

physics of Nature must, first of all, formally state wherein consists its fundamental difference from the Transcendental Philosophy. This is done as follows. The empirically given is given as perception; hence it is required to exhibit the conceptions fixed in perception by the understanding. Since such an exhibition is a construction, the special science of nature corresponds to its conception only as construction is employed in it, or as mathematics is applicable. This, now, brings Kant directly to limiting the province of mathematics strictly to nature. Since there are phenomena of the inner and the outer sense, nature also is in part outer (corporeal, extended), in part inner (psychical, thinking). Since, then, the latter lies without the province of the mathematical method (only *in minimo*, as regards the constant flux of inner changes, were such a method conceivable), there is applicable to the inner nature only an empirical mode of treatment, mere theory of nature. Properly speaking, the science of nature relates only to corporeal nature, and since this appears to us solely through motion affecting us, it is a theory of motion. If now we pass to the deduction of the first principles themselves, and combine directly therewith the more proximate determinations which they receive in the *Metaphysical Foundations*, we have, corresponding to the categories of quantity, the first principle which Kant terms the Principle of all *Axioms of (pure) Perception*, and formulates as follows: All perceptions are extensive quantities. An application of this theorem to matter in motion gives, as the first part of the Philosophy of Nature, *Phoronomy* (Works, viii. pp. 454-476), or theory of the Mathematics of Motion, wherein from the definition of motion first laid down, that it is change of distance, hence something relative, appertaining to both of two bodies approaching one another, the law of the communication, velocity, and direction of motion is not only explained without the absurd hypothesis of a *force* of inertia, but is construed in perception. To the three categories of quality there correspond in the system of first principles the *Anticipations of Sense-perception*, which centre in the proposition: All qualities have degree. An application of this first principle to the empirically given matter in motion gives the second main division of the *Metaphysical Foundations*, the *Dynamics* (pp. 447-530), in which the qualitative distinction of solid, fluid, etc., are referred back to the various

degrees of space-filling, *i.e.*, to the various relations of the forces of attraction and repulsion. Further, the "System of First Principles" lays down three *Analogies of Experience* corresponding to the categories of relation; and these analogies are repeated almost *verbatim* in the third main division of the *Metaphysical Foundations*, the *Mechanics*, only, again, with more proximate determinations of the same; and there result the three *a priori* laws: The quantity of material substance is unchangeable; every change has an external cause (which excludes Hylozoism with its merely inner causes, and so does away with this death of the philosophy of nature), and that in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal. Finally, the three *Postulates of Empirical Thought*, in which the Transcendental Philosophy had established, that what is physically (*i.e.*, in accordance with experience) possible is real and necessary, are applied, in the fourth main division of the *Metaphysical Foundations*, the *Phenomenology* (pp. 554-568), to rectilinear, circular, and relative motion. For the rest, Kant frequently implies that in these principles he intends to exhaust all that a metaphysics of nature has to offer; and he warns us against the attempt to go further into detail, instead of relinquishing this to observation and calculation.

6. As at the close of the Transcendental *Æsthetic* there arose the necessity for explaining its relation to the doctrines of the English realists, so at the close of his Transcendental Analytic Kant himself deems it necessary to distinguish his doctrines from the idealistic theories of Berkeley and Leibnitz. In this, from the circumstance that in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which appeared after the Garve-Feder review had brought against it the charge of relationship with Berkeley, there was incorporated the *Refutation of Idealism* (ii. pp. 223-226), some supposed they saw evidence of anxiety, inconsistency and what-not on the part of Kant. But a point was overlooked here to which Fichte had already called attention, *viz.*, that in the inserted refutation it is not Berkeley, but the "problematical" idealism of the Cartesians that is discussed (particularly in mind were the Egoists mentioned in § 268, 3), and that Kant, without giving the lie to his fundamental principles, so refuted the supposition that there is only inner perception, that he shows that the being-affected presupposes an affecting cause. Further,

there was a failure to note what the work by Frederichs (cited below) with justice points out, that very much of this refutation has merely been taken out of the more unsuitable place in the first edition, and put in a more suitable one in the second. But, finally, it is forgotten that even in the first edition Kant had expressed himself very decidedly against the "so-decried empirical idealism": indirectly in the section on the *Distinction of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena* (ii. pp. 236-253); expressly in what he says on this subject in the sixth section of the *Antinomies of Pure Reason* (ii. pp. 389-393). Berkeley's name, it is true, is not mentioned there; but since even later where it occurs, Kant appears to be acquainted with him only at second hand, I can still only hold to the opinion, in spite of the objections put forward in the profound treatise by Frederichs, that Berkeley was in Kant's mind at this point. The idealism combated by Kant, which that refutation calls materialistic idealism, is designated as empirical and subjective, since it is merely able to tell how presentations are habitually combined in the empirical Ego, whereas Kant's idealism is not an empirical, but a transcendental (rational), not a subjective, but an objective, idealism, because it shows how consciousness *must* combine presentations. (In Kant's terminology, the distinction may, therefore, be stated thus: According to Berkeley there are only perceptions; according to Kant experiences; hence the former denies all metaphysics of nature, the latter proposes one.) In the second place, Kant with justice makes much of another distinction. According to Berkeley, bodies are things in which, and behind which, there is absolutely nothing, mere appearances, not essentially different from dreams; he wholly denies things-in-themselves. It is quite otherwise with Kant: he is always insisting that appearance, or the mere presentation, should not be confounded with phenomenon, which is a presentation of *something*, and underlying which there is its transcendental object, *i.e.*, a condition of its existence that is independent of us. On this point he is fond of appealing to the healthy human understanding, which rightly repudiates this denial of things. But Kant thereby appears to place himself in perfect agreement with Leibnitz, of whom it was shown that he did not, as did Berkeley, convert bodies into purely mental existences ("notional things") or appearances, or into half-mental existences, beneath which lay, as their "good

foundation," reality, which was related to the phenomenon as the water-drop to the rainbow (*vid.* § 288, 3). What reasons had Kant for controverting so decidedly the Leibnitzian idealism, not only in the above-mentioned section, but in a section written especially for that purpose, *On the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection* (ii. pp. 254-273)? Very weighty reasons. He criticises it on the ground that it is dogmatic, *i.e.*, that it asserts positively of the true essence assumed to lie behind phenomena, that it consists of simple thinking beings, which are subject to the law of sufficient reason, whence also his doctrine in its completeness has been called Ontology. To all this, of course, Kant must come into opposition, because he repudiated the presuppositions that had guided Leibnitz. According to Leibnitz, phenomenon or sensible object is something confusedly known, real being, on the contrary, an object of the understanding, is something clearly known. Naturally, therefore, his assertions in regard to the latter are made with positiveness. According to Kant, the understanding can indeed *think*, but not *know*, unless sense furnishes it the material for knowledge; and he refutes in the above section the particular assertions of Leibnitz, inasmuch as he shows that they rest upon an unjustifiable isolation of the activity of the understanding. But further, his view, that conceptions without perceptions are empty, brought him to the position that all knowing is limited to phenomena, to the sensible. For that reason a knowledge of the non-phenomenal is impossible, about as impossible as it is to see a dark room in the light. The non-phenomenal and the thing-in-itself coincide; and hence we have no knowledge of things-in-themselves, neither a confused nor a clear knowledge; and in opposition to Leibnitz's dogmatic idealism, he calls his own a critical idealism: this makes no affirmation concerning things-in-themselves. It does not even decide concerning them whether they are in us or out of us; only the negative characteristic can be predicated of them, that they are not subject to the conditions of phenomena, namely, time, space, and the categories. They are mere limiting conceptions, guide-posts, which tell us that the realm of sense and of the understanding is not the only one, that it is not the world, but an island.

Cf. Frederick's: *Der phænomenale Idealismus Berkeley's und Kant's*. Berlin, 1871.

7. As it was shown above that Kant's divergences from Locke and Hume as regards the faculty of receptivity were approximations towards and leanings upon Leibnitz and Berkeley (§ 298, 5), so it is not difficult to show that here, where he considers the spontaneity of the mind, the thorough study of the idealism of Locke and Hume has removed the semi-idealism of Leibnitz. The Lockian doctrine of the receptivity of the mind, according to which the mind is dependent upon impressions from without, had made too deep an impression upon him to permit of his conceiving mind with Berkeley as pure activity. And again, he had been too fully convinced by Hume that the causal-nexus does not lie in things themselves, to be able with Leibnitz to subject to this law purely substantial beings. On the one hand, he was warned by the idealists against reducing all to sense; on the other, by the realists against the opposite danger of reducing all to intellect.

§ 300.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

1. As the critique of sense answers the first of the questions into which the main question subdivided itself, and the critique of the understanding the second, so the critique of reason is to answer the third question, namely, the question whether a metaphysics of the supersensible is possible (*Proleg.*, §§ 40-60, Works, iii. pp. 249-301). This problem is solved by the *Transcendental Dialectic* (ii. pp. 276-532). The word *reason*, which in Kant (*e.g.*, in the title of his work) often has a signification so broad that it covers the mind in all its functions, and hence is what he also indeed terms *das Gemüth*, is here opposed to sense and the understanding, and is, therefore, taken in a narrower meaning. As they were the faculties of perception and conception, so it is defined as the faculty of Ideas; but these are immediately defined as "regulative" principles, which are not "constitutive," *i.e.* do not declare that anything *is*, but only that something *should be*; and hence reason speaks only in postulates, requisitions, problems. These are directed to the understanding; so that, as the understanding illumines sense, the reason guides the understanding. As the latter had converted the matter

furnished it by sense into experiences, so reason gives it the norms by which it has to govern itself in the act of synthesis resulting in experiences. Reason, therefore, transcends both, and has a function entirely different from theirs. As the activity of the understanding was combined with sense in cognition, it is not to be wondered at if Kant often opposes sense and understanding taken together, as faculties of knowledge, to the reason (later to the faculty of desire), or, also, as theoretical, speculative reason (an expression instead of which the term *understanding* also occurs), to the practical reason. It must, however, be confessed that, in spite of his apparently strict terminology, Kant's mode of procedure is here, as elsewhere, very free, for there are very many passages in which the reason is treated as a higher faculty of *knowledge*, whereas there are just as many in which it is opposed to the two faculties that are the sources of knowledge. He was also led to treat reason again and again as a faculty of knowledge by his fondness for symmetry in method. Since it was made the business of the understanding to judge, there remains for the reason the function of inference. The reason is, therefore, in one aspect, the faculty of Ideas; in another, the faculty of inference. This conjunction is very skilfully brought about, and all possible acuteness employed to bring the three Ideas which are afterwards discussed, into correspondence with the three kinds of syllogism, the categorical, the hypothetical and disjunctive. But since where the deduction is once made, it is forgotten, and in the sequel the Ideas are spoken of only in so far as they are problems, this aspect may be overlooked, and reason here spoken of, so far as, as a faculty of rules and problems, it forms a contrast with the other two theoretical faculties. Whereas these two faculties taken together have to do with what is, reason is concerned with what should be, that is, what lies beyond all existence. But, now, it had been shown that knowledge, as the combined activity of sense and understanding, was limited to the possible objects of experience, hence to what was sensible; and, just for that reason, the application of the categories was immanent (in the province of experience). Likewise it had been shown that the law-determined arrangement of the sensible, or of phenomena, to which, as to its only province, the understanding was assigned, is called nature. It is, therefore, quite natural, that to reason is assigned the province of the supersensible; that it is said of the

Ideas, that they stand for what can never present itself in experience; that to them immanent application is denied and the transcendental is assigned as the only proper application: finally to the conceptions of nature are opposed the conceptions of freedom which lie in reason. If it is of questionable propriety even to designate the content of the understanding, which knows, and that of the reason, which puts problems, by the common name of "conceptions," then Kant's terminology becomes positively barbarous, when he calls the problems of reason, *e.g.*, duties—because they are not phenomena,—things (!)-in-themselves. The expression *noumenon*, which he likewise employs, gave Reinhold, later, occasion for distinguishing more exactly things which in Kant are still undistinguished and hence interchangeable, namely, the unknown causes of our having sensations, and the requisitions of the reason. But just because Kant had not drawn strict distinctions at this point, it is easy to understand why he says, If we were only (sense and) understanding, we should be satisfied with the realm of phenomena, it would be for us the world; but the fact that we are also reason, makes that realm an island, for now we know that there is a realm of that which is not, but should be. Hence the reason, by its requisitions, causes to arise those limiting conceptions which tell us that the realm of experience, or of the existent, is not the only one. Since phenomena are in themselves only relations (to that for which there are phenomena), the realm of phenomena, or of the understanding, is of course that of the relative. On the contrary, all the requisitions of reason have in view not the holding fast to the relative, the conditioned, but the quest of the unconditioned, the absolute. The Idea of the absolute, as well as all others, is a problem to be solved, it is a regulative principle; a mistake is made when a constitutive use is made of it. This mistake, however, is very easily made. For the solution of a problem, that is to say, it is necessary that one should *think* this solution, *i.e.*, should think the problem as solved. If, now, we confound thought and knowledge, to the latter of which there belongs, besides thought, also the being-given in perception, reality is ascribed to the required solution, that is to say, a category (the first of Quality), which, as was shown, is valid only of possible objects of experience, is applied to what can never be an object of experience. In this case the reason becomes sophistical, or dialectical. Now in many cases such

a confusion appears to be unavoidable; and then we have illusions, sophistications (or dialectic) of the reason, which are as unavoidable as that the sea appears to be a mountain, or that the moon appears to all, even to the astronomer, larger at its rising. Precisely as in these cases the illusion does not vanish when we perceive that the sea is level and the moon does not become smaller, but thereby becomes harmless inasmuch as we will certainly take no measures that rest upon that illusion, so the perception that those unavoidable sophistications are nothing but illusions, will not, indeed, obviate them, but make them harmless. Since this part of the *Critique* has for its object to lay open to view the sophistic and dialectic of the reason, Kant calls it Transcendental Dialectic. (Properly speaking he should have said Antidialectic.) This critique of the reason as becoming dialectic is at the same time, of course, a critique of the previous (*i.e.*, the Leibnitz-Wolffian) metaphysics, the leading principles of which are alleged to consist wholly of such illusions, may in fact all be reduced to the one illusion underlying them, that the unconditioned, instead of being merely employed as a norm in the use of our understanding, is taken as an extension of knowledge given by our understanding, and we hence treat what is merely problematical as if it contained for us something positively given. Since a critique of ontology had already been given (*vid.* § 299, 1) in the demonstration that it is impossible and that an analytic of the understanding must be put in its place, Kant limits himself to criticising the three other parts of metaphysics, but in this criticism allows psychology to precede cosmology. His aim is to show to all three that they so far mistake the demand that we should go in quest of the unconditioned (in us, without us, finally, as regards all possible existence) as to assume that in these mere postulates positive information is given us.

2. The critique of rational psychology receives with Kant the title, *On the Paralogisms of Pure Reason* (ii. pp. 308–329), because in these it is to be shown that the main principles of that science (*vid.* § 290, 6), *viz.*, that the soul is simple (and hence immortal), that it is a substance, that it is a person, that it is distinct from the body, rest upon as many paralogisms. In making this assertion, Kant has in view not so much Wolff's own arguments as those of Mendelssohn and Reimar, perhaps also those of his teacher Knutzen, who, all

three, made the unity of self-consciousness the basis of their proof of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. But just herein lies the paralogism. Through the Idea of the unconditioned, that is to say, the reason demands that in all phases of thought the Ego always assign to itself the place of subject, never that of predicate; further, that it posit all its ideas as its own by referring them to a unity, and that it posit all that it presents to itself, as its counterposed other (Non-ego, as Fichte, later, calls it). These demands, instead of being fulfilled as such, are by a variety of confusions (hence paralogisms) converted into positive assertions. In general it was a confusion where the demand relating to the Ego, *i.e.*, pure consciousness, which is not an object of experience, was immediately treated as applicable to the soul, which is an object of experience, hence a phenomenon, or thing of sense. Connected with this, however, was a variety of other confusions: the logical conception of subject was confused with the metaphysical conception of substance, and then this conception was applied to the soul, which is given to us only as a flowing stream of ideas, although the schema of substance was the permanent. Likewise, a real simple substance was made of the logical unity of the subject, to say nothing whatever of the fact that even the simple may perish, not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual diminution. Further, it was a *petitio principii* to conclude, from the fact that I am for myself in every moment purely an individual, that my soul is objectively (for all others) an identical person. Finally, it was a fourth paralogism, when from the mere direction (given by reason) to oppose self to all else, it was directly concluded that the soul is distinct from the body, since the inner and the outer sensations which form the matter of those two phenomena (*i.e.*, soul and body) may be caused by two very similar *x*'s, perhaps, indeed, by one and the same *x*, which last, as regards the intricate question concerning the *commercium animæ et corporis*, would have its peculiar advantage. On the standpoint of transcendental idealism, which places time and space within us, this question receives for its precise formula the following: How is it possible that there should be in a thinking being the forms of pure perception, time and space, in which it appears to itself? The sum of the entire critique is, Every rational psychology that pretends to be a doctrine, *i.e.*, to contain real affirmations, instead of being a discipline,

i.e., of containing only admonitions against certain points of view, is a delusion. In the place of all principles that a metaphysics of the soul usually gives, must be put the plain *non liquet*, an exchange by which we lose nothing, for, since we know that no one, not even our opponent, can know anything concerning the real fact, no materialistic reasonings against immortality can disturb us.

Cf. Jürgen Bona Meyer: *Kant's Ansicht über die Psychologie als Wissenschaft*. Bonn, 1869.

3. The critique of cosmology is treated in the section on the *Antinomies of Pure Reason* (ii. pp. 332-439). The Idea of the Unconditioned demands that all phenomena be not left in their isolated being, that we attempt to find in a system of the same what we call the world. This world-Idea has modifications corresponding to the four classes of categories, and hence gives a plurality of world-Ideas, which are also termed world-conceptions. They require that we do not always cling to the incomplete, but seek completeness and perfection. If one regards the requisitions as positive assertions, there arise principles which, since there underlies them an Idea of the reason, commend themselves to us as true, may, in fact, be proved; only, those which are the opposites of them have exactly the same demonstrative force. These are the well-known antinomies which are treated in The Antithetic of the Pure Reason. On the one side are, as theses, the main principles of the cosmology of Wolff, or rather, of Meier, *i.e.*, the principles of "pure dogmatism"; on the other, are their antitheses (of Hume), which are to be regarded as the main principles of "pure empiricism," and both are proved in a manner recalling Wolff's demonstrations. To the propositions; The world is limited in time and space, Consists of simple parts, Has place for necessity as well as for freedom, Presupposes the existence of an absolutely necessary essence, correspond the opposites; The world is infinite as regards time and space, Only the composite is, There is only causal relation, hence no freedom, There is no necessary cause of the world. Transcendental idealism, or the distinction of things-in-themselves and phenomena, that is, of reason and understanding, which explains the origin of these antinomies, accomplishes here still more: it solves them. It solves the first two (the mathematical) by showing that the theses as well as the antitheses are false, or that they consist in illusions. (Properly speaking

this was already done when it was shown that that which is complete,—hence the world-whole, and likewise, the last part are Ideas, *i.e.* demands not to remain at any one point, but to seek further). The last two (the dynamical), on the other hand, are solved in a different manner; since he shows that both may be true if the thesis be referred to things-in-themselves), and the antithesis to phenomena. It is conceivable that in the world of phenomena all acts of man are necessary consequences of the nature of his sense-faculty, or of his empirical character, and hence the subjects of calculation, and that, outside of, or alongside of, that phenomenal world, man exists unaffected by time and space, and hence does not exist prior to his acts but as an intelligible nature pervading them, a thought-nature, and, as such, is free. The moral consciousness, which, even where we recognise the deed to be the necessary fruit of the character, blames the doer, appears to confirm this duality, which shows transcendental idealism to be conceivable and possible. The case of the fourth antinomy presents a quite similar form. What is asserted by the antithesis may be entirely correct, *viz.*, that everything in the world of phenomena is to be explained by some other in turn and never to be referred back to the will of a cause of the world, since we can reason back to this only if we are able to arrive at the limit of the series of causes, to which we can never come; and, after all, the thesis would be justified and there could be posited outside of the realm of phenomena an absolutely necessary being. Transcendental idealism cannot prove that this is so, but can show the conceivability of it. Rather, it can do only the latter. For it has shown that time-succession and causality obtain solely of what appears (to us).

4. The critique of rational theology which Kant had already anticipated in the fourth antinomy is contained in the section on the *Ideal of Pure Reason* (ii. pp. 490–532). Starting from the fundamental principle of Wolff's ontology (*vid.* § 290, 4), that only the completely determined is real, Kant shows that such perfect determinateness is conceived to exist only where all positive predicates are united, hence in the content of all realities. According to the same principle of Wolff, this conception is to be thought as individual, and thus the preceding discussions yield the Idea of perfection *in individuo*, or the Ideal of the same, which is an indispens-

able standard for reason. If, now, this standard is to be conceived as a thing, there results the Idea of God as the *summum ens*, which, therefore, is gotten by realizing, hypostatizing, finally, personifying, a necessary postulate of the reason, or by attributing, as was done in the case of the psychological and cosmological Idea, a predicate to the noumenon that properly belongs only to the phenomenon. Reason itself feels that this is rash, and hence attempts to justify this subreption by supplementary considerations; and from this attempt proceed the proofs for the existence of God. Kant's critique of the Wolffian rational theology is, really, confined to the critique of this the most important portion of it. His predecessors had already opposed the ontological proof, as the only *a priori* proof, to the rest as proofs *a posteriori*. Kant was thereby led to look upon it as the only speculative proof. He was confirmed in his view by the consideration that the teleological proof, the real nerve of which lies in the fact that the order in things does not have its root in things themselves but is accidental to them, rests upon the cosmological proof, which in turn, as Kant seeks to show, presupposes the ontological proof. The critique of this last, therefore, affects all proofs in general for the existence of God. If, after the Cartesian manner, existence be attributed to the most real of all natures because, without it, that nature would be self-contradictory, as a triangle would be without three-sidedness, then it is forgotten that, as we can in the last example think away both subject and predicate without any contradiction, just so is it, indeed, a contradiction to think of God as non-existent, but by no means such to think that no God exists. The other (*i.e.*, the Wolffian) mode of argument, *i.e.*, conceiving existence as one of the realities whose complex God is said to be, forgets that the content of a notion undergoes an increase by the added reality, but not by existence, any more than a hundred dollars are more than a hundred by the fact that they have existence. Existence expresses only a relation to our thought, means that we must be receptive, that something is "given" to us. Since, now, there is only one way in which something is given to us, *viz.*, sensation, but God is not so given to us, the ontological proof, as well as all others resting upon it, is an "advocate's proof," and just as little as one can squeeze out of a hundred imaginary dollars their existence, so little is the existence of the most real of all natures, to be

gotten from the mere conception of it. This impossibility robs us of nothing. On the contrary, since we know that as regards the existence of God there can be no proof, we are, as respects all atheistic demonstrations, entirely undisturbed. The impossibility of His existence can be just as little proved, either *a priori*, for the conception of Him is not self-contradictory, or *a posteriori*, for we have nothing to do here with an object of experience. Therefore *non liquet* is here, also, the highest wisdom; well worthy to be observed as regards the *form* of the existence of this ideal. As regards the content of it, this is a necessary regulative, not only as relates to our consideration of nature, but also as relates to our conduct; and reason demands that we treat nature, not as the materialists do, but as if there were a God, and it obliges us to act not as Epicureans, but as if a God existed.

