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Four Types of Loyalty in Early Modern Central Asia

The Tūqāy-Tīmūrid Takeover
of Greater Mā Warā al-Nahr, 1598–1605

By

Thomas Welsford



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
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For HWC



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May 2012

A NOTE ON CONVENTIONS

Transliteration and Titulature


The composition of this book has required the rendering in Latin script of material from a variety of languages. Transliteration is always a somewhat arbitrary process, and the greater an author's pretensions to rigour the more gleefully will readers spot inevitable discrepancies in practice. In what I thus perhaps do well to acknowledge is likely to prove an ill-fated attempt at consistency, I render personal names and most other lexical elements from languages written in the Arabic script—whether Arabic, Persian or pre-modern Turkic—according to the American Library of Congress system for transliterating Arabic. However, in the main body of the text—as opposed to those footnote references where I give quotations in their original language—I render a number of reasonably well-known place names in the form in which they are most familiar; I thus for instance offer 'Bukhara' rather than 'Bukhārā', 'Termez' rather than 'Tirmidh', and 'Amu Darya' rather than 'Amū Daryā'. In the main body of the text I similarly transliterate several well-known ascriptions of status or office (e.g. khan, sultan) without diacritics, except in cases (e.g. Mas'ūd Sulṭān Khānum) where the ascription is an integral part of a personal name. In most instances, I render non-onomastic transliterated terms in italics; I make exceptions here for (i) well-known ascriptions of status or office such as those noted above and (ii) all other ascriptions of status or office when encountered not in the abstract but in apposition to personal names as elements of titulature. (I thus distinguish, say, between speaking of the office of *naqīb* and speaking of Shāh Khwājah Naqīb, an individual who held said office.) One complicating factor for my transliteration scheme is the variety of orthographic forms for certain names encountered in our sources (Qarshī and Qārshī, for instance, or Nadir Muḥammad and Nadhir Muḥammad): in the main body of the text I generally adopt one such rendering over various equally valid alternatives, and confine orthographic variants to footnoted quotations in the original language.

Russian, Armenian and modern Kazakh are transliterated according to the relevant American Library of Congress systems (though without inverted breves for diphthongs and consonant clusters); Tsarist-era Russian is altered to read as it would after the script change of 1917. Modern Uzbek

is rendered from the Cyrillic into Uzbekistan's post-1995 modified Latin alphabet.

Genealogical Relationships

Much of the following discussion will concern individuals related to one another by varying degrees of consanguinity. In the absence of any satisfactory conventional mechanism for describing complex genealogical bonds, I use the matrix (x,y) as a means of conveying the paternal relationship of any two actors A and B. By this matrix, x denotes how many generations separate A from his and B's closest common male paternal ancestor, and y denotes the number of generations from this common ancestor to B; the level of *paternal consanguinity* between people may be calculated as a function of $1/(x+y)$. Matrix relationships are symmetric: if B is A's $(3,4)$ kinsman, then A must be B's $(4,3)$ kinsman. If x or $y = 0$, the relationship is *linear*: if $x = 0$, B is A's *descendent*, and if $y = 0$, B is A's *ancestor*. If both x and $y > 0$, the relationship is *lateral*: $(1,1)$ kinsmen are brothers, and $(2,2)$ kinsmen are first cousins.



Here B is C's $(1,1)$ kinsman, E is B's $(1,2)$ kinsman, B is F's $(3,1)$ kinsman and G is A's $(0,4)$ kinsman.

ABBREVIATIONS

Bibliographic Resources and Reference Works

- Abuseitova/Baranova M.Kh. Abuseitova and Iu. G. Baranova (eds.), *Pis'mennye istochniki po istorii i kul'ture Kazkhstana i Tsentral'noi Azii v XIII–XVIII vv.* (Almaty: Daik Press, 2001)
- Akhmedov B.A. Akhmedov, *Istoriko-geograficheskaia literatura Srednei Azii XVI–XVIII vv.* (Tashkent: Fan, 1985)
- Babinger F. Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1927)
- Beeston A.F.L. Beeston, *Catalogue of the Persian, Turkish, Hindūstānī, and Pushtū Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, part III: Additional Persian Manuscripts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954)
- Björkman W. Björkman, "Die klassisch-osmanische Literatur", in *PTF* II.427–465
- Blochet E. Blochet, *Catalogue des manuscrits turcs* (2 vols., Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1932–1933)
- BL British Library
- BN Bibliothèque Nationale de France
- EF² *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edition (Leiden: Brill, 1960–)
- EI^r *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982–)
- Ethé H. Ethé, *Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office* (2 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903–1937)
- Hofman H.F. Hofman, *Turkish Literature, A Bio-Bibliographical Survey, Section III: Muslim Central Asian Literature, pt. I* (6 vols., Utrecht: University of Utrecht, 1969)
- IA *Islām Ansiklopedisi* (13 vols., Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940–1988; reissued Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Güzel Sanatlar Fakültesi, 1997)
- IVANRUZ Institut vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan
- Kadyrova M. Kadyrova, *Zhitiia Khodzha Akhrara—Opyt sistemnogo analiza po rekonstruksii biografii Khodzha Akhrara i istorii roda Akhraridov* (Tashkent: IFEAC, 2007)
- Mawjānī S.'A. Mawjānī, *Fihrist-i nuskhahhā-yi khaṭṭ-i fārsī-yi Institū-yi Āthār-i Khaṭṭ-i Tājikistān* (3 vols., Tehran: Kitābkhānah-yi buzurg-i Ḥaḍrat-i Ayatallāh ... Najafī: 1377/1998–1999)
- Morley W.H. Morley, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Historical Manuscripts in the Arabic and Persian Languages Preserved in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1854)

Munzawī	A. Munzawī, <i>Fihristwārah-yi kitābhā-yi fārsī</i> (Tehran: Anjuman-i āthār wa mufākhir-i farhangī, 1374/1995–1996–)
PTF	<i>Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta</i> (3 vols., Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964–2000)
RAS	Royal Asiatic Society
Rieu	C. Rieu, <i>Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum</i> (3 vols., London: The Trustees of the British Museum, 1879–1895)
Rieu, <i>Supplement</i>	C. Rieu, <i>Supplement to the Catalogue of Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum</i> (London: The Trustees of the British Museum, 1895)
Sachau/Ethé	E. Sachau and H. Ethé, <i>Catalogue of the Persian, Turkish, Hindūstānī, and Pushtū Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library</i> (2 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889–1930)
<i>Sochineniia</i>	V.V. Bartol'd (ed. Iu. Bregel'), <i>Sochineniia</i> (8 vols., Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1963–1977)
Storey	C.A. Storey, <i>Persian Literature; A Bio-bibliographical Survey</i> (London: Luzac, 1927–)
Stori/Bregel'	Ch.A. Stori (ed. and tr. Iu. Bregel'), <i>Persidskaia literatura; Bio-bibliograficheskii obzor</i> (3 vols., Moscow: GRVL, 1972)
StPOIVAN	Sankt Peterburgskii otdelenie Instituta vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk
SVR	<i>Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR</i> (11 vols., Tashkent: Fan, 1952–1987)

Key to Sources

ĀĀ	Abū'l-Faḍl 'Allāmī, <i>Ā'īn-i Akbarī</i>
AfT	Faḍlī Khūzānī Iṣfahānī, <i>Afḍal al-tawārīkh</i>
AhT	Ḥasan Bīk Rūmlū, <i>Aḥsan al-tawārīkh</i>
AN	'Abū'l-Faḍl 'Allāmī, <i>Akbar-nāmah</i>
AŞ	Muḥammad Şāliḥ Kanbū Lāhawrī, <i>'Amal-i şāliḥ</i>
AṬ (Bukhārī)	Şalāḥ b. Mubārak Bukhārī, <i>Anīs al-ṭālibīn</i>
AṬ (Churās)	Shāh Maḥmūd b. Mīrzā Faḍil Churās, <i>Anīs al-ṭālibīn</i>
'AṬ	Muḥammad Ṭāhir b. Abū'l-Qāsim, <i>Ajā'ib al-ṭabaqāt</i>
ATR	Anon, <i>Addendum to Tārīkh-i Rashidī</i>
BA	Maḥmūd b. Amir Walī, <i>Baḥr al-asrār</i> : unless specified otherwise, MS BL I.O. 1496; when specified
	(i) MS IVANRUz 7418
	(ii) BA/MIKKh, material excerpted in translation by V.P. Iudin, in <i>Materialy po istorii kazakhskikh khanstv</i> (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1969), 329–368
	(iii) BA/Āriyānā, material excerpted by Dr. Wāhidi in <i>Āriyānā</i> 32.3, 103–121
BN	Zahīr al-Dīn Muḥammad Bābur, <i>Bābur-nāmah</i>

- BW Zayn al-Dīn Wāṣifī, *Badā'ī' al-waqā'ī'*
DhJT Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, *Dhayl-i jāmi' al-tawārikh*
DQ Mullā Awāz, *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*
FH Siyāqī Nizāmī, *Futūḥāt-i humāyūn*
FN 'Shadī', *Faṭḥ-namah*
FSh Ibrāhīm Amīnī, *Futūḥāt-i shāhī*
HI Amīn b. Aḥmad Rāzī, *Haft iqlīm*
IHS Ghiyāth al-Dīn b. Humām al-Dīn Muḥammad Khwāndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-siyār*
IM Malik Shāh Ḥusayn b. Malik Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Shāh Maḥmūd Sīstānī, *Ihyā al-mulūk*
IN Amīr 'Abdallāh, *Iskandar-namah*
IVANRUZ 1644/I Documents issued by *sayyids* in sixteenth-/seventeenth-century Andījān, MS IVANRUZ 1644/I
IQN 'Suhaylā', *Imām Qulī-namah*
IZ Qāsim b. Yūsuf Abū Naṣrī, *Irshād al-zirā'at*
JA 'Hazinī', *Jawāhir al-abrār*
J'Ā Shihāb al-Dīn Khwārazmī, *Jāddat al-'āshiqīn*
JāIM Mawlānā Payrawī Bukharā'ī, *Jālis-i mushṭaqīn*
JāmM 'Abd al-Baqā b. Bahā al-Dīn b. Makhdūm-i A'zam, *Jāmi' al-maqāmāt*
Jenkinson Antony Jenkinson's travel account
JN Muṣṭafa b. 'Abdallāh Kātib Chalabī, *Jahān-numā*
JT (Qādir 'Alī Bik) Qādir 'Alī Bik Jalāyirī, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*
JT (Rashīd al-Dīn) Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*
KhB Malik Shāh Ḥusayn b. Malik Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Shāh Maḥmūd Sīstānī, *Khayr al-bayān*
KhDzhSh Land purchase documents tr. P.P. Ivanov as *Khoziaistvo Dzhuibarskikh Sheikhov* (see bibliography)
KhS Muḥammad-Ma'sūm b. Khwājagī Isfahānī, *Khulāṣat al-siyār*
KhT Qāḍī Aḥmad Ibrāhīmī Ḥusaynī al-Qummī, *Khulāṣat al-tawārikh*
LNQ Muḥammad al-'Alīm al-Ṣidīqī al-Alawā'ī, *Lamaḥāt min nafahāt al-quds*
LT Amīr Yahyā al-Qazwinī, *Lubb al-tawārikh*
Maktūbāt Anonymous *maktūbāt* volume, MS BL I.O. 1758
MA Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad Shabānkāra'ī, *Majma' al-ansāb*
M'Ā Shaykh Muḥammad Baqā, *Mir'āt al-'ālam*
MAḥ Sayyid Khwājah Bahā al-Dīn Ḥasan Bukhārī 'Nithārī', *Mudhakkir al-aḥbāb*
MajT Mullā Ṣayf al-Dīn b. Dāmullā Shāh 'Abbās Akhsikatī and Nūr Muḥammad b. Mullā Ṣayf al-Dīn, *Majmū' al-tawārikh*
MAkh Muḥammad Qāsim b. Khwājah Dīwānah Sayyid Atā'ī, *Manāqib al-akhyār*
MAR Mīrzā Badī' al-Zamān Dīwān [?], *Majma' al-arqām taḍyīl dar bayān-i 'amalāt*
MAṣ Muḥammad Badī' Malīḥā Samarqandī, *Mudhakkir al-aḥbāb*

<i>Maṭṭ</i>	Abū'l-ʿAbbās Muḥammad Ṭālib b. Khwājah Ṭaj al-Dīn Ḥasan Khwājah, <i>Maṭlab al-ṭālibīn</i>
<i>MB</i>	Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan, <i>Musakhkhir al-bilād</i> : unless specified otherwise, Nādirah Jalālī's text edition (Tehran: Mīrāth-i maktūb, 1385/2006–2007); when specified, MS StPOIVAN S465 or MS IVANRUz 1505
<i>Mift</i>	Jānī Maḥmūd Ghijduwānī, <i>Miftāḥ al-ṭālibīn</i>
<i>MKA</i>	Mawlānā Shaykh, <i>Maqāmāt-i Khwājah Ahrār</i>
<i>MLC</i>	Fr. Antonio Monserrate, <i>Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius</i>
<i>MM</i>	Sidī 'Alī Ra'īs, <i>Mir'āt al-mamālik</i>
<i>MML</i>	Muḥammad al-Muftī Tāshkandī-Ahangarānī, <i>Manāqib-i Mawlānā Lutfullāh</i>
<i>MNB</i>	Faḍl-Allāh b. Rūzbihān Khunjī Iṣfahānī, <i>Mihmān-nāmah-yi Bukhārā</i>
Morley 162	Anonymous mid-seventeenth-century history, MS RAS Morley 162
<i>MS</i>	'Abd al-Razzāq Samarqandī, <i>Maṭla' al-sa'dayn wa majma' al-bahrayn</i>
<i>M'UA</i>	Mīr 'Abd al-Awwāl Nīshābūrī, <i>Majālis-i 'Ubaydallāh Ahrār</i>
<i>MuHT</i>	Muḥammad Amīn b. Mīrzā Muḥammad Zamān Bukhārī Ṣūf-yānī, <i>Muḥīṭ al-tawārīkh</i>
<i>MuT</i> (Badā'ūnī)	'Abd al-Qādir Badā'ūnī, <i>Muntakhab al-tawārīkh</i>
<i>MuT</i> (Naṭanzī)	Mu'īn al-Dīn Naṭanzī, <i>Muntakhab al-tawārīkh</i>
<i>MuT</i> (Shirāzī)	Hasan Bik b. Muḥammad Bik Khaqī Shirāzī, <i>Muntakhab al-tawārīkh</i>
<i>NA</i>	Shihāb al-Dīn Abū'l 'Abbās Aḥmad al-Nuwayrī, <i>Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab</i>
<i>NĀ</i>	Maḥmūd b. Hidāyat Allāh Afushtah-yi Naṭanzī, <i>Naqāwāt al-āthār fī dhikr al-akhyār</i>
<i>NJĀ</i>	Qāḍī Aḥmad Ghaffārī Qazwīnī, <i>Nuskah-yi jahān-ārā</i>
<i>NJM</i>	Abū'l-Qāsim Aw-Ughlī Ḥaydar, <i>Nuskah-yi jāmi'-i murāsālāt</i>
<i>NTA</i>	Muḥammad b. Muḥammad of Adrianople, <i>Nukhbat al-tawārīkh wa al-akhbār</i>
<i>NZJ</i>	Muṭribī al-Aṣamm al-Samarqandī, <i>Nuskah-yi zibā-yi Jahāngīr</i>
<i>PN</i>	'Abd al-Ḥamīd Lāhawrī, <i>Pādīshāh-nāmah</i>
<i>al-Qand</i>	Najm al-Dīn 'Umar b. Muḥammad al-Naṣafī, <i>al-Qand fī dhikr 'ulamā Samarqand</i>
<i>R'AH</i>	Fakhr al-Dīn 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Wā'iz al-Kāshifī, <i>Rashaḥāt-i 'ayn al-ḥayāt</i>
<i>RDJP</i>	Don Juan of Persia, <i>Relaciones de Don Juan de Persia</i>
<i>RR</i>	Badr al-Dīn Kashmīrī, <i>Rawḍat al-riḍwān</i>
<i>RS</i>	Badr al-Dīn Kashmīrī, <i>Rawḍat al-salāṭīn</i>
<i>RŞ</i>	Mīrzā Bik b. Ḥasan Junābādī, <i>Rawḍat al-Safawīyah</i>
<i>RT</i>	Tāhir Muḥammad b. 'Imād al-Dīn b. Sulṭān 'Alī b. Ḥājji Muḥammad Ḥusayn Sabzawārī, <i>Rawḍat al-tāhirīn</i>
<i>S'Ā</i>	Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāḍī, <i>Silsilat al-'arifīn wa tadhkīrat al-ṣiddīqīn</i>

- SHM* Anon, *The Secret History of the Mongols*
ShN (Binā'ī) 'Binā'ī, *Shībānī-nāmah*
ShN (Šāliḥ) Muḥammad Šāliḥ, *Shībānī-nāmah*
ShNSh Ḥāfiz-i Tanish, *Sharaf-nāmah-yi shāhī*: unless specified otherwise, MS StPOIVAN D88, published in reproduction with notes and translation by M.A. Salakhedinova (2 vols., Moscow: Nauka, 1983/1989); when specified, MS BL Or. 3497 (i.e. for unpublished remainder of work)
- ShT* Abū'l-Ghāzī, *Shajarat-i Turk*
SūSal Ḥājji Mir Muḥammad Salīm, *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*
SūSīd Dūst Muḥammad Falizkan b. Nawrūz Muḥammad al-Akhsikati, *Silsilat al-ṣiddīqīn*
- SirS* Muḥammad Raḥīm, *Sirāj al-sālikīn*
SM Faḍl-Allāh b. Rūzbihān Khunji Iṣfahānī, *Sulūk al-mulūk*
Tārikh (Chalabī) Šayfi Chalabī, *Tārikh*
TA Khwājah Nizām al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Harawī, *Ṭabaqāt-i Akbarī*
TA Jalāl al-Dīn Munajjim Yazdi, *Tārikh-i 'Abbāsī*; unless specified otherwise, S.-A. Waḥid-niyā's text edition (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Waḥid, 1366/1987–1988); when specified, MS BL Add. 27241 or MS Bodleian Elliot 367
- TĀĀ'A* Iskandar Bik Munshī, *Tārikh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*; unless specified otherwise, Ī. Afshār's text edition (Tehran: Mu'assasah-yi intishārāt-i amir-i kabir, 1350/1971–1972); when specified, MS BL Or. 152 or MS BL Add. Or. 16684
- TAFK* 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ṭālī, *Tārikh-i Abū'l-Fayd Khān*
TAKhKh Mas'ūd b. 'Uthmān Kūhistānī, *Tārikh-i Abū'l-Khayr Khānī*
TBKK Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārikh-i Bukhārā, Khuqand wa Kāshghar*
- TCh* Shāh Maḥmūd b. Mīrzā Faḍil Churās, *Tārikh-i Churās*
TDS Ūtamīsh Ḥājji, *Tārikh-i Dūst Sultān*
TGNN Anon, *Tawārikh-i guzīdah-yi nuṣrat nāmah*
TI Anon, *Tadhkirat al-irshād*
TJ Abū'l-Muzaffar Jahāngīr, *Tūzuk-i Jahāngīrī*
TJJ 'Alā al-Dīn Aṭā Malik-i Juwaynī, *Tārikh-i jahāngushā-yi Juwaynī*
TK Anon, *Tārikh-i Kāshghar*
TKh Muḥammad Šādiq Kāshgharī, *Tadhkirah-yi khwājagān*
TMKh Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī b. Khwājah Baqā Balkhī, *Tārikh-i Muqīm Khānī*
- TMQ* Aḥmad b. Shams al-Dīn, *Tārikh-i miṣṭāḥ al-qulūb*
TQKh Khwājah Qulī Bik Balkhī, *Tārikh-i Qipchāq Khānī*
TN Muḥammad Ṭahir Naṣrābādī, *Tadhkirah-yi Naṣrābādī*
TR Mīrzā Ḥaydar Dūghlāt, *Tārikh-i Rashīdī*
TŞ Anon, *Tārikh-i Şighārī*
TSh Muṭribī al-Aṣamm al-Samarqandī, *Tadhkirat al-shu'arā*
TShKh Anon, *Tārikh-i Shībānī Khān wa mu'āmalāt-i Amīr Timūr*
TSR Mullā Sharaf al-Dīn b. Nūr al-Dīn Ākhund Mullā Farhād, *Tārikh-i Sa'īd Raqīm*

<i>TT</i>	Muṣṭafā b. ‘Abdallāh Kātib Chalabī, <i>Taqdīm al-tawārikh</i>
<i>TŪ</i>	Abū’l-Qāsim Kāshānī, <i>Tārīkh-i Uljaytū</i>
‘ <i>UN</i>	Mīr Muḥammad-Amīn Bukhārī, ‘ <i>Ubaydallāh-nāmah</i>
‘ <i>UT</i>	‘Abd al-Ghaffār Qirīmī, ‘ <i>Umdat al-tawārikh</i>
<i>ZĀ</i>	‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad Naṣrallāh, <i>Zubdat al-āthār</i>
<i>ZN</i> (Shāmī)	Nizām al-Dīn Shāmī, <i>Zafar-nāmah</i>
<i>ZN</i> (Yazdī)	Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Alī Yazdī, <i>Zafar-nāmah</i>
<i>ZNM</i>	‘Muqīmī’, <i>Zafar-nāmah-yi Muqīmī</i>
<i>ZT</i>	Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, <i>Zubdat al-tawārikh</i>

INTRODUCTION

In late sixteenth-century Central Asia, a family of individuals descended from the thirteenth-century warlord Chingīz Khan seized power from another Chingīzid family, whose own members had been ruling for the previous hundred years. The interloper party thus initiated a dynastic change, with consequences which would long reverberate across the region.

The present book is about these events. It is about the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover of Greater Mā warā al-nahr. By 'Greater Mā warā al-nahr', I refer to a sprawl of locales and networks centred on, but frequently extending beyond, that cartographic zone which local contemporaries termed Mā warā al-nahr:¹ to a conglomerate of territories centred on the cities of Bukhara, Samarqand, Tashkent and Balkh, that is, loosely conjoined by a system of political authority and a range of normalised conventions which will be the subject of much of what is to follow. By 'Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover', I refer to the seizure of control over this region by a particular party of *Tūqāy-Tīmūrids*. The italicised term denotes that larger group of Chingīzid dynasts who, in contradistinction to those *Shībānids* whose members thereby lost power, were commonly descended not from Chingīz Khan's grandson Shībān b. Jūchī, but from Shībān's brother Tūqāy Tīmūr.² Around the turn of the seventeenth century, a party of Tūqāy-Tīmūrid dynasts came to power at the expense of their hitherto-incumbent Shībānid kinsmen. Nor did these interlopers simply seize *power*. Perhaps for the first time in the post-Mongol history of Central Asia, members of an incoming dynasty acceded to their predecessors' *authority*, as they appropriated wholesale the dimensions and resources of a polity whose existence

¹ In Arabic, 'that which is beyond the river'. Although the term was originally used by those viewing Central Asia from the south to denote the entire region north of the Amu Darya, most 'locals' applied it solely to the area between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya and between 63° and 68°E, comprising what is today most of modern Uzbekistan.

² Other scholars refer to the incoming party rather as Jānids, Astrakhānids or Ashtar-khānids. I opt to term them 'Tūqāy-Tīmūrids' in view of (i) a wider tendency in post-Mongol Central Asia to name dynastic parties with reference to some eponymous common ancestor and (ii) the fact that it was their descent from Tūqāy Tīmūr which was most germane in distinguishing them from their Shībānid rivals. For further discussion of this point, see below, p. 51.

antedated their own rule. The present book examines how the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover took place. It also considers what this dynastic shift reveals about life more generally in early modern Central Asia.

A Story Well Told

The story of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover is reasonably well known. It has been so since the early seventeenth century. In 1606, the Mughal historian Ṭāhir Muḥammad b. 'Imād al-Dīn b. Sulṭān 'Alī b. Ḥājī Muḥammad Ḥusayn Sabzawārī devoted an entry to the preliminary stages of the crisis in his *Rawḍat al-tāhirīn*, a Persian-language universal history of the Islamic world. Ṭāhir Muḥammad writes as follows.

'Abdallāh Khan ibn Iskandar Khan: he reigned for a few more years in the region of Mā warā al-nahr. In 1006AH (14 August 1597–3 August 1598) he passed away. He ruled for 44 years.

'Abd al-Mu'min ibn 'Abdallāh Khan ibn Iskandar Khan: he exercised power after his father, and he put his paternal uncles to death along with their children. He also killed Qul Bābā Kūkaltāsh, who was the foster-brother of 'Abdallāh Khan, and who among the famous *amīrs* [of the time] was governor of Khurāsān.³ While 'Abd al-Mu'min was planning to destroy most of his father's *amīrs*, a number of people conspired together, and when he was returning back from the bath-house to his palace they brought him low by the strike of an arrow: and the state was left without a leader.⁴

About six years later, another Mughal historian called Ḥasan Bik b. Muḥammad Bik Khāqī Shīrāzī completed his own universal history, entitled the *Muntakhab al-tawārikh*. In this work, Ḥasan Bik updates Ṭāhir Muḥammad's account of events in Central Asia. After 'Abd al-Mu'min's murder, he writes,

³ The region south and west of the Amu Darya, comprising southern Turkmenistan, northwestern Afghanistan and northeastern Iran.

⁴ 'Abdallāh Khān ibn Iskandar Khān chand sāl-i dīgar bih saltanat gudharānīdah dar wilāyat-i Mā warā al-nahr dar sanah-yi hazār wa shash-i hijrī bih jahān-i jāwidān shitāft wa chihil wa chahār sāl mulk rānd. 'Abd al-Mu'min ibn 'Abdallāh Khān ibn Iskandar Khān ba'd az pidar farmān farmānd [sic]. A'mām-i khūd-ra bā awlād bih qatl rasanīd wa Qul Bābā Kūkaltāsh, kih barādar-i riḍā'i-yi 'Abdallāh Khān wa az jumlah-yi umarā-yi nāmdār ḥākim-i Khurāsān būd, bikusht, wa dar ṣadad-i ān shud kih akthar-i umarā-yi pidar-rā az pāy dārad, kih chandi ittifaq namūdah dar zamānī kih az garmābah bih dawlat-khānah tawajjuh mīfarmūd bih ḍarb-i tīrāndāzi dar āwurd, wa ān dawlat bī-sarī shud: RT 339a. I have emended 'barādar-i riḍā'i' in place of 'barādar-i ṣā'i', as is given in the manuscript.

all of Khurāsān and Merv and Khwārazm⁵ came under the possession of [the Safavid] Shah 'Abbās. Kildī Muḥammad Khan b. 'Abd al-Ghaffār b. Bābā Sultan took possession of Tashkent and Andījān and Akhsī.

Pīr Muḥammad Khan b. Sulaymān Sultan, grandson of Jānī Bīk Sultan became the ruler of Bukhara. After a few days he was killed by Bāqī Khan.

Bāqī Khan b. Jānī Sultan, nephew on the sister's side of 'Abdallāh Khan, was descended on his father's side from the line of sultans of Ūrganj. Because there was nobody from the line of 'Abdallāh Khan, he sat as the ruler of Samarqand. He brought down Pīr Muḥammad Khan, who had issued the *khutbah* and *sikkah*⁶ in his own name in Bukhara, and killed him. He⁷ dispatched Badī' al-Zamān b. Khwājah Ḥasan, nephew on the sister's side of [the Mughal emperor] Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Akbar, to Badakhshan.⁸ Badī' al-Zamān went there and issued the *khutbah* and *sikkah* in Akbar's name. Bāqī Khan dispatched an army against him. He captured Badī' al-Zamān and put him to death, and entrusted the government of Balkh to Walī Bīk, his brother. He dispatched an army against Kildī Muḥammad Khan, but was defeated, and he returned to Samarqand. He died in 1014 AH [19 May 1605–8 May 1606].

Walī Khan is the brother of Bāqī Khan. He was made governor of Balkh by his brother, and after his brother's death he succeeded him.⁹

Thus the story. The Shībānid 'Abd al-Mu'min is murdered, and the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid Bāqī Khan kills 'Abd al-Mu'min's Shībānid successor Pīr Muḥam-

⁵ The extended littoral hinterland of the Amu Darya west of approx. 62°E until the river debouches into the Aral Sea, comprising northwestern Uzbekistan and north-central Turkmenistan.

⁶ The Friday prayer address and coinage. It was a conventional Islamicate rulership perquisite that both should be issued in the name of the present sovereign (see below, p. 122).

⁷ The syntax here suggests that the subject of this sentence is Bāqī Khan; logically, however, it should be Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Akbar.

⁸ For the purposes of this book, the remote region north of 36°N and south of the Amu Darya between 69.5° and 71.5°E, comprising part of northeastern Afghanistan.

⁹ *Tamām-i Khurāsān wa Marw wa Khwārazm bih taṣarruf-i Shāh 'Abbās dar āmad. Kildī Muḥammad Khān bin 'Abd al-Ghaffār bin Bābā Sulṭān Tāshkand wa Andījān wa Akhsī-rā mutaṣarrif shud. Pīr Muḥammad Khān bin Sulaymān Sulṭān, nabīrah-yi Jānī Bīk Sulṭān, pādīshāh-i Bukhārā shud. Ba'd az andak rūzī bar dast-i Bāqī Khān kushat shud. Bāqī Khān bin Jānī Sulṭān, khwāhar-zādah-yi 'Abdallāh Khān, az jānīb-i pidar bih salāṭīn-i Ūrganj mirasad. Chūn kasī az silsilah-yi 'Abdallāh Khān nabūd, ū dar Samarqand bih pādīshāhī nishastah Pīr Muḥammad Khān-rā—kih dar Bukhārā khutbah wa sikkah bih nām-i khūd kardah būd—bih dast āwurdah bih qatl rasānid. Badī' al-Zamān Khān walad-i Khwājah Ḥasan khwāhar-zādah-yi Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Akbar pādīshāh-rā bih Badakhshān fristād. Ū bih-d-ānjā raftah khutbah wa sikkah bih nām-i Akbar pādīshāh kard. Bāqī Khān lashkar bih sar-i ū kashidah ū-rā giriftah bih qatl āwurdah hukūmat-i Balkh bih Walī Bīk, barādar-i khūd, dād. Wa lashkar bih sar-i Kildī Muḥammad Khān kashidah shikast khwurdah bih Samarqand mu'āwadat namūd. Bih tārikh-i arba' ashra wa alfwafāt yāft. Walī Khān barādar-i Bāqī Khān, kih az jānīb-i barādar ḥākīm-i Balkh būd, ba'd az fawt-i barādar qā'im-i maqam shud: MuT (Shirāzī) 259b–260a.*




Figure 1: Introducing the protagonists: the putative genealogical relationship of actors noted by Ṭāhir Muḥammad and Ḥasan Bik (underlined).

mad before proceeding to capture the imperial metropole of Bukhara and its adjoining regions. From this point on, there will be little to surprise us. With this narrative from 1612, Ḥasan Bik has already succinctly told the story which I shall recount again over the course of the chapters to come.

Nor is Ḥasan Bik alone in telling this story. Elements of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover narrative are to be found in a variety of other seventeenth-century Mughal histories;¹⁰ in seventeenth-century Safavid court and re-

¹⁰ AN; AS; PN.

gional histories;¹¹ in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Tūqāy-Tīmūrid court histories;¹² in poetic *tadhkirah* compilations;¹³ and in Sufi hagiographies.¹⁴ One finds little relating to the takeover in Ottoman historical narrative,¹⁵ but certain further elements of the story can be reconstructed from items of diplomatic correspondence dispatched between imperial and local courts.¹⁶

Availing themselves of this wealth of source material, scholars have been telling the story of the takeover for almost two hundred years. In 1824, the Russian author Joseph Senkowski published an annotated translation of Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī's early eighteenth-century *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*, a section of which was devoted to the events of the takeover.¹⁷ Forty years later, Vladimir Vel'iaminov-Zernov utilised a variety of Persian and Turkish sources to produce his *Issledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh*. In this work, Vel'iaminov-Zernov discussed the takeover, briefly, to complement his account of another Tūqāy-Tīmūrid family who during the sixteenth century nominally ruled the region of Ryazan', south-east of Moscow.¹⁸ Later in the nineteenth century, the Hungarian scholar Arminius Vámbéry briefly narrated the events of the takeover in his *History of Bokhara*,¹⁹ which in turn constituted source material for accounts of the episode by the British authors Henry Howorth²⁰ and Francis Skrine and E. Denison Ross.²¹

¹¹ *NĀ*; *FH*; *TA*; *TMQ*; *AfT*; *TĀĀ'A*; *RŠ*; *IM*.

¹² *MB*; *BA*; Morley 162; *TSR*; *TShKh*; *TQKh*; *MuT*; *TMKh*; *SilSal*.

¹³ *TSh*; *NZJ*; *KhB*.

¹⁴ *DQ*; *MaṭT*.

¹⁵ The last reference in *NTA* (completed 1619) to events taking place in Central Asia, f. 68a-b, concerns the reign of a Shībānid dynast who died in 1551-1552. The last such reference in *TT* (completed 1648), f. 35a, concerns events which occurred in 1596.

¹⁶ *Maktūbāt*; *NJM*.

¹⁷ J. Senkowski, *Supplément à l'histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs et des Mogols, contenant un abrégé de l'histoire de la domination des Uzbèks dans la Grande Bukharie, depuis leur établissement dans ce pays jusqu'à l'an 1709, et une continuation de l'histoire de Kha-rèzm, depuis la mort d'Aboul-ghazi-khan jusqu'à la même époque* (St. Petersburg, 1824), 32-36.

¹⁸ V.V. Vel'iaminov-Zernov, "Issledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh", in *Trudy vostochnogo otdeleniia Imperatorskogo Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva* 10 (1863-1864), II.349-351.

¹⁹ A. Vámbéry, *History of Bokhara from the Earliest Period down to the Present* (London, 1873), 304-323.

²⁰ H.H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century* (3 vols., London, 1882-1927), II.ii.739-746.

²¹ F.H. Skrine and E.D. Ross, *The Heart of Asia* (London, 1899), 194-195.

During the twentieth century, accounts of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover proliferated further. In the Soviet Union, historians such as M.A. Abduraimov and B.G. Gafurov recounted the episode within their larger synoptic works,²² while the American Martin Dickson alluded to the events of the takeover in his analysis of what he termed 'Uzbek dynastic theory'.²³ A student of Dickson, meanwhile, was one of the first scholars to construe the takeover as a subject of intrinsic worth, rather than as a mere blip in some larger, smoother story. First in his 1973 Princeton Ph.D. dissertation, and then in a series of publications, Robert McChesney exploited a rich variety of sources to consider in some detail both the constitutive events of the takeover and the significance of the political changes which were therein effected.²⁴

Recent years have seen the appearance of French- and Persian-language works referring *en passant* to the events of the takeover.²⁵ During much the same period, three other scholars have followed McChesney's more particularistic approach towards the episode. One of these was the late B.A. Akhmedov, an Uzbek scholar whose career stretched from the latter half of the Soviet period into the early years of independence. Like McChesney, Akhmedov was at pains to exploit a wider variety of source material than had many of his local predecessors, and in his publications relating to the takeover he delineates certain episodes with a finer grain than scholars had hitherto achieved.²⁶ Akhmedov's work has itself more recently consti-

²² M.A. Abduraimov, *Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii v Bukharskom khanstve v XVI—pervoi polovine XIX veka* (2 vols., Tashkent, 1966–1970), 1,56–65; B.G. Gafurov, *Tadzhiki* (Moscow, 1972); references henceforth to the work's English translation, *Central Asia—Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times* (2 vols., Delhi, 2005), here II.381.

²³ M. Dickson, "Uzbek Dynastic Theory in the 16th Century", in *Trudy XXV mezhdunarodnogo kongressa vostokovedov* (Moscow, 1960), 208–216 [209].

²⁴ R. McChesney, "Waqf at Balkh: A Study of the Endowments at the Shrine of 'Alī Ibn Abī Tālib" (Princeton University Ph.D. thesis, 1973), particularly 58–59; "The "Reforms" of Bāqī Muḥammad Khān", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 24 (1980), 69–84; "The Amīrs of Muslim Central Asia in the XVIIth Century", in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 26 (1983), 33–70, particularly 37–43; *Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889* (Princeton, 1991), particularly 72–80; *Central Asia—Foundations of Change* (Princeton, 1996), 102–105.

²⁵ B. Babajanov and M. Szuppe, *Les Inscriptions persanes de Chār Bakr, nécropole familiale des khwāja Jūybārī près de Boukhara* (London, 2002), particularly 28–29; 'A. Ghafāri-Fard, *Rawābiṭ-i Ṣafawīyah wa Ūzbikān* (Tehran, 1376/1997–1998), 267–280.

²⁶ B.A. Akhmedov, *Istoriia Balkha* (Tashkent, 1982), 99–101 and elsewhere; "O vremeni i obsoyatel'stvakh smeny na rubezhe XVI–XVII vv. dinastii Sheibanidov Ashtarkhanidami", in *Vostochnoe istoricheskoe istochnikovedenie i spetsial'nye istoricheskie distsipliny II* (Moscow, 1994), 161–171; and, almost identical to the latter, [Akhmedov], "Shayboniyardan keyin

tuted a point of reference for the St. Petersburg scholar Anton Alekseev, a significant portion of whose 2006 monograph on the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid ruling house is devoted to the circumstances in which members of the dynasty acceded to authority at the turn of the seventeenth century.²⁷ The third such individual to accord significant attention to the circumstances of dynastic shift is the British historian Audrey Burton. During the 1980s and 1990s, Burton tirelessly worked on a range of manuscript resources lodged in Britain and the former Soviet Union, as well as a mass of unduly-neglected Indian material, producing from her researches a series of articles which constitute essential reading for anyone concerned with the takeover.²⁸ She subsequently gathered these articles, together with other published and unpublished material, into a single volume comprising a magisterial political history of late-sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Central Asia.²⁹ The object of sober, somewhat equivocal praise,³⁰ Burton's achievement has perhaps not enjoyed the appreciation it deserves. As will become clear, however, Burton's work is a volume to which I am presently much obliged. Her account of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover, as well as of the events it followed and preceded, will remain a crucial source of reference for many decades to come.

The Limits of Exegesis

Thanks to the work of these scholars, students of early modern Central Asian history are now broadly familiar with the sequence of events whereby the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids came to power. But the historian does not discharge his or her duty by simply telling a story. It would be an impoverished historiography of the French Revolution, for instance, which foregrounded

Ashtarxoniyarlarning hokimiyat tepasiga kelish sanasi xususida", in *idem*, *Tarixdan Saboqlar* (Tashkent, 1994), 184–195.

²⁷ A. Alekseev, *Politicheskaya istoriya Tukai-Timuridov* (St. Petersburg, 2006), 93–112. The work is a modified version of his 2004 St. Petersburg University doctoral thesis "Sredniaia Azii pri Ashtarkhanidakh v XVII–XVIII vv. (po persoiazychnomu istoricheskomu sochineniiu "Bakhr al-asrar")", to whose fuller takeover narrative (117–140) I shall occasionally make reference.

²⁸ Most notably A. Burton, "Who Were the First Ashtarkhanid Rulers of Bukhara?", in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 51 (1988), 482–488, and *eadem*, "The War of Words between 'Abd al-Mu'min and Shah 'Abbās", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 39 (1995), 51–77.

²⁹ Burton, *The Bukharans—A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History 1550–1702* (Richmond, Surrey, 1997); takeover narrative at 99–122.

³⁰ See reviews of *The Bukharans* by e.g. Y. Bregel in *Journal of Asian Studies* 57 (1998), 849–851, and K. Hitchins in *Central Asiatic Journal* 43 (1999), 150–151.

narrative at the expense of any concern for the actual causes of political shift. All too many scholars have construed it as their purpose merely to recount the takeover narrative, thereby overlooking how and why events occurred in the fashion in which they did.

This reflects the fact that much of the scholarship relating to the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover is *exegetic*. That is to say, scholars tell stories about the episode by relating the stories previously told by earlier chroniclers. Such practice allows the exegete little explanatory agency: whereof his informant does not explicitly speak, thereof must he in turn remain silent. In some accounts of the takeover, therefore, one looks in vain for any analytical component whatsoever. Early writers such as Senkowski and Vámbéry, for instance, recounted the events of the takeover by simply paraphrasing the work of a single Persianate chronicler. Such practice did not go without criticism. "We in the nineteenth century must be more careful than Tartars of the seventeenth", wrote V.V. Grigoriev of Vámbéry's *History of Bokhara*, "and if we do not exactly know [about certain events], we ought to say we do not know, and not repeat stupid fables."³¹

Alert to such criticisms, many scholars have since adopted one of two alternative exegetic strategies for improving the putative truth-value of the stories they have told. One such strategy, common in the Soviet Union, was the practice of *istochnikovedenie*. This term refers to a process of selectively reading sources to isolate the material facts pertaining to an event from the narrative wherein they are contained, thus in the somewhat optimistic hope of disencumbering the useful matter of what chroniclers knew from the obfuscatory patina of what they wanted, or believed.³² Starting with Martin Dickson's dissertation on early sixteenth-century Safavid-Uzbek relations,³³ meanwhile, many western historians of early modern Islamic Central Asia have followed a somewhat more sophisticated approach. Adopting an exegetical strategy to which I myself shall have recourse (see below,

³¹ V.V. Grigoriev, in a Russian-language review re-issued as appendix II to E. Schuyler, *Turkistan—Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja* (2 vols., London, 1876), 1.360–389 [377].

³² E.g. A.M. Akramov, "Tavarikh-e guzida Nusrat-name" kak istochnik po istorii Uzbekistana XV—nachala XVI veka, in *Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane 1964.5*, 48–51; M.Kh. Abuseitova, "Musakhkhir al-bilad" Mukhammadiar ibn Arab Katagana kak istochnik po istorii Kazakhstana XVI veka, in *Pis'mennye pamiatniki vostoka 1978–1979* (1987), 3–12; and K.A. Pishchulina, "Bakhr al-Asrar" Makhmud ibn Vali kak istochnik po sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii Vostochnogo Turkestana XVI–XVII vv., in B.A. Tulepbaev (ed.), *Kazakhstan, Sredniia i Tsentral'naia Azia v XVI–XVIII vv.* (Alma-Ata, 1983), 34–88.

³³ Dickson, "Sháh Tahmásb and the Úzbeks (The Duel for Khurásán with 'Ubayd Khán 930–946/1524–1540)" (Princeton University Ph.D. thesis, 1958).

pp. 33–38), scholars have sought not to *disencumber fact from context* but to *evaluate fact by context*, according particular significance to the content of what they have identified as ‘reliable’ narrative voices.

This *Quellenkritik* approach to exegesis is a marked improvement on the previous one. By contextually situating various sources on a graduated scale of epistemological worth, it allows us to synthesise a narrative at least as reliable as any one of its disparate textual components. As the exacting work of McChesney and Burton has demonstrated, and as I in turn hope to show with my own proposed takeover narrative over the chapters to come, the critical examination of under-investigated sources can yield useful new insights into the most familiar of stories.

But even the most careful exegetes are prey to the logic of their informants. Whatever the factual accuracy of its disparate elements, a story may still be compromised by the narrative syntax with which these elements are orchestrated. To reproduce a chronicler’s attribution of cause and effect, for instance, may often tell us more about the chronicler’s interpretation of events than about why said events transpired as they did. Comments by Martin Dickson illustrate this danger. “[I]n Māvarānnahr in the XVIIth century [...] the prevailing local Changīzī [line] of descent became extinct”, Dickson writes, proceeding to tell how members of the Tūqāy-Timūrid family accordingly inherited the “potential rights and loyalties” hitherto enjoyed by their Shībānid predecessors, their “Changīzī descent alone [being] deemed sufficient to begin [a] new dynastic [line]”.³⁴ In relating how dynastic ‘extinction’ thus brought about the Tūqāy-Timūrid accession to power, Dickson of course echoes Ḥasan Bik’s account in the *Muntakhab al-tawārikh* of how “because there was nobody from the line of ‘Abdal-lāh Khan, [Bāqī Khan] sat as the ruler of Samarqand.”³⁵ In both cases, however, the proffered explanation is a misleading rationalisation of events. As we shall see, at the time of Bāqī Khan’s accession to power ‘the prevailing local Changīzī [line] of descent’ was far from extinct: and surviving Shībānid dynasts would continue to bedevil Bāqī Khan and his kinsmen for years to come. It was, indeed, not *because* the Tūqāy-Timūrids enjoyed ‘rights’ that they acceded to power, but *despite* the fact that any such rights would have been heavily contested by others who shared them. In echoing Ḥasan Bik’s attempt to account for why the takeover episode transpired as it did, Dickson might be said to have discerned special providence in the fall of the wrong sparrow.

³⁴ Dickson, “Uzbek Dynastic Theory”, 209.

³⁵ *MuT* (Shirāzī) 260a.

The danger here is of course the danger of hindsight. Most sources relating to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover were composed substantially after the event. In drawing upon these later accounts, the exegete is in danger of reproducing what we might identify in them as a common teleological assumption, namely that the course of the takeover was heavily pre-determined by divine will.³⁶ If divine will itself is nowadays somewhat out of vogue as an explanatory device, the exegete may nevertheless tacitly reproduce the shape, if not the substance of earlier chroniclers' views, substituting for divine determinism simply the *post hoc* assurance that, events having occurred in the manner that they did, they scarcely could have occurred otherwise: if not, in so many words, that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover was 'fated to happen', then at least that its outcome was so unsurprising—because so undemanding of explanation—as effectively to have been inevitable.

Such a view misrepresents the situation. Far from following a pre-ordained outcome, the course of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover was highly contingent: as we shall see in the chapters to come, events were influenced by a range of complex variables, without a fine grasp of which we struggle to account for the dynamics of political change. Just as importantly, such a view misrepresents contemporary people's views of the situation. Even if people living at the time of the takeover believed that events were subject to some larger scheme, this gave them little assurance as to how matters would actually transpire; it is, after all, easier to read the inclinations of divine will in retrospect than in anticipation. When adopting their chosen courses of action, therefore, people did so in ignorance of what the consequences of these would be. Lacking as they did the reassurance of hindsight, they were taking risks.

Even with hindsight, indeed, it took contemporaries some time before they came to regard the outcome of the takeover as an indisputable fact. Writing in 1612, the afore-mentioned Mughal historian Ḥasan Bīk appears to regard it as such. That is to say, in his account of the takeover he recounts a series of episodes which—to borrow a term from Erving Goffman—he *frames* within a larger narrative of dynastic change.³⁷ Subsequent chroniclers do much the same thing. Writing in 1606, however, the earlier Mughal historian Ṭāhir Muḥammad does not. Ṭāhir Muḥammad describes a cri-

³⁶ For further discussion of this teleological tendency in our sources, see below, pp. 283–286.

³⁷ For terminology see E. Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (New York, 1974), 10–11, and *passim*.

sis. He does not describe how this crisis resolved itself: he does not relate how Bāqī Khan managed to re-establish equilibrium under a new dynastic regime. Of course, Ṭāhīr Muḥammad was writing a long way away from where the events in questioning were happening, and may not actually have known about Bāqī Khan's victory over the Shībānīd Pīr Muḥammad in 1599.³⁸ But several other, more local contemporaries did know about this victory, and wrote about it. One of these was the Samarqand-based author Mullā Awāz, who in ca. 1603 recounted the battle in a Sufi hagiography entitled the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*.³⁹ Another was Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaḡhan, who in ca. 1607 wrote a Bukharan court history called the *Musakhkhir al-bilād*, where he recounted both Bāqī Khan's victory and a range of further associated events.⁴⁰ In neither work, however, are these stories subsumed into a larger narrative of dynastic shift.⁴¹ Writing several years before Ḥasan Bik produced his *Muntakhab al-tawārikh*, Mullā Awāz and Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaḡhan both seem still to have been uncertain as to the larger significance of Bāqī Khan's victory. These early accounts thus offer a salutary warning about the teleological dangers of exegesis. Far from regarding the takeover as pre-ordained, contemporaries were evidently slow to regard it even as a takeover.

The historian of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover may do well, therefore, to distance oneself from the view, as encountered in some of our sources, that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid accession to power was an historical inevitability. By doing so, we may be in a better position to realise how little of the episode we actually understand: why it was that political change took place in the fashion that it did, say, and why it was that the dynamics of dynastic shift were felt in different ways in different parts of the khanate. Once aware of our ignorance, we can start trying to remedy it.

³⁸ We should not, however, exaggerate the slow pace of information exchange between Central Asia and the Subcontinent. Antonio Monserrate, a Jesuit missionary to the Mughal court who produced his *Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius* in the period before his death in 1600, seems for instance to have been aware that 'Abdallāh Khan had died in 1598, writing (MLC 672) that "Abdullacanus, while alive, followed the [party of the?] Turkish king Amurathes [i.e. Sultan Murad]" (*Abdullacanus Amurathes, Turcarum Regis partes, dum vixit sequutus est*).

³⁹ *DQ* 37a–38b.

⁴⁰ *MB* 165–166, 177, 218 and elsewhere.

⁴¹ See below, pp. 261–264.

Persons and Populace

The question, of course, is how to do so. If it little avails us to regard the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover as merely inevitable, a perusal of the sources may leave us not much clearer as to how we might make better sense of the episode. One obvious option, of course, is to adopt what we might term a 'biographical' perspective: that is to say, to consider the episode in terms of the interplay between the various individuals and parties whom we find named in our source materials. In the light of the *Rawḍat al-tāhirīn*, we might thus conceptualise the episode's opening salvoes with reference to the personal interactions of 'Abdallāh Khan, 'Abd al-Mu'min and Qul Bābā Kūkaltāsh; following the *Muntakhab al-tawārikh*, meanwhile, we might try to make sense of the subsequent course of events with reference to the actions and presumed intentions of Kīldī Muḥammad Khan, Pīr Muḥammad Khan, Bāqī Khan, Badi' al-Zamān and Walī Khan. In the chapters to come, this is indeed largely what I do, and I hope with reason: by considering the episode in terms of the self-motivated behaviour of particular individuals, we come to see the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid accession to power not as a pre-ordained outcome but, more fruitfully, as the contingent consequence of human choices.

Taken on its own, however, this 'biographical' approach has severe drawbacks. Leaving aside the epistemological precariousness of attempting to discern from heavily conventionalised narratives the intentions of individuals living hundreds of years ago, it risks perpetuating a view of History simply as the Lives of Great Men, attributing outcomes to eminent individuals—their qualities, their shortcomings, their toothaches—while failing to consider how and with what resources these individuals managed to influence the actions of others.⁴² Taken on its own, a 'biographical' approach risks turning the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover into something out of Plutarch. To complement such an approach, therefore, I propose in this book to broaden the scope of my enquiry, according attention not just to the figures of Bāqī Khan et al. but also to the role played by an entire class of actors whose contribution to the course of the takeover has

⁴² Amongst modern scholarship pertaining to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover, Burton's work in particular sometimes displays this tendency. The approach is scarcely confined to scholars of Central Asia: for a recent example in the field of Iranian history, see M. Axworthy, *The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, From Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant* (London/New York, 2006).

hitherto often been ignored: the role played, that is, by members of the wider subject population.

Conceptualising the role played by members of the wider population is not simple. The vast majority of our sources are concerned with events which occurred at the epicentres of power, whether in a royal court or in a prominent Sufi lodge. They furnish far fewer glimpses, by contrast, of life in a village, in a bazaar or on the steppe. However, such poverty of detail scarcely justifies the way in which scholars have tended either to overlook the early modern Central Asian populace or, in the case of the Soviet Marxist tradition, to regard this populace largely just as an oppressed proletariat. As I hope to show in the chapters to come, our sources make quite clear that members of the wider population possessed what we might term *agency*: people were able to exercise significant choices in pursuit of goals which were meaningful to them. Both during the events of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd takeover and throughout the early modern period more generally, members of the populace had scope, through their chosen courses of action—the allocation of resources, say, and the contracting of interpersonal alignments—to pursue the goals which they cherished. In this book, I want to consider some of the ways in which they did this: and in which, by pursuing these goals, members of the populace helped to influence the course of events.

Conceptualising Constituencies

So who exactly were these members of the populace? In one sense, of course, we have no idea: their names and backgrounds have disappeared, undocumented, into the past. In another sense, however, our sources tell us quite a lot about them. They were the people whom between 1598 and 1605 we find fighting on the battlefield; the non-combatants whom we encounter holding out under enemy siege; the faithful performing pilgrimage to the Sufi shrine; and the town-dwellers acclaiming the newly elevated khan as he enters the city gates. They were members of what we might call the various different *constituencies* which we encounter over the course of the takeover: members, that is to say, of the various groups whose constituents we can see to have displayed some particular course of action, and which thus in some fashion influenced the course of events.⁴³

⁴³ My thinking here is particularly influenced by Jürgen Paul's brilliant *Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler: Ostiran und Transoxanien im Vormongolischer Zeit* (Beirut, 1996).

In conventional usage, of course, to speak of a 'constituency' is to speak of a sort of territorial grouping. It may thus seem self-evident that we regard the Samarqandi populace as one constituency, say, and the population of Bukhara as another. And there is something to be said for such an approach: as we shall see in chapter 4, for much of the period in question the populations of these two cities and their surrounding hinterlands appear to have adopted very different—indeed, often mutually antagonistic—lines of action, and influenced the course of the takeover in very different ways. As I hope to show repeatedly throughout this book, however, we can also discern as active during the period 1598–1605 a variety of constituencies whose salient commonality was not so much a shared territorial location as a shared sense of *purpose*. When attempting to conceptualise the various constituencies which helped determine the circumstances of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd accession to power, therefore, I do so with reference to the differing sorts of purposes which their members commonly displayed.

Scholars of pre-modern Central Asia have attempted to conceive of their subjects' purposes in a variety of ways. Soviet scholars tended generally to interpret popular political behaviour in classical Marxist terms, discerning in people's courses of action an awareness of economic interest and a resentment of class exploitation. An obvious merit to this approach is that it rescues its subjects from what E.P. Thompson identified as "the enormous condescension of posterity",⁴⁴ doing them the justice of regarding them as autonomous, rational actors with a clear-eyed sense of what might be best for them. But while, as we shall see, economic self-interest indeed helped to inform people's courses of behaviour, it was not alone in doing so: so too did a range of normative beliefs—ideologies, we might call them—which Soviet literature is generally keener to dismiss as instances of false consciousness than to analyse as behavioural influences. Marx has many insights, but he says little about why people might be willing to risk their lives for an idea.

Western scholars of pre-modern Central Asia, by contrast, have often tended to accord more attention to people's ideas than to their material needs. One example of this is the tendency to consider human behaviour as a means of displaying *identity*. Several western scholars of pre-modern Central Asia have fruitfully approached their subject matter with reference to this notion, exploring how the social or political behaviour of a particu-

⁴⁴ E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, revised edition (London, 1991), 12.

lar constituency might serve as an expression of this constituency's group identity, and how an awareness of this identity might inform the composition of literary sources in which it is verbally articulated.⁴⁵ But there are drawbacks to this approach. Notable is the fact that, in recent years, the concept of 'identity' has been blunted by the ubiquity of the term's invocation,⁴⁶ becoming in some instances less a spur to analytical thought than a figleaf for its absence: a totem to which one doffs one's cap before getting down to telling one's chosen story.⁴⁷

Another way in which western scholars have tended to conceptualise the purposes of a pre-modern Central Asian populace is with reference to the idea of *legitimacy*. Proceeding from the work of Max Weber, numerous historians of Central Asia and the wider Islamicate world have sought to evoke the criteria by which members of some particular constituency may have consensually determined the legitimacy—that is to say, the acceptability—of a given state of affairs.⁴⁸ In thus evoking what people in a particular environment commonly deemed to be important, such studies usefully suggest some of the priorities which may have led members of the populace to influence events around them.

As with 'identity', however, so too does 'legitimacy' have its shortcomings as a heuristic device. One obvious problem is that the Weberian reading of the term often bleeds into what we might call the 'genealogical' one, according to which legitimacy is a quality attendant simply upon an individual's parentage.⁴⁹ While the question of their ruler's parentage might indeed

⁴⁵ Thus e.g. B.F. Manz, "The Development and Meaning of Chaghatay Identity", in J.-A. Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia* (Durham, NC, 1992), 27–45; A.J.F. Frank, *Islamic Historiography and 'Bulghar' Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia* (Leiden, 1998).

⁴⁶ For comments, see R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity'", in *Theory and Society* 29 (2000), 1–47.

⁴⁷ See e.g. S. Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity from Tribe to Nation-State* (London, 1995), a work which despite its title is really just a narrative history of Kazakhstan. Note also C. van der Leeuw, *Azerbaijan—A Quest for Identity* (London, 2000): while 'questing for identity' sounds like rather good fun, van der Leeuw gives little clue as to what it actually consists of.

⁴⁸ See e.g. S. Album, "Power and Legitimacy: The Coinage of Mubārīz al-Dīn Muhammad ibn al-Muzaffar at Yazd and Kirmān", in *Le Monde Iranien et l'Islam* 2 (1974), 157–171; T. Allsen, "Spiritual Geography and Political Legitimacy in the Eastern Steppe", in H.J.M. Claessen and J.G. Oosten (eds.), *Ideology and the Formation of the Early States* (Leiden, 1996), 116–135; J. Miyawaki, "The Legitimacy of Khanship among the Oyirad (Kalmyk) Tribes in Relation to the Chinggisid Principle", in R. Amitai-Preis and D. Morgan (eds.), *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* (Leiden, 1999), 319–331; A.F. Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds* (Cambridge, 2008), 1.

⁴⁹ Rosemary O'Kane makes a similar point when she critiques David Beetham's concep-

influence people's views as to the acceptability of a given state of affairs, it is unlikely to have been the sole such factor: in considering the matter of a particular ruler's 'legitimacy', scholars often emphasise the question of descent to the exclusion of other considerations which, as we shall see in chapters 2–4, might be more influential in determining the actions and attitudes of the populace.

Furthermore, even when conceptualised in solidly Weberian terms, the idea of 'legitimacy' tends to suffer from the inconsistency of its construal. Some writers conceive of legitimacy relativistically, as a quality to be appraised by the standards of a specific historical environment. Other scholars, meanwhile, construe legitimacy in the light of their own ethical judgements. Some such scholars construe legitimacy normatively, as a point of aspiration. They regard it as a gold standard, attainable only when people can determine their 'criteria for acceptability' under the assumption of what John Rawls terms a 'veil of ignorance' as to their respective vested interests,⁵⁰ or in circumstances satisfying the conditions of what Jürgen Habermas calls 'domination-free communication'.⁵¹ Other such theorists, by contrast, refer by 'legitimacy' to an entirely debased standard of acceptability. Because domination-free communication is impossible, suggests Ralph Miliband, any consensually 'legitimate' state of affairs will necessarily be widely abusive, reflecting little more than the preferences of whatever interest groups presently control the channels of discourse.⁵²

That one theorist's 'acceptability' thus equates to another's 'abusiveness' should not come as a surprise. The greatest shortcoming of the concept of 'legitimacy' as commonly used is that its invocation obscures how something which is circumstantially tolerable for one person may less so for another. The notion of 'legitimacy' *qua* consensual standard of acceptability does little justice to the range of preferences cherished by various elements in a larger population. In recent years, several scholars have acknowledged this plurality of preferences by replacing a single, totalising conception of

tion of legitimacy as "a function of three continuous variables [... t]he precise relationship between [which] is not given": *eadem*, "Against Legitimacy", in *Political Studies* 41 (1993), 471–487 [474].

⁵⁰ J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition (Oxford, 1999), 17.

⁵¹ J. Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz", in *idem* and N. Luhmann (eds.), *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?* (Frankfurt, 1971), 101–141 [120].

⁵² R. Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (London, 1973), 197; also L. Boltanski and L. Thévenot, *On Justification* (Princeton, 2006), 37, on how "the notion of 'legitimization' [...] tends to confuse justification with deceit".

legitimacy with a conjugation of different legitimacy types.⁵³ But their work remains as bedevilled as ever by a tendency towards idealism, as they parse these types as the attainment of particular autonomous standards, rather than the furthering of what elements in a variegated population might have regarded as their own subjectively meaningful purposes. However carefully one does so, to talk about 'legitimacy' is to risk speaking of a society while forgetting about its different members.

In this book, therefore, I propose an alternative way of conceptualising the various purposes which led constituencies to influence the course of events from 1598 to 1605. Instead of regarding these constituencies simply as groups in pursuit of material self-interest, or as subscribers to particular notions of 'identity' or 'legitimacy', I regard them as groups of people displaying differing *sorts of loyalty*.

By 'loyalty', I shall henceforth mean *an individual's self-subjugation to something which is not him, whether this be to an individual, a group or any other entity*. In understanding the term simply thus, I strip it of its most conventional illocutionary connotation,⁵⁴ namely that it is a form of behaviour which is somehow deserving of the speaker's approval.⁵⁵ I strip the term also of what we might call its 'prescriptive' meaning, as expressed for instance by the philosopher Josiah Royce when he identifies as the loyal person him alone who "*willingly and thoroughly devotes himself to [his] cause*".⁵⁶ The obvious difficulty with Royce's prescription, of course, is that we cannot tell if somebody has 'thoroughly' devoted himself to a cause until the exhaustion of all possible circumstances in which he might terminate his attachment. The Solonian implication to Royce's argument—in effect, that we count no man loyal until he is dead—seems, for most historians at least, distinctly unhelpful.⁵⁷ It would hardly avail the student of electoral

⁵³ For our purposes, most notably A. von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie* (Istanbul, 2002), 46–48.

⁵⁴ For terminology here see J.L. Austin in *idem*, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford, 1962), 99–101, followed in turn in Q. Skinner, "Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts", in *idem*, *Visions of Politics—Volume 1: Regarding Method* (Cambridge, 2002), 103–127.

⁵⁵ Contrast thus with the philosopher John Ladd, who claims that it is oxymoronic to speak of 'a loyal Nazi': R.E. Ewin, "Loyalty and Virtues", in *The Philosophical Quarterly* 42 (1992), 403–419 [404].

⁵⁶ J. Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (New York, 1908; reprinted Nashville, 1995), xv; original italics.

⁵⁷ In some contexts, of course, this implication may be well founded. In imperial China, for instance, 'loyalism' was a highly formalised phenomenon whereby, upon the fall of a

politics, for instance, to refrain from calling somebody loyal who is, and has been, the devoted supporter of some political party, simply because the fact of this person's being alive preserves the possibility of his subsequently re-orienting his attachments. Like the electoral scholar, I shall henceforth understand loyalty in purely descriptive terms, as a quality manifest in what people do, and are likely to do. I shall understand it as the range of people's presently visible forms of self-subjugation, and the inductively reckoned likelihood of their continued self-subjugation in the time thereafter.

This is of course a very broad reading of the term, containing within it a wealth of divergent associations. Should the self-subjugating individual act in deference to some other entity's normative authority or physical power, his 'loyalty' may broadly approximate to what we think of as *obedience* or *submissiveness*. Should there exist no such hegemonic agency to impel self-subjugation, by contrast, an actor's more voluntaristic attachment might more usefully be conceived in terms akin to *commitment*, or *sympathy*. In differing sorts of loyalty, we can discern differing sorts of purpose, and differing sorts of behaviour: to speak of 'loyalty' is thus to speak of some of the widely varying ways in which people's interpersonal attachments influenced events in the period 1598–1605. In the chapters to come, I propose to consider some of these differing sorts of loyalty, the differing groups of people who manifested them, and the differing fashions in which they helped determine the circumstances of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds' accession to power.

Categorising Loyalties

In each of the first four chapters of this book, I discuss a particular kind of loyalty as manifested by a particular constituency of people, and consider how it influenced the course of events from 1598 to 1605. In framing my study around a typology of interpersonal attachments, my project here is hardly unique. But the taxonomic principles with which I formulate this typology are somewhat different from those adopted in other such classificatory projects.

dynasty, "traditional morality called for a mortal sacrifice on the part of men [...] who had placed themselves in direct relation to the ruling house": see L.A. Struve, "Ambivalence and Action: Some Frustrated Scholars of the K'ang-hsi Period", in J.D. Spence and J.E. Wills, Jr. (eds.), *From Ming to Ch'ing—Conquest, Region and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China* (New Haven, 1979), 324–365 [326]; also J.W. Jay, *A Change in Dynasties—Loyalism in Thirteenth-Century China* (Bellingham, 1991), 9.

One common means of conceptualising different loyalties is of course with reference to their respective *recipients*. A loyalty to one party is manifestly not the same as a loyalty to another. But the degree of dissimilarity is highly variable. Géza David relates how, in the sixteenth century, a Hungarian nobleman considered switching loyalty from the Hapsburgs to the Ottomans.⁵⁸ Had the nobleman indeed acted thus, his new attachment might have come at direct zero-sum cost to his former Hapsburg masters: yet it might, as far as he was concerned, also have remained of a similar order to his previous self-subjugation, involving similar commitments and ambitions. This is plainly rather different from the case of two Phanariot princes in seventeenth-century Romania, whose loyalties were torn between the Ottoman Empire and the Orthodox church.⁵⁹ In this latter instance, the axes of the princes' respective attachments would have been somewhat askew: loyalty to the etatist recipient need not have come at zero-sum cost to the interests of the ultramontane one, and might have reflected a very different range of priorities. To categorise loyalties according to their recipients, therefore, may in fact be less to categorise than simply to enumerate them, and risks obscuring the widely varying forms which self-subjugation might assume.

An alternative classificatory schema relates to the varying *intensity* of different loyalties. G.P. Fletcher proposes a distinction between 'minimal' loyalty, namely that requiring the mere refraining from betrayal, and 'maximum' loyalty, demanding constant priority over all other recipients of self-subjugation.⁶⁰ This typology has the merit of acknowledging how varying inflections of loyalty may constitute different projects, and entail different commitments. In its ascription of particular 'demands' to particular loyalties, however, it construes such loyalties in terms not of what people actually do, but of what obligations are 'imposed' upon people by unseen dispositions of power. With its idealising assumptions and empirical insouciance, Fletcher's contribution is thus of greater use to the legal philosopher than it is to the historian.

In a work published in 1980, the Islamic historian Roy Mottahedeh proposed a classificatory schema of loyalties which to this day remains

⁵⁸ G. David, "Janos Balassi and his Turkish Connections", in *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 48 (1995), 339–346.

⁵⁹ D. Livianos, "Pride, Prudence, and the Fear of God: The Loyalties of Alexander and Nicholas Mavrokordatos (1664–1730)", in *Dialogos* 7 (2000), 1–22.

⁶⁰ G.P. Fletcher, *Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships* (New York, 1993), 40–77.

considerably more sophisticated than either of the above. The forms of attachment discussed in *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* are categorised according to the *vocabulary with which they are articulated*. Although Mottahedeh's discussion primarily confines itself to tenth- and eleventh-century Būyid society, his arguments are widely applicable. Mottahedeh proposes that some attachments—'acquired loyalties'—are generally described according to a purposive vocabulary,⁶¹ and that others—'loyalties of category'—are described according to a vocabulary of ascription.⁶² In proposing a distinction between loyalties described in terms of what one does and those described in terms of who one is, Mottahedeh usefully conveys how an individual's forms of self-subjugation may be not merely different but incommensurable: to steer a course between conflicting loyalties, he suggests, may demand something far more complex than merely totting up their respective claims on an abacus. As one political theorist has recently observed, the huge variety of differing human projects renders "conflicts between logically or practically incompatible goods, interests or ideals highly problematic."⁶³ Reading Mottahedeh's work, we are reminded that such problems are by no means specific to the modern world alone.

The shortcoming of Mottahedeh's contribution is that, when categorising 'acquired loyalties' according to their associated vocabulary, he conceptualises this vocabulary as more than a simple descriptive tool. He proposes that vocabulary is itself constitutive of the respective loyalties under discussion. Mottahedeh's 'acquired loyalties' are effectively juridical categories, arranged by whatever terms of contract formalise a party's entrance into an undertaking. Mottahedeh thus distinguishes the *bay'ah*—what Marshall Hodgson terms "the act of acceptance [of somebody's regnal authority] by the notables generally on behalf of the whole community"⁶⁴—from contractually binding expressions of *shukr al-ni'mah* (gratitude for generosity),⁶⁵ and other such verbalised oaths and vows. Clearly, the *bay'ah* is not the same 'thing' as the *shukr al-ni'mah*. But the distinct nature of either such obligation may have been rather clearer to the 'creditor' party than to the

⁶¹ R. Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (Princeton, 1980), 40–96.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 97–174.

⁶³ R. Bellamy, *Liberalism and Pluralism—Towards a Politics of Compromise* (London, 1999), 74.

⁶⁴ M.G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* (3 vols., Chicago, 1974), II, 348.

⁶⁵ Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, 54, 72–78.

'indebted' one. Construed as rhetorical projects aimed at achieving some goal, conceding suzerainty and acknowledging gratitude might in fact be very similar projects. They might both be circumstantially useful paths of least resistance to conditions which might otherwise prove dangerous.

It is crucial to Mottahedeh's approach that one takes professions of attachment seriously. But if it is true of the Būyid state that, as Mottahedeh suggests, people were widely committed to maintaining the attachments they contracted,⁶⁶ it is rather less true of early modern Central Asia. People in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Greater Mā warā al-nahr seem to have taken a highly instrumental view of the words they used, exploiting the language of obligation as a malleable set of resources with which to pursue their own goals. This is well illustrated in a passage from the *Baḥr al-asrār*, a universal history by the mid-seventeenth-century chronicler Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī. The passage recounts events which occurred in 1611, when a party of Qazaqs attacked Tashkent, and forces dispatched by the ruling Bukharan khan succeeded in cutting off the Qazaqs' escape route towards the city of Turkistān. "With the path of flight closed off to them", Maḥmūd writes, the Qazaqs "[...] by necessity pursued the path of obedience and submission".⁶⁷ As Maḥmūd here observes, 'the path of obedience' was an expedient: it was the best option which the Qazaqs presently had available. Should other options subsequently present themselves, there was little likelihood that the Qazaqs would continue to feel obligated by their undertaking. To examine the language with which the Qazaqs notarised their 'obedience and submission' is thus rather to miss the point: in early modern Central Asia, at least, the relationship between language and loyalty does not seem to have been quite as close as Mottahedeh suggests.

As an alternative to the typologies outlined above, therefore, in the present book I propose to categorise loyalties *with reference to people's differing motivations for undertaking self-subjugation*. That is to say, I categorise loyalties with reference to what, adopting the vocabulary of the moral and political philosopher, we might term the various 'conceptions of the good' towards which they served. Such conceptions ranged widely. In early modern Central Asia, as anywhere else, any individual's conceptions of the good would have been likely to extend from the materialist and universal—the self-interested avoidance of hunger, for instance—to the idealist and

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁶⁷ *Chūn rāh-i farār masdūd [...] būd, bih darūrat az rāh-i iṭā'at wa inqiyād dar āmadah dast-i tawassul bih dāman-i 'āṭifat-i khawāqīn zadah mustad'i-yi mušālahah shudand: BA 95a.*

contingent—the furthering, for example, of some contextually specific ideology. As well as ranging widely, a person's conceptions of the good would have been both multiform and *non-fungible*: by this latter term, I mean that the painless attainment of one conception of the good—nutritional sufficiency, for instance—would have been unlikely to compensate for the non-attainment of another—the inability, for instance, to discharge some religious duty.⁶⁸

Faced with this wide array of human purposes, it is perhaps not immediately obvious how we can use it to frame our taxonomic project. However, a range of thinkers from Aristotle through Thomas Aquinas to David Hume and Adam Smith have argued that among people's varying conceptions of the good we can discern a reasonably universal order of human priorities. It is frequently suggested, for instance, that

(a) the pursuit of some ideal, such as 'honesty'

constitutes something which is more similar to

(b) the pursuit of a second ideal—even a potentially contradictory one—such as 'kindness'

than to

(c) the pursuit of some material interest, such as financial gain

or to

(d) the display of affection towards another human being, or group of human beings.⁶⁹

In the following discussion of loyalty in early modern Central Asia, I defer to this tradition of thought. I categorise forms of self-subjugation into loyalties motivated by *principle*, loyalties motivated by *interest* and loyalties motivated by *affection*. In the first chapter of this book, I consider forms of attachment undertaken in the pursuit of a super-ethical value, or norm; more particularly, I consider forms of attachment towards people *in whom such a value is deemed to inhere*. Focusing on what Weber conceptualises as the quality of 'charisma', I consider the behaviour of that constituency which deemed it important to be ruled by individuals belonging to a divinely established dynasty, and examine why in 1598 the force of such a preference

⁶⁸ For discussion of the idea of non-fungibility, see e.g. A. Sen, "Equality of What?", in *idem*, *Choice, Welfare and Measurement* (Oxford, 1982), 353–369.

⁶⁹ S. Holmes, "The Secret History of Self-Interest", in J.J. Mansbridge (ed.), *Beyond Self-Interest* (Chicago, 1990), 267–286 [272].

proved to be weaker than it had been over the previous century. In chapters 2 and 3, I consider two distinct forms of attachment undertaken in pursuit of material interests. In chapter 2, I conceptualise a constituency whose members were wont to align themselves with whomsoever they deemed to possess in largest measure some *personal quality enabling the furtherance of their material goals*; this allows me in turn to consider how Pīr Muḥammad Khan's failure, as noted in the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, to retain authority over the likes of 'Tashkent and Andījān and Akhsī' led certain parties to seek his overthrow by the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid dynast Bāqī Khan. In chapter 3, I conceptualise a risk-averse constituency whose members' degree of self-subjugation to a ruler reflected *the degree of self-subjugation from which the ruler was already able to draw advantage*; in so doing, I consider how the behaviour of this constituency allowed Bāqī Khan to capitalise on his victory over Pīr Muḥammad and establish himself in authority over Bukhara and elsewhere. Finally, in the fourth chapter I consider people's affectionate attachments to other individuals and groups, and their self-subjugation to actors who, by their actions and their identity, embodied *how and why such relationships were meaningful*; drawing upon these ideas, I consider why, as Ḥasan Bik notes, it was specifically from Badī' al-Zamān in Badakhshan and from Kildī Muḥammad in the lands north of the Syr Darya that Bāqī Khan subsequently encountered such forceful opposition. By thinking about different sorts of loyalty, and the different sorts of constituencies which displayed them, I hope thus to discern in the events of 1598–1605 a rather richer story than has hitherto been told. makes

Two observations are due at this point. The first is that in conceiving of differing 'loyalty types' I conceive not of discrete phenomena, but of ideal-type categories with which to make sense of what otherwise might appear as a Borgesian Chinese encyclopaedia of behavioural forms. The second observation is that these categories are my own interpolations. My proposed taxonomy of loyalties finds little intimation in the language of those whose behaviour we shall henceforth be examining. Indeed, one might argue that I betray my own post-Enlightenment assumptions in the suggestion, for instance, that the pursuit of a super-ethical principle be distinct from the pursuit of personal reward. The religious, after all, might expect their pursuit of such an ideal to reap them benefit in the afterlife.

That the above are thus 'imposed' categories need not mean, however, that they are inapplicable to the experiences of the people I discuss. One might discern a reasonably universal distinction, for instance, between the second and third loyalty types, on the one hand, and the first and fourth, on the other. The former loyalties are basically *consequentialist*, motivated by

a teleological desire to prosecute the actor's further aims; the latter forms of attachment, by contrast, might be described as more generally *deontological*, undertaken as a means of discharging what the actor would have regarded as some intrinsic responsibility. It is a virtue of the above taxonomy that it thus conveys the sheer diversity of purposes with which people identified their welfare. The taxonomy suggests how a particular individual's various conceptions of the good might have reflected his awareness, say, of being *Muslim*, *hungry*, and *part of a community of Samarqandis*. It thus suggests what range of projects might have mattered to such an individual as he aligned and realigned himself and his resources.

As we shall see, some actors might recognise an entire range of complementary, though incommensurable reasons for subjugating themselves to a single recipient. They might undertake self-subjugation *qua* members of multiple constituencies. Other actors, however, might be conflicted in their priorities.⁷⁰ Should somebody believe that 'the pursuit of virtue' and 'the attainment of gain' were best furthered through different courses of action, he might have equally good cause for subjugating himself to a variety of different, even opposing recipients. It is a further aim of this book, therefore, to consider in what circumstances one kind of loyalty might trump another. In each chapter I consider some of the factors influencing the relative power, or what I shall henceforth term *affective force*, of particular loyalties. By exploring some of the constraining and enabling factors which influenced the making and breaking of political relations, I consider certain circumstances in which people might accord salience to their membership of particular constituencies, and investigate what factors caused contextually-salient loyalty types to possess the 'affective force' to outweigh people's alternative conceptions of the good.

In so doing, I hope to complement our *histoire événementielle* with an idea of what motivations impelled people to undertake the actions which helped bring about dynastic change. At the same time, I hope to use the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover as a social *révélateur*:⁷¹ as an instance of disorder,

⁷⁰ Such instances of internal conflict have recently become the subject of much discussion by historians of selfhood in late medieval and early modern Europe. See e.g. N.Z. Davis, "Boundaries and the Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France", in T.C. Heller, M. Sosna and D. Wellberry (eds.), *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality and the Self in Western Thought* (Stanford, 1986), 53–63 [59–60]. Davis observes that individuals who were schooled by their families towards some career for which they felt themselves unsuited frequently expressed a sense of conflict between social expectation and what they regarded as their own true character.

⁷¹ Again, I am influenced here by the work of Jürgen Paul. See particularly "L'Invasion

that is, illustrating in high resolution some of the generally obscured priorities and compromises of life more generally in early modern Central Asia. As we begin to examine how people's varied courses of behaviour helped bring about the Tuqāy-Timūrid takeover, I hope to evoke some of the textures of a society far removed from our own.

SOURCES AND METHODS

Scholars recounting the events of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover have generally done so with reference primarily to chronicles, hagiographies and other such narrative works. In the present book, I am no exception. Although I occasionally fill out my story with reference to legal and chancery documents, together with diplomatic communications and previously published epigraphic and numismatic materials,¹ I base this study predominantly on Islamicate literary sources.

My book is thus in many ways a highly conventional contribution to the study of pre-modern Central Asian history. Scholars looking for evidence of the much-heralded 'archival revolution' in Central Asian historical studies will find little to interest them here. But in forsaking the craggy peaks of the archive for the softer pastures of the library, I am not merely indulging my appetite for the pleasures of literary narrative: in this book I attempt also to think about some of the ways in which we as historians can use narrative sources, both to destabilise our most familiar stories and to reconfigure these stories anew.

One such familiar set of stories is to be found in the afore-mentioned *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*. Vámbéry (see above, p. 5) was not the only scholar whose account of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover draws heavily on this work. Writing in *Central Asia—Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times*, Bobodzhan Gafurov criticises Makhkam Abduraimov's account of the takeover in *Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii v Bukharskom khanstve*, observing that it "positively and uncritically follows Mohammad Yusuf Munshi, whose

¹ For epigraphic materials, see C.F. Yate, *Northern Afghanistan or Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission* (Edinburgh and London, 1888); Babajanov and Szuppe, *Les Inscriptions persanes de Châr Bakr*; and Babajanov, A. Muminov and Paul, *Schaibanidische Grabinschriften* (Wiesbaden, 1997). For numismatic materials, see E.A. Davidovich, *Istoriia monetnogo dela Srednei Azii XVII–XVIII vv. (Zolotyie i serebrianyie monety Dzhaniidov)* (Dushanbe, 1964); *eadem*, "Serebrianyie monety udel'nykh vladitelei kak istochnik po istorii Srednei Azii XVI v.", in *Pis'mennye pamiatniki vostoka 1973* (1979), 55–100; *eadem*, *Istoriia denezhnogo obrashcheniia srednevekovoi Srednei Azii* (Moscow, 1983); and *eadem*, *Korpus zolotykh i serebrianykh monet Sheibanidov, XVI vek* (Moscow, 1992); also N.M. Lowick, "Coins of Sulaimān Mirzā of Badakhshān", in *The Numismatic Chronicle* 7.5 (1965), 221–229; *idem*, "Shaybānid Silver Coins", in *The Numismatic Chronicle* 7.6 (1966), 251–330; and *idem*, "More on Sulaimān Mirzā and His Contemporaries", in *The Numismatic Chronicle* 7.12 (1972), 283–287.

information on the history of the 16th century is very often confused and doubtful.² The extent to which the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* is 'confused and doubtful' becomes clear only when we read the work in the light of other, earlier narrative sources for the takeover. When we juxtapose the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* against other such sources, we see that it recounts the events of the takeover in a fashion as flattering as possible to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid ruling house; in Yuri Bregel's words, the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* emerges indeed as "the most biased and the least reliable of all works of Janid [i.e. Tūqāy-Tīmūrid] historiography".³ But if juxtaposition with earlier sources highlights the shortcomings of the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*'s takeover narrative, this does not mean that the narrative is wholly without value. Indeed, it is by acknowledging its artifice and by thinking of it specifically as a narrative—as a cluster of descriptive verbal elements syntactically arranged so as to offer a sense of both sequentiality and consequentiality—that we may approach Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī's account in terms which for our purposes may be most valuable: as a reminder, that is, that even a century after the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids' accession to power the events of 1598–1605 remained a worthwhile subject for retelling.

Exploring Narrative Strategies

Rather than conceiving of the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* as a mirror of reality, it may thus be more useful to consider what Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī is actually doing in relating the narrative that he does. Such an approach is hardly unusual. Informed by the sort of epistemological concerns proposed by theorists of the 'linguistic' or the 'literary turn',⁴ several scholars of the Islamicate world have recently proposed to conceive of their source materials as purely literary artefacts. By examining "not "what happened," but "what people say happened,""⁵ they explore the sort of rhetor-

² Gafurov, *Central Asia*, II.381, on Abduraimov, *Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii*, I.56–57.

³ Y. Bregel, "Historiography XII. Central Asia", in *Elr* XII (2004), 395–402 [399]. For similar assessments, see e.g. Akhmedov, *Istoriko-geograficheskaia literatura Srednei Azii XVI–XVIII vv.* (Tashkent, 1985), 82, and Ghafārī-Fard, *Rawābiṭ-i Ṣafawīyah wa Uzbikān*, 29.

⁴ See e.g. D. LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts", in *idem* and S.L. Kaplan (eds.), *Modern European Intellectual History—Reappraisals and New Perspectives* (Ithaca, 1982), 47–86.

⁵ D. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde* (University Park, PA, 1994), 12.

ical artifices with which an author tells his chosen story.⁶ In chapter 5 of the present book I too attempt something of this kind, by considering the strategies with which Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī and other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Central Asian chroniclers recount their respective takeover narratives.

In so doing, I attempt to show that the author of the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* is scarcely alone in using language strategically in order to shape the reader's perception of events therein related. The authors of several rather better-regarded sources similarly avail themselves of the opportunities available for manipulating their material and exploiting the illocutionary capacities of their vocabulary.⁷ One such source is the *Baḥr al-asrār*, by the mid-seventeenth-century Balkhi author Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī. Maḥmūd's universal history is an extremely important work, regularly cited by scholars as an authoritative point of reference;⁸ only rarely is it observed that the work's Tūqāy-Tīmūrid section seems deliberately to be structured in such a fashion as to influence the attitudes of a mid-seventeenth-century audience.⁹ The *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* is another source whose claim to be "distinguished by its relative objectivity"¹⁰ is somewhat belied by its takeover narrative. This work is a mid-eighteenth-century history of the Indian Mughals and Central Asian Chingīzids, written in India by Bāqī Khan's exiled (2,5) Tūqāy-Tīmūrid kinsman Ḥājī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm. Like the *Baḥr al-asrār*, the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* is widely cited by scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,¹¹ none of whom seem to have noticed that its account is as replete with fictitious interpolations and judicious omissions as is the

⁶ E.g. J.S. Meisami, *Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century* (Edinburgh, 1999), particularly 12–13; S. Conermann, *Historiographie als Sinnstiftung—Indo-persische Geschichtsschreibung während der Mogulzeit (932–118/1516–1707)* (Wiesbaden, 2002); G. Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy—History and Historiography at Play* (Berkeley, 2003), 50–68.

⁷ See e.g. below, pp. 94–97, for the vocabulary of 'rebellion'.

⁸ In addition to McChesney, Akhmedov, Burton and Ghafārī-Fard, authors who use the work include V.V. Bartol'd ("Tseremonial pri dvore uzbekskikh khanov v XVII veke", in *Sochineniia*, II.ii.388–399), and Z.V. Togan ("The Topography of Balkh down to the Middle of the Seventeenth Century", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 14 (1970), 277–288).

⁹ A notable exception is V.P. Iudin, discussing the work in *Materialy po istorii kazakhskikh khanstv* (Alma-Ata, 1969), 323–329 [323].

¹⁰ Bregel, "Historiography XII", 399.

¹¹ In addition to afore-mentioned studies, note e.g. Akhmedov, "Silsilat al-Salatin", in E.A. Davidovich and G.F. Girs (eds.), *Istochnikovedenie i tekstologiya Srednevekovogo Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka* (Moscow, 1984), 27–34, and A. Ziiaev, "Perepiska pravitelei Sheibanidov i Ashtarkhanidov s Iranoi i Indiei" in P.G. Bulgakov and I. Karimov (eds.), *Issledovaniia po istorii, istorii nauki i kul'tury narodov Srednei Azii* (Tashkent, 1993), 99–109.

Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī.¹² Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī is thus rather unfairly maligned. When telling the story of the takeover, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī, Ḥājī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm and other Central Asian chroniclers use language every bit as creatively as he.

Conceptualising Dispositions

By examining the rhetorical moves and illocutionary resonances of 'what people say happened', I hope to uncover some of the attitudes and dispositions which influenced the course of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover. Some sceptics will of course suggest that any attempt to recover more than these constitutive rhetorical strategies is doomed to failure. They observe that literary artefacts produced in one episteme, for instance, may contain multiple ironies which are obscure to readers in another environment;¹³ they observe also that diachronic shifts in semantic meaning render it likely that statements which 'say' something to us would have 'said' something quite different to an earlier addressee.¹⁴ Such concerns may be well founded. Islamicate narrative is often highly referential, with much of its 'meaning' drawn from obscure intertextual webs of allusion.¹⁵ Furthermore, the occasional recognition that a statement's resonances undercut its nominal import suggests that many more ironies may be lost on the modern reader.

Recently, however, several scholars of the Islamicate world have made compelling arguments for the modern historian's ability, if not, in Collingwood's bold phrase, "to discern the thoughts" of historical actors,¹⁶ then at least to glean from a historical source clues as to the attitudes and outlooks attending the source's composition. One forceful such argument comes from the work of Cornell Fleischer, whose reading of the *Kunh al-akhbār*, a late sixteenth-century Ottoman universal history, interrogates the chron-

¹² Akhmedov's failure in this regard may be most understandable, since he gives the impression of not having read the work he professes to discuss, ascribing to Ḥājī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm an account of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids' genealogy ("Silsilat al-Salatin", 32) quite unlike that which is actually supplied (for which see below, p. 293).

¹³ Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", in *idem*, *Visions of Politics*, 57–89 [82].

¹⁴ J.G.A. Pocock, "Introduction: The State of the Art", in *idem*, *Virtue, Commerce, and History* (Cambridge, 1985), 1–34 [7–9].

¹⁵ See e.g. M. Waldman, *Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative—A Case Study in Personal Islamicate Historiography* (Columbus, 1980).

¹⁶ R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1946), 215.

icle's rhetorical strategies for clues to the resentments and frustrations of a conservative surrounded by parvenus.¹⁷ Sholeh Quinn, meanwhile, examines the rhetorical moves contained within a range of Safavid historical chronicles to consider how authors in receipt of patronage may have responded to the insecurities of a dynasty anxious to justify its existence.¹⁸

As we set about examining some of the attitudinal dispositions which influenced the course of the takeover, I shall frequently follow the lead of these last two scholars. In some instances, following Fleischer, I shall consider what sentiments might personally be ascribed to individual authors. One such example, which I shall explore in chapter 4, is the case of the seventeenth-century literary compiler Muṭribī al-Aṣamm al-Samarqandī. As will become clear, Muṭribī's is the guileless voice of the Samarqandi communal partisan: in the unselfconscious assumptions he betrays through his taxonomical organization of material in the *Nuskhah-yi zibā-yi Jahāngīr*, Muṭribī may indeed prove even more self-revealing than does the Mughal emperor Zāhīr al-Dīn Muḥammad Bābur, whose *Bābur-nāmah* is widely praised for the introspective insights of its author.¹⁹ In other instances, following Quinn, I shall consider what priorities might be ascribed to the patrons at whose behest individual authors set about telling their respective tales; chapter 5, in particular, will consider in detail some of the political concerns underlying the decision by successive Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd rulers to foster works touching on the circumstances of the takeover.

Rather than considering the attitudes of individual *authors* or *patrons*, though, our hermeneutic project will more generally be to consider the attitudes of that immeasurably larger literary constituency comprising the *audiences* for whose consumption our narratives were originally composed. As a constituency by definition less speaking than spoken to, the passive recipients of narrative might appear to furnish singularly little information about their priorities or attitude states. But if one conceives of the transmission of linguistic meaning somewhat pragmatically, in terms of the interpretive interaction between speaker and addressee, audiences emerge as rather more articulate than they might first appear. To deem it worth using language to communicate a particular point, the speaker is likely to seek

¹⁷ C. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire—the Historian Mustafa Āli (1541–1600)* (Princeton, 1986).

¹⁸ S.A. Quinn, *Historical Writing during the Reign of Shah 'Abbās—Ideology, Imitation and Legitimacy in Safavid Chronicles* (Salt Lake City, 2000).

¹⁹ See e.g. S.F. Dale, *The Garden of the Eight Paradises—Bābur and the Culture of Empire in Central Asia, Afghanistan and India (1483–1530)* (Leiden, 2004), 23–51.

assurance that he and his interlocutor sufficiently understand some shared linguistic convention for the addressee to grasp his utterance in the fashion intended. Should a speaker's address to his addressee feature a particular metaphor, for instance, the speaker is presumably ascribing to his interlocutor some common capacity to understand—at the speaker's prompting, at least—the intended force of the conceit.²⁰ When a chronicler offers an analogy between good government and a well-maintained garden, say, he thus reminds the historian that in early modern Central Asia there indeed existed a significant constituency of actors to whom the maintenance of agricultural order represented a sufficiently transparent virtue for the analogy to make due sense (see below, p. 11).

Of all the literary genres which we shall encounter over the course of the book, one stands out for the wealth of clues thus furnished by its exemplars as to the presumed dispositions of an imagined audience. This is the genre of Sufi hagiography. The present study draws upon approximately twenty-fourteenth- to eighteenth-century Persian- and Turkic-language hagiographic sources.²¹ Although, as will become evident, these works can sometimes furnish useful perspectives upon the course of events, for our purposes they are useful primarily for the information they yield as to the likely attitudes of their intended audiences. What makes hagiographies so hermeneutically valuable—and, as Soviet scholars perhaps learned to their cost, so unaccommodating to *istochnikovedenie* studies²²—is the fact that they are conceived, in Jürgen Paul's formulation, to furnish information *for* life, not *about* it.²³

As Devin DeWeese observes, hagiographies, and the individual stories contained within them, “were circulated to convey specific messages,

²⁰ Thus famously L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, 1953) 96 (#355) and elsewhere. Some care is of course necessary here, in that a person's recourse to a metaphor may sometimes tell us less about his or her experiential frame of reference than about said metaphor's own conventionalised force, disjointed from the circumstances of its origin. For further discussion, see D. Davidson, “The Social Aspect of Language”, in *idem*, *Truth, Language, and History* (Oxford, 2005), 109–125.

²¹ *AT* (Bukhāri); *AT* (Churās); *DQ*; *JA*; *J'Ā*; *JālM*; *JāmM*; *LNQ*; *MAkh*; *MaT*; *MifT*; *MKA*; *MML*; *M'UA*; *R'AH*; *RR*; *S'Ā*; *Sa'diyah*; *SilSīd*; *SirS*; *TI*; *TKh*.

²² For a suitably undistinguished example of such work, see I.A. Saidakhmedov, M.Iu. Iunuskhodzhaeva and G.Iu. Astanova, “Agiograficheskie sochineniia kak istochnik dlia izucheniia dukhovnoi i politicheskoi zhizni Vostochnogo Turkestana”, in Akhmedov (ed.), *Iz istorii Srednei Azii i Vostochnogo Turkestana XV–XIX vv.* (Tashkent, 1987), 149–161.

²³ Paul, “Hagiographische Texte als historische Quelle”, in *Saeculum* 41 (1990), 17–45 [18].

whether didactic and exemplary [...] or tactical and 'political'".²⁴ Exploration of the 'messages' contained in our hagiographic sources may thus evoke what fears and aspirations hagiographers could attribute to their audience constituencies. Whether such fears and aspirations were well founded is almost irrelevant. The danger of dying by shipwreck in late-medieval Iran and Central Asia was probably remote, but the proliferation of hagiographic shipwreck tropes suggests that conventionalised fears nevertheless circulated widely.²⁵ Similarly, stories of Sufi shaykhs punishing bandits (see below, p. 135) need hardly evoke what life in early modern Central Asia was *actually* like. Taken as allegories, however, they may suggest what constituencies in early modern Central Asia *thought* life was like and, correlatively, what constituencies thought life *should* be like. From such clues one may begin to recover some of the attitudinal dispositions with which individuals and constituencies set about the business of conducting their own existence.

Establishing Events

My final project when considering the present range of source materials will be to consider in some detail what they tell the historian about events which actually occurred in Greater Mā warā al-nahr between about 1598 and 1605. This exegetic project may seem to contradict the epistemological scepticism implied in the proposed hermeneutic approaches outlined above. To approach a source on the presumption that it is of some truth-value may seem incompatible with examining the attitudes evoked by the work's rhetorical contrivances.²⁶ Perhaps unsurprisingly, few historians of early modern Central Asia have attempted to marry both approaches. Nevertheless, several exegetic strategies may help yield a reasonably reliable *histoire événementielle* to complement our proposed archaeology of outlooks.

Even if a work's truth-value is indeed subordinated to its author's rhetorical projects, this scarcely means that it thereby be wholly untrue. To dismiss

²⁴ DeWeese, "The *Mashā'ikh-i Turk* and the *Khojagān*: Rethinking the Links between the Yasavī and Naqshbandī Sufi Traditions", in *Journal of Islamic Studies* 7 (1996), 180–207 [190].

²⁵ Paul, "Faire naufrage", in Aigle (ed.), *Miracle et karāma—Hagiographies médiévales comparées* (Turnhout, 2000), 375–395.

²⁶ On this point, see e.g. C. Wickham, *Framing the Early Middle Ages—Europe and the Mediterranean, 400–800* (Oxford, 2005), 8.

our sources as mere propaganda is to traduce the range of purposes of those chroniclers who wrote them, among which was frequently a desire to relate the events of the past as best they could. Our problem is thus how to distinguish reliable material from the less reliable. An obvious way of doing this is by using details contained within one source to substantiate the details contained in another. Of course, some care is needed here. A confluence of detail is epistemologically significant only if the sources in question are mutually independent. But this is not always the case. It may often transpire that the contents of one narrative are imported from another:²⁷ what might appear to be two sources' mutual corroboration may prove to be nothing of the sort.

As we shall see, textual borrowings of this kind were often contained within 'national' historiographic traditions: when recounting the events of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover, Indian chronicles frequently reproduced certain generic details which we do not find attested anywhere else,²⁸ and several sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Safavid sources are highly obliged to other such works which were similarly composed in Iran.²⁹ One might expect, by contrast, that when a Central Asian chronicler recounts some detail pertaining to the takeover which is recounted also by a Mughal or a Safavid chronicler, there might be good circumstantial grounds for accepting that two distinct traditions have faithfully recorded something which actually happened. But this is not always so. A tradition of literary cosmopolitanism meant that chroniclers working in one environment might draw upon works composed distantly elsewhere: the two Mughal histories which we encountered in the Introduction, for instance—Ṭāhir Muḥammad's *Rawḍat al-ṭāhirīn* and Ḥasan Bīk's *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*—both draw extensively on the *Nuskah-yi jahān-ārā*, a universal history composed by the Safavid author Qāḍī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Ghaffār,³⁰ while Muṭribī's Samarqand-focused *Nuskah-yi zibā-yi Jahāngīr* bears evi-

²⁷ Thus, for instance, *TQKh* draws extensively on *TShKh*. Richard Foltz suggests (*Mughal India and Central Asia* (Oxford, 1998), 171) that the latter work is nothing other than a mistitled copy of the former; as we shall see, however, despite Khwājam Qulī Bīk Balkhī's borrowings there are in fact significant differences between the two works. See also below, p. 257 n. 15, for how multiple hagiographic works might recycle a single narrative for their own competing purposes.

²⁸ See below, particularly p. 49, p. 89 n. 241, and p. 176 n. 114.

²⁹ See below, particularly p. 37 and p. 44 n. 38.

³⁰ It is a weakness of Conermann, *Historiographie als Sinnstiftung*, that, in his emphasis on intertextual borrowings within Mughal historiography, he neglects to consider how such borrowings might occur also across political frontiers.

dence of exposure to Indian literary tradition.³¹ Audrey Burton is thus rather misleading when she cites as discrete authorities for certain elements in her takeover story both the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* and the *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*, a Safavid regnal history from ca. 1628.³² Like other authors who hold Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm's work in high regard, Burton neglects to observe that the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*'s takeover narrative is largely an avatar of Iskandar Bik Munshī's history, with much of its material directly appropriated from the earlier work. In such circumstances, the mere replication of detail is rather less telling than the avatar's occasional departures from its informant.

Unfortunately, not all of the takeover story can be recounted from the confluences of source materials. Elements of detail frequently appear in only one source, or one narrative tradition. Where the claims of one source have to be weighed against the claims of another, I generally prefer the source whose other claims about the takeover are most consistent with the claims contained in other narrative traditions. While alert to Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī's fabrications in the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid genealogical preamble to his takeover narrative (see below, pp. 287–293), for instance, I generally follow Burton and others in relating his account of events over that, say, of Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī in the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*.³³ One of the virtues of the *Baḥr al-asrār* is that—to paraphrase another scholar writing about a comparable source tradition—"the logic of [its] arrangement provides information concerning phenomena about which there is no direct evidence".³⁴ I shall have cause to exploit such 'logic' at several junctures in this book.

Where possible, I also generally prefer early sources to late ones. Of course, one might expect an author writing 'with hindsight' to take a more critically balanced approach than one writing in the heat of events. As Adeeb Khalid observes, however, it was not until the early twentieth century that Central Asian historians began seriously to assess the truth-value of their sources.³⁵ As the example of Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm in the

³¹ See below, p. 49 n. 66, and p. 210 n. 113.

³² Burton, *The Bukharans*, 102 and elsewhere.

³³ See e.g. below, p. 199 n. 62, where I, like Burton, date events according to Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī's rather than Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī's chronology.

³⁴ E.L. Keenan, Jr., "Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy", in *Slavic Review* 26 (1967), 548–558 [549].

³⁵ A. Khalid, "The Emergence of a Modern Central Asian Historical Consciousness", in T. Sanders (ed.), *Historiography of Imperial Russia* (New York, 1999), 433–454.

eighteenth century illustrates, and as we shall see further below, an author writing ‘with hindsight’ frequently offers a misleading account of the events under discussion. This is for various reasons. Works composed substantially after the events which they relate may be embroidered—wittingly or otherwise—with apocryphal narrative elements;³⁶ they may contain anachronistic interpolations, coloured by assumptions prevailing at the time of their composition;³⁷ and their retellings of earlier events may be distorted by the political expediencies of the moment.³⁸ Given the methodological difficulties of working with late sources, it is perhaps a shortcoming of the takeover narratives by McChesney, Akhmedov and Burton that they fail to make full use of several works standing out by their proximity to the events therein related.

One such neglected early work is the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*, that afore-mentioned Sufi hagiography from ca. 1603 which relates the events of Pīr Muḥammad’s

³⁶ In eighteenth-century Central Asia, for instance, there proliferated a number of apocryphal works about the life of the fourteenth-century military leader Tīmūr: see particularly R. Sela, *The Legendary Biographies of Tamerlane: Islam and Heroic Apocrypha in Central Asia* (Cambridge, 2011). Late seventeenth-century Iran, meanwhile, witnessed a similar proliferation of heavily fictionalised works about the early Safavids of the sixteenth century: see e.g. A.H. Morton, “The Date and Attribution of the *Ross Anonymous*: Notes on a Persian History of Shāh Ismā‘īl I”, in C. Melville (ed.), *Pembroke Papers 1* (Cambridge, 1990), 179–212; Quinn, *Historical Writing during the Reign of Shah ‘Abbās*, 211–219; and B. Wood, “The *Tarikh-i Jahānārā* in the Chester Beatty Library: an Illustrated Manuscript of the ‘Anonymous Histories of Shah Isma‘il’”, in *Iranian Studies* 37 (2004), 89–107 [92]. Attempts by certain scholars to argue for the historicity of such works (see for example N. Atygaev, “Problema vzaimootnoshenii Kazakhskogo khanstva i Sefevidskogo (kyzylbashskogo) gosudarstva v XVI v.”, in M.Kh. Abuseitova and S. Abdullo (eds.), *Istoriko-kul’turnye vzaimosviazi Irana i Dasht-i Kipchaka v XIII–XVIII vv.* (Almaty, 2004), 233–252 [234–235]) are unconvincing.

³⁷ In *SilSal* 173a–b, for instance, Ḥājī Mir Muḥammad Salīm states that in 1611 the defeated Tūqāy-Tīmūrid dynast Walī Muḥammad claimed, when fleeing to the Safavid court in Isfahan (see below, p. 247), that his intention was “to perform *ṭawāf* at the Ka‘bah in Mecca, and *ziyārat* to the tomb of Muḥammad in Medina.” This statement is not supported by any of our earlier sources: but in the lengthy intervening period prior to the work’s composition such claims by Central Asian exiles became widely conventional. Aware of this fact, Ḥājī Mir Muḥammad Salīm appears simply to have assumed that Walī Muḥammad justified his actions in a fashion similar to people who came after him. See Welsford, “The Re-opening of Iran to Central Asian Pilgrimage Traffic, 1600–1650”, in A. Papas, Welsford and T. Zarcone (eds.), *Central Asian Pilgrims: Hajj Routes and Pious Visits between Central Asia and the Hijaz* (Berlin, 2011), 149–167 [150–153].

³⁸ I have attempted elsewhere to show, for instance, how the late sixteenth-century Bukharan source tradition (most notably *SNS*, though also *RR*, *RS*, *ẒNM* and to a certain extent *MB*) gives a misleading impression of early and mid sixteenth-century intra-Shibānid relations, particularly with regard to the status of the non-Abū’l-Khayrid Shibānid rulers of Ḥiṣār. See Welsford, “Rethinking the Ḥamzahids of Ḥiṣār”, in *Asiatische Studien* 65 (2011), 797–823.

overthrow by Bāqī Muḥammad. Burton alludes to the work in her bibliography, but she makes little reference to it; although occasionally cited by other authors,³⁹ the work has only recently been thoroughly interrogated by Alexandre Papas,⁴⁰ and still has information to yield about events at the turn of the seventeenth century. A second work which has yet to enjoy its due is Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan's also afore-mentioned *Musakhkhir al-bilād*, from ca. 1607. This prosopographically arranged political history receives passing attention from Burton, and has been the subject of several *istochnikovedenie* articles;⁴¹ as we shall see, however, it contains an entire range of stories relating to the takeover which have hitherto escaped mention. The final 'early' takeover account which has been significantly neglected by historians is that contained in the *Tārīkh-i 'Abbāsī*, by the Safavid chronicler Jalāl al-Dīn Munajjim Yazdī.⁴² Composed in ca. 1611, the *Tārīkh-i 'Abbāsī* offers a notably earlier Safavid perspective on the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover than do the frequently-cited *Tārīkh-i miftāḥ al-qulūb*, *Rawḍat al-Ṣafawīyah* or *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*, as well as the recently-rediscovered third volume of the *Afḍal al-tawārīkh*; while not all of its information is original—elements are plainly borrowed from the late-sixteenth-century *Futūḥāt-i humāyūn*, by Siyāqī Nizāmī—it contains much material that is not paralleled elsewhere. In her monograph, Burton fails to make use of the work at all, while McChesney seems to have been alerted to its existence only after completing his 1980 article on the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover.⁴³

As we follow our story, the narrative voices of Yazdī, Mullā Awāz and Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan will blur alongside the voices of Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī and other more frequently cited chroniclers of the takeover. By

³⁹ See e.g. Z.N. Vorozheikina, "Doislamskie verovaniia kirgizov v XVIv. po rukopisi "Ziia al-kulub", in I.A. Orbeli (ed.), *Voprosy filologii i istorii stran sovetskogo i zarubezhnego vostoka* (Moscow, 1961), 182–189, and Iudin, "Izvestiia "Ziia al-kulub" M Avaza o kazakhakh XVI veka", in *Vestnik AN KazSSR* 1966.5, 71–76.

