

Political Power and Social Theory
Volume 20

Political Power and Social Theory

Diane E. Davis
Julian Go
Editors



POLITICAL POWER AND
SOCIAL THEORY

POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY

Series Editor: Diane E. Davis

Recent Volumes:

- Volume 1: 1980
- Volume 2: 1981
- Volume 3: 1982
- Volume 4: 1984
- Volume 5: 1985
- Volume 6: 1987
- Volume 7: 1989
- Volume 8: 1994
- Volume 9: 1995
- Volume 10: 1996
- Volume 11: 1997
- Volume 12: 1998
- Volume 13: 1999
- Volume 14: 2000
- Volume 15: 2002
- Volume 16: 2004
- Volume 17: 2005
- Volume 18: 2006
- Volume 19: 2008

POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY VOLUME 20

POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY

EDITED BY

DIANE E. DAVIS

*Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA, USA*

JULIAN GO

*Boston University, Boston,
MA, USA*



United Kingdom – North America – Japan
India – Malaysia – China

Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK

First edition 2009

Copyright © 2009 Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Reprints and permission service

Contact: booksandseries@emeraldinsight.com

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the text, illustrations or advertisements. The opinions expressed in these chapters are not necessarily those of the Editor or the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-84950-667-0

ISSN: 0198-8719 (Series)



Awarded in recognition of Emerald's production department's adherence to quality systems and processes when preparing scholarly journals for print



INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

CONTENTS

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS	<i>ix</i>
EDITORIAL BOARD	<i>xi</i>
EDITORIAL STATEMENT	<i>xiii</i>
LIST OF REVIEWERS	<i>xv</i>
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION <i>Diane E. Davis</i>	<i>xvii</i>

PART I: REVISITING PARADIGMS OF POLITICS AND POWER

REVIVING POWER STRUCTURE RESEARCH: PRESENT PROBLEMS, THEIR SOLUTIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS <i>Clayton D. Peoples</i>	<i>3</i>
IN MOVEMENT: NEW PLAYERS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN, 1962–1977 <i>Damián A. González Madrid and Óscar J. Martín García</i>	<i>39</i>

**PART II: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
EMPIRE AND COLONIALISM
(GUEST-EDITED BY JULIAN GO)**

- NEO-BOURDIEUSIAN THEORY AND THE
QUESTION OF SCIENTIFIC AUTONOMY:
GERMAN SOCIOLOGISTS AND EMPIRE,
1890s–1940s
George Steinmetz 71
- TRANSNATIONAL IDEOLOGIES AND
STATE BUILDING: THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE IN TRANSITION
Elif Andaç 133
- WHITE SUPREMACIST CONSTITUTION OF
THE U.S. EMPIRE-STATE: A SHORT CONCEPTUAL
LOOK AT THE LONG FIRST CENTURY
Left Quarter Collective 167
- CONFRONTING “EMPIRE”: THE NEW
IMPERIALISM, ISLAMISM, AND FEMINISM
Valentine M. Moghadam 201

**PART III: SCHOLARLY CONTROVERSY:
CONTESTING GEOGRAPHIES
OF CITIZENSHIP**

- INCOMPLETENESS AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF MAKING: TOWARDS DENATIONALIZED
CITIZENSHIP?
Saskia Sassen 229
- THE PROSTHETIC CITIZEN:
NEW GEOGRAPHIES OF CITIZENSHIP
Tim Cresswell 259

THE INCOMPLETENESS OF RIGHTS-BEARING
CITIZENSHIP: POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND
RENATIONALIZATION

Michael Peter Smith

275

CITIZENSHIP REDUX: WHY CITIZENSHIP
REMAINS PIVOTAL IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD

David Jacobson

281

ON DENATIONALIZATION AS
NEOLIBERALIZATION: BIOPOLITICS, CLASS
INTEREST, AND THE INCOMPLETENESS OF
CITIZENSHIP

Matthew Sparke

287

CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDST OF
TRANSNATIONAL REGIMES OF VIRTUE

Aihwa Ong

301

REJOINDER

Saskia Sassen

309

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

- Elif Andaç* Department of Sociology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA
- Tim Cresswell* Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, London, UK
- Damián A. González Madrid* Department of History, University of Castile-La Mancha, Ciudad Real, Spain
- David Jacobson* Department of Sociology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA
- Left Quarter Collective* Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
- Óscar J. Martín García* History Institute, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, Spain
- Valentine M. Moghadam* Department of Sociology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
- Aihwa Ong* Department of Anthropology, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
- Clayton D. Peoples* Department of Sociology, University of Nevada at Reno, Reno, NV, USA
- Saskia Sassen* Department of Sociology, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

Michael Peter Smith

Department of Human and
Community Development,
University of California at Davis,
Davis, CA, USA

Matthew Sparke

Department of Geography,
University of Washington,
Seattle, WA, USA

George Steinmetz

Department of Sociology and
Department of Germanic Languages
and Literatures, University of
Michigan-Ann Arbor

EDITORIAL BOARD

Ronald Aminzade
University of Minnesota

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva
Texas A&M University

Michael Burawoy
University of California-Berkeley

John Coatsworth
Columbia University

Diane E. Davis
*Massachusetts Institute of
Technology*

Susan Eckstein
Boston University

Peter Evans
*University of
California-Berkeley*

Julian Go
Boston University

Nora Hamilton
*University of Southern
California*

Evelyne Huber
*University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill*

Eiko Ikegami
*New School University Graduate
Faculty*

Howard Kimeldorf
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor

Florencia Mallon
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Jill Quadagno
Florida State University

Ian Roxborough
*State University of New York-Stony
Brook*

Michael Schwartz
*State University of New York-Stony
Brook*

George Steinmetz
University of Michigan

John D. Stephens
*University of North Carolina-Chapel
Hill*

Maurice Zeitlin
University of California-Los Angeles

Sharon Zukin
City University of New York

EDITORIAL STATEMENT

Political Power and Social Theory is a peer-reviewed annual journal committed to advancing the interdisciplinary understanding of the linkages between political power, class relations, and historical development. The journal welcomes both empirical and theoretical work and is willing to consider papers of substantial length. Publication decisions are made by the editor in consultation with the members of the editorial board and anonymous reviewers. For information on submissions, please see the journal website at www.bu.edu/sociology/ppst.

LIST OF REVIEWERS

Patricio Abinales

Kevin Amidon

Cemil Aydin

Karen Barkey

Leah Castañeda

Eric Ching

John Coatsworth

William Domhoff

Slobodan Drakulic

Cynthia Enloe

James Fenelon

Robert Fishman

Alyosha Goldstein

Neil Gross

Thomas D. Hall

Aleksandra Milicevic

Beth Mintz

Phillip Oxhorn

V. Spike Petersen

Robert Putnam

Ann Sisson Runyan

John Sidel

Bartholomew Sparrow

Djordje Stefanovic

Kay Warren

Nicholas Hoover Wilson

Lanny Thompson Womacks

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

This year's volume of *Political Power and Social Theory* marks the end of my tenure as editor of this esteemed journal, truly. Although I composed a very similar sentence a year ago, circumstances beyond my control delayed the transition. Thankfully, our new incoming editor, Professor Julian Go, from the Department of Sociology at Boston University, has already started his tenure as this volume goes to press. In addition to undertaking the review of pending and current incoming manuscripts, he also has contributed to this year's volume by agreeing to guest-edit a special section on empire and colonialism. On behalf of the entire editorial board and our readership, I thank Julian for his work on this volume, welcome him to the helm, and wish him well in future volumes. I look forward to continuing my own commitment to PPST as just another member of the editorial board. In the meantime, we can expect some new ideas and new blood in the editorial board as Julian takes over the journal and moves it in new directions. It is an exciting time to consider changes in the field of comparative-historical sociology, as the discipline seeks to accommodate both old and new trends as well as the transforming spatial scales in which political power and social theory are increasingly embedded.

Volume 20 herewith starts the ball rolling by showcasing chapters that pursue these themes. The question of what is "old" and what is "new" hovers over most of the contributions, particularly the peer-reviewed chapters in Parts I and II, which consider such longstanding socio-historical concerns as power structure theory, class-based collective action, and empire – but examine them through new conceptual, methodological, and historical lenses. This year's volume also offers a critical treatment of the spatial or territorial dynamics of state hegemony, class power, ideologies of governance, and citizenship – with the latter theme most well developed in debate over the "new geographies of citizenship" in the scholarly controversy section as well as guest-edited section on empire and colonialism in Part II. As with prior volumes, the comparative and historical range of the papers is impressive, building on empirical evidence drawn from Spain, Germany, Turkey, Iraq, the USA, and elsewhere while utilizing a wide range of temporal frames of analysis that span from the nineteenth-, twentieth-, and twenty-first centuries to what Moon-Kie Jung

terms “the long first century” of American expansionism, a moment defined in terms of a particular national state-building trajectory rather than chronologically.

The chapters in Part I, grouped under the heading *Revisiting Paradigms of Politics and Power*, directly take up the challenge of re-examining old paradigms and questioning their relevance or utility, either through the lens of hindsight or by probing assumptions that have not held up well to historical evidence and more nuanced sociological theorizing. Clayton Peoples’ “Reviving Power Structure Research,” opens the section by calling attention to questions of class power and class action, two themes that frequently dominated the pages of *Political Power and Social Theory* in the early years of its inception under the editorship of Maurice Zeitlin. Although this chapter’s principal objective is to assess the declining popularity of power structure research in American sociology, and to consider whether its basic tenets are flawed, as opposed to misunderstood or misconceived, it also presents empirical evidence drawn from the study of business and labor organizations in American society to offer an account of the role of class power in determining congressional outcomes. Among the findings highlighted by Peoples are the importance of conceptualizing class in a relational fashion, so as to transcend the muddled character of much prior work on class power, and of foregoing a preoccupation with elite unity in the effort to better examine elite influence. Both modifications, he argues, can help challenge the “death of class” thesis. In studying elite influence, Peoples also argues that a systematic historical accounting of the accumulated advantage of class-based influence will help better specify the power of business in determining political outcomes, thus leading to a renewed appreciation for power structure research and its value for understanding contemporary American society.

The second chapter in Part I, “In Movement: New Players in the Construction of Democracy in Spain, 1962–1977,” by Damián A. González Madrid and Óscar J. Martín García, transports us to an entirely different locale and time period: Spain in the 1960s and early 1970s, during the dictatorship of General Franco. Taking forward Peoples’ concern with the drawbacks associated with identifying elite unity as the source of power in political development, González and Martín raise questions about the conventional view of Spain’s democratic transition. While most scholarship links the failure of the Franco dictatorship and the emergence of a democratic regime to an elite-led transition generated from above through elite consensus, González and Martín argue that the roots of transition rest in bottom-up struggles emanating from civil society. While not a novel

argument in its entirety, what sets their claim apart from prevailing views is the focus on communist-led political party action and its regional concentration in a poor part of Spain generally ignored in transition arguments. In this sense, this chapter not only sheds new light on old arguments about democratic transition, using historically grounded studies built on “old” class-based collective action dynamics to explain the “newer” phenomenon of democratization in Spain, it also identifies the spatio-territorial dynamics of this collective action. Framed in terms of the leading questions that hover over this year’s volume, the authors argue that the democratization of Spain owes much of its origins to “old-school” working class protagonists, embodied in the Communist party, as well as to their mobilization in peripheral regions that have remained off the social and class radar screen of most of the scholarship on democratization. Aside from laying the foundation for questioning longstanding assumptions about the democratic character or implications or radical working class movements, this chapter highlights the importance of unique regional histories in large-scale political changes, of the ways that labor movements can lay the foundation for a more pluralistic, class-inclusive critiques of dictatorship, and how both sets of factors and their transformative implications cannot be understood without understanding the path-dependent historical and spatial dynamics of the process.

Part II, guest-edited by Julian Go and titled *New Perspectives on Empire and Colonialism*, carries forward the concern with historical and spatial dynamics of regime hegemony and state power, albeit with a focus on transnational rather than national dynamics. What unites the essays in Part II with the chapter on Spain’s democratic transition in Part I are the concern with core-periphery dynamics, or the ways that the “margins” – whether defined as neglected regions within the nation, as seen in the chapter by González and Martin, or those poor regions of the world susceptible to foreign domination, as with Iraq and the USA – can be the subjects as well as the objects of hegemonic political power, and a sociological interest in explicating the conditions under which actions in the periphery can determine the fate of the core, and not just vice versa. Equally important and in keeping with the overarching themes of this volume, the four chapters in Part II also focus on a concept that has both a historical and a contemporary face: the notion of empire, and its various forms, including colonialism and other forms of occupation.

Finally, although the chapters in Part II represent what might be thought of as the “new imperial-colonial studies” in sociology, they directly take up questions of what is new and what is old in the study of empire and

colonialism, drawing on cases as distinct as the US involvement in contemporary Iraq, Ottoman penetration of Central Asia, and US westward expansion into native American territories.

Because of current events, perhaps, scholars across the disciplines have renewed their interest in questions of empire and colonialism and how best to define and theorize it, revisiting this larger question – much as did Peoples in his studies of the power structure paradigm – in light of new cases and new historical evidence. George Steinmetz's chapter, which begins the section, critically and self-reflectively lays out a conceptual apparatus for such an endeavor by tackling the problem of imperial knowledge, which was first raised by Edward Said and postcolonial studies. Discussing the imperialist themes in the writings of key German sociologists, including Max Weber, Steinmetz shows that the relationship between the German empire and sociological knowledge was not as simplistic as some existing approaches (including postcolonial studies) would suggest. He deftly deploys Bourdieu's field theory to show how the relationship between empire and knowledge was mediated by the dynamics of academic fields. Rather than accepting a monolithic discursive logic of Orientalism, he argues that position in and logics of the field shaped imperial knowledge. Taking many of these ideas as a challenge to conventional research on empire, but concerning herself with a concrete case, Elif Andac's chapter, "Transnational Ideologies and State Building: The Ottoman Empire in Transition," seeks a better understanding of the conditions under which empire ends. Like the González and Martin piece, this chapter is interested in the dynamics of transition, but it bypasses conventional preoccupations with mobilization and elite unity/disunity, or even questions of knowledge and empire, and focuses instead on matters of political form and ideology. In studying the transition from the Ottoman empire to the Ottoman nation-state, the essay not only joins important new work on non-Western empires, it also emphasizes how transnational ideologies were, paradoxically, important for the so-called nationalist transition, laying the foundation for a territorial recasting of sovereignty built on national rather than transnational regime-building.

The last two chapters in this part discuss the US empire, but focus on different historical aspects of it. Moon-Kie Jung's chapter, "White Supremacist Constitution of the U.S. Empire-State," scrutinizes constitutional law and reinterprets the first centuries of American political expansion. While narratives of American exceptionalism portray America's westward and overseas expansion as either affirmations of America's benign, anti-imperial character or as aberrations from America's true

liberal-democratic character, Moon-Kie polemically suggests that we rethink the territorial and sovereignty yardsticks by which we make such assessments at all. Rather than start from the premise that the United States is a "nation," he insists that we recognize it as an "empire-state," even when it extends itself into contiguous territory, where alternative sovereignties were not always recognized. By focusing on the complexities of constitutional law and America's related treatment of its imperial subjects, Moon Kie shows that this status as an empire-state is not an aberration but built into the very structure of the US state. Valentine Moghadam's chapter, "Confronting 'Empire': The New Imperialism, Islamism, and Feminism," moves the story of the US's imperial activities to the present. Since the Iraq war, commentators and scholars have heralded the rise and/or demise of the American empire, but Moghadam's exploratory yet insightful essay adds the gendered dimension of US imperial expansion that has been often overlooked in such discourses of the present conjuncture. American empire, Moghadam reminds us, must not only be situated within projects of geopolitical hegemony and capital accumulation but also dynamics of "rival masculinities."

The volume ends with its customary scholarly controversy section, in which a provocative chapter by Saskia Sassen titled "Incompleteness and the Possibility of Making: Towards Denationalized Citizenship" sets the tone for further debate. With an elegant, erudite, and authoritative style that we have come to expect from Saskia Sassen, this essay extends Part II's concern with sovereignty and state power, both its territorialities and transnational dynamics, but focuses more on the practice of citizenship than institutions of the state. Sassen offers new conceptual, methodological, and theoretical building blocks for the study of the new geographies of citizenship in the modern world, challenging conventional views along the way. Commentaries by Timothy Cresswell, Michael Peter Smith, Aihwa Ong, Matthew Sparke, and David Jacobson either extend, reformulate, or challenge her claims, in the process laying bare what is old and new about citizenship as a concept and an ideal, and inspiring us to further interrogate this ever-changing form of rights-bearing and claim-making political subjectivity.

In closing, both congratulations and thanks are in order. First, congratulations go to both Cedric de Leon and Julian Go, who either have or will continue to grace our pages. Last year's best paper in comparative-historical sociology (the Barrington Moore Award) went to Cedric for "No Bourgeois Mass Party, No Liberal Capitalist Democracy": The Missing Link in Barrington Moore's American Civil War," which appeared in

Volume 19 of PPST. We are proud to say that this is the second PPST paper to have received the coveted Barrington Moore Award in recent years. Also, our new incoming editor, Julian Go, received the Mary Douglas Prize for Best Book from the Sociology of Culture Section of the American Sociological Association. We are thrilled to have Julian taking on the leadership of the volume, and know that this major award bodes well for the continued excellence and high visibility of the journal. Finally, as we move forward to a new future under Julian's watchful eye, I would like to extend a special round of thanks to Christina Proenza for her prior service as managing editor and her assistance in the transition, as well as to Julian Go for so graciously and supportively greasing the wheels of leadership change. A round of applause also goes to the new editorial staff at Emerald (thanks to Claire Ferres, Sarah Kennedy, and Mary Miskin), for helping us get back on track with a serious production schedule and for accommodating our tardiness.

Diane E. Davis
Cambridge, MA

PART I
REVISITING PARADIGMS OF
POLITICS AND POWER

REVIVING POWER STRUCTURE RESEARCH: PRESENT PROBLEMS, THEIR SOLUTIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Clayton D. Peoples

ABSTRACT

Power structure research examines core issues in the discipline of sociology; yet this important area of study is declining because of the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems. In this paper, I address each of these problems and proposing solutions. I then test the validity of my proposed solutions by conducting empirical analyses examining how big business and labor political action committee (PAC) contributors influence U.S. House decision making. My findings vividly show significant big business influence on House decision making, but negligible labor influence. These findings carry considerable implications for power structure theorizing and research, and provide a solid foundation for future power structure work.

Power structure research examines issues central to the discipline of sociology (e.g., [Hunter, 1953](#); [Mills, 1956](#)). At its core, power structure research is concerned with issues of class and resultant inequality, examining

how our stratification system is maintained via political decisions. This important area of research seeks to identify who is in power and explain how they perpetuate their power through their influence on the political institutions that regulate and structure economic life. Put more concisely, power structure research aims to answer questions of who rules and how in political decision making. Yet despite its clear importance, power structure research has declined over the past twenty years, with fewer studies examining questions of political power today than in the past. For instance, a review by Mintz (2002) reveals 20% fewer political power works in the eight-year period (1993–2001) relative to the prior eight-year period (1985–1992), and this decline has continued into the present.

There are likely a number of reasons for the decline in power structure research. Some of these reasons have to do with changes in the social climate. For instance, social activism and public challenges to the power structure were much more prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s relative to the recent decades. Yet there are also a number of reasons related to scholarly research itself, particularly *conceptual*, *theoretical*, and *methodological* problems that hinder power structure research. In this paper, I explore each of these problems in turn and forward solutions. I then incorporate these solutions into a quantitative analysis examining the influence of big business versus labor on decision making in the U.S. House.

I begin by discussing the *conceptual issue* surrounding class and its purported “death” that serves to undermine power structure research. Next, I identify a *theoretical dilemma* concerning various forms of the prevailing power structure theories that has led to gridlock in political power work. I then pinpoint a *methodological problem* plaguing political power research stemming from the fact the literature addresses different questions depending on the theoretical perspective. In presenting each of these problems, I propose specific solutions. I then test the validity of my solutions by conducting *empirical analyses* examining big business PAC influence versus labor PAC influence in the U.S. House, the results of which show great promise toward revitalizing power structure research. Finally, I finish the paper with *conclusions and future directions*.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUE: DEFINING CLASS (IM)PROPERLY

At the 1958 American Sociological Association meetings, Robert Nisbet argued that social class is dying (Nisbet, 1959). Since then, a number of

other sociologists have logged similar arguments about the “death of class” (e.g., Clark & Lipset, 1991; Pakulski & Waters, 1996). The notion that class is dying undermines power structure research because of the importance of class in questions concerning political influence. But the death of class thesis has serious logical flaws. Further, these logical flaws notwithstanding, the death of class thesis has little empirical evidence backing its claims. In the following text, I address the main logical flaw in the death of class thesis, namely, its improper conceptualization of class. Next, I critically examine one of its primary assertions, weighing it against existent research evidence. I then propose a solution to this conceptual issue that should help political power research move beyond the potentially damaging impact of the supposed death of class.

Logical Flaw

The main logical flaw in the death of class thesis is that class is rarely defined properly. Proponents of the thesis typically define class gradationally rather than relationally. For example, in the oft-cited Clark and Lipset (1991) piece, they conflate class with “hierarchy,” or stratification. Yet defining class gradationally severely limits the utility of class as a concept (Ossowski, 1963; Wright, 1997), for instance, the gradational conceptualizations of class popular in U.S. discourse (Fig. 1). Popular discourse in the United States suggests that our “classes” are merely income- or SES-based groupings such as “upper-,” “middle-,” and “lower-class” groups. These class locations have little consequence for social relations or social conflict. It is difficult to envision meaningful differences or conflict emerging between, say, the upper class and the lower class; because they do not have opposing interests and




Fig. 1. Gradational Class Conceptualization Based on Income (Percentages Calculated Using 2003 U.S. Census Income Data).

they just happen to exist in different places on a stratification continuum. Relational conceptualizations of class are much more useful in recognizing the differences and potential conflicts between classes.

Relational conceptualizations of class view class as a determinant of stratification rather than synonymous with stratification (e.g., Hout, Brooks, & Manza, 1993; Slomczynski, 1989). There are essentially two models of class in this tradition. One, stemming from the work of Weber, defines class as the relational groupings emerging from position in the market, and is primarily focused on class as a shaper of different life chances. The second, drawing on the work of Marx, defines class as the relational categories emerging from position in the means of production and focuses on class as not only a producer of different life chances, but, also, as a source of conflict. Both carry significant advantages over gradational models because the resultant classes have specific relations to one another. These relations have implications for differences in behaviors, and potential conflicts, across and between class categories. This then enables researchers to empirically test hypotheses and claims concerning class, such as those forwarded by the death of class thesis.

The death of class thesis makes a number of claims. Perhaps, the most popular claim regarding political action is that class no longer predicts voting behavior (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Pakulski & Waters, 1996). But analyses of voting using relational conceptualizations of class reveal a continuing significance of class in voting behavior in the United States (e.g., Hout, Brooks, & Manza, 1995) and elsewhere (e.g., Slomczynski & Shabad, 2000). This clearly demonstrates that the claims of the death of class thesis regarding voting behavior simply do not hold up to empirical scrutiny if class is defined properly. Extending this to the larger political arena – and to topics of greater interest to power structure research – class likely impacts policy as well, as class-based actors vie for influence. But to adequately explore this possibility, class needs to be conceptualized relationally rather than gradationally.

Solution

The preceding discussion underscores the fact that *class needs to be conceptualized relationally* – not only for class research but, also, for power structure research. Whether this relational conceptualization is Weberian or Marxian should depend on the degree to which conflict is central to the research question. In power structure research and theorizing, conflict is

Table 1. Relational Class Conceptualization Based on Marxian Ideas.

Does not Own Means Production	Has Some Ownership of, or Authority over, Means of Production (Contradictory Class Locations)			Owns Means of Production
Labor (40%)	Expert (16%)	Supervisory (29%)	Small Business (13%)	Big Business (2%)

Note: Percentages based on Wright’s (1985) study of classes in the United States.

fairly central given that many political power questions naturally revolve around who, if anyone, dominates in the competition over political sway. I therefore use a modified contemporary Marxian model in this paper.

With Marxian class analysis, the most important class divide is between those who own the means of production and those who do not. In contemporary capitalist societies, there is also a notable gray area made up of those in “contradictory class locations” having varying levels of ownership or authority (Wright, 1985). A modified version of Wright’s contemporary Marxian class model is depicted in Table 1. Importantly, in this model, classes have opposing interests stemming from exploitation, and this could lead to conflict at the site of production *and* in the political sphere.

The greatest potential for conflict exists between *big business* and *labor* as class categories, where big business is defined as owners of production who hire multiple workers, and labor is defined as that large group of workers who have neither ownership nor authority over the means of production. *I will thus focus primarily on the Marxian classes of big business and labor in this study.* As I will explain in some detail later, I use the political representatives (political action committees, PACs) of (a) corporations with capital stock and (b) organized labor as the proxies for these two class groups.

THEORETICAL DILEMMA: IRRECONCILABLE VERSIONS OF THEORY

The debates among social scientists regarding what role class-based groups play in governmental decision making go back over a century, with three main competing theories emerging from these debates: elite/class theory, pluralist theory, and state autonomy theory. These three theories have become broad groupings that encompass diverse perspectives. For instance,




Fig. 2. Chronological Depiction of Elite/Class, Pluralist, and State Autonomy Theories in their Multiple Forms, Mid-Twentieth Century – Present.

each of these three main theories now include both traditional versions of their constituent arguments and alternative versions of their arguments. In the following section, I present the three theories in a chronological fashion (Fig. 2), discussing how each emerged and how they are related to one another. I then discuss the problems with the theories (particularly in their alternative forms) and the gridlock that has ensued in power structure research.

Elite/Class Theory

Elite/class theory argues that big business dominates the government. It contends that while special interest groups and other actors in society attempting to influence the government are diverse, groups within the same realm of general class interest (big business, in particular) rarely compete with one another and often act in ways that promote their class-wide interests. It has some origins in the elite theories of Pareto,

Mosca, and Michels; but it also has strong roots in Marx's writings concerning the role of the government in ensuring the success of big business. While there was at one time a significant debate between elite ideas and class-based ideas within the field, these debates have generally subsided with a move away from the original elite theories toward more class-based model (at least in sociology).

Hunter (e.g., 1953) and Mills (e.g., 1956) were the first to forward elite/class theory in the United States. While neither claimed direct lineage to Marx – in fact, both framed their individual studies as, in part, responses to Marx's claims (Domhoff, 1990) – it is clear now that their work fits well in the general tradition Marx's work began. Hunter's (1953) study on community power structure in Atlanta showed that those in community decision-making posts are either members of the big business class or are connected to big business via relational networks. Mills's (1956) well-known study showed that on the national level in the United States, there are a relatively small number of interconnected people who reside at the top levels of the economic, political, and military institutions. Mills showed that big business (or the "corporate rich," as he referred to them) overlaps significantly with those at the top of the political arena, presumably leading to influence over political decision making. Mills's book is a popular mainstay in sociology to this day, and has helped spawn other impressive works on national power structure in the United States, the most notable of which are a series of books by Domhoff (e.g., 1967, 2006) asking the question, "Who rules America?" and answering, "Big business and its associated wealthy individuals do."

Traditional View: Instrumentalist

The research begun by Mills (1956) and continued by Domhoff (e.g., 1967) at the national level has traditionally argued, at least implicitly, that big business exercises fairly direct influence over governmental decision making. For Mills, this was through the overlap between big business and political actors (particularly in the executive branch); for Domhoff, this is through the multiple avenues of influence existent between the wealthy and politicians via conservative policy formation groups, think tanks, etc. The work by Miliband (1969), however, made this argument more explicit. Miliband argued that big business has a direct influence on policy and policymakers (and the capitalist state, more generally), a view that has come to be known as the "instrumentalist" view.

Alternative View: Structuralist

Not all in the elite/class perspectives, however, agree with the instrumentalist view. The initial counterargument to instrumentalism came out of the work by Poulantzas (1974). In this work, Poulantzas argued for a more “structuralist” view. Essentially, this alternative version of elite/class theory contends that big business *appears* to directly dominate governmental decision making because of the pattern of policy outcomes seemingly beneficial to big business – but this appearance is deceiving. Structuralism argues that in reality big business does not have any significant *direct* influence; instead, the structure of capitalist society necessitates that the government create a legal environment conducive to the success of big business. So, if members of the government make decisions that favor big business, it is not necessarily because big business influences them – it may simply be because they decide in ways that are good for the maintenance of the capitalist system, in general. While the instrumentalist view is still forwarded today, the emergence of the structuralist view has led to considerable debate within the elite/class perspective and beyond.

Pluralist Theory

Pluralist theory contends that no single bloc of interests dominates the government. Pluralist theory views the government as a “neutral arena open to societal influence” (Gilbert & Howe, 1991, p. 205). It also argues that the interest groups and other actors in society attempting to influence government are diverse, often with competing interests. Pluralist theory therefore contends that no one bloc of these groups (for instance, big business) should be able to exert more influence on governmental decision making than other blocs, in other words, the majority rules. Pluralist theory thus has ideological roots in ideal conceptions of representative democracy in which the people have considerable influence. Academically speaking, though, pluralism did not emerge as a major theoretically informed body of research until after elite/class theory’s challenges to ideal conceptions of democracy in the mid-twentieth century.

Traditional View: Interest Group Pluralist

Some of the most significant works in pluralism were direct responses to the elite/class works of Hunter (e.g., 1953) and Mills (e.g., 1956), and, thus,

focused on interest groups. The best known of these were probably [Polsby's \(1960\)](#) targeted arguments against elite/class theory and its approach to studying power, and [Dahl's \(1961\)](#) oft-cited book on community power in New Haven. Polsby attacked elite/class theory for approaching the issue of power and government from what he viewed as a biased assumption that someone rules. Polsby argued that most elite/class theory approaches studies of power and government with the question, "Who rules?" rather than "Does anyone rule?" He then argued that this initial question sets the stage for finding that an elite group of select individuals (big business) rules because it is built on this very assumption. Dahl attacked elite/class theory based on a study he conducted on community power structure in New Haven, the findings of which differed significantly from Hunter's findings on Atlanta. In Dahl's study, he found that a vast array of groups held some political sway in the community, and that decisions affecting the community were not dominated strictly by big business. Dahl's work therefore runs in direct contradiction to Hunter's work, raising question about the degree to which big business actually dominates political decision making, at least at the community level.

Alternative View: Public Opinion Pluralist

In recent years, some working on the framework of pluralist theory have moved toward focusing on the general public as an agent of influence on the government rather than focusing on the interest groups. [Burstein's \(e.g., 1998\)](#) work is probably the most representative – at least in sociology – of this focus on the public. Burstein argues that public opinion has a significant effect on the governmental decision making, and that studies of power and government should "bring the public back in." In the process, he downplays the role of interest groups. Political scientists involved in this movement log similar arguments, but they tend to emphasize the role of elections and constituency interests. So this alternative view within pluralism, while maintaining that a vast plurality of actors influence governmental decision making, focuses on the public and downplays the role of interest groups. Also it is noteworthy, in this alternative version of pluralism, the "middle class" portion of the public is often cited as the main beneficiary of policy, drawing on the simple gradational models of class criticized earlier. Of course, there are still those more traditional pluralists who study the role of interest groups, but now pluralist theory encapsulates both the interest group view and the public opinion version.

State Autonomy Theory

State autonomy theory argues that state actors rule. It emphasizes the primacy of individuals within the state in governmental decision making, contending that the state is “autonomous,” generally impervious (or unresponsive) to outsiders such as special interest groups. As Akard (1992) notes, state autonomy theory rejects “all theories that ... explain state policies with reference to economic or other ‘societal level’ phenomena” (p. 598). It therefore rejects both elite/class and pluralist theories (Gilbert & Howe, 1991). In large part, it arose as an alternative view of power and government in response to the debates in the mid-twentieth century between elite/class theory and pluralist theory. Specifically, though, it grew out of the move toward a more structural view within elite/class theory.

After Poulantzas (1974) published his critique of instrumentalist elite/class theory, U.S. sociologists took the argument a step further, focusing on the state. Though some would not consider him a state autonomy theorist, Block (e.g., 1977) was in many regards the most pivotal early figure in this movement. Block (1977) argued as Poulantzas did, but in very memorable terms, that “the ruling class does not rule.” He took the argument a step further than Poulantzas, though, arguing that members of the government, or “state managers,” decide firstly in ways that protect their own interests. He argues this self-interested rationalization is true for all three major groups involved – big business, labor, and state managers – and since rationalization occurs outside the view of others, this cannot be seen as a function of other groups. So while it may be that the interests of governmental actors often correspond with the interests of big business, in those instances in which those interests do not correspond (for instance, when governmental actors’ reelections are at stake), these “autonomous” state managers will decide against the interests of big business.

Traditional View: State-Centered Theory

Soon after Block depicted state actors as autonomous, this burgeoning line of theorizing took off, becoming more resolute in its claims about the exclusive power of governmental bodies and their members. Skocpol (e.g., 1980) was a central figure in the solidification of true state-centered theory. After praising Block’s work, she argued that governmental decision making can be explained almost entirely as a function of the independent influences of transnational governmental relations, internal governmental structure, past decision making patterns, political parties, and, similar to

Block, the rational calculations of governmental actors (Skocpol, 1980). Interestingly, though, despite her initial traditional line, she soon relaxed her claims a bit, helping create an alternative form of state autonomy theory with others (e.g., Skocpol & Amenta, 1985).

Alternative View: Institutionalism

The alternative version of state autonomy theory, sometimes, referred to as “institutionalism,” continues to focus on state institutions and actors, but cedes that outsiders may sometimes influence governmental decision making. For instance, Amenta and Carruthers (1988) argue that “middle class” social movement organizations (again reminiscent of gradational class models) played a role in the formulation and passage of old-aged policy. But this alternative form of state autonomy theory maintains that big business plays little, if any, significant role in governmental decision making. For instance, work in this area argues strongly that big business had little or nothing to do with the social policies of the New Deal (Amenta & Parikh, 1989; Skocpol & Amenta, 1985). So state autonomy theory has undergone fairly rapid change since its inception – even to some degree in the same individual’s work – but at its core its primary focus is still the state, even if it now grants in its alternative form that *some* outside actors may have an influence in governmental decision making.

Problems with the Theories

The primary problem with these theories is that they have become too fluid (Mintz, 2002), rendering them ineffectual in their ability to explain the workings of power in government (particularly in their alternative forms). While social science theories tend to be more fluid than theories in the physical or natural sciences, social science theories still need to (1) *explain* social phenomena and (2) be *testable* to maintain their utility and warrant being called “theories,” particularly in the face of opposing theories. I argue in the following section that the alternative forms of the theories of power and government have failed in these two important regards.

Problem of (Non)Explanation

As the descriptions of the theories in the preceding sections and Fig. 2 show, all three of these theories began as distinct explanations of the workings of power in government. With time, though, these theories generated alternative forms in addition to their more traditional versions. Of course,

one could argue that this is merely part of the normal process of accumulation of knowledge and the subsequent revision of theory: as new evidence emerges that does not fit perfectly with the claims of a theory (but does not necessarily counter its core claims), the theory should be revised to accommodate this new evidence. But at what point does accommodation undermine *explanation*? As accommodation carries a theory further away from its core claims, the theory may eventually lose its distinctiveness. This is true of power structure theories. As one scholar notes, “The [alternative] variant of each [power structure] theory ... dilutes the distinctive character of the theory” (Hooks, 1993, p. 37). This is exactly the case (Table 2).

Table 2 shows that the traditional versions of elite/class, pluralist, and state autonomy theories provide distinct sets of answers to the two key questions in power structure research. For instance, traditional elite/class and pluralist theories agree that class-based groups influence governmental decision making, but they disagree strongly on the issue of whether or not big

Table 2. Chart Depicting the Answers of Multiple Forms of Elite/Class, Pluralist, and State Autonomy Theories to the Two Key Questions in Power Structure Research.

	Do Class-Based Groups Have an Influence on Governmental Decision Making?	Does Big Business Have a Dominant, <i>Direct</i> Influence on Governmental Decision Making?
<i>Elite/Class theory</i>		
Traditional: Instrumentalism	Most of the time	Most of the time
Alternative: Structuralism	Sometimes	Almost never
<i>Pluralist theory</i>		
Traditional: Interest group pluralism	Most of the time	Almost never
Alternative: Public opinion pluralism	Sometimes	Almost never
<i>State autonomy theory</i>		
Traditional: State-centered	Almost never	Almost never
Alternative: Institutionalism	Sometimes	Almost never

business dominates this influence – elite/class theory answers, “almost always,” while pluralist theory responds, “almost never.” This difference clearly distinguishes them from one another. Traditional state autonomy theory is distinct in its own right, then, as it enters the debate arguing against both traditional elite/class and traditional pluralist theories on whether or not special interest groups influence governmental decision making at all, countering their answers with, “almost never.” But the alternative versions of these theories are much more ambiguous and are virtually indistinguishable in the answers they provide to these key questions.

As shown in [Table 2](#), the alternative versions of the theories provide basically identical answers. Take the question of whether or not special interest groups, in general, have influence on governmental decision making: while the nuances of their explanations differ in some regards, all three theories ultimately provide the broad, ambiguous answer, “sometimes.” Alternative elite/class theory argues that special interest groups may occasionally influence governmental decision making; alternative pluralist theory argues that the general public is important, but special interests groups may sometimes have influence nonetheless (especially those in the “middle”); and alternative state autonomy theory argues similarly that special interest groups (“middle class” groups, in particular) may occasionally have an influence on governmental decision making. On the question of whether or not big business *directly* dominates this influence, all three alternative theories respond “almost never.” Again, the nuances of their answers may differ, but they ultimately come to the same conclusion – even, surprisingly, alternative elite/class theory. Following [Poulantzas’ \(1974\)](#) structural view, alternative elite/class theory argues that big business does not *directly* dominate since most decisions correspond with their interests without any intervention necessary.

Problem of (Un)Testability

The fact that the alternative versions of these theories are fluid and virtually indistinguishable creates a major problem in addition to the issue of deficient explanation – it renders them *untestable* in their alternative forms. One scholar in this area recently noted, “This fluidity in theory helps explain why testing competing models [now offers] little potential ...” ([Mintz, 2002](#), p. 62). As a result, most research findings on power and government could be used to back the claims of any one of these three alternative theories, as has occurred in the literature on the New Deal ([Mintz, 2002](#)). From the perspective of those wedded to a specific theory, this is convenient and any findings can be construed as “support” for their theory. From the

perspective of social science, though, this is disastrous because it means these alternative theories cannot be subjected to a critical test. In this situation, explanations of power and government cannot advance; gridlock takes over. This is precisely what has happened.

The debates between elite/class, pluralist, and state autonomy theories have entered into gridlock, and new work in this area has become sparse, as noted in the introduction. Political power research reached began to decline some 20 years ago. Not coincidentally, the thrust of this decline corresponded fairly well with the emergence of the alternative version of the third and final theoretical camp in these debates – state autonomy theory (see earlier discussions and Fig. 2). Once this last theory developed an alternative strand, there was little left to debate; research could no longer critically assess the claims of any of the theories since they had all become virtually indistinguishable.

The preceding discussion on problems of explanation and testability is not meant to dismiss the substantive value and utility of work in these alternative traditions. For instance, the work of Poulantzas (e.g., 1974) presents valid points about the structure of the relationship between capitalism and the state, and is a useful extension of Marxian ideas in creating a better understanding of the various functions and workings of the capitalist state. The work of Burstein (e.g., 1998) forwards a valid and constructive explication of the potential role of public opinion in political outcomes, and provides a meaningful bridge between sociology and political science in this area. Finally, the work of Amenta (e.g., Amenta & Carruthers, 1988) extends the all-important work on social movement impact, showing that some groups can indeed have impact against the odds. In other words, all of these works (and others in these traditions) have great substantive value. The problem, though, is that with regard to key power structure questions they provide indistinctive answers, leaving them indistinguishable and, ultimately, untestable on the key concerns in power structure research.

Solution

Since the alternative versions of these theories fail to distinctively explain class influence and cannot be critically tested, these alternative versions serve to impede the progress of work on political power. Different scholars in the field present different strategies for overcoming this dilemma. One approach, which I will call the “synthesis approach,” attempts to synthesize the theories in some fashion, either through examining and combining the

middle ground arguments of these theories, or through picking the most relevant claims of the theories and combining them when feasible (e.g., Hooks, 1993; Mintz, 2002). The other approach, which I will call the “period/setting approach,” continues to focus primarily on the traditional, distinctive arguments of the theories, but attempts to determine which traditional theory provides the best model of political power in a given period and/or setting (e.g., Domhoff, 1967, 2006).

While the synthesis approach has its benefits, it can also lead to the same problem described earlier: blurring of the theories and undermining critical theory testing. Certainly, the explanatory power of social science theories can sometimes be enhanced via synthesis – but I would argue this is only true when they are not competing explanations of the same phenomenon. In the case of the theories dealt with here, they began as competing explanations of power structure; therefore, synthesis can lead to indistinctiveness (see Table 2) and make critical tests of the theories impossible. This is where the period/setting approach has an advantage – critical tests of these theories are still possible under its focus on the traditional arguments of the theories.

Theory testing is one of the primary means in social science of determining which theory is most applicable when and under what circumstances, thereby resolving debates and advancing knowledge. So the real advantage of the period/setting approach is that it allows for theory testing – while enabling one to maintain the distinctiveness of theoretical arguments – and determine *when* and *where* a given theory is a good explanation rather than watering it down in hopes that it will explain everything at all times. *Thus, taking a “period/setting” approach – focusing on the distinctive arguments of the traditional versions of these theories while acknowledging that they may ultimately be applicable in only certain eras/places – is critical for advancement in power structure research, and I therefore do so in this paper.* But advancing power structure research also depends on asking the right questions.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM: DIFFERENT QUESTIONS, DIFFERENT ANSWERS

Studies coming out of the three respective power structure camps have often addressed different questions, bypassing one another. More importantly, none of them have done an excellent job of answering key questions

concerning influence. Elite/class research has tended to focus on the question of big business *unity* rather than big business *influence on governmental decision making*. Granted, the question of unity is important – traditional pluralist theory argues that big business generally cannot unify, while traditional elite/class theory argues that it can. The verdict: most research on this question shows that big business unity can and does occur (Roscigno, 1992). For instance, research illustrates that there is considerable consistency in the way big businesses contribute money to political campaigns (Burris 2001; Clawson, Neustadt, & Bearden, 1986; Clawson, Neustadt, & Weller, 1998). So this strand of elite/class research is important in answering the question of unity. But it fails to address the more critical question on power and government: Does this unity result in influence over governmental decision making?

Pluralist research has not done significantly better in answering the question of influence. While pluralist research alleges to address questions of influence directly, often pluralist work involves simply asking political leaders who, if anyone, influences them (Polsby, 1960), which could clearly elicit evasive or scripted answers. Moreover, most of this research is done on the microscale in communities (e.g., Dahl, 1961), which may not translate well to more macrolevels – arguably the more important levels for broader questions about the workings of power in governmental decision making.

State autonomy research has at times done pretty well at focusing questions around influence. But the evidence concerning influence coming out of this research is inconsistent. For instance, a lot of research has been devoted to explaining patterns of influence surrounding the New Deal. Some state autonomy research suggests that business and labor had very little to do with the New Deal (e.g., Skocpol & Amenta, 1985; Amenta & Parikh, 1989), arguing that state actors and institutions essentially acted alone. But other research (not necessarily in the state autonomy tradition) shows otherwise (e.g., Jenkins & Brents, 1989; Levine, 1988), suggesting that class-based groups – big business, in particular – helped structure New Deal policies.

Solution

The issues discussed earlier suggest that focusing on unity among class-based groups – or focusing on specific policy issues (e.g., New Deal policies) – may not tell us much about class-based influence in governmental decision making more generally. What is needed is an approach that examines the *influence* of these groups on a *wider array* of government

Table 3. Sums of Big Business and Labor PAC Contributions in Actual Dollars to Winning U.S. House Candidates, and Percent Equivalent of All PAC Money (1991–2000).

Years	Big Business	% of Total	Labor	% of Total
1991–1992	\$35,186,488	31.6	\$26,936,047	24.1
1993–1994	\$36,900,907	32.2	\$27,716,154	24.1
1995–1996	\$46,131,568	32.7	\$36,080,310	25.5
1997–1998	\$46,403,697	30.2	\$39,192,048	25.5
1999–2000	\$58,849,301	31.7	\$42,708,898	23

Source: Based on data from the FEC.

decisions. One way would be to examine decision making on legislative roll call votes. U.S. House members, cast over 500 votes in an average year, creating traceable broad patterns of decision making over time on a vast array of issues. One significant manner in which class-based groups could influence roll call voting is through giving campaign contributions.

Arguably, some of the most important power struggles between big business and labor occur in the lawmaking realm. This makes sense when considering the importance of this arena. The rules that govern production (and, thus, economic activity and its rewards) are decided in Congress – tax codes, labor laws, trade policies, and countless other regulations affecting production are debated and enacted here. It is no wonder organizations representing big business and labor in the political arena invest vast resources in attempts to influence legislators. Perhaps the most glaring example of this is PAC campaign contributions. Table 3 shows summary statistics calculated from Federal Election Commission (FEC) data on big business (“corporations with capital stock”) and labor (“union and labor organization”) PAC contributions over a 10-year span.

As Table 3 shows, big business and labor PACs contribute tremendous sums of money to house members – combined, they tend contribute more than one hundred million dollars nowadays. What makes this especially impressive is that these staggering figures include only PAC contributions to winning candidates. When adding contributions to losing house candidates, these numbers rise significantly. What is interesting about these numbers is not just the sheer sum of money contributed by these class-based groups, but, also, that their contributions account for the majority of all PAC contributions to winning house candidates in each and every election cycle. In other words, big business and labor together contribute more money than all the other PACs combined – and these other PACs include *all* other

class-based PACs as well *all* of the many issue-based PACs that contribute to campaigns (e.g., abortion-centered PACs, gun-centered PACs, etc.). Big business and labor thus invest significantly in their struggles with one another in the political sphere. *This implies that examining the influence of big business and labor PAC contributors on roll call voting in a given time period would be an effective means of critically testing power structure theories, and I therefore do this in the present study.*

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

To test the viability of my proposed solutions to the aforementioned problems, I conduct empirical analyses that provide promise for the future of power structure research. To maintain consistency with my proposed solutions, I do the following in my empirical analyses: (1) I define class relationally based on the means of production, focusing on big business and labor, looking at big business and labor PAC contributors; (2) I derive hypotheses concerning the influence of these contributors on roll call voting from the “traditional” versions of the three theories of power structure; and (3) I test these hypotheses by statistically examining the effects of big business and labor contributors (PACs) on many decisions – nearly 1,000 roll call votes over a two-year period – in the U.S. House.

Hypotheses

I derive the following empirically testable hypothesis regarding the role of contributors in legislative roll call voting from the three theories of power structure (in their traditional forms): State autonomy theory hypothesizes that contributors, whether big business- or labor-based, *do not* affect roll call voting. However, both pluralist and elite/class theories predict that contributors *do* affect voting. In terms of big business contributors versus labor contributors, pluralist theory postulates that big business contributors *do not* affect roll call voting more significantly than labor contributors, whereas elite/class theory predicts that big business contributors *do* affect voting more significantly than labor contributors. With these hypotheses, I can directly test predictions of the traditional versions of state autonomy theory, pluralist theory, and elite/class theory concerning PAC contributors and their influence on roll call votes.

Analytic Approach: Relations/Networks

There are a number of studies in political science that examine the relationship between campaign contributions and roll call voting, but their results vary significantly, with some finding contributions matter a lot and some finding very little influence of contributions (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). Part of the reason for this inconsistency is too few cases. Many of the studies on contributions and roll call voting examine just a small subset of bills, leaving their findings ungeneralizable. As already mentioned, I will examine a large number of bills – nearly 1,000 – over a two-year period, thus resolving this issue.

More importantly, another reason for the variation in findings across these studies is that they fail to take into account the social context of contributing and voting. Most existent studies of roll call voting do not construct their statistical models to account for the social interdependence of legislators. Many of these studies use “spatial” models of roll call voting (e.g., Heckman & Snyder, 1997; Poole & Rosenthal, 1985), which, while statistically advanced, do not diverge much from standard attribute models of behavior. The legislature is a social arena (Caldeira & Patterson, 1987), and receiving a campaign contribution is, in essence, the establishment of a relational tie via “gift” (Clawson et al., 1998; Gordon, 2005). Moreover, the concept of power implies a relation between actors, which is why many power structure studies use social network techniques (e.g., Knoke, 1990). I thus apply a relational/network approach in my analyses – shifting my units to pairs of legislators. This better captures the social nature of legislative decision making and contributor influence networks, which web across Congress.

Data

To test my hypotheses, I use data on members of the 107th U.S. House of Representatives, 2001–2002 (see Table 4 for a concise summary of each variable, data sources, measurement, and descriptive statistics). This is an ideal House to analyze because it was approximately mid-way through the republican majority in the U.S. House that lasted twelve years through the 2006 lawmaking year, dominating our recent political climate in the United States.

I include data on all members of the 107th House excluding those who voted in only one – or none – of the roll calls in the two-year period

Table 4. Variables Used in Analyses of Vote Similarity among Members of the 107th U.S. House (2001–2002).

Variables	Source	Description/Measurement	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Dependent variable</i>				
Vote similarity	Poole and Rosenthal, available electronically www.voteview.com	Proportion of votes legislators <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> agreed on out of the total they could have agreed on	.697	.170
<i>Main independent variable(s)</i>				
Business PAC contributors (logged)	FEC filings, available electronically at the FEC's website	Log of the # of big business PAC contributors legislators <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> share adjusted for # they could share	.093	.048
Labor PAC contributors (logged)	FEC filings (as above)	Log of the # of labor PAC contributors legislators <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> share adjusted for # they could share	.125	.103
<i>Control variables</i>				
Same party	Congressional and biographical references	Dummy: 1 = legislators <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> are in the same party (0 = not)	.498	.500
Same race	Congressional and biographical references	Dummy: 1 = legislators <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> are the same race	.825	.379
Same gender	Congressional and biographical references	Dummy: 1 = legislators <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> are the same gender	.778	.415
Committee overlap	Congressional and biographical references	Sum count of the # of legislative committees legislators <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> sit on together	.227	.455

Sources: Description/Measurement and Descriptive Statistics.

Note: *N* (for all variables) = 93,528.

(this situation only occurred in the case of legislators who were elected but did not go on to serve in the House) and those few legislators who did not receive any campaign contributions (this only occurred in the case of legislators who funded their own campaigns or who took office late to replace a legislator who left office mid-assembly). In the end, 433 of the 435 House members remain after these exclusions.

My data on these 433 legislators come from a number of sources. The data incorporate information on legislative roll call voting, gathered from congressional records and compiled by [Poole and Rosenthal \(2007\)](#). The data also include information on big business and labor campaign contributions, gleaned from the FEC. Additionally, the data include information on political and demographic characteristics of the legislators, such as their party affiliation, race, gender, and committee membership, retrieved from public records.

For each variable, I convert the data into a legislator-by-legislator matrix before running analyses (see [Table 5](#), for an example). This conversion enables me to account for the interdependence of legislators, helping me to capture the social context of their behavior by linking their behavior with that of their colleagues. Additionally, this conversion carries other significant benefits: it allows for the inclusion of multiple votes and multiple contributor ties in a single analysis because the variables are essentially measures of similarity across all pairs of legislators. For example, my dependent variable literally measures the vote similarity between all pairs of legislators. Thus, rather than measuring their voting as occurring in a social vacuum, it measures their voting in relation to the voting of their peers, and it allows for the inclusion of multiple votes (in this case, 990 votes) in one variable by calculating their percent of similarity in voting across these votes. Specifics on how each variable is coded and measured given in the following section.

Table 5. Example of a Variable Organized as a Relational Matrix.

	Legislator 1	Legislator 2	Legislator $N-1$	Legislator N
<i>Variable: Roll call vote similarity</i>				
Legislator 1	–	$F_{1,2}$	$F_{1,N-1}$	$F_{1,N}$
Legislator 2	$F_{2,1}$	–	$F_{2,N-1}$	$F_{2,N}$
Legislator $N-1$	$F_{N-1,1}$	$F_{N-1,2}$	–	$F_{N-1,N}$
Legislator N	$F_{N,1}$	$F_{N,2}$	$F_{N,N-1}$	–

Note: F = Number of times legislators i and j vote the same way over a period of time (subject to standardization).

Variables

Dependent Variable: Vote Similarity

As noted earlier, I use data on legislative votes collected by [Poole and Rosenthal \(2007\)](#) in their “voteview” project, which are publicly available at www.voteview.com. Poole and Rosenthal have compiled roll call vote records and created raw roll call vote data sets for the 1st through the present U.S. House (and Senate). For this study, I use their roll call data on the 107th House, 2001–2002, including data on how members voted on *all* of the roll call votes ($N = 990$) that took place during the two-year period. To prepare the vote similarity variable for analysis using a relational approach, I shift the units to relational dyads. To do so, I convert the data into legislator-by-legislator dyadic relational matrixes (see [Table 5](#)) in SAS using methods outlined by [Moody \(1998\)](#). In each cell of the matrix is a value representing the proportion of bills and resolutions that dyads of legislators, i and j , agreed on given the total possible number of bills they could have agreed on, taking into account nonvoting (since some legislators did not vote on certain bills, due either to absenteeism or conflicts of interest, I could not use a simple count of vote agreement – I needed to take into account nonvoting). The total number of dyads is 93,528: $((433 \text{ senders}) \times (432 \text{ receivers}))/2$.

Main Independent Variables: Big Business and Labor PAC Contributions

I obtained information on legislators’ receipts of PAC campaign contributions electronically through the FEC. The data cover the election cycle leading to the 107th House. In other words, the data cover contributions given to candidates in the years 1999 and 2000, as election for the 107th House occurred in November 2000 and the 107th ran 2001 through 2002. In the FEC data, all types of PAC contributions are included in a single data file, but are identifiable by type. As such, big business (“corporation with capital stock”) and labor (“union or labor organization”) are clearly identifiable class-based PAC types within the data file.

Big business and labor exhibit interesting patterns of contributing. As already noted, big business and labor account for the majority of the money contributed to winning U.S. House candidates (see [Table 3](#) for more detail). Big business makes more contributions – and contributes more money – than labor, but both make a large number of contributions totaling many millions of dollars. Some may believe that big business contributes almost exclusively to republicans, while labor gives the vast majority of its contributions to democrats. This is not entirely true. A large share – nearly

40% – of big business PAC contributions to members of the 107th House went to democrats. Meanwhile, over 30% of labor PAC contributions to members of the 107th House went to republicans.

With the FEC data, I construct two measures of campaign contributions for the study: one based on shared *big business* PAC contributors, and one based on shared *labor* PAC contributors. Operationally, “shared contributors” means receiving contributions from the same sources, regardless of the number or money amount. I use these measures of shared contributors in my analyses rather than measures based on money for a number of reasons: First, PAC contributions usually involve set money amounts. PACs frequently solicit monies in predetermined sums (such as asking \$50 per plate at a fundraising meal); and more importantly, PACs then give this money in fixed quantities to candidates, often \$500 or \$1,000 per candidate per election. More importantly, innovative research by Mizruchi (1992) set a precedent for measuring shared contributions in studies of corporate political action rather than measuring money amount per se, because in theory the contribution tie matters more in a social-relational context than money amount. To be sure, I constructed and tested measures based on money amount in preliminary models – they produced results very similar to measures based on shared contributions. So, given the nature of giving and the precedent in past work, I use shared contributors measures in my final models.

Again, I arranged the data into dyadic relational matrixes. With both measures, in each cell of the matrix is the log of the number of contributors legislators i and j share controlling for the number of contributors each has where N_{ij} is the number of people contributing to both legislators i and j , N_i is the number contributing to legislator i , and N_j is the number contributing to legislator j , which is built on Mizruchi’s (1989) work. I log the two variables because their distributions are highly skewed (see equation below for more detail). Again the total number of dyads for each variable is 93,528.

$$\text{Similarity}(ij) = \log \frac{N_{ij}}{\sqrt{N_i N_j}}$$

Control Variable: Ideology/Party

A number of studies in political science have found that personal ideology is a very strong determinant of roll call voting – so strong, in fact, that some argue ideology is the primary dimension on which legislators make decisions (e.g., Poole & Rosenthal, 1985, 1991; Schneider, 1979). There are, however,

a number of problems with many measures of legislator ideology. Often these measures are based on scores derived from interest group indexes, yet these indexes are usually surveys of legislators' past votes on issues, which presents a tautology since using scores from these indexes to explain roll call votes is essentially using votes to explain votes (Jackson & Kingdon, 1992). One way this problem of measurement can be resolved is by using party as a proxy of ideology.

Legislator ideology can be viewed as a factor that corresponds somewhat well with simple left-right or liberal-conservative categories; party affiliation, too, corresponds somewhat well with left-right categories. Thus, party is a factor that, at least to some degree, likely taps legislator ideology. Using party as a proxy of ideology is somewhat limiting in that there are generally two main categories with which to belong, whereas an interest group score-based measure could include a range of possible scores. Nonetheless, party does not pose tautological issues when used as a vote predictor, and it shares an important characteristic with ideology measures – great predicting strength.

In studies of roll call voting that include party as a predictor, party almost always emerges as the quintessential vote determinant (Weisberg, 1978), rendering other variables insignificant compared with its strength. In fact, a number of studies suggest that the effect of contributions on roll call voting *becomes less significant or even non-significant* when party is added to the equation (Goidel, Gross, & Shields, 1999), which makes its inclusion critical to this study. In practice, research no longer questions whether or not party affects voting, but, instead, tends to focus on issues of accurately estimating just how strong the effect of party is, spurring methodological debates (e.g., Snyder & Groseclose, 2000, 2001; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2001). One of those debates asks whether or not party *and* other indicators of ideology should be included in the same statistical models.

While some researchers would argue that party and ideology are different enough to merit the inclusion of both in models of roll call voting, recent statistical testing and scrutiny suggests that major methodological issues arise when both are included in models (Herron, 2001). As such, I use party in my models as a proxy for ideology, and exclude any additional measures of ideology from the analyses. In constructing the party variable, I again arranged the data into a dyadic relational matrix. In each cell of the matrix is a dummy value (1 or 0), where 1 indicates that legislators *i* and *j* are in the same party. Again, the total number of dyads is 93,528.

Control Variable: Same Race

There is considerable discussion in sociology concerning the relative importance of race versus class (e.g., Wilson, 1978). There are also interesting debates in this literature concerning what race is – category versus social group versus cognitive construction (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 1997, 1999; Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004; Loveman, 1999) – and keen insights into how race/ethnicity is formed (e.g., Omi & Winant, 1994). While the discussions continue to this day, most demographic evidence illustrates that race is correlated with a number of important socioeconomic factors. Moreover, research shows that race is an important factor affecting social relations (e.g., Blau, Blum, & Schwartz, 1982). Additional work suggests that racially derived social relations become institutionalized (Bonilla-Silva, 1997) and result in unique objective group interests (Bonilla-Silva, 1999).

Racial groups rally around perceived objective group interests. This occurs in the political sphere, where there are a number of race-based political organizations that aim to promote and defend group interests. Within political bodies themselves, there are a number of formal organizations that unite politicians of the same race, such as the Congressional Black Caucus, and research suggests that these organizations can be very influential forces in politics (Wright, 2000). As such, race likely influences the way legislators vote on roll calls, meriting its inclusion as a control variable. Information on legislators' racial backgrounds was obtained from various congressional biographical references, both online and otherwise. In constructing the racial homophily variable, I again arranged the data into a dyadic relational matrix. In each cell of the matrix is a dummy value, where 1 indicates that legislators i and j are the same race. Again, the total number of dyads for the variable is 93,528.

Control Variable: Same Gender

Gender is also an important factor affecting socialization, and should in theory affect roll call voting. A review of the relatively small body of existent research on gender and roll call votes, however, yields mixed findings. One study suggests gender affects roll call voting family leave legislation (Segal & Brzuzy, 1995). Similarly, another study argues that gender affects voting on women's issues, with female legislators voting more favorably than males toward policies that benefit women (Thomas, 1989). But a study on non issue-specific roll call voting suggests that gender has little impact overall (Barnello, 1999). As such, the relationship between gender and roll call

voting is unclear, warranting further examination. Information on legislator gender was gathered from various biographical references as with race. In constructing the gender homophily variable, I again arranged the data into a dyadic relational matrix. In each cell of the matrix is a dummy value, where 1 indicates that legislators i and j are the same gender. Again the total number of dyads for the variable is 93,528.

Control Variable: Committee Overlap

Within the legislature, there are specific responsibilities that bring certain representatives into close contact. One of those tasks is serving on committees. Legislative committees bring legislators together and increase their odds of establishing relationships with one another (Caldeira & Patterson, 1987). While it is true that legislators have some choice in what committees they sit on, this interest in a committee does not guarantee that all the legislators choosing to participate in that committee carry the same opinions. As such, committees are arenas with diverse viewpoints, where negotiation and compromise are crucial – without compromise, bills would never leave committee for vote. Given that committees are clearly arenas, where interactions and influence take place, committee overlap should be a social tie with importance for roll call voting. In other words, the greater committee overlap between two legislators, the more likely they are to vote similarly on bills. I therefore include committee overlap as a control variable in my models. In constructing the committee overlap variable, I again arrange the data into a dyadic relational matrix. In each cell of the matrix is the number of legislative committees that legislators i and j sit on together. The total number of dyads for the variable is again 93,528.

Other Variables: Tenure Similarity, District Proximity

I also added control variables in my initial models that measured things such as tenure similarity among members and district similarities. The first is important as a socializing factor within the House; the second is a key proxy for constituency interests, which is particularly important to address given that sometimes members receive similar contributions because they are in similar and adjacent districts. I describe each of these variables in more detail in the [appendix](#). As it turns out, neither was statistically significant, and neither added to the explanatory power of the models. Moreover, neither variable changed the relationship between shared PAC contributors and roll call vote similarity. As such, I exclude these variables from my final analyses for the sake of parsimony, but nonetheless feel confident in the robustness of my models.

Methods

In all my analyses, I use an innovative statistical technique that eliminates many of the problems associated with relational data. The technique is called quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) regression. QAP is a very conservative, rigorous form of regression that circumvents many of the assumptions of standard parametric regression, making it ideal in situations, where the units of analyses are relational dyads since relational data violate many of these assumptions. For instance, relational data violate one of the key assumptions of standard parametric regression, in that the cases are not independent. Since QAP is a non-parametric technique, though, it resolves this autocorrelation issue. Below I describe how QAP works.

QAP is a procedure similar to bootstrapping whereby the dependent variable relational matrix is regressed on the independent variable relational matrixes once to produce standard OLS coefficients. After this, the rows and columns of the dependent variable matrix are randomly reordered and the regression is performed again. This essentially shuffles the actors while still preserving the structure of the relations in the matrix. This reordering, re-regressing procedure is repeated many times (typically, and in this study, 1,000 times), and the original regression coefficients (with all the actors in their actual, original positions) are compared with the distribution of subsequent coefficients to determine their significance (Hubert & Schultz, 1976). For instance, if a given coefficient from the original regression model is greater than 95% of the coefficients in 1,000 other randomly reordered models, the coefficient is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test). While rarely used in research that does not involve relational data, QAP has been the standard technique for regressing relational matrixes given its benefits over other techniques. Moreover, Mizruchi (1992) and Burris (2005) set a precedent for using QAP regression in power structure research, where relational matrixes are involved.

Causality Concerns

The question of causality is an important one: while contributions may affect roll call voting, it is very possible that roll call voting affects contributions, as many have noted (e.g., Stratmann, 1991; Wawro, 2001). The question of causality must therefore be addressed. I address causality concerns in my analyses in three important ways: (1) As already noted, I use data on legislators' receipts of campaign contributions in 1999 and

2000 – temporally, all of these contributions were given/received before the legislators’ votes analyzed, which occurred 2001–2002. (2) In separate analyses, I run models with freshman legislators only. This is important because freshman legislators do not have a House voting record on which contributors could have based their 1999–2000 contributions. (3) Also in separate analyses, I run models with non-freshman legislators including a lagged control variable for their prior voting. This is most important because controlling for prior voting patterns ensures that the effects of campaign contributions, if any, for these elder legislators reflect a genuine causal ordering whereby contributions affect votes.

RESULTS

Findings based on these analyses are shown in Table 6. The results in model 1 of Table 6 shows that big business contributions are significantly related to roll call voting whereas labor contributions are not – in other words, the more big business PAC contributors legislators share, the more similarly they vote; but sharing labor PAC contributors has no significant affect on similarity in voting. Big business contributions are significant at the .001 significance level, suggesting a less than 1 in 1,000 probability and the

Table 6. Unstandardized Coefficients from QAP Regression of Similarity in Roll Call Voting among Members of the 107th U.S. House (2001–2002) on Shared Big Business and Labor PAC Campaign Contributors, with Control Variables.

	Model 1 (All Legislators)	Model 2 (Freshmen)	Model 3 (Non-Freshmen)
Business PAC contributors	.251***	.082	.085*
Labor PAC contributors	-.037	.014	-.097
Party	.287***	.293***	.041***
Race	.028**	.082*	-.002
Gender	.003	-.005	.000
Committee overlap	.009**	.008	.005*
Prior voting	–	–	.880***
Adjusted R ²	.728	.921	.845
N	93,528	861	76,245

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (one-tailed significance test).

relationship between big business contributions and roll call voting is a product of chance. Importantly, this significant relationship exists controlling for the effects of party and other variables. This is important because, as noted earlier, some have argued that contributions lose their significance when party is added to the equation – this is apparently not the case with big business contributions. In a similar vein, it is also worth noting that the adjusted R^2 of the model is .728, suggesting the variables included in the model account for 72.8% of the variation in roll call vote similarity between legislators during this two-year period. This large adjusted R^2 leaves very little room for the possibility that other variables not included in the model may account for the significant relationship between big business contributions and voting.

Model 2 in Table 6 shows results for freshman legislators. Neither big business contributions nor labor contributions are significantly related to voting among freshmen. Part of what may be responsible for this lack of statistical significance, though, is the smaller N of legislators in the model. Note that most of the other variables that were significant in the first model are no longer significant here – only party (and race to a lesser degree) maintains significance. So, what does this imply about causality? This is a bit unclear, and deserves some discussion.

The relationship between big business contributions and voting among freshmen is a positive relationship (albeit non-significant), while the relationship between labor contributions and voting is virtually no different from zero. These patterns mirror those in the first model except that big business contributions (and many control variables) are non-significant – again likely due, in part, to the smaller N . Hence, these findings do not rule out the possibility that the relationship between big business contributions and voting found in the first model are causal. What is needed to address the causality question is some additional insight from analyses of elder legislators' voting, which the next model provides.

In Model 3, which gives findings for non-freshman legislators, the results are much stronger and very revealing. Big business contributions are significant for non-freshmen legislators whereas labor contributions are not, controlling for their prior voting patterns. This suggests that among elder legislators in the 107th House, big business contributions are not only significantly related to patterns of roll call voting, but are likely *causing* these patterns of voting. How can this be explained? A social influence interpretation seems the most plausible explanation. Put differently, it is likely a situation in which a social relationship builds between big business contributors and House members – and the influence on members' voting is

directed through this social bond. In such a relationship, big business contributions are seen as “gifts” (see Clawson et al., 1998; Gordon, 2005) that serve to build friendships between contributor and member, and these gifts are reciprocated over time – perhaps not immediately (e.g., among freshmen), but eventually.

Clawson et al. (1998) shed light on this social process and how it works. Big business PACs contribute money to members. Most PACs do this in a pragmatic fashion – they tend to avoid ideological considerations in deciding whom to give a contribution. More importantly, they tend to give contributions in person rather than simply sending a check. This helps establish a relationship between the PAC and the member. This relationship then grows over time. When a PAC representative (e.g., lobbyist associated with the PAC) wishes to talk with the member about an issue, they are usually granted access. Access may result in influence, as the present findings suggest. But even in the absence of influence on a particular bill, the access and conversation increases the social bond between the business PAC and the House member. This likely leads to more contributions, more access, potential influence, etc.

One question arises, though, about the above social relationship: Why would this not be the same for labor PACs? Clawson et al. (1998) suggest a couple of reasons why the bond between big business PACs and politicians may be especially strong (and, by implication, why the bond between labor PACs and politicians is less strong). One reason has to do with social resources. While business PACs and labor PACs both contribute large sums of money, business PACs have an advantage in that their associated persons belong to the same social circles as the politicians. They therefore have more opportunity to interact and establish friendships. Similarly, business PACs (and their affiliated individuals) are in a similar social class as politicians; the same cannot be said of labor PACs and their members. This then feeds back into the social issues mentioned earlier, as social circles likely involve a certain degree of social class homophily.

In sum, my findings show that in terms of class-based influence, big business contributions are related to patterns of roll call voting in the 107th U.S. House, whereas labor contributions are not. Moreover, my findings provide evidence of a causal relationship whereby big business contributions affect voting – particularly for non-freshman legislators, who seem especially swayed by their big business contributors. These findings thus fail to support the predictions of state autonomy theory. Granted, there is party influence, but controlling for party does not eliminate the influence of

big business. The findings also fail to support the predictions of pluralist theory. The only theory supported is elite/class theory. Of course, these findings are based on just two years' worth of political decisions, but my findings nonetheless suggest that during this important two-year period in the U.S. House – a two-year period roughly in the middle of the republican-dominated Congress that spanned some 12 years – an elite/class model best explains the patterns emerging from the 990 decisions that were made. Additionally, my findings validate the solutions I proposed to the problems in power structure research, thus marking a starting point for meaningful revival of this critical line of research.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Power structure research explores questions of central importance to the discipline of sociology; but because of conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues, this important line of research has entered a period of abeyance. Conceptually, the death of class thesis – and muddying of class as a concept – has undermined one of the key premises of power structure research: that class matters in politics. Yet when class is defined meaningfully (relationally), the death of class thesis falls apart. Theoretically, the emergence of alternative versions of the three main power structure theories has rendered them virtually indistinguishable and untestable, resulting in gridlock. Focusing on the traditional arguments of these theories via a period/setting approach, however, increases their explanatory power and opens up new opportunities for critical theory testing. Methodologically, the focus on elite unity rather than elite influence and the reliance on unique cases have also contributed to the standstill in power structure research. Examining class-based group influence on multiple policy decisions over time, however, helps resolve this issue.

In this paper, I utilize my earlier proposed solutions and conduct empirical analyses. Focusing on opposed class-based groups based on a relational (Marxian) model of class, I test hypotheses derived from the traditional versions of three power structure theories by statistically analyzing how big business and labor PAC contributions influence roll call voting in the 107th U.S. House, 2001–2002. Findings suggest that *big business contributions causally affect roll call voting*, while labor contributions do not, supporting the predictions of elite/class theory. These findings support the validity of my proposed solutions to the problems in the power structure literature, and provide promise for a revival of work in this area.

Future research on power structure could extend the analyses begun in this paper in a number of ways. First, research could examine roll call voting in the U.S. House (or Congress more generally) temporally, including more years. Examining more years would enable researchers to more concretely determine which theory of political power best explains governmental decision making in what time period, determining the extent to which there is variation over time. Additionally, future research could extend the analyses in the paper cross-nationally, examining how patterns in the United States differ from patterns existent elsewhere. This would provide power structure work a broader picture of the workings of power in politics under different political and institutional arrangements. Regardless of what directions future political power research takes, this paper seeks to provide a solid foundation for forwarding new work in this important realm.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research was funded in part by a Congressional Research Award from the Dirksen Congressional Center. I wish to thank Kevin Speakman, Lee Cayayan, and Jen Killius for their research assistance. I also wish to thank Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, J. Craig Jenkins, and Steven H. Lopez for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

REFERENCES

- Akard, P. J. (1992). Corporate mobilization and political power: The transformation of U.S. economic policy in the 1970s. *American Sociological Review*, 57, 597–615.
- Amenta, E., & Carruthers, B. (1988). The formative years of U.S. social spending policies. *American Sociological Review*, 53, 661–678.
- Amenta, E., & Parikh, S. (1989). Capitalists did not want the Social Security Act: A critique of the “Capitalist Dominance” thesis. *American Sociological Review*, 55, 124–129.
- Barnello, M. A. (1999). Gender and roll call voting in the New York State Assembly. *Women and Politics*, 20, 77–94.
- Baumgartner, F. R., & Leech, B. L. (1998). *Basic interests: The importance of groups in politics and in political science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Blau, P. M., Blum, T. C., & Schwartz, J. E. (1982). Heterogeneity and intermarriage. *American Sociological Review*, 47, 45–62.
- Block, F. (1977). The ruling class does not rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State. *Socialist Revolution*, 7, 6–28.
- Bonilla-Silva, E. (1997). Rethinking racism: Toward a structural interpretation. *American Sociological Review*, 62, 465–480.

- Bonilla-Silva, E. (1999). The essential social fact of race. *American Sociological Review*, 64, 899–906.
- Brubaker, R., Loveman, M., & Stamatov, P. (2004). Ethnicity as cognition. *Theory and Society*, 33, 31–64.
- Burris, V. (2001). The two faces of capital: Corporations and individual capitalists as political actors. *American Sociological Review*, 66, 361–381.
- Burris, V. (2005). Interlocking directorates and political cohesion among corporate elites. *American Journal of Sociology*, 111, 249–283.
- Burstein, P. (1998). Bringing the public back in: Should sociologists consider the impact of public opinion on public policy? *Social Forces*, 77, 27–62.
- Caldeira, G. A., & Patterson, S. C. (1987). Political friendship in the legislature. *The Journal of Politics*, 49, 953–975.
- Clark, T. N., & Lipset, S. M. (1991). Are social classes dying? *International Sociology*, 6, 397–410.
- Clawson, D., Neustadt, A., & Bearden, J. (1986). The logic of business unity: Corporate contributions in the 1980 Congressional Elections. *American Sociological Review*, 51, 797–811.
- Clawson, D., Neustadt, A., & Weller, M. (1998). *Dollars and votes: How business campaign contributions subvert democracy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Dahl, R. (1961). *Who governs?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Davidson, R. H., & Oleszek, W. J. (1998). *Congress and its members* (6th ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Domhoff, G. W. (1967). *Who rules America?* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Domhoff, G. W. (1990). *The power elite and the state: How policy is made in America*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Domhoff, G. W. (2006). *Who rules America? Power, politics, and social change*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Gilbert, J., & Howe, C. (1991). Beyond “state vs. society”: Theories of the state and new deal agricultural policies. *American Sociological Review*, 56, 204–220.
- Goidel, R. K., Gross, D. A., & Shields, T. G. (1999). *Money matters: Consequences of campaign finance reform in U.S. House elections*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gordon, S. (2005). *Campaign contributions and legislative voting behavior: A new approach*. New York: Routledge.
- Heckman, J. J., & Snyder, J. (1997). Linear probability models of the demand for attributes with an empirical application to estimating the preferences of legislators. *RAND Journal of Economics*, 28, 142–189.
- Herron, M. C. (2001). Interest group ratings and regression consistency. *Political Analysis*, 9, 260–274.
- Hooks, G. (1993). The weakness of strong theories: The U.S. State’s dominance of the World War II investment process. *American Sociological Review*, 58, 37–53.
- Hout, M., Brooks, C., & Manza, J. (1993). The persistence of classes in post-industrial societies. *International Sociology*, 8, 259–277.
- Hout, M., Brooks, C., & Manza, J. (1995). The democratic class struggle in the United States, 1948–1992. *American Sociological Review*, 60, 805–828.
- Hubert, L., & Schultz, J. (1976). Quadratic assignment as a general data analysis strategy. *British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology*, 29, 190–241.
- Hunter, F. (1953). *Community power structure*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

- Jackson, J. E., & Kingdon, J. W. (1992). Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 36, 805–823.
- Jenkins, J. C., & Brents, B. (1989). Social protest, hegemonic competition, and social reform: A political struggle interpretation of the origins of the American welfare state. *American Sociological Review*, 54, 891–909.
- Knoke, D. (1990). *Political networks: The structural perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Levine, R. F. (1988). *Class struggle and the new deal: Industrial labor, industrial capital, and the state*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Loveman, M. (1999). Is “race” essential? *American Sociological Review*, 64, 891–898.
- McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2001). The hunt for party discipline in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, 95, 673–687.
- Miliband, R. (1969). *The state in capitalist society*. New York: Basic Books.
- Mills, C. W. (1956). *The power elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mintz, B. (2002). Elites and politics: The corporate elite and the capitalist class in the United States. *Research in Political Sociology*, 11, 52–77.
- Mizruchi, M. S. (1989). Similarity of political behavior among large American corporations. *American Journal of Sociology*, 95, 401–424.
- Mizruchi, M. S. (1992). *The structure of corporate political action: Interfirm relations and their consequences*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moody, J. (1998). *SPAN: SAS programs for analyzing networks. User's manual*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Nisbet, R. A. (1959). The decline and fall of social classes. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 1, 11–17.
- Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). *Racial formations in the United States*. New York: Routledge.
- Ossowski, S. (1963). *Class structure in the social consciousness*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Pakulski, J., & Waters, M. (1996). The reshaping and dissolution of social class in advanced society. *Theory and Society*, 25, 667–691.
- Polsby, N. (1960). How to study community power: The pluralist alternative. *Journal of Politics*, 22, 474–484.
- Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1985). A spatial model for legislative roll call vote analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29, 357–384.
- Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1991). Patterns of congressional voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 35, 228–278.
- Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2007). *The voteview website*. Available at <http://voteview.com/default.htm>
- Poulantzas, N. (1974). *Political power and social classes*. London: New Left Books.
- Roscigno, V. A. (1992). Conservative and critical approaches to the power structure debate: An assessment and critique of empirical findings. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 20, 63–81.
- Schneider, J. E. (1979). *Ideological coalitions in Congress*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Segal, E. A., & Brzuzny, S. (1995). Gender and congressional voting: A legislative analysis. *Affilia*, 10, 8–22.
- Skocpol, T. (1980). Political response to capitalist crisis: Neo-Marxist theories of the state and the case of the New Deal. *Politics and Society*, 10, 155–201.
- Skocpol, T., & Amenta, E. (1985). Did capitalists shape social security? *American Sociological Review*, 52, 572–575.

- Slomczynski, K. M. (1989). Are social classes consistently stratified? In: K. M. Slomczynski (Ed.), *Social structure and mobility: Poland, Japan, and the United States* (pp. 11–31). Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences.
- Slomczynski, K. M., & Shabad, G. (2000). Structural determinants of political experience: A refutation of the “Death of Class” thesis. In: K. M. Slomczynski (Ed.), *Social patterns of being political: The initial phase of the post-communist transition in Poland* (pp. 187–211). Warsaw: IFiS Publishers.
- Snyder, J. M., & Groseclose, T. (2000). Estimating party influence on congressional roll call voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44, 193–211.
- Snyder, J. M., & Groseclose, T. (2001). Estimating party influence on roll call voting: Regression coefficients versus classification success. *American Political Science Review*, 95, 689–698.
- Stratmann, T. (1991). What do campaign contributions buy? Deciphering causal effects of money and votes. *Southern Economic Journal*, 57, 606–620.
- Thomas, S. (1989). Voting patterns in the California Assembly: The role of gender. *Women and Politics*, 9, 43–56.
- Wawro, G. (2001). A panel probit analysis of campaign contributions and roll-call votes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45, 563–579.
- Weisberg, H. F. (1978). Evaluating theories of congressional roll-call voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 22, 554–577.
- Wilson, W. J. (1978). *The declining significance of race: Blacks and changing American institutions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Wright, E. O. (1985). *Classes*. London: Verso.
- Wright, E. O. (1997). *Class counts: Comparative studies in class analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wright, S. D. (2000). The Tennessee black caucus of state legislators. *Journal of Black Studies*, 31, 3–19.

APPENDIX. DESCRIPTION OF TENURE SIMILARITY AND DISTRICT SIMILARITY AS CONTROL VARIABLES

The longer two legislators have been in the legislature together, the more likely they are to have established a relationship with one another. Furthermore, there are a number of orientations and events geared toward incoming cohorts of legislators (Davidson & Oleszek, 1998), bringing them into contact. So even legislators who have been in the legislature for a short time are more likely to come into contact with one another if they are in the same cohort. Therefore, tenure similarity can be considered, in the very least, a tie that links legislators to one another. I therefore include tenure similarity as a control variable in my preliminary analyses. I construct two different measures of tenure similarity for testing: one measuring the

negative absolute value of the difference in the number of years legislators i and j have overlapped in the legislature, the other simply measuring the minimum number of years legislators i and j have served in the legislature together. Neither measure is statistically significant in the test model results. Additionally, neither had any measurable impact on the main relationship under study – the relationship between campaign contributions and roll call voting. I therefore exclude tenure similarity in the final models.

Another variable I test that yields a similar non-significance is district proximity. One would think that district proximity would have some influence on roll call vote similarity between dyads of legislators. Generally speaking, being from the same state should place legislators' interests closer because of similar constituencies. And from the perspective of campaign contributions, legislators should, conceivably, receive contributions from more of the same PACs if they are from the same geographic region, meaning that controlling for district proximity would seem crucial in analyses of how campaign contributions influence roll call voting since it is possible that any statistically significant effect of contributions is merely a reflection of constituency interests. This said, I construct a dyadic relational measure of district proximity for testing that measures whether or not legislators i and j represent districts in the same state, and in test models the measure is non-significant. Moreover, this variable does not have a discernible impact on the relationship between campaign contributions and roll call voting; the coefficients for big business and labor contributions do not change with the addition and subtraction of the measure. I therefore exclude district proximity in the final models.

IN MOVEMENT: NEW PLAYERS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN, 1962–1977

Damián A. González Madrid and
Óscar J. Martín García

ABSTRACT

Specialised literature on democratisation has generally presented the Spanish case as the model of an elite-led political settlement. This approach forms the basis of the most widespread interpretation of Spain's transition to democracy as a work of top-down political engineering. However, this scholarship fails to pay sufficient attention to the capacity for agency of civil society and both "old" and "new" social movements. In fact, although there is no doubt that democracy arrived in Spain by means of a negotiated transition, it must not be forgotten that the pacts among elites were influenced, as is demonstrated here, by relentless social pressure among highly organised collective actors, including the Communist Party. This paper shows that protests by this organisation and other collective actors in the most socioeconomically underdeveloped provinces of Spain, most of which have been ignored by the most influential scholarship on the transition, were vitally important in the negotiated path to democracy. As such, it investigates the relationship between social unrest and political change through the study of provinces which, a priori, were considered to be socially and politically inactive.

Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 20, 39–68
Copyright © 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 0198-8719/doi:10.1108/S0198-8719(2009)0000020008

This analysis of popular mobilisation in poor and politically marginalised provinces enables a deeper theoretical and empirical understanding of the dynamics from below, which were fundamental in Spain's transition process.

