

Ludwig
Wittgenstein

*Public and Private
Occasions*

Edited by James C. Klagge
and Alfred Nordmann

Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Preface

When Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) returned from World War I, he had completed the only major philosophical work published in his lifetime. Believing that the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* had essentially solved the problems of philosophy, he had nothing more to say about it. Wittgenstein became an elementary school teacher, then worked as a gardener and an architect. Meanwhile, his book was discussed in Cambridge, Vienna, and elsewhere—its readers were obviously still talking about philosophy. They raised new questions and wanted to hear what Wittgenstein had to say about them. Consequently, in 1929 Wittgenstein returned to academia in Cambridge, and from 1930 to 1947 he held various fellowships, lectureships, and eventually the professorship of philosophy at Cambridge University. This collection of primary material covers Wittgenstein’s years as a Cambridge don.

What Wittgenstein had to say during those years differed in approach, tone, and content from the seemingly definitive early work. Constantly reworking his views in manuscripts, he was unwilling to accept any casting of them as final. The trail of these attempts is well documented by the publication of his manuscripts. Only posthumously, in 1953, did a culmination of these efforts, the *Philosophical Investigations*, appear.

At the same time Wittgenstein lectured regularly to a small and changing group of Cambridge students, and he was involved with a broader range of the Cambridge intellectual community. These lectures and public conversations provided occasions for Wittgenstein to articulate his changing views to others. He had to offer the particular contexts and motivations that are often missing in his manuscripts. And since Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy began with conversations, and was accompanied by them, it is no accident that much in the *Philosophical Investigations* takes the form of dialogue.

These occasions form an especially useful complement to the manuscripts—an avenue in their own right into Wittgenstein’s philosophy: They show him doing philosophy—with students, fellow philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists. In this editorial collaboration, James Klagge took responsibility for presenting the public occasions. We offer a synopsis that covers not only the official lecture courses, but also Wittgenstein’s

extensive involvement with the Cambridge Moral Science Club, and other events. We present newly published material from all of these venues.

The imaginary dialogues of the *Philosophical Investigations*, and the real dialogues of Wittgenstein's many public occasions, are paralleled by the "probing thoughts" of his diaries. The so-called Koder diaries from the 1930s are here presented for the first time to English readers. They are accompanied by a selection from Wittgenstein's correspondence with his old friend Ludwig Hänsel. Together these private documents exemplify the rigor of Wittgenstein's investigations, whether they concern the language games of religious devotion or Hänsel's philosophical musings, the notion of a pure and idealized language or the possibility of honesty untainted by vanity.

Wittgenstein himself suggests that it would be difficult to separate his diaries from his typically philosophical thought: "The movement of thought in my philosophizing should be discernible also in the history of my mind, of its moral concepts and in the understanding of my situation." In our editorial collaboration, Alfred Nordmann took responsibility for these private occasions.

Throughout his life Wittgenstein maintained that philosophy does not consist of theses or doctrines. Instead, it should free us from misleading impulses of thought. It should let us find our bearings and our way in the world. Wittgenstein lived this idea of philosophy as an ongoing activity. He did so rather safely within the confines of his manuscripts. He was more exposed—at greater risk—on the public and private occasions that are collected here. It is in these autobiographical moments, when friendship is tested, and in the confrontation with skeptics and believers, that we can get a richer sense of Wittgenstein's philosophical practice.

Part I

PRIVATE OCCASIONS

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Movements of Thought: Diaries 1930–1932, 1936–1937

Wittgenstein's writing is usually divided into three categories—the few publications, a great many manuscripts, and the various typescripts generated from the manuscripts. This volume strengthens the case for the consideration of his lectures and public conversations as a form of publication; it also includes an example of his private correspondence and one of the two manuscripts that have been designated as “diaries.”

Manuscript 183^a is also known as the “Koder diaries.” After Wittgenstein's death in 1951, his sister Margarete Stonborough gave it as a personal memento to Wittgenstein's old friend Rudolf Koder.^b On first sight, this manuscript is not at all dissimilar from Wittgenstein's other notebooks. Entries are dated, private remarks alternate with rather more philosophical reflections, certain formulations get copied into other manuscripts, his writing is edited—heavily at times—and some of it appears in a coded script. As opposed to his other notebooks and the so-called secret diaries of 1914–1916, the Koder diaries are unique precisely in that they do not set off the private from the public at all.

On August 8, 1914, Wittgenstein began keeping a diary. On that day he traded a larger manuscript volume for a military uniform, anxiously asking himself whether he would still be able to work. A week later, he suddenly started writing in an illegible code, and yet another week later Wittgenstein divided his diary in two: On left pages he recorded private matters in his secret code, while the pages on the right contained philosophical remarks in normal script.^c

^aThe manuscripts and typescripts are numbered in accordance with the conventions introduced in Georg Henrik von Wright's survey, “The Wittgenstein Papers.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Occasions*, ed. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), pp. 480–506 with an addendum on pp. 507–510. For another addendum, see this volume, pp. 407–410.

^bKoder also received a typescript of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, a manuscript of the “Lecture on Ethics,” and manuscript 142 (a manuscript of the *Philosophical Investigations*). Wittgenstein's correspondence with Koder was published in Martin Alber, ed., *Wittgenstein und die Musik* (Innsbruck: Haymon, 2000). The very last letters in that correspondence indicate what significance Wittgenstein attached to such mementos.

^cAccordingly, these diaries were published as two entirely different books. The *Notebooks 1914–1916* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979) provide the immediate philosophical background to the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*; they include the normal writing on the right-hand side. The unauthorized publication of the *Geheime Tagebücher* (Vienna: Turia and Kant, 1991) arguably offers glimpses of a larger private and spiritual background; it contains the coded entries. Wittgenstein's code consisted simply enough in a reversal of the alphabet, putting “z” for “a,” “y” for “b,” and so on.

Thus, Wittgenstein provided his future editors with a fairly clear criterion by which to distinguish his private from his public writing: the coded remarks are private.

Manuscript 183 offers no such criterion. Its first part (pages [1–142])^a consists of sometimes intensely personal observations from the years 1930–1932. Written entirely during Wittgenstein’s stays in Cambridge, it contains no coded remarks at all. The second part (pages [142–243]) was written in Norway (and once, on pages [148–158], on his way to Norway). Here, we see him switching between coded and uncoded remarks in the middle of philosophical reflections as well as personal observations.^b Ilse Somavilla, the original editor of the Koder diaries, quotes a passage from manuscript 157a which suggests that Wittgenstein may be using the code to protect precious remarks from superficial and insensitive readers:

There is a great difference between the effects of a script that is easily & fluently legible, & one which one can write but not easily decipher. In it one locks one’s thoughts as in a jewelry box.^c

Somavilla also notes, however, that not all of Wittgenstein’s coded remarks are precious. Indeed, one might argue that some of the worst writing in these diaries appears in code.

In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk offers another hint, one that applies particularly to the entirely uncoded entries in the first part of the diaries. At the end of 1929, Wittgenstein conceived of writing an autobiography. On December 28, he notes in manuscript 108:

I for instance cannot write my biography on a higher plane than I exist on. [. . .] Something inside me speaks in favour of my writing my biography, and in fact I would like some time to spread out my life clearly, in order to have it clearly in front of me, and for others too. Not so much to put it on trial as to produce, in any case, clarity and truth.^d

Monk goes on to comment that “nothing came of this plan, although for the next two or three years he continued to make notes that attempted to expose the ‘naked truth’ about himself and to reflect about the nature of a worthwhile autobiography.” Monk then offers a hypothetical judgment that may apply rather straightforwardly to the Koder diaries, which were unknown to him:

^aThe bracketed numbers refer to the original pagination of the diary. The following edition presents two facing diary pages per printed page; the original pagination is provided in brackets throughout.

^bSee for example, pages [151 and 183], or pages [146, 168, 202–204, and others]. Many of the uncoded remarks are no less scathingly personal than the coded ones in their vicinity, for example, pages [167 or 184].

^cQuoted in vol. 1, p. 11 of Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher 1930–1932, 1936–1937 (MS 183)*, ed. Ilse Somavilla (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1997), 2 vols.

^dThis coded remark appears in vol. 2 of the *Wiener Ausgabe* of Wittgenstein’s writings, edited by Michael Nedo (Vienna: Springer, 1993), p. 156.

Any autobiography he might have written would almost certainly have had more in common with St. Augustine's *Confessions* than with, say, Bertrand Russell's *Autobiography*. The writing of it would, that is, have been fundamentally a spiritual act.^a

The remarks of manuscript 183 constitute a spiritual act, but one that cannot be divorced from Wittgenstein's philosophical practice, his rejection of all things impure and superstitious in the serious and rigorous quest for clarity and truth. In this regard, Wittgenstein's *Confessions* are indeed akin to those of Augustine or Rousseau. Instead of writing a "secret" diary, Wittgenstein subjects apparently personal concerns to the same scrutiny, the same movements of thought, the same standards of written expression as he does more overtly philosophical matters.^b

While the absence of a clear private/public distinction suggests the label "autobiographical notes" or "how to write about oneself," another distinctive feature of manuscript 183 warrants the label "diary." Most of his manuscripts are devoted to a particular investigation and Wittgenstein fills their pages in rather short order until all of them are filled, the task is completed for now, or a next stage of writing and editing can begin. Instead, Wittgenstein would write in manuscript 183 for a while, then leave it aside, and so this rather small volume ended up spanning more than seven years. Indeed, it appears that Wittgenstein turned to this notebook nine times, most of those prompted by certain public and private occasions: a birthday, returns to Cambridge or Norway from emotionally charged trips to Vienna, his confession, the start of lectures, a sustained confrontation with the Bible, and the like.^c

The diaries were first edited by Ilse Somavilla at the Brenner Archive in Innsbruck, Austria, in collaboration with the Wittgenstein Archive at the University of Bergen, Norway. They were published in 1997 under the title *Denkbewegungen* (Movements of Thought). In accordance with the conventions developed by the Wittgenstein Archive, Ilse Somavilla developed a "diplomatic" version of the diary that preserves most details of how the original text appears on the page: deletions, additions, insertions, even the coded remarks are faithfully reproduced. We are reprinting this diplomatic edition here (footnotes to the translation provide the decoded German text of the coded remarks). Ilse Somavilla also produced a more fluently legible "normalized" version. It is based not on Wittgenstein's first writing but on what are taken to be his last changes to the text. Earlier formulations, undecided alternatives, or other variants are provided in the footnotes. Alfred Nordmann's translation is an attempt to render this normalized version as literally as possible.

^aRay Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 281f.; compare a remark on page 312 concerning 1931, "the year in which his planned autobiography received its greatest attention."

^bCompare Alfred Nordmann, "The Sleepy Philosopher: How to Read Wittgenstein's Diaries," in James C. Klagge, ed., *Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 156–175.

^cWe suggest at the beginning of each period what the particular occasion may have been. The nine periods are: April 26 to May 26, 1930 (pp. [1–30]), October 2 to November 26, 1930 (pp. [30–56]), January 16 to March 11, 1931 (pp. [56–73]), May 6, 1931 (apparently one long entry on pp. [73–92]), October 12 to November 11, 1931 (pp. [92–134]), January 11 to 28, 1932 (pp. [134–142]), November 19 to December 1, 1936 (pp. [142–148]), January 27 to April 30, 1937 (pp. [148–242]), and September 24, 1937 (pp. 242–243).

Much has been made of the literary value of Wittgenstein's writing. In this literal translation it becomes manifest as an ongoing, not always successful search for precision. Even at its very best, Wittgenstein's prose is never smooth or elegant. Noting that he is "in love with my sort of movement of thought in philosophy," he is quick to add: "This does not mean, by the way, that I am in love with my style."^a He favors noun constructions, uses few adjectives, chooses simple predicative verbs; instead of trying to express what he feels, he offers descriptions of his feelings. These descriptions are pointed and acute when they issue from exacting observation. Occasionally, however, they fail to attain clarity, perhaps because Wittgenstein has not yet attained a sufficiently clear view of a matter: "I always want to bargain down the truth that I know & when it is unpleasant, & again and again have thoughts with which I want to deceive myself." To be sure, this sentence could be rendered less awkward and more readable: "When it is unpleasant I always want to haggle over what I know to be the truth. Again and again. . . ." If this procedure hasn't been followed, this is because less awkward formulations would have been available in the original German, too, and in his search for an honest formulation Wittgenstein let this one stand.^b

Underlined words and phrases (single or double) in the normalized text were underlined by Wittgenstein. Dotted underlining stands for his use of wavy lines to indicate uncertainty or doubt concerning a formulation, often prompting the search for an alternative, sometimes leaving the matter undecided. Coded text appears in italics. Obvious spelling errors or missing punctuation have been silently corrected in the normalized translation. Only Wittgenstein's characteristic use of "&" for "and" was not normalized.^c

Readers of the German diplomatic version will also note dotted underlining with which Wittgenstein restored words or phrases which he had crossed out. When Wittgenstein was no longer dissatisfied or doubtful about an expression, he crossed out the wavy underlining. This is indicated by—a mixture of dotted and broken underlining. When certain phrases in the German version appear in brackets, these are Wittgenstein's own; they contain alternative formulations without an indication of his preference for one over another (the last of these bracketed remarks serves as the basis for the normalized translation). The sign @ marks an illegible syllable or word in the diplomatic version. Occasionally Wittgenstein writes a letter or word directly on top of an earlier version, especially when he changes capitalization, this is indicated by bracketed expressions in which the change

^aSee page [100] of the diaries and note his criticism on [205] of Karl Kraus as an extraordinarily talented "architect of sentences." In contrast to Kraus's vanity, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's "wit is the flame that can burn on a pure candle only" (see p. [114]). Like Lichtenberg, Wittgenstein doesn't craft good formulations but writes down what occurs to him and from that selects the most fitting formulations.

^bThe German text reads as follows (see p. [208f.]): "Ich möchte immer von der Wahrheit, die ich weiß & wenn sie unangenehm ist, etwas abhandeln & habe immer wieder Gedanken, mit denen ich mich selbst betrügen will." Just a few lines further down, Wittgenstein chose to edit a formulation, moving it from present to future tense. Significantly, perhaps, the strange construction of the quoted sentence was left unaltered.

^cWittgenstein very occasionally wrote "and." When the English translation (e.g., "again and again" for "immer wieder") introduces an "and" of its own, Wittgenstein's convention is not adopted.

appears in second place: so, “[Blb]linden” tells us that Wittgenstein first wrote “Blinden” then changed this to “blinden.”^a Faint shadowing is used when after his correction the original word is no longer legible.

Ilse Somavilla’s notes are included in this edition and designated “[I.S.],” sometimes amended and occasionally shortened. The remaining notes are by the editors.

^aCompare page [63], note b.

[1]

26.4.30

Ohne etwas Mut kann man
nicht einmal eine vernünftige
Bemerkung über sich
selbst schreiben.

Ich glaube manchmal
Ich leide unter einer Art
geistiger Verstopfung. Oder ist
das nur eine Einbildung
ähnlich der wenn man
fühlt man möchte erbrechen
wenn tatsächlich
nichts mehr drin ist?

Ich bin sehr oft oder ^{beinahe} immer
voller Angst.

Mein Gehirn ist sehr reizbar.
Habe heute von der Marguerite
Taschentücher zum Geburts-
tag bekommen. Sie haben mich
gefreut, wenn mir auch jedes
Wort noch lieber gewesen wäre
& ein Kuss ^{noch viel} lieber ~~als alles~~.

Von allen Menschen die

[1]

26.4.30^a

Without a little courage one can't even write a sensible^b remark about oneself.

Sometimes I think^c

I suffer from a sort of mental^d constipation. Or is that my imagination, similar to when one feels one might vomit when, in fact, there is nothing left?

I am very often or almost always full of anxiety.

My brain is very irritable. Received handkerchiefs for my birthday from Marguerite today.^e They pleased me though any word would have pleased me more & a kiss yet much more.^f

^aOn April 26, 1930, Wittgenstein turned 41 years old. Having returned to Cambridge and academic life in January of 1929, Wittgenstein had recently accepted an invitation to give his first course of lectures (starting on January 20, 1930). After spending most of his Easter vacation in Vienna, he visited Bertrand Russell for a day and a half in Cornwall. He wanted to discuss with him typescript 209, the *Philosophical Remarks* (this typescript was to be used as a basis for the decision by Trinity College on the renewal of his fellowship). Wittgenstein arrived back in Cambridge on April 25. The circumstances of the preceding days are described in Ray Monk's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 291–294.

^bThe German “vernünftig” could also be translated as “rational” or “reasonable.”

^cWittgenstein appears to have added this incomplete sentence later on, perhaps to preface the following remark (“Sometimes I think I suffer. . . .”). However, he did not make the corresponding adjustment of beginning the next line in lower case. Thus it is also possible that these words begin a sentence which was neither completed nor deleted. [I.S.]

^dNotoriously, “Geist” can be translated either as “mind” or as “spirit.” Did Hegel, for example, write a phenomenology of the mind or of the spirit? Except in those few instances where the English language clearly requires “spirit” or “spiritual,” “Geist” and “geistig” are rendered as “mind” and “mental.”

^eMarguerite Respinger was born in 1904 and died Marguerite de Chambrier in 2000. Her father was a wealthy Swiss businessman. A Cambridge acquaintance of Wittgenstein's nephew Thomas Stonborough, she was invited by Wittgenstein's sister Margarete to stay at their homes in Vienna and Gmunden in 1926. Soon after her arrival in Vienna, Marguerite got to know Ludwig Wittgenstein. Since he had sprained his ankle and was taken care of in his sister's house, her guest room was needed for him. In Vienna, Marguerite attended a women's school for graphic design. Later she took a six-month course of instruction at a Vienna hospital and continued at the Red Cross school in Berne. [I.S.] Compare Monk's *Wittgenstein* [1,a], pp. 238–240 (in these notes, previously cited works are referenced by giving the number of the diary page and the footnote in which the full reference can be found).

^fWittgenstein first wrote “& a kiss more than anything,” then changed this to “& a kiss yet much more.”

[2–3]

jetzt leben würde mich ihr Verlust
am schwersten treffen, das
will ich nicht frivol sagen,
denn ich liebe sie oder hoffe
daß ich sie liebe.

Ich bin müde & Ideenlos
das ist freilich immer so in den
ersten Tagen nach meiner Ankunft
bis ich mich an das Klima gewöhnt
habe. Aber freilich ist nicht ge-
sagt daß ich nicht überhaupt
vor einer leeren Periode stehe.

Es ist mir immer fürchter-
lich wenn ich denke wie ganz
mein Beruf von einer Gabe ab-
hängt die mir jeden Moment
entzogen werden kann. Ich
denke sehr oft, immer wieder,
hieran & überhaupt daran
wie einem alles entzogen werden
kann & man gar nicht weiß
was man alles hat & das
aller Wesentlichste eben erst

dann gewahr wird wenn man
es plötzlich verliert. Und
man merkt es nicht eben
weil es so wesentlich,
daher so gewöhnlich ist.

Wie man auch nicht merkt
daß man fortwährend
atmet als bis man Bron-
chitis hat & sieht daß
was man für selbstverständ-
lich gehalten hat gar nicht
so selbstverständlich ist.
Und es gibt noch viel mehr
Arten geistiger Bronchitis.

Oft fühle ich daß etwas in
mir ist wie ein Klumpen der
wenn er schmelzen würde
mich weinen ließe oder ich
fände dann die richtigen
Worte (oder vielleicht sogar
eine Melodie). Aber dieses
Etwas (ist es das Herz?) fühlt
sich bei mir an wie Leder &

Of all the people [2] now alive the loss of her would hit me the hardest; I don't want to say that frivolously, for I love her or hope that I love her.

I am tired & lack ideas, that is of course always the case in the first few days after my arrival until I get used to the climate.^a But that isn't to say, of course, that I am not standing at the beginning of an empty period.

It always strikes me frightfully when I think how entirely my profession depends on a gift^b which might be withdrawn from me at any moment. I think of that very often, again and again, & generally how everything can be withdrawn from one & one doesn't even know what all one has & only just then becomes aware of the most essential [3] when one suddenly loses it. And one doesn't notice it precisely because it is so essential, therefore so ordinary. Just as one doesn't notice one's breathing until one has bronchitis & sees that what one considered self-evident is not so self-evident at all.^c And there are many more kinds of mental bronchitis.

Often I feel that there is something in me like a lump which, were it to melt, would let me cry or I would then find the right words (or perhaps even a melody). But this something (is it the heart?) in my case feels like leather & [4] cannot melt. Or is it only^d that I am too much a coward to let the temperature rise sufficiently?

^aWriting in the coded script he often used for private remarks, Wittgenstein had noted on the previous day in MS 108: "Arrived in Cambridge again after my Easter vacation. In Vienna much with Marguerite. Easter Sunday in Neuwaldegg with her. We kissed each other a lot for three hours and it was very nice." This was published in volume 2 of the *Wiener Ausgabe* of Wittgenstein's writings, edited by Michael Nedo (Vienna: Springer, 1993), p. 242. [I.S.]

^bSince the German word "Gabe" could also be translated as "talent," compare Wittgenstein's various remarks about talent on pages [31, 43, 57, 156, and 212] below (he uses the German word "Talent" in those passages).

^cWhat is "selbstverständlich" is taken for granted, appears natural or obvious.

^dWittgenstein began to write "only," crossed it out, changed his mind again, and wrote it out.

[4–5]

kann nicht schmelzen. Oder
ist es daß ich ~~ne~~ nur zu feig
bin die Temperatur genügend
steigen zu lassen?

Es gibt Menschen die zu schwach
zum Brechen sind. Zu denen
gehöre auch ich.

Das Einzige was vielleicht ein-
mal an mir brechen wird
& davor fürchte ich mich
manchmal ist mein Verstand.

Ich glaube manchmal daß
mein Gehirn die Beanspruchung
einmal nicht aushalten ~~wird~~
& nachgeben wird. Denn es
ist furchtbar beansprucht
für seine Stärke – so scheint es
mir wenigstens oft.

Bis etwa zu meinem 23^{ten} Lebensjahr wäre

es mir unmöglich gewesen in einem
freistehenden Bett zu schlafen
& auch sonst nur mit dem
Gesicht zur Wand. Ich weiß
nicht wann mich diese Furcht ver-
lassen hat. War es erst im
Krieg?

Vor einigen Tagen träumte ich folgendes:

Ich führte ein Maultier dessen
Wärter ich zu sein schien. Zuerst
auf einer Straße – ich glaube
in einer orientalischen Stadt;
dann in ein Büro wo ich in
einem großen Zimmer warten
mußte. Vor diesem war noch ein
kleineres mit vielen Leuten. Das
Maultier war unruhig & störrisch.
Ich hielt es an einem kurzen
Strick & dachte ich möchte daß
es sich den Kopf an die Wand
anrennt – an der ich saß – dann
wird es ruhiger werden. Ich sprach

27.

There are people who are too weak to vomit.^a I am one of them.

The only thing that at some point might break in me & I am sometimes afraid of that, is my intellect.^b

Sometimes I think that at some point my brain won't take the strain on it & will give out. And given what its strength^c is, it is frightfully strained—at least that's how it often seems to me.

27.[4.30]

Until about the 23rd year of my life it would have been [5] impossible for me to sleep in a freestanding bed & even then only with my face toward the wall. I don't know when that fear left me. Was it only during the war?

A couple of days ago I dreamt the following:

I was leading a mule whose keeper I seemed to be. First on a street—I think in an oriental town; then into an office where I had to wait in a large room. In front of that was a smaller one full of people. The mule was restless & stubborn. I held it by a short rope & thought that I would like for it to run its head up against the wall—at which I was sitting—then it would calm down. I kept talking [6] to it, calling it “inspector.” For it

^a“Brechen” is the German word for “to vomit.” It also means “to break.” Wittgenstein shifts to this second meaning of “brechen” in the following remark.

^b“Intellect” always serves as the translation of “Verstand.”

^c“Stärke” is “strength” also in the sense of the thickness of a material.

[6–7]

immer zu ihm & nannte es dabei „Inspektor“. Und zwar schien mir dies die gebräuchliche Benennung für ein Maultier etwa wie man ein Pferd „Brauner“ oder ein Schwein „Wuz“ nennt. Und ich dachte „wenn ich jetzt zu zu Pferden komme, werde ich sie ... Pferden kommen werde, so werde ich sie auch Inspektor nennen“ (d.h. so gewöhnt bin ich das Wort Inspektor vom Verkehr mit den Maultieren). Als ich daraufhin aufwachte fiel mir erst auf, daß man ja Maultiere gar nicht „Inspektor“ nennt.

Ramseys Geist war mir sehr zuwider. Als ich vor 15 Monaten nach Cambridge kam da glaubte ich, ich würde nicht mit ihm verkehren können denn ich hatte ihn von ~~meinen~~ unserer letzten Begegnung vor etwa 4 Jahren bei

Keynes in Sussex in so schlechter @.. dem ich dies sagte Erinnerung. Keynes sagte mir aber er glaube ich sollte sehr wohl mit ihm reden können & nicht bloß über Logik. Und ich fand Keynes's Meinung bestätigt. Denn ich konnte mich über manches ganz gut mit R. verständigen. Aber auf die Dauer ging es doch nicht wirklich gut. Die Unfähigkeit R's zu wirklichem Enthusiasmus oder zu wirklicher Verehrung was das selbe ist widerte mich endlich mehr & mehr an. Andererseits hatte ich eine gewisse Scheu vor R.. Er war ein sehr rascher & geschickter Kritiker wenn man ihm Ideen vorlegte. Aber seine Kritik half nicht weiter sondern hielt auf & ernüchterte. Der kurze Zeitraum wie Schopenhauer ihn nennt zwischen den beiden langen

seemed to me that this was the ordinary name for a mule just as one calls a horse “bay” or a cat “kitty.”^a And I thought “if I now come to have horses I will call them inspector, too” (that is, I am so used to the word inspector from dealing with mules). Only after I awoke from this did I notice that one doesn’t call mules “inspector” at all.

Ramsey’s mind repulsed me.^b When I came to Cambridge 15 months ago I thought that I would not be able to have dealings with him, for I had such unpleasant memories of him from our last meeting 4 years ago with [7] Keynes in Sussex.^c But Keynes, whom I told this, said to me he thought that I should well be able to talk with him & not just about logic. And I found Keynes’s opinion confirmed. For I could communicate quite well with R. about some things. But in the course of time it did not really go well, after all. R’s incapacity for genuine enthusiasm or genuine reverence, which is the same, finally repulsed me more & more. On the other hand I had a certain awe of R. He was a very swift & deft critic when one presented him with ideas. But his criticism didn’t help along but held back & sobered. That short period of time, as Schopenhauer calls it, between the two long ones [8] when

^aInstead of “cat” and “kitty,” the German has “Schwein (pig)” and “Wuz.”

^bFrank Plumpton Ramsey had died about six weeks earlier on January 19, 1930; on February 22, he would have turned 27. Wittgenstein visited him at his deathbed. Ramsey was a logician and mathematician. Following Russell and Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*, and influenced by Wittgenstein’s analysis of tautologies, he attempted to provide a logical foundation for mathematics. He also considered the logic of decision and questions of national economy. In September of 1923, while still a student in Cambridge, he visited Wittgenstein for two weeks in Puchberg. They read and discussed the *Tractatus* daily, prompting Wittgenstein to make changes to the English translation which were incorporated in the second edition of 1933. In October of 1923 Ramsey’s review of the *Tractatus* appeared in the philosophical journal *Mind*. [I.S.] According to Ray Monk, in the year which preceded his death, Ramsey “was not only Wittgenstein’s most valued partner in philosophical discussion, but also his closest friend” (see his *Ludwig Wittgenstein*, cited on p. [1.a], p. 258, also p. 498). Wittgenstein acknowledged Ramsey’s “always certain and forcible” criticism in his preface to the *Philosophical Investigations*. See also p. 17/24 of the remarks from Wittgenstein’s posthumous remains that were collected under the title *Culture and Value*, edited by Georg Henrik von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980/revised edition Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). Finally, see Theodore Redpath’s *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student’s Memoir* (London: Duckworth, 1990), p. 33.

^cWittgenstein had come to know John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) in 1912 during his studies with Russell. Wittgenstein was to join them as a member of the “apostles” but did not feel comfortable about this and wanted to submit his resignation a few days after his election. Even though there was no close friendship between Wittgenstein and Keynes, he could always count on help from the prominent economist and founder of “Keynesianism.” [I.S.] As a matter of fact (see Monk [1.a], pp. 230f) the meeting had taken place 5 years ago.

[8–9]

in denen eine ^{den Menschen}Wahrheit ^{||}, – zuerst
 paradox, & dann trivial –
 erscheint war bei R. zu
 einem Punkt geworden. Und
 so plagte man sich zuerst
 lange vergebens ihm etwas
 klar zu machen bis er plötz-
 lich die Achsel darüber zuckte
 & sagte es sei ja selbstver-
 ständlich. Dabei war er aber
 nicht unaufrichtig. Er hatte
 einen häßlichen Geist. Aber keine
 häßliche Seele. ~~Ich~~ Er genoß
 Musik wirklich & mit Verständ-
 nis. Und man sah ihm an welche
 Wirkung sie auf ihn ausübte.
 Von dem letzten Satz eines der
~~pos~~ letzten Beethovenschen Quar-
 tette den er mehr als vielleicht
 alles andere liebte sagte er
 mir er fühle dabei die Himmel
 seien offen. Und das bedeutete
 wenn er es sagte.
etwas in sein von ihm.

Freud irrt sich gewiss sehr oft
 & was seinen Charakter betrifft
 so ist er ^{wohl} ~~vielleicht~~ ein Schwein
 oder etwas ähnliches
 || aber an dem was er sagt ist unge-
 heuer viel. Und dasselbe ist von
 mir wahr. There is a lot in
 what I say.

Ich trödle gerne. Vielleicht
 jetzt nicht mehr so sehr wie
 in früherer Zeit.

28.

Ich denke oft das Höchste was
 ich erreichen möchte wäre eine Me-
 lodie zu komponieren. Oder es wun-
 dert mich daß ^{mir} ~~ich~~ bei dem Verlangen
 danach nie eine eingefallen ist. Dann
 aber muß ich mir sagen daß es
 wol unmöglich ist daß mir je
 eine einfallen wird, weil mir
 dazu eben etwas wesentliches oder
das Wesentliche fehlt. Darum

some truth appears first paradoxical & then trivial to people, had shrunk to a point for R.^a And so at first one labored arduously for a long time in vain to explain something to him until he suddenly shrugged his shoulders about it & said this was self-evident, after all. But he wasn't insincere about this. He had an ugly mind. But not an ugly soul. He truly relished music & with understanding. And one could see by looking at him what effect it had on him. Of the last movement of one of Beethoven's last quartets, a movement he loved perhaps more than anything else, he told me that it made him feel as if the heavens were open. And that meant something when he said it.^b

[9]

Freud surely errs very frequently & as far as his character is concerned he is probably a swine or something similar, but in what he says there is a great deal.^c And the same is true of me. There is a lot in what I say.^d

I like dawdling. Perhaps less so now than in former times.

28.[4.30]

I often think that the highest I wish to achieve would be to compose a melody. Or it mystifies me that in the desire for this, none ever occurred to me. But then I must tell myself that it's quite impossible that one will ever occur to me, because for that I am missing something essential or the essential. That is why [10] I am thinking of it as such a high

^aNear the end of his preface to the first edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, Arthur Schopenhauer speaks of the fate that always befalls the knowledge of truth, "to which only a brief triumph is allotted between the two long periods in which it is condemned as paradoxical or disparaged as trivial" (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, vol. 1, p. xv). [I.S.]

^bWittgenstein used wavy underlining to indicate his uncertainty or dissatisfaction with a formulation. In this case he had initially underlined the entire sentence, then changed the ending but did not, as he sometimes would, cross out the wavy underlining.

^cWittgenstein here uses the quantitative term "ungeheuer viel" as in "a tremendous amount." After writing that Freud was "perhaps" a swine, Wittgenstein changed this to "probably (wohl)" and added "or something similar." Wittgenstein's attitude toward Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was very critical but he nevertheless took notice of much in Freud's writing, for example, the notion that in some sense one is saying something in one's dreams. Before 1914 Wittgenstein's interest in psychology was limited to his experiments on rhythm, but in his 1942–1946 discussions with Rhees he considered himself a student and follower of Freud. On the other hand he considered harmful the enormous influence of psychoanalysis in Europe and the United States. Compare Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). See also Wittgenstein's 1945 letter to Norman Malcolm in Malcolm's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 100f. [I.S.]

^dThis sentence was written in English.

[10–11]

schwebt es mir ja als ein so hohes
Ideal vor weil ich dann mein
Leben quasi zusammenfassen
könnte; und es krystallisiert
hinstellen könnte. Und wenn
es auch nur ein kleines schäbi-
ges Krystall wäre, aber doch
eins.

Mir ist nur dann wohl wenn
ich, in ~~irgend~~ ^{gewissen} einem ^{II} Sinn, begeistert
bin. Und dann habe ich wieder
Angst vor dem Zusammen-
bruch dieser Begeisterung.

Heute zeigte mir Mrs Moore eine
dumme Kritik einer Aufführung
der 4^{ten} Symphonie von Bruckner
wo der Kritiker über Bruck-
ner schimpft & auch von
Brahms & Wagner respectlos
redet. Es machte mir zuerst
keinen Eindruck da es das
Natürliche ist daß alles

– großes & kleines – von Hunden an-
gebellt wird. Dann schmerz-
te es mich doch. In gewissem
Sinne fühle ich mich berührt
(seltsamerweise) wenn ich denke
daß der Geist nie verstanden
wird.

30.

29. Unfruchtbar & träg@. Zu dem
Geistigen: Ich denke mir dann
immer: haben diese Großen da(rum)zu
so unerhört viel gelitten, daß
heute ein Arschgesicht kommt
& seine Meinung über sie abgibt.
~~Geste~~ Dieser Gedanke erfüllt mich
oft mit einer Art von Hoffnungslo-
sigkeit. – Gestern |S|saß ich eine
Zeit lang im Garten von Trinity &
da ~~kam~~ dachte ich merkwürdig
wie die gute körperliche Entwick-
lung aller dieser Leute mit voll-
liger Geistlosigkeit zusammen-
geht (Ich meine nicht Verstand

ideal because I could then in a way sum up my life; and set it down crystallized. And even if it were but a small, shabby crystal, yet a crystal.

29.[4.30]

I feel well only when I am in a certain sense enthusiastic. Then again I fear the collapse of this enthusiasm.

Today Mrs. Moore^a showed me a stupid review of a performance of Bruckner's 4th symphony where the reviewer complains about Bruckner & also talks disrespectfully of Brahms & Wagner.^b At first it didn't make an impression on me since it is natural that everything [11]—great & small—is barked at by dogs. Then it pained me after all. In a certain sense I feel touched (strangely) when I think that the mind is never understood.

30.[4.30]

Unproductive & sluggish. On yesterday's matter^c: It always makes me think: did these great ones suffer so unspeakably so that some buttfac^d can come today & deliver his opinion about them. This thought often fills me with a sort of hopelessness.—Yesterday I sat for a while in the garden of Trinity^e & there I thought, strange how the well developed physique of all these people goes together with complete unspiritedness (I don't mean lack of [12]

^aDorothy Mildred Moore, née Ely (1892–1977) attended Newham College from 1912 to 1915 and in 1915 the lectures of G. E. Moore, whom she married on November 11, 1915. [I.S.]

^bAnton Bruckner's (1824–1896) Fourth Symphony in E-flat Major is also called the "romantic" symphony. *Culture and Value* contains various remarks by Wittgenstein on Bruckner, including one from 1934 or 1937 where Bruckner is discussed in relation to Wagner and Brahms: "In the days of silent film all the classics were played with the films, but not Brahms & Wagner. Not Brahms, because he is too abstract. I can imagine an exciting scene in a film accompanied by Beethoven's or Schubert's music and might gain some sort of understanding of the music from the film. But not an understanding of music by Brahms. Bruckner on the other hand does go with a film" (for the citation see [6,b] above, p. 25/29). [I.S.]

^cThe German word is nearly illegible and might be deciphered "Gestrigen (yesterday's matter)" or "Geistigen (the matter of the mind or spirit)."

^dWittgenstein wrote "Arschgesicht."

^eOn June 19, 1929, Wittgenstein had received a stipend from Trinity College for the continuation of his researches. While a student before World War I, after his appointment later in the year (on December 12, 1930) to a five-year term as research fellow, and again in 1939 as professor of philosophy he lived in the same rooms on Whewell's Court in Cambridge's Trinity College. [I.S.]

[12–13]

losigkeit) Und wie andererseits ein Thema, ~~etwa~~ von Brahms voll von Kraft, Gra~~z~~ie, & Schwung ist & er selbst einen Bauch hatte. Dagegen hat der Geist der Heutigen keine Sprungfedern unter den Füßen. Ich möchte den ganzen Tag nur essen & schlafen. Es ist als wäre mein Geist müde. Aber wovon? Ich habe in allen diesen Tagen nichts wirkliches gearbeitet. ~~Ich~~ (ifF) fühle mich blöd & feig.

Bis mir etwas klar wird ^{ist} dauert es außerordentlich lang. – Das ist wahr auf den verschie-
densten Gebieten. ^{Mein} ~~Das~~ Verhältnis zu den anderen Menschen z.B. wird mir immer erst nach langer Zeit klar. Es ist als brauchte es kolossal lang bis sich der große Nebelballen ver-

1.5.

zieht & der Gegenstand selbst sichtbar wird. Während dieser Zeit aber bin ich mir meiner Unklarheit nicht einmal ganz klar bewußt. Und auf einmal sehe ich dann wie die Sache wirklich ist oder war. Darum wäre ich wohl ^{bin} überall unbrauchbar wo halbwegs schnelle Entscheidungen zu treffen sind. Ich bin sozusagen einige Zeit verblendet & erst dann fallen mir die Schuppen von den Augen.

2.5

In meinen Vorlesungen trachte ich oft die Gunst meiner Zuhörer durch eine etwas komische Wendung zu gewinnen; sie zu unterhalten damit sie mir willig Gehör schenken. Das ist gewiß etwas Schlechtes.

Ich leide oft unter dem

intellect.)^a And how on the other hand a theme by Brahms is full of vigor, grace, & drive^b & he himself had a potbelly. In contrast the spirit of our contemporaries has no springs under its feet.

All day I want nothing but eat & sleep. It is as if my spirit were tired. But from what? In all these days I haven't really worked at all. Feel dumb & cowardly.^c

1.5.[30]

It takes extraordinarily long until something is^d clear to me.—This is true in various spheres. My^e relation to others, for example, always becomes clear to me only after a long time. It is as if it took colossally long for the large patch of fog to recede [13] & the object itself to become visible. But during this time I am not even quite clearly aware of my unclarity. And all of a sudden I then see how the matter really is or was. And probably that's why I am useless^f whenever reasonably quick decisions need to be made. I am so to speak blinded for a while & only then the scales fall from my eyes.^g

2.5.[30]

In my lectures^h I often seek to gain favor with my audience through a somewhat comic turnⁱ; to entertain them so that they willingly hear me out. That is certainly something bad.

^aWittgenstein contrasts “Geistlosigkeit (mindlessness, unspiritedness)” and “Verstandlosigkeit (lack of intellect).” In this and the following sentences, “Geist” is therefore translated “spirit” and not “mind.”

^b“Schwung” could also be translated as “sweep” or “liveliness.”

^cMore literally: “I haven't worked (on) anything real.” The next sentence originally began “I feel” but Wittgenstein crossed out the “ich.”

^dWittgenstein first wrote “becomes.”

^e“The relation” was changed to “my relation.”

^fWittgenstein left standing an undecided alternative formulation: “I would be useless . . .”

^gThis colloquial German idiom derives from the story of Saul's conversion in Acts 9:18 (“Und also bald fiel es von seinen Augen wie Schuppen und ward wieder sehend”).

^hOn January 20, 1930 (the day after Ramsey's death), Wittgenstein embarked on his very first course of lectures by invitation of Richard Braithwaite on behalf of the moral science faculty. “Braithwaite asked him under what title the course should be announced. After a long silence Wittgenstein replied: ‘The subject of the lectures would be philosophy. What else can be the title of the lectures but Philosophy’” (Ray Monk, see [1,a] above, p. 289).

ⁱ“Eine etwas komische Wendung” could refer to a figure of speech or to a change of direction.

[14–15]

Gedanken wie sehr der Erfolg oder der Wert dessen was ich tue von @ meiner Disposition abhängt. Mehr als bei einem Konzertsänger. Nichts ist gleichsam in mir aufgespeichert; beinahe Alles muß im Moment produziert werden. Das ist – glaube ich – eine sehr ungewöhnliche Art der Tätigkeit oder des Lebens.

Da ich sehr schwach bin, bin ich ungemein abhängig von der Meinung Anderer. Wenigstens im Moment des Handelns. Es sei denn daß ich lange Zeit habe mich zu {d|t}erfangen.

Ein gutes Wort {w|d}as mir jemand sagt oder ein freundliches Lächeln wirken lange angenehm & ermunternd & versichernd auf mich nach & ein unangenehmes d.h.

unfreundliches Wort ebenso lange bedrückend ~~auf mich~~.

Am {W|w}ohlätigsten ist dann das Alleinsein in meinem Zimmer dort stelle ich das Gleichgewicht wieder her. Zum mindestens das geistige wenn auch die Nerven den Eindruck noch behalten.

Der Beste Zustand bei mir ist der der Begeisterung weil der ^{wenigstens teilweise} die lächerlichen Gedanken ~~gt~~ aufzehrt & unschädlich macht.

Alles oder beinahe alles was ich tue auch diese Eintragungen sind von Eitelkeit gefärbt & das beste was ich tun kann ist gleichsam die Eitelkeit abzutrennen, zu isolieren & trotz ihr daß {r|R}ichtige zu tun obwohl sie immer zuschaut. Verjagen kann ich sie nicht. Nur manchmal

I am often pained by the thought of [14] how much the success or value of what I do depends on how I am disposed. More so than for a concert singer. Nothing is as it were stored up in me; nearly everything must be produced at the moment. That—I believe—is a very unusual sort of activity or life.

Since I am very weak, I am extremely dependent on the opinion of others.^a At least at the moment of action. Except when I have a long time to collect myself.^b

A good word from someone or a friendly smile has a lasting effect on me, pleasantly encouraging & assuring, & an unpleasant, that is, [15] unfriendly word has an equally long effect, depressing.^c

Being alone then in my room provides the greatest relief; there I restore my equilibrium. At least a mental equilibrium even though my nerves retain the impression.

The best state for me is the state of enthusiasm because it consumes the ridiculous thoughts at least partially^d & renders them harmless.

Everything or nearly everything I do, these entries included, is tinted by vanity & the best I can do is as it were to separate, to isolate the vanity & do what's right in spite of it, even though it is always watching. I cannot chase it^e away. Only sometimes [16] it is not present.

^aCompare a coded entry from the year 1929 in MS 107: "What others think of me always occupies me to an extraordinary extent. I often aim to make a good impression. That is, I very frequently think about the impression I make on others and find it pleasant when I deem it good and otherwise unpleasant" (vol. 2 of the *Wiener Ausgabe*, [2,a] above, p. 45). [I.S.]

^bWittgenstein here uses a verb from Austrian dialect: "terfangen" (or, more accurately: "derfangen") meaning something like "to catch or collect oneself." [I.S.]

^cInitially, Wittgenstein wrote of an equally long effect "on me," then struck "on me."

^d"at least partially" was inserted into the line.

^eThis could be rendered "I cannot chase her away," since vanity is gendered as a female in German.

[16–17]

ist sie nicht anwe@send.

Ich liebe die Marguerite sehr
& ~~bin~~^{große} habe Angst sie möchte
nicht gesund sein da ich
schon über eine Woche keinen
Brief von (I|i)hr habe. Ich den-
ke wenn ich allein bin wieder
& wieder an sie aber auch
sonst[,]. ~~am meisten~~ Wäre ich an-
ständiger so wäre auch meine
Liebe zu ihr anständiger.
Und dabei liebe ich sie jetzt
so innig als ich kann. An
Innigkeit fehlt es mir viel-
leicht auch nicht. (a|A)ber an
Anständigkeit.

Lese Spengler Untergang etc. &
finde trotz des vielen Unverant-
wortlichen im Einzelnen, viele
wirkliche, bedeutende Gedanken.
Vieles, vielleicht das Meiste be-

rührt sich ganz mit dem was ich
selbst oft gedacht habe. Die
Möglichkeit ~~der ab~~ einer Mehr-
zahl abgeschlossener Systeme
welche wenn man sie einmal
hat ausschauen als sei das
eine die Fortsetzung des An-
deren.

Und das hängt alles
auch mit dem Gedanken zusam-
men, daß wir gar nicht
wissen (bedenken) wieviel dem
Menschen genommen – oder
auch gegeben – werden kann.

6.5.

Neulich las ich zufällig in den
Budenbrooks vom Typh[ty]us &
wie Hanno B. in seiner letzten
Krankheit niemand mehr
erkannte außer einem Freund.
Und da fiel mir auf daß man
das
gemeinhin als selbstverständ-
lich ansieht & denkt,

I love Marguerite very much & am very anxious that she might not be healthy since I haven't gotten a letter from her in more than a week. When I am alone I think of her again & again but at other times too. Were I more decent, my love for her would be more decent too. And yet I love her now as tenderly as I can. Tenderness^a is perhaps not what I am lacking. But decency.

6.5.

Reading Spengler Decline^b etc. & in spite of many irresponsibilities in the particulars, find many real, significant thoughts. Much, perhaps most of it, [17] is completely in touch with what I have often thought myself.^c The possibility of a number of closed systems which, once one has them, look as if one is the continuation of another.

And all this has to do with the thought that we do not know (consider) how much can be taken away from—or given to—the human being.

The other day I happened to read in Buddenbrooks of typhoid & how Hanno B. in his final illness no longer recognized anyone except a friend.^d And there it struck me that one generally considers this self-evident, thinking, [18] of course, this is only natural once the

^aThe German “Innigkeit” can be translated by a host of terms, including “sincerity,” “affection,” “devotion,” “attachment,” or “closeness.”

^bOswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Knopf, 1957), first published 1918–1922. Along with Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, and Sraffa, Wittgenstein considered Spengler (1880–1936) one of those who influenced him (*Culture and Value*, [6,b] above, p. 14/16, see also p. 19/21). Compare Georg Henrik von Wright's *Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, pp. 212f.), also Ray Monk's [1,a], pp. 299–303, and Rudolf Haller, *Questions on Wittgenstein* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), pp. 74–89. [I.S.]

^cSpengler's thought “everywhere joins up (berührt sich ganz)” with Wittgenstein's.

^dThomas Mann's novel *Buddenbrooks* appeared in 1901. Its penultimate chapter objectively describes the course of typhoid and only implies the death of Hanno Buddenbrook. Hanno belongs to the third generation of a merchant's family in which a growth of sensitivity and awareness comes at the cost of diminished vitality and social position. Hanno embodies tender fragility and aesthetic sensibility. His detachment from the life of the bourgeoisie becomes complete through his musical inclinations. [I.S.]

[18–19]

natürlich, wenn das Gehirn einmal so zerrüttet ist so ist das nur natürlich. Aber in Wirklichkeit ist es zwar nicht das Gewöhnliche daß wir Menschen sehen & sie nicht erkennen aber das ~~Erkennen~~ was wir „Erkennen“ nennen ist nur eine spezielle Fähigkeit die uns sehr wohl abhanden kommen könnte ohne daß wir ^{als} minderwertig zu ~~nennen~~ betrachten wären. Ich meine: Es erscheint uns als selbstverständlich daß wir Menschen „erkennen“ & als totale Zerrüttung wenn ~~wir sie~~ jemand sie nicht erkennt. Aber es kann dieser Stein sehr wohl in dem Gebäude fehlen & von Zerrüttung nicht die Rede sein. (Dieser Gedanke ist wieder mit den Freud'schen nahe

über die verwand|t|, mit dem, ~~daß z.B.~~ Fehlleistungen)

D.h. wir halten alles was wir haben für selbstverständlich & wissen gar nicht daß wir compett sein können auch ohne dem & dem was wir gar nicht als besondere Fähigkeit erkennen weil es uns zur @ Vollständigkeit ~~desse~~ unseres Verstandes zu gehören scheint.

Es ist schade daß Spengler nicht bei seinen Guten Gedanken geblieben ist & weiter gegangen ist als er verantworten kann. Allerdings wäre durch die größere Reinlichkeit sein Gedanke schwerere zu verstehen gewesen aber auch dadurch erst wirklich nachhaltig wirksam. So ist der Gedanke daß die

brain is so deteriorated. But while in reality it is not ordinarily the case that we see people & not recognize them, what we call “recognizing” is only a special capacity which we could easily lose without being regarded inferior.^a I mean: It seems self-evident to us that we “recognize” people & it seems total deterioration when someone does not recognize them. But this brick can very well be missing from the building & not a hint of deterioration.^b (This thought is again closely related to those of Freud [19], to the one on slips.)^c

That is, we consider all we have as self-evident & do not even know that we could be complete even without this & that, which we don’t even recognize as some special capacity since to us it seems to belong to the completeness of our intellect.

It’s a shame that Spengler did not stick with his Good Thoughts & went further than what he can answer for. Greater cleanliness, however, would have made his thought more difficult to understand, but only this would really have made it lastingly effective, too.^d Thus is the thought that the [20] string instruments assumed their Definitive Shape between

^aWittgenstein first wrote: “and yet we would not have to be called inferior.” The German verb for “lose” is “abhanden kommen,” which often means something like “misplace,” “lose track of,” or “become lost,” as when one “loses” one’s keys or a document on a cluttered desk.

^bAn actual case very much like this is described and discussed by Oliver Sacks in the title essay in his collection *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat* (New York: Summit, 1985).

^cInitially, this sentence was to continue differently: “such as the thought that the slips . . .”—Wittgenstein here refers to Freud’s theory regarding a certain type of error (Fehlleistungen), most famously the “Freudian slips.”

^dWittgenstein frequently invokes the notion of “Reinheit,” or purity. Here he considers Spengler’s “Reinlichkeit,” which designates hygiene, neatness, cleanliness.

[20–21]

Streichinstrumente zwischen 15-1600
ihre Endgültige Gestalt ange-
nommen haben von ungeheurer
Tragweite (& Symbolik). Nur
sehen die meisten Menschen
wenn man ihnen so einen Ge-
danken ohne viel drumherum
gibt nichts in ihm. Es ist
wie wenn ~~man~~ einer ~~Mensch~~
glaubte daß ein Mensch
sich immer unbegrenzt weiter
entwickelt & man sagte ihm:
schau, die Kopfnähte eines
Kindes schließen sich mit
... Jahren & das zeigt dir schon
daß die Entwicklung überall
zu einem Ende kommt was
sich da entwickelt ein geschlos-
senes Ganzes ist das einmal
vollständig da sein wird &
nicht eine Wurst die beliebig
lang weiterlaufen kann.

Als ich vor 16 Jahren den Gedan-
ken hatte, daß das Gesetz der
Kausalität ~~be~~ an sich bedeu-
tungslos sei & es eine Betracht-
ung ~~gibt~~ der Welt gibt die es
nicht im Auge hat da hatte
ich das Gefühl vom (a|A)nbrechen
einer Neuen Epoche.

In einer (b|B)eziehung muß ich
ein sehr moderner Mensch
sein weil das Kino so außer-
ordentlich wohltätig auf mich
wirkt. Ich kann mir keine
~~Form des~~ Ausruhens des Geistes
denken was mir adäquater wäre
als ein amerikanischer Film. Was
ich sehe & die Musik geben mir
eine selige Empfindung ~~vielleicht~~
vielleicht
etwa in einem infantilen Sinne
aber darum natürlich nicht weniger
stark. Überhaupt ist wie ich
oft gedacht & gesagt habe

1500 and 1600 of enormous magnitude (& symbolism).^a Only most people see nothing in such a thought if one gives it to them without much ado. It is as if someone believed that a human being keeps on developing without limit & one told him: look, the cranial sutures of a child close at . . . years & that shows already that development comes everywhere to an end, that what is developing here is a self-contained whole which at some point will be completely present & not a sausage which can run on indefinitely.

[21]

16 years ago when I had the thought that the law of causality is insignificant^b in itself & that there is a way of regarding the world which does not bear it in mind,^c I felt the beginning of a New Era.^d

In one regard I must be a very modern person since the cinema has such an extraordinarily beneficial effect on me.^e I cannot imagine any rest for the mind^f more adequate to me than an American movie. What I see & the music give me a blissful sensation perhaps in an infantile way but therefore of course no less powerful.^g In general as I have often

^aThe capitalization is Wittgenstein's. See Oswald Spengler, [16,b] above, vol. 1, chap. 1, sec. 4: "The string instruments assumed their definitive shape 1480–1530 in Northern Italy."

^b"bedeutungslos" can also be translated as "meaningless."

^c"die es nicht im Auge hat" can also be translated "which is not oriented toward it," "which does not intend it or aim for it."

^dCompare remarks 6.36 and 6.362 of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: "If there were a law of causality, it might go: 'There are laws of nature.' But of course one can't say that: it shows itself.—What can be described that can also happen, and what is supposed to be excluded by the law of causality, that can't be described either." See also 6.32 and 6.321 and the entry of March 29, 1915 in his *Notebooks 1914–1916* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 41.

^e"wirkt wohltätig" could be translated as "providing relief," perhaps "having a soothing or palliative, generally becoming" effect.

^fWittgenstein initially wrote that he can't imagine a "form of rest for the mind (keine Form des Ausruhens des Geistes)."

^gAfter writing "perhaps" and crossing it out, Wittgenstein ended up leaving "perhaps" and "somewhat as," both with wavy underlining to indicate his uncertainty about the alternatives ("vielleicht" and "etwa" in German).

[22–23]

~~das Kino~~ der Film etwas sehr
 Ähnliches wie der Traum & die
 Gedanken
 Freudschen Methoden lassen
 sich unmittelbar auf ihn anwen-
 den

Eine Entdeckung ist weder groß
 noch klein; es kommt darauf
 an was sie uns bedeutet.

Wir sehen in der Kopernicanischen
 Entdeckung etwas Großes – weil
 wir wissen daß sie ihrer Zeit
 etwas Großes bedeutete & vielt-
 leicht auch weil noch ein Ausklang
 dieser Bedeutung zu uns herüber
kommt – & nun schließen wir
 per analogiam daß die Entdek-
 kungen Einsteins etc. zum min-
 desten etwas ebenso Großes sind.
 Aber sie sind – wenn auch von
 noch so großem praktische(m) ^{Wert} Inter-
~~esse, Wichtigkeit~~, vielseitigem Inter-

esse etc – doch nur so groß als sie
bedeutend (symbolisch) sind. Es
 verhält sich damit natürlich
 wie – z.B. – mit dem Heldenentum. Eine
 früherer Zeiten – mit Recht –
 Waffentat ^{||} wird ^{||} als Heldentat gerühmt.

[a]Aber es ist ganz wohl möglich
 daß eine ebenso schwierige oder
 noch schwierigere Waffentat heute
 eine reine Sportsache ist und zu
 Unrecht ~~mit~~ den Namen Heldentat
 erhält. Die Schwierigkeit, die prakti-
 sche Bedeutung alles das ~~was man~~
 kann man, gleichsam, von außen
 beurteilen; die Größe das Helden-
 entum wird von der Bedeutung
 bestimmt die die Handlung hat.
 Von dem Pathos das mit der Han-
 dlungsweise verbunden ist.

~~Darum~~ Weil aber eine bestimmter
 Zeitabschnitt eine bestimmte Ras-
 se ihr Patos mit ganz bestimm-
 ten Handlungsweisen verbindet
 so werden die Menschen irrege-

thought & said [22] a film^a is something very similar to a dream & the thoughts of Freud are directly applicable to it.^b

A discovery is neither great nor small; it depends on what it signifies to us.

We view the Copernican discovery as something great—because we know that it signified something great in its time & perhaps because a resonance^c of this significance comes across to us—& now we infer by analogy that Einstein’s discoveries etc. are something at least equally great. But they are—no matter how great their practical value,^d many-sided interest [23] etc.—only as great as they are significant (symbolic).^e It is with this of course as it is—for example—with heroism. A feat of weaponry of former times is—rightfully—praised as a feat of heroism.^f But it is quite possible that an equally or even more difficult feat of weaponry is today purely a matter of sport and is unjustly called a feat of heroism. The difficulty, the practical significance, all that can be judged, as it were, from outside; the greatness of the heroism is determined by the significance of the action. By the pathos which is associated with the way of acting.

Because, however, a particular period of time, a particular race associates its pathos with very particular ways of acting, people are led astray^g [24] & believe that the greatness,

^aWittgenstein first wrote “the cinema,” then crossed it out and substituted “film.”

^bThe word “thoughts” was introduced as an alternative to “methods.” Wittgenstein used wavy underlining to indicate his uncertainty about “methods” but didn’t cross it out after writing “thoughts” above it.

^cThe German “Ausklang” (“final chord”) refers to the sound that lingers on at the end of a musical performance.

^dBefore settling on “Wert” or “value,” Wittgenstein had considered and crossed out “practical interest” and “practical importance.”

^eCompare a remark from November 22, 1931: “The real achievement of a Copernicus or Darwin was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new point of view (Aspekt).” (*Culture and Value*, [6,b] above, p. 18/26). [I.S.]

^f“Of former times” and “rightfully” were inserted into the original sentence: “A feat of weaponry is praised as heroic.”

^gA comma was added to separate the two subjects of this sentence: “a particular period of time” and “a certain race.”

[24–25]

führt & glauben, die Größe, die Bedeutung liege notwendig in jener Handlungsweise. Und dieser Glaube wird immer erst dann ad absurdum geführt, wenn durch einen Umschwung eine umwertung der Werte eintritt d.h. das wahre Pathos nun sich auf andere Handlungsweise legt.

Dann bleiben – wahrscheinlich immer – die alten jetzt wertlosen Scheine noch einige Zeit im Umlauf & werden von nicht ganz ehrlichen Leuten für das Große & Bedeutende ausgegeben, bis man die neue Einsicht wieder trivial findet & sagt „natürlich gelten diese alten Scheine nichts“.

Das Trinken, zu einer Zeit symbolisch ist zu einer anderen Zeit Suff.

D.h. der Nymbus, nämlich der echte

Nymbus haftet nicht an der äußern Tatsache d.h. nicht an der Tatsache.

Beim Lehren der Philosophie kann man oft sagen „Spitzbuben selbst, die uns zu Schelmen machen!“

8.

Ich habe nie einen Streich gemacht & werde wohl nie einen machen. Es ist meiner Natur nicht gemäß. (Ich halte das, wie alles Natürliche weder für einen Fehler noch für einen Vorzug)

9

Ich bin sehr verliebt in die R. freilich schon seit langem aber jetzt besonders stark. Dabei weiß ich aber daß die Sache aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach hoffnungslos ist. D.h. ich muß gefaßt sein, daß sie jeden Moment @ sich

significance lies necessarily in that way of acting. And this belief is always reduced to absurdity just when^a a transvaluation of values^b comes about through an upheaval, that is, when true pathos now settles upon another way of acting. Then—probably always—the old, now worthless bills remain in circulation for some time & people who are not quite honest pass them off as great & significant until one finds the new insight once again trivial & says “of course these old bills are worthless.”

Drinking, at one time it is symbolic, at another boozing.^c

That is, the nimbus, or the genuine [25] nimbus does not attach to the external fact, that is, not to the fact.

When teaching philosophy one can often say: “Scoundrels themselves who turn us into rogues!”^d

8.[5.30]

I never committed a prank & probably won’t ever commit one. It would not accord with my nature. (As with everything natural, I consider that neither a fault nor a merit.)

9.[5.30]

I am very much in love with R.,^e have been for a long time of course, but it is especially strong now. And yet I know that the matter is in all probability hopeless. That is, I must be braced that she might get [26] engaged & married any moment. And I know that this will

^aMore literally, Wittgenstein’s “immer erst dann” should be rendered “always just when and not earlier.”

^bWittgenstein here uses a phrase that had assumed the status of a slogan with Nietzschean overtones (“Umwertung aller Werte”)—see p. [53] below.

^cThe German word here is “Suff.”

^dWittgenstein here quotes from Friedrich Schiller’s (1759–1805) play *Die Piccolomini*, the middle part of the *Wallenstein* trilogy, act 4, scene 7 (“Spitzbuben selbst, die uns zu Schelmen machen!”).

^e“R.” stands for Marguerite’s last name, Respinger.

[26–27]

verloben & heiraten kann. Und ich weiß daß das sehr schmerzlich für mich sein wird. Ich weiß also daß ich mich nicht mit meinem ganzen Gewicht an diesen Strick hängen soll weil ich weiß daß er einmal nachgeben wird. Daß heißt ich soll mit beiden Füßen auf dem festen Boden stehen bleiben & den Strick nur halten, aber nicht mich an ihn hängen. Aber das ist schwer. Es ist schwer so uneigennützig zu lieben daß man ~~@~~ die Liebe hält & von ihr nicht gehalten werden will. – Es ist schwer ^{die Liebe} ~~II~~ so ^{halten} zu ~~lieben~~ daß man, wenn es schief geht sie nicht als ein verlorenes Spiel ansehen muß sondern sagen kann: darauf war ich vorbereitet & es ist auch so in Ordnung. Man könnte sagen „wenn Du Dich nicht aufs Pferd setzt Dich ihm also ganz anvertraust so

kannst Du freilich nie abgeworfen werden aber auch nie hoffen je zu reiten. Und man kann darauf nur sagen: Du mußt Dich dem Pferd ganz widmen & doch gefaßt sein daß Du jederzeit abgeworfen werden kannst.

Man glaubt oft – und ich selber verfall oft in diesen Fehler – daß alles aufgeschrieben werden kann was man denkt. In Wirklichkeit kann man nur das aufschreiben – d.h. ohne etwas blödes & unpassendes zu tun – was in der Schreibform in uns entsteht. Alles andere wirkt komisch & gleichsam wie Schmutz. ^{Dreck} D.h. etwas was weggewischt gehörte.

Vischer sagte „eine Rede ist keine Schreibe“ und eine Denke ist ~~auch~~ schon erst recht keine.

be very painful for me. I therefore know that I should not hang my whole weight on this one rope since I know that eventually it will give. That is I should remain standing with both feet on firm ground & only hold the rope but not hang on it. But that is difficult. It is difficult to love so unselfishly that one holds on to love & does not want to be held by it.— It is difficult to hold on to love in such a way^a that, when things go wrong one does not have to consider it a lost game but can say: I was prepared for that & this is also alright. One could say “if you never sit on the horse and thus entrust yourself to it completely, then [27] of course you can never be thrown but also never hope ever to ride.”^b And all one can say to that is: You must wholly dedicate yourself to the horse & yet be braced that you may be thrown at any time.

One often thinks—and I myself often make this mistake—that everything one thinks can be written down. In reality one can only write down—that is, without doing something stupid & inappropriate—what arises in us in the form of writing. Everything else seems comical & as it were like dirt.^c That is, something that needs to be wiped off.

Vischer said “speaking is not writing” and thinking is even less so.^d

^aWittgenstein first wrote “It is difficult to love in such a way” and then substituted the unusual formulation concerning the difficulty of “holding,” “keeping,” or “maintaining” love (the German word is “halten”).

^bClosing quotation marks are presumably missing here.

^cThe diary offers two German words here: “Dreck” and “Schmutz.” Both are best translated as “dirt.”

^dThough the source of this quote could not be determined, Wittgenstein is most likely attributing it to Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807–1887). This German writer and philosopher is best known for his *Aesthetics or Science of the Beautiful*, for a work on *The Sublime and the Comical*, and for his parody *Faust: The Tragedy's Third Part*. [I.S.] The quoted statement “Eine Rede ist keine Schreibe” wittily reflects on the difference between speaking and writing. The noun “Rede” means “speech” but can also be taken as a substantivized form of the verb “reden” (as in “ich rede” or “I speak”). Vischer’s statement now submits the verb “schreiben” (to write) to the same treatment which yields the crude noun “Schreibe”—a kind of slang. Wittgenstein takes this a step further by inventing yet another noun when he introduces “eine Denke” as derived from “denken” (to think). The strangeness of this play on words would be captured by translating as follows: “Vischer said ‘a speech is no writ’ and a think all the less so.”

[28–29]

(Ich bin immer froh eine neue Seite anfangen zu können.)

Ich denke: Werde ich die R. je wieder in den Armen halten & küssen können? Und muß auch darauf gefaßt sein & mich damit aussöhnen können daß es nicht geschehen wird.

Stil ist der Ausdruck einer allgemeinen menschlichen Notwendigkeit. Das gilt vom Schreibstil wie vom Baustil (und jedem anderen).

Stil ist die allgemeine Notwendigkeit sub specie eterni gesehen.

Gretl machte ^{einmal} über Klara Schumann eine sehr gute Bemerkung: wir sprachen darüber daß es ihr – wie es uns scheint – an irgend etwas Menschlichem gefehlt haben muß, über ihre Prüderie etc. Da@ sagte Gretl

„sie war eben nicht was die Ebner Eschenbach war“ und das sagt alles.

Loos, Spengler, Freud & ich gehören alle in dieselbe Klasse die für diese Zeit charakteristisch ist.

12.

Ich habe immer Angst vor meinen Vorlesungen obwohl es bis jetzt immer ziemlich gut gegangen ist. Diese Angst besitzt mich dann wie eine Krankheit. Es ist übrigens nichts anderes als Prüfungsangst.

Die Vorlesung war mäßig. Ich bin eben schon müde. ~~denn ich habe keine ordentlichen Ferien gehabt.~~ Keiner meiner Hörer ahnt wie mein Gehirn arbeiten muß um das zu leisten, was es leistet. Wenn meine Leistung nicht erstklassig ist, so ist sie doch das Äußerste was ich leisten kann.

[28] (I am always glad when I can start a new page.)

I think: Will I ever be able to hold R. in my arms again & kiss her? And this too I must be braced for, & be able to reconcile myself that it will not happen.

Style is the expression of a general human necessity.^a This holds for a writing style or a building style (and any other).

Style is general necessity viewed *sub specie aeterni*.^b

Gretl once made a very good remark about Clara Schumann^c: we were speaking about how she must have lacked—as it appears to us—something human, about her prudishness etc. That’s when Gretl said: [29] “after all she was not what Ebner Eschenbach was” and that says it all.^d

Loos, Spengler, Freud & I all belong to the same class that is characteristic for this age.^e
12.[5.30]

Before my lectures I am always anxious even though so far it has always gone quite well. This anxiety then possesses me like an illness. It is by the way nothing other than test anxiety.

The lecture was mediocre. I am tired already, after all.^f None of my students has any idea how my brain must work in order to achieve what it achieves. If my achievement is not first rate, it is still the utmost of what I can achieve.

^aSee Spengler [16,b] above, vol. 1, chap. 4, sec. 1,1: “Style is [. . .] the revelation of something metaphysical, a mysterious having to, a fate.” See also chap. 6, sect. 6, and Joachim Schulte’s essay “Stilfragen” in his *Chor und Gesetz* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990).

^b“Considered from the point of view of eternity.” On various occasions Wittgenstein used this expression from Spinoza’s *Ethica* (1677), book V, proposition 31, scholium. See remark 6.45 of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, *Culture and Value*, [6,b] above, p. 5/7, and an entry dated 7.10.16 of his *Notebooks 1914–1916*, [21,d], p. 83. [I.S.]

^cThe third oldest of Wittgenstein’s sisters, Margarete Stonborough (1882–1958) married Jerome Stonborough in 1905. Pianist and composer Clara Schumann, née Wieck (1819–1896) married Robert Schumann in 1840, was a close friend of Brahms, and had frequent contact with the Wittgenstein family. [I.S.]

^dThe short stories, novels, and aphorisms of the Austrian writer Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach (1830–1916) testify to her human sympathy and social engagement. [I.S.]

^eWittgenstein got to know Adolf Loos (1870–1933) in 1914. A pioneer of modernist architecture, Loos wrote in one of his critical pamphlets that “ornament is murder.”

^fOriginally the sentence continued: “since I didn’t have a decent vacation.” Wittgenstein crossed this out.

[30–31]

Ich glaube es gehört heute
 Heroismus dazu die Dinge
nicht als Symbole im Kraus-
 schen Sinn zu sehen. Das heißt
 sich freizumachen von einer
 Symbolik, ~~z~~ die zur Routine
 werden kann. Das heißt
 freilich nicht ~~sie~~ versuchen
^{wieder}
 sie ^{||} flach zu sehen sondern
 die Wolken des, sozusagen, billi-
 gen Symbolismus in einer höhe-
 ren Sphäre wieder zu verdampfen
 (so daß die Luft wieder durch-
 sichtig wird)

Es ist schwer sich diesem
 Symbolismus heute nicht hin
 zugeben.

Mein Buch die log.phil. Abhandlung
 enthält neben gutem & echtem auch
 Kitsch d.h. Stellen mit denen ich
 Lücken ausgefüllt habe und sozu-

16. sagen in meinem eigenen Stil. Wie viele
~~solche Stellen~~ von dem Buch
 solche Stellen sind weiß ich
 nicht & es ist schwer es jetzt
 gerecht zu schätzen.

26.5.

Ein Mann mit mehr Talent
^{dann}
 als ich ist der, der dort
^{wenn}
 wacht, wo ich schlafe. Und
 ich schlafe viel, darum ist es
 leicht mehr Talent zu haben
 als ich.

2.10.

In Cambridge angekommen. Fuhr
 von Wien am 26^{ten} ab & zu
 Tante Clara in Thumersbach
 & wenn es auch nicht so rein
^{dort}
 herrlich ^{||} bei ihr war wie sonst
 in Laxenburg so war es doch
 schön & ich schied mit guten
 Gefühlen. Am 27^{ten} abend kam
 ich in Gottlieben an & da war es
 erst gespannt ~~das~~ so viel

[30] 16.[5.30]

I think that today it requires heroism to see things not as symbols in the sense of Kraus.^a That is, to free oneself of a symbolism that can become routine. That is of course not to try seeing them as shallow again but to vaporize the clouds of the so-to-speak cheap symbolism in a higher sphere (so that the air becomes transparent again).

It is difficult not to give in to this symbolism today.

Aside from the good & genuine, my book the *Tractatus Log.-Phil.* also contains kitsch, that is, passages with which I filled in the gaps and so-to-speak [31] in my own style. How much of the book consists of such passages I don't know & it is difficult to fairly evaluate now.

26.5.[30]

A man with more talent than I is awake then, when I sleep.^b And I sleep a lot and therefore it is easy to have more talent than I.

2.10.[30]^c

Arrived in Cambridge. Left Vienna on the 26th & to Aunt Clara in Thumersbach & even if it was not as purely wonderful there with her as it usually is in Laxenburg, it was nice nevertheless & I parted with good feelings.^d On the evening of the 27th I arrived in Gottlieben^e & at first it was tense there since so much [32] murkiness was in the air, & in the

^aThis refers to the Austrian journalist, publicist, writer Karl Kraus (1874–1936), who from 1899 until his death was editor of *Die Fackel*. Wittgenstein was an admirer of Kraus before World War I and had *Die Fackel* forwarded to him during an extended stay in Norway from October 1913 until June 1914. It was a remark by Kraus about the journal *Der Brenner* that prompted Wittgenstein's donation to Ludwig von Ficker, editor of the *Brenner*. Later on Wittgenstein's attitude toward Kraus became increasingly critical; in this volume see, for example, letter 233 of his correspondence with Hänsel. Compare also a remark from January 11, 1948 (*Culture and Value*, [6,b] above, p. 66/76): "Raisins may be the best part of a cake; but a sack of raisins is not better than a cake; & someone who is in a position to give us a sack of raisins still cannot bake a cake with them, let alone do something better. I am thinking of Kraus & his aphorisms, but also of myself & my philosophical remarks. A cake, that is not as it were: diluted raisins." [I.S.]

^bIn an alternative formulation Wittgenstein speaks of a man "who wakes there, where I sleep."

^cNearly five months and a summer in Austria have passed since the last entry; compare Monk's biography, [1,a], pp. 298–304. Wittgenstein's classes were to begin on October 13.

^dClara Wittgenstein (1850–1935) was an unmarried sister of Wittgenstein's father, Karl. For most of the year she lived in the Wittgensteins' castle Laxenburg near Vienna. Karl's children had fond memories of the many holidays they spent with her. Thumersbach is a village in the province of Salzburg. [I.S.]

^eGottlieben is a small town in Switzerland on the Rhine River just downstream from Lake Constance, very close to Germany and the city of Constance.

[32–33]

unaufgeklärtes in der Luft lag & wir saßen im Auto in dem sie mich abholte & beim Abendessen still oder von ~~über~~ gleichgültigen Dingen redend. Und stockend, ~~wie man~~ oder gezwungen fließend wie man es tut wenn eigentlich schwere Sachen im Innern drücken. Nach dem Nachtmal fing ich an über ihren letzten Brief zu reden. Ich sagte daß mir ein gewisser Ton von Triumph an ihm als unrichtig aufgefallen sei. Daß sie wenn alles in Ordnung wäre nicht in triumphalem Ton geschrieben hätte weil sie dann auch die Schwierigkeiten gesehen hätte & das Angenehme als eine Gnade des Himmels angenommen hätte. Ich bat sie so bald als möglich nach

Wien zu kommen & dort zu arbeiten.

Erst als wir (besonders ich) ^{ziemlich} schon viel geredet hatten sah ich daß sie sehr unglücklich sei. Im Grunde war der Gedanke an das Heiraten in ihr obenauf. Das schien für sie doch die einzige wirkliche Lösung. Das brauche sie & sonst nichts. Ich bat sie Geduld zu haben. es werde sich das Richtige – ihr angemessene – für sie finden. Sie solle jetzt vor allem einmal wieder anständig arbeiten & das weitere abwarten. Erst bei einer anständigen Arbeit werde ihr alles klarer & leichter erträglich werden. – ~~Am nächsten Morgen~~ Sie war bei diesem Gespräch wieder recht fremd gegen mich wieweil meinen Küssen eher aus &

car in which she picked me up & at dinner we sat quietly or talking of incidental things.^a And spoke falteringly or forcedly fluent as one does when really heavy matters are pressing inside. After the evening meal I started talking about her last letter. I said that I noticed in it as not right a certain tone of triumph. That she wouldn't have written in a triumphant tone if everything was alright because then she would have seen the difficulties, too & accepted what is pleasant as a grace of heaven. I asked her to come to Vienna as soon as possible [33] & work there. Only when we (especially I) had already talked quite a bit did I see that she was very unhappy. The thought of marriage was basically on her mind. To her that seemed to be the only real solution, after all. That's what she said she needs^b & nothing else. I asked her to be patient. that^c she will find what's right for her—appropriate to her. Most of all she should just work decently again & wait for the rest. Only with decent work everything would become clearer & more easily bearable for her.—During^d this conversation she was again rather distant toward me, tended to dodge my kisses & [34] often

^aAccording to the original German “so viel unaufgeklärtes” was in the air, which literally means so much that is “unenlightened,” “unsettled,” or “unresolved.”

^bWittgenstein wrote “das brauche sie” which is a form of indirect speech, quoting what she has said.

^cThough a new sentence, this one was not capitalized by Wittgenstein. It continues in indirect speech.

^dWittgenstein began to write “the following morning” and then crossed that out in order to include the following impressions before turning on the next page to the following morning.

[34–35]

sah oft geradezu finster
 drein & blickte dabei zur
 Seite was ich an ihr nie ge-
 sehen hatte & mich gleich-
 sam erschreckte. Sie schien
 gegen mich, bitter, beinahe
 kalt ^{1f} & unglücklich & abwei-
 send. Am nächsten Morgen war
 es etwas besser. Wir gingen
 spazieren & plauderten
 einiges & sie war zugänglicher
 & herzlicher. Sie war jetzt ent-
 schieden dafür nach Wien zu
 gehen & schien im Allgemeinen
 ruhiger. Am Abend aber nach
 einem weiteren ernsten Gespräch
 fing sie an zu weinen. ~~Sie~~ Ich
 hielt sie in meinen Armen
 & sie weinte an meiner Schulter.
 Es war aber ein gutes Weinen &
 sie war darauf weicher & etwas
 erleichtert. Am nächsten
 Morgen entschied ich mich
 noch einen Tag zu bleiben

gegen meinen ursprünglichen Plan.
 Ich hatte das Gefühl es
 werde für sie (& überhaupt)
 gut sein Auch sie war – glaube
 ich – froh darüber. Am Nach-
 mittag gingen wir nach Konstanz
 um ein Paket mit zwei Sweatern
 aufzugeben die sie für Talla
 gestrickt hatte. Ich mußte eine
 gewisse
~~Art~~ Eifersucht oder doch ein
 ähnliches Gefühl unterdrücken.
 War es deshalb oder vielleicht
 eine Reaktion auf die früheren
 Aufregungen (denn alles war un-
 geheuer anstrengend für mich)
 ich fühlte eine ~~stale~~hafte
 Verstimmung auf dem Nach-
 hauseweg & es ka(nn|m) mir
 @ immer etwas zum Weinen.
 Ich bat M. voranzugehen
 & kam später nach. Es er-
 leichterte mich allein sein
 zu können. Zuhause hatte

had a virtually gloomy expression & looked away, which I had never seen in her & which as it were shocked me. She seemed cold toward me, bitter, & unhappy & almost dismissive.^a The next morning it was a little better. We went for a walk & chatted some & she was more accessible & affectionate. She was now decidedly in favor of going to Vienna & generally seemed calmer. But in the evening after another serious conversation she began to cry. I held her in my arms & she cried on my shoulder. But it was a good crying & she was softer afterwards & somewhat relieved. The next morning I decided to stay another day [35] against my original plan. I had the feeling that it would be good for her (& in general). She too was—I think—glad about it. In the afternoon we went to Constance to mail a packet with two sweaters^b which she had knitted for Talla.^c I had to stifle a certain jealousy or at least a similar feeling.^d Was it because of that or perhaps a reaction to the earlier excitement (for everything was incredibly strenuous for me) I felt vivid displeasure on the way home & I constantly choked up.^e I asked M. to walk ahead & followed later. It relieved me that I could be alone. At home [36] I still had a pounding heart & retreated to

^aWittgenstein first wrote: “She appeared cold & unhappy & dismissive.” He then qualified “cold” with “gegen mich” (toward or against me); he included “bitter,” and added a “beinahe” to “abweisend” (almost refusing me, cold, dismissive, detached or aloof).

^bAn English word is used here: “mit zwei Sweatern.”

^cMarguerite Respinger married Talla Sjögren (1902–1945) in 1933. In a letter to Ilse Somavilla, dated September 25, 1995, she writes that she found in Talla a partner “who agreed with her way of life and signified peace.” Talla was one of three sons of Carl and Mima Sjögren and the brother of Wittgenstein’s friend Arvid. Along with Marguerite, he also belonged to Thomas Stonborough’s circle of friends (all of whom 10 to 15 years younger than Wittgenstein). After his father’s early death, Talla Sjögren lived with his mother and brothers in Vienna where he studied forestry and civil engineering. He acquired a farm in Chile where he moved with Marguerite. There he was shot and killed by a poacher in 1945. After his death, Marguerite married Benoît de Chambrier in 1949 and since 1952 lived on an estate near Neuchâtel. In 1978 she wrote her privately published memoirs for family and friends, “Granny et son temps.” She lived in Geneva.

^dBefore settling on “a certain jealousy,” Wittgenstein had written “a sort of jealousy” and crossed that out.

^eA completely literal translation would read: “there always came to me something for crying”—not an idiomatic phrase in German either.

[36–37]

ich noch immer Herzklopfen
 & zog mich in mein Zimmer
 zurück wo ich mich etwas
 elend fühlte. Dann kam
 ich, noch immer aufgereggt
 zu M. in den Salon wo wir
 gewöhnlich beisammen saßen.
 Sie war über meinen Zustand
 etwas bestürzt (ängstlich)
 aber er wurde bald besser
 vielleicht auch weil ich ihre
 Teilnahme fühlte. Am
 Abend dieses Tages war unser
 Verhältnis so gut & innig
 wie in früheren Tagen. Ich
 hielt sie in den Armen &
 wir küßten uns lange &
 ich war froh geblieben zu sein.
 Am nächsten Tag aber kam
 ein Brief von Talla & der
 erzeugte einen Umschwung,
 oder Rückschlag in der
 Stimmung. Am ~~Morgen~~ Nachmittag

ruderte ich sie auf den Rein zu
 einer klein Insel wo viel
 Schilf wächst wie dort über-
 all & ruderte ins Schilf
 hinein was ich sehr liebe. Und
 dort saßen wir im Boot &
 redeten lange über unser Ver-
 hältnis zu einander. Sie @
 sagte wie wenig ich ihr bedeute
 wenn ich abwesend sei.
 Und daß sie überhaupt
 ihr Verhältnis zu mir nicht
 begriffe. Daß sie sich z.B.
 von mir küssen lasse &
 mich küsse, ^{wovor sie} ~~was sie~~ bei jedem
 anderen @ zurückscheuen würde,
~~aber~~ (&) nicht versteht warum
 sie es bei mir kann. Ich erklär-
 te ihr manches so gut ich
 konnte. Wir fuhren mit einan-
 der nach Basel wo sie zu
 tun hat & mit mir am Bahn-
 hof wartete bis mein Zug nach

my room where I felt somewhat wretched. Then, still excited, I joined M. in the parlor where we usually sat together. She was somewhat shocked (anxious) about my condition but it soon got better perhaps in part because I felt her sympathy. That evening our relationship was as good & tender^a as in earlier days & we kissed each other for a long time & I was glad to have stayed. But on the next day a letter from Talla arrived & this produced an upheaval, or setback in the mood. In the afternoon^b [37] I rowed her to a small island on the Rhine where lots of reeds are growing as they do all around there & rowed into the reeds which I love doing very much. And there we sat in the boat & talked for a long time about our relationship. She said how little I mean to her when I am absent. And that she does not comprehend her relationship to me at all. That for example she lets herself be kissed by me & kisses me, of which she would shy away with everyone else,^c &^d doesn't understand why she can do it with me. I explained some things to her as well as I could. We drove to Basel together where she had something to do & waited with me at the train station for my train to [38] Boulogne. During this trip to Basel, however, her mood grew

^aAs on the bottom of page [16] above, Wittgenstein uses the word “innig” (close, affectionate).

^bOriginally, the sentence was to begin with “In the morning.”

^c“wovor sie bei jedem anderen zurückscheuen würde” is still indirect speech: “from which according to her, she shrinks back with everyone else.”

^dWittgenstein first wrote “but” and changed this to “&.”

[38–39]

Boulogne abging. Während dieser Fahrt nach Basel nun verschlechterte sich ihre Stimmung immer mehr. Sie wurde wieder finster & traurig. Ob durch den Inhalt von Tallas Brief oder nur dadurch daß er [@] überhaupt gekommen war & sie an ihre vergeblichen Wünsche mahnte, weiß ich nicht. Ich hielt ununterbrochen ihre Hand & sprach von Zeit zu Zeit in sie ein nur um ihr – beinahe ^{wenn auch} unbewußt – eine geringe Stütze zu geben. Beim letzten Abschied küssten wir uns aber ich fuhr mit schwerem Herzen fort & mit dem Gefühl sie in keinem guten Zustand zurückzulassen. Ich kam gestern nachmittag in London an & fuhr gleich zu Murakami dessen

guten & herzliche Art mir (H|h)alf. Dann brachte ich den Abend mit Gilbert zu & wir waren eigentlich lustig wenn mich auch mein schweres Gefühl nie verließ wie es natürlich ist. Heute vormittag schrieb ich einen langen Brief an Gretl worin ich so gut ich konnte das Ergebnis meines Aufenthalts bei M. & den Aufenthalt selbst beschrieb. Dann nach Cambridge wo ich bei Lettice wohne die sehr freundlich ^{& gut} mit mir ist. Ich erzählte ihr von Marguerite & unseren Schwierigkeiten. – Ich bin mir über die Bedeutung aller meiner Erlebnisse mit M. sehr im Unklaren. Ich weiß nicht wohin das führen soll, noch was ich tun soll um es in der besten Weise zu beeinflussen und auch mein Egoismus spielt

worse and worse. She became gloomy again & sad. Whether due to the content of Talla's letter or only because it had arrived at all & reminded her of her futile wishes, I don't know. I held her hand the whole time & spoke to her from time to time only to give her—though unconsciously^a—some small support. At the final farewell we kissed but I departed with a heavy heart & with the feeling of leaving her not in a good state. I arrived in London yesterday afternoon & drove right away to Murakami^b whose [39] good & affectionate manner helped me. I then spent the evening with Gilbert^c & we were actually quite merry even though my heavy feeling never left me as is natural. This morning I wrote a long letter to Gretl in which I described as well as I could the result of my stay with M. & the stay itself.^d Then on to Cambridge where I am staying with Lettice who is very friendly & good to me.^e I told her about Marguerite & our difficulties.—I am very unclear about the significance^f of all my experiences with M.. I don't know where this is to lead, or what I should do to influence it in the best way and my egoism, too, interferes [40]

^aWittgenstein left an alternative formulation that he also underlined to indicate his uncertainty or dissatisfaction: “almost unconsciously.”

^bAccording to a letter by Hermine Wittgenstein to Ludwig, probably from October 1932, Murakami was a London dealer of Japanese art; see Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Familienbriefe*, ed. Brian McGuinness et al. (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1996), p. 141. [I.S.]

^cGilbert Pattison (1908–1994) met Wittgenstein on a train when both returned in 1929 from Vienna to Cambridge. Pattison had traveled Europe extensively, became seriously ill with polio in 1927, and in 1928 joined Emmanuel College in Cambridge to study foreign languages. Wittgenstein and he remained close friends throughout the 1930s, Pattison spending many weekends in Cambridge. [I.S.]

^dThis letter has not been published and perhaps no longer exists.

^e“& good” was inserted later. After attending Newnham College in Cambridge, Lettice Cautley Ramsey, née Baker (1898–1985), received her MA in 1925 and in the same year married Frank Plumpton Ramsey (see page [6] above). Lettice was a well-known photographer and in 1932 became manager of the “Cambridge photographers” Ramsey and Muspratt. She was one of the few women in whose company Wittgenstein felt comfortable. When he returned to England early in 1929, he spent the first two weeks with Lettice and F. P. Ramsey in Cambridge. [I.S.]

^f“Bedeutung” can also be translated as “meaning.”

[40–41]

in meine Gedanken hinein & verwirrt vielleicht alles am meisten obwohl ich das nicht klar sehe.

An M. geschrieben. Ich halte ihr – in Gedanken – die Hand, wie ich es auf der Fahrt nach Basel tat, obwohl ich wußte daß sie nicht an mich dachte, nur damit sie unbewußt eine Stütze oder Hilfe hat. Oder sich vielleicht einmal mit guten Gefühlen daran erinnert.

Bin traurig in dem Gedanken M. nicht helfen zu können. Ich bin sehr schwach & wetterwendisch. Wenn ich stark bleibe d G.H. werde ich ihr vielleicht dadurch helfen können. – Es ist möglich, daß, was sie braucht, vor allem ein starker & fester Pflock ist der stehen

bleibt, wie sie auch flattert. Ob ich die Kraft dazu haben werde? Und die nötige Treue?

3. Möge mir Gott das Nötige geben.

Ich sollte mich nicht wundern wenn die Musik der Zukunft einstimmig wäre. Oder ist das nur, weil ich mir mehrere Stimmen nicht klar vorstellen kann? Jedenfalls kann ich mir nicht denken daß die alten großen Formen (Streichquartett,

4. Symphonie, Oratorium etc) irgend eine Rolle werden spielen können. Wenn etwas kommt so wird es – glaube ich – einfach sein müssen, durchsichtig. In gewissem Sinne nackt. Oder wird das nur für eine gewisse Rasse, nur für eine Art der Musik gelten(?)

7.10.

with my thoughts & perhaps does the most to confuse everything, even though I don't see this clearly.

3.[10.30]

Wrote to M.. I am holding her hand—in my thoughts—as I did on the ride to Basel, even though I knew that she wasn't thinking of me, only so that she unconsciously has some support or help. Or so that she might remember it some day with good feelings.

4.[10.30]

Am saddened by the thought^a of not being able to help M.. I am very weak & moody. If I remain strong, with the help of God,^b I can perhaps help her through that.—It is possible that what she needs most of all is a strong & firm post that remains standing [41] no matter how she flutters. Whether I will have the strength for that? And the necessary loyalty?^c May God grant me what is necessary.

I shouldn't be surprised if the music of the future were in unison. Or is that only because I cannot clearly imagine several voices? Anyway I can't imagine that the old large forms (string quartet, symphony, oratorio etc.) will be able to play any rôle at all. If something comes it will have to be—I think—simple, transparent.

In a certain sense, naked.

Or will that hold only for a certain race, only for one kind of music(?)

7.10.[30]

^aWittgenstein literally writes “in the thought.”

^bThe diary contains only the abbreviated expression “d G.H.” The editor [I.S.] conjectures that this stands for “durch Gottes Hilfe”—“with the help of God.”

^c“die nötige Treue” could also be translated “the required fidelity” or “faithfulness.”

[42–43]

Suche nach Wohnung & fühle mich elend & unruhig. Unfähig mich zu sammeln. Habe keinen @.. @.. Brief von M. bekommen & auch das beunruhigt mich. Schrecklich daß ~~ich~~ es keine Möglichkeit gibt ihr zu helfen oder daß ich doch nicht weiß wie ihr zu helfen wäre.^{ist.} Ich weiß nicht welches Wort von mir ihr gut tun würde oder ob es das Beste für sie wäre nichts von mir zu hören. Welches Wort wird sie nicht mißverstehen? Auf welches wird sie hören? Man kann beinahe immer auf beide Arten antworten & muß es endlich Gott überlassen.

Ich habe manchmal über mein seltsames Verhältnis zu Moore nachgedacht. Ich achte ihn hoch

& habe eine gewisse nicht ~~ganz~~ geringe Zuneigung zu ihm. Er dagegen? Er schätzt meinen Verstand, mein philosophisches Talent hoch,^{d.h.} ~~d.h.~~ er glaubt daß ich sehr gescheidt bin aber seine Zuneigung zu mir ist wahrscheinlich recht gering. Und ich konstruiere dies mehr als ich es fühle, denn er ist freundlich zu mir, wie zu jedem & wenn er hierin mit verschiedenen Leuten verschieden ist so merke ich doch ~~keinen~~ den Unterschied nicht weil ich ~~für~~ gerade ~~für~~ diese Nuance ~~keine A~~ nicht verstehe. Ich bin aktiv oder aggressiv er aber passiv & darum merke ich während unseres Verkehrs gar nicht wie fremd ich ihm bin. Ich erinnere mich darin an meine Schwester Helene der es mit Menschen gradeso geht. Es kommt dann die peinliche

[42] Looking for an apartment & feeling miserable & restless. Incapable of collecting myself. Have not received a letter from M. & that too worries me. Terrible that there is no possibility of helping her or that at any rate I don't know how she can be helped.^a I don't know what word from me would do her good or whether it would be best for her to hear nothing from me. Which word won't she misunderstand? Which will she heed?^b One can almost always answer both ways & must ultimately leave it to God.

I have occasionally thought about my strange relationship with Moore.^c I respect him greatly [43] & have a certain, not inconsiderable affection for him.^d He on the other hand? He esteems my intellect, my philosophical talent highly, that is,^e he believes that I am very clever but his affection toward me is probably quite inconsiderable. And I construct this more than I feel it, for he is friendly to me, as to everyone & if he is different in this regard with different people, then I don't notice this difference because I do not understand just this nuance. I am active or aggressive but he passive & therefore I don't notice in our dealings at all how much of a stranger I am to him. I remind myself in this regard of my sister Helene who is the same way with people.^f This leads to the awkward [44] situation

^aThe diary leaves an undecided alternative: “could be helped.”

^b“auf etwas hören” is an idiomatic phrase that literally means “to listen to something,” but often connotes “to obey.”

^cGeorge Edward Moore (1873–1958) was a professor in Cambridge from 1925 to 1939, guest professor in the USA from 1940 to 1944, and editor of the philosophical journal *Mind*. His 1903 publication in *Mind* of “Refutation of Idealism” established him as one of the founders of English naturalism. Other works include *Principia Ethica* (1903), *Ethics* (1912), *Commonplace Book of G.E.M.* (1912–1953), *Philosophical Studies* (1922), and *A Defence of Common Sense* (1924). He attended Wittgenstein's lectures from 1930 to 1933. In this volume, more on Wittgenstein's relationship with Moore can be found in letter 233 of his correspondence with Hänsel. See also Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 116. [I.S.]

^dOriginally, the text contained a “ganz,” suggesting that Wittgenstein might have formulated at first “have a not altogether inconsiderable affection toward him.” At some stage (perhaps even before he wrote “inconsiderable”), the “altogether” was crossed out.

^eWittgenstein wrote “d.h.” (that is), crossed it out, then inserted it again.

^fHelene Salzer, née Wittgenstein (1879–1956), was Wittgenstein's second oldest sister. She was called Lenka by her family. Ludwig especially appreciated her humor and musicality. [I.S.]

[44–45]

Situation heraus daß man fühlt
 man habe sich den Menschen
 aufgedrängt ohne daß man es
 wollte oder wußte. Plötzlich
 kommt man darauf daß @..
 man mit ihnen nicht so steht
 wie man annahm weil sie die
 Gefühle nicht erwidern die man
 ihnen entgegenbr^{trägt}ingt; man hat
 es aber nicht bemerkt da
 die Verschiedenheit der Rollen in
 diesem Verkehr ^{auf jeden Fall} so groß ist daß
 sich dahinter Nuancen von Zunei-
 gung & Abneigung ^{leicht} verstecken kön-
 nen. Ich fragte Moore heute,
 ob er sich freue wenn ich zu ihm
 regelmäßig (wie im vorigen Jahr) komme
 & sagte ich werde nicht gekränkt
 sein wie immer die Antwort aus-
 falle. Er sagte es sei ihm selbst
 nicht klar & ich: er solle sich's
 überlegen & mir mitteilen; was
 er versprach. Ich sagte

ich könne nicht versprechen
 daß mich die Antwort nicht
 traurig machen werde, wohl
 aber daß sie mich nicht kränken
 werde. – Und ich glaube daß es
 Gottes Wille mit mir ist, daß
 ich «das» hören & es tragen soll.

Immer wieder glaube ich daß ich
^{eine Art} ähnlich dem Peter Schlemihl ^{oder sein soll} bin, ^{||}
 & wenn dieser Name soviel wie
 Pechvogel ~~bedeutet~~, so heißt,
 so bedeutet das, daß er
 durch das äußere Unglück
^{soll} glücklich werden muß.

8.10.

In der neuen Wohnung, sie paßt
 mir noch nicht, wie ein neuer
 Anzug. Ich fühle mich kalt &
 ungemütlich. Schreibe das nur
 um etwas zu schreiben & mit
 mir selbst zu reden. Ich könnte
 sagen: jetzt bin ich endlich mit

that one feels as if one had imposed oneself upon people without wanting to or being aware of it. Suddenly it hits one that the relation to them is not as one assumed because they do not reciprocate the feelings one bears toward them;^a but one hadn't noticed it since the difference of rôles in these interactions at any rate is so great that the nuances of like & dislike can easily hide behind them.^b I asked Moore today whether he is glad when I come to see him regularly (as in the previous year)^c & said that I will not be offended whatever the answer turns out to be. He said that it wasn't clear to himself, & I: he should think it over & inform me; which he promised to do. I said [45] I could not promise that his answer will not sadden me, yet, however, that it will not offend me.—And I believe it is God's will with me, that I shall hear & bear it.

Again and again I believe that I am, or am supposed to be a sort of Peter Schlemihl^d & if this name means^e as much as unlucky fellow, this signifies that through outward unhappiness he is supposed to^f become happy.

8.10.[30]

In the new apartment, it doesn't fit me yet, like a new suit.^g I feel cold & uncomfortable. Writing this only to be writing something & to talk to myself. I could say: now I am finally [46] alone with myself & must gradually get into conversation with me.

^aWittgenstein first wrote "entgegenbringt" (brings toward them). After expressing his doubt regarding "bringt," he added "trägt" (carries or bears) but left the question undecided.

^b"at any rate" and "easily" were inserted into the line.

^cThis expression in indirect speech could be elliptical for: "whether he would be glad, if I came."

^dAs in note a above, this is an undecided alternative to: "that I am [inserted into line: or am supposed to be] similar to Peter Schlemihl." Adelbert von Chamisso (1781–1838) published "The Wonderful Story of Peter Schlemihl" in 1814. This fairy tale of a man without a shadow who learns to accommodate himself to his luckless lot is a Biedermeier version of *Faust*. Compare Wittgenstein's remark about the story in *Culture and Value* [6.b], p. 14/21, also MS 111 in vol. 4 of the *Wiener Ausgabe* (Vienna: Springer, 1995), p. 38. [I.S.]

^e"bedeutet" was replaced by "heißt," but both words can be translated "means."

^fThe diary offers an alternative formulation "must" and leaves the matter undecided.

^gIt is difficult to determine where Wittgenstein lived at that time. From the list of addresses published by the *Cambridge University Reporter*, Wittgenstein's is missing for October 1930. The January 1931 edition lists "6 Grantchester Road," and for April 1931 "C1 Bishop's Hostel, Trinity College." Since there was occasionally a delay in printing addresses, it cannot be ruled out that Wittgenstein lived at 6 Grantchester Road in October 1930 already. He probably rented two rooms in the house of George and Alison Quiggin. [I.S., based on information provided in a letter dated October 27, 1995 by Jonathan Smith, Trinity College Library]

[46–47]

mir allein & muß nach & nach
mit mir ins Gespräch kommen.

In der ^{großstädtischen} Großstadt – Zivilisation kann
sich der Geist nur in einen Winkel
drücken. Dabei ist er aber nicht
etwa atavistisch & überflüssig
sondern er schwebt über der
Asche der Kultur als (ewiger)
Zeuge – – quasi als Rächer
der Gottheit.
Gottes.

Als ^{eine} erwarte er seine neue Verkör-
perung (in einer neuen Kultur)

Wie müßte der große Satiriker
dieser Zeit ausschauen?

Es ist 3 Wochen seit ich
@ an Philosophie gedacht
habe aber jeder Gedanke an
sie ist mir so fremd als hatte
ich durch Jahre nichts solches

mehr gedacht. Ich ~~soll~~ will
in meiner ersten Vorlesung
über die spezifischen Schwie-
rigkeiten ~~der Gegenst~~ der Phi-
losophie sprechen & habe
das Gefühl: wie kann ich darü-
ber etwas sagen, ich kenne sie
ja gar nicht mehr.

9.

Obwohl ich bei recht freund-
lichen Leuten bin (oder gerade
deshalb?) fühle ich mich an-
dauernd gestört – obwohl
sie mich nicht tötlich stören – &
kann nicht zu mir kommen.
Das ist ein scheußlicher Zu-
stand. Jedes Wort das ich
sie sprechen höre stört mich.
Ich fühle mich umgeben & ver-
zum Arbeiten
hindert zur Ruhe zu kommen.

Ich fühle mich in meinem Zimmer
nicht allein sondern exiliert.

In the metropolitan civilization^a the spirit can only huddle in some corner.^b And yet it is not for instance atavistic & superfluous but hovers above the ashes of culture as an (eternal) witness— —as if an avenger of the deity.^c

As if it were awaiting a new incarnation^d (in a new culture).

What would the great satirist of this time have to look like?

It is 3 weeks since I thought of philosophy but every thought of it is so foreign to me as if I had not thought [47] such things for years anymore. In my first lecture I want to speak^e about the specific problems of philosophy & have the feeling: how can I say anything about this, I don't know them anymore.^f

9.[10.30]

Even though I am with quite friendly people (or just because of it?) I constantly feel disturbed—even though they do not actively disturb me—& cannot come to myself.^g That's an awful state. Every word I hear them speak disturbs me. I feel surrounded & prevented from getting down to work.^h

In my room I feel not alone but exiled.

^a“großstädtisch” or “metropolitan” was added as an alternative to the original “Großstadt-Zivilisation” or “big city civilization,” which was neither crossed nor underlined.