5. But can we get from this critique of the individual parts of metaphysics enough to answer the question, whether as a whole it is possible? If so, the answer will be of the following import, that there is not a metaphysics of the supersensible, if by that is understood a supersensible being, and that, consequently, the fundamental principle of rational psychology, that the soul must be immortal; of cosmology, that man is free; of theology, that there is a God, cannot claim to be proved, or to be principles of certain knowledge. At the same time, however, the negative result of the Transcendental Analytic, that the sphere of the sensible is not the only one, is here supplemented by the positive consideration that the region of problems lies beyond, or outside of, this sphere. Hence there is no knowledge of the supersensible, because it is not a being (*Seyn*), but there is, indeed, a willing of it, or an endeavour to get beyond the sensible. Since, now, it is possible, in a variety of ways, to arrive at *a priori* firm conclusions regarding this which is the content of volition and endeavour, *i.e.*, regarding ends lying beyond the sensible, and since by metaphysics was understood the totality of all *a priori* principles, there is shown by the Transcendental Dialectic the possibility of a metaphysics of problems. Since among these the ethical problems take the highest rank, the Metaphysics of Morals is connected with the Transcendental Dialectic just as the Metaphysics of Nature is with the Transcendental Analytic, and we, again following a hint of Kant and the example of Beck, connect it immediately with that.

6. Kant has developed practical or moral philosophy partly in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Wks., iv. pp. 1 and fol.), partly in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (Wks., iv. pp. 95 ff.), partly in the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Right*, and the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Virtue* (Wks., x. pp. 1 ff.); and attempts to give therein what can be laid down *a priori* on the subject of human conduct. The matter contained in these three works is distributed in such a way that the *Groundwork*, etc., treats the laws of moral conduct, the *Critique* the faculty for it, the *Metaphysical Foundations* the system of moral conduct. Less here than anywhere else, should it be forgotten that Kant passed under the influence of the partial views that divided the eighteenth century into two opposing sides. On the one side was realism, which treated man as a purely natural being, and accordingly demanded a pursuance of the natural impulses, one class of realists, meaning by these, as did Hutcheson, particularly the benevolent, and the other class, as did Helvetius, the selfish impulses (*vid.* § 281, 6, and § 284, 5). Opposed to these, stand the idealists, who conceived man as a rational nature, as spirit, and accordingly represented him as ruled by the idea of perfection, of logical unity with himself. The end of action, which they both, indeed, call happiness, is, with one side, the greatest possible amount of sensuous enjoyment, with the other, self-admiration and self-sufficiency. But both exhibit man as one in himself and sole, inner duality being left out of question; and consequently their Ethics is, in the main, a theory of goods and virtues. The moral philosophy of the men of the enlightenment and the Philosophers for the World sought to combine these two tendencies, but could do this only by ignoring (superficially) their differences. It was quite otherwise with Kant. What is necessary to a really concrete unity and organic fusion was brought forward by him: the opposition between the elements to be fused, their untruth, the truth of both, and their reconcilableness. Even then such a higher unity could be attained by him only by taking a standpoint above the two and making them his objects. He comprehends empiricism and rationalism also in the sense that he explains them. If they had merely said, This is the moral law; he inquired first of all, How is the moral law possible? From the fact that he conceived man

as at the same time a sense-nature and a rational nature, but did not forget that the two are opposed to one another, there immediately came to view, in the reconciliation of the two, the inadequateness of both sides; and hence "the ought," through which ethics acquires the form of a doctrine of duties, which speaks in imperatives. The preference which, confessedly, he here gives to the Wolffian over the English conception of ethics brings it about that the rational nature is conceived as master and the sense-nature as slave. As regards form, therefore, the moral problem appears as a universal and unconditioned (categorical) imperative; as regards content, it is the making of the reason valid as against the natural inclinations. Not he who is benevolent merely by nature is the moral man, but he who does good to others, even "though nature did not make him a friend to man." Such a reconciliatory position is easily combined with transcendental idealism and its distinction of noumenon and phenomenon; in fact, it springs out of it. Man as phenomenon receives the law; man as noumenon gives it. The fact, however, that the moral postulate speaks as an imperative yields immediately an important consequence. That I unconditionally *ought*, I can feel only because I at the same time feel that I *can*, and so, therefore, the fact of "the ought" does not make "the can," or freedom, certain (for this could not be proved), but it makes *me* sure and certain of it. Since without freedom there is no "ought," that is, no moral law would be possible, there is ground of knowledge (or rather of certainty) of freedom, and it, again, is a real ground of the moral law. The Transcendental Dialectic could assert only that freedom is conceivable. Here there enters as a complement the subjective certainty, which, since I cannot act morally without it, is, in the proper sense, moral. This does not widen my knowledge (it would do this if it showed to us objectively what freedom is and how to demonstrate it; but that is impossible); but the certainty that freedom is, is purely subjective, comes to us from the fact that we "ought." At the same time we become certain of a second fact that had been shown in the Transcendental Dialectic to be conceivable; that every human being is a two-fold nature—a temporal sense-nature whose every act is subject to the law of causality, and an intelligible character existing out of time, which as transcendental ground is responsible for all acts. As this intelligible

character, I am really free; transcendental freedom is the possibility of making an absolute beginning, whereas the freedom of the Leibnitzians, as a determination from within, is not much more than the freedom of a turnspit driven by clock-work. The view that does not get beyond phenomena because its space and time are determinations of things-in-themselves must come to the denial of such freedom; only upon the critical standpoint is it, not, indeed, proven theoretically that freedom is a fact, but shown that we are justified in thinking of ourselves, that is, our intelligible nature, as free, upon which depends, not the individual acts but the entire series of them, our empirical nature, upon which, in repentance, we pass sentence of condemnation. (Here, again, as from the fact of mathematics, we can conclude back to the correctness of the theory of space and time.) That we are here brought by practical need to make theoretical (transcendental) assumptions follows from the primacy which the practical reason has over the theoretical. Those assumptions are, hence, postulates (not in the strict mathematical sense) of the practical reason, by which are to be understood presuppositions which are necessary from the practical point of view, but regarding which we cannot hope that they will satisfy a theoretical interest or extend knowledge. That the law-giver and the subject of the law are the same nature, as noumenon and as phenomenon, explains why the law at the same time fills us with fear (strikes us down), and inspires us with confidence, forms of feeling which are commingled in reverence, which therefore unites compulsion and freedom. Just so is it clear why Kant always attributes to the moral law the character of autonomy, and why he combats every form of heteronomy in morals. Such heteronomy Crusius, for example, seemed to him to introduce in founding morals upon theology. We can speak of a *priori* determinations in reference to what should be, only if reason itself gives the law. Only thus, too, can we speak of a categorical character in its imperative; if what should be, depended upon the arbitrary will of God, it would have validity only on condition that God did not alter His will, and would therefore be a hypothetical imperative.

7. As the opposition of the two theories to be reconciled had led to conceiving the nature of man as an "ought" and an imperative, so the perception that the two suffered under just the same deficiencies and were wanting in truth, led to

another important determination: All previous systems of morals, it was said, have made it impossible to give an *a priori* ethical theory, to conceive the law of morals as categorical imperative, because they placed the principle of action in the object willed, in the matter of the action, or, what is the same thing, laid down material principles. Such are the principles of happiness and of perfection, to which all others can be reduced. As regards the first, this is clear: Since only that object is willed which is the source of pleasure, and this is known merely empirically, the principle is an empirical principle. Just so, it has only conditional validity, namely, for beings that have impulses, which one might justly wish to be free from. The principle of perfection, it is held, stands higher than the other, but even to it may be shown that its requirements are merely conditional, and hence that at bottom it cannot get beyond putting intellectual cleverness in the place of morality. Both defects must be avoided, but can so be, only if the norm be not derived elsewhere than from the command of reason itself. To find it in that, we must abstract from the matter of the same, and must consider the pure will (the term being understood in the same sense in which, earlier, we spoke of the pure understanding) and the law in its purity. Since there then remains only the form of the law, or what makes the law a law (as before there remained only the form of the understanding), and this is its universal validity, we have as the principle of morality the formula: Act so that the maxim of thy action may be a principle of universal legislation (more concisely—as thou wouldst wish that all should act). The objection which a critic makes to the principle, that it is a mere formula, Kant pronounces the greatest commendation; and he appeals to the judgment of the mathematicians as regards the importance of formulæ. He then shows, further, that there follow from this formula a pair of determinations which are more material in kind. One is, that men, because they are the subjects of that legislation considered as an end, must never be thought of as things but always as persons. A second is, that, since the touchstone is placed not in the fact of validity but in the universality, we are justified in expecting and demanding of all, the observance of the law of reason. It is in agreement with this that he often says that the universal will is not what all will but what all rational beings should will.

8. If the deed in its actuality is in harmony with the formula laid down, it is legal. If, on the other hand, the motive of the deed agrees with that formula, the deed is moral: the former is agreement with the letter, the latter, with the spirit of the moral law. In accordance with this distinction the *Metaphysics of Morals* is divided into the Theory of Right and the Theory of Virtue (Ethics). The first contains the compulsory externalities, the second the duties, which are not conscience, but regarding which conscience renders a decision (the name *virtue-duty* [*Tugend-pflicht*] is an unfortunate coinage). Only the common title "Metaphysics of Morals" unites the two; otherwise they so fall apart that every relation, just so soon as it does not rest upon a pure moral obligation, is at once conceived as purely an institution of right. Such are marriage and the State, which, accordingly, are conceived as mere contracts, inner disposition not being discussed. Here, as in general in the *Theory of Right* [*or Law*], Kant follows the doctrine of natural right laid down by Thomasius and Wolff. After defining legal right as the content of the conditions under which the will of individuals is harmonized according to a universal law of freedom—which is possible only where there is a regulated limitation of the individual will—Kant deduces all rights out of the conception of law-determined freedom, and then divides them into private right and public right. To the first belong rights in things, in persons (right of contract), finally in persons considered as things. (Among these rights "in persons after the manner of things" he reckons marriage.) Public right is subdivided into the right of states, of nations, and of citizens of the world. Between private and public right, or, rather, in both, falls criminal law, in which Kant, in opposition to all tendencies of the eighteenth century, maintains the theory of retaliation, and, with the sternness of a Minos, demands propitiation for guilt, and hence calls the pardoning-power "slippery." Attacks on the death-penalty he terms sophistical because they proceed from the false idea that the transgressor has willed the punishment (then would he, in fact, be rewarded); rather is he punished because he willed the transgression. In the Right of the State he in many respects agrees with Montesquieu. Only, he does not attach nearly so much importance as Montesquieu to the different forms of rule, *i.e.*, to whether one or many wield the highest power. He attaches all the more importance to the kind of government. The re-

publicanism, which he extols, is, in general, to him the opposite of despotism. He finds it wherever the law-giving and the law-executing power are separate. Hence an autocratic constitution may often stand much nearer to it than a democratic, for of all despotisms that of an individual is the most tolerable. The dilemma in which his theory places the citizen, to whom it denies entirely the right of resistance, although his theory at the same time repudiates the views of Hobbes, he thinks himself to have solved by postulating unrestricted expression of opinion. From publicity he hopes there will result the healing of all political evils. His Public Right may be summed up in the following principles: The civil constitution in every state should be republican; the right of nations should be founded on a federalism of free states; and the right of citizens of the world should be bounded by the conditions of universal hospitality. The casuistic questions that are appended to the individual chapters betoken the zeal with which Kant immerses himself in the contemplation of the most individual relations. Much more original does Kant appear in his Ethics, or *Theory of Virtue*, than in the Theory of Right. The above-given formula receives here a more proximate determination, in that the end and motives governing our actions should be tested by the consideration whether their universality may rightly be desired. As compared with legal duties, moral duties are wider, not as though they were more subject to exception, but because the number of acts in which that motive can show itself active is greater. Now at this point, especially, is it that the negative attitude towards the natural impulses becomes conspicuous: since the fulfilment of duty is an over-coming of these, it is called *virtus*, manly strength. For the same reason, he cannot, as do the English moralists, look upon one's own happiness as the goal of action; what natural impulse requires cannot be duty. It is for another reason that he restricts the formula of those who make perfection, whether one's own or another's, this goal: the perfection of another can be furthered only by that other himself; it cannot, therefore, be our duty to further it. Kant, therefore, concludes as follows: One's own perfection and the happiness of another may be demanded solely because duty requires it; hence not from mere inclination. From this formula we get the division of the moral duties. Duties towards one's self are designated as the duties which relate

to one's own culture ; and these concern either the animal or the moral side of man. Now among the last-mentioned is included also the duty to have religion, *i.e.*, the duty to regard the voice of conscience (of the *homo noumenon*) as divine, where so doing gives greater strength to the moral law. Just as there are no duties towards animals, but man owes it to *himself* not to be inhuman or to act in an inhuman way, so there are no duties towards God. Duties towards others are divided into duties of merit, or duties of love, and duties of obligation, or duties of respect. Both are united in the duties of friendship.

9. The sharp separation, already mentioned above, of the legal and the moral with a man who, like Frederick the Great and Lessing, as regards natural impulse, thinks and feels as a Stoic, and, as regards nationality, as a believer in the Enlightenment, has no subjective counterpoise where the definitions of marriage and the State are in question. Both are to him contracts. The first, certainly, hardly admits of excuse. But the case is otherwise where his ethnological interests and his cosmopolitan ideas together find expression in the treatment of the history of the world. In the short works entitled : *Ideas for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (1789); *On Everlasting Peace* (1795), and concerning the progress of the human race in his *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798), one sees how Kant is on the point of rising above the opposition in which his view has its root. The goal of the world's history is to him the rational, *i.e.*, as was above remarked, the republican, form of state. The race, which, since the individual cannot do it, must be assumed to participate in all human perfection, approaches this form of state in such a manner that the individual generations are steps upon the way. A means thereto is the antagonism of individual states, which differ in natural conditions, and the egoistic interests of individuals. But as both draw nearer to that goal, there is presented a harmony between nature and freedom, between natural impulse and reason. This becomes ever greater, for the goal, the true republic, is attained wherever a union of states puts an end to war, as in true politics right and morals are the same. The chief means for ascertaining how far this is already accomplished and for effecting lasting continuance is, again, publicity, the right of the individual to try all that is a subject of dispute by the moral standard.

What publicity tolerates, even more what it demands, is certainly right. But that the human race has already made really important progress, is, according to Kant, evidenced by a most noteworthy fact, which he sees not so much in the French Revolution itself as in the disinterested sympathy with which the world followed this event. He finds this sympathy significant and gratifying in two respects: one is, that it shows how universally it is left to each people to determine its own form of state; the second is, that it proves how widely spread is the respect for the republican form of state. What Kant thought in this connection concerning the individual occurrences of the Revolution appears from his expressions in the *Theory of Right* concerning the *crimen immortale, inexpiabile* of the 21st of January, 1793.

10. If Kant, in what to him constituted the content of his moral duties, gives the solution of the third of what were cited above (*sub* 6) as problems of an organic fusion, namely, recognised the truth of realistic eudæmonism and of the rationalistic perfection-theory, he does this still more, because without the above-noted limitation, in what he gives as the last goal of all legal as well as of all moral action. This is the highest good, and Kant places the same in the union of perfection and happiness, where the latter is conditioned by the former. But in doing this he expressly wishes to make sure of distinguishing happiness from the self-satisfaction that naturally follows perfection, and, in agreement with the realists, places it in a favourable natural condition of existence, *i.e.* he conceives it as sensuous satisfaction. But since in the present no such harmony finds place, inasmuch as the virtuous person often finds himself in an unfortunate, the wicked man in a fortunate, condition of existence; since, further, neither from the notion of nature is it demonstrable that nature is a servant of morality, nor from that of morality that morality is subject to nature, we must assume that a time of adjustment will come, and, further, that there is a ground of agreement between nature and the moral law, which can lie only in the author of both. Thus, therefore, is repeated what appeared in connection with the highest cosmological Idea—the Idea of freedom, and, likewise, in connection with the highest psychological Idea—that of immortality, and with the theological—that of divinity. Not that they become certain to us, but that we become certain of them. What, therefore, had shown itself as

theoretically indemonstrable and as only conceivable, and remains absolutely unknowable, and as regards its *what* and *how* a mere *x*, becomes morally certain to us as regards its *that*. God, freedom, and immortality are, therefore, postulates of the practical reason, which commands the theoretical reason, which had been able merely to arrive at a *non liquet*, to take as a principle that without the assumption of which the practical end is not to be realized. Since, now, these three form the content of theology, ethics is not to be founded upon theology, but, conversely theology upon ethics : a theological ethics like that of Crusius had been rejected as untenable, and remains so ; a theology founded upon ethics is quite admissible. (It was earlier remarked [*vid.* § 281, 7] that Shaftesbury had expressed himself in precisely the same way.) Here Kant acknowledges that whoever can co-operate just as energetically in the realization of that moral order of the world without those assumptions is not obligated by them. He appears to have held it to be the least possible to dispense with the assumption of freedom ; hence he often calls it a fact, and the certainty of it frequently a kind of knowledge ; it is a *scibile*. On the contrary, it appears to him the most possible to observe the moral law without the assumption of the existence of God. The expressions, that this Idea is "unavoidable," and that the theoretical certainty of an existing God overwhelms us and fills us with terror, which involuntarily recall the *Système de la Nature* (*vid.* § 286, 3) ; and, finally, the circumstance that God and the harmony between morality and nature are both designated by one and the same term, (the highest good) prove that Kant was much inclined to do what soon afterwards Fichte did : to substitute for the idea of God that of the moral order of the world. The assumption merely of the That and merely for practical ends, Kant terms faith, and opposes it to knowledge as to assumption based on theoretical grounds, which at the same time relates to the What : but just so also does he oppose it, as a rational faith, to the historical faith which is a theoretical, only more uncertain, belief. Only another expression in favour of the primacy of the practical reason over the theoretical is it, therefore, when Kant says that he is obliged to limit knowledge in order to make a place for faith. If, now, one saw in the fact of his having spoken of a (conditional) duty of making such assumptions, nothing more than Basedow's duty of faith

(§ 293, 6), this must, of course, have appeared to Kant very superficial. Kant is not all concerned, as was Basedow, with a "happifying" assurance, but only with an assurance without which it were not possible to act morally. And yet, in the second place, since only that can be believed which the theoretical reason has previously shown to be conceivable, the door is barred against every gratifying delusion and absurdity. Equally right is he in refusing to admit the charge that was brought against him from out the circle of the adherents of Jacobi, that his need-faith is really equivalent to the dictum: What one wishes, that he is inclined to believe. We are not concerned here with the need of any interest but with (practical) reason itself, which, just because it produces this need, causes these assumptions.

II. In the three Parts of the Theory of Elements the *Critique of Pure Reason* had laid down what was known and can be postulated *a priori*, *i.e.*, had marked out the limits of the content of philosophy. The *Transcendental Theory of Method* (ii. pp. 535-636) undertakes another problem: it aims to discover how this content attains a scientific form, or how out of the material the possession of which the Theory of Elements has secured to us, an edifice can be erected. The suggestions that Kant here gives are preponderantly negative; hence the first chapter, *The Discipline of Pure Reason* (536-594), occupies the largest space. It gives a warning against applying the method of mathematics in philosophical investigations simply because of the success of mathematics. What is usually given, *e.g.*, by Baumgarten, as the difference between mathematics and philosophy, *viz.*, that the former has to do with the quantitative, the latter with the qualitative, is, partly, not quite correct and, partly, a secondary consequence of the real difference, which consists in the circumstance that philosophy deduces from pure conceptions, whereas mathematics constructs, *i.e.*, presents notions in perception. Hence philosophy cannot begin with definitions—only with the rarest good fortune does it end with them—is not at liberty to deduce from fixed axioms, must give neither more than one proof nor an apagogical proof for a proposition, and must, finally, abstain from all hypotheses except when by means of them it has to be shown as against the transcendent assertions of an opponent that other suppositions besides his are also conceivable. As the first chapter was

occupied with the opposition in which philosophical (dogmatic) knowledge stands to mathematics, so the second is concerned with the *Canon of Pure Reason* (594–619), particularly with the distinction between theoretical belief and certainty, the ground and end of which are merely practical,—a subject that was discussed, in part, in the tenth paragraph of this section. Opinion, faith, and knowledge are distinguished; under the second of these, again, pragmatic, doctrinal, and moral faith are distinguished; and this part of the work concludes with the consoling assurance that in what relates to the essential ends of man the bounties are impartially distributed, since the greatest philosopher stands on the same footing with him who is guided by the commonest understanding. In the third chapter, *The Architectonic of Pure Reason* (619–632) we have, first, a determination of the conception (not that of the schools but that of the world) of philosophy,—philosophy being the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of the human reason, and the philosopher being, therefore, not merely an intellectual artist but one who legislates for the human reason. Then it is shown how the two main divisions of philosophy, the Philosophy of Nature and of Morals, have to do, the former, with what is, the latter, with what should be. Those parts which are pure, abstracting from all that is empirical, may be termed the Metaphysics of Nature and of Morals, which are both preceded by Transcendental Philosophy as propædeutic and critique. In a somewhat artificial manner, Kant attempts to force metaphysics into the four parts given by Wolff, only with the modification, that in the place of the rational psychology is put rational physiology (of which the former forms a minimal part). The fourth chapter of the Theory of Method, *The History of Pure Reason* (633–636), classifies previous views, opposing, according to various grounds of division, intellectualism to sensualism, noölogism to empiricism, scientific to naturalistic philosophy, and finally sceptical to dogmatic philosophy. The invitation to enter with him upon the hitherto untrodden critical way, that thus it may become, instead of a footpath, a highway, closes the Theory of Method.

§ 301.

THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT.

I. To what extent Kant has succeeded in solving the *first*

problem of the most modern philosophy has been shown, partly in the account of his theoretical philosophy, partly in the concluding observations upon his Transcendental *Æsthetic* and *Analytic*. But likewise it has been brought out in the account of his practical philosophy, although there we were obliged to admit that in this Hutcheson and Shaftesbury were not quite so largely recognised as were Locke and Hume in the investigations regarding knowledge. Instead of that, however, there appear in the practical philosophy very decided suggestions towards the solution of the *second* problem, towards a reconciliation of the views that had distinguished the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That a child of the latter, as Kant was, should incline far more to it, and that, just for this reason, he should not, in the solution of this problem, advance nearly so far as in the solution of the first, is to be presumed beforehand. But when one sees that the same man who rated the authority of the individual, in the sense of the revolutionary century, so high that, leaving far behind him the self-determination of the Leibnitzians, he ascribes to it the capacity not merely to develop but to make an absolute beginning,—that this man conceives conscience not as one's own inner voice but as the voice of the race; that he whom Rousseau so moved and who owes so much to him and to Montesquieu, yet speaks so decidedly against the right of a people to alter its political compact and to offer resistance to authority, because authority can never to this extent be in the wrong; when one, finally, hears that he to whom, as to all the Enlightened of his century, Spinoza was so abhorrent that he could never resolve upon a thorough study of him, and of whom one must therefore expect that, like Mendelssohn, he would understand by "man" only the individual and would see in "humanity" a merely abstract conception, instead of which he allows (without neutralizing the idea, as did Lessing [§ 294, 16], by an assumed transmigration of souls) that humanity progresses, and says, by way of consolation, to future generations: *fata volentem ducunt nolentem trahunt*—one will hardly need to wonder when one hears that Kant's contemporaries reckoned him among the pantheists. He is not a pantheist; so little is he so, that the individualistic moment greatly predominates in him, although undoubtedly he has, more than his contemporaries, a comprehension of the views of the seventeenth century and has

made room for them more, even, than did Lessing. Likewise one cannot deny that Kant's discrimination between the pure and empirical Ego, the former of which accompanies every (individual) consciousness as consciousness *per se*, would be much more readily accepted by a Spinozist, to whom the idea of the *intellectus infinitus* was familiar, than, perhaps, by Mendelssohn. And, indeed, the later development, precisely of the theory of pure apperception, has shown that in it there lies the germ of pantheistical theories. The *homo noumenon* in practical philosophy, the pure apperception in theoretical philosophy, are insights that did not spring up in the soil of the Enlightenment. Much more, however, than in the works on theoretical and practical philosophy does this appear—and with it appears the tendency to unite with them those of his own century—in the work, which, with the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the first, the *Critique of Practical Reason* as the second, must be called Kant's third masterpiece, viz., in the *Critique of Judgment* (Wks., vii. pp. 3–376).