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL CHANGE TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

The democratisation processes which took place at the end of the last century, first and foremost in Southern Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s and subsequently in Eastern Europe, have been the object of numerous conceptualisations and generalisations in social science studies. Although for obvious reasons we cannot dwell on the rich theoretical debate regarding the processes involved in the transitions to democracy, it is important to highlight that in addition to the neo-institutionalist approach, in which the rationalisation of authority and structural differentiation formed the basis of democracy, some specialised literature has viewed the spread of civic culture and moderate political participation as a condition that favoured the establishment of democratic systems (Eisendstadt, 1965). Along similar lines, other authors inspired by the works of Lipset (1960) have deemed democracy to be the inevitable result of economic development processes and social modernisation. Such theories have, however, been criticised as mechanistic and ahistorical by certain analyses which claim that “transitions are produced by actors who choose strategies that lead to change from one kind of regimen to another” (Karl & Schmitter, 1991, p. 273).

For such approaches, the Spanish case has been presented as the “very model of the modern elite settlement” (Gunther, 1992, p. 134). According to this theory, it was the elites, in particular those belonging to the more liberal sectors of the Franco regime, which – within the sphere of high politics and guided by their predisposition to form pacts and reach consensus – managed almost virtuously to adapt the political structures to the country’s level of social and economic development. This analytical pillar forms the basis of the most widespread interpretation of the transition to democracy as a “work of political engineering or craftsmanship”. Yet, although this version examines some of the most important factors required to understand the process of political change, it does not, however, pay too much attention, as Threlfall (2008, p. 937) points out, to the “capacity for agency from civil

society organizations”.¹ In fact, although there is no doubt that democracy arrived in Spain by means of a negotiated transition initiated and controlled by reformists within the Franco regime, it must not be forgotten that the negotiations and pacts among elites that made up the new democratic institutional framework in Spain were preceded and influenced, as we will attempt to demonstrate here, by relentless social pressure. This took the form of working-class unrest and disputes organised by certain social movements that managed to introduce their main claims and demands, in addition to influencing the preparation of the political agenda of the transition (Balfour, 1994). In broad terms, this is the argument put forward in important works by authors such as Fishman (1990, 2004), Balfour (1989) and Foweraker (1989). These have served as theoretical and methodological works of reference for new approaches questioning the leading interpretations (which focus on the role of the elites) on the political transition towards democracy in Spain.²

Along these lines, in recent times, studies in the field of social history have acquired greater importance in the history of the transition. However, protests led by different collectives from the less-industrialised and less-developed provinces of the country have generally “been pushed into the background if not openly ignored by specialised historiographical studies carried out in recent years” (Cobo & Ortega, 2003, p. 113). For that reason, the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between social unrest and political change through the study of the provinces of Albacete and Ciudad Real, which, a priori, were considered to be socially and politically inactive due to important structural factors. As we will attempt to demonstrate later, the analysis of popular mobilisation in provinces in which the effects of socioeconomic development were more limited enables a deeper theoretical and empirical understanding of the dynamics from below which were fundamental in Spain’s transition process.

A study of this kind is also relevant because, although changes in the authoritarian structure of Spain fall within what Huntington describes as the *global democratic revolution* experienced by a considerable number of countries during the past three decades of the previous century, international factors – although important – are not enough to explain the Spanish process in which local and regional dynamics played a very important role. This factor enables us to demonstrate how the wave of protests and discontent was strong enough to allow it to spread from the industrial and urban zones (where the unrest started) to include other less-developed, more deprived areas where conditions were less favourable for dissent. Cases of inland provinces such as Albacete and Ciudad Real illustrate the

geographical and socio-professional extent of the discontent and also the correlation between the general struggle for political power and the protests which emerged locally in rural society. In short, the following pages will attempt to explain the mobilisation mechanisms in provinces that illustrate the social and territorial spread of a conflict which made it impossible for the dictatorship to survive.

Finally, it is important to highlight that the social unrest which took place in Albacete and Ciudad Real between 1962 and 1977 was led mainly by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE in its Spanish initials), just as it was in the rest of the country. In both these provinces, communist activists participated in and indeed led workers' protests against the official trade union system. During the 1960s, the occupation of public space by the "old" working class movement gradually opened up new opportunities and decreased the repression. This favoured the appearance of new social players for whom the recovery of democratic freedom was a fundamental aspect of their demands. Such movements were also promoted by communist militants in these provinces who – in collaboration with Catholics, independent activists and extreme left-wing militants – helped to act as a driving force behind the cultural scene through their presence in non-conformist student and youth groups. They also encouraged the formation of neighbourhood associations that opposed the local authorities of the Franco regime and became involved in professional associations (of health workers, teachers, lawyers, civil servants, etc.). Finally, they introduced the cooperative movement to the farming community and organised Farmers' Commissions (*Comisiones Campesinas*) opposing the agricultural structures imposed by the dictatorship. Thus, in addition to the PCE's determination to take advantage of any social front to express their democratic social and political claims, the majority of social players acknowledged the need for a "workers' vanguard" which, led by the communists, would become the fundamental reference point for protest against Franco's regime. However, it is a well-known fact that by the 1960s, the PCE's strategy no longer involved a proletarian revolution but instead subordinated this to the democratisation of the State through the alliance of workers and the reformist middle classes. The result, as *Álvarez Junco (2001)* points out, was the emergence during this period of a social movement subject to the political needs of the struggle against Franco, while the traditional demands of the working-class movement were marked by the democratic culture promoted by the new social movements. This political burden which, due to the survival of the authoritarian regime, characterised collective action during the last years of the Franco regime, linked social mobilisation

directly with democratic change in a dialectical process which was not only noticeable in urban and industrial areas but also, as explained later, in rural provinces and less-developed areas of Spain.

THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL: PUERTOLLANO AND THE STRIKES OF 1962

The wave of strikes that took place during 1962 marked the start of a long period of protest which continued over the next two decades and changed the physiognomy, geography, organisation and range of the protests. From that moment onwards, a social struggle began in Spain that centred on particular sectors, industries and local areas. It also marked the start of a conflict, which, although not in general the expression of a clash of ideologies, was based on the defence of specific, intimate, everyday interests of certain groups. Thus, the unrest that existed during the final part of the dictatorship was deeply rooted in the desperate needs of ordinary people who suffered the most destructive effects of the economic miracle on a daily basis, in addition to the contradictions of social change and the repressive forces of Franco's dictatorship. However, although the social opposition that developed in the 1960s was not inherently revolutionary, it did spread a growing "oil slick" of conflicts and unrest that, despite not overthrowing the Franco regime, did manage to severely wear it down.

The strikes of 1962 began in the coalfields of Asturias, from where they spread to other mining areas of the country such as the city of Puertollano, located in the backward, rural, agricultural province of Ciudad Real. The strike reached the mineshafts of Puertollano on Wednesday 9 May, when work came to a halt in two companies, *ENCASO* and *SMMP*. Over a 10-day period, the strike managed to mobilise 12,000 workers. Civil government reports from 1962 described what happened "as practically a general strike" which spread across the whole region and paralysed businesses, transport services, municipal services, etc. (Ortiz Heras, 2002). The unrest witnessed during that turbulent month of May paralysed the mines and brought to light new organisational structures and forms that originated in the informal networks of sociability and solidarity forged during the day-to-day work at the mine. That is how the socio-political movement of the Workers' Commissions (*Comisiones Obreras*) came about in Puertollano. It was a movement that, through the mobilisation of workers, proved to be an effective means of defending the working class

and fighting against the authoritarian structure of the Franco regime. In the years that followed, the Workers' Commissions efficiently carried out the work of a trade union, thanks to their plurality, flexibility and skill at incorporating illegal activities into the open, public work carried out legally by means of Franco's official trade union platform.

The major social unrest, unheard of since the civil war, which took place in the coal-mining area of Puertollano after the strike of 1962 also led to the growth of local political organisations opposed to the dictatorship. This in turn led to new protests by more politically active vanguards mainly related to the PCE. Activists from the party represented a minority of clandestine activists intent on mobilising society and causing political unrest, responsible for what the authorities condemned as the "underhand, subversive preparation" of the majority of labour disputes. Through their daily commitment to the problems of the mine, these activists managed to set up networks and create flows of solidarity with a membership which, despite its informal nature, was nevertheless increasingly prepared to mobilise to defend its interests. According to the official trade union, the members were the victims of "outside influences".³

Thus, by means of an upward process which began at the foundations of the social movement and rose to the organisational structures of the party, the development of the Workers' Commissions, which in Puertollano were mainly made up of communist activists, as a means of expressing social demands hastened the configuration of the organs of the PCE in the city and nearby villages. On 25 July 1962, the Regional Committee of the PCE was formed, mainly made up of miners from *SMMP* and workers from *ENCASO*, and 15 September saw the creation of the regional division of the Union of Young Communists of Spain (González Madrid, 2008). By the mid-1960s, the PCE of Puertollano had around 50 activists. It was then habitual for activists to be involved in both organisations, therefore providing the party with the human, strategic and ideological resources necessary for the development and consolidation of the Workers' Commissions.

During the strikes of 1962, the spread of solidarity played an essential role in extending the protest from the mines of Asturias to many other parts of the country. What the local authorities referred to as a "rare harmony" among workers from different places was a sign of solidarity based on a collective identity. This led the miners of Puertollano to recognise the problems of their fellow Asturians as their own. One example was the message "LONG LIVE THE STRIKE IN ASTURIAS" painted on one wall of the city. Thus, public displays of working-class identity through solidarity reflected

the politicisation of the conflict, as the repressive attitude of the governors gave political importance to the class position. Hence, despite the fact that after the strike of 1962 a rising working-class movement appeared in Puertollano, which was made up of an emergent generation of young activists and based on new mobilisation structures; the source of the spread of solidarity mentioned above continued to lie in the working-class mining culture. This tradition survived in the everyday life of the workplace and neighbourhoods despite the repression that this mining town suffered after the civil war. Although historical studies have tended to portray tradition and innovation as antithetical terms when used to refer to the formation of working-class identity during the last part of Franco's regime, it is important not to lose sight of links with past traditions and cultures from previous periods of mobilisation. It is therefore debatable whether the working-class movement and its struggle during the final stages of Franco's dictatorship should be portrayed, as it usually is, merely as social turmoil, as the reflection of deep socioeconomic changes that had no past, no roots and no socio-cultural references.

The identity of the working class of this period was not built on a vacuum. Spanish workers did not create their own experiences without previous reference guidelines. Neither the deep socioeconomic changes of the 1960s, nor the restructuring plans, nor post-war repression managed to fully erase the cognitive traditions of social, economic and political struggle that took root over more than a third of a century among the miners of Puertollano. Little attention has perhaps been paid to the fact that "conceptual and discursive transformations", beyond isolated ideological statements, were less vulnerable to repression than class-based organisational structures, as they were preserved through contacts with former activists in the working-class neighbourhoods of the city, in the heart of clandestine organisations, in family stories, in classes on the history of the working-class movement in the halls of Catholic movements, etc. Just like the everyday practices of resistance and the reproduction of dissident subcultures described by Scott (1990) in some of his works, these confined spaces and everyday, informal networks kept alive "the cognitive traditions required to rekindle activism following a period of inactivity within the movement" (Sewell, 1994, p. 96). Such traditions acted as "reserves of cultural components which successive generations of activists can use to form movements with similar ideologies despite being separated by time" (McAdam, 2001, p. 52). It can therefore be suggested that through this continuity a certain "amount of past experience" was present in the speeches and images on which collective identity and solidarity was based and which gave meaning and legitimacy to

the strike of May 1962 and the subsequent protests which continued until the end of the dictatorship (Laraña, 1999).

The strikes of 1962 were followed by months of appeasement and a decline in social unrest. However, in 1964 mobilisations of considerable importance again took place in Puertollano, which led to the break out of some highly politicised strikes both in *SMMP* and in *ENCASO* that lasted several weeks. During these strikes, along with lockouts and dozens of miners being sacked, the workers expressed their “complete lack of faith” in the official trade union representatives and their support for the “Workers’ Commissions because people think they would be more effective”.⁴ Moreover, in the mid-1960s the workers of Puertollano showed that they were willing to take to the streets and take control of public spaces by means of demonstrations and gatherings, such as those which in 1964 ended with shouts of “FREEDOM” and “NO TO THE DEATH PENALTY”. Likewise, as from 1962, the First of May was celebrated with gatherings in Rincona Park in which workers, as occurred in 1968, demanded “our rights, work for the unemployed and freedom for all”.⁵ These years also witnessed an increase in the number of mass meetings of the working class organised in the countryside and in places outside the city, such as San Agustín’s hill, to avoid being seen by the police. This therefore highlighted the flexibility and variety of collective action that was not limited to traditional strikes or “silent” individual conflict.

This range of collective action also included activities within the scope of the law, although in this case it had other objectives in mind. In fact, working-class activists did not miss the opportunity to take part in and influence the trade unions of the Franco regime through the union elections. From the early 1960s, in an attempt to revitalise official trade unionism, Franco’s dictatorship promoted greater levels of representation and allowed the direct, yet closely controlled, election of certain workers’ representatives. This represented a “change in the framework of opportunities and expectations” in the mobilisation of the working class (Gómez Roda, 2004, p. 96). Thus, the “entry” strategy begun by communist and Christian activists of the Workers’ Commissions was given a tremendous boost by the union elections of 1966. In Puertollano, just like in the more industrialised areas of the country, the Workers’ Commissions set out to take over the core trade union structures. They gained control of the workers’ councils of *ENCASO* and *SMMP* and the chairmanship and deputy chairmanship of the Social Section of the Fuel Union, positions from which they organised and mobilised workers in defence of their interests and, as a result of the rigidity of the social and labour regulations of Franco’s regime, in the struggle to achieve greater trade union and political rights.

VILLAMALEA, THE RED VILLAGE

The tendency of Spanish social history to regard the collective players of the last part of the dictatorship as a by-product of an urban and industrial modernisation process which spread of its own accord and at its own rhythm has led to a certain degree of historiographical marginalisation when it comes to evaluating the contribution of agricultural and rural collectives to the democratic construction process. However, in the province of Albacete, as in many other places in less-industrialised, poor, rural, agrarian areas of Spain, there is one village, namely Villamalea, which is exemplary because of its determined resistance to Franco's dictatorship. The example of this village was probably an exception, but the same cannot be said of the latent discontent among rural sectors and groups of farmers in the provinces of Albacete and Ciudad Real in light of the ineffectiveness of the Farmers' Associations (*Hermandades de Labradores*), the official trade union organisations for farm workers. On occasions, this latent discontent rose to the surface in the form of open conflict, as was the case in some small villages in La Mancha such as Cenizate, Bonete, Montealegre and El Bonillo due to land reparcelling or in Higuera and Pozohondo due to a dispute with the authorities regarding the use of common, public woodland.

In the village of Villamalea, in the mid-1950s, a faction of young communists who had not lived through the civil war and who had been less affected than their ancestors by post-war repression, sought to "rise above the surface in any way possible, since working in secret prevented us from exerting any influence". Encouraged by the new strategies adopted by the leadership of the PCE, they began to infiltrate the local political, economic and trade union institutions of the Franco regime in order to "defend the economic interests of agricultural workers and create a mass movement" (Sanz Díaz, 2003, p. 280). Thus in 1961, they took over the leadership of the San Antonio Abad Wine-Producing Cooperative, which from then on became a "scouting party for the struggle" and "a mobilisation platform for the Party through which it channelled its protests".⁶ In time, this cooperative became the "symbol of the agricultural workers' struggle and their political, economic and social confrontation with institutions and the Franco regime". According to an informant of the PCE who travelled through the area in 1970, in Villamalea the "centre of all economic, social and political life is the cooperative, which began some years ago with a few dozen members but which now groups together a thousand farming families".⁷

The fact that the cooperative was controlled by members of the opposition enabled them to infiltrate and “colonise” other local institutions. The social and political influence that the opposition acquired through the cooperative meant that in consecutive elections in 1966, 1971 and 1975, the candidacies headed by communists and other local people committed to the farmers’ movement managed to win the chairmanship, with the exception of 1975, of the Farmers’ Association and take control of the association’s social section. The only local institution which managed to resist the “entry” strategy led by the communists was the Town Hall. Only the varied and numerous obstacles imposed by the Civil Governor managed to keep activists from the farmers’ movement out of municipal power in the elections that took place in 1971 and 1976. However, so strong and prolonged was the tempest that the opposition unleashed on the Town Hall that it was continually discredited and lost its influence on the social, economic and political life of the community.

The extent to which groups have access to power determines the type and level of collective action that they undertake, as well as the authorities’ willingness to repress their activities (Tilly, 1998). The fact that the communists of Villamalea controlled various local institutions meant that they used mainly legal means. They were represented, in the words of a PCE report, by “the driving force behind all this work”, namely the farmer Enrique López Carrasco, who was chairman of the Cooperative, the Farmers’ Association, the Rural Savings Bank (*Caja Rural*) and a member of various different provincial committees and organisations. He was a farmer who, according to the report, “knows how to combine legal and illicit work, although he mainly uses legal means”. Through the legal struggle carried out by communists and other sectors of the village, social and political control was taken of the official organisations, not to channel or spread discontent but instead for the exact opposite, as platforms to defend the interests of farm workers and to encourage demonstrations. Thus, the pragmatic use of resources provided by official organisations represented a “mechanism which sometimes makes it possible for villages which are oppressed or lacking resources to overcome their organisational shortcomings” (McAdam, 2005, p. 48).

This open, legal public struggle was supplemented by clandestine activism involving activities that were not allowed under Franco’s legal system such as meetings, the distribution of propaganda, strikes, demonstrations, etc. As a result of this activism within the opposition movement, the early 1970s witnessed the birth of the Farmers’ Commissions, which represented the transfer of the Workers’ Commission movement of the factories to rural,

farm working areas. According to the police, these groups or committees of farmers and small landowners worked together with the PCE, sometimes “supporting national campaigns to provoke unrest and at other times taking advantage of everyday friction between the administration and its subjects”.⁸ In turn, anti-Franco activism and political unrest increased as a result of the resources provided by the open, legal struggle carried out within the framework of the cooperative and other institutions. Thus, if from the late 1950s onwards the local committee of the PCE in Villamalea was never dismantled and its composition never revealed, this was because the clandestine nature of the village was tightly interwoven with the legal activities carried out.

Control of the Cooperative and the Rural Savings Bank, together with participation in the official trade union structures of the Farmers’ Association, provided the opposition activists in Villamalea with legal cover and, more importantly, the possibility of offering a considerable number of farmers access to agricultural subsidies, low-interest loans, the possibility of negotiating prices and labour conditions, all of which had a decisive impact on their living conditions. Thus, the main protests were associated with the real needs of the residents and instead of following any particular ideological model, basically defended the interests of the majority of small landowners and farmers who lived within an authoritarian framework and did not have any true union rights. In this respect, the PCE activists in Villamalea managed, on a day-to-day basis, to combine social and political aspects through work in the cooperative and the trade union at grass-roots level, thus consolidating the political strategy of the party and increasing active politicisation against the dictatorship.⁹

The leaders of the farmers’ movement took advantage of “everything that could be done by the institutions of the regime to help the people”.¹⁰ Thus, through work carried out openly within the framework of these institutions, the PCE established a network of social services that affected areas outside the reach of the Town Hall, for instance, the library, the Rural Savings Bank, the Robert Owen company store, the theatre club, a bar, the Friends of UNESCO Club, etc. As a result, over almost two decades the PCE set up and consolidated tightly knit local solidarity networks which, at the same time as the good social results strengthened the party, created a sense of community identity based on collective action. That is why Villamalea was soon known as “the red village”.

This collective identity found a public outlet in a leisure context at the highly popular Grape Harvest Festivals. Organised by the cooperative, the festivals represented “nothing more or less than another pretext to continue

making demands”, to continue distancing people from the official institutions and to protest. Ever since they began in the 1960s they were always very well attended and enjoyed popular support. Despite being modest celebrations, they were characterised by “comradeship, camaraderie and joy: everyone in the village looked forward to the first days of September so we could celebrate the festival”.¹¹ Many people from the village took part in the popular festivities and decorated floats with signs such as “DOWN WITH FRAUD, LONG LIVE AGRICULTURE!”, “NO TO MONOPOLIES, YES TO COOPERATIVES” and “WHAT WITH THE WEATHER AND THE GOVERNMENT, FARMERS ARE DYING”. During the festivities in 1976, the tractors which were used as floats displayed slogans which were closely linked to the current political affairs of the country, such as one which demanded a “UNITARY TRADE UNION” or another which proposed the following “SOLUTION: THE BREAK OUT OF DEMOCRACY”.¹²

Based around the Cooperative and the other institutions, the mobilisation structures provided by the organisation of the local PCE took preference over the informal structures of the community itself, which developed their considerable protest capacity based on experiences of reciprocal action in the areas of neighbourhood and labour relations. In this respect, the Grape Harvest Festival represented an opportunity to ritualise expressions of social unease and political criticism, in addition to strengthening feelings of solidarity and highlighting the identity of a community strongly attached to its cooperative and to the defence of the general interests of the village. For that reason, it is no surprise that the authorities of Franco’s regime either tried to put an end to the festivities and water them down within the framework of other religious festivities or impose sanctions on the organisers. That was precisely what happened when the civil governor fined the chairman of the cooperative for having “programmed and held the aforementioned festivities and infringed the regulations leading to a serious breach of the peace and social order by holding meetings, demonstrations and parades without prior permission (...) in order to create unease in the community and express your disagreement with the current political situation” (Sanz Díaz, 2003, p. 280).

The strength of the solidarity networks and community identity forged in Villamalea in the 1960s and 1970s was highlighted during the long confrontation (1972–1975) between the Cooperative and the Ministry of Agriculture over the Obligatory Wine Delivery (*Entrega Vínica Obligatoria*). The authorities responded to the cooperative’s refusal to give part of the grape harvest to the government by imposing sanctions that provoked a long, bitter conflict. During this conflict the mass meetings held by farmers

took on a leading role, to such an extent that they became the main means of mobilising and organising workers during those years. These mass meetings acted as a dynamic link between the cooperative and the residents, in addition to being a means of democratically ratifying all the decisions taken, which helped to legitimise the struggle among the people of the village and strengthen the signs of solidarity. The meetings, which were attended by more and more people and became increasingly radical in 1975, were “a democratic training ground for the village”, but they also managed to energise and politicise informal interaction and everyday social relationships in the various different social circles of the village. As one report said, the “atmosphere in the village is highly politicised and in everyday conversations instead of talking about football, it is quite common to hear people discussing local, national and international problems with the same passion”.¹³ Finally, faced with the farmers’ and the cooperative’s determination not to pay, the government was forced to give in. Thus, not even a long-running dispute managed to break the solidarity networks that existed in the community. If anything, it deepened their resistance and increased their democratic awareness.

The open militancy and constant, tangible commitment to the problems of the village and its farmers enabled the leaders of the movement to enjoy the warmth, recognition and trust of the residents.¹⁴ These types of links created as a result of the conflict and of living together on a daily basis enabled an important change to take place in the way society viewed the repression. If in previous decades the government’s violence had affected unknown factions of clandestine activists, during the 1960s and 1970s the threat of such violence affected workers who, with realistic and responsible determination, openly defended farmers’ interests by perfectly legal means such as the Cooperative, the Rural Savings Bank and the Farmers’ Association. It was possible that any attempt to silence those who had won the trust and support of the majority of residents would eventually degenerate into a politicised and even radicalised conflict. In this respect it is worth mentioning some public disturbances which took place in 1976 that were reminiscent of traditional riots and for which some of the movement’s leaders were arrested for taking part in mass meetings, strikes, etc. For example, after the arrest of some people attending a speech during the Grape Harvest Festival in 1976, almost 200 people shouting “FREE THE PRISONERS” surrounded the police station until those arrested were set free some hours later. Two months later, in November 1976, the police arrested various demonstrators who were taken to the police station in Villamalea, but “in light of the somewhat agitated behaviour of the people”, they had to

be “transferred to the headquarters of the Civil Guard in Albacete” where they were put in solitary confinement.¹⁵ In short, the situation reached a point in Villamalea in which, as a result of open conflict, it was impossible to repress the opposition without causing mobilisations which strengthened the movement. A good example of this is the proactive nature of the collective players and their ability, over and beyond functional perceptions, not only to avoid and stand up to repression but also to take advantage of it and generate waves of solidarity and politicisation.

PROTESTS FOR A NEW DECADE

The ever-widening gap between a regime anchored to resistance to political change and a rapidly changing society gave rise to the profound, irreversible crisis of a dictatorship which, in the words of the British Ambassador in Madrid, was clearly unable to satisfy the aspirations of the people and at the same time keep control of workers, students, intellectuals and minority groups. For a regime whose legitimacy intrinsically depended on maintaining public order and which was radically incompatible with social conflict and dissent, the situation seriously threatened its survival, especially since strikes became a constant and a habitual feature of the Spanish scene in the 1970s. In fact, the protests, which had started in the early 1960s, became more intense and more generalised in the early 1970s, which formed a virtuous circle between the growing socio-political unrest, the spread of activism and the strengthening of organisational structures that, in turn, led to greater mobilisation. In general terms, from 1970 onwards the number of disputes, with the exception of the brief parenthesis between 1971 and 1972, was constantly on the increase (Molinero & Ysàs, 1992).

The dictatorship responded to this means of challenging the legality and *peace* of the Franco regime in the usual way by using greater repression, above all after the Workers’ Commissions were made illegal in 1967. The best example of such tougher controls on public order in these provinces was in the city of Puertollano. In the midst of redundancies, sanctions and arrests, October 1967 saw the dismantling of the Workers’ Commissions in mining areas. The following year, to mark the 1 May celebrations, 35 demonstrators were arrested on 28 April and at the same time, a series of warnings were published in the provincial newspaper threatening to “forcefully and energetically repress any type of disruptive behaviour which may be attempted”.¹⁶

In view of such warnings, it is no surprise that in the summer of 1970, the local committee of the PCE was dismantled and almost 50 people arrested. Although the party quickly reorganised, it was not long before there were new setbacks and from April to June 1971, at least 23 activists from Puertollano were sent to the provincial prison. That year the Civil Governor considered that the organisation “of the clandestine communist party active in the city” had been fully dismantled, thus putting an end to the “constant disturbances to the work and social order and also to public order which existed among the workers of the Puertollano mines and likewise in the *ENCASO* Industrial Complex”. These disturbances “also affected nearby work centres and other towns and villages in the province”. Likewise, part of the local committee from Albacete fell in December 1973, amidst accusations made by a group of priests who complained of the humiliation and mistreatment that some of those arrested had suffered.¹⁷

The period between 1967 and 1973 witnessed what was possibly the greatest wave of repression unleashed on the opposition since the early years of the dictatorship (Foweraker, 1989). But far from acting as a deterrent or preventing people from mobilising, this increased political activities against the Franco regime, led to the spread of solidarity movements at home and significantly damaged the regime’s image abroad. This was true to such an extent that in the early 1970s, not only was the dictatorship unable to guarantee internal stability, but it was also singled out in Strasbourg and Brussels as an insurmountable obstacle to Spain’s integration into some of the West’s main international institutions (EEC and NATO). This factor was of paramount importance given that sectors traditionally allied to the Franco regime (bankers, industrialists, etc.) began to realise that their interests would perhaps be better defended in a more progressive socio-political system. This situation was clearly revealed during the international crisis of 1973 that, in addition to eroding the legitimacy of the regime as a force for economic development, led big business and the world of finance to look towards Europe and meant that they were willing to pay the political price of democratisation in exchange for social stability and entry into the European Common Market.

As some authors have pointed out, rounds of protests mobilise people who are organised but they also organise those who are not mobilised (Tarrow, 1991). The protests that were started in the 1960s by “forward-looking” groups in the large urban and industrial centres of the country gradually opened up new opportunities for the appearance, through imitation and diffusion, of new players. Thus, protests slowly reached, albeit with varying frequency and intensity, new towns and villages in the

provinces of Albacete and Ciudad Real and new areas of the labour market, such as technical and professional sectors. The first mobilisations among these white-collar workers involved bank employees from the province of Albacete. In this sector there was a group of Christian activists who criticised the incompetence of the trade unions of Franco's regime and the lack of legal means to effectively defend workers' interests. Consequently, in 1972 they participated in "pacific protests carried out by bank employees from all around Spain" and shortly afterwards demanded "rights of assembly, association and expression".¹⁸ In December 1974, some 600 bank employees from the province of Albacete joined one of the biggest national strikes that the sector experienced during the dictatorship. Previously, in 1970, these workers had already publicly demanded the creation of a trade union which was "independent from the State, from political groups and from any other organisation" as a "basic principle" to "meet the need to defend our interests". They demanded that the union be "made up only of workers" and that "the businessmen should set up their own", in addition to requesting that "all the leaders, right up to the highest level, be elected by the workers" and that there should be "full guarantees for those who occupy positions of responsibility".¹⁹ It is therefore no surprise that as from the late 1960s, the provincial authorities showed great concern about the situation of the Banking Union "given the level of politicisation of this union and the problems the union is experiencing nationally".²⁰

The early 1970s also witnessed the first signs of ecclesiastic dissent in two dioceses – Albacete and Ciudad Real – which were closely linked to the political power of the dictatorship. It is worth highlighting here that after the Second Vatican Council, certain sectors of the Church moved from a position of consubstantiality with the dictatorship to become a source of conflict and constant criticism. This was the result, among other factors, of the fact that younger members of the clergy identified with the social problems facing workers and therefore with many of the demands made by the movements opposing the Franco regime. From 1970 onwards, authorities from the province of Albacete detected priests who "declare themselves to be liberals and in certain respects hostile to the regime", some of whom had "on several occasions expressed their disagreement with decisions taken by the government and also by their own superiors in the church", and given "sermons of a liberal nature".²¹ In 1973, the Civil Governor of Ciudad Real reported the existence of "certain individual, although mainly isolated, cases of priests expressing criticism or hostility towards the central government during their sermons, mainly when referring to issues concerning the social order". Shortly afterwards, the

“liberal tendencies of the sermons given by a young priest” were also condemned.²² What is more, to the greater puzzlement of the dictatorship this distancing of the Catholic Church spread to a certain sector of the regime’s political elite. These men, who were concerned about preserving their influence and prestige in the face of increasing protests and the growing disrepute of the dictatorship, perceived that their future political careers depended on the creation of a more open system. The fact that one sector of the ruling class was tempted to change and develop the system increased the growing tension in the regime between those who opposed any change whatsoever and those who were in favour of gradual liberalisation. Such internal divisions and break-ups weakened the dictatorship, a situation which became increasingly noticeable as the regime proved unable to promote reforms which would be acceptable to the majority of Spaniards.

What is more, from the late 1960s onwards, other productive sectors of the province of Albacete such as the metal, transport, construction and chemical industries, in addition to the hotel and catering trade and even agriculture, also began to witness an increase in the “general discontent”. This soon turned into “conflictive tensions”, particularly those involving “trade union opposition groups” active in the shoe factories of Almansa and the Workers’ Commissions in the farming sector of Villarrobledo. That same year, the Civil Governor of Ciudad Real warned of the existence of a clandestine group belonging to the PCE in Puertollano which “wastes no opportunity to provoke restlessness and unease among the workers of this important industrial complex”.²³ Under this influence, in 1970 there was “marked tension in the social atmosphere due to the situation of the company” *Hullera del Centro (HUCESA)* in Puertollano. The crisis procedures initiated by the company led to a considerable reduction in staff numbers, although “not before there were various different conflicts and incidents for precisely that reason, in particular two demonstrations in March 1970 which had to be broken up by the police”. Likewise, the same sources reported the existence of “months of more or less organised protests” among workers in the mercury mines in Almadén, which were owned and run by the state. Shortly afterwards, in 1971, there were labour disputes in *HUCESA*, *Tamoin* and *Peñarrova* in Puertollano which were repeated the following year together with disputes in *Montajes Nervión*. In 1971, the police in Albacete showed concern that the “general atmosphere in the province has been one of unrest” and “occasionally alarm”, a “reflection of what is happening nationally”.²⁴

In 1973, the authorities in Albacete acknowledged that “there has been increased activity in what could be referred to as the opposition

movement”.²⁵ That year, Ciudad Real also experienced strikes in *Montajes Basauri* in January and collective action taken by the workers of *Sevillana de Electricidad* between April and June. Thus, despite the “defeats” of the early 1970s, Puertollano demonstrated that the atmosphere was conducive to “hostile activities”. But at that stage Puertollano, which had been the bastion of anti-Franco resistance since 1962 and suffered considerable repression for that very reason, was no longer alone. In 1973, the Civil Governor acknowledged the existence of “Marxist and communist organisations, as well as workers’ commissions” in Almadén and Alcázar de San Juan. The “oil slick” was spreading irremissibly.

OPPORTUNITIES AND THE SPREAD OF THE CONFLICT

During the two years between President Carrero Blanco’s assassination (December 1973) and the death of Franco (November 1975), the instability of the dictatorship grew at the same rate as the disputes. The escalation of social unrest was due to the convergence of different factors that gave rise to an objectively more favourable climate for the mobilisation of working-class movements opposed to the dictatorship. The confused liberalisation process initiated by Arias Navarro’s government, together with the internal break-up of the heart of the regime, the irruption of a major economic crisis which, according to the Governor of Ciudad Real, led to the “toughening of labour relationships and an increase in collective tensions”, and the emergence of an international scene marked by the revolution in Portugal, led to the appearance of political opportunities which made it easier for less docile collectives to act (Tarrow, 2004).

In this context of uncertainty, the opposition movement was strengthened and increased its activities against the Franco regime, which led to greater social mobilisation and political unrest. In both provinces, but especially in Albacete, from 1973 onwards the PCE reorganised its provincial committee and began to penetrate the working-class movement, energised the cultural and associative scene through its presence in student and youth circles, promoted neighbourhood groups which gave rise to resident associations, took part in professional collectives (of health workers, teachers, lawyers, civil servants, etc.) and finally, introduced the cooperative movement to the farming world and organised the Farmers’ Commissions. Albacete also witnessed the appearance of small groups of extreme left-wing activists who

were closely linked to student uprisings, such as the Young Red Guard, the (Marxist–Leninist) Communist Party and factions close to the Revolutionary Workers Organisation. Despite all the limitations and weaknesses resulting from the limited number of people involved and the context, the clandestine activists of these organisations acted in collaboration with Christians, working-class priests and workers to set up incipient social movements (working-class, student, neighbourhood and agricultural movements) which helped to erode the political structures of the dictatorship and also contributed to the pressure which undermined every effort from above to maintain power or reform the system which did not represent a true move towards democracy.

In the urban areas of La Mancha, an ever-increasing number of workers were opposed to the official Francoist vertical trade union, to which membership was mandatory. In 1974, the Provincial Trade Union Delegate from Albacete expressed his concern for what he perceived as “clearly politically motivated plans to complicate the labour situation”. Franco’s governors in Albacete warned of the existence of workers who were being “drawn in by the anti-union stance of some working-class priests working in the city”, who were also accused of straining labour relations. The union leaders in Albacete were even relieved when summer arrived, pleased that “the majority of workers begin their holidays and certain sources of clearly anti-union feeling disappear”.²⁶ The two most important protests took place during the second half of the year. The first involved the conflict in the textile company *López Vera*, which mobilised a great number of workers in the whole sector between September and November and required the intervention of the Governor himself to put an end to a protest which was becoming increasingly politicised and radicalised. The second, which took place during the month of December, involved, as mentioned previously, over five hundred bank employees from Albacete (*Martín García, 2008*). In Ciudad Real, almost two hundred workers went on strike in Puertollano, while at the same time in some villages of the province farmers began to express the discontent that they had kept to themselves for many years in a context of “rising unrest”.

In 1975, the Civil Governor of Ciudad Real had a clear notion of the political and social situation in the province he controlled: “it can be said that the level of unrest has increased throughout the whole province in 1975”.²⁷ This undoubtedly had something to do with the reappearance of the Working Commissions in Puertollano and the Democratic Committee that was set up by residents of the provincial capital. In Albacete, the situation of general unrest and the effects of the economic crisis could also

be felt through increased unrest, which in this case was “even more strained” because of active competition between “groups which could be considered part of the opposition movement”. One such example involved working-class Catholic groups that were accused of using the structures of the Church to incite prejudice “against the established order among the working classes”.²⁸

An important factor in this increased tension and unrest was the appearance of sources of student protests in higher education institutions and secondary schools in provincial capitals like Albacete and Ciudad Real. For instance, in Ciudad Real cells of the PCE appeared in the School of Nursing, the School of Technical Agricultural Engineering, the School of Education and the Juan de Ávila Secondary School. In Albacete, in 1972 and 1973 the Socio-Political Brigade reported “a series of academic strikes and protests involving members of the teaching staff” in secondary schools in the capital, which in 1974 and 1975 led to incidents and various strikes in the School of Education.²⁹

Although the effects of social change, economic development and increased income were always extremely modest in these parts of the country, during the 1960s more and more middle-class pupils were able to gain access to the increasingly overcrowded university system which was also more socially diverse and permanently disrupted by the student movement (Hernández Sandoica, 2007). When the students who, while attending university in Albacete or Ciudad Real, began to get involved in the opposition movement returned home “to their villages” at weekends or during the holidays, they took with them their models for collective action, frames of reference and mobilisation structures which opened up new opportunities for young people who were part of the social networks then developing in the universities, secondary schools and youth clubs mentioned previously.³⁰ Thus, university students helped to develop processes to spread the protest by means of which it was possible for players from different enclaves to see themselves as sufficiently similar to each other to justify joint action. Thanks to them, and also to working-class priests, other exiled anti-Franco activists, the media, gatherings and meetings with activists from other places, etc., information about the “initial action reaches geographically or institutionally distant groups which, on the basis of this information, consider themselves to be sufficiently similar to the initial insurgents” and decide to emulate them. Organisational resources, information and speeches were gradually channelled into these mechanisms, which managed to build bridges between the demands and identities of collectives from different parts of the country. This resulted in changes in the quantity and

level of coordinated disputes that led to more generalised unrest and a larger number of players involved (McAdam, 2003).

It was equally important to keep university students politically active once they had left university and entered the labour market. From 1975 onward the city of Albacete witnessed movements in the professional associations of lawyers, draughtsmen and doctors, while the Education Department of the University of Ciudad Real witnessed a surge in hostility after the arrival of a group of young teachers from Madrid. According to the police, they intended to transfer “the conflicts and labour problems that temporary teachers faced in Madrid and other capitals” to secondary and higher education in the capital of La Mancha. And 1975 also saw the appearance of a group of lawyers and university graduates who organised debates, conferences and lunches in the *Juman Club* in order to discuss “the current Spanish political scene and the possibility of creating a political association advocating independent democracy, freedom of assembly and association, membership of the European Common Market, amnesty, etc.”.³¹ Likewise, in the 1970s the world of professional journalism witnessed the arrival of young graduates who had been taught socialist principles while working in the turbulent student media. At the same time some groups of young people started to make their first contributions to opinion journalism. In this respect, “by providing information about what they do, the movements create opportunities for their followers, third parties, political parties and elites” (Tarrow, 2004, p. 110). In this sense, above all between 1974 and 1975, the newspaper *La Verdad* from Albacete played an extremely important role in the development of the trade union movement in Albacete. By taking advantage of the fact that it belonged to a Catholic press group, it was able to transmit workers’ problems and initiatives to the whole of society. In parallel with these events, newspapers emerged which were published by clandestine organisations. These included the Democratic Information Bulletin (*Boletín Democrático de Información*) published by the PCE in Albacete and The Provincial Truth (*La Verdad Provincial*) published by the communists in Ciudad Real. The aim of the latter, according to the police, was to “promote the clandestine democratic efforts of the communist party among the working class”. The main benefit of these types of clandestine publications, despite their lack of realism on occasions and their limited circulation, was that by informing people of protests taking place in other parts of the country and providing information on the contents and forms of action happening in other places, they managed to make workers understand that “what initially appeared to be individual ideas and actions” were in fact “shared and carried out by others” (Gusfield, 2001, p. 105).

For example, once Franco had died, the leaders of the Catholic Working-Class Youth Association of Albacete valued the bulletin entitled Working-Class Youth (*Juventud Obrera*) because it “offers alternatives for action as it provides information about experiences in other places”.³²

The labour conflicts which took place in the health sector in the province of Albacete during 1975 were the direct result of transferring opposition straight from the student movement to the new professional setting. Although joined by nurses and nursing auxiliaries, not for nothing were the disputes mainly organised by housemen, a group whose protests were based on “a political conscience previously acquired at university when part of the student movement” (Lacalle, 1976, p. 35). During the summer of 1975 there were strikes, sit-ins and disputes at the Social Security Hospital and in the Psychiatric Hospital in Albacete. However, health workers were not the only group in the public administration system that showed signs of rebelliousness during Franco’s final months. In 1975 and 1976, they were joined by technicians from the Administration of Justice and from the municipal administration system, teachers, prison warders, veterinary surgeons, etc.

Thus, dissent and discontent erupted in a state administration system that had been purged during the post-war period and that had previously been faithful to the dictatorship. The outbreak of conflicts among these groups helped to change the way working-class protests were viewed by sections of society whose image of such protests had been based on prejudice. At least partly, such fears and distrust began to recede when those who organised the strike and were later arrested were not only factory workers or “uncivilised” farmers, but rather doctors, teachers, lawyers and journalists. This gradually led to greater social acceptance of collective action to which the dictatorship had no answer and little symbolic capacity with which to discredit it.

In both provinces, just like in the rest of the country, the “models of collective behaviour which were essentially proletarian at the start of the cycle became the currency of all wage earners when the cycle reached its peak” (Tarrow, 1989, p. 331). But activists from the middle and professional classes did not merely emulate the wage demands of manual workers. As a reflection of the socialist political principles they had previously acquired in the university movement, the most committed hospital and school workers made very similar demands to those made by students, above all those related to improvements in public services and others linked to reforms in the health and education systems that involved changing the political structure of the country. This “tertiarisation” of the conflict, together with the appearance of the neighbourhood association movement, helped to question the social legitimacy of the regime by increasing people’s interest in

the workings of public services and taking a deeper look at the moral economy of a working class which, above all when the economic crisis got worse, began to understand the need to obtain small parts of that indirect salary which had been relegated to second place in the light of the emphasis factory workers placed on wage claims. Thus, the problems of increasing sectors of the population converged and encouraged protests not only against the political order but also against the lifestyle and system of values supported by the political order.

This was the case of the town of Almansa, and subsequently Alcázar de San Juan, where amidst disputes involving various sectors of the health service in the capital and the demands of a growing neighbourhood association movement, an important civil campaign began which demanded the construction of a hospital. In 1974, the Trade Union Organisation itself highlighted that “the problem of medical attention in Almansa was terrible and the target of all kinds of criticism. Since it was a general problem, it went beyond the scope of the trade union because it did not only apply to workers’ health care but instead affected the whole population because of the lack of doctors and specialists in almost all basic areas”. Furthermore, according to Franco’s authorities, opposition groups were focusing on these deficiencies and there was a risk of “attempts being made to politicise and disrupt the labour situation”. In fact there had already been “attempts to hold demonstrations, carry out technical stoppages and even proposals not to pay Social Security contributions”.³³ In this atmosphere of public anger over the lack of medical attention, many parents suddenly began to express their discontent with the dreadful condition of the classrooms in one of the schools in the town. This, together with the Mayor’s inability to keep the promises he had made, led some 70 families to hold a demonstration in the street and refuse to send their children to school at the start of the academic year in 1975. Thus, in Almansa deficiencies in public services gave rise to a common feeling among citizens that they had been abandoned by the central and local authorities. Apart from helping to strengthen links between residents, workers and members of the opposition, this feeling obliged people to reflect on the fact that the political system was unworkable.

AFTER FRANCO: THE FINAL BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY

As outlined earlier, the origins of the transition to democracy are closely linked to the crisis within the Franco regime and both, in turn, are related to

the increase in social unrest and mobilisation that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, according to a report at the time of Franco's death in 1975, his regime had been profoundly weakened by the considerable mobilisation of the labour force in recent years, dissent in universities and among professional collectives, the growth of socialist or regionalist clandestine political parties and regional discontent. These all indicated that discontent was rising and that there was a growing demand for representative institutions, elections, free trade unions, etc.

Franco died on 20 November 1975, yet his death did not represent, as is usually claimed, the beginning of the transition. His death was followed by several months of heightened social conflict and police repression more closely related to a fight for democratic freedom against a dictatorship which was weakened but whose instruments of repression remained intact, than a planned process of political transition (Sartorius & Sabio, 2007). After the dictator's disappearance, the social and political dynamics of the country, and by extension the provinces under study here, became even more turbulent and difficult at the end of 1975 and during the early months of 1976. If the number of disputes quintupled between 1971 and 1975, in 1976 the number of workers on strike and the number of hours lost because of disputes multiplied the figures for the previous year by four and seven, respectively. The number of days lost for every thousand workers due to labour disputes tripled the average figure for countries in the EEC, despite the fact that in these countries – unlike in Franco's Spain – workers had the right to strike. According to diplomatic reports written shortly after Franco's death, not for nothing was the combination of labour unrest, disturbances in the streets and violence capable of leading to a loss of control of the situation, which forced a radical change with unpredictable consequences in Spain. The situation, which the reformist sectors of the dictatorship were fully aware of, required the route towards reform to speed up if the unrest were not to spread and undermine any possibility of peaceful change.

This spectacular growth in the level of social mobilisation was linked to the negotiation of two-thirds of the collective agreements in the context of a harsh economic crisis. However, there is no doubt that such outbreaks of protest were mainly due to an increase in the opportunities available and the political expectations resulting from Franco's death. With uncommon force, the dictator's disappearance brought together specific demands made in the workplace with the unrest of society in general. This helped to form strong links between the disputes at local or sectorial level and the national struggle for political power. In the words of the Provincial Work Delegation of

Albacete, “tension and disputes were increasing” in the province, especially at the “end of the year” which was a “reflection of the national situation”. Along these same lines, the trade union leadership acknowledged that it could not avoid “the series of social and labour demands which have appeared all around the country and which, naturally, can also be heard in our province”.³⁴ Thus, in the following months there were strikes and stoppages in numerous sectors of these two provinces such as health, teaching, metal, electricity, mining, textile, banking, shoes making, leather, agriculture, transport, etc. Moreover, these labour conflicts were supplemented and strengthened by additional collective action such as sit-ins, demonstrations and mass meetings.

These social disputes gave rise to an incipient civil society, which met in bookshops, cultural associations, cinema clubs, youth clubs, independent theatre groups, neighbourhood associations, etc. In short, the final moments of Franco’s regime witnessed the dawn of a booming civil society, which opened up new areas of debate and political training beyond the social control of the dictatorship. At the heart of this incipient civil society, increasing numbers of people from these provinces learned about and embraced democratic practices and values.

Moreover, among the increasing number of socio-political demands made once Franco had died, the request for an amnesty played a leading role. This was demanded in demonstrations and sung during concerts of protest songs and it brought together different sections of society united under the identity of citizens with political rights around demands for freedom and democracy. This happened in the demonstration which took place in the streets of Puertollano on 14th July under a single slogan of “Amnesty”.³⁵ A little earlier in February 1976 in Albacete, calls were made for an “amnesty for different classes, sectors and people”. At the end of January 1976, the Town Hall of Hellín even called for an “amnesty for political prisoners and exiles and for those suffering sanctions because of union and labour activities”.³⁶ It is therefore no surprise that the Civil Governor of Albacete considered the demand for amnesty to be “the most evocative and the most frequently used as a banner for more or less public demonstrations and clandestine events which claim to be cultural acts, scientific conferences, etc”.³⁷

The dictator’s death was a pivotal point which came at a time when those who were “less brave, but more numerous, saw that the system was vulnerable to the protests”. As a result, Franco’s death triggered an intense period of mobilisation which affected almost all parts of Spain and in many places saw the appearance of open labour disputes for the first time. The politicisation and exuberance of the social scene following Franco’s death

increased the expectations of a collective response from players who prior to the weakening of the dictatorship had been passive and who sensed greater opportunities to obtain improvements in their living conditions. For that reason, in 1976 collectives such as taxi drivers, bakers, photographers, nurses, etc. joined the conflict. Although the demands of these groups centred mainly on working conditions, the mobilisation of sectors which had few links with collective action embodied, precisely because they had the opportunity to mobilise at a time of social unrest when the dictatorship was breaking up, the inherent political importance of the appearance of any new collective group in conflict. Moreover, when towards the end of 1976 the round of protests reached its peak, the range of tactical innovations and the variety of actions increased. This introduced new forms of organisation and new ways of expressing discontent such as recitals, political dinners, sit-down protests, canteen boycotts, etc.

In conclusion, the Spanish case has often been presented, in line with the arguments of J.J. Linz, as a pragmatic model of political crafting acted out in the upper echelons of politics. The lack of interest in the role of civil society groups has often been attributed to the fact that the process of political change was initiated, and controlled, from within the regime itself by its more progressive sectors. But the fact is that at the time of Franco's death, it was unviable for the dictatorship to continue despite the control that it still had over the armed forces, the police and the judiciary. It is therefore impossible to understand the appearance of pro-change attitudes at the core of the Franco regime without taking into account the fact that during the 1970s it became increasingly clear that the regime was incapable of adapting to the profound changes which had been taking place in Spanish society since the early 1960s. These increasingly met with clear expressions of rejection and dissent among a wide range of sectors of society. Thus, the end of the dictatorship and the recovery of freedom was in part a popular victory, which contrasts and counterbalances conventional interpretations which take the recovery of freedom for granted and refer to the almost natural exhaustion of the regime. Among the factors which made the dictatorship impracticable and the democratic alternative a possibility, it is worth highlighting that there were many different forms of disputes involving an ever increasing number of citizens against a regime which was radically incompatible with any kind of breach of the peace and in the context of a society which was constantly undergoing changes and transformations with new attitudes, expectations and behavioural guidelines. The fever pitch that protests reached during the final period of Franco's regime, not only in the major urban and industrial centres of the

country but also in rural and less developed areas, helped to place democratic demands at the top of the political agenda and clear the way for political change.

NOTES

1. In fact, it has almost become a tradition, as Fishman (2007, p. 2) states, for contemporary analysts of Spanish politics to observe “political protest with much less significance than other themes located squarely within the realm of institutionalized power”.

2. See, among others, Gallego (2008), Sartorius and Sabio (2007) and Ortiz Heras (2008).

3. Provincial Deputy Secretariat of Social Organisation (VPOS), “Antecedentes sobre el parte reservado correspondiente al mes de enero de 1964”, Provincial Historical Archive of Ciudad Real (AHPCR), Institutional Administration of Socio-Professional Services (AISS), Folder 55.

4. VPOS, “Antecedentes sobre el parte reservado correspondiente al mes de noviembre 1964” and “Acta de presidentes de las secciones sociales del sindicato provincial y de la COSA”, May 1964, AHPCR, AISS, Folders 55 and 715.

5. Workers’ Commission of Puertollano, “A los trabajadores y al pueblo de Puertollano”, 27th April, 1968, in AHPCR, Civil Government (GC), Folder 1058 (Ortiz & Sánchez, 1993).

6. According to the testimony of Julián Gómez, who lived in Villamalea and was an activist in the PCE (2007), Seminary of Studies on Francoism and the Transition (SEFT), University of Castile–La Mancha (UCLM).

7. “Villamalea, Ref. OA/17. C-20-4-70, Informe de Carlos”, 20th April. Historical Archive of the PCE (AHPCE), Nationalities and Regions, Provincial Committee of Albacete, file 67, 5/3.

8. Civil Government of Albacete, “Memoria del Gobierno Civil”, 1972, Historical Archive of the Province of Albacete (AHPA), Civil Government (GC), book (reference number not available).

9. “Villamalea, Ref. OA/17. – C-20-4-70. Informe de Carlos”, 20 April 1970.

10. According to the testimony of Joaquín Fernández and José García, both of whom lived in Villamalea and were Communist Party members (2007), SEFT, UCLM.

11. According to the testimony of Julián Gómez (2007), SEFT, UCLM.

12. According to the testimony of Joaquín Fernández (2007), SEFT, UCLM.

13. “Villamalea, Ref. OA/17. –C- 20-4-70. Informe de Carlos”, 20 April 1970.

14. In the words of one communist activist of the time “we were normal, politically committed people who had nothing to do with the image that the regime had created in people’s minds of thieving, murderous communists. In Villamalea that was all thrown overboard because we were normal people who worked like everybody else. We drank our beers and took part in everything ... in the dances, parties and football matches ... and what’s more, we cared about the problems of the village”. According to the testimony of Joaquín Fernández (2007), SEFT, UCLM.

15. *El País*, 14 November, 1976, p. 11.
16. *Lanza*, 30 April 1968, p. 1.
17. *La Verdad*, 23 January, 1974, p. 4.
18. *La Verdad*, 9 July 1974, p. 5.
19. Banking Union, "Libro de Actas", 20 January 1970, AHPA, Libros de la OS, Book 443.
20. Secretariat of Economic Affairs, "Memorias", 1968, AHPA, Trade Union Organisation (OS), Folder 2133.
21. Civil Government of Albacete, "Memoria del Gobierno Civil", 1969 and 1970, AHPA, GC, book (reference number not available).
22. Civil Government of Ciudad Real, "Memoria de gestión anual correspondiente a 1972", AGA (General Archive of the Administration), Interior, Folder 474. Provincial Police Superintendent, "Informe sobre orden público y criminalidad en esta capital desde enero a abril del corriente año 1975", AHPCR, GC, Folder 409.
23. Civil Government of Ciudad Real, "Memoria de gestión correspondiente a 1969", AGA, Interior, Folder 492.
24. Civil Government of Ciudad Real, "Memoria de gestión del Gobierno Civil del año 1970", AGA, Interior, Folder 498. Civil Government of Albacete, "Memoria del Gobierno Civil", 1971, AHPA, GC, book, (reference number not available).
25. Civil Government of Albacete, "Memoria del Gobierno Civil", 1973, AHPA, GC, book, reference number not available.
26. Secretariat of Social Affairs, "Partes a Madrid", 15 June 1974, AHPA, OS, Folder 2145.
27. Civil Government of Ciudad Real, "Memoria de gestión anual correspondiente a 1975", AGA, Interior, Folder 11448.
28. Secretariat of Social Affairs, "Partes a Madrid", 15 June 1975, AHPA, OS, File 2146. Secretariat of Economic Affairs, "Memorias", 1975, AHPA, OS, File 2133.
29. State Interior Policy Office "Acuses de recibo", 3, 6 and 21 March 1975, AHPCR, GC, Folder 387.
30. The youngest activists, who were still in the secondary schools of Albacete, drew considerable inspiration "from what students from Murcia and Valencia brought them." However, the students also had "quite a lot of influence" on young workers, since "there was a group of university students who used to bring back ideas from the university". According to the testimony of Victoria Delicado (2007) and Fernando Sánchez (2005), SEFT, UCLM.
31. Provincial Police Superintendent, "Informe sobre orden público y criminalidad en esta capital desde enero a abril del corriente año 1975", AHPCR, GC, Folder 409.
32. "A todos los militantes de la Federación JOC. Síntesis de la planificación del trabajo que tiene que realizar el equipo de la Juventud Obrera", March 1976, Josefina Ruescas' private archive.
33. Delegación Comarcal de Almansa, "Correspondencia", 1975, AHPA, OS, Folder 3874.
34. Civil Government of Albacete, "Memoria del Gobierno Civil", 1975, AHPA, GC, book, reference number not available.
35. Provincial Police Superintendent, "Manifestación autorizada el día 14 en Puertollano", 20th July 1976, AHPCR, GC, File 371; *Lanza*, 15th July, 1976, p. 26.

36. *La Verdad*, 29th January, 1976, p. 12.

37. Civil Government of Albacete, “Memoria del Gobierno Civil”, 1976, AHPA, GC, book, reference number not available. *La Verdad*, 8th February, 1976, p. 7.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This work was funded by the National R+D+i Programme of the Ministry of Education and Science and written as part of the research project *El largo camino hacia la democracia. Cambio económico, movimientos sociales y construcción identitaria en la España meridional (1959–1979)*, HUM2006-14138-C06-03/HIST. Translated by Paul Edgar.

REFERENCES

- Álvarez Junco, J. (2001). Movimientos sociales en España: Del modelo tradicional a la modernidad postfranquista. In: E. Laraña & J. Gusfield (Eds), *Los nuevos movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad* (pp. 413–443). Madrid: CIS.
- Balfour, S. (1989). *Dictatorship, workers and the city: Labour in Greater Barcelona since 1939*. Oxford: OUP.
- Balfour, S. (1994). *La dictadura, los trabajadores y la ciudad. El movimiento obrero en el área metropolitana de Barcelona (1939–1988)*. Valencia: Edicions Alfons el Magnànim.
- Cobo, F., & Ortega, T. (2003). La protesta de sólo unos pocos. El débil y tardío surgimiento de la protesta laboral y de la oposición democrática al régimen franquista en Andalucía oriental. *Historia Contemporánea*, 26, 113–135.
- Eisenstadt, S. M. (1965). *Modernization: Protest and change*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Fishman, R. (1990). *Working class organization and the return to democracy in Spain*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Fishman, R. (2004). *Democracy’s voices. Social ties and the quality of public life in Spain* (p. 11). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Fishman, R. (2007). On the significance of public protest: Puzzles and challenges of Spanish politics (Along with some explanations). *Newsletter of Iberian Politics*, 2(1), 2–11.
- Foweraker, J. (1989). *Making democracy in Spain*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Gallego, F. (2008). *El mito de la transición*. Barcelona: Crítica.
- Gómez Roda, A. (2004). *Comisiones Obreras y represión franquista*. Valencia: PUV.
- González Madrid, D. (2008). Los trabajadores de Ciudad Real frente a la dictadura franquista. In: M. Ortiz Heras (Ed.), *Movimientos sociales en la crisis de la dictadura y la transición. Castilla-La Mancha 1969–1979* (pp. 93–130). Ciudad Real: Biblioteca Añil.
- Gunther, R. (1992). Spain: The very model of the modern elite settlement. In: J. Highley & R. Gunther (Eds), *Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (pp. 122–144). New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Gusfield, J. (2001). La reflexividad de los movimientos sociales: Revisión de las teorías sobre la sociedad de masas y el comportamiento colectivo. In: E. Laraña & J. Gusfield (Eds), *Los nuevos movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad* (pp. 93–199). Madrid: CIS.
- Hernández Sandoica, E. (2007). *Estudiantes contra Franco (1939–1975). Oposición política y movilización juvenil*. Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros.
- Karl, T. L., & Schmitter, P. C. (1991). Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe. *International Social Science Journal*, 128, 269–284.
- Lacalle, D. (1976). Profesionales y técnicos ante el conflicto laboral. In: D. Lacalle (Ed.), *El conflicto laboral en profesionales y técnicos*. Madrid: Editorial Ayuso.
- Laraña, E. (1999). *La construcción de los movimientos sociales*. Madrid: Alianza.
- Lipset, S. (1960). *Political man. The social basis of politics*. New York: Doubleday.
- Martín García, O. (2008). Albacete: de la balsa de aceite a la conflictividad social. In: M. Ortiz Heras (Ed.), *Movimientos sociales en la crisis de la dictadura y la transición* (pp. 60–92). Ciudad Real: Biblioteca Añil.
- McAdam, D. (2001). Cultura y movimientos sociales. In: E. Laraña & J. Gusfield (Eds), *Los nuevos movimientos sociales. De la ideología a la identidad* (pp. 43–69). Madrid: CIS.
- McAdam, D. (2003). Beyond structural analysis: Toward a more dynamic understanding of social movements. In: M. Diani & D. McAdam (Eds), *Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to collective action* (pp. 289–316). Oxford: OUP.
- McAdam, D. (2005). *Dinámica de la contienda política*. Barcelona: Hacer.
- Molinero, C., & Ysàs, P. (1992). Movimientos sociales y actitudes políticas en la crisis del franquismo. *Historia Contemporánea*, 8, 269–287.
- Ortiz Heras, M. (2002). Trasapal: la consigna de la huelga en Puertollano. In: R. Vega (Ed.), *El camino que marcaba Asturias. Las huelgas de 1962 y su repercusión internacional* (pp. 337–349). Gijón: Trea.
- Ortiz Heras, M. (2008). *Los movimientos sociales en la crisis de la dictadura y la transición: Castilla-La Mancha, 1969–1979*. Ciudad Real: Añil.
- Ortiz, M., & Sánchez, I. (1993). Comisiones Obreras en Castilla – La Mancha: Puertollano como un tolmo, 1962–1978. In: D. Ruiz (Ed.), *Historia de Comisiones Obreras (1958–1988)* (pp. 363–389). Madrid: Siglo XXI.
- Sanz Díaz, B. (2003). *Villamalea. Historia de un pueblo de Castilla-La Mancha, 1875–1977*. Villamalea: Ayuntamiento de Villamalea.
- Sartorius, N., & Sabio, R. (2007). *El final de la dictadura. La conquista de la democracia en España. Noviembre de 1975-Junio de 1977*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy.
- Scott, J. (1990). *Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts*. Yale: Yale University Press.
- Sewell, W. H. (1994). Cómo se forman las clases: Reflexiones críticas en torno a la teoría de E. P. Thompson sobre la formación de la clase obrera. *Historia Social*, 18, 91–117.
- Tarrow, S. (1989). *Democracy and disorder. Protest and politics in Italy, 1965–1975*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Tarrow, S. (1991). *Struggle, politics and reform: Collective action, social movements and cycles of protest*. Occasional Paper, Vol. 21, pp. 47–69. Western Society Program, Cornell University.
- Tarrow, S. (2004). *El poder en movimiento. Los movimientos sociales, la acción colectiva y la política*. Madrid: Alianza.
- Threlfall, M. (2008). Reassessing the role of civil society organizations in the transition to democracy in Spain. *Democratization*, 15(5), 935–955.
- Tilly, Ch. (1998). *El siglo rebelde, 1830–1930*. Zaragoza: PUZ.

PART II
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
EMPIRE AND COLONIALISM
(GUEST-EDITED BY JULIAN GO)

NEO-BOURDIEUSIAN THEORY AND THE QUESTION OF SCIENTIFIC AUTONOMY: GERMAN SOCIOLOGISTS AND EMPIRE, 1890s–1940s

George Steinmetz

What were the specific properties of the field in which the colonial science of people like Maunier produced its discourse on the colonial world [?] ... We need to analyze the relationship this relatively autonomous scientific field had with, on the one hand, the colonial power, and, on the other, the central intellectual power, that is to say, the metropolitan science of the day.

“Les conditions sociales de la production sociologique: sociologie coloniale et décolonisation de la sociologie,” contribution to a conference on Ethnology and Politics of the Maghreb, June 5, 1975. (Bourdieu, 1993a, p. 51)

This paper explores the connections between the discipline of sociology and imperial politics. More specifically, I ask why some of the sociologists who study empires are able to keep a certain degree of analytic distance from their object of analysis, while others are drawn into direct or indirect dependence on the empires they study. Bourdieusian sociology of science defines this as a problem of *scientific autonomy* and *scientific heteronomy* (Bourdieu, 1988, 2004). Colonialism and imperialism are certainly not the only objects of study that often undermine scientific objectivity. Almost all research in the social sciences deals with topics and objects whose very

Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 20, 71–131
Copyright © 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 0198-8719/doi:10.1108/S0198-8719(2009)0000020009

existence is seen as oppressive or objectionable. Empires are an interesting example of a contentious object of analysis because of their enormous prestige in certain times and places and their ignominious reputation in much of the world since the 1960s. For over a century, colonial and noncolonial empires and their allied research organizations have offered employment, professional awards, and economic resources to sociologists and other scientists in exchange for practical, applicable results.

The loss of scientific independence is not simply a function of professional rewards and financial resources, however. The question of autonomy in scientific work is shadowed by the psychic issue of ego autonomy. Since Freud, the problem of ego autonomy has usually been focused on difficulties in gaining independence from parental figures. In his classic psychobiography of Max Weber, Mitzman (1985) focuses almost entirely on the impulses and impediments to Weber's intellectual work and intimate life that resulted from this original triangle. More recently however psychoanalytic theory has begun applying concepts such as transference, symbolic and imaginary identification, and ego ideals and ideal egos to the entire sweep of social existence. If we return to Mitzman's case study, this broadened perspective would suggest analyzing Weber's relations with a whole array of personages, while retaining a focus on the originary genesis of the subject in the parental triangle. Scientists are surrounded by figures who have mentored, influenced, and praised them and also by others who have personally dominated, challenged, debated, ridiculed, and disdained them and their work. Positive identifications and negative cathexes both compound the problem of scientific autonomy, as Mitzman (1985) shows. The work of scientists, like that of poets, writers, and artists (Bloom, 1997), is shaped by powerful identifications with idealized role models, by positive and negative transferences, and most broadly by the unconscious and its fantasies, wishes, needs, and drives.

Connecting social and psychic mechanisms in the study of scientific autonomy and other social practices is part of a larger project of constructing a *neo-Bourdieuian social theory*. A reconstructed (neo- or post-) Bourdieusian approach needs to integrate social and psychic mechanisms and to accentuate the historicizing tendencies in Bourdieu's work – tendencies that led him toward a conjunctural mode of accounting for ruptural historical events¹ and a historicist understanding of his own key categories such as symbolic capital and field as being linked to a specific world-historical time and place (Steinmetz, 2010a). I refer to the theoretical approach that results from historicizing Bourdieusian theory and specifying its psychoanalytic microfoundations as *historical socioanalysis*.

The “historical” part of this formula suggests that any and all social science needs to remain aware of the cultural, geographical, and epochal situatedness of all causal mechanisms or structures.² The psychoanalytic aspect is reflected in the shift from “sociology” to “socioanalysis” (a move made by Bourdieu himself) and in reinterpretation of Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and symbolic capital as involving, respectively, imaginary and symbolic identifications (Steinmetz, 2006a). The psychoanalytic and historical emphases in this approach reinforce each other, since it is at the level of the individual and the individual unconscious that we can most clearly perceive the basic historical principles of overdetermination, accident, conjuncture, and unpredictability, principles that need to be applied in the analysis of any social event or process (Steinmetz, 2008a). In this chapter, I will try to show how Bourdieu’s account of scientific autonomy and heteronomy is enriched through an account of autonomy’s psychofoundations.

I will focus here on two German sociological analysts of empire, Max Weber and Richard Thurnwald, both of whom faced threats to the autonomy of their scientific work on empires – threats that emanated specifically from the German empire(s) in which they lived and from the empires they took as their analytic objects. The cases of Weber and Thurnwald stake out two extremes on a spectrum of postures concerning scientific autonomy. I will ask how we might account for their differing ability to main scientific independence.

SOCIOLOGY AND EMPIRE

Anthropologists have long discussed the ways in which their discipline has been entangled, consciously and unconsciously, with the colonized populations they study. A foundational text in this regard was Michel Leiris’ *Phantom Africa (L’Afrique fantôme; Leiris, 1934)*, which described an African ethnographic expedition led by Marcel Griaule as a form of colonial plunder. Leiris criticized anthropologists’ focus on the most isolated, rural, and traditional cultures, which could more easily be described as untouched by European influences, and he saw this as a way of disavowing the very existence of colonialism. In 1950, Leiris challenged Europeans’ ability even to understand the colonized, writing that “ethnography is closely linked to the colonial fact, whether ethnographers like it or not. In general they work in the colonial or semi-colonial territories dependent on their country of origin, and even if they receive no direct support from the local

representatives of their government, they are tolerated by them and more or less identified, by the people they study, as agents of the administration” (Leiris, 1950, p. 358). Similar ideas were discussed by French social scientists throughout the 1950s. Maxime Rodinson argued in the *Année sociologique* that “colonial conditions make even the most technically sophisticated sociological research singularly unsatisfying, from the standpoint of the desiderata of a scientific sociology” (Rodinson, 1955, p. 373). In a rejoinder to Leiris, Pierre Bourdieu acknowledged in *Work and Workers in Algeria* (*Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*) that “no behavior, attitude or ideology can be explained objectively without reference to the existential situation of the colonized as it is determined by the action of economic and social forces characteristic of the colonial system,” but he insisted that the “problems of science” needed to be separated from “the anxieties of conscience” (2003, pp. 13–14). Since Bourdieu had been involved in a study of an incredibly violent redistribution of Algerians by the French colonial army at the height of the anticolonial revolutionary war, he had good reason to be sensitive to Leiris’ criticisms (Bourdieu & Sayad, 1964). Rodinson called Bourdieu’s critique of Leiris’ thesis “excellent” (1965, p. 360), but Bourdieu later revised his views, noting that the works that had been available to him at the time of his research in Algeria tended “to justify the colonial order” (1990, p. 3). At the 1974 colloquium that gave rise to a book on the connections between anthropology and colonialism, *Le mal de voir*, Bourdieu called for an analysis of the relatively autonomous field of colonial science (1993a, p. 51). A parallel discussion took place in American anthropology somewhat later, during the 1960s. At the 1965 meetings of the American Anthropological Association, Marshall Sahlins criticized the “enlistment of scholars” in “cold war projects such as Camelot” as “servants of power in a *gendarmérie* relationship to the Third World.” This constituted a “sycophantic relation to the state unbefitting science or citizenship” (Sahlins, 1967, pp. 72, 76). Sahlins underscored the connections between “scientific functionalism and the natural interest of a leading world power in the status quo” and called attention to the language of contagion and disease in the documents of “Project Camelot,” adding that “waiting on call is the doctor, the US Army, fully prepared for its self-appointed ‘important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of nation-building’” a mission accompanied by “insurgency prophylaxis” (1967, pp. 77–78). At the end of the decade, *Current Anthropology* published a series of articles on anthropologists’ “social responsibilities,” and *Human Organization* published a symposium entitled “Decolonizing Applied Social Sciences.” British anthropologists followed suit, as evidenced by Talal Asad’s 1973 collection *Anthropology*

and the Colonial Encounter. During the 1980s, authors such as [Gothsch \(1983\)](#) began to address the question of German anthropology's involvement in colonialism. The most recent revival of this discussion was in response to the Pentagon's deployment of "embedded anthropologists" in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Middle East. The "Network of Concerned Anthropologists" in the AAA asked "researchers to sign an online pledge not to work with the military," arguing that they "are not all necessarily opposed to other forms of anthropological consulting for the state, or for the military, especially when such cooperation contributes to generally accepted humanitarian objectives ... However, work that is covert, work that breaches relations of openness and trust with studied populations, and work that enables the occupation of one country by another violates professional standards" ("Embedded Anthropologists" 2007).³ Other disciplines, notably geography, economics, area studies, and political science, have also started to examine the involvement of their fields with empire.⁴

With very few exceptions, however, historians of sociology have not been interested in this set of issues (but see [Connell, 1997, 2007](#); [Steinmetz, 2010b](#)). Sociologists have, however, been deeply involved in studying, counseling, and criticizing empires from the discipline's intellectual beginnings in the 19th century through to the present. Each phase of sociology's disciplinary development has been embedded within, or shadowed by, new developments in imperial politics. Auguste Comte, who first popularized the word "sociology," discussed early modern colonialism in his *Cours de philosophie positive*, asking "whether the colonial system on the whole accelerated or retarded the overall development of modern society," and concluding that colonialism actually "retarded social development" by promoting "retrograde thought and social immobility" (Comte, 1830–1842, Vol. 6, pp. 128–129, 133–134).⁵ Many of sociology's 19th-century *predisciplinary* founders were directly concerned with colonialism, including John Stuart Mill, who worked on native policy for the British East Indies Company in India ([Zastoupil, 1994](#)), [Tocqueville \(2001\)](#), who developed policies for colonial Algeria and India, and Albert Schäffle, who wrote a book-length essay on "colonial political studies" ([Schäffle, 1886–1888](#)). Sociology emerged as a university academic discipline in precisely the same decade as the European scramble for Africa (the second wave of global colonialism), United States colonial expansion in the aftermath of the Spanish-American war, and the development of imperialist spheres of influence, treaty ports, and coastal colonies in China. Few attentive contemporaries, one might think, could fail to speculate about

the reasons for this imperial upsurge, the looming dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the crumbling of the Qing dynasty in China, or the rivalries pushing European states toward war with one another.

Many of the founders of sociology as an academic discipline in the decades leading up to the World War I focused on traditional land empires or modern colonialism. The leading figure in the first generation of academic sociology in Germany, Max Weber, analyzed land empires throughout his entire academic career. His brother Alfred Weber published on European colonialism (Weber, 1918, 1935, 2000) and the Chinese empire (Weber, 1943). Alfred Vierkandt published a treatise on *Naturvölker and Kulturvölker* (natural and cultural peoples), developing a distinction that undergirded German colonial discourse and policy (Vierkandt, 1896).⁶ Franz Oppenheimer's (1929) *System of Sociology* included a volume on ancient Rome. Ernst Grünfeld (1913) published a study of European treaty port colonies in China.⁷ Leopold von Wiese, a leading figure in Weimar and post-1945 German sociology, wrote extensively on his travels in India, Hong Kong, and the German colony in Qingdao, China (von Wiese, 1914a, 1914b, 1922), and published a semi-pornographic colonial novel set in British colonial Ceylon (von Wiese, 1923).

Sociologists in other countries were equally focused on empire during sociology's foundational period. The first international "Congress of colonial sociology," attended by a number of French university professors, was held in Paris in 1900.⁸ A large number of French sociologists were connected to colonialism as their analytic object, research setting, or source of analytic raw material, and these numbers increased during the interwar period and the two decades after World War II. Several of the founders of US sociology were involved in the Anti-Imperialist League, an organization described by Albion Small as a precursor of the American Sociological Society (Small, 1916, p. 775). Franklin Giddings became a supporter of American imperialism (Giddings, 1900). W. E. B. Du Bois wrote about colonialism continuously from World War II (Du Bois, 1915) until his death in Ghana in 1963. Dutch sociologist Steinmetz (1903) analyzed indigenous or "customary law" in European colonies. Most of the early founders of British sociology were involved in Britain's imperial ventures in one way or another, including Benjamin Kidd, whose *Control of the Tropics* (Kidd, 1898) compared different approaches to colonial rule, and Patrick Geddes (1917, 1947), who was both a critic of imperialism and a direct contributor to British rule in India. When the World War I shattered Europe's long-lasting peace, social scientists began to speculate about the "atavistic" elements allegedly lying behind Germany's

imperialist aggressiveness (Veblen, 1915; Schumpeter, 1951). W. E. B. Du Bois argued that German bellicosity was driven by British and French efforts at “relegating Germany to a second place in colonial imperialism,” and that support for Nazism was strengthened by Germany’s loss of colonies after 1919 (Du Bois, 1986 [1940], p. 724; 1975 [1945], p. 108).

In Weimar Germany, which had lost its colonial empire in World War I, sociologists became more, not less interested in colonialism (e.g. Brinkmann, 1921).⁹ Arthur Salz, a political economist and sociologist who was close to the Weber’s (Lassman, Velody, & Martins, 1988, p. 206), published an important study of political imperialism (Salz, 1931). Norbert Elias, a student of Alfred Weber’s, discussed the application of his Freudian thesis of the “civilizing process” to colonial situations (1939/1994, pp. 463–363). Sociological interest in colonialism also expanded in France under the influence of Marcel Mauss, Durkheim’s nephew, who inherited his status as the leader of a group of sociologists between the wars, and who combined generalizing theory with ethnographic data from primitive (i.e. colonized) peoples. Mauss was a member of the Committee for the Defence and Protection of Indigenous Peoples, a group that protested colonial abuses but without challenging the existence of colonialism per se (Sibeud, 2002, p. 23, n. 10), but he called in 1913 for the creation of a bureau of ethnography that would “activate ethnographic studies in France, and particularly in the French colonies” (quoted in Conklin, 2002, p. 267). Most importantly, Mauss helped to create the *Institut d’Ethnologie* (Ethnological Institute), dedicated to the memory of Durkheim, in 1925 (Karady, 1982). The Institute’s mandate was to study the French colonies (Lévy-Bruhl, 1925 [1910]). It overlapped to some extent with the national *École coloniale* (Amselle, 1993) and received its principal funding from the colonies, but sought to approach colonial problems more scientifically and autonomously and did not seek to place its students in colonial service (Conklin, 2002, p. 287; De L’Estoile, 2002, pp. 294–295). Nonetheless, Mauss and the Institute’s other founders insisted that the Institute “was at the disposal of colonial governments and protectorates for any information concerning expeditions (French or foreign), the study of indigenous races, the conservation and study of monuments and collections, or the study of social facts” (Mauss quoted in Fournier, 2006, p. 237). Several generations of Mauss’ students (and their students) conducted pioneering research in and on colonized societies.

After 1933, Nazism reawakened German dreams of continental imperialism and colonial empire and gave rise to new theories of German

continental imperialism (Neumann, 1942; Arendt, 1951), some in the guise of *Zwischeneuropa* (“intermediate Europe”; Wirsing, 1932), others as an eastern-oriented *Grossraum* or “greater space” (Schmitt, [1941]; Kaiser, 1968). Many of the sociologists who stayed in Germany after the Nazis seized power in 1933 turned their attention to applied policy research, contributing to ethnic policymaking in occupied Eastern Europe and helping with plans for a renewed German colonial empire in Africa (Weinberg, 1963; Schmokel, 1964; Linne, 2002; Gutberger, 1996; Klingemann, 1996, 2002, 2009). Ethnosociologist Richard Thurnwald and his student and editorial assistant Wilhelm Mühlmann (Michel, 1992, 1995) were particularly involved in the study of empire before, during, and after the Nazi era.

After 1945, Soviet expansionism focused social scientists’ attention on the causes and results of continental imperialism. The ongoing process of decolonization was embedded within discussions of the passage from European colonialism to informal US hegemony and postcolonial “under-development” (e.g., Balandier, 1956; Bourdieu, 1959). French sociologists’ focus on questions of colonialism reached a kind of apotheosis after 1945, lasting for several decades, as the pages of the *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie* and the revived *Année sociologique* were filled with analyses of colonized and decolonizing societies. Ethnosociologists like Jacques Soustelle, Germaine Tillion, Paul Mus, Paul Mercier, Georges Balandier, and Pierre Bourdieu were directly or indirectly involved in late colonial administration.¹⁰ US policies of informal empire were analyzed and organized by modernization theories, which were subsequently criticized starting in the late 1960s (Mazrui, 1968). Sociological research on colonialism first reemerged in the United States at the end of the 1950s with Wallerstein’s Ph.D. dissertation on Ghana and the Ivory Coast and his edited volume on “the colonial situation” (Wallerstein, 1959, 1966). Historical sociological research on European colonialism was conducted in the early 1970s (Hermassi, 1972; Magubane, 1971) and then subsided, emerging once again in the 1990s (Steinmetz, 1995, 1997; Go, 1999). Since the beginning of the 21st century, the new American imperialism has captured the attention of a growing number of sociologists (e.g. Mann, 2003; Steinmetz, 2003; Calhoun, Cooper, & Moore, 2006; Go, 2008), while also inspiring sociological research on a number of other empires. A few contemporary sociologists in Germany and France have also worked on ancient empires (Breuer, 1987) and modern colonial empires (Saada, 2007; Lardinois, 2008; Bertrand, 2005, 2008; Dezalay & Bryant, 2008).

TOWARD A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC AUTONOMY

This brief overview of the analytic and practical contributions of academic sociologists to the study and practice of empire raises a number of questions. What explains the rise and fall of sociological interest in empire over time and the variation of interest across national settings? When and why do sociologists tend to focus on their “own” empires and when do they become interested in earlier empires or in other nation’s colonies? How do theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of empire vary across disciplines? And what are some of the most promising theories of empires, regardless of their conditions of origin?

Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of the *field* is a very helpful first step in understanding science, as he shows in *Homo Academicus* (1988) and elsewhere. To understand why some scientists tend to adjust their research to the field of power (business, the state, religious institutions) while others resist the pull of such forces, Bourdieu suggests that we need to look at scientists’ holdings of inherited and field-specific scientific capital, and to analyze their scientific strategies in relation to their location in a space of positions and possibilities. Bourdieu understands the field as an arena of specialized practice that is partially independent of external forces, partly autonomous from the field of power.¹¹

Field theory avoids the dual error of construing science either as a function of extra-scientific forces (capitalism, empire, scientists’ personal background and current social situation) or as remaining entirely independent of such external factors.¹² Against the first set of theories we need to acknowledge that scientific research is often driven by discussions and conflicts located entirely *within* scientific fields rather than by discourses originating in non-academic realms. At the very least, scientific fields provide a sort of buffer, a *prism of refraction*, through which external discourses have to pass in order to be taken up by scientists. Nor can holdings of economic or symbolic capital be immediately or automatically deployed to advantage in new fields of endeavor. All forms of capital have to undergo a process of conversion or adaptation to the peculiarities of the field in which a subject is currently active.

Field theory also rejects the second approach, which understands pure science completely on its own terms, as oblivious to and unaffected by the extra-scientific world. Science’s autonomy can only ever be relative or partial. The limits on scientific autonomy are revealed within the (partially autonomous) scientific field itself. A field’s relative autonomy is often combined with its configuration as a *chiastic* structure. Every social field is a

battlefield, a terrain of symbolic conflict. There is an overall polarization in the field between heteronymous and autonomous poles, each correlated with unequally distributed field-specific symbolic capital. Actors located closer to the heteronymous pole will tend to orient their practices to external forces in the overarching field of power such as economic markets or the state.

Analyzing science as a field helps explain why European scholars, even those located in the same country and historical period, may not share the same views of colonialism, empire, or anything else (Steinmetz, 2008b, 2008c). Some views *are* shared by all of the participants in a field – the field’s *illusio* or common commitment to the arbitrary stakes and history of the game. This common culture coexists, however, with intense disagreements about substantive matters and stark differences at the level of individual habitus, resources, and holdings of symbolic capital. It should be possible to identify a shared *illusio* and sense of the rules and stakes of the game in any field, as well as autonomous and heteronymous poles and a hierarchy of unevenly distributed field specific symbolic capital.

It is an empirical question whether any particular type of practice takes on the properties of a field at all. The researcher also needs to establish in every case whether certain representations and practices come to be recognized by all participants in a field as more or less distinguished, or whether instead a field remains unsettled with respect to internal ranking. Once a field is settled, it becomes possible to argue that certain actors systematically gain symbolic profits from their habituses and practices at the expense of others. Settled fields are in this respect structures of *symbolic violence* in which the arbitrariness of their definitions of excellence is hidden by the tacit consensus of the dominant and the dominated. Dominant positions are frequently, though not always, located at a field’s autonomous pole.