^b“Geist” is here more adequately translated as “spirit” rather than “mind.”

^c“avenger of the deity (Gottheit)” was introduced as an alternative to “avenger of God (Gottes).” See a remark from January 11, 1930, in *Culture and Value*, [6,b] above, p. 3/5: “The earlier culture will become a heap of rubble & finally a heap of ashes; but spirits will hover over the ashes” (this remark has been published in context in [2,a], p. 166). [I.S.]

^d“a new incarnation” is an alternative to “its new incarnation.”

^eThis clause originally began “I am supposed to (soll),” which was crossed out.

^fWittgenstein began his lectures for the Michaelmas term on October 13 with the following remarks about the rôle and difficulties of philosophy: “The nimbus of philosophy has been lost. For now we have a method of doing philosophy [. . .] What we are in fact doing is to tidy up our notions, to make clear what *can* be said about the world. [. . .] This activity of clearing up is philosophy. [. . .] The only way to do philosophy is to do everything twice.” See *Wittgenstein's Lectures 1930–1932: From the Notes of John King and Desmond Lee* (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), pp. 21–24. [I.S.]

^g“zu mir kommen” in the sense of regaining consciousness as when someone’s “comes to.”

^hAlternative to the original formulation “prevented from getting rest (zur Ruhe zu kommen).”

[48–49]

Fühle mich im allgemeinen etwas besser. Für mich arbeiten kann ich noch nicht, & das macht zum Teil der Zwiespalt ^{in mir} ~~zwischen~~ der englischen & deutschen Ausdrucksweise. Ich kann nur dann wirklich arbeiten, wenn ich mich an-dauernd deutsch mit mir un-terhalten kann. Nun muß ich aber für meine Vorlesungen die Sachen eng-lisch zusammenstellen & so bin ich in meinem deutschen Denken gestört; wenigstens bis sich ein Friedenszustand zwischen den beiden gebildet hat & das dauert einige Zeit, vielleicht sehr lang.

Ich @.. bin im Stande es mir in allen Lagen einzurich-ten. Wenn ich in eine neue Wohnung komme so unter andere Um-stände so trachte ich mir so-

16. bald als möglich eine @ Technik zurechtzulegen um die verschiedenen Unbequemlichkeiten zu ertragen & Reibungen zu vermeiden: Ich richte es mir in den gegebenen Umständen ein. Und so richte ich es mir nach & nach auch mit dem Denken ein nur daß das nicht einfach durch einen gewissen Grad von Selbstüberwin-dung & Klugheit ^{Verstand} ~~zu ma~~ geht. Sondern es muß sich von selbst herausbilden & zurechtlegen. Wie man endlich doch in dieser gezwungenen Lage einschläft. Und arbeiten können ähnelt in so vieler Beziehung dem ^{ein} schlafen können. Wenn man an Freuds Defi-nition des Schlafs denkt so könnte man sagen daß es sich in beiden Dingen um eine Truppenverschie-bung des Interesses handelt. (Im einen Fall um ein bloßes

[48] 16.[10.30]
 Feeling generally a little better. I cannot work for myself yet & that is in part due to the conflict in me of the English and German modes of expression.^a I can really work only when I can continuously converse with myself in German. But for my lectures I must now arrange things in English & so I am disturbed in my German thought; at least until a peaceful accord has formed between the two & that takes some time, perhaps very long.

I am capable of accommodating myself to all situations. When I come into new living quarters under new circumstances I undertake [49] as soon as possible to devise a technique to endure the various discomforts & to avoid friction: I accommodate myself to the given circumstances. And thus I accommodate myself gradually also with thinking, only this cannot be done simply through a certain degree of self-mastery & intellect.^b Instead this must form & arrange itself on its own. Just as one finally does fall asleep in this strained position. And being able to work is in so many ways similar to being able to fall asleep.^c If one thinks of Freud's definition of sleep one could say that both cases concern a shift of the troops of interest.^d (In the one case it is merely [50] a withdrawal, in the other a withdrawal and concentration at some location.)

^aThe sentence first spoke of "the conflict (Zwiespalt, also: ambivalence) between the English and German modes of expression." Wittgenstein crossed out "between" and inserted "in me."

^bWittgenstein added "intellect (Verstand)" as an undecided alternative to "intelligence (Klugheit)."

^cThe "ability to sleep" was changed by way of insertion into the "ability to fall asleep."

^dIn the fifth lecture of his *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Freud addresses the question of what is sleep: "That is a physiological or biological problem concerning which much is still in dispute. We can come to no decisive answer, but I think we may attempt to define one psychological characteristic of sleep. Sleep is a condition in which I refuse to have anything to do with the outer world, and have withdrawn my interest from it (mein Interesse von ihr abgezogen habe). I go to sleep by retreating (zurückziehen) from the outside world and warding off the stimuli proceeding from it. Again, when I am tired from that world I go to sleep. I say to it as I fall asleep: 'Leave me in peace, for I want to sleep.' The child says just the opposite: 'I won't go to sleep yet; I am not tired, I want more things to happen to me.' Thus the biological object of sleep seems to be recuperation, its psychological characteristic the suspension of interest in the world" (New York: Pocket Book, 1953), p. 92; compare also p. 424. [I.S.]

[50–51]

Abziehen im andern um ein
Abziehen, & Conzentrieren an einer
Stelle)

Moore hat meine Frage
dahin
später so beantwortet,
daß er mich zwar nicht eigent-
lich gern habe, daß mein Um-
gang ihm aber so ~~viel~~ gut
tut daß er ~~ihn~~ glaubt ihn
fortsetzen zu sollen. Das ist
ein eigentümlicher Fall.

Ich werde überhaupt mehr geach-
tet als geliebt. (Und das erstere
natürlich nicht mit recht) wäh-
rend einiger Grund bestünde
mich gern zu haben.

Ich glaube daß mein Denk-
apparat außergewöhnlich kom-
pliziert & fein gebaut ist
& darum mehr als gewohn-

lich empfindlich. Vieles stört
ihn, setzt ihn außer Aktion
was einen gröberer Mechanis-
mus nicht stört. Wie ein Stäubchen ein feines
Instrument zum
Stillstand bringen kann aber ein gröberer nicht beeinflusst.

Es ^{ist} merkwürdig, seltsam,
wie sehr es mich beglückt
wieder irgend etwas über Logik
@ schreiben zu können obwohl
meine Bemerkung gar nicht
besonders inspiriert ist. Aber
das blo@ße mit ihr allein
beisammen sein zu können
gibt mir das Glücksgefühl. Wieder
geborgen, wieder zu Hause, wieder
in der Wärme sein zu können
ist es wonach mein Herz sich
sehnt & was ihm so wohl tut.

18.

Die Manier im Schreiben ist
ist eine Art Maske hinter der
das Herz seine Gesichter schneidet
wie es will.

Moore later answered my question to the effect^a that while he does not actually like me, my company nevertheless does him so much good that he thinks he should continue to keep it. That is a peculiar case.

I am on the whole more respected than loved. (And the former of course not justly) while there would be some reason to like me.

I believe that my mental apparatus is built in an extraordinarily complicated & delicate manner & therefore more sensitive than [51] normal.^b Much that wouldn't disturb a cruder mechanism disturbs it, puts it out of action. Just as a particle of dust can bring a fine instrument to a standstill but will not influence a cruder one^c

It is curious, strange, how happy it makes me to be able to write something about logic again even though my remark is not particularly inspired. But merely being able to be alone with her gives me that feeling of happiness. The capacity to be sheltered again, at home again, in the warmth again, that is what my heart yearns for & what does it such good.^d

18.[10.30]

The manner in writing is a sort of mask behind which the heart makes faces as it pleases.^e

^a“dahin (to the effect)” is an alternative to “so (thus, in this manner).”

^bThe German for “mental apparatus” is “Denkapparat,” which could also be rendered “machinery for thinking or thought.” Wittgenstein’s sister Hermine compared him to a sensitive “precision instrument” in her contribution to a volume edited by Rush Rhees, *Recollections of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 4.

^cThis last sentence was inserted in the margin.

^dThe “feminine” German noun “die Logik” is indeed a “she” in this remark: “das bloße mit ihr (with it or her) allein beisammen sein zu können gibt mir das Glücksgefühl.”

^eWittgenstein wrote “Manier im Schreiben”: “manner of writing” would translate this expression too weakly, “mannerism in writing” too strongly. Also, Wittgenstein accidentally repeated the “is.”

[52–53]

Echte Bescheidenheit ist eine religiöse Angelegenheit.

Wenn man mit Leuten redet die einen nicht wirklich ver-
fühlt man immer das man has made
stehen, one always makes a

^a fool of oneself, wenigstens ich.

Und das geschieht mir hier immer wieder. Man hat die Wahl zwischen völliger Fremdheit & dieser unangenehmen Erfahrung. Und ich könnte ja sagen: Ich habe doch den einen oder den anderen Menschen auch hier mit denen ich reden kann ohne in diese Gefahr zu kommen; & warum ziehe ich mich von den anderen nicht ganz zurück? Aber das ist schwer & mir unnatürlich. Die Schwierigkeit ist mit einem Menschen freundlich zu sprechen ohne Punkte

zu berühren in denen man sich nicht verstehen kann. Ernst zu sprechen & so daß @ keine unwesentliche Sache die zu (m|M)ißverständnissen führen muß berührt wird. Es ist mir beinahe unmöglich.

19.

22.

Unsere Zeit ist wirklich eine Zeit der Umwertung aller Werte. (Die Prozession der Menschheit biegt um eine Ecke & was früher die Richtung nach oben war ist jetzt die Richtung nach unten etc.) Hat Nietzsche das im Sinne gehabt was jetzt geschieht & besteht sein Verdienst darin es vorausgeahnt & ein Wort dafür gefunden zu haben?

Es gibt auch in der Kunst Menschen die glauben ihr ewiges Leben durch gute Werke erzwingen zu können & solche die sich der

[52]

Genuine modesty is a religious matter.^a

19.[10.30]

When talking with people who don't really understand one, one always feels that one has made a fool of oneself,^b at least I do. And here this happens to me again and again. One has the choice between remaining a complete stranger & this unpleasant experience.^c And of course I could say: Here too, I have this or that person, after all, with whom I can talk without danger of this; & why don't I withdraw altogether from the others? But that's difficult & unnatural for me.^d The difficulty is how to speak in a friendly way with someone & not touch upon points [53] on which we cannot understand each other. To speak seriously & so that one does not touch upon anything inessential which must lead to misunderstandings. This is just about impossible for me.

22.[10-30]

Our age is really an age of the transvaluation of all values. (The procession of humankind turns a corner & what used to be the way up is now the way down^e etc.) Did Nietzsche have in mind what is now happening & does his achievement consist in anticipating it & finding a word for it?^f

In art, too, there are people who believe that they can forcibly bring about their eternal life by doing good works & those who cast themselves [54] in the arms of grace.^g

^aCompare a remark from roughly 1944 in *Culture and Value*, [6,b] above, p. 45/51: "People are religious to the extent that they believe themselves to be not so much *imperfect* as *sick*. People who are halfway decent will believe themselves utterly imperfect, but religious people believe themselves *wretched*." [I.S.]

^bWittgenstein used an English expression here. At first he wrote that when talking with people who don't really understand one, "one always makes a fool of oneself." He then created an alternative formulation by adding "fühlt man immer das man has made a (one always feels that one has made a)." He did not decide between these alternatives.

^cThe original formulation speaks simply of a choice between complete strangeness, alienation, or estrangement (völliger Fremdheit) "& this unpleasant experience."

^dThe German reads "mir unnatürlich" which suggests something like "does not agree with my nature."

^eMore literally: "What used to be the direction to the top is now the direction to the bottom."

^fNietzsche refers to the "transvaluation of values (Umwertung der Werte)" in chapter 3 of *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886). In 1895 he published *The Anti-Christ*, which was first conceived as the first part of a larger work with the title *Transvaluation of All Values (Umwertung aller Werte)*.

^gPresumably an allusion to Romans 11:6 and 2 Timothy 1:9.

[54–55]

Gnade in die Arme werfen.

Wenn mir etwas fehlt etwa eine Halsentzündung wie heute so werde ich gleich sehr ängstlich, denke, was wird werden wenn es schlimmer wird & ich einen Doktor brauche & die Doktoren hier sind nichts wert & ich muß vielleicht auf lange meine Vorlesungen einstellen etc - als ob der liebe Gott mit mir einen Kontrakt abgeschlossen hätte daß er mich ungestört hier läßt. Wenn ich solche Angst bei Anderen sehe, so sage ich „das muß man eben hinnehmen“; es fällt mir aber selbst sehr schwer mich auf's Hinnehmen einzustellen statt auf's Genießen.

Man sieht gerne den Helden ^{im Anderen} als Schauspiel (das uns geboten wird) aber selbst einer zu sein auch nur

im Geringsten schmeckt anders.

Im durchscheinenden Licht hat das Heldentum eine andere Farbe als im auffallenden. (schlecht)

Der Unterschied ist eher der zwischen einer gesehenen & einer gegessenen Speise. Weil hier das Erlebnis wirklich ein gänzlich anderes ist.

1.11.

Was mich im Schlafen stört stört mich auch im Arbeiten. Pfeifen & Sprechen aber nicht das Geräusch von Maschinen oder doch viel weniger.

9.

Patriotismus ist die Liebe zu einer Idee.

16.

Der Schlaf & die geistige Arbeit entsprechen einander in vieler Beziehung. Offenbar dadurch daß beide ein Ab-

When something is wrong with me like today's sore throat I get very anxious right away, think, what'll happen if it gets worse & I need a doctor & the doctors here are worthless & perhaps I must cancel my lectures for a long time etc.—as if the Good Lord had made a contract with me that here he will leave me undisturbed. When I see such anxiety in others, I say “that must simply be endured”; but it is very difficult for me to adjust myself to endurance rather than enjoyment.

One likes to see the hero in the other as a drama (that is performed for us)^a but to be even the least [55] bit of a hero oneself leaves a different taste.^b

In a translucent light heroism has a different color than in a conspicuous one. (bad)

The difference is more like that between a dish that is seen & one that is eaten. Because here the experience is really an entirely different one.^c

1.11.[30]

What disturbs me in my sleep^d also disturbs me in my work. Whistling & speaking but not the sound of machines^e or at least much less.

9.[11 or 12.30]

Patriotism is love of an idea.^f

16.[11 or 12.30]

Sleep & mental work correspond to one another in many respects. Apparently in that both involve a with[56]drawal of attention from certain things.^g

^a“in the other” was inserted into the line; the last words could also be translated “a play (that is staged for us or presented to us).”

^bLiterally: “tastes differently.”

^cFollowing custom, the German “Erlebnis” is here translated as “experience.” However, as opposed to “Erfahrung (experience),” “Erlebnis” lacks the structure and meaning of “experience,” but relates instead to the visceral aspects of experience, to sensation, adventure, the immediate perception of or participation in something that is happening.

^dLiterally: “in sleeping.”

^e“Geräusch von Maschinen” could also be translated “noise of engines.”

^fLiterally: “love to an idea.”

^gWhere he spoke of a “withdrawal of interest” on [49f.] above, Wittgenstein here formulates “Abziehen der Aufmerksamkeit (withdrawal of attention or attentiveness).”

[56–57]

ziehen der Aufmerksamkeit von
gewissen Dingen enthalten.

26,

Ein Wesen, das mit Gott in
Verbindung steht, ist
stark

16.1.31.

Es ist in meinem Leben eine
Tendenz dieses Leben zu
basieren auf der Tatsa-
che daß ich viel gescheiter
als die Anderen
bin als meine Mitmenschen

Wenn aber diese Annahme
zusammenzubrechen droht
wenn ich sehe ^{um} || wie @ wenig
gescheiter ich bin als
andere Menschen dann
werde ich erst gewahr
wie falsch diese Grundlage
überhaupt ist auch
wenn die Annahme richtig
ist oder wäre. Wenn ich
mir sage: ich muß mir erst

einmal
|| vorstellen daß alle anderen

Menschen ebenso gescheit

~~wären~~ sind wie ich – ~~damit~~

womit ich mich gleichsam

des Vorteils der Geburt

, des ererbten Reichtums

begebe. – und dann wollen

wir sehen wie weit ich durch

die Güte allein komme,

wenn ich mir dies sage

so werde ich mir meiner

Kleinheit bewußt.

Oder soll ich so sagen:

Wieviel von dem was ich

geneigt bin an mir für das

Abzeichen eines Charakters

zu halten ist bloß das

Resultat eines schätzbaren

Talents!

Es ist beinahe ähnlich als

sähe man sich die Tapferkeits

A being that stands in contact with God is strong.

16.1.31^a

There is a tendency in my life to base this life on the fact that I am much cleverer than the others.^b But when this assumption threatens to break down, when I see by^c how much less clever I am than other people, only then do I become aware how wrong this foundation is in general even if the assumption is or were right. When I tell myself: first I must [57] imagine that all other people are^d just as clever as I am—by which as it were I forgo the advantage of birth, the inherited riches—and then let's see how far I get through goodness alone, when I tell myself that, I become aware of my smallness.

Or shall I say it so: How much of what I tend to take for the stamp of character^e in me is only the result of a shabby talent!

It is almost similar to looking at the medals [58] of valor on one's uniform^f & saying

^aAlmost two months have lapsed since the previous entry. Again, Wittgenstein has just recently returned to Cambridge from a vacation in Austria. Classes for the Lent term were to begin on January 19.

^bWittgenstein first wrote "than my fellow human beings (Mitmenschen)." He used wavy underlining to indicate his uncertainty regarding this phrase and added "than the others."

^cThe "by" was inserted into the line and then called into question through wavy underlining.

^dOriginally: "were" or "would be" (wären), then corrected to "are" (sind).

^eThe German word is "Abzeichen": While "Zeichen" is "sign," "Abzeichen" means "badge," "stripes," or "insignia."

^fRay Monk's biography has this to say about Wittgenstein's own medal of valor, which he received after the Austrian offensive of June 15, 1918: "Once again he was cited for his bravery: 'His exceptionally courageous behaviour, calmness, sang-froid, and heroism,' ran the report, 'won the total admiration of the troops.' He was recommended for the Gold Medal for Valour [. . .] but was awarded instead the Band of the Military Service Medal with Swords, it being decided that his action, though brave, had been insufficiently consequential to merit the top honor." ([1.a] above, p. 154).

[58–59]

medaillen an seinem Kriegsrock
 an & sagte sich: „ich bin
 doch ein ganzer Kerl“
 Bis man dieselbe Medaille
 an vielen Leuten bemerkt
 & sich sagen muß daß
 sie gar nicht der Lohn
 der Tapferkeit waren son-
 dern die Anerkennung eines
 bestimmten Geschick[es]s).

Immer wieder, wo ich
 mich gern als Meister
 fühlen möchte, komme
 ich mir wie ein Schuljunge
 vor.

Wie ein Schuljunge der
 geglaubt hat viel zu
 wissen & draufkommt
 daß er im Verhältnis zu
 Anderen gar nichts weiß.

Samstag 17.

Es fällt mir schwer zu

arbeiten d.h. meine Vorlesung
 vorzubereiten – obwohl es höchste
 Zeit ist – weil meine Ge-
 danken bei meinem Verhält-
 nis zur Marguerite sind. Einem
 Verhältnis bei dem ich beinahe
 nur aus dem was ich gebe
 Befriedigung schöpfen kann.
 Ich muß Gott bitten daß
 er mich arbeiten läßt.

27.

der vergangenen
 Die Musik aller Zeiten ent-
 spricht immer gewissen Maxi-
 men des guten & rechten der
 selben Zeit. So erkennen wir
 in Brahms die Grundsätze
 Kellers etc etc. Und da-
 rum muß eine ^{gute} Musik die
 heute oder vor kurzem gefunden
 wurde, die also modern ist,
 absurd erscheinen, denn wenn
 sie irgend einer der heutig~~en~~
ausgesprochenen Maximen

to oneself: “I am quite a fellow.”^a Until one notices the same medals on many people & must tell oneself that they are not at all the reward for bravery but the recognition of a particular skill.

Again and again, where I would like to have a sense of myself as a master, I feel like a schoolboy.

Like a schoolboy who thought he knew a lot & discovers that in relation to others he knows nothing.^b

Saturday 17.[1.31]

I find it difficult to [59] work, that is to prepare my lecture—even though it is high time—because my thoughts are with my relationship to Marguerite. A relationship in which I can draw satisfaction just about only from what I give. I must ask God that he lets me work.

27.[1.31]

The music of past times always corresponds to certain maxims of the good & right at that time.^c Thus we recognize in Brahms the principles of Keller etc etc.^d And that is why good music^e which was found today or recently, which is therefore modern, must seem absurd, for if it corresponds to any of the maxims articulated^f today [60] it must be dirt.

^a“Ich bin doch ein ganzer Kerl”—also in the sense of “I’m a real man.”

^b“im Verhältnis zu Anderen”—literally “in relation to others,” most likely in the sense of “in comparison to others” but possibly also in the sense of “in my way of relating to others.”

^cWittgenstein wrote “the music of all times” and then added the undecided alternative “the music of past times.”

^dThe Swiss author Gottfried Keller (1819–1890) participated in the political struggles of the so-called re-generation. He forged close ties to Ludwig Feuerbach, whose worldview influenced him decisively. Keller’s own style of poetic realism emerged from his encounter with late romanticism (see especially his novel *Green Henry* or the collection of novellas *The People of Seldwyla*). Paul Engelmann reports that Keller was one of the few great writers whom Wittgenstein “admired tenderly, even passionately.” Keller was to have commanded a kind of “truthfulness” and the “complete appropriateness of expression to sensation” that Wittgenstein was looking for in art (see Engelmann’s *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein—With a Memoir*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967, pp. 86f.). In his *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics* [9.c], p. 41, Wittgenstein says that in Keller he found a “wisdom” that he “would never expect from Freud.” [I.S.]

^e“Good” was inserted into the line.

^fThe German is “ausgesprochen,” which can also be translated “uttered” or “expressed.”

[60–61]

entspricht so muß sie Dreck sein. Dieser Satz ist nicht leicht verständlich aber es ist so: Das Rechte heute zu formulieren dazu ist so gut wie niemand gescheit genug & alle Formeln, Maximen, die ~~wir~~ ausgesprochen werden sind Unsinn. Die Wahrheit würde allen Menschen ganz paradox klingen. Und der Komponist der sie in sich fühlt muß mit seinem Gefühl im Gegensatz stehen zu allem ^{jetzt} || Ausgesprochenen & muß also nach den gegenwertigen Maßstäben absurd, blödsinnig, erscheinen. Aber nicht anziehend absurd (denn das ist das was doch im Grunde der heutigen Auffassung entspricht) sondern ||N||n|ichtssagend. Labor ist dafür ein Beispiel dort wo er wirklich

bedeutendes geschaffen hat wie in einigen, wenigen, Stücken.

Man könnte sich eine Welt denken in der die religiösen sich von den irreligiösen Menschen nur dadurch unterschieden daß jene den Blick beim Gehen gegen oben gerichtet hätten während diese gradaus sähen. Und hier ist das |h|H|inaufschauen tatsächlich mit einer unserer religiösen Gesten verwandt, das ist aber nicht wesentlich & es könnten auch umgekehrt die religiösen Menschen gradaus sehen etc. Ich ^{in diesem Fall} meine daß Religiosität || gar nicht durch Worte ausgedrückt erschiene & jene Gesten doch ebenso viel & so wenig sagten wie die Worte unserer religiösen Schriften.

This sentence is not easy to understand but it is so: Today no one is clever enough to formulate what is right & all formulas, maxims, which are articulated^a are nonsense. The truth would sound completely paradoxical to everyone. And the composer who feels it in him must stand with this feeling in opposition to everything that is nowadays^b articulated & according to present standards he must therefore appear absurd, stupid. But not engagingly absurd (for after all, this is basically what corresponds to the present attitude) but vacuous. Labor is an example of this where he created something really [61] significant as in some few pieces.^c

One could conceive a world where the religious people are distinguished from the irreligious ones only in that the former were walking with their gaze turned upwards while the others looked straight ahead. And here the upward gaze is really related to one of our religious gestures, but that is not essential & it could be the other way round with the religious people looking straight ahead etc. What I mean is that in this case^d religiosity would not seem to be expressed in words at all & these gestures would still say as much & as little as the words of our religious writings.

^aWittgenstein began writing “which we . . .,” then struck “we” and proceeded with the passive construction “are articulated.” This translation attempts to preserve the distinctions between “sagen” (to say), “jemandem etwas sagen” (to tell someone something), “äußern” (to utter or state), “reden” (to talk), “sprechen” (to speak), “aussagen” (to declare, testify), “ausdrücken” (to express) and “aussprechen” (to articulate or express in speech).

^b“jetzt (now)” was inserted into the line.

^cJosef Labor (1842–1924) was a Viennese composer who went blind at a young age and received his training at the Vienna Institute for the Blind and its Academy of Music. At his first piano recital in 1863 he found general recognition and was appointed royal chamber pianist in Hannover. In 1866 he began learning in Vienna to also play the organ and started in 1879 to perform as an organ virtuoso. He was soon considered the best organist in Austria. His works include a violin concerto, piano pieces, a concert piece for piano and orchestra, chamber music and vocal compositions. His students included Arnold Schönberg. An association was founded in 1923 to “facilitate the effectiveness of the organ virtuoso and musical artist Josef Labor” and “to enable the printing of numerous unpublished tone poems.” Labor was a frequent visitor at the Wittgensteins’ house and was sponsored especially by Hermine. Brian McGuinness wrote that Labor’s chamber music was the only contemporary music that passed muster with Wittgenstein; see p. 125 of his *Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889–1921* (London: Duckworth, 1988). [I.S.] For a more detailed account, see *Wittgenstein und die Musik*, ed. Martin Alber (Innsbruck: Haymon, 2000), especially Alber’s essay on Josef Labor and music in the Wittgenstein family.

^d“in this case” was inserted into the line.

[62–63]

Meine Schwester Gretl machte einmal eine ausgezeichnete Bemerkung über Clara Schumann Wir sprachen von einem Zug von Prüderie in ihrer Persönlichkeit & daß ihr irgend etwas fehle & Gretl sagte : „sie hat das nicht was die Ebner Eschenbach hat“. Und das ipfjaßt alles zusammen.

Kann man sagen: es fehlte ihr Genie? – Labor erzählte mir einmal sie habe in seiner Gegenwart einen Zweifel darüber geäußert daß ein Blinder das & das in der Musik könne. Ich weiß nicht mehr was es war. Labor war offenbar ent-rüstet darüber & sagte mir „er kann es aber doch“. Und ich dachte: wie charakteristisch

1.[3|2].

bei allem Takt den sie gehabt haben muß eine halb bedauern- de halb geringschätzigte Bemerkung über einen (B|b)linden Musiker zu machen. – Das ist schlechtes neunzehntes Jahrhundert, die Ebner Eschenbach hätte das nie getan.

Wir sind in unserer Haut gefangen.

Ich brauche außeror- dentlich viel Energie um meinen Unterricht geben zu können. Dies sehe ich, wenn ich im Geringsten schlaff bin & gleich un- fähig mich für die Vor- lesung vorzubereiten.

Die drei Variationen vor dem Eintritt des Chors in der

5.

7.

[62] 1.2.[31]
 My sister Gretl once made an excellent remark about Clara Schumann. We were speaking about a trait of prudishness in her personality & that she was lacking something & Gretl said : “she does not have what Ebner Eschenbach has.” And that sums it all up.^a

Can one say: she was lacking genius—Labor once told me that in his presence she stated her doubt that a blind person could do this & that in music. I don’t know anymore what it was. Labor was evidently outraged about this & told me “but he can so.” And I thought: how characteristic [63] with all the tact she must have had to make such a half pitying, half disparaging remark about a blind musician.^b—That is bad nineteenth century, Ebner Eschenbach would never have done this.

5.[2.31]

We are imprisoned in our skin.

7.[2.31]

I need an extraordinary amount of energy in order to hold my classes. I see this when I am lax in the slightest & immediately incapable of preparing myself for the lecture.

The three variations before the entrance of the choir^c in the [64] 9th Symphony could be called the early spring of joy,^d its spring and its summer.

^aWittgenstein here repeats almost verbatim a remark from page [28f.]. It appears that before writing “And that sums it all up (faßt alles zusammen)” Wittgenstein started the sentence “And that fits . . . (paßt)”

^bWittgenstein first capitalized “Blinden” which indicates that he may have wanted to write “about a blind man.” He changed the capitalization and ended up with “blinden Musiker.”

^cThis probably refers to the reminiscences to the first three movements on the “theme of joy.” These occur in the second chaos-moment of the final movement, followed by the baritone solo (“O Freunde, nicht diese Töne”) and then the choir (communication from Friedrich Heller, Vienna). [I.S.]

^dThe German “Vorfrühling” literally means “prespring,” the time when spring is just announcing itself.

[64–65]

9^{ten} Symphonie könnte man
den Vorfrühling der Freude,
ihren Frühling und ihren Sommer
nennen.

Wenn mein Name fortleben
wird dann nur als der Terminus
ad quem der ^{großen} abendländischen
Philosophie. Gleichsam wie der
Name dessen der die Alexandri-
nische Bibliothek ^{verbrannt}
angezündet hat.

Ich neige etwas zur Sentimen-
talität. Und nur keine sentimen-
talen Beziehungen. – Auch nicht
zur Sprache.

Nichts scheint mir dem Ge-
dächtnis eines Menschen
für immer abträglicher als Selbst-
gerechtigkeit. Auch dann
wenn sie im Gewand der Be-
scheideneit ^{auftritt}
einhergeht.

^{mit}
Ich werde in steigendem Alter
mehr & mehr logisch kurzsichtig.

Meine Kraft zum Zusam-
mensehen schwindet. Und mein
Gedanke wird kurzatmiger.

8. ~~Es ist~~ (d)ie Aufgabe der Philo-
sophie ist, den Geist
über bedeutungslose Fragen
zu beruhigen. Wer nicht
zu solchen Fragen neigt der
braucht die Philosophie
nicht.

9.
Meine Gedanken sind so vergäng-
lich, verflüchtigen sich so geschwind,
wie Träume, die unmittelbar
nach dem Erwachen aufgezeich-
net werden müssen, wenn sie nicht
gleich vergessen werden sollen.

10
Der Mathematikprofessor Rothe

If my name lives on then only as the *Terminus ad quem* of great occidental philosophy.^a
Somewhat like the name of the one who burnt down^b the library of Alexandria.^c

8.[2.31]

I tend a bit to sentimentality. But please, no sentimental relations.—Not to language either.

It seems to me that nothing more than self-righteousness will forever diminish the remembrance of a person. Also when it appears^d in the guise of modesty.

[65]

With increasing age^e I am becoming more & more logically short-sighted.^f

My power of seeing how things go together is diminishing. And my thinking increasingly suffers from shortness of breath.

The task of philosophy is to soothe the mind about meaningless questions. Whoever doesn't tend to such questions doesn't need philosophy.^g

9.[2.31]

My thoughts are so evanescent, evaporate so fast, like dreams which must be recorded immediately upon awakening if they are not to be forgotten right away.

10.[2.31]

The professor of mathematics Rothe^h [66] once told me that Schumann lost a great part

^a“*Terminus ad quem*”: the endpoint or destination. “Great” was inserted into the line.

^bWittgenstein wrote “angezündet (ignited),” used wavy underlining to indicate his doubt, then put “verbrannt (burnt)” above it.

^cThere were two Alexandrian libraries. The larger one with its 700,000 scrolls (including Aristotle’s dialogues) was destroyed during the Alexandrian war in 47 B.C. [I.S.]

^d“Auftreten (to appear)” can also mean “to make an entrance (on stage).” Wittgenstein had first written that self-righteousness “walks along (einhergeht)” in the guise of modesty. He applied wavy underlining, struck out “einhergeht,” wrote “auftritt” above it with its own wavy underlining.

^e“With increasing age” is an undecided alternative to “in increasing age.”

^fThe German “kurzsichtig” means both shortsighted and myopic or nearsighted.

^gCompare remark 133 in the *Philosophical Investigations*. [I.S.]

^hWittgenstein is probably referring to Rudolf Rothe (1873–1942), professor at the Technical University of Berlin and in the 1920s author of a multivolume popular textbook for physicists, mathematicians, and engineers (*Höhere Mathematik*, Leipzig: Teubner Verlag). [I.S.]

[66–67]

sagte mir einmal daß durch
die Wirksamkeit Wagners
Schumann um einen großen
Teil seiner rechtmäßigen
Wirkung gekommen sei. – Es
ist viel wahres in diesem Gedanken.

Lesen betäubt meine Seele.

Brot & Spiele, aber auch
Spiele in dem Sinn in dem die
Mathematik ja auch die
Physik ein Spiel ist. Es sind
immer Spiele worauf ihr Geist aus
ist in den Künsten, im Laborato-
rium wie auf dem Fußballplatz.

Man kann den Magen an
wenig Nahrung gewöhnen aber
nicht den Körper; der leidet
an der Unternahrung selbst
wenn der Magen keinen Einspruch
mehr erhebt, ja sogar schon

mehr Nahrung von sich weisen
würde. Ähnlich nun geht es
mit dem Ausdruck der Gemütsbe-
wegung: Zuneigung, Dankbarkeit etc.
Man kann diese Äußerungen künst-
lich eindämmen bis man vor dem
was früher natürlich war zurück-
scheut aber der übrige seelische
Organismus leidet durch die
Unternahrung.

13.

19.

Jede mögliche kleinste & größte
Erbärmlichkeit kenne ich weil ich
~~sie~~ selbst ^{sie} _{ih} begangen habe.

20.

14.

Die meisten Menschen folgen in
ihrer Handlungsweise der Linie
des geringsten Widerstandes; und
so auch ich.

22

Hamann sieht Gott wie einen Teil
der Natur an & zugleich wie die Natur.
Und ist damit nicht das religiöse

of his rightful influence through the effectiveness of Wagner.—There is much truth in this thought.

13.[2.31]

Reading numbs my soul.

Bread & games, but also games in the sense in which mathematics, yes even physics is a game. Their mind is always set on games in the arts, in the laboratory as well as on the soccer field.^a

14.[2.31]

The stomach can be accustomed to little nourishment, but not the body; it suffers from malnutrition even when the stomach no longer objects, indeed, even when it would already [67] reject more nourishment. Now this is similar to the expression of emotion: affection, gratitude etc. One can artificially curb these expressions until one shies away from what used to be natural but the rest of the spiritual organism suffers from malnutrition.

19.[2.31]

I know every possible slightest & greatest wretchedness because I myself committed it.^b

20.[2.31]

Most people pursue in their way of acting the path of least resistance;^c and so do I.

22.[2.31]

Hamann considers God a part of nature & at the same time like nature.^d

And doesn't this express the religious [68] paradox: "How can nature be a part of nature?"

^a"Brot und Spiel (bread and games, bread and circuses)" translates the Latin phrase "panem et circenses" (what governments give the masses to keep them distracted and content).—This sentence could also be translated as follows: "As on the soccer field, their spirit (that of mathematics and of physics) always goes for games in the arts, in the laboratory." Malcolm's *Memoir*; [42c], p. 55, relates that Wittgenstein told Freeman Dyson that a soccer match first prompted his thought that "in language we play *games* with *words*."

^bThe word order was changed to emphasize "myself."

^cWittgenstein chose the less colloquial expression "Linie (line)" of least resistance.

^dJohann Georg Hamann (1730–1788) was a close associate of Jacobi, Kant, and Herder. He objected to the neglect by Enlightenment rationalism of the historical character of the human being. According to Hamann, reason cannot be separated from intuition, understanding, and historical experience: There is no thinking without language. On the parallels between Hamann's and Wittgenstein's philosophy see Hans Rochelt's "Das Creditiv der Sprache," *Literatur und Kritik*, April 1969, pp. 169–176. [I.S.]

[68–69]

Paradox ausgedrückt: „Wie kann die Natur ein Teil der Natur sein?“

Es ist merkwürdig: Moses Mendelsohn erscheint in seinen Briefen an Hamann schon wie ein Journalist.

Der Verkehr mit Autoren wie Hamann, Kierkegaard, macht ihre Herausgeber anmaßend. Diese Versuchung würde der Herausgeber des (c|C)herubinischen Wandermannes nie fühlen noch auch der @..

Confessionen des Augustin oder einer Schrift Luthers.

Es ist wohl daß(s), daß die Ironie eines Autors den Leser anmaßend zu machen geneigt ist.

Es ist dann etwa so: sie sagen sie wissen daß sie nichts wissen bilden sich aber auf diese Erkenntnis enorm viel ein.

Ein natürliches Sittengesetz interessiert mich nicht; oder doch nicht mehr als jedes andere Naturgesetz & nicht mehr als dasjenige wonach ein Mensch das Sittengesetz übertritt. Wenn das Sittengesetz natürlich ist so bin ich geneigt den Übertreter in Schutz zu nehmen.

25.

Die Idee daß jemand heute vom Protestantismus zum Katholizismus oder vom Protestantismus zum Katholizismus übertritt ist mir peinlich (wie vielen Andern). (In jedem der beiden Fälle in anderer Art). Es wird eine Sache die ^(jetzt) nur als Tradition Sinn haben kann gewechselt wie eine Überzeugung. Es ist als wollte einer die Bestattungs-
unseres eines andern
gebräuche seines Landes mit denen der
Türken vertauschen. – Wer vom Protestantismus zum Katholizismus übertritt erscheint mir wie ein geistiges Monstrum. Kein guter katholischer Pfarrer hätte das

It is curious: Moses Mendelssohn appears already in his letters to Hamann like a journalist.^a

Dealing with authors like Hamann and Kierkegaard makes their editors presumptuous. The editor of the *Cherubinischer Wanderer* would never feel this temptation, nor would the editor of Augustine's *Confessions* or of a work by Luther.^b

It is probably that the irony of an author inclines the reader to become presumptuous.

It is then roughly like this: they say they know that they don't know anything but are enormously proud of this recognition.

[69] I am not interested in a natural moral law; or at least no more than in any other law of nature & no more than in that which makes someone transgress the moral law. If the moral law is natural I am inclined to defend its transgressor.

25.[2.31]

The idea that nowadays someone would convert^c from Catholicism to Protestantism or from Protestantism to Catholicism is embarrassing to me (as to many others). (In each of those cases in a different way.) Something that can (now)^d make sense only as a tradition is changed like a conviction. It is as if someone wanted to exchange the burial rites of our country for those of another.^e— Anyone converting from Protestantism to Catholicism appears like a mental monstrosity.^f No good Catholic priest would have done [70] that, had

^aThe philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) identified Judaism with the Enlightenment religion of reason. Only one letter to Hamann is known (March 2, 1762), but Wittgenstein might have had in mind his letters on literature in which Mendelssohn writes critically about Hamann; see his *Gesammelte Schriften* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1844), vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 99–105, 403–412. [I.S.]

^bAngelus Silesius, . . . aka Johannes Scheffler (1624–1677), published under the title *Cherubinischer Wandersmann* six volumes of pantheistic aphorisms on the relation between human beings, eternity, and God. Wittgenstein considered Augustine's *Confessions* as possibly “the most serious book ever written” (Norman Malcolm in *Recollections of Wittgenstein* [51,b], p. xvi). [I.S.]

^cThe German for both “transgress” and “convert” is “übertreten.”

^dThe parenthetical “now” was inserted into the line.

^eThis formulation is an undecided alternative to “of his country for those of the Turks.”

^fA “geistiges Monstrum” might also be “a spiritual monster.”

[70–71]

getan wenn er als Nicht-Katholik geboren worden wäre. Und der entgegengesetzte Übertritt zeigt ^{II} von einer abgründigen Dummheit.

Vielleicht beweist der erste eine tiefere, der andere eine seichtere Dummheit.

1.3.

Habe jetzt Grund, anzunehmen daß Marguerite sich nicht besonders viel aus mir macht.

Und da geht es mir sehr seltsam. Eine Stimme in mir sagt: Dann ist es aus, & Du must verzagen.

– Und eine andre sagt: Das darf Dich nicht unterkriegen, darauf mußt Du rechnen, & Dein Leben kann sich nicht darauf aufbauen, daß ein, wenn auch sehr gewünschter Fall, eintritt.

Und die letztere Stimme hat recht, nur ist es eben ~~dann~~ der Fall eines Menschen der lebt & von

Schmerzen gepeinigt ist. Er muß kämpfen, damit ihm die Schmerzen das Leben nicht verleiden. Und dann hat man Angst vor den ~~Augenblicken oder~~ Zeiten der Schwäche.

Diese Angst ist freilich selbst nur eine Schwäche, oder Feigheit.

Man will eben immer gerne ruhen, aber nicht kämpfen müssen. G.m.i.!

Wer nicht das Liebste am Schluß in die Hände der Götter legen kann sondern & immer selbst daran herumbasteln will, der hat doch nicht die richtige Liebe ^{dazu} ^{II}. Das nämlich ist die Härte die in der Liebe sein soll. (Ich denke an die „Hermannschlacht“ & warum Hermann nur einen Boten zu seinem Verbündeten schicken will.)

Gewisse Vorsichtsmaßregeln @ nicht zu ergreifen ist nicht bequem,

he been born a non-Catholic. And the reverse conversion reveals^a abysmal stupidity.

Perhaps the former proves a deeper, the latter a more shallow stupidity.

1.3.[31]

Have reason to suppose now that Marguerite does not particularly care for me. And that is very strange for me. One voice in me says: Then it's over, & you must lose heart.—And another one says: That must not get you down, you had to anticipate it, & your life cannot be founded upon the occurrence of some, even if greatly desired case.

And the latter voice is right, but then^b this is the case of a human being who lives & is tormented by [71] pain. He must struggle so that the pain does not spoil life for him. And then one is anxious about times of weakness.^c

This anxiety is of course only a weakness itself, or cowardice. For one always likes to rest, not having to fight. God be with her!^d

Someone who cannot finally entrust what he loves most into the hands of the gods but^e wants to keep tinkering with it himself, doesn't have the right love for it^f after all. For this is the severity which is supposed to be part of love.^g (I am thinking of the "Hermannsschlacht" & why Hermann wants to send only one messenger to his ally.)^h

To forego certain precautions is not a matter of convenience, [72] but what's least convenient in the world.

^aIt is difficult to determine here whether Wittgenstein wrote "zeugt (testifies to, is a sign of)" or, less idiomatically, "zeigt (shows)."

^bWittgenstein wrote "then," crossed it out, and restored it.

^cOriginally: "moments or times of weakness."

^dIlse Somavilla plausibly conjectures that "G.m.i.!" is short for "Gott mit ihr!"

^eWittgenstein first wrote "&" then added "but" as an undecided alternative.

^f"for it (dazu)" was inserted into the line.

^g"die Härte die in der Liebe sein soll" is literally "the hardness or toughness that is supposed to be in love."

^hWittgenstein here refers to act 2, scene 10 of Heinrich von Kleist's (1777–1811) play *Hermannsschlacht*. The play deals with the victory of Arminius over the Romans in the year 9. In the scene, Hermann wants to send Luitgar (along with his two sons) as his only messenger to Marbod. Luitgar asks permission to take two friends in case something happens to him. Hermann declines the request: "Who would want to thus tempt the powerful Gods?! Do you think the great work could be done without them? As if their lightning couldn't strike down three just as well as one! You'll go alone; and if you arrive too late at Marbod's, or never, so be it! It is my fate to bear." [I.S.]

[72–73]

sondern das Unbequemste von der Welt.

Beethoven ist ganz & gar Realist;
ich meine, seine Musik ist ganz
wahr, ich will sagen: er sieht das
Leben ganz wie es ist & dann
erhebt er es. Es ist ganz Religion
& gar nicht religiöse Dichtung.
Drum kann er in wirkliche
Schmerzen trösten wenn die An-
dern versagen & man sich bei
ihnen sagen muß: aber so ist
es ja nicht. Er wiegt in keinen
schönen Traum ein sondern
erlöst die Welt dadurch daß er
sie als Held sieht, wie sie ist.

Luther war kein Potestant.

2.

Ich bin außerordentlich feig, &
ich benehme mich im Leben, wie
der Feige in der Schlacht.

7.

Bin von der Arbeit der letzten Monate
ermüdet & von der peinigenen
Angelegenheit mit Marguerite ganz
geschlagen. Ich sehe hier eine
Tragödie voraus. Und doch
gibt es nur eines: sein Bestes
tun & weiter arbeiten.

11.3.

Eine ausgezeichnete Bemerkung
Engelmans die mir oft wieder ein-
fällt: Während des Baues in der
Zeit als wir noch zusammen arbei-
teten sagte er mir nach einer Unter-
redung mit dem Bauunternehmer:
„Sie können mit diese^{Menschen}(n|m) ~~Leuten~~ nicht
Logik reden!“ – Ich: „Ich werde
ihm Logik beibringen“ – Er: „Und
er wird Ihnen Psychologie beibrin-
gen.“

6.5.

Ein Apostel sein ist ein Leben.
Es äußert sich wohl zum
Teil in dem was er sagt, aber

Beethoven is a realist through & through;^a I mean his music is totally true, I want to say: he sees life totally as it is & then he exalts it. It is totally religion & not at all religious poetry. That's why he can console in real pain^b while the others fail & make one say to oneself: but this is not how it is. He doesn't lull one into a beautiful dream but redeems the world by viewing it like a hero, as it is.^c

Luther was no Protestant.

2.[3.31]

I am uncommonly cowardly, & I behave in life like a coward in battle.

7.[3.31]

[73] Am fatigued from the work of the last months & quite beat from the torturous situation with Marguerite. Here I foresee a tragedy. And yet there is only one thing: to do one's best & keep working.

11.3.[31]

An excellent remark by Engelmann which often reoccurs to me:^d During the construction when we were still working together he told me after a talk with the building contractor: "You can't talk logic with this man!"^e—I: "I will teach him logic."—He: "And he will teach you psychology."

6.5.[31]^f

To be an apostle is a life. In part it surely expresses itself in what he says, but [74] not in

^aCompare Wittgenstein's remarks on Beethoven in the *Recollections* of John King and Maurice Drury [51,b], pp. 69f., 111f., and 115. [I.S.]

^bAs in English, so in German. Instead of writing that Beethoven's music consoles real pain (*wirkliche Schmerzen*), Wittgenstein adds a somewhat unidiomatic "in."

^cThe German is somewhat ambiguous. Though Beethoven might have seen the world for what it is, namely a hero, the context suggests that Beethoven heroically sees the world as it is.

^dPaul Engelmann (1891–1965) studied architecture with Adolf Loos and served for a year as Karl Kraus's private secretary. In 1916 Wittgenstein took officers' training in Engelmann's hometown of Olmütz. Engelmann documents their friendship and the Olmütz discussion circle in his *Memoir* [59,d]. Working at first with Engelmann, Wittgenstein designed and built from 1926 to 1928 a house for his sister Margaret Stonborough in Vienna's Kundmannngasse. [I.S.]

^eAfter he wrote "these people," Wittgenstein substituted "Mensch" or "Menschen" (illegible). The contractor was probably Friedl. [I.S.] Compare *Culture and Value* [6,b], p. 15/22 (also *Wiener Ausgabe* vol. 4 [45,d], p. 132), and Hermine Wittgenstein's *Recollections* [51,b], pp. 6–8.

^fOn March 10, 1931, Wittgenstein wrote to William Eccles: "I am going down for Easter vacation on Friday and coming up again about the 20th of April," in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Occasions*, ed. James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 9. By all indications the next 19 pages were all written on May 6, 1931.

[74–75]

nicht darin daß es wahr ist,
sondern, darin daß er es
sagt. Für die Idee leiden
macht ihn aus, aber
auch hier gilt es, daß der
Sinn des Satzes „dies ist ein
Apostel“ die Art seiner
Verification ist. Einen
Apostel beschreiben heißt
ein Leben beschreiben. Der
Eindruck den diese Beschrei-
bung auf Andere macht
muß man Diesen überlassen.
An einen Apostel glau-
ben heißt, sich zu ihm
so & so zu verhalten –
tätig zu verhalten.

Wenn man sich nicht mehr
ärgern will, muß auch die
Freude eine andre werden,
sie darf ~~nämlich~~ nicht mehr
das sein was das Correlat

zum Ärger ist.

Zu Kierkegaard: Ich stelle
Dir ein Leben dar & nun
sieh, wie Du Dich dazu ver-
hältst, ob es Dich reizt (drängt)
auch so zu leben, oder wel-
ches andere Verhältnis Du
dazu gewinnst. Ich möch-
gleichsam
te quasi durch diese Dar-
stellung dein Leben auf-
lockern.

In wieweit mein Denken
ein Flug ist, ist gleichgül-
tig (d.h. ich weiß es nicht &
räsoniere darüber nicht). Es
ist ein Schwung. –

„Es ist gut, weil es Gott so
befohlen hat“ ist der richtige
Ausdruck für die Grundlosigkeit

that it is true but in that he says it. Suffering for the idea defines him but here, too, it holds that the meaning of the sentence “this one is an apostle” lies in the mode of its verification.^a To describe an apostle is to describe a life.^b What impression this description makes on others must be left to them. Believing in an apostle means to relate toward him in such & such a way—relate actively.

If one does not want to get angry any more, one’s joy too must change, it must not be the correlate [75] to anger any longer.^c

On Kierkegaard:^d I represent a life for you & now see how you relate to it, whether it tempts (urges) you to live like that as well, or what other relation to it you attain. Through this representation I would like to as it were loosen up your life.^e

To what extent my thought takes flight is of no concern (that is I don’t know & don’t ponder it). It has drive.—^f

“It is good because God commanded it” is the right expression for the lack of reason.^g

^aThe German for “defines him” is “macht ihn aus” as in “is his makeup,” or “constitutes him.” Wittgenstein originally wrote “this is an apostle” used wavy underlining for “this” then put “this one.” This example extends Wittgenstein’s “verificationism” in a new direction. This idea goes back to the *Tractatus* (see, for example, 4.063) and played a significant role in his 1930 conversations with members of the so-called Vienna Circle; see *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979), pp. 47, 79, 227, 243–246.

^bCompare the “Remarks on Frazer’s *Golden Bough*,” in *Philosophical Occasions* [73,f], pp. 121f.: “If a narrator places the priest-king of Nemi and ‘the majesty of death’ side by side, he realizes that they are the same. The life of the priest-king shows what is meant by that phrase.” Wittgenstein read Frazer in the first half of 1931.

^cInitially the last clause included a “namely,” which Wittgenstein struck (“namely it must not . . .”)

^dWittgenstein comments on one of the literary devices employed in the writings of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855).

^e“So to speak (gleichsam)” is an undecided alternative to “quasi.”

^fWittgenstein’s German here is content with odd noun constructions: “To what extent my thought is a flight is of no concern. . . . It is a sweep.”

^g“lack of reason (Grundlosigkeit)” could also be “lack of cause” or “absence of justification.” See *Tractatus* 6.372 and Wittgenstein’s discussion with the Vienna Circle on December 17, 1930: “according to the shallow interpretation the good is good because God wants it; according to the deeper interpretation God wants the good because it is good. I think the first conception is the deeper one: good is what God commands. For it cuts off any explanation as to ‘why’ it is good” [74,a], p. 115. [I.S.]

[76–77]

Ein ethischer Satz lautet
„Du sollst das tun!“ oder „Das
ist gut!“ aber nicht „Diese Men-
schen sagen das sei gut“.

Ein ethischer Satz ist aber
eine persönliche Handlung.
Keine Konstatierung einer
Tatsache. Wie der Ausruf^{ein}
der Bewunderung. Bedenke
doch daß die Begründung
des „ethischen Satzes“ nur
versucht den Satz auf
andere zurückzuführen
die Dir einen Eindruck
machen. Hast Du am Schluß
keinen Abscheu vor diesem
& keine Bewunderung für
jenes so gibt es keine Be-
gründung die diesen Namen
verdiente.

Kompositionen die am Klavier,
auf dem Klavier, komponiert

sind, solche, die mit der
Feder denkend & solche die
mit dem inneren Ohr allein
komponiert sind, müssen einen
ganz verschiedenen Charak-
ter tragen, & einen Ein-
druck ganz verschiedener
Art erzeugen.

Ich glaube bestimmt,
daß Bruckner mit dem inneren
Ohr & einer Vorstellung vom
spielenden Orchester, Brahms
mit der Feder komponiert
hat. Das ist natürlich viel
einfacher dargestellt, als
es ist. Eine Charakteristik
aber ist damit getroffen.

Aus der Notenschrift der
Komponisten müßte man
sich hierüber Aufschluß
holen können. Und wirklich
war, glaube ich, die Noten-

[76] An ethical proposition states “You shall do this!” or “That is good!” but not “These people say that this is good.” But an ethical proposition is a personal act. Not a statement of fact.^a Like an exclamation of admiration.^b Just consider that the justification of an “ethical proposition” merely attempts to refer the proposition back to others that make an impression on you. If in the end you don’t have disgust for this & admiration for that, then there is no justification worthy of that name.

Music composed at the piano, on the piano [77], music composed thinking with the quill & music composed exclusively by hearing within must bear a completely different character, & create a completely different sort of impression.

I definitely think that Bruckner composed by hearing within & by imagining the orchestra playing, that Brahms composed with the quill. Of course that presents matters much simpler than they are. Yet it hits upon one characteristic.^c

The composer’s writing of the notes should provide some insights about this. And indeed, Bruckner’s writing [78] was, I believe, clumsy & ponderous.

^aCompare *Tractatus* 6.422: “The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form ‘thou shalt . . .’ is: And what if I do not do it? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the *consequences* of an action must therefore be irrelevant. At least these consequences will not be events. For there must be something right in the formulation of that question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself. (And this is clear also that the reward must be something acceptable, and the punishment something unacceptable.)” [I.S.]

^bThis is an undecided alternative to “Like the exclamation.”

^cThis is one of several remarks in these diaries which Wittgenstein copied into other manuscripts. In this case, a slight variant appears in MS 153a (1931) and can also be found in *Culture and Value* [6,b], p. 12/14: “Compositions composed at the piano, on the piano, those composed thinking with the quill & those composed exclusively by hearing within must be of a completely different kind, & make a completely different kind of impression. I definitely think that Bruckner composed only by hearing within & by imagining the orchestra playing, that Brahms composed with the quill. Of course that presents matters simpler than they are. Yet it hits upon one characteristic.” [I.S.] There is clear evidence that Wittgenstein copied this *into* rather than *from* MS 153a: As in the diary version, the wording in MS 153a was initially “must bear a completely different character.” Wittgenstein changed this only then into “must be of a completely different kind.”

[78–79]

schrift Bruckners ungeschickt
& schwerfällig.

Bei Brahms die Farben des
Orchesterklanges Farben
von Wegmarkierungen.

Eine Tragödie könnte doch
immer anfangen mit den
Worten: „Es wäre gar nichts
geschehen, wenn nicht ...“.

(Wenn er nicht mit einem Zipfel
seines Kleides in die Maschine
geraten wäre?)

Aber ist das nicht eine einsei-
tige Betrachtung der Tragödie,
die sie nur zeigen läßt, daß
eine Begegnung unser ganzes
Leben entscheiden kann.

[über unser ganzes ...] [... unser ganzes
Leben bestimmen kann.]

Ich glaube, daß es heute
ein Theater geben könnte,
wo mit Masken gespielt
würde. Die Figuren wären
eben stilisierte Menschen-
Typen. In den Schriften Kraus's
ist das deutlich zu sehen.
Seine Stücke könnten, oder
müßten, in Masken auf-
geführt werden. Dies ent-
spricht natürlich einer ge-
wissen Abstraktheit dieser
Produkte. Und das Masken-
theater ist, wie ich es meine,
überhaupt der Ausdruck
eines spiritualistischen
Charakters. Es werden
daher (auch) vielleicht nur
Juden zu diesem Theater
neigen.

Der Gegensatz zwischen Komö-

In Brahms the colors of the orchestral sound colors of trail markers.^a

A tragedy could always, after all, begin with the words: “Nothing whatsoever would have happened, had not . . .”^b

(Had not a corner of his clothing caught in the machine?)

But isn't that a one-sided view of tragedy which only lets it show that one encounter can determine our entire life?^c

[79]

I think that there could be a theater today where one performs with masks. The characters would be just stylized human types. In the writings of Kraus this can be seen clearly. His plays could or should be performed in masks.^d This corresponds, of course, to a certain abstractness of these products. And on the whole the theater of masks, as I mean it, is of a spiritualist character. Therefore it is perhaps (also) that only Jews will tend toward this theater.^e

At the time^f the opposition between comedy & tragedy was always worked out as an

^aThis sentence lacks a verb (presumably: are or are like) in the German.

^bThis and the following three remarks Wittgenstein also copied almost verbatim into MS 153a. They are included in *Culture and Value*, p. 12/14.

^cWittgenstein experimented with various formulations and left the final wording open. His alternatives include “that one encounter can decide about our entire life” and “can decide our entire life.” He copied the latter formulation into MS 153a.

^dKraus's most famous play was published between 1918 and 1922. *The Last Days of Humankind* is impossible to perform in full. Its 220 scenes call for a cast of more than 500. About a third of the text is assembled from speeches, editorials, news reports, military bulletins, etc. Since it deliberately overtaxes the means of the theater and since the characters speak primarily the language of public proclamations, the play calls for an adaptation by the puppet theater or a theater of masks. There is no evidence that Wittgenstein was familiar with the productions or writing of Edward Gordon Craig (1872–1966), who emphasized the relation between puppet and actor.

^eCompare *Culture and Value*, p. 1/3: “Tragedy consists in the tree not bending but breaking. Tragedy is something un-Jewish.”

^fIt is not clear what Wittgenstein's “at the time” refers to, though his characterization applies to most classical theories of drama from Aristotle through the nineteenth century.

[80–81]

die & Tragödie wurde seinerzeit immer wie ein den dramatischen Raum a priori teilender herausgearbeitet. Und es konnten einen dann gewisse Bemerkungen wundern, daß etwa die Komödie es mit Typen die Tragödie mit Individualitäten zu tun habe. In Wirklichkeit^{ist} sind Komödie & Tragödie kein Gegensatz so daß die eine das von der andern abgeschlossene Stück des dramatischen Raumes wäre. (So wenig wie Moll & Dur solche ⌈Gegensätze sind.) Sondern es^{sie} sind zwei von vielen möglichen Arten des Dramas, die nur einer bestimmten – vergangenen – Kultur als die einzigen erschienen^{erschieden sind} ist. Der richtige Vergleich wäre der mit den @ modernen Tonarten.

Es war charakteristisch für die Theoretiker der vergangenen Kulturperiode, das a priori finden zu wollen, wo es nicht war. es war charakteristisch für die verg. Kulturperiode, Oder, soll ich sagen, ⌈ den Begriff, ~~oder Unbegriff~~, des ‚a priori‘ zu formen [schaffen].

Denn nie hätte sie diesen Begriff geschaffen wenn sie von vornherein die Dinge [Sachlage] so gesehen hätte wie wir sie sehen. (Dann wäre der Welt ein großer – ich meine, bedeutender – Irrtum verloren gegangen.) Aber in Wirklichkeit kann man so gar nicht rasonieren, denn ~~jener~~^{dieser} Begriff war in der Kultur selbst [in der ganzen Kultur] begründet.

⌘ Daß einer den Andern verachtet,

a priori division of the dramatic concept of space.^a And certain remarks could then be found puzzling, for instance that comedy deals with types and tragedy with individualities. In reality comedy & tragedy are no opposition as if the one were only that part of dramatic space that was excluded by the other. (Just as little as minor & major are such opposition.)^b Instead they are only two of many possible kinds of drama which only appeared to one particular—past—culture as the only ones. The right comparison is^c to modern musical keys.

[81] A characteristic of theorists of the past cultural era was wanting to find the a-priori where there wasn't one.

Or should I say a characteristic of the past cultural era was to create the 'a priori.'^d

For it would have never created the concept if from the start it had seen the situation^e the way we see it. (A great—I mean, significant—error would then have been lost to the world.) But in reality one cannot argue like that, for this concept was founded in the whole culture.^f

^aAfter writing “dramatic space,” Wittgenstein added the undecided alternative “concept of space.”

^bWittgenstein placed an insertion sign before “opposition.” He added wavy underlining to the insertion sign but did not insert any text.

^c“is” is an undecided alternative to “would be.”

^dWittgenstein first wrote: “Or should I say to form the concept, or nonconcept, of the ‘a priori.’” He struck “or nonconcept,” inserted “it was characteristic,” changed “to form” into “to create,” and all the while indicated his uncertainty or dissatisfaction with the entire second half of this remark. See a remark dated February 27, 1937, in MS 157b: “The ‘order of things,’ the idea of the form(s) of representation, thus of the a priori is in itself a grammatical deception.” [I.S.]

^eThe original “things” was replaced by “Sachlage” (which has been translated “situation,” “state of things,” and “state of affairs” by the various translators of the *Tractatus*).

^fWittgenstein changed this from “for that concept was founded (begründet) in culture itself.” The German for “argue” is “rasonnieren,” which in modern German does not mean “reason” but rather “hold forth.”

[82–83]

wenn schon unbewußt (Paul Ernst) heißt, es kann dem Verachtenden klargemacht werden, wenn man ihm eine bestimmte Situation, (die in Wirklichkeit ~~(noch)~~ nie eingetreten ist (& wohl nie eintreten wird) vor die Augen stellt, & er zugeben muß, daß er dann so & so handeln würde. [... daß er dann so & so handeln – & dadurch der Verachtung Ausdruck geben – würde.]

Wenn man Wunder Christi etwa das Wunder auf der Hochzeit zu Kana so verstehen will wie Dostojewski ^{tat} es getan hat, dann muß man sie als Symbole auffassen.

Die Verwandlung von Wasser in Wein ist höchstens erstaun-

lich & wer es könnte den würden wir anstaunen aber mehr nicht. Es kann also nicht das das Herrliche sein. – Auch das ist nicht das Herrliche daß Jesus den Leuten auf der Hochzeit Wein verschafft & auch das nicht daß er ihnen den Wein [daß er den Wein ihnen] auf eine ^{gibt} so unerhörte Weise ^{zukunft} verschafft. Es muß das Wunderbare sein das dieser Handlung ihren Inhalt & ihre Bedeutung gibt. (Und ~~das~~ ~~Wunderbare~~ damit meine ich nicht das Außergewöhnliche, oder noch nie Dagewesene, sondern ^{den} einen Geist in dem es ^{getan} vollbracht wird und für den die Verwandlung von Wasser in Wein nur ein Symbol ist (gleichsam) eine Geste. Eine Geste die (freilich) nur der machen kann der dieses Außerordentliche kann. Als

That one person disdains the other, [82] even if unconsciously (Paul Ernst)^a means: it can be made clear to the one who disdains by presenting him with a particular situation which never occurred in reality^b (& probably never will occur) & he must admit that he would then act like this & that—& through this express his disdain.^c

If one wants to understand as Dostoevsky did the miracles of Christ such as the miracle at the wedding of Cana, one must consider them symbols.^d The transformation of water into wine is astounding [83] at best & we would gaze in amazement at the one who could do it, but no more. It therefore cannot be what is magnificent.—What is magnificent is also not that Jesus provides wine for the people at the wedding & also not that he gives it to them^e in such an unheard of manner. It must be the marvelous that gives this action content^f & meaning. And by that I don't mean the extraordinary or the unprecedented^g but the spirit in which it is done^h and for which the transformation of water into wine is only a symbol (as it were) a gesture. A gesture which (of course) can only be made by the one who can do this extraordinary thing. The miracle must be understood as [84] gesture, as

^aPaul Ernst (1866–1933) was a German novelist, an advocate of the strict, antipsychologistic form of the renaissance novella. According to Brian McGuinness, it is likely that during the 1916–1917 Olmütz discussions with Paul Engelmann “Wittgenstein read or reflected on the *Nachwort* to the Grimms’ fairy tales by Paul Ernst, which influenced him so powerfully with its account of how language misleads us—graphic modes of expression and metaphors being taken literally” (*Wittgenstein: A Life* [60,c], pp. 251f.). [I.S.] See also Wolfgang Künne, “Paul Ernst and Ludwig Wittgenstein,” in *Wittgenstein Studies*, January 1996.

^bAfter “reality,” Wittgenstein had added a parenthetical “(yet)” but struck that.

^cThis sentence originally ended: “that he would then act like this & that.”

^dWittgenstein here refers to pt. 3, bk. 7, chap. 4 of the *Brothers Karamazov* where the story of Christ’s transformation of water into wine (John 2:1–10) provides a mystical experience of never-ending joy to Alyosha. Compare Wittgenstein’s remarks about the scientific and the religious attitude towards miracles in his “Lecture on Ethics” ([73,f], pp. 43f.). [I.S.]

^eWittgenstein used wavy underlining for two previous suggestions: “provides (verschafft)” and “gives (gibt).” He settled for “zukommen läßt (seeing to it that someone gets something).”

^fThere is a nearly untranslatable play on words at work here. The German for “miracle” is “Wunder,” and therefore “das Wunderbare (the wonderful)” means also “the miraculous.”

^gWittgenstein started off writing a parenthetical remark: “(And the wonderful . . .)” He struck all but the “And” and continued “by that I don’t mean . . .”

^hWittgenstein left the undecided alternative “a spirit (Geist) in which it is performed (vollbracht).”

[84–85]

~~die~~
 Geste, als Ausdruck muß
 das Wunder verstanden wer-
 den, wenn es zu uns reden soll.
 Ich könnte auch sagen:
 Nur ~~es~~ wenn er es tut ~~ist es~~
~~ein Wunder~~ der es in einem
 wunderbaren Geist tut ist es ein
 Wunder. Ohne diesen Geist ist es nur
 eine außerordentlich seltsame
 Tatsache.
 Tat. Ich muß gleichsam
 den Menschen schon kennen
 um sagen zu können, daß
 es ein Wunder ist. Ich muß
 das Ganze schon in dem richti-
gen Geiste lesen, um das Wun-
 derbare darin zu empfinden [um
 empfinden
 das Wunder darin zu sehen .]

Wenn ich im Märchen lese, daß
 eine Hexe einen Menschen in ein
 wildes Tier verwandelt, so ist es
 doch auch der Geist dieser Hand-
 lung, ^{auf mich} der mir den Eindruck

macht.

(Man sagt von einem Menschen,
 wenn er könnte, er würde
~~den Gegner~~
 den Ändern durch seinen Blick
 töten.)

Wenn die ~~S~~ [@] späten unter
 den großen Komponisten ^{einmal} ¹ in
 einfachen Fortgängen
 klaren harmonischen Verhältnis-
 sen schreiben, dann ist es als
bekannt sie sich zu ihrer
 Stammutter. [als wollten
 sie sich zu ... bekennen.] [... dann
 ‹bekennen sie sich zu ihrer›]

Maler scheint mir gerade in diesen
 Momenten (^{wenn} ~~wo~~ die Ändern am stär-
 ksten ergreifen) ^{besonders} ^{am} ¹ unerträglich-
~~sten~~ ^{dann} & ich möchte ¹ immer sagen:
 von den Anderen
 aber das hast Du ja nur ¹ gehört,
 das gehört ja nicht (wirklich) Dir.

Beschmutze alles mit meiner
 Eitelkeit.

expression if it is to speak to us.^a I could also say: It is a miracle only when he does it who does it in a marvelous spirit.^b Without this spirit it is only an extraordinarily strange fact.^c I must, as it were, know the person already before I can say that it is a miracle. I must read the whole of it already in the right spirit in order to sense the miracle in it.^d

When I read in a fairy tale that the witch transforms a human being into a wild animal, it is also the spirit of this action, after all, that makes an impression [85] upon me. (One says of someone that, if he could, his looks would kill the opponent.)^e

When for a change the later ones of the great composers write in simple harmonic progressions, they are showing allegiance to their ancestral mother.^f

Especially in these moments (where the others are most moving) Mahler^g seems especially unbearable to me & I always want to say then: but you have only heard this from the others, that isn't (really) yours.^h

Soiling everything with my vanity.

^aAfter writing this, Wittgenstein inserted a “that is” to change the text into: “as gesture, that is, as expression.” But then he added wavy underlining to the “that is,” finally struck it again. Compare *Culture and Value* [6,b], p. 45/51: “A miracle is, as it were, a gesture which God makes . . .”

^bOriginally, Wittgenstein wrote simply: “It is a miracle only when he does it.” As before, “wunderbarer (wonderful) Geist” means also “miraculous spirit.”

^c“Fact (Tatsache)” was added as an undecided alternative to “deed (Tat).”

^dWittgenstein first wrote “in order to sense the marvelous in it,” changed this to “in order to see the miracle in it,” finally added “sense (empfinden)” as an undecided alternative to “see.”

^e“the opponent (Gegner)” is an undecided alternative to “the other.” Wittgenstein was equally dissatisfied with both.

^fThis is a heavily edited passage. At an early stage it may have read: “When the later ones of the great composers write in clear harmonic proportions, this is as if they wanted to show allegiance to their ancestral mother.”

^gWittgenstein wrote “Mahler.” For Wittgenstein’s attitude toward the composer Gustav Mahler (1860–1911) see a remark from 1948 in *Culture and Value*. It begins as follows: “If it is true, as I believe, that Mahler’s music is worthless, the question is what I think he should have done with his talent” ([6,b], p. 67/76). But see John King’s *Recollections* [51,b], p. 71. [I.S.]

^hAgain, the first version may have read like this: “Especially in these moments (when the others are most moving) Mahler seems most unbearable to me & I always want to say: but you have only heard this, that isn’t really yours.”

[86–87]

Den Finen
 Manchen bringt die Erziehung
 das Erwerben der
 (die ^{||} Bildung) nur in sein
 lernt damit ... kennen
 eigenes Gut. Er begeht damit
 @
 quasi das väterliche Erbe.
 Während der Andere dadurch ihm
 fremde [wesensfremde] Formen aufnimmt.
 Und da wäre es besser er bliebe
 ungebildet wenn auch noch so
 & ungeschliffen
 garstig (& ohne jeden Schliff) .

Glücklich der, der nicht aus
 Feigheit gerecht sein will, sondern
 aus Gerechtigkeitsgefühl, oder aus
 Rücksicht für den Andern. – Ich
 bin beinahe immer aus Feigheit
 gerecht. [Meine Gerechtigkeit, wenn ich
 meistens
 gerecht bin, entspringt beinahe
 immer der Feigheit.]

Übrigens verurteile ich die Gerechtigkeit
 nicht in mir, die sich etwa auf
 einer religiösen Ebene abspielt auf

die ich mich aus den schmutzigen
 Niederungen meiner Lust & Unlust
 flüchte. Diese Flucht ist recht
 Furcht
 wenn sie aus Abscheu vor dem
 Schmutz geschieht.

D.h., ich tue recht daran, wenn
 ich mich auf eine geistigere
 auf der ein
 Ebene begeben wō ich ^{||} Mensch
 sein kann – während Andere
 es auch auf einer ungeistigeren
 sein können.

Ich habe eben kein Recht
 in dem Stockwerk
 so zu leben wie sie & fühle auf
 ihrer Ebene mit Recht meine
 Inferiorität.

Ich muß in einer more rarified
 atmosphere leben, gehöre dort hin;
 & sollte ~~mich nicht~~ der Versu-
 chung widerstehn mit Adern
 die es dürfen in der dichteren Luft-
 schicht leben zu wollen.

[86] Through education (the acquisition of culture)^a the one^b simply comes into his own. He thereby gets to know^c as it were his paternal heritage. While the other acquires through this forms that are alien to his nature. And there it would have been better if he had remained uncultured no matter how awful & unpolished.^d

Fortunate is he who wants to be just not from cowardice but from a sense of justice, or from a regard for the other.—Most of the time my justness, when I am just, stems from cowardice.^e

By the way I don't condemn that justness in me which plays itself out on, say, a religious plane onto [87] which I flee from the dirty basement of my pleasure & displeasure.^f This flight is right when it happens out of fear^g of the dirt.

That is, I am doing right when I proceed to a more spiritual plane on which I can be a human being^h—while others can be human also on a less spiritual one.

I just don't have the right to live on that floorⁱ as they do & on their plane feel my inferiority rightfully.

I must live in a more rarified atmosphere^j and belong there; & should resist the temptation of wanting to live in the thicker layer of air with the others, who are allowed to do so.

^aWittgenstein first wrote "culture (die Bildung)" and changed this to "das Erwerben der Bildung."

^b"the one (den Einen)" was introduced as an undecided alternative to "some (manchen)." He indicated his uncertainty about both.

^cBefore "gets to know (kennenlernen)" Wittgenstein tried the unusual "begehen (as in: to observe a holiday or ritual, celebrate a birthday)" to which he added wavy underlining.

^dWittgenstein preferred "ungeschliffen (unpolished or uncouth)" over the earlier formulation "ohne jeden Schliff (without any refinement)."

^eThis resulted in several steps from the original "I am almost always just out of cowardice."

^f"aus den schmutzigen Niederungen (lower spheres) meiner Lust & Unlust."

^g"fear (Furcht)" is an undecided alternative to "disgust (Abscheu)."

^hWittgenstein first wrote "where I can be human (wo ich Mensch sein kann)." He remained equally dissatisfied with "where" and "on which." Compare Goethe's *Faust*, part I, scene 2, which celebrates the place where one can say: "Here I am human, here that's what I am allowed to be (Hier bin ich Mensch, hier darf ich's sein)."

ⁱ"to live on that floor" is an undecided alternative to "to live so."

^jWittgenstein wrote "more rarified atmosphere" in English.

[88–89]

Wie in der Philosophie verleiten
 uns
Einen auch im Leben scheinbare
 Analogien (zu dem was der
 Andere tut oder tun darf). @
 Und auch hier gibt es nur
 ein Mittel gegen diese Verführung:
 auf die leisen Stimmen horchen
 die uns sagen, daß es sich hier
 doch nicht so verhält wie
 dort.

Den letzten Grund (ich meine die
 letzte Tiefe) meiner Eitelkeit
 decke ich hier doch nicht auf.

Wenn ich von einer Tragödie
 (im Kino z.B.) ergriffen werde,
 dann sage ich mir immer:
 nein, so werde ich's nicht tun!
 oder: nein, so soll es nicht
 sein. Ich möchte den Helden
 & alle trösten. (Aber das ^{heißt} doch

nicht die Begebenheit als Tragö-
 die verstehn. Drum versteh ich
 auch nur den guten Ausgang
 (im primitiven Sinn) Den Unter-
 gang des Helden verstehe ich –
 ich meine, mit dem Herzen – nicht.
 Ich will also eigentlich immer
 ein Märchen hören. (Darum auch
 meine Freude am Film) Und dort
 werde ich wirklich ergriffen & von
 Gedanken bewegt. D.h., er liefert
 mir wenn er nicht zu fürchter-
 lich schlecht ist immer Mate-
 rial für Gedanken & Gefühle.

Die Photographien meines Bruders
 Rudi haben etwas Oberländerisches,
 oder ~~vielme~~ richtiger etwas vom
 Stil der guten Zeichner der alten
 ‚Fliegenden Blätter‘.

Ein englischer Architekt oder Musi-
 ker (vielleicht überhaupt ein Künstler),

[88] As in philosophy so in life we are led astray by seeming analogies (to what others do or are permitted to do).^a And here, too, there is only one remedy against this seduction: to listen to the soft voices which tell us that things here are not the same as there.

The ultimate ground (I mean the ultimate depth) of my vanity I won't uncover here anyway.^b

When I am gripped by a tragedy (in the cinema, for example), I always tell myself: no, I won't do it like that! or: no, it shouldn't be like that. I want to console the hero & everyone. But that amounts to [89] not understanding the occurrence as a tragedy. That's why I only understand the happy end (in the primitive sense). The downfall of the hero I don't understand—I mean, with the heart. So what I really always want is to hear a fairy tale. (Therefore my enjoyment of movies.) And there I am truly gripped & moved by thoughts.^c That is, as long as it is not frightfully bad it always provides me material for thoughts & feelings.

The photographs of my brother Rudi^d have something of Oberländer, or more correctly^e something of the style of the good illustrators of the old 'Fliegende Blätter.'^f

An English architect or musician (perhaps any artist at all), [90] one can be almost certain that he is a humbug!

^aWittgenstein first wrote "one (Einen)" and added wavy underlining.

^bInstead of "ultimate ground (letzte Grund)" one could translate "final reason." The German for "ultimate depth" is "letzte Tiefe."

^cThis wordplay is not in the original: Wittgenstein writes that he is "moved (ergriffen)" by a film or in its grip, and then that he is "moved" or set in motion by thoughts (von Gedanken bewegt).

^dRudolf Wittgenstein (1881–1904) was the fourth child and third oldest son of Karl and Leopoldine Wittgenstein. He was described as a nervous, anxious child, the one with the most literary sensibility. He was a student of chemistry in Berlin when he committed suicide at the age of 23, perhaps due to his homosexuality and problems of adapting to life in Berlin. [I.S.]

^eBefore putting "richtiger" Wittgenstein began writing "rather (vielmehr)" but crossed that out.

^fAdolf Oberländer was a caricaturist for the *Fliegende Blätter*, an illustrated humorous magazine that appeared from 1844 to 1944 in Munich. Famous contributors of texts and drawings include Wilhelm Busch, Moritz von Schwind, Carl Spitzweg, Felix Dahn, Ferdinand Freiligrath, Emanuel Geibel, and Joseph Victor von Scheffel. Their humor typically targeted the forms of conduct of the German bourgeoisie. [I.S.]

[90–91]

man kann beinahe sicher sein, daß er ein Humbug ist!

Ich kann die Qualität eines Malpinsels nicht beurteilen; ich verstehe nichts von Pinseln & weiß, wenn ich einen sehe, nicht ob er gut, schlecht oder mittelmäßig ist; aber ich bin überzeugt daß englische Malpinsel hervorragend gut sind. Und ebenso überzeugt, daß die Engländer nichts von Malerei verstehen.

Die Rohstoffe sind hier immer ausgezeichnet aber die Fähigkeit fehlt sie zu formen. D.h.: Die Menschen haben Gewissenhaftigkeit, Kenntnisse & Geschick aber keine feine Empfindung keine Kunst. [aber nicht Kunst, noch feine Empfindung.]

Meine Selbsterkenntnis steht

so: Wenn eine gewisse Anzahl von Schleiern auf mir gelassen werden, sehe ich noch klar, nämlich die Schleier. Werden sie aber entfernt, so daß mein Blick meinem Ich näher dringen könnte, so beginnt
 ; mein Bild vor meinen Augen
 ; zu verschwimmen. [so beginnt
 ; mein Bild sich mir
 ; sich mein Bild mir zu ver-
 ; wischen.]

spreche
 Ich rede viel zu leicht. – Man kann mich durch eine Frage, einen Einwand zu einem Fluß von Reden verführen. Während ich rede ~~sage~~ sehe ich manchmal, daß ich in einem häßlichen Fahrwasser bin.; mehr sage als ich meine, rede um den Andern zu amüsieren, Irrelevantes hineinziehe um zu impressionieren ~~etc.etc.~~ u.s.w.. Ich trachte dann das Gespräch

I can't judge the quality of a paint brush, I know nothing of brushes & know not, when I see one, whether it is good, bad or mediocre; but I am convinced that English paint brushes are outstandingly good. And equally convinced that the English understand nothing of painting.

The raw materials are always excellent here but the ability to form them is lacking. That is: The people have conscientiousness, knowledge & dexterity but not art, nor refined sensibility.^a

This is the state of my self-knowledge:^b [91] When a certain number of veils is left upon me, I still see clearly, namely the veils. But if they are removed so that my gaze could penetrate closer to my self, my image begins to blur for me.^c

I speak^d far too easily.—Through a question or an objection one can seduce me to produce a stream of words. While I talk^e I sometimes see that I am on an ugly track:^f that I say more than I mean, talk to amuse the other, draw in irrelevancies in order to impressionate^g and so forth.^h I then strive to correct the conversation [92], to steer it back onto a more decent

^aWittgenstein wrote “but no refined sensibility no art,” added wavy underlining to the whole expression, crossed out “no refined sensibility,” and finally arrived at “but not art, nor refined sensibility (nicht Kunst, noch feine Empfindung).”

^bLiterally: “My self-knowledge (Selbsterkenntnis) looks like this.”

^c“my self” is a translation of “mein Ich,” literally, “my I.” The last clause was revised by Wittgenstein after he indicated his uncertainty about the original formulation: “my image begins dissolving (or merging: *verschwimmen*) before my eyes.” The German for “blur” is “*verwischen*,” which can also be translated as “smudge” or “smear.”

^d“speak (*spreche*)” is an undecided alternative to “talk (*rede*).”

^eWittgenstein wrote “say (*sage*)” right behind “talk (*rede*),” then crossed out “say.”

^fFollowing up perhaps on the metaphor of a stream of words or “river of talk (*Redefluß*),” Wittgenstein speaks here of an ugly “waterway (*Fahrwasser*)” or the wake created by other boats that may steer one in the wrong direction.

^gThe word “*impressionieren*” is self-exemplifying. It is used by that sort of people who are trying in vain to impress their listeners.

^hWittgenstein wrote “etc.etc.,” crossed this out, and replaced it with “*usw. (und so weiter: and so forth)*.”

[92–93]

zu korrigieren es wieder in eine
^{ere}
 anständige Bahn zurückzu-
 lenken. Biege es aber nur etwas
 und nicht genügend aus Furcht
 – mangelndem Mut – & behalte
 einen schlechten Geschmack.

Besonders in England ~~pas~~ ge-
 schieht mir das leicht
 da die Schwierigkeit der Verstän-
 digung (wegen des Charakters, nicht
 wegen der Sprache) von vornherein
 enorme sind. So daß man seine
 übungen auf einem schwankenden
 Floß statt auf festem Boden
 ausführen muß. Denn man
 weiß nie ob einen der Andere
 ganz verstanden hat; & der
 Andere hat Einen nie ganz
 verstanden.

12.10.31.

Heute nacht erwachte ich aus
 einem Traum mit Entsetzen & ich
 sah plötzlich, daß ein ... ja etwas bedeute
 merkte, daß ein solches Entsetzen

etwas bedeute, @ daß ich darüber
 nachdenken solle was es
 bedeutet.

Der Traum hatte sozusagen zwei
 Teile (die aber unmittelbar auf einan-
 der folgten) Im ersten war jemand
 gestorben, es war traurig & ich schien
 mich gut aufgeführt zu haben & dann
 quasi beim Nachhausekommen
 sagte jemand & zwar eine (S|s)tarke,
 alte ländliche Person (von der
 Art unserer Rosalie) (ich denke auch an
 die Kumäische Sybille) } zu mir ein Wort
 des Lobes & etwas wie: „Du bist
 doch jemand“. Dann verschwand
 dieses Bild & ich war ^{im Dunklen} allein ^{||} & sagte
^{zu}
^{||} mir (-) ~~aber-ige~~ ironisch „Du bist doch
 jemand“ & Stimmen riefen laut
 um mich her (aber ich sah nieman-
 d@ der rief) „die Schuld muß doch
 gezahlt werden“ oder „die Schuld
 ist doch nicht gezahlt“ oder so
 etwas. Ich erwachte wie aus einem

course. But only turn it a little and not enough out of fear—lack of courage—& retain a bad taste.

This happens to me easily especially in England since the difficulty of communication (because of character,^a not because of the language) are enormous from the start. So that one must perform one's exercises on a swaying raft rather than on solid ground. For one never knows whether the other has entirely understood one; & the other has never understood one entirely.^b

12.10.31^c

Last night I awoke with dread from a dream & I suddenly saw that such dread means something after all,^d [93] that I should think about what it means.

The dream had so to speak two parts (which however followed immediately upon one another). In the first someone had died, it was sad & I seemed to have conducted myself well & then as if upon returning home someone, namely a strong, old rural person (of the sort of our Rosalie)^e (I am also thinking of the Cumaean Sybil)^f gave me a word of praise & something like: "You are someone, after all." Then this image disappeared & I was alone in the dark^g & said to myself^h—with irony "You are someone, after all" & voices shouted loudly around me (but I saw no one shouting) "the debt must yet be paid" or "the debt is yet unpaid" or something like that.ⁱ I awoke as from a [94] dreadful dream. (Hid

^a"Character" probably refers to "the English character" (shared by individual personalities) or possibly to the character of communication in England (social conventions and the like).

^bCompare the opening remark from 1914 in *Culture and Value* [6,b], p. 1/3.

^cFive months have passed. During the summer Marguerite had visited him for 3 weeks in Norway (Wittgenstein arranged accommodations to acquaint her with the simple life); they also saw each other almost daily near the end of the summer in Austria. See Monk's biography [1,a], pp. 318f. and *Wittgenstein in Norway*, ed. Kjell Johannessen et al. (Oslo: Solum, 1994), pp. 43f. The *Cambridge Reporter* announced that Wittgenstein would be in his rooms on October 10 to meet interested students; the term started on October 16.

^dThis is an undecided alternative to "I noticed that such dread means something."

^eRosalie Hermann, apparently one of the Wittgensteins' housekeepers. In a letter of February 26, 1916 (not included in *Familienbriefe* [38,b]), Hermine Wittgenstein writes to Ludwig of "good old Rosalie" being very sick, presumably on her deathbed. [I.S.]

^fThe Cumaean Sybil is a legendary Greek prophet with oriental origins. Probably in the fifth century B.C. she announced her oracles from a cavernous spring in Eretrea. She was considered author of the *Sibyline Books* that were burned in 83 B.C. [I.S.]

^g"in the dark" was inserted into the line.

^hBy inserting a "zu" into the line, Wittgenstein changed "sagte mir (told myself)" to "sagte zu mir (said to myself)."

ⁱ"die Schuld (also: the guilt) muß doch gezahlt werden" or "ist doch nicht gezahlt."

[94–95]

entsetzlichen Traum. (Versteck~~te~~ ~~mich~~
 meinen Kopf – wie ich es sei der Kind-
 heit in diesem Falle immer tue –
 unter die Decke & wagte erst nach
 einigen Minuten ihn frei zu machen &
 die Augen zu öffnen) Mir kam ^{wie ich sagte} [↑] zum
 Bewußtsein, daß dieses Entsetzen
 eine tiefere Bedeutung hat (ob-
 wohl es auf eine Weise vom Magen
 kam, denn das war mir bald klar)
 d.h., daß die Fähigkeit so entsetzt
 in mir [für mich] habe.
 zu sein etwas [↑] zu bedeuten hat.
 Unmittelbar nach dem Erwachen,
 im Entsetzen, dachte ich: ob Traum, oder
 nicht Traum, ~~das hat~~ dieses Entsetzen
 hat etwas zu bedeuten. Ich habe
 doch etwas getan, etwas gefühlt,
 was immer mein Körper daweil
 getan hat.

D.h., dieses Entsetzens ist der
 Mensch fähig. – Und das hat etwas
 zu bedeuten.

Wenn der Mensch die Hölle auch

in einem Traum erlebte, & danach
 erwachte, so gäbe es sie doch.

Ich habe eine schlecht erzogene
 (oder unerzogene) Sprache. D.h. @
 es fehlt ihr eine gute sprach-
 liche Kinderstube. – Wie ja wohl der
 Sprache der allermeisten Menschen.

Las einmal in Claudius
 ein Zitat aus Spinoza wo er
 über sich selbst schreibt
^{dieser}
 konnte der Betrachtung aber
 nicht ganz froh werden. Und
 jetzt fällt mir ein daß ich ihr
 in einer Beziehung mißtraute
 ohne sagen zu können worin
 eigentlich. Ich glaube aber
 jetzt daß mein Gefühl ist, daß
 Spinoza sich selbst nicht
 erkennt [erkannt hat]. Also
 das, was ich von mir selbst
 weiß [sagen muß].

my head^a—as since childhood I have always done in this case—under the blanket & dared only after a few minutes to uncover it & to open my eyes.) As I said I became conscious that this dread has a deeper significance (even though in a way it came from the stomach, for that soon became clear to me), that is, that the capacity to feel dread is to mean something for me.^b Immediately after awaking, in dread, I thought: dream or no dream, this dread means something. I did something, felt something, after all, whatever my body was doing in the meantime.

That is, the human being is capable of such dread.—And this means something.

Also if a person experienced hell [95] in a dream & awoke afterwards, it would still exist.^c

Mine is a badly mannered (or ill-mannered) language.^d That is, it lacks a good linguistic upbringing.—Probably like the language of almost everyone.

Once read in Claudius^e a quote from Spinoza in which he writes about himself but I couldn't quite come to terms with this reflection.^f And now it occurs to me that I distrusted it in one regard without being able to say really in what. But now I believe that my feeling is that Spinoza did not recognize himself. Thus, just what I have to say about myself.^g

^aWittgenstein first wrote “hid myself,” struck the “myself” and put “my head.”

^b“As I said” was inserted into the line.—“that soon became” is an undecided alternative to “that was soon.”—“for me” was inserted into the line after Wittgenstein tried inserting “in me.” He remained uncertain about both. He also left as an undecided alternative “hat zu bedeuten (must mean or just: means)” and “habe zu bedeuten (is to mean).”

^cThe construction of the sentence suggests that it may be missing the word “nur”: “Wenn der Mensch die Hölle auch [nur] in einem Traum erlebte . . .” The sentence would then mean: “Even if people experienced hell only in a dream & woke up afterwards, it would still exist.”

^dThere is a play on the word “erzogen” here: “schlecht erzogen” can also mean “badly educated,” while “unerzogen” is also “unruly” or “ill-behaved.”

^eThe work of Matthias Claudius (1740–1815) was popularized by Karl Kraus. Claudius is best known for his poems in the style of plain folk songs. [I.S.] In part V of his collected writings from the *Wandsbeker Bote* (addendum to the second “Conversation about Freedom”), Claudius provides an extended quote from the fragment “The Emendation of the Intellect” in which Spinoza reflects on the conditions that led him to search for what is truly good; see vol. 1 of Spinoza’s *Collected Works*, ed. E. Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 7–11.

^fWittgenstein left as an undecided alternative (also with wavy underlining): “the reflection.”—The subject “I” was suppressed in the German but is needed here. Wittgenstein literally writes that he could not become quite joyful in regard to this reflection (“nicht ganz froh werden”).

^gInitially, Wittgenstein wrote: “So just what I know (weiß) about myself.” The German for “to recognize” is “sich erkennen”; thus one could also translate that Spinoza “did not know himself.”

[96–97]

«schwätzt nicht»

Er schien nicht zu erkennen
daß er ein armer Sünder war.
Ich kann nun natürlich
schreiben ich sei einer. Aber ich erken-
ne es nicht sonst würde ich anders.

Das Wort erkennen ist eben irre-
leitend, denn es handelt
sich um eine Tat die Mut er-
fordert.

Man könnte von einer Selbstbi-
ographie sagen: dies schreibt
ein Verdammter aus der Hölle.

In einem Satz steckt so viel
als dahinter steht.

Jetzt verstehe ich etwas das
Gefühl in meinem Traum.

Ich denke in jenem Zitat von ^{aus}
Spinoza an das Wort „Weisheit“

letzten
im Grunde
welches mir ein ^{TI} hohles Ding zu
sein schien (& scheint) hinter
dem sich der eigentliche Mensch,
wie er wirklich ist, versteckt.
(Ich meine: vor sich selbst ver-
steckt)

Decke auf, was Du bist.

Ich bin z.B. ein kleinlicher, lügne-
rischer Wicht & kann doch über
die größten Dinge reden.

Und während ich es tue, scheine
ich mir von meiner Kleinlichkeit
vollkommen detachiert zu
sein. Bin es aber doch nicht.

Selbsterkenntnis & Demut ist Eins.
(Das sind billige Bemerkungen.)

13.

Ich möchte nicht, daß mit
mir geschieht, was mit man-

[96] don't blather!^a

He did not seem to recognize that he was a poor sinner. Of course I can write now that I am one. But I do not recognize it or else I would.^b

The word recognize is misleading, after all, for it is a deed which requires courage.

One could say of an autobiography: one of the damned is writing this from hell.

In a sentence as much has gone into it stands behind it.

Now I understand a little the feeling in my dream.

In that quote from^c Spinoza I am thinking of the word "wisdom" [97] which in the final analysis^d appeared (& appears) a hollow thing to me behind which hides the actual person, how he really is. (I mean: hides from himself)

Uncover what you are.

I am for example a petty, lying rogue & yet can talk about the grandest things.

And while I am doing that, I seem to myself perfectly detached^e from my pettiness. Yet I am not.

Self-recognition & humility is one. (These are cheap remarks.)

13.[10.31]

I don't want happening to me what happens to [98] some wares. They are lying on the

^aThis appears to be the order of composition of this paragraph: First, Wittgenstein wrote, "He did not seem to recognize that he was a poor sinner. Of course I can write now that I am one. But I do not recognize it or else I would." The remark breaks off, and he crosses most of it out with a wavy line that expresses uncertainty or dissatisfaction. Alongside it he writes: "don't blather!" He then continues by remarking: "The word recognize is misleading, after all, for it is a deed which requires courage."

^bThe sentence breaks off here. The German still includes a "differently" which, in German, can precede the (missing) verb: "otherwise I would . . . differently."

^c"from" is an undecided alternative to "by."

^dWittgenstein first inserted "im Grunde (at bottom or basically)" into the line, then inserted the word "letzten (final or ultimate)" into the insertion, thus transforming it into "im letzten Grunde (in the final analysis)." However, he indicated his doubts about that last change.

^eWittgenstein produces a self-exemplifying, detached expression by employing the foreign word "detachiert" for "detached."

[98–99]

chen Waaren geschieht. Sie liegen
 auf ^rdem Ladentisch, die Käufer sehn
 sie & da ihnen ^eetwas die Farbe
 oder der Glanz
 oder ~~(sonst etwas)~~ in die Augen
 sticht so nimmt jeder die Sache
 in die Hand
 auf sieht sie einen Augenblick an,
 nicht erwünscht
 & läßt sie dann als unerwünscht
 auf den Ladentisch zurückfallen.
 [... die Käufer sehen sie, die Farbe,
 oder der Glanz, sticht ihnen in die Augen
 & sie nehmen den Gegenstand einen Augen-
 blick in die Hand & lassen ihn
 dann als unerwünscht auf den
 Tisch zurückfallen.]

Meine Gedanken kommen
 beinahe nie unverstümmelt
 in die
 zur Welt.
 Entweder es wird ein Teil
 bei der Geburt verrenkt oder
 abgebrochen. Oder der Gedanke
 ist überhaupt eine Frühgeburt
 & in der ^{Wort} Sprache noch nicht

lebensfähig. Dann kommt ein
 Satz-
 kleiner Fötus zur Welt, dem --
 dem noch die wichtigsten Glieder
 fehlen.

Die Melodien der frühen Beethoven
 schen Werke haben (schon) ein
 anderes Rassen~~g~~esicht als
 z.B. die Melodien Mozarts. Man
 könnte den Gesichtstypus/zeich-
 nen der diesen Rassen entsprä-
 che. Und zwar ist die Rasse
 Beethovens gedrungener, grob-
 gliedriger, mit runderem oder
 viereckigerem Gesicht, die Rasse
 Mozarts mit feineren schlanke-
 ren & doch rundlichen Formen &
 die Haydens groß & schlank von
 der Art mancher österreichischer
 Aristokraten. Oder lasse ich mich
 da von dem Bild verführen das
 ich von den Gestalten dieser Männer
 habe. Ich glaube nicht.

display table, the shoppers see them, the color or the sheen^a catches their eye & they handle the object for a moment & then let it drop back on the table as undesired.^b

My thoughts rarely come into the world^c unmutilated.

Either some part of them gets twisted at birth or broken off. Or the thought is a premature birth altogether & not yet [99] viable in the language of words.^d Then a small fetus of a sentence^e is born^f that is still lacking the most important limbs.

The melodies of Beethoven's early works (already) have different racial features^g from for example the melodies of Mozart. One could draw the type of face which would correspond to the races.^h Namely, Beethoven's race is more stocky, with coarser limbs, a rounder or squarer face, Mozart's race with more delicate more slender & yet rotund forms & that of Haydnⁱ tall & slender of the type of certain Austrian aristocrats. Or am I here seduced by the image I have of these men's figures. I don't think so.

^a"or the sheen" replaces "(or something else)," which was crossed out.

^bWittgenstein first wrote "so everyone picks the thing up (nimmt das Ding auf)," applied wavy underlining to "auf," and created "so everyone handles the thing (nimmt das Ding in die Hand)." In a further revision he eliminated "everyone" and maintained "shoppers" as the subject throughout.

^c"come into the world (kommen in die Welt)" is an undecided alternative to "are born (kommen zur Welt: come to the world)."

^d"of words" was inserted into the line, changing "Sprache (language)" into "Wortsprache."

^e"of a sentence" was inserted into the line, changing "Fötus (fetus)" into "Satzfötus."

^fThis time Wittgenstein left "zur Welt kommen (come to the world)."

^gThe German is "Rassegesicht," which could also be translated "racial face, character, physiognomy, or expression."

^h"the races" is an undecided alternative to "these races."

ⁱWittgenstein misspelled the name of the Austrian composer Joseph Haydn (1732–1809) as "Hayden."

[100–101]

Merkwürdig zu sehen, wie ~~sich~~
 ein Stoff ^{sich} einer Form widersetzt.

Wie der Nibelungenstoff sich
 der dramatischen Form widersetzt.

Er will kein Drama werden &
 wird kein's & nur dort ~~gibt er~~
~~nach~~ [ergibt er sich] wo ^{der} Dichter
 oder Komponist sich entschließt

episch zu werden [~~ihn episch zu behandeln~~]

So sind die einzigen bleibenden
 & echten Stellen im „Ring“ ~~„des Nibelungen“~~
 die epischen, in denen Text oder
 Musik erzählen. Und darum
 sind die eindrucksvollsten Worte
 des „Rings“ die der Bühnenweisungen.

Ich bin in meine Art der Gedanken
 bewegung beim Philosophieren etwas
 verliebt. (Und vielleicht sollte ich
 das Wort „etwas“ weglassen.)

Etwas ist nur so ernst, als es

ernst ist.

[Etwas ist nur so ernst, als es
 wirklich ernst ist]

Übrigens heißt das nicht, daß ich in
 meinen Stil verliebt bin. Das
 bin ich nicht.

Vielleicht, wie sich mancher gern
 reden hört, höre ich mich gerne
 schreiben?

Daß Dir etwas einfällt ist
 ein Geschenk des Himmels,
 aber es kommt darauf an,
 was Du damit machst.

Natürlich sind auch solche
 gute Lehren billig eine Tat
 durch die Du nach ihnen handelst.
 (Ich dachte bei dem vorigen Satz
 an Kraus.)

[100] Strange to see how a material resists a form. How the material of the Nibelung-legends^a resists dramatic form. It does not want to become a drama & won't become one & it surrenders only^b where the^c poet or composer decides to turn epic.^d Thus the only lasting & authentic passages in the "Ring"^e are the epic ones in which text or music narrate. And therefore the most impressive words of the "Ring" are the stage directions.

I am somewhat in love^f with my sort of movement of thought in philosophy. (And perhaps I should omit the word "somewhat.")

This does not mean, by the way, that I am in love with my style. That I am not.^g

[101] Something is serious only to the extent that it is really serious.^h

Perhaps, just as some like to hear themselves talk, I like to hear myself write?

That something occurs to you is a gift from heaven, but it depends on what you make of it.

Of course such good teachings, too, are rightly a deed through which you act according to them.ⁱ (In the previous sentence I was thinking of Kraus.)

^aThe German here is simply "Nibelungenstoff," that is, the Nibelung subject matter or material that goes back to the anonymous *Nibelungenlied* written around 1200. The legends have been adapted to the stage (for example, by Friedrich Hebbel) and most notably by Richard Wagner in his cycle of operas.

^bWittgenstein first wrote "gives way (nachgeben)" but crossed this out.

^c"the" was inserted into the line.

^dThe original "to treat it epically" received wavy underlining and was eventually crossed out.

^eThe title of Wagner's cycle of operas "Ring des Nibelungen" was initially written out in full.

^fAs in English, "to be in love (verliebt sein)" is not the same as "to love (lieben)."

^gWittgenstein changed the order of the remarks here: "This does not mean, by the way . . ." was written after the next remark ("Something is serious . . .").