2. In order rightly to estimate this work, in which Kant really transcends the standpoint of the two other Critiques, it must be borne in mind that the psychological foundations of all his investigations were not discovered by himself, but were borrowed, first from Wolff and the Wolffians, later from Tetens, whose book, as Hamann writes, always lay open on his table. Likewise must it, in the second place, not be forgotten that, according to his express explanation, all determinations usually contained in a complete ontology are to find their foundation in the *Critique*, a position in which he distinctly refers to Baumgarten. But these two facts must lead to Kant's leaving behind him the dualism between understanding and reason, the conceptions of nature and of freedom to which he had come, and then transcendental idealism also. The distinction between the theoretical reason, or the understanding, and the practical reason, or reason proper, is, as Kant expressly confesses, just the same as that which Tetens designates by the words *faculties of knowledge and of desire*. Now even Meier, more clearly Mendelssohn, and most strikingly Tetens, had shown that the faculty of feeling stands between the two as the faculty of pleasure and pain. Likewise, again, there was to be found in every complete ontology, and particularly in that of Baumgarten (*Met.*, 341 ff.), a conception the name for which, on account of its relationship with the problems or

conceptions relating to freedom, Kant had often applied to these, which, however, finds application equally in nature; and that is the conception of the end. By the fact that practical philosophy has shown what end should be realized, nothing is decided regarding the end which we find realized, regarding the perceived conformity to end. Hence is imposed a transcendental investigation of the feeling of pleasure and an analysis of the conception of the end, based on psychological and ontological principles. But both can very well be combined, since, as Kant expressly remarks in justification of this combination, the perception of conformity to an end always excites pleasure, and, conversely, what produces satisfaction must appear to us as end-determined. But that this investigation should have been termed Critique of Judgment instead of Critique of the Faculty of Feeling is explained by the fact that the *vis aestimativa* of the Schoolmen was adopted by the Wolffians as *judgment*; but Kant was without doubt also led habitually to call the faculty intermediate between understanding and reason, judgment, because logic usually places judging between conceiving and reasoning. In so doing, however, he calls attention directly to the circumstance that there is here no concern with an act of judgment in which the particular is subsumed under a given universal, but rather with one in which a universal is sought for the given particular. He calls this last, which alone henceforth is to be in question, an act of the reflecting, as opposed to the determining, judgment, which only subsumes under a known law. But that, in the investigations here to be instituted, Kant begins to transcend those of the other two Critiques, is clear from the fact that he is here compelled to deviate from the previous rhythmus of division. Kant, as did the Middle Ages, adhered to the Platonico-Aristotelian tradition that a scientific division must be dichotomous; and so closely that he cites it only as a "clever notion" that always, in the third category of each class, the two others are contained. The insertion of this third member between understanding and reason forces from Kant the confession that his divisions are mostly trichotomous. He excuses himself by saying that the dichotomous division corresponds to the analytic mode of procedure; trichotomy, on the other hand, to the synthetic. The more there dawns upon his followers the consciousness that his and their philosophy has to solve the problem of mediation (the problem of the age) to bridge over

and get beyond all previous antitheses by synthesis, the more must trichotomy rule in the articulation of the system; for, *dualitas reducta ad unitatem est trinitas*, runs the old saying. The schema of triple-membered articulation in philosophical investigation, which, later, was degraded, by misuse, into a Procrustean bed, dates properly from that table with which the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* ends (p. 39), where, between the faculty of knowledge and that of desire, is placed the feeling of pleasure and pain, between understanding and reason, judgment, between determination by law and the final end, determination by end, between nature and freedom, art.

3. Corresponding to the problems which the transcendental establishment of the Metaphysics of Nature and of Morals had to solve, Kant formulates also the problem of the Critique of (reflective) Judgment thus: It has to answer the question, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible as regards our delight in perceived conformity to an end? *i.e.*, Can we, and why can we, determine, as regards pleasure, anything independently of all experience? But this question immediately falls into two, since, upon closer consideration, conformity to an end shows itself to be twofold. An object, that is to say, may affect the observer in a way that is end-determined as regards the person affected, *i.e.*, is in harmony with his nature and character: this conformity to an end, which contributes as little to the knowledge of the object as the merely finding it agreeable does, may be termed subjective, and the pleasure felt in it should be termed æsthetic, because it has nothing to do with the conception of the object (the logical element in it). It is otherwise where we perceive the conformity of an object to its notional or ideal possibility, *i.e.*, its nature and character; since we attribute to it objective conformity to an end, and our pleasure in it is logical. The *Critique of Judgment* falls, accordingly, into the Critique of Æsthetic and of Teleological judgment. Each of these, just as does the *Critique of Pure Reason*, falls into a Theory of Elements and a Theory of Method; only, Kant here himself confesses what was above asserted by us as regards the *Critique of Pure Reason* (§ 298, 2), that the Theory of Method is merely an appendix. The division of the Theory of Elements is in both parts the same: the Analytic determines in what (subjective and objective) conformity to an end consists, the Dialectic

answers the question how, as regards it, synthetic judgments *a priori* are possible.

4. The *Critique of Æsthetic Judgment* treats, in its First Part, of the *Analytic of Æsthetic Judgment* (pp. 43-202), the Beautiful and the Sublime, and has in the *Observations* written in the year 1764 a precursor similar to that which the *Critique of Pure Reason* had had in the *Dissertation*. Like the word "agreeable," each of those two words denotes not so much a property of the object as its relation to the subject. Only, the judgment which æsthetic taste pronounces regarding the beautiful, and æsthetic feeling regarding the sublime, does not claim, as does the judgment of the physical taste and feeling regarding the pleasantness of an object, to have merely individual validity; but though it does not, as does the moral law, postulate universal validity, it nevertheless requires of every one to recognise its general validity. That Kant terms the demonstration of the justification therefor the key to the entire investigation, and that he calls it the deduction of the (æsthetic) judgment of taste (and feeling) must appear as a matter of course to any one who bears in mind the deduction of space and time, as well as of the categories. Considering the beautiful first, he arrives at the result that where a perceived object causes us to subsume not only, as in the act of knowing, this perception under a conception, but also (because it brings to light a harmonious relation between imagination and understanding) the *faculty* of perception under the *faculty* of conception, there is produced a pleasure that is denoted by the word "beautiful." Since this pleasure is communicable, which an agreeable sensation of smell, for example, is not, we place the ground of the same in the object; and again, since the two faculties which were in concord in this pleasure are found in all men, we assume in all men a susceptibility to the beautiful, which, properly, should alone be called *sensus communis*, or common feeling (*Gemeingefühl*). Strictly speaking, we ought not to say, "The object is beautiful," but, "The object must seem beautiful to every one." Because it is, properly speaking, not the objective property of the object but the idea of it, which excites in an appropriate way the person contemplating it, the beautiful may be termed the formal conformity to end, or conformity to end as regards form; and the æsthetic judgment of taste does not at all concern the *material* existence of a thing. (Even the

imaginary pleases as beautiful.) The more precise definition of the conception of the beautiful may be attained by the aid of the table of categories, or, rather, according to the four classes of these; and the most important results to be mentioned are that an object is to be regarded as beautiful which calls forth a free, disinterested pleasure that does not rest upon a conception and is not to be traced to a conscious intention, and, finally, arises universally and necessarily. The sublime, to which Kant now passes, is held to be distinguished from the beautiful in such a manner that in it perceptions are not compared with conceptions of the understanding, but with Ideas of the reason, so that we feel the superiority of the reason to the imagination in that the extensive or intensive magnitudes which this produces, even the infinite which it fabricates, seem small in contrast to Ideas. Just on account of this disproportion between the two, there is mingled in the feeling of the sublime, as not in that of the beautiful, with the feeling of pleasure a kind of pain, and from this commingling there results the feeling of reverence, whereby the feeling for the sublime is connected more with the moral, the taste for the beautiful, on the other hand, with the theoretical. Since in the feeling for the sublime, just as above in the case of the beautiful, the faculty of perceptions is subordinated to the faculty of Ideas, so there arise thereby æsthetic (*i.e.*, sensible) Ideas (*i.e.*, something non-sensible), which point beyond experience, as do the Ideas of reason, but differ from them in such a way that the æsthetic Idea is a perception to which no conception ever corresponds, and which therefore is inexplicable [*inexpönbel*], whereas the Idea of reason is a conception to which no perception can ever correspond, and which is therefore indemonstrable [*indemonstrabel*], since to demonstration demonstration is also necessary. The impression of the beautiful and the sublime may be produced by an object of nature as well as by an object created by freedom. The latter, the art-product, will, since the consciousness of ends and intention must be wanting, be able to do this only if it be the work of genius, of freedom become natural endowment, in which the product of freedom has become like nature. In the beautiful work of art, therefore, that mean between nature and freedom is most completely attained. Where genius, the faculty of æsthetic Ideas, calls forth, by the production of the beautiful, or art, æsthetically interesting ideas, it is these that please and not the object,

for this may be hateful. Or more precisely, it is the harmony called forth by them in us, that fills us with pleasure. Since the means by which ideas are called forth (their presentation) may be a word, gesticulation, or tone of voice, art falls into the arts of discourse (poetry and oratory), the formative arts (plastic art and the art of design), and the arts of the play of sensation (music and painting). With the given explanation of beauty and sublimity, now, is also given the possibility of answering the question whether and how, as regards them, there are synthetic judgments *a priori*; which is answered, together with others, in the *Dialectic of Æsthetic Judgment* (pp. 203–226). If beauty were a property of objects, our judgments regarding it would have to be derived from experience. But since it has been shown that beauty and sublimity lie in us precisely as time, space, and the categories do, it is also shown that we must derive our judgments regarding them from ourselves. The idealism of conformity to an end answers the question in the affirmative, and explains the possibility of so doing: it explains at the same time how even that can be beautiful which is very obviously produced without design and by mechanical causes. All this, æsthetic realism, which declares beauty to be an objective property, is unable to do. Whereas according to it a beautiful object of nature would be possible only where nature had a design to please us, idealism teaches us to receive the object with favour, to look upon it *as if* it had the power to call forth in us an end-determined frame of mind. And the idealism of conformity to an end has the advantage, that contradictions that are not solvable by realism can be easily solved by it. The two propositions, The judgment of taste cannot rest upon a conception, for otherwise it would be demonstrable, and, It must rest upon one, for otherwise it could not be at all disputable, are reconciled by æsthetic idealism, in that it shows that in the thesis there is in question a conception of the understanding that extends our knowledge and hence is limited to the realm of experience, whereas in the antithesis there is in question a conception of the reason in an Idea, which transcends the realm of experience (hence the name of this section). Whoever should expect that the Dialectic, which, now, has shown the possibility of *a priori* judgments of taste, will be followed, similarly as was the Dialectic of Pure Reason, by a Metaphysics of the Beautiful, is undeceived by the short *Appendix*

with which the *Critique of Judgment* closes (pp. 224–227), which declares a theory of method of taste to be impossible, because there is no science of the beautiful. Manner (*modus*) here occupies the place of method (*methodus*); the master shows how to do, the pupil imitates. The best means to be employed as propædeutic to all fine art is the study of the ancients, and moral culture; this is with justice termed a study of the *humaniora*.

5. In the First Part of the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*, the *Analytic* (pp. 232–258), there is first determined the conception of the inner end, or end of nature, in opposition to that of utility, which the previous teleology had laid down: it is something that is cause and effect of itself, since in it all parts are determined by the Idea of the whole and are held in reciprocity, so that, consequently, the organized and self-organizing product of nature is to be regarded as an end of nature. On the necessity of such a view, Kant has expressed himself *in extenso* in the Introduction, to this effect: The Transcendental Dialectic and the philosophy of nature resting upon it had laid down all the *a priori* universal laws to which the ordered world (nature) of movable matter is subject. Since they all relate only to motions that are called forth by external causes, they may be termed mechanical, their totality mechanism. Now in one portion of the phenomena of nature we encounter a multitude of particular laws not to be deduced from those universal laws; which particular laws must, when compared with those universal laws, be regarded as accidental, *i.e.*, as not necessary, consequences of the mechanism of nature. The tendency of reason is to seek everywhere a universal law for those accidental particular laws—which indeed had been the business of the reflecting judgment. Such a law is, now, that of a causality that is different from that which is mechanical and depends upon external causes, and hence is an inner causality. But the inner ground of motion is end, or purpose (motive, cf. § 40). The necessity for the assumption of this second or other kind of causality is a necessity determined by the organization of our understanding, hence obtains only of us, is subjective. If we were not constituted so that we have to bring the conception—as that which attests the possibility of the object—into conjunction with the perception, which is a warrant of its reality, or, so that the perception gives to our merely formal

conception all content ; if, to express it otherwise, our understanding were perceptive and our perception were intellectual, the case here might be different. It is possible to conceive such an understanding ; in fact, it must be pre-supposed that in a nature the reality of which follows from its possibility, thoughts (conceptions) immediately have reality (are perceptions). To such an understanding all the parts may be presented at the same time with the Idea of the whole ; but for that reason, also, there can be no difference at all between what occurs as the result of causes and what occurs as the result of ends. With us it is entirely otherwise. Our understanding acts discursively ; derives the whole out of the parts, and hence views the latter as antecedent to the former. When, consequently, it encounters phenomena which (like those of life) cannot be understood in this way, it acknowledges that these will never find their Newton, who will construe them as he did the motions of the planets. Hence it is not forbidden, even as regards these phenomena, to carry the explanation based on mechanical causes as far as it will go, and only at the last moment possible admit the other kind of causality. But, sooner or later, we shall arrive at a point where that explanation no longer suffices, but we must consider the living object as regards its inner determination by an end, in order to understand it. But here two things must never be forgotten : first, that there is only one portion of the phenomena of nature in which the Idea of an end in nature is indispensable, viz., those of the organic world ; second, that the indispensability of the same is merely subjective, has being only for us, so that we ought not so much to say, These phenomena are, as, rather, They are to be explained *by us* only by the assumption of an inner end. The fact that the Idea of an inner determination by an end is only a subjective maxim explains the delight that we feel on perceiving it ; but such is not the case as regards knowledge of mere causal connection. More important is it, that here also only the idealistic view of inner determination by an end places us in a position to solve the contradictions that remain unsolvable on the standpoint of the opposed view. The *Dialectic of Teleological Judgment* (pp. 259-294), that is to say, shows us that the two propositions, Everything happens in accordance with mechanical laws, and, Nothing is possible in accordance with mechanical laws, do not form an insoluble contradiction. The solution

lies in the circumstance that both are false, and that the defenders of the first, Epicureanism and Spinozism, as well as those of the second, Hylozoism and Theism, are untenable systems of natural science, the one fanciful, the other chimerical, because they convert maxims of reflection into dogmatic assertions, entirely apart from the fact that they ignore the above-mentioned distinction of the organic and inorganic world. Here also, to the Dialectic is joined an *Appendix*, which discusses the theory of method of the teleological judgment (pp. 295–376). This contains an extended discussion of teleology and its relation to natural science and theology. Here Kant expresses himself to this effect, that if man be looked upon as the final end of the world, this is admissible only if man, the *homo noumenon*, the subject of morality, be spoken of, and hence, properly speaking, morality must be fixed as this final end. In favour of this view speaks also the fact that the well-being or happiness which that earlier teleology particularly had in view may be conceived also as a result of the mere nature-mechanism, but morality cannot at all be so conceived. As regards, further, the physical theology, Kant does not fail to perceive that in it is formulated what the human heart usually feels in viewing the order in nature,—superiority to it. But he remarks upon this point, particularly where the physico-theological argument for the existence of God is advanced, that so little is known by us of the order in nature, and the amount of what appears to us, by reason of this ignorance, as disorder is so great, that we can at most only conclude to a wise orderer, but not by any means to an all-wise creator. But it is otherwise if we make our point of departure what was just affirmed to be the final end of nature, *i.e.*, morality, and, instead of a physical theology, attempt an ethical theology. Of all proofs for the existence of God, the moral, as given in the practical philosophy, according to which the existence of God is a postulate of the practical reason, is the most cogent, and, like the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the *Critique of Judgment* closes with the praise of the faith of reason, which, because it rests upon morality, is religion, *i.e.*, knowledge of our duty as a divine command.

6. The assertion made above (*sub 1*), that in the *Critique of Judgment* more than in the other two *Critiques* Kant has combined the views of the seventeenth century with

those of the eighteenth, in which he had been bred, will be found justified by the table of contents preceding the work. The relative justification, which he allows to the purely mechanical point of view as regards phenomena up to those of life; his agreement, bordering on literalness, with Descartes, where, in opposition to the view that man as a sensible existence is to be conceived as the end of creation, he confesses that to an infinite understanding all synthesis through ends may become mechanism—a position with which may easily be combined, as a complement, the Spinozistic assertion that the mind in philosophizing, being a part of such an infinite understanding, views the universe as this does,—all this makes it clear why to many who were in agreement with the results of the two other *Critiques*, the *Critique of Judgment* was an unwelcome phenomenon, the more so the more anti-pantheistic they were, whereas to those who constructed a pantheism upon a Kantian foundation it was most welcome. (The former statement will be illustrated in connection with Herbart, the latter in connection with Schelling.) If, therefore, in the practical philosophy, Kant, by distinguishing the intelligible and empirical natures of man, had made it possible, as did Leibnitz (indeed even more than he), to ascribe to him subjectivity, as Spinoza had accidentality, the separation of inorganic nature from the organic places him in a position to combine with the rigid mechanism of the Cartesio-Spinozistic view the teleology of Leibnitz and the Enlightenment; but the conception of an inner conformity to an end had made it possible for him to rise above both these. But at the same time the, above-made assertion is thereby justified (§ 296, 3), that in proportion as the second problem of the most modern philosophy finds its solution, the *third* also attains solution, namely, the placing the view of antiquity in possession of its rights. No age has shown so little understanding for this as that of the Enlightenment. Winckelmann and Lessing, the only two who form an exception, are the prophets of a new age, to which Kant, who is their intellectual relative and supporter, already belongs by the fact that he, with them, calls it into life. Even the fact that, in the system of Kant, physics is one of the main divisions, and that in the other division the theory of the State plays so important a rôle, evinces (cf. § 120) an agreement with the philosophy of the ancients; still more the fact that in the

manner in which he views nature all the various ways are combined in which the philosophy of the ancients had viewed it. Before Anaxagoras, there was only one view, which derived all things out of the natural sources of motion, *i.e.*, the mechanical view; with Anaxagoras there begins, and has not ceased even with Plato (*vid.* § 87, 5), the external teleological way of looking at nature, which connects nature with ends lying outside of it, and thus diverges from that first theory. Aristotle was the first who maintained the conception of the inner immanent end, which places him in a position to be even more just than Plato to the earlier theory, which entirely ignored end in nature, to say nothing of the fact that it enabled him to conceive the nature of living being, as well as that of the work of fine art, as self-end. Although Kant had no direct acquaintance with Aristotle, as had Lessing, and hence does not confess to having such reverence for him (regarded as a logician), yet the agreement with Aristotle's theory (of nature and of fine art) is as great in his case as in Lessing's. But if he is in agreement with Aristotle, so also is he with all philosophemes before Aristotle, who had incorporated these into his system. But the third period of ancient philosophy had put forth other theories; and first, those of the Dogmatists (§ 95 ff.), which originally were indeed only in the province of ethics. But the relationship of the Kantian theories with those of the Stoics has been so often affirmed and shown to be just in this province, that, instead of repeating what was long ago said, we must, the rather, bear in mind that the admirer of Lucretius could not, irrespectively of the Epicureans, have come to conceive happiness as an attendant of natural circumstance, and yet give it so high a place in ethics. That Kant has points of agreement with the Epicurean theory even much more in physics than in ethics his *Theory of the Heavens* expressly acknowledges. Further, as regards Scepticism (*vid.* § 99 ff.), Kant is very often obliged to allow himself to find fault with it, and the justification for asserting, when speaking of Pyrrho, that he formulated the problem of philosophy just as Kant has, will very soon be shown. That, finally, the Roman Syncretism (*vid.* § 106) should leave lasting traces upon a man who at school was a rival of Ruhnkenius in Latin and must consequently have had his Cicero well in mind, this last circumstance must be a guarantee, even if he had not, at the beginning of his literary

activity, fixed as a goal the mediation of oppositions, and his proof for the existence of God were not to be found in Cicero. Therefore not only pre-Aristotelian but also post-Aristotelian theories found acceptance with the father of the mediation-philosophy. But since, for a real mediation, it is necessary that the opposition of sides should have become sharpened to the farthest extreme, it becomes necessary to show as regards Kant—if indeed there does not apply to him a criticism analogous to that brought against Platonism in regard to physical and logical one-sidedness (*vid.* § 82), namely, that it carried the whole pagan philosophy into what was indeed a Christian view (*vid.* § 258), but a view already reconciled with the world, and hence conceded to pre-Christian secularity a preponderance—that the diametrical opposite of the ancient philosophy, the mediæval spiritual philosophy, or theosophy, likewise received with him a full recognition. That such is really the case, and that also the mediæval philosophy is, in its most essential forms, contained as a moment in the Kantian system, is proved, above all, by the fourth masterpiece of Kant: *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* (Wks., vi.).

§ 302.

KANT'S RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF MERE REASON.

1. In the *Transcendental Theory of Method* (p. 601) Kant, in almost literal agreement with Pyrrho, states the task of philosophy to be the answering of the three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? He designates the first of these as theoretical, the second as practical, the third as at the same time practical and theoretical. This last is done because, as appears from what follows (p. 602), Kant connects immediately with the third question, as its complement, the presupposition that the one who hopes will do what he should do. All three *Critiques*, which have just been characterized, have ended in the faith of reason, or religion, and in all three the theoretical *and* the practical question were answered as if they meant, What may I hope in order to do what I ought? *i.e.*, the theoretical was throughout subordinated, as means, to the practical, as to the end, exactly in a manner corresponding to the steadily inculcated primacy of the practical reason, of which God, freedom and immortality were so often proclaimed by him to be postulates.

But, now, there appears a work, which, according to an expression in one of Kant's letters, has as its object the answering of that third question, or, what means the same thing, to give Kant's philosophical theory of religion. Here his method of procedure is as if he had asked, "What may I hope, *if* I do what I ought? that is, theoretical certainty becomes a consequence and (since this consequence does not enter as unwilled consequence) appears as a willed consequence or proposed end and hence as an essential fact. What wonder that many of his "Enlightened" friends were alarmed at this approach to the orthodox, with whom pure theory was the essential thing, whereas the Enlightened, and hitherto Kant also, had declared it to be right-doing. A work so honestly intended must suffer being characterized as a disloyal condescension; one of the most profound works, as a sad example of the weakness of age. If Kant fixed as the problem of his philosophical theory of religion, to show that what can be known through the doctrines of the Church and of the Bible can also be known by reason, keeping entirely within the limits of reason, and employed, to establish and explain his principles, the history, languages, books of all people, even the Bible itself,—his course is just the opposite of that followed by the Church Fathers, who drew from the Bible the eternal truth, and that by the Scholastics, who made truths of reason out of dogmas. But just on this account must he come into contact with them. Coincidence in the two sides in this encounter shows that all essential dogmas which Patristic activity had established (*vid.* §§ 140–144) were discussed by Kant; as an encounter with those who were moving in an opposite direction, it shows that the course for Kant is the opposite of that which the framers of dogmas had followed. He first comes to terms with Augustine, then with what Cyril and Dioscurus had laid down, and finally with Athanasius. First he attempts to get an unbiased standpoint. Since this is presented neither by supernaturalism, which asserts the necessity of a supernatural revelation, nor by naturalism, which asserts its impossibility, nor even, finally, by Deism, which declares that historical religion contains only what natural religion teaches, Kant takes such a position, that upon all this he decides nothing, but declares natural religion to be necessary, which demands that a thing be recognised as a duty rather than as a divine command. Whoever maintains this principle, hence he

who thinks as he himself does, is characterized by Kant as the pure rationalist.