The contending and dominating positions within a given scientific field vary over time and across disciplines. For example, German colonial ethnology was dominated by biological racism in the late 19th century but this began to shift around World War I, and during the Weimar Republic cultural diffusionist and “cultural circles” (*kulturkreis*) positions became dominant. Adolf Bastian, a founder of German academic anthropology, the Royal Ethnographic Museum in Berlin, and the Berlin Ethnological Society, argued that human “races” were “different species” and that black Africans were less intelligent than other races and should be compelled to manual labor (Bastian, 1884, p. 31; 1860, Vol. 3, p. 396). Felix von Luschan, who succeeded Bastian as head of the Berlin Ethnological Museum and held the first Anthropology Chair at Berlin University, initially focused on body measurements and designed a chromatic scale for classifying skin color, but

argued later in his career that “the concept of ‘race’ as a whole [was] imprecise” (Laukötter, 2007, p. 159) and that “the only savages in Africa are whites suffering from ‘Tropenkoller’ (colonial madness)” (Luschan, 1915, p. 11). Ethnologist Leo Frobenius defended forced labor at the first German Colonial Congress in 1902, and he argued during his second African expedition that “you have to treat the Negro harshly” and defending flogging as punishment. But Frobenius later became highly critical of colonial racism. His argument that the “idea of the barbaric Negro is a European invention” made him into an icon for some early pan-Africanists like Aimé Césaire (Gothsch, 1983, pp. 117ff., 120, 131; Césaire, 2000, p. 53). In French colonial social science, ethnology continued to defend a view of African culture as timeless and unchanging even after 1945, while sociologists like Georges Balandier and Paul Mercier insisted on a historical approach to African cultures as fully caught up in modernity and change (Balandier & Mercier, 1952; Balandier, 1953, 1955a, 1955b; Mercier, 1951, 1954).

Autonomy from empire also varied by research topic, discipline, and historical period. Before 1918 a great deal of the research on colonized societies was carried out by colonial officials. Pre-1914 institutions like the École coloniale in Paris, the Berlin Seminar for Oriental Languages, the Hamburg Colonial Institute, and the Dutch Royal Academy in Delft (later Leiden) were largely staffed by officials, military men, and missionaries with colonial experience. There was a great deal of back-and-forth between colonial activities and academic social science. For example, the missionary Carl Gotthilf Büttner was dispatched to Otjimbingwe in German Southwest Africa by the Rhenish Missionary Society in 1872. In addition to becoming an outspoken advocate of German colonialism (Büttner, 1885, p. 39; Menzel, 1992), Büttner helped the new German “imperial commissary” (*Kaiserlicher Kommissar*) Heinrich Goering convince Herero chief Kama-herero to sign a “protection treaty” with the German government in 1885. In 1887 Büttner was appointed to teach Swahili at the newly founded Seminar for Oriental Languages, where he trained administrators and soldiers bound for the colonies and edited the *Zeitschrift für afrikanische Sprachen* from 1887 to 1890. The College de France created a chair in Muslim Sociology and Sociography in 1902 “with funds from the Governor General of Algeria and the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco,” and the first appointment to the chair was “a former military man, Alfred le Chatlier” (Clark, 1973, p. 55). Berber specialist Robert Montagne was assigned to direct the Sociological Section of the Native Affairs Bureau (*Direction des Affaires Indigènes*) in the French colonial state in Morocco in

1917 (Seddon, 1973). After 1918, the study of colonialism and colonized societies gained some autonomy from colonial governance. Hamburg's Colonial Institute became the core of Hamburg University and the Berlin Seminar for Oriental Languages and Halle Colonial Academy turned themselves into schools of foreign studies.

Of course, there are certain historical moments and political systems in which the autonomy of science is severely eroded, and Nazi Germany is an extreme example of an assault on academic autonomy. Jewish and other non-“Aryan” and liberal or left-wing academics were purged from the universities and prevented from publishing. The state had the power to decide who would be hired, fired, and permitted to attend scientific conferences, which institutes, universities, and disciplines would even exist and how much money they would get, and whether books or dissertations could be published. Alfred Rosenberg's organization, which included from 1941 a “Hauptamt Soziologie,” enforced conformity with Nazi doctrine – albeit with less effectiveness than other parts of the Nazi state, and even if it was internally riven by differences. The party also propagated the use of official linguistic formulae (LTI – *Lingua Tertii Imperii*; Klemperer, 2006), which infiltrated the work of social scientists, for example in the use of the term *Umvolkung* rather than *Assimilation* in work on the Germanization of Eastern European populations. Scientific autonomy was further undermined by the state-mandated creation of interdisciplinary fields like “colonial science” and *Ostforschung*.¹³ Entire disciplines, including sociology, were largely folded into these interdisciplinary, applied research fields. Publishing opportunities disappeared in many areas (Derks, 1999) even as research budgets skyrocketed for the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and other institutions (Szöllösi-Janze, 2001, p. 14).

The Nazi concept of *Gleichschaltung* (coordination) points to a severe reduction of cultural and scientific independence from the state. *Gleichschaltung* means something like a coordination of spheres, or in Bourdieusian terms a *synchronziation of fields* (Bourdieu, 1988, pp. 173–180). But even in Nazi Germany scientific work continued to operate partially according to its own internal rules and dynamics. This was true of disciplines that were not related to immediate policymaking and also of some domains from which the state demanded concrete, applied results. Programs such as the phantasmagorical “*Welteislehre*” (doctrine of cosmic ice; see Nagel, 1991) or Nazi “German physics” never achieved “discursive monopoly or predominance” (Ash, 1999, p. 346) within their respective scientific arenas. Research on tropical medicine sponsored by the Colonial Department of the *Reichsforschungsrat* may never have been put into practice, but it was

supposed to be medically sound (Reichsforschungsrat, 1942). In this respect, Bourdieusian field theory converges with arguments that the Nazi regime was “in no way simply hostile to science” (Szöllösi-Janze, 2001, p. 11). Just as the Nazi state was a “polycratic” field of permanent internal power struggles (Broszat, 1981) rather than monolithic and internally coherent, so too many scientific fields in Nazi Germany continued to display a wide array of individual strategies of accommodation and independence, and retained a chiasmic structure with more autonomous and more dependent poles. According to Walker (1989, p. 85), “Instead of viewing the interaction between National Socialism and science in terms of black and white, in terms of ‘nazis’ and ‘enemies/victims of the nazis’, the grey areas must be investigated, where scientists both opposed and supported certain aspects of National Socialist policy.” Langewiesche (1997) has detailed the divergent forms of “self-Gleichschaltung” among a group of Tübingen professors from different disciplines shortly after the *Machtergreifung*; Carsten Klingemann (2009) has done the same with respect to sociologists in Nazi Germany. A similar diversity of stances characterized scientists and intellectuals who went into the so-called inner emigration, like Alfred Weber.

In order to make sense of the different types of accommodation and distancing from the state we need to understand the official political position on the object of analysis. This is more difficult than it sounds, because official policy discussions of land and sea empires were often internally divided. It is usually possible to discern a dominant government position on imperial issues during the Nazi period, but not in Wilhelmine Germany and even less during the Weimar Republic. Before 1933, a social scientist who wanted to coordinate his interpretation of empire with the views of extra-scientific elites was forced to make a selection from an array of options. After 1933, and especially with the creation of the *Kolonialpolitisches Amt* (KPA) of the NSDAP, an official approach to colonialism emerged. The curriculum for KPA training courses for colonial administrators was “based on instructions approved by [KPA head Franz Ritter von] Epp and by Alfred Rosenberg” (Schmokel, 1964, p. 155). Government officials like Rudolf Asmis, Oskar Karstedt, and Rudolf Karlowa detailed the official approach in books, decrees, and periodicals like *Deutscher Kolonial-Dienst*. Asmis’ 1940 “German Colonial Catechism” represented “a kind of constitutional document for the future” colonial empire (*ibid.*, p. 162). Karstedt, a KPA official, covered the same ground in his book on “problems of native policy in Africa” (Karstedt, 1942) as Thurnwald did in his 1939 book *Koloniale Gestaltung* (*Colonial Organization*). The lines between academic and government colonial specialists were extremely blurred. Counsel-General

Karlowa of the Ribbentrop Bureau discussed colonialism in a volume edited by the academic ethnologist Diedrich Westermann, in which the latter presented his ideas on native policy (Westermann, 1937). Writers like Westermann and Thurnwald were able to align their writing with the official party line, supporting territorial segregation between blacks and whites and a ban on mixed marriage in the colonies, along with other mainstays of the “Colonial Catechism” (Thurnwald, 1937, 1938a).

Social science was able to maintain pockets of partial autonomy in Nazi Germany, especially before 1938.¹⁴ Views of Max Weber were highly diverse but far from uniformly negative (Klingemann, 1996, Chap. 9). The *Festschrift* for Ferdinand Toennies, who lost his job in 1933 and stepped down as head of the German Sociological Society, was published in 1936 in Leipzig, with essays by the anti-Nazis Franz Boas and Gerhard Colm and refugee Karl Löwith, a Social Democratic economist who had been active against Nazi organizations in Germany and had emigrated in 1933 to teach at the University in Exile of the New School for Social Research. Werner Landecker, a member of the German-Jewish *Kulturbund*, earned a law degree in Berlin in 1936 with a dissertation on international law (Landecker, 1999).¹⁵ Anthropologist Leonhard Adam lost his position in 1933 but continued to edit *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* (*Journal of Comparative Jurisprudence*) in Germany until 1938. Adam was the original editor of the 1937 *Lehrbuch für Völkerkunde*, to which Thurnwald and his student Mühlmann contributed. When controversy arose around Adam’s role Theodor Preuss took over as editor, but Adam still contributed a chapter. Even this was too much for the Nazi Americanist Walter Krickeberg, whose attack on Thurnwald and Mühlmann for collaborating with Adam triggered an infamous “debate” in Krickeberg and Thurnwald both tried to prove that the other was more “Jewish” (Krickeberg, 1938; Thurnwald, 1938b; Timm, 1977; Fischer, 1990, pp. 63–67). At the same time, this dispute demonstrated that Nazism had not produced scientific homogeneity; Krickeberg’s *Kulturkreis* (cultural areas) approach and Thurnwald’s own “functionalism” continued to coexist, and the polarization between the two frameworks inside Ethnology was one of the underlying reasons for the fight (Mühlmann, 1937).¹⁶

EGO AUTONOMY

Bourdieu’s analysis of the field is a helpful first step in understanding science, as shown by *Homo Academicus* (Bourdieu, 1988) and other studies.

At the same time, Bourdieu was reluctant or unable to develop the *psychic* underpinnings of his categories of habitus, symbolic capital, and field (Steinmetz, 2006a). He recognized the importance of such a project increasingly over time, arguing that sociology and psychoanalysis were equally valuable ways of “constructing the same object” (Bourdieu, 1999a, 1999b, p. 512). Bourdieu interwove psychoanalytic arguments with his own theory, for example in *The Rules of Art*, where he argues that the ambivalence of the central figure in Flaubert’s *Sentimental Education*, Frédéric, with respect to his own inheritance “may find its principle in his *ambivalence* towards his mother, a double personage, obviously feminine, but also masculine in that she substitutes for the disappeared father” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 10). In *Pascalian Meditations*, Bourdieu uses a psychoanalytic logic in explaining the genesis of subjects suited with “the durable disposition to invest in the social game” and to compete in social fields. This requires the transition from self-love to a “quite other object of investment” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 166). Socioanalysis (his new word for sociology)¹⁷ and psychoanalysis, he argued, “should combine their efforts” to explain “the transition, described by Freud ... from a narcissistic organization of the libido, in which the child takes himself (or his own body) as an object of desire, to another state in which he orients himself towards another person, thus entering the world of ‘object relations,’ in the forms of the original social microcosm and protagonists of the drama that is played out there” (2000, p. 116). Bourdieu was as much concerned with “heirs who refuse to inherit” as with those who follow their prescribed path. This openness to non-reproductive logics refutes those critics of Bourdieu who see him as uniquely focused on social reproduction (Steinmetz, 2010). In *Pascalian Meditations*, Bourdieu discussed individual differences in the ability even to form an integrated habitus. An overaccommodating personality, he suggested, may be connected to a “rigid, self-enclosed, overintegrated habitus,” while an opportunist or adaptive personality type might allow the habitus to dissolve “into a kind of *mens momentanea*, incapable of ... having an integrated sense of self” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 161).

A psychoanalytic approach is centrally important to our current concern. Scientific autonomy cannot be separated from other forms of autonomy, including the *psychic* autonomy of the individual scientists. But integrating the psychoanalytic and the socioanalytic levels forces us in each case to ask: *autonomy from what?* To answer this question we need to turn to the basic analytic unit or starting point in the sociology of sociology, which is the individual sociologist. Even if “society intervenes at the very centre of the creative project,” the immediate place where this creative project is

generated is the individual artist, writer, scientist, sociologist, etc. (Bourdieu, 1971 [1966], p. 166). Like other cultural fields, sociology is structured around the unequal distribution of a species of symbolic capital specific to the field (sociological, or social-scientific capital). The main way in which scientific recognition is generated is through *individual* achievements such as publications and discoveries (Merton, 1973). Bourdieu is interested in the variable levels of autonomy that individuals and groups of scientists maintain vis-à-vis the external field of power and other fields. But he does not consider other axes of individual autonomy.

Any individual faces a range of different objects upon which he may become dependent or from which he may seek autonomy. Analytically these objects can be seen as ranging from the most proximate to the most distant from the individual.¹⁸ The most distant objects include other galaxies, solar systems, and planets, but these are unlikely to shape sociologists' scientific practices. Slightly less distant from the individual sociologist are the great political empires and foreign states and transnational economic and cultural systems. Here too we have to be cautious, even when dealing with social scientists focused on empires as their objects of analysis, in drawing any rapid conclusions about causality. On the one hand, the reemergence of assertive foreign military interventions by the United States after 2001 went hand in hand with a sharp increase in specialists in US empire. But the unevenness of this interest cross-nationally, across different fields of the human sciences, and even within a specific American discipline like sociology suggests that many other factors are at work in translating a real world event or process into an object of scientific investment. As Max Weber wrote, social life is a "vast chaotic stream of events, which flows away through time," meaning that something other than its mere existence must be present to make a given event the object of scientific scrutiny (M. Weber, 1949, p. 111). Moving down to a slight more proximate level we arrive at the national-level extra-scientific powers with which Bourdieu was most concerned: business and the state. National-level fields that lie outside science will also influence scientists' choices and strategies mainly in indirect or mediated ways, as they are translated into the terms of a specific field. But some scientists will be exposed or expose themselves more directly to influences outside science, usually because they are relatively poor in their own field's specific symbolic capital, as discussed above.

Continuing our movement toward the individual scientist we arrive finally at this immediate field of activity. But for Bourdieu, fields are not only agonistic battlefields, sites of competition and conflict. They are also the

primary domains in which individuals seek recognition for the value of their work from other participants in the same field. Even in his earliest analysis of fields Bourdieu emphasized their dual character as arenas of struggle and mutual recognition (Bourdieu, 1971 [1966], p. 170). All fields, especially loosely structured ones like sociology, depend for their very existence on a constantly renewed web of acts of mutual recognition and nonrecognition (i.e. non-membership in the field) and ongoing assessments of the relative value in the field's specific hierarchy of each actor and action. Bourdieu quotes Sartre: "there are some qualities that come to us solely from the judgment of others" (Sartre, 1988, p. 77). But Bourdieu does not use the words autonomy and heteronomy to discuss the ways in which people define themselves in relation to other participants in the same field. For Bourdieu, autonomy is assessed by examining the relationship between an actor in a field (or a field in its entirety)¹⁹ and forces lying *outside* the field. But if we construct the individual as a kind of Nomos, we can immediately see that interpersonal or I-Thou relations pose problems of autonomy and heteronomy for the individual. The "entry into the world of 'object relations'" and the "orientation toward others," mentioned by Bourdieu, lead individuals not only to differentiate themselves from others but also to unconsciously identify, emulate, introject, and imitate others (or imagos of others).²⁰ Such dynamics are of central importance for the analysis of any field.

The relevance of individual unconscious identifications with others for understanding science can be clearly seen if we move to the final intra-individual level and ask about psychic autonomy. Of course Freud uses the term autonomy only a few times in his work and "only as in everyday language" (Gullestad, 1993, p. 22). In Freudian Ego Psychology, autonomy refers to the independence of the ego from the id (Rapaport, 1967), and in the work of Erik Erikson, autonomy means "deciding for oneself when faced with a significant other" (Gullestad, 1993, p. 28), that is, being "an individual who dares to march out of step." Theories of *ego autonomy* thus differentiate between "the ego's autonomy from the drives on the one hand, and from the environment on the other" (Hurvich, 2005, p. 474).

Imitation and conformity are partly rooted in a universal feature of human psychic existence, namely, the adoption of ego ideals and ideal egos in the process of forming unconscious identifications.²¹ It is not possible to escape from this dependence by abandoning ego ideals, since, as Cornell (2003, p. 144) notes, the very suspicion of ego ideas is itself another kind of ideal, an "ego ideal of how we should be." Nonetheless it should be possible to gain some conscious control over unconscious identifications and from

the “drives” more generally (Rapaport, 1951), that is, to gain some control over unconscious sources of scientific action.

Ego autonomy in both of the main senses – autonomy from unconscious drives and wishes and autonomy from significant others and the environment – is of central importance for understanding scientific activity, since scientists are caught up in complex relations of mentorship and emulation on the one hand and differentiation and competition on the other. In order to understand why some scientists become conformists, adjusting their research to the field of power, while others resist the pull of such forces, we need to combine socioanalytic and psychoanalytic approaches. Psychoanalysis is better suited to understanding why some individuals form a “rigid, self-enclosed, overintegrated habitus” while others are opportunist or adaptive and incapable of “having an integrated sense of self” (2000, p. 161).²²

We can now revisit the question: What makes some individual scientists better able or more predisposed to maintain their scientific autonomy than others? In part this is a function of inherited economic capital, which may allow someone like Flaubert in the French literary field or Max Weber in the German social science field to pursue activities that flout or even do the opposite of the demands of powerful state and economic actors. However, some individuals are predisposed to heteronomy *despite* their economic independence, while others doggedly pursue an autonomous path despite economic hardship. To understand such variations we might distinguish between the opportunist personality type and the subject who is predisposed to obey an internal superego and to resist external demands. In fields that are already poorly autonomized, like sociology, the first type will tend to gravitate toward dominant powers outside the field. Sociology has periodically seen waves of identification with biology, economics, physics, and other external sciences. The willing adjustment of many German social scientists to the demands of the Nazi state suggests a different sort of external identification. As for the second, “integrated” personality type, it is important to note that this can strengthen both autonomous and heteronymous scientific stances, depending on the contents of the identifications. Alfred Weber’s identification with his older brother led him to develop his own version of “value neutrality” under the guise of the “free floating intelligentsia,” even as he came to reject the doctrine of value freedom as presented by Max Weber (Demm, 2000a, pp. 37, 264). A figure like Hamburg sociology professor Andreas Walther, however, illustrates that a highly independent, even rigid personality could arrive at scientific stances that were heteronymous. Walther adopted views that were

unpopular, even suspect, in the sociological field during the Weimar period, defending quantitative, presentist, American-style sociology, which he believed was disdained by most of his German sociological colleagues for its “crass positivism” (Walther, 1927). Walther greeted the Nazi takeover and became a party member in March 1933, and become more prominent in the sociology discipline, supervising 33 dissertations in Hamburg after 1933 (Wassner, 1985, p. 51). The heteronymization of his sociological research in the Nazi period thus seems to have stemmed not from an opportunist “*mens momentanea*” but from a rigid, self-controlled, and self-righteous personality structure rather than a labile, opportunist one.

These considerations might help us understand the scientific choices of the two sociologists examined in this paper. Of course (*pace* Mitzman, 1985), we cannot really hope to psychoanalyze people who did not leave records of a self-analysis or psychoanalysis. What we can do is analyze their texts, letters, and other records, asking how they dealt with issues of scientific and personal autonomy in these records. Fortunately these sociologists left ample direct and indirect records of their views of scientific and ego autonomy.

EMBATTLED AUTONOMY, 1880–1945

Max Weber and Richard Thurnwald present two very different patterns of scientific autonomy and dependence. Max Weber (1864–1920), was recognized as the leading German sociologist during his lifetime.²³ The Max Weber “myth” in Heidelberg in the decade before World War I rivaled that of his acquaintance, the poet Stefan George (Honigsheim, 1926; Norton, 2002, pp. 475–480; Radkau, 2009, pp. 293–297). At the meetings of the German Sociological Association between 1910 and 1933, no name was mentioned more frequently than Max Weber’s (Kaesler, 1984, p. 41). He was called the most important “maker of sociology” by the other German sociologists interviewed by Earle Edward Eubank in 1934 (Kaesler, 1991). Sociologically, Weber exemplified the 19th century model of the German university professor, in which *Besitz* (economic capital) formed the precondition for *Bildung* or academic culture, and also allowed for considerable scientific autonomy. This was true for Weber at least after he married Marianne Schnitger (Roth, 2001, p. 549) and obtained his first professorship at Freiburg in 1894 (Weber, 1988, pp. 199–201). Before that time Weber was financially dependent on his father. Shortly after Weber received the status of *Ordinarius* (full professor) at Heidelberg in 1897 his

father died in a series of events that triggered his nervous breakdown. His teaching and research came to a halt and he resigned his professorship in 1903, again becoming financially dependent, this time on his mother (Mitzman, 1985, pp. 148–153; Radkau, 2009, p. 282). In 1908, Marianne inherited a great deal of money (Radkau, 2009, pp. 280–283), easing the Webers' financial condition. Weber had already started to reemerge with the publication of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in 1904–1905, and he began to play a central role in the nascent German discipline of sociology and in academia and politics more generally, finally accepting a chair in economics at Vienna in 1919 and Lujo Brentano's chair at Munich in 1920, where he moved just before he died.

Weber attached central importance to autonomy. Much of his writing during the 1890s can be interpreted at least in part in the context of his obsession with his own and his mother's autonomy from his overbearing, patriarchal father, Max Weber, Sr., and his desire to escape from "abject dependence" (Mitzman, 1985, pp. 124, 133; Radkau, 2009, p. 110). An example is Weber's argument that the Prussian rural laborers' exodus from the eastern estates was rooted in a desire for liberation from patriarchal feudal authoritarianism, as opposed to a strictly economic calculus. Weber associated the Prussian Junkers with his father, whom he saw as a conformist, "comfortable" petty bureaucrat who "enabled himself 'to keep pace with this living standard' only by pirating his wife's inheritance" (Mitzman, 1985, pp. 48, 123). Many of his research projects, including his research on the Prussian rural laborers in the 1890s and his study of the "psychophysics" of industrial labor (Weber, 1984a, 1984b), were financed by the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (Radkau, 2009, pp. 79, 267), and Weber's attack on the Verein's old guard for mixing politics and science may have been partly driven by his overflowing rage at authority figures who placed him in a situation of dependence.²⁴ Weber intervened directly in several different arenas bearing directly on the question of scientific autonomy, above all in his doctrine of "value-free science" (M. Weber, 1949, [1919] 1958; Nau, 1996), even if he did not seem to apply the doctrine systematically and continued to allow himself to mix science and politics even as he anathemized it in others (Mommssen, 1984).²⁵ Weber thus presents a case of heightened economic autonomy, living much of the time on family money rather than his own earnings. In psychic and scientific terms, however, his relationship to autonomy was more complicated.

Richard Thurnwald was the son of an Austrian factory manager (Melk-Koch, 1989, p. 31) who had studied law, sociology, and Orientalism and published two of his earliest articles on the *bildungsbürgerliche* topics of

ancient Egypt and Babylonia (Thurnwald, 1901, 1903–1904). At the outset, then, he seemed to combine *Besitz* and *Bildung* much like Weber and so many other 19th century German professors. However, Thurnwald's shift from ancient history to the ethnology of Melanesians and Africans correspond to mounting personal economic difficulties. Born in the 1860s like Max Weber, Thurnwald was *sociologically* younger than him, an eternal “newcomer” to the German social scientific field who was closer to the younger German academics during the Weimar Republic than to the established mandarins.²⁶ Thurnwald converted from Catholicism to Protestantism when he moved to Germany after his university studies and never returned to Austria. He spent fourteen years outside Germany, beginning with two long research trips to New Guinea (1906–1909 and 1912–1914). During this period he became known among his academic sponsors as “*bedürfnislos*” (frugal).²⁷ Thurnwald began his teaching career as a Private Docent at Halle (1919–1923) and became an “extraordinary” professor (that is, without full health and pension benefits) for Sociology and Ethnology at Berlin University in 1923 at the age of 56 (Asen, 1955, p. 200). According to his biographer, Thurnwald probably lost a great deal of money in the postwar inflation and struggled financially after a messy divorce, leading him to request emergency funds from his employer repeatedly (Melk-Koch, 1989, pp. 253, 262). Thurnwald eagerly accepted offers as visiting professor at Yale in 1931–1932 and 1935–1936 and was willing to take a permanent job at *any* American college or university in this period, but was ultimately unsuccessful.²⁸ Only at the age of 77 did Thurnwald finally obtain a position as full professor (*Ordinarius*) at Berlin University, which was now located in the Soviet occupied zone. Thurnwald gave up this position in 1949 and moved to the newly founded Free University in West Berlin, where he was bumped back down to the rank of *Honorarprofessor* (Melk-Koch, 1989, pp. 281–282). Thurnwald's research and publications consistently received outside funding: his first three year trip to German New Guinea (1906–1909) was financed by the Berlin Ethnological Museum and the Baessler Stiftung; his second trip to New Guinea in 1912 was paid for by the deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft and German Colonial Office. During the Weimar Republic his research was sponsored by the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures (IIALC) and the Australian National Research Council; his journal *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie* (renamed *Sociologus* in 1931) was subsidized by the *Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft*.

Given these differing levels of inherited economic capital one might expect Weber's writings on empire to show more autonomy from their objects of

analysis than Thurnwald's. At first glance, however, this does not seem to be the case. Weber was, if anything, more vehemently imperialist in his political views than Thurnwald, starting in the 1890s and culminating in World War I, when he and his brother Alfred actively campaigned for a system of informal German hegemony over "Mitteleuropa" (Central Europe; Mommsen, 1984, pp. 205–206, 211–227). Weber was much more involved in party politics than Thurnwald throughout his entire lifetime. Thurnwald's best known work appears at first glance to respond mainly to ideas and movements within sociology and ethnology, the two university disciplines in which he held professorial chairs. He founded the journal *Sociologus* in the mid-1920s and was the leading German representative of functionalist ethnography. If we remained at the level of the text and failed to place Thurnwald's evolving views in the shifting context of their production, we might reach the mistaken conclusion that he actually had a greater distance from imperialist ideas and politics than Weber. Weber's pattern of source selection in *The Religion of China* seems at first glance to reflect his bourgeois social class background, since the most negative views of China were found among the European merchant classes at the time.²⁹ In fact, Weber's selection of evidence was guided by a different logic, a strategy adjusted to the autonomous logic of the sociological field (see later). And if we examine Thurnwald's entire oeuvre, following the peregrinations of his thinking over the course of more than half a century, it becomes clear that he constantly adjusted his analysis to leading ideas and dominant figures in domains quite distant from his own academic disciplines. In the decade before 1914 Thurnwald's writing on colonialism was framed as if he were participating in the colonial state field (Steinmetz, 2008b) rather than the metropolitan academic field. Between 1918 and 1923 Thurnwald echoed the clamorous public discourse of the revanchist movement that was trying to reclaim Germany's lost colonies. In the United States, between 1930 and 1936 Thurnwald echoed the views of American anthropologists and sociologists like Boas, Lowie, Herskovits, Sapir, and Wirth, all of whom were more critical of racism and colonialism than the majority of German professors at the time. One he returned to Germany, however, Thurnwald's research quickly became closely aligned with Nazi imperial goals and racist ideals (between 1937 and 1945).

This contrast between Thurnwald and Weber seems at first glance to be partly explained by their respective holdings of economic capital and differing amounts of field-specific symbolic capital. Economically more vulnerable and scientifically less established than Weber, Thurnwald gravitated toward the heteronymous pole of the German social science field.

Above and beyond this, Thurnwald's entire personality seems to have been highly adaptive, even opportunist, while Weber's personality was stubbornly, even "heroically" individualistic. Weber was willing to challenge the united opinion of the German historians and historical economists on value-free science and to attack the most established academic Mandarins such as Karl Knies and Rudolf Stammeler (Weber, 1975, 1977a, 1977b), and he personally confronted Erich Ludendorff in 1918 on German military strategy (Mommsen, 1984, p. 325). Weber's insistence that science had to keep a great distance from the state was powerfully motivated by his personal quest for autonomy from his father, mother, and other figures of authority in his personal life. By contrast, Thurnwald seems to have been driven to conform to the demands of every field he entered, however temporarily. The reasons for this difference are impossible to determine without further biographic evidence. But we can examine the two sociologists' writing in more detail, trying to discern their practical stance toward autonomy.

Weber as a Modernist Mandarin: The Example of The Religion of China

Weber was concerned with empires, including the German empire(s), throughout his adult life. In addition to his Habilitation thesis on Rome (Weber, 1891) he wrote several long essays on ancient civilizations (Weber, 1976). His 1895 Freiburg University inaugural lecture was a full-throated defense of German imperialism (Weber, 1989; Mommsen, 1984, pp. 37–40; Mitzman, 1985, p. 143). During World War I, Weber focused on extending German hegemony over Eastern Europe "largely by indirect means," using a "concept of German imperialism" that was "scarcely modest" (Mommsen, 1984, p. 206). In *Economy and Society* Weber returned to ancient land-based empires and brought them into the same analytic framework as modern imperialism. Here Weber found "features that have since recurred in basic outline again and again and which still recur today," including the reciprocal impact of economic and political impulses and the centrality of "honor" and the importance of the "prestige of power" (Weber, 1978, Vol. 2, pp. 910–921).

It is in his *magnum opus* (Tenbruck, 1999), the three-volume *Sociology of Religion* (*Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*), that the question of autonomy from the imperial object of analysis is posed most acutely for Weber. Weber devoted a large section of the first volume, which he completed just before his death, to the Chinese empire (Weber, 1964). China

was the key comparative case for Weber since it had the “strongest predisposition for capitalism,” including “a world lead in technological innovation until early modern times, a hard-working mentality geared to practical solutions, a layer of moneyed merchants and a rational state administration” (Honigsheim, 1923, p. 276; Radkau, 2009, p. 277). At the moment when Weber began his research and writing, China was still subject to German imperial manipulations and Qingdao was a formal German colony. Prussia had concluded a separate treaty with China after the Second Opium War, opening China to Prussian traders and missionaries and allowing Prussia to open a legation in Beijing. In 1897 Germany seized Qingdao and triggered a chain reaction of European annexations of Chinese coastal colonies. Germany headed the allied military campaign against the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 and German troops massacred alleged Boxer sympathizers in a series of notorious expeditions. After the rebellion the Chinese Crown Prince was compelled to travel to Berlin in order to formally apologize and kowtow before the Kaiser. In Shandong province German marines tried to extend Germany’s power beyond the official borders of the Qingdao colony in a separate set of aggressive moves (Steinmetz, 2007, Chap. 7). During the decade before World War I, however, certain forces inside the German government started backing away from the idea of continuing to occupy a conquered colony inside China, advocating instead a peaceful cultural penetration of the country and cultivation of the Chinese state as a potential military ally in East Asia.

The *Religion of China* is a text in which Weber’s stance of scientific neutrality seems to be severely at risk of breaking down. Weber’s central question was why China had failed to develop a modern form of rational capitalism despite the existence of many preconditions. His answer focused on the economic ethic of Confucianism, which was oriented toward “adjustment to the world” rather than the “rational transformation of the world.”³⁰ Confucianism prevented the rationalization not only of the capitalist economy but also of the state, law, education, and even poetry and the basic Chinese personality structure.³¹ Weber completely avoided discussing the possible effects of imperialism on China’s development. His description of China as timeless and unchanging and his explanation for its alleged stasis seemed to replicate the classic European and German discourse known as Sinophobia, which had flourished since the middle of the 18th century. Weber seemed to reject the alternative, equally well-wrought European vision of China’s Mandarin elite as a meritocratic aristocracy of talent who provided a check on the willful dictatorship of the Emperor (Steinmetz, 2007, Chap. 6).

Weber's arguments about China were simply incorrect, as was already pointed out by a contributor to the Max Weber festschrift in 1923, the Sinologist and former Austrian envoy to China Arthur von Rostorn (Rosthorn, 1923; Walravens, 2005, pp. 101–102). Weber himself pointed to the “provisional” nature of his findings (M. Weber, 1920, p. 13). Rather than assuming from the start some kind of scientific bias on Weber's part, however, we should begin by focusing on the process by which he assembled the raw materials for his text. Although he spoke at length with the German traveler and mystic Count Hermann von Keyserling, who saw China as possessing an ideal form of government and advanced aesthetic sensibilities, Weber's views of India as an “orgiastic” culture were closer to Keyserling than his views of China (Keyserling, 1925, Vol. 2, pp. 106–107; Radkau, 2009, pp. 466–468). Indeed, there is no evidence that Weber had any single privileged informant on China. He heard von Rostorn lecture on ancient Chinese religions to the “Eranos Circle” in Heidelberg in 1906 and again in Vienna in 1918 (Schmidt-Glintzer, 1989, pp. 15, 41). Weber made patterned selections from the expertise and literature available to him.³² The fact that Weber began his three-volume sociology of religion with China – after first presenting Protestantism – was not an arbitrary decision. It emphasized Weber's debt to Hegel, including Hegel's uncompromising Sinophobia, which had itself been a philosophical translation of the discourse of the European merchants in East Asia.³³ The overall design of Weber's comparative religion project, organized around a discourse of lack, echoed the well-established thesis of Chinese stagnation, which Hegel described as the arrested development of Oriental freedom (“The Oriental World knows only that One is Free”).

But from the very beginning of the Sinophobic discourse in the 18th century it had met with challenges and reputations. Even in German universities, among the best-known Sinologists, there was an opposing view that painted a more nuanced picture of Confucianism and Chinese history. Yet Weber ignored or dismissed these various forms of “Sinophilia.”

One possible explanation for Weber's choice of evidence is simply that he wanted to prove that ascetic Protestantism alone was capable of generating capitalism – that he “cherry-picked” his evidence. Although this is entirely plausible it is difficult to reconcile with his “ascetic” scientific program and his expressed wish, in the introduction to the *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion*, that the Sinologist would “find nothing essential that he would have to judge as simply false” (Weber, 1920, p. 13). A second possible explanation for his source selection is that Weber was, as he himself sometimes said only half in jest, a “class-conscious bourgeois”

(Mommsen, 1984, p. 109). His work could then be read as a direct transcription of merchant capitalist interests.³⁴ There are several problems with this account. First, the typical merchant class discourse on China was drenched in straightforward racism, but Weber's texts, while perhaps exemplifying a form of *cultural racism*, never strayed into socio-biological explanations of Chinese backwardness. Weber insisted that it was "obviously not a question of deeming the Chinese 'naturally ungifted' for the demands of capitalism" (Weber, 1964, p. 248). Most importantly, Weber is best characterized neither as bourgeois nor as a *Bildungsbürger* (member of the educated middle class), but rather as having had a foot in both classes and a mixed or *cleft habitus* (Bourdieu, 2007). Furthermore, Weber's social background and class position was not expressed directly in the academic social science field but was translated into terms and postures appropriate to that field – as is always the case with semi-autonomous fields.

Indeed, Weber invented a whole new position in the German academic field. The overarching field of the social and human sciences in Germany was divided broadly at the end of the 19th century between two poles: on the one hand the various historicisms codified as *Geisteswissenschaften* and on the other hand the array of positivisms and naturalisms that denied any difference between the natural and human sciences. The first grouping was associated with Fritz Ringer's (1969) German "Mandarins." Weber himself is responsible for Ringer's concept, having compared the old-style German professoriate, with their "humanist, exclusive and bookish literary education," which stamped them as "belonging socially to the cultured status group," to the Chinese Mandarins (Weber, 1964, p. 121). The second group were the academic "Modernists," in Ringer's terms, who challenged the long-lasting hegemony of the German Mandarins and their classical, philological, humanistic approach.

Despite Weber's frequent jibes at the German Mandarins, however ("nothing is more horrible to me than the arrogance of the 'intellectual' and learned professions," he wrote to Marianne before their marriage [Weber, 1988, pp. 187–188]), he was not as unambiguously allied with the Modernists in the academic field as Ringer suggests. In Ringer's (2004) view, Weber was a modernist, not a mandarin, since he supported the modernization of 19th-century German higher education. Nonetheless, Weber was definitely, or also, part of the social science field's dominant, consecrated elite and a Mandarin through and through. He participated in the Eranos circle in Heidelberg, whose members were all male full professors. He was both attracted to and repelled by Stefan Georg and his elitist cult. An art collector, Weber was able to live "basically on the

proceeds of a successful sale of [his] Klinger collection” before Marianne’s inheritance in 1908 (quoted in Radkau, 2009, p. 282). Weber was a music connoisseur and his study of the “rational and sociological foundations of music” (Weber, 1921) was one of his first investigations of the concept of rationalization.

Still, Ringer is partly correct in arguing that Weber was not an academic Mandarin. Instead there is a rather consistent pattern in Weber’s work of seeking a *middle-ground* position between the modernist and mandarin poles. His strategy of creating a new position in a nascent social science field is reminiscent of Flaubert’s strategy in the French literary field, as described by Bourdieu (1996). Weber wrote his Habilitation thesis in a classic “German Mandarin” field – Roman history – and he addressed a classic German Mandarin problem – Rome’s decline. But he attempted “to grasp classical antiquity with the plainest and most modern instrument, an analysis of agrarian measurement techniques” (Radkau, 2009, p. 72). In an extremely non-historicist move Weber compared Roman land policy to contemporary Prussian policy rather than emphasizing ancient Rome’s uniqueness (Weber, 1891, 1976). Indeed, the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* understood Weber’s Habilitation thesis as qualifying him for a study of Polish laborers in the German present (Konno, 2004, p. 45). Along similar lines, Weber sought in his epistemological writings to overcome the split between historicism and positivism, interpretive description and causal explanation. His concept of the ideal type represented a compromise between the internal logical consistency of an ideal (as in the abstract economic theory of the Austrian school of marginal utility), and the concrete historical reality that was preferred by the German historical school of economics (Radkau, 2009, p. 260). In *Economy and Society* Weber even spoke of *Marktgemeinschaft* (market community), merging the two mutually exclusive antithetical poles of Toennies’ famous *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* model (Radkau, 2009, p. 414). His argument in favor of *specialized* sciences rather than the traditional *generalism* of the German Mandarins was coupled with a vigorous campaign to exclude applied policy research from sociology (Rammstedt, 1988). Weber’s pursuit of this median strategy inside the academic field was not a direct effect or reflection of his social class background, but was an effort to occupy a position that was *homologous* to his position in the overarching field of power. The midpoint in the field of power between bourgeois and *Bildungsbürger*, economic and cultural capital, was roughly homologous to the midpoint between the Mandarin and modernist positions inside the university social sciences field.

Weber's sociology of religion project has the same intermediate quality. On the one hand, he concerned himself in the midst of the Great War with the seemingly esoteric topics of Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. He studied British censuses of India rather than fighting against Britain on the battlefield – the only one of Helene Weber's sons who did not fight (Radkau, 2009, p. 464). On the other hand – and this is the “modernist” side – Weber refused to accept the traditional German Mandarin Sinologists as his guides to Chinese history. Weber ignored the literature of the German Jesuits in China, from Johann Adam Schall von Bell to Athanasius Kircher, who had praised Confucianism, and he ignored 19th century university Sinophiles like Johann Heinrich Plath, Wilhelm Schott, Georg von der Gabelentz, Wilhelm Grube, and Gustav Klemm, director of the Royal Library in Dresden and author of the ten-volume *Cultural History of Mankind*, who defended China's “wonderful form of government, wise laws, advanced moral institutions, in sum, its unique culture” and observed that the Chinese were justified in viewing Europeans as barbarians in the wake of Opium Wars (Klemm, 1847, pp. ii, 510; Leutner, 1987). Weber's central question was also a “modernist” one: Rather than asking why China had declined – a question linked to ancient and pre-modern visions of history as a cycle of empires – he asked why China had supposedly *always* been stagnant – an assumption closer to modern race-theoretical thinking and evolutionary social theories.

In making these arguments, Weber aligned himself with De Groot and von Richthofen. Both of these China specialists occupied the most prestigious category of academic position in Germany: *Professor Ordinarius* at Berlin University. But von Richthofen was located in a modern discipline, geography, and had a highly practical background, having worked as geographer in California gold mining camps and traveled through China for four years in the pay of a European Chamber of Commerce, scouting out locations for a German invasion and penetration of China in the 1860s and 1870s (Richthofen, 1897, 1898, 1907). Weber recommended Richthofen's China diaries to his readers (Weber, 1964, p. 252, n. 1). De Groot's social trajectory also differed from the classical German Mandarin Sinologists. His background was not in the European universities and libraries but in the Dutch East Indies, where he had worked for years as a missionary and colonizer. Both men held views of China that were closer to the typical colonial merchant than to a classic 19th century German Sinologist. The Orientalists Schott and Grube, who had also been at Berlin University, did not have this practical side but were armchair philologists.

Weber distanced himself from China specialists who were located outside the university field or in structurally inferior academic positions. He ignored the writing of Ku Hung-Ming, a neo-Confucian intellectual and anti-imperialist who had studied and published in Germany, and he ignored the writing of Alfons Paquet, who published essays praising Ku Hung-Ming and traditional China (Paquet, 1911, 1912, 1914). Weber downplayed the work of the liberal Protestant missionary and Sinologist Richard Wilhelm, who had founded a Confucius Society in colonial Qingdao that was aimed at strengthening the Confucian tradition. Contrary to Weber, Wilhelm traced China's problems to "alienation and despiritualization" resulting from western interventions, not to Confucianism. But Wilhelm was associated with the Protestant Weimar mission society at the time of Weber's research.³⁵ Weber also distanced himself from Sinologist Otto Franke, who also had a practical background as a diplomatic interpreter. Franke was critical of German imperialism in China and was associated at the time with the less prestigious Hamburg Colonial Institute.³⁶ Both Sinologists were loosely associated with a growing, cosmopolitan, anti-imperialist group of intellectuals that started to emerge in Europe and the colonies before 1914, gaining strength during the interwar period. But few of these emerging anti-imperialists were located in prestigious universities or positions. The faculty members at the Berlin Seminar for Oriental Languages were separated from the regular faculty at Berlin University by a powerful social barrier. The Seminar for Oriental Languages was involved in the more practical work of training interpreters and officials for overseas and colonial postings, and also had "native" teachers. Weber did refer to one publication in the seminar's journal in *The Religion of China* (1964, p. 258, n. 49), but he ignored an article that directly challenged his thesis in that journal in 1913. The article was written by one of the Seminar's Chinese language instructors, Wang Ching Dao (1913).³⁷

Sinologists who directly opposed Western imperialism were even more untouchable for Weber than traditional German Mandarins. First, the academic anti-imperialist position, unlike Weber's own supposedly strictly "personal" imperialist views, posed a threat to academic freedom. Weber supported the hiring of socialists and Marxists in German universities and enthusiastically welcomed Jewish, Russian, and socialist students into his circle in Heidelberg, but he insisted that they avoid politics in their teaching and scientific research.

In sum, Weber sought out authorities in the Chinese studies field whose positions were structurally homologous to his own – modernist elite university mandarins. Weber's strategizing in the semi-autonomous

academic field led him to select the very Sinophobic tropes which his basic thesis on the uniqueness of the Protestant ethic required, and for which he should have had a natural predilection according to reductionist sociologies of knowledge. My hypothesis is that these simpler explanations are nonetheless incorrect, even if they would predict (or retrodict) the same “outcomes” in his text. According to my explanation, Weber would have become more open to the work of modernist Sinophiles like Richard Wilhelm and Otto Franke if they had moved into prestigious university chairs during his lifetime. Since no *modernist* Sinophilic Sinologists held the position of Ordinarius in a German university before 1920, it is impossible to test this hypothesis directly.

Richard Thurnwald as a Case of Scientific Adaptability

Unlike Weber, who had an omnivorous appetite for new objects of study, Thurnwald worked on the same themes throughout his adult life, and his views on theoretical and methodological matters remained fairly constant. But his analysis of imperialism shifted rather dramatically, tracking prevailing trends either in German imperial politics or abroad. Thurnwald and Weber may have had equally imperialist political opinions before 1920, but Thurnwald was less scientifically autonomous than Weber. This can be shown by reconstructing his views on race theory, colonial native policy, and European and German colonialism more generally. Thurnwald’s autonomy from extra-scientific imperial politics and discourses seemed to be greatest during the Weimar Republic and the first half of the 1930s, when he held an “extraordinary” professorship at Berlin University, taught at Yale, and conducted research in Tanganyika and New Guinea. In this period, Thurnwald’s views of colonialism evolved slowly from dependence on the field of power to a sort of dependence on prevailing views within academic circles. After 1936, his views of colonialism came to be tightly synchronized with official Nazi colonial ideology.

Whereas Max Weber expressed skepticism about the relevance of eugenic theory and racial biology for sociology at the first meeting of the German Sociological Society in 1910, Thurnwald allied himself with race theory in the decade before World War I, publishing dozens of his earliest articles starting in 1904 in the *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie*, a journal he also co-edited. At the beginning of the 1920s he was still seen as the relevant social scientist to write the entries on “race,” “racial hygiene,” and “racial struggle” for a new *Dictionary of Politics* (Herre, 1923). In 1924,

however, Thurnwald published an article critical of reductive socio-biological approaches. For the next decade Thurnwald largely avoided race-sociological discussions altogether (Amidon, 1998). In his theory of “leadership and social sifting” (Thurnwald, 1926a), biological selection was treated as a result of social processes rather than as an independent variable; “natural selection” was explicitly dismissed as explaining human societies (1935a, p. 94). Only after Thurnwald resettled in Nazi Germany in 1936 did he begin to publish in journals like *Zeitschrift für Rassenkunde*. Still, he remained less enthusiastic about the Nazi discourses of race than his student Mühlmann, who published a major treatise on “The Science of Race and Ethnos” in 1936 (Mühlmann, 1936).

Thurnwald’s writing on colonialism and native policy falls into five main periods: pre-1914, 1914–1922, 1922–1930, 1930–1936, and 1936–1945. Before 1914, his views even in scientific publications are framed as if he were participating in the colonial state field as much as the metropolitan academic field (Steinmetz, 2008b). His first article on the topic, entitled “Colonial Native Policy” (Thurnwald, 1905), was a detailed review of a lecture by Hans Zache, a colonial official in German East Africa. Here for the first time Thurnwald presented a simple argument that he would repeat throughout his life: control of native labor is the “actual problem of native policy” in tropical colonies, since Europeans and North Americans are physically unsuited for physical labor in the tropics and since colonialism’s *raison d’être* is economic exploitation (1905, p. 632). Thurnwald seemed to approve of Zache’s argument that “as colonizers, we are the tools of a principle of evolution or development which is that the lower cultures are replaced by the higher ones.” He agreed that “it is therefore is a question of which qualities [the white man] finds already present in the Negro that can be used to contribute to the cultural development that is being directed by the whites.” Most native tribes, Thurnwald continued, were “work-shy.” The Negro’s passivity “predestines him to be a *Knecht* of the *Herrenvölker*, the prototype of the slave” (1905, p. 632). Thurnwald did not disagree with Zache’s assertion that the African never advanced beyond the stage of sensuality and daydreaming and was an instinctive liar, incapable of creating state-like institutions. Even the classic 19th century colonial trope of the inexorable extinction of the *Naturvölker* confronted with superior western culture surfaced here.

European ethnographic discourse was imported into the colonial state, which operated like a political *field* in Bourdieu’s sense, one in which the dominant form of field-specific symbolic capital was ethnographic capital – a claim to a superior understanding of native culture (Steinmetz, 2008b).

Colonizers' *social positions* in the colonial state field were related to the positions they took in the ongoing battle of claims to ethnographic superiority. German colonial ethnographic representations of black Africans were not entirely homogenous at this time (Steinmetz, 2007). Zache was staking out a racist extreme in the battle of ethnographic representations. The fact that Thurnwald repeated Zache's views with little dissent was surprising both because Zache was anything but a scientist and because even within the colonial state field, university educated officials tended to base their claims to authority on displays of hermeneutic insight and linguistic ability (Steinmetz, 2007). Thurnwald did not seem to realize or to care that he was embracing a view of the African that was typically associated with military figures. This social haplessness, this failure to understand the rules of the game or even which game was being played, pointed to a trait that reappears again and again over Thurnwald's career.

In 1905, Thurnwald was still a metropolitan social scientist with no experience in overseas colonies. Five years later, having returned to Germany from his first Oceanic expedition, Thurnwald repeated his earlier idea that the white man "is the brain, which sets the arms and legs of the native in motion" (1910a, p. 192; also 1910b, p. 608). He now added a claim to a kind of practical usefulness on the part of the ethnographer: "if the white man wants to use his superior intellect to influence and steer the laborer, who is better adapted to the climate, he needs to know how the native feels and thinks, what he views as right and wrong" (1910a, p. 192). Having lived for three years in the colonies Thurnwald had internalized the rules of the colonial field. As an academic schooled in several foreign languages and disciplines, Thurnwald gravitated toward a position in the colonial state field that made his own qualities seem essential to the colony's operations. In another article published the same year in a colonial journal (*Koloniale Rundschau*), Thurnwald offered to "sketch the various social types used as labor power in the South Seas," since

the correct evaluation of the native workforce leads to the use of each racial type according to its abilities ... Out of the chaos of mere contiguity [*Nebeneinander*] emerges the orderliness of stratification (*Uebereinander*) organized according to individual endowments and abilities. (1910b, pp. 609, 632)

A "correct evaluation" of the problem would be a scientific one, not one based on applying military or capitalist categories to the highly esoteric and impenetrable native cultures. In a subsequent essay called "Applied Ethnology in Colonial Policy" (1912a), Thurnwald argued that "native policy ... circles around [the] problem" of controlling native workers

“through our cultural power” (“*durch geistige Machtmittel*”), since we can no longer “hunt, catch and chain natives like animals.” Of course, German colonizers in Southwest Africa and East Africa had just finished doing just that – treating natives like hunted animals – in a series of military campaigns between 1904 and 1908. Thurnwald’s position was thus directed not against colonial ideas from some distant past but against contending German social forces in the immediate colonial present. Thurnwald’s consistent emphasis on the need for a *psychological* ethnology of the colonized suggests an effort to privilege another arena where colonizers led by crass military and economic visions of native culture could not compete with academics. Thurnwald was also already beginning to embrace a mild relativism, writing that “there is no absolute measure of the worth of a given culture.” He aligned himself with the native policies of regulated preservation of indigenous culture that were associated with some of the more liberal German colonial governors in the Pacific such as Wilhelm Solf and Erich Schultz in German Samoa.³⁸ Thurnwald now wrote that “it is meaningless to try to assimilate the natives” to “our Nordic conditions”: the colonizer should “intervene only to regulate, not to destroy.” In the larger publication based on his first expedition to New Guinea Thurnwald argued for seeking “an appropriate symbiosis” between European and local culture (1912b, p. 19). Colonial racists at the time vehemently opposed any such “synthesis,” and were in the midst of passing laws to ban racial intermarriage in the German colonies. Thurnwald’s views had become sociologically “appropriate” for his position in the colonial field.

Thurnwald spent six years in overseas colonies between 1906 and 1914, so it is perhaps understandable that his statements during this period seem directed toward other colonial actors rather than fellow social scientists. And yet the publications referred to in the preceding paragraph were all published while Thurnwald was in Germany between his overseas research trips. There is no evidence that he hoped to find employment in the colonies, even though he received research support from the Colonial Office. The fact that Thurnwald engaged in battle mainly with contenders in the colonies reveals a pattern of intellectual heteronomy that cannot be explained by financial difficulties or problems in gaining a professorship in Germany.

Thurnwald did initiate a polemic against the dominant school in the German ethnological field in the same 1912 lecture on “Applied Ethnology in Colonial Policy.” In addition to his “protest” against the “poor understanding” of native subjectivity by colonial officials, he attacked “the way in which scientific ethnographic studies of natives sometimes see it as an honor to deal with the most unpractical things, with bows and arrows and drums

and so on.” Ethnography, Thurnwald argued, “is not exhausted by illuminating historical influences.” Here he was throwing down the gauntlet to the dominant grouping in the German ethnological field, the cultural-historical or *Kulturkreis* school. Thurnwald’s alternative was to open ethnology to other disciplines, especially sociology, law, psychology, and biology. In a period of poorly established disciplinary boundaries, Thurnwald’s move represented an embrace of academic heteronomy – heteronomy vis-à-vis other disciplines. Without arguing that all forms of interdisciplinary stem from a position of field-specific weakness, this is a recognizable pattern (Bourdieu, 1991b).

The second phase in Thurnwald’s colonial analysis begins in the last two years of World War I, after he returned to Germany from New Guinea via California, and ends with his move from Halle to Berlin. Thurnwald (1917a, 1918a) wrote a series of articles that echoed the colonial movement’s arguments for Germany’s retention of its colonies as a guarantee of peace. In an article, on “Holland and its Colonial Policies” he repeated his prewar argument in favor of a “humane” native policy. He now found an example of human colonialism in the Dutch framework of “ethical politics.” Here colonial “rule is founded in a superiority of the spirit, unlike the English method of economic force or other nation’s use of direct violence” (1917b, p. 40). In 1918, Thurnwald jumped into the same broad debate in which the Weber brothers were pushing for German hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe and wrote that “the war must bring us an expansion of our *Lebensraum*,” including “adequate colonial possessions” (1918b, p. 43). Responding to British claims that Germany had been an immature and especially brutal colonizer (Union of South Africa, 1918), Thurnwald insisted that “native policy before war was much more humane in the German than in the English colonies” (1918b, pp. 53–54). Thurnwald joined the Halle Colonial Academy just as Germany was losing its colonies in 1918, and he participated in discussions about transforming it into a school of foreign studies (along the lines followed by the Hamburg Colonial Institute and the Berlin Seminar for Oriental Languages).³⁹ In 1922, he lectured at Halle on the possibility of a non-belligose (*unkriegerische*) colonialism.⁴⁰ This seems to have been motivated by ongoing discussions of the League of Nations mandate colonies.

Rather than becoming an embittered German colonial revanchist like so many former colonial governors and officers, Thurnwald moved away from colonialism altogether in the third phase, following the 1922 lecture. It was at this time that he became an “extraordinary” professor (*Extraordinarius*) at Berlin University. Although he had participated in all three German

“colonial congresses” before the war (1901, 1902, 1905, 1910a, 1910b, 1910), Thurnwald did not participate in the fourth colonial congress in 1924.⁴¹ He now seemed to accept Germany’s loss of colonies (Thurnwald, 1929a, p. 8). During the 1920s, he worked on his five-volume, 1,618-page *Human Society* (*Die Menschliche Gesellschaft*), considered to be his lasting achievement alongside his ethnographic discoveries in Oceania.⁴² In the introduction to volume one of *Die Menschliche Gesellschaft* Thurnwald addressed the “crisis” in native life that had been precipitated by sustained contact with the colonizer’s culture and superior technology (Thurnwald, 1931–1935, Vol. 1, pp. 21–22). The rest of *Die Menschliche Gesellschaft* dealt exclusively with non-European “traditional” societies, however, and did not analyze the impact of Europe or European imperialism at all.

In the fourth phase of Thurnwald’s work on colonialism, starting at the end of the 1920s, he began paying more attention to ongoing transformations – mainly negative ones – in colonized societies. The theme of change in colonized societies was the main focus of a series of publications based on a research trip to Tanganyika in 1930–1931, including the book *Black and White in East Africa* (1935) and a series of articles (Thurnwald, 1929a, 1929b, 1931a, 1931b, 1931c, 1932a, 1932b, 1932c, 1935b). Thurnwald claimed that his new emphasis on problems of “acculturation” was a response to the shock of seeing a “Negro at the typewriter” (the title of Thurnwald, 1932c) in Tanganyika and revisiting New Guinea in 1934 and seeing the “transition of a savage society from almost complete integrity to a growing disintegration of the old order” (Thurnwald, 1936a, p. 347). European colonialism had brought peace and economic development to previously warlike societies, but in doing so had mainly made things worse. Chiefly authority and traditional culture had been broken, and the “spice had been taken out of native life with the loss of independence and of the excitement they had derived from fighting” (1936a, p. 353). Thurnwald analyzed cultural mixing by distinguishing between “culture” and “civilization” (echoing Alfred Weber’s [1920–1921] treatment of that distinction). The civilizational level, defined as technology and technical knowledge, could still be seen as progressing, but cultures could not be arrayed along any progressive, linear scale (Thurnwald, 1935a, p. 4; Thurnwald, 1939a, pp. 422–423).⁴³ This writing on colonial acculturation was accompanied by a growing skepticism about European cultural superiority. Cultural hybridity and “primitive thinking” were both found among Europeans as well the colonized, *pace* Lévy-Bruhl (1925 [1910]). Thurnwald also began analyzing the emergence of anticolonialism in an “awakening Africa” (1935a, p. 80). Attending a conference at Howard University’s sociology

department in 1936, he discussed the “crisis of imperialism” with representatives from Africa, China, and India, and with “colored Americans.” Here he argued that “inherent in imperialism is the ‘hybris,’ the overbearing insolence of the dominant stratum,” which “inescapably leads to its nemesis,” in the guise of “a new generation of natives has grown up which has been educated in schools by Europeans, in ways of thought that are European, and in using devices introduced by Europeans” (1936b, p. 84).

Thurnwald’s work in this fourth phase, during which he lived mainly in the United States, underscores the fact that he was highly responsive not just to political power but to his more immediate academic environment. His thinking in this period seems to have been more responsive to developments inside American anthropology and sociology than to events in the colonized world or discussions in the German disciplinary fields. Or rather: the impact of colonial changes on Thurnwald’s work is filtered through the discourse of his non-German academic colleagues. After all, the colonized world had been in “crisis” since the beginning of modern colonialism; European rule had always been characterized by the production of cultural hybridity and a technological advantage over the colonized. Also revealing is that Thurnwald did not mention meeting with representatives of anticolonial movements while in Africa but only at an African-American university. He carried on a lively correspondence with American anthropologists and sociologists who were more advanced on race questions than most of the professors Thurnwald associated with in Germany. Thurnwald struck an explicitly anti-Nazi stance in this period in correspondence with Boas and other Jewish professors, writing to Boas in 1933 that “we learn with disgust and consternation of the occurrences provoked by the new government in Germany. We *Auslandsdeutsche* should also all dissociate ourselves from this government.”⁴⁴ During this period Thurnwald’s funding came mainly from non-German sources, although Berlin University continued to hold his position open for him. His East Africa research was sponsored by the International African Institute in London, whose funding came from the Rockefeller Foundation (Adedze, 2003, p. 338).

In the fifth phase, Thurnwald’s work was aligned with the Nazi state and Nazi imperial ideologies. His first major article after returning to Germany from the United States, entitled “Die Kolonialfrage,” represented a sharp departure from his work in the years immediately preceding it. In “The Crisis of Imperialism” (1936) he had condemned colonialism. Now Thurnwald argued that Germany should regain its African colonies to obtain *Lebensraum* and tropical raw materials (1937, pp. 66–69). Thurnwald set out to refute the “colonial lie,” that is, the argument codified in the

Versailles Treaty that disqualified Germany as a competent colonial power. In a 500-page book called *Koloniale Gestaltung (Colonial Development, 1939)* and a 120-page article (Thurnwald, 1940) he compared German colonial practices with those of Britain, France, and other European powers. Here and in a secret report for the Colonial Law Committee of the *Akademie für Deutsches Recht* Thurnwald elaborated a specifically Nazi form of colonial administration and a plan for “the organization of native labor in East Africa and its organization on a National Socialist basis” (Thurnwald, 2001 [1938]). Nazi terminology and concepts like race, space (*Raum*), and *Lebensraum* now structured his discussion of colonialism. German colonialism was to be governed by the “Führer principle” (Timm, 1977, p. 634). The “white’s claim to lead the native” was grounded in fact that the colonizer brings progress to the colonized, and expropriation of the natives’ land was defended as making it more productive and allowing the native to increase his “*Lebensraum*” (1939b, p. 433). The possibility of anticolonialism was now traced to “Bolshevist” propaganda coming from American blacks (1939b, p. 378). In addition to polemicizing against Weimar-era and especially “Frankfurt” sociology as having been corrupted by the “poisoning” influence of Jews (Timm, 1977, p. 622), Thurnwald argued that “the numerous South African Jews” joined the British in opposing the Boers’ exemplary segregation policies (2001 [1938], p. 625). African colonies should be divided into three zones: one for whites only, a mixed zone, and native reservations. Natives would need a “work card” in order to work in the white space. The colonized would govern themselves inside their reservations under the oversight of a resident German “native caretaker.” Rather than lumping all natives together under a single rubric, Thurnwald specified that there would be a plurality of distinct “black spaces” for each tribe. In addition to reservations Thurnwald also allowed for “worker colonies next to larger plantations, mines, or other large firms.” For Thurnwald it was important that Africans “mainly pursue their traditional agrarian activities” and “be allowed to put on their old festivals and dances.” In this and other respects Thurnwald’s Nazi-era analysis continued to develop themes from the fourth phase. Native legal proceedings were to be carried out by the native chief, under the Caretaker’s supervision.⁴⁵ The goal of German colonialism, Thurnwald insisted, was to *prevent* “the rise of a black proletariat,” which would have “nasty consequences” (Thurnwald, 2001 [1938], p. 627).

The culmination of Thurnwald’s self-*Gleichschaltung* was his proposal for an institute for ethnological research that would encompass “ethnographic research at home” (*Volksforschung in der Heimat*) alongside research on

overseas and colonized societies (Timm, 1977, p. 622). Thurnwald had long insisted that sociology should not respect the distinction between primitive and modern, European and non-European societies (Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, 1936). But by calling on Berlin University to bridge this gap at this precise moment, Thurnwald was essentially giving his approval to projects of harnessing *Ostforschung* to *Ostpolitik*, that is, putting ethnosociology to work in the service of the Nazi colonization of Eastern Europe. Ethnological research on Eastern Europe was by this time focusing on the project of sorting out the populations that could be successfully Germanized from the others, and Thurnwald's protégé Mühlmann was one of the most active participants in this reorientation of ethnological science toward applied research on the European east. The official justification for conquering the east was to create Lebensraum and to mobilize a pliant work force, although genocidal annihilation soon emerged as the leading state goal. In 1942, Thurnwald asked for a reduction in his course load because he was working on "a series of reports on the deployment of foreign workers" for the *Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition*.⁴⁶ Thurnwald was thus at least implicitly accepting the removal or massacre of populations that would not be contributing to German projects. Combined with the fact that Thurnwald had noticed (and at the time, criticized) attacks on Jews in Germany since 1933, it seems impossible that he could not have imagined what would happen to those who were not useful for slave labor or ethnic assimilation. By the end of the 1930s, the distance between Thurnwald's scientific work and official Nazi imperial policy had narrowed to the vanishing point.

CONCLUSION: EGO AUTONOMY AND SCIENTIFIC AUTONOMY REVISITED

If Max Weber was scientifically autonomous and Thurnwald a seeming mirror of the dominant forces in his immediate environment at any given time, what about the two scholars who initially stood in their shadows, Alfred Weber and Wilhelm Mühlmann? Questions of scientific ego autonomy would seem to be particularly acute in cases like these.⁴⁷

Alfred Weber was born in 1868 and was economically autonomous like his brother, although he never married. Like Max he wrote a Habilitation thesis with a famous professor historical national economics (Gustav Schmoller). After teaching at Prague from 1902 to 1907 Alfred obtained a

professorship at Heidelberg, where he remained for the rest of his life (he died in 1958). If anything he struck an even more autonomous stance in the academic sphere, even if he became skeptical of Max's value free doctrine fairly early. During the 1920s he presided over an exciting interdisciplinary social science research center, the Heidelberg Institute for State and Social Sciences (Blomert, Esslinger, & Giovannini, 1997; Blomert, 1999). Most of the rising stars in sociology and the other social sciences passed through Heidelberg in the Weimar period, more specifically through the Institute for State and Social Sciences, and many studied with Alfred Weber.⁴⁸ Weber was the one of the only Heidelberg University professors not driven into exile in the Nazi period who did not compromise with the Nazis (Demm, 2000a, pp. 267–308; Remy, 2002). After 1945 Weber was part of a "Committee of Thirteen" untainted faculty members charged with helping the occupying American military powers to denazify the university. Weber favored more extensive purges than any other Heidelberg faculty member (Remy, 2002, pp. 138, 160) and was adamant about restoring the university's autonomy from the state and the professors' autonomy from administrators. In short, his position on scientific autonomy was similar to that of his brother's, except that he accepted a necessary normative dimension in scientific work. This position, already articulated before 1914, became even more pronounced after the Nazi era (Weber, 1955, pp. 37–43).

Alfred Weber also followed his own path in his research. Before 1907 he was known for his studies of home work, cartels, and imperialism (Demm, 2000a, p. 83). While in Prague he supervised the doctoral thesis of none other than Franz Kafka, the world's greatest analyst of psychic abasement vis-à-vis both bureaucratic authority and father figures (Demm, 2000a, p. 43).⁴⁹ Alfred's contribution to industrial location theory (Weber 1929 [1909]) pursued a strategy similar to Max's by combining the two great contending economic schools at the time, Austrian marginal utility theory and German historical economics (Demm, 2000a, p. 67). Between 1910 and 1935, Alfred became known as the main voice of historical and cultural sociology in Germany and internationally (Weber, 1935, 1997). His 1935 magnum opus, *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie (Cultural History as Cultural Sociology)* could not find a publisher in Nazi Germany and came out in the Netherlands. Weber continued to write, and in 1943 he published *Das tragische und die Geschichte (The Tragic and History)*, which revisited the same Oriental civilizations as Max Weber's sociology of religion but with a completely different question: what explains the variable presence of a "tragic" worldview in various cultures? That this was an oblique criticism of the ongoing German politics of the present hardly needs stating,

especially after Marianne Weber explained the way in which participants in her discussion circle even during the Nazi period could say “something to us which seemed exceptionally close to our present-day experiences” even while appearing to be remote (Weber, 1977a, p. 235).

Alfred Weber dealt with imperialism on three different occasions. In 1904 he published “Germany and economic imperialism,” which analyzed the new “protectionist imperialism” that was seeking to turn the “undeveloped parts of the world into permanent economic dependencies of the present-day developed parts” by throwing up “imperialism barbed wire” around their borders (Weber, 2000, pp. 394, 396). Weber calmly assembled statistics to show that Germany had nonetheless been able to increase its exports to protected colonial markets. His conclusion was that Germany “can’t accomplish much at all with imperial policy” (*ibid.*, p. 387). This data-backed conclusion not only flew in the face of the liberal imperialist circles that the Weber brothers frequented but was also at odds with the power-political imperialism that Max Weber continued to defend. During World War I, Alfred joined Max in projects to strengthen German hegemony over *Mitteleuropa* (Demm, 1990, p. 207; Weber, 1999, pp. 178–229). Alfred argued at this time that the smaller eastern nations would become dependent on the German “leading nation” (Demm, 1990, p. 209). Alfred described this informal imperialism as a “great organizational federation of equal, self-governing parties” that would “eliminate the imperial form” altogether (1999, p. 203). After 1918 Alfred became a vocal critic of both European colonialism and German imperialism (Weber, 1924). His treatise on world history summarized modernity under the conceptual heading of western imperial expansion (“*das expansive Abendland seit 1500*”) and discussed the creation of a “global Occident” (*Welt-Abendland*) with its colonial empires, and the rise of a “uprising of the masses” in the global peripheries, societies that “had arrived at the threshold of history when they create a new synthesis” from their own traditions and western modernity (1935, pp. 405, 408).

So far the only moment of loss of autonomy seems to be World War I, when Alfred became a fervent social Darwinistic militarist and a liberal imperialist. The obvious place to look, however, is the psychic level. Alfred looked up to his older brother even as a child. He shared a lover with him, Else Jaffé-Richthofen, and probably knew “that Else loved Max more than himself” (Radkau, 2008, p. 21). Alfred came eventually to be known as “Minimax” and W.e.b.e.r. or “will eigenen Bruder endlich revidieren” (“wants to finally revise his own brother”; Demm, 2000a, p. 61). After the war he suffered the humiliation of hearing Talcott Parsons, his erstwhile

student and now the leading sociologist in the world, declare that Alfred Weber was not a sociologist at all (von Beyme in Demm, 2000b, p. 220). René König, the rising star of West German sociology, derided Alfred as a philosopher of history and not a sociologist. In a widely-read text, König assimilated Alfred Weber to “historical and social philosophers” like Spengler (König, 1958, p. 151) – an enormous insult for the anti-Nazi who was now a Social Democrat. The hopelessly antiquated German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler argued that the “republication” of Alfred Weber’s work was “a mistake,” since Weber’s work was “hopelessly antiquated.” German sociologist Walter L. Bühl said that Alfred Weber’s work was “a complete failure,” a form of “cultural criticism loaded with resentment” (Molt, 2002, p. 89). Interestingly, most of these critics of Alfred Weber are themselves strongly identified with the work of Max Weber. Despite this extremely difficult situation Alfred Weber seems to have navigated questions of ego autonomy effectively.

The same cannot be said for Wilhelm Mühlmann. Mühlmann had defended a doctoral dissertation on the secret Arioi society in precolonial Tahiti in 1932 (Mühlmann, 1932) but faced an even more difficult academic job market than Thurnwald had. In 1932, when Thurnwald was in the United States and complaining about the Nazis in his letters, Mühlmann was already dropping hints about his sympathies for Hitler. In a letter to Thurnwald Mühlmann observed that “many of the students of my age are running into the arms of the Nazis.”⁵⁰ In October 1932 Mühlmann published an article comparing “cornerstones and horns” in Tahitian and Jewish culture.⁵¹ In March 1933, after the Nazi seizure of power, Mühlmann wrote to Thurnwald saying that some people, and not only Jews, were thinking of leaving Germany, and that “I too thought about emigrating but came to the conclusion that I would stay.”⁵² Mühlmann flourished professionally during the Nazi period, often at the expense of Jewish and other professional competitors whom he badmouthed politically. He defended the Nazi ban on marriage between Christians and Jews (Mühlmann, 1936, pp. 536–537), and wrote a memo arguing that ethnologists who did not follow modern (Nazi) sociobiological views should be fired from ethnographic museums – at a time when he was searching for just such a position (Michel, 1995, p. 150). He went on the attack against the rival *Kulturkreis* ethnological school as a “degeneration of science” (Mühlmann, 1942, p. 292) pursued by “Catholic Jews” (Michel, 1995, p. 151) like Wilhelm Schmidt, founder of the Vienna school (Petermann, 2004, p. 599), who denied the importance of race as opposed to culture (Mühlmann, 1937). Mühlmann’s career benefited from close connections to several key figures inside the notorious Rosenberg

Office, and Alfred Rosenberg directly funded Mühlmann's research (Michel, 1992, p. 91). Mühlmann described the Jews as a *Scheinvolk* or "sham people" (Mühlmann, 1942) and, along with Gypsies, as "rootless or uprooted ... sifting itself again and again out of all ethnic communities of vagabonds, vagrants, bums, and so on, whose sociological connections with Jews and Gypsies has been amply demonstrated" (Mühlmann, 1942, p. 294).

The culmination of Mühlmann's transformation into a Nazi social scientist involved a change in his main object of research from Polynesians to Eastern Europeans. This responded to the Nazi regime's privileging of eastern conquest and its fervent anti-Semitism. Other ethnologists such as Otto Reche turned toward *Ostforschung* (Eastern European studies). Mühlmann was one among many who challenged the boundaries between *Völkerkunde* and *Volkskunde* (Blome, 1941). This shift was already indicated by his growing interest in Jewish customs in 1932. Between 1942 and 1944 he published a string of publications on the problem of "trans-folking" (*Umvolkung*) – a Nazi neologism for the Germanization of certain ethnic groups in the occupied zones or the absorption of smaller ethnic groups into larger, more powerful ones. The corollary of trans-folking in actual policy was the extermination of the Jews and other inhabitants of the occupied zones who were not seen as viable candidates for assimilation. Mühlmann explained this in a scientific essay written during the early part of the Holocaust:

trans-folking as a process obeys geopolitical-strategic laws. Just as the aim of war is the annihilation of the enemy, so the goal of trans-folking is ethnic extermination. Subjective ethnic conversion under the superior weight of the foreign ethnic gradient corresponds to surrendering to the enemy in war ... The suffering ethnos constitutes small and tiny ethnic islands that become ever more tightly surrounded and finally give way before the flood of the stronger ethnic group. (Mühlmann, 1942, p. 296)

Mühlmann went on to publish a book-length study of trans-folking (Mühlmann, 1944) and to write on the ethnic composition of Eastern and Southeast Europe (Mühlmann, 1943). He appeared frequently as a speaker at the Nazi Institute for Border and Foreign Studies, which was responsible for applied research on ethnic issues in the occupied zones. Even if the defenders of trans-folking ultimately lost out to the stronger and more brutal "race faction" (Klingemann, 1989, p. 21) inside this Institute and the Nazi state more generally, this does not gainsay Mühlmann's complete loss of scientific autonomy.

It would be easy to explain the increasingly Nazified, applied orientation of Mühlmann's work in terms of economic hardship and the lack of a

permanent university position. But there seems to be more involved. Mühlmann had worked very hard for Thurnwald in the early 1930s, doing most of the editorial work for the journal *Sociologus*. But Thurnwald got most of the international credit, especially in the United States and especially after the journal went bilingual in 1932. Thurnwald was institutionally too weak to be able to help Mühlmann economically. The fact that he “escaped” to the United States in the first half of the 1930s may have aroused some resentment in his student as well. But Mühlmann owed most of his central research ideas to Thurnwald, being strongly identified with the “functionalist” approach that Thurnwald had introduced into German anthropology. Mühlmann’s attacks on the *Kulturkreis* school echoed Thurnwald’s more measured, scientific criticisms. Even the racial, sociobiological turn in Mühlmann’s work was indebted to Thurnwald, whose earlier work on “social sifting” as a kind of social evolutionary mechanism was re-biologized by Mühlmann. In sum, Mühlmann seems to have been pushed toward Nazi protectors by his relative poverty and also by a desire for scientific ego autonomy from his former mentor and weak patron.

My assumption in this paper is that scientific autonomy is worth defending. This does not necessarily entail erecting a tall wall between science and politics or the outside world. More than anyone else, Pierre Bourdieu has convincingly shown why “there is no opposition between autonomy and engagement” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 187–188). Even an engaged, militant sociology needs to start from a position of relative scientific autonomy.

NOTES

1. Bourdieu’s account of the crisis of May 1968 in *Homo Academicus* (Bourdieu, 1988, pp. 159–193) follows an explanatory strategy that is very similar to Althusser’s in “Contradiction and Overdetermination” (Althusser, 1990). Bourdieu breaks here with any residual notion in his work of a singular universal trajectory from tradition to modernity (a tendency seen in his studies of Algeria, rural Béarn, and French state formation, for example). The events of May 1968 are explained instead by the “synchronization of crises latent in different fields,” the transformation of a “regional crisis” into “a general crisis, a historical event” (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 173). This occurs when the *acceleration* produced by a regional crisis is able to bring about a *coincidence* of events which, given the different *tempo* which each field adopts in its relative autonomy, *should* normally start or finish in dispersed order or, in other words, succeed each other without necessarily organizing themselves into a unified causal series.”

2. As I argue in Steinmetz (2008a), the causal mechanisms of the social sciences are best described as social structures, to avoid possibly misleadingly *mechanical* connotations of the word *mechanism* (Steinmetz, 1998). *Psychic* structures are the “mechanisms” of psychoanalytic theory and science. But if social and psychological structures are analytically distinguishable, they are often not only combined but condensed with one another (along with various natural mechanisms ranging from biological to meteorological ones) in the genesis of human practices (Bhaskar, 1986, pp. 109–112).

3. See also Mulrine, 2007. On anthropology and colonialism, see Leclerc (1972), Asad (1973), Gothsch (1983), Stocking (1991), Zimmerman (2001), Penny (2002), and Steinmetz (2004).

4. On area studies and comparative political science, see Morrissey (1976), Wallerstein (1997), Robin (2001), and Vitalis (2005); for geography, see Godlewska and Smith (1994) and Smith (2003); and for economics, see Mirowski (2005).

5. The word “sociologie” was actually used as early as the 1780s by the Abbé Sièyes but was made famous by Comte (Guilhaumou, 2006).

6. Treatments of Vierkandt by historians of sociology tended to ignore his “anthropological” work (Hochstim, 1966, p. 27), due a retrospective narrowing of the sociological field and the resulting belief that “primitive” societies had always been the sole property of anthropology.

7. See Papcke (1993, ch. 5) on Grünfeld, a forgotten figure who committed suicide in Germany in 1938 after completing *Die Peripheren* (1939).

8. *Congrès international de sociologie coloniale* (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1901), 2 Vols.

9. Of course, the Weimar Republic was still referred to as *Das deutsches Reich*; the word *Reich* had different connotations in German than the English and French words “empire” (Bosbach & Hiery, 1999). Despite the political pressures of nominalism, however, the Kaiserreich was an Imperium insofar as it annexed and ruled over outlying foreign areas (Alsace, parts of Poland, Austria, and Denmark) whose subjects did not have entirely equal rights; moreover the head of state was called Kaiser, or Caesar, and Roman images abounded (Steinmetz, 2006b). Like traditional land empires, Imperial Germany was regionally multinational or cosmopolitan, a magnetic center exerting hegemonic cultural attraction over smaller nations and peripheral elites.

10. Jacques Soustelle, a student of Marcel Mauss and specialist in the Native American cultures of Mexico, was Governor General of French Algeria in 1955. He recruited Germain Tillion, a specialist in Algeria, to take charge of education, and she implemented a network of social centers (*Centres Sociaux*) which provided practical education, job training, medical care, and other forms of welfare to Algerian peasants (Forget, 1992). Paul Mus was a specialist in Buddhist and Sanskritist cosmology who became a critic of French colonialism and the American war in Vietnam and coined the term *Union française*, which he imagined as a “postimperial entity” (Bayly, 2009, p.196) that would be a “free and equal ‘association’ between the former colonial state and its ex-colony” (Larcher-Goscha, 2009, pp. 214–215). Mercier and Balandier were sociologists working in French west Africa in the late 1940s and early 1950s who ran a number of social science research centers and became highly critical of colonialism. Pierre Bourdieu, finally, was sent to Algeria in 1955 at the age of 25 for his military service and took a position as

assistant professor at the University of Algiers and published his first book, *Sociologie de l'Algérie*, in 1958. He went on to conduct field research on the impact of capitalism on Algerian workers (Darbel, Rivet, Seibel, & Bourdieu, 1963) and the uprooting and resettlement of Algerian villagers (Bourdieu & Sayad, 1964). Both of these studies were commissioned by the French government and sponsored by the Association of Demographic, Economic, and Social Research., which was trying to reform French colonialism. But Bourdieu became a strong supporter of an “Algerian Algeria” (Nouschi, 2003; Yacine, 2004; Silverstein & Goodman, 2009).

11. On field theory, see Bourdieu (1991a, 1993b, 1996, 1999a).

12. To see how this approach can illuminate the empire-knowledge relationship we need to briefly recall the prevailing approaches in the literature on imperial knowledge. The first approach, associated with Edward Said (1978), sees metropolitan science as a determinant that shapes the third world, including the colonies. The second approach inverts this account and explains science as a product of social conditions, as a function of social class or of some other social properties of intellectuals, or of capitalism, colonialism, or another social system. The third approach, which is positivistic or commonsensical, sees science as entirely independent of external influences. According to this third approach any writing that is clearly subordinated to outside powers is simply unscientific. I will not consider other approaches to the sociology of science in this paper except where needed and noted. I have shown elsewhere that precolonial ethnographic descriptions of non-European cultures did shape later German colonial native policies but only insofar as these discourses were adopted by colonial officials and wielded as cultural weapons in their struggles for power and status inside the colonial state (Steinmetz, 2007).

13. See *Aufgaben der deutschen Kolonialforschung*, edited by Kolonialwissenschaftliche Abteilung des Reichsforschungsrates (1942), which was published only for internal government use (*nur für den Dienstgebrauch*). On the entire field of colonial sciences in Nazi Germany, see Schmokel (1964).

14. For example, faculty at Cologne were able to prevent the head of the western section of the Nazi “University Lecturers League” Willy Gierlichs from obtaining a regular professorship due to his lack of a “major scientific publication” (Klingemann, 1996, p. 63).

15. Landecker went into exile the following year, earning a Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Michigan and eventually becoming a tenured sociology professor there (Lüschen, 2002).

16. Other examples: Nazi sociologist Karl Valentin Müller had “no objections to a possible race-mixing” in a German-dominated Czechoslovakia, even if this violated Himmler’s views on race; in 1942 the Nazi Rektor of Königsberg University recognized three distinct schools in German economics (Klingemann, 2002, p. 191; idem, 1996, p. 187).

17. Bourdieu probably introduced the neologism *socioanalysis* because it resonated with *psychoanalysis*.

18. Each of these objects can also be considered from the standpoint of their own problems of autonomy and independence; each of them can be constructed as a Nomos, that is, a system seeking some sort of internal order. The idea of the Nomos is different from Luhmann’s autopoietic system because it is not necessarily defined by a binary linguistic code.

19. Bourdieu is also interested in the overall autonomy of entire fields. Compared to other fields, social science (including sociology) “is particularly exposed to heteronomy, because external pressure is particularly strong there and because the internal conditions for autonomy (in particular the requirement of a ‘ticket of entry’) are very difficult to set up” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 87).

20. Jeffrey Alexander (1995, pp. 144–145) makes almost the opposite critique of Bourdieu, arguing that his theory of habitus differs from psychoanalysis in failing to understand the social self as empirically autonomous and differentiated from others. In the work of the 1990s, however, Bourdieu increasingly focused on the ego-analytic tradition discussed by Alexander, which “emphasized the body, the breast and the body ego [as] reference points from which the self must differentiate, not as mirror-images with which the self is identified” (*ibid.*). I am arguing instead that Bourdieu theorizes *differentiation* but does not theorize relations of *similitude*, mirror-images, ego ideals and ideal egos, and other identifications. For Bourdieu, similarities among different individuals’ representations and practices stem from similarities at the level of habitus, and not from psychic identifications and mirroring. It is precisely this level of identifications, which involves direct relations between individuals and ego ideals (or ideal egos), which needs to be integrated into Bourdieu’s theory. Admittedly, however, Bourdieu is vague about the means by which habituses are “orchestrated,” so that Alexander’s critique has some merit.

21. Identification in psychoanalysis is an unconscious mental process “by which someone makes part of their personality conform to the personality of another, who serves as a model” (Mijolla, 2005, p. 787). On the difference between ego ideals and ideal egos, see Freud (1914, 1921), Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), Mijolla-Mellor (2005), and Lagache (1961).

22. The difference between a controlling superego and a labile, opportunist psychic structure also helps us understand the original choice of a profession. The extreme forms of autonomy and heteronomy can be associated in the first case with the “heir who, so to speak, refuses to inherit, that is, to be inherited by his inheritance” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 11) and in the second with heirs located on the “main diagonal” of the social mobility table.

23. Of course there has always been disagreement on Weber’s influence on German sociology during the 1920s (see for example Schroeter, 1980). Weber’s place in the field between 1909 and 1933 (and even through the Nazi period; see Klingemann, 1996) was central insofar as he had the greatest amount of field-specific symbolic capital; this is a different criterion than Weber’s “influence.” The postwar West German discussion of Weber began in earnest with the 1964 convention of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie* (Kaesler, 2002).