^hThis is one of the occasions where Wittgenstein first wrote the remark (without the "really") and then offered a variant of the entire remark in brackets—this variant (which includes the "really") has the status of an undecided alternative. As usual, the last variant is used here.

ⁱ"Billig" can also be translated "cheap" or "cheaply." Accordingly, this sentence could be rendered: "Of course such good teachings, too, can liberally be regarded a deed . . ." or (if one adds a comma or semicolon): "Of course such good teachings also come cheap; a deed . . ."

[102–103]

Erkenne Dich selbst & Du
wirst sehen, daß Du in jeder
Weise immer wieder ein armer Sünder
bist. Aber ich will kein armer
Sünder sein & suche auf alle Weise
zu entschlüpfen (benütze alles als
Tür um diesem Urteil zu entschlüpfen).

Meine Aufrichtigkeit bleibt
^{an}
immer bei einem bestimmten
Punkt stecken!

Wie man sich in einem hohlen
Zahn gut auszukennen scheint,
wenn der Zahnarzt in ihm herum-
^{während}
bohrt, so lernt man durch
des bohrenden Denkens
das Bohren des Denkens jede
Räumlichkeit jeden Schluff eines Ge-
dankens kennen & wiedererkennen.

Was ich, quasi, auf dem Theater ^(Kierkegaard)
||

in meiner Seele aufführe macht
ihren Zustand nicht schöner
sondern (ehr) verabscheuens-
würdiger. Und doch glaube
ich immer wieder diesen Zustand
durch eine schöne Scene auf
dem Theater schöner zu machen.
Denn ich sitze im Zuschauer-
raum derselben statt das
Ganze von außen zu betrach-
ten. Denn ich stehe nicht gern
auf der nüchternen, alltäg-
unfreundlichen
lichen, ~~häßlichen~~ Straße son-
dern sitze gern im warmen,
angenehmen Zuschauerraum.

Ja, nur für wenige Momente
^{in's Freie}
gehe ich hinaus auf die Straße
& dann vielleicht auch ^{nur} mit
dem Gefühl immer wieder in's
können.
Warme schlüpfen zu dürfen.

Die Zuneigung der Andern zu

[102] Know thyself^a & you will see that you are in every way again and again a poor sinner. But I don't want to be a poor sinner & seek in all manner to slip away (use anything as a door to slip away from this judgment).^b

My sincerity always gets stuck at^c a certain point!

Just as one seems to know quite well one's way about a hollow tooth when the dentist is probing it, so in the course of probing thought^d one learns to know & recognize^e every space, every crevice of a thought.

What I perform, so to speak (Kierkegaard),^f on the stage [103] in my soul doesn't render its condition more beautiful but (rather) more despicable. And yet again and again I take myself to be beautifying this condition through a beautiful scene on the stage. For I am sitting in the auditorium rather than viewing everything from the outside.^g For I don't like standing on the sober, ordinary, unfriendly^h street but like sitting in the warm, pleasant auditorium.

Yes, only for a few moments I step out into the openⁱ & perhaps even then only^j with the feeling of being able to slip back into the warmth at any time.^k

^aTo capture the Socratic "Erkenne dich selbst," "erkennen (recognize)" is here translated as "know." See [96] above: "He did not seem to recognize (erkennen) that he was a poor sinner."

^bIn German as in English "Urteil (judgment)" also refers to the verdict of a judge.

^c"at (an)" is an undecided alternative to "with (bei)."

^dThe German for "probing" is "bohren," which literally means "drilling." Wittgenstein first wrote "through the probing of thought." While he left the choice between "through" and "in the course of" undecided, he indicated his dissatisfaction with "probing of thought."

^eThe original reads more succinctly "kennen & wiedererkennen."

^f"(Kierkegaard)" was inserted into the line. Wittgenstein may be referring to his *Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). Kierkegaard draws on the theater as a metaphor and considers an audience that does not wish to remain in the auditorium but wants to go down to the street or wherever the scene is taking place.

^gThe German "auf dem Theater" means "on stage." By writing "derselben" instead of "desselben" Wittgenstein appears to refer to the auditorium of the scene and not to the auditorium of the theater.

^h"unfriendly" is a substitute for "ugly," which was crossed out by Wittgenstein.

ⁱ"into the open (in's Freie)" is an undecided alternative to "into the street (auf die Straße)."

^jWittgenstein first inserted "only" into the line and was then doubtful about his improvement.

^k"being able to (zu können)" is an undecided alternative to "being permitted to (zu dürfen)."

[104–105]

entbehren wäre mir überhaupt
unmöglich, weil ich in diesem Sinne
viel zu wenig (oder kein) Selbst
habe.

Vielleicht habe ich nur insoweit
ein Selbst als ich mich tatsäch-
lich verworfen fühle.

Und wenn ich sage daß ich mich
verworfen fühle so ist das
kein Ausdruck (oder ^{nur:} beinahe
nie ein Ausdruck?) ~~dessen~~ dieses
Gefühls

Ich habe mir oft den Kopf
darüber zerbrochen daß ich
nicht besser bin als Kraus
& verwandte Geister & es mir
mit Schmerzen vorgehalten.
Welche Unsumme von Eitel-
keit liegt aber in diesem Gedan-
ken.

24.10.

Das Geheimnis der Dimensionie-
oder
rung eines Sessels eines ~~Fensters~~
sie die Auffassung des
Hauses ist, daß ~~sie uns den Ge~~

«Gegenstand(es) ~~anders auffassen~~
ändert kürzer
~~m-macht~~. Mache das länger &

es sieht aus wie eine Fortsetzung
dieses Teiles, mache es länger
& es sieht aus wie ein ganz
unabhängiger Teil. Mache es stär-
ker & das Andere scheint sich
darauf zu stützen, mache es
schwächer und es scheint am
Andern zu hängen. etc.

Nicht der graduelle (~~quantita-~~
~~tive~~) Unterschied der Länge ist
es eigentlich, worauf es ankommt,
sondern der qualitative der
Auffassung.

Wenn ~~man~~ der Brahmsschen
~~Orches~~ Instrumentierung (m)Mangel
vorgeworfen wird
an Farbensinn ~~vorwirft~~, so muß

To be deprived of the affection of others [104] would be altogether impossible for me because in this sense I have far too little (or no) self.

Perhaps I have a self only insofar as I feel actually reprobate.

And when I say that I feel reprobate, this is no expression (or just:^a hardly ever an expression?) of this feeling.^b

I have often racked my brain over my not being better than Kraus & kindred spirits & painfully reproached myself with this. Yet what an untold amount^c of vanity there is in this thought.

[105]

24.10.[31]

The secret of dimensioning an armchair or a house^d is that it changes one's awareness of the object.^e Make this shorter^f & it looks like the continuation of that part, make it longer & it looks like a completely independent part. Make it sturdier & the other seems to rest upon it, make it weaker and it seems to hang on the other. etc.

It isn't really the gradual difference^g of length that matters but the qualitative difference of awareness.

^a“just: (nur:)” was inserted into the line.

^bWittgenstein crossed out “of that (dessen)” and then wrote “of this feeling (dieses Gefühls).”

^cThe German word is “Unsumme”—an immeasurable sum.

^d“house” was written after Wittgenstein crossed out “window.” Compare Hermine Wittgenstein's *Recollections of Wittgenstein* as the designer of his sister's house: “Ludwig designed every window and door, every window-lock and radiator, with as much care to attention to detail as if they were precision instruments, and on a most elegant scale. [. . .] Perhaps the most telling proof of Ludwig's relentlessness when it came to getting proportions exactly right is the fact that he had the ceiling of one of the rooms, which was almost big enough to be a hall, raised by three centimeters, just as it was almost time to start cleaning the completed house” ([51,b], pp. 6–8).

^eWittgenstein crossed out “that it makes us apprehend (auffassen: become aware of, view) the object differently” and substituted “daß es die Auffassung des Gegenstandes ändert.”

^f“shorter” was inserted to replace the crossed out “longer.”

^gWittgenstein first wrote “gradueller (quantitative) Unterschied” but struck the parenthetical “quantitative.”

[106–107]

man sagen daß die Farblosigkeit schon in der Brahms'schen Thematik liegt. Die Themen schon sind schwarz-weiß, wie die Brucknerschen schon färbig; auch wenn Bruckner er sie tatsächlich aus irgendeinem Grund auf nur einem System niedergeschrieben hätte, so daß wir von einer Brucknerschen Instrumentierung nichts wüßten.

Nun könnte man sagen: dann ist ja alles in Ordnung, denn zu schwarz-weißen Themen gehört auch eine schwarzweiße ~~In~~ (also farblose) Instrumentation. Ich glaube ^{nur} daß gerade hier die Schwäche der Brahms'schen Instrumentation liegt, indem sie nämlich vielfach doch nicht ausgesprochen schwarz-weiß ist. Dadurch entsteht dann der Eindruck der uns oft glauben macht, wir vermissten Farben,

weil die Farben, die da sind, nicht erfreulich wirken. In Wirklichkeit vermischen wir, glaube ich, Farblosigkeit. Das zeigt sich auch oft deutlich z.B. im letzten Satz des Violinkonzerts wo sehr merkwürdige Klangeffekte gibt (als ^{es} ^{einmal} wie dürre Blätter blättern die Töne ^{von den Violinen ab}) & wo man ^{das} doch als einen einzelnen Klangeffekt empfindet, während man die Klänge bei Bruckner als ^{die} ^{Umkleidung} selbstverständliche Fleisch ^{der} ^{dieser} zu den Knochen seiner Themen empfindet. (Ganz anders ist es beim Brahms'schen Chorklang der der Thematik ebenso angewachsen ist wie der Brucknersche Orchesterklang der Brucknerschen Thematik.) (Die Harfe ~~im~~ ^{am Schluß des} ersten Teils des Deutschen Requiems.)

If Brahms's instrumentation is accused of lacking a sense of color^a, one must [106] say that colorlessness is already in Brahms's themes. The themes are already in black and white, just as Bruckner's are already colorful; even if Bruckner^b had for some reason written them down in one system only so that we knew nothing of a Brucknerian instrumentation.

One could say now: well then everything is okay for to the black and white themes belongs a black and white (colorless) instrumentation.^c But I believe^d that precisely in this lies the weakness of Brahms's instrumentation, namely in that it is frequently not decidedly black and white after all. Thus arises the impression that often makes us believe that we are missing colors, [107] because the colors that are there don't have a pleasing effect. In reality, I think, we are missing colorlessness. And often this shows itself distinctly, for example in the last movement of the Violin Concerto^e where there are^f very peculiar sound effects (once as if the sounds were peeling like dry leaves from the violins)^g & where yet one senses this^h as an isolated soundeffect, while one senses Bruckner's sounds as the natural clothing of the bones of these themes.ⁱ (It's quite different for Brahms's choral sound which takes root in the themes just as Bruckner's orchestral sound does in Bruckner's themes.) (The harp at the end of^j the first part of the German Requiem).^k

^aThis sentence was originally written in the active voice "if one accuses Brahms's instrumentation . . ." Also, Wittgenstein began writing "orchestration" before choosing "instrumentation."

^b"Bruckner" is an undecided alternative to "he."

^cWittgenstein began the word "instrumentation" before writing "(thus colorless) instrumentation," then crossed out the "thus."

^d"Ich glaube nur" could also be translated "It's just that I believe." The word "nur" was inserted into the line.

^eWittgenstein refers to Johannes Brahms's Concerto for Violin and Orchestra, D Major, opus 77. [I.S.]

^f"there are" was inserted into the line.

^g"once" and "like dry leaves" were inserted into the line.

^h"this" was inserted into the line.

ⁱ"the obvious clothing (die selbstverständliche Umkleidung) of the bones of these themes" is an undecided alternative to "the obvious flesh (das selbstverständliche Fleisch) to the bones of his themes."

^j"at the end of" replaces "in" (which was crossed out).

^kWittgenstein probably refers to the second of the seven movements of Brahms's *German Requiem* for solo voices, choir, orchestra, and organ, opus 45. [I.S.]

[108–109]

Zum „Geheimnis der Dimensionierung“:
 der eigentliche Sinn der Dimensionierung zeigt sich darin, daß man dem Gegenstand je nachdem sich seine Maßverhältnisse ändern andere Namen geben kann. (Ganz so, natürlich, wie dem Ausdruck des Gesichtes dessen Proportionen man änderte; ‚traurig‘, ‚frech‘, ‚wild‘ etc., etc..)

Die Freude an meinen Gedanken (philosophischen Gedanken) ist die Freude an meinem eigenen seltsamen Leben.
 Ist das Lebensfreude?

Es ist sehr schwer nichts von sich zu halten & jeden Beweis daß man doch ein Recht habe etwas von sich zu halten (Beweis nach Analogien) von @ vornherein, auch ehe man den Fehler durchschaut hat irgendwo verstanden hat daß er ^{||} nicht stimmt

(ja auch wenn man nie auf den Fehler kommen sollte) für Trug zu halten [als Trug zu erklären].

31.10.

Zum Studium der Philosophie sind heute am besten noch Studenten der Physik vorbereitet. (~~Nicht~~ ^{der} ~~Ma-~~ ~~thematik~~) Ihr Verständnis ist durch die offenbare Unklarheit in ihrer Wissenschaft aufgelockert als das der Mathematiker die in einer selbstsichern Tradition festgefahren sind.

Ich könnte mich beinahe als einen amoralischen Nucleus sehen, an dem die Moralbegriffe (A|a)n-^{kleben} derer Menschen leicht hängen bleiben.

So daß, was ich redete eo ipso nie @.. mein Eigenes wäre da ja dieser Nucleus (ich sehe ihn wie einen

[108]

Concerning the “secret of dimensioning”: the real meaning of dimensioning shows itself in that one can give the object different names as its measured proportions change. (Just as, of course, with the expression of the face the proportions of which one has changed; ‘sad,’ ‘naughty,’ ‘wild,’ etc., etc.)

The joy I have in my thoughts (philosophical thoughts) is joy in my own strange life. Is that the joy of life?^a

It is difficult to think nothing of oneself & to declare^b as delusional any proof that after all one may have a right to think something of oneself (proof by analogies), to declare this from the outset, even before one has seen through the mistake^c [109] (yes even if one should never catch on to the mistake).

31.10.[31]

The best prepared these days for the study of philosophy are students of physics.^d Due to the evident lack of clarity in their science their understanding is more loose than that of the mathematicians who are stuck in their self-assured tradition.

I could almost see myself as an amoral nucleus to which the moral concepts of other people stick^e easily.

So that, what I am saying is eo ipso never my own,^f since this nucleus (I picture it as a

^aLeaving out the parenthetical “(philosophical thoughts),” Wittgenstein copied this remark into MS 155; compare *Culture and Value* [6,b], p. 22/20.

^bWittgenstein originally wrote “to consider delusional.”

^c“even before one has seen through the mistake” is an undecided alternative to “even before one has understood that it (the proof) is somewhere not correct.” However, Wittgenstein’s diary allows for different reconstructions here. Ilse Somavilla suggests that Wittgenstein’s proposed alternative amounts to “even before one has seen through the mistake that it is somewhere not correct.”

^dWittgenstein struck the parenthetical remark “(Not of mathematics).” One of his students at the time was the student of physics W.H. Watson. See the preface of his *On Understanding Physics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. ix.

^e“stick (kleben)” is an undecided alternative to “hang” or “become attached (hängen).”

^fWittgenstein uses the Latin “eo ipso (due to the fact itself).”

[110–111]

~~leblosen~~ weißen toten Ballen) nicht reden kann. Es bleiben vielmehr an ihm bedruckte Blätter hängen. Diese reden dann; freilich, nicht wie in ihrem ursprünglichen Zustand sondern durcheinander mit andern ~~hängenbleibenden~~ ~~hängenbleibenden~~ Blättern & beeinflusst durch die Lage in die sie der Nucleus bringt. – Aber wenn das auch mein Schicksal sein sollte, so wäre ich doch der Verantwortung nicht enthoben & es wäre Sünde oder Unsinn dieses Schicksal etwa zu beklagen.

Man könnte sagen: Du verachtest die natürlichen Tugenden, weil Du sie nicht hast! – Aber ist es nicht noch viel wunderbarer – oder ebenso wunderbar – daß ein Mensch ohne alle diese Gaben Mensch sein kann!

„Du machst aus der Not eine Tugend“. Gewiß, aber ist es nicht wunderbar, daß man aus der Not eine Tugend machen kann.

Man könnte es so sagen: Das Wunderbare ist, daß das Tote nicht sündigen kann. Und das Lebende zwar sündigen kann aber auch der Sünde entsagen: Ich kann nur in soweit schlecht sein, als ich auch gut sein kann.

Ich stelle mir die Menschen ^{manchmal} ~~oft~~ als Kugeln vor: die eine aus echtem Gold durch & durch, die andere eine Schichte ~~Dreck~~ wertloses Material, darunter Gold; die dritte eine täuschende aber falsche Vergoldung darunter – Gold. Wieder eine wo unter der Vergoldung Dreck ist & eine wo in diesem Dreck wieder ein Körnchen echtes Gold ist. U.s.w., u.s.w..

[110] white dead^a bundle) cannot talk. Instead, printed sheets stick to it. These then talk; of course, not in their original state but mixed up with other sheets^b & influenced by the position into which they are brought by the nucleus.—But even if this was to be my fate, I would not be relieved of responsibility & it would be sin or nonsense for example to lament this fate.

One could say: You despise the natural virtues because you don't have them!—But is it not much more marvelous—or just as marvelous—that a human being without these gifts can still be human!^c

[111] “You make a virtue of necessity.” Sure, but is it not marvelous that one can make a virtue of necessity.

One could put it like this: The marvelous is that what is dead cannot sin. And that what lives can sin but also renounce sin: I can be bad only to the extent that I can also be good.

I sometimes^d imagine human beings like balls: one out of genuine gold through & through, the other a layer of worthless material^e with gold underneath; the third a deceptive but false gilding and underneath—gold. Yet another where there is dirt under the gilding & one where in this dirt there is again a kernel of genuine gold. Etc. etc.

^aAs an alternative to “dead,” Wittgenstein first added “lifeless,” then struck it again.

^bWittgenstein wrote “mit andern hängenbleibenden Blättern”: “with other sheets that are getting attached.” He then struck “hängenbleibenden.”

^cIt is “wunderbar (wonderful, marvelous)” that a human being without all these “Gaben (talents, gifts)” can still be a “Mensch (a human being).”

^d“sometimes” replaces “often” which first received wavy underlining and was then struck.

^eWittgenstein wrote “dirt,” struck that word, and continued with “worthless material.”

[112–113]

Ich glaube die letztere bin vielleicht ich.

Aber wie schwer ist so ein Mensch zu beurteilen. Man kommt ihm drauf, daß die erste Schichte falsch ist & sagt: „also ist er nichts (w|W)ert“, denn daß es falsch vergoldetes echtes Gold geben soll, glaubt niemand.

Oder man findet unter der falschen Vergoldung den Mist & sagt: „Natürlich! das war zu erwarten.“ Aber daß dann in diesem Mist noch wirkliches Gold versteckt sein soll, das ist schwer zu vermuten.

Wenn eine Kanone zum Schutz gegen Fliegerangriffe so bemalt ist, daß sie von oben aussieht wie Bäume oder Steine, daß ihre wahren Konturen unkenntlich &

falsche an ihre Stelle getreten sind, wie schwer zu beurteilen ist dieses Ding. Man könnte sich (e|E)inen denken der sagt: „das sind also alles falsche Konturen, also hat das Ding gar keine wirk-wirkliche Gestalt lichen Konturen“ Und doch hat es eine wirkliche feste Gestalt aber sie ist mit den gewöhnlichen Mitteln gar nicht zu beurteilen.

Meine Schwester Gretl las einmal eine Stelle aus einem Essay ^{von} Emerson^s vor, worin er seinen Freund einen Philosophen (den Namen habe ich vergessen) beschreibt; @ aus dieser Beschreibung glaubte sie zu entnehmen ~~sollte hervorgehen~~, daß dieser Mann mir ähnlich gewesen sein ^{müsse} ~~müsse~~ . Ich dachte ^{bei} ~~bei~~ mir: Welches Naturspiel! – Welches Naturspiel, wenn ein Käfer ausschaut wie ein Blatt, aber dann ein wirklicher Käfer ist, & nicht ein Kunstblumenblatt. ~~wie es die Menschen~~

[112]

I think that I am perhaps the latter.

But how difficult it is to judge such a person. One finds him out, discovering that the first layer is false^a & says: “so he is worthless” for no one believes that there can be falsely gilded genuine gold. Or one finds the trash under the false gilding & says: “Of course! That was to be expected.” But that there should then still be genuine gold hidden in this trash, that is difficult to suppose.

When a cannon is painted to protect against air raids in such a way that from above it looks like trees or rocks, that its true contours become indiscernible & [113] false ones have taken their place, how difficult it is to judge this thing. One could imagine someone who says: “so all these are false contours, therefore the thing has no real shape^b at all.” And yet it has a real firm shape but it cannot at all be judged by ordinary means.

My sister Gretl once read a passage from an essay by Emerson^c in which he describes his friend, a philosopher (I forgot the name);^d from this description she thought she could gather^e that this man must have been similar to me. I thought to myself:^f What sport of nature!^g—What sport of nature where a beetle looks like a leaf but then it is a real beetle & not the leaf of an artificial flower.^h

^a“discovering” was added to make this sentence more easily intelligible in English.

^b“no real shape” is an undecided alternative to “no real contours.”

^cWittgenstein here changed “one of Emerson’s essays” to “an essay by Emerson.” The essays by American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) were widely read in Europe, for example, by Friedrich Nietzsche. On November 15, 1914, Wittgenstein noted in his “secret” diary: “I am now reading in Emerson’s ‘Essays.’ Perhaps they will have a good influence on me.” See his *Geheime Tagebücher 1914–1916*, ed. Wilhem Baum (Vienna: Turia and Kant, 1991), p. 40. [I.S.]

^dWittgenstein’s sister Gretl is probably referring to Emerson’s 1862 funeral address for fellow transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862). [I.S.]

^eWittgenstein first wrote and struck out “was supposed to have emerged.”

^fThe German “Ich dachte mir” means “I thought or imagined.” Wittgenstein inserted a “bei,” thus rendering it “I thought to or with myself.”

^gWittgenstein writes “Naturspiel (play, game, sport of nature)” and not the more familiar “Naturschauspiel (spectacle of nature).”

^hThis sentence originally continued onto the next page “as people [make it] out of paper.” Wittgenstein struck these words before completing the sentence.

[114–115]

~~aus Papier~~

Im richtige geschriebene Satz
 löst sich ein Partikel vom
 Herzen oder Gehirn ab & kommt
 als Satz aufs Papier.

Ich glaube meine Sätze sind
 meistens Beschreibungen visueller
 Bilder die mir einfallen.

Der Witz Lichtenbergs ist die
 Flamme die nur auf einer reinen
 Kerze brennt.

„Ich kann so lügen, – oder
 auch so, – oder vielleicht
 am besten, indem ich die Wahr-
 heit ganz aufrichtig sage.“ So
 sage ich oft zu mir selbst.

2.1[011].

Dostojewskij sagt einmal der
 Teufel nähme jetzt die Gestalt

der Furcht vor der Lächerlichkeit
 an. Und das muß wahr sein.

Denn vor nichts fürchte ich mich
 so; nichts möchte ich so unbedingt
 vermeiden als die Lächerlichkeit.

Dabei weiß, ich daß es eine Feig-
 heit ist wie jede@ andere, & daß
 die Feigheit überall hinaus
 getrieben, da ihre letzte unein-
 nehmbar Festung hat. So

daß sie nur zum Schein besiegt
 von
 ist wenn sie sich an manchen
 Plätzen
 Stellen zurückgezogen hat da

sie sich ruhig in diese Festung be-
 (& von dort das ganze Land wieder einnehmen wird)
 gibt & dort sicher ist. Der ganze

Sieg war nur Komödie. [... So daß sie
 nur zum Schein besiegt ist, wenn

sie den einen oder andern Platz
 preisgibt
~~preisgegeben hat~~, da sie sich ^{endlich} ruhig

in diese Festung zurückzieht &
 dort sicher ist.]

Wenn ich den Leuten von mir sagte

[114]

In the correctly written sentence, a particle detaches from the heart or brain & arrives as a sentence on paper.

I believe that my sentences are mostly descriptions of visual images that occur to me.

Lichtenberg's wit is the flame that can burn on a pure candle only.^a

"I can lie like that,—or also like that,—or best of all, by telling the truth quite sincerely."
So I often say to myself.^b

2.11.[31]

Dostoevsky once said that the devil nowadays takes the guise [115] of fear of the ridiculous. And that must be true. For there is nothing I am more afraid of; nothing I want to avoid so unconditionally as ridiculousness.^c And yet I know that this is a cowardice like any other, & that cowardice having been expelled everywhere has its last unconquerable citadel there. So that it is only seemingly defeated when it surrenders^d this place or that, since at last^e it can calmly retreat into this citadel & is safe there.^f

^aBest known for his posthumously published aphorisms, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799) was an experimental physicist and Enlightenment author of popular essays on scientific and philosophical issues. Two of Wittgenstein's students pointed out similarities between Lichtenberg and Wittgenstein: Georg Henrik von Wright in his 1942 essay "Georg Christoph Lichtenberg als Philosoph" (*Theoria*, vol. 8, pp. 201–217); J. P. Stern in his book *Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of Scattered Occasions* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959). [I.S.]

^bIn Dostoevsky's *Demons*, Stepan Trofimovich declares: "My friend, I have been lying all my life. Even when I was telling the truth" (pt. 3, chap. 7, sec. 2, in the Pevear translation).

^cWittgenstein is here referring to chapter 6, book 10 of Dostoevsky's *Brothers Karamazov* where Kolya Krasotkin worries that people are laughing at him. Alyosha replies (in the Garnett/Matlaw translation): "The devil has taken the form of that vanity and entered into the whole generation; it's simply the devil." Compare O. K. Bouwsma, *Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949–1951* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), pp. 6f.

^d"surrenders (preisgibt)" replaces "has surrendered" which was struck by Wittgenstein.

^e"at last (endlich)" was inserted into the line.

^fThis entire sentence was preceded by various revisions. The original formulation appeared to have been: "So that it is only seemingly defeated when it has withdrawn at some spots, since it can calmly proceed into this fortress & is safe there. The entire victory was only a farce (Der ganze Sieg war nur Komödie)." Wittgenstein then introduced the undecided alternative "withdrawn from some places" and added after "& is safe there" the parenthetical remark "(& from there will recapture the whole country)." It is not clear whether the last variant was intended to replace also the previously unedited "The entire victory was only a farce."

[116–117]

was ich ihnen sagen sollte,
würde ich mich der Verachtung
& dem Hohn beinahe Aller die
mich kennen preisgeben.

„Vaterlandsloses Gesindel“ (auf
die Juden angewandt) steht auf
der gleichen Stufe mit „krumm-
nasiges Gesindel“, denn, sich ein
Vaterland zu geben, steht ebenso-
wenig in eines Menschen Belieben
wie, sich eine gerade Nase geben.

Das Schuld beladene Ge-
wissen könnte leicht beichten;
der eitle Mensch kann nicht
beichten.

^{will}
Ich werde mich keinem Ent-
schluß von mir gefangen geben,
es sei denn, daß der Entschluß
mich gefangen hält.

Umarme einen Menschen für
ihn & nicht für Dich.

7.

Bin jetzt durchaus beunruhigt,
durch Gewissen & Gedanken

Es ist seltsam ^{wem} (~~wenn~~~~daß~~) in zwei
Zimmern untereinander zwei
Welten wohnen können. Das
geschieht wenn ich unter den
zwei Studenten wohne die über
mir Lärm machen. Es sind wirk-
lich zwei Welten & es ist keine
Verständigung möglich.

Ich habe jetzt das Gefühl, als
müßte ich ~~quasi~~ in's Kloster gehn
(innerlich), wenn ich die Marguerite
verlöre.

Der Gedanke an eine bürgerliche
Verlobung der Marguerite erregt
mir Übligkeiten. Nein in diesem

If I told people about me [116] what I should be telling them, I would expose myself to the contempt & derision of nearly everyone who knows me.

“Rabble without a country” (applied to the Jews) is on the same level as “crooked-nosed rabble,” for to give oneself a country^a is just as little at a person’s discretion as is giving oneself a straight nose.

The conscience burdened by guilt could easily confess; but the vain person cannot confess.^b

I don’t want to^c let myself become captive to a decision of mine unless the decision holds me captive.

[117]

Embrace someone for him & not for yourself.^d

7.[11 or 12.31]

Am quite worried now, through conscience & thoughts.

It is strange when^e two different worlds can live in two rooms one beneath the other. This happens when I live below the two students who make noise above me. These are really two worlds & no communication is possible.^f

I now have the feeling as if I would have to join a monastery^g (inwardly) were I to lose Marguerite.

The thought of a bourgeois engagement for Marguerite makes me nauseous.^h No in this

^a“Vaterlandsloses Gesindel” is a derogatory term that refers to all those who lack a fatherland, do not belong, or have no allegiance to the country in which they live.

^bThe German language distinguishes between “confessing or admitting a crime” in a civil setting (gestehen) and “confessing a sin” in a religious setting (beichten). Wittgenstein uses the latter expression here.

^c“don’t want to” is an undecided alternative to “will not.”

^d“Umarme einen Menschen für ihn,” that is, presumably for his own sake.

^eWittgenstein tried “wenn (when or if)” and “daß (that),” struck both and inserted “wem” (misspelled for “wenn”).

^fAccording to Karl Britton’s “Recollections of Ludwig Wittgenstein” (*Cambridge Journal*, vol. 7: 1954, pp. 709–715), Wittgenstein was then living at “H4 Great Court in Trinity” and moved to rooms in Whewell’s Court after Christmas.

^gWittgenstein first wrote “I would have to in a way (quasi) join a monastery,” then struck “quasi.”

^h“bürgerlich” means “bourgeois” as well as “civil” (see page [121]). Also, the word Wittgenstein uses for “nausea” is old Viennese dialect: “Übligkei.” It would be another year (just before Christmas 1932) until Marguerite sent a letter to Margarete Stonborough announcing her intention to marry Talla Sjögren. The wedding took place shortly thereafter on New Year’s Eve. [I.S.] When he wrote these remarks, Wittgenstein had not yet “lost” Marguerite (compare note c on page [92] above).

[118–119]

Fall könnte ich nichts für sie
 tun & müßte sie behandeln
 wie ich sie behandeln ^{würde}, wenn sie
 sich ~~einen Rausch an~~ gebietrunken
 hätte, nämlich: nicht mit ihr reden
 bis sie den Rausch ausgeschlafen
 hat.

Es ist wahr daß man auch
 auf dem Trümmerfeld der Häuser
 soll leben können in denen
 man zu leben gewohnt war.
 Aber es ist schwer. Man hat
 seine Freude eben doch von
 der Wärme & Behaglichkeit
 der Zimmer genommen, auch
 wenn man es ^{nicht} kaum wußte.

Aber jetzt, wo man auf den
 Trümmern umherirrt, weiß man
 es.

Man weiß daß jetzt nur der
 Geist wärmen kann & daß man
 gar nicht gewohnt ist sich vom

Geist «er»wärmen & erhalten zu lassen.

(Wenn man verkühlt ist tut
 das Waschen weh & wenn man «im»
 geistig krank ist, das Denken.

Ich kann (d.h. ich will) den Ge-
 nuß nicht aufgeben. Ich will
 das Genießen nicht aufgeben
 & will kein Held sein. Daher
 leide ich den durchdringenden &
 beschämenden Schmerz der Verlas-
 senheit.

Die Verzweiflung hat kein Ende,
 es sei denn, daß man ihr ein
 & der Selbstmord endet sie nicht
 Ende macht indem man sich
 aufrafft.

Der Verzweifelte ist wie ein eigensin-
 niges Kind das den Apfel haben
 will. Aber man weiß für gewöhn-
 lich nicht, was es heißt, den Eigen-

[118] case there is nothing I could do for her & would have to treat her as I would^a if she had gotten drunk,^b namely: not talk to her until she slept off her stupor.

It is true that one may be able to live also on the field of rubble from the houses in which one was once accustomed to live. But it is difficult. One had derived one's joy from the warmth & coziness of the rooms, after all, even if one didn't know^c it. But now, as one wanders aimlessly on the rubble, one knows it.

One knows that only the mind can provide warmth now & that one is not at all accustomed to being warmed^d by [119] the mind.

(When one is chilled it hurts to wash & when one is sick in the mind it hurts to think.)

I cannot (that is, do not want to) give up enjoyment. I don't want to give up enjoying & don't want to be a hero. I therefore suffer the piercing & shameful pain of forlornness.

Despair has no end & suicide does not end it,^e unless one puts an end to it by pulling one-self together.

The person who despairs is like a stubborn child who wants to have the apple. But one usually doesn't know what it means to break stubborn[120]ness. It means to break a bone in

^a“would” was inserted into the line.

^bWittgenstein first used another idiom for getting drunk (“sich einen Rausch antrinken”) before settling on the more simple and direct “sich betrinken.”

^c“didn't know” is an undecided alternative to “hardly knew.”

^dInitially, Wittgenstein wrote “being warmed & maintained,” then struck “& maintained.”

^eThe words “& suicide does not end it” were written between two lines as if he was planning perhaps to insert them behind “unless one puts an end to it.” Wittgenstein used an arrow to indicate their insertion behind “has no end.”

[120–121]

sinn zu brechen. Es heißt einen Knochen im Leibe brechen (und ein Gelenk machen, wo früher keins war).

Alte Gedankenbrocken die einen schon vor langer Zeit hoch oben im Darm gedrückt haben kommen später bei einer Gelegenheit heraus. Dann sieht ~~an~~ ^{& merkt} man eine(m)n Teil eines Satzes ^{|| ☞}, das ein paar Tagen oder war es was ich vor ^{||} Wochen immer habe sagen wollen. [Dann bemerkt man einen Teil eines Satzes & sieht: das war es, was ich vor einigen Tagen immer habe sagen wollen.]

Der bürgerliche Geruch des Verhältnisses Marguerite – Talla ist mir so grausig, unerträglich daß ich vor ihm aus der Welt fliehen könnte.

Jede Beschmutzung kann

ich ertragen, nur die bürgerliche nicht. Ist das nicht seltsam?

Ich weiß nicht ob mein Geist in mir krank ist oder ob es der Körper ist. Ich ~~stelle~~ mache den Versuch & stelle mir vor daß manches anders wäre als es ist, & ich fühle, daß mein ~~dann~~ Befinden dann gleich normal würde. Also ist es der Geist; & wenn ich lustlos & trübe, meine Gedanken wie in einem dicken Nebel, dasitze & eine Art schwachen Kopfschmerz spüre, so soll das daher kommen, daß ich vielleicht – oder wahrscheinlich – die Liebe der Marguerite verlieren werde!

Wenn man im Kot steckt, gibt es nur Eins: Marschieren. Es ist besser vor Anstrengung tot umzufallen, als jammernd

the body (and make a joint where there wasn't one before).^a

Old lumps of thought which a long time ago had already been pressing in the upper intestines come out later on some occasion. Then one notices a part of a sentence & sees: that's what I had always been meaning to say a few days ago.^b

The bourgeois odor of the Marguerite-Talla relationship I find so gruesome, unbearable that I could flee from it out of this world.

Every defilement I can [121] tolerate except the one that is bourgeois. Isn't that strange?^c

I don't know whether my mind is sick in me or whether it is the body. I do the experiment & imagine^d some things different from how they are, & I feel that my condition would then^e return to normal right away. So it is the mind; & when I am sitting there listless & dull, my thoughts as if in a thick fog & feel a sort of mild headache, then this is supposed to come from perhaps—or probably—losing Marguerite's love!

When stuck in excrement, there is only one thing to do: March. It is better to drop dead from exertion than [122] to die in a whimper.

^aCompare the very brief tale of "The Stubborn Child," no. 117 in Grimm's fairy tales: After starving itself to death, it defiantly sticks its arm out of the grave which the parents then have to break.

^bThis entire sentence was offered as an undecided alternative to an earlier version: "One then sees a part of a sentence & notices: that's what I had always been meaning to say a few days or weeks ago." Inserted into this earlier version were "& notices" and "a few days or."

^cSee page [117] above. One hour before Marguerite's wedding on New Year's Eve 1932, Wittgenstein called on Marguerite, imploring her: "You are taking a boat, the sea will be rough. Remain always attached to me and you will not drown." (See Monk [1,a], p. 339.) [I.S.]

^dWittgenstein began writing "imagine," crossed this out, and wrote "do the experiment & imagine."

^eThe diary also contains a crossed out "then" as in "that then my condition."

[122–123]

zu krepieren.

Geist, verlaß mich nicht! D.h.,
das schwache Spiritusflämm-
chen meines Geistes ^{möge} ~~möchte~~ nicht
verlöschen!

Kierkegaards Schriften haben etwas
Neckendes & das ist natürlich be-
absichtigt, wenn ich auch nicht sicher
weiß; ob genau diese Wirkung
beabsichtigt ist, die sie auf mich
haben. Es ist auch kein Zweifel daß
der, der mich neckt mich zwingt, mich
mit seiner Sache auseinanderzusetzen
& ist diese Sache wichtig so ist das
gut. – Und dennoch gibt es etwas
was dieses Necken in mir verurteilt.
Und ist dies nur mein Resentiment?
^{weiß} Ich sehe auch sehr wohl daß
Kierkegaard das Aesthetische ~~durch~~
mit seiner Meisterschaft darin ad
absurdum führt & daß er das natür-

lich auch will. Aber es ist als wäre
in seinem Aesthetischen bereits der
Tropfen Wehrmuths drin, so daß
es eben an & für sich schon nicht so
schmeckt wie das Werk eines Dich-
ters. Er ahmt dem Dichter gleich-
sam mit unglaublicher Meister-
schaft nach, ohne aber ein Dichter
zu sein & daß er ~~Dicht~~ keiner ist
merkt man doch in der Nachahmung
Die Idee daß jemand einen Trick
verwendet um mich zu etwa zu
veranlassen ist unangenehm. Es
ist sicher daß dazu (diesen Trick zu
gebrauchen) großer Mut gehört & daß
ich diesen Mut ^{nicht} ^{††} – nicht im entferntesten
– hätte; aber es fragt sich, ob, wenn
ich ihn hätte, es ^{recht} gut wäre ihn
zu gebrauchen. Ich glaube, dazu
gehörte dann außer dem Mut auch
ein Mangel an Liebe zum Nächsten.
Man könnte sagen: Was Du
Liebe des Nächsten nennst ist Eigen-

Mind, don't abandon me! That is, may^a the weak flame of the spirit lamp that is my mind not expire!

There is something teasing about Kierkegaard's writings & that is intended, of course, even though I am not sure whether they are intended to have precisely that effect that they have upon me. There is also no doubt that one who teases me forces me to deal with his concern & if that concern is important, this is good.—And yet there is something in me that condemns this teasing. And is this only my resentment?^b And I know quite well^c that with^d his mastery of it Kierkegaard reduces the aesthetic to absurdity & that of course [123] he wants to do that. But it is as if there already were a drop of bitter^e in his aestheticism, so that in & of itself it already doesn't taste like the work of a poet. He imitates the poet with as it were incredible mastery, but without being a poet & that he isn't one after all becomes noticeable in the imitation. The idea that someone uses a trick to get me to do something is unpleasant. It is certain that it takes great courage (to use this trick) & that I would not^f—not remotely—have this courage; but it's a question whether if I had it, it would be right^g to use it. I think that aside from courage it would also take a lack of love of one's fellow human being.^h One could say: What you call love for the fellow human being is self-[124]interest. Well, then I don't know any love without self-interest, for

^a“may (möge)” replaces a crossed out “might (möchte).”

^bThe German use of the French word “Ressentiment” designates a sort of ill feeling or resentment that also involves envy.

^c“know” is an undecided alternative to “see.”

^dWittgenstein first wrote “through,” struck it, then wrote “with.”

^eThe translation “drop of bitter” results from a perhaps unintended play on words by Wittgenstein: His spelling “Wehrmut” creates a hybrid of the words “Wermut (vermouth)” and “Wehmut (melancholy, wistfulness).” Kierkegaard goes on to write about the (bitter) taste from a single drop of vermouth.

^fThis first “not” was inserted into the line.

^g“right” is an undecided alternative to “good.”

^hThe German “Liebe zum Nächsten” has a biblical ring: “liebe deinen Nächsten wie dich selbst (love thy neighbor as thyself).” “Nächstenliebe” is also translated as “charity.”

[124–125]

nutz. Nun, dann kenne ich keine Liebe ohne Eigennutz, denn in die ewige Seeligkeit des Andern kann ich nicht eingreifen. Ich kann nur sagen: Ich will ihn so lieben, wie ich – der um meine Seele besorgt ist – wünsche, daß er mich liebte.

Mein ewiges Bestes kann er in gewissem Sinne nicht wollen; er kann mir nur im irdischen Sinne gut sein & für alles das Respekt haben, was in mir ein Streben zum Höchsten zu ver-raten scheint.

Wenn ich an meine Beichte denke, so verstehe ich das Wort „... & hätte der Liebe nicht u.s.w.“. Denn auch diese Beichte nützte mich nichts wenn sie ~~wie~~ gleichsam wie ein ethisches Kunststück gemacht würde. Ich will aber nicht sagen, daß ich sie ^{unterlassen} darum ~~nicht gemacht~~ habe, weil mir das bloße Kunststück nicht

genug war: ich (war|bin) zu feig dazu.

(Ethisches Kunststück ist etwas was ich den Andern, oder auch nur mir (selbst), vorführe um zu zeigen was ich kann.)

Ich verstehe den Geisteszustand meines Bruders Kurt voll-
kommen. Er war nur ^{noch} um einen Grad verschlafener als der meine.

Die Denkbewegung in meinem Philosophieren mußte sich in der Geschichte meines Geistes, seiner Moralbegriffe & dem Verständnis meiner Lage, wiederfinden lassen.

Wer gegen Mücken(schwärme) (an) kämpfen muß findet es eine wichtige Sache einige verschucht zu haben. Aber das ist für den ganz un-wichtig der mit Moskitos nichts

I cannot intervene in the eternal salvation of another. I can only say: I want to love him as I—who cares for my soul—wish that he would love me.

In a certain sense he cannot want what is eternally best for me; he can only be good to me in a worldly sense & show respect for all that seems to reveal in me a striving for what's highest.

When I am thinking of my confession, I understand the expression “. . . & had not love etc.”^a For, even this confession would be of no use to me if it were made as it were like an artful ethical trick.^b But I don't want to say that I refrained from it because the mere trick was not [125] enough for me: I am too cowardly for it.^c

(An artful ethical trick is something that I perform for others, or also only for me (myself), in order to show what I can do.)

I understand the mental state of my brother Kurt^d perfectly. It was by only one degree even^e sleepier than mine.

The movement of thought in my philosophizing should be discernible also in the history of my mind, of its moral concepts & in the understanding of my situation.^f

Someone who must fight (against) (swarms of) mosquitos finds it an important matter to have chased some away. But that is quite unimportant to those who are not concerned [126] with mosquitos. When I solve philosophical problems I have a feeling^g as though I

^aCompare Luther's translation of Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, 13:1: “Wenn ich mit Menschen und mit Engelzungen redete und hätte der Liebe nicht, so wäre ich ein tönend Erz oder eine klingende Schelle (And if I talked in the tongues of humans and angels and had not love, I would be a sounding brass or a tinkling bell).” It is unclear whether at this time Wittgenstein actually made a confession, as suggested by Drury who is not sure about the year 1931 (see [51,b], p. 120). [I.S.] Again, Wittgenstein uses “confession” in the religious sense of “Beichte.”

^bThe first “like” was crossed out from “like as it were like.”—“(artful) trick” is “Kunststück.”

^c“refrained from it” replaces “didn't do it” which is crossed out. Wittgenstein changed “was too cowardly” into “am too cowardly.”

^dKurt or Konrad Wittgenstein (1878–1918) was the second oldest of Wittgenstein's brothers. He appeared to have a harmless, cheerful disposition (see *Familienbriefe* [38,b], pp. 102f.) and managed one of his father's companies. When during World War I his troop refused to follow his command and deserted, he took his life. [I.S.]

^e“even” was inserted into the line.

^fLiterally: “The movement of thought in my philosophizing should be rediscoverable also in the history of my mind (wiederfinden lassen: to be found again). . . .”


^gWittgenstein wrote “I feel,” crossed this out and continued “I have the feeling.”

[126–127]

zu tun hat. Wenn ich philosophische Fragen löse ~~fühle ich~~ habe ich das Gefühl als hätte ich etwas äußerst Wichtiges für die ganze Menschheit getan & denke nicht, daß die Dinge mir so ungeheuer wichtig scheinen (oder soll ich sagen: mir so wichtig sind), weil ich von ihnen geplagt werde.

15.

Ein Traum heute nacht: Ich kam in ein Bureau um eine Rechnung – ich glaube – einzukassieren.



So etwa sah das Zimmer aus
a, b, c sind Tische d die Tür
(c nicht ganz sicher); vor a
& b je ein Stuhl auf dem

Stuhl vor a saß ein Beamter zu seiner linken stand ich. Außer mir war im Zimmer noch eine sehr lärmende Gesellschaft einer von ihnen saß vor b & sie alle sprachen zu dem Beamten ^{II} & der Mann vor

b ~~machte~~ nahm dabei eine besondere Stellung ein, etwa indem er spaßhaft alles was die Andern (die bei c standen) dem Beamten verdolmetschte. Der Beamte sagte er könne sich mit ihnen nicht abgeben & wandte sich mir zu. Ich gab ihm die Rechnung & er fragte von wem sie wäre. Ich hätte gerne gesagt, es stehe ohnehin darauf & er solle selbst nachsehen (er hielt die Rechnung nämlich so daß er den Kopf nicht sehen konnte) traute mich aber nicht es zu sagen, sondern gab den Namen an: Laval, oder ... de Laval. Darauf überprüfte der Beamte die Rechnung in dem er sie in einem elektrischen Apparat untersuchte (ich dachte er fotografiert sie mit Röntgenstrahlen). Sie war in eine(m|r) Art Kasten der mit einem schwarzen Tuch um-

had done something of utmost importance for all of humanity & don't think that these matters appear so immensely important to me (or shall I say: are so important to me) because they plague me.

15.[11 or 12.31]

A dream last night: I came into an office in order to—I think—collect payment for a bill. The room looked roughly like this^a a, b, c are desks d the door (not quite sure about c); a chair in front of both a & b an official was sitting in front of a and I stood to his left. Aside from me there was a very noisy bunch in the room, one of them sat in front of b & all of them spoke noisily & merrily^b to the official, & the man in front of [127] b occupied^c in this a special position, such as translating jokingly for the official all that the others (who were standing near c) were saying.^d The official said he couldn't deal with them & turned to me. I gave him the bill & he asked who it was from. I would have liked to have said that it's written there anyhow & he should see for himself (for, he was holding the invoice in such a manner that he couldn't see the letterhead) but didn't dare say it and provided the name instead: Laval, or . . . de Laval. The official then inspected the bill by examining it in an electrical apparatus (I thought he took a picture of it with x-rays). It was in a sort of box which was [128] wrapped in a black cloth.^e The scene had changed & the room was now

^aThe diary contains a sketch of the layout.

^b“noisily and merrily” was inserted into the line.

^cWittgenstein started off with “made,” struck that and continued with “assumed.”


^dSince Wittgenstein forgot to put a verb, “were saying” was added to amend the sentence.

^eWittgenstein originally meant to put a bracketed remark here but struck the opening bracket.

[128–129]

wickelt war. {Die Szene hatte sich verändert & der Raum war jetzt wie ein kleines Laboratorium. Auf einem großen Tisch stand der Kasten

von ihm gingen Drähte aus.



Ich saß auf einem Stuhl beinahe wie ein Verbrecher auf dem elektrischen Stuhl. Die Drähte

gingen zu mir & dann zur Wand.

Ich schien von ihnen & Stricken umwunden zu sein. Ich ~~sagte zu dem~~

~~Beamten~~ konnte nicht ver-

stehen warum ich hier so sitzen

Und müsse. Ich sagte zu dem Beamten:

„the circuit doesn't pass through my body“. Er: „of course not“.

Ich (unwillig): „But you have fettered me“. Er sagte ^{darauf} es sei ja nur mein kleiner Finger gefesselt

& „we do this to everybody. Und jetzt sah ich, daß ich gar nicht gefesselt war, denn die Stricke

& Drähte hingen zwar in Schleifen um mich waren aber nirgends sonst angemacht & nur mein kleiner Finger war durch einen Spagat an einem Haken (am Tisch?) angebunden. Ich stand auf um meine Freiheit zu erproben & sagte etwas verlegen zum Beamten ~~es täte mir~~ „I'm sorry“ ich hätte nicht bemerkt, daß ich (ganz) frei sei. Dann wachte ich auf.

Gleich nach dem Aufwachen deutete ich den Traum als ^{ein} Gleichnis, welches ich für mein Verhältnis zur Marguerite brauchte. Nämlich: es schaut nur so aus als wäre ich an sie mit 1000 Stricken gebunden; in Wirklich-hängen keit gehen diese Stricke nur um mich, binden mich aber ~~nicht~~ an niemand & nur der kleine Spagat ist das Band zwischen uns.

like a small laboratory. On a big table stood the box with wires extending from it.^a I was sitting on a chair almost like a criminal in the electric chair. The wires were coming toward me & then to the wall. I seemed to be coiled by them & ropes. I^b couldn't understand why I had to sit here like that. And^c said to the official: "the circuit doesn't pass through my body."^d He: "of course not." I (annoyed): "But you have fettered me." He said thereupon^e that only my little finger was fettered, after all & "we do this to everybody." And now I saw that I wasn't fettered at all, for though the ropes [129] & wires were draped in bows around me, they were not fastened anywhere else & only my little finger was tied by a string to a hook (at the table?).^f I got up in order to try out my freedom & said a bit sheepishly to the official "I'm sorry"^g I hadn't noticed that I was (completely) free. Then I woke up.

Immediately after awakening I interpreted the dream as^h a simile which I neededⁱ for my relation to Marguerite. Namely: it only looks as if I was bound to her by a 1000 ropes; in reality these ropes only dangle^j around me but tie me to no one & only the small string is the bond between us.

^aAgain, the diary contains a sketch of the setup.

^bWittgenstein first wrote "I said to the official," then struck everything but the "I" and continued.

^c"And" is an undecided alternative to "I."

^dAll the quoted dialogue was written in English.

^e"thereupon" was inserted into the line.

^fThe word "Spagat" means "string" only in Austrian. In German, the term is exclusively used to refer to "the splits" in gymnastics (and to be sure, the tied little finger in Wittgenstein's dream is doing the splits). Karl Menger noted that "Spagat" was one of a "few typically Austrian words, not understood in Germany" that were included by Wittgenstein in his 1926 spelling dictionary for elementary schools. See Menger's *Reminiscences of the Vienna Circle and the Mathematical Colloquium*, ed. L. Golland, B. McGuinness, A. Sklar (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), p. 84.

^gWittgenstein first used indirect speech in German "that I am sorry (es tärte mir leid)," crossed this out and wrote in English "I'm sorry."

^h"as" was inserted into the line.

ⁱWittgenstein wrote "brauchte (needed) and not "gebrauchte (used, employed)."

^j"dangle (hängen)" is an undecided alternative to "go (gehen)."

[130–131]

Soviel es Dich gekostet hat, so viel werden sie zahlen.

Was Du geleistet hast, kann Andern nicht mehr ^{sein} bedeuten als Du selbst.

Das Christentum sagt eigentlich: laß alle Klugheit fahren.

Wenn ich sage, ich will die Eitelkeit ^{möchte} ablegen, so ist es fraglich, ob ich das nicht wieder nur aus einer Eitelkeit heraus will. Ich bin eitel & soweit ich eitel bin, sind auch meine Besserungswünsche eitel. Ich möchte dann gern wie der & der sein der nicht eitel war & der mir gefällt, & ich überschlage schon im Geiste den Nutzen, den ich vom „Ablegen“ der Eitelkeit haben würde. Solange man auf der Bühne ist, ist man eben Schau-

spieler, was immer man auch macht.

Ich höre im Geist schon die Nachwelt über mich reden, statt mich selbst zu hören, der, da er mich kennt, freilich ein viel undankbareres Publikum ist.

Und das muß ich tun; nicht den Andern in der Phantasie hören sondern mich selbst. D.h nicht dem Andern zusehn, wie er mir zusieht – denn so mache ich's – sondern mir selbst zusehen. Was für ein Trick@, & wie unendlich immer wieder die Versuchung auf den Andern, & von mir weg, zu schau.

Von dem religiösen Ärgernis konnte man auch sagen: tu te fache, donc tu as tort. Denn Eines ist sicher: Du hast unrecht Dich zu ärgern, Dein Ärger ist gewiß

[130]

What you have accomplished cannot be^a any more to others than you yourself are to them.

As much as it cost you, that much will they pay.^b

Christianity is really saying: let go of all intelligence.

When I say I would like to^c discard vanity, it is questionable whether my wanting this isn't yet again only a sort of vanity. I am vain & insofar as I am vain, my wishes for improvement are vain, too. I would then like to be like such & such person who was not vain & whom I like, & in my mind I already estimate the benefit which I would have from "discarding" vanity. As long as one is on stage, one is an actor after all, [131] regardless of what one does.

In my mind I already hear posterity talking about me instead of hearing myself, the one who, because he knows me, is of course a far less appreciative audience.

And that is what I must do:^d listen not to another in my imagination but to myself. That is, not watch the other watching me—for that's how I do it—but watch myself. What a trick, & how infinitely great again and again the temptation to look at the other & away from myself.

Of religious offense one could also say: tu te faches, donc tu as tort.^e For one thing is sure: You are wrong to be angry, your anger^f [132] shall surely be overcome.^g And then there is

^a"be" is an undecided alternative to "mean."

^bOriginally, this was the first remark on [130], followed by "What you have accomplished . . ." Wittgenstein used an arrow to change the order of these two remarks.

^c"I would like to (möchte)" is an undecided alternative to "I want to (will)."

^dWittgenstein changed a semicolon into a colon.

^e"You are angry, therefore you are wrong."

^fIn this remark Wittgenstein first uses "Ärgernis (something that provokes anger; an offense, scandal, nuisance, vexation, outrage)," then the verb "sich ärgern (to be angry, offended, scandalized, annoyed, vexed, in rage)," and finally "Ärger (anger, annoyance, rage)."

^gWittgenstein added "shall surely be overcome (soll gewiß überwunden werden)" in brackets as an undecided alternative behind "can surely be overcome" or "is surely to be overcome (ist gewiß zu überwinden)."

[132–133]

zu überwinden [soll gewiß überwunden werden]. Und es frägt sich dann nur ob am Schluß der Andre mit dem was er gesagt hat [r]echt behält. Wenn Paulus sagt, der gekreuzigte Christus ist den Juden ein Ärgernis so ist ^{das} gewiß, & auch, daß das Ärgernis im Unrecht ist. Aber die Frage ist: Was ist die rechte Lösung dieses Ärgernisses?

Gott als Geschichtliches Ereignis in der Welt ist so paradox, ~~aber~~ ebenso paradox, wie, daß eine bestimmte Handlung in meinem Leben dort & dann sündlich war. Das heißt das ein Augenblick meiner Geschichte ewige Bedeutung hat ist nicht mehr noch weniger paradox, als daß ein Augenblick oder eine Zeitspanne der Weltgeschichte ewige

Bedeutung hat. Ich darf nur sofern an Christus zweifeln, als ich auch an meiner Geburt zweifeln darf. – Denn in derselben Zeit in der meine Sünden geschehen sind (nur weiter zurück) hat Christus gelebt. Und so muß man sagen: Wenn das Gute & Böse überhaupt etwas Geschichtliches ist dann ist auch die göttliche Weltordnung & ihr Zeitlicher Anfang & Mittelpunkt ~~verständlich~~ denkbar.

Wenn ich aber nun an meine Sünden denke & ^{daß ich} diese Handlungen ^{getan habe, ist eine} ~~sind~~ nur ¹ Hypothesen, warum beue ich sie als ob kein Zweifel über sie möglich wäre? Daß ich mich jetzt an sie erinnere ist meine Evidenz & die Grundlage meiner Reue & des Vorwurfs, daß ich zu feig bin, sie zu gestehen.

only the question whether what the other one said is right in the end. When Paul says that the crucified Christ is an offense to the Jews then this^a is certain & also that the offense is in the wrong. But the question is: What is the right solution of this offense?

God as a Historical Event in the world is so paradoxical, just^b as paradoxical as that a certain action in my life was sinful then & there.^c That is, that a moment of my history has eternal significance is no more or less paradoxical than that a moment or span of time^d in world history has eternal [133] meaning. I may doubt Christ only insofar as^e I may also doubt my own birth.—For Christ lived in the same time in which my sins occurred (only further back). And so one must say: If good & evil are historical at all then the divine order of the world & its temporal beginning & center is also conceivable.^f

But if I now think of my sins & it is only a hypothesis that I have performed these acts,^g why do I regret them as if any doubt about them was impossible? That I now remember them is my evidence & the basis of my remorse & of the reproach that I am too cowardly to confess them.

^a“this” was inserted into the line; Wittgenstein may have first set out to write “then it is certain that . . .” See I Corinthians 1:23.

^b“just” was preceded by a “but” that was struck.

^cInstead of “sündig (sinful)” Wittgenstein here uses the somewhat archaic term “sündlich.” It can also mean “in the manner of sin” or “sinlike.” [I.S.]

^dIn German, “a moment or span of time” is “ein Augenblick oder eine Zeitspanne.”

^eWittgenstein wrote “sofern (literally: provided that, as long as)” but appears to have used it short for “insofern (in so far, to the extent).”

^f“conceivable (denkbar)” replaces “understandable (verständlich),” which was struck.

^gWittgenstein first wrote “& these acts are only hypotheses,” inserted “that I have performed” into the line, struck “are” and changed “hypotheses” into “a hypothesis.”

[134–135]

Sah die Photographien der Gesichter
 Corsischer Briganten & dachte:
 diese Gesichter sind zu hart, & meines
 zu weich als daß das Christentum
 darauf schreiben könnte. Die Ge-
 sichter dieser Briganten sind schreck-
 lich anzusehen, herzlos, in gewisser
 [w]eise kalt & verhärtet; & doch
 sind sie ^{wohl} nicht weiter vom rechten
 Leben entfernt als ich, nur auf
 einer andern Seite [, stehen nur auf
 einer andern Seite abseits vom ^{Rechten} ~~Ideal~~].

Schwäche ist ein furchtbares
 Laster.

11.1.32.

Wieder in Cambridge zurück, nach-
 dem ich viel erlebt habe:
 Marguerite, die mich heira-
 ten will(!), Streit in der Fami-
 lie, etc.. – Ich bin aber im
 Geist schon so ~~alt~~,
 daß ich nichts unreifes mehr

tun darf & die Marguerite
 ahnt nicht wie alt ich bin.
 Ich erscheine mir selbst
wie ein alter Mann.

Meine philosophische
 Arbeit kommt mir jetzt
 vor wie eine Ablenkung
 von dem Schweren, wie eine Zerstreu-
 ung ein Vergnügen dem ich
 mich nicht mit ganz gutem
 Gewissen hingebe. Als ginge
 ich in's Kino statt einen Kranken
 zu pflegen.

Man könnte sich einen
 Menschen vorstellen, der
 von seiner Geburt bis zu
 seinem Tod immer entweder
 schlief oder in eine(m|r) Art
 Halbschlaf oder Dusel lebte.
 So verhält sich mein Leben
 zu dem wirklich lebendigen

[134]

Saw photographs of the faces of Corsican brigands & thought: these faces are too hard & mine too soft for Christianity to be able to write on them. The faces of the brigands are terrible to look at, heartless, in a certain way cold & hardened; & yet they are probably^a no further removed from the right life than I, they are standing only on another side away from the righteous.^b

Weakness is a horrible vice.

11.1.32^c

Back in Cambridge after having experienced much: Marguerite who wants to marry me(!), quarrel in the family etc.^d—But in the mind I am so old already^e [135] that I must not do anything immature anymore & Marguerite has no idea how old I am. I appear to myself as an old man.

My philosophical work now seems to me like a diversion from the difficult, like a distraction, an enjoyment to which I do not devote myself with an entirely good conscience. As if I were going to the cinema instead of nursing a sick person.

One could imagine a person who from birth to death is always either sleeping or lives in a sort of half-sleep or daze. This is how my life compares^f to one that is really alive [136]

^a“probably (wohl)” was inserted into the line.

^b“standing only on another side away from the righteous” was added in brackets. It is an undecided alternative to “only on another side.” Within the brackets, “the righteous (dem Rechten)” replaces “the ideal (dem Ideal)” which was struck. Wittgenstein copied this remark into MS 153b; see *Culture and Value* [6,b], pp. 13/15f.: “Am seeing photographs of Corsican brigands & think to myself: the faces are too hard & mine too soft for Christianity to be able to write on them. The faces of the brigands are terrible to look at & yet they are certainly no further removed from a good life & only situated on another side of it than I.” [I.S.] See also Wittgenstein’s discussion of faces recounted in Theodore Redpath’s memoir [6,b], p. 70.

^cBetween the previous remark and this one, Wittgenstein spent another Christmas vacation in Austria. Considering that his classes didn’t begin until January 22, he arrived earlier than usual.

^dThe quarrel may have concerned a party for the 60th birthday of Hermine (Mima) Sjögren. She was a friend of Wittgenstein’s sisters and the mother of his friend Arvid and of Marguerite’s future husband, Talla. His sister Margarete Stonborough had written a skit for the occasion but Wittgenstein believed that this would gloss over the difficulties in their relation to Mima. He did not attend the party on December 29, 1931; compare *Familienbriefe* [38,b], pp. 132–137.

^e“so ancient (so uralt)” was changed to “so old (so alt)” by striking “ur.” The German for “in the mind” is “im Geist,” which might also be rendered “in the spirit.”

^fLiterally, “So verhält sich mein Leben . . .” means “So my life relates . . .”

[136–137]

Menschen (ich denke gerade an Kierkegaard). Wacht so ein im Halbschlaf lebender je für eine Minute auf so dünkt es ihn wunder was zu sein & er wäre nicht abgeneigt sich unter die Genies zu zählen.

Kaum eine der mich tadelnden unter meinen Bemerkungen ist ganz ohne das Gefühl geschrieben, daß es doch immerhin schön ~~von mir~~ ist daß ich mich tadle [daß ich meine Fehler sehe].

28.1.32

Wie wenig Achtung ich im Grunde für meine eigene Leistung habe zeigt sich mir darin, daß ich einen Menschen von dem ich Grund hatte zu glauben, ~~daß~~ er entspreche in einem andern Fach dem

was ich in der Philosophie bin, daß ich so einen Menschen nur mit großem Vorbehalt oder schätzen gelten lassen ^{||} würde.

Ich träumte heute folgenden sonderbaren Traum: Jemand (war es Lettice?) sagte mir von einem Menschen, er heiße Hobbson

„with mixed b“; welches ~~so viel~~ hieß ~~heißt~~, daß man ihn „Hobpson“ ausspricht. – Ich erwachte & erinnerte mich daran: daß mir Gilbert einmal ~~von~~ ^{bezüglich} der Wortes Aussprache eines Namens

gesagt hatte „~~it's~~ pronounced with mixed b“, daß ich verstanden hatte „... mixed beef“ & nicht wußte was er meine, daß es so geklungen hatte als meinte er man müsse eine Speise welche „mixed beef“ heißt beim Aussprechen des Wortes im

(I am thinking of Kierkegaard just now). Should such a one who lives half-asleep ever wake up for a minute, he will deem himself quite something else & he would not be disinclined to count himself among the geniuses.

Hardly one of my remarks that reproach me is written entirely without the feeling that at least it is nice^a that I see my faults.

28.1.32

How little regard I basically have for my own achievement shows itself for me in that I would accept or esteem^b only with great reservations a person of whom I had reason to believe he was^c in some other discipline [137] what I am in philosophy.^d

Last night I dreamed the following curious dream: Someone (was it Lettice?) told me of some person that his name is Hobbson “with mixed b”; which meant^e that one pronounces it “Hobpson.”—I woke up & remembered that Gilbert once told me, regarding^f the pronunciation of a word, “pronounced with mixed b”^g which I understood as “. . . mixed beef”^h & didn’t know what he meant, that it sounded as if for the pronunciation of that word one needed to have in one’s mouth a food called “mixed beef” [138] & also remembered that I

^aWittgenstein wrote “nice of me,” first added wavy underlining to “of me,” then struck it.

^b“or esteem” was inserted into the line.

^cSetting out to write “that he was” Wittgenstein struck “that” and continued in indirect speech.

^dWittgenstein’s construction is a bit more cumbersome. His lack of regard shows itself in that “a person of whom I had reason to believe he is in some other discipline what I am in philosophy, that I would accept or esteem such a person only with great reservations.

^e“meant” replaces “means as much as” (which was struck).

^f“regarding” replaces “of” (which at first also received wavy underlining and was then struck).

^gWittgenstein wrote in English “it’s pronounced with mixed b” and struck “it’s.”

^h“mixed beef” is English in the original.

[138–139]

Munde haben & daß, ich, als ich Gilbert verstanden hatte, das als Witz sagte. An alles das erinnerte ich mich sofort beim Aufwachen. Dann kam es mir immer weniger & weniger plausibel vor & erst am morgen als ich schon angekleidet war schien es mir offener Unsinn. (Geht man übrigens diesem Traum nach so führt er auf Gedanken über ~~die~~ Rassenmischung und was, im Zusammenhang damit für mich von Bedeutung ist.)

Eine Seele die nackter als die andern vom Nichts durch die Welt zur Hölle geht, macht einen größeren Eindruck auf die Welt als die bekleideten bürgerlichen Seelen.

Nur als ihrer Zuflucht kann

mir die Marguerite treu bleiben. Das kann & soll sie auch, wenn sie sich einmal in einen andern Mann verliebt. Es würde dann klar werden, worauf ich bei ihr ein Recht habe. Ich kann ihr dazu zureden mir als ihrer Zuflucht treu zu bleiben; alles andere wäre Ausnützung ihrer gegenwärtigen Notlage.

Ich habe eine nacktere Seele als die meisten Menschen & darin besteht sozusagen mein Genius.

Verstümme einen Menschen ganz & gar schneide ihm Arme & Beine Nase & Ohren ab & dann sieh was von seinem Selbstrespekt & von seiner Würde übrig bleibt & wieweit seine Begriffe von

told this as a joke after understanding Gilbert. I remembered all that immediately upon waking up. Then it appeared less & less plausible to me & only in the morning when I was already dressed it seemed to me obvious nonsense. (By the way, if one looks into this dream it leads to thoughts about racial mixing^a and what is significant to me in connection with it.)

A soul that goes more naked than the others from nothingness through the world to hell^b makes a greater impression on the world than the dressed bourgeois souls.

Marguerite can remain faithful^c to me [139] only as her refuge. This she can & also should, when at some point she falls in love with another man. It would then become clear what I am entitled to with her. I can encourage her to remain faithful to me as her refuge; everything else would be taking advantage of her current predicament.^d

My soul is more naked than that of most people & in that consists so to speak my genius.

Mutilate a human being all the way, cut off his arms & legs nose & ears & then see what remains of his self-respect & of his dignity & to what extent his concepts of [140] such

^a“the” in “the racial mixing” was struck.

^b“From nothingness through the world to hell” is a variant on the “Prologue on the Theatre” of Goethe’s *Faust* which announces a journey “vom Himmel durch die Welt zur Hölle (from heaven through the world to hell).”

^cThe German “*treu*” means “loyal” or (in committed relationships) “faithful.”

^dThe final separation between Wittgenstein and Marguerite de Chambrier occurred only after her second marriage when, according to Marguerite, she received a letter from him that deeply offended her. In this letter (dated August 13, 1946) Wittgenstein expressed the wish that Marguerite might one day find work which would bring her together “with humans in a humane way” (“mit Menschen in menschlicher Weise”) and “not as a lady.” “Should you at some point have a decent job, or be looking for one, I would gladly see you again! Just not as a lady passing through. We would only depress each other.” There is, however, one further letter from Wittgenstein to Marguerite, dated September 9, 1948, in which he thanks her for the “dear package” (according to Marguerite de Chambrier it was probably a gift of chocolate). [I.S.]

[140–141]

solchen Dingen dann noch die selben sind. Wir ahnen gar nicht, @ wie diese Begriffe von dem Gewöhnlichen, normalen, Zustand unseres Körpers abhängen. Was wird aus ihnen wenn wir mit ~~Ringen~~ einem Ring durch unsere Zungen & gefesselt an einer Leine geführt werden? Wie viel bleibt dann noch von einem Menschen in ihm übrig? In welchen Zustand versinkt so ein Mensch? Wir wissen nicht, daß wir auf einem hohen schmalen Felsen stehen, & um uns Abgründe, in denen alles ganz anders aussieht.

Die Adoption altväterischer Münzbezeichnungen „Groschen“, „Thaler“, charakteristisch für, was heute Österreich ist, & auch für den Zustand in den Europä-

ischen Ländern überhaupt.

Damit hängt zusammen das neubeleben von Volkstänzen & Trachten & eine Art der Vertrottlung.

Meine Hauptdenkbewegung
eine ganz andere
ist heute ganz anders als
vor ¹⁵11-20 Jahren.

Und das ist ähnlich, wie wenn ein Maler von einer Richtung zu einer andern übergeht.

– Das Judentum ist hochproblematisch, aber nicht gemütlich. Und wehe wenn ein Schreiber die gemütvollste Seite ~~hervorhebt~~ betont. Ich dachte an Freud, wenn er vom jüdischen Witz redet.

M. braucht mich als Korrektiv, aber nicht als ihren

things still remain the same. We have no idea how these concepts depend on the ordinary, normal, condition of our body. What becomes of them when we are led by a leash with a ring^a through our tongues & tied-up? How much of a human being then remains in him? Into what sort of state does such a human being sink? We don't know that we are standing on a high and narrow rock & around us chasms in which everything looks completely different.^b

The adoption of ancestral^c terms for coins “penny,” “dime”^d is characteristic for what Austria is today & also for the state of the Euro[141]pean countries in general.

Tied up with that is the revival of folk dances & traditional costumes & a sort of move toward dopeyness.^e

My main movement of thought is a completely different one today^f from 15 to 20^g years ago.

And this is similar to when a painter makes a transition from one school to another.

—Jewishness is highly problematic but not cozy. And beware if a writer stresses its sentimental side.^h I was thinking of Freud when he talks about Jewish humor.ⁱ

M. needs me as a corrective but not as her [142] sole proprietor.

^aWittgenstein first wrote “with rings,” struck “rings,” and continued “a ring.”

^bCompare one of the remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*: “But it may very well be the case that the completely shaved body induces us in some sense to lose our self-respect. (Brothers Karamazov.) There is no doubt whatever that a mutilation which makes us appear unworthy or ridiculous in our own eyes can completely deprive us of our will to defend ourselves. How embarrassed we sometimes become—or at least many people (I)—by our own physical or aesthetic inferiority” ([73,f], p. 155). [I.S.]

^cWittgenstein uses “altväterisch” (instead of the more customary “altväterlich”) which means “patriarchal, traditional.”

^dThe examples in German are “Groschen” and “Thaler.”

^eA literal translation of the German “Vertrottelung” would require a word like “dopeyfication.”

^f“a completely different one” is an undecided alternative to “completely different.”

^g“15” was inserted into the line.

^hWittgenstein wrote “emphasizes (hervorhebt),” struck that word, and continued “stresses (betont).”

ⁱ“Witz” could also be translated “wit” or “joke(s).” The remark talks of “Judentum (Jewry)” and its “gemütvoll(e) (emotional)” and “gemütliche (genial, comfortable)” side. Wittgenstein is referring to chapter 3 of part A in Freud's *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*.

[142–143]

Alleinbesitzer.

Ich habe manchmal das Gefühl, wie wenn mein Verstand ein Glasstab wäre der belastet ist & jeden Moment brechen kann.

Mein Geist scheint dann außerordentlich fragil zu sein.

Es gibt einen Gedanken ^{dem} in den man beim Einschlafen weiter oder weniger weit reisen kann & beim Erwachen gibt es eine Rückkunft aus größerer oder geringerer Weite [Entfernung].

Skjolden [211]9.11.36.

Ich habe vor ^{ca} 12 Tagen an Hänsel ein Geständnis meiner Lüge bezüglich meiner Abstammung geschrieben. Seit der Zeit denke ich wieder & wieder da-

rüber nach, wie ich ein volles Geständnis allen mir bekannten Menschen machen kann & soll. Ich hoffe & fürchte! Heute fühle ich mich etwas krank, verkühlt. Ich dachte: “Will Gott mit mir Schluß machen, ehe ich das Schwere tun konnte?” Möge es gut werden!

20.11.

Matt & arbeitsunlustig, oder eigentlich unfähig. Aber das wäre ja kein schreckliches Übel. Ich könnte ja sitzen & ruhen. Aber dann verfinstert sich meine Seele. Wie leicht vergesse ich die Wohltaten des Himmels!!

Nachdem ich nun das eine Geständnis gemacht habe, ist es als könne ich den ganzen Lügenbau nicht länger halten, als müsse er ganz niederstürzen. Wäre er nur schon ganz eingestürzt! So daß die Sonne auf Gras & auf die Trümmer scheinen könnte.

Am schwersten wird mir der Gedan-

I sometimes feel as if my intelligence were a glass rod which carries a load & can break any moment.

My mind seems to be extraordinarily fragile then.

There is a space for thought in which,^a when falling asleep, one can sojourn further or not so far & when awakening there is a return from a greater or lesser distance.

Skjolden 19.11.36^b

About 12 days ago I wrote to Hänsel a confession of my lie concerning my ancestry.^c Since that time I have been thinking again & again [143] how I can & should make a full confession to everyone I know.^d I hope & fear! Today I feel a bit sick, chilled. I thought: “Does God want to put an end to me before I could do the difficult thing?” May it turn out well!

20.11.[36]

Weary & disinclined to work or really incapable. But that would not be a terrible ill. I could sit & rest, after all. But then my soul clouds over. How easily I forget the favors of heaven!

After having now made that one confession it is as if I couldn't support the whole edifice of lies anymore, as if it had to collapse entirely. If only it had entirely collapsed already! So that the sun could shine on the grass & the ruins.

^a“in which (in dem)” is an undecided alternative to “into which (in den).”

^bFour and a half years have passed. Wittgenstein's fellowship at Trinity College had run out after Easter term, 1936. Starting in September 1913, Wittgenstein occasionally visited the Norwegian village of Skjolden, where he soon began building a cabin that he first occupied in 1921 (compare *Wittgenstein in Norway* [92,c]). Wittgenstein moved there in August 1936 for his longest stay, with two interruptions, until December 1937.

^c“About” was inserted into the line. On Ludwig Hänsel (1886–1959), see our preface to his correspondence with Wittgenstein, pp. 257–259. Wittgenstein is here referring to letter 225.

^dWittgenstein had a written confession presented on Christmas as his family was coming together for dinner. Upon Margarete Stonborough's remark “Honorable people do not read another person's confession,” no one—with one exception—touched it (personal communication by John Stonborough, but compare letter 231 in the Wittgenstein-Hänsel correspondence). Wittgenstein also wrote to Engelmann and in January 1937 sought out G. E. Moore, Fania Pascal, and Rush Rhees in England to confess his “sins.” According to Pascal and Rhees, however, no one had ever been in doubt about Wittgenstein's background. Pascal writes in her “A Personal Memoir” that she never met anyone less capable of lying ([51,b] pp. 37 and 177). [I.S.] Wittgenstein's correspondence with Hänsel shows that his Austrian family and friends were more likely to consider his confession a personal breakthrough of sorts.

[144–145]

ke an ein Geständnis gegen Francis,
weil ich mich für ihn fürchte &
vor der fürchterlichen Verantwortung
die ich dann tragen muß. Nfi wre
Prvyv qznn wrvh gitzvn. Omtv Tmvg ori
svpuvn.

21.

(Rc|C|h habe von Hänsel auf meinen
Brief eine schöne & rührende Ant-
wort erhalten. Er schreibt, er
bewundere mich. Welcher Fallstrick!
~~Ich habe einen~~ Er weigert sich den
Brief den andern Freunden & Ver-
wandten zu zeigen. Ich habe daher
heute ein längeres & umfassen-
deres Geständnis an Mining
geschrieben. Bin versucht, darü-
ber leichtfertig zu denken!
Die Schrauben^{muttern}, kaum angezogen,
werden gleich wieder locker, weil,
~~das Ding wieder nachgibt worauf~~
~~sie drücken wieder nachgeht.~~ was
sie zusammenpressen sollen,

wieder nachgibt.

Ich habe immer Freude an meinen
eigenen guten Gleichnissen; möchte
sie nicht eine so eitle Freude sein.

Du kannst Christus nicht den Erlöser
nennen, ohne ihn Gott zu nennen. Denn
ein Mensch kann Dich nicht erlösen.

23.

Vh uvspg zfxs ovrnvi Ziyvrg (ovrnvi
lsrpmhmlsrhxsvn Ziyvrg) zn Vinhg &
Dzsisvrgsprvyv. – Drv rxs zfxs rn wvn
Emipvhfntvn mug tvhxsdnwegpg szyv
rnwvo rxs emitzy vmdzh (R|h)xsmn af
evihgvsvn, dzsivnw rxs nmxs smuu-
tv^{vh} ~~rxs~~ dviwv ori qpzi dviwvn.

24.

Rxs szyv svfgv wvn Yprvu org vrnvo Tv-
hgznwnrh zn Ornrnt zytvhxsrxqg. Mydmsp
wzh Tvhgznwnrh muuvnsviart rhg, hm
uvspg ori wmxs nmxs roovi wvi Vinhg, wvi
wvi Pzvtv vnghlirxsg.

The most difficult is the thought [144] of a confession to Francis^a because I fear for him & the horrible responsibility I then have to bear. *Only^b love can bear this. May God help me.*

21.[11.36]

I received from Hänsel a beautiful & touching answer to my letter.^c He writes that he admires me. What a snare! ^dHe refuses to show the letter to the other friends & relatives. I therefore wrote a longer & more comprehensive confession to Mining^e today. Am tempted to think carelessly about it!

Just as the screws are tightened, they become loose again, because what they are to squeeze together is [145] giving way again.^f

I always take joy in my own good similes; were it not such vain joy.

You can't call Christ the savior without calling him God. For a human being cannot save you.

23.[11.36]

My^g work (my philosophical work) is also lacking in seriousness & love of truth.—Just as in my lectures I have also cheated often by pretending to already understand something while I was still hoping that it would become clear to me.

24.[11.36]

Today I mailed the letter with my confession to Mining. Even though the confession is candid, I am still lacking the seriousness that is appropriate to the situation.

^aWittgenstein met Francis Skinner (1911–1941) in the fall of 1932. Skinner soon became his constant companion, perhaps the most intimate friend and intellectual partner he ever had. See Monk's biography [1,e], concerning their relationship, especially pp. 331–334, 376–378.

^bWittgenstein wrote this remark in code (compare the introduction to these diaries). The German transcription reads: Nur die Liebe kann dies tragen. Möge Gott mir helfen.

^cSee letter 226 in the Hänsel-Wittgenstein correspondence.

^dWittgenstein started writing "I have a" but struck this beginning.

^eMining is the nickname for Wittgenstein's oldest sister Hermine (1874–1950), who remained unmarried and after her father's death took on the role of head of family. She cared in a motherly way for her younger siblings, especially Ludwig, who referred to her as "by far the *deepest*" of his siblings (Rhees in [51,b], p. ix). [I.S.]

^fWittgenstein first wrote "because the thing on which they press gives way again." Also, through a small insertion "Schrauben (screws)" was changed to "Schraubenmuttern (nuts of screws)."

^gThe decoded text reads: Es fehlt auch meiner Arbeit (meiner philosophischen Arbeit) an Ernst & Wahrheitsliebe.—Wie ich auch in den Vorlesungen oft geschwindelt habe indem ich vorgab etwas schon zu verstehen, während ich noch hoffte es [changed from: ich] werde mir klar werden. [24.] Ich habe heute den Brief mit einem Geständnis an Mining abgeschickt. Obwohl das Geständnis offenerzig ist, so fehlt mir doch noch immer der Ernst, der der Lage entspricht.

[146–147]

25.

Svfgv prvhh Tmgg ori vrnuzppvn – wvnn
 znwvih qznn rxs'h nrxsg hztnv –
~~da~~ wzhh rxs wvn @Pvfgvn srvi ro @
 Mig vrn Tvhgznwrh ovrnvi Orhhv-
 gzgvn ozxsvn hmppgv. Fnw rxs hztgv,
 rxs qmnnv nrxsg! Rxs drpp nrxsg my-
 dmsp rxs hmpp. Rxs gizfv orxs nrxsg
 vrnozsp wvi Znnz Ivynr & wvo Zinv
 Wizvtnr af tvhgsvn. Hm rhg ori ~~evav~~
 tvzvtg dmiwvn wzhh rxs vrn Drxsg
 yrn. Nrsg pzntv vhv ori wz vrnurpv
 hztgv rxs ori rxs dziv yvivr orxs
 qivfartv af pzhhv.

Ich hätte doch so gern, daß alle
 Menschen eine gute Meinung von mir
 haben! Wenn es auch eine falsche ist;
 & ich es weiß daß sie falsch ist! –

Vh rhg ori tvtyvvn lmiwvn, – & rxs
 omxsgv Pmy wzufi szyvn! Pvsiv wmxs
 orxs – !

30.11.

Vh ypzhg vrn Hgfo fnw rxs qznn

ovrnv Tvwznqvn nrxsg hzoovpn. – 1.12.

Ein Satz kann absurd erschei-
 nen & die Absurdität seiner Oberflä-
 che von der Tiefe, die gleichsam hin-
 ter ihm liegt verschlungen werden.

Das kann man auf den Gedanken
 von der Auferstehung der Toten & auf
 andere mit ihm verknüpfte anwen-
 den. – Was ihm aber Tiefe gibt ist die
 Anwendung; das Leben das der führt
 der ihn glaubt.

Denn dieser Satz ^{z.B.} || kann der Aus-
 druck der höchsten Verantwortung sein.
 Denn denke doch Du würdest vor
 den Richter gestellt! Wie sähe Dein Leben
 aus, wie erschiene es Dir selbst, wenn
 Du vor ihm stündest. Ganz abgesehen
 davon, wie es etwa ihm erscheint &
 ob er einsichtig, oder nicht einsichtig,
 gnädig, oder nicht gnädig ist.

“Weiß ist auch eine Art Schwarz.“

[146]

25.[11.36]

Today^a God let it occur to me—for I can't say it any other way—that I should confess my misdeeds to the people in the village here. And I said, I couldn't do it! I don't want to, even though I should. I don't dare confess even to Anna Rebni & Arne Draegni.^b Thus it was shown to me that I am a scoundrel. Not long before this occurred to me I had been telling myself that I was prepared to be crucified.

I would like so much after all for everyone to have a good opinion of me! Even if it is a false one; & I know that it is false!—

It^c has been granted to me,—& I want praise for it! So instruct me—!

30.11.[36]

A^d storm is blowing and I [147] cannot collect my thoughts.—

1.12.[36]

A sentence can appear absurd & the absurdity at its surface be engulfed by the depth which as it were lies behind it.

This can be applied to the thought concerning the resurrection of the dead & to other thoughts linked to it.—What gives it depth, however, is its use: the life led by the one who believes it.

For, this sentence can be, for example,^e the expression of the highest responsibility. Just imagine, after all, that you were placed before the judge! What would your life look like, how would it appear to yourself if you stood in front of him. Quite irrespective of how it would appear to him & whether he is understanding or not understanding, merciful or not merciful.

“White is also a sort of black.”

^aThe decoded text in German: Heute liess Gott mir einfallen—denn anders kann ich's nicht sagen—dass ich den Leuten hier im Ort ein Geständnis meiner Missetaten machen sollte. Und ich sagte, ich könne nicht! Ich will nicht obwohl ich soll. Ich traue mich nicht einmal der Anna Rebni & dem Arne Draegni zu gestehen. So ist mir gezeigt worden dass ich ein Wicht bin. Nicht lange ehe mir das einfiel sagte ich mir ich wäre bereit mich kreuzigen zu lassen.

^bAnna Rebni (1869–1970) and Arne Draegni (1871–1946) were two of Wittgenstein's friends and neighbors in Skjolden. Anna was a teacher in Oslo but returned to Skjolden in 1921 to run a farm and later the local youth hostel. Arne was a farmer on one of the various Bolstadt farms. Wittgenstein maintained a close correspondence with him after his 1936/37 stay in Skjolden. What survives of this correspondence is published in *Wittgenstein and Norway*, [92,c]. [I.S.]

^cThe decoded German: Es ist mir gegeben worden,—& ich möchte Lob dafür haben! Lehre doch mich—!

^dThe decoded text: Es bläst ein Sturm und ich kann [147] meine Gedanken nicht sammeln.—

^e“for example” was inserted into the line.

[148–149]

27.1.37

Zfu wvi lfxqqysi emn Drvn & Vntpznw,
 zfu wvi lvrhv emn Yvitvn nzxs Hqrmpp-
 wvn. Ovrn Tvdrrhvn avrtg ori orxs
 hppyhg zph vrvn vpvnwvn Ovnhxsvn;
 hxsdxs w.s. fndrpprt af pvrwvn,
uvrt: roovi rn Ufixsg Znwwivn vrvn
 fntfnhgrtvn Vrnwifxq af ozxsvn
 a.Y. wvo Lmigrv ro Smgvpv, wvo
 Wrwnvi, etc.. Fnqvfhs. Zo hxsdvihgvn
 zyvi ufspv rxs wvn Emidfiu wvi
 Uvrtsvrg. Srngvi rho zyvi hgvsg
 wrv Prvypmhrqtvrg (& wrv Fyvisvyfnt).
 Zyvi wrv Hxszo wrv rxs rvvag volurnwv
 rhg zfxs nrxsg Tfgvh rnhmuvin
 rxs ovrnv zfhhviv Nrvwvipztv hgziqvi
 volurnwv zph wrv Nrvwvipztv wvi
 Dzsivrg. Ovrn Hgmpa & ovrnv Vrgvp-
 qvrg hrnw evipvgag.

Rn wvi Yryvp szyv rxs nrxgh
 zph vrn Yfxs emi ori. ~~ow~~ Zyvi dz-
 ifo hztv rxs ”nrxgh zph vrn
 Yfxs” ~~o~~ rxs szyv vrn Yfxs emi ori,

vrn Wmqfovng, wzh dvnn vh zppvrn
 ypvryg, nrxsg ovhi Dvig szyv qznn,
 zph ritvwn vrn znwvvh Wmqfovng.
 (Wzh szg Pvhrrnt tvovrng.) Wrhvh
 Wmqfovng ^{zn hrxs} ~~h~~ qznn orxs af qvrno Tpzfyvn
 zn wrv Pvsivn wrv vh vngszpg
 ‘eviyrnwn’, – hm dvrrt drv ritvwn
vrn znwvvh Wmqfovng, wzh ori
 hzggv rn wrv Sznwv uzppvn qmnnvn.
 Smpp rxs wrv Pvsivn tpzfyvn hm
 nrxsg wvhszpy dvrp ori wrvh &
 nrxsg ^{vgdzh} ~~h~~ znwvvh yvirxsgv dmiwvn
 rhg. Hrv ofhvn ori ervpovsi vrnpvfxh-
gvn: & wzorg ovrnv rxs nrxsg
 nfi Pvsivn wvi Vgsrq, hmnwvin ~~zfxs~~
srhgmirhxsv Pvsivn. Nrxsg wrv Hxsirug,
 nfi wzh Tvdrrhvn qznn ori yvuvs-
 pvn – zn Zfuvihmvsfnt, Tvixsg etc af
 tpzfyvn. Af tpzfyvn, nrxsg zph zn
 vgdzh dzsivsvrnprxsvh, hmnwvin
 rn znwvivo Hrnnv. Fnw ovrn Fntpzf-
 yv qznn ori nfi rn hmuvin afo
 Emidfiu tvozsg dviwvn, zph vng-

[148]

27.1.37^a

On^b the return from Vienna & England, on the trip from Bergen to Skjolden. My conscience presents me as a miserable human being to myself; weak, that is unwilling to suffer, cowardly: in fear of making an unfavorable impression on others, for example on the doorman at the hotel, the servant, etc. Unchaste. Most heavily, though, I feel the charge of cowardice. But behind it stands indifference (& arrogance). But the shame I feel now is also no good insofar as I feel my outward defeat more strongly than the defeat of truth. My pride & my vanity are hurt.

With the Bible I have nothing but a book in front of me. But why do I say “nothing but a book”? I have a book in front of me, [149] a document which, if it remains alone, cannot have greater value than any other document.

(This is what Lessing meant.)^c In and of itself this document cannot ‘attach’ me to any belief in the doctrines which it contains,—just as little as any other document which could have fallen into my hands. If I am to believe these doctrines I should do so not because this & not something else was reported to me. Instead they must be evident to me: & with that I don’t just mean doctrines of ethics but historical doctrines. Not the letter, only conscience can command me—to believe in resurrection, judgement etc. To believe not as in something probable but in a different sense. And I can be reproached for my unbelief only

^aWittgenstein interrupted his extended stay in Skjolden by taking a trip to Vienna and London (and there to make some confessions). See page [143], note d and Monk [1, a], pp. 367–372.

^bThe next few pages were written in code: Auf der Rückkehr von Wien & England, auf der Reise von Bergen nach Skjolden. Mein Gewissen zeigt mir mich selbst als einen elenden Menschen; schwach d.h. unwillig zu leiden, feig: [struck: immer] in Furcht Anderen einen ungünstigen Eindruck zu machen z.B. dem Portier im Hotell, dem Diener, etc. Unkeusch. Am schwersten aber fühle ich den Vorwurf der Feigheit. Hinter ihm aber steht die Lieblosigkeit (& die Überhebung). Aber die Scham die ich jetzt empfinde ist auch nichts Gutes insofern ich meine äussere Niederlage stärker empfinde als die Niederlage der Wahrheit. Mein Stolz & meine Eitelkeit sind verletzt. In der Bibel habe ich nichts als ein Buch vor mir. Aber warum sage ich “nichts als ein Buch”? ich habe ein Buch vor mir, [149] ein Dokument, das wenn es allein bleibt, nicht mehr Wert haben kann, als irgend ein anderes Dokument. (Das hat Lessing gemeint.) Dieses Dokument [inserted: an sich] kann mich zu keinem Glauben an die Lehren die es enthält ‘verbinden,’ —so wenig wie irgend ein anderes Dokument, das mir hätte in die Hände fallen können. Soll ich die Lehren glauben so nicht deshalb weil mir dies & [changed from “nichts”:] nicht etwas anderes berichtet worden ist. Sie müssen mir vielmehr einleuchten: & damit meine ich nicht nur Lehren der Ethik. sondern [struck: auch] historische Lehren. Nicht die Schrift, nur das Gewissen kann mir befehlen— an Auferstehung, Gericht etc zu glauben. Zu glauben nicht als an etwas wahrscheinliches, sondern in anderem Sinne. Und mein Unglaube kann mir nur in sofern zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, als ent-

^cWittgenstein is probably referring to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s (1729–1781) “Education of the Human Race.” See note c to letter 244 in the Hänsel-Wittgenstein correspondence. [I.S.]

[150–151]

dvwvi ovrn Tvdrhhvn wvn Tpzfyvn
 yvurvpg – dvnn vh hm vgdzh tryg –,
 mwvi zph vh ori Nrvwirtqvrgev
 @ emidriug; wrv orxs rn vrni Dvr-
 hv, wrv rxs zyvi nrxsg qvnnv,
 nrxsg afo Tpzfyvn qmoovn pzhhv.
 Wzh svrhg, hm hxsvrng vh ori,
 rxs hmpp hztvn: Wf qznnhg rvag
 fyvi vrnv hmpxsvn Tpzfyvn tzi
 nrxsg drhhvn, vi ofhh vrn Tvrgvh-
 afhgzv hvrn emn wvo wf tzi
 nrxsg dvrhhg fnw wvi [w|W]rxs hm-
 pzntv nrxsg zntvsg zph wrn Tv-
 drhhvn rhn [w|W]ri nrxsg muuvnyzig;
 wztvtvn szhg wf rvag wvrvo
 Tvdrhhvn rn wvo af Umptvn dzh
 vh wri hztg. Vrvn Hgivr gfyvi
 wvn Tpzfyvn qznn vh ufi [w|W]rxs
 nrxsg tyvvn wz [w|W]f nrxsg dvrhhg,
 @ (nrxsg wzh qvnnhg) dmifyvi
 tvhgirggnv driw. Wrv Livwrtg qznn
 wrv [e|E]miyvwrntfnt wvh Tpzfyvnh hvrn,
 zyvi hrv,] rn hrxs], qznn wvn Tpzfyvn
 wfixs wzh dzh rn rhi emitvsg

nrxsg yvdtvn dmppvn. (Qmngvn wrvh
 Dmivg afo Tpzfyvn evyrnwvn, hm qmnn-
 gvn znwv Dmivg zfxs ^{afo Tpzfyvn} ~~wvrvo znwvin~~
 evyrnwvn.) Wzh Tpzfyvn uzntg org
 wvo Tpzfyvn zn. Ozn ofhh org wvo
 Tpzfyvn znuzntvn; zfh Dmivgn umptg
 qvrn Tpzfyv. Tvnft.

– – – Aber gibt es nicht vielerlei
 Weisen sich für Tinte & Papier zu
 interessieren? Interessiere ich mich
 nicht für Tinte & Papier wenn ich
 einen Brief aufmerksam lese? Denn
 jedenfalls schau^{dabei} ich [↑] aufmerksam
 auf Tintenstriche. – “Aber dies sind
 ja hier nur Mittel zum Zweck!” –
 Aber doch ein sehr wichtiges Mittel
 zum Zweck! – Ja freilich können
 wir uns andere Untersuchun-
 gen über Tinte & Papier vorstel-
 len, die uns gar nicht interessie-
 ren, die uns für unsern Zweck ganz
 unwesentlich zu sein sch(ie|ei)nen würden.
 Aber was uns also interessiert wird

insofar as [150]^a either my conscience commands the belief—if there is such a thing—, or in that it accuses me of depravities, which in some manner, that I am not aware of, however, don't let me attain belief. This means, so it seems to me, that I should say : You cannot know anything about such a belief now, it must be a state of mind of which you know nothing at all and which is of no concern to you as long as your conscience does not reveal it to you; whereas you must now follow your conscience in what it tells you. A dispute about religious belief cannot exist for you since you don't know what the dispute is about (aren't acquainted with it). The sermon can be the precondition of belief, but in virtue of what happens in it,^b it cannot aim [151] to impel belief. (If these words could attach one to belief, other words could also attach one to belief.) Believing begins with belief. One must begin with belief;^c from words no belief follows. Enough.

- - - But aren't there various ways of being interested in ink & paper? Am I not interested in ink & paper when I read a letter attentively? For at any rate while doing that^d I am looking attentively at ink strokes.—“But here these are only means to an end!”—But surely a very important means to an end!—Yes of course we can imagine other investigations of ink & paper which would be of no interest to us, which would appear to us completely inessential to our end. But therefore what interests us [152] will be shown by our sort of

^aContinuing in code: weder mein Gewissen den Glauben befiehlt—wenn es so etwas gibt—, oder als es mir Niedrigkeiten vorwirft; die mich in einer Weise, die ich aber nicht kenne, nicht zum Glauben kommen lassen. Das heißt, so scheint es mir, ich soll sagen: Du kannst jetzt über einen solchen Glauben gar nichts wissen, er muss ein Geisteszustand sein von dem du gar nichts weißt und der Dich solange nichts angeht als dein Gewissen ihn Dir nicht offenbart; dagegen hast du jetzt deinem Gewissen in dem zu Folgen was es dir sagt. Einen Streit über den Glauben kann es für dich nicht geben da du nicht weißt, (nicht das kennt) worüber gestritten wird. Die Predigt kann die Vorbedingung des Glaubens sein, aber sie, durch das was in ihr vorgeht, kann den Glauben [151] nicht bewegen wollen. (Könnten diese Worte zum Glauben verbinden, so könnten andere Worte auch [replacing “einem andren”:] zum Glauben verbinden.) Das Glauben fängt mit dem Glauben an. Man muss mit dem Glauben anfangen; aus Worten folgt kein Glaube. Genug.

^b“in virtue of what happens in it” is an undecided alternative to “in itself (in sich).”

^cThe German is grammatically ambiguous and can also be translated “Believing begins with believing. One must begin with believing.”

^d“doing that (dabei)” was inserted into the line.

[152–153]

unserer
 unserer
 die Art der Untersuchung zeigen.
 Unser Gegenstand ist, so scheint
 es, sublim, & so sollte er,
 möchte man glauben
 scheint es, nicht von trivialen &
 in gewissem Sinne unsicheren Gegen-
 ständen handeln, sondern von
 Unzerstörbarem
 [Ein für mich ungemein charakteristi-
 sches Phänomen kann ich auf der Reise
 beobachten: Ich schätze die Menschen, es
 sei denn daß sie mir durch ihre Er-
 scheinung oder durch ihr Auftreten
 einen besonderen Eindruck machen,
 als weniger für minder ein als mich
 selbst: das heißt für gewöhnlich ich wäre
 geneigt das Wort "gewöhnlich" von ihnen
 zu gebrauchen, 'einer aus der Masse'
 & dergleichen. Ich würde dies vielleicht
 nicht sagen, aber der Blick mit dem
 ich ihn zuerst ansehe sagt es. Es
 ist schon ein Urteil in diesem Blick.
 unbegründetes, &
 Ein ganz ^{||} unberechtigtes. Und auch
 dann natürlich unberechtigtes, wenn

sich der Mensch bei genauerer Bekannt-
 schaft wirklich als sehr gewöhnlich,
 d.h. oberflächlich, herausstellen
 sollte. Ich bin freilich in Vielem
 ungewöhnlich & daher ^{viele} ^{||} Menschen gegen
 mich gehalten gewöhnlich; aber worin
 besteht denn meine Ungewöhnlichkeit?

Wenn unsere Betrachtungen
 von Wort & Satz handeln so sollten
 sie doch in einem idealeren Sinn von
 ihnen handeln, als in dem, in welchem
 ein Wort verwischt, schwer leserlich,
 sein kann u. dergl.. – So werden
 wir dazu geführt statt dem Wort
 die 'Vorstellung' des Wortes betrach-
 ten zu wollen. Wir wollen zu Reinerem,
Klarerem, zu Nicht-hypothetischem.
 [Darauf bezieht sich die Bemerkg
 im Band XI.]

28.1.

Noch auf der Reise im Schiff. Wir legten an
 einem Landungsplatz an & ich sah auf das
 Drahtseil, ^{mit dem} ^{||} das ~~vom~~ Schiff angebu(h)än(den)gt war,

investigation.^a Our subject is, so it seems, sublime & therefore, one would think,^b it should not deal with trivial & in a certain sense shaky objects but with the indestructible.

[I can observe on this journey a phenomenon that is uncommonly characteristic of me: Unless their appearance or demeanor makes a special impression on me, I judge people inferior to me:^c that is I would be inclined to use the word “ordinary”^d about them, ‘a man from the street’ & the like. Perhaps I wouldn’t say this but my first glance at them says it. There is already a judgement in this glance. A completely unfounded & unjustified^e judgement. And it would also be unjustified of course [153] if upon closer acquaintance that person really proved to be very ordinary, that is superficial. I am of course in many ways extraordinary & therefore many^f people are ordinary compared to me; but in what does my extraordinariness consist?]

If our considerations deal with word & sentence then they should do so in a more ideal sense than the one according to which a word can be smudged, hard to read and the like.— Thus we are led to want to consider the ‘representation’^g of the word rather than the word. We aspire to something more pure, more clear, to something non-hypothetical. [My remark in volume XI refers to this.]^h

28.1.[37]

Still on the journey by boat. We were mooring at the landing dock & I watched the steel cable by which the boat was secured,ⁱ [154] and the thought came to me: walk on the

^a“our sort of investigation (die Art unserer Untersuchung)” is an undecided alternative to “the sort of investigation (die Art der Untersuchung).”