2. Of the four parts, into which the Philosophical Theory of Religion falls, the first treats of, The Indwelling of the Evil Principle by the side of the Good, or *Concerning the Radical Evil in Human Nature* (pp. 177-216). After characterizing here the two opposed views, according to one of which the world lies in wickedness and daily sinks deeper in, while the other, the "heroic," asserts, in the face of all historical experience, the opposite; and after having expressed the opinion that here, also, an intermediate view is possible, he combats the view that evil is one with sense, or is grounded in a natural impulse. Rather, as evil does not consist in the sense-nature nor in reason, but in the (false) subjection of the latter to the former, instead of the reverse, it proceeds from, or has its roots in, the fact that man has made this conversion a maxim (for only what proceeds from a maxim of the will is good or evil). This maxim, for which no temporal origin can be pointed out, which preconditions all evil deeds, since it is their subjective condition, may be termed an innate propensity; but one may not will to exculpate a human being on that account. For, since this propensity is evil, it must be a deed of one's own, and there remains only that the *peccatum originarium* is an intelligible deed, to be cognised only by the reason, a deed from which the temporal, empirically knowable evil deeds, *peccata derivativa*, proceed. If, now, this fact be represented as historical, as in the Bible, the non-temporal condition of evil deeds is converted into a pre-condition of all evil deeds. Just so the two facts that that maxim has its ground in the mind, and that its origin in man cannot be pointed out, make, when combined, the conclusion almost inevitable that a mind outside the human mind (The Seducer) is the ground. The distinction—represented in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as possible, shown in the Practical Philosophy to be necessary—into the intelligible, and empirical natures, or thought and sense, alone helps us here; as this also enables us to conceive the conversion from the evil to the good, whether this appear always as a gradual change in the sense-nature, or as a revolution in the thought-nature, a new birth or creation. Whoever (like God) knows the intelligible ground of action, will be able to look upon the empirical ground which is still involved in progres-

sion as good, as well-pleasing to Him. As a subsidiary point, because it relates to what the reason can neither construe nor show as impossible, Kant treats of the question whether there be works of grace, by which God can help to that conversion. It should have no practical interest whatever, since we ourselves should always do all that is possible for our own betterment.

3. The Second Part treats of the *Conflict of the Good Principle with the Evil for the Mastery in Man* (pp. 219-257), and discusses particularly the theory of Atonement. Since humanity in its moral perfection is the final end of creation, this man who alone is well-pleasing to God can with right be characterized as existent from all eternity, as He through whom (*i.e.*, for whose sake) all things were made, as the Son of God, etc. This Idea of perfect humanity, since we have not made it, has descended to us and has made its dwelling with us, united itself with us. It is to be thought only under the Idea of a man in whom we practically believe if we seek to become so like him that there is secured to us the assurance of living with him in equal relations. If now, a man of so divine a disposition should come at a certain time, as it were out of Heaven, upon earth, and had given in himself the example of a man well-pleasing to God, and brought about an infinitely great moral good through a revolution in the human race, he *might*, perhaps, be a supernaturally begotten man; we have the less cause to assume this, as the exaltation of such a holy one above all human frailty might be an obstacle to the practical efficacy of his example. Still, he could speak of himself as if the Ideal of the Good were corporeally represented in him, because he speaks only of that disposition of mind which he has taken for his rule. This disposition of mind would be the righteousness that obtains before God. By the death of the old man we receive into ourselves the disposition of the Son of God, hence Him, and the pain that accompanies such death is the punishment that the new man suffers for the old, which then by personification becomes the death suffered by him for our redemption. Only with this view of the theory of redemption is it of practical importance; for we see that only by the receiving of the Ideal, of the Son of God, into our disposition and by change of heart, is absolution conceivable, and with it the certainty that the feared might of evil can avail nothing

against that which is good. The General Observation to the Second Part considers, though as subsidiary, miracles, and arrives at the result that they are theoretically indemonstrable, even though undeniable, and ethically without meaning, since a belief supported by them would be immoral. Practically, moreover, nobody believes in them.

4. The Third Part considers the victory of the good principle over the evil, and the *Founding of a Kingdom of God upon Earth* (pp. 261-325). So far as men can work together, for this victory, they have the condition for the establishment of an ethical community, in which the law-giver is not, as in a civil community, the people at large united into one whole, but the Searcher of Hearts, so that *ethical community* and *people of God* mean the same thing. This Idea can be carried out only in the form of a Church, in which the people are distinguished from their leaders, who are servants of the Church. A true Church (ordered in accordance with the table of categories) will have the predicates of universality, purity, freedom, and unchangeableness. Since the frailty of men makes it impossible that the faith of reason, this foundation of the invisible Church, should be the basis of a visible Church, there inevitably enters into the place of pure ethical religion a religion of worship, in which, it is supposed, one renders proper service to God by fulfilling certain statutory injunctions. Like all statutes, these can be learned only empirically; hence the religion of the visible Church, or the creed, consists merely in a historical faith. Such a faith can be kept abiding only by a scripture believed to be holy, as regards which, it is fortunate if it, like the Bible, contains the purest ethical doctrines. Every creed is one of the modes of faith in which religion, more or less concealed, manifests itself, hence is a vehicle of the pure faith of religion. Properly speaking, it has the latter for its expounder, and a moral exposition of the Holy Scripture, therefore, stands higher than the mere scriptural learning, which has a doctrinal character. The object of every creed is to prepare the way for the faith of reason; if the leading-string snaps before it becomes a fetter, that transition can precede it without revolution, otherwise, not. For that reason, Kant eulogizes his age, because all persons of culture refrain from pronouncing judgment as to whether the Holy Scripture is of divine origin, obliging no one to assent to the doctrine that it is, and regard

moral conduct as the essential thing in religion. This is an approximation to the goal where God shall be all in all, in that the historical faith has prepared the way for the faith of reason. The General Observation to this Part relates to the mysteries, and is occupied particularly with the Trinity, which is interpreted in such a manner that God is to be conceived as having a moral quality of a three-fold nature, for which the designation of each of the various (moral) personalities is not an unfit expression. Without the distinctions of holiness, goodness, and justice, there is incurred the danger of falling into a slavish faith, since God would be thought of as is a human despot (in whom the three forms of authority are united). But it must always be held fast that reason can permit this mystery only in a practical interest. Not with a view to a theoretical knowledge of God, but because it is of practical interest that calling, atonement, and election should not be confounded, can we say that the symbol of baptism expresses complete pure ethical religion.

5. The Fourth Part, which treats of true and false service under the dominion of the good principle, or of *Religion and Priesthood* (pp. 329-389), is linked with the fact that in the preceding Part the transition from the historical faith to that of reason is designated as the proper coming of the kingdom of God. Before the goal is completely attained, true service of God consists in furthering that transition, false service in the hindering of it. If in the Christian religion, which, like the others, contains, besides the doctrines of natural religion, a historical and a statutory element, worth is attributed to the latter alone, or even merely a greater worth than to the former, there arises a preponderance of the learned class, since only they are familiar with the historical element. This preponderance leads to priesthood, which, since the majority of the people consists of laity, is a source of danger to the State, because those who have become habituated to rendering a false show of service at last become clever in rendering only a mere show of obedience to the civil law. If false service consists in the false subjection of the faith of reason to the historical faith, as a part of it must be reckoned also the false education of youth, which bases the theory of virtue upon the theory of godliness, instead of, in the opposite way, awakening first the ethical spirit and beginning a new life. The General Observation considers the means of grace (an expression in

which there is said to lie a contradiction). Prayer, a wish expressed in God's presence, which the majority of people hesitate to use, as they do loud speaking, rests, if it is to be more than a self-exaltation in a soliloquy, upon an illusory personification. Church-going and sacraments are convenient means of keeping alive feeling, but may become dangerous if they betray one into substituting for the only proper way, leading from virtue to grace, the false way which indolence chooses and which ostensibly leads from grace to virtue.

6. One must be blind or must delude himself if he is doubtful as to the answer to the question, To whom does Kant the more incline; to those who recognise only a religion of right-doing, or those who call themselves by preference orthodox? or if one should say, the justification of dogma, and hence of the Middle Ages which originated dogmas, was as clear to Kant as, somewhat later, it was to Franz von Baader. One cannot deny, however, that there was reason for this, when, in earnest and in jest, Kant was proclaimed, after the appearance of his Theory of Religion, as the promoter of orthodoxy; when his friends shook their heads over the supposed fact that he had appeared as an apostle of a new Scholasticism; when Willmann gave him friendly greeting (and was not repulsed) because he agreed in so many things with the mediæval Mystics. The charge of gnosticism which, on account of his interpretation of the dogmas, appears to us to-day as the one lying nearest to hand, was, probably because people troubled themselves little about the Gnostics, not open at that time, but all the more open later. Whoever, finally, as regards that "intelligible act," recalls the doctrine of Origen, as well as individual expressions of Augustine, will hardly call it an unjustifiable assertion that the most essential standpoints of the Middle Ages resound in Kant's philosophy of religion precisely as do those of antiquity in his philosophy of nature. If one bears in mind that, Lessing excepted, none of the spokesmen of the eighteenth century saw in the theology of the Middle Ages anything else than puerilities, one can fathom the gulf that was put by this book between them and Kant. Hence the long-continued neglect of it. If, however, one puts together what was said at the end of the Transcendental Æsthetic (§ 298, 3), of the Transcendental Analytic (§ 299, 6), and in various places in the account of the practical philosophy (§ 304), and finally, in connection

with the *Critique of Judgment* (§ 301, 6), and what was just now said, even the above-made assertion is justified, namely, that Kant is, indeed, not the alpha and omega of the latest philosophy, but the epoch-making philosopher of it, because in him all its problems already have their solution. Whether and wherein these solutions remain incomplete, the further development of philosophy has to show. As by the discovery made by Anaxagoras the circle was described beyond which Attic philosophy did not pass, so Kant, who—if we may institute a comparison—took a step forward as great as (if not greater than) did Anaxagoras, the Sophists, and Socrates together, laid the foundation upon which, up to the present day, all have built.

B.—KANTIAN AND ANTI-KANTIAN.

§ 303.

THE RECEPTION OF CRITICISM

1. Although the Kantian philosophy might be expected to have, not less than the Wolffian (*vid.* what was said above, § 290, 9), a numerous following, yet this was a long time in coming. Scarcely any notice was taken of the *Dissertation*; much less was its epoch-making character suspected. One person, however, forms an exception here; naturally so, since he had appeared as respondent for it, and Kant had talked the contents of it over with him. This was the brilliant Marcus Herz, who in his *Reflections in Speculative Philosophy* (Königsberg, 1771) developed further Kant's views on time and space. Attention was directed to the *Dissertation* also by Mendelssohn, whose criticisms of it nevertheless show how little he had perceived its importance. The *Critique of Pure Reason* also appeared, and the best review of it (the Garve-Feder review) Kant could with justice characterize as one in which criticism had preceded investigation. Towards arousing the attention of the public, more was contributed than by Kant's own *Prolegomena* by the court-preacher Johann Schulze (1793–1805), in his *Explanations relating to Professor Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, and, later, by his *Examination of the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason* (2 vols., Königsberg,

1789-92), because he here distinctly showed that this new system was not dangerous to religion. Much greater services were rendered to the dissemination of the Kantian doctrines by K. L. Reinold, in the *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* which appeared in Wieland's *Deutscher Mercur* in the years 1786 and 1787, and were published separately later. In these it was for the first time shown that all oppositions that had hitherto divided philosophy were reconciled by this system and that the source of all disputes was cut off. It was of great consequence for the doctrine that the Jena *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, founded in the year 1785, and particularly Schütz and Hufeland, the two chief-editors, took a decided stand for the doctrine. Because of this, as also of the circumstance that Reinhold was professor there, and that, besides him, the very prolific writer CARL CHRISTIAN EHRHARD SCHMID (1761-1812) likewise taught in the spirit of Kant, Jena was, almost more than Königsberg itself, the principal seat, and, particularly, the seminary of Kantism. At the end of the nineties there was hardly a German university where the Kantian philosophy was not taught from a professorial chair, hardly any of the more important German towns in which there did not live writers of the Kantian school, and hardly a science that had not found application for Kantian ideas, even though it may have been that many of these applications consisted merely in bringing forward the Table of Categories, and were strongly suggestive of Lully's rotation method. A complete enumeration of the names of the most important Kantians in and out of Germany cannot be expected here. This may be found in my large work on the *Entwicklung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant* (2 vols., Leipsic, 1848-53), in § 14, 2.

2. OPPONENTS of a philosophy the founder of which says at the close of his chief work, "Hitherto all paths in philosophy have led to no goal; there remains, then, to those who find themselves in one of the paths hitherto trodden, only the new critical path," could not be wanting. All attacks upon Kant that proceed from an interest in particular questions, whether theoretical or practical, political or religious, may here be passed by. Only a momentary glance will be bestowed upon those which strike at the basis or the fundamental views of the system. The philosophy that ruled in Germany was, as has been shown (*vid.* § 294), the syncretistic popular philosophy,

having, on the one hand, a realistic, on the other an idealistic, colouring. Both must have divined that the new doctrine would threaten death to them. But of course each would condemn in it, not what was akin, but what was opposed, to itself. From the Göttingen circle came, as has frequently been said, the first more important review (in this class cannot be numbered that by Ewald published in the Gotha *Gelehrte Zeitung*) of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This review sees in the work pure Berkeleyianism. The leaders of this circle, Meiners and Feder, miss no opportunity to attack Kant. To the first, Kant is a sophist, because he professes to doubt sensible reality; to the second, an extreme idealist. Weisshaupt, who was trained by Feder, makes about the same objections as his earlier master. A man who stands in close relation with this circle is Tiedemann in Giessen, who, gradually coming to very sceptical views, combats the Kantian system as too dogmatic. Not widely different proves to be the verdict of Platner of Leipsic, although he proceeds with a certain diplomatic prudence. In direct opposition thereto, Eberhard, who belongs to the Berlin circle, asserts that Kant arrived at his divergences from the doctrine of Leibnitz with the assistance of Locke, who is therefore responsible for his errors. Mendelssohn, again, who belongs to the same circle, sees in Criticism only a revival of the scepticism of Hume, and hence, Kant is to him the universal iconoclast. A blunter view of the case is that of Nicolai, who, in romances professing to be witty, attacks the "*vonvornige*" (*a priori*) philosophy. The spirit of Mendelssohn and Nicolai had become the ruling one in the Berlin Academy, when the former was dead and the latter was not yet member of it. Thus in the year 1792, the prize-question on the Progress of Metaphysics was instituted by it, and repeated in 1795; for the answering of this, Schwab received the prize because he proved that metaphysics had remained wholly unshaken since the time of Wolff. (A treatise by Hülsen, which contained the remark that nothing such as the gentlemen called metaphysics really existed after 1781, and particularly after the Science of Knowledge, was generally regarded merely as pleasantry.) The same Schwab published, with a recommendation from Nicolai, *Nine Dialogues between Wolff and a Kantian* (1798), as well as *Eight Letters upon some Contraaictions and Inconsequences in Kant's latest Works* (1791). He was also one of the most active

contributors to Eberhard's philosophical journal, which had taken for its especial task the combating of Kant.

3. Neither wholly among the adherents, nor wholly among the opponents, of Kant, are to be counted those who adopt a multitude of ideas which were first set in circulation by him, but combine with them so much that Kant had combated that only more or less of one or another element decides where they are to be placed. Least of all, and yet to some extent, do Kantian ideas make their appearance in the kind and manner in which Ulrich of Jena develops, in his logical and ethical writings, his determinism, to which Kant opposed his "turn-spit"; more, however, in Professor Abel of Stuttgart, who antagonized Kant in a series of writings, but with weapons which he had taken from him. While Brastberger and Borträger attempt a reconciliation between Kant and the Enlightenment, ABICHT in Erlangen is usually numbered entirely among the Kantians, and has really close connection with them by his works: *Investigation of the Function of the Will* (1788), and *Metaphysics of Pleasure according to Kant* (1789), and by the fact that with Born, the translator of the *Critique of Pure Reason* into Latin, he edited the *New Philosophical Magazine for the Exposition of the Kantian System* (1789-91). But he did not stop there: Reinhold's attempt to be spoken of later, to preface Kant's *Critique* by an Elementary Philosophy as an introduction, found an imitator in Abicht, who also wrote such a work (1795), which, however, differed greatly from Reinhold's. Still more removed from Kant and Reinhold was he in his *Re-examining Critique of the Speculating Reason* (Altenberg 1799-1801), the title of which, even, betrays its positive, and, at the same time, negative, relation to Criticism. Finally are to be mentioned a couple of men who avowedly borrow much from Kant, but, since they learned to know him when they had already received philosophical incitement from other quarters, were incapable of occupying the position of mere pupils. As regards the sources of this incitement they form a kind of contrast one with the other, since the one received his impulse from Spinoza, and the other owes his entirely to the eighteenth century. The former is AUGUST WILHELM REHBURG (1757-1836), a man who was highly respected as a theoretical and practical statesman, whose political views, which were formed in part by J. Möser, were expounded in

his judgments upon the French Revolution, which appeared first in the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, then as a work proper. It touches at very many points the celebrated work of Burke. That it was particularly the study of Spinoza that furnished to him the theoretical basis for his anti-revolutionary views, appears from the earlier-written work, *On the Relation of Metaphysics to Religion* (1787), in which he explains that there is no other metaphysics than the Spinozistic, but defends this against the charge of being dangerous to religion. Wholly different is the position of CHRISTIAN JACOB KRAUS (1753–1807), who was Professor of Practical Philosophy and Cameralistics in Königsberg, and very highly esteemed by Kant. His treatise on *Pantheism*, composed at the suggestion of Jacobi, shows that he had zealously studied Spinozism, but with the individualistic view of his century tenaciously fixed in his conviction. There could not be expected of a pupil of Hume and Adam Smith an inclination towards that "Proteus," as it was the fashion for a long time after the appearance of Kraus's essay to term pantheism. Grateful recognition of Hume was it, also, that caused Kraus, who was in agreement with Kant in the theory of time and space and of transcendental freedom, to wish that scepticism might more fully receive its due in Kant's philosophy. Kraus's works, edited by H. von Auerswald (7 vols., 1808–1813), have for their eighth volume, a work entitled: *Voigt, a Biography of this Learned and Discreet Man* (1819).

4. More was contributed towards the spreading of Kantian Ideas by Germany's Sophocles, JOHANN CHRISTOPH FRIEDRICH SCHILLER (Nov. 10, 1759—May 9, 1805), than by any professed philosopher. The instruction of Abel in the Carlsschule, the ardour with which the youth studied the writings of Lessing and Garve, the enthusiasm with which Rousseau filled him, are the most important *momenta* in the development of Schiller's view of the world before his attention was turned to Kant. The Philosophical Letters of the year 1786 show, attractive as they are, a ferment that had not yet arrived at clarification, of pantheistic and sceptical opinions. That it was, at the very first, the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, and then (after 1791) the *Critique of Judgment*, that were for Schiller the entrance-gate into Criticism is readily comprehensible. But one underestimates Kant's influence upon Schiller and the capacity

of the latter for philosophical investigation, if one supposes that he had success only with Kant's *Æsthetics*. Through the encouragement given him by Körner and the assistance given him by Reinhold, but most of all through his own close reading of Kant's works, he identified himself, more perhaps than either of the men named, with the original Kantian stand-point. That the principal business of philosophers is analysis, that we can suppose the existence of an intuitive understanding only in a superhuman being, that philosophy has to limit itself to the deduction of the most universal laws of knowability, but has to discover empirically the particular to be subsumed under them—all this Schiller holds as firmly as Kant, and both, therefore, saw in the Science of Knowledge a mistake. To what Schiller otherwise says in the most various writings, on the distinction between realism and idealism, there arises no objection from the Kantian stand-point. Just as decidedly as in the transcendental philosophy does Schiller agree with Kant in respect to ethics; at least in what is essential, the unconditional—hence independent of an empirically given nature in man—validity of the moral law. This does not imply that the poet, for whom, as artist, the sensuous side of man has great importance, is somewhat doubtful as regards the rigorism of duty, which appears to lead to an ascetic, monkish morality. It appears from Kant's answer to him how highly Kant respected him, and how well Kant knew himself to be in agreement with him. In a political regard, also, must Schiller be placed with Kant in his equally strong opposition to anarchy and despotism; only, in the case of Schiller, there gradually makes its appearance an element that is usually wanting in the then corypheuses of literature, and which had left even him for a long time cold, viz., the national. It is not only the cosmopolitan, it is also the German, that expresses himself in Schiller's political views. Most of all, as was natural under the circumstances, was it the æsthetic doctrines of Kant that interested Schiller. His first teacher in æsthetics, Lessing, whose dictum that the representation of the beautiful is the sole end of art became the rock upon which the edifice of Schiller's *Æsthetics* continued to stand, had founded upon Aristotle. Schiller first came to know Aristotle's *Poetics* after he had formed for himself an æsthetics under the guidance of Kant, and is surprised to find in it the confirmation of his own theories. At first, Schiller

had hoped to find in Kant the conception of the beautiful objectively defined. Gradually, what were precisely the cardinal points of Kant's Critique of *Æsthetical Judgment*, viz., that there is no objectively demonstrable principle for the beautiful, hence no science of the same, but that criticism and analysis have discovered only the subjective conditions under which a thing pleases as beautiful; that *æsthetic* pleasure is independent of the matter and the existence of the object, and relates solely to its form and its appearance; that that is beautiful which calls forth a free play or a harmonious relation of the powers of representation and hence makes us feel subjective conformity to end, etc.,—won Schiller's assent. The fruits of the reflections that were aroused by Kant are laid down in the *Æsthetical Essays*, among which are particularly to be mentioned: *On the Ground of Pleasure in Tragical Subjects* (1792): *On the Art of Tragedy* (1792): *On Grace and Dignity* (1793): *On the Pathetic* (1793): *On the *Æsthetic* Education of Man* (1795): *On the Necessary Limits in the Use of Beautiful Forms* (1795): *On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry* (1796). He shows in these works how *æsthetic* feeling brings into harmonious accord the form-giving reason and the matter-receiving sense-faculty, and puts the mind in a state of quiet reflection, since what is perceived (the beautiful) produces by the form of its appearance an active play of the imagination. Differing from Kant, who supposes the feeling of the beautiful to be produced only where the dependent, conditioned beauty (of the human form) does not supervene (upon the tone or colour composition), Schiller considers man as the proper ideal, and passes from the grace and dignity to be distinguished in him to the distinction between beauty and sublimity. That the sublime should particularly interest him, who was almost exclusively a tragic poet, lies in the nature of the case. It was so particularly at first, when the beautiful was to him an intimation of the true and good, art a means to these, and subordinated to morals. How this subordination prepared the way for co-ordination and finally for super-ordination, and how he had "poetized himself into philosophy, and again philosophized himself back into poetry," has been very ingeniously shown, step by step, by Kuno Fischer in the work mentioned below. It is clear that here Kant has been transcended. It is wholly peculiar to Schiller that he weighed exactly the importance of the feeling of the beautiful and of art for the development of humanity as

a whole, a point which Kant had hardly touched. The one-sided and fragmentary culture which is a consequence of the wholly necessary modern division of labour demands a restoration of complete and perfect humanity. This, art secures, because, as a joyous recreation, it offsets and supplements hard disintegrating labour, and, as it carries the sense-nature of man back to form and thought, so it carries his spiritual nature back to matter and sense; whereby, indeed, the known truth and willed goodness are invested with the ornament of beauty. Thus he can call the poet the true man, or even say, Man is man only when he plays. Of the very greatest importance for the development of æsthetics is it that Schiller first formulated under the names *naïve* and *sentimental* the great distinction which, now as the distinction between the classic and the romantic, now as that between the simple and the reflective, now that between the ancient and the modern, has played so great a rôle in this science; and thereby, at the same time, indicated the goal, an art-ideal "in which the objective realism and the plastic sense for form of antiquity should be united with the subjective idealism and the wealth of thought of modern times."