24. In the “rural laborer study” (*Landarbeiter-Enquête*) Weber analyzed the supposed threat to the eastern German border zones posed by Polish immigration and the factors motivating Prussian-German rural laborers to emigrate. The study thus combined “sociological analysis with ‘*volkstumpolitischer Agitation*’” (Klingemann, 2002, p. 177). His contribution to the study of the psychophysics of labor was driven “above all by the question of [enhancing] the profitability of the [workers’ contribution] to the capitalist process of production” ([63]Demm, 2000a, p. 72), a thoroughly “bourgeois” orientation that went against the more social political orientation of the older members of the Verein für Sozialpolitik.

25. Weber's later campaign to separate academic sociology from politics was directed partly *against* the Verein für Sozialpolitik and also against the politicization of the university lecture-hall by the German Mandarin professors (Josephson, 2004).

26. Thurnwald moved to Berlin from Austria in 1900 and converted from Catholicism to Protestantism in 1904 (Melk-Koch, 1989).

27. Melk-Koch (1989, p. 162), quoting the head of the commission in charge of staffing and preparing the Kaiserin-August-Fluß-Expedition in which Thurnwald participated.

28. The reasons for his failure to get a job in the United States were explained to Thurnwald in a letter from sociologist L. L. Bernard (June 26, 1936, Yale University Library [hereafter YUL], Thurnwald papers).

29. See Steinmetz (2007) on European merchant class Sinophobia and Kaiser Wilhelm's hyper-Sinophobia.

30. M. Weber (1964, pp. 235–242, 249).

31. Confucianism itself had actually undergone a certain rationalization, according to Weber, but in a form that was antithetical to the socioeconomic rationalization.

32. In Schmidt-Glintzer's reconstruction of the writing and publication of volume one of the *Religionssoziologie* there is no information on the libraries and other sources Weber used, other than a letter to von Rosthorn (Schmidt-Glintzer, 1989, pp. 42–43).

33. Steinmetz (2007, p. 402). Schmidt-Glintzer (1989, p. 6) emphasizes the "tradition of beginning with China," and surely has Hegel's philosophy of history in mind.

34. This seems to be the argument of Allen (2004), for example.

35. Wilhelm worked as a missionary and teacher in Qingdao from 1899 to 1919, and received an honorary doctorate from Frankfurt University in 1922 and was given an *Honoraryprofessur* in 1924. He taught at Beijing University between 1922 and 1924, and from 1924 until his death in 1930 at Frankfurt am Main, where he founded the Sinological Institute (Hirsch, 2003).

36. Franke was appointed to the first German chair in Sinology at the Hamburg Colonial Institute in 1909. After the war, Franke held De Groot's Chair at Berlin University (1923–1931).

37. According to historian Jonathan R. Herman (personal communication), Wang Ching Dao did the initial translations from Chinese for Martin Buber's publication of two Chinese texts, although Wang was only credited for unspecified assistance in the prologue.

38. Thurnwald met Schultz in the Pacific in 1909 and later recruited him as a contributing editor for his journal *Sociologus*. As State Secretary of the Colonial Office, Solf helped finance Thurnwald's research in New Guinea in 1914 (Melk-Koch, 1989, pp. 129, 189).

39. See "Gründung einer Kolonialakademie in Halle/Saale am 6.11.1908," in Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 8023 (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft); Richard Thurnwald to Geheimrat, February 23, 1921, Halle, on connecting colonial studies to the Auslandsstudiendienst; "Eine neue Aktionsprogramm der Kolonialakademie," Halle, February 25, 1921 (the last two in YUL Thurnwald papers).

40. "Wie weit ist unkriegersiche Kolonisation möglich?" Notes for lecture, Halle Colonial Academy, July 17, 1922, in YUL Thurnwald papers.

41. See Grosse (1993, p. 77) and *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1924 zu Berlin am 17. und 18. September 1924* (Berlin: Verlag Kolonialkriegerdank, 1924).

42. Volume 6 of *Die Menschliche Gesellschaft* was published posthumously (Adam, 1955, p. 152).

43. Thurnwald specified that the separation between civilization and culture was a heuristic device. These were two different ways of looking at the same process: civilizational technologies are stamped by the culture that uses them while culture also has a technical side (Thurnwald, 1939a, p. 426).

44. Thurnwald to Boas, March 26, 1933. See Thurnwald to Chefredakteur Dr. Klein, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 26, 1933, in which he criticizes the “serious and unjustifiable outrages against Jews” and recalls that many German-American Jews “stepped in to defend Germany” during and after World War I, including Boas, who was a founder of the *Notgemeinschaft*. Both letters in Thurnwald papers, YUL.

45. Thurnwald’s proposal was in some respects actually more “liberal” than German policies directed in Namibia before 1914 which had attempted to reduce the Herero to a propertyless proletariat. In other respects his organizational model reproduced elements of the Germans’ earlier colonial policies. Reservations and worker colonies (*werfts*) had existed in German South West Africa before 1914. The Native Caretaker was reminiscent of the German “native commissioners” who had been assigned to *werfts* and tribes. The native commissioners in German Southwest Africa were supposed to organize and spy on the colonized and encourage them to work and “lose their warlike attributes,” but they were also intended as advocates for native interests against illegal abuses by employers and settlers (Zimmerer, 2001, p. 123).

46. According to Timm (1977, p. 623), quoting from Thurnwald’s personnel file at the Humboldt University. It is unclear whether, and how much, Thurnwald was paid for these reports. On the Ministry for Ammunition and forced labor, see Naasner (1994).

47. I can only sketch the beginnings of an answer here but plan to return to these two cases in a future essay.

48. See the transcript of Alfred Weber’s 1929 seminar with Karl Mannheim on Lukács’ *History and Class Consciousness* (in Demm, 1999, pp. 443–462).

49. According to Lange-Kirchheim (1977), Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony” is “ideologically and in many sections even stylistically dependent” on Alfred Weber’s article “the civil servant” (Weber, 1927); see also Harrington (2007).

50. Mühlmann to Thurnwald, October 10, 1932, in YUL, Thurnwald papers, Box 2, folder 27.

51. Mühlmann to Thurnwald, October 18, 1932, in YUL, Thurnwald papers, Box 2, folder 28.

52. Mühlmann to Thurnwald, March 21, 1933, in YUL, Thurnwald papers, Box 2, folder 39.

REFERENCES

Adam, L. (1955). In memoriam: Richard Thurnwald. *Oceania*, 25(3), 145–155.

- Adedze, A. (2003). In the pursuit of knowledge and power: French scientific research in West Africa, 1938–65. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 23(1–2), 335–344.
- Alexander, J. C. (1995). *Fin de siècle social theory: Relativism, reduction, and the problem of reason*. New York: Verso.
- Allen, K. (2004). *Max Weber: A critical introduction*. London: Pluto Press.
- Althusser, L. (1990). Contradiction and overdetermination. In: *For Marx* (pp. 87–128). London: NLB.
- Amidon, K. S. (1998). “Diesmal fehlt die Biologie!” Max Horkheimer, Richard Thurnwald, and the Biological Prehistory of German Sozialforschung. *New German Critique*, 35(2), 103–137.
- Amselle, J.-L. (1993). Anthropology and historicity. *History and Theory*, 32(4), 12–31.
- Arendt, H. (1951). *The origins of totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Asad, T. (1973). *Anthropology and the colonial encounter*. New York: Humanity Books.
- Asen, J. (1955). *Gesamtverzeichnis des Lehrkörpers der Universität Berlin*. Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz.
- Ash, M. G. (1999). Scientific changes in Germany 1933, 1945, 1990: Towards a comparison. *Minerva*, 37, 329–354.
- Balandier, G. (1953). Messianismes et nationalismes en Afrique Noire. *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 14, 41–65.
- Balandier, G. (1955a). *Sociologie actuelle de l’Afrique noire; dynamique des changements sociaux en Afrique centrale*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Balandier, G. (1955b). *Sociologie des Brazzavilles noires*. Paris: A.Colin.
- Balandier, G. (Ed.) (1956). *Le Tiers-Monde, sous-développement et développement*. Institut national d’études démographiques, Travaux et documents No. 27. PUF, Paris.
- Balandier, G., & Mercier, P. (1952). *Particularisme et evolution. Les pêcheurs Lebou du Sénégal*. Études Sénégalaises, no. 3. Centre IFAN-Sénégal, Saint-Louis, Sénégal.
- Bastian, A. (1860). *Der Mensch in der Geschichte. zur Begründung einer psychologischen Weltanschauung* (3 Vols.). Leipzig: O. Wigand.
- Bastian, A. (1884). *Allgemeine Grundzüge der Ethnologie*. Berlin: D. Reimer.
- Bayly, S. (2009). Conceptualizing resistance and revolution in Vietnam: Paul Mus’ understanding of colonialism in crisis. *Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, 4(1), 192–205.
- Bertrand, R. (2005). *Etat colonial, noblesse et nationalisme à Java: la tradition parfait*. Paris: Karthala.
- Bertrand, R. (2008). Des gens inconvenants. Javanais et Néerlandais à l’aube de la rencontre imperial. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 171–172, 104–121.
- Bhaskar, R. (1986). *Scientific realism and human emancipation*. London: Verso.
- Blome, H. (1941). *Bericht über die Arbeitszusammenkunft deutscher Völkerkundler in Göttingen am 22. und 23. November 1940*. Göttingen: n.p.
- Blomert, R. (1999). *Intellektuelle im Aufbruch: Karl Mannheim, Alfred Weber, Norbert Elias und die Heidelberger Sozialwissenschaften der Zwischenkriegszeit*. München: Hanser.
- Blomert, R., Esslinger, H.-U., & Giovannini, N. (Eds). (1997). *Heidelberger Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften: das Institut für Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften zwischen 1918 und 1958*. Marburg: Metropolis.
- Bloom, H. (1997). *The anxiety of influence: A theory of poetry* (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

- Bosbach, F., & Hiery, H. (Eds). (1999). *Imperium/Empire/Reich: ein Konzept politischer Herrschaft im deutsch-britischen Vergleich (An Anglo-German comparison of a concept of rule)*. München: K.G. Saur.
- Bourdieu, P. (1959). La logique interne de la civilisation algérienne traditionnelle. In: Secrétariat social d'Alger (Ed.), *Le sous-développement en Algérie* (pp. 40–51). Alger: Éditions du Secrétariat social d'Alger.
- Bourdieu, P. (1971 [1966]). Intellectual field and creative project. In: M. D. Young (Ed.), *Knowledge and control: New directions for the sociology of education* (pp. 161–188). London: Collier-Macmillan.
- Bourdieu, P. (1988). *Homo academicus*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The logic of practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1991a). Political representation: Elements for a theory of the political field. In: *Language and symbolic power* (pp. 171–202). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1991b). On the possibility of a field of world sociology. In: P. Bourdieu & J. S. Coleman (Eds), *Social theory for a changing society* (pp. 373–387). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1993a). For a sociology of sociologists. In: *Sociology in question* (pp. 49–53). London: Sage.
- Bourdieu, P. (1993b). Some properties of fields. In: *Sociology in question* (pp. 72–77). London: Sage.
- Bourdieu, P. (1996). *The rules of art*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1999a). Rethinking the state: Genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field. In: G. Steinmetz (Ed.), *State/culture* (pp. 53–75). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1999b). *The weight of the world: Social suffering in contemporary society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (2000). *Pascalian meditations*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (2003). Colonialism and ethnography. Foreword to Pierre Bourdieu's *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*. *Anthropology Today*, 19(2), 13–18.
- Bourdieu, P. (2004). *Science of science and reflexivity*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (2007). *Sketch for a self-analysis*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bourdieu, P., & Sayad, A. (1964). Paysans déracinés, bouleversements morphologiques et changements culturels en Algérie. *Études rurales*, 12, 56–94.
- Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Breuer, S. (1987). *Imperien der alten Welt*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Brinkmann, C. (1921). *Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert*. Bielefeld: Velhagen & Klasing.
- Broszat, M. (1981). *The Hitler state: The foundation and development of the internal structure of the Third Reich*. New York: Longman.
- Büttner, C. G. (1885). Die Missionsstation Otjimbingue in Damaraland. *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin*, 20, 39–56.
- Calhoun, C., Cooper, F., & Moore, K. (Eds). (2006). *Lessons of empire. Imperial histories and American power*. New York: The New Press.
- Césaire, A. (2000). *Discourse on colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Clark, T. N. (1973). *Prophets and patrons: The French university and the emergence of the social sciences*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Comte, A. (1830–1842). *Cours de philosophie positive*. Paris: Bachelier.
- Conklin, A. (2002). Civil society, science, and empire in late Republican France: The foundation of Paris's museum of man. *Osiris*, 2nd series, 17, 255–290.
- Cornell, D. (2003). Autonomy re-imagined. *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture*, 8(1), 144–149.
- Connell, R. (2007). *Southern theory*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Connell, R. W. (1997). Why is classical theory classical? *American Journal of Sociology*, 102(6), 1511–1557.
- Darbel, A., Rivet, J.-P., Seibel, C., & Bourdieu, P. (1963). *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*. Paris: Mouton.
- De L'Estoile, B. (2002). Science de l'homme et "domination rationnelle". Savoir ethnologique et politique indigène en Afrique coloniale française. *Revue de synthèse*, 4th series, 3–4, 291–323.
- Demm, E. (1990). *Ein Liberaler in Kaiserreich und Republik: der politische Weg Alfred Webers bis 1920*. Boppard am Rhein: H. Boldt.
- Demm, E. (1999). *Von der Weimarer Republik zur Bundesrepublik: der politische Weg Alfred Webers 1920–1958*. Düsseldorf: Droste.
- Demm, E. (2000a). *Geist und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert: gesammelte Aufsätze zu Alfred Weber*. Frankfurt: Lang.
- Demm, E. (2000b). *Alfred Weber zum Gedächtnis. Selbstzeugnisse und Erinnerungen von Zeitgenossen*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Derks, H. (1999). Social sciences in Germany, 1933–1945. *German History*, 17(2), 177–219.
- Dezalay, Y., & Bryant, G. (2008). L'impérialisme moral. Les juristes et l'impérialisme Américain (Philippines, Indonésie). *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 171–172, 40–55.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1915). The African roots of war. *Atlantic Monthly*, 115, 707–714.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1975 [1945]). *Color and democracy: Colonies and peace*. Millwood, NY: Kraus-Thomson Organization.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1986 [1940]). Dusk of dawn. In: Du Bois, W. E. B. (Ed.), *Writings* (pp. 549–802). New York: Library of America.
- Elias, N. ([1939] 1994). *The civilizing process*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Fischer, H. (1990). *Völkerkunde im Nationalsozialismus. Aspekte der Anpassung, Affinität und Behauptung einer wissenschaftlichen Disziplin*. Berlin: D. Reimer Verlag.
- Forget, N. (1992). Le Service des Centres Sociaux en Algérie. *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*, 26, 37–47.
- Fournier, M. (2006). *Marcel Mauss: A biography*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Freud, S. (1914). On narcissism: An introduction. *Standard Edition*, 14, 65–143.
- Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of ego. *Standard Edition*, 18, 67–143.
- Geddes, P. (1917). *Ideas at war*. London: Williams and Norgate.
- Geddes, P. (1947). *Patrick Geddes in India*. Edited by Jacqueline Tyrwhitt. London: L. Humphries.
- Giddings, F. H. (1900). *Democracy and empire, with studies of their psychological, economic, and moral foundations*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Go, J. (1999). Colonial reception and cultural reproduction: Filipino elite response to U.S. Colonialism. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 12(4), 337–368.
- Go, J. (2008). *American empire and the politics of meaning: Elite political cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. colonialism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Godlewska, A., & Smith, N. (Eds). (1994). *Geography and empire*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Gothsch, M. (1983). *Die deutsche Völkerkunde und ihr Verhältnis zum Kolonialismus: ein Beitrag zur kolonialideologischen und kolonialpraktischen Bedeutung der deutsche Völkerkunde in der Zeit von 1870 bis 1975*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Grosse, P. (1993). Kolonialismus und Öffentlichkeit im späten Kaiserreich: Die Deutschen Kolonialkongresse 1902, 1905 und 1910. Magisterarbeit, Freie Universität Berlin.
- Grünfeld, E. (1913). *Hafenkolonien und Kolonieähnliche Verhältnisse in China, Japan und Korea; eine kolonialpolitische Studie*. Jena: G. Fischer.
- Guilhaumou, J. (2006). Sieyès et le non-dit de la sociologie: du mot à la chose. *Revue d'histoire des sciences humaines*, 15, 117–134.
- Gullestad, S. E. (1993). A contribution to the psychoanalytic concept of autonomy. *Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review*, 16, 22–34.
- Gutberger, J. (1996). *Volk, Raum und Sozialstruktur. Sozialstruktur- und Sozialraumforschung im "Dritten Reich"*. Münster: Lit.
- Harrington, A. (2007). Alfred Weber's essay "the civil servant" and Kafka's "in the penal colony": The evidence of an influence. *History of the Human Sciences*, 20(2), 41–63.
- Hermassi, E. (1972). *Leadership and national development in North Africa: A comparative study*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Herre, P. (Ed.) (1923). *Politisches Handwörterbuch*. Leipzig: K.F. Koehler.
- Hirsch, K. (2003). *Richard Wilhelm, Botschafter zweier Welten*. Frankfurt am Main: IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation.
- Hochstim, P. (1966). *Alfred Vierkandt. A sociological critique*. New York: Exposition Press.
- Honigshaim, P. (1926). Der Max Weber Kreis in Heidelberg. *Kolner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie*, 5(3), 270–287.
- Hurvich, M. S. (2005). Ego autonomy. In: A. de Mijolla (Ed.), *International dictionary of psychoanalysis* (pp. 473–474). Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference.
- Josephson, P. (2004). Lehrfreiheit, Lernfreiheit, Wertfreiheit: Max Weber and the University Teachers Congress in Jena 1908. *Max Weber Studies*, 4(2), 201–219.
- Kaesler, D. (1984). *Die frühe deutsche Soziologie 1900 bis 1934 und ihre Entstehungs-Milieus*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Kaesler, D. (1991). *Sociological adventures: Earle Edward Eubank's visits with European sociologists*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Kaesler, D. (2002). Max Weber: Vom akademischen Außenseiter zum soziologischen Klassiker. Einleitung des Herausgebers. In: D. Kaesler (Ed.), *Max Weber: Schriften 1894* (pp. vii–xxxvi). Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner.
- Kaiser, J. H. (1968). Europäisches Großraumdenken. Die Steigerung geschichtlicher Größen als Rechtsproblem. In: H. Barion, E.-W. Böckenförde, E. Forsthoff & W. Weber (Eds), *Epirrhisos. Festgabe für Carl Schmitt* (pp. 529–548). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Karady, V. (1982). Le problème de la légitimité dans l'organisation historique de l'ethnologie française. *Revue française de sociologie*, 23, 17–35.
- Karstedt, O. (1942). *Probleme afrikanischer Eingeborenenpolitik*. Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn.
- Keyserling, H. G. von. (1925). *The travel diary of a philosopher*. London: J. Cape.
- Kidd, B. (1898). *The control of the tropics*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Klemm, G. (1847). *China, das Reich der Mitte*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
- Klemperer, V. (2006). *The language of the Third Reich: LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist's Notebook*. London: Continuum.

- Klingemann, C. (1989). Angewandte Soziologie im Nationalsozialismus. 1999. *Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts*, 4(1), 10–34.
- Klingemann, C. (1996). *Soziologie im Dritten Reich*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Klingemann, C. (2002). Ostforschung und Soziologie während des Nationalsozialismus. In: J. M. Piskorski, J. Hackmann & R. Jaworski (Eds), *Deutsche Ostforschung und polnische Westforschung im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft und Politik* (pp. 161–203). Osnabrück-Poznan: Poznanskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk.
- Klingemann, C. (2009). *Soziologie und Politik: Sozialwissenschaftliches Expertenwissen im Dritten Reich und in der frühen westdeutschen Nachkriegszeit*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- König, R. (1958). *Soziologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
- Konno, H. (2004). *Max Weber und die polnische Frage (1892–1920): eine Betrachtung zum liberalen Nationalismus im wilhelminischen Deutschland*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Krickeberg, W. (1938). Review of Lehrbuch der Völkerkunde. *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 69, 464–466.
- Lagache, D. (1961). La psychanalyse et la structure de la personnalité. *La psychanalyse*, 6, 5–58.
- Landecker, W. S. (1999). *Die Geltung des Völkerrechts als gesellschaftliches Phänomen: eine rechts- und sozialwissenschaftliche Analyse aus dem Jahr 1936*. Münster: Lit.
- Lange-Kirchheim, A. (1977). Franz Kafka: “In der Strafkolonie” und Alfred Weber: “Der Beamte”. *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*, N.F. 27, 202–221.
- Langewiesche, D. (1997). Die Universität Tübingen in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus: Formen der Selbstgleichstaltung und Selbstbehauptung. *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 23, 618–646.
- Laplanche, J., & Pontalis, J.-B. (1973). *The language of psychoanalysis*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Larcher-Goscha, A. (2009). Ambushed by history: Paul Mus and Colonial France’s ‘Forced Reentry’ into Vietnam (1945–1954). *Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, 4(1), 206–239.
- Lardinois, R. (2008). Entre monopole, marché et religion. L’émergence de l’État colonial en Inde, années 1760–1810. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 171–172, 90–103.
- Lassman, P., Velody, I., & Martins, H. (Eds). (1988). *Max Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Laukötter, A. (2007). The time after Adolf Bastian: Felix von Luschan and Berlin’s Royal Museum of Ethnology. In: M. Fischer, P. Bolz & S. Kamel (Eds), *Adolf Bastian and his universal archive of humanity: The origins of German anthropology* (pp. 153–165). New York: G. Olms.
- Leclerc, G. (1972). *Anthropologie et colonialisme*. Paris: Fayard.
- Leiris, M. (1934). *L’Afrique fantôme*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Leiris, M. (1950). L’ethnographie devant le colonialisme. *Les temps modernes*, 58, 357–373.
- Leutner, M. (1987). Sinologie in Berlin: Die Durchsetzung einer wissenschaftliche Disziplin zur Erschließung und zum Verständnis Chinas. In: H.-Y. Kuo (Ed.), *Berlin und China* (pp. 31–56). Berlin: Colloquium Verlag.
- Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1925 [1910]). *How natives think*. New York: A.A. Knopf.
- Linne, K. (2002). ‘Weisse Arbeitsführer’ im ‘kolonialen Ergänzungsraum’. *Afrika als Ziel sozial- und wirtschaftlicher Planungen in der NS-Zeit*. Münster: Monsenstein & Vannerdat.
- Luschan, F. von. (1915). *Anthropological view of race*. New York: Hamburg-Amerika Linie.

- Lüschen, G. (2002). In memoriam Werner S. Landecker 30.04.1911–19.05.2002. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 54, 617.
- Magubane, B. (1971). A critical look at indices used in the study of social change in colonial africa. *Current Anthropology*, 12(4–5), 419–445.
- Mann, M. (2003). *Incoherent empire*. London: Verso.
- Mazrui, A. A. (1968). From social Darwinism to current theories of modernization: A tradition of analysis. *World Politics*, 21, 69–83.
- Melk-Koch, M. (1989). *Auf der Suche nach der menschlichen Gesellschaft: Richard Thurnwald*. Berlin: Reimer.
- Menzel, G. (1992). *C. G. Büttner*. Wuppertal: Verlag der Vereinigten Evangelischen Mission.
- Mercier, P. (1951). *Les tâches de la sociologie*. Institut français d'Afrique noire, Dakar.
- Mercier, P. (1954). Aspects des problèmes de stratification sociale dans l'Ouest Africain. *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 17, 47–65.
- Merton, R. K. (1973). The ambivalence of scientists. In: *The sociology of science* (pp. 383–412). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Michel, U. (1992). Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann (1904–1988) – ein deutscher Professor. Amnesie und Amnestie: Zum Verhältnis von Ethnologie und Politik im Nationalsozialismus. *Jahrbuch für Soziologegeschichte*, 1991, 69–117.
- Michel, U. (1995). Neue ethnologische Forschungsansätze im Nationalsozialismus? Aus der Biographie Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann (1904–1988). In: T. Hauschild (Ed.), *Lebenslust und Fremdenfurcht* (pp. 141–167). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Mijolla, A. de. (2005). Identification. In: A. de Mijolla (Ed.), *International dictionary of psychoanalysis* (pp. 787–792). Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference.
- Mijolla-Mellor, S. de. (2005). Ego ideal, ego ideal/ideal ego. In: A. de Mijolla (Ed.), *International dictionary of psychoanalysis* (pp. 479–481). Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference.
- Mirowski, P. (2005). How positivism made a pact with the postwar social sciences in America. In: G. Steinmetz (Ed.), *The politics of method in the human sciences: Positivism and its epistemological others* (pp. 142–172). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Mitzman, A. (1985). *The iron cage. An historical interpretation of Max Weber*. (Rev. ed.). New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Molt, P. (2002). Alfred Weber heute. *Die politische Meinung*, 387(February), 89–95.
- Mommsen, W. J. (1984). *Max Weber and German politics, 1890–1920*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Morrissey, M. (1976). Imperial designs: A sociology of knowledge study of British and American dominance in the development of Caribbean social science. *Latin American Perspectives*, 3(4), 97–116.
- Mühlmann, W. E. (1932). Die geheime Gesellschaft der Arioi: Eine Studie über polynesische Geheimbünde, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Siebungs- und Auslesevorgänge in Alt-Tahiti. Berlin University, doctoral dissertation.
- Mühlmann, W. E. (1936). *Rassen- und Völkerkunde: Lebensprobleme der Rassen, Gesellschaften und Völker*. Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn.
- Mühlmann, W. E. (1937). Politisch-katholische Rassenforschung?. *Volk und Rasse*, 12, 35–38.
- Mühlmann, W. E. (1942). Umvolkung und Volkwerdung. *Deutsche Arbeit*, 42(1), 287–297.
- Mühlmann, W. E. (1943). Das rassische Bild. In: K. C. von Loesche & W. Mühlmann (Eds), *Die Völker und Rassen Südosteuropas* (pp. 38–56). Vienna: Volk und Reich Verlag.
- Mühlmann, W. E. (1944). *Assimilation, Umvolkung, Volkwerdung: Ein globaler Überblick und ein Programm*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

- Mulrine, A. (2007). The culture warriors. *U.S. News and World Report*, December 10, 34–37.
- Naasner, W. (1994). *Neue Machtzentren in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1942–1945: die Wirtschaftsorganisation der SS, das Amt des Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitsansatz und das Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition, Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem*. Boppard am Rhein: H. Boldt.
- Nagel, B. (1991). *Die Weltelehre: ihre Geschichte und ihre Rolle im "Dritten Reich"*. Stuttgart: Verlag für Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik.
- Nau, H. H. (1996). *Der Werturteilsstreit: die Äusserungen zur Werturteilsdiskussion im Ausschuss des Vereins für Sozialpolitik (1913)*. Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag.
- Neumann, F. L. (1942). *Behemoth: The structure and practice of national socialism*. London: V. Gollanez Ltd.
- Norton, R. E. (2002). *Secret Germany: Stefan George and his circle*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Nouschi, A. (2003). Autour de Sociologie de l'Algérie. *Awal. Cahiers d'études Berbères*, 27–28, 26–29.
- Oppenheimer, F. (1929). *System der Soziologie, Vol. 4, part 1, Rom und die Germanen*. Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- Papcke, S. (1993). *Deutsche Soziologie im Exil*. Frankfurt: Campus.
- Paquet, A. (1911). Vorwort. In: H.-M. Ku (Ed.), *Chinas Verteidigung gegen europäische Ideen* (pp. i–xiv). Jena: E. Diederichs.
- Paquet, A. (1912). *Li, oder Im neuen Osten*. Frankfurt am Main: Rütten & Loening.
- Paquet, A. (1914). Der Kaisergedanke. *Der neue Merkur*, 1, 45–62.
- Penny, H. G. (2002). *Objects of culture*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Petermann, W. (2004). *Die Geschichte der Ethnologie*. Wuppertal: Peter-Hammer-Verlag.
- Radkau, J. (2008). Max Weber between "eruptive creativity" and "disciplined transdisciplinarity". In: F. Adloff & M. Borutta (Eds), *Max Weber in the 21st century* (pp. 13–30). Florence: EUI working papers.
- Radkau, J. (2009). *Max Weber: A biography*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Rammstedt, O. (1988). Wertfreiheit und die Konstitution der Soziologie in Deutschland. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 17(4), 264–271.
- Rapaport, D. (1951). The autonomy of the ego. *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, 15, 113–123.
- Rapaport, D. (1967). The autonomy of ego. In: M. Gill (Ed.), *The collected papers of David Rapaport* (pp. 357–367). New York: Basic Books.
- Reichsforschungsrat. (1942). *Aufgaben der deutschen Kolonialforschung*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.
- Remy, S. P. (2002). *The Heidelberg Myth: The nazification and denazification of a German University*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Richthofen, F. F. von. (1897). *Kiautschou, seine Weltstellung und voraussichtliche Bedeutung*. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke.
- Richthofen, F. F. von. (1898). *Schantung und seine Eingangspforte Kiautschou*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer.
- Richthofen, F. F. von. (1907). *Ferdinand von Richthofen's Tagebücher aus China*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer.
- Ringer, F. K. (1969). *The decline of the German mandarins: The German academic community, 1890–1933*. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press.
- Ringer, F. K. (2004). *Max Weber – An intellectual biography*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

- Robin, R. (2001). *The making of the cold war enemy: Culture and politics in the military intellectual complex*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rodinson, M. (1955). Review of Naissance du proletariat marocain. *Année sociologique* 1952, 3rd series, 6, 371–373.
- Rodinson, M. (1965). Sociologie de l'Islam. *Année sociologique* 1964, 3rd series, 15, 360–364.
- Rosthorn, A. von. (1923). Religion und Wirtschaft in China. In: M. Palyi (Ed.), *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie. Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber* (pp. 221–238). München and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
- Roth, G. (2001). *Max Webers deutsch-englische Familiengeschichte 1800–1950: mit Briefen und Dokumenten*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Saada, E. (2007). *Les enfants de la colonie: les métis de l'empire français entre sujétion et citoyenneté*. Paris: Découverte.
- Sahlins, M. (1967). The established order: Do not fold, spindle, or mutilate. In: I. L. Horowitz (Ed.), *The rise and fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the relationship between social science and practical politics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage.
- Salz, A. (1931). *Das Wesen des Imperialismus*. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner.
- Sartre, J.-P. (1988). *“What is literature?” and other essays*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Schäffle, A. (1886–1888). Kolonialpolitische Studien. *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, 42, 625–665; 43, 123–217, 343–416; 44, 59–96, 263–306.
- Schmidt-Glintzer, H. (1989). Einleitung, Editorischer Bericht. In: *Max Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus*, H. Schmidt-Glintzer (Ed.), *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*, (Vol. 2, Part 19, pp. 1–25, 31–73). Tübingen: Mohr.
- Schmitt, C. ([1941] 1991). *Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte* (4th ed.). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Schmokel, W. W. (1964). *Dream of empire: German colonialism, 1919–1945*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Schroeter, G. (1980). Max Weber as outsider: His nominal influence on German sociology in the twenties. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 16, 317–332.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1951). *Imperialism and social classes*. New York: A. M. Kelley.
- Seddon, D. (1973). Introduction. In: R. Montagne (Ed.), *The Berbers: Their social and political organisation* (pp. xiii–xl). London: Cass.
- Sibeud, E. (2002). Ethnographie africaniste et ‘inauthenticité’ coloniale. *French Politics, Culture and Society*, 20(2), 11–28.
- Silverstein, P. A., & Goodman, J. A. (2009). Introduction. Bourdieu in Algeria. In: J. E. Goodman & P. A. Silverstein (Eds), *Bourdieu in Algeria* (pp. 1–62). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Small, A. (1916). Fifty years of sociology in the United States (1865–1915). *American Journal of Sociology*, 21(6), 721–864.
- Smith, N. (2003). *American Empire: Roosevelt's geographer and the prelude to globalization*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Steinmetz, G. (1995). Distorting mirrors: Exoticism, assimilation, and aesthetic reflexivity in German colonialism. Paper given at the inaugural conference for the German Studies program at the University of Texas, Austin.
- Steinmetz, G. (1997). Theorizing the colonial state: The German overseas empire, 1880–1914. Paper presented to the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Toronto.

- Steinmetz, G. (1998). Critical realism and historical sociology. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(1), 170–186.
- Steinmetz, G. (2003). The “Devil’s handwriting”: Precolonial discourse, ethnographic acuity and cross-identification in German colonialism. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 45(1), 41–95.
- Steinmetz, G. (2004). The uncontrollable afterlives of ethnography: Lessons from German ‘salvage colonialism’ for a new age of empire. *Ethnography*, 5(3), 251–288.
- Steinmetz, G. (2006a). Bourdieu’s disavowal of Lacan: Psychoanalytic theory and the concepts of “habitus” and “symbolic capital”. *Constellations*, 13(4), 445–464.
- Steinmetz, G. (2006b). Imperialism or colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, by way of Basra. In: C. Calhoun, F. Cooper & K. Moore (Eds), *Lessons of empire: Imperial histories and American power* (pp. 135–156). New York: The New Press.
- Steinmetz, G. (2007). *The Devil’s handwriting: Precoloniality and the German colonial state in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Steinmetz, G. (2008a). *Logics of history* as a framework for an integrated social science. *Social Science History*, 32(4), 535–554.
- Steinmetz, G. (2008b). The colonial state as a social field. *American Sociological Review*, 73(4), 589–612.
- Steinmetz, G. (2008c). La sociologie historique en Allemagne et aux Etats-Unis: un transfert manqué (1930–1970). *Genèses*, 71, 123–147.
- Steinmetz, G. (2010a). Bourdieu, historicity, and historical sociology. *Cultural Sociology*, 10(1).
- Steinmetz, G. (2010b). Sociology and its imperial entanglements. Introduction. In: Steinmetz, G. (Ed.), *Sociology and empire*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Steinmetz, S. R. (Ed.) (1903). *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Stocking, G. W., Jr. (Ed.) (1991). *Colonial situations: Essays on the contextualization of ethnographic knowledge*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Szöllösi-Janze, M. (2001). National Socialism and the sciences: Reflections, conclusions, and historical perspectives. In: M. Szöllösi-Janze (Ed.), *Science in the Third Reich* (pp. 1–36). Oxford: Berg.
- Tenbruck, F. H. (1999). *Das Werk Max Webers: gesammelte Aufsätze zu Max Weber*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Thurnwald, R. (1901). Staat und Wirtschaft im alten Ägypten. *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, 11, 697–714, 769–788.
- Thurnwald, R. (1903–1904). Staat und Wirtschaft in Babylon zu Hammurabis Zeit. *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 26(4), 644–675; 27(2), 64–88, 190–202.
- Thurnwald, R. (1905). Koloniale Eingeborenenpolitik. *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie*, 2, 632–636.
- Thurnwald, R. (1910a). Das Rechtsleben der Eingeborenen der deutschen Südseeinseln, seine geistigen und wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen. *Blätter für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre*, 6(5–6), 178–191.
- Thurnwald, R. (1910b). Die eingeborenen Arbeitskräfte im Südseeschutzgebiet. *Koloniale Rundschau*, 10, 607–632.
- Thurnwald, R. (1912a). Angewandte Ethnologie in der Kolonialpolitik. In: Internationale Vereinigung für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre in Berlin (Ed.), *Verhandlungen der ersten Hauptversammlung für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*

- und Volkswirtschaftslehre in Berlin zu Heidelberg vom 3. bis 9. September 1911 (pp. 59–69). Berlin: Franz Vahlen.
- Thurnwald, R. (1912b). *Forschungen auf den Salomo-Inseln und dem Bismarck-Archipel*, Vol. I: *Lieder und Sagen aus Buin*. Berlin: D. Reimer (E. Vohsen).
- Thurnwald, R. (1917a). Kolonien oder Weltwirtschaft?. *Koloniale Rundschau*, 9/10, 385–395.
- Thurnwald, R. (1917b). Holland und seine Kolonialpolitik. *Das neue Deutschland*, 6(2), 39–40.
- Thurnwald, R. (1918a). Die Kolonien als Friedensbürgschaft. Vortrag vom 26.1.18. *Blätter für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre*, 14(4–6), 170–185.
- Thurnwald, R. (1918b). Der Wert von Neu-Guinea als deutsche Kolonie. *Koloniale Rundschau*, 1/2, 43–56.
- Thurnwald, R. (1926a). Führerschaft and Siebung. *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, 2(1), 1–18.
- Thurnwald, R. (1929a). Deutschlands Anteil an den kolonialen Problemen von heute. *Der Kolonialfreund*, 7, 7–9.
- Thurnwald, R. (1929b). The social problems of Africa. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 2(2), 130–137.
- Thurnwald, R. (1931–1935). *Die menschliche Gesellschaft in ihren ethno-soziologischen Grundlagen*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter.
- Thurnwald, R. (1931a). Soziologische Forschungen über die Veränderungen im Leben des Afrikaners unter den Einwirkungen der europäischen Zivilisation. *Forschungen und Fortschritte*, 7(2), 17–18.
- Thurnwald, R. (1931b). Soziale Wandlungen in Ostafrika. *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, 7(2), 148–168.
- Thurnwald, R. (1931c). Die neue afrikanische Welt. *Koloniale Rundschau*, 9–10, 193–199.
- Thurnwald, R. (1932a). Social transformations in East Africa. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 38(2), 175–184.
- Thurnwald, R. (1932b). The psychology of acculturation. *American Anthropologist*, 34(4), 557–569.
- Thurnwald, R. (1932c). Die Neger an der Schreibmaschine. Soziale Wandlungen in Afrika. (Mit Bildern von der Schomburgh-Afrika-Expedition). *Die Koralle*, 8(4), 154–157.
- Thurnwald, R. (1935a). *Black and White in East Africa. The fabric of a new civilization*. London: Routledge.
- Thurnwald, R. (1935b). Wirtschaftliche Wandlungen bei ostafrikanischen Völkern. *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 142, 541–561.
- Thurnwald, R. (1936a). The price of the white man's peace. *Pacific Affairs*, 9(3), 347–357.
- Thurnwald, R. (1936b). The crisis of imperialism in East Africa and elsewhere. *Social Forces*, 15(1), 84–91.
- Thurnwald, R. (1937). Die Kolonialfrage. *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 145, 66–86.
- Thurnwald, R. (1938a). Kolonialwirtschaftliche Betriebe. *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 148, 48–62.
- Thurnwald, R. (1938b). Zur persönlichen Abwehr. *Archiv für Anthropologie*, 24(3/4), 300–302.
- Thurnwald, R. (1939a). Methoden in der Völkerkunde. In: O. Reche (Ed.), *Kultur und Rasse, Otto Reche zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet von Schülern und Freunden* (pp. 420–428). München: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag.
- Thurnwald, R. (1939b). *Koloniale Gestaltung. Methoden und Probleme überseeischer Ausdehnung*. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag.

- Thurnwald, R. (1940). Die fremden Eingriffe in das Leben der Afrikaner und ihre Folgen. In: H. Baumann, R. Thurnwald & D. Westermann (Eds), *Völkerkunde von Afrika* (pp. 455–573). Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt.
- Thurnwald, R. (2001 [1938]). Bericht zu der Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Eingeborenenerarbeit und –sozialrecht vom 11.7.38 über die Organisation der Eingeborenenerarbeit in Ostafrika und ihre Gestaltungsmöglichkeit auf nationalsozialistischer Grundlage. In: W. Schubert (Ed.), *Akademie für Deutsches Recht 1933–1945, Protokolle der Ausschüsse*, Vol. 12, *Ausschuß für Rechtsfragen der Bevölkerungspolitik (1934–1940) und Ausschuß für Kolonialrecht zusammen mit den Entwürfen des Kolonialpolitischen Amtes (1937–1941); Sachverständigenbeirat für Bevölkerungs- und Rassenpolitik im Reichsministerium des Inneren (1933/1939)* (pp. 617–627). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Timm, K. (1977). Richard Thurnwald: 'Koloniale Gestaltung' – ein 'Apartheids-Projekt' für die koloniale Expansion des deutschen Faschismus in Afrika. *Ethnographisch-Archäologische Zeitschrift*, 18, 617–649.
- Tocqueville, A. de. (2001). In: J. Pitts (Ed.), *Writings on empire and slavery*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Union of South Africa. (1918). *Report on the natives of South-West Africa and their treatment by Germany*. London: HMSO.
- Veblen, T. (1915). *Imperial Germany and the industrial revolution*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Vierkandt, A. von. (1896). *Naturvölker und Kulturvölker*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
- Vitalis, R. (2005). Birth of a discipline. In: D. Long & B. C. Schmidt (Eds), *Imperialism and internationalism in the discipline of international relations* (pp. 159–182). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- von Wiese, L. (1914a). Die gegenwärtige Stellung Ceylons in der Weltwirtschaft im Vergleich mit Vorder- und Hinterasien. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 3(1), 139–162.
- von Wiese, L. (1914b). Die Rodias auf Ceylon. *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie*, 11(1), 33–45.
- von Wiese, L. (1922). *Briefe aus Asien*. Köln: Rheinland-Verlag.
- von Wiese, L. (1923). *Nava. Eine Erzählung aus Ceylon*. Jena: Diederichs.
- Walker, M. (1989). National socialism and German physics. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 24(1), 63–89.
- Wallerstein, I. (1959). *The emergence of two West African nations, Ghana and the Ivory Coast*. PhD dissertation, Columbia University.
- Wallerstein, I. (Ed.) (1966). *Social change: The colonial situation*. New York: Wiley.
- Wallerstein, I. (1997). The unintended consequences of area studies. In: N. Chomsky, I. Katznelson, R. C. Lewontin, D. Montgomery, L. Nader, R. Ohmann, R. Siever, I. Wallerstein & H. Zinn (Eds), *The Cold War and the university: Toward an intellectual history of the postwar years* (pp.195–231). New York: New Press.
- Walravens, H. (2005). Rosthorn, Arthur von. In: *Neue Deutsche Biographie* (Vol. 22, pp. 101–102). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Walther, A. (1927). *Soziologie und Sozialwissenschaften in Amerika*. Karlsruhe: Verlag G. Braun.
- Wang, C. D. (1913). Die Staatsidee des Konfuzius und ihre Beziehung zur konstitutionelle Verfassung. *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin*, 16(1), 1–49.
- Wassner, R. (1985). *Andreas Walther und die Soziologie in Hamburg. Dokumente, Materialien, Reflexionen*. Hamburg: Institut für Soziologie der Universität Hamburg.

- Weber, A. (1918). Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker und der Friede. *Preussische Jahrbücher*, 171, 60–71.
- Weber, A. (1920–1921). Prinzipielles zur Kulturosoziologie. (Gesellschaftsprozeß, Zivilisationsprozeß und Kulturbewegung). *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 47, 1–49.
- Weber, A. (1924). Deutschland und die europäische Kulturkrise. *Die neue Rundschau*, 35, 308–321.
- Weber, A. (1929 [1909]). *Alfred Weber's theory of the location of industries*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Weber, A. (1927). Der Beamte. In: *Ideen zur Staats- und Kulturosoziologie* (pp. 81–101). Karlsruhe: Braun.
- Weber, A. (1935). *Kulturgeschichte als Kulturosoziologie* (uitgeversmaatschappij, n.v). Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's.
- Weber, A. (1943). *Das Tragische und die Geschichte*. Hamburg: H. Govert.
- Weber, A. (1955). *Einführung in die Soziologie*. Munich: R. Pieper & Co.
- Weber, A. (1997). *Schriften zur Kultur- und Geschichtssoziologie (1906–1958)*. *Alfred-Weber-Gesamtausgabe* (Vol. 8). Marburg: Metropolis.
- Weber, A. (1999). *Politische Theorie und Tagespolitik (1903–1933)*. *Alfred-Weber-Gesamtausgabe* (Vol. 7). Marburg: Metropolis.
- Weber, A. (2000). *Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik (1897–1932)*. *Alfred-Weber-Gesamtausgabe* (Vol. 5). Marburg: Metropolis.
- Weber, M. (1891). *Die römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats- und Privatrecht*. Stuttgart: F. Enke.
- Weber, M. ([1919] 1958). Science as a vocation. In Shils, E. A. & Finch, H. A. (Eds.), *The methodology of the social sciences* (pp. 77–128). Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Weber, M. (1920). *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Vol. 1). Tübingen: Mohr.
- Weber, M. (1921). *Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik*. München: Drei Masken Verlag.
- Weber, M. (1949). "Objectivity" in social science and social policy. In Shils, E. A. & Finch, H. A. (Eds.), *The methodology of the social sciences* (pp. 50–112). Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Weber, M. (1964). *The religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (Ed. and trans. Hans H. Gerth). New York: Free Press.
- Weber, M. (1975). *Roscher and Knies: The logical problems of historical economics*. New York: Free Press.
- Weber, M. (1976). *The agrarian sociology of ancient civilizations*. London: NLB.
- Weber, Ma. (1977a). Academic conviviality. *Minerva*, 15(2), 214–246.
- Weber, M. (1977b). *Critique of Stammler*. New York: Free Press.
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society* (2 vols.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Weber, M. (Ed.) (1984a). *Zur Psychophysik der industriellen Arbeit 1908–1912*. *Gesamtausgabe*, Part one, Vol. 11. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Weber, M. (Ed.) (1984b). *Die Lage der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland, 1892*. *Gesamtausgabe*, Part one, Vol. 3. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Weber, Ma. (1988). *Max Weber: A biography*. New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Weber, M. (1989). The national state and economic policy. In: K. Tribe (Ed.), *Reading Weber* (pp. 188–209). London: Routledge.
- Weinberg, G. L. (1963). German colonial plans and policies 1936–1942. In: W. Besson & F. Frhr. H. v. Gaer (Eds), *Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewusstsein* (pp. 462–491). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.

- Westermann, D. (Ed.) (1937). *Beiträge zur deutschen Kolonialfrage*. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt.
- Wirsing, G. (1932). *Zwischeneuropa und die deutsche Zukunft*. Jena: Diederichs Verlag.
- Yacine, T. (2004). Pierre Bourdieu in Algeria at War. *Ethnography*, 5(4), 487–509.
- Zastoupil, L. (1994). *John Stuart Mill and India*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Zimmerer, J. (2001). *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia* (2nd ed.). Münster: Lit.
- Zimmerman, A. (2001). *Anthropology and antihumanism in imperial Germany*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, O. v. (1936). Ethnosozologie? Grundsätzliches und Antikritisches zu Thurnwalds Werk 'Die Menschliche Gesellschaft'. *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 144, 528–555.

TRANSNATIONAL IDEOLOGIES AND STATE BUILDING: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN TRANSITION

Elif Andaç

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the constitution and transformation of the political regime in the Ottoman Empire in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th century. It argues that our understanding of the transitional stages between the end of empires and the formation of new states continues to be analytically underdeveloped, particularly in the context of Eastern/Southeastern Europe. Drawing on recent scholarship, which challenges the existing dichotomous empire-to-nation model and suggests furthering studies on the transition period, the paper offers a close-up look at the role of transnational ideologies played during the transition from empire-to-nation. It highlights the existence of a rather complex interplay between national and transnational ideologies. It argues that understanding the role of transnational ideologies allows us to attribute more agency to the political actors of the late Ottoman era, helping model the changes that happened in the state's legitimacy, the ideological transformations, and the political mobilization of the elites in this period. Focusing on the Ottoman case, it sheds insights on both Habsburg and Russian Empires,

Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 20, 133–166
Copyright © 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 0198-8719/doi:10.1108/S0198-8719(2009)0000020010

which exhibited similar characteristics at that time. It also illustrates the role that transnational ideologies played in all three cases.

This paper examines the constitution and transformation of the political regime in the Ottoman Empire in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th century. It looks at the process of the Ottoman Empire's transition from an empire to nation states and suggests that this process was primarily marked by the interplay of nationalist and transnationalist ideologies in state building, as opposed to the dominance of nationalist ideologies, which are commonly believed to have played the major role in the collapse of the empire.

After the 19th century, the demise of imperial regimes and the ascendance of the nation state as the dominant political form have led to the common assumption that this pattern, originated in Western Europe, is universal. According to this perspective, the end of empires was an inevitable product of modernization. It is assumed that the process of building modern states would always follow, if somewhat belatedly, the same pattern, with nationalism becoming the invincible and natural victor (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990).

A closer look at the transformations of the last 100 years of the Ottoman Empire reveals that the process of modern state building did not follow this Western European model. The political mobilization that built the modern state relied on a complex interplay between national and transnational ideologies, in that its political elite played a strong and active role in experimenting with alternative ideologies to nationalism in its attempts to renew the legitimacy of the state, both in the eyes of their subjects and the greater international community.¹ Ideologies which dominated the public sphere debates, such as pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, pan-Ottomanism, or communism, all have a "transnational" character. Specifically, they transcend the boundaries of any particular ethnic, religious, or cultural community in their attempt to unite large numbers of diverse communities against rising nationalist ideologies. This period of experimentation and the resulting ideologies contributed more to the political and cultural structure of the nation states that followed than the previous legacy of the empire.

The general literature on nationalism (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hechter, 2000; Hobsbawm, 1990) and empires (Doyle, 1986; Eisenstadt, 1967, 1980; Lieven, 2000; Tilly, 1997) provides a number of useful analytic frameworks that situate the transformation of this region in a broader

historical perspective. Moreover, many scholars working in these traditions recognize the distinct character of political regimes and state–society relationships in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Barkey, 2008; Barkey & Von Hagen, 1997; Brubaker, 1996; Glenny, 2000; Kasaba, 2006; Mardin, 1962; Sugar & Lederer, 1969; Todorova, 1997). Recent scholarship has problematized the use of Western conceptions of nationalism, pointing out the uniquely ambiguous character of nationalisms that prevailed in that particular region (Barkey & Von Hagen, 1997; Comisso, 2006; Kasaba, 2006; Kayali, 1997; Keyder, 1997). However, our understanding of the transitional stages between the end of empires and the formation of new states continues to be analytically underdeveloped, particularly in the context of understanding the alternative ideological experiments that the political elites of Eastern/Southeastern Europe conducted outside of the nation-state models.² The reasons for this analytical underdevelopment are

1. Studies of empires and nationalism focus on the rise of nationalism and the emergence of the nation states as the major and the most important outcome to be explained. What happened within the transition period, therefore, remains an obscure, empirical black box.
2. In addition, the relative brevity of these periods compared with the length of overall imperial rule and the apparent stability of the successor nation states, may have led to the perception that these periods as “interludes” (Kayali, 1997), further contributing to the lack of scholarly attention in the area.
3. After experiencing the rise of nationalism, empires underwent major structural transformation. In fighting against nationalism, they lost a number of their essential characteristics that made them empires, and thus they no longer fit their own description. The scholarship on empires fails to adequately capture the nature of this new “in-between” modernizing political entity, which is neither an empire, nor a nation state.
4. Moreover, scholarship on nationalism and nation states often fails in some ways to explain the changes that actually took place within an empire. Their body of work often assumes and thus looks for the same pattern of modern state building in every case. They also tend to consider models other than the nation state model “paths-not-taken,” or failed experiments. Consequently, much of the ideological change that happened among the political elites has come to be categorized either as *the last attempts of a failing empire* or as *the early signs of the development of national consciousness*, producing a dichotomization that may miss critical elements of a more complex process of change.

POLITICAL ELITES, IDEOLOGIES, AND CRITICAL JUNCTURES

The politics of the 19th century Ottoman Empire evolved to a large extent around the Great Powers of the time.³ Two of those Great Powers, Austria-Hungary and Russia, were the immediate neighbors of and shared a similar political structure similar to the Ottomans. In the early 19th century, these three were the only remaining examples of absolutist land empires in Europe. By the start of the 20th century, they were transformed either into a multitude of nation states or new federal states. While there was significant variation in the timing of these changes, not all of the transformations resulted in the creation of a typical nation state. Further, what is considered the last phase of the empires lasted more than the life of the newly created nation states. The idea that all political entities were on their way to becoming nation states was teleologically assumed. The emergence of so many nation states at the start of the 20th century led to the common view that an aspiration toward nation statehood must have been the most viable, if not the only political choice available to the political elites.

Until recently, the dominant periodization of this period has implied a rather sharp break between empires and nation states. Such a view is largely rooted in theories of nationalism. The putative understanding of nationalism is that it is a modern phenomenon (Anderson, 1983; Calhoun, 1993; Gellner, 1983; Greenfeld, 1992; Hechter, 2000; Hobsbawm, 1990; Kedourie, 1966), dating no earlier than the 17th century. Even those who argue for the priority of nations over nationalism (Armstrong, 1982; Marcu, 1976; Smith, 1986) seldom dispute the centrality of the modern state in its spread as an ideology (Calhoun, 1993, p. 216). Both camps also tend to agree that the first and second decades of the 19th century marked a major turning point in modern political history.⁴

In any periodization, “historical epochs should exhibit important long-term continuities, and moments of transition between epochs should involve the dissolution of old continuities and the forging of new ones” (Green, 1995, p. 101). And, this is precisely what the periodization rooted in the theories of nationalism has done: the early 19th century marked the dissolution of old empires and the emergence of new nation states. Such an approach has preempted a focused examination of the transition process between the end of empires and the emergent political entities (nation state or not). In early cases where the process has received scholarly attention, the studies have not fully addressed the “process” of transition, but instead

focused either on the beginning or on the end of it. The language resulting from this particular periodization that has been used to describe the changes which affected the three land empires – Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov – also contributed to the cause of nationalizing elites by providing them with an essentially dichotomous view. For instance, empire versus nation state came to mean archaic versus novel, traditional versus modern, autocracy versus democracy, imprisoned nations versus liberated ones. “The Astronomy of empire is not a simple story of rise, decline, and failed attempts at salvage. In such a grand cosmology, the actual forces of change are obscured more than illuminated,” says Barkey (2008, p. 294). To capture these forces of change, a different set of analytical tools are needed.

While overcoming this dichotomy is an important step in understanding the transition from empire-to-nation – to which recent scholarship has contributed significantly (Barkey, 2008; Deringil, 1998; Hanioglu, 2008; Kayali, 1997; Mazower, 1999; Weitz, 2008) – it is also necessary to discern the frequent use of transnational ideologies that characterized the period from the end of empires to the rise of nation states. The use of transnational ideologies in the Ottoman context began largely in the late 19th century when the Ottoman–Muslim political elites began incorporating elements of nationalist thought with a new set of transnational ideologies to strengthen the legitimacy of the state and thus to save the empire.

Political elites – defined as state elites and intellectuals actively engaged in a conversation regarding the political agenda of the existing state – are the most important actors in shaping political decision making (Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Moore, 1981; Putnam, 1976)⁵. Ideologies provide the repertoire of action, the vocabulary from which political actors derive their decisions during the state building process but also limit the range of options available to the same actors (Giddens, 1979; Mannheim, Wirth, & Shils, 1936). As Giddens (1984, pp. 1–33) notes, social structure and social reality both enable and constraint agency in a reproductive process of structuration.

There were three main ideologies between the beginning of the 19th and early 20th century: imperialism (both land and maritime), nationalism, and transnationalism. The first two have been addressed by the existing literature, while transnationalism originated during the empire-to-nation transition of late 19th to early 20th century, remains within the repertoire of political actors today.

Transnational ideologies are most commonly referred to in the literature as ideologies which transgress, though not always with the intention or ability to subvert, the territorial boundaries of the nation state

(Basch, Schiller, & Szanton Blanc, 1994; Duara, 1997; Kearney, 1995; Robinson, 2001).⁶ However, transnationalism is considered a contemporary ideology that gained significance later in the 20th century as the movement of people and goods increased between regions (Barkan, 2007; Sassen, 2006; Tarrow, 2005). I suggest recasting the emergence of transnationalism in the political context of the 19th century, as an ideology employed in state building and state legitimation efforts. These efforts transcend the boundaries of a particular nation or type of nationalism and have the capacity to include diverse groups of people from different places and from different racial, religious, and linguistic groups. This type of transnationalism arises after the emergence of nationalism but precedes the formation of the nation state.

Transnational ideologies have the transcendent power (Mann, 1986) to encompass or cross-cut other power networks. Imperialism and nationalism are essentially antithetical ideologies. Transnationalism provides imperial political elites with an all-encompassing solution: to keep the scale, magnitude, and glory of the old empire within the same political structure while creating a new basis for legitimacy of the state. Two particular ideologies in the last two centuries⁷ have had a powerful transnationalist influence: religion and communism.⁸ As will be shown later, the elites commonly relied on these ideologies in their struggle against the rise of nationalism.

There is neither a single model nor a prescribed methodology of historical periodization. Among the popular periodizations, the broadest ones are the most persuasive, often in the form of dichotomies such as pre-modern, modern and post-modern, agrarian and industrial, empires and nation states. They are conceptually simple and are also easy to articulate and to use in various explanations. Moreover, it is common practice to mark the new period – such as the period of nation states – in reference to the emergence of the new ideology. Therefore, accounts of the age of nation states often conveniently date back to 1800s. However, “it is the intermediary phases – such as the phase between the end of empires and the emergence of nation states – that test and so often overturn these periodizations (Toohey, 2003, p. 215). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the era of nationalism does not properly begin until the early 20th century, and it is preceded by a period of transnationalism between 1880s and 1910s. In particular, the years around 1880 were a critical juncture – “a point when a particular option is adopted from among two or more alternatives⁹” (Mahoney, 2001, p. 6).

This critical juncture is defined by the emergence (and elimination) of a new state ideology chosen by the leading political elite. The range of options

available to political actors depends on their antecedent historical conditions, as well as the ruling elite's level and nature of interaction with the Great Powers (who function as the primary international political influence in the region). Consequently, the elites' selection of a particular state ideology during this critical juncture, i.e. a transnational ideology as opposed to a national one, greatly influences the institutional or structural patterns of the following period.

In this next section, I will first go through the changes that happened between from the early 1800s to 1880s¹⁰, providing a general description of regional changes in the Eastern and Southeastern Europe. These changes, I argue, exhibit similar, still-imperial patterns with the Ottoman case. I will then explain the particular patterns of change within the Ottoman Empire. Finally, I will focus on the transnational era, starting around 1880.

IMPERIAL RULE AND THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS: 1814–1880

19th Century in the Region

The year 1814 marks the defeat of Napoleon in Europe, and it stands as a symbolic date for the establishment of nationalism as a recognized, powerful ideology. Theories of nationalism treat this date almost as an inherent beginning of the end for empires. However, during the first half of the 19th century, empires continued to reign in the region as the most legitimate political form of rule. In fact, the Hapsburgs and Romanovs gained new territories and continued to pursue imperial strategies in their internal and external relations. Analytically, this particular period signifies an era during which imperialism continued to rule along with and despite the emergence of nationalism. This period also marks the beginning of the formation of the Concert of Europe. Formed in 1815 following the Congress of Vienna by four great powers – Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, joined by France in 1818 – the concert aimed to create a platform where members could act together on issues concerning their common interests, favoring the preservation of the territorial and political status quo, which often meant the preservation of the imperial rule (Albrecht-Carrié, 1968).

“In absolutist Europe,” Hobsbawm suggests (1996, p. 306), “the rigidity of the political regimes in 1815, which had been designed to fend off all change of a liberal or national kind, left even the most moderate of

oppositionists no choice other than the status quo or revolution.” That rigid imperial structure of the first half of the 19th century showed signs of change and flexibility following the revolutions of 1848. Even though these revolutions – in an area including France, the German Confederation, the Austrian Empire, southeastern Europe, and Italy (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 11) – were not exclusively related to rising nationalist ideologies, they quickly took the form of ethnic nationalism, in several less industrialized areas.

The unification of Germany and of Italy took place within this period, providing for the first time a serious nationalist alternative to state formation for the old regime.¹¹ The Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849 eventually led to the creation of Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867, replacing the old Hapsburg monarchy. Slavs and Bohemian Czechs started to express their demands for political reforms starting in 1848 by refusing to attend the German National Assembly.

The Grounds for Redefining the State: Early Ottoman 19th Century

Throughout the first half of the 19th century, imperial ambitions continued to reign among the Great Powers of Europe. Despite all the new challenges and changes in the world scene, the Ottoman Empire, also continued to maintain its imperial ideology along with its competitors in Europe.

Two major changes directly affecting the Ottoman Empire took place early in the 19th century. First, nationalism as a new ideology became a powerful force in threatening the territorial integrity of empires and in challenging the basis of their legitimacy as political systems. Second, the Great Powers of Europe started to develop considerable interest in the fate of the Ottoman Empire, disturbed by its significant territorial losses. The Eastern Question – referring to the attempts of Western powers to find a solution to the threat of fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire with its potential adverse consequences to European peace – had become a serious motivation for European powers to get involved in the internal affairs of the Empire (Anderson, 1966; Kent, 1996; Toynbee, 1923).

The Ottoman Empire had been experiencing significant territorial losses in the 18th and 19th centuries. In 1798, Napoleon had invaded Egypt, a key Ottoman province. In the turmoil following the invasion, an Ottoman military officer from Albania who was the appointed governor, seized power in Egypt in 1805. Serbs rebelled in 1804, following an appeal to the sultan regarding the abuses of the local administration. By 1817, a hereditary rule

by a Serbian prince had been established with the help of Russian involvement. Bessarabia was lost to Russia in 1812; Greeks mounted an uprising in 1821 which the Janissaries failed to squash. After the failure, Sultan Mahmut II in 1824 invited Muhammed Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, to join Ottoman efforts to quell the Greek revolt. Even though the Greek rebels were defeated, the Kingdom of Greece was established by 1830 through the diplomatic intervention of Britain, France, and Russia (Ahmad, 1993, p. 25; McCarthy, 1996, p. 207; Quataert, 2000, p. 57).

Even though all these insurgencies were later interpreted as nationalist struggles and wars of independence with a distinctly modern character, the Ottoman state and its periphery had no lack of similar events throughout its imperial history. The internal structure of all empires at the time tended to acknowledge and to treat such incidences as a natural part of the imperial rule. In fact, in most of the 19th century cases, the insurgencies were successfully suppressed by the empire and independence came only after the involvement of one or all of the Great Powers favoring a newly established Christian nation state as a replacement for the already weakened Ottoman rule in the area.

In the Serbian uprising of 1804, for instance, “the revolt of the Belgrade was not at first the rising of a powerful national group against a foreign oppressor. It broke out in protest against the weakness of the state. Far from starting as a nationalist revolution, the Christian rebels aimed at the restoration of Ottoman rule in their province” (Glenny, 2000, p. xxvi). Similarly, the Kingdom of Greece was established after the uprising itself had been defeated, and “owed its existence to the military and diplomatic intervention of the Great Powers in favor of a Greek State” (Adanir & Faroqhi, 2002, p. 32). Even though many nationalizing elites used Greek uprisings as an example of early nationalisms (Kohn, 1944), various scholars have also pointed out that there was no ground for a nationalist movement to appear in Greece, because the Greeks had “a common bond of language and religion, but they were not consciously affected by national ideas” (Haddad & Ochsenwald, 1977, p. 10).

Decades after the “wars of independence,” travelers, missionaries, and diplomats who traveled through the former Ottoman Balkans struggled to understand the boundaries and the references to particular nationalities, which were supposed to have liberated themselves from the old empire. In 1864, a French writer states, “Even in our days, how often have I heard people ask who the Christian populations of Turkey belong to – Russia, Austria, France? And when some dreamers replied: These populations belong to themselves – what amusement, what pity such utopianism.”

(Mazower, 2000, p. xxvii). As late as 1910, Roy Trevor (1911, p. xii), a traveler in the Balkans, wrote about his experience in Bosnia Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Montenegro, saying that “it is safe to say that for the next ten years at least travelers will find Eastern life still pure to the core, charming in its very freshness, the people split up into many different races, each with its own customs, dress, tongue and religion; living their own lives and working out their preordained destiny.”

Bulgarian independence, which came decades after the first two Balkan cases, had an even more interesting twist. On the one hand, nationalism had spread further and gained more support among the Christians of Southeastern Europe, and especially earlier in the 19th century, considerable mutual sympathy had existed among the different nationalist movements of the Balkans (Adanır & Faroqhi, 2002, p. 34). On the other hand, later in the 19th century, some conflict and competition for power in the region had started to take place, and the Ottoman center had gone through a serious reconstruction and reform that provided more legitimacy for a continuing imperial legacy with more room for local powers to operate. In fact, the Bulgarian drive for autonomy was at first directed largely against the Greek Orthodox Church’s Patriarch and upper clergy. During the first stages of the movement to form an autocephalous Bulgarian Church, Bulgarian political leaders could count on a sympathetic stance of the members of the Ottoman ruling group (Adanır & Faroqhi, 2002, p. 34; İnalçık, 1992).

Overall, in terms of political developments of this era, it is important to note that the initial uprisings at the Western periphery of the Ottoman Empire did not have a broad, popular, and national character. The Ottoman Balkans had been a highly multicultural territory, “characterized by fluid exchange, both social and economic, between various people” (Karakasidou, 1997, p. 21). And, the development of a bottom-up, broad-based, “national” movement in the Balkans right at the beginning of the century, was rather unlikely.¹² Instead, these nation state building projects were, opportunistic movements of intellectual and political elites who were “seizing the right moment.” As Adanır and Faroqhi (2002, p. 41) suggest, “It can be argued that the nation state formation in Ottoman Europe was hardly a corollary of bourgeois aspirations for social and political emancipation. Independence, attained in the wake of an Ottoman military defeat, brought the most militant factions of the relevant elites to the forefront. Consequently, nation states were created before the corresponding national societies had developed, and the new rulers had to embark upon daring projects of nation-building ‘from-above.’”

Ottoman response to the territorial losses in the Balkans was hardly drastic. The most important change during this period is the accelerated development of a political elite in Western standards, particularly with the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II (between 1806 and 1839).

Building on Selim III's reforms, Mahmud II tried mainly to improve the administration. He did not opt for general Westernization, but had concerns about the equality of his subjects, and had advocated that Muslims and non-Muslims should be treated alike (Temperley, 1936). The clothing law, which passed in 1829, changed the centuries-old visual differences between various religious, ethnic, class, and status groups of the empire in favor of a Western-looking uniform for the bureaucrats – composed of fez, which replaced the traditional turban¹³, and the stambouline, a black frock coat.¹⁴ Mahmud had a census taken, and founded the first official paper, the *Moniteur Ottomane*, which soon got replaced with its Turkish version, *Takvim-i Vekayi*. He replaced the title of several of his ministers – including ministries of foreign affairs, of the interior and of the treasury – to conform to European counterparts (Davison, 1973, p. 28). He founded a medical school that adopted a Western education model, and from 1834 onwards¹⁵, he commissioned medical and military students to study in Paris, London, and Vienna.

In fact, even though the Ottoman Empire lost significant territory during this time, the losses were perceived not as a threat to the legitimacy of the empire as a political unit, but rather, as signs of weaknesses of the political/military machine in place. In other words, even though nationalism caused damage to the old empire, it was perceived as a movement at the peripheries, not as an alternative state ideology for the center. Political elites did not consider switching to nationalist ideology to improve the state as an institution. Instead, they tried to further reinforce the imperial system (such as resorting to more direct rule) or improve the structure of the bureaucracy and the military.

Rebuilding the Ottoman State

By the mid-19th century, the Eastern Question had become the key factor in determining the political changes in the region. As various revolts ended with the creation of local autonomy, and Russians extended their influence into the southern Balkans; the Great Powers increasingly feared the prospects of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the resulting instability in the region. They repeatedly tried to interfere in the negotiations

between the Ottoman Porte and the “rebellious” nations, especially when they thought the consequences of a particular territorial loss for the empire would have had serious impact on their status quo (Quataert, 2000, p. 57). Therefore, they were highly selective in supporting the types of insurgencies that may “cherish their own political notions of nationhood, and were eager to dispatch their princes, bankers, or missionaries to the region” (Adanır & Faroqhi, 2002, p. 42).

One of the major changes in the Ottoman state in this period was the change in the balance of power, as the conservative wing lost ground. As a result of the military defeats of the traditional Ottoman army and the consequent success of the modernized armies (such as Muhammed Ali Pasha’s), Mahmud II managed to replace the janissaries with a new-style army. The indirect result of this military change was the elimination of the conservative elite that lost the army support and the opening of a window of opportunity to restructure the state. Most importantly, a new bureaucratic class came about for the first time, which “possessed a higher sense of loyalty to the state which its members no longer saw as being manifested only in the person of the sultan” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 25).

The series of reforms and reconstruction of the Ottoman state, which followed Mahmud’s policies, resulted in important enactments between 1839 and 1856. The reforms aimed at modernizing the state’s relations with its subjects, making all male subjects the same vis-à-vis the state and each other in appearance, in matters of taxation, in bureaucratic and military service. Mahmud said: “I distinguish among my subjects: Muslims in the mosque, Christians in the church, Jews in the synagogue, but there is no difference among them in any other way” (Karal, 1982).

This radical departure from the traditional patrimonial rule of the Ottoman center was based on the intention to foster the loyalty of the non-Muslim segments of the population to the Ottoman state and its legal system (Quataert, 2000, p. 65) and to further legitimize the status of the empire in the international arena composed of “modern” or “modernizing” states. In fact, modernizing reforms in the Ottoman Empire, “were always implemented under the influence of values and patterns developed in Europe” (Özdalga, 2005, p. 3).

The Rose Garden Decree (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu*) of 1839, marking the beginning of Tanzimat¹⁶ period, was the official statement of the center indicating its intentions to eliminate inequality and create justice for all of its subjects. It clearly stated that “... these imperial concessions are extended to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be.” Inspired significantly by the cameralist movement in Europe, bureaucrats such as

Saik Rifat Pasha, the ambassador to Austria and Sadrazam Mustafa Resit Pasa believed that they could create an “Ottoman consciousness” (Mardin, 1991, p. 12) by means of reforms aiming at all remaining subjects of the empire and providing official state guarantee for their private property and judicial rights.

Tanzimat reforms had a dual character. On the one hand, they were designed to create new Western institutions to improve the state apparatus and to bring the state back into competition with the West. But, on the other hand, they tried to preserve the traditional rule of Islam and most of the traditional state institutions (Davison, 1973, p. 39).

While the long-term goals of the Tanzimat reforms did not necessarily follow the original plans of the bureaucrats, their impact on educational, judicial, and administrative system influenced state building in modern Turkey.¹⁷ Despite their religious connotations, they created a considerable de facto secularization of the Ottoman political elite.

The reforms of 1839 were expanded through a Sultanic edict of 1856, which started the second phase of the reforms of mid-19th century. The new edict, known as *Islahat fermamı*, promised Ottoman non-Muslims equal rights and, employment in the developing Ottoman bureaucracy (Davison, 1973; Findley, 1980). This edict is considered a result of the increased British and French pressure on the Ottoman state toward further Westernization and more effective application of the doctrine of equality (Ahmet Cevdet & Baysun, 1953; Davison, 1973, p. 52).¹⁸ It also facilitated the official admission of the Ottoman Empire to the European Concert at the end of the Crimean war.¹⁹

In his opening of the edict, Sultan Abdülmecid stated: “... Wishing today to renew and enlarge yet more the new regulations instituted for the purpose of obtaining a state of affairs in conformity with the dignity of my empire and the position which it occupies among civilized nations, ... I desire to increase well-being and prosperity, to obtain the happiness of all my subjects who, in my eyes, are all equal and are equally dear to me, and who are united among themselves by cordial bonds of patriotism, and to assure the means of making the prosperity of my empire grow from day to day.”

The customary blessing that followed the sultan’s opening was given by a well-known cleric. The content of that blessing is one of the most striking examples that reveal the magnitude and difficulty of the task the state had engaged. In his prayer, there was no mention of the reforms, non-Muslims, or equality. As the cleric repeated, “Oh God, have mercy on the people of Muhammad. O God, preserve the people of Muhammad,” the minister of war whispered in the ear of his neighbor that he felt like a man whose

evening-long labors on a manuscript were ruined through a careless upsetting of the inkpot (Davison, 1973, p. 3).²⁰

Throughout this period, the reconstruction efforts evolved around a state building frame that would tie different cultural, ethnic, racial, and religious groups together, under the rubric which adhered to a transnational identity.²¹ Unsurprisingly, they were heavily supported by non-Muslims (Göçek, 1996, p. 114), as well as a newly educated middle class. The introduction of the telegraph, newspapers, and rising interest in literature also contributed to the development of a more effective public opinion. The Turkish term for public opinion, *efkar-ı umumiye*, was increasingly used by Ottoman writers, “and this opinion was the product of converging and competing influences ranging from the oldest Muslim tradition to the latest Parisian secular thought” (Davison, 1973, p. 9).

The attempts made by the statesmen and the Sultan during this time are considered by some scholars as “redefining Ottomanism as an imperial supra-nationalism” (Findley, 1989, p. 89). It is indeed important to emphasize the difference in ideologies conceived in this period from those that came about during the next one: The Ottoman center, for the first time, had to consider nationalism a serious threat to the existence of the imperial state. But, the choice of the political elites was still limited to finding a way to improve the existing imperial state, by borrowing some of the tools that seemed to work well within nationalism. Nationalism itself was perceived as the enemy, as the anti-thesis, as an ideology contend with, not ideology which can be adopted “as is.”

THE TRANSITION: TRANSNATIONALIST SOLUTIONS

In 1870s, a world without Habsburgs, Romanovs, or Ottomans was probably not conceivable in many people’s mind. By the end of World War I, all three had collapsed.²²

By the end of the 1870s, with the Treaty of Berlin²³ the Ottoman Empire lost the principalities of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Bulgaria.²⁴ Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi Pazar both came under Austro-Hungarian occupation.²⁵ The only significant non-Muslim populations remaining in the empire after 1878 were the Greeks and the Armenians.²⁶ After the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, Albania was also declared independent. Losing the Balkans meant a loss of identity for the center. Todorova (1997, p. 46)

goes as far as to suggest that the “Balkans *are* the Ottoman Legacy.” It is at this critical point that the political elites engaged in a search for strategies to save the empire from disintegration as a result of rising nationalisms.

While Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires did not experience the same territorial loss with the Ottomans, their ethnic and religious complexity led their political elite to look for strategies to constantly renew their own legitimacy. In the case of Russia, a series of reforms increasing the interconnectedness of its populations (establishment of State Bank and Peasant Land Bank, the development of railroad systems, cultural and educational reforms accompanied by a significant industrial development) helped the “Russification” project of the center.

Similarly, after 1867, the Habsburg political elites passed a series of laws and reforms guaranteeing the equality and protection of all nationalities and languages.²⁷ By 1914, Austro-Hungarians had roughly eleven different groups of people, out of which only five lived exclusively within the imperial borders, and the remaining six (Germans, Italians, Poles, Romanians, Ruthenes, and Serbs) had a majority living outside of the monarchy (Lieven, 2000, p. 177). The relative success of these reforms is indicated by the fact that in each case, the empire maintained its integrity until the end of World War I.

THE OTTOMAN TRANSITION ERA

The Failure of the Tanzimat Reforms

Three different options of identity emerged and persisted throughout three periods of the Ottoman transition: the Tanzimat, the reign of Abdulhamid II, and the Young Turks era (Barkey, 2008, p. 290). Tanzimat reforms had aimed at creating a new basis of allegiance for the Empire’s diverse population, especially non-Muslims, and prevent the emergence of new demands of independence. By 1880, continuing military defeats and the subsequent territorial losses showed that the efforts of the Tanzimat era had failed.

There are a few possible explanations for the relative failure of Tanzimat reforms: First, one might suggest that there was not enough basis for an “Ottoman” nation to emerge due to the centuries-long *millet* system which had created the allegiances on the basis of religious affiliations, and the expectation of a loosely connected indirect rule of administrated groups.²⁸ However, Habsburgs and Romanovs seemed to have had a better success rate in containing their nationalist movements despite their similarly structured indirect rule, at least during the last decades of the 19th century.

Another reason could be that the reforms initiated by the state came too late after the rise of nationalism, especially to overcome the appeal of overthrowing a Muslim occupier in predominantly Christian Balkan territories.²⁹ At that point, the modernization reforms initiated by the Ottoman center usually meant an increased direct rule, which might have indirectly increased the intensity of demands for independence (Hechter, 2000).

Finally, it could also be that the execution of the reforms at the state level did not mean for the people what they meant for their European counterparts: the decree of Gulhane, “translated into the reality of the Ottoman Empire at the time ... meant the abolition of the special privileges and obligations of the different religious groups” (Faroghi, 2004, p. 249). The special taxes levied on non-Muslims were abolished, but this also meant that Christians and Jews could be conscripted in the army, which had been an obligation that many Muslims were reluctant about. In theory, they could also become bureaucrats, but the decades that followed the decree of the decree of Gulhane showed that the distribution of bureaucrats in Ottoman administrative offices remained predominantly Muslim (Findley, 1989).³⁰

Conservatist or Progressive? The Young Ottomans and many Uses of Islam

The failure of the reforms of the Tanzimat era led to a new phase in the transformations of the Ottoman state. During this new phase, the political elites of the empire struggled to create a new basis of legitimacy for the state, at times competing with each other. This competition ended with the short-term prevalence of a transnational ideology: the state claimed a religious basis for its legitimacy, and choose to “islamify” (which refers both to the use of Islam in state institutions as a source of legitimation of state power and the change of preference of the state elite towards creating a relatively homogenous Muslim population within the borders) its institutions and political practices. Yet, this seemingly conservatist turn marked by the increase in the use of religion in state building, was in fact, a development along the lines of modernization process and was carried out as a result of the attempt of the state to keep itself in line with the “progressing” modern world.

Occupying a vast territory from the Middle East to the Balkans, from North Africa to the Crimea, the Ottoman Empire included a rich variety of linguistic, ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. The religious-communal organization (millet system) provided the basis for the administration of these various groups until the late 19th century.³¹

In the *millet* system, the boundaries of different universal religions within the borders of the empire were used as the “natural” borders dividing administrative units: Muslims, Christians, and Jews were all categorized as major groups, and ethnic and linguistic differences mainly provided the subdivisions. All these communities were rather loosely connected to the center –as commonly seen in multi-cultural empires – via a network of ties that determined mutual duties and responsibilities, such as the subjects’ responsibility to pay taxes and recognize the legitimacy of the central government. The government, in turn, was responsible in providing infrastructure and protection for its subjects. Even though Islam was the state religion throughout Ottoman rule, mass conversion was not practiced, and there was no significant explicit policies encouraging non-Muslim segments of the population to convert until the reign of Abdulhamid II starting in the late-19th century.³²

One of the first political movements explicitly engaged in finding an alternative strategy to the ongoing state transformation was a group called the Young Ottomans. They emerged as an influential social movement in 1865, mainly as a reaction to some implications of Tanzimat reforms. The movement was identified with a handful of young intellectuals, mainly writers and journalists – including Namık Kemal, Şinasi, Ziya Paşa, Ali Suavi and Hayreddin Paşa. They were all well versed in Western traditions and had a good knowledge of the Western world mainly through their work for the state translation office (Mardin, 1962).

Although comprising a diverse group with different worldviews, they were commonly concerned with the “overly Western” tone of the reforms of the Tanzimat period. Directing their criticisms to the head bureaucrats of the reform era,³³ they argued that the reforms were a reflection of the economic imperialism of the Great Powers, that they compromised the political and economical status of the Muslims, and, most importantly, that they lacked cultural authenticity. In their view, Tanzimat reforms could not go beyond mere imitation of the Western norms and values and failed to connect to the Muslim majority of the population (Georgeon, 1995; Mardin, 1962, 1991). The reforms lacked a fundamental philosophy, a foundation to ground any ethical norms, and the Young Ottomans suggested using Islamic principles to address these deficiencies.

It is during this era that the writings on the concept of homeland (*vatan*) gained increasing currency, especially through the literary works of Namık Kemal (Derिंगil, 1993) who was introducing the literary genres of the West to Ottoman audiences. His play “Vatan yahut Silistre”³⁴ (The Homeland or Silistre), elaborated on the idea that the love for the homeland/fatherland is

a virtue above all (Çagaptay, 2006, p. 6). Taking place in a small Muslim Turkish town along the Danube during the Crimean war, the play glorified the patriotic behavior of the characters and received an overly enthusiastic response from the crowds. The prominent newspapers of the period, such as *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, *İbret*, *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, *Servet-i Fünun*, played a crucial role in creating and shaping the public opinion. Özbek (2005, p. 71) suggests that “even a quick survey gives the impression that writers and editors took their roles very seriously, acting almost as if they were part of an organized public-relations campaign.” Using coverage from war front, for example, they conveyed “the unity of the military and the wider population with the sultan as its commander in chief.”

Even though it emerged as a movement reacting to over-Westernization of the Ottoman policies, and had an explicit religious tone in its criticisms, the Young Ottoman ideology could not readily be identified as a traditionalist reaction to modernity. Young Ottomans were the products of the same elite education as the bureaucrats they criticized, and their writings were read mostly by these same bureaucrats (Kasaba, 2006; Mardin, 1962). Most of them also published extensively in Europe, showing their commitment to the ideals of liberal democracy, while spending time with various political groups ranging from communists to republicans and various nationalist factions (Türköne, 1991, p. 88). Their main orientation was not anti-modernist, but rather a clearer understanding of a distinctly modern Ottoman identity, in an era when the prevalence of national identities had become the new international norm.

Their efforts were signaling the formation of a “political nation,” and the emergence of the Ottomanism as a state-building ideology during this period. However, these ideas provided little in the sense of a Western-styled popular nationalist movement – one based on an imagined shared historical past and a secular culture. In fact, many scholars argued that the diversity of the population was so big that it was not possible to create any “national” unity, but, at the very least an Ottoman patriotism could be achieved through the idea of devotion to the common fatherland (Davison, 1973; Mardin, 1962). To make matters more complicated, the centuries-long domination of the *millet* system had created an allegiance on the basis of religious affiliations.³⁵ It should therefore not come as a surprise that at this point, the first framework that provided the content to the new ideology of state building was a religious one, namely, Islam.

It is paradoxical that the efforts to create a modern secular state resorted to using traditional religious motifs and vocabulary (Deringil, 1998).³⁶ Yet, as Mardin (1989, p. xx) points out: “it was from Islam that the

Muslim Ottomans could draw the emotional resonance that could mobilize both the upper and lower classes. It was Islam that would provide the store of symbols which could compete with the national symbols of the Greeks and the Serbs.”

The 19th century was marked by the need of the Ottoman center to increase its appeal to its subjects. This was a pressing issue in an era where various non-Muslim segments of society had started to shift allegiance, by building of national identities where none existed before. In addition, Muslim groups started to express frustration with their privileges taken away by the reforms intended to create a modern state. As the Ottoman center started to realize the danger of losing legitimacy, it “started to create a common series of reference markers. Their formulation took place in the space where the state power and society confronted one another, leading to a process of implicit negotiation between power holders and subjects” (Deringil, 1998, p. 45), with the expectation that Islam would provide the ideological ties which would bind together what remained of the Empire (Deringil, 1998; Landau, 1995).

