

GEORGE RITZER
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Encyclopedia of
SOCIAL
THEORY



VOLUME II

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**SOCIAL
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Encyclopedia of
**SOCIAL
THEORY**

VOLUME I

EDITOR
GEORGE RITZER
University of Maryland, College Park

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Introduction

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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*. There are, of course, encyclopedias of the social sciences (among others) that have addressed some of the topics assembled here. However, because their treatment of social theory has been only part of a much broader set of topics, these other sets of volumes have been unable to provide the focus and depth required to define the field of social theory in a reasonably complete (of course, inevitably there are topics that are not covered) and systematic fashion.

The purpose of an encyclopedia is to summarize and codify knowledge in a given field. This is in contrast to a handbook, which offers essays on cutting-edge research in a field, or a dictionary, which provides short, to-the-point definitions of key concepts in a field (Sica 2001). Certainly, an encyclopedia also does some of the things that one finds in handbooks and dictionaries. Thus, the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory* offers handbook-like (albeit briefer) entries on cutting-edge topics, such as globalization, consumption, complexity theory, and actor network theory, and it provides state-of-the-art interpretations of long-established theories. Also, like a dictionary, the entries in this encyclopedia provide basic introductions to key ideas, concepts, schools, and figures in social theory. However, the entries tend to be far longer and offer much more depth than those found in dictionaries.

However, an encyclopedia is much more than the presentation of a set of ideas. Its publication is an acknowledgment that a field of study has acquired considerable intellectual coherence and that it is regarded as a legitimate source of knowledge. The publication of an encyclopedia of social theory, then, speaks to the importance and relevance of social theory to academia and to the world in which we now live. Social theory is not merely an afterthought of empirical work in the social and human sciences, but rather, it stands at the base of such work and as a body

of knowledge that offers a unique form of interpretation and engagement with the world.

This is not to say that all of the 300-plus entries contained in this encyclopedia cohere around a common set of world-views, philosophical outlooks, or political positions. Social theory encompasses a wide range of academic disciplines. Perspectives from sociology, economics, philosophy, anthropology, political science, women's studies, cultural studies, psychoanalysis, and media theory (among others) are presented in this encyclopedia. Some of these fields, such as economics, philosophy, and sociology, made especially critical contributions to the early development of social theory. While theoretical ideas continue to flow from those disciplines, others, such as media and cultural studies, are now having a particularly important impact on social theory. Despite the diversity of inputs and theories, what is common to the entries in this encyclopedia is a critical engagement with social issues, including the cutting-edge developments in modern, postmodern, and globalizing societies. Such a critical engagement requires, as its starting point, the careful articulation and study of ideas and theories about society and the people who live in them. It seeks understanding and clarification of our common (or perhaps uncommon) situation, and in many cases seeks reform or even social change.

While a multitude of disciplines are represented in these pages, it should be made clear that the reference point for much of this encyclopedia is the discipline of sociology. This is because of the central role that sociologists (or those, such as Marx and Veblen, who have come to be considered as sociologists, at least to some degree) have played in the development of social theory and also because the editor is both a sociologist and a social theorist. While the touchstone is sociology, most of the ideas and theorists to be discussed here either have their origins in other disciplines and/or are having an impact on them.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL THEORY