^b“one would think” is an undecided alternative to “it seems.”

^cWittgenstein wrote “as lesser (als weniger),” struck this and continued with “inferior to me (für minder).”

^dFirst, Wittgenstein wrote “that is, as ordinary.” He then struck “as ordinary” and continued “I would be inclined to use the word ‘ordinary.’”

^e“unfounded & (unbegründetes &)” was inserted into the line before “unjustified (unberechtigtes).”

^f“many” was inserted into the line.

^gIn its philosophical meaning, the German word “Vorstellung” refers to mental representations; colloquially, it can also be translated as “idea.”

^hWittgenstein here presumably refers to a manuscript volume now known as MS 115. While no corresponding remark could be found in it, similar remarks occur in *Philosophical Investigations* 105–109. [I.S.]

ⁱ“by which the boat was secured” changed from “that was fastened to the ship.”

[154–155]

& der Gedanke kam mir: gehe auf dem Seil; Du wirst natürlich nach wenigen Schritten ins Wasser fallen – aber das Wasser war nicht tief & ich wäre nur naß geworden aber nicht ertrunken; & vor allem wäre ich natürlich ausgelacht oder für ein wenig verrückt gehalten worden. Ich schreckte sofort vor dem Gedanken zurück, das zu tun & mußte mir gleich sagen, daß ich kein freier Mensch, sondern ein Sklave bin. Freilich wäre es 'unvernünftig' gewesen dem Impuls zu folgen; aber was sagt das?! Ich verstand, was es heißt, daß der Glaube den Menschen selig macht, d.h. von der Furcht vor Menschen frei macht, indem er ~~den~~ ^{ihn} ~~Menschen~~ unmittelbar unter Gott stellt. Er wird sozusagen (R)reichsunmittelbar. Eine Schwäche ist, kein Held zu sein, aber eine noch ^{schwächere} viel größere Schwäche ^{den Helden} ~~einen solchen~~ zu spielen, also nicht einmal die Kraft haben, das Deficit

klar & ohne Zweideutigkeit in der Bilanz zu bekennen. Und das heißt: bescheiden werden: nicht in ein paar Worten, die man ^{einmal} ~~11~~ sagt, sondern im Leben.

Ein Ideal haben ist recht. Aber wie schwer, sein Ideal nicht spielen zu wollen! Sondern es in dem Abstand von sich zu sehen, in dem es ist! Ja, ist das auch nur möglich, – oder müßte man darüber entweder gut oder wahn-sinnig werden? Müßte diese Spannung, wenn sie ganz erfaßt würde, den Menschen nicht entweder zu Allem bringen, ~~können~~ ^{ihn} oder zerstören.

Ist es hier ein Ausweg, sich in die Arme der Gnade zu werfen?

Heute nacht folgenden Traum: Ich stand mit Paul & Mining, es war, wie auf einer vorderen Plattform eines Wagen der Elektrischen aber daß es das war, war nicht klar. Paul berichtete der Mining davon, wie begeistert mein Schwager Jérôme von

cable; of course you will fall into the water after a few steps—but the water wasn't deep & I would not have drowned but only gotten wet; & most of all I would have been laughed at of course or considered a little crazy. I immediately shrank back from the thought of doing this & had to tell myself right away that I am not a free man^a but a slave. Of course it would have been 'unreasonable' to follow the impulse; but what does that say?! I understood what it means that belief is bliss for a human being, that is, it frees him from the fear of others by placing him^b immediately under God. He becomes so to speak an imperial subject.^c It is a weakness not to be a hero, but it is by far a weaker^d weakness to play the hero,^e thus not even to have the strength to clearly [155] & without ambiguity acknowledge the deficit on the balance sheet. And that means: to become modest: not in a few words which one says once^f but in life.

To have an ideal is alright. But how difficult not to want to playact one's ideal. Instead to see it at that distance from oneself at which it is! Yes, is this even possible—or would one either have to become good or go mad over it? Wouldn't this tension, if it were fully grasped either open the person to everything or destroy him.^g

Is it a way out here to cast oneself into the arms of grace?^h

Last night the following dream: I stood with Paulⁱ & Mining, it was as if on the front platform of a streetcar but it wasn't clear that it was that. Paul told Mining how enthusiastic my brother-in-law Jerome^j was about [156] my unbelievable musical gift; the day before

^a"man (Mann)" is an undecided alternative to "human being (Mensch)."

^b"him" replaces "the human being (den Menschen)."

^cWittgenstein uses an arcane political term here. In the Middle Ages, municipalities were "reichsunmittelbar" if they answered directly to the emperor and not to an intermediary prince.

^d"weaker" is an undecided alternative to "greater."

^e"the hero" replaces "one."

^f"once" was inserted into the line.

^gIt appears that this sentence was changed from: "Wouldn't this tension, if it were fully grasped be capable of opening the person to everything (zu Allem bringen können)."

^hCompare pages [53f.] above.

ⁱWittgenstein's fourth oldest brother Paul (1887–1961) was a gifted pianist. After losing his right arm in World War I, he continued performing and commissioned concerts and chamber music for the left hand from Maurice Ravel, Sergei Prokofiev, Richard Strauss, Franz Schmidt, Josef Labor, Erich Wolfgang Korngold, and others. [I.S.]

^jJerome Stonborough (1873–1938) was Margarete's husband (see page [28], note c above). [I.S.]

[156–157]

meiner unglaublichen musikalischen
 Begabung gewesen sei; ich hatte
 nämlich am Tag vorher so wunder
 bar bei einem Werk von Mendelsohn,
 “(Die) Bachanten” (oder so ähnlich)
 hieß es), ^{mitgesungen} ~~mitgewirkt~~; es war als
 hätten wir (in) diese(s)m Werk unter uns
 zu Hause ^{außerordentlich ausdrucksvoll} musiziert & ich hätte ^{II}
 mitgesungen ^{& auch mit besonders} ~~auch~~ ausdrucksvolle
 Gesten. ~~dazu gemacht~~. Paul & Mining
 schienen mit dem Lob Jeromes voll-
 kommen übereinzustimmen. Jerome
 ein über das andre mal ^{Welches}
 habe ^{II} gesagt: “Was für ein Talent!” (oder
 etwas Ähnliches; ich erinnere mich daran
 nicht sicher) Ich hielt eine abgeblühte
 Pflanze in der Hand mit ^{schwärzlichen} ^{II} Samen(körnern) die
 in den schon offenen
~~schon aus den~~ Schötchen ~~herausfielen~~ &
 dachte; wenn @ sie mir sagen
 sollten, wie schade es doch um mein
 ungenutztes musikalisches Talent
 sei, wü|e|rde ich ihnen die Pflanze zei-
 gen & sagen, daß die Natur mit
 ihrem Samen auch nicht sparsam

ist & daß man nicht ängstlich sein &
 einen Samen ruhig umkommen lassen
^{weghinwerfen} soll
 soll. Das ganze war von Selbstgefälligkeit
 getragen. – Ich wachte auf & ärgerte,
 oder schämte, mich ~~über~~ wegen meiner Eitel-
 keit. – Es war das nicht ein Traum der
 Art wie ich ihn in den letzten 2 Monaten
 (etwa) sehr oft gehabt habe: wo ich
 nämlich im Traum verächtlich handle,
 z.B. lüge, & mit dem Gefühl aufwache:
 Gott sei dank, daß es ein Traum war;
 & den Traum auch als eine Art Warnung
 nehme. Omtv rxs nrxsg tzna tvovrn
 fnw zfxs nrxs dzsnhrnrt dviwvn!
 Omtv Tmgg Viyziovn org ori szyvn.
 30.1.
 Ufspv orxs qmilviprxs qiznq; rxs yrn
 zfhhvimiwvngprxs hxsdzxs & szyv vrn tv-
 drhhvh Hxsdrnwvptvufsp. Dvnn rxs orxs
 nfi irxsgrt af ovrnvo qmilviprxsvn Af-
 hgznw hgvppv n dfiww! Rxs yrn nmxs
 svfgv, drv zph qpvrvni Yfy yvro
 Azsniag, dm rxs zfxs roovi wrv driq-
 prxsvn Hxsoviavn org wvi Ufixsg emi

I had so wonderfully sung along^a in a work of Mendelsohn, it was called “the Bacchantae” (or something like this);^b it was as if we had performed from this work among ourselves at home & I had sung along with extraordinary expressiveness & also with especially expressive gestures.^c Paul & Mining seemed to completely agree with Jerome’s praise. Jerome was to have said again and again:^d “What talent!” (or something similar; I don’t remember this for sure). I held a withered plant in my hand with blackish seeds in the little pods that had already opened^e & thought: if they were to tell me what a pity it is about my unused musical talent, I will show them the plant & say that nature isn’t stingy with its seed either [157] & that one shouldn’t be afraid & just throw out a seed.^f All of this was carried on in a self-satisfied manner.—I woke up & was angry or ashamed because of^g my vanity.—This was not the sort of dream that I have been having very often during the last 2 months (roughly): namely where I act despicably in the dream, lie, for example, & wake up with the feeling: Thank God that this was a dream; & take this dream also as a sort of warning. *May^h I not become completely base and also not mad! May God have mercy on me.*

30.1.[37]

Feel physically sick; I am extraordinarily weak & have a certain feeling of dizziness. If only I could relate myself correctly to my physical condition! Still today I am like the small boy at the dentist’s where I would also always mix up the real pain with the fear of [158] pain & didn’t really know where one ended & the other began.ⁱ

^aThis clause was to open with a “for (nämlich)” which was struck; “sung along” is an undecided alternative to “took part” which Wittgenstein had struck and then restored for consideration.

^b*Culture and Value*, [6,b], includes numerous remarks on Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (1809–1847). There is no work by Mendelssohn entitled “The Bacchantae.” [I.S.]

^cWittgenstein changed this from “I had sung along also made expressive gestures to it.”

^d“again and again (ein über das andre mal)” was inserted into the line.

^eThis was changed from “with seed that were already falling out of the little pods.”

^f“throw out (hinwerfen)” is an undecided alternative to “let go to waste (umkommen lassen).”

^g“because of” replaces “about my.”

^hFrom here on written in code: Möge ich nicht ganz gemein und auch nicht wahnsinnig werden! Möge Gott Erbarmen mit mir haben! (30.1.) Fühle mich körperlich krank; ich bin außerordentlich schwach & habe ein gewisses Schwindelgefühl. Wenn ich mich nur richtig zu meinem körperlichen Zustand stellen würde! Ich bin noch heute, wie als ein kleiner Bub beim Zahnarzt, wo ich auch immer die wirklichen Schmerzen mit der Furcht vor [158] Schmerzen vermengt habe & nicht eigentlich wusste wo das eine aufhörte & das andere anfang.

ⁱWittgenstein started writing “where these began” then changed the order.

[158–159]

Hxsoviavn eviovtng szyv & nrxsg vrtvng

prxs ~~ev~~ dfhgv dm ~~wrvhv-znurntvn~~
 wzh vrnv ~~wzh znwviv znurnt.~~
~~rwnv-z(u)ffu~~ zfusmigv & ~~wrvhv-znurn-~~
~~tvn.~~

Unser Gegenstand ist doch sublim,

– wie kann er dann von gespro-
 chenen oder geschriebenen Zeichen han-
 deln?

Nun wir reden von dem Gebrauch
der Zeichen als Zeichen (& natürlich
 ist der Gebrauch des Zeichens nicht
 ein Gegenstand; der als das E^eigent-
 liche [&] Iⁱnteressante dem Zeichen
 als seinem bloßen Vertreter
 gegenüber^{steht} ~~gestellt.~~ ^{.)} ~~gegen~~

Aber was ist am Gebrauch der Zei-
 chen Sublimes? Da erinnere ich
 mich, erstens, daran, daß Namen oft eine
 magische Rolle ^{zugekommen ist,}
~~zu spielen~~ ~~geschiehen~~

~~haben~~, & zweitens daran, daß die Prob-
^{der Formen}
 leme, die durch ein Mißdenken unserer
 unserer Sprache
 Sprachformen entstehen, immer den
 Charakter des profunden haben.

⟨Virnnviv Wrxs!⟩

31.1.

Denk wie uns das Substantiv ^{“Zeit”} ^{||} ein Me-
 dium vorspiegeln kann; ^{wie es} ~~---~~ uns in die
 Irre führen kann, (...|daß) wir einem Phantom
 (auf & ab) nachjagen.

Adam benennt die Tiere – – –

Tmgg pzhh orxs vi(o)m)oo hvrn zyvi nrxsg
 fyvhlzng!

Ich fühle mich als wäre mein
 Verstand in einem sehr labilen Gleich-
 gewichtszustand; so als würde ein ver-
 hältnismäßig geringer Stoß ihn zum
 umschnappen bringen. ^{Es ist so} ~~So~~ ^{||} wie man
 sich manchmal dem Weinen nahe
 fühlt, den herannahenden Weinkampf
 fühlt. Man soll dann recht
 ruhig, gleichmäßig & tief zu atmen
 versuchen, bis der Krampf sich
 löst. Und so Gott will wird es mir
 gelingen.

2.2.

Erinnere Dich beim Philosophieren zur
 rechten Zeit daran, ~~wie angenehm~~
 mit welcher Befriedigung Kinder (&

Our object is sublime, after all—how then can it deal with spoken or written signs?

Now we speak of the use of signs as signs (& of course the use of signs is not an object; the object is what is real & interesting as opposed to the sign as its mere representative.)^a

But what is there that is deep^b in the use of signs? What I am reminded of first here is that a magical role has often been attributed to names,^c & second^d that the problems which arise through the misconception of the form of our language always have the character of the profound.

[159] *Remind yourself!*^e

31.1.[37]

Consider how the noun “time”^f can conjure a medium; how it can lead us astray so that we chase (back & forth) after a phantom.

Adam names the animals---

God let me be pious but not eccentric!^g

I feel as if my intellect was in a very unstable equilibrium; so as if a comparatively slight push would make it flip. It is as^h when one sometimes feels close to crying, feels the approaching crying fit. One should then try to breathe quite calmly, regularly & deeply until the fit is eased. And if God wills I will succeed.

2.2.[37]

Remind yourself at the right time when doing philosophy with what satisfactionⁱ children (& [160] also plain folk)^j hear that that is the greatest bridge, the highest tower,

^a“as signs” was struck and then restored; the “&” between “real” and “interesting” was inserted into the line; “as opposed to” is a translation of “it stands against,” which replaces “it is placed against.”

^b“what is deep (Tiefes)” is an undecided alternative to “what is sublime (Sublimes).”

^cReplacing “that names often appeared to play a magic role.”

^dWittgenstein wrote that he was reminded “secondly of that (zweitens daran)”; he then struck and then restored the “of that.”

^eA page appears to have been torn out between pages 158 and 159. There is no indication of missing text, however, nor a break in Wittgenstein’s page numbering. In the upper left-hand corner of the page Wittgenstein inserted in code “Erinnere Dich! (Remember!)” [I.S.]

^f“time” was inserted into the line.

^gWittgenstein wrote this in code: Gott lass mich fromm sein aber nicht überspannt (high strung)!

^h“It is as” replaces “As.”

ⁱWittgenstein wrote “how pleasantly,” struck this and continued “with what satisfaction.”

^j“plain folk (einfache Leute)” replaces “das Volk (the masses)”

[160–161]

auch ~~das Volk~~ (einfache Leute) hören
das sei die größte Brücke, der höchste
 Turm, die größte Geschwindigkeit ... etc..

(Kinder fragen: "was ist die größte
 Zahl?") Es ist nicht anders möglich

als daß ein solcher Trieb allerlei
 & daher philosophische Verwicklungen
 philosophische Vorurteile ^{||} erzeugen
 muß.

3.2.

Du sollst die Annehmlichkeiten des
 Lebens nicht wie ein Dieb davontragen.

(Oder wie der Hund der einen Knochen
 gestolen hat & mit ^{ihm} dem Knochen im

~~Maul~~ davonrennt.)

Aber was bedeutet das ^{nicht} ^{||} fürs Leben!!

4.2.

Ich kann wohl die ^{christliche} ^{||} Lösung des
 Problems des Lebens (^{Erlösung} ^{||}, Auferste-
 hung, Gericht, Himmel, Hölle) zu-
 ablehnen, aber damit ^{ist} ~~habe~~

~~ich~~ ja das Problem meines Lebens

nicht gelöst, denn ich bin nicht
 gut & nicht glücklich. Ich bin

nicht erlöst. Und wie kann ich
 also wissen, was mir, wenn ich
 anders lebte, ganz anders lebte,
 als einzig akzeptables Bild der
 Weltordnung vorschweben würde.

Ich kann das nicht beurteilen. Ein
 anderes Leben rückt ja ganz andere
 Bilder in den Vordergrund, macht
 ganz andere Bilder notwendig. Wie

Not beten lehrt. Das heißt nicht,

daß man durch das andere Leben
^{notwendig} ^{||} seine Meinungen ändert. Aber lebt

man anders, so spricht man

anders. Mit einem neuen Leben

lernt man neue Sprachspiele.

Denk z.B. mehr an den Tod, – &

es wäre doch sonderbar, wenn

Du nicht dadurch neue Vorstel-

lungen, neue Gebiete der Sprache,

kennen lernen solltest.

5.2.

Kann aus irgend einem Grunde nicht
 arbeiten. Meine Gedanken kommen nicht

the greatest speed . . . etc. (Children ask: “what is the greatest number?”) It is impossible for such a drive not to produce various philosophical prejudices & therefore philosophical entanglements.^a

3.2.[37]

You shouldn’t carry away the comforts of life like a thief. (Or like the dog who has stolen a bone & runs away with it.)^b

But what all this means for life!!

4.2.[37]

I may well reject the Christian solution of the problem of life (salvation, resurrection, judgment, heaven, hell)^c but this does not solve^d the problem of my life, for I am not good & not happy. I am [161] not saved. And thus how can I know what I would envision as the only acceptable image of a world order if I lived differently, lived completely differently. I can’t judge that. After all, another life shifts completely different images into the foreground, necessitates completely different images. Just like trouble teaches prayer.^e That does not mean that through the other life one will necessarily^f change one’s opinions. But if one lives differently, one speaks differently. With a new life one learns new language games.

Think more of death, for example—& it would be strange if through that you wouldn’t get to know new conceptions, new tracts of language.

5.2.[37]

Can’t work for some reason. My thoughts don’t budge [162] & I am at a loss, don’t know

^a“& therefore philosophical entanglements” was inserted into the line.

^b“with it” replaces “with the bone in its mouth.”

^c“Christian” and “salvation” were inserted into the line; “reject (ablehnen)” is an undecided alternative to “repudiate (zurückweisen).”

^dWittgenstein wrote, literally, “through this is not solved,” which replaced “through this I have not solved.”

^e“Wie Not beten lehrt” can also be translated “how need, privation, want teaches praying.”

^f“necessarily” is inserted into the line.

[162–163]

vom Fleck & ich bin ratlos, weiß nicht
was ich in dieser Lage anfangen
soll. Rxs hxsrvnv srvi wrv Avrg
rn fnnfgavi Dvrhv af evitvfwvn.

Im guten Sinne “schwerver- 6.2.
ständig” ist ein Künstler, wenn
uns das ~~endliche~~ Verständnis
Geheimnisse offenbart, nicht, einen
Trick, den wir nicht verstanden hatten.

7.2.

Vh uvspg ovrnvo Hxsivryvn drvwvi
zn Uimoortqvrq & Vitvyvnsvrg. So
sorge ich mich darum daß, was
ich jetzt hervorbringe Bachtin
schlechter erscheinen könnte, als
was ich ihm gegeben habe. Drv qznn
yvr hmpxsvi Wfoosvrg, Tfgvh svizfh-
qmoovn. –

8.2.

Der ideale Name ist ein Ideal; d.i.,
ein Bild,
|| eine Form der Darstellung, der wir
zuneigen. Wir wollen ^{die} Zerstörung & Verän-
derung darstellen als Trennung &

Umgruppierung von Elementen. Diese Idee
nun könnte man in gewissem Sinne
erhaben nennen; sie wird es dadurch,
daß wir die ganze Welt durch sie
betrachten. Aber es ist nun nichts
wichtiger, als daß wir uns klar werden,
welche Erscheinungen, welche einfa-
chen, hausbackenen, Fälle das Urbild ^{zu}
dieser Idee sind. Das heißt: Frage Dich,
wenn Du versucht bist, allgemeine
metaphysische Aussagen zu machen
(immer): “An ~~was für~~ ^{welche Fälle} denke ich denn
eigentlich? – Was für ein Fall, welche Vor-
stellung, schwebt mir denn da vor?”

Dieser Frage widersetzt sich nun etwas
in uns, denn wir scheinen damit das
Ideal zu gefärden; ^W während wir doch ^{es}
doch nur
nichts tun als es an den Ort zu
stellen ^{wohin es hingehört} ~~wo es stehen soll~~. Denn es soll
das Bild sein womit wir die Wirk-
lichkeit vergleichen, ^{Hilfe dessen // wodurch//}
mit dessen Hilfe
wir darstellen, wie sie ist; nicht
ein Bild wonach wir die Wirklichkeit

what to do in this situation. *I^a seem to waste my time here in a useless fashion.*

6.2.[37]

An artist is “difficult to understand” in a good sense when the understanding^b reveals secrets to us, not a trick which we hadn’t understood.

7.2.[37]

My writing is lacking piety & devotion again. So I am concerned that what I produce now might appear worse to Bachtin than what I have given him.^c *How can anything good come from such stupidity.* —

8.2.[37]

The ideal name is an ideal, that is, a picture,^d a form of representation to which we are inclined. We want to represent the destruction^e & change as separation & [163] regrouping of elements. One could call this idea in a certain sense sublime; it becomes sublime in that we see the whole world through it. But now nothing is more important than making clear to ourselves which phenomena, which simple, home-spun cases are the original picture of this idea. That is: When you are tempted to make general metaphysical statements, ask yourself (always): What cases^f am I actually thinking of? — What sort of case, which conception do I have in mind here? Now something in us resists this question for we seem to jeopardize the ideal through it: whereas we are doing it only in order to put it in the place where it belongs.^h For it is supposed to be a picture with which we compare reality, through which we represent how things stand. Notⁱ a picture by which we falsify [164] reality.

^aIn code: Ich scheine hier die Zeit in unnützer Weise zu vergeuden.

^bWittgenstein first wrote “das endliche Verständnis (the ultimate, final, eventual understanding),” then struck “endliche.”

^cThe brother of the literary scholar Mikhail Bachtin (1895–1975), Nicholas Bachtin (1896–1950) was along with Piero Sraffa and others one of Wittgenstein’s communist friends. [I.S.]—The first and last sentences of this paragraph were written in code: Es fehlt meinem Schreiben wieder an Frömmigkeit & Ergebnisheit. [. . .] Wie kann bei solcher Dummheit, Gutes herauskommen.

^d“a picture,” was inserted into the line.

^e“the” was inserted into the line; the wavy underlining indicates Wittgenstein’s uncertainty.

^fAs before, the inserted “of (zu)” then received wavy underlining.

^gWittgenstein started writing “what sort of” but struck this.

^h“whereas we are doing it only in order to” is an undecided alternative to “whereas we do nothing but”; “where it belongs” replaces “where it should stand.”

ⁱUndecided alternative to “with the help of which we represent how it is; not.”

[164–165]

umfälschen.

Wir werden daher immer wieder fragen:

“Woher nimmt sich, dieses Bild?!” dem
 wir eine so allgemeine ^{Bedeutung} Anwendbarkeit
 vindizieren wollen.

Die „sublime Auffassung“ zwingt
 mich von dem konkreten Fall weg-
 zugehen, da, was ich sage, ja auf ihn
 nicht paßt. Ich begeben mich nun in eine
 ätherische Region, rede vom eigentlichen
 Zeichen, von Regeln die es geben muß.
 (obwohl ich nicht sagen kann wo & wie),
 – & gerate ‘aufs Glatteis’.

9.2.

Ein Traum: Ich ^{fahre} ~~sitze~~ im Eisenbahnzug
 & sehe durchs Fenster eine Land-
 schaft: ~~Es ist~~ eine Ortschaft & ziem-
 lich im Hintergrund ^{sehe ich} ~~sehe ich~~ etwas,
 was wie zwei große Montgolfieren
 aussieht. Ich freue mich über den
 Anblick. Nun steigen sie auf, ^{aber} @ es zeigt
 sich, daß es nur ein(e) Luftballon ist
 Ding ist, eine Art Montgolfiere

Montgolfiere ist

|| mit einem (F)fallschirmartigen Gebilde

~~darüber~~ darüber. Beides braunrot. Wo
 es sich vom Boden hebt, sieht (es|der) ‹Boden›
 schwarz aus, ‹, wie› vom Feuer offenbar. Nun
 aber fliege auch ich in einem Ballon.

Die Gondel ist wie ein Koupé & ich
 sehe durchs Fenster, daß die Mont-
 golfiere, wie vom Wind getrieben, sich
 uns nähert. Es ist gefährlich, denn
 unser Ballon kann Feuer fangen.

Nun ist die Montgolfiere ganz nah.

Ich ^{nehme an} ~~stelle mir vor~~, daß unsere Mann-
 schaft, die ich ^{mir} || über meinem Koupé
 vorstelle ~~annehme~~, versucht, die Montgol-
 fiere ^{von uns} || wegzustoßen. Ich glaube aber,

sie hat uns vielleicht schon be-
 rührt. Ich liege nun auf dem
 Rücken in dem Koupé; & denke:
 jeden Moment kann eine furchtbare
 Explosion erfolgen & alles aus sein.

Rxs wvnqv rvqag mug zn wvn Gmw,
 & wzizn, drv rxs rn wvi Gmwvhnmg
 yvhgvsvn dviwv; & wvi Gizfo szntg

Therefore we will ask again and again about that image for which we want to vindicate such general significance:^a “Where does that image derive itself from?!”

The “sublime conception” forces me to move away from the concrete case since what I say doesn’t fit it. I now move into an ethereal region, talk of the real sign, of rules that must exist (even though I can’t say where & how)—& find myself ‘on thin ice.’^b

9.2.[37]

A dream: I am riding on a train & through the window see a landscape: a village & pretty much in the background I see something that looks like two big hot air balloons.^c I delight in the view. They now ascend but it turns out that it is only one [165] balloon with a parachute-like construction above it.^d Both maroon. Where it rises from the ground the ground looks black, as from the fire.^e But now I am also flying in a balloon.

The gondola is like a compartment & I see through the window that the other balloon^f is approaching us as if driven by the wind. It is dangerous, for our balloon can catch fire. Now the other balloon is very close. I assume that the crew, which I imagine to be above my compartment, tries to push the balloon away from us.^g But I think it may have touched us already. I am now lying on my back in the compartment; & think: any moment a horrible explosion can happen & everything is over.

^h*am often thinking about death now & about how I will prevail in the anguish of death, & the dream relates [166] to that.*

^a“significance” is an undecided alternative to “applicability” which received wavy underlining.

^b“aufs Glatteis geraten” is also used in *Philosophical Investigations*, 107 as a metaphor for the faults of the sublime conception. Wittgenstein discusses the sublime with reference to the ideal, the real sign, and the original picture (Urbild) also in MS 157a and b. There, too, he arrives around February 8 at a point of dissatisfaction. See MS 157a, pp. 115f., 122, 130f., MS 157b, 27.2.1937 and thereafter; compare *Philosophical Investigations* 94, 101, 108f. [I.S.]

^c“riding” replaces “sitting;” Wittgenstein first wrote “it is a village” and struck “it is.”

^dWittgenstein struck various formulations such as “that it is only one thing, a sort of balloon.”

^eAfter writing “from the fire apparently,” Wittgenstein struck “apparently.”

^fWittgenstein refers to his balloon as “Ballon” and calls the other “Montgolfiere.”

^g“assume” and “imagine” traded places; “from us” was inserted into the line.

^hIn code: Ich denke jetzt oft an den Tod, & daran, wie ich in der Todesnot bestehen werde; & der Traum hängt [166] damit zusammen.

[166–167]

wzorg afhzoyn.

Mein Gewissen plagt mich & läßt mich nicht arbeiten. Ich hab~~n~~ \ Schriften Kierkegaards gelesen & das hat mich noch mehr beunruhigt, als ich es schon war.. Ich will nicht leiden; das ist es was mich beunruhigt. Ich will nicht auf irgendwelche Bequemlichkeit verzichten, oder auf einen Genuß. (Ich würde z.B. nicht fasten, oder mir auch nur im Essen (a|A)abbruch tun.) Aber ich will auch nicht gegen irgend jemand auftreten & mir Unfriede schaffen. Wenigstens nicht, wenn der Fall nicht unmittelbar unter meine Augen gerückt wird. Aber selbst dann fürchte ich, ich möchte mich drücken. Dazu lebt in mir eine unausrottbare Unbescheidenheit. Ich möchte mich bei Jämmerlichkeit aller Elendigkeit immer mit den Bedeu-

13.2.

tendsten vergleichen. Vh rhg zph qmngv rxs, nfi Gimhg urnwvn rn wvi Vi-qvnngrh ovrnvi Rzooviprxsqvrg.

Laß mich daran festhalten, daß ich mich nicht selbst betrügen will. D.h. ich will eine Forderung, die ich als solche anerkenne, mir selbst immer wieder als Forderung eingestehen. Das verträgt sich völlig mit meinem Glauben. Mit meinem Glauben, wie er ist. Daraus folgt, daß ich entweder die Forderung erfüllen werde, oder darunter leiden werde, sie nicht zu erfüllen, denn ich kann sie mir nicht vorhalten & nicht darunter leiden, daß ich ihr nicht genüge. Ferner aber: id|Die Forderung ist hoch furchtbar. Das heißt: was immer am (n|N)euem Testament wahr oder falsch sein mag, eines kann nicht bezweifelt werden.: daß ich, um richtig zu leben, ganz anders leben müßte, als es mir behagt. «Daß das Leben viel ernster ist, als es an der Oberfläche behagt. ausschaut. Das Leben ist ein furchtbarer Ernst.»

Das Höchste aber, das ich zu erfüllen

13.2.

My conscience plagues me & won't let me work. I have been reading in the works of Kierkegaard & that unsettled me even more than I already was. I don't want to suffer; that is what unsettles me. I don't want to let go of any conveniences or of any pleasure. (I would not fast, for example, or even restrain myself in my eating.) But I also don't want to oppose anyone & involve myself in discord. At least not as long as the matter is not placed right before my eyes. But even then I fear that I might dodge it. In addition an in-eradicable immodesty dwells in me. In all my pitifulness^a I still always want to compare myself to the [167] most significant persons. *It^b is as if I could find solace only in the recognition of my pitifulness.*

Let me hold on to this that I do not want to deceive myself. That is, a certain demand which I acknowledge as such I want to admit to myself again and again as a demand. This agrees entirely with my belief.^c With my belief as it is. From that it follows that I will either meet the demand or suffer from not meeting it, for I cannot prescribe it to myself & not suffer from not living up to it. But furthermore: The demand is high.^d That is, whatever may be true or false in regard to the New Testament, one thing cannot be doubted: that in order to live right I would have to live completely differently from what suits me. That life is far more serious than what it looks like at the surface. Life is frightfully serious.^e

^a“Pitifulness (Jämmerlichkeit)” is an undecided alternative to “wretchedness (Elendigkeit).”

^bIn code: Es ist als könnte ich, nur Trost finden in der Erkenntnis meiner Jämmerlichkeit.

^c“belief” is a translation of “Glauben” which includes “religious faith” among its meanings.

^d“high (hoch)” is an undecided alternative to “frightful (furchtbar).”

^eThe last two lines were added later. Wittgenstein inserted them at the end of the paragraph. “ein furchtbarer Ernst” literally means “a frightful seriousness.”

[168–169]

bereit bin, ist: “fröhlich zu sein in meiner Arbeit”. D.h.: nicht unbescheiden, gutmütig, nicht direkt lügnerrisch, im Unglück nicht ungeduldig. Nicht, daß ich diese Forderungen erfüllte! aber ich kann es anstreben. Was aber höher liegt kann, ^{oder will} ich nicht anstreben, ich kann es nur anerkennen & yrggvn, wzhh wwi Wifxq wrvhvi Znviqvnfnft nrxsg af ufixsgviprxs driw, d.h., daß er mich leben läßt, daß er also meinen Geist nicht verdunkle.

Vh ofhh wzaf, tpxrxshzo, wfixs wrv Wvxqy, wvn Lpzumnw, fngvi wvo rxs ziyvrgv, fyvi wvn rxs nrxsg hgvrtvn drpp, vrn Prxsg wfixshxsroovin.

15.2.

Wie das Insekt das Licht umschwirrt so ~~werde ich jetzt vom~~ ^{ums} Neuen Testament ~~angezogen~~.

Ich hatte gestern diesen Gedanken: Wenn ich ganz von Strafen im Jenseits

absehe: Finde ich es richtig, daß ein Mensch sein Leben lang für die Gerechtigkeit leidet dann vielleicht einen schrecklichen Tod stirbt, – & nun keinerlei Lohn für dieses Leben ^{hat} ~~erhält~~? Ich bewundere doch einen solchen, stelle ihn hoch über mich, & warum sage ich nicht, er war ein Esel, daß er sein Leben so benützt hat. Warum ist er nicht dumm? Oder auch: warum ist er nicht der “elendeste Mensch”? Sollte er das nicht sein, wenn nun das alles ist, daß er ein schreckliches Leben hatte bis an sein Ende? Denke nun aber ich antwortete: “Nein er ist nicht dumm gewesen, denn nach seinem Tode geht es ihm ^{nun} ~~dafür~~ gut.” Das ist auch nicht befriedigend. Er scheint mir nicht dumm, ja, im Gegenteil, er scheint mir das Richtige zu tun. Ferner scheine ich sagen zu können: er tut das Rechte, denn er empfängt den rechten Lohn, und doch kann

The highest, however, that I [168] am prepared to carry out is: “to be cheerful in my work.” That is: not immodest, good-natured, not directly untrue, not impatient in misfortune. Not that I am meeting these demands! but I can strive for it. But what lies higher I cannot or do not want to^a strive for, I can only acknowledge it & ask^b that the pressure of this acknowledgment does not become too horrible, that is, that it will let me live, thus that it does not cloud my mind.

For^c that, as it were, a light must shimmer through the ceiling^d under which I work and above which I do not want to rise.

15.2.[37]

Like the insect around the light so I buzz around the New Testament.^e

Yesterday I had this thought: If I disregard entirely punishments in the [169] hereafter: Do I find it right that a person suffers an entire life for the cause of justice, then dies perhaps a terrible death,—& now has^f no reward at all for this life? After all, I admire such a person & place him high above me & why don't I say, he was an ass that he used his life like that. Why is he not stupid? Or also: why is he not the “most miserable of human beings”? Isn't that what he should be, if now that is all: that he had a miserable life until the end? But consider now that I answer: “No he was not stupid since he is doing well now after his death.”^g That is also not satisfying. He does not seem stupid to me, indeed, on the contrary, seems to be doing what's right. Further I seem to be able to say: he does what's right for he receives the just reward^h and yet I can't think [170] of the reward as an award

^a“or do not want to” was inserted into the line.

^bIn code: bitten, dass der Druck dieser Anerkennung nicht zu fürchterlich wird.

^cIn code: Es muss dazu, gleichsam, durch die Decke, den Plafond, unter dem ich arbeite, über den ich nicht steigen will, ein Licht durchschimmern.

^dWittgenstein used a German (durch die Decke) as well as Austrian (durch den Plafond) term, thus ended up saying “through the ceiling” twice.

^eInitially, Wittgenstein wrote “Like the insect buzzes around the light so I am now attracted by the New Testament.” He struck “am now attracted by” and replaced this with “around.”

^f“has” replaced “receives.”

^g“now (nun)” replaced “in return (dafür).”

^hWittgenstein first used “das Richtige (what's right),” then “das Rechte (what's right or just)” and finally referred to “den rechten Lohn (the just or right award).”

[170–171]

ich mir den Lohn nicht als Belohnung nach seinem Tode denken.

“Dieser Mensch muß heimkommen”

möchte ich von einem solchen sagen.

Man stellt sich die Ewigkeit (des Lohnes oder der Strafe) für gewöhnlich als eine endlose Zeitdauer vor. Aber man könnte sie sich geradesogut als einen Augenblick vorstellen. Denn in einem Augenblick kann man alle Schrecken erfahren & alle Glückseligkeit. Wenn Du Dir die Hölle vorstellen willst so brauchst Du nicht an nie endende Qualen zu denken. Vielmehr würde ich sagen: Weißt Du welches unsagbaren Grauens ein Mensch fähig ist? Denk daran & Du weißt was die Hölle ist, obwohl es sich da gar nicht um Dauer handelt.

Und ferner, wer weiß welches Grauens er fähig ist, der weiß das noch immer

nichts ist gegen etwas noch viel [s]Schrecklicheres, was, solange wir noch von Äußerm abgelenkt werden können, noch gleichsam verdeckt liegt. (Die letzte Rede des Mephisto im Lenauschen Faust.) Der Abgrund der Hoffnungslosigkeit, kann sich im Leben nicht zeigen. Wir können nur bis zu gewisser Tiefe in ihn hineinschauen, denn “wo Leben ist, da ist Hoffnung”. ^{Im} ~~Im~~ Peer Gynt ~~sage~~ heißt es ^{erkauft} ~~heißt es~~: “Zu teuer ^{bezahlt} man das Bißchen Leben mit solch einer Stunde verzehrendem Beben.” – Wenn man Schmerzen hat, so sagt man etwa: “Jetzt dauern diese Schmerzen schon 3 Stunden, wann werden sie denn endlich aufhören”, in der Hoffnungslosigkeit aber denkt man nicht: “es dauert schon so lange!”, denn da vergeht die Zeit in gewissem Sinne gar nicht.

Kann man nun nicht jemandem, & ich mir, sagen: “Du hast recht ^{tust} Dich vor der Hoffnungslosigkeit zu fürch-

after his death.^a Of such a person I want to say “This human being must come home.”

One imagines eternity (of reward or of punishment) normally as an endless duration. But one could equally well imagine it as an instant. For in an instant one can experience all terror & all bliss. If you want to imagine hell you don’t need to think of unending torment. I would rather say: Do you know what unspeakable dread a human being is capable of? Think of that & you know what hell is even though this is not at all a matter of duration.^b

And furthermore, those who know what dread they are capable of, know that this is nothing yet [171] in comparison to something even far more terrible which as it were remains covered up as long as we can be still distracted by externalities. (Mephisto’s last speech in Lenau’s *Faust*.)^c The abyss of hopelessness cannot show itself in life. We can look into it only down to a certain depth, for “where there is life, there is hope.” In *Peer Gynt* it goes: “An hour of this consuming strife is too dear a price to pay for life.”^d—When one is in pain one says something like: “These pains have already lasted 3 hours now, when will they finally stop,” but in hopelessness one does not think “it lasts so long already!” for in a certain sense time does not pass at all in it.

Now, can’t one say to someone & I to myself: “You are doing right^e to be afraid of hopelessness! [172] You must live in such a way that your life can’t come to a head in

^a“ . . . and yet I can’t think of the reward (Lohn) as an award (Belohnung) after his death.”

^bWittgenstein included a version of this remark in MS 157a, see *Culture and Value* [6,b], p. 26/30: “In one day one can experience the horrors of hell; there is plenty of time for that.”

^cThese are among Mephistopheles’s final words to the dying Faust in Nikolaus Lenau’s (1802–1850) *Faust* fragment of 1836: “Once the stream of blood has subsided, the rush of which covered the secret, you can look down to the bottom and then behold your nature and mine” (“Ist erst der Strom des Blutes abgeflossen, Das brausend das Geheimnis übergossen, Kannst du hinunterschauen auf den Grund, Dann wird dein Wesen dir und meines kund”). *Culture and Value* contains various remarks on Lenau, see [6,b], pp. 3/5, 33/39, and especially three remarks from 1946 on p. 54/61: “I often fear madness. Have I any reason to assume that this fear does not spring from, so to speak, an optical illusion: of seeing something as an abyss that is close by, when it isn’t? The only experience I know of that speaks for its not being an illusion, is the case of Lenau. [. . .] What is important is what Faust says about his loneliness or isolation.” [I.S.]

^dThese verses come from Michael Meyer’s translation of the second act of Henrik Ibsen’s (1828–1906) dramatic poem *Peer Gynt* of 1876. Wittgenstein quoted the German verse translation: “Too dearly purchased [replacing: paid for] is that bit of life (das bißchen Leben) with such an hour of consuming tremor (verzehrendem Beben).”

^e“you are doing right” is an undecided alternative to “you are right.”

[172–173]

ten! Du mußt so leben, daß sich Dein Leben nicht am Ende zuspitzen kann zur Hoffnungslosigkeit. Zu dem Gefühl : Nun ist's zu spät." Und es scheint mir, als könne es sich zu verschiedenem zuspitzen.

Aber kannst Du Dir denken, daß das Leben des wahrhaft Gerechten sich auch nur so zuspitzt? Muß er nicht die "Krone des Lebens" erhalten? Fordre ich für ihn nichts Anderes? Fordre ich für ihn nicht Verherrlichung?! Ja! Aber wie kann ich mir die Verherrlichung^{seine} denken? Ich könnte meinem Gefühle nach sagen: er muß nicht nur das Licht schauen, sondern unmittelbar an das Licht herankommen, mit ihm^{nun} eines Wesens werden, – und dergleichen. Ich könnte also, scheint es, alle Ausdrücke brauchen, die die Religion hier tatsächlich gebraucht. Es drängen sich mir also diese Bilder auf. Und doch scheue ich mich diese

Bilder & Ausdrücke zu gebrauchen. Vor allem sind es natürlich nicht Gleichnisse. Denn was sich durch ein Gleichnis sagen läßt, das auch ohne Gleichnis. Diese Bilder & Ausdrücke haben ihr Leben vielmehr nur in einer hohen Sphäre des Lebens nur in dieser Sphäre ~~werden~~ ~~sie~~ können sie mit Recht gebraucht werden. ~~Ich könnte nur sagen:~~ ^{kann} "Ich könnte eigentlich nur eine Geste machen, die etwas Ähnliches heißt wie "unsagbar", & nichts sagen. – Oder ist diese unbedingte Abneigung dagegen hier Worte zu gebrauchen eine Art Flucht? Eine Flucht vor einer Realität? Ich glaube nicht(.;|) ^a Aber ich weiß es nicht. Pzhhx orxs adzi emi qvrno Hxspfh af- ifxqhxsvfn, zyvi zfxs fnywrrtg nrxsg zyvitpzfyrhxs hvrn!! Rxs drpp nrxsg fnivrnprxs wvnqvn! 16.2.37

Tmgg! pzhhx orxs af wri rn vrn Eviszpgnrh q[0|m]oovn, rn wvo rxs "vifsprxs hvrn qznn rn ovrvi Ziyvrg!

hopelessness, in the feeling: Now it's too late." And it appears to me that it could come to a head in different ways.

But can you imagine that the life of the one who is truly just also comes to a head only like that? Mustn't he receive the "crown of life"? Don't I demand nothing but this for him? Don't I demand his glorification?! Yes! But how can I imagine his^a glorification? In accord with my feelings I could say: not only must he see the light, but get immediately to the light, become of one nature with it now,^b—and the like. It therefore seems that I could use all those expressions which religion really uses here.

These images thus impose themselves upon me. And yet I am reluctant to use these [173] images & expressions. Above all these are not similes, of course. For what can be said by way of a simile, that can also be said without a simile.^c These images & expressions have a life rather only in a high sphere of life, they can^d be rightfully used only in this sphere. All I could really do is make a gesture^e which means something similar to "unsayable," & say nothing.—Or is this absolute aversion to using words here some sort of flight? A flight from a reality? I don't think so; but I don't know.^f *Let^g me not shy away from any conclusion, but absolutely also not be superstitious!! I do not want to think uncleanly!* 16.2.37

God! let me come into a relation to you in which I "can be cheerful in my work"!

^a"his" is an undecided alternative to "the."

^bWittgenstein wrote "must come close to the light," struck "come" and left the phrase elliptical.—"now" was inserted into the line.

^cThe German "Gleichnis" has been translated as "metaphor" and "simile." Compare the "Lecture on Ethics" in *Philosophical Occasions* [73,f], pp. 42f.: "Now all religious terms seem in this sense to be used as similes or allegorically. . . . And if I can describe a fact by means of a simile I must also be able to drop the simile and to describe the facts without it." For remarks on religion and whether speaking is essential to it, see also Wittgenstein's conversations with the Vienna Circle [74,a], p. 117. [I.S.]

^d"can be" replaces "will be."

^eThis replaces "I could (alternative: can) only say" followed by a colon and quotation marks.

^f"But I don't know" was initially a separate sentence.

^gFrom here on in code: *Lass mich zwar vor keinem Schluss zurückscheuen, aber auch unbedingt nicht abergläubisch sein!! Ich will nicht unreinlich denken!* [16.2.37] *Gott! Lass mich zu dir in ein Verhältnis kommen, in dem ich "[incorrectly spelled but probably:] fröhlich sein kann in meiner Arbeit! Regarding "uncleanly" compare [19, d] above.*

[174–175]

Tpzyfv wzizn wzhh Tm^gg emn wri
rn rvwvo Omovng zppvh umiwvin
qznn! Hvr wri vw^hhvn driqprxs
yvdfhhg! Wznn yrggv wzhh vi wri
wzh Tv^hxsvnq wvh Pvyvnh tryg!
Wvnn Wf qznnhg rvwviavrg rn
Dzsnhrnn evruzppvn mwvi tzna
& tzi fntpfxqprxs dviwvn, dvnn
Wf vgdzh nr^xsg gfhg dzh emn
wri evipzntg driw!

Es ist ein Ding zu Gott zu
reden & ein anderes, von Gott
zu Anderen zu reden.

Viszpgv ori ov^rnvⁿ Evihgzⁿw
iv^rn & fnyvupvxqg! –

Ich möchte gern tief sein; –
& doch scheue ich vor dem Abgrund
im Menschenherzen zurück!! –

Ich winde mich unter der
Qual, nicht arbeiten zu können,
@ mich matt zu fühlen, nicht von
Anfechtungen ungestört leben zu
können. Und wenn ich nun bedenke,

– die wirklich etwas waren –
was Andere, ^{||}, zu leiden hatten, so
ist, was ich erlebe, nichts im Ver-
gleich ~~dazu~~. Und doch winde ich mich
unter dem im Vergleich winzigen Druck.

Meine Erkenntnis ist eigent-
lich: wie fürchterlich unglücklich
der Mensch werden@ kann. Die Erkennt-
nis eines Abgrundes; & ich möchte
sagen: Gott gebe, daß diese Erkenntnis
nicht klarer wird.

Fnw rxs qznn driqprxs rv^gag
@ nr^xsg ziyvrgvn. Wvi Kfvpp rhg
ori evihrtg & rxs dv^rhh rsn nr^xsg af
urnwvn.

17.2.

^{urnwv}
Roovi drwvi vigzllv rxs orxs zfu
tvovrvn Tvwznqvn, rz zfu wvn tvovrn-
hgvn Tvwznqvn. Seufxsvpvr wvi pzxsvi-
prxshgvn Hmⁱgv & dm vh wz^h Smxshgv
yvgiruug.

Drv ozn zfu wfⁿnvo Vth fyvi
^{zvi} org Znthg
vrⁿvo grvuvn Dzhhvi ^{||} tvsg, hm ziyvrgv
^{hmdvrg}
rxs svfgv vrⁿ dv^rntg, ~~wz~~ vh ori ~~vi~~
tvtyvⁿ rhg.

[174]^a *Believe that at any moment God can demand everything from you! Be truly aware of this! Then ask that he grant you the gift of life! For you can fall into madness at any time or become unhappy through & through if you don't do something that is demanded of you!*

It is one thing to talk to God & another to talk of God to others.

Sustain^b my intellect pure & unblemished!

I would like to be deep;—& yet I shy away from the abyss in the human heart!!—

I am writhing under the torment of not being able to work, of feeling feeble, not being able to live undisturbed by temptations. And when I now consider [175] what others—who really were somebodies—had to suffer, then what I live through is nothing in comparison.^c And yet I am writhing under a comparatively tiny pressure.

What I recognize^d is actually: how terribly unhappy a human being can become. The recognition of an abyss; & I want to say: God grant that this recognition does not become clearer.

And^e I really can't work now. My source has dried up & I don't know how to find it.

17.2.[37]

Again and again I find myself dwelling on base thoughts, yes on the basest thoughts. Hypocrisy of the most ridiculous sort & where it concerns what's highest.

Just as one treads with fear on thin ice across deep water, so I am working a little bit today, as far as it is granted to me.^f

^aWittgenstein continues in code: Glaube daran dass Gott von dir in jedem Moment alles fordern kann! Sei dir dessen wirklich bewusst! Dann bitte dass es dir das Geschenk des Lebens gibt! Denn Du kannst jederzeit in Wahnsinn verfallen oder ganz & gar unglücklich werden, wenn Du etwas nicht tust was von dir verlangt wird!

^bIn code: Erhalte mir meinen Verstand rein & unbefleckt!—

^cWittgenstein wrote “nothing in comparison to that” and struck the “to that.” Also, “—who really were somebodies (die wirklich etwas waren)—“ was inserted into the line.

^d“Meine Erkenntnis” could be translated “my discovery” or even “my knowledge.” “Recognition” and “recognize” is in keeping with other occurrences of “erkennen.”

^eIn code: Und ich kann wirklich jetzt nicht arbeiten. Der Quell ist mir versiegt & ich weiss ihn nicht zu finden. [17.2.] Immer wieder [undecided alternative: ertappe ich mich] finde ich mich auf gemeinen Gedanken, ja auf den gemeinsten Gedanken. Heuchelei der lächerlichsten Sorte & wo es das Höchste betrifft. Wie man auf dünnem Eis über einem tiefen Wasser mit Angst geht, so arbeite ich heute ein wenig, [undecided alternative: da] soweit es mir gegeben ist.

^f“find myself” is an undecided alternative to “catch myself.”—“as far as” is an undecided alternative to “since.”

[176–177]

Der furchtbare Augenblick
im unseligen Sterben muß doch
der Gedanke sein: “Oh hätte ich
doch nur ... Jetzt ist’s zu spät.”
Oh hätte ich doch nur richtig ge-
lebt! Und der seelige Augen-
blick muß sein: “Jetzt ist’s voll-
bracht!” – Aber wie muß man
gelebt haben, um sich das sagen
zu können! Ich denke, es muß
auch hier Grade geben. Zyvi rxs
hvyphg, dm yrn rxs? Drv dvrg emo
Tfgyv & drv (N|n)zs zo fngvin Vnwv!

V.

18.2.

Szyv timhhv Hvsnhfxsg nzxs Uiznxrh.
Ufixgv ufi rsn. Omtv rxs wzH Irxs-
grtv gfn.

Wenig fällt mir so schwer, wie
Bescheidenheit. Dies merke ich jetzt
wieder, da ich <in> Kierkegaard lese.
Nichts ist mir so schwer als mich
unterlegen zu fühlen; obwohl es sich

nur darum handelt die Wirklich-
keit zu sehen, so wie sie ist.

Dziv rxs ro Hgzvov ovrv Hxsiru
T.a.m.?

Es wäre mir viel lieber zu hören:
“Wenn Du das nicht tust, wirst
Du Dein Leben verspielen.”, als: “Wenn
Du das nicht tust, wirst Du bestraft”.
Das Erste heißt eigentlich: Wenn Du
das nicht tust, ist Dein Leben ein
Schein, es hat nicht Wahrheit & Tiefe.

19.2.

Heute nacht gegen morgen fiel mir
ein, daß ich heute den alten Sweater
herschicken sollte, den ich mir
schon lange vorgenommen hatte, zu
verschenken. Dabei aber kam mir
auch, gleichsam als Befehl, der Gedan-
ke, ich solle ^{zugleich} auch den neuen her-
schenken den ich mir – übrigens ohne
eigentliches ~~großes~~ Bedürfnis – neulich in Bergen
gekauft habe (er gefällt mir sehr).
Ich war nun über diesen ‘Befehl’@

[176]

The horrible instant in an unblessed death must be the thought: “Oh if only I had . . . Now it’s too late.” Oh if only I had lived right! And the blessed instant must be: “Now it is accomplished!”^a—But how must one have lived in order to tell oneself this! I think there must be degrees here, too. *But^b I myself, where am I? How far from the good & how close to the lower end!*

E.^c

18.2.[37]

Have^d great longing for Francis.^e Fear for him. Would that I do what is right.

Few things are as difficult for me as modesty. Now I am noticing this again as I read in Kierkegaard. Nothing is as difficult for me as to feel inferior; even though it is [177] only a matter of seeing reality as it is.

Would^f I be able to sacrifice my writing for God?

I would much rather hear “If you don’t do that, you will gamble away your life,” than: “If you don’t do that, you will be punished.” The former really means: If you don’t do that, your life will be an illusion, it does not have truth & depth.

19.2.[37]

Last night toward morning it occurred to me that today I should give away the old sweater^g which I had long intended to give away. But then, as it were like an order, the thought also came to me that I should at the same time^h also give away the new one which I recently bought in Bergen—incidentally without realⁱ need (I like it a lot). On account of the ‘order’ I was now [178] simultaneously in a sort of shock & outrage as so often during the

^aIn Luther’s translation “Es ist vollbracht” were Christ’s last words on the cross. Wittgenstein wrote “Jetzt ist’s vollbracht!” See John 19:30: “It is accomplished!”

^bIn code: Aber ich selbst, wo bin ich? Wie weit vom Guten & wie nah am untern Ende!

^cWittgenstein wrote “V.” Ilse Somavilla conjectures that this letter might be in code and thus represents “E.”—perhaps short for an ironically fitting “The End.” It might also represent a roman numeral, indicate an intended insertion or continuation, etc.

^dIn code: Habe grosse Sehnsucht nach Francis. Fürchte für ihn. Möge ich das Richtige tun.

^eWittgenstein is referring to Francis Skinner.

^fIn code: Wäre ich im Stande meine Schrift G.z.o.?—Ilse Somavilla conjectures that “G.z.o.” stands for “Gott zu opfern.” “Schrift” or “Schriften (writings)” was cut off at the margin after “Schrif.”

^gWittgenstein uses the English word, as in “der Sweater.”

^h“at the same time” was inserted into the line.

ⁱ“real (eigentliches)” replaces “great (großes).”

[178–179]

sogleich in einer Art Bestürzung & Empörung, wie so oft in diesen letzten 10 Tagen. Es ist aber nicht, daß ich so sehr an diesem Sweater hänge (obwohl das irgendwie mitspielt), sondern was mich 'empört' ist, daß so etwas, & also alles von mir verlangt werden kann; & zwar verlangt, – nicht, daß es als gut oder erstrebenswert empfohlen wird. Die Idee, daß ich verloren sein kann, wenn ich es nicht tue. – Nun könnte man einfach sagen: "Nun, gib ihn nicht her! was weiter?" – Aber wenn ich nun dadurch unglücklich werde? Was heißt denn aber die Empörung? Ist sie nicht eine Empörung gegen Tatsachen? – Du sagst: "Es kann sein, daß von mir das furchtbar Schwerste verlangt wird." Was heißt das? Es heißt ^{doch} !: Es kann sein, daß ich morgen fühle, daß ich meine

Manuskripte (z.B.) verbrennen muß; d.h., daß, wenn ich sie nicht verbrenne, mein Leben (dadurch) zu einer Flucht wird. Daß ich damit von dem Guten, von der Quelle des Lebens abgeschnitten bin. Und mich eventuell durch allerlei Possen über die Erkenntnis betäube, daß ich ^{es} ~~verdammte~~ bin. Und wenn ich sterbe, dann ^{würde} ~~werden~~ diese Selbstbeschwindelung ein Ende nehmen.

Es ist nun ferners das wahr, daß ich nicht durch Überlegungen etwas zu etwas Rechtem machen kann, was mir in meinem Herzen als Possen erscheint. Keine Gründe der Welt könnten ^{z.B.} ! beweisen, daß meine Arbeit wichtig & etwas ist, was ich tun darf & soll, wenn mein Herz – ohne einen Grund – sagt, ich habe sie zu lassen. Man könnte sagen: "Was Possen sind, entscheidet der liebe Gott." Aber ich will diesen

last 10 days. But it is not that I am so attached to that sweater (though this plays some part, too) but what makes me ‘outraged’ is that something like this, & therefore everything can be demanded from me, & specifically demanded,—not just recommended as good or worthwhile. The idea that I might be lost if I don’t do it.—Now one could simply say: “So don’t give it away! what then?”—But what if this goes on to make me unhappy? But what does the outrage mean after all? Isn’t it a rage against facts?—You say: “It can be that what is most horrible and difficult is demanded of me.” What does that mean? It means, after all:^a It can be that tomorrow I feel I must burn my [179] manuscripts (for example); that is, that if I don’t burn them my life will (through that) turn into fleeing.^b And that through this I am cut off from the good, from the source of life. And perhaps through all sorts of antics dull myself to the recognition that it is so.^c And when I die this self-deception would^d come to an end.

Now furthermore this is true that I cannot through reflections make something right that appears as antics in my heart. No reasons of this world could prove, for example,^e that my work is important & something that I may & should do, when my heart says—without any reason—that I have to stop it. One could say: “The dear Lord decides what antics are.” But I don’t want to use this [180] expression now. Rather: I cannot & shall

^a“after all (doch)” was inserted into the line. Wittgenstein frequently uses “ja” and “doch” for emphasis. Instead of “It means, after all” one could translate “But it means” or—perhaps most faithfully—“It means, doesn’t it.” It is unclear whether he inserts these words to more accurately express his thought or for the stylistic reason of improving the flow of his text.

^b“zu einer Flucht wird” could be translated “becomes a flight” or “becomes a running away.” While “escape” connotes a flight from confinement, the following pages elucidate what Wittgenstein means here by “fleeing.”

^cWittgenstein first wrote “daß ich verdammt bin (that I am damned),” struck “verdammt,” and replaced it by “es.” This yielded, literally, “that I am so (that is, cut off from the source of life).”

^d“would” replaces “will.”

^e“for example” was inserted into the line.

[180–181]

Ausdruck jetzt nicht gebrauchen.

Vielmehr: Ich kann mich, & soll mich, durch keine Gründe überzeugen, daß die Arbeit, z.B., etwas Rechtes ist. (Die Gründe die Menschen mir ^{sagen} angeben würden, – Nutzen, etc – ^{||} sind lächerlich). – Heißt das nun, oder heißt es nicht, daß meine Arbeit & Alles, was ich sonst genieße, ein Geschenk ist? D.h., daß ich ~~mir~~ nicht darauf ruhen kann, als auf etwas Festem, auch abgesehen davon, daß es mir durch Unfall, Krankheit, etc. genommen werden kann. Oder vielleicht richtiger: Wenn ich nun darauf geruht habe & es für mich etwas Festes war, & es nun nicht mehr fest für mich ist, ^{da} ^{||} ich eine Abhängigkeit fühle, die ich früher nicht gefühlt habe, (ich sage nicht einmal: ich erkannte jetzt eine Abhängigkeit, die ich früher nicht erkannt hatte), so

habe ich das als Tatsache hinzunehmen. Das was mir fest war, scheint jetzt zu schwimmen & untergehen zu können. Wenn ich sage, ich muß es als Tatsache hinnehmen, so meine ich eigentlich: ich muß mich damit auseinandersetzen. Ich soll nicht darauf mit Entsetzen stieren, sondern glücklich sein dennoch. Und was heißt das für mich? – Man könnte ja sagen: “Nimm eine Medizin, damit diese Idee dieser Abhängigkeit vergeht (oder such nach so einer).” Und ich könnte mir natürlich denken, daß sie vorübergehen wird. (Auch etwa durch einen Wechsel der Umgebung.) Und wenn man mir sagte, ich sei ^{ist} jetzt krank, so wäre das vielleicht auch wahr. Aber was sagt das? – Das heißt doch: “Flieh diesen Zustand!” Und angenommen, er hörte jetzt sogleich auf, mein Herz hört auf in den Abgrund zu sehen, @ es kann seine Aufmerk-

not convince myself through any reasons, that my work, for example, is something right. (The reasons people would tell me,^a—utility, etc.—^b are ridiculous).—Now does this mean, or doesn't it, that my work & everything else I enjoy is a gift? That is, that I can't rest on it as something firm, even regardless of the fact that it could be taken from me through an accident, sickness etc. Or more accurately perhaps: Now, if I have been relying on it & it was something firm for me & it is now no longer firm for me, since^c I feel a dependency which I hadn't recognized before (I am not even saying that I am now recognizing a dependency which I hadn't recognized before), then [181] I have to accept that as fact. That which was firm for me seems adrift now & capable of going under. When I say I have to accept that as fact, I really mean: I must confront myself with it. I shall not gape at it in shock but be happy in spite of it. And what does that signify^d for me?—One could say, after all: "Take some medicine (or search for some) so that the idea of this dependency goes away." And I could imagine, of course, that it will go away. Also for example through a change of surroundings.^e And if one told me that I was sick now, this is^f perhaps also true. But what does it say?—This means, after all: "Flee from this condition!" And assume it ceased right now and my heart ceases to look into the abyss, able to direct its atten[182]tion to the world again,—but this doesn't answer the question what I

^a"tell me (mir sagen)" is an undecided alternative to "offer me (mir angeben)."

^b"—utility, etc.—" was inserted into the line.

^c"since" was inserted into the line.

^d"signify (bedeutet)" is an undecided alternative to "mean (heißt)."

^eWittgenstein placed this sentence in parentheses and later struck those.

^f"is perhaps (ist vielleicht)" is an undecided alternative to "were perhaps" or "might be (wäre)."

[182–183]

samkeit wieder auf die Welt richten, – aber damit ist ja die Frage nicht beantwortet, was ich tun soll, wenn mir das nicht geschieht (denn dadurch, daß ich es wünsche geschieht es nicht). Ich könnte also frei-lich nach einem Mittel gegen diesen Zustand suchen, aber solange ich das tue, bin ich ja noch in dem Zustand₁, (weiß auch nicht, ob & wann er aufhören wird) & ^{soll} muß also das Rechte, meine Pflicht, tun, wie sie es in meinem gegenwärtigen Zustand ist. (Da ich ja nicht einmal weiß, ob es einen zukünftigen geben wird.) Ich kann also zwar hoffen, daß er sich ändern wird, muß mich aber in ihm jetzt einrichten. Und wie tue ich das? Was habe ich zu tun damit er, so wie er ist, erträglich wird? Welche ^{Attitude} Stellung nehme ich zu ihm ein? Die der Empörung? Das ist der Tod! In der Empörung schlage

ich nur auf mich selbst los. Das ist ja klar!; wen soll ich denn damit schlagen? Ich muß mich also ergeben. Jeder Kampf dabei ist ein Kampf mit mir selbst; & je stärker ich schlage, desto stärker werde ich geschlagen. Ergeben müßte sich aber mein Herz, nicht ^{einfach} meine Hand. Hätte ich Glauben, d.h., würde ich unverzagt tun wozu die innere Stimme mich auffordert, so wäre dieses Leiden geendet.

Nrxsg wzh Qnrvn srpug yvro Yvgvn,
zyvi ozn qnrvg.

Nenn es alles Krankheit! Was hast Du damit gesagt? Nichts.

Nicht erklären! – Beschreiben!
Fngvidriu wvrn Svía & hvr nrxsg
ymhv, wzhh wf hm pvrwvn
ofhgh! Wzh rhg wvi lzg, wvn
rxs ori tvyvnmhpp. Dvnn wf
qiznq yrhg, wznn irxsgv wrxs rn
wrhvhi Qiznqsvrg vrn; hvr nrxsg

am supposed to do if that does not happen to me (for it doesn't happen through my wishing it). So I could of course look for a remedy for this condition, but as long as I do that I am still in the condition (also don't know if & when it will cease) & therefore am supposed to^a do the right thing, my duty, as it is in my present condition. (Since I don't even know whether there will be a future one.) While I can thus hope that it will change I have to accommodate myself to it now. And how do I do that? What must I do so that it becomes bearable as it is? What attitude^b do I assume towards it? That of outrage? That is the death of me!^c In rage I only beat [183] up on myself. But that is obvious! for, whom am I supposed to be beating with this? Therefore I must surrender. Any fight in this is only a fight against myself; & the harder I beat, the harder I get beaten. But it is my heart that would have to submit, not simply^d my hand. Were I a believer, that is, would I intrepidly do what my inner voice asks me to do, this suffering would be over.

What^e helps in praying is not the kneeling, but one kneels.

Call it a sickness! What have you said by that? Nothing.

Don't explain!—Describe!^f *Submit^g your heart & don't be angry that you must suffer so!^h This is the advice I should be giving myself. When you are sick, accommodate yourself to the sickness; don't be [184] angry that you are sick.*

^a“am supposed to (soll)” is an undecided alternative to “must (muß).”

^bWittgenstein introduced the word “Attitude” as an undecided alternative to “Stellung (position).” The German use of “Attitüde” borrows from the French and refers to a general posture and stance, not to a particular view or opinion.

^cLiterally: That is death!

^d“simply” was inserted into the line.

^eIn code: Nicht das Knien hilft beim Beten, aber man kniet.

^fSee remark 126 (also, 109 and 124) in the *Philosophical Investigations*: “Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains or deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.” [I.S.]—Various critics, most notably Joachim Schulte and Mark Rowe, relate Wittgenstein’s “Don’t explain!—Describe!” to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s morphological method. See Richard Raatzsch, ed., *Goethe and Wittgenstein: Seeing the World’s Unity in Its Variety in Wittgenstein-Studien*, Jahrbuch, forthcoming.

^gFrom here in code: Unterwirf dein Herz & sei nicht bös, dass es so leiden muss! Das ist der Rat, den ich mir geben soll. Wenn du krank bist, dann richte dich in dieser Krankheit ein; sei nicht [184] böse dass du krank bist.

^hThe phrase “Unterwirf dein Herz (submit your heart)” may originate from Tolstoy’s paraphrase of the first letter of John 3:19–21. See *Kurze Darlegung des Evangeliums*, trans. Paul Lauterbach (Leipzig: Reclam, 1892), p. 200: “When his heart struggles, he submits his heart to God. Because God is more important than the wishes of the heart. But when the heart doesn’t struggle, then he is blessed.” (“Wenn sein Herz kämpft, dann unterwirft er sein Herz Gott. Darum, daß Gott wichtiger ist, als die Wünsche des Herzens. Wenn aber sein Herz nicht kämpft, dann ist er selig.”) [I.S.]

[184–185]

ymh wzhh wf qiznq yrhg.

Das aber ist wahr, daß, sobald
ich auch nur aufatmen kann,
sich bei mir die Eitelkeit regt.

Pzhh orxs wrvhv tvhgvsvn:

~~ixsg~~ ufi orxs
Nzxs vrnvo || hxsdvivr Gzt qnrvgv

rxs svfgv yvro Zyvnrwhhvn & yvgvgv
& rn wrv Smsv yprxqvnw
vg & hztgv @ lpmgaprxs qnrvnw ||: “Vh

rhg nrvozn srvi.” Wzyvr dfiww ori

dmosp af Ofgv zph dziv rxs rn
vgdzh
vrnvo (d)D)rxsgrtvo zfutvqzpig dmiwvn.

Dzh vh zyvi vrtvngprxs yvwvf-
gvg, wzh dvrhh rxs || ^{nrpxs}nrxsg. Rxs ufs-

pv orxs pvrsgvi. Zyvi wzh svrhhg

nrxsg vgdz: rxs hvr ~~uf~~ uifsvi

rn vrnvo Rügfo tvdvhn. Denn

war es ein Irrtum, ^{was}~~wer~~ beschützt

mich davor, daß ich in ihn zurück-

falle?! Also kann hier von Irrtum

& einem Überwinden des Irrtums

nicht die Rede sein. Und nennt

man es Krankheit so kann wieder

von einem Überwinden nicht die Rede

sein; denn die Krankheit kann mich
ja jederzeit wieder überwinden. Wvnn
rxs hztgv az zfxs wrvhv Dmig
nrxsg zph rxs tvizvw dmpggv, hmn-
wvin vh qzo. Fnw drv vh qzo hm qznn
vgdzh znwvvh qmoovn. – “Pvyv hm,
wzhh wf tfg hgviyv qznnhg!”

20.2.

Du sollst so leben, daß Du
vor dem Wahnsinn bestehen kannst,
wenn er kommt. Fnw wvn Dzs-
hrnn hmpphg wf nrxsg uprvsvn.
Es ist ein Glück, wenn er nicht
da ist, aber ~~uprvsvn~~ fliehen sollst
Du ihn nicht, so glaube ich mir
sagen zu müssen. Denn er ist der
strengste Richter (das strengste
Gericht) darüber ob mein Leben recht
oder unrecht ist; er ist fürchterlich,
aber Du sollst ihn dennoch nicht
fliehen. Denn Du weißt ja doch nicht,
wie Du ihm entkommen kannst;
& während Du ^{vor ihm} || fliehst, benimmst Du

This, however, is true, that just as soon as I can barely breathe a sigh of relief, vanity stirs in me.

Let^a me confess this: After a difficult day for me^b I kneeled during dinner today & prayed & suddenly said, kneeling & looking up above: “There is no one here.” That made me feel at ease as if I had been enlightened in an important matter. But what it really means, I do not know yet. I feel relieved. But that does not mean, for example: I had previously been in error. For if it was an error, what^c protects me against falling back into it?! Thus there can be no talk of error here & the overcoming of this error. And if one calls it sickness once again there can be no talk of an overcoming, [185] for any time the sickness can overcome me again. For^d after all, I also didn’t say this word just when I wanted to, but it came. And just as it came something else can come, too.—“Live in such a manner that you can die well!”

20.2.[37]

You shall live so that you can hold your own in the face of madness when it comes. And^e you shall not flee madness. It is good fortune when it isn’t there, but flee^f it you shall not, or so I think I must tell myself. For madness is the most severe judge (the most severe court) of whether my life is right or wrong; it is horrible but nevertheless you shall not flee it. For you don’t know anyway how you can elude it, & while you are fleeing from it,^g you behave [186] disgracefully, after all.

^aIn code: Lass mich dies gestehen: Nach einem [inserted: für mich] schweren Tag kniete ich heute beim Abendessen & betete & sagte plötzlich kniend [inserted: & in die Höhe blickend]: “Es ist niemand hier.” Dabei wurde mir wohl zu Mute als wäre ich in etwas Wichtigem aufgeklärt worden. Was es aber eigentlich bedeutet, das weiss ich [inserted: noch] nicht. Aber das heisst nicht etwa: ich sei früher in einem Irrtum gewesen.

^bWittgenstein inserted “recht (rather)” and “für mich (for me)” into the line, then struck “recht.”

^c“what” replaces “who.”

^dIn code: Denn ich sagte ja auch dieses Wort nicht als ich gerade wollte, sondern es kam. Und wie es kam so kann etwas anderes kommen.—“Lebe so, dass du gut sterben kannst!”

^eIn code: Und den Wahnsinn sollst du nicht fliehen. Wittgenstein frequently wrote about madness and his fear of going mad. Compare these remarks from 1944 and 1946 (*Culture and Value*, pp. 44 and 54/50 and 62): “If in life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health of our intellect by madness.”—“Madness doesn’t have to be regarded as a sickness. Why not as a sudden—more or less sudden—change of character?” [I.S.]

^fWittgenstein wrote “flee (fliehen)” in code, struck this, wrote the word uncoded and underlined.

^g“from it” was inserted into the line.

[186–187]

Dich ja unwürdig.

Rxs pvhv ro N.G. & evihgvsv
 [e]E]rvpvh & Dvhvngprxsvh nrxsg,
 zyvi Ervpvh wmxs. Rxs ufspv orxs
 svfgv ^{eryp} dmspvi zph Tvhgvin. Omtv
 vh ypvryvn.

Man könnte mir sagen: “Du sollst Dich nicht so viel mit dem N. T. einlassen, es kann Dich noch verrückt machen.” – Aber warum ‘soll’ ich nicht, – es sei denn, daß ich selbst fühlte, ich soll nicht. Wenn ich glaube, in einem Raum das Wichtige, die Wahrheit, sehen zu können – oder sie finden zu können, dadurch, daß ich hineingehe, so kann ich doch fühlen, ich soll hineingehen, was immer mir drin geschieht & ich soll nicht aus Furcht es vermeiden, hineinzugehen. ☩ Wirnvn hrvsg vh ervppvrxsg hxszfirt zfh, fnw ozn @ omxsgv tpvrxs drvwi srnzfh-

pzfuvn; zyvi hmpp rxs nrxsg evihfxsvn
 hgznwszug af ypvryvn? Rxs omxsg
 rn hm vrnvo Uzpp, wzhh ori rvoznw
 zfu wrv Hxsfpgvi qpmlug & ori hztg:
 “Ufixsgv wrxs nrxsg! wvnn wzh
 rhg ivxsg.”

Rxs wznqv Tmgg, wzhh rxs
 rn wrv Vrnhoqvrq nzxs Nmidvtvn
 tvqmoovn yrn!

Wie kommt es, daß die Psalmen (die Bußpsalmen), die ich heute gelesen habe eine Speise für mich sind & das N. T. eigentlich bis jetzt noch keine Speise? Ist es bloß zu ernst für mich?

Der Unschuldige muß anders sprechen, als der Schuldige, & andere Anforderungen stellen. Bei David kann nicht stehen: “Seid vollkommen”, es heißt nicht, daß man sein Leben zum O

fer bringen soll & es wird nicht eine ewige Seeligkeit versprochen. Und das Annehmen dieser Lehre – so scheint es mir – erfordert, daß man sagt:

I^a am reading in the N.T.^b & don't understand many & essential things but much I do understand, after all. I feel much better today than yesterday. Would that it stay.

One could tell me: “You shouldn't get so involved with the N.T., it may yet drive you crazy.” — But why ‘shouldn't’ I, — unless I felt myself that I should not. When I believe that through stepping into a room I can see — or find — what's important, what's true, then I can feel, after all, I should step in, no matter what happens to me inside & I shall not avoid stepping in out of fear. *Perhaps^c it looks ghastly inside, and one wants to immediately run out [187] again; but should I not try to remain steadfast? In such a case I want someone to pat me on the shoulder & say to me: “Fear not! for this is right.”*

I thank God that I have come to Norway into the loneliness!

How is it that the psalms I read today (the penitential psalms)^d are nourishment for me & the N.T. up to now really not? Is it only too serious for me?

The one who is innocent must speak differently & must make different demands than the one who is guilty. It can't say in David:^e “Be perfect”; it doesn't say that one should sacrifice one's life, & there is no promise of eternal bliss. And the acceptance of this teaching requires — so it seems to me — that one says: [188] “This life with all sorts of pleasure

^aIn code: Ich lese im N.T. & verstehe Vieles & Wesentliches nicht, aber Vieles doch. Ich fühle mich heute [inserted in line: viel] wohler als Gestern. Möge es bleiben.

^bWittgenstein writes “N.T.” for “New Testament.”

^cIn code: Drinnen sieht es vielleicht schaurig aus, und man möchte gleich wieder hinaus[187]laufen; aber soll ich nicht versuchen, standhaft zu bleiben? Ich möchte in so einem Fall, dass mir jemand auf die Schulter klopfte & mir sagt: “Fürchte dich nicht! denn das ist recht.” Ich danke Gott, dass ich in Einsamkeit nach Norwegen gekommen bin!

^dThe psalms are a collection of songs, prayers for different occasions, poems of wisdom which owe their origin to various authors, occasions, and times in Israelite history. There are seven penitential psalms (five of them attributed to David) among the 150 which have been divided into five books. Perhaps, Wittgenstein was referring to Luther's 1517 edition of “The Seven Penitential Psalms.” [I.S.]

^eLiterally: In David could not be written (Bei David kann nicht stehen). Most of the psalms in the book of Psalms are attributed to David.

[188–189]

“Dieses Leben mit allerlei Lust & Schmerz ist doch nichts! Dazu kann es doch nicht da sein! Es muß doch etwas viel Absoluteres sein. Es muß zum Absoluten streben. Und das einzig Absolute ist, wie ein kämpfender, ^{ein} stürmender, Soldat ~~auf den Tod los~~ das Leben ~~zu~~ durch~~zu~~fechten auf den Tod los. Alles Andere ist Zaudern, Feigheit, Bequemlichkeit ^{also} [!] Erbärmlichkeit.” Das ist natürlich nicht Christentum, denn hier ist ^{z.B.} [!] von von ewigem Leben & ewiger Strafe keine Rede. Aber ich verstünde auch, wenn (e)iner sagte: Das Glück in einem ewigen Verstande ist nur so zu erreichen; & kann nicht erreicht werden, dadurch daß man sich hier bei allerlei kleinem Glück aufhält. Aber hier ist noch immer nicht von einer ewigen Verdammnis die Rede.

Dieses Streben nach dem Absoluten, welches alles irdische Glück zu

kleinlich erscheinen läßt, den Blick hinaufwendet & nicht eben, auf die Dinge, sieht, erscheint mir als etwas Herrliches, Erhabenes, aber ich selbst richte meinen Blick auf die irdischen Dinge; es sei denn, daß mich “Gott heimsucht” & ~~ich~~ der Zustand über mich kommt, in dem das nicht möglich ist. Ich glaube: Ich soll das & das tun, & das & das nicht tun; & das kann ich in jener matteren Beleuchtung von oben tun; das ist nicht jener Zustand. Warum soll ich heute meine Schriften verbrennen?! Ich denke nicht dran! – Aber ich denke schon dran, wenn die Finsternis auf mich herabgestiegen ist & droht auf mir zu bleiben. Es ist dann als hätte ich meine Hand auf einem Gegenstand ^{er} ~~einer Herdplatte~~ & ~~sie~~ würde heiß & ich hätte die Wahl zwischen Fahrenlassen & Verbrennen. In dieser Lage will man die Worte der Bußsalmen gebrauchen.

& pain is nothing, after all! It can't be there for these! It must be something far more absolute, after all. It must strive toward the absolute. And the only absolute is, to battle through life toward death,^a like a fighting, a^b charging soldier. Everything else is wavering, cowardice, sloth, thus^c wretchedness." This is no Christianity, of course, since, for example,^d there is no mention of eternal life here & eternal punishment. But I would also understand if someone said: Happiness understood as eternal can be achieved only like this & cannot be achieved by dwelling here among all sorts of small happinesses. But there is still no mention yet of eternal damnation.

This striving for the absolute which makes all worldly happiness appear too [189] petty, which turns our gaze upward & not level, toward the things, appears as something glorious, sublime to me; but I myself turn my gaze toward the wordly things; unless "God visits me" & that^e state comes over me in which this becomes impossible. I believe: I should do this & that, & not do this & that; & all of this I can do in such a rather dim illumination from above; this is not that state. Why should I burn my writings today?! No way!^f— But I do think of it when the darkness^g has descended upon me & threatens to remain there. Then it is as if I had my hand on an object^h & the object was getting hot & I had the choice between letting go & burning up. In this situation one wants to use the words of the penitential psalms.

^aBefore Wittgenstein wrote of battling "through life" he started writing "toward death," struck this and only then wrote "to battle through life toward death."

^bThis second "a" was inserted into the line.

^c"thus" was inserted into the line.

^d"for example" was inserted into the line.

^eWittgenstein began the clause "& I," struck "I" and continued with "that state. . ."

^fWittgenstein here uses a colloquial expression: "Ich denke nicht dran (No thought of it)!"

^gAfter writing "darkness (Finsternis)" Wittgenstein used wavy underlining to indicate his uncertainty about the term and later struck the wavy underlining.

^h"an object & it [the object]" replaces "a hotplate & it [the hand]."

[190–191]

(Den eigentlichen Christenglauben – nicht den Glauben – verstehe ich noch gar nicht.)

~~Pzhh orxs rz nrsg emi rrvvo~~

~~'Dzshhnn' uprvvn!~~ zyvi rsn

hfxsvn ^{wzh} dziv Evidvtvsvrg.

Denk, jemand in einem

furchtbaren Schmerz, wenn etwa etwas Bestimmtes in seinem Körper vorgeht ~~seine Hand verbrannt wird~~, schrie

“Fort, fort!”, obwohl nichts ist, was

er fort wünscht, – könnte man@

nun sagen: “Diese Worte sind falsch angewendet”? So etwas würde man

doch nicht sagen. Ebenso wenig, wenn

er z.B. ~~eine~~ in diesem Zustand eine ‘abwehrende’ Geste macht, oder ^{aber} auf

die Knie fällt & die Hände faltet

könnte man das vernünftigerweise

als falsche Gebärden erklären. Er

tut eben das in so einer Lage. Hier

kann von ‘falsch’ nicht die Rede sein.

Welche ^{Anwendung} sollte richtig sein, wenn eine

notwendige falsch ist? Andererseits könn-

te man nicht sagen, es sei eine richtige Anwendung der Gebärde gewesen &

deshalb sei hier jemand gewesen, vor dem er gekniet hätte. Es sei denn

daß diese beiden Aussagen iden

@ identischen Sinn haben sollen, &

dann ist auch das “daher” falsch.

Wende das aufs Gebet an. Wer die

Hände ringen & flehen muß, wie man von dem sagen er sei könnte ~~man von der~~ im Irrtum,

~~sein~~ oder in einer Einbildung. 21.2.

Die Leiden des Geistes los werden, das heißt die Religion los werden.

~~H~~ Szhg Wf nrsg rn wvrvo

tznavn Pvyvn ritvndrv tvprggn,

& (nf nrsg zfu wrvhv Zig), & drphg

wf rvvag prvyvi afifxq af wrvhvn

Pvrwvn?!

Rxs yrn tfgofgrt zyvi rxs yrn

zfhvimiwvngprxs uvrvtv & wzifo

hxspvxsg. Rxs omxsgv Pvfgn svpvn,

dm vh qvrnv timhhviv Znhgivntfnt,

zyvi emi zppvo, keinen Ofg qmhgvg.

[190]

(The actual Christian faith—as opposed to faith—I don't understand at all yet.)^a
but to seek it out that would be recklessness.^b

Consider someone in horrible pain, say when something particular is happening in his body,^c yelling “Away, away!,” even though there is nothing that he wishes away,—could one say now: “These words are wrongly applied”?? One wouldn't say such a thing. Equally, if, for example, he makes a ‘defensive’ gesture or rather^d falls upon his knees & folds his hands, one couldn't reasonably declare these to be wrong gestures. This is just what he does in such a situation. There can be no talk of ‘wrong’ here. Which application^e would be right if a necessary one is wrong? On the other hand couldn't [191] one say, it was a right application of the gesture & thus there was someone here before whom he has knelt. Unless both of these statements are to have identical sense, & then the “thus” is wrong, too.^f Apply this to prayer. How could one say of him who must wring his hands & beseech, that he is mistaken or in an illusion.^g 21.2.[37]

To get rid of the torments of the mind, that is to get rid of religion.

Have^h you not been somehow tormented in your whole life (just not in this way) & would you rather return to those torments now?!

I am good-natured but an extraordinary coward & therefore bad. I want to help people

^aIn either or both instances, “Glauben” can also be translated “belief.” Perhaps, Wittgenstein aims to contrast faith and belief here, for example: “The actual Christian faith—as opposed to belief—I don't understand at all yet.”

^bIn code: aber ihn suchen [inserted: das] wäre Verwegenheit.—“that” was inserted into the line. This sentence was originally preceded by another coded remark which was struck: Lass mich ja nicht vor jenem ‘Wahnsinn’ fliehen! (Let me by no means flee that ‘madness’!)

^creplaces “say when his hand gets burnt.”

^d“rather (aber)” was inserted into the line.

^e“application” was inserted into the line.

^fThe second “thus” is not literally a quote of the preceding occurrence: Wittgenstein uses the synonymous terms “deshalb” and “daher.” In this passage, the word “falsch” was translated as “wrong” instead of “false” or “incorrect.”

^gWittgenstein made various changes before arriving at this sentence; it is difficult to reconstruct what he originally set out to write.

^hExcept for one word, the following was written in code: Hast du nicht in deinem ganzen Leben irgendwie gelitten (nur nicht auf diese Art, & willst du jetzt lieber zurück zu diesen Leiden?! Ich bin gutmütig aber ich bin ausserordentlich feige & darum schlecht. Ich möchte Leuten helfen, wo es keine grössere Anstrengung, aber vor allem, keinen Mut kostet.

[192–193]

Qmoov rxs hvpyhg wzyvr rn wrv

tvirnthgv Tvuzsi, hm hxsvfv rxs

afixq. Fnw fngvi Tvuzsi ovrnv rxs

a.Y. wrv vgdzh vmn wvi tfgvn Ovr-

nfnt wvi Ovnhxsvn af eviprivn.

Rxs qmngv wrv uvrnwprxsv Prnrv

roovi nfi hgfiovn, dvnn emn srn-

gvn zfu orxs tvhxmhhvn driw.

pvrwvn ofhh hm rhg vh wmxs yvhhi

Dvnn rxs Pvrw szyvn ofhh,

dziv wzh

hm rhg vh wmxs yvhhi hmpxsvh,

dzh zfh wvo Qzolu wvh Tfgvn

tvtn wzh Hxspvxsgv vnghgvsq,

wzh dzh

zph hmpxsvh, d wzh zfh wvo

Qzolu wvh Hxspvxsgvn org hrxs

hvpyhg driw.

Dzh rxs rvgag tpzfyv: Rxs

tpzfyv, wzhh rxs orxs nrxsg

mwwi rsivi Ovrnfnt

emi wvn Ovnhxsvn ^{ll} ufixsgvn hmppgv

dvnn rxs gfn drpp, dzh rxs ufi ivxsg

szpgv.

Rxs tpzfyv, wzhh rxs nrxsg

pftvn hmpp; wzhh rxs wvn Ovnhxsvn

tfg svrn hmpp; wzhh rxs orxs hvsvn

(^uulqwhX
Ymhn)

(wfixs wvn Qzolu wvh Tfgvn)

hmpp drv rxs triqprxs yrn; wzhh rxs

ovrnv Yvkfvoprxsqvrq oluvin hmpp, dvnn

^{vh} ^{ll} vgdzh [s]Simsvvh trppg; wzhh rxs ^{ll} uims-

prxs hvrn hmpp, dvnn vh ori tvtv-

yvn rhg, zyvi dvnn nrxsg, wzhh rxs

wznn org Twwfpw & Hgzwnwszugrtqvrq

wrv Gifyhvpqrtqvrq vigiztv; dzhh wi

Afhgznw dvpxsvi zppvh @ emn ori

umiwvig wfixs wzh Dmig “Qiznqsvrg”,

mwwi “Dzsnhrnn”, nrxsg vipvwrtg

rhg, w.s.: wzhh rxs rn wrvhvo Af-

hgznw vyvnhm evizngdmigprxs yrn,

drv zfhhvishzpy, wzhh vi af ovrnv

Pvyvn tvsmig drv rvwvi znwviv fnw

rso wrv ^{zphm} ^{ll} emppv Zfuoviqhzoqvrq tvyf(s)ig.

Vrnnv Tpzfyvn zn vrnv Vipmhfnt

wfixs wvn Gmw Xsirhgr szyv rxs nrxsg;

mwwi zyvi nmxs nrxsg. Rxs ufspv

zfxs nrxsg vgdz, wzhh rxs zfu wvo

Dvtv af hm vrnv Tpzfyvn hvr, zyvi

rxs ^{szpgv} ^{ll} ~~tpzfyv~~ wzhh vh omtprxs rhg, wzhh

rxs vrnoz p ~~rn-w~~@ srvi vgdzh evi-

hgvsvn dviwv, ~~dzh~~ dmemn rxs rvgag

where no great exertion but most of all where no courage is required. [192]^a If this gets me into the slightest danger, I shy away. And by danger I mean, for example, losing some of the high opinion people have of me.

The only way I could ever charge the enemy line is when I am shot at from behind.

If I must suffer it is better, after all, by way of a battle of the good against the bad in me, rather than by way of a battle within the evil.^b

What I believe now^c: I believe that I should not fear people and their opinions when I want to do what I consider right.

I believe that I should not lie; that I should be good to people; that I should see myself [193] as I really am; that I should sacrifice my comfort when something higher is at stake; that I should be cheerful in a good way when it is granted to me and when not, that I should then endure the gloom with patience & steadfastness; that the condition which demands everything from me is not taken care of by the words “sickness” or “madness,” that is: that in this condition I am just as responsible as out of it, that it belongs to my life like any other and that it thus deserves full attention. I don’t have a belief in a salvation through the death of Christ; or at least not yet. I also don’t feel that I am on the way to such a belief,

^aWittgenstein continues writing in code: Komme ich selbst dabei in die geringste Gefahr, so scheue ich zurück. Und unter Gefahr meine ich z.B. die etwas von der guten Meinung der Menschen zu verlieren. Ich könnte die feindliche Linie immer nur stürmen, wenn von hinten auf mich geschossen wird. Wenn ich leiden muss so ist es doch besser durch den Kampf des Guten mit dem Schlechten in mir, als durch den Kampf im Bösen. Was ich jetzt glaube: Ich glaube, dass ich mich nicht vor den Menschen [inserted: oder ihrer Meinung] fürchten sollte wenn ich tun will, was ich für recht halte. Ich glaube, dass ich nicht lügen soll; dass ich den Menschen gut sein soll; dass ich mich sehen [193] soll wie ich wirklich bin; dass ich meine Bequemlichkeit opfern soll, wenn es etwas Höheres gilt; dass ich [inserted: in guter Weise] fröhlich sein soll, wenn es mir gegeben ist, aber wenn nicht, dass ich dann mit Geduld & Standhaftigkeit die Trübseligkeit ertrage; dass der Zustand welcher alles von mir fordert durch das Wort “Krankheit,” oder “Wahnsinn” nicht erledigt ist, d.h.: dass ich in diesem Zustand ebenso verantwortlich bin, wie ausserhalb, dass er zu meinem Leben gehört wie jeder andere und ihm die also volle Aufmerksamkeit gebührt. Einen Glauben an die Erlösung durch den Tod Christi habe ich nicht; oder aber noch nicht. Ich fühle auch nicht etwa, dass ich auf dem Wege zu so einem Glauben sei, aber ich halte es für möglich [changed from: aber ich glaube dass es möglich ist], dass ich einmal hier etwas verstehen werde, wovon ich jetzt.

^bThis much revised passage first stated that it is better if his suffering is what results from a battle of the good against the bad rather than what results from a battle of the bad with itself.

^cIn his wartime diaries *Notebooks 1914–16* Wittgenstein compiled a similar list of his current beliefs, see [21,d], pp. 72f.; compare also pp. [90f.] above.

[194–195]

nrxsgh evihgvsv, dzh ori rvgag nrxsgh
 hztg, & wzhh rxs wznn vrvn Tpzf-
 yvn @ szyvn dviwv, wvn rxs rvgag
 nrxsg szyv. – Rxs tpzfyv, wzhh
 rxs nrxsg zyvitpzfyhrxs hvrn wzii,
 w.s., wzhh rxs nrxsg ufi orxs org
 Dmignv, wrv rxs ^{vgdz}|| pvhv, Oztrv givryvn
 hmpp, w.s., orxs nrxsg rn vrvn Zig
 Tpzfyvn, vrvn Zig Fnevinfnug srnvrn-
 ivwvn hmpp & wzii. Rxs hmpp ovrnv
 Evinfnug nrxsg evifnivrntvn. (Wvi
 Dzsahrnn zyvi evifnivrntg wrv
 Evinfnug nrxsg.) Dvnn vi zfxs nrxsg
 rsi Dzxsghi rhg)

Rxs tpzfyv, wzhh wvi Ovnhxs
 hvrn Lvyvn rn zppvn hvrnvn Sznwvfnv
~~hxs~~ tzna || emv Vrvtyvfnv
 pvravn pzhhv n qznn, fnw rxs
 ofhh rvgag tpzfyvn, wzhh wrvh
 wz smxshgv Pvyvn rhg. Rxs dvrhh,
 wzhh rxs hm pvyvn qmngv, dvnn
 rxs dmppgv, dvnn rxs wzaf wvn
 Ofg szggv. Rxs szyv rsn zyvi
 nrxsg fnw ofhh smuavn wzhh orxs

wzh nrxsg af Gmwv, wzh svrhhg vdrv,
 fnvpxqprxs ozxsvn driw.

Omtv wrv Gifyhvp, wzv Vpvnwvufsp,
 dzsivnw rxs wzv zppvh hxsivryv
 ritvnwdrv ivrntvn!

Rxs pvhv roovi drwvi rn wvn
 Yirvuvn wvh Zlmhgvv Lzfpfh & rxs
 pvhv nrxs tvn rn rsnvn. Fnw
 rxs dvrhh nrxsg, my wvi Drwvihgznv
 & Diwvidrppv
 || wvn rxs wz volurnwv, nrxsg, afo Gvrv
 dvrnthgvnh, emn wvi Hlizxsv svi-
 ifsig, nzoprxs emo Wvfhgxsvn, Tvi-
 oznrhxsvn, zphm emn wvi Fyvihvafnt.
 Rxs dvrhh vh zyvi nrxsg. Vh rhg ori,
 zph dziv vh nrxsg ypmhh wrv Pvsiv,
 wrv orxs wfxs rsiv Hxsvdiv, ||, dfixs
 rsivn Vinhg, zyghmhg, hmnwvin zfxs
 (ritvnwdrv) wrv Lvihmnrpxsqvrg wvh
 Pvsivnwvn.
 Emigiztvnwvn. Vh hxsvrng ori, zph
 dziv ori, zfhvi zppvo rvnvo, ritvnw
 vgdzh uivow, & wzwfixs zyghmhvvnw,
 rn wvi Pvsiv. Dvnn vi, a.Y., hzgt “Wzh
 hvr uvin!”, hm rhg ori vgdzh fnzn-

but I consider it possible that one day I will understand something here of which I [194]^a understand nothing now, which means nothing to me now & that I will then have a belief that I don't have now.—I believe that I should^b not be superstitious, that is, that I should not perform magic on myself with words I may be reading, that is, that I should & must not talk myself into a sort of faith, a sort of unreason. I shall not sully reason. (But madness does not sully reason.^c Even if it is not its guardian.)

I believe that human beings can let their lives be guided by inspirations entirely in all their actions and I must now believe that this is the highest life. I know that I could live like that if I wanted to, if I had the courage for it. But I don't have it and must hope that this [195] won't make me unhappy unto death, that is, eternally.

May gloom, the feeling of misery, somehow cleanse while I am writing all this!

I read again and again in the letters of the apostle Paul & I don't like reading in them. And I don't know whether the resistance & revulsion I feel stem at least in part from the language, namely from the German, Germanic, thus from the translation. But I don't know it. It appears to me as if it were not merely the teaching which repulses me through its gravity, greatness, through its seriousness, but (somehow) also the personality of the one who teaches^d it. It seems to me as if, aside from all that, there was something alien & thereby repulsive to me in the teaching. When, for example, he says "Far from it!" I find something

^aIn code: nichts verstehe, was mir jetzt nichts sagt, & dass ich dann einen Glauben haben werde, den ich jetzt nicht habe.—Ich glaube, dass ich nicht abergläubisch sein soll, d.h., dass ich nicht für mich in Worten, die ich etwa lese, Magie treiben soll, d.h., mich nicht in eine Art Glauben, eine Art Unvernunft hineinreden soll & darf. Ich soll meine Vernunft nicht verunreinigen. (Der Wahnsinn aber verunreinigt die Vernunft nicht. Auch wenn er nicht ihr Wärter ist) Ich glaube, dass der Mensch sein Leben ganz [inserted: in allen seinen Handlungen] von Eingebungen leiten lassen kann, und ich muss jetzt glauben, dass dies das höchste Leben ist. Ich weiss, dass ich so leben könnte, wenn ich wollte, wenn ich dazu den Mut hätte. Ich habe ihn aber nicht und muss hoffen dass mich [195] das nicht zu Tode, das heisst ewig, unglücklich machen wird. Möge die Trübsal, das Elendgefühl, während ich das alles schreibe irgendwie reinigen! Ich lese immer wieder in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus & und ich lese nicht gern in ihnen. Und ich weiss nicht, ob der Widerstand & Widerwille den ich da empfinde, nicht zum Teil wenigstens, von der Sprache herrührt, nämlich vom Deutschen, Germanischen, also von der Übersetzung. Ich weiss es aber nicht. Es ist mir, als wäre es nicht bloss die Lehre, die mich durch ihre Schwere, [inserted: Grösse], durch ihren Ernst abstösst, sondern auch (irgendwie) die Persönlichkeit des Lehrenden. Es scheint mir, als wäre mir, ausser allem jenem, irgend etwas fremd, & dadurch abstossend in der Lehre. Wenn er z.B. sagt "Das sei ferne!" so ist mir etwas unan

^b"should" is an undecided alternative to "must."

^cWittgenstein speaks of "unreason," then "my reason," and finally "reason (die Vernunft)."

^dUndecided alternative to "the one who presents it (des Vortragenden)." Compare two remarks on Paul in *Culture and Value* (pp. 30 and 32/35 and 37; October and November 1937). [I.S.]

[196–197]

tvnvsfo zn wvi ypmhhvn Zig wvh Izr-
hmnvovngh. Zyvi vh rhg omtprxs
wzhh ~~wzh~~ wrvh hrxs tzna zyhgmh-
ovsi vmo
hvn dfiwv, dvnn rxs ~~wvn~~ Tv rhg
wvh Yirvuvh vitiruuvn dfiwv. Rxs
szpgv vh zyvi ufi omtprxs, wzhh
wrv nrxsg fndrxsgrt rhg.

Ich hoffe wzhh wrv rvgartv Gizf-
irtqvrq & Kfzp wrv Vrgvppqvrg rn ori
eviyivnnvn omxsqvn. Zyvi driw hrv
nrxsq hvsi yzpw drwvviqmoovn dvnn
wrv Kfzp zfusmig? Fnw hmpp wrv wzifo
nrv zfusmivn?? Wzh omtv Tmqq evisfgvn.

In ovrnvi Hvvpv rhg (rvgag) Drngvi,
drv irnth fo orxs svi. Vh rhg zppvh
evihxsnvrg, vh tifng & ypfsg nrxsgh.
Rxs hmppgv zp hm tvwfpwrt dzigvn,
my vh ori yvhxsrwvvn rhg, vrvn
Uifsprnt af hvsvn.

22.2.

Szyv Ofg & Tvwpw zfxs afo Gmw, wznn
driw vri ervppvrxsg wzh Pvyyv tv-
hxsvnqg! Omxsgv wmxs wvi Hxsnv

fo orxs yvtrnnvn drwvvi Hxsmnsvrg
af tvdrnnvn & nrxsq ypmhh Gizfirtqvrq
af szyvn!

Ich träumte heute morgen: Ich
stehe am Klavier (undeutlich gesehen)
& ~~les~~ sehe auf einen Text eines
Schubert-Liedes. Ich weiß, daß er im
Ganzen sehr dumm ist, bis auf eine
schöne Stelle am Ende, die heißt:

~~“Betriffst Du~~ “Yvgirgghg Wf drhhvwn
ovrnv Emitvyrity,
Dziw Wrih rn vrvvo Zftvnyprxqv
qpzi,”

{Dann weiß ich nicht, was kommt &
es schließt:

Wenn
“Will ich vielleicht schon in der Grube
modre.“

Gemeint ist: Wenn Du in Deinen
(philosophischen) Gedanken an die
Stelle kommst, wo ich war, dann
fühle für
(soll es heißen) hab Achtung vor
mein Denken, wenn ich vielleicht etc..

Tmqq hvr vh tvwznqg, wzhh rxs orxs

un[196]^a pleasant in the mere manner of the *raisonnement*.^b But isn't it possible that this would shed itself entirely if I were gripped more by the spirit of the letter. But I consider it possible that this is not unimportant.

I hope that the present sadness & agony will consume the vanity in me. But won't it come back very soon when the agony ends? And shall it therefore never end?? May God prevent this.

In my soul there is winter (now) like all around me. Everything is snowed in, nothing turns green & blossoms. But I should therefore patiently await whether I am destined to see a spring.

22.2.