Abdulhamid II and the Islamification of the Empire

The young Ottomans played a significant role in the establishment of the first constitution in the empire. They achieved this both by their writings in the newspapers and magazines of the era and by increasing the public awareness of the political situation. They also contributed to the public pressure put on the state for a change, and suggested an ideological framework for the new direction for the state to take in its policies. While their organized activities were short-lived,³⁷ the idea of merging European liberalism and Islamic tradition was taken up on several occasions especially by Islamic modernists later in the following century. Finally, these actors pioneered in consciously trying to create and influence public opinion. They went as far as to forge the notion of *Efkar-ı Umumiye*, meaning public opinion (Zürcher, 2004, p. 70).

The reformers eventually helped Sultan Abdulhamid take the throne and compelled him to hold elections for a new Ottoman parliament in December 1876 and 1877.³⁸

The first article of the Ottoman constitution of 1876 stated that “The Ottoman Empire is a unit, including its present territories and parts and privileged provinces, which can be divided at no time and for no cause whatsoever.” Article 8 stipulated that all subjects regardless of their religion

or sect were to be called *Osmanlis* (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000). The constitution signaled clearly that the Ottoman statesmen were trying to reaffirm the integrity of the empire. Yet, the actors did not have a specific program or a plan of action in place to implement that idea (Davison, 1973).

Shortly after sultan Abdulhamid II came to power in 1876, the ottomans were defeated by the Russians in Crimean War. One of the most important consequences of this defeat, during which Russian forces came close to entering the suburbs of Istanbul, was the annulment of the short-lived Constitution. Another key outcome was the establishment of a Bulgarian principality. This sent waves of refugees to Istanbul and undermined the conditions of Circassians in Bulgaria (Ipek, 1994). Additional territorial losses stemming from the Treaty of Berlin, increased the refugee problems. The growing nationalist insurgencies created a bitter atmosphere in the capital, and led the new Sultan and his advisors to believe that Ottomanism was a failure due to its multi-national and multi-religious features.³⁹

It is, therefore, no surprise that such a radical change of policy occurred at this particular time. As Karpas (2001, p. 153) notes, The Treaty of Berlin, “constituted the most important historical, cultural, and psychological watershed in the history of the Ottoman Empire.” Not only the Balkans – the heartland of the empire – was lost, but also, the modernizing elite were increasingly perceived as having no clear vision for the Empire’s future success (153–154). At this point the importance of Southeastern Europe, where the Ottomans held a limited amount of territory, declined in the eyes of the government as well (Adanır & Faroqhi, 2002, p. 38).⁴⁰ As a result, the empire’s adoption and promotion of a Panislamist ideology became more prominent. However, Panislamism, as a transnational ideology that transcended the boundaries of the Ottoman *millets* did not merely co-exist with local nationalisms. Rather, it shaped their trajectories – determining the foundations of Turkish and Arab nationalisms of the following century.

The 30 years following the indefinite annulment of the first constitution under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II⁴¹, is commonly referred to as the Hamidian era in Ottoman history. It is during this era that Abdulhamid synthesized the Islamic elements, which were already available in the public sphere, and turned them into clearly articulated, politicized ideological constituents of a new state.

During the last decades of the 19th century, the telegraph system had been established in almost all provinces of the empire. The railroad system had also expanded significantly⁴², connecting different parts of the empire, and increasing the degree of central control (Zürcher, 2004, p. 77). The modern

schools based on Western models, produced considerable numbers of graduates to be employed in the state bureaucracy.⁴³ They also increased the size of the literate population in the empire, which in turn created a bigger market for the consumption of print press.⁴⁴ The necessary conditions for creating and spreading a new definition of the Ottoman people was in place.

When Abdulhamid II came to power, one of the first things he did was to confront nationalism and liberalism, the two forces he considered disruptive. By establishing a strict censorship on the press⁴⁵ and any other form of public criticism of the state, and by creating one of the most extensive and sophisticated spy systems, he personally took charge of the ideological direction of the state. His policies were in part a response to the rising appeal of nationalism among his Christian subjects. It is also likely for his choices to be influenced by the increasing proportion of Muslims in the population, which was a natural result of territorial losses to Christian minorities. In fact, he may have considered nurturing Muslim solidarity as a strong basis for his legitimacy.

Sultan Abdulhamid II was a deeply religious man and expressed his religiosity openly when needed: “If we want to rejuvenate, find our previous force, and reach our old greatness we ought to remember the fountainhead of our strength. What is beneficial to us is not to imitate the so called European civilization but return to the *Seriat*, the source of our strength ... Mighty God, I can be your slave only and ask only your help” (Karpas, 2001, p. 162). Yet his personal religiosity has limited bearing on the explanation for the increased use of Islam in state institutions. Indeed, there have been varying degrees of religiosity among Ottoman Sultans in the past. In fact, the degree of appeal to Islam and Muslim solidarity in Abdulhamid’s strategies have evolved overtime, leaving room for other alternatives to be openly discussed throughout his 33 years reign.

The assessment of the Abdulhamid II’s reign has been one of the most controversial issues in the Ottoman historiography. Because of his autocratic approach, and the changes he made towards a more Islamic state, he has often been considered an icon in conservative circles, but seen as a dark figure symbolizing anti-modernity among Kemalist secularists. The subsequent discord across opposing views on this issue has permeated the competing accounts of modernization and of the changes that happened during the last century of the Empire. The adherents of secularism and modernization have viewed this period as a period of failed attempts toward progress and interpreted the Hamidian era with its religious and autocratic state as a major point of regression. By contrast, the more

traditionalist-minded considers Abdulhamid as a major figure in incorporating Islam, as the representative of the Ottoman value system, and a savior of the Empire that was about to lose all of its values on its way to an ill-fitting Western-type modernization.

Recent studies have viewed both of these accounts as rather simplistic and have therefore occasioned a growing trend to address the complexities of the Hamidian era (Deringil, 1998; Fortna, 2002; Özbek, 2005). Consequently, the emphasis has shifted on the need to identify the interaction between various ideologies during this period. The traditional historiography of this period, not only portrayed the force of nationalist ideologies as the only viable option, but also perceived the empires – the anti-thesis of the nation state, as static, weak, passive actors watching and waiting to be destroyed by the irresistible force of nationalist ideologies. A more complex account reveals that the imperial states were fighting against the forces of nationalism not just by trying to prevent these forces from spreading further, but also by actively incorporating, adopting and developing *transnational* ideas in order to re-legitimize their own existence. This active borrowing and adaptation of ideological elements coming from the West suggests that the Ottoman state in the Hamidian period was, indeed, in tune with world trends (Deringil, 1998, p. 67).

The official strategies of legitimization employed by Abdulhamid II, ranged from the use of pan-Islamic to pan-Turkic, and to supra-confessional Ottomanist ideologies depending on various conditions (Deringil, 1991; Neumann, 2002). The reason for such “fluidity” or instability of state policies is not just a pure opportunism on Abdulhamid’s part. Rather, it reflects a significant interplay of ideologies during a state (re)building period when the center engaged in search for effective strategies of enhancing its position and maintaining order.

Abdulhamid II saw the Young Ottomans as a serious threat, and as a result, exiled many of them. The danger for him lied not necessarily in the Islamic-cultural foundation for reforms they requested, but in their demand for a more democratic, liberal state. Even Namık Kemal, who is considered an icon of this era, did not have a single, consistent ideology. He combined – at least in principle – romantic nationalism with loyalty to the multi-national Ottoman state (Mardin, 1962; Neumann, 2002) reflecting the fuzziness and the unpredictability of the developments in this era. In fact, in the Ottoman context, ideological concepts of Islamism, constitutionalism or nationalism developed almost exclusively within the conceptual framework of the improvement of the existing empire, not its abolishment (Rustow, 1973).

The Revolution of 1908 and the Young Turks

During Abdulhamid's reign, despite his extreme measures to suppress any opposition and establish a new legitimacy based on Islamic unity and principles, a significant number of opponents emerged. Ironically, his attempts to bolster his new legitimacy had created new challenges from within the system. The most important of these opponents was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), or *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, founded in 1889 by many constitutionalists who were exiled or voluntarily fled Abdulhamid's despotic regime.⁴⁶

The program of the CUP was "based roughly on Ottomanism (the preservation of the empire and an attempt to create unity around the symbols provided by the Ottoman dynasty), opposition to foreign intervention, and the reinstatement of the constitution" (Brummett, 2000, p. 2). The CUP had been especially successful in recruiting military officials (all of whom were trained in Western languages and formed the primary educated elite of the empire at the time). These recruitment efforts brought the constitutional revolution of 1908 during which Sultan Abdulhamid reluctantly agreed to reinstate the constitution. This, in turn, led to his deposition and Sultan Mehmed V Resat's coming to power. The change of power was a critical turn for the Ottoman state in the sense that, even though Ottoman sultans officially remained in power until the end of the empire, the real political power had switched into the hands of military officials and bureaucrats (Ahmad, 1969; Hanioglu, 1995; Turfan, 1999; Zürcher, 1984).

The Islamic aspect of the state's legitimacy faced a significant challenge after the revolution of 1908. Censorship established under the Hamidian rule had restrained the potential for an wide open discussion of political and social order, but the new regime facilitated a fresh public forum to the penmen of Istanbul (Brummett, 2000, p. 5). There were, for example, 58 journals associated with Young Turks during this era.⁴⁷ An important factor in the rise of the number and depth of political alternatives discussed in this period was the ambiguity of the identity of the new ruling class. Members of the CUP formed one segment of the Young Turks, which could be identified as a loosely connected group of intellectuals including members from the military, press, artists, and scientists, all of whom were united in opposition to the monarchy. But, there was little, if any, consensus on the nature of the new regime to be established. Furthermore, the inexperience of the CUP bureaucrats extended the discussion of alternatives until the end of World War I.

The range of political alternatives was mainly within the realm of what most scholars label as pan-movements, namely Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism.⁴⁸ Although socialism seemed to have had a presence, especially as a popular alternative among the minorities of the empire (Tunçay & Zürcher, 1994). It received support from a significant number of deputies in the first assembly (Ahmad, 1993).⁴⁹

Turkish nationalism took prominence in the aftermath of the Word War I and during the war of independence, when the Ottoman Empire lost its Arab provinces, and the possibility of establishing a Turkish nation state seemed more feasible. However, major ideologues of Turkish nationalism, such as Akcura and Gokalp, were very much product of this ambiguous and fluid period of transnationalism, where they had a chance to argue against alternative forms of state formation with their colleagues.⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

The rise of nationalist movements and the growing pressure coming from the Great Powers of Europe had posed significant challenges for the Ottoman Empire during the first few decades of the 19th century. But, overall, neither the uprisings at the Western territory of the Empire nor the interferences from the Great Powers threatened the ruling political elite sufficient enough to lead them to question their Imperial identity. Instead of considering nationalism as a dangerous movement, the Ottoman political elite chose to strengthen the existing Imperial political and military machine in place.

During mid-19th century, the Ottomans engaged in significant reforms with the intention to modernize the state and stop the rise of secessionist nationalist movements. They introduced equality between non-Muslim and Muslim communities and provided Ottoman citizenship irrespective of religious or ethnic identities. They also allowed non-Muslims to join the army. It is only during the second half of the 19th century that the Ottoman center started to take nationalism more seriously, as a dangerous enemy. As a result, they borrowed some of the elements of nationalism with an intention to reinforce the Imperial state. This is when the political elite realized that the state's legitimacy was in jeopardy and tried to redefine Ottomanism as an Imperial form of nationalism. The success of peripheral nationalisms in this period – whether in the form of declaring independence or bringing demands to the center regarding political and cultural rights – meant that the imperial state had lost its legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects,

and created what Habermas (1975, p. 71) calls a “legitimacy crisis.”⁵¹ This crisis was prevalent in all three empires of the region – the Habsburgs, the Romanovs, and the Ottomans. The attempts made by the political elites of all three empires in overcoming this crisis included redefining the state and its relations to its populations through restructuring of the existing institutions and invention of the new ones. The empires had to reassume a new identity, which could not be compatible with their old ones.⁵² Therefore, the emerging ideologies of the period cannot be adequately examined by relying exclusively on the scholarship concerning empires.

In the last two decades of the 19th century under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman center changed its strategies of re-legitimizing from a direct adaptation of Western reforms into assigning a *de facto* Islamic identity to the state and its institutions. This is a transnational solution that the elite hoped would incorporate the majority of the Empire’s subjects into the new political entity it aspired to become. The strategy was to borrow some of the weapons of their enemies (nationalism), and to adopt them into the institutional structure of the Imperial state. The alternative ideologies of that era, namely Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism, or pan-Turkism⁵³, and socialism, all had the same transnational character.

The theories of nationalism typically suggest that by the early-to-mid 19th century, many believed that there was no hope for Empires; that, they were condemned to collapse; and that nation states were destined to take over. This may not have been the ubiquitous condition at the time. Part of the reason as to why nation state models were teleologically conceived as the only option was that the imperial visions of the political elites were undermined, and the models other than the nation state were labeled as paths-not-taken, or failed experiments.

The new scholarship on empire-to-nation transition points to the need for examining the process whereby empires were transformed into nation states. As Esherick, Kayali, and Van Young (2006, p. 4) point out, studies could “begin to appreciate the last years of empires as something more than corruption, failure, and decline,” and examine the “dynamic reforms and cultural efflorescence” of the late imperial era with an open mind that can account for transnational patterns. With this paper, I argue that the transition was a rather complex process, composed of the interplay of imperial, national *and* transnational ideologies. A closer look at the Habsburg and the Russian Empires would reveal that this process was not unique to the Ottomans, but rather, a common trait across the empires of the Other Europe.

NOTES

1. While these categories of nationalism and transnationalism may occasionally seem to stand in sharp opposition, defining alternative paths of political development, these moments are little more than instances of the broader process of the co-evolution of the two types of ideologies. This should be particularly obvious in the political development of Southeastern Europe, where at various times communism, Panslavism, Panislamism, and similar transnational ideologies competed vigorously with, but quite often modified, complemented, and even reinforced nationalist attempts at state building.

2. In the late 19th century, the territorial boundaries of the Ottoman Empire still stretched from Southeastern Europe to most of the today's Middle East. Although there are many regionally focused studies, which address the European and the Middle Eastern parts, and the Middle East is not technically a part of Southeast Europe, I prefer to include scholarship on the Middle Eastern regions here based on its significance for the political analysis of the Empire.

3. That is the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, Prussia, France, and Russia during the first half of the 19th century and Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany after the second half of the 19th century. For a more detailed discussion of selection criteria (see [Levy, 1981](#)).

4. "Historians of nationalism agree to differ in their estimates of how much of it (and what sorts of it) already existed in the Atlantic world of 1785. They are at one in recognizing that that world by 1815 was full of it, and that although each national variety had of course its strong characteristics, those varieties had enough in common for it to constitute the most momentous phenomenon of modern history" ([Best, 1982, p. 29](#)).

5. If we start with the idea that some people have more political power than others ([Putnam, 1976](#)), and that during the nineteenth century, the number of people who had access to any type of political power was significantly smaller compared with modern nation states, the size of the group to be considered remains significantly small. This includes primarily the members of the dynasty, the top military officials and bureaucrats, the local notables, and journalists and writers of the period.

6. The concepts of macro-nationalism and pan-movements have been used to label ideologies of this era; however, they do not provide the same analytical depth as the concept of transnationalism.

7. Anarchism along with communism is also considered a transnational ideology ([Duara, 1997, p. 1033](#)) as it is in the same continuum with communism as a modern, radical, utopian ideology.

8. [Gorski \(2006, p. 104\)](#) suggests that the two theoretical sources of Mann's concept of ideological power are the sociology of religion, specifically derived from Durkheim and Weber, and Marxism. It is rather interesting that the two strong forms of transnational ideologies also overlap with his conceptualization of ideological power.

9. For earlier definitions of critical juncture, see [Lipset and Rokkan \(1967\)](#) and [Collier and Collier \(1991\)](#).

10. Keep in mind that the dates suggested here are only approximate and overlap with significant developments in the region.

11. Germany technically was an empire until the end of the World War I. However, both Germany and Italy used nationalism explicitly in their state building and are considered classical examples of unification nationalism.

12. Glenny (2000, p. xxvi) also suggests that it is indeed a very interesting paradox that nationalism as an ideology did find its way first through the most underdeveloped parts of Europe (Greece and Serbia) where the national consciousness was less likely to develop compared with the heart of the continent.

13. Ulema was exempt from the obligation to wear the fez.

14. The change in costume was quickly emulated by the public and senior civil servants, followed by the members of the ruling intelligentsia throughout the Ottoman Empire. Later in the early Turkish republic, the fez came to be regarded as a symbol of ottomans' backwardness and banned from use.

15. There are some discrepancies on the dates given for the first students sent abroad. Bernard Lewis (2002) suggests that they date as early as 1827, however, Davison (1973, p. 27) argues that the first students Lewis cited in his work were "four slave boys educated in Husrev Pasa's household," indicating that they were sent privately without the state's initiative.

16. Derived from the root "tanzim"/order, refers to the series of reforms and reorganization of institutions.

17. The results of the Tanzimat reforms were at best mixed. Karpat (1972, p. 274) suggests that these bureaucratic reforms "failed in the end" due to a "lack of public control." Davison (1973, p. 406) reaches a slightly more positive conclusion that administration was "a little more efficient" after the reforms.

18. The edict took place in February 1856. During the month of January, the British ambassador to the Porte-Lord Stratford, the French ambassador Thouvenel, and the Austrian internuncio Prokesch are known to have met at an increased intensity with Ali Paşa-Grand Vezir, and Fuad Paşa-foreign minister to discuss the content of the edict (Ahmet Cevdet & Baysun, 1953, p. 73).

19. With the treaty signed on March 30, 1856; and a tripartite treaty signed by Britain, France, and Austria on April 15, 1856, guaranteeing joint and several defense of Ottoman Independence and integrity (Holland, 1885, p. 259).

20. For a more detailed discussion see Ahmet Cevdet and Baysun (1953).

21. The modern state building in the 19th century could evolve in two different directions: National or transnational. In either case, it could also use representative democracy (and there is a difference between adhering to the principals of representative democracy versus adopting an ideology, which ties different segments of the society together by legitimizing the center in the eyes of all).

22. It is important to note that Hobsbawm (1989) calls the era between 1875 and 1914 as the Age of Empire, based on the fact that a new kind of (colonial) imperialism was born during that time, but also that "it was probably the period of modern world history in which the number of rulers officially calling themselves, or regarded by western diplomats as deserving the title of 'emperors' was at its maximum" (p. 56). Even though the new colonial imperialism as an ideology was drastically different from the ideology of the land empires, the legitimacy of the empire as a political unit obviously did not diminish its value during this period.

23. Signed by the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire as a final revision of the Treaty of San Stefano.

24. Bulgaria remained under formal Ottoman rule and was divided between the Principality of Bulgaria and the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia.

25. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia in 1908.

26. Karpát (1985) suggests that the Greeks and Armenians constituted no more than one-fifth of the population at that point; but the important change was not so much about the proportion of the non-Muslim to Muslim in the empire, but rather how diffused the non-Muslim communities were.

27. All children could be educated in their own languages and all languages customary in crownland could be used in administration and public life. There were penal codes indicating that it is an offense to incite hostility against other nationalities and religions (Lieven, 2000, p. 184).

28. Some scholars (see Karpát, 1972) argue that the millet system has itself been the basis of the birth of nationalist movements of 19th and 20th centuries.

29. At the absence of a clearly defined ethnic identity, allegiances were to the religious divisions communities belonged to. Even though the absence of an ethnic basis might be considered a disadvantage for the development of a national identity, the emphasis on religious rule, in the case of a ruler of the Muslim faith, as the "other" of Christianity, might have contributed significantly to the desire for separation from the empire when the opportunity arose.

30. For example, among 366 career officials in the ministry of foreign affairs, 259 were Muslim (Findley, 1989, p. 91).

31. The reforms of 1860's extended the autonomous states of millets and gave their organization a formal secular character (İnalçık & Quataert, 1994).

32. With the exception of the use devshirme system, where Christian boys were recruited and converted to later serve either as an administrator or a soldier in the army. For more detailed discussion of the devshirme system (see İnalçık & Quataert, 1994).

33. Primarily against Ali and Fuad Pasha's.

34. This is also the first Turkish play put on stage.

35. Some scholars (McCarthy, 1996) argue that the millet system has itself been the basis of the birth of nationalist movements of 19th and 20th centuries (see Karpát, 1972).

36. The United States indeed used a very similar strategy, and it is worth exploring the parallels between the Ottoman State in transition and the US state building.

37. Zürcher (2004, p. 70) suggests that their organized activity period did not last more than five years.

38. Leading Ottoman politicians in the constitutional revolution included Mithat Pasa (a provincial reformer turned minister, Huseyin Avni Pasa (the minister of war), Suleyman Pasa, the director of the military academy, Seyhulislam Hayrullah Efendi, as well as Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasa who were then appointed as palace secretaries.

39. In addition to the losses in the Balkans, by 1880, Ottomans lost Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austro-Hungarian Empire, Cyprus and Egypt to British, Lebanon and Tunisia to France, and the only significant non-Muslim populations remaining in the empire were the Greeks and Armenians, who together constituted about one-fifth of the population (Karpát, 1985).

40. With the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there still existed a significant proportion of Muslim population.

41. The constitution was never officially abolished and a possible imminent return to the constitutional rule was rather alive as an idea until the early 1880's (Devereux, 1963).

42. For more on the construction of the Ottoman railroads and the famous Baghdad railway (see McMurray, 2001).

43. Both the number of schools and students more than doubled between 1867 and 1895 (Zurcher, 2004, p. 78).

44. Between 1876 and 1888, nine to ten new periodicals appeared in Istanbul each year (ibid).

45. By 1888, the number of periodicals that appeared every year dropped to one on average from nine to ten in the period following Tanzimat (ibid).

46. Members of CUP called the regime as "istibdat," the Ottoman word for despotism.

47. For a comprehensive list and analysis of Young Turk journals see Hanioglu (1995).

48. For a detailed discussion of opposition movements during the second constitution see Islamoglu (2001).

49. Ahmad (1993, pp. 18–19) suggests that it was minority deputies who embraced the idea of socialism at the time.

50. Akcura became one of the most influential figures in defining the Turkish nationalism of the early twentieth century. Taking the pan-Islamism of the young Ottomans to a new direction of pan-Turkism, and defining it as a distinct political doctrine and program for the first time, he contributed a great deal to the switch of the Ottoman political elites from adhering to a transnational framework for the state (pan-Islamism), to a more national one. His article entitled "Uc Tarz-i Siyaset" (Three pathways of policy), "was for the pan-Turanist what the communist Manifesto was for the Marxist" (Zarewand, 1971, p. 9). Ziya Gokalp, became more of an influence in the following Republican era. Heavily influenced by Durkheim, he suggested a Turkish nationalism based on common language, subjective self-identification, socialization, and acculturation in a distinct Turkish culture. His book, *Turkculugun Esaslari* (the Principals of Turkism), became one of the major sources of inspiration for the nationalists of the New Republic.

51. His definition of legitimacy crisis is a situation in which "the structural dissimilarity between areas of administrative action, and areas of cultural tradition, constitutes ... a systematic limit to attempts to compensate for legitimation deficits through conscious manipulation." That manipulation is limited, I suggest, within the existing status quo: If the cultural realm is already national and the state still acts imperial, the crisis is apparent, and can not be overcome with manipulation, and requires restructuring, and redefinition of the state.

52. Which did not include, for example, mass education, establishment of an official language, homogenization of the diverse communities.

53. Pan-Turanism is generally referred to as the ideal of unification all Turkish speaking people, whereas pan-Turkism is more ethno-centric in its outlook. For more on the use of these two terms (see Landau, 1995).

REFERENCES

- Adamır, F., & Faroqhi, S. (2002). *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A discussion of historiography*. Leiden: Brill.
- Ahmad, F. (1969). *The Young Turks; the committee of union and progress in Turkish politics, 1908–1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Ahmad, F. (1993). *The making of modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Ahmet Cevdet, P. S., & Baysun, C. (1953). *Tezâkir*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- Albrecht-Carrié, R. (1968). *The concert of Europe*. New York: Walker.
- Anderson, B. R. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, M. S. (1966). *The eastern question, 1774–1923: A study in international relations*. London: Macmillan.
- Armstrong, J. A. (1982). *Nations before nationalism*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Barkan, E. R. (2007). *Immigration, incorporation & transnationalism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Barkey, K. (2008). *Empire of difference: The Ottomans in comparative perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barkey, K., & Von Hagen, M. (1997). *After Empire: Multiethnic societies and nation-building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Basch, L. G., Schiller, N. G., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1994). *Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states*. London: Routledge.
- Best, G. F. A. (1982). *Honour among men and nations: Transformations of an idea*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brummett, P. J. (2000). *Image and imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Çagaptay, S. (2006). *Islam, secularism, and nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* London: Routledge.
- Calhoun, C. (1993). Nationalism and ethnicity. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 19, 211–239.
- Collier, R. B., & Collier, D. (1991). *Shaping the political arena: Critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Comisso, E. (2006). Empires as prisons of nations versus empires as political opportunity structures: An exploration of the role of nationalism in imperial dissolutions in Europe. In: J. W. Esherick, H. Kayalı & E. Van Young (Eds), *Empire to nation: Historical perspectives on the making of the Modern World*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc.
- Davison, R. H. (1973). *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876*. New York: Gordian Press.
- Deringil, S. (1991). Legitimacy structures in the Ottoman State: The reign of Abdulhamid II (1876–1909). *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 23(3), 345–359.
- Deringil, S. (1993). The Ottoman origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namik Kemal to Mustafa Kemal. *European History Quarterly*, 23, 165–191.
- Deringil, S. (1998). *The well-protected domains: Ideology and the legitimation of power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*. London: I.B. Tauris.

- Devereux, R. (1963). *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period, a study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Doyle, M. W. (1986). *Empires*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Duara, P. (1997). Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900–1945. *The American Historical Review*, 102(4), 1030–1051.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. (1967). *The decline of Empires*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. (1980). Cultural orientations, institutional entrepreneurs, and social change: Comparative analysis of traditional civilizations. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 85(4), 840–869.
- Esherick, J., Kayali, H., & Van Young, E. (2006). *Empire to nation: Historical perspectives on the making of the Modern World*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Faroqhi, S. (2004). *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Findley, C. V. (1980). *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Findley, C. V. (1989). *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A social history*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fortna, B. C. (2002). *Imperial classroom: Islam, the state, and education in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and nationalism*. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
- Georgeon, F. (1995). *Des Ottomans Aux Tures: Naissance D'une Nation*. Istanbul: Isis.
- Giddens, A. (1979). *Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in social analysis*. London: Macmillan.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society: Introduction of the theory of structuration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Glenny, M. (2000). *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–1999 (1st American ed.)*. New York: Viking.
- Göçek, F. M. (1996). *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gorski, P. S. (2006). Mann's theory of ideological power. In: J. A. Hall & R. Schroeder (Eds), *An anatomy of power: The social theory of Michael Mann*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Green, W. A. (1995). Periodizing world history. *History and Theory*, 34(2), 99–111.
- Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism: Five roads to modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1975). *Legitimation crisis*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Haddad, W. W., & Ochsenwald, W. (1977). *Nationalism in a non-national state: The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
- Hanioglu, M. S. (1995). *The Young Turks in opposition*. New York and Washington, DC: Oxford University Press and Institute of Turkish Studies.
- Hanioglu, M. S. (2008). *A brief history of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hechter, M. (2000). *Containing nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Higley, J., & Burton, M. G. (1989). The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns. *American Sociological Review*, 54(1), 17–32.
- Higley, J., & Moore, G. (1981). Elite integration in the United States and Australia. *The American Political Science Review*, 75(3), 581–597.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1975). *The age of capital, 1848–1875*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1989). *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (1st Vintage Books ed.). New York: Vintage.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1996). *The Age of Revolution 1789–1848* (1st Vintage Books ed.). New York: Vintage Books.
- Holland, T. E. (1885). *The European concert in the eastern question. A collection of treaties and other public acts*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- İnalçık, H. (1992). *Tanzimat Ve Bulgar Meselesi*. Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Eren Yayınları ve Kitapçılık.
- İnalçık, H., & Quataert, D. (1994). *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- İpek, N. (1994). *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri, 1877–1890*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
- İslamoğlu, I. (2001). Modernities conformed: State transformations and constitutions of property in Qing and Ottoman Empires. *Journal of Early Modern History*, 5/4, 353–386.
- Karakasidou, A. N. (1997). *Fields of wheat, hills of blood: Passages to nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870–1990*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Karal, E. Z. (1982). Non-Muslim representatives in the First Constitutional Assembly, 1876–1877. In: B. Braude & B. Lewis (Eds), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The functioning of a plural society*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers.
- Karpat, K. H. (1972). The transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3(3), 243–281.
- Karpat, K. H. (1985). *Ottoman population, 1830–1914: Demographic and social characteristics*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Karpat, K. H. (2001). *The politicization of Islam: Reconstructing identity, state, faith, and community in the Late Ottoman State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kasaba, R. (2006). Dreams of Empire, dreams of nations. In: J. W. Esherick, H. Kayalı & E. Van Young (Eds), *Empire to nation: Historical perspectives on the making of the Modern World*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Kayalı, H. (1997). *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Kearney, M. (1995). The local and the global: The anthropology of globalization and transnationalism. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24, 547–565.
- Kedourie, E. (1966). *Nationalism (3rd ed.)*. London: Hutchinson.
- Kent, M. (1996). *The great powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire* (2nd ed.). London: Frank Cass.
- Keyder, Ç. (1997). The Ottoman Empire. In: K. Barkey & M. Von Hagen (Eds), *After Empire: Multiethnic societies and nation-building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kili, S., & Gözübüyük, A. S. (2000). *Türk Anayasa Metinleri : Senedi İttifaktan Günümüze (2. baskı. ed.)*. Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Kohn, H. (1944). *The idea of nationalism: A study in its origins and background*. New York: Macmillan Company.
- Landau, J. M. (1995). *Pan-Turkism: From irredentism to cooperation (2nd rev. and updated ed.)*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Levy, J. S. (1981). Alliance formation and war behavior: An analysis of the great powers 1495–1975. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25, 581–613.

- Lewis, B. (2002). *The emergence of Modern Turkey*/Bernard Lewis (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lieven, D. C. B. (2000). *Empire: The Russian Empire and its rivals*. London: J. Murray.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives*. [Contributors: Robert R. Alford and Others]. New York: Free Press.
- Mahoney, J. (2001). *The legacies of liberalism: Path dependence and political regimes in Central America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mann, M. (1986). *The sources of social power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mannheim, K., Wirth, L., & Shiels, E. (1936). *Ideology and utopia: An introduction to the sociology of knowledge*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Marcu, E. D. (1976). *Sixteenth century nationalism*. New York: Abaris Books.
- Mardin, Ş. (1962). *The genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mardin, Ş. (1991). *Türk Modernleşmesi* (1. baskı. ed.). Cagaloglu, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Mardin, Ş. & American Council of Learned Societies. (1989). Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey the Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, SUNY series in Near Eastern studies pp. ix, 267 p.). Available from <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heh.00915>
- Mazower, M. (1999). *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (1st American ed.)*. New York: A.A. Knopf (Distributed by Random House).
- Mazower, M. (2000). *The Balkans: A short history*. New York: Modern Library.
- McCarthy, J. (1996). *The Ottoman Turks: An introductory history to 1923*. New York: Longman.
- McMurray, J. S. (2001). *Distant ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the construction of the Baghdad Railway*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Neumann, C. (2002). Bad times and better self: Definitions of identity and strategies for development in Late Ottoman Historiography, 1850–1900. In: S. Faroqhi & F. Adanır (Eds), *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A discussion of historiography*. London: Brill.
- Özbek, N. (2005). Philanthropic activity, Ottoman patriotism, and the Hamidian regime, 1876–1909. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 37(1), 59.
- Özdalga, E. (2005). *Late Ottoman Society: The intellectual legacy*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Putnam, R. D. (1976). *The comparative study of political elites*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Quataert, D. (2000). *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Robinson, W. I. (2001). Social theory and globalization: The rise of a transnational state. *Theory and Society*, 30(2), 157–200.
- Rustow, D. A. (1973). The Modernization of Turkey in historical and comparative perspective. In: K. H. Karpat (Ed.), *Social change and politics in Turkey* (pp. 93–120). Leiden: Brill.
- Sassen, S. (2006). *Cities in a world economy* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1986). *The ethnic origins of nations*. Oxford: B. Blackwell.
- Sugar, P. F., & Lederer, I. J. (1969). *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
- Tarrow, S. G. (2005). *The new transnational activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Temperley, H. W. V. (1936). *England and the near East: The Crimea*. London: Longmans.
- Tilly, C. (1997). How Empires End. In: K. Barkey & M. Von Hagen (Eds), *After Empire: Multiethnic societies and nation-building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (p. 200). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Todorova, M. I. A. N. (1997). *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Toohey, P. (2003). The cultural logic of historical periodization. In: G. Delanty & E. F. Isin (Eds), *Handbook of historical sociology*. London: SAGE.
- Toynbee, A. J. (1923). *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A study in the contact of civilisations* (2nd ed.). London: Constable.
- Trevor, R. (1911). *My Balkan tour: An account of some journeyings and adventures in the near East, together with a descriptive and historical account of Bosnia, & Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia & the Kingdom of Montenegro*. London: John Lane.
- Tunçay, M., & Zürcher, E. J. (1994). *Socialism and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1923*. London: British Academic Press in association with the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.
- Turfan, N. (1999). *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the military and Ottoman collapse*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Türköne, M. E. (1991). *Siyasî Ideoloji Olarak İslâmciliğin Dogusu* (1. baskı*. ed.). Cagaloglu, Istanbul: İletisim Yayınları.
- Weitz, E. D. (2008). From the Vienna to the Paris system: International politics and the entangled histories of human rights, forced deportations, and civilizing missions. *The American Historical Review*, 113(5), 1313–1343.
- Zarewand (1971). *United and independent Turania. Aims and designs of the Turks*. Leiden: Brill.
- Zürcher, E. J. (1984). *The unionist factor: The rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926*. Leiden: Brill.
- Zürcher, E. J. (2004). *Turkey: A modern history* (3rd ed.). London: I.B. Tauris.

WHITE SUPREMACIST CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. EMPIRE-STATE: A SHORT CONCEPTUAL LOOK AT THE LONG FIRST CENTURY

Left Quarter Collective

ABSTRACT

Against the prevalent assumption that the United States is and has been a nation-state, this article proposes to reconceptualize it as an empire-state, a state encompassing hierarchically differentiated spaces and peoples. In addition to being descriptively more apt, an empire-state approach provides a firmer basis for understanding the United States as a racial state, a state of white supremacy. Drawing on evidence from constitutional law, I examine the early development of the U.S. empire-state, the long 19th century. The article demonstrates how U.S. state formation has always entailed the racial construction of colonial spaces, specifically “territories” and American Indian lands. Through an extended consideration of Dred Scott v. Sandford, the 1857 Supreme Court case associated almost exclusively with African Americans and hardly ever with empire, I argue for a unified framework to analyze the different but linked racial subjections of colonized and noncolonized peoples. The article concludes with several implications of an empire-state approach to the United States.

Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 20, 167–200
Copyright © 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 0198-8719/doi:10.1108/S0198-8719(2009)0000020011

I

The United States has never been a nation-state.

The United States has always been an empire-state.¹

The United States has always been a racial state, a state of white supremacy.

I am tempted to stop here, for fear of diminishing returns and out of embarrassment for sharing commonplace, even if not common, observations. At the risk of explaining the obvious, I would nevertheless like to make a case for their banality. My genuine hope is for the disappearance and obsolescence of what I write here – the quicker, the better. Analytically, I wish for my words to fade into the background, as the brute facts of the U.S. empire-state and white supremacy become commonsensical axioms for theoretical elaborations and empirical investigations. Politically, I look forward to the day when the notions of U.S. empire-state and white supremacy have only historical referents.

My strategy for this paper is simple and straightforward: I discuss several concepts and apply them in, by turns, broad and fine strokes to the case of the United States. None of the concepts or applications are, or should be, controversial in and of themselves. Taken together, they may cohere into something original and useful, particularly in my own discipline of sociology.² I examine the early development of the U.S. empire-state, the long 19th century, drawing on evidence from constitutional law for two reasons. First, the Constitution, its initial framing and subsequent interpretations and amendments, provides and represents the basic foundation or architecture of the evolving U.S. state. Although my aim is not to assert their primacy in relation to other state institutions or nonstate actors, constitutions are undeniably a crucial component of modern state formation (Arjomand, 1992).³ Second, given the practical limitations of an article-length study, restricting the empirical purview to constitutional law furnishes a measure of coherence and concision to the discussion.⁴

My intention is not to specify a new theory but to outline the basic elements of a framework upon which theorizing can take place. The emergent empire-state approach aims to bring together studies of race, the state, and empire, which is generally lacking with respect to the United States. It also allows us to make unified sense of, and see connections between, the diverse histories of peoples who have been racially subjected to and have struggled against the U.S. empire-state, without overlooking significant differences and particularities. I begin with a few words on a few concepts and introduce the argument that the United States has always been an empire-state, not a nation-state. I flesh out the argument in the

subsequent sections, analytically separating out the two defining dimensions of colonialism: the hierarchical differentiation of spaces and of peoples. I show how U.S. state formation has always entailed the racial construction of colonial spaces, focusing on the acquisition and disposal of “territories” and on American Indian lands and sovereignty. Given the racial subjection of various peoples of the U.S. empire-state, which has been overwhelmingly, but mostly group-specifically, documented, I ask whether and on what basis we should study the imperial subjection of colonized and noncolonized peoples within the same framework, which I answer through an in-depth analysis of a counterintuitive Supreme Court case, *Dred Scott v. Sandford*. The paper concludes with several implications of the empire-state approach.

II

In their widely and justly celebrated *Racial Formation in the United States*, Omi and Winant ([1986] 1994) place the state squarely at the center of their analysis. More than two decades after its first publication, the book is still one of the rare exceptions to the ongoing mutual nonrecognition and disengagement between theories of racial formation and of state formation (Goldberg, 2002, pp. 2–4; James & Redding, 2005, p. 193; King & Smith, 2005, p. 79). Contra other theories of racial inequalities and domination, many of which emphasize, for instance, economic interests and relations, Omi and Winant foreground the political. The U.S. state, they argue, “from its very inception has been concerned with the politics of race” (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 81). In their Gramscian perspective, the racial order at a given historical moment is “equilibrated by the state – encoded in law, organized through policy-making, and enforced by a repressive apparatus.” Periodically, especially since World War II, social movements may successfully pressure the state and destabilize the racial order, and the state responds variously to establish a new “unstable equilibrium,” a new racial order (*ibid.*, p. 84). “Inherently racial,” the state, for Omi and Winant, is “increasingly the preeminent site of racial conflict,” and “race will always be at the center of the American experience” (*ibid.*, pp. 5, 82).⁵

I agree that the U.S. state is inherently racial and, in all likelihood, will always be racial. As “inherently” and “always” signal, Omi and Winant are not proffering purely empirical statements about the U.S. state but theoretical claims about its intrinsic character. But on what basis can we make such assertions, and *how* has the U.S. state been racial? I suggest that the questions remain considerably unanswered and unanswerable because

the U.S. state is almost universally assumed to be, and to have been, a nation-state.⁶

Let us first define the constituent, hyphenated terms. A *nation* is, as Benedict Anderson memorably put it, “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” A categorical identity, it entails direct membership and is “always conceived as a deep, *horizontal* comradeship” (1991, pp. 6, 7; emphasis added).⁷ *States* are “coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories” (Tilly, 1990, p. 1). Modifying Max Weber’s classic definition, Charles Tilly concurs on the basic importance of coercion and territory but scales back on the idea that the state claims a monopoly of coercion or its legitimacy.⁸

My contention is that, for the United States, the political community to which the *state* has been coupled has never been the *nation*. I do not mean in the trivial sense that the *nation-state* is an ideal type no actual nation-state fits precisely but that the United States has not been a nation-state in a fundamental, square-peg-in-a-round-hole sense. By virtue of the assumed internal horizontality of nations, nation-states imply politically homogeneous populations of *citizens*, or state members. As a corollary, territories over which nation-states claim sovereignty are politically homogeneous spaces, symbolized on atlases by evenly colored, neatly bounded blocks. The United States has never come close to achieving these political “ideals” and, in all probability, is constitutionally, both literally and figuratively, incapable of doing so.

The polity to which the U.S. state has always laid claim in fact, if not in rhetoric, is an empire. Unlike nation-states, *empire-states* (Cooper, 2005) are not horizontally homogeneous but hierarchically differentiated. Empire-states entail the usurpation of political sovereignty of foreign territories and corresponding populations. In terms of geography, an empire-state encompasses spaces of “different degrees of sovereignty” (Stoler, 2006, p. 128), territories of unequal political status. In terms of belonging or membership, the peoples of an empire-state effectively, through *de jure* and *de facto* practices, have differential access to rights and privileges. These conditions are what George Steinmetz (2008, p. 591) refers to as the “sovereignty” and, following Partha Chatterjee (1993), “rule of difference” criteria of *colonialism*, the formal supplantation and exercise of sovereignty over territories and peoples. Here, I would add a caveat to the rule of difference criterion. Steinmetz writes, “Where conquered subject populations are offered the same citizenship rights as conquerors in exchange for

their assimilation into the ruling culture, we are better off speaking of modern state making rather than colonialism” (2005, p. 348; see also Cooper, 2005, p. 27). But if we were to view the rule of difference from the vantage point of subject populations, like the indigenous peoples of North America and Hawai‘i, we would find that the *imposition* of “equal” citizenship can be and, by many, is seen as a practice of colonial rule (Bruyneel, 2004).⁹ In other words, without the consent of the colonized, unilaterally ridding the rule of difference through assimilation rather than decolonization may not eliminate but instead reproduce and even deepen colonial domination. After all, extermination and assimilation were but two poles of the U.S. state’s genocidal colonial policies toward American Indians in the 19th century and beyond, summed up by the two infamous quotes “The only good Indian is a dead Indian” and “Kill the Indian in him and save the man” (Wolfe, 2006, p. 397).¹⁰

III

“The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course....”

– Edward Said (1993, p. xii)

“I am persuaded no constitution was ever before as well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government.”

– Thomas Jefferson (1809 letter to James Madison as quoted in Williams, 1980, p. vii)

The continual misrecognition of the United States as a nation-state, not least by the state itself, has been integral to U.S. nationalism, and its attendant sense of exceptionalism, and thereby to the formation, fortification, and imperception of the United States as an empire-state.¹¹ As Steinmetz (2006, p. 137) notes, “American power...seems continually to generate the mirage of its own disappearance.” This is not, however, due to “the deceptively *informal* character of American empire since the early nineteenth century” – that “American power...does not typically annex and permanently occupy foreign lands – with the important exceptions of the westward expansion of the continental state, Hawai‘i, and the colonies created from the spoils of the Spanish-American War” (Steinmetz, 2006, pp. 136, 137; emphasis in original).¹² Although the informal, or nonterritorial, facet of U.S. empire has been immense,¹³ the “important exceptions” have been important but far from exceptional or uncharacteristic, which is readily apparent when we take in their spatial expanse: the overland and overseas annexations of the long 19th century stretched from the original 13 states westward to the Eastern Hemisphere, northward

to above the Arctic Circle, and southward to below the equator and, with certain exceptions like the Philippines and the Panama Canal Zone, are still under the *formal* jurisdiction of the United States.

Many may object that the great majority of the territory under U.S. sovereignty are the 50 states, which are all of equal standing and in which the U.S. Constitution fully and evenly applies, and that the only true and brief foray into formal empire-building by the United States was at the turn of the last century consequent to the Spanish–American War. Obsessed with comparisons to what they imagine to have been the prototypical (i.e., European) empires, the British above all, academic and nonacademic commentators alike eagerly point out how the United States has been and is exceptional. Of course, a careful examination would reveal an equal number of empires and exceptions (and ideologies of exceptionalism), as well as repertoires of ruling practices that greatly overlapped, and varied, between empires and changed over time within them.¹⁴ No one, or one type of, empire-state epitomizes the category to the exclusion of others, and the United States is no exception.

As troubling as the persistent ideology of exceptionalism is how the U.S. state's own practical categories of colonial rule frequently and insidiously double as analytical categories. Foremost, in much of the literature on the U.S. empire, the legal distinction between *incorporated* and *unincorporated* territories, drawn by the Supreme Court in the *Insular Cases* in early 20th century, marks the analytical distinction between metropole and colony: states and incorporated territories, on the one hand, and unincorporated territories, on the other (see discussions below). Therefore, Guam, the Philippines (up to 1946), and Puerto Rico are treated as bona fide colonies, whereas Hawai'i, Alaska, and all parts of what are now the 48 contiguous states are not.

The uncritical reproduction of U.S. exceptionalism and state categories has a couple of related consequences: the temporal depth and spatial breadth of the U.S. empire-state are routinely and often grossly underestimated, and its history becomes oversimplified. As a countermeasure, I propose that we see less like the state and more like the ruled.¹⁵ In the context of the U.S. empire-state, such an optical shift must begin with the indigenous.¹⁶ From the vantage point of the Native peoples of North America, the birth of the United States as a state was at once the birth of the United States as an empire-state. If we accept that England had established colonies in North America, usurping the political sovereignty of Native American peoples and territories, what changed after the colonies broke away and founded a state, or a federation of states, of their own? For the indigenous, the United States immediately became one more empire-state

with which they had to contend. After all, as Christopher Tomlins (2001, p. 365) reminds us, the colonists declared independence, “in large part, in order to free themselves from imperial constraints that restrained their own colonizing (or to use the preferred anodyne phrase, their own ‘westward movement’).”

As already indicated, the metropole/colony distinction is of limited utility in analyzing the U.S. empire-state.¹⁷ In part, this may have to do with its principally overland character. But much more than that, the vulgar and deadly immodesty of the state’s and its white citizens’ colonial ambition rendered metropole and colony largely overlapping and, at times like the present, nearly coterminous. Taken as a whole, the abiding colonial logic was to wrest land away from indigenous sovereignty and control. In North America, it was to empty the land of Indians, through coerced cessions, broken treaties, extermination, and assimilation, and geographically confine the survivors on ever shrinking reservations with diminished Native sovereignty. In effect, doing away with the metropole/colony distinction itself has been part and parcel of the U.S. colonial project, a condition of possibility for assertions that the United States has been a nation-state, not an empire-state. Native survival and resistance, above all, have been what put the lie to such claims. Indigenous territories under colonial rule today consist minimally of the Indian reservation lands, maximally of the entire United States, and quite reasonably of all the lands that were never ceded.¹⁸

Colonial rule over Indian-held lands was one of the fundamental issues for the United States from the very beginning. Under the British, a royal proclamation in 1763 had drawn a line along the Appalachian Mountains to keep Indians and white settlers apart, prohibiting, if futilely, the latter from the western portion that extended to the Mississippi River and was designated Indian territory. The newly independent states had to decide what to do with the territory, a crucial issue since some states, as a carryover from the British era, had claims to it, and others none. As one of the latter, Maryland cited the former’s relinquishment of their claims as a precondition for its ratification of the Articles of Confederation, which required unanimous assent. All states eventually ceded their trans-Appalachian claims.¹⁹ In this way, the very formation of the U.S. state hinged on lands occupied by Indians but over which it asserted ultimate sovereignty (Meinig, 1986; Nobles, 1997). The issues originally raised by the trans-Appalachian territories would continue to shape, bedevil, and haunt the geography of U.S. empire-state formation: the acquisition and disposal of “territories,” and Indian sovereignty.

The blueprint for the nascent state, the U.S. Constitution expressly acknowledged the reality of spaces under U.S. sovereignty that did not enjoy

equal standing with the “several states.” In short, colonial spaces. In Article IV, Section 3, it vested Congress with the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” The “United States” was therefore not literal: it comprised not only the states but also other political spaces, which were to be ruled ultimately as Congress saw fit and would not have voting representation in the federal government. The constitutionality of *further* acquisition of territories was initially and periodically uncertain. Nonetheless, by 1853, with the Gadsen Purchase from Mexico, the United States had assumed sovereignty over the entire area of today’s 48 contiguous states, with that of 16 future states still composed of territories.

The Constitution did not address how territories could be transformed into states, merely stating in the aforementioned article and section, “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union” (Article IV, Section 3).²⁰ The widely held assumption during the 19th century was that the process followed the principle set out in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 for the disposal of the northwestern portion of the trans-Appalachian territories (Sparrow, 2006): temporary governments organized by Congress, followed by “establishment of States, and permanent government therein...on an equal footing with the original States, at as early periods as may be consistent with the general interest” (Section 13).²¹

The acquisition of overseas territories in the late 1890s, particularly the former Spanish colonies of Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, profoundly upset the tacit assumption. Above all, racism toward their nonwhite, non-Anglo-Saxon inhabitants incited the uproar and debate, both among imperialists and anti-imperialists, and centrally informed the construction of the categories of “incorporated” and “unincorporated” territories, distinguishing those slated to become states and others that could be kept and governed *indefinitely* as territories (Burnett & Marshall, 2001b; Kramer, 2006).²² But this categorical bifurcation of territories did not suddenly inject racism into a hitherto nonracial practice of empire-state formation. Rather it laid bare the white supremacist underpinnings.²³

Acquiring territories, even under the assumption that they would be turned into states, has always been a racist process. The politics around conquering and taking possession of Texas and what would become the U.S. Southwest from Mexico, for example, had been patently structured by anti-Mexican racism, as numerous studies have shown.²⁴ What the new territories of 1898 provoked were a more radical doubt of whether white supremacy could be maintained through the usual colonial practices of the U.S. state and its resolution through the *Insular Cases*’ doctrine of territorial

incorporation. The deviant case of Hawai'i was revealing. Like the island colonies obtained through the Spanish–American War, it was annexed in 1898, located overseas, and inhabited predominantly by nonwhites – Native Hawaiians and migrant laborers from China, Japan, and elsewhere. However, unlike them, it was slotted into the newly invented “incorporated” category, the same one to which all past and then present U.S. territories on the North American continent retroactively belonged. The decisive difference was that Hawaii’s economy and politics had long been dominated by white settlers from the United States, foremost descendants of missionaries from the Northeast.²⁵ It was precisely because U.S. white supremacy was already and sufficiently guaranteed that Hawai'i was incorporated while other overseas territories were not. Still, principally because of its concerns about the nonwhite-majority population, Congress would not grant Hawai'i admission into the Union as a state until 1959 (Bell, 1984; Jung, 2006; Merry, 2000; Osorio, 2002).²⁶ If the unincorporated former Spanish colonies were considered “foreign to the United States in a domestic sense,” the Territory of Hawai'i was seen and treated as domestic in a foreign sense – a part yet apart, rather than vice versa.²⁷ On the flip side, we can infer that the relatively short and smooth transition of most territories to statehood was also underwritten by white supremacy, that the taken-for-granted certainty of white dominance was a necessary condition of possibility.²⁸ And in the antebellum period, the transition always took into account the delicate sectional balance of power in the U.S. Senate between the North and the South, evening out the numbers of “free” and “slave” states admitted. Needless to say, the equilibration helped to preserve and prolong the white supremacist institution of slavery (Sparrow, 2006).

In addition to acquiring and ruling territories, incorporated and unincorporated, U.S. empire-state formation has always entailed the construction of colonial spaces in relation to the indigenous populations. But the Constitution was evasive. “Indian” appeared twice in the original Constitution, in the Three-Fifths and Commerce Clauses, but neither mention dealt directly with Indian lands.²⁹ Nonetheless, given the intrinsic coloniality of the U.S. state, built as it was on soil that was once exclusively the domain of Native Americans, constitutional questions about their political status were unavoidable. The initial answers were proffered in the Marshall Trilogy, three related Supreme Court cases in early 19th century whose prevailing opinions were penned by Chief Justice John Marshall. In *Johnson v. M'Intosh* of 1823, the Court formally invoked the extra-constitutional, and profoundly white supremacist, doctrine of discovery as the basis of U.S. sovereignty over Indian territories, adopting and adapting

the centuries-old colonial logic and rationale of European rule over non-Europe: "This principle was, that discovery gave title to the [European] government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession." In other words, each European power acquired title to non-European lands that it "discovered" to the exclusion, and customarily with the tacit agreement, of other European powers. The Court reasoned that "original inhabitants" retained their "right of occupancy" and use of land, but their rights and "sovereignty, as independent nations," were "necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired" and "diminished," as the "ultimate dominion" lay with the European "discoverer."³⁰ Corollarily, the latter held the right of preemption, the "exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest."³¹ According to the decision, the United States, upon its independence, inherited this unmistakably colonial relationship from Britain.

The remaining two rulings of the trilogy further specified the relationship. The 1831 case of *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* determined whether the Cherokee, and by extension other Native American nations, constituted a state and, if so, what kind of state. On the first question, the Court decided in the affirmative: "They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them....The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts." At the same time, indigenous peoples were not "*foreign States.*" Rather, they were deemed to be "domestic dependent nations" in a "state of pupilage" with a relationship to the United States "resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian," sounding a rhetorical echo for the unincorporated territories to come.³² A year after *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, the inferior but definite sovereignty of Indian nations was affirmed in another case involving the Cherokee and the state of Georgia, *Worcester v. Georgia*. "Indian nations" were recognized as "always [having] been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial," but, per the discovery doctrine, "with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power."³³ And the authority of that imposition by the United States lay entirely with the federal government.³⁴

The scope of federal authority grew and turned out to be without limit. A half century of white settler encroachment and violence, genocidal warfare, cession treaties, and removals onto reservations later, the Supreme Court weighed in on *United States v. Kagama* in 1886 to uphold a new

federal law that intruded on the *internal* affairs of Indian reservations for the first time.³⁵ Extending the logic of the Marshall Trilogy, again on extra-constitutional grounds, the Court further undermined Native sovereignty and conferred on Congress plenary, or complete, power over Indians (Wilkins, 1997). Having already passed a law in 1871 to no longer deal with Indians bilaterally through treaties, Congress was now constitutionally empowered to, and did, legislate unilaterally to reorder and seize Indian lands and otherwise regulate Indian lives.³⁶ In 1903, the Supreme Court outdid itself again. Asserting that the “plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning” and that, citing *Kagama*, “Indian tribes are the wards of the nation...communities dependent on the United States,” the Court, in *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock*, declared that Congress, but not Indians, could disregard *existing* treaties at its discretion: “When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress.”³⁷ Attesting to its manifest racism, a U.S. senator responded at the time, “It is the *Dred Scott* decision No. 2, except that in this case the victim is red instead of black. It practically inculcates the doctrine that the red man has no rights which the white man is bound to respect, and, that no treaty or contract made with him is binding” (Matthew Quey as quoted in Wilkins, 1997, p. 116).³⁸ Lest we dismiss such cases as relics of the past, the ruling in *Lone Wolf*, like those in the *Insular Cases*, still obtains, as does, it should be clear, the U.S. empire-state (Aleinikoff, 2002; Biolsi, 2005; Sparrow, 2006).

IV

“But the principal meaning of colonization has come to involve people rather than land....”

– Frederick Cooper (2005, p.27)

“These Indian Governments were regarded and treated as foreign Governments as much so as if an ocean had separated the red man from the white....”

– Roger Taney in *Dred Scott v. Sandford* (1857)³⁹

The hierarchical differentiation of space and the hierarchical differentiation of people, both immanent and foundational to empire-state formation, are plainly related.⁴⁰ Since the hierarchical differentiation of space is not about space in itself but about the *politics* of ordering space, it is inextricably always already about the politics of ordering people. And, as argued above, the construction of U.S. colonial spaces – whether they be Indian lands,

incorporated and unincorporated territories, the “several states,” or the United States as a whole – centrally turned on the racialization of their inhabitants, on the production and reproduction of white supremacy. With little controversy, at least on the left and even among liberals, we could probably agree that certain populations were colonized by the U.S. state: indigenous peoples of North America and Hawai‘i, Mexicans of northern Mexico/southwestern United States, and peoples of the so-called unincorporated territories. (With a little controversy, we could also acknowledge that most, if not all, of them continue to be colonized.⁴¹)

What about other people of color, others subjected to racial domination? In much of the literature on colonialism, the binary oppositions of colonizer/colonized, European (or equivalent)/native, and citizen/subject are unproblematically assumed to refer to the same relationship.⁴² How then should we conceive of *noncolonized, nonnative subjects*? For the United States, does it make sense, for example, to categorize Blacks, past or present, as *colonized*? This is exactly what theories of internal colonialism once contended (e.g., Blauner, 1972), with which I disagree specifically but agree generally.⁴³ The racial domination of Blacks in the United States has not been one of *colonial* domination, which, by definition, would involve the formal usurpation of territorial sovereignty. The formation of the U.S. empire-state did not entail the expropriation of lands over which Blacks had prior claims. In other words, the “main battle” has not been “over land” (Said, 1993, p. xii).

In a broad sense, however, theories of internal colonialism were right to frame the oppression of Blacks in terms of colonial empire. First, as a matter of historical fact, the state with which they have had to contend for the past two and a half centuries has been an empire-state, not a nation-state. Second, Blacks have always been treated, through de jure and de facto practices, as less than full citizens, as less than equal to white citizens. But even so, while it may be of undoubted relevance with respect to colonized peoples, like Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, or Samoans, does the imperial, rather than national, character of the U.S. state significantly impinge upon how we understand the racial domination of Blacks, and other noncolonized peoples, who have been systematically treated as less than white citizens? Has the imperial state form been merely incidental to anti-Black or most anti-Asian racisms? Had the U.S. state been a nation-state, would the exclusion of Blacks and other noncolonized peoples from full citizenship have been significantly different? Put simply, what do we gain *analytically* by insisting on an empire-state theoretical approach?

In an empire-state, racial domination of colonized peoples does not happen in isolation from that of noncolonized peoples, and vice versa. Though qualitatively different, they are intimately and intricately linked. Rather than a series of self-contained dyadic relations between whites and various racial others, white supremacy comprises a web of crisscrossing discursive and practical ties. It is a unified, though differentiated, field that calls for a unified, though differentiated, theoretical framework. For instance, in the afterglow of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, President Thomas Jefferson envisaged in the newly acquired territory an expanded “empire of liberty” in which his vaunted citizenry of white yeomen could grow and flourish. He also saw potential solutions to vexing racial problems supposedly posed by those beyond the pale pale of citizenship: “the means of tempting all our Indians on the East side of the Mississippi to remove to the West” (as quoted in [Meinig, 1993, p. 78](#)) and of “diffusing” and thereby defusing Blacks, slavery, and the dreaded threat of insurrection, made all too real by the Haitian Revolution ([Freehling, 2005](#)). Such articulations of empire, white supremacy, racialized citizenship, and colonial and noncolonial imperial subjection were not rare or limited to the early 19th century and the ruling elite. To take an example from the turn of the 20th century, the state and the public, military and civilian officials, legislators and judges, academic and popular commentators, officers and soldiers, business and labor leaders, editorialists and cartoonists, and many others apparently could not imagine, talk about, write on, wage war against, or govern the newly colonized peoples of the former Spanish colonies and Hawai‘i without references to Blacks, Native Americans, and the Chinese. They compared, differentiated, analogized, contrasted, transposed, extended, ranked, and homogenized. As much as the imperialists, anti-imperialists – whether they were white former abolitionists, Black anti-lynching activists, or white trade unionists active in the anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese movements – made the associations, though with obviously divergent intentions and effects (e.g., [Jacobson, 1998](#); [Kramer, 2006](#); [Murphy, 2009](#)).

The U.S. state, itself a unified but differentiated field, is a principal agent, or set of agents, in the field of white supremacy. Like other agents, it, too, confronts and helps to reproduce the field that is a unified but differentiated whole: it makes certain distinctions between colonial and noncolonial imperial subjects as well as within those categories, but it also generates identities, parallels, and overlaps. Explicitly and implicitly, intentionally and unintentionally, the state thus divides *and* unites as it rules. (It thereby sets barriers against and, dialectically, possibilities for coalitions of resistance.)

Compared to many nonstate agents and even among state institutions, the Supreme Court has relatively fewer degrees of freedom, constrained as it is, at least nominally, by *stare decisis* and the Constitution itself.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, it, too, continually affirms the interconnectedness of practices of racial rule, the overall “unity” of a “‘complex structure’...in which things are related, as much through their differences as through their similarities” (Hall, 1980, p. 325). To illustrate, I discuss one case that is identified hardly ever with empire and almost exclusively with African Americans: *Dred Scott v. Sandford* (1857).

Marking one of the most significant moments in the history of African Americans, the *Dred Scott* decision denied U.S. citizenship to Blacks, both “free” and slave, in no uncertain terms, drawing an unambiguous distinction between “the citizen and the subject – the free and the subjugated races.” According to the odious opinion of the court, authored by Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney, the Constitution was unequivocal in distinguishing between the “citizen race, who formed and held the Government, and the African race, which they held in subjection and slavery and governed at their own pleasure.”⁴⁵

Evincing the complex unity of white supremacy, this case quintessentially about Blacks could also be seen, in a nontrivial sense, as a part of Native American, Asian/Asian American, Pacific Islander, and Latina/o histories. Toward the start of his opinion, right after summarizing the question before the Court, Taney takes a seemingly gratuitous detour for a long paragraph. It is entirely devoted to contrasting the “situation...of the Indian race” to that of “descendants of Africans”: since the “colonial” era, “although [Indians] were uncivilized, they were yet a free and independent people, associated together in nations or tribes and governed by their own laws....These Indian governments were regarded and treated as foreign Governments as much so as if an ocean had separated the red man from the white, and their freedom has constantly been acknowledged.” Therefore, although they were “brought...under subjection to the white race...in a state of pupilage,” Indians could “without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress...and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe and take up his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.”⁴⁶

A decade before, however, the Supreme Court, in another opinion written by Taney, had arrived at a contrary conclusion. In *United States v. Rogers* (1846), lands held by Indians were judged to be “a part of the territory of the

United States” that had been merely “assigned to them.” Further, ever since European “discovery,” “native tribes...have never been acknowledged or treated as independent nations.”⁴⁷ How do we account for the inconsistency? In *Dred Scott*, Taney contradicted his earlier opinion regarding Indians to forestall a presumably more dire contradiction regarding Blacks. In 1790, Congress had passed a law restricting the right of naturalization to “aliens being free white persons.”⁴⁸ But, evidently not satisfied with this statutory proscription, Taney sought to *constitutionally* block even the future *possibility* of naturalized citizenship for Blacks. One of the two dissenters in the case, Benjamin Robbins Curtis conceded, needlessly, that Congress’s constitutional power of naturalization was confined to “aliens.”⁴⁹ But he went on to note that being “colored” itself did not pose a constitutional barrier and, in fact, American Indians and Mexicans had already been made U.S. citizens through treaties.⁵⁰ The other dissenter, John McLean, likewise remarked, “Under the late treaty with Mexico, we have made citizens of all grades, combinations, and colors. The same was done in the admission of Louisiana and Florida.”⁵¹

Presumably because they had uncontroversially been seen as “aliens” before U.S. annexation, Taney did not bother to address Mexicans of the Southwest or nonwhites of Louisiana and Florida territories in his opinion. He also granted that “color” was not a constitutional hindrance to naturalization.⁵² But, though not explicitly pushed by Curtis on it, the issue concerning Native Americans could not be so easily dispensed with: some Indians who had been born under U.S. sovereignty according to previous rulings, including his own, had been accorded U.S. citizenship. If they could be naturalized, why could Blacks not be? Taney resolved the apparent dilemma by insisting that the Constitution “gave to Congress the power to confer [citizenship] upon those *only* who were born *outside* of the dominions of the United States” and asserting that Indians, abruptly redefined as “aliens and foreigners,” fit this description.⁵³ Thus lacking the capacity to “raise to the rank of a citizen anyone born *in* the United States who...belongs to an inferior and subordinate class,” Congress could not naturalize Blacks even if it were so inclined.⁵⁴

In *Dred Scott*, ruling on, and ruling, Blacks led to a reexamination into the rule of Indians (and Mexicans and others). The racial subjection of one was related to the racial subjection of the other, evidencing a common field of white supremacy. The articulation in this instance was one of difference. To refuse U.S. citizenship to all Blacks, the Supreme Court was provoked to state explicitly how Native Americans were dissimilar, modifying its previous view on Indian sovereignty. In this way, the Court endorsed and

justified the differential treatment of the two “subject” populations, one rooted in slavery and the other in colonization. At the same time, the decision also alluded to the inevitable imbrications of imperial subjection. In support of the Court’s opinion, Taney cited a number of state laws that ostensibly formed a consensus against the idea of Black citizenship. Though not commented on by the Court, three of them – two forbidding intermarriage with whites and one prohibiting travel without a written pass – applied not only to “any negro” or “mulatto” but also “Indian.”⁵⁵

The decision in *Dred Scott* with regard to Black citizenship was overruled, at least formally, by the passage and ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution during Reconstruction. But some of its reasoning survived to be debated anew decades later. One of the arguments put forth by the plaintiff Dred Scott was that his residence from 1836 to 1838 at Fort Snelling, taken there by his owner, had made him free. With the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which had simultaneously admitted Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a “free” state to maintain sectional balance, Congress had prohibited slavery in the remaining territories of the Louisiana Purchase lying north of 36° and 30’ latitude; this area included the part of Wisconsin Territory in which the aforementioned army post stood.

The Supreme Court rejected Scott’s claim, concluding that Congress had overreached: the Missouri Compromise, already voided by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 by the time *Dred Scott* made its way to the Court, was unconstitutional.⁵⁶ According to Taney, Congress’s constitutional “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory...belonging to the United States” (Article IV, Section 3) was immaterial: the Territorial Clause pertained *only* to the territory claimed by the United States at the time of the Constitution’s original adoption and could “have no influence upon a territory afterwards acquired from a foreign Government.”⁵⁷ The lone means to acquire and, implicitly, govern additional territories was instead through the Admissions Clause: “New States may be admitted by the Congress....” (Article IV, Section 3). From acquisition to admission, temporary territorial governments organized by Congress were permissible, but it had no plenary power to “establish or maintain colonies...to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure.” Just as in the several states, Congress had “powers over the citizen strictly defined, and limited by the Constitution,” but “no power of any kind beyond it.”⁵⁸ Thus, legislating as it did for the Louisiana Purchase territories in the Missouri Compromise, Congress had overstepped its definite powers and infringed on U.S. citizens’ right of property, the “right of property in a slave.”⁵⁹

Having pronounced that Congress had “no power...to acquire a Territory to be held and governed permanently in that character,” *Dred Scott* was bound to reemerge when various state and nonstate actors were clamoring to do just that in the overseas territories annexed at the turn of the century, and others were mobilizing in opposition. It appeared extensively in *Downes v. Bidwell* (1901), “generally considered the most important of the *Insular Cases*”; Justice Edward Douglass White’s opinion in the case, immediately about tariffs on Puerto Rican goods, introduced and detailed what would eventually become the controlling doctrine of territorial incorporation (Burnett & Marshall, 2001a, p. 7).

Somewhat dissonant with the amply deserved infamy of *Dred Scott*, Taney’s opinion on territories perversely took on a kind of “premature anti-imperialist” quality (Levinson, 2001, p. 130).⁶⁰ For the four dissenting judges in *Downes*, the Constitution included all territories when referring to the “United States” and was fully in effect there. As John Marshall Harlan averred in his dissent, “The Constitution is supreme over every foot of territory, wherever situated, under the jurisdiction of the United States, and its full operation cannot be stayed by any branch of the government....”⁶¹ In the opinion signed onto by all of the dissenters, Chief Justice Melville Weston Fuller drew on *Dred Scott*, noting that “the Court [had been] unanimous in holding that the power to legislate respecting a territory was limited by the restrictions of the Constitution.”⁶²

In the lead opinion in *Downes*, Henry Billings Brown took a diametrically opposing position. For him, the “United States” referred strictly to the constituent states. The Constitution applied to any given territory only if, and only to the degree, Congress explicitly extended it. Brown discussed *Dred Scott* at great length and concluded that Taney’s thoughts on territories were irrelevant as legal precedent (Sparrow, 2006, p. 88): the question in *Downes* was “readily distinguishable from the one” on slavery, and that *Dred Scott* had taken up the territory question at all had been unnecessary and “unfortunate.”⁶³

White’s concurring opinion, joined by two others, split the difference between the maximalist and minimalist definitions of the “United States.” Like Brown, he affirmed Congress’s plenary power over territories, which had been disputed by *Dred Scott* but, both before and after it, had been sustained in other cases. But he disagreed with Brown’s criticism of *Dred Scott* and partly sided with Fuller: “the principle which that decision announced, that the applicable provisions of the Constitution were operative” in the territories, was still valid. The question was not, per Brown, “whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident,

but whether the provision relied on is applicable” to a given territory, a question that hung on “its relations to the United States.”⁶⁴ Some territories, like the continental ones and Hawai‘i, were “incorporated” into the United States. Others like Puerto Rico and, by extension, the other former Spanish colonies “had not been incorporated into the United States, but [were] merely appurtenant thereto as...possession[s].” In other words, the “United States” included some territories but not others, although all were “subject to [U.S.] sovereignty.”⁶⁵ The precise meaning and consequences of “incorporation” remained fuzzy, but this and subsequent cases seemed to suggest that the Constitution “fully” applied in the incorporated territories.⁶⁶ For the unincorporated territories, White’s opinion, though theoretically different, had the identical practical implications as Brown’s: “only certain fundamental constitutional prohibitions” – underspecified but certainly fewer than in incorporated territories – “constrained governmental action there” (Burnett & Marshall, 2001a, pp. 9–10). In 1904, White’s doctrine of territorial incorporation was adopted by a majority of the Court for the first time, in *Dorr v. United States*. Among other things, the opinion of the Court quoted the same passage from Curtis’s opinion in *Dred Scott* that White had cited in *Downes*.⁶⁷

As in *Dred Scott*, and later *Insular Cases*, race and citizenship were front and center in *Downes*. A major impetus and impact of legally inventing the category of unincorporated territories were the prevention of incorporating their inhabitants on an equal footing with white Anglo-Saxon citizens and the empowerment of Congress to calibrate how unequal the footing should be. In his lead opinion in *Downes*, Brown gave voice to the animating fear: what would happen if Congress did not have the discretionary power to determine the citizenship “status” of a territory’s “inhabitants”?⁶⁸ After all, if territories “are inhabited by alien races...the administration of government and justice according to Anglo-Saxon principles may for a time be impossible.”⁶⁹ But those “alien races” needed not to worry, for “there are certain principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character which need no expression in constitutions or statutes to give them effect or to secure dependencies against legislation manifestly hostile to their real interests” – never mind how different their stated interests may have been. To give credence to this paternalistic argument, Brown cited a number of cases involving noncitizens who *already* lacked constitutional protection – one dealing with American Indians, *Johnson v. M’Intosh*, and several dealing with Chinese “aliens [who were] not possessed of the political rights of the citizens of the United States.” Thanks to Anglo-Saxon self-restraint, the inhabitants of the new territories, or any territory, would likewise not be

“subject to an unrestrained power on the part of Congress to deal with them upon the theory that they have no rights which it is bound to respect” – the last phrase an obvious, if not obviously negative, allusion to *Dred Scott*.⁷⁰

White’s concurring opinion sounded the same alarm about citizenship. He illustrated his point with a hypothetical example, appealing to the discovery doctrine espoused in *Johnson v. M’Intosh*, among other cases, and tacking on a bit of feigned concern about the potential tax burden on the colonized to his paramount apprehension about racial fitness for citizenship:

Citizens of the United States discover an unknown island, peopled with an uncivilized race, yet rich in soil, and valuable to the United States for commercial and strategic reasons. Clearly, by the law of nations, the right to ratify such acquisition and thus to acquire the territory would pertain to the government of the United States. *Johnson v. M’Intosh*, 8 Wheat. 543, 595, 5 L. ed. 681, 694....Can it be denied that such right could not be practically exercised if the result would be to endow the inhabitants with citizenship of the United States and to subject them, not only to local, but also to an equal proportion of national, taxes, even although the consequence would be to entail ruin on the discovered territory, and to inflict grave detriment on the United States, to arise both from the dislocation of its fiscal system and the immediate bestowal of citizenship on those absolutely unfit to receive it?⁷¹

Worse yet, Brown pointed out, even if immediate bestowal of citizenship could be avoided, “children thereafter born, whether savages or civilized, [would be]...entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens. If such be their status, the consequences will be extremely serious.”⁷² He closed his opinion with a warning, “A false step at this time might be fatal to the development of what Chief Justice Marshall called the American empire.”⁷³

Brown’s reference to “children thereafter born” stated aloud what must have implicitly informed the other judges’ discourse on citizenship. Though unmentioned in any of the opinions in *Downes*, he was alluding to *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* (1898), a case decided by the same court just three years earlier. To go a little further back, nine years before that case, the Supreme Court, in *Chae Chan Ping v. United States*, had *unanimously* upheld the racially based Chinese exclusion laws of the 1880s, specifically the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888.⁷⁴ The broader effect of the decision was to establish Congress’s plenary power over “aliens,” which, like the plenary powers over American Indian sovereignty and over territories, still obtains to this day (Aleinikoff, 2002). (A corollary effect was that the constitutional sanction afforded to Congress to legislatively contravene international treaties, with China in this particular case, provided precedential support for the 1903 ruling in *Lone Wolf* that gave similar sanction to abrogate treaties

with Native Americans – yet another example of the interconnectedness of racial rule, the imbrications of colonial and noncolonial imperial subjection.⁷⁵) However, even the patent anti-Chinese racism of the Court had its legal limits. Both Congress and the courts had consistently denied the right of naturalization to Chinese migrants and would continue to do so until 1943. But given the Fourteenth Amendment – “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States....” (Section 1) – the Supreme Court could not but acknowledge, in *Wong Kim Ark*, birthright citizenship of “all children here born of resident aliens,” including the Chinese.⁷⁶ Consequently, as argued by Brook Thomas, “*Wong Kim Ark* forced any Justice intent on denying citizenship to residents of the insular territories to restrict the definition of what comes within the territorial limits of the United States” (2001, p. 96; see also Levinson, 2001, p. 132). And restrict they did.

On racial grounds, the Court chose to define the “United States in a domestic sense” as being composed of states and incorporated territories and relegated the inhabitants of the unincorporated territories in Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean indefinitely to something always less than full citizenship, that is, colonial subjection. Uniformly denied initially, residents of today’s unincorporated territories, except American Samoa, have been accorded U.S. citizenship over the years, with or without their consent.⁷⁷ Yet, in the context of the colonial relationship between the U.S. state and these territories, characterized by Congressional plenary power, U.S. citizenship has never meant equality, not just informally but formally, and territorial inhabitants have been systematically withheld certain privileges and immunities.⁷⁸ (Same goes for American Indians, on all of whom, if not before through treaties or previous legislation, U.S. citizenship was imposed through the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.)

With the exception of one justice, the same Supreme Court that heard *Wong Kim Ark* and *Downes* had also been on the bench for *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896).⁷⁹ One of four dissenters in *Downes*, Harlan had been famously lone in that role in *Plessy*. Insisting that “there is no caste” and that the “Constitution is color-blind,” he predicted, “In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the *Dred Scott Case*” and “stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens.” Referring to Taney’s opinion, he argued that the postbellum amendments to the Constitution were supposed to have “eradicated these principles” of excluding Blacks from the “rights and privileges which [the Constitution] provided for and secured to citizens of

the United States.”⁸⁰ Here, Harlan used *Dred Scott* to analogize the state-endorsed racial subjection of antebellum Blacks to what would follow from *Plessy*.

A former slave owner from a slave-owning family, Harlan has been hailed for his judicial antiracism (Chin, 1996; Przybyszewky, 1999; Sparrow, 2006; Yang, 2009). A product of its time, however, it had definite limits. Harlan’s “antiracism” was one within the boundaries of white supremacy, one for *legal* equality that he was certain would not upset but safeguard white dominance: “The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.”⁸¹

Harlan’s opinion was firmly anchored to the idea of equal *citizenship*, and his temporal comparison of the plight of Blacks led to a second comparison. His discussion of Blacks’ *Dred Scott* past and *Plessy* future segued to his timeless contempt for the Chinese:

There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But, by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the Union, who are entitled, by law, to participate in the political control of the State and nation, who are not excluded, by law or by reason of their race, from public stations of any kind, and who have all the legal rights that belong to white citizens, are yet declared to be criminals, liable to imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by citizens of the white race.⁸²

The Louisiana law that the decision upheld, mandating racial segregation of railway trains, did not mention the Chinese, nor did it indicate to which of “the white, and colored races” they belonged, nor did it confine its purview to citizens (*Revised Laws of Louisiana, 1897, pp. 762–763*). Yet in discussing the subjection of Blacks, Harlan evidently felt compelled to do all three.⁸³

Toward the beginning of his dissent, Harlan wrote, “While there may be in Louisiana persons of different races who are not citizens of the United States, the words in the act ‘white and colored races’ necessarily include all citizens of the United States of both races residing in that State. So that we have before us a state enactment that compels, under penalties, the separation of the two races....”⁸⁴ The initial phrase of the first sentence, and the statute itself with its ambiguous conjunctions and punctuation, were

unclear on how many “races” there were, but by the end of the sentence, Harlan definitively settled on two and equated “colored” with Black. He also narrowed the scope of the case to “citizens” and then further narrowed the scope to “citizens of...both races”: constitutional protections were for U.S. state members only, and U.S. state membership included two “races,” and two “races” only, Black and white. The tragedy, from his vantage point, was that the U.S. state would permit and abet the maintenance of racial distinction and inequality between these two categories of citizens. But he saw no contradiction between this “color-blind” jurisprudence and his acceptance and advocacy of other racial distinctions and inequalities, namely those concerning the Chinese (Yang, 2009). That persons “belonging to [the Chinese race] are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country” was how it should be. Likewise for their inability to “become citizens.” What rankled was that the “few” Chinese who were in the country would be able to “ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens,” while Black citizens could not. For Harlan, the Chinese quintessentially constituted the *citizen’s* racial other – two mutually exclusive categories. In this light, Harlan’s remarks on the Chinese in *Plessy* were hardly a throw-away digression at odds with his otherwise commendable antiracism but spoke to a vital component of a coherent racism that prefigured his, and only one other justice’s, unwillingness to recognize even the birthright citizenship of U.S.-born Chinese two years later in *Wong Kim Ark* (Levinson, 2001; Yang, 2009). The difference between Harlan and the other justices was not that he was antiracist and they were racist, but that he and they drew, at the dawn of the 20th century, the “color line, – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men [and women] in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea” – differently in relation to U.S. citizenry and empire (Du Bois [1903], 1965, p. 221; Chin, 1996; Thomas, 2001).

V

Dred Scott v. Sandford was of a piece with the U.S. Constitution; naturalization laws; the Missouri Compromise; treaties with American Indians, France, Spain, and Mexico; *Johnson v. M’Intosh*; *United States v. Rogers*; Reconstruction Amendments; *Plessy v. Ferguson*; *United States v. Wong Kim Ark*; *Downes v. Bidwell*, *Dorr v. United States*, and other *Insular Cases*; and more. The racial subjection, colonial and noncolonial, and fates of Blacks, American Indians, Mexicans, Chinese, Puerto Ricans, Filipina/os, Samoans, Chamorros, and others were interlinked. So were the

constructions of politically unequal spaces, including states, incorporated and unincorporated territories, and Indian reservations. Clear and stable demarcations between metropole and colony, domestic and foreign, citizen and subject, and colonized and other imperial subjects proved impossible, made impossible by the very efforts to clarify and stabilize them. Of course, this brief study only begins to touch on issues of race, geography, and citizenship in relation to one institution of the U.S. empire-state; it does not even broach the practices of other state actors, much less those beyond the state. But even with this simplified, myopic scope, we can glimpse the U.S. empire-state's complex structure of racial rule, a unified but differentiated field in which a tremor or quake in one area can set off intended and unintended aftershocks in others.

In a different context, [Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller \(2003, pp. 576–578\)](#) warn of the pitfalls of “methodological nationalism,” the pervasive, unquestioning “naturalization of the nation-state by the social sciences”:

We have identified three variants of methodological nationalism: 1) ignoring or disregarding the fundamental importance of nationalism for modern societies; this is often combined with 2) naturalization, i.e., taking for granted that the boundaries of the nation-state delimit and define the unit of analysis; 3) territorial limitation which confines the study of social processes to the political and geographic boundaries of a particular nation-state.

In Pierre Bourdieu's terms, the variants are all a part of the dominant social-scientific *habitus*. When the object of analysis is the United States, we need to also recognize the unreflexive meta-methodological nationalism involved: a figment of U.S. nationalism, the nation-state has never been. The *illusion* of the nation-state, rather than the nation-state itself, is what is naturalized, and the *reality* of the U.S. empire-state is what is just as habitually denied.

An empire-state approach has manifold theoretical and empirical implications. [Cooper \(2005\)](#) incisively explores many of them for the far-flung interdisciplinary field of colonial studies. I end this paper with several for a relatively neglected tract of that field, sociology of the United States. Overall, methodological nationalism simply can no longer operate as *habitus*, which, if taken seriously, has the potential to unsettle the entire discipline. In the sociology of race, a literature mostly segregated from colonial studies, an empire-state approach would expose the inadequacy of the standard practice of focusing on one particular white–nonwhite relation of domination at a time within the borders of a nonexistent nation-state, and questions of empire, absent since the demise of theories of internal

colonialism, would rightly return to prominence. We would be more open and better positioned to discern connections between histories of racial subjection that have been treated as more or less discrete, especially between those of colonized and noncolonized peoples of color, *and* to make sense of the qualitative differences between them. Silence concerning the indigenous peoples of North America and the Pacific would be, one hopes, too deafening to persist. Heretofore all but ignored except in relation to racial categorization and the census, the racial state could no longer be overlooked and could be theorized on a firmer footing. And familiar topics could be seen from a fresh critical angle. For example, given the extraordinary rise, size, and racial character of the prison-industrial complex, prisons and prisoners (and former prisoners) could be seen for what they are: imperial spaces and subjects. What about “aliens,” who, like territorial inhabitants and American Indians, are still subject to Congressional plenary power? Are they citizens-in-waiting of this supposed nation of immigrants, or are many, especially the undocumented, subjects indefinitely without rights which the state and its citizens are bound to respect? How distinct is the line between citizen and subject, and how is it drawn?