Most contemporary commentators trace the origins of social theory to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While humans have described and theorized the nature of social relations and social organization for thousands of years, only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did social relations and society—seen as an entity in itself—become an object of sustained reflection and study. Social theory emerged alongside of, and often in response to, forces that were radically transforming social life: capitalism, political revolutions in France and America, the Industrial Revolution, urbanization, and scientific thought. In response to and in accord with these changes, Enlightenment philosophers (e.g., Montesquieu, Rousseau) and their critics articulated some of the earliest social theories. Many Enlightenment thinkers believed that through the application of reason, it would be possible to design an ideal political community and social order. However, the failure of the French Revolution provoked strong criticism of Enlightenment ideals, which in part had guided its course. Conservatives such as Bonald and Maistre articulated theories of society that asserted the necessity of hierarchy and religious order against the liberal ideals of the revolution. Romantics lamented the rise of abstract reason, urban society, and the loss of humanity's connection to its natural, sympathetic impulses. These streams of thought, and many others, gave rise to what we now think of as social theory, and as evidenced by the entries in this encyclopedia, they remain a rich resource for contemporary theorizing (Rundell 2001; Taylor 1989). While the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory* contains essays that specifically address these early years of social theory (see the Scottish Enlightenment, the German Idealists, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Bonald, and Maistre) as well as essays that discuss topics that relate to the ancient origins of some modern ideas and institutions (see Democracy, Citizenship, and Herrschaft), the majority of the entries address social theory as it has developed from the nineteenth century onward. In designing the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*, four national traditions were singled out for detailed treatment because of their extraordinary contributions to social theory: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, the study of society was institutionalized through the creation of the discipline of sociology. During this period, the French philosopher and socialist Auguste Comte coined the term "sociology." In the late nineteenth century, Émile Durkheim played a central role in formally establishing sociology as a scientific discipline committed to the systematic and empirical study of "social facts." Along with his nephew Marcel Mauss and other collaborators, Durkheim created an influential journal, *L'Année Sociologique*, which was to define the study of sociology in early twentieth-century France.

At roughly the same time, Max Weber established the basis for a scientific sociology in Germany and along with several colleagues (including Georg Simmel) founded the German Sociological Society. In the United Kingdom, Herbert Spencer's evolutionary theories profoundly affected the development of British social theory, but British thinking and research also emphasized individual, utilitarian action, and this was to have a great impact in the United States. In 1889, the first American sociology department was founded at the University of Kansas; and in later years, the uniquely American schools of pragmatism and structural functionalism became influential. These "classical" years, and by extension, the social theory that emanated from them, are necessarily addressed in this encyclopedia. The work and life of Émile Durkheim, for example, is described in the entry about him, but other entries also reflect his conceptual legacy: Anomie, Sacred and Profane, Social Facts, and many others that involve a more indirect influence. In addition, classical figures who have traditionally been excluded from the sociological canon have been included in this *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*. Marianne Weber, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and W. E. B. Du Bois are examples of theorists whose work is now being discussed not only for its historical significance but also for its relevance in developing social theories that more adequately account for the experiences of women and minorities today.

The twentieth century gave rise to a wide range of social theories, and many of these can be thought of in terms of national traditions. From the 1930s through the 1960s, the United States was the center of the rise and fall of structural-functional theory (with roots in the work of Durkheim and that of a number of anthropologists). Premised in liberal political values and confidence in social harmony provided by the welfare state, especially after World War II, structural functionalism offered an all-encompassing, synthetic system of social thought. The weakness of this kind of social theory—most notably its inability to offer convincing explanations of social conflict and the unequal distribution of wealth, as well as social change—led to its collapse beginning in the late 1960s.

In contrast to the singular control that structural functionalism once exercised over the field, American sociology in the 1970s could be characterized as multiparadigmatic. It included the revival and development at the macrolevel of a number of neo-Marxian theories and also saw the emergence of critical feminist social theories. These latter theories gave women's experiences, and later the experiences of many marginalized groups, a central position in social analysis. Significantly, these theories added the study of race and gender to Marx's primary emphasis on class inequality.

Beginning in the late 1960s, American sociological theory also pushed further in the direction of microsociology,

in large part to counter the macrosociological focus of structural functionalism. Inspired by earlier work in phenomenology, pragmatism, and behaviorist psychology, theories such as symbolic interactionism (with roots going back to the early twentieth century and the Chicago school), ethnomethodology, and exchange theory provided fine-grained descriptions of everyday life. The proliferation of macrosociological theories and microsociological theories, and the seeming gap between them, called for a reconciliation or synthesis, and in the 1980s, sociological theory took a decidedly “metatheoretical” turn. Metatheorists organized, characterized, and offered syntheses of the various sociological theories and helped give rise to a concern for “macro-micro” integration.

Throughout the same period, the most influential developments in European social theory (especially in France, Germany, and Great Britain) came from traditions outside of sociology, including linguistics, anthropology, psychoanalysis, and literary theory. These various traditions profoundly shaped social theory in Europe and since the 1980s have had an increasing impact on American social theory, thereby making it increasingly difficult to make any clear-cut distinctions between American and European social theory.