⁴⁰ Papas, *Soufisme et politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan: étude sur les Khwājas naqsh-bandis du Turkestan Oriental* (Paris, 2005), 5 and elsewhere.

⁴¹ Abuseitova, "Musakhkhir al-bilad" Mukhammadīar ibn Arab Katagana kak istochnik"; Iudin, "Ta'rikh-i Shaybani" kak istochnik po istorii kazakhskogo i karakalpakskogo narodov", in Tulepbaev (ed.), *Voprosy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia Kazakhstana* (Alma-Ata, 1988), 201–221.

⁴² Scholars are hardly helped by Sayf-Allāh Waḥīd-niyā's uncritical text edition of the work, which is littered with elementary misreadings. A new edition is urgently required.

⁴³ McChesney, "The "Reforms" of Bāqī Muḥammad Khān", 74, claims that *TMQ* (ca. 1619) is the earliest extant Safavid source for the takeover. He subsequently acknowledges his oversight when drawing upon *T'A in idem*, "Waqf and Public Policy: the Waqfs of Shāh 'Abbās, 1011–1023/1602–1614", in *African and Asian Studies* 15 (1982), 165–190.

drawing on these under-tapped sources, however, and by interrogating once again those better-known works which have hitherto yielded the narratives we know, I hope to root the following investigation of early modern Central Asian attitudes within a synthesised political narrative which is fuller, and more reliable, than anything achieved heretofore.

CHAPTER ONE

CHARISMATIC LOYALTY

Two Deaths, Many Accessions: Spring and Summer, 1598

In early February 1598,¹ ‘Abdallāh Khan died in Samarqand. His death came after fifteen years in khalal authority, and at the end of an eminent career stretching back to the mid-1550s. Upon learning of this news, ‘Abdallāh’s son ‘Abd al-Mu’min rushed north from his own princely seat of Balkh. He wanted to ensure his own accession to the khalal office.

For much of the previous decade, ‘Abdallāh had been on poor terms with his son. ‘Abd al-Mu’min was an extremely gifted military leader, and in the 1570s and 1580s he had lent his father ‘Abdallāh invaluable assistance against rivals based in Tashkent.² In the early 1590s, ‘Abd al-Mu’min then led a series of western campaigns, capturing much of Khurāsān from the Safavids who ruled Iran.³ For all his abilities, however, ‘Abd al-Mu’min was also arrogant and cruel. He was “a tyrannical and bloodthirsty ruler [...] and the ear of his disposition never heard a single word from the pages of justice and humanity”, according to one Safavid historian,⁴ and he proved a sore trial to his father. He was outraged, for instance, when in 1588 ‘Abdallāh failed to appoint him governor over the newly conquered city of Herat, the appointment instead going to an individual called Qul Bābā.⁵ ‘Abdallāh’s

¹ AN III.736–737 dates the death to 14 Bahman 976, which equates (using http://www.iranchamber.com/calendar/converter/iranian_calendar_converter.php) to 3 February 1598; in his translation of the work, however, Beveridge renders the date as 24 January. Burton, *The Bukharans*, 95, follows Vámbéry, *History of Bokhara*, 294, in dating the death to 2 Rajab 1006; whereas Vámbéry renders this as 6 February, Burton more correctly (according to <http://www.oriold.uzh.ch/static/hegira.html>) renders it as 8 February. BA 7418 413b dates the death simply to early 1006 (*dar badāyat-i sāl-i hazār wa shash*). KhB 30a dates it to 6 Muḥarram 1005 (30 August 1596): this date is plainly wrong, and suggests that Malik Shāh Ḥusayn is here garbling TA 173–174 and TĀĀ’A 570, both of which give 6 Muḥarram as the date of the battle of Pul-i Sālār (for which see below, p. 59).

² ShNSh 3497 171a, 237b.

³ RR 288a, 503b; TMQ 548a–b; AfT 23b–24a, 31b, 113b; TĀĀ’A 411–412; KhB 29a.

⁴ *Ū pādishāhī būd jabbār [wa] saffāk [...] gūsh-i khulqash harfī az saffah-yi ‘adālat wa murūwat nashanīdah*: FH 37b.

⁵ BA 7418 412b; TSR 181b; SilSal 129a.

alternative choice of appointee was an entirely reasonable one. Not only was Qul Bābā 'Abdallāh's *kūkaltāsh*, or foster brother,⁶ but for the last few years he had shown his worth as a highly respected governor of Samarqand.⁷ But 'Abd al-Mu'min was in no mood to acknowledge the wisdom of Qul Bābā's appointment, and from this point on he harboured a grudge against the man who had beaten him to the job.

During the 1590s, relations between 'Abdallāh and his son became ever more hostile. Several sources relate how 'Abd al-Mu'min conspired to kill 'Abdallāh and accede to the throne himself.⁸ In the late 1590s, he attempted a coup, dispatching a supporter called Shāh Muḥammad Alā-Chūpān to capture the Bukharan citadel while 'Abdallāh was out hunting.⁹ After this came to nothing, 'Abd al-Mu'min opened negotiations with Qazaq nomads from the Dasht-i Qipchāq.¹⁰ In 1597 he encouraged them to attack Mā warā al-nahr from the north, in order to undermine 'Abdallāh's position and allow 'Abd al-Mu'min to exploit this weakness by moving up from Balkh with his own army. 'Abdallāh dispatched troops to meet the Qazaq threat, but the expeditionary force was quickly defeated.¹¹ The khan decided to march north himself, but while he was passing through Samarqand he succumbed to illness and quickly died. At least two of our sources suggest that the khan had been poisoned by one of his associates, a certain Muḥammad Bāqī Bī.¹² Muḥammad Bāqī Bī was a prominent Samarqandi *amīr* of the Dūrmān tribe who had been a close associate of 'Abdallāh since the early 1570s.¹³ Certain authors relate, however, that by early 1598 he had entered into a conspiracy

⁶ *T'ĀĀ'A* 553. For the significance accorded this relationship, see I. Vásáry, "The Institution of Foster-Brothers (*emildāš* and *kökaldāš*) in the Chingisid States", in *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 36 (1982), 549–562.

⁷ *ShNSh* 3497 239a; *TSR* 179b; *SilSal* 150a.

⁸ *FH* 22b, *TSh* 140.

⁹ *TA* 163–164, following *FH* 23b–24a; see also *SilSal* 147a–b.

¹⁰ This is the Persian name for the steppe belt running from Ukraine to western Mongolia. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, much of the region's eastern part was inhabited by Turkic nomads belonging to the Qazaq confederation.

¹¹ *TA* 164, following *FH* 24b.

¹² *AN* III.736, suggesting that the *amīr* poisoned him at a dinner he organised in his honour; also *MaḥT* 120b, noting how 'Abd al-Mu'min *Khān bih ittifāq-i Muḥammad Bāqī Bī dar ṭa'ām-i khān zahr andākhtah bih darajah-yi shahādāt rasānid*. *T'ĀĀ'A* 553–556 (followed in turn by *SilSal* 149a) and *BA* 7418 413b do not mention any conspiracy.

¹³ See e.g. *ShNSh* 3497 162b–163a (supporting 'Abdallāh against the Kūchkūnjid dynast Būzakh Khwar in Shāhrukhiyah), 171a (supporting him against the Suyūnchid 'Abd al-Karīm b. Khuramshāh in Sayrām), 221a–b (supporting him against the line of Timūrid *mīrzās* in Badakhshan, for which see also *MaḥT* 93b), and 244b–245a (participating in the campaign against Safavid-held Herat).

with 'Abd al-Mu'min, agreeing to eliminate the incumbent in return for assurances that he would retain high office upon the new khan's accession.

When 'Abd al-Mu'min reached Samarqand, he seems to have convened a *qūriltāy*, or general assembly of *amīrs*, sultans and other eminent parties, to deliberate as to who should succeed his late father. As 'Abd al-Mu'min doubtless hoped, the convened delegates agreed that khalal authority should pass to him, and they undertook to submit to his authority and accept his might.¹⁴ This was good news for Muḥammad Bāqī Bī Dūrmān, whom 'Abd al-Mu'min appointed to gubernatorial authority in Samarqand, perhaps in deference to their earlier agreement.¹⁵ But it was bad news for lots of other people.

'Abd al-Mu'min and the Wages of Fear

After a decade of perceived slights by his father, 'Abd al-Mu'min evidently resented those individuals who had enjoyed warm relations with the late khan. Immediately upon his elevation, therefore, he began purging the empire of 'Abdallāh's former associates. Having forced various eminent court poets and musicians into exile in India and Iran,¹⁶ 'Abd al-Mu'min turned his attention to Qul Bābā Kūkaltāsh, 'Abdallāh's appointee to Herat. Accompanying 'Abdallāh on his northern campaign in February 1598, Qul Bābā had been with him at the time of his death. He learned that 'Abd al-Mu'min was heading north towards Samarqand, and decided to flee with his family to Safavid-held Khurāsān. But he was captured while trying to cross the Amu Darya, and was brought back to Samarqand to face charges of high corruption.¹⁷ Condemned, Qul Bābā was sentenced to watch his two sons being butchered like sheep, before he in turn was executed.¹⁸

Qul Bābā's execution gave a taste of things to come. Over the next four months or so, 'Abd al-Mu'min did little to court the affection of his new

¹⁴ *Umarā wa salāṭīn-i ūzbik, akābir wa a'yān-i Mā warā al-nahr wa buzurgān-i khitāh-yi Bukhārā majma'ī tartīb dādah wa majmū' dar quriltāy ḥāḍir gardidah, bih ittifāq wa istiṣwāb-i yak digar 'Abd al-Mu'min-rā bar sarir-i pādishāhi nishānidah [...] tawq-i mutāba'at wa famāndārī wa raqabah-yi inqiyād wa ṭā'atguzārī dar mutāba'at wa mulāzamat andākhtand: NĀ 588.*

¹⁵ AN III.742.

¹⁶ IM 240–241.

¹⁷ TMQ 552a–b.

¹⁸ For the circumstances of his death see DQ 107b–108b, AN III.742, RT 339a, TA 175, TMQ 552b–553a, RŞ 737, TĀĀ'A 555 (followed in turn by *SilSal* 149b–150a), *NZJ* 127 and 141, suggesting that he was killed not in Samarqand but in "the vicinity of Akhsi and Andijān" (*dar nawāḥī-yi Akhsi wa Andigān*), and BA 7418 414a–b.

subjects. In the *Naqāwāt al-āthār fi dhikr al-akhyār*, Maḥmūd b. Hidāyat Allāh Afushtah-yi Naṭanzī tells us that the newly elevated khan straightaway gave himself over to unbridled debauchery.¹⁹ Other sources, meanwhile, tell of ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s poor relations with various *amīrs*²⁰ and close members of his own family.²¹ We may term these family members *Jānī-Bikids*: by this name, I allude to their common descent from an early sixteenth-century figure called Jānī Bik b. Khwājah Muḥammad. One such Jānī-Bikid was ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s uncle Dūstum (otherwise known as ‘Abd al-Quddūs), had been governor of Tashkent for much of the period since ‘Abdallāh Khan had captured it from rivals in 1582.²² Dūstum had been on cool terms with ‘Abd al-Mu’min since at least the previous year, and upon learning of ‘Abdallāh’s death he invited fellow Jānī-Bikid dynasts to come and take refuge with him; among those who came was ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s (3,4) kinsman Rustam b. Isfandiyār,²³ whom ‘Abd al-Mu’min had recently dispossessed of gubernatorial authority over Miyānkāl. Learning that his kinsmen were thus attempting to bulwark themselves in the north, ‘Abd al-Mu’min marched up towards Tashkent. Having enticed Dūstum and Rustam out of the city with a promise of negotiations, ‘Abd al-Mu’min ordered their peremptory execution.²⁴ According to one source, he then

¹⁹ ‘Abd al-Mu’min Khān [...] *bih marāsim-i ‘aysh wa ‘ushrat wa lawāzīm-i suḥbat wa farāghat pardākht wa hamwārah bih ārāstan-i bazmhā-yi turkānah wa murattab sākhtan-i jashnhā-yi mulūkānah farmān dādah* [...]: *NĀ* 588. According to Maḥmūd b. Hidāyat Allāh Afushtah-yi Naṭanzī, these habits would lead to ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s downfall: see below, p. 44 n. 38.

²⁰ *TMQ* 553a, noting how ‘Abd al-Mu’min gave orders for the capture and public humiliation of forty of his father’s former *amīrs* who had failed to abase themselves before him: *tu-rā mīfrīstam bih Samarqand kih chihil dū shākhah musta‘idd kunī kih man chihil nafar az umarā-yi pidar-i khūd kih sar bih man furū namiyāwurdand khwāhim girānīd*. Sources recount that he was particularly hostile to Khudāy Nazar Bī Chuhrah Āqāsī Qalmāq. *FH* 40b, followed in turn by *TA* 167, tells that throughout early 1598 Khudāy Nazar Bī was in continual fear for his life, and *NZJ* 127 relates that ‘Abd al-Mu’min dispatched somebody to Khwārazm, where at the time Khudāy Nazar Bī was based, in order to put him to death.

²¹ See e.g. *TSh* 140, on how ‘Abd al-Mu’min “planned to kill those sultans who were closest to him” (*qaṣd-i qatl-i salāṭīnī kih aqrabā-yi ū būdand namūd*).

²² *ShNSh* 3479 201b; *MB* 214. *TShKh* 109b (followed in turn in *TQKh* 268a) claims by contrast that it was Hazārah Sultan (for whom see below, p. 43) who “raised the flag of authority in Tashkent” (*liwā-yi istilā-yi Tāshkand afrākht*).

²³ For his ancestry, see *MB* 201. *TShKh* 109b (followed in turn in *TQKh* 268a) confuses him with his eponymous (4,1) kinsman Rustam b. Jānī Bik, for whom see *MB* 190.

²⁴ *MB* 201, 216; also *AN* III.742; *RT*, 339a; *BA* 7418 414b. Noting Dūstum’s death, Alekseev incorrectly relates that it instead took place near Herat: “Sredniaia Aziia pri Ashtarkhanidakh v XVII–XVIII vv.”, 121. Khwājājam Qulī Bik Balkhī claims (*TQKh* 268a) that Rustam was able to escape: *Rustam Muḥammad munhazim raft*. He thus deviates from his *TShKh* source narrative, which makes no mention of Rustam’s fate.




Figure 2: Jānī-Bīkid victims of 'Abd al-Mu'min's reign (underlined).

took measures to discourage the Tashkentis from ever again supporting such defiance, ordering the random execution of fifty men by way of an exemplary punishment.²⁵

'Abd al-Mu'min now turned his attention east, focusing on another close relative who like Dūstum had been exercising extensive gubernatorial authority for much of the previous decade. This was Ūzbik b. Rustam, 'Abd al-Mu'min's (3,2) kinsman, who had governed most of the Fergana valley since ca. 1588,²⁶ and whose relations with 'Abd al-Mu'min had long been strained. In the 1590s Ūzbik had repeatedly tried to mediate between 'Abdallāh and 'Abd al-Mu'min, but had only succeeded in antagonising the younger dynast.²⁷ In February 1598, furthermore, he had emerged as a clear rival to 'Abd al-Mu'min, according to one author vainly trying to forestall his elevation by making an attempt on Samarqand while the prince was still on the road from Balkh.²⁸ Ūzbik does not seem to have been surprised, therefore, when 'Abd al-Mu'min marched against him that spring. He had already packed off his sons Hazārah and Pīr Muḥammad to putative safety under the care of Tawakkul, khan of the Qazaqs,²⁹ and had strengthened the citadel defences at his base in Akhsikat.³⁰ When 'Abd al-Mu'min invested

²⁵ NZJ 128.

²⁶ MB 191.

²⁷ Ibid., 192.

²⁸ *Chūn rūzgār-i 'Abdallāh Khān bih sar āmad Ūzbik Khān 'amm-zādah-yi ū Samarqand-rā gird girift: AN III,742.*

²⁹ TShKh 109b (followed in turn in TQKh 268a) claims instead that Hazārah was captured by 'Abd al-Mu'min.

³⁰ MB 192; BA 7418 415a.

the citadel, however, Ūzbek supposedly succumbed to disease and died after only three days.³¹ His death gave ‘Abd al-Mu’min full control of the Fergana valley, which he placed under the gubernatorial authority of his (3,3) kinsman Muḥammad Qulī b. Maḥmūd, one of the few relatives towards whom he was reasonably well-disposed.³² ‘Abd al-Mu’min then headed back towards central Mā warā al-nahr.

‘Abd al-Mu’min’s plan was now to lead a further campaign against Safavid-held Khurāsān. For much of the 1590s ‘Abd al-Mu’min had been engaged in a bitter ongoing ‘war of words’ with Shah ‘Abbās,³³ and before his campaigns into Tashkent and Fergana he had given orders for Muḥammad Bāqī Bī and other regional governors to start mobilising troops in readiness for another offensive. But plans for this offensive came to nothing, as events took a different turn.

On 17 June 1599,³⁴ ‘Abd al-Mu’min and an expeditionary army of “Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Qazaqs, Qalmāqs and others”³⁵ were on the road south from Tashkent. In the twilight they were passing through a small village east of Jiz-zakh just off the main Tashkent-Samarqand road,³⁶ when their column was ambushed. An assailant shot an arrow straight through ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s body, and rushed the khan’s horse. Knocking ‘Abd al-Mu’min off his mount, he then hacked off the khan’s head.³⁷ In his brief khalifate career, ‘Abd al-Mu’min had made more enemies than was good for him.

Conspirators and Protégés

Most sources attribute ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s death to a conspiracy contracted by several of ‘Abdallāh Khan’s most prominent tribal *amīrs*.³⁸ Although the

³¹ AN III.742; BA 7418 415a.

³² MB 195. Muḥammad Qulī had previously been based in Samarqand.

³³ The phrase is borrowed from Audrey Burton’s “The War of Words”.

³⁴ 23 Dhū’l-Qa’dah 1007; TA 168, following FH 42a.

³⁵ BA 7418 415a.

³⁶ There is some confusion as to the name and orthography of this village. FH 42a and TA 168 refer to it as Zānī; other sources call it variously Zāmin (BA 7418 415a), Zāmin (TMQ 553b, TSh 140, NZJ 128, TSR 196a), Dāmin (TMKh 115), Dāmin (AN III.742, MaT 121a, TShKh 110a, this latter followed in turn in TQKh 268b) or Šā’in (RŠ 738). By contrast, RT 339a claims that he was attacked as he was travelling “from the bath-house to his palace” (*az garmābah bih dawlat-khānah*).

³⁷ TA 167, following FH 42a.

³⁸ NĀ 589 instead claims that ‘Abd al-Mu’min was killed by a youth fending off his amorous advances. Such gossipy rumours are a trope in Safavid narrative: thus *AhT* 396–397 and *KhT* 387 (in this case, as elsewhere, the two sources reporting a single tradition), for Nawrūz Aḥmad’s death in 1556; also *AhT* 400 and *KhT* 393, for Burhān Sultan’s death in

exact identity of all the conspirators is unclear, sources mention twelve individuals who supposedly participated in the assassination. The ringleader seems to have been 'Abd al-Wāsi' Bī Kinakas,³⁹ an associate of 'Abdallāh from the mid-1570s.⁴⁰ Fellow named conspirators include 'Abd al-Wāsi's brother 'Abd al-Ṣamad Bī,⁴¹ Muḥammad Mu'min Mīrzā, Khudāy Nazar Bī Qalmāq, Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān, Ḥājji Bī Qūshchī, Shāh Afkān Mīrzā, Junayd Bī,⁴² Muḥammad Qulī Bī Atāliq Bahrīn,⁴³ Muḥammad Yār Qārluq⁴⁴ and Qāsim Ḥājji.⁴⁵ As supporters of 'Abdallāh Khan, these individuals had all been stripped of their former perquisites by 'Abd al-Mu'min and now feared suffering the same fate as their former associate Qul Bābā Kūkaltāsh.⁴⁶ Other than this, however, they did not have much in common, and they displayed little solidarity upon achieving their goal of assassinating the murderous 'Abd al-Mu'min.

Before the late khan's body even had time to cool,⁴⁷ the conspirators broke up into factions. Some conspirators, such as Khudāy Nazar Bī Qalmāq, Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān and Muḥammad Qulī Bī Atāliq Bahrīn, proceeded west towards Bukhara.⁴⁸ Others, such as 'Abd al-Wāsi' Bī, Muḥammad Yār Qārluq and Ḥājji Bī Qūshchī, headed to Samarqand.⁴⁹ Still others, including

1557. Incidentally, the Ottomans told similar stories about the Safavids: E. Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert* (Freiburg, 1970), 92.

³⁹ *TA* 167, following *FH* 40b; *DQ* 35b; *TMQ* 553b; *BA* 7418 415b; *TSh* 140.

⁴⁰ *ShNSh* 171b; *ShNSh* 3497 163a, 244b.

⁴¹ *T'ĀĀ'A* 557 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 154b); *NZJ* 128; *Maṭṭ* 120b–121a. Interestingly, no single source mentions the participation of both 'Abd al-Wāsi' and his brother.

⁴² *TA* 167, following *FH* 40b, for these last five individuals.

⁴³ *TA* 167 (as 'Yār Muḥammad Qulī', perhaps thus conflated with Muḥammad Yār Qārluq); *TMQ* 553b; *T'ĀĀ'A* 557 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 154b); *BA* 7418 415b; *NZJ* 128; *TShKh* 110a (followed in turn in *TQKh* 268b); *TMKh* 115 (as 'Muḥammad Qulī Khan Khwājah'). Alekseev ("Sredniaia Aziia pri Ashtarkhanidakh v XVII–XVIII vv.", 118) misleadingly calls this figure 'Muḥammad Qulī Bī Tirandāz'; as found in our sources, the word *tīrandāz* (= archer) denotes not Muḥammad Qulī Bī's title or tribal affiliation but his role as 'Abd al-Mu'min's assassin.

⁴⁴ *BA* 7418 415b.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Note however *Aft* 114a, suggesting instead that the conspirators were motivated by the fearful prospect of having to meet the forces of Shah 'Abbās in battle: *bahādūrān tābi tawaqquf dar barābar-i lashkar-i qiyāmat-athar dar khūd nadīdah qarār-i qatl-i 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān-rā dādah dar hangām furṣat ū-ra bih qatl āwurdah-and.*

⁴⁷ Once it had cooled, it was buried in Balkh (*TSR* 196b), but was subsequently exhumed and moved to Bukhara, where it was reinterred alongside the coffin of 'Abdallāh b. Iskandar at the shrine of Bahā al-Dīn Naqshband: see *TMQ* 553b–554a, ascribing responsibility to Qāsim Ḥājji Diwānbikī, and *TQKh* 268b (with no mention, however, in *TShKh* 110a).

⁴⁸ *BA* 57a.

⁴⁹ *T'ĀĀ'A* 591, *BA* 51a–b.

Yār Muḥammad Mirzā and Shāh Afkān Mirzā, instead travelled south to Balkh.⁵⁰ Each group was hurrying to its respective destination in the hope of elevating its own chosen candidate to succeed ‘Abd al-Mu’min.

In Bukhara, since ca. 1560 the ‘capital’ of the khanate, *amīrs* elevated somebody called Pīr Muḥammad, who was the son of Sulaymān b. Jānī Bīk, and thus ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s (3,2) kinsman.⁵¹ In Samarqand, ‘Abd al-Wāsi’ Bī Kinakas secured the elevation of an unnamed son of Pāyandah Muḥammad b. Dūstum, who was ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s (2,3) kinsman.⁵² In Balkh, meanwhile, it evidently took a bit of time to decide upon a ruler. One tradition relates that the Balkhi *amīrs* first considered and rejected the candidacy of ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s own infant son;⁵³ another suggests that they initially elevated somebody called Jānī Muḥammad,⁵⁴ an individual who was much more

⁵⁰ *TĀĀ’A* 557 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 163b), *TA* 177.

⁵¹ *MB* 178 (in the context of an entry devoted to Sayyid Muḥammad Sultan b. Kipak b. Būpāy Sultan b. Khūjūgham [= Kūchkūnji] Sultan b. Abū’l-Khayr Khan); *MuT* (Shirāzī) 259b; *TMQ* 554a; *AfT* 125a, *TĀĀ’A* 557; also *TShKh* 110a (followed in turn in *TQKh* 268b), suggesting that before his elevation in Bukhara Pīr Muḥammad had been ruler of Balkh. For coinage in his name, see Davidovich, *Istoriia denezhnogo obrashcheniia srednevekovoi Srednei Azii*, 246. *TA* 178 suggests that Pīr Muḥammad was the son of Iskandar Sultan, who in turn was the fraternal nephew of Iskandar Khan; this ascription is found also in e.g. Bodleian Elliot 367 f. 232a.

⁵² *MB* 217. In relating this episode, Alekseev (“Sredniaia Aziia pri Ashtarkhanidakh v XVII–XVIII vv.”, 121, 125) confuses Pāyandah Muḥammad’s unnamed son with Muḥammad Qulī b. Maḥmūd, whom ‘Abd al-Mu’min had previously entrusted (see above, p. 44) with gubernatorial authority over Fergana.

⁵³ *TĀĀ’A* 557, followed in turn in *SilSal* 155b. Contrast with e.g. *NZJ* 129 and *TShKh* 110a (followed in turn in *TQKh* 268b), claiming that ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s son was actually elevated in authority: see below, n. 54.

⁵⁴ *TA* 175–176 relates that Jānī Muḥammad was briefly elevated to Balkhi authority by a group of *amīrs* under the command of ‘Ādil Pāy Katāwal, who “clothed him in the robe of sovereignty and swore their loyal service” (*khil’at-i pādīshāhānah pūshīdah, kamar-i khidmat wa iṭā’at-i ū bar miyān bastand*), but who reversed this move when confronted by the widow of ‘Ibādallāh Sultan (noted also in *AfT* 125b), who chastised them for elevating an “outsider” (*būgānah*) in place of her own son ‘Abd al-Amīn. (Waḥīd-niyā’s edition wrongly gives this individual, p. 176, as *pisarī az ‘Ubaydallāh Khān* rather than the correct *pisarī az ‘Ibādallāh Khān*, as given in e.g. MS Bodleian Elliot 367 229a). This story appears also in *TĀĀ’A* 557–558, which unlike the *TA* narrative suggests that the Balkhi *amīrs* elevated Jānī Muḥammad only after considering and rejecting the candidacy of ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s infant son. We find echoes of the in *TĀĀ’A* narrative in *SilSal* 156b, which claims however that Jānī Muḥammad was elevated at this time to khalid authority in Samarqand (*dar dār al-salṭānah-yi Samarqand Jānī Muḥammad Khān julūs-i salṭanat farmūd*); for Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm’s similarly unsupported account of Jānī Muḥammad’s subsequent activities in Balkh, see below, p. 169 n. 83, and p. 174 n. 106. For discussion of Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī’s apocryphal claim (*TMKh* 121) that Jānī Muḥammad was offered the Bukharan throne immediately after ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s death see below, n. 62.

distantly related to 'Abd al-Mu'min in the paternal line, and to whom as a prominent figure in this story we shall soon have cause to return. After some negotiation, however, the *amīrs* decided to support the elevation of a youth called 'Abd al-Amīn.⁵⁵ They did so because they were informed that he was the son of 'Abdallāh's late brother 'Ibādallāh—he had escaped 'Abd al-Mu'min's dynastic purge by being disguised as a girl, we read⁵⁶—and that his parentage thus made him “a suitable candidate for authority from within the ruling family”.⁵⁷

The three newly elevated 'provincial rulers'⁵⁸ were uniformly undistinguished. Pāyandah Muḥammad's son was evidently little more than a child,⁵⁹ and 'Abd al-Amīn only a youth.⁶⁰ According to Iskandar Bīk Munshī in the *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*, meanwhile, Pīr Muḥammad was elevated in Bukhara only because there was no other possible candidate,⁶¹ and he bore the marks of an opium habit to which he had succumbed during the traumatic events of 'Abd al-Mu'min's reign.⁶² All three individuals would prove poor heirs to the legacy of 'Abdallāh Khan: and none of them would rule for long.

⁵⁵ MB 176 and 209; T'A 176; AfT 125b; T'ĀĀ'A 558; BA 58b. For coinage issued in 'Abd al-Amīn's name, see Lowick, “Shaybānid Silver Coins”, 329, and Davidovich, *Istoriia denezhnoho obrashcheniia*, 252. Some late authors wrongly suggest that 'Abd al-Amīn was elevated as 'Abd al-Mu'min's son (NZJ 129, TShKh 10a, this latter followed in turn in TQKh 268b) or as his brother (Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, II.ii.739–740).

⁵⁶ T'ĀĀ'A 558, followed in turn in *SilSal* 156a.

⁵⁷ *Az dūdman-i pādīshāhī pādīshāh-zādah-yi qābil wa sazāwar-i saltanat hast*: T'ĀĀ'A 557.

⁵⁸ The original Persian term is *mulūk-i ṭawā'if*, for which see e.g. AN III.737; also *ibid.*, III.742, relating how *Mā warā al-nahr ṭawā'if al-mulūk shud*. For discussion of the term, and of its connotations of disorder, see e.g. E. Tucker, “Explaining Nadir Shah: Kingship and Royal Legitimacy in Muḥammad Kazim Marvi's *Tārīkh-i 'Ālamārā-ye nāderī*”, in *Iranian Studies* 26 (1993), 95–117 [96], and M. Bernardini, *Mémoire et propagande à l'époque timouride* (Paris, 2008), 51.

⁵⁹ MB 217.

⁶⁰ T'A 176 and T'ĀĀ'A 558 claim that 'Abd al-Amīn was sixteen. Khwājam Quli Bik claims (TQKh 268b) that he was only three; he here deviates from his TShKh source narrative, which makes no mention of 'Abd al-Amīn's age.

⁶¹ *Chun kasī kih shāyastah-yi saltanat būdah bāshad dar Bukhārā nabūd nāchār bih saltanat-i Pīr Muḥammad Khān [...] rāḍī shudah [...]*: T'ĀĀ'A 557. See also *SilSal* 150a, on how 'Abd al-Mu'min “left none of the Jūchid princes alive except for Pīr Muḥammad and a few babies” (*az salaṭīn-i Jūchī-nīzhād siwā-yi Pīr Muḥammad [...] wa chand shūr-khwārah hīchkasra zindah nagudhāshht*). This latter passage is strongly redolent of one in TShKh 10a (followed in turn in TQKh 268b): *ghayr-i Pīr Muḥammad [...] sih ṭīf-i digar zindah nagudhāshht*.

⁶² T'ĀĀ'A 557 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 156a): TMO 55.22: TOKh 268b




Figure 3: Local successors to 'Abd al-Mu'min in Samarqand, Bukhara and Balkh (underlined).

Yār Muḥammad, Dīn Muḥammad and the Tūqāy-Timūrids

The newly elevated rulers of Samarqand, Bukhara and Balkh were not the only individuals in Greater Mā warā al-nahr who were established in 'local khalnal authority' in mid-summer 1598. In the west of the khanate, a fourth individual called Yār Muḥammad was established in authority over the region around Herat. As the father of that Jānī Muḥammad whose abortive Balkhi candidacy we have just noted, Yār Muḥammad was not a close blood relative of 'Abd al-Mu'min. However, his sister Mihrijān Khānum was married to 'Abdallāh and he himself was married to Mas'ūd Sulṭān Khānum, 'Abd al-Mu'min's aunt,⁶³ while Jānī Muḥammad was apparently married to two of 'Abdallāh's sisters, namely Gul Pāshah Bīkīm⁶⁴ and Zīhr Bānū Bīkīm.⁶⁵ The sons of Jānī Muḥammad were thus maternally related to members of the Bukharan ruling house in several ways.

⁶³ BA 38a. See also PN I.217, on how Iskandar Khan, recognising Yār Muḥammad to be an able young man, gave him in marriage the hand of his daughter, the sister of 'Abdallāh (*Iskandar Khān pidar-i 'Abdallāh Khān ū-rā jawān-i aṣīl-i qābīl dānistand, dukhtar-i khūd-rā, kih hamshīrah-yi haqīqī-yi 'Abdallāh Khān būd, dar hībālah-yi nikāh-i ū dar āwurd*). A variation on this passage is given in 'Aṣ I.303: *Sikandar Sulṭān pidar-i 'Abdallāh Khān nazar bih najābat wa qābūlyat-i ū kardah karīmah-yi khūd-rā, kih hamshīrah-yi haqīqī-yi 'Abdallāh Khān būd, bih ū dar silk-i izdīwāj kashīdah, wa thamarah-yi in paywand-i arjumand zūd bih 'ālam shuhūd paywastah Jānī Sulṭān bih 'arḍah-yi wujūd āmad*.

⁶⁴ NZJ 179.

⁶⁵ *SūSal* 125b–126a. The two names encountered here and in NZJ 179 may alternatively be different appellations of a single person.




Figure 4: The relationship between Yār Muḥammad and Dīn Muḥammad, and the family of 'Abd al-Mu'min.

Through the paternal line, Yār Muḥammad was related to 'Abd al-Mu'min only very distantly indeed. Seventeenth-century Indian chroniclers betray their dependence on one another's work by persistently identifying Yār Muḥammad as a descendent of the 'sultans of Ūrganj';⁶⁶ if by 'sultans of Ūrganj' they mean members of that party which governed the Khwārazm region during the 16th and 17th centuries, the implication would be that Yār Muḥammad was 'Abd al-Mu'min's ($x = 8$) kinsman.⁶⁷ However, more

⁶⁶ *MuT* (Shirāzi) 260a. See also *PN* I.217, claiming that Yār Muḥammad was the cousin of Ḥājjim Khān (i.e. Ḥājjī Muḥammad b. Āghatāy, for whom see e.g. A. Gündoğdu, "Hive Hanlığı Tarihi (Yadigar Şibanları Devri 1512–1740)" (Ankara University Ph.D. thesis, 1995), 107–125), the wālī of Ūrganj ('*amm-zādah-yi Ḥājjim Khān wālī-yi Ūrganj*'); *AŞ* I.303, following *PN* I.217 and additionally suggesting that Yār Muḥammad came to Mā warā al-nahr after having taken offence at Ḥājjim Khān's behaviour (*bih sabab-i sulūk-i nā-hanjār kih mulāyim-i ṭab' wa muwāfiq-i mizāj-i ū nabūd ranjīdah az Khwārazm bar āmad*); and *M'Ā* 170a. Interestingly, *NZJ* 179 also describes Yār Muḥammad as descended "from the sultans of Khwārazm": this seems to be evidence of the work's Indian influence, for which see also below, p. 210 n. 113.

⁶⁷ Members of this family, collectively known as 'Arabshāhids, were descended from 'Abd al-Mu'min's (8,0) ancestor Pūlād b. Mankū Tīmūr: *BA/MIKKh* 346–351; *Maṭṭ* 38a–b; *ShT* 182–184. It is possible that in referring to the 'sultans of Ūrganj' the Indian chroniclers are confusing the 'Arabshāhids with the descendents of Yār Muḥammad's (7,0) ancestor Qutlugh Tīmūr, who ruled the region of Khwārazm in the early fourteenth century: see e.g. Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, *The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, AD 1325–1354*, tr. H.A.R. Gibb (Cambridge, 1962), II.311, III.541 and 544–546, and *DhJT* 180 and 191; discussion in Togan, "Hārīzm", in *IA* V.i.240–257 [250–251].




Figure 5: The paternal relationship between Yār Muḥammad and 'Abd al-Mu'min.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ For Shibānid descent, see *TGNN* 69b–75b, *MNB* 45, *ZĀ* 471b–472a, *TAKhKh* 352a, *ShNSh* 27a, *IN* 114b–116b, *BA/MIKKh* 346–451 and *ShT* 182–183; I thus disregard the variant genealogy given in e.g. *AhT* 396–397 and *KhT* 287. For Tūqāy-Timūrid descent, see *IQN* 10b–14b, *BA* 2a–4a, *MaT* 122b and *ShT* 179; I thus disregard several eighteenth-century works offering markedly different Tūqāy-Timūrid genealogical narratives, notably *TMKh* 119, *TQKh* 269b–270a (Khwājā Qulī Bik Balkhī thus deviating from his *TShKh* source narrative, which offers no such genealogy), *SilSal* 124b–125a and *TAFK* 1a. Some of these divergent accounts are

authoritative sources indicate that Yār Muḥammad was actually ‘Abd al-Mu‘min’s (14,12) kinsman. The two men’s closest common ancestor was Jūchī, the youngest son of Chingīz Khan, whose descendents had been ruling much of the Dasht-i Qipchāq since the late 1220s. ‘Abd al-Mu‘min’s (13,0) ancestor was Shībān b. Jūchī, and Yār Muḥammad’s (11,0) ancestor was Shībān’s brother Tūqāy Timūr: we may most neatly convey the two men’s attenuated paternal relationship by speaking of ‘Abd al-Mu‘min as a *Shībānid* dynast and of Yār Muḥammad as a *Tūqāy-Timūrid*, each thus with reference to his respective eponymous ancestor.⁶⁹

It may be useful at this juncture briefly to look back in time. The families of ‘Abd al-Mu‘min and Yār Muḥammad had long lived separately from one another. Together with other Shībānids, ‘Abd al-Mu‘min’s ancestors had lived for most of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in the region of western Siberia.⁷⁰ Under the leadership of ‘Abd al-Mu‘min’s great-great-great grandfather Abū’l-Khayr Khan, the family had expanded south into what is today Kazakhstan in the mid-fifteenth century,⁷¹ and at the turn of the sixteenth century a grandson of Abū’l-Khayr called Muḥammad Shībānī led his fellow Shībānids and their non-Chingīzid tribal supporters in an invasion of Mā warā al-nahr.⁷² Having captured most of Mā warā al-nahr from its former Timūrid masters by 1507, Muḥammad Shībānī then attempted to expand Shībānid rule westwards into Khurāsān.⁷³ His efforts culminated in disaster, however, when in 1510 he was killed at Merv in a showdown with the Safavid ruler Shah Isma‘īl.⁷⁴

Despite this setback, Muḥammad Shībānī’s fellow *Abū’l-Khayrids*—that is, descendents of the famous Abū’l-Khayr⁷⁵—managed to regroup, and

⁶⁹ For the vocabulary of eponymeity, see Dickson, “Uzbek Dynastic Theory”, 209–210.

⁷⁰ Iudin, “Ordy: Belaia, Siniaia, Seraia, Zolotaia”, in Tulepbaev (ed.), *Kazakhstan, Sredniaia i Tsentral’naia Azia* 106–165 [128–129]; A.G. Nesterov, “Gosudarstva Sheibanidov i Taibugidov v zapadnoi Sibiri v XIV–XVII vv. — arkhologiiia i istoriia” (Summary [Avtoreferat] of Moscow University Ph.D. thesis, 1988), 12–13.

⁷¹ Akhmedov, *Gosudarstvo kochevykh uzbekov* (Moscow, 1965), 47–58.

⁷² A.A. Semenov, “Sheibani-khan i zavoevanie im imperii timuridov”, in *Materialy po istorii Tadzhikov i Uzbekov Srednei Azii* (Stalinabad, 1954), 39–83.

⁷³ *HS* 367–391; *ZĀ* 476b–477b; *FSH* 325.

⁷⁴ *HS* 591–592; *ZĀ* 478b–479a; *FSH* 334–335.

⁷⁵ The use of this term is perhaps misleading, since it omits from its domain of reference descendents of Abū’l-Khayr’s (2,3) kinsman Ḥamzah b. Bakhtiyar, who in the early sixteenth century were evidently part of the same dynastic ruling collective and were only subsequently excluded therefrom: see Welsford, “Rethinking the Ḥamzahids of Ḥiṣār”. A more appropriate ancestral name might be ‘Ibrāhimid’, since it was from Shībān’s (a.6) descendant




Figure 6: The Abū'l-Khayrid family.

after several years of hostilities against their Safavid and Tīmūrīd rivals they succeeded in regaining control of Mā warā al-nahr together with parts of northern Khurāsān and the southern Dasht-i Qipchāq, which thereafter remained subject to Abū'l-Khayrid rule for most of the rest of the sixteenth century. 'Abd al-Mu'min was the last eminent scion of the Abū'l-Khayrid family.

Yār Muḥammad, meanwhile, had a very different story to tell. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries most Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds had lived to the west of their Shībānīd kinsmen, rarely nomadising further east than the Ural river and the settlement of Sarāychuk, near the north-eastern shore of the Caspian.⁷⁶ In the mid-fifteenth century, sub-dynasties descended from a brother of Abāy b. Ūz Tīmūr b. Tūqāy Tīmūr had established themselves in khal authority in Kazan and Crimea,⁷⁷ while descendents of Abāy's own (o,6) kinsman Muḥammad established themselves in khal authority at Astrakhan, on the north-west coast of the Caspian Sea.⁷⁸ Yār Muḥammad's

their ancestry. But in the wake of Dickson, "Uzbek Dynastic Theory", 209, it has become conventional to speak of an 'Abū'l-Khayrid' ancestral grouping and dynastic collectivity: in deference to convention, I retain the terminology.

⁷⁶ BA 8a, 23a–b; 'UT, 93–94.

⁷⁷ D.M. Iskhakov, "O rodoslovnoi khana Ulug-Mukhammeda", in *Tiurkologicheskii sbornik 2001* (2002), 63–74 [68]; also *JT* (Qādir 'Alī Bik) 233; BA 2b–3b, 30a; 'UT 76.

⁷⁸ I.V. Zaitsev, "Obrazovanie astrakhanskogo khanstva", in *Tiurkologicheskii sbornik 2001* (2002), 32–62 [38–39].




Figure 7: The paternal relationship of Yār Muḥammad to the Qazaq khans and khans of Kazan, Crimea and Astrakhan.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ BA 2a–4a. As is evident from this chart, Tūqāy Timūr had a lot of descendents. To distinguish members of the dynastic party which established itself in authority in Central Asia during the period 1598–1605 from other Tūqāy-Timūrid dynasts, we might perhaps term them 'Māngishlāqids', in view of their common descent from Māngishlāq b. Jawāq. Again, however, it remains more conventional to term them simply 'Tūqāy-Timūrids', and in deference to convention I retain the terminology.

grandfather Jawāq and father Māngishlāq both lived in Astrakhan, although neither individual ever became Astrakhani khan himself. Authority instead passed between descendents of Jawāq's two brothers Aḥmad and Maḥ-mūd.⁸⁰

The circumstances of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds' journey from Astrakhan to Mā warā al-nahr remain extremely unclear.⁸¹ The *Baḥr al-asrār* reports that Yār Muḥammad's grandfather Māngishlāq led the family southeast to Mā warā al-nahr some time around 1528;⁸² other sources, meanwhile, suggest that it was Yār Muḥammad himself who set off for Mā warā al-nahr in the middle of the sixteenth century, apparently in response to the Russian conquest of Astrakhan in 1556.⁸³ Whatever the truth, it is evident that members of this newly-arrived family unit quickly distinguished themselves in the Abū'l-Khayrid khanate. Yār Muḥammad contracted his afore-mentioned marriage alliance with Iskandar Khan, and the offspring from this union soon acquired a reputation for valiant behaviour.

Particularly notable among these offspring was Yār Muḥammad's grandson Dīn Muḥammad,⁸⁴ who was 'Abd al-Mu'min's maternal first cousin once removed. Dīn Muḥammad was an extremely energetic military leader. In the 1580s he had played an important part in 'Abdallāh's campaigns against local opponents in Qunduz, Badakhshan and elsewhere in the east of the khanate,⁸⁵ and subsequently he made a name for himself while supporting 'Abd al-Mu'min in his western campaigns.⁸⁶ Subsequent tradition particu-

⁸⁰ BA 4a-b, 34b-35a; UT 94, 108-109. Discussion in P.I. Rychkov, *Vvedenie kastrakhanskoi topografii* (Moscow, 1774), 51-63.

⁸¹ See e.g. Trepavlov, "Rodonachal'niki Ashtarkhanidov v Desht-i Kipchake (zametki o predystorii Bukharskoi dinastii)", in *Türkologicheskiı sbornik 2007-2008* (2009), 370-395 [370-371] for the varying accounts offered by different scholars.

⁸² BA 36b-37a: see below, pp. 292-293.

⁸³ PN I.217, dating events to "after the Russian conquest of Astrakhan" (*ba'd az giriftan-i tā'ifah-yi Urūs-i wilāyat-i Hashtarkhān-rā*); also *SilSal* 124b, dating events to the reign in Bukhara of Iskandar b. Jāni Bik, i.e. after 1561. I have found no textual support for Gafurov's claim (*idem*, *Central Asia—Pre-Historic to Pre-Modern Times*, II, 381) that it was 'Janibeg' [i.e. Jāni Muḥammad] who "fled to the Sheibanids".

⁸⁴ Several works note that he was popularly known by some alternative rendering of his name: see e.g. FH 46b, referring to *Dīn Muḥammad Khān, mashhūr bih Tīlīm Khān*; also NĀ 591, referring to *Dīn Muḥammad [...]* *bayn al-jumhūr bih Tīlīm Khān mashhūr*; TMQ 554b, referring to *Dīn Muḥammad Khān, mashhūr bih Tinīm Khān*, and TĀĀ'A 455 (followed in turn in e.g. 'AŞ I.303) referring to *Dīn Muḥammad Khān, mashhūr bih Yitīm Khān*: note however that various MSS, e.g. BL Or. 152f. 240b and BL Add. Or. 16684f. 165, refer instead to *Dīn Muḥammad Khān, mashhūr bih Tīlīm Khān*). RDJP 192 refers meanwhile to 'Telin Can' and RŞ 739, 741 and 744 refers to 'Dinim Khān'.

⁸⁵ *ShNSH* 3497 231a; BA 7418 383a; BA 43a-44a.

⁸⁶ TĀĀ'A 411-412, 455-457; RŞ 739; IQN 20b; BA 44a-48a.

larly remembered Dīn Muḥammad's activities at the capture of Mashhad. Two eighteenth-century sources claim that he exploited his renown to persuade 'Abd al-Mu'min to grant the inhabitants of the fallen city an amnesty after several days of unchecked looting, and that by this timely intercession he won so much gratitude that Mīrzā Abū Ṭālib Ridā, guardian of the city's famed shrine of Imām 'Alī Mūsā, gave him his own sister in marriage.⁸⁷ When 'Abd al-Mu'min then withdrew to Balkh, he left Dīn Muḥammad to govern the newly conquered territories of Khurāsān and Sīstān⁸⁸ from a gubernatorial seat at Qā'in.⁸⁹ In the later 1590s, however, the family's relations with 'Abd al-Mu'min deteriorated. "They failed to obey 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan", writes Iskandar Bik Munshī in the *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*, "and they showed little regard for his orders and prohibitions."⁹⁰ As the relationship with 'Abd al-Mu'min became increasingly antagonistic, Dīn Muḥammad sought to defend his interests by cultivating ties instead with 'Abdallāh, his maternal great-uncle.⁹¹

'Abdallāh's death in February 1598 deprived Tūqāy-Tīmūrid family members of their prime ally and protector. Upon 'Abd al-Mu'min's arrival in Samarqand, Dīn Muḥammad's father Jānī Muḥammad—an individual with a long family association with the city (see below, p. 244)—was exiled to Balkh,⁹² and the rest of the family realised that they too should expect little goodwill from the newly-elevated khan. Several sources relate that Yār Muḥammad departed for India, under the pretext that he wished to perform the *hajj*;⁹³ Dīn Muḥammad, meanwhile, defied 'Abd al-Mu'min's

⁸⁷ *TMKh* 163–164; *SilSal* 137a–b. The two works here are both presumably drawing on an earlier source. For further discussion of their common borrowings, see below, pp. 254–255.

⁸⁸ The region of eastern Iran, southwestern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, around the modern city of Shahr-i Zabul.

⁸⁹ *TA* 168, following *FH* 43b; *TMQ* 554b–555a; *T'ĀĀ'A* 180 (with reference to Mawlānā Walī, an eminent poet who died in Qā'in during Dīn Muḥammad's governorship); *IM*, 260; *BA* 44b, comprising a *dāstān* on Dīn Muḥammad's *takhlīs-i qal'ah-yi Qā'in wa ghayr-i ān az qilā'-i ān ḥudūd*; and *PN* I.217 and 'AŞ I.303.

⁹⁰ *Itā'at-i 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān namikardand wa bih amr wa nahī-yi ū ziyādah-yi iltifātī namīnamūdand*: *T'ĀĀ'A* 559. See also *SilSal* 145b, independently recording how on repeated occasions Dīn Muḥammad failed to participate in 'Abd al-Mu'min's campaigns into Khurāsān: *chand martabah kih 'Abd al-Mu'min bih tashkūr-i ba'dī mahāl-i Khurāsān kih dar taht-i Qizilbāsh māndah būd raftah Dīn Muḥammad wa umarā-yi Khurāsān bih hamrāhī-yi ū nakardand*.

⁹¹ *IM* 260.

⁹² *TA* 175, claiming that 'Jānī Sultan' was dispatched to Balkh just nine days before the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min, and immediately prior to his own abortive Balkhi elevation (see above, pp. 46–47); for his exile and/or imprisonment see also *T'ĀĀ'A* 557 and 559, *NZJ* 127 and *BA* 58b.

⁹³ *T'ĀĀ'A* 560, followed in turn in *SilSal* 157b; *BA* 40b; and *PN* I.217–218 and 'AŞ I.304.

instructions to return to Samarqand and remained in his stronghold around Qā'in.⁹⁴ At some point over the next month or two, he then set out from Qā'in with the aim of capturing Herat.⁹⁵ Since Qul Bābā's departure, Herat had been subject to an *amīr* of the prominent Dūrmān tribe called Ḥājji Bī.⁹⁶ Ḥājji Bī opted not to resist Dīn Muḥammad's approach,⁹⁷ and Dīn Muḥammad straightaway entered the citadel and "raised the flag of *ḥukūmat*".⁹⁸ He did not do so in his own name, however. Instead, he repudiated the title in favour of his grandfather Yār Muḥammad,⁹⁹ who had learned of Dīn Muḥammad's seizure of Herat while journeying on the *hajj* and had hurried to join his kinsman.¹⁰⁰ Although Dīn Muḥammad did not possess the khalal title himself, he was clearly *de facto* ruler. It was he who dispatched a

⁹⁴ *TMQ* 555b, recording that Dīn Muḥammad and his brothers killed the unfortunate messenger who was sent to command their return.

⁹⁵ There is some disagreement among our sources as to the timing of subsequent events. *TA* 168 claims that Dīn Muḥammad established himself in authority over Herat during the reign of 'Abd al-Mu'min. Most of our other sources, including *NĀ* 591, *AfT* 115a, *TMQ* 555b, *RŞ* 739, *TĀĀ'A* 559 (followed in turn by *SilSal* 157a), *BA* 41b, *PN* 1.217–218 and *TShKh* 111a (followed in turn in *TQKh* 270a), claim that he did not do so until after 'Abd al-Mu'min's death.

⁹⁶ *TĀĀ'A* 559, followed in turn in *SilSal* 157a; *IQN* 23a; *BA* 53a and 164b; *NZJ* 235. Contrast with *TA* 168, claiming that Dīn Muḥammad's very reason for establishing himself in Herat was that, after Qul Bābā, the city "lacked an independent governor" (*az ḥākim-i mustaqill khālī būd*).

⁹⁷ *TĀĀ'A* 559, stating that Ḥājji Bī was unable to oppose Dīn Muḥammad's entry into the citadel because "he did not think that there was anyone from the ruling family in Mā warā al-nahr who was capable of exercising authority" (*dar Mā warā al-nahr az nishād-i salāḥīn kasi kih shāyastah-yi pādishāhī bāshad gumān nadāsh*). *SilSal* 157a–158a here embroiders upon the *TĀĀ'A* narrative, with an account of how Ḥājji Bī accorded Dīn Muḥammad a warm reception into the city (*bā a'yān wa umarā wa ashrāf-i Hirāt wa 'uzamā-yi ūzbikīyah kih dar Hirāt būdand bi yarāq wa silah bih istiḡbāl bar āmadah*). See also *IQN* 23a and *BA* 53a.

⁹⁸ *Ūṭam' dar saltānat-i Khurāsān kardah dar dār al-saltānah-yi Hirāt 'alam-i ḥukūmat bar afrākh*: *NĀ* 591.

⁹⁹ *Bih tūrah-yi Chingīzī [...] ism-i pādishāhī bar ū iṭlāq namūdah khuṭbah wa sikkah bih nām-i ū kard*: *TĀĀ'A* 560. A variation of this account is given in *SilSal* 157b: 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān bih *dastūr wa yasā-yi Chingīzī wa shūwah-yi 'Abdallāh Khānī [...] sikkah wa khuṭbah bih jadd-i khūd Yār Muḥammad [...] kardah ism-i pādishāhī bar ū iṭlāq namūd* (the reference here to 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān is evidently a mistake). See also *BA* 41b: *ān shahriyār [i.e. Dīn Muḥammad] [...] qabūl-i ān muhim-i humāyun-rā khilāf-i yāsā wa yūsūn dānistah [...] jadd-i buzurgwār-i khwīsh Yār Muḥammad Khān-rā bih iqbāl-i mu'āmalah-yi saltānat wa ijlāl ridāmand sākh*.

¹⁰⁰ *TĀĀ'A* 560, followed in turn in *SilSal* 157b. Note however that there is some doubt regarding the timing of Yār Muḥammad's return from India. *BA* 41a suggests that it occurred before the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min, while *PN* 1.218 by contrast claims that it did not occur until a substantially later date, a full year after Dīn Muḥammad's death and the arrival of his brother Bāqī Muḥammad b. Janī Muḥammad in Bukhara.

campaign to secure the capture of Mashhad,¹⁰¹ and he also, according to a dubious late source, who dispatched forces to secure the submission of Merv.¹⁰² He also moved to galvanise local Khurāsāni support, sending communications to various sections of the population in order to assure them of his good will.¹⁰³

Dīn Muḥammad was well aware, however, that backing from eminent Khurāsānis would avail him little if and when ‘Abd al-Mu’min should march against him. He needed further backing, and he was not going to get it from elsewhere in the khanate. He and his brother Bāqī Muḥammad thus resolved upon a fateful expedient. They dispatched the *amīr* Yūsuf Bahādur Qūshbikī with a letter to the court of Shah ‘Abbās in Isfahan. In this letter, they informed ‘Abbās that following ‘Abdallāh’s death they had established themselves in the shah’s former holding of Herat, which they proposed to rule as ‘Abbās’ vassals. In return, they hoped that ‘Abbās might come to their assistance should ‘Abd al-Mu’min advance against them.¹⁰⁴ ‘Abbās responded warmly to this overture, offering as it did a good opportunity to restore his position in Khurāsān. He prepared for a campaign to assist Dīn Muḥammad against the Bukharan threat.¹⁰⁵

Instead of being pleased to learn of ‘Abbās’ plans, however, Dīn Muḥammad was disheartened. Things had changed in the meanwhile. With ‘Abd

¹⁰¹ *TA* 171; *RS* 740–741. The campaign, under the command of a certain Muḥammad Sultan, proved unsuccessful.

¹⁰² *Silsal* 157b–158a, relating how the *hākim* of Merv, Sulaymān Yasāwul, sought to secure the local khalal elevation of a certain Qāsīm Sultan. Learning of this, Dīn Muḥammad dispatched his brother Walī Muḥammad to regain authority over the city. Seeking to make amends for his catastrophic error of judgement, Sulaymān Yasāwul welcomed Walī Muḥammad with a warm reception, and brought him into the city. Walī Muḥammad was not to be mollified, however: he took possession of the citadel, and put the local garrison to death. The story appears to be a late invention: most early sources indicate that throughout this period Merv remained under the governorship of the Abū’l-Khayrīd dynasty Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, for whom see below, pp. 170–172. Compare however with *TQKh* 269b, for discussion of which see below, p. 192 n. 29.

¹⁰³ *Yarlıghhā bih istīmālat-i sādāt wa arbāb wa ahālī bih atrāf wa jawānib-i Khurāsān wa mustahfizān-i qilā’ wa bilād fristād*: *TĀĀ’A* 560, followed closely by *Silsal* 157b (*yarlıghhā bih istīmālat-i arbāb wa ahālī-yi atrāf wa jawānib-i Khurāsān wa mustahfizān-i qilā’ wa bilād fristād*).

¹⁰⁴ *TA* 168, following *FH* 44a; also *TMQ* 555b and *TĀĀ’A* 559–560, both dating this communication to before Dīn Muḥammad’s accession to power in Herat.

¹⁰⁵ *TA* 169. Contrast with *AJT* 114b, suggesting that ‘Abbās was prompted to move east upon learning from Muḥammad Qulī Bik that Dīn Muḥammad, for all his assertions of friendship towards ‘Abbās, had no intention of surrendering control of Khurāsān: *Muḥammad Qulī Bik āmadah bih ‘ard rasānīd kih ‘Agar chih Tilīm Sulṭān zāhīr alāf muḥabbat zadah khūd-rā az jumlah-yi mukhlīshān mīshumurad, fa-amā bih riḍā-yi khūd dandān-i ṭam’ az wilāyat-i Khurāsān bar dāshtah bih taṣarruf nakhwāhad dād’*.

al-Mu'min's unforeseen death in mid-June, the danger from Bukhara had suddenly lifted, and the need for Safavid assistance had passed. The contract with 'Abbās into which Dīn Muḥammad had entered suddenly looked like a burden. A strong central ruler had fallen and been replaced by several weaker regional rulers, and Dīn Muḥammad might have been well placed to exploit the resultant power vacuum. Neither Pīr Muḥammad, 'Abd al-Amīn nor Pāyandah Muḥammad's son could rival his own military and administrative record, and in early summer 1598 Dīn Muḥammad could reasonably have regarded himself as the strongest candidate to succeed the little-loved 'Abd al-Mu'min. Full khalif authority was there for the taking; but Dīn Muḥammad had made things difficult for himself. Shah 'Abbās was marching east, and Shah 'Abbās regarded Dīn Muḥammad as his vassal. He was not going to take kindly to any attempt by Dīn Muḥammad to extricate himself from this position.

Several sources recount that, upon learning of 'Abbās' eastward advance,¹⁰⁶ Dīn Muḥammad discussed with his supporters what he should do. Some *amīrs*, including Ḥājjī Bī, 'Abdallāh Manghit and the former governor of Mashhad Abū'l-Muḥammad Bī, recommended that he should abandon Khurāsān to the advancing Safavid army, and withdraw back towards Mā warā al-nahr.¹⁰⁷ Others proposed a more robust response, arguing that Dīn Muḥammad should refuse to yield an inch, and instead prepare for

¹⁰⁶ *SūSal* 157b–158b claims that 'Abbās, before marching east, sent Dīn Muḥammad a letter emphasising that his aims were not aggressive, that he had no ambitions against Mā warā al-nahr, and that, in the wake of 'Abd al-Mu'min's death, he simply wished to retake possession of those lands in Khurāsān and Sistān which "have long been an integral element of Iran" and which, before falling into the possession of 'Abd al-Mu'min and 'Abdallāh, had "been part of our family's heritage for the last hundred years" (*qadīmān dākhil-i Īrān wa mawrūthī-yi yak šad sālah-yi īn dūdman ast*). The passage is derived from two passages in Ḥājjī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm's *T'ĀĀ'A* source narrative. The more obvious borrowing is from *T'ĀĀ'A* 562, where we read that, upon learning of the Safavid advance from local informants (for which see also e.g. *RŠ* 741), one of Dīn Muḥammad's own *amīrs* advised Dīn Muḥammad that "for a hundred years Khurāsān has been the camping ground and dwelling place of the Qizilbāsh, and the Ūzbiks have never established a permanent residence there: our own camping ground and dwelling place has long been Mā warā al-nahr" (*wilāyat-i Khurāsān yūrt wa maskan-i šad sālah-yi Qizilbāsh ast, dar hīch zamān Ūzbikiyah dar Khurāsān istiqāmati-yi tām nayāftah-and, wa yūrt wa maskan-i qadīm-i mā Mā warā al-nahr ast*). The less obvious borrowing, and one from a very different point in the *T'ĀĀ'A* narrative, is from *T'ĀĀ'A* 452–453, where we read that Shah 'Abbās claimed in a letter to 'Abd al-Mu'min—not Dīn Muḥammad—that "Khurāsān has been part of our family's heritage for the last hundred years" (*Khurāsān mulk-i mawrūthī-yi yak šad sālah-yi īn dūdman ast*). It is unclear what authorial motivations lie behind Ḥājjī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm's elision of the two passages.

¹⁰⁷ *T'ĀĀ'A* 562–563; *RŠ* 740; *IQN* 23b.

battle. Dīn Muḥammad sided with the more belligerent party,¹⁰⁸ perhaps calculating that pusillanimity in the face of the Safavid threat would tarnish his valiant reputation and undermine any future bid for full khalal authority. As 'Abbās travelled east through Sabzawār, Nishāpūr and Mashhad, Dīn Muḥammad organised his resources. He placed one of his family members in charge of administering Herat,¹⁰⁹ and dispatched his nephew Muḥammad Sultan with a small detachment of troops to harass 'Abbās's army as it advanced east from Mashhad,¹¹⁰ while he himself took charge of mobilising forces for the upcoming showdown.

By early August 1598, Dīn Muḥammad had amassed a contingent of troops.¹¹¹ Having expected 'Abbās' army to press on south from Mashhad to Herat, Dīn Muḥammad was relieved to learn that the Safavid forces had instead opted to withdraw back towards Iran. He advanced north in pursuit, hoping to use the momentum from this campaign to conquer those parts of Khurāsān which were still under Safavid rule. Before his army had advanced far, however, it was ambushed near the settlement of Pul-i Sālār¹¹² by 'Abbās' men, whose supposed retreat had been a mere subterfuge. On 9 August¹¹³ the two armies lined up opposite one another, and battle commenced.

During much of the day's melee, Dīn Muḥammad's forces enjoyed the upper hand. Both wings of 'Abbās' army sustained heavy losses, and their commanders Farhād Khan and Ganj 'Alī were compelled to order withdrawals.¹¹⁴ But Dīn Muḥammad was then seriously wounded, and his troops faltered, enabling 'Abbās to register a bloody victory. Accounts suggest that between four and seven thousand Uzbek forces were killed in the

¹⁰⁸ TĀĀ'A 563; RŞ 741.

¹⁰⁹ FH 46a claims that he appointed his brother Bāqī Muḥammad; most of our sources however suggest that Bāqī Muḥammad was a participant in the subsequent battle, and so could not have stayed behind in Herat. *SilSal* 159a claims instead that Dīn Muḥammad appointed his grandfather Yār Muḥammad.

¹¹⁰ *KhB* 30a–b.

¹¹¹ TA 173 (estimating the force at twenty-four thousand men); *SilSal* 159a (estimating five thousand).

¹¹² TĀĀ'A 570, locating the settlement 4 *farsakhs* from Herat; also RŞ 741. The settlement is identified elsewhere as Pul-i Mālān (*IM* 300) and Til Pul (*KhB* 30b).

¹¹³ 6 Muḥarram 1007: TA 173–174; TĀĀ'A 570. *SilSal* 159b gives a garbled version of this last, dating the battle to 6 Muḥarram 1008 (29 July 1599); Ghafārī-Fard, *Rawābiṭ-i Šafawīyah wa Ūzbikān*, 278, notes that *TSR* similarly dates the battle to 1008 (24 July 1599–12 July 1600). *BA* 55a dates the battle instead to 1006 (14 August 1597–3 August 1598), and *KhB* 30a dates it to 8 Muḥarram 1006 (21 August 1597).

¹¹⁴ TA 174; *KhB* 30b; TĀĀ'A 571; RŞ 743.

showdown.¹¹⁵ Prominent victims included the afore-mentioned Hājji Bī¹¹⁶ and ‘Abdallāh Manghit,¹¹⁷ as well as Nājūy Bī Dūrmān¹¹⁸ and Tangrī Bīrdī Ughlān,¹¹⁹ both of whom had been long-time allies and supporters of Dīn Muḥammad since the late 1580s.¹²⁰

Most sources suggest that Dīn Muḥammad himself managed to escape the carnage of the battlefield.¹²¹ It is related, however, that by the time he arrived back at Herat the townspeople had learned of the battle's outcome, and they prudently refused to let him in.¹²² Dīn Muḥammad thus fled off into the wilderness—in the direction of Bādghīs, according to one source¹²³—whence he never returned. His exact fate is unclear. One source suggests that he succumbed to wounds contracted in battle, and was buried with his horse where he fell.¹²⁴ Others blame his death on bandits, claiming that ‘depraved’ tribesmen—variously Qipchāq,¹²⁵ Qāqchi¹²⁶ or Qarābī¹²⁷—killed him in order to steal his weapon and his horse.¹²⁸ Whatever the truth of the matter, it was a squalid end to a glittering career: and an unprepossessing overture to the subsequent events of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover.

¹¹⁵ *TA* 174 (seven thousand); *TĀĀ’A* 572, followed in turn in *SilSal* 159b (four thousand); *TShKh* 11a, followed in turn in *TQKh* 270a (six thousand).

¹¹⁶ *FH* 66b–67a; *TA* 174; *NZJ* 235; *BA* 55a.

¹¹⁷ *TA* 174; *TĀĀ’A* 573; *BA* 55a.

¹¹⁸ *TĀĀ’A* 573; *BA* 55a.

¹¹⁹ *FH* 67a; *BA* 55a.

¹²⁰ Nājūy Bī: *ShNSh* 3497 231a; *IM* 229–231; *TĀĀ’A* 457 (rendered as Nājūli Bahādur; the passage is missing, meanwhile, from BL Or. 152 f. 241a and BL Add. Or. 16684 f. 165b). Tangrī Bīrdī: *IM* 239–252.

¹²¹ Note however *RDJP* 193, which suggests that Dīn Muḥammad's forces abandoned him once the outcome of the battle became clear, and that he was captured and put to death on ‘Abbās' orders: *y así, no pudiendo desta vez el crédito y todo el reion de Corazan, y en la retirada perdieron a su rey Telin Can, al cual, siendo preso, mandó matar el rey Xabas.*

¹²² *NĀ* 599.

¹²³ *TMQ* 556a.

¹²⁴ *TA* 174. Contrast with *AfT* 125a, recounting a report that some of Dīn Muḥammad's supporters carried his corpse back to Mā warā al-nahr.

¹²⁵ *RS* 745.

¹²⁶ *TĀĀ’A* 574.

¹²⁷ *TMKh* 123, the editor noting ‘Qarā’ī’ as a variant reading.

¹²⁸ See also *TMQ* 556a, recounting that bandits cut off his head as a trophy, having found him after he had fallen from his horse: *Chūn Tinim Khān bih Bādghīs rasīd, bih wāsītah-yi zakhmī kih az ān mu’arakah yāftah būd bī-shu’ūr shudah az asb bih zūr āmadah bar khāk uftād, kih dar in athnā jam’ī az mardum-i aḥshām-i ān nawāhī paydā shudah chūn ū-rā shināktand sarash az tan jidā kardah nazd-i shāh-i ‘ālī-panāh āwurdand.*

The Tūqāy-Tīmūrid Takeover: A Question of Rights?

The battle of Pul-i Sālār put an end to Dīn Muḥammad's khalnal ambitions. But in chapter 2 we shall see how, less than twelve months after Dīn Muḥammad's defeat and death, his brother Bāqī Muḥammad managed to overthrow the Bukharan Abū'l-Khayrid incumbent, and restore Yār Muḥammad to the formal khalnal authority which he briefly enjoyed in Herat during the previous spring and summer. What happened in 1598 was thus the precursor to a set of events which saw authority pass from members of one Chingīzid dynasty to members of another.

Vladimir Vel'iaminov-Zernov was well aware of the significance of these events. He pondered how and why Dīn Muḥammad's Tūqāy-Tīmūrid kinsmen managed to establish themselves in authority over a Bukharan khanate hitherto ruled by individuals of an entirely different line of descent.¹²⁹ But scholars writing after Vel'iaminov-Zernov frequently played down the importance of the events they were relating. One such figure was Henry Howorth. "The change was not so great as is generally supposed", he writes, as if reproving Vel'iaminov-Zernov, and in words redolent of Martin Dickson's (see above, p. 9) some seventy years later, "for the new stock seems to have acquired its rights to the throne with the family of Abulkhair."¹³⁰

In suggesting that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids' accession to authority consisted simply of their taking possession of that to which they were entitled, both Howorth and Dickson betray their reliance on late partisan sources seeking to provide the takeover with a justificatory rationale. Accounts of how, for instance, members of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid family were pre-ordained to rule after an early Abū'l-Khayrid ruler tacitly conferred authority upon one of their number¹³¹ find no support outside Tūqāy-Tīmūrid tradition, and are almost certainly stories invented long after the event. While it is true, of course, that Dīn Muḥammad's kinsmen boasted strong genetic propinquity to 'the family of Abulkhair' by dint of their maternal ancestry, it is unclear what prerogatives this propinquity actually secured them. According to Iskandar Bīk Munshī in the *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*, it ensured that people at least considered the candidature of Dīn Muḥammad's kinsmen during the succession debates of 1598:¹³² but the outcome of these

¹²⁹ Vel'iaminov-Zernov, *Issledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh*, II.349-351.

¹³⁰ Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, II.ii.743.

¹³¹ BA 37b-38a; see below, pp. 270-271.

¹³² TĀĀ'A 557, relating how in February 1598 various Balkhis consented to Jāni Muḥammad's proposed elevation to khalnal authority, in view of his identity as 'Abdallāh, Khan

discussions indicates that constituencies opted wherever possible to elevate Abū'l-Khayrid candidates over those whose paternal descent made them 'dynastic outsiders'.¹³³ Nor perhaps should this be surprising. During the period in question, maternal ancestry was of limited salience in determining people's status. There were exceptions here: seventeenth- and eighteenth-century chroniclers accorded extensive narrative significance, for instance, to the distinguished maternal descent of Nadir Muḥammad Khan (r. 1641–1651).¹³⁴ However, this was highly unusual.¹³⁵ Sixteenth-century hagiographies might occasionally note the maternal descent of their subjects,¹³⁶ but the general paucity of such information in court narrative suggests that people's maternal ancestry was elsewhere rarely deemed to be a matter of much significance.¹³⁷ This reflects the fact that successional systems in early modern Central Asia were almost exclusively patrilineal.¹³⁸ An individual's distinguished maternity might accord him status over somebody with identical

sororal nephew and in the apparent absence of any living members of the khalal family other than 'Abd al-Mu'min's young child (*chūn pisar-i 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān ṭīfl ast wa dīgarī az dūdmān-i salṭanat nīst lā 'ilāj bih salṭanat-i ū bih jihat-i khwāhar-zādah-gī-yi 'Abdallāh Khān rāḍī shudah-īm*). See also above, p. 46.

¹³³ See e.g. *T'A* 175–176, relating how the widow of 'Ibādallāh Sultan persuaded the Balkhis to elevate her son in place of the "outsider" (*bigānah*) Jānī Muḥammad; also *T'ĀĀ'A* 557, as above, with its implication that Jānī Muḥammad was not regarded as a member of the *dūdmān-i salṭanat*.

¹³⁴ His mother was Shahr Banū Bigim, the sister of Mirzā Abū Ṭālib Riḍā, *mutawallī* of the Imām 'Alī Mūsā shrine at Mashhad: see *T'ĀĀ'A* 962, followed in turn (and in greater detail) in *SilSal* 137a–b and 245b, *BA* 55a and 161b–162a, and *TMKh* 163 (describing Nadir Muḥammad simply as "one of the descendants of the eighth Imam": *aw awlād-i Imām-i hashtum*).

¹³⁵ Rather less significance is accorded to the maternal ancestry of Nadir Muḥammad's brother Imām Qulī, with our sources failing even to agree on who his mother was. *BA* 91 identifies her as the daughter of Ḥaydar Mirzā Ārlāt, and *SilSal* 136b–137a and 183a identifies her as the daughter of Nadir Dīwānbiki Ārlāt.

¹³⁶ For instance, a life of the late fifteenth-century Naqshbandī shaykh 'Ubaydallāh Aḥrār (*R'AH* 381) emphasises that Aḥrār's grandmother was the great-great-granddaughter of Maw-lānā Ṭāj al-Dīn Daraghmi. Similarly, Masami Hamada shows ("Le Mausolée et le culte de Satuq Bughrā Khān", in *JHS* 3 (2001–2002), 63–87 [77]) how sympathetic chroniclers of the late-sixteenth-century shaykh Khwājah Ishāq emphasise his maternal descent from the tenth-century ruler Satuq Bughrā Khan, famously credited (M. Grenard, "La Légende de Satok Boghra Khan et l'histoire", *JA Série* 9.15 (1900), 5–79) with spearheading the Islamisation of East Turkistan.

¹³⁷ There were exceptions, of course: princes ruling mid-sixteenth-century Samarqand, for instance, had particular cause to emphasise their line of maternal descent (see below, pp. 225–229). By contrast, 'Abdallāh Khan's maternal descent (from the daughter of Āghā Jān Bigim) is mentioned in *MB* 205 only in passing.

¹³⁸ See e.g. K. Grønbech, "The Turkish System of Kinship", in *Studia Orientalia Ioanni Pedersen ... dicata* (Haunia, 1953), 124–129.

paternity but a less distinguished maternal ancestry,¹³⁹ but it was unlikely to confer rights to the throne over the claims of an actor boasting some conventionally 'superior' line of paternal descent.

This is important, since at the turn of the seventeenth century there were many actors in Greater Mā warā al-nahr who were still able to claim an Abū'l-Khayrid *nasab*¹⁴⁰ (ancestry, dynastic identity) through the male line. Writing in the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*, Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī claims that after 'Abd al-Mu'min's death in June 1598 there was nobody left in the ruling family:¹⁴¹ but this is quite untrue. We see that it is untrue from a reading of the *Musakhkhir al-bilād*, which contains biographical entries about several such family members: the most cursory reading of Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan's work shows that the 'prevailing local Changizī [line] of descent' had *not* become extinct at the time of the takeover. Whatever entitlement Dīn Muḥammad and his kinsmen thus enjoyed to the 'rights and loyalties' of rulership, therefore, several Abū'l-Khayrids would seem on the face of it to have had a stronger one.

Nor, as we shall see, is it the case that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds owed their accession to authority in Greater Mā warā al-nahr simply to having been "invited in to rule as khāns".¹⁴² In suggesting otherwise, Dickson appears again to be drawing upon the apocryphal contents of the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*. Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī claims that, in the absence of any living Abū'l-Khayrid dynasts, the Bukharans acted of their own volition in opting to elevate Jānī Muḥammad b. Yār Muḥammad upon the khalan throne in early 1598;¹⁴³ he thus overlooks the awkward fact that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd

¹³⁹ Note here for instance the circumstance of Iskandar b. Jānī Bik's accession to khalan authority in 1561: see Burton, "The Accession of Iskandar Khan", in *Iran* 32 (1994), 111–114 [112], and below, p. 128.

¹⁴⁰ For terminology, see Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, 98–100.

¹⁴¹ *Wa ba'd az īn wāq'ah* [i.e. the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min] *dar atrāf-i mamālik kasān fristādand wa tālib-i turah shudand. Har chand tafahḥuṣ kardand, paydā naqardid, zira kih dar ayyām-i 'Abdallāh Khān akthar dar yūrishhā-yi Īrān wa Kāshghar wa Dasht-i Qipchāq bīh shahādāt rasidah būdand wa ba'dī-rā kih az ū khilāfi zāhir shudah būd khūd bīh rah-i 'adam fristādah. Gharāḍ kih siwā-yi 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān digari nabūd: TMKh 116.*

¹⁴² Dickson, "Uzbek Dynastic Theory", 209.

¹⁴³ *Ba'd az wāq'ah-yi 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān umarā-yi Bukhārā jihat-i darūrat Jānī Khān-rā bar takht nishāndand: TMKh 121*, proceeding then to recount how Jānī Muḥammad turned down the offer because, although a Chingizid, he did not boast the requisite Shihānīd descent, and how the Bukharans then elevated his son Dīn Muḥammad, deeming him appropriate on account of his being 'Abdallāh's *khwāhar-zādah* (*līkin ū qabūl namikard wa miḡuft "Aḡar-chih man nīz Chingīz-nīzhād-am, khilāfat-i mulk-i Bukhārā kasī-rā kih [az] salāṭīn-i Shihānīyah bāshad ū-rā nisbat būdah bāshad"*). 'Aqibat Dīn Muḥammad walad-i Jānī




Figure 8: Surviving Abū'l-Khayrids (underlined) in summer 1599.¹⁴⁴

accession to power was, as we shall see in chapters 2 and 3, in fact highly contested. The idea that people made overtures to the Tūqāy-Timūrids in the hope of coming under their authority is not actually wholly misleading: we find accounts of such overtures in three reasonably reliable sources from the turn of the seventeenth century. In both the *Futūḥāt-i humāyūn* and the *Baḥr al-asrār*, we read that in summer 1598 certain constituencies in Mā warā al-nahr dispatched appeals to Dīn Muḥammad in Khurāsān, urging him to come and rule over them;¹⁴⁵ in the *Musakhkhir al-bilād*, meanwhile,

Muḥammad Khān-rā kih khwāhar-zādah-yi 'Abdallāh Khān mīshud tā'iq-i saltanat didah [...] khuṭbah wa sikkah bih nām-i ū kardand).

¹⁴⁴ MB 166–213; T'ĀĀ'A 557.

¹⁴⁵ *Masnad-i khānī wa sarīr-i jahānbānī az wujūd-i salāṭin-i dhū'l-iqtidār khālī māndah muḥīṭ-i saltanat wa ḥukūmat-i Ūzbikīyah az durr-i thamīn-i dhāt-i sardaran-i jalādat-āthar tahī gashṭ. Umarā wa sarān wa a'āzīm wa a'yān-i Tūrān dar kār-i saltanat mutaraddad gashṭah bā yak digar dar īn bāb mashwarah namūdand. Chūn az awlād-i Chingīz Khān bih ruzhd wa ahlīyat wa mardī wa shajā'at-i Dīn Muḥammad digarī nabūd, shakl-i dawlat az qur'ah-yi saltanat dar khānah-i tālī-i ū nishast wa āftāb-i saltanat az burj-i āmāl-i ū sāṭī' gashṭ, hamkunān bih ittifaq bih pādishāhī-yi ū qā'il gashṭah az Bukhārā wa Balkh wa Samarqand arā'iq nidwistah firistādand: FH 44a–b. (As usual, TA 182 closely follows the account of events given in FH, but heavily inflects the above passage, relating the circumstances of Dīn Muḥammad's elevation in Dīn Muḥammad's own words and thus withholding from the account any sort of authorial approbation: Dīn Muḥammad guft kih "'Abd al-Mu'min kushtah shud wa Mā warā al-nahr az wārith khālī māndah wa a'yān-i sipāh wa lashkarī muttafiq shudah-and bih pādishāhī-yiman".) See also BA 41b: dar athnā-yi īn ḥāl rusul wa rasā'il-i munir*

Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan claims that at some point in late 1599 or early 1600 people in Shibarghān, west of Balkh, decided to present a similar appeal to Bāqī Muḥammad.¹⁴⁶ In neither instance, however, did anything come of the move: Dīn Muḥammad was killed soon after at Pul-i Sālār, and the Shibarghānis apparently thought better of their original intention and submitted instead to a certain Shāh Muḥammad Sultan b. Bāqī Sultan Jāpuq.¹⁴⁷ Nor in either case does the appeal seem to have been motivated by people's reverence for the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds' line of descent: according to Siyāqī Nizāmī, the appellants in summer 1598 were enamoured primarily of Dīn Muḥammad's military prowess,¹⁴⁸ while the Shibarghānis simply hoped that Bāqī Muḥammad would help protect them against their enemies in Balkh.¹⁴⁹ Even if either invitation had been operative in securing the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds' accession to power, therefore, the incomers would have owed their elevation to something more than the rights which accrued to them from their 'Changīzī descent alone'.¹⁵⁰

'Rights', in any case, are like fairies: they exist only if people believe in them. When speaking of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds' 'right' to authority, therefore, Dickson is really speaking of what we might term a *patrimonial belief*: the belief, that is, that a particular actor's identity obliges people to allow or actively help him to attain a particular unit of utility. Upon the death of a ruler, people sharing a 'patrimonial belief' might thus regard themselves as obliged to recognise or facilitate the accession of whomsoever they contextually understand to be the hereditarily best entitled of the dead man's kinsmen. Such beliefs evidently held widespread currency among constituencies in early modern Central Asia. Several sources attest to how actors conceived of political authority as a patrimony, or *mīrāth*.¹⁵¹ But the attested

az tafwīd-i salṭanat-i mamlakat-i Mā warā al-nahr bih kuf-i kifāyat-i marām-i Khusraw-i 'ālī-maqām Dīn Muḥammad Khān az nazd-i umarā-yi ān ḥudūd mutawātir wa mutawālī farār rasīdah [...]. The BA account differs from the FH account in suggesting that invitations were dispatched to Dīn Muḥammad even before he arrived in Herat.

¹⁴⁶ *Ba'd az marāsim-i mashwarat wa kingāsh wa naṣīhat dawlat-khwāhī bih shahriyār-i Sikandar-i ṣawlat Bāqī Muḥammad Khān zāhir gardānīdah [...]: MB 210.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 210–211.

¹⁴⁸ *FH 44a–b.*

¹⁴⁹ *MB 210.*

¹⁵⁰ Dickson, "Uzbek Dynastic Theory", 209.

¹⁵¹ *RS 209b* notes how certain Abū'l-Khayrīds disputed 'Abdallāh's claim to authority over Samarqand on the grounds that such authority was their own exclusive *mīrāth*. Adapting *TR 13–15*, *TI 187* tells how Chingīz Khan established political authority over Mughūlīstān as the *mīrāth* of his descendants; see also *DhJT 111* and *MS 134*, noting how, in their struggles against the Chaghatāyīds, the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Ilkhānīds claimed Iran as their patrimonial *mīrāth*.

survival of multiple Abū'l-Khayrids into and after 1599 suggests that people's patrimonial beliefs around this time should have militated in favour of one of these individuals, and against any Tūqāy-Timūrid actor. The fact that the Tūqāy-Timūrids nevertheless managed to secure enough support to seize power suggests, therefore, that such patrimonial beliefs did little to influence people's behaviour. This was either because few people shared such beliefs, or because these beliefs possessed little affective force in determining the behaviour of those amongst whom they held currency.

Such a state of affairs contrasts with other instances in the history of pre-modern Central Asia, where constituencies seem to have invested their patrimonial beliefs with great conviction. One thinks, for instance, of events which supposedly occurred in the Ural region in the mid-fifteenth century.¹⁵² For some time, Abū'l-Ghāzī relates, the tribal population of this region had been subject to a line of Shībānid Chingīzids: but when the reigning incumbent Timūr Shaykh b. Ḥājjī Tūli was killed in battle with a party of marauding Qalmāqs, it transpired that neither he nor his brother had any living offspring. "Despair piled on top of despair",¹⁵³ we read, as people failed to think of anyone who could lawfully be Timūr Shaykh's successor. As individual tribal contingents splintered away from the grouping, the elders of the Uyghūr tribe convened a meeting to establish what should be done. In the end, they sent a messenger to the late khan's senior wife, asking if any of his other wives or concubines were pregnant. If any yielded a boy, the messenger said, he should be elevated as khan. Timūr Shaykh's widow replied that nobody else was pregnant, but that she believed she was expecting a son. Upon the circulation of this news, the dissident tribal contingents returned to the fold, and six months later the young Yādigār was born. Members of the Uyghūr and Naymān tribes pledged loyalty to the infant, and a period of regency continued until Yādigār reached majority.¹⁵⁴

In undertaking their submission to Yādigār, the protagonists of this story seem to have done so in what may be termed *an open field of play*. That is to say, they acted in circumstances where no prior-standing disposition of power—or what, in later stages of this book (see below, p. 144), I term a *regime*—was capable of enforcing their submission through coer-

¹⁵² Caution is perhaps in order as to the story's factuality, as it shares generic similarities with *TR* 15–17, relating how in the fourteenth-century *amirs* desperate to find a successor to the late Chaghatāyid Isān Buqā Khan went to great lengths to track down his infant son, Tughluq Timūr.

¹⁵³ *Umidsizlik bir bürinüng üstinah büldi: ShT* 184.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 184–185.

cive means. By voluntarily submitting to an infant's authority, the tribesmen demonstrated that they were not simply *eager* to be ruled by one whose paternal ancestry 'entitled' him to rule, but were *committed* to being so ruled.¹⁵⁵ The tribesmen's determination to uphold their patrimonial beliefs was evidently sufficient to override other aspirations which they might hold.

Ceteris paribus, few people would have wanted to be subject to an infant. Certain parties might benefit from a child's elevation to authority, of course,¹⁵⁶ but they were liable to do so at the expense both of their neighbours and of the polity's aggregate material welfare.¹⁵⁷ The Safavid chronicler Iskandar Bik Munshī thus claims that Balkhis made their feelings known when presented with the khanal candidature of 'Abd al-Mu'min's infant son in 1598. "A two-year-old child would be incapable of ruling us", he has them say, "and what we need is a vigorous young man who is capable of standing up to our enemies".¹⁵⁸ Tribesmen in the fifteenth-century Ural region may well have had similar concerns. According to Abū'l-Ghāzī's story, however, they were nevertheless determined to be ruled by the person whose dynastic identity they believed best entitled him to authority.

During their own ascent to authority between 1598 and 1605, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds were not as disadvantaged by the fact of their dynastic identity as they might have been in other environments. This is because the force of people's patrimonial beliefs was weaker than it was elsewhere. The variety of reasons for this reflects the variety of reasons why people might place conviction in such beliefs in the first place. One reason for doing so might be purely instrumental. Actors could have quite selfish consequentialist reasons for aligning themselves with whomsoever was most closely related to the former incumbent. For instance, widely-circulating notions of hereditism, positing the generational transfer of moral and practical capacities, might inspire people who responded warmly to some particular incumbent's disposition to nurse a consequentialist desire for this incumbent to

¹⁵⁵ Amartya Sen offers a useful gloss on the phenomenon of 'commitment', observing how, in being sufficient to override an individual's other aspirations, it "drives a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare". *Idem*, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory", in Mansbridge (ed.), *Beyond Self-Interest*, 25–43 [33].

¹⁵⁶ E.g. M. Pārsādūst, *Shāh Ṭahmāsb-i awwal* (Tehran, 1381/2002–2003), 33–36: in the sixteenth-century Safavid empire, several Qizilbāsh *amīrs* enriched themselves during the infancy of Shah Ṭahmāsb b. Isma'īl.

¹⁵⁷ For further discussion of 'aggregate welfare', see chapter 2.

¹⁵⁸ *Ṭīft-i dū sālah shāyastah-yi saltanat-i mā nīst, mā-rā jawān-kār-i āzmūdahī mibāyad [kih] bā a'ādī muqāwamat tawānad namūd: T'ĀĀ'A* 557. The statement appears almost verbatim also in *SilSal* 155b.

be succeeded by as close as possible a kinsman, in whom they believed such a disposition was most likely to be reproduced.¹⁵⁹

A second reason for placing conviction in patrimonial belief might be very different from this first. Instead of according instrumental worth to the quality of a candidate's dynastic identity, people might accord it a more intrinsic sort of value, associating this identity with a constitutive virtue to which they felt deontologically bound to defer. Presently setting aside consequentially-motivated patrimonial bonds, for the rest of this chapter I shall examine why and how people might contract deontologically-motivated attachments towards actors boasting a particular *nasab*: and I shall consider why the force of these attachments should have weakened around the time of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover. The rest of this chapter will thus concern itself with the workings and vacillations of what we may term *charismatic loyalty*.

On Charismatic Loyalty

By 'charismatic loyalty', I refer to the attachments of a ruler's *charismatic constituency*. That is, I refer to the behaviour of that constituency of subjects who discerned in some actor a quality of *charisma*, and who felt an intrinsic obligation to align themselves with this actor on account of the numinous qualities which his charisma supposedly embodied.

Max Weber on Charisma

The concept of charisma as used in academic discourse comes from the famous formulation of Max Weber. Weber defines charisma as that quality of leadership which results from a person's being "endowed with supernatural, superhuman [...] powers",¹⁶⁰ offering the prophet Muḥammad as a prime exemplar of such a person.¹⁶¹ He proceeds then to consider how the possession of such powers might enable the charismatic actor to acquire popular support. First of all, he suggests, people might align themselves with the actor in the consequentialist hope of deriving benefits from his capacities.

¹⁵⁹ Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, 98–99; von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung*, 46; more generally, L. Marlow, *Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge, 1997), 57–60.

¹⁶⁰ M. Weber, *Economy and Society—An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (New York, 1968), 241.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 440.

After some time, however, people's perceptions of the charismatic actor might change, as they came to interpret the actor's supposed powers not as autonomous accomplishments but as epiphenomenal manifestations of some higher sanction with which the actor enjoyed his present authority. Following this change, Weber suggests, people would align themselves with the charismatic actor less out of instrumental considerations than out of the conviction that the actor possessed an intrinsic quality of 'chosen-ness', and "that it [was] the duty of those subject to charismatic authority to recognise its genuineness and to act accordingly."¹⁶²

With the tincture of chosen-ness obviously a valuable resource, Weber goes on to consider how such a quality might pass from one actor to another. Having already suggested how an individual's chosen-ness might be dissociated from its mere outward manifestations, Weber now proposes that an individual's failure to display any such superhuman capacities need not preclude his being acclaimed as 'chosen', should people accept that his chosen-ness had simply transferred to him from the Ur-charismatic actor. Weber suggests that charismatic chosen-ness might be transferred in several different ways. The recipient of a former incumbent's transferred chosen-ness might be the incumbent's *miraculously revealed* successor, as with the Dalai Lama; his *designated* successor, as in instances of apostolic succession; or—most importantly, for our purposes—his *hereditary* successor, whose charisma was betokened by his line of descent.¹⁶³

Charismatic Spiritual Attachments

Weber's conception of charisma is useful because it is empathetic. By relating how people might ascribe some hereditarily transferred quality of 'chosen-ness' to individuals boasting a particular dynastic identity, Weber evokes a cultural landscape wherein an actor's *nasab* might signify an intrinsic worth imperceptible to external onlookers. By suggesting that to recognise an actor's charisma is necessarily to recognise an obligation towards it, Weber is furthermore able to offer an internally meaningful rationale for actions which to the consequentialist may appear unnecessary, or self-defeating.

One instance of such ostensibly 'irrational' deference towards the *nasab* in early modern Central Asia relates to people's regard for what one might

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 242.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 246–247.

term *spiritual dynasties*. Among such dynasties were lines of *sayyids*, or descendents of the prophet Muḥammad through his son-in-law 'Alī.¹⁶⁴ Their genealogical distinction secured them a wide variety of prerogatives; like a variety of other eminences, for instance, *sayyids* often enjoyed preferential fiscal treatment over the wider mass of the population.¹⁶⁵ From the earliest days of the Caliphate, the value of such perquisites had necessitated the establishment of a dedicated *niqābat* office, to determine who at any time truly possessed *sayyid* status.¹⁶⁶ *Sayyids* also enjoyed a degree of social reverence, with outsiders evidently deeming it a major honour to marry into *sayyid* families.¹⁶⁷ In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Central Asian *sayyid* populations in Andkhūd,¹⁶⁸ Samarqand,¹⁶⁹ Balkh,¹⁷⁰ Termez¹⁷¹ and elsewhere continued to enjoy the prerogatives accruing from popular regard, with the office of *shaykh al-islām* in Termez, for instance, long surviving as a perquisite of the local *sayyid* family.¹⁷²

Another category of spiritual dynasties comprised lines of Sufi shaykhs. From the ninth and tenth centuries onwards, Sufis throughout the Islamic world had enjoyed a reputation for communicating with the divine and for the capacities thus conferred upon them for intercession and the performance of miracles.¹⁷³ By the sixteenth century, however, few Sufis were acquiring repute through their own autonomous spiritual exertions,¹⁷⁴ and

¹⁶⁴ For a good discussion of the various interpretations ascribed to this term, see D. Damrel, "Forgotten Grace: Khwāja Khāwand Mahmūd Naqshbandī in Central Asia and Mughal India" (Duke University Ph.D. thesis, 1991), 22–26.

¹⁶⁵ Abduraimov, *Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii*, II.150, ff., noting how such parties were assessed for lower rates of taxation than most other people.

¹⁶⁶ DeWeese, "The Descendents of Sayyid Ata and the Rank of *Naqīb* in Central Asia", in *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 115 (1995), 612–632 [615].

¹⁶⁷ RR 117b–118b; Babajanov and Szuppe, *Les Inscriptions persanes de Chār Bakr*, 66–67 (marriage alliances with Nishāpūri *sayyids*); M. Kadyrova, *Zhitiia Khodzha Akhrara—Opyt sistemnogo analiza po rekonstruktsii biografii Khodzha Akhrara i istorii roda Akhraridov* (Tashkent, 2007), 85, 124–126 (alliances with Kirmāni *sayyids*).

¹⁶⁸ BA/*Ariyānā* 114–115.

¹⁶⁹ BA 58b.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 333b–334a.

¹⁷¹ L.V. Stroeva, "Bor'ba kochevoi i osedloi znati v chagataiskom gosudarstve v pervoi polovine XIV v.", in *Pamiati akademika Ignatiia Iulanovicha Krachkovskogo* (Leningrad, 1958), 206–220 [208].

¹⁷² BA/*Ariyānā* 108.

¹⁷³ J.S. Trimingham, *Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford, 1971); A. Karamustafa, *God's Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle Period, 1200–1550* (Salt Lake City, 1999).

¹⁷⁴ DeWeese, *An 'Uvaysi' Sufi in Timurid Mawarannahr: Notes on Hagiography and the Taxonomy of Sanctity in the Religious History of Central Asia* (Bloomington, 1993), particularly 34–35.

an individual's spiritual authority was increasingly deemed to inhere not in any demonstrated intercessional capability but in his relationship to an authoritative predecessor. Although scholars often think of this relationship as an initiatory one between master and student, it was frequently more common for spiritual authority to devolve hereditarily from father to son. Hereditary transmission was long the norm within the Yasawī brotherhood,¹⁷⁵ and during the sixteenth century the Naqshbandī Khwājagān similarly adopted a hereditary model¹⁷⁶ over earlier initiatory practice.¹⁷⁷ By the end of the century, Naqshbandī spiritual authority in Mā warā al-nahr had largely become confined to three shaykhly dynasties, comprising the descendants of Khwājah 'Ubaydallāh Aḥrār (d. 1490),¹⁷⁸ Khwājah Aḥmad Kāsānī (d. 1542)¹⁷⁹ and Khwājah Muḥammad Islām Jūybārī (d. 1563/4).¹⁸⁰

Ancestral members of these Sufi dynasties enjoyed a variety of perquisites accorded to them by rich and poor alike. Powerful sponsors offered their favoured shaykhs lofty positions at court,¹⁸¹ key roles in regnal ceremonial,¹⁸² and material resources ranging from grain subventions¹⁸³ to grants of authority over entire administrative regions.¹⁸⁴ Humbler supporters,

¹⁷⁵ DeWeese, "The Descendants of Sayyid Ata", *passim*.

¹⁷⁶ F. Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein": *Derwische und Gesellschaft im islamischen Mittelasien im 16. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2000), 194.

¹⁷⁷ Paul, *Doctrine and Organisation: the Khwājagān/Naqshbandīya in the first generation after Baha'uddīn* (Halle/Berlin, 1999), 65; also DeWeese, "Khojagānī origins and the Critique of Sufism: the Rhetoric of Communal Uniqueness in the *Manāqib* of Khoja 'Alī 'Azīzān Rāmītanī", in De Jong and B. Radtke (eds.), *Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics* (Leiden, 1999), 492–519.

¹⁷⁸ O.A. Sukhareva, "Potomki Khodzha Ahrara", in G.F. Kim, Girs and Davidovich (eds.), *Dukhovenstvo i politicheskaia zhizn' na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke v period feodalizma (Bartol'dskoe chtenie, 1982)* (Moscow, 1982), 157–168; McChesney, *Central Asia—Foundations of Change*, 102–105, 169; Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 164–169.

¹⁷⁹ N. Veselovskii, "Dagbid", in *Zapiski vostochnogo otdeleniia Imperatorskogo Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva* 3 (1888), 85–95; Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 170–175.

¹⁸⁰ P.P. Ivanov, *Khoziaistvo Dzhuibarskikh Sheikhov. K istorii feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia v Srednei Azii XVI–XVIII vv.* (Moscow–St. Petersburg, 1954); Akhmedov, "Rol' dzhuibarskikh khodzhei v obshchestvenopoliticheskoi zhizni Srednei Azii XVI–XVII vekov", in Kim et al. (eds.), *Dukhovenstvo i politicheskaia zhizn'*, 16–31; Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 176–180.

¹⁸¹ DeWeese, "The Descendants of Sayyid Ata", 612–613.

¹⁸² Sela, *Ritual and Authority in Central Asia: The Khan's Inauguration Ceremony* (Bloomington, 2003), 42–44, for participation in khalan elevations.

¹⁸³ *DQ* 32a–34a.

¹⁸⁴ In 1584, 'Abdallāh tried to give Badakhshan to his spiritual preceptor Khwājah Sa'd b. Muḥammad Islām (see below, p. 137).

meanwhile, might demonstrate their attachment by braving the perils of travel (see below, pp. 132–135) in pursuit of a shaykh's blessing,¹⁸⁵ or by providing lavish shows of hospitality which they could ill afford.¹⁸⁶ Soviet scholars often profess to account for this sort of behaviour by suggesting that shaykhly dynasts were simply feudal potentates wielding the material resources bequeathed them by their ancestors, and that people making such sacrifices were doing so either under physical duress or in the consequentialist hope of averting punitive action.¹⁸⁷ But if contemporaries indeed believed that these dynasts' inherited 'authority' was merely coercive, it would be difficult—at least without recourse to some quasi-Confucian notion of filial piety—to explain why dynasts should then have bothered sponsoring hagiographic works devoted to the lives and supposedly miraculous achievements of their deceased forebears. One best explains the maintenance of a hagiographic tradition if we recognise that the constituencies exposed to this tradition believed

- (a) that the miraculous achievements therein related were real,
- (b) that these achievements denoted a quality of divine authorisation,

and

- (c) that this quality of divine authorisation might devolve, hereditarily or otherwise, from the time *about which* a story was being told until the time *in which* it was being related.

As I hope will become clear over the course of this book, early modern Central Asia was a highly 'numinous' environment. It was home to a wide range of spiritual dynasts who enjoyed authority because constituencies associated their respective *nasabs* with some quality of divinely conferred authorisation. As fruitfully adopted by several scholars of Sufism,¹⁸⁸ Weber's

¹⁸⁵ *JāmM* 144b.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 160b: one lowly associate of Kāsānī struggled to afford the five sheep which he bought on the occasion of the shaykh's visit. *AT* (Churās) 87a evokes the burdens of hospitality, relating how another associate of Kāsānī, Jār-Allāh, pretended not to be home (*dār khānah būd, panhān shud*) when the shaykh came to visit, but paid for his discourteous behaviour when he then fell ill and died, all his descendants dying soon after (*wa ba'd az wafāt-i Jār-Allāh, awlad wa ahfād-i ū hamah habā wa nāchiz shudand, wa manzil-i ū kharāb wa wayrān shud*).

¹⁸⁷ Ivanov, *Khoziaistvo Dzhuibarskikh Sheikhov, passim* (on Jūybārīds); O.D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty, XV–XVI vv.* (Moscow, 1974), 21–22 (on Alhrārīds).

¹⁸⁸ See e.g. Z. Khenchelaoui and T. Zarcone, "La Famille Jilānī de Hama—Syrie (Bayt al-

conception of hereditarily-transferred charisma evokes an environment within which it would have made sense to defer to actors boasting the ancestral distinction that they did: and within which hagiographers would have had good reason to tell their chosen stories.

Charismatic Political Attachments: The Chingīzid Dispensation

Another phenomenon which becomes somewhat more comprehensible in the light of Weber's concept of charisma relates to particular varieties of *exculpatory narrative*, wherein authors attempt to disperse odium resulting from the prior actions of their patrons. Exculpatory narratives are commonplace in the wake of any kind of violent political change. For our present purposes, what is significant is the extent to which such narratives proliferated in environments where non-Chingīzid actors had recently seized authority from formerly established Chingīzid lines.

The variety of exculpatory narratives offered in such circumstances is wide. Some narratives deny any idea of appropriation, and claim that the non-Chingīzid interloper was simply serving as regent on behalf of a Chingīzid incumbent. This strategy was favoured by both the fourteenth-century warlord Tīmūr, who overthrew the ruling Chaghatāyid dynasty of Chingīzids,¹⁸⁹ and individual members of the Manghit dynasty, who in the early eighteenth century came to power at the expense of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids.¹⁹⁰ Other interlopers, meanwhile, sponsored accounts which sought to justify an act of appropriation which they readily acknowledged. In this process of justification, instrumental arguments might play their part: incomers might claim to have eliminated the corruption of an *ancien régime*, for instance.¹⁹¹ But interlopers also drew explicit attention to the less instrumentally significant matter of their own dynastic background. One such practice was to emphasise one's own descent from individuals boasting high consanguinity with Chingīz Khan, as did actors in fourteenth-century Iran¹⁹²

Jilānī)", in *Journal of the History of Sufism* 1–2 (2000), 53–77 [53]; Babadzhanov, introduction to Kadyrova, *Zhitia Khodzha Akhrara*, 4.

¹⁸⁹ Tīmūr (r. 1370–1405) initially claimed to rule on behalf of a prince called Suyūrghtāmish (who was a descendent of Ūgudāy b. Chingīz Khan, and thus only very distantly related to the overthrown line of Chaghatāyids): *ZN* (Shāmī) 14.

¹⁹⁰ Muḥammad Dāniyāl Bī (r. 1758–1785) claimed to rule on behalf of Abū'l-Ghāzī, Dīn Muḥammad's (0,5) kinsman: von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung*, 278–279.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 235–238.

¹⁹² Tūghāy Tīmūr, who ruled parts of Iran ca. 1338–1353, claimed descent from Chingīz Khan's brother Jūchī Qasār: *MA* 306–308; *DhJT* 200; *MS* 172–174; *NJĀ* 218–219.

and seventeenth-century Mongolia,¹⁹³ as well as the fifteenth-century Timūrids.¹⁹⁴ Others, by contrast, accorded weight to quite distinct figures contained within their own *nasab*-lines. Leaders of the Noghays, who in the fifteenth century came to power in parts of the Dasht-i Qipchāq previously contained within the Chingīzid Golden Horde, offer a clear example of this. By fostering narratives about their supposed ancestor Bābā Tūklās, whom they credited with converting the formerly heathen ruler of the Golden Horde Ūzbik Khan (r. 1313–1341), they sought to present themselves as descendents of the very person who had supposedly rescued the Chingīzids from the wilderness of *shirk* [paganism, idolatry].¹⁹⁵

The proliferation of such discursive undertakings is telling, because it implies that a degree of utility accrued from their circulation, and thus that there existed some target constituency whose attitudes towards the interloper party required changing (see below, pp. 255–258). The fact that favoured rhetorical strategies involved rendering this party sympathetic, ancestrally similar or hereditarily superior to the ousted Chingīzid line suggests, furthermore, that the salient point requiring exculpation was not simply that interlopers had overthrown an incumbent regime, but that the overthrow saw non-Chingīzids prevailing at the expense of Chingīzids. Centuries after the life of Chingīz Khan, some constituencies evidently continued to observe a norm according to which political authority in Central Asia was, and should remain, a natural Chingīzid perquisite.

We look in vain to find much acknowledgment of such a conviction in much Soviet historiography. Not only have Russian historians long been cool towards the Mongol legacy,¹⁹⁶ but Marxist scholars find it difficult to accept that subjects should have exercised any political preferences other

¹⁹³ Qalmāq rulers similarly claimed descent from Jūchī Qasār: V.P. Uspenskii, "Sopernichestvo potomkov Chingis-Khana i Khasara v XIII–XIX vv.", in I.E. Petrosian (ed.), *Tiurkskie i mongol'skie pis'mennye pamiatniki* (Moscow, 1992), 102–109; Miyawaki, "The Legitimacy of Khanship", 326–327; N. Di Cosmo and D. Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest—A Documentary History* (Leiden, 2003), 5–11.

¹⁹⁴ ZT I:35–37: people popularly claimed that Timūr was Chingiz Khan's (3,8) kinsman, sharing with him a common ancestor named Tūmanāy. For conflicting assessments of the claim's verisimilitude, see Howorth, "The Factitious Genealogies of the Mongol Rulers", in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 40 (1908), 645–668 and Z.V. Togan, "Taḥqīq-i nasab-i Amīr Tīmūr", in S.M. Abdullah (ed.), *Professor Mohamed Shafi Presentation Volume* (Lahore, 1955), 105–113.