Kuno Fischer: *Schiller als Philosoph*. Frankf. a. M. 1858. Tomascheck: *Schiller in seinem Verhältniss zur Wissenschaft*. Wien, 1862. Karl Twisten: *Schiller in seinem Verhältniss zur Wissenschaft*. Berlin, 1863.

5. Considering how long it was before the *Critique of Pure Reason* found recognition in Germany, its recognition in other countries may be called sudden. Already in the year 1796 the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung* noticed with great pleasure certain *Dutch* works on Criticism, which were soon followed by others. The names: van Hemert, van Bosch, Chandois, Cras, Heumann, Servaas and Kinker are very important in connection with the spread of Kantism. An essay of the last-named on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was very soon translated into French, and was the occasion of the fact that in *France* already in the year 1801 the highest scientific authority, the Academy, expressed itself concerning Kant. Through the mouth of Destutt de Tracy (*vid.* § 286, 4) it expressed itself adversely, of course. In sharp contrast stands what Villers expressed in his *Philosophie de Kant*, published in the year 1801; so also a verdict given in the following year by Hühne (Wronsky). Both, however,

remained for the most part unnoticed, as appears from Degerando's verdict. No book so smoothed the way for the understanding of the Kantian Philosophy in France as the well-known work of Madame de Staël. But for this, Victor Cousin's *Lectures on the Kantian Philosophy* (1820) would hardly have received such approbation that they could be printed twenty years later. Rémusat also holds an honourable place among the expositors of the Kantian theory, and among the translators of Kant's works Kératry, Tissot, Weyland, Jouffroy, Trullard, Kortet, Barni have made themselves well-known. Men began to occupy themselves with Kant in *England* even earlier than in France. Nitsch and Willich apprised the English public in the years 1796 and 1798 of the great revolution in the sphere of philosophy. Then the works of Beck (*vid.* § 308, 7 ff.) early found translators. And then the representatives of the Scotch School (*vid.* § 292, 4 ff.), and, after them, Englishmen also, began to perceive that German speculation could be no longer ignored; and how little they have done this is shown by Edward Caird's *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant* (Glasgow, 1877), which may here be mentioned in lieu of a long list of works the absence of which it amply compensates for.

§ 304.

THE FAITH-PHILOSOPHY.

1. Attacks made from a standpoint that had become questionable even to one occupying it (Lessing) could not possibly shake a system that stood so high above it. However much those who made the attacks might exclaim against arrogance, when they had brought upon themselves the necessity of hearing repeatedly from the Kantians that they had not understood Kant, the latter could hardly say otherwise than, If a philosophy obviates the opposition between realism and idealism, pantheism and individualism, naturalism and theosophy by the fact that it reflects upon them (by becoming transcendental), and of course no longer says, as do those involved in this opposition, *It is so or so*, but *So and so* I must *view* it; and must nevertheless allow itself to be reproached with having denied that it is so, hence with having asserted

that it *is* otherwise, its adherents are in the right if they call this a fighting with windmills, a want of judgment, a misapprehension. Only the attacks of those are worth notice who, like the transcendental philosophers, have abandoned that lower region and have made objections not based upon presuppositions which the transcendental philosopher denies, but upon presuppositions which he himself makes. But precisely this is the position of the three younger contemporaries of Kant, who, personally in close relation with each other, not only agree in what they charge against Kant as an inconsistency, but also in making the word *faith* their battle-cry. Although the meaning of this term is different with each, yet they are properly placed under the common designation *Faith-Philosophers*. The circumstance that what they censure in Kant is precisely the point with the correction of which the further development of Criticism is linked, alone suffices, even though it cannot be demonstrated that their charges occasion this improvement, to refute those who include the Faith-Philosophers in the pre-Kantian period.

2. We name here, first, JOHANN GEORG HAMANN, a fellow-countryman and a valued acquaintance of Kant, who was born in Königsberg on the 27th of August, 1730, and, after a life of very great inner restlessness, died, while on a journey in Westphalia, on the 21st of June, 1788, as emerited superintendent of the Königsberg warehouse. His works, first collected by F. Roth, appeared in Berlin (8 vols., 1821-42). His autobiography, and the letters contained therein, as well, are indispensable to the understanding of the many allusions in his thoughtful but singular works. So hostile was he to all abstractions that lead the disjunctive understanding to the utterance merely of half-truths, that he often proclaimed as his maxim the *principium coincidentiæ oppositorum*, and, just for that reason, scoffs at the Enlightenment, that *aurora borealis* of the eighteenth century, which wrongly separated the divine and the human; and he is in agreement with Kant in this, that neither the materialism of the French nor the rationalism of the Germans satisfies him. But Kant, because of his "two stems" of the faculty of knowledge, appears to him to be held fast in that reprehended separation [of the divine and the human]; the mere fact of language, in which reason acquires sensible existence, seems to him to refute this two-stemmedness. Verbalism, he says, unites

idealism and realism. If in the uniting of opposites Hamann has a place by the side of Kant, often indeed surpassing him in this respect, he falls behind Kant by the fact that this union is with him something merely subjective. Hence his repugnance to all demonstration; hence his eulogies of Hume, as having put in the place of knowledge the subjective certainty of faith. That, he regards as a greater merit than his investigations relating to the conception of causality. Both, his delight in reconciled contradiction and the subjectivism in his thought, are united in the most natural way, in that Hamann was more and more immersed in those religious doctrines which because of their concrete character, are an abomination to the disjunctive understanding and, because of his own inner experience, are certain to the believer. Hence the atonement, in which "apotheosis" is conditioned by the "descent-into-hell of self-knowledge," or, what is the same thing, only objectively expressed, the God-man, being the Word become flesh, solves all contradictions. Just so as regards the triune God, who is one and many. Without these "mysteries" Christianity is to him not conceivable. An attempt, however, to *prove* these, instead of inwardly experiencing them and living them, appears to him just as foolish as the attempt to deny them. Since with Hamann the two, the subjective certainty and the concrete dogma uniting the members of the opposition, are inseparable, he is (for that reason) as far removed from conceiving faith as mere sincerity of conviction as from converting it into letter-service. We may call him the theosophist, or the mystic, among the Faith-Philosophers.

Cf. C. H. Gildemeister: *Joh. Georg Hamann's, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften*. 6 vols. Gotha, 1858-74. The same: *Hamann-Studien*. Gotha, 1873.

3. Contraposed to him as his complementary counterpart is JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER, the naturalist among the Faith-Philosophers (born August 25th, 1744, in Mohrungen in East Prussia, died as Superintendent-General in Weimar, on the 18th of December, 1803). In his Complete Works, which were published in Tübingen by Cotta, his philosophical writings fill fifteen volumes. (These alone, as also Herder's influence only upon philosophy, are here considered; his much greater importance for literature and for theology are disregarded. The first of these has been admirably brought

out by Hettner). Inducted into philosophy by Kant, who had not yet made his great discoveries, but stimulated much less by Kant than by Hamann, with whom he always remained in close association, he sees, as does Hamann, in language, with which reason first awakes, a proof that the separation of sense and thought is, *a posteriori* and *a priori*, an abstraction, and that, just for that reason, there is no pure thought, but all certainty rests upon inner knowledge, experience, faith. For that reason also there is need, not of a critique of the faculty of knowledge, but of a philosophy of the same, which always rests upon language and consists in a deduction of the forms of language and thought. But this coincidence with Hamann relates only to the form and manner of attaining certainty. As regards that of which they both are certain, there exists a great difference, even an opposition. The content of Hamann's faith consists in the inwardly experienced divine secrets; that of Herder's experiences, in the ideas with which his finely-discriminating and enthusiastic study of nature supplies him. Even in that which they both magnify with almost idolatrous admiration, namely, language, Herder makes so prominent the natural or purely human origin—the fact, that is to say, that man has to discover language—that Hamann, who otherwise, nevertheless, asserts that the truly human is also divine, returns to the “higher” (Süssmihl's) hypothesis. Nowhere does this accentuation of the natural element appear so plainly as in what, philosophically considered, is Herder's most important work, *Ideas for the Philosophy of History*. To comprehend man, the microcosm, he begins with the universe, and attempts to show how the central position of the planet on which man dwells and its constitution condition the mode of human thought and feeling. Whereas the ape attains only to an essayed perfection, to imitation, man, endowed, by virtue of his erect position, with tools of action, is destined for finer thought, for art and language, in short, for what, since Herder, has been designated as humanity. That the history of man is a great nature-process, or rather that history and nature are ruled by the same law—that is the leading thought in this work, since which there has first existed a philosophical treatment of history. This thought is so opposed to the Kantian standpoint, that even apart from all additional, personal grounds, Kant and Herder would have become alienated, through their

modes of treating nature. Just so, however much one may be pained at the way in which Herder, in his *Metacritique* and *Calligone*, antagonizes Kant, one is obliged to confess that Herder's enthusiasm for nature must have brought him to regard much of what Kant says of æsthetic pleasure as error, quite apart from the fact that he confounded with this theory transcendental investigations regarding the possibility of a theory of the beautiful. That in this accentuation of the natural element Herder occupies himself, with especial predilection, with man in closer proximity to his natural condition, lies in the nature of the case. Hence his enthusiasm for the conditions of humanity and of peoples in their childhood, for Orientalism and Classicism, for folk-songs, etc. Conversely, it is conceivable that he is wholly incapable of appreciating the stages of humanity where it is opposed to the natural. His treatment, particularly of the Middle Ages, frequently of entire Christendom, is extremely harsh; and one might be astonished to hear the finely-sensitive, intellectual companion of Winckelmann and Lessing speak of the Crusades as Herder does, if one did not consider that the spirit that was described (§ 119) as non-worldly must have been repugnant to the man who was nature-intoxicated and world-intoxicated. (Obviously, that Herder was a preacher is a part of the same irony of fate as that Hamann held office as superintendent of a warehouse. But the former did not, as did the latter, bear that irony with humour, but very often with feelings of bitterness.) As regards the frequently-mentioned relation between the view of antiquity and that of Spinoza, one need not wonder if one finds Herder bringing forward in his work, *God*, which contains his philosophy of religion, a peculiarly modified Spinozism, in which, in spite of all his protests against the expression, God is, in reality, assigned the position of a world-soul. It is an attempt—which his intercourse with Goethe could only make more natural—to infuse into Spinozism a more vital view of nature. That Herder's *Ideas* were largely employed by the later philosophy of nature is as easy to understand as that supranaturalism should be drawn from Hamann. We mentioned above Hamann's *principium coincidentiæ oppositorum*. He himself says that he borrowed it from Giordano Bruno. Had he known the source from which the latter drew it, Nicolaus of Cusa (§ 224, 2), he would have called him his authority and

not the other, who in throwing out the idea of the God-man (*vid.* § 247, 4), to Hamann so indispensable, borders so closely upon Spinoza, whom Hamann condemns as "murderer and street-robber of sound reason and science." Herder, whose attention, we may take it for granted, was first drawn to Giordano Bruno by Hamann, can, as having himself an enthusiasm for Spinoza, much more readily respect the intellectual companion of Spinoza as his predecessor, than could Hamann. But with the same positiveness that we can assert that the Cusan had pleased Hamann we can declare that he had disgusted Herder.

Cf. Maria Caroline v. Herder *Erinnerungen aus dem Leben Joh. Gottfr. von Herder's.* 2 vols., 1853 (vols. 39 and 40 of the Historical Works).

4. That the seeds sown by Hamann should not only, as he himself says, bloom in Herder, but also bear the fruits missed by him, there was required a man who united in himself the ideas of the Mystics and the Pantheists, and in doing so did not, as did Hamann, in the name of positive Christian religion, nor, as did Herder, in the name of mistreated Nature and Art, protest against Criticism, but set philosophy against philosophy. This was done by "the pantheist in head and mystic in heart,"—as the one who stood nearest to him (Wizenmann) was in the habit of characterizing him,—FRIEDRICH HEINRICH JACOBI (born on the 25th of January, 1743, in Düsseldorf, died as pensioned President of the Academy at Munich on the 10th of March, 1819). His works, the collection of which he himself had begun, were published in Leipsic, by Gerh. Fleischer (1812–1825) in six volumes, the fourth of which is divided into two parts. In Geneva, where he went for his education, he was first turned to philosophy by Le Sage, who was an adherent of the atomistic physics. There he was occupied at first only with English and French writings. He knew Bonnet almost by heart, and the writings of Rousseau, naturally very celebrated in Geneva, were read with eagerness. With this fact there later connected itself very naturally his interest in the Scotch School. Having returned to Germany, and living in favourable circumstances, he devoted all his leisure time to advancing himself in science by conversation, correspondence, and reading. No movement remained unnoticed by him. Among others, Kant, by his writings on evidence and on the ontological proof for the

existence of God, gave the first impulse to a more profound study of Spinoza. The revolution wrought by Kant found in him a very attentive observer. Earlier than any other, he directed attention to the not fortunate changes that Kant had undertaken in the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, and gave warning against ignoring the first, more consistent, edition. (The counsel remained unfollowed, was indeed so fully forgotten, that, forty years later, when Schopenhauer repeated it, all the world supposed that it was given for the first time.) When in the year 1785 he published the correspondence carried on with Mendelssohn regarding Lessing's Spinozism, from which it appeared that the man who had hitherto been known only as a psychological romance-writer and an author of brief essays was the most profound of the students of Spinoza at that time, and a noteworthy philosophical thinker, he already occupied the stand-point, which, changes in terminology left out of account, he always held. This, as he himself always recognised, touches Kant's at many points. His maxim, borrowed from Pascal, that the understanding refutes dogmatism, and nature scepticism, pleased Kant, who had refuted both; likewise the fact that Jacobi is unsatisfied both with the realistic doctrines that originated with Locke, and the idealistic doctrines derived from Leibnitz, although he had not agreed with Jacobi in terming them atheistic; Jacobi asserts further that he can appeal to Kant, when he gives as the reason why those two theories are untenable, that it is common to both that they attempt to demonstrate the truth. But since to demonstrate something means only to show it to be conditioned (by a ground), it is impossible to demonstrate the unconditioned, so that Kant is fully justified in limiting knowledge to the sphere of the relative, finite, phenomena. If one calls the unconditioned, God, one must say that demonstration converts God into a finite nature, *i.e.*, denies Him as God, so that it may be called an interest of demonstrative science that there be no God. A striking example of the correctness of this position is Spinozism, this unexcelled masterpiece of demonstrative science. Kant's argument concerns all other cases as well as the last, and cannot do otherwise, for the principle of the ground upon which all demonstration rests is in reality the same as the principle *totum parte prius est*, of which one may be easily convinced by reflecting upon mathematical demonstrations; but this principle can lead to nothing else than to the whole

of the world, not to a prætermundane cause, or a living God. We must, therefore, concede Kant to be right in holding that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated, that God cannot be known, for a demonstrated God is no God.

5. In the limitation of knowledge to the sphere of the finite or conditioned, Jacobi declares himself to be in perfect agreement with Kant. But in another point he admits that there is agreement only in expression. The faith, that is to say, for which Kant makes room by limiting knowledge, and which Jacobi, after the example of Wizenmann, would call, instead of the faith of reason, rather, the faith of need, is by no means the same that Jacobi has in mind when he says that all certainty regarding that which demonstration cannot attain to rests upon faith. In avowed agreement with Hume and Reid, he understands by this that kind of assumption which is wholly independent of practical need, purely theoretical, but without demonstrable grounds. Its content is, accordingly, there-being, existence, sensible as well as supersensible. That my body, or that God, exists, I cannot prove; they are immediately certain to me, or I believe them. (What is *verbatim* the same thing may be read in Hamann's *Socratic Memorabilia*.) Since every demonstration is an act of self-creation, the faith that is opposed to this has the character of an act of reception, hence Jacobi's expressions, that existence is revealed to us, that we get it through a miraculous operation, etc.; which made the difference between this faith and that which the orthodox call so, to many so nearly imperceptible that Mendelssohn, for example, appears to have once supposed that Jacobi wished, as did Lavater earlier, to convert him. Even persons having closer relationship with Jacobi, with justice censured these expressions borrowed from religion. Instead of *faith* Jacobi would willingly say *inner life* or *inner experience*, later, very often, *feeling*, frequently *sensation* or *sense*; usually, however, in the latest period of his life, *reason* (so in what he last wrote, the Introduction to his philosophical works), whereby he, as did Herder earlier, laid weight upon the fact that *Vernunft* (reason) comes from *vernehmen* (to perceive, know). Whereas, therefore, sense and reason were formerly opposed, later the opposition has been between sense and understanding, and reason stands on the same side with sense, from which it is distinguished in such a manner that it perceives supersensible objectivity, as eye or ear does sensible

existence. By means of both there is *perception, i.e.*, existence is not made but is known by a receptive act. In the certainty of existence the certainty of the I and that of the Thou are so immediately one that both the one-sidedness of realism and that of idealism are out of the question. (Sensible perception has its origin where soul borders upon nature, and supersensible perception where it borders upon the supernatural.) From this one root all knowledge springs, and that duality of knowledge-stems which Kant inconsistently assumes, and the unity of which Hamann and Herder had already shown by reference to language, must be given up. This dualism is, according to Jacobi, the reason why Kant, who, as the first problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows, had, properly speaking, to come to pure idealism in which assumed things have no place, assumed, with an inconsistency that perhaps does honour to the man but not to the philosopher, existence external to the Ego. If one adopts the stand-point of the two stems of knowledge, the only consistent position remaining is the materialistic idealism of Spinoza, or the idealistic materialism of Fichte. And again, if one is serious in asserting that faith has to do only with the postulates of the practical reason, one must go further and put the moral order of the world in the place of God, and then Kant is only the John the Baptist of speculation, and Fichte its Messiah. Of a quite different nature is true philosophy, which, of course, does not aim to be demonstrative science and speculation. It is certainty of the existence of things, hence not idealism; of God, hence not atheism; it is, in general, knowledge of fact, and is, just for that reason, opposed to speculation, which has for its object not only the *that* but the *how* and *why*, and proves (*beweist*), whereas philosophy is merely a showing (*weisen*); so that the knowledge of reason may be termed an inspiration, to which the knowledge of the understanding is related merely as a token and sign.

6. Thus far Hamann and Herder could pronounce themselves in agreement with most of the principles of Jacobi; for with them, also, faith had been subjective certainty without demonstrative grounds. But as regards the content of faith, Jacobi is evidently in agreement with neither the God-intoxicated Hamann, nor the world-intoxicated Herder, but this "self-tormentor," as Hamann would fain have called him, who was always rummaging in his inner consciousness, was never able wholly to get outside of himself; so that he said of him-

self that he never understood the view of another, and his opponents said that he falsified it wherever he would explain it, and landed in mere self-explanation, which, indeed, he had given as his goal.

Jacobi is interested, not, like Hamann, in the facts of the kingdom of God, nor, like Herder, in the facts of the natural world, but in the facts of consciousness. If we hold fast what was said in the introduction to modern philosophy (§ 259) and combine with that what was just now remarked concerning the opposition between Herder and Hamann, we shall not necessarily term it a trivial remark if we say, that Herder and Hamann represent the ancient and mediæval element in the Faith-Philosophy, and Jacobi the modern. Herein lies one of the many reasons why only in the form which Jacobi gave to it could the Faith-Philosophy become the creed of a school. The individualism which is peculiar to Jacobi's standpoint, which displays itself so visibly in the manner of his philosophizing and in the style of his writings (letters, personal confessions, dialogues, exclamations, etc.), which makes it clear, among other things, why none of the post-Kantian systems was so offensive to him as the System of Identity; why he was so stirred up when Wieland defended Hobbes' principles, etc., must make it impossible for him to feel friendly towards the Kantian categorical imperative. As in his *Woldemar* he had claimed for the heart the immunities and licenses of high poetry, for which the grammar of virtue has no rules, so in his *Letter to Fichte* he claimed the *jus aggratiandi* as against the letter of the law, in that so frequently quoted passage: "*Ja, ich will lügen wie Desdemona sterbend log,*" etc. (Yes, I will lie as did Desdemona dying, etc.), because it is a prerogative of man that the law should exist for his sake and not *vice versa*. For himself there is no contradiction if, in spite of that, he closes his romance with the moral, Woe to him who trusts to his heart, or if he shudders at the idea that a Berlin student (probably a pupil of de Wette) finds in the heart pardon for transgression. The subjectivity to which he ascribed sovereignty is by no means an empty subjectivity, but one filled with an ample content, so that his standpoint has been well called that of superior personality. For that reason it has not been unjustly asserted that his two romances develop the theme of his philosophizing, the absolute justification of moral individuality,

better, almost, than all his other works. The subjectivism of Jacobi shows itself in the religious sphere similarly as in the ethical. His work on *Divine Things and their Revelation*, in which he condemns the System of Identity because of its pantheism, and which called out the merciless reply of Schelling, teaches nothing of divine things, speaks merely of their becoming revealed, so that, just as with Rousseau, instead of the theory of God, there is given a theory of piety, theology is supplanted by a pisteology. Hence his insistence that we only know *that* but not at all *what* God is. All definitions of the nature of the Divine Being are to him anthropomorphisms. To a "religious materialist" like Claudius, who speaks of the historical Christ, he opposes, if not indeed as his own, yet as a standpoint which lies nearer to it than the other, religious idealism, which knows no other Christ than that which a divine nature in us becomes, and is far from all idolatry bound up in one man. It is no wonder that the theology of feeling, which later inclined towards orthodoxy, as well as the rationalistic "sincerity of conviction," appealed to Jacobi. Since he constantly repeats that it is only the being, not the nature, of the object of belief that constitutes the content of faith, it is comprehensible why, also, he prefers most of all to call God being; since, further, his standpoint emphasizes immediacy as opposed to mediacy, it is comprehensible why he antagonizes all who assume mediation in God. Against the defenders of the trinity, he advances the unity, of God; against those who conceive God as a process, His completed perfection; and in this he unceasingly celebrates, with Rousseau, the unknown God. It is, properly speaking, an inconsistency when Jacobi attributes to God the predicate of personality. He is led to do this by the fact that, whereas demonstrative knowledge rests upon the principle of the ground and hence knows only timeless mathematical dependence, he assigns to faith the category of cause and temporal succession (a reminiscence of Hume), and accordingly opposes to the ground of the world (the world-whole) the cause of the world or the, not extramundane, but prætermundane Godhead. Of course when Schelling, in earnest with the personality of God, ascribes to Him what is a condition of personality, a sub-personality which is to be subordinated, Jacobi declares himself against such natural history of the Absolute.

Cf. Eberh. Zierngiebl: *Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Leben, Dichten und Denken*. Vienna, 1867.

7. In closest connection with Jacobi stood his early deceased friend Thomas Wizenmann, on whom Al. von der Goltz has written an extended monograph (*Mittheilungen aus dessen Briefwechsel und literarischem Nachlass*. Gotha, 1859, 2 vols.). Under the *nom de plume* "Volunteer" ["*Freiwillige*"] Wizenmann published a work entitled: *Results of the Philosophy of Jacobi and Mendelssohn Critically Examined*; later (1787) also a *Letter to Kant*, because the latter had expressed himself in Mendelssohn's favour more than was proper. Further, a work by Johann Neeb (1767–1843) credits Jacobi wholly with the views contained in it. Neeb was later, however, further removed from Jacobi than Friedrich Köppen (1775–1858), who is to be regarded as the proper representative of the school of Jacobi, whose doctrines he develops particularly in his *Exposition of the Nature of Philosophy* (Nürnberg, 1810), and has defended in many polemical writings. Cajetan von Weiller (1762–1826) and Jacob Salat (born 1766) employed Jacobi's ideas, particularly in efforts towards religious enlightenment within the Catholic church, and both were very prolific writers, the first being, in this regard, of greater depth. Like von Weiller and Salat in Bavaria, only with greater success, worked Leopold Rembold (1787–1844) in Austria, so long as the academical chair was not forbidden him; so, further, the Bohemian, Anton Müller (1792–1843), and the pupils of Rembold, viz., J. N. Jäger and R. Joh. Lichtenfels (1795–1860), who both extended the philosophy of Jacobi from Vienna to the professorial chairs of Austria, as, later, was done with that of Herbart. In both cases the clergy believed it could tolerate a philosophy that declared the knowledge of the Divine Being to be impossible. In a still freer relation towards Jacobi stood Jean Pierre Frédéric Ancillon (born in 1767, died, while Prussian minister, in 1837), whose writings on public law are not to be mentioned here, but only the *Faith and Knowledge in Philosophy* (Berlin, 1824), and *For the Reconciliation of Extremes in Opinion* (2 vols., 1828–31). Related views, confined, however, to the sphere of æsthetics and religion, were developed by Chr. Aug. Hein. Clodius, professor in Leipsic (1772–1836). His *Sketch of a System of Poetics* (2 vols., Leips., 1804); *Outline of the Universal Theory of Religion* (Leips., 1808); and his work *On God in Nature, in the History of Man, and in Consciousness* (4 vols., Leips., 1818–22) are here to be named. His poetical works do not belong here.