In France, the work of Swiss-born linguist Ferdinand de Saussure laid the groundwork for structuralist social theories. These took as their starting point the assumption that the social world and, as argued by anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, symbol systems more generally were organized like and through language. Structuralism combined with currents from other European schools of thought, giving rise to, among others, structuralist Marxism (Louis Althusser), structuralist psychoanalysis (Jacques Lacan), and structuralist sociology (the early work of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu). The existential work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir also had an impact on social theory both in Europe and the United States. Sartre’s writings were influential in the development of various microtheories as well as more humanistic branches of neo-Marxian theory. Its focus on human agency also functioned as a negative touchstone for those developing structural theories. Beauvoir’s work was especially influential in the formation of feminist social theories.

Following widespread political uprisings in 1968, especially in France, the humanistic and scientific ideals of earlier social theories were challenged as never before. This gave rise to a widespread reassessment of the underlying assumptions of social theory. In this context, the literary theorist Jacques Derrida offered deconstruction as a critique of existing theories of knowledge and as a method for the study of society. These critical poststructuralist efforts were also developed through Michel Foucault’s “genealogical” method and the later postmodern writings of Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, and Jean Baudrillard.

By the 1980s, just as a number of American social theorists were working toward greater micro-macro integration, many of their European colleagues were attempting to reconcile the theoretical split between theories that privileged the autonomy of social structures and those that valorized the freedom and agency of individuals (following the work, among others, of Sartre on existentialism). In light of these concerns, Pierre Bourdieu (in France) developed a theory integrating habitus and field; Anthony Giddens (in Great Britain; see also, the work of Margaret Archer) proposed and elaborated a “structuration” theory; and Jürgen Habermas (in Germany) offered a theory of the relationship between system and lifeworld (as well as a concern for the degree to which the system was colonizing the lifeworld).

German social theory has contributed other concepts and ideas central to the development of twentieth-century social theory. Karl Marx, a lifelong exile from his German home, was deeply sympathetic to the cause of the European working classes. His work offered both a political vision of the modern Europe, most energetically outlined in the *Communist Manifesto* (written with his colleague and financial backer, Friedrich Engels) and an economic theory of social change, articulated in the three volumes of *Capital*. Clearly, Marx’s work has been influential. It has stood, and continues to stand, as an inspiration for large-scale social change and political organization, and it has given rise to a wide variety of neo-Marxist social theories, academic organizations, and journals. As a counterpoint to Marx, Max Weber, writing a generation later, emerged as a giant in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German sociology and social theory. Whereas Marx anticipated the inevitability of revolutionary change, Weber offered a more staid and pessimistic vision. His studies in comparative and historical sociology led him to conclude that modern societies (whether capitalist, socialist, or some other) faced increasing rationalization, which he characterized with the metaphor of an “iron cage,” an image that continues to compel contemporary social theorists. Furthermore, since the 1970s, Weber’s work on social organization and institutional structures has had a strong impact on historical and comparative sociology.

Like his French counterpart, Durkheim, Weber was also interested in scholarly disputes about method and theory in sociology. He was influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey, who articulated the influential distinction between the *Naturwissenschaften* (natural sciences) and the *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences). Should social science follow the natural sciences and embrace a “positivist” theory of knowledge, or should it recognize itself as a moral and cultural science dedicated to a hermeneutic interpretation of social life? Indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, German philosophers and social scientists articulated tensions and developed arguments that continue to occupy social theory. The

history of these debates is presented in this encyclopedia with entries on the Positivismstreit and the Werturteilstreit (among others), as are contemporary articulations of “positivist” and “interpretive” social theories.

An argument could be made that contemporary social theory has pushed beyond these disputes and that new fusions of science and art are now being undertaken. Moving beyond old distinctions between art and science, complexity theory, for example, draws on cutting-edge “chaos” theories in physics and mathematics to analyze and describe social systems. Moving beyond modern distinctions between human beings and inanimate objects, actor network theories and “postsocial” theories (both largely based in France and Great Britain) grant objects unprecedented agency, thereby inviting interpretive investigations of objects and relationships that might once have been studied through the lens of natural science.