¹⁹⁵ DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, 323–352.

¹⁹⁶ For discussion, see e.g. C.J. Halperin, "Russia and the 'Mongol Yoke': Concepts of

than a purely consequentialist desire to be ruled by the actor under whom they might least painfully feel the consequences of feudal exploitation.¹⁹⁷ Soviet scholarship thus fails to convey any need for exculpatory narrative as a means of reconciling people with such affronts to norm as the termination of Chingīzid rule.

Weber's concept of charisma offers a better means of evoking the utility of such narrative. According to Weber's definition, Chingīz Khan was the very embodiment of a charismatic ruler. Not only did his remarkable personal qualities enable him, like the prophet Muḥammad, to oversee the foundation of an extensive land empire,¹⁹⁸ but like Muḥammad he was also credited with a quality of divine inspiration. The *Secret History of the Mongols* tells how divine portents protected the youthful leader from his enemies,¹⁹⁹ and some traditions lasting well into the twentieth century went so far as to confer upon Chingīz a formal apotheosis.²⁰⁰ The fact that some people evidently continued to believe in a quality of Chingīzid chosenness suggests, therefore, both why subject constituencies may have felt an obligation towards maintaining a Chingīzid rulership perquisite, and why non-Chingīzid interlopers should have sought to do whatever possible to encourage people to recalibrate their attitudes.

Western scholars often speak of a *Chingīzid dispensation*,²⁰¹ by which they refer to the long-continued duration of Chingīzid rule in Central Asia. Conceiving of the 'dispensation' empathetically offers a way into understanding this phenomenon. By thinking of the dispensation as an episteme within which people identified Chingīzid descent with some quality of chosenness deemed to represent a necessary condition for khalal authority, one begins to grasp both why Chingīzid authority lasted so long, and why the termination of this authority necessitated such rhetorical convolutions on the part of those keen to justify a new state of affairs. Weber's conception of hereditary charisma suggests how constituencies might deem it

¹⁹⁷ E.g. Abduraimov, *Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii* II.241–248.

¹⁹⁸ J.J. Saunders, "The Nomad as Empire-BUILDER: A Comparison of the Arab and Mongol Conquests", in *idem*, *Muslims and Mongols* (Canterbury, NZ, 1977), 36–66; A.M. Khazanov, "Muhammad and Jenghiz Khan Compared: The Religious Factor in World Empire Building", in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993), 461–479.

¹⁹⁹ *SHM* 25.

²⁰⁰ Ts.Z. Žamtsarano, "Kul't Chingis Khana v Ordose", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 6 (1961), 191–234.

²⁰¹ McChesney, "The Amīr of Muslim Central Asia" in *J. H. M. J.* 1971, 21–22.

necessary to determine their interpersonal attachments on the basis of who an actor was, and whom he was descended from.

Charisma and Consensus

One reason why people's patrimonial convictions played a comparatively insignificant role in determining their political attachments during the period 1598–1605 was that charismatic loyalties possessed weaker affective force than they did at other times. Such weakness reflects the fact that there was a drop in consensus at the end of the sixteenth century as to who the recipient of people's charismatic loyalties should actually be.

The importance of consensus becomes apparent if one begins to conceive of charisma in terms akin less to Weber than to Durkheim. Instead of thinking of chosen-ness as a subjectively-visible *quality*, one might opt to think of it as a subjectively-meaningful *reference point*, signified to the relevant constituency by some arbitrarily, but consensually recognised token of value (such as a particular line of descent). In Durkheimian functionalist terms, the purpose of any such reference point might be described as coordinative, inasmuch as it serves to foster common cause and to minimise conflict among those who undertake to recognise its conventionalised significance. The referential purpose of language, for instance, relates to the fact that, by according approximately uniform significance to the same repertoire of signs, a multitude of actors can thereby signal their intentions to one another with greater accuracy than would otherwise be possible; the referential purpose of money, meanwhile, relates to how it allows actors to achieve consensus as to the commensurate worth of what might otherwise be incommensurable units of utility.²⁰² The denotative system which Weber identifies as 'charisma' seems to have performed a similar coordinative function. The consensual attribution of 'chosen-ness' fostered group solidarity by imposing upon some constituency a common burden of loyalty towards whomsoever was presently deemed to enjoy higher sanction. It was not only 'the chosen' who benefited from the attribution of chosen-ness. It was also the people doing the attributing.

The integrative capacity of any denotative system is likely to be proportionate to the extent of this system's consensual recognition. The more widely axiomatic a signifier's interpretation, the more liable is an inter-

²⁰² "Everyone wants money", says a character in David Mamet's *Heist* (2001). "That's why it's called money."

prefer to regard this signifier as intrinsically meaningful, and the more likely he thus is to modify his behaviour in deference to the worth which the signifier represents. Just as the communicative capacity of any word necessarily depends on the degree of consensus as to its meaning, so too the affective force of any population's charismatic loyalty towards a particular actor is likely to be proportionate to the share of the population deeming this actor's identity to signify some quality of chosen-ness. This is not just because more people are liable to feel obligated towards the actor, but also because those who already feel obligated are liable to feel more so, as the behaviour of people around them further supports their own beliefs. ("My conviction grows infinitely", writes the 18th-century German poet Novalis, "the moment another soul will believe in it."²⁰³) One would be likely to feel a greater obligation towards some specifically-distinguished dynast—a greater willingness, say, to sacrifice one's own immediate material interests to ensure the dynast's acquisition and maintenance of authority—if the behaviour of fellow subjects supported, rather than undermined, one's acceptance that the chosen-ness signified by this dynast's *nasab* was genuine, and that one's own deontological responsibility was real.

The Self-Evidence of Chosen-Ness

In some environments, the attribution of chosen-ness might be more axiomatic than in others, because it was more consistent. That is to say, in some environments there might be a higher probability than elsewhere that the attributes deemed to denote one actor's chosen-ness would in other circumstances be deemed to denote another's. The more consistent the determination of charisma, the more likely might constituencies be to attain consensus as to whose identity presently signified chosen-ness: and the stronger might thus be their sense of obligation thereto.

Weber does not concern himself with the varying self-evidence of charisma. His empathetic reading posits an environment in which constituencies either recognise an individual's charisma or they do not, and in which an individual's hereditarily-transferred chosen-ness is axiomatically manifest by dint of whom he is descended from. The obvious implication is that Weber conceives of hereditary charisma as a 'boundless' resource, accruing to all who boast (paternal) descent from an Ur-charismatic ancestor. In some contexts, such a conception seems quite reasonable. As

²⁰³ R. von Hardenberg, 'Novalis', *Schriften*, ed. L. Tieck and F. Schlegel (2 vols., Berlin, 1805), I.188. The apophthegm will be most familiar to Anglophone readers as the epigraph to Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* (London, 1900), and as a sentiment quoted approvingly by the narrator in E.M. Forster's *Howards End* (London, 1910).

observed above, at any moment in early modern Central Asia multiple members of spiritual dynasties were liable to be enjoying perquisites accorded them by dint of who they were; similarly, people's reverence for the quality of Chingīzid descent evidently served to distinguish perceptions of those who corporately boasted this quality from perceptions of those who corporately did not.²⁰⁴ In other instances, however, this notion of 'boundless' charisma proves hopelessly indistinct. Events in fourteenth-century Iran illustrate this well. If people in Iran had deemed all Chingīzids to enjoy higher sanction in equal degree, they would have had little reason for acting as they did in 1335. That year, the Īlkhānid ruler Abū Sa'īd b. Ūljāytū Khan died without male successors, following almost a century of Īlkhānid rule. In the absence of anyone 'from the line of Ghāzān Khan and Sultan Abū Sa'īd Khan', *amīrs* opted to elevate Arpā Khan, a Chingīzid from the line of Arīq Būqā b. Tūlū. In the words of one sixteenth-century chronicler, however, the populace wished to be ruled by somebody 'from the line of Hūlāgū'. Putting aside any consequentialist fears they might have about the efficacy of female rule,²⁰⁵ therefore, they demanded that authority be given instead to Sāti Bik Khātūn, who was Abū Sa'īd's sister.²⁰⁶ Such behaviour suggests that while Chingīzid descent may have been a necessary condition for the ascription of chosen-ness in this particular ecology, it was not a sufficient one. It clearly mattered to people in mid fourteenth-century Iran that authority devolve not only to a Chingīzid, but to the person whose identity rendered him or her *the right* Chingīzid.

When deciding upon a ruler, at least, people evidently regarded chosen-ness as what we might term an *additive* quality. That is, they regarded it as a quality accruing to whichever Ur-charismatic descendent presently best satisfied various sequentially-more exacting additional criteria. In ecologies where the nature of such additional criteria was self-evident, the attribution of chosen-ness might be largely axiomatic. In England and France, for

²⁰⁴ Kathryn Babayan applies a similar notion of 'corporate charisma' to the sixteenth-century Safavid dynasty: *eadem*, "The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamate Shi'ism", in *Iranian Studies* 27 (1994), 135–161 [141].

²⁰⁵ According to one leading *amīr* at the time, "a woman is not appropriate for ruling Iran" (*zanī pādīshāhī-yi mulk-i Īrān-ra nashāyad*): *DhJT* 208. *TŪ* 32–33 suggests that other parties had similarly dismissive views of women's political capacities, relating that one Chaghatāyid prince berated a kinswoman with ideas above her station, on the grounds that "women's thoughts and speech should be concerned with the spindle and the loom, not with the khalnal throne or titulature" (*rāy wa sukhn-i zanān az dūk wa charkhah bāshad, nah az sarīr wa afsar-i khāniyat*).

²⁰⁶ *TAKhKh* 315b. Earlier sources relating these events include *MA* 292–301, *DhJT* 189–193 and *MS* 122–126.

instance, it was conventional practice by the late thirteenth century for patrimonial entitlement to devolve according to primogeniture.²⁰⁷ By rendering it reasonably predictable that eldest son would succeed eldest son, primogeniture fostered a high degree of semiotic consistency regarding the attribution of charisma, as constituencies accepted that the fact of being an incumbent's eldest son denoted a chosen-ness to which they were bound to submit.²⁰⁸ By contrast, polities which lacked any single genealogical mechanism for determining entitlement were less consistent in the attribution of chosen-ness. Early modern Central Asia was one such environment where succession was highly indeterminate.²⁰⁹

The reason why Central Asia lacked any fixed successional mechanism relates to what one might term the *corporate instability* of Chingīzid rule. Throughout the period of the dispensation, there was a tension as to whether regnal eligibility should be a prerogative of the many or of the few. Chingīz himself is remembered as an exponent of collective rule. Believing that his sons Chaghatāy, Ūgudāy and Tūluī, plus descendents of the predeceased Jūchī, should share responsibility for ruling the land he had conquered, he supposedly divided the empire between them, perforating each prince's principal territorial possession with micro-holdings which were distributed among his brothers, so that everybody would have a stake in everybody else's appanage.²¹⁰ It is also related that Chingīz also divided up the prerogatives of office. He proposed that his third son Ūgudāy should serve as khan,²¹¹ apparently regarding him as the individual best qualified to exercise the responsibilities of authority,²¹² at the same time supposedly tasking his second son Chaghatāy with upholding his law-code, or *yāsā*.²¹³ By these dispositions, Chingīz would appear to have demonstrated his desire to establish a kind of Chingīzid collective, whose members might commonly enjoy (a) a share of administrative authority and its associated perquisites, and (b) common potential eligibility for supreme khalal accession.

²⁰⁷ E. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies—A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, 1957), 330.

²⁰⁸ A.W. Lewis, "Anticipatory Association of the Heir in Early Capetian France", in *American Historical Review* 83 (1978), 906–927 [906–907].

²⁰⁹ On the relative 'determinacy' of succession, see J. Goody, "Introduction", in *idem* (ed.), *Succession to High Office* (Cambridge, 1966), 1–56 [23–24].

²¹⁰ Allsen, "Sharing out the Empire: Apportioned Lands under the Mongols", in Khazanov and A. Wink (eds.), *Nomads in the Sedentary World* (London, 1997), 172–190.

²¹¹ *SHM* 209.

²¹² *TJ* I.143.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, I.162.

The advantages of universal in-group eligibility were clear. As Chingiz was supposedly keen to impress upon his offspring, it is harder to break a fistful of arrows than to snap a single stem lying on its own.²¹⁴ But the disadvantages were equally apparent. With the passing of generations, the practice of making all family members stake-holders in a common disposition of power might yield an instability cost, as an exponentially-rising number of ancestrally-entitled parties put ever-greater demand on resources and opportunities, and as stakeholders became increasingly reluctant to share these resources and opportunities with ever-more distantly related kinsmen. This is approximately what happened in the thirteenth-century Chingizid world empire,²¹⁵ and it is approximately what also happened in several of what we may term the *Chingizid epigone states*. In contrast to Yüan China and İlkhānid Iran, which witnessed the rapid adoption of exclusive monarchical primogeniture in the face of long-dominant 'settled' tradition,²¹⁶ stakeholders in the Jüchid and Chaghatāyid khanates continued to retain a notion of the corporate collective. While in the Chingizid collective eligibility had devolved by consensually-determined meritocracy, however, eligibility for the rulership-perquisite in these 'epigone states' devolved by something more closely resembling gerontocracy, whereby the incumbent was succeeded by his oldest living fellow-member of the collective, regardless of whether this latter was his linear or lateral kinsman. But as demand for resources grew, and consensus decreased as to how these resources should be distributed, events would soon show that gerontocracy offered a much less resilient successional mechanism than primogeniture did.

In such times of crisis, two expedients might present themselves. The first expedient was for a large corporate polity to split into several smaller polities, in each of which eligibility might be confined more exclusively not just to descendants of some common ancestor but to those tracing parentage

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, L.40. The trope is highly conventional, with echoes in e.g. Mongolian and Byzantine literary tradition: see *SHM* 4 and Constantine Porphyrogenitus (ed. Gy. Moravcsik, tr. R.J.H. Jenkins), *De Administrando Imperii* (Washington, 1967), 180. It may be familiar to some readers also from David Lynch's *The Straight Story* (1999).

²¹⁵ P. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 22 (1978), 186–244; Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran", in G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds.), *Rulers of the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), 223–242.

²¹⁶ J.W. Darden, "From Mongol Empire to Yuan Dynasty", in *Mongolica Serica* 30 (1972–1973), 117–165; H. Franke, *From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: the Legitimation of the Yüan Dynasty* (Munich, 1978), particularly 46–52; I.P. Petrushevskii, "Gorodskiaia znat' v gosudarstve khulaguidov", in *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie* 5 (1948), 85–107.




Figure 9: First- and second-generation Chingizid epigone states.

from some eponymous descendent of this ancestor. Although the establishment of inter-polity frontiers might actually reduce the total sum of resources available for redistribution (see below, p. 134), the closer average consanguinity of those sharing rulership prerogatives in any one polity might at least foster greater common cause as to how these resources should be assigned. The other expedient was for some individual sub-dynastic party to reduce the demand on resources and opportunities by increasing the mortality rate of commonly-entitled fellow dynasts. Outbreaks of violence regularly saw members of one sub-family exterminate other members of the ruling collective, thereby empowering themselves to re-establish authority as their own exclusive perquisite.²¹⁷ In sixteenth-century Khwārazm, for instance, two 'Arabshāhid sub-families allied to remove a third sub-family which for a decade or so had been dominating authority.²¹⁸ On other occasions, actors might go even further than this. One famous instance of eliminational violence occurred in sixteenth-century Greater Mā warā al-nahr. As will be related at further length in chapter 2, in a series of inter-appanage wars from ca. 1555 to 1582 'Abdallāh Khan eliminated almost all of his ($x > 1$) kinsmen. Although his primary victims were descendents of his (4,1) kinsmen Kūchkūnjī and Suyūnch Muḥammad, 'Abdallāh also targeted several

²¹⁷ Joseph Fletcher takes the idea somewhat further, referring on one occasion ("Turko-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire", in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4 (1979-1980), 236-251 [238-239]), to "the integrating war that society needed in order to continue to cohere". He neatly thereby illustrates what many people may find distasteful about functionalist lines of thought.

²¹⁸ Dickson, "Uzbek Dynastic Theory", 213.

of his ($x = 2$) kinsmen, including his first cousin Dīn Muḥammad b. Pīr Muḥammad, whom in 1573 he expelled from authority in Balkh.²¹⁹ Not only might 'Abdallāh be said thus to have dismantled the Abū'l-Khayrid collective, but the sheer extent of this violence also reduced the odds of any new collective replacing the last one. In circumstances strongly reminiscent of what we also find in mid-century Khwārazm,²²⁰ by weakening the position of all but his ($x \leq 1$) kinsmen 'Abdallāh inadvertently raised the odds of authority devolving to his unloved son, and of a collective regime giving way to a primogenitural one.

The Chingīzid collective was an unstable system, requiring regular pruning in order to perpetuate itself. The constant likelihood of violent intervention undermined any consistency in the attribution of chosen-ness, because it was difficult to infer the future value of any quality of descent: there was no assurance that a *nasab* which at one moment conferred eligibility would thereafter continue to do so. The contingency of any supposed dynastic worth threatened to impede the consensual recognition that one Chingīzid rather than another presently enjoyed some higher authorisation to rule. In order to inculcate consensus where otherwise there might be none, therefore, actors had to rely heavily on ritual.

Charisma and Ritual

In many parts of the pre-modern world, ritual played an important role in fostering the perception that a ruler exercised authority by grace of some higher sanction. Clifford Geertz, for instance, has studied how ritualised royal progresses might serve to impress upon an audience a paradigmatic image of divinely authorised kingship.²²¹ Although Geertz neglects to observe this point, the utility of ritual in any pre-mass-communications era crucially reflected the fact that ritual was participatory: as intrinsic to the purpose of the royal progress as the display of paradigmatic authority was the fact that onlookers were automatically cast in the paradigmatic role of dutiful subjects. By taking part in ritual, individuals were performing whatever function attached to the role imposed upon them: and were enacting

²¹⁹ *ShNSh* 190b–191a; *AhT* 453–454; *RS* 233a–245b; *MB* 286.

²²⁰ Dickson, "Uzbek Dynastic Theory", 213, 216, on the activities of the 'Arabshāhid dynast Hājji Muḥammad.

²²¹ C. Geertz, "Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power", in *idem*, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York, 1983), 121–146.

their deference to whatever values were written into this role.²²² Participants might thus find themselves signalling to one another their adherence to beliefs which autonomously they might never have cherished, but which authorities wished them to express.²²³ The advantage of convening a ritual, therefore, was that it allowed one to circulate the sort of information which one wanted circulated.

One obvious form of such ritual both in medieval Europe and in early modern Central Asia was the coronation ceremony.²²⁴ The wide cross-cultural significance accorded to hieratic coronation ceremonies suggests that people might regard an enthroned ruler's numinous authority as something qualitatively greater than that which simply 'transferred' to him at the moment of his predecessor's passing. In the medieval West, for instance, hierocratic canonists regarded coronation as nothing less than the bestowal of a God-given authority which had hitherto been denied the yet-uncrowned ruler.²²⁵ A more pragmatic reading of the coronation ceremony might instead construe it as a forum for mass signalling. In addition to compacting their own supposed covenants of fidelity, participants were signalling to one another—wittingly or otherwise—that they recognised the 'numinous' worth to which they were enacting deference: and by so doing were adding to the currency of this worth with the enacted force of their own conviction.

In certain ecologies lacking a stable successional mechanism, including early modern Central Asia, there existed a second, even more significant ritual which played a similar role in inculcating consensus as to the attribution of chosen-ness. From the mid-thirteenth century onwards, it was conventional practice upon the death of a ruling incumbent in Central Asia for leading princes and *amīrs* to convene a *qūriltāy*. Scholars often regard the *qūriltāy* as a deliberative gathering where participants considered which candidate out of several should be proposed for elevation. If, as was possible, among these candidates there were no single front-runner, this description might be about right. Were one candidate manifestly more likely to accede than any other, however, the *qūriltāy*'s function might be rather different, serving not to elect a successor but to groom this front-runner with a veneer

²²² M. Bloch, "Introduction", in *idem* (ed.), *Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Society* (London, 1975), 1–28 [24–26].

²²³ D.I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics and Power* (New Haven, 1988), 67.

²²⁴ E. Eichmann, *Die Kaiserkrönung im Abendland* (Würzburg, 1942), particularly 129–222; Sela, *Ritual and Authority*, *passim*.

²²⁵ Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 325–329.

of consensual ratification, through the invocation of the *yāsā* and the *tūrah*, or what one might broadly gloss as 'Chingizid practice'.

The origins and substance of the *yāsā* and the *tūrah* were—and remain—uncertain.²²⁶ Such uncertainty meant that these concepts could be invoked as a rationale for a wide range of activities. They were sufficiently malleable, for instance, for fifteenth-century historians to claim that Timūr's activities were the very expression of a 'Chingizid practice' which Timūr himself might actually be deemed to have been responsible for overthrowing.²²⁷ Similarly, the fact that Chingiz's own testamentary ambitions for Ūgudāy had betrayed a basically meritocratic outlook did not stop subsequent generations from invoking Chingizid tradition to justify successive instances where authority devolved by dynastic seniority. Participants at the *qūriltāy* of spring 1598 doubtless cited the *tūrah* when ruling in favour of 'Abd al-Mu'min's primogenitural elevation, just as people seem to have done in 1511 when approving Kūchkūnjī's gerontocratic accession.²²⁸

Of course, it need not follow that people were consciously instrumentalising 'Chingizid practice' in order to achieve some desired outcome. Most people held Chingizid tradition in high regard,²²⁹ and leading actors were

²²⁶ For discussion of the *yāsā*, see D. Ayalon, "The Great Yāsa of Chingiz Khān—A Reexamination, A: The Basic Data in the Islamic Sources on the Yāsa and its Contents", in *Studia Islamica* 33 (1971), 99–140; Morgan, "The 'Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān' and Mongol Lands in the Ilkhānate", in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 49 (1986), 163–176.

²²⁷ *MuT* (Natanzī) 291, noting how Timūr convoked a tribal assembly "according to the *tūrah* of Chingiz Khan" (*bar qarār-i tūrah-yi Chingiz-Khānī Amīr Šāhib-qarān bih mubārakī-yi qūriltāy farmūd*).

²²⁸ *LT* 370, noting that "because Kūchkūnji Khan was the eldest, and because it is the practice of their *tūrah* that whoever of their race is seniormost becomes khan, he became *pādishāh* in Mā warā al-nahr" (*Kūchkūnji Khān kih [...] asann būd wa rasm-i tūrah-yi ishān chunīn ast kih har kas az nīzhād-i ishān asann bāshad khān shawad, dar Mā warā al-nahr bih pādishāhi rasīd*); *MB* 144, relating how "all the victorious sultans made common cause and, in accordance with the old *tūrah* and *yāsāq* [sic], they turned their attention to the important matter of who would be khan. And because Kūchkūnji was older than everybody else, they accorded to him the khalnal title" (*tamāmī-yi salāṭīn-i nušrat-qarīn ittīfāq namūdand wa binā bar tūrah wa yāsāq-i qadīm rūy dar muhimm-i khānīyat āwurdand. Wa chūn Kūchkūnji Khān bih sāl az hamah buzurgtār būd, bih ism-i khānī ū-rā mawsūm gardānidand*). *BA* 7418 312a–b offers a notably dissonant narrative, suggesting that people's respect for the 'ancient *yāsā*' meant that they wanted Kūchkūnji to rule as senior dynast (*bih mawjib-i yāsā-yi qadīm bih jānīb-i Kūchum Khān, kih asann-i khawānīn būd, tamāyul dāsht*), but that in view of Kūchkūnji's absence from Samarqand "a gathering of sultans and *hākims* instead agreed on the khalnal authority of [Kūchkūnji's younger brother] Suyūnch Muḥammad" (*jam'-i salāṭīn wa hūkkām bar khānīyat-i Suyūnchak Khān ittīfāq uftād*).

²²⁹ Parties occasionally criticised 'Chingizid practice' as inimical to *shar'ah*: see e.g. *TŪ*, 98–99 (on popular disapproval of the decision by the Ilkhānid Ūljaytū Khan to privilege the

careful to enact their own deference thereto. It was apparently in the name of 'Chingīzid practice' that Dīn Muḥammad decided, as noted above (p. 56), to disclaim formal Herati authority in favour of his grandfather;²³⁰ it was probably in the name of 'Chingīzid practice' also that in 1561 'Abdallāh is supposed to have piously disclaimed khal authority in favour of another 'senior dynast', his father Iskandar b. Jānī Bīk (see below, pp. 127–128). Such behaviour suggests that somebody, either the actors themselves or a postulated audience of onlookers, regarded it a virtue to defer to 'Chingīzid tradition'—howsoever they contextually understood this. Because there was no authoritative record dating back from Chingīz's own rule, people knew of a 'Chingīzid tradition' only in the form of its various late avatars, each articulating a world-view somewhat different from the next. Perhaps as a result of what one author terms a widespread 'confirmation-seeking bias',²³¹ people seem to have been disposed towards accepting as canonical whatever normative rationale was currently salient, regardless of whatever other rationales might equally be justified by alternatively-constructed versions of 'Chingīzid tradition'.

Successive rulers in early modern Central Asia enjoyed charismatic authority because *qūriltāy* participants consensually determined that it was these individuals whose accessions successively best embodied a 'Chingīzid tradition' which people dimly understood but piously revered.²³² Even the most powerful candidate did well to seek acclamation at the *qūriltāy*, as a means of providing his rule with its own ritualised justification. Those who

yāsā over the competing legal claims of Sunni and Shii Islam), and S'Ā 68a–b, with discussion in Ī. Togan, "Uluğ Bey Zamanında Yasa ve Şeriat Tartışmaları", in *Tarih Çevresi 1* (1994), 9–16 (expressing pious disapproval of the Tīmūrid prince Ulugh Bīk's drinking bouts *bar rasm-i Chingīzī*). In an account (BA 210a–b) of how Nadir Muḥammad b. Dīn Muḥammad upon acceding to khal authority sought to empower Islamic tradition over Chingīzid practice, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī describes this latter as "a set of rules which was revered under some name according to the common usage of each tribe, with the Mongols calling it *yāsā* and *yūsūn* and the Uzbeks calling it *tūrah*, each people thus according to the custom a particular title and regarding its evil stipulations something to which to aspire" (*rusūm bud kih dar 'urf-i har tā'ifah az ān bih ismī mu'tabar bud, chunānchih Mughulān yāsā wa yūsūn guftandī wa Ūzbikīyah tūrah khwāndandī, wa ham chunīn har qawmī ān āyin-rā nāmī nihādī wa 'amal-i bad-i ān-rā az ma'rūqāt dānistandī*).

²³⁰ T'ĀĀ'A 560 (citing *tūrah*); BA 41b and *SilSal* 157b (both citing *yāsā*).

²³¹ D. Good, "Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust", in D. Gambetta (ed.), *Trust—Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations* (Oxford, 1988), 31–48 [40].

²³² Although Weber suggests that 'charisma' and 'tradition' represent entirely different modes of establishing legitimacy, Edward Shils argues (*idem*, "Charisma, Order, and Status", in *American Sociological Review* 30 (1965), 199–213 [200]), that a perceived ability to *embody* tradition may itself secure the attribution of charisma.

failed to do so might regret their mistake. When in the mid-1530s the Abū'l-Khayrid prince 'Abd al-Laṭīf established himself in authority over Samarqand 'without a meeting of sultans', his putative subjects quickly aligned themselves with his elder brother 'Abdallāh, who marched on the city and unceremoniously removed 'Abd al-Laṭīf from power. As far as Maḥmūd b. Walī is concerned, 'Abd al-Laṭīf was condemned to failure not by any prior-standing dynastic ineligibility but by his sheer disregard for the niceties of ritual.²³³ In spring 1598, 'Abd al-Mu'min was careful not to make any such miscalculation. By convening a *qūriltāy*, 'Abd al-Mu'min attempted to add lustre to the fact that he was the most powerful living dynast. He strove to foster the perception that he was *rightly* the most powerful.

The events of 17 June of course gave the lie to this notion. As 'Abd al-Wāsi' Bī Kinakas and his fellow conspirators demonstrated, there existed a constituency which failed to recognise that 'Abd al-Mu'min was remotely entitled to authority. This was partly because people's consequentialist dislike of 'Abd al-Mu'min's brutal behaviour overshadowed any sense of patrimonial commitment. But it was probably also because the force of people's patrimonial commitment was already weak. In particular, the *qūriltāy* ratification process seems not to have carried the weight which 'Abd al-Mu'min had hoped. One reason for this was that many *amīrs* had evidently not attended the gathering. As we saw above, 'Abd al-Mu'min convened the *qūriltāy* as quickly as possible after his father's death, in order to pre-empt the candidature of other Jānī-Bikid dynasts. By confining the field of participants, 'Abd al-Mu'min ensured his speedy acclamation: but he also ensured that there existed a large constituency which was not represented during the process of attributing chosen-ness, and which failed to lend its imprimatur to the outcome. By deviating from what, for good reason, had since the thirteenth century been the conventional practice of trying to maximise people's participation in *qūriltāy* gatherings,²³⁴ he undercut the force of his acclamation. There is an obvious analogy here with modern politics: as numerous opposition parties are well aware, the easiest way to impugn the validity of an election is to withhold one's own candidature. By removing one's supporters from the voting process, one may claim to have disencumbered them

²³³ BA 7418 328a, ascribing 'Abd al-Laṭīf's overthrow to the fact that "there had not yet been a meeting of sultans or a conferral of khalid authority" (*ijtimā'-yi salāṭin wa qarār-dād-i muḥimm-i khānī hanūz bīh zuhūr nayāmadah būd*).

²³⁴ *TJJ* I.204–205 (widespread participation in the *qūriltāy* of 1246, where Guyūk b. Ūgudāy was confirmed for elevation); *ibid.*, III.16–17 (widespread participation in the *qūriltāy* of 1251, where Mankū b. Tūlūi was confirmed for elevation).

from any participatory responsibility to recognise an electoral result.²³⁵ Correspondingly, it is by rendering as many people as possible complicit in a decision-making process that one best secures consent towards a resultant outcome. To his cost, 'Abd al-Mu'min in early 1598 failed to recognise this.

In the late sixteenth century there was a drop in the efficacy of those ritual instruments which had hitherto served to foster common cause, as ever-fewer people felt obliged to recognise the attribution of worth. Outbreaks of violence during the inter-appanage wars and again during 'Abd al-Mu'min's reign eliminated numerous Chingīzid princes and tribal leaders who had hitherto willingly or otherwise played a part in consensually ascribing to some individual the quality of chosen-ness. Whereas ritual participation had once been a prerogative accruing to eminence within the polity, it now attached rather to membership of a partisan political group: and those who stood outside this group were alienated both from the decision-making process and from that constituency which continued to recognise the present ruler as embodiment of Chingīzid tradition. It was the good fortune of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds that they appeared on the scene just as people's ritually-inculcated charismatic loyalties towards the Abū'l-Khayrīds were in decline.

Eligibility, Popularity and Takeover

On several occasions at the turn of the seventeenth century, the Safavid ruler Shah 'Abbās tried to take advantage of the disorder which spread across Greater Mā warā al-nahr after 'Abd al-Mu'min's death. He did so by sponsoring attempts by Central Asian exiles to expel the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd interlopers and restore Abū'l-Khayrīd authority in Greater Mā warā al-nahr (see below, particularly pp. 181–184). When justifying such policies, 'Abbās claimed that he was acting out of disinterested concern for what one chronicler suggests he termed 'the Chingīzid princes'.²³⁶ 'Abbās apparently thus sought to cast the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd takeover as an assault

²³⁵ R. Nadeau and A. Blais, "Accepting the Election Outcome: The Effect of Participation on Losers' Consent", in *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1993), 553–463, particularly 562. This is perhaps borne out by the events of the 1240s and 1250s: Bātū b. Jūchī was a rare non-participant in the afore-mentioned *qūriltāy* of 1246 (*TJF* 1.205), and was thus not implicated in the decision to elevate Guyūk; this may explain why Bātū alone subsequently felt free to march against Guyūk, just as this latter was dying in 1251 (*ibid.*, III.15).

²³⁶ *Bih umārā-yi Balkh payghām kard kih "Mā-rā az in yūrīsh gharādī juz salānat-i salātin-zādahā-yi Chingīzī nīst"*. *SilSal* 164b, in the context of 'Abbās' Balkh campaign of 1011 (21 June 1602–10 June 1603), for which see below, pp. 181–184. Hājjī Mir Muḥammad Salīm's *T'ĀĀ'A* source narrative (see immediately below, n. 237) omits reference to any such statement.

on that Abū'l-Khayrid rulership-perquisite with which 'Chingīzid tradition' had locally been associated for the previous hundred years.²³⁷ He thereby tried to mobilise people against those very Tūqāy-Tīmūrid interlopers whom in summer 1598 he had claimed to be supplanting.

As it transpired, 'Abbās' attempts came to little. This was partly because the shah himself was widely reviled in Greater Mā warā al-nahr. With many Central Asians convinced that it was impossible to achieve 'concord and reconciliation' between themselves and the schismatic Shiite Qizilbāsh,²³⁸ the Safavid shah was in a poor position to cast himself as champion of Chingīzid tradition. Even had 'Abbās been better placed to so, though, constituencies would still have been unlikely to shift their alignments in favour of his Abū'l-Khayrid protégés, let alone have united to overthrow their recently-elevated Tūqāy-Tīmūrid rulers. As events following 1989 and 1991 clearly illustrate, any kind of constituted worth—whether a local fiat currency or a charismatic line of descent—tends to lose its value when a population lacks the solidarity and trust required for agreeing on what it holds dear.²³⁹ The failure of 'Abbās' restoration attempts illustrates how he overestimated the value of his investment. 'Abbās' failure offers a salutary warning against exaggerating the affective force of charismatic loyalty.

'Abbās also committed a further, more fundamental miscalculation. The shah overestimated the significance of dynastic eligibility among those various conceptions of the good by which constituencies in early modern Central Asia determined their attachments. The failure of 'Abbās' Abū'l-Khayrid protégés illustrates how actors whose appeals for loyalty were predicated on valorised dynastic seniority alone might enjoy less support than those who associated themselves with a variety of other contextually-salient values and interests. The events of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover saw members of a dynasty whose claim to 'chosen-ness' inhered in little more than their Ur-Chingīzid descent and their retrospectively valorised maternal ancestry draw successfully upon a variety of more instrumental loyalty types to

²³⁷ See here TĀĀ'A 613, on how 'Abbās, speaking of the *silsilah-yi Jānī-Biki*, stated that "regnal authority in Mā warā al-nahr and Turkistān is the ancestral perquisite of that family" (*salṭanat wa dārā'i-yi Mā warā al-nahr wa Turkistān [...] haqq-i mawrūthi ān dūdman ast*).

²³⁸ *Firqaḥ-yi muta'aṣṣibah-yi Ūzbikīyah bā ṭabaqaḥ-yi mutabarīyah-yi Qizilbāsh paywastah dar mashrab wa madhhab mutaghā'ir wa mutadādd-and kih ijtimā' wa iltiyām-i in dū fariq mumkin wa mutasawwar nist*: *SilSal* 179a, ascribing the sentiment to Walī Muḥammad in 1611.

²³⁹ For discussion of this phenomenon, see e.g. K. Verdery, "A Transition from Socialism to Feudalism? Thoughts on the Postsocialist State", in *eadem*, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Princeton, 1996), 204–228.

overthrow an Abū'l-Khayrid ruling house which for almost a century had enjoyed the charismatic tincture of khalid eligibility. Far from being that case-study in khalid entitlement assumed by Howorth and Dickson, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover illustrates the heuristic poverty of any approach which tries to explain the course of events simply in terms of whom people are descended from. A khalid candidate's dynastic identity was important, certainly. As will become clear, however, it was not the only factor which influenced people's political attachments.

The Fugitive

Not all of Dīn Muḥammad's supporters died on the battlefield at Pul-i Sālār that day. Among the survivors were Dīn Muḥammad's three brothers, Bāqī Muḥammad and Walī Muḥammad and Pāyandah Muḥammad. Bāqī Muḥammad and Walī Muḥammad are credited with fighting bravely during the showdown; borrowing the language of the Iranian poet Firdawsī's epic *Shāh-nāmāh*, one early seventeenth-century source describes them as "two descendents of Rustam".²⁴⁰ According to one Safavid chronicler, the two brothers inspired much of the rest of the army, and helped to put 'Abbās' lieutenant Farhād Khan to flight.²⁴¹ Once Dīn Muḥammad himself had taken flight, however, the brothers realised that the situation was lost. Recognising that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid position in Herat was now indefensible, they decided to flee.

For some reason which is not entirely clear, the three brothers did not all head off in the same direction. According to several Mughal chronicles, Pāyandah Muḥammad opted to flee south, in the direction of Qandahār.²⁴² Bāqī Muḥammad and Walī Muḥammad, by contrast, opted to flee to Mā warā al-nahr. The two men first gathered up their grandfather Yār Muḥammad and their young nephews, Dīn Muḥammad's newly-orphaned sons Imām Qulī and Nadir Muḥammad, who had stayed inside Herat's citadel during the battle. This family group then headed north, first to Andkhūd²⁴³

²⁴⁰ *IQN* 25a. For more on the *Shāh-nāmāh*, see below, p. 268.

²⁴¹ *RŠ* 743. See however *FH* 46a, as noted above (p. 59 n. 109), recording that Bāqī Muḥammad was posted in Herat during the battle and did not take part in the fighting.

²⁴² *AN* III.817; *PN* I.219; *AS* I.304–305. In opting to flee to Qandahār, Pāyandah Muḥammad may have been influenced by the fact that his grandfather Yār Muḥammad during his exile from Mā warā al-nahr had recently spent time in the region: see e.g. *BA* 41a, as above.

²⁴³ *TA* 178.

and then, having probably crossed the Amu Darya at Karkī,²⁴⁴ on to the city of Qarshī.²⁴⁵ Making great play of his “humility and submission”,²⁴⁶ Bāqī Muḥammad informed the khan of Dīn Muḥammad’s death, and requested permission to come to Bukhara as a refugee.²⁴⁷ As he approached Bukhara, however, he found that Pīr Muḥammad was not at present in the city, and the local population, being reluctant to allow him in without permission, denied him entry.²⁴⁸ Bāqī Muḥammad thus proceeded to where Pīr Muḥammad was encamped, and performed homage to the khan “in accordance with the practice and custom of Chingīzid sultans”.²⁴⁹ His renewed appeal for sanctuary now met with a warm reception. In the late summer of 1598, as we shall see, the Qazaq khan Tawakkul had invaded Mā warā al-nahr with an enormous army, and Samarqand and Miyānkāl had quickly fallen to attack. Anxious at the prospect of Bukhara itself coming under Qazaq assault, Pīr Muḥammad and his *amīrs* decided to grant Bāqī Muḥammad’s request: even if the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid arrived without an army, they reasoned, his status as *pādishāh-zādah* might at least help to galvanise the population in this time of need.²⁵⁰ Deferring to their opinion, Pīr Muḥammad welcomed his distant kinsman into the city.

At the time, this probably looked like a good move.

²⁴⁴ The crossing-point is noted in T’ĀĀ’A 592 (giving ‘Gargī’ in place of ‘Karkī’), followed in turn in *SilSal* 160a.

²⁴⁵ T’A 178; TMQ 554a.

²⁴⁶ *Bā khuḏū’ wa khushū’-i tamām*: T’A 178.

²⁴⁷ *Bāqī Sultān [...] firistād wa namūd [sic] kih ‘Aḥwāl-i Tūlīm Khān wa jamā’-at-i Ūzbikīyah bih shikast qarār yāft wa mā panāh bih tū āwurdah-īm, amr chī-st?’*: *ibid.*

²⁴⁸ T’ĀĀ’A 592.

²⁴⁹ *Bih qā’idah wa ādāb-i salāṭīn-i chingīzīyah*: *ibid.*

²⁵⁰ *Umarā guftand “Har chand Bāqī Sultān-rā lashkari nīst amā nām-i pādishāh-zādah-gī bih ū-st, āmadan-i ū khūb ast”*: T’A 178. See also T’ĀĀ’A 592, on how Pīr Muḥammad’s *amīrs* “regarded his arrival as a blessing” (*umarā-yi Pīr Muḥammad āmadan-i ishān-rā mughtanam shumurdah*): Hājji Mir Muḥammad Salīm (*SilSal* 160a) slightly alters this latter passage, suggesting that it was Pīr Muḥammad himself who welcomed Bāqī Muḥammad’s arrival (*Pīr Muḥammad āmadan-i ishān-rā mughtanam dānistah*). Several other sources make no mention of Pīr Muḥammad’s rule, and suggest that Bāqī Muḥammad was elevated onto the Bukharan throne as soon as he arrived: see e.g. ‘AṢ I.304 (*chunān chih Bāqī Khān bā Wali Muḥammad Khān bih Bukhārā āmadah bar masnad-i ḥukūmat nīshast*) and TMKH 124 (*dū barādar-i digar āmadah-and wa ahl-i Bukhārā īn ma’nā-rā maḥḏ-i mawhibat-i ilāhī dānistah bih istiḡbāl-i shāh-zādahhā bar āmadah wa ān rūz tāj-i saltanat-rā bar [...] Bāqī Muḥammad Khān nihādand*). Mention of the Bukharans according Bāqī Muḥammad an ‘*istiḡbāl*’ may reflect a borrowing from T’ĀĀ’A 594 (for which see below, p. 141).

CHAPTER TWO

CLIENTELIST LOYALTY

Rebellion in Samarqand

In August 1599,¹ Pīr Muḥammad, the Jānī-Bikid ruler of Bukhara, marched east at the head of a joint Bukharan-Balkhi army. His destination was Samarqand, a city some hundred and fifty miles away. Relations had recently deteriorated between himself and the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid dynast Bāqī Muḥammad, whom he had recently appointed as Samarqand's governor.

As far as the Jānī-Bikid was concerned, the appointment had gone to Bāqī Muḥammad's head. Some time after taking up office in Samarqand, Bāqī Muḥammad began to regard himself as better qualified to rule than Pīr Muḥammad;² in the words of one late chronicler, he took to governing Samarqand "as though the region belonged personally to him".³ He set himself up in a splendid court, keeping several of his Tūqāy-Tīmūrid cousins in

¹ TA 182–183 dates the episode to early Ṣafar 1008 (23 August–20 September 1599). N.M. Lowick claims ("Shaybānid Silver Coins", 256), that Bāqī Muḥammad was already ruling Bukhara by 23 July 1599 (i.e. the end of 1007AH), but the claim is unsubstantiated; so too is the claim of Alekseev ("Sredniaia Aziia pri Ashtarkhanidakh v XVII–XVIII vv.", 129) that these events did not take place until 1601.

² *Khūd-rā dar amr-i saltanat wa farmānrawā'ī az Pīr Muḥammad Khān shāyastahtar mīdīd*: T'ĀĀ'A 593. In the *Silsilat al-salātīn*, Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm here deviates (*Sil-Sal* 160b) from his T'ĀĀ'A source narrative, noting simply that there was a clash of personalities between Bāqī Muḥammad and Pīr Muḥammad, with Pīr Muḥammad fearing that the Bāqī Muḥammad might one day attack and defeat him: *mīyān-i ū wa Pīr Muḥammad suwī-yi mizāj bih ham rasīdah Pīr Muḥammad Khān az khawf-i ān kih mabādā bar Mā warā al-nahr lashkar kashīdah bar man ghalabah wa istīlā kunad [...]*. Ḥājji Mīr tactfully thus plays down the fact that Pīr Muḥammad's fears were entirely justified. Among our other sources, *AfT* 125b gives an extremely abbreviated account of events, noting just how news reached Shah 'Abbās "of Bāqī Khan's heading to Turan, his fighting Pīr Muḥammad Khan and his establishing authority in Bukhara" (*khābar-i raftan-i Bāqī Khān bih wilāyat-i Tūrān wa muḥārabah-yi ū bā Pīr Muḥammad Khān wa istiqlāl-i Bāqī Khān dar Bukhārā [...]*), while Mīrzā Bik b. Ḥasan Junābādī in the *Rawḍat al-salātīn* makes no reference to the episode at all.

³ *Samarqand mamlakatī-rā taḥt-i taṣarruf-i khūd dīd*: TQKh 269a. The phrase does not appear in Khwājam Qulī Bik Balkhī's TShKh source narrative.

close attendance⁴ and according himself the title of khan.⁵ For a while, Pīr Muḥammad did nothing to challenge such disquieting pretensions to independence. After some months, however, Bāqī Muḥammad became increasingly self-assertive. No longer content with authority over Samarqand and its immediate environs, he began to expand his authority elsewhere across the region. Prime among his targets was Miyānkāl, a settlement on the Zarafshān river approximately halfway between Samarqand and Bukhara.⁶ He wrote to Pīr Muḥammad, demanding that the khan yield Miyānkāl to himself. Outraged at such a demand, Pīr Muḥammad immediately rejected Bāqī Muḥammad's overture; according to Jalāl al-Dīn Munajjim Yazdī in the *Tārīkh-i 'Abbāsī*, he stated that nobody from Bāqī Muḥammad's family had held such authority since the time of Tuqtāmīsh Khan—Bāqī Muḥammad's own (12,5) Tūqāy-Tīmūrid kinsman—in the late fourteenth century.⁷ But Bāqī Muḥammad would not be put off. He marched west and put Miyānkāl to siege.⁸ The city held out for three weeks. When it fell, Bāqī Muḥammad executed Pīr Muḥammad's appointed representative Qul Muḥammad Bī, and replaced him with his own appointee Īshim Dāghdāqā, who had hitherto served him as his *mīrākhūr-i kūchak*.⁹ Bāqī Muḥammad then proceeded on to besiege the nearby settlement of Dabūsiyah.¹⁰ News of this advance was sufficient to provoke Pīr Muḥammad into taking action. He summoned

⁴ *Jamī'atī 'aẓīm dast dād wa Raḥman Qulī Sulṭān wa 'Abbās Sulṭān, a' mām-i Bāqī Sulṭān, wa Tursūn Muḥammad Sulṭān, barādarash, wa sā'ir aqrabā' wa a'yān biḥ Samarqand āmadah pāy dar dā'irah-yi itā' atash nihādand: T'ĀĀ'A 593.* Ḥājji Mir Muḥammad Salīm substantially reproduces this passage in *SilSal* 160b, though omits mention of Tursūn Muḥammad, who he claims (*SilSal* 148a) had died in Samarqand in 1598; see below, p. 177 n. 119.

⁵ *Khūd-rā khāni dānistah: T'A 181.* See also *T'ĀĀ'A 593: biḥ laqab-i khāni mulaqqab gash-tah [...]*.

⁶ *TMQ 554a* instead identifies the settlement of Sāghārj as the object of contention: *Mawlānā Khwājagī Āyim-kanah-rā [sic: see below, p. 98] bā risālat nazd-i Pīr Muḥammad Khān firistād, maḍmūn-i risālat ān kih "Samarqand jā-yi andak ast, aqar khān qaṣabah-yi Sāgharj-rā biḥ man 'ināyat mikunad, 'ayn-i lutf wa mazīd-i sā'ir altāfat, wa aqar muḍāyaqaḥ dārad, biḥ ghayr az jang chārah nist".* The passage in question proceeds then to note how Pīr Muḥammad rejected the demand, saying "*al-ḥāl kih Samarqand biḥ tū dādah-am, ṭalab ziyādātī mikunū, sar chih az dastāt miyāyad?*" See also *SilSal* 160b, where Ḥājji Mir Muḥammad Salīm deviates from his *T'ĀĀ'A* source narrative in suggesting that Miyānkāl at the time was under the gubernatorial authority of Bāqī Muḥammad's grandfather Yār Muḥammad.

⁷ *Az zamān-i Tuqtāmīsh Khān kih ābā-yi īshān ast tā ḥāl az firqah-yi īshān hichkas-rā chunīn ḥukūmatī rūy nadādah: T'A 181.* I have emended 'firqah' for Waḥīd-niyā's 'qariyah', with reference to Bodleian Elliot f. 236a-b and BL Add. 27241 f. 144b.

⁸ *MB 178-179; T'ĀĀ'A 593.*

⁹ *T'A 181-182.*

¹⁰ *T'ĀĀ'A 593; BA 59a-60a.*

forces from Balkh, Ḥiṣār and other regions in the south,¹¹ and set out to punish the overweening Tūqāy-Timūrid.

Bāqī Muḥammad was stricken to learn of Pīr Muḥammad's approach. According to one Safavid chronicler, he tried to talk himself out of the situation, sending apologies to Pīr Muḥammad for his former misbehaviour and even dispatching his mother out towards Bukhara in order to avert the oncoming attack.¹² But when it became apparent that nothing would sway Pīr Muḥammad from his course of action, Bāqī Muḥammad determined to defend himself. Withdrawing to Samarqand, he set about building up the town's defences.¹³ He then sat tight as Pīr Muḥammad's army drew near and invested the city. After several days under siege, Bāqī Muḥammad dispatched his cousin Raḥman Qulī Sultan¹⁴ to make a sortie on Pīr Muḥammad's forces. When Raḥman Qulī had imposed heavy casualties on the besieging army,¹⁵ Bāqī Muḥammad sallied out from the citadel, and with an assortment of forces he defeated the Bukharan-Balkhi troops. Informed that Pīr Muḥammad had been captured alive, Bāqī Muḥammad gave instructions for his execution.¹⁶ The line of Bukharan Jānī-Bīkids had fallen.

In summer 1599, Bāqī Muḥammad led a rebellion against Pīr Muḥammad's khalal authority: and his triumph at Samarqand reflected his success in getting people to join this rebellion. As we shall see, one reason why people aligned themselves with Bāqī Muḥammad was because they thought he could help them. Bāqī Muḥammad was thus a beneficiary of what I term people's *clientelist loyalties*.

¹¹ TA 182; TMQ 554b; T'ĀĀ'A 593; BA 60a; TShKh nob (followed in turn in TQKh 269a).

¹² *Iḥār-i nadāmat namūd wa 'udhr-khwāhī kard kih "Az bi-'aqlī wa ḥamāqat chunīn 'amali az man sar-zadah nādīm-an, wa qasam mīkhwaram kih min ba'd har chand [kih] bigūṭ bikunam" [...]* Bāqī Khān mādar-i khūd-rā pīsh-i Pīr Muḥammad Khān firistād wa iltimās-i bisyār kard wa bih hīch wajh min al-wujūh dar ma'riḍ qabūl niyāmad wa mu'āwadat namūd. Bāqī Khān āzār-i bisyār az mu'āwadat-i bi-murād-i mādar kashīd wa guft "Mu'āmalah-yi mā bih ḥarīq-i Ūzun Ḥasan wa Sulṭān Abū Sa'īd mīshawad." TA 182. Reference here to 'Ūzun Ḥasan and Abū Sa'īd' alludes to the confrontation between Timūrid and Aq Qoyunlu forces in 1469 which resulted in Abū Sa'īd's defeat and execution, for which see e.g. I. Aka, *Iran'da Türkmen Hâkimiyeti (Kara Koyunlular Devri)* (Istanbul, 2001), 76–82.

¹³ TA 182.

¹⁴ Raḥman Qulī was the son of Tursūn Muḥammad b. Yār Muḥammad: *SilSal* 161a. He is also referred to as 'Abd al-Raḥman: see e.g. TA 201.

¹⁵ T'ĀĀ'A 594, followed in turn in *SilSal* 161a.

¹⁶ DQ 38b (for discussion of this passage, see below, p. 245); MB 179; MuT (Shirāzi) 260b; TA 183, suggesting that it was Bāqī Muḥammad himself who captured Pīr Muḥammad (*bih dast-i khūd garībān-i Pīr Muḥammad Khān-rā girift wa az asb bih zir āwurd*); TMQ 554a–b, suggesting that it was Bāqī Muḥammad's father Jānī Muḥammad who gave orders for Pīr Muḥammad's execution (*chūn Janī Bik Khān chashmash bar Pīr Muḥammad Khān uftād, farmūd tā ū-rā bih qatl āwurd*); T'ĀĀ'A 594; BA 60b.

By 'clientelist loyalty', I refer to the loyalty which an actor enjoys if he is deemed to possess the personal ability to further his supporters' material projects: and which eludes him if he is not. As a consequentialist attachment rather than a deontological one, it somewhat resembles the conception of loyalty proposed by John Locke and other European contractarians. Of course, constituencies in early modern Central Asia lacked any Enlightenment conception of the 'social contract', revocable or otherwise. Islamicate normative works depict regnal authority not as an artificial creation but as a state of affairs both necessary and natural, and authors view with horror the suggestion that mere actor shortcomings should result in the revocation of fidelity.¹⁷ In practice, however, constituencies were not so bound to convention as to accept an incumbent actor's incapable government. Bāqī Muḥammad's success at the Samarqand showdown suggests that he enjoyed support at least in part because he promised to do a better job of furthering people's interests than Pīr Muḥammad did.

Rebellion and Language

When Pīr Muḥammad learned of Bāqī Muḥammad's ambitions towards Miyānkāl, he accused Bāqī Muḥammad and his supporters of *ṭughyān* (sedition).¹⁸ Bāqī Muḥammad was only one of many actors during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries whose actions were described as rebellious. By contrast with most putative instances of 'rebellion', however, the events of the Samarqand uprising of 1599 were unusual in offering a gauge of people's clientelist loyalties. Elsewhere, the vocabulary of *ṭughyān*, together with that of *'iṣyān* (rebellion), denoted a wide range of human behaviour, little of it motivated by people's shifting clientelist loyalties nor even striking the dispassionate modern observer as 'rebellious'. Such behaviour included

- (a) the activities of external populations which had never submitted to khalan authority,¹⁹

¹⁷ For the Persianate world, see famously A.K.S. Lambton, "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes—Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government", in *Studia Islamica* 6 (1956), 125–146 [146].

¹⁸ *Pīr Muḥammad Khān dar Bukhārā az īn akhbār-i mūhish bi-ārām gashtah [...] kas bih Balkh nazd-i 'Abd al-Amīn Khān wa umarā-yi ānjā firistādah ishān-rā az ṭughyān-i Bāqī Khān khabar dādah [...]: TĀĀ'A* 593.

¹⁹ See e.g. *BA* 112b on the *ṭughyān* of Abulāy Sultan Qazaq, and *BA* 7418 382a on 'Abdallāh Khān's campaign to conquer the Shiite population of Khurāsān "who were given over to *bid'at* [religious innovation] and *ṭughyān*" (*taskhīr-i Khurāsān wa isti'shāl-i ān ahl-i bid'at wa ṭughyān*).

- (b) the disruptive activities of Turco-Mongolian tribal parties within the khanate whose loyalty towards the khan had always been so limited that its 'revocation' was of little consequence (see below, p. 193),
- (c) a subjected population's resistance to external occupation by metropolitan authority to which it did not regard itself as having submitted,²⁰

and

- (d) a local population's submission to a formally-incumbent and newly-restored dynastic line, undertaken at the initiative, and with the extensive backing, of foreign actors (see below, pp. 181–184).

Such semantic 'imprecision' reflects how vocabulary is often used strategically. Words which denote a particular phenomenon frequently also serve the illocutionary function of connoting how that phenomenon should be judged. The vocabulary with which one performs an act of naming is thus liable to influence an audience's attitude towards the named thing. Consequently, an actor *x* who is hostile towards actor *y* may derive utility from applying a conventionally 'negative' vocabulary to as many as possible of *y*'s activities, so as to compromise these in the minds of his audience. In the Islamic world, notions of rebellion generate a prominent cluster of such terminology.²¹

If it is unsurprising that in summer 1599 Pīr Muḥammad should have cast Bāqī Muḥammad as a rebel, it is equally unsurprising that Bāqī Muḥammad should have rejected the charge. He was not a rebel, he claimed, arguing that because

- (a) he had not made any changes as Samarqandi governor to the dedication of the of *khutbah* (Friday prayer address) or the wording of the

²⁰ E.g. *ShN* (Ṣāliḥ) 76, *TGNN* 132a–133a, for the 1507 anti-Abū'l-Khayrid 'rebellion' in Qarākul, near Bukhara.

²¹ B. Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago, 1988), 95. In addition to the likes of *ṭughyān* and *'iṣyān*, Islamicate vocabulary offers the further concept of *fitnah*, a state of rebellion against divine or human order so feared that authors including Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyah and the Timūrid historian Shāmi all claim that a single night of its duration is even less desirable than endless years of tyranny, or *ẓulm*: L. Gardet, "Fitna", in *EF* II (1960), 930–931 [930]; H. Laoust, *La Politique de Ghazālī* (Paris, 1970), 376; Lambton, "Early Timurid theories of state: Ḥāfiẓ Abrū and Niẓām al-Dīn Šāmi", in *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* 30 (1978), 1–9 [9]. Charges of *fitnah* were a favoured accusation by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors writing on behalf of the Sunni khans of Bukhara and the Shiite Safavids of Iran, each accusing the other party of *fitnah* in wilfully disregarding manifest theological truth: *MAKh* 14b–15a, 25a, 31a, on Shāh Isma'īl's *fitnah*; *TA* 167, on Abū'l-Khayrid *fitnah* in Khurāsān, 1587–1588.

sikkah (coin issue), both of which were still issued in Pīr Muḥammad's name,²²

this meant that

- (b) he was still a loyal servant of Pīr Muḥammad and, as such, he could hardly be accused of rebelling against him.²³

Like Pīr Muḥammad, Bāqī Muḥammad was using language strategically. Construing 'rebellion' in highly formalistic terms enabled him to rebut the damning taint of rebelliousness as he chose to interpret it. This would have been with two aims. The first was to defer his showdown with Pīr Muḥammad until some more propitious later time by assuring the Bukharans that there was presently no conflict of interest between himself and them; the second was to reassure his own potential supporters that aligning themselves with him would not make them party to criminal behaviour.

'Rebellion' is an extremely malleable term across various linguistic repertoires, as actors derive utility from extending or confining its semantic range. This does not mean, however, that the concept need lack descriptive value in our own linguistic repertoire. The critical onlooker will recognise a quality of 'rebelliousness' in Bāqī Muḥammad's behaviour patently missing from those other modes outlined above. This quality relates both to the consequences of Bāqī Muḥammad's actions and, crucially, to the way in which these actions related to Bāqī Muḥammad's prior behaviour and attitude states. In contrast to other supposed instances of *ṭughyān* and *'iṣyān*, Bāqī Muḥammad's behaviour satisfied a set of conditions which one may identify as a pre-requisite for determining rebellion, whereby the rebel

- (a) transfers loyalty, and its associated benefits, from the authority embodied in an *established actor*, whose claim to loyalty it has elsewhere explicitly/tacitly recognised, to the authority located in an *oppositional actor*, whether this individual is oneself or some other actor (the *cognitive transfer* condition)
- (b) transfers loyalty in the probable knowledge that any utility to the party and/or the oppositional actor will be at the established actor's expense (the *zero-sum* condition)

²² This may be true: the only coins known to have been minted in Samarqand in 1007 (4 August 1598–23 July 1599) were inscribed with Pīr Muḥammad's name: Lowick, "Shaybānid Silver Coins", 328.

²³ *Chūn tā ḥāl taghyīr-i sikkah nakardah būd, ān-rā dalil-i iṭā'at wa inqiyād sākhtah: T'ĀĀ'A* 593.

- (c) is influential, alone or alongside fellow rebels, in determining the relative fortunes of the established actor and oppositional actor (the *agency* condition).

Bāqī Muḥammad was not the only rebel at the Samarqand showdown. The behaviour of his supporters satisfied these conditions as well, particularly once Pīr Muḥammad marched east on Samarqand and it became evident that support for Bāqī Muḥammad would necessarily come at the cost of the established actor Pīr Muḥammad. Unfortunately for Bāqī Muḥammad's supporters, however, there was not much scope for them to escape the taint of rebellion: were one of Bāqī Muḥammad's supporters now to shift his stance and align himself with Pīr Muḥammad, he risked rendering himself a rebel as well, only one ranged against Bāqī Muḥammad rather than against the khan. In any system of authority there will be a hierarchy of established actors, each expecting loyalty from their juniors and displaying loyalty to the established actors who are senior to themselves. With Pīr Muḥammad an *imperial* established actor and Bāqī Muḥammad a *regional* established actor, a supporter of Bāqī Muḥammad who held out against Pīr Muḥammad might be an *imperial rebel*, while one who realigned himself with the Bukharans would be a *regional rebel*. But Bāqī Muḥammad was lucky. Accounts of events in Samarqand suggest that very few of his initial supporters switched alignment. During the Samarqand showdown, far more people proved to be imperial rebels than regional rebels.

Imperial Rebels

Chroniclers estimate that Pīr Muḥammad's joint Bukharan-Balkhi army totalled between forty and seventy thousand men.²⁴ Bāqī Muḥammad could defeat this army only because he enjoyed a large body of support himself. Some of his rebel supporters were veteran Tūqāy-Timūrid associates who had accompanied him from Khurāsān after Shah 'Abbās' defeat of Dīn Muḥammad's forces at Pul-i Sālār in spring 1599. Suyūnch Bī Ūshūn, for instance, was a former comrade of Dīn Muḥammad,²⁵ whose loyalty Bāqī Muḥammad later rewarded with an appointment to the office of *atāliq*.²⁶ Similarly, Bāqī Muḥammad's Miyānkāli appointee Iṣhim Mirākḥūr-i kūchak

²⁴ *TA* 182, *TĀĀ'A* 593 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 160b) and *TShKh* 110b (followed in turn in *TQKh* 269a) give a figure of 40,000; *DQ* 37b gives a figure of 70,000.

²⁵ *BA* 55b.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 167b.

had previously served alongside the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds in Sistān.²⁷ But Bāqī Muḥammad's circle of loyalists had been heavily diminished by the Pul-i Sālār defeat. Several thousand Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd supporters had fallen in the battle, among them men of the stature of Nājūy Bahādur Dūrmān, a doughty associate of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd princes since at least 1587.²⁸ When Bāqī Muḥammad fled to Bukhara, therefore, it was not as a retinued warlord, but as a supplicant seeking refuge. Less than a year later, a band of survivors from Bāqī Muḥammad's original Khurāsāni contingent would scarcely have been sufficient to repel Pīr Muḥammad's attack.

Bāqī Muḥammad's more extensive source of rebel support during the Samarqand showdown, therefore, came from the Samarqandis themselves. Some sources note the role played by Sufi shaykhs living in the Samarqand region. In the *Baḥr al-asrār*, for instance, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī relates the activities of a certain Khwājah Amkinagī, a shaykh from the Naqshbandīyah brotherhood. Recounting how the shaykh came to Bāqī Muḥammad's assistance when Pīr Muḥammad rejected the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd's appeals for negotiation, Maḥmūd claims that Khwājah Amkinagī then filled his followers with 'divine inspiration' (*ilhām-i ghaybī*), which enabled them to secure victory.²⁹ The *Baḥr al-asrār* also emphasises the valiant military contribu-

²⁷ IM 263. This Iṣhim was *not*, as Smirnova claims (*ibid.*, notes, 472), the eponymous Qazaq khan.

²⁸ See above, p. 60.

²⁹ BA 145b–146a: *Manqūl ast dar ān āwān kih Pīr Muḥammad Khān bā ubbahat wa 'azamī kih guwāh az taṣawwur-i shukūh-i ān sutūh āmadī az Bukhārā bih 'azm-i isti'ṣāl-i nihāl-i iqbāl-i khawānīn-i Tūqāy-Tīmūrī mutawajjih-i Samarqand gardīd, Bāqī Muḥammad Khān, kih rā'is wa rā'is-i khawānīn-i 'izzat-qarīn būd, bā hamah-yi saṭwat wa ṣalābat az mudāfu'ah-yi šūrī-yi ābā namudah dast-i tawassul bih dāman-i ān mubāriz-i ma'nawī ya'nī ḥaḍrat-i khwājah dar zad. Wa ān janāb nakst bih mawjib al-ṣulh khayr mutawajjih-i iṣlāh-i dhāt al-bayn gashtah, khwāstand kih Pīr Muḥammad Khān-rā az ān dā'iyah imtina' namāyand. Ān nishānah-yi tūr ta'dhīr az ān tadbīr sar-bāz zadah ān ḥaḍrat-rā bī nāyl-i maṣṣūd bāz gardānīd. Lā-jaram khuddām-i khwājagī bā ilhām-i ghaybī mutawajjih-i t'lā-yi a'ālam-i khawānīn wa inkisār-i rāyāt-i arbāb mu'āwadat gashtah Bāqī Muḥammad Khān-rā bih iṭṭāf-i izīdī mustazhar sākh-tand. Wa bih dhāt-i aqdas-i ṭarīq-i marāfaḡat maslūk dāshdah bih hangām-i muḡābalah bār bih dastūr-i ahl-i muḡārabah bih jānīb-i lashkar-i Bukhārā ḥamlah namūdand. Muḡarīn-i in ḥāl rā'yat-i iqbāl-i khawānīn irtifā' yāftah liwā-yi nā-rawā-yi Pīr Muḥammad Khān makhfūd wa maksūr gardīd, tā ān kih khān bī tadbīr asīr ta'dhīr gashtah bih dast-i yakī az mulāzimān-i khawānīn bih qatl rasīd. Chūn ān karāmat-i zāhirah wa fariḡ-i 'ādat-i bāhirah az ān ḥaḍrat simt-i wuḡū' padhīraft, tamāmat-i khawānīn, khuṣūsan Bāqī Muḥammad Khān, bīsh az pīsh 'uqdat-i ān janāb maslūk dāshdah [...]. See similarly DQ 38a, briefly noting how, in addition to Khwājah Iṣḥāq and Khwājah Ḥāshim, "his eminence Mullā Khwājagī Amkinagī, sultan of both secular and spiritual matters, and most select lord of both worlds, took part in the fighting" (*sultān-i dunyā wa dīn wa bar guzidah-yi ḥaḍrat-i rabb al-'ālamayn Mullā Khwājagī Amkinagī jang mikunand*), TSR 201a and TMQ 554a (as above, p. 92), referring to Bāqī Muḥammad's friendly interaction with 'Mawlānā Khwājagī Āyim-kanah' [*sic*].*

tion of Turco-Mongolian *amīrs* from the Samarqand region. These included the former conspirator Muḥammad Yār Qārluq (see above, p. 45) and Dūstum Bī Arghūn, both of whom lined up alongside Bāqī Muḥammad during the showdown.³⁰ While little is known of Muḥammad Yār Qārluq's prior career, we know enough of Dūstum Bī Arghūn's to conclude that this latter *amīr* had probably not known Bāqī Muḥammad prior to 1599. While Bāqī Muḥammad was stationed in Khurāsān during the 1590s, Dūstum was stationed far off to the east in Kūlāb,³¹ only returning to central Mā warā al-nahr after 'Abd al-Mu'min's murder when he briefly governed Qarshi.³² Although he had only a brief acquaintance with the khan, Dūstum Bī Arghūn proved himself like Muḥammad Yār Qārluq a reliable ally, and remained a close associate of the Tūqāy-Timūrids over the next decade.³³

What Should One Do in a Siege?

There was one other party of rebel actors who played a part in Bāqī Muḥammad's Samarqand victory. These were the humbler town-dwellers and agriculturalists from the surrounding hinterland, generally Persian- rather than Turkish-speakers, who had gathered within the city walls to take shelter from Pīr Muḥammad's approach. They can hardly be credited with an active role in the battle's outcome, since they probably did not join Bāqī Muḥammad's Turco-Mongolian *amīrs* and tribal warriors in sallying out for the final showdown. Their contribution to Bāqī Muḥammad's success might be reckoned less in terms of what they did than of what they did not do. Sitting tight within the city walls, they refrained from betraying the city to Pīr Muḥammad's surrounding army.

This is more significant than it may appear. It was not uncommon in pre-modern Central Asia for urban populations to become regional rebels, defying the wishes of local rulers by surrendering their city to besieging forces. When in 1567 'Abdallāh Khan decided to lay siege to Merv, he hoped to provoke the city's population into defecting from their present 'Arabshāhid masters.³⁴ As 'Abdallāh knew, sieges could be effective in driving a wedge between ruler and ruled. In the 1550s townsmen had surrendered Bukhara to 'Abdallāh Khan's forces after the death of Burhān Khan, denying Burhān's

³⁰ TĀĀ'A 594; BA 60a–b. For his Samarqandi associations, see *ibid.*, 52b.

³¹ *ShNSh* 3497 250a–b.

³² BA 51b.

³³ *Ibid.*, 79a.

³⁴ MB 257.

former supporters the opportunity to establish a successor of their own choosing.³⁵ Similarly, when 'Abdallāh besieged Samarqand in 1578, he goaded locals into retracting their allegiance from the present Samarqandi incumbent Jawānmārd 'Alī and surrendering to the Bukharan army.³⁶ Such repeated instances of 'unauthorised' civic surrender reflect two facts. The first is that beleaguered authorities under siege could rarely establish a disciplinary regime sufficient to constrain the behaviour of a subject urban population, meaning that besieged populations could often act with reasonable autonomy in pursuit of their own interests. The second is that by the mid-sixteenth century, the cost of surrender to the besieging army had fallen to below the cost of continued defiance. This meant that populations often reckoned that their own interests were better served by submission than by resistance.

Prior to the mid-sixteenth century, the balance of costs in any siege was rather different. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the cost of submission had often been so high as to make surrender in times of siege extremely unattractive. When Chingīz Khan and Tīmūr undertook their programmes of conquest, they often punished the least sign of resistance by an urban population with a *qatl-i 'āmm* (general massacre), *pour décourager* anyone else foolish enough to countenance opposition.³⁷ The threat of massacre may have dissuaded populations from offering resistance in the first place, but it hardly did much to offer an incentive for submission to any population which already found itself under siege. Thereafter, however, recourse to *qatl-i 'āmm* wavered. Chingīz or Tīmūr could afford to take such destructive measures, since their ambitions for universal conquest offered the prospect of a resource base sufficiently extensive to withstand the losses incurred through exemplary punishment: but their more modest successors were generally reluctant to exploit such an expensive device. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Muḥammad Shībānī resumed his predecessors' pretensions to universal authority, confidently asserting that he would soon be ruling over lands as far-flung as Syria and Egypt;³⁸ like these forerunners, furthermore, he also punished obstinate populations with *qatl-i 'āmm*

³⁵ *ShNSh* 95b ff.

³⁶ *TSR* 166b.

³⁷ *TJ* I, 98–99 (Chingīz Khan in Khwārazm), 104 (in Balkh), 127 (in Merv); J. Aubin, "Comment Tamerlan prenait les villes", in *Studia Islamica* 19 (1963), 83–122.

³⁸ *Fikrīm ul-dūr kih alīb [sic] Shām wa 'Irāq / Būlgahh-min Miṣr ul-ūsīghah qanāq: ShN* (Ṣāliḥ) 148.

as part of his demonstrative repertoire.³⁹ But after Muḥammad Shībānī was killed at Merv in 1510, an expensive series of inconclusive cross-boundary disputes with the Safavids and other neighbours gradually terminated the late khan's unbounded territorial ambitions.⁴⁰ As it became apparent just how limited their authority was, Muḥammad Shībānī's successors realised that it would be rash to diminish their already constrained resource base. Consequently, by the mid-Abū'l-Khayrid period *qatl-i 'āmm* was an uncommon occurrence, and surrender was a cheaper option than it had previously been.

While the cost of surrender thus decreased during the sixteenth century, the cost of ongoing resistance remained as crippling as before. The 'impregnable' defences of an urban citadel⁴¹ could not prevent provisions from running short, and chroniclers relate that people were often reduced to eating the flesh of cats, dogs and even babies.⁴² Besieged populations were not alone in suffering from food shortages, of course; a besieging army outside the city walls might suffer similar dietary straits.⁴³ But the consequences of these shortages were markedly different inside and outside a city under siege. The immediate consequence of an unsatisfactory diet was much more likely to be disease than starvation: and conditions under siege were more favourable for epidemiological spread than conditions outside. Generals often divided their besieging forces into constituent sub-units,⁴⁴ which had the effect of minimising the risk of infection transfer; such an option was naturally unavailable to people within a tightly packed city under siege. A swollen population of town-dwellers and agrarian refugees put pressure on the city's rudimentary hygienic provisions,⁴⁵ and disease consequently spread fast. Because no besieging army could stay in place for

³⁹ Ibid., 238, describing a massacre in Khujand.

⁴⁰ Dickson, "Shāh Tahmāsb and the Úzbeks", *passim*. For the abandonment of universal ambitions as part of a wider sixteenth-century trend, see Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters", in *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18 (1983), 198–220 [205].

⁴¹ People's misguided faith in the supposed 'impregnability' of their defences is a repeated trope. See *ShN* (Šālih) 76 (Qarākul), 176 (Ūrā Tipah); *ShNSH* 3497 178b (Sawrān), 213b (Qunduz).

⁴² *ShN* (Šālih), 84, 316; *BN* 137; *HS* 607; *RR* 230b.

⁴³ U. Berndt, "Organisation eines Feldzugs nach einer mittelasiatischen Quelle", in *Asiatische Studien* 58 (2004), 1–13 [7–8].

⁴⁴ E.g. during the 1587–1588 siege of Herat: *ShNSH* 3497 244a–245a.

⁴⁵ *Lashkar-i 'azīm az ʔaraf-i Dasht-i Qipchāq bih Bukhārā āmad, wa ān chandān khalq-i wilāyat-i Bukhārā dar ḥiṣār dar āmadand, wa az ghāyat-i izdihām mardum bisyārī az bāmhārā [sic] mabraz sāktah būdand: AT* (Bukhāri) 32.

ever, there accrued a daily *arithmetically*-increasing benefit from holding out. Should disease break out, however, exponential transfer rates meant that the daily advantage of defiance was more than outbalanced by *geometrically*-increasing mortality costs. The longer a besieged city held out, furthermore, the greater the threat to the city's long-term agricultural security. Wherever an urban population was particularly obdurate, it was common practice for invading forces to hasten its submission by destroying local water channels.⁴⁶ Leaving aside its impact within the city walls, this practice had disastrous consequences for an artificially irrigated agricultural regime (see below, pp. 111–114). Crops which were not simply destroyed were usually consumed by the besieging forces. Advancing without extensive logistical supplies, armies supported themselves by ransacking whichever agricultural hinterland they found themselves in.⁴⁷ If forces abandoned a siege and withdrew, they often did so only because the city's hinterland could not support them for any longer: the besieged party's 'victory' was thus tempered by the likelihood of future want. When the authorities in early sixteenth-century Samarqand persuaded their subjects to defy Muḥammad Shībānī's forces for month after month, they were condemning the sedentary population to a famine which continued to afflict the city a full year after the siege's termination.⁴⁸

Given that a cost-benefit analysis thus implies that civic surrender in times of siege became a steadily more 'rational' move over the course of the sixteenth century, the fact that Samarqandi townspeople nevertheless remained loyal to Bāqī Muḥammad during the showdown of 1599 is telling. They offered him their tacit support because they evidently accorded to the prospect of his victory a utility value outweighing those short- and mid-term interests which, *ceteris paribus*, would ordinarily have urged for submission. One reason for this may have been because the Samarqandi townsfolk—like the shaykh and the *amīr*—thought Bāqī Muḥammad would be a better ruler than the Jānī-Bikid imperial established actor was. Recent events would have done much to shape such a belief.

⁴⁶ E.g. BA 7418 383a: in 1583, the rebellious Abū'l-Khayrid Mahdī Sultan tried to reduce the citadel of Mārghilān (see here also *ShNSh* 3497 201b–202a) by cutting off the town's water supply.

⁴⁷ *ShN* (Ṣāliḥ) 402: after exhausting local resources, Muḥammad Shībānī's army fell hungry after three months besieging Chīn Sūfī's forces in Khwārazm.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 152–154.

A Tale of Two Dynasts: Responses to the Qazaq Invasion of Mā Warā al-Nahr

Eight months or so before the Samarqand showdown, an invasion by Qazaq nomads from the north had allowed Bāqī Muḥammad to trump any claim by his Jānī-Bikid rival to champion the interests of Mā warā al-nahr's population. The invasion had been the brainchild of the Qazaq ruler Tawakkul Khan, who for much of the 1580s and 1590s had been a subservient ally to the Bukharans.⁴⁹ News of 'Abdallāh's death in early 1598, followed by the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min that June, inspired Tawakkul to assert himself. In winter 1598–1599, Tawakkul marched south out of the Dasht-i Qipchāq with an army of Qazaqs, Qaraqalpaqs and Kyrgyz in the direction of Mā warā al-nahr. First of all he captured Tashkent and the other settlements along the Syr Darya river, all of which fell without opposition.⁵⁰ Then he advanced south towards Samarqand.

Samarqand in the winter of 1598–1599 proved an easy target for the Qazaqs. As noted above (p. 46), 'Abd al-Wāsi' Bī Kinakas, one of the conspirators involved in 'Abd al-Mu'min's assassination, had established himself in command over the region, elevating Pāyandah Muammad's son to serve as puppet khan. Learning of Tawakkul's approach, 'Abd al-Wāsi' Bī decided against offering resistance. Instead, he contrived to save his own skin by brokering a deal with Tawakkul.⁵¹ He surrendered the city to the Qazaqs, and delivered the prince as a hostage,⁵² in return for which Tawakkul rewarded him with an appointment to high Qazaq military office. Tawakkul stayed only briefly in Samarqand before he headed west with 'Abd al-Wāsi' Bī towards Dabūsiyah and Bukhara, leaving his brother Īshim Sultan with a garrison of twenty thousand men to govern Samarqand and the surrounding region.⁵³ Some time later, Tawakkul then killed Pāyandah

⁴⁹ Tawakkul is widely credited, for instance, with the defeat and execution of 'Abdallāh's Tashkenti rival Bābā Sultan: see e.g. *RR* 234a–b, 236a–b, *ShNSh* 3497 162b–163b, *MB* 163 and *Maṭṭ* 97a–98a, noting however G.K. Konkashpaev, "Nekotorye svedeniia o prebyvanii oiratov na territorii Kazakhstana", in G.O. Avliaev (ed.), *Problemy etnogeneza Kalmykov: Sbornik statei* (Elista, 1984), 112–118 [116], recording a tradition whereby Bābā Sultan was captured and killed by the Noghays.

⁵⁰ *TA* 178; *TMQ* 554a; *T'ĀĀ'A* 592 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 160a); *BA* 51b–52a.

⁵¹ 'Abd al-Wāsi' kih az umarā-yi mu'tabbar-i 'Abdallāh Khāni wa sharik-i qatl-i 'Abd al-Mu'min būd wa bih ān silsilah kufrān-i ni'mat warzidah bih khidmat-i Tawakkul Khān raftah ū-rā bih taskhīr-i Mā warā al-nahr targhib wa tahrīk dāsht: *T'ĀĀ'A* 592 (followed in turn by *SilSal* 160a).

⁵² *MB* 217; *BA* 51b.

⁵³ *T'ĀĀ'A* 592.

Muḥammad's hapless son,⁵⁴ thus indulging a recently acquired penchant for murdering Jānī-Bikid princes.⁵⁵

For the first time in almost a century Samarqand had fallen to attack from outside the khanate: and the Bukharan khan Pīr Muḥammad had done nothing to help the unfortunate Samarqandis. Nor did Pīr Muḥammad respond as Tawakkul's army advanced towards Miyānkāl and Dabūsiyah, both of which fell to the invading forces.⁵⁶ Indeed, it was not until Tawakkul's army reached the walls of Bukhara itself that the khan took action. Pīr Muḥammad's initial inclination was to leave Bukhara's defence to his *amīrs* and lieutenants,⁵⁷ but as the siege continued into a second month it became apparent that a more assertive plan of campaign was needed to repel the invaders.⁵⁸ Fortunately, just a couple of days before Tawakkul's forces began investing the city the Tūqāy-Timūrid dynast Bāqī Muḥammad had arrived in Bukhara, having fled from the Pul-i Sālār battlefield. As noted at the end of the last chapter (see above, p. 90), the ruling authorities had welcomed him into the city, calculating that his princely status might be of use in helping to rally support in the face of imminent attack. Circumstances now demanded that Bāqī Muḥammad show himself worthy of such hopes.

Pīr Muḥammad and Bāqī Muḥammad agreed upon a ruse. Bāqī Muḥammad and five thousand supporters would leave the citadel under cover of darkness, and conceal themselves at some distance from the city. The next morning Pīr Muḥammad and his army would march out as though for battle against the Qazaqs, but would quickly withdraw towards Bukhara, in order to entice the Qazaqs into pursuing them. Bāqī Muḥammad and his supporters would now ambush the pursuing Qazaq army, and cut them down before they had an opportunity to regroup.⁵⁹ The defending authorities duly put this plan into action. Pīr Muḥammad advanced out from the city and immediately withdrew, and Bāqī Muḥammad chose his moment to attack. His forces sustained heavy losses during the ensuing melee. Among the casualties was the eminent Samarqandi *amīr* Muḥammad Bāqī Bī Dūrmān, as

⁵⁴ BA 51b.

⁵⁵ Tawakkul had recently killed the two princes whom Ūzbek Sultan had optimistically entrusted to his care, as well as Muḥammad Qulī b. Maḥmūd, 'Abd al-Mu'min's former appointee to Fergana (see above, p. 44): MB 193 and 195; BA 51b.

⁵⁶ T'ĀĀ'A 592; BA 52a.

⁵⁷ TMQ 554a.

⁵⁸ BA 51b.

⁵⁹ TA 179-180.

well as the Abū'l-Khayrid prince Sayyid Muḥammad Sultan, whose resolute behaviour had recently inspired Muḥammad Bāqī Bī to vain hopes of elevating him one day to Samarqandi khalif authority.⁶⁰ Along with many others, both men were captured and killed by the Qazaq forces.⁶¹ But Tawakkul was then knocked off his horse and, injured in the resultant scuffle, he decided to retreat back towards Samarqand.⁶²

Having orchestrated this impressive victory, Bāqī Muḥammad was now firmly in charge of the situation. Having overseen the execution of all fifteen thousand Qazaq captives,⁶³ Bāqī Muḥammad then headed east in pursuit of Tawakkul Khan, leaving instructions for Pīr Muḥammad to follow with troops close behind, so that they might take advantage of the victory and push the Qazaqs as far away from Mā warā al-nahr as possible.⁶⁴ When Bāqī Muḥammad arrived at Samarqand, he found it abandoned by the former occupying forces. He continued north, to find that Tawakkul had died of his injuries in Tashkent.⁶⁵ With Īshim having fled further into the Dasht-i Qipchāq,⁶⁶ Bāqī Muḥammad took possession of Tashkent, and sat tight to wait for Pīr Muḥammad's arrival.

Once the Qazaq threat had been repelled, Pīr Muḥammad began acting like the ruler he claimed to be. Through the intermediary offices of a Naqshbandī shaykh he contracted peace with the Qazaqs,⁶⁷ and in a brace of appointments he placed Tashkent under the authority of his Abū'l-Khayrid

⁶⁰ MB 17; the passage is rendered into Uzbek in Ahmedov, "Shayboniylardan keyin Ashtarxoniyilarning hokimiyat tepasiga kelish sanasi xususida", 192.

⁶¹ MB 178; TĀĀ'A 592 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 160a); BA 57a–b; Morley 162 30b.

⁶² TA 180. Ḥājī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm suggests (*SilSal* 160b) that it was Bāqī Muḥammad himself who wounded Tawakkul: *Tawakkul Khān az dast-i Bāqī Muḥammad Sultān zakhmī shudah munhazam gashtah* [...]. He thus here deviates from his TĀĀ'A source narrative, which attributes no responsibility for Tawakkul's injury: *Tawakkul Khān zakhmī shudah kāri nasakht 'inān-i 'azimat bih ṣawb-i murāja'at tāftah* [...]; TĀĀ'A 592.

⁶³ Burton, *The Bukharans*, 103, suggests that among the prisoners thus executed was 'Abd al-Wāsi' Bī, but it is unclear what attestation she is here drawing on. *SilSal* 160a suggests that 'Abd al-Wāsi' Bī was killed in the thick of battle: *dar in mu'rakah muqaddimah al-jaysh shudah būd, bih qatl rasīd*. (Contrast with Ḥājī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm's TĀĀ'A source narrative, where no mention is made of his death.)

⁶⁴ TA 180.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 181 (on the road to Tashkent); *TMQ* 554a; TĀĀ'A 592; BA 58a; Morley 162 31a.

⁶⁶ TA 181.

⁶⁷ TĀĀ'A 593, noting that terms were contracted on the condition that the Samarqandi army should thereafter harbour no ambitions against Tashkent: *bih istiṣwab-i mashā'ikh-i Naqshbandīyah miyānah-yi ū wa wālī-yi ṭā'ifah-yi Qazāq kih dar Tāshkand būdand ṣulḥ-i gūnah'iwāqī' shud mashrūṭ bar ān kih lashkar-i Samarqand muta'arriḍ-i Tāshkand nagardad*. The passage is followed in turn in *SilSal* 160b.

kinsman Jahāngīr Sultan⁶⁸ and Samarqand under Bāqī Muḥammad.⁶⁹ By issuing such 'appointments', Pīr Muḥammad made clear that he regarded himself as the suzerain authority over both Tashkent and Samarqand,⁷⁰ even though he had previously failed to exercise meaningful rule in either region. He was thus asserting his hegemonic status. But contemporaries were well aware that Bāqī Muḥammad's role in defeating the Qazaqs had eclipsed the role played by Pīr Muḥammad himself. Even while he was still in Khurāsān, Bāqī Muḥammad had enjoyed a reputation for his martial abilities,⁷¹ and these subsequent events had burnished this renown. When Bāqī Muḥammad and Pīr Muḥammad were on the battlefield fighting a common enemy, at least, it was clear that it was the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid who was better placed to give the orders.

Rebellion and Repression

Scholars often posit some direct relationship between the extent of a subject population's disposition towards rebellion and the 'abusiveness' of a ruling regime's exercise of authority. Soviet authors, for instance, frequently cite the outbreak of 'proletarian uprisings' as evidence for the repressiveness of particular regimes in pre-Soviet Central Asia.⁷² Because these authors tend to regard any kind of pre-socialist authority as inherently abusive, they suggest that any move by such authority to assert itself was liable to generate waves of resentment and opposition. But the events of 1598–1599

⁶⁸ MB 178, noting that Jahāngīr (identified here as 'Kabīr') was only ten years old at the time; discussion in Burton, *The Bukharans*, 103 and 545.

⁶⁹ TMQ 554a; T'ĀĀ'A 592, followed in turn in *SilSal* 160b. Contrast with TA 181, which suggests instead that it was Bāqī Muḥammad who 'granted' authority in Bukhara to Pīr Muḥammad: *Bāqī Sultān az rū-yi adab guft kih "Bukhārā pāytakht-i mulūk-i khawāṣṣ-i Chingīzī-st [...] wa al-hāl mā Pīr Muḥammad Khān-rā bih jā-yi 'Abdallāh Khān mīdānīm, munāsib ān ast kih Bukhārā pāytakht bāshad wa bāqī-yi ulkā-rā ikhtiyār-i ḥaḍrat-i khān dārad, bih har kas shafaqat namāyad amr az ū-st"*.

⁷⁰ For Pīr Muḥammad's coin issues in both regions see Lowick, "Shaybānid Silver Coins", 257 and 328, and Davidovich, *Korpus zolotykh i serebrianykh monet Sheibanidov, XVI vek*, 247.

⁷¹ Siyāqī Nizāmī, describing Din Muḥammad's forces at the Pul-i Sālār battle (FH 58a) says of Bāqī Muḥammad that he was distinguished above everybody else by his bravery: *Bāqī Sultān [...] az sār barādārān balkih az jamī'-i bahādūrān bih ṣfat-i shajā'at-i mumtāz wa jalādāt wa mardānagī bayn al-aqrān sar-afraz būd*.

⁷² E.g. Ivanov, "Vosstanie Kitai-Kipchakov v bukharskom khanstve, 1821–1825", in *Trudy IV Akademii Nauk SSSR* 28 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1937), 64–65; T.R. Ryskulova (ed.), *Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirgizstane* (Moscow, 1937), *passim*; Abduraimov, *Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii*, II.241–248. Soviet literature is rather less eager to attribute post-1917 uprisings to institutional oppression: see e.g. H. Tursunov and M. Nazarov, "Prichiny vozniknoveniia basmachestva v Srednei Azii", in B.V. Lumin (ed.), *Basmachestvo* (Tashkent, 1984), 5–21.

suggest rather a different story. One reason why the Samarqandis aligned themselves with the rebellious Bāqī Muḥammad at the showdown of 1599 seems to have been that they regarded Pīr Muḥammad as insufficiently energetic to assert his will over them. If anything, Pīr Muḥammad's problem was that *he was not assertive enough*.

This makes sense for two reasons. The first relates to what might be termed *the rational-choice argument*. Discussed further in chapter 3, such an argument suggests that a rebellion is most likely to take place when circumstances—such as people's awareness of being subject to an ineffectual ruler—reassure a materially self-interested population that *such an undertaking is significantly likely to succeed*. The second reason why the Samarqand rebellion of 1599 reflected Pīr Muḥammad's lack of self-assertion relates to what scholars term *the relative deprivation argument*. According to this argument, people are most inclined towards rebellion in circumstances where they attribute to some failure of authority a perception that their present living standards are worse than they should be: worse, that is, because not only 'intrinsically' unsatisfactory but *worse than they have been in recent memory*.⁷³ As will become clear over the rest of this chapter, Samarqand in 1599 offered just such a set of circumstances. Recent experience had made clear to the Samarqandis that the man presently presuming to imperial hegemony was less capable of defending their interests than other rulers had been, and others might be. This helps explain why the Samarqandis aligned themselves as imperial rebels alongside Bāqī Muḥammad: Pīr Muḥammad had failed to enmesh himself in their clientelist loyalties.

Clientelist Loyalty

When referring to 'clientelist loyalty', I refer to an instrumental mode of behaviour whereby people align themselves with the actor whom they regard as best able to further their interests, their *degree* of attachment reflecting the *extent* of their belief in the actor's ability to perform this function.⁷⁴ When in 1598 the Balkhis rejected the khalid candidature of 'Abd

⁷³ For a paradigmatic expression of this view, see T.R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, 1970), particularly 22–30.

⁷⁴ There is perhaps an analogy here with Joseph Schumpeter's notion of interest-driven 'adversary democracy'. According to the Schumpeter thesis, a constituent's degree of attachment towards his elected representative is purely correlative to the extent to which he

al-Mu'min's militarily-incapable two-year-old son (see above, p. 67), they offered a clear-cut example of how self-interested parties might determine their attachments in the consequentialist pursuit of advantage. Of course, populations generally defer to a sense less of what is autonomously and absolutely 'best for them' than of whatever interests they are contextually most focused upon.⁷⁵ Accordingly, in chapter 3 I examine self-interested forms of attachment in early modern Central Asia which people contracted primarily with a view to *what they owned*. In this present discussion of 'clientelist loyalty', by contrast, I consider an equally self-interested form of attachment which people contracted with a view to *what they did*.

Subsistential Constituencies and Moral Economies

Material in the *Baḥr al-asrār* and other sources indicates that in the run-up to the 1599 Samarqand showdown various *subsistential constituencies* aligned themselves with Bāqī Muḥammad and against his Abū'l-Khayrid rival. By 'subsistential constituencies', I refer to groupings whose members *conceived of their interests with reference to whatever subsistential project they pursued in order to attain a livelihood*. Members of these constituencies aligned themselves with Bāqī Muḥammad because he offered a better prospect than Pīr Muḥammad of furthering their respective subsistential projects. This was not because of any altruism on Bāqī Muḥammad's part, but because he was better motivated and better able to use the coercive and incentivising resources at his disposal in order to exercise the responsibilities and prerogatives of authority, and thus to provide a range of the public goods on which these subsistential projects depended.

Some care is required when speaking of subsistential constituencies. Because sixteenth-century Samarqand was not an industrialised economy, the division of labour was highly limited, and many actors doubtless pursued a mixed repertoire of subsistential projects. Nevertheless, one can reasonably speak of a basic distinction in Samarqand and elsewhere between sedentary agriculturalists and nomadic/semi-nomadic pastoralists. For the purposes of this book, we may conceive of two elementary subsistential

regards his material interests to be well served by his political representative, or—more precisely—the extent to which he regards them to be *better* served by this representative than they would be by the representative's electoral challenger: J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York, 1962).

⁷⁵ On 'focus' in the construal of self-interest, see H.A. Simon, "Rationality in Psychology and Economics", in *The Journal of Business* 59.4.2 (1986), 209–224 [215–217].

constituencies, whose respective members primarily pursued a range of either agricultural or pastoral projects. Such projects informed not only each respective constituency's sense of its immediate self-interest but also its wider set of dispositions as to how life should be structured and authority exercised, or—to borrow E.P. Thompson's famous term—its 'moral economy'.⁷⁶

Speaking of a 'moral economy' of course carries risks, lest one exaggerate a subsistential constituency's capacity for attaining and maintaining its 'corporate outlook' amidst the variety of other self-conceptualising schemata available to its members. Soviet historiography is particularly prone to this tendency, with scholars frequently perpetuating the Marxist fallacy of regarding early modern Central Asia's largely Persianate agricultural population as a *corporately, pre-eminently and pan-contextually self-aware proletariat* (see above, pp. 13–14). Central Asia's Turco-Mongolian pastoral population receives similarly monolithic treatment, but for somewhat different reasons. At pains to establish 'national histories' for the alchemised eponymous populations of all five newly-created Central Asian union republics,⁷⁷ successive authors construe the pastoral population as a *corporately, pre-eminently and pan-contextually self-aware forerunner of the modern Uzbek people*,⁷⁸ thereby identifying this population's socio-cultural dispositions according to an 'ethnic' construal of selfhood, rather than a subsistential one.⁷⁹ Any such totalising ascription of group identity is wholly misleading, particularly given that, lacking clear territorial outlines to demarcate their hinterlands, neither constituency possessed an obvious metropole where members could gather to engage in the sort of unmediated interaction

⁷⁶ E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century", in *Past and Present* 50 (1971), 76–136.

⁷⁷ For the Soviets' Central Asian nation-building campaign, see e.g. T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, 2001), 125–181.

⁷⁸ G.A. Abdurakhamov, "The Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek People and the Formation of the Uzbek Language", in D. Sinor (ed.), *Essays on Uzbek History, Culture and Language* (Bloomington, 1993), 1–12; A.A. Askarov, "Nekotorye aspekty izucheniia etnogeneza i etnicheskoï istorii uzbekskogo naroda", in V.P. Alekseev (ed.), *Materialy k etnicheskoï istorii nesenleniia Srednei Azii* (Tashkent, 1986), 3–14. A.Iu. Iakubovskii, *K voprosu ob etnogeneze uzbekskogo naroda* (Tashkent, 1941). For this tendency in the post-Soviet period, see D. Hoshimova, "O'zbek xalqi etnogenezi masalasi qo'yilishiga doir", in *Sharqshunoslik* 6 (1995), 117–125.

⁷⁹ Edward Allworth's comments on the cultural dispositions of pre-modern 'Uzbek-ness' perpetuate this tendency. *Idem*, *The Modern Uzbeks from the Fourteenth Century to the Present—A Cultural History* (Stanford, 1990), particularly 17–29.

necessary for fostering group solidarity and mutual obligation (for which see below, p. 207).⁸⁰

Nevertheless, it is clear that actors contextually situating themselves within a particular subsistential constituency might (a) share a common set of socio-normative dispositions and (b) co-ordinate their behaviour in the awareness of this fact. The behaviour of the fifteenth-century Naqshbandī shaykh Khwājah ‘Ubaydallāh Ahrār illustrates this well. When conceiving of his subsistential interests, Ahrār identified himself as a *dihqān*, or farmer-landowner.⁸¹ Whether this unusually mobile *dihqān* found himself in Tashkent, Samarqand or Herat, Ahrār regularly identified himself with the values and concerns of the local agrarian population, in contradistinction to those of local pastoral nomads.⁸²

Without a leader, a subsistential constituency's capacity for articulating and prosecuting common values and interests was of course limited. Agrarianists, in particular, had little scope for mobilising coercive force. But a variety of improvised methods remained available to the subsistential constituency for pursuing its vision of a moral economy.⁸³ Because, as will be shown (pp. 111–114, 117), an entire fiscal system depended on the generation of an arable surplus, farmers were able—albeit at high personal cost—to revoke their clientelist loyalty by defaulting in production. Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, farmers responded to extortionate tax assessments by abandoning their property and letting land run fallow, with disastrous effect.⁸⁴ When determining his actions, therefore, the ruler did well to court both the nomad and the farmer.

⁸⁰ Nor, of course, were they ‘imagined’ communities, at least as Benedict Anderson influentially uses the term, arguing that the salience which people accord to their large-scale communal identities is a modern phenomenon, contingent on the advanced technology of ‘print capitalism’: *idem*, *Imagined Communities* (London, 1983), 34–36.

⁸¹ *Ḥaḍrat-i īshān guftah-and “Mā mardum-i dihqān-īm”*: MKA 70. See also M’UA 238, noting how members of Ahrār’s family “used to be engaged in agriculture and trade” (*bih zirā’at wa tijārat mashghūl mībūdah-and*).

⁸² See MKA 54, telling how Ahrār ransomed numerous inhabitants of the Tashkent region from Uzbek servitude (*manqūl ast kih yak-bārī Ūzbikān āmadah wilāyat-i Tāshkand-rā kharāb sākhtah ‘iyāl wa atfāl-i musulmānān-rā asīr kardah raftah būdand. Ḥaḍrat-i īshān bih Tāshkand raftand wa miqdār-i hazār jāmah-yi karbās bih mardumī kih asīrān dāshtand farmūdand kih wukalā-yi īshān bidahand tā ān mardum asīrān-i khūd-rā khulās sāzand*); also R’AH 611–612.

⁸³ For the modern world, see J.C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, 1985), particularly 242–248.

⁸⁴ R.G. Mukminova, *Ocherki po istorii remesla v Samarkande i Bukhare v XVI veke* (Tashkent, 1976), 207; Gündoğdu, “Hive Hanlıği Tarihi”, 124; R.N. Nabiev, “Istochniki po istorii krestostnogo prava v Srednei Azii”, in *Arkheograficheskiı ezhegodnik* 1963, 87–105 [98–99].

As will become clear, the *prima facie* interests of our two proposed subsistential constituencies were widely divergent. It was thus rare for people to co-ordinate their activities *qua* representatives of differing subsistential constituencies. But all subsistential constituencies agreed about one thing. They recognised that the healthy constitution of society required strong government by a strong ruler. And if anyone in turn-of-the-century Greater Mā warā al-nahr wanted a strong ruler, they knew where to look. Veteran of the Badakhshan and Sistān campaigns, and vanquisher of Tawakkul: there were not many distinguished authority figures around in 1599, but Bāqī Muḥammad was one of them.

*The Pādishāh As Euergetist:*⁸⁵ *Persianate Conceptions of the Paternalistic Ruler*

When Persianate narrative describes political authority, it frequently invokes the image of a horticulturalist maintaining his well-tended garden. A good ruler causes his territories to be "cultivated and prosperous" (*ābād wa ma'mūr*),⁸⁶ and he "purges sweet-smelling herbs of scrub and thorns".⁸⁷ Such tropes reflect an agrarian population's belief that without the ruler's assertive intervention life naturally tended to disorder and difficulty. The *Irshād al-zirā'at* is a late Tīmūrid-era agronomical tract from Herat, and its preface supports this impression. It tells how the art of cultivating grain in the wilderness is so difficult that even the angels struggled to teach the art to Adam,⁸⁸ and ends with solemn thanks to the Tīmūrid prince Ḥusayn Bayqarā, without whose generous support, it suggests, the farmer's lot would be an impossible one.⁸⁹ Throughout the sixteenth century, farmers continued to depend on the *pādishāh* for their security of lifestyle.

Most obviously, they depended on the *pādishāh* to ensure the maintenance of an irrigational regime. While it is commonplace for historians to speculate on the prerogatives accruing to political authority in a hydraulic

⁸⁵ Borrowed from ancient historians, the term denotes a paternalistic civic benefactor. See e.g. P. Veyne, *Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism* (London, 1990), particularly 10–13.

⁸⁶ *MB* 200; *TSR* 157a; *BA* 80a, 215b, 291b.

⁸⁷ *Riyāḥin-i [...]* *bahār-i ṭabī'at-rā az khār wa khas-i khuṭūr-i īn futūr muṣaffā gardānīdah [...]*: *SilSal* 284a. See also e.g. *ShNSh* 7b and *BA* 93a.

⁸⁸ *IZ* 38–44.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 198; see discussion in M.E. Subtelny, "A Medieval Persian Agricultural Manual in Context: the *Irshād al-Zirā'a* in Late Timurid and Early Safavid Khorasan", in *Studia Iranica* 22 (1993), 167–217 [189].

ecology,⁹⁰ few have considered the responsibilities incumbent upon a ruler in such circumstances. Early modern Central Asia illustrates these responsibilities clearly. Greater Mā warā al-nahr is largely arid, and would not naturally support agrarian activity away from the oases of Bukhara and Samarqand. From long before the Arab conquest, people thus directed their efforts to constructing and maintaining canal systems, tapping the Amu Darya, Syr Darya and Zarafshān rivers in order to direct water into fields which had once been desert. Because the digging and clearing of ditches is intensive work, it is a job which has often been performed under compulsion, whether by Sumerian slaves or by chain-gangs in the American Deep South. Early modern Central Asia was no exception in this regard: in the 1530s Indian prisoners of war were digging ditches in Sawrān,⁹¹ and forty years later a large number of workers were press-ganged into excavating canals in the east of the khanate.⁹² The *pādishāh's* military resources enabled him to secure compliance from bonded labour forces, just as his income from tax receipts secured the services of labourers toiling for wages: as a result, he was better-placed than other actors to maintain an irrigational infrastructure.⁹³ Any decline in a ruler's capacity to maintain this infrastructure might lead to desertification, people's widespread fear of which is richly attested in hagiographic tradition.⁹⁴ Events in mid-eighteenth-century Mā warā al-nahr would indeed prove the weight of the *pādishāh's* environmental responsibilities, as governmental collapse in the wake of Qazaq invasion brought about the collapse of the irrigational regime, and the sands crept back towards Bukhara.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ E.g. K. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, 1957); for criticism, see P. Anderson, "The 'Asiatic Mode of Production'", in *idem*, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1974), 462–549 [484–492].

⁹¹ *Az umūr-i gharībah kih dar Turkistān mushāhadah kardīm ān būd kih Amīr 'Arab dar yak farsangī-yi Šabrān dū kāriz jāri kardah būdand [...] wa qarib bih duwist ghulām-i hindūstānī lā-yanqatī' dar ān kāriz kār mikardand: BW I. 271.*

⁹² *RR 303b–304a*, cited in Abduraimov, "Malozvestnyi istochnik po istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii v Bukhare v XVI v.", in *Narody Azii i Afriki* 1968.3, 121–128 [125].

⁹³ Bartol'd, "K istorii orosheniia Turkestana", in *Raboty po istoricheskoi geografii* (Moscow, 2002), 95–233 [107]. Paul observes ("Forming a Faction: the *Himāyat* System of Khwajah Ahrar", in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 23 (1991), 533–548) that in the late 15th century Khwajah 'Ubaydallāh Ahrar was able to maintain an irrigational infrastructure independently of the Timūrid ruling house, but it is unclear whether 16th-century Sufi shaykhs possessed any such capacity.

⁹⁴ *DQ 55a; JāmM 73b, 95a, 111a.*

⁹⁵ W. Holzwarth, "Relations between Uzbek Central Asia, the Great Steppe and Iran, 1700–1750", in S. Leder and B. Streck (eds.), *Shifts and Drifts in Nomad-Sedentary Relations* (Wiesbaden, 2005), 179–215 [208–209].

Strong rule was also attractive because it offered protection against human threats to agricultural activity. Pir Muḥammad committed a serious error in overlooking how all agriculturalists had an interest in the ruler's ability, for instance, to police the khanate's northern frontier zone against incursion from Qazaq raiding parties. Like other Turco-Mongolian nomadic groups, the Qazaqs were unable to provide all their nutritional requirements from pastoral production. Because their territory was home to very little agrarian activity,⁹⁶ they had to look elsewhere for the means of supplementing their diet. In the west, Qazaqs looked to the Volga-Ural region,⁹⁷ and in the east they retained an interest in settled northern Altishahr⁹⁸ and the area around Turfān.⁹⁹ In general, however, they directed their hungry attention southwards, most notably towards the Syr Darya littoral¹⁰⁰ but frequently also towards Greater Mā warā al-nahr more generally. Occasionally in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Bukharan authorities found it politic to appease their Qazaq neighbours by formally entitling them to fixed agrarian revenue sources within the khanate, thus in the hope of avoiding the greater cost of full-blown attack.¹⁰¹ On other occasions, as in the winter of 1598–1599, parties simply advanced from the Dasht-i Qipchāq in order to plunder whatever they could. Nomads did not just take grain, but seized anything that was available. Livestock was valuable,¹⁰² and human captives might be sold as slaves.¹⁰³ As the Samarqandis learned to their cost,

⁹⁶ M.K. Koigeldiev (ed.), *Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh istochnikov, vol I: posol'skie materi-aly russkogo gosudarstva (XV–XVII vv.)* (Almaty, 2005), 424, for the Cossack Vasilii Kobiakov's account of travelling across the entirely deserted region from Tobolsk to Turkistān in 1696: *A shli de oni ot Tobolska sukhim putem priamo dva mestatsa do pervogo gorodu Turgustanu, gde zhitel Kazach'ei Ord'y vladelets Tevki khan. A shli de oni ot Tobolska step'iu, nikakikh liudei ne vidali.*

⁹⁷ Anon (Z.V. Togan), "La littérature kazakh", in *PTF* II, 741–760 [742].