Have courage & patience even toward death, then perhaps you will be granted life! If only the snow [197] around me would begin to regain beauty & not just have sadness!

I dreamt this morning: I am standing at the piano (indistinctly seen) & look upon a text of a Schubert song. I know that on the whole it is very stupid, except for one beautiful passage at the end which goes:

“Entering^c knowingly
my foothills,
To you it became in an instant
clear,”

Then I don't know what comes & it closes:

“When perhaps already in the pit I
am rotting away.”

What this means: When in your (philosophical) thoughts you come to the place where I was, then (it is supposed to mean) feel respect for my thinking when perhaps already etc.

^aIn code: genehm an der blossen Art des *Raisonnements*. Aber es ist möglich dass dies sich ganz abstossen würde, wenn ich mehr vom Geist des Briefes ergriffen würde. Ich halte es aber für möglich, dass die nicht unwichtig ist. *Ich hoffe* dass die jetzige Traurigkeit & Qual die Eitelkeit in mir verbrennen möchten. Aber wird sie nicht sehr bald wiederkommen wenn die Qual aufhört? Und soll die darum nie aufhören?? Das möge Gott verhüten. In meiner Seele ist (jetzt!) Winter, wie rings um mich her. Es ist alles verschneit, es grünt & blüht nichts. Ich sollte also geduldig warten, ob es mir beschieden ist, einen Frühling zu sehen. [22.2.] Habe Mut & Geduld auch zum Tod, dann wird dir vielleicht das Leben geschenkt! Möchte doch der Schnee [197] um mich beginnen wieder Schönheit zu gewinnen & nicht bloss Traurigkeit zu haben!

^bWittgenstein emphasizes his distance by employing the French word for “reasoning” here.—Luther uses “Das sei ferne” (“Far from it”) 24 times in his translation of the Bible, 13 times in the letters of Paul (for example, Romans 3:4, 6, and 31, 6:2 and 15, 7:7 and 13, 11:1 and 11).

^cIn code: Betrittst Du wissend meine Vorgebirge, Ward Dirs in einem Augenblicke klar.—There is no known source of this imagined Schubert song.

[198–199]

svfgv vgdzh ifsrvti & dmspvi ufspv.

Dvnn roovi zyvi rxs orxs dmspvi
ufspv, rhg ori wrv Vrgvpqvrq hvsi
nzsv.

Rxs hztv ori ivgag mug, rn
advruvpszugvn ~~Om~~ Avrgvn: “Vh rhg
nrvoznw srvi.” fnw hxszfv fo orxs.
Omtv ~~orxs~~ zyvi wzh ^{rn ori} nrxsgh [t|T]vovrnvh
dviwvn!

Rxs tpzfyv rxs hmpp ori hztvn:
“Hvr nrxsq qnvxsgrhxs rn wvrnvi
Ivprtimn!” Mwvi, evihfxsv, vh nrxsq
af hvrn! Wvnn wzh rhg rn wvi
Irxsgfnt afo Zyvitpzfyvn.

Wvi Ovnhxs pvyg hvrn tv-
^{org wvo}
dmsnprxsvh Pvyvn yvro Hxsvrnv
vrnvh Prxsgh wvhvhn vi hrxs
nrxsq yvdfhgh driw, zph yrh vh
zfhpmhxsg. Pmhxsg vh zfh hm
rhg wzh Pvyvn lpmgaprxs zppvh
Dvigvh, Hrnrvh, mwvi drv ozn hztvn
drpp, yvizfyg. Ozn driw lpmgaprxs
rnnv, wzhh wrv ypmhhv Vcrhgvna –

drv ozn hztvn omxsgv – zn hrxs nmxs
tzna pvvi, mwv rhg. Vh rhg drv dvnn
wvi Tpzna omn zppvn Wrntvn dvttv-
drhxsg dziv, zppvh rhg gmg. Wzh ~~tv-~~
~~hxsrvsg a.Y. oznxsozp nzsxsrnvi Qiznq-~~
~~svrg – rhg zyvi wzifo nrgfiprxs nrxsq~~
~~findriqprxsvi mwvi findrxsgrtvi, w.s.~~
~~nrxsq org vrnvo Zxshvpafixgn af vi-~~
~~pvwrtvn. Ozn rhg wznn lvyvnrwt~~
~~tvhgmivn. Mwvi ervpovsi: wzh~~
~~rhg wvi vrtvngprxsv Gmw, wvn ozn~~
~~[U|u]fixsgyn qznn, wvnn wzh ypmhhv~~
~~‘Vnvw vvh Pvyvnh’ vipvyg ozn rz~~
~~nrxsq (drv rxs tzna irxsgrt tv-~~
~~hxsirvyvn szyv), Zyvi dzh rxs srvi~~
~~rvgag tvhxsirvyvn szyv, rhg zfxs~~
~~nrxsq wrv emppv Dzsivrg.~~

Rn ovrvn wfoovn Twznqvn
evitvrxsv rxs orxs org wvn smxs-
hgvn Ovnhxsvn!

Wzh Ufixsgviprxsv dzh rxs yvhxsivr-
yvn dmppgv rhg vrtvngprxs, wzh ozn
‘zfu nrxsgh ovsi vrn Ivxsq szg’. ~~Org~~

Thank^a God that I [198] feel a bit quieter & better today. But whenever I feel better, I am very close to vanity.

Now I often tell myself in doubtful times: “There is no one here.” and look around. Would that this not become something base in me!

I think I should tell myself: “Don’t be servile in your religion!” Or try not to be! For that is in the direction of superstition.

A human being lives his ordinary life with the illumination of a light of which he is not aware until it is extinguished. Once it is extinguished, life is suddenly deprived of all value, meaning, or whatever one wants to say. One suddenly becomes aware that mere existence—[199] as one would like to say—is in itself still completely empty, bleak. It is as if the sheen was wiped away from all things,^b

In my stupid thoughts I compare myself to the highest human beings!

Really, the horrible that I wanted to describe is that one “doesn’t have a right to anything

^aIn code: Gott sei gedankt, dass ich mich heute etwas ruhiger & wohler fühle. Wenn immer aber ich mich wohler fühle, ist mir die Eitelkeit sehr nahe. Ich sage mir jetzt oft, in zweifelhaften Zeiten: “Es ist niemand hier.” und schaue um mich. Möge aber das [inserted: in mir] nichts Gemeines werden [wavy underlining of “in mir” and “werden” was struck]! Ich glaube ich soll mir sagen: “Sei nicht knechtisch in deiner Religion!” Oder, versuche, es nicht zu sein! Denn das ist in der Richtung zum Aberglauben. Der Mensch lebt sein gewöhnliches Leben mit dem [undecided alternative to: beim] Scheine eines Lichts dessen er sich nicht bewusst wird, als bis es auslöscht. Löscht es aus so ist das Leben plötzlich alles Wertes, Sinnes, oder wie man sagen will, beraubt. Man wird plötzlich inne, dass die blosse Existenz—[199] wie man sagen möchte—an sich noch ganz leer, öde ist. Es ist wie wenn der Glanz von allen Dingen weggewischt wäre, [crossed out: alles ist tot. Das geschieht z.B. manchmal nach einer Krankheit—ist aber darum natürlich nicht unwirklicher oder unwichtiger, d.h. nicht mit einem Achselzucken zu erledigen. Man ist dann lebendig gestorben. Oder vielmehr: das ist der eigentliche Tod, den man fürchten kann, denn das blosse ‘Ende des Lebens’ erlebt man ja nicht (wie ich ganz richtig geschrieben habe). Aber was ich hier jetzt geschrieben habe, ist auch nicht die volle Wahrheit.] In meinen dummen Gedanken vergleiche ich mich immer mit den höchsten Menschen! Das Fürchterliche was ich beschreiben wollte ist eigentlich, dass man “auf nichts mehr ein Recht hat.”

^bThe continuation was crossed out: *everything is dead. This sometimes happens after a sickness, for example—but of course it is not therefore less real or important, that is, not taken care of by a shrug. One has then died alive. Or rather: this is the real death that one can fear, for the mere ‘end of life’ one does not experience (as I have written quite correctly). But what I have written here isn’t the full truth either.—Wittgenstein is referring to *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.4311: “Death is not an event of life. Death is not experienced (erlebt).”*

[200–201]

~~nrxsg~~ ‘Wvi Hvtvn rhg org nrxsg.’ W.s.:
 @. ori emn
 Vh rhg lf zilpjh szggv rvoznw ~~zn~~ vvhvhn
 uivfnwprxsvs Afhsvn zyszntg
 Znviqvnfnft zppvh ~~prvtg~~, tvhztg: “Gf,
 dzh wf drpphg, zyvi ovrnv Afhgroofnt
 szhg wf nrxsg!” Dzifo svrhgh vh: “Wvi
 Svii afng”. – Vi qznn wrxs eviwviyv.
 Ozn qznn wzn hztvn ozn usziv
 afi
 rn wrv Smppv. Zyvi wzh rhg vrtv<n>gprxs
 driqprxs
 qvrn ‘Yrpw’, wvnn dvnn rxs rn
 vrvnv Zytifnw uszivn dfiww hm
 @ ofhgv wzh nrxsg ufixsgyzi hvrn.
 Vrn Zytifnw rhg rz nrxsg Hxsivxq-
 prxsvh; & dzh rhg wvnn wrv Smppv):
 wzhh ozn vgdzh org rsi evitprxsvn,
 rxs ovrnv
~~qmngv~~, wfixs wrvhv Yrpw viqpz-
 ivn qmngv? Ervpovsi ofhh ozn ~~wzh~~
 wrvhv Afhgznw “vrnv Zsnfnt emn
 wvi Smppv” nvnnvn – wvnn ozn
 omxsgv rn rso zfxs hztvn: Vh qznn
 nmxs ufixsgyzi dviwv<n> wvnn nmxs
 rhg nrxsg rvwv Smuunfnt tzna zfh-
 tvpmhxsg. Kann man sagen, dass
 man deshalb so leben muss, dass,

wenn man nicht mehr hoffen kann,
 man etwas hat, um sich daran
 zu erinnern?

Pvyv hm, wzhh wf @ emi rnvvo
 Afhgznw yvhgvsvn qznnhg: wvnn
zpp wvrn Drga, zpp wvrn Evihgznw
svpuv<n> wri wznn nrxsg. dviwv<n>
wri wznn nrxsg svpuv<n>. Wf yrhg
org rsnvn evipmivn, zph dvnn
 wf hrv tzi nrxsg szggvvhg. (Wf
 qmngvvhg yvnhmtfg wvrnv tfgvn
 Yvrnv yizfxsvn dmppvn, dvnn wf
 wfixs wrv Pfug uzpphg.) Wvrn
tznabh Pvyv<n> rhg (rz) fngvitzivn,
 zphm wf org zppvo dzh wf szhg.
 Wf sznthg arggvinw, org zppvo dzh
 wf szhg, fyvi wvo Zytifnw. Vh rhg
 ufixsgyzi, wzhh vh hm vgdzh tvyv<n>
 qznn ; Wrvhv Tvwnzqvn szyv rxs ervp-
 vprxsg, dvrg rxs srvi rvvag hm dv-
 nrt Prxsg hvsv; zyvi vh rhg srvi
 nfn hm dvnt Prxsg fnw rxs szyv
hrv. Dziv vh nrxsg qmorhxs rvozn-

anymore.” [200]^a “There is no blessing with anything.”^b That is, this seems to me as if someone on whose friendly regard^c everything depends said: “Do as you wish but you don’t have my consent!” Why does it say: “The Lord is wrathful.”—He can ruin you. Then one can say that one is descending to hell. But this is not really an ‘image,’ for if I really had to descend into an abyss this wouldn’t have to be frightful. An abyss is nothing terrible, after all & what is hell anyway: that one could compare something to it, that is, explain it through this image? One must rather call this condition “a presentiment of hell”—for in this condition one also wants to say: It can get more horrible still: for all hope is not yet completely extinguished. Can one say that one must therefore live in such a way that [201] when one can hope no longer, one has something to remember?

Live^d so that you can prevail in the face of that condition: for all your wit, all your intellect won’t do you any good then. You are lost with them as if you didn’t have them at all. (You might as well try to use your good legs while falling through the air.) Your whole life (after all) is undermined, and therefore you, with all you have. You hang trembling, with all you have, above the abyss. It is horrible that such a thing can be. Perhaps I have these thoughts because I now see so little light here; but there is so little light here now and I

^aContinuing in code: “Der Segen ist mit nichts.” D.h.: Es ist [inserted: mir] als hätte jemand von dessen freundlichem Zusehen [undecided alternative to: Anerkennung] alles abhängt, gesagt: “Tu, was du willst, aber meine Zustimmung hast du nicht!” Warum heisst es: “Der Herr zürmt.”—Er kann dich verderben. Man kann dann sagen man fahre zur [undecided alternative: in die] Hölle. Aber das ist eigentlich kein ‘Bild,’ denn wenn ich [inserted: wirklich] in einen Abgrund fahren würde so müsste das nicht furchtbar sein. Ein Abgrund ist ja nichts Schreckliches; & was ist denn die Hölle: dass man etwas mit ihr vergleichen [struck: könnte], ich meine, durch dieses Bild erklären könnte? Vielmehr muss man [struck: das] diesen Zustand “eine Ahnung von der Hölle nennen—denn man möchte in ihm auch sagen: Es kann noch furchtbarer werden: denn noch ist nicht jede Hoffnung ganz ausgelöscht.

^b“Mit nichts [with nothing]” was replaced by “Der Segen ist mit nichts.”—There is no biblical source for this quote but Psalm 109:17 (attributed to David) asks that the godless person be deprived of everything he had a right to: “As he delighted not in blessing, so let it be far from him!”

^c“friendly regard (literally: watching)” is an undecided alternative to “recognition.”

^dIn code: Lebe so, dass du vor jenem Zustand bestehen kannst: denn all dein Witz, all dein Verstand [struck: helfen dir dann nichts] werden dir dann nichts helfen. Du bist mit ihnen verloren, als wenn du sie gar nicht hättest. (Du könntest ebensogut deine guten Beine brauchen wollen, wenn du durch die Luft fällst.) Dein ganzes Leben ist (ja) untergraben, also du mit allem was du hast, über dem Abgrund. Es ist furchtbar, dass es so etwas geben kann. Diese Gedanken habe ich vielleicht, weil ich hier jetzt so wenig Licht sehe; aber es ist hier nun so wenig Licht und ich habe sie. Wäre es nicht komisch jeman—

[202–203]

wvo af hztn: Ozxs wri nrxsg h wifh,
 wf hgriyh rz rvgag nfi, dvrp wf
 vrntv Ornfgvn qvrnv Pflug qivthg.
 Org zppvo & Hgmpa, zppvi ^{wvrnvi} Vrnyrpfnt
zfu wzh & rrvnh, yrhg wf wznn
 evipmivn, hrv szpgvn wrxs nrxsg,
 wvnn hrv hrnw org fngvitzivn fnw
zppvh dzh wf szhg. Du sollst Dich
 aber vor driesem Zuhganw, obwohl
 er fürchterlich ist, nicht fürchten.
 Du sollst ihn nicht frivol ver-
 gessen & ihn doch nicht fürchten.
 Vi driw wvrnvo Pvyvn wznn Vinhg
 tvyvn & nrxsg Tizfvn. (Rxs tpzfyv
 hm.)

2[2|3].2.

Man kniet & schaut nach oben
 & faltet die Hände & spricht, &
 sagt man spricht mit Gott, man
 sagt Gott sieht alles was ich tue;
 man sagt Gott spricht zu mir
 in meinem Herzen; man spricht
 von den Augen, der Hand, dem Mund
 Gottes, aber nicht von andern Teilen

L
 des Körpers: lerne daraus die Gram-
 matik des Wortes “Gott”! [Ich habe
 irgendwo gelesen, Luther hätte geschrieben,
 die Theologie sei die “Grammatik des
 Wort(es) Gottes”, der heiligen Schrift.]

Ivhlvqg emi wvo Dzsnhrrn –
 wzh rhg vrtvngprxs zppvh, dzh rxs
 hztn.

Rxs ypvryv roovi drvwi rn wvi
 Qmomwrw hrgavn, hgzzg srnzfh
 zfu wrv Hgizhhv af tvsvn.

Vrvn † ivprtrmhv Uiztv rhg
 nfi vngdvwi Pvyvnhuiztv mwvi hrv
 rhg (pvvivyh) Tvhsdzga. Wrvvh Hlizxs-
 hlrp(→) qmnngv ozn hztn – driw nfi
 org Pvyvnhuiztv tvhlrvpg. ^{Tzna} † [Z]snprxs,
 wzh Dmig
 drv † “Zf-dvs” qvrnv Yvwwfgfnt szg, – zfhv
 zph Hhxoviavnhxsiv.

Rxs drpp hztn: Dvnn vrvn
 vdrtv Hvpvrtqvrq nrxsg ufi ovrn Pvyvn,
ovrvn Lebensweise, etwas bedeutet,
 dann habe ich mir über sie nicht
 den Kopf zu zerbrechen; kann ich

have them. Wouldn't it be funny [202]^a to tell someone: Don't mind that, you are only dying now because you can't breathe for a few minutes. With all conceit, with all your pride in this & the other, you are lost then, these don't hold you, for they are undermined along with all you have. But you should not fear this condition^b even though it is frightful. You shouldn't forget it frivolously & yet not fear it. It^c will then give your life seriousness & not dread. (I believe so.)

23.2.[37]

One kneels & looks up & folds one's hands & speaks, & says one is speaking with God, one says God sees everything I do; one says God speaks to me in my heart: one speaks of the eyes, the hand, the mouth of God, but not of the other parts [203] of the body: Learn from this the grammar of the word "God"! [I read somewhere, Luther had written that theology is the "grammar of the word of God," of the holy scripture.]^d

Respect^e for madness—that is really all I am saying.

Again and again I keep sitting through the comedy, instead of walking out into the street.

A religious question is either a question of life or it is (empty) chatter. This language game—one could say—gets played only with questions of life. Much like the word "ouch" does not have any meaning—except as a scream of pain.

I^f want to say: If eternal bliss means nothing for my life, my way of life, then I don't have to rack my brain about it; if I am to [204] rightly think about it, then what I think must

^aContinuing in code: dem zu sagen: Mach dir nichts draus, du stirbst ja jetzt nur, weil du einige Minuten keine Luft kriegst. Mit allem Stolz, aller [inserted: deiner] Einbildung auf das & jenes, bist du dann verloren, sie halten dich nicht, denn sie sind mit untergraben und alles was du hast.

^bWittgenstein mixed coded and uncoded letters when spelling "Zuhganw [Zustand]."

^cIn code: Er wird deinem Leben dann Ernst geben & nicht Grauen. (Ich glaube so.)

^dCompare remark 373 in the *Philosophical Investigations*, and Alice Ambrose, ed., *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932–1935* (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1979), p. 32.

^eIn code: Respekt vor dem Wahnsinn—das ist eigentlich alles, was ich sage. Ich bleibe immer wieder in der Komödie sitzen, statt hinaus auf die Strasse zu gehen. Eine religiöse Frage ist nur entweder Lebensfrage oder sie ist (leeres) Geschwätz. Dieses Sprachspiel—könnte man sagen—wird nur mit Lebensfragen gespielt. [Inserted: Ganz] ähnlich, wie [inserted: das Wort] "Au-weh" keine Bedeutung hat—ausser als Schmerzensschrei.

^fWritten in code and then decoded by Wittgenstein himself: Ich will sagen: Wenn eine ewige Seeligkeit nicht für mein Leben, meine

[204–205]

mit Recht darüber denken, so muß, ~~es~~ was ich denke, in genauer Beziehung zu meinem Leben stehen, sonst ist, was ich denke, Quatsch, oder mein Leben in Gefahr. – Eine Obrigkeit, die @ nicht wirkt, nach der ich mich nicht zu richten brau-
ehe, ist keine Obrigkeit. Wenn ich mit Recht von einer Obrigkeit rede, muß ich selbst auch von ihr abhängen.

24.2.

Nfi dvnn rxs qvrn (tvovrvni) Vtm-
rhg yrn, qznn rxs zfu vrvnv hznugvn
Gmw smuuvn.

Wvi Ivrvn szg vrvnv Szigv, wrv
hxsdvi af vigiztvn rhg. Wzifo nroog
ozn wrv Viozsnfntvn vrvnh Wmhgm-
rvehqr pvrxsqvi zn, zph vrvnh Qrvi-
qvtzziw. Wvi vrvnv wifxqg nmxs, dzsivnw
wvi znwviv hxsmn hxsnrvwvg.

Dvnn wf nrxsg yvivr g yrhg,
wrvnv Ziyvrg ufi vgdzh nmxs
smsvvh af mluvin, hm driw qvrn

Hvrvn org rsi hvrvn. Wvnn rsiv
Smsv viszpg hrv, wzvfixs wzhh
rn dzsiv Smsvnpzvtv
wf hrv zn wrv irxsgrtv Hgvppv
ro Eviszpgnrh afo Rwwzp hvghg.

Wzifo evinrxsgvg Vrgvppvrg wvn
Dvig wvi Ziyvrg. Hm rhg wrv Ziyvrg
wvh Qizfh ^{a, Y,} afi 'qprntvnnvn Hxsvppv'
tvdmivvn. (Qizfh dzi vrn, zfhhvimi-
wvngprxs yvtzygvi, Hgzaxsrgvqg.)

Es scheint, ich bin wieder
nach & nach erhalte wieder ^{a, Y,} Arbeitskraft. Denn
in den letzten 2-3 Tagen konnte ich
wieder mehr & mehr, obwohl doch noch
wenig, über Philosophie denken & ^{Bemerkungen}
schreiben. Andererseits habe ich in
meiner Brust das Gefühl, als ob mir
das Arbeiten vielleicht trotzdem nicht
gestattet erlaubt sei. D.h., ich fühle mich nur
mäßig, oder ^{nur} halb, glücklich ^{beim Arbeiten} in der Ar-
beit & habe eine gewisse Furcht es
möchte mir untersagt werden. Ich
glaube, der Grund ist der, D.h., ein
Unglücksgefühl möchte über mich

stand in a precise relation to my life, otherwise what I think is rubbish or my life is in danger.—An authority which is not effective, which I don't have^a to heed, is no authority. If I rightfully speak of an authority I must also be dependent upon it.

24.2.[37]

Only^b if I am no (base) egoist can I hope for a peaceful death.

The one who is pure has a hardness which is tough to bear. That is why one accepts the admonitions of a Dostoevsky more easily than those of a Kierkegaard. One of them is still squeezing while the other is already cutting.

If you are not willing to sacrifice your work for something still higher, [205] there is no blessing with it. For it attains its height only when you place it at its true altitude^c in relation to the ideal.

That is why vanity destroys the value of the work. This is how the work of Kraus, for example, has become a 'tinkling bell.'^d (Kraus was an architect of sentences, extraordinarily talented at that.)

It appears I am gradually regaining energy to work again. For in the last 2–3 days I was able to think more & more about philosophy again, though still little, & write remarks. On the other hand I have in my breast a feeling as if perhaps I was nevertheless not permitted^e to work. That is, while working I feel only tolerably or only half happy & have a certain fear that it may yet be prohibited. That^f is, that a feeling of gloom might come over me

^a“have” replaces “need,” to which Wittgenstein also applied wavy underlining and which he later struck altogether.

^bIn code: Nur wenn ich kein (gemeiner) Egoist bin, kann ich auf einen sanften Tod hoffen. Der Reine hat eine Härte, die schwer zu ertragen ist. Darum nimmt man die Ermahnungen eines Dostojewski leichter an als eines Kierkegaard. Der eine drückt noch, während der andere schon schneidet. Wenn du nicht bereit bist, deine Arbeit für etwas noch höheres zu opfern, so wird kein [205] Segen mit ihr sein. Denn ihre Höhe erhält sie, dadurch dass du sie in die wahre Höhenlage im Verhältnis zum Ideal stellst. Darum vernichtet Eitelkeit den Wert der Arbeit. So ist die Arbeit des Kraus, [inserted: z.B.], zur 'klingenden Schelle' geworden. (Kraus war ein, ausserordentlich begabter, Satzarchitekt.)

^c“place it at its true altitude” is an undecided alternative to “put it in its right place”—“altitude (Höhenlage)” resonates with the metaphor of the work “attaining height (Höhe erhalten).”

^dSee [124] above and Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, 13:1.

^eUndecided alternative to “allowed.”

^fWittgenstein started writing “I believe the reason is this,” then struck this beginning.

[206–207]

hereinbrechen, welches mi(ch|r) das
 (w|W)eiterarbeiten ~~unmöglich macht~~ in
 Sinnlosigkeit verwandelt & mich
 zwingt, die Arbeit niederzulegen. Möge
 das aber nicht geschehen!! – Dies
 aber hängt zusammen, mit dem Ge-
 fühl, daß ich zu wenig lieb bin,
 d.h. zu egoistisch. Daß ich zu wenig
 um das Sorge, was Andern wohl-
 tut. Und wie kann ich @ leben ruhig
 leben, wenn ich nicht dabei hoffen
 kann, sanft zu sterben. Tmgg yvhvhi
 vh!!

“Vh rhg nrvoznw srvi” ,(-) zyvi rxs
 qznn zfxs zppvrn dzsnhrnrt dvi-
 wvn.

Es ist merkwürdig, daß man
 sagt, Gott habe die Welt erschaf-
 fen, & nicht: Gott erschaffe,
 fortwährend, die Welt. Denn wa-
 rum soll es ein größeres Wunder
 sein, daß sie zu ^{sein} ~~existieren~~ begonnen
 hat, als daß sie fortfuhr zu sein.

Man wird von dem Gleichnis des Hand-
 werkers verleitet. Daß Einer einen Schuh
 @ macht, ist eine Leistung, aber ein-
 mal - (aus Vorhandenem) - gemacht,
 bleibt er von selbst einige Zeit bestehen.
 Denkt man sich aber Gott als Schöpfer,
 muß die Erhaltung des Universums
 nicht ein ebensogroßes Wunder sein
 als seine Schöpfung, – ja, sind die
 beiden nicht eins? ^{Warum} Wozu soll ich
 einen ^{einmaligen} Akt der Schöpfung annehmen
 & nicht ^{postulieren} ~~ein~~ ^{bloß} einen ~~for~~ dauernden Akt des
 –der einmal angefangen hat –, der einen zeitlichen
 Erhaltens ^{ein} ~~for~~ dauerndes
 läuft, ~~des~~ ^{||} Erschaffens?

Anfang hatte

27.2.

^{org Rms. Ymphgzw}
 Dzi 2 Gztv dvt ^{||}, zfu wvi Hfxsv nzxs
 vrnvo Wrvnhgozwxsvn ufi Uiq. Ivynr; msnv
 Viumpt. (Vh dzi hxsmn & zntvnvso.)
 Nfn yrn rxs vgdzh fnvinhg; zyvi – Tmgg
 hvr Wznq – nrxsg fntpfqprxs.
 Wzh Xsirhgvingfo hztg: Wf
 hmpphg srvi , (rn wrvhvi Dvpg) → (-) hmafz-
 tvn @ – nrxsg hr@gavn, hmnwvin tvsvn.

[206] which will render continued work meaningless & force me to give up work. But would that this not happen!!—But all of this is connected to the feeling that I am not loy-ing enough, that is, too egoistic. That I care too little what feels good to others. And how can I live calmly if all the while I can't hope to die peacefully. *God,^a make it better!!*

“There is no one here,”—but I can go mad all by myself, too.

It is strange that one says God created the world & not: God is creating, continually, the world. For why should it be a greater miracle that it began to be,^b rather than that it continued to be. [207] One is led astray by the simile of the craftsperson. That someone makes a shoe is an accomplishment, but once made (out of what is existing) it endures on its own for a while. But if one thinks of God as creator, must the conservation of the universe not be a miracle just as great as its creation,—yes, aren't the two one and the same? Why should I postulate a singular act of creation & not a continuous act of conservation—which began at some point, which had a temporal beginning, or what amounts to the same, a continuous creating?^c

27.2.[37]

Was^d away for 2 days with Joh. Bolstad,^e looking for a maid for Miss^f Rebni; without success. (It was nice & pleasant.) Now I am somewhat unserious; but—thank God—not unhappy.

Christianity says: Here (in this world)—so to speak—you should not be sitting but going.

^aIn code: Gott [difficult to decipher, running against the margin of the page: besser] es!! “Es ist niemand hier,”—aber ich kann auch allein wahnsinnig werden.

^b“be” replaces “exist.”

^cThe last sentence was heavily edited. An earlier variant may have read: Why should I assume an act of creation & not [inserted: merely] a continuous act of conservation or what amounts to the same, of creating?

^dIn code: War 2 Tage weg [inserted: mit Joh. Bolstad], auf der Suche nach einem Dienstmädchen für Frk. Rebni; ohne Erfolg. (Es war schön & angenehm.) Nun bin ich etwas unernst; aber—Gott sei Dank—nicht unglücklich. Das Christentum sagt: Du sollst hier (in dieser Welt)—sozusagen—nicht sitzen, sondern gehen.

^eJohannes Johannesson Bolstad's (1888–1961) father was also a Johannes Johannesson Bolstad. Wittgenstein had built his house on the father's property and already in 1921 he bequeathed it to another son, Arne Bolstad. First a sailor, the younger Johannes Bolstad emigrated to the United States in 1907 but returned in 1929 to take care of his share of the family farm. [I.S.] Compare *Wittgenstein and Norway* [92,c].

^fWittgenstein used the Norwegian abbreviation “Frk.”

[208–209]

Wf ofhgg srvi dvt; & hmpphg nrxsg
lpmgaprxs dvtvirhhvn dviwvn, hmn-
wvin gmw hvrn, dvnn@ wvrn Qmilvi
hgriyg.

Die Frage ist: Drv tvhg wf
wrvh Pvyvn
wfixs wrvhv Dvpg? – (Mwvi: Wzh
hvt wvrnv Uiztv!) – Wvnn ovrnv
Ziyvrg, a.Y., rhg rz nfi vrn Hrgavn
rn wvi Dvpg. Rxs zyvi hmpp tvsvn
& nrxsg ypmhh hgavn.

28.2.37

Es ist doch möglich daß ich
nach etlichen zusammenhängen-
den Kapiteln in meiner Arbeit
bloß lose Bemerkungen schrei-
ben kann & soll. Ich bin doch
ein Mensch, & abhängig von dem,
wie es geht! Aber es ist mir schwer
das wirklich einzusehen.

1.3.

Ich möchte immer von der Wahr-
heit, die ich weiß & wenn sie unan-
genehm ist, etwas abhandeln &

habe immer wieder Gedanken, mit de-
nen ich mich selbst betrügen will.

Wird es mir gegeben sein, weiter
zu arbeiten? Ich arbeite, denke &
schreibe, jetzt täglich einiges, das meiste
davon nur mäßig gut. Ist das aber
nun das Versiegen dieser Arbeit, oder
wird ^{rinnen} ~~rinnt~~ der Bach weiter ^{II}, & ~~wird~~ wach-
sen? Wird die Arbeit sozusagen
ihren Sinn verlieren? Ich wünsche
es nicht; aber es ist möglich! – Denn
erst muß man leben, – dann kann
man auch philosophieren.

Ich denke die ganze Zeit
an's Essen. Da meine Gedanken wie
in einer Sackgasse angelangt
sind, kommen sie immer wieder
auf's Essen zurück als auf
das, was die Zeit vertreibt.

Rn vrnvo zyhxsvfprxsvn Tvrhgvh-
afhgznw: Msnv Tvwnzqvn, hgrvi, ovrnv
Ziyvrg hztg ori tzi nrxsg, & rxs yrn
srvi rn wvi Mwv msnv Hrnn & Advxq

[208]^a *You must away from here, & should not suddenly be torn away, but be dead when your body dies.*

The question is: *How^b do you go through this life?^c—(Or: Let this be your question!)—Since my work, for example, is only a sitting in the world, after all. But I am supposed to go & not just sit.*

28.2.37

It is quite possible that after quite a few coherent chapters in my work I can & should write only loose remarks. I am a human being, after all & dependent on how it goes! But it is difficult for me to really acknowledge that.

1.3.[37]

I always want to bargain down the truth that I know & when it is unpleasant & [209] again and again have thoughts with which I want to deceive myself.

Will it be granted to me that I keep working? I work, think & write some daily now, most of it only tolerably good. But is that now the draining away of this work or will the brook continue to flow, & swell?^d Will the work so to speak lose its meaning? I do not want that; but it is possible!—For first one must live,—then one can also philosophize.^e

I think of eating all the time. Since my thoughts have arrived as if in a dead end, they return again and again to eating as to that which kills time.

In^f a hideous state of mind: Without any thoughts, gaping vacantly, my work means nothing to me & I am here in the wasteland without rhyme or reason^g [210] As if someone had played a joke on me, brought me here & left me sitting here.^h

^aContinuing in code: Du musst hier weg; & sollst nicht plötzlich weggerissen werden, sondern tod sein, wenn dein Körper stirbt.

^bIn code: Wie gehst du durch dies Leben?—(Oder: Das sei deine Frage!)—Denn meine Arbeit, z.B., ist ja nur ein Sitzen in der Welt. Ich aber soll gehen & nicht bloss sitzen.

^c“through this life” is an undecided alternative to “through this world (durch diese Welt).”

^dWittgenstein first wrote: “or does this brook continue to flow & will swell,” then replaced “does” with “will” and struck the second “will.”

^eCompare the Latin proverb “*primum vivere deinde philosophari.*” [I.S.]

^fIn code: In einem abscheulichen Geisteszustand: Ohne Gedanken, stier, meine Arbeit sagt mir gar nichts & ich bin hier in der Öde ohne Sinn & Zweck [210] Als hätte sich jemand einen Witz mit mir erlaubt, mich hier her gebracht & hier sitzen lassen.

^gLiterally, Wittgenstein’s idiomatic “Sinn & Zweck” means “meaning & purpose.”

^h“sitzen lassen” is idiomatic for “standing someone up” or “leaving stranded.”

[210–211]

Zph szggv hrxs rvoznw vrnv Drga
org ori vipzfyg, orxs srvi/svi tv-
yizxsg & srvi hrgavn pzhhv.

2.3.

Heute ging es mir besser beim Ar-
beiten; Gott sei Dank. (Es|Vh) hxsrvn drv-
wvi vgwzh Hrnn rn wvi Ziyvrg af
hvrn.

3.3.

Wieviel leichter ist es doch noch,
zu arbeiten, als der Arbeit den
rechten Platz anzuweisen!

Wzh Qnrvn ywvfyg, wzhh ozn
^{Wzirn}
vrn Hqpzev rhg. (Fnw wzirn qmnnngv
wrv Ivprtrmn yvhgsvn.)

Svii, dvnn rxs nfi dfhhgv, wzhh 4 3.
rxs vrn Hqpzev yrn!

Wrv Hmnnv qmoog vrgag ~~hxsrvn~~
hvsj nzs v af ovrno Szfh, & rxs
ufspv orxs uimsvi! Vh tvsg ori
fneviwrvng tfg. –

6.3

Ich ^{Philosophische}
~~Man~~ schreibe öfters ^{ff} Bemerkungen die

falschen
ich einst gemacht habe an der unrichtigen
Stelle ab: dort arbeiten sie
Sie müssen dort stehen, wo sie ihre
nicht! An der richtigen Stelle nur
volle Arbeit leisten!
leisten sie ihre volle Arbeit!

Es ist interessant, wie falsch Spen-
gler, der sonst viel Urteil hat,
Kierkegaard einschätzt. Hier ist einer
der zu groß für ihn ist & zu nahe
steht, er sieht nur 'die Stiefel des
Riesen'. –

Rxs dvrhh, rxs yrn tvovrn, &
wmxs ufspv rxs orxs vrgag hm
ervp dmspvi zph emi vrnrtn Gztn
& Dmxsvn. Uzhg ufixsgv rxs orxs
emi wrvhvo Dmsphvrn, wz vh hm
fneviwrvng rhg. Fnw wmxs yrn
rxs uims. Omxsgv rxs nrxsg
af tvovrn hvrn!

8.3.

Ich habe jetzt eine große Sehnsucht
danach, die Sonne von meinem Haus
zu sehen & stelle täglich Schätzungen
an wieviele Tage sie noch wegbleiben

2.3.[37]

Today I fared better in my work; thank God. *There^a seemed to be some meaning in the work again.*

3.3.[37]

Yet how much easier it is to work than to assign to work its proper place!

Kneeling means that one is a slave. (Religion might consist in this.)

Lord, if only I knew that I am a slave!

4.3.[37]

The sun comes close to my house now & I feel gladder! I am doing undeservedly well.

6.3.[37]

I frequently copy to the wrong place Philosophical Remarks which [211] I made earlier: there they don't work! They must stand there where they perform their whole work!^b

It is interesting how wrong Spengler, who usually has much judgement, is in his evaluation of Kierkegaard. Here is one who is too great for him & stands too close, he only sees 'the giant's boots.'^c—

I^d know I am base & yet I feel much better than a couple of days & weeks ago. I am almost afraid of this well-being since it is so undeserved. And yet I am glad. Would that I not be too base!

8.3.[37]

I now have a great longing to see the sun from my house & make daily estimates how many more days it will stay [212] away. I think that it cannot be visible to me for 10 days

^aIn code: Es schien wieder etwas Sinn in der Arbeit zu sein. [3.3.] Uncoded: Wieviel leichter ist es doch [illegible word: "noch" or "auch"], zu arbeiten, als der Arbeit den rechten Platz anzuweisen. In code: Das Knien bedeutet, dass man ein Sklave ist. (Darin könnte [here: might or could] die Religion bestehen.) Herr, wenn ich nur wüsste, dass ich ein Sklave bin! Die Sonne kommt jetzt sehr nahe zu meinem Haus & ich fühle mich froher! Es geht mir unverdient gut.

^b"to the wrong place (falschen)" is an undecided alternative to "incorrect (unrichtigen)." The capitalized "Philosophische" was inserted into the line. The last sentence is an undecided alternative to: "Only at the right place (richtigen) do they perform their whole work!"

^cIn *The Decline of the West* Spengler refers to Kierkegaard only once as someone who plays with religious expressions (see [16,b], vol. 2, p. 137). That scholars are dwarfs between the feet of intellectual giants is a favorite theme of Schopenhauer's *Parerga and Paralipomena* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974, vol. 1, pp. 157f., 181, vol. 2, §§ 4–6, 248–254, 379f., pp. 535f., 542), also at the end of volume 2, chapter 15 of the *World as Will and Representation*. A definitive formulation of Schopenhauer's metaphor is offered by Nietzsche in the first section of his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.

^dIn code: Ich weiss, ich bin gemein, & doch fühle ich mich jetzt so viel wohler als vor einigen Tagen & Wochen. Fast fürchte ich mich vor diesem Wohlsein, da es so unverdient ist. Und doch bin ich froh. Möchte ich nicht zu gemein sein!

[212–213]

wird. Ich glaube sie kann nicht vor
 10 Tagen von mir zu sehen sein &
 vielleicht nicht vor 2 Wochen, obwohl
 ich mir ~~immer gern eine~~ gesagt habe,
 ich werde sie schon in 4 Tagen sehen.
 Aber werde ich noch 2 Wochen leben??
 Ich muß mir immer wieder sagen, daß
 es auch herrlich genug ist, wenn ich
 den ^{starken} Schein sehe, denn ich jetzt schon
 sehe & daß ich damit ganz zu-
 frieden sein kann. ~~Wenn~~ (z)Z|fxs
 wzh rhg fneviwrvng! & rxs hmpp nfi
 wznqyzi hvrn!

10.3.

Vh tvsg ori fneviwrvng tfg.

12.3.

Ich bin ein Mensch ^{von} mit geringem
 Talent; möge ich dennoch etwas
 Rechtes leisten. Denn das ist
 möglich! glaube ich. – Möchte ich
 unbestechlich sein! Darin ^{würde} liege
 das Wertvolle liegen.

Wie schwer ist es sich selbst 13.3

zu kennen, sich ehrlich einzugestehen,
 was man ist!

Es ist eine ungeheuere Gnade, wenn
 auch noch so ungeschickt, über
 die Sätze in meiner Arbeit nachdenken zu
 dürfen.

14.3.

Ich glaube, daß heute die Sonne in
 mein Fenster hereinscheinen wird. Bin
 wieder enttäuscht worden.

15.3.

Sich selbst zu erkennen ist furcht-
 lebendige
 bar, weil man zugleich die @ wesent-
 liche Forderung erkennt, &, daß man
 ihr nicht genügt. Es gibt aber kein
 besseres Mittel sich selbst kennen
 zu lernen, als den Vollkommenen
 zu sehen. Daher muß der Vollkom-
 mene einen Sturm der Empörung
 in den Menschen wecken; wenn sie
 sich nicht ganz & gar demütigen
 wollen. Ich glaube, die Worte: “Seelig,
 wer sich nicht an mir ärgert”, meinen:

& perhaps not for 2 weeks, even though I told myself^a that I will see it in 4 days already. But will I live for another 2 weeks?? I must tell myself again and again that it is also glorious enough when I see its strong^b shine which I am seeing already & that I can be quite content^c with that. *This^d too is undeserved & I should just be grateful!*

10.3.[37]

I am doing undeservedly well.

12.3.[37]

I am a person with little talent; may I nevertheless accomplish something decent. For that is possible! I think.—Would that I were incorruptible! The valuable would lie in that. How difficult it is to know [213] oneself, to honestly admit what one is! 13.3.[37]

It is a tremendous blessing to be allowed to think, no matter how clumsily, about the sentences in my work.

14.3.[37]

I think the sun will shine into my window today. Have been disappointed again.

15.3.[37]

To know oneself is horrible,^e because one simultaneously recognizes the living demand,^f &, that one does not satisfy it. But there is no better means to get to know oneself than seeing the perfect one. Thus the perfect one must arouse in people a storm of outrage; unless they want to humiliate themselves through & through. I think the words “Blessed is he who does not get angry at me”^g mean: [214] Blessed is he who can stand the view of the

^aThis phrase originally began “even though I always liked to.” Wittgenstein struck “liked to” and continued “told myself.”

^b“strong” was inserted into the line.

^c“ganz zufrieden” can also be translated “completely content.”

^dIn code: [struck: Denn] Auch das ist unverdient! & ich soll nur dankbar sein! [10.3.] Es geht mir unverdient gut.

^eAs opposed to “kennen” a few lines above, Wittgenstein uses “erkennen” here. “Erkennen” is usually translated “recognize.”

^f“living demand (lebendige Forderung)” is an undecided alternative to “essential demand (wesentliche Forderung).”

^gWittgenstein quotes Luther’s translation of Matthew 11:6; compare pages [131f.] above.

[214–215]

Seelig, wer den Anblick des Vollkommenen aushält. Denn Du mußt vor ihm in ~~den~~ Staub fallen, & das tust Du nicht gern. Wie willst Du nun den Vollkommenen nennen? Ist er Mensch? – Ja, in einem Sinne ist er natürlich Mensch. Aber in anderem Sinne ist er doch etwas ganz anderes. Wie willst Du ihn nennen? mußt Du ihn nicht “Gott” nennen? Denn was entspräche dieser Idee, wenn nicht das? Aber früher hast Du vielleicht Gott in der Schöpfung gesehen, d.h. in der Welt; & nun siehst Du ihn, in anderem Sinn, in einem Menschen.

Einmal sagst Du nun: “Gott hat die Welt erschaffen” & einmal: “Dieser Mensch ist-Gott”. Aber Du meinst nicht, daß dieser Mensch die Welt erschaffen hat, & doch ist hier eine Einheit.

Wir haben zwei verschiedene Vorstellungen von Gott: oder, wir haben zwei

verschiedene Vorstellungen & gebrauchen für beide das Wort Gott.

Wenn Du nun aber an eine Vorsehung glaubst: d.h., wenn Du glaubst, daß nichts, [@] ~~ohne Gottes Willen-geschicht~~ was geschieht, anders geschieht, als durch den Willen Gottes; dann mußt Du also auch ^{gewiß} glauben, daß dies Größte, daß ein Mensch zur Welt kam, der Gott ist, durch Gottes Willen geschehen ist. Muß dann aber dies Factum nicht für Dich ‘entscheidende Bedeutung’ haben? Ich meine: muß das dann nicht für Dein Leben Konsequenzen haben, Dich zu etwas verpflichten? Ich meine: mußt Du nicht in ethische Beziehungen zu ihm treten? Denn Du hast doch z.B. dadurch Pflichten, daß Du einen Vater & eine Mutter hast & nicht z.B. ohne sie auf die Welt gesetzt worden bist. Hast Du also

perfect one. For you must fall into dust^a before him, & you don't like doing that. What do you want to call the perfect one? Is he a human being?—Yes, in a certain sense he is of course a human being. But in another sense he is yet something completely different. What do you want to call him? don't you have to call him 'God'? For what would correspond to this idea, if not that? But formerly you saw God perhaps in the creation, that is, in the world; & now you see him, in another sense, in a human being.

Now at one time you say: "God created the world" & at another: "This human being is—God." But you do not mean that this human being created the world, & yet there is a unity here.^b

We have two different conceptions of God: or, we have two [215] different conceptions & use the word God for both.^c

But now if you believe in providence: that is, if you believe that nothing that happens, happens any other way than through the will of God,^d then you must also believe^e that this greatest thing happened through the will of God, namely that a human being was born who is God. Mustn't this fact then be of 'decisive significance' for you? I mean: mustn't it then have implications for your life, commit you to something? I mean: mustn't you enter into an ethical relation with him? For you have duties, for example, due to the fact that you have a father & a mother & weren't, for example, put into the world without them. Don't you therefore have [216] duties also through & toward this fact?

^aWittgenstein wrote "into the dust" and struck "the."

^bOn December 17, 1930, in his conversations with members of the Vienna Circle [74,a], p. 118 Friedrich Waismann asked Wittgenstein: "Is the existence of the world connected with what is ethical?" Wittgenstein responded: "Men have felt that there is a connection and they have expressed it thus: God the Father created the world, the Son of God (or the Word that comes from God) is that which is ethical. That the Godhead is thought of as divided and, again, as one being indicates that there is a connection here." [I.S.]

^cWittgenstein used lines in the margins to the left and right of these lines to indicate his uncertainty or dissatisfaction.

^dAfter writing "that nothing happens without God's will" Wittgenstein struck the last four words and continued "that happens, happens any other way than through the will of God."

^eWittgenstein inserted a "certainly" into the line ("then you must certainly also believe") but struck it again.

[216–217]

nicht auch Pflichten durch &
gegen jenes Faktum?

Empfinde ich nun aber solche
Pflichten? Mein Glaube ist zu schwach.

Ich meine, mein Glaube an die Vor-
scheidung, mein Gefühl: “es geschieht
alles durch Gottes Willen”. Und
dies ist nicht eine Meinung – auch
nicht eine Überzeugung, sondern
eine Attitude den Dingen & dem Ge-
schehen gegenüber. Omtv rxs nrxsg
uiremp dviwvn!

Hast Du eine (W)wertvolle Bemerkung
gefunden; & sei es auch nur
ein Halbedelstein, so muß Du ihn
jetzt richtig fassen.

Ich dachte heute: “Arrangiere
ich nicht meine Gedanken, wie meine
Schwester Gretl die Möbel in einem Zim-
mer?” Und dieser Gedanke war mir
zuerst nicht angenehm.

Ich dachte gestern an den Aus-
druck: “ein reines Herz”; warum

habe ich keines? Das heißt doch: wa-
rum sind meine Gedanken so unrein!
Eitelkeit, Schwindel, Mißgunst ist im-
mer wieder in meinen Gedanken. Möge
Gott mein Leben so lenken, daß es
anders wird.

17.3.

Vh rhg dvtvn wvi Dmpqvn fnoht-
prxs af hvsvn, my wrv Hmnnv
hxsmn fyvi wvo Yvit hgvsg mwvi ^{nmxs} || nrxsg
& rxs yrn emi Hvsnhfxsg hrv
vnpwprxs af hvsvn uzhg qiznq. (Rxs
omxsgv org Tmgg ivxsgvn.)

18.3.

Die Sonne dürfte jetzt über dem
Berg stehen, aber sie ist des Wetters
wegen nicht zu sehen. Wenn Du
mit Gott rechten willst, so heißt
das, Du hast einen falschen Be-
griff ^{von Gott} ^{Es ist ein} ~~es ist ein~~ Aberglauben // Du bist
in einem Aberglauben. // Du hast einen
unrichtigen Begriff, wenn Du auf das
Schicksal erzürnt bist. Du sollst

Do I feel such duties, however? My faith is too weak.

I mean, my belief^a in providence, my feeling: “everything happens through the will of God.” And this is no opinion—also not a conviction, but an attitude^b toward the things & what is happening. *May^c I not become frivolous!*

16.3.[37]

If you have found a valuable remark, & were it only a semiprecious stone, you must now set it correctly.

Today I thought: “Am I not arranging my thoughts as my sister Gretl does the furniture in a room?” And at first I found this thought unpleasant.

Yesterday I thought of the expression: “a pure heart”;^d why [217] don’t I have one? That means, after all: why are my thoughts so impure! In my thoughts there is again and again vanity, swindle, resentment. May God steer my life so that it becomes different.

17.3.[37]

Because^e of the clouds it is impossible to see whether the sun is above the mountain already or not yet^f & I am almost sick from the longing to finally see it. (I want to quarrel with God.)

18.3.[37]

The sun should be above the mountain now but is invisible because of the weather. If you want to quarrel with God, that means that you have a false concept of God. You are superstitious.^g You have an incorrect concept when you get angry with fate. You should [218]

^aAgain, the German “Glaube” can be rendered “belief” or “faith.” Accordingly, one could translate “My belief is too weak” or “my faith in providence.”

^bWittgenstein uses the English word as a German noun here: “eine Attitude.”

^cIn code: Möge ich nicht frivol werden!

^dCompare Matthew 5:8: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.” [I.S.]

^eIn code: Es ist wegen der Wolken unmöglich zu sehen, ob die Sonne schon über dem Berg steht oder [inserted: noch] nicht & ich bin vor Sehnsucht sie endlich zu sehen fast krank. (Ich möchte mit Gott rechten.)

^f“yet” was inserted into the line.

^gWittgenstein’s “Du bist in einem Aberglauben (you have or hold a superstition)” plays on the more familiar construction “Du bist in einem Glauben (you have or hold a belief).” This formulation appears as an undecided alternative to “Es ist ein Aberglaube (it is a superstition).”

[218–219]

Deine Begriffe umstellen. Zufriedenheit
 müßte
 mit Deinem Schicksal muß das erste
 Gebot der Weisheit sein.

Ich habe heute die Sonne von
 meinem Fenster gesehen in dem Augen-
 blick, als sie anfang hinter dem

westlichen Berg aufzugehen. Gott sei
 zu meiner Schande
 Dank. Aber ich glaube nun, II, daß
mir dieses Wort nicht genug

vom Herzen gekommen ist. Denn

ich war wohl froh, als ich die Sonne

nun wirklich erblickte, aber

meine Freude war doch zu wenig

tief, zu lustig, nicht wahrhaft

religiös. Ms. dziv rxs wmx gruvvi!

19.3.

Ca 20 (m)Mjin. nach 12 kommt jetzt der Rand

der Sonne über den Berg zum Vorschein.

Sie bewegt sich a(m)n der Bergschneide

entlang, so daß sie nur zu einem

Teil zu sehen ist, zur Hälfte oder

weniger, oder mehr. Nur auf wenige Augen-

blicke war sie beinahe ganz zu sehen.

Und das zeigt, daß sie doch nur gestern
 erst über den Horizont gekommen

ist; wenn nicht gar heute zum ersten
 Mal. Um 1^h ^{war} ~~ist~~ sie schon untergegan-
 gen. Und sie kommt nun noch ein-
 gerade
 mal II vor dem Untergehen.

20.3.

Ich glaube, ich verstehe, daß
 der Geisteszustand des Glaubens
 den Menschen seelig machen kann.

Denn wenn der Mensch glaubt,

von He ganzem Herzen glaubt, daß

der Vollkommene sich für ihn

hingegen, sein Leben geopfert,

hat, ~~so~~ daß er ihn damit ^{– von Anfang –} II

mit Gott ausgesöhnt hat, so

daß Du nun nur noch dieses

Opfers würdig weiter leben sollst, –

so muß dies den ganzen Menschen

veredeln, sozusagen, in den Adelstand

erheben. Ich verstehe – will ich sagen –

daß dies eine Bewegung der

Seele zur (s)Seeligkeit ist.

rearrange your concepts. Contentment with your fate ought to be^a the first command of wisdom.

Today I saw the sun from my window at the moment when it started rising from behind the western mountain. Thank God. But to my shame I now believe that this word^b was not sufficiently heartfelt. For I was quite glad when I really saw the sun but my joy was not deep enough, too merry, not truly religious. Oh,^c if only I were deeper!

19.3.[37]

About 20 minutes after 12 the rim of the sun now shows itself. It moves along the edge of the mountain so that it is only partially visible, half of it or less, or more. Only for very few moments it was almost completely visible. [219] And that shows that, after all, it first crossed the horizon only yesterday; if not for the first time today. At 1pm it had^d set already. And now it comes once more just^e before setting.

20.3.[37]

I believe: I understand that the state of mind of believing can make the human being blissful. For when people believe, wholeheartedly believe, that the perfect one has sacrificed himself for them, that^f he has therefore — from the beginning^g — reconciled them with God, so that from now on you shall simply live in a way that is worthy of this sacrifice, — then this must refine the whole person, elevate him to nobility, so to speak. I understand — I want to say — that this is a movement of the soul toward bliss.

^a“ought to be (müßte)” is an undecided alternative to “must.”

^bWittgenstein drew an arrow from “word” to “God,” perhaps indicating that the whole expression “thank God” was less than heartfelt.

^cIn code: Oh, wäre ich doch tiefer.

^d“Had set (war untergegangen)” replaces “has set (ist untergegangen).”

^e“just” was inserted into the line.

^fWittgenstein wrote “so that” and struck “so.”

^g“from the beginning” was inserted into the line.

[220–221]

Es heißt – glaube ich –: “Glaubt daran, daß ihr nun ausgesöhnt seid, & sündigt ‘hinfort nicht mehr!’” – Aber es ist auch klar, daß dieser Glauben eine Gnade ist. Und, ich glaube, die Bedingung für ihn ist, daß wir unser Äußerstes tun & sehen, daß es uns zu nichts führt, daß, soviel wir uns auch plagen, wir unversöhnt bleiben. Dann kommt die Versöhnung nach Wunsch. Ist nun aber der verloren, der dieses Glaubens nicht ist? Das kann ich nicht glauben; oder ^{aber} noch nicht glauben. Denn vielleicht werde ich’s glauben. Wenn hier vom ‘Geheimnis’ (dieses) jenes) Opfers gesprochen wird: so müßtest Du die Grammatik ^{des} ~~dieses~~ Wortes “Geheimnis” hier verstehen!

Es ist niemand hier:
& doch spreche ich & danke & bitte. Aber ist darum dies Sprechen

& Danken & Bitten ein Irrtum?!

Eher könnte ich sagen:

“Das ist das Merkwürdige!”

Bin im Zweifel, was ich in der nächsten Zukunft tun soll.

Eine Stimme in mir sagt mir, daß ich ^{jetzt} ^{||} von hier weg soll, & nach Dublin. Aber andererseits hoffe ich wieder, daß ich das jetzt nicht tun muß. Ich möchte sagen: Möchte es mir vergönnt sein, noch hier ~~zu~~ einige Zeit zu arbeiten! – Ich bin aber, sozusagen, am Schluß eines Abschnittes meiner Arbeit angelangt.

Gott, welche Gnade ist es, ohne furchtbare Probleme leben zu können! Möchte sie bei mir bleiben!

21.3.

Yrn tvovrn & nrwvrt & vh tvsg ori
nfi af tfg. Fnw wmxs yrn rxs uims
wzhh vh ori nrxsg hxspxvsgvi tvsg!
Prvyvn Yirvu emn Ozc.

[220]

It is written—I believe—“Believe that you are now reconciled, & don’t sin ‘henceforth any more’!”^a—But it is also clear that this belief is a blessing. And, I believe, the condition for it is that we do our utmost & see that it leads us nowhere, that, no matter how much we torment ourselves, we remain unreconciled. Then the reconciliation comes rightfully.^b But now, is that person lost who is not of this belief? I can’t believe that; or rather^c can’t believe it yet. For perhaps I will believe it. If one is speaking here of the ‘secret’ of that sacrifice: you would have to understand the grammar of the^d word “secret” here!

There is no one here: & yet I speak & thank & petition. But is this speaking [221] & thanking & petitioning an error?!

I would rather say: “This is what’s strange!”

In doubt what to do in the immediate future. An inner voice tells me that I should now^e get away from here, & to Dublin. But then again I hope that I won’t have to do this now. I would like to say: Would that I am granted that I can work here some more time!—But I have, so to speak, arrived at the end of a section of my work.

God, what a blessing it is to be able to live without horrible problems! Would that it stays with me!

21.3.[37]

Am^f base & low & doing all too well. And yet I am glad that I am not doing worse! Dear letter from Max.^g

^aCompare John 5:14 and 8:11; but see also Romans 5 and 6 on reconciliation. [I.S.]

^bThe German verb “sich plagen” is ambiguous in that it can but need not take an object (“toil” and “torment ourselves”).—“rightfully or justly (zu Recht)” is an undecided alternative to a phrase which had received wavy underlining: “as requested or according to our wishes (nach Wunsch).”

^c“rather” was inserted into the line.

^d“the” replaces “this” which had received wavy underlining.

^e“now” was inserted into the line.

^fIn code: Bin gemein & niedrig & es geht mir nur zu gut. Und doch bin ich froh dass es mir nicht schlechter geht! Lieben Brief von Max.

^gMax Salzer (1868–1941) was the husband of Wittgenstein’s sister Helene. He was a ministry official at the highest rank. Wittgenstein’s reply to his letter is published in *Familienbriefe* [38.b], p. 157: “And also I want to inform you that very soon a small book of mine will appear under the title ‘Philosophical Treasure for the Home,’ dedicated to you and your wife. It is printed on thin hygienic paper with non-staining ink and every single sheet can be torn out separately.”

[222–223]

Heute geht die Sonne hier um 12^h
auf & erscheint nun ganz.

Die Bäume waren heute früh dick mit
Schnee beladen, nun schmilzt er
aller. – Ich bin immer wieder zur
Eitelkeit geneigt auch über meine
Eintragungen hier & ihren Stil. Möge
Gott es bessern. – Wrv vihgv Uprv-
tv zfhhvz zn ovrnvo Uvnhgvi, dm
vh wrv Hmnnv yvhxsvrng. Fo 1^h tvsg
wrv Hmnnv drwvvi fngvi & qmoog zyvi
nmxs vrnozp afo Emihxsvrn. Vor dem
Untergehen ist die Sonne noch
einmal für etwa 10 Minuten zu sehen.

Vh rhg nrvoznw srvi: Zyvi vh
rhg vrnv svjiprxsv Hmnnv srvi,
& vrn hxspvxsgvi Ovnhxv. –

Ich bin wie ein Bettler, der manch-
mal nicht ohne ^{reluctantly} Widerstreben zugibt,
daß er kein König ist.

Heute kam die Sonne von ca ¼ 12 bis

22.3.

¼ 2, dann einen Augenblick um ¼ 4 ^{über dem Berg} zum
[v]orschein & wehe sie untergeht scheint
sie wieder herein.

Srpu & Vipvfxsgv! Aber wenn
ich morgen etwas glauben sollte
was ich heute nicht glaube, so
war ich darum heute nicht ^{in einem} Irr-
tum. Denn dieses 'glauben' heißt
ja nicht meinen. Aber mein Glaube
morgen kann lichter (oder dunkler)
sein als mein Glaube heute. Srpu
& Vipvfxsgv! & möge kein Dunkel
über mich kommen!

24.3.

Ich bitte, & rxv szy'h hxsmn hm,
drv rxv'h szyvn drpp: nzoprxx
szpy Sroovp, szpy Smppv!

Die Sonne geht um ca ¼ 2 unter
geht aber dann dem Rand des Berges
so entlang daß man noch längere
Zeit ihren äußersten Rand wahrnimmt.
Es ist herrlich! Sie ist also doch nicht
eigentlich untergegangen. –

[222]

22.3.[37]

Today the sun rises here at 12 noon & now appears completely.

This morning the trees were thickly loaded with snow, now all of it is melting.—Again & again I tend toward vanity, also regarding my entries here & their style. May God improve this.—*The^a first fly outside the window where the sun shines on it. At 1pm the sun sets again & however shows itself once more.* Before it sets the sun can be seen once more for about 10 minutes.

There^b is no one here: But there is a glorious sun here, & a bad person.—

23.3.[37]

I am like a beggar who sometimes reluctantly^c admits that he is no king.

Today the sun showed itself above the mountain from roughly 11:45 until [223] 1:15, then a moment at 3:45 & before it sets it shines in again.

Help^d & Illuminate! But if I believe something tomorrow that I don't believe today, I was not therefore in an error^e today. For this 'believing' is not holding an opinion, after all.^f But my belief tomorrow can be lighter (or darker) than my belief today. *Help & illuminate!* & would that no darkness descend upon me!

24.3.[37]

I am petitioning & *I already have it as I want to have it: namely half heaven, half hell!*^g

The sun sets at about 1:30 but then moves along the mountain ridge so that for quite some time one still perceives its outermost ridge. It is glorious! So it hasn't really set after all.—

^aIn code: Die erste Fliege aussen an meinem Fenster, wo es die Sonne bescheint. Um 1^h geht die Sonne wieder unter & kommt aber noch einmal zum Vorschein.

^bIn code: Es ist niemand hier: Aber es ist eine herrliche Sonne hier, & ein schlechter Mensch.

^cWittgenstein uses the English word "reluctantly" as an undecided alternative to "nicht ohne Widerstreben (not without reluctance)."

^dIn code: Hilf & Erleuchte!—"erleuchte" can also be translated "enlighten" but not in the sense associated with the Enlightenment (Aufklärung).

^e"in an error (in einem Irrtum)" replaces "in error (im Irrtum)."

^fHere, the German "meinen" refers to "holding an opinion."

^gIn code: ich hab's schon so, wie ich's haben will: nämlich halb Himmel, halb Hölle!

[224–225]

(25.3.)

Ich hatte heute diesen Gedanken:
 Als ich meine Beichte seinerzeit niedergeschrieben hatte da dachte ich ein paar mal auch an meine Mama & dachte ich könne sie in irgend einem Sinne @ nachträglich durch mein Geständnis erlösen; auch sie nämlich habe, in irgend einem Sinn, ein solches Geständnis auf dem Herzen gehabt & sei es in ihrem Leben nicht losgeworden, denn sie sei verschlossen geblieben. Und mein Geständnis, kam es mir vor, spreche nun endlich auch in ihrem Namen; & sie könne sich nun ^{irgendwie} ~~sozusagen~~ nachträglich damit identifizieren.
 (Es wäre, als habe ich eine Schuld gezahlt die sie schon gedrückt hat & als könnte ~~sie mir~~ ihr Geist mir sagen: “Gott sei Dank, daß Du sie jetzt abgetragen hast.”)
 – Heute nun dachte ich im Freien über den Sinn der Lehre vom Erlösungstod nach & ich dachte: Könnte die Er-

lösung durch das Opfer, darin bestehen, daß er das getan hat, was wir Alle zwar wollen, aber nicht können. Im Glauben aber identifiziert man sich mit ihm, d.h. man ^{in der Form} entrichtet die Schuld nun ~~durch~~ ^(von) demütige(r) Anerkennung; man soll also ganz niedrig werden, weil man nicht gut werden kann.

Mir kam der Gedanke, ich solle morgen (am Charfreitag) fasten & ich dachte ; das will ich tun. Aber gleich drauf schien es mir wie ein Gebot, ich habe es zu tun & dagegen sträubte ich mich. Ich sagte: “Ich will es tun, wenn es mir von Herzen kommt & nicht weil es mir befohlen wird.” Aber dies ist doch kein Gehorsam! Es ist doch nicht Ertötung zu tun, was einem vom Herzen kommt (auch wenn es ~~gütig, oder~~ freundlich ~~ist~~) oder in gewissem Sinne fromm ist). Dabei

[224]

I had this thought today: At the time when I had written down my confession I thought a few times also of my mom^a & thought that I could in some sense retroactively redeem her through my confession^b; for I thought she, too, was carrying such a confession in her heart & hadn't unburdened it in her life for she remained withdrawn. And my confession, so it seemed to me, was finally speaking in her name, too; & she could now somehow^c identify with it retroactively. (It would be as if I paid the debt that had already burdened her & as if her spirit^d could tell me: "Thank God that you paid it off now.")— Now, I was thinking outside today about the meaning of the doctrine of the redemptive death & I thought: Might the re-

[225]

25.3.[37]^e

demption through the sacrifice consist in the fact that he did what all of us want to, but can't do. But in believing one identifies with him, that is, one pays the debt now in the form of^f humble recognition; one shall therefore become quite abject because one can't become good.

The thought occurred to me that I should fast tomorrow (on Good Friday) & I thought: I will do that. But immediately afterwards it appeared to me like a commandment, as if I had to do it & I resisted that. I said: "I want to do it if it comes from my heart & not because I was commanded to." But this then is no obedience! There is no mortification in doing what comes from the heart (even if it is friendly or in some sense pious).^g You don't

^aLeopoldine (Poldy) Wittgenstein, née Kallmus (1850–1926) was a sophisticated woman whose primary love was music. She played the piano and organ exceedingly well and was considered a stern critic. Rudolf Koder maintained that she played her piano better even than her son Paul, the pianist (as reported by John Stenborough to Ilse Somavilla). Hermine Wittgenstein writes this about her mother in her *Familienerinnerungen*: "And yet I saw or felt clearly that my mother did straightforwardly what she recognized to be right and good, that in doing so she never considered her own wishes, indeed, didn't appear to have any. [. . .] She never spared herself, was rather very hard on herself and hid all pain especially from her husband and her mother." [I.S.]

^bThe German language distinguishes between two kinds of confession. In this sentence Wittgenstein first uses "Beichte (religious confession, the confession of sins)." The second and the next two occurrences refer to a "Geständnis (civil confession, the confession of a crime)."

^c"somehow" replaces "as it were."

^d"her spirit (ihr Geist)" replaces "she."

^eWittgenstein added the date by putting it into the top margin of the page.

^f"in the form of" replaces "through."

^gInitially, the parenthetical remark was "(even if it is kind or friendly)." Wittgenstein struck "kind or" and ")," then added "or in some sense pious."

[226–227]

stirbst Du doch nicht. Dagegen

stirbst Du gerade beim Gehorsam
gegen einen Befehl, aus bloßem
Gehorsam. Das ist eine Agonie,
^{, soll,}
kann ^{||} aber eine fromme Agonie
sein. Wenigstens, so versteh' ich's.

Aber ich selbst! – Ich gestehe,
daß ich nicht absterben will,
obwohl ich, verstehe, daß es das
Höhere ist. Wzh rhg ufixsgyzi; &
omtv wrvhv Ufixsgyziqvrq wfixs
vrnv Prxsghxsvrn vipvfxsgvg
dviwvn!

Szyv vrn lzzi Nzxsgv ^{arvoprxs} ^{||} hxspvxsg tv-
hxspzuvn & ufspv orxs drv gmg, qznn
nrxsg ziyvrgvn; ovrnv Tvwznqvn hrnw
gifyv & rxs yrn wvlirorvig zyvi rn vrnvi
urnhgvin dvrhv. (W.s., rxs ufixsgv orxs
emi tvdrhhvn ivprtrmhvn Tvwznqvn.)

26.3.

Kritisiere nicht, was ^{Ernste} ^{Ernstes} ~~Große~~ ^{||} geschrieben

haben, denn Du weißt nicht, was Du
kritisierst. [Wozu|Warum] sollst Du über Alles

(Aber das heißt nicht: stimme m
allem diesem überein.)

«Dir» eine Meinung bilden. ^{||}

Ich bin (~~ich meine meine Religion ist~~)
so erleuchtet als ich bin; ich meine:
meine Religion ist so erleuchtet,
als sie ist. Ich habe mich gestern
nicht weniger erleuchtet & heute
nicht mehr. Denn, hätte ich's gestern
so ansehen können, so hätte ich's
~~gewiß getan~~ bestimmt so angesehen.

Man verwundert sich darüber, daß
eine Zeit nicht an Hexen glaubte &
eine spätere an Hexen glaubt &
daß dies & Ähnliches geht & wieder-
kehrt, etc.; aber Du brauchst
nur anzusehen, was Dir selbst
geschieht um Dich nicht ^{mehr} ^{||} zu verwun-
dern. – An einem Tag kannst Du be-
ten aber an einem andern vielleicht
nicht, & an einem mußt Du beten, &
an einem andern nicht.

Vh tvsg ori zfh Tnzww svfgv ervp
yvhhvi zph tvhgvin.

die [226] in this, after all. Whereas you die precisely in obedience to a command, from mere obedience. This is agony but can be, is supposed to^a be, a pious agony. That's at least how I understand it. But I myself!—I confess that I do not want to die off, even though I understand that it is the higher. *This^b is horrible; & may this horribleness become illuminated by the light shining in!*

Have been sleeping quite^c badly for a few nights & feel dead, can't work; my thoughts are dim & I am depressed but in a glowering way. (That is, I am afraid of certain religious thoughts.)

26.3.[37]

Don't criticize what serious people have written seriously,^d for you don't know what you are criticizing. Why should you form [227] an opinion about everything. But that doesn't mean: agree with all that.^e

I am^f as illuminated as I am; I mean: my religion is as illuminated as it is. I haven't illuminated myself less yesterday & not more today. For had I been able to view it like that yesterday, I would have definitely viewed it like that.^g

One shouldn't be puzzled that one age doesn't believe in witches & a later one does believe in witches & that this & similar things go away & come back, etc.; but in order to no longer^h be puzzled you only need to look at what happens to yourself.—One day you can pray but on another perhaps not, & one day you must pray, & on another not.

Throughⁱ mercy I am doing much better today than yesterday.

^a“is supposed to be (soll)” was inserted into the line.

^bIn code: Das ist furchtbar, & möge diese Furchtbarkeit durch einen Lichtschein erleuchtet werden! Habe ein paar Nächte [inserted: ziemlich] schlecht geschlafen & fühle mich wie tot, kann nicht arbeiten; meine Gedanken sind trübe & ich bin deprimiert aber in einer finstern weise. (D.h., ich fürchte mich vor gewissen religiösen Gedanken.)

^c“quite” was inserted into the line.

^d“what serious people have written seriously (was Ernste Ernstes geschrieben haben)” replaced what “great ones have written (was Große geschrieben haben).”

^eThe entire sentence “But that doesn't mean . . .” was inserted in the top margin of the page.

^f“I am” was originally followed by the parenthetical remark “(I mean: my religion is).” Wittgenstein struck this remark.

^g“definitely viewed it like that” replaces “certainly done it.”

^hBy inserting “mehr” into the line, Wittgenstein changed “not (nicht)” into “no longer (nicht mehr).”

ⁱIn code: Es geht mir aus Gnade heute viel besser als gestern.

[228–229]

Nun kommt die Sonne kurz nach 127.3.

11^h herauf & heute ist sie strahlend. Es fällt mir schwer nicht immer wieder in sie hinein zu sehen, d.h., ich möchte immer wieder in sie schauen obwohl ich weiß daß es für die Augen schlecht ist.

30.3.

Hüte Dich vor einem billigen Pathos wenn Du über Philosophie schreibst! Das ist immer meine Gefahr, wenn mir wenig einfällt. Und so ist es jetzt. Ich bin zu einem seltsamen Stillstand gekommen & weiß nicht recht, was ich machen soll.

Die Sonne scheint nun ^{von heute an} von

1/2 11 bis 1/2 6 ununterbrochen zu mir herein, & es ist herrliches Wetter.

Ich hatte gehofft meine Arbeitskraft werde sich erholen, wenn ich mehr von der Sonne sehen würde, aber es ist nicht so gekommen.

Mein Gehirn macht 2.4.

nur recht träge Bewegungen. Leider.

Ich bin jetzt leicht durch 4.4.

meine Arbeit ermüdbar; oder bin ich träge? – Manchmal denke ich daran ob ich von hier jetzt schon abreisen sollte. Etwa: zuerst nach Wien für einen Monat, dann nach England für einen Monat – oder länger – dann nach Russland. Und dann wieder hierher zurück? – Oder nach Irland? Das Klügste scheint mir jetzt daß ich in etwa 3 Wochen hier abreise. –

5.4.

Möge ich doch das Leben sehen, wie es ist, (.)|(d|D).h. es mehr als Ganzes sehen, & nicht bloß einen kleinen, winzigen, Ausschnitt, ich meine ^{z.B.} ^{1f}: meine Arbeit. Es ist dann als ob alles andere durch eine dunkle Blende abgeblendet wäre & nur dieses Stück sichtbar. Dadurch erscheint alles falsch. Ich

[228]

27.3.[37]

The sun comes up just after 11 a.m. now & is radiant today. I find it hard not to look into it again and again, that is, I want to look into it again and again even though I know that it is bad for my eyes.

30.3.[37]

Beware of cheap poignancy^a when writing about philosophy! I am always in danger of that when little occurs to me. And so it is now. I have come to a curious standstill & don't quite know what to do.

Starting today^b the sun now shines in from 10:30 until 5:30 without interruption & the weather is glorious.

I had hoped my capacity to work would recover when I saw more of the sun, but it didn't turn out that way. 2.4.[37]

My brain makes [229] only rather sluggish movements. Unfortunately.

4.4.[37]

I easily tire from my work now; or am I sluggish?—I sometimes consider whether I should now already leave from here. For example: first to Vienna for a month, then to England for a month—or longer—then to Russia.^c And then return here again?—Or to Ireland?^d What now appears most prudent to me is to leave here in about 3 weeks.—

5.4.[37]

Would that I see life as it is. That is, see it more as a whole, & not just a small, tiny section of it, I mean, for example:^e my work. It is then as if everything else was dimmed by a dark screen & only this piece visible. Because of that everything appears wrong. I [230] see, feel^f the value of things wrongly.

^aThe German word is "Pathos," which signifies grand emotional gestures.

^b"starting today" was inserted into the line.

^cIn September 1935 Wittgenstein had traveled to Russia planning to stay for a while doing simple labor on a collective farm. When he was only offered a position at a university, he left Russia in the beginning of October. Here we find him almost two years later talking about Russia again, and on June 21 of the same year he would write to Paul Engelmann: "I am now in England for a short stay; perhaps I shall go to Russia. God knows what will become of me" ([59,d], p. 59). Compare Monk's biography [1.a], pp. 248, 342f., 347–354. [I.S.]

^dWittgenstein had gone to Dublin in August 1936 to visit his friend Maurice O'Connor Drury. At the time he considered studying medicine and then starting a joint practice with Drury. Later he would frequently travel to Ireland (in the years 1947, 1948, and 1949). [I.S.]

^e"for example" was inserted into the line.

^f"feel" was inserted into the line.

[230–231]

, fühle
 sehe ^{||} den Wert der Dinge falsch.

Ich weiß gar nicht, was ich in Zukunft tun soll. Soll ich hierher, nach Skjolden, zurückkehren? Und was hier, wenn ich hier nicht werde arbeiten können? Soll ich hier auch ohne die Arbeit leben? Und ohne eine geregelte Arbeit, – das kann ich nicht. Oder soll ich unbedingt zu arbeiten versuchen? Wenn das, so muß ich es auch jetzt tun!

Ich bin überzeugt, ich sehe alles falsch an, wenn ich so spekuliere.

Hat mein norwegischer Aufenthalt seine Schuldigkeit getan? Denn, daß er in eine Art halb gemütlich, halb ungemütliches Einsiedlerleben ausartet, das kann nicht recht sein. Er muß Frucht bringen! – Es gäbe ja nun die Möglichkeit hier jetzt viel länger zu bleiben, mein Kommen nach

Wien & England zu verschieben. Und die Frage ist: Könnte ich nicht dazu entschließen, ^{etwa} || noch zwei Monate hier zu bleiben? Gott, ich glaube ja! Nur Sorge ich mich um meinen Freund & ich will nicht meine Leute in Wien enttäuschen. Ich glaube, ich kann es wohl auf mich nehmen, hier zu bleiben, wenn ich mit ganzem Herzen hier sein kann; wenn es einfach meine Aufgabe ist, hier zu bleiben; & zu warten, ob ich werde gut arbeiten können.

Andererseits ist wahr, daß mich jetzt etwas von hier wegtreibt. Ich fühle mich stumpf, möchte weg & nach einiger Zeit erfrische zurückkommen. – Eines ist sicher ich ermüde jetzt sehr rasch durch meine Arbeit, & dies ist nicht meine Schuld. Nach wenigen Stunden nicht sehr intensiver Arbeit kann ich nicht mehr denken. Es ist so, als wäre ich jetzt müde. Fehlt

I don't know at all what I should do in the future. Shall I return here, to Skjolden? And do what here, when I am not able to work here? Should I live here also without work? And without regular work,—I can't do that. Or shall I absolutely attempt to work? If that, I must do that now too!

I am convinced I am looking at everything wrongly when I speculate like that.

Has my Norwegian stay done its job?^a For it can't be right that it degenerates into a sort of half-comfortable, half-uncomfortable hermit's life. It must bear fruit!—There would be the possibility, after all, to stay here much longer now, to postpone my arrival in [231] Vienna & England. And the question is: Could I resolve to stay here, say,^b for another two months? God, I believe yes! It's just that I worry about my friend^c & don't want to disappoint my people in Vienna. I believe I can take it upon myself to stay here if I can be here wholeheartedly, if it is simply my task to stay here, & to await whether I will be able to work well.

On the other hand it is true that something drives me away from here. I am feeling dull, want to get away & return fresh after a while.—One thing is for sure, I very quickly tire now in my work & this is not my fault. After a few hours of not very intense work I can't think anymore. It is as if I were tired now. Am I lacking the correct [232] nourishment? That would be possible.

^aCompare this entry of August 19, 1937 in MS 118, pp. 5f.: "I am feeling very strange; I don't know whether I have a right or good reason to live here now. I have no real need of loneliness, nor an overwhelming drive to work. One voice says: wait a little, then it will show itself.—Another voice is saying: Impossible that you will be able to endure here! But what shall I do? To Cambridge? I won't be able to write there. [. . .] One thing is clear: I am here now—no matter how and why I came here. So let me utilize my being-here as far as it goes. [. . .] That is, I can stay roughly 6 weeks, no matter how my work might go, but if after this time I have no clear reason for assuming that I work better here than elsewhere, then it is time to go. May God grant that I utilize my time of being-here well!" [I.S.]

^b"etwa (say)" was inserted into the line and could also be translated "roughly."

^cWittgenstein is probably referring to Francis Skinner.

[232–233]

die richtige Nahrung? Es wäre möglich.

6.4.

Eine Auslegung der Christlichen Lehre: Wach vollkommen auf! Wenn Du das tust, erkennst Du, daß Du nicht taugst; & damit hörst die Freude an dieser Welt für Dich auf. Und sie kann auch nicht wiederkommen, wenn Du wach bleibst. Du brauchst aber nun Er-lösung, – sonst bist Du verloren. Du mußt aber am Leben bleiben (und diese Welt ist für Dich tot) so brauchst Du ein neues Licht anderswoher. In diesem Licht kann keine Klugheit, oder Weisheit, sein; denn für diese Welt bist Du tot. (Denn sie ist das Paradies, in dem Du aber Deiner Sündigkeit wegen nichts anfangen kannst.) Du mußt

Dich also als tot anerkennen, & ein anderes Leben in [e]mpfang nehmen (denn ohne das ist es unmöglich, Dich, ohne Verzweiflung, als tot anzuerkennen). Dieses Leben muß Dich, gleichsam, schwebend über dieser Erde erhalten; d.h, wenn Du ^{nicht} † auf der Erde gehst, so ruhst Du doch nicht ^{mehr} † auf der Erde, sondern hängst im Himmel; Du wirst von oben gehalten, nicht von unten gestützt. – Dieses Leben aber ist die ~~menschliche~~ Liebe, die menschliche Liebe, zum Vollkommenen. Und diese ist der Glaube. 'Alles andere findet sich.'

Tmgg hvi tvpmyg wzhh rxs svf-
ge qzivi yrn & ori yvhhvi rhg.

Habe heute wieder gemerkt, wie ich gleich deprimiert werde, wenn Leute, aus irgend einem Grund, nicht sehr, nicht besonders freundlich zu mir sind. Ich fragte mich: warum bin ich so mißmutig darüber?

6.4.2.4.[37]

An exegesis of the Christian teaching: Wake up completely! When you do that you recognize that you are no good & thus the joy you take in this world comes to an end. And it can't come back either if you stay awake. But now you need salvation,—otherwise you are lost. But you must stay alive (and this world is dead to you) so you need a new light from elsewhere. In this light there can be no cleverness, wisdom; for to this world you are dead. (Since this world is the paradise in which, because of your sinfulness, you can't go about anything, however.) You must [233] acknowledge yourself as dead & receive another life (for without that it is impossible to acknowledge yourself as dead without despair). This life must uphold you as if in suspension above this earth; that is, when you are walking on the earth, you nevertheless no longer^a rest on the earth, but hang in the sky;^b you are held from above, not supported from below.—But this life is love, human love, of the perfect one.^c And this love is faith.

'Everything else works itself out.'^d

God^e be praised that I am clearer today & feeling better.

Noticed again today how I get depressed right away when people, for whatever reason, are not very, not especially friendly to me. I asked myself: why do I get so ill-humored about this? [234] & answered myself: "Because I am quite unstable." Then the comparison

^aAgain, by inserting a word into the line, Wittgenstein changed "do not (nicht)" into "no longer (nicht mehr)."

^bThe German word "Himmel" refers to both heaven and sky. One could also have translated "hover in heaven."

^cWittgenstein first wrote "human love," struck "human" and continued with "love, human love."—The German "Liebe zum Vollkommenen" is ambiguous: While it could be rendered "love of the perfect," the context (see [213f., 219, 234]) suggests that Wittgenstein speaks of loving the perfect one (den Vollkommenen).

^dCompare this passage to a remark from MS 120 (dated December 12, 1937) in *Culture and Value* [6,b], pp. 33/38f. Wittgenstein asks how the certainty is attainable that is requisite for salvation or redemption: "Only love can believe the resurrection. Or: what believes in resurrection is love. One might say: redeeming love believes even in the resurrection; holds fast even to the resurrection.[. . .] So this can only come about if you no longer support yourself on this earth but suspend yourself from heaven. Then *everything* is different and it is 'no wonder' if you can then do what now you cannot do. (Someone who is suspended is of course to be regarded like someone who is standing but the interplay of forces within him is quite different, after all & hence he is able to do quite different things than can one who stands.)" [I.S.]

^eIn code: Gott sei gelobt dass ich heute klarer bin & mir besser ist.

[234–235]

& antwortete mir: “Weil ich ganz un-
gefestigt bin”. Dann fiel mir der
Vergleich ein, daß ich mich ganz
so fühle, wie ein schlechter
Reiter auf dem Pferd: ist das Pferd
gut aufgelegt, so geht es gut,
kaum aber wird das Pferd un-
ruhig, so wird er unsicher, so
merkt er seine Unsicherheit & daß
er ganz vom Pferd abhängig ist.
So geht es, glaube ich, auch meiner
Schwester Helene mit den Leuten.
So Einer ist geneigt, einmal gut, ein-
mal schlecht von den ~~Menschen~~
Leuten zu denken, jenachdem sie
gerade mehr oder weniger freund-
lich mit ihm sind.

9.4.

“Du mußt den Vollkommenen
lieben über alles, so bist Du
selig.” Das scheint mir die Summe
der christlichen Lehre zu sein.

[12|11].4

Das Eis ist nun schon schlecht &
ich muß mit dem Boot über den Fluß
fahren. Das bringt (u|U)nbequemlichkei-
ten & (geringe) Gefahren mit sich. Ich
bin leicht verzagt & geängtet .

Ich habe jetzt vor in den ersten
Tagen des Mai nach Wien zu reisen. Ende
Mai nach England.

Heute gegen (m|M)orgen träumte
mir, ich hätte eine lange (P|p)hilosophi-
sche Diskussion mit mehreren Andern.

Ich kam dabei zu dem Satz, den
ich beim Aufwachen noch ^{ungefähr} II wußte:

“Laß uns doch unsre Mutterspra-
che reden, & nicht glauben wir
müßten uns an unserm eigenen Schopf
aus dem Sumpf ziehen; das war
ja, – Gott sei Dank – nur ein Traum.
Wir sollen ^{ja} II nur Mißverständnisse
beseitigen.” Ich glaube, daß ist
ein guter Satz.

Tmgg zppvrn hvr Pmy!

occurred to me that I feel just like a bad rider on a horse: if the horse is well disposed, then it goes well, but as soon as the horse gets restless, the rider becomes insecure, and notices his insecurity & that he depends entirely on the horse. I believe this is also how my sister Helene fares with people. Such a person is inclined to think well of people^a at one time, ill at another, depending on whether they are more or less friendly to her just then.

9.4.2.4.[37]

“You must love the perfect one more than anything, then you are blessed.”^b This seems to me the sum of the Christian doctrine.

11.4.2.4.[37]

[235] The ice is already bad now & I must take the boat across the river. This brings inconveniences & (small) dangers with it. I get fainthearted & scared easily.^c

I plan to travel to Vienna in the first days of May. At the end of May to England.^d

At around dawn I dreamt today that I had a long philosophical discussion with several others.

In it I arrived at a sentence which upon awakening I still vaguely^e knew.

“But let us talk in our mother tongue, & not believe that we must pull ourselves out of the swamp by our own hair;^f that was—thank God—only a dream, after all. We are only supposed to remove misunderstandings, after all.”^g I think, this is a good sentence.^h

To Godⁱ alone be praise!

^a“people (Leute)” replaces “human beings (Menschen).”

^bIn the New Testament compare Matthew 22:37, Luke 10:27, and Mark 12:30. [I.S.]

^cThe German can also be translated: “I am a little fainthearted (verzagt) & scared (geängstigt).”

^dWittgenstein did indeed travel to Vienna in the first days of May, leaving from there to Cambridge on June 2. There he dictated a revised version of the *Philosophical Investigations* (typescript 220). On August 10 he began his return to Skjolden, where he arrived on August 16 and stayed until the middle of December. [I.S.]

^e“vaguely (ungefähr)” was inserted into the line.

^fWittgenstein is here referring to the Baron Munchhausen’s legendary feat of pulling himself (horse and rider) out of a swamp by pulling at his hair (to be found in the first chapter of Gottfried August Bürger’s expanded German edition of *Des Freiherrn von Münchhausen wunderbare Reisen und Abenteuer zu Wasser und zu Lande*, 1786).

^g“after all (ja)” was inserted into the line; wavy underlining indicates doubts about this insertion.

^hCompare remark 91 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, also remarks 87, 90, 93, 109, 11, and 120, and the preface to the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

ⁱIn code: Gott allein sei Lob!

[236–237]

Die Kürze des Ausdrucks: die Kürze des Ausdrucks ist nicht mit der Elle zu messen. Mancher Ausdruck ist kürzer, der auf dem Papier länger ist. Wie es leichter ist, ein 'f' so zu schreiben: *f*, als so: *f*. ~~Wenn man~~ Man fühlt oft, ein Satz sei zu lang & dann will man ihn kürzen, indem man Wörter abstreicht; dadurch kriegt er eine gezwungene & unbefriedigende Kürze. Vielleicht aber fehlen ihm Worte zur richtigen Kürze.

16.4.

Seit gestern haben die Birken kleine grüne Spitzen. – Ich fühle mich schon einige Tage etwas unwohl, auch sehr matt. Ich arbeite schlecht, obwohl ich mir Mühe gebe. Bin nicht klar, wie viel Sinn

es hat, noch 14 Tage hier zu bleiben.

Eine Stimme sagt mir: 'reise doch früher!' & eine sagt: wart & bleib da! – Wenn ich doch wüßte was richtig ist!

In den letzten Tagen oft in "Keiser & Galiläer" gelesen, & mit großem Eindruck. –

Für das Fortreisen spricht manches; aber auch die Feigheit. Und für das Dableiben auch etwas – aber auch Pedanterie, Furcht vor dem Urteil Anderer, & dergl.. – Es ist nicht recht davonzulaufen, der Ungeduld & Feigheit nachzugeben, & andererseits erscheint es unvernünftig, & auch wieder feig, hier zu bleiben.

Wenn ich hier bleibe, so fürchte ich krank zu werden & dann nicht nach Hause & nach England zu kommen: als ob ich nicht auch

[236]

The shortness of an expression: the shortness of an expression is not to be measured with a yard-stick. Some expressions are shorter that are longer on paper. Just as it is easier to write ‘f’ like this: *f* rather than like this: *f*. One^a often feels that a sentence is too long & then wants to shorten it by striking out words; through that it assumes a forced & unsatisfying shortness. But perhaps it lacks words to have the right shortness.

16.4.2.4.[37]

Since yesterday the birches have had small green tips.—I have been feeling a bit unwell for a few days already, also very weary. I am working badly even though I make an effort. Am not clear how much sense [237] it makes to stay here for another 14 days. A voice tells me: ‘why don’t you travel earlier!’ & another says: wait & stay!—If only I knew what is right!

In the last days I have often read in “Emperor & Galilean,”^b & greatly impressed—

Several things speak in favor of a departure; but also cowardice. And a few things also in favor of staying—but also pedantry, fear of the judgement of others, & the like.—It is not right to run away, to give in to impatience & cowardice, & on the other hand it seems unreasonable, & once again cowardly to stay here.

If I stay here, I am afraid of becoming sick & then not getting home & to England: as if I [238] couldn’t get sick or have an accident also in Vienna etc.!

^aWittgenstein began a sentence “When (or if) one,” struck those words and continued “One often feels . . .”

^bThe Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen wrote *Emperor and Galilean* in 1873. The play examines the reign of Roman Emperor Julian the Apostate.

[238–239]

in Wien krank werden oder verunglücken könnte etc.?!
Schwerer ist es hier zu bleiben, als wegzufahren.

Ist das Alleinsein mit sich selbst – oder mit Gott, nicht wie das Alleinsein mit einem Raubtier? Es kann ^{Dich} ^{||} jeden Moment anfallen. – Aber ist es nicht eben darum, daß Du nicht fortlaufen sollst?! Ist dies nicht, sozusagen, das herrliche?! Heißt es nicht: gewinne dieses Raubtier lieb! – Und doch muß man bitten: “Führe uns nicht in Versuchung!”

Ich glaube: es ist durch das Wort “glauben” in der Religion furchtbar viel Unheil angerichtet worden. Alle die verzwickten Gedanken über

das ‘Paradox’, die ewige Bedeutung einer historischen Tatsache u. dergl.

Sagst Du aber statt “Glaube an Christus”: “Liebe zu Christus”, so

17.4.

verschwindet das Paradox, d.i.,

die Reizung des Verstandes. Was

hat die Religion mit so einem

(Auch das kann für den oder den zu seiner Religion gehören) Kitzeln des Verstandes zu tun. ^{||}

Nicht das man nun sagen könnte:

Ja jetzt ist alles einfach – oder

verständlich. Es ist gar nichts

verständlich, es ist nur nicht

unverständlich. –

20.4.

Heute nacht & in der Früh

wurde beinahe das ganze Eis

am See gegen den Fluß hinunter

19.4

getrieben, so daß der

See plötzlich beinahe ganz

frei ist.

Seit ein paar Monaten schon

bedröht ich wieder beim Stuhlgang &

habe auch etwas Schmerzen. –

It is harder to stay here than to leave.

17.4.[37]

Is being alone with oneself—or with God, not like being alone with a wild animal? It can attack you^a any moment.—But isn't that precisely why you shouldn't run away?! Isn't that, so to speak, what's glorious?! Doesn't it mean: grow fond of this wild animal!—And yet one must ask: Lead us not into temptation!

19.4.[37]

I believe: the word “believing” has wrought horrible havoc in religion. All the knotty thoughts about [239] the ‘paradox’ of the eternal meaning of a historical fact and the like.^b But if instead of “belief in Christ” you would say: “love of Christ,” the paradox vanishes, that is, the irritation of the intellect. What does religion have to do with such a tickling of the intellect. (For someone or another this too may belong to their religion.)^c

It is not that now one could say: Yes, finally everything is simple—or intelligible. Nothing at all is intelligible, it is just not unintelligible.—

20.4.

Last night & in the early morning almost all of the ice at the lake was driven down to the river so that the lake is almost entirely clear.

For a few months now I have been having blood in my stool again & also have some pain.—[240] Think often that perhaps I will die of rectal cancer.^d Be that as it may—would

^a“you” was inserted into the line.

^bSee pages [132f.] above and a remark from MS 120 (dated December 8 and 9, 1937) in *Culture and Value*, [6,b], p. 32/37: “Christianity is not based on a historical truth, but presents us with a (historical) report & says: now believe! But not believe this report with the belief that belongs to a historical report,—but rather: believe, through thick & thin & you can do this only as the outcome of a life. Here you have a report!—don't relate to it as to another historical report! Let it take a quite different place in your life.—There is nothing paradoxical in that! [. . .] Human beings seize this report (the gospels) believingly (that is, lovingly): That is the certainty of this taking-for-true; nothing else.” [I.S.]

^cThis parenthetical remark was inserted into the line.

^dWittgenstein had been repeatedly examined for a possibly serious intestinal disease when, in November 1949, he was diagnosed with cancer of the prostate (he died on April 29, 1951).

[240–241]

Denke oft daran, daß ich vielleicht
an Mastdarmkrebs sterben wer-
de. Wie auch immer – möge ich
gut sterben!

Fühle mich etwas krank &
meine Gedanken kommen nicht
in Schwung. Trotz Wärme & gutem
Wetter.

Ich tue heute etwas
Falsches & Schlechtes: nämlich
ich vegetiere. Ich kann, scheint's,
nichts rechtes tun & bin
dazu in einer Art dumpfen
Angst. – Ich sollte vielleicht
unter solchen Umständen
fasten & beten; – aber ich bin
geneigt zu essen & esse – denn
ich fürchte mich an so einem
Tage auf mich zu schauen.

Habe mich bestimmt am
1. Mai hier wegzureisen – so Gott
will.

Heute heult der 23.4

Wind ums Haus, was mir immer
sehr arg ist. Es beänzigt & stört
mich.

Rxs yvofsv orxs tvtn ovrv
gizfirtvn & ymhvn Tvufspv af hgivrgvn;
zyvi ovrv Qizug vipzsog hm hxsnvpp.

26.4

Herrliches Wetter. Die Birken schon
belaubt. Gestern nacht sah
ich das erste große Nordlicht.
Ich habe es ungefähr 3
Stunden lang angesehen;
ein unbeschreibliches Schau-
spiel.

Rxs vigzllv orxs mug zfu
Hxszyrtqvr & Tvra!!

27.4.

Wrv Dzsisvrg hmppgvhg wf
prvyszyvn: zyvi Wf prvvhg roovi
znwviv Wrntv & wrv Dzsisvrg
nfi nvyvnyvr!

2[8|9].4.

Irgendwie gerinnen mir jetzt

that I die good!^a

Feeling a bit sick & my thoughts aren't gaining momentum.^b In spite of warmth & good weather.

Today I am doing something wrong & bad: namely I vegetate. I can't seem to do anything sensible & am moreover in a sort of dull fear.—Under such circumstances I should perhaps fast & pray;—but I am inclined to eat & eat—for on a day like this I am afraid to look at myself.

Have directed myself to leave on May 1st—God willing.

23.4.[37]

Today the wind is howling [241] around the house which always gets to me. It scares & disturbs me.

I^c am making an effort to fight my sad & mean feelings; but my strength wears out so quickly.

26.4.[37]

Glorious weather. The birches are in leaf already. Last night I saw the first great Northern Lights. I looked at them for roughly 3 hours; an indescribable spectacle.

I^d often catch myself being shabby & miserly.

27.4.[37]

You should love the truth: but you always love other things & the truth only on the side!

29.4.[37]

Somehow my thoughts are now curdling [242] when I try to think about philosophy.^e—Is

^aThe German is ambiguous; while he may be wishing to die good (that is, as a good person), his expression can also be translated: “would that I die well.”

^bLiterally, Wittgenstein writes of his thoughts not “moving into gear (*in Schwung kommen*).”

^cIn code: Ich bemühe mich gegen meine traurigen & bösen Gefühle zu streiten; aber meine Kraft erlahmt so schnell.

^dIn code: Ich ertappe mich oft auf Schägigkeit & Geiz! [27.4.] Die Wahrheit solltest du liebhaben: aber Du liebst immer andere Dinge & die Wahrheit nur nebenbei!

^e“Philosophy” replaces “logic.”

[242–243]

meine Gedanken, wenn ich
über ~~Logik~~ Philosophie denken
will. – Ob das das Ende meiner
philosophischen Laufbahn
ist?

30.4.

Ich bin im höchsten Grade übel-
nehmerisch. Ein böses Zeichen.

24.9.37

Juden! ihr habt der Welt schon
lange nichts mehr gegeben, wo-
für sie Euch dankt. Und das
nicht, weil sie undankbar
ist. Denn man fühlt nicht
Dank für jede Gabe, bloß
weil sie für_uns nützlich ist.

Drum gebt ihr wieder
etwas, wofür Euch nicht kalte
Anerkennung, sondern warmer
Dank gebührt.

Aber das Einzige, was sie von
Euch braucht, ist Eure Unter-

werfung unter das Schicksal.

Ihr könnt ihr Rosen geben,
die blühen werden, nie verwel-
ken.

Man hat Recht, sich vor den
Geistern auch großer Männer zu
fürchten. Und auch vor denen
guter Menschen. Denn was bei
ihm Heil gewirkt hat, kann bei
mir Unheil wirken. Denn der
Geist ohne den Menschen ist
nicht gut – noch schlecht. In
mir aber kann er ein übler
Geist sein.

that the end of my philosophical career?

30.4.[37]

I bear grudges to the highest degree. A bad sign.

24.9.37^a

Jews! for the longest time you haven't given the world anything for which it is grateful to you. And that, not because it is ungrateful. Since one doesn't feel gratitude for every contribution just because it is useful to us.

So give it something again for which you deserve not cold recognition but warm gratitude.

But the only thing it needs from you is your sub[243]mission to fate.

You might give it roses that will blossom, never wilt.^b

One is right to fear the spirits^c even of great men. And also those of good people. For what produced well-being in him^d can effect ill-being in me. For the spirit without the person is not good—nor bad. But in me it can be a nasty spirit.^e

^aFive months later. Wittgenstein had returned to Skjolden in August. Francis Skinner was staying with him for 10 days while these last two remarks were written. Compare Monk's biography [1.a], pp. 376f., also *Wittgenstein and Norway* [92.c], p. 50.

^bCompare this remark by Wittgenstein's biographer Ray Monk (which was written before these diaries became known): "So long as he lived, Wittgenstein never ceased to struggle against his own pride, and to express doubts about his philosophical achievement and his own moral decency. After 1931, however, he dropped the language of anti-Semitism as a means of expressing those doubts" ([1.a], p. 317). See also David Stern's "Was Wittgenstein a Jew?" in James C. Klagge, ed., *Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 237–272.

^c"Geister" could be translated "minds," "spirits," or "ghosts."

^dThe referent of "him" is unclear—someone or one of the great men or good people.