Contemporary social theory is also indebted to the writings and research of a variety of neo-Marxian theorists, including those associated with the Frankfurt school in Germany. Beginning in the 1920s, the members of this school provided a synthesis of Marx, Weber, and Freud and offered critiques of modern fascist and democratic/consumer societies. The Frankfurt school influenced mid-century American social theory after its move, in the midst of the ascendancy of Nazism in Germany, to Columbia University in New York in the 1930s. The work of the Frankfurt school has been central in establishing the basis for critical cultural studies. Equally important to the history of cultural studies and social theory is the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), or the “Birmingham school,” established at the University of Birmingham, England, in the 1960s. In contrast to what many now see as the overly elitist perspective of the Frankfurt school, members of the CCCS offered theories of popular culture and the media that combined elements of Marxism, poststructuralism, feminist analysis, semiology, and a number of other perspectives. The views of both of these schools are addressed in entries on culture, such as Media Critique, Television and Social Theory, Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies, and many others. Finally, contemporary German theorists such as the previously mentioned Jürgen Habermas (extending the work of the Frankfurt school), Niklas Luhmann, and Ulrich Beck have offered comprehensive theories of society that exhibit a powerful European style, rich in philosophical reflection and grounded in interdisciplinary knowledge. These authors confirm that social theory, especially in its current incarnations, reaches beyond sociology to include a wide range of disciplines and problems (economic, political, social, and psychological).

It would be impossible to list all of the national or intellectual traditions that have contributed to the development of social theory, and it is, in any case, an artificial

enterprise, for as we have seen, even in its earliest stages, social theory reached beyond nations and disciplines, and in the present, these old boundaries are becoming increasingly less relevant. Critiques of the “grand narratives” of science and social progress have led to a reassessment of social theory and its Western, liberal commitment to progress and reason. Too often, despite the good intentions of their creators, the grand narratives excluded the experiences and voices of social minorities and supported the political, economic, and military oppression of non-Western peoples. This view is reflected in a number of the postmodern essays in this encyclopedia, as well as those coming from feminist traditions. These include widespread critiques of the positivist theories of knowledge that had been especially central to Anglo-American social theories and the formulation of alternative epistemologies: social constructionism, feminist standpoint theory, queer theory, revivals of hermeneutic techniques, and the integrative perspectives mentioned above. Indeed, even as the heyday of postmodern deconstruction has passed, social theory has been deeply influenced by the critique of normal science, stable identities, and settled forms of thought. At the same time, in a globalizing world, social theory has gone global. If there was a time when certain theories could be thought of as emerging from particular national traditions, reflecting their concerns, interests, and style of thought, then a strong argument can now be made that social theory is no longer organized around national problems and orientations. (Instead, as Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider argue in their entry on Cosmopolitan Sociology, social theory should organize its thinking around the global.)

Postmodern critique and globalization present challenges to the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*. After all, the concept of the modern encyclopedia developed, at least in part, out of the Enlightenment hope that it is possible to arrange knowledge systematically and that this arrangement could contribute to ideals such as scientific progress, the accumulation of knowledge, and social change. If the postmodernists are correct, then such systematization is deeply problematic, if not impossible. The impulse behind this encyclopedia continues to speak to some of the Enlightenment ideals. It is worthwhile to take stock of existing forms of knowledge, and as a resource for study and critical engagement with the social world, this encyclopedia can contribute to the development of our common understanding. In this regard, the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory* aims to be comprehensive and to compile most of the theories and ideas that have been central in shaping the way that social theorists now think about their work and the world in which they live. At the same time, we recognize that, especially in the social sciences, knowledge is always in the process of transformation, and social theorists engage in a reflexive activity rediscovering and reinterpreting their history and foundations. In the

nineteenth century, Wilhelm Dilthey argued that because social knowledge is historically embedded, it is always open to this kind of interpretation and clarification. He thereby distinguished the social and human sciences from the natural sciences. More recently, Anthony Giddens has described this reflexivity with the term “double hermeneutic.” Social theorists interpret the world in which they live; social theories serve to alter the social world that social theorists study; and therefore, the theorists must constantly revise their theories of that world. With this in mind, we hope that the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory* will not only serve as a foundation for learning but will also inspire a creative and reflexive engagement with the ideas contained within it.