⁹⁸ A string of settlements to the north of the Taklamakan desert, in southwestern Xinjiang.

⁹⁹ *Jālm* 47a; *BA* 7418 227a, 228b–231b, 233a; *AT* (Churās) 103a–b; Iudin, "Persidskie i tiurkskie istochniki po istorii kazakhskogo naroda XV–XVIII vekov", in *idem, Tsentral'naia Aziia v XIV–XVIII vekakh glazami vostokoveda* (Almaty, 2001), 17–71 [55–56].

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. *MNB* 86, on how the Syr Darya littoral region would be one of the most flourishing regions of the world, were it not for the perpetual threat of Qazaq attack: *agar andīshah-yi ghārat wa wayrānī bih wāsītah-yi 'ubūr-i lashkar-i Qazāq nabūdī, shāyastī ma'mūr tarīn 'ālam ān bilād būdī.*

¹⁰¹ *ShNSh* 3497 167a identifies Shighāy Khan as the recipient of one such *suyūrgḥāl*.

¹⁰² As Muḥammad Shibānī knew from his own raiding days: *FN* 67–68.

¹⁰³ *AT* (Bukhārī) 95; for a later period, note the Russian envoy Matvei Troshin's comments on the Qazaq slave trade, ca. 1695: Koigeldiev (ed.), *Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh istochnikov*, 420–421.

it was a risky business maintaining a sedentary existence if the *pādishāh* could not guarantee one's livelihood. Just as agriculturalists looked to the ruler to co-ordinate the maintenance of an irrigational regime, therefore, they also expected him to co-ordinate the region's defences.

The Khan As Guarantor: Turco-Mongolian Conceptions of Authority and Solidarity

Persianate agriculturalists did not themselves expect to take the lead in maintaining a defensive *limes* against Qazaq invasion, of course. Since the early Islamic period a conventional division of labour had seen Turks, together with other peoples of the mountain and the steppe, entrusted with military responsibilities, while Iranians assumed responsibility for agricultural production and the manning of an imperial bureaucracy.¹⁰⁴ Although there had been a substantial Turcophone population in greater Mā warā al-nahr before Muḥammad Shībānī's invasion,¹⁰⁵ numbers had increased significantly at the turn of the sixteenth century. Totalling somewhere between two and four hundred thousand men,¹⁰⁶ Muḥammad Shībānī's army of conquest had comprised nothing but Turco-Mongolian nomads, and these nomads would continue to dominate military activities in the khanate over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The interests of Turco-Mongolian nomads were ostensibly very different from those of the Persianate sedentary population. Nevertheless, Turco-Mongolian tradition echoed the Persianate disposition in favour of strong government. It is common, therefore, for Turkic epic to idealise the archetypal strong ruler.¹⁰⁷ Relating the activities of the legendary 'Ādil Sultan', for instance, Qipchaq-language poems from the Volga-Ural-Aral region commonly emphasise his precocious childhood ability to break in wild thoroughbreds.¹⁰⁸ A Crimean-Noghay version of the poem relates that by his early teens Ādil Sultan was refusing to defer to his enemies,¹⁰⁹ and a

¹⁰⁴ See e.g. D. Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System* (New Haven, 1981), particularly 46–52, 151–157.

¹⁰⁵ Especially the Barlās and Arghūn tribes: thus e.g. R'AH 528, BA 333a.

¹⁰⁶ Holzwarth, "The Uzbek State as Reflected in Eighteenth Century Bukharan Sources", in *Asiatische Studien* 60 (2006), 312–353 [323], notes a range of such estimates; he himself proposes c. 300,000.

¹⁰⁷ For discussion of these idealising tropes, see e.g. A. Schmitz, *Die Erzählung von Edige* (Wiesbaden, 1996), 95–114.

¹⁰⁸ A.I. Isin, "Ādil Sultan" *epikabyq zhyry* (Almaty, 2001), 81.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 94.

Noghay version tells how he led offensives against rival khans when aged just sixteen.¹¹⁰

The most common metaphor for political authority in this literary tradition is that of the shepherd and his flock.¹¹¹ The *Shībānī-nāmah*'s protagonist presents himself before his troops at the siege of Samarqand as a shepherd of men,¹¹² and the poet resumes this pastoral vocabulary a little later, when lyrically describing the pasturage where Muḥammad Shībānī and his supporters set up camp.¹¹³ A good shepherd leads a biddable flock; in less able hands, the flock becomes disordered and restive. Shādī's *Fath-nāmah* tells how exactly this happened in the mid-fifteenth century after Abū'l-Khayr Khan's death. Abū'l-Khayr's ineffectual successor Shaykh Ḥaydar only ruled briefly, and under his watch the Shībānīd *ulūs* became 'like a flock without a shepherd',¹¹⁴ falling under the lure of unprincipled rival chiefs. The flock remained dispersed until reconstituted—almost individual by individual, if one is to credit the account in Binā'ī's *Shībānī-nāmah*¹¹⁵—by the good shepherd Muḥammad Shībānī himself.

Strong rule was necessary because a population in disorder would fall to its enemies. As Chingīz Khan himself apparently recognised in the instructions which he left his descendents (see above, p. 80), dispersal was dangerous, and self-preservation urged solidarity in the face of external threat. But a population of almost half a million Turco-Mongolian tribesmen required an acute sense of external threat to maintain that group solidarity whose strength—as anthropologists have shown—often lies in inverse proportion to number.¹¹⁶ In the absence of external danger, internal hostilities both within and between individual tribes inevitably assumed sufficient salience to render group solidarity a very distant priority. Engaged in internecine bickering, an entire population might remain oblivious to existential threat. The task of the khan-as-shepherd was thus to maintain the solidarity of the population in circumstances where component groups

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 107.

¹¹¹ The motif is occasionally, but much less commonly found in Arabic and Persianate literary traditions: see Nizām al-Mulk, *Siyāsat-nāmah*, tr. H. Darke as *The Book of Government, or Rules for Kings: the Siyar al-muluk or Siyasat-nama of Nizam al-Mulk* (London, 1978), 22, with discussion in Lambton, "Justice in the Medieval Persian Theory of Kingship", in *Studia Islamica* 17 (1962), 91–120 [94].

¹¹² *ShN* (Ṣāliḥ), 148–150.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 176.

¹¹⁴ *FN* 57.

¹¹⁵ *ShN* (Binā'ī), 110, 114, 118, 122.

¹¹⁶ A. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (Oxford, 1940), 142–147.

regarded their interests as more conflicting than conjoined. This was not easy, particularly as the ruler's means of enforcing solidarity were limited. As Abū'l-Khayr was reminded when Jānī Bik and Girāy defected to Yūnus Khan's Moghuls in the early 1460s,¹¹⁷ the nomadic Turco-Mongolian population was highly mobile, and if people did not like what they heard they could simply take themselves elsewhere. Without easy recourse to the coercive tools available to his sedentary opposite, the khan-as-shepherd had to rely upon other methods for inculcating common cause.

Some of these measures were *integrative*. The ceremonial of *qūriltāy* and coronation (see above, pp. 82–86) can be read as part of a larger project to render the Turco-Mongolian tribal population corporately complicit in the khan's exercise of authority. Another means was for the khan regularly to canvass the opinions of those around him. Muḥammad Shībānī won considerable approbation for doing just this. "His place is above all khans," writes Muḥammad Ṣālīḥ in the *Shībānī-nāmāh*. "He follows the Qur'an, he consults sultans."¹¹⁸ If Muḥammad Shībānī occasionally deferred to the opinions of others,¹¹⁹ this vaunted process of consultation more generally served as a ritual for appropriating the voices of those with whom he took counsel.¹²⁰ Subsequent rulers also used consultation as a means of securing compliance. Prior to his assault on Badakhshan in 1584, for instance, 'Abdallāh studiously sought the advice of *amīrs* and sultans whose support he would soon be needing.¹²¹ He thus rendered his interlocutors stakeholders in what proved to be a long and gruelling campaign.

Other measures for engendering solidarity were *exclusive*. Successive rulers exploited systems of hierarchy by favouring the powerful at the expense of the less powerful, the retraction of whose support would be less of a blow to common cause. One device was to maintain the practice of tribal stratification, whereby certain tribal formations were distinguished above others by their privileged interaction with the khalal metropole.¹²²

¹¹⁷ TR 108–109; *ShNSh* 40b; BA 7418 266b–267a and 575 5b; TK 26a.

¹¹⁸ *Bārchah khānlāridin a'lā ūrūnī / [...] / Bār-dūr ānīng ishī Qur'an bīrlah / Ūltūrūbdūr nīchah sultān bīrlah*: *ShN* (Ṣālīḥ), 36. The passage is cited in N. Kılıç, "Change in Political Culture: the Rise of Sheybani Khan", in *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* 3–4 (1997), 57–68 [59].

¹¹⁹ *ShN* (Ṣālīḥ) 186.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 72, 134.

¹²¹ *Bār-i diḡar dar bāb-i tawajjuh bih ṣawb-i wilāyat-i Badakhshān mashwarat namūd*: *ShNSh* 3497 213a.

¹²² U. Schamiloglu, "Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the Golden Horde" (Columbia University Ph.D. thesis, 1986), *passim*; for stratification see also T.J. Barfield, "Tribe and

Different groupings were favoured in different successor states. In the fourteenth-century Bātū'id-dominated Golden Horde, the Qiyāt, Saychiyūt, Naymān and Qānglī tribes had enjoyed pre-eminent status,¹²³ and the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds ruling early fifteenth-century Crimea accorded particular distinction to the Arghūn, Bahrīn, Shīrīn and Qipchāq tribes.¹²⁴ From the fourteenth or fifteenth century onwards, meanwhile, the Shībānīds had accorded pre-eminence to the Qārluq, Bayrak, Naymān and Qūshchī tribes,¹²⁵ whose representatives were still in special attendance at high court ceremonial in the late sixteenth century and long after.¹²⁶

Another 'exclusive' means of maintaining tribal order in mixed sedentary/nomadic sixteenth-century Central Asia was by distributing among tribesmen grain and other supplements to pastoral output, all expropriated from sedentary agriculturalists.¹²⁷ Towards this end, the sedentary population conventionally had to pay tax at between ten¹²⁸ and twenty¹²⁹ per cent of its output in cash or kind.¹³⁰ In the classical Islamic period, all tax was theoretically paid into a central treasury. However, post-classical juridical innovations, such as the 'feudal'¹³¹ institutions of *iqṭā'*¹³² and *suyūrghāl*,¹³³ enti-

State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective", in P.S. Khoury and J. Kostiner (eds.), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley, 1990), 153–182 [172–180].

¹²³ M. Kafalı, "Cuci Ulusu'ndaki il ve kabilelerin siyasî rolleri ve ehemmiyetleri", in *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* 2 (1971), 99–110 [101].

¹²⁴ G.A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi Zolotoi Ordy* (Moscow, 1973), 172.

¹²⁵ ZĀ 88a; see also BA 8a, suggesting simply that the Qārluq, Bayrak, Naymān and Qūshchī tribes "were under Shībanid rule" (*dar taht-i farmān-i awlād-i Shībān Khān būdand*).

¹²⁶ *ShNSh* 3497 205a, noting the participation of Nazar Bī Naymān and Tursūn Bī Qūshchī at the coronation of 'Abdallāh II in 1583; BA 8a, on how these tribes *dar silk-i ibtā'-i nishād-i Tūqāy Tīmūr Khān intizām dāshand*. After the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd takeover, members of other tribes (Kyrgyz, Qalmāq, Ālchīn, Ming, Yūz) started playing more prominent roles in court ceremonial: BA 91a–b (elevation of Imām Qulī Khan, 1611); *MuT* 106b (elevation of Şubhān Qulī Khan, 1681).

¹²⁷ Holzwarth, "The Uzbek State", 327–329.

¹²⁸ *Ushr*: SM 93a; Paul, *Die politische und soziale Bedeutung der Naqşbandiyya in Mitteleasien im 15. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1991), 114.

¹²⁹ *Kharāj*: SM 94a–b; Paul, *Die politische und soziale Bedeutung*, 113.

¹³⁰ SM 93b for *kharāj-i wazīfah* (assessed in cash) and *kharāj-i muqāsimah* (assessed in kind); discussion in e.g. Semenov, *Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogovogo ustroistva byvshego Bukharskogo khanstva* (Tashkent, 1929), 22.

¹³¹ Outside the Soviet Union, such vocabulary owes much to A.N. Poliak, "La Féodalité islamique", in *Revue des études islamiques* 10 (1936), 247–265.

¹³² Akhmedov, "Ikta v Srednei Azii v XVI—nachale XVIII v.", in *Formy feodal'noi zemel'noi sobstvennosti i vladeniia na Blizhnom i Srednem Vostoke—Bartol'dovskie chteniia 1975 g.* (Moscow, 1979), 15–24.

¹³³ Petrushevskii, *Ocherki po istorii feodal'nykh otnoshenii v Azerbaidzhane i Armenii v XVI—nachale XIX vv.* (Leningrad, 1949), 143–183.

bled grant-holders to gather a region's fiscal surplus directly for themselves. This further facilitated the tribal military elite's exploitation of a sedentary agricultural base. By assuming responsibility for the allocation of such crucial resources, the strong khan-as-shepherd made clear why it was in the tribal population's interest to maintain group solidarity under his rule. Weak authority and attendant disorder threatened to imperil that redistribution of agricultural goods upon which the Turco-Mongolian tribal population's long-term livelihood depended. The pastoral population's degree of clientelist loyalty towards the established actor was thus contingent on the maintenance of this redistributive system.

The Virtues of Co-Ordination

Both Persianate agriculturalists and Turco-Mongolian nomads relied on the khan to provide public goods which they themselves were ill-placed to deliver. More particularly, they relied on the khan to ensure that the 'opposite' subsistential constituency continued to provide a resource on which they themselves depended. Nomads needed agrarianists to act in contravention of their best short-term interests by yielding a proportion of their agricultural output for redistribution; similarly, in times of enemy attack agrarianists needed nomads to disregard their own best short-term interests by shouldering the risks inherent in leading the defence against invasion. Confronted with a classic co-ordination problem, both groups benefited from central authority's preparedness to deploy a range of incentives and disciplinary mechanisms to impel people to disregard their immediate self-interest and pursue individually sub-optimal policies, muffling the white noise of the two subsistential constituencies' mutual discord, and amplifying the harmony of their reciprocal interests.

One might of course object that such an argument for strong authority is disconcertingly functionalist, and that it is one easier made by an external viewer than by an implicated contemporary. But some parties in sixteenth-century Mā warā al-nahr clearly recognised the advantage of the khan's enforcing individually self-denying outcomes upon his variegated subject population. One such party was Faḍl-Allāh b. Rūzbihān Khunjī Iṣfahānī, a refugee in Bukhara from Safavid Iran and author of a governmental treatise entitled the *Sulūk al-mulūk*. Khunjī writes extensively about the khan's responsibility for maintaining a system of redistributing agricultural surplus, noting that this is the pre-requisite for a system of military mobilisation. But he notes also that limitations are in place to prevent rulers from extracting *too much* from agriculturalists. It is conventional practice, Khunjī

says, for a ruler to offer fiscal concessions if land proves unproductive,¹³⁴ and he should redistribute property if there is nobody at hand to cultivate it.¹³⁵ Furthermore, he should expropriate resources reasonably,¹³⁶ since a fiscally crippled agriculturalist is no good to anybody. Unlike the devastating arbitrary raids by Abū'l-Khayrid war parties into Safavid-ruled Khurāsān in the early and mid-sixteenth century,¹³⁷ this system of institutionalised expropriation thus required Turco-Mongolian nomads to disregard their immediate maximising interests, in order to guarantee farmers a modicum of socio-economic security. Because long-term redistributive order depended on the secure generation of agrarian surplus, food-producers therefore had to be secure in their living.¹³⁸ It is, after all, a foolish parasite which kills its host.

Khunji's work thus offers a further argument for strong authority in addition to those already discussed in this chapter. Central authority alone can co-ordinate divergent short-term interests in order to enable their attenuated fulfilment over the longer run. By constraining appetites and tendencies whose untrammelled satisfaction would incur general disutility, the strong ruler is better able than the weak to direct people's actions towards the greater utilitarian good.

'Abdallāh's Contribution

It is thus evident why subsistential constituencies in 1599 should have preferred the prospect of strong rule by Bāqī Muḥammad over the prospect of weaker rule by the addled Pīr Muḥammad. But the mere fact that one individual was abler than another scarcely accounts for why people were prepared to align themselves alongside him as rebels against the incumbent Jānī-Bikid regime. Before the end of the sixteenth century, clientelist loyalties were seldom as pertinent in determining khalat fortunes as they proved in the case of Pīr Muḥammad and Bāqī Muḥammad. The proliferation

¹³⁴ *Agar zamīn shūrah bāshad wa āb bih-d-ū narasad, kharāj bih-d-ū wājib namīgardad [...]* tā shūrah zār shawad kharāj dar ū nīst: *SM* 101b.

¹³⁵ *Agar kasi nayāyad kih an zamīn bih muzāra'at qabul kunad, bidahad bih kasi kih bar an qā'im namāyad*: *ibid.*, 100a–b.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 97a.

¹³⁷ *HI* 553, for Muḥammad Shībānī's forces ransacking Sarakhs, forcibly removing 70,000 inhabitants to Mā warā al-nahr.

¹³⁸ For similar sentiments, note Ghāzān Khan's supposed speech on the dangers of short-term thinking and the importance of maintaining 'an equilibrium in all things': *JT* (Rashid al-Dīn) 674–675.

of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century instances where individuals are described as 'Alexander-like'¹³⁹ suggests, of course, that such qualities in a ruler as fortitude and strategic acumen long retained value in the popular imagination: but only very rarely did the manifestation of such qualities lead people to support gifted newcomers against less able members of an established ruling party. For all one's easy assumptions about the instability of the region—"What is it about Central Asia that makes us want to say that people came sweeping out of it?", asks a character in Don DeLillo's *The Names*¹⁴⁰—rebellion was a strikingly infrequent phenomenon in early modern Central Asia. Not only were rebellions much less common than in late medieval Europe, for instance,¹⁴¹ but people were also less likely to align themselves against established rulers here than in environments such as medieval Khurāsān or the Maghreb, where constituencies frequently mobilised in defiance of Islamic normative strictures against rebellion, and where political continuity was a short-lived thing.¹⁴² With Muḥammad Shībānī having largely drawn upon forces from the Dasht-i Qipchāq during his conquest of Mā warā al-nahr in 1500–1505,¹⁴³ Bāqī Muḥammad was the first individual since Timūr who owed his establishment of a new dynastic regime principally to a mobilised local population.

There were several reasons why it was rare for local populations to overthrow established regimes. One, discussed in chapter 1, was that constituencies in early modern Central Asia often attributed to the established dynasty some quality of 'patrimonial entitlement'; as will become clear in chapter 3, another was that people often ascribed an instrumental utility value to the maintenance of even a sub-optimal status quo. A third reason is that populations often had very limited assumptions as to what they were

¹³⁹ The epithet is a common one. See e.g. *ShN* (Ṣāliḥ) 54, 114, 228, 260; *MB* 151, referring to 'Abdallāh as *ṣāhib-qarān-i Sikandar-mithāl*, and 240, referring to him as *khān-i Iskandar-nishān*.

¹⁴⁰ D. DeLillo, *The Names* (London, 1983), 260.

¹⁴¹ J. Dumolyn and J. Haemers, "Patterns of Urban Rebellion in Medieval Flanders", in *Journal of Medieval History* 31 (2005), 369–393; S.K. Cohn, *Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200–1425: Italy, France and Flanders* (Cambridge, MA, 2006).

¹⁴² C.E. Bosworth, "The Armies of the Ṣaffārīds", in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 31 (1968), 534–544 [538–539]; R. Bulliet, "Local Politics in Eastern Iran under the Ghaznavids and Seljuks", in *Iranian Studies* 11 (1978), 35–56 [41]; B.A. Mojuetan, "Legitimacy in a Power State: Moroccan Politics in the Seventeenth Century during the Interregnum", in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 13 (1981), 347–360 [347–348].

¹⁴³ Muḥammad Shībānī did not rely *solely* on external forces: see Kılıç, "Change in Political Culture", for how he succeeded also in recruiting to his cause various nomadic parties already based in Mā warā al-nahr. I am grateful to Nurten Kılıç-Schubel for this observation.

entitled to expect from khalan authority, with the result that their clientelist demands were accordingly limited also. Over the course of sixteenth century, however, this ceased to be the case. In what remains of this present chapter, I want to consider how the interventional reach and territorial scope of khalan authority expanded over this period, and how this shift consequently influenced people's beliefs as to what they were entitled to expect from the person holding khalan office. As authority became more important, with a greater capacity to deliver the sort of public goods discussed above, it became correspondingly more important that the khalan office be discharged by the person best able to provide these goods. 'Abdallah II was the agent of this shift, and Bāqī Muḥammad was its beneficiary.

Pīr Muḥammad was notoriously ill-equipped to discharge the functions of khalan authority. Had he sat on the Abū'l-Khayrid khalan throne in Bukhara seventy-five years earlier, though, it is unlikely that his incompetence would have constituted even partial grounds for Samarqandis to align themselves as imperial rebels alongside his Tūqāy-Tīmūrid challenger. One of the many reasons why this would have been so is that the Samarqandis would have had few expectations as to how Pīr Muḥammad should behave, and would thus have been unlikely to take umbrage at any shortcomings. Khalan authority as widely conceived in the 1520s was more constrained in two significant ways than khalan authority as imagined in the late sixteenth century.

Definitional Constraints to Khalan Authority

Until the 1560s, people evidently believed that the khalan title necessarily devolved by hereditary eligibility. If this was partly because of their 'charismatic' attachment to a particular line of descent (see chapter 1), it was also because until the middle of the century people understood the khalan title to denote little more than one Abū'l-Khayrid's dynastic seniority, and the respect to which this supposedly entitled him from his fellow Abū'l-Khayrid dynasts. The khalan title was a *formal statement*, rather than a *substantive one*. Concepts of 'seniority' and 'authority' are not mutually exclusive, of course: but the title was an identification more of who one was than of what one did. It needed have little to do with ruling people.

The novelty of this position emerges if one compares the elevation of Kūchkūnjī in 1511 with Ūgudāy's accession to khalan authority after the death of Chingīz Khan in 1227. As noted in chapter 1 (p. 79), Chingīz nominated Ūgudāy to succeed him on grounds not of dynastic seniority but of meritocratic superiority, as the individual who out of his surviving

sons was best placed to fulfil that duty of providing military, administrative and economic stability which had hitherto lain with Chingīz himself. By his choice of candidate, Chingīz signalled that he regarded the khalal title as a badge of real, responsible authority, and not as some mere genealogical perquisite. Constituencies evidently shared Chingīz Khan's view of khalal office: when Ūgudāy was succeeded by his ill-distinguished son Gūyūk, many rejected his entitlement to rule, instead supporting Mūngkā b. Tūlū, among other reasons because he was abler than his cousin.¹⁴⁴ Nor did a subsequent shift towards succession by dynastic seniority (see above, p. 80) stop people in the Chingīzid epigone states from associating khalal authority with the sort of responsibilities and prerogatives which Chingīz himself had envisaged. Unpopular or incapable incumbents were repeatedly overthrown by rebellious internal constituencies, in environments from thirteenth-century Īlkānid Iran¹⁴⁵ to the fifteenth-century Jūchid Dasht-i Qipchāq.¹⁴⁶ Subjects evidently remained as determined as before that the khalal office be occupied by one capable of discharging the practical responsibilities which mattered to them.

For reasons which are still not clear, the 1511 *qūriltāy* radically reformulated khalal authority. The formerly substantive office of khan was recast as a formal statement, its prerogatives amounting to little more than having the *khuṭbah* and *sikkah* issued in the khan's own name. Such prerogatives were plainly marginal to most other people's interests and ambitions. The Russian scholar Senkowski doubted that Kūchkūnjī possessed any authority whatsoever, suggesting that he "was no more than a vassal khan to the ruler of Bukhara, and was never Shībānī's successor".¹⁴⁷ One seventeenth-century chronicler takes a somewhat subtler view of events. "After the death of Shāhī Bīk [i.e. Muḥammad Shībānī] Khan, the reins of state were entrusted to Kūchkūnjī", writes Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī. "But the powers of establishing and dismantling authority, of locking up and setting free, and various other regnal matters lay in the hands of 'Ubaydallāh."¹⁴⁸ It was thus Muḥammad

¹⁴⁴ *TJJ* I.217; *JT* (Rashīd al-Dīn), 395–396; E.E. Oliver, "The Chaghatāi Mughals", in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 20 (1888), 72–128 [91]. For an alternative interpretation of events, see K. Ho-dong, "A Reappraisal of Gūyūk Khan", in R. Amitai and M. Biran (eds.), *Mongols, Turks and Others—Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World* (Leiden, 2005), 309–338.

¹⁴⁵ Baydū was overthrown in 1295; *JT* (Rashīd al-Dīn) 624–628, with discussion in Morgan, *Medieval Persia 1040–1797* (London, 1988), 70–71.

¹⁴⁶ The Tūqay-Timūrid Barāq Khan was overthrown in 1427; V.V. Trepavlov, *The Formation and Early History of the Manghit Yurt* (Bloomington, 2001), 24.

¹⁴⁷ Senkowski, *Supplément à l'histoire générale*, 10.

¹⁴⁸ *Zamān-i mahāmm-i saltānat ba'd az fawt-i Shāhī Bīk Khān agar chih mufawwad bih*

Shībānī's nephew 'Ubaydallāh b. Maḥmūd who assumed the responsibilities and prerogatives of military command at Ghijduwān in 1512, when he checked a Safavid expeditionary force attempting to invade Mā warā al-nahr.¹⁴⁹ It was 'Ubaydallāh also who took charge of most Khurāsāni raiding missions until the 1530s.¹⁵⁰ The materially 'insubstantial' nature of khalal authority meant that Kūchkūnjī and his immediate khalal successors were untroubled by rebellion during their terms of office. There was little reason for constituencies to bother rebelling against a formally-conceived khan, *qua* khan, because there was little intrinsic to his khalal authority which impacted upon people's lives.

Territorial Limits to Khalal Authority

Even had Kūchkūnjī been elevated to substantive, rather than formal khalal office, the scope of his authority would still have been highly constrained. Having elevated Kūchkūnjī to the khalal title in 1511, *qūrlitāy* participants reconvened in spring 1512, at a gathering where they formally agreed to a tetrapartite division of primary appanages between Muḥammad Shībānī's kinsmen. By the terms of this agreement, Kūchkūnjī received the region of Samarqand, Suyūnch Muḥammad took Tashkent and Turkistān, 'Ubaydallāh and other descendents of Muḥammad Shībānī's father Shāh Būdāq got Bukhara and Qarshī, and the line of Jānī Bīk received Miyānkāl.¹⁵¹ When Balkh was recaptured from the Safavids in 1524, it too was given to the Jānī-Bīkids.¹⁵² Kūchkūnjī's putative khalal authority was thus weak anywhere outside the immediate vicinity of Samarqand. The ruler of each appanage assumed the prerogative to raise taxes and issue fiscal immunities,¹⁵³ and to sub-appanage his holdings at will.¹⁵⁴ In time, furthermore,

kaff-i kifāyat-i Kūchkūnjī Khān būd amā az 'anah-yi 'azl wa naṣb wa qabd wa bast wa sār umūr-i pādishāhī dar dast-i 'Ubaydallāh Khān būd: BA 7418 327b.

¹⁴⁹ *SM* 8a-b; *BW* I.112-118; *MAḥ* 17; *ShNSH* 33b; *TMQ* 241b.

¹⁵⁰ Dickson, "Shāh Ṭahmāsb and the Ūzbeks", *passim*.

¹⁵¹ *ShNSH* 33a; discussion in Dickson, "Shāh Ṭahmāsb and the Ūzbeks", 35-36.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 80-84; Akhmedov, *Istoriia Balkha*, 78-79.

¹⁵³ McChesney, "Waḳf at Balkh", 32.

¹⁵⁴ See J.L. Bacqué-Grammont, "Une Liste ottomane de princes et d'apanages Abu'l-Khayrides", in *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 11 (1970), 423-453 [430-431], reproducing Topkapı document E.1291, an Ottoman diplomatic report composed ca. 1533 which attests to the widespread practice of sub-appanaging in Central Asia. For instance, Kistin Qarā Sūltān b. Jānī Bīk, the Jānī-Bīkid ruler of Balkh, evidently sub-appanaged several local dependencies among his brothers. According to the document, Rustam was sub-appanaged in Shibarghān, west of Balkh, and Yār Muḥammad was sub-appanaged in Termez, to the north,

parties even encroached upon the khan's own exclusive entitlement to issue coinage in his name. Under the leadership of Kūchkūnjī's (3,4) kinsman Timūr Sultan b. Ḥamzāh,¹⁵⁵ a party of non-Abū'l-Khayrid Shibānids who were appanaged in Ḥiṣār started minting their own eponymous coinage.¹⁵⁶ People in Ḥiṣār freely assumed this khalal prerogative because there was little that Kūchkūnjī could do to stop them. He lacked any mechanism for enforcing discipline beyond the frontiers of his own appanage.

Regional sovereignty enabled each appanage-holder to secure the support of local Turco-Mongolian tribesmen by redistributing agricultural surplus as he deemed appropriate. The attachments which they thereby built up in turn undermined the khan's scope for prevailing on the loyalties of people living beyond the frontiers of his own appanage. Any large-scale military venture thus depended on the goodwill of his fellow Abū'l-Khayrids. When Kūchkūnjī on one occasion led an army supposedly totalling 250,000 men against the Safavids,¹⁵⁷ he was able to do so only because his kinsmen freely consented to mobilise and dispatch contingents of their own against this common threat. At other times, fellow Abū'l-Khayrids either declined to participate in such campaigns or, like the afore-mentioned 'Ubaydallāh, undertook them independently of khalal authority.

The territorial constraints to khalal authority continued through the first half of the sixteenth century. 'Ubaydallāh may have made a more distinguished incumbent than Kūchkūnjī when he acceded to the khalal title after the death of Abū Sa'īd b. Kūchkūnjī in 1533,¹⁵⁸ but the territorial scope of his sway was as confined as Kūchkūnjī's had been. 'Ubaydallāh remained unable to compel his kinsmen to co-operate in military campaigns,¹⁵⁹ and

while Isfandiār and Sulaymān were sub-appanage-holders respectively in Tātkint and Kūfin, settlements near Miyānkāl.

¹⁵⁵ For his ancestry, see *ShNSh* 27a–b. He was sometimes known as Timūr Aḥmad: see e.g. *J'Ā* 62a, as immediately below.

¹⁵⁶ *Timūr Aḥmad khān-i Ḥiṣārī būd [...] kih chandgāh dar Mā warā al-nahr khuṭbah wa sikkah bih nām-i ū mikhwāndand: J'Ā* 62a, proceeding to note how Timūr himself acknowledged that he was not part of the established ruling house (*mīguft kih hargiz dar ṭabaqah-yi mā manzilāt wa dawlat-i khāqānī nabūd [...]*). For discussion, see Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt Tausend Wege ein", 160, and Welsford, "Rethinking the Hamzahids of Ḥiṣār", 798–799. Regarding Timūr's titulature, Muṭribī al-Aṣamm al-Samarqandī in the *Tadhkirat al-shu'arā* similarly identifies him as khan, referring to him (*TSh* 176) as "Timūr Khān Ḥiṣārī".

¹⁵⁷ *KhT* 250.

¹⁵⁸ For the date see *AN* III.732; *MB* 152; *BA* 7418 329a–330a.

¹⁵⁹ Recounting the events of the battle at Ghijduwān, Zayn al-Dīn Wāṣifi relates (*BW* I.116) how none of 'Ubaydallāh Khan's kinsmen wished to contribute assistance, and how Jānī Bik Sultan lent support only when shamed into doing so by Mīr-i 'Arab.

the Suyūnchids particularly often withheld assistance.¹⁶⁰ Judging from the notable absence of any extant Tashkenti coin issues in 'Ubaydallāh's name,¹⁶¹ the Suyūnchids may also have failed to acknowledge his khalal authority through the *khutbah* and the *sikkah*.

What brought an end to this highly delimited system of territorial authority was of course the extended appanage conflict of the mid-sixteenth century. Whatever the conflict's final outcome, however, participants were initially little motivated by any desire to extend khalal authority's territorial sway. The opening salvos of the conflict were fired across sub-appanaged territories, as growing pressure on resources encouraged appanage-holders to assert themselves at the expense of their kinsmen. In 1546/7, the effete Balkh-based Jānī-Bikid dynast Qilich Qarā¹⁶² was ousted by supporters of his uncle Pīr Muḥammad,¹⁶³ who had previously been sub-appanaged at Farāhīn;¹⁶⁴ in Bukhara, meanwhile, 'Ubaydallāh's grandson Burhān Sultan¹⁶⁵ was soon competing for authority with Yār Muḥammad, a fellow Shāh-Būdāqid.¹⁶⁶

By 1550, pressure on resources meant that parties from one primary appanage were beginning to challenge the sovereignty of primary appanages elsewhere. The first party to disturb the status quo was the aforementioned Jānī-Bikid Pīr Muḥammad, who in 1551 attempted to capture Bukhara from the incumbent Shāh-Būdāqid Burhān.¹⁶⁷ He failed, however, and in the longer run it was the Suyūnchids who posed the greater threat to appanage stability. This was perhaps because their own territory around Tashkent and Turkistān had both a larger population of Turco-Mongolian nomadic tribesmen than in other appanages¹⁶⁸ and a proportionately

¹⁶⁰ *JāmM* 79a.

¹⁶¹ Davidovich, *Istoriia denezhnogo obrashcheniia*, 196–199.

¹⁶² *MB* 185 observes that he was so Persianised that he scarcely spoke Turkish: *ū shāh-zādah'ī būd dar kamāl-i zarāfat wa akthar-i awqāt bih zabān-i fārsī takallum minamūd wa bih alfāz-i turkī sukhn-i kam mīguft.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 185, dating events to eighteen months and seventeen days after Qilich Qarā's accession. Qilich Qarā evidently acceded to Balkhi authority in 1545, since a tombstone inscription recorded by Yate in *Northern Afghanistan or Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission*, 214, identifies this as the year of his predecessor Kistin Qarā's death.

¹⁶⁴ Bacqué-Grammont, "Une Liste ottomane", 430. The location of Farāhīn is unclear.

¹⁶⁵ He was the son of 'Ubaydallāh's son Muḥammad Raḥīm Sultan: *ShNSh* 58b.

¹⁶⁶ *MB* 121 and 142, dating the episode to 961 (7 December 1553–25 November 1554); discussion in M.A. Salakhedinova, "Nekotorye dannye o politicheskoi zhizni Bukhary v seredine XVI v. i ob uchastii v nei Turkmen", in Girs (ed.), *Srednevekovyi vostok: istoriia, kul'tura, istochnikovedenie* (Moscow, 1980), 237–241.

¹⁶⁷ *ShNSh* 57a, 59b.

¹⁶⁸ See e.g. *AhT* 397, in the context of Nawrūz Aḥmad's death, noting how 20,000 members

smaller agrarian base with which to feed them: they thus had both the resources and the motive to try appropriating the means of agricultural production in lands abutting onto their own. By 1552 the Suyūnchid Nawrūz Aḥmad was raiding Samarqand, subject at the time to the khan 'Abd al-Laṭīf b. Kūchkūnjī,¹⁶⁹ and soon after he joined forces with 'Abd al-Laṭīf both to threaten Burhān's Bukharan regime¹⁷⁰ and to expel the party of Jānī-Bikids who were appanaged in Miyānkāl, between Bukhara and Samarqand.¹⁷¹

Later in 1552, Nawrūz Aḥmad succeeded 'Abd al-Laṭīf to khalal authority.¹⁷² Emboldened by his achievements at Miyānkāl, he now moved to expel the Kūchkūnjīds from Samarqand. After several abortive attempts,¹⁷³ in 1553 he captured the city,¹⁷⁴ and dispatched 'Abd al-Laṭīf's nephew Sulṭān Sa'īd, hitherto the ruling incumbent, into exile in Kashgar.¹⁷⁵ Samarqand would remain the khalal seat until Nawrūz Aḥmad's death in 1556.¹⁷⁶ Nawrūz Aḥmad's evident pre-eminence among his Abū'l-Khayrid kinsmen had little to do with any intrinsic khalal prerogative,¹⁷⁷ however, which remained as constrained after his death as it had been beforehand. When Pīr Muḥammad succeeded Nawrūz Aḥmad to the khalal title,¹⁷⁸ people clearly did not regard control of Samarqand as a perquisite of office, and the city reverted to Kūchkūnjīd rule under the recently-returned Sulṭān Sa'īd.¹⁷⁹ Pīr Muḥammad instead took advantage of internal feuding between the Shāh-Būdāqids to

of his *ulūs* camped out in the steppe over winter: *bīst hazār kas az mardum-i ulūs-i ū dar ṣahrā-yi madhkūr qishlāq kardah [...]*.

¹⁶⁹ *ShNSh* 59b.

¹⁷⁰ *JāmM* 77b.

¹⁷¹ *AḥT* 397; *ShNSh* 57a–59b. Discussion in Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt Tausend Wege ein", 82.

¹⁷² *Semerqand Pādīshāhī 'Abdū'l-laṭīf Hān fevt olup Baraḳ Hān Semerqand-da hān olup [...]*; *MM* 129. See also *ShNSh* 69a; *AN* III.732–733.

¹⁷³ *MML* 178a–180a.

¹⁷⁴ *Baraḳ Hān [...]* *Semerqand'ı alup zabt idüp [...]*; *MM* 129–130. See also *ShNSh* 72a; *SirS* 102b.

¹⁷⁵ *ShNSh* 80a; *MB* 147, dating events to 962 (26 November 1554–15 November 1555).

¹⁷⁶ For his death see *AḥT* 396–397 and *KḥT* 387 (for which see also above, p. 44 n. 38); *MB* 187, dating the death to 17 Dhū'l-Qa'dah 963 (22 September 1556).

¹⁷⁷ The contemporary onlooker Sīdī 'Alī Ra'īs observed (*MM* 129) that during Nawrūz Aḥmad's reign the rulers of Balkh and Bukhara continued to issue the *khuṭbah* in their own names: *Belh'de Pīr Muḥammed Hān ve Buhārā'da Būrhān Seyyid Hān öz adlarına huṭbe ok idüp [...]*.

¹⁷⁸ *MB* 187.

¹⁷⁹ *AḥT* 400; *ShNSh* 101b–102a; *MB* 147, relating how Sulṭān Sa'īd returned from Kashgar to Samarqand in 965 (24 October 1557–13 October 1558) following Nawrūz Aḥmad's death, and "raised the banner of rulership in his ancestral country" (*dar mamlakat-i mawrūthī-yi khūd liwā-yi saltanat bar afrakht*).

establish himself in Bukhara. Bukhara would remain a Jānī-Bīkid stronghold for the rest of the sixteenth century,¹⁸⁰ but Pīr Muḥammad himself only managed to hold on in power for five years. In 1561, his nephew ‘Abdallāh b. Iskandar forced him to withdraw from the city.¹⁸¹ Construing this withdrawal as a resignation of the khalal title, ‘Abdallāh now determined that authority should transfer to Iskandar.

‘Abdallāh’s intervention against his uncle marked the first occasion since 1510 that the khalal title did not devolve gerontocratically to the senior-most living Abū’l-Khayrid. Up until this time the practice of gerontocracy had governed khalal successions because no constituency felt sufficiently strongly about the khalal title to determine it should be otherwise. Thereafter, things began to change: and the consequences of these changes would be far-reaching.

‘Abdallāh’s Challenge to Convention

Of all the Abū’l-Khayrid dynasts in sixteenth-century Greater Mā warā al-nahr, it is ‘Abdallāh b. Iskandar whose career has been subjected to greatest scrutiny by modern historians of the region. Assessments of his activities have varied widely. Some scholars follow contemporary Bukharan chroniclers in identifying ‘Abdallāh’s reign as constituting the apogee of Abū’l-Khayrid authority,¹⁸² while others take a more critical perspective, suggesting that the Abū’l-Khayrid dispensation collapsed as a direct consequence of his activities.¹⁸³ Despite such debate, though, scholars have frequently underestimated just how far ‘Abdallāh went in redefining the very meaning of political authority among subsequent generations. Regardless of whether or not he succeeded in his aims, ‘Abdallāh certainly managed to change what it meant to be khalal.

He had given notice of his intentions when he expelled his uncle Pīr Muḥammad Khan from Bukhara in 1561. Had ‘Abdallāh simply captured the city, his action would have been unremarkable within the context of the mid-century appanage struggles. What was more significant was his subsequent decision to elevate Iskandar, his own father, upon the Bukharan khalal throne.¹⁸⁴ As conventionally understood, Iskandar’s claim to

¹⁸⁰ *ShNSh* 111a.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 111b–112a.

¹⁸² E.g. Vámbéry, *History of Bokhara*, 285.

¹⁸³ McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, 64–65.

¹⁸⁴ *MB* 203 dates the elevation to Sha’bān 968 (17 April–15 May 1561).

eligibility was tenuous. As one of Jānī Bik's junior sons,¹⁸⁵ he had little entitlement to gerontocratically determined authority as long as Pīr Muḥammad and his other elder brothers were still alive.¹⁸⁶ 'Abdallāh tried to make a case for Iskandar's eligibility, playing down his father's relative youth and emphasising the seniority of Iskandar's mother among Jānī Bik's various wives.¹⁸⁷ At the same time, though, 'Abdallāh seems to have presented khalal authority as a 'natural' right devolving on whomsoever occupied the 'khalal seat' of Bukhara: given that Pīr Muḥammad had jeopardised his claim to the title by fleeing the region, authority necessarily passed to the people who had expelled him. By this logic, 'Abdallāh recast khalal entitlement as the fruit of one's own actions. No longer a mere statement about who one was, this reformulated conception of the khalal office was instead a statement about what one was able—and entitled—to do.

Although 'Abdallāh made no claim to khalal authority himself, the majority of our extant sources suggest that Iskandar's accession was a purely formal affair, and that it was 'Abdallāh who retained actual political power while his father devoted himself to a contemplative life.¹⁸⁸ For the duration of Iskandar's twenty-two year reign, political power and formal authority appear thus to have resided in two different individuals. This was no longer the case after 'Abdallāh's own khalal elevation in 1583.¹⁸⁹ Upon his acces-

¹⁸⁵ *BA/MIKKh* 329 identifies him as Jānī Bik's twelfth son; *MB* 183 lists him as his fifth. According to *AN* III.738, 'Abdallāh claimed to Pīr Muḥammad that Iskandar was actually the oldest living Jānī-Bikid, and that according to ancestral practice it was therefore right that the *khuṭbah* and *sikkah* should be issued in his name: "*Chūn dar īn ulūs az pidar-i man kuhn-sāl-tar nīst, ān sazāwar kih bih ā'in-i niyāgān khuṭbah wa sikkah bih nām-i ū shawad*".

¹⁸⁶ Burton, "The Accession of Iskandar Khan", 111.

¹⁸⁷ Burton, "The Accession of Iskandar Khan", as above.

¹⁸⁸ *RS* 166a; *MB* 202–203; *TSR* 177a; *BA* 39a, noting how 'Abdallāh *ham dar ḥayat-i wālidash rā'iq wa fā'iq-i muhimmāt-i pādīshāhī būd*; *SilSal* 123b–124a. (For discussion of some of this material, see below, p. 280 n. 86). It is possible, however, that we are in danger here of succumbing to a late 16th-century Bukharan narrative tradition which is at pains to attribute the Jānī-Bikid faction's success to 'Abdallāh alone. The more Samarqando-centric author Muṭribī claims, by contrast, *NZJ* 120, that throughout his reign Iskandar maintained direct control over the administration of the khanate, and that 'Abdallāh was not authorised to do anything without his father's approval ('*Abdallāh Khān kih arshad-i awlād-i ū būd [...]* *dar hīch muhimmī az muhimmāt-i jahānbānī wa kishwar-sitānī bī rukhshat-i pidar shurū' namikard*). Muṭribī proceeds to relate that on one occasion 'Abdallāh undertook a campaign in defiance of his father's will, with the result that he then had to present himself with excuses before Iskandar when the campaign came to grief ('*Abdallāh Khān bih pīsh-i pidar āmadah 'udhr-khwāhī namūdah guftah kih "Khilāf-i farmūdah namikardam, umarā ma-rā bih ṭār-i man nagudhashtand.*").

¹⁸⁹ *ShNSh* 3497 205a–b. 'Abdallāh's elevation, like Iskandar's, was in defiance of gerontocratic practice, since at the time of his accession he was not the oldest living Abū'l-Khayrid or

sion, 'Abdallāh was able to enmesh his formal authority with the political might which he had spent much of the last two decades accumulating for himself.

'Abdallāh had been extremely active during Iskandar's reign. He had been steadily dismantling the Abū'l-Khayrid appanage system. Of the four sub-families originally appanaged by the terms of the 1511/2 *qūriltāys*, the line of Shāh Būdāq had fallen as a result of internal dissension and Jānī-Bikid pressure before 'Abdallāh even began his political activities. Of the remaining sub-families, it was the Suyūnchids who remained most threatening. Nawrūz Aḥmad's son Bābā was a gifted military leader, who on several occasions bloodied 'Abdallāh's forces.¹⁹⁰ For the time being, therefore, 'Abdallāh refrained from confronting his northern neighbours. He concentrated on undermining both the Samarqand-based Kūchkūnjīds and Pīr Muḥammad's Balkh-based line of Jānī-Bīkids, lest either party join forces with their Suyūnchid kinsmen. Only after 'Abdallāh had captured Balkh in 1573¹⁹¹ and Samarqand in 1578¹⁹² did he feel confident of marching north against the Suyūnchids. He took possession of Tashkent in late 1578, and placed it under the authority of Bābā's more amenable elder brother Darwīsh Sultan.¹⁹³ Outraged at his brother's treachery in accepting the appointment, Bābā swiftly murdered Darwīsh.¹⁹⁴ 'Abdallāh thus again marched north, this time to punish the fratricide. In late 1582, a lengthy campaign on the southern fringes of the Dasht-i Qipchāq ended with Bābā dead at the hands of 'Abdallāh's client, the Qazaq khan Tawakkul.¹⁹⁵

When 'Abdallāh formally acceded to the khalal title the following year, he had yet to send forth campaigns to Badakhshan, Kashgar, Khurāsān or Khwārazm. But there was henceforth no question as to who, and who alone, ruled Mā warā al-nahr.

Jānī-Bikid: *MB* 191 notes that his first cousin Ūzbik b. Rustam was two months his senior. *BA* 7418 386a relates that upon Iskandar's death in 1583 Ūzbik actually laid claim to the khalal title, but that his candidature was rejected.

¹⁹⁰ See e.g. *AhT* 462 and *KhT* 591, relating Bābā's 1575 victory over 'Abdallāh.

¹⁹¹ *ShNSH* 174a–196a; *AhT* 453–454; *MB* 188. For 'Abdallāh's post-1573 authority over Balkh see also *MLC* 672, where the author refers to "Abdullacan, son of king Osbeqsultan [*sic*], and king of Balkh" (*Abdullacanus, Osbeqsultani Regis filius, et Balci rex*).

¹⁹² *ShNSH* 218a–219a; *RS* 227a; *ZNM* 11a; *NZJ* 76–77. Note also *MLC* 672, as above, where the author notes how 'Abdullacan' "killed Bosacoros, and claimed the kingdom of Samarqand [...] for himself" (*Bosacoram interfecit, et Samarqandaeum regnum [...] sibi vindicavit*). It is unclear with whom the figure named 'Bosacoros' is to be identified.

¹⁹³ *RS* 294a–b; *BA* 154a; *TSR* 166b.

¹⁹⁴ *RS* 302b; *BA* 154b; *MB* 162.

¹⁹⁵ *ShNSH* 175a–184b; *RS* 344b–355b; *RR* 234a–b; *MB* 163.

Utilitarian Benefits of 'Abdallāh's Challenge: Administrative Answerability

The most obvious beneficiary of 'Abdallāh's move to replace the appanage system with a functional monarchy was 'Abdallāh himself. By eliminating the most dangerous of his Abū'l-Khayrid rivals, 'Abdallāh had entrenched himself in a position where he could enjoy the lucrative prerogatives of political authority without that danger of intra-dynastic opposition which had bedevilled his khalal predecessors. But 'Abdallāh was not the only individual to derive utility from this shift. So too did his subject population, who enjoyed the stability dividend which resulted from the reduced threat of internecine political disorder. 'Abdallāh's elimination of rivals was one step towards minimising this threat; another was his decision to replace a system of government by locally-sovereign stakeholders, each following their own autonomous interests, with a system of administrative functionaries, to be appointed and dismissed at the will of the khan.

Some of these functionaries were themselves Abū'l-Khayrid dynasts. Henceforth, their Abū'l-Khayrid identity would offer no protection if their behaviour suggested that they had ideas above their station. 'Abdallāh's cousin Ūzbek Sultan b. Rustam learned this when he attempted to acquire for himself a local court and retinue in Hīṣār after being appointed there in the mid-1570s.¹⁹⁶ Apparently disapproving of such flashy behaviour, in 1584 'Abdallāh dispatched Ūzbek instead to distant Tashkent.¹⁹⁷ 'Abdallāh was also free to remove Abū'l-Khayrid governors from authority if they were incompetent. This was the fate of 'Abdallāh's brother Dūstum. As an early instance of an Abū'l-Khayrid's inadequacy incurring the revocation of his authority, after two years of ineffectually failing to deal with the Qazaq threat Dūstum was unceremoniously relieved of the Tashkent governorship in 1584.¹⁹⁸

'Abdallāh also appointed loyal *amīrs* to gubernatorial positions over formerly autonomous appanaged lands. It is perhaps ironic that 'Abdallāh, credited by McChesney for the "repudiation of the steppe tradition",¹⁹⁹ should thus have empowered members of the Turco-Mongolian nomadic population to assume the sort of administrative prominence denied them

¹⁹⁶ *ShNSh* 3497 187b; *RR* 245a-b; *MB* 191; *TSh* 610.

¹⁹⁷ *ShNSh* 3497 236a; *RR* 249a; *MB* 191; *MatT* 86b. Ūzbek seems already to have been an object of suspicion following his attempt after Iskander's death in 1583 to claim the khalal title for himself: see above, p. 128 n. 189.

¹⁹⁸ *ShNSh* 3497 235a; *MB* 191, 215.

¹⁹⁹ McChesney, "Waqf in Balkh", 43.

for much of the sixteenth century. Whereas it was often a mark of powerful rulers in both the Ottoman and Safavid empires that they sought to curb tribal authority,²⁰⁰ ‘Abdallāh by contrast exploited it to the full, though he took measures to ensure that such authority remained answerable to himself. This represented a clear policy shift. Although Muḥammad Shibānī Khān had frequently appointed *amīrs* to administrative rule, his successors had rejected such practice. By the appanage distribution of 1511, Samarqand for instance had passed from the control of Jān Wafā Bī Naymān²⁰¹ to the Kūchkūnjids, under whom it remained until falling to ‘Abdallāh’s forces in 1578. Thereafter, though, the city soon came under amīral administration, governed successively by ‘Abdallāh’s close associates ‘Abd al-Wāsi‘ Bī and Muḥammad Bī Dūrmān,²⁰² Qul Bābā Kūkaltāsh²⁰³ and Ḥājji Bī Atāliq Qūshchī.²⁰⁴ Nor was Samarqand unusual. After its capture in 1573, the region of Andkhūd in northern Afghanistan passed from Jānī-Bikid appanage control to the gubernatorial authority first of Amīr Jūltāy Bī²⁰⁵ and then Amīr Quraysh.²⁰⁶ In the years after 1585, the south-eastern settlement of Ṭāliqān was administered by Ḥājji Bī Dūrmān²⁰⁷ and his brother ‘Iwaḍ Bī,²⁰⁸ and during the same period the former Jānī-Bikid holding of Qarshī was administered by Mullā Muḥammad Bī Tabāsh and Aqīm Ḥājji Naymān.²⁰⁹ As he did with his kinsmen, ‘Abdallāh carefully kept replacing one tribal office-holder with another, to prevent any appointee from building up local attachments which might challenge his overriding obligation to central authority as embodied in the *dīwān-i a‘lā*.²¹⁰

By replacing autonomous appanage-holders with appointed functionaries, ‘Abdallāh was able to give his administrative system a disciplinary backbone, capable of impelling his appointees to act in defiance of their own short-term interests for the sake of the greater common good. The khan

²⁰⁰ R.P. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington, 1983), 51–66; Babayan, “Abu Muslim: Victim of the Waning of the Qizilbash”, in *eadem*, *Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 121–160.

²⁰¹ *HS* II.43; *AḥT* 100.

²⁰² *ShNSh* 3497 163a.

²⁰³ *TSR* 179b; *MAṣ* 52b, *SilSal* 150a.

²⁰⁴ *ShNSh* 3497 249a; *NZJ*, 183, 185.

²⁰⁵ *ShNSh* 193a; *ShNSh* 3497 242a.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 248a.

²⁰⁷ *NZJ* 187.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 237.

²⁰⁹ *ShNSh* 3497 241b.

²¹⁰ For the term, see *MB* 214 and *BA* 110b; discussion in McChesney, “Waqf in Balkh”, 69.

scarcely possessed a true Weberian monopoly of violence, of course, but he enjoyed sufficient coercive power over his gubernatorial appointees to be assured of their compliance whenever his authority came under threat. This was the case in 1583, for instance, when the Suyūnchid dynast Mu'min Sultan started agitating against Bukharan rule in the region of Andijān. Because 'Abdallāh was in the south of the khanate at the time, he opted not to march out himself, and instead ordered several governors stationed closer to the Fergana valley to crush the uprising on his behalf. 'Abdallāh's brother Düstum hastened east from Miyānkāl, while his (2,3) kinsman Isfandiyār set out from his post at Shahrisabz and his (3,3) kinsman Suyūnch Muḥammad proceeded forth from Sāgharj.²¹¹ Together with support from the Qazaq ruler Tawakkul, they quickly expelled the rebel, who fled across the Tien Shan to Kashgar.²¹² The socio-political disorder caused by Mu'min's misbehaviour would have been much worse had 'Abdallāh not reformed the autonomous appanage system. Since military co-operation would have been merely consensual rather than mandatory, it would have been difficult for 'Abdallāh to direct the re-establishment of order from afar, and instead he himself would have had to undertake a long-range campaign. This would have been slow. It would probably also have placed a heavier burden on Andijān's agrarian economy: since troops appear rarely to have carried more than a month's provisions,²¹³ an army travelling from afar might consume them all over the course of the journey, and would need to requisition more food from the surrounding area than a locally-dispatched force which had not exhausted its supplies along the road. By reducing both the time and the widely shared logistical costs of eliminating disorder, the gubernatorial system was a marked utilitarian improvement upon the system of informal alliances which preceded it.

Utilitarian Benefits of 'Abdallāh's Challenge: Trans-Empire Traffic Flows

Individual subsistential constituencies derived particular advantage from 'Abdallāh's governmental reforms. Among these constituencies were people who construed their interests *qua* traders, pilgrims and anyone else who made it their business to travel. For much of the sixteenth century, it had been extremely difficult to move from one region within the khanate to

²¹¹ *ShNSh* 3497 200a–203a; *BA* 7418 383a. According to *ZNM* 69a, Suyūnch Muḥammad was based not in Sāgharj but in Shīrāz, near Samarqand.

²¹² *ShNSh* 3497 202a, 239b; *RR* 236b; *MB* 169–170.

²¹³ *MNB* 91; discussion in Berndt, "Organisation eines Feldzugs", 7.

another. This was in large part simply a matter of ecology, of course. Irrigation had long allowed agricultural activity to penetrate out beyond the immediate vicinity of such oasis centres as Bukhara, Samarqand and Qarshī, but for every hectare of settled land there were many more of empty wilderness. One did not have to travel far north out of the Bukhara region before entering desert,²¹⁴ for instance, and Andkhūd's agricultural hinterland abutted directly onto a fearsome sandy wasteland known as the *chūl-i zardak*.²¹⁵ Even if one zone of settled activity adjoined another, a traveller passing anywhere other than along the heavily settled course of the Zarafshān river from Bukhara to Samarqand was unlikely to proceed directly from one hinterland to the next. Travelling southeast from Bukhara to Qarshī, for instance, one came to the village of Nūndūq, which in the early fifteenth century marked the limits of the Bukharan region.²¹⁶ But one still had to traverse many miles of arid steppe before reaching Kāsān, the most north-westerly settlement in the Qarshī region.²¹⁷ Passing from Mā warā al-nahr to Khwārazm similarly involved crossing a lot of empty territory along the way. The sixteenth-century Ottoman traveller Sidī 'Alī Ra'īs tells how he made an agonising ten-day journey from the westernmost of Mā warā al-nahr's outlying settlements to Hazārasp, Khwārazm's closest entry-point:²¹⁸ for this entire period he was neither in one region nor in the other, but in a desolate *aporia* between the two.

The appanage system compounded the hardships experienced by long-distance travellers. This was most obviously the case during the inter-appanage wars from the 1540s onwards. One individual whose journey was

²¹⁴ See e.g. *MNB* 72, relating how Muḥammad Shībānī's forces, "having set out from the village of Ghijduwān in the direction of Turkistan, stopped two *farsakhs* out from Ghijduwān in a vicinity abutting on the desert, until people brought supplies of water" (*chūn az qaṣabah-yi Ghijduwān kūch bih ṣawb-i Turkistān muqarrar shud, bar dū farsakhi-yi Ghijduwān maḥalli kih bar kanār-i bādīyah ast [...] tawaqquf farmūdand tā mardumān āb bar dāshtand [...]*).

²¹⁵ *Bīyābān-i Zardak ast, wa pāyāni nadārad, wahm-i halāk ast: AṬ* (Bukhārī) 260. See also *BA* 191b and 313a and *BA/Āriyānā* 114–115. Writing in the mid-1930s, Robert Byron notes how the governor of the region described to him how "the ground is all *cooked* between here and Mazar [i.e. Mazār-i Sharīf, near Balkh]": *idem, The Road to Oxiana* (London, 1937), 279; the passage is discussed in turn in C. Sykes, *Four Studies in Loyalty* (London, 1946), 144–145. Despite its title, incidentally, Sykes' book is on a completely different subject from my own.

²¹⁶ *Nūndūq, kih sar hadd-i Bukhārā-st: AṬ* (Bukhārī) 157.

²¹⁷ Ahmedov [Akhmedov], "Manoqiblar"—"muḥim tarixiy manba" in *idem, Tarixdan Saboqlar*, 255–269 [261].

²¹⁸ *Āb-i Āmū kenārından H'ārezm'e 'azm idüp şeb ü rüz arslanlar ile şavaşup aşlā yalınuz bir kişi şu almağa qādır olmayup biñ dürlü belā ile on günde şehr-i Hezārūs'a geliniip [...]*: *MM* 136.

thus affected was the afore-mentioned Sīdī 'Alī Ra'īs, who tried to travel west from Badakhshan in order to get back home to the Ottoman Empire. While he was in Badakhshan "news arrived of hostilities between Pīr Muḥammad, khan of Balkh, and Barāq [i.e. Nawrūz Aḥmad] Khan, and the roads were dangerous", he writes, "and the regions of Qunduz, Kabādiyān, and Termez were unstable, since Pīr Muḥammad's *inīs*, that is his younger brothers, were in revolt there."²¹⁹ Prevented from moving due west, he instead had to make a long detour north to Kūlāb, whence he travelled via Shahrīsabz and Samarqand to Khwārazm.²²⁰ Internecine conflict made an already taxing journey even more difficult.

Even before such hostilities, however, travellers had suffered from the frictional inefficiencies of the appanage system. This was because each locally autonomous dynast sought to concentrate his limited investment capacities in those areas where they would yield him greatest advantage. Such areas were the local metropole, where the appanage-holder would maintain a highly visible court as a locus for patronage and self-display, as well as intensively farmed agricultural zones radiating away from the central oasis. The more distant—and generally less productive—parts of the region were of less importance. Of course, the ruler might withdraw to a remote *yaylāq* (summer pasture) or *qishlāq* (winter pasture) according to the season; many appanage territories furthermore possessed a *qurūq*, or self-contained open space, which by the sixteenth century generally served as a hunting reserve,²²¹ and functioned in times of need as a military congregation ground, its acreage offering appropriate fodder for the vast retinue of animals which accompanied a cavalry-based military campaign.²²² In general, however, local rulers were slow to assert themselves at the margins of the appanage, just as they were reluctant to distribute patronage outside their own subject territories.

This highly nucleated distribution of resources had unfortunate consequences for anyone travelling between one metropole and the next. One did not have to go far beyond city limits to see how a ruler's capacity for maintaining order began to weaken. If a local Sufi shaykh wished to avoid inter-

²¹⁹ *Belh Hān'ı Pīr Muḥammed Hān ile Baraq Hān mabeyninde 'adāvet olduḡın zikr idüip ve ol yollar muḥāḡara olup Pīr Muḥammed Hān'ün inileri ya'nı küçük qarındaşları kazaq olmaḡın Kunduz ve Kavādiyān ve Termid cānibleri fetret üzeredür.* Ibid., 128.

²²⁰ Ibid., 128–129.

²²¹ DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, 182.

²²² S.V. Dmitriev, "Sredneaziatskie kuruki v epokhu Shibanidov (po materialam XVI v.)", in *Tiurkologicheskii sbornik 2005* (2006) 143–158.

ference from the local appanage-holder he could secure virtual autonomy by moving a short distance away,²²³ much as Khwājah Aḥmad Kāsānī did by establishing himself at Dahbīd, near Samarqand,²²⁴ or Khwājah Muḥammad Islām Jūybārī at the Bukharan exurb of Chār Bakr.²²⁵ If one moved a few miles further, metropolitan rule became a very distant thing indeed. To judge from the stories told by hagiographers, bandits operated freely in the deserted interstices of the khanate, plundering hapless merchants²²⁶ and convoys.²²⁷ Hagiographies furthermore relate how people often implored Sufi saints to punish the malefactors, suggesting that rulers shrugged off responsibility for doing so themselves.²²⁸ The problem was that the appanage system allowed local rulers to exercise power for the pursuit of their own maximal self-interest, rather than with responsibilities towards a larger entity stretching beyond the immediate hinterland. As long as this remained the case, empty territories would continue to be an internal frontier, where authority lay marginalised and its virtues lay invisible.

Things changed with 'Abdallāh. Because his victory in the appanage wars assured him authority over the entire khanate, he did not see interstitial wilderness as the political frontier which it had been for his predecessors. Since it was in his interest to ensure the prosperity not just of one metropole but of its far-flung neighbours within the khanate, it was in his interest also to enable people's profitable passage from one region to the next. If goods could be sold at a higher price in one city than in another, this would increase the income accruing to the treasury from *tamghā* (sales tax).²²⁹ It was worth doing whatever was necessary to ease the profitable passage of goods, therefore, whether this meant pouncing hard on criminal bands or improving the state of roadside provisions. 'Abdallāh is particularly famous for the latter. Before his reign there did of course already exist some caravanserais, *ribāṭs*, bridges and watering-holes,²³⁰ but nineteenth-century western travellers to Central Asia noted that contemporaries attributed most such facilities to 'Abdallāh's doing.²³¹

²²³ See e.g. Papas, *Soufisme et politique*, 53.

²²⁴ *JāmM* 100a–b; *BA* 142b.

²²⁵ *RR* 22b; *Maṭṭ* 32b; Babajanov and Szuppe, *Les Inscriptions persanes de Chār Bakr*, 21–22.

²²⁶ *JāmM* 66a.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 82a, 147b.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 145a, noting a follower's request for assistance against bandits.

²²⁹ Mukminova, *Ocherki po istorii remesla*, 213.

²³⁰ E.g. *BW* 1.463, on the *ribāṭ-i Aḥmad Mirak*, near Herat; *JāmM* 111b.

²³¹ A. Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara, together with a Voyage of the Indus* (2 vols., London, 1834), I.263, II.46; N.V. Khanikoff (tr. C.A. de Bode), *Bokhara: Its Amir and its People* (London,

Many building projects of course are erroneously ascribed to 'Abdallāh:²³² though he may have restored the fifteenth-century citadel at Merv, he can hardly have built it, as some suggest.²³³ But even if many such accounts are apocryphal they nevertheless attest to the widespread belief that 'Abdallāh had been a friend to the traveller. Such a belief is supported by material from early modern sources. The *Nuskah-yi zībā-yi Jahāngīr* and the *Khayr al-bayān* relate how 'Abdallāh's post-1588 gubernatorial appointee to Herat founded *ribāṭs* in both Khurāsān and Mā warā al-nahr,²³⁴ and the *Sharaf-nāmah-yi shāhī* describes how 'Abdallāh built a *ribāṭ* and *masjid* on the road to Khuzār;²³⁵ the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*, meanwhile, relates how he ordered the construction of countless travellers' lodges, bridges and *ribāṭs*.²³⁶ By these limited projects, 'Abdallāh made the desert a little safer than it had been before.

Constituencies benefited in other ways from 'Abdallāh's conviction that the responsibilities of government extended across former appanage frontiers. When the sedentary population around Ūrā Tipah and Shāhrukhīyah experienced dearth after the fall of Samarqand in the winter of 1578–1579, 'Abdallāh provided them with grain from Bukhara.²³⁷ Such an external life-line would have been impossible under the Kūchkūnjids' previous autarkic regime. 'Abdallāh was also able to undertake larger-scale irrigational projects than had been possible for his forerunners. Individual appanage-holders had invested what they could in canal maintenance, of course, since without an irrigational infrastructure they would have been unable to secure income from agricultural tax receipts. Because it was difficult for them to mobilise money or labour from outside their own holdings, however, their investment capacities were constrained. 'Abdallāh's capacities

1845), 125, 127, 137, 140; Vámbéry, *History of Bokhara*, 294; E. Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I.70, 227, 231–232, 286–287.

²³² See e.g. A. Jumanazar, *Nasaf* (Tashkent, 2006), 102, rejecting the popular attribution of Qarshī's "Abdallāh Khan mosque".

²³³ For the citadel's fifteenth-century foundation, *ZT* II.337–340; Y. Sayan, *Türkmenistan'daki Mimari Eserler (XI–XVI. Yüzyıl)* (Ankara, 1999), 20–21, notes the erroneous attribution.

²³⁴ *NZJ* 140; *KB* 423a.

²³⁵ *ShNSh* 3497 241b.

²³⁶ *Dar binā-yi biqa'āt-i khayr chūn masājid wa khānaqāh wa madāris wa ma'ābir wa 'imārat wa ribāṭāt jihad az hadd fuzūn dāsht. Manqūl ast kih dar ayyām-i saltanat-i khūd rūzi az ustādān pūrsid kih "Adad-i 'imārat-i mā bih chand rasidah ast?" Ān mardum ba'd az muhāsabah wa shumār 'arḍ namūdand kih "Siwā-yi digar 'imārat [sic] hazār wa yak sardābah wa ribāṭ binā yaftah ast": *TMKh* 100. See similarly *TShKh* 109b (followed in turn in *TQKh* 268a).*

²³⁷ *ShNSh* 3497 162b.

were much greater, because he could transfer resources across the khanate. When he captured Ḥiṣār in 1573, for instance, he gave orders for the reconstruction of a canal system which had fallen into neglect under the previous semi-independent regime; one (admittedly partisan) chronicler relates that although the scheme employed local manpower the funding all came from the Bukharan metropole.²³⁸ The eased flow of capital enabled 'Abdallāh to pay for the irrigation of impoverished regions whose populations might never have afforded to do so themselves.

Utilitarian Benefits of 'Abdallāh's Challenge: A Centralised Resource Base

It was not just eased traffic flows which enabled 'Abdallāh to assume such responsibilities throughout the length of the khanate. It was also the massively increased resource base which he enjoyed. The *Sulūk al-mulūk* relates that it was conventional practice for newly-captured lands and heirless lands to pass as private crown property into the ruler's direct possession, for him to exploit as he saw fit.²³⁹ This may not have been entirely true, since land-purchase records indicate that for several months after 'Abdallāh's capture of Samarqand in 1578 a Kūchkūnjid princess safely held onto her family property, before selling it for her own profit to a prominent Sufi shaykh.²⁴⁰ But 'Abdallāh's 1578 victory clearly yielded him control over much of the region. In 1581 he granted the Qazaq khan control over the subsidiary territory of Khujand,²⁴¹ and he entrusted Shahrīsabz to one of his most loyal *amūrs*.²⁴² Similarly, 'Abdallāh was free to distribute land in Badakhshan after the conquest of 1584 brought this new province into his grasp.²⁴³ 'Abdallāh retained control over the lands which he did not thus hand away. He exploited some for their fiscal capacities, generating income for subsequent military operations and enabling him to adorn his court with a circle of poets and historians more distinguished than any since the days of

²³⁸ *RR* 303b–304a; see above, p. 112 n. 92.

²³⁹ *SM* 112b, 119a.

²⁴⁰ A 18 March 1579 land deed reproduced in A.A. Egani and Chekhovich, "Regesty sred-neaziatskikh aktov (s fotoproizvedeniem publikuemykh vpervye)", in *Pis'mennye pamiatniki vostoka 1976–1977* (1984), 105–110 [106–107] notes the sale of property by 'Arab Khānum bint Abū Sa'īd to Khwājah Sa'd Jūybārī.

²⁴¹ *ShNSh* 3497 167a.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 234a. The *amīr* in question was Qanbar Bī, a veteran of the Sayrām and Badakhshan campaigns (*ibid.*, 171b, 214b).

²⁴³ *ShNSh* 221a; *RR* 284a; *MaṭT* 83a–b.

Muḥammad Shībānī or ‘Ubaydallāh. Other lands, by contrast, ‘Abdallāh relinquished, in order to establish *waqfs*, or trust funds, for the endowment of such large-scale construction and irrigation projects described above.

The institution of *waqf* had long been the key mechanism for allowing large-scale euergetism in the Islamic world.²⁴⁴ A ruler could convert his *khāṣṣah* lands into *waqf* in order to generate funds for building and endowing a *madrasah*, say, just as a taxpayer might convert any fiscally immune *milk* property for this purpose. The virtue of establishing such a fund was that it was guaranteed for perpetuity by Islamic law. A donor knew that his property would remain free from appropriation or re-allocation for as long as its income could guarantee the *madrasah*'s maintenance. Although *waqf* properties were occasionally re-allocated,²⁴⁵ this was a less frequent practice in Central Asia than in post-Mamlūk Cairo²⁴⁶ or among the Safavids.²⁴⁷ Consequently, it was by no means uncommon for a fifteenth-century foundation still to be flourishing four centuries later, as the Russians advanced into the region.²⁴⁸ When endowing mosques in Bukhara²⁴⁹ or *madrasahs* in Balkh²⁵⁰ and Qarshi,²⁵¹ therefore, ‘Abdallāh was providing for posterity. He was also looking to rival the legacy of such individuals as ‘Ubaydallāh Aḥrār²⁵² or Aḥmad Kāsānī, Aḥrār's early-sixteenth-century successor.²⁵³ Both shaykhs had been extremely wealthy, and used their wealth to establish large-scale *waqf* foundations funding such social provisions as mosques, caravanserais and bath-houses.

²⁴⁴ M.F. Köprülü, "Vakıf Müessesesinin Hukukî Mahiyeti ve Tarihi Tekâmülü", in *Vakıflar Dergisi* 2 (1942), 1–36.

²⁴⁵ See e.g. *NZJ* 25, noting how after 1578 ‘Abdallāh financed the reconstruction of various buildings in Samarqand by appropriating *waqf* revenue from the *Gūr-i Amīr* (for which latter see below, pp. 227, 234–235).

²⁴⁶ D. Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt's Adjustment to Ottoman Rule—Institutions, Waqf and Architecture in Cairo (16th and 17th Centuries)* (Leiden, 1994), 153–158.

²⁴⁷ *DM*, 16–17; S.R. Shatzmiller, "Islamic Institutions and Property Rights: the Case of the 'Public Good' Waqf", in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 44 (2001), 44–74 [60].

²⁴⁸ Gross, "The *Waqf* of ‘Ubayd Allāh Aḥrār in Nineteenth Century Central Asia: A Preliminary Study of the Tsarist Record", in E. Özdalga (ed.), *Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia* (Istanbul, 1999), 47–60.

²⁴⁹ Davidovich, *Istoriia denezhnogo obrashcheniia*, 286, citing *waqf-nāmāhs* held as TsGIA UzSSR I.323, op.1 no. 1,24/1, 55/69.

²⁵⁰ McChesney, "Waqf in Balkh and Bukhara in the 2nd half of the 11th/17th century—political, social and economic aspects", in *Hamdard Islamicus* 12 (1989), 39–56 [52].

²⁵¹ Jumanazar, *Nasaf*, 136.

²⁵² Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty, passim*.

²⁵³ No Kāsānid *waqf-nāmāh* survives: Babajanov, "Biographies of Makhдум-i A'zam al-Kasani al-Dahbidi, *Shaykh* of the 16th-century Naqshbandiya", in *Manuscripta Orientalia* 5,2 (1999), 3–8 [7]. Note however passing reference to endowments in Egani and Chekhovich, "Regesty sredneaziatskikh aktov", 106–107.

Few of 'Abdallāh's predecessors had been able to establish endowments on anything like this scale. Ahrār and his descendents owned land as far-afield as Tashkent and Kabul, and in 1546 the Ahrāri family was able to convert much of this into a single *waqf* foundation.²⁵⁴ Such an endowment would have been impossible for any contemporary Abū'l-Khayrid. Although Muḥammad Shībānī's landholdings had been extensive—his widow created a *waqf*-foundation with lands extending from Samarqand to Qarshī²⁵⁵—the creation of the appanage system thereafter confined people's holdings to a single region, thus limiting the territory which they could afford to give over for charitable purposes. Over the course of the sixteenth century, appanage-holders found it ever more difficult to establish *waqf* foundations, since by alienating their lands they were irrevocably reducing their limited tax base. They found it difficult to undertake large-scale euergetic projects at the same time as maintaining their own autonomous courts. Arguments *ex silentio* are dangerous, but it is worth observing that the last Kūchkūnjid known to have founded charitable endowments in Samarqand was thus 'Abd al-Laṭīf,²⁵⁶ after whose death in 1552 it may have been too expensive for his successors Sulṭān Sa'īd or Jawānmard 'Alī to follow suit; nor are any Suyūnchid endowments attested in Tashkent after the mid-1560s.²⁵⁷ But endowment records proliferate for the period of 'Abdallāh's reign, as the khan began establishing *waqfs* across the empire. Nor was 'Abdallāh himself alone in undertaking such projects. Several of his gubernatorial representatives similarly established their own *waqf* foundations.²⁵⁸ People could afford to act thus because of the sumptuary restrictions which 'Abdallāh seems to have placed upon them:²⁵⁹ with local metropolises no longer the centre of courtly patronage which they had been under the appanage system, more money was available for social provisions instead.

²⁵⁴ Dale and A. Payind, "The Ahrāri *Waqf* in Kābul in the Year 1546 and the Mughūl Naqshbandiyyah", in *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 119 (1999), 218–233.

²⁵⁵ Mukminova, *K istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii v Uzbekistane XVI v. po materialam "Vakf-name"* (Tashkent, 1966), 103–224.

²⁵⁶ Passing attestation in *MA* 111a; Egani and Chekhovich, "Regesty sredneaziatskikh aktov", 106–107.

²⁵⁷ The last known Suyūnchid endowment was made around this time by Darwish b. Nawrūz Ahmad: see Davidovich, *Korpus zolotykh i serebrianykh monet Sheibanidov*, 159.

²⁵⁸ McChesney, "Economic and Social Aspects of the Public Architecture of Bukhara in the 1560's and 1570's", in *Islamic Art* 2 (1987), 217–241 [232, 237].

²⁵⁹ *TSh* 610 (see above, p. 130 n. 196).

'Abdallāh and Clientelist Loyalty

There is always disagreement between advocates of centralisation and localisation as to which secures more efficient governmental rule. Were populations in early modern Central Asia to conceive of their interests *qua* members of subsistential constituencies, however, they should have had little doubt as to the merits of centralised government. A quorum of people clearly derived practical advantage from 'Abdallāh's centralising policies. Benefit accrued from the fact that such policies allowed 'Abdallāh better to perform those roles of euergetist, guarantor and co-ordinator which subsistential constituencies had reason to value. By assuming monopolistic authority, 'Abdallāh was able to provide a range of paternalistic services which had previously been impossible due to the inefficiencies of the appanage system, and furthermore to direct these services with greater acuity to where they were most needed. A centralised resource base facilitated a re-distributional system, and thus helped to urge tribal solidarity. And by co-ordinating regional administration 'Abdallāh was able to increase aggregate welfare, escaping the impasse which had attended the appanage system by impelling his appointees to act in contravention of their immediate short-term interests to the greater common good.

Thirty years previously, the khal title had been a familial honorific. 'Abdallāh's career invested the title with meaning and value. The khal office now mattered: and it also mattered to whom it devolved. Thanks to 'Abdallāh's career, khal authority was now too important to fall into the hands of somebody unqualified to exercise it. This was of clear significance for the events of 1599. It was not simply because Pir Muḥammad proved to be a *bad ruler* that people's clientelist loyalties impelled them to become imperial rebels in the Samarqand showdown. More particularly, it was because recent experience in the late sixteenth suggested to Bāqī Muḥammad's supporters that they *were entitled to a better ruler than the present khal*. Somebody else could do better. At the Samarqand showdown, Bāqī Muḥammad was the beneficiary of disappointed expectations. But how long would it be before he, in turn, became their victim?

CHAPTER THREE

INERTIAL LOYALTY

According to the mid-eighteenth-century *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*, Bāqī Muḥammad's victory over the little-loved Pīr Muḥammad was a source of celebration for all. The work claims that Bāqī Muḥammad received a true hero's reception when he arrived in Bukhara soon after the battle.

When with victory and triumph Bāqī Muḥammad Khan drew close to the city of Bukhara, the local grandees and eminences and the people of that country both great and humble joyfully welcomed him in. And at the auspicious moment, with all favourable auguries, that world-conquering khan entered the city. And in the year 1009 AH¹ he took his place on the throne of authority and government.²

No earlier source offers quite so delirious an account of Bāqī Muḥammad's Bukharan arrival.³ Nor is it entirely clear what Bāqī Muḥammad's supposed accession around this time to 'the throne of authority and government' actually amounted to. Like Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm, a number of authors suggest that upon his arrival in Bukhara Bāqī Muḥammad was formally enthroned in regnal authority.⁴ On the basis of several other sources,

¹ As before (see above, p. 59 n. 113), Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm seems to have got his chronology out here by a year. Almost all other sources date both the showdown and Bāqī Muḥammad's subsequent arrival in Bukhara to 1008 (24 July 1599–12 July 1600). See above, p. 91 n. 1, and below, p. 142 n. 5.

² *Chūn Bāqī Muḥammad Khān bā fath wa firūzī nazdik bih shahr-i Bukhārā rasīd a'yan-i mamlakat wa arkān-i saltanat wa shighār wa kibār-i ān diyār bih istishār-i tamām istiqbāl namūdah bih s'ati-yi sa'īd wa fālī-yi humāyūn ān khān-i gītī-satān bih shahr dar amadah bih tārikh-i hazār wa nuh-i hijri [...]* bar sarīr-i saltanat wa jahānbānī julūs farmūdah [...]: *SilSal* 161b.

³ TĀĀ'A 594, from which Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm derives his afore-cited account, gives a mildly more sober version of events: *ashraf wa a'yan bih marāsim-i istiqbāl isti'jāl namūdah ādāb-i kurnish wa tahniyat bih zuhūr āwurdand wa khidmatash bih 'azamat wa kāmrāni qadam dar baldah-yi Bukhārā nihādah [...]*.

⁴ See e.g. TĀ 183, relating Bāqī Muḥammad's elevation on 20 Šafar 1008 (11 September 1599) upon Bukhara's *masnad-i saltanat-i jahānbānī*; TĀĀ'A 593, on Bāqī Muḥammad's elevation *dar takhtgāh-i Abdallāh Khān bar sarīr-i jahānbānī*; and NZJ 179, on how in 1008 Bāqī Muḥammad was elevated upon the *takht-i pādishāhī*. As noted above (p. 90 n. 249), 'AŠ I.304 relates how upon reaching Bukhara Bāqī Muḥammad acceded to the *masnad-i hukūmat*, but notes that he then chose to elevate Yār Muḥammad to regnal authority.

however, it seems more likely that Bāqī Muḥammad, like his brother Dīn Muḥammad before him, disavowed the khalid title in favour of a senior family member, possibly to be identified as his father Jānī Muḥammad⁵ but more probably his grandfather Yār Muḥammad.⁶

For various reasons, therefore, Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm's account is less than entirely trustworthy. Where the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* is at one with almost all other sources, by contrast, is in making clear that Bāqī Muḥammad's advance from Samarqand to Bukhara was an easy one. As he hurried west after his victory over Pīr Muḥammad in the Samarqand showdown, Bāqī Muḥammad was lucky enough to meet little concerted opposition along the way. Events allowed him swiftly to capitalise upon a victory which might easily have proved just a one-off. In the present chapter, I want to consider why this should have been the case.

⁵ Morley 162 31a, noting how in 1008 (24 July 1599–12 July 1600) Bāqī Muḥammad “issued the *khuṭbah* in the name of his father Jānī Khān” (*khān khuṭbah bih nām-i pidar-i khūd Jānī Khān khwānd*); Maṭṭ 121a, relating how at some unspecified point “Bāqī Muḥammad sat his father Jānī Muḥammad on the regnal throne” (*Bāqī Muḥammad pidar-i khūd Jānī Muḥammad-rā dar masnad-i pādīshāhī nashānid*).

⁶ TMQ 554b, noting how “once Bāqī Khan was done with battle, he set off and, having arrived in Bukhara, sat on the regnal throne and issued the *sikkah* and *khuṭbah* in the name of his grandfather Yār Muḥammad Khan” (*Bāqī Khān chūn az jang fārigh shud, ilghār kardah bih Bukhārā dar āmadah bar sarīr-i saltanat nishastah sikkah wa khuṭbah-rā bih nām-i Yār Muḥammad Khān jadd-i khūd khwānd*). See also PN 1.218, recording that “Bāqī Muḥammad placed [Yār Muḥammad] on that country's throne of government, and issued the *khuṭbah* and *sikkah* in his name” (*Bāqī Muḥammad Khān ū-rā bar masnad-i ḥukūmat-i ān mulk mutamakkin sākhtah sikkah wa khuṭbah bih nām-i ū kard*); the passage is substantially repeated in 'AṢ 1.305. In the *Baḥr al-asrār*, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī tells a more complicated story. He relates, f. 61b, how, after the death of Pīr Muḥammad, “the blessings of god's favour and of regnal authority were re-animated by Yār Muḥammad Khan, and Mā Warā al-nahr came fully under his family's rule” (*mu'āwanat-i iltāf-i allāhī wa mayāmin-i tawwajjuhāt-i shahānshāhī ya'ni khaqān-kār agāh wa khusraw bih intibāh-i Yār Muḥammad Khān bin Manqishlāq Khān, mamlakat-i mawfūr al-surūr-i madhkūr bih dastūr-i istiqlāl wa istikmāl dar ḥiṭah-yi taṣarruf-i awliyā-yi dawlat-i īn dūdmān dar āmad*). But he notes, f. 61a, that Yār Muḥammad recused himself from the position of titular ruler (*ihṭirāz wa ijtināb-i khaqān-i 'ālī-janāb Yār Muḥammad Khān ibn Manqishlāq Khān az marāsīm-i saltanat-i šūrī*), and that Jānī Muḥammad was elevated on the throne in his place (*Jānī Muḥammad Khān-rā bar sarīr-i 'izzat wa masnad-i saltanat ijlās farmūd*) (*ibid.*, 61b). As Burton observes (“Who Were the First Ashtarkhānid Rulers of Bukhara?”, 484), Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī's account leaves it unclear how long Yār Muḥammad exercised formal authority before stepping aside. See however 'AṢ 1.305, claiming that Yār Muḥammad stepped down after two years, and Davidovich, *Istoriia monetnogo dela*, 12–13, who notes that in 1009 (13 July 1600–1 July 1601) coins were minted in Jānī Muḥammad's name in various cities around the khanate. For one possible explanation behind Yār Muḥammad's apparent decision to stand aside, see below, p. 176.

Following its defeat at Samarqand, Pīr Muḥammad's defeated army quickly splintered. Surviving members of 'Abd al-Amīn's expeditionary relief force retreated back to Balkh, where figures such as Shāh Khwājah Naqīb would continue to exercise influence for the next few years (see below, p. 179). Out of Pīr Muḥammad's own associates who had survived the battle, a few had withdrawn to nurse their wounds, with a view to later fighting another day. People such as Dūst Chuhrah-Āghāsī⁷ and the former conspirators Khudāy Nāzar Bī Qalmāq and Muḥammad Qulī Bī Bahrīn⁸ evidently recognised that their depleted forces were insufficient to hold out at Bukhara, and fled further west. Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī relates that Dūst Chuhrah-Āghāsī headed for Khwārazm with the supposed intention of proceeding from there to Mecca, to atone for the sins he had committed while supporting Pīr Muḥammad. Any dreams of 'atonement' came to nought, however, when the *amīr* was caught and killed along the road by a Tūqāy-Tīmūrid advance party.⁹ As for Khudāy Nāzar Bī and Muḥammad Qulī Bī, they headed for Khurāsān, where they were received by Shah 'Abbās.¹⁰ With 'Abbās' support, Muḥammad Qulī Bī would prove a persistent nuisance for the newly established Tūqāy-Tīmūrid regime over much of the next decade.¹¹ Other than Muḥammad Qulī Bī, however, very few of Pīr Muḥammad's former supporters would trouble Bāqī Muḥammad again.

Indeed, the impression which accrues is that after the Samarqand showdown several of Pīr Muḥammad's former associates instead opted to transfer their loyalties to Bāqī Muḥammad. Among these individuals was somebody called Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān. Shāh Kūchuk Bī had played an active role in elevating Pīr Muḥammad after 'Abd al-Mu'min's assassination (see above, p. 45), and subsequently proved one of Pīr Muḥammad's doughtiest supporters during the Qazaq assault on Bukhara.¹² But he

⁷ *DQ* 37b, for the participation in Pīr Muḥammad's Samarqand campaign, see also below, p. 240. For the office of *chuhrah-āghāsī* see e.g. *TĀĀ'A* 962.

⁸ Both these individuals had participated in Pīr Muḥammad's khalal elevation (see above, pp. 45–46), later helping Pīr Muḥammad defend Bukhara from Qazaq assault (*BA* 52a, 57a). Whereas Muḥammad Qulī Bī is known to have marched out with Pīr Muḥammad for the Samarqand showdown (*ibid.*, 60a), no source mentions Khudāy Nāzar Bī's participation in this campaign; he may have remained in Bukhara to oversee the city's administration.

⁹ *BA* 62a.

¹⁰ *TĀĀ'A* 598–599. Contrast with *AT* 14b, which suggests that 'Muḥammad Qulī Bī' headed to 'Abbās' court at an earlier juncture, while Dīn Muḥammad was still alive in Khurāsān. See above, p. 57 n. 105.

¹¹ *BA* 89a–90a, 96b, 184b.

¹² *Ibid.*, 57a.

evidently then submitted to Bāqī Muḥammad. This is clear because it is attested that soon after the Samarqand showdown Shāh Kūchuk Bī was serving as Bāqī Muḥammad's *amīr al-umarā*.¹³ Although the date of his submission is unknown, it is unlikely to have occurred before the showdown. It is unlikely because Shāh Kūchuk Bī's name is missing from any account of Bāqī Muḥammad's Samarqand line-up.¹⁴ Authors such as Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī were clearly sympathetic to the memory of Shāh Kūchuk Bī,¹⁵ and if the *amīr* had played any part in Bāqī Muḥammad's victory, such authors would have been likely to mention it. It is likely, therefore, that only at some point subsequent to the Samarqand showdown did Shāh Kūchuk Bī transfer his attachments to Pīr Muḥammad's nemesis. The likelihood that he acted thus, and at this particular juncture of proceedings, turns our attention in this chapter to the phenomenon of what I propose to call *inertial loyalty*.

On Defection

At some point probably in late summer 1599, Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān transferred his attachment from the party of Pīr Muḥammad, the last Abū'l-Khayrid khan of Bukhara, to Bāqī Muḥammad, the man who had defeated him. One might be tempted to identify Shāh Kūchuk Bī's behaviour as 'rebellious', but this would be misleading. Given that he seems to have transferred his attachments only after Pīr Muḥammad's defeat and execution, his actions would not have carried that zero-sum cost to an established sovereign which I suggested above (p. 96) might be regarded as a criterion for rebellion. Although he was scarcely in a position to transfer loyalty away from Pīr Muḥammad's *person*, however, Shāh Kūchuk Bī did transfer loyalty away from what we might term Pīr Muḥammad's *established regime*.

By an 'established regime', I refer to *the disposition of politico-military power with which a ruler is associated, but from which he remains distinct*. Rulers might outlive particular regimes,¹⁶ and regimes might outlive par-

¹³ TSR 207b.

¹⁴ Although BA 60a mentions a 'Kūchuk Atāliq' among Bāqī Muḥammad's supporters at the Samarqand showdown, this figure is clearly identified in TMQ 557a as an individual distinct from Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān.

¹⁵ E.g. BA 88b, in the context of his subsequent murder (see below, pp. 247–248).

¹⁶ See e.g. Aubin, *Émirs mongols et vizirs persans dans les remous de l'acculturation* (Paris, 1995), 41–42, for the fall of the Juwaynī-dominated regime during the reign of Arghūn Khan

ticular rulers.¹⁷ Pīr Muḥammad's regime might have survived him, had his associates retained group solidarity after his death. Even after the defeat at Samarqand, individuals such as Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān might have secured the elevation of a pliant successor, under whom the regime might have attempted to resist the Tūqāy-Timūrid assault. But this did not happen. Rather than trying to preserve the regime in summer 1599, certain former supporters of Pīr Muḥammad instead helped to terminate it. They did so by jumping ship. That is to say, they *defected*.

For the concept of 'defection' to be of any analytical value, it requires some precision in its application. In the present chapter, I want to consider how figures such as Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān influenced the course of the takeover by 'defecting' from Pīr Muḥammad's established regime to Bāqī Muḥammad's rival disposition of power. But the actions of Muḥammad Qulī somewhat complicate this story. On the face of it, Muḥammad Qulī's flight to Khurāsān would seem to constitute a textbook instance of defection, complete with its conventional connotations of movement across a geopolitical frontier. But there was an important distinction between Muḥammad Qulī's behaviour and that of Shāh Kūchuk Bī. Shāh Kūchuk Bī's behaviour directly helped those Tūqāy-Timūrid interlopers who overthrew the former regime, whereas Muḥammad Qulī's behaviour did not. In order to accord some semantic specificity to such clearly differing modes of action, it may be useful to propose a distinction between

- (a) *defection*, namely the zero-sum realignment of one's interests and resources away from an established regime towards an *oppositional regime* either inside the polity or outside it, which is committed to the established regime's overthrow, and
- (b) *desertion*, namely the non-zero-sum realignment of one's interests and resources away from an established regime towards a territorially external *alternative regime* which is not committed to the established regime's overthrow.

According to this distinction, Shāh Kūchuk Bī's behaviour constituted defection, since the recipient of his loyalty transfer was committed to overthrowing Pīr Muḥammad's established regime. By contrast, Muḥammad

(1284–1291); also Subtelny, "Centralising Reform and its Opponents in the Late Timurid Period", in *Iranian Studies* 21 (1988), 123–159, for shifting regimes during the reign of Husayn Bayqarā (1460–1506).

¹⁷ Thus e.g. regime continuity from the reign of Iskandar to the reign of 'Abdallāh II.

Qulī's behaviour constituted 'desertion'. His flight to Isfahan did not constitute an act of violence against the established Abū'l-Khayrid regime. That this is so reflects the circumstances of the moment. During the existential struggles of the sixteenth century (see above, p. 51, and elsewhere), the Safavid court had represented an 'oppositional regime' towards the Abū'l-Khayrid established regime, and successive shahs had aspired to eliminating their Abū'l-Khayrid opposites. With the events of 1599, however, partisans of Pīr Muḥammad's established regime saw the Safavid court shift from oppositional regime to 'alternative regime', as 'Abbās reconsidered his policies in the light of Bāqī Muḥammad's Samarqand victory. Success at Samarqand and Bukhara rendered the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds' formerly oppositional and now established regime a circumstantially greater danger to Safavid interests than the formerly established and now oppositional Abū'l-Khayrid regime was. 'Abbās thus

- (a) no longer had cause to seek the *elimination* of the now oppositional Abū'l-Khayrid regime, and
- (b) had active cause to seek the *restoration* of this Abū'l-Khayrid regime—or at least biddable version of this regime—as an effective means of counterbalancing or eliminating the more salient threat presently coming from the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds.

As we shall see, desertion by the likes of Muḥammad Qulī helped prompt 'Abbās to take action against the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds as *champion of the Abū'l-Khayrid cause*. This was doubtless as the deserters hoped. With a formerly-oppositional regime established in authority, a formerly-established regime in abeyance and an alternative regime both strong and well-inclined, anyone identifying his welfare with the maintenance or recreation of a pre-1599 disposition of power would have regarded desertion as the best means of achieving this goal.

By transferring their attachment from one party to another, figures such as Shāh Kūchuk Bī were effectively offering their *conditional submission*. Descriptions of other such instances suggest that this process would have involved the enactment of

- (a) submission, whereby the submitting party formally offered its abasement before the submitted-to party,¹⁸ and

¹⁸ E.g. RR 244a: 'Āshiq Mughūl Bāshligh, governor of Qunduz, formally submitted to Bukharan forces during 'Abdallāh's 1584 southeastern offensive.

- (b) conditionality, whereby the submitting and submitted-to parties established, by means of mutual oaths and entreaties ('*ahd wa paymān wa sawgand-i Qur'ān*¹⁹), what each of them were supposed to get out of the submitting party's act of submission.

Of course, in many instances 'conditional submission' was tantamount to 'surrender', and 'conditionality' secured the submitting party little more than a tenuous promise of survival. Parties under siege thus often offered their conditional submission as a damage-limiting exercise, when there was no other expedient to prevent the siege from entering its destructive endgame (see above, pp. 99–102). But Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān presumably had a range of alternative choices available to him at the time he defected; he could, for instance, have followed Muḥammad Qulī Bī's example by deserting to Shah 'Abbās' alternative regime after the battle. Instead, he freely defected to Bāqī Muḥammad's oppositional regime. In this chapter, I argue that Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān defected because the information available to him suggested that it was worth his while to do so.

On Inertial Loyalty

The fact that Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān defected to Bāqī Muḥammad suggests that he felt no submissive sense of 'inertial loyalty' towards Pīr Muḥammad's established regime. By 'inertial loyalty', I refer to a consequentialist mode of behaviour, conceptualised most easily according to what in chapter 2 I briefly referred to as 'the rational-choice argument'.²⁰ The rational-choice argument holds that individuals act in whatever way they calculate to be most likely to maximise their own material utility. At its simplest, it predicts that a rational actor will adopt a particular course of action if the information available to him suggests that the probable utility of his doing so is greater than the probable utility of his not, or, expressed mathematically, that

¹⁹ E.g. *AḥT* 453, telling how Dīn Muḥammad b. Pīr Muḥammad sought assurances when he submitted Balkh to 'Abdallāh in 1573: *ākhir al-amr Tinīm ba'd az 'ahd wa paymān wa sawgand-i Qur'an az qal'ah-yi Handawān bīrūn āmadah [...]*. (Handawān was the name given to Balkh's citadel.) Conspirators might similarly offer one another '*ahd wa paymān*': thus *ShNSh* 3497 249a, in the context of a Tashkent-centred conspiracy in 1587–1588 (see below, pp. 197–198).

²⁰ M. Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA, 1965).

$(P(p)) > (1 - P(l))$, where

- (a) p is the value of the anticipated *payoff* accruing from successful action,
- (b) l is the value of the anticipated *loss* incurred by unsuccessful action, and
- (c) P is the probability of the action achieving success.²¹

If it is true of two distinct courses of behaviour that in each case the probable utility of action is greater than that of inaction, meanwhile, the argument predicts that a rational actor is likely to adopt whichever course of action generates a higher probable utility value, expressed mathematically as

$$(P(p)) - (1 - P(l)).$$

Proceeding from this point, one may conceive of an actor's inertial loyalty to some established regime as his rational response to the probabilistic calculation that

- (a) the *actual utility* which he expects to continue deriving as a *stakeholder* within that multi-personal disposition of material welfare, or *status quo*, presently obtaining under the established regime

is greater than

- (b) the *probable utility* which he might expect to derive as a stakeholder in whatever counterfactual status quo he might bring about by realigning himself from an established regime towards an oppositional one.

In turn, one may construe the *force* of the actor's inertial loyalty as a function of the *utility differential* between actual utility (a) and probable utility (b). As the differential value of ((a)—(b)) increases, so too should the rational actor's inertial attachment to the established regime. As (a) tends towards (b), the force of this inertial attachment should decrease. *Ceteris paribus*, should (a) < (b) one would expect the rational actor to defect, thereby sowing the seeds for a new inertial attachment to the new recipient of his loyalty.

The concept of rational choice has of course been widely criticised. Many authors suggest that it offers a fallacious, insufficient or merely tautological

²¹ These calculations are discussed in somewhat greater detail—and, I should admit, with somewhat greater mathematical rigour—in e.g. N. Olsson-Yaouzis, "Revolutionaries, Despots, and Rationality", in *Rationality and Society* 22 (2010), 283–299 [286].

means of accounting for human behaviour.²² In a similar vein, one might reasonably object that my proposed conception of inertial loyalty is a somewhat impoverished one, failing as it does to consider how people's norms and convictions may help determine their interpersonal attachments. That such an ideal-type offers an imperfect model for political behaviour need not mean, however, that it thereby offers a wholly unhelpful one. Indeed, I suggest that the notion of inertial loyalty offers some useful insights into the striking volatility of political attachments around the time of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover, as actors aligned and realigned themselves to an extent to which they had rarely done so during the previous hundred years.

As thus conceptualised, inertial loyalty is manifestly the most contingent of all the loyalty types conceptualised in this book. Unlike the case with other loyalty types, the recipient of inertial loyalty is not a particular ruler but a regime. Whereas actors may attribute to the recipient of their charismatic or clientelist loyalties some intrinsic worth attendant on the fact of who this recipient is, or what he is capable of achieving, their inertial loyalty towards a regime reflects a perception not that this regime is necessarily in any way 'good', but simply that supporting it is a circumstantially-better option than the alternatives. That is, at moment (x) the loyal actor recognises nothing intrinsic to the recipient regime to militate for ongoing attachment at moment ($x+1$), should an intervening utility shift instead urge a shift in behaviour. Economists neatly convey the contingency of inertial attachments when they use the term in the context of brand loyalty. A customer displaying 'inertial loyalty' is one whose repeat purchase of a particular brand is motivated by the perception "that choosing this particular brand is less risky than buying another one [...] *without any care for the brand itself*".²³ Should the customer then receive information causing him to recalibrate the utility differential between actual and counterfactual status quos—assurance that the P -derived risk to buying an alternative brand is minimal, for instance—nothing about the original brand would argue for maintaining his original purchasing pattern. The dramatic events of 1599 offer a clear account of what may happen when information

²² For a critique of narrowly conceived rational choice theory, see e.g. Mansbridge, "The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life", in *eadem* (ed.), *Beyond Self-Interest*, 3–22 [9].

²³ A. Amin, "Consumers' True Brand Loyalty: The Central Role of Commitment", in *Journal of Strategic Marketing* 6.4 (1998), 305–319 [310] (my italics).

encourages hitherto inertially-loyal stakeholders in a status quo to re-assign new utility values to presently-actuated and counterfactual courses of action.²⁴

Inertia, Stability and Risk

In later sections of this chapter, I shall try to use this 'differential-function' idea of inertial loyalty to help explain the shifting dynamics of political attachment which attended the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover. Before that, however, we might do well first to consider how the formulation helps explain the relative stability of political attachment for much of the century prior to the events in question. In the last chapter, I noted that manifestations of the behavioural category termed 'rebellion' were strikingly uncommon in early modern Central Asia (p. 120). One might also note that manifestations of the larger behavioural group comprising 'defection' were strikingly uncommon as well. An obvious contrast presents itself here with the Ottoman Empire. As compared with people in the Ottoman Empire, populations in early modern Central Asia were notably reluctant to realign themselves alongside bandit chiefs to challenge an established ruling regime,²⁵ and they seem to have been less attracted to the counterfactual promises offered by antinomian or millenarian religious sects.²⁶ More tentatively, the absence of that genre of social-diagnostic literature which proliferated in the cosmopolitan literary milieu of Istanbul²⁷ suggests that populations in early modern Central Asia were somewhat less concerned than their Ottoman contemporaries even to think about improving upon imperfect reality. *Pace* the assumptions of some doctrinaire exponents of rational choice,²⁸ any actor may quite rationally decide that the knowledge of holding a reasonable hand of cards makes it more sensible to stick even with a sub-optimal

²⁴ Much of my thinking in what follows has been informed by studies into the dynamics of regime change in the modern world: note particularly S. Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Information Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991", in *World Politics* 47 (1994), 42-101.

²⁵ For early 17th-century Celali uprisings in the Ottoman Empire, see e.g. S. Faroqi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699", in H. İnalcık and D. Quartaert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1994), II.411-636 [414-419].

²⁶ Karamustafa, *God's Unruly Friends*, *passim*.

²⁷ P. Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th-17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes", in *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 40 (1986), 217-240; for analogies, see J.H. Elliott, "Self-Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth-Century Spain", in *Past and Present* 74 (1977), 41-66.

²⁸ For a strong example of which, see S.L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley, 1979).

state of affairs than to take the risk of initiating uncertain change. Populations in early modern Central Asia seem to have been strongly disposed towards such cautious behaviour.

If one conceptualises political behaviour in terms of utility differentials, one may begin to explain the 'conservatism' of stakeholder constituencies in early modern Central Asia with the observation that the attribution of utility values to payoff and loss is innately subjective. For instance, somebody who values his life and the lives of his loved ones is liable to ascribe to the prospect of his and their deaths a consequential disutility value outweighing the utility that might accrue as a material payoff for some counterfactual course of action. For the moment, one may divide the risks involved in defection into three categories. The first is the risk of incurring a *punitive cost* at the hands of the established regime, should one's act of defection prove insufficient for the oppositional regime to establish itself in power, and instead simply be deemed a crime against the ruling establishment. The second is the risk of incurring what may be termed an *uncertainty cost*. People in early modern Central Asia often feared undermining even an imperfect or unpopular regime, lest by weakening or replacing this regime they caused a presently sub-optimal status quo to be replaced by some even worse counterfactual disposition. Even were actors confident of their defection replacing a sub-optimal regime with a better one, meanwhile, they might still fear incurring an attendant *transaction cost*. By 'transaction costs', I refer to some of the likely short-term frictional by-products of political shift. Factional violence between adherents of the old and the new might be one such by-product; another might be economic disorder, resulting from disturbance to the money supply caused by a newly-established ruler's releasing newly-minted coinage.²⁹

To illustrate the fear of such risks, one may consider the behaviour of the fifteenth-century Naqshbandī shaykh Khwājah 'Ubaydallāh Aḥrār. Aḥrār bitterly criticised successive Timūrid sultans for failing to observe religious convention,³⁰ and he accused them of making excessive demands upon the agrarian population.³¹ But when Sultan Aḥmad's rule came under threat

²⁹ For the consequences of monetary disorder, see e.g. Jenkinson, 85–86; *UN* 137b–141a, with discussion in Davidovich, *Istoriia monetnogo dela*, 135–142.