C.—THE SEMI-KANTIANs.

§ 305.

I. So long as the doctrines of Kant are defended, as was indicated above, by charging its opponents with not understanding or with misunderstanding it, and by saying again what had once been said, as, for example, Kant says again, in part better, in the *Prolegomena* what had been said in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the theory preserves, of course, its original purity. It is otherwise where the objections of opponents are actually entered into, since, also here, there is not wanting what has never been wanting, and what was pointed out in connection with the Eleatics (*vid.* § 37): one of the opposing sides in dispute becomes infected with the stand-point of the other. If, now, this latter occupies a lower level than the one defended, it happens as it did with Melissus,—there is a letting down, as in the present case; for it is not to be denied that Kant, in attempting to come to an agreement with the realistic popular philosophy that had been triumphed over by his system, weakened (apparently at least) his idealism. It is otherwise where the stand-point of the opponent is a higher one. Here the putting one's self on a level with it is an advance, as the example of Zeno shows. All three of the antagonists of the Kantian stand-point mentioned in the foregoing sections—the syncretistic popular philosophy tinged with realism, particularly as represented at the last by the Göttingen school—the Wolffian philosophy become popular philosophy, as represented by Nicolai, Eberhard and their intellectual kinsmen—finally the Faith-Philosophy, particularly in the form which it had received at the hands of Jacobi, were the occasion of Kantism's being adulterated with other elements, and of the appearance of those peculiar phenomena which H. Ritter was the first to designate by the excellent name of *Semi-Kantian*. Quite apart from the subjective endowments of the men, their performances will stand in unequal rank always according to the various problems which they propose to themselves. To introduce elements of the realistic or the idealistic popular philosophy into Criticism, which has already taken them up into itself sufficiently, does not mean to enrich it. But if the Faith-Philosophy, which stood upon a level with it, in much, indeed, transcended it, be introduced, something of value for

it may be derived therefrom. It is for this reason that Fries stands so high above Bouterwek and Krug, and he was the only one who put forth a theory and founded a school, both of which had a lasting influence.

2. FRIEDRICH BOUTERWEK, born on April 15th, 1766, educated at Göttingen as a jurist and *littérateur*, began in the year 1791 to give lectures in that place upon the Kantian philosophy, to which his first writings (*Aphorisms*, 1793; *Paulus Septimius*, 2 Parts, 1795) acknowledge adherence in essential regards. He first diverged from Kant in practical philosophy, where he missed a material moral principle; which is, of course, equivalent to renouncing Kant. But he soon showed in the theoretical philosophy, also, that Göttingen was not the soil in which idealism could thrive. The noise made about realism in his nearest vicinity; Schulze's *Ænesidemus* and other sceptical writings; the reckless advance, moreover, of Fichte upon the idealistic path, impelled him to look about everywhere for defence against idealism. Jacobi's writings directed his attention to Spinoza, and his *Abridgment of Academical Lectures* (1799), particularly his chief work, *Idea of an Apodictic* (2 vols., Halle, 1799), contained the attempt, later declared by him to be a failure, to perfect Criticism by the introduction of realistic elements. Later he united himself more and more with Jacobi. But the writings that he published in this later period have, with the exception of his *Philosophy of Religion* (1824), not found much consideration—his purely philosophical works, that is to say. On the contrary, his *Æsthetics* (2 Parts, Leipsic, 1806) has often been reprinted, and his twelve-volume *History of Poetry and Oratory* (1801–1819) has been highly praised. The *Æsthetics* occupies a more empirical standpoint. He does not please so much where he treats the subject philosophically, as in his *Metaphysics of the Beautiful* (1807). He died on the 8th of August, 1828, as a professor in Göttingen. The *Apodictic*, so called because it inquires after the ultimate demonstratively certain ground of all knowledge, undertakes to be a self-explanation of Criticism. Criticism needs such a thing, he maintains, because, though Kant pointed out the distinction between thought and knowledge, he repeatedly forgot it and put mere thought in place of knowledge. If, now, one separates the two, and considers first mere thought (Logical Apodictic), it is discovered that thought with its demonstrations

guarantees at most only the necessity of being thought, but never proves being, or objectivity, hence not certainty. The critique of thought, therefore, or logical apodictic, conducts to logical Pyrrhonism. Likewise the Transcendental Apodictic, the second part of the system, conducts to Spinozism. It is evident, that is to say, that for knowledge there is requisite the immediate, indemonstrable certainty of a being or absolute somewhat, a real principle (which Kant, also, smuggled in in his undeduced things-in-themselves), in which there lies no manifoldness (hence even Kant never proves that there are things-in-themselves); the *omne esse*, therefore, of Spinoza. But the Apodictic, in its third (practical) part, gets beyond logical Pyrrhonism and transcendental Spinozism. The experience, that is to say, of one's own self-activity and of the opposition it encounters proves that there is, in us and without us, a living force, a virtuality; hence refutes Pyrrhonism. Likewise, since ethical action is not conceivable without individuality, and this not without a plurality of individuals, Spinozism is refuted; and Practical Apodictic has to show how we come to posit many bodies offering resistance, and, among them, such as we have to regard as men. In connection with this last question the canon is laid down: A rational answer to a rational question is a guarantee of a rational nature; and hence so great stress is laid upon language. Bouterwek himself has proposed as the most suitable name for his theory "*Absolute Virtualism*," and against this there is nothing to say. Since the philosophy the first influences of which Bouterwek received, and from the effects of which he never wholly freed himself, was a syncretism composed of very different elements, it is comprehensible that he should add to his own doctrine this and that feature of every new doctrine that became known to him. Hence it may be true that many of his ideas were borrowed from Schelling, although any one who starts with Kant and studies Spinoza, in order to find means of defence against Fichte could, even without borrowing, arrive at points of contact with him. But it is clear that by this fusion of Kant's doctrines with the syncretism which Kant had left behind him, content and strict form in system must suffer.

3. The latter is not the case with the *Transcendental Synthetism* of Krug, because the form of the popular philosophy with which he adulterated Criticism had been in its origin a strictly reasoned system. Hence, here, the neat appearance,

affording a synoptical view by reason of the dichotomous division, and given a learned air by reason of its Greek terminology. WILHELM TRAUOGOTT KRUG, born on the 22nd of January, 1770, in Radis, near Wittenberg, studied theology after 1788 in Wittenberg under Reinhard, and (Wolffian) philosophy under Jehnichen. After he had heard Reinhold for a short time in Jena, he published in Göttingen his *Letters on the Perfectibility of Revealed Religion* (1795), which, it is true, appeared anonymously, but made his name known. Already in Wittenberg he began his over-prolific literary activity, which he continued as professor in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, then (after 1805) in Königsberg, finally (after 1809) in Leipsic, until his death (on Jan. 13th, 1842). Besides larger works, he wrote a great number of *brochures* in the spirit of religious and political Liberalism, and, moreover, had a variety of learned disputes. The *Outline of a New Organon of Philosophy* (Meissen, 1801) contains the programme of his subsequent activity, to which he also strictly held himself. What is developed very much at length in: *The Fundamental Philosophy* (1803), *The System of Theoretical Philosophy* (3 vols., 1806-10), *The System of Practical Philosophy* (3 vols., 1817-19), all of which have often been reprinted, is all to be found in a much more concise and hence better form in his *Handbook of Philosophy* (2 vols., 1820), which has often been reprinted. The *Universal Handbook of the Philosophical Sciences* (5 vols., 1827 ff.) has likewise often been reprinted, just as many of his works have been translated into foreign languages.—Since philosophizing is, according to Krug, nothing other than, by an act of introversion, coming to understand one's self and arriving at peace with one's self, the first question that must be asked in a philosophical Problematic and answered in the philosophical Apodictic is, What are the real bases of all knowing? Krug finds these in the immediately certain facts of consciousness, which the healthy human understanding feels, but which the philosophizing reason does not so much deduce *out of* a single fundamental fact (as Reinhold and Fichte would have it) as reduce *to one*. This fundamental fact may be thus formulated: I am active and seek absolute harmony in all my activity. On this formula, therefore, we should base the highest principle of all philosophy. Since in every definite consciousness there is given a synthesis of being and know-

ledge, but this has for its presupposition that being and knowledge are originally (*a priori*) united in us, all empirical syntheses (facts of consciousness) point to an original fact of transcendental synthesis which, because it is the original synthesis, cannot be genetically explained nor comprehended. This transcendental synthesis which occurs in the Ego (Kant would have said, "Through which the Ego becomes") contains, as reflection upon it shows, the fact that reality is allowed to the Ego as well as to the opposite of it, hence the two one-sided views: realism leading to materialism, and idealism leading to nihilism,—one-sided views which the transcendental synthetism, which is perhaps not Kantism, but certainly is the true Criticism, leaves behind itself. This system recognises, in agreement with the healthy human understanding, the three-fold conviction of one's own existence, of the being of other things, and of the reciprocity that finds place between the two, as incontestably certain, although indemonstrable, fact. If one considers further the facts of consciousness, one finds certain conditions under which the received empirical content falls within consciousness, which are to be found with all men, and therefore constitute the essential fundamental character of man. These, the totality of which may be termed the pure Ego, are pre-eminently the subject of philosophy, which, therefore, considers not so much the individual differences as, rather, the faculties, laws, and limits common to all men. Of the faculties, there are, since feeling is the obscure beginning of theoretical and practical activity, two, the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of desire, each distinguishable into three stages; hence philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical, the former, however, into the theory of thought (*logica sive dia-næologia*), theory of knowledge (*metaphysica sive gnoseologia*), theory of taste (*æsthetica sive callologia*), the latter into the theory of right (*ius natura sive dicæologia*), theory of virtue (*ethica sive aretologia*), theory of religion (*ethico-theologia sive eusebiologia*). In the content there presents itself little that is peculiar. In the theory of knowledge, since perception and conception belong to knowledge, the forms of the pure Ego, time, space and categories are treated of, but the difficult investigations relating to paralogisms and antinomies of the pure reason are omitted. In the theory of right, marriage, State, and Church are banished from the pure theory, where they have no place, to the applied. The original compact of the

State is treated as a fact. The theory of religion rests, as do all the individual parts of philosophy, upon the facts of consciousness, of which there are here two that constitute the content of religious consciousness, the belief in God, and the hope of an eternal life. Dogmas are objective expressions for the subjective states of religiosity, *i.e.* confidence that the end of humanity is realizing itself. Without optimism and perfectibilism, therefore, no religiosity is conceivable.

Cf. *Meine Lebensreise von Urceus (Autobiographie)*. Leipzig, 1835.

4. Towards the fusion of Kantism with the Faith-Philosophy, a fusion, which, as was shown above, need not be a retrograde step, and which, just for that reason, the most important by far of the Semi-Kantians had taken as his problem, Kant himself had at least half completed a step in advance. Whoever completes this will have reason to say in reference to this matter that he has left Kant behind him. The assertion, so offensive to the Faith-Philosophers, that faith has to do only with practical postulates, was with Kant a consequence of the principle, accepted by the Faith-Philosophers, that the divine cannot be known, and of the position (not admitted by them) that, besides the sphere of knowledge, there is only that of volition, and hence what is not a conception of nature is necessarily a conception of freedom, what does not fall to physics must belong to ethics. But, now, Kant himself, in his *Critique of Judgment* (in which Fries recognised the central point of the entire Critical system), and in his philosophy of religion, had, properly speaking, broken the spell of this dilemma. What otherwise contains in itself opposition, manifestly falls into unity with itself when the beautiful is, not known (through conceptions), is not even willed (because of an interest), but is felt. And just so in religion, considered as hope, to which Kant expressly assigns happiness as object, is this otherwise wholly practical conception not an object of volition, but of an enduring (hence theoretical) expectation. A fusion of æsthetic and religious feeling, a union of the two with that faith which was, even by Jacobi, called feeling,—this it is that is sought by Fries, who was first stimulated by Herder, Schiller, and Jacobi, left unsatisfied by Reinhold and still more by Kant, disgusted by Fichte, finally moulded by intercourse with Jacobi. But quite apart from this fusion with the ideas of Jacobi, which may be termed accidental, Fries—and by this he is

once more distinguished to his advantage from the Semi-Kantians just named—has, by his conception of Criticism, determined more closely, though always one-sidedly, a point that was left undetermined in Kant. How the pure Ego is related to the empirical, what the state of the case is as regards consciousness *per se* as distinguished from *a* consciousness,—upon this point Kant had expressed himself so vaguely that he left his words open to different interpretations. But, at the same time, he demanded a more precise determination of this point; for the fact that both were designated by the same term (Ego, consciousness, etc.) did not permit of their being kept entirely separate. Whereas, now, the further development of Criticism by Fichte brought the pure or transcendental Ego into the forefront in such a manner that the empirical Ego receives the appearance of an accident or an effect of the other, the opposite way out of the difficulty was likewise possible. It was just this that Fries had recourse to. All that Kant says of the Ego he refers to the empirical Ego; a necessary consequence of this is, that all investigations relating to the Ego become questions of empirical psychology. The theme worked out by Fries in all his later activity, viz., that the critique of reason is a psychological, hence empirical, investigation into the question how we know *a priori*, had been already uttered by him when he settled at the university of Jena. It was first made public in the year 1798 in the third number of C. Chr. F. Schmid's *Psychological Journal*. The repellant influence which Fichte, whom he heard in Jena, exerted upon him, only strengthened him in his opinion, and must have drawn him ever nearer to him who placed the problem of philosophy in self-knowledge, but had understood by the self, similarly as did the Scottish School, merely Kant's empirical Ego—Jacobi. By their later personal intercourse they were mutually strengthened and furthered in their views.—JACOB FRIEDRICH FRIES, born at Barby, on the 23rd of August, 1773, and educated at that place in the communion of the Moravians, studied philosophy in Leipsic and Jena after the year 1795, habilitated himself, after he had been for one year family tutor in Switzerland, in Jena in 1801, and became, in 1806, after several years' travel, professor of philosophy and mathematics in Heidelberg, having published, besides some smaller things written in part anonymously, his *Philosophical Theory of Right* (1803), his *System*

of *Philosophy as Evident Science* (1804), and *Knowledge, Faith and Presentiment* (1805). During his Heidelberg professorship appeared his chief work, already outlined in greater part, in Switzerland: *New Critique of Reason* (3 vols., 1807; 2nd ed., 1828 ff.), also his *System of Logic* (1811). Called to Jena in the year 1816, he was obliged, on account of his participation in the Wartburg festival, to limit himself from the year 1824 onwards to lectures upon mathematics and physics. Not until later did he again lecture upon philosophical branches. He died on the 10th of August, 1843. The most important works published by him during his Jena period are: *Handbook of Practical Philosophy* (1st vol., 1818; 2nd [*Philosophy of Religion*], 1832), *Handbook of Psychological Anthropology* (2 vols., 1820), *Mathematical Philosophy of Nature* (1822), *System of Metaphysics* (1824), *History of Philosophy* (2 vols. 1840).

Cf. E. L. Th. Henke: *Jakob Friedrich Fries aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlass dargestellt*. Leipzig, 1867.

5. Fries gives as the principal point of difference between himself and Kant the following, that he converted Kant's investigations into investigations in empirical psychology, or anthropological investigations, and thereby did away with that "prejudice of the transcendental," which in Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling (on whom in 1803 he had written a special work), had borne such evil fruits. He complains that Kant seeks to determine so much *a priori*, e.g., what relates to pure apperception; and, instead of that, aims merely to tell what he discovers by self-observation. (Obviously he remains accountable for the justification of the presupposition that every one who observes himself will discover the same thing, a presupposition that Kant did not need, simply because his method of procedure was not psychological). With the exception of this defect, philosophy, by the subjective turn which Kant gave to it, enters upon a new era, and a multitude of questions never to be answered, e.g., regarding the transcendental truth or agreement of ideas and objects, are, once for all, done away with, and room is made for those alone admissible according to the standard of subjective or psychological truth. The organ through which this self-observation is possible is the reflecting understanding, the function of which is analysis and hence judgment. The understanding, accordingly, really supplies no knowledge, but only classifies it, brings it to

consciousness. In justified opposition to Kant, who will have everything demonstrated, Jacobi has pointed out certain indemonstrable knowledge in us; but he borders very closely on not allowing that anything at all should be deduced, as a result of which all philosophy would cease to be, and mysticism would take its place. Whereas demonstration is an objective, deduction is a subjective, method of proof, which consists in the showing how original knowledge underlies an assertion. The being of God is not, it is true, proved, but deduced, when it is shown that every finite reason believes in a God. The faculty, now, of these indubitable, hence, true, principles is the reason, or the original self-activity which, together with the original power of having impressions, the sense-faculty, constitutes the essence of sensible-rational mind, or man, so that just on that account every function of mind, its knowing, willing, feeling, is subject to this form, can be sensible and rational. To bring the original principles of reason to consciousness, or, give them the form of judgments, is the business of the understanding, which thereby solves the problem of transcendental philosophy. Like Kant, Fries begins with sensation; like Reinhold, and still more like Maimon, he would here have regard paid only to the fact of sensations being given, not to a possible giver. But, then, more precisely than either, he considers the question how, by a mechanism, which he, with Platner, terms the course of thought that resembles memory, the productive imagination converts sensations, by giving them time and space determinations, into phenomena, which then, again, are by the logical understanding, converted, by means of the categories, into experiences, of the possible objects of which alone is there a true, hence also a mathematical knowledge.

6. Though thus far in entire agreement with Kant's Transcendental *Æsthetic* and *Analytic*, Fries believes that he discovers a lacuna here. Jacobi's sneer, that Kant had gotten the hypothesis of things-in-themselves merely out of the reflective-conception, phenomenon, appears to him not wholly unfounded. Since the objects of possible experience give only relations and never absoluteness, and it is, on the contrary, a fact already at hand and not further deducible, that reason postulates a being-in-itself, reason must transcend that which can never present such a being, and by virtue of this fact it enters into the sphere of Ideas or ends, that is, of that which

ought to be. As such problems, they are objects of faith, not objects of knowledge. Both, freedom and nature, are so distinct one from the other that Fries absolutely rejects all teleological consideration of nature, and censures Kant for conceiving organism as an end of nature. Rather, the conception of reciprocity and of periodicity suffices perfectly for this, as Schelling has shown in his *Philosophy of Nature*, which may, just because of this, be called the first great idea since Kant's *Critique*. Even the organism must be mathematically construed, for there is no other than a mathematical philosophy of nature, as was correctly asserted by Kant, who just as correctly has given the reason why the inner nature can be a subject only of a descriptive not of a properly philosophical treatment. In spite of this declaration against Kant's view of the organism, Fries yet calls the *Critique of Judgment* Kant's most important work, and does so because in it attention was for the first time directed to a sphere in which reason and understanding, thing-in-itself and phenomenon, Idea and experience meet. This is the sphere of the beautiful and the sublime. (Fries had already pointed out in the first of all his works, that the teleological judgment laid down laws which were too broad for a world of phenomena, and too narrow for a world of things-in-themselves, but hence justified the assumption that the world of phenomena is phenomenon of the world of things-in-themselves.) Here, and likewise in the religious sphere, we arrive at an apprehension of the presence in experience of that which transcends experience, of the eternal in the finite, which may most fittingly be called presentiment. Since religion does not give positive knowledge of its object, this object is mystery. The world, in the scientific contemplation of which Ideas cannot at all be introduced, not even for regulative use, as Kant says, is construed according to Ideas in æsthetic-religious contemplation. Fries often formulates the substance of his anthropologico-critical investigations, or his *anthropologism*, as follows: Of phenomena we have knowledge; we exercise belief as regards the true nature of things; presentiment gives us power to discern the latter by means of the former.

7. Fries is not alone as regards the way he took. In considerable independence of him stood Gottl. Benj. Jäsche, who was editor of Kant's *Logic*, author of an : *Architectonic of the Sciences* (1819), of an *Outlines of Ethics* (1824), and a

monograph on *Pantheism* (3 vols., 1826 ff.), and died as professor in Dorpat. In decided *rapport*, again, with Fries was Friedrich Calker (died the 4th of January, 1870, as professor in Bonn), author of *The Theory of the Original Law of the True, Good, and Beautiful* (1820), and of some other writings, having in view a similar fusion of the doctrines of Kant and Jacobi, this fusion being then carried by de Wette and others into theology. Also Christian Weiss (26th May, 1774 to Feb., 1853), author of many writings, among which *The Living God* (Leipsic, 1812), has attracted most attention, had adopted in large measure Fries' views. Fries' school appeared as a closed phalanx after the death of the master, and will again be spoken of among the phenomena following Hegel's death (*vid.* § 344. 2).

8. Born two years later than Fries, was a man whose chief significance, it is true, lies in the field of Catholic theology, into which, in part directly, by the founding of a numerous school, in part indirectly, by the calling out of a more powerful reaction, he brought a higher life. He cannot, however, be passed by in these *Outlines*, but must be given a place among the Semi-Kantians. This is GEORG HERMES, born April 22nd, 1775, who, educated at the gymnasium at Rheine and at the university at Münster, laboured very effectively at the latter place as teacher in the gymnasium and professor in the university, and from 1820 till his death (26th of May, 1831) as professor of theology in Bonn. Fitted by natural capacity and by education rather for an oral teacher, he was not a very prolific writer. His *Investigations relating to the Inner Truth of Christianity* (Münster, 1805) was followed by his chief work, *Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*; that is to say, the First Part (by far the most important), the Philosophical Introduction, in the year 1819 (2nd ed., 1831), the Second Part (incomplete), the Positive Introduction, in the year 1829 (2nd ed., 1834). This, as well as the *Christian-Catholic Dogmatic*, which appeared after his death, does not interest us here.

Cf. W. Esser : *Denkschrift auf Geog. Hermes*. Cologne, 1832.

9. Good mathematical training caused Hermes to seek in his philosophising for definite, clear conceptions before all things else, and to demand cool and unimpassioned, as distinguished from "vivacious," thinking. The direction, again, of his philosophy was determined by the circumstance that

empirical psychology was to him the entrance-door to philosophy. Very far-reaching religious doubts caused him to seek for intellectual rest at first in the older metaphysics, in the form it had taken under the hands of the Eclectic, Stattler, who had been educated in the doctrine of Wolff. He found it the less, because he at the same time studied Kant. The "subjective turn" which Fries so extolled in Kant's philosophy, pleased Hermes also, who on that account places Kant, and Fichte (only in his popular works), above all other modern philosophers; particularly above the philosophers of nature, who, according to him, philosophize merely with the imagination. But he did not find full satisfaction even in those two, because they appeared to him to start from certain undemonstrated presuppositions, which made impossible for them what becomes possible where there is a more far-reaching doubt, viz., to attain to a metaphysics, *i.e.*, to the discovery of reality by the method of reflection. If, as philosophical investigation must, we question all, even what hitherto has passed for self-evident, the Philosophical Introduction must, before all, inquire, Is it possible for us to decide regarding the truth in what ways it is attainable and whether any of these ways is applicable to the proof of Christianity? With this question, there is, next, connected as a second, Is there a God, and what is His nature? and as a third, Must a supernatural revelation of God to men be admitted as possible, and under what universal conditions must it be deemed actual? With the answering of these three questions the Philosophical Introduction terminates. (The Positive Introduction contains in the First Part, the only one that appeared, an investigation of the genuineness and trustworthiness of the Bible; the Second and Third Parts were to have treated Tradition and Oral Teaching.)