ORGANIZATION AND USE OF THE *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY*

The *Encyclopedia of Social Theory* is a two-volume set that includes 336 entries written by authors from 14 countries (United States, Canada, Australia, Britain, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Singapore). Entries range in length from 400 to 6,000 words and contain information on specific theories, theorists, schools of thought, key concepts, and topical subjects. Most entries begin with a short definition or description of the concept or idea. Entries on specific theorists are written as reviews of the theorists' intellectual contributions but include biographical information, including connections to other theories and theorists. Furthermore, all entries conclude with a brief section on further readings and a set of cross-references that point readers in the direction of related topics discussed elsewhere in the encyclopedia.

To ensure adequate coverage, an editorial board consisting of 12 members from five countries (United States, Canada, Germany, Australia, and Britain) was selected. These editors are recognized experts in their fields, and all have contributed significantly to the development of social theory. Many of these editors have also contributed essays to these volumes. Peter Beilharz wrote on a number of topics related to Marxism; Karen Cook contributed essays on Social Exchange Theory and Richard Emerson; Mary Rogers wrote numerous essays on Feminist Theory; Jonathan Turner provided pieces on Conflict Theory, Janet Chafetz, and Rae Blumberg; Andrew Wernick wrote an essay on Auguste Comte and coauthored the piece on Jean-Paul Sartre; Peter Kivisto wrote on Industrial Society and Alain Touraine; Gary Alan Fine dealt with Collective Memory; Gerd Nollmann wrote on Jürgen Habermas and Ferdinand Tönnies and, along with Hermann Strasser, authored an essay on Ralf Dahrendorf; Douglas Kellner contributed essays on Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies, Frederic Jameson, and the Frankfurt School.

In consultation with George Ritzer and Todd Stillman (the first of two managing editors; Jeff Stepnisky succeeded Stillman and helped complete work on the encyclopedia), the deputy editors created lists of entries for the encyclopedia in 10 areas of specialization. American, British, German, and French editorial areas reflect the contributions of these national traditions to the development of social theory. While macrosociological theories are covered under several headings, separate domains were created for microbehaviorist and microinteractionist theories. Feminist, Marxian, and cultural theories were defined as separate editorial areas, and they were intended to cover the work of theorists that have become particularly salient in the twenty-first century. Finally, the “key concepts in social theory” domain was created to allow us to include topics that did not fall into any of the above categories.

The authors chosen by the editors to write entries are experts in their fields of study and are regular commentators on social theory more generally. Thus, the encyclopedia includes entries by Ulrich Beck (on Risk Society and Cosmopolitan Sociology), Bryan Turner (on Individualism), Charles Lemert (on Foucault, Discourse, Genealogy, Governmentality, and W. E. B Du Bois), Craig Calhoun (on Nationalism), Erik Olin Wright (on Social Class), Jeffrey Alexander and Gary Marx (on Neil Smelser), Karin Knorr Cetina (on the Postsocial), Norman Denzin (on Postmodernism), Paul DiMaggio (on Cultural Capital), and many other notables too numerous to mention.

It is worth noting that a decision was made to devote considerable space in this encyclopedia to people, to social theorists, including many now living. Both of these decisions are controversial. There is a view among some of those involved with work on encyclopedias that people, especially those still living, should either be excluded or given minimal space. However, social theories are very much the products of individuals and in many cases are hard to distinguish from the people who created them. Furthermore, to this day, social theorists and students of theory read and seek to master the work of individual classic and contemporary theorists. There is, we think, little debate that there should be entries on classic thinkers such as Marx or Du Bois. More controversial is the inclusion of many entries on living theorists. However, just as scholars have read, and continue to read, the work of Marx and Du Bois, they also devote themselves to the body of work created by contemporary theorists such as Giddens and Habermas. Thus, even though they are dwarfed by the number of entries on theories and theoretical ideas, this volume is characterized by a significant number of entries on social theorists, both living and dead.