For the sociology of the U.S. empire, an empire-state approach would open up this small but growing field. Temporally, the entire history of the United States awaits, not only the undeniably important turns of the 20th and 21st centuries but also the turn of the 19th century and all else. Geographically, we need to correct for our hyperopia, obviously not to impair our improving capacity to see faraway overseas but to enhance our ability to see nearby overland. The constituent states of the Union and incorporated territories have not been politically homogeneous spaces to be classified unproblematically as the “metropole,” coextensive with what has been misrecognized as the nation-state.⁸⁵ On a related note, U.S. colonialism and (nonterritorial) imperialism have not been serial but concurrent moments, which can go unnoticed if we look only overseas. The U.S. empire-state has always produced overlapping and competing temporalities and geographies, and we would be well advised not to accept the official ones, like the notion that contemporary United States is a postcolonial nation-state. Finally, an empire-state approach to the United States would bridge the counterproductive divide between the sociologies of race and empire.⁸⁶ The imperial subjections of noncolonized peoples, usually the province of the former, and of colonized peoples, usually the province of the latter, form a unified but differentiated field of white supremacy that calls for critical and innovative research, and praxes, across existing boundaries.

NOTES

1. On the concept of *empire-state*, see Cooper (2005), especially Chapters 1 and 6. For an early usage of the term, see Francis (1954, pp. 8–9).

2. Legal scholars, historians, cultural critics, and others substantially outpace sociologists in recognizing the full spatial and temporal scope of the U.S. colonial empire (e.g., Kaplan, 2002; Kaplan & Pease, 1993; Meinig, 1986; Williams, 1980; Wilson, 2002).

3. “The constitutions of the last two centuries are monuments to an eminently modern enterprise...Constitution-making is a deliberate attempt at institution-building at the fundamental level of laying down the normative and legal foundations of the political order” (Arjomand, 1992, p. 39; see also Go, 2003, p. 90).

4. But for constraints of space, the analysis could readily be brought to the present and cast a much wider empirical net.

5. For a recent effort in political science that expands on and is mostly compatible with Omi and Winant (1994), see King and Smith (2005). They differ in a few ways. Whereas the former stresses the struggle between social movements and the state as the central dynamic in racial politics, the latter sees the opposing forces as *racial institutional orders*, rival political coalitions made up of both state and nonstate actors. As a consequence, King and Smith find the state to be less unitary in relation to race. They also do not share Omi and Winant’s view that the U.S. state is inherently racial and speculate that “someday the United States may transcend [racial institutional orders] entirely – though that prospect is not in sight” (King & Smith, 2005, p. 75). As with Omi and Winant, however, the U.S. state is still conceptualized implicitly as a nation-state.

6. For example, though critical of Omi and Winant’s theory of the racial state, Goldberg (2002, p. 4) affirms the nation-state as the primary object of analysis: “In *The Racial State* I seek to comprehend the co-articulation of race and the modern state. I argue that race is integral to the emergence, development, and transformations (conceptually, philosophically, materially) of the modern nation-state. Race marks and orders the modern nation-state, and so state projects, more or less from its point of conceptual and institutional emergence.”

7. Although I use Anderson’s definition of nation, I could substitute it with others without much consequence.

8. Weber (1946, p. 78; emphasis in original) defines the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.”

9. Today, even outside the fifty states, all citizens of U.S. territories, except American Samoa, hold U.S. citizenship (Sparrow, 2006).

10. The quotes are attributed to General Philip Sheridan, in 1869, and Captain Richard Pratt, in 1892. The former, however, is the popular rendering of what Sheridan might actually have said: “The only good Indians I ever saw were dead” (Hutton, 1999, p. 180).

11. From the beginning of U.S. history to the present, amnesias and denials of empire have also been punctuated by moments of recognition, acceptance, celebration, and critique of empire. But as the cycle of forgetting and remembering may predict, most recognitions and critiques have been only too partial, in both senses.

12. Other exceptions include American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, Panama Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands.

13. In this paper, I do not discuss nonterritorial imperialism and imperialistic activity (Go, 2007, 2008; Steinmetz, 2005).

14. To be clear, I do not mean that comparisons cannot be useful or that empires are all equally different from each other.

15. I refer, of course, to Scott's (1998) *Seeing Like a State*.

16. Certainly in sociology but, I am sure, in a number of other disciplines, the silence with regard to the Native peoples of North America and the Pacific Islands is shamefully nearly absolute.

17. *Limited*, but not *no*, utility. The boundedness of colonies and the existence and relative autonomy of colonial states within empire-states are variable.

18. Of the over two billion acres of indigenous land taken by the United States from its founding to 1900, only half was "purchased by treaty or agreement" (Barsh, 1982, p. 7). Indian reservations within the contiguous United States totaled 84,199 square miles as of 1984 (Frantz, 1999, p. 44), approximately the size of Utah or Idaho. See Biolsi (2005) for a range of mutually nonexclusive sovereignty claims made by Native Americans premised on different geographies.

19. Two states, North Carolina and Georgia, did so after the adoption of the Constitution.

20. Congress's power was complete in this regard as long as an admission did not involve areas under the jurisdiction of any existing states, in which case the legislative consent of the affected states was required.

21. Though not novel, the ideas behind this and the previous paragraphs have all but been forgotten. For example, despite his racist imperialism, political scientist Abbott Lawrence Lowell's characterization of U.S. history of colonialism, in a popular forum in 1899, was on target: "Properly speaking, a colony is a territory, not forming, for political purposes, an integral part of the mother country, but dependent upon her, and peopled in part, at least, by her emigrants. If this is true, there has never been a time, since the adoption of the first ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory in 1784, when the United States has not had colonies" (1899a, p. 145). The ideology of U.S. exceptionalism and, after the *Insular Cases*, the close identification of the former Spanish colonies as the only true U.S. colonies were likely significant culprits for the collective memory loss.

22. Rather than whether the Constitution would "follow the flag" or whether U.S. citizenship would be conferred, Burnett and Marshall (2001a) see *indefiniteness* as the overriding defining feature of unincorporated territories. Burnett (2005) adds further that separability, the constitutional possibility of deannexation, distinguishes unincorporated territories from states and incorporated territories.

23. For an example, see Lowell (1899a). See Smith (2001) for a discussion of Lowell (1899a). Lowell's (1899b) legal scholarship prefigured the eventual doctrine of territorial incorporation developed in the *Insular Cases*.

24. For an example related to the law, see Perea (2001).

25. Hawaii's sugar-based economy depended on tariff-free access to the U.S. market, which had been established a quarter century prior, through the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876. Politically, the white elite, with the backing of the U.S. minister to

Hawai'i and U.S. troops, had overthrown the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 and set up a "republic" which actively invited U.S. annexation.

26. Similar dynamics prevailed for the territories of New Mexico and Oklahoma (Levinson & Sparrow, 2005).

27. The quote is from Justice Edward White's concurring opinion in *Downes v. Bidwell* (182 U.S. 244 [1901] at 341). Those familiar with the case will note that my usage of White's phrase exceeds his narrow, legal meaning, and my inversion of it would not make sense in the original context.

28. White supremacy was not, however, a sufficient condition for a short and smooth path to statehood. Utah, with its Mormon population, had a particularly long and rough ride.

29. Section 2 of Article I excludes "Indians not taxed" from enumeration for apportioning seats in the House of Representatives and "direct Taxes," which was later reproduced in the Fourteenth Amendment. In the same article, Section 8 empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."

30. *Johnson v. M'Intosh*, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) at 573–574.

31. *Ibid.* at 587. For recent discussions of the discovery doctrine, see Miller (2008), Newcomb (2008), and Robertson (2005).

32. *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) at 16–17; emphasis added. "Pupilage" and other cognate notions had also appeared in Supreme Court cases in relation to U.S. overland territories, prior to the *Insular Cases* in relation to unincorporated, overseas territories (see Burnett & Marshall, 2001a, pp. 33n52); in fact, cases involving Indian sovereignty have had a largely separate legal genealogy from those involving "territories," including unincorporated ones (Thomas, 2001).

It should be noted that tutelary metaphors had divergent meanings. For incorporated territories, they signified "growing" into being accepted as one of the several states on an equal footing. For unincorporated territories, they could mean eventual independence but not necessarily. And for the indigenous of North America, they promised neither equality nor independence.

33. *Worcester v. Georgia*, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 551 (1832) at 559.

34. "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokee themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress" (*ibid.* at 561).

35. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).

36. Perhaps the most devastating was the General Allotment Act of 1887 that privatized reservation lands and distributed parcels to individual Indians. After such allotment, the remaining lands, often the choicest, were sold by the government to whites, the proceeds from which went toward programs for assimilating Indians. In this way, nearly two-thirds of Indian-held lands were taken between 1887 and 1934 (Frantz, 1999; O'Brien, 1989).

37. 187 U.S. 553 (1903) at 565–567.

38. The oft quoted passage from *Dred Scott v. Sandford* that Quey paraphrased is, "They [Blacks] had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race either in social or

political relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit” (60 U.S. [19 How.] 393 [1857] at 407).

39. *Ibid.* at 404.

40. Not symmetrically related, however. The former implies the latter, but the reverse is not necessarily true.

41. Of the mentioned, the colonial status of Mexicans would be the most questionable, as a vast majority of Mexican-origin people in the United States today are migrants or descendants of migrants, not descendants of those who had once lived under Mexican sovereignty in what is now the U.S. Southwest.

42. The boundary within the pairs is increasingly recognized, rightly, as having been variably motile, but colonialism is nonetheless “fundamentally dualistic” (Steinmetz, 2008, p. 593).

43. The sudden and fatal decline of *internal colonialism* as a theoretical framework in the social sciences has been lamentable. It did not get everything right; in fact, it probably got more things wrong than right. But it had enormous value in calling attention to and critiquing U.S. racism and linking it to questions of colonialism. Although many factors led to the theories’ precipitous decline, one of the major shortcomings was that many exponents, and nearly all of the critics, agreed that the theories, as applied to racism in the United States, took the notion of *colonialism* only metaphorically: the United States might have exhibited certain similarities to European colonialism in Africa and Asia but had not really engaged in colonialism proper. Thus, the United States was, once again, seen as exceptional.

44. With regard to Native Americans, Deloria and Wilkins (1999, p. 55) write, “Incisive and tedious review of Supreme Court decisions would show that this tendency to write law without reference to any doctrines or precedents is more the rule than the exception.”

45. *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) at 418, 420.

46. *Ibid.* at 403–404.

47. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846) at 571–572. For an in-depth discussion, see Wilkins (1997, pp. 38–51).

48. *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) at 419.

49. *Ibid.* at 578. As Smith (1997) suggests, Curtis’s concession was rash and ultimately undermined his own argument.

50. *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) at 586. Curtis cited three treaties: “Treaties with the Choctaws, of September 27, 1830, art. 14; with the Cherokees, of May 23, 1836, art. 12; Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, art. 8.”

51. *Ibid.* at 533.

52. *Ibid.* at 419.

53. *Ibid.* at 418–419; emphases added. There is no acknowledgment here that he had noted earlier in the opinion that “the white race claimed the ultimate right of *dominion*” (*ibid.* at 403–404; emphasis added).

54. *Ibid.* at 417; emphasis added. *Dred Scott* does not appear to directly address foreign-born Blacks who migrated to the United States not as slaves. Smith (1997, p. 266) sees a contradiction, which may be. There is also the possibility that Taney was strictly insisting on, or fudging, the “class of persons” dealt with in the ruling,

defined toward the beginning as “the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold *as slaves*” (*Dred Scott* at 403; emphasis added).

55. *Ibid.* at 413–414, 416.

56. Although there were two earlier examples, including *Marbury v. Madison* (5 U.S. [1 Cranch] 137 [1803]), which established the doctrine of judicial review, “*Dred Scott* was the only case in the eighty years of pre-Civil-War constitutional history in which the Supreme Court limited congressional power in any significant way” (Newman & Gass 2004, p. 8).

57. *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) at 432. With the last phrase “from a foreign Government,” Taney rhetorically skirted around the thorny fact that two states, North Carolina and Georgia, had not yet ceded their trans-Appalachian lands when the Constitution was adopted. But since the cessions had been anticipated at the time, he could not plausibly argue that the framers had not intended the Territorial Clause to be operative there.

58. *Ibid.* at 446, 449.

59. *Ibid.* at 451.

60. Of course, Levinson means “anti-imperialist” in a very restricted sense. Nobody on the Court gainsaid the U.S. state’s right to acquire the former Spanish colonies in the first place.

61. *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 at 384–385.

62. *Ibid.* at 360.

63. *Ibid.* at 274.

64. *Ibid.* at 291–293. See Burnett and Marshall (2001a, pp. 9–11) and Sparrow (2006, pp. 91–93) for discussions of White’s opinion.

65. *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 at 341–342.

66. As Burnett and Marshall (2001a, p. 11) note, the Constitution has never applied in full in any territory.

67. *Dorr v. United States*, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) at 142.

68. *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 at 279.

69. *Ibid.* at 287.

70. *Ibid.* at 280–281, 283. The cited cases involving the Chinese were *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); *Lem Moon Sing*, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); and *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).

71. *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 at 306.

72. *Ibid.* at 279.

73. *Ibid.* at 286.

74. Also known as the *Chinese Exclusion Case*, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).

75. 187 U.S. 553 (1903) at 566.

76. 169 U.S. 649 (1898) at 693. Exemplifying once again the interconnectedness of noncolonial and colonial racial rule, this case dealing with the Chinese also addressed the U.S. citizenship status of American Indians. The majority opinion invoked *Elk v. Wilkins* (1884), the “only adjudication that ha[d] been made by this court upon the meaning of the clause, ‘and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ in the leading provision of the Fourteenth Amendment,” to deny its applicability to “children born in the United States of foreign parents of Caucasian, African or Mongolian descent not in the diplomatic service of a foreign country”: the earlier decision had “concerned only members of the Indian tribes within the United States” (*ibid.* at 680,

682). As quoted in *Wong Kim Ark*, the ruling in *Elk v. Wilkins* had held that “Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indiana [*sic*] tribes, (an alien though dependent power,) although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more ‘born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ within the meaning of the first section of the fourteenth amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the children born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations” (112 U.S. 94 [1884] at 102). Further, both of these cases cited *Dred Scott*.

77. Residents of the Philippines were denied U.S. citizenship all the way through to independence in 1946.

78. For example, to this day, residents of Puerto Rico cannot elect representatives or senators to Congress or cast a vote for the presidency. They receive fewer and lower social welfare benefits. Puerto Rico’s self-governance does not undermine but is enabled, and can be overridden, by Congressional plenary power. Constitutional rights, including those enumerated in the Bill of Rights, do not apply in Puerto Rico of their own force but were extended there by Congress (Aleinikoff, 2002). Legislatively granted by Congress, birthright citizenship itself of those born in Puerto Rico is “not equal, permanent, irrevocable citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment” (H.R. Report No. 105–131, pt. 1, 1997, p. 19, as quoted in Román, 1998, p. 3).

79. Stephen J. Field on *Plessy* was replaced by Joseph McKenna before the two later cases. Though on the Court at the time, David J. Brewer did not participate in *Plessy*, nor did McKenna in *Wong Kim Ark*.

80. *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) at 559–560.

81. *Ibid.* at 559.

82. *Ibid.* at 561. Though not discussed here, the well-known majority opinion in *Plessy* also referred to the Chinese (*ibid.* at 542, 550).

83. How Harlan determined that “by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United States” is unclear. The majority opinion’s two references to the Chinese did not concern their treatment under the Louisiana statute. Among the briefs filed in the case, I found only one buried reference to the Chinese, which hardly necessitated and not likely triggered Harlan’s disquisition. On behalf of the plaintiff Homer Adolph Plessy, his lawyer James C. Walker wrote:

The court [Supreme Court of Louisiana] is confident that the statute obviously provides that the passenger shall be assigned to the coach to which by race he belongs; but the trouble is the court takes for granted what is only assumed, and not granted or proved, that is to say the race to which the passenger belongs; when neither jurists, lexicographers, nor scientists, nor statute laws nor adjudged precedents of the state of Louisiana, enable us to say what race the passengers belongs to, if he be an “octoroon.” We know that he is not of pure Caucasian type, neither can he be said to be of any of the colored races. Which race is the colored race referred to in the statute? There are Africans, Malays, Chinese, Polynesians; there are griffs and mulattoes. But which of all these is the colored race the statute speaks of? The legislature might have relieved us from this perplexity, but it has not done so. (“Brief for Plaintiff in Error,” as reprinted in Kurland & Casper, 1975, p. 78.)

84. *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) at 553.

85. Although not discussed here, an empire-state approach to the United States would not preclude but encourage studies of trans- and interstate structures and processes. As the ripple effects of *Dred Scott* suggest, the boundaries of domestic, colonial, imperial, foreign, and so on are blurry and contingent.

86. Sociologists of knowledge would find, I suspect, disquietingly correlated divides of backgrounds, networks, and political and epistemological sensibilities between the two subfields' practitioners.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author thanks Tyrone Forman, Tom Guglielmo, J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, Amanda Lewis, George Lipsitz, Anna Marshall, Erin Murphy, Dave Roediger, and Caroline H. Yang for their readings of an earlier draft.

REFERENCES

- Aleinikoff, T. A. (2002). *Semblances of sovereignty: The Constitution, the state, and American citizenship*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities*. New York: Verso.
- Arjomand, S. A. (1992). Constitutions and the struggle for political order: A study in the modernization of political traditions. *European Journal of Sociology*, 33(1), 39–82.
- Barsh, R. L. (1982). Indian land claims policy in the United States. *North Dakota Law Review*, 58, 7–52.
- Bell, R. J. (1984). *Last among equals: Hawaiian statehood and American politics*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Biolsi, T. (2005). Imagined geographies: Sovereignty, indigenous space, and American Indian struggle. *American Ethnologist*, 32(2), 239–259.
- Blauner, R. (1972). *Racial oppression in America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Bruyneel, K. (2004). Challenging American boundaries: Indigenous people and the 'gift' of US citizenship. *Studies in American Political Development*, 18, 30–43.
- Burnett, C. D. (2005). The constitution and deconstitution of the United States. In: S. Levinson & B. H. Sparrow (Eds), *The Louisiana Purchase and American expansion, 1803-1898* (pp. 181–208). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Burnett, C. D., & Marshall, B. (2001a). Between the foreign and the domestic: The doctrine of territorial incorporation, invented and reinvented. In: C. D. Burnett & B. Marshall (Eds), *Foreign in a domestic sense: Puerto Rico, American expansion, and the Constitution* (pp. 1–36). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Burnett, C. D., & Marshall, B. (Eds). (2001b). *Foreign in a domestic sense: Puerto Rico, American expansion, and the Constitution*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Chatterjee, P. (1993). *The nation and its fragments*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Chin, G. (1996). The Plessy myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese cases. *Iowa Law Review*, 82, 151–182.
- Cooper, F. (2005). *Colonialism in question: Theory, knowledge, history*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Deloria, V., Jr., & Wilkins, D. E. (1999). *Tribes, treaties, and constitutional tribulations*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. ([1903] 1965). The souls of black folk. *Three Negro classics* (pp. 207–389). New York: Avon Books.
- Francis, E. K. (1954). Variables in the formation of so-called “minority groups”. *American Journal of Sociology*, 60(1), 6–14.
- Frantz, K. (1999). *Indian reservations in the United States: Territory, sovereignty, and socioeconomic change*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Freehling, W. W. (2005). The Louisiana Purchase and the coming of the Civil War. In: S. Levinson & B. H. Sparrow (Eds), *The Louisiana Purchase and American expansion, 1803-1898* (pp. 69–82). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Go, J. (2003). A globalizing constitutionalism? Views from the postcolony, 1945–2000. *International Sociology*, 18(1), 71–95.
- Go, J. (2007). Waves of empire: US hegemony and imperialistic activity from the shores of Tripoli to Iraq, 1787–2003. *International Sociology*, 22(1), 5–40.
- Go, J. (2008). Global fields and imperial forms: Field theory and the British and American empires. *Sociological Theory*, 26(3), 201–229.
- Goldberg, D. T. (2002). *The racial state*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Hall, S. (1980). Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance. In: *Sociological theories: Race and colonialism* (pp. 305–345). Paris: UNESCO.
- Hutton, P. A. (1999). *Phil Sheridan and his army*. Tulsa, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Jacobson, M. F. (1998). *Barbarian virtues: The United States encounters foreign peoples at home and abroad, 1876-1917*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- James, D. R., & Redding, K. (2005). Theories of race and state. In: T. Janoski, R. R. Alford, A. M. Hicks & M. A. Schwartz (Eds), *The handbook of political sociology: States, civil societies, and globalization* (pp. 187–198). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jung, M. (2006). *Reworking race: The making of Hawaii's interracial labor movement*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kaplan, A. (2002). *The anarchy of empire in the making of US culture*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kaplan, A., & Pease, D. E. (Eds). (1993). *Cultures of United States imperialism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- King, D. S., & Smith, R. M. (2005). Racial orders in American political development. *American Political Science Review*, 99(1), 75–92.
- Kramer, P. A. (2006). *The blood of government: Race, empire, the United States, and the Philippines*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kurland, P. B., & Casper, G. (Eds). (1975). *Landmark briefs and arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional law* (Vol. 13). Arlington, VA: University Publications of America.
- Levinson, S. (2001). Between the foreign and the domestic: The doctrine of territorial incorporation, invented and reinvented. In: C. D. Burnett & B. Marshall (Eds), *Foreign in a domestic sense: Puerto Rico, American expansion, and the Constitution* (pp. 121–139). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

- Levinson, S., & Sparrow, B. H. (2005). Introduction. In: S. Levinson & B. H. Sparrow (Eds), *The Louisiana Purchase and American expansion, 1803–1898* (pp. 1–18). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Lowell, A. L. (1899a). The colonial expansion of the United States. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 83(496), 145–154.
- Lowell, A. L. (1899b). The status of our new possessions – a third view. *Harvard Law Review*, 13(3), 155–176.
- Meinig, D. W. (1986). *The shaping of America: A geographical perspective on 500 years of history* (Vol. 1). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Meinig, D. W. (1993). *The shaping of America: A geographical perspective on 500 years of history* (Vol. 2). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Merry, S. E. (2000). *Colonizing Hawai'i: The cultural power of law*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Miller, R. J. (2008). *Native America, discovered and conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis and Clark, and Manifest Destiny*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
- Murphy, E. (2009). Women's anti-imperialism, "The White Man's Burden," and the Philippine-American War: Theorizing masculinist ambivalence in protest. *Gender & Society*, 23(2), 244–270.
- Newcomb, S. T. (2008). *Pagans in the promised land: Decoding the doctrine of Christian discovery*. Golden, CO: Fulcrum.
- Newman, N., & Gass, J. J. (2004). *A new birth of freedom: The forgotten history of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments*. New York: Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law.
- Nobles, G. H. (1997). *American frontiers: Cultural encounters and continental conquest*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- O'Brien, S. (1989). *American Indian tribal governments*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). *Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. New York: Routledge.
- Osorio, J. K. (2002). *Dismembering Lāhui: A history of the Hawaiian nation to 1887*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Perea, J. F. (2001). Fulfilling manifest destiny: Conquest, race, and the Insular Cases. In: C. D. Burnett & B. Marshall (Eds), *Foreign in a domestic sense: Puerto Rico, American expansion, and the Constitution* (pp. 140–166). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Przybyszewsky, L. (1999). *The republic according to John Marshall Harlan*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Revised Laws of Louisiana. (1897). *Containing the revised statutes of the State (official edition, 1870) as amended by acts of the Legislature, from the session of 1870 to that of 1896 inclusive, and all other acts of a general nature for the same period, compiled and annotated by Solomon Wolff*.
- Robertson, L. G. (2005). *Conquest by law: How the discovery of America dispossessed indigenous peoples of their lands*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Román, E. (1998). The alien-citizen paradox and other consequences of US colonialism. *Florida State University Law Review*, 26(1), 1–47.
- Said, E. (1993). *Culture and imperialism*. New York: Vintage.
- Scott, J. C. (1998). *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Smith, R. M. (1997). *Civic ideals: Conflicting visions of citizenship in US history*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Smith, R. M. (2001). The bitter roots of Puerto Rican citizenship. In: C. D. Burnett & B. Marshall (Eds), *Foreign in a domestic sense: Puerto Rico, American expansion, and the Constitution* (pp. 373–388). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Sparrow, B. H. (2006). *The Insular Cases and the emergence of American empire*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Steinmetz, G. (2005). Return to empire: The new US imperialism in comparative historical perspective. *Sociological Theory*, 23(4), 339–367.
- Steinmetz, G. (2006). Imperialism or colonialism? From Windhoek to Washington, by way of Basra. In: C. Calhoun, F. Cooper & K. W. Moore (Eds), *Lessons of empire: Imperial histories and American power* (pp. 135–156). New York: New Press.
- Steinmetz, G. (2008). The colonial state as a social field: Ethnographic capital and native policy in the German overseas empire before 1914. *American Sociological Review*, 73(4), 589–612.
- Stoler, A. L. (2006). On degrees of imperial sovereignty. *Public Culture*, 18(1), 125–146.
- Thomas, B. (2001). A constitution led by the flag: The Insular Cases and the metaphor of incorporation. In: C. D. Burnett & B. Marshall (Eds), *Foreign in a domestic sense: Puerto Rico, American expansion, and the Constitution* (pp. 82–103). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1990). *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1990*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Tomlins, C. (2001). Legal cartography of colonization, the legal polyphony of settlement: English intrusions on the American mainland in the seventeenth century. *Law and Social Inquiry*, 26(2), 315–372.
- Weber, M. (1946). *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology*. (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, Trans.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, W. A. (1980). *Empire as a way of life*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wilkins, D. E. (1997). *American Indian sovereignty and the US Supreme Court: The masking of justice*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Wilson, J. G. (2002). *The imperial republic: A structural history of American constitutionalism from the colonial era to the beginning of the twentieth century*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Wimmer, A., & Schiller, N. G. (2003). Methodological nationalism, the social sciences, and the study of migration: An essay in historical epistemology. *International Migration Review*, 37(3), 576–610.
- Wolfe, P. (2006). Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8(4), 387–409.
- Yang, C. H. (2009). *Reconstruction's labor: Racialized workers in the narratives of US culture and history, 1870-1930*. Unpublished book manuscript.

CONFRONTING “EMPIRE”: THE NEW IMPERIALISM, ISLAMISM, AND FEMINISM

Valentine M. Moghadam

ABSTRACT

The paper examines recent debates on “Empire” and offers a feminist perspective. It asks: what are the gender dynamics of the new imperialism and its rival, Islamism? Drawing on world-system theory and feminist studies of international relations, this paper examines hegemonic masculinities in empire, war, and resistance; the cooptation of women’s rights for neoliberal and expansionist purposes; the world-system’s transition from U.S. hegemonic power to an alternative yet to be determined; and the role of global feminism in challenging Empire and shaping an alternative world.

Since the turn of the new century, debates have raged over “Empire”, “the new imperialism”, and the ascendancy or decline of the United States as the world-system’s hegemonic power. Gender dynamics, however, have been underresearched. This paper seeks to make a feminist contribution to the discussions by drawing attention to the salience of gender and hypermasculinities in contemporary political and economic projects, notably in American military expansion and in certain forms of resistance.

Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 20, 201–226
Copyright © 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 0198-8719/doi:10.1108/S0198-8719(2009)0000020012

A key question is posed and addressed: What is the work that gender is made to do, literally and epistemologically, in the “new imperialism” and its rival, Islamism?¹ Drawing on world-system theory and feminist studies of international relations, the paper examines the world-system’s transition from U.S. hegemonic power to an alternative still to be determined; rival hypermasculinities; the cooptation of women’s rights for neoliberal and expansionist purposes; and the role of global feminism in visions of an alternative world.

The paper begins with a brief review of two sets of literature – the contributions of feminist scholarship and recent debates on the world order – followed by my own analysis of the evolution of U.S. imperialism, the challenge of global Islamism, and proposed alternatives. My approach to the international system is informed by the work of feminist political scientists Cynthia Enloe and Ann Tickner, with their emphasis on patriarchy and inequality, and by world-system analyses of the capitalist nature of the world economy and the implications of hegemonic transition. The paper’s analysis also draws on R.W. Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity, and on my own work on transnational feminist networks (TFNs) and on gender and conflict (Moghadam 2005, 2007).

FEMINIST STUDIES AND THE DEBATE ON “EMPIRE”: A REVIEW

For over two decades, feminist scholars have produced a prodigious body of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary studies on the gender dynamics of modernity, state building, nationalism, revolution, and fundamentalism.² Feminist political economy has elucidated the gender biases of development projects, notably structural adjustments and the global trade regime.³ In addition to uncovering the gendered discourses and policies associated with political and economic projects, feminist scholars have criticized the projects’ perpetuation of women’s oppression, exploitation, or exclusion. As research has shown, concepts of the “Ideal Woman” and the “Ideal Society” have accompanied political, cultural, and economic processes, sometimes with injurious effects.⁴ Studies by feminist scholars have examined the role of women and of gender ideologies in colonialism, whether in terms of “the white women’s burden” and the colonizers’ dubious discourse of women’s rights, or in terms of concepts and representations of racialized femininity and masculinity in the metropolis and in the periphery.⁵

In addition, feminist scholarship has approached the study of international relations in distinctive ways, emphasizing patriarchal states and policies and diverse forms of masculinity observed in world politics.⁶ One study of the "remasculinization of America" (Jeffords, 1989) examined images of masculinity in dominant U.S. culture following the humiliating defeat of the United States in Vietnam.

Parallel to the scholarship, feminism has developed a variety of political stances and strategies. One strand – notably socialist feminism or radical-democratic feminism – strives for social and gender emancipation and equality, and it emphasizes the necessary link between feminism and broad societal transformation. This strand is discernible in many of the activist TFNs, such as MADRE, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE), and Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML). TFNs are at odds with hegemonic forms of power, whether neoliberal, militarist, authoritarian, or religious fundamentalist.⁷

A separate body of studies has examined "empire", "the new imperialism", and the status of U.S. hegemony. Hardt and Negri's lengthy book *Empire*, which appeared in 2000, launched a debate on global politics and the post-Cold War world order. The debate took a new turn after September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, and especially in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom. Where Hardt and Negri had seen Empire as diffuse and nonmilitaristic, other scholars revived concepts of colonialism (with its objectives of territorial and resource acquisitions) and imperialism (with its objectives of the spread of capitalism). The emphasis on U.S. imperialism appeared in many scholarly papers, opinion pieces, and blogs, and debates ensued over whether the Bush administration was a radical departure from U.S. foreign policy or a continuation. As the "war on terror" expanded, American commentators began to decry the erosion of civil liberties at home. And as the United States began to appear bogged down in two seemingly endless wars, commentaries from supporters and critics alike raised questions about American power. Paul Kennedy's (1987) historical study of great powers had warned that decline occurs when empires overextend themselves, and this argument was now applied to the United States. Others explicitly called for a renewal of American power; Niall Ferguson (2004), for example, argued that American power is both necessary and positive.

Among left-wing scholars, debates ensued over whether we are observing a new phase of U.S. imperialism (Harvey, 2003; Wallerstein, 2003), or the

consolidation of an integrated system of global capitalism (Robinson, 2004; Wood, 2003), or a combination of imperial and neoliberal projects (Pieterse, 2004). Some scholars distinguish between Empire and hegemony; Christopher Chase-Dunn (1998, p. 8), for example, explains that in the modern world-system, “the centrality of markets and capitalist accumulation undercuts the tendency to empire-formation”. Thus, strictly speaking, the United States has not constituted an empire, though it has engaged persistently in “imperialistic activity” (Go, 2007). According to Ellen Meiksins Wood, the policies of the Bush administration were “firmly rooted not only in the past half century of U.S. history but in the systemic logic of imperialism” (Wood, 2003, p. x).

Many studies suggest that American economic power declined relatively after the 1970s – that is, relative to the growing power of Europe, the newly industrializing countries, and more recently, China. This despite the fact that beginning with the Reagan administration, successive American administrations have sought to maintain American hegemony through diplomacy and free trade, including the so-called Washington consensus that resulted in the global spread of neoliberal capitalism during the 1980s and 1990s. In the face of growing challenges and tensions, both economic and political, the U.S. ruling elite turned to the reassertion of military power. Wallerstein (2003) has warned that the current world order resembles the chaos and competition of the early 20th century, which led to two world wars.

There is much merit to these arguments, though less to the Hardt–Negri thesis of a centerless and demilitarized Empire. Given the spread of neoliberal globalization, Ellen Wood’s analysis of a “universal” capitalism and Robinson’s thesis of global capitalism ring true, although Robinson’s assertion of a transnational state apparatus may be premature. Confirming Wallerstein’s argument, one can point to competing political and economic agendas in today’s world: between radical Islamists and the West, and between the old core powers (United States, Europe, Japan) and the emerging economic powers (principally Russia, China, and India; and secondary powers such as Iran and Venezuela). One can also agree with Chase-Dunn regarding the structural limits to empire formation in the modern world-system. And the implosion of the global financial market in 2008, which began in the United States, would confirm the thesis of declining hegemony, chaos, and world-system transition. Missing from the frameworks, however, are feminist insights about gender, masculinities, and the patriarchal nature of power and the world order. These insights are important, because they help to explain the persistence of competition, militarism, conflict, and war.

A feminist theory of imperialism has yet to be formulated, although a number of cogent critiques exist, notably that of Zillah Eisenstein (2004). Spike Peterson's "feminist rewriting of global political economy" also deserves mention; its holistic framework situates the productive, reproductive and virtual economies in gendered capitalist relations (Peterson, 2003). This paper's objective is more modest: to integrate feminist insights into debates on the new imperialism and hegemonic decline, focusing on the concepts of patriarchy, gender, and hypermasculinities. Such an exercise is warranted, given the advances in feminist analysis and the recognition that gender is as integral a part of social structure and political processes as is class (Lorber, 1994). In this paper, the "new imperialism" is understood to be both an economic and political enterprise, with military backing; to be spearheaded by the world-system's hegemon; to be supported by globalized economic and political elites; and to reflect gender impulses as much as the class interests of the owners of capital. Three stages of U.S. imperialism are proposed: the era of Cold War anticommunism; the post-Cold War era of structural adjustments and neoliberal capitalist expansion; and the new wars in the "greater Middle East".

U.S. IMPERIALISM: CONTINUITY, CHALLENGES, AND THE PRESENT DISORDER

In the 1950s, and especially in the context of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, U.S. hegemony of the capitalist world-system was built on three pillars: an ideological claim to the superiority of its institutions; military power; and economic success. Various U.S. administrations emphasized and encouraged one or another of the pillars. For example, the Carter administration initially stressed a foreign policy informed by human rights (though it later lent covert support to an Islamist uprising in Afghanistan). The Clinton administration emphasized economic growth and expansion (though it was not without its military adventures), and the Bush administration favored the reassertion of military power. Today, all three pillars have been weakened. Parallel to the decline of U.S. hegemony has been the ascendancy of challengers from the semi-periphery – notably, Brazil, Russia, India, and China – as well as non-state actors such as militant Islamist movements and networks. All operate within the capitalist world-system; all accept the tenets of capitalism, including profit and the

private ownership of the means of production; and all are comfortable with male dominance of the political and economic spheres.

Was the Bush administration's foreign policy uniquely hawkish? In fact, there has been more continuity than disjuncture in U.S. foreign policy and expansionism, certainly since the end of WW II and the start of the Cold War. Examples of U.S. "imperialistic state practices" over the past decades are the anticommunist crusades of the 1950s to the 1970s in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Indochina, along with the American war in Vietnam. The 1980s saw U.S. support for the Contra wars in Central America; the invasion of Grenada; protection of the Khmer Rouge; and support for the Mujahidin insurgency in Afghanistan. These developments had dire consequences for the people and polities in question, and in many cases they took place on behalf of business interests. For "the greater Middle East", interventions range from the CIA-sponsored 1953 coup d'état against Iran's Prime Minister Mossadegh to the 1992 toppling of Afghanistan's President Najibullah. What should be underscored in connection with Afghanistan is that the United States supported an Islamist rebellion opposed to girls' schooling – solely because the Soviet Union backed the modernizing, left-wing government dedicated to women's emancipation and social development in its impoverished country. The defeat of the Kabul government and the coming to power of the Mujahidin in late April 1992 led to the decline of Afghan women's participation and rights, infighting among the Mujahidin, and the eventual rise of the Taleban. In world-historical terms, U.S. support for the war in Afghanistan – which encompassed the administrations of Carter, Reagan, and Bush Sr. – was especially significant to current developments: it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and world communism, the expansion of militarized Islamist networks, and the emergence of a unipolar world led by the United States (Cooley, 1999; Moghadam, 2009, chapters 1 and 2).

Does the "new imperialism" begin with the 2003 invasion of Iraq? In fact, if a new stage in post-WWII U.S. hegemony is to be identified, it would be the spread of neoliberalism in the 1980s – through structural adjustment policies forced onto indebted countries across the developing world, and through tight monetary policies in the United States and the United Kingdom that were labeled Reaganomics and Thatcherism. Walden Bello (2000) has argued that structural adjustment policies were a way of "disciplining" independent-minded Third World countries. Neoliberal economic policies expanded globally after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, facilitated by powerful institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. The policies

were not without their critics, however; over a decade before the "Battle of Seattle", feminist scholar-activists developed strong critiques of structural adjustment policies for their effects on women and the poor.⁸

The end of the Cold War spawned international discussions about the "peace dividend", whereby budgets previously devoted to military spending and the nuclear arms race would be reallocated to social and economic development. But the collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States in a position of unparalleled military predominance, and the ruling elite began using this strategic asset in the 1990s to redraw the geopolitical map of the world, first in the Gulf War after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and then in the Yugoslav wars of Bosnia and Kosovo. It is an irony of history, albeit a tragic one, that the so-called humanitarian interventions of the 1990s – notably the 1991 Gulf War and the punitive sanctions regime against Iraq, the invasion of Somalia, and the NATO bombings of Serbia following the Milosovic government's assault on the Kosovo Liberation Army – paved the way for the resurgence of the more overt military projects of the new century. It should be noted that these events spanned the administrations of Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton, with the cooperation of both the Democratic and Republican political parties. The U.S.-led air strikes against Iraq and Sudan took place during the Clinton administration, as did the air raids against Serbia, which were conducted for 56 days in 1999, killing hundreds of Serbian civilians.⁹ As Gibbs (2009, p. 11) points out, "the purported acts of humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia were perfectly consistent with the geo-strategic interests of the United States and other key states, as well as of private interest groups within those states". Among these objectives, he argues, were to maintain U.S. hegemony and to find a new role for NATO. Still, the new imperial design did not become fully realized until the rise of the neoconservative wing of the ruling elite and the victory of George W. Bush in the presidential election of 2000. Even then, this scheme awaited the conditions in which it could be implemented. The attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 created those conditions.

For a while, following the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 and the routing of the Taleban, it appeared that the neoconservative project for "the New American Century" was being successfully implemented. The Bush administration's National Energy Policy backed the continued production and consumption of oil rather than the development of alternative sources of energy – even though, or perhaps because, the Chinese government had decided to make car production and ownership a pillar of the Chinese economy (Klare, 2008). Overtaking Afghanistan and Iraq could be seen as a way to guarantee oil supplies to the United States. It certainly reflected the

Bush/Cheney administration's "commitment to the perpetuation of the Petroleum Age by any means and at any cost" (Klare, 2008, p. 39).

However, the invasion of Iraq and events since then have served to underscore the limits of U.S. power. These limits have at least three sources. First, there is the concerted resistance to American imperialistic designs in Iraq – invasion, occupation, control over the country's oil resources, and privatization of the security apparatus, designs that Harvey (2005) has correctly called "accumulation by dispossession".¹⁰ The resistance to the new imperialism is both local and transnational, and it is fierce. The second source is, as noted, the relative economic weakness of the United States vis-à-vis other core countries and emerging markets, notably BRIC. For example, whereas Russia in 2006 had a foreign trade surplus of about \$130 billion, the United States had a deficit of about \$880 billion. Much of the U.S. deficit came from importing about 13.6 million barrels of oil a day, at a cost of about \$450 billion, including \$10 billion worth of oil imported from Russia. In contrast, Russia was able to export 5.7 million barrels a day (Goldman, 2008). As Rees (2006) explains, it is the critical meeting point between overwhelming military strength and relative economic decline that explains the motivation of the Bush administration to rely on its military capacity to discipline both its allies and its competitors on the world stage. But militarism has proved costly in economic as well as human and moral terms, and the 2008 financial crisis served to underscore the historic decline of U.S. hegemony.

Third, the limits of U.S. power have been seen in the factionalism within the ruling elite, particularly in the disagreements between the Democrats and the Republicans over the conduct, costs, and morality of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹¹ In 2008–09 divisions became even more acute – especially in the context of the presidential campaigns and the first year of the Barack Obama administration – over approaches to addressing the financial crisis and the economic recession. Even an establishment figure such as Fareed Zakaria argued in his 2008 book *The Post-American World*, that the U.S. political system – "captured by money, special interests, a sensationalist media and ideological attack groups" – is "dysfunctional".¹²

These observations would confirm that American hegemonic power is indeed in decline, and that unlike the "golden age of capitalism" following World War II, the rise of other advanced and emerging economies makes the world-system a far more competitive environment. The capitalist world-system today is still led by the United States with the collusion of the economic and political elites of key European, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries, but the United States faces serious competition as well as overt

resistance. How the competition between the dollar and the euro, between the old capitalist powers of the core and the emerging semi-peripheral power centers (BRIC as well as “uppity” countries such as Venezuela and Iran), and between the various factions of the American ruling elite will be played out remains to be seen.¹³ At the moment, the terrain upon which these contradictions, rivalries, and ambitions are being played out is the Middle East and Central Asia. There is a local resistance, and it consists largely of militant Islamists with sophisticated weapons, a transnational reach, and patriarchal agendas.

Marx understood colonialism and capitalism as intertwined, and in *Capital* he made a particularly pithy and sarcastic comment about slavery and plunder – or “primitive accumulation” – constituting “the rosy dawn of capitalism”.¹⁴ In the same way, U.S. military actions in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq could be understood as part of the “rosy dawn of the new imperialism”, in that they represent the (overextended) reach of U.S. hegemonic power, the persistent search for oil, and the extension of capitalism across the globe. But the rosy dawn is receding.

The conceptual and political implications of the narrative sketched above are worth highlighting: Foucauldians have been wrong to view power as diffuse and without a center; Hardt and Negri prematurely theorized away the militarized state, the hegemonic role of the United States, and coercive international relations; the much-vaunted knowledge economy and presumed postmaterialist values in the rich countries of the 21st century have not replaced the old-style search for natural resources;¹⁵ American militarism has been met with outrage from global civil society but with the overt or covert consent of many business elites and governments; and the boys with the toys are at it again.

HEGEMONIC (OR HEROIC- OR HYPER-) MASCULINITIES

It is here that the longstanding feminist critique of patriarchal state systems, international relations, and militarism, along with recent studies of masculinities, becomes especially compelling (Enloe, 2007; Eisenstein, 2004; Marchand & Runyan, 2000; Tickner, 1992). The processes of capital accumulation and territorial expansion that we have been discussing, as well as the aggressive tactics of resistance groups, bear features of what can only be called hypermasculinity, complete with swagger and muscle.

Indeed, what we observe are competing hypermasculinities, such as those of al-Qaeda and of the Bush administration.

“Hegemonic masculinity” has become a key concept in gender analysis since Connell (1998) identified it as a particular culture’s standards and ideal of real manhood, at a particular time in history. In countries such as America and Australia, Connell explains, hegemonic masculinity is defined by physical strength and bravado, exclusive heterosexuality, suppression of “vulnerable” emotions such as remorse and uncertainty, economic independence, authority over women and other men, and intense interest in sexual “conquest”. What Connell has defined as “emphasized femininity” is constructed around adaptation to male power and acquiescence to male authority. Its central feature is attractiveness to men, which includes physical appearance, ego massaging, suppression of “power emotions” such as anger, nurturance of children, exclusive heterosexuality, sexual availability without sexual assertiveness, and sociability. Both standards and ideals may be observed in many cultures, albeit with variations on the sexual element. For example, in Muslim cultures, female modesty is valued far more than sexual availability. And rather than intense interest in sexual conquest, hegemonic masculinity in a typical Middle Eastern context might consist in the capacity to “protect” family or personal honor by controlling the comportment of the women in the family (and sometimes in the community). Cross-cultural specificities notwithstanding, hegemonic masculinity is reproduced in various social institutions, notably the family, religion, the sports arena, the media, and the military.¹⁶ The masculinist institution par excellence is the military, but hypermasculinity is also a defining feature of the corporate domain – with its risk takers, rogue traders, and manipulative financiers.

In a similar analysis, Lauren Langman and Daniel Morris (2004) discuss “heroic masculinity”, although they tie it more to militarism than is the case in Connell’s analysis. They point out that civilizations and cultures based on conquest or expansion, societies where politics and militarism are fused, or countries where the military is a central and valorized institution, all exhibit discourses, images, and practices of heroic masculinity. In considering American society and the role of its military in both capitalist accumulation and expansion of U.S. power, and in considering the foundational narratives of heroic masculinity in Islam, one can easily imagine a “clash of heroic masculinities” (as Langman and Morris put it), between the American security state and a transnational Islamist network such as al-Qaeda. The clash contributes to the chaos in the contemporary world-system.

Contemporary rivalries in hegemonic or heroic masculinities mirror the inter-capitalist rivalries of the early part of the 20th century – which, as noted, led to World War I and World War II. Rival masculinities were at play in the showdown between Saddam Hussein and the Bush and Blair governments. The tensions that emerged in 2008 between Russia and NATO over Georgia and Kosovo can be understood at least partly in terms of rival masculinities.¹⁷ The same may be said for the war between the Taleban and foreign troops, and the standoff on nuclear issues among the United States, Israel, Iran, and North Korea. Rival masculinities underlie, also, many of the factors that have been attributed to the “new conflicts” of the post-Cold War era, such as the emergence of a global weapons market, the decreasing capacity of states to uphold the monopoly of violence (Kaldor, 1999; Kaldor and Luckham, 2001), interethnic competition (Chua, 2004), and what Benjamin Barber famously termed “Jihad vs McWorld” (Barber, 2001). Indeed, rival masculinities constitute a key factor in the conflicts that emerge over natural resources, such as oil or diamonds; in aggressive nationalism and ethnic rivalries; and in politicized religious projects. Hegemonic masculinity is a central ideological pillar of both the new imperialism and of Islamism. From a feminist perspective, hegemonic/heroic/hypermasculinity is a causal factor in war, as well as in women’s oppression. As Anne Sisson Runyan has aptly noted, “the world is awash with contending masculinities that vie to reduce women to symbols of either fundamentalism or Western hypermodernity” (Runyan, 2002, p. 362).

Let us now pause to consider that on the Right, there is a tendency to demonize all forms of local resistance as brutal, patriarchal, and terroristic, and to contrast them to the American democratic agenda. Conversely, on the Left, there is a tendency to romanticize all forms of resistance as legitimate actions against the American imperialist agenda. In navigating through these muddy waters, progressive scholars would do well to emphasize the damaging effects of hypermasculinity on the part of both the new imperialism and its non-state challengers. In Iraq, for example, the effects since 2003 include the following: (1) women appearing in *hijab* in public, for fear of harassment or worse; (2) a spike in domestic violence, “honor killings”, kidnappings, and rapes; (c) targeted assassinations of women leaders; (d) assaults by foreign soldiers and by the resistance; (e) a drop in women’s political participation, despite a 25 percent quota; (f) ambiguities and contradictions in the new Iraqi constitution, especially as regards women’s rights in the family; (g) the use of young women as suicide bombers (Lattimer, 2008).

If hegemonic/hyper/heroic masculinities can trigger war, the reverse is also true. Wars, and especially occupations by foreign powers, are often

accompanied by crises of masculinity that lead to restrictions on women's mobility and increases in violence against women, both at home and on the streets. In areas where honor is all important, such as many Muslim-majority societies, concepts of hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity may be heightened, and the protection of women and girls may become an exaggerated feature of postconflict society, too, with increases in honor killings or veiling or the reassertion or strengthening of traditional gender ideology and its legal frameworks. In societies where the issue of women and the public space is already fraught with the legacy of guardianship and segregation, women may be compelled to remain at home, or to venture outdoors only when accompanied by a male relative. Governments may be complicit in these forms of the "disciplining" of women, or they may be too weak to exercise control and protect women's rights. During conflict, women often are caught between weak states, occupying powers, armed opposition movements, and patriarchal gender arrangements. Some may be co-opted into carrying out questionable acts of resistance, such as the increasing number of young women in Iraq being recruited by al-Qaeda as suicide bombers (Steele, 2008). In postconflict reconstruction, politics often remains masculine and male dominated, with women largely excluded from political decision making (Moghadam, 2007).

CO-OPTING – WHILE IGNORING – WOMEN'S RIGHTS

As the countries of the greater Middle East are predominantly Muslim and largely authoritarian, it allows the American ruling elite to try to cover its military and economic ambitions with the mask of human rights, women's rights, and democracy. Here we need to understand the ideological leadership that hegemons exhibit – or the way they ideologically justify their power and offer a "vision of the world" that is different from the straightforward coercion of colonialists. As Wallerstein (2002, p. 358) has pointed out concerning the three historical hegemons of the modern world-system:

The Dutch offered religious tolerance (*cuius region, eius religio*), respect for national sovereignty (Westphalia), and *mare liberum*. The British offered the vision of the liberal state in Europe moving towards constitutionalism and political incorporation of the 'dangerous classes', the gold standard, and the end of slavery. The United States offered multiparty elections, human rights, (moderate) decolonization, and free speech.

That the United States is a democracy, in which its citizens enjoy an array of formal rights, has always served to justify American hegemony. Anatol Lieven notes that American "exceptional nationalism" – with its tenets of "faith in liberty, constitutionalism, the law, democracy, individualism and cultural and political egalitarianism" – has underpinned the notion that the United States has a duty to spread its vision of democracy and freedom to the rest of the world (Lieven, 2004, p. 66). Notwithstanding the many deficits of its political process and welfare system, its class and racial inequalities, and the more peculiar aspects of its sex/gender system, most Americans have accepted the ideology that theirs is the most democratic, the freest, the most prosperous, and basically, the greatest country in the world and in history. And they believe that women have a higher status and more "opportunities" in the United States than anywhere else on earth. Since most Americans know little about the status of women in the advanced democratic and welfare states of northern Europe, they tend to compare their lives with the most egregious forms of patriarchy in India or the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa – reproduced and stereotyped as these are in various media and literary images – and thus feel morally superior. The longstanding ideological construction of America as the home of democracy, prosperity, and rights, which in recent years added women's rights to its panoply (but only selectively and opportunistically) has helped to legitimize American interventions, domestically, since at least the 1991 Gulf War (Eisenstein, 2004).

As noted, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was met with what the United States presented as a humanitarian war to defend a defenseless country – though to keen observers it was clear that control over Kuwaiti oil was the real reason. The ideological construct took on huge proportions after September 11 and with the invasion of Afghanistan, when former first lady Laura Bush and various women in and around the Bush administration made "the restoration of Afghan women's rights" a central objective. The notion of a constructed ideological mask helps to uncover the real reason for the NATO bombing campaign of Serbia in 1999. Rather than a selfless "humanitarian intervention" to save the lives of Bosnians, Kosovars, and women victims of Serbian aggression, it was another step toward the construction of a neoliberal globalized world order and the reassertion of American power.

It should be noted that the imperial defense of women's rights is a very recent discursive and ideological phenomenon. In the context of the Contra wars in Central America and the U.S.-supported *jihad* in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the discourse of women's rights was nonexistent. Indeed, the very real

gender dynamics of the Afghan war were totally eclipsed in the media and popular imagination by constant references to heroic guerrillas versus godless communists (Moghadam, 1989, 2002). In league with its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – neither of them a beacon of human rights, women’s rights, or democracy – the United States supported a tribal-Islamist uprising, and its propagandists in the media and the human rights community covered up the misogyny of the Mujahidin. Later, the U.S. decision to send troops to Kuwait (and then to Saudi Arabia) to defeat Saddam Hussein’s army also had no explicit women’s rights rationale. It was the U.S. media that projected contrasting images of liberated, assertive, and physically fit American women soldiers against oppressed, veiled, and beleaguered Kuwaiti and Saudi women. Never mind that American women frequently confront sexual harassment and abuse in the military (Enloe, 2007, p. 85) – the ideological construct of the New American Military Woman was made, and the image stuck in the popular consciousness. It also struck Osama bin Laden as arrogant and sacrilegious. Bad enough that infidel soldiers were on the soil of the Prophet; but to have “naked” women among them was inconceivable.¹⁸ A version of the image of the New American Military Woman was reproduced in the film *G.I. Jane*. In this film, in which a problematic version of feminism is combined with political intrigue and imperialistic activity, not only does the protagonist (played by actress Demi Moore) undergo a physical transformation from a demure woman with an office job to a muscular soldier as foul-mouthed as any of her male comrades, but she even takes part in the invasion of an Arab country.

While the world’s attention in the 1990s was focused on atrocities in Bosnia and – to a far lesser extent – Central Africa, the punitive sanctions regime in Iraq received very little attention. Feminist scholars of the Middle East, however, note that the sanctions not only adversely affected the literacy, health, and welfare of large proportions of the Iraqi population but also had specific gendered effects, notably in terms of the deterioration of Iraqi women’s social roles, legal status, and family positions (Al-Ali, 2007, chapter 5; Zangana, 2007, p. 73; Susskind, 2007; al-Jawaheri, 2008). Iraqi working women were located largely in the public sector, with a large proportion employed as teachers. As the 1990s wore on, they found their incomes deteriorating and their jobs essentially worthless. Many left employment to look after their families – making up for the withdrawal of social services – or did what they could to augment the family budget in the growing informal economy. Rising unemployment and inflation, along with the deterioration of the social and physical infrastructure, exacerbated

class and gender inequalities, put pressure on women in households, and led to crises in family relations (al-Jawaheri, 2008). In some cases, families pooled resources to start new businesses; in other cases, family ties disintegrated in the face of economic hardship, and widowed or divorced women found themselves alone – and sometimes on the streets. Polygamy, early marriage, domestic violence, and honor killings increased, along with fertility, infant and child mortality, and maternal mortality. As the social fabric deteriorated, women faced a resurgent patriarchy at home and on the streets.

Ironically, this was occurring at a time when the discourse of women's human rights assumed global proportions, largely driven by the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women, which took place in Beijing in 1995. Many applauded Hillary Clinton's ringing speech in Beijing that "women's rights are human rights", but the speech could be seen, in retrospect, as part of the ideological construct and cover for U.S. imperialistic activities during the 1990s and into the new millennium. The speech not only co-opted women's human rights for an imperialistic project, but it ignored the very real violations of human rights occurring in Iraq and being experienced by Iraqi women. Of course, progressive TFNs such as MADRE, the Association of Women of the Mediterranean Region, and WILPF were aware of, and protested, the co-opting and ignoring of women's human rights in Iraq,¹⁹ but policymakers and the media were fixated on Saddam Hussein's weapons arsenal.

In contrast to Iraq, the Afghanistan arena saw widespread and highly effective anti-Taleban international feminist agitation. As global feminists – in solidarity with activists in Kabul and in the refugee camps of Peshawar – turned up the volume in their denunciations of the Taleban's "gender apartheid" in Afghanistan, elements of the U.S. ruling elite listened in and learned to selectively appropriate the discourse. That discourse proved useful when the Bush administration decided to bomb Afghanistan in retaliation for September 11 and because the Taleban hosted and harbored Osama bin Laden.

Here, the work that gender was being made to do, literally and epistemologically, was quite onerous: there was the clash of rival masculinities in the form of the conflicts between the United States on one side, and al-Qaeda and the Taleban on the other; there was the (mis)appropriation of the discourse of women's human rights to help legitimize the enterprise; and there was the difficulty of distinguishing between imperial "feminism" and global feminism (or feminist internationalism). The latter led to much recrimination among feminists in the United States. Many could not see

clearly through the muddy waters; some charged those feminists who had advanced the gender apartheid discourse with playing into the hands of the Bush regime and helping to encourage total war. Others, bizarrely, accused feminists in and around the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the Feminist Majority, along with many academic feminists, of exaggerating discrimination in Western societies and of being complicit in the continued oppression of women in the Global South and especially in Muslim societies.²⁰ Ironically, neither group – neither the “postcolonial” feminists nor the rightwing “feminists” – had been vocal during the 1980s and early 1990s, when earlier U.S. administrations financed an Afghan “resistance” that was, among other things, extraordinarily patriarchal and antifeminist.²¹ The rise of the Taliban was made possible by U.S. policy in Afghanistan in the 1980s and its support for the Mujahidin. Al-Qaeda’s rise originated in the same.

In the case of Iraq, neoconservative hubris and arrogance eclipsed any moral high ground. As discussed above, the invasion of Iraq had already been decided, and rather than pretend to be undertaking a “humanitarian intervention” (as had been the case in Kuwait and in Yugoslavia), the Bush administration insisted that it was in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction through a preemptive war. The case for democracy building was an afterthought, and even then, the discourse of women’s rights was nowhere to be heard. Proconsul Paul Bremer was initially insensitive to women’s rights issues, ignoring warnings about the ascendancy of Islamist forces and their gender implications. He was forced to concede, however, when women’s organizations in Iraq and TFNs petitioned against the notorious Resolution 137 in January 2004, and this seemed to indicate the power of women’s transnational organizing (al-Jawaheri, 2008, pp. 144–45). Funding became available for civil society in general and women’s groups in particular. But the “honeymoon”, if it could be called that, did not last long. The invasion and occupation were bound to trigger resistance and reaction, while the collapse of a once strong and centralized state with a monopoly on the means of violence was sure to unleash anarchy, as well as sectarian chaos. In this context, women’s rights in Iraq encountered various manifestations of rival hypermasculinities, with tragic outcomes. And still the Bush administration and its supporters claimed that the United States went into Iraq with the best of intentions, and that it would leave with its honor and power intact.

The path to the new American imperialism – and to hegemonic decline – is littered with ideological debris as well as with bodies. The success of military power and capital accumulation requires not only economic

resources but also ideological constructions for legitimation. In the present era, that of the promotion of women's rights and democracy against global terrorism has come to replace that of the promotion of liberty and freedom against godless communism.²²

In 2009, the Taleban are resurgent in Afghanistan and have emerged in Pakistan; both governments are powerless as well as corrupt. The heartbreaking travails of the people of Iraq are well known. The speculative financial markets of neoliberal globalization have driven up the prices of basic staples in poor countries. This makes the Bush administration's delusional boasts several years ago supremely ironic (see [White House, 2003](#)):

In Afghanistan, we helped liberate an oppressed people. And we will continue helping them secure their country, rebuild their society, and educate all their children – boys and girls. (Applause.) In the Middle East, we will continue to seek peace between a secure Israel and a democratic Palestine. (Applause.) Across the Earth, America is feeding the hungry – more than 60 percent of international food aid comes as a gift from the people of the United States. As our nation moves troops and builds alliances to make our world safer, we must also remember our calling as a blessed country to make this world better. ...

... And this nation is leading the world in confronting and defeating the man-made evil of international terrorism. (Applause.)

AGAINST IMPERIALISM: GLOBAL FEMINISM AND ANOTHER WORLD

Inevitably, the new imperialism has spawned opponents. Its primary nemesis, militant Islam, may be admired in some quarters, but it is hardly a salutary alternative from a progressive feminist perspective. Quite apart from their role in fighting secular activists and left-wing movements – sometimes (as in Afghanistan in the 1980s) in concert with the United States – Islamist movements are virulently antifeminist. Their vision of the Ideal Society hinges on the Ideal Woman – the veiled wife, supporting her husband's jihad, rearing committed Muslims at home, and transmitting religious and cultural practices ([Bouatta & Cherifati-Merabtine, 1994](#)). Women who are unveiled, or single, or otherwise nonconformist may be deemed "naked" or "corrupt" or "plagued by the West". Such women may be subjected to warnings, verbal abuse, corporal punishment, assassination, or – if Islamists are in power – imprisonment and execution. Women have

been subjected to Islamist bullying or worse in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.

The new imperialism's other opponent is the global justice movement, which arose in the latter part of the 1990s in response to the harsh economic regime of globalization. In calling for "another globalization" or "another world", the movement pursues international solidarity, social justice, human rights, accountability, real democracy, and an end to war. The global justice movement combines a large number of transnational social movements as well as more locally based groups, who convene at the World Social Forum (WSF) – the oppositional counterpart to the World Economic Forum – and at regional gatherings. Between 2001 and 2004, the WSF met in Porto Alegre, Brazil; thereafter it has met in Mumbai, India (2005); in Caracas, Venezuela (2006); in Nairobi, Kenya (2007); and again in Brazil (2009). Its "take-off" at the Battle of Seattle in late 1999 was followed by a series of coordinated protest actions at the meeting sites of the world's financiers, trade negotiators, and politicians. Its repertoire of collective action includes demonstrations against the World Trade Organization, debates and networking at the WSF and regional forums, and antiwar rallies (Broad, 2002; Smith & Johnston, 2002; Starr, 2005; Smith, 2008; Moghadam, 2009).

One subset of networks within the broad network of global justice activists is comprised of TFNs. They are structures organized above the national level that unite women from three or more countries around a common agenda, such as women's human rights, reproductive health and rights, violence against women, peace and antimilitarism, or feminist economics. They work with each other and with transnational advocacy networks to draw attention to the negative aspects of the world-system, to try to influence policy making, and to insert a feminist perspective in global advocacy and activism. TFNs emerged in the mid-1980s, thereby predating the global justice movement by about a decade, and they continue to grow. Some formed to criticize neoliberal economic policies and their effects on women workers and the poor (e.g., MADRE, DAWN, and WIDE), and others arose in response to the growth of fundamentalism and political Islam (notably, Women Living Under Muslim Laws, or WLUML). These networks and older groups such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) have been joined by new groups such as Code Pink, criticizing U.S. foreign policy, calling for an end to war and suffering in Iraq, and seeking a world characterized by equality and solidarity. As such, their socialist feminism, like their nonviolence, is at odds with both imperialism and militant Islam.

A few words about the progressive feminist internationalism of MADRE and Code Pink should underscore its difference with the "humanitarian intervention" of the new imperialism. MADRE's work in Iraq dates back to the 1991 Gulf War, when it began collecting an assortment of needed supplies for Iraqi families, including milk and medicine. It continued this work throughout the 1990s, and frequently decried the detrimental effects on women and children of the sanctions regime. After the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, MADRE partnered with UNICEF/Iraq and provided 25,000 citizens with supplies and emergency aid, including essential drugs and medical supplies to those in need.²³ Working with its local feminist partner, the Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq (OWFI), MADRE has helped to address the problem of honor killings and to support the creation of women's shelters for victims of domestic and community violence in Iraqi cities such as Baghdad, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Nasariyeh. The campaign has given rise to a web of shelters and an escape route for Iraqi women, which is known as the Underground Railroad for Iraqi Women and is largely run by OWFI volunteers.²⁴ All this is accompanied by a steady release of reports and publications denouncing the invasion and occupation of Iraq, especially for its effects on women and children.

Code Pink has become famous (notorious, in rightwing corners) for its direct action tactics in confronting members of the U.S. political elite over the war in Iraq. Its action repertoire also includes acts of feminist humanitarianism and international solidarity, as evidenced by visits to Baghdad to demonstrate opposition to war and solidarity with the Iraqi people. Founders Medea Benjamin and Jodie Evans, along with Sand Brim, traveled to Iraq in February and December 2003. In December 2004, Code Pink coordinated the historic "Families for Peace Delegation" to Amman, Jordan, involving the three Code Pink founders and a member of the antiwar group United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ), along with several relatives of fallen American soldiers and families of 9/11 victims. According to one report: "In an inspiring act of humanity and generosity, they brought with them \$650,000 in medical supplies and other aid for the Fallujah refugees who were forced from their homes when the Americans destroyed their city. Although the American press failed to cover this unprecedented visit, the mission garnered enormous attention from Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya, and Dubai and Iranian television, who witnessed first hand the depths of American compassion" (Milazzo, 2005, p. 103; see also Brim, 2003, pp. 10–12).

The mission statement of Code Pink identifies itself as "a women-initiated grassroots peace and social justice movement working to end the war in

Iraq, stop new wars, and redirect our resources into healthcare, education and other life-affirming activities".²⁵ Toward this end, it works with other feminist and social justice networks, including NOW and UFPJ. Both MADRE and Code Pink are active in the global justice movement.

In these and other ways, alternatives are being proposed to U.S. imperialism, neoliberal capitalist globalization, and Islamist violence. Jackie Smith (2008, p. 2224) shows how the WSF is an alternative arena for the cultivation of "skills, analyses, and identities that are essential to a democratic global polity". Christopher Chase-Dunn and his students have examined the rise of a "global left" comprised of transnational social movements that meet at the WSF, as well as a number of left-wing governments currently concentrated in Latin America (Chase-Dunn et al., 2009). Positioning themselves against both neoliberal capitalism and the new American imperialism, the "democratic globalizers" (Smith) and the "global left" (Chase-Dunn) exhibit the potential to form a counter-hegemonic bloc in global politics (Boswell & Chase-Dunn, 2000). But if the bloc is to succeed, it will have to include TFNs and its alternative frameworks will have to integrate feminist insights.

Global feminism has much to offer in the way of analysis of international relations. Catherine Eschle has discussed "globalized feminist movement democracy" created by "transversal feminist activism" (Eschle, 2001, p. 279). Cynthia Enloe (2006) explains: "Focusing our attention on the military-industrial complex, oil and empire isn't enough. If we dismiss the politics of femininity and masculinity, we will never get to the bottom of what fuels militarization. We will never roll it back because we won't know what propels it forward". Christa Wichterich, a WIDE scholar-activist, argues that feminists have to go beyond the legitimate liberal perspective of gender equality and women's human rights to push for "interventionist reform in favor of poor people, social justice and gender equality on the one hand, and on the other hand fight against the overexploitation of human and natural resources, against the commodification and privatization of everything, the destruction of livelihoods and alternative economic arrangements" (cited in WIDE, 2007, p. 30). Ann Tickner aptly put it thus: "the achievement of peace, economic justice, and ecological sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination and subordination; genuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations" (Tickner, 1992, p. 193, 128).

As this paper has shown, feminist analysis is critical to our understanding of the causes and consequences of militarism, whether that of imperialism or

of Islamism, as well as the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. When we consider hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity, we understand how the rhetoric of what Enloe calls "manly protection and feminine gratitude" can fuel imperialistic activities and war. Theoretical understanding can then be put into practice in the form of transnational collective action and alliances of global movements – labor, environmental, peace and justice, and women's movements – that could pose a formidable challenge to the violence and co-optations of imperialism, the hegemony of global capitalism and its inequalities, and war. I end in agreement with a pertinent prediction by Wallerstein (2000, p. 249): "The modern world-system is in structural crisis and has entered into a period of chaotic behavior which will cause a systemic bifurcation and a transition to a new structure whose nature is as yet undetermined and, in principle, impossible to predetermine, but one that is open to human intervention and creativity". In other words, another world is possible.

NOTES

1. Here "Islamism" refers to a militantly politicized movement, network, or regime, and not to Islamic theology or the belief system of ordinary Muslims. I place "new imperialism" in quotes because I believe that U.S. "imperialist state practices" (Harvey, 2005, p. 92) have been continuous since the end of WWII (to be elaborated below).

2. See, for example, Kandiyoti (1991), Moghadam (1994a, 2003), and Nira Yuval-Davis (1997).

3. Bakker (1995), Elson (1991), Peterson (2003), Sparr (1994), Sen and Grown (1987), and WIDE (1998).

4. Papanek (1994), see also Bouatta and Cherifati-Merabtine (1994), and Moghadam (1994b).

5. See especially Ahmed (1993), Jayawardena (1995), McClintock (1995), and Stoler (2002).

6. Enloe (1990, 2006, 2007), Peterson (1992), Pettman (1996), and Tickner (1992, 2001).

7. For an elaboration, see Moghadam (2005, 2009).

8. See in particular the references in Note 3.

9. For an interesting dissident Israeli view of the bombing of Serbia, and some prescient comments about the world order, see http://www.freeman.org/m_online/apr99/haetzni.htm.

10. The invasion of Iraq was accomplished by the British military as well, but the capital accumulation objectives of the British have been less evident than those of the United States.

11. On this latter point, see Elizabeth Drew (2007).

12. Cited in Mishra (2008, p. 13).

13. U.S. President Barack Obama has been critical of the conduct of the war in Iraq, but he has indicated a commitment to pursuing war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban resurgence. This would suggest, again, continuity in U.S. foreign policy rather than disruption and a new direction.

14. Karl Marx, *Capital* Vol. I, Part VIII: Primitive Accumulation, Ch. 31: "Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist."

15. See the World Values Survey for extended discussions of how postindustrial, developing, and poor countries exhibit different values and beliefs, from traditional and material to postmaterial and self-expressive (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/>).

16. In countries such as Egypt, as well as in the United States, hegemonic masculinity is also premised on "heteronormativity". See Pratt (2007) for details on Egypt.

17. Rival masculinities were evident in Georgia's attacks on South Ossetia and Russia's swift counterattack and armed defense of Ossetia, in August 2008. At the same time, Russia's "new swagger" derives from its more secure economic position, as discussed above.

18. Among other sources, see the PBS documentary series "America at a Crossroads" (originally aired during the week of 16 April 2007), in particular "Jihad: the Men and Ideas Behind Al-Qaeda".

19. At the July 2000 meeting in Nicosia, Cyprus, of the Association of Women of the Mediterranean Region (AWMR), two panels were dedicated to the effects of the bombing raids and the sanctions on women and children in Iraq. The present author prepared a paper examining the deterioration of literacy and health among women and children. Among the resolutions passed by the AWMR, one pertained to Iraq.

20. Criticisms of the Feminist Majority, NOW, and other mainstream American feminist organizations came from both "postcolonial feminists" and from rightwing American feminists such as Hymowitz (2003), Chesler (2005), and Hoff Summers (2007).

21. Postcolonial feminism in the United States originates in the now-classic essay by Chandra Mohanty (1988), which took to task a number of publications on "Third World women's oppression". While the essay raised important issues, especially concerning methodology, it seemed to theorize away any oppression in Muslim-majority countries. Appearing in 1988, at the height of the Afghan conflict, the essay made no reference to the conflict or to the Mujahidin's patriarchal gender agenda.

22. The PBS special series, "America at a Crossroads", which was aired during the week of April 16, 2007, covers some of the issues I have discussed, such as the origins of al-Qaeda and the war in Iraq. In one segment, Richard Perle, a key promoter of the neoconservative agenda and architect of the war in Iraq, is seen visiting Afghanistan and emphasizing the valiant role of the United States in advancing women's rights and democracy.

23. MADRE (2007b).

24. MADRE (2007a). This is also information from an interview I conducted with OWFI founder and leader Yanar Mohammad, in Amsterdam, May 2005.

25. CodePink (2003).

REFERENCES

- Ahmed, L. (1993). *Women and gender in Islam: Historical roots of a modern debate*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Al-Ali, N. S. (2007). *Iraqi women: Untold stories from 1948 to the present*. London: Zed Books.
- Al-Jawaheri, Y. H. (2008). *Women in Iraq: The gender impact of international sanctions*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bakker, I. (Ed.) (1995). *The strategic silence: Gender and economic policy*. London: Zed Books.
- Barber, B. (2001). *Jihad vs McWorld* (2nd ed.). New York: Times Books.
- Bello, W. (2000). Building an iron cage. In: T. Mertes (Ed.), *A movement of movements: Is another world really possible?* (pp. 49–69). London: Verso.
- Boswell, T., & Chase-Dunn, C. (2000). *The spiral of capitalism and socialism: Toward global democracy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Bouatta, C., & Cherifati-Merabtine, D. (1994). Social representations of women in an Islamic discourse: Algeria. In: V. M. Moghdam (Ed.), *Identity politics and women: Cultural reassertions and feminisms in international perspective*. Westview Press.
- Brim, S. (2003). Report from Baghdad. *Off our Backs*, March–April, pp. 10–12.
- Broad, R. (Ed.) (2002). *Global backlash: Citizen initiatives for a just world economy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Chase-Dunn, C. (1998). *Global formation: Structures of the world-economy* (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield.
- Chase-Dunn, C., Niemeyer, R., Saxena, P., Kaneshiro, M., Love, J., & Spears, A. (2009). *The New Global Left : Movements and regimes*. IROWS Working Paper no. 50. University of California, Riverside, CA. Available at: <http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows50/irows50.htm>
- Chesler, P. (2005). *The Death of Feminism: What's Next in the Struggle for Women's Freedom*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chua, A. (2004). *World on fire: How exporting free market democracy breeds ethnic hatred and global instability*. New York: Anchor Books.
- CodePink. (2003). *About us*. Retrieved December 3, 2007 from: <http://www.codepink4peace.org/article.php?list = type&type = 3>
- Connell, R. W. (1998). Masculinities and globalization. In *Men and Masculinities*, 1(1), 1–20.
- Cooley, J. (1999). *Unholy wars: Afghanistan, America and international terrorism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Drew, E. (2007). The war in Washington. *New York Review of Books*, May 10, pp. 53–55.
- Eisenstein, Z. (2004). *Against empire*. London: Zed Books.
- Elson, D. (Ed.) (1991). *Male bias in the development process*. London: Macmillan.
- Enloe, C. (1990). *Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Enloe, C. (2006). Macho, Macho Military. *The Nation*, posted online on March 7 at: <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060320/enloe>
- Enloe, C. (2007). *Globalization and militarism: Feminists make the link*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Eschle, C. (2001). *Global democracy, social movements, and feminism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Ferguson, N. (2004). *Colossus: The price of America's empire*. New York: Penguin.
- Gibbs, D. N. (2009). *First do no harm: Humanitarian intervention and the destruction of Yugoslavia*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.

- Go, J. (2007). Waves of empire: U.S. hegemony and imperialistic activity from the shores of Tripoli to Iraq, 1787–2003. *International Sociology*, 22(1), 5–40.
- Goldman, M. I. (2008). Moscow's new swagger. *Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 1.
- Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2003). *The new imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2005). From globalization to the new imperialism. In: R. P. Appelbaum & W. I. Robinson (Eds), *Critical globalization studies* (pp. 91–100). London: Routledge.
- Hoff Summers, C. (2007). The subjection of Islamic women and the fecklessness of American feminism. *The Weekly Standard*, 12(34), May 21.
- Hymowitz, K. S. (2003). Why feminism is AWOL on Islam. *City Journal*, 13(1).
- Jayawardena, K. (1995). *The white Woman's other burden*. London: Routledge.
- Jeffords, S. (1989). *The remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Kaldor, M. (1999). *New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kaldor, M., & Luckham, R. (2001). Global transformations and new conflicts. *IDS Bulletin*, 32(2), 48–69.
- Kandiyoti, D. (Ed.) (1991). *Women, state and Islam*. London: Macmillan.
- Kennedy, P. (1987). *The rise and fall of the great powers: Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House.
- Klare, M. (2008). Past its peak: On the oil crisis. *London Review of Books*, 14 August, pp. 38–39.
- Langman, L., & Morris, D. (2004). Hegemony lost: Understanding contemporary Islam. In: T. Reifer (Ed.), *Globalization, hegemony and power: Antisystemic movements and the global system*. Paradigm.
- Lattimer, M. (2008). Iraqi women count the cost of freedom they have lost. *The Guardian Weekly*, February 22, pp. 4–5.
- Lieven, A. (2004). *America right or wrong: An anatomy of American nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lorber, J. (1994). *Paradoxes of gender*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- MADRE. (2007a). *Honor crimes*. Retrieved Nov 28 from: <http://www.madre.org/articles/int/honorcrimes.html>
- MADRE. (2007b). *Madre programs in Iraq*. Retrieved November 28 from: <http://madre.org/programs/Iraq.html>
- Marchand, M., & Runyan, A. S. (Eds). (2000). *Gender and global restructuring: Sightings, sites, and resistances*. London: Routledge.
- McClintock, A. (1995). *Imperial leather: Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial contest*. New York: Routledge.
- Milazzo, L. (2005). Code Pink: The 21st century mothers of invention. *Development*, 48(2), 100–104.
- Mishra, P. (2008). Rise of the rest. *London Review of Books* (November 6), pp. 13–15.
- Moghadam, V. M. (1989). Revolution, the state, Islam and women: Sexual politics in Iran and Afghanistan. *Social Text*, no. 22 (Spring), pp. 40–61.
- Moghadam, V. M. (Ed.) (1994a). *Identity politics and women: Cultural reassertions and feminisms in international perspective*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Moghadam, V. M. (1994b). *Gender and national identity: Women and politics in Muslim societies*. London: Zed Books.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2002). Patriarchy, the Taleban and the politics of public space in Afghanistan. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 25(1), 19–31.

- Moghadam, V. M. (2003). *Modernizing women: Gender and social change in the Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2005). *Globalizing women: Transnational feminist networks*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2007). Peacebuilding and reconstruction with women: Reflections on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. In: V. M. Moghadam (Ed.), *From patriarchy to empowerment: Women's movements, participation, and rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia*. Syracuse University Press.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2009). *Globalization and social movements: Islamism, feminism, and the global justice movement*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Mohanty, C. (1988). Under Western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. *Feminist Review*, 30(Autumn), 61–88.
- Papanek, H. (1994). The ideal woman and the ideal society: Control and autonomy in the construction of identity. In: V. M. Moghadam (Ed.), *Identity politics and women: Cultural reassertions and feminisms in international perspective* (pp. 42–76). Westview Press.
- Peterson, V. S. (Ed.) (1992). *Gendered states: Feminist (re)visions of international relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Peterson, V. S. (2003). *A critical rewriting of global political economy: Integrating productive, reproductive, and virtual economies*. London: Routledge.
- Pettman, J. J. (1996). *Worlding women: A feminist international politics*. London: Routledge.
- Pieterse, J. N. (2004). *Globalization or empire?* London: Routledge.
- Pratt, N. (2007). The Queen Boat Case in Egypt: Sexuality, national security and state sovereignty. *Review of International Studies*, 33, 129–144.
- Rees, J. (2006). *Imperialism and resistance*. London: Routledge.
- Robinson, W. I. (2004). *A theory of global capitalism*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Runyan, A. S. (2002). "Still not 'at home' in IR: Feminist world politics ten years later" [review essay]. *International Politics*, 39(September), 361–368.
- Sen, G., & Grown, C. (1987). *Women, crises, and development Alternatives*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Smith, J. (2008). *Social movements for global democracy*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Smith, J., & Johnston, H. (Eds.) (2002). *Globalization and resistance: Transnational dimensions of social movements*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Sparr, P. (Ed.) (1994). *Mortgaging women's lives: Feminist critiques of structural adjustment*. London: Zed.
- Starr, A. (2005). *Global revolt: A guide to the movements against globalization*. London: Zed.
- Stoler, A. L. (2002). *Carnal knowledge and imperial power: Race and the intimate in colonial rule*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Steele, J. (2008). Is she villain or victim? *The Guardian Weekly*, September 26, pp. 23–25.
- Susskind, Y. (2007). *Promising democracy, imposing theocracy: Gender-based violence and the war on Iraq*. New York: MADRE.
- Tickner, A. (1992). *Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tickner, A. (2001). *Gendering world politics: Issues and approaches in the post-Cold War era*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (2000). Globalization or the age of transition? A long-term view of the trajectory of the world-system. *International Sociology*, 15(2), 249–265.

- Wallerstein, I. (2002). Three hegemonies. In: P. K. O'Brien & A. Cleese (Eds.), *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2001* (pp. 357–362). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Wallerstein, I. (2003). *The decline of American power: The U.S. in a chaotic world*. New York: New Press.
- White House. (2003). President delivers state of the union (January 23). Retrieved from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html>
- WIDE. (1998). *Trade traps and gender gaps: Women unveiling the market*. Report on WIDE's Annual Conference held at Jarvenpaa, Finland, 16–18 May 1997. Brussels: WIDE.
- WIDE. (2007). *New aid, expanding trade: What do women have to say?* Report of the WIDE Annual Conference, Madrid, 14–16 June 2007. Brussels: Women in Development Europe.
- Wood, E. M. (2003). *Empire of capital*. London: Verso.
- Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). *Gender and nation*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Zangana, H. (2007). *City of windows: An Iraqi woman's account of war and resistance*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

PART III
SCHOLARLY CONTROVERSY:
CONTESTING GEOGRAPHIES
OF CITIZENSHIP

INCOMPLETENESS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING: TOWARDS DENATIONALIZED CITIZENSHIP?

Saskia Sassen

ABSTRACT

The changing articulation of citizenship is traced, both in relation to the national and the global. Conceiving of citizenship as an incompletely theorized contract between the state and the citizen, and locating her inquiry at that point of incompleteness, the author opens up the discussion to the making of the political. The central thesis is that the incompleteness of the formal institution of citizenship makes it possible for the outsider to claim for expanded inclusions. It is the outsider, whether a minoritized citizen or an immigrant, who has kept changing the institution across time and space. Times of unsettlement make this particularly visible. The current period of globalization is one such period, even though this is a partial unsettlement. New types of political actors are taking shape, changing the relationship between the state and the individual, and remaking the political.

Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 20, 229–258

© 2009 by Saskia Sassen

ISSN: 0198-8719/doi:10.1108/S0198-8719(2009)0000020013

Beneath the reinvigorated imperial logics that organize the political economy of the US today, emergent social dynamics are enabling disadvantaged and minoritized groups to *make* new forms of the political (Young, 2002; Fraser, 2007; Yuval-Davis, 1999; Bada, Fox, & Selee, 2006; Nussbaum, 2008; Bartlett, 2007; Smith, 2003; Bonilla-Silva, 2003). New types of political actors are taking shape, changing the relationship between the state and the individual (Bosniak, 2006; Shachar, 2009; Westbrook, 2007). The particular aspect in this larger configuration that I pursue here concerns the fact that this is a period when once again citizenship reveals itself to be an open condition notwithstanding its high level of formalization. Elsewhere (Sassen, 2008, Chap. 6; 1996, Chap. 3).¹ I have developed the argument that citizenship is an incompletely theorized contract between the state and the citizen. This incompleteness makes it possible for a highly formalized institution to accommodate change – more precisely, to accommodate the possibility of responding to change without sacrificing its formal status. Second, my argument is that the longevity of the institution suggests that it is *meant* to be incomplete, that is to say, capable of responding to the historically conditioned meaning of citizenship. Incompleteness brings to the fore the work of making, whether it is making in response to changed conditions, new subjectivities, or new instrumentalities. Finally, it is the outsider and the excluded who have been key makers of this incompleteness by subjecting the institution to new types of claims across time and space – from rights to citizenship by nonproperty owners to fullness of marriage rights by gays and lesbians. There are elements in these dynamics of transformation that only become formalized long after the original claim-making, and hence in their time are easily thought of as prepolitical. But I argue that these elements are better defined as informal or not-yet-formalized types of politics.