10. The *first* (in Kantian terminology, *transcendental*) investigation first defines truth as the agreement of knowledge with the object known or of our judgment with the relation presented in reality between the subject and the predicate, and shows that since a comparison with the unknown object is impossible, there remains for us merely the psychological investigation, whether and where we decide regarding such agreement, and, again, whether and where this decision is certain. These two questions coincide with the following: Upon what are we decided before all reflection? and What

remains even after reflection, as an unalterably firm decision? The fact presents itself, now, at the same time, that the decision which we find in ourselves is, at one time, thrust upon us, at another, freely adopted by us. In the first case, it is a holding-for-true (more concisely, holding), in the second, a taking-for-true (more concisely, assuming). The question to be answered contains, therefore, first, the question, Is there a sure belief [holding-for-true] existing before reflection? The fact presents itself that both the knowledge, *i.e.*, consciousness given by sense-perception, and the knowledge and comprehension derived from this by the understanding, through the application of its stem-conceptions, do not possess this certainty. That which must necessarily be thought by the understanding is not as such necessarily to be held as true: the philosophies of the understanding, which misunderstand this, are, therefore, even the Kantian, philosophies of appearance. The case is otherwise with reason than with the faculties of knowledge (sense) and of thought (the understanding), reason being the faculty of comprehension or proof, which applies a ground to what has been perceived and thought, in order to discover its possibility. The principle of the understanding, the law of identity, is for the reason only a principle of non-reality, *conditio sine qua non*. Reason first seeks a ground for what the understanding must think as *actual*: when it has found this, and its need of proving is satisfied, it must not only think, but must hold as true and real. The understanding is a mere thought-faculty; the reason is, besides, a faculty of truth and reality. If, now, we make reason a positive criterion and attempt to gainsay (to doubt) what we know and understand, it results that what we immediately find in ourselves as datum (*e.g.*, the fact that we have sensations) must be held true, and exists as such before all reflection; the first transcendental question, Is there a sure belief? is answered in the affirmative. How is it with the second, Is there a sure assumption based on practical ends? First it is shown that sensible ends justify no assumptions; hence assumption on the basis of inclination does not give certainty. It is otherwise with rational ends, *i.e.*, those which reason not only recommends but unconditionally prescribes, so that it proves itself to be here not only practical but obligatory. There may, of course, enter in the moral necessity for assuming what appears to the

theoretical reason as doubtful (never what appears to it impossible). In all cases, namely, where the highest command of duty, the exhibition and conservation of the dignity of man in ourselves and others, cannot be fulfilled without the assumption of this or that real thing, we are in the proper sense of the word *morally* certain of it. This certainty is, it is true, entirely different from the necessary holding-for-true, for in the latter it always happens that first the known object, and then the knowledge, is held as true; whereas in assumption the reverse is the case; also, the necessity of belief is one grounded in the nature of the reason, hence is physical, that of assumption depends upon an end, and hence is moral. Certainty is in both cases the same. The common result of the two is (rational) faith. This word is always properly employed wherever something is accepted as indubitable reality; improperly, whenever it is a matter of opinion.

11. The answer to the *second* main question requires, as Hermes himself says, a metaphysical investigation (no longer an investigation in the theory of knowledge, or a transcendental investigation), for the problem of all metaphysics is, at bottom, only to discover reality by the method of reflection. Indeed, since it appears in this investigation that the question whether there is a God can be answered only in proportion as the like question regarding the inner and outer world has been answered, there are here to be solved the highest psychological, cosmological, and theological problems. In the solution of all three, Hermes arrives at much more positive results than Kant in his *Transcendental Dialectic* (*vid.* § 300, 2-4). Applying the result reached above, that what is found as fact in immediate consciousness must, and hence may, be held as true, he starts, now, with the indubitable fact that we find in ourselves sensations, presentations, etc. If, now, the understanding is compelled to think of some of these mental states as not (longer) existing, of others as existing, it can do this only by thinking temporal change of a substance present throughout those states, *i.e.*, of the Ego. But this idea formed by the understanding must be realized (made unalterable) by reason, because otherwise reason would lack ground (the possibility) for that indubitable fact. Hence the critical (reflecting) reason must hold as true an Ego distinct from the non-Ego, *i.e.*, an inner world. But just so, if the indubitable fact that I find the idea of an external object

forced upon me be comprehended as possible, the reflecting reason, also, must, as every one does before reflection, hold sense-objects as limited to definite portions of space and as the bearers or rather causes of our sensations, *i.e.*, hold an external world as real. The answer to this (theological) main question, which is linked with those preliminary psychological and cosmological questions, is the more circumstantial that, as regards both the existence and the attributes of God, it is always inquired, first, whether the belief, then whether the assumption, of these is necessary. For the existence of God, we have the decisive ground of reason that the changes of things, particularly their origin and passing out of existence, can be comprehended only if an infinite series of created things or an uncreated thing be supplied in thought as cause of that change; the first, however, is untenable because in that case we have to do only with effects, never with a cause, hence there remains for us only to hold as real an uncreated thing or a cause. In opposition to Kant and Fichte, it is asserted that the certainty of the existence of God is not a moral certainty, but that it is a physical necessity for the theoretical reason to hold as real a certain, eternal, absolute, unchangeable, personal, creative first cause of the transitory world. It is otherwise as regards the attributes of God, where theoretical and practical reason, belief and assumption, unite in making us certain of the incomprehensible power, knowledge, and goodness, as well as of the holiness, freedom, and love of God, in virtue of which God wills our happiness, which, just because He wills it eternally, is therefore eternally willed and hence will endure eternally. In spite of this faith, rendered irrevocably certain through the theoretical and practical reason, it must not be misunderstood, that much that transcends the power of reason to conceive, as *e.g.*, the infinitude of the divine attributes, can become certain to us only by the way of experience; especially, that the real nature of God remains to us, even after actual revelation, uncognizable. A mistaking of the limits of our comprehension leads to anthropopathic ideas of God as they appear in the present errors, both where conceived analogy with a father has led to an over-mild, and where comparison to a judge, to a stern God. As regards the third question (the possibility of a supernatural revelation), it is merely to be remarked that, whereas the existence of God is securely established by the theoretical reason, the

above-mentioned attributes of God by the theoretical and practical reason, revelation in general, and a definite revelation in particular, is guaranteed only by the obligatory reason, so that, therefore, it remains a moral necessity.

Ct. Albert Kreuzhage: *Beurtheilung der Hermesischen Philosophie*, etc. Münster, 1838.—Bolzano: *Prüfung der Philosophie des seligen Georg Hermes*, etc. Sulzbach, 1840.

12. It may appear strange that we place with Hermes a man, whose work, just now mentioned, contains an expression of high regard for his personal character, but whose chief doctrines—thorough-going doubt, subjectivism, according to which necessity represents knowledge of the truth, finally, assumption based on postulates—he so severely criticises. And yet they belong together not only on account of the similar position which they took up in the Catholic Church and the Church took up towards them, but on account of their point of contact in science. Neither, it is true, had ever been a follower of Kant, but they owe to him even more than they themselves acknowledge; both feel themselves repelled by the consequences drawn from Kant's doctrines by those going beyond those doctrines, and incline rather towards such as he had gotten beyond; with both, clearness in conceptions takes precedence of everything else, and, with full adherence to Catholic dogmas, they always seek to fulfil the demands of the natural understanding; finally, alike distinguished by their talent for teaching, they both become the centres of circles of faithful disciples, only, that upon one the distrust of ecclesiastical superiors did not fall till after his death, so that his activity in the teacher's chair was never interrupted, whereas it early drove the other from that post, and compelled him to adopt instead of the occupation of stimulating men by personal contact, which was more in harmony with his natural aptitude, that of the prolific writer. Hence the more brilliant success of the one who was not the more significant. BERNHARD BOLZANO, born Oct. 5th, 1781, in Prague, zealously occupied with mathematics and philosophy from early youth, regarded it as his life-work in both to help, by illustrating their conceptions, to place them upon a firm foundation. In mathematics, where he is perhaps more important than in philosophy, he early appeared as a writer. His *Considerations relating to certain Subjects in Elementary*

Geometry (Prague, 1804), as well as the *Contributions towards a Fundamental Presentation of Mathematics* (Prague, 1810), attempt, by putting conceptions in the place of intuitive construction, to avoid the unmethodical procedure previously prevailing, in which, e.g., in order to demonstrate something about lines one calls to his assistance principles taken from the theory of surfaces and requires a variety of undemonstrated pre-suppositions. Thus, by means of the conception of similarity rightly grasped, the definition, previously sought in vain, of the straight line, and likewise the foundation of the theory of parallels, are to be discovered. His *Binomial Theorem* (1816), as well as the *Three Problems of Rectification, Complanation, and Cubing* (Leipsic, 1817), and the later-published *Essays on the Composition of Forces* (1842), and the *Three Dimensions of Space* (1843) are connected with those works. The preference which he gave to the conceptual development over the perceptual caused him to meditate for a long time the writing of an anti-Euclid. Having been appointed professor of the philosophical theory of religion, he published, in the year 1813, *Edificatory Discourses to Academic Youths*, in two volumes. These, and still more the various rumours concerning the free-thinking of his discourses, provoked the distrust of his superiors, and as he refused to recall his heresies, he lost his office as teacher, in the year 1820. He withdrew to the country and there lived, closely occupied as a writer, until the year 1848. Only the *Athanasia* (1827) was published by this suspiciously-watched man himself and under his own name. All the rest his friends caused to be printed, or, if he himself did it, he kept his name concealed. Most important of all are the *Text-Book of the Science of Religion*, etc. (4 vols., Sulzbach, 1834); and *Science of Knowledge*, etc. (4 vols., Sulzbach, 1837). Of both together he himself published a *critical résumé* under the title: *Bolzano's Science of Knowledge and Science of Religion* (Sulzbach, 1841), these being related to his (often too) extended works, almost as Kant's *Prolegomena* were to his *Critique of Pure Reason*. All the works of Bolzano, including certain polemical works, the æsthetical treatises on the *Conception of the Beautiful* (1843), and the *Division of the Fine Arts* (1847), as well as the posthumous treatise, *What is Philosophy?* fill twenty-five volumes; and a complete list of the same is to be found in the First Part of the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Vienna

Academy for the year 1849, with grateful reminiscences of him by his oldest pupil, Professor Fest, and by Rob. Zimmerman.

Cf. *Lebensbeschreibung des Dr. Bolzano*, etc. Sulzbach, 1846 (*Autobiographie*).

13. Bolzano's *Science of Knowledge* has in common with Fichte's only the name. It professes to be merely a logic,—one, of course, that aims to show, by a thorough critique of other treatises on the subject, that a new one is needed, and why. Since Bolzano understands by science the theory of truths of a certain kind that deserve to be brought together in a text-book, he embodies in the definition of the science of knowledge this reference to the mode of presentation, and defines it as the totality of rules in accordance with which we should treat the sciences in well-ordered text-books. Although it is the fundamental science, still it must receive into itself principles of various kinds, particularly psychological, though this fact does not justify us in making psychology the basis of philosophy, and thus really abandoning all objective knowledge. On the contrary, the first of the five Parts of the Logic, viz., the *Fundamental Theory* (§§ 17–45), is to furnish proof that there is objective truth and that a knowledge of the same is possible for us. Everything by virtue of which a thing has its rightness, whether one knows of it or not, is a truth-in-itself. Even if we admit that the all-wise God knows every truth, yet we must suppose that there are truths-in-themselves, since they are not true because He knows them, but He knows them because He is all-wise. Truths-in-themselves, accordingly, have not (as have the truths conceived in our thought) a place of existence; hence “reality” is in so far to be denied them; nor must we limit them to the sphere of the eternal, for, that it rains to-day, is just as much a truth as, that a triangle has three sides. Since, now, Bolzano, just as Aristotle and Kant before him, assumes truth and falsehood to be bound up with the proposition, he is compelled to speak of propositions-in-themselves; indeed, since propositions consist of ideas (not always of conceptions), even of ideas-in-themselves; and hence he declares it a defect of language that we are compelled to say “proposition,” when no proposing, or idea, when no conceiving, should be thought of in that connection. The theory of ideas-in-themselves, their combination into propositions-in-themselves, further,

of true propositions-in-themselves, and finally of their combination into syllogisms, forms the subject-matter of the Second (most extended) Part, the *Theory of Elements* (§§ 46–268), which, therefore, nominally, treats of the same thing as formerly the theory of elements in other logics did; only, here things are separated that are there confounded, viz., the objective constituents of a proposition containing truth, and our thought of the same, *i.e.*, the idea-in-itself, and the conceived idea; and the view is limited entirely to the former. Without this separation we are involved in a multitude of false propositions; among which, Bolzano signalizes particularly the proposition that the parts of a conceived idea correspond to the parts or properties of the object. This proposition, he says, is incompatible with Kant's celebrated distinction of analytic and synthetic judgments; further, makes it impossible to conceive rightly the nature of the idea to which there is no corresponding object (*e.g.*, nothing); finally, is the root of other false propositions, *e.g.*, the familiar one, The extension and intention of conceptions stand in inverse ratio, etc. Also in the distinction between perceptions (particular presentations) and conceptions, Bolzano confesses himself a grateful pupil of Kant; only, he contests decidedly the way in which Kant makes use of this distinction in the theory of time and space. These two are not perceptions but conceptions, because they are nothing real, but characteristics of reality; a time, that is to say, is the condition under which a property may with truth be attributed to a real thing (only now or as present is a thing black, and so excludes the not-black), and the sum of all times is (infinite) time. Just so is a place or a space the characteristic which we have to add in thought to the forces of a real thing in order to conceive it as an efficient cause; but the sum of all places is infinite space. Kant's theory of the categories, as well as his theory of time and space, is subjected to an examination and, in particular, is charged with incompleteness. In passing from ideas-in-themselves to propositions-in-themselves, Bolzano lays the greatest stress upon the fact that all *propositions*, even the more complex ones, in which an entire proposition occupies the place of subject, are reducible to the formula: *A* has (the property) *b*. In this formula we have, in the first place, "has" put as the real copula, instead of "is." Further, it renders clear the meaning of propositions of existence in which objectivity forms the predicate. Finally, it enables

us to avoid a number of errors, *e.g.*, that in the negative judgment the negation, or that in every judgment the time-qualification, belongs to the copula. Rather does the former, —since the negative judgment has the form: *A* has want of *b*,—belong to the predicate. Just so does the second belong to the subject (the existing *A* has *b*); a fact the knowledge of which secures us against regarding change as a denial of the *principium contradictionis*: Those are really different subjects of which something different is predicated. Among the theories relating to *true* propositions-in-themselves, Bolzano signalizes the rule that in all truths the subject-idea must be objective. (Propositions, the grammatical subject of which is the word *nothing*, are only an apparent contradictory instance.) Further, the rule that the objective connection of ground and consequence finds place between truths, and on that account has meaning only in relation to propositions, whereas objects or real things are related to one another as cause and effect. The Fourth Part of the Theory of Elements is taken up with the consideration of the *sylogism*. Here Bolzano attempts to show that a number of deductions of one true proposition from another is overlooked in the hand-books on logic. So the syllogism of probability, the importance of which is proved by mathematics. Also here, for the rest, it is always insisted upon that the derivability of a proposition is an objective relation, that, just for that reason, the judgment (*i.e.*, the conceived proposition) is not to be included in the definition of the syllogism. After a precise discussion, in the Fifth Part, of the *linguistic expression* of propositions, the Theory of Elements closes with a critique of previous presentations of the subject. In hardly any part of the work are so brilliantly displayed, as in this main division, learning, and acuteness in castigating every inaccuracy. With the theory of principles and elements the consideration of ideas-in-themselves and propositions-in-themselves is concluded, and Bolzano passes to the consideration of their appearance in the mind. This is done first in the *Theory of Knowledge* (§§ 269–321). That the four parts of this, in which are treated our subjective ideas, our judgments, the relation of the same to truth, finally their certainty and probability, run parallel to the first four parts of the Theory of Elements cannot surprise us. Just as little can the fact that much that is of a psychological nature is mixed in here. The Fourth Part of the Science of

Knowledge treats the *Art of Inventing* (§§ 322–391) contains methodological and topical rules, and shows among other things, how to meet scepticism, sophistic fallacies, etc. Finally, in the Fifth Part, Bolzano comes to the *Science of Knowledge Proper* (§§ 392–718). Herein are discussed, in nine chapters, first, the conception of science, then of a text-book, further, the laying out of the first into separate sciences; then we pass to the various kinds of readers, since a book written for the learned differs from a book written for tradesmen or for any one else whatever; then the selection of the propositions to be taken up, their application, oral and written expression, are treated at greater length, even punctuation-marks not being left untouched. Reflections upon the proper conduct of the author, as well as upon books that are didactic in character without being properly text-books, form the close, to which there is a critical appendix, which criticizes the dialectical method, as everywhere there goes hand in hand with the development of his own doctrines the explanation of them with reference to those of others. Noteworthy is the fact that when Bolzano returns to the definition of science laid down at the very beginning, he adds to the reference previously made to a text-book that is to be edited the further qualification, that the mode of treatment must be of such a kind that the greatest possible sum of good may result. In his critical *résumé* he permits himself to reprehend, in a sarcastic vein, both the prosaic-technical filling of the text-book with the phrases that so glibly talk of the organism of science, and the utilitarian standpoint of those to whom barren subtleties mean profundity.

14. The Text-Book of the *Science of Religion*, likewise, defines science as the totality of all important assertions concerning a subject; but, instead of specifying the resulting text-book, he seeks here an order by which a conviction resting upon reasonable grounds may be produced. Then, after defining religion as the totality of doctrines that have an influence upon our virtue and happiness, he marks out the problem of the philosophical science of religion in such a way, that its subject-matter consists of those religions which appear to the writer as the most perfect. The ground for regarding the Christian religion, and, indeed, the Catholic conception of it, as such a religion, is that it is revealed, *i.e.*, attested or sanctioned, by God; for whether this be done in a natural or super-

natural way is entirely unessential as regards the conception of revelation. The criterion of the divine revelation is, whether it is morally beneficial, and whether there are connected with it certain extraordinary (although natural) occurrences, of which no other use can be conceived than that they serve to the attestation of this religion. After a discussion, in the first chapter (§§ 9-59), of the conception of religion in general, and of organized religion in particular, there is given in the second chapter (§§ 64-94) a brief characterization of natural religion, in which, among other things, God is defined as the unconditionally real, from which the "natural" attributes of God follow. Then in the third chapter (§§ 95-134), the necessity of a revelation is discussed, and in the fourth (§§ 135-177), its characteristics. With this second volume of the Text-Book Bolzano passes to the Second main part of his work, —to showing that the Christian-Catholic system possesses the highest moral usefulness, and that its origin and extension have the attestation of extraordinary occurrences. And, in fact, the second volume (and main part) is occupied only with the latter, whereas the former is first treated of in the third and fourth volume (as the third main part). The evidence of authority and miracles, as well as the genuineness of the sources, is discussed in the first three chapters of the Second Part (§§ 4-54), and in the fourth, the presence in Christianity of the external characteristic of revelation is pointed out. Much more extended is the proof of the inner characteristic, moral usefulness. The systematic presentation of the doctrine of Catholicism in its inner excellence is the subject of the Third main part, which begins with the third volume of the Text-Book. First is discussed (§§ 3-30) the Catholic doctrine of the sources of knowledge, then, in the second chapter (§§ 31-234), the Christian-Catholic Dogmatics, in six divisions of the work. Everywhere appears the effort to show how closely the healthy human understanding, with its postulates, borders upon what the Christian-Catholic doctrine promises and teaches. Of the doctrines relating to God, it may be mentioned that the doctrine of the three persons of the Divine nature is represented as wholly reasonable, and that the reference of the Father to the All, the Son to Humanity, and the Holy Ghost to the individual soul, is here especially emphasized. That the temporal character of Creation should be denied is consistent with Bolzano's conception of individual

substances, which furnishes him the data of his doctrine of immortality. The treatment of the dogmas and the elucidation of them does not suggest the later Schoolmen, but very often Raymond of Sabunde and Anselm. They here appear so clear and so readily intelligible, that it is almost incomprehensible why every one does not assent to them. The mystical element is entirely wanting in Bolzano. The third and last chapter (§§ 235-300) is concerned with the Christian-Catholic theory of morals. This contains, in the first division, the *Christian-Catholic Ethics* (§§ 236-271), in which are laid down not one, but eight most general laws of morals, among which every one will find that or those to which he attributes universal validity. In the discussion of revealed duties, only those duties are so classed the moral usefulness of which can be proved by reason also. In this section are also examined the conceptions of law, which are discussed more at length, in part in special (occasional) writings of Bolzano, to which he distinctly refers in his *Résumé*. Joining on to the Ethics in the second division is the *Christian Ascetics* (§ 292-300), which develops the means to virtue, the natural, as well also as those with which, in addition to the fact that they are serviceable in and of themselves, are united very special manifestations of grace, that is to say, the means of salvation. The standpoint of the healthy understanding is never denied, but there is always united with it a reference to ecclesiastical institutions. Often (*e.g.*, where pilgrimages are identified with journeys of recreation in the society of friends), this suggests Basedow's schemes of Enlightenment. All the particular sacraments are examined in turn, and through ordination the transition to primacy in the Church is made, and it is pointed out that it is perfectly legitimate if the primate takes now a submissive, now a dictatorial, position towards worldly institutions.

15. The foregoing account may serve to justify the placing of Bolzano with Hermes, and of both with the Semi-Kantians. In so doing, we should be obliged, as regards the doctrines of both, to place Hermes more with Fries, and Bolzano with Krug, whereas, as regards their intellectual importance, exactly the opposite relation might hold. The fact that the one treated rational theology almost solely, and the other with decided preference, has limited their influence to the members of their confession. In this is to be found the explanation of the fact that in the presentations of the history of philosophy given by

Protestants they are scarcely mentioned. It may, therefore, be pardoned as an attempt at compensation, if more space has been devoted here to both than to those who, because of their much more widely extended influence, are much better known, since those who once become known are of course treated by every new historian.

SECOND DIVISION.

The Elementary Philosophy and its Opponents.

§ 306.

1. Although, since the phases of the process of the development of German speculation were first compared with those of the revolutionary movement of the preceding century, such a comparison has lost the charm of novelty—a brilliant comedy, indeed, has given it the character of being merely an ingenious fancy—yet what has thus far been done in this history requires that it should also here be pointed out how the world-historical necessity of the resolution of Kant's system through others is recognisable in the fact that the world-event with which the revolution produced by it must be compared was not the last, but that, upon the commotions in America, followed times of unrest in Europe, the waves of which rose higher than those beyond the ocean. But entirely apart from that, it may be shown from Kant's doctrine itself that it could not possibly remain fixed at the point to which he had brought it. It was not first asserted by others, but was avowed by Kant himself, and put forth, with a just pride, in every leading section of his works, that he had reconciled what Leibnitz and Locke had taught. But that is scarcely a real reconciliation where the tree of knowledge grows from two stems, the crowns of which are so united by the intermingling of their branches that they appear to form only the one which is called natural science. The Faith-Philosophers were at one as regards this point—that this dualism must be overcome, and they all extolled speech as a point in which sense

and thought are more closely united than in that confused commingling of the branches of different stems; as if Kant himself had not indicated before them, in the schematism of pure reason, just such an inner reconciliation; as if he had not in this same place suggested that it might, indeed, be one and the same activity by which we give to sensations the unity of space and with which we think. But not only in this obscure corner of his philosophical system, which eludes many eyes because of its difficulty, but even at the beginning, where he speaks of the two stems of knowledge, he says (as if tantalizingly) that the two may perhaps have a common root. In fact, Kant had even told to him who had ears to hear *where* one must seek for this root. If, according to him, perceptions are immediate and individual, and conceptions mediate and universal, presentations, then *both* perception and thought are, obviously, faculties of presentation. When, therefore, Reinhold, who is presently to be considered, announced to the Kantians that he had found the common root of the faculties of perception and conception in the faculty of presentation, it was just as natural that all, or at least the most important thinkers, should side with him, as it was that the Cartesians should pass on to Occasionalism. The nature of the case made it impossible to do otherwise.