The editors have also developed a guide to point readers in the direction of specific entries. This Reader's Guide is organized around 20 headings. In addition to the editorial areas chosen while developing the Encyclopedia, we have added a number of categories: Theorists, Schools and

Theoretical Approaches, Macrosociological Theories, Comparative and Historical Sociology, Psychoanalytic Theory, Postmodern Theory, Politics and Government, Method and Metatheory, and Economic Sociology. Furthermore, we have included a category for Other/Multiple National Traditions. This category includes all those theorists who do not belong to the four national traditions identified in this introduction. No doubt, such distinctions are difficult to make, and particular theorists who have worked in more than one national tradition might identify themselves differently than we have here or may even consider the notion of national traditions unimportant. We find this category useful in distinguishing theorists who do not easily fall within the traditions noted earlier. In all, the headings used in this Reader's Guide were chosen not only because they represent notable areas of study within social theory (both past and present) but also because these themes were well represented in the encyclopedia both within and across seemingly independent editorial areas. These categories are primarily guides for accessing materials within the encyclopedia and should not be taken as definitive of the major areas of study within social theory. Finally, entries have not been assigned to only one category. Most entries appear under two or more headings.

As with all such efforts, the creation of this encyclopedia had its highs and lows. The editors performed well and did what was expected of them. In fact, in most cases, the editors performed far beyond anything we could have hoped, and deep gratitude is owed to them, indeed to all the editors. In one case, an editor was forced to resign relatively early in the process but was replaced by a team that completed the task with aplomb.

Of course, much the same story applies to the authors of the entries in this volume. There were a few "no-shows" and "dropouts," and they were generally replaced with little difficulty. A few people were late with their submissions. However, in the end, virtually everything we wanted to see in the encyclopedia is here, authored by scholars well qualified to write the material. As we have looked over what has been produced here, we find ourselves more than pleased with the results. Most of the authors have outdone themselves and

in some cases have produced entries that far exceed what we could have ever hoped for. The merits of this volume are directly traceable to the work of the editorial board and, especially, of the hundreds of authors.

A word about the managing editors, Todd Stillman and Jeff Stepnisky. It is they who did the truly hard work involved in bringing this mammoth project to a successful completion. They handled *all* of the day-to-day tasks involved in producing this encyclopedia, including the regular contact and seemingly endless e-mails with editors, authors, and personnel at Sage. Their hard work freed up the editor to concentrate on matters of substance and multiple readings of each entry.

Finally, a word of thanks to Sage Publications, especially to Rolf Janke, vice president and head of the reference division. Rolf believed in this project from the beginning, provided all of the technical support we needed, and offered a supportive environment in which to work. We thank him as well as other Sage people who were involved along the way, including Sara Tauber, Vince Burns, Yvette Pollastrini, Denise Santoyo, Carla Freeman, Barbara Coster, and Linda Gray. At the University of Maryland, Laura Mamo, Michael Ryan, James Murphy, and Jon Lemich provided crucial aid in bringing the project to completion. We thank all of those who have been involved with the project. Because of their efforts, we are confident that the *Encyclopedia of Social Theory* will stand as an important resource for social thought well into the twenty-first century.

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About the Editorial Board

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George Ritzer is Distinguished University Professor at the University of Maryland. Among his awards are an Honorary Doctorate from La Trobe University, Australia, and the American Sociological Association's Distinguished Contribution to Teaching Award. He has chaired the American Sociological Association's Section on Theoretical Sociology, as well as the Section on Organizations and Occupations. Among his books in metatheory are *Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science* and *Metatheorizing in Sociology*. In the application of social theory to the social world, his books include *The McDonaldization of Society*, *Enchanting a Disenchanted World*, and *The Globalization of Nothing*. Sage has published two volumes of his collected works, one in theory and the other in the application of theory to the social world, especially consumption. In the latter area, he is cofounding editor of the *Journal of Consumer Culture*. He has edited the *Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists* and coedited the *Handbook of Social Theory*. His various textbooks have defined the field of social theory for over two decades. His books have been translated into over 20 languages, with over a dozen translations of *The McDonaldization of Society* alone.