^eThis last entry of the diary apparently filled its last remaining space. Wittgenstein left Norway in December 1937 and in the course of 1938 returned once again to academic life in Cambridge.

meiner ungläublichen musikalischen
 Begabung gewesen sei; ich hatte
 nämlich am Tag vorher so wunder-
 bar bei einem Werk von Mendelssohn,
 "Die Bachanten" (oder so ähnlich)
 mit ~~gehört~~ ^{mitgehört}; es war als
 hätte ich in diesem Werk unter uns
 zu Hause ^{ausdrucksvoll} ~~ausgedrückt~~ ^{ausgedrückt}
 mitgehört, ~~und~~ ^{ausdrucksvoll} ~~ausgedrückt~~ ^{ausgedrückt}
 gesehen. ~~Das~~ ^{Das} ~~ganz~~ ^{ganz} Paul + Minnie
 schrieben mit dem Lof Teromes voll
 kommen übereinzustimmen. Jerome
 hat ^{in der Hand} ~~gesagt~~ ^{gesagt} "Talent!" (oder
 etwas Ähnliches; ich erinnere mich daran
 nicht sicher) Ich hielt eine abgeblühte
 Pflanze in der Hand mit ^{in der Hand} ~~in der Hand~~ ^{in der Hand}
~~in der Hand~~ ^{in der Hand} ~~in der Hand~~ ^{in der Hand}
 dachte; wenn ~~ich~~ ^{ich} ~~ich~~ ^{ich} ~~ich~~ ^{ich}
 sollten, wie schade es doch um ein
 ungebenutztes musikalisches Talent
 sei, würde ich ihnen die Pflanze zei-
 gen + sagen, daß die Natur mit
 ihrem Samen auch nicht sparsam

У нас в науке до сих пор + у нас в науке
 преобладает до сих пор до сих пор до сих пор
~~еще не~~ ~~еще не~~ ~~еще не~~ ~~еще не~~
~~еще не~~ ~~еще не~~ ~~еще не~~ ~~еще не~~

Unser Gegenstand ist doch abstrakt,
 - wie kann er dann von gesprochenen
 oder geschriebenen Zeichen be-
 deuten?

Nun würde von dem Gebrauch
 der Zeichen ~~als Zeichen~~ (~~+ natürlich~~
 ist der Gebrauch des Zeichens nicht
 der Gegenstand; der als da. Er-
 leidet, Interessante dem Zeichen
 als seinem ^{ersten} bloßen Vertreter
 gegenübergestellt) ~~gegenüber~~

Aber was ist ein Gebrauch der Zei-
 chen ^{gegenüber} abstraktes? Da erinnere ich
 mich, erstens, daran, daß Namen oft eine
 spezifische Rolle ^{zugehört} ~~haben~~
 haben, + zweitens ~~haben~~, daß die Prob-
 leme, die durch sie ^{entstehen} ~~entstehen~~ ^{entstehen} ~~entstehen~~
^{entstehen} ~~entstehen~~ ~~entstehen~~ ~~entstehen~~
 entstehen, immer den
 Charakter des profunden haben.

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Umgруппierung von Elementen. Dies ist
 nun ~~etwas~~ man in jedem Sinne
 Erhaben nehmen; sie wird es dadurch
 da wir die ganze Welt durch sie
 betrachten. Aber es ist nun nicht
 wichtiger, als da wir uns klar werden
 welche Erscheinungen, welche einafa-
 chen, handhabbaren, Fälle das Urbild
 dieser Idee sind. Inter: Frage dich,
 wenn du versuchst bist, allgemeine
 metaphysische Aussagen zu machen
 (immer): ~~du~~ ^{in welchem Falle} denke ich das
 eigentlich? - Was für ein Fall, welche Ver-
 hellung, schwebt ein denn da vor?
 Diese Frage widerspricht sich wenn etwas
 in uns, den wir schauen damit das
 Ideal zu befürden; während wir das
 nicht ^{noch} ~~haben~~ ^{haben} als es an den Ort zu
 stellen ^{wohin es gehört} ~~es~~ ^{will}. Denn es ist
 das Bild sein ^{woher} wir die Welt
 lichkeit vergleichen, mit ^{der} ~~dem~~ ^{Welt}
 wir darstellen, wie sie ist; nicht
 ein Bild was ist wir die Willkür?

^{noyph}
 or vobz was vobz yth'ns in neboralms can be
 Quoor res kopych wpyor ru wro
sviruthgo Touzal, hu ksoofu res
 afifeg. Fluw fuzoi Touzal oovuo res
 a y. wro vqazh ovm wri. Hfgou Ov
 uput wri Ooubkoon af coiprovion.
 Res qumungo wro voruapkes Prarot
 roovi upi kgfioou, down eum sm.
 guu gfu ovs tohagupha drid.
 down res Powd gyon ofth
^{ponwou ofth to why of ypp y dhoi}
 hu rly vth wmas yohoi kumpsoh,
 dzh. gfh was Qzolu wth Hfgou
 Hton wth Hspozago ouhgoug,
 gfh kumpsoh, ^{with} gfh voo
 Qzolu wth Hspozogou org hro
 kopych drid.
 Dzh res rezag hzzfyu: Res
 hzzfyu, wth. res vobz rezag
 hu won Ooubkoon ^{ami vobz oviout} upifegou kumpso
 down res gfu drpp, dzh res afi iong
 upgo.
 Res hzzfyu, wth res urrez
 pftou kump; wth res won Ooubkoon
 hz vobz kump; wth res ovs loon

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Ludwig Hänsel–Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Friendship, 1929–1940

On November 3, 1918, the Austrian officer Ludwig Wittgenstein became an Italian prisoner of war. Sometime thereafter he was transferred to a camp for about seventeen hundred officers at Cassino.^a

Ludwig Hänsel arrived in Cassino on November 18. Like Wittgenstein, the sculptor Michael Drobil, and the teacher Franz Parak, he stayed there until August 21, 1919. Looking back at these nine months, Hänsel wrote in 1933: “I consider the time of my imprisonment the best and happiest time of my life. I was alive and free as hardly ever before or since.” Among the reasons for this happiness was that “one could be splendidly alone among the masses.” In particular, however, he relished the rich cultural life at the camp:

There was chamber music and gymnastics, soccer clubs and exhibitions of paintings, festivities of all kind with astounding feats of decoration, male choirs and cabaret presentations, revues and humorous talks. Talks for example about satanism in literature (weak) and Andersen’s fairy tales (charming). In general a great number of talks and lectures. Everyone found his audience. The course of lectures about German literature the greatest and most appreciative one. One could hear lectures on projective geometry and logic, Kant and Dutch painting, psycho-analysis and Hebrew, French and the epistles of Paul (in

^aAccording to Ray Monk’s biography, Wittgenstein stayed at a camp in Como until January. This is consistent with Hänsel’s first mention of Wittgenstein in a letter dated February 20. Also, Franz Parak talks of meeting Wittgenstein as a recent arrival on a new transport. Monk and Michael Nedo are probably wrong, however, when they suggest that Wittgenstein met Hänsel and Drobil in Como already or on the way to Cassino. According to Brian McGuinness, Hayek’s unpublished Wittgenstein biography suggests that “Wittgenstein first knew Hänsel (at Como presumably) as a lecturer on logic where he heard him in silence, but afterwards expounded symbolic logic to him.” See Brian McGuinness, *Wittgenstein—A Life: Young Ludwig 1889–1921* (London: Duckworth, 1988), pp. 268–277; Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 158; Ludwig Hänsel, “Gefangenenlager bei Cassino,” in Ilse Somavilla, Anton Unterkircher, and Christian Paul Berger, eds., *Ludwig Hänsel–Ludwig Wittgenstein: Eine Freundschaft* (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1994), pp. 12–14; Franz Parak, “Wittgenstein in Monte Cassino,” in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Geheime Tagebücher: 1914–1916*, ed. Wilhelm Baum (Vienna: Turia and Kant, 1991), pp. 141–154; Michael Nedo, *Einführung: Introduction to the Wiener Ausgabe of Wittgenstein’s works* (Vienna: Springer, 1993), pp. 21f.

Greek!) and who knows what else. [. . .] And there were plenty of books. In private possession or in the large, well-maintained camp-library.^a

In this spirit of intellectual excitement Hänsel wrote home to his wife Anna on February 20, 1919: “I have come to know a young (30-year old) logician who is more significant in his thought than all those of roughly the same age whom I have gotten to know so far—serious, of noble simplicity, nervous, with a childish capacity for enjoyment. His name is Wittgenstein.”^b

Hänsel himself was thirty-two when he met the almost thirty-year old “young logician.” At the University of Graz he had studied German, French, and philosophy, attending lectures also in art history, history, and Indo-Germanic languages. After receiving his Ph.D. in 1910 he became a teacher of German and French. Ray Monk describes the intellectual bond between Hänsel and Wittgenstein at Cassino:

Wittgenstein got to know Hänsel after attending a class on logic that Hänsel was giving to prisoners who hoped upon release to train as teachers. This led to discussions between them, during which Wittgenstein led Hänsel through the elements of symbolic logic and explained the ideas of the *Tractatus* to him. They also read Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* together.^c

This intellectual bond was to be supplanted by a professional bond. During his time at Cassino Wittgenstein decided to become an elementary school teacher, and much of the early part of his correspondence with Hänsel revolves around his teaching. Since Hänsel was teaching at the academic *Gymnasium* and later became headmaster of one, Wittgenstein referred to him some of his more promising charges at the rural elementary schools where he was teaching.^d

The extant correspondence between Hänsel and Wittgenstein spans from September 12, 1919, to February 1, 1951. It has been published almost in its entirety in a collection that also contains numerous essays by Hänsel and critical studies of the Hänsel-Wittgenstein relationship. Most importantly, the 270 letters in that edition are not limited to the correspondence between Wittgenstein and Hänsel themselves but paint a picture of its cultural context by including letters to Hänsel from the Wittgenstein family, from Wittgenstein’s pupil Ernst Geiger, and from their mutual friend, the sculptor Michael Drobil.^e

^aSee Hänsel’s “Gefangenenerlager bei Cassino,” pp. 13, 14.

^bQuoted on page 15 of the volume *Ludwig Hänsel–Ludwig Wittgenstein* (p. 257, note a): “Ich habe einen jungen (30 jährigen) Logiker kennen gelernt, der gedanklich bedeutender ist als alle etwa Gleichaltrigen, die ich bis jetzt kennengelernt habe - ernst, von edler Selbstverständlichkeit, nervös, von einer kindlichen Fähigkeit, sich zu freuen. Er heißt Wittgenstein.”

^cSee Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein*, p. 158.

^dA part of the Hänsel-Wittgenstein correspondence was first published in Konrad Wünsche, *Der Volksschullehrer Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985).

^e*Ludwig Hänsel–Ludwig Wittgenstein: Eine Freundschaft* includes 270 letters, including 119 from Wittgenstein to Hänsel, 2 from Wittgenstein to Hänsel’s wife Anna, 49 from Hänsel to Wittgenstein; also, letters to Hänsel from sculptor Michael Drobil (3), from Wittgenstein’s former pupil Ernst Geiger (2), from his mother Leopoldine (5), his aunt Clara (3), sister Hermine (71), brother Paul (6), sister Margarete Stonborough (7), and nephew John Stonborough (3). Not included are at least 12 letters from Hänsel to Wittgenstein (compare page 377).

Our selection provides no substitute for the wealth of material included with the full correspondence. We focused on the immediate interaction between Wittgenstein and Hänsel at a time when, due in part to the physical distance between them, their correspondence was particularly substantive. As it happens, this is also the time when Wittgenstein assumed his public role as teacher of philosophy in Cambridge and when he embarked on the autobiographical project of the diaries, including his confession of 1937 to family and friends. Alfred Nordmann's translation includes all the published letters written by Wittgenstein (33) and Hänsel (4) from the period between Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge and the beginning of World War II, which prompted a seven-year hiatus in their correspondence. Two letters from Hermine, and one from Paul Wittgenstein have also been included because they shed light on the immediate context. We have retained the numbering of letters and most of the annotations provided by the original editors.^a Additional notes are designated "[Eds.]."

We also retained the title of the published correspondence *Ludwig Hänsel—Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Friendship*. These letters may demonstrate that Wittgenstein was not an easy friend to have—but since the demands and the meaning of friendship were always at stake, they also demonstrate that Wittgenstein was a good friend throughout.

^aOur selection of 40 from the letters numbered 181 to 259 appeared on pages 113 to 159 of *Ludwig Hänsel—Ludwig Wittgenstein: Eine Freundschaft*.

181 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, nach dem 18. 1. 1929]

L. H.!

Du wirst wohl von meiner Schwester Gretl erfahren haben daß ich in Cambridge bleibe. Ich habe vorläufig viel Schererei weil ich noch keine passende & billige Wohnung gefunden habe. Die Menschen sind sehr nett mit mir & das tut mir wohl. Mein Gehirn ist recht blöd, hoffentlich bessert es sich bald. Schreib' wie es Euch allen geht! Bitte teile auch dem Drobil das Wissenswerte über meine werte Person mit & grüße Ihn bestens. Er ist mich jetzt bis etwa zum 20^{ten} März los. Dann komme ich bis ca 14^{ten} April nach Wien.

Meine Adresse ist vorläufig bis auf weiteres

L. W. c/o J. M. Keynes Esq.

King's College

Cambridge England

Wenn ich mehr weiß werde ich mehr schreiben. Grüße die Kinder & Deine Frau.

Dein

Wittgenstein

vom Pfarrer Neururer habe ich heute einen Brief auf Umwegen bekommen. Er läßt Dich grüßen.

181 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, after January 18, 1929]

L.H.!

You probably heard from my sister Gretl that I will be staying in Cambridge.^a For the time being I am having a lot of trouble because I have not yet found a fitting & cheap apartment. The people are very nice to me & that does me good. My brain is rather dumb, hopefully that will improve soon. Write how all of you are doing! Please communicate also to Drobil^b what is worth knowing about my worthy person & best regards to him. He is now rid of me until about March 20th. Then I'll come until around April 14th to Vienna.

For the time being my address is tentatively

L.W. c/o J.M. Keynes Esq.

King's College

Cambridge England

Once I know more, I will write more. Greetings to your children & your wife,

Yours

Wittgenstein

today I received a forwarded letter from Father Neururer.^c He sends greetings.

^aWittgenstein had planned to travel to Cambridge in the fall of 1928. Because of a cold, he postponed the trip until January 1929. He arrived on January 18, intending to stay for only about fourteen days. This then became a permanent stay. During the first two weeks or so he lived with Frank and Lettice Ramsey at Mortimer Road 4, then with Mrs. Dobbs.

^bWhile prisoners of war, Wittgenstein and Hänsel formed a friendship with the Viennese sculptor Michael Drobil (1877–1958). Drobil made pencil sketches and a marble bust of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein worked in Drobil's studio and, between 1926 and 1928, created the bust of a girl's head. See Irene Nierhaus, "Der Kopf: Wittgenstein als 'aufrichtiger' Dilletant" in *Wittgenstein: Biographie, Philosophie, Praxis*, volume 1 of the exhibition at the Wiener Secession (Vienna: Wiener Secession, 1989), pp. 238–251. See a remark from 1931 in *Culture and Value*, edited by Georg Henrik von Wright rev. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 19/16.

^cAlois Lucius Neururer (1878–1952) was ordained to the priesthood in 1904. He moved to Trattenbach as of December 12, 1917, and became the parish priest on May 1, 1918. Wittgenstein met Neururer while teaching at the Trattenbach elementary school from 1924 to 1926. Their friendship lasted to the end of their lives. The letters from Neururer are currently not accessible. Wittgenstein told Drury in a 1949 conversation: "I have had a letter from an old friend in Austria, a priest. In it he says he hopes my work will go well, if it should be God's will. Now that's all I want: if it should be God's will." See Rush Rhees, ed. *Recollections of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 168.

183 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, vor dem 20. 3. 1929]
Montag

Lieber Hänsel!

Verzeih, daß ich Dir erst jetzt auf Deinen Brief antworte & auch jetzt nichts Gescheites. – Ich kann nur sagen, daß ich Dir sehr, sehr dankbar bin für das, was Du für Geiger tust. Grüß ihn von mir, bitte. Es ist schön, daß die Bücher dem Mareile gepaßt haben. Freilich waren sie wohl etwas zu elementar für sie. Aber für den Anfang sind sie glaube ich wunderbar. Und die Idee dieser vereinfachten Sprache ist eine ausgezeichnete. Ich lasse der I. Mareile für Ihre Zeilen danken & Alle herzlichst grüßen. Ich komme um den 20^{ten} nach Wien. Ich freue mich Dich wiederzusehen & Euch alle.

Dein
L. Wittgenstein

Bitte grüße Drobil.

184 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, nach dem 14. 4. 1929 ?]

Lieber Hänsel!

Dank Dir für das Buch! Auch für die guten Stunden mit Dir!

183 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, before March 20, 1929]

Monday

Dear Hänsel!

Forgive me for answering your letter only now & even now with nothing decent.—All I can say is that I am very, very grateful for what you are doing for Geiger.^a Give him my greetings, please. It is nice that the books suited Mareile.^b Of course they were a bit too elementary for her. But for starters they are wonderful, I think. And the idea of this simplified language is excellent. I extend my thanks to dear Mareile for her letter & most sincere greetings to all. I am coming to Vienna around the 20th. I am looking forward to seeing you again & all of you

Yours

L. Wittgenstein

Greetings to Drobil.

184 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, after April 14, 1929 ?]^c

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for the book! Also for the good hours with you!

^aErn(e)st Geiger (1912–1970) was a student of Wittgenstein's in the year 1923/1924 while he attended the fifth grade at the *Volksschule* in Puchberg. He continued his schooling in Vienna where he graduated from the *Bundesrealgymnasium Wien III* in 1932. He was one of various gifted students for whom Wittgenstein sought—in most cases without success—to secure an advanced education. Letters 155 and 157–160 indicate that Ludwig Hänsel was asked by Hermine Wittgenstein to help find new accommodations when Geiger displayed disciplinary problems. In letter 173, Hermine asks Hänsel to tutor him in mathematics or physics or find a tutor for him. In her next letter (174, probably end of 1927) she writes: “for me he is like a wall without a door and never before has it been so clear to me that guardianship does not become fruitful when it doesn't arise naturally but—as in this case—is imposed upon one by a third party. But the matter has been given this direction by my brother Ludwig and I must see that it is brought to a decent conclusion” (see also letter 190).

^bMaria (Mareile) Dal Bianco, née Hänsel (1915–1993) was the second of Hänsel's three children. It is not clear what books for the fourteen-year-old Wittgenstein is referring to.

^cThe conjectural dating is based on letter 181, but this letter may have been written in another year (see letter 185).

Laß einmal etwas von Dir hören. Meine Adresse ist für die nächste Zeit: (1 1/2 Monate) Trinity College.

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

185 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, Frühjahr/Sommer 1929 ?]

Lieber Hänsel!

Pierre Larousse Dictionaire universel du XIX^{me} siècle sagt im Artikel ›Pendaison‹ (u.a.):

»La mort par pendaison peut avoir lieu quelle que soit la position du corps. Elle survient par asphyxie, par congestion ou par compression et lésion da la moelle épinière, après la luxation des premières vertèbres cervicales«

Herzlichste Grüße

Dein genauer

Ludwig Wittgenstein

186 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, vor dem 15. 7. 1929]

L. H.!

Ich werde am 16. oder 17. Juli England verlassen & über Paris & die Schweiz nach Wien fahren. Alles was halbwegs auf meiner Route liegt ist mir als Treffpunkt

Keep in touch. My address is for the time being: (1 1/2 months) Trinity College.^a

Yours

Ludwig Wittgenstein

185 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, spring/summer 1929 ?]^b

Dear Hänsel!

The Pierre Larousse Dictionnaire universel du XIX^{me} siècle^c states under the entry ‘Pendaison’: (among other things):

“La mort par pendaison peut avoir lieu quelle que soit la position du corps. Elle survient par asphyxie, par congestion ou par compression et lésion de la moelle épinière, après la luxation des premières vertèbres cervicales”^d

Best regards

Your exact

Ludwig Wittgenstein

186 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, before July 15, 1929]^e

L.H.!

I will leave England on July 16 or 17 & travel to Vienna via Paris & Switzerland. Anywhere more or less on that route suits me well as a meeting place & I am so dumb & unpractical that

^aOn June 19, 1929, Wittgenstein received a stipend from Trinity College for the continuation of his researches. While a student before World War I, after his appointment later in the year (on December 12, 1930) to a five-year term as research fellow, and again in 1939 as professor of philosophy he lived in the same rooms on Whewell’s Court in Cambridge’s Trinity College.

^bSame stationary as letter 184; the two letters were next to each other in the Hänsel papers but in an envelope labeled 1935/36.

^cWittgenstein quoted from this fifteen-volume encyclopaedia (published between 1864 and 1876) also in a 1933 letter to Gilbert Pattison.

^d“Hanging: Death by hanging can occur whatever position of the body may be. It is brought about by asphyxiation, by congestion or compression and injury of the spinal cord after dislocation of the first cervical vertebra.”

^eIt is possible that Hänsel stayed in a French monastery at that time which he did occasionally for about two weeks in the summer.

recht & ich bin so dumm & unpraktisch daß es am besten sein wird Du bestimmst. Wenn wir uns ein-zwei Tage sehen wollen so müßte es an einem nicht zu teuren Ort sein da ich etwas sparen muß. Bitte schreibe mir einen Vorschlag.

Dein
Wittgenstein

187 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

Frostlake Cottage
Malting Lane
Cambridge
[vor dem 15. 7. 1929]

L. H.!

Am besten wäre es Du würdest mich in Calais treffen und zwar komme ich mit dem Schiff von Dover das um 14^h 30 Uhr eintrifft & bitte Dich mich bei der Landungsstelle zu erwarten. Nun aber der Tag: Ich möchte schon am 15^{ten} nach Calais kommen. Ist es Dir möglich dann schon hinzukommen? Wenn ja, so telegraphiere mir gleich, daß, ja; und wenn nicht, so telegraphiere das frühest mögliche Datum. Ich werde mich dann danach richten. D.h., z.B., wenn Du telegra[p]hierst »komme am 16^{ten}« so werde ich am 16^{ten} kommen. Grüße Deine Familie bestens!

Auf Wiedersehen

Dein
Wittgenstein

it's best that you decide. If we want to see each other one or two days it shouldn't be at too expensive a place since I must save a little. Please send me a suggestion.

Yours
Wittgenstein

187 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

Frostlake Cottage^a
Malting Lane
Cambridge
[before July 15, 1929]

L.H.!

The best thing would be for you to meet me in Calais, for I am coming with the ship from Dover that arrives at 2:30 pm & ask you to await me at the jetty. But now concerning the day: I would like to come to Calais already on the 15th. Is it possible for you to come there that soon? If yes, wire me right away that yes; and if not, wire me the earliest possible date. I will then go by that. That is, for example, if you wire “come on the 16th” then I'll come on the 16th. Best regards to your family!

Good bye

Yours
Wittgenstein

^aWittgenstein spent the first part of the summer vacation 1929 at the house of Maurice Dobb and his wife in Cambridge, Frostlake Cottage, Malting House. Along with Piero Sraffa, Nicholas Bachtin, and George Thomson, Dobb was one of Wittgenstein's Marxist friends. Together with David Haden-Guest and John Cornford he founded the Cambridge Communist Party to which belonged many leading intellectuals, including young members of the so-called Apostles; see Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 343, 347f.

188 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

Hochreit Post Hohenberg
N. Ö.
Samstag [vor dem 29. 8. 1929 ?]

Lieber Hänsel!

Danke für Eure liebe Karte. Ich fahre in den letzten Tagen August nach England zurück & könnte es so einrichten daß ich am 29^{ten} August zu Euch nach Pabenschwand käme & bis zum 30^{ten} oder 31^{ten} bliebe. Laß mich, bitte, gleich durch eine Zeile wissen, ob Euch das recht wäre, da ich Verschiedenes danach einzurichten habe.

Seid herzlichst begrüßt.

Dein
L. W.

189 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, nach dem 23. 11. 1929]

L. H.!

Dank' Dir für Deinen Brief. Ich stimme nicht mit Dir überein, das weißt Du. Und ich will kurz sagen, warum nicht. Ich halte beide Parteien für unanständig. Die rote scheint mir nur insofern weniger schlimm, als ihre Unanständigkeit eine zeitgemäße, die der anderen sogar noch eine retrograde ist. D.h. ich würde beiläufig sagen die grünen & schwarzen sind noch nicht einmal so weit. Weiter: Alle diese

188 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

Hochreit Post Hohenberg

N.Ö.^aSaturday [before August 28, 1929]^b

Dear Hänsel!

Thanks to all of you for the nice card. I return in the last days of August to England & could arrange it in such a manner that I could visit you in Pabenschwand^c & stay until the 30th or 31st. Let me know, right away, please, whether this would be alright with you, since I will have to arrange various matters accordingly.

Best regards.

Yours

L.W.

189 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, after November 23, 1929]^d

L.H.!

Thanks for your letter. I don't agree with you, you know that. And I will briefly say why not. I consider both parties indecent.^e The red one appears less onerous to me only insofar as its indecency is in keeping with the times, whereas that of the others is moreover one that is retrograde. That is I would mention in passing the greens & blacks haven't even gotten

^aThe Hochreit in Nieder Österreich (N.Ö., Lower Austria) was the country estate of the Wittgenstein family.

^bSince Wittgenstein never returned to England this early in following years, the year in question should be 1929.

^cPabenschwand, near Plainfeld, is one of the farms administered by the Benedictine Order. After 1927 until about 1934, Hänsel and his family spent the school vacations there.

^dThis letter is an answer to an extant, but unpublished letter by Hänsel to Wittgenstein which is dated November 23, 1929.

^eAfter the elections of 1927 the ruling government of chancellor Ignaz Spiegel was composed of the Christian-Social Party, the "Großdeutschen (United German)" and the "Landbund (Rural Coalition)." The Social Democrats formed the opposition. "Black" designates the Christian-Social Party, the reds are the Social Democrats, and "green" refers to the Landbund, which is unrelated to today's green parties. The "Landbund für Österreich" wanted to represent the entire rural population; its orientation was nationalistic and anti-Semitic.

Parteien sind religionslos aber die größte Gefahr für die Religiosität scheint mir bei der grünen Partei zu liegen, in ungefähr demselben Sinne, in dem das Laue von dem Warmen entfernter ist als das Kalte, obwohl das paradox klingt; aber Du weißt auch woher es stammt. Die offene Feindschaft gegen die Religion scheint mir hoffnungsvoller, als die andere schweinische Gesinnung, die mit der Religion & mit Gott auf Du & Du ist & sie zu sich herabzieht. Ich bin nicht dumm genug zu glauben, daß in der roten Partei ein »edler atheismus« herrscht, sondern auch da ist alles verkappt & falsch, aber um ein Geringes schlechter verkappt & daher der Seele weniger gefährlich, als eine Gesinnung, die es zustande bringt mit den höchsten Idealen scheinbar auf gutem Fuße zu stehen. Es wäre eine lange Sache zu erklären, warum das Parteiwesen in anderen Ländern, z.B. in England, immerhin noch nicht jedes anständigen Menschen unwürdig ist; aber in unserer speziellen Lage glaube ich, daß alle Parteien hoffnungslos sind & die einzige äußerst schwache Hoffnung auf den Wenigen ruht, die nicht glauben, daß durch die Unterstützung einer unanständigen Sache doch etwas Gutes entstehen kann. D.h., ich glaube, daß es in diesem Falle nicht richtig ist, zwischen zwei Übeln zu wählen sondern beide gleichermaßen zurückzuweisen, da aller Jammer hier gerade dadurch entsteht, daß Keiner Charakter genug besitzt um radikal die Forderung der Anständigkeit zu betonen & nicht letzten Endes doch zu packeln. Wo die Lage so zugespitzt ist, wie bei uns, da ist eben auch ein größerer Ernst der Entscheidung nötig als anderswo. Es ist genau so wie im Leben des Einzelnen, der auch in minder ernsten Lagen sich in seinen Entscheidungen mehr oder weniger nach dem Herkommen richten kann, tritt aber der außergewöhnliche Fall ein, eine unbürgerliche Entscheidung treffen muß. – Hat ein Staat – wie der unsere – seinen kulturellen (weltlichen, bürgerlichen) Sinn verloren, dann ruht seine einzige Hoffnung – glaube ich – in denen, die den Ernst dieser Lage erkennen & nun eine höhere Macht zur Entscheidung anrufen, wo die weltliche /bürgerliche/ Macht (sozusagen der Magistrat) ihr göttliches Recht verloren hat. So sehe ich die Sache. Je größer der Schatz ist desto besser muß man ihn hüten & je höher das Ideal ist desto wählerischer muß man, glaube ich, in den Mitteln sein, es hoch zu halten. Wenn Du glaubst, Dein Ideal in alten Fetzen einwickeln zu müssen, daß ihm nichts geschieht, dann gib acht, daß es sich nicht am Ende verflüchtigt & Du nur einen Sack alter Fetzen in der Hand behälst. Aber für Dich fürchte ich das nicht du wirst es nicht sich verflüchtigen lassen, aber denen du das Packet überreichst, an die mußt Du denken daß sie nicht die Embalage für das Ideal halten. Es ließe sich darüber noch viel sagen, aber ich kann jetzt nicht mehr.

so far yet. Further: All of these parties lack religion but the greatest danger for religiosity seems to me to lie with the green party, in roughly the same sense in which the lukewarm is more distant from the warm than is the cold, though that sounds paradoxical; but you also know where it comes from.^a Open hostility to religion seems more promising to me than the other disgusting conviction,^b which is on personal terms with religion & with God & drags it down to its own level. I am not dumb enough to believe that a “noble atheism” rules in the red party, instead there too everything is cloaked & false, but by a slight degree less well cloaked & therefore less dangerous to the soul than a conviction that manages to be apparently on good terms with the highest ideals. It would be a long matter to explain why the party system in other countries, for example in England, is at least not yet a disgrace to every decent human being;^c but in our special situation I believe that all parties are hopeless & that the only extremely faint hope rests on the few, who do not believe that something good can nevertheless come from supporting an indecent thing. That is, I believe that in this case it is not right to choose between two evils but to repudiate both equally, since all misery here comes about precisely through this that no one has enough character to radically stress the demand of decency & doesn’t in the end make a deal after all. Where the situation is as acute as with us, a greater seriousness of decision is also necessary, of course, than elsewhere. It is just as in the life of the individual whose decision in less serious situations can more or less follow tradition, but who must make a nonbourgeois decision if an extraordinary situation occurs.—If the state—like ours—has lost its cultural (secular, bourgeois) meaning, its only hope—I believe—rests on those who recognize the seriousness of this situation & now call upon a higher power for a decision where the secular /bourgeois/^d power (the magistrate, so to speak) has lost its divine right. That’s how I see the matter. The greater the treasure the better one must guard it & the higher the ideal the more careful one must be in the choice of the means for upholding it. If you believe that you have to wrap your ideal in old rags so that nothing happens to it, then look out that it won’t evaporate in the end & and you hold nothing but a sack of old rags. But I am not afraid of that in your case; you won’t let it evaporate, but you must think of those to whom you hand the package that they won’t take the packaging for the ideal. Much more could be said about this but I can’t go on anymore.

^aCompare *Revelation* 3:15–16: “I know your works, that you are neither cold nor hot. I wish you were cold or hot! So, because you are lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spew you out of my mouth.” Also letter 232 below.

^bThe German “Gesinnung” can also be translated “ideology,” “orientation,” “position,” or “persuasion.” [Eds.]

^c“noch nicht jedes anständigen Menschen unwürdig” could also be translated “not yet unworthy of any human being.” [Eds.]

^d“bourgeois (bürgerliche)” was written above the word “secular (weltliche).”

Auf Wiedersehen! Grüße Deine Frau & die Kinder von mir.

Dein
Wittgenstein

194 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

Hochreit.
Donnerstag [Sommer 1930 ?]

L. H.!

Ich möchte in den letzten Tagen des Monats am 29^{ten} oder 30^{ten} oder 31^{ten} zu Dir nach Pabenschwandt kommen & möchte wissen, ob das Euch paßt. Bitte antworte mir gleich. Und zwar an die Adresse Argentinierstr 16, da ich morgen von hier wegfahre. Vielleicht ist es am besten Du telegraphierst mir »Ja« oder »Nein«. Das soll sich darauf beziehen, daß ich an irgend einem dieser letzten Tage komme. Ich laß Dich dann meine Ankunft genau wissen.

Über die Skizzen Mareiles war ich sehr erfreut.

Sei herzlichst begrüßt

Dein
L. W.

199 HERMINE WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Wien, um den 22. 3. 1931]

Sehr geehrter Herr Director

Ich soll Ihnen von meinem Bruder Ludwig Grüße ausrichten und Ihnen über ihn berichten. Er ist seit einer Woche in Wien und wollte in Neuwaldegg wohnen u arbeiten, hatte aber am Mittwoch einen heftigen Gallensteinanfall auf der Fahrt zu Koder und in dessen Wohnung. Er muss furchtbare Schmerzen gehabt haben. Koder telefonierte an meine Schwester Stonborough und diese holte Ludwig ab u.

Good bye! Regards to your wife & the children.

Yours
Wittgenstein

194 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

Hochreit.
Thursday [summer 1930?]^a

L.H.!

I would like to visit you in Pabenschwand in the last days of the month on the 29th or 30th or 31st & would like to know whether this is alright with all of you. Please answer me right away. And please to the address Argentinierstr 16, since I am leaving here tomorrow. Perhaps it is best you cable me “yes” or “no”. This should then refer to my coming on any one of those last days. I will then let you know my exact arrival.

I was very pleased by Mareile’s sketches.

Best regards

Yours
L.W.

199 HERMINE WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Vienna, around March 22, 1931]^b

Dear Headmaster^c

I am supposed to give you regards from my brother Ludwig and to report about him. He has been in Vienna for a week and wanted to stay and work in Neuwaldegg but on Wednesday had a severe gallstone attack on the way to Koder and in his apartment. He must have had terrible pain. Koder called my sister Stonborough and she fetched Ludwig and has him

^aSince in the early 1930s Wittgenstein regularly spent his summers in Austria, this letter could have been written also in 1931–1934. (Or, perhaps, as a follow-up to letter 188 in 1929. [Eds.]

^bThe dating is based on two letters by Wittgenstein to Moritz Schlick. In the first one (postmarked March 9, 1931) he announces his arrival in Vienna for March 15; in the second (postmarked March 20, 1931) he tells him that he is living with his sister Margarete Stonborough in the Kundmannngasse because of a gallstone attack.

^cFrom 1926 to 1931 Hänsel was interim headmaster of a highschool for girls in Vienna. Though on familiar terms with him, Wittgenstein’s sisters would often address him formally as professor or, as in this case, “Herr Director.”

nahm ihn zu sich in die Kundmangasse, was natürlich das allerbeste für ihn ist. Es geht ihm auch schon viel besser, der Anfall hat sich bis auf eine leise Mahnung nicht wiederholt nur fühlt er sich sehr matt, besonders zuweilen, ich denke es spielen da auch nervöse Sachen sehr mit. Er würde sich freuen wenn Sie ihn telefonisch anrufen damit Sie eine Zusammenkunft vereinbaren können.

Hoffentlich ist bei Ihnen alles wohl! Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Ihre aufrichtig ergebene

Hermine Wittgenstein

200 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

STONBOROUGH
VIENNA

[Ende März 1931]

L. H.!

Ja es ist beschissen daß wir beide krank sind. Ich bin, wenn nicht Unerwartetes eintritt, Dienstag schon wieder in Neuwaldegg. Am liebsten möchte ich schon morgen dorthin übersiedeln. Nur der Transport ist etwas unangenehm. Hoffentlich fühlst Du Dich bald halbwegs gut. Ich bin sehr matt & schwach.

Dein
W.

204 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Wien, Sommer/Herbst 1932]

L. H.!

Ich war heute auf der Hochschule für Welthandel da wir daran dachten den Geiger dort 3 Semester machen zu lassen statt eines einjährigen Abiturientenkurses an der Handelsakademie. Ich dachte nämlich daß der Hochschulkurs dasselbe leisten würde aber ernster wäre & ein besseres Lehrer- & Studentenmaterial hätte. Meine Auskünfte sind aber nicht befriedigend ausgefallen & ich will mit Dir darüber spre-

stay with her in the Kundmangasse which, of course, is the very best for him. He is already doing a lot better, except for a gentle reminder the attack has not repeated itself, it's just that he feels very feeble especially at times, I think nervous matters very much play a rôle here too. He would be pleased if you called him on the phone so that you can arrange a meeting.

I hope that all is well with you! With best regards

Your sincerely devoted

Hermine Wittgenstein

200 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

STONBOROUGH

VIENNA

[end of March 1931]

L.H.!

Yes it is bloody awful that both of us are sick. If nothing unexpected occurs I will already be in Neuwaldegg on Tuesday. I wish I could move there already tomorrow. Only the transport is somewhat unpleasant. Hopefully you'll soon feel halfway well. I am very feeble & weak.

Yours

W.

204 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Vienna, Summer/Fall 1932]^a

L.H.!

I went to the college for world trade today since we were thinking of placing Geiger there for 3 semesters, instead of the one-year course for Gymnasium graduates at the trade academy. For I was thinking that the college course would achieve the same while being more serious & offering better teacher & student material. My inquiries did not turn out

^aThe back of the first sheet of this letter contains the student essay "Vacation Plans" by one of Hänsel's students, Grete Fischauf.

chen. Die Möglichkeit zum Faulenzen ist natürlich an der Hochschule größer. Weiß der Teufel was man machen soll!

Bitte laß Dir die Sache ein klein wenig durch den Kopf gehen. Vielleicht entsinnst Du Dich eines Menschen bei dem man bessere Erkundigungen einziehen kann

Dein
L. W.

214 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, nach dem 29. 5. 1935]
Donnerstag

Lieber Hänsel,

Herzlichen Dank für Deinen Brief. Meine Sommer- wie meine Zukunftspläne sind noch ganz im Unklaren. Ich bin noch weit davon entfernt zu wissen, ob man mich für ständig überhaupt nach Russland lassen wird. Ich muß mir von verschiedenen Seiten Rat holen, sowohl darüber, wie es anzustellen ist, daß man als Nicht-turist nach Russland gelassen wird, als auch darüber, um was für eine Art Stelle oder Arbeit ich mich bemühen soll. Ich bin auch noch im Unklaren darüber, ob ich mich auf diese Arbeit hier durch irgend ein Studium vorbereiten soll oder nicht. Es ist außerordentlich schwer darüber einen gescheiten & maßgebenden Rat zu hören & ebenso schwer für mich eine (in meinem Sinn) richtige Entscheidung zu treffen. Es ist beinahe sicher, daß ich in diesem Sommer nicht nach Russland fahren werde, sondern erst im September. – Aber ich sehe, daß es mir ganz unmöglich ist Dir – in einem Brief alle verschiedenen Möglichkeiten & Gründe & Gegenstände auseinanderzusetzen. Wenn ich mehr weiß, wirst Du's von mir hören. Ob ich im Sommer nach Österreich kommen werde weiß ich noch nicht und werde es wohl noch einen Monat lang nicht wissen.

satisfactory, however & I want to talk to you about this. The opportunities for being lazy are greater at the college, of course. The devil knows what one is supposed to do!^a

Please think this matter over a little bit. Perhaps you can think of a person who can provide better information

Yours
L.W.

214 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, after May 29, 1935]

Thursday

Dear Hänsel,

Many thanks for your letter. My plans for the summer and the future are still entirely unclear. I am still far from knowing whether they will even let me into Russia permanently.^b I must still get advice from various sources, on the one hand about what to do in order to be let into Russia as a non-tourist, on the other hand about what sort of position or work I should try to get. I am also still unclear whether or not I should prepare myself here for this work through some sort of studies.^c It is extraordinarily difficult to get intelligent & authoritative advice about this & just as difficult for me to arrive at a (in my sense) right decision. It is almost certain that I will not travel to Russia this summer but only in September.—But I see that it is quite impossible for me to explain to you—in a letter all the various possibilities & arguments & counter-arguments. Once I know more you'll hear it from me. I don't know yet and probably won't know for a month whether I will come to Austria in the summer.

^aAfter graduating from a Bundesrealgymnasium, Geiger ended up pursuing the second option (the one-year course at the trade academy). He completed it successfully in June 1933.

^bSeveral times Wittgenstein contemplated traveling to Russia and settling down there (see "Movements of Thought," [229,c]). He seriously pursued this option in 1935. After John Maynard Keynes had arranged an interview with the Russian ambassador, Wittgenstein left for Russia in September (see Wittgenstein's correspondence with Keynes in *Cambridge Letters*, ed, Brian McGuinness and Georg Henrik von Wright [Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, pp. 262–267]). He stayed for only about two weeks, probably because he was offered a university position and not one as a worker on a collective farm (see Ray Monk's, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* [New York: Free Press, 1990, pp. 350–352]).

^cWittgenstein started to learn Russian from Fania Pascal in 1934 (compare her memoir in *Recollections of Wittgenstein*; see letter 181, note c).

Sei herzlichst begrüßt, grüße Drobil, die Kinder & Deine lb. Frau. Ich bin sicher, Ihr alle habt um meine Tante Clara getrauert.

Dein Ludwig Wittgenstein

220 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, nach dem 22. 6. 1936]

Donnerstag

z. Z.

Lieber Hänsel!

Herzlichen Dank für Deinen lieben Brief. Ich bin sehr froh, daß Drobil sich der Mareile annimmt. Es wird ihr (u. ihm) guttun. Ich werde im Sommer nicht nach Österreich kommen. Ich bleibe noch etwa einen Monat hier & fahre dann nach Norwegen (oder vielleicht nach Island), um dort zu arbeiten. Ich möchte etwa ein Jahr in Ruhe dort bleiben, will aber, wenn es geht, zu Weihnachten nach Wien fahren. Wie es dort (in Norwegen) mit meiner Arbeit gehen wird, weiß Gott. – Davon, daß Schlick auf der Universität erschossen worden ist, wirst Du gehört haben. Wie schrecklich!

Meine Adresse ist bis auf weiteres »Trinity College«. Laß in nicht zu langer Zeit wieder von Dir hören. Grüß Deine Kinder & Deine Frau herzlichst von mir & ebenso den Drobil, die alte D.-S..

Dein alter

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Best regards, greetings to Drobil, your children & your dear wife. I am sure that all of you mourned for my aunt Clara.^a

Yours Ludwig Wittgenstein

220 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge, after June 22, 1936]

Thursday

at present

Dear Hänsel!

Many thanks for your dear letter. I am very glad that Drobil is taking on Mareile. It will do her (and him) good. I will stay here for another month & then go to Norway (or perhaps Iceland) in order to work there.^b I would like to spend about a year there in peace, but, if possible, want to come to Vienna for Christmas. How it will go there (in Norway) with my work, God knows.—You will have heard of Schlick getting shot at the University.^c How terrible!

My address for the time being is “Trinity College.” Let me hear from you not too long from now. Best regards from me to your children & your wife & also to Drobil, the old D.-S.^d

Your old friend

Ludwig Wittgenstein

^aClara Wittgenstein had died on May 29, 1935 in Laxenburg (see “Movements of Thought,” [31,d]).

^bOn August 8, 1936, Wittgenstein left for Norway and as of August 27 settled in his cabin there (see the second part of his diary which was written there). He worked on a German version of the so-called *Brown Book*. After abandoning it, he started with the first draft of the *Philosophical Investigations*. He left for Vienna on December 8, went to Cambridge in January, and returned to Norway at the end of that month. Excepting one other interruption (from May to August in Vienna and Cambridge) he stayed there until the middle of December 1937.

^cSchlick was killed on June 22, 1936, by his former doctoral student, thirty-three-year-old Hans Nelböck. His stated reasons concerned Schlick’s hedonism and his empiricist critique of all transcendental or metaphysical knowledge. Nelböck was sentenced to ten years in prison but after two years of imprisonment was released immediately after the National Socialists seized power in Austria.

^d“D.-S.” stands for “Drecksau” in German but also suggests the corresponding term of endearment “dumb shit.” Compare Wittgenstein’s April/May 1936 letter to his sister Helene in *Familienbriefe*, ed. Brian McGuinness et al. (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1996), p. 151. Here he sends regards to her husband Max, “the old D.-S.”

222 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Skjolden, Herbst 1936]
Samstag

Lieber Hänsel!

Vielen Dank für Deinen Brief. Du Armer, – ich kann mir die Schwierigkeit Deiner Aufgabe ungefähr vorstellen. Behalt nur den Kopf oben. Auch ich hatte jetzt eine etwas schwere Zeit denn ich war einige Wochen lang krank. Es fing mit einem Gallenanfall an & endete mit einer Art von Magen- & Darmkatarrh der äußerst unangenehm war. Gott sei Dank hatte ich einen guten Arzt & der riet mir ein Mittel daß mir nun endlich geholfen hat. Zwar bin ich noch sehr schwach, aber ich kann seit zwei Tagen wieder etwas essen ohne Schmerzen zu kriegen & werde, wenn ich vorsichtig bin in ein paar Tagen wieder auf der Höhe sein. Daß Du traurig bist die alte Wohnung verlassen zu müssen glaub ich Dir gern! Auch mir tut es ja sehr leid. Aber es wird mit der Zeit auch in der Neuen wohnlich werden. Man braucht so viel Geduld im Leben & ich habe so wenig! Wie mag es Deinen Kindern gehn? & Deiner lieben Frau. Sie werden sich alle schwer in den neuen Zustand finden. Grüß sie alle. Hier habe ich schönes Wetter & die Leute sind nett & freundlich & hilfreich. Die Gegend paßt mir sehr.

Sei jetzt herzlichst begrüßt
von Deinem

L. W.

225 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Skjolden] 7. 11. 36.

Lieber Hänsel!

Ich habe Dich & mehrere Andere einmal in der italienischen Gefangenschaft damit angelogen, daß ich sagte, ich stamme zu einem Viertel von Juden ab & zu drei Viertel von Ariern, obwohl es sich gerade umgekehrt verhält. Diese feige Lüge hat mich lang gedrückt, & ich habe diese Lüge, wie viele andere, auch andern Menschen gesagt. Ich habe bis heute nicht die Kraft gefunden, sie zu gestehen. – Ich

222 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Skjolden, Fall 1936]

Saturday

Dear Hänsel!

Many thanks for your letter. You poor guy,—I can just about imagine the difficulties of your task. Just keep your chin up. I also just had a somewhat difficult time since I was sick for a couple of weeks. It began with a gallbladder attack & ended with a sort of gastro-intestinal disorder that was extremely unpleasant. Fortunately I had a good doctor & he recommended a remedy that now finally helped me. Though I am still very weak, for the last two days I have been able to eat a bit without ensuing pain & if I am careful I'll be up to par again in a couple of days. I readily believe that you are sad having to leave the old apartment!^a After all, I am very sorry about it, too. But in time the new one will also become comfortable. One needs so much patience in life & I have so little! I wonder how your children are doing & your dear wife. All of them will have a hard time adjusting to the new condition. Give my greetings to all of them. The weather here is beautiful & the people are nice & friendly & helpful. This region suits me well.

Best regards for now

Yours

L.W.

225 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Skjolden] 7.11.36.

Dear Hänsel!

I lied to you & several others back then during the Italian internment when I said that I was descended one quarter from Jews and three quarters from Arians, even though it is just the other way round.^b This cowardly lie has burdened me for a long time & like many other lies I also told this one to others. Until today I have not found the strength to confess it.^c—

^aThis refers to the apartment in which Hänsel had lived from September 25, 1913 until October 30, 1936. He stayed in the new apartment for only two years until he found another permanent home.

^bThis is the confession Wittgenstein mentions in his first diary entry for the year 1936 (see "Movements of Thought," [142f.]). It is the only known written record of the series of confessions Wittgenstein made in 1936 and 1937 (recipients included G. E. Moore, Maurice O'C. Drury, Paul Engelmann, and Fania Pascal).

^cWittgenstein uses "gestehen," that is, a word without religious connotation that refers to the admission of a crime or deed. [Eds.]

hoffe, Du wirst mir verzeihen; ja ich hoffe sogar, Du wirst mit mir weiter & so wie bisher verkehren & mich nicht weniger gern haben. Ich weiß, das ist viel erwartet, aber dennoch hoffe ich es. Ich habe Dir auch sonst noch manche Lüge abzubitten. – Ich wünsche, daß Du diesen Brief Deiner lieben Frau & den Kindern, meinen Geschwistern & ihren Kindern, dem Drobil & meinen übrigen Freunden & der Frau Sjögren bekanntmachst; d.h. ihn ihnen zu lesen gibst. Mögen auch sie mir alle verzeihen; ich weiß, daß ich Dir & Allen einen großen Schmerz zufüge & doch muß ich es tun. Ich fürchte, daß mir mancher vielleicht nicht ganz wird verzeihen können. Ich will heute nicht mehr schreiben. Leb wohl!

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Es geht mir gut.

226 HÄNSEL AN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Wien, 15. Nov. 36.

Lieber Wittgenstein!

Du bist (immer wieder) ein herrlicher Mensch! Dein Brief hat mich sehr ergriffen und mächtig gefreut, für Dich und für mich. (Ich danke Dir für Dein Vertrauen.) Was die Viertel jüdischen Blutes betrifft, habe ich zwar an Deinen Worten nicht gezweifelt, sonst aber habe ich – verzeih! – immerhin gewußt, daß Du es schwerer hast als andere Leute, eigene Mängel zuzugestehen. Ich kann es ja übrigens auch nicht. Du hast selbst oft davon gesprochen und – in der Gefangenschaft – mit Recht hinzugesetzt: andere seien mit ihrer Aufrichtigkeit im Kleinen unaufrichtiger als Du mit Deinen großen Lügen, oder so ungefähr. (Zu den anderen habe ich auch mich gerechnet und habe Grund genug, es jetzt erst recht zu tun.) Du aber machst alles wieder in so großer Weise gut. (Wenn ich Dir nur dazu helfen könnte, daß Du richtig beichten gingest. Könntest Du Dich mit der Sigrid Undset, in Norwegen, bekannt machen? Mit ihr persönlich. Von ihrem Roman Olav Andunssohn, glaube ich, hättest auch Du etwas.)

I hope you will forgive me; yes I even hope that you will continue to deal with me & as before & won't like me the less. I know that is expecting much, but I hope for it nevertheless. I have to apologize to you also for several other lies.—I wish that you will make this letter known to your dear wife & the children, to my siblings & their children, to Drobil & my other friends & Mrs. Sjögren; that is, that you let them read it. May all of them forgive me, too; I know that I am causing you & everyone great pain & yet I must do it. I am afraid that perhaps some will not be able to forgive me entirely. I don't want to write anymore today. Fare well!

Yours
Ludwig Wittgenstein

I am doing well.

226 HÄNSEL TO WITTGENSTEIN

Vienna, 15. Nov. 36.

Dear Wittgenstein!

You are (again and again) a marvelous human being!^a Your letter moved me very much and gladdened me greatly, for you and for me. (I thank you for your confidence.) As far as the one quarter of Jewish blood is concerned, while I hadn't doubted your words, I have known at least—forgive me!—that it is harder for you than for other people to acknowledge your own defects. And I, by the way, can't do it either. You have often spoken of it yourself and—during the internment—added rightly: that others with their forthrightness in small matters are less forthright than you with your great lies, or something like that. (I counted myself among those others and have reason enough to do it all the more so now.) But you make all well again in such a grand manner. (If only I could help bring about that you would really go to confession.^b Could you acquaint yourself with Sigrid Undset, in Norway? With her personally. You too would get something out of her novel *The Master of Hestviken*, I believe.)^c

^aOn November 21, Wittgenstein records his reaction to this letter in his diaries (see "Movements of Thought," [144f.]). [Eds.]

^bHänsel speaks of "beichten" here, that is, of confession in the religious, especially Catholic sense. [Eds.]

^cThe Norwegian writer Sigrid Undset (1882–1949) received the Nobel Prize for literature in 1928, especially for her novel *Kristin Lavransdatter* (1920–22). In 1924 she converted to Catholicism and from 1925 to 1927 wrote *Olav Andunssøn* (translated as *The Master of Hestviken*), a stark and violent tale of love and guilt, selflessness and pride.

Deinen Auftrag, den Brief meiner Familie, Deinen Geschwistern und den andern, die Du genannt hast, bekannt zu geben, wollte ich anfangs ausführen. Unter dem Eindruck Deines Briefes. Und mit der Überzeugung, die ich auch jetzt nicht geändert habe, sie würden darüber ebenso glücklich sein wie ich. Ich hätte ihre Freude gern mit der meinen geteilt und (z.B.) gern die Ergriffenheit meiner Kinder gesehen. Aber ich tu es doch nicht. Ich habe keine Kraft dazu. Auch nicht, wenn Du mich darum bittest. Ich könnte später einmal davon reden, Dir zu Ehren. Aber jetzt den Inhalt des Briefes bekannt zu machen, ihn vorlesen, ihn herumschicken, das darfst Du nicht von mir verlangen. Sei mir nicht böse, daß ich mich weigere! (Sei auch nicht böse, daß ich auf die Beichte, auch nicht, daß ich auf die Sigrid Undset hingewiesen habe!) Es geschieht (beides) aus Freundschaft. Ich bewundere Dich. Aber ich habe Dich doch auch gern, ganz menschlich und von Herzen. Daß Du Deine Fehler hast, ist selbstverständlich, und ich habe sie mir nicht wegdisputiert. Dazu bin ich zu nüchtern veranlagt. Ich habe auch die meinen (und viel armseligere als Du). Daß Du mich trotzdem gern hast und mir vertraust, gehört zu meinem Glück. Daß Du das und das an mir nicht anerkennst, schmerzt mich. Aber der Schmerz ist gesund. Er schützt mich (wie mich Karl Kraus hie und da geschützt hat) vor der Einbildung. Er hat bewirkt, daß ich auch gegen mich doch immer wieder einigermaßen nüchtern geblieben bin.

Aber, weil ich schon von mir zu reden angefangen habe: wir sind umgezogen in die fünf hallenden Säle, richten sie langsam ein, sind aber bis heute (meine Frau will jetzt noch nicht recht heraus) in dem kleinen Kabinett geblieben, in das wir uns gleich zuerst eingenistet hatten. Ich lege Dir eine Karte bei.

Alles Gute für Deine Arbeit und für Dein Herz! für Deine Seele.

Dein
Ludwig Hänsel

227 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Skjolden] 22. Nov. [1936]
Samstag

Lieber Hänsel,

Nur ein paar Worte in Eile. Ich danke Dir innigst für Deinen lieben & guten Brief, den ich in keiner Weise verdient habe. Daß Du aber meinen Brief nicht weiter schicken willst ist mir ein schwerer Schlag. Denn nun muß ich den Andern schreiben, denn wissen müssen sie es! Ja dies ist um so schwerer, als ich in ca 3 Wochen, wenn ich nach Österreich komme allen Freunden & Verwandten ein umfassenderes Geständnis ablegen muß & ich hoffte diesem auch durch meinen Brief den Weg zu bahnen; es für die Andern & auch für mich dann leichter zu machen.

Initially I meant to follow your instructions to make the letter known to my family, your siblings and the others mentioned by you. Under the impression of your letter. And with the conviction, which I still hold, that they would be just as happy about it as I. I would have gladly shared their joy with mine and (for example) liked to have seen my children moved by it. But I am not doing it after all. I don't have the strength for it. Not even if you asked me to do it. I could speak about it some time later, in honor of you. But to make the content of the letter known now, to read it to others, to send it around, this you must not demand from me. Don't be angry at my refusal! (Also don't be angry that I referred to religious confession or, for that matter, to Sigrid Undset!) It happens (both of it) out of friendship. I admire you. But I like you, too, simply as another human being and from my heart. It goes without saying that you have faults, and I haven't talked myself out of those. I am too soberly inclined for that. I have mine, too (and far more miserable ones than you). That you like me anyhow and trust me, is part of my good luck. That you don't accept this and that in me, pains me. But that pain is healthy. It protects me (as Karl Kraus has protected me here and there) against conceit. It has brought it about that again and again I have remained fairly sober also toward myself.

But since I have already begun talking about myself: we have moved into the five echoing halls, furnishing them slowly, but have remained to this day (my wife even now doesn't really want to leave it) in the small room in which we made our nest at the very beginning. I am including a card for you.

All the best for your work and for your heart! for your soul.

Yours
Ludwig Hänsel

227 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Skjolden] 22. Nov. [1936]
Saturday

Dear Hänsel,

Just a few words in a hurry. Heartfelt thanks for your dear & good letter which I haven't deserved by any means. But that you don't want to forward my letter is a heavy blow. For now I must write to the others, for know it they must! Yes this is all the harder since in about 3 weeks, when I come to Austria I must make a more comprehensive confession^a to all my friends & relatives & I hoped that my letter would prepare the ground for this; to

^aWittgenstein again speaks of "Geständnis," that is, of a secular confession of guilt. [Eds.]

Ich wollte ja nicht, daß Du den Brief vorliest, sondern nur, daß Du ihn weiter-
schickst; zuerst etwa meiner Schwester Mining, damit sie dann das übrige tut.

Ich will jetzt schließen.
Ich bin wie immer

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

228 HÄNSEL AN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Wien, 26. 11. 36.

Lieber Wittgenstein!

Du hast recht. Ich gebe Deinen Brief an Deine Schwester weiter. Ich sehe auf
einmal ein, daß ich das darf und daß ich Dir damit helfen kann. Du mußt meine Un-
sicherheit verzeihen.

Alles Gute!

Dein
Hänsel

Ich werde den Brief auch meinen Kindern und meiner Frau vorlesen.

229 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Skjolden, 30. 11. 1936]
Montag

Lieber Hänsel

Dank Dir für Deinen Brief. Du hast mir aber mit Deiner Weigerung, meinen
Brief weiterzugeben, einen großen Dienst erwiesen. Denn ich sah, daß ich nun
mein ganzes Geständnis zu Papier bringen müsse. Denn erst hatte ich geglaubt, es
nicht zu können.– Ich habe es vor 6 Tagen an meine Schwester Mining geschickt.
Es ist für alle meine Verwandten & Freunde bestimmt & Du wirst es also auch er-
halten.

Mögest Du mir auch das verzeihen, was Du dort lesen wirst!

make it easier that way for the others & also for me. After all, I didn't want that you read them the letter, just that you pass it on; first for example to my sister Mining^a so that she can then do the rest.

I want to close now.

I am as always

Yours

Ludwig Wittgenstein

228 HÄNSEL TO WITTGENSTEIN

Vienna, 26.11.36

Dear Wittgenstein!

You are right. I am passing your letter on to your sister. Suddenly I see that I am allowed to do this and that I can help you through this. You must forgive my uncertainty.

All the best!

Yours

Hänsel

I will also read the letter to my children and my wife.

229 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Skjolden, 30.11.1936]^b

Monday

Dear Hänsel

Thank you for your letter. But you rendered me a great service through your refusal to pass on my letter. For I saw that I would now have to write down my whole confession.^c For initially I had believed that I couldn't do this.—I sent it about 6 days ago to my sister Mining. It is meant for all my relatives & friends & you will therefore receive it, too.^d

May you forgive me also what you will be reading there!

^aMining is Hermine Wittgenstein (see "Movements of Thought," [145,g]).

^bWittgenstein just wrote "Monday," the corresponding date (November 30, 1936) was added by Hänsel.

^cWittgenstein uses the secular "Geständnis" again. [Eds.]

^dAccording to Arvid Sjögren, this version of Wittgenstein's confession was placed in the reading room of the Wittgenstein family. Not everyone chose to read it; see *Familienbriefe*, letter 220, note d, pp. 151f., also letter 231 below. [Eds.]

Über Beichte & die norwegische Schriftstellerin will ich mit Dir reden, wenn ich nach Wien komme. Ich möchte zwischen dem 12^{ten} & 15^{ten} kommen & freue mich darauf Alle wiederzusehen, wenn auch meine Freude mit Angst gemischt ist.

Ich werde in Wien Deine Hilfe sehr bedürfen.

Es geht mir sehr gut.

Dein

Ludwig Wittgenstein

230 PAUL WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

WIEN, IV. ARGENTINIERSTRASSE 16.

8. Dezember 36.

Hochverehrter Herr Direktor,

Vom »Durchbrechen einer Schranke« kann keine Rede sein: ich bin dankbar für Ihre frdl. Zeilen! Schon deshalb, weil ich daraus ersehe, daß meine Gründe, wenn Sie sie auch entkräften wollen, dennoch auf Verständnis bei Ihnen gestoßen sind.

Das ganze für und Wider wäre viel zu lange für einen Brief; das könnte ich nur gelegentlich einer mündlichen Aussprache mit Ihnen erledigen. Doch bei der Zähigkeit meiner Ansichten, die einigermaßen tief sitzen, glaube ich nicht, daß ich von deren Gegentheile zu überzeugen sein würde; ich möchte Sie daher jetzt schon bitten, es mir nicht zu verübeln, wenn ich im Falle einer solchen Aussprache, auf meinen, vielleicht irrigen, Ansichten beharre.

In aufrichtiger Hochschätzung Ihr ergebener

Paul Wittgenstein.

About religious confession^a & the Norwegian author I want to talk to you when I come to Vienna. I want to arrive between the 12th & the 15th & joyfully anticipate seeing everyone again, even if fear is mixed in with my joy.

In Vienna I will be very much in need of your help.

I am doing very well.

Yours
Ludwig Wittgenstein

230 PAUL WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL^b

VIENNA, IV. ARGENTINIERSTREET 16
8. December 36

Honored Headmaster,

There is nothing to justify speaking of “a breakthrough through a barrier”: I am grateful for your friendly letter! If only because I see from it that, even though you want to refute them, you have an understanding for my reasons.

The entire pro and con would be far too long for a letter; I could take care of that only on the occasion of a conversation with you. But with the tenacity of my views which are fairly deep-seated, I don’t believe that I could be convinced of their opposite; in case of such a conversation I would therefore like to ask you now already not to be annoyed with me for persisting in my, perhaps erroneous, views.

With sincere respect yours truly

Paul Wittgenstein

^a“religious confession” is a translation of “Beichte.” [Eds.]

^bSee “Movements of Thought,” [155,j] on Wittgenstein’s brother, the pianist Paul Wittgenstein. This is one of six letters Paul wrote to Hänsel in the years 1923 to 1939 (nos. 114, 162, 211, 215, 252). Paul may have been one of those who did not read the confession, or he may be disagreeing with Hänsel about its significance.

231 HERMINE WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Wien, vor dem 11. 12. 1936]

Sehr geehrter Herr Director

Beiliegend ist das Weihnachtsgeschenk für die »Kinder«, sie müssen mir dann, wie alljährlich, am 1. Feiertag das Resultat zeigen.

Eben erhielt ich ein Telegramm von Ludwig, besagend dass er Freitag Abend kommt. Ich bin so froh dass ich die Angelegenheit so betrieben habe, es fehlt jetzt nur noch Engelmann, dessen Adresse ich noch nicht habe und die in Amerika lebenden Genannten, über die meine Schwester Stonborough noch mit Ludwig sprechen will. Ich bin sehr gespannt auf seine Stimmung; ich glaube die Herzlichkeit aller, die das Geständnis gelesen, oder abgelehnt, oder für später erbeten haben, wird zugenommen haben, aber zum Contact gehören zwei Personen, es kommt darauf an wie Ludwig reagiert. Mit besten Grüßen sehr geehrter Herr Director

H. Wittgenstein

232 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

Skjolden i Sogn
Dienstag [9. 2. 37.]

Mein lieber Hänsel!

Ich habe Dir versprochen, Deine Aufsätze zu lesen & Dir meine Meinung darüber zu schreiben. Das letztere ist aber furchtbar schwer für mich; & nachdem ich einige Zeit hin & her gedacht habe, sehe ich, daß ich nichts Eingehendes darüber schreiben kann. Mir fehlt dazu die Kraft.

231 HERMINE WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Vienna, before December 11, 1936]^a

Dear Headmaster

Enclosed is the christmas present for the “children”, they must then, as always, present the results on the first holiday.^b

Just now I received a cable from Ludwig, saying that he is coming Friday evening. I am so glad that I pursued the matter like this, only Engelmann is missing now, whose address I don't have yet, and those mentioned who live in America about whom my sister Stonborough still wants to talk to Ludwig. I am very curious about his mood; I believe the affection will have increased of all those who have read the confession, or refused it or requested it for later;^c but it takes two persons for a contact, it depends on how Ludwig reacts. With best regards, dear headmaster,

H. Wittgenstein

232 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

Skjolden in Sogn
Tuesday [February 9, 1937]^d

My dear Hänsel!

I promised you to read your essays & write to you my opinion about them. But the latter is horribly difficult for me; & after thinking back & forth about it for a while, I see that I cannot write anything detailed about them. I am lacking the strength for it.

^aWittgenstein left Skjolden for Vienna on December 8, 1936. The dating of this letter is based on the assumption that his cable is announcing his arrival from Norway on Friday evening, December 11. (It is also possible, however, that Wittgenstein cabled Hermine that he is accepting her invitation to an event that she has organized for a Friday evening after his arrival. [Eds.]

^bMuch of Hermine and Gretl's correspondence with Hänsel concerns monetary and other gifts and stipends to him and his three children, at this point between eighteen and twenty-two years of age. The annual Christmas visit probably included a musical recital or the like. [Eds.]

^cOn December 3, 1936, Wittgenstein's sister Margarete Stonborough wrote to him: “My dear, my good Luki / I am grateful that for once I may say it: I think of you with tender love. I have often done it but always shied away from saying it. If the confession has relieved you, thank God that he made it possible for you. [. . .] You surely know that to each of the sins you confessed I could juxtapose my own, or far worse ones of the same kind. Everyone is looking forward to your upcoming visit; I especially” (*Familienbriefe*, letter 220, note d, pp. 154f.). [Eds.]

^dThe date was provided by Hänsel.

Das glaube ich klar zu sehen, daß der Aufsatz über »Das Relative & d. Absolute« schlecht, sehr schlecht ist; & der über »Vaterländische Erziehung« viel besser; aber auch nicht etwas wirklich Gutes. Ich werde nun nur Bemerkungen über sie machen & mögen diese Bemerkungen Dich weniger schmerzen, als Dir gut tun!

Du schreibst im ersten Aufsatz: »Der Hinweis auf Widersprüche ist immer wieder das stärkste Argument in der Hand des flachen & bequemen Geistes gegen alles ›Absolute‹«. »Und auch für«, schrieb ich hinein. Aber das beweist natürlich nichts gegen oder für das Absolute, & es heißt nur, daß, solange der Geist flach & bequem ist, er nicht für oder gegen das Absolute argumentieren soll. Und Freund! wenn der flache & bequeme Geist nicht aus Deinem Aufsatz spricht, so weiß ich nicht, wo diese Worte anzuwenden sind! – Welch ein Gemengsel von ganz ungenügend Verdautem & Durchdachtem! Dazu die Ungründlichkeit: Z.B. Die vierte Dimension, ein Paradox der Wissenschaft?! Wer hat Dir das gesagt? Und was weißt Du von der »Materie, die sich in Energie verwandelt«? Ist ein, den Uninformierten paradox klingender Ausdruck ein Paradox?! – Wenn ich in diesem Aufsatz lese, so erinnert er mich an das, was einer erbricht: Halbverdaute Speisebrocken & eigener Schleim. Ich will den Vergleich nicht fortsetzen. – Und die großen Worte! Jeder Irrtum eines wirklichen Denkers enthält unendlich viel mehr Wahrheit als solche lau aufgetischte Wahrheiten (angenommen, daß es Wahrheiten sind; oder besser: angenommen, daß sich mit diesen Worten auch Wahrheiten sagen lassen.). Auch hier ist das Kalte dem Warmen näher, als das Laue.

This I believe I see clearly, that the essay about “The Relative & the Absolute” is bad, very bad; & the one about “Patriotic Education” much better; but also not something really good.^a I will only make remarks about them now & may these remarks pain you less than do you good!

In the first essay you write: “The pointing out of contradictions is again and again the strongest argument against everything ‘absolute’ in the hands of the shallow & lazy spirit”. “And also for,” I wrote into the text. But this of course proves nothing for or against the absolute, & all it means is that the shallow & lazy spirit should not argue for or against the absolute. And friend! if the shallow & lazy spirit doesn’t speak through your essay, I don’t know where these words could be applied!—What a jumble of the quite insufficiently digested & thought through! Add to that the lack of thoroughness: For example, the fourth dimension, a paradox of science?! Who told you that? And what do you know about “matter transforming itself into energy”? Is an expression that sounds paradoxical to the uninformed, a paradox?!^b—When I read this essay, it reminds me of what someone vomits: Half-digested chunks of food & one’s own slime. I don’t want to continue the comparison.—And the big words! Every error of a real thinker contains infinitely more truth than truths dished out so lukewarm (assuming that they are truths; or better: assuming that truths can be said also with words like these.). Here too the cold is closer to the warm than the lukewarm.^c

^aHänsel’s “Das Relative und das Absolute” was first published in *Österreichische Rundschau* no. 10 (1936): 451–460, and reprinted on pp. 180–189 of Ilse Somavilla, Anton Unterkircher, and Christian Paul Berger, eds., *Ludwig Hänsel–Ludwig Wittgenstein: Eine Freundschaft* (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1994). It includes two references to Wittgenstein, once when it calls all mathematical and logical propositions “tautologies.” Also, arguing that knowledge is not a human construction and only the questions are determined by the knowing subject, Hänsel cites Kant and then Wittgenstein: “Of course, a lot depends on the question: to stupid questions even the cleverest science cannot find the answer (Wittgenstein).”—*Vaterländische Erziehung* appeared as number 6 of the *Schriften des Pädagogischen Institutes der Stadt Wien* (Vienna, Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1935).

^bWittgenstein is referring to a passage on p. 186 of the reprinted essay: “Everything spiritual leads to paradox and without it has no sense. Those who shake their heads about this should just remind themselves how many paradoxes science accepts even in the domain of inanimate nature, in physics: the fourth dimension, for example, or matter that transforms itself into energy and vice versa! Where the absolute shows itself, even if only from afar, paradox is the most natural way of expressing it. The pointing out of contradictions is again and again the strongest argument against everything ‘absolute’ in the hands of the shallow & lazy spirit. But smooth comprehensibility is possible only in the narrowest domain, not anymore, as is evidenced clearly enough by the present, in the foundations of the exact sciences, of mathematics, of physics, even less so in biology, still less so in knowledge of the human being.”

^cSee letter 189 above.

Lieber Freund! Auch ich bin denkfaul & weiß darum so gut, wie es dem Denkfaulen geht. Freilich ist mein Fall ein ganz anderer als der Deine, weil meine Aufgabe eine ganz andere ist. Aber die Denkfaulheit ist, im Vergleich zur Aufgabe in unsern beiden Fällen ganz ähnlich. Und alles, was ich an Dir tadeln muß, muß ich mir selbst vorwerfen.

Ich glaube aber, es ist unverantwortlich, mit so wenig Denken & so wenig Gründlichkeit über dergleichen einen Vortrag zu halten; & gar an einer Volkshochschule, die ohnehin die Brutstätte der Ungründlichkeit & Seichtigkeit ist! – Ich glaube, daß so ein Vortrag den Hörern & Dir schadet, Dir aber am meisten. Ich fühle ebenso sehr das Bedürfnis, Dich vor so etwas zu warnen, wie ich es fühlen würde, Dich zu warnen, Gift zu essen.

Über den zweiten Aufsatz kann ich gar nichts rechtes sagen. Es kommt mir vor als sähe ich Dich über ein tief zerklüftetes Terrain gehen; aber auf einer ziemlich dicken Schneeschicht, die die Risse & Klüfte nur schwach erkennen läßt. – Etwas Gutes zu machen kostet eben sehr viel! (Und ich drücke mich auch immer wieder, den Preis zu zahlen.) Ich kann es also nicht von Dir verlangen. Aber darum bleibt doch gut gut, & schlecht schlecht.

Ich meine natürlich nicht, es sei schlecht, sich über die vierte Dimension & anderes keine klaren Gedanken gemacht zu haben; auch nicht, es sei schlecht, etwa im Familienkreis, über so etwas zu reden (& zu sagen, »Ich habe nie recht verstanden, was es eigentlich mit der vierten Dimension in der Mathematik auf sich hat«). Ich halte es nur für schlecht mit dem Schein der Autorität über Dinge, über die man sich einige schwache & unklare Gedanken gemacht hat einen Vortrag zu halten. – Nun weiß ich aber, daß es Dir fern liegt, ein Wissen vortäuschen zu wollen, das Du nicht besitzt. (Dies sähe viel eher mir ähnlich.) Nicht das ist es, was Dich verleitet, so zu reden. Sondern Oberflächlichkeit des Denkens & eine Art Phrasenhaftigkeit. Ein Mangel an Tiefe des Nachdenkens. Und, ich glaube, tieferes Nachdenken würde Dich zunächst nicht dahin führen, besser über diese Dinge zu schreiben, sondern, das Schreiben bleiben zu lassen.

Ich denke, Du bist Philologe! – Und in philologischen Fragen habe ich dich immer vorsichtig, bescheiden & gründlich gefunden. Es würde Dir nicht einfallen, mit anderthalb Gedanken & einer unverdauten Belesenheit über Philologie Vorträge zu halten. (Und Du würdest nicht ohne Geringschätzung über den reden, der es täte.)

Und was mußte man denn, Deiner Meinung nach, besitzen um über das »Relative & Absolute« reden zu können? – Doch wohl tiefe, schwer errungene, Gedanken, oder großes Wissen, oder vielleicht beides. Oder ist das ein Gegenstand über den man mit Nutzen plaudern kann?

Nun glaube nicht, daß ich Dein Denken über diese Dinge geringschätze! Weit entfernt! ich schätze es hoch. Aber nur solange Du dir Deiner Grenzen bewußt

Dear friend! I too am a lazy thinker & therefore know so well how it is with those who are lazy thinkers.^a Of course my case is quite different from yours because my task is entirely different. But in relation to the task the laziness of thought is quite similar in our two cases. And I have to accuse myself of everything that I must reprove in you.

But I believe it is irresponsible on the basis of so little thought & so little thoroughness to present a lecture on such matters, let alone at a community college^b which is a breeding ground for lack of thoroughness & superficiality to start with.—I believe that such a lecture harms the audience & you, but most of all you. I feel the need to warn you against such things just as much as I would feel the need to warn you not to eat poison.

About the second essay I can't say anything suitable. It appears to me as if I saw you walking across a deeply cleft terrain; but on a pretty thick layer of snow which allows one to perceive the cracks & fissures only faintly.—To produce something good costs a lot, after all! (And again and again I also shirk paying the price.) So I can't demand it from you. But even so good still remains good, & bad bad.

I do not mean of course that it is bad not to have formed clear thoughts about the fourth dimension & other things; also not that it is bad to talk about such things for instance in the family circle (& to say, "I never quite understood what the fourth dimension in mathematics is really all about"). I only consider it bad to lecture with a semblance of authority on matters about which one has formed some faint & unclear thoughts.—But I well know, of course, that it is far from you to want to feign knowledge that you do not possess. (This would be far more like me.) It is not that which tempts you to talk like this. But superficiality of thought & a sort of phrasemongering. A lack of depth of reflection. And I believe that deeper reflection would not initially lead you to write better about such matters, but to leave writing alone.

I think you are a philologist!—And on questions of philology I always found you to be careful, modest & thorough. You wouldn't think of lecturing me about philology with a few half-baked thoughts & undigested reading-knowledge. (And about the one who would do it, you wouldn't talk without disdain.)

And, according to your opinion, what would one have to possess in order to be able to talk about the "relative & absolute"?—Probably deep, hard-won thoughts or great knowledge, or perhaps both. Or is this a subject about which one can profitably chat?

Now do not think that I have low esteem for your thinking about these matters! Far from it! I esteem it highly. But only as long as you remain aware of your limits. Otherwise it

^aThe German word is "denkfaul," that is, to be mentally lazy, have a lazy brain, and so on. [Eds.]

^bHänsel's essay is based on a lecture at the *Ottakringer Volkshochschule*. The institution and support of institutes for public and especially workers' education had been a popular concern among educators and activists. [Eds.]

bleibst. Sonst wird es von etwas Schönem zu etwas Verächtlichem. Denke! & denke für den Hausgebrauch!

Man kann nichts Stärkeres zu Deinem Preise sagen, als daß man dich lieben & hochschätzen muß, obwohl du solche Escapaden machst.

Nun noch eins: Du sagst wahrscheinlich: »Man muß doch seiner Überzeugung Ausdruck geben, auch wenn sie mit dem eigenen Fach nichts zu tun hat. Denn ich (Hänsel) soll doch Leute erziehen, & das heißt nicht nur, ihnen Deutsch & Französisch beibringen.« Gewiß, das ist wahr. Aber seiner Überzeugung Ausdruck geben heißt nicht über Dinge schwätzen, auch nicht notwendig: über sie Vorträge halten. Vielmehr ist dies nur eine Art, der Überzeugung Ausdruck zu geben, & eine Art, die nur unter ganz bestimmten Voraussetzungen (Dich & Deine Umgebung betreffend) möglich ist. Es kann einem sehr wohl verwehrt sein, ihr anständigerweise diesen Ausdruck zu geben. – Ich habe z. B. Gedanken (& nicht schlechte) über die populär-wissenschaftliche Schreiberei der heutigen Wissenschaftler; aber es ist mir versagt meine Meinung in Form von polemischen Schriften Leuten mitzuteilen. Ich habe die entsprechende Gabe nicht; & muß meine Überzeugung, die mir wichtig ist, auf anderem, weit weniger direktem, Wege an den Mann bringen.– Darum, weil ein Anderer das gut kann, kann ich es noch nicht; & darum, weil ein Anderer wieder es schlecht macht, darf ich es nicht auch schlecht machen! (Mir ist übrigens in diesem Falle meine Unfähigkeit ganz klar, & ich bin daher gar nicht in Versuchung hier eine Dummheit zu machen.) Es gibt ja viele Wege Deine Überzeugung in reinlicher Weise & also mit der Kraft der Überzeugung, die ja dem Geschwätz immer fehlt, den Menschen beizubringen. Weil ein Weg dazu der direkte erscheint, deswegen darfst Du ihn noch nicht gehen. Und weil Deine Gegner ihn vielleicht unanständigerweise gehen, bist Du noch nicht berechtigt ihn zur Verteidigung der guten Sache zu gehen. Du mußt Dich vielleicht, in Gottes Namen, & um der guten Sache willen mit einem weniger direkten bescheiden. (Dazu gehört Kraft & Mut.) Du bist wie ein Mensch, dem seine Feinde Pflanzen aus seinem Garten ausgerissen haben, & der nun, um zu zeigen, daß er sich nichts gefallen läßt, statt Samen zu säen, alte Blumen aus der Vase nimmt & sie statt der ausgerissenen in den Boden steckt. Nur den, der eine frische Pflanze von einer alten nicht unterscheiden kann, wird dies, für kurze Zeit, täuschen; aber nach ein paar Minuten (wenn nämlich der Vortrag vorüber ist) verwelken die Blumen ganz, & der Garte[n] schaut so trostlos aus, wie vorher.

Ich will nun schließen. Nimm, bitte, von meinen Bemerkungen, was Du brauchen kannst; aber wirf nichts weg nur darum, weil es vielleicht schlecht schmeckt. Ja nicht einmal darum, weil es vielleicht mit unreinen Gedanken, Selbstgefälligkeit & dergl von mir geschrieben ist Die Wahrheit ist nicht immer angenehm, mir so wenig wie Dir. Und das weißt du ja alles genau! Nur Eins: wenn Du etwas schreibst, laß Dich's viel kosten. Dann wird gewiß etwas daran sein. Und sonst gewiß nicht.

turns from something beautiful into something despicable. Think! & think for use in the home!

One cannot say anything more strongly in praise of you than that one must love & esteem you highly, even though you engage in such escapades.

One more thing: You are probably saying: “But one must give expression to one’s conviction even if it has nothing to do with one’s own discipline. For I (Hänsel) am supposed to educate people, & that doesn’t mean to only teach them German & French.” Definitely, this is true. But to express one’s conviction does not mean to blather about things, also doesn’t necessarily mean: to lecture about them. Instead this is only one way to give expression to the conviction, & a way that is possible only under very definite conditions (concerning you & your surroundings). One may well be barred from decently giving it this expression.—I, for example, have thoughts (& not bad ones) about the popular-scientific scribbling of today’s scientists; but I am barred from communicating my opinions to people in the form of polemic writings. I don’t have the requisite gift; & must get my conviction, which is important to me, across in another, far less direct manner.—Just because someone else can do it well, I cannot do it myself; & just because yet someone else does it badly, I am not allowed to do it badly, too! (In this case, by the way, my inability is completely clear to me, & I am therefore not even tempted to do something stupid here.) There are many ways, after all, to teach people your conviction in a cleanly manner^a & thus with that strength of conviction which blather is always lacking, after all. Just because one path towards this always appears to be the direct one, you may not therefore take it. And just because your opponents take it perhaps indecently, you are not therefore entitled to take it in defense of the good cause. For God’s sake & for the sake of the good cause you must perhaps content yourself with a less direct one. (This takes strength & courage.) You are like a person whose enemies have pulled up plants from his garden & who now, in order to show that he won’t let them get away with anything, instead of sowing seeds takes old flowers out of the vase & and sticks them in the ground in place of the ones that were pulled up. Only a person who cannot distinguish a fresh plant from an old one will be deceived by this for a short time; but after a couple of minutes (namely when the lecture is over) the flowers wilt altogether & the garden looks as desolate as before.

I want to close now. Please take from my remarks what is of use to you; but don’t throw anything away just because it perhaps tastes bad. Yes not even because it was written by me with uncleanly thoughts, complacency & the like. Truth isn’t always pleasant, to me as little as to you. And you know all that very well! Just one thing: if you write something, let it cost you much. Then there’ll definitely be something to it. Otherwise definitely not.

^aSee “Movements of Thought,” [19,d] for Wittgenstein’s use of “reinlich (cleanly, hygienic)” and its allusion to “rein (pure).” [Eds.]

Bitte glaube auch an meine unwandelbare Gesinnung & mein Gefühl für Dich!
Grüße Deine lieben Kinder & Frau herzlichst von mir

Dein alter Ludwig Wittgenstein

233 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Skjolden] Mittwoch, 10. 3. [1937]

Lieber Hänsel!

Dank' Dir für Deinen lieben Brief!

Ich glaube ich sollte Dir noch einiges schreiben, um vielleicht die Situation klären zu helfen. Und ich werde in dem was ich schreibe wieder »hart« sein; aber das heißt nur soviel, als daß ich schreiben will, wie ich's wirklich meine. In dem, was Du mir schriebst, sehe ich manches, was geeignet ist, zu falschen Schlüssen zu führen, & es wäre, glaube ich, unendlich wichtig, daß hier Deine Gedanken sehr klar würden.

Denn wenn auch die Klarheit der Gedanken an & für sich nicht das Wichtigste ist, so wird sie doch dort überragend wichtig, wo Unklarheit zum Selbstbetrug führen könnte. Ich glaube z. B. ich könnte mich einem weniger klugen Menschen, als Du bist, leichter verständlich machen, da er nicht so leicht wieder eine Parade bei der Hand hätte, die dann erst wieder als nicht stichhältig erwiesen werden muß. Ich meine aber natürlich nicht, daß diese Klugheit etwas Schlechtes ist; sie ist nur etwas Gefährliches, wenn nicht noch weitere Klugheit dazukommt. Ich habe eine Menge Klugheit, aber ich scheue davor zurück sie zur strengen Kritik meiner selbst anzuwenden.

Du schreibst, Du habest lange Zeit mit den Gedanken über das Relative & Absolute zu tun gehabt & es sei Dir ernst gewesen. Das glaube ich. – Aber der Ernst bestand darin, daß Du ein Problem gesehen hat & daran – wenn ich so sagen darf – genagt hast. Dieses Nagen – nehme ich an – war ernst. Damit ist aber nicht gesagt, daß es nun Ernst ist zu ungebildeten Menschen zu sprechen wie einer, der Wahrheit besitzt, – statt wie ein Suchender. Ernst wäre es, diesen Leuten zu sagen: »Meine Herren, ich habe über diese Dinge viel, wenn auch ganz ungenügend, nachgedacht. Vielleicht wird es dem Einen oder Andern von Ihnen helfen, wenn ich Ihnen sage, welche Argumente mir offenbar falsch, – welche mir plausibel erscheinen, – & was ich selbst glaube.«

Du schreibst: »Da & dort eines Sprunges bin ich mir dabei freilich bewußt«. Aber ich will sagen: Wäre der Geist der richtige, so wären einige, & auch vieler, Fehler gar nicht so wichtig. Ich glaube ich kann das am besten dadurch erklären, daß ich von einem Beispiel rede, das mir selbst vor Augen ist: Ich kenne, wie Du

Please believe also in my unchanging conviction^a & my feelings for you!
 Many regards to your dear children & wife

Your old friend Ludwig Wittgenstein

233 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Skjolden] Wednesday, 10.3. [1937]

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for your dear letter!

I believe I should write you some more, in order perhaps to help clarify the situation. And I will again be “severe” in what I write; but all that means is only that I want to write as I really mean it. In what you wrote to me I see several things that are prone to lead to wrong conclusions, & I believe it would be infinitely important that your thoughts here become very clear.

For, while the clarity of thoughts is not in & of itself the most important thing, it becomes exceedingly important where lack of clarity could lead to self-deception. I believe, for example, that I could make myself more easily understood to a person who is less intelligent than you are, since he would not have a parry so readily at his disposal, which must only then again be established as unsound. But I mean of course not that this intelligence is something bad; it is only something dangerous unless it is joined by another intelligence. I have a lot of intelligence; but I shy away from applying it to a stern criticism of myself.

You write that for a long time you have been dealing with thoughts about the relative & absolute & that you were serious. I believe that.—But the seriousness consisted in your seeing a problem &—if I may say so—gnawing on it. This gnawing—I assume—was serious. But this doesn’t imply that it is now serious to speak to uneducated people like someone who possesses the truth,—instead of like a seeker. To be serious would be to say to these people: “Gentlemen, I have thought about these matters a lot, even if quite insufficiently. Perhaps it will help one or another among you when I tell you which arguments appear obviously false to me,—and which plausible,—& what I believe myself.”

You write: “I am quite conscious, of course, of a leap here & there.” But I want to say: If the spirit were right, some & even many mistakes would not be so important at all. I believe that I can best explain this by talking of an example that I have in front of me: As

^aAs in letter 189 above, “conviction” serves to translate “Gesinnung.” [Eds.]

weiß in Cambridge einen Prof. Moore. Er ist Professor der Philosophie (ein alter Mann). Dieser ist zwar ein Denker, aber er hat – soviel ich beurteilen kann – nie eine entscheidende Entdeckung in der Philosophie gemacht. Er hat aber in seinem Lehrberuf mehr genützt, als viele Andere, die ein entschieden größeres Talent haben, als er. Und zwar einfach durch seine Ehrlichkeit. Oder man könnte auch sagen, durch seinen Ernst, denn das ist hier dasselbe. (Und wenn man das Schlechte Deines Aufsatzes mit einem Wort treffen wollte, so müßte man sagen: es fehlt ihm am Ernst. – Wenn der Ernst auch beim Nagen da war.) Eine Vorlesung Moore's nun ist nichts weniger als Unterhaltend denn er bekennt sich als einer, der nagt & noch nicht klar ist. (Er nagt in der Vorlesung.) Und niemand hält ihn darum für dumm. Und auch der wenigst Gescheite lernt von ihm: 1.) wie schwer es ist die Wahrheit zu sehen & 2.) daß man nicht sagen braucht, man verstehe etwas, was man nicht versteht.

Aber gerade so hättest ja Du Deinen Zuhörern helfen sollen. – Nicht, daß Du ihnen das ›ungenügend verdaute‹ gegeben hast, ist das Schlimme, sondern, daß Du es ihnen als ein Verdautes gegeben hast. – Wer in Aphorismen, Bemerkungen, schreibt, der muß verdaut haben. sonst ist der Aphorismus ein Schwindel. (Ich weiß freilich, wie sehr die aphoristische Schreibweise – besonders durch Kraus – in unserer Zeit liegt. Und wie sehr bin ich selbst von ihm beeinflusst. Auch im schlechten Sinne.

Du, lieber Hänsel, müßtest Dich streng vor jeder aphoristischen Schreibweise in Acht nehmen: Und wo es Dir wirklicher tiefer Ernst ist – wie z.B. in Deinen lieben Briefen – da finden sich auch keine Aphorismen.

Du schreibst: »Es wird wohl immer so sein müssen & sein dürfen, daß der gerade ein bißchen Gescheitere dem andern von seiner Weisheit abgibt.....«. Gewiß!! D.h.: Wenn Du etwas weißt, so sag's ihm; wenn Du einen Gedanken gehabt hast, so teil ihn ihm als Gedanken mit; wenn Du Zweifel hast, so teil sie als Zweifel mit, etc. Nur darin kann doch die Belehrung bestehen. Denn wenn der Gescheitere ihm Unklares mitteilt, aber so, als wäre es schon klar, & was er glaubt, als wäre es bewiesen etc., so gibt er ihm ja nichts von seiner Weisheit ab.

Nur durch innere Wahrheit, ich meine durch Deine innere Wahrheit, kannst Du Andern zu größerer Wahrheit helfen. Ein anderes Mittel gibt es nicht. Merkwürdigerweise wirkt auch in so einem Vortrag der Mensch mehr durch das Beispiel, das er gibt, als durch die geäußerten Meinungen. Siehe Prof. Moore. – Und das bringt mich darauf, wie wenig ich dieses Beispiel, das ich selbst vor Augen hatte, nachgeahmt habe. Denn ich habe meinen Zuhörern unzählige Male verheimlicht, wie un-

you know, in Cambridge I know a Prof. Moore.^a He is a professor of philosophy (an old man). Though he is a thinker he never made—as far as I can judge—a decisive discovery in philosophy. But in his vocation as a teacher he has been more useful than many others who had a decidedly greater talent than he. And this simply through his honesty. Or one could also say, through his seriousness, for this amounts to the same here. (And if one wanted to pinpoint the badness of your essay with one word, one would have to say: It lacks seriousness.—Even though the seriousness was there during the gnawing.) Now a lecture by Moore is everything but entertaining for he acknowledges himself as one who is gnawing & not yet clear. (He is gnawing during the lecture.) And no one therefore considers him stupid. And also the least clever learns from him: 1.) how difficult it is to see the truth & 2.) that one need not say that one understands what one does not understand.

But just like this you should have helped your audience.—What’s bad is not that you gave them the ‘insufficiently digested,’ but that you gave it to them as something digested.—Someone who writes aphorisms, remarks, must have digested, otherwise the aphorism is a fraud. (I know of course how much the aphoristic way of writing—especially through Kraus—is part of our time.^b And how much I am myself influenced by him. Also in the bad sense.

You, dear Hänsel, ought to strictly watch out for any way of writing aphoristically: And where you take things really deeply seriously—as for example in your dear letter—one won’t find any aphorisms either.

You write: “Probably it always has to be & is always permissible that the one who just now is a little cleverer imparts some of his wisdom to the other . . .”. Certainly!! That is: When you know something, tell him; when you had a thought, convey it to him as a thought; when you have doubts, convey them as doubts, etc. The instruction can only consist in this, after all. For when the cleverer one conveys something unclear to him, but does so as if it were clear already, & when he conveys what he believes as if it were proven etc., he imparts to him none of his wisdom, after all.

Only through inner truth, and I mean through your inner truth can you help the other to greater truth. There is no other means. Strangely, even in a lecture a person affects more through the example he gives than through the stated opinions. See Prof. Moore.—And this brings me to how little I have been following this example which I myself had in front

^aSee “Movements of Thought” [42,c].

^b“especially through Kraus” is ambiguous here; it could mean “especially because of Kraus” but also that through Kraus’s writing or his example Wittgenstein is aware how much the aphorism belongs to his age (*liegt in unserer Zeit*). Concerning Karl Kraus, see “Movements of Thought” [30,a]. [Eds.]

klar die Sache mir selbst noch war, & habe getan, als wäre sie mir schon klar, wenn ich erst hoffte, sie würde mir klar werden.

Mein lieber Hänsel! Nochmals herzlichsten Dank für Deinen lieben Brief! Ich habe jetzt selbst, in gewisser Form, eine schwere Zeit hinter mir, & noch nicht hinter mir, denn ich muß mir selbst immer Vorwürfe machen, & habe doch nicht die Anständigkeit, es besser zu machen. Ich wünsche uns Beiden alles Gute Innen & Außen. Gott mit Dir!

Dein alter

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Grüße Deine liebe Familie & denkt zu Ostern an mich, denn ich werde wahrscheinlich dann nicht in Wien sein. Grüß auch Drobil, wenn Du ihn siehst & überhaupt alle Freunde. Die Mareile soll fleißig & anständig zeichnen!

234 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Skjolden] 14. 4. [1937]

Lieber Hänsel!

Ich möchte nur mit ein paar Worten Deinen letzten lieben Brief beantworten. Du sagst, in meinem letzten Briefe sei kein Zorn gewesen. Es war auch in meinem ersten kein Zorn; bitte glaube das ja nicht (& versuche es nicht zu glauben)! Ich habe mehrere Tage an ihm geschrieben, mir vorher lang überlegt, ob ich schreiben sollte, & was; & nachdem ich geschrieben hatte, ließ ich den Brief ein paar Tage liegen & habe ihn dann noch einmal neugeschrieben. Natürlich ist damit nicht gesagt, daß ich es auf die richtigste Weise geschrieben habe.

Ernst, sehr ernst kommt mir die Sache auch heute noch vor; für Dich, aber auch für Deine ganze Umgebung. Denn ich bin überzeugt, daß, wie jede halbwegs anständige Tat gute Wirkungen ausstrahlt, so jede schlechte üble Folgen. Ich meine: Unechtheit gebiert Unechtheit & Echtheit gebiert Echtheit. Damit will ich Dich aber nicht dafür verantwortlich machen, daß die Mareile nur mehr Fahnen zeichnet. Aber wie mögen diese Fahnen sein?? Du wirst vielleicht sagen: »Ganz nett.« Und das ist, in einem Sinne, gewiß wahr & doch fürchte ich, es sei ein Abstieg. Möge ich im Irrtum sein! Denn daß sie sonst nichts mehr zeichnet, tut mir zwar sehr leid, aber der Grund könnte ja der sein, daß diese Quelle auf natürliche Weise versiegt. Wenn nur nicht etwas Unechtes daraus wird!

of me. For countless times I kept from my audience how unclear the matter still was to me & acted as if it were clear already, when I was only hoping it would yet become clear.^a

My dear Hänsel! Once again most sincere thanks for your dear letter! I myself have now, in a certain form, a difficult time behind me, & not yet behind me, for I must always reproach myself & yet don't have the decency to do better. I wish both of us all the best inside & out. May God be with you!

Your old friend

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Greetings to your dear family & think of me at Easter because I will probably not be in Vienna then. Greetings also to Drobil when you see him & in general all friends. Mareile is to draw studiously & properly!^b

234 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Skjolden] 14.4. [1937]

Dear Hänsel!

I would only like to answer your last dear letter with a few words. You say that there was no wrath in my last letter. There was no wrath also in my first one; please by all means don't believe this (& try not to believe it)! I wrote it over several days, thought for a long time beforehand whether I should write & what; & after I wrote it I let the letter lie for a few days & then rewrote it once again. Of course this doesn't mean that I wrote it in the most appropriate way.

Serious, very serious the matter still appears to me today; for you but also for your whole surroundings. For I am convinced that, just like any half-way decent deed radiates good effects, so every bad one vile consequences. I mean: disingenuousness breeds disingenuousness & ingenuousness breeds ingenuousness. But with this I don't want to hold you responsible for Mareile drawing nothing but flags anymore. But what might these flags be like?? Perhaps you will say: "Quite nice." And that is in a certain sense surely true & yet I fear that this represents a decline. Would that I am mistaken! For while I am sorry that she isn't drawing anything else anymore, the reason for that could well be that this source is drying up in a natural way. If only it doesn't turn into something disingenuous!

^aCompare "Movements of Thought" [145] where, in an entry dated November 23, 1936, Wittgenstein uses a nearly identical formulation. [Eds.]

^bCompare "Movements of Thought" [212–228], where Wittgenstein is waiting for Easter and the appearance of the sun. Regarding Drobil and Mareile, see letter 220 above. [Eds.]—Mareile learned drawing also from Hermine Wittgenstein. She would often (mostly at Christmas time) give watercolors of flowers or other plants to Ludwig and Hermine.

Ja, die Bewunderung ist schädlich! Das weiß ich auch von mir selbst.

In ca 3–4 Wochen will ich nach Wien kommen & freue mich drauf Euch zu sehen. Möge es Euch gut gehen! Dein

Ludw Wittgenstein

236 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Skjolden, nach dem 12. 10. 1937]

Lieber Hänsel!

Dank Dir für Deinen lieben Brief. Das Geld, von dem Du schreibst, werde ich gewiß bald erhalten. Aber, bitte, schick um Gottes Willen keins mehr! Erstens ist das Ganze nicht der Rede wert, zweitens kann ich mit dem, was Du mir schickst, jetzt gar nichts anfangen. Wenn es sein muß, werde ich Dir erlauben, mir jeden Heller zurückzuzahlen – wenn ich ihn brauchen kann.

Ratschläge habe ich eigentlich dem Hermann keine gegeben, es sei denn den ei-nen, sein Gewissen, & alles was mit Religion zusammenhängt, ernst zu nehmen. (Ich hoffe, & glaube, er wird sich besser halten, als ich es unter den gleichen Umständen getan hätte.)

Denk viel an Gott & es wird zwischen Euch auch das Rechte herauskommen. Gute Ratschläge zu geben, habe ich aber nicht das Recht, denn ich selber bin ein Schwein.

Und das bringt mich auf den Drobil: hast Du ihn einmal gesehen? Arbeitet er etwas vernünftiges? Grüß Alle herzlichst.

Dein alter

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Noch eines will ich schreiben; bitte nimm mir's nicht übel! Bitte, vergiss oder übersieh' nicht, daß Hermann jetzt zum Mann wird; ich meine nicht dem Alter nach, aber tatsächlich dem Charakter nach. Er kommt zur Welt (& zu Gott) in ein selbständigeres Verhältnis; & möge es ein gutes werden! Aber wir, weder Du, noch ich, können unserm Wunsch auf einem direkten Wege durchsetzen. Du kannst nur, das Beste wünschend, an seiner Seite stehen. Ich glaube, was Du hoffst, ist viel ähnlicher dem, was ich hoffe, als Du ahnst. Verzeih mir alles das, was vielleicht unnütz ist, aber nicht schlecht gemeint. Ich danke Dir für Dein Vertrauen!

Yes, admiration is harmful! I know that also from my own example.

I want to come to Vienna in about 3 to 4 weeks & look forward to seeing you. May all of you be doing well! Yours

Ludw Wittgenstein

236 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Skjolden, after October 12, 1937]

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for your dear letter. The money of which you write I will surely receive soon. But please, for God's sake, don't send any more! First of all the whole thing isn't worth mentioning, second, I have no use at all now for what you are sending me. If it must be I will allow you to repay me every cent—when I can use it.

I really haven't given Hermann any advice, except the one to take his conscience & everything having to do with religion seriously. (I hope, & believe, he will hold up better than I would have under the same circumstances.)^a

Think much of God & the right thing will also come out between the two of you.^b But I don't have the right to give good advice, for I am a swine myself.

And that brings me to Dobril: have you seen him recently? Is he doing sensible work? Greet everyone most sincerely.

Your old friend

Ludwig Wittgenstein

I want to write one more thing; please don't take offense! Please, don't forget or overlook that Hermann is now becoming a man; I do not mean according to age but in fact according to character. He is coming into a more independent relation to the world (& to God); & may it become a good one! But we, neither you nor I, can have our wish in a direct way. Hoping for the best you can only stand by his side. I believe, what you are hoping for is much more similar to what I am hoping for than you imagine. Forgive me for everything that is perhaps useless but without ill intention. I thank you for your trust!

^aThe youngest of Hänsel's three children, Hermann Hänsel was born in 1918. He had been studying French and German at the University of Vienna when in 1937 he switched to agriculture and eventually became an internationally renowned expert in plant breeding. He visited Wittgenstein on his bike from October 10 to 12, 1937. Compare Wittgenstein's notes about this visit in Manuscript 119.

^bThis sentence could also be interpreted as "things will turn out right also between the two of you." [Eds.]

238 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

36 Chelmsford Rd.
Ranelagh
Dublin
22. 2. [1938]

Lieber Hänsel!

Es würde mich freuen von Dir zu hören. Ich möchte auch gerne von Dir ein vernünftiges Wort darüber hören, wie es jetzt in Wien steht. Hier hört man allerlei, was Angst erregen könnte, aber man kann den Zeitungen nicht trauen. Ich bin aber dennoch im Inneren besorgt.