³⁰ *S'Ā* 68a–b (criticising Ulugh Bik); also *M'UA* 221 (criticising *izhār-i bī-ī'tiqādī-yi ba'dī salāṭīn wa 'adam-i inqiyād-i īshān*), and 237 (criticising *ba'dī salāṭīn kih dar bāb-i ri'ayat-i aḥkām-i shar'iah musāhil-and, wa āthār-i ihtimām bih ri'ayat-i shar'iat az umarā-yi īshān wa mulāzimān zāhir nist*).

³¹ *Bih taqrīb-i zulm wa ta'addī-yi salāṭīn wa ḥukkām mīfarmūdand: "Ḥukkām bih mat-hābah-yi tāziyānah-and. īshān barā-yi ta'dīb-i ra'āyā-yi musulmūn ḥākim-and. Yak asb bīst*

from Aḥmad's own brother Maḥmūd, Aḥrār angrily denounced the interloper. He claimed that it was wrong for brothers to fight one another,³² and made clear that he would have nothing to do with Maḥmūd. Aḥrār thus displayed an inertial attachment towards Aḥmad's regime, despite seeing little intrinsic worth in the fact of who Aḥmad was, or what Aḥmad was capable of achieving. Regardless of the lofty ideals which he cited, Aḥrār seems to have been at least partly motivated by the perception that support for Maḥmūd's actions would threaten the present disposition of material welfare in Samarqand.³³ If Aḥrār and people like him defected, their behaviour would either

- (a) fail to remove Aḥmad from power, but simply incur punishment for themselves *qua* rebels,
- (b) weaken Aḥmad's regime, and with it the regime's already-limited capacity to provide such public goods as the defence of Mā warā al-nahr from northern nomads,³⁴ thus creating a new status quo which in utilitarian terms would be even less optimal than the present one,

or

- (c) help Maḥmūd overthrow Aḥmad's regime and replace it with one of his own, thus incurring
 - a. uncertainty (in the absence of further information) as to whether Maḥmūd's new regime would be better or worse at providing the afore-mentioned goods,

and

- b. the likely transaction costs attendant on this shift.

One did not need to be a devoted acolyte of Aḥmad to recognise that, *ceteris paribus*, continued inertial loyalty was preferable to any of these options.

There are several reasons why early modern Central Asia should have been a markedly risk-averse environment. The work of James C. Scott may

tāziyānah-rā kuhnah wa tāsīdah mīsāzad.: *M'UA* 254. See also Paul, "Forming a Faction", particularly 535, and J.M. Rogers, "Aḥrār", in *EIr* 1 (1984), 667-670 [668].

³² "Tīgh bar rū-yi barādar-i khūd kashīdan chih munāsib az mulāzīmān-i ḥadrat-i shumāst?": *M'UA* 304. See also *R'AH* 528-535.

³³ *M'UA* 304. For people's wider tendency to invoke norms when justifying actions undertaken in pursuit of self-interest, see H. Neveux and E. Österberg, "Norms and Values", in P. Blickle (ed.), *Resistance, Representation, and Community* (Oxford, 1997), 155-215 [156-157].

³⁴ For the danger of fifteenth-century Uzbek attack, see e.g. *MKA* 54, *R'AH* 611-612 (both also cited above, p. 110 n. 82).

help account for people's fear of uncertainty costs. Scott observes that small-scale agriculturalists—such as those comprising the bulk of early modern Central Asia's agrarian population—tend naturally to prefer the maintenance of a predictably sub-optimal established status quo to its replacement with an uncertain alternative.³⁵ Agriculturalists act thus because they know that the promise of any advantage from improved conditions will be outweighed by the threat of much greater disadvantage should circumstances instead deteriorate.³⁶ Surplus (that is, anything more than that needed for bare subsistence consumption, elementary commodity exchange and assessed fiscal contribution) may be good: but its per-unit utility is less than the per-unit disutility of shortfall (that is, the measure by which output fails to meet those basic requirements). Should a local farmer in early modern Central Asia enjoy a small surplus one year, the value of that surplus would probably thereafter depreciate annually: stored crops would spoil over time, and any capital from their sale would lose its worth at the rate of inflation.³⁷ A good yield one year therefore could not compensate for a correspondingly bad one the year after. The greater the fluctuation factor, meanwhile, the greater the disadvantage to the farmer: with the price of any commodity rising and falling in inverse ratio to its supply, a crop's per-unit value would be least when farmers in a particular community had most to sell, and greatest in those times of shortage when they had to acquire their foodstuffs from elsewhere.

Like agrarian producers, consumers in early modern Central Asia also had cause to fear uncertainty costs. This was because they too were liable to experience greater disadvantage from diminished yields than advantage from bumper crops. Many town-dwellers, for instance, suffered from the inability to accumulate surplus grain supplies for lean seasons. Some local notables could afford to maintain granaries for their own private use,³⁸

³⁵ Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, 1976), 4–5, and *passim*.

³⁶ See e.g. G. Kamanou and J. Morduch, "Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty", in S. Dercon (ed.), *Insurance Against Poverty* (Oxford, 2005), 155–175 [163].

³⁷ For inflation in early modern Central Asia, see Davidovich, *Istoriia denezhnogo obrashcheniia*, 282–287, tracing steady increases in the price of grain over the course of the sixteenth century. For inflation as a more widespread phenomenon of the period, see J.A. Goldstone, "East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China", in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30 (1988), 103–142 [106–107].

³⁸ *Matī* 76b for Jūybārid granaries in Bukhara; also *KhDzhSh*, document numbers 11, 43 and 99.

but in times of want urban residents without granaries found themselves prey to hoarders, who exploited increased demand to market their supplies at inflated prices. Of course, some wealthy shaykhs and other 'charitable' parties freely rendered up their own supplies for the needy,³⁹ but accounts of urban disorder in response to predatory price-fixing⁴⁰ suggest that such provisions had a limited impact in softening the inflationary impact of harvest shortfall. A season of cheap food offered no guarantee of protection against a season of rising prices; given the choice between maintaining a low-deviation status quo and undertaking changes which were as likely to worsen the situation as to improve it, consumers had rational grounds for choosing the former option.

Other reasons for fearing uncertainty costs may have been somewhat more specific to the circumstances of time and place. The fact that many communities in early modern Central Asia depended on an irrigational network, for instance, may have rendered people reluctant to weaken the established regime's hitherto-proven capacity for maintaining those dispositions which enabled the network to keep functioning. Actors may also have been mindful of how exiguous were the mechanisms available to them for absorbing instability's associated risks. In times of hardship, for instance, access to formal credit networks seems to have been limited. Although lenders were sometimes willing—despite Qur'anic injunctions against usury⁴¹—to advance loans at interest, sources often identify the recipients of credit as socially-prominent figures such as leading shaykhs, whose reputations may have helped provide surety.⁴² As for the hard-pressed smallholder, reciprocal communal attachments would of course always offer a lifeline of sorts: individuals in small communities rarely starve unless their neighbours starve as well. But the efficacy of other forms of extra-governmental protection were unpredictable. Although it is a trope of Sufi hagiographies that their subjects assist peasants laid low by bandits or blight (see above, p. 135, and below, p. 218 n. 164), for instance, some shaykhs in early modern Central Asia were clearly less active than others in protect-

³⁹ E.g. *BW* II.179, for the charitable activities of Khwājah Hāshimī, the Bukharan *shaykh al-islām*.

⁴⁰ Mukminova, *Ocherki po istorii remesla*, 216, for disorder in Samarqand in 1501.

⁴¹ For limits to the practical consequences of such injunctions, see e.g. N. Çagatay, "Riba and Interest Concept and Banking in the Ottoman Empire", in *Studia Islamica* 32 (1970), 54–68.

⁴² E.g. *JāmM* 160b, for a loan to the prominent Kāsānid shaykh Khwājah 'Abd al-Sāmī'; contrast however with Mukminova, *Ocherki po istorii remesla*, 168, for Qul Bābā Kūkaltāsh's loan to less prominent Samarqandi artisans.

ing their followers' interests. Several sixteenth-century Naqshbandī shaykhs may have been as wealthy and influential as Khwājah Aḥrār, for instance, but figures such as Aḥmad Kāsānī and Muḥammad Jūybārī do not appear to have assumed anything like Aḥrār's degree of paternalistic responsibility towards a population of associates. Certainly, there is no strong sixteenth-century analogy with Khwājah Aḥrār's so-called '*ḥimāyat* system', whereby Aḥrār took it upon himself to shield his followers from socio-economic hazards resulting from the shortcomings of Tīmūrid government.⁴³

Populations in early modern Central Asia may also have had particular cause to fear the transaction costs attendant on political shift. In some environments, including the Ottoman Empire, the cost of regime transaction might be minimal. This was because any attempt at establishing an oppositional regime could well come from within that very imperial court where the established regime was presently based.⁴⁴ The presence at court of various members of the ruling family offered any metropolitan actor aspiring to establish an oppositional regime a ready range of figureheads in whose name he might do so, while observation of those around him might suggest to the actor whether or not such a course of action were likely to enjoy sufficient consensual support to achieve its goal without protracted opposition. In early modern Central Asia, by contrast, court intrigue was not such a viable mechanism for low-cost regime change. Samarqand's fifteenth- and Bukhara's sixteenth-century prominence notwithstanding, Greater Mā warā al-nahr was a rather less centralised entity than the likes of the Ottoman Empire. The widespread ascription of gubernatorial or appanage authority to ruling family members meant that fewer of these members were located at an imperial court. This in turn meant that any potentially-viable successor to a presently-established ruler was proportionately more likely to come from further afield; this was the case, for instance, with the afore-mentioned Tīmūrid Sultan Maḥmūd, who at the time of his challenge to Aḥmad was governor of Ḥiṣār and Badakhshan.⁴⁵ Practical constraints to the trans-regional establishment of consensus, together with widespread tendencies towards regional partisanship (see chapter 4), meant that even 'successful' regime change might be fiercely contested. One did not have to love an established regime to recognise the wisdom of supporting it.

⁴³ Paul, "Forming a Faction", *passim*.

⁴⁴ L.P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem—Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 1993), particularly 77–79.

⁴⁵ *ShN* (Binā'ī) 121; *ZĀ* 470a–b.

Pir Muḥammad's Failure

Constituencies in early modern Central Asia generally demonstrated a presumption of loyalty towards whichever regime was currently and contingently established in power. The behaviour of Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān suggests, however, that at the very end of the sixteenth century the strength of such a presumption was much weaker than was usually the case.

One important factor was the widespread perception that Pīr Muḥammad's established regime was heavily compromised. What is significant here is not the fact that, as noted in the last chapter, Pīr Muḥammad's personal failings rendered him ill capable of providing those public goods on which the livelihoods of certain subsistential constituencies depended. Significant is rather the fact that such failings lessened the perceived likelihood of Pīr Muḥammad's regime *simply remaining in power*. Any rational actor contemplating the respective utility of

(a) ongoing attachment to Pīr Muḥammad's established regime

and

(b) defection to Bāqī Muḥammad's oppositional regime

would recognise that a reduced probability of the established regime's survival—and (in a binary system, at least) a correlatively increased probability of the oppositional regime's success—threatened to undermine or even negate the utility differential accruing from ongoing inertial attachment.

The most obvious way in which Pīr Muḥammad's personal shortcomings undermined his established regime relates to his failure to prevail upon people's clientelist loyalties. But another relates to the fact that he failed to exploit the resources available to him in order to establish a clear material advantage over potential rivals. When in summer 1598 Pīr Muḥammad was elevated upon the khal throne after 'Abd al-Mu'min's death, the sweep of his rule did not extend further than Bukhara and the adjoining regions of Miyānkāl (see above, p. 92) and Qarshī.⁴⁶ Not only were Herat, Balkh and Samarqand all under the authority of other rulers, but Pīr Muḥammad failed to impose himself in several other regions of the khanate as well. Ḥiṣār seems to have been subject to his brother Maḥmūd Sultan,⁴⁷

⁴⁶ TA 182, noting how in the run-up to the Samarqand showdown Pīr Muḥammad was able to mobilise 30,000 men from Qarshī and elsewhere.

⁴⁷ The date of Maḥmūd Sultan's 'accession' to Ḥiṣāri authority is uncertain. Maḥmūd b.

Badakhshan would remain in uproar for the next two or three years (see below, pp. 189–192), and Tashkent and the other trans-Syr Darya cities fell under the authority of Tawakkul's Qazaqs. Despite these territorial limits to his authority, though, Pīr Muammad probably ruled more of Greater Mā warā al-nahr than anyone else did: and, like Nawrūz Aḥmad in the 1550s (see above, p. 126), he could have exploited this differential to his own advantage. But he failed to do so.

With 'Abd al-Amīn weak, Pīr Muammad could have taken the opportunity to campaign first against Balkh and then against Shibarghān or Qunduz, both of which were rich in valuable pasturage but neither of which were likely to command sufficient manpower to repel a major Bukharan campaign. By such a string of campaigns, he could have given force to his pretensions to imperial suzerainty. As it was, however, Pīr Muammad displayed no intention of trying to get rid of his rivals. After all, it would take a lot of work to eradicate all these parties, and the notoriously 'ignorant'⁴⁸ Pīr Muammad was not prepared to exert himself. He settled instead for a regional condominium, whereby he and his locally established opposite numbers together might reap the fiscal benefits of regional rule. What Pīr Muammad wanted was something like the former appanage system. If he thought this was a viable long-term proposition, however, his calculations were hopelessly adrift. The post-1510 appanage regime was briefly workable because it possessed effective consensual mechanisms. By attending a *qūrlitāy*, stakeholders formally acknowledged their common cause, while the high $1/(x+y)$ consanguinity of appanage-holders briefly assured a degree of sentimental attachment and a notion of who constituted the common enemy. In 1598, consensus was much weaker. Because there was no single *qūrlitāy* in the confused wake of 'Abd al-Mu'min's death (see above, pp. 45–47), Pīr Muammad relied instead on bilateral undertakings for ensuring that fellow dynasts respected his local authority.

Amīr Walī suggests, *BA* 60a, that Maḥmūd Sultan was governing the region by 1599, relating how in that year he dispatched a Ḥiṣārī contingent to support Pīr Muammad's Samarqand campaign (see above, p. 93 n. 11). Muammad Yār Qaṭaḡhan, meanwhile, claims that 'Abd al-Amīn appointed Maḥmūd to Ḥiṣārī authority only some time after Bāqī Muammad's Samarqand victory (*MB* 212). The easiest explanation for this disparity is that in 'appointing' Maḥmūd to authority, 'Abd al-Amīn was merely acknowledging the *de facto* authority in the region which Maḥmūd already enjoyed. In the late 1580s and 1590s, Maḥmūd exercised gubernatorial authority in Ṭāliqān, to the south of Ḥiṣār across the Amu Darya (*MB* 352), and in summer 1598 he may have utilised the resources thus available to him to seize control of Ḥiṣār.

⁴⁸ *Majhul: SilSal* 150a.

When the Balkhis deferentially requested that Pīr Muḥammad recognise 'Abd al-Amīn as his junior dynast, he readily agreed.⁴⁹ If he hoped that other rulers would similarly commit themselves to maintaining the regional balance of power, however, Pīr Muḥammad was disappointed: sources mention no other such bilateral agreements. Pīr Muḥammad paid the price for this when he marched on Samarqand to meet Bāqī Muḥammad's challenge. With his authority limited to the Bukharan region, he could not mobilise support from elsewhere. As damagingly, the failure to secure broader trans-regional recognition of his Bukharan authority meant that appeals for voluntary help carried little weight. His brother Maḥmūd sent a small detachment from Ḥiṣār under the command of his son 'Abdallāh, and 'Abd al-Amīn dispatched a similarly small force from Balkh:⁵⁰ but populations elsewhere neglected to lend any assistance at all. Pīr Muḥammad's failure to match the khalid title with a corresponding hold on resources condemned him to engage in a closely-matched battle effectively fought between Bukharans and Samarqandis.

Had Pīr Muḥammad previously been more assertive, he would have been more likely to enjoy a material differential over the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid challenger. This differential would have increased the probability of his regime's survival. Benefit would not just have accrued from the actual material advantage which Pīr Muḥammad thus derived: as money begets money, so too might this material advantage have generated its own compound benefits, as people's calculations in the knowledge of this advantage led them to modify their own behaviour by ascribing a greater probabilistic utility differential to their own ongoing inertial attachment. As it was, the

⁴⁹ *Maktūb-i ikhlāṣ-āmīz bih Pīr Muḥammad niwīstah ū-rā tahniyat wa mubārakbād-i julūs-i khānī guftand wa iltimās namūdand kih 'Abd al-Amīn Khān-rā farzand-i khūd dānistah bih ṭariq-i zamān-i 'Abdallāh Khān wa 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān har yak dar maqarr-i dawlat-i khūd mutamakkin būdah bih mu'āwanat-i yak-dīgar bih dārā'ī-yi mamlakat mashghūl bāshand [...]* bih maṣlahat-i waqt inkār-i in ma'nī nakardand wa az jānib-i Pīr Muḥammad yarliḡh bih ū niwīstah farzand khū'āb kardand wa shukr-i in 'aṭiyah guftand, izhār-i bashāshat wa khurramī namūdand wa mamlakat-i 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān-rā bar ū musallam dāshtand, mashrūṭ bar ān kih Balkh bih nām-i ū sikkah nāzanad wa dar khuṭbah ism-i Pīr Muḥammad Khān-rā bar ism-i khūd muqaddam dārad: *TAA'A* 558. An abbreviated version of this passage is found in *TShKh* 110a (followed in turn in *TQKh* 268b), which similarly notes how Pīr Muḥammad undertook to respect the integrity of 'Abd al-Amīn's territorial holdings, the only proviso being that 'Abd al-Amīn should issue the *khuṭbah* in his name (*Pīr Muḥammad niz bih-d-ū musallam dāsht, shurūṭ-i ān kih dar khuṭbah ism-i ū muqaddam bāshad*).

⁵⁰ *TA* 182; see also *BA* 60a, noting that both Ḥiṣār and Balkh sent contingents of 5,000 men, under the joint command of Maṣṣūr Sultan.

decreased probability of the regime's survival meant that there was correlatively less of a material incentive to disincline Pīr Muḥammad's former supporters from defection.

Stakeholders

Among the actors most concerned at Pīr Muḥammad's failure to entrench his regime in authority were those whose support the khan could least afford to lose. As the defection of Shāh Kūchuk Bī showed, some of the very most prominent actors in Pīr Muḥammad's regime felt little inertial attachment towards the present established regime.

This was unusual. In general, prominent stakeholders in a status quo might be expected to align themselves with the established regime, since it was this disposition of power which underwrote the inequalities perpetuating their own disproportionate material welfare. Rulers often made people prominent stakeholders in a bid for their inertial loyalty. When 'Abdallāh Khan issued a *suyūrghāl* grant to the Qazaq dynast Shighāy Khan (see above, p. 113 n. 101), for instance, he was following a time-honoured practice of allocating patronage as a means of rendering the recipients' interests congruent with one's own. More generally, large-scale property-holders might have cause to seek the perpetuation of a presently-established regime, for fear lest any incoming oppositional regime abrogate their holdings. While it was rare for incumbent parties to expropriate landholdings, incoming parties frequently seized properties not protected by *waqf*-status. Muḥammad Shībānī acted thus,⁵¹ as also did 'Abdallāh in the wake of the appanage wars.⁵² Incoming parties tended to act thus because they needed to create a new re-distributional network in order to bolster themselves in authority.

Khwājah Aḥrār's status as a prominent landholder may help explain why he was so ill-disposed to the prospect of regime change. But Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān's behaviour suggests that, in certain circumstances, *an actor's awareness of holding a profitable stake in the present status quo might actually serve not to militate for inertial loyalty, but to add momentum to an impulse towards defection.* As an actor who had been instrumental in Pīr Muḥammad's elevation, Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān held a valuable stake in

⁵¹ Mukminova, *K istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii*, 36–45.

⁵² See above, p. 113.

that disposition of material welfare which he had helped bring about by his actions in summer 1598. As a result of Pīr Muḥammad's personal failings, however, it was doubtful whether his *regime* was capable of maintaining this status quo. Consequently, the likes of Shāh Kūchuk Bī would have been uncertain whether ongoing attachment was the best means of preserving the value of their stake. Far from being a guarantor of loyalty, the privileges which the *amīrs* currently enjoyed were rather a token of *what they stood to lose* were Pīr Muḥammad's regime to collapse while they were still on board. An *amīr* whose perquisites under this established regime earned him perhaps 200,000 *tangah* every year⁵³ would clearly have had more to lose than a peasant might from being on the losing side. If an *ancien régime* could not be saved, its prominent stakeholders might at least try to ensure that they had a chance of recouping their losses under its likely replacement.

The situation in which Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān thus found himself was scarcely unique in the history of early modern Central Asia. During the appanage wars of earlier decades, numerous *amīrs* had been confronted with the likelihood that their ongoing loyalty to a weakened Kūchkūnjid or Suyūnchid cause would entail a severe personal cost. In comparison to the *amīrs* of 1599, however, actors in earlier decades had often remained reluctant to realign themselves, whatever disutility their ongoing inertial attachment might incur. The behaviour of Jān Fūlād Ūshūn illustrates this well. Jān Fūlād Ūshūn was a close associate of the Suyūnchid prince 'Abd al-Sattār, under whose authority he held office in the small trans-Syr Darya town of Sawrān.⁵⁴ When news arrived in 1582 that 'Abdallāh had captured Tashkent and Turkistān and was advancing westwards to Sawrān, Jān Fūlād opted to hold tight alongside 'Abd al-Sattār, despite the fact that 'Abdallāh's army greatly outnumbered the defending forces. Jān Fūlād's continued loyalty to 'Abd al-Sattār did him few favours. Upon the city's capture, 'Abdallāh ordered Jān Fūlād to be executed alongside his family members, presumably as an exemplary punishment to dissuade others from such 'blind' obedience. Having seen his relatives being tortured and put to death, Jān Fūlād himself was half-dead by the time that his own execution came to pass.⁵⁵

⁵³ BA 7418 407a–b gives this as the value of *suyūrghāl*-holdings in the southwest of the khanate which 'Abd al-Mu'min granted Shāh Muḥammad Bahādur in the mid-1590s. See also discussion in Akhmedov, "Ikta v Srednei Azii", 19.

⁵⁴ *ShNSh* 3497 172b.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 178b, 194a–b.

In 1582, Jān Fūlād fatefully opted not to defect, even though he might have had good cause to doubt whether 'Abd al-Sattār's regime was capable of protecting his life and livelihood. This perhaps reflects the way in which constraints to mobility in the appanage system (see above, pp. 132–137) generated a close consociation of person and place: Jān Fūlād may well have balanced his material interests against a sense of affection towards a dynasty whom he had long served. Actors in 1599 evidently felt very differently. The behaviour of individuals such as Shāh Kūchuk Bī reflects how their loyalty towards Pīr Muḥammad was—unusually—almost exclusively inertial, and might be terminated at any moment.

This may be seen from the behaviour of Muḥammad Bāqī Bī Dūrmān, that prominent *amūr* to whom many chroniclers, as noted in chapter 1, ascribe responsibility for the death of 'Abdallāh II in early 1598. As a prominent stakeholder in 'Abd al-Mu'min's regime, Muḥammad Bāqī Bī was relatively late in defecting to Pīr Muḥammad's regime. Indeed, immediately upon learning of 'Abd al-Mu'min's death Muḥammad Bāqī Bī rushed straight to Samarqand, in the hope of bulwarking the established regime there.⁵⁶ But he soon received news from Bukhara that the conspirators were primed to elevate Pīr Muḥammad to khalī authority. Learning of this development, Muḥammad Bāqī Bī evidently decided that it would be preferable to realign himself with his former enemies than to make some quixotic attempt at preserving a probably-doomed regime. Although Muḥammad Bāqī Bī had previously seen in Pīr Muḥammad no intrinsic virtue to merit his loyalty, a self-interested concern to retain his former pre-eminence now impelled him to transfer his attachments to the new Bukharan khan.⁵⁷ As might equally be said of Shāh Kūchuk Bī and many of Pīr Muḥammad's other supporters, such motivations betokened a weak foundation for any ongoing attachment. Within months, indeed, Muḥammad Bāqī Bī was contemplating a further shift in alignment. He now planned to transfer his attachments from Pīr Muḥammad to Sayyid Muḥammad b. Kīpak, whom he might have succeeded in elevating as ruler of Samarqand had he and his protégé not been killed in battle with the Qazaqs (see above, pp. 104–105).

That which led people such as Muḥammad Bāqī Bī towards Pīr Muḥammad's regime seems to have been the very same self-interested impulse as that which subsequently led them to forsake his regime in favour of another.

⁵⁶ BA 51b.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 52a.

If a military metaphor were not singularly inapplicable to so un-martial an individual as Pīr Muḥammad, one might suggest that the hapless khan was hoist by his own petard.

A Tipping Point?

As Shāh Kūchuk Bī contemplated defecting to Bāqī Muḥammad's oppositional regime in the summer of 1599, he would doubtless have had to weigh up two conflicting impulses. The first such impulse would have been a risk-averse inclination to bide his time: to postpone committing himself to a realignment with its attendant possibility of punitive and other costs, that is, until information suggested that Bāqī Muḥammad's current success was not a mere one-off, and that the replacement of Pīr Muḥammad's established regime by Bāqī Muḥammad's oppositional alignment was indeed inevitable. As a prominent stakeholder in a stricken established regime, however, Shāh Kūchuk Bī would probably also have nurtured a very different second inclination: the impulse, that is, to defect as quickly as possible, in order to reap the maximum material benefit from his actions.

Shāh Kūchuk Bī's dilemma reflects the basic relationship between *risk* and *payoff*. Although the risk involved in early defection might be great, the resultant payoff might be great as well. Sometimes, of course, the likely payoff of a particular course of action can be directly and intrinsically proportionate to its riskiness. Should a political activist construe his purpose as solely to impress his convictions upon other people, he may well derive the greatest payoff from acting in circumstances where he most visibly thereby incurs personal danger, since his self-sacrifice may thus attest to the commitment with which he holds his views.⁵⁸ In other instances, the relationship between payoff and risk might be more circumstantial. The greater the proportion of actors who are dissuaded from a particular line of behaviour by the risk ascribed thereto, the greater would be the individual payoff which a correlatively-smaller group of other actors might hope to recoup should such a course of action prove successful. In the wake of Bāqī Muḥammad's showdown with Pīr Muḥammad, Shāh Kūchuk Bī may have construed such a payoff in terms of the disposition of material welfare in the

⁵⁸ Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Information Cascades", 69–71; taken further, see e.g. M. Biggs, "Dying Without Killing: Self-Immolations, 1963–2002", in Gambetta (ed.), *Making Sense of Suicide Missions* (Oxford, 2005), 173–208, particularly 195–198.

Bukharan region. With Bāqī Muḥammad having defeated Pīr Muḥammad and Bukhara poised to fall to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds, Bāqī Muḥammad would need to expand his administrative roster. The earlier and more resolutely Shāh Kūchuk Bī defected to Bāqī Muḥammad's oppositional regime, the greater might be his presumed commitment to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd party, and the greater his claim to a stake in some future Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd disposition whose value might be even greater than the stake he presently held in Pīr Muḥammad's regime. Postponing his defection until a later stage might of course reduce the risk of incurring punitive costs: but it may have been for this very reason that Shāh Kūchuk Bī regarded postponement as a less attractive option, since a plethora of other people acting in deference to the same rationale might minimise his own payoff.

Quite distinct from the Samarqand showdown itself, Shāh Kūchuk Bī's defection to Bāqī Muḥammad's oppositional regime may thus have constituted part of what Thomas Schelling terms a 'tipping point'.⁵⁹ By this term, I mean not just that the defection of Shāh Kūchuk Bī (and whatever supporters he could bring to bear) may have been sufficient so to alter the material balance of the established and oppositional parties as to enable Bāqī Muḥammad's subsequent capture of Bukhara and elsewhere. I mean more particularly that Shāh Kūchuk Bī's actions were significant for the message which they sent to fellow members of Pīr Muḥammad's regime. By defecting, Shāh Kūchuk Bī signalled to these fellow members that he believed it to be probabilistically preferable not only to defect, but to defect *sooner rather than later*, before the likely payoff accruing to one's own actions were further undermined by the actions of other people. With opposition thus looking like an increasingly unattractive option, Bāqī Muḥammad was able to capture Bukhara without obstruction.

Expanding the Differential

By early September 1599, Bāqī Muḥammad had managed to establish himself in control over both Samarqand and Bukhara. There could be little doubt that he was now the pre-eminent authority across all of Greater Mā warā al-nahr. Even once he had made sure of his authority over this heartland, however, the scope of Bāqī Muḥammad's rule was still smaller than

⁵⁹ T. Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York, 1978), 91–102. Describing tribal politics more generally, McChesney ("The Amīrs of Muslim Central Asia", 38) similarly speaks of a "band-wagon" effect.

that of ‘Abdallāh, his eminent predecessor. This was because all lands north of the Syr Darya, south of the Amu Darya and east of 69°E (i.e. the line running roughly Tashkent—Ūrā Tipah—Ḥiṣār—Qunduz) still lay outside his grasp. As the Safavid author Mirzā Bik b. Ḥasan Junābādī notes in the *Rawḍat al-Ṣafawīyah*, “around this time Bāqī Mirzā [sic], the brother of Dīnim Khan, had not yet established full sovereignty, and was only one ruler [in the region] out of several.”⁶⁰ Bāqī Muḥammad needed to change this state of affairs: like ‘Abdallāh, he recognised that the easiest way of retaining control over his subject dependencies was to go on the offensive. The appanage wars had shown how difficult it was to retain one’s territory if one did not enjoy a greater resource base than one’s rivals, and Pīr Muḥammad’s fate illustrated this very same difficulty.

A Rationale for Hegemony

Fresh from his triumph at Samarqand, Bāqī Muḥammad resolved not to repeat Pīr Muḥammad’s mistake. As early as August 1599 he seems to have reached terms with Nūr Muḥammad, the newly-re-established ‘Arabshāhid ruler of Merv.⁶¹ but any other neighbours hoping he might be satisfied with a condominium division of authority would have been disappointed. Iskandar Bik Munshī relates that after his Samarqand victory “princes from the regions of Tashkent, Turkistān, Balkh, Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān and Badakhshan all sent ambassadors to congratulate him.”⁶² Bāqī Muḥammad did not capitalise on these overtures as the princes might have hoped. He could have exploited the ‘diplomatic’ recognition denoted by such communication both to secure confirmation of his holdings and to establish a mutual-assistance treaty as insurance against attack, thus to establish something like the appanage system which had eluded Pīr Muḥammad. But Bāqī Muḥammad did not do this. Congratulations from the Balkhis and Ḥiṣāris may have been tainted by the knowledge that these parties had assisted

⁶⁰ *Bāqī Mirzā, barādar-i Dīnim Khān, dar ān walā hanūz istiqlāl-i tamām nayāftah būd wa dar i’ dād-i umarā ma’ dūd būd: RS 752.*

⁶¹ *TA 193, describing how Nūr Muḥammad presented Bāqī Muḥammad with a prize mare and offered his friendship by covenant and oath (mādyānī [...] bih jihat-i Bāqī Khān firistādah wa dūstī-rā mu’akkad bih ‘ahd wa yamīn sākhtah).*

⁶² *Salāṭin-i aṭrafāz Tāshkand wa Turkistān wa Balkh wa Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān wa Badakhshān ilchiyān firistādah ū-rā tahniyat wa mubārakbād guftah: T’ĀĀ’A 595.* The phrase ‘tahniyat wa mubārakbād’ is perhaps a deliberate echo of T’ĀĀ’A 558 (see above, p. 158 n. 49), where it appears in Iskandar Bik Munshī’s account of how the Balkhis congratulated Pīr Muḥammad upon his accession in summer 1598. In the *Silsilat al-salāṭin*, Ḥājji Mir Muḥammad Salīm deviates from his T’ĀĀ’A source narrative in omitting any mention of such communications.

his enemy, and Bāqī Muḥammad would have known that as a non-Abū'l-Khayrid he was condemned to stand excluded from whatever mutual intra-familial sympathy (see below, p. 203) existed between his opposite numbers. Appanage rule in the wake of 'Abdallāh's reign was a precarious thing; and Bāqī Muḥammad would remain in danger for as long as his potential rivals together retained the capacity to outbalance his own resource base. Rather than interpreting the princes' congratulations as active invitations to co-operation, Bāqī Muḥammad evidently interpreted them as passive 'non-aggression pledges', allowing him time to amass resources in readiness for an assertive course of action. Far from averting Tūqāy-Timūrid attack, such overtures simply granted Bāqī Muḥammad the luxury of being able to time his subsequent moves as he saw fit.

Internal Deployment, Internal Challenge

Immediately after Bāqī Muḥammad captured Bukhara, he tried to capitalise on the moment. He placed his cousin Raḥman Qulī Sultan in charge of a small army, and dispatched him to capture Balkh from 'Abd al-Amīn.⁶³ The campaign was a disaster. 'Abd al-Amīn and his *amīrs* easily defeated the expeditionary force, and then used the momentum from their victory to restore control over Termez, a town on the Amu Darya which for much of the sixteenth century had been under Balkhi rule. Shīrīm Bī, the former governor of Termez, had shown disquieting signs of personal ambition,⁶⁴ but 'Abd al-Amīn was now able to secure the city and entrust it to 'Ādil Pāy,⁶⁵ a former associate of 'Abd al-Mu'min⁶⁶ who was now one of 'Abd al-Amīn's closest associates.⁶⁷

Bāqī Muḥammad's abortive campaign had done more to bolster a rival than to strengthen his own hand. Learning of Raḥman Qulī's defeat, he was reminded of the danger of impetuosity. He was alert to the errors of 'Abd al-Mu'min, Pīr Muḥammad's ill-distinguished predecessor, who had fatally undermined his support by the intemperance with which he had embarked upon his own punitive campaigns in 1598. Chastened by Raḥman Qulī's setback, Bāqī Muḥammad thus decided to take his time before again advancing into action.

⁶³ MB 210.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 211.

⁶⁶ DQ 34b; TA 175-176; NZJ 179.

⁶⁷ TĀĀ'A 557; NZJ 129.

He did not need to hurry. Diplomatic communications had suggested that neighbouring princes were temporarily committed to peaceable relations. Bāqī Muḥammad had little cause to fear being overthrown so long as his disparate rivals failed either to co-ordinate their actions or to secure extensive 'foreign' military support. With little immediately to sway his hand towards a pre-emptive plan of campaign, therefore, Bāqī Muḥammad seems to have sat tight for approximately nine months,⁶⁸ turning his attention to 'internal' administrative matters.

Bāqī Muḥammad's key priority during this period was to re-establish a system of regional government. Two concerns urged haste in this undertaking. The first was that Bāqī Muḥammad needed to establish a functional administrative system capable of mobilising revenue and men. His second concern was to distribute a range of privileges and prerogatives sufficient to turn his supporters into stakeholders, and thus to inculcate a degree of inertial loyalty towards his nascent regime. Given how, as we have seen, Bāqī Muḥammad modelled much of his interventionist and expansionist political career on that of 'Abdallāh b. Iskandar, one might expect him to have emulated his predecessor's example also in conferring most administrative appointments upon tribal *amīrs* (see above, pp. 130–131). However, this seems not to have been the case. In the *Baḥr al-asrār*, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī records that in late 1599 Bāqī Muḥammad instead entrusted regional authority across Mā warā al-nahr to various of his own Tūqāy-Timūrid kinsmen. He established his father Jānī Muḥammad in Samarqand,⁶⁹ his brother Walī Muḥammad in nearby Sāgharj⁷⁰ and his uncle 'Abbās Sultan in Shahrīsabz.⁷¹ His kinsmen Pīr Muḥammad and the afore-mentioned Raḥman Qulī b. Tursūn Muḥammad received Ūrā Tipah and Khuzār respectively,⁷² while he himself retained control over Bukhara.⁷³ Anyone witnessing these appointments might well have assumed that Bāqī Muḥammad was attempting to re-animate the sort of collective family rule which had previously existed

⁶⁸ Thus August 1599 to summer 1600, this latter our proposed date for Bāqī Muḥammad's southern campaign (see below, p. 167 n. 76).

⁶⁹ *BA* 62a.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*; see also *TA* 218. For 'Abbās Sultan as a son of Yār Muḥammad, see e.g. *TA* 175, *BA* 42a, *PN* L.218 and 'AŞ I.305, Morley 162 28a and *SilSal* 125a.

⁷² For both appointments see *BA* 62a; for Pīr Muḥammad's appointment to Ūrā Tipah, see also *TSh* 161. There is some uncertainty as to Pīr Muḥammad's descent, with *TSh* 161 identifying him as the son of Malik b. Yār Muḥammad, and *PN* L.218, 'AŞ I.305 and *SilSal* 125a identifying him as Yār Muḥammad's own son. For Raḥman Qulī's descent, see above, p. 93.

⁷³ *BA* 62a.

in Greater Mā warā al-nahr under the Abū'l-Khayrids over the period of ca. 1510–1570, and which had been terminated only by 'Abdallāh's conclusive victory in the mid-century appanage wars. As we shall see, however, time would soon show whether this was really the case.

Having seen to questions of regional administration, Bāqī Muḥammad might then have embarked straight upon an aggressive plan of campaign. But he was checked by an unforeseen challenge coming from the east. By early 1600, an individual called Kildī Muḥammad had established himself in authority over parts of the Fergana valley,⁷⁴ and at some unspecified point in the following year or so Kildī Muḥammad advanced west to make an attack on Ūrā Tipah, presently under the gubernatorial authority of Bāqī Muḥammad's afore-mentioned cousin Pīr Muḥammad. Bāqī Muḥammad dispatched his brother Walī Muḥammad, governor of Sāgharj, to assist his beleaguered kinsman. Although Walī Muḥammad managed to repel Kildī Muḥammad back towards Andījān, it took several indecisive battles before he could finally put Kildī Muḥammad to flight.⁷⁵ The close-fought nature of this conflict may have reminded Bāqī Muḥammad of the need to protect himself from any repetition of any such challenge, by learning from Pīr Muḥammad's mistake and expanding the material differential elevating him above potential rivals. In summer 1600,⁷⁶ therefore, Bāqī Muḥammad marched south.

The Pattern of Conquest

By heading south, Bāqī Muḥammad was assuming the initiative. Rather than wait for his other neighbours to follow Kildī Muḥammad's lead and take action against him, he decided to take action as it suited him rather than his enemies. His plan was first to establish authority in places where he calculated that he would easily prevail. By doing this, Bāqī Muḥammad could acquire the financial and military means necessary for allowing his subsequent advance into regions which were more likely to offer resistance.

⁷⁴ Nabiev, "Novye dokumental'nye materialy k izucheniiu feodal'nogo institute "suiurghal" v Fergane XVI–XVII vv.", in *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk UzSSR* 1959.3, 23–32, reproducing a letter whereby Kildī Muḥammad appointed a *qāḍī* in 1600.

⁷⁵ BA 62a–63a.

⁷⁶ I.e. several months before early Jumādī II 1009 (8 December 1600–1605 January 1601), when news reached Isfahan that Bāqī Muḥammad's forces had reached Balkh (*TA* 200–201). Note also Muṭribī, telling (*NZJ* 179) of Bāqī Muḥammad campaigning "in the second year of his reign", i.e. at some point in 1009 (13 July 1600–1 July 1601).

Bāqī Muḥammad's first target was the region of Ḥiṣār,⁷⁷ which in 1600 was still under the authority of Maḥmūd, brother of the late Bukharan khan Pīr Muḥammad.⁷⁸ Several factors made Ḥiṣār an appropriate target for Bāqī Muḥammad's forces at this early stage of the Tūqāy-Timūrid reconstitution of empire. First, Ḥiṣār was *defeatable*. The region is constricted by the Bābātāgh, Zarafshān and Pamir mountain ranges, and it would be difficult for somebody governing the region to impose his authority beyond these natural lines of demarcation. Whereas rulers in other regions such as Balkh could often exploit hinterlands extending hundreds of miles away from the city limits, Ḥiṣārī rulers had to draw upon a more tightly delimited resource base. This meant that they only had access to a confined pool of manpower, and constrained their scope for inculcating loyalty through the distribution of patronage. Secondly, Ḥiṣār was *governable*. Although the region is remote—shielded from central Mā warā al-nahr by the Bābātāgh mountains, and easily reached only from the south—it is internally quite accessible. Ḥiṣār is mostly low-lying, and the local metropole of Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān commands easy access to the surrounding hinterland. It thus differs from regions such as mountainous Badakhshan, where no urban centre offers the ruler a similar degree of panoptic control. Because of these factors, as well as because of the region's high agricultural productivity,⁷⁹ Ḥiṣār was more suitable for gubernatorial administration and fiscal exploitation, and thus as a target for conquest.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Note however *TSR 200a*, which suggests that Bāqī Muḥammad first captured Balkh, and only then advanced against Ḥiṣār: *rū-yi tawajjuh bih sawb-i wilāyat-i Balkh āwurdah bā andak tawajjuh dar qabḍ-i tašarruf dar āwurdah ba'd az taskhīr-i wilāyat-i Balkh 'inān-i 'azīmat bih jānīb-i Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān kashid*. This account is followed in various later works, including *ATR 94: Balkhni musakkkhīr qilghāndin kiyin shād khurramlik birlah 'azīmatnīng Ḥiṣār ṭarafīgā tārtti*.

⁷⁸ Alekseev, "Sredniaia Aziia pri Ashtarkhanidakh v XVII–XVIII vv.", 130, instead claims that Ḥiṣār was under the authority of Muḥammad Salīm b. Pīr Muḥammad (for whom see below, pp. 178–184).

⁷⁹ Tsarist-era surveyors observed that Ḥiṣār produced twice as much millet and more than twice as much barley as Kūlāb, a region of similar size to the southeast: B.I. Iskandarov, *Iz istorii Bukharskogo Emirata (Vostochnaia Bukhara i Zapadny Pamir v kontse XIX v.)* (Moscow, 1958), 65. Such productivity partly reflects high precipitation rates. Between 1961 and 1990, the region around Ḥiṣār received an annual average of 569 mm of rain, while Samarqand received an average of 355 mm and Andijān 238 mm: *Climatological Normals (CLINO) for the Period 1961–1990* (Geneva, 1996), 232, 254.

⁸⁰ Ḥiṣār was also strategically important as a means of controlling access between Mā warā al-nahr and lands south of the Amu Darya. According to Mīr Muḥammad-Amīn Bukhārī in the early 18th-century *Ubaydallāh-nāmah*, for instance, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Dürmān urged 'Ubaydallāh Khan b. Şubḥān Qulī Khan to take steps in order to secure control over Ḥiṣār, describing the region as "the gates to Mā warā al-nahr": *UN 44b–45a*.

Informed of Bāqī Muḥammad's approach, Maḥmūd opted not to offer any resistance. He was doubtless aware of the physical disadvantage at which he found himself. Furthermore, historical memory offered little cheer for any ruler of Ḥiṣār proposing to defy the full might of the Bukharan army. In 1573, Ḥiṣār's autonomous ruler Hashim Sultan—the son of Timūr Sultan, for whom see above, p. 124—had been foolhardy enough to defy 'Abdallāh Khan's expeditionary forces. 'Abdallāh had easily captured the region, and Hāshim paid for his vainglory with his life, as he and fellow family members were pitilessly put to death.⁸¹ Sensibly, therefore, Maḥmūd decided that discretion was the better part of valour. He headed first to Balkh and then on into the "desert of wandering", where nothing was heard of him again.⁸²

Bāqī Muḥammad might then have returned back to Bukhara, having asserted control over much of the eastern khanate north of the Amu Darya. But he then received some news which encouraged him to alter his plans. Word arrived that the ruler of Balkh had died, and that the Balkhi population had descended into disorder.⁸³ This dead ruler was not 'Abd al-Amīn, but his short-lived successor. In the two and a half years or so since *amīrs* had elevated 'Abd al-Amīn to khalif authority, nearly as much had occurred in Balkh as in Bukhara.

Almost immediately upon his accession in Balkh, 'Abd al-Amīn's nominal authority had begun to wane. This seems to have been the consequence largely of the fact that a lot of people doubted whether he was really the son of 'Ibādallāh,⁸⁴ and consequently doubted also whether he was eligible

⁸¹ *Tārīkh* (Chalabī) 130 (translation), 202 (text); also *ShNSh* 194b–199a *RS* 246a–253a, *MB* 288–289, *TMQ* 544b. See also discussion in Welsford, "Rethinking the Ḥamzahids of Ḥiṣār", 817–818.

⁸² *BA* 63b–64a; *TSR* 220b; *NZJ* 179. *TMQ* 556b, meanwhile, suggests that Bāqī Muḥammad defeated not Maḥmūd but this latter's son 'Ibādallāh: *'Ibādallāh Sultān walad-i Maḥmūd Sultān kih ḥākīm-i Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān būd, chūn dīd kih tāb-i muqāwamat nadārād, qal'ah-rā andākhatah mutawajjih-i Hindūstān shud.*

⁸³ *TMQ* 556b; *AfT* 133a; *RS* 753; *NZJ* 179–180. *SilSal* 163a similarly tells of disorder in Balkh, but states that the ruler who had died was Bāqī Muḥammad's father Jānī Muḥammad. *TMKh* 126 offers a highly divergent account of events, claiming that Bāqī Muḥammad was prompted to embark on his campaign against Balkh by the news that his brother Dīn Muḥammad had been killed in that vicinity by Qarābī tribesmen (for which episode see above, p. 60): *Dar tārikh-i sanah-yi ahdi 'ashar wa alf khān-i giti-sitāni Bāqī Muḥammad Khān shanīd kih Dīn Muḥammad Khān az razmgāh bih salāmat birūn āmadah būdah ast, bih wilāyat-i Qunduz bih dast-i mardum-i Qarābī kushtah shudah ast. Ātish-i qahr wa ghadab-i ū dar ishti'āl āmadah bā sipāh-i bi-karān wa lashkar-i birūn az 'adad 'āzīm-i wilāyat-i Balkh shud.* Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī thus elides the events of 1008 with those of 1011.

⁸⁴ See e.g. *NZJ* 129, on how 'Abd al-Amīn was "of unknown ancestry" (*majhūl al-nasabī*); *AfT* 125b, noting how Shah 'Abbās received news that various senior Uzbeks were raising

to rule. With 'Abd al-Amīn struggling to command people's charismatic attachments, various *amīrs* who held a stake in Balkh's established status quo—including several who had participated in his elevation—came to regard their association with him less as a resource than a burden. In the face of his possible downfall, self-interest impelled a succession of prominent Balkhī *amīrs* to flee what might prove to be a sinking ship. Ḥasan Khwājah Naqīb and Nādir Bāyish Qūshbīkī deserted to Pīr Muḥammad in Bukhara;⁸⁵ several others including the former conspirator Allāh Birdī Kūkaltāsh Ūtārchī meanwhile deserted west towards Shibarghān, some hundred and thirty miles from Balkh, where they established themselves in autonomous authority.⁸⁶ As disorder spread, 'Abd al-Amīn was unable to stand up for himself when Muḥammad Ibrāhīm arrived to challenge his rule. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm was an Abū'l-Khayrid dynast who was related to 'Abdallāh Khan both as his (4,3) paternal kinsman⁸⁷ and as his sororal nephew.⁸⁸ He evidently enjoyed some repute in the khanate. In the mid-1590s, 'Abdallāh entrusted Merv and northern Khurāsān to his rule,⁸⁹ and

objections to 'Abd al-Amīn's supposed ancestry (*mutashakkī būdan-i a'āzim-i ūzbik dar nasab-i 'Abd al-Amīn Khān bih 'arḍ rasānidah* [...]); and TĀĀ'A 558, in the context of the circumstances of his elevation, noting how prior to this "people had never heard that 'Ibādallāh Sultan had a son" (*hargiz nashanidah būdand kih 'Ibādallāh Sultān-rā pisari bāshad*). MB 176, meanwhile, notes that the identity of 'Abd al-Amīn's parents was unclear, and that the decision to declare him the son of 'Ibādallāh Sultan was the result of pragmatic considerations (*pidar wa mādar-i ū mushakkkhaṣ nist, wa umarā-yi ān wilāyat binā bar maṣlahat wa az rū-yi ḍarurat [ū-rā] pisar-i 'Ibādallāh Sultān sākhtand*); see however also *ibid.*, 209, relating that 'Abd al-Amīn had the bearing of a born ruler, and that although many people doubted that he was the son of 'Ibādallāh Sultan nobody of good judgement could dispute his manifestly royal parentage (*awṣāf-i pādīshāhī dar nāṣiyah-yi jamālāsh zāhir wa hawīdā wa ṣifāt-i shahriyāri az jabūn-i mubīnash wādīh wa paydā, aqar-chih akthar-i mardum dar būdan-i pisar-i 'Ibādallāh Sultān mutaraddud būdand, walikin har kas az kiyāsāt bih didah-yi farāsāt [...] bih yaqīn midānist kih az natā'ij-i salāṭīn būd wa awḍā' wa aṭwārash dalālat bar ān mūkard kih ū shāh-zādah-yi aṣlī ast, nah 'amalī*).

⁸⁵ MB 210.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* It was Allāh Birdī Kūkaltāsh Ūtārchī and his colleagues who then considered inviting Bāqī Muḥammad to come and assume authority over the Shibarghān region: see above, p. 65.

⁸⁷ MB 175, identifying him as son of Suyūnch Muḥammad b. Kipak b. Būbāy b. Khwājah Muḥammad; identification supported by Yate, *Northern Afghanistan*, 214, describing this individual's tombstone in Mazār-i Sharīf. Other sources offer alternative identifications: Muḥammad Ibrāhīm b. Kipak (TA 177); b. Tursūn Muḥammad (TĀĀ'A 576, followed in turn in *SilSal* 156b–157a); b. Aḥmad (?) (NZJ 128).

⁸⁸ TA 171; contrast with *AJT* 125a, which identifies Muḥammad Ibrāhīm instead as the nephew of Pīr Muḥammad.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*; TĀĀ'A 576. Compare with MB 175, suggesting that Muḥammad Ibrāhīm was

one source suggests that in summer 1598 Muḥammad Ibrāhīm was people's original choice for Balkhi authority before the elevation of 'Abd al-Amīn.⁹⁰ Confronted later that year by the Safavid advance into Khurāsān (see above, pp. 57–60), Muḥammad Ibrāhīm was forced to take flight. But he was captured on the road from Merv to Chārjūy, and was packed off to the Safavid court.⁹¹ Shah 'Abbās recognised that this young man was extremely gifted, and decided to use him for his own plans.

The shah decided to make Muḥammad Ibrāhīm his protégé. After playing host to Muḥammad Ibrāhīm in Isfahan for several months, 'Abbās dispatched him off to Balkh, together with a small force—including the former deserter Khudāy Naẓār Bī Qalmāq (for whom see above, p. 143),⁹² plus several Safavid generals—with which he was to capture the city.⁹³ By backing Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, 'Abbās evidently hoped to bring Balkh into the sphere of Safavid influence. According to Iskandar Bik Munshī in the *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*, however, the shah professed to a more altruistic purpose, foreswearing any personal ambitions and expressing the hope that 'Abd al-Amīn and Muḥammad Ibrāhīm would together make common dynastic cause against the Tūqāy-Timūrid interlopers.⁹⁴ Despite

appointed to authority in the Khurāsān region (more specifically in Abiward and Bāghbad, not Merv) only after the death of 'Abdallāh, during the reign of 'Abd al-Mu'min.

⁹⁰ *AfT* 125a–b.

⁹¹ See *MB* 175, *TA* 171, *T'ĀĀ'A* 576–577, *AfT* 125a and *RŠ* 752. *NZJ* 128 instead claims that Muḥammad Ibrāhīm fled to 'Abbās, seeking refuge from 'Abd al-Mu'min.

⁹² *T'ĀĀ'A* 596, 606. *RŠ* 752 wrongly identifies him as Khudāy Naẓār Bī Qunghrāt.

⁹³ *TA* 177, dating his dispatch to Rabī II 1008 (21 October–18 November 1599); also *MB* 175, *TMQ* 556a–b, *T'ĀĀ'A* 596 and *AfT* 125a–b. *RŠ* 753 improbably dates his dispatch to 1009 (13 July 1600–1 July 1601).

⁹⁴ *Maḍmūn-i 'ināyat-nāmah-yi nāmī ān kih mamlakat-i Mā warā al-nahr yūrt-i qadīm wa maskan-i mawrūthī-yi awlād-i pādishāh-i marḥūm Jānī Bik Khān ast, wa ḥalā az awlād-i nāmdār-i ū wa al-inzhād Muḥammad Ibrāhīm māndah, har dū mā-rā bih manzilah-yi farzand a'azz and [...] maṭlab-i dīgar siwā-yi ḥuṣūl-i nīknāmī nīst, ghayrat wa mardānagi-yi muqtaḍā ān ast kih barādarānah bā yak dīgar ittīfāq namūdah himmat bih taṣarrūf-i mulk-i mawrūth maṣrūf dārānd [...]:* *T'ĀĀ'A* 596. *AfT* 125b ascribes to 'Abbās a similar motive, though suggests that the shah was keen to foster common cause between Muḥammad Ibrāhīm and his 'uncle' Pīr Muḥammad, rather than with 'Abd al-Amīn, whose elevation to the Balkh throne Faḍlī Khūzānī Isfahānī has not noted at this juncture in the narrative: *Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Sulṭān bih istiqlāl bar Tūrān mutamakkin gardad, wa 'umm-i buzurgwār bā ū dar maqām-i mihrībānī bāshad [...].* In the *Rawḍat al-Ṣafawīyah*, Mīrẓā Bik b. Ḥasan Junābādī goes so far as to claim that it was at the behest of the Balkhis themselves that the shah dispatched 'Ibrāhīm Muḥammad Khan' [*sic*] back to Balkh: *a'yān wa sardārān-i qubbat al-Islām Balkh maṣlahat dar ān dīdānd kih shakhṣī sukhndān-i mu'addab, 'āqil-i khurmand bih dargāh-i salāṭīn-panāh-i [...] pādishāh-i Irān arsāl dārānd tā istīd'ā-yi rukḥṣat-i iṭlāq-i Ibrāhīm Muḥammad Khān namāyānd kih dar mamlakat-i Balkh basāt-i salṭanat mumahhad*

'Abbās' lofty statement of purpose, this did not happen. Many of 'Abd al-Amīn's former supporters forsook the Balkhi incumbent for Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, and 'Abd al-Amīn was soon imprisoned and killed.⁹⁵ The date of 'Abd al-Amīn's death is uncertain, but we do know that Muḥammad Ibrāhīm then acceded and reigned for between two months⁹⁶ and two years⁹⁷ before dying of pox (*ābilah*) some time in 1600.⁹⁸ Bāqī Muḥammad took advantage of his death in order to act.

Having appointed a certain Ayyūb Qurchī-Bāshī to take charge of Ḥiṣār,⁹⁹ Bāqī Muḥammad proceeded west with his brother Walī Muḥammad. Along the way, Bāqī Muḥammad paused to reduce the city of Termez, on which he had already made an unsuccessful attempt the previous year (see above, p. 165). Since then, 'Ādil Pāy had remained in authority, but in the intervening period he had cast off Balkhi suzerainty and now ruled the region as a small autonomous entity.¹⁰⁰ Bāqī Muḥammad's advance now terminated

gardānīdah dam az bandagi wa wilā-yi dūdmān-i 'alayhī-makān-i Ṣafawīyah zanad wa mam-lakat-i Ṭukhārīstān wa Jayhūn-kanār bar dākhil-i maḥrūsah-yi Īrān bāshad [...]: RS 752.

⁹⁵ *TA* 177; *T'ĀĀ'A* 601; *NZJ* 129. The executioner was supposedly the former conspirator Yār Muḥammad Mīrzā, who had previously participated in 'Abd al-Amīn's elevation (see above, p. 46). *SilSal* 157a claims that 'Abd al-Amīn was put to death before Muḥammad Ibrāhīm's arrival.

⁹⁶ *TMKh* 124.

⁹⁷ *RS* 753; *SilSal* 157a. Intermediate estimates for his reign are seven months (*TA* 177) and one year (*BA* 63a).

⁹⁸ For his succumbing to disease, see *TA* 177, *TMQ* 556b, *AfT* 133a and *T'ĀĀ'A* 606. Regarding the circumstances of Muḥammad Ibrāhīm's rule more generally, there is widespread disagreement. *NZJ* 129 claims that he "pursued a path of justice and treated the Balkhis well" (*ṭarīq-i 'adālat-rā pīsh grīftah bih ahl-i Balkh sulūk-i khūb minamūd*). But other sources are more critical. *AfT* 133a recounts how Muḥammad Ibrāhīm alienated many of his supporters by ordering the execution of Nazar Bī (*Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Khān [...] hukm bih qatl-i Nazar Bī Bahādur namūd, jam'ī wa aqrabā-yi mushār ilayhī jihat-i qatl-i ū az khān āzardah gashtah dar maqām-i fitnah būdand*), and *T'ĀĀ'A* 606 claims that he did little to oversee the responsibilities of state (*intizām-i amūr-i dawlat kamtar mīpardākht*), with the result that power fell into the hands of incompetent and conceited people (*zanām-i mahāmm-i dawlat-i ū bih dast-i nādānān-i jāhil wa jāhilān-i khūd-rā'ī-yi ghāfil uftād*); Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī, meanwhile, presents him (*TMK* 124–126) as an unmitigated villain, claiming that during his reign he murdered Muslims at night in the streets and markets (*musulmān-rā shabḥā dar kūchah wa bāzār bih darajah-yi shahādat mīrasānīdah*), with the result that the Balkhis sought intervention from Walī Muḥammad b. Jānī Muḥammad who came and defeated him in battle. This last story is fictitious, and is a further instance of Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī's tendency to ascribe the Tūqāy-Timūrīds' establishment in power to the invitations of subject populations (see above, p. 63).

⁹⁹ *TMQ* 556b. For the office of *qurchī-bāshī*, or page, see Berndt, "Organisation eines Feldzugs", 4, and *T'ĀĀ'A* 962.

¹⁰⁰ *TA* 201–202. *TMQ* 556b does not mention Bāqī Muḥammad's activities in Termez, recounting instead that after the capture of Ḥiṣār Bāqī Muḥammad took possession of Dih-i Naw.




Figure 10: Abū'l-Khayrid dynasts active in the south of the khanate, ca. 1598–1600 (underlined).

'Ādil Pāy's presumptions of authority. The *amīr* was easily defeated, and Bāqī Muḥammad replaced him with an appointee of his own.¹⁰¹

By late autumn 1600, Bāqī Muḥammad was now primed to march on Balkh. At this juncture, however, his plans were thrown into disorder by the news that a brother of the late Qazaq ruler Tawakkul was taking advantage of his absence to raid the Samarqand region with impunity. He straightaway headed back to Samarqand in order to oversee the city's defence. Accounts vary as to his subsequent course of action. In the *Baḥr al-asrār*, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī claims that Bāqī Muḥammad now entrusted responsibility for the Balkh campaign to his brother Walī Muḥammad, while he himself continued to grapple with the Qazaq threat.¹⁰² According to Jalāl al-Dīn Munajjim Yazdī in the *Tārīkh-i 'Abbāsī*, by contrast, Bāqī Muḥammad tarried only briefly in Samarqand before then setting out once again for the south, where he assumed control of the Balkh expedition himself.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ BA 64a; NZJ 179. Discussion in Ivanov, *Khoziaistvo Dzhuibarskikh Sheikhov*, 76–77 ('Ādil Pāy mistakenly rendered as 'Abd al-Bāy). TA 201–202 claims instead that Bāqī Muḥammad again failed to capture Termez.

¹⁰² BA 63b–64b. AFT 133b does not mention the Qazaq attack at this juncture, but still notes that Bāqī Muḥammad dispatched Walī Muḥammad to take possession of Balkh (*Bāqī Khān rawānah bih Balkh gashtah Walī Muḥammad Khān barādar-i khud-rā fristād kih dākhil-i shahr shudah bih tašarruf āwurad*). See also *SilSal* 163b, again omitting mention of the Qazaq attack, and recording that Bāqī Muḥammad dispatched Walī Muḥammad towards Balkh at the head of an advance guard (*muqaddamat al-jaysh*); contrast this with TĀĀ'A 606, which makes no mention of Walī Muḥammad's appointment.

¹⁰³ TA 202. The poet Mawlānā Bāqī similarly attributes the capture of Balkh to Bāqī Muḥammad rather than his brother: see below, p. 258.

Regardless of who commanded them, the Bukharan forces evidently acquitted themselves well during the subsequent military campaign. The Balkhis had responded to Muḥammad Ibrāhīm's death by elevating in his place a young Ḥiṣāri dynast (variously named in our sources as 'Abdallāh¹⁰⁴ and 'Ibādallāh,¹⁰⁵ and most likely to be identified as the son of Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān and nephew of the late Bukharan khan Pīr Muḥammad).¹⁰⁶ But their attempt to preserve the Balkhi established regime under a new figurehead proved unequal to Bukharan military might. After briefly attempting to resist the approaching army, the Balkhis peacefully submitted¹⁰⁷ and Walī Muḥammad assumed gubernatorial control over the city.¹⁰⁸ With Ḥiṣār,

¹⁰⁴ Waḥīd-niyā's non-critical edition of *TA* identifies him, 177, as 'Ubaydallāh, but this is at odds with what we find in various MSS of the work, e.g. Bodleian Elliot 367 f. 231a and BL Add. 27241 f. 140b, both of which refer to him as 'Abdallāh. Afshār's non-critical edition of *TĀĀ'A* similarly identifies him, 606, as 'Ubaydallāh, but this is again differs from what we find in various MSS, e.g. BL Or. 152 f. 323a and BL Add. Or. 16684 f. 227a, where his name is rendered as 'Abdallāh.

¹⁰⁵ *TMQ* 556b; *BA* 64a.

¹⁰⁶ Both *TA* 177 and *BA* 64a note his descent from Maḥmūd (for whose own descent see *MB* 194). Several authors suggest that other individuals were elevated following the death of Muḥammad Ibrāhīm. Alekseev claims ("Sredniaia Aziia pri Ashtarkhanidakh v XVII–XVIII vv.", 131) that they elevated Muḥammad Salīm b. Pīr Muḥammad. Ḥājjī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm, deviating from his *TĀĀ'A* source narrative, suggests (*SilSal* 157a) that after Muḥammad Ibrāhīm's death the Balkhis elevated Jānī Muḥammad b. Yār Muḥammad in his place: *ba'd az ān Jānī Muḥammad az Samarqand bih Balkh rasīdah umarā wa a'yān wa waqī' wa sharif-i ān baldah muqaddam-i sharif-i ū-rā ghanīmat shumurdah bih istiqbāl bar āmadand wa ū-rā bih Balkh dar āwurdah bih takht-i khānī nishānidah [...]*. He then 'rejoins' the *TĀĀ'A* narrative, recounting (*SilSal* 163a–b) how after Jānī Muḥammad's death the Balkhis elevated 'Abdallāh in his place.

¹⁰⁷ In the *Tārikh-i miṭāh al-qulūb*, Aḥmad b. Shams al-Dīn records (*TMQ* 556b) that "when Bāqī Muḥammad reached the vicinity of Balkh local residents came out and accorded him a formal welcome, and brought him into the city with all due honours" (*chun bih ḥawālī-yi qubbat al-islām rasīd, ahl-i Balkh istiqbāl namūdah [...]* wa Bāqī Khān-rā bih i'zāz-i harchih tamām-tar bih shahr dar āwurdand). In the *Tārikh-i 'alam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*, meanwhile, Iskandar Bik Munshī recounts (*TĀĀ'A* 606) that most of the Balkhi soldiers decided that it was not worth opposing Bāqī Muḥammad, and tacitly submitted to his authority (*akthar-i sipāhīyān wa ma'ārīf-i lashkar [...]* mukhālīfat-i Bāqī Khān-rā munāsib-i waqt nadānistah bāṭinan dil bih itā'at-i ū bastah [...]); see similarly *TA* 202 and *NZJ* 180. *AfT* 133b suggests that Yār Muḥammad Mirzā attempted to defy the Bukharan army for a few days, but soon abandoned the struggle (*Yār Muḥammad Mirzā chand rūzī bā 'īshān jadal namūdah, chūn tāb-i maqāwamat nadāshat qal'ah-rā bih Walī Muḥammad Khān dādah [...]*), while Ḥājjī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm again deviates from his *TĀĀ'A* source narrative to suggest (*SilSal* 163b) that Balkh fell only after a fully pitched battle: *dar nazdīk-i shahr bayn al-jānibayn muḥārabah-yi ṣa'b ittifaq uftād wa 'Abdallāh Sultān wa bisyāri az sardaran-i 'umdaḥ-yi Balkh bih qatl rasīdand*.

¹⁰⁸ *TMQ* 556b; *MuT* (Shīrāzi) 260b; *BA* 64b; *NZJ* 180.

Termez and Balkh all now under Tūqāy-Tīmūrid authority, the offensive of 1600 had proved highly successful.

Internal Challenge, Internal Deployment

Conditions in central Mā warā al-nahr, meanwhile, were not quite so propitious. Although Bāqī Muḥammad easily repelled the resurgent Qazaq threat, he soon found himself under pressure from closer quarters. It became apparent that his kinsmen Raḥman Qulī Sultan and ‘Abbās Sultan both resented the fact that Walī Muḥammad had been appointed in their place as governor of Balkh.¹⁰⁹ Bāqī Muḥammad of course had good reason to appoint his brother rather than Raḥman Qulī or ‘Abbās: Raḥman Qulī’s maladroitness in the first abortive attempt on Balkh (see above, p. 165) had cost Bāqī Muḥammad his one defeat of note since Pul-i Sālār, and subsequent to this setback neither individual seems to have participated in any of Bāqī Muḥammad’s military undertakings. Neither had contributed resources towards the recent Ḥiṣār/Balkh campaign; nor had they lent any assistance the previous year when Kildī Muḥammad had attacked Ūrā Tipah from out of the Fergana valley. For some time, therefore, Bāqī Muḥammad may have doubted the extent of both men’s attachment to his khalifal regime.

The ramifications of worsening intra-Tūqāy-Tīmūrid relations were widely felt. By winter 1600–1601, Safavid spies were informing Shah ‘Abbās that Bāqī Muḥammad’s relations with his cousins were so poor that “there [was] a state of terror and revolt and warfare and struggle in Mā warā al-nahr.”¹¹⁰ The situation thereafter deteriorated even further. Raḥman Qulī began plotting with the Badakhshanis against metropolitan Bukharan rule,¹¹¹ and at some point in 1601 ‘Abbās Sultan abandoned his gubernatorial

¹⁰⁹ BA 65a, on how “signs of treachery towards the mighty *khāqān* Bāqī Muḥammad Khan became visible on the part of ‘Abbās Sultan and Raḥman Qulī Sultan” (*āyāt-i ghadr [...] az ‘Abbās Sultān wa Raḥman Qulī Sultān nisbat bih khāqān-i karwān-tawān Bāqī Muhammad Khān bih wuḍūḥ paywast*); also TA 218 on how “Raḥman Qulī aligned himself in opposition to Bāqī Muḥammad” (*Raḥman Qulī bā Bāqī Muḥammad sar-i mukhālifat dārad*). I have emended ‘Raḥman Qulī’ in place of ‘Chaman Qulī’, as is given in Waḥid-niyā’s non-critical edition.

¹¹⁰ *Dar Mā warā al-nahr āshub wa fitnah wa jang wa judā-st*: TA 219.

¹¹¹ He appears to have entered into negotiations with Badī’ al-Zamān, the Badakhshani renegade ruler (for whom see below, pp. 187–189). *Maktūbāt* 345b–346a preserves the text of what is supposedly a letter from Badī’ al-Zamān to Raḥman Qulī, informing the addressee that he has recently “raised the flag of religious war in the regions of Badakhshan and Khuttalān” (*liwā-yi ghāziyatī dar mamālik-i Badakhshān wa Khuttalān bar afrākhatah [...]*).

seat at Shahrīsabz in an attempt to establish himself in the south of the khanate. ‘Abbās’ ambitions proved vain, however, when he was soon captured in the vicinity of Samarqand and put to death for treachery.¹¹² Bāqī Muḥammad capitalised on his momentum by then expelling Raḥman Qulī from authority over Khuzār.¹¹³ Nor, according to the Mughal chronicler ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Lāhawrī, did Bāqī Muḥammad stop there. In the *Pādīshāh-nāmah*, Lāhawrī claims that Bāqī Muḥammad suspected his grandfather Yār Muḥammad of having shown favour to ‘Abbās Sultan and other dissident family members, and so demoted him from titular authority, elevating Jānī Muḥammad in his place to the *salṭanat-i šūrī*.¹¹⁴ While the claim finds no independent confirmation elsewhere, it helps account for the puzzling passage in the *Baḥr al-asrār* where Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī blandly relates how Yār Muḥammad soon after being elevated to titular authority disavowed the title in favour of his son (see above, p. 142 n. 6).¹¹⁵ Although it is impossible to identify for certain the actual circumstances of Yār Muḥammad’s demotion, it is clear that in the wake of this episode the family’s intra-dynastic relations were changed for good: having briefly experimented with a form of corporate rule, Bāqī Muḥammad had now taken steps to ensure that political authority was confined much more closely in his own hands. Where Yār Muḥammad and his descendents had formerly comprised a sort of ruling collective similar to that established by the sixteenth-century Abū’l-Khayrīds, Bāqī Muḥammad now ensured that none other than the descendents of his own father Jānī Muḥammad would henceforth be considered for the khanal title: dynastic politics in the seventeenth century would look very different from those in the sixteenth.¹¹⁶

¹¹² BA 65a.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 65a–b.

¹¹⁴ PN 1.218: *Chūn Bāqī Khān dar yāft kih jaddash bih tarbiyat-i pisarān-i khūd ‘Abbās Sulṭān wa Tursūn Sulṭān wa Pīr Muḥammad Sulṭān, kih nah az mādar-i Jānī Khān-and, sar-i garm ast, pidar-i khūd-rā Jānī Khān bih khānī bar girift*. See also ‘AṢ 1.305, recounting how after two years in titular authority Yār Muḥammad became ill-disposed towards Bāqī Muḥammad (*bā Bāqī Khān nahīrah-yi khūd bī-lutfī āghāz nihādah* [...]), and began lending his support instead to ‘Abbās Sultan, Tursūn Sultan and Pīr Muḥammad Sultan, whereupon Bāqī Muḥammad foiled his ambitions and elevated Jānī Muḥammad to titular authority in his place (*jadd az kār kūtāh sakhtah Jānī Muḥammad Khān pidar-i khūd-rā bih salṭanat mawsum namūd*). Although these accounts find no direct support in any other source tradition, they perhaps chime with Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī’s account, BA 61a, of how at some point Yār Muḥammad stepped down from titular authority (see above, p. 142 n. 6).

¹¹⁵ For discussion of this point, see Burton, “Who Were the First Ashtarkhānid Rulers of Bukhara?”, 485–486.

¹¹⁶ For further discussion of this point, with particular reference to the significance in the seventeenth century of the office of *kagalgā*, see below, pp. 277–278.

One source which says little about these changes is the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*. As a descendent of Yār Muḥammad through the line not of Jānī Muḥammad but of Tursūn Muḥammad,¹¹⁷ the historian Ḥājjī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm was the offspring of people who had effectively been disenfranchised from khalan eligibility by Bāqī Muḥammad's reconfiguration of the Tūqāy-Timūrid ruling collective: the process of disenfranchisement was perhaps not something on which he wished to dwell. Ḥājjī Mīr is, however, at pains to emphasise that not all Tursūn Muḥammad's descendents alienated themselves in the way that 'Abbās Sultan had done. Throughout the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*, he claims that for several decades thereafter a number of 'Tursūnids' continued to make themselves invaluable to the ruling khan.¹¹⁸ While we might be tempted to disregard his claim as a self-serving one, it is interesting to note that the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* is not the only source to suggest that certain Tursūnid elements retained an important function after the downfall of 'Abbās Sultan. In the *Tārīkh-i miṭṭāḥ al-qulūb*, the Safavid chronicler Aḥmad b. Shams al-Dīn claims that in late spring 1602 Tursūn Muḥammad and his son Shāh Sa'īd Sultan accompanied Bāqī Muḥammad and several other Tūqāy-Timūrid sultans on a journey down to Balkh.¹¹⁹ If this is indeed

¹¹⁷ *SilSal* 127a and 148a, referring to Tursūn Muḥammad as the author's (4,0) ancestor (*jadd-i sīwum-i mu'allif; jadd-i sīwum raqim-i akhbār*); also 208b, 251b, 262b, where Ḥājjī Mīr identifies himself as the son of Rustam Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Yār b. Pāyandah Muḥammad b. Tursūn Muḥammad b. Yār Muḥammad.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 208a–b, on how in 1040 (23 April 1640–11 April 1641) the Bukharan khan Nadir Muḥammad b. Dīn Muḥammad appointed Šūfī Sultan b. Tursūn Muḥammad, formerly governor of Tāliqān, to gubernatorial authority in the recently-conquered regions of Khwārazm and Ūrganj, and was subsequently richly rewarded for his services (*Šūfī Sultān ibn Tursūn Muḥammad Sultān-rā, kih qabl az in hukūmat-i Tāliqān dāsht, bih iyālat-i Khwārazm wa Ūrganj muqarrar farmūdah [...] Šūfī Sultān ḥasab al-ḥukm bih Khwārazm wa Ūrganj raftah bih tansiq wa nizām-i ānjā pardākhtah [...] bih khil'athā-yi shāhānah wa tashrifāt-i pādishāhānah mutafakkkhir wa mubāhi gardidand*); *ibid.*, 251b, on how Muḥammad Yār b. Pāyandah Muḥammad b. Tursūn Muḥammad (described as *jadd-i amjad-i raqim-i in awraq wa khādīm-i makhādīm-i āfāq*) assisted Nadir Muḥammad during a mid-seventeenth-century Mughal attack on Balkh.

¹¹⁹ *TMQ* 557a, noting the participation also of Pīr Muḥammad (i.e. Pīr Muḥammad b. Malīk), Jānī Muḥammad, and Imām Qulī and Nadir Muḥammad, sons of the late Dīn Muḥammad. By contrast Ḥājjī Mīr Muḥammad Salīm states (*SilSal* 148a) that Tursūn Muḥammad died in Samarqand in late 1598; as part of his Tursūnid-centric narrative, he proceeds to claim that it was the news of Tursūn Muḥammad's death, together with 'Abd al-Mu'mīn's refractory behaviour, which provoked the Qazaq khan Tawakkul to attack Tashkent (for which episode see above, pp. 103–104): *chūn riḥlat-i Tursūn Muḥammad Sultān wa sar kashī-yi 'Abd al-Mu'mīn Khān dar Turkistān ishtihār yāft, salāṭīn-i Qazāq sar bih tughyān bar āwurdah wa Tawakkul Sultān ism-i khāni bar khūd iṭlāq kardah hā lashkari bar sar-i Tāskhand āmadah wa ān-rā muḥāsarah kard*. In offering this account, Ḥājjī Mīr Muḥammad

true, Bāqī Muḥammad was lucky that he could count on their support. He had received news from Walī Muḥammad that a Safavid army was marching on Balkh, and it looked as though he was going to need all the help he could get.

Inertial Loyalty: Variations on a Theme

When Walī Muḥammad captured Balkh in late 1600, many stakeholders in the former Balkhi regime immediately fled the region. Whereas Bāqī Muḥammad still felt sufficiently insecure after Samarqand to deem it worthwhile dispatching advance parties to track down some of these fugitives, neither he nor Walī Muḥammad took such trouble in the wake of their Balkhi success. Some time later, therefore, lots of fugitives were being treated to warm receptions at foreign courts.

According to Aḥmad b. Shams al-Dīn in the *Tārīkh-i miftāḥ al-qulūb*, ‘Ibādallāh b. Maḥmūd after the fall of Ḥiṣār had headed for India,¹²⁰ thus following the example of various sixteenth-century Badakhshani princes who had similarly deserted south in times of danger or hardship.¹²¹ Two of ‘Ibādallāh’s Abū’l-Khayrid kinsmen, meanwhile, had fled for Isfahan. One of them was Pīr Muḥammad’s son Muḥammad Salīm Sultan. Muḥammad Salīm had hitherto been based not in Balkh but in Andkhūd, about a hundred and thirty miles to the west,¹²² where he had been appointed to gubernatorial office by ‘Abd al-Amīn. After ‘Abd al-Amīn’s death, Muḥammad Salīm had been able to establish himself in autonomous authority, and by late 1600 he had been ruling the region for about a year.¹²³ With him for much of that period had been a youth called Jahāngīr, who was the first cousin of the current Balkhi incumbent Muḥammad Ibrāhīm.¹²⁴ After Tawakkul’s defeat in early 1599, Jahāngīr had been appointed by the Bukharan ruler Pīr

Salim distorts his TĀĀ’A source narrative, which states (TĀĀ’A 552–553) that Tawakkul was emboldened to act solely by news of the hostility between ‘Abdallāh and ‘Abd al-Mu’min: *chūn akhbār-i mukhālifat wa nizā’-i pidar wa pīsar dar Turkistān shuyū’ yāft, salāṭīn-i Qazāq [...] sar bih tughyān bar āwurdah [...].*

¹²⁰ ‘Ibādallāh Sulṭān walad-i Maḥmūd Sulṭān, *kih ḥākīm-i Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān būd, chūn dūd kih tāb-i muqāwamat nadārad, qa’ah-rā andākhatah mutawajjih-i Hindūstān shud*: TMQ 556b.

¹²¹ Burton, *The Bukharans*, 47–48.

¹²² *Contra* Alekseev, *Politicheskaia istoriia Tukai-Timuridov*, 105, as noted above (p. 168), suggesting that Muḥammad Salīm had instead previously been based in the region of Ḥiṣār.

¹²³ TĀĀ’A 606 (followed in turn by *SilSal* 163b); *AJT* 133b.

¹²⁴ For his descent (Jahāngīr b. Sayyid Muḥammad b. Kipak b. Būpāy b. Khwājah Muḥammad) see *MB* 178 and TĀĀ’A 606 (followed in turn by *SilSal* 163b).

Muḥammad to govern Tashkent. But relations had worsened between him and Bāqī Muḥammad, his neighbour to the south in Samarqand. The situation reached the point where Jahāngīr took flight, first to Dabūsiyah and then to Bukhara, where he sought refuge with Pīr Muḥammad. Jahāngīr did not participate in the Samarqand showdown, but when news arrived of Bāqī Muḥammad's victory he fled Bukhara for Balkh, whence he was dispatched to assume gubernatorial authority over Shibarghān, a small town some thirty miles southeast of Andkhūd.¹²⁵ When Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr learned of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid advance, they were worried. Shibarghān and Andkhūd were within easy striking distance from Balkh, and neither individual had reason to expect much kindness from Bāqī Muḥammad. Consequently, both men abandoned their stronghold and headed west in search of refuge.¹²⁶

In addition to the two Abū'l-Khayrid princes, a number of Balkhi *amīrs* fled west towards the Iranian frontier.¹²⁷ Many of these *amīrs* had long experience in the art of transferring and re-transferring their allegiance. Several, including Yār Muḥammad Mīrzā and Shīr Afkān Mīrzā, had conspired in the murder of 'Abd al-Mu'min and the elevation of 'Abd al-Amīn (see above, pp. 45-46); of others, such as 'Arab Atāliq and Shāh Khwājah Naqīb, we know only that they had a hand in 'Abd al-Amīn's overthrow and the elevation first of Muḥammad Ibrāhīm¹²⁸ and then of 'Abdallāh b. Maḥmūd.¹²⁹ From late 1598 onwards, these Balkhi *amīrs* had done whatever they could to preserve their investment in the status quo. Their desertion to Isfahan in winter 1600-1601 was the latest step in this struggle. Seeking refuge with 'Abbās, they joined Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr in imploring him for help to restore the former Balkhi established regime.¹³⁰

Yār Muḥammad Mīrzā et al. clearly deemed that it was preferable to seek 'Abbās' help in restoring a Balkhi established regime than to defect to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid oppositional regime. Despite our suggestion that the Samarqand showdown constituted a 'tipping point', some Balkhis in late 1600 seem thus to have displayed greater inertial loyalty to a defunct regime than Bukharans such as Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān had done over a year earlier, even though Tūqāy-Tīmūrid successes in the intervening period

¹²⁵ *MB* 179, *BA* 58b.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 64b; *AfT* 133a.

¹²⁷ *TĀĀ'A* 608-609.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 601; *AfT* 133b; *NZJ* 129.

¹²⁹ *TĀĀ'A* 606.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 609-610.

meant that the probabilistic cost of defection had decreased, and that of non-defection had risen to increasingly unattractive levels. Although such behaviour may seem counter-intuitive, in fact it should not come as a surprise.

In winter 1600–1601, the Balkhi *amīrs* may have had good cause to prefer desertion over defection, since any payoff accruing from this latter course of action might be minimised by the fact that *they had not defected to Bāqī Muḥammad earlier*. Yār Muḥammad Mīrzā et al. had grounds for fearing that late defection would avail them little. Having conspicuously failed to follow Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān's example by defecting to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds in 1599, the Balkhi *amīrs* would be hard-pushed to claim that their subsequent change of heart was anything other than opportunistic, and their loyalty to Bāqī Muḥammad anything other than a temporary expedient; they might thus suffer from a perceived 'integrity deficit' relative to those *amīrs* who had defected earlier. Even if Bāqī Muḥammad judged them to display sufficient integrity to merit an entrée into his oppositional regime, meanwhile, there was no assurance that they would receive a defection payoff sufficient to offset the losses incurred by the termination of the Balkhi established status quo. After all, by late 1600 a combination of Bāqī Muḥammad's long-time associates and earlier defectors from Pīr Muḥammad's regime might well already have stacked the higher rungs of a Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd patronage ladder. Had the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds aspired to unbounded conquest, Yār Muḥammad Mīrzā et al. could have held out the hope that they, as members of the 'periphery' in late 1600, might with time be absorbed into the lucrative ranks of the 'centre', as a zone of newly-subjugated lands expanded ever beyond them. As it was, however, the unlikelihood, in the light of 'Abdallāh's Kashgar debacle (see below, p. 273), of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds' attempting unbounded conquest suggested that the scope for preferment was finite, and that the window of opportunity for other people to attain high advancement within the regime had already diminished. As the proportion of 'Abdallāh's former empire now under Bāqī Muḥammad's authority grew, the scope for advantage through defection shrank accordingly. As a famous twentieth-century defector warned an equally famous devotee of the status quo, life tends to punish latecomers:¹³¹ and people who had not already defected to Bāqī Muḥammad had

¹³¹ The words of Gorbachev to Honecker in October 1989. See J. Schade, "Massenpsychologie der Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen", in *Forum der Psychoanalyse* 19 (2003), 42–49 [45].

Total defections to Bāqī Muḥammad,
as percentage of khalan population




Figure 11: Stereotypical graph illustrating the likely consequences of reducing defection payoff over time, showing x as proportion of residual non-defectors.¹³²

increasingly little incentive to do so.¹³³ Bāqī Muḥammad would find this to be a problem for the rest of his reign.

Bāqī Muḥammad perhaps soon regretted not taking greater steps to prevent Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr from taking sanctuary with the Safavids. Arriving in Isfahan, the princes received a warm welcome, which

¹³² In the absence of robust statistical data, I here merely offer a generic S-curve graph, similar to those found in various quantitative studies of uptake rates in the adoption of new practices, whether pertaining to religious conversion, for which see R. Bulliet, *Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period: An Essay in Quantitative History* (Cambridge, MA, 1979), 27–28, or to the adoption of new technologies, for which see E.M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations*, 5th edition (New York, 2003), 272–273.

¹³³ An analogy presents itself with the early sixteenth century, where Tīmūrid-appointed office holders who failed to defect early to Muḥammad Shībānī subsequently proved extremely resistant towards his invading forces. See e.g. *ShN* (Ṣāliḥ) 98–106, blaming the sufferings experienced by Samarqandis during the city's lengthy siege on Abū'l-Makārim, the local *shaykh al-islām*. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ claims that Abū'l-Makārim's fear of losing his *ex officio* privileges led him selfishly to defy popular appeals for surrender, even in the face of overwhelming enemy opposition.

they reciprocated with the gift of an enormous diamond which 'Abd al-Mu'min had seized at the capture of Mashhad.¹³⁴ When Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr asked 'Abbās for help in re-establishing Abū'l-Khayrid authority over Greater Mā warā al-nahr, the shah was evidently pleased to have a pretext for flexing his muscles in the region, just as he had done previously by sponsoring Muḥammad Ibrāhīm's Balkhi elevation.¹³⁵ According to Faḍli Khūzānī Iṣfahānī in the *Afdal al-tawārīkh*, 'Abbās dispatched Khān Muḥammad Bīk, *dīwānbīkī* to the late Dīn Muḥammad b. Jānī Muḥammad, to Bukhara with a letter presenting Bāqī Muḥammad with two options: if he surrendered Balkh to the two fugitive princes and confined his own authority to Bukhara and Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān, then hostilities between Iran and Turan would come to an end, whereas his failure to do as requested would result in the misery of ongoing warfare.¹³⁶ When Khān Muḥammad Bīk returned to the Safavid court with news that Bāqī Muḥammad refused to cede even the smallest piece of territory,¹³⁷ Shah 'Abbās amassed his troops and set off for the east.¹³⁸ The Tūqāy-Timūrid regime thus found itself

¹³⁴ T'ĀĀ'A 610. *SilSal* 164a–b offers a longer account, noting how Humāyūn b. Bābur had originally given the diamond to Shah Ṭahmāsb, who had presented it to the shrine at Mashhad where it had subsequently fallen into the hands of invading Uzbek forces and entered the possession of Yār Muḥammad Mīrzā, who upon his flight from Balkh to Andkhūd presented it in turn to Muḥammad Salīm Sultan. In *Aft* 134a Faḍli Khūzānī Iṣfahānī offers a substantively very similar (though independently worded) account of the diamond's history.

¹³⁵ Note, however, that several sources suggest other pretexts for the campaign. *TMQ* 556b and *RŞ* 753 relate that 'Abbās moved in response to news of Muḥammad Ibrāhīm's death, while *TMKh* 128 suggests that he claimed to be avenging members of the Qarābī tribe whom Bāqī Muḥammad had supposedly killed in vengeance for the death of his brother Dīn Muḥammad (for which see above, p. 60).

¹³⁶ *Nazd-i Bāqī Khān fristādand kih "Chūn salāṭīn-zādahhā-yi Tūrān panāh bih īn āstān āwurdaḥ-and, agar chūnān-chih bih dastūr Balkh-rā bih īshān gudhashtah khūd bih wilāyat-i Bukhārā wa Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān rawand, raf'-i kulfat-i mā-bayn-i Irān wa Tūrān khwāhad shud, wa illā āmadah-yi qital wa jidāl būdah, az āsīb-i ghāziyān-i ṣafar-qarīn ayman nabāshad": Aft* 142b.

¹³⁷ *Dar īn waqt Khān Muḥammad Bīk az nazd-i Bāqī Khān āmadah bih 'arḍ rasānīd kih mushār ilayhi bih riqā-yi khūd yak qi'ah-yi mulk-i Mā warā al-nahr-rā bih salāṭīn-zādagān nakhwāhad dād, wa qarār-i jang dād: ibid.*

¹³⁸ Contrast with *TMQ* 557a, which makes no mention of 'Abbās' ultimatum, noting instead how Walī Muḥammad, stricken with panic at the news of the Safavid advance, consulted as to what he should do with his *amīrs*, who advised him—in vain—to abandon Balkh and bide his time in Bukhara until Shah 'Abbās' departure, whereafter he might recapture the city without difficulty (*chūn khabar-i tawajjuh-i khāqān-i a'zam bih sam'-i Walī Muḥammad Khān rasīd, jahān dar pīsh-i chashmash tārik shudah [...] dil az ḥukūmat bar dāshtah bā umarā mashwarat kard, sardāran guftand "Ṣalāḥ dar ān ast kih Balkh-rā gudhāshtah mutawajjih-i Bukhārā shawīm, wa chūn khāqān-i a'zam bih 'Irāq murāja'at namāyad mā bā lashkar mutawajjih shudah Balkh az Qizīlbāsh mitawānīm girift"*). See also T'ĀĀ'A 613, which again

confronted by the first of what would prove to be several attempted Abū'l-Khayrid restorations.

The run of such attempted restorations over the first two decades of the seventeenth century attests to the eagerness both of Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr to restore their 'ancestral holdings', and of the Safavid regime to exploit such impulses to its own advantage. But it also attests to the singular lack of success attending such initiatives. Events would show, indeed, that appeals from Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr constituted an 'opportunity' which 'Abbās might have done well to resist. The backing which he had previously offered Muḥammad Ibrāhīm offered little analogy with his attempt to restore the two princes. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm had been able to exploit people's investment in an established status quo which stood imperilled by 'Abd al-Amīn's vacillating and dubiously-authorized established regime. But things had changed in the intervening period. By the time 'Abbās marched in support of Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr, locals who had remained in Khurāsān after Bāqī Muḥammad's conquest of the region had already thrown in their lot with the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds: and inertial loyalties now militated on behalf of what constituted a new Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd established regime.

When 'Abbās' forces arrived at the Khurāsāni town of Andkhūd, Bāqī Muḥammad's local gubernatorial appointee Mu'min Bī Qarāwul recognised that his garrison would have little hope of withstanding the incoming army, and he abandoned the city.¹³⁹ Andkhūd submitted without opposition, and 'Abbās was able to reappoint Muḥammad Salīm to the authority he had previously enjoyed.¹⁴⁰ To judge, though, from a popular Persian saying which apparently originated from around this time—"Escape from Andkhūd", it ran, "it is the very image of hell!"¹⁴¹—members of the new Qizilbash-backed regime do not seem to have enjoyed much of a welcome. As 'Abbās

makes no mention of 'Abbās' ultimatum, and states that the shah sent Bāqī Muḥammad a letter simply informing him that he was marching east in support of the two princes.

¹³⁹ TA 222; T'ĀĀ'A 622-623; AfT 144a; BA 66b-67a.

¹⁴⁰ AfT 144a-145b, noting also the appointment of 'Arab Bahādur as Muḥammad Salīm's *atāliq*; T'ĀĀ'A 623.

¹⁴¹ Appendix to Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī (ed. and tr. C. Schefer), *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand). Depuis les derniers années du règne de Nadir Chah (1153), jusque'en 1233 de l'Hégire (1740-1818), par Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary.* (Paris, 1876), 261: "Les Efchar furent transplantés du Khorassan à Endkhou par Châh Abbas. Un proverbe persan dit: "Fuis Endkhou! L'eau y est amère et salée: le sable y écorche: elle est remplie de scorpions et les mouches sont venimeuses. F-loigne-toi de cette ville, elle est l'image de l'enfer!"

advanced further east towards Balkh, he was similarly unable to prevail upon locals to defect to his Abū'l-Khayrid protégés. The Balkhis stayed loyal to their governor Walī Muḥammad, and 'Abbās' army was compelled to camp some distance away from the city.¹⁴² Nor evidently did the agrarian population rally to 'Abbās' assistance. In order to feed itself, the Safavid army took to raiding the surrounding countryside, at the same time establishing a long-distance logistical chain, all the way back to central Iran. With the army thus dependent on over-extended supply lines, resources soon dwindled, and in late June or July 1602¹⁴³ 'Abbās had to retreat after barely a skirmish when his weakened forces succumbed to an outbreak of dysentery.¹⁴⁴

'Abbās had inflicted a needless defeat upon himself, and his mistake was basic. He had assumed that the presence of Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr would excite people's Abū'l-Khayrid loyalties and thereby ease his accession to Khurāsāni authority. This was wrong. Proclamations that 'Abbās was restoring the Abū'l-Khayrids to their rightful authority would probably have cut little ice with the population of northern Khurāsān even if such claims had not been tainted with the stain of Safavid 'heterodoxy'. People did not rally to the princes' oppositional regime on this occasion, and they did not do so a few years later in 1607 when the princes once again attempted to regain authority.¹⁴⁵ Since, *ceteris paribus*, people's inertial loyalties naturally inclined towards the established alignment of authority, it was a risky bet supporting pretenders against an incumbent regime. Once a dynasty was in power, it was difficult to remove it.

Three Years after Samarqand

The result more of food poisoning than of martial valour, Bāqī Muḥammad's 'victory' against Shah 'Abbās was neither quite as dashing nor quite as decisive as it might have been. As chapter 5 will show, however, authors sympathetic or beholden to the Tūqāy-Timūrid regime soon began placing particu-

¹⁴² *KhB* 31a.


¹⁴³ *TA* 226, dating events to early 1011 (21 June 1602–10 June 1603). *AfT* 143a, *RŠ* 753 and *NZJ* 180 offer similar dates. Contrast with *KhB* 31a, dating events instead to 1009 (13 July 1600–1 July 1601), and Morley 162 31a, suggesting that Safavid forces marched on Balkh just a month after Bāqī Muḥammad's elevation to authority in 1008 (24 July 1599–12 July 1600).

¹⁴⁴ *TMQ* 557a; *TĀĀ'A* 626–628; *AfT* 145b–146a; *RŠ* 755–756; *NZJ* 180.

¹⁴⁵ *TMQ* 559a; *AfT* 185b; *TĀĀ'A* 706–707 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 169a–170a); *BA* 82a and 173b; *MatT* 93a.

lar emphasis upon this Balkh showdown as a core element of their narrative repertoires. Not only did the khan's success invite flattering intertextual comparison with the chequered track-records of previous rulers of note (see e.g. above, p. 51), but subsequent commentators could interpret 'Abbās' forced withdrawal as Bāqī Muḥammad's first victory against a ruler who shared his own imperial status. The Balkh showdown was very different from Bāqī Muḥammad's Samarqand victory, for instance, which by itself had simply confirmed the Tūqāy-Timūrid's pre-eminence among many individuals aspiring to political authority in Greater Mā warā al-nahr. A cascade of defections followed by a run of easy regional conquests meant that by the time of 'Abbās' ill-fated eastern campaign Bāqī Muḥammad was empowered to act in a manner much more akin to that of 'Abdallāh Khan, as befitting an imperial hegemon. If Bāqī Muḥammad's success reflected his canny policy of making stakeholders of his supporters and expanding his resource base, it was also a consequence of that more autonomous process whereby a quorum of risk-averse and interest-maximising parties incrementally opted to throw in their lot with the new regime.

Even as Bāqī Muḥammad basked in the glory of this putative triumph, however, several problems were developing on the horizon. Already by late 1600, the Tūqāy-Timūrids had penetrated those regions of the khanate which they had calculated would easily submit. Elsewhere, however, they were still much more hesitant. Following a run of Timūrid pretenders, Badakhshan presently sat under the control of Mirzā Badī' al-Zamān b. Khwājah Ḥasan Khāldār Ahrārī; as will become clear, events had already allowed Badī' al-Zamān to demonstrate his intentions to be rather more energetic in his defence of Badakhshani autonomy than his predecessors had been. Another problematic individual was Kildī Muḥammad, whom we previously encountered (p. 167) as a rebel based in the Fergana valley, but who by 1602 was securely established in authority over an extensive territory north of the Syr Darya. These two men were considerably more threatening than the likes of Maḥmūd Sultan at Ḥiṣār or the Balkhi *amīrs* who had fled into Safavid exile. They were threatening because of who they were: or because of who their local constituencies of support perceived them to be. Events over the next couple of years would highlight a fundamental difficulty which continued to haunt the Tūqāy-Timūrids throughout the dynasty's hundred-and-fifty-year history. This was the problem of communal loyalty.



CHAPTER FOUR

COMMUNAL LOYALTY

Local Challenges

Bāqī Muḥammad had no opportunity to rest on his laurels after his success against Shah 'Abbās at Balkh. Events in the east of the khanate now demanded his attention. Instead of marching back to Bukhara, therefore, he headed east in the direction of Badakhshan, where somebody called Mīrzā Badī' al-Zamān was making trouble.

Badakhshan was a mountainous and remote region in the southeast of the khanate, and was the last area within what would subsequently be regarded as the Bukharan *mamālik-i mahrūsah* to come under imperial authority.¹ For almost forty years it was ruled by Sulaymān Mīrzā b. Khān Mīrzā, a (0,6) descendent of Tīmūr,² who through an adroit series of diplomatic manœuvres was able to defy Abū'l-Khayrid ambitions in the area until 1584, when 'Abdallāh finally captured the region after a lengthy winter campaign.³ Even after 'Abdallāh had successfully reduced Badakhshan, figures associated with the previously-established Tīmūrid ruling dynasty continued to claim authority over the region from their sanctuary in India. The first such move occurred in 1586, when the former incumbent Sulaymān Mīrzā briefly regained power, before succumbing to Bukharan forces.⁴ Three years later, an individual professing to be Sulaymān's great-grandson Muḥammad Zamān appeared in Badakhshan, claiming to have escaped from captivity in Bukhara.⁵ He tried to set himself up in authority, but was

¹ Subsequent conquests in western Khurāsān and Khwārazm during the late 1580s and 1590s were temporary, and both regions are excluded from most seventeenth-century accounts of khalan holdings.

² For Sulaymān's rule, see e.g. Lowick, "Coins of Sulaimān Mīrzā of Badakhshān", and Akhmedov, "Poslednie Timuridy i bor'ba za Badakhshan", in Bulgakov and Karimov (eds.), *Issledovaniia po istorii, istorii nauki i kul'tury narodov Srednei Azii*, 82–98 [93–97].

³ For the campaign, see *ShNSh* 3497 210b–218a, *AN* III.435 and 441–447, and *AA* I.326, dating events to 992 (14 January 1584–2 January 1585); also *RS* 432b–445a, *RR* 243a–250a, *TA* II.597, *MB* 347–353, *TMQ* 546a, *BA* 7418 389b–391a. Dickson ("Shāh Tahmāsb and the Ūzbeks", 47) instead dates events to 991 (25 January 1583–13 January 1584).

⁴ *KhT* 901; *AN* III.514–515; *TA* II.601–603; echoes in *ShNSh* 3497 227a–228b, *RR* 249a.

⁵ *AN* III.571.

soon defeated and killed.⁶ Both attempts at a Timūrid restoration thus came to little. However, after the end of 'Abdallāh's forceful reign in early 1598, Abū'l-Khayrid authority over the region faltered, and a succession of individuals claiming Timūrid descent managed sequentially to establish themselves in authority.

By June 1601, Mīrzā Badī' al-Zamān had killed the last of these individuals and assumed control of the region himself.⁷ It swiftly transpired that Badī' al-Zamān would be rather more assertive than his Timūrid predecessors. Several sources relate that he proceeded to issue the *khutbah* and *sikkah* in the name of Akbar, the Mughal ruler of India.⁸ At the same time, however, he sent an envoy to Isfahan in order to negotiate an alliance with Shah 'Abbās,⁹ subsequently demonstrating his enthusiasm for this Safavid alliance by contributing forces towards 'Abbās' abortive attempt on Balkh.¹⁰ This act rendered him the first Badakhshani ruler since Sulaymān's grandson Shāhrukh Mīrzā in 1579 to engage in military action beyond Badakhshan or its immediate environs.¹¹ Such temerity made it quite clear to Bāqī Muḥammad that he needed to counter this Badakhshani threat. He gathered troops for the forthcoming campaign, and dispatched his associate Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dūrmān (see above, pp. 143–144) in advance to scout out the territory.¹²

According to Aḥmad b. Shams al-Dīn in the *Tārīkh-i miftāḥ al-qulūb*, Badī' al-Zamān was frightened to learn of Bāqī Muḥammad's approach, and told his *amīrs* that he planned to flee to Kabul. His supporters dissuaded him from this course of action. They claimed that he had little immediately to fear: if Bāqī Muḥammad were to advance into Badakhshan he would first have to reduce the citadel of Qunduz along the way, and two hundred years earlier such a feat had taken Timūr's renowned army a full seven months.

⁶ *RS* 445b; *BA* 7418 407b–409b; *TSh* 150–152; *SilSal* 147a.

⁷ *AN* III.792; *TSR* 202a (followed in turn in *ATR* 65).

⁸ *MuT* (Shīrāzī) 260a; *NZJ* 180.

⁹ *TA* 220. Badakhshani-Safavid diplomatic relations were nothing new: Akhmedov, "Poslednie Timuridy i bor'ba za Badakhshan", discusses communications between Sulaymān Mīrzā and Shāh Tahmāsb I, as contained, ff. 52a–69b, in an uncatalogued Safavid documentary compilation held in Tashkent as IOSASU 13231.

¹⁰ *NZJ* 180, telling how "when the 'Iraqi army came to Balkh, [Badī' al-Zamān] also dispatched the Badakhshani army to assist Shah 'Abbās, and his troops did enormous damage in the vicinity of Balkh" (*dar nawāḥi-yi Balkh wayrāni-yi bisyār bisyār kard*).

¹¹ For Shāhrukh Mīrzā's activities, including his relations with various Abū'l-Khayrid dynasts who shared his antipathy towards 'Abdallāh's Jānī-Bīkids and his 1579 campaign against Balkh, see *ShNSh* 208b–209a and *MB* 219 and 347, plus discussion in Burton, *The Bukharans*, 32.

¹² *BA* 68b–69b.

Thus reassured, Badī' al-Zamān stood his ground. But his *amīrs'* advice proved misguided: when the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid army reached Qunduz, the citadel quickly succumbed, and Bāqī Muḥammad was able to proceed into Badakhshan itself.¹³ When the two armies lined up against one another, the Badakhshani troops proved no match for the imperial forces. The captive Badī' al-Zamān was brought into the presence of Bāqī Muḥammad, and was swiftly put to the sword.¹⁴

Pretenders in Badakhshan

Chroniclers well disposed to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid regime suggest that Badī' al-Zamān was executed as a rebel. Describing Bāqī Muḥammad's campaign into Badakhshan, Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm in the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* relates how "Badakhshani hotheads and rebellious types" had elevated Badī' al-Zamān to authority, thereby "raising the flag of *fitnah* and *fasād* (rebellious opposition)".¹⁵ Such terminology may have helped the authorities to elicit suitably prejudicial responses to the episode, but it does the modern historian few favours. With no evidence that Badī' al-Zamān had ever recognised Bāqī Muḥammad's authority,¹⁶ there is nothing to suggest that his behaviour satisfied what we previously termed (see above, p. 96) rebellion's 'cognitive transfer condition'. Instead of thinking of Badī' al-Zamān as a rebel, therefore, one may do well to think of him as a *pretender*.

By a 'pretender', I refer to an actor actively proclaiming, or having sponsors actively proclaim on his behalf, a particular identity in a bid for regnal

¹³ *TMQ* 557b; see also *TSR* 202a–b.

¹⁴ *MuT* (Shīrāzī) 260b; *TMQ* 558a; *T'ĀĀ'A* 632 (followed in turn in *SilSal* 167a); *BA* 70a–71a. According to Abū'l-Faḍl 'Allāmī in the *Akbar-nāmah*, Bāqī Muḥammad's treatment of Badī' al-Zamān would have unfortunate consequences for his hapless brother Pāyandah Muḥammad, who since his flight to Qandahār after the battle of Pul-i Salār (see above, p. 89) had been a virtual prisoner of the Mughal ruler Akbar. Having learned of Badī' al-Zamān's death, Pāyandah Muḥammad's captors gave orders for the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid prince to be executed in retribution for his brother's actions: *Mirzā Walī bih kīn-i barādar-i khūd-i Badī' al-Zamān, kih Bāqī Khān az ham gudharānīd, khūn-i ū bī-gunāh* [i.e. Pāyandah Muḥammad] *rīkht*: *AN* III.817. Contrast with *PN* I.219, suggesting that Pāyandah Muḥammad died of illness in Lahore. The circumstances of Pāyandah Muḥammad's death are discussed in Burton, *The Bukharans*, 119.

¹⁵ *Khīrah-sarān wa mutamarridān-i Badakhshān Badī' al-Zamān Mirzā nāmī-rā* [...] *dar ānjā bih salṭanat bar dāstah liwā-yi fitnah wa fasād bar afrāshand*: *SilSal* 167a. Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm here deviates from his *T'ĀĀ'A* source narrative, where no such statement is to be found.

¹⁶ It was a predecessor who in 1599 had supposedly congratulated Bāqī Muḥammad upon his succession to authority in Bukhara (see above, p. 164).

authority which is otherwise unlikely to accrue to him. Construed thus, the term applies to a variety of actors active during the period 1598–1605. It applies to the briefly reigning khans Pīr Muḥammad and ‘Abd al-Amīn, as well as to Muḥammad Salīm, whom Shah ‘Abbās tried to ‘restore’ to Abū’l-Khayrid authority over Balkh in 1602 (see above, pp. 181–184). Like all of these people, Badī’ al-Zamān would have been unlikely to accede to the prominence he did if he and his supporters had not made particular play of the fact of who he was.