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
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ACTOR NETWORK THEORY

Actor network theory (ANT), also known as enrolment theory or the sociology of translation, emerged during the mid-1980s, primarily with the work of Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law. ANT is a conceptual frame for exploring collective *sociotechnical* processes, whose spokespersons have paid particular attention to science and technologic activity. Stemming from a Science and Technologies Studies (STS) interest in the elevated status of scientific knowledge and counter to heroic accounts or innovation models, ANT suggests that the work of science is not fundamentally different from other social activities. ANT privileges neither natural (realism) nor cultural (social constructivism) accounts of scientific production, asserting instead that science is a process of heterogeneous engineering in which the social, technical, conceptual, and textual are puzzled together (or juxtaposed) and transformed (or translated).

As one of many anti-essentialist movements, ANT does not differentiate between science (knowledge) and technology (artifact). Similarly, proponents do not subscribe to the division between society and nature, truth and falsehood, agency and structure, context and content, human and non-human, microlevel phenomenon and macrolevel phenomenon, or knowledge and power. Nature and society, subjectivity and structure, and fact and fiction are all effects of collective activity. ANT advances a *relational materiality*, the material extension of semiotics, which presupposes that all entities achieve significance in relation to others. Science, then, is a network of heterogeneous elements realized within a set of diverse practices.

THE ACTOR IN ANT

Taking seriously the agency of nonhumans (machines, animals, texts, and hybrids, among others), the ANT network

is conceived as a heterogeneous amalgamation of textual, conceptual, social, and technical actors. The “volitional actor” for ANT, termed *actant*, is any agent, collective or individual, that can associate or disassociate with other agents. Actants enter into networked associations, which in turn define them, name them, and provide them with substance, action, intention, and subjectivity. In other words, actants are considered foundationally indeterminate, with no a priori substance or essence, and it is via the networks in which they associate that actants derive their nature. Furthermore, actants themselves develop as networks. Actors are combinations of symbolically invested “things,” “identities,” relations, and inscriptions, networks capable of nesting within other diverse networks.

THE NETWORK IN ANT

The terms *actor* and *network* are linked in an effort to bypass the distinction between agency and structure, a core preoccupation within sociology (as well as other disciplines). This distinction is neither useful nor necessary for ANT theorists, as macrolevel phenomena are conceived as networks that become more extensive and stabilized. Networks are processual, built activities, performed by the actants out of which they are composed. Each node and link is semiotically derived, making networks local, variable, and contingent.

Analytically, ANT is interested in the ways in which networks overcome resistance and strengthen internally, gaining coherence and consistence (stabilize); how they organize (juxtapose elements) and convert (translate) network elements; how they prevent actors from following their own proclivity (become durable); how they enlist others to invest in or follow the program (enroll); how they bestow qualities and motivations to actors (establish roles as scripts); how they become increasingly transportable and “useful” (simplify); and how they become functionally indispensable (as obligatory points of passage).

THE THEORY IN ANT

ANT is considered as much a method as a theory; anti-essentialism informs both the conceptual frame used for interpretation and guides the processes through which networks are examined. ANT advances three methodological principles. The first is *agnosticism*, which advocates abandoning any a priori assumptions of the nature of networks, causal conditions, or the accuracy of actant's accounts. ANT imposes impartiality and requires that all interpretations be unprivileged. The second principle is *generalized symmetry*, employing a single explanatory frame when interpreting actants, human and nonhuman. Investigators should never shift registers to examine individuals and organizations, bugs and collectors, or computers and their programmers. The third is *free association*, which advocates abandoning any distinction between natural and social phenomenon. These distinctions are the effects of networked activity, are not causal, and cannot provide explanation.

In line with its ethnomethodological roots, ANT theorists describe networks by "following the actor" into translations. Interested in contextual conversions as well as alterations in content, ANT advocates entering scientific debates prior to closure, examining *science in the making*.

THE CORE CONCEPT: TRANSLATION

For ANT theorists, the "success" of science is attributable to the ability of scientific networks: to force entities to pass through labs or clinics in order to harness "scientific evidence" within disputes; to translate materials, actors, and texts into *inscriptions* that allow influence at a distance; and to organize as *centers of translation* where network elements are defined and controlled, and strategies for translation are developed and considered.

Within all sociotechnical networks, relational effects result from disputes between actors, such as attempts at the advancement of a particular program, which necessarily results in social asymmetry. Therefore, ANT can also be considered a theory of the mechanics of power: the stabilization and reproduction of some interactions at the behest of others, the construction and maintenance of network centers and peripheries, and the establishment of hegemony. Rather than power as possession, power is persuasion, "measured" via the number of entities networked. Power is generated in a relational and distributed manner as a consequence of *ordering struggles*.