2. But with this getting back to the common root of the faculties of knowledge there results, at the same time, another advantage for the Kantian theory. That he is not indifferent to the form of the system, and that this depends upon the unity of the ruling idea, or, also, upon the end, Kant had declared in the *Transcendental Theory of Method*. How important with him, further, demonstration was, we would know even if we had only become aware of Jacobi's and Fries' objections thereto. But if we inquire how in both regards the two-stemmed tree appears, Kant leaves very much to be desired. Because of the two-fold beginning, having its character in the fact that, just as in the *Æsthetic*, so in the *Analytic*, the given matter and the superimposed form are at first separated, each being isolated; and, again, just as there the subjectivity of time and space was indirectly inferred from the fact that without it there could be no mathematics *a priori*, so here the justification for the application of the categories was inferred from the fact that without it there could be no real experience,—the transcendental deduction of

time and space is entirely without result for that of the categories. At least they are not in their union a solidarity, as Kant supposed, when he said, that Hume had either to declare mathematics an empirical science or attribute objective validity to the conception of cause. Against Hume—and him Kant meant nevertheless quite to refute—the transcendental deduction of the categories really has not the least demonstrative force; for, if one had said to him, Otherwise we have only subjective syntheses, or perceptions, not objective syntheses, or experiences, he would have answered, I assume the existence of the first alone, the last I deny entirely. But if, on the other hand, we ignore Hume, the two deductions suggest altogether too strongly Kästner's method of proving mathematical propositions, that one and another should not soon have wished to discover and substitute for that retrogressive, a *progressive* mode of procedure. If it should be possible to formulate in a principle raised above all question, the activity of that common root out of which by a progressive movement it could be deduced *that* and *why* the two modes of thought separate one from the other, that and why in each of the two there are an empirical and a pure element, passivity and activity, a material and a formal side, or whatever else the two may be termed, all grounds for hesitation would be done away with. But just this Reinhold desires to compass by his deeper foundation of Criticism.

§ 307.

A.—REINHOLD.

Ernst Reinhold: *K. L. Reinhold's Lehren and literarische Werke nebst einer Auswahl von Briefen*, etc. Jena, 1825.

I. KARL LEONHARD REINHOLD, who was born in Vienna on the 26th of October, 1758, and released by the suppression of the order of Jesuits from a novitiate with them, studied, after leaving his fatherland, in Leipsic under Platner, then went to Weimar and became a coadjutor of Wieland on the *Deutscher Mercur*, and later his son-in-law. The *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, which appeared in the *Mercur*, in which Reinhold shows that all oppositions that had until then divided philosophy were resolved in the Kantian system, won for him a friendly acknowledgment from Kant, and was the

occasion of his receiving a professorship at Jena, which he filled with remarkable success for seven years, and exchanged for the professorship in Kiel, where he was Teten's successor. In the year 1789 appeared in the *Deutscher Mercur* the essay on the *Past Fortunes of the Kantian Philosophy* with which Kant was entirely satisfied, which was not the case as regards the most important by far of Reinhold's works published in the same year: *Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Presentation* (Prague and Jena, 1789), although Reinhold always announced the lectures which he gave in connection with this work as being on the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The *Contributions to the Correction of the Previous Misunderstandings of Philosophers* (2 vols. 1790-94), served further towards the founding of what he now designated by the very appropriate name: *Elementary Philosophy*. The work on the *Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge* (1791) also belongs here, and the presentation of the Elementary Philosophy is to be found in all these works, as if they had all appeared contemporaneously; but only in these, for with Reinhold's departure from Jena began his changes of view. His *Selection of Miscellaneous Writings* (1797), presents a confirmation of what Jacobi and Fichte had said, that the Elementary Philosophy is merely introductory to the Science of Knowledge (*vid.* §§ 311-313). But he does not stop even here. The writings of Chr. Gottfried Bardili (1761-1808), particularly the most important of these, *Outlines of Elementary Logic* (1800), corresponded, so it appeared to him, to the latent wish to remedy the idealism of the Science of Knowledge by supplementing it with realistic elements; and the union of logic and ontology pleased him so much better than the endeavours in Schelling's Philosophy of Nature towards the same end, that he for a long time regarded this as a caricature of the performances of Bardili. The *Contributions to the Easier Survey of the State of Modern Philosophy* (6 Parts, 1801) shows him to be in entire agreement with Bardili. He did not remain so long, for he says of his *Groundwork of a Synonymics for a Universal Linguistic Usage in the Philosophical Sciences* (1812), that it is a fifth standpoint which as a last result he lays before the world. As in Reinhold's dependence on Bardili we must recognise a sense for the demands which Schelling sought to meet, so in his *Synonymics* we must acknowledge a presentiment that there is needed a critical sifting of the thought-

forms and philosophical terminology as it was laid before the world, contemporaneously with that work, in Hegel's Logic. Some minor works which followed thereupon have remained unnoticed. Reinhold died on the 10th of August, 1823.

2. Almost in the same words in which was shown above the necessity of going beyond the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Reinhold formulates what the Elementary Philosophy aims to accomplish; viz., to present the two stems of knowledge as branches of one faculty of presentation; further, by fixing a firm indubitable first principle and deduction, actually to prove the two Kantian results, "that we do not know things-in-themselves, but bear within us the *a priori* principles of knowledge," instead of allowing merely that they are valid only for the case in which the fact of mathematics and experience is granted, hence only hypothetically valid. This it is that is the aim of the theory of the faculty of presentation, which, so far as it succeeds in it, places on a deeper foundation what Kant had taught, but thereby becomes also a foundation for all knowledge, a science of the sciences, the true *philosophia prima* and Elementary Philosophy, and at the same time receives the form of a system. Moreover, an obstacle standing in the way of the Kantian philosophy is therewith removed. For the embarrassing misconception that Kant's investigations, which differ from all previous ones in that they deal with knowing instead of known objects, were investigations relating to the knowing subject, he was not to blame. (Whoever considers sight considers something that is different both from the object seen and the seeing eye.) Another obstacle, however, was really called into existence by Kant himself. The knowing which he had in mind is a complicated act, concerning the peculiar character of which very diverse views prevail, the *possibility* of which, in fact, many deny (the Sceptics). A right understanding or a misunderstanding depends, therefore, upon the happy or unhappy accident of the reader's conceiving or not conceiving knowledge just as Kant himself did. We have therefore to discover the wholly simple activity underlying knowledge and never doubted by any one. But this is the activity of presentation; the fact of our having presentations, every one recognises, no one doubts. The characterization of this fact, now, gives Reinhold the desired first and only fundamental principle, that of consciousness, a principle that contains what takes place in *all* conscious-

ness, which, just for that reason, must recur, only in a different character, in sensuous, just as in intellectual consciousness. This principle he formulates as follows : The presentation is distinguished in consciousness from the presented (object) and the presenting (subject), and is related to both. (Since it is left wholly undecided here whether there are objects outside of consciousness or not, even the extreme idealist, the egoist, admits the principle under consideration.) The problem of the Elementary Philosophy is, now, to discover what is presentable or falls in the presentation ; hence it has to abstract from the conceived [object] and the conceiving [subject] (as was abstracted above from the object and the eye). The inner conditions of the reality of the mere presentation we call faculty of presentations. (Hence, according to the example above : the faculty of sight is neither object nor eye, but the inner condition of seeing.) Reinhold here gives emphatic warning against our confounding outer and inner conditions of reality ; as the child has the first in its parents and the second in its component parts (body and soul), we have here to do not with the question how the idea arises, but with the question of what it consists. Hence Reinhold seeks only the inner ground of the presentation given as a fact. On account of the double relation in which, according to the highest principle, the presentation stands, it must contain two component parts or moments, the matter corresponding to the presented thing or the object, and the form corresponding to the presenting subject. (Whoever thinks the distinction between the matter or content of the presentation and its object an idle one, should reflect that even presentations of the non-existent have a matter, and that when we approach a tree our presentation continually gains a new content, which certainly the object of it does not.) The presentation is, just for that reason, neither received (Locke) nor generated (Leibnitz), but formed (out of matter). But from this it also immediately follows that nothing can ever be presented as it is before it has received the form of the presentation ; hence never as it is in itself. Further, that it is nonsense to call presentations images of objects ; at most could the matter of the same be so called, but not even that can be so called. If one compares the matter (stuff) and form of the presentation, the latter is seen to have been produced, but the former not, and hence we say that it is a "given" (not : it is given, for

this might easily be referred to an object outside of the act of presentation). If now we reason back to the inner ground of the presentation, we must distinguish in the faculty of presentations a faculty for the given, the matter, that is to say, receptivity, and likewise one for producing the form, that is to say, spontaneity. The former, since only what contains difference, that is to say, a manifold, can affect the mind, must be a faculty for receiving the manifold; the latter, a faculty for combining the manifold by an act of synthesis into a unity. There can, therefore, never be a presentation that would not present, as aspects, the manifoldness of the given, and the made unity.

3. Herewith are given the first data for a theory of sense and understanding. But only the first data, for many intermediate steps are necessary to reach the point at which Kant's Transcendental *Æsthetic* and *Analytic* had started. They serve at the same time to fix the relation of this theory to earlier standpoints. In the Leibnitzo-Wolffian school unconscious ideas (presentations) played a very important *rôle*; these, of course, Reinhold could not suppose to exist, since the matter of the presentation first receives form, and hence first becomes, in consciousness. But he borrows from Leibnitz the distinction between obscure, clear, and distinct ideas (presentations), and so brings it into combination with those three moments, that his investigation has to do with the question whether all presentations are accompanied by a clear consciousness. This, now, is not the case. The mere presence of a presentation in consciousness leaves it entirely undecided whether it is a repeated presentation, whether a mere presentation, etc., hence the consciousness accompanying it is obscure and relates it immediately, *i.e.*, without making that distinction, to something objective. Presentations thus immediately related to something objective are perceptions. From these are to be distinguished the presentations in which we are conscious of the presented *as* presented, and which, therefore, relate mediately to objects; namely, conceptions. The obscure consciousness which accompanies the first receives light and clearness through the latter. The faculty of the former is sense, of the latter, understanding. That is not mere receptivity, this not mere spontaneity, but in every consciousness these two are united, though of course in different degrees. Otherwise, in fact, neither sense nor understanding would be a faculty of presentation.

4. As regards, now, the *Theory of Sense* its chief deviation from Kant is a more precise terminology. Kant had called space and time now pure forms of perception, and now, again, pure perceptions. But Reinhold makes a distinction. Since with him, exactly as with Kant, a perception is a presentation, *i.e.*, a formed matter, he holds that the given sensations, constituting matter, are by the co-existence and succession lying in our presentations, and constituting form, converted into perception (phenomenon). But since this form itself, as the example of geometry teaches, can be made an object of perception, he makes a distinction, and holds that, for the geometer, co-existence is the matter and construction the form of the perception, which he calls *mere* space, or space *in general*. Just so will the form of succession become an object of perception and hence a perception of *mere* time. *Mere* space is here something different from empty space. Whereas, therefore, in the phenomenon perceived as succession the matter is empirical, though the form is *a priori*, and hence the perception is empirical, the perception of mere space is a pure *a priori* perception, because its matter also has this character. As regards the rest, Reinhold agrees with all that Kant's Transcendental *Æsthetic* had taught. Just so in his *Theory of the Understanding* he agrees with all that Kant taught in the Transcendental Analytic; only, he holds that not so much should be made to depend on Logic, which in fact itself must, properly, rest upon the Elementary Philosophy. After showing why the combination of perceptions into an objective unity is an act of judgment, he attempts to derive out of the nature of the judgment and the two elements of it, its matter and its form, the norms of its synthesis, *i.e.* the table of categories. The relation of the subject to its objective unity with the predicate conditions the quantity of the judgment; the relation of the predicate to its objective unity with the subject, the quality of the judgment. Again, as regards the form of the judgment, or the synthesis, this, according as the relation to the terms to be united, or to the one performing the act of judgment, who unites them, is taken into account, gives relation and modality. In each of these there should be—since, as we have seen, there are united in presentations generally manifoldness and unity—three categories, the third of which unites in itself the other two. As to the rest, the theory of the schemata of pure

reason, the pure first principles of the same, and the union of all in the one principle, that everything must be subject to the conditions of possible experience, Reinhold deviates from Kant just as little as in the principle that all knowledge is limited to phenomena. The *Theory of Reason*, which here takes the place of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, depends, just as this does, upon the principle that as the understanding judges, so reason infers, and allies the three Ideas with the three syllogisms of the reason, an alliance that is called one of the greatest services of Kant. But it is peculiar to him that, similarly as in the Theory of Sense, he distinguishes what Kant had confounded. Kant had taken the two words, things-in-themselves and noumena as wholly synonymous, and accordingly had called on the one hand, duties things-in-themselves, and, on the other, the unknown cause of our sensations noumenon. Here, again, Reinhold distinguishes very exactly. Noumenon is never anything else to him than Idea of the reason, a demand. Hence it never signifies anything other than what always remains beyond experience: it is an eternal ought. If, then, we speak of its unknowability, this word has here only this import: There is no meaning in speaking of knowing or not-knowing when there is no being, but only mere problems. These are not things to be *known* but to be executed. But it is entirely different as regards unknowable things-in-themselves. These are objects independent of our mode of thought, and since in our presentations there is contained at least the matter corresponding to objects, they have much greater resemblance to phenomena than to noumena. To the latter, things-in-themselves (precisely like phenomena) constitute an opposite, and may therefore be called merely negative noumena. Noumena are neither conceived objects, as are phenomena, nor non-conceived objects, as are things-in-themselves; they are in fact, not objects, but mere laws, by which we have to govern ourselves in dealing with objects of experience. (What Reinhold says regarding the practical spirit, partly in his chief work, partly elsewhere, has little importance.)

§ 308.

B.—REINHOLD'S OPPONENTS.

I. Of the two ways in which a philosophical system may be given a further extension, deeper foundation and nearer

determination, the first requires a man who, as regards that which he established, sees further than his predecessor. This can hardly be denied of Reinhold as regards the reduction of the two stems; and hence even Kant himself was scarcely prepared to criticise adversely this "hypercritical" friend in any other way than to say that it was too early for a deeper establishment of his system. Likewise the opponents of Reinhold, who went beyond Kant in a different manner, did not belittle this service. This starting from a simple point, which was first made possible by that union, as well as the actual deduction of transcendentalism, which Kant, in reality, justified only by reduction (Reinhold says: induction), was conceded by his contemporaries and by those who came after him to be his own achievement, accomplished without assistance from others. It is different as regards the second mode of expanding a philosophical system. Nearer determinations, as the example of the Socratic School has shown (§§ 67-70), can be given to what as yet remains indeterminate, even by those who at no single point see more deeply than the master, but, because they direct their view wholly to one side of the system, see more acutely at one or another point. Hence it may also happen, as it did there, that the progress in question is made by several at the same time who together supplement the one-sidedness of each. As regards Reinhold, we find the peculiarity that criticism is expanded by him in the two ways at the same time, that is to say, as Plato and the Cyrenaics had developed the doctrine of Socrates. In one case he worked alone; in the other, he worked in conjunction with his opponents. One point, for example, which Kant had left so obviously vague that there was no possibility that it should remain so longer, was things-in-themselves. What are they? In spite of all protests of the elder Fichte to the contrary, which many, following him, have repeated with great assurance, it may be asserted that at least four different conceptions of Kant's things-in-themselves rest upon his express explanations. The Fichtean who says that things-in-themselves are whatever we make of them, may with justice appeal to the assertion that only the reason, *i.e.*, the faculty of problems, leads us to the hypothesis of things-in-themselves. The sceptic appeals to the fact that Kant left it undecided whether things-in-themselves are without us or within us; the idealist to the fact that Kant

regarded them as limiting conceptions which merely say Here our knowledge ceases; he, again, who holds the opposite view, appeals to the fact that there are many passages in Kant into which the meaning can be read, that things-in-themselves are the causes, to us otherwise unknown, of our sensations, the objects from which we receive, not indeed sensations, as Fichte says in his protest, but impressions, out of which we ourselves then form perceptions or phenomena, *i.e.*, presentations. This last interpretation is that adopted by Reinhold; by means of the above-given separation of things-in-themselves and noumena he succeeds—to employ here words of his own with which, later, he characterized his earlier standpoints—in giving to Kant's doctrines as empirical an interpretation as the letter of them will suffer. In spite, therefore, of the fact that in his theory he gives warning against thinking as regards the "given" sensations, of something *by which* they are given to us, things-in-themselves are nevertheless to him nothing else than these givers; they are causes of the impressions we receive.

2. Now, that this is incompatible with the spirit of the Kantian philosophy, had long since been pointed out by F. H. Jacobi in his *David Hume*, when he showed that Kant's system was consistent only if it became actual idealism, *i.e.*, if by things-in-themselves be understood an x posited only by and in consciousness. At present the case stood thus,—there is no getting inside of Kant's system without the thing-in-itself, and no staying there with the thing-in-itself. But much more strikingly was this put in an anonymous work aimed directly at Reinhold, which appeared with the title: *Ænesidemus, or On the Fundamental Principles of the Elementary Philosophy put forth by Professor Reinhold* (1792). (It soon became known that the author of this work was GOTTLOB ERNST SCHULZE [23rd of Aug., 1761 to 11th of Jan., 1833], professor in Helmstädt [later at Göttingen], who later gave up the sceptical standpoint, which he still occupied in his *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy* 2 vols. 1801, for one that takes as its principle the observation of the facts of consciousness, and in many respects approximates to Jacobi and Fries. See his *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, 1814; *Psychical Anthropology*, 1816; and, *On Human Knowledge*, 1832.) This work, which has been epoch-making in the development of Criticism, shows, now, in the most

striking way, that it is the most decided contradiction possible, if it be asserted, first, that categories apply only to phenomena, and then that things-in-themselves are *causes* of impressions, as if cause were not a category. Since the same holds true of the category of reality, Criticism would be consistent, according to Ænesidemus, only in not supposing, sceptically, the existence of things-in-themselves, but in asserting, apodictically, their impossibility. At the same time, Ænesidemus does not draw these consequences for himself. This the Kantian must do: *he* is no Kantian.

3. Though Ænesidemus-Schulze thus indulged in scoffing, as if no one among the Kantians would draw these bold conclusions, they had long since, and upon the very same grounds that he had adduced, been drawn by the very remarkable automath SALOMON MAIMON (1754 to 22nd Nov., 1800), who had stated his views in the work which sprang out of comments made when first reading the *Critique of Pure Reason*: viz. *Essay on the Transcendental Philosophy* (1790), better in the *Philosophical Dictionary* (1791), as well as in his *Ramblings in the Province of Philosophy* (1793), his *Attempt at a New Logic* (1794), and particularly well in the *Critical Investigations relating to the Human Mind* (1797). Agreeing with Kant that philosophy begins with transcendental investigations, *i.e.*, investigates that without which no real object can be thought, he nevertheless does not approve of the formula, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? This, he thinks, rests upon the confusion of the analytical judgment with the identical proposition, and were better formulated, How can we make analytic, propositions which, because of our lack of knowledge, are synthetic? This, however, relates only to the expression. Agreeing with Reinhold that the two stems of knowledge must be given up, he is also at one with him in holding that all shall be deduced from consciousness. Only, Reinhold appears to him to have in view a particular kind of consciousness, the consciousness of a presentation, instead of consciousness in general, which lies still deeper, and possesses a different value in the different forms of consciousness. The consciousness that constitutes the universal form of the faculty of knowledge, without which no presentation, no conception, no Idea, can be thought, subsumption under which is termed "thought"—this should be made the starting-point.

4. As regards, now, first, the treatment of *Sense*, he regrets that many, *e.g.*, Reinhold, have been led by the Kantian expression, "Sensations are given to us," to assume things-in-themselves outside the faculty of knowledge. Since cause, reality, plurality, etc., are categories, a Kantian cannot speak of several things-in-themselves that produce impressions upon us. In general, objects outside of the faculty of knowledge are not things, and the Critical Dogmatism of Reinhold and others forgets that "given" means merely: presented without consciousness of our spontaneity. We may assume that there are in ourselves things-in-themselves in distinction from phenomena; and then they are the complete syntheses of the marks, Ideas, or limiting conceptions to which we gradually approach, as to the value of $\sqrt{2}$; whereas a thing-in-itself outside of consciousness is an imaginary quantity, like $\sqrt{-a}$, and hence can be employed by the transcendental philosopher only as this imaginary quantity is employed, to prove the absurdity of any assumption. The faculty, for having given knowledge, *i.e.*, knowledge the origin of which is unknown, is sense. If there is a knowledge that precedes and conditions others, it is given *a priori*; if it is not a condition of other knowledge, it is *a posteriori*. Thus not only is the sensation yellow a "given" something, but so also are time and space; the two latter are however given *a priori* because they are a condition of every body. Time and space are definite forms of bringing into unity the manifold; hence they have for their ground and their presupposition the identity and diversity by which *in general* manifoldness is reduced to unity. Time and space are sensuous presentations of diversity, or diversity presented as externality, as Leibnitz correctly teaches, and what is not true of an infinite understanding is true of us,—sense is imperfect understanding. With Reinhold, Maimon then distinguishes space as form of perceptions, and as itself the matter of a perception. Very precise investigations of the first elements (differentials) of sensations, which are here united with those relating to time and space, are particularly interesting because Fichte has often confessed his "boundless" respect for Maimon's genius, which gave the first impulse towards his theory of sensation.

5. In the discussion of the *Understanding* there are, particularly, two points in which Maimon appears on the side of Reinhold against Kant. In the first place, he will not tolerate

the idea that the transcendental logic is dependent upon the pure (or school) logic. Rather, must the opposite be true, as appears already from the fact that a multitude of logical rules are inexact, even false, if there be not taken in connection with them something that results purely from transcendental investigations. I can very well unite A and non-A in a consciousness; in fact, I always do it where I make the latter predicate in a negative judgment, but I cannot join them both in a real object; just so the *principium exclusi tertii* is entirely without meaning where neither of the two opposite predicates can ever be united with the subject in a real object, etc. We have, therefore, to inquire, What combination of thoughts gives a real object of thought? and here the rule is, that in which the one can be thought without the other, but not this without that. Since in this case the latter is a possible attribute of the former (right-angled of triangle), the *Law of Determinability* is made the principle of real thought, which explains, among other things, the difference between analytical and identical propositions, as well as that between negative and infinite judgments, etc. Real thought is thus distinguished from arbitrary thought, which combines things that can be thought one without the other (as circle and black); and from the formal thought which combines inseparable determinations of reflection (as cause and effect). Only real thought contains real synthetic judgments. These are, therefore, subject to the law of determinability. By means of this law the categories can be deduced, and that, too, not from the pre-existing and given judgments, but in such a way that it will now be shown, the rather, why the table of judgments is complete. Categories as ways of subsuming under the unity of consciousness, or, what means the same thing, as conditions of the possibility of a real object, must, of course, be contained in the fundamental law of this subsumption as a germ, and therefore be deduced therefrom. (How Maimon effects this is of little interest.) The second point in which Maimon is in entire agreement with Reinhold is that the transcendental deduction (through which we have experience, which, otherwise, would be impossible) remains, as against Hume, who denies experience in the Kantian sense, without effect. And all the more since, properly speaking, it appears from Kant's own words that Hume is quite right in his position. According to Kant, by the application of the categories the necessary con-