Badī’ al-Zamān appears to have asserted for himself a number of distinguished lines of ancestry. Some individuals seem to have believed that he was a descendent of the former Badakhshani ruler Sulaymān Mīrẓā,¹⁷ but this seems dubious.¹⁸ Several other sources suggest that he claimed descent from ‘Ubaydallāh Ahrār.¹⁹ At the same time, he also traced a line of ancestry running back to the Mughal emperor Humāyūn.²⁰ This gave him a claim to being a descendent of the Timūrids, who had ruled Central Asia for a century or so before Muḥammad Shībānī’s Uzbek conquest. Most of our sources

¹⁷ *TĀĀ’A* 632 identifies him as the paternal grandson (*nawādah*) of Sulaymān Mīrẓā’s daughter; *Silsal* 167a garbles this identification (as found also in various MSS of *TĀĀ’A*, e.g. BL Or. 152 f. 337a and BL Add. Or. 16684 f. 236a) giving him instead as the maternal grandson (*nawāsah*) of Sulaymān himself.

¹⁸ Sulaymān Mīrẓā did have a descendent called Badī’ al-Zamān who fled from Badakhshan to Kabul in 1585; see *TJ* I.163, 202, 289, 360 and II.6. But this individual seems then to have been killed not by Bāqī Muḥammad’s forces in Badakhshan but at the hands of his own younger brothers: *ibid.*, II.259. Nevertheless, Badī’ al-Zamān’s supposed descent Sulaymānid descent receives support in Lowick, “More on Sulaimān Mīrẓā and His Contemporaries”, 286.

¹⁹ *TJ* II.91, noting the activities of an individual identified as Badī’ al-Zamān b. Khwājah Ḥasan Khāldār Ahrārī, who “after the death of the Prince [= Muḥammad Ḥākīm b. Humāyūn b. Bābur] ran away, and went to Mā warā al-nahr, [and] in that exile, he died.” The passage is cited in Foltz, *Mughal India and Central Asia*, 61, glossing Muḥammad Ḥākīm as Badī’ al-Zamān’s ‘patron’ (thus contra e.g. *BA* 69a, as below). *MuT* (Shīrāzī) 260b similarly identifies Badī’ al-Zamān as the son of Khwājah Ḥasan, whose own ancestry the author fails to specify; ‘Abd al-Rahīm Mawlawī’s edition of the *Akbar-nāmah* gives him, III.792, as the son of Khwājah Ḥusayn, though certain MSS of the work, e.g. BL Add. 26207 f. 329b, again give him as the son of Ḥasan. *TĀĀ’A* 632 (supported by MSS BL Or. 152 f. 337a and BL Add. Or. 16684 f. 236a) states that Badī’ al-Zamān was *az nīzhād-i khwājahhā-yi Ahrār*; following this account, *Silsal* 167a states that he was *az awlād-i qudrat al-abrār ḥadrat-i Khwājah Ahrār*. *NZJ* 58 does not comment on Badī’ al-Zamān’s descent, but relates that after his death in Badakhshan his body was brought to Samarqand, where it was buried alongside Ahrār. Contrast with *TSR* 202a (followed in turn by e.g. *ATR* 65), identifying Badī’ al-Zamān as the descendent instead of Khwājah ‘Alā al-Dīn ‘Aṭṭār (for discussion of whose life and legacy see Paul, *Doctrine and Organisation*, 3–6).

²⁰ *MuT* (Shīrāzī) 260b; *TA* III.1187; *TMQ* 557b; *TĀĀ’A* 632; *TJ* II.91; *NZJ* 180; *BA* 69a; and *TSR* 202a (followed in turn in *ATR* 65). For his relations with Akbar see also R. Islam, *A Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations (1500–1750)* (2 vols., Tehran, 1982), II.228.

suggest that Badī' al-Zamān's claim to Tīmūrid ancestry was not particularly strong, since his descent from Humāyūn ran through the female line only.²¹ But his claim was stronger than anything which other people in Greater Mā warā al-nahr could manage. It was certainly more authoritative than the claims to Tīmūrid ancestry put forward by his immediate predecessors. The first of these presented himself in Badakhshan soon after 'Abdallāh's death in 1598, claiming to be somebody called Muḥammad Zamān, a great-grandson of the afore-mentioned Sulaymān Mīrzā.²² Muḥammad Zamān himself had tried to expel the Abū'l-Khayrid invaders, but was killed soon after.²³ The person claiming to be him fifteen years later was thus a fraudulent pretender, rather than a genuine one.²⁴

In Badakhshan, as elsewhere in early modern Central Asia, fraudulent pretence was a dangerous business. Of course, people who backed a pretender for pragmatic reasons might continue to do so even if they knew he was acting in bad faith. The Mughal emperor Akbar, for instance, knew quite well that 'Muḥammad Zamān' was not who he said he was, but still offered him extensive military backing in 1598–1599, as a means of weakening Bukhara's position in the southeast of the khanate.²⁵ But any constituency which regarded the pretender's assumed identity as an innate part of his appeal was liable to withdraw its support, violently, should evidence emerge of foul play.²⁶ This is what happened in Badakhshan in summer 1601.

²¹ *MuT* (Shīrāzī) 260b, *TA* III.1187, *TMQ* 557b, *TĀĀ'A* 632, *IJ* II.91 and *TSR* 202a all identify Badī' al-Zamān as Akbar's *khwāhar-zādah*, or nephew on his sister's side. Contrast with *BA* 69a, followed by Burton, *The Bukharans*, 115, identifying him instead as the son of Akbar's brother Muḥammad Ḥakīm b. Humāyūn.

²² *TA* 177; *TSR* 202b.

²³ For his activities, see *ShNSh* 3497 223b–226a, *RS* 445b, *RR* 244b, *AN* III.571, *TSh* 150–152 (differing substantially from the *ShNSh* account) and *BA* 7418 407b–409a; discussion in Akhmedov, *Istoriia Balkha*, 97, and "Poslednie Timuridy i bor'ba za Badakhshan", 96.

²⁴ In fact, he was the second fraudulent pretender claiming to be Muḥammad Zamān; another had already assumed this identity in a bid for power during the period 1590–1594. See *AN* III.571 and 652, identifying him as a native of Andijān.

²⁵ *AN* III.751. According to *MuT* (Badā'ūnī) II.355 and 366–367, Akbar had similarly offered military assistance to the previous Muḥammad Zamān pretender: this contrasts with Burton's claim in *The Bukharans*, 67, that "Akbar, who knew his claim to be false, refused to give him any military help, for he did not want to jeopardize his treaty with 'Abdallāh".

²⁶ Note e.g. events in the fourteenth-century Golden Horde. In 1359, the Bātū id Bīrdī Bik died intestate. His mother Taytughlū Bīkīm therefore secured the elevation of somebody whom she claimed was his late son Kildī Bik, in order to prevent power from slipping beyond her grasp. When the nature of the fraud soon emerged, Kildī Bik was overthrown, and Taytughlū Bīkīm imprisoned and killed. See V.L. Iegorov, "Razvitie tsentrobeznykh ustremlenii v Zolotoi Orde", in *Voprosi istorii* 1974.8, 36–50 [46], and Kafali, "Şiban

As soon as the Badakhshanis realised that the successor of 'Muḥammad Zamān' was not who he claimed to be, the Badakhshanis defected to Badī' al-Zamān in sufficient numbers for him overthrow this hapless incumbent.²⁷ For the next year or so, Badī' al-Zamān was unchallenged as the truest embodiment of a Badakhshani Tīmūrid heritage.

In three years, three pretenders had presented themselves to the Badakhshanis, and all three had presented themselves as Tīmūrids. During this period, they were furthermore the only *soi-disant* Tīmūrids to present themselves anywhere in Greater Mā warā al-nahr. A contrast of sorts thus emerges between the Badakhshani pretenders and the likes of Pīr Muḥammad et al. These latter were what we might term *charismatic pretenders*. Any utility to asserting their dynastic identity lay in their establishing a claim to a supposedly 'intrinsic' quality of Abū'l-Khayrid chosen-ness. By contrast, Badī' al-Zamān and his fraudulent predecessors were *communal pretenders*. The advantage which they derived from asserting their identity was necessarily limited to the confined locale in which they did so. Instead of claiming charisma, these people were claiming a quality of *communal pre-eminence*, accruing to whichever person could presently claim to be most symbolic of, or most sympathetic to, a particular community's self-associative repertoire. It was not just who these people were that mattered. It was who they were, and where they were. Popular support for such 'communal pretenders' would be a recurrent bane to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids for much of the rest of the seventeenth century.

Communal Pretenders in the North

Bāqī Muḥammad entrusted control of Badakhshan to his brother Walī Muḥammad. Because the region was not easily accessible from Walī Muḥammad's gubernatorial base at Balkh, Walī Muḥammad in turn appointed somebody called Bāqī Jān Parwānachī to oversee its day-to-day administration.²⁸ Bāqī Muḥammad now returned to Mā warā al-nahr,²⁹ where he encountered a scene of uproar.

Han Sülalesi ve Özbek Ulusu", in E. Güngör (ed.), *Atsız Armağanı* (Istanbul, 1976), 295–306. For comparable events in seventeenth-century Khwārazm, see Gündoğdu, "Hive Hanlığı Tarihi", 179, and T. Sultanov, "Rod Shibana, syna Dzhuchi: mesto dinastii v politicheskoi istorii Evrazii", in *Tiurkologicheskii sbornik 2001* (2002), 11–27 [24–25].

²⁷ *TSR* 202a.

²⁸ *BA* 71a. For the office of *parwānachī* see *MAr* 147.

²⁹ Note however *TQKh* 269b, where Khwājam Qulī Bik Balkhī claims that Bāqī Muḥammad, after capturing Badakhshan, led a campaign into Khurāsān in 1012 (11 June 1603–29 May

The perpetrator of this uproar was the afore-mentioned Kildī Muḥammad Sultan (see above, p. 167), who was now ruling much of the region north of the Syr Darya from Tashkent eastwards into the Fergana valley. Like Badī' al-Zamān, Kildī Muḥammad was a pretender. He exercised authority in his claimed capacity as a Suyūnchid Abū'l-Khayrid dynast. Unlike Badī' al-Zamān, however, he may very well have been a fraudulent pretender. Writing in the *Musakhkhir al-bilād*, Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan states that Kildī Muḥammad was the son of 'Abd al-Sattār b. Bābā Sultan,³⁰ but a variety of other authors suggest that this was not really the case. The *Baḥr al-asrār* refers to "Kildī Muḥammad, who fraudulently gave himself as counting among the descendents of Bābā Khan",³¹ while the *Imām Qulī-nāmāh* says that he was a member of the Qaṭaghan,³² a notoriously restive tribe³³ with which several other troublemakers from the same era were associated.³⁴ Nor do most Safavid authors support Kildī Muḥammad's claimed identity, despite the shah's predilection for identifying and supporting Abū'l-Khayrid opponents/victims of the new Tūqāy-Timūrid regime. Aḥmad b. Shams al-Dīn at one point in the *Tārīkh-i miṣṭāḥ*

1604), capturing Merv, Mashhad and Nishāpūr and having the *khutbah* issued in his name in Ūrganj (*mutawajjih-i Khurāsān gasht, Marw mustakhlāṣ sākhṭ, qarīb shash māh aṭrāfi Mashhad wa Nishāpūr tawāqūf warzīdah [...] dar Ūrganj khutbah bih nām-i ū khwāndand*). The claim is not supported in other sources, including Khwājājam Qulī Bīk Balkhī's *TShKh* source narrative. However, it perhaps strikes a chime with *SilSal* 157b–158a, where Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm claims that in summer 1599 Bāqī Muḥammad's brother Dīn Muḥammad was able to capture Merv (see above, p. 57). The two passages may reflect a late tradition according to which the first Tūqāy-Timūrid rulers were able to extend their authority much further west than was actually the case.

³⁰ *Dar āwān-i ibtidā-yi dawlat-i khāqānī-yi [...] Bāqī Muḥammad Bahādur Khān, az jamī'ī-ū Ūzbikān dar wilāyat-i Andigān chand kas-rā az awlād-i 'Abd al-Sattār Sulṭān paydā sākhṭand wa tāj-i pādishāhī bar sar nihādah [...] wa az ān jumlah Kildī Muḥammad Sulṭān [kih] shajā-tarīn-i īshān būd [...] khutbah wa sikkah-rā bih nām-i khūd nihādah wa [sic] Bāqī Muḥammad Khān-rā shikast dād: MB 165–166.* We know from other sources that an individual called Kildī Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Sattār actually existed: see Babajanov, Muminov and Paul, *Schaibanidische Grabinschriften*, 112, for a gravestone dedicated to Ṣāḥib Jamāl Khānum, who is identified as the daughter of Kalid Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Sattār. *MuT* (Shirāzī) 260a meanwhile suggests that Kildī Muḥammad was the son instead of 'Abd al-Ghaffār b. Bābā Sultan.

³¹ BA 62a–b, 72a.

³² *Az Qaṭaghān [sic]-nizhādān Kildī bih nām: IQN 116a.*

³³ *DQ 35b–36a, for their piratical activities in the region north of Balkh in 1598; for a somewhat later period, see discussion in J.-H. Grevemeyer, Herrschaft, Raub und Gegenseitigkeit: Die politische Geschichte Badakhshans 1500–1883 (Wiesbaden, 1982), 51–55.*

³⁴ Note e.g. the notorious early seventeenth-century Qazaq khan Tursūn, identified as a member of the Qaṭaghan in *TCh* 65a; for Tursūn's historical association with the Qaṭaghan, see Iudin, "Persidskie i tiurkskie istochniki", 56.

al-qulūb casts doubt on Kildī Muḥammad's Chingīzid descent by identifying him as a *mīrzā*, rather than a khan or sultan,³⁵ while Iskandar Bīk Munshī in the *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī* says that 'Kildī Muḥammad Khan' was a Qazaq.³⁶

Somewhat discomfited by Bāqī Muḥammad's assertion of authority, Kildī Muḥammad had followed the likes of Muḥammad Salīm, Jahāngīr and Bādī' al-Zamān by seeking an alliance with Shah 'Abbās. "Should his Highness dispatch an army [from Isfahan]," he is supposed to have written, in a communication dated to Ramaḍān 1009 (6 March-4 April 1601), a year or so before 'Abbās marched east in support of Muḥammad Salīm and Jahāngīr, "we shall take possession of all of our ancestral land, and we shall become master of Samarqand and Bukhara."³⁷ 'Abbās' abortive Balkh campaign probably did not quite amount to the assistance which Kildī Muḥammad had been hoping for, and Kildī Muḥammad did not succeed in becoming master of Samarqand and Bukhara. He did issue the *khuṭbah* and the *sikkah* in his own name,³⁸ however, and took advantage of Bāqī Muḥammad's forced absence south of the Amu Darya to raid central Mā warā al-nahr with impunity.

When Bāqī Muḥammad arrived in Bukhara, he learned that Kildī Muḥammad had assembled a body of troops from Tashkent, Bārkanḍ, Akhsī, Andījān, Sawrān and Mārghilān, and that together with this army he was raiding lands south of the Syr Darya.³⁹ Bāqī Muḥammad therefore headed towards Tashkent to meet the approaching forces. The resultant battle culminated in an unedifying defeat for Bāqī Muḥammad. The Tūqāy-Timūrid forces showed little resolve on the battlefield, and troops

³⁵ *Guftār dar dhikr-i [...] raftan bih jānib-i Tāshkand bih ḥarb-i Kildī Muḥammad Mirzā: TMQ 558a*. Elsewhere in the work, however, Aḥmad b. Shams al-Dīn refers to 'Kildī Muḥammad Khān'.

³⁶ T'ĀĀ'A 632, rendering Kildī Muḥammad Khan as 'Kilīrī Muḥammad Jān'; this rendering is given also in certain MSS of the work, for example BL Or. 152f. 337a. There is some variation amongst manuscripts, however: BL Add. Or. 16684f. 236a, for example, gives the more conventional 'Kildī Muḥammad'. *SilSal* 168a also gives the conventional rendering, suggesting that Ḥājji Mir Muḥammad Salīm had access to a manuscript of T'ĀĀ'A in which the name was rendered thus.

³⁷ *Chūn nawāb-i kalb-i āstān-i 'ālī az ān jānib lashkar bifristand mā ulkā-yi mawrūthi bi'l-tamām bih dast āwarim wa Samarqand wa Bukhārā-rā šāhibī mikunim: T'A 219*.

³⁸ MB 166. For coin issues, see Davidovich, *Istoriia denezhnogo obrashcheniia*, 251-252, "Serebrianye monety udel'nykh vladitelei kak istochnik po istorii Srednei Azii XVI v.", 91, and *Korpus zolotykh i serebrianykh monet Sheibanidov*, 153.

³⁹ *Chandān lashkar az Tāshkand wa Bārkanḍ wa Akhsī wa Andigān wa Šīrān wa Marghilān bar sar-i Kildī Muḥammad Khān jam' shud, kih 'adadash dar kārkhānah-yi khayāl nagunjad, wa Kildī Muḥammad Khān bā lashkar-i bī-karān az shahr birūn āmadah chūn bih kanār-i Ab-i Shāhrukhiyah rasīd az āb gudhashtah firūd āmad: TMQ 558a*.

were forced to flee back to Samarqand, with the enemy in pursuit.⁴⁰ Arriving before Samarqand's walls, Kildī Muḥammad's forces moved to invest the city. Inside, Bāqī Muḥammad faced further difficulties. The Samarqandi shaykh Hāshim Khwājah Ahrārī was angry at Bāqī Muḥammad for the recent death of his Ahrārī kinsman Badī' al-Zamān in Badakhshan, and only after some time were khan and shaykh sufficiently reconciled together to collaborate in the city's defence.⁴¹ Finally abandoning the siege, Kildī Muḥammad moved off towards a neighbouring settlement—variously identified as either Dabhīd, to the northwest of Samarqand,⁴² or Chūpān Ātā, to the east⁴³—which he hoped would be an easier target. By this point, Bāqī Muḥammad was thoroughly disheartened with the situation. Instead of marching in defence of Dabhīd/Chūpān Ātā himself, he dispatched his kinsman Pīr Muḥammad Sultan to act as leader of the advance guard.⁴⁴ Fortunately for Bāqī Muḥammad, Pīr Muḥammad showed greater resolution than some of his relatives. He launched a ferocious attack on the enemy, seriously wounding Kildī Muḥammad and forcing him to retreat back north across the Syr Darya. Rather like Tawakkul Khan before him (see above, p. 105), when Kildī Muḥammad arrived back at Tashkent he straightaway succumbed to his injuries, and died.⁴⁵

Away from the battlefield, by early 1603 Bāqī Muḥammad appears to have acceded to formal khalif authority.⁴⁶ According to Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī in the *Baḥr al-asrār*, Jānī Muḥammad died in Samarqand after a lengthy illness in 1012 (11 June 1603–29 May 1604), and was buried in Bukhara at the Naqshbandī shrine of Qaṣr-i 'Ārifān.⁴⁷ Bāqī Muḥammad's elevation seems

⁴⁰ Ibid.; *MuT* (Shīrāzī) 260b; *BA* 73a–b.

⁴¹ *BA* 73b; discussion in McChesney, *Central Asia—Foundations of Change*, 103–104.

⁴² *TMQ* 559a.

⁴³ *BA* 73b.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ *LNQ* 131b; *BA* 73b. *TMQ* 559a gives a very similar account of events, but unlike our other sources goes on to suggest that Bāqī Muḥammad was so traumatised by his initial defeat at the hands of Kildī Muḥammad that he fell ill and died soon after: *Bāqī Khān ba'd az raftan-i Kildī Muḥammad Khān az ghaṣah-yi shikastī kih yāftah būd bīmār shud [...] kas bih talab-i Walī Muḥammad Khān fristādah ū-rā az Balkh talab kard, wa chūn Walī Muḥammad Khān bih Samarqand rasīd, barādar-rā bih ān ḥāl dīn-i 'ālam dar nazārash tārīk shud [...] Bāqī Khān jahān-i fānī-rā wadā' namūdah [...]*. For discussion of the circumstances of Bāqī Muḥammad's death, see below, p. 246 n. 304.

⁴⁶ By spring 1603, Bāqī Muḥammad was issuing coins in his own name: see Davidovich, *Istoriia monetnogo dela*, 14.

⁴⁷ *BA* 71b–73a. Discussing the transfer of power from father to son, Burton, *The Bukharans*, 120, suggests that there occurred a progressive cooling in relations between Bāqī Muḥammad

to have had little bearing on affairs north of the Syr Darya, where the situation remained parlous.

When Kildī Muḥammad died, he left a son who would continue to cause problems for the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds until the early years of Imām Qulī Khan's reign (1611–1641).⁴⁸ The more immediate danger, however, now came from somebody who called himself 'Abd al-Ghaffār. This individual seems to have been another fraudulent pretender. Although he claimed to be the eponymous son of the Suyūnchid dynast Bābā Sultan, sources suggest that this was not the case.⁴⁹ One redaction of the *Musakhkhir al-bilād* recounts, for instance, that

After the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan and the start of the reign of Bāqī Muḥammad Khan, a large group of people from Turkistān belong to the *īl* of the Manghits claimed that an individual who bore a resemblance to 'Abd al-Ghaffār Sultan was indeed 'Abd al-Ghaffār, and advanced forth, capturing the *wilāyats* of Turkistān and Tashkent and Akhsi and Andijān.⁵⁰

The subsequent course of events is unclear. According to the afore-mentioned version of the *Musakhkhir al-bilād*, 'Abd al-Ghaffār humiliated Īshim Sultan b. Tawakkul and Bahādur Sultan b. Suyūm in battle, and these two Qazaq princes resolved to avenge their defeat. They took one of 'Abd al-Ghaffār's supporters hostage, interrogating him until he revealed that 'Abd al-Ghaffār was encamped at Qarāqāmīsh, near Tashkent.⁵¹ The Qazaqs hurried thither to launch a dawn raid, and Īshim Khan himself killed 'Abd al-Ghaffār in the subsequent fray.⁵² An alternative redaction of the same

and his father Jānī Muḥammad, and that the older man prudently decided to absent himself from the khanate by heading off on pilgrimage, dying *en route* soon after his departure: but the evidence to support this contention is scant.

⁴⁸ *TMQ* 564a; *IQN* 118b–132b; *BA* 103b–104a. Burton, *The Bukharans*, 121–122, instead dates these later events to 1604–1605.

⁴⁹ Several sources note that 'Abd al-Ghaffār was killed during the reign of 'Abdallāh II. *ZNM* 94a–b recounts his death at the hands of a certain Amīr Shāhim Bī Qūrchi, while *RR* 236b–237a, *ShNSH* 3497 201b–202b and *MB* 167 claim that he and his nephew Mahdī Sultan were killed in the vicinity of Osh by a joint force under the command of 'Ibādallah, 'Abd al-Quddūs, Isfandiyār and Tawakkul, while trying to flee to Kashgar.

⁵⁰ *Ba'd az waḥāt-i 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān wa ibtidā-yi dawlat-i Bāqī Muḥammad Khān jam'ī-yi kathīr az mardum-i Turkistān az īl-i Abūl Manghūt shakhshī-rā kih bih 'Abd al-Ghaffār Sultān bih qadrī mushābahat dāsht 'Abd al-Ghaffār nām nihādah khurūj namūdand, wilāyat-i Turkistān wa Tāshkand wa Akhsi wa Andijān-ra fath namūdand: MB* 167–168, following *MB* StPOIVAN 99b. The Tashkent MS of the work refers to a group of Qaraqalpaqs in place of Manghits.

⁵¹ T.K. Beisembiev, *Annotated Indices to the Kokand Chronicles* (Tokyo, 2008), 648, identifies Qarāqāmīsh as the location of a stream in the Tashkent region.

⁵² *MB* IVANRUZ 1505 65b.

work holds that 'Abd al-Ghaffār instead died at the hands of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds. Concerned at the scale of 'Abd al-Ghaffār's ambitions, we read, Bāqī Muḥammad dispatched a representative beyond the Syr Darya in order to meet the threat. Bāqī Muammad's appointee marched north and defeated 'Abd al-Ghaffār. He then publicly executed another "seventeen or eighteen sons of Bābā" before returning to Bukhara.⁵³

In an essay published in 1993, Robert McChesney briefly discusses the challenges north of the Syr Darya facing the Bukharan khan around the turn of the seventeenth century. He observes that during this period "[t]he appeal of the Suyūnjukid cause remained a powerful force in Tashkent politics".⁵⁴ McChesney thus implies that it was people's loyalty to the quality of 'Suyūnchid-ness' which impelled them to challenge Bukharan rulers who lacked this resource. In fact, it may be truer to suggest that the challenges facing the khan came from *Tashkenti* loyalists. As a series of further pretender incidents occurring between 1587 and 1635 illustrates, it was not some intrinsic attachment to the quality of Suyūnchid-ness which impelled people to challenge Bukharan rule, but their attachment to a communal sense of Tashkenti selfhood. Each local pretender traded on this mode of attachment in turn.

The first of these pretender incidents occurred in 1587–1588, only five years or so after 'Abdallāh Khan had finally captured Tashkent from the Suyūnchids. In this year, we read,

A group of powerful men and a party of eminent figures from among the Turks of the *wilāyat* of Tashkent and the vicinity of Shāhrukhiyah and Khujand began raising, together with a crowd of evil ruffians, a cry of ignorant delusion and vain hope. They gathered in the region of Piskat and, entering into a binding oath with one another, they held a meeting. And in perfect concord and with no appearance of hypocrisy they claimed that the Qazaq sultan Jān 'Alī Sultan, whose physiognomy bore a general resemblance to Bābā Sultan, was indeed Bābā. And according to the rite and custom of Chīngīz Khān, they lifted up a cup and sat him down on the throne of state and sovereignty. And

⁵³ MB StPOIVAN 99b; this is the version given in MB 168. The passage is discussed in Abuseitova, "Musakhkhir al-bilad" Mukhammadiar ibn Arab Katagana kak istochnik po istorii Kazakhstana XVI veka", 10–12, and "Iz istorii vneshnepoliticheskikh sviazei kazhskogo khanstva s sosednimi gosudarstvami vo vtoroi polovine XVII v.", in Tulepbaev (ed.), *Kazakhstan, Sredniia i Tsentral'naia Azia*, 165–176; also Burton, *The Bukharans*, 122, and Iudin, "'Ta'rikh-e Shaibani" kak istochnik", 201–220, and "Persidskie i tiurkskie istochniki", 38.

⁵⁴ McChesney, "The Conquest of Herat 995–996/1587–1588: Sources for the Study of Šafavid/Qizilbāsh—Shībānid/Ūzbek Relations", in J. Calmard (ed.), *Études Safavides* (Paris/Tehran, 1993), 69–107 [96].

however much he tried to strain his neck out from the noose of this fancy, and regardless how he sought to get away from this appalling precipice, they did not leave him to be himself.⁵⁵

In opting to elevate somebody who resembled the Suyūnchid dynast Bābā Sultan, the conspirators would appear to have chosen their candidate carefully. Although Bābā Sultan had been dead since 1582, the circumstances of his death had been obscure: he had died at the hands of the Qazaq Tawakkul far away in the Dasht-i Qipchāq (see above, p. 129), and although Tawakkul had sent Bābā's head to 'Abdallāh's court in Bukhara for confirmation, nobody in Tashkent seems to have seen the corpse. Any members of the local population who were predisposed towards accepting Jān 'Alī Sultan's claimed descent, therefore, might claim some sort of evidential grounds—however flimsy—for doing so. In their choice of candidate, the conspirators evidently reckoned on attracting such people's support.

Like the Kīldī Muḥammad and 'Abd al-Ghaffār incidents, the events of 1587–1588 might seem to support McChesney's contention that Bukharan rule in Tashkent was indeed undermined by people's residual Suyūnchid attachments. But subsequent events put some pressure on this idea. The first of these events occurred during the rule of Bāqī Muḥammad's brother Walī Muḥammad (1605–1611), when a party of Qaraqalpaqs elevated to regional authority somebody whom they identified as Shaykhim Sultan.⁵⁶ As before, 'Shaykhim' seems to have been a fraudulent pretender. The *Musakhkhir al-bilād* relates that the person whom the Qaraqalpaqs elevated was not

⁵⁵ *Atrāk-i wilāyat-i Tāshkand wa nawāḥī-yi Shāhrukhīyah wa Khujand az mardum-i tawān-gir wa firqah-yi mu'tabbar bā fawjī az awbāsh-i bad kahr-i khayālāt-i bāṭil [wa] tamanniyāt bilā tā'il kardah dar mawḍī-i Piskat jam'iyat kardand wa bā yak dīgar 'ahd wa paymān bastah paymān-rā bih aymān tākid dādah kingāsh pish āwurdand wa az ghāyat-i wafāq wa kamāl-i ittifaq bī-shā'ibah-yi nijāq az salāṭīn-i Quzāq Jān 'Alī Sulṭān-rā kih bih šūrāt fi'l-jumlah mushābih-i Bābā Sultān hūd Bābā Sultān khwāndand wa chunān-chih rasm wa ā'in-i Chingiz Khānī ast kāsah bar dāshtah bar masnad-i dawlat wa salṭanat nashāndand wa ū har chand sar az rabqah-yi in khayāl kashid wa khūd-rā az in warṭah-yi hā'il dūr gardānid ū-rā bih khūd namāndand: *ShNSh* 249a; the events are related also in *MB* 191 and *BA* 7418 401a–402a. S.K. Kamalov, "Vzaimootnoshenii karakalpakov s kazakhskimi zhuzimi, bukharskimi i khivinskimi khanstvami v XVI–XVIII vv.," in Kamalov, Zh.U. Ubbiniazov and A.K. Koshchanov (eds.), *Iz istorii vzaimootnoshenii karakalpakov s drugimi narodami Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* (Tashkent, 1988), 21–45 [37], gives a garbled reading of Ḥāfiẓ-i Tanish's text, suggesting that the fraudulent pretender sought to imitate not Bābā Sultan but Barāq Khan, that he was supported in his pretence by the Qaraqalpaqs, and that the attempted elevation occurred not in 1587–1588 but in 1582.*

⁵⁶ *MB* 152; discussion in Ivanov, "Ocherki po istorii karakalpakov", in A.N. Samoilovich (ed.), *Materialy po istorii karakalpakov* (Moscow, 1935), 9–89 [64].

Shaykhim himself, but merely somebody living near Tashkent who resembled him.⁵⁷ Having persuaded a Qazaq called Abū'l-Layth⁵⁸ to confirm this individual's assumed identity, they elevated 'Shaykhim' to khalif authority. The hapless puppet soon paid the price for this deception. After he had ruled for a brief period, the Tashkentis apparently recognised that he was not the person he claimed to be. Realising that their faith had been abused, they took him prisoner. "They cut off his head as though it were the head of a sheep," we read, "and rid themselves of their former misapprehension".⁵⁹

The novelty of this incident is that the person who the 'Shaykhim' pretender was claiming to be was not a Suyūnchid dynast but a Kūchkūnjid. Shaykhim was descended from the late Kūchkūnjid ruler Abū Sa'īd Khan, and was scarcely in a position to appeal to Suyūnchid loyalists.⁶⁰ But he was a figure who may have been familiar to Tashkentis, since for much of the 1570s he had governed Zāmin, an important settlement on one of the major roads from Tashkent into Mā warā al-nahr.⁶¹ This made him a much more meaningful figure within a Tashkenti associational repertoire than was Walī Muḥammad, for instance.

A final pretender incident some thirty years later further undermines the idea that constituencies were motivated to rebel by some commitment to perpetuating a specifically Suyūnchid line of succession. In 1635, the Tashkentis rebelled against their Tūqāy-Timūrid governor, Iskandar Sultan b. Imām Qulī Khan.⁶² People aligned themselves with several local nobles, together with whom they impelled Iskandar to flee the city. Among those nobles who then assumed power, the *Baḥr al-asrār* lists 'Ārif Khan, Murād Sultan, Qul Tikah Sultan, Futur Sultan, Ṭāhir Sultan, Būkī Sultan and Kitah

⁵⁷ *Shakhshī-rā kih fi'l-jumlah bih Shaykhim Sulṭān mushābahat dāshṭ: MB 152.*

⁵⁸ This individual is perhaps to be equated with the famous Abūlay Sultan (*BA 101a, 112b-116a*, etc), usually identified as a Qazaq descended from Tūqāy Timūr b. Jūchī (Sultanov, *Podniatyē na beloi koshme. Potomki Chingiz-khana* (Almaty, 2001), 191-192), but occasionally identified as a Shibānid descendent of Kūchum, the last khan of Siberia (G.F. Miller, *Istoriia Sibiri* (2 vols., Moscow, 2000), II.114; Kafah, "Cuci sūlāsesi ve ṣu' beleri", in *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* 1 (1970), 103-120 [120]).

⁵⁹ *Sar-i ū-rā mānand-i gūsfand barīdand, wa khūdhā-yā az ān andīshah khalāṣ gardānīdand: MB 152-153.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 152, identifying him as the son of Muḥammad Sultan b. Abū Sa'īd.

⁶¹ *ShNSh 239a*. This was presumably the settlement near where 'Abd al-Mu'min was murdered in summer 1598 (see above, p. 44).

⁶² *BA 116b* for Iskandar's original appointment. Like Burton, *The Bukharans*, 188, I prefer *BA* to *TMKh 144* and *SilSal 184a*, both of which give an earlier date for the uprising.

Khwājah. Although the work says little about most of these, it includes an interesting detail about ʿĀrif Khan. It says that he was the son of Bābā Shaykh Khan, and that he was descended from Awliyā Qarā Khan.⁶³

Awliyā Qarā Khan is an individual who figures widely in popular tradition about the early Islamisation of Central Asia. Identified as the son variously of Irbūz Qarā Khan,⁶⁴ Amīr Sayyid Khwājah⁶⁵ or Shāh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz,⁶⁶ he appears in numerous saintly genealogies; narratives associate him particularly with the cities of Ṭalās and Sayrām, and the surrounding Syr Darya region,⁶⁷ where he is credited with having established an eponymous line of *sayyids*.⁶⁸ The fact that ʿĀrif Khan deemed it meaningful to claim him as an ancestor suggests that Awliyā Qarā Khan exercised some force upon the 17th-century Tashkenti popular imagination: a force comparable to that, for instance, exerted by Abū Bakr b. Ismaʿīl Qafal Shāshī, a prominent shaykh from the Qarākhānid era⁶⁹ whose shrine in Tashkent received a steady flow of pilgrims from the surrounding region.⁷⁰

One may of course doubt whether ʿĀrif Khan was actually descended from whom he claimed. Folk memory rarely stretches back more than seven generations⁷¹—let alone more than five hundred years—and written

⁶³ *ʿĀrif Khān walad-i Bābā Shaykh Khān kih az nasl-i Awliyā Qarā Khān ast*: BA 119a.

⁶⁴ Muminov, von Kügelgen, DeWeese, and M. Kemper (eds.), *Islamizatsiia i sakralʹnye rodoslovnyie v Tsentralʹnoi Aziī: Nasledie Iskhak Baba v narrativnoi i genealogicheskoi traditsiiax, tom 2: genealogicheskie gramoty i sakralʹnye semeistva XIX–XXI vekov: nasab-nama i gruppy khodzhei, sviazannykh s sakralʹnym skazaniem ob Iskhak Babe* (Almaty—Bern—Tashkent—Bloomington, 2008), 109, 133.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 109 (thus as the second figure of this name to appear in the genealogy in question); Z. Zhandarbek, *“Nasab-Nama” nusqalary zhāne turki tarikhy* (Almaty, 2002), 59.

⁶⁷ Muminov, von Kügelgen, DeWeese, and Kemper (eds.), *Islamizatsiia i sakralʹnye rodoslovnyie v Tsentralʹnoi Aziī*, 133.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁶⁹ J. Castagné, “Le Culte des lieux saints de l’Islam au Turkestan”, in *L’ethnographie* 46 (1951), 46–124 [51–52]. For the importance of the Qarākhānid-era past in the popular imagination of Tashkent and the Syr Darya region, see Muminov, “Veneration of Holy Sites of the Mid-Sirdar’ya Valley: Continuity and Transformation”, in Kemper, von Kügelgen, and D. Yermakov (eds.), *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the early 20th centuries* (Berlin, 1996), 355–367, DeWeese, “Sacred History for a Central Asian Town: Saints, Shrines and Legends of Origin in Histories of Sayram, 18th–19th centuries”, in Aigle (ed.), *Figures mythiques des mondes musulmans* (Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 89–90, 2000), 245–295 [250], and Zhandarbek, “Nasab-Nama”, 9–15 and *passim*.

⁷⁰ MKA 48–49, 78, 128; MAkh 25b; SilʹSid 88b; JāmM 112a.

⁷¹ Bregel, “Tribal Tradition and Dynastic Theory: The Early Rulers of the Qongrats According to Munis”, in *African and Asian Studies* 16 (1982), 357–398 [394].

genealogies stretching back to before the Mongol conquest are inevitably susceptible to inaccuracy.⁷² The Tashkentis who accepted 'Ārif's proffered identity may well, therefore, have been predisposed towards credulity, perhaps in the hope that Awliyā Qarā Khan's supposed descendent might coordinate opposition to what was, as will become clear, a locally-unloved Bukharan regime. This is not to say, however, that their attachment to 'Ārif simply constituted an instrumental means to an end. After all, memories of previous unsuccessful pretender uprisings must have suggested to the Tashkentis in 1635 that their decision to support 'Ārif Khan was likely to incur net material disutility. This was indeed what proved to be the case. Livid at the news of his son's death, Imām Qulī Khan immediately marched on Tashkent, where he supposedly ordered his troops to continue massacring the defeated townspeople "until the blood of the Tashkentis reached his stirrup".⁷³

The successive Tashkenti pretender episodes of the period 1587–1635 constituted a single recurrent trend. In each case, a Tashkenti constituency aligned itself against representatives of a Bukharan ruling regime. Every instance furthermore saw the constituency aligning itself with pretender candidates who all had something in common. What they had in common was not any particular dynastic identity, but a contextually believable and hermeneutically meaningful association with the region of Tashkent itself.

⁷² DeWeese, "The Politics of Sacred Lineages in 19th-century Central Asia: Descent Groups linked to Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in Shrine Documents and Genealogical Charters", in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 31 (1999), 507–530.

⁷³ *Man sawgand khwurdah-am kih tā khūn-i Tashkandiyān bih rakāb-i man narasad, dast az qatl bāz nadāram: TMKh* 145–146, proceeding then to tell how the 'ulamā sought to limit casualties by suggesting that Imām Qulī should be induced to ride his horse through a *hawq* in which blood-stained water ran up to the depth of his stirrup, thus requiring him to desist from slaughter. The episode is related also—albeit in somewhat different terms—in *BA* 120a–b and *SilSal* 184b. Nor did a predisposition towards credulity stop supporters from acting contrary to their material self-interest if they learned that a pretender had deceived them. In 1558, for instance, the population of Chārjūy rose and overthrew the local pretender who was ruling as the town's appanage-holder, because they realised that he was not, as he claimed, the son of the town's former Shāh-Budāqīd incumbent Burhān Sultan. The material cost of their action outweighed any associated advantage: by overthrowing the incumbent, people plunged the city into chaos, thereby easing 'Abdallāh's subsequent capture of the region. But the town-dwellers were unwilling to submit to an insincere ruler, and resolved on overthrow regardless of the consequences. The episode is related in *ShNSh* 102b–103a; for background, note also *RR* 173b and *RS* 148b, with discussion in M.E. Masson, *Srednevekoye torgovye puti iz Merva v Khorezm i v Maverannakhr: Trudy iuzhno-turkmenistanskoi arkheologicheskoi kompleksnoi ekspeditsii XIII* (Ashkhabad, 1966), 140–141, where the episode is misdated to 1550.

The Suyūnchids perhaps maintained the strongest such association; one notes, for instance, a passage in Badr al-Dīn Kashmīrī's 1590–1591 *Rawḍat al-riḍwān* where, relating events in 1586, Kashmīrī describes Tashkent as “the throne of Nawrūz Aḥmad”.⁷⁴ After the termination of the Suyūnchid line, however, actors were prepared to associate themselves with others boasting this quality of local eminence in somewhat more attenuated form.

This is why McChesney's suggestion about ‘Suyūnchid loyalists’ seems to miss the point. The run of pretender episodes only makes sense as the single iterated phenomenon they evidently constituted if we interpret them not as the manifestation of some intrinsic, quasi-charismatic attachment to the Suyūnchid line but as the expression of some wider inclination to be ruled by somebody—whether Suyūnchid or otherwise—who embodied what it was to be part of the community in which one lived. In order to discuss this inclination a little further, in the present chapter I want to consider the phenomenon of what I term *communal loyalty*.

On Communal Loyalty

By ‘communal loyalty’, I refer to a constituency's attachment towards an individual whom people commonly deem to incarnate a sense of what makes this constituency distinct and special. Said individual might be a member of the group in question—“one of us”, as it were—or he might be a social outsider to whom people attribute some sort of privileged power of representation. In either instance, the individual derives support as a consensually recognised embodiment of community, and of the relationships out of which this community is built.

Affectual Attachments

A constituency's communal loyalty is a reflection of the interpersonal relationships out of which people derive their sense of community. When conceiving of ‘communal loyalty’, I thus conceive of a mode of attachment which is primarily motivated not by normative or instrumental considerations, but by *affectual* ones. ‘Affectual’ considerations may here be taken to refer, following Weber, to impulses “determined by the actor's specific affects and feeling states”,⁷⁵ as theoretically distinct from his normative

⁷⁴ *Takht-i Nawrūz Aḥmad*: RR 249a.

⁷⁵ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 25.

convictions and his material interests. Inter-personal relationships often demonstrate such affectual attachments. An awareness of the shared experiences and expectations underpinning any relationship may often lead an actor to regard his own well-being as a function of somebody else's.

The closer a relationship is, the more likely it is at any moment to inform the actor's role identity, and thus to perform this framing function. The more likely it is, furthermore, when doing so to exercise significant affective force on the actor's behaviour. At their strongest, an individual's affectual attachments might amount to what Amartya Sen terms *sympathy*. In early modern Central Asia as elsewhere, the recipients of an actor's 'sympathetic' attachments—whereby the actor's "sense of well-being is psychologically dependent on someone else's welfare"⁷⁶—were most likely to be those to whom he was bound by genetic consanguinity,⁷⁷ romantic affiliation⁷⁸ or friendship.⁷⁹ In certain contexts, though, even much more loosely constituted relationships might be sufficiently salient to inform the actor's perception of his material and ethical priorities. In monitored interaction games, for instance, mutually-unfamiliar laboratory participants who are randomly assigned to group *x* are wont to behave more fairly—or less selfishly—towards fellow group-*x* members than towards 'non-peers' randomly assigned to group *y*.⁸⁰

It is not hard to understand why this should be the case. Once an actor construes it as an element of his selfhood that he is part of a particular community, he is liable to modify his behaviour in deference to its associated communal norms, so as to minimise the danger of being excluded from this community—of incurring a form of social death,⁸¹ one might say—by way of peer-group sanction.⁸² From the actor's position, it thus makes eminent

⁷⁶ Sen, "Rational Fools", 32.

⁷⁷ *ShN* (Şālih) 364–374, on Muḥammad Shibānī's grief at the death of his brother Maḥmūd.

⁷⁸ *BN* III–112, on the author's infatuation with a young boy; *DQ* 72b–74b, on Sultan Salīm's vicarious sufferings on behalf of his ailing wife.

⁷⁹ *BN* 62, on a certain 'Alī Shīr Bīk, moved to tears at the kindness of a friend.

⁸⁰ M. Billig and H. Tajfel, "Social Categorisation and Similarity in Intergroup Behavior", in *European Journal of Social Psychology* 3 (1973), 27–52, particularly 48–49.

⁸¹ See discussion of this term see e.g. O. Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), particularly 35–76.

⁸² See famously S. Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York, 1974), 113–122, on how fear of communal sanction or peer-group exclusion may be sufficient to override what in other circumstances one might regard as one's highest ethical commitments. For discussion of how people may freely adopt risky courses of action out of a sense of obligation to fellow members of a group see also C. Calhoun, *Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle*

sense to distinguish one's behaviour towards people with whom one identifies from one's behaviour towards those with whom one does not. Michael Taylor conceptualises such a state of mind by evoking what he terms a 'thin theory of rationality'. Because man is a social being, Taylor writes, even if somebody finds that a mode of interactive behaviour conflicts with what might otherwise constitute his 'atomised' beliefs or interests, "it is precisely in virtue of [his] membership of a community that it is *rational* for him to participate".⁸³

Community and Locality

An individual's communal loyalty sees him acting to maintain the rules and codes underpinning those relationships which contextually matter to him. With each individual liable to contract multiple such relationships, these bonds are likely to coalesce into various networks of community. Some of these networks are *functional* communities, or communities of action. In early modern Central Asia, these would include the guild, the saintly following, the juridical school, and similar organisational frameworks for channelling social intercourse. Other communities are *territorial* communities. These are communities of space, constituting that tangle of spatially demarcated theatres—the home, the street, the *quartier*, the town, the region—within which particular modes of social engagement are spatially confined.

Territorial communities in early modern Central Asia appear to have been proportionately much stronger than functional communities. That is, their constitutive relationships seem to have exerted greater affective force on people's modes of behaviour. This was not always so clearly the case in the Islamic world, where functional communities were often strong. In other political ecologies, for instance, people's attachment to a territorially indistinct sense of guild identity might extend to the point of involvement in intra-civic hostilities.⁸⁴ This was very different from early modern Central Asia, where guild affiliations, though extant,⁸⁵ played little part in

for *Democracy in China* (Berkeley, 1994), 171, where Calhoun notes of student protestors at Tianenmen Square that their "strong feeling for friendship—including a level of loyalty that put most Westerners to shame—was not individualistic but truly social."

⁸³ M. Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action", in *idem* (ed.), *Rationality and Revolution* (Cambridge, 1988), 63–97 [65, 69]; original italics.

⁸⁴ See e.g. comments by K. Çiçek, reviewing E. Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage* (Leiden, 2004), in *Belleten* 68 (2004), 751–753 [753].

⁸⁵ Mukminova, *Ocherki po istorii remesla*, 159–172; Chekhovich, "Gorodskoe samoupravle-

marshalling violence. Similarly, Abū'l-Khayrīd Central Asia continued to witness formal disputation between devotees of the Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī law-schools,⁸⁶ but *madhhab*-attachments failed to generate anything like the violent rivalries, for instance, which Makdisi and Bulliet have described for eleventh-century Baghdad and Nishāpūr.⁸⁷

The notably weak affective force of non-territorial communities in early modern Central Asia attests to how this was an environment in which long-distance interaction was expensive and dangerous, and in which obstructive physical space was thus markedly prejudicial to the establishment of salient long-distance bonds. Early modern Central Asia was an environment in which non-territorial diasporic groupings were fragile: territorially-dispersed tribes such as the Dūrmān or Qūshchī rarely managed to make common cause during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,⁸⁸ and only closely-nucleated groups as the Qaṭaghan (who were based primarily around Balkh and Qunduz: see above, p. 193) and the Qipchāq (who nomadised close to Herat)⁸⁹ proved able to act as coherent socio-political units. In early modern Central Asia, social solidarity was strongly associated with place. That is to say, a community's degree of solidarity was not just—as is commonly the case in other political ecologies (see above, p. 115)—inversely correlative to its population total. It was also directly proportionate to the mutual proximity of its members.⁹⁰ This presented a problem for successive Bukharan rulers, since it meant that people's localised communal loyalties enjoyed strong salience over any sense of participation in a common imperial project.

Differing modes of economic interaction, for instance, bound the individual in relationships enmeshing him within a variety of territorial communities, out of all of which 'the khanate' was generally the least meaningful.

nie v Srednei Azii feodal'nogo perioda", in Davidovich (ed.), *Bartol'dovskie chteniia: Tovarnodenzhnye otnosheniia na Blizhnom i Srednem Vostoke v epokhu feodalizma* (Moscow, 1979), 230–236 [233].

⁸⁶ See e.g. *MNB* 175–179, relating a disagreement between adherents of the two legal schools about the legality or otherwise of consuming *qumiz*, that is to say fermented milk.

⁸⁷ G. Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-century Baghdad", in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 24 (1961), 1–56; Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur* (Cambridge, MA, 1972), particularly 27–35.

⁸⁸ Kılıç, "Change in Political Culture", 61.

⁸⁹ *RŞ* 745; *T'ĀĀ'A* 619; *BA* 121b, 184b; *UN* 104a; *SilSal* 256. Discussion in Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 24. It is striking that tribes living south of the Amu Darya seem to have displayed greater solidarity during this period than did those living to the north.

⁹⁰ For a similar picture relating to an earlier period, see Paul, "L'invasion mongole comme "révélateur", 48–49.

In many instances, an individual would have regarded his primary community as that comprising his own household: most smallholders, for example, would have shared much of the grind of daily subsistence with their fellow family members. But people's dependence on an irrigational infrastructure meant that households could not survive in isolation, and were instead clustered in villages commonly drawing water from a particular channel system. Were a farmer to generate a small surplus for sale on the market, his own village would acquire prominence as a secondary community, since it was the obvious forum for most low-level socio-economic exchange. Because it is always expensive to move bulky nutritional staples over land, trade relations were generally conducted over the shortest distance possible, resulting in the close socio-economic interdependence of village/hinterland units. In nineteenth-century Calvados, in France, the average distance over which goods were transported to market was less than two miles, and in early modern Central Asia it was perhaps not much greater.⁹¹ Even allowing for higher rates of productivity resulting from an artificial irrigation regime, individual villages may therefore have consumed a comparably high proportion of local output to that 86% which Braudel has shown was consumed in early eighteenth-century Languedoc communities.⁹² People's daily interaction would thus have accorded extensive salience to their sense of village identity. This is likely to have remained the case even despite the fact that from ca. 1500 changes in land-ownership patterns began to have deleterious consequences for village-level autonomy, as large-scale land acquisitions and endowments by the likes of Ahrārīds, Kāsānīds and Jūybārīds resulted in multiple villages effectively coming under absentee private rule.⁹³

Trade relations might then enmesh the villager into more extensive territorial groupings. Villages were generally clustered around a small town, together forming a tertiary unit which was known as a *tūmān*. The *tūmān* centre constituted an attractive market for agricultural goods. This was

⁹¹ X. de Planhol, *Géographie historique de France* (Paris, 1988), 239. See however Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel* (Cambridge, MA, 1975), 20, noting that transportation using livestock might be somewhat more efficient than pre-modern European wheeled transport.

⁹² F. Braudel, *The Identity of France*, vol. 2: *People and Production* (London, 1990), 488.

⁹³ Paul, "Le Village en Asie Centrale aux XVe et XVIe siècles", in *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* 32 (1991), 9–16; *idem*, "La Propriété foncière des cheikhs Juybari", in *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* 3–4 (1997), 183–202. In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that whereas the Volga-Ural region, the north Caucasus and East Turkistan all produced a body of *kraevedenie* (village-history writing) in the post-sixteenth-century period, the genre is absent in Greater Mā warā al-nahr. See Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia—the Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910* (Leiden, 2001), 23–24.

because towns were heavily dependent on imports. In pre-modern Europe, most settlements with over five thousand inhabitants relied on produce imported from beyond their immediate exurbs.⁹⁴ Such dependence enabled the producer to sell at a higher premium than in the village, even taking transport costs into account. Furthermore, village agrarianists used these *tūmān* bazaars to purchase goods which they could not supply for themselves. Such goods included both pastorally produced items, sold by local Turco-Mongolian nomadic populations who similarly needed to supplement their own diet,⁹⁵ and basic artisanal commodities, manufactured by townsmen and sold in exchange for food. The *tūmān* centre was thus a hub for the enactment of community. Unlike the village, the *tūmān* encompassed too much space and too large a population for all its inhabitants regularly to interact and know one another. But people's widespread dependence on the market metropole ensured the potentiality of social interaction: if not a 'real' community, therefore, it was at least an 'imagined' one, with the *tūmān* bazaar the actual/possible intersection point for a wider human hinterland.

A further set of market relations integrated the villager into a fourth unit, called the *wilāyat*. The usage of this term by Central Asian authors is notoriously diffuse, because—to employ a rather awkward distinction—it can be used as an element of either 'political' or 'territorial' vocabulary. As the former, it simply denotes the seat of a *wālī*, or governor, whether this be all India under the Mughal emperor⁹⁶ or the area around the small settlement of Nawqā, located approximately half-way between Samarqand and Miyānkāl in the Zarafshān valley.⁹⁷ Henceforth, however, I shall use the term in its more familiar 'territorial' context. As such, the *wilāyat* as broadly understood in Greater Mā warā al-nahr⁹⁸ was a large region, typically an aggregate of between six and ten *tūmāns*, all of which were clustered around

⁹⁴ J. Landers, *The Field and the Forge—Population, Production, and Power in the pre-industrial West* (Oxford, 2004), 114.

⁹⁵ Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World* (Cambridge, 1984), 16 and elsewhere.

⁹⁶ *MAh* 47.

⁹⁷ For Nawqā as a *wilāyat*, see e.g. document entries no. 2 (dated 8 Dhū'l-Hijjah 1022/19 January 1614) and 3 (dated 3 Shawwāl 1030/21 August 1621) in Welsford and N. Tashev (eds.), *A Catalogue of Arabic-Script Documents from the Samarqand Museum, Uzbekistan* (Samarqand, 2012); compare with document entry no. 6 (dated Ramaḍān 1214/27 January–25 February 1800), where Nawqā is instead described as a subsidiary settlement within Miyānkāl *wilāyat*.

⁹⁸ In East Turkistan, by contrast, the *wilāyat* is more generally understood as a single oasis hinterland: Papas, *Soufisme et politique*, 28.

a sizeable eponymous urban centre.⁹⁹ Boasting a larger population than the *tūmān* centre, a typical *wilāyat* metropole consequently relied even more heavily on food imports from the surrounding hinterland: although large cities were frequently ringed by an extensive ring of gardens and allotments, the owners of these smallholdings sought only to supplement their diet, not to constitute it.¹⁰⁰ Villagers were also integrated into the *wilāyat* community as consumers themselves. With an increased population size facilitating the division of labour, the *wilāyat* metropole was a natural centre of specialist artisanal production. In Bukhara, for instance, there existed a number of specialised bazaars, each catering to a specialised market for artisanal goods produced in the city's dedicated workshops.¹⁰¹

Finally, specialised merchants were active within a fifth unit. Although one might expect this to have been the Bukharan empire itself, it was instead an extended trading zone stretching right the way across the Eurasian landmass. Early modern Central Asia was located at the crossroads of a trans-continental trade network,¹⁰² whereby merchants transported valuable and semi-valuable goods and commodities¹⁰³ to and from markets as far afield as Mughal India and Muscovy. As for the empire itself, it was of relatively little significance as a self-contained trading zone: when sources identify a travelling merchant's provenance or destination, it is usually somewhere far beyond the khanate's boundaries.¹⁰⁴ This reflects the fact that few local constituencies within the khanate offered as lucrative a market for the region's indigenous luxuries as did Agra, Nizhnii Novgorod or Peking. Of course, some locally produced goods did enjoy extensive

⁹⁹ McChesney, "Bukhara's Suburban Villages: Juzmandun in the Sixteenth Century", in A. Petruccioli (ed.), *Bukhara: The Myth and the Architecture* (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 93–120 [113].

¹⁰⁰ Schwarz, "Bukhara and Its Hinterland: the Oasis of Bukhara in the Sixteenth Century in the Light of the Juybari Codex", in *Bukhara: The Myth and the Architecture*, 79–92 [85]; Abduraimov, "Pervyi russkii kupecheskii karavan v Tashkente (1738–1739)", in *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk UzSSR* 1955.6, 87–93 [90].

¹⁰¹ Note e.g. Bukhara's Tukum-dūzān bazaar (*KhDzhSh*, document no. 16) and Safid-furūshān bazaar (ibid., document no. 30).

¹⁰² E.g. S.C. Levi, *The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade, 1550–1900* (Leiden, 2002); M. Alam, "Trade, State Policy and Regional Change: Aspects of Mughal-Uzbek Commercial Relations, c.1550–1750", in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 37 (1994), 202–227.

¹⁰³ For these traded goods, see J. Gommens, "The Horse Trade in 18th Century South Asia", in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 37 (1994), 228–250; Burton, *The Bukharans*, 363–390.

¹⁰⁴ E.g. R'AH 536–537 and Sa'diyah 146b, noting the presence of Bukharan traders in East Turkistan.

inter-*wilāyat* demand. Samarqandi and Bukharan paper, for instance, circulated widely.¹⁰⁵ These two individually recognisable paper types clearly enjoyed a premium commodity value distinct from their mere use value, which secured them a wide market. But most areas of 'specialised' artisanal production were commonly practised in most major urban centres: few Samarqandis would have needed to go to Bukhara's dedicated saddle-market¹⁰⁶ in order to fit out their own horses, for instance. 'Abdallāh's reforms (see above, pp. 132–137) did much to ease inter-*wilāyat* travel, but in general one region's demand for another region's produce was not sufficient to justify braving the still considerable physical obstacles to transporting goods from one place to the other.

Locality, Empire and Convention

Local communities thus constituted networks of interaction bound by equivalential links which were of greater salience than those yoking territorially diffuse subjects of a larger Bukharan empire. This is reflected by the ways in which the Bukharan empire was verbally conceptualised by people. When describing the khanate, most authors did so with reference to its constitutive regions, whether these were conceived as its component *wilāyats* or as alternatively defined territorial units.

A Jūybārid hagiography notes how Khwājah Muḥammad Islām predicted to 'Abdallāh that the khan would conquer "Mā warā al-nahr and Turkistān, and parts of Khurāsān and Khwārazm".¹⁰⁷ The *Sharaf-nāmah-yi shāhī* relates how 'Abdallāh managed to subjugate "Mā warā al-nahr, Balkh and Ḥiṣār".¹⁰⁸ A late-sixteenth-century work describes the composition of 'Abdallāh's expeditionary army, comprising forces from "Mā warā al-nahr and Turkistān, and the countries of Badakhshan and Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān".¹⁰⁹ A marginally later Safavid history, meanwhile, offers an even fuller breakdown of 'Abdallāh's forces, noting contingents from "the furthestmost lands of Turkistān and the *wilāyat* of Fergana, and the Syr Darya, and Jand, Khujand, Samarqand, Bukhara, Qarākul, Ḥiṣār, Qunduz, Bāghlān, Khuttalān, Badakhshan, Balkh and Tukhāristān."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Mukminova, *Ocherki po istorii remesla*, 95–104.

¹⁰⁶ *KhDzhSh*, document no. 271.

¹⁰⁷ *MaʼT* 61a–b.

¹⁰⁸ *ShNSh* 3497 178b.

¹⁰⁹ *RR* 498b.

¹¹⁰ *RŞ* 663.

Of course, early modern Central Asia was hardly unique in lending itself to such 'enumerative' descriptions. Following a long Persianate tradition, Safavid authors seeking to emphasise the territorial authority of the shah might do so by similarly listing the various regions over which the shah exercised dominion. Tellingly, however, the Bukharan khanate lacked a synoptic self-designation to parallel notions of 'Iran' within the Safavid Empire. Certainly, the conception of 'Turan' served rather differently for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Central Asian authors from its usage by Safavid, Ottoman and Mughal contemporaries to denote the khanate *in toto*.¹¹¹ Far from any sort of self-appellation, 'Turan' as applied within Mā warā al-nahr generally denoted a state of otherness in the lands north of the Syr Darya,¹¹² and continued to do so into the nineteenth century.¹¹³

In the absence of a common single term for the Bukharan empire, people in sixteenth-century Central Asia instead conceptualised the khanate in terms of its constitutive cities and *wilāyats*. There is an obvious reason why this should have been the case. It is that people regarded these territorial communities as more meaningful than any idea of the empire as a unit of reference. Individual communities were more *saliently meaningful* because, as we have just seen, they enjoyed greater contextual significance *qua* interaction networks than the empire did. The empire's constitutive communities were also more *stably meaningful* than any autonomous conception of empire, since the nuclear content of any such latter conception in early modern Central Asia was liable to vary. In the sixteenth century the outlines of the Bukharan khanate were in permanent flux (see above, p. 123 and elsewhere), and before the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover it was rare for any sense of imperial selfhood to survive the transition from one dynasty to another. City- and *wilāyat*-level identities, by contrast, displayed extensive longevity. Such longevity was heavily determined by environmental circumstances. The highly localised concentration of water resources in the oasis geography of central Mā warā al-nahr and northern Khurāsān meant

¹¹¹ See e.g. *IM* 180; *MM* 129, on "Tūrān-zemīn ya'nī Māverā'ū'nehr"; and *AN* III.576, referring to 'Abd al-Mu'min as "the son of the ruler of Turan" ('*Abd al-Mu'min Sultān pūr-i farmānrawā-yi Tūrān*).

¹¹² E.g. *TSR* 169a: 'Abdallāh II moved 'into Turan' against the Tashkent-based Suyūchids in 1578.

¹¹³ Both *NZJ* and *SilSal* use the term 'Turan' in the fashion which we find amongst Safavid and Mughal chroniclers: see e.g. *SilSal* 128a, 165a–166a, 183b, 189b, and *NZJ* 21 (referring to Imām Quli Khan's *hukm-dārā-yi Tūrān*), 33 and 302. In both works, however, the usage may well reflect Mughal literary influence (for which see also above, p. 49 n. 66).

that few places could boast the sort of provisions enjoyed by cities such as Bukhara, Samarqand and Merv: these latter were 'natural' locations for settlement, and had been since long before the Arab invasion. Consequently, in each city periodic episodes of depopulation—most notably at the time of the Mongol conquest—were followed by recovery and urban reconstruction on, or near, the site of previous settlement;¹¹⁴ Balkh, indeed, had reputedly been flattened on twenty-two occasions, each time rebuilding itself anew.¹¹⁵ Instances of destruction were thus merely epiphenomenal in the *longue durée*: with nowhere else in the vicinity similarly capable of catering to a densely-packed human population, new settlements were simply built amidst the ruins of old ones.¹¹⁶ The consequent resilience of city- and *wilāyat*-units allowed them to survive the rise and fall of multiple regimes, thus enabling them to engrain themselves ever further in the associative repertoires of successive generations.

The Chosen Community

For centuries, the local communities of city and *wilāyat* had been bound by strong affectual ties. But they did not regard themselves as bound by these ties alone. As the political theorist Ernesto Laclau observes, members of individual communities often construct "a popular identity which is something qualitatively more than the simple summation of [the community's] equivalential links."¹¹⁷ This observation is borne out by events in early modern Central Asia. As we shall see, people's sense of group membership was frequently bolstered by a tendency to regard communities as embodying not only their interpersonal *sympathies*, but also their shared super-ethical *values*.

It was common practice, for example, for people in early modern Central Asia to regard even the smallest settlement as a locus of particular spiritual significance. As one instance of this, people frequently situated their own town or village within a universal religious history. By encouraging people to regard their communities as integral elements of a larger plan for humanity,

¹¹⁴ In the early fifteenth century, Shāhrukh b. Tīmūr refounded Merv beside the site of the pre-Mongol city: *ZT* II.337–340 (see above, p. 136); also *JN* 222b.

¹¹⁵ *AT* 48b.

¹¹⁶ North of the Syr Darya, proximity to rivers was more influential in determining a city's situation, and reduced location constraints permitted a greater fluidity in urban dynamics; medieval Tashkent, for instance, flourished at the expense of its older neighbour Farākat: Buriakov, *Istoricheskaia topologiia tashkentskogo oazisa*, 13.

¹¹⁷ E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London, 2005), 77.

such stories fostered people's commitment towards preserving what made their own localised network of relationships distinct and special. Some communities claimed association with pre-Islamic prophets. Samarqandis have long believed that the tomb of Daniel is located right outside their city,¹¹⁸ while the population of Osh—'the Mecca of the Persians', according to popular terminology¹¹⁹—maintain that Solomon is buried on the town's rocky outcrop.¹²⁰ Other regions claimed association with the early Islamic age. Stories about Imām 'Alī, for instance, proliferate throughout Central Asia. People in Darwāz, in the Wakhsh corridor of southern Tajikistan, maintain a tradition that Muḥammad dispatched 'Alī to fight in the region,¹²¹ and a story circulates that 'Alī briefly halted at the village of Arawan, west of Osh, when battling the white demon.¹²² According to the most famous of these such narratives, of course, 'Alī's tomb was supposedly situated outside Balkh, in what is today the city of Mazār-i Sharīf.¹²³ Stories relating to the consecutive waves of communal Islamisation in the pre- and post-Mongol Conquest eras, meanwhile, frequently provided valorised aetiologies for varieties of social collective.¹²⁴ The social unit under discussion varied widely. Conversion stories might serve as communal charter narratives for particular urban populations, for instance, such as occurred in the trans-Syr Darya town of Sayrām in the nineteenth century, where stories attributed the city's foundation to expeditionary forces dispatched from the Hijāz.¹²⁵ Elsewhere, such stories might relate to members of a tribe out of whose 'traditional' saintly

¹¹⁸ Castagné, "Le Culte des lieux saints", 85; Muminov, "Veneration of Holy Sites of the Mid-Sīrdar'ya Valley", 360.

¹¹⁹ 'AT 174a; for discussion of the epithet, see Zarcone, "Pilgrimage to the "Second Meccas" and "Ka'bas" of Central Asia", in Papas et al., *Central Asian Pilgrims*, 251–277 [254–256].

¹²⁰ Castagné, "Le Culte des lieux saints", 81; Zarcone, "Un Lieu saint atypique: le Trône de Salomon (Takht-i Sulaymān) à Osh (Kirghizistan)", in Bacqué-Grammont and J.-M. Durand (eds.), *L'Image de Salomon, sources et postérités* (Paris-Louvain, 2008), 209–232.

¹²¹ B. Grąbczewskiego, *W pustyniach Raskemu i Tybetu* (Warsaw, undated), 42.

¹²² Castagné, "Le Culte des lieux saints", 82.

¹²³ HS 439–440; HI 559; BA 318a–b; 'AT 47b–51b; *SilSal* 181b. Discussion in McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, *passim*.

¹²⁴ DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, particularly 516–532.

¹²⁵ *Idem*, "Sacred History for a Central Asian Town", 250; Muminov, von Kügelgen, DeWeese and Kemper, *Islamizatsiia i sakral'nye rodostovnye v Tsentral'noi Azii*, 73, 76, 79, 106–108, 110–112 and etc; document entry no. 690 in Welsford and Tashev, *A Catalogue of Arabic-Script Documents from the Samarqand Museum*. See similarly D. Gladney, "Muslim Tombs and Ethnic Folklore: Charters for Hui Identity", in *Journal of Asian Studies* 46 (1987), 495–532, on how the Hui of Western China commonly claim for themselves a Yemeni origin.

alignments one might establish a communal origin: the Naymān tribe was thus associated with the figure of Yīlichī Ātā, while the Kiyāts commonly looked to a certain Yūnsīz Ātā.¹²⁶

Another way in which people ascribed religious value to their community was through their communal interaction with locally established charismatic Sufi shaykhs,¹²⁷ whose presence might be construed as a sign of divine favour. Even the smallest village, for instance, might be home to an ascetic holy man. Such 'unaffiliated' dervish figures are most widely attested from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, before the more eminent saintly brotherhoods had acquired formalised organisational frameworks (see above, pp. 70–71). Nevertheless, an attenuated version of the phenomenon survived into the Abū'l-Khayrid and Tūqāy-Timūrid periods.¹²⁸ A sixteenth-century work relates the activities of several dervishes in the region of Khurāsān,¹²⁹ and the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* identifies a holy man called Ibrāhīm Darwīsh who was active at the time of Shah Jahān's invasion of Balkh in 1646, and whose constituency was narrowly confined to Jūznān, in Badakhshan, where he lived in isolation.¹³⁰

Tūmān-level settlements played home to Sufi shaykhs as well. Such figures were often 'hereditary' shaykhs, who unlike most antinomian ascetics received spiritual authority through a direct chain of transmission from their forefathers. Whether members of the hereditary Yasawīyah or Kubrāwīyah or of the increasingly 'ancestralised' Naqshbandiyah (see above, p. 71), 'hereditary' saints often lived and died in the same settlements as their ancestors, and thus over consecutive generations became closely enmeshed in the self-associative repertoires of particular local communities. Among *tūmān*-level settlements playing host to particular shaykhly

¹²⁶ Muminov and Babajanov, "Amir Temur and Sayyid Baraka", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 45 (2000), 28–62 [39].

¹²⁷ For communal shaykhly attachments, see DeWeese, "Yasavī Šayḫs in the Timurid Era: Notes on the Social and Political Role of Communal Sufi Affiliations in the 14th and 15th Centuries", in Bernardini (ed.), *La civiltà timuride come fenomeno internazionale* (2 vols., Rome, 1996), I, 173–188.

¹²⁸ MAḥ 86–87, on the figure of Dīwānah-yi Ḥusāmī Qalandar, a resident of Khiva in the mid-sixteenth century renowned for his unconstrained forms of behaviour (*dar bī-qaydī shuhrat-i tamām dāsh*t); also BA 141b, for an encounter between Aḥmad Kāsānī and a 'mad shaykh'. Discussion in Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 122–123.

¹²⁹ BW I.481–482.

¹³⁰ *Dar mawḍī-i Jūznān Ibrāhīm-nām darwīshī dar nāḥiyah-yi ān mawḍī munzawī būdah bih izīdī-parastī ishtighal dāsh*t. *Sukkān-i ān ḥudūd ū-rā az isḥāb wa jadd wa ḥāl dānistah bih kamāl-i i'tiqād wa irādat bih ū dāsh*tand: *SilSal* 222b.

lines was the town of Kasbī. Kasbī was a settlement in the *wilāyat* of Qarshī situated along the Bukhara road,¹³¹ and it was home to a line of shaykhs descended from Tīmūr's famous spiritual advisor Amīr Barakah through his son Amīr Shams al-Dīn Ḥaydar.¹³² One such descendent was an individual called Fūlād Khwājah b. Dīwānah Khwājah. In the early seventeenth century Fūlād served as Imām Qulī's *shaykh al-islām* in Samarqand,¹³³ but from the early 1580s until ca. 1603 he had devoted his energies to activities within his native town.¹³⁴ Kasbī clearly retained this shaykhly association a full century later, since an early eighteenth-century source relates that when the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid 'Ubaydallāh Khan (r. 1702–1711) arrived in Kasbī on the way south to Balkh, "*khwājahs* from the line of Amīr Ḥaydar came to attend his lordship."¹³⁵ Similarly, in the fifteenth century the Samarqandi *tūmān* settlement of 'Aliyābād was home to a line of Yasawī shaykhs descended from Mawdūd,¹³⁶ and in the *wilāyat* of Shahrisabz the *tūmān* settlement of Kattā Langār had become 'home' by the mid-sixteenth century to a line of 'Ishqī saints.¹³⁷

Tūmān inhabitants were not alone in having communal dealings with local shaykhly lines. Inhabitants of entire *wilāyat* regions did so too. This was particularly visible in the sixteenth century, when several *wilāyats* became the *de facto* constituencies of prominent spiritual groupings. Mawdūd Shaykh's great-grandson Khudāyād, for instance, established himself in Miyānkāl,¹³⁸ while the region of Samarqand was home to the Aḥrārīd and Kāsānīd Naqshbandī lines, and the Jūybārīd descendants of Aḥmad Kāsānī's pupil Muḥammad Islām centred their activities around Bukhara. All these shaykhly lines enjoyed extensive spiritual partisanship

¹³¹ *ShNSh* 62b.

¹³² For Ḥaydar see Muminov and Babajanov, "Amir Temur and Sayyid Baraka", 29–34.

¹³³ *NZJ* 215.

¹³⁴ *TSh* 241.

¹³⁵ *Khwājagān-i Mūr Ḥaydarī kih sākin-i qaṣabah-yi madhkūr-and sharūyat-i khidmat bih taqdīm āwurdah* [...]: 'UN 32b.

¹³⁶ *JA* 188; *LNQ* 46a. Discussion in A.K. Borovkov, "Ocherki po istorii uzbekskogo iazyka. (Opredelenie iazyka khikmatov Akhmada Iasevi)", in *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie* 5 (1948), 229–250 [238].

¹³⁷ Schwarz, "*Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein*", 97–101; Babadzhanov, "Ishkiia", in *Islam na territorii byshei Rossiskoi imperii: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, vyp. 3 (Moscow, 2001), 46–47. For the 'Ishqiyah more generally see also DeWeese, "Spiritual Practice and Corporate Identity in Medieval Sufi Communities of Iran, Central Asia, and India: The Khalvatī/'Ishqī/Shattārī Continuum", in S. Lindquist (ed.), *Religion and Identity in South Asia and Beyond: Essays in Honor of Patrick Olivelle* (New York/London/Delhi, 2010), 251–300 [268–276].

¹³⁸ *LNQ* 106b–107a; discussion in Borovkov, "Ocherki po istorii uzbekskogo iazyka", 239.

from the populations of their respective *wilāyat* regions. In the early sixteenth century, such partisanship distinguished these populations from members of the political elite, whose spiritual attachments were considerably more cosmopolitan.¹³⁹ 'Ubaydallāh Khan, for instance, had relations with the Kubrāwī shaykh Ḥusayn Khwārazmī in Bukhara,¹⁴⁰ with Aḥmad Kāsānī¹⁴¹ and Amīr Abū'l-Baqā in Samarqand,¹⁴² with Mawlānā Afsārī in Miyānkāl,¹⁴³ and with the *sayyid* Mawlānā Muḥammad Amīn Zāhid in Termez.¹⁴⁴ Because few members of the population—particularly among those who worked the land—enjoyed the sort of inter-*wilāyat* mobility which enabled 'Ubaydallāh to contract this range of attachments, most people instead forged communal relations with the shaykhs who lived in their closest vicinity.

Locally established Sufis were familiar to people, and outsiders conspicuously stood out. When Ḥusayn Khwārazmī met an unfamiliar shaykh in his native region of Khwārazm, he knew straight away "that this person was not Khwārazmian, because Khwārazm is not so large that one cannot recognise other members of the population."¹⁴⁵ Familiarity rendered shaykhs locally meaningful through a variety of frames. Within Bukhara, for instance, the Jūybārid shaykhs were closely enmeshed in a particularly Bukharan sense of community. Not only did their ancestry confer upon them a degree of charismatic authority (see above, pp. 71–72), but they were also generous local euergetists: Khwājah Muḥammad Islām founded Bukhara's Madrasah-yi Gawkūshān in ca. 1561,¹⁴⁶ and his grandson 'Abd al-Raḥīm Khwājah endowed the Kālābād Madrasah in 1608.¹⁴⁷ The Jūybārids were thus saliently meaningful to Bukharans in a way that the Aḥrārids, for instance, never were. With a Jūybārid shrine at Chār Bakr, just west of Bukhara, available to them as a locus for ritual and supplication,¹⁴⁸ the

¹³⁹ Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", particularly 151–162.

¹⁴⁰ *JĀ* 57b.

¹⁴¹ *JāmM* 94b–95a, 122b. Discussion in J. Fletcher, "Aḥmad Kāsānī", in *Elr* I (1985), 649.

¹⁴² *MAh* 37–38.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 178.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 166.

¹⁴⁵ *Ma-rā yaqūn būd kih īshān Khwārazmī nīstand zīrā kih Khwārazm ān wasī at nadāshat kih mardum-i ū natavān shinākht, wa har kas kih furzand-i ānjā būd hamah-rā shakḥs mīdānistim: MīT* 54a–b.

¹⁴⁶ *RR* 290a; discussion in McChesney, "Economic and Social Aspects of the Public Architecture of Bukhara in the 1560's and 1570's", 229.

¹⁴⁷ *MaT* 78a; discussion in Davidovich, *Istoriia monetnogo dela*, 83.

¹⁴⁸ E.g. *MaT* 158a–b, noting how every year on 14 Sha'bān "all the population of Bukhara

Bukharans were unlikely to risk the hardship involved in performing pilgrimage to further-removed, and consequently less meaningful shrines elsewhere. Few seem to have bothered to visit the tomb of Aḥrār in Samarqand, for instance, which instead remained a locus for enacting a particularly Samarqandi sense of community.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, if anyone from further afield were to visit Aḥrār's tomb it was probably less likely to be people from neighbouring *wilāyat* regions than members of the Aḥrārī spiritual line whose forefathers had fled Samarqand for India upon the Uzbek invasion of 1500.¹⁵⁰ Although members of this Aḥrārī line long retained a presence at the Mughal court, they frequently travelled back and forth to Samarqand in order to pay their respects at Aḥrār's mausoleum.¹⁵¹ When people found themselves enmeshed in trans-regional 'pilgrimage hinterlands', therefore, these often extended *across* the frontiers of the khanate, rather than *within* them.¹⁵² Consequently, neither the khanate nor any other trans-regional unit was able to rival the close consociation of shaykh and settlement. Such consociation bolstered the affective force of people's communal selfhood, by aligning a sense of local identity alongside a sense of charismatic loyalty towards local embodiments of spiritual authority.

Communal Qualities

Another way in which people accorded a sense of value to their own communities was by associating these communities with particular valorised qualities, and thereby asserting superiority over alternative communities in whom such qualities were supposedly lacking. This process of association illustrates how communities might place a premium on the sense

and its seven *tūmāns* performed a pilgrimage to the tomb of Khwājah Sa'd" (*rūz-i chahār-dahum-i māh barāt būd, tamāmī-yi mardum-i Bukhārā wa haft tūmān bih ziyarat-i mazār-i fā'id al-anwār-i haḍrat-i Khwājah Sa'd al-millat wa'l-dīn jam' āmadah būdand*).

¹⁴⁹ For Samarqandi visitors to the shrine, see MKA 103; *JāmM* 103b–104a; *DQ* 38a; *MAṣ* 120b; *Samarīyah* 42.

¹⁵⁰ See e.g. *TR* 567, *AN* II.194, and *BA* 71a, on the visits to Samarqand of Khwājah Khāwand Maḥmūd and his son Khwājah Mu'īn, for whose activities in the Subcontinent see Damrel, "Forgotten Grace", *passim*.

¹⁵¹ Foltz, *Mughal India and Central Asia*, 95–96.

¹⁵² Note here also patterns of pilgrimage to the shrine of Khwājah Ishāq b. Aḥmad Kāsānī at Isfidūk, near Samarqand. Before his return to Samarqand, Ishāq had spent much of his life establishing a saintly constituency for himself beyond the Tien Shan in East Turkistan (see e.g. M. Hartmann, "Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: Das Ende der Čaghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choğas in Kašgarien", in *Der Islamische Orient. Berichte und Forschungen* 1 (Berlin, 1905), 195–374 [199–202]; Papas, *Soufisme et politique*, 43–59). Many of the pilgrims who visited his tomb came from East Turkistan.

of being different from their neighbours. Such a tendency partly reflected the fact that particular communities *were* different from their neighbours, most fundamentally as a result of very real ecological specificities within the khanate. Despite popular assumptions that Central Asia is nothing but a single rolling belt of arid grassland,¹⁵³ the region possesses a wide range of micro-ecologies, with areas even just a few miles apart varying immensely in their natural and manmade geo-hydrological resources.¹⁵⁴ Sixteenth-century documents relating land acquisitions by Bukhara's line of Jüybārid shaykhs indicate how land plots in drier, less fertile areas were often larger than those in better-watered zones. The average size of plots bought by Jüybāri family members in the well-watered village of Jüybār-i 'Arīḍ, in Bukhara *wilāyat*'s Rūd-i shahr *tūmān*, was approximately 10 *tanābs*, or 2.5 hectares.¹⁵⁵ This seems to have been rather smaller than the size of plots under transaction in other parts of the *tūmān*. Plots of land bought by Jüybāris in the settlement of Dihchah-yi Sajal averaged 35 *tanābs*,¹⁵⁶ and in Asbāb-i Zirāb they averaged over 50 *tanābs*.¹⁵⁷ Because less fertile territories required more land to generate a living than their more productive neighbours, landowners in ill-provisioned regions probably depended more on the services of a bonded labour force, with a consequent impact upon the power relations between ruler and ruled.

Although ecological specificities resulted in extensive variation within single *tūmān* regions, the consequences of such variations ramified at the *wilāyat* level. Far away from Mā warā al-nahr's artificially extended oasis zone, for instance, the khanate's trans-Syr Darya territories tended to contain a higher proportion of pastoral nomads than the lands to the south. The Tashkent- and Turkistān-appanaged Suyūnchids were thus surrounded by a lower density of Persian-speaking agrarianists than were their Jānī-Bikid and Kūchkūnjid kinsmen to the south. It was perhaps consequently that they failed—with exceptions¹⁵⁸—to adopt a Persianate scribal culture,

¹⁵³ E.g. Akiner, "Conceptual Geographies of Central Asia", in *idem*, S. Tideman and J. Hay (eds.), *Sustainable Development in Central Asia* (New York, 1998), 3–62 [8–12].

¹⁵⁴ G. Gintzburger, K.N. Todevich, B.K. Mardunov and M.M. Mahmudov, *Rangelands of the Arid and Semi-Arid Zones in Uzbekistan* (Montpellier, 2003), particularly 74–77. For historical discussion, see particularly Szuppe, *Entre Timourides, Uzbeks et Safavides: question de l'histoire politique et sociale de Hérat dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1992), 36–48, and Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 21–58.

¹⁵⁵ *KhDzhSh*, documents no. 234–256.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, documents no. 221–227.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, documents no. 136–138.

¹⁵⁸ The sub-appanage-holder Kildī Muḥammad b. Suyūnch Muḥammad cultivated a

instead retaining their native Turkic for official communications.¹⁵⁹ This distinguished the Tashkent *wilāyat* not only from elsewhere in greater Mā warā al-nahr, but also from the oasis regions of East Turkistan, whose extant literary heritage¹⁶⁰ suggests much greater integration within a Persianate *oecumene*.

Local ecological particularities were often socialised into locally specific patterns of consumption. All *wilāyats* had one or more primary cereal crop, but the balance of production varied according to which grain type was most appropriate for a particular ecology. By the seventeenth century, people in the low-precipitation zone around Balkh¹⁶¹ were concentrating on heavily irrigated rice production,¹⁶² whereas marginally better-watered Samarqand and Bukhara were situated within a wheat production area,¹⁶³ and we know that at least some people in Khwārazm depended on millet.¹⁶⁴ Highly visible signifiers could attest to locally differing consumption patterns. The development of recognisably distinct Bukharan and Samarqandi architectural traditions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for instance, suggests a pre-eminence of 'local taste' to which even cosmopolitan patrons deferred.¹⁶⁵

Remoter communities, meanwhile, tended to possess an even more distinct range of socio-cultural particularities. Badakhshanis particularly stood out in this regard. Sufficiently cut off from the rest of Greater Mā warā al-nahr to have been spared the worst of the Mongol¹⁶⁶ and the Timūrid

Persianate court at Shāhrukhīyah: *BW* L.489 and etc, with discussion in Subtelny, "Art and Politics in early 16th-century Central Asia", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 27 (1983), 121–148 [138–141].

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. IVANRUz 1644/I 29a, a Turkic-language *suyūrhāl* grant by Nawrūz Aḥmad in favour of his son Darwish Sultan; discussion in A. Juvonmardiev, "XVI–XIX asrlarda Farghonada feodal-yer egaligiga oid muhim hujjat", in *Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane* 1962.5, 69–71.

¹⁶⁰ For a discussion of some of the monuments of this literary heritage, see Papas, *Soufisme et politique*, 2–6.

¹⁶¹ In recent decades, the area around Mazār-i Sharīf in northern Afghanistan received an average of 187 mm precipitation p/a, as compared with Tashkent (420 mm p/a) and Samarqand (355 mm p/a): *Climatological Normals*, 91, 254.

¹⁶² *JN* 221b.

¹⁶³ *R'AH* 405; for a later period, see V.N. Chertova, "Dagbitskaia volost'. Dannie ekonomicheskogo issledovaniia volosti v 1892 i 1893 gg.", in *Spravochnaia knizhka samarkandskoi oblasti* 4 (1896), 1–30 [6].

¹⁶⁴ *AT* (Bukhārī) 221 tells a story about a Khwārazmian millet farmer who had difficulty raising his crop; story reproduced in *R'AH* 26, *MAkh* 18b.

¹⁶⁵ E.g. E. Knobloch, *Monuments of Central Asia* (London, 2001), 125.

¹⁶⁶ T.G. Abaeva, *Ocherki istorii Badakhshana* (Tashkent, 1964), 97.

conquests,¹⁶⁷ Badakhshanis displayed a range of dispositions quite different from those of their distant neighbours. Religious heterodoxy was widespread,¹⁶⁸ and Badakhshani tradition held that descendents of Alexander the Great exercised sway over the region until well into the fifteenth century.¹⁶⁹ Viewing Badakhshan from outside, onlookers claimed that the Badakhshanis were a uniquely vicious and base population. "People display little truth or sincerity in that country", claims one Mughal historian,¹⁷⁰ while a later Iranian chronicler relates that the Badakhshanis were wont even to refuse a traveller's appeal to sell him a morsel of bread.¹⁷¹ The Badakhshanis themselves doubtless held an equally firm conception of the values they represented.

Such conceptions illustrate not only how regional populations differed from one another in numerous ways, but how people *believed* that they differed in many more.¹⁷² A hagiography devoted to Khwājah Aḥrār, for instance, attests to how people might ascribe classificatory significance to the smallest points of detail distinguishing them and their neighbours. In late fifteenth-century Herat, we read, children used to wear muslin trousers when swimming, while in Samarqand youngsters conventionally swam in the nude. The author claims that this simple difference was sufficient for the Heratis to conclude that the impious Samarqandis were worthy of nothing but scorn.¹⁷³ This ascriptive tendency emerges even more clearly in an

¹⁶⁷ *ZN* (Shāmi) 15–16, 51–52; *MuT* (Naṭanzī) 206–208.

¹⁶⁸ See e.g. *TR* 346, noting how in Badakhshan there were many followers of the reviled Mulāhidah sect, who held that compliance with the precepts of *sharī'ah* was incumbent only upon those who lived at the time of the prophet Muḥammad, and that the only duty for people at the time of writing was to speak nicely and to keep one's word (*mīgūyand muqayyad bih aḥkām-i sharī'at būdan dar zamān-i payghambar bar hamah farḍ būd; in zamān ān chih farḍ ast kalimah-yi tayyibah guftan wa ba'dī-yi ān garwīdan farḍ ast*); also *BA* 276b.

¹⁶⁹ In the *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, Mirzā Ḥaydar Dūghlāt notes (*ibid.*, 137) how the late fifteenth-century Badakhshani ruler Shāh Sultān Badakhshī was supposedly descended from "Iskandar Dhū'l-Qarnayn Fliqūs Rūmī". See also *HI* 605, *JN* 171b and *BA* 276b, with discussion in Abaeva, *Ocherki istorii Badakhshana*, 101.

¹⁷⁰ *Dar ān marz wa būm az ḥaqīqat wa ikhlāṣ kam nishān mīdahand*: *AN* II.22.

¹⁷¹ *Mardumānash* [...] *bisyār bad wa danī-ṭab' būdand, kih agar musāfirī bar ānhā wārid mīshud az laqmah-yi nāni dirīgh balkih bih qīmat ham namīfurūkhtand*: *TBKK* 150.

¹⁷² Elizabeth Gaskell's comments about nineteenth-century Yorkshiremen suggest that such belief was hardly specific to the population of early modern Central Asia. "Even an inhabitant of the neighbouring county of Lancaster is struck by the peculiar force of character which the Yorkshiremen display ..." *Eadem, The Life of Charlotte Brontë* (London, 1857, repr. 1997), 17.

¹⁷³ *Dar miyān-i mardum-i Hirī adab wa ḥayā bisyār ast. Jamā'atī-yi aytām dar Hirī har-giz balandtar az shitālang barahnah namīdārānd. Tārīqhā-yi aytām-i Samarqand sahil ast.*

anecdote told by the early seventeenth-century author Muṭribī. Muṭribī relates how the poet Mawlānā Pīrawī Bukhārī used to urge wealthy Muslims to take four wives. According to the *mawlānā*, a man should marry a Samarqandi, a Bukharan, a Tashkenti and a Sīstāni. “As for the Samarqandi wife”, he claimed,

she is good as an ornament, for showing off, and for great sex. The wife from Bukhara is appealing because she is a good hostess, polite, and clever at getting rid of people. The Tashkenti wife is excellent as a producer of sons, for her general fertility, and for begetting many male and female offspring. What the Sīstāni wife is good for is this: whenever any of the other three wives is negligent or fails in her duties, which might call for the use of the whip, the Sīstāni wife will do the job.¹⁷⁴

Mawlānā Bukhārī’s typology of regional personality types illustrates people’s tendency, as described by Laclau (see above, p. 211), to ascribe to human collectives empirically dubious forms of commonality. Other works offer further glimpses of this same tendency. The Balkhi author Muḥammad Ṭahir b. Abū’l-Qāsim, for instance, relates of the Tashkentis that they were renowned for their bravery and aggression,¹⁷⁵ while in the *Baḥr al-asrār* Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī claims that his own fellow inhabitants of Balkh could be distinguished from people elsewhere by their poetic ability, their attractiveness and their good temper.¹⁷⁶ In fact, other populations might well have challenged this suggestion that Balkhis were uniquely distinguished by their literary capacities. Samarqandis, in particular, were proud of their own poetic achievements. The majority of Central Asian *tadhki-rah*s compiled between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries were written by Samarqandis celebrating the compositional careers of their friends

Farmūd: dar bīrūn-i darwāzah-yi Fūrūzābād ābī ast. Bar kinār-i āb darakhtān-and. Gāhī dar ān sāyahhā mīnishastam. Khwurdān wa īfāl-i īshān—kih dar sinn-i shash wa haft sālagi būdand—harḡiz barahnah dar āb namī-dār-āmadand. Bih azār mī-dār-āmadand. Dar in shahr in tūr-i adab wa ri’āyat nīst. Az in jihat mardum-i Hirī Samarqandiyān-rā munkir-and: M’UA 299.

¹⁷⁴ *Amā zan-i samarqandī az barā-yi ārā’ish wa namā’ish wa khūbi-yi mubāsharat nikū-st, wa zan-i bukhārī az barā-yi mūhmāndārī wa mardumī wa mardum gusil kardan diljū-st, zan-i tāshkandī az barā-yi zā’idan-i farzand wa kuthrat wa mardumī wa tanāsul az dhukūr wa ināth bisyār khūb ast, wa amā zan-i sīstānī az barā-yi ān kih har yik az izdīwāj-i thalāthah aḡar dar amūr-i rūzgār ihmāl wa ta’allul wa takāsul wa tajāhul warzand kih bā’ith-i shalāq zadan shawad hamah-rā bih rūy zanand kih tahammul wa purdāsht-i in ma’nī dārad: NZJ 265. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer at Brill for correcting my reading of this passage.*

¹⁷⁵ ‘AT 174b.

¹⁷⁶ BA/Ariyānā 104.

and associates. Muṭribī's *Nuskah-yi zibā-yi Jahāngīr*, for instance, is divided into two sections, one containing compositions by poets associated with Samarqand and the second briefly treating the work of authors based anywhere else in the khanate.¹⁷⁷ Muḥammad Badi' Maliḥā Samarqandī's late-seventeenth-century *Mudhakkir al-aṣḥāb* offers an even more Samarqand-centric account of poetic activity, interweaving accounts of Samarqandi literary careers with snippets of regional history and several saintly biographies, many of them relating to locally-based descendents of Khwājah Aḥrār.¹⁷⁸ A different impression altogether accrues from the *Tadhkirah-yi Naṣrābādī*, another late seventeenth-century literary compilation which was composed at the Safavid court in Isfahan. Of the fifty Central Asian poets whose works are discussed in this *tadhkirah*, only twelve are Samarqandis and eight Balkhis, whereas twenty-four are identified as natives of Bukhara.¹⁷⁹ Like the inhabitants of Balkh and Samarqand, Bukharans could also invoke a collective literary sensibility as one of the factors communally distinguishing them from members of adjacent *wilāyats*.

As in any instance of communicative action, the arbitrariness with which people selected an 'ethically constitutive' epithet¹⁸⁰ as communal signifier need have done nothing to undermine this epithet's conventionalised force. By associating their communities with values which they perceived to be lacking in neighbouring areas, people did not only regard themselves as different from their neighbours, but also regarded themselves as 'better'. One seventeenth-century source, for instance, relates how Bukharans used to tell insulting stories about the Samarqandis, professing relief that Bukhara's more westward location spared them from having to look towards Samarqand while praying.¹⁸¹ From this perspective, any notion of pan-imperial commonality might be an affront to a sense of communal selfhood, threatening to contaminate the virtues of one's own community with the shortcomings of one's neighbours.

¹⁷⁷ NZJ 69–118 (section one); 119–266 (section two). For the arrangement of Muṭribī's work see further below, p. 228.

¹⁷⁸ MAṣ *passim*.

¹⁷⁹ TN 432–434.

¹⁸⁰ For the terminology see R. Smith, *Stories of Peoplehood* (Cambridge, 2003), 15.

¹⁸¹ Ba'ḍī *guftah-and kih "Al-ḥamdu li'llāh kih Samarqand dar qiblah wāqī" nashud, kih mā-rā har ruz panj bār bih ān ṭaraf nikāh bāyast kard*": JāmM 104a.

Communal Loyalty and the Appanage System

Although the phenomenon of communal loyalty was nothing new in early modern Central Asia, the affective force of this loyalty type seems to have increased substantially from the early Abū'l-Khayrid period onwards. "One critical factor throughout the entire sixteenth century", writes Florian Schwarz, one of the few scholars adequately to observe this phenomenon, "was a strong tendency towards regionalisation."¹⁸² This was principally due to a single intervention, namely the establishment of the Abū'l-Khayrid appanage system.

When the Abū'l-Khayrid princes gathered at the *qūriltāy* of 1512 (see above, p. 123), they agreed how to divide Muḥammad Shibānī's recently constituted empire into appanages. It is a commonplace to observe that nomadic or recently-sedentarised political hierarchies conceive of authority in terms more of people than of place, and it is certainly true that at the beginning of the sixteenth century the commonest term for denoting political entities in Central Asia was the *ulūs*, a term usually denoting an aggregate of people.¹⁸³ (By the seventeenth century, by contrast, '*ulūs*' was used primarily to denote individual single tribal formations.¹⁸⁴) Nevertheless, appanage allocations clearly acknowledged sedentary spatial convention, since there was extensive congruity between appanage lots and long-recognised *wilāyat* zones. The Kūchkūnjids' landholdings were concentrated within the single *wilāyat* of Samarqand, while fellow dynasts possessed compositely constituted holdings. The Suyūnchids ruled at least four mutually adjoining *wilāyat* zones, centred upon the cities of Tashkent,¹⁸⁵ Sayrām,¹⁸⁶ Turkistān¹⁸⁷ and Andījān.¹⁸⁸ Established in authority over both Bukhara and Qarshī,¹⁸⁹ the Shāh-Būdāqids were emplaced in two *wilāyat* regions, meanwhile, as were the Jānī-Bikids, with holdings in Miyānkāl¹⁹⁰

¹⁸² Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 234.

¹⁸³ See e.g. ZĀ 475b, relating how "Qāsim Khan was the illustrious ruler in the *ulūs* of the Qazaqs and Manghits" (*Qāsim Khān Qazāq wa Mangqīt ūlūsīdā pādīshāh-i dhū-shawkat ūrdī*); also FN 57, applying the term to denote Abū'l-Khayr's supporters.

¹⁸⁴ See e.g. BA 35b (referring to the *ulūs-i Qunghrāt*), 293a (the *ulūs-i Mīng*), 296a (the *ulūs-i Uyrāt*), 297a (the *ulūs-i Naymān*) and 304a (the *ulūs-i Yūz*).

¹⁸⁵ *ShNSh* 33a; *MB* 162.

¹⁸⁶ *ShNSh* 83a.

¹⁸⁷ *BA* 154a.

¹⁸⁸ *MNB* 263; *IOSASU* 1644/I 26a.

¹⁸⁹ *ShNSh* 33a.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

and Balkh.¹⁹¹ Individual Abū'l-Khayrid regimes thus mapped onto well-established single/multiple territorial zones, adding a 'political' architecture to prior-existing 'cultural' frameworks of communal self-awareness and thereby adding to what we might term the 'density' of these communities.¹⁹² Of course, *wilāyat*-metropoles had previously been seats of gubernatorial authority in the Tīmūrid era¹⁹³ and before. The difference lay in the fact that appanage holdings, unlike gubernatorially administered territories, were individually autonomous (see above, pp. 123–125). Whereas governors merely *represented* the distant authority of an imperial centre, appanage-holders themselves *embodied* an authority which required no authorisation from elsewhere. This meant that formalised political obligation was directed not to a single imperial capital but towards a multiplicity of *wilāyat*-metropoles, with each appanage-centre housing an autonomous version of that established actor whose responsibilities and prerogatives were discussed in chapter 2. The consequences of this shift were far-reaching.

Communal Partisanship, and 'Communal Entrepreneurs'

Appanage-rulers seem to have achieved a high degree of political (if not territorial: see above, p. 134) penetration within their subject territories. This is suggested by references to levels of military participation over the sixteenth century. One source relates a mid-century attack on Shāh-Būdaqīd Bukhara by a combined Suyūnchid-Kūchkūnjid army of two hundred thousand men.¹⁹⁴ Another describes a later incursion of one hundred thousand Suyūnchid troops across the Syr Darya,¹⁹⁵ and a nineteenth-century traveller describes an inscription commemorating a 1571 battle where 'Abdallāh's thirty-thousand strong army supposedly defeated a Suyūnchid force of four hundred thousand.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, it is recounted that even junior

¹⁹¹ MB 214; TSh 90; Akhmedov, *Istoriia Balkha*, 78–79.

¹⁹² The relative density and consequent affective force of particular communal groupings is a major subject of discussion in network analysis. For theoretical treatment see e.g. M.S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties", in *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (1973), 1360–1380, particularly 1370; for the adoption of such ideas by historians see e.g. S.D. Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* (Berkeley, 2011), particularly 171.

¹⁹³ For instance, for much of the reign of Sultan Aḥmad (1469–1494), 'Abd al-'Alī Tarkhān governed Bukhara (*R'AH* 545, *TR* 257, *BA* 279a) and his son Muḥammad Bāqir Tarkhān governed Ḥiṣār (*AhT* 12).

¹⁹⁴ *JāmM* 77b.

¹⁹⁵ *RS* 210b.

¹⁹⁶ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, 231–232.

sub-appanaged dynasts regularly mobilised ten thousand troops, as apparently did Bābā's brother Sultan Amīn when he defected to 'Abdallāh in the early 1570s.¹⁹⁷ Troop estimates are notoriously inaccurate, of course,¹⁹⁸ and such figures may be little more than conventionalised tropes. Even so, the sheer scales of magnitude on display suggest that appanage chiefs were scarcely less successful than their imperial successors in mobilising their respective subject populations: according to Mullā Awāz in the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*, 'Abdallāh's army on the Kashgar campaign in the mid-1590s totalled 'just' fifty thousand men,¹⁹⁹ and some twenty years later Imām Qulī Khan is supposed to have relied on expeditionary forces of a hundred thousand to eliminate disorder in Tashkent²⁰⁰ and the Fergana valley.²⁰¹

Appanaged regimes became adept at inculcating partisanship. Because it was difficult to coerce military support from the tribal Turco-Mongolian manpower pool (see above, pp. 115–116), rulers instead had to offer incentives for military participation. While a redistributive network comprised the basic material incentive for cooperation throughout the pre-modern period, the phenomenon of regional autonomy under the appanage system offered a further spur to such participation. Tribal populations in the Tashkent region mobilised in large numbers on behalf of the Suyūnchids because they identified their welfare with the welfare of the established regime.

To an extent, such identification was only natural. The success or failure of a long-range acquisitive campaign such as 'Abdallāh's Kashgar expedition was of direct and immediate consequence only to those who took part. Because the earlier appanage wars were more closely-fought hostilities, by contrast, the immediate costs of failure were likely to be borne by non-participants as well as by those who were directly involved. Any campaign against a neighbouring settlement, for instance, risked inviting enemy counter-attack upon one's own territorial community: this occurred in 1579, for instance, when 'Abdallāh vigorously responded to a Suyūnchid assault on Samarqand, capturing several Tashkenti possessions on the rebound.²⁰² Since military abstention offered no protection against the costs of set-

¹⁹⁷ *RS* 231a.

¹⁹⁸ For a good discussion on this point see Aubin, "L'Avènement des Safavides reconsidérée (Études Safavides III)", in *Moyen Orient et Océan Indien* 5 (1988), 1–130 [28–33].

¹⁹⁹ *DQ* 30b.

²⁰⁰ *BA* 94b.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 118a.

²⁰² *TSR* 166b.

back, non-belligerence was relatively unattractive. Because an individual's *wilāyat*-association was already likely to be highly determinative upon his fate, therefore, it was in his interest to help direct matters to his advantage by contributing military assistance.

In addition to material self-interest, however, people's calculation in favour of military participation seems also to have reflected their sympathetic and normative attachments to a sense of territorial community. Hagiographic and other material suggests that by the mid-sixteenth century many Turkic pastoral groups associated themselves as closely with a local communal repertoire as did their sedentary neighbours did.²⁰³ This perhaps reflects the way in which appanaged *wilāyat*-rulers went out of their way to cultivate equivalential links amongst their regional subjects, and between their subjects and themselves. Rulers thus functioned as what we might term localised 'communal entrepreneurs'.²⁰⁴ They deployed their resources to strengthen people's self-associative repertoires and to reify particular aspects of regional self-conceptualisation. This enabled appanage-holders to bolster their disciplinary authority with a recognisable claim to communal pre-eminence, and thus enabled them when necessary to exploit as agents the communal loyalties which they themselves had bulwarked.

Historical Figures, and the Timūrid Legacy

Over the course of the 1520s and 1530s, Kūchkūnjī and his sons Abū Sa'īd and 'Abd al-Laṭīf oversaw the construction of a splendidly appointed *madrasah* in Samarqand.²⁰⁵ This was a useful thing to do. It was useful partly because they were thus able to inculcate clientelist loyalty through this lavish display of civic euergetism. But they also derived utility from the project's more symbolic value. Like 'Abd al-'Azīz b. 'Ubaydallāh Khan, who in the 1540s endowed a *madrasah* in the centre of Bukhara,²⁰⁶ the Kūchkūnjid princes

²⁰³ In the *Lamahāt min nafahāt al-quds*, Muḥammad al-'Alim al-Ṣidiqī al-Alawā'ī suggests that in sixteenth-century Miyānkāl the Yasawī shaykh Khudāydād enjoyed as much communal authority among the local Uzbek population as he did among Persianate sedentarists: *Ūzbik wa ghayruhu-rā murid migirad: LNQ 106b-107a*. The passage is noted in Borovkov, "Ocherki po istorii uzbekskogo iazyka", 241, wrongly citing 170a.

²⁰⁴ The formula is borrowed from David Laitin's conception of 'ethnic entrepreneurs', glossed as those "who have an interest in altering the payoffs for individual identity choices": *idem, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, 1998), 248.

²⁰⁵ MAṣ 110a; mentions also in *DQ 56a, TSh 154, 520*.

²⁰⁶ Babadzhanov, "K datirovke mecheti "Valida-yi 'Abd al-Azizkhan" v Bukhare", in *Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane 1998.4-5*, 90-93.

were identifying themselves with earlier rulers who had similarly left their mark on the urban landscape: Isma'īl Khan Sāmānī and the Qarākhānī Arslān Khan in Bukhara,²⁰⁷ and Timūr and Ulugh Bik in Samarqand.²⁰⁸ As Timūr's sixteenth-century afterlife illustrates, such historic figures could be widely revered in regional tradition: and appanage-holders were canny to encourage and exploit such reverence for their own purposes.

As far as Samarqandis were concerned, association with their Tīmūrid heritage offered an ethically constitutive story which highlighted one of the things which made them special. The Tīmūrid age represented the apogee of a Samarqandi communal past. To exercise authority in 16th-century Samarqand was to sit upon the '*takht-i Tīmūr Gūragān* (Throne of Tīmūr)',²⁰⁹ and in this same period a village located just outside the city boundaries was known as 'Sang-i sabz (Green Stone)'.²¹⁰ This name may refer either to the slab of jade which Ulugh Bik brought to Samarqand in the 1420s in order to adorn Timūr's tomb,²¹¹ or to Tīmūr's celebrated coronation stone, which played a significant role in neo-Tīmūrid conceptualisations of the city in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.²¹² But its exact denotation is less relevant than the clue it offers to Tīmūr's ongoing significance in the process of Samarqandi self-conceptualisation.²¹³

This significance can be glimpsed elsewhere. Tentatively dated to the sixteenth century, a Samarqandi shrine catalogue entitled the *Qandīyah* illustrates how people continued to elaborate stories about Timūr a century after his death. Mention by the early fifteenth-century authors Shāmī and Yazdī how Tīmūr once performed a pilgrimage to the *mazār* of Qutham b. 'Abbās²¹⁴ is subsequently embroidered into a more extensive narrative.