Central to ordering struggles is the concept of displacement, inherent in the process of translation. Translation (transport with deformation), as distinguishable from diffusion (transfer without distortion), is both a process and effect. Scientific knowledge and artifacts are translated as networks become more extensive and/or concentrated and as subsequent iterations emerge. Network actants, as well

as the relations that bind them, are translated as networks change. Thus, translation is the process of establishing identities and the conditions of interaction, and of characterizing representations.

However, translation is always at the same time a process of both social and physical displacement. Network elements deviate from previous inclinations are converted to *inscriptions* or *immutable mobiles* (combinable textual, cartographic, or visual representations that remain stable through space and time), are defined and ascribed roles, and are mobilized and/or circulated through translation. The realization of a set of networked possibilities entails that others are always unrealized. As effect, translation orders, and produces society and agency, nature and machine.

Translation is the process of converting entities, of making similar (such that one entity may be substituted for another) or simplifying (black-boxing or translating network elements into a single block) while retaining difference (translation is not simply transfer). In this sense, translation is also *betrayal*, of origins and of solidity. In short, translation is both a practice (making equivalent) and an outcome (both realized effects and the displacement of alternative possibilities), understood in terms of the translator, the translated, and the translation medium.

Networks characterized by a high level of *convergence* are those that demonstrate agreement as a result of translation. That is, converged networks are those that are both highly aligned and coordinated. *Alignment* describes the degree to which networks are defined by a common history and a shared space. *Coordination* refers to the adoption of convention, codification, and translation regiments. Tightly converged networks may also demonstrate strong *irreversibilisation*. The degree of irreversibility a network demonstrates refers to the capacity to return to a previous iteration of the network, as well as the degree to which subsequent translations are determined. Tightly converged and highly co-coordinated networks are, in other words, those that are simplified through translation.

Simplified networks, when resulting in single-point actants, are those that are *punctualized* or are *black-boxed*. Punctualized networks are considered only in terms of their input and output, are "taken for granted," or are counted as resource. Computed axial tomography (CAT) scans, despite their internal complexity; genes, despite their controversial nature; or the National Academy of Sciences, despite the expense of entities enrolled, may become black-boxed.

Black boxes, however, may always be reopened. Networks demand continual maintenance because order is always provisional. As a set of dynamic alliances, networks are subject to possible desertion or competitor recruitment. Furthermore, the stabilization of a network, however temporary, involves the successful dismissal an *antiprogram* through prevailing in a *trial of strength* (the direct confrontation of a claim or a spokesperson). A *spokesperson*

speaks on the behalf of others, the entities he, she, or it constitutes (animals or machines who do not speak or masses of humans who defer to the spokespersons). Thus, spokespersons simplify networks of others (who may or may not consent) by representing their interests, attributing identity, establishing roles, and advancing a course of action. Outside actants may challenge a network's spokesperson (the validity or reliability of the representation) or confront an advanced claim (the "truthfulness" of the assertion or the efficacy of its measurements). Thus, domination is inherently both contestable and reversible.

SITUATING ANT

Emerging during the mid-1980s, ANT was situated within the sociology of science and technology. Traceable through semiotics/structuralism and into poststructuralism, ANT shares some similarities with Foucauldian material-semiotics and borrows from his conception of power/knowledge.

One can also identify parallels between Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the assemblage and the ANT network as dispersed, dynamic, performative, and topographical. Theorists have also remained faithful to ethnomethodology, acknowledging the built nature of sociotechnical networks and advocating an examination of the taken for granted.

Throughout the 1980s, ANT had not coalesced into a single theoretical perspective. Theorists presupposed that advancing a single set of principles was counter to the desire to sustain ANT as a diverse and dispersed set of practices with transformative properties. However, because of the portability of its fundamental concepts, ANT became a *fixed center* or *obligatory point of passage* by the mid-1990s. Essentially, ANT was black-boxed.

Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, ANT was scathingly criticized: (1) as managerialist, (2) as emphasizing