I locate my inquiry at this point of incompleteness so as to open up the analysis to the role played by the *making* of the political, especially by the excluded. A critical distinction in my analysis is that between the incompleteness of a formalized institution and the formal exclusions it contains. The latter pertains to what is a visible excluding (such as foreign-born who are not naturalized, or nonwhites and nonproperty owners in earlier times in the United States). The incompleteness that concerns me here is of a specific sort. It does not pertain to what is left out knowingly, and perhaps necessarily, in the process of formalizing, and which can become highly visible through this excluding. Rather the kind of incompleteness that concerns me is integral to the condition of being formalized.² It is rendered invisible by the fact itself of full formalization. It

is not captured by Weber's concept of the iron cage. I am interested in the frictions between the formalized and the incomplete. Incompleteness enables a formal institution to incorporate change, including change that is potentially lethal to that institution. Formal institutions generally cannot avoid the unsettlements of daily life, and more generally, the conflicts that mark an epoch, a period. Some formalized institutions are sufficiently abstract to escape with only minor chinks in their armor. But this is not the case with institutions that encase critical and contested components of daily life or of an epoch, such as citizenship. These institutions can be brought down, no matter how powerful their formalization and their supporters. The divinity of the sovereign in medieval times and slavery in modern times are two grand cases of the fall of formalized institutions.

The conceptualizing of these various issues is organized here by the proposition that insofar as citizenship is at least partly and variably shaped by the conditions within which it is embedded, conditions that have changed in specific and general ways, today we may well be seeing yet another set of changes in the institution itself as we enter a new global phase. These changes may not yet be formalized and some may never become fully formalized. Today, one of the critical dynamics of change is globalization in its multiple incarnations, from organizational to subjective.

In my work I have long insisted that it is a mistake to see the global and the national as mutually exclusive and in some sort of zero-sum relationship—what one gains, the other loses (e.g., [Sassen, 1996, 2008](#)). I find and theorize that the national, including the national state, is one of the strategic institutional locations for the global. That is to say, some of the larger contextual changes which may carry specific consequences for citizenship in our current era include changes in the national. Thus citizenship, even if situated in institutional settings that are “national,” is a possibly changed institution if the meaning of the national itself has changed. The changes brought about by globalizing dynamics in the territorial and institutional organization of state authority are also transforming citizenship.

I interpret these types of changes as a partial and often incipient denationalizing of citizenship to distinguish it from postnational and transnational trends, which are also taking place. With the term “denationalization” I seek to capture something that remains connected to the “national” as constructed historically and is indeed profoundly imbricated with it but is so on historically new terms of engagement. “Incipient” and “partial” are two qualifiers I find useful in my discussion of denationalization. From the perspective of nation-based citizenship theory, some of these transformations might be interpreted as a decline or

devaluation of citizenship, but I argue that this is rather a feature of that complex incompleteness that marks the institution which allows it to accommodate transformations without sacrificing its formal status. Some of the transformations that are linked to particular features of globalization – notably the denationalizing of the national – are easily obscured by the fact that the institution remains embedded in the language, the code, the representations of the national. Here I examine formal and informal changes in the rights of citizens, in citizens' practices, and in the subjective dimensions of the institution. By including nonformalized "rights," practices, and subjectivities, the analysis can grasp instabilities and possibilities for further change in the institution.

AN INCOMPLETE SUBJECT

The rights articulated through the subject of the citizen are of a particular type and cannot be easily generalized to other types of subjects. Yet the complexity and multiple tensions built into the formal institution of citizenship make it a powerful heuristic for examining the question of rights generally and the specific case of rights issued by national states. The type of contextualizing I advance here brings to the fore the particularity of what is often universalized: the *national* citizen as a rights-bearing subject.

Elsewhere (Sassen, 2008, Chaps. 2 and 3) I have examined the active making of diverse kinds of rights-bearing subjects. For instance, the *making* of a citizen-subject in medieval times issued out of the active *making* of urban law by urban burghers. England and the United States in the 1800s saw the shaping of a fully enabled property-owning citizen (epitomized by the industrial bourgeoisie) and a disadvantaged citizen (the normally male factory worker), an inequality formalized in the law. The 1900s saw the partial remaking of this disadvantaged citizen through civil and workplace struggles: disadvantaged subjects fought for and gained several formal rights. These are just a few instances in recent Western history. Struggles for making a rights-bearing subject have happened across the centuries and around the world, with vast variations of form and content. The modern 21st century citizen arising out of the nation-state is also being remade in bits and pieces, even though formally this category may appear permanent.

My focus here is on how this highly formalized institution confronts today's changes in the larger social context, in the law, in political subjectivities, and in discursive practices. A key element bringing these various histories together, as well as securing the durability of the institution

of citizenship, has been the larger historical project usually described as the development of the modern state: the project to render national major institutions that might well have followed a different trajectory, and to some extent did for most of the recorded history.

Political membership as a national category is today an inherited condition, one that is experienced as a given rather than as a process of *making* a rights-bearing subject. And while its making in Europe arose out of the conditions of the cities, from the Greek city-states to the cities of the Late Middle Ages, today it is generally understood to be inextricably articulated with the national state (Himmelfarb, 2001; see Abu-Lughod, 1989 for another geography of this history of political membership). Yet today's significant, even if not absolute, transformations in the condition of the national generally, and the national state in particular, help make visible the historicity of the formal institution of citizenship and thus show its national spatial character as but one of several possible framings. Both the nation-state and citizenship have been constructed in elaborate and formal ways. And each has evolved historically as a tightly packaged bundle of what were often rather diverse elements.

Some of the main dynamics at work today are destabilizing these national bundlings and bring to the fore both the fact itself of that bundling and its particularity. The work of making and formalizing a unitary packaging for diverse elements comes under pressure today in both formalized (e.g., the granting of dual nationality and recognition of the international human rights regime) and nonformalized ways (e.g., granting undocumented immigrants in the United States the "right" to mortgages so they can buy homes). Among the destabilizing dynamics at work are globalization and digitization, both as material processes and as signaling subjective possibilities or imaginaries. In multiple ways they perform changes in the formal and informal relationships between the national state and the citizen. There are also a range of emergent political practices often involving hitherto silent or silenced population groups and organizations. Through their destabilizing effects, these dynamics and actors are producing operational and rhetorical openings for the emergence of new types of political subjects and new spatialities for politics. More broadly, the destabilizing of national state-centered hierarchies of legitimate power and allegiance has enabled a multiplication of nonformalized or only partly formalized political dynamics and actors.

Today's condition of unsettlement helps make legible the diversity of sources and institutional locations for rights, as well as the changeability and variability of the rights-bearing subject that is the citizen,

notwithstanding the formal character of the institution. We can detect a partial redeployment of specific components of citizenship across a wide range of institutional locations and normative orders, going well beyond the national bond. These are components that have been held together rather tightly for the last 100 years. We also can detect a growing range of sites where formal or experiential features of citizenship generate instability in the institution, and hence the possibility of changes.

Analytically, I distinguish between citizenship markers arising from the formal apparatus of the nation-state, including citizenship as a formal institution, on the one hand, and, on the other, citizenship markers arising outside that formal apparatus (that can, at the limit, signal types of informal citizenship). Among the first I include, the changing relationship between citizenship and nationality, the increasingly formalized interaction between citizenship rights and human rights, the implications for formal citizenship of the privatizing of executive power along with the erosion of citizens' privacy rights, and the elaboration of a series of portable citizenship rights for high-level professionals engaged in novel types of formal cross-border economic transactions (Sassen, 2008, Chaps. 4–6).

Among the second I include a range of incipient and typically not formalized developments in the institution that can be organized into three types of empirical cases. One category is the processes that alter a status and involve both informal and formal institutional environments. Two examples illustrate the range of possible instances. One is the fact that international human rights enter the national court system through an often rather informal process, which with time can become stabilized and eventually made part of national law. The other is the fact that undocumented immigrants who demonstrate long-term residence and good conduct can make a claim for regularization on the basis, ultimately, of their long-term violation of the law because this temporal dimension points to, in my reading, the active making by the immigrant of the material conditions supporting that claim (e.g., sustaining the duties of neighborliness, parenthood, employee, etc., over many years). These types of dynamics are good examples of one of the theses that have organized much of my research in previous work: excluded actors and not fully formalized norms are factors that can make history, even though they become recognized only when formalized. A second type of empirical case is the variety of components usually bundled with the set of formal citizenship rights even though their legal status is of a different sort. A possible way of categorizing these components is in terms of practices, identities, and locations for the enactment of citizenship (see Bosniak, 2000a). This differentiation allows me

to focus on subjects who are by definition categorized as not political in the formal sense of the term, such as the subject that is the “housewife” or the “mother,” but who may have considerable political agency and be an emergent political actor. And the third type of empirical example is that of subjects not quite fully authorized by the law, such as undocumented immigrants, but who can nonetheless function as bearers of partial rights (e.g., the right to wages for work done) and, more generally, as part of a larger informal political landscape.

One of the critical institutional developments that gives meaning to such informal political actors and practices is the thesis that the formal political apparatus today accommodates less and less of the political. While the United States is perhaps emblematic of this shrinking presence of “the” political in the formal state apparatus, it is a condition that I argue is increasingly evident in a growing number of “liberal democracies.”

WHEN THE GLOBAL TRIANGULATES BETWEEN THE NATION-STATE AND CITIZENSHIP

Some of the major transformations occurring today under the impact of globalization may give citizenship yet another set of features as it continues to respond to the conditions within which it is embedded. The nationalizing of the institution that took place over the last few centuries may give way to a partial denationalizing. A fundamental dynamic in this regard is the growing articulation of globalization with national economies and the associated withdrawal of the state from various spheres of citizenship entitlements, with the possibility of a corresponding dilution of loyalty to the state. In turn, citizens’ loyalty may be less crucial to the state today than it was at a time of intense warfare and its need for loyal citizen-soldiers.

Global firms and global markets mostly benefit from peace among the rich countries –with the exception of firms and markets involved in war industries. The “international” project represented by such firms and markets is radically different from what it was in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. This became evident in the debates leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, an event that renationalized politics. Except for highly specialized sectors, such as oil- and war-linked supplies and services, global firms in the United States and elsewhere were basically opposed to the invasion. Also the position of the citizen has been markedly weakened by states’ concern with national security, especially that of the United

States; this introduces yet another variable that can blur the differences between being and not being a citizen. Where previous nationality could determine designation as a suspect resident citizen, as for example, Germans and Japanese in the United States during World War II, today all citizens are, in principle, suspect in the United States given the government's "War on Terror."

Many of the dynamics that built economies, polities, and societies in the 19th and 20th centuries involved an articulation between the national scale and the growth of entitlements for citizens. This articulation was not only a political process; it contained a set of utility functions for workers, for property owners, and for the state. These utility functions have changed since the 1970s. During industrialization, class formation, class struggles, and the advantages of employers or workers tended to scale at the national level and became identified with state-produced legislation and regulations, entitlements, and obligations. The state came to be seen as a key to ensuring the well being of significant portions of both the working class and the bourgeoisie. The development of welfare states in the 20th century resulted in good part from the struggles by workers whose victories contributed to actually make capitalism more sustainable; advantaged sectors of the population, such as the growing middle class, also found their interests playing out at the national level and supported by national state planning, such as investment in transportation and housing infrastructure. Legislatures (or parliaments) and judiciaries developed the needed laws and systems and became a crucial institutional domain for granting entitlements to the poor and the disadvantaged.

Today, the growing weight given to notions of the "competitiveness" of states puts pressure on the particular utility functions of that older phase, and new rationales are developed for cutting down on those entitlements, which in turn weakens the reciprocal relationship between the citizen and the state. This weakening relationship takes on specific kinds of content for different sectors of the citizenry. The loss of entitlements among poor and low-waged workers is perhaps the most visible case (Munger, 2002), but the impoverishment of the old traditional middle classes evident in a growing number of countries around the world is not far behind. Finally, the intergenerational effects of these trends signal more change. Thus the disproportionate unemployment among the young and the fact that many of them develop only weak ties to the labor market, once thought of as a crucial mechanism for the socialization of young adults, will further weaken the loyalty and sense of reciprocity between these future adults and the state (Roulleau-Berger, 2002).

As these trends have come together at the turn of the 21st century they are destabilizing the meaning of citizenship as it was forged in the 19th and most of the 20th centuries. The growing emphasis on notions of the “competitive state” and the associated emphasis on markets have brought into question the foundations of the welfare state broadly understood – that is, the idea that the state bears responsibilities for the basic well-being of its citizens, and that the state’s utility function is to be distinguished from that of private firms (Aman, 1998, 2004; Schwarcz, 2002; Hall & Biersteker, 2002). For Marshall (1977) and many others, the welfare state is an important ingredient of social citizenship; the reliance on markets to solve political and social problems is seen, at its most extreme, as a savage attack on the principles of citizenship (Saunders, 1993). For Saunders, citizenship inscribed in the institutions of the welfare state is a buffer against the vagaries of the market and the inequalities of the class system.

The nature of citizenship has also been challenged by the erosion of privacy rights “justified” by the declaration of national emergencies, as well as by a proliferation of old issues that have gained new attention. Among the latter are the question of state membership of aboriginal communities, stateless people, and refugees.³

All of these have important implications for human rights in relation to citizenship (Benhabib, 2004; Brysk & Shafir, 2004). These social changes in the role of the nation-state, the impact of globalization on states, and the relationship between dominant and subordinate groups also have major implications for questions of identity. Ong (1999, Chaps. 1 and 4) finds that in cross-border processes individuals actually accumulate partial rights, a form she calls flexible citizenship.⁴ Global forces that challenge and transform the authority of nation-states may give human rights an expanded role in the normative regulation of politics as politics become more global (Jacobson, 1996, 2009; Soysal, 1994, 2000; Hunter, 1992; Rubenstein & Adler, 2000; Sakai, de Bary, & Toshio, 2005). If citizenship is theorized as necessarily national (Himmelfarb, 2001) then these new developments are not fully captured in the language of citizenship.⁵ An alternative interpretation would be to suspend the national, as in postnational conceptions, and to posit that the issue of where citizenship is enacted should, as Bosniak (2000a) argues, be determined in light of developing social practice.⁶

Over the last two decades there have been several efforts to organize the various understandings of citizenship: citizenship as legal status, as possession of rights, as political activity, and as a form of collective identity and sentiment (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Carens, 1996; Benhabib, 2002;

Vogel & Moran, 1991; Conover, 1995; Bosniak, 2000b). Further, some scholars (Young, 2002; Turner, 1993; Taylor, 2007) have posited that cultural citizenship is a necessary part of any adequate conception of citizenship, while others have insisted on the importance of economic citizenship (Kirsch, 2006; Fernández-Kelly & Shefner, 2005; Sassen, 1996, Chap. 2). Still others emphasize the psychological dimension and the ties of identification and solidarity we maintain with other groups in the world (Conover, 1995; Carens, 1996; Pogge, 2007). Many of these distinctions deconstruct the category of citizenship and are helpful for formulating novel conceptions. And they do not necessarily cease to be nation-state-based. The development of notions of postnational citizenship requires questioning the assumption that people's sense of citizenship in liberal democratic states is fundamentally characterized by nation-based frames. In explaining postnational citizenship, these questions of identity need to be taken into account along with formal developments such as EU-citizenship and the growth of the international human rights regime (Baubock, 2006). Insofar as legal and formal developments have not gone very far, a focus on experiences of identity emerges as crucial to postnational citizenship.

A focus on changes inside the national state and the possibility of new types of formalizations of citizenship status and rights – formalizations that might contribute to a partial denationalizing of certain features of citizenship – should be part of a more general examination of change in the institution of citizenship. Distinguishing postnational and denationalized dynamics in the construction of new components of citizenship allows us to take account of changes that might still use the national frame, yet are in fact altering the meaning of that frame.

The scholarship that critiques the assumption that identity is basically tied to a national polity represents a broad range of positions, many having little to do with postnational or denationalized conceptions. For some, the focus is on the fact that people often maintain stronger allegiances to and identification with particular cultural and social groups within the nation than with the nation at large (Young, 1990; Taylor, 2007). Others have argued that the notion of a national identity is based on the suppression of social and cultural differences (Friedman, 1973; Young, 2002). These and others have called for recognition of differentiated citizenship and modes of incorporation predicated not only on individuals but also on group rights, often understood as culturally distinct groups (Young, 1990; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Taylor, 2007; Conover, 1995). As de los Angeles Torres (1998) has observed, the “cultural pluralist” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994) or multiculturalist positions (Spinner-Halev, 1994) posit alternatives to a

“national” sense of identity but continue to use the nation-state as the normative frame and to understand the social groups involved as parts of national civil society. This also holds for proposals to democratize the public sphere through multicultural representation (Young, 1990; Kymlicka, 1995) since the public sphere is thought of as national. Critical challenges to statist premises can also be found in concepts of local citizenship, typically conceived of as centered in cities (e.g., Magnusson, 1990, 2000; Isin, 2000), or by reclaiming for citizenship domains of social life often excluded from conventional conceptions of politics (Bosniak, 2000a). Examples of the latter are the recognition of citizenship practices in the workplace (Pateman, 1989; Lawrence, 2004), in the economy at large (Dahl, 1989; Sennett, 2003), in the family (Jones, 1998; Hindman, 2007), and in new social movements (Tarrow, 1994; Magnusson, 2000; Bartlett, 2007). These are more sociological versions of citizenship, not confined by formal political criteria for specifying citizenship. While some of these critical literatures do not go beyond the nation-state and thereby do not fit in postnational conceptions of citizenship, they may fit in a conception of citizenship as becoming denationalized.

Partly influenced by these critical literatures and partly originating in other fields, a rapidly growing scholarship has begun to elaborate notions of transnational civil society and citizenship. It focuses on new transnational forms of political organization emerging in a context of rapid globalization and proliferation of cross-border activities of all sorts of “actors,” notably immigrants, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), first-nation people, human rights, the environment, arms control, women’s rights, labor rights, and rights of national minorities (Smith & Guarnizo, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Bonilla, Mélendez, Morales, & de los Angeles Torres, 1998; Brysk & Shafir, 2004). For Falk (1993) these are citizen practices that go beyond the nation. Transnational activism emerges as a form of global citizenship, which Magnusson describes as “popular politics in its global dimension” (1996, p. 103). Wapner sees these emergent forms of civil society as “a slice of associational life which exists above the individual and below the state, but also across national boundaries” (1996, pp. 312–333). Questions of identity and solidarity include the rise of transnationalism (de los Angeles Torres, 1998; Cohen, 1995; Franck, 1992; Levitt, 2001) and translocal loyalties (Appadurai, 1996, p. 165; Basch, Schiller, & Blanc, 1993).

Third is the emergence of transnational social and political communities constituted through transborder migration. These begin to function as bases for new forms of citizenship identity to the extent that members maintain identification and solidarities with one another across state territorial

divides (Levitt, 2001; Portes, 1995; Basch et al., 1993; Smith, 2005; Soysal, 1997). These are, then, citizenship identities that arise out of networks, activities, and ideologies that span the home and the host society. Fourth is a sort of global sense of solidarity and identification, partly out of humanitarian convictions (Slawner & Denham, 1998; Pogge, 2007). Today there are often practical considerations at work, as in global ecological interdependence, economic globalization, global media, and commercial culture, all of which create structural interdependencies and a sense of global responsibility (Falk, 1993; Held & McGrew, 2007; Hoerder, 2000).

In brief, through different vocabularies and questions these diverse literatures make legible the variability of citizenship. In so doing, they also signal what we might think of as the incompleteness of citizenship, one inherent to the institution given its historicity and embeddedness.⁷ In this incompleteness also lies the possibility of its transformation across time and place.

CITIZENSHIP DISASSEMBLED: A LENS INTO THE QUESTION OF RIGHTS

These empirical conditions and conceptual elaborations of the late 20th century together produce a fundamental question. What is the analytic terrain within which we need to place the question of rights as articulated in the institution of citizenship (Sassen, 1996, Chap. 2; 2008, Chap. 6)? The history of interactions between disadvantage and expanded inclusions signals the possibility that the new conditions of inequality and difference evident today and the new types of claim-making they generate may bring about further transformations in the institution of citizenship. For instance, although it has an old history,⁸ the question of diversity assumes new meanings and contains new elements. Notable here are the globalization of economic and cultural relationships and the repositioning of “culture,” including cultures embedded in religions that encompass basic norms for the conduct of daily life.⁹ It is clear that republican conceptions of citizenship are but one of several options, even though they can accommodate diversity via the distinction of public and private spheres.¹⁰

There are three aspects that begin to capture the complexity of contemporary citizenship and, more broadly, the formation of a rights-bearing subject. One of these can be captured through the proposition that citizenship is partly produced by the practices of the excluded; this opens up

the terrain for rights in a context where the grip of the nation-state on questions of identity and membership is weakened by major social, economic, political, and subjective trends. Second, by expanding the formal inclusions of citizenship, the national state itself contributed to create some of the conditions that eventually facilitated key aspects of post- or transnational citizenship, particularly in a context of globalization. Third, insofar as the state itself has undergone significant transformation, notably the changes bundled under the notion of the competitive state and the quasi-privatized executive, there is a reduced likelihood that state institutions will do the type of legislative and judiciary work that in the past led to expanded formal inclusions.

These three dynamics point to the absence of a linear evolution in the institution of citizenship. The progressively expanding inclusions that took off in the United States in the 1960s, notably the struggles for civil rights, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and feminist struggles, produced conditions for new trajectories in the development of citizenship. Those inclusions enabled a variety of actors to make claims.

The formalizing of increasing inclusions has contributed to the centrality of equality to citizenship, giving it an aspirational quality that brings yet another dimension to the question of rights. In a socio-economic context where the traditional protected middle classes are becoming impoverished, equality becomes a substantive norm that takes the project of citizenship beyond formal equality of rights. Also the traditional middle classes which have enjoyed formal equality of rights move towards new types of substantive claims. With the growing importance of national law for the giving of presence and voice to hitherto silenced minorities, the tension between the legal status and the normative project of citizenship has also grown: the legal status is no longer enough not only for those who are minoritized socially, but also for the newly vulnerable traditional middle classes. For many, citizenship is now a normative project whereby social membership becomes increasingly comprehensive and open-ended.

Globalization and human rights contribute to this tension and thereby further the elements of a new discourse on rights. Though in very different ways, both globalization and the human rights regime have contributed to destabilizing the existing political hierarchies of legitimate power and allegiance over the last decade as economic insecurity fed new and old racisms and nationalisms. The pressures of globalization on national states have also redirected claim-making. This is already evident, among other cases, in the decision by first-nations people to address the UN and claim direct representation in international fora, rather than going through the

national state. It is also evident in the increasingly institutionalized framework of the international human rights regime which now offers some actors the possibility to bypass unilateral state sovereignty (Jacobson & Ruffer, 2006). We see today a growing emphasis on claims and aspirations that go beyond a national definition of rights and obligations, facilitating in the process new discourses and subjectivities.

Though often presented as a single concept and experienced as a unitary institution, citizenship actually describes a number of discrete but connected components in the relation between the individual and the polity. Current developments are bringing to light and accentuating the distinctiveness of these various components, from formal rights to practices and subjective dimensions, and the tension between citizenship as a formal legal status and as a normative project or an aspiration (Bosniak, 2006; Shachar, 2009). The formal equality that attaches to all citizens rarely embodies the need for substantive equality in social terms. Finally, the growing prominence of an international human rights regime has produced synergies between citizenship rights and human rights, even as it has underscored the differences between these two types of rights.

Insofar as citizenship is a status that articulates legal rights and responsibilities, the mechanisms through which this articulation is shaped and implemented can be analytically distinguished from the status itself. In the medieval cities of Europe, urban residents themselves set up the structures through which to establish and thicken the rights and obligations of the citizen, a special status to be distinguished from the overall population of urban residents. They did so through the codification of a specific type of law, urban law that constructed them as rights-bearing subjects. Today it is largely the national state that articulates the subject of the citizen.

Some of these issues can be illustrated through the evolution of equal citizenship. Equal citizenship is central to the modern institution of citizenship; the expansion of specific types of equality among citizens has shaped a good part of its evolution in the 20th century. Yet insofar as equality is based on membership, as a criterion, citizenship status forms the basis of exclusive politics and identities. This exclusiveness can be seen as essential because it provides the sense of solidarity necessary for the development of modern citizenship in the nation-state (Walzer, 1995; Bosniak, 1996). In a country such as the United States, the principle of equal citizenship remains unfulfilled, even after the successful struggles and legal advances of the second half of the 20th century. Groups defined by race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and other “identities” still face

various exclusions from full participation in public life. This is especially so at the level of practices even in the face of changes in the formal legal status, and notwithstanding formal equality as citizens. Feminist and race-critical scholarship has highlighted the failure of gender- and race-neutral conceptions of citizenship, such as legal status, to account for the differences of individuals within communities (Benhabib, Butler, Cornell, & Fraser, 1995; Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1996; Delgado & Stefancic, 1999; Benhabib, 2002). In addition, because full participation as a citizen is conditioned by a (variable) minimum of material resources and social rights (Marshall, 1977; Handler, 1995), poverty can severely reduce participation.¹¹ In brief, legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights because these rights are often conditioned by the position of different groups within a nation-state.

With the major transformations afoot both inside (Sassen, 2008, Chap. 4) and beyond (Sassen, 2008, Chap. 5) the state, as well as the ascendance of human rights as a significant vector of contemporary law (Koh, 1998; Jacobson & Ruffer, 2006; Bosniak, 2006), this articulation may well begin to change once again. And so might the actual content and shape of citizens' rights and obligations. One window into these issues is a comparison of particular features that are meant to distinguish the citizen and the alien, the two foundational institutions for membership in the modern state. The particular features I am after here are those that mark an unstable difference. These are in many ways minor features, and they are situational in that they only emerge in certain spaces and at particular times. The next section examines some of these particularities (for a full treatment see Sassen, 2008, Chaps. 6, 8, and 9).

BENEATH NEW NATIONALISMS, A BLURRING OF MEMBERSHIP POLITICS

Unlike the citizen, the immigrant or, more generally, the alien is constructed in law as a very partial, thin subject. Yet the immigrant and immigration have been made into thick realities, and as words they are charged with content. In this tension between a thin formal subject – the alien – and a rich reality lies the heuristic capacity of immigration to illuminate tensions at the heart of the historically constructed nation-state (Sassen, 1996, Chap. 3). These tensions are not new, historically speaking (Sassen, 1999), but as with citizenship, current conditions are producing their own distinct possibilities.

Further, the changes in the institution of citizenship itself, particularly its debordering of formal definitions and national locations, have implications for the definition of the immigrant. Confronted with postnational and denationalized forms of citizenship, what is it that we are trying to discern in the complex processes we group under the term immigration?¹² On the other hand, the renationalizing of citizenship narrows the definition of the citizen and thereby that of the immigrant. As a subject, then, the immigrant filters a much larger array of political dynamics than its status in law might suggest.

Working with the distinctions and transformations discussed thus far, I want to explore the possibility of two somewhat stylized subjects that destabilize formal meanings and thereby illuminate the internal tensions of the institution of citizenship, specifically the citizen as a rights-bearing subject. On the one hand, we can identify a type of informal citizen who is unauthorized yet recognized, as might be the case with undocumented immigrants who are long-term residents in a community and participate in it as citizens do. On the other hand, we can identify a formal citizen who is fully authorized yet not fully recognized, as might be the case with minoritized citizens and with subjects engaging in political work even though they do so not as “citizens” but as some other kind of subject, for example, as mothers.

Perhaps one of the more extreme instances of a condition akin to informal citizenship is what has been called the informal social contract that binds undocumented immigrants to their communities of residence (Schuck & Smith, 1985). Thus, unauthorized immigrants who demonstrate civic involvement, social deservedness, and national loyalty can argue that they merit legal residency.

At perhaps the other extreme of the undocumented immigrant whose practices allow him/her to become accepted as a member of the political community are those who are full citizens but yet not fully recognized as such. Minoritized citizens who are discriminated against in any domain are one key instance. This is a familiar and well-documented condition. However, a very different case is the citizen who functions as a political actor even though he/she is not recognized as such. This is a condition I see emerging all over the world and read as signaling the limitations of the formal political apparatus for a growing range of political projects. Women are often such actors.

Women emerged as a specific type of political actor during the brutal dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s in several Latin American countries. It was precisely their condition as mothers and wives that gave them the clarity and courage to demand justice and bread, and in a way protected them from

attacks by the armed soldiers and policemen they confronted. Mothers in the barrios of Santiago during Pinochet's dictatorship, the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, and the mothers regularly demonstrating in front of the major prisons in El Salvador during that country's civil war, all were driven to political action as mothers – that is, by their despair over the loss of children and husbands, and the struggle to provide food in their homes.

These are dimensions of formal and informal citizenship and citizenship practices that do not fit the indicators and categories of mainstream academic frameworks for understanding citizenship and political life. The subject that is the housewife or the mother does not fit the categories and indicators used to capture participation in public life. Feminist scholarship in all the social sciences has had to deal with a set of similar or equivalent difficulties and tensions in its effort to constitute its subject or to reconfigure a subject that has been flattened. The theoretical and empirical distance that has to be bridged between the recognized world of politics and the as yet unmapped experience of citizenship of the housewife.

POSTNATIONAL OR DENATIONALIZED CITIZENSHIP?

The transformations discussed thus far in this chapter raise questions about the proposition that citizenship has a necessary connection to the national state insofar as they significantly alter the conditions for that articulation. Posing the question this way denaturalizes conventional political thought and parallels the argument about the historicity of both the institution of citizenship and that of sovereignty, especially as it is brought to the fore through the new conditions introduced by globalization. Some scholars (e.g., [Bosniak, 2000a](#)) argue that there is no objective definition of citizenship to which we can refer authoritatively to resolve any uncertainties about the usage of the term. The discussion in the preceding sections showed the extent to which the institution of citizenship has multiple dimensions, many of which are under contestation.

These developments have increasingly been theorized as signaling the emergence of postnational forms of citizenship ([Soysal, 1994, 2000](#); [Jacobson, 1996](#)).¹³ The emphasis in this formulation is on the emergence of locations for citizenship outside the confines of the national state. The European Union (EU) passport is, perhaps, the most formalized of these.

But the reemergence of a concern with cosmopolitanism (Turner, 2000; Nussbaum, 1998) and the proliferation of transnationalisms (Smith & Guarnizo, 1998; Sanjeev, 2005) have been key sources for notions of postnational citizenship. Bosniak states that there is a reasonable case to be made that “the experiences and practices we conventionally associate with citizenship do in some respects exceed the boundaries of the territorial nation-state—though the pervasiveness and significance of this process varies depending on the dimension of citizenship at issue” (2000a, p. 488). Whether it is the organization of formal status, the protection of rights, citizenship practices, or the experience of collective identities and solidarities, the nation-state is not the exclusive site for their enactment, but it remains by far the most important site.

There is a second dynamic becoming evident that shares aspects with postnational citizenship but is usefully distinguished in that it concerns specific transformations within the national state that directly and indirectly alter specific aspects of the institution of citizenship. These transformations are not predicated necessarily on locations for the institution outside the national state, which are key to conceptions of postnational citizenship. These changes in the law of nationality described later in this section, although minor, capture some of these transformations inside the national state and further indicate an increased valuing of effective rather than purely formal nationality. It is also useful to distinguish this second dynamic of transformation inside the national state because most of the scholarship on these issues is about postnational citizenship (e.g., Soysal, 1994; Bosniak, 2000a) and has overlooked some of the trends I describe as a denationalizing of particular aspects of citizenship.

I see the potential for capturing two – not necessarily mutually exclusive – possible trajectories for the institution of citizenship in the differences between these dynamics. These trajectories are embedded in some of the major conditions marking the contemporary era; that we can identify two possible trajectories contests easy determinisms about the impact of globalization (i.e., the inevitability of the postnational), and they signal the potential for change in the institution of citizenship even inside the national framing of the institution. Their difference is a question of scope and institutional embeddedness. The understanding in the scholarship is that postnational citizenship is located partly outside the confines of the national.¹⁴ In considering denationalization, the focus moves on to the transformation of the national, including the national in its condition as foundational for citizenship. Thus it could be argued that postnationalism and denationalization represent two different trajectories.¹⁵ Both are viable and neither

excludes the other. One has to do with the transformation of the national, specifically under the impact of globalization, though not exclusively perhaps, and will tend to instantiate inside the national. The other has to do with new forms that we have not even considered, and might emerge out of the changed conditions in the world located outside the national.

If important features of the territorial and institutional organization of the political power and authority of the state have changed, then we must consider that key features of the institution of citizenship – its formal rights, its practices, its subjective dimension – have also been transformed even when it remains centered on the national state. This territorial and institutional transformation of state power and authority has allowed operational, conceptual, and rhetorical openings for nation-based subjects other than the national state to emerge as legitimate actors in international/global arenas that used to be confined to the state (e.g., *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 1996). Further, among the sharpest changes in the condition of citizens are the new security measures (e.g., the Patriot Act in the United States), which in this context can be seen as a stimulus for particular citizens to want to go transnational to make claims, notably to human rights courts such as the European Court on Human Rights or, if pertinent, the International Criminal Court.

The national remains a referent in my work on citizenship. But clearly it is a referent of a specific sort: it is, after all, *its change* that becomes the key theoretical feature through which it enters my specification of changes in the institution of citizenship.¹⁶ Whether this devalues citizenship is not immediately evident at this point, partly because I read the institution of citizenship as having undergone many transformations in its history precisely because it is to variable extents embedded in the specifics of each of its eras.¹⁷ We can identify three elements that signal this particular way of using the national as a referent for capturing changes in the institution of citizenship.

First, it was through national law that many of the expanded inclusions that enabled citizens were instituted (Karst, 1997), inclusions which today are destabilizing older notions of citizenship.¹⁸ This pluralized meaning of citizenship partly produced by the formal expansions of the legal status of citizenship is helping explode the boundaries of that legal status even further, for example, the increasing number of states that now grant dual nationality, EU citizenship, and the strengthening of human rights. If we assume that “the enjoyment of rights remains as one aspect of what we understand citizenship to be, then we can argue that the national grip on citizenship has been substantially loosened” (Bosniak, 2000a, p. 470), perhaps most especially by the emergence of the human rights regime (Soysal, 1994; Jacobson & Ruffer,

2003). This transformation in nation-based citizenship is not only due to the emergence of non-national sites for legitimate claim-making. The meaning of the territorial itself has changed (see Sassen, 2008, Chap. 5; 1996, Chap. 1), in addition digital space enables articulations between national territorial and global spaces that deborder national encasements for a variety of activities, from economics to citizenship practices.¹⁹ All of these have been interpreted as loosening the “national grip” on citizens’ rights.

A second critical element is the strengthening, including the constitutionalizing, of rights that allow citizens to make claims against their states and to invoke a measure of autonomy in the formal political arena that can be read as a lengthening distance between the formal apparatus of the state and the institution of citizenship. The political and theoretical implications of this dimension are complex and in the making: we cannot tell what the practices and rhetorics that might be invented and deployed will be. Certainly the erosion of citizens’ privacy rights is one factor that has sharpened the distance with the state for some citizens and has caused some citizens to sue governments.

A third element is the granting by national states of multiple “rights” to foreign actors, largely and especially economic actors – foreign firms, foreign investors, international markets, and foreign business people (Sassen, 2008, Chap. 6; 1996, Chap. 2). Admittedly, this is not a common way of framing the issue. It comes out of my perspective about the impact of globalization and denationalization on the national state, including the impact on the relationship between the state and its own citizens, and between the state and foreign actors. I see this as a significant, though not much recognized, development in the history of claim-making. For me the question as to how citizens should handle these new concentrations of power and “legitimacy” that attach to global firms and markets is a key to the future of democracy. Detecting the extent to which the global is embedded and filtered through the national (e.g., the concept of the global city) is one way of understanding whether therein lies a possibility for citizens, still largely confined to national institutions, to demand accountability of global economic actors through national institutional channels, rather than having to wait for a “global” state.

Thus, while accentuating the national may appear as a handicap in terms of democratic participation in a global age, it is not an either/or proposition precisely because of this partial embedding of the global in the national. There is indeed a growing gap between globalization and the confinement of the national state to its territory. But it is inadequate simply to accept the prevailing wisdom in this realm that, wittingly or not, presents the national

and the global as two mutually exclusive domains – for theorization and for politics. This is a highly problematic proposition even though I recognize that each domain has specificity. It is enormously important to develop forms of participatory politics that decenter and sometimes transcend national political life, and to learn how to practice democracy across borders. In this I fully support the political project of postnational citizenship. We also can engage in democratic practices that cross borders and engage the global from within the national and through national institutional channels.

The international human rights regime may eventually become an acceptable and effective alternative to specific cases of judicial enforcement of citizens' rights. In the United States, for instance, it would affect the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. In Europe some of this is already happening. Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and various EU treaties has produced important substantive changes in the domestic law of member countries, enforced by domestic courts (e.g., [Jacobson & Ruffer, 2006](#)).

But in most of the world, human rights are enforced either through national law or not at all. Critical here is [Koh's \(1998\)](#) argument that human rights norms get incorporated into national law through an at times slow but effective means he calls "transnational legal process." Two major changes at the turn of the millennium are the growing weight of the human rights regime on states under the rule of law and the growing use of human rights instruments in national courts both for interpretation and adjudication. This is an instance of denationalization insofar as the mechanisms are internal to the national state – national courts and legislatures – while the instruments invoke an authority that transcends the national state and the interstate system. The long-term persuasive powers of human rights are a significant factor in this context.

It is important to note here that the human rights regime, while international, deals with citizens inside a state. It thereby destabilizes older notions of exclusive state sovereignty articulated in international law, which posit that matters internal to a country are to be determined solely by the state. The human rights regime subjects states to scrutiny when it comes to treatment of individuals within its territory.

NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CITY?

Many of the transformations in the broader context and in the institution itself become evident in today's large cities. Perhaps the most evolved type

of site for these types of transformations is the global city (Sassen, 2001, 2006). The global city concentrates the most developed and pronounced instantiations of some of these changes and in so doing is reconfigured as a partly denationalized space that enables a partial reinvention of citizenship.

These are spaces that can exit the institutionalized hierarchies of scale articulated through the nation-state. That reinvention, then, takes the institution away from questions of nationality narrowly defined and toward the enactment of a large array of particular interests, from protests against police brutality and globalization to sexual preference politics and house squatting by anarchists. I interpret this as a move toward citizenship practices that revolve around claiming rights to the city. These are not exclusively or necessarily urban practices. But it is especially in large cities that we can observe simultaneously some of the most extreme inequalities and conditions enabling these citizenship practices.

In global cities, these practices also contain the possibility of directly engaging strategic forms of power, which I interpret as significant in a context where power is increasingly privatized, globalized, and elusive. Where Max Weber saw the medieval city as the strategic site for the enablement of the burghers as political actors and Lefebvre saw the large modern cities as the strategic site for the struggles of the industrial organized workforce to gain rights, I see in today's global cities the strategic site for a whole new type of political actors and projects.

Current conditions in global cities are creating not only new structurations of power but also operational and rhetorical openings for new types of political actors that may have been submerged, invisible, or without voice. A key element here is that the localization of strategic components of globalization in these cities means that the disadvantaged can engage the new forms of globalized corporate power and, further, that the growing numbers and diversity of the disadvantaged in these cities under these conditions becomes heuristic in that they become present to each other. It is the fact of such "presence," rather than power per se that generates operational and rhetorical openings. Such an interpretation seeks to make a distinction between powerlessness and invisibility/impotence, and thereby underlines the complexity of powerlessness. Powerlessness is not simply the absence of power; it can be constituted in diverse ways, some indeed marked by impotence and invisibility, but others not. The fact that the disadvantaged in global cities can gain "presence" in their engagement with

power but also vis-à-vis each other, does not necessarily bring power but neither can it be flattened into some generic lack of power.

CONCLUSION

Citizenship becomes a heuristic category through which to understand the question of rights and subject formation and to do so in ways that recover the conditionalities entailed in its territorial articulation and thereby the limits or vulnerabilities of this framing. At the most abstract or formal level not much has changed over the last century in the essential features of citizenship unlike, for example, the characteristics of leading economic sectors. The theoretical ground from which I addressed the issue is that of the historicity and the embeddedness of both citizenship and the national state.

Once we accept that the institution of citizenship is embedded and hence marked by this embeddedness and that the national state is undergoing significant transformations in the contemporary era (due to a partly overlapping combination of globalization, deregulation, and privatization), we can posit that the nature of citizenship will sooner or later incorporate at least some of these changes in at least some of its components. Strictly speaking, I call this particular dynamic *denationalization*. It is an open question, empirically, operationally, and theoretically, whether this will also produce forms of citizenship completely located outside the state, such as postnational citizenship. While this distinction may seem and indeed be unnecessary for certain types of argumentation, it is an illuminating one if the effort is to tease out the changes in the institutional order within which citizenship is embedded. It puts the focus on the national rather than on the non-national settings within which some components of citizenship may eventually be and to some extent already are changing.

But this national setting is getting partly denationalized – it may not be globalized, but it is profoundly, even if only partly, transformed. This fits into one of my larger concerns, which is to understand the embedding of much of what we call the global in national institutional settings and territories and how this transforms the national. It often occurs in ways that we do not recognize or do not represent as such and, indeed, continue to code or see as national. This brings with it the need to decode what is national in some of the institutional and territorial settings we continue to see or represent as national. And it suggests that a critical dynamic is a rearticulation of the

spatio-temporal organization of relations between universality and particularity rather than simply an evolution of the nation-state.

NOTES

1. When not otherwise specified, this essay is largely based on these two sources; this is also where the reader will find a fuller conceptual, empirical, and bibliographic elaboration of the argument.

2. For a fuller development of this distinction between the incompleteness of the institution and the exclusions of that institution, please see Sassen (2009, 2008, Chap. 6).

3. See, for example, Knop (2002), see also Sassen (1999, Chaps. 6 and 7).

4. See Ong (1999, Chaps. 1 and 4). Ong is one of the major and most original contributors to the elaboration and discovery of a very particular set of transnationalisms that alter traditional notions of citizenship. Her work goes well beyond the fact of crossing borders.

5. Thus for Karst, “In the US today, citizenship is inextricable from a complex legal framework that includes a widely accepted body of substantive law, strong law-making institutions, and law-enforcing institutions capable of performing their task” (2000, p. 600). Not recognizing the centrality of the legal issues is, for Karst, a big mistake. Postnational citizenship lacks an institutional framework that can protect the substantive values of citizenship. Karst does acknowledge the possibility of rabid nationalism and the exclusion of aliens when legal status is made central.

6. For some of the earlier conceptualizations from the perspective of immigration see Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1996). There is a growing literature that is expanding the content of citizenship. For example, some scholars focus on the affective connections that people establish and maintain with one another in the context of a growing transnational civil society (see generally Fraser, 2007; Glasius, Kaldor, & Anheier, 2003; Cohen, 1995; Lipschutz & Mayer, 1996). Citizenship here resides in identities and commitments that arise out of cross-border affiliations, especially those associated with oppositional politics, though it might include the corporate professional circuits that are increasingly forms of partly deterritorialized global cultures (e.g., Menjivar, 2000; Smith, 2005; Moghadam, 2005).

7. See Sassen (2008, pp. 289–290) where I develop elements for deciphering conceptual parameters that capture the complexity of citizenship today and, more generically, the formation of rights-bearing subjects.

8. The challenge of negotiating the inclusion of citizens and the question of diversity is an old one. Saxonhouse (1992) observes that ancient Greece confronted the problem of diversity and thereby produced political theory – we might add, to rationalize exclusion.

9. For example, it is becoming evident that in the Muslim world the sphere of the public is being affected by current dynamics, notably the growing use of the Internet, which is enabling the formation of a transnational Muslim public sphere (Eickelman & Anderson, 1999).

10. This has been the official position of the French, explicated in the case of the demand by some Muslim sectors in France for girls to wear veils to school: they can be worn at home but are prohibited in public spaces, including public institutions.

11. Even in a rich country such as the United States, old and unreliable voting machines and difficult-to-access polling stations can reduce participation.

12. At some point we are going to have to ask what the term immigrant truly means. People in movement are an increasingly strong presence, especially in cities. Further, when citizens begin to develop transnational identities, it alters something in the meaning of immigration. In my research I have sought to situate immigration in a broader field of actors by asking who all the actors are involved in producing the outcome that we call immigration. My answer is that there are many more than just the immigrants, whereas existing law and the public imagination tend to identify immigrants as the only actors producing this complex process.

13. See also the chapters in *Inis (2000)* which elaborate these issues from the specific angle of the city and the locality.

14. See notably *Soysal's (1994)* trend-setting book; see also *Bosniak (2000a)* who, while using the term denationalized, is using it to denote postnational, and it is the postnational concept that is crucial to her critique as well as to her support of some of the aspirations signaled by the term postnational.

15. In this regard, *Bosniak's (2000a, p. 508)* conclusion contains both of these notions but conflates when she asks whether denationalized citizenship can ultimately decouple the concept of citizenship from the nation-state.

16. *Bosniak (1996, pp. 29–30)* understands this when she asserts that for some (*Sassen, 1996; Jacobson, 1996*) there is a “devaluing” (for me, rather, a repositioning) of citizenship but that the nation-state is still its referent and in that regard is not a postnational interpretation.

17. In this regard, I have emphasized the significance (*Sassen, 2008, Chap. 6; 1996, Chap. 2*) of the introduction in the new constitutions of South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and the central European countries of a provision that qualifies what had been an unqualified right (if democratically elected) of the sovereign to be the exclusive representative of its people in international fora.

18. One example comes indirectly through changes in the institution of alienage. In *Karst's* interpretation of US law, aliens are “constitutionally entitled to most of the guarantees of equal citizenship, and the Supreme Court has accepted this idea to a modest degree” (2000, p. 599; see also 599n. 20, where he cites cases). *Karst* also notes that the Supreme Court has not carried this development nearly as far as it could have (and he wishes), thereby signaling that the potential for transforming the institution may well be higher than the actual disposition to change it. *Smith (2001), Neumann (1996), Bosniak (2006)* provide developed and in-depth accounts of the status of immigrants and aliens generally in the Constitution and in US law more generally. A significantly transformed institution of alienage would have an impact on changing at least some features of the meaning of citizenship. For an extraordinary account of how the US polity and legal system has constructed the subject of the immigrant, in this case the Asian American, see *Palumbo-Liu (1999)*.

19. See, for example, *Teubner's (2004)* argument about a right of access to digital space as part of a larger argument about decentered constitutionalism.

REFERENCES

- Abu-Lughod, J. (1989). *Before European hegemony: The world system A.D. 1250–1350*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Aman, A. C. (1998). The globalizing state: A future-oriented perspective on the public/private distinction, federalism, and democracy. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 31(4), 769–870.
- Aman, A. C. (2004). *The democracy deficit: Taming globalization through law reform*. New York: New York University Press.
- Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bada, X., Fox, J., & Selee, A. (2006). *Invisible no more: Mexican migrant civic participation in the United States*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Bartlett, A. (2007). The city and the self: The emergence of new political subjects in London. In: S. Sassen (Ed.), *Deciphering the global: Its spaces, scales and subjects* (pp. 221–242). New York: Routledge.
- Basch, L. G., Schiller, N. G., & Blanc, C. S. (1993). *Nations unbound: Transnational projects, post-colonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states*. Langhorne: Gordon and Breach.
- Baubock, R. (2006). *Migration and citizenship: Legal status, rights and political participation*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, IMISCOE Reports.
- Benhabib, S. (2002). *The claims of culture: Equality and diversity in a global era*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Benhabib, S. (2004). *The rights of others: Aliens, residents and citizens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Benhabib, S., Butler, J., Cornell, D., & Fraser, N. (1995). *Feminist contentions: A philosophical exchange*. New York: Routledge.
- Bonilla, F., Mélenlez, E., Morales, R., & de los Ángeles Torres, M. (Eds.). (1998). *Borderless borders: US latinos, Latin Americans, and the paradox of interdependence*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Bonilla-Silva, E. (2003). *Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence of racial inequality in the United States*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bosniak, L. (1996). Opposing prop. 187: Undocumented immigrants and the national imagination. *Connecticut Law Review*, 28, 555–618.
- Bosniak, L. (2000a). Citizenship denationalized. Symposium: The state of citizenship. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 7(2), 447–510.
- Bosniak, L. (2000b). Universal citizenship and the problem of alienage. *Northwestern University Law Review*, 94(3), 963–984.
- Bosniak, L. (2006). *The citizen and the alien: Dilemmas of contemporary membership*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brysk, A., & Shafir, G. (2004). *People out of place: Globalization, human rights, and the citizenship gap*. New York: Routledge.
- Carens, J. (1996). *Culture, citizenship, and community: A contextualized exploration of justice as evenhandedness*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, J. (1995). Interpreting the notion of global civil society. In: M. Walzer (Ed.), *Toward a global civil society* (pp. 35–40). Providence: Berghahn Books.
- Conover, P. J. (1995). Citizen identities and conceptions of self. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 3(2), 133–166.

- Crenshaw, K., Gotanda, N., Peller, G., & Thomas, K. (Eds). (1996). *Critical race theory: The key writings that formed the movement*. New York: New York Press.
- Dahl, R. A. (1989). *Democracy and its critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Delgado, R., & Stefancic, J. (Eds). (1999). *Critical race theory: The cutting edge*. Philadelphia: Temple Press.
- de los Angeles Torres, M. (1998). Transnational political and cultural identity: Crossing theoretical borders. In: F. Bonilla, E. Mélendez, R. Morales & M. de los Angeles Torres (Eds), *Borderless borders* (pp. 169–182). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Eickelman, D., & Anderson, J. W. (1999). *New media in the Muslim world: The emerging public sphere*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Falk, R. (1993). The making of global citizenship. In: J. Brecher, J. Brown Childs & J. Cutler (Eds), *Global visions: Beyond the new world order* (pp. 39–51). Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Fernández-Kelly, M. P., & Shefner, J. (2005). *Out of the shadows*. College Station: Penn State University Press.
- Franck, T. M. (1992). The emerging right to democratic governance. *American Journal of International Law*, 86(1), 46–91.
- Fraser, N. (2007). Transnationalizing the public sphere: On the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion in a Post-Westphalian World. Special section: Transnational public sphere. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24(4), 7–30.
- Friedman, L. M. (1973). *A history of American law*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Glasius, M., Kaldor, M., & Anheier, H. (2003). *Global civil society yearbook 2002*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hall, R. B., & Biersteker, T. J. (Eds). (2002). *The emergence of private authority in global governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Handler, J. (1995). *The poverty of welfare reform*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Held, D., & McGrew, A. (Eds). (2007). *Globalization theory: Approaches and controversies*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Himmelfarb, G. (2001). *One nation, two cultures: A searching examination of American society in the aftermath of our cultural revolution*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Hindman, H. (2007). Outsourcing difference: Expatriate training and the disciplining of culture. In: S. Sassen (Ed.), *Deciphering the global: Its scales, spaces and subjects* (pp. 153–176). New York: Routledge.
- Hoerder, D. (2000). Metropolitan migration in the past: Labour markets, commerce, and cultural interaction in Europe, 1600–1914. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 1(1), 39–58.
- Hunter, D. B. (1992). Toward global citizenship in international environmental law. *Willamette Law Review*, 28(3), 547–564.
- Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*. (1996). Feminism and Globalization: The Impact of the Global Economy on Women and Feminist Theory, 4(2).
- Isin, E. (Ed.) (2000). *Democracy, citizenship, and the global city*. New York: Routledge.
- Jacobson, D. (1996). *Rights across borders: Immigration and the decline of citizenship*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jacobson, D. (2009). Multiculturalism, gender and rights. In: S. Benhabib & J. Resnik (Eds), *Migrations and mobilities: Citizenship, borders, and gender* (pp. 304–332). New York: New York University Press.
- Jacobson, D., & Ruffer, G. (2003). Courts across borders: The implications of judicial agency for human rights and democracy. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 25(1), 74–93.

- Jacobson, D., & Ruffer, G. (2006). Social relations on a global scale: The implications for human rights and for democracy. In: M. Giugni & F. Passey (Eds), *Dialogues on migration policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Jones, K. T. (1998). Scale as epistemology. *Political Geography*, 17(1), 25–28.
- Karst, K. (1997). The coming crisis of work in constitutional perspective. *Cornell Law Review*, 82(3), 523–571.
- Karst, K. (2000). Citizenship, law, and the American Nation. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 7(2), 523–571.
- Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activism beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kirsch, M. (Ed.) (2006). *Inclusion and exclusion in the global arena*. New York: Routledge.
- Knop, K. (2002). *Diversity and self-determination in international law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Koh, H. H. (1998). The 1998 Frankel lecture: Bringing international law home. *Houston Law Review*, 35(3), 623–682.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kymlicka, W., & Norman, W. (1994). Return of the citizen: A survey of recent work on citizenship theory. *Ethics*, 104(2), 352–381.
- Lawrence, A. (2004). From collective action to institutionalized labor rights: Parallel and diverging logics of collective action in Germany and South Africa. *New Political Science*, 26(2), 189–204.
- Levitt, P. (2001). *The transnational villagers*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lipschutz, R., & Mayer, J. (1996). *Global civil society and global environmental governance: The politics of nature from place to planet*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Magnusson, W. (1990). The reification of political community. In: R. B. J. Walker & S. H. Mendlovitz (Eds), *Contending sovereignties: Redefining political community* (pp. 45–60). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Magnusson, W. (1996). *The search for political space: Globalization, social movements, and the urban political experience*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Magnusson, W. (2000). Politicizing the global city. In: Isin (Ed.), *Democracy, citizenship, and the global city* (pp. 289–306). London: Routledge.
- Marshall, T. H. (1977 [1950]). Citizenship and social class. In: T. H. Marshall (Ed.), *Class, citizenship, and social development* (pp.71–134). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Menjívar, C. (2000). *Fragmented ties: Salvadoran immigrant networks in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2005). *Globalizing women: Transnational feminist networks*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Munger, F. (Ed.) (2002). *Laboring below the line: The new ethnography of poverty, low-wage work, and survival in the global economy*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Neumann, I. (1996). *Russia and the idea of Europe: A study in identity and international relations*. New York: Routledge.
- Nussbaum, M. (1998). *Cultivating humanity: A classical defense of reform in liberal education*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. (2008). Robin west, jurisprudence and gender: Defending a radical liberalism. *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 75(3), 985–996.
- Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible citizenship*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Palumbo-Liu, D. (1999). *Asian/American: Historical crossings of a racial frontier*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Pateman, C. (1989). *The disorder of women: Democracy, feminism and political theory*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Pogge, T. (2007). Cosmopolitanism. In: R. Goodin, P. Pettit & T. Pogge (Eds), *A companion to contemporary political philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 312–331). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Portes, A. (Ed.) (1995). *The economic sociology of immigration*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Rouleau-Berger, L. (Ed.) (2002). *Youth and work in the postindustrial cities of North America and Europe*. Leiden: Brill.
- Rubenstein, K., & Adler, D. (2000). International citizenship: The future of nationality in a globalized world. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 7(2), 519–548.
- Sakai, N., de Bary, B., & Toshio, I. (Eds). (2005). *Deconstructing nationality*. Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program.
- Sanjeev, K. (2005). *Dams and development. Transnational struggles for water and power*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1996). *Losing control?: Sovereignty in an age of globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1999). *Guests and aliens*. New York: New Press.
- Sassen, S. (2001). *The global city* (2nd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2006). *Cities in a world economy* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
- Sassen, S. (2008). *Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2009). The incomplete subject and the possibility of making in Rorty's philosophy. In: Sandbote (Ed.), *Festschrift in honour of Richard Rorty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Saunders, P. (1993). Citizenship in a liberal society. In: Turner (Ed.), *Citizenship and social theory*. London: Sage.
- Saxonhouse, A. W. (1992). *Fear of diversity: The birth of political science in ancient Greek thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schuck, P., & Smith, R. (1985). *Citizenship without consent: Illegal aliens within the American polity*. New Have: Yale University Press.
- Schwarz, S. L. (2002). Private ordering. *Northwestern University Law Review*, 97(1), 319–350.
- Sennett, R. (2003). *Respect in an age of inequality*. New York: Norton.
- Shachar, A. (2009). *The birthright lottery: Citizenship and global inquiry*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Slawner, K., & Denham, M. (Eds). (1998). *Citizenship after liberalism*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Smith, M. P., & Guarnizo, L. E. (Eds). (1998). *Transnationalism from below*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Smith, P. J. (2001). The impact of globalization on citizenship: Decline or renaissance. *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 36(1), 116–140.
- Smith, R. C. (2005). *Mexican New York: Transnational lives of new immigrants*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Smith, R. M. (2003). *Stories of peoplehood: The politics and morals of political membership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soysal, Y. N. (1994). *Limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Soysal, Y. N. (1997). Changing parameters of citizenship and claims-making: Organized islam in European public spheres. *Theory and Society*, 26(4), 509–527.
- Soysal, Y. N. (2000). Citizenship and identity: Living in diasporas in post-war Europe? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(1), 1–15.
- Spinner-Halev, J. (1994). *The boundaries of citizenship: Race, ethnicity, and nationality in the liberal state*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Tarrow, S. G. (1994). *Power in movement: Collective action and politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, C. (2007). *A secular age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Teubner, G. (2004). Societal constitutionalism: Alternatives to state-centered constitutional theory. In: C. Joerges, I. J. Sand & G. Teubner (Eds), *Transnational governance and constitutionalism* (pp. 3–28). Hartford: Hartford Publishing.
- Turner, B. S. (2000). Cosmopolitan virtue: Loyalty and the city. In: E. F. Isin (Ed.), *Democracy, citizenship and the global city* (pp. 129–147). New York: Routledge.
- Turner, B. S. (Ed.) (1993). *Citizenship and social theory*. London: Sage.
- Vogel, U., & Moran, M. (Eds). (1991). *The frontiers of citizenship*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Walzer, M. (1995). *Toward a global civil society*. Providence: Berghahn Books.
- Wapner, P. (1996). *Environment activism and world civic politics*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Westbrook, D. A. (2007). *Between citizens and state: An introduction to the corporation*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Young, I. M. (1990). *Justice and politics of difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Young, I. M. (2002). *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yuval-Davis, N. (1999). Ethnicity, gender relations and multiculturalism. In: R. Torres, L. Miron & J. X. Inda (Eds), *Race, identity and citizenship* (pp. 112–125). Oxford: Blackwell.

THE PROSTHETIC CITIZEN: NEW GEOGRAPHIES OF CITIZENSHIP

Tim Cresswell

ABSTRACT

The relationship between changing geographies and the notion of citizenship is outlined. As well as focussing on the transformation of the nation-state, it is argued, it is necessary to concentrate on other kinds of geographical transformation. These include changing regimes of mobility, the privatisation of public space and the salience of belonging at the local level. The paper insists on the importance of geography (both material and imaginative) to the process of making up the citizen and this is illustrated through considerations of the 'denizen' and the 'shadow citizen' in relation to their various geographies. In each case issues of place and mobility lie at the heart of the process by which citizens and their other come to be defined and lived. Recognizing the geographical constitution of the citizen means thinking about the citizen not as a self-sufficient individual body but as a 'prosthetic citizen' who is a product of the assemblage of the body and the world.

The question before us concerns the possibilities inherent in the incomplete project of citizenship. The nature of these possibilities, as outlined by Saskia Sassen, is rooted in the processes by which the nation-state is being hollowed out through twin processes of globalisation and regionalisation

Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 20, 259–273
Copyright © 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 0198-8719/doi:10.1108/S0198-8719(2009)0000020014

(Jessop, 2002). The key figure here is the outsider, Simmel's stranger (Simmel, 1950). The outsider/stranger presents problems for a subject position that is based on notions of belonging to a particular spatial configuration – a notion of belonging based on a sedentarist metaphysics (Malkki, 1992; Cresswell, 2006). In this response to Sassen's comprehensive outline of the changing nature of citizenship in the 21st century I do not offer a critique, because I essentially agree with broad outline of her argument. Rather I outline, in more detail, the relationship between geographies and changing notions of citizenship. My central point is that the citizen is a kind of geographical and historical assemblage: an achievement of a multitude of human/environment interfaces. The citizen has classically been defined as an individual and simultaneously a universal body. Here I want to think of the 'prosthetic citizen' – a character whose capacities are intimately linked to his or her geographies (both material and imaginative). In this response I focus on transformations in geography other than those of the nation-state, particularly around notions of place and mobility. Before that, however, I consider the general utility of citizenships and rights.

CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS

The majority of work on the lineage of citizenship focuses on its relation to the spaces of the nation-state on the one hand and the city on the other. As the nation-state emerged, and as Europe became urbanised, the citizen emerged as a figure. With this figure came a bundle of rights. Less common is the observation that the idea of the citizen also emerged hand in hand with new notions of mobility. In many ways the citizen is defined by mobility. In the pre-nation-state, pre-urban, world of feudal Europe the vast majority of people lived their lives pretty much where they were born. They belonged to place and to the soil (Dodgshon, 1987). As agricultural labourers were freed from the land, new classes of wanderers were born: the vagrants and vagabonds, the masterless men who threatened the local, place-based, geography of order that made life legible (Beier, 1985; Groebner, 2007). While there had always been outsiders and strangers, their number was small. There had always been poor, homeless people but they had been dealt with through local charity. The new wanderers, the strangers, people who arrived with the scent of elsewhere about them, presented a new problem. They needed to be made legible. The solution to this was the nationalisation of the definition of legitimate mobility. The almshouse, the passport and the

poor laws were all parts of a concerted process to understand, regulate and discipline this new mobility (Torpey, 2000). Attached to mobility was the necessity of identity. As Groebner has shown, the notion of identity was more or less invented in and around Bern in the late 15th century where the supposed threat of masterless men led to the poor being issued identity documents to prove they were worthy of alms (Groebner, 2007). If you had this identity then you deserved charity. If you had no identity then you did not. Inversely, mobility lay at the centre of this process. In a place where everybody is known from birth to death, identity is pre-given. It is only the mobile strangers arriving en masse that provoke the need to be certain of who someone is.

As Bauman has put it, the new strangers were the ‘the advanced troops or guerilla units of post-traditional chaos’ (Bauman, 1995, p. 94). A number of other ‘mobile subjects’ arose with this new constellation of mobility (Cresswell, 2010). Ian Hacking, for instance, has charted the emergence of panics about ‘fugue’ – a diagnosis of aimless wandering and loss of memory – with similar concerns about the new figures of the vagrant and the tourist (Hacking, 1996). The marginalised and excluded wanderers arose as the central figure of the citizen arose. All of them formed part of an assemblage of regulations, forms of surveillance and material and imaginative geographies that arose with the nation-state as a response to new forms of mobility. The rise of the citizen accompanied the rise of the nation and the simultaneous emergence of new regimes of mobility in early modern Europe. Sassen suggests that some of this geography is changing again and the citizen is changing with it.

Why is it important to think through the twinned concepts of citizenship and rights? Implicit in these discussions is an assumption that these concepts are useful and valuable. That they have, in some limited sense, been useful markers for some people and that they could, with suitable transformation, be even more useful to even more people. Both are, of course, products of a liberal–democratic history and geography. Both have been made to serve those who produced them in the first place. Some of the best-known critiques of rights discourse make this point well. A minimal reading of rights would see them as a legal category that allows individuals’ redress in courts of law should the rights be transgressed or denied. But there are, of course, wider senses of rights enshrined in notions of civil rights or human rights. Human rights, in particular, suggest that some people who have strictly legal rights denied to them can nevertheless claim a wider sense of rights (black people under apartheid in South Africa are a familiar example).

The critique of rights suggests that, following Marx, we think of rights as the product of capitalist society that provides a partial improvement on the lack of rights that characterised a feudal mode of production.

None of the supposed rights of man go beyond the egoist man, man as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. (Marx, 1978, p. 43)

Or as the critical legal theorist, Duncan Kennedy, put it

Rights talk was the language of the group – the white male bourgeoisie – that cracked open and reconstituted the feudal and then mercantilist orders of Western Europe, and did it in the name of Reason. The mediating power of the language, based on the presupposition of fact/value and law/politics distinctions and on the universal and factoid character of rights, was a part of the armory of this group, along with the street barricade, the newspaper, and the new model family. (Kennedy, 2002, p. 214)

Rights, then, are a product of a particular history (and geography) that tend to appear as though they are universal or even natural. Marx was the first to recognise that rights are generally a good thing – a big improvement to the absence of rights. But he (and critical legal scholars that followed him) also insisted on the importance of recognising their historical lineage and the limits that come with that. These limits are rooted in both the national character of rights and the ways in which they apply to individuals as defined by liberal democracies.

More recent discussions of rights and citizenship, informed by post-structural scholarship, note that rights and citizens are universal abstractions whose universality is belied by the fact that they rely on the simultaneous production of alterity. The non-citizen and the non-right are a necessary part of any understanding of citizenship and rights. Citizenship and rights are also based on particular spatialities born of liberal democracies under capitalism. One of these spatialities, of course, is the division of public and private which forms the geographical bedrock for notions of things such as ‘citizen’ and ‘alien’. As with the notion of rights, it is important to note that the construct ‘citizen’ inhabits a particular geography. This is a point made well by Lisa Lowe.

Insofar as the legal definition and political concept of the citizen enfranchises the subject who inhabits the national public sphere, the concept of the abstract citizen – each formally equivalent, one to the other – is defined by the negation of the material conditions of work and the inequalities of the property system. In the United States, not only class but also historically sedimented particularities of race, national origin, locality and embodiment remain largely invisible within the political sphere. In this sense, the legal and political forms of the nation have required a national culture in the integration of the differentiated people and social spaces that make up “America,” a national

culture, broadly cast yet singularly engaging, that can inspire diverse individuals to identify with the national project. (Lowe, 1996, p. 2)

Much of the critical discussion of citizenship arises from considerations of immigration and the immigrant. To Bonnie Honig, it is the immigrant who makes the citizen make sense. The immigrant provides an excluded other who, by their exclusion, confirms the value of the citizen tag. The immigrant tries to be a citizen (thus confirming the status of citizenship as something to be valued). The mobility of the immigrant both valorises and threatens citizenship. The occasional success of an immigrant leads to the notion of the immigrant as a 'supercitizen'.

...the iconic good immigrant – the supercitizen – who upholds American liberal democracy is not accidentally or coincidentally partnered with the iconic bad immigrant who threatens to tear it down.... The co-presence in American political culture of xenophilia and xenophobia comes right out of America's fundamental liberal commitments, which map a materially privileged normative citizenship onto an idealized immigrant trajectory of membership. (Honig, 2001, p. 97)

The citizen evokes the absence of the non-citizen (in order to make the citizen make sense). The mobility of citizen (correct mobility) is constructed in relation to mobilities that are other (alien mobilities).

So the very emergence of the citizen was twinned with the emergence of other mobile subjects (the vagrant/vagabond) and the citizen has continued to be twinned with threatening others. As the nation-state became cemented, the control and regulation of mobility was increasingly conducted at national level (Torpey, 2000). By the end of the 20th century, the threatening other was less likely to be the vagrant and more likely to be the alien or immigrant. Behind both of these lay geographical imaginations of the relations between place and mobility, between fixity and flow. Sassen's argument is that the geography that produced the citizen is changing along with conceptions of citizenship. Her main focus is the nation-state. In the remainder of this response, I consider a number of other configurations of geography, citizenship and rights.

THE DENIZEN: A PARADOXICAL GEOGRAPHICAL SUBJECT

The category 'citizen' depends on a paradoxical geographical imagination. On the one hand, it refers to a form of belonging to a particular place – the nation-state (or, earlier, the city). It defines a relation between the individual

and the space of the nation-state that brings with it certain rights which are defined within that space. In a western liberal democracy these include such things as the right to assemble, to speak and to vote. They usually also include the right to free movement. And this is where the paradox emerges. As well as defining a form of sedentarist identity based on a mapping on to a fixed place, the citizen is also defined by his or her mobility – the right and ability to move both within national space and across national borders.

The coming together of these geographical imaginations of fixity and flow can also be seen in the potentially empowering category of the ‘denizen’. Hammar has defined denizens as those ‘who are foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status’ (Hammar, 1990, p. 15). This definition immediately highlights geographies of mobility (the denizen is from elsewhere – foreign) and the geographies of place (the denizen lives here – is a resident). This definition has deep roots in history but rather shallow roots in law, being a category used in (English) common law. The word denizen is often used to refer to people who appear to be deeply associated with a particular place. If we talk of the ‘denizens of the lower east side’ or the ‘denizens of the 100 club’, we are referring to people who habituate these places, who are connected to place through regular everyday practice. Generally the kind of place referred to in such statements is not a nation-state but something more local, even a particular building or public square for instance.

In legal terms, denizenship can be seen as a pathway to full citizenship. In this sense it is an inferior kind of legal subject who has the right to be in a place and some other rights depending on the will of the nation-state, but not the right to vote in national elections (though some denizens in countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands do have the right to vote in local elections – in the place they habituate). Generally denizens are granted civil rights but denied political rights (Castles & Davidson, 2000). Hammar outlines three ‘gateways’ to becoming a citizen: the right to enter and stay for a brief period, the right to permanent residence and finally the process of naturalisation. A denizen has not passed through the last of these gateways. In this sense the denizen is an imperfect citizen who pays taxes, works legally, sends children to school, contributes to the life of a place but cannot vote. They represent a halfway point between the category ‘alien’ and the category ‘citizen’. The label denizen means that citizenship is no longer the only subject category that carries rights with it as ‘the determining criteria became the permanent residence instead, which confers civic and socio-economic rights virtually identical to those of citizens’ (Atikcan, 2006, p. 11).

There is nothing necessarily progressive or liberatory about the notion of the denizen. Sassen's account of denationalised citizenship focuses on the changing nature of the nation in a world of immigration, globalisation and digitisation and what this might mean for the category of citizen. But there are other spaces at other scales that are changing too. Some of these changes suggest reconfigurations of denizenship. One kind of space that is changing (in a way that is coupled with globalisation and digitisation) is public space. It has been widely observed that citizens, as well as being members of nation-states with a bundle of rights, are also those who are able to participate in public space. This is the narrative developed by [Arendt \(1958\)](#). It has also been widely observed that the nature of public space has also changed in the contemporary city. More and more space is apparently public but privately owned, policed and regulated. Cities are being divided into security enclaves such as gated communities or shopping malls ([Graham & Marvin, 2001](#); [Davis, 1992](#)). The demise of public space can be linked with the demise of a certain notion of citizenship. If there is less public space to share then there are more limited opportunities for the practice of citizenship. Simultaneously, however, there are all kinds of spaces it has become possible to be a member of through a private contract. Needless to say, there are many people excluded (formally or informally) from these spaces (gated communities, gyms, social clubs, high-end malls, etc.) due to poverty, race or some other identifiable characteristic.

Just as the citizen emerged alongside changes in the nation-state and in the city, so the notion of citizen will change as the city is transformed. We live in the world of 'splintered urbanism' in which mobility opportunities are being reconfigured through the development of infrastructures of mobility and communication that separate and regulate mobilities in new ways ([Graham & Marvin, 2001](#)). Mobilities are often divided and monitored through integrated surveillance and security systems in order to allow the smooth passage of the 'kinetic elite' between important nodes in the network society ([Castells, 1996](#)). As these mobility opportunities are enabled, so parts of the city are progressively cut off from these urban 'tunnels'. A train travelling from airport to the city centre, for instance, will often bypass swathes of the inner city without allowing access. And the kinetic elite, who inhabit these infrastructural spaces, often live in well-known hotel chains when visiting, or secure and isolated enclaves in the city when at home. Lieven de Caeter has labelled this kind of city lifestyle and geography a 'capsular civilisation' ([de Caeter, 2004](#)). People, he argues, live in capsules which separate and

protect them from the hostile outside. Marc Schuilenburg describes such a landscape:

Everything is organized in capsules of isolated entities. This landscape is articulated, in terms of architecture, as a series of heavily protected and isolated spaces: shopping malls, special urban design districts, gated communities, Community Improvement Districts (CIDs), amusement parks, cultural zones, historic districts, and Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). To allow the spatial and social segregation to function, they are armed with an architecture that is subject to permanent supervision. (Schuilenburg, 2008, p. 360)

While this perspective has often been over-emphasised, it is nonetheless increasingly a true description of a large number of cities around the world, and particularly global cities – the very spaces in which citizenship, according to Sassen, is being reconfigured. The inhabitants of these capsules and enclaves might be described as denizens (Schuilenburg, 2008; Shearing & Wood, 2003).

One powerful argument is that governance is no longer exclusively in the hands of the nation-state and is increasingly fractured. We have a multitude of memberships and affiliations, each with its own kind of governance. This demands at least a partial rethinking of citizenship. As Shearing and Wood put it:

People now live within a world full of crisscrossing group memberships that simultaneously operate across and through multiple governmental domains. Within such worlds, to think of people's political or governmental status only, or even primarily, as 'a member, native or naturalized, of a (usually specified) State or Commonwealth, as the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary has it, is too limiting. (Shearing & Wood, 2003, p. 406)

The question is whether it is possible to stretch the definition of citizenship (so rooted in the nation-state and its associated geographical imaginations) to account for these new forms of regulations (and their associated geographical imaginations) or to abandon it in favour of other terms such as 'denizen'. In Shearing and Wood's formulation we (i.e., inhabitants of western liberal democracies) all have multiple denizenships that are determined by the kinds of regulatory domains we inhabit. When we are in the gym, we are a denizen of the gym regulated by the rules of that private space. On a more permanent basis, when we live in a gated community, we are an extremely well-regulated denizen of that small area of the city. This kind of denizen is no longer an imperfect, not-quite, citizen, but a privileged member of a particular group and its associated spaces.

There is nothing particularly progressive about such a status and in many cases it can be extremely reactionary.

However, there may be a more progressive potential in the category and concept of denizenship. Rather than being seen as a legal category that resides between alien and citizen, or, on the other hand, as a denotation of privileged membership, we might think of it in a more affirmative way. It is easy to imagine a case in which an individual (whether immigrant or not) wants to be located in a particular place (an example of Harvey's 'militant particularism' perhaps (Harvey, 1996)) but does not want to be identified with the space of the nation-state.

Consider the story of Fong Yue Ting. Fong Yue Ting was a resident of New York State in 1892. In 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act had been passed. It had declared all Chinese Labourers 'aliens' and excluded them from the United States. The 1892 Geary amendment had made it compulsory for all Chinese people to carry an identity document with them. This was one of the key moments in the invention of the modern passport (Torpey, 2000). To get this document, an applicant would have to register with their local tax office. Fong Yue Ting had lived in New York State before the passage of either act but had never applied for such a document. He was arrested and scheduled for deportation. He was an alien and not a citizen. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court along with two other similar cases. Fong Yue Ting's attorneys made the argument that while he was not a citizen, his long-term residence made him something other than an alien – a denizen. The defence was unsuccessful. If Fong Yue Ting was not a citizen, he was an alien and did not carry with him the bundle of rights that come with citizenship. Despite the failure of the defence, it did prompt a spirited dissenting opinion from Justice Brewer. Brewer agreed with the 'denizen' defence and forcefully argued that Fong Yue Ting's residence meant that he was not merely a 'traveller'. He noted how 'there are 100, 000 and more of these persons living in this country, making their homes here, and striving by their labour to earn a livelihood. They are not travelers, but resident aliens'.¹ Brewer noted that Ting was a long-term resident with connections to the community. He had lived in the United States since 1879. He argued that 'there is force in the contention of counsel for appellants that these persons are "denizens", within the true meaning and spirit of that word as used in the common law'. He cited English legal history in which 'a denizen is an alien born, but who has obtained ex donatione regis letters patent to make him an English subject. ... A denizen is in a kind of

middle state between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them’.

In respect to this, after quoting from some of the early constitutions of the states, in which the word ‘denizen’ is found, counsel say: ‘It is claimed that the appellants in this case come completely within the definition quoted above. They are alien born, but they have obtained the same thing as letters patent from this country. They occupy a middle state between an alien and a native. They partake of both of them. They cannot vote, or, as it is stated in Bacon’s Abridgment, they have no ‘power of making laws,’ as a native-born subject has, nor are they here as ordinary aliens’.²

Although the ‘denizen defense’ failed in this instance, it does point to the progressive potential of a subject position that is not defined by the space of the nation-state. In addition to the reactionary forms of membership in privileged urban enclaves that form one form of denizenship there is at least some possibility of a more familiar form of belonging in place that has the capacity to carry some legal force. It breaks the stranglehold of the either/or nature of the citizen/alien binary.

SHADOW CITIZENS

While it is possible to imagine people who are not strictly citizens but are denizens of privileged enclaves of the city it is also clear that there are many people who are legally citizens but do not benefit from many of the rights associated with that status. Homeless people, non-white people (in majority white nations), travellers, gay people, lesbians and bisexuals, disabled people and many others are frequently treated in ways that make citizenship a dubious notion. Engin Isin has noted how the citizen figure is produced through a logic of othering rather than a logic of exclusion:

The logic of exclusion assumes that the categories of strangers and outsiders, such as women, slaves, peasants, metics, immigrants, refugees, and clients, preexisted citizenship and that, once defined, it excluded them. The logic of exclusion presupposes that the excluding and excluded are conceived as irreconcilable; that the excluded is perceived in purely negative terms, having no property of its own, but merely expressing the absence of the properties of the other; that these properties are essential; that the properties of the excluded are experienced as strange, hidden, frightful, or menacing; that the properties of the other; and the exclusion itself...is actuated socially. (Isin, 2002, p. 3)

The logic of othering, on the other hand, suggests that the citizen and its others came into being as part of the same logic, simultaneously. Thus ‘slaves were not simply excluded from citizenship but made citizenship possible by their very formulation’ (Isin, 2002, p. 4). But even within the

logic of othering there is still a binary of citizen and other. The notion of a 'shadow citizen' – a figure who is legally a citizen but is not treated as such – interrupts this logic and focuses attention on notions of spatial justice.

Critical geographers have subjected the abstractions of citizenship and rights to a number of critiques (Chouinard, 2001; Blomley & Pratt, 2001; Peake & Ray, 2001; Kobayashi & Ray, 2000; Bullen & Whitehead, 2005; Painter & Philo, 1995; Desforges, Jones, & Woods, 2005). Key to these critiques has been a recognition of the spatialities of these apparently universal abstractions. They argue that we need to take into account the uneven distribution of citizenship rights as they are lived in situ, paying attention to the locatedness of the marginalized which 'places them at the margins of visibility for justice' (Peake & Ray, 2001, p. 184). Another geographical factor in the production of shadow citizenship is the reality of the material production of different mobilities (Cresswell, 2001, 2010). The entanglement of citizenship and rights naturalizes mobility as the property of individual, moving, able bodied citizens. One kind of 'shadow citizen' therefore is the disabled person. Vera Chouinard has outlined the spaces of shadow citizenship where the 'law as discursively represented and law as lived are fundamentally at odds' (Chouinard, 2001, p. 165). Disabled people frequently inhabit these spaces. While such people are symbolically central to an imagined geography of rights and citizenship that is blind to geography (in Canada), Chouinard argues that they are frequently marginalized by the blindness of rights discourse to the spatiality of disability. Indeed, the geographical imagination that informs notions of citizenship and rights – one that includes able-bodied, locomoting bodies – actively marginalized those who move differently. A citizen is (culturally, of not legally) in possession of a mobile body that fits into norms of fitness, health and independence from the world around it. Assumptions about the body's capacity to move are rooted in a universal disembodied subject-citizen.

There are many other examples of shadow citizenship in which the mobility–citizenship–rights nexus is disrupted. Race is often a key factor. Black people in major cities across the west are still far more likely to be stopped by police due to racial profiling and the mythical crime of 'driving while black' (Harris, 1997). In post 9/11 London, people of middle-eastern appearance are increasingly stopped by the police on suspicion of activities associated with terrorism. Racial profiling also appears to take place in airports in western nations where non-white people are frequently stopped and searched in customs or before boarding a flight. And then there those who Schuilenburg refers to as 'margizens' – the homeless, the drug addicted,

the beggars, the unemployed and others (Schuilenburg, 2008). In the majority of cases these people may be legal citizens but the inhabitation of this category and the rights that come with it are mostly meaningless in everyday life. And such people are actively produced by the very spatial arrangements that produce the privileged denizens of the city's secure enclaves. The shadow citizen is neither a citizen nor an alien in their ideal forms. The shadow citizen inhabits a world which is neither the polis of the citizen nor its excluded other. The shadow citizen is a product of an uneven material geography of power.

OUTLINE OF A PROSTHETIC CITIZENSHIP

Paying attention to the geographies of citizenship means a lot more than noting the changing nature of the nation-state. While it is true that the citizen figure is rooted in the constitution of the nation-state as a space, this is not the only changing geography that the citizen inhabits. In this paper I have explored a number of geographies that form part of the way in which the citizen is made up. These include the changing geographies of mobility, the local geographies of place and the splintering of public space in the city. All of these form part of the production of splintered citizenship in the modern world. The kinetic elite, denizens and shadow citizens all illuminate aspects of the new geographies of citizenship and rights in the liberal democratic nation-state. To conclude, I outline the kind of theorisation that underlines this argument.

Central to my account of the geographies of citizenship is the recognition that geography is central to the production of new entanglements of rights and identity. Geography is not simply the backdrop or stage to malleable identities. Rather, it is a fundamental part of the process of reconfiguration. Following Hacking we might think of the citizen in terms of (geographical) historical ontology, as a figure 'made up' as a product of an assemblage of laws, other forms of representation, officials, buildings, passports, regulations, papers and spaces such as the nation-state and the city (Hacking, 2002; De Landa, 2006). Part of this process of making up is geography. This means three things. First it refers to the power of geographical imaginations about place and mobility. Understanding identities as connected to places is one way a geographical imagination informs the making up of citizens. The notion of a sedentarist metaphysics describes this process of locating and fixing people. The connection of citizens to the nation-state and the description of strangers as aliens is an example of this kind of imagination in

action. Equally, the construction of the citizen is informed by geographical imaginations of mobility both as central to notions of freedom and as a constant threat to the security of the sedentary. The second way in which geography is implicated is through the transformation of the material spaces through which citizenship is enacted. At one level there is the creation of the nation-state and then the hollowing out process that has led Sassen to delineate the landscape of citizenship necessitated by the changing status of the nation-state in the 21st century. But in addition to this there are the changing material geographies of the modern city including the creation of secure enclaves and newly regulated mobility infrastructures. Third, there is the new constellation of mobility that transforms the monopoly on the regulation of correct mobility from a predominantly national concern to one that is increasingly privatized at the local scale and denationalized at the global scale. All of these geographies form part of the historical–geography ontology of the citizen.

All of these point to the need to think about citizenship in an expanded realm. Here, I find the notion of prosthetic citizenship useful. If the citizen in a liberal democracy is thought of in terms of the able-bodied individual who is unconnected to the world around him (and this body is also male), then prosthetic citizenship insists on the fact that bodies are parts of assemblages that connect them to things such as infrastructures, laws and regulations, notions of place and mobility and the geographical landscape about them. I borrow this term from Celeste Langan (2001). She has described an ‘omnibus model of rights’ which links the experience of, for instance, the wheelchair bound to the children dependent on their mothers for travel to school or the domestic servants travelling across Los Angeles on public buses to clean the homes of businessmen who travel downtown in fast, plush, commuter trains. It connects the experience of the metaphorical figures of the tourist and the vagabond who haunt the world of globalisation in Bauman’s liquid modernity (Bauman, 1998,2000). We all move with the aid of prosthetic devices. Wheelchairs or cars are simply the most obvious. Mobility is an achievement of an assemblage of people and things, of technologies and regulations, of stories and sites. Once we recognise that the right to mobility that citizens are defined by is a result of human–environment interfaces, we recognise that citizenship is not individual but social in the widest sense. The new citizen is the prosthetic citizen. The nation-state, however configured, is a key part of this assemblage but there is a lot of detail between the space of the nation and the body of the citizen that is brimming over with geography. And this needs to be accounted for.