²⁰⁷ M. Usanova, "Ismoil Somoniy Vaqfnomasi", in *Sharqshunoslik* 6 (1995), 24–31; Chekhovich, "Tiazhba o vakfe medresc Arslan-khana", in *Pis'mennye pamiatniki vostoka 1978–1979* (1987), 123–145.

²⁰⁸ T.W. Lentz and G.D. Lowry, *Timur and the Princely Vision: Persian Art and Culture in the Fifteenth Century* (Los Angeles, 1989), 34–42.

²⁰⁹ *RS* 296a; see also *TShKh* 109b (followed in turn in *TQKh* 268a), noting 'Abd al-Mu'min b. 'Abdallāh's elevation upon the *takht-i Tīmūr*.

²¹⁰ *MB* 204, identifying Sang-i sabz as a suburb of Samarqand (*az muḍāfāt-i baldah-yi madhkūr ast*); *JāmM* 94a, reproduced in Uzbek translation in Ahmedov, "“Manoqiblar”—muhim tarixiy manba", 263; *BA* 168a.

²¹¹ Bartol'd, "Khafiz-i Abri i ego sochineniia", in *Sochineniia VIII* (Moscow, 1977), 74–97 [96].

²¹² Sela, "The "Heavenly Stone" (Kök Tash) of Samarqand: A Rebels' Narrative Transformed", in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 3.17 (2007), 21–32.

²¹³ For comments see Manz, "Tamerlane's Career and Its Uses", in *Journal of World History* 13 (2002), 1–25.

²¹⁴ *ZN* (Shāmī) 211; *ZN* (Yazdī) 346a.

Qutham was a companion and cousin of the Prophet who helped bring Islam to Central Asia, and was thereafter known as *Shāh-i zindah*.²¹⁵ According to the *Qandīyah* Tīmūr wished to communicate with Qutham, so dispatched somebody called Ḥadā into his tomb to speak to him. Qutham did not wish to be disturbed, and threatened to blind Ḥadā if he revealed his existence to Tīmūr. Tīmūr was angry to realise that his envoy's profession to have seen nothing was untruthful, but when Ḥadā admitted that he had simply wished to retain his sight Tīmūr magnanimously relented in his wrath, promising to build a *madrasah* for the use of Ḥadā and his descendents. The author concludes by noting that the *madrasah* was still standing at the time of composition.²¹⁶ Samarqand's late-fourteenth-century history is thus interwoven with traditions relating to a much more ancient past.

Stories also circulated about Tīmūr's close associates. Prime among these was his spiritual advisor Sayyid Barakah, to whom Samarqandis accorded saintly agency throughout the sixteenth century. Muṭribī describes how Mīr Tūlik, head of artillery (*tūpchī-bāshī*) to Sulṭān Sa'īd b. Abū Sa'īd, went on a drunken rampage in the city and caused 150 gold coins' worth of damage. The author relates that it was only thanks to Barakah's spiritual intervention that Mīr Tūlik was captured and punished for his crime.²¹⁷ This story is contained within a larger passage devoted to Tīmūr's tomb-complex at the Gūr-i Amīr. According to Muṭribī, this tomb-complex had been a pilgrimage-site for Samarqandis since the brief rule of Bābur in the early sixteenth century.

[The complex] is situated in the south of the city in a place which is called Chaqar-i Samarqand. An account of this tomb, renowned for its perfection and beauty, is as follows. One enters from the northern direction coming from the city. As you come in through the gate and past a dome you see a broad courtyard filled with trees, both of the sort which bear fruit and those which do not. To the left of that, there is a pool like the river of Paradise, full of limpid water. And from the happy time of the Paradise-dwelling *pādishāh* Bābur onwards it is related that the people of Samarqand, men and women alike, would come and throng together here on the occasions of 'īd and *nawrūz*.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ Bosworth, "Qutham b. al-'Abbās b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib al-Hāshimī", in *EI*² V (1986), 551. For Qutham's Samarqandi associations, see *al-Qand* 677–681.

²¹⁶ *Qandīyah* 33–45.

²¹⁷ *NZJ* 24–25.

²¹⁸ *Dar jānīb-i jānūbī-yi shahr dar maqāmī kih mashhūr bih Chaqar-i Samarqand ast wāqī shudah wasf-i ān dakhmah-yi mashhūrah bih tamāmāh wa kamālkhā chunān ast kih mudakh-khal-i ān az jānīb-i quṭb-i shumālī-yi shahr ast. Ibdtidā darwāzah wa gunbadī chūn dar āyand*

Such rituals suggest that Tīmūr remained an ever-present figure in Samarqandi social practices for several centuries after his death. The Kūchkūnjids evidently authorised these rituals, or actively encouraged them. This was because they wished to exploit Tīmūr's constitutive function for their own purposes.

The Kūchkūnjids did not merely appropriate the Samarqandis' self-associative repertoire, but actively situated themselves within it. They themselves enjoyed a degree of communal eminence, because Kūchkūnjī's own maternal ancestry collectively made 'Tīmūrids' of them all. In 1451 Abū'l-Khayr Khan had helped the Tīmūrid dynast Abū Sa'īd to secure authority over Mā warā al-nahr, and in thanks Abū Sa'īd betrothed to Abū'l-Khayr the princess Rabī' Sulṭān Bīkīm.²¹⁹ The two products of this union were Kūchkūnjī and Suyūnch Muḥammad. The Samarqandi Kūchkūnjids in particular seem to have accorded particular emphasis to their Tīmūrid background.²²⁰ This is suggested by the arrangement of biographical material in Muṭribī's heavily Samarqand-centric *Nuskah-yi zibā-yi Jahāngīr*. Muṭribī classifies the Kūchkūnjids among the *Salāṭīn-i Chaghatāy*. He thereby identifies them with the sixteenth-century Tīmūrid rulers of Badakhshan and the Mughals in India, thus in contradistinction to other Abū'l-Khayrid dynasts—including Suyūnchids—whom he classifies together with 'Arab-shāhid and Tūqāy-Tīmūrid princes as members of the *Salāṭīn-i Ūzbikīyah*.²²¹

Other parties helped the Kūchkūnjids to assert their Tīmūrid-derived communal pre-eminence. The Kūchkūnjids were greatly assisted by India's Mughal emperors, who, keen to perpetuate memories of their Tīmūrid

maḥawwaṭah-yi wasī'ī zāhīr mīshawad mushtamal bar ashjār-i muthmirah wa ghayr-i muthmirah. Bar jānīb-i dast-i chap-i ān ḥawḍ-i kawthar-mithāl-i mamlū az āb-i zalāl. Wa az zamān-i farkhandah-nishān pādīshāh-i jinnat-makān Bābur pādīshāh nishān midahand kih mardum-i Samarqand az dhukūr wa ināth dar ayyām-i 'īd wa nawrūz [...] dar in maḥawwaṭah izdthām mīnamāyand: Ibid., 20.

²¹⁹ TAKhKh 322b–324a; discussion in Akhmedov, *Gosudarstvo kochevykh uzbekov*, 128–131. Ahrāri hagiographic tradition instead ascribes responsibility for Abū Sa'īd's victory to the intervention not of Abū'l-Khayr but of Khwājah Ahrār: see e.g. *M'UA* 213 and *R'AH* 519–525, plus discussion in Gross, "Khoja Ahrar: A Study of the Perceptions of Religious Power and Prestige in the Late Timurid Period" (New York University Ph.D. thesis, 1982), 95–109.

²²⁰ See e.g. *MB* 143.

²²¹ *NZJ* 69; contrast this with the classificatory schema in *MAh*, where entries are arranged according to whether individuals are associated with Chīngīzīd sultans, deceased Chaghatāyīd (= Tīmūrid) sultans, living Chaghatāyīd sultans or other non-Bukharan rulers. Discussing *NZJ*'s classificatory schema, Akhmedov mistakenly suggests that entries are arranged according to whether individuals are associated with Shibānīds or non-Shibānīds: [Akhmedov], "Mutribi va uning tazkiralari", in *Tarixdan Saboqlar*, 277–286 [281].

past,²²² were at pains to maintain close relations with their Samarqandi 'kinsmen'. Akbar was a particularly energetic devotee of Timūrid brotherhood, regularly sending gifts all the way to Mā warā al-nahr. For a time, he sent the Samarqandis an annual gift of an elephant, though discontinued this practice after one creature went on the rampage, killing four elephant-keepers and setting off on the road to India.²²³ ("I do not know for certain whether it got back to India or not", reports the conscientious Muṭribī.²²⁴) Thereafter, Akbar instead sent gold for the upkeep of the Gūr-i Amir.²²⁵ By such generosity, Akbar was signalling the importance he ascribed to his own Timūrid descent and the relationship to the Kūchkūnjids which this granted him. Whatever the immediate practical use of Akbar's gifts, they were of enormous symbolic value to the Kūchkūnjids, since they helpfully drew attention to the Kūchkūnjids' own line of Timūrid ancestry. By asserting both this ancestry and the trans-regional prominence which it secured the bearer, Akbar's gifts not only strengthened a Samarqandi self-associative repertoire, but also strengthened the Kūchkūnjids' particular claim to embody this repertoire through their own continued rule.

Spiritual Partisans

The Kūchkūnjids were probably unique among appanage-holders in the degree of utility they derived from fostering association with prominent historical figures. But most appanage-holders derived advantage from identifying themselves with their subjects' communally forged spiritual attachments. When 'Ubaydallāh b. Maḥmūd (r. 1534–1539) was ruling Bukhara,

²²² For discussion, see e.g. Foltz, "Thoughts and Acts of the Mughal Emperors Regarding Central Asia", in *idem*, *Mughal India and Central Asia*, 127–147; Quinn, "The Timurid Historiographical Legacy: A Comparative Study of Persianate Historical Writing", in A. Newman (ed.), *Society and Culture in the Early Modern Middle East* (Leiden, 2003), 9–31, particularly 27, and B. Péri, *Az indiai Timuridák és a török nyelv: a török írás- és szóbeliség a mogul-kori Indiában* (Pilicsaba, 2005), particularly 14–15. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Mughal rulers continued to maintain that the city of Samarqand actually belonged by rights to them: the Jesuit missionary Father Antonio Monserrate conveys this tradition when he recounts, *MLC* 672, how 'Abdullacanus' captured 'the kingdom of Samarcanda' although by law it actually belonged to Zelaldimus (i.e. Akbar): *Abdullacanus [...] Samarcandaeum regnum, quod iure Zelaldino cedit, sibi vindicavit*.

²²³ *NZJ* 69–70, referring to the elephant in question as a *fil-i Maḥmūdī*: the allusion here is to the elephant of the same name which was paralysed when being brought by enemy forces to destroy the Ka'bah, as related in *Qur'ān* 105.1.

²²⁴ *Ma'lūm nadāram kih āyā bih Hindūstān āmadah bāshad yā nah: NZJ* 70.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

he regularly spent time as a pilgrim at the shrine of Bahā al-Dīn Naqshband at Qaṣr-i 'Ārifān.²²⁶ Similarly, 'Abdallāh Khan made it his practice to visit the *mazārs* of both Naqshband and 'Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī either before or after several of his most important military campaigns.²²⁷ However 'honestly held' the religious convictions of these two individuals, both rulers probably derived instrumental benefit by enacting rituals which were symbolically meaningful to their Bukharan constituents. This phenomenon of religious theatre was manifest in other forms of ritual. Funeral ceremonies, for instance, allowed appanaged rulers to demonstrate their commitment to a communal religious outlook. Suyūnch Muḥammad was interred by the *mazār* of Aḥmad Yasawī in Turkistān,²²⁸ the Balkhi Jānī-Bikid Kistin Qarā was buried by the tomb of 'Alī in Mazār-i Sharīf,²²⁹ and Iskandar's funeral in 1583 took place at Qaṣr-i 'Ārifān.²³⁰ In each case, the dead dynast was buried in high pomp at a shrine which over time had played a constitutive role in people's localised self-associative repertoires.²³¹

Appanaged rulers did not only defer to their regional populations' spiritual self-associative repertoires, but on occasion took measures to shape them. This can be seen in the light of events after the death of Aḥmad Kāsānī in 1542. During his lifetime, Kāsānī had been cosmopolitan in his spiritual attachments. He maintained relations with a variety of Chingīzid dynasts both within and outside the Abū'l-Khayrid empire, and he regularly departed from his Samarqandi base to associate with prominent spiritual figures in Bukhara,²³² Balkh²³³ and Tashkent;²³⁴ he is apocryphally supposed also to have travelled widely in East Turkistan.²³⁵ Such 'promiscuity' echoed the behaviour of Aḥrār, who in the late fifteenth century had freely consorted with Tashkentis, Samarqandis and Heratis alike (see above, p. 110). But such cosmopolitanism declined after Kāsānī's death, as

²²⁶ See e.g. *BW* I.234 and *MAh* 12.

²²⁷ *ShNSh* 3497 168b, 204a, 228b.

²²⁸ Babajanov, Muminov, Paul, *Schaibanidische Grabinschriften*, 104–107.

²²⁹ Yate, *Northern Afghanistan*, 214.

²³⁰ *ShNSh* 3497 204a; *MB* 203; *BA* 7418 385a.

²³¹ Interestingly, the heavily Timūrid-invested Kūchkūnjid dynasts were not generally buried at religiously 'numinous' sites; most members of the sub-family were buried by Muḥammad Shībānī's tomb in Samarqand. See Babajanov, Muminov, Paul, *Schaibanidische Grabinschriften*, 63–86.

²³² *JāmM* 52b, 97b, 101a, etc; *BA* 141b.

²³³ *JāmM* 79b.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 112a, 141b–142a.

²³⁵ H.G. Schwarz, "The Khwājas of Eastern Turkestan", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 20 (1976), 266–296 [270–272]. Papas (*Soufisme et politique*, 35) rebuts the claim.

individual appanage-holders increasingly sought to 'patronise local cults',²³⁶ thereby appropriating particular shaykhly figures to bolster their subjects' communal attachments.

The succession to Aḥmad Kāsānī's spiritual authority was heavily fought-over, and highly controversial. When Kāsānī's own master Muḥammad Qāḍī had died, Kāsānī was the unchallenged recipient of his spiritual mantle, as Muḥammad Qāḍī in turn had been designated successor to Aḥrār. During his lifetime, however, Kāsānī had raised the stakes: by his adroit acquisition of wealth and political influence, he demonstrated to aspirant successors that spiritual pre-eminence carried 'instrumental' worth in addition to its longer-recognised 'intrinsic' value.²³⁷ It was perhaps consequently that, when he died, few of his spiritual associates were prepared to accept being passed over in favour of his designated successor. There thus followed a long period of spiritual contestation among rival claimants. What is striking about this contestation is the degree of congruence between its partisan fault-lines and the outlines of *wilāyat* and appanage. This partly reflects the tendency of spatially demarcated populations to support the candidate whom they regarded as their own. It also reflects the way that individual appanage-rulers weighed into the matter by championing the claims of their own favoured candidate.

According to most Bukharan sources, Muḥammad Islām Jūybārī was Kāsānī's spiritual successor.²³⁸ According to most non-Bukharan sources, he was not.²³⁹ Several Samarqandi authors, for instance, claim that Kāsānī designated as his successor either Muḥammad Amīn or Khwājah Ishāq.²⁴⁰ These were both sons of Kāsānī, who had long been associated with the Samarqand region. Other sources, meanwhile, maintain that Kāsānī's true successor was Luṭfullāh Chustī,²⁴¹ a pupil from the Fergana region who in time had also been a former associate of Muḥammad Qāḍī.²⁴² This proliferation of

²³⁶ F. Schwarz, "Ohne Scheich kein Reich: Scheibaniden und Naqšbandis in der Darstellung von Maḥmūd ibn Walī", in H. Preißler and H. Stein (eds.), *Annäherung an das Fremde: XXVI. Deutscher Orientalistentag vom 25. bis 29.9.1995 in Leipzig (ZDMG Supplementa 11)* (Stuttgart, 1998), 259–267 [265].

²³⁷ Babajanov, "Biographies of Makhdum-i A'zam", 3.

²³⁸ *Maṭṭ* claims, 40a–41a, that Muḥammad Islām was assured of succession even as a child, having impressed Kāsānī with his youthful miracles.

²³⁹ For good general discussion, see Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 190–191.

²⁴⁰ E.g. *DQ* 5a, claiming that Kāsānī predicted Ishāq's future pre-eminence. For wider discussion of prediction as a trope in hagiography and court chronicles see below, p. 270 ff.

²⁴¹ *MML* 38–39 and 45–46, emphasising Chustī's particular closeness to Kāsānī.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 30–34.

stories makes it difficult to establish which actor had the strongest claim to inherit Kāsānī's mantle. What is clear, however, is that Muḥammad Islām enjoyed the strongest backing in the long-drawn-out subsequent process of contestation. With close ties to, and support from the ascendant Jānī-Bikid dynasts Iskandar and 'Abdallāh, Muḥammad Islām and his descendants were able by increments to expand their spiritual authority across the regions which fell to Jānī-Bikid rule over the course of the appanage wars. The decision by Iskandar and 'Abdallāh to support Muḥammad Islām may well reflect the fact that he, unlike his rival contestants for Kāsānī's mantle, had long-standing dynastic ties to the Bukhara region.²⁴³ Support for Muḥammad Islām might thus appeal to a local constituency upon which Bukhara's newly-established Jānī-Bikid rulers were keen to prevail.

By their support, Iskandar and 'Abdallāh rendered Muḥammad Islām a specifically Bukharan spiritual authority. At the same time, they ensured that Muḥammad Islām's spiritual rivals would henceforth associate themselves with other regions and other appanage-rulers. Samarqandi tradition relates, for instance, that Muḥammad Amīn confined himself to the Samarqand region after the Jūybārīds' accession to pre-eminence, and that he thereafter simply served as *kitābdār*, or librarian, to the Kūchkūnjid 'Abdal Sultan b. 'Abd al-Laṭīf.²⁴⁴ Just as the Kūchkūnjids were pleased to identify themselves with this son of the 'Samarqandi' Aḥmad Kāsānī, other rulers appanaged elsewhere were keen to consort with both Chustī and Khwājah Ishāq. Both individuals found a warm welcome at several regional courts located at the margins of greater Mā warā al-nahr. Luṭfullāh Chustī concentrated his activities in the regions of Tashkent²⁴⁵ and Andījān,²⁴⁶ and in Ḥiṣār, in the southeast of the khanate,²⁴⁷ while Ishāq spent time at local courts in

²⁴³ The Jūybārīds claimed descent from Imām 'Alī through Imām Abū Bakr Sa'd Sūmitānī, whose tomb was a popular pilgrimage destination near Bukhara: *RR* 22a; *MaṭT* 8a.

²⁴⁴ *TSR* 186a–b. An alternative tradition claims that Muḥammad Amīn remained active in Bukhara, where he became a son-in-law of Muḥammad Islām before returning to Samarqand immediately prior to his death: thus *MaṭT* 48b, *TSh* 183.

²⁴⁵ *SirS* 76b, 102b–103b.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 71a–b, 82b, 95b; *MML* 131–133. Memories of his activities in the region would resurface in nineteenth-century Quḡandī tradition. According to legend, Chustī predicted to his pupil Chamāsh Bī that his descendants would rule the region, which indeed occurred when the Ming dynasty assumed authority: *TSh* 2b–3a.

²⁴⁷ *SirS* 110a–b; discussion in R. Mukimov, "Mavzolei-ye Makhdum-e Azam", in N.N. Negmatov, R.S. Mukimov, Z.A. Alieva, P.T. Samoilik (eds.), *Hissorskii zapovednik i ego arkhitekturnye pamiatniki*, (Dushanbe, 1994), 53–67 [64].

Balkh,²⁴⁸ Ḥiṣār²⁴⁹ and East Turkistan,²⁵⁰ before returning to spend his final years in Samarqand. By welcoming these shaykhs into their courts, local appanage-holders may well have sought to bolster the salience and affective force of their subjects' sense of communal selfhood. By casting various post-Kāsānid Naqshbandīs as 'communal saints', rulers were able to enlarge their panoply of ethically constitutive norms which bulwarked communal solidarities. Such solidarities in turn permitted rulers to draw upon people's communal loyalties in the face of outside threat.

Appanages from Outside

As a result of decisions made at the 1512 *qūriltāy*, Abū'l-Khayrid appanage-holders held their territories as autonomous possessions. During the sixteenth century, the degree of appanage autonomy increased. By appropriating their subjects' self-associative repertoires, appanage-holders enmeshed their local autonomies with long-established regional *wilāyat* identities. They were thus able to generate deeply rooted socio-political entities, which possessed salience in determining people's self-conceptualisation, and affective force in determining their political attachments.

The force with which these *wilāyat*-appanage aggregates were clustered in mutual isolation can be seen in the writings of outside witnesses. Whereas Central Asian sources conceptualise the mid-sixteenth-century Abū'l-Khayrid empire as a *bricolage* of regional units, external observers frequently failed to glimpse any binding architecture whatsoever. In 1579, Moscow's envoy to the Noghays Afanasii Boltin sent a report to the tsar of the activities of "Bukharans, Tashkentis, Urganjis [= Khwārazmians], Siberians and Noghays", thus according a Tashkenti polity the same diplomatic recognition as that accorded to the Jāni-Bikid metropole.²⁵¹ Describing events in eastern Iran after Shah Ṭahmāsb's death in 1576, meanwhile, the sixteenth-century Armenian chronicler Hovhanisik Tsaret'si relates how the region came under attack from "Bukharan and Balkhi armies".²⁵² Such examples suggest some doubt on the part of external observers as to whether Greater Mā warā al-nahr actually constituted a single political

²⁴⁸ DQ 9b-13a; Jālm 63a-66a.

²⁴⁹ DQ 14a-22a.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 24a; TKh 34.

²⁵¹ Koigeldiev, *Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh istochnikakh*, 173.

²⁵² Hovhanisik Tsaret'si, *Zhamanakagrut'yun*, 246, reproduced in L.Kh. Ter-Mkrtichian (ed.) *Armiānskie istochniki o Srednei Azii* (Moscow, 1985), 101. Arak'el Davrizhet'si follows Hovhanisik Tsaret'si's account verbatim in his later *Patmut'yun*, 479.

entity. They neatly convey both the rootedness and the salience of localised conceptions of selfhood in sixteenth-century Central Asia. They also hint at the challenges which Bāqī Muḥammad and his successors would encounter after the immediate events of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover.

Communities under Assault

During the sixteenth century, communal loyalties grew stronger as a result of the appanage system. More particularly, they grew stronger as a result of the way in which the appanage system distributed the *loci* of political authority across the regions of the khanate. Over the course of the 1570s and early 1580s, ‘Abdallāh dismantled the appanage system, and replaced it with a system of monopolar political authority. One might assume that this consequently served to reduce people’s degree of communal loyalty. But it did not. Instead, ‘Abdallāh’s policies engendered widespread local resentment. However much ‘Abdallāh furthered people’s subsistential interests by his empowerment of khalal authority (see above, pp. 127–139), he simultaneously frustrated their communal commitments. Instead of appeasing communal loyalties, ‘Abdallāh antagonised them.

After ‘Abdallāh captured Samarqand from the Kūchkūnjids in 1578, he appointed his brother ‘Ibādallāh Sultan to assume gubernatorial authority.²⁵³ Seven years later, ‘Ibādallāh Sultan was murdered by Mirzā ‘Abd al-Raḥīm,²⁵⁴ a member of that Dürmān tribe of which elements had long been associated with the Samarqand region.²⁵⁵ Sources give differing accounts of the reason behind his assassination. Bukharan tradition simply describes ‘Abd al-Raḥīm as a deranged rebel.²⁵⁶ But Muṭribī suggests a different story, suggesting that ‘Abdallāh’s Samarqandi governor may have paved the way for his downfall by affronting local tradition. Continuing his discussion of Samarqand’s Gūr-i Amīr, Muṭribī tells that ‘Ibādallāh Sultan forbade townspeople from visiting Tīmūr’s shrine, on the grounds that “in disregard of good behaviour people were climbing up the blessed mausoleum for fun”.²⁵⁷

²⁵³ *ShNSh* 3497 237b; *MB* 206; *NZJ* 121.

²⁵⁴ *ShNSh* 3497 237a; *MB* 207; *BA* 7418 391a.

²⁵⁵ Thus e.g. Tawakkul Bī Dürmān, father of Bāqī Muḥammad’s ally Bāqī Bī (for whom see e.g. *BA* 52b), fought and died for the Samarqandi Kūchkūnjid Sultān Sa’id: *ShNSh* 79b.

²⁵⁶ *ShNSh* 3497 237a; *MB* 207.

²⁵⁷ *Khalā’iq tark-i adab namūdah bih jihat-i tafarruḥ bar bālā-yi dakhmah-yi munawwarah bar miyāmadand: NZJ* 20–21.

The prohibition was unpopular with local inhabitants, and in the early seventeenth century the governor of Samarqand under the Tūqāy-Timūrid dynast Imām Qulī curried favour with locals by rescinding the order.²⁵⁸

In banning people from visiting the Gūr-i Amīr, 'Ibādallāh seems to have presented himself as a concerned steward of Samarqand's architectural heritage. But his decision to issue the edict may have been motivated by less elevated considerations. Unlike the Kūchkūnjids, Samarqand's new Jānī-Bikid rulers could boast no Timūrid ancestry, and thus stood excluded from this element in their subjects' communal self-conception. Whereas the enactment of Timūrid memorial rites had facilitated the Kūchkūnjids' appeal to Samarqandi communal loyalties, it actively undermined any such appeal on the part of the Jānī-Bikids. Because 'local values' had been extensively co-opted by previous appanage regimes, the Jānī-Bikids seem to have regarded such values as a threat to themselves: and they therefore set about undermining them. But 'Ibādallāh's fate may attest to the divisive consequences of such policies. Far from reducing inter-*wilāyat* partisanship, events in the wake of Jānī-Bikid victory in the appanage wars often aggravated prior-standing communal tensions.

Disrupted Material Interests

'Abdallāh's string of conquests may have succeeded in making his authority incrementally ever more incontestable, but regional populations rarely forgot the waves of brutality which he unleashed along the way. Qāsim Shaykh, for instance, may have felt betrayed by 'Abdallāh when the khan breached the terms which he, as intermediary, had negotiated for the surrender of Samarqand in 1578. Mystically informed of the city's imminent downfall, and hoping to minimise damage from the resultant fallout, Qāsim is supposed to have persuaded the Samarqandi ruler Jawānmard 'Alī to submit peacefully, in return for an assurance of safe conduct.²⁵⁹ But once 'Abdallāh was in command of the city, he instead issued an order for the prince's execution.²⁶⁰ Khwājah Ishāq was similarly perturbed at the violence of 'Abdallāh's 1573 Ḥiṣār offensive, which he is supposed to have witnessed in a vision.²⁶¹ Distaste at 'Abdallāh's behaviour may have influenced

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 21.

²⁵⁹ LNQ 115a. *Maṭī'* 96a-b instead credits the Jūybārī shaykh Khwājah Sa'd with the intervention.

²⁶⁰ NZJ 87-88.

²⁶¹ DQ 22a.

Ishāq's decision to assist the khan's non-Bukharan opponents. Tradition relates that he miraculously rescued the Kūchkūnchid dynast Būzah Khwar from drowning on campaign,²⁶² and in the mid-1590s also helped the Moghul Muḥammad Khan b. 'Abd al-Rashīd to repel 'Abdallāh's expeditionary offensive against Kashgar.²⁶³

Regardless of how capable 'Abdallāh's newly-established regime was of preserving socio-political order, the physical costs of military defeat lingered long in the popular consciousness. Alongside the heroising memories of 'Abdallāh encountered in Tūqāy-Timūrid- and Manghit-sponsored narrative, Samarqandi works especially attested to a similarly entrenched counter-tradition, according to which he was merely a capricious thug.²⁶⁴ Although 'Abdallāh's policy of amassing and centralising political authority brought with it a valuable 'security dividend', the virtues of this dividend were frequently lost on recently-subjugated regional populations, who were furthermore wont to blame the Bukharan authorities on the subsequent rare occasions when socio-political order came under threat.

Events in Tashkent illustrate this well. "On account of ['Abdallāh II's] power and ferocity, the Qazaq sultans lived in perfect obedience", writes Iskandar Bik Munshī in the *Tārikh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*.²⁶⁵ Tashkentis were thus spared much of the Qazaq-generated violence which the English traveller Anthony Jenkinson had witnessed in the 1550s, when he described how "certaine barbarous fiede people [elsewhere identified as 'Cassacks'] warre against *Taskent*".²⁶⁶ But if 'Abdallāh hoped for gratitude from the Tashkentis, he would be disappointed. On a single occasion in 1584, a Qazaq army under Tawakkul ravaged Tashkent, and 'Abdallāh's appointed governor Dūstum was unable to prevent large-scale damage.²⁶⁷ 'Abdallāh drew lessons from these events, and replaced the hapless Dūstum with the better-qualified Ūzbek Sultan (see above, p. 130), thus helping to ensure that Tashkent would thereafter be immune from attack for more than a decade. Given that

²⁶² Ibid., 142a. For Būzah Khwar's Kūchkūnchid ancestry, see MB 153, identifying him as Buzah Khwar b. Sulṭān Muḥammad Sultan b. Abū Sa'īd Khan.

²⁶³ DQ 30b–32a, 44a; JāLM 34b–36a; AT (Churās) 54a–b.

²⁶⁴ E.g. LNQ 115a, as above.

²⁶⁵ *Salāṭin-i Qazāq* [...] az ṣawlat wa siṭwat-i ū juz bih adab zindigānī namikardand: T.ĀĀ'A 552–553. For discussion of Qazaq submissiveness see D. Schorkowitz, *Die soziale und politische Organisation bei den Kalmücken (Oiraten) und Prozesse der Akkulturation vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 135.

²⁶⁶ Jenkinson, 90–91.

²⁶⁷ Burton, *The Bukharans*, 49, dates events to 1585, although Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan makes quite clear (MB 214–215) that they occurred under Dūstum's governorship.

the Tashkentis were already resentful at the Bukharans' presence in their region, however, they nevertheless attributed the isolated events of 1584 to the Jānī-Bīkids' dereliction of their duties, and soon after they mobilised against Bukhara, aligning themselves with the communal pretender claiming to be Bābā Sultan (see above, pp. 197–198). The events of 1584 drew censure, whereas the Suyūnchids had never been censured for a much more persistent failure to keep the peace in earlier decades.

Events in the late 1590s offered the Tashkentis rather more reasonable grounds for resentment towards their Bukharan masters. Preoccupied by worsening relations with 'Abd al-Mu'min, 'Abdallāh began to weaken in his paternalistic concern for maintaining order. When Tawakkul's Qazaqs advanced on the city in 1597, therefore, they did so with virtual impunity. "‘Abdallāh ‘did not regard [Tawakkul] as worthy of his meeting in person", writes Iskandar Bik Munshī in the *Tārīkh-i ‘ālam-ārā-yi ‘Abbāsī*, "and he dispatched his closest sultans and *amūrs* from the marcher lands and his own soldiers to see him off. There was an enormous battle between these two parties somewhere between Tashkent and Samarqand, and 'Abdallāh Khān's army [...] was defeated."²⁶⁸ Other sources, meanwhile, relate that 'Abd al-Mu'min himself cynically invited the Qazaqs to attack Tashkent, hoping thereby to gain the upper hand over 'Abdallāh (see above, p. 40). According to the *Tārīkh-i ‘Abbāsī*:

[‘Abd al-Mu'min] dispatched somebody to Tawakkul Khan, *hākīm* of the wagoned Qazaqs, [with a message saying] "I shall help you. Go to Tashkent and make yourself master." Tawakkul Khan did as instructed in 'Abd al-Mu'min's communication, and took possession of Tashkent. When this news reached 'Abdallāh Khan, he headed out for Samarqand that very day, and dispatched Khwājam Qulī Qūshchī-Bikī with twelve thousand Uzbeks toward Tashkent. This party was vanquished. Upon learning of his army's defeat, 'Abdallāh Khan dispiritedly headed back to Bukhara.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸ 'Abdallāh Khān ū-rā shāyastah-yi muqābalah-yi khūd nadīdah sulṭānān-i aqrabā wa umarā-yi thughūr-i mamālik wa lashkariyān-i khūd-rā bih mudāfa'ah-yi ū nāmzad namūd. Dar miyān-i Tāshkand wa Samarqand miyānah-yi ān dū grūh ḥarbī-yi 'azīm ittifaq uftādah, lashkar-i 'Abdallāh Khān [...] dar in ma'rakah shikast khwurdah [...]: TĀĀ'A 552–553, followed in turn in *SilSal* 148a.

²⁶⁹ Kas pūsh-i Tawakkul Khān hākīm-i Qazāq-i 'arābah-liq firistād kih man bā tū yāram: mutawajjih-i Tāshkand shū wa sāhibi kun. Tawakkul Khān bih mawjab-i firistādah-yi 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān 'amal namūdah Tāshkand-ra sāhibi namūd. Chūn in khabar bih 'Abdallāh Khān rasīd dar rūz mutawajjih-i Samarqand shud. Khwājam Qulī Qūshī Bīgī-rā bā dawāzdah hazār Ūzbek bih sar-i Tāshkand firistād. Īn jamā'at shikast khwurdand. Az shanīdan-i shikast-i lashkar 'Abdallāh Khān āzardah shud, bih Bukhārā mu'āwadat namūd: TA 164, following FH 24b–25a. I have here emended several misreadings in the Waḥid-niyā text (which

Sources do not relate whether this version of events held currency within Tashkent itself. If it did, the story would doubtless have exacerbated Tashkenti perceptions of high-handed Bukharan injustice, implying as it does that members of the Jānī-Bikid regime were prepared to imperil their subjects for the sake of short-term political advantage.

Accounts of 'Abd al-Mu'min's activities in the region after 'Abdallāh's death suggest further cause for Tashkenti resentment towards the Bukharan metropole. Marching north in order to crush his seditious kinsmen Ūzbik and Dūstum (see above, pp. 42–43), 'Abd al-Mu'min ordered them to be put to death in Tashkent "together with fifty innocent *amīrs* and *pādishāhs* on one single day".²⁷⁰ These 'innocent' objects of 'Abd al-Mu'min's anger were probably Tashkentis who had made the mistake of consorting with the rebel Jānī-Bikid princes. Their execution generated further visible victims of Bukharan violence, more than fifteen years after the end of the appanage wars. In the intervening period there had clearly been little love lost between Tashkentis and representatives of the imperial metropole.

Affronted Communal Values

Equally contentious were 'Abdallāh's attempts to foster a centripetal spiritual geography by bolstering the penetrative scope of Bukhara's Jūybārī line at the expense of rival saintly aggregates. In the early 1570s 'Abdallāh granted Muḥammad Islām ownership of large tracts of land in Balkh and Qarākul,²⁷¹ and a decade or so later gave Khwājah Sa'd b. Muḥammad Islām lands in Tashkent, Turkistān, Sayrām, Andijān and Kabādiyān, and even tried to give him full control of all Badakhshan.²⁷² Such generosity may have endeared 'Abdallāh to his Jūybārī mentors,²⁷³ but it alienated local populations who had come to associate themselves with various of the Jūybārīds' spiritual rivals. The passing of time after the post-Kāsānid fallout did little to soften mutual antipathies between competing spiritual parties. The

gives e.g. "Irāq" for 'Qazāq') by drawing on e.g. MS Bodleian Elliot 367 f. 218a and MS BL Add. 27241 f. 130a (which however reads 'Qarāq' for 'Qazāq'). For the Qazaqs' use of wagons see e.g. P.A. Andrews, *Felt Tens and Pavilions: The Nomadic Tradition and its Interaction with Princely Tentage* (London, 1999), 756–760.

²⁷⁰ *Dar yak rūz panjāh kas-rā az umarā wa pādishāhān-i bigunāh bih qatl rasānīd: NZJ* 128.

²⁷¹ *KhDzhSh* 52, 332.

²⁷² Nabiev, "Iz istorii feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia v Fergane v XVI–XVII vekakh", in *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk UzSSR* 1960.3, 25–35 [27].

²⁷³ For his relationship with members of the Jūybārī line, see e.g. *RR* 300a–301b and etc. and *MaʼT* 46a–b, with discussion in Schwarz, "Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein", 201–205.

Jūybārīds refused to allow a pupil of Chustī from entering Bukhara lest he attempt to acquire associates,²⁷⁴ and Muḥammad Islām outraged Ishāq by making clear that he recognised no boundaries to his own spiritual authority.²⁷⁵

Encroaching Jūybārīd influence did not terminate the local authority of other saintly figures, however. It was thus perhaps tactless of 'Abdallāh to allow his Jūybārīd devotion to overshadow his relations with other prominent Sufis. Yasawī tradition, for instance, reports that Qāsim Shaykh was so alienated that he refused to accept from 'Abdallāh the gift of a valuable prize horse.²⁷⁶ If the shaykh's rejection of gifts is a conventional hagiographic trope,²⁷⁷ a comparable account found in the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb* offers even clearer evidence of mutual suspicion between Sufi and khan. In this hagiography, Mullā Awāz relates that 'Abdallāh deliberately snubbed Ishāq by failing to offer him any of the largesse which he offered Ishāq's more amenable brothers Muḥammad Āmīn and Khwājah Dūst.²⁷⁸ ('Abdallāh supposedly came to regret his behaviour, however, when Ishāq appeared in a dream to save him from a rampaging tiger; relenting, he gave Ishāq a generous supply of grain.²⁷⁹) Such gracelessness on 'Abdallāh's part may have helped provoke shaykhs who had once consorted with him to realign themselves elsewhere. During the appanage wars, the Yasawī saint Yūsuf Khwājah Sayyid Ātā'ī was a supporter of 'Abdallāh, participating in the khan's campaigns in both Sayrām²⁸⁰ and Herat²⁸¹ but by the mid-1590s he had defected to the Qazaqs, where he perhaps found in Tawakkul a more congenial associate.²⁸²

By alienating locally prominent shaykhs, 'Abdallāh risked alienating those communal constituencies for which such shaykhs constituted part of a self-associative repertoire. 'Abd al-Mu'min went even further than his father, by imposing punitive sanctions on those shaykhs of whom he personally disapproved. Sources say little about 'Abd al-Mu'min's religious attachments: but the young khan was clearly no friend to Khwājah Ishāq. The *Ḍiyā al-qulūb* records that 'Abd al-Mu'min was resentful at the shaykh

²⁷⁴ *JāLM* 89a.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 67a.

²⁷⁶ *Asbī az barā-yi ān ḥaḍrat firistadah, ān ḥaḍrat ān-rā radd kardah-and: LNQ* 119a.

²⁷⁷ See e.g. *AT* (Bukhārī), 51–52; *R'AH* 402–403.

²⁷⁸ *DQ* 33a.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 34a.

²⁸⁰ *ShNSh* 3497 171b.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 244b.

²⁸² *Dar in athnā Yūsuf Khwājah Sayyid Ātā'ī bā jam'ī az mardum-i bi waḥdā az Andijān birūn āmadah [...]* nazd-i Tawakkul Sulṭān giriftah raftah: *MB* 195.

for poaching the services of one of his close associates,²⁸³ and suggests that he feared the shaykh's Samarqandi communal eminence. Immediately upon arriving in to Samarqand to be elevated after 'Abdallāh's death, we read, 'Abd al-Mu'min ordered Ishāq to be transported to Balkh, as little more than a common prisoner.²⁸⁴

According to the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*, Pīr Muḥammad II proved as antagonistic towards Ishāq as his predecessor. When Pīr Muḥammad was preparing his campaign against Bāqī Muḥammad, we read, his associate Dūst Chuhrah-Āghāsī offered him some advice. This was that Pīr Muḥammad's army should attack Ishāq's court at Isfīdūk before striking at Samarqand itself, in order to kill the saint and prevent him from intervening on the battlefield. Pīr Muḥammad assented to the proposal: and Ishāq only escaped death by fleeing to the *mazār* of Aḥmad Kāsānī.²⁸⁵ When Pīr Muḥammad then attacked Samarqand, Ishāq miraculously reappeared from within the city walls, seated on his customary white charger. He charged into battle, and proceeded to secure victory for Bāqī Muḥammad.²⁸⁶

²⁸³ *DQ* 92b–95b.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 34b; also *NZJ* 127, noting Ishāq's arrest at the same time as that of Jānī Muḥammad b. Yār Muḥammad (for which see above, p. 55). Mullā Awāz proceeds to relate that before Ishāq got to Balkh he was mystically informed of 'Abd al-Mu'min's impending death, and straightaway hurried back to Samarqand: *DQ* 35a–b.

²⁸⁵ Mullā Awāz relates (*ibid.*, 37b) how "before the battle occurred, Dūst Chuhrah-Aghāsī, one of the prominent amirs of Pīr Muḥammad Khan, made an appeal to Pīr Muḥammad, saying "Entrust the robbing of the Saint to me, that as I rob him I afflict him so that I be the means of his death." And Pīr Muḥammad approved. News of this reached the Saint, and he went by litter to the blessed tomb of Makhdūm-i A'zām. [...]" (*Qabl az ān kih jang wāqī' shawad, Dūs [sic] Chuhrah-Aghāsī, kih az umarā-yi 'azām-i Pīr Muḥammad Khān būd, az Pīr Muḥammad iltimās namūdah kih "Tārāj-i ḥaḍrat-i ishān-rā bih faqīr 'ināyat kunīd, kih man ḥaḍrat-i ishān-ra tārāj kardah bāsham bih jafā-yi tamām ḥaḍrat-i ishān-ra halāk kardah mībāsham."* Pīr Muḥammad Khān qabūl kardah ast, wa in khabar bih ḥaḍrat-i ishān rasidah ast. Ḥaḍrat-i ishān bar takht-i rawān nishashtah bih mazār-i fayd al-anwār-i ḥaḍrat-i Makhdūm-i A'zām shudand. [...]); *Ibid.*, 37b.

²⁸⁶ The passage proceeds to recount (*ibid.*, 38a–b) how, during the battle between Bāqī Muḥammad and Pīr Muḥammad, the eminent Samarqandi figure Mullā Darwish Balkhī "was astonished to see his eminence [i.e. Ishāq] appear by the grace of God, with a large detachment. He was mounted on a white horse, and all that he wore was white, and he had a sword in his hand. He first cut down the [enemy's] standard, and then cut off Pīr Muḥammad Khan's head. And [the observer] cried out and said: "Thank the Lord, victory has fallen to our side!" (*Mutahayyir būdah bih-nāgāh bih 'ināyat-i Allāh ḥaḍrat-i ishān paydā mīshawand bā jam'-i kathīr bar asb-i safīd sawār, wujūd-i har chih pūshīdah-and safīd, wa shamshūr dar dast. Awwal tūgh-i ū-rā qalam kardand, ba'd az ān sar-i Pīr Muḥammad Khān barīdand. Janāb-i Mullā Darwish faryād kardah wa guftah ast "Al-ḥamdu li'llāh kih fath dar in taraf wāqī' shud!"*).

Of course, this account of events contains various elements which are manifestly problematic for the more literal-minded historian. Most obviously, reference to occultation and reappearance clearly reveals more about the author's exposure to widely circulating hagiographic tropes than about what actually happened outside Samarqand's city gates. One is also struck by generic similarities between the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*'s account and a passage in the *Baḥr al-asrār* already mentioned above (see p. 98). In this aforementioned passage, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī relates the role which the Naqshbandī shaykh Khwājah Amkinagī played in securing Bāqī Muḥammad's victory. When Pīr Muḥammad announced that he would not accept a peaceful compromise, Khwājah Amkinagī intervened miraculously to help save the day. The shaykh's associates "set off with mystical inspiration to unfurl [Bāqī Muḥammad's] battle-standards in glory, and to bring despair to the flags of those seeking enmity", we read, "and they bathed Bāqī Muḥammad in divine favour."²⁸⁷

Taken together, the two passages suggest that people subsequently ascribed success at the showdown to various Sufi actors who, whether as Kāsānids or as other members of the Naqshbandīyah, had recently suffered at the hands of the Bukharan Jānī-Bikids. Whether or not these Sufi actors were actually involved in the showdown is almost irrelevant. Regardless of whether they participated in defeating Pīr Muḥammad, their supporters were certainly involved: and one reason for this involvement was the abusive way in which Pīr Muḥammad and his predecessors had treated the Samarqandis' shaykhly leaders. By indulging their spiritual prejudices, Jānī-Bikid rulers contrived ever further to alienate themselves from an already suspicious and resentful Samarqandi constituency.

'Abdallāh may have assumed that his unrivalled military might enabled him to act with impunity: but his successors paid the price for continuing to disregard communal sympathies. Samarqandis played a significant role in the downfall of both 'Abd al-Mu'min and Pīr Muḥammad, as well as helping to elevate the first of their Tūqāy-Timūrid successors.

²⁸⁷ *Bā ilhām-i ghaybī mutawajjih-i 'lā-yi a'ālam-i khawānīn wa inkisār-i rāyāt-i arbāb mu'āwadat gashṭah Bāqī Muḥammad Khān-rā bih ilṭāf-i 'izīdī mustaḡhar sākhtand*: BA 145b. The passage is quoted at greater length above, p. 98.

Regionalism and the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids

Support from Samarqandis was of crucial importance in helping the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids secure khanal rule in the early seventeenth century. Samarqandi manpower was also doubtless invaluable in helping Bāqī Muḥammad to establish authority over further-flung regions such as Tashkent and Badakhshan which, as we have seen, proved most resistant to his rule. Within a decade, however, a series of events had caused relations between the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid khan and Samarqandi circles to worsen irreparably. Indeed, Bāqī Muḥammad's successors would find that Samarqand's population could be as resentful towards Tūqāy-Tīmūrid metropolitan authority as it had previously been towards the Jānī-Bikids. Having exploited the Samarqandis' communal loyalties in order to establish themselves in power, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids now found that these loyalties threatened in turn to bring about their own dynastic downfall.

Exploiting Samarqandi Communal Loyalty

Decades after 'Abdallāh's late sixteenth-century dismantlement of the appanage system, numerous actors continued to seek advantage from exploiting those communal loyalties which this system had done so much to strengthen. Events in Samarqand in the wake of 'Abd al-Mu'min's death illustrate this well. Between 1598 and 1599, three communal pretenders and their respective supporters attempted to claim for themselves a quality of communal eminence, as a means of exploiting the Samarqandis' communal attachments. The last and most significant of these communal pretenders was Bāqī Muḥammad himself.

After the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min, 'Abd al-Wāsi' Kinakas immediately secured the khanal elevation of Pāyandah Muḥammad's son (see above, p. 46). From what little is known of his brief career, this latter individual seems to have boasted little personal distinction. What he did boast, however, was a degree of communal eminence accruing by dint of his parentage. His father was well-remembered in Samarqand circles. Although Pāyandah Muḥammad was a Jānī-Bikid dynast—as son of Dūstum b. Iskandar, he was actually 'Abdallāh Khan's nephew²⁸⁸—he had aligned himself during the appanage wars alongside the Kūchkūnjids, and against his own Jānī-Bikid kinsmen; in 1578, for instance, 'Abdallāh had to dispatch an expedition against Khujand in order to prevent him and Mahdī Sul-

²⁸⁸ MB 217; Burton, *The Bukharans*, 549, identifies him as a Kūchkūnjid.

tan b. Jawānmard 'Alī from attacking Jānī-Bīkid holdings in the region.²⁸⁹ Later, Pāyandah Muḥammad sought forgiveness from 'Abdallāh,²⁹⁰ and was rewarded with sequential administrative appointments to Ḥiṣār²⁹¹ and Herat.²⁹² But people continued to remember Pāyandah Muḥammad primarily for his Samarqandi sympathies. Muṭribī, for instance, classifies him alongside the Kūchkūnjids as a 'Timūrid dynast' (see above, p. 228). He offers this classification on the grounds that Pāyandah Muḥammad had married Jawānmard 'Alī's daughter, in a union whereby he defined himself as Jawānmard 'Alī's *dāmād*, or son-in-law.²⁹³ In Pāyandah Muḥammad's son, the Samarqandis may well have believed that they had the truest embodiment available to them of their region's rich Timūrid past.

The successor to Pāyandah Muḥammad's son enjoyed similar Samarqandi communal eminence, but for different reasons. Unlike his predecessor, Sayyid Muḥammad had no discernible Kūchkūnjid affiliations. But he was a long-term resident of the Samarqand region, and built up close relations with many people. In ca. 1580–1581, 'Abdallāh had appointed him to replace his brother Suyūnch Muḥammad in administrative authority over Sāgharj, a *tūmān* centred on an eponymous settlement forty miles north-west of Samarqand itself.²⁹⁴ Sayyid Muḥammad remained in Sāgharj until the late 1590s, during which period he acquired the name 'Sayyid Muḥammad Sultan Sāghārjī'.²⁹⁵ Although he then moved to Shibarghān, he was evidently still a widely-familiar figure when he returned to help defend Samarqand from the Qazaqs, and Muḥammad Bāqī Bī accordingly had little hesitation in proposing his elevation to local khal authority.

Bāqī Muḥammad was the third party to exploit Samarqandi communal loyalties in the brief period between 1598 and 1599. The adroitness with which he did so can be gauged from the success with which he prevailed upon Samarqandis to support him in the June 1599 showdown against Pīr Muḥammad. In addition to believing that Bāqī Muḥammad would be a better ruler than his Abū'l-Khayrid rival, many of his supporters may well have believed that he would better uphold the interests and values of that Samarqandi community with which they identified themselves.

²⁸⁹ *ShNSh* 241a.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 242b–243a.

²⁹¹ *ShNSh* 3497 238b.

²⁹² *MB* 217.

²⁹³ *NZJ* 89.

²⁹⁴ *MB* 177–178; see also Ahmedov, "Shayboniylardan keyin Ashtarxoniyarning hokimiyat tepasiga kelish sanasi xususida", 192.

²⁹⁵ *TSh* 164.

Like Sayyid Muḥammad, Bāqī Muḥammad enjoyed a degree of communal eminence courtesy of the long period of time that he and his kinsmen had spent in and around Samarqand during the late sixteenth century. The *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* claims that ‘Abdallāh had appointed Bāqī Muḥammad’s uncle Tursūn Muḥammad to office in Samarqand after the city’s capture in 1578.²⁹⁶ Although this claim is not supported elsewhere, the *Sharaf-nāmah-yi shāhī* suggests that members of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid family had been prominent in Samarqand since at least 1588, when Bāqī Muḥammad’s grandfather Yār Muḥammad Sultan dispatched a contingent of Samarqandi forces to assist ‘Abdallāh during the siege of Herat.²⁹⁷ Several Safavid chronicles support this impression. By 1598, they claim, ‘Abd al-Mu‘min so feared the Samarqandi influence of Bāqī Muḥammad’s father Jānī Muḥammad that he exiled this latter to Balkh (see above, p. 55).²⁹⁸

These stories suggest that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids were already somewhat engrained in the Samarqandis’ self-associative repertoire by the time that Bāqī Muḥammad was appointed to gubernatorial office. Upon his appointment, Bāqī Muḥammad capitalised on his communal eminence by ostentatiously enacting Samarqandi communal values in a bid to canvass support. In addition to demonstrating his euergetic credentials by ordering the construction of a kitchen for feeding the city’s poor,²⁹⁹ he cannily appropriated elements of Samarqandi communal iconography towards his own ends. One nineteenth-century history, for instance, presumably draws on earlier lost works when relating how Bāqī Muḥammad took a leaf out of the Kūchkūnjids’ book by professing an association with Timūr: throughout the length of his Samarqandi rule, we read, he kept Timūr’s coronation stone within his own audience hall.³⁰⁰

Such gestures allowed Bāqī Muḥammad to enmesh himself in the Samarqandis’ sense of communal selfhood, rather as the Kūchkūnjids had done up until 1578. This galvanised his support during the subsequent Samarqand

²⁹⁶ *Abū’l-Khayr Khān bā pidarash Jawānmard ‘Alī Khān ibn Abū Sa‘īd Khān ibn Kūchkūnji Khān ibn Abū’l-Khayr Khān-ra, kih maṣdar-i fitnah wa mādah-yi fasād būdand, qayd kardah bih Karmīnah firistād tā dar ānjā bih qatl rasīdand. Hukūmat wa iyālat-i Samarqand-i firdaws-mānand-rā bih Tursūn Muḥammad Sultān ibn Yār Muḥammad Khān, kih jadd-i sīwum-i mu‘allifast, tafwīd farmūd: SilSal 127a.* Tursūn Muḥammad’s supposed Samarqandi authority is noted also *ibid.*, 148a, in the context of his death (for which see also above, p. 177 n. 119).

²⁹⁷ *ShNSh 3497 242a.*

²⁹⁸ *TA 175; T’ĀĀ’A 557; BA 58b.*

²⁹⁹ *Dar ayyām-i dawlat wa awqāt-i salṭanat-i khwīsh dar ark-i wilāyat-i Samarqand-i firdaws-mānand kih takhtgāh-i pādishāhān ast khūrish-khānah’ī amr farmūdand: TSR 203b.*

³⁰⁰ Sela, “The “Heavenly Stone””, 28, citing material in the *Tārīkh-i Khumūlī*.

showdown, enabling him to prevail upon the support of a wide range of Samarqandi actors. A number of Samarqandi *amīrs*, including the former conspirator Muḥammad Yār Qarluq (see above, p. 45), aligned themselves alongside Bāqī Muḥammad,³⁰¹ as—if we are to believe hagiographic tradition—did several prominent Sufis. In addition to Khwājah Ishāq and Khwājah Amkinagī, a third shaykh mentioned as participating in the showdown is Khwājah Ahrār's great-great-grandson Khwājah Hāshim,³⁰² whose ancestors, as we have seen, had long been identified with the Samarqand region. According to the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*, in the heat of the battle one of Ishāq's associates had a vision, where he saw Khwājah Hāshim fighting the Bukharan forces alongside Bāqī Muḥammad.³⁰³

The Cost of Samarqandi Partisanship

In 1599, Samarqandi communal loyalties helped Bāqī Muḥammad defeat and overthrow Pīr Muḥammad, the established ruler of Bukhara. A decade later, these communal loyalties assisted in the overthrow of a second established ruler. This time, however, the victim of such loyalties was not a Jānī-Bikid Abū'l-Khayrid, but Bāqī Muḥammad's own brother Walī Muḥammad Khan. Once established in khalif authority, successive Tūqāy-Tīmūrid rulers in turn found themselves facing challenges from the very communal attachments which had previously served them so well.

³⁰¹ For Muḥammad Yār Qarluq's participation in the battle see *BA* 60a.

³⁰² For his Ahrāri descent see *DQ* 38a, identifying him as “*az awlād-i ḥaḍrat-i Khwājah Ahrār*”; *MAṣ* 71a, noting how ‘Abdallāh II granted the office of Samarqandi *shaykh al-Islam* to “*Khwājah Hāshim khwājah-yi Ahrārī*”; and *SilSal* 84b.

³⁰³ Mullā Awāz tells (*DQ* 37b–38a) how, on the day of the battle between Pīr Muḥammad Khan and Bāqī Muḥammad Khan, Mullā Darwish Balkhī (for whom see also above, p. 240), “was considering together with several darwishes in the mosque of the blessed Khwājah Ahrār what the outcome of the battle was going to be, and on which side defeat would fall. Whereupon the eminent Mullā Darwish found himself transported to the middle of the battlefield and he saw himself in the middle of the fighting. And he observed that the eminent Khwājah Hāshim Khwājah, descendent of his eminence Khwājah Ahrār, appeared on the side of Bāqī Muḥammad, fighting against the army of Pīr Muḥammad Khan, and striking with swords in both hands.” ([...] *dar masjid-i ḥaḍrat-i Khwājah-yi Ahrār quddus sirruhu bih chandī az darwishān mutawajjih būdand kih āyā aḥwāl-i jang chīgūnah khwāhad būd wa shikast dar kudām taraf shud* [...] *kih janāb-i Mullā Darwish khūd-rā dar miyān-i jang-gāh mibinad wa nazār mīkunad kih janāb-i* [...] *Khwājah Hāshim Khwājah, farzand bih wāsīt-i ḥaḍrat-i Khwājah-yi Ahrār, zāhīr shudand az jānīb-i Bāqī Muḥammad Khān wa bā lashkar-i Pīr Muḥammad Khān dar jang shudand wa bih har dū dast shamshūr zadand.*) The passage proceeds immediately to recount the decisive mystical intervention of Khwājah Ishāq, for which again see above, p. 240.

Like the initial stages of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover itself, the events of 1610–1611 constituted ‘imperial rebellion’ (see above, p. 97). In this instance, the role of imperial rebel was performed by supporters of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid princes Imām Qulī and Nadir Muḥammad, who were sons of the late Dīn Muḥammad and nephews of Bāqī Muḥammad and Walī Muḥammad. When Bāqī Muḥammad died,³⁰⁴ Walī Muḥammad straightaway succeeded to the khalid title.³⁰⁵ He appointed Imām Qulī to gubernatorial authority over Samarqand,³⁰⁶ and Nadir Muḥammad to authority over Shahrisabz.³⁰⁷ For the first few years of Walī Muḥammad’s reign, Imām Qulī and Nadir Muḥammad behaved well. Both brothers lent Walī Muḥammad valuable assistance in sequential campaigns into the southeast of the khanate. Nadir Muḥammad helped crush an uprising by ‘Abdallāh, son of the former Ḥiṣārī ruler Maḥmūd Sultan,³⁰⁸ and in 1607 the princes helped Walī Muḥammad defeat a challenge coming from Badakhshan. Informed that a local Badakhshani pretender claiming to be a Tīmūrid dynast called Mīrzā Ḥasan was attacking Qunduz, they straightaway marched south to repel the attackers.³⁰⁹

Fresh from these successes, Imām Qulī and Nadir Muḥammad now drew confidence to assert themselves more aggressively in their respective gubernatorial seats. Their behaviour worried Walī Muḥammad, who resolved to remove them from authority. But local resistance ensured that this move came to nothing, and instead Walī Muḥammad decided to constrain their behaviour by placing each prince under the watchful eye of an appointed *atālīq*. The khan dispatched Nazar Bī Kūkaltāsh to observe Imām Qulī’s

³⁰⁴ Different sources give different dates for his death. *NZJ* 180 dates it to 1013 (30 May 1604–18 May 1605); *AfT* 185b, *T’ĀĀ’A* 687 and *MuT* (Shirāzi) 260b date it to 1014 (19 May 1605–8 May 1606); *TMQ* 559a states that Bāqī Muḥammad died aged 36 at the end of a six-year reign, i.e. presumably some time in 1014; *BA* 76a and *Maṭṭ* 122b date the death to 1015 (9 May 1606–27 April 1607); and *TSR* 204a (followed in turn in e.g. *ATR* 68) states that Bāqī Muḥammad died at the end of an eight-year reign, i.e. presumably some time in 1016 (28 April 1607–16 April 1608). Following earlier sources, I propose an earlier date rather than a later one, probably at some point in 1605.

³⁰⁵ Babajanov and Szuppe record a tradition that Walī Muḥammad actually conspired in his brother’s death: *idem*, *Les Inscriptions persanes de Chār Bakr*, 29, citing *Maṭṭ* 198b.

³⁰⁶ *BA* 76b.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 80a, 169b.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 77a–78a.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 78b–79a, 170a–173a. It is not entirely clear who the *soi-disant* Mīrzā Ḥasan claimed to be: one possibility is that he presented himself as Akbar’s nephew Khwājah Ḥasan, whom we encountered above, p. 190 n. 19, as supposed father of the earlier Badakhshani pretender Badī’ al-Zamān.

behaviour in Samarqand; he then packed Naẓar Bī's brother Shāh Bī Kūkal-tāsh off to Balkh, whither he had previously transferred Nadir Muḥammad in order to separate him from his brother. Soon after these appointments, however, both princes murdered their respective *atāliqs* and gathered in Balkh in order to regroup their forces.³¹⁰ Harassed by challenges in the north of the khanate, Walī Muḥammad decided to offer terms, undertaking not to attack the princes so long as they remained in Balkh and did not advance north into Mā warā al-nahr. The princes consented to these conditions, and for the following year an uneasy peace obtained between the rival factions.³¹¹ But in spring 1611 Imām Qulī and Nadir Muḥammad decided to advance. Proceeding north from Balkh, they met Walī Muḥammad's forces at Qarshī.³¹² Forced to withdraw after an accidental stampede in his camp, Walī Muḥammad fled west, first to Chārjūy and then on to Isfahan, where he took refuge with Shah 'Abbās.³¹³ Imām Qulī was now elevated to the khal title.³¹⁴

These events can be explained in various ways. Chroniclers who are sympathetic or beholden to Imām Qulī and/or Nadir Muḥammad blame Walī Muḥammad's downfall on what they depict as his congenital character faults. In the *Baḥr al-asrār*, for instance, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī sees in Walī Muḥammad's downfall the workings of divine fortune. The work condemns Walī Muḥammad as "a sedition-performing *khāqān*", and claims that "the fire and dust of rebellion and perversity" only subsided once Imām Qulī had acceded to authority.³¹⁵ Modern scholars, meanwhile, might instead emphasise Walī Muḥammad's failure to emulate his brother's example (see above, pp. 175–176) by striking quickly to eliminate any trace of dissent among regionally-established family members. Like Pīr Muḥammad before him, Walī Muḥammad paid heavily for a tendency to put his head in the sand in times of difficulty. Alongside such hesitance, he further alienated people with occasional bouts of capricious brutality. In late 1610, for instance, he caused particular resentment among those amīral circles which he would have done well to cultivate, by executing the prominent *amīrs* Dūstum Bī

³¹⁰ *TMQ* 560a–b; *BA* 84a–b.

³¹¹ *TĀĀ'A* 833–834; *BA* 87a–b.

³¹² *TSR* 208a.

³¹³ *TA* 434–444; *KhB* 33b–34a; *TĀĀ'A* 832–836; *RŞ*, 830–833; *BA* 89a–90a; *TSR* 208b. For the claim in *Silsal* 173a–b that Walī Muḥammad's intention in heading west was to perform the *hajj*, see above, p. 36 n. 37.

³¹⁴ *BA* 91a–b.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 77b.

Arghūn, Ḥājji Bī Qūshchī and Shāh Kūchuk Bī Dürmān on the unproved suspicion that they were planning a conspiracy.³¹⁶ As the fate of 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan had previously illustrated, threatening arbitrary violence offers little advantage to the ruler: and in 1610, as in 1598, this bloodshed provoked a rash of defections from the established regime to the challenger regime.

For our purposes, however, the most important thing to observe about Walī Muḥammad's overthrow and Imām Qulī's elevation is the role which Samarqandi communal loyalties played over the course of events. Like Pīr Muḥammad in 1600, the fallen established actor in 1611 was a *Bukharan* figure; like Bāqī Muḥammad in that earlier showdown, the victorious challenger in 1611 was widely identified as a *Samarqandi*, and as such was assured of Samarqandi support. The matter was not that Walī Muḥammad simply lived in Bukhara, of course, but that he was perceived to identify himself with a particularly Bukharan self-associative repertoire. This can be seen from Walī Muḥammad's spiritual attachments. Throughout his reign, Walī Muḥammad consorted much more closely with the Jūybārīds of Bukhara than with the Samarqandi Kāsānīds and Aḥrārīds. He married his sister Jānī Khānum to Muḥammad Islām's grandson 'Abd al-Raḥīm Khwājah,³¹⁷ and in turn took 'Abd al-Raḥīm's own sister as a wife.³¹⁸ 'Abd al-Raḥīm was to prove a close ally. He helped rally forces against the rebellious princes in Balkh,³¹⁹ and came out in support when in 1611 Walī Muḥammad returned from Iranian exile in what transpired to be a doomed bid to regain authority.³²⁰

In consorting with this Jūybārīd shaykh, Walī Muḥammad was not simply indulging his own spiritual preferences. 'Abd al-Raḥīm already enjoyed authority at the Bukharan metropole at the time of Walī Muḥammad's accession, and participated in the khan's formal elevation ceremony.³²¹ He had previously cultivated a warm relationship with Bāqī Muḥammad,³²² and Robert McChesney records a tradition as found in the *Maṭlab al-ṭālibīn* that the shaykh had used his spiritual authority to help the Tūqāy-Timūrīds capture Balkh in 1601.³²³ A seventeenth-century Jūybārīd hagiography would

³¹⁶ *TMQ* 562b–563a; *BA* 88b; *TSR* 207b.

³¹⁷ Babajanov and Szuppe, *Les Inscriptions persanes de Chār Bakr*, 29.

³¹⁸ *Maṭṭ* 168a.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 154b.

³²⁰ *BA* 97b. For Walī Muḥammad's subsequent defeat, see *KhB* 34a–b; *T'ĀĀ'A* 840–847; *RS* 834; *BA* 96a–99b; *TSR* 208b–209b; *SūSal* 173a–181a.

³²¹ *Maṭṭ* 122a.

³²² *Ibid.*, 121b.

³²³ McChesney, "The "Reforms" of Bāqī Muḥammad Khān", 82, citing *Maṭṭ* 277a–b. I have not been able to consult this passage.

claim that 'Abd al-Raḥīm maintained close relations with the first Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd khan, of course: but that is no reason for rejecting this account of events out of hand. In addition to prevailing upon local *amīrs*, in summer 1599 Bāqī Muḥammad would also have needed to prevail upon locally eminent Bukharan spiritual leaders. Antagonistic relations with the likes of Mawlānā Pāyandah Akhsikati³²⁴ threatened to alienate the Bukharans as 'Abdallāh had alienated the Samarqandis before him. Association with 'Abd al-Raḥīm may have been particularly attractive in the later stages of Bāqī Muḥammad's reign: with fallout from the death of Bādī' al-Zamān causing relations to deteriorate with his former associate, Samarqand's Hāshim Khwājah Aḥrārī (see above, p. 195), Bāqī Muḥammad would have found 'Abd al-Raḥīm to be a valuable font of spiritual authority.

During their respective reigns, Bāqī Muḥammad and Walī Muḥammad derived utility from consorting with 'Abd al-Raḥīm Khwājah. But this utility came at a cost. While Walī Muḥammad could count on the support of his Bukharan intercessor over the course of hostilities with his nephews, Imām Qulī was assured of support from a range of prominent Samarqandi shaykhs. Prime among these was an individual called Hāshim Khwājah Dahbīdī (to be distinguished from the afore-mentioned Hāshim Khwājah Aḥrārī). As the son of Muḥammad Amīn and the grandson of Aḥmad Kāsānī,³²⁵ Hāshim Khwājah Dahbīdī was of long-established Samarqandi stock. Once relations between the khan and the princes deteriorated, Hāshim Khwājah immediately aligned himself with Imām Qulī.³²⁶ When Imām Qulī then fled south to join his brother in Balkh, Hāshim Khwājah stayed in Samarqand, where he seems to have remained a persistent thorn in Walī Muḥammad's side. He bitterly opposed Walī Muḥammad's new Samarqandi appointee Muḥammad Bāqī Bī Qalmāq,³²⁷ and did everything he could to encourage Imām Qulī in his resolve. On the eve of one military showdown, Imām Qulī confessed to Hāshim Khwājah his fear that the next day would bring

³²⁴ Although born in Fergana and educated in Samarqand (*TSh* 191), this figure was evidently a Bukharan partisan. After the 1599 Samarqand showdown he briefly sheltered the refugee Dūst Chuhrah-Āghāsī (*BA* 62a), and later gave refuge to other locals who suffered under Bāqī Muḥammad's regime: see e.g. *NZJ* 47–48, in the context of an entry devoted to the Bukharan shaykh Khwājah 'Abd al-Karīm (*ba'd az wafāt-i 'Abdallāh Khān Bāqī Khān wālid-i ū-rā muṣādarah farmūd wa zar-i bisyār girift. Bih-d-ān sabab miḥnat kashīd, tark-i hamah-yi kār wa bār namūd wa bih jināb-i Mawlānā Pāyandah Akhsitakī [sic] [...] inābat kardah būd*).

³²⁵ *BA* 143a; *MaṭT* 49a.

³²⁶ *TMKh* 235; *SilSal* 184b.

³²⁷ *BA* 88b; discussion in McChesney, *Central Asia—Foundations of Change*, 105.

defeat, and asked for his assistance. Hāshim Khwājah told him not to worry, assuring him that victory would fall to his own 'victory-bringing army'.³²⁸ Throughout the long internecine conflict, Hāshim Khwājah remained Imām Qulī's prime cheerleader.

Nor was it just Samarqand's religious establishment which aligned itself alongside the rebellious princes. By means of such measures as re-opening access to the Gūr-i Amīr (see above, p. 235), Imām Qulī was able to prevail upon a wider population as well. If Walī Muḥammad had any reason for executing the three 'conspirators' (pp. 247–248) in late 1610, it was probably the fact that two of the three figures were prominent members of Samarqand's tribal establishment, whose communal loyalties were likely to militate in favour of Imām Qulī. Dūstum Bi Arghūn was an *amīr* of long Samarqandi standing, who during 'Abdallāh's reign had been a close associate of the famed Samarqandi *amīr* Muḥammad Bāqī Bi Dūrmān (see above, p. 40), and who had subsequently supported Bāqī Muḥammad at the Samarqand showdown (p. 99); during Walī Muḥammad's reign he then remained in Samarqand.³²⁹ Ḥājji Bi Qūshchī, meanwhile, had participated in attempts in late 1598 to elevate an Abū'l-Khayrid dynasty to authority in Samarqand (see above, pp. 45–46), and he long enjoyed fame in the city as a literary patron and bibliophile.³³⁰ In killing these two individuals, Walī Muḥammad seems to have calculated that their Samarqandi association would lead them to oppose the quality of Bukharan-ness which he himself embodied, and would thus impel them to support his rebellious nephews. Having failed to cultivate Samarqandi local loyalties, Walī Muḥammad was now engaged in a damage-limitation exercise, which aimed at confining the utility which Imām Qulī could derive from these loyalties himself.

Walī Muḥammad's plans came to little. By killing these two Samarqandi old hands, Walī Muḥammad simply undermined his own parlous position. Muḥammad Bāqī Bi Qalmāq came under so much pressure from his Samarqandi subjects that he now defected to Imām Qulī.³³¹ Perhaps fearing that the support of hardened Bukharan partisans would, as a decade earlier,

³²⁸ *Khān-i kishwar-satān az ḥaḍrat-i ishān istid'ā-yi fātiḥah namūdah wa istimdād khwās-tand wa ān ḥaḍrat farmūdah-and kih "Zafar dar lashkar-i firūzi-athar-i tū khwāhad būd"*: TSR 209b.

³²⁹ BA 79a.

³³⁰ TSh 455–456, NZJ 183–185; for discussion of his library, see also Szuppe, "Circulation des lettres et cercles littéraires—Entre Asie centrale, Iran et Inde du Nord (XVe–XVIIIe siècle)", in *Annales—Histoire, Sciences sociales* 2004, 997–1018 [1004].

³³¹ IQN 97a.

prove insufficient to stave off disaster, Walī Muḥammad took flight. The Tūqāy-Timūrid leadership was reaping what it had previously helped sow.

The Dilemma

Imām Qulī was a beneficiary of Samarqandi communal loyalties: and he evidently knew it. He acknowledged his debt at the elevation ceremony which attended his accession to khalif office in 1611. Participants included Khwājah Hāshim Dahbīdī; Hāshim's brother, Šāliḥ Khwājah Dahbīdī; Yūsuf Qarābāghī, a Kubrāwī shaykh of uncertain background but with strong Samarqandi associations to whom Imām Qulī was greatly attached;³³² and 'Alim Shaykh, a pupil of the afore-mentioned Yasawī mystic Qāsim Shaykh.³³³ Unlike Walī Muḥammad, or 'Abdallāh before him, Imām Qulī had no Jūybārid representative attend the ceremony. Indeed, there does not seem to have been a single Bukharan partisan in attendance.

Six years later, Imām Qulī Khan issued a document from his seat at Bukhara. The document was a grant entitling the recipient to draw water from the Khānum-arīq canal in the village of Yangī Qurgān, north of the Syr Darya near Sayrām.³³⁴ The recipient of this document was somebody called 'Abdallāh Khwājah, who was the son of 'Abdī Khwājah and the nephew of 'Abd al-Raḥīm Khwājah Jūybārī. In six years, Imām Qulī had changed his tune. After his initial *froideur* towards 'Abd al-Raḥīm³³⁵ and the Bukharan 'establishment' more generally, Imām Qulī evidently relented in his stance, almost certainly having made the same calculation as Bāqī Muḥammad and others before him. A Bukharan khan could not survive on Samarqandi support alone: he needed the support of the Bukharans as well. But as soon as a ruler appealed to a Bukharan sense of community, he began to alienate himself from the Samarqandis who had once supported him. However adeptly one exploited people's communal attachments when bidding for power, there was always somebody else waiting in the wings to mobilise regional partisanship against the central authority which one had struggled to establish.

³³² *NZJ* 216.

³³³ *BA* 91a-b.

³³⁴ Pishchulina, "Prisyrdar'inskie goroda i ikh znachenie v istorii kazakhskikh khanstv v XV-XVII vekakh", in *Kazakhstan v XV-XVII vekakh* (Alma-Ata, 1969), 5-49 [10].

³³⁵ After Walī Muḥammad's final defeat, 'Abd al-Raḥīm left Mā warā al-nahr and headed to Iran, supposedly with the aim of proceeding to Mecca. Imām Qulī was livid to learn of his departure, perhaps fearing that the shaykh would canvass Safavid support for a further bid to unseat him (*MaṭT* 170b-171a).

Successive Jānī-Bikid and Tūqāy-Timūrid khans tried and failed to juggle their subjects' communal loyalties, with the Samarqandis forever proving particularly obdurate.³³⁶ This story of regional rivalry is one which has continued unbroken right down to the present day. In his history of Soviet language planning in 1920s' Uzbekistan, William Fierman relates how ideological imperatives were quickly jettisoned in favour of regional pride, as deputations from Samarqand, Tashkent and the Fergana valley played tug-of-war over how the proposed new language should look and sound.³³⁷ And in contemporary Europe and North America, pork-barrel politics illustrate how the demands of the local continue even today to undermine the workings of central government. When it came to regulating communal loyalties in the early seventeenth century, therefore, the Tūqāy-Timūrids probably did not have much of a chance.

³³⁶ Memories of a Samarqandi Kūchkūnjid past, for instance, evidently continued to hold force in the region until at least the mid-17th century, with monumental tombstones dedicated to the memory of Laṭīfah Khānum bint Abū'l-Khayr b. Jawānmard 'Alī, who died in 1030 (26 November 1620–15 November 1621), and Rāb'ah Sulṭān bint Jawānmard 'Alī, who died in 1042 (19 July 1632–1637 July 1633): see Babajanov, Muminov and Paul, *Schaibanidische Grabinschriften*, 99–100.

³³⁷ W. Fierman, *Language Planning and National Development: the Uzbek Experience* (Berlin, 1991), particularly 89–95.

CHAPTER FIVE

BIDDING FOR LOYALTY: THE TŪQĀY-TĪMŪRID TAKEOVER AND ITS ECHOES IN NARRATIVE TRADITION

More than a hundred years after the events of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover, one story relating to these events was still circulating widely among litterateurs in Central and Southern Asia. This was the story of Bāqī Muḥammad's 1602 Balkh showdown with Shah 'Abbās (see above, pp. 183–184). The story is told in the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*, composed in Balkh soon after 1704 by Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī b. Khwājah Baqā Balkhī,¹ and in the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*, written in India in the mid-eighteenth century by Hājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm.² Both works relate what happened when Bāqī Muḥammad learned of Shah 'Abbās' approach. Bāqī Muḥammad immediately marched south, we read, until he and his army reached the Amu Darya. Bāqī Muḥammad would normally then have paused to ferry his troops across the river. Because of the pressing Safavid threat, however, he decided that there was no time to waste.

"The Qizilbāsh tribe has come to the Mother of Cities [i.e. Balkh], and taken it capture," says Bāqī Muḥammad in the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*'s version of the story. "If we are correct in our faith, we shall pass safely across this raging river, and if it is they who are correct we shall become food for the crocodile of death."³ The *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* features a similar speech. "The enemy of state and religion has come up close to the vicinity of Balkh with troops beyond reckoning," says Bāqī Muḥammad, "and two Chingīzid princes are coming with him as enemies of the state, and a group of our faithful Uzbek *amīrs* have fallen to his snares and devices; and in these straightened circumstances we now face the challenge of getting [our] twenty thousand men across this man-devouring river."⁴

¹ *TMKh* 127–130.

² *SilSal* 165a–167a.

³ "Qawm-i Qizilbāsh bih diyār-i umm al-bilād āmadah istilā namūdand. Agar dīn-i mā ḥaqq ast az īn daryā-yi zakhkhār bih salāmat migudharīm wa agar ḥaqq bih jānib-i ān mardum ast, tu mah-yi nahang-i fanā khwāhīm shud": *TMKh* 128.

⁴ "Dushman-i mulk wa dīn bā afwāj-i bi andāzah-yi dast wa garibān shudah kih nazdik bih

Both versions relate that Bāqī Muḥammad responded to this crisis in the same way: "without ferry or ford",⁵ he "plunged himself into the bloodthirsty abyss; and like a crocodile in his swimming skills and agility he crossed the river."⁶ Amazed at his bravery, his army followed suit. "When the *amūrs* and the military commanders saw this act of bravery, they threw themselves into the river, and with the grace and felicity of their ruler all twenty thousand men displayed courage and arrived intact and safe at the [other] shore of that danger-filled body of water."⁷ Bāqī Muḥammad and his army then advanced against 'Abbās' Safavid forces, and recorded a magnificent victory. "The holy warriors of the khan's army all reached for their implacable bloodshedding swords and set about killing them", we read. "They turned them all into fodder for their swords."⁸

Although the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* was composed earlier than the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*, it is unlikely to have constituted the source material for Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm's subsequent rendition of events. This emerges from the way that the two works otherwise offer very different accounts of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd takeover. Balkhī's account accords no mention, for instance, to Pīr Muḥammad's rule after the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min in late 1598,⁹ and we have noted throughout this book how Ḥājji Mīr's account of the takeover primarily draws upon material in the *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī*. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that similar such stories about the Amu Darya episode were circulating at least a century or so earlier. One such piece of evidence comes from a brief anonymous history of Central Asia dating from ca. 1630, which is presently held in the library of the Royal Asiatic Society in London. Although the work gives only a very brief account of Bāqī Muḥammad's Balkh campaign, it contains several interesting resonances with what we find in the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* and the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*,

Balkh āmad, wa dū pādīshāh-zādah-yi chīngīzīyah bih i'ādā-yi salṭanat hamrāh-i ū mī-āyand, wa jam'i az umarā-yi mu'tamadah-yi ūzbikīyah dar pay-i ighwā'i wa taḥrīk-i ānhā hastand, wa dar in fursat-i tang az chūnīn daryā-yi mardum-khwār gudhashtan-i bīst hazār kas dushwār mīnamāyad": *SilSal* 165a.

⁵ *Bī kashtī wa ma'bar*: *TMKh* 128.

⁶ *Khūd-rā dar ān lujjah-yi khūn-khwār zadah mānand-i nahang bih shināwarī wa chālāk-dasti az ān āb 'ubūr farmūd*: *SilSal* 165a.

⁷ *Umarā wa sardārān chūn in jur'at wa dilāwarī az pādīshāh-yi mu'āwanah dīdah khūdhārā dar daryā andāktah wa bih farr wa iqbal-i pādīshāhī mardānagī-rā kār farmūdah hamah-yi bīst hazār kas az ān baḥr-i pur-khaṭar ṣahīḥ wa sālim bih kanār bar āmadand*: *SilSal* 165a. *TMKh* 128–129 gives a very similar account, but gives 'ḥayrāt' in place of the better 'jur'at'.

⁸ *Ghāzīyān-i lashkar dast bih tīgh-i bī-durīgh khūnrīz burdah bih qatl kūshidah hamah-rā 'alaf-i shamshūr kardand*: *TMKh* 129–130.

⁹ See above, p. 63 n. 143.

similarly noting the absence of boats with which to ferry the troops across, and again evoking the idea of “fighting one’s way across the bloodthirsty river”.¹⁰ Although earlier than the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* and the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*, however, this heavily compressed account is plainly not their common source narrative, and like them appears instead to be drawing on an even earlier tradition. One may hazard a guess as to this tradition’s origins. In the *Nuskhah-yi zibā-yi Jahāngīrī*, Muṭribī has this to say about somebody called Mawlānā Ṣaydī Qarākulī.

He composed a certain *Bāqī-nāmah* in verse, and gave an excellent account of the Khan’s crossing the Amu [Darya] and the movement of his victorious troops against the army of Shah ‘Abbās. He had not presented it to [Bāqī Muḥammad] Khan when this latter passed away. Through the intermediary offices of one of the *amīrs*, he presented these verses to Walī Khan.¹¹

It appears very likely, then, that the anonymous history, the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* and the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* all commonly draw upon the *Bāqī-nāmah* for their respective riparian narratives. Although Qarākulī’s work is lost to us today, its echoes seem still to have percolated among literary circles a full century after its composition. The Amu Darya narrative may well be the most significant monument to the way in which early seventeenth-century authors took it upon themselves to compose stories which were flattering to the new regime. It is this practice of *bidding for loyalty* which I want to discuss in this final chapter.

‘Bidding for loyalty’ may seem an awkward formulation, particularly given the wide currency enjoyed by the alternative concept of ‘legitimation’. In recent decades, numerous historians have examined how authors might seek to justify a particular disposition of authority by composing narrative works putting forward ‘their side of the story’. Proliferating within the literature on pre-modern Central Asia,¹² the wider Islamic world¹³ and

¹⁰ [...] *bih daryā-yi khūn-khwār sitiz kunand* [...]: Morley 162 31a.

¹¹ “*Bāqī-nāmah*” *nām chīzī bih nazm āwurdah wāqī’ah-yi ‘ubūr-i khān-rā az Āmūyah wa tawajjuh-i ‘asākir-i nuṣrat-ma’āthir-rā bih lashkar-i Shāh ‘Abbās bisyar khūb bastah bud. Hanūz bih khān nagudharānīdah būd kih khān-i madhkūr bih chaman-i sarāy-i khuld shittāfi. Ān manzūm-rā bih wāsīt-i yakī az umarā bih Walī Khān gudharānīdah: NZJ 204.*

¹² Bregel, “Tribal Tradition and Dynastic Theory”; Beisembiev, “Legenda o proiskhozhdenii kokandskikh khanov kak istochnik po istorii ideologii v Srednei Azii”, in Tulepbaev (ed.), *Kazakhstan, Sredniaia i Tsentralnaia Aziia v XVI–XVIII vv.*, 95–105; Woods, “Timur’s Genealogy”; von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung*; Bernardini, *Mémoire et propagande à l’époque timouride*, 45 and *passim*; Babadzhanov, *Kokandskoe khanstvo: vlast’, politika, religiia* (Tokyo—Tashkent, 2010), 305–394. See also, in a somewhat different context, DeWeese, “The Legitimation of Bahā’ ad-Dīn Naqshband”, in *Asiatische Studien* 60 (2006), 261–305.

¹³ R.A. Abou-El-Haj, “Aspects of the Legitimation of Ottoman Rule as Reflected in the

more broadly elsewhere, 'legitimation studies' offer an attractively lucid contribution to a larger debate about the contested relationship between language and power. By highlighting power's need to justify itself, such studies undermine easy notions about the state's 'natural' monopolistic reach, and illustrate how the enactment of authority must depend upon its wider acceptance.

But many of these studies are also problematic. Presently leaving aside our difficulties with the concept of 'legitimacy' itself (see above, pp. 15–17), a more specific problem relates to the question of utility. 'Legitimation studies' are predicated on the assumption that a particular legitimating narrative is useful: but all too often they neglect to consider what makes it so. Such neglect is twofold. It relates first to a failure to consider the legitimating narrative's *causal utility*: a failure, that is, to consider what is significant about the narrative's compositional environment which makes it useful for the author to tell the particular story he does. There is a danger of being so myopically attuned to the rhetorical moves with which an author tells his story that one fails to consider what impels him to do so in the first place. Secondly, it relates to a failure to consider the legitimating narrative's *consequential utility*. Even if one can establish a causal rationale for why an author tells the story he does, one is still a long way from knowing how the author's finished composition actually furthers the aims of the actor on whose behalf it has been written. 'Legitimation studies' concerned exclusively with the act of composition offer no assessment of what one might term the resultant work's *interventional agency*. That is, they fail to consider the extent to which the work is capable of influencing the beliefs and/or behaviour of its audience.

A work's 'interventional agency' is of course necessarily bound up with the question of circulation. Even a potentially affecting literary composition is of little utility to anyone until it is related to somebody else. But it is important here to distinguish—as some scholars fail to do—*text* from *narrative*. When gauging a work's interventional agency by reference to its circulation, one should be concerned less with how widely the actual text was disseminated—a question with its own attendant problems¹⁴—than

Preambles to two early *Liva Kanunnameler*", in *Turcica* 21–23 (1991), 371–383; Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, particularly 83–85; Quinn, *Historical Writing during the Reign of Shah 'Abbās*.

¹⁴ Certainly, it is risky to judge a work's textual dissemination with reference just to the number of extant copies. Copies of any given work are liable to have perished over time, and copies of certain *categories of work* are more liable to have perished than are copies of

with the degree to which the narratives contained within this text were transmitted across a wider constituency. (More precisely, one should consider the circulation of what one might term *sympathetic avatars* of these narratives, namely versions of a story which retain something close to the original narrative's rhetorical upshot, as opposed to *appropriative avatars*, which reproduce a story's substance while inflecting its import to achieve some alternative purpose.¹⁵) Although the process of narrative circulation may involve the dissemination of written texts, it is useful to remember that this need not be the case: particularly in a low-literacy, pre-printing environment such as early modern Central Asia, most narratives are likely to have circulated more widely through oral transmission than through scribal reproduction. Maria Szuppe addresses this point when she observes that numerous works in early modern Central Asia would have circulated 'purely orally'.¹⁶ Rather than thus thinking in terms of reified 'works', however, it might be more accurate to think in terms of the circulation of narratives. From the perspective of a literary sponsor seeking to communicate a particular viewpoint, the 'successful' work would have been the one which fostered multiple sympathetic avatar narratives, the circulation of which might in turn influence constituencies far removed from the environment where the original work was first composed. The apparent survival of orally transmitted *Bāqī-nāmah* narratives into the eighteenth century suggests how a work such as Qarākūlī's might not itself require extensive textual dissemination in order to exercise a residual influence on people's beliefs.

One further problem with 'legitimation studies' is the widespread assumption that it is the newly established regime which most requires legitimation. In fact, it is the newly established regime (or at least the newly endogenously-established regime) which enjoys the clearest mandate for action. If not enough actors had consented to Bāqī Muḥammad's activities from the outset, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover would not have happened in the first place. Not everybody had consented to the takeover, of course, and many of those who did so acted simply out of the desire to avoid trouble,

others. Many Muslims, for instance, would probably opt to rescue their copy of the Qur'an rather than any other book from a burning room.

¹⁵ Sufi hagiography offers a rich repository of such appropriative narrative avatars. Devin DeWeese has shown, for instance, how Naqshbandi-sponsored works such as *R'AH* appropriated earlier pro-Yasawī contestation narratives, inflecting these narratives to attribute the post-fifteenth-century Naqshbandī domination of Central Asian religious life with a degree of 'inevitability'.

¹⁶ Szuppe, "Circulation des lettres et cercles littéraires", 1018.

rather than from any attachment to the newly-established regime: but Bāqī Muḥammad's success can nevertheless be read as a demonstration of the consensual acceptance which he presently enjoyed. By producing narratives in celebration of Bāqī Muḥammad's accession to power, authors were seeking not to legitimise an 'illegitimate' state of affairs, but to emphasise the success with which Bāqī Muḥammad had already managed to engrain himself in people's attachments.

Over the course of the seventeenth century, however, the situation was to change: and bidding for loyalty was to acquire a rather different sort of dimension.

Bidding for Loyalty, 1599–1605

On Patronage

During the years of his reign, Bāqī Muḥammad was associated with several prominent litterateurs of the age. Among these was an individual called Mawlānā Bāqī, who composed a mildly witty chronogram relating Bāqī Muḥammad's capture of Balkh and Ḥiṣār in 1600.

The Shah, by whose justice the world was rendered excellent
—An excellence which by his justice was constantly renewed—
Took possession of Ḥiṣār and Balkh in the course of two months:
My pen etched for those two cities/months a place in history.¹⁷

The fact that Mawlānā Bāqī composed this verse need not mean that he was himself a keen aficionado of Bāqī Muḥammad. Several sources indicate that authors could be ruthlessly pragmatic in their attachments, hawking their talents when necessary to the highest bidder. Muṭribī vividly describes how several poets entered the service of 'Abdallāh II, even though they felt little sentimental attachment to him. The *Tadhkirat al-shu'arā* includes the following entry on the poet Muqīmī Samarqandī, author of the *Zafar-nāmah-yi Muqīmī*:

On account of his poverty it occurred to him to offer in verse and prose an account of the dispatch of troops by the eminent *khāqān* 'Abdallāh to Samarqand and the imprisonment of Jawānmard 'Alī Khān. He set it all down

¹⁷ *Shāhī kih az 'adl-i ū jahān yāftah bahr / bahr az 'adlash tāzahgī yāftah dahr / bigirift Ḥiṣār wa Balkh dar 'ahd-i dū māh / kilkam fi tārikh raqam kard dū shahr*: TSR 200b, BA 152b. The verse turns on the dual meaning of *shahr*, as encountered in the last line; as an Arabic word it means 'month', and as a Persian word it means 'city'.

in writing, and after the capture of Samarqand he dispatched the work to the late *khāqān*. [‘Abdallāh] found the work very much to his liking, and accorded to [Muqīmī] the highest degree of patronage. He would take him alongside his victory-bringing troops wherever he resolved to go, and within a matter of days the afore-mentioned [Muqīmī] would put everything down in verse. He was employed in this function for a long time.¹⁸

Mushfiqī was another eminent poet who made a similarly pragmatic career choice. Born in Merv and educated in Bukhara, Mushfiqī had spent much of his professional life at the Kūchkūnjid court in Samarqand. He was employed first by Sulṭān Sa‘īd, on whose behalf he composed funerary verses for the tomb of Bahādur Sultan, and then by Jawānmard ‘Alī.¹⁹ As a result of his cosmopolitan background, Mushfiqī may not have felt much communal loyalty to the Kūchkūnjids. But generous patronage rendered him a direct stakeholder in the Kūchkūnjid status quo, inertially bound to the regime. The fall of Samarqand reduced this inertial loyalty, and Mushfiqī immediately defected to the Janī-Bikids. He dedicated to ‘Abdallāh several poetic *dīwāns*²⁰ and a little-known *Jahān-nāmah* or *Tārīkh-i ‘Abdallāh*,²¹ before heading first to India and then back again to Bukhara, where he died.²²

Such stories suggest that authors who dedicated their works to Bāqī Muḥammad acted thus because they calculated that Bāqī Muḥammad would make it worthwhile for them to do so. Some authors were disappointed, of course. Having failed to finish his *Bāqī-nāmah* while Bāqī Muḥammad was alive, Mawlānā Ṣaydī Qarākūlī was faced with the dilemma of how to draw profit from his labours. But authors who completed their works during the khan’s lifetime may have been amply rewarded for their pains. Among these authors was an individual called Mullā Nazārī Mashhadī, whom Muṭribī describes as a poet “without compare, whose verses

¹⁸ *Bih jihat-i iflās khayālī bast wa wāqī‘āt-i lashkar kashīdan-i khāqān-i jinnat-makān ‘Abdallāh Khān-rā bih ṣawb-i Samarqand wa mutahaṣṣin gardīdan-i Jawānmard ‘Alī Khān-rā dar ṣūrat-i nazm wa nathr dar silk-i tahrīr wa ḥayz-i taqrīr kashīdah ba‘d az fath-i dār al-mulk Samarqand bih khāqān-i maghfūr gudharānīd. Ḥaḍrat-i Khān-rā pasandīdah-yi tib‘i laṭīf āmadah, ū-rā ri‘āyat-i mawfūr namūdah, bih hamrāhī-yi ‘asākīr-i nuṣrat-mā‘thir bih har jānībī kih ‘azōmah-i muṣammam mīgardīd mīburdand, wa ḥāfiz-i madhkūr waqā‘ī‘-i wāridah-rā dar kiswat-i nazm bih marūr-i ayyām qalami mīnamūd wa muddat-i madīd wa ‘ahd-i ba‘id bih-d-īn amr maṣṣūb būd: TSh 476.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 463–464.

²⁰ For which he acquired the title *malik al-shu‘arā*: *ĀA* I.653 (notes).

²¹ Storey I.373–374, laconically noting that the manuscript is ‘in private possession’.

²² *HI* 536.

were wondrously pleasing".²³ In the late sixteenth century, Mashhadī had been based in India, where he was engaged in service with the emperor Akbar b. Humāyūn.²⁴ But at some point during Akbar's reign Mashhadī travelled north to Central Asia. "In the year 1013 (30 May 1604–18 May 1605)", Muṭribī writes, "he came to Samarqand, and presented a *qaṣīdah* in praise of Bāqī Khan."²⁵ If Mashhadī deemed his journey to be worthwhile, he doubtless reckoned that Bāqī Muḥammad would pay handsomely for his services. Poets generally swarmed to the Mughal court in order to enjoy that lavish opulence which Muṭribī describes so well;²⁶ and anyone forsaking this opulence must have been confident of a warm reception elsewhere. Mashhadī evidently calculated that Bāqī Muḥammad had reasons for offering just such a welcome.

Signalling Loyalty

One important function which poets and writers might perform was the function of signalling loyalty to the regime. Their compositions constituted bodies of information which might influence other constituencies presently determining their own degrees of loyalty towards a particular disposition of power. As I argued in chapter 3, any constituency's degree of inertial loyalty towards a ruling regime tended to vary according to the information it possessed about how loyal other constituencies presently were; the clearer the signals that constituency *x* was presently loyal to the regime, the more likely constituency *y* was to reckon on the regime's ongoing survival, and thus display inertial loyalty as well. By generating and circulating paradigmatic statements of loyalty, writers on a retainer might 'distort' this informational flow, fostering inertial loyalty in one constituency by alluding to the loyalty supposedly already displayed by another.

This seems to have been an important task during the early years of Bāqī Muḥammad's reign. In chapter 3, I suggested that by ca. 1601–1602 all but a small residual proportion of the population of Mā warā al-nahr had submitted to Bāqī Muḥammad's newly established Tūqāy-Tīmūrid regime.

²³ *Az shu'rā-yi bī naẓīr būdah wa ash'arash 'ajā'ib dīlpadhīr*: NZJ 189.

²⁴ *HJ* 801–802.

²⁵ *Dar tārikh-i sanah thalāth 'ashar wa alfbih Samarqand āmad wa qaṣīdah-yi dar madh-i Bāqī Khān gudharānīd*: NZJ 189.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 267–314, detailing Muṭribī's experiences at the court of Jahāngīr b. Akbar; discussion in Foltz, "Two Seventeenth-Century Central Asian Travellers to Mughal India", in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 3.6 (1996), 367–377.

But people's inertial loyalties may still have been limited, since individual constituencies seem to have been muted in signalling their own attachment to his authority. One gets an impression of this from a somewhat different context. In the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*'s account of what would prove to be Walī Muḥammad's abortive attempt at reconquest in 1611, Ḥājjī Mīr accords the fugitive khan a speech urging Shah 'Abbās to hurry and dispatch an expeditionary force against the interloper Imām Qulī. Haste is in order, Wali Muḥammad argues, since Imām Qulī "has not yet cemented his authority, and our own supporters have not contracted their submission to him".²⁷

The muted quality of people's attachment to Bāqī Muḥammad's regime emerges particularly clearly from two works composed in the immediate wake of the takeover, to which we briefly alluded in the introduction. These works are the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb* and the *Musakkhkhīr al-bilād*. The authors of both relate some of the constituent events associated with the takeover, but they situate themselves at an emotional remove, failing explicitly to identify themselves with the Tūqāy-Timūrids' post-takeover regime.

What is most striking about the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*'s account of the Samarqand showdown is the distinctly marginal role which it accords to Bāqī Muḥammad. "It is reported", writes Mullā Awāz,

that after the killing of 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan, Pīr Muḥammad Khan became the ruler in the *wilāyat* of Bukhara, and Bāqī Muḥammad Khan became ruler in the city of Samarqand: and hostilities later developed between them.²⁸

Of the two rivals, it is Pīr Muḥammad who emerges as the more distinct personality, depicted as he is as an enemy of both Ishāq and the Samarqandi people. By contrast, Bāqī Muḥammad is a bland figure, whom Mullā Awāz suggests bore little responsibility for defeating the Bukharan army. Instead, as we saw above (p. 240), the work ascribes the showdown's outcome primarily to the miraculous intervention of Khwājah Ishāq. Ishāq is evidently the hero of Mullā Awāz's story, and Bāqī Muḥammad little more than an onlooker. The work's treatment of Bāqī Muḥammad thus differs starkly from the treatment accorded to secular rulers in other hagiographies. In Badr al-Kashmīrī's *Rawḍat al-riḍwān*, for instance, 'Abdallāh is as prominent an actor as Muḥammad Islām Jūybārī, to whom the work is

²⁷ *Hanūz Imām Qulī Sultān chandān quwwat wa shawkat hāsil nakardah wa hawā-khwā-hān-i mā sar bih itā'at-i ū niyārwardand: SilSal* 179a.

²⁸ *Manqūl ast kih ba'd az kushtah shudan-i 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān dar wilāyat-i Bukhārā pādishāh Pīr Muḥammad shud wa dar shahr-i Samarqand pādishāh Bāqī Muḥammad Khān shudah bud. Ba'd az ān dar miyān-i in dū pādishāh nizā' paydā shud: DQ* 37a-b.

ostensibly devoted. In the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb*, by contrast, there is little to distinguish Bāqī Muḥammad alongside such diverse rulers as Muḥammad Khan, the Chaghatāyid Moghul ruler of East Turkistan,²⁹ and Salīm II, the Ottoman sultan,³⁰ who are similarly cast as beneficiaries of Iṣḥāq's spiritual agency.

Nor does Bāqī Muḥammad emerge as the primary beneficiary of Iṣḥāq's agency even in the particular context of the 1599 showdown. "Victory has fallen to *our* side", says the onlooker who witnesses Pīr Muḥammad's beheading;³¹ Mullā Awāz describes a Samarqandi victory, rather than a specifically Tūqāy-Tīmūrid one. Of course, this may attest to the skill with which Bāqī Muḥammad drew upon Samarqandi communal loyalties in the run-up to the showdown, exploiting people's communal selfhood so that they might support him out of attachment to a sense of Samarqandi-ness. If so, however, there was a downside to this. There is little sense in the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb* that Bāqī Muḥammad enjoyed any particular communal eminence, or that he engrained himself in people's self-associative repertoires; the fact of who he was does not emerge from the work as a significant constitutive virtue. The work suggests that any Samarqandi communal loyalty towards the newly established Tūqāy-Tīmūrid ruling house was contingent and fleeting. It thus perhaps offers an intimation of the problems which Samarqandi local loyalties would pose Walī Muḥammad and his Bukharan successors during the first few decades of Tūqāy-Tīmūrid rule (see above, pp. 245–251).

A similar impression accrues from the *Musakkkhir al-bilād*. Whereas the linguistic content of the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb* suggests that Mullā Awāz was addressing a somewhat socially-marginal constituency of Samarqandis,³² Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan's more cosmopolitan work suggests that people at the metropole may also have been only loosely attached to the newly-established regime. The *Musakkkhir al-bilād* offers a rich account of events, featuring much information which is absent from subsequent retellings. Its account of what happened in Balkh after 'Abd al-Mu'min's death is partic-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 27b–28b; depicted also in *AṬ* (Churās) 89a–90a, *TCh* 49b–50b.

³⁰ *DQ* 72a–75a.

³¹ For the passage in question see above, p. 240.

³² As Joseph Fletcher observes, the language of the work is far removed from the elegant acrolect familiar from other literary texts, featuring numerous Turkic calques and a very confined vocabulary. *Idem*, "Confrontations between Muslim Missionaries and Nomad Unbelievers in the Late Sixteenth Century: Notes on Four Passages from the 'Ḍīya' al-Qulūb'", in *Tractata Altaica: Denis Sinor sexagenario optime de rebus altaicis merito dedicate* (Wiesbaden, 1976), 167–174 [170].

ularly useful, for instance, with no other work relating the reign of 'Abd al-Amīn in such detail. The *Musakhkhir al-bilād* alone tells how Maḥmūd Sultan acquired authority in Ḥiṣār (see above, p. 156 n. 47), and how Allāh Birdī Kūkaltāsh Atālīq led a mass desertion to Shībarghān (see above, p. 170). The work's account of matters in the Tashkent region is similarly invaluable. No other source mentions how Pīr Muḥammad appointed Jahāngīr to gubernatorial authority after the defeat of Tawakkul in 1599, or how worsening relations with Bāqī Muḥammad impelled Jahāngīr to flee to Miyānkāl, then Bukhara, then Balkh, and finally to Isfahan, where with 'Abbās' help he would continue agitating towards an Abū'l-Khayrid restoration for the next decade (see above, pp. 178–179). Nor does any other account mention the 'Abd al-Ghaffār and Shaykhim local pretender incidents discussed in chapter 4 (see above, pp. 196–199).

The *Musakhkhir al-bilād* is a crucial source for anyone attempting a synoptic account of the events of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover. But it also offers some stimulating clues to the way in which near-contemporaries perceived these events. Although the work's takeover narrative is rich, it is also fractured, with all the relevant information contained in a series of discrete prosopographical entries, each dedicated to an individual member of the Abū'l-Khayrid dynasty. Writing in the reign of Walī Muḥammad, Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan nevertheless organised the *Musakhkhir al-bilād* around the family tree of a fallen ruling house, which hindsight would confirm had collapsed almost a decade earlier.

The conclusion to draw from this fact is not that Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan was simply hostile to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids. If he were hostile, he would have been unlikely, for instance, to describe Bāqī Muḥammad's reign as "the khalal dominion of the eminent ruler Abū'l-Ghāzī Bāqī Muḥammad Khān, in the scope of his power a new Jamshīd, and in his bravery a second Alexander".³³ He might also have drawn particular attention to the 'injustice' of Pīr Muḥammad's overthrow and execution, whereas in fact Pīr Muḥammad is one of very few identifiable Abū'l-Khayrid dynasts not to receive any prosopographical entry whatsoever.³⁴ The truer conclusion is that the *Musakhkhir al-bilād* testifies to the way in which memories of the Abū'l-Khayrid dynasty

³³ *Dawlat-i khāqānī-yi 'ālī-ḥadrat, Jamshīd-i dawlat, Sikandar-i shawkat, Abū'l-Ghāzī Bāqī Muḥammad Khān*: MB 165.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 194 for entry on Pīr Muḥammad's father Sulaymān b. Jānī Bik; *ibid.*, on his brother, Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān; 195 on his nephew, Muḥammad Qulī b. Maḥmūd; 196 on his uncle, Yār Muḥammad b. Jānī Bik.

continued to influence people's consciousness in the first few years after Bāqī Muḥammad's accession. In particular, the work illustrates how memories of 'Abdallāh Khan's reign continued to exercise enormous weight. The prosopographical entries in the first half of the work demonstrate a clear pro-Jānī-Bikid and anti-Suyūnchid bias,³⁵ while the work's briefer second half is given over to an idealising account of 'Abdallāh's reign itself, largely cribbed from the *Sharaf-nāmah-yi shāhī*.³⁶ Apparently unaware that the work contains details relating to the period 1598–1605, Vincent Fourniau suggests that the *Musakkkhir al-bilād* was both undertaken and completed at 'Abdallāh's behest.³⁷ Fourniau's suggestion is plainly unsupported, but it does indicate just how lightly-felt a presence the Tūqāy-Timūrids remain throughout the work. Bāqī Muḥammad had defeated Pīr Muḥammad and acceded to khal authority: to judge from the *Musakkkhir al-bilād*, however, people were still reluctant to align themselves wholeheartedly with the new regime.

A Rhetorical Panoply

By composing works which were admiring of Bāqī Muḥammad and his kinsmen, authors such as Mawlānā Ṣaydī Qarākūlī allowed members of the incoming Tūqāy-Timūrid regime to prevail upon people's inertial loyalties, both by signalling loyalty and by providing the khan with a forum for conspicuous consumption, wherein he could draw attention to his command of resources and to the material differential which he thus enjoyed over his nearest rivals. But the Tūqāy-Timūrid regime also derived more particular utility from the actual content of the literary material which passed into circulation. Whereas Mawlānā Bāqī's chronogram contains little more than generic *madh* (praise, panegyric), for instance, Qarākūlī's lost *Bāqī-nāmah* seems to have included a much more carefully-considered discursive reper-

³⁵ Ibid., 101–220. The authorial tone is well illustrated in e.g. the following character description of the Kūchkūnjid prince Abū'l-Khayr b. Jawānmard 'Alī: "he was a prince who was extremely haughty and rash, and very proud and vain. He was always coming up with incendiary plans and seditious ideas, and he did not care in the least about destroying the country or harming the population" (*ū pādishāh-zādah'ī būd kih dar kamāl-i tajabbur wa tahawwur wa ghāyat-i takabbur wa ghurūr, hamwārwah dā'iyah-yi sharāngzī wa khayāl-i fitnah-jū'ī dar khātir dāsht, wa az wayrāni-yi mamlakat wa kharābī-yi ra'iyat ašlan andishah'ī nadāsht*): *ibid.*, 149.