Von mir kann ich nichts Klares schreiben. Ich schreibe & gehe manchmal in ein Irrenhaus (aber nicht als Patient). Was aus mir werden wird, weiß ich noch nicht. Körperlich geht es mir nicht schlecht, geistig so-so.

Hast Du von Geiger etwas gehört? Hat er seine Prüfungen gut hinter sich? Sei nicht böse, daß ich nichts rechtes schreiben kann & nur viel wissen möchte.

Grüß Deine liebe Frau & die Kinder herzlichst.

Dein alter

Ludwig Wittgenstein

238 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

36 Chelmsford Rd.
 Ranelagh
 Dublin
 22.2. [1938]^a

Dear Hänsel!

I would be glad to hear from you. I would also like to hear from you a sensible word about how things are in Vienna now.^b Here one hears all sorts of things that could incite fear, but one cannot trust the newspapers. But inside I am still worried.

I cannot write anything clear concerning myself. I am writing & sometimes go to an insane asylum (but not as a patient).^c What will become of me, I don't know yet. Physically I am not doing badly, mentally so-so.

Have you heard something from Geiger?^d Did he conclude his exams? Don't be angry that I can't write anything proper & only want to know a lot.

Greet your dear wife & the children most sincerely.

Your old friend

Ludwig Wittgenstein

^aSince February 8, Wittgenstein had been living with his student and friend Maurice O'C. Drury. See Drury's *Recollections of Wittgenstein*; see letter 181, note c, pp. 76–171.

^bWittgenstein was writing at a time of heightened tension. On February 12, Austria's chancellor Schuschnigg had visited Hitler, who pressured him to include National Socialists in the government. On March 11, Hitler's forces occupied Austria. The intervening month saw great political unrest in Vienna.

^cOn Wittgenstein's advice Drury had left the university to become a physician. At the time, he was working at Dublin's municipal hospital. "Wittgenstein asked me if I could arrange for him to have discussions with patients who were seriously mentally ill. He said this would be a matter of great interest to him. [. . .] Wittgenstein then went two or three days a week and visited some of the long-stay patients. [. . .] I was fascinated to see how gently and helpfully Wittgenstein was able to discuss with him. When at one point I tried to join in the discussion, Wittgenstein at once told me to 'shut up.' Afterwards, when we were walking home [he said]: 'When you're playing ping-pong you mustn't use a tennis racket'" (*Recollections*, see letter 181, note c, p. 140). [Eds.]

^dGeiger was just then finishing his studies. He began working in a pharmacy on April 20, 1938.

239 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

36 Chelmsford Rd
 Ranelagh
 Dublin
 15. 3. 38.

Lieber Hänsel!

Bitte berichte mir kurz, wie es in Wien & bei Dir & Deiner Familie steht, auch, was Du von den Meinen weißt. Bitte schreibe mir, ob Du glaubst, ich sollte nach Wien kommen.

Ich denke viel an Euch.

Dein
 Ludwig Wittgenstein

Hast Du keine Zeit so soll mir der Hermann schreiben, aber ich fürchte er würde zu wenig klar – weil schreibfaul – schreiben.

Grüß Alle!

242 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81 East Rd.
 Cambridge
 7. 5. 38.

Lieber Hänsel!

Ich wollte Dich schon lange bitten, Dich nach dem Aufenthalt & Befinden des Pfarrers Neururer zu erkundigen. Vor ca einem Jahr lebte er in Mitterbach an der Mariazellerbahn. Als ich ihm dorthin zu Weihnachten schrieb erhielt ich eine Antwort aus einem Ort in der Nähe von Zwettl & es schien, daß er nun dort lebte. Ich habe den Namen des Orts leider vergessen (war es ›Rosenburg‹?) & seine Karte

239 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

36 Chelmsford Rd
Ranelagh
Dublin
15.3.38

Dear Hänsel!

Please report briefly how things are in Vienna^a & with you & your family, also what you know of mine. Please write to me whether you believe that I should come to Vienna.

I am thinking much of you.

Yours
Ludwig Wittgenstein

If you don't have time, Hermann shall write to me, but I fear that—lazy about writing—he would write without enough clarity.

Greetings to everyone!

242 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

81 East Rd.
Cambridge
7.5.38.

Dear Hänsel!

I have been meaning to ask you for a long time about the whereabouts & well-being of Father Neururer. About a year ago he lived in Mitterbach at the Mariazeller-Railway. When I wrote there for Christmas I received an answer from a place in the vicinity of Zwettl & it seemed that he was living there now. Unfortunately I forgot the name of the place (was it 'Rosenburg'?) & lost his card.^b Perhaps you can write to Mitterbach near

^aGermany annexed Austria on March 11, and Hänsel was suspended from work on March 14. Wittgenstein had reason to worry, since his family was of Jewish descent. He was hoping, however, that his relatives would be safe because of the respect they enjoyed and their many contributions to Austria. Accordingly, Hermine Wittgenstein asks Hänsel in letter 240 what he knows about Ludwig's wartime decorations; she was compiling a list of family accomplishments in order to obtain "Aryan treatment."

^bAfter retiring in August 1936, Neururer moved to Rosenau near Zwettl and lived there until the end of this life.

verloren. Vielleicht kannst Du nach Mitterbach bei Mariazell schreiben &, wenn Du seine Adresse ermittelt hast, auch ihm schreiben & ihm Grüße & gute Wünsche von mir ausrichten. Ich wünsche sehr zu wissen, wie es ihm geht. Wenn ich seine Adresse weiß, werde ich ihm selbst schreiben.

Ich denke oft an Euch & mit vielen guten Wünschen für das innere & äußere Leben. Ich möchte gerne wieder von Hermann etwas hören, wenn er Zeit hat. Grüß Alle herzlichst!

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

243 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81 East Rd.
Cambridge
31. 5. 38.

Lieber Hänsel!

Dank Dir für Deinen Brief. Hermann schrieb, Du legest seinem Brief einen Brief bei, & ich nahm an, daß es ein Brief von Dir an mich sei. – Aber auch von Neururer lag nichts bei. Möchtest Du recht viel Gelegenheit haben, Leuten in ein oder der andern Weise zu helfen

Ich denke mir, eine Menge Menschen um Dich herum werden Dir heute dafür dankbar sein.

Bei mir ist alles im alten. Ich hoffe Euch im Laufe des Sommers sehen zu können; aber es ist noch unbestimmt.

Ich bin für die Gesundheit meiner Schwester Gretl besorgt. Ich fürchte, die Anstrengungen, die sie sich zumutet, werden zu groß für sie sein; & von ihrem Leben hängt das Glück einer Menge anderer Leute ab.

Grüß Deine Kinder & Deine lb. Frau herzlich!

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Dank dem Mareile nochmals für die liebe Zeichnung!

Mariazell & once you find out his address also write to him & convey greetings & good wishes from me. I very much want to know how he is doing. Once I know his address, I will write to him myself.

I often think of all of you & with best wishes for your life inside & outside. I would like to hear from Hermann again, when he has time. Greet everyone most sincerely!

Yours

Ludwig Wittgenstein

243 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

81 East Rd.
Cambridge
31.5.38.

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for your letter. Hermann wrote that with his letter you would be enclosing another letter & I assumed that it would be a letter from you to me.—But there was also nothing enclosed from Neururer. May you have plenty of opportunity to help people in one way or another.

I imagine that today many people around you are therefore grateful to you.

With me everything is as it was. I hope to see all of you in the course of the summer, but it is still uncertain.

I am worried about the health of my sister Gretl. I am afraid the strain she subjects herself to will be too great for her; & on her life depends the happiness of many other people.^a

Greet your children & dear wife sincerely!

Yours

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Thank Mareile again for the dear drawing!

^aIn 1938, Margarete Stonborough involved herself on behalf of many people who wanted to emigrate from Austria, vouching for them that they would not become a burden to the United States. She was also unsettled by the first divorce, in 1936, of her son Thomas, and by her husband, who suffered serious depressions after being diagnosed with cancer (he took his own life on June 15, 1938). Suffering from a heart defect ever since the birth of her second son John, her health was seriously affected.

244 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81 East Rd.
Cambridge
10. 9. 38.

Lieber Hänsel!

Dank Dir für die Photographie! Ich gestehe, ein Bild, auf dem Du weniger – beinahe hätte ich gesagt – schelmisch ausschaust, wäre mir noch lieber gewesen. Aber ich habe es so beschnitten, daß nur die beiden Köpfe & etwas von Brust & Schultern zu sehen ist & jetzt gefällt es mir ganz gut. Ich weiß natürlich, daß der altväterisch lustige Eindruck des Bildes gänzlich unbeabsichtigt zustande gekommen ist; aber mir ist eine einfache, trockene &, womöglich, ernste Photographie immer lieber als eine Genrescene, so natürlich sie auch sein mag. – Ich werde einen Laokoon für Photographen schreiben. – Ich hoffe es geht Euch halbwegs gut. Mir geht es sehr gut, aber ich habe keine Hoffnung, bald nach Österreich kommen zu können, & mit[t]lerweile mag meinen Leuten Manches zustoßen. – Bitte grüß Deine Kinder von mir. Ich wüßte gern, was der Hermann macht; ich wollte ich könnte ihn einmal sehen. Du weißt, ich halte sehr viel von ihm.

Hilf, wenn Du kannst. Mögest Du die Kraft haben, Dir nichts vorzumachen.
Grüß Deine liebe Frau herzlichst.

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

244 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

81 East Rd.
Cambridge
10.9.38

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for the photograph!^a I confess that I would have liked even more a picture in which you look less—I almost would have said—mischievous. But I have trimmed it in such a way that only the two heads & something of the chest and shoulders are visible & now I like it quite well. I know of course that the antiquated impression of the picture came about quite inadvertently; but I always prefer a plain, dry &, if possible, serious photograph over a genre-scene, no matter how natural it may be.—I will write a Laocoon for photographers.^b—I hope that all of you are doing reasonably well. I am doing very well but I have no hope of being able to come to Austria soon, & in the meantime much can happen to my people.—Please greet your children from me. I would like to know what Hermann is doing; I wish I could see him some time. You know, I think highly of him.

Help, when you can. May you have the strength not to fool yourself.
Greet your dear wife sincerely.

Yours
Ludwig Wittgenstein

^aThe photograph is not known today. Fania Pascal writes in *Recollections of Wittgenstein* (see letter 181, note c, p. 28): “Francis [Skinner] told me that Wittgenstein would devote hours to shaving off tiny slivers from the small photos he took before he would be satisfied with some kind of balance achieved. Certainly when he gave me my copies they were much reduced from the original size; one was now smaller than an inch in square. During the Spanish Civil War Wittgenstein, seeing in our room an enlarged photograph of John Cornford, who had just been killed in Spain, sniffed: “They think you can just enlarge a photo. Now look. It’s all trousers.””

^bIn 1766, the playwright and Enlightenment philosopher Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) published *Laocoon: Or about the Limits of Painting and Poetry*. Focusing especially on the example of pain, Lessing explores the limits of expression that are specific to the media of painting (as well as sculpture) and poetry. Wittgenstein also refers to Lessing’s theological stance. He alludes to the “parable of the rings” from Lessing’s play *Nathan the Wise* when he reflects in his diaries (“Movements of Thought” [149]) on the meaning of religious documents; and he quotes in *Culture and Value* (see letter 181, note b, p. 8/11) from his influential essay “On the Education of the Human Race.” [Eds.]

245 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81 East Rd
Cambridge
14. 12. 38.

Lieber Hänsel!

Dank Dir für Deinen Brief. Ich muß Dir sagen, daß er mich nicht – wie sonst alle Deine Briefe – wirklich gefreut hat. Es hat mich an ihm etwas befremdet, das ich lange nicht fassen konnte, wofür mir aber dann das Wort einfiel: Teilnahmslosigkeit. Es gab mir, als ich ihn las, einen Schock, wie Du nach einem Bericht über ein Knallgasexperiment der Ib. Mareile am Schluß Deines Briefes schreibst, Du habest von meiner Schwester Gretl erfahren, wie es meinen Geschwistern ergangen sei. Als redetest Du von Menschen, die Du kaum je gesehen hast. Ich dachte: Bist Du denn jetzt ganz außer jedem Kontakt mit ihnen?! Und daß sie jetzt viel Sorge & Trübsal haben konntest Du Dir ja wohl denken. – Ich hoffe Du verstehst mich. Wenn nicht, so würde keine weitere Erklärung es klarer machen. Ich will Dich aber nicht kritisieren & habe dazu auch keinerlei Recht; Du sollst aber doch wissen, wie ich fühle.

Gerne hörte ich wieder etwas von Hermann. Ich wünsche ihm zu den »starken Muskeln« auch ein starkes Gehirn & noch mehr, ein ebensolches Herz. Nicht, daß ich zweifle, daß er es hat! Aber ich weiß nur zu gut: es ist schwer zu behalten.– Von mir ist nichts zu berichten. Ich war zwei Monate lang etwas unwohl & bin jetzt wieder gesund. Ich arbeite nicht viel, bin auch faul, aber es geht gerade.

Ich kann jetzt noch nicht nach Wien kommen, glaube aber bestimmt, es wird zu Ostern schon gehen.

Als ich einmal schrieb, ich wünsche Dir, Du mögest Dir nichts vormachen, meinte ich eigentlich: ich wünsche Dir, daß Du Deinen Kopf Deinem Herzen nichts vormachen läßt. Der Kopf dreht sich einmal so, einmal so, aber es ist wünschenswert, daß das Herz, wie die Kompaßnadel auf dem Schiff, sich nicht mitdreht!*

Ich glaube nicht, daß alles Unsinn ist, was ich jetzt geschrieben habe. Und daß ich nicht viel wert bin, macht es auch nicht zu Unsinn.

245 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

81 East Rd
Cambridge
14.12.38

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for your letter. I must tell you that—unlike all your other letters—it did not really give me joy. Something in it disconcerted me which for a long time I couldn't grasp, but the word for which then occurred to me: detachment.^a It shocked me when after a report of an experiment with oxyhydrogen gas by dear Mareile, I read at the very end of the letter that you heard from my sister Gretl what happened to my siblings.^b As if you were talking about people whom you have hardly ever seen. I thought: Is it that you are altogether out of touch with them now?! And that they now have much worry & grief you could probably well imagine.—I hope you understand me. If not, no further explanation could make it clearer. But I don't want to criticize you & also have no right whatsoever to do so; but you shall still know how I feel.^c

I was glad to hear from Hermann again. In addition to the “strong muscles” I wish him also a strong brain & even more so, just such a heart. Not that I am doubting that he has it! But I know all too well: it is hard to keep.—There is nothing to report about me. For two months I was slightly unwell & am healthy again now. I don't work much, am lazy, too, but it's just tolerable.

I can't come to Vienna now but definitely believe that it will work out at Easter.

When once I wrote that I wish you won't fool yourself, I really meant: I wish that you won't let your head fool your heart. The head turns now this way and then another way, but it is to be wished that, like the compass-needle on the ship, the heart doesn't turn along!*

I don't think that what I wrote now is all nonsense. And that I am not worth much doesn't make it nonsense either.

^aWittgenstein uses “Teilnahmslosigkeit (literally: lack of participation),” which can also be translated “indifference,” “lack of compassion” or “aloofness”; see letter 251 below. [Eds.]

^bThis might refer to the imprisonment for several days of all three Wittgenstein sisters as well as Arvid Sjögren. They were later acquitted for being inadvertently in possession of forged Yugoslavian passports (Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein*, pp. 398f).

^cIn letter 246 Hermine writes to Hänsel: “Until recently I thought these times were terribly hard for Jews, but now I know that they are just like that for other people also, namely the non-Nazi of character.” She regrets that a frank conversation with him was impossible because she always has guests living in her house. [Eds.]

Sag Hermann, er soll mir einmal wieder eine vernünftige Zeile schreiben.
Grüß Deine liebe Frau & die Mädchen herzlich & nimm auch Dich nicht aus.

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

245 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81 East Rd
Cambridge

248 HÄNSEL AN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Wien, 28. 12. 38.

Lieber Wittgenstein!

Alle fünf danken Dir herzlich für Deine lieben fünf Christmas-Karten! Richtiger: erst nur die drei, die daheim geblieben sind. Mareile kommt mit ihren alten Freundinnen erst zu Sylvester zurück. Dem Hermann, der länger ausbleibt – auf den Radstädter Tauern und in den Schladminger Bergen – schicken wir Deinen Brief mit dem Paket, das die Mama eben packt: Weihnachtsbäckereien für Sylvester, die wahrscheinlich zu spät kommen werden, weil er seine Adresse so spät geschickt hat.

Am Christtag war dieses Mal – auf meine Bitte – Dein Fräulein Schwester Hermine bei uns, in der neuen Wohnung, zur Jause (vormittag), statt umgekehrt wir bei ihr. Sie war so lieb, diesen meinen Vorschlag anzunehmen und ich glaube, es war sehr gut so, ich meine sogar, wenn ich da auch nur raten kann, es hätte sie ein bißchen gefreut. Sie hat auch meine Kinder wieder reichlich beschenkt und meiner Frau einen sehr schönen Zykamenstock gebracht, und wir waren wieder so »blöde«, kaum Muh dazu zu sagen. Unsere Freude ist erst nachher herausgekommen, als sie schon fort war. – Ich muß das auch ihr selbst schreiben.

Bei mir hat sich noch nichts geändert. –

Zum neuen Jahr wünschen wir Dir alle das Beste! Mareile hat Dir das Neujahrslied von Mörike abgeschrieben. Ich hatte es mir anders gedacht. Aber sie meinte, es ginge in keiner anderen Schrift.

Tell Hermann he should drop me another sensible line some day.
Greet your dear wife & the girls sincerely & don't exempt yourself either.

Yours
Ludwig Wittgenstein

*A lesson for your friend L.W..

248 HÄNSEL TO WITTGENSTEIN

Vienna, 28.12.38

Dear Wittgenstein!

All five of us thank you sincerely for your dear five Christmas cards!^a More accurately: for now only the three who stayed home. Mareile returns with her old girl-friends only on New Year's Eve. Hermann, who'll stay away longer—on the Radstadt Tauern^b and the Schladmingen mountains—will receive your letter with the parcel that his mother is packing just now: Christmas pastries for New Year's Eve which will probably arrive too late because he sent his address too late.

This time—upon my request— your sister Miss Hermine was with us on Christmas day, in the new apartment for a snack, instead of the other way round when we come to her. She was so kind to accept this suggestion of mine and I think it was very good this way, I even believe, though I can only guess here, that it gave her a little joy. She also once again gave my children generous gifts and brought a very beautiful potted cyclamen, and once again we were so “dumb” to hardly acknowledge it.^c Our joy only came afterwards, when she had gone already.—I have to write this also to her.

With me nothing has changed yet.^d—

I wish you all the best for the New Year! Mareile copied for you the New Year's song by Mörike.^e I had imagined it differently. But she thought it couldn't be done in a different script.

^aHänsel uses the English word “Christmas” here. [Eds.]

^bThe Tauern are a group of mountains in the eastern Alps.

^cHänsel literally writes “to hardly say moo to it.” [Eds.]

^dSince March 14, 1938, Hänsel had been suspended “for political reasons” from his office as headmaster. He had filed a request for reinstatement in the school system that was not granted until September 9, 1939.

^eAccording to Paul Engelmann's *Letters from Wittgenstein: With a Memoir* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), pp. 84–88, Wittgenstein thought highly of the German late romantic poet Eduard Mörike (1804–1875). Hänsel refers to one of Mörike's most pious poems “Am Silvesterabend (On New Year's Eve).” [Eds.]

Aber: hast Du ihre Zeichnungen und meinen Brief auch wirklich bekommen?
Und den von Hermann?

Ich freue mich auf das Wiedersehen zu Ostern.
Herzliche Grüße!

Dein Ludwig Hänsel

249 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81, East Rd
Cambridge
29. 12. 38.

Lieber Hänsel!

Vielen Dank für das Buch! Wenn mir auch ein abgetragenes aus Deiner Bibliothek noch lieber gewesen wäre, so hätte ich mir doch gewiß kein besseres aussuchen können. Wenn ich nur ein besserer Leser wäre! Von Mareile habe ich zwei liebe Zeichnungen bekommen. Das Kouvert in dem Du sie abgeschickt hast war aber gänzlich zerrissen & die hiesige Post steckte das Ganze in einen andern Umschlag. Ich schreibe dies nur, weil den Zeichnungen keine Zeilen beilagen & ich fürchte, es könnte ein Brief verloren gegangen sein.

Mir geht es körperlich gut, aber seelisch gar nicht recht. Ich bin dumm & reizbar.–

Möchtest Du meinen letzten Brief aufgenommen haben, wie er gemeint war: als eine Aufrichtigkeit*, nicht als eine Bosheit; & ich hoffe, er war keine Ungerechtigkeit. (Aber wer weiß!)

Mit allen guten Wünschen & vielem Dank

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Ich habe nie mehr etwas von Drobil gehört! Weißt Du etwas?

* Du kannst sagen: es ist eine billige Aufrichtigkeit, einen Andern tadeln. Und das ist wahr.

But: did you really receive her drawings and my letter? And the one from Hermann?
I am looking forward to seeing you again at Easter.
Sincere greetings!

Your Ludwig Hänsel

249 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

81, East Rd
Cambridge
29.12.38

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for the book! Though I would have liked even more one that is well-worn from your library, I certainly could not have picked a better one.^a If only I were a better reader! From Mareile I received two dear drawings. However, the envelope in which you mailed it was entirely torn apart & the post here put everything into another envelope. I am only writing this because no writing was included with the drawings & I fear a letter could have been lost.

Physically I am doing well, but spiritually I am not at all alright.^b I am stupid & irritable.—

Hoping that you took my last letter as it was meant: as frankness* and not as malice; & I hope it was no injustice. (But who knows!)

With all good wishes & many thanks

Yours
Ludwig Wittgenstein

I have never heard from Drobil again! Do you know something?

*You can say: it is cheap frankness to reproach someone else. And that is true.

^aIt is not known what book Wittgenstein is referring to here.

^bWittgenstein wrote that "seelisch" he was doing "gar nicht recht." [Eds.]

250 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81, East Rd
Cambridge
31. 12. 38.

Lieber Hänsel!

Dank Dir für Deinen lieben Brief vom 28. 12.. Es war reizend vom Mareile, mir den Mörke abzuschreiben. Bitte sag ihr das. Auch war mir Dein Brief ein lieberes Geschenk, als selbst Dein offizielles Geschenk; so sehr das mich gefreut hat.

Aber Dein Brief, von dem Du schreibst, ist offenbar verloren gegangen. Er lag wohl den beiden Zeichnungen des Mareile bei? (Die Post hat dieses Jahr mit den Paketen gewütet!)

Wenn ich zu Ostern, wie ich hoffe, kommen kann, muß ich dem Mareile erst richtig danken (durch einen Schlag auf den Kopf).

Grüß Deine liebe Frau & die Kinder herzlich.

Euer
Ludwig Wittgenstein

251 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81, East Rd
Cambridge
4. 1. 39

Lieber Hänsel!

Heute erhielt ich Deinen & Mareiles Brief vom 1. Jänner, die mich beide gefreut haben. Ich war offenbar vorschnell Dir Teilnahmslosigkeit vorzuwerfen. Ein schlimmer Fehler von mir, das hastige Urteilen; einer aus einer Armee. Daß jener Brief aber, besonders als ich ihn zum ersten Mal las, mir einen Schock gegeben hat, das ist wahr. Aber es war dieser Schock natürlich kein moralischer, etwa über etwas besonders Übles in Dir; sondern vergleichbar dem, welchen man in folgender Situation erhalten könnte: Denk Dir ich säße im Zimmer eines schwer Kranken; da geht die Tür auf & jemand kommt lachend herein & erzählt, wie hübsch es auf seinem Ausflug war. Das könnte einem einen Riß geben & man möchte sich vielleicht über Teilnahmslosigkeit beklagen. Aber es kann sich dann herausstellen, daß er, im Gegenteil, teilnehmend war, aber in diesem Moment verlegen, oder befangen, oder ich weiß nicht was.

So gibt es eben allerhand Mißverständnisse. Sei bitte, nicht innerlich gekränkt über das Unrecht, das ich Dir getan habe.

Der Mareile & Anna dank, bitte, herzlich für ihre lieben Zeilen. Es tut mir sehr leid, daß der erste Brief der Mareile verloren gegangen ist.

250 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

81, East Rd
Cambridge
31.12.38

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for your dear letter of December 28. It was delightful of Mareile to copy the Mörike for me. Please tell her that. Also your letter was a dearer present even than your official present; as much as that has given me joy.

But your letter of which you write has obviously been lost. It was with the drawings by Mareile, wasn't it? (This year the postal service wreaked havoc on the parcels!)

If I can come at Easter, as I hope, I must first of all thank Mareile properly (with a whack on the head).

Sincere greetings to your dear wife & the children.

All of yours
Ludwig Wittgenstein

251 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

81, East Rd
Cambridge
4.1.39

Dear Hänsel!

Today I received yours & Mareile's letter of January 1, both of which gave me joy. I was obviously rash to accuse you of detachment. Hasty judgment, a bad mistake of mine; one from the army. But it is true that, when I first read it, that letter shocked me. But this shock was of course not a moral one, as if about something especially bad in you, but rather comparable to that which one might experience in the following situation: Imagine I was sitting in the room of someone severely ill; then the door opens & someone comes in laughing & tells how nice it was on his outing. This could tear at a person & one might perhaps complain about detachment. But it can then turn out that, on the contrary, he was concerned but at the moment embarrassed, or inhibited, or I don't know what.

So all kinds of misunderstandings can come about. Please, don't be inwardly offended by the injustice I have done you.

Give my sincere thanks to Mareile & Anna for their dear letters. I am very sorry that the first letter by Mareile got lost.

Von Neururer erhielt ich gestern eine Karte. Er schreibt fast nichts; aber ich habe mich doch gefreut.

Grüß Deine liebe Frau & Dich selbst herzlich.

Dein Ludwig Wittgenstein.

254 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

Herrn
Dr. Ludwig Hänsel
18. Alseggerstr. 38
Wien
Austria

[Poststempel: Cambridge, 13. III. 39]

Lieber Hänsel!

Dank Dir für Deinen Brief. Gott sei Dank ist alles, wider Erwarten, gut gegangen. Vielleicht kann ich Euch in 1 1/2 bis 2 Monaten sehen.

Grüß Deine liebe Frau herzlichst!

Ich denke viel an Euch!

Dein
Ludwig Wittgenstein

256 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

81, East Rd
Cambridge
26. 8. 39.

Lieber Hänsel!

Ich will Dir nur Grüße senden & gute Wünsche für die Zukunft, die mehr als sonst verschleiert ist. Die Grüße sind übrigens aufzuteilen auf Dich, Deine liebe Frau & die Kinder. Wie es mit mir selbst werden wird kann ich mir noch gar nicht

I received a card from Neururer yesterday. He writes hardly anything at all; but I was glad anyway.

Greet your dear wife & yourself sincerely.

Yours Ludwig Wittgenstein

254 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

Ludwig Hänsel, Ph.D.
18. Alseggerstr. 38
Vienna
Austria

[Postmark: Cambridge, March 13, 1939]^a

Dear Hänsel!

Thank you for your letter. Thank God that, contrary to all expectations, everything went well.^b Maybe I can see you in 1½ to 2 months.

Most sincere greetings to your dear wife!

I am thinking a lot of all of you!

Yours
Ludwig Wittgenstein

256 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

81, East Rd
Cambridge
26.8.39

Dear Hänsel!

I only want to send you greetings & good wishes for the future which is veiled more than usually. By the way the greetings are to be divided between you, your dear wife & the children. I can't imagine at all yet what will become of myself: I feel anything but

^aWittgenstein wrote this on a card with Easter greetings.

^bWittgenstein may be referring to the acquittal of his sisters (see letter 245, note b). It is also possible, however, that he is talking about his own efforts to become a professor in Cambridge (he was appointed as Moore's successor on February 11) and to obtain British citizenship (which he received on June 2).

denken: ich fühle mich nichts weniger als fähig, Philosophie zu lehren. Nun wir werden sehen. Ich wünsche Euch alles Gute, außen & innen! Ich denke immer viel an Euch.

Wie immer Dein alter

Ludwig Wittgenstein

258 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AN HÄNSEL

[Cambridge] 13. 8. 40.

Lieber Hänsel!

Hoffentlich erreichen Dich diese Zeilen, die Dir nur sagen sollen, daß ich an Euch Alle immer mit den alten Gefühlen denke. Mögen wir uns wiedersehen!

Grüß Deine liebe Frau & die Kinder herzlichst!

Immer Dein alter

Ludwig Wittgenstein

SENDET ANTWORT AN
MEINEN VOLLEN NAMEN
PER ADRESSE POSTFACH
506. LISSABON.

260 HÄNSEL AN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

[Wien] 23. 11. 40.

Lieber Wittgenstein!

Wir haben uns, soweit wir noch beisammen sind, sehr über Deinen Brief aus Lissabon gefreut. Grüße von Dir haben wir öfter bekommen, von Deinem Fräulein Schwester. Aber Deine Schriftzüge zu sehen, war doch etwas Eigenes.

Mareile ist nicht mehr bei uns. Sie ist Lehrerin in Radomsko bei Radom in Polen. Es ist kalt dort. Aber sie hat große Freude mit den Kindern. Zu Weihnachten kommt sie heim.

Hermann ist gerade auf Urlaub hier.

capable of teaching philosophy.^a Well we will see. I wish all of you all the best, outside & inside!

As always your old friend

Ludwig Wittgenstein

258 WITTGENSTEIN TO HÄNSEL

[Cambridge] 13.8.40

Dear Hänsel!

I hope you receive these lines which are only supposed to tell you that I am thinking of all of you always with the old feelings. May we see each other again!

Most sincere greetings to your dear wife & the children.

Always your old friend

Ludwig Wittgenstein

SEND ANSWER TO
MY FULL NAME
AS PER POSTAL BOX
506. LISBON^b

260 HÄNSEL TO WITTGENSTEIN

[Vienna] 23.11.40.

Dear Wittgenstein!

All of us, as far as we are still living together, were very glad about your letter. Greetings from you were repeatedly conveyed to us by your sister. But to see your handwriting is something special, after all.

Mareile no longer lives with us. She is a teacher in Radomsko near Radom in Poland. It is cold there. But she has great joy with the children. She is coming home for Christmas.

Hermann is here on leave just now.

^aLiterally, “Ich fühle mich nichts weniger als fähig, Philosophie zu lehren” should be translated “I feel nothing less than capable of teaching philosophy.” [Eds.]—Wittgenstein was to assume his professorship on October 1.

^bWittgenstein probably wrote this letter in Cambridge and got himself a postal box address in Portugal, a neutral country during World War II.

Anna ist mit ihrem Mann noch in der Hinterbrühl. Sie sieht sehr gut aus. Und ihre kleine Gertrud, die schon ein halbes Jahr alt ist, auch.

Wir grüßen Dich herzlich und wir freuen uns auf den Tag, an dem wir uns wiedersehen werden.

Alles Gute! Fröhliche, gesegnete Weihnachten!

Dein
Ludwig Hänsel

Es geht mir gut.

Ihr dankbarer Hermann
Herzliche Grüße! Anna Hänsel

Anna is still living with her husband in the Hinterbrühl area. She looks very good. And so does her little Gertud who is already half a year old.

We greet you sincerely and are looking forward to the day on which we will see each other again.

All the best! Joyful, blessed Christmas!

Yours

Ludwig Hänsel

I am doing well.

Your grateful Hermann

Sincere greetings! Anna Hänsel^a

^aThe extant correspondence resumes on March 4, 1947, with a letter from Hänsel to Wittgenstein and concludes with a letter from Wittgenstein, dated February 1, 1951.

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Part II

PUBLIC OCCASIONS

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The Wittgenstein Lectures

Just as we have a catalogue of Wittgenstein's papers, it would be useful to have a guide to Wittgenstein's lectures. It would be useful to know when he gave lectures, where and to whom, and on what topics, and more specifically what he said.

Since his lectures, unlike his papers, have no enduring existence, they are harder to study. Nevertheless, we have evidence about his lectures—comments he made in letters, notes he made in preparation, recollections and notes from his listeners and friends, official records and minutes, diary entries, and so forth.

Though Wittgenstein nearly always lectured extemporaneously, the lectures were preceded by enormous preparation, and Wittgenstein took them very seriously. As Norman Malcolm has reported (1984, p. 48), Wittgenstein "said that he had always regarded his lectures as a form of publication." And Casimir Lewy recalled: "Wittgenstein once said to me that 'to publish' means 'to make public', and that therefore lecturing is a form of publication" (1976, p. xi).

Yorick Smythies, who probably attended more of Wittgenstein's lectures than any other student, wrote the following in a draft of an introduction to a planned publication of Wittgenstein's lectures (Smythies, forthcoming):

Re-reading [these notes], now, after thirty years, I find them more natural, fluent, simple, continuous, expressive, than the remarks contained in Wittgenstein's so-far published writings. . . . While he was lecturing, he was not able to delete what had been said, or to give to trains of thought more tightness than they were showing themselves to have. Also, tones which give personal expressiveness to his lectures became omitted, automatically, from his writings. The expletives, interjectory phrases, slangy asides, etc., which were essentially constituent in what he was saying to his classes, would have shown affectation if they had been addressed to the general, reading, public.

Wasfi Hijab, a student of Wittgenstein's during his last two years at Cambridge, claimed (1999) that teaching was the only way Wittgenstein could adequately convey his thought.

While it is futile to argue over the relative merits of his lectures and his manuscripts as avenues to understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy, it is clear that his lectures played a central part in his philosophical life. They gave him countless opportunities, or forced upon him countless occasions, to articulate his ideas. Unlike his manuscripts, wherein the interlocutor was invariably himself, his lectures kept him in contact with other people. These people have had an enormous influence on the philosophical reception of Wittgenstein's ideas. His lectures also provoked him to address a wider range of issues than he tended to write about. That he finally retired from teaching because it hindered his attempt to bring his manuscript to completion (Malcolm 1984, p. 103: letter to Malcolm, August 27, 1947) in no way detracts from the central role his teaching played in stimulating and propagating his work.

I have divided Wittgenstein's lectures into three categories: (1) talks to the Cambridge Moral Science Club, (2) Cambridge University course lectures, and (3) lectures given on other occasions. In the first and third groups I have sometimes included Wittgenstein's participation in public discussions, even when he was not the "lecturer."

TALKS TO THE CAMBRIDGE MORAL SCIENCE CLUB

The Cambridge Moral Science Club (CMSC) gave students and faculty an opportunity to hear and discuss papers of philosophical interest from Cambridge students and faculty, as well as from faculty outside of Cambridge. Meetings generally lasted one and a half to three hours. (See Pitt 1981–1982 for the history and nature of the club.)

Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge in October 1911 and was first listed as a member of the CMSC for the year 1912–1913. Wittgenstein recommended in 1912 that no paper should last longer than seven minutes (Moore's letter to Hayek, in Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, p. 79). The club adopted the recommendation on November 15, 1912.

1. November 29, 1912, "What Is Philosophy?"

Minutes for the meeting, held in Wittgenstein's rooms, with G. E. Moore in the chair, record that about fifteen members were present:

Mr Wittgenstein . . . read a paper entitled 'What is Philosophy?' The paper lasted only about 4 minutes, thus cutting the previous record established by Mr Tye by nearly two minutes. Philosophy was defined as all those primitive propositions which are assumed as true without proof by the various sciences. This defn. was much discussed, but there was no general disposition to adopt it. The discussion kept very well to the point, and the Chairman did not find it necessary to intervene much.

(The minutes are presented in facsimile in Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, p. 89.)

Wittgenstein left Cambridge in 1913 and did not return to its academic life until January 1929. At the meeting of May 10, 1929, the minutes record: "At the end of the discussion Mr Wittgenstein suggested that an old rule of the Club, that no paper should be more than seven minutes long, should be renewed. Most of the members present seemed to think that it would be desirable to set a time limit to papers, but that 7 minutes was too short. It was suggested that a motion suggesting a time limit should be proposed at the [next] meeting. . . . Mr Wittgenstein also suggested that the reading of minutes should be abolished."

At the next meeting, May 17, 1929, the minutes record: "Mr Wittgenstein . . . pointed out that enough philosophical problems could be raised in twenty minutes to occupy the minds of the members of the club for the rest of the evening." Ultimately added to the rules was: "and it is therefore desirable that the papers should be as short as possible."

At the meeting on November 8, 1929, Mr. B. Moran read a paper entitled "Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds." The minutes laconically record that "a discussion followed." But it obviously proved fodder for thought, as Wittgenstein's first official contribution to the CMSC since his return was apparently a response to it.

2. January 31, 1930, "Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds"

The meeting was held in Dr. Broad's rooms, starting at 8:30 P.M. There were thirty-five members present. Prof. Moore was in the chair. The minutes record: "The minutes of the last meeting were read and adopted." While Wittgenstein's earlier suggestion about reading minutes had apparently not been accepted, minutes were now lamentably brief: "Dr. L. Wittgenstein spoke shortly on 'Evidence for the existence of other Minds'. A discussion followed." (Facsimile of the minutes in Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, p. 231.)

Wittgenstein arrived a bit late for the meeting. F. R. Leavis, the literary critic and Cambridge don, relates (1984, pp. 63–64): "He dropped in one day very soon after lunch, and an unguarded polite reference I made to a paradox he had presented me with the last time we met started him discoursing earnestly and energetically, for it turned out that the paradox for him was pregnant and crucial." Apparently he continued developing the argument for the next six hours, during which time Leavis was hardly able to pay attention to him, which did not deter Wittgenstein. "I was dazed and tired and wanted him to go. Suddenly, at about eight o'clock, he realized the time and a pressing fact. . . . 'I'm talking to the Moral Science Club this evening. Come down with me.' . . . I heard afterwards that, apologizing for his lateness, he explained that he had been arguing all the afternoon with Dr Leavis."

Wittgenstein stopped going to CMSC meetings beginning with the fall of 1931. Apparently this was because some people objected that he dominated the discussions (Wittgenstein 1995, p. 271: Wittgenstein's letter to Russell, apparently from November 1935). Fania Pascal,

who attended CMSC meetings during that time, recalls (Pascal 1984, p. 16): “Wittgenstein was the disturbing (perhaps disrupting) centre of these evenings. He would talk for long periods without interruption, using similes and allegories, strolling about the room and gesticulating. He cast a spell. . . . Once he said: ‘You cannot love God, for you do not know him’, and went on elaborating the theme.” Wittgenstein was away from Cambridge academic life from the fall of 1936 to early 1938, living mostly in Norway.

By the fall term of 1938 Wittgenstein was again paying his subscription to the club. On November 10, 1938, Sir Arthur Eddington gave a talk to the club on “Prof. Stebbing’s ‘Philosophy and the Physicists.’” The meeting was held at Theodore Redpath’s house. The minutes record: “The discussion consisted mainly of objections by Mr Watson and Dr Wittgenstein against Prof. E’s view that all scientific knowledge is knowledge of structure, given by the relations between pointer-readings.”

On December 1, 1938, Dr. A. C. Ewing gave a talk to the club on “A Reply to Mr Wisdom on Meaninglessness.” The minutes record:

In discussion Doctor Wittgenstein said that he had never heard of the Verification Principle till about a fortnight previously. He knew about the method of asking the verification of propositions. The main point of asking the verification of some statement was to bring out distinctions. He did not like calling the statement that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification, a principle. That made philosophy look too much like mathematics. There are no primitive propositions in philosophy.

Gasking and Jackson (1967, p. 54) attribute the following remark to Wittgenstein at a CMSC meeting. It seems likely it came from this meeting:

I used at one time to say that, in order to get clear how a certain sentence is used, it was a good idea to ask oneself the question: “How would one try to verify such an assertion?” But that’s just one way among others of getting clear about the use of a word or sentence. For example, another question which it is often very useful to ask oneself is: “How is this word learned?” “How would one set about teaching a child to use this word?” But some people have turned this suggestion about asking for the verification into a dogma—as if I’d been advancing a *theory* about meaning.

At the meeting on February 16, 1939, Mr. D. Prince gave a talk on “The Use of a Word.” This provoked a response by Wittgenstein the following week.

3. February 23, 1939

The meeting was held in Yorick Smythies’s rooms in King’s College. Wittgenstein opened his talk by asking, “Why do philosophers often ask the meaning of some quite common

words?" He was partly responding to a talk given the week before by Derek Prince, in which Prince argued against the idea that the meaning of a word is equivalent to the use to which the word is put. Theodore Redpath's original minutes of the discussion of Prince's paper and then of Wittgenstein's paper are published in this volume, pp. 377–380. These minutes give a vivid sense of how Wittgenstein managed to make his points through a fluid discussion that involved several people in attendance. Redpath's published account (Redpath 1990, pp. 82–86) adds some details but omits others. The presentation lasted less than half an hour.

4. February 2, 1940, "Causal and Logical Necessities"

The meeting was held in Wittgenstein's rooms, with G. E. Moore in the chair. The minutes were taken by Casimir Lewy:

Prof. Wittgenstein gave a talk on Causal and Logical Necessities. The chief point of the talk was to show how a proposition which is originally based on experience and accepted as empirical comes to be regarded as necessary and analytic. The idea of causal necessity (or rather, an idea of causal necessity) was shown to be intimately connected with, and even due to, the conception of 'tracing a mechanism.'

The principle point of the discussion which followed was as to the meaning and use of the phrase 'self-evident,' e.g. when one says that some causal propositions or principles are self-evident.

On May 23, 1940, Isaiah Berlin gave a talk to the club on "Solipsism." The meeting was held in Timothy Moore's rooms in Trinity, with G. E. Moore in the chair. Berlin relates (Ignatieff 1998, p. 94), "After a few initial questions Wittgenstein became impatient and took over the discussion. . . . 'No, no, that is not the way to go about it. Let me. Don't let's talk philosophy. Let's talk business with each other. Ordinary business. In ordinary circ[um]stance[s], I say to you, 'You see a clock. The minute hand and the hour hand are both nailed to the clock face to certain ciphers. The whole face goes round, but the time remains the same.' No? That is solipsism."

5. October 25, 1940, "Other Minds"

Held in Timothy Moore's rooms in Trinity, with Lewy in the chair. The minutes were taken by Timothy Moore, secretary:

Prof. Wittgenstein read a paper in which he discussed various problems connected with other people's minds. First he mentioned several of the answers which have been given to the question "How do we know of the existence of other people's minds?", and explained why he considered the analogical argument to be unsatisfactory. Then he discussed the nature of this question itself; and, among other things, described at some length the sort of circumstances

under which he would wish to say that a person did not believe that other people had minds, or did believe that flowers felt.

A discussion followed.

On January 24, 1941, G. H. Hardy gave a talk to the club on “Mathematical Reality,” sections 20–22 of his book *A Mathematician’s Apology* (Hardy 1992). The meeting was held in C. D. Broad’s rooms. Mays (1967, p. 82) recalls: “Hardy mentioned that he did not accept Wittgenstein’s view that mathematics consisted of tautologies. Wittgenstein denied that he had ever said this, and pointed to himself saying in an incredulous tone of voice, ‘Who, I?’”

While Wittgenstein gave no talks to the club for the next four years, he was elected chairman three times, in 1941–1942 (replacing Moore after nearly thirty years), 1942–1943, and 1943–1944. Some unpleasantness arose in November 1944 over his not having been informed of his nomination for reelection, and a resolution of apology was passed unanimously.

6. February 22, 1945

The meeting was held in R. B. Braithwaite’s rooms in King’s College, with Braithwaite in the chair. Minutes simply record: “Prof. L. Wittgenstein opened a discussion.”

Continuing the long-standing debate about length of papers, the minutes for May 17, 1945, record: “Prof. Wittgenstein suggested that in future people who were invited to ‘read papers’ to the Club should be sent a standard note which did not in any way suggest they should read elaborate papers.” And again on May 31, 1945, the minutes record: “Prof Wittgenstein proposed that the following be sent to all people invited to open discussions: ‘We should be very grateful if you would open a discussion at the Cambridge Moral Science Club on..... . The purpose of the club is to discuss problems of philosophy. In our experience only a very small number of points can be dealt with thoroughly in an evening. Therefore short papers, or a few opening remarks stating some philosophical puzzle, tend as a rule to produce better discussions than long and elaborate papers, which are difficult to digest at a single hearing.’ This was unanimously accepted.” The form of invitation was later to create some difficulties (see p. 337 *infra*).

7. October 25, 1945

The meeting was held in Braithwaite’s rooms in King’s College, with Wittgenstein in the chair. Minutes, taken by secretary G. E. M. Anscombe, record that:

Professor Wittgenstein opened a discussion on Professor Moore’s paradox: “P, but I don’t believe P.” He maintained that the problem raised by this utterance was not to be solved by re-

garding it as a piece of inconsistent behaviour; nor could it be said simply that it must be a lie, for even if it was a lie the absurdity remained. We should rather consider the asymmetry of psychological expressions such as “know,” “believe” and so on: i.e. the asymmetry between their use in the first person present and in other persons or tenses, or in suppositions. Professor Moore was present and finally said that though he agreed that the utterance was absurd, it might nevertheless be true, for it might both be true that p, and that I did not believe p.

At the November 29, 1945, meeting Moore himself then gave a talk on “P, but I do not believe P.” The minutes contain no mention of Wittgenstein.

At the December 6, 1945, meeting, held in Braithwaite’s rooms, with Wittgenstein in the chair, Anscombe’s minutes record that an

impromptu discussion . . . was held on the question “Did the world have a beginning in time?” First it was asked whether, if the world were supposed to have begun 3 years ago, the expression “4 years ago” were senseless. Professor Wittgenstein compared the status of the date “3 years ago” to that of the velocity which is the velocity of light. The expression “4 years ago” would not be absurd, any more than the expression “310 thousand kms. per second”; but given that “3 years ago” was assigned as the date of the beginning of the world, then it is absurd to ask what happened 4 years ago; though it would be a mistake, not an absurdity to say that the world began four years ago.

The discussion turned later on the status of a dispute about whether the world had a beginning in time.

On March 14, 1946, with Wittgenstein in the chair, the club continued an impromptu discussion of Ayer’s interpretation of Cogito Ergo Sum: “Professor Wittgenstein argued about the importance of the gesture with which one points to oneself, and sketched out the circumstances in which one might no longer do so, and so no longer feel the force of Descartes’ argument.”

On October 25, 1946 (Edmonds and Eidinow 2001, pp. 281–82), Karl Popper gave a talk on “Methods in Philosophy” (as titled in the minutes). Wittgenstein was in the chair. Popper (1974, p. 97) reports that

I received an invitation from the Secretary of the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge to read a paper about some ‘philosophical puzzle’. It was of course clear that this was Wittgenstein’s formulation, and that behind it was Wittgenstein’s philosophical thesis that there are no genuine problems in philosophy, only linguistic puzzles. Since this thesis was among my pet aversions, I decided to speak on ‘Are There Philosophical Problems?’. I began my paper (. . . in R. B. Braithwaite’s room in King’s College) by expressing my surprise at being invited by the Secretary to read a paper ‘stating some philosophical puzzle’; and I pointed out

that by implicitly denying that philosophical problems exist, whoever wrote the invitation took sides, perhaps unwittingly, in an issue created by a genuine philosophical problem.

The confrontation that followed between Popper and Wittgenstein has been the subject of much speculation and disagreement. The secretary, W. Hijab, merely noted that “the meeting was charged to an unusual degree with a spirit of controversy.” But the stage had been set for another talk by Wittgenstein three weeks later.

8. November 14, 1946, “Philosophy”

The meeting was held in Braithwaite’s rooms, Gibbs Hall H3 in King’s, with Ewing in the chair and Hijab as secretary. Wittgenstein wrote to G. E. Moore (Wittgenstein 1995, p. 324, dated November 14, 1946) in part: “I’m giving a talk, roughly, on what I believe philosophy is, or what the method of philosophy is.” Minutes and notes for this talk (and the one by Popper) are published in this volume, pages 397–99.

Some five months later (April 24, 1947) A. C. Ewing gave a paper, “Impossibility of Metaphysics?” with Wittgenstein in the chair. (A version of this paper was published as Ewing 1948.) In this paper, as published, Ewing defends metaphysical statements against the usual verificationist criticisms. The published paper has clearly been modified to take account of some of Wittgenstein’s comments. While the club minutes note nothing more than that the meeting was in Braithwaite’s rooms, extensive notes of the discussion between Ewing and Wittgenstein were kept by Gilbert Harris Edwards (1946–1947, pp. 119–122):

Wittgenstein said that not all statements were empirically verifiable. Thus mathematical propositions and psychological propositions in the first person came under this heading. Wittgenstein said that it was important to ask the verification questions of any question. Also he objected to the hack phrase of “Verification Principle”. Ewing said that Positivism excludes Theological propositions. To this Wittgenstein replied that—it was nonsense to say that such propositions were meaningless—what we wanted to know was how they were used, how the theologians talked among themselves.

Wittgenstein was asked if he could say what the character of metaphysical statements was and why he ruled them out. In reply he said that the characteristics of a Metaphysical statement, insofar as one could be given at all, was the empirical air, the pseudo empirical character. They are put in such a way as to make us think we could experiment to find ou[t] more about them.

E.g. Is space absolute or relative? He cited the fact that he once walked about trying to experiment upon idealist statements.

But he said that Metaphysical statements were a family and this was first known. Concerning the question as to why they were rejected he said it was very hard to answer with no particular case on hand. To illustrate he cited an old controversy from medicine where ‘homeop-

athy' (treatment of diseases by drugs—something like the disease) and 'allopathy' (treatment of a disease by introducing a different tendency . . .) were debated. Nowadays if anybody were to say "which?" the answer would be "This isn't a question," or "Study medicine."

An example of a Metaphysical question was the Ontological argument: Ewing said that anybody could have a present of this since existence was not a predicate. Wittgenstein now took up the question as to what was meant by saying that existence was not a predicate and why it sufficed to refute the Ontological argument. A more simple example was given of one who said that Dragons did not exist, but in order to predicate [non-?] existence of them they must exist in some way. To refute him Ewing said we point out that existence is not a predicate. But Wittgenstein queried this asking whether the man would appear illuminated afterwards. He said that if somebody said "Man is 100" and we told him that "100" was not a predicate of man, we were doing a similar thing. If a person were so stupid as to talk like that we could hardly expect our words to have great effect. What use is the answer? Wittgenstein said that it was of course important to say that we did not predicate 100 of a man, but not in this respect. We should ask what we are saying when we say existence is not a predicate.

Ewing said that the positivists claimed that there was no real difference in the metaphysical systems, but only a difference in the way people talked about the world. Now since one was supposed to be better than another on the ground that it was more illuminating or something it may be asked on what ground one was preferred to another.

Wittgenstein asked Ewing if the fact that one did not lead to contradictions whereas the other did was not enough. No reply.

Wittgenstein then said that to call a difference in Metaphysical systems a mere difference in way of talking was quite misleading—like saying that the difference between two suits was a difference in tailoring. There is also the difference in attitude, in the way we looked at the world and our problems.

The Moral Science Club meetings exposed Wittgenstein to a number of papers by influential thinkers beyond his current colleagues and students. Wittgenstein is known to have been present for the following *notable* papers (either because they were in his rooms, or he was in the chair, or the minutes indicate his involvement in discussion):

- A. J. Ayer, "Sense Data and Incorrigible Propositions," May 19, 1939.
- Gilbert Ryle, "Philosophers' Arguments," January 26, 1940.
- Isaiah Berlin, "Solipsism," May 23, 1940.
- M. H. A. Newman, "Formalism and Logic," November 15, 1940.
- A. J. Ayer, Discussion of *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, February 12, 1941.
- C. H. Waddington, "Scientific Empiricism," May 1, 1941.
- G. E. Moore, "Certainty," October 26, 1944.
- Bertrand Russell, "Proper Names," January 25, 1945.
- C. D. Broad, "Leibniz and Clarke on Absolute versus Relative Space," January 24, 1946.
- A. J. Ayer, "Causality," May 30, 1946.

K. R. Popper, "Methods of Philosophy," October 25, 1946.

J. L. Austin, "Nondescription," October 31, 1946.

H. H. Price, "Universals and Resemblances," November 29, 1946.

At a meeting on May 29, 1947, after a paper by Malcolm, but for which it is not recorded whether Wittgenstein was present, there was a "16–12 vote in favor of Braithwaite's motion that in future one or two long papers be read each term, to which a reply could be read by someone. . . ." It was decided this would be given a year's trial before permanent adoption. There is no indication that Wittgenstein attended any further meetings.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY LECTURES

In January 1929, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge after a fifteen-year absence. He conducted research for all three terms of that year, and he was granted a Ph.D. in June 1929. On October 16, 1929, the faculty board of moral science resolved that he should be invited to give a course of lectures to be included in the lecture list for the Lent term of 1930. (Lent term runs ten weeks from late January to March; Easter term, sometimes called "Summer" or "May" term, runs eight weeks from April to June; Michaelmas term runs ten weeks from October to December.)

In a conversation witnessed by S. K. Bose, Wittgenstein was asked by Braithwaite under what title his courses should be announced. After a long silence Wittgenstein replied: "The subject of the lectures would be philosophy. What else can be the title of the lectures but Philosophy." This title was used thereafter for all his courses as announced in the *Cambridge University Reporter*, except for the 1932–1933 lectures: "Philosophy for Mathematicians."

On October 22, 1929, Wittgenstein reflected, in code, in his notebook (Wittgenstein 1993–1996, 2: 102): "Having real problems and I'm so unclear that I can't write down anything proper. Supposed to hold lectures in the next two terms. Am doubtful how it will go. The main thing would be that my work move forward well now." Later he encountered an unexpected impediment (Wittgenstein 2003b, p. 57: October 16, 1930): "I cannot work for myself yet [during the Michaelmas term] & that is in part due to the conflict in me of the English and German modes of expression. I can really work only when I can continuously converse with myself in German. But for my lectures I must now arrange things in English & so I am disturbed in my German thought; at least until a peaceful accord has formed between the two & that takes some time, perhaps very long." Wittgenstein continued lecturing at Cambridge on a fairly regular basis, except for various leaves of absence, through the Easter term of 1947.

Lent 1930 (L30); Easter 1930 (E30)

Wittgenstein's friend Frank Ramsey died on January 19, 1930 (Monk 1990, pp. 288–289). The first lecture was the next day—Monday, January 20. Wittgenstein's diary notation of

the first lecture is: “5–6 Vorlesung” with plans to meet “Gil” Pattison afterward (printed in facsimile in Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, p. 234).

Desmond Lee’s notes (Lee 1980, p. 1) of the opening lecture begin as follows: “Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement. This ‘philosophic’ puzzlement is one of the intellect and not of instinct. Philosophic puzzles are irrelevant to our every-day life. They are puzzles of *language*. Instinctively we use language rightly; but to the intellect this use is a puzzle.” Later that first day Wittgenstein reflected: “Held my first regular lecture today: so, so. I think that it will go better next time. — if nothing unforeseen comes up” (Wittgenstein 1993–1996, 2: 174).

Lectures were held once every week — Mondays at 5:00 P.M., lasting for about an hour, in an ordinary lecture room in the University Arts School. Discussion class, lasting at least two hours, was Thursdays at 5:00 P.M., at first in the lecture room but soon in R. E. Priestly’s set of fellow’s rooms in Clare College. Later the lectures were also moved to Priestly’s rooms and they began to last longer as well (Moore 1993, p. 49).

Lectures and discussions were attended by about fifteen people—a mixture of undergraduates and graduates, including Desmond Lee, S. K. Bose, and Maurice O’C. (Con) Drury. G. E. Moore was regularly present, and occasionally other dons such as I. A. Richards.

Students’ notes for (L30) are published in Lee 1980, pages 1–14; and notes for (E30), pages 15–20. Moore’s published lecture notes (Moore 1993) are organized more topically than chronologically. Nevertheless, in his own style of organization he refers to terms (L30) and (E30) as “(I)”. Moore’s original notes, from which the published notes were drawn, were chronological and are on deposit at the University Library, Cambridge. Notes by Lee (1930–1931) are on deposit in Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge. Moore reports (1993, p. 50): “I remember Wittgenstein once saying to me that he was glad I was taking notes, since, if anything were to happen to him, they would contain some record of the results of his thinking.”

The atmosphere of Wittgenstein’s lectures was perhaps well captured by I. A. Richards (1972) in his poem “The Strayed Poet.” Lee (1979, p. 214) recalls that the lecture “was itself of a very informal nature, and liable to break off into discussion. He had no kind of system or technique, but simply talked about problems that were in his mind. . . . The discussions were not so very dissimilar from the lectures. . . . Though Wittgenstein preferred discussion to lecture as being less formal and allowing a train of thought to be followed more easily, he completely dominated any discussion in which he took part, and these discussions associated with his lectures were largely a monologue, the problem being to find a question or problem to get him started and to provide an occasional interjection to keep him going.” He continues (p. 218) that Wittgenstein relied on Moore “a good deal to help in his discussion classes by making the comment that would set or keep the ball rolling.” “Wittgenstein always had a blackboard at both lectures and [discussions] and made plenty of use of it” (Moore 1993, p. 49).

In his diary (2003b, p. 21: May 2, 1930) Wittgenstein worried that “in my lectures I often seek to gain favor with my audience through a somewhat comic turn; to entertain them

so that they willingly hear me out. That is certainly something bad.” And later (May 12, 1930): “Before my lectures I am always anxious even though so far it has always gone quite well. This fear then possesses me like a disease. It is by the way nothing other than test anxiety. The lecture was mediocre. It’s just that I am already tired ~~since I didn’t have a decent vacation~~. None of my listeners has any idea how much my brain must work in order to achieve what it achieves. If my achievement is not first rate, it is still the outer limit of what I can achieve.”

Drury (1984, p. 118) records a conversation with Wittgenstein, probably during the time of these lectures: “I think in your recent lectures you have been directly concerned with Kant’s problem: how are synthetic a priori propositions possible? Wittgenstein: Yes, you could say that. I am concerned with the synthetic a priori. When you have thought for some time about a problem of your own, you may come to see that it is closely related to what has been discussed before, only you will want to present the problem in a different way.”

Michaelmas 1930 (M30); Lent 1931 (L31); Easter 1931 (E31)

In (M30) and (L31) lectures were Mondays at noon, and discussion was moved to Fridays at 5:00 P.M. According to Moore (1993, p. 49) lectures and discussions continued to be held in Priestly’s rooms for all these terms (not switching to Wittgenstein’s new rooms in Whewell’s Court in Trinity College until October 1931). But King (Lee 1980, p. xii) claims Wittgenstein began holding lectures and discussions in his own rooms in Whewell’s Court in Easter term, 1931. (However, compare Britton’s preferable account below, p. 343.) In any case, note taking became much more difficult in (E31)—apparently because of a more informal setting.

Preparing for the first lecture in (M30) Wittgenstein wrote in his diary (2003b, p. 55: October 8, 1930): “It is 3 weeks since I thought of philosophy, but every thought of it is so foreign to me as if I had not thought such things for years. In my first lecture I want to speak about the specific problems of philosophy & have the feeling: how can I say anything about this, I don’t know them anymore.” The first class was held on Monday, October 13. Lecture notes (Lee 1980, p. 21) open with: “The nimbus of philosophy has been lost. For we now have a method of doing philosophy, and can speak of *skilful* philosophers.”

Among the students were Desmond Lee, John King, Raymond D. Townsend, John Inman, M. O’C. Drury, D. G. James, W. H. Watson, A. J. Shillinglaw, J. B. Nansen, and S. K. Bose. King also adds: “M[aurice] Cornforth (and occasionally his future wife Miss K[it]ty Klugman), and J. Bronowski (about twice).”

Notes for (M30) are pages 21–41, notes for (L31) are pages 42–59, and notes for (E31) are pages 60–64 in Lee (1980). Moore (1993) referred to these terms as “(II)” in his topical account. Notes by King (1930–1931), Townsend (1930–1931), and Inman (1931) are extant, as are Moore’s unpublished chronological notes.

Michaelmas 1931 (M31); Lent 1932 (L32); Easter 1932 (E32)

In a letter to Moore (Wittgenstein 1995, pp. 250–51, dated August 23, 1931) Wittgenstein requests to be relieved of lectures for the Michaelmas term “to reserve all my strength for

my own work.” McGuinness and von Wright claim (Wittgenstein 1995, p. 250) that he gave no lectures that academic year, which is confirmed by the *Cambridge University Reporter*. Moore (1993, p. 49) claims that lectures resumed in (E32). In any case, Wittgenstein continued to hold discussions on Fridays from 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. for the whole academic year.

Discussions (during M31) were held in Wittgenstein’s rooms, H4 Great Court, in Trinity College, changing to his rooms in Whewell’s Court after Christmas (Britton 1954, pp. 709–10; Goodstein 1972, p. 272). Although Lee and Moore both hold that Wittgenstein was, by Michaelmas term, teaching in his rooms in Whewell’s Court, this cannot be so. In his diary (2003b, p. 125) notation for November 7, 1931, Wittgenstein complains of the noisy students who live above him. But his rooms in Whewell’s Court were at the top of the stairs—K10. (It seems likely, therefore, that classes for (E31) were also held in H4 Great Court.) The rooms in Whewell’s Court were the ones Wittgenstein had had in 1912–1913 (Moore 1993, p. 49).

Ten to fifteen would attend, including Moore, and occasionally some other dons (Lee 1980, p. xiv). Britton estimated the number at twenty. King recalls, in addition to himself and Moore, A. C. Ewing, Karl Britton, David Haden-Guest, Francis Skinner, R. L. Goodstein, “Sprague (a very short-sighted American), and R. B. Braithwaite (fitfully, and with Miss [Margaret] Masterman, whom he was to marry).” Braithwaite contributed an article to Cambridge’s *University Studies*, that appeared in March 1933, in which he described Wittgenstein’s views in the *Tractatus* and how they had changed since he returned to Cambridge. Wittgenstein took vigorous exception to this account of his views (1993c).

Notes for (M31), (L32), and (E32) are on pages 65–108 in Lee 1980. Moore refers to his notes for classes during (E32) as “(III)”, though Moore’s (III) also includes notes from the following academic year. Moore’s chronological notes and King’s notes for these terms are extant.

In preparatory notes written (in English) in a pocket notebook (MS 155, 1931) Wittgenstein described his teaching method (1993–96, v. 3, p. vii):

What I should like to get you to do is not to agree with me in particular opinions but to investigate the matter in the right way. To notice the interesting kind of things (i.e. the things which will serve as keys if you use them properly).

What different people expect to get from religion is what they expect to get from philosophy.

I don’t want to give you a Def. of Philos. but I should like you to have a very lively idea as to the characters of philosophic problems. If you had, by the way, I could stop/start/ lecturing at once.

To tackle the phil. problem is difficult as we are caught in the meshes of language.

“Has the universe an end/beginning/ in Time” (Einstein)

You would perhaps give up Phil. if you knew what it is. You want explanations instead of wanting descriptions. And you are therefore looking for the wrong kind of thing.

Philos. questions, as soon as you boil them down to.....change their aspect entirely. What evaporates is what the intellect cannot tackle.

In the lecture notes for this year we find Wittgenstein saying (Lee 1980, p. 66): “The meaning of a proposition is its mode of verification” and “the meaning of a word lies

entirely in its use.” Goodstein (1972, pp. 272–73) recalls the very first lecture of (M31). Wittgenstein:

was talking about a rope that we were to imagine had one end in the room, and stretched out of the window and across Great Court with its other end out of sight. Someone was measuring the rope, following it foot by foot from its end in the room. Suppose that no matter how far the rope was followed the end was not found, could we ever say that the rope was infinitely long? Did it make any sense to say that rope was infinitely long? Could we devise a test to find if it was infinitely long? Of course, so long as the criterion was that of following the rope it made no sense to say the rope was infinitely long; we could decide if it was or was not longer than any chosen length, but there was no outcome to the attempt to measure the rope which would lead us to say that the rope was infinitely long. Was there then no sense in talking about an infinitely long rope? Imagine that we devised a machine which when applied to one end of the rope indicated the length of the rope by means of the angle through which a pointer on a dial turned, the length being proportional to the tangent of the angle turned through. Suppose we now applied the machine to a particular piece of rope and the pointer turned through an angle of ninety degrees, would we not now say that the rope was infinitely long?

Goodstein also recalled from this same lecture (p. 284) Wittgenstein “said that you can invent a machine that will not work but you cannot invent a game that will not work. This sums up the difference between physical and logical possibility in a nutshell. . . . The design [of a machine] itself cannot tell you if it will work. . . . But if you invent a game, you invent the rules of the game; the rules may be inconsistent, but if this is so it shows itself in the rules (and there is nothing that needs to be put to the test of experience).”

Britton (1967, pp. 56–7) gives an account of the atmosphere of these discussions: “On the whole Wittgenstein was tremendously impatient in his discussion: not impatient of the raw newcomer to philosophy, but of the man who had developed philosophical views of his own. Wittgenstein talked often standing up and walking excitedly about—writing on the blackboard, pointing, hiding his face in his hands. But the most characteristic of all his attitudes was a very quiet, very intense stare—suddenly adopted and leading to a slow deliberate utterance of some new point. Very often he got thoroughly ‘stuck’: appealed in vain to his hearers to help him out: he would walk about in despair murmuring: ‘I’m a fool, I’m a fool.’ And such was the difficulty of the topics he discussed, that all this struggle did not seem to us to be in the least excessive.”

Michaelmas 1932 (M32) (M32m); Lent 1933 (L33) (L33m); Easter 1933 (E33) (E33m)

During this academic year, Wittgenstein gave two sets of lectures: one set on his regular topic of “Philosophy” and another set called “Philosophy for Mathematicians” marked as (. . . m). The regular class had lectures on Mondays at 5:00 P.M., and discussions on Fridays at 5:00 P.M. The class for mathematicians met Wednesdays at 5:00 P.M. All the classes, from here through 1936, met in his sparsely furnished rooms at the top of the stairs in Whewell’s Court.

Ambrose (1972, p. 13) says that “during the first term [M32] I felt that I was hearing a lecture in which there were gaps, such as intermittent deafness might produce.” She goes on to say “few questions were raised, though he tried desperately to grasp their point, sometimes by the disconcerting procedure of threading his way through the chairs brought into his rooms . . . to confront the questioner at close quarters.” During the lectures this year the contrast between “criteria” and “symptoms” first appeared.

Notes for (M32), (L33), and (E33) are on pages 3–40 in Ambrose 1979. Moore (1993) refers to his notes for classes during these terms as “(III)”, though that also includes notes from (E32). Notes for the lectures for mathematicians are on pages 205–225 in Ambrose 1979. Because they are so short and seem to be divided into eleven lectures, it seems unlikely that they cover a year-long course. It is possible that they constitute, instead, the initial lectures for the eventually canceled class for mathematicians during Michaelmas 1933 (a possibility suggested in a letter from Ambrose to the author).

There is a letter from Wittgenstein to a mathematics student—Mary Cartwright—(published in facsimile in Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, p. 258), in which Wittgenstein comments on his class process. Though the letter is dated only “Saturday,” its reference to class on “Wednesday” suggests it concerned the class for mathematicians this academic year:

Thanks very much for your letter and the paper on ‘Number’. I wonder if you would allow me to discuss it next Wednesday in our class. It would come in very useful indeed. It’s the only way of getting anything out of these classes to try to formulate your thoughts on a subject yourself. + then have them pulled to bits. For if they can stand the pulling, all the better. I can’t pick holes if there aren’t any. In case you don’t object to my discussing your paper on Wednesday, please don’t bother to reply.

Michaelmas 1933 (M33) (M33m); Lent 1934 (L34); Easter 1934 (E34)

The *Cambridge University Reporter* announced the continuation of the class for mathematicians and Wittgenstein’s regular class (vol. 63, June 29, 1933, p. 1322; vol. 64, October 2, 1933, p. 62). To the former, according to Ambrose (1967a, p. 148): “30 to 40 people turned up, which distressed [Wittgenstein]. After three or four weeks of lecturing he turned up at lecture and told the class he couldn’t continue to lecture.” Instead he proposed to give dictations to a select group of students and have them distributed to the rest of the class. The *Reporter* later acknowledged (vol. 64, pp. 522, 786) that only the regular philosophy class was taught each term. Ambrose recalled that about a dozen students attended it (1967a, p. 149).

Wittgenstein’s dictations were made to H. S. M. Coxeter, R. L. Goodstein, Francis Skinner (all mathematicians), Margaret Masterman Braithwaite, and Alice Ambrose (a philosopher with mathematical interests). Dictations began on November 8. Within a month Mrs. Helen Knight and another were added; Coxeter left after the first term. In a letter to Moore at the end of the first term (1995, p. 256) Wittgenstein says that he had dictated twice a week—ten times that term and anticipated dictating perhaps three times a week for the rest

of the year—about fifty-two dictations altogether. He also estimated the cost of printing fifteen copies. Eventually copies were made, bound in blue paper. The volume came to be called the “Blue Book” (Wittgenstein 1958).

In the Blue Book Wittgenstein’s important notions of “language game” and “family resemblance” begin to take shape. Wittgenstein sent a corrected copy to Russell some two years later (1995, pp. 269–70), warning him that “I think it’s very difficult to understand them, as so many points are just hinted at. They were meant only for the people who heard the lectures” (a surprising disclaimer, since they were originally supposed to *substitute* for hearing the lectures!). A facsimile of the first page of Skinner’s copy, with corrections, is reproduced in Nedo and Ranchetti (1983, p. 269). Other copies were distributed as well, some reaching people Wittgenstein had not intended.

Though the preponderance of mathematicians among the students taking dictation suggests they came from the class for mathematicians, the material dictated in the Blue Book could hardly be thought to substitute for a course on philosophy for mathematicians. Additional notes from Wittgenstein exist from this year and have been labeled the “Yellow Book.” Among the selected parts published by Ambrose (1979), a portion is labeled as notes taken by Ambrose on lectures that Wittgenstein gave before canceling the formal lectures (pp. 43–55), and the rest are notes from informal discussions that occurred after the formal lectures were canceled, in intervals between dictations for the Blue Book (pp. 56–73). But the first portion could hardly be notes from the soon-to-be-canceled course for mathematicians, since it is altogether nonmathematical, as are the Blue Book and the rest of the Yellow Book. Furthermore, no notes seem to exist from the uncanceled “Philosophy” course. Additional notes exist from the Yellow Book discussions by Masterman (about one hundred pages, in private hands) and Skinner (about ten pages, Skinner, no date).

Michaelmas 1934 (M34); Lent 1935 (L35); Easter 1935 (E35)

According to Redpath (p. 18) classes met twice per week, Tuesday at 5:00 P.M. and Friday at 5:00 P.M., for two to two and a half hours per meeting, in Wittgenstein’s rooms. By Easter term Macdonald’s dated notes (1935) show classes being held on Mondays and Wednesdays. Ten to twelve people attended the lectures regularly for the academic year. Students, some more regular than others, included Theodore Redpath, Alice Ambrose, Margaret Macdonald, Abraham Gans, Dave Belmont, Francis Skinner, George Paul, Rush Rhees, R. L. Goodstein, Charles Hardie, A. G. M. Landau, Alister Watson, John Wisdom, and Peter Dupré (see Redpath 1990, p. 19; Ambrose 1967b), and probably also John Cornford.

In these lectures Wittgenstein begins to undertake a deeper examination of the notions of following a rule and continuing a sequence. Notes for (M34) are on pages 77–118, (L35) on pages 119–163, and (E35) on pages 164–201 in Ambrose (1979). (See also Macdonald 1935.) Redpath (pp. 105–6) prints a letter he wrote to Wittgenstein raising a question from class, which Wittgenstein then went on to discuss in the next class.

Redpath recalls (1990, pp. 19–20) the atmosphere of these classes: “Wittgenstein’s style of lecturing was quite unlike anything I had come across. . . . I had not realised . . . how

personal and, in some important sense, ‘natural’ they would be. . . . Quite often . . . points were sparked off by remarks made by members of the audience at his invitation. For his own train of thought would frequently come to a halt. On such occasions he would sometimes sit astride a small upright chair, resting his arms on the back or holding the tops of the uprights, and curse himself roundly in such terms as ‘Damn my bloody soul!’ . . . He seldom had any notes for his lectures—just occasionally a scrap of paper or an envelope.”

In a talk to the Cambridge Moral Science Club on May 31, 1935, John Wisdom read a paper on “Moore and Wittgenstein.” The minutes for that meeting record (quoted more extensively in Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, pp. 266–67):

People might say that Wittgenstein in his lectures spends an unconscionable time saying nothing definite, that Broad deals out dope, and that Moore pursues a will o’ the wisp, but he [Wisdom] has observed that each produces a change in those who go to their lectures which, although it is different in each case, is in each case a change of a kind philosophers have sought.

Wittgenstein also dictated the “Brown Book” (Wittgenstein 1958) to Ambrose and Skinner during this academic year. However, this did not replace his regular lectures.

By the end of the next academic year Wittgenstein’s five-year fellowship from Trinity would run out. He became interested in finding work in the Soviet Union as a laborer. He traveled there for two weeks in September but, ironically, the only work he could find was in philosophy: “first a chair in philosophy at Kazan University, and then a teaching post in philosophy at the University of Moscow” (Monk 1990, p. 351). This was the last thing he wanted to do.

Michaelmas 1935 (M35); Lent 1936 (L36); Easter 1936 (E36)

Wittgenstein’s classes met in his rooms in Whewell’s Court on Mondays and Wednesdays this year, commencing on October 11, 1935.

Rhees summarizes topics from (M35) in Rhees 1984a, page 1. Detailed notes of those lectures are given in Macdonald 1935–1936. Notes of (L36), beginning in the middle of February, are in Rhees 1993, pages 290–326. All the lectures from (L36) are included in Macdonald’s notes. Notes of (E36) are in Rhees 1993, pages 326–367, and Macdonald. There are also notes of these lectures by Smythies and by John Wisdom. Wittgenstein himself made very extensive notes, apparently in preparation for these lectures (Wittgenstein 1993e). In both the lecture notes and the preparatory notes the notion of private experience receives careful scrutiny.

Redpath (1990, p. 31) recalls the following incident from this year: There was a student who

knew shorthand, and he asked Wittgenstein if he might take down in shorthand what was said and, after Wittgenstein had vetted it, have it circulated to whomever Wittgenstein thought fit. Apparently Wittgenstein agreed to this, and [the student] came a couple of times or so and took the proceedings down in shorthand and then typed them out. Unfortunately, I gather, he

badly misjudged Wittgenstein's reaction to the typescript. Apparently he thought that Wittgenstein was honest that he would want everything he said to appear in the draft submitted to him, and so the typescript included a good sprinkling of the oaths of which Wittgenstein characteristically delivered himself when he lost the thread of his thought or felt baffled and unable to proceed. [The student] never appeared again, and I heard that Wittgenstein had been wild with anger and submitted the delinquent to a far from gentle dressing down.

Wittgenstein's fellowship ran out at the end of (E36), and he spent the period from August 1936 to December 1937 largely in Norway. Upon retreating to Norway, Wittgenstein reflected in his diary that "my work (my philosophical work), too, is lacking in seriousness & love of truth.—In my lectures, for example, I have often cheated by pretending already to understand something while I was still hoping that it would become clear to me." (2003b, p. 153: November 23, 1936). And also his letter to Hänsel (2003a, p. 303: March 10, 1937): "For countless times I kept from my audience how unclear the matter still was to me then & acted as if it were already clear, when I was only hoping it would yet become clear."

Lent 1938 (L38); Easter 1938 (E38)

Wittgenstein seems to have returned to academic life in Cambridge largely because of a desire ultimately to gain British citizenship (Monk 1990, pp. 394–95). It is unclear how quickly this return took place. Redpath (1990, pp. 46–47) recalls twice-a-week classes beginning immediately in (L38). But Wittgenstein's pocket diary notes (McGuinness, letter to the author) only three or four "discussions" in January and February. Monk (p. 401) seems to imply that classes only began in (E38). In any case, the *Cambridge University Reporter* gives no listing for Wittgenstein's classes during either of these terms. Since Wittgenstein did not want too many people to come, they were apparently not "open" lectures but were for people Wittgenstein had chosen to attend (Redpath 1990, p. 46).

When Wittgenstein left Cambridge in 1936 he gave up his rooms, so classes now met in James C. Taylor's rooms, K2 in Whewell's Court, and later in rooms of other students such as Rush Rhees. During (L38) Wittgenstein spent time in Dublin as well as Cambridge, but when he was in Cambridge he lived with Skinner at 81 East Road. Redpath recalls classes meeting twice a week for two or more hours a meeting. Classes for (E38) commenced on Monday, April 25, at 5:00 P.M., for lecture, with Fridays for discussion (Wittgenstein's letters to Moore, 1995, pp. 296–97).

The core students were Rush Rhees, Yorick Smythies, James Taylor, Redpath, and Casimir Lewy. Lewy attended all of Wittgenstein's lectures from 1938 through June 1945 (Hacking 1985, p. x). Redpath (1990, p. 47) adds to this list: George Paul, Francis Kitto, Alister Watson, and Douglas Gasking. Occasionally Drury attended and then, or perhaps later in the fall, Richard Bosanquet and Margaret Paul (née Ramsey) attended—ten or twelve students in all.

Redpath claims (pp. 47, 76) these lectures were about the foundations of mathematics. Wittgenstein's MS 159, from 1938, contains German notes on Gödel's proof and then En-

glish notes on material related to lectures from (E38) (Wittgenstein 1993a, Appendices A, B, and C). It seems likely, then, that at least the first few lectures of (L38) were on Gödel's proof. Nedo (1993, pp. 37–38) says the announced topic was “Philosophy and Philosophical Foundations of Mathematics.”

Rhees's notes (Wittgenstein 1993a, pp. 407–11, 419–21, and 423–26) all date from (E38). The lectures on Religious Belief (Barrett 1972, pp. 62–72) were apparently part of a larger course of lectures on Belief. These are probably from (L38) or (E38). The aesthetics lectures are claimed, by Barrett (Preface), to date from “the summer of 1938.” But since “Summer term” was a synonym for “Easter term” these may be from (E38).

Smythies attended lectures by Wittgenstein from 1938 to 1947, only missing some during the war years. Extensive but largely undated and often indecipherable notes from Smythies (Smythies, no date) are held by Kagoshima International University, Japan. Smythies worked for many years trying to condense and reorganize these notes topically into a book (mainly drawing on the notes from 1938 and occasionally employing notes from other students such as Taylor). A relatively complete draft of this book remains in private hands and should be published shortly (Smythies, forthcoming).

Drury, who attended one of the aesthetics lectures, writes (Drury, p. 141): “During this lecture one of the students was rapidly writing notes. Wittgenstein told him not to do so. ‘If you write these spontaneous remarks down, someday someone may publish them as my considered opinions. I don't want that done. For I am talking now freely as my ideas come, but all this will need a lot more thought and better expression.’”

Michaelmas 1938 (M38)

The *Cambridge University Reporter* (vol. 68, p. 1249) had Wittgenstein offering regular announced lectures twice a week from Wisdom's rooms. However, in a letter to Moore (Wittgenstein 1995, October 19, 1938, p. 300), Wittgenstein writes: “I am still not well at all. I am bodily very weak and shaky, and feel incapable of thinking properly about any subject. I cannot therefore start lecturing now, and I don't know whether I shall regain sufficient strength in the next 3 weeks, say, to do so. . . . I wonder whether it had not better be announced in the Reporter that I can't lecture for the present and until further notice.”

No notes definitely dating from this term are known. The fact that Malcolm came to Cambridge for this term, but didn't begin attending Wittgenstein's lectures until the following term (Malcolm 1984, p. 23), suggests that Wittgenstein never ended up giving lectures this term. But, in any case, no cancellation was announced in the *Reporter*.

A postcard to Moore (Wittgenstein 1995, p. 302: November 25, 1938) has Wittgenstein spending ten days in Hastings in the middle of term. And in a letter to Hänsel (2003a, p. 315) dated December 14, 1938, Wittgenstein reports: “For two months I was slightly unwell & am healthy again now.” Redpath also comments (1990, p. 78) on his poor state during this term.

Lent 1939 (L39); Easter 1939 (E39)

Wittgenstein lectured twice a week, Mondays and Wednesdays, at 5:00 P.M., apparently holding no discussion class this term (Moore, p. 48 n. and letter to Moore in Wittgenstein 1995, p. 310). Class meetings lasted two hours or more. Since Wittgenstein was still living at Skinner's apartment, classes were held in Smythies's rooms in King's College.

Lectures were attended by Norman Malcolm, Douglas Gasking, R. G. Bosanquet, Casimir Lewy, Marya Lutman-Kokoszynska (a visiting scholar from Poland), Rhees, Smythies, Alan Turing (the famous mathematician), Alister Watson, John Wisdom, and G. H. von Wright. (Not Findlay, according to Findlay 1972–1973, p. 173, and not Toulmin, according to Janik and Toulmin 1973, p. 11.) Present less often were Redpath, Derek Prince, and M. A. Cunningham.

Explaining to von Wright why he did not want casual visitors in his lectures, Wittgenstein (1993d, pp. 459–60: March 9, 1939) wrote:

I am, in my classes, doing my utmost to explain a *very* difficult matter to the students who have been attending my classes this term. I know that it is quite impossible for any one coming in in the middle, or at *the end*, of the term to get any idea of what we really are driving at. In fact he must necessarily get wrong ideas. . . . If I could, as many other people can, prepare my lectures in writing and then read them off in front of the class the presence of new people would not disturb me. But as I'm unable to do this and have to think things out afresh while I'm talking I am very easily disturbed.

Hence, von Wright began attending at the beginning of (E39). The (E39) lectures commenced on April 24.

These are perhaps Wittgenstein's most famous and best documented lectures. They are on the foundations of mathematics. Cora Diamond's edition of students' notes from these lectures (Diamond 1976) is a compilation of notes from R. G. Bosanquet, N. Malcolm, R. Rhees, and Y. Smythies. Rhees's notes (1939) are extant. A bootleg version of Malcolm's notes of these lectures (1954) once had limited circulation. The notes end with the sad lament: "The seed I'm most likely to sow is a certain jargon."

Malcolm (1984, p. 23) says that Wittgenstein "told me that the only thing that made it possible for him to conduct his lecture classes [extemporaneously] was the fact that he had done and was doing a vast amount of thinking and writing about all the problems under discussion." Wittgenstein himself made at least some notes specifically in preparation for these lectures (MS 161, pp. 1–32). Malcolm continues (p. 24): "It is hardly correct to speak of these meetings as 'lectures', although this is what Wittgenstein called them. For one thing, he always carried on original research in these meetings. . . . For another thing, the meetings were largely conversation. . . . Wittgenstein's personality dominated these meetings. I doubt that anyone in the class failed to be influenced by him in some way."

Monk (1990, p. 423) relates, "Exhausted and disgusted by his lectures, he would invariably go to see a 'flick' after them, accompanied by [one of his student] friends from the class. He would always sit in the front of the cinema, where he could be totally im-

mersed in the picture. He described the experience . . . as ‘like a shower bath’, washing away his thoughts of the lecture.”

Wittgenstein was elected professor of philosophy at Cambridge, succeeding Moore, on February 11, 1939, with the appointment to begin on October 1. In reply to a telegram from Keynes informing him of the decision, Wittgenstein wrote: “I hope to God that you haven’t made a mistake. I know, it’s up to me to prove that you haven’t. Well I *hope* I’ll be a decent prof” (Wittgenstein 1995, p. 309). In a letter to his old friend Eccles (Wittgenstein 1993g, p. 11: March 27, 1939), Wittgenstein wrote: “Having got the professorship is very flattering and all that but it might have been very much better for me to have got a job opening and closing crossing gates. I don’t get any kick out of my position (except what my vanity and stupidity sometimes gets).” After his election, Wittgenstein told Drury (Drury 1984, p. 141) “that Broad had said: ‘To refuse the chair to Wittgenstein would be like refusing Einstein a chair in physics.’” He obtained his British citizenship on April 14, 1939.

Michaelmas 1939 (M39)

As summer came to a close, Wittgenstein wrote to Hänsel (2003a, p. 323: August 26, 1939): “I feel anything but capable of teaching philosophy. Well we will see.” Then after war broke out in Europe, he wrote to von Wright (1993d, p. 461: September 13, 1939): “I wish you were here and could help me with my discussion classes. They should start in about 3 weeks; but I can’t imagine how I shall be able to lecture. I feel as though, under the present shameful and depressing circumstances, I ought to do anything but discuss philosophical problems, with people who aren’t really deeply interested in them anyway.” Nevertheless the *Cambridge University Reporter* (vol. 70, pp. 93, 453) announced his usual course, to meet Mondays and Thursdays at 5:00 P.M. John N. Findlay says (1984, p. 20) classes were held Thursday evenings in Wittgenstein’s rooms in Whewell’s Court (which he finally reoccupied this term).

Findlay mentions Malcolm and C. A. Mace as among the others in attendance. Timothy Moore (son of G. E. Moore) also attended Wittgenstein’s classes regularly between October 1939 and June 1941. Lewy would have been present as well, and perhaps also Redpath.

Malcolm (1984, p. 23) and Monk (p. 415, probably relying on Malcolm) claim that the lectures on foundations of mathematics continued into this term. But J. N. Findlay’s account (1972–1973, pp. 173–75; 1984, p. 20) seems preferable. He says the lectures were on Memory (and dreams). Findlay described the lectures as “extremely incoherent” (p. 175), though he offers a summary of what he found in them (p. 174):

[H]e was expounding the by now familiar doctrine that memory did not precede but followed the memory language-game, in which people simply felt inclined to talk of events which obviously were not happening when they spoke, and in which other people, to whom they appealed for confirmation, were in some cases strangely willing to do. They too, they said, had

been there, and had witnessed what the rememberer was describing. The convention arose of speaking of these non-occurrent but confirmable events in the past tense: the reference to the past sprang from the conventional use of the past tense in such linguistic acts of remembering and not vice-versa. Poor old Broad and others who put the reference to the past first were deeply confused: they believed in that great absurdity—pre-linguistic meanings, a language before language. The language of memory resembled the language of dreams, where dream reports are the foundation of dreams and not vice-versa, as Malcolm afterwards spelt out laboriously in his book on *Dreams*: only no one tried to confirm a dream, whereas other people confirmed one's memories, and looked for evidence that fitted in with them. Findlay [speaking of himself in the third person] regarded the analysis as brilliantly sophisticated and said so: Wittgenstein publicly regretted that he could be brought to the water yet not made to drink.

No other notes or recollections known to be from this term have been found.

It is odd that Malcolm never mentioned these lectures on memory and dreams in his *Memoir*. In his own book on *Dreaming* (1959) he makes no general acknowledgment to Wittgenstein, though he refers to passages from the *Investigations* a half dozen times. However, he does say (p. 87): “In a lecture Wittgenstein once said that it is an important thing in philosophy to know when to stop. If we cease to ask *why* it is that sometimes when people wake up they relate stories in the past tense under the influence of an impression, then we will see dream-telling as it is—a remarkable human phenomenon, a part of the natural history of man, something *given*, the foundation for the concept of dreaming.” This remark presumably dates from the lectures this term.

Yorick Smythies made undated notes on many lectures by Wittgenstein: eight lectures on volition, two on freedom of the will (Smythies 1993, alternate text in Wittgenstein 1998), ten on description, some on belief. These would have dated from the period 1938 and after. (Smythies seems to have left Cambridge at the end of Lent term, 1940, apparently not returning full-time until mid to late 1945.) In *Philosophical Occasions* (1993, pp. 427–28) we argued that the lectures on freedom of the will probably came from this term. There are brief notes from a course of lectures on description (Barrett 1972, pp. 32, 37–40) that probably date from (M39) as well.

Reflecting on his own teaching Wittgenstein wrote (1980/1998, p. 38/43, January 13, 1940): “A teacher may get good, even astounding, results from his pupils while he is teaching them and yet not be a good teacher; because it may be that, while his pupils are directly under his influence, he raises them to a height which is not natural to them, without fostering their own capacities for work at this level, so that they immediately decline again as soon as the teacher leaves the classroom. Perhaps this is how it is with me; I have sometimes thought so.”

Lent 1940 (L40); Easter 1940 (E40); Michaelmas 1940 (M40);

Lent 1941 (L41); Easter 1941 (E41)

Wolfe Mays (1967, pp. 79ff) began attending Wittgenstein's lectures in Lent, 1940, and on for “a year or two.” According to Mays, lectures took place in two-hour sessions twice a

week from 4:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M. in Wittgenstein's rooms at the top of Whewell's Court in Trinity. The *Cambridge University Reporter* (vol. 70, p. 453) has them taking place Mondays and Thursdays at 5:00 P.M.

The number of people present was never more than a dozen. From this period Mays recalls Robert H. Thouless (a psychologist and lecturer in education at Cambridge), Timothy Moore, A. M. Mardiros, Smythies, Stephen Körner, Elizabeth Anscombe, Lewy, and Rose Rand. (However, Anscombe did not in fact come to Cambridge until 1942.) Stephen Toulmin was present at lectures in 1941 (Janik and Toulmin, p. 11). Perhaps it is from one of these terms that Toulmin's delightful recollection dates (Toulmin 1953, p. 51): "as Wittgenstein has remarked, 'what is or is not a cow is for the public to decide.'"

Concerning the lectures of this period, Mays recollects: "Wittgenstein's lectures were mainly devoted to questions of meaning, belief, and the foundations of mathematics" (1967, p. 83). Mays summarizes his impressions of some aspects of these lectures:

His approach to philosophical problems was essentially aesthetic in the widest sense. He had a very strong, almost abnormal imagery, and this came out in the bizarre examples he used to produce in class to illustrate his arguments. For example, he likened his soul to a yellow spot over his shoulder. In the manner of Dean Swift he once tried to draw an analogy between the faces of men and those of animals. You can often, he said, see in one man the resemblance of a horse, in another that of a pig and in another that of a dog. To illustrate the expressionist character of language he suggested that we try swearing at a dog in an affectionate tone of voice, and to bring out the arbitrary nature of naming, he argued that we might christen the piece of chalk he was holding in his hand "Jack." (p. 80)

[Wittgenstein] poked fun at traditional modes of philosophizing, and he used the bed-maker (i.e., female college servant) as a measuring rod when traditional philosophical arguments were raised in class. "What," he would ask, "would my bed-maker say of this kind of abstract talk?" (p. 82)

When he was lecturing on belief he read extracts from James' *Principles of Psychology*, and discussed them critically. . . . Wittgenstein often indulged in what I can only call speculative anthropology. This was particularly to be seen in the way he illustrated his arguments by reference to the behavior of hypothetical tribes. . . . He might, for example, say, "Imagine how a particular tribe having a different culture could use such an expression to mean something different from what we mean." . . . In his lectures Wittgenstein made valiant efforts to quote examples to show that psychological data could be externalized. He talked a good deal about the criteria for deciding whether a person was in pain or not. Suppose, he said, so and so was on the operating table and surgeons were sticking knives into him; if he showed no signs of reacting, could he therefore be said to be in pain, or was he shamming? In these examples Wittgenstein sometimes tended to regard other people as if they were inanimate objects or automata, as when he said, "Suppose I cut off Mr. X's arm thus," at the same time striking his own left arm with the edge of his right hand. (pp. 83–84)

What has lingered in my mind over the years, as far as Wittgenstein's lectures were concerned, has been the stuffiness of the room in which they were held, the intellectual fog generated, and the puzzled look on the faces of his listeners. The awkward feeling you had

Wittgenstein was going to pounce on you and ask a question to which you would give what he would consider to be a silly reply. (pp. 84–85)

Wittgenstein's own reflections on the lectures were somewhat more positive. To Malcolm he wrote (Malcolm 1984, p. 87: March 26, 1940): "My lectures have gone moderately well this term & I hope they won't be too awful next term" and (pp. 87–88: May 29, 1940): "My lectures didn't go *too* bad this term, & last week I had an 'at-home' & I'm intending to have at-homes regularly now because I have an idea it might steady people a bit if they go on with *some sort of* decent thinking *in spite* of the unrest they feel. Of course if people cease to come that'll be just that." Nedo (1993, p. 40) quotes the "Lecture-List" from the *Cambridge University Reporter*: "Prof. Wittgenstein will be at home to his students on Sundays at 5 P.M. in his room in Trinity College."

Redpath relates that (1990, p. 94) "one day [in Lent term, 1940] I asked him why he never stated any political views or discussed politics in any of his lectures. His reply was interesting. He said he *could* not do so but that one day he would give a lecture or talk explaining *why* he could not. He never gave such a lecture or talk while I was still attending his classes." Redpath stopped going to Wittgenstein's classes in June 1940 (p. 97).

Mays reports (1967, p. 81): "Wittgenstein disliked us to take notes during his classes, and he would prevent anyone who was foolhardy enough to try. He did, however, allow Smythies to take notes." Further recollections or notes known to be from these terms have not been found.

Michaelmas 1941 (M41); Lent 1942 (L42); Easter 1942 (E42); Michaelmas 1942 (M42); Lent 1943 (L43)

The (M41) term began with the usual schedule of classes on Mondays and Thursdays at 5:00 P.M. (*Cambridge University Reporter*, vol. 72, p. 89). But in November, Wittgenstein began working in London at Guy's Hospital as part of the war effort. During the rest of this whole period (see *Cambridge University Reporter*) Wittgenstein lectured only on Saturdays, from 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. Apparently he held class only on alternate Saturdays for at least a while (Henderson 1973, p. 188).

Many fewer students were at Cambridge during the war. Wittgenstein reported to Rhees (November 11, 1942) that he was lecturing to about ten students. Lewy would have attended regularly, along with Robert Thouless and Stephen Körner. New faces on the scene included Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Kreisel. Malcolm relates that (1984, p. 27): "During World War II, when he lectured on Saturdays, an American negro soldier was a member of the class. Wittgenstein remarked more than once what a friendly and good-natured face the man had, and how sorry he was when he ceased to come."

Bouwsma relates (p. 73): "Miss Anscombe said that during the war he once returned the money Cambridge paid him for lectures: 'The lectures were no good, not worth the money.'" Edmonds and Eidinow (p. 72) claim that this was during the time when he was only giving lectures on weekends.

Wittgenstein's own research was focusing again on the foundations of mathematics, and Rhees (1984b, p. 224) says Wittgenstein wrote to him in November 1942 that he was lecturing on the foundations of mathematics.

One of Wittgenstein's favorite students was Georg Kreisel, who was in contact with Wittgenstein from 1942 through Wittgenstein's death in 1951. Kreisel had regular conversations with Wittgenstein as well as attending his lectures. Kreisel (1978a, p. 80) claims: "His lecture-courses . . . were very *tense*; as were, for that matter, many of his conversations . . . about everyday trivialities. By contrast he was extraordinarily *relaxed*, when analysis of proofs . . . or a *bon mot* . . . was at issue. Still more astounding (for me) was how often he sketched, in a few minutes in the course of Friday afternoon walks, the content of his two-hour seminar the next day, or afterwards, on Saturday evening, supplemented or extended that content. Without exaggeration: what he actually said in the lecture did not really express his thoughts (beforehand and afterwards) very well at all." And (1978b, p. 86): "At least in my own experience the style of W[ittgenstein]'s conversations on foundations (not on everyday matters!) was very different from his public performances, which were always tense and often incoherent. . . ."

The respect in which Wittgenstein held Kreisel is indicated by the 1944 anecdote Monk relates (p. 498, from Rush Rhees) about how Wittgenstein thought Kreisel to be the most able philosopher he had ever met who was also a mathematician—even better than Ramsey. On February 27, 1947, Wittgenstein chaired Kreisel's talk to the Cambridge Moral Science Club on "Mathematical Logic."

In April 1943, Wittgenstein moved to Newcastle to join a research medical unit and worked there for nearly a year. While in Newcastle he wrote to Malcolm (1984, p. 92: September 11, 1943): "I've given up my rooms in College. I'm supposed, of course, to come back there as a professor after the war, but I must say I can't quite imagine how I'll be able to do it. I wonder if I'll ever be able to teach philosophy again regularly. I rather think I shan't be able." In February 1944, having finished this war-related work, he was granted a leave of absence from Cambridge to spend time in Swansea working on his own research. He did not return to Cambridge until October 1944. Consequently there were no lectures during the terms from Easter 1943 through Easter 1944.

Michaelmas 1944 (M44); Lent 1945 (L45); Easter 1945 (E45)

Initial announcements for the Michaelmas term did not include a class from Wittgenstein (*Cambridge University Reporter*, vol. 75, p. 87, but then compare p. 331). On returning to Cambridge, Wittgenstein reoccupied his old rooms in Whewell's Court and resumed the customary two two-hour classes each week (Nedo 1993, p. 43) beginning on Monday, October 16. Thouless and Lewy were again among the attendees, as was Anscombe. Wittgenstein wrote to Rhees (Monk, p. 476: November 28, 1944): "My class is exceedingly poor. I have so far 6 people, none of whom is really good." Lectures for (L45) began on Friday, January 19.

Monk says (p. 477): “His lectures dealt with . . . problems in the philosophy of psychology. . . . He had thought of using as a text William James’s *Principles of Psychology*—primarily to illustrate the conceptual confusions that he was concerned to combat,” but (as he wrote to Rhees, November 28, 1944, in Monk, p. 477): “you were right; I didn’t take James as my text but just talked out of my own head (or through my own hat).” He dealt with material corresponding roughly to sections 189–421 of the *Investigations*. Anscombe recalls (1981, p. viii–ix):

I always hated phenomenalism and felt trapped by it. I couldn’t see my way out of it but I didn’t believe it. It was no good pointing to difficulties about things which Russell found wrong with it, for example. The strength, the central nerve of it remained alive and raged achingly. It was only in Wittgenstein’s classes in 1944 that I saw the nerve being extracted, the central thought ‘I have got *this*, and I define “yellow” (say) as *this*’ being effectively attacked.—At one point in these classes Wittgenstein was discussing the interpretation of the sign-post, and it burst upon me that the way you go by it is the final interpretation. At another point I came out with ‘But I still want to say: Blue is there.’ Older hands smiled or laughed but Wittgenstein checked them by taking it seriously, saying ‘Let me think what medicine you need. . . . Suppose we had the word “painy” as a word for the property of some surfaces.’ The ‘medicine’ was effective, and the story illustrates Wittgenstein’s ability to understand the thought that was offered to him in objection.

In MS 129 he wrote: “What I am trying to teach today is the transition from what is not obviously nonsense to what obviously is” (Nedo 1993, p. 44).

Michaelmas 1945 (M45); Lent 1946 (L46); Easter 1946 (E46)

Before the beginning of term Wittgenstein pleaded to Malcolm (1984, p. 98: September 20, 1945): “I hope you’ll come to Cambridge before I make up my mind to resign the absurd job of a prof. of philosophy. It is a kind of living death.—I’m going back to it in a fortnight.” But he was offering classes according to the usual schedule (Nedo 1993, p. 44): “In the academic year 1945/46 he holds 2-hour seminars twice weekly on the philosophy of psychology.” Classes in (L46) commenced Friday, January 18; classes in (E46) on Friday, April 26.

Stephen Toulmin attended all of Wittgenstein’s lectures from Lent 1946 through Easter 1947. He says they were exclusively devoted to material from the *Investigations*, with special reference to Part II. Wasfi A. Hijab (1999) attended all classes from Michaelmas 1945 to Easter 1947. He says they were all devoted to philosophical psychology, but it didn’t matter what subject Wittgenstein discussed. What was important was the method he brought to bear on the subject, which was always the same. He always emphasized the importance of the context for understanding things—when we ignore the context, what remains is flawed. In a letter to Rhees (February 2, 1946) Wittgenstein reported: “My lectures aren’t too terribly bad but they are pretty poor. I’m talking about problems of Gestalt psychology & am frightfully unclear myself & unable to get to the deep aspects of the matter.”

Hijab recalls that in the course of a lecture Wittgenstein would often stop for two to three minutes to collect his thoughts. In a two-hour class perhaps fifteen to twenty minutes would be silence. Wittgenstein always complained of his difficulty expressing himself. What he gave was more a performance than a lecture. He was investigating philosophy in front of his students, so they could learn how to do philosophy. Though he rarely talked about himself or what he was trying to do in lectures, he did once say that he was trying to discover the “geometry of psychology.”