NOTES

1. *Fong Yeu Ting v. United States* 149 U.S. 698 (1893), 734.
2. *Fong Yeu Ting v. United States* 149 U.S. 698 (1893), 736.

REFERENCES

- Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition* (1998). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Atikcan, E. O. (2006). *Citizenship or denizenship: The treatment of third country nationals in the European Union*. Working Paper, 85, Sussex European Institute.
- Bauman, Z. (1995). *Life in fragments: Essays in postmodern morality*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bauman, Z. (1998). *Globalization: The human consequences*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bauman, Z. (2000). *Liquid modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beier, A. L. (1985). *Masterless men: The vagrancy problem in England 1560–1640*. London: Methuen.
- Blomley, N. K., & Pratt, G. (2001). Canada and the political geographies of rights. *The Canadian Geographer*, 45, 151–166.
- Bullen, A., & Whitehead, M. (2005). Geographical perspectives on the sustainable citizen: The new ecologies of citizenship. *Citizenship Studies*.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The rise of the network society*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
- Castles, S., & Davidson, A. (2000). *Citizenship and migration: Globalization and the politics of belonging*. New York: Routledge.
- Chouinard, V. (2001). Legal peripheries: Struggles over disabled Canadians' places in law, society and space. *The Canadian Geographer*, 45, 187–192.
- Cresswell, T. (2001). The production of mobilities. *New Formations*, 43, 3–25.
- Cresswell, T. (2006). *On the move: Mobility in the modern Western world*. New York: Routledge.
- Cresswell, T. (2010). Outline of a politics of mobility. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 28.
- Davis, M. (1992). *City of quartz: Excavating the future in Los Angeles*. New York: Vintage.
- de Cauter, L. (2004). *Capsular civilization: On the city in the age of fear*. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers.
- De Landa, M. (2006). *A new philosophy of society: Assemblage theory and social complexity*. London: Continuum.
- Desforges, L., Jones, R., & Woods, M. (2005). New geographies of citizenship. *Citizenship Studies*, 9, 439–451.
- Dodgshon, R. A. (1987). *The European past: Social evolution and spatial order* (Distributed in the United States of America by Sheridan House Inc.). Houndmills: Macmillan Education.
- Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (2001). *Splintering urbanism networked infrastructures, technological mobilities and the urban condition*. London: Routledge.
- Groebner, V. (2007). *Who are you? Identification, deception, and surveillance in early modern Europe*. Brooklyn: Zone Books.
- Hacking, I. (1996). Les aliens voyageurs: How fugue became a medical entity. *History of Psychiatry*, 7, 425–449.

- Hacking, I. (2002). *Historical ontology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hammar, T. (1990). *Democracy and the nation state: Aliens, denizens, and citizens in a world of international migration*. Aldershot: Avebury; Gower Pub. Co.
- Harris, D. A. (1997). Driving while Black and all other traffic offenses: The Supreme Court and pretextual stops. *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, 87, 544–582.
- Harvey, D. (1996). *Justice, nature and the geography of difference*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
- Honig, B. (2001). *Democracy and the foreigner*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Isin, E. F. (2002). *Being political: Genealogies of citizenship*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Jessop, B. (2002). *The future of capitalist state*. Oxford: Polity.
- Kennedy, D. (2002). The critique of rights in critical legal studies. In: W. Brown & J. Halley (Eds), *Left legalism/left critique*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Kobayashi, A., & Ray, B. (2000). Civil risk and landscapes of marginality in Canada: A pluralist approach to social justice. *The Canadian Geographer*, 44, 401–417.
- Langan, C. (2001). Mobility disability. *Public Culture*, 13, 459–484.
- Lowe, L. (1996). *Immigrant acts: On Asian American cultural politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Malkki, L. (1992). National geographic: The rooting of peoples and the territorialization of national identity among scholars and refugees. *Cultural Anthropology*, 7, 24–44.
- Marx, K. (1978). On the Jewish question. In: R. C. Tuckner (Ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (2nd ed). New York: Norton.
- Painter, J., & Philo, C. (1995). Spaces of citizenship: An introduction. *Political Geography*, 14, 107–120.
- Peake, L., & Ray, B. (2001). Racializing the Canadian landscape: Whiteness, uneven geographies and social justice. *The Canadian Geographer*, 45, 180–186.
- Schuilenburg, M. (2008). Citizenship revisited-denizens and margizens. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 20, 358–365.
- Shearing, C., & Wood, J. (2003). Nodal governance, democracy, and the new 'denizens'. *Journal of Law and Society*, 30, 400–419.
- Simmel, G. (1950). *The sociology of Georg Simmel*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Torpey, J. C. (2000). *The invention of the passport: Surveillance, citizenship, and the state*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

THE INCOMPLETENESS OF RIGHTS-BEARING CITIZENSHIP: POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND RENATIONALIZATION

Michael Peter Smith

ABSTRACT

A full picture of the making of new rights-bearing subjects requires theorizing the political obligations as well as entitlements of citizenship. These must be specified lest the enumeration of political obligations be left to extreme nationalists and advocates of racial, ethnic, gender, and cultural exclusion. The worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression has led many nation-states to re-regulate their national economies and decouple them from the global economy. New terms of engagement and combinations of political rights and duties are likely to follow from nations' turn to looking out for themselves in the uncharted waters of the global meltdown.

It is important to reflect upon the changing rights and duties of citizenship under globalization. In her essay "Incompleteness and the Possibility of Making: Towards Denationalized Citizenship?" Saskia Sassen provides a thought-provoking theoretical reflection on the making of new modes of

rights-bearing citizenship in the context of the boundary-spanning dynamics of globalization and digitalization. In so doing, she adds incrementally to her extensively developed discourse on the interplay of territory, authority, and rights in liberal democratic political theory and practice (Sassen, 2006). As this essay's title suggests, Sassen seeks to situate her inquiry at the juncture of an incompletely theorized contract between state and citizen. She discusses changing circumstances which, she argues, have made it possible for new types of political actors – identified at various junctures in her essay as “outsiders” (immigrants, aliens, ethnic minorities, women, housewives, and mothers) – to voice new claims for inclusion in both old (national) and new “denationalized” (international, transnational, post-national, and urban) spaces of citizenship, thereby remaking political space.

Sassen suggests that this remaking can amount to a formal reconfiguration of citizenship as in past instances occasioning the fall of the institutions of divine sovereignty in medieval times or slavery in more modern times. At other points in her essay Sassen distinguishes between citizenship as a formal institution and citizenship “markers” that emerge outside formal institutions but can “signal” the emergence of new types of informal citizenship. Such cases include the informal insinuation of international human rights norms into national legal processes and claims for full inclusion in national citizenship of undocumented transnational migrants who have become partial rights-bearing subjects on the basis of their long-term residence, good conduct, and gainful employment in their places of migration.

This partial denationalization of citizenship claims-making has been furthered structurally and contextually, Sassen argues, by a “fundamental dynamic,” namely, the “growing articulation of globalization with national economies,” and the associated neo-liberal transformation of the relationship between state and citizen, particularly the withdrawal of the state from the provision of citizen entitlements, which, she claims, gives rise to “a corresponding dilution of loyalty to the state.” In a move that reveals the Euro-centric or at least North-centric location of her discourse, she homes in on the policies and practices of “rich countries,” further arguing that citizen loyalty has become less important to such core countries than it was in past times when intense warfare engendered a need for loyal citizen-soldiers.

Missing in this discussion of the partial denationalization of citizenship and erosion of citizen loyalties to nation-states is any consideration of historical or contemporary counter-tendencies to the envisaged long-march toward the expansion of rights-bearing subjects in liberal-democratic

political spaces. At the level of human agency, Sassen's essay grants a central role to heretofore excluded "outsiders" who are making history by pressing for new modes and logics of political inclusion. However, she gives no attention whatsoever to the fact that already included social and political actors in liberal-democratic political regimes (to say nothing of actors in authoritarian political spaces) also have political agency, and can, and do, resist these new inclusions, whether on the basis of perceived patriotic duty, ethnic essentialism, defense of law abidingness, or even what, in the US context, Samuel Huntington (2004) has called "Anglo-Protestant" political and civic culture. It is nationalist ideologues of all sorts who are responding to perceived threats to national borders, cultures, and identities projected by writers like Huntington, commentators like Patrick Buchanan and Lou Dobbs, and confrontational activists like the Minutemen and most recently, the "birthers," by engaging in virulent forms of exclusionary politics.

Such actors, and their theoretical voices, have chosen to focus on the other side of the incompletely theorized contract between the citizen and the state, namely the obligations or duties of citizenship in order to privilege the position of what might be termed the "duties-bearing subject." In the US context, such thinkers and practitioners have harped upon such putative obligations as the duty to learn English, and the corresponding provision of English-only classes in public schools; the duty of law-abidingness and the corresponding criminalization of undocumented immigrants and refusal to grant amnesty to "illegals"; and the duty to renounce all other national loyalties when taking the oath of national citizenship as a way to ward off phobic fears of new forms of dual and transnational citizenship (on the latter see Smith & Bakker, 2008).

I provide these examples not to grant them validity but to make the point that a more complete picture of the making and remaking of the citizenship contract between state and citizen requires a careful theorization of the political obligations as well as the political rights and entitlements of citizenship. At a minimum, it is incumbent upon progressive political thinkers, including Sassen, to *explicitly* theorize the obligations entailed in the new forms of citizenship she discusses, lest the political discourse on the contractual obligations of citizenship be left open only to extreme nationalists and proponents of racial, ethnic, gender, or cultural exclusion. There is an implicit theorization of the question of political obligation in Sassen's essay, such as the notion that the long-standing residence, good conduct, and useful employment of undocumented immigrants should count as evidence of their performance of responsible behavior and thus should be taken into account as elements of a renegotiated contract extending national

citizenship. Sassen's essay also explicitly mentions in passing, although it under-theorizes, the notion of an implicit social contract binding undocumented immigrants to their places of residence. She thus concludes that "unauthorized immigrants who demonstrate civic involvement, social deservedness, and national loyalty can argue that they merit legal residency."

I argue here that related dimensions of the obligations of citizenship that require further explication include such duties as: (1) the obligation to pay taxes, which many transnational migrants who have fictitious Social Security cards actually regularly overpay into the national retirement system, thereby keeping it solvent; (2) the obligation to complete a period of national service, military or otherwise, which immigrants with green cards also regularly perform; and (3) the obligation to participate in institutions of collective governance such as voting and jury duty. In this respect, it is salient to recall that in many European cities, as well as some US municipalities and school districts, where local residence rather than national citizenship enables immigrants to vote, such modes of political engagement may also provide clear evidence of responsible conduct in the domain of collective governance.

Having said this, I wish to make clear that I am not arguing that such requirements must be formally institutionalized to fashion a fixed list of the duties of citizenship, since they are implicitly already present, but that their presence must be made visible and explicitly theorized if we are to more fully engage the multifaceted discourse on the incompleteness and partial denationalization of citizenship. Given Sassen's informed reflections on the making of the citizenship of rights-bearing subjects, her views on the question of the political obligations of these subjects would be most welcome.

An additional critical question remains regarding the timeliness and currency of Sassen's reading of the formative impact of globalization and neo-liberalism on national economies – particularly the resilience of the regime of deregulation, privatization, and shrinking entitlements – and the continuing impact of these developments, in turn, on citizen loyalty to nation-states. Put straightforwardly, I would ask all theorists of globalization who have linked economic globalization inexorably with neo-liberal political practices the following question: What effect has the ongoing global financial crisis had on what Sassen privileges as a fundamental structural dynamic, namely "the growing articulation of global with national economies and the associated withdrawal of the state from various spheres of citizenship entitlements, with the possibility of a growing dilution

of loyalty to the state”? Since the onset of the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, we are now witnessing a remarkable move by many core country nation-states to dramatically *re-regulate* their national economies in order to decouple them from the global economic downturn. In the US case this mode of crisis management has included the bailout of the financial system’s toxic assets by the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve; state ownership of large shares of now bankrupt multinational corporations like General Motors and Chrysler; ongoing efforts by Congress and the White House to reconfigure federal regulatory policies to protect homeowners and credit-card consumers from the worst effects of the near collapse of the housing and financial markets; and even the expansion of entitlement policies such as increased eligibility and lengthened coverage of displaced workers for unemployment compensation to both stimulate the national economy and otherwise cope with the negative material and symbolic effects of the economic meltdown. These policy shifts appear to signal a renationalization of previously denationalized political space. What sorts of effects will these expansions of state power to manage the global economic crisis nationally have on the social production of affective citizen loyalty?

Signs of renationalization are abound. The trend toward re-regulation of global financial institutions has reached the point where a recent article in *The New York Times* by Norris (2009) envisages a political retreat from global banking as an already achieved consequence of the global economic meltdown. In the absence of any real consensus on what should be done at the international scale, Norris reports, “countries are looking out for themselves,” legislatures are pillorying executives and independent regulatory agencies that failed to anticipate or avert the near collapse of the global economy, and multilateral financial institutions such as the Institute for International Finance now complain bitterly about national efforts to apply widely different national standards to re-regulate the local affiliates of international banks and other financial institutions. Reflecting on the fluidity and unsettlement of the political economy of scale under current global economic crisis conditions, Norris (2009, pp. B1, B6) offers the following observation:

But what was global before the crisis quickly turned local. The countries that suffered the most were those that had no locally owned banking system – think of Eastern Europe – and those that had banking systems far larger than the nation could afford to rescue – think of Iceland. ... Among the leaders of the major countries there is universal agreement that a coordinated global regulatory system is needed – and little will to get such a system in place. They talk globally when the Group of 20 meets, and act locally when they return home.

Given her informed understanding of how the national management of world historical events such as the political debates leading up to the US invasion of Iraq have reshaped events and renationalized politics, Sassen is unlikely to be surprised by the rapid rescaling of political space entailed in the events just described. The question that remains to be answered is: What new political circumstances, terms of engagement, and bundling of political rights and duties are likely to follow from the current trend of nations to look out for themselves in the uncharted waters of the global meltdown? Will the ties between citizen and state be strengthened or will they be further weakened by new terms of political discourse pitting an inside “us” against such outside forces as “global bankers,” “global terrorists,” “illegal immigrants,” and other culturally and politically alien forces in a very rapidly changing world?

New identities are being forged by the rights-demanding subjects discussed throughout Sassen’s essay – internal minorities demanding new group rights and the recognition of cultural difference; transnational migrants seeking local municipal or urban citizenship; members of the global workforce demanding citizenship practices in the workplace. Will these forces be strong enough, separately or in combination, to offset an incipient right-wing populist downside of a renationalized politics of citizenship, which is a real possibility opened up by growing fears of rapid global change? What will the politics of citizenship look like in the days ahead, at what scales will it be fought out, who will win, and who will lose?

REFERENCES

- Huntington, S. (2004). *Who are we?* New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Norris, F. (2009). A retreat from global banking. *The New York Times*, July 24, pp. B1, B6.
- Sassen, S. (2006). *Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Smith, M. P., & Bakker, M. (2008). *Citizenship across borders*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

CITIZENSHIP REDUX: WHY CITIZENSHIP REMAINS PIVOTAL IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

David Jacobson

Citizenship reemerged as a topic of major academic and policy interest from the 1990s, and as extensive and passionate as that debate has been, Saskia Sassen's commentary illustrates why we have not fully unlocked its importance. Citizenship, in Sassen's thought-provoking argument, articulates the relationship of the individual and the state, and the national and the international. The articulation here is, as I read it, both in the meaning of, first, "makes sense of," conceptualizes and gives voice to a set of relationships, and second, facilitates the facile movement between different parts. In this latter sense, citizenship is the "joint" or nexus that articulates between social and political parts, much in the way (metaphorically speaking) our bodies have articulating joints.

In the traditional, simplest picture of citizenship, it defined a world where individuals belonged to mutually exclusive states, and therein lay their agency; states in turn gathered their authority through "embodying" its citizenry. On the international stage the state had "personality" (and rights of national self-determination, self-defense, and sovereignty, much like an individual domestically) – a kind of global citizen where the individual qua individual was effaced. Citizenship in this sense was the fulcrum upon which social, political, and international relations operated. The world was never

this simple, of course, but as an organizing principle (articulated in the words of theorists such as Laski, 1917) it worked reasonably well.

As Sassen points out, citizenship was, is, and always will be a work-in-progress (or “incomplete” in her words). And herein lies its strength; it remains the mechanism through which attempts at articulating – again, in both senses of the term – the bits and pieces and cogs and wheels of social and political relations are worked out – or what Sassen calls “the political.” In thinking of today’s context, which is rather messy and where a work-in-progress is a particularly apt term, we have to consider as Sassen does the ways citizenship is articulated – and articulates. This involves considerations of inter alia dual citizenship, the interplay with human rights, the surprising constitutive role of “marginal” parties such as minorities, refugees, undocumented migrants, and women in that regard. Individuals now have more agency, legally speaking, on the international stage through international human rights law, and this is reflected in myriad ways, including the legitimation of dual citizenship and the activities of transnational networks and communities. Again, citizenship is critical as the fulcrum, linking up different actors (in different ways from the traditional model) – from individuals to organizations, from states, state agencies to international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

In terms of academic debate, Sassen is navigating, or bridging, between protagonists in the lively (and at times heated) debate between exponents of postnationalism and its critics. Soysal (1994, 1997) kicked off the debate, drawing on an institutionalist model, in the spirit of the sociologist John Meyer; she coined the term, in this context, of postnationalism. I argued (Jacobson, 1996) that we were witnessing a shift, a recasting of nationality as a human right, and the courts played a particularly important role in this regard. Migration flows that bypassed the regulatory mechanisms of the states – undocumented or guest worker programs that became permanent – played an important part in this process. Human rights become a way of addressing populations that do not fit neatly into the traditional citizen–alien framing.

Jacobson and Ruffer (2003) elaborated on the role of the courts and other judicial entities, and how they were generating an alternative form of political engagement – complementing and to some extent limiting traditional republican forms of politics. Sassen (1996) herself further developed the postnational argument. Most postnationalists have emphasized the dialectical quality of change (or what Hegel termed *aufgehoben* – involving both transcendence and preservation): for example, the state remains critically important in realizing human rights norms but in so doing

qualifies its own sovereignty. Bosniak (2006) and Spiro (2003) have also contributed interesting analysis and nuance in the description of forms of postnationalist argument, notably through the description of legal developments.

The postnational arguments unleashed a torrent of criticism – and surprisingly vociferous at that. But much of the criticism – and I am of course an interested party – was based on strawmen versions of postnationalism, or a hanging onto what the German sociologist Ulrich Beck called “methodological nationalism” – a characteristic of much sociological and geographical research on migration in the United States. For example, it was mistakenly suggested that the postnationalists were arguing that the state was “weakened” (when in fact its functional role expands) or that they were suggesting states were moving to “open borders” (which is not required by any means under international human rights law). Joppke (1999), initially one of the more passionate critics, has more recently conceded much to the postnational argument – but others, such as Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) and Hansen (2009) maintain the critique. Other criticisms were misunderstandings of the argument, suggesting they were normatively driven – and this kind of criticism came from both sides of the political spectrum. Benhabib (2004) misread my argument as a defense of communitarianism. Hansen has seen postnationalism, by all its exponents, as an attack on citizenship itself, threatening societal cohesion – again, well off the mark.

In her commentary, Sassen adds a new (third?) way of addressing this debate in her argument about “denationalization.” She sees denationalization through changes that are embedded in the state itself – in her words, the meaning of the territorial has changed. These changes loosen the grip of the state and strengthen the claims of citizens against the state. A further element is the granting of multiple “rights” to different actors – foreign firms, investors, and business people. (One can add, as Ruffer has argued, that as rights have increasingly, over the last 40 plus years, been embedded inside public and private organizations themselves, so this too leads to a denationalization in this regard.) Sassen suggests that the postnational argument emphasizes the formulation of citizenship outside the confines of the national state. She suggests this is the case in, say, the role of the European Court of Human Rights.

Detecting the extent the global is filtered through the national – here Professor Sassen brings up the example of the global city – we witness the process of denationalization. In her argument, the national and the global are not in a zero sum game but in a more intricate relationship

(see also Sassen, 2008). The very practice of democracy, which can now transcend borders through various activist groups but is channeled through the national and local “frame” is an expression of such a phenomenon. The global city is more broadly the strategic site of such activities. A large array of political interests play out in such global cities, she notes, separate from the national as traditionally understood. It is a strategic site for a whole new range of political actors. In an interesting observation, Sassen notes how not just rights but subject formation – the foundation of our very identities – has changed through this denationalization.

This is a thought-provoking analysis but I see it as an extension of the postnational argument, rather than a emendation, or third way; the interactive relationship of, notably, human rights with the state was always stressed – this I think is true across the postnational arguments, though not always explicit in analyses of international law (such as Peter Spiro’s work). Even the European Court of Human Rights is not “external” as such to the state: it comes into play only when national courts are unwilling to engage with claims of human rights abuse, and its rulings take effect through states. More importantly, I think that Sassen’s analysis would profit from an expanded elucidation of the institutional mechanisms through which the national and global intersect and, in turn, how this impacts the meaning and role of citizenship (including rights and “subjectship”).

What is the institutional nexus, and mechanism that effects these relations – that is, the ways citizenship is itself brought into play? In this regard, one has to again turn to the growing role and significance of the courts, judicial and administrative bodies, and the “judicialization” of organizations as a whole. These entities are mediating between the global and the national and, indeed, the global and the local. It is for this reason that actors of different kinds – such as marginalized groups more broadly – have political agency. It is judicially embedded in them – a distinct evolution of citizenship from the classical image so vividly described in Michael Walzer’s (1965) work on the Puritan saints. We are all “agents” now, no matter how passive, as courts negotiate identities, subjectship, and the meaning of citizenship. The courts in the process mediate sexual status, women’s rights, and other social identities with transnational human rights norms. These entities are of and outside the state at the same time – even if the language is strictly, say, constitutional in the American case. The “articulation” is here, again, in both the meaning of “conceptualizes and gives voice” to a set of relationships, and second, facilitates the movement between different parts – national and global, and individuals and other actors, domestic and international. If traditionally the courts were largely blind “beyond the

water's edge," in American terms, or utterly subject to parliamentary sovereignty in British terms, this is no longer true. The normative field that courts mediate is no longer limited, formally and informally, by national boundaries. Courts and judicial-like entities are territorially bounded – but draw increasingly from extraterritorial legal and normative sources.

We are facing an extraordinary moment in global history. The organizing principles of social and political life – from notions of state sovereignty to the concepts of the free market and a bounded society – are less certain, more questioned, and highly fluid. This is the kind of moment that also makes and breaks social scientists: the great figures of the 19th and early 20th centuries – one thinks of the familiar suspects such as Marx and Weber – achieved their notoriety in part in being able to elicit or impose sense and meaning on an apparently inchoate social world. Those figures gave a vocabulary for explaining a world in sharp transition, not only for a group of fellow specialists but for a much broader public.

At the very moment that fields such as sociology are as vital in addressing contemporary challenges as ever, the discipline is as a whole curiously low key. This can be attributed in part to an academy, which is highly specialized and thus leading to a fracturing of knowledge. It is in such an environment where scholars like Saskia Sassen become critical, precisely because they try to comprehend not just the “big picture” but the cogs and wheels of social and political change, how institutions develop and decay, and how human beings are implicated in this process. Such scholars struggle against the tide of “normal science,” in Kuhnian terms. But normal science is good for studying ebbs and eddies, not the broad, global currents and gales we now face. We need to urgently expand our horizons and intellectual scope.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I am grateful to Daniel Levy for his comments.

REFERENCES

- Benhabib, S. (2004). *The rights of others: Aliens, residents and citizens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bosniak, L. (2006). *The citizen and the alien: Dilemmas of contemporary membership*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Hansen, R. (2009). The poverty of postnationalism: Citizenship, immigration and the New Europe. *Theory and Society*, 38(1), 1–24.
- Jacobson, D. (1996). *Rights across borders: Immigration and the decline of citizenship*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jacobson, D., & Ruffer, G. (2003). Courts across borders: The implications of judicial agency for human rights and democracy. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 25(1), 74–93.
- Joppke, C. (1999). *Immigration and the nation-state*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Laski, H. (1917). *Studies in Problems of Sovereignty*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1996). *Losing control? Sovereignty in an age of globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2008). *Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Soysal, Y. N. (1994). *Limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Soysal, Y. N. (1997). Changing parameters of citizenship and claims-making: Organized Islam in European public spheres. *Theory and Society*, 26(4), 509–527.
- Spiro, P. (2003). *Mandated membership, diluted identity: Citizenship, globalization, and international law, in globalization and citizenship*. New York: Rowan & Littlefield.
- Waldinger, R., & Fitzgerald, D. (2004). Transnationalism in question. *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(5), 1177–1195.
- Walzer, M. (1965). *The revolution of the saints*. Harvard University: Cambridge University Press.

ON DENATIONALIZATION AS NEOLIBERALIZATION: BIOPOLITICS, CLASS INTEREST, AND THE INCOMPLETENESS OF CITIZENSHIP

Matthew Sparke

How is the global embedded in the national? How do national institutions enable global relations? And how in turn is citizenship being transformed as a social, political, and legal institution amidst these two-way ties? These are some of the important questions at the heart of Saskia Sassen's paper examining the "denationalization" of citizenship. Drawing on a wide diversity of theoretical literatures, and complicating simple sound bites with her sensitivity to the contested character of key concepts, Sassen here offers inspiration and provocation in equal amounts. Her approach is inspiring in part because of the insistence from the start that it is the always-incomplete nature of citizenship that allows for it to be both developed and studied as an outcome of diverse insurgencies against the exclusion and marginalization of the non-citizen or sub-citizen. Sassen thus models a way of theorizing citizenship that problematizes its enclosure as a fixed and finalized socio-legal institution. Instead, she shows how it can be explored as a congeries of ongoing and open-ended citizenship struggles or projects. These ongoing processes of redefinition, she suggests, have a tendential

trajectory, and it is with Sassen's attempt to chart this trajectory that her paper makes its particular provocation: namely the argument that today, in the context of globalization, we are seeing citizenship becoming increasingly denationalized.

Sassen explains that she prefers the term denationalization to the alternatives of postnationalization and transnationalization because for her the "de" does not fall prey to the tendency of implying that the nation-state and national norms of citizenship have been utterly eclipsed amidst increasing and intensifying global interdependencies. I am not convinced myself that evocations of the postnational and transnational always do this, nor that the "de" in denationalization really delivers us from the "death of the nation-state" discursive denouement. Indeed, in some senses denationalization, with its allusions to deregulation and privatization, seems at odds with the arguments about the ongoing salience of the national-state, particularly when one considers how the term's semiotic denotation of deterritorialization seems to point in a destructive, one-way "end of the nation-state" direction compared to the more double-edged implications of the "post" – *coming after* but also *incorporating and building on* – in postnational. That said, as I have argued in a critique of Arjun Appadurai's pean to the postnational (Sparke, 2005, chapter 2), upbeat accounts of postnational consciousness also risk being reduced to "end of the nation-state" sloganeering too. What matters most, it seems, is not the term so much as the explanation that comes with it, and here Sassen's opening definition is clear. "With the term 'denationalization,'" she says, "I seek to capture something that remains connected to the 'national' as constructed historically, and is indeed profoundly imbricated with it but is so on historically new terms of engagement."

Sassen's definition of denationalization leads thus to questions about what phenomena define the "historically new terms of engagement." With its rhetorical resonance with deregulation and deterritorialization, one might suppose that denationalization would be tied by Sassen to neoliberalization. Instead, though, she prefers to appeal to "globalization" in the abstract, and she thereby delinks her account of denationalization from any direct description of neoliberalism as either a policy-making orthodoxy or a dominant pattern of governmental practices. Neoliberalization is never used to name the "historically new terms of engagement," and neoliberal norms are rarely addressed except to mention that "the changes bundled under the notion of the competitive state and the quasi-privatized executive [have] reduced the likelihood that state institutions will do the type of legislative and judiciary work that in the past led to expanded formal

[citizenship] inclusions.” This latter point is an important one, I think, because it hints at the historical irony of pro-market innovations in one aspect of citizenship (i.e., the restructuring of governance to make it more responsive to a defiantly denationalized class of corporate citizens) leading to the inhibition of insurgent innovations in alternative aspects of citizenship (e.g., the organizing of social movements by those dispossessed through interstate competition or so-called emergency executive action). In other words, this particular historical irony points to the ways in which what Sassen calls “incompleteness” has today been appropriated in the interests of expanding and entrenching an increasingly denationalized form of neoliberal hegemony. Sassen herself, however, does not use such other words, and, because she does not therefore address the connective imperatives running between denationalization and neoliberalization, her paper does not explore the class interests that seem to be structuring so many of today’s most influential, albeit incomplete, recodifications of citizenship.

In the rest of this response I want to point to some of the developments in citizenship that disappear from view when we delink an account of denationalization from an explicit concern with neoliberalization. I do so with great respect for Sassen’s already expansive theoretical repertoire, and with nothing like her extraordinary record of world-renowned research into the diverse topics of citizenship, migration, global cities, and globalization. I have written a little on the global geographies of neoliberalism, and I cite some of this work here in order to indicate that my comments have some substantive study behind them. However, I do not want to pretend to any special personal or disciplinary insight into neoliberalism and class. It should be noted too that throughout her more extensive and interdisciplinary work, Sassen hardly ignores questions of class herself. Indeed, having first read her work as an undergraduate, I still remember finding it useful for making points about the class-divided spatiality of global cities in a tutorial. And much more recently I have found her new book on global assemblages of territory, authority and rights (Sassen, 2006) especially helpful for highlighting the links between class and trade law for a textbook I am writing on globalization.

As well as respecting Sassen’s work, I here make my points about neoliberalization knowing too that there are many good reasons to be cautious about invoking neoliberalism as a catch-all category for describing the political-economic arrangements and orthodoxies associated with contemporary globalization. For one thing, it is an “ism” that tends to run together the arrangements and orthodoxies by being used to describe

both pro-market *practices* of governance and free-market fundamentalist *ideologies* at the same time. It is also a term which while being somewhat overused by critics on the Left remains counter-intuitive and confusing for those on the Right who – especially in the United States – tend to rail against all things “liberal” even when they do so in the name of liberalizing markets and citizens from state control. Meanwhile, at a theoretical level, the term can be confusing too, drawing sometimes on Foucauldian arguments about citizenship projects of individualized responsabilization (Lemke, 2001), while at other times invoking more Marxian theories of post-Fordist restructing, the roll-back of welfare-state citizenship in rich countries, and the entrenchment of accumulation by dispossession (and the associated abridgement of democratic citizenship rights) more globally (e.g., Harvey, 2005).

Rather than seeing the theoretical twists and turns as a basis for abandoning the term, I have elsewhere argued that theories of neoliberalism remain remarkably useful for exploring how top-down market-based reforms in governance (*à la* Marxian accounts) and bottom-up innovations in economic governmentality (*à la* Foucauldian accounts) come together in context-contingent ways in the world at large (Sparke, 2006a; see also Li, 2007, for an inspiring illustration of how to do this in ethnographic research). Moreover, as I have sought to show with related empirical work on the biopolitics of border regimes in free trade areas, this sort of approach to neoliberalism also provides a fruitful framework for thinking about how the denationalization of citizenship is actually worked out at and across international borders (Sparke, 2006b; Sparke, Sidaway, Bunnell, & Grundy-Warr, 2004; Sparke, 2000; see also Amoore & de Goede, 2008). Such empirical work corroborates Sassen’s crucial point that national institutions are deeply involved in enabling processes of denationalization (although for a compelling account of how inter-national analysis can come to terms with global dispossession too, see Hart, 2006). Customs and border patrol agencies, for instance, are key to facilitating the expedited cross-border movement of frequent travelers who have paid for membership in pre-cleared passport-control fast tracks. These travelers may remain national citizens of diverse foreign countries, but, as long as they can pay for the necessary applications, they can avail themselves of fast cross-border passage from national border control agencies in the same way as they can avail themselves of investment and property rights from national trade and patent offices. As prudential, risk-managing entrepreneurial subjects, they can thereby bring their individual internalization of neoliberal norms into profitable alignment with the more macro neoliberal imperatives and

incentives involved in their management of (and hence their need for mobility within) transnational business networks. At the level of citizenship theory, these sorts of observations lead me to concur with others who argue that we are seeing a neoliberalization of citizenship in which, what Marshall once called, “social citizenship” and “political citizenship” are being abridged and undermined at the same time as the liberal “civil citizenship,” once historically associated with economic contracts and their national legal infrastructure, has become neoliberally denationalized, which is to say, opened to the transnational business class thanks to the transnational legal infrastructure of free trade regulations and related neoliberal policies set at and across national, regional, and personal scales (see also Blank, 2007; Hindess, 2002; Mitchell, 2004; Mitchell, Marston, & Katz, 2004).

Such arguments about neoliberalization seem to coincide with Sassen’s own points about the business class interest in denationalization, an interest in what she calls “the granting by national states of multiple ‘rights’ to foreign actors, largely and especially economic actors – foreign firms, foreign investors, international markets, and foreign business people.” In this respect, she acknowledges that the incompleteness of citizenship renders it susceptible to appropriation and innovation by a denationalizing business class, a class, in other words, that is able to instrumentalize incompleteness in the interests of expanding its rights and freedoms across transnational space. My concern, though, is that if we only consider such developments in the terms of denationalization, we risk ignoring how the relationship to the national for other classes becomes increasingly disempowering precisely because it territorializes politics and disciplines agency in the interest of entrenching neoliberal hegemony. Sassen alludes to the political challenge “for citizens, still largely confined to national institutions” of making the denationalizing business class democratically accountable in the absence of a global state. She also underlines the importance of this challenge vis-à-vis the future of democracy: “For me,” she stresses, “the question as to how citizens should handle these new concentrations of power and ‘legitimacy’ that attach to global firms and markets is a key to the future of democracy.” However, by suggesting too that “detecting” denationalizing developments in sites such as global cities might provide citizens with a “possibility... to demand accountability” of the global business class, she sounds rather too similar to the sorts of sanguine sages of civil society who soften the rough edges of Davos-type business meetings with idealistic accounts of cosmopolitan communion. While Sassen’s detective work does not descend into quite such depoliticized discussion, the result is that she still downplays the degree to which all sorts of demands of a more radically resistant sort

have been developed already by critics of neoliberalism (for a literature review, see Sparke, 2008; for a closer examination of global city insurgency in particular see Leitner, Peck, & Sheppard, 2007). Indeed, had she addressed the discourses of anti-neoliberal resistance at any length, they themselves would have underlined the importance of understanding neoliberal hegemony as a transnational target of protest and, as such, as a working name for the “historically new” upon which and with which diverse citizenship projects around the world are now actively engaged.

Critics in global cities ranging from Seattle to Porto Alegre to Mumbai have made these points against neoliberalism repeatedly (Sen, Anand, Escobar, & Waterman, 2006; Sparke et al., 2005). Their slogans – “No Globalization Without Representation” and “Another World Is Possible” – clearly make bold global demands, but at the same time they make them well aware of the asymmetrical advantages in influence and authority of the neoliberal institutions – the World Trade Organization and the World Economic Forum – against which their protests have been deliberately organized. The problem from the protestors’ and organizers’ perspectives is not one of detection or of finding places and possibilities to make demands as global citizens, but rather of overcoming the ways in which such resistance is repeatedly disciplined and reterritorialized in the interests of maintaining neoliberal hegemony. And this in turn means noticing the class-selective operationalization of denationalization: on the one hand, involving national agencies and authority in the expansion of transnational rights and freedoms for the business class, while, on the other hand, involving national agencies and authority in the domestication and disciplining of demands for democracy and regulatory rights by less privileged classes. I am not saying that class is the only axis of marginalization in such situations. Those who demand new global protections for the environment, for women, and for human rights and health are all equally disciplined and dismissed as “protectionists” by business elites (who all ironically but tellingly never hesitate to “protect” national sovereignty when global anti-neoliberal regulations are proposed). My suggestion is simply that noticing neoliberalism makes noticing the class-selective divergences in denationalization much easier to examine and explain, especially when we want to understand the reining in of resistance movements within the borders of nation-states. Sassen’s own suggestions that we “develop forms of participatory politics that decenter and sometimes transcend national political life,” that we “learn how to practice democracy across borders,” and that we also “engage the global from within the national” all remain vitally salient in this regard. But noticing the class-selective divergences in denationalization also

underlines the need to be aware that the “we” of decentered democracy and postnational participation remains far from equally open to all.

At a more micrological level, another advantage of linking an account of denationalization to the study of neoliberalization is that it brings to the forefront some of the dominant biopolitical technologies through which contemporary citizenship projects operate. For example, at the very same time as they have developed expedited crossing lanes for denationalized business class citizens, US agencies have been enforcing policies of so-called expedited removal and extraordinary rendition in ways that radically reimpose national territory (and terror) on the bodies of those deemed dangerous to the security of citizens of a defensively defined national homeland. The danger of examining such dynamics simply in terms of denationalization is that they either just seem contradictory – inclusive denationalization for some and brutally exclusive denationalization for others – or that the radically divergent directions in denationalization are explained by divergent and theoretically contradictory mappings of biopolitics – for example, Hardt and Negri’s smooth space for the business class versus Agamben’s spaces of sovereignty’s exceptions for the excluded (for a brilliant examination of these theoretical contradictions see [Coleman & Grove, 2009](#)). To be sure, neoliberalism hardly accounts for or theoretically encapsulates all these contradictions. Other neo’s ranging from American neoconservatism to religious neofundamentalism are also a part of the picture, and, if we follow the analysis of [Brown \(2006\)](#), they in turn help account for why denationalization can be coincident with the nightmarish eclipse of political citizenship she calls “de-democratization.” These context-contingent complexities noted, it also seems clear that an expansive set of neoliberal norms and practices *connect* the soft cosmopolitanism of the business class with the carceral cosmopolitanism of those subject to expedited removal and extraordinary rendition ([Sparke, 2006b](#)). Private prisons are used by ICE for purposes of expedited removal in the same way as the national government outsources software and hardware development for expedited crossing lanes to private sector businesses. Similarly, the CIA has used private corporate jets for extraordinary rendition and for the outsourcing of torture in the same way as TNCs use the very same corporate jets to organize transnational commodity chains and the outsourcing of sweatshop labor to unaccountable factories. The latter parallel gives new meaning to Sassen’s points about increasing executive privilege, of course, but the larger point here is that some of the more obvious examples seen in recent years of appropriated and instrumentalized incompleteness reflect a neoliberalization that ensures in

turn that the denationalization of citizenship is not only class-selective, but also operates at a biopolitical level to construct modes of being and modes of movement through space deeply mediated by market capitalism.

Sassen's account of emergent aspects of citizenship is itself highly heterogeneous and is thus attuned at moments to market mediations. And while she does not theorize these mediations in the terms of biopolitics, she also escapes some of the limits of the governmentality and citizenship literature: her enduring interest in the networks of both migrants and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) leading her to be cognizant of plural cross-border solidarities and diverse articulations of global responsibility that are often missing in Foucauldian accounts of responsabilized citizenship. Since the latter represents such a significant theoretical influence in contemporary accounts of citizenship, though, let us consider Nikolas Rose's recent book *The Politics of Life Itself* as a case in point (Rose, 2007). I would argue that Rose's arguments about the molecularization of biomedicine and the rise of ethopolitics as the core code of conduct of contemporary citizenship could be usefully supplemented by Sassen's more heterogeneous and global analysis of denationalization. Nevertheless, there is a way in which her delinking of denationalization from neoliberalization also leads to some of the same blind spots one finds in Rose's account of 21st century biological citizenship (see also Rose & Novas, 2005). Just as Rose addresses the emergence of risk-managing biomedical citizen subjects in a way that ignores how their calculating biopolitics are related to harsh life and death body counts in less privileged parts of the world (see Braun, 2007), Sassen's complex calculus of denationalization does not address as directly as it might the ways in which the expansion of citizenship rights for one class of bodies is directly related to the exploitation and diminished rights of others. However, by connecting Rose's interest in the biopolitics of health citizenship, and Sassen's interest in global networks, with a critical awareness about the neoliberalization of denationalization, another much more integrated, albeit uneven, picture of 21st century citizenship comes into view, a picture of exploitative asymmetry amidst global interdependency. For me, some of the most exciting new work on global citizenship has been focused on making sense of the structural violence and exclusionary implications of this picture. Given that so many important historical reterritorializations of citizenship have been made and marked through the changing scales of health citizenship – from the sanitation systems of the Roman empire through the quarantines of medieval cities to the development of modern national-state healthcare systems in the twentieth century – and given too that so many of the contemporary denationalizing

dynamics that interest Sassen impinge on this most unevenly embodied aspect of biopolitics, I will conclude these remarks by briefly pointing to work on health citizenship that seems especially exemplary in terms of acknowledging the links between its denationalization and neoliberalization.

Kaushik Sunder Rajan, for example, shows that today's privileged "patients in waiting" (whose denationalized biological citizenship through individualized risk management preoccupies Rose) are materially related to "experimental subjects" who are denationalized by biocapital but who inhabit other less privileged places in the global economy. "[T]he tendential axes of global asymmetry on which biocapital plays out," he highlights, "imply that the more likely subject position for Indian populations with respect to genomics is not that of a *consumer* as much as that of *experimental subject*" (Rajan, 2006, p. 149). This is also an argument made with attention to neoliberalism by Adriana Petryna in an account of "biological citizenship" that is much more asymmetry-aware than that of Rose. The globalized offshoring and outsourcing of drug trials, she shows, raise vital "questions about the unequal social contexts in which research is being performed and about how conditions of inequality remake a global geography of human experimentation" (Petryna, 2006, p. 33). Such processes of exploitation that give biological citizenship to some by taking it away from others connect in turn to the sorts of commodified "medical citizenship" that scholars have found in the consumption of globally traded organs and tissues (Scheper-Hughes, 2005; Waldby & Mitchell, 2006), as well as to the more complex kinds of "therapeutic citizenship" that Vinh-Kim Nguyen analyses as "a form of stateless citizenship, whereby claims are made on a global order on the basis of one's biomedical condition, and responsibilities worked out in the context of local moral economies" (Nguyen, 2005, p. 142).

One important insight emerging from these studies is that while the different populations are biopolitically connected, the biopolitical connections create a privileged and empowering kind of denationalized citizenship to those who can afford new drugs while systematically depending on the outcasting into sub-citizenship and non-citizenship of those from and on whose "treatment naïve" bodies the drugs are first developed and tested. Such experimental subjects may thereby be bound-in biopolitically into the lives of the world's biological and therapeutic citizens, but, to adapt Sassen's terms, with brutal incompleteness in terms of protections and rights. Incompleteness is in this sense completely skewed by the interests of a global class hierarchy, an incompleteness that biopolitically embodies neoliberal violence in the form of class-selective distributions of sickness and health (Nguyen & Peschard, 2003). Moreover, all the while vulnerability

to border-crossing diseases such as AIDS is commonly cited as a basis of a shared global citizenship of human beings in the face of a common biological threat (and as such, as a basis for the sort of “shared global responsibility” cited by Sassen), studies alert to uneven health citizenship show that biomedical research itself reproduces the same narrowed neoliberal interest in finding surplus value in what is coded as surplus human life (Cooper, 2008). Craddock’s (2007) study of HIV vaccine development illustrates, thus, that where such capitalist value cannot be found, the research is suspended, the viral clades of HIV found in the Global South receiving far less experimental attention even as they kill far more people. And even biomedical interventions that are actually supposed to include the excluded through aid (as opposed to corporate experimentation) are now being shown to be profoundly uneven and innovatively neoliberal in terms of enrollment into health citizenship. Thus Nguyen has shown that the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) represents a remarkable innovation in the sorts of citizenship constructed by what Foucault once called pastoral power (Nguyen, 2009). In short, he shows how the Bush administration’s promotion and projection of PEPFAR in Africa came not only as a sort of foreign policy compensation for the violent creation of non-citizens in Iraq and Guantanamo but also with the simultaneous advancement of faith-based organizations as agents of therapy and the attendant development of new confessional-*cum*-cost-benefit-calculation rites for the would-be biological citizens seeking their aid.

I will end here with one last example of the neoliberal sorting of health citizenship in denationalization that returns us to the complex figure of a citizen-subject on who Sassen suggests we need to conduct more research: the housewife. Go to the website of the *New York Times*, search under “hospital deportation” and you will find a photograph that captures on the very margins of the frame the face and outstretched caring hand of Petrona Gervacio Gaspar (http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2008/08/01/us/20080803DEPORT_18.html). The focus of the accompanying story is her son who was deported from a US hospital in a private air ambulance. The main point of the article is that, because he was an uninsured and undocumented immigrant, Gaspar’s son represented such a large unreimbursable cost to the hospital that it was prepared to pay \$30,000 for the private jet to return him forcibly to Guatemala. This privatization of a practice over which the national-state traditionally has had monopoly control is on the rise under conditions of neoliberalization. In the case of hospital deportations, moreover, such developments clearly point to the ways in which neoliberal sorting systems structure access to health

citizenship and its unhealthy alternatives both in and outside America. After all, the same private jet air ambulances are also being used more and more by the privileged patients of commodified medical citizenship too: the denationalized consumer-citizens of so-called medical travel that a recent corporate consulting report advertises is the new frontier in for-profit healthcare (McKinsey, 2008). But in the perverse pattern of US hospital deportations, the same neoliberal technology of medical travel is being used to transport patients with severe life threatening injuries away from medical care and into the homes of housewife carers such as Gaspar who can only offer Alka Seltzer and prayer along with their love. Feminist geographers have mapped such private spaces of care and belonging showing that they remain intimately intertwined with the ongoing and incomplete rescaling of citizenship (Craddock, 2000; Fannin, 2006; Fluri & Dowler, 2004; Marston, 2000; Lawson, 2007). However, these and related studies also show that we need to track the ways in which projects of expanding citizenship rights frequently involve or inspire authoritarian backlashes and exclusions too (Mitchell et al., 2004; Sangtin & Nagar, 2006; Sparke, 1996). Notwithstanding all her home care, Gaspar's experience (especially when reflected upon alongside the hateful comments of xenophobic website readers frustrated by their own diminishing entitlements as American citizens) reveals that such exclusion is especially acute in a cross-border context shaped at both ends by neoliberalism.

Here again we see class coming together with nation to structure processes of outcasting from citizenship, or, as website comment 630 from Albuquerque puts it: "American citizens are not the caretakers of the world. We can't even afford to care for all of our citizens! Keep the illegals out." We may see denationalization too, or, as Sassen puts it, "citizenship identities that arise out of networks, activities, and ideologies that span the home and the host society." However, here they are identities structured by a starkly asymmetric incompleteness that expands citizenship for some with technologies that make denationalization dangerous and deadly for others. The resulting decline into sub-citizenship and non-citizenship was all too clear to the Guatemalan housewife watching her son's continuing convulsions and worsening bouts of blood vomiting and unconsciousness. "Every time," she told the reporter, "he loses a little more of himself." For some readers this assessment, uttered in the Kanjobal Indian dialect that the reporter characterized as "an otherworldly squeak," may only seem to mark the final eclipse of citizenship altogether (from bare life, as the Agamben authorities would want to call it, to barely any life at all). However, for others, including a number of more caring commentators on the *New York*

Times website, the same housewife assessment served, it seems, as a sort of calling to cross-border solidarity, a kind of denationalized revisioning of health citizenship by citizens seeing the linked ravages of neoliberalization in both the United States and Guatemala. Though these critics may never have read Judith Butler on scenes of suffering provoking denationalized feelings of shared vulnerability (Butler, 2004), and though they might not therefore have been able to articulate their own senses of fellow-feeling in terms of how a mother's grief enabled a form of affective self-undoing in themselves, their comments still illustrate an ethical responsiveness to the precariousness of another's situation. Provoking also an awareness of denationalized suffering due to neoliberalism, the loss of self reported by Gaspar might further be interpreted in this way as leading to calls for denationalized democratic citizenship in the same sort of dialectical fashion as was once outlined by Marx in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*: "I am nothing and I should be everything" (translated as basis of an "infinitely demanding" ethics of citizenship in Critchley, 2007, p. 104). It seems to me that this is also a message of the housewife's care for her sick son. It is obviously a very long distance message which has to travel and be translated, but we still might learn from it, I am suggesting here, in the manner of fieldworkers learning from volunteer care-givers and thereby follow Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in her own sympathetically critical suggestion that such North–South urban–rural-routed recodings of responsibility amidst globalization offer a way to "revise and enhance the brilliant work of Saskia Sassen" (Spivak, 2008, pp. 9 and 166). To this end, I would add, Sassen's own insistence on the incompleteness of citizenship remains invaluable.

REFERENCES

- Amoore, L., & de Goede, M. (Eds). (2008). *Risk and the war on terror*. New York: Routledge.
- Blank, Y. (2007). Spheres of citizenship. *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, 8, 411–452.
- Braun, B. (2007). Biopolitics and the molecularization of life. *Cultural Geographies*, 14(1), 6–28.
- Brown, W. (2006). American nightmare: Neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and de-democratization. *Political Theory*, 34(6), 690–714.
- Butler, J. (2004). *Precarious life: The power of mourning and violence*. New York: Verso.
- Coleman, M., & Grove, K. (2009). Biopolitics, biopower, and the return of sovereignty. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 27, 489–507.
- Cooper, M. (2008). *Life as surplus: Biotechnology and capitalism in the neoliberal era*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Craddock, S. (2000). *City of plagues: Disease, poverty, and deviance in San Francisco*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Craddock, S. (2007). Market incentives, human lives, and AIDS vaccines. *Social Science & Medicine*, 64(5), 1042–1057.
- Critchley, S. (2007). *Infinitely demanding: Ethics of commitment, politics of resistance*. New York: Verso.
- Fannin, M. (2006). Global midwifery and technologies of emotion. *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies*, 5(1), 70–88.
- Fluri, J., & Dowler, L. (2004). House bound: Women's agency in white separatist movements. In: C. Flint (Ed.), *Spaces of hate: Geographies of discrimination, and intolerance in the USA* (pp. 69–86). New York: Routledge.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hart, G. (2006). Denaturalizing dispossession: Critical ethnography in the age of resurgent imperialism. *Antipode*, 38, 975–1001.
- Hindess, B. (2002). Neo-liberal citizenship. *Citizenship Studies*, 6, 127–143.
- Lawson, V. (2007). Geographies of care and responsibility. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 97(1), 1–11.
- Leitner, H., Peck, J., & Sheppard, E. (Eds). (2007). *Contesting neoliberalism: Urban frontiers*. New York: Guildford.
- Lemke, T. (2001). The birth of bio-politics: Michel Foucault's lecture at the Collège de France on neo-liberal governmentality. *Economy and Society*, 30, 190–207.
- Li, T. M. (2007). *The will to improve: Governmentality, development and the practice of politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Marston, S. (2000). The social construction of scale. *Progress in Human Geography*, 24(2), 219–242.
- McKinsey. (2008). *Mapping the Market for Medical Travel*, published online on the website of the McKinsey management consultancy firm at: http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_abstract_visitor.aspx?ar = 2134&pagenum = 1
- Mitchell, K. (2004). *Crossing the neoliberal line: Pacific rim migration and the metropolis*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Mitchell, K., Marston, S., & Katz, C. (2004). *Life's work: Geographies of social reproduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Nguyen, V.-K. (2005). Antiretroviral globalism, biopolitics, and therapeutic citizenship. In: A. Ong & S. Collier (Eds), *Global assemblages: Technology, politics and ethics as anthropological problems* (pp. 124–144). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Nguyen, V.-K. (2009). Government-by-exception: Enrolment and experimentality in mass HIV treatment programmes in Africa. *Social Theory & Health*, 7(3), 196–217.
- Nguyen, V.-K., & Peschard, K. (2003). Anthropology, inequality, and disease: A review. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 32, 447–474.
- Petryna, A. (2006). Globalizing human subjects research. In: A. Petryna, A. Lakoff & A. Kleinman (Eds), *Global pharmaceuticals: Ethics, markets, practices* (pp. 33–60). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Rajan, K. S. (2006). *Biocapital: The constitution of postgenomic life*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Rose, N. (2007). *The politics of life itself: Biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rose, N., & Novas, C. (2005). Biological citizenship. In: A. Ong & S. Collier (Eds), *Global assemblages: Technology, politics and ethics as anthropological problems* (pp. 439–463). Oxford: Blackwell.

- Sangtin, W., & Nagar, R. (2006). *Playing with fire: feminist thought and activism through seven lives in India*. Foreword by Chandra Talpade Mohanty. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sassen, S. (2006). *Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Scheper-Hughes, N. (2005). The last commodity: Post-human ethics and the global traffic in 'Fresh' organs. In: A. Ong & S. Collier (Eds), *Global assemblages: Technology, politics and ethics as anthropological problems* (pp. 145–167). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sen, J., Anand, A., Escobar, A., & Waterman, P. (2006). *The World Social Forum: Challenging Empires*. Available online at <http://www.choike.org/2009/eng/informes/1557.html>
- Sparke, M. (1996). Negotiating national action: Free trade, constitutional debate and the gendered geopolitics of Canada. *Political Geography*, 15(6/7), 615–639.
- Sparke, M. (2000). Chunnel visions: Unpacking the anticipatory geographies of an Anglo-European borderland. *Journal of Borderland Studies*, XV(1), 2–34.
- Sparke, M. (2005). *In the space of theory: Postfoundational geographies of the nation-state*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sparke, M. (2006a). Political geographies of globalization: (2) Governance. *Progress in Human Geography*, 30(2), 1–16.
- Sparke, M. (2006b). A neoliberal nexus: Citizenship, security and the future of the border. *Political Geography*, 25(2), 151–180.
- Sparke, M. (2008). Political geographies of globalization (3): Resistance. *Progress in Human Geography*, 32(1), 1–18.
- Sparke, M., Brown, E., Corva, D., Day, H., Faria, C., Sparks, T., & Varg, K. (2005). The world social forum and the lessons for economic geography. *Economic Geography*, 81(4), 359–380.
- Sparke, M., Sidaway, J., Bunnell, T., & Grundy-Warr, C. (2004). Triangulating the borderless world: Geographies of power in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, NS, 29, 485–498.
- Spivak, G. C. (2008). *Other Asias*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Waldby, C., & Mitchell, R. (2006). *Tissue economies: Blood, organs and cell lines in late capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDST OF TRANSNATIONAL REGIMES OF VIRTUE

Aihwa Ong

Following from her earlier work on the global city, Saskia Sassen expands on her concept of denationalization as a global effect on citizenship. Specifically, Sassen argues that “the incompleteness of the formal institution of citizenship makes it possible for the outsider to claim for expanded inclusions,” and that the institutionalization of these claims will lead to a condition of “denationalized citizenship.”

While one can generally agree with Sassen that other institutions outside the state are involved in extending protections or in the organization of collective identities, the overall argument creates confusion over what exactly is meant by citizenship, how it is related to the territorialized nation-state, and whether protections extended by transnational regimes constitute “citizenship.” In other words, while I agree that in practice citizenship is usually incompletely extended or provided, I challenge her argument that citizenship can become “denationalized.” There is a conflation of two distinctive regimes: citizenship as an institution of the nation-state and universal human rights as Kantian aspiration of world citizenship.

Drawing on my own work, I will limit my comments to three points that are pertinent to Sassen’s formulation.

First, we used to think of different dimensions of citizenship – political rights, legal entitlements, moral claims, a state, territoriality, etc. – as more

or less tied together. For instance, when we talk about citizenship, we may be referring to one of several components, beyond “the formal and the subjective” mentioned but not identified by Sassen. Citizenship as a term can refer to juridico-legal, political, cultural, and social elements that are linked together in a particular nation. Besides the territory and the state, the components in citizenship include, in various combinations,

- a juridico-legal concept based on the state’s defense and implementation of the human rights of citizens within (and perhaps beyond) the national territory.
- citizenship as a political membership that defines citizens according to their claims and duties in relation to the nation, for example conscription and defense of the motherland.
- a cultural ideal of national belonging to an imagined community (Anderson 1991[1983]) and shared values that evolve over time such as human dignity, particular languages and religions, traditions of solidarity and harmony, multiculturalism, etc.
- social norms of citizenship, that is loyalty, ethics, moral worthiness, and contribution to the common good.

In our discussions, these different aspects are frequently not distinguished and the lack of what we mean by citizenship becomes as blurring as the national borders are said to be by the effects of globalization. Furthermore, globalization has been wielded as a generic term to mean (privatization, deregulation) when many other forms of transnational linkages are implied. The broader concern of Sassen, to analyze the intersection of “formal citizenship” and “globalization,” points to the need for finer differentiation and more careful attention to what exactly is being “denationalized” and what is not.

Second, instead of thinking of globalization as a planetary condition of privatization, deregulation, and neoliberalism, a mid-range approach that attends to situated articulations of these forms with particular nations is analytically useful and particularly illuminating. Stephen J. Collier and I have reanalyzed the global as the dispersal of universalizable technologies – that is “global forms” such as neoliberal logic, human rights regime, corporate programs – and their situated articulation with particular milieus of citizenship. Such “global assemblages” crystallize conditions of possibility for the transformation of norms and practices in politics and ethics (Collier & Ong, 2005). For instance, the intersection of neoliberal values and the politics of emerging nation-states can mutate notions about the ethics of citizenship.

As I have argued elsewhere, increasingly, the cross-border flows of beliefs, ideals, knowledge, markets, and actors have had a mutating effect on a nation's thinking on citizenship and its various commitments and interests. Specifically, some of the components long associated with national citizenship are becoming disarticulated from one another, and articulated with diverse universalizing norms defined by neoliberal criteria, or human rights, and practices of corporations (Ong 2005a, 2006).

For instance, in fast-growing Asian countries, citizenship as political rights and cultural solidarity has remained robust, while the social norms of citizenship are increasingly influenced by a neoliberal emphasis on acquisition of knowledge, skills, and entrepreneurial ethos (Ong, 2008). Through the invoking of the political exception, certain sectors and categories of citizens are expected to strive for new social norms of human capital, entrepreneurial and self-managing than other areas, in a graduated approach to improving the overall human resources of the nation (Ong 2005b). In other words, certain citizenship components are now articulated with global regimes based on nonterritorial norms of human capital, but the juridico-legal elements have remained relatively unaffected. There is the possibility, however, that human rights regimes are beginning to interact with politico-legal thinking on citizenship in say China, but the adoption of these ideals is still in question.

Third, beyond the state-centered control of citizenship and its criteria, anthropological investigation has opened up the study of citizenship by focusing on very different kinds of claims on national regimes or global entities. Here we are dealing with the practices and performances that activate a variety of claims for inclusion or protection in multiple contexts. For instance, my concept of "flexible citizenship" analyzed the transnational maneuvers of a managerial elite that skillfully navigates different immigration regimes in order to gain access to profitable markets and safe nations. Hong Kong managers intent upon capital accumulation in global spaces must also manipulate negative cultural stigmas in the host country in order to make claims on citizenship (Ong, 1999). Another kind of citizenship claims is made by excluded populations who lack access to fundamental democratic rights. For instance, millions of on-line Chinese use the Internet for entertainment as well as for accessing foreign news, spreading stories of injustice, and promoting a cyber public that challenges authoritarian rule (Ong, 2006).

Yet other examples of citizens' claims are by citizens and residences excluded from protections codified by the state law. In Latin America and India, social movements in the streets have developed at the confluence of

urban development and migrant communities. Street demonstrations by the disenfranchised – poor migrants, shantytown dwellers, refugees – articulate array of civil, political, and social rights. The streets form an arena for the political mobilization of the poor to claim public resources such as urban housing, water, and electricity in an exercise of “substantive citizenship” (Holston, 1993). The victims of Chernobyl dramatize how notions of life itself can change social norms of citizenship. By claiming biomedical resources, social equities, and human rights from the Russian state, victims gave form to a kind of “biological citizenship” (Petryna, 2002). Another example from Europe shows how health has become the ground for claiming asylum. The suffering body of the HIV-infected migrant reverses public perception of his biopolitical otherness rooted in race and alien status. Increasingly, some form of legal recognition is awarded in the name of humanity, that is the right to a healthy body, regardless of the citizenship of the patient (Fassin, 2001).

Despite these changes in the ethical heft of citizenship, many others cannot make claims on a state, but must instead turn to transnational agencies for protection. Global agencies from the United Nations to the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to corporations extend minimalist protections that fall short of citizenship. Despite the rhetoric of human rights, it is by no means clear that the right to survival can everywhere be translated into citizenship. In practice, human rights discourse merely legitimizes claims on intervention on the grounds of common humanity. Categories of the human – refugees, the undocumented, subjects of failed states, and nonstate persons – exercise claims on the grounds of sheer survival, not citizenship (see Ong, 2003). These are “counter-politics of sheer life” – a situated form of political mobilization that involves ethical claims to resources articulated in terms of their needs as living beings (Collier & Lakoff, 2005, p. 29). For instance, in Cote D’Ivoire, HIC patients are required to assemble themselves around a clinic in order to claim a kind of “therapeutic citizenship” from drug dispensing pharmaceutical companies (Nguyen, 2005). Global corporations, in an age of concern to demonstrate social responsibility, are increasingly exercising a kind of “ethical citizenship” by spreading resources and knowledge, but such ethicalizing corporate behavior does not amount to citizenship because it is based not on law but on social norms and is highly contingent in implementation. These forms of nonstate transnational protections and right to survival mimic conventional citizenship, but do not displace it.

CONCLUSION

In short, as the empirical cases briefly mentioned above show, globalization cannot be said to lead to the denationalization of citizenship, but rather it brings about specific articulations between national citizenship and transnational norms on the one hand, and the rise of nonstate spaces where transnational institutions seek to protect people on the grounds of humanity, not citizenship on the other. By differentiating among the components that used to be tied together as citizenship, and tracing their variable links to global forms, I identify two kinds of transformations within and outside the state when it comes to administering the human:

- (a) In situated interactions between global forms and national politics, citizenship can become linked to external social criteria of moral worthiness (based on human capital or human rights) promoted by transnational regimes.
- (b) As states for a variety of reasons exclude protection from some citizens as well as noncitizens, a spectrum of nonstate agencies provide citizenship-like resources and protections that fall grievously short of actual citizenship.
- (c) Some transnational norms interact with citizenship criteria, and some transnational institutions extend protection, but these do not displace citizenship and merely seek to protect marginalized citizens and stateless persons.

Citizenship, as Sassen notes, is embedded in the nation-state, but by that logic cannot be “denationalized,” as she also claims in a contrarian move. While we can all agree that transnational regimes of virtue or corporate largess are extending protections and services to a variety of marginalized groups regardless of national borders, these regimes do not replace but rather seek to supplement citizenship orders. Human rights regimes do not displace citizenship because they do not exist as formal legal relationship with enforceable rights and obligations to a territorialized citizenry. By contrast, only states can enforce (human rights as) citizenship rights. Certain conceptualizations of citizenship can be influenced by the discourse of human rights (as has been the case in China), but the transnational regimes of virtue cannot disembed citizenship from the state.

The claim of “denationalized citizenship?,” while tentative, is derived from a kind of unilinear thinking that presumes successive political orders

culminating in a form of world citizenship. Here it is useful to invoke the Kantian ideal of allegiance to the worldwide community of human beings (Kant, 1964). Despite the proliferation of NGOs, multilateral agencies, and other groups, they do not collectively constitute the kind of robust institutions and commitments that would qualify as a Kantian “world citizenship,” a condition that would require a federation of states that institutionalize human rights, and thus still requires state action to protect its citizens (i.e., citizenship). Without a global state that can enforce rights, claims of nonstate citizenship are fundamentally discourses of ethical obligations to our fellow humans as members of the same planetary oikos (Arendt, 1958). There is, in other words, a profound difference between the state-based *systems of government* which target population is citizens and nonstate *regimes of ethical governance* for which the reference population is humanity itself.

These two spaces of politics influence one another and articulate in complex and contingent ways. As I noted above, anthropologists have shifted from a linear logic to a spatial assemblage as the space of inquiry into the particular interactions of co-existing political systems. Careful empirical study of situated articulations between citizenship orders and regimes of transnational virtue is more fruitful for analyzing our fractal political contemporaneity.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, B. (1991 [1983]). *Imagined communities* (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
- Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Collier, S. J., & Lakoff, A. (2005). Regimes of living. In: A. Ong & S. J. Collier (Eds), *Global assemblages: Technology, politics, and ethics as anthropological problems*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Collier, S. J., & Ong, A. (2005). Introduction: Global assemblages, anthropological problems. In: A. Ong & S. J. Collier (Eds), *Global assemblages: Technology, politics, and ethics as anthropological problems* (pp. 3–21). Malden: Blackwell.
- Fassin, D. (2001). The biopolitics of otherness. *Anthropology Today*, 17(February), 3–23.
- Holston, J. (1993). Introduction. In: J. Holston (Ed.), *Cities and citizenship*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Kant, I. (1964). *Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals* (H. J. Paton, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.
- Nguyen, V.-K. (2005). Antiretroviral globalism, biopolitics, and therapeutic citizenship. In: A. Ong & S. J. Collier (Eds), *Global assemblages: Technology, politics, and ethics as anthropological problems* (pp. 124–144). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Ong, A. (2003). *Buddha is hiding: Refugees, citizenship, the New America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ong, A. (2005a). (Re)Articulations of citizenship. *Political Science & Politics, October*, 763–765.
- Ong, A. (2005b). *Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Ong, A. (2006). Mutations in citizenship, *theory, culture, and society*, Special NEP Issue. *Problematizing Global Knowledge*, 22(3), 499–503.
- Ong, A. (2008). *Please stay: Pied-a-terre subjects in the megacity*. In: E. F. Isin, P. Nyers & B. S. Turner (Eds), *Citizenship between past and future* (pp. 81–91). London: Routledge.
- Petryna, A. (2002). *Life exposed: Biological citizens after Chernobyl*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

REJOINDER

Saskia Sassen

I want to thank the respondents for their observations and critiques. It is impossible to address the many points raised in these five responses. Here I will limit myself to some of the issues which are emblematic of the diverse interpretive tools of each author and may or may not contain a foundational disagreement.

A first set of issues concerns the concept of citizenship itself which I will address through Ong's critique of my articulating of denationalization with what is a nation-state-centered category. Whatever the disagreements of interpretation, I have great admiration for Ong's work; she is one of the most original and important scholars on the subject and has made major contributions to the effort of recognizing new formations and dynamics.

Ong's comments touch on some key issues in a discussion of citizenship, some of which are raised in other responses as well, even though they may be positioned differently. Ong's account begins with the question of what is citizenship, and gives us a definition that is widely recognized and accepted, and can be summarized as: "citizenship is an institution of the nation-state." This definition leads her to write "I challenge her argument that citizenship can become 'denationalized.' There is a conflation of two distinctive regimes: citizenship as an institution of the nation-state and universal human rights as Kantian aspiration of world citizenship" (Ong, 2009, p. 301).

My entry into the question of citizenship is sufficiently transversal as to accommodate what from some perspectives might indeed be a contradiction in terms. I posit that a range of dynamics, claims, shifts, which are evident today have the capacity to denationalize what was historically constructed as national, including citizenship.¹ Indeed, I take it even further: In the same

book on which this paper is based, but in a different chapter (Sassen, 2008a, Chap. 4), I describe empirical conditions of the last 20 years that show that such a process of denationalizing is also taking place inside the state apparatus, notably the executive branch of the government.

Further, I extend the *question* of rights/citizenship to the granting by national states of multiple “rights” to foreign actors, largely and especially economic actors – foreign firms, foreign investors, international markets, and foreign business people (Sassen, 2008a, Chap. 5; 1996, Chap. 2). Admittedly, this is not a common way of framing the issue of citizenship and rights. And indeed, only one of the respondents, Jacobson, picked up on it! It comes out of my perspective about the impact of globalization and denationalization on the national state, including the impact on the relationship between the state and its own citizens, and between the state and foreign firms. I see this as a significant, though not much recognized, development in the history of rights-granting. For me the question as to how citizens should handle these new concentrations of power and “legitimacy” that attach to global firms and markets is a key to the future of a working democracy.

Here Cresswell’s (2009, p. 260) “central point that the citizen is a kind of geographica, p. 1 and historical assemblage. An achievement of a multitude of human/environment interfaces” is a powerful framing for the mix of elements, many transversal and some tangential, that I bring into my analysis. Cresswell focuses on one particular aspect of this larger framework: the relationship between geographies and changing notions of citizenship. This relationship is also critical for Ong.

A second key issue in Ong’s discussion, and also in Smith, is the importance of disentangling the diverse components that constitute citizenship, and from there she seems to call on me to make “finer differentiation and more careful attention to what exactly is being ‘denationalized’ and what is not” (Ong, 2009, p. 302).

I agree completely with the notion that we need such differentiation, and indeed do considerable specifying of differentiations, I quote from my paper:

Here I examine formal and informal changes in the rights of citizens, in citizens’ practices, and in the subjective dimensions of the institution. By including nonformalized ‘rights,’ practices, and subjectivities the analysis can grasp instabilities and possibilities for further change in the institution The type of contextualizing I advance here brings to the fore the *particularity* of what is often universalized: the *national* citizen as a rights-bearing subject (p. 232).

And again: “Analytically, I distinguish between citizenship markers arising from the formal apparatus of the nation-state, including citizenship as a formal institution, on the one hand, and, on the other, citizenship markers arising outside that formal apparatus (that can, at the limit, signal types of informal citizenship). ... One of the critical institutional developments that give meaning to such informal political actors and practices is the thesis that the formal political apparatus today accommodates less and less of the political” (pp. 234–235).

Indeed, the matter of distinctions is central to all our work. My concern in this paper is elaborating these inside the national frame, but the national is part of diverse global geographies – and thereby becomes partly denationalized. The other responses take these distinctions outside the national. Creswell emphasizes denizenship and shadow citizens, and the multiple geographies of mobility that produce these diverse subjects. Smith, using the vector of neo-liberalisms’ ravages, brings to the fore the uneven effects on diverse population groups, and has developed various aspects of transnationalism from below in his larger body of work. Sparke describes a whole range of new specialized geographies that give the privileged denationalized citizenship by providing them access to what they want, no matter where in the world it is to be found. Jacobson shows how the judicializing of politics constructs postnational geographies for claims and rights. And Ong’s work has, of course, laid the conceptual groundwork for these extended spaces and vectors for citizenship.

Ong writes further: “Second, instead of thinking of globalization as a planetary condition of privatization, deregulation, and neo-liberalism, a mid-range approach that attends to situated articulations of these forms with particular nations is analytically useful and particularly illuminating” (Ong, 2009, p. 302).

Again I completely agree, and have worked hard over the last 20 years to develop the notion of globalization along these lines. I have never argued that it was planetary or that it was only about privatization. And what Ong refers to as “mid-level formations” have been at the center of my empirical and theoretical work – the global city, cross-border migrations, digital formations, and now the national state apparatus itself as part of global spaces, all have been a key focus in my work. Aiwah Ong knows this, but since this statement keeps coming up I thought I would just say it one more time.

A third important element Ong brings up is that certain “citizenship components are now articulated with global regimes based on non-territorial

norms of human capital, but the juridico-legal elements have remained relatively unaffected” (p. 303).

I agree completely with the first part. But I am not so sure about the second part, nor do I think the other respondents would agree with it. I write in the paper “Today’s condition of unsettlement helps make legible the diversity of sources and institutional locations for rights, as well as the changeability and variability of the rights-bearing subject that is the citizen, notwithstanding the formal character of the institution. We can detect a partial redeployment of specific components of citizenship across a wide range of institutional locations and normative orders, going well beyond the national bond” (p. 233). Furthermore, as I discuss in the paper, the world trading system has created a professional worker with portable rights across all the signatory countries – which is almost all. This is usually overlooked in discussions of citizenship and migration, or perhaps not sufficiently known.

I read particular aspects of both Cresswell and Sparke’s papers as allowing for juridico-legal shifts in response to such articulations with global regimes. And I also read Jacobson’s response and much of his work as documenting precisely such juridico-legal shifts partly as a response to practices – from claim-making to the necessity of recognizing the growing weight of old and new cross-border dynamics. Cresswell’s shadow citizens and denizens can be read as part of a larger geography for assembling novel types of subjects. I see an affinity with some of the subjects I describe which are not fully aligned with the more common distinctions. For instance, my distinction between “a type of informal citizen who is unauthorized yet recognized, as might be the case with undocumented immigrants who are long-term residents in a community and participate in it as citizens do, ... and a formal citizen who is fully authorized yet not fully recognized, as might be the case with minoritized citizens and with subjects engaging in political work even though they do so not as ‘citizens’ but as some other kind of subject, for example, as mothers” (p. 244). These cases unsettle some of the basic conventional alignments between the law and the subject, an issue also critical to Jacobson’s work.

An important issue raised by all the papers is the relationship of the state to citizenship, where citizenship is a far more ambiguous category than the traditional scholarship assumes. Ong writes that “beyond the state-centered control of citizenship and its criteria, anthropological investigation has opened up the study of citizenship by focusing on very different kinds of claims on national regimes or global entities” (Ong, 2009, p. 303). I agree with the second half of this sentence, but part of my effort is of course also to open up to questioning the notion of state control over citizenship. As I

argue in the paper “Whether it is the organization of formal status, the protection of rights, citizenship practices, or the experience of collective identities and solidarities, *the nation-state is not the exclusive site for their enactment*, but it remains by far the most important site” (p. 246, emphasis added).

Ong has made a major contribution to some of these developments through her concept of “flexible citizenship” (Ong, 1999) which captures “the transnational maneuvers of a managerial elite that skillfully navigates different immigration regimes in order to gain access to profitable markets and safe nations” (Ong, 2009, p. 303). Another instance, in my reading of Ong’s flexible citizenship, is the biological geographies described by Sparke and his concept of biological citizenship, and the growing diversity of biological and health-related components that have engendered a rapidly growing and by now well-established literature.

Cresswell’s emphasis on geographies of mobilities is one I share. Let me add to this that at some point we are going to have to ask what the term immigrant truly means. People in movement are an increasingly strong presence, especially in cities. Further, when citizens begin to develop transnational identities, it alters something in the meaning of immigration. In my research I have sought to situate immigration in a broader field of actors by asking which all actors are involved in producing the outcome that we call immigration. My answer is that there are many more than just the immigrants, whereas existing law and the public imagination tend to identify immigrants as the only actors producing this complex process.

Jacobson has made a major contribution to the mapping of emergent geographies for claim-making and for the sources of rights. I have learnt much from his work and there is little I disagree with. His comment raises two issues. One is that my emphasizing the denationalizing of processes historically constructed as national, when applied to questions of citizenship, opens to a form of postnational citizenship. I cannot disagree with this. Thus it could be argued that postnationalism and denationalization represent two different trajectories. The other has to do with new forms that we have not even considered, and might emerge out of the changed conditions in the world located outside the national. Both are viable, and neither excludes the other.

But I do think that the analytic terrain for elaborating the processes involved is distinct. At least, that is my concern. My focus shares aspects with postnational citizenship but is usefully distinguished in that it concerns specific transformations within the national state that directly and indirectly alter specific aspects of the institution of citizenship. These transformations

are not predicated necessarily on locations for the institution outside the national state, which are key to conceptions of postnational citizenship. The work of research and the work of interpretation are different. And perhaps that is my central concern here. I do argue for more in the paper: Identifying “two possible trajectories contests easy determinisms about the impact of globalization (i.e. the inevitability of the postnational), and they signal the potential for change in the institution of citizenship even inside the national framing of the institution” (p. 246).

Elaborating, the territorial and institutional transformation of state power and authority has allowed operational, conceptual, and rhetorical openings for nation-based subjects other than the national state to emerge as legitimate actors in international/global arenas that used to be confined to the state. I can see that Jacobson would argue, and reasonably so, that this is postnational. But I find that a bit too general. For instance, I would go for specific changes inside the national: thus I have emphasized the significance (Sassen, 2008a, Chap. 6; 1996, Chap. 2) of the introduction in the new constitutions of South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and the central European countries of a provision that qualifies what had been an unqualified right of the democratically elected sovereign to be the exclusive representative of its people in international fora. The provision says that the sovereign cannot make that claim, and that citizens can make claims for direct representation in international fora. More generally my argument is that over the last 20 years the meaning of the territorial itself has (not for the first time!) changed (see Sassen, 2008a, Chap. 5, 1996, Chap. 1). In addition, digital space enables articulations between national territorial and global spaces that deborder national encasements for a variety of activities from economics to citizenship practices – yet these activities do not necessarily become postnational in this process.

For me it is, then, an open question, empirically, operationally, and theoretically, whether this will also produce forms of citizenship completely located outside the state, such as postnational citizenship. While this distinction may seem and indeed be unnecessary for certain types of argumentation, it is an illuminating one if the effort is to tease out the changes in the institutional order within which citizenship is embedded. Jacobson is of course right when he writes that “even the European Court of Human Rights is not ‘external’ as such to the state: it comes into play only when national courts are unwilling to engage with claims of human rights abuse, and its rulings take effect through states,” and, further that my analysis “would profit from an expanded elucidation of the institutional mechanisms through which the national and global intersect and, in turn,

how this impacts the meaning and role of citizenship (including rights and “subjectship”).” (Jacobson, 2009, p. 284) Yes!

The above should also serve as a response to Smith in that it makes the point that in my analysis the geography of the global includes the national. A second point on which Smith insists is that citizenship is also about duties. Yes, it does, and no, I do not use the vocabulary of duties. My emphasis in this paper, fully developed elsewhere (Sassen, 2008a, Chaps. 6–8), is that citizenship has become a practice of consumption – we, the privileged, consume our citizenship and we consume democracy. I argue that citizenship is about making the political – and this incorporates what Smith calls duties, and what I would say is the work of making the political. In the paper I focus on how practices in a context of incompletely formalized subjects open terrain for the making of the political also by those who are contestatory and those whose claims are not part of the *formal* political apparatus.

This making of the political can be postnational as per Jacobson, transnational as per Ong, take on novel formats arising out of geographies of mobility as per Cresswell, and constitute novel denationalized geographies of bio-privilege as per Sparke. But this making can also take place inside the national, and not be national in the historical sense of the word – it can be a political making that denationalizes the national. It can coexist with supranational and global institutions and space. Returning to Smith’s comment, in this paper my concern was centrally with the making of the political in thick national settings dominated by powerful formalized actors (who by the way also evince much informal power).

In my analysis most people are immobile, and immobility is the category I am now working on. I started working on mobility 20 years ago or more, continue to consider it critical, and have documented how new mobilities are continuously being made – through both the practices of the powerful, such as those described by Sparke, and through the practices of the powerless, examined by Ong, Jacobson, Cresswell, and also by Smith in other work (e.g., Smith & Guarnizo, 1998). But I think we have neglected analyses of immobility. I conceive of immobility as a variable: at one end it is the conventional understanding – the immobile as immobile – but at the other it is a category that can articulate with the global. One question I ask myself in my research (Sassen, 2008a, Chaps. 7 and 8) is whether the immobile can make globalities. And my answer is that under certain conditions they can and are doing so. This also brings in my proposition that under certain conditions powerlessness becomes complex, and in that complexity lies the possibility of making *a* history. Powerlessness cannot be flattened into some

generic lack of power, as Cresswell and Ong show in their work. The spaces of the immobile are among those where at least some of the future formats for the political are being forged. And here is where my analysis of the possibility of the active making of denationalized spaces and subjects *inside* the national becomes critical. (I repeat, a making that can coexist with multiple other variants examined in these responses.)

There are several other issues raised by the respondents that I cannot address fully. But there is one category that brings together several questions, and that is neo-liberalism. Smith and Sparke both use it to address critical conditions. Smith emphasizes the importance of documenting the ravages of neo-liberalism and the strategies of resistance and contestation. Sparke argues that we are seeing a neo-liberalizing of denationalized citizenship: his core instance is the biological citizenship of the privileged that can get what they need from anywhere in the world and can in that sense be considered as denationalized.

It is indeed the case that in this paper I do not dwell on the ravages of neo-liberalism invoked by Smith and by Sparke. But it is also the case that I have long documented the ravages of capitalism in the past and in its particular present mode in several books and articles (most recently see Sassen, 2008b, 2008c, and my nonacademic writing for OpenDemocracy.net, and blogging on the financial crisis for HuffingtonPost.com). More basically, the strong line running through my academic work from the beginning is a theoretical and methodological project. One key aim of this work is to produce theory and methods that can help to develop a deep understanding of the formalized and the informal, of systems and practices, of power and powerlessness, of victimhood and making. It is one way of documenting capitalism's capacity for destruction – of people, of livelihoods, of places, of good political projects, of the environment. Partly I have been able to do this because the last two decades have seen an explosion in the research and writing about the horrors of neo-liberalism, with expanding objects of exploitation, as is well illustrated in Sparke's brilliant paper.

More analytically put, the focus of my academic work has been to elaborate an intermediate zone that remains underanalyzed – not the horrible effects nor the powerful sources for such ravages, but a somewhat elusive intermediate set of spaces, practices, actors. This is also what I do in this particular paper. My analysis of incompleteness is partly heuristic: what does this incompleteness reveal about possible trajectories in the making. Denationalization is one dynamic that can create particular cross-border geographies of membership among the immobile exploited. It already does for the privileged, with its own particularities, as Sparke so well develops.

This possibility of cross-border geographies of membership among the immobile is perhaps also implicit in the papers by Cresswell and Ong, even though the explicit emphasis is on mobilities. I think of the work of the respondents and so many others as a collective process of assembling a novel and much expanded analytic terrain for understanding a diverse set of processes that lack a clear shape, but signal an emergent condition.

NOTES

1. Ong mentions that what I am actually after is the Kantian notion of universal citizenship. No, I am after the opposite, an argument that I develop at length in my response (Sassen, 2007) to Benhabib's (2004) use of Kant in her conception of citizenship.

REFERENCES

- Benhabib, S. (2004). *The rights of others: Aliens, residents and citizens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cresswell, T. (2009). The prosthetic citizen: New geographies of citizenship. *Political Power and Social Theory*, 20, 259–273.
- Jacobson, D. (2009). Citizenship redux: Why citizenship remains pivotal in a globalized world. *Political Power and Social Theory*, 20, 281–286.
- Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible citizenship*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Ong, A. (2009). Citizenship in the midst of transnational regimes of virtue. *Political Power and Social Theory*, 20, 301–307.
- Sassen, S. (1996). *Losing control? Sovereignty in an age of globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2007). A response to Seyla Benhabib. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 6(4), 433–446.
- Sassen, S. (2008a). *Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2008b). Mortgage capital and its particularities: A new frontier for global finance. *Journal of International Affairs*, 62(1), 187–212.
- Sassen, S. (2008c). Two stops in today's new global geographies: Shaping novel labor supplies and employment regimes. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 52(3), 457–496.
- Smith, M. P., & Guarnizo, L. E. (Eds). (1998). *Transnationalism from below*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.