³⁶ Ibid., 220–362.

³⁷ V. Fourniau, "Quelques sources concernant l'histoire agraire des Özbeks à partir du XVI^e siècle", in *Turcica* 19 (1987), 277–301 [293].

toire. Reconstructing the *Bāqī-nāmah*'s Amu Darya narrative from its subsequent avatars, one can identify various ways in which Qarākūlī took it upon himself to help Bāqī Muḥammad bid for the audience's loyalties.

The most obvious of these ways, of course, was by bidding for clientelist loyalty. Whereas most Safavid and Central Asian versions of the 1602 Balkh showdown describe an unedifying series of skirmishes concluding with 'Abbās' forced retirement after an outbreak of dysentery, the two eighteenth-century works modelled on the *Bāqī-nāmah* take a much loftier view of affairs, according to which the Bukharan victory was a direct consequence of Bāqī Muḥammad's inspired leadership. By giving a stronger impression than any other sources of the threat posed to Balkh by the Safavids' approach, the *Bāqī-nāmah* avatars imply that the city owed its safe deliverance to Bāqī Muḥammad alone. They particularly emphasise the significance of Bāqī Muḥammad's decision to swim across the Amu Darya. In taking it upon himself to be the first to plunge into the water, Bāqī Muḥammad displayed the courage which subjects might admire in a ruler;³⁸ in prevailing upon his troops to do the same thing, meanwhile, he displayed that capacity for maintaining group solidarity which, as noted above (pp. 114–118), was so particularly valued in Turco-Mongolian tradition.

Qarākūlī may well also have used the *Bāqī-nāmah* as a means of bidding on Bāqī Muḥammad's behalf for people's charismatic loyalties. This is suggested by the way the later *Bāqī-nāmah* avatars construe the Amu Darya episode as a reflection of Bāqī Muḥammad's divine favour. Having related Bāqī Muḥammad's supposed prediction that the fate of his men would constitute a litmus test for the relative virtues of the Sunni and Shiite faiths, the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* proceeds to recount how Bāqī Muḥammad was promptly vindicated in his religious convictions. "By the holy grace of the Prophet, peace be upon him," Balkhī writes, "it is said that as they emerged from the waters of danger there was not a single person's horse whose saddle had got damp. Indeed, who can begin to describe the nobleness of the

³⁸ Mention in *TMKh* and *SūSal* of Bāqī Muḥammad's being the first to enter the water contrasts with what we find in *TMQ* 557a, where Aḥmad b. Shams al-Dīn claims that Bāqī Muḥammad did not cross the river until all his men had already done so: *lashkar-i Bukhārā bā sipāh-i Samarqand jam' kardah mutawajjih-i Balkh shud, wa chūn bih kanār-i āb-i Jayhūn rasid, lashkariyān qūshūn qūshūn az āb 'ubūr namūdah bih Walī Muḥammad Khān mulḥaq mīshudand [...]* *chun majmū'-i lashkar az āb gudhāshtand Bāqī Khān az 'aqab-i hamah az āb gudhāsht.*

religion of Muḥammad?"³⁹ As 'Abbās' men were to learn, it was a dangerous business fighting a divinely-guided opponent. Balkhī attributes the outbreak of dysentery which crippled the Safavid army to divine working. He recounts how 'Abbās' men impiously cut down trees for firewood near the shrine of a certain Bābā Abdāl, and how

by the blessings of that eminent figure, their food was infected with a mortal poison, and everybody who had eaten a quantity of this food was struck with a stomach ache: and within an hour they were traversing the road of annihilation.⁴⁰

Should Qarākulī have included such sentiments in his original *Bāqī-nāmah*, as is likely, the message would have been clear. Not only was it prudent to submit to a ruler displaying the marks of both personal virtue and divine favour, but it was religiously incumbent upon one to do so as well.

At the same time as bidding for people's clientelist and charismatic loyalties, Qarākulī was trying to help Bāqī Muḥammad bid for their communal loyalties. The *Bāqī-nāmah's* Amu Darya narrative includes several elements which were evidently contrived to help enmesh Bāqī Muḥammad within an audience's self-associative repertoire. Instead of rendering Bāqī Muḥammad an appropriate recipient of specifically 'Samarqandi' or 'Balkhi' loyalties, however, these elements served to demonstrate the khan's credentials as a fitting ruler of Greater Mā warā al-nahr more generally. The *Bāqī-nāmah* narrative was part of that larger, ultimately unsuccessful attempt to impress upon audiences a unifying sense of 'Central Asian-ness' to counteract their centrifugal *wilāyat* loyalties.

This emerges most clearly from a brief mythical excursus with which both the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī* and the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* follow their accounts of Bāqī Muḥammad's miraculous river crossing. "It is recounted in history books", writes Balkhī,

that when Bīzhan came to Turan to get hold of Kaykhusraw he took hold of the prince and returned to Iran. When Afrāsiyāb learned of this he sent an army in pursuit. And when, in the course of his journey, they came to the banks of the Amu Darya river, his seventy troops displayed great courage, and without ferry or ford they plunged into the river and emerged safely on the

³⁹ *Az barakāt-i dīn-i nabawī—ṣallā Allāh 'alayhi wa sallam—manqūl ast kih chunān az ān baḥr-i khaṭarnāk gudhashtah kih zayn-i asb hich kudām tar nashudah būd. Arī dar sharāfat-i dīn-i āyīn-i Muḥammadi kih-rā sukhn ast?* TMKh 128–129.

⁴⁰ *Az karamāt-i ān buzurgwār ān ṭa'ām khāṣṣiyat-i zahr-i halāhal paydā kardah wa kas az ān qadarī khwurdah bud bih dar-i shikam muḥtalā shudah, dar yak sā'at rāh-i 'adam paynamūd: ibid., 129.*

other side. This is what Bāqī Muḥammad Khan did. Other than him, nobody has had the bravery to do such a thing, nor ever will.⁴¹

Ḥājji Mir Muḥammad Salīm offers a similar story. "Right down to the present day", he writes,

history books reveal no sultan who has showed such bravery and daring except for Shah Kaykhusraw son of Sīyāwush, who at the start of his reign went together with Kayūsālār from Turan to Iran, and Afrāsiyāb dispatched fourteen detachments, each with a hundred thousand men, in pursuit, that they might capture him and put him to death; when he arrived at the bank of this river, for fear of being overtaken by his enemies he threw himself into the river and crossed safely. But the difference and contrast [here] is great, because Kaykhusraw had no other way of escape except across the river, whereas Bāqī Muḥammad Khan's aim was the repulsion of the villainy of the Qizilbāsh.⁴²

There are, of course, clear divergences between these two accounts. The first compares Bāqī Muḥammad's behaviour with that of Afrāsiyāb, while the second contrasts it with the behaviour of the person Afrāsiyāb was pursuing. Furthermore, whereas Balkhī's version suggests that Afrāsiyāb's behaviour constituted a precedent for Bāqī Muḥammad's crossing, Ḥājji Mir Muḥammad Salīm claims that Kaykhusraw's behaviour actually paled alongside the later episode. These variations suggest that the two authors were not consulting a written text when composing their respective works, but were instead drawing on what had by then become a widely circulated oral narrative. Taking the two presently constituted passages as shadows on the wall, however, it is possible to reconstruct something of the authorial motivation impelling Qarākuli to include this mythical allusion in his own work.

⁴¹ *Dar kutub-i tawārikh mastūr ast kih chūn Bīzhan [bih] jihat-i āwurdan-i Kaykhusraw bih Tūrān raftah būd shāh-zādah-rā giriftah bih jānib-i Īrān raj'at namūd. Afrāsiyāb khabardār shudah muta'āqib-i ishān lashkar firistād. Dar athnā-yi rāh bih ānhā rasidah tā lab-i daryā-yi Jayhūn, haftād jang 'azīm kardah bi kashtī wa ma'bar khūdhā-rā dar āb zadah bih salāmat gudhashtand. Bāqī Muḥammad Khān nīz chunān kard, dīgar hīch kas-rā jur'āt-i īn nashudah, wa nakhwāhad shud: ibid., 129.*

⁴² *Az rū-yi kutub-i tārikh tā hāl hīchkas az salāṭīn īn qism-i jalādat wa mardānaḡi nakardah and maḡar Shāh Kaykhusraw ibn Sīyāwush kih dar ibtidā-yi saltānat az Tūrān bih rafāqat-i Kayūsālār bih Īrān mīraft wa Afrāsiyāb chahārdah alghār kih har alghārī šad hazār kas bāshad dar ta'āqub firistadah būd kih ū-rā dastgīr namūdah bih qatl rasānand. Chūn bih lab-i hamīn daryā rasīd az bīm-i ta'āqub-i dushmanān khūdhā-rā bih daryā zadah wa salāmat bigudhasht. Likīn farq wa tafāwut bisyār ast, kih Kaykhusraw juz daryā gurīz-gāhī nadāsht, wa 'ubūr-i Bāqī Muḥammad Khān bih qašd-i mudāfā'ah-yi sharr-i dushman būd: *SilSal* 165a-b.*

Both Kaykhusraw and Afrāsiyāb are figures from epic tradition, whose exploits are most famously recounted in Firdawsī's *Shāh-nāmāh*. While historians have long been aware of this narrative's ethically-constitutive significance for the construction of an 'Iranian' national identity,⁴³ they have tended to overlook the role which the story has played in fostering a sense of Turanian, or Central Asian, selfhood. In fact, *Shāh-nāmāh* avatar narratives evidently circulated widely throughout Greater Mā warā al-nahr during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,⁴⁴ and people as far afield as East Turkistan deemed it a mark of culture to have passages of the work at one's instant recall.⁴⁵ Stories which served south of the Amu Darya as a signifier of Iranian identity functioned in the north as a badge of Central Asian-ness. For instance, the figure of Afrāsiyāb featured prominently in urban aetiologies throughout the region.⁴⁶ Evoking echoes of the *Shāh-nāmāh* narrative thus allowed Qarākulī to capitalise on the opportunity presented to him to cast Bāqī Muḥammad as Greater Mā warā al-nahr's champion against the depredations of 'Abbās and his Iranian forces.

By plunging straight into the waters of the Amu Darya Bāqī Muḥammad compared favourably not just with the heroes of legendary epic, but also with various historical figures who were closely bound into an audience's self-associative repertoire. The capacity for crossing rivers was itself a conventional trope for inspired leadership. Crossing rivers was a dangerous business, and people regularly offered prayers for safe passage;⁴⁷ it is unsurprising, therefore, that the *Mihmān-nāmāh-yi Bukhārā* should ascribe particular significance to Muḥammad Shībānī's decision to cross the frozen-over Syr Darya since, as Khunjī observed, this was an extremely danger-

⁴³ M. Vaziri, *Iran as Imagined Nation—The Construction of National Identity* (New York, 1993), 119–126.

⁴⁴ Thus authors frequently describe prominent actors as 'Rustam-like': *ShN* (Binā'ī) 106; *ShN* (Ṣāliḥ) 72, 94; *IQN* 25a (see above, p. 89). For the *Shāh-nāmāh* as a popular literary model, see e.g. *NZJ* 178, on the sixteenth-century poet Mullā Tīlah Bukhārī, who composed verse "in the manner of Firdawsī's *Shāh-nāmāh*".

⁴⁵ *TCh* 75a, observing of a certain Muḥammad Mu'min b. Muḥammad Amin that "he was gifted and able, and knew most of the *Shāh-nāmāh* by heart" (*fādīl wa qābil būd, akthar-i Shāh-nāmāh-rā dar dhikr dāsht*). I have emended '*fādīl*' in place of '*fāṣīl*', as is given in Akimushkin's edition. The passage in question is noted in Sultanov, "Soslovie sultanov v Kazakhskom khanstve v XVI–XVII vv.", in A.K. Marghullan (ed.), *Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma* (Alma-Ata, 1981), 142–148 [147].

⁴⁶ *JN* 251b, on the legendary origins of Bazdar, near Qarshī; Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion* (London, 1968), 119, on the origins of Rāmītān, near Bukhara; *SūSal* 185b, for Tashkent as '*takhtgāh-i Afrāsiyāb*'.

⁴⁷ E.g. *ShNSh* 3497 162a.

ous undertaking.⁴⁸ But the clearest historical precedent for the *Bāqī-nāmah* narrative comes from the early fifteenth century. Several historians relate what happened when Tīmūr, pursuing his notorious rival Tuqtāmīsh Khan, came to the Ural river. According to Shāmī's *Zafarnāmah*, advisors informed Tīmūr that they had a choice of three nearby crossing points. But Tīmūr decided not to cross at any of these, lest the army be exposed to an ambush. Instead, he decreed that troops should place their faith in God and plunge straight into the river where they were. Nervously agreeing to the proposal, his men threw themselves into the water and thus crossed the Ural.⁴⁹ If echoes here with the *Bāqī-nāmah* are clear, they are even clearer in Naṭanzī's *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Mu'īnī*, dating to 1412. In this work, Naṭanzī adds a programmatic statement about Tīmūr's crossing the Ural "where nobody had done so before", and like Ḥājji Mīr in the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* he describes the body of water in question as a *daryā-yi khūn-khwār* (bloodthirsty river).⁵⁰ Since these narratives presumably constituted part of the *Bāqī-nāmah*'s discursive background, Qarākulī may well have been trying to foster associations between his own patron and the widely-revered Tīmūr, and thus to secure for Bāqī Muḥammad a share in that quality of 'Tīmūr-ness' which, as noted above (pp. 225–229), continued to enjoy widespread currency throughout the sixteenth century.

The final way in which Qarākulī's *Bāqī-nāmah* may have tapped into people's self-associative repertoires relates to the work's treatment of Muḥammad Shībānī Khan, who established the Abū'l-Khayrid dynasty in Greater Mā warā al-nahr at the turn of the sixteenth century. In the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*, Ḥājji Mīr claims that Bāqī Muḥammad forbade his men from pursuing the retreating forces of Shah 'Abbās. This was apparently because "Bāqī Muḥammad remembered the bad conduct of Shah Isma'īl, the martyrdom of Muḥammad Khan Shībānī, and the perfidious behaviour of Shah 'Abbās when fighting Dīn Muḥammad, and the defeat of the Muslim army."⁵¹ That

⁴⁸ *MNB* 121–122, noting of one crossing-place that "it was extremely narrow and dangerous, and if the army had opted to cross here it is likely that few people would have made it alive" (*ma'bar bih ghāyat tang wa khaṭarnāk būd, wa agar 'asākīr mayl-i 'ubūr kardandī shāyastī kih kam kasī tarīq-i najāt sipardī*).

⁴⁹ *ZN* (Shāmī) 120; see also *ZN* (Yazdī) 214a.

⁵⁰ *Mutawakkilānah az jā'ī kih hīch āfrīdah hargiz nagudhashtah būd az ān daryā-yi khūn-khwār bigudhasht: MuT* (Naṭanzī) 345.

⁵¹ *Khān-i nuṣrat-nishān kirdār-i Shāh Isma'īl wa shahādāt-i Muḥammad Khān Shībānī wa ghadr wa makr-i Shāh 'Abbās dar muqābūlah-yi Dīn Muḥammad Khān wa shikast-i lashkar-i Islām-ra yād kardah: SilSal* 166b.

is to say, Bāqī Muḥammad knew that he thus enjoyed moral superiority over the enemy, and did not want to squander this superiority by pursuing and massacring an army of mere invalids.

The immediate point of this passage is to disencumber Bāqī Muḥammad from responsibility for a disaster which followed directly on from the Balkh victory. This was that episode related in Safavid sources, where a party of troops set off in pursuit of the fleeing Qizilbāsh forces, only to be cut down and massacred by their intended quarry.⁵² But the speech accorded to Bāqī Muḥammad is of more particular significance for the relationship it evokes between the founder of the Tūqāy-Timūrid ruling dynasty and that founder of the Abū'l-Khayrid dynasty who predeceased him by a century. The speech casts Bāqī Muḥammad as Muḥammad Shībānī's avenger, but at the same time makes clear that the present incumbent is not weakened by any of the congenital failings which assailed his distant predecessor. Muḥammad Shībānī was defeated at Merv because he did not know his limits. He undermined his military advantage by pressing it home too far. Bāqī Muḥammad would not make these mistakes. He was ruler of Turan, not Iran, and unlike Muḥammad Shībānī he did not harbour idle fantasies of unbounded conquest.⁵³ Bāqī Muḥammad might be loyal to memories of an Abū'l-Khayrid past, but he was proposing to improve on it by the establishment of a Tūqāy-Timūrid present. Constituencies could support him while remaining true both to their practical interests and to their normative convictions.

Bidding for Loyalty, 1605–1749

In the *Baḥr al-asrār* (ca. 1641–1645) Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī relates a story which does not appear in any other extant source. It tells what happened when 'Abdallāh Khan's father Iskandar Khan went out hunting one day with Māngishlāq, who was Bāqī Muḥammad's great grandfather.

It is related that one day Iskandar Khan and Māngishlāq Khan set off in the hunting reserve in pursuit of a deer. Iskandar went out ahead and caught up with his prey. Striking it a blow, he sat himself down on it as one might. When Māngishlāq arrived at the scene, Iskandar Khan, aware that his sitting thus was contrary to polite behaviour, but also that his getting up would cause

⁵² T^A 229, relating two such encounters; *AfT* 148b, recounting "the defeat of the army of Turan and the death of [Bāqī Muḥammad's lieutenant] Sayyid Bik" (*maghlūb shudan-i lashkar-i Tūrān wa wafāt-i Sayyid Bik*) in the vicinity of Jijiktū; *RS* 756–757, noting the death of three thousand Uzbeks.

⁵³ For such fantasies, see above, p. 100.

the prey to struggle and thrash about, asked his eminence [Māngishlāq] to sit down as well. In the absence of a carpet, and in view of Māngishlāq's refusal to sit down on the ground—which would not be fitting for a sultan—finally Iskandar Khan sat on one side of the deer and invited Māngishlāq to sit down on the other.⁵⁴

This story is an example of a common trope which we may term the *portent narrative*, whereby prior-occurring events offer a spectral intimation of what will subsequently transpire. The episode's import is clear. With the hapless deer an associational stand-in for Bukharan political authority, Maḥmūd is able to present the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover as a heavily foreshadowed outcome. When Bāqī Muḥammad overthrew Pīr Muḥammad in the Samarqand showdown of 1599, the implication runs, he was simply fulfilling Tūqāy-Tīmūrid family destiny.

The story of Māngishlāq's hunting trip almost certainly originated some considerable time after Bāqī Muḥammad's own reign. This is not just because early seventeenth-century works such as Suhaylā's *Imām Qulī-nāmah* (ca. 1630) fail to mention the episode in their Māngishlāq narratives:⁵⁵ more particularly, it is because it was only some time after Bāqī Muḥammad's own reign that people would have drawn much utility from disseminating such a contrived tale. Over the course of the seventeenth century, a developing crisis within the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid empire meant that the process of bidding for loyalty became ever more important, not less so.

Bāqī Muḥammad's reign was a success story: but much of the success which he enjoyed came at the expense of his successors. Measures which Bāqī Muḥammad undertook in the pursuit of loyalty undercut his successors' subsequent ability to prevail upon such loyalty themselves. Antagonised communal loyalties, such as we considered in the last chapter, were one problem. Another related to Bāqī Muḥammad's attitude towards the legacy of 'Abdallāh Khan. 'Abdallāh's career-long efforts to empower the khalal office (see above, pp. 119–139) did much to enable Bāqī Muḥammad's accession to khalal authority. But Bāqī Muḥammad's debt to this

⁵⁴ *Manqūl ast kih rūzī dar shikārgāh Iskandar Khān wa Mangishlāq Khān dar 'aqab-i āhū'i tākhtand wa Iskandar Khān pish-dastī namūdah khūd-rā bih ān šayd rasānid. Chūn ān-rā dhabh namūdah bih dastūr-i mā'hūd bar bālā-yi ān nishast. Chūn Mangishlāq Khān rasid Iskandar Khān nishastan-i khūd-ra khilāf-i ādab dānistah az ānjā kih bar khwāstan nīz mawjib-i junbish wa taysh-i šayd būd az ān-janāb mustad'ī-yi julūs gardīd. Chūn basātī hādir nabūd wa Mangishlāq az julūs-i bar khāk kih nah dastūr-i salāṭīn ast ābā mīnamūd. Lājaram Iskandar Khān bar yak jānib-i āhū nishast wa dar jānib-i digar khān-rā nishānid: BA 38a.*

⁵⁵ IQN 14a.

legacy had baleful consequences, as can be seen in two key regards. The first relates to the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds' damagingly inflexible conception of empire, and the second to their complicity in the alienation of Balkh from the rest of the khanate. Over the course of the seventeenth century, these tendencies together undermined the scope for anybody in khalal office to engrain himself among his subjects' varied conceptions of the good.

"All That Is Human Must Retrograde If It Do Not Advance ..."

Bāqī Muḥammad had a fixed idea of which territories he, as khan, was both entitled and required to rule: and his Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd successors duly followed his example. The fidelity with which they did so gradually undermined their capacity for appealing to people's clientelist and inertial loyalties.

In his territorial conception of empire, as in so much else, Bāqī Muḥammad was heavily influenced by memories of the reign of 'Abdallāh b. Iskandar. This is not to suggest, of course, that Bāqī Muḥammad blindly aped 'Abdallāh's example. As we saw in chapter 3, for instance, Bāqī Muḥammad adopted—at least initially—a much more corporatist policy in dealing with his fellow Tūqāy-Tīmūrīd family members than his predecessor had done, as though at pains to avoid the dysfunctional diarchic structure of authority which had marred the last years of 'Abdallāh's reign. While Bāqī Muḥammad often showed himself inclined to emulate 'Abdallāh's chosen courses of action—his recognition of established fiscal immunities, for instance⁵⁶—he showed also on occasion that he had learned from his predecessor's mistakes. Accordingly, the territory over which Bāqī Muḥammad claimed title was both no less and no more than that territory which

⁵⁶ See here e.g. document entries no. 403 and 404 in Welsford and Tashev (eds.), *A Catalogue of Arabic-Script Documents*. The first is a document issued in the name of 'Abdallāh Khan and dating from 995 (12 December 1586–1581 December 1587), confirming the fiscal privileges on land located in Bāgh-i Mazār, in Samarqand's Yārkāt *tūmān*, which was endowed as *waqf* in favour of the shrine to Amīr Khalīl-Allāh b. Shāh Nī'mat-Allāh Kirmānī, a *sayyid* supposedly descended in the twentieth generation from the prophet Muḥammad (see e.g. 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Shir Malik b. Muḥammad Wā'izī, *Risālah dar siyar-i Ḥadrat-i Shāh Nī'matullāh Walī*, ed. J. Aubin in *Matériaux pour la biographie de Shāh Nī'matullāh Walī Kirmānī* (Tehran, 1956), 270–320 [274–275]). The second is a document issued in the name of Walī Muḥammad Khan and dating from Jumādā II 1019 (21 August–18 September 1610), again confirming that the property in question has long enjoyed the fiscally privileged status of *waqf*. Although we have no extant document issued in the name of Bāqī Muḥammad, the wording of doc. 404 indicates that he too evidently deferred—tacitly or otherwise—to the terms of 'Abdallāh's earlier confirmation of privilege.

‘Abdallāh had successfully governed before him. It is hardly co-incidental, for instance, that Bāqī Muḥammad showed little inclination towards imposing himself in the lands east of the Tien Shan. Although generations of Abū'l-Khayrids had claimed authority over Kashgar in the early and mid-sixteenth century,⁵⁷ ‘Abdallāh’s own career had put an end to such rhetoric in 1594–1595, when he tried and failed to invade the region.⁵⁸ Bāqī Muḥammad evidently learned from this embarrassing debacle, and avoided expressing any pretensions to Kashgari authority. His Tūqāy-Timūrid successors followed his example with such scrupulousness that Imām Qulī’s decision to welcome exiled Kashgari opponents of Aḥmad Khan b. Muḥammad subsequently stands out as a rare show of defiance towards East Turkistan’s Moghul regime.⁵⁹ In this regard, Bāqī Muḥammad was sensible to have learned from one of ‘Abdallāh’s failures. Elsewhere, however, he was over-ambitious in looking to emulate ‘Abdallāh’s successes. It was a difficult job trying to hold onto the late Abū'l-Khayrid’s territories, as the decades following Bāqī Muḥammad’s accession would show.

As a result of Bāqī Muḥammad’s piecemeal reconstitution of ‘Abdallāh’s territorial holdings, the Tūqāy-Timūrids inherited an over-expanded empire, and they encountered enormous problems trying to preserve it. ‘Abdallāh’s empire was not sustainable. Throughout the course of his reign, ‘Abdallāh had consciously adopted an expansionist policy. From the capture of Merv in 1567 to the invasion of Khwārazm in 1592 and his forays into Khurāsān in the years thereafter, ‘Abdallāh was able to finance government with the resources accruing from conquest. Newly-captured land and booty was processed into the redistributive network, while the promise of future preferment encouraged former stakeholders in locally-established

⁵⁷ See e.g. *AḥT* 114, recounting how in 1510 Muḥammad Shībānī claimed in a letter to Shah Ismā‘īl that amongst his military resources was a contingent of troops from Kashgar under the command of his kinsman Suyūnch Muḥammad; *KhT* 180, on how Kūchkünjī b. Abū'l-Khayr claimed to be “ruler of Mā warā al-nahr and Kashgar and Andijān and Ṭaraz and Sawrān and Qāmūl and Ṭurfān and Ghalmaq [sic] and Qāzāq [sic]”; and *RS* 505b, on how ‘Abdallāh’s authority stretched “from Kashgar to Sabzawār”.

⁵⁸ *DQ* 30b–32a; *TMQ* 550b–551a; *BA* 7418 224b–225b; *JāIM* 34b–36a; discussion in O.F. Akimushkin, “Kashgarskii pokhod uzbekov pri Abdallah-khane”, in *Iranskaia filologiya. Kratkoe izlozhenie dokladov nauchnoi konferentsii posviashchennoi 60-letiiu prof. A.N. Boldyreva* (Moscow, 1969), 5–9. Vámbéry, *History of Bokhara*, 285, gives a confused account of ‘Abdallāh’s eastern campaigns, wrongly claiming that “not only all Farghānā, but also Kāshgar and Khotan, were subdued by the Shaybānides”; his assertion is followed in e.g. Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, With an Appendix on the Non-Muslim Turkic Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London, 1986), 270.

⁵⁹ *BA* 7418 227a, noting the flight of Shāh Ḥaydar b. ‘Abd al-Karīm, governor of Khotan.

regimes to transfer their inertial loyalties towards the imperial metropole. As the rate of expansion slowed down in the last year or so of 'Abdallāh's life, however, such expedients faltered. Bukharan control began to waver in several regions, particularly in the empire's most recently-conquered western fringes, where local stakeholders were least committed to the preservation of 'Abdallāh's regime.⁶⁰ Like a pyramid scheme, 'Abdallāh's empire was not a system which flourished in stasis.

Paradoxically, therefore, Tūqāy-Tīmūrid fidelity to the territorial outline of 'Abdallāh's empire was about the worst possible way of guaranteeing its maintenance. By failing to expand into lands beyond the frontiers established by 'Abdallāh, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds made it difficult for themselves to maintain control of the territories within them. This was because the maintenance of empire was itself an expensive business. If successful, an expansionary military campaign may yield net financial utility: but defensive campaigns (such as that against 'Abbās at Balkh in 1602, or various expeditions against Abū'l-Khayrid or Tūqāy-Tīmūrid pretenders in the decades thereafter) and punitive campaigns (such as Imām Qulī's expedition against Tashkent in 1635: see above, pp. 119–121) are likely to constitute a net drain on resources, even if they attain their designated goals. During the seventeenth century the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds periodically swelled treasury coffers by leading occasional booty raids into Safavid Khurāsān, such as that against Merv in 1631.⁶¹ But their reluctance to contemplate further expansion meant that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds found themselves consuming their fixed resource base faster than it was able to replenish itself.

In order to raise funds, therefore, successive khans adopted short-term expedients which simply exacerbated their longer-term penury. One frequent such move was to sell fiscal privileges. During the mid-seventeenth century, it became increasingly common practice for landowners to indemnify themselves against *kharāj* by yielding two thirds of their holdings to the ruler, so that they might retain the remaining third at a lower rate of fiscal assessment.⁶² Iterated over time, this process catastrophically reduced

⁶⁰ T'ĀĀ'A 522–523 gives a good illustration of the weakness of people's inertial loyalties in the newly-captured territories in the west of the khanate, relating how, when the deposed 'Arabshāhid ruler Ḥājī Muḥammad attempted to recapture Khwārazm in late 1597 after three years of Bukharan rule, people willingly transferred their attachments back to him: *mardum-i ān wilāyat bih qudūm-i ishān bashāshat wa khurramī bih zuhūr āwurdah dar maqām-i ittā'at wa inqiyād dar āmadand.*

⁶¹ *KhS* 131, 155.

⁶² Chekhovich, "Bukharskie pozemel'nye akty XVI–XIX vv.", in *Problemy istochnikovedeniia* 4 (1955), 222–242. See also Schwarz, "Contested Grounds: Ambiguities and Disputes

the available tax base. In turn, this undermined the khan's capacity for drawing upon both inertial and clientelist loyalties. A decline in the fiscally-accumulated private goods available under the established status quo diminished scope for generating inertially-bound direct stakeholders, while the reduced means for incentivising actors to behave on behalf of the common interest constrained the khan's ability to offer such public goods as security and stability, upon whose maintenance clientelist loyalties were contingent.

Given that the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds displayed little inclination towards imperial expansion, they might have had a better chance of preserving an empire in stasis if they had cut costs by forswearing claims to those regions whose administration was most burdensome. It would probably have been sensible, for instance, to renounce control over such cities in the southern Dasht-i Qipchāq region as Turkistān, Sawrān and Sighnāq. These were thankless places to govern. They were a long way from the empire's centres of authority, they were not hugely productive, and for much of the time they were under sustained Qazaq attack.⁶³ If they were intended to serve as a firewall protecting Tashkent and Mā warā al-nahr from the nomadic north, they did a bad job of it. Khans might have done better instead to pool their resources and simply strengthen Tashkent's garrison.

As it was, the logistical costs of operating in the Dasht-i Qipchāq were considerable, and khans found it increasingly difficult to maintain authority there. In 1616 Walī Muḥammad's successor Imām Qulī was only able to expel the Qazaq prince Abūlāy from Sawrān with the assistance of Tursūn, Abūlāy's Qazaq rival,⁶⁴ and from the middle of the century Bukharan rulers were resigned to the fact that Sayrām was firmly in Qazaq hands.⁶⁵ Because the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds evidently deemed it a mark of pride to maintain rule in the Dasht-i Qipchāq, these must have been wounding setbacks. The khan therefore attempted wherever possible to conceal his weakness by maintaining the fiction that autonomous parties exercised authority on his behalf. When Imām Qulī Khan learned that the Qazaqs had advanced

over the Legal and Fiscal Status of Land in the Manghit Emirate of Bukhara", in *Central Asian Survey* 29 (2010), 33–42 [36].

⁶³ Several scholars claim that all lands north of the Syr Darya were subject to Qazaq rule for most of the seventeenth century; thus A.P. Chuloshnikov, "K istorii feodal'nykh otnoshenii v Kazakhstane XVII–XVIII vv.", in *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR* 1936.3, 497–524 [499]; (Togan), "La littérature Kazakh", 743; Sh.B. Chimitdorzhiev, *Vzaimootnosheniia Mongolii i Srednei Azii v XVII–XVIII vv.* (Moscow, 1979), 21.

⁶⁴ V.A. Moiseev, *Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII–XVIII vv.* (Alma-Ata, 1991), 25.

⁶⁵ DeWeese, "Sacred History for a Central Asian Town", 252.

as far as Tashkent, he tacitly decided not to offer resistance and instead 'appointed' Tursūn to govern the city.⁶⁶ This face-saving arrangement only lasted for about a year, however, before Tursūn began issuing coinage in his own name and hatched plans to invade Samarqand.⁶⁷ Provoked into battle, Imām Qulī was able to vanquish him,⁶⁸ but not before an initial Bukharan defeat raised the spectre of central Mā warā al-nahr itself passing into Qazaq hands. For much of the rest of the century, Tashkent remained in a state of limbo between Qazaq and Tūqāy-Tīmūrid control.

By abandoning their claims to the Dasht-i Qipchāq, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids might have freed up resources for governing regions whose control might be of greater utilitarian benefit. One such region was the famously fertile Fergana valley, control of whose extensive agricultural resources would have been a boon to treasury coffers. Although the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids always claimed to govern the region,⁶⁹ their presence was largely nominal. Like 'Abdallāh before them, they spent little time there. In fact, it was a coalition of locally established Naqshbandī *khwājahs* and Turco-Mongolian tribesmen which exercised meaningful authority throughout the region, to the extent that in the early eighteenth century the coalition was able to establish full regional independence.⁷⁰ Another such region was Khwārazm, which like Fergana was agriculturally wealthy and weakly defended, and where 'Abdallāh had similarly shown little more than opportunistic interest. He first campaigned there in 1576, when he briefly captured Hazārasp from the 'Arabshāhids Pūlād and Tīmūr;⁷¹ but he then withdrew to Mā warā al-nahr,

⁶⁶ IQN 138a–b, in a passage entitled *Durust kardan-i Tursūn Muḥammad [...] dar inqiyād-i khāqān-i gīti-satān wa wālī shudan-i ū dar wilāyat-i Tāshkand wa Turkistān wa mukhālifāt bih ḥadrat-i khān karrat-i thāni*; for other such Qazaq 'appointments', see e.g. *Silsalā* 185a.

⁶⁷ IQN 138a: *pay-i khuṭbah wa sikkahash shud bih jān [...]*; discussion in B. Kochnev, "Les Relations entre Astrakhanides, khans kazaks et 'Arabshahides (dernières données numismatiques)", in *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* 3–4 (1997), 157–167 [160].

⁶⁸ IQN 143a–147a; BA 106b–108a.

⁶⁹ See e.g. statements in IOSASU *Cheklar* no. 33 lines 23–24 and no. 11 lines 47–48, reproduced in Chekhovich and A.K. Arends, *Dokumenty k istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii v bukharskom khanstve XVII–XIX vv.* vol.1., *Акты феодальной собственности на землю XVII–XIX vv.* (Tashkent, 1954), 16 and 58.

⁷⁰ Beisembiev, *Tarikh-i Shahrukhi kak istoricheskii istochnik* (Alma-Ata, 1987), 10–12; H.N. Bababekov, "Fergana and the Khanate of Kokand", in C. Adle, I. Habib and K.M. Baipakov (eds.), *History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Volume V—Development in Contrast: from the Sixteenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Paris, 2003), 71–81 [72–73].

⁷¹ RR 222b–223b; *ShT* 255; discussion in Veselovskii, *Ocherk istoriko-geograficheskikh svendenii o khivinskom khanstva ot drevneishikh vremen do nastoiashchogo* (St Petersburg, 1877), 123, dating events to 1575.

not to make another attempt on the region for eighteen years, when, exploiting internal instabilities, he dispatched Khwājam Qulī Qalmāq to establish Bukharan rule.⁷² When imperial holdings came under threat, furthermore, ‘Abdallāh’s response indicated that he set higher store by his northern possessions than by the lands to the west. Confronted with the news in 1597 that Qazaqs were agitating in the Dasht-i Qipchāq at the same time as the exiled ‘Arabshāhid rulers were attempting their own Khwārazmian restoration, ‘Abdallāh opted to dispatch forces north, not west.⁷³ This may simply have been a pragmatic move: whereas Khwārazm is separated from central Mā warā al-nahr by hundreds of miles of desert, the Dasht-i Qipchāq commands easy access to Samarqand via Tashkent, and the Qazaq challenge probably represented the greater existential threat to the empire *in toto*. By perpetually deferring to ‘Abdallāh’s example, however, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids undercut their own freedom for making any such pragmatic calculations themselves. They were hamstrung by the fact that a commitment towards upholding ‘Abdallāh’s legacy effectively prevented them from pursuing the grubbier necessities of *raison d’état*.

The Balkh Problem

In 1582, ‘Abdallāh appointed his son ‘Abd al-Mu’min to govern Balkh.⁷⁴ ‘Abd al-Mu’min thereafter retained control of the city as his centre of activities until he acceded to khalif office in spring 1598. Over these sixteen years, Balkh became ‘normalised’ as the seat of the khan’s expected successor. Largely as a result of Bāqī Muḥammad’s actions, Balkh continued to constitute a *de facto* khalif court-in-waiting throughout much of the seventeenth century, with widely disruptive consequences.

In 1600, Bāqī Muḥammad appointed his brother Walī Muḥammad to Balkh authority (see above, p. 174), so that Balkh was again the seat of the expected ruler-in-waiting. Certainly, Walī Muḥammad would have struck most contemporaries as by far the likeliest candidate to succeed his brother. Bāqī Muḥammad had a son called ‘Abdallāh or ‘Ibādallāh, of course, but

⁷² RS 518a–541a; TĀĀ’A 463–464; TSR 187b; ShT 268–269; discussion in Gündoğdu, “Hive Hanlıği Tarihi”, 119; Veselovskii, *Ocherk istoriko-geograficheskikh svedeniĭ*, 124.

⁷³ For ‘Abdallāh’s northern campaign, see TĀ 164, following FH 24b–25a (see above, p. 237). For the ‘Arabshāhid reconquest of Khwārazm, see TĀĀ’A 522–523 (see above, p. 274 n. 60) and ShT 271–273, with discussion in Gündoğdu, “Hive Hanlıği Tarihi”, 127.

⁷⁴ MB 328; RS 434a instead dates the appointment to ca. 1584.

with this individual still an infant⁷⁵ the prospect of primogenitural succession was remote; at the same time, incipient tensions with his ($x = 2$) relatives Raḥman Qulī Sultan and ‘Abbās Sultan (see above, pp. 175–176) suggested that there was little likelihood of succession passing to an ($x > 1$) kinsmen. In the *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*, Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī suggests that Bāqī Muḥammad went so far as to appoint Walī Muḥammad as his *qa’lkhān*:⁷⁶ the terminology here is somewhat obscure, but ‘*qa’lkhān*’ appears to be a cognate of ‘*kagalgā*’, meaning a designated or anticipated successor.⁷⁷ Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Munshī is of course writing here with hindsight: but it is likely that even before Walī Muḥammad subsequently acceded to the khalal title, many observers would have regarded Balkh as the place *where the future khan lived*.

This perception of Balkh received ever greater support over the course of the seventeenth century. As Nadir Muḥammad’s gubernatorial base during much of his and Imām Qulī’s protracted struggle against Walī Muḥammad, Balkh was very much midwife to the post-1611 khalal regime (see above, pp. 246–247), and by the reign of Imām Qulī himself it had become conventional practice for the ruling Bukharan khan to appoint his *kagalgā* to Balkhi authority. It was Nadir Muḥammad’s seat during Imām Qulī’s reign,⁷⁸ that of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz during Nadir Muḥammad’s,⁷⁹ and Subḥān Qulī’s during the rule of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz.⁸⁰ The consequences of this development were far-reaching. In some ways, the Balkhi *kagalgā* arrangement offered visible structural advantages both to the Bukharan incumbent and to a wider subject population. Khans were able to plan for the succession of a designated kinsman with much greater security than was possible in the sixteenth century, for instance. Years as *kagalgā* enabled the designated successor to build up over time the necessary means for pressing home his claim to Bukharan khalal authority. Not only did this reduce that threat of losing out to dynastic interlopers which had dogged his Abū’l-Khayrid predeces-

⁷⁵ The boy’s mother, Ay Khānum bint ‘Ibādallāh Sultan bint Iskandar, was the widow first of ‘Abd al-Mu’min, then of the Qazaq Īshim Khan and then of Pīr Muḥammad (*SilSal* 178a–b); she must thus have married Bāqī Muḥammad in or after 1599. She subsequently married Walī Muḥammad, and then Imām Qulī. It perhaps comes as little surprise to read (*ibid.*, 178a) that she was extremely beautiful: *zanī būd kih dar Mā warā al-nahr bih nikū-rū’i ‘adil nadāsh*t.

⁷⁶ *TMKh* 124.

⁷⁷ J. Matuz, “Qalḡa”, in *Turcica* 2 (1970), 103–129.

⁷⁸ *SilSal* 185a: Nadir Muḥammad as ‘*qa’lkhān*’.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 210b. Nadir Muḥammad had originally appointed him to Samarqand: *ibid.*, 203b.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 263a.

sors, but the consequently-decreased scope for intra-familial contestation reduced the likely transaction costs of political shift (see above, pp. 151–152).

But Balkh's transition into a khalal court-in-waiting came at a heavy cost. Most obviously, it resulted in Balkh's becoming ever more alienated from the khalal metropole. This process is best recounted in Robert McChesney's history of the 'Alid shrine at Mazār-i Sharīf. McChesney painstakingly illustrates how the seventeenth century witnessed a process of bifurcation, whereby the locus of political authority transferred from a monarchical khalal actor to the twin actors of Bukharan khan and Balkhi *kagalgā*. McChesney's account traces the consequences of this shift upon Balkh itself, and offers an archaeology for subsequent Balkhi 'independence' during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁸¹ But McChesney fails to consider the effects which this shift had on the workings of political authority throughout the rest of the khanate. The alienation of Balkh caused khalal authority to become much weaker than it had been in the late sixteenth century. Most obviously, the authority of the khan became territorially constrained, rather as it had been under the appanage system. The *kagalgā*'s increasingly sovereign authority in the Balkh region undermined the Bukharan khan's ability to enforce Balkhi mobilisation, for instance, and any khan wishing to raise an army found himself depending on the *kagalgā*'s goodwill. This was a risky business. Nadir Muḥammad, for example, was distinctly capricious in his responses to appeals for assistance from Imām Qulī. In 1613 he hurried north with an army to help defeat a Qazaq-sponsored rebellion in the Fergana valley.⁸² But in 1621 he demurred when Imām Qulī again sought his assistance against the khanate's northern neighbours.⁸³ Such constraints to authority again undermined people's clientelist and inertial loyalties. They reduced the utilitarian benefits accruing from trans-empire traffic flows (see above, pp. 132–137) and a centralised resource base (pp. 137–139), and exacerbated the difficulty of trying to generate inertially-bound direct stakeholders in the established regime.

⁸¹ McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, 85–126, 149–169.

⁸² *IQN* 112b–113a; *BA* 103a, 108b; *SilSal* 186a–188a. See however *T'ĀĀ'A* 865, claiming that Nadir Muḥammad initially resisted Imām Qulī's appeals since Rustam b. Wali Muḥammad was active near Balkh, and might attack the city if it were left ungarrisoned. Discussion in Burton, "Nadir Muḥammad Khān—Ruler of Bukhara (1641–1645) and Balkh (1645–1651)", in *Central Asiatic Journal* 32 (1988), 19–33 [21].

⁸³ *T'ĀĀ'A* 962–963.

The problem was not just that Balkh increasingly broke away from the rest of the empire, however. It was also that Balkh *kagalgā* regimes actively undermined successive Bukharan regimes. As the place 'where the future khan lived', Balkh served throughout the seventeenth century as an 'anti-Versailles': a spatial node, that is, where parties which were hostile to the present Bukharan regime might gather in the hope of precipitating its replacement. In the sixteenth-century, all but three Abū'l-Khayrid khans died peacefully while still on the throne; following the dubious circumstances of Bāqī Muḥammad's death (see above, p. 246), by contrast, not until Subḥān Qulī Khan in 1702 did a single Tūqāy-Timūrid die peacefully in office. Actors based in and around Balkh helped hasten the end of four successive Bukharan khalid regimes. Having participated in the coalition which forced Walī Muḥammad to flee to Isfahan in 1611, Balkhi actors were then instrumental in provoking the abdication of khans Imām Qulī, Nadir Muḥammad and 'Abd al-'Azīz. All three of these later rulers claimed that the reason for abdicating was that they wished to perform the *ḥajj*.⁸⁴ This may have been true. But lots of pious rulers might have wished to perform the *ḥajj* in earlier decades, yet refrained from abdicating in order to do so. Over the mid-seventeenth century, going on the *ḥajj* became a conventionalised face-saving expedient which allowed embattled Bukharan rulers to stand down rather than face the higher existential costs of defying the challenges posed by *kagalgās* and their Balkh-based challenger regimes.

Imām Qulī's abdication illustrates this rationale. The formal reason for Imām Qulī's abdication was that he was going blind, which apparently meant that he was no longer able to fulfil the responsibilities of the khalid office.⁸⁵ Such sentiments may come as a surprise. After all, several Abū'l-Khayrid dynasts had held authority in the sixteenth century despite congenital shortcomings which constituted much greater impediments to delivering the benefits of leadership. According to most late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century authors, for instance, the otherworldly Iskandar Khan⁸⁶ had for instance, had never displayed any particular capacity for exe-

⁸⁴ *KhS* 291–294, *NJM* 259a, *MaṭT* 122b, *TQKh* 272b, *SilSal* 201a–202a (Imām Qulī); *TMKh* 170, *SilSal* 264b (Nadir Muḥammad); *TQKh* 278a, *TMKh* 178, *SilSal* 289b ('Abd al-'Azīz). For discussion of the claim that Walī Muḥammad headed west to perform the *ḥajj* see above, p. 36 n. 37.

⁸⁵ *Chashm-i jahān-bīn-i Imām Qulī Khān az binā'ī mānd*: *TQKh* 272a.

⁸⁶ See e.g. *MAḥ* 4, on Iskandar's close association with members of the Naqshbandiyah and how, by his tireless spiritual questing, he fulfilled Ghijduwānī's precept of *safar dar*

cuting his khalal duties, yet safely remained on the Bukharan throne for the rest of his days. But things had changed by the mid-seventeenth century. 'Abdallāh had bequeathed his successors a widely expanded conception of the responsibilities incumbent on any khalal ruler (see above, p. 140), with the result that clientelist loyalty was a more valuable commodity in the seventeenth century than it had been in the sixteenth. At the same time, however, deference to 'Abdallāh's example made it increasingly difficult for successive Tūqāy-Timūrid incumbents to perform their responsibilities adequately. Khalal authority's consequently weakened scope for offering utilitarian advantage made it ever more difficult for incumbents to draw upon people's clientelist loyalties, particularly since the empowered position of the Balkhi *kagalgā* meant that as soon as an incumbent experienced failure there was always a ready candidate to do the job instead. What provoked Imām Qulī's abdication, therefore, was that declining faculties impeded his ability to maintain that he was better placed than his Balkhi *kagalgā* Nadir Muḥammad to execute khalal authority. With little purchase on people's charismatic, inertial or local loyalties, he evidently realised that abdication would be a sensible move.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, a khan was not necessarily khan for life. The decades after Bāqī Muḥammad's reign saw successive Tūqāy-Timūrid incumbents suffer from a progressive weakening of the loyalties they enjoyed, to the extent that their reigns became sequentially untenable. The behaviour of Imām Qulī and his successors illustrates how khalal authority had become a privilege, whose exercise required constant justification. Incumbents had to keep bidding for loyalty throughout their reigns; and as part of this process they took to telling stories about who they were, and what qualities entitled them to remain in authority. Primarily, of course, this involved emphasising their own personal virtues. Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī wrote the *Baḥr al-asrār* at the court of Nadir Muḥammad, for instance, and went to particular pains to establish which virtues supposedly distinguished his patron over other Tūqāy-Timūrid kinsmen. But

waṭan (*bih sharaf-i tawbah wa mutāba'at-i silsilah-yi sharīfah-yi khwājagān* [...] *bih sunnat-i nabawī musharraf gashṭah* [...] *musāfir-i rūḥ dar waṭan-i tan bih qadm-i sulūk rafī' namūdah* [...] *ma'nī-yi safar dar waṭan-rā muḥayyā misākht*). Ḥājji Mir Muḥammad Salim, who usually draws upon the *Tārīkh-i 'ālam-ārā-yi 'Abbāsī* as his source narrative, substantially copies Nithārī's afore-mentioned account in *SilSal* 123b–124a. See also *MB* 202, referring to Iskandar as a *khān-i darwish-nishān*, and 203, noting how he devoted his time to *mujālasat wa mukhālaṭat bā ahl-i 'ilm wa 'arīfān wa arbāb-i faḍl wa ifāq wa aṣḥāb-i zuhd wa qur'ān*. For further comments see above, p. 128 n. 188.

the process of bidding for loyalty also involved establishing a genealogical archaeology, allowing actors to contextualise their own claimed virtues alongside the more conventionally recognised virtues of their forefathers. Over the course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, therefore, accounts of a Tūqāy-Timūrid family past culminating in the takeover of 1598–1605 became an ever-more important stock element in people's discursive repertoires.

Substantive Qualities, and Virtue

The *Baḥr al-asrār* is just one of several late works from the mid-seventeenth century onwards whose accounts of what supposedly happened before 1598 make sense only in the light of events occurring subsequently. Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī's above-cited rendering of the 'Māngishlāq episode' exemplifies the wider tendency of authors to situate plainly apocryphal elements into their sixteenth-century narratives. In one important way, however, the 'Māngishlāq episode' is an oddity. Rather as in the Biblical story of Jacob and Esau, it suggests that Māngishlāq used trickery in order to receive Iskan-dar's tacit authorisation to rule. By contrast, most other such retrojected 'portent narratives' instead tell how pre-1598 Tūqāy-Timūrid actors accumulated repute by displaying particularly attractive qualities.

Sometimes these stories tell how an actor attracted attention through his *substantive qualities*: those qualities accruing, that is, from his personal skills and dispositions. As noted in chapter 1, even before 1598 several stories were circulating about the 'substantive qualities' of Bāqī Muḥammad and his brothers. But only from the mid-seventeenth century onwards is there evidence that authors sought to derive utility by retrojecting such qualities to Bāqī Muḥammad's forefathers. The *Imām Qulī-nāmah* offers an early instance of this practice, according programmatic epithets to ancestors of the work's protagonist. One forefather is described as "a shah possessed of justice and rectitude",⁸⁷ a second as "shāhanshāh of the world and the heavens",⁸⁸ a third as "the Faridūn of the age, unequalled in his time",⁸⁹ and a fourth as a "blessed Khusraw, a shah from the world's line of pious

⁸⁷ Tūqāy Timūr b. Jūchī, who *shahī būd paywastah dar 'adl wa dād*: IQN 12b.

⁸⁸ Tumghān (here Tūmghāy) b. Abāy, as *shāhanshāh-i gūti wa gardūn*: ibid., 13a.

⁸⁹ Timūr Bik b. Qutlugh Timūr, who *Faridūn-i zamān būd wa yaktā-yi 'aṣr*: ibid. Faridūn was a legendary king of Iran who appears in the *Shāh-nāmah*: see A. Tafazzoli, "Fērēdūn", in *Elr* IX (1999), 531–533.

rulers",⁹⁰ all of these accolades doubtless redounding to the credit of Imām Qulī himself.

Later narratives, meanwhile, seem to have been at pains to valorise particular qualities which sponsors specifically wished to claim for themselves. They suggested that such qualities were those which, manifested by an ancestor, had allowed pre-1598 observers to foresee the Tūqāy-Timūrid family's subsequent success. The theme of prediction is thus a common trope in these narratives. This would have been rather a novelty in the seventeenth century, since predictive tropes had featured only rarely in Abū'l-Khayrid-era historical works. They had, however, been a long-running commonplace in earlier hagiographical narrative.⁹¹ The *Majālis-i 'Ubaydallāh Ahrār* of ca. 1500 relates how Ahrār's grandfather Khwājah Shihāb al-Dīn vowed that the young boy should subsequently become an *'ālam-gīr* (conqueror of the universe),⁹² and the *Ḍiyā al-qulūb* tells how Kāsānī similarly foresaw Ishāq's future greatness.⁹³ The Jūybārid-focused *Sa'dīyah*, meanwhile, tells how people were able to predict the future greatness of the young Muḥammad Islām, whose contemplative nature even as a child struck many observers.⁹⁴ The adult Muḥammad Islām was himself supposedly able to predict the achievements of others. Hagiographies relate how, when hunting in the desert with Iskandar Khan, Muḥammad Islām predicted to Iskandar that his son 'Abdallāh would be a great ruler. The wonder of this prediction, we read, was that Muḥammad Islām was speaking at the very moment when 'Abdallāh was born.⁹⁵

One such portent narrative featuring this predictive trope appears in a brief anonymous history of the Abū'l-Khayrids and Tūqāy-Timūrids, composed some time after ca. 1650. The following passage explains why Iskandar Khan decided to marry his daughter off to Bāqī Muḥammad's grandfather Yār Muḥammad.

Iskandar Khan said: 'I am going to give my daughter to somebody who is both a learned man and a ruler.' Yār Muḥammad possessed a share of all kinds

⁹⁰ Tīmūr Qutluḡ b. Tīmūr Bik, as *Khusraw-i kāmrān / az khānān-i dāndār-i 'ālam-i madār*: ibid.

⁹¹ For predictions in hagiographical narrative see also above, p. 231.

⁹² *Nazarhā kardah-and wa sar wa rū-yi ma-rā dīdah-and wa guftah kih "Īn pisar-i man 'ālam-gīr shawad"*: *M'UA* 238.

⁹³ *DQ* 5b.

⁹⁴ *Sa'dīyah* 10a–11b.

⁹⁵ *RR* 56b–57a; also *Maṭṭ* 58b, on how Muḥammad Islām *farmūdand kih "Khudā-yi ta'ālā bih shumā pisari dād kih pādīshāh-i kalān khwāhad shud wa iqlīm dar zir-i farmān-i ū khwāhad shud"*.

of intellectual accomplishment, and particularly of the written word. People said, 'Whatever you seek will be attainable for you.' Iskandar Khan gave him his daughter, and from her two sons and one daughter were born.⁹⁶

Better knowledge of which late-seventeenth-century actors similarly cast themselves as masters 'of all kinds of intellectual accomplishment' might offer an idea of who could have derived utility from promulgating this plainly embroidered narrative. Even without such information, however, the passage clearly contrasts with the likes of Qarākulī's reconstructed *Bāqī-nāmah*. This is not a story where the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds accede to power as a result of Bāqī Muḥammad's actions alone. Rather, it is a story where Yār Muḥammad's gifts were a token of future success, where the Jānī-Bīkid marriage alliance was a precursor to later triumphs, and where the takeover was heavily foreshadowed long before Bāqī Muḥammad was born.

The above passage is not purely predictive, of course. It suggests that Yār Muḥammad came to Iskandar's attention because the qualities which he displayed were qualities which Iskandar valued. In the *Silsilat al-salāṭīn*, Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm similarly suggests that Yār Muḥammad's personal qualities marked him out in the eyes of his Abū'l-Khayrid contemporaries. This is particularly clear in a passage relating what supposedly happened when Yār Muḥammad and Iskandar Khan first met. Iskandar immediately warmed to his newly arrived guest, we read, and proposed that they should make common cause.

[One day] Iskandar Khan came to Yār Muḥammad. He spoke the following. "Given that matters in this world are contingent on mutual affection and concord, it stands to reason that when people's interests are united they easily advance. Think of me, therefore, as your younger brother, and as your supporter and assistant: and let us, in accordance with our desires, prioritise those things which demand our mutual support, and become colleagues and allies in our respective plans of conquest." [...] Finally Yār Muḥammad with his truthful tongue replied to this last, speaking as follows. "Now that old age has caught up with me, I am no longer possessed of physical ability, and the ways of contemplation and retreat have become attractive to me. Every day I wish more and more therefore to devote myself to contemplative retirement, and to cut loose my attachments to titular authority. I shall begin my path toward the inevitable world of the spirit, in pursuit of that true aim and fundamental desire which deserves to be the goal of all high-minded people:

⁹⁶ *Iskandar Khān mīguft kih "Man dukhtar-i khūd-rā bar kasī mīdādām kih mullā mīshud ham pādishāh."* *Yār Muḥammad Khān az jam'-i 'ilm bahrah dāsht, khuṣūṣan az 'ilm-i raqam. Mardum guftand kih "Ān-chih mītalabīd muyassar shud."* *Iskandar Khān dukhtar-i khūd-rā dād, az ū dū pisar, yak dukhtar shud*: Morley 162 28a. The grammar in this passage is highly unconventional.

and I shall devote myself to the worship of our creator being." When Iskandar Khan saw that that glorious khan had fully withdrawn from the business of government, and was devoting himself to the life of the *darwīsh*, he made *suyūrghāls* of several flourishing villages over the territory of the khanate and gave them to him, that he might use their revenues to supply him with the necessities of life, and that it might be in a state of physical comfort that he could devote himself to seeking the favour of almighty God.⁹⁷

The most obvious function of this passage is to suggest that Yār Muḥammad possessed the same sort of moral dignity as that widely attributed elsewhere (see above, p. 280 n. 86) to Iskandar himself. In having Yār Muḥammad explicitly disavow any pretensions to political power, Ḥājji Mīr Muḥammad Salīm appears to be redressing the way in which the Tūqāy-Timūrid dynasty was depicted by several earlier chroniclers. We already encountered above (p. 176) the claim found in two mid seventeenth-century Mughal chronicles that Yār Muḥammad was a vainglorious individual whose political ambitions led to a deterioration in relations with Bāqī Muḥammad, and his own removal from the *salṭanat-i šūrī*; even in the *Baḥr al-asrār*, meanwhile, Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī—who, as we shall see, is in general as avid a Tūqāy-Timūrid cheerleader as anyone—notes at several points that Yār Muḥammad's character traits made him a figure of some suspicion for Iskandar Khan and the other Abū'l-Khayrids, who were reluctant to trust him with authority.⁹⁸ In claiming that, on the contrary, relations between Yār Muḥammad and Iskandar Khan were characterised by a mutual

⁹⁷ *Iskandar Khān pīsh-i Yār Muḥammad Khān tashrifāwurdah farmūd kih "Chūn dar 'ālam asbāb muwāfaqat-i aḥbāb-i yak-jihat wa abwāb muṭābaqat-i barādarān-i hawā-khwāh, amr-i ḡarūrī-st kih kārhā-yi bastah bih āsānī kushādah kard; wa aknūn mā-rā barādar-i khūrd-i khūd taṣawwur kardah mumidd wa mu'ayyam-i khūd dānand: bih mīnmat bar jān-i khūd nihādah ān-chih sharā'it-i imdād wa lawāzim-i i'ānat wa istis'ād būdah bāshad bar ḥasab-i arzū [sic] bih taqdīm rasānīdah dar mulk-gīrī-yi ham-dīgar sharik wa anbāz bāshīm."* [...] *Bī'l-ākhir Yār Muḥammad dar pāsukh zabān-i ḥaqīqat bayān kushād wa guft: "Aknūn ayyān-i pīrī man-rā dar yajtah quwā-yi jismānī-yi man az ḥarakat mādah wa asbāb-i tajarrud wa mawādd-i tafarrud bī taraddud māysarat shudah, rūz bih rūz dar tazāyudāt mikhwāhīm kih kūshah-yi inziyā ikhtiyār kardah qat'-i ta'alluq-yi salṭanat-i šūrī namūdah qadam dar rāh-i wilāyat-i ma'nawī-yi ḡarūrī zadah mutawajjih-i maḡsad-i ḥaqīqī wa maṭlab-i aṣlī kih ṭalab-i arbāb-i ḥimmat-rā sazāwar tawānad būd bih parastash [xxx] bī-hamtā'ī purdāzam."* *Chūn Iskandar Khān dīd kih ān khān-i sa'adat-nishān tamām wa bih-kamāl dast az salṭanat shustah bih kār-i darwīshī purdāzad az nawāḥī-yi mamlakat chand mawāḡī-i ma'mūrah-rā sūrghāl [sic] kardah bih ū tafwīḡ namūd kih maḡsūlāt-i ān-rā ṣarf bih 'ayshat-i khūd kardah fāriḡ al-bāl dar gird-āwari-yi riḡā-yi īzid-i muta'al takāpū'i wa just-wa-jū'i namāyad: SilSal 125a-b.*

⁹⁸ *Banā bar ān Iskandar Khān wa awlād wa aḥfād-i amjadash az ū mustash'ir gashtah az tafwīḡ-i azimmat-i ḥukūmat-i bilād [wa] dā'iyah-yi sarūrī-yi 'Ibād bih kaf-i kifāyat rutbat-i khān-i mushār ilayhi abā wa imtinā' mīnamūdand: BA 39a.*

selflessness and warmth, Ḥājjī Mir Muḥammad Salīm would appear to be offering a direct rejoinder to the 17th-century chronicler.

But Ḥājjī Mir Muḥammad Salīm may be doing something more here than simply resurrecting Yār Muḥammad's reputation. By emphasising how Yār Muḥammad wished to devote himself to 'contemplative retirement', the author may well be fostering deliberate echoes with events in the mid-seventeenth century, when successive Tūqāy-Timūrid incumbents similarly abdicated from authority. Whether trying to save face after having abdicated oneself or trying to hasten the abdication of one's rival, a mid-seventeenth-century actor could have derived considerable utility from circulating the account of this sixteenth-century 'precedent' for his own actions. Disseminating such an ethically-constitutive story about one's forefather would have offered several harried Tūqāy-Timūrids a useful means of engraining their behaviour in people's wider conceptions of the good.

Embodied Qualities, and Status

The second kind of portent narratives found in mid-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century works are those relating how Tūqāy-Timūrid actors acquired repute in the pre-1598 period by dint of their *embodied qualities*: the status accruing from who they were, that is, rather than from what they were capable of. This second category of portent narrative was much the clearer mid-seventeenth-century innovation. No extant late-sixteenth-century source ascribes any value to the fact of Bāqī Muḥammad's Tūqāy-Timūrid descent, and there is no evidence that this descent was presented as a particular virtue in Qarākulī's *Bāqī-nāmāh* narrative. Even the epithets (see above, pp. 282–283) which Suhaylā accords Imām Qulī's ancestors in the *Imām Qulī-nāmāh* suggest that these individuals were distinguished by their personal qualities rather than by the fact of their ancestry. Until the mid-seventeenth century, the Tūqāy-Timūrid *nasab* carried little eminence. Thereafter, however, this began to change, as authors tried to turn the quality of 'Tūqāy-Timūrid-ness' into an autonomous constitutive virtue.

This was not an easy thing to do. Throughout the sixteenth century, people's charismatic loyalties had been directed towards the Shībānid line, whose members were quite distinct from the genealogically distant Tūqāy-Timūrid family. Not only were the Tūqāy-Timūrids widely recognised to be distinct from their Shībānid cousins, but they were also regarded as substantially inferior. This comes across clearly in a passage from *Tārīkh-i Dūst Sulṭān*, a Turkic-language work composed in a Khwārazm in ca. 1555. According to Ūtamīsh Ḥājjī, "the descendents of Shībān Khan assume a posi-

tion of superiority in their dealings with the [Tūqāy-Timūrid] descendents of Tuqtāmish Khan, Timūr Qutluḡ and Urus Khan.⁹⁹ The passage gives three reasons for this. The first is that Chingīz supposedly admired Shībān much more than he did his other grandson Tūqāy Timūr, giving Shībān sovereign authority over his own *yurt* and not even giving Tūqāy Timūr a single wagon. Secondly, popular tradition during the history of the Golden Horde remembered Shībān as the more distinguished warrior, with a reputation for ravaging enemy nations. The third reason relates to events in the mid-fourteenth century, when the line of Golden Horde rulers descended from Bātū b. Jūchī came to an end. The grandmother of the last Bātū'id incumbent

decided that khal authority in that country should pass to the line of Shībān Khan's offspring. She went and brought out Khiḡr Khan, the son of Manqutāy, and elevated him as khal in the *wilāyat* of Sarāy. "After the descendents of Şāyin Khan, authority over that khal seat passed to us", [the Shībānids] say.¹⁰⁰

During the seventeenth century, authors writing for successive Tūqāy-Timūrid rulers sought to challenge this barrage of prevailing attitudes. Maḡmūd b. Amīr Walī recorded the most ambitious attempt to redeem the Tūqāy-Timūrid family from the sort of preconceptions recorded by Ūtamīsh Ḥājjī. The *Baḡr al-asrār* is scarcely hostile to the Abū'l-Khayrids, of course; the work's penultimate volume sees the author as well-disposed to 'Abdallāh II as is Muḡammad Yār Qaṭaḡhan in the *Musakḡkḡhir al-bilād*.¹⁰¹ But a painstaking Tūqāy-Timūrid genealogical archaeology at the start of the final volume then allows Maḡmūd b. Amīr Walī both to cast the quality of 'Tūqāy-Timūrid-ness' as a constitutive virtue and to identify which members of this dynastic line display this quality best.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ *Shībān Kān ūḡhlānlārī Tukhtamish* [sic] *Khān bilā Timūr Qutlī* [sic] *wa Ūrus Khān ūḡhlānlārīḡhah fakhr qilib maqtānūrlār*: TDS 38b.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 38b–39a: *Jān Bik Khānning anāsi Tāy Duwālī Bīḡim imdi "Yurtaqī khānlīq Shībān Khān ūḡhlānlārīḡhah takār" tīb Manqutāy ūḡhlī Khiḡr Khānnī ūndā yitib iltib Sarāy wilāyatīndah khān qildi. "Şāyin Khān ūḡhlānlārīndīn sūḡ ul khān takhtīndah khānlīq bizḡa takkāndūr" tirlār.*

¹⁰¹ See e.g. BA 7418 340a, for the exalted titulature accorded 'Abdallāh.

¹⁰² The contents of this archaeology are overlooked in several studies of Chingīzid genealogies, including Allsen, "The Princes of the Left Hand: an Introduction to the History of the *Ulus* of Orda in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries", in *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 5 (1985), 5–40, Iskhakov, "O rodoslovnoi khana Ulug-Mukhammeda", and Zaitsev, "Obrazovanie Astrakhanskogo khanstva".

One obvious move towards the first aim was to make the figure of Tūqāy Timūr a more eminent personage than hitherto depicted. From the fourteenth century onwards, Tūqāy Timūr had commonly been portrayed in works such as the *Tārīkh-i Dūst Sultān* as one of Jūchī's more insignificant offspring, paling beside Shībān. In Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, for instance, Shībān is a prominent participant in Jūchī's western campaigns,¹⁰³ while Tūqāy Timūr achieves little of note. With the early-sixteenth-century establishment of Shībānid dynasties in Greater Mā warā al-nahr and Khwārazm, it became especially common practice for authors working under these regimes to emphasise Shībān's particular qualities. In the *Zubdat al-āthār*, 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad Naṣrallāh claims that Shībān was both wiser and braver than any of Jūchī's other sons,¹⁰⁴ while Abū'l-Ghāzī's *Shajarat-i turk* relates how Jūchī recognised these qualities by giving Shībān sovereign authority over fifteen thousand families.¹⁰⁵ In the *Baḥr al-asrār*, Maḥmūd turns these traditions upside down by suggesting that it was instead Tūqāy Timūr who was the more distinguished descendent. Whereas the *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh* claims that Tūqāy Timūr was Jūchī's thirteenth son, and Shībān his fifth,¹⁰⁶ the *Baḥr al-asrār* presents Tūqāy Timūr as the fourth of Jūchī's sons, and thus Shībān's senior sibling.¹⁰⁷ As though by way of a rejoinder to 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad Naṣrallāh's claim in the *Zubdat al-āthār*, Maḥmūd furthermore states that it was Tūqāy Timūr, rather than Shībān, who "was distinguished over all other Jūchid sultans in matters of religion, generosity and bravery".¹⁰⁸ He proceeds then to ascribe to Tūqāy Timūr a political and military career befitting his newfound seniority. As a rejoinder to widely circulating stories about Shībān's pre-eminence, Maḥmūd relates how Tūqāy Timūr took the lead in campaigns against the Bāshqurd (Bashkirs) and the Ās (Alans); he also claims that Tūqāy Timūr converted to Islam together with Barkah Khan b. Jūchī.¹⁰⁹ This latter is a clever gambit. Authors widely regarded Barkah's conversion as the 'opening move' in Central Eurasia's post-conquest process of (re)Islamisation,¹¹⁰

¹⁰³ *JT* (Rashid al-Dīn) II.325–327.

¹⁰⁴ *Shībān Khān, kih a'qal wa ashja' i ikhwān irdi [...]*: ZĀ 471b.

¹⁰⁵ *Shībān Khānghah jūldūk tīb un bīsh mīng iylīk il bīrdi*: *ShT* 181.

¹⁰⁶ *JT* (Rashid al-Dīn) II.354.

¹⁰⁷ *BA* 3a.

¹⁰⁸ *Tūqāy Timūr kih az sār salātin-i Jūchī-Khāni bih marāsīm-i diyānat wa sakhāwat wa shajā' at imtiyāz-i tamām dāsh*: *ibid.*, 6a.

¹⁰⁹ *Tūqāy Timūr Khān maṣḥūb-i Barkah Khān bih sharaf-i Islām musharraf gasht*: *ibid.*, 3a. Earlier accounts of Barkah's conversion (e.g. *NA* XXVII.357) do not mention Tūqāy Timūr.

¹¹⁰ J. Richard, "La Conversion de Berke et les débuts de l' Islamisation de la Horde d' Or", in

and by situating Tūqāy Timūr within this narrative Maḥmūd is able to strengthen the inherited Islamic credentials of Tūqāy Timūr's subsequent descendants.

Whereas Shībānid-sponsored narratives claim that Shībān alone received a *yurt* from Chingīz Khan, the *Baḥr al-asrār* now seeks to establish that it was actually the Tūqāy-Timūrids who enjoyed the longer tradition of regional suzerainty. Unlike the *Tārikh-i Dūst Sulṭān*, the *Baḥr al-asrār* makes no mention of Khiḍr's rule.¹¹¹ It also omits reference to Mardū, a second Shībānid whose brief reign is widely attested in those fifteenth- and early-sixteenth-century works which supply Maḥmūd with much of his Golden Horde narrative.¹¹² Having excised several Shībānid actors from his story, Maḥmūd goes on to accord a more prominent role to his Tūqāy-Timūrid protagonists. When Tūqāy Timūr died, we read, he bequeathed to his son Ūz Timūr the right to rule over 'Hājjī Tarkhān', or Astrakhan,¹¹³ which was of course the region whence members of the Tūqāy-Timūrid family later fled to Greater Mā warā al-nahr in the mid-sixteenth century (see above, p. 54). For much of the rest of the genealogical archaeology, Maḥmūd tells how Ūz Timūr's descendants continued to govern Astrakhan as their own sovereign territory. He claims that the Tūqāy-Timūrids acquired a number of skills during their rule in Astrakhan which would coincidentally later come in useful when their descendants were ruling over Greater Mā warā al-nahr. When recounting the reign of Ūz Timūr's grandson Tumghān b. Abāy, for instance, he tells how Tumghān sallied forth from Astrakhan in order to rid the Dasht-i Qipchāq of "tyranny and disorder",¹¹⁴ and recorded a memorable victory over the Qalmāqs and Kyrgyz.¹¹⁵ This story is patently chimerical, but it serves a useful purpose: taken together with the other narrative interventions outlined above, it allows Maḥmūd to suggest how the quality of being a Tūqāy-Timūrid was less a handicap than a qualification for executing authority in seventeenth-century Greater Mā warā al-nahr.

Revue des études islamiques 35 (1967), 173–184; Vászary, "History and Legend' in Berke Khan's Conversion to Islam", in Sinor (ed.), *Aspects of Altaic Civilization III* (Bloomington, 1990), 230–252.

¹¹¹ BA 7418 255b.

¹¹² E.g. ZN (Yazdī) 66b and HS I.43; Mardū omitted BA 7418 255b, as above.

¹¹³ The circumstances of Ūz Timūr's accession are related in a passage entitled *Dāstān-i julūs-i Ūz Timūr Khān bin Tūqāy Timūr Khān bin Jūchī Khān bar sarīr-i salṭanat-i mamlakat-i Hājjī-Tarkhān bih dastūr-i wālid-i sa'adat-nishān*: BA 6a.

¹¹⁴ *Fitnah wa fasād*: *ibid*, 7a.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7a. In this passage Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī in fact relates Tumghān's name as Nūmghān.

But it was not enough for Maḥmūd simply to establish the relative superiority of 'Tūqāy-Timūrid-ness' over 'Shībānid-ness'. He also had to establish that this quality was best displayed by members of the particular sub-line descended from the late-fourteenth-century figure of Tīmūr Qutluḡ, who were presently ruling in Bukhara. This was partly just because by the mid-seventeenth century there were clearly lots of people in existence who had a claim to the quality of 'Tūqāy-Timūrid-ness'. Although it is impossible to be sure how many descendents of Tūqāy Timūr were alive in ca. 1640, the author of an early-fifteenth-century genealogical work called the *Mu'izz al-ansāb* notes at least 272 at the time of writing,¹¹⁶ and the number is likely to have increased geometrically over the subsequent two hundred years.¹¹⁷

More particularly, however, Maḥmūd was at pains to distinguish members of the Bukharan ruling house from several infamous actors who were similarly descended from Tūqāy Timūr. In the above-cited passage about Tūqāy-Timūrid 'inferiority', the *Tārīkh-i Dust Sultān* refers to descendents of both Tuqtāmīsh Khan and Urus Khan alongside the line of Tīmūr Qutluḡ. The figures of Tuqtāmīsh and Urus were both problematic for anyone attempting to ascribe virtue to the quality of Tūqāy-Timūrid descent. Tuqtāmīsh was a late-fourteenth-century ruler of the Golden Horde, who over the course of his career entered into hostilities with both Tīmūr and Īdīgū Mīrzā.¹¹⁸ His choice of enemies secured him an unsavoury reputation in both Tīmūrid historiography¹¹⁹ and Noghay epic.¹²⁰ In post-Timūrid Central Asia, memories of Tuqtāmīsh's vicious behaviour echoed in the villainous role accorded him in such folk narratives as Mullā Şayf al-Dīn Akhsikatī's *Majmū' al-tawārikh*,¹²¹ and a similarly unsavoury note emanates from the tradition related in several works suggesting that Tuqtāmīsh's descendents were responsible for causing chaos in the sixteenth-century Qazaq khanate.¹²² Urus was a similarly problematic figure, because he was

¹¹⁶ S. Ando, *Timuridische Emire nach dem Mu'izz al-ansāb* (Berlin, 1992), 25–26.

¹¹⁷ Note however that *TGNN*'s ca. 1508 Tūqāy-Timūrid prosopography actually mentions fewer dynasts than does the earlier *Mu'izz al-ansāb*: see Ando, as above.

¹¹⁸ DeWeese, "Toktamish", in *EI*² X (1999), 560–563.

¹¹⁹ *ZN* (Shāmī) 44–48, 101–106, 120–125, 157–159 etc.

¹²⁰ S. Çagatay, "Die Ädigä-Sage", in *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher* 25 (1953), 243–282.

¹²¹ *MajT* 37a, ff.

¹²² See e.g. *NJĀ* 207, relating how "the authority of the Ūrdahid family was seriously weakened by extensive opposition from the descendents of Tuqtāmīsh" (*dawlat-i dūdman-i Ūrdah bih wāsītah-yi kuthrat-i ikhtilāf-i farzandān-i Tuqtamish da'f-i tamām paydā kardah* [...]); the passage is followed in e.g. *RT* 337b. (Ghaffārī's suggestion that the 16th-century Qazaq descendents of Urus Khan derived their ancestry from Ūrdah b. Juchī rather than

great-grandfather to the unpopular figures of Jānī Bik and Girāy, who in ca. 1468 had abandoned their former associate Abū'l-Khayr Khan, the Shībānīd ruler of the Dasht-i Qipchāq, and fled east in order to establish what would subsequently become the rapacious Qazaq khanate.¹²³

The *Baḥr al-asrār*'s genealogical archaeology carefully differentiates Bukhara's seventeenth-century rulers from such unattractive kinsmen. Maḥmūd is reluctant, for instance, to identify Tuqtāmīsh as a Tūqāy-Tīmūrid. In order to play down Tuqtāmīsh's consanguinity with the ruling Bukharans, Maḥmūd generally refers to him instead just as "a member of the race of Jūchī".¹²⁴ Maḥmūd also accords particular attention to the way in which Tuqtāmīsh and his descendents ravaged Astrakhan,¹²⁵ thus suggesting that ancestors of the ruling Tūqāy-Tīmūrid line as much as anyone else were victims of his violence. In order to distinguish the ruling Tūqāy-Tīmūrids from their Qazaq cousins, meanwhile, the *Baḥr al-asrār* offers a stark contrast between the behaviour of Barāq Khan, Urus' grandson, and Kūchuk Muḥammad, grandson of Tīmūr Qutluḡ and Bāqī Muḥammad's (5,0) kinsman.¹²⁶ The passage in question compares the way in which these two early-fifteenth-century individuals respectively maintained relations with the settled population of Greater Mā warā al-nahr. Barāq, we read, was greedy and ambitious. He claimed authority over the town of Sighnāq in the southern Dasht-i Qipchāq, and when negotiations faltered with the Tīmūrid ruler Shāhrukh b. Tīmūr, Barāq embarked upon successive booty raids against Samarqand. The behaviour of Kūchuk Muḥammad could not have been more different. Succeeding Barāq, he set about restoring order in the Dasht-i Qipchāq, eliminating various dissident elements and winning the admiration and support even of non-Tūqāy-Tīmūrid elements who were struck by his effortless authority.¹²⁷

Tūqāy Tīmūr shows the influence of *MuT* (Naṭanzī), and is followed in e.g. Vásáry, *Az Arany Horda* (Budapest, 1986), 312). Outside the *NJĀ*-inflected narrative tradition, there is little to suggest that descendents of Tuqtāmīsh had any role in 16th-century Qazaq politics; it is possible that the 'Tuqtāmīsh' in question was that less well-known individual who in 1556 attempted to assassinate the Crimean khan Dawlat Girāy before seeking refuge at the Noghay court (Vel'iaminov-Zernov, "Issledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh", II.420–425).

¹²³ *TR* 108–109, noted also above, p. 116; *BA* 7418 266b–267a.

¹²⁴ *Jūchī-nizhād*: *BA* 8a–24b, repeatedly.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 15a.

¹²⁶ Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī is at pains to identify Kūchuk Muḥammad as an ancestor of Yār Muḥammad and his family: see e.g. *BA* 7418 357a, describing him as belonging to the *silsilah-yi nasab-i Yār Muḥammad Khān*.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 357b–358a, on how he successfully brought various dissident elements into line (*raqāb-i aṣḥab-i 'inād wa a'nāq-i ahl-i nafāq-rā inqiyād gashtah* [...]), dispatching a *yarlīq* to

Having thus focused the attractive quality of 'Tūqāy-Tīmūrid-ness' upon that sub-line of Tūqāy-Tīmūrids whose members later established themselves in Bukhara, Maḥmūd is now able to tell stories about how this quality of 'Tūqāy-Tīmūrid-ness' was instrumental in securing status across Greater Mā warā al-nahr long before the takeover. The *Baḥr al-asrār* relates at length, for instance, the circumstances of Māngishlāq's flight from Astrakhan to Bukhara, dated here to some point around 1528. Upon learning of Māngishlāq's approach from across the Syr Darya, we read, Kūchkūnĵi Khan sent a formal party to receive the honoured visitor. In fact, Kūchkūnĵi did not move fast enough, and Māngishlāq arrived in Samarqand before the reception party found him. But another Abū'l-Khayrid dynast displayed rather greater alacrity. "When the news of [Māngishlāq's] arrival reached Jānī Bik," we read, "[...] he set off without delay from Miyānkāl to Samarqand, and went to meet that eminent petitioner for assistance. And he presented to him all kinds of unmatched gifts and offerings."¹²⁸ The reason for Jānī Bik's eagerness to meet the visitor was supposedly that there was a close bond between the two families, resulting from the fact that as a child Jānī Bik's father had spent some time in Astrakhan, "being raised by [Māngishlāq's father] Jawāq Sultan".¹²⁹

In 1528, soon after Māngishlāq's arrival, Jānī Bik died. But Maḥmūd claims that bonds between the Abū'l-Khayrid and Tūqāy-Tīmūrid families continued to flourish in the years after Jānī Bik's death. Māngishlāq took it upon himself to raise Jānī Bik's children as though they were his own,¹³⁰ we read, and was entrusted with government over the region of Miyānkāl.¹³¹ He married two of his daughters to prominent Jānī-Bikids, giving Tursūn Bikī Khānum to Jānī Bik's son Iskandar and Mihrijān Khānum to Iskandar's own son 'Abdallāh; in return, his son Yār Muḥammad received the hand of Iskan-

tribes in the Dasht-i Qipchāq in which he urged the Shībanid and Tūqāy-Tīmūrid dynasts of the time to make common cause (*maḍmūn-i yarliġh-i humāyūn-rā bih masāmi'-i ṭawā'if-i Dasht-i Qipchāq rasānidand. Chūn jashnī bih-d-īn nashāt wa anjumanī bih-d-īn nashāt simt-i sar-anjām yaft, wa shāh-zādahhā-yi Shībānī wa khān-zādahhā-yi Tūqāy-Tīmūri bā sarān-i ūl wa ulūs [...] har yak dar urūnhā qarār giriftand, khān-i sa'adat-nishān dā'iyah-yi jam'ī wa andīshah-yi qadīmī-rā az dil bih zabān āwurdah [...]*).

¹²⁸ *Chūn khabar-i wuṣūlsh bih janāb-i Jānī Bik Khān [...] farā rasid, bi tawaqquf az Miyānkāl bih Samarqand āmadah bih mulāqāt-i ān ḥadrat-i mustamid gardīd, wa tuḥaf wa hadāyā-yi lā yaqīr az niḡr [xxx] gudharānīd: BA 37a.*

¹²⁹ *Wālidash muddathā dar zill-i tarbiyat-i Jawāq Sulṭān būd: BA 37a, thus perhaps a variant on the tradition (e.g. HS 488) that Muḥammad Shībānī had sought refuge in Astrakhan after Abū'l-Khayr's death.*

¹³⁰ *Tamāmat-i awlād-i Jānī Bik Khān dar zill-i tarbiyat-i janāb-i Khān qarār giriftah: BA 37b.*

¹³¹ *Ibid., 37b-38a.*

dar's daughter Mas'ūd Sulṭān Khānum.¹³² This final upshot to the story is of course identical to that found in the anonymous history outlined above (pp. 283–284): but where that work renders Yār Muḥammad the architect of his fortunes, the *Baḥr al-asrār* suggests that the family owed its success instead to Māngishlāq's quality of 'Tūqāy-Tīmūrid-ness'.

Other late authors pursue alternative strategies for valorising the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid line, their "conscious, competitive, and often conflicting efforts to establish an ascriptive legitimacy"¹³³ frequently jarring with Maḥmūd's own version of the story. The *Tārīkh-i Muqīm Khānī*, for instance, records that Bāqī Muḥammad and his descendents were actually descended from Ursh [= Urus] Khan, presented here as Chingīz Khan's grandson and championed as the heroic victor over both Tīmūr and Tuqtāmīsh.¹³⁴ The *Silsilat al-salāṭīn* replicates this suggestion,¹³⁵ as well as claiming that it was Yār Muḥammad rather than Māngishlāq who first led the Tūqāy-Tīmūrids to safety in Mā warā al-nahr. When the Russians captured Astrakhan (i.e. in 1554), we read, Yār Muḥammad

set out for Mā warā al-nahr with the hope of putting to the ruler an appeal for assistance. When he reached the frontiers of Khwārazm, Iskandar Khan, learning of his approach, dispatched a large gathering of *amīrs* and other prominent figures with gifts and presents—fancy delicacies, money, fabric and steeds—as far as the bank of the river in order to receive him. As [the party] drew close to the blessed city of Bukhara, Iskandar Khan himself, together with all the requisites for the sort of welcome which is fitting and appropriate for khans and sultans, came forth to offer a grand reception, and brought Yār Muḥammad in to Bukhara with all due pomp and honour. There, he put him up in a special residence which was appropriate for the rank of his eminence. [...] Between Iskandar and Yār Muḥammad there then occurred a common royal *majlis*, which went on for day after day.¹³⁶

¹³² *Ibid.*, 38a.

¹³³ The phrase is borrowed from Woods, *The Aqquyunlu—Clan, Confederation, Empire*, 2nd edition (Salt Lake City, 1999), 173.

¹³⁴ *TMKh* 119.

¹³⁵ *SilSal* 124b–125a, 156b. Akhmedov, "“Silsilat al-Salatin”", 32, misleadingly suggests that the work's Tūqāy-Tīmūrid genealogy is identical to that found in *JQN* 10b–14b et al.

¹³⁶ *Bih ṭaraf-i Mā warā al-nahr āmadah umīd-i istīmdād wa istīn'āt bih pādīshāh āwurd. Chūn bih hadd-i Khwārazm rasīd Sīkandar [sic] Khān shanīdah jam'i-yi kathīr az umar' wa akābīr wa shurufā'rā ma' taḥā'if wa hadāyā az nafā'is wa nuqūd wa aqmīshah wa rukūb tā lab-i āb bih istīqbālāsh frīstād. Har-gāh nazdīk-i baldah-yi fākhīrah-yi Bukhārā āmad khūd Sīkandar Khān bā īshāf-i lawāzīm-i istīqbāl wa anwā'-i marāsīm-i mulāqāt kih farākhūr-i aḥwāl-i khawāqīn wa munāsīb-i aṭwār-i salāṭīn bāshad bih istīqbāl bar āmadah bā 'izāz wa ihtirām-i tamām Yār Muḥammad-rā bih Bukhārā dar āwurdah dar manzilī-yi khāsshah kih shāyān-i shān-i ān 'ālīshān būd furūd āwurd [...] wa majlis-i pādīshāhānah-yi īshān-rā ruz bih rūz tāzah bih tāzah ārāyīsh midād: *SilSal* 125a.*

Once again, the story finds no support in sixteenth-century material and is almost certainly chimerical. Yār Muḥammad would not have been a particularly distinguished visitor to Iskandar's court. As the mere ($x = 4$) kinsman of Astrakhan's ruling incumbent Yagmūrchī b. Bīrdī Bīk, he was some way removed from dynastic authority.¹³⁷ But Ḥājji Mīr (or his informant) does not concern himself with this. Like Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī and other late chroniclers, Ḥājji Mīr seeks simply to evoke a world where the quality of Tūqāy-Timūrid-ness carries cachet, to compensate for the way that in the real world this cachet was corroding. As loyalties became ever more transitory and insecure, the process of bidding for loyalty became increasingly contorted.

A Legacy?

Throughout the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, authors devoted a lot of effort towards according worth to the Tūqāy-Timūrid family and to their heavily prefigured takeover of power. The stories which they told served to rebut accusations that the Tūqāy-Timūrids had wrongfully seized authority from their Abū'l-Khayrid predecessors, and contributed to the repertoire of devices with which incumbent rulers sought to engrain themselves in their subjects' conceptions of the good.

Although it is difficult to judge the extent to which these stories succeeded in helping incumbents bid for loyalty, it is striking how narrowly most of these stories seem to have circulated. One looks in vain for subsequent echoes of any kind of the *Bahr al-asrār*'s Māngishlāq narrative or the *Silsilat al-salāṭin*'s account of Yār Muḥammad's splendid reception. This may be because such stories had a short shelflife, lasting only a little while before being replaced by something better. Equally, it may be because they simply failed to strike a chord with their audience. A heroic Bāqī Muḥammad crossing the Amu Darya was sufficiently attractive for people to indigenise the story, whereas the twists and turns of Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī's Tūqāy-Timūrid genealogical archaeology were perhaps simply too convoluted to be of any appeal.

The transience of these stories may be gauged from various later sources. It is telling, for instance, that several authors fail to note any shift in authority whatsoever from the Shībānids to the Tūqāy-Timūrids at the turn of the

¹³⁷ Vel'iaminov-Zernov, "Issledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh", I.49.

seventeenth century. In the mid-seventeenth-century *Taqdīm al-tawārīkh*, the Ottoman author Muṣṭafā b. ‘Abdallāh Kātīb Chalabī claims that Samarqand remained under the authority of the ‘Shaybakiyah’ from 839/1435–1436 to 1057/1647–1648.¹³⁸ Similarly, the author of the Manghit-sponsored *Tuhfah-yi khānī*, Qāḍī Wafā, suggests that Bāqī Muḥammad and his successors were simply perpetuating a regime which had already been in place for the previous hundred years.¹³⁹ Such suggestions resonate with an account by the German traveller Eduard Friedrich Eversmann, who visited the Bukharan court of the Manghit ruler Mir Ḥaydar in the early nineteenth century. When there, he recorded various stories about the city’s rulers, past and present. Of Bukhara’s earlier history, Eversmann writes as follows.

Schaibani Chan left a son and heir, Abaidula Chan, who was succeeded by his son, Isskander Chan, who left two sons, Abdula Chan and Dschani Muhamed Chan; the first succeeded him in the government, and is said to have erected the first regular caravansary, about a hundred years ago; he left five sons, Din Muhamed, Baki Muhamed, Uali Muhamed, Imam-kuli, and Nadir Machmed Chan: Din Muhamed inherited the throne; he was succeeded by his son Abdul Asis Chan, who also left two sons, Subhankuli and Abaidula Chan; Subhankuli Chan inherited the throne, and was followed by his son Abulfais Chan.¹⁴⁰

The Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds’ invisible family presence in this narrative attests to what constituted their ultimate failure. They were more successful at justifying their rule as the continuation of ‘Abdallāh’s legacy than they were in engraining their own dynasty in people’s conceptions of the good. Regardless of how destructive this legacy proved to be over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ‘Abdallāh’s rule continued to be remembered in later tradition with a warmth which the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds could only dream of. There is just one individual of significant narrative note in Eversmann’s account, and it is the same caravanserai-building hero as the individual who had previously dominated Muḥammad Yār Qaṭaghan’s early seventeenth-century *Musakhkhir al-bilād*. A century and a half’s worth of recasting events may have helped individual rulers bid for the loyalty of their subjects, but it did little to secure the Tūqāy-Tīmūrīds’ identification

¹³⁸ TT 48a.

¹³⁹ Von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung*, 208–209.

¹⁴⁰ E.F. Eversmann, *Reise von Orenburg nach Bukhara*, published in English in *New Voyages and Travels; consisting of Originals and Translations* vol. IX (London, 1823), part 5: “Russian Missions into the Interior of Asia”, 11–61 [41–42].

as autonomous embodiments of a constitutive virtue. Between 1598 and 1605 Bāqī Muḥammad enjoyed a spectacular run of successes. Of the Tūqāy-Timūrids more generally, however, it might be said that little in their rule became them like the telling of stories about it.

CONCLUSION

It has been observed that few words in the English language are so malleable as 'therefore'.¹ A glance at various academic literatures bears this observation out. What historians present as 'conclusions' are often sententious codas to the stories which they tell. "If Chinggis Khan had been the punishment of God, his grandson Hülegü was God's secret intent revealed", writes George Lane, thus bringing to a close his hoarsely emphatic history of early Īlkhānid Iran.² As I draw this book to an end, I claim no such transcendent insight for the world which I have been trying to describe. What I want to do instead in these final few pages is much more straightforward. By synthesising some of the ideas which have emerged in previous chapters, and by attempting to address some of the possible objections to my wider lines of argument, I want to consider more generally how the concept of loyalty may be of use for the historian of early modern Central Asia and of other places and periods.

Using the events of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover as a point of reference, I have attempted in this book to illustrate the political behaviour of a hitherto-obscure Central Asian populace in terms of people's display of what I have conceptualised as a number of distinct 'loyalty types'. In particular, I have explored various episodes over the course of the takeover where the manifestation of one particular loyalty type seems to have been notably influential in determining people's chosen course of action, thus with the aim of considering what factors may have helped determine the greater affective force of one loyalty type over another. Thus, in chapter 1 we explored how the affective force of people's 'charismatic loyalty' may have related to the degree of discursive agreement as to who presently best embodied a quality of chosen-ness. Our investigation of 'clientelist loyalty' in chapter 2 examined how the affective force of such an attachment might be proportionate to the degree of impact which political authority had upon people's lives. Discussing 'inertial loyalty' in chapter 3, we noted the importance of that stake which actors had in a socio-economic status quo,

¹ I. Berlin, "The Concept of Scientific History", in *idem*, ed. H. Hardy and R. Hausheer, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (London, 1997), 17–58 [32].

² G. Lane, *Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran—A Persian Renaissance* (London, 2003), 261.

observing that as an actor's stake grew so too might his degree of determination either to help preserve an established regime or to defect to an oppositional one. Finally, in chapter 4's discussion of 'communal loyalty' we considered how the affective force of such an attachment might be contingent on the degree to which agents boosted people's perceptions of communal selfhood by investing in communities' self-associative repertoires.

Stated thus, my lines of reasoning are modest: some readers may find themselves wondering whether I have not spent the last few hundred pages outlining the patently self-evident. And in large part, of course, I have: indeed, this has been central to my purpose. Rather as Richard Rorty describes Wittgenstein's conception of the philosopher's task as a process of re-describing the complex in terms of the simple,³ so too have I attempted to re-describe some of the obscurer patternings of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover in terms of various social dynamics which, translated to another environment such as the world around us today, we might largely take for granted. The fact that these dynamics seem to have held force in early modern Central Asia may come as little surprise to us: but it may nevertheless be salutary to be reminded that early modern Central Asia, for all its contextual specificities, was an environment like others in which such dynamics were at play.

A more serious objection to my arguments might be that they are merely casuistic. Even if one accepts the somewhat metaphysical premise behind my proposed categorisation of loyalty types with reference to the differing 'orders' of human purpose—which, as I hope I made clear in the Introduction, I offer more in Rortyan terms as a re-descriptive device than as a realist taxonomy of discrete entities—one might very reasonably object that any attempt to gauge the circumstantial affective force of one particular loyalty type is undermined by the improbability of said loyalty type ever being so self-contained as to function in absolute isolation from the others. We are human, the objection might run: we conflate our purposes. Just as we are often liable to discern duty where our interests also happen to lie, so too may our awareness of cherishing a consequentialist attachment lead us to discern also a deontological one urging the same course of action: and any attempt to conceptualise the affective force of the one attachment in isola-

³ R. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge, 1989), 90–91.

tion from the other is perhaps less a task for the scholar than a parlour game for the amateur sophist.—Such an objection, I should suggest, would be entirely fair, if this were indeed a parlour game in which I were indulging. As it is, throughout the book I have attempted instead to emphasise how people's courses of action are best explained with reference not to single loyalty types conceived in isolation, but to confluences of overlapping priorities: if, for instance, our sources suggest that clientelist considerations encouraged the Samarqandis to support Bāqī Muḥammad in the showdown of 1599 (see above, p. 140), so too, I argue, do they suggest that local communal attachments similarly encouraged people likewise (see above, p. 242). Lacking as we do the experimental resources of the laboratory clinician or the sociologist's questionnaire, it is beyond our capacity as historians scientifically to calibrate the respective salience of each of these two attachments in urging the Samarqandis' chosen course of action: but this does not prevent our making the observation that such attachments seem to have exercised greater affective force at one particular juncture in our story than at others, nor our proceeding to consider why this should have been the case. By using the conceit of differing loyalty types as a spur to our thinking, we find ourselves down some fertile lines of empirical enquiry which might otherwise have been closed to us.

I emphasise in that last sentence *empirical* enquiry. Although the language with which I have attempted to organise my thinking in this book has on occasion been somewhat abstract, my prime purpose here has been to conceive of loyalty not as something to be anatomised on an ethereal surgeon's table but as a point of reference with which to make better sense of a particular historical episode. Readers will decide for themselves to what extent I have here been successful. Even if they accept my approach, however, they may quite reasonably question the utility of effort spent in conceptualising such a reference point from scratch merely in order to re-evaluate a single ill-remembered incident. Indeed, it might be said that by confining my discussion to the events of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover I fail in fact to offer any substantiation for my chosen approach, it being the test of any intellectual method that it make sense not just of one set of circumstances but of multiple such. Although such an objection brings us perhaps uncomfortably close to the presumptions of social science, it raises a question which it might be useful briefly to consider, namely how—if at all—historians of other human environments might utilise the concept of loyalty as a reference point for their own ends.

What is immediately clear here is that my proposed taxonomy of loyalty types is in no way a universally applicable one. For many historians, the

concept of 'charismatic loyalty', for instance, may be distinctly unhelpful. The attribution of transcendent chosen-ness as implied in the ascription of charisma seems to be markedly less pronounced in the political behaviour of most people living in the modern western world, for example, than was the case in early modern Central Asia: historians of contemporary Europe, say, may find that the idea of 'charismatic loyalty' means little to them.⁴ In such circumstances, however, I should suggest that just a very minor modification to our understanding of 'charismatic loyalty' might render the concept much more meaningful. As we saw in chapter 1, the attribution of chosen-ness in early modern Central Asia was contingent not just upon some belief in higher sanction but also upon that participatory decision-making process whereby said sanction was actually ascribed to a recipient: should an individual claim sanction without having submitted to this decision-making process, people were liable to reject his claim, even if this necessitated their disregarding those qualities which in other circumstances they might have deemed to constitute evidence of chosen-ness. If one thus re-conceptualises the recipient of charismatic loyalty in pragmatic terms as *he who has secured the consensual ratification of his peers*, it is a surprisingly modest move from the khan whose candidature has been approved at the *qūrlitāy* to the European politician who has secured victory in the conventional fashion at the polls: and a correspondingly modest move from 'charismatic loyalty' to what we might conceive as 'rule-bound loyalty', namely one's obedience to that individual whom, however unattractive, misguided or incapable one may find him, one acknowledges to owe his authority to the outcome of a decision-making process—a secret ballot with full adult suffrage, for instance—which has been conducted according to rules to which one has either actively or tacitly given one's consent.

The crucial point here is that 'rule-bound loyalty' and 'charismatic loyalty', whatever their mutual differences, are both manifestations of what we conceived earlier in the book (see above, pp. 202–203) as that wider 'order of purpose' whereby people contract interpersonal ties which are in some way expressive of their normative convictions and their respect for codes of practice. To the observation that, as currently conceived, my four proposed

⁴ The concept is perhaps of more use to students of political behaviour in the contemporary United States, where relatively high degrees of religiosity and a resilient narrative of American exceptionalism mean that attributions of higher chosen-ness are somewhat more common than in Europe. See e.g. G. Bowden, "Obama, Palin, and Weber: Charisma and Social Change in the 2008 U.S. Election", in *Canadian Review of Sociology* 47 (2010), 171–190.

loyalty types are of limited relevance for other times and places, my rejoinder is therefore that yes, of course they are: and that it is up to whomsoever wishes to adopt the typology offered here also to *adapt* the typology so as best to convey the dimensions of life in whatever human environment one chooses to write about.

Such adaptations may sometimes of necessity be more extensive than the one outlined above. It is not difficult, for instance, to envisage circumstances where not only the applicability but also the adequacy of my schema might be in question. When E.M. Forster famously contemplates the alternative between betraying his country and betraying his friend,⁵ he envisages a clash of loyalties which does not easily lend itself to re-description in terms of a programmatic contrast between, say, norms and inter-personal attachments, of the sort which in this book I have largely considered. In envisaging a contest between the claims of patriotism and friendship, Forster envisages a contest between what he conceives as *two competing ethical ideals*, both occupying what, in the post-Aristotelian tradition (see above, p. 22), we might regard as a common domain of human purpose, and yet making very different sorts of demands on one's conscience. Whether we conceptualise it as 'charismatic loyalty', 'rule-bound loyalty' or as something else entirely, my premise at the start of this book that as humans we are liable to observe just a single norm-driven form of inter-personal attachment emerges in the light of Forster's comments as a gross oversimplification, and one which the circumstances of our subject matter may sometimes require us to redress. Indeed, one might suggest that my own recounting of the events of the Tūqāy-Timūrid takeover suffers from my failure to do just this: in conceptualising as 'charismatic loyalty' people's norm-driven attachment towards both khan and holy man, for instance, I perhaps obscure the somewhat differing conceptions of the good embodied in these respective ties, and the ways in which such attachments might frequently find themselves in mutual competition. In attempting to offer as parsimonious a typology of attachments as possible, I may have allowed Occam's Razor to slice off more than it should.

For all the limitations to my approach, however, it remains my contention that it is by conceptualising the priorities and goals with regard to which people determined their interpersonal attachments that we best explore the dynamics of their behaviour, whether during the events of the


⁵ Forster, "What I Believe", in *Two Cheers for Democracy* (London, 1951), 78.

Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover or during other such episodes in history. In particular, I have tried to show how a person's course of action might be influenced by the knowledge of being part of a group of people with whom one shares some particular ascription of worth. We have seen how in some instances a person's awareness of belonging to such a group might embolden him to take action in pursuit even of his own most individually self-interested goals. In chapter 3, for instance, we saw how people seeking through defection to maximise their own personal share of some finite resource pool often took steps towards this end through common, rather than atomised courses of action, lifting their head over the parapet only when assured that the promise of similar action by enough other people offset the risk of personal loss. In other instances, we saw how particular conceptions of the good might themselves be predicated on expressions of group solidarity. As noted in our discussions of charismatic and communal loyalty, individuals often committed heavily to the furtherance of socially constituted goals—subordination to a quality of 'chosen-ness', for instance, or the preservation of communal traditions—whose worth might evaporate upon the termination of consensus as to what these goals comprised. Again, these observations may not be terribly surprising: the question, however, is whether by framing our exploration of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover with relation to some more conventional heuristic reference point such as 'identity' or 'legitimacy' we might still have noticed them. By necessarily directing our attention to the dynamics of interpersonal attachment, recourse to the concept of loyalty usefully forces us to think how forms of social interaction may both help to determine our various purposes and guide our chosen paths to self-fulfilment. Loyalty is good for thinking about groups with.

And at this final juncture in the book there remains just more thing which I should like to note. It relates to another over-simplification of which throughout the volume I have perhaps been guilty. When I was considering in chapter 1 why 'Abd al-Mu'min should have been the recipient of only a very diminished charismatic loyalty, it might be suggested that in one key regard I misrepresented the matter. Similarly in chapter 2, when I considered why Bāqī Muḥammad should have been the recipient of people's unusually salient clientelist attachments; in chapter 3, when I explored why Pīr Muḥammad should have been the recipient of just a highly attenuated inertial loyalty on the part of his supporters; and in chapter 4, when I outlined why in summer 1599 Bāqī Muḥammad should have been the recipient of a heightened communal loyalty from the Samarqandis. The reason is this: that in each case it might perhaps be truer to say that the dynast in question was less the *recipient* of loyalty than the *beneficiary*, or even the *expres-*

sion of an attachment which need never in fact actually have been focused upon him. When in summer 1599 the Samarqandis aligned themselves with Bāqī Muḥammad in hostility to the approaching Bukharan forces, they were aligning themselves alongside the person whom they consensually deemed to embody in largest measure a sense of communal distinctiveness. But although Bāqī Muḥammad derived utility from their thus doing so, he was in a sense just the expression of that commitment which Samarqandis felt towards their perception of being special: their loyalty, it might be said, was in fact directed primarily towards a dimension of their own selfhood. The same point might be made elsewhere. The clientelist attachment which people similarly displayed toward Bāqī Muḥammad might be reframed as merely the mark of their commitment to the fruition of their own socio-economic projects. It requires little reworking of our understanding of inertial loyalty to see people's—limited—inertial attachment towards the regime of Pīr Muḥammad as the course of action which they deemed most likely to uphold their own sense of having an investment in the socio-economic status quo. And even the charismatic attachment which people felt towards a consensually elevated ruler might be reconceptualised as merely their expression of commitment to an idea of themselves as people for whom 'higher chosen-ness' had meaning and value. There is scarcely space here to pursue the matter further: but in attempting over the course of this book to study the dynamics of people's interpersonal alignments, we may in fact more truly have been studying the differing commitments which people felt towards dimensions of their own sense of self. What appeared at the outset as a simple story of political change may transpire to be a more introspective story altogether.

The Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover of Greater Mā warā al-nahr was an episode of dynastic shift, whereby one Chingīzid line acceded to power at the expense of another by means of courtly intrigue, the mass mobilisation of resources and bloody confrontation on the battlefield. In this book, however, I have tried to show that it is not by treating it simply in terms of high political history that we best make sense of the episode. As we have seen, the circumstances of the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover reflected the ways in which it suited members of the wider populace to influence the course of events. Like all social phenomena, the Tūqāy-Tīmūrid takeover was above all a by-product of people's everyday lives.



The Tūqāy-Timūrids empire, ca. 1605

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