Once Hijab had a friend visit him who wanted to attend one of Wittgenstein’s lectures. Wittgenstein refused. He would let anyone attend, but only if staying for the whole term’s course. He said: I am like a piano teacher. I am trying to teach a style of thinking, a technique—not a subject matter. If you hear me playing just a bit, you’d think it was awful—just noise, discordant notes. You would think it was a poor performance, but it is not a performance at all.

Anscombe recalls (1995, p. 407): “He himself in his classes sometimes said he was as if were giving examples of ‘five-finger exercises’ in thinking. These were certainly not limited in number like the set a piano teacher might employ, and were not like automatic formulae of investigation.” (Cf. Gass 1971, p. 248: “what you heard was something like a great pianist at practice: not a piece of music, but the very acts which went into making that performance.”)

Wittgenstein’s letters to Malcolm (1984) offer a sort of running commentary on his classes this year: “My class just now is fairly large, 19 people. Many of them will drop off, of course, & I wish this process could be accelerated.—Smythies is coming & a woman who’s very good, i.e., *more* than just *intelligent*. There is also an Indian (or, at least, he is dark) who seems to be all right; also two American soldiers: one’s a dud, the other’s nice but I don’t think he knows what we’re talking about” (p. 100: October 30, 1945). “Last term my lectures didn’t go too bad, on the whole. At the beginning of the term I thought I wouldn’t be able to manage them” (p. 101: December 15, 1945). “My lectures begin in 3 days. I’ll talk a lot of rubbish” (p. 102: January 15, 1946). “I haven’t done any decent work for ages apart from my classes. They went all right last term. But now my brain feels burnt out. . . . Tomorrow’s my first lecture. *Oh Hell!*” (pp. 102–3: April 25, 1946).

Michaelmas 1946 (M46); Lent 1947 (L47); Easter 1947 (E47)

Classes met twice a week, Mondays and Fridays—commencing on Friday, October 11, 1946. There were also informal meetings on Saturday afternoons, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M., on whatever issues happened to come up. Classes met in Wittgenstein’s usual rooms in Whewell’s Court.

Monk claims (1990, p. 499) that in this last year at Cambridge Wittgenstein added regular seminars on the philosophy of mathematics to his weekly classes on the philosophy of psychology. And Nedo (1993, p. 44) claims he gave “two series of seminars, one on the ‘Foundations of Mathematics’ and one on the ‘Philosophy of Psychology.’” This seems unlikely in light of Malcolm’s accounting of Wittgenstein’s schedule during this year

(1984, p. 46): “Wittgenstein devoted a great deal of time to students that year. There were his two weekly classes of two hours each, his weekly at-home of two hours, a whole afternoon spent with me, another whole afternoon spent with Elizabeth Anscombe and W. A. Hijab, and finally the weekly evening meeting of the Moral Science Club which he usually attended.” Hijab says the afternoon discussions with him and Anscombe were devoted to philosophy of religion. And he says there were no lectures on the foundations of mathematics. In any case, the *Cambridge University Reporter* for that academic year (vol. 77, pp. 92, 460, 800) lists Wittgenstein as teaching only one course each term.

Those attending the lectures included Norman Malcolm, Peter Geach, W. A. Hijab, A. C. Jackson, Kanti Shah, Georg Kreisel, Miss H. Martini, J. R. Jones, E. B. Hunt, Stephen Toulmin, G. H. von Wright (during Easter term), G. E. M. Anscombe, Smythies, Gilbert Harris Edwards, Peter Munz, John Vinelott, and Christau.

The lectures from this academic year are thoroughly documented in Geach (1988), which gives full notes from Geach (pp. 3–116), Shah (pp. 119–232), and Jackson (pp. 235–348). There are also some notes from Malcolm (1984, pp. 41–43) and Edwards (1946–1947, covering classes starting on November 8, 1946, and extending through what is apparently May 16, 1947). The Saturday discussions covered a variety of topics, such as psychical research and aesthetics (Geach, p. xiii). Malcolm (1984, pp. 45–46) relates a riddle that Wittgenstein told for the purpose of throwing light on the nature of philosophy. Notes from several Saturday meetings taken by Edwards are given in this volume (pp. 401–05).

A preface to the lecture notes taken by Edwards (1946–1947, p. 2) gives a sense of what it was like being in these lectures:

There were a few deck chairs for those who arrived early and the rest of us sat where we could on the floor.

Wittgenstein did not permit note taking, and quite rightly so for his seminars were more akin to . . . cathartic sessions than the classic pattern of someone who knew a lot transmitting it to we who knew little. He would pose problems such as “What is thinking?” and soon show that attempts to resolve them led only to pseudo-solutions. He would lead himself and all of us into a region of complete puzzlement from which there appeared to be no way out; indeed I well recall him sending us away after one lengthy and exacting session saying “I’ve completely foxed myself.” For this we respected him all the more. The whole of his searching questioning was accompanied with gestures, postures and facial expressions that emphasised his direction; I particularly remember the forehead and eyebrows for he seemed to have the ability to raise one eyebrow almost to the top of his forehead whilst the other remained unmoved; moreover his oft repeated affirmative “Yum,” meaning “Yes” went with an indescribable puckering of his most plastic face.

Wittgenstein wrote to von Wright (1993d, p. 461: February 21, 1947): “My lectures vary a great deal. They are sometimes satisfactory, sometimes unsatisfactory.”

In general he was growing increasingly pessimistic about his role as a teacher. In a notebook that he kept for his work this year he wrote (MS 133, p. 82: November 24, 1946; in

Wittgenstein 1980/1998, p. 56/64): “I am showing my pupils sections of an immense landscape, which they cannot possibly find their way around.” And also (MS 133, p. 41: November 19, 1946; in Monk 1990, p. 507): “My lectures are going well, they will never go better. But what effect do they leave behind? Am I helping anyone? Certainly no *more* than if I were a great actor playing out tragic roles for them. What they are learning is not worth learning; and the personal impression I make does not serve them with anything. That’s true for all of them, with, perhaps, one or two exceptions.” (Cf. also Bouwsma 1986, pp. 9–12, 36; and Tranøy 1976, p. 17.) A. C. Jackson’s notes for the year end with this (Geach 1988, pp. 347–48): “The only way to deal with a puzzle is to get someone to see it’s *not* a puzzle. . . . Unless you can show that a puzzle is not a puzzle you are left with what really are puzzles: a puzzle is something with no solution.”

Anscombe recalls (1995, p. 406): “I once heard someone ask Wittgenstein what it all came to, what was so to speak the upshot, of the philosophy he was teaching in the 1940’s. He did not answer.”

The July 25, 1947, issue of the *Cambridge University Reporter* (vol. 77, p. 1344) listed Wittgenstein as teaching a class in the following year, but the first October issue no longer listed him. In October 1947, Wittgenstein had resigned his chair effective December 31, 1947. Michaelmas 1947 was a sabbatical for him, which he spent in Cambridge.

OTHER LECTURES

Wittgenstein gave lectures or participated in discussions in other various circumstances. Only events in which Wittgenstein was designated as a participant are numbered:

1. July 13, 1912. “Experiment on Rhythm (Demonstration), by L. Wittgenstein and B. Muscio (Introduced by C. S. Myers)”

This was a presentation to the British Psychological Society meeting in Cambridge. The meeting included five additional presentations by others (British Psychological Society program 1912).

Wittgenstein’s new friend David Pinsent records in his diary (Monday, May 13, 1912; in von Wright 1990, p. 3): “At 2.30 I went *chez* Wittgenstein and we went on to the Psychological Laboratory, where I had arranged to act as a ‘subject’ in some experiments he is trying: to ascertain the extent and importance of rhythm in music. Not bad fun.” There are similar reports of experiments six times over the following month. Surprisingly, Pinsent’s entry for Saturday, July 13 (the date of the presentation), mentions nothing about it, though it does record that they dined together that evening at the Bull Hotel.

Bernard Muscio (1887–1928) was an undergraduate member of the Cambridge Moral Science Club in 1911–1913. He became university demonstrator in experimental psychology

at Cambridge and later professor of philosophy, University of Sidney. Myers was an experimental psychologist at Cambridge with whom Wittgenstein had some discussions about the relationship between logic and psychology (Wittgenstein 1995, p. 14: letter to Russell, June 22, 1912).

Moore reported to Hayek: “[Wittgenstein] told me long afterwards, in the Lectures in 1933, that he undertook these experiments, which were on rhythm, in the hope that they would throw some light on questions of Aesthetics, but of course they threw none; but they did, however, establish one point of some interest, namely that, in some circumstances, all the subjects of the experiment heard an accent on certain notes which were in fact not accented by the machine which was being used” (letter dated March 8, 1953; in Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, p. 84). Wittgenstein described the demonstration to Russell (Wittgenstein 1995, p. 16: July 1, 1912) as “a most absurd paper on rhythms.”

Despite Wittgenstein’s dismissal of the paper, in one of his last lectures at Cambridge, on May 16, 1947 (L47), in the course of a discussion of gestalt psychology, he is reported by Gilbert Harris Edwards (1946–1947, pp. 145–46) to have said the following:

Talk of visual organization suggests grouping. Thus if a series of sounds of the same nature follow at equal distances in time, we can hear e.g. every second one as accented. . . . Suppose we say we hear the sounds accented ~ - [short/long]. We may ask if this is an auditory matter. Of course it is. There is an auditory experience which will justify it; and we can have such an experience in fact, we can hear the sounds as they are really produced ~ - [short/long].

(This discussion took place at p. 101 in Geach’s notes, p. 229 in Shah’s notes, and p. 331 in Jackson’s notes in Geach 1988, but it is not elaborated in any of those places.)

2. May 1913. Demonstration “Of an Apparatus for Psychological Investigation Of Rhythm”

The next year Wittgenstein and Muscio gave a demonstration of presumably the same work at the ceremonial opening of the new laboratory for experimental psychology at Cambridge (McGuinness, p. 128, referring to a letter from Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell: July 15, 1913).

In the fall of 1913 Wittgenstein was scheduled to give a course of lectures on philosophy to the Working Men’s College in London (see Pinsent’s diary, pp. 80–81, 83 in von Wright 1990). Members of the Apostles group at Cambridge, such as E. M. Forster, also taught there. Wittgenstein had begun preparations for these lectures when he finally decided to live in Norway instead, and they were never given by him.

Wittgenstein was away from academia more than a dozen years. His interest in philosophical matters was renewed by discussions with Frank Ramsey, from Cambridge, and with some of the members of the Vienna Circle in 1927 and 1928. Wittgenstein returned to academic life in Cambridge in January 1929 and resumed philosophical research.

3. July 13, 1929. Lecture “About Generality and Infinity in Mathematics”

This talk was given to the joint session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, held at University College, Nottingham, England.

In a letter to Russell (Wittgenstein 1995, p. 239) requesting his presence, Wittgenstein wrote: “My paper (the one *written* for the meeting) is ‘Some remarks on logical form’, but I intend to read something else to them about generality and infinity in mathematics which, I believe, will be greater fun (though it may be all Chinese to them).—I fear that whatever one says to them will either fall flat or arouse *irrelevant* troubles in their minds and questions. . . .”

Leavis tells an anecdote about Wittgenstein’s exhausted but intense condition the night before this talk (Leavis 1984, pp. 60–61). Upon arrival at the meeting, the Oxford philosopher John Mabbott, mistaking Wittgenstein for some local student, “said to him kindly ‘I’m afraid there is a gathering of philosophers going on in here.’” Wittgenstein replied, “I too” (Mabbott 1986, pp. 78–79). While Russell did not attend, Gilbert Ryle was among those in attendance, and this led to his acquaintance with Wittgenstein.

While it may seem that this would have been Wittgenstein’s last involvement with the Aristotelian Society, in fact he chaired a meeting of the CMSC that was a joint meeting with the Aristotelian Society on February 1, 1945—featuring a paper by Ewing, “Are Mental Attributes, Attributes of the Body?”—held in Braithwaite’s rooms in King’s College. But when it came to another joint session with the Mind Association, Wittgenstein had had enough. According to Britton (1967, p. 62): “[Wittgenstein] railed against professional philosophers, mourned the present state of philosophy in England and asked: ‘What can one man do alone?’ When I told him that the next jamboree was to be held at Cambridge in 1947 and that I was to read a paper, he said: ‘Very well, to me it is just as if you had told me that there will be bubonic plague in Cambridge next summer. I am very glad to know and shall make sure to be in London.’ (And so he was.)”

4. November 17, 1929. A Lecture on Ethics

The lecture was given to the Heretics Society in Cambridge, at the invitation of C. K. Ogden. A facsimile reproduction of a page from Wittgenstein’s appointment diary (Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, p. 230) shows the meeting following one of W. E. Johnson’s Sunday afternoon at-homes, which Wittgenstein often attended.

The Heretics Society was a general audience that had no particular interest or training in philosophy. Previous speakers included Bertrand Russell, H. G. Wells, and Virginia Woolf. Several weeks later Wittgenstein discussed the contents of the lecture with members of the Vienna Circle (Waismann 1979, pp. 77, 92–93).

A typescript that was presumably read for this lecture has been published (Wittgenstein 1993b). There is also a handwritten manuscript (MS 189a) that appears to be an earlier draft. In the philosophical notebook that Wittgenstein worked in during the week leading up to the lecture (MS 107, Wittgenstein 1993–1996, vol. 2, pp. 111, 113; and 1980/1998, p. 3/5), he wrote: “What is Good is Divine too. That, strangely enough, sums up my ethics.

Only something supernatural can express the Supernatural.” And later: “You cannot lead people to the good; you can only lead them to some place or other; the good lies outside the space of facts.”

Wittgenstein’s discussions with members of the Vienna Circle continued after his return to Cambridge during his visits to Vienna. Notes from eighteen of these discussions—from December 18, 1929, to July 1, 1932—were taken by Friedrich Waismann (1979). Since they are closer to private conversations than public discussions, they are not included in this list. But admittedly the distinction is vague.

5. May 28, 1930. “The Foundations of Mathematics”

This was a lecture given to the Trinity Mathematical Society at 8:45 P.M. in the Old Combination Room, Trinity College, Cambridge.

The Trinity Mathematical Society was formed in 1919. Founding honorary members included G. H. Hardy and J. E. Littlewood (April 2, 1919). Other early honorary members included Bertrand Russell (October 29, 1919) and F. P. Ramsey (November 5, 1924). Over the years, papers were given by Hardy, Littlewood, Born, Eddington, Dirac, Polya, Ramsey, Broad, and Russell, among many others. Francis Skinner, later to become Wittgenstein’s friend and student, was secretary for the society beginning in 1931.

Minutes for February 12, 1930, record that “upon the proposal of the Secretary [G. W. Ward] Dr. Ludwig Wittgenstein was declared an honorary member of the Society.” His residence at the time was listed as Bishop’s Hostel [sic], Trinity College. Minutes of this lecture are given in this volume, pages 373–74. The talk includes his first known critique of the Frege-Russell definition of number.

On June 19, 1930, Wittgenstein met with Waismann and Schlick to discuss (Waismann 1979, pp. 102ff.) what Waismann should say in his upcoming lecture, “The Nature of Mathematics: Wittgenstein’s Standpoint,” to be delivered in Königsberg in September at the Second Conference on Theory of Knowledge in the Exact Sciences. Although it was not announced in the program, Waismann’s well-received talk was given along with talks by Carnap on logicism, Heyting on intuitionism, and von Neumann on formalism. While the other lectures were published in 1931, only the first portion of the typescript of Waismann’s lecture survives, and was published much later (Waismann 1982, 1986). How close (what we know of) Waismann’s lecture in September was to Wittgenstein’s own views is a matter of dispute.

In Waismann’s addendum (1979, pp. 164f) to the notes of the June meeting, in a discussion of the definition of number, Wittgenstein says: “In Cambridge I explained the matter to my audience in this way. . . .” This must refer to the lecture to the Trinity Mathematical Society in May. Thus Wittgenstein’s account of the explanation that Waismann goes on to record must be considered, along with the minutes, as part of our evidence about the contents of that lecture.

6. February 19, 1940. "The Descent of Mathematics"

This lecture was given to the Trinity Mathematical Society (joint meeting with the Adams Society, St. John's College) at 8:30 P.M. in the Old Combination Room, Trinity College, Cambridge. Minutes from this meeting and further details are given in this volume, pages 374–75.

I. J. Good, who was a student in mathematics at Cambridge at this time, attended this lecture and recalls only "the way [Wittgenstein] pointed bony fingers into the middle distance while thinking what to say next." Wittgenstein's student and friend, Georg Kreisel, became president of the society for Michaelmas term, 1943.

In 1941 Wittgenstein agreed to give the annual 'Philosophical Lecture' to the British Academy in 1942. He prepared notes for the lecture (Wittgenstein 1993f) but ultimately decided not to give the lecture because of "pressure of other work." His friend Francis Skinner had died suddenly on October 11, 1941, and Wittgenstein had begun working at Guy's Hospital in November. C. D. Broad gave the lecture in 1942.

In the 1940s, when he was free from other duties, Wittgenstein spent a good deal of his time in Swansea, Wales, with his friend Rush Rhees. Rhees recalls (1984b, p. 201) Wittgenstein's participation in the discussion of a paper by classics professor Benjamin Farrington on "Causal Laws and History" at the College Philosophical Society in Swansea in 1943, where Wittgenstein commented that:

when there is a change in the conditions in which people live, we may call it progress because it opens up new opportunities. But in the course of this change, opportunities which were there before may be lost. In one way it was progress, in another it was decline. A historical change may be progress and also be ruin. There is no method of weighing one against the other to justify . . . speaking of "progress on the whole."

Farrington said that even "with all the ugly sides of our civilization, I am sure I would rather live as we do now than have to live as the caveman did." Wittgenstein replied: "Yes of course you would. But would the caveman?"

Wittgenstein was involved at least once in the discussions of a student literary society called "The Contemporary." According to Stern (1989, pp. 11ff.), the society had about twelve members—students who studied German unapologetically, feeling that the war was behind them. "We were emphatically anti-war and against the general spirit of the time." Meetings took place in the college rooms of members.

On a "cold, wet November evening in 1944" they were discussing the concepts of honor, valor, loyalty, and justice in the *Iliad*. A confusing argument went back and forth

over how they relate to contemporary notions, and words like “decadent relativism” were used.

Stern describes his first impression of Wittgenstein at this meeting: “The man on the bench at the bay window had kept his raincoat on; the woolen cap on his knees and the firm shoes reminded one of a farmer from the North. Supporting his chin were the hands that held the handle of his walking stick, made of ash-wood; the posture of the rather slight, forward-leaning body conveyed the impression of concentration and mental energy, and at the same time that of impatience. With his first words he claimed and received the attention of everyone. The voice was not loud but full-sounding, I found it immediately engaging; the light accent was Southern German or Austrian . . . , and in this warm, melodious voice rested a kind of authority I have never encountered since. The name that was mentioned by the chairman when presenting the speaker was unknown to me.” Stern then recounts Wittgenstein’s remarks:

Our terminology (so he began the argument) is neither identical to that of Homer, but also not entirely different from it. Surely the language of Homer is doubly strange to us, in terms of time and place—the analogy of a foreign language may well be literally correct, and yet in a certain sense it isn’t correct after all. We understand what Homer means when he speaks of the heroism of someone like Achilles or of the mourning of someone like Priam—not because these concern ‘eternal values’ or the ‘eternally human’ (as one of the speakers had maintained) but because we are connected to Homer’s world somewhat as by a rope. A rope, however, is not of *one* piece but consists of many interwoven, partially overlapping short strands of hemp of which none reaches from one end to the other—even the famous ‘central thread [rote Faden]’—the ‘red strand’ with which the Royal Navy marks its property—is spun from short pieces. The strength of the rope—our confidence that we really understand those terms—depends on the reaching-over and cutting-across of the particular, successively following usages of words; they produce what we call a tradition. And what is true for words like ‘virtue’ and ‘heroism’ (the speaker concluded), holds also for what people at different times called ‘history,’ ‘philosophy,’ and the like.

“And truth?” Stern asked.

Why should the grammar of the word ‘truth’ be composed differently, he answered, than that of the just-mentioned words?

Stern calls this meeting the first of a long series of arguments and encounters with Wittgenstein over the next two years. Whether Wittgenstein attended any further meetings of the society is unclear.

7. April 10 and 17, 1946. “Motives and Causes”

Two Wednesday discussions with a small group at University College, Swansea, in Wales. Karl Britton recalls (1954, p. 712): “he did not get where he wanted: but I noticed his ‘wider’ and more receptive attitude: but also a tendency (not altogether new) to be very

hard on his friends and kindly to the uninitiated. When he was going I persuaded him to come again next week, although Rhees would be away; and my students said: ‘We have never *seen* a man thinking before.’”

8. May 14(?), 1947. Opening the Discussion of a Paper Given by Oscar Wood on Descartes’s “Cogito, Ergo Sum”

Wittgenstein accepted an invitation to speak to the Jowett Society meeting at Magdalen College, Oxford. He was to open the discussion of a paper by Oscar Wood, the undergraduate secretary of the society.

Relying largely on diary entries from Mary Warnock, Monk (1990, pp. 496–97) says that in attendance was “practically every philosopher” Warnock had ever seen, notably “Gilbert Ryle, J. O. Urmson, Isaiah Berlin, and Joseph Pritchard”:

In his reply to Wood’s paper Wittgenstein ignored altogether the question of whether Descartes’ argument was valid, and concentrated instead on bringing his own philosophical method to bear on the problem raised. . . .

Wittgenstein: If a man says to me, looking at the sky, ‘I think it will rain, therefore I exist,’ I do not understand him.

Pritchard: That’s all very fine; what we want to know is: is the *cogito* valid or not?

Pritchard (described by Mary Warnock in her diary as ‘extremely old and deaf with a terrible cough. Totally tactless’) several times interrupted Wittgenstein in an effort to get him to address the question of whether Descartes’ *cogito* was a valid inference or not. And every time he did so, Wittgenstein avoided the question, implying that it was unimportant. What Descartes was concerned with, Pritchard retorted, was far more important than any problem that Wittgenstein had discussed that evening. He then, in Mary Warnock’s words, ‘shuffled out in disgust.’ He died about a week later.

Philippa Foot (2001, p. 1) adds that during the discussion, “Wittgenstein interrupted a speaker who had realized that he was about to say something that, although it seemed compelling, was clearly ridiculous, and was trying . . . to say something sensible instead. ‘No,’ said Wittgenstein. ‘Say what you *want* to say. Be *crude* and then we shall get on.’” Foot (letter to the author) recalls that Pritchard crossly asked why Wittgenstein would keep “talking about babies” (presumably he had been talking about what a child would have to know when it came to understand some expression). In addition to the meeting recounted by Monk, Foot says there was a later second discussion that continued the discussion from the official meeting.

In the following years Wittgenstein referred to Oxford as “a philosophical desert” and “the influenza area” (Malcolm 1984, p. 79).

In July and August 1949, during a visit to the United States, Wittgenstein had several informal discussions with faculty members at Cornell University. Some of the issues are

recounted by Bouwsma (1986, pp. 3–42) and Malcolm (1984, p. 70), including Descartes's *cogito*, ethics, free will, religion, meaning, and knowledge.

9. September 1949. Two Talks on the Problems of Knowledge and Certainty

While visiting Norman Malcolm, after retirement from Cambridge, Wittgenstein gave two talks to philosophy graduate students at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, on two consecutive evenings: “once talking about verification, once about knowledge” (Malcolm 1984, p. 70).

One of the students, William Gass, recalls (1971, p. 96):

He met with us, the graduate students there in philosophy, for two two-hour sessions. Monologues they were really, on the problems of knowledge and certainty, but since it was his habit merely to appear—to appear and to await a question—it was we who had to supply the topic, and for that delicate mission one of us was carefully briefed. G. E. Moore had once asked . . . how do I know that this is a hand? And it was thought that the opening question might properly, safely, touch on that. Not all of us were primed, though, and before anyone realized what was happening a strange, unforeseen and uncalculated question had rolled down the table toward the master. Aristotle? Had it to do with Aristotle? And Wittgenstein's face fell like a crumpled wad of paper into his palms. Silence. Aristotle. We were lost. He would leave. In a moment he would rise and shuffle out, pained and affronted. Then Paul Ziff put his question—ours—for it was he who had been the student appointed; and after a terrible empty moment, Wittgenstein's head came up, and he began.

I thought, at the time, I'd undergone a conversion, but what I'd received, I realize now, was a philosophy shown, not a philosophy argued. Wittgenstein had uttered what he felt could be uttered (and it was very important), but what he had displayed could only be felt and seen—a method, and the moral and esthetic passion of a mind in love.

Drury recalls (1984, p. 158) that in the autumn of 1948, in answer to his question whether he had ever read anything of Aristotle's, Wittgenstein answered: “Here I am, a one-time professor of philosophy who has never read a word of Aristotle!”

10. Late Winter, 1950. “What One Sees When Looking through a Microscope”

Wittgenstein attended a meeting of the Kraft Circle in Vienna, a student version of the old Vienna Circle. Meetings were held twice a month at the Kolingasse, the headquarters of the Austrian College Society.

Wittgenstein was invited to a meeting, at Anscombe's suggestion, by Paul Feyerabend after Anscombe had been unsuccessful explaining Wittgenstein's ideas to the circle. He eventually agreed to come. According to Feyerabend's recollections (1995, p. 76):

I started summarizing what we had been doing and made some suggestions of my own. Wittgenstein was over an hour late. “His face looks like a dried apple,” I thought, and continued talking. Wittgenstein sat down, listened for a few minutes, and then interrupted: “Halt, so

geht das nicht!” (“Stop, that’s not the way it is!”) He discussed in detail what one sees when looking through a microscope—these are the matters that count, he seemed to say, not abstract considerations about the relation of “basic statements” to “theories.” I remember the precise way in which he pronounced the word *Mikroskop*. There were interruptions, impudent questions. Wittgenstein was not disturbed. He obviously preferred our disrespectful attitude to the fawning admiration he encountered elsewhere. . . . Wittgenstein, I heard, had enjoyed himself.

In the spring of 1950 Wittgenstein received an invitation from Oxford University to deliver the annual series of six John Locke Lectures for 1950 (for £200). Bouwsma (1986, pp. 56–57) notes that Wittgenstein “had been approached by Ryle to give the John Locke lectures, but there would have been an audience of two hundred and no discussion. He wouldn’t do it. People would hear and make something cheap of what he said. He might do something for a group of friends.” (Compare his letter to Malcolm, 1984, p. 126: April 5, 1950.) The 1950 lectures were, as it happened, given by his American friend O. K. Bouwsma.

Note: I began gathering information for this chapter in 1994. Unfortunately, by then many people who might have had helpful information about Wittgenstein’s lectures had already died. For others, so much time had passed that useful details were hard to recollect. I would like to thank the following for their assistance: William Boos; Rowan Craft of the Cambridge Moral Science Club; John Dawson of the University of Cambridge Computing Centre; Cora Diamond; Philippa Foot; I. J. Good; Wasfi Hijab; Alice Ambrose Lazerowitz; Brian McGuinness; Volker Munz; Alfred Nordmann; Josef Rothhaupt; Theodore Redpath; Ross Scimeca of the Hoose Library of Philosophy, University of Southern California; Cedrick B. A. Smith; Ian Smith of Bernard Quaritch, Ltd., London; Jonathan Smith and the staff of Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge; David Thouless; Georg Henrik von Wright; and Sam Webster and Alan Bain of the Trinity Mathematical Society. I shall be grateful for any additional information and corrections that others studying Wittgenstein’s lectures might wish to suggest.

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Wittgenstein and the Trinity Mathematical Society: 1930 and 1940

The Trinity Mathematical Society was formed in 1919. Founding honorary members included G. H. Hardy and J. E. Littlewood (April 29, 1919). Other early honorary members included Bertrand Russell (October 29, 1919) and F. P. Ramsey (November 5, 1924). Over the years, papers were given by Hardy, Littlewood, Born, Eddington, Dirac, Polya, Ramsey, Broad, and Russell, among many others.

Minutes for February 12, 1930, record that “upon the proposal of the Secretary [G. W. Ward] Dr. Ludwig Wittgenstein was declared an honorary member of the Society.” His residence at the time was listed as Bishop’s Hostel, Trinity College.

The meeting of May 28, 1930, began at 8:45 P.M. and was held in the Old Combination Room. The society minutes^a record:

The newly elected President [G. W. Ward] called upon Dr. Ludwig Wittgenstein to give a lecture on “The Foundations of Mathematics.”

After saying that it was impossible to talk about such a wide subject in such a short time, Dr. Wittgenstein made a very successful attempt. He began by quoting and criticizing Russell’s definition of number, i.e., ‘the class of classes similar to a given class’, similarity being defined by means of a 1-1 correlation, and pointed out that Russell confuses the existence of this correlation with the possibility of its existence. An example of a similar confusion is provided by two points and the line joining them. Frege says that a line joins the two points even if it is not drawn, but actually what exists is only the possibility of drawing the line.

After this idea had been more fully developed, Dr. Wittgenstein went on to describe the late Mr. Ramsey’s very ingenious work on the subject. The only flaw in this work and that of Frege and others was that it was so brilliant that any child could see it was wrong.

The lecture concluded with some remarks about arithmetic, to the effect that the latter was really only a game and that its application had nothing to do with mathematics.

^aPermission to publish minutes from the Trinity Mathematical Society granted by Sam Webster, president.

A lively discussion followed, a large part of which was spent in trying to convince Mr. L.C. Young that there was no sense in saying $a=a$ is a convention.^a In the course of one of his numerous illustrations from everyday experience Dr. Wittgenstein suggested that the chessboard might have a real application to problems of war in Mars, when Bishop really did move sideways. The President took advantage of a lull in the discussion and the meeting was declared social at 11.00 P.M.

There is no indication that Wittgenstein was involved in any of the society meetings for the next ten years. But he reappeared in the program for Lent term, 1940. The meeting of Monday, February 19, 1940, was a joint meeting with the Adams Society of St. Johns College, begun at 8:30 P.M., held in the Old Combination Room. Minutes, taken by J. G. Liverman, record:

Then he [President S. N. Higgins] called on Professor L. Wittgenstein, who had kindly offered to do so despite his ill-health, to give his lecture on 'The Descent of Mathematics'.

First the professor considered various common sentences into which the idea of comparison entered. Some of these, such as those comparing different human beings, are experiential statements. Others, for instance "Black is darker than grey" are more properly regarded as grammatical. The distinction is important when the ideas of length and measurement are discussed; one of the chief difficulties in mathematical philosophy is that arising from definitions masquerading as experiential statements.

The lecturer went on to discuss other statements which he described as being 'well within the region of the obvious', as "the whole is greater than the part." A proposition of this nature is independent of time, but involves certain restrictions on the method of measurement. The comparison of numbers can be made in several ways, including that of assigning an ordered symbol to each one of the objects which is to be counted, and that of one-to-one correlation. The result obtained by the different methods is found by normal adult observers to be always the same, except in a few cases when the difference can be supposed to be due to an error, which a further investigation could correct.

Professor Wittgenstein explained that it was possible to conceive systems in which this was not the case, and for which two or more results were equally correct. He considered the Russellian definition of addition, and summed up by saying that the introduction of definitions involves a new technique. Questions were asked about the relationship of physics to mathematics. After many unsuccessful attempts, the President finally took advantage of a momentary lull in the Newman-Wittgenstein controversy^b to thank the professor for his

^aYoung had given a talk to the society on November 20, 1929, entitled "Integration in Topological Space." He was elected as an honorary member on October 14, 1931, and later went on to teach at Cape Town University.

^bM. H. A. (Max) Newman (1897–1984) of Christ's College, Cambridge, was a lecturer in mathematics. In a memoir, the Bloomsbury writer Frances Partridge recalled that "the distinguished mathematician, Max Newman, who had several discussions with [Wittgenstein], told me that once—when philosophy versus mathematics was at issue between them—he heard Wittgenstein muttering under his breath, 'You ought to have been drowned at birth!'" (Frances Partridge, *Memories* [1981], p. 159).

Newman gave talks to the society on the following dates: November 11, 1936, on "Finitist Mathematics," a review of the situation in metamathematics at that time with reference to the Entscheidungsproblem, Hilbert, Gödel, and Brouwer; February 5, 1940, on "The Ham Sandwich Theorem," a topic in topology; and November 27, 1941, on the defense and usefulness of "Axiomatics." He was elected an honorary member of the so-

lecture and to declare the meeting social, after a short speech from the President of the Adams Society, at 22 hrs. 55 minutes.

While the minutes for the meeting suggest a smooth presentation, a mathematics student who was present at the talk, Cedric A. B. Smith, recalls: "I seem to remember it quite well, even though 60 years have passed. Wittgenstein started speaking, but halted before he had finished the first sentence, and said 'That's not what I meant to say, what I meant to say was: . . . He began a second sentence, halted before he had finished it, and said 'That's not what I meant to say, what I meant to say was . . .', began a third sentence, and halted . . . and so on for a whole hour. As my memory goes, he did not say one complete sentence in the whole hour."

ciety on October 19, 1942. Newman also gave a talk to the Cambridge Moral Science Club on November 15, 1940, on the topic "Formalism and Logic" with Wittgenstein in the chair. Extensive minutes of this talk exist, but unfortunately they conclude with the unhelpful: "A discussion followed."

Newman was a mentor of Alan Turing. For a short time in 1935, Newman and Wittgenstein were both on Alice Ambrose's Ph.D. examination committee until Wittgenstein withdrew.

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Cambridge Moral Science Club Meetings: Prince and Wittgenstein, February 1939

Wittgenstein was deeply involved in activities of the Cambridge Moral Science Club during most of his years at Cambridge, especially upon his arrival in 1912–1913, and his return in 1929–1931. After a hiatus of several years brought on by complaints that he dominated discussions, he renewed his involvement in 1938–1939. Meetings of the club were held on a weekly basis during terms, and topics of discussion were often carried over from one week to the next. What follows is an illustration of this sort of on-going discussion. These official club minutes were taken by the secretary, Theodore Redpath.^a Derek Prince was a student in Wittgenstein's lectures.

Feb. 16th, 1939.

Mr D. Prince: The Use of a Word

. . . held in Mr. Braithwaite's rooms in King's. Professor Moore was in the chair. Mr Prince read a paper called 'The Use of a Word.' He tried to show that the equivalence: 'the meaning of a word' = 'the use to which the word is put' = 'the occasions on which it is used,' does not hold.

In discussion Doctor Wittgenstein tried to shew the use of the first equivalence, & maintained that nobody in his senses had ever held the second. He thought, however, that in some cases one can *infer* the correct use of a word from the occasions on which it is used, & in some cases one cannot. He said that there is a case in which one couldn't make up one's mind as to whether the difference between two people's remarks which are seemingly conflicting is one of fact or one of language, e.g. if I say 'This bike's green', when normally it would be called black. He later said that to say 'I never know whether there is a book on the table' is not a statement about language: but that pointing out things about the notation of a person who says that might clear up his difficulties.

Theodore Redpath

^aPermission to publish minutes from the Cambridge Moral Science Club granted by Rowan Cruft, secretary.

The next week Wittgenstein led a discussion following up on this paper. According to Redpath, "Wittgenstein had a small blackboard placed on an easel and used it to write up one or two points he wished to make."^a Redpath says the talk took about half an hour.

Feb. 23rd, 1939

Doctor L. Wittgenstein:

The sixth meeting of the term was held in Mr Smythies' rooms in King's. The Secretary was in the Chair. There were two guests, Dr Ewing & Mr Braithwaite. Dr Wittgenstein spoke for a short time by way of opening the discussion. He put this question to those present: Why do philosophers ask 'what is the meaning of a word', (a most common word)? Have they forgotten the meaning of the term, etc?

Doctor Ewing thought the most important cases in which philosophers ask for the use of a word are cases in which they are doing something other than what they think they are doing, e.g. the case of physical objects. Mr Strachey suggested they were asking for definitions or at least trying to find out whether there can be a definition. Mr Braithwaite said he thought the philosopher was in a sense asking for an explicit description of the behaviour of using the word.

Dr Wittgenstein then asked how a definition acts as a coherent account of the use of a word. He said one might say that a definition draws together the usages of words. Augustine when he asks for the meaning of a word collects usages of the word. He reminds himself. If a definition is an account of the meaning isn't it queer that people should forget it (Prince), for surely a definition is a very simple thing?

Dr Wittgenstein then asked what would be taken as the necessary qualifications for a definition to be an attempt at a coherent account of the use of a word. Must there not be a technique of working with symbols so that the definition seems to show the exact position of the word in question with respect to all these symbols. Suppose one defined number as Frege did, has one given a full account of the use of 'number' or 'one'? No, there are actual uses of numbers which are not accounted for by it, e.g. counting people. Definition is one peculiar account of the use of a word. Only if you've mastered the technique of the language will you learn the word from the definition. In this sense a coherent account is not given by a definition.

Take the case of a physical object. Is it possible to define 'cap' by means of sense-data? Dr W thought it quite easy, but that it leads nowhere.

Why do we want a coherent account at all? Philosophers only ask about certain words. Mr Braithwaite: They ask about words which are typical of a certain group, e.g. 'table', which is typical of a certain group. Dr W: Yes: but another thing is time, viz. if they do ask

^aTheodore Redpath, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student's Memoir* (London: Duckworth, 1990), p. 83. Redpath published an edited version of these minutes in his memoir, but the original minutes convey a better sense of the meeting, as well as an additional point at the end that was inexplicably deleted.

& they want a definition, they do not want the most natural definition, e.g. of 'chair' they do not want the definition 'something to sit on'. Why are they not satisfied with the normal definition of chair, or, to put the question in another way, why do they wish to ask the definition of a physical object?

Mr Earle suggested that they wanted to define it in terms of philosophers' words.

Dr W asked whether one might say that the philosopher (?wanted to describe?) the relation between one type of word and another type of word.

Partly.

St. Augustine found it so immensely difficult to find out what time was. What did he want to find out about time? Someone might say that St. Augustine was not puzzled about the usage of the word 'time', which is something pedestrian, but was puzzled about the essence of time which does not seem so pedestrian. Why was he puzzled?

Mr Rush Rhees said puzzlement often occurred when there was a conflict of uses. Dr W: this is often called a contradiction. He cited a passage from Hertz's Principles of Mechanics, in which the latter said that people ask about the essence of matter, etc., because a lot of defining criteria have been heaped on these notions, & these criteria are in conflict. This irritates our mind, & makes us ask 'what is the essence of so & so?' The answer is not given by further criteria, but by giving less criteria. When these contradictions are avoided, the question is not answered, but the mind no longer perplexed ceases to ask it. Dr W said that he must confess that this passage seemed to him to sum up philosophy.

Nothing is more characteristic of philosophy than to ask oneself the same question a thousand times. One case is that a person never stops doing this. Another case is that a person stops. What is given to you to make it stop? Sometimes a new analogy, which replaces an old analogy.

He had often pointed out that a child is perplexed when a word is seen to have two different meanings. If this is to cease to be puzzling it must be surrounded by other cases.

Dr W then went back to last week's discussion:

In a vast number of cases it is possible to replace 'the meaning of a word' by 'the use of a word'. In what way is this useful? Mr Lewy: It may get rid of the idea that the meaning is a picture attached to the word. Dr W: How do the use and the picture hang together? Isn't there an entirely parallel connexion, viz. between ostensive definition & use? Suppose I ask: what is a zebra? does someone's pointing to a picture of a zebra involve that he uses the word 'zebra' as we do? The connexion of image or picture & use is that as a matter of fact in an enormous number of cases to one particular image corresponds one particular use, & where it does not, which is also in an immense number of cases, there puzzlement arises. Why is it in a great number of cases useful to ask for the use & not the meaning? Because meaning suggests one object, whereas use suggests a number of objects spread out in time.

"In a great number of cases it is advisable to put 'use of a word' for 'meaning of a word'," is a slogan. Sometimes it is ridiculed: sometimes it is boosted. Both wrongly. If one does philosophy it is natural one should come to certain sorts of step which it is

advisable to take. Philosophical investigations are tedious & difficult, & slip the memory. Slogans are easy, & stick in the memory. If the use goes but the slogan remains, it is ridiculous. Dr W said that although he had often used the words of the slogan, he had never had need to call it anything.

It is a colossally important fact that all objects around us have one name. What is this a principle of?

Theodore Redpath

Discussions between Wittgenstein, Waddington, and Thouless: Summer 1941

Robert H. Thouless (1894–1984) was a psychologist by training and held a post as lecturer in education at Cambridge starting in 1938. He began coming to Wittgenstein’s lectures sometime in 1940 or 1941, and Wittgenstein was an occasional visitor at the Thouless home during the war.

The series of conversations recounted here began sometime in the spring of 1941 and continued into the fall.^a Usually they were just between Wittgenstein and Thouless, but several times they were joined by C. H. Waddington (1905–1975), who was at that time a lecturer in zoology at Cambridge. Waddington offers the following account of the setting and the content of some of these conversations:

During one summer, 1940, I think, or 1941, [Wittgenstein] and R. H. Thouless and I used to meet one evening every week, and spend three or four hours after dinner discussing philosophy in the Roundabout Garden of Trinity, Cambridge. The subject of most of these discourses was the relationship between a word and the thing it signifies. I vividly remember those twilight evenings, when Wittgenstein would jump up from the lawn on which we had been sitting and pull out of a pocket of his shabby sports coat a matchbox or some other small object. As he held it up in front of us and tried to make us realize the impervious vacuity of the gap which exists between the object in his fingers and the auditory modulation of air pressure or the black

^aOn April 16, 1941, the minutes for a committee of the British Academy record that “Professor Wittgenstein be invited to deliver the [Philosophical] lecture for 1942.” It could have been that it was with this public lecture to a non-philosophical audience in mind that Wittgenstein sought an opportunity to work through his basic ideas aloud.

In addition to being a recent auditor of Wittgenstein’s lectures, Thouless had, on February 28, 1941, given a paper to the Cambridge Moral Science Club on “Evidence for Clairvoyance and Telepathy.” Wittgenstein chaired the meeting, and extensive minutes exist by secretary Timothy Moore. At the very next meeting, on May 1, 1941, with Wittgenstein again in the chair, Waddington gave a talk on “Scientific Empiricism” to the Moral Science Club. No minutes exist for that talk.

Though Wittgenstein later withdrew his agreement to give the Philosophical Lecture to the British Academy, what seem to be preparatory notes for this lecture have been published: “Notes for the ‘Philosophical Lecture,’” in *Philosophical Occasions*, pages 445–58. In November Wittgenstein began work as a porter at Guy’s Hospital in London, only returning to Cambridge for classes on weekends.

marks on white paper by which we refer to it, his main weapon of exposition was to persuade us to shed the preoccupations of the first year of the Second World War and to feel ourselves again children whose mother was instructing us in our first words. Something of the same method—a method which explicitly recognizes the importance of a developmental analysis of language—comes over in the first four pages or so of the *Philosophical Investigations*, but it was of course incomparably more vivid when the phrases were formulated slowly and painfully by Wittgenstein himself, his face, between the incongruously student-like, tousled, curly hair and open-necked shirt, frowning and contorted with the effort to express precisely his understanding of the way in which the relation he was discussing is inexpressible. Often, indeed, his words came to a standstill, but communication continued for some time further by means of facial and bodily gesture.^a

The following notes were taken down and typed out by Thouless.^b While Thouless's notes lack Waddington's romantic charm, they provide us with an honest account of an engaged but by no means convinced friend's understanding of and reaction to Wittgenstein's presentation of his ideas at this time.

[Wednesday] 28/5/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless

Wittgenstein started by saying that all statements he would make would be obviously true. If I could challenge any of them he would have to give way. Might seem trivial and unimportant because so obviously true. By going over things already known to and accepted by me, he would make me see things in a new way.

Nothing he would say would depend on how things actually happen. On a previous evening I had illustrated a remark of Waddington's by referring to Köhler's observations on chimpanzees.^c That did not matter to him. If it had not happened, he might have invented it for purposes of illustration. It would make no difference to its value as illustration whether it did or did not happen.

Returning to a question previously discussed as to whether "I have a toothache" refers to something different from what is referred to in "He has a toothache" (the former to a fact of introspection, the latter to behaviour). They refer to the same thing.

Previously (May 21st), Wittgenstein developed idea of 'private charts'. Suppose we taught someone how to bring things of different colours when we said "Bring me a red cup", etc. and he made a key to his behaviour which he alone could see. Then we could never infer from his behaviour what was on his private chart. If we said "Bring me a blue

^aC. H. Waddington, *The Ethical Animal* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), 41–42. Either Waddington's recollections are from conversations not recorded by Thouless, or else Waddington took very different things away from these conversations than Thouless did.

^bFrom Thouless's typescript a corrected typescript was made by his son, David James Thouless. It is published here with the permission of the Thouless family.

^cWolfgang Köhler did extensive research on apes and chimpanzees in 1913–1917. While *The Mentality of Apes*, first published in 1917, published in English translation in 1925, is the best known, Thouless was also familiar with Köhler's *Aus der Anthropoidenstation auf Teneriffa—II. Optische Untersuchungen am Schimpansen und am Haushuhn*, published in Berlin (1915). This monograph was cited by Thouless in some of his own publications, cited in note a, p. 393 infra, and was relevant to his own research.

cup” and he brought a blue cup, there might be green colour instead of blue on his private chart. Both green and blue cups might have the same colour marks in his private chart. [This, I think, is a mistake. We could not infer nature of individual entries in chart; we could infer that certain colour discriminations would only be possible if structure of chart were of a certain kind. That if A and B produce different responses, A' and B' cannot be the same.]^a

When I say “I have toothache”, this cannot be taken to refer to what is on our private chart. ‘Toothache’ is not to be considered as the name of an experience as ‘cup’ is the name of an object.

We must distinguish between naming an object, i.e. hanging a label round it with the name ‘cup’, ‘Wittgenstein’ or ‘Thouless’ on it, and the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is generally but not always simply the use of that word. The word ‘toothache’ is used in the same way whether it is my toothache or someone else’s. It may refer to behaviour. We may have ‘language games’ in which words are only used to refer to certain things; we might imagine a tribe whose words referred only to war. We might play a language game in which the word ‘toothache’ referred only to the behaviour of groaning and clapping the cheek. Then when we said “I have toothache” it would refer to my behaviour of this kind just as “he has toothache” would refer to his behaviour. We might similarly play a language game in which we always referred to experiences, mine and his.

This is terribly hard, Thouless. I’m sorry. I have thought over all this for years. I have made mistakes and forgotten them and made the same mistakes again. It is now as if we had ploughed furrows in different parts of a field. There is a lot left to do.

[Wednesday] 11/6/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless

Obviously “I have toothache” does not refer to behaviour. It is a part of behaviour. “He has toothache” does not refer to his behaviour because we can say “I doubt whether he has toothache” when we know he shows the behaviour of toothache.

What we refer to is not always conveyed by the grammatical form of words. “It is cloudy” seems to speak of the present, but it may refer to the future and convey that I think it is going to rain. ‘He moans’ is a statement about a man’s behaviour. It may, in fact, refer to his behaviour but it may refer to his pain.

Let us return to another question: do names of objects refer to sense-data? No, they do not. It is true that we might have a language in which the word ‘cap’ referred to sense-data of a particular kind but this would not be the general use of the word. All sorts of sense-data may be called ‘cap’ (illustrated by crumpling his own cap). If I had learned to call this (showing uncrumpled cap) ‘cap’, I should still not know whether this was also ‘cap’ (showing crumpled cap). Clearly ‘cap’ does not refer to sense data.

We could not know how ‘cap’ is used unless we had acquired a technique of using names. Suppose I had a chess set of unusual shape and I pointed to one piece and said

^aBracketed insertions such as this are by Thouless, save for the indications of the days of the week the meetings were held on, which are insertions of the editors.

“That is the king”. If you knew no chess, this would tell you nothing about how it was used. If you already played chess, you would understand all about its use when I said “This is the king” because you would already have the technique of using the king in chess.

So I can’t convey the meaning of any words just by pointing. I point to a bench and say “This is green”. You will not know what other things to call green unless you already have the technique of colour naming. So also if I say “This is a bench”, you will not know in what other ways the word ‘bench’ may be applied unless you have the technique of thing-naming. This technique is acquired in childhood; only some philosophers pretend they have not acquired it and think that they only have the technique of naming sense-data.

We can imagine a language-game in which people apply different names to an object at rest and an object in motion. That would be a different technique of naming from ours. If I say “this is Jack” (holding up his cap), how do you know that this is also called ‘Jack’. You would not know unless you had already acquired the technique of naming things which applies the same name to an object at rest and to that object in motion.

[While walking home after the discussion:] I remember a funny story. A man very drunk was pushing against a brick wall and saying “I will go out by this door”. It is like that in philosophy. We push against a brick wall when there is really a door standing wide open. So we must often leave a problem unsolved for a time and turn to another because the way we were trying to solve the first may be pushing against a brick wall.

All this talk of ‘referring to’ may be terribly misleading. Some words refer to things, so we create ghosts for other words to refer to. It may be really that they have a use which is not the use of referring to.

When we philosophise, we must approach the problems of our language as barbarians, as if we did not know before how it was used.

[Wednesday] 18/6/41 Waddington, Wittgenstein and Thouless

Mostly recapitulation for Waddington of previous discussion. All we have done so far is to explore what is meant by ‘referring to’. We can equally well take any other piece of language, e.g. we could discuss what we mean by ‘the same as’.

[Wednesday] 9/7/41 Waddington, Wittgenstein and Thouless

Yes, we could say “Toothache refers to a sensation” meaning that it does not refer to a behaviour, or to a colour. That is a way of expressing something about the technique of use of the word toothache, but we must get rid of the idea that to know the meanings of words we must know what they refer to. We must understand the much more complicated and difficult technique of their use.

An objection that may be made to this theory that the meaning of a word is the technique of its use (which would be a fatal objection if there were no reply to it) is the case of words with two meanings such as ‘bank’. Are there two techniques of use or one? We can reply either two or one or many. But if one makes a distinction between the different

uses, people immediately see the point. Purposely use the vague word 'point' here because the conception is vague.

For example, 'is' in "2 and 2 is 4" and "the rose is red". When Russell used the symbol $=$ for the first use and \in for the second everyone saw the point. They felt relief from a confusion.

Waddington said this confusion would not exist for people whose language had no copula. Wittgenstein agreed. The use of language is like the use of spectacles with a picture on them which in the end one attributes to the object [systematic distortion e.g. by prismatic lenses would seem to be better].⁴ The object of philosophising is to get rid of this distorting effect of language on our understanding of reality.

[Wednesday] 16/7/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless

There is another example of how little the meaning of a word may be explained by saying what it refers to. The word 'now'. What does this refer to? 9.50 P.M. But its meaning is quite different from that of 9.50 P.M. Suppose there was a language without such words as 'now', 'here', etc. The people who used this language would be puzzled as to the meaning of such a word as 'now' which refers sometimes to one time and sometimes to another.

Going back to words such as 'bank' with two meanings. Has such a word two uses or one? We may answer: you can call it either two uses or one. Sometimes we feel sure that we should call the meaning one, sometimes that it ought to be called two. Sometimes we are indifferent whether it is called two or one. We can go back to an illustration I gave earlier. I use a hammer for knocking in nails or for breaking glass. If you ask me whether this is two uses or one, I can answer you that you can call it either two or one.

Grammatical propositions

What kind of proposition is this, that our own experience is private? Is it an experiential proposition expressing a fact which is known by introspection? No, it is a grammatical proposition, that is a grammatical proposition about how we use language.

All propositions which seem to be statements about the essences of things are grammatical propositions. This sounds absurd because it seems to mean that all such propositions depend on arbitrary properties of language and do not express characteristics of the real world. But properties of language are not arbitrary. They do in a certain sense mirror the world around us. We have, for example, separate shape names and colours. This means that colours and shapes are all mixed up [i.e. vary independently]. A square can be red or green. A red object may be square or circular. To people from a world in which all square objects were green and all circular objects red, this mixing of shapes and colours would seem very odd. It is a peculiarity of our world which is reflected in our language, in the distinction between colour and shape words.

⁴Thouless is alluding to experimental work done in the 1930s in which subjects wore goggles with simple prisms for extended periods of time. See James J. Gibson, "Adaptation, After-Effect and Contrast in the Perception of Curved Lines," *Journal of Experimental Psychology* (February 1933): 1-31.

In the same way, they could infer something about our size from the length of our unit, foot or metre. Not that we were exactly that length but that our sizes and the sizes of objects with which we commonly dealt were not a thousand times that size or a thousandth of it. They would know the sort of size we were.

Suppose a world in which all squares are green and all circles red. They would say “I have seen a red-and-circular object.” We could not find out whether they were using ‘red’ and ‘circular’ in our sense—i.e. which element in the compound word ‘red-and-circular’ referred to shape and which to colour. They might imagine green and circular objects in their fiction.

I asked whether they would have in their compound word separate elements referring to shape and to colour. Wittgenstein said they might; it depends on what assumptions one makes about them. I asked whether this did not contradict what Wittgenstein had previously said as to language reflecting characteristics of the world since these people have colour and shape word elements although colour and shape are now mixed up. Wittgenstein said no, because their colour and shape words would not be separate but always coupled together.

As to possibility of having separate words for facts always occurring together, I mentioned that H. J. Watt had distinguished two properties of musical sound—pitch and volume—which always varied concurrently.⁴ Wittgenstein found that very interesting and wants further discussion of it.

[Tuesday] 22/7/41 Wittgenstein, Waddington and Thouless

How could one distinguish between volume and pitch in a pure tone? Not by Watt’s superior powers of introspection. One might make gestures, perhaps in dancing, throwing out the hands to indicate increase in volume, rising on the toes to indicate heightening of pitch. We might say in a large room that the music needs to be of greater volume (throwing out the hands), in different circumstances we may indicate by speech and gesture that it needs to be of lower pitch. These have different meanings but refer to the same thing. Unless there were some other sense in which the word ‘volume’ was used, the distinction could not be made. So we might say of a door intended for some ceremonial use that it needs to be more stately. To make it more stately may require always and invariably that it must be made higher. But when we say that we want it more stately, we mean something different from that we want it higher. In other circumstances we might say and mean we wanted it higher (e.g. because we wanted to be able to let some tall object pass underneath it).

⁴Henry Jackson Watt (1879–1925) was a psychologist at the University of Glasgow. In “The Elements of Experience and Their Integration: or Modalism,” *British Journal of Psychology* (September 1911): 127–204, he wrote: “Pitch and voluminosity cannot be identified with one another . . . [but they] are mutually dependent variables. It is impossible to run through the variations of pitch without at the same time varying voluminosity and vice versa” (pp. 143–44). By “volume” or “voluminosity” Watt and Thouless seem not to mean mere loudness. In his book *The Psychology of Sound* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917), Watt writes: “High tones are small and thin; the lower a tone gets, the bigger and bulkier it becomes” (pp. 211–12). Thouless succeeded Watt at Glasgow upon the latter’s death.

[Tuesday] 29/7/41 Wittgenstein, Waddington and Thouless

I asked Wittgenstein whether he still held views expressed in the *Tractatus*. No. It's like this. If you find your way out of a wood you may think that it is the only way out. Then you find another way out. But you might never have found it unless you had gone along the other way first. I should not be where I am now if I had not passed through what is expressed in the *Tractatus*.

When I wrote that, I had Plato's idea of finding the general idea lying behind all particular meanings of a word. Now I think of the meanings as like the fibres of a rope. One may run the whole way through, but none may.

Asked to amplify the statement made last week that propositions which seem to express the essences of things are grammatical propositions. [The following explanation did not come easily. It was broken by frequent expressions of dissatisfaction and ejaculations of "God damn my soul".]

We can take such a proposition as that red and green can't be in the same place at the same time. Compare it with the proposition that Thouless and Waddington can't sit in the same chair at the same time. I asked whether that was a grammatical proposition. Wittgenstein said "No. I am not an imbecile. I don't suppose that is a grammatical proposition." It can be tested by Thouless and Waddington trying to sit on the same chair at the same time. But it may also be a grammatical proposition. Suppose that whatever happened as the result of the test you said: that is not what I mean by both sitting on the same chair at the same time, then it would have been a grammatical proposition.

He dissented from Waddington's statement that it was both a grammatical proposition and a factual proposition. It can't be both, it may be either; it depends on the way you are using it.

Now suppose you shine red and green lights on to a white screen. I don't know what colour they would make, suppose it is a dirty grey. Someone might say "Now you have red and green in the same place". The proposition is not a statement of fact, it is a statement of how you are going to use the phrase 'red and green at the same place'.

Suppose you took two flowers and added two more flowers and counted them and found there were five, you would not say "so two and two don't make four they make five". You would say that something had happened to the flowers to make them five. Two and two makes four is a grammatical proposition.

[This discussion took place some time earlier than it was written down, so Wittgenstein's thought may not always be correctly represented.]

[Wednesday] 13/8/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless

We were talking about the impossibility of seeing red and green at the same place at the same time. Of course it need not be red and green. It could have been light red and dark red.

Suppose we had this experiment. We could have a transparent cube which looked red from one side and green from the other. Then you could say: Here we see red and green at the same place at the same time. But the reply would be: No, that is not what I mean by

seeing red and green at the same place at the same time. Then you might say: What do you mean then? I could reply: Red and green can't be at the same place at the same time in the way that red and soft can. Then there would be a difficulty of knowing how to pass analogically from red and soft to red and green.

This is a difficulty of all analogy. Suppose I said: we will play a game in which I hit once with my hand and you walk one step; I hit twice and you walk two steps, and so on. You would not know what to do when I hit three times. It is not only that you don't know the formula we are working on, an infinite number of formulae $n=f.r$ could give you 1,1; 2,2, for the first two values of n and r .^a If I gave you the formula I could only explain it by giving examples. If I gave a thousand examples, you would not know how the formula worked for the 1,001th. Suppose the formula were $n=r^2$. You said: what is 1001²? I could only explain by saying $1 \times 1 = 1$, $2 \times 2 = 4$, etc., and however many examples I gave, you would not know how to apply the formula next time. Of course, in fact, all people would make the same decision. That is why people have taken refuge in the mystical idea that we understand the formula intuitively.

We can consider another grammatical proposition: black is darker than white. That is a different kind of proposition from: this patch is black and this is white. For this last kind of proposition one must include a statement of time: this patch is black now. One might suppose that time may also enter into the first proposition because one may say: Black is always darker than white. This is, however, not a correct statement since it introduces time into what is essentially a timeless statement.

Black is darker than white is a proposition like the propositions of mathematics. These too are timeless.

[Tuesday] 19/8/41 Wittgenstein, Waddington and Thouless

Most sentences that are grammatical propositions may also at other times be experiential propositions. If we took black and white objects into a dark room they would be equally dark. That means that we can make an experiential proposition about the darkness of black and white. It is a grammatical proposition only if, whatever fact of experience were observed, its truth would not be affected—we should reply “That is not what I mean by black not being darker than white”.

The statement “black is darker than white” looks the same as “this object is darker than that”. But obviously they are different in the fact that the second refers to some period of time while the first is timeless. So also “This is a yard long” may be an experiential proposition (with the time reference always found in experiential propositions). On the other hand, it may be a grammatical proposition if ‘this’ refers to the standard yard. The proposition is then timeless and gives a definition of what is meant by ‘one yard’.

[Some difficulty in going on after this, so I asked whether his use of ‘grammatical proposition’ was the same as my use of ‘verbal proposition’. I repeated W. James’ story of

^aPresumably by “ $n=f.r$ ” Thouless means $n=f(r)$.

the dispute as to whether if a bear chased a man round a tree, the man was correctly said to be going round the bear, which W. J. resolved by pointing out that it was a verbal and not a factual dispute.^{3]}

Yes, I should call that a verbal dispute. But it does not look like one. A verbal dispute should contain signs which stand for words. I should prefer to take the case of the moon's motion round the earth while the earth moves round the sun. The actual path of the moon is not circular. Can it be said to go round the earth? It can be shown that it can by a diagram showing that its path can be compounded of two motions, one of which is a circular motion round the earth. Or one can make an apparatus with levers which will trace out the path of the moon by compounding two circular motions.

[Tuesday] 26/8/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless

To say "mathematics has the function of grammar" would be false. It has many other functions. But mathematical propositions are of the same kind as grammatical propositions even when they appear to be experiential propositions.

We may make the experiential proposition that the angles of a triangle which we have measured add up to two right angles (or that they don't exactly). But true mathematical propositions cannot be contradicted by any kind of experience.

Let us consider the nature of geometrical propositions. It is sometimes said that the geometrical line and point are abstractions. This is only because we are in the habit of drawing them with pen or pencil. If we had been used to drawing with a brush we would make a line as the boundary between white and black or coloured surfaces. We can make a perfectly true line as boundary to a surface and a perfectly true point as the meeting place of two such boundaries. What do we mean by saying that a straight line can be drawn between two points? Sometimes stated as that there is a straight line between two points (whether drawn or not). We think of the possible line as if it were a very thin line—as the ghost of a line.

The formulation I suggest is "It makes sense to join two points" although, of course, it may be true or false. It does not, in all cases, make sense to say that a straight line joins three points.

It is sometimes said that arithmetic is the science of number just as botany is the science of plants. It is true that arithmetic is about numbers, but numbers also enter into other sciences. You may make a numerical proposition in botany or any other science but it is only a means to some statement about plants or whatever may be the subject of the science. In arithmetic numerical propositions are used in a different way. One ends with some statement about numbers. So the relation of arithmetic to numbers is not at all that of any science to its special subject matter.

Of what nature is the proposition "two and two makes four"? It is a grammatical proposition—that one part of the meaning of 4 is 2 plus 2. It states an internal relationship

³Cf. William James, *Pragmatism* (London: Longmans, 1907), lecture II. As James tells the story, it is a man chasing a squirrel around the tree. The question is whether the man can be said to be going around the squirrel.

between numbers (an internal property is one without which the X possessing it would no longer be called X, that is, it is one which seems to state the essence of X).

Euclid talks of the length of lines but does not say how the length is to be measured. In the same way arithmetic talks of numbers but does not describe how enumeration takes place. We count 1, 2, 3, etc. In other words we learn a series by heart and use it for counting by saying one member of the series for each object to be counted. We might use some other series such as "Mary had a little lamb . . .". We may use some other technique of counting such as counting in pairs. Twice two is four means that if we have a series which seems to have four members if we count it serially, we shall get two groups of two if we count it by twos.

Suppose we had two very big numbers and we did not always get the same result when we multiplied them together. We might say that the product is not always the same. We know that the product of 2 and 2 is always the same, we can't infer from this that the product of any two very big numbers remains the same because we don't know that the rules of multiplication apply beyond where they have been tested (for the reason already given that the understanding of examples depends on the rule given for them and the understanding of the rule depends on examples and cannot be supposed to be understood beyond the point to which examples have been given).

We find that counting always gives the same results. Suppose some people who counted by some different method (such as reciting a poem) did not always get the same result. It might seem to us listening to them that they did not always recite the poem the same way, sometimes leaving out some of the words, but they would seem the same to them.

This is very muddled. I am only confusing you more than you were before. The only sensible thing I have said tonight is that arithmetical rules are statements of internal relations.

[Wednesday] 3/9/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless, afterwards including Waddington

I asked Wittgenstein about his statement that the way to express the possibility of drawing a straight line between two points was to say that the assertion that a straight line joined the two points made sense.

Wittgenstein: Yes, it is a very fishy way of expressing it but it was the way I suggested.

Thouless: But you can't say, in general, that the statement that a straight line joins three points in a plane does not make sense. It may be true or false and therefore is not senseless.

Wittgenstein: No of course it is not senseless if three points are mentioned without specification of their position. But three points might be specified as at the three corners of a triangle or by their coordinates and then it might be senseless to say that they were joined by a straight line.

I also asked whether his principle of the impossibility of knowing the nature of a mathematical operation meant that the method of mathematical induction was impossible. Wittgenstein replied: No, of course not.

Waddington then came in and much of the discussion was repetition of last week. Wittgenstein said that the essential character of an arithmetical proposition was that we did not 'recognize' an experiential proof of it.

The discussion became somewhat superficial and Wittgenstein was unhappy and felt that he was not able to make himself clear. The following day, he suggested that he and I should meet on the morning of the next Saturday and return to the problems of the philosophy of psychology.

[Saturday] 6/9/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless

Suppose two men were playing chess by telephone. We could listen in to their communication with each other but not see what they were doing. We should not know what they were doing. One might be playing on an ordinary chess board with ordinary men, the other might just be pushing his finger on a chess board or he might have no chess board at all. They might be doing any blasted thing.

I agreed that we should not know exactly what they were doing, but asked if he seriously meant they might be doing *any* thing. We should know that they were not doing some things. For example, we should know that one was not playing on a cylindrical board with the 8th rank continuous with the first, because this would mean there was no longer agreement about the possible moves. They would no longer be playing the same game.

I don't think Wittgenstein saw the force of this objection. He repeated that they might be doing anything, even one might be playing on a cylindrical board. Neither of them might have a chess board. If you assumed they were playing with chess men on a chess board this would simply be a hypothesis. It might be true but it might not.

I returned to my point and tried to illustrate it by reference to the diagnosis of colour blindness. I said that I agreed you could not find out what colours looked like to the colour blind person. You diagnosed colour blindness by finding that the colour blind person could not play the same game of fetching coloured objects as the normal person. It corresponded to a difference in the structure of the board on which they were playing the game.

Wittgenstein said: Oh, there is an awful misunderstanding between us. A terrible misunderstanding. You say that you could not find out what the colours look like to a colour blind person. What does it mean: 'What colours look like to a colour blind person'?

I amended it to "It is senseless to ask what colours look like to a colour blind person." But if you think it is senseless why do you want to say it at all? It is as if you want to say this but are willing to give it up. You ought not even to want it. Suppose we all played chess—chess as we know it—on a board with 100 squares. You could make the rules for this, including prohibition of moving on some squares. You might say to me: "But why, Wittgenstein, can't I play on the prohibited squares?" I might answer you by showing you the 64 square board. You see then that it was not a game with prohibited squares but a complete game played on every square of a 64 square board. You would no longer want to play on the prohibited squares, it would be as if they did not exist for you.

Wittgenstein was not particularly interested in the application of his analogy to colour blind people, merely remarking that it means they can't learn to play the same colour game as ourselves.

There might be a colour game in which when we say “Fetch me a red object”, the other person brought something red. Let us call this game 1. It seems that there might be another colour game in which when asked for a red object, he might bring us one which was white but happened to be illuminated by red light. We will call this game 2.

[I was not very clear as to what he meant to say about the relationship of game 1 and game 2. Sometimes he seemed to regard both as possible kinds of reaction; sometimes he seemed to speak as if there were something mistaken in the idea that game 2 could be played. I think he meant that game 2 was a possible type of reaction but that its nature was mistaken if we regarded it as a game played with private sensations.]

Suppose we asked for a red object and the person asked gave us a green object, we should say that he did not understand the use of the word red. But suppose that he were in another room where the illumination was such that an object that looked red to us looked green to him. Suppose we asked him for a red object, he would pick up an object that looked green to him, but when he threw it into our room, it would be the kind of object we required. How do we know that this is not what is always happening?

[Wednesday] 10/9/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless

I asked again whether the two men playing chess over the telephone might really be doing anything whatever. I said that one of them could not really be playing halma.^a

Wittgenstein: Yes, they might be doing anything whatever. They might even be playing halma. What corresponded to a move in chess might not be a move in halma; it might be a series of moves or a whole game.

[Wittgenstein obviously lost interest in this point and I did not press it. His answer showed that he realised the necessity for structural equivalence but he did not seem to regard this as a limitation but spoke as if any two activities might be structurally equivalent.]

You^b said some evenings ago “I know what green looks like to me”. This, of course, is meaningful and true if what it means is that you know how the word green is used in ordinary speech. But it may be taken to mean that you can, as it were, peel off your private experience of green to leave the object colourless. It may be taken to be a statement about a private world.

[Wittgenstein spent some time trying to say why it was senseless to talk about a private world. Finally he felt that he had overcome the difficulties and said “We know that it is private, but how do we know that it is a world?” It was late, and I failed to understand what he meant.]

[Monday] 15/9/41 Wittgenstein and Thouless

I asked for elucidation of what Wittgenstein meant by asking “How do we know it is a world?”

^aHalma is a Victorian game, rather like Chinese checkers, played on a board with 16×16 squares.

^bPresumably Thouless.

When you talk of a private world you are adding something to it besides that it is private. There would be the same objection to anything else that you added to it. You might call it 'private experience', but how do you know that it is experience? If it is private you can say nothing else about it whatever.

There was then a discussion of game 2, the details of which I have forgotten. The upshot of it was that game 2 could be played, but that we should be mistaken if we thought of it as a game of the same kind as game 1 except that the properties of objects that determined our behaviour were private ones instead of public ones.

[Monday] 22/9/41

I asked Wittgenstein whether I had rightly understood him to say that game 2 was a possible game to play but that it was a mistake to describe it as if it were the same kind of game as 1.

Wittgenstein: Yes, that is what I said. Of course we can play game 2, the psychological game as we may call it, but we are inclined then to think that we are playing the same kind of game as game 1 only with psychological objects. It is the kind of hypostatisation into which we are often misled.

I mentioned my experiments on phenomenal regression and said that I regarded these as investigations of my subject's private experiences.^a Wittgenstein said there is no objection to regarding them as studies of private experiences provided only that one understands by this simply that one is using a different criterion of right and wrong from that used if one is studying common objects. There must always be some criterion of right and wrong. It might in such an experiment be the self-consistency of the answers, but it might not, changing answers might be taken to show that the private experience was changing. Suppose that there was a psychological experiment in which you would accept any answer whatever, what would you say of such an experiment? I replied that its results could not have any psychological interest.

Wittgenstein: No, it would be worse than that. It would be no experiment at all. Nothing could be found out by such an experiment.

To illustrate how language led us to hypostatise objects, he told a story of how he had the experience of his soul being outside his body (in a state of extreme fatigue after watching by the bedside of his mother).^b But one might ask, how can you, Wittgenstein, have such an experience as of your soul being outside your body? The answer is "I had". It is the language forms to which we have been conditioned all our lives which give us the means of such an expression of an experience.

^aThouless's work on phenomenal regression was done in Glasgow in the early 1930s. It is concerned with such problems as whether distant objects are perceived as small, and how much tilted circular objects are perceived as elliptical. Cf. Robert H. Thouless, "Phenomenal Regression to the Real Object—I," *British Journal of Psychology* (April 1931): 339–59; "Phenomenal Regression to the Real Object—II," *British Journal of Psychology* (July 1931): 1–30; and "Individual Differences in Phenomenal Regression," *British Journal of Psychology* (January 1932): 216–41.

^bAfter a lengthy illness, Wittgenstein's mother died on June 3, 1926.

[Thursday] 25/9/41

I asked whether it was right to understand from last week's discussion that such a word as 'sensation' stood for a mere ghost, resulting from treating words in game 2 as standing for objects in the same way as did the words in game 1.

Wittgenstein: Yes, that is right. It is a ghost word. But that does not mean that it may not be used. I don't want to prohibit the use of any words unless they are misleading. They are misleading when in fact they mislead us. You may use all sorts of misleading expressions without harm if only you remember what they mean and when they become dangerous. You may, for example, use such an expression as 'such a thing was in my mind' so long as you are not misled by it. It may be said that it is safer not to use such expressions at all. Perhaps it is safer, but there is no real harm in them unless one is misled by them.

If we ask where an experimental psychologist may be misled, it is not in his experiments but in the conclusions he may draw from them and in the hypotheses he sets out to test. He may, of course, misjudge the importance of any set of experiments but the experiment itself may be worth while even if based on mistaken presuppositions and used to support wrong conclusions.

There are two things I ought to talk about.^a The first is what we mean by description. There is the nonsensical statement that we can't describe a feeling. Of course, we do describe feelings. We also can describe a face in various ways. We can describe it by sketching or by giving the Cartesian coordinates of its surface. People sometimes say the second is the ideal method of description, but we might fail to recognise a face described in this way while we could from a very imperfect sketch. How good a description is must be judged by how well it achieves its end. Description stands for a number of different things overlapping in various ways but with no one common feature.

The second thing I want to talk about is something I am shying from like a frightened horse. It is whether one can talk about someone following a private rule. Suppose I write down the first number *one*, and the second *four*, and the third *nine*, how could you ever know how I was going on? This seems trivial, but it is very important and very difficult.

[Wittgenstein continued this explanation in words I have forgotten which did not make clear to me the point he was driving at.]

I suggested that one might take a simpler example: Suppose a man were planting fruit trees and followed the rule of first an apple, then a damson, then an apple, and so on.^b

Wittgenstein: Yes, exactly, and how on? That is a perfectly good example. But you could take a still simpler one: first an apple, then an apple, then an apple. The same thing would apply.

I agreed that one could not rightly deduce the rule from first an apple, then a damson, however many examples were given. But I suggested the rule might be given. An apple is always to have a damson on both sides of it and a damson is always to have an apple on both sides.

^aThe wording of this sentence suggests Wittgenstein may have had in mind some other occasion, as mentioned in note a, p. 381.

^bA damson is a kind of plum.

Wittgenstein: There you make the mistake which is always made in discussing this question, of supposing that by putting in the word 'always', you have got over the difficulty of 'and so on'.

[Tuesday] 30/9/41

[I found Wittgenstein reading Freud.]

This ought to be put on ice for many years. Then one could start again and one might discover by a different route what one could recognise to have been the thought of Freud. But not from this, not even by knowing this and trying to correct it. The disciples of Freud have produced nothing but nonsense. They have been fascinated by his means of expression. No one has allowed his thought to be more overlaid by his means of expression than has Freud. There are deep strata, as it were hundreds of feet thick, of means of expression overlying and obscuring the original facts of observation. One cannot see the original facts because they are hidden by the means of expression.

One can use a filing system for letters in two ways. One may read the letters and think about them and then put them in the appropriate files. This is not Freud's way. It is as if, when he receives a letter, he only glances at it hardly caring for its contents and immediately puts it in the appropriate position in the file. Then it is the filing system not the letters in it that interests him.

It is as if he draws a typical face like this (drawing a diagrammatic face). Then when he sees a new face he draws it always the same way. His followers have taken the same face. Sometimes they have corrected a little the shape of the nose or the length of the mouth, but they have not realised that what is necessary is to get right away from Freud's drawing of a face.

[I reminded him that we were talking about the following of a rule and said that I understood him to be maintaining that if one followed a rule such as planting first an apple, then a damson, another person could not deduce what one would do next.]

No, I did not say that. That would be absurd. Of course he would do what you would do next. There is a deep misunderstanding here. I am not saying anything that there might be disagreement about. We must agree about all this. [I said: "If we understand one another."] Yes, if we understand one another.

I began by asking "What can one mean by saying that someone is following a private rule?" Suppose that a tribe was carrying out some activity, let us say playing a game. Someone went to that tribe and came home and tried to describe what they were doing, he could describe their activity without giving any rules or he could give the rules of what they were doing. [I said that description by the use of rules might be more successful in conveying the nature of the activity to the hearers.] Yes, 'convey', but 'convey' is a word with many meanings. What is meant by convey here? Isn't the test that you can make people do something, to play the same game, or merely to talk about it. If a description makes people do the things you want them to do, it is a successful description. You may do this by describing without giving any rules or you may find it better to give the rules. Both are methods of description but they are different methods. That is what I was driving at last

time when I talked about description. Description is the name of many different ways of using language. They have no one common element but they overlap in various ways. You can have description without giving rules and description giving rules. Sometimes people can be got to do things without giving them rules, sometimes only by giving them rules.

Now what is the characteristic of a description which uses rules? [I suggested answers such as that a rule was in the general form: ‘In such circumstances, such a thing must always be done’. Wittgenstein found objections to all.] The giving of rules is one of our techniques of description. We can imagine a tribe which had not this technique. To get people to do things by giving them rules is one of the things we have been trained in from childhood. Without this training we could not understand rules or understand what a rule was.

[I cannot remember the exact course of his argument. The upshot of it was that it is senseless to talk of following a private rule.]

Two later meetings with Waddington in which other things were discussed connected with evolution and genetics. Wittgenstein was making numerous suggestions about evolution such as the possibility that different phyla did not descend from the same stocks and that evolution was not originally from unicellular organisms. I later said that I thought the difference between him and the scientists was that he liked all possibilities to be open. He agreed and said that he was fascinated by the contemplation of different possibilities and did not sympathise with those who wanted to close doors.

He had been laughing at Waddington’s attendance at the British Association^a meeting on Science and the World Order. Waddington said that the next week he was going to a meeting on the philosophy of science with Neurath and Miss Stebbing.^b

Wittgenstein: “This however is not a laughing matter.” He jeered at the title *Wiener Kreis*^c as a publicity stunt and ended: “And, Hell, Blazes, I founded the logical-positivists.”

I referred to the *Tractatus* at one point and Wittgenstein said “There is a lot that is very fishy about that book.”^d

^aThe British Association for the Advancement of Science.

^bOtto Neurath (1882–1945) was a founding member of the Vienna Circle. L. Susan Stebbing (1885–1943) was professor of philosophy at the University of London. Neurath gave a paper, “Universal Jargon and Terminology,” at an Aristotelian Society meeting in 1941: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, n.s. 41 (1940–1941): 127–48. Perhaps Stebbing was chair of the session.

^c“Vienna Circle,” the name taken by a group of scientifically-minded philosophers who met in Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s. Wittgenstein’s conversations with some of its members during the years 1929–1932 are recorded in Friedrich Waismann’s *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (Blackwell, 1979).

^dIn the introduction to his book *Science and Ethics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1942), Waddington writes that, concerning discussions of ethics, Wittgenstein had once said to him: “This is a terrible business—just terrible! You can at best stammer when you talk of it.”

Cambridge Moral Science Club Meetings: Popper and Wittgenstein, Fall 1946

Perhaps the best-known event in Wittgenstein's life was his alleged "confrontation" with Karl Popper (1902–1994). Popper was an increasingly influential philosopher of science who had just secured a readership at the London School of Economics. He was invited to give a talk to the Cambridge Moral Science Club, which he used as an opportunity to challenge Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. While the details of what happened may never be fully known, it is clear that after a lively discussion Wittgenstein stormed out of the room. The minutes for Popper's talk are given below,^a but Popper has also elaborated his points elsewhere, to which references will be made.

Oct. 26th, 1946.^b

Dr. K.R. Popper: *Methods in Philosophy*.^c

In Mr. Braithwaite's rooms at King's.

In the first part of his paper Dr. Popper explained how he chose this topic as a consequence of his astonishment and surprise at the Secretary's letter of invitation (it is the Club's form of invitation), which made use of such expressions as, "a short paper," "open a discussion", "state a philosophical puzzle" etc., which reflected a different view from his own as to what philosophy is. He went on to describe this philosophy and its origins, giving it the label, "Linguistic Philosophy" (Wittgenstein and his "school"). He considers the advent of this School an epoch in philosophy, but he would criticize it very strongly on several points. Thus while it occupies itself with "preliminaries" it claims exclusiveness to the title of "philosophy" and never goes beyond these "preliminaries" to the more important problems of philosophy. After

^aPermission to publish minutes from the Cambridge Moral Science Club granted by Rowan Cruft, secretary.

^bIn *Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument between Two Great Philosophers* (New York: Ecco, 2001), David Edmonds and John Eidinow argue that the talk was actually given on Friday, October 25, 1946, and that the minutes are misdated. They add that the meeting began at 8:30 P.M. and was attended by some thirty people. The meeting was in room H3 of the Gibbs Building at King's College.

^cIn "Autobiography," in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, vol. 1, ed. P. Schilpp (Chicago: Open Court, 1974), pp. 97–99, Popper gives the title as "Are There Philosophical Problems?"

all, one knows what he “means” by his philosophical question and the important thing is to provide the “true answer” for it. It also cultivates “esoter[ic]ism.”^a

In discussion, however, it turned out that to give an example of the “beyond the preliminaries” problems is a difficult task which calls for both labour and time.^b The examples which Dr. Popper actually suggested seemed to some of the audience to be no more than problems in pure math. or Sociology.^c The meeting was charged to an unusual degree with a spirit of controversy.

Prof. Wittgenstein was in the chair.

Wasfi Hijab, Secretary

Three weeks later Wittgenstein spoke to the Club in reply to Popper. These are the official minutes of the meeting:

Nov. 14th., 1946.

Prof. L. Wittgenstein: Philosophy.

In Mr. Braithwaite’s Rooms at King’s.

Prof. Wittgenstein’s main aim in this paper was to correct some misunderstandings about philosophy as practiced by the Cambridge School (i.e. by Wittgenstein himself). In a way

^aWhat Popper meant by this is clarified in a letter to Bertrand Russell, who was also at the meeting, written shortly after the meeting (published in I. Grattan-Guinness, “Russell and Karl Popper,” *Russell* 12, no. 1 [1992]: 13–15). In this letter of October 27 Popper wrote: “philosophical activity in Wittgenstein’s sense . . . is not exoterically arguable. It cannot, and does not, consist of more than clever guesses about various intended meanings. It leads to a series of ‘He *may* have meant . . .’, but it does not lead to any assertion which can be open to argument. This fact completely destroys any link with the rationalist tradition in philosophy and must lead to esotericity.” See also Popper’s criticism of Wittgenstein in *The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II: The High Tide of Prophecy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), n. 52 to chap. 11, p. 299, where he calls his work “esoteric” as well.

^bIn “Autobiography” Popper writes (p. 98) that he gave “a list I had prepared of philosophical problems, such as: Do we know things through our senses?, Do we obtain our knowledge by induction? These Wittgenstein dismissed as being logical rather than philosophical. I then referred to the problem whether potential or perhaps even actual infinities exist, a problem he dismissed as mathematical. . . . I then mentioned moral problems and the problem of the validity of moral rules. At that point Wittgenstein, who was sitting near the fire and had been nervously playing with the poker, which he sometimes used like a conductor’s baton to emphasize his assertions, challenged me: ‘Give me an example of a moral rule!’ I replied: ‘Not to threaten visiting lecturers with pokers.’ Whereupon Wittgenstein, in a rage, threw the poker down and stormed out of the room, banging the door behind him.”

Popper’s account of this exchange has itself become the focus of dispute. Two of Wittgenstein’s friends who were at the meeting, Casimir Lewy and Peter Geach, denied that the incident ever took place (Geach, *Times Literary Supplement*, February 13, 1998, 17). Another person at the meeting—Peter Munz—insists that it did, though Popper’s use of the term “threaten” was an exaggeration (Munz, *Times Literary Supplement*, March 27, 1998, 17). Apparently it was not uncommon for Wittgenstein to use a poker as a “prop” during lectures and discussions. In their recent book, written fifty-five years after the encounter, Edmonds and Eidinow offer an exhaustive account of the extant evidence from the surviving witnesses.

^cIn his letter of October 27 Popper describes a further topic in the discussion. In particular Russell apparently suggested the example of Locke’s views on ideas as raising philosophical problems. Then Popper describes Wittgenstein’s response (“Why does Locke say such queer things?”) and goes on to reconstruct a line of argument against his response (including what is quoted in note a supra).

Popper does not refer to any incident, but Russell (in a letter of reply to Popper dated November 18) confessed: “I was much shocked by the failure of good manners which seemed to me to pervade the discussion on the side of Cambridge. In Wittgenstein this was to be expected. . . .”

In their recent book, Edmonds and Eidinow publish (pp. 284–85) some of Popper’s notes prepared in advance for the talk.

the paper was a reply to Dr. Popper's paper (Oct. 23rd [sic]). Investigating the uses of words, which is only a part of what is attempted here, is not carried out for any linguistic purpose, as shown by the fact that the description of the uses is given to those who already know what the word means, rather these uses of a word are discussed as characterisations of the concept for which the word stands. A question may be answered in either one of two ways: by giving an explicit answer to it, or by showing how the question is a muddled one, and therefore should not have been asked. Philosophical questions are answered in the second way, for the general form of a philosophical question is, "I am in a muddle; I don't know my way." Professor Wittgenstein gave as an example what Mach did in connection with the muddle about "temperature," and he quoted with approval what Hertz said about questions as 'What is Force?' Hertz thought that people ask such questions, but not 'What is iron?', e.g., [???] the puzzling features of 'force'; and when these puzzling features are clarified the mind, satisfied, will stop asking the question.

One of the interesting points that emerged in the discussion was how the same question uttered by another person may not be a muddle question at all. "It is like two persons having identical rooms; when coming to the first you may implore the owner to tidy it up and put it in order, while to the second you may not say anything of the sort, even the very dust may be necessary."

Dr. Ewing was in the chair.

Wasfi Hijab

Notes for this meeting were also taken by a student, Gilbert Edward Harris:

Wittgenstein gave a talk on the methods of philosophy.

Philosophy can be compared to tragedy and comedy as far as giving a definition is concerned. The definitions of philosophy are inadequate for they would not mean a thing to people who knew no philosophy at all. Compare with a definition of tragedy as given to someone who has never seen a tragedy. Conversely one can know what philosophy, tragedy is without being able to say, one can know the technique without being able to describe it. An applied mathematician too would be at a loss to say what applied maths is; he would have to give examples to show what was meant. We can say definitions are of some use but only if some philosophy is already known.

"Philosophical questions start with a muddle over some problem."

We can answer them by clearing the problem or the question, and if the latter we remove the problem by showing it to be non-existent.

Hertz was quoted. He asked why we made so much bother about the use of such words as 'force', 'energy', 'substance' etc. and not ever such words as 'table', 'lead' and 'gold'. He replied that the muddle over these words could be cleared not by seeking a definition but by removing all the ambiguities until there were no more questions to be asked. No more questions are asked, not because we can define such words as 'force' but because we know what force is (or is not).

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Wittgenstein's Saturday Discussions: 1946–1947

In addition to his regular twice-weekly lectures in 1946–1947, Wittgenstein held “at home” discussions on Saturday afternoons from 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. Topics were not planned in advance, but were whatever was raised by the half-dozen or so students who happened to attend. Malcolm has characterized the strained atmosphere of the meetings.^a Malcolm also has recounted the discussion at one such meeting, and Geach another.^b What follow are notes from five meetings, taken by Gilbert Harris Edwards. They are interspersed among the notes he took from Wittgenstein’s regular lectures given during that academic year.^c

[probably Saturday, November 23, 1946]

A philosophical problem is deep in the way that a poem or a face or a piece of music is deep. However there is depth which relates to ethical matters. [H]e meant that a poem could not be called deep unless much connected with the poem was already known, until a technique was known. A deep face on Earth may not be called deep on Mars; we cannot separate deep faces from the techniques of calling them deep. And the same for philosophical problems. We cannot separate the depth from all the other things connected with it. I [Edwards?] suggested the mystery aspect and problem aspect of what we considered, and that to remove the problem did not necessarily remove the mystery. He agreed and said that as far as he was concerned such might be the end (goal) of philosophy. (Discussion Sat[urday])

Wittgenstein compared problems concerning temperature (e.g., what is temperature?) to philosophical problems. Scientists puzzled themselves about temperature, as to why

^a Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 45.

^b Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein*, 46; and Peter Geach, *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology: 1946–47* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), xiii.

^c Dates have been conjectured by correlating his surrounding notes from the regular classes with Kanti Shah's dated notes from the regular classes (as published in Geach, pp. 119–232).

one substance (say, water) should expand so irregularly with increase of temperature, and others not. However Mach pointed out that all they were doing was to compare the expansion of one substance with another, the water with the mercury in the tube, etc. Notice how the perplexity vanishes when what was a problem appears in this new light. (Same discussion)

[probably Saturday, January 25, 1947]

(Saturday night's Discussion) We can say we [love] a thing because it is good and yet if we say we love a thing because it is bad there is a feeling that this is not quite usual. (We wouldn't know under what circumstances we would say such a thing.) I believe Wittgenstein suggested the queer sound of the latter was because our idea of goodness was connected with approval. Commenting on Russel[1]'s definition of good as 'what is desired by the many' Wittgenstein said we could say it was useless. If we imagined a state where the desires of the many were investigated before an act was performed, then the definition would have a use[,] otherwise no.

Is the concept of 'good' different among men? Can we imagine conditions where it is very different? Suppose a people had completely different behaviour from ours—they toss a coin in the air and from the result decide what they are to do. They may of course believe the gods guided the fall but what of the gods?—how are we to say they are good or evil save by these people's concepts? Would we be inclined to say

- (a) they have no morality, or
- (b) they seem to have one but completely different from ours.

There is an inclination to say both. If their behaviour was completely indiscriminate then we would certainly be inclined to say (a), and if they did show some measure of approval and disapproval we would incline to (b).

Suppose one person reasons before acting, while another just acts not reasoning, then would we say they had the same concepts of morality? How would we find out?

[probably Saturday, February 1, 1947]

Discussion Saturday.

A problem in 'aesthetics' was raised. We see a picture (read a poem, etc.) and then suddenly we express appreciation. What happens? What can we say of this.

Wittgenstein pointed out that in music we may wonder why a tune is so dull, and then proceed suddenly to play it properly, knowing where to accent etc. Also an odd word 'will do the trick'. A certain point or configuration pointed out makes a picture clear to us.

When the 'click' occurred we may quite well say we 'understood' the picture, and the word gained consent among the class.

Wittgenstein said this word was very appropriate because the appreciation was more akin to understanding than anything else.

At one point we can say “Now I see!”, “Now I understand”. After that we can point out certain patterns and the picture would have a new meaning for us. It would become a paradigm. Thus a smiling face as painted may become a model for certain expressions we find among people. The picture would then have a use for us. It falls into place with many other things in our life. Before the click we can say nothing. Afterwards we can say a lot about the picture but even if we said all this to somebody else then it does not follow that he too would click.

The word beautiful is bad. The reason is that it is hardly ever used outside classes discussing aesthetics. Wittgenstein said he hardly ever applied it to anything he appreciated. It misleads and levels out the great difference between appreciating different matters; it is like calling all pictures green or all dishes by the name of the sauce spread over them. To say “I see the beauty”, “I appreciate it because it is beautiful” is to use so many words.

The question of ‘what happens’ is one of those queer questions.

The behaviouristic approach is in a way good for these problems.

Up to a point he can say nothing: then he can say ever so much about colour, lines etc. Also at the time of being able to say this he may light up and cry “Ah!” This is “what happens”.

It is not enough to ask simply “what happens?”: we must ask “what happens when?”, “what happens in?” Also pseudo-problem, of “How does he know he appreciates it?[]” The question of what happens when we ‘click’ is simply a pseudo question. Compare with the problem “what happens when we think?”

The problem of justification however is real. If I say a picture is good, then how can I justify this to one who says it is not. The answer is enormous, concerning all that [is] connected with our culture. When people try to find a definition of poetry they make the mistake of thinking there must be something in common between the poems of (say) Homer and Wordsworth. There are words quite untranslatable. It is very odd that people from various countries should even be able to understand the word “taste”. It is exceedingly strange that different people and people of different culture[s] should be able to stand before a picture and express admiration. It is even odd that so many nations should bother about painting at all.

[. . .]

Concerning the problem as to how we know other people appreciate pictures the extreme case can be taken. Showing somebody a picture, he says that he likes it and then with an expressionless face “turns away and bothers no more”. In such a case we are baffled: we could not say of him whether he knew what our word appreciation meant. On the other hand if he behaved as we expected then we would say he knew how to use the word “appreciate”. The ‘click’ was compared with seeing different Gestalts, but the difference of course is obvious for to appreciate a picture is not merely the seeing of a new pattern.

Compare with the case of trying to teach a child the word pain if when he should be in pain he laughed and behaved as to show pleasure.

[probably Saturday, February 15, 1947]

Discussion

We are not “interested” in things that are really important, e.g., in the death of our friend. We are interested in the cinema and philosophy. Ideas never make any real change unless it hurts us to recognize them. Normally when we have new ideas we talk a different way and otherwise carry on as before.

[probably Saturday, February 22, 1947]

Discussion.

Kierkegaard said something to the effect that the best proof he knew for the existence of God was that his father told him so.

Now it seems plain that K[ierkegaard] did not particularly wish to stress the competence of his father. What then does he mean? What follows from this? It would seem that he was pointing to the general and traditional belief of humanity, to the fact that most people did believe. If our fathers had not told us then we would not know, but when told the idea is accepted readily.

This may be compared to being taught how to speak and act.

If someone says he believes something then we can't always tell what he believes merely from the words he uses, we must look to his grounds. Two people may say they believe the same things, and yet investigation of the grounds may show their beliefs are not even comparable. We may compare this with a mathematical proof. If someone says he has proved something we don't often know what he has proved until we look at the proof. It is so often a matter of finding what things are connected with what he says.

Sometimes it is useful to regard words as pictures. The picture of God the Father may have ever so many uses for different people—yet they would all say they believed in God the Father. When we find out what the picture is connected with (its uses) we may find all sorts of different grounds. So when a person says he has proved the existence of God we prob-

ably don't know what he has proved until we look at the proof. If we are arguing as to whether Jones is in his rooms there is a sense in which we can say we are all arguing on the same ground. But when we argue about God we may not even know what the other person's ground is like. Totemism. It is said that some people believe their fathers are wolves. But how do we know? And in what way?

This is a very peculiar remark.

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Appendix

2002 Addendum to von Wright's "The Wittgenstein Papers"

Since the 1993 reprinting of von Wright's "The Wittgenstein Papers" with our addendum in *Philosophical Occasions*, additional material from Wittgenstein has been published (or has come to our attention). This is an update through 2002.

SUPPLEMENTS TO THE LISTING OF MANUSCRIPTS

126 and 127. No longer missing. The originals were recently discovered and are now held at Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge.

183 Notebook. 1930–1932 and 1936–1937. 243 pp.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LISTING OF TYPESCRIPTS

246 A poem, presumed to be by Wittgenstein. No date. 1 page.

SUPPLEMENT TO "COMMENTS ON INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IN THE CATALOGUE"

183. The so-called Koder notebook, found in 1993 in the possession of the heirs of Rudolf Koder. This is a diary in which entries are dated from April 26, 1930, through January 28, 1932, and from November 19, 1936, through September 9, 1937 (with many gaps).

SUPPLEMENTS TO THE FINAL SECTION: "THE POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATIONS"

MS 183 was published in two volumes (diplomatic and normalized editions) as *Denkbe-
wegungen: Tagebücher, 1930–1932/1936–1937*, edited by Ilse Somavilla (Innsbruck:

Haymon-Verlag, 1997). The diplomatic edition is reprinted with normalized English translation in this volume.

A new and fuller edition of *Vermischte Bemerkungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp-Verlag, 1994), prepared by Alois Pichler, provides the full context of passages from the original edition. It also indicates the manuscript sources from which each of the remarks was taken. This listing was previously available only from the Bergen Archive. The volume also prints a facsimile of TS 246—a poem that has been attributed to Wittgenstein.

A revised translation of this fuller edition, with sources, still titled *Culture and Value* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), was prepared by Peter Winch. The poem is reprinted and translated.

Oxford's CD-ROM series *Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition* (2000). This offers text (diplomatic and normalized) and facsimile versions of all Wittgenstein's writings, as catalogued by von Wright. These texts are all published in the original language in which they were written. Almost always this is German, with some English and rare appearances of other languages.

The Published Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein is a CD-ROM version of nearly all of Wittgenstein's published works as of 1982 (but no letters, and missing the *Prototractatus* and the preface to Wittgenstein's *Wörterbuch*), edited by H. Kaal and A. McKinnon (Clayton, Ga.: Intelix Past Masters Series, 1993), in languages of original composition.

The *Wiener Ausgabe* (*Vienna Edition*), edited by Michael Nedo (Vienna and New York: Springer-Verlag, 1994–2001), has published transcriptions of Wittgenstein's writings (without translations) as follows:

- MS 105 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 1:1–34.
 - MS 106 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 1:35–196.
 - MS 107 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 2:3–131, 165–203.
 - MS 108 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 2:132–65, 207–333.
 - MS 109 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 3:3–143, 165–77.
 - MS 110 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 3:147–64, 177–334.
 - MS 111 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 4:3–100.
 - MS 112 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 4:103–240.
 - MS 113 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 5:3–158.
 - Part 1 (pp. 1–60) of MS 114 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 5:161–95.
 - pp. 1–312 of TS 211 was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 8, pt. 1.
 - TS 213 (“Big Typescript”) was published in *Wiener Ausgabe*, 11.
- (Further volumes are projected.)

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophische Untersuchungen, Kritisches-genetische Edition, edited by Joachim Schulte (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001) publishes the following material (without translations):

- MS 142 was published on pp. 53–204.
- MS 144 was published on pp. 993–1086.

- TS 220 was published on pp. 210–328.
 TS 221 was published on pp. 329–446.
 TS 225 was published on pp. 207–209.
 TS 227 was published on pp. 741–989.
 TS 239 was published on pp. 449–562.
 TS 242 was incorporated into pp. 565–738.

TS 206 was published in Friedrich Waismann, *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), pp. 189–91.

A thorough correlation between Wittgenstein's published writings through 1992 and the original source manuscripts and typescripts was carried out by Alois Pichler, "A Source Catalogue of the Published Texts," in M. Biggs and A. Pichler, *Wittgenstein: Two Source Catalogues and a Bibliography*, Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen no. 7 (1993): 9–90.

SUPPLEMENTS TO APPENDIX II: "WITTGENSTEIN'S LETTERS"

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters, Correspondence with Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and Sraffa, edited by B. McGuinness and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), is a more comprehensive collection than previous editions of correspondence both from and to Wittgenstein, with English translations of those things that were written in German.

"Ludwig Wittgenstein's Correspondence with Skjolden," edited by G. H. von Wright and K. Åmås, in *Wittgenstein and Norway*, edited by K. Johannessen, R. Larsen, and K. Åmås (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1994), publishes all of Wittgenstein's surviving correspondence (some fifty letters and postcards between 1914 and 1946) with friends in Norway. Those things written in Norwegian or German have also been translated into English.

Wittgenstein: Familienbriefe, edited by B. McGuinness, M. Ascher, and O. Pfersmann (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky Verlag, 1996), publishes correspondence between Wittgenstein and his family (178 letters, 67 written by Ludwig). Nearly all are in German, several in English.

Ludwig Hänsel–Ludwig Wittgenstein: Eine Freundschaft: Briefe, Aufsätze, Kommentare, edited by I. Somavilla, A. Unterkircher, and C. P. Berger (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1994), publishes Wittgenstein's correspondence with Ludwig Hänsel between 1919 and 1951 (270 letters, including 49 from Hänsel to Wittgenstein—12 others remain unpublished, 119 from Wittgenstein to Hänsel and 2 from Wittgenstein to Hänsel's wife, Anna). Published in German (selections reprinted and translated into English in this volume).

Wittgenstein und die Musik: Briefwechsel Ludwig Wittgenstein—Rudolf Koder, edited by M. Alber (Innsbruck: Haymon Verlag, 2000), publishes Wittgenstein's correspondence with Koder between 1923 and 1951 (122 letters, including 52 from Koder to Wittgenstein and 70 from Wittgenstein to Koder). Published in German.

Letters to Wittgenstein from David Pinsent and correspondence between Wittgenstein and Pinsent's mother are published as pages 95–111 of *A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man*, edited by G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

Letters (or excerpts) from Wittgenstein to a number of individuals, such as Roy Fouracre, Rowland Hutt, Gilbert Pattison, Rush Rhees, Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Friedrich Waismann, and others, can be found in Michael Nedo and Michele Ranchetti, eds., *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); and Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Free Press, 1990).

Letter from Wittgenstein to Theodore Redpath, dated April 12, 1938, published in Theodore Redpath, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student's Memoir* (London: Duckworth, 1990), p. 65.

Letter from Wittgenstein to Victor Gollancz, dated September 4, 1945, with reply, published in Ruth Dudley Edwards, *Victor Gollancz: A Biography* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1987), pp. 406–8. (Excerpt in Monk, p. 481.)

An electronic edition of all of Wittgenstein's correspondence is being compiled at the Brenner Archive under the editorship of Monika Seekircher.

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The following is an index of names and terms in English. German terms as they occur in the diary (MS 183) can be searched using Oxford's CD-ROM publication of *Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition* (2000). Significant help with the index was provided by Alexandra Bauer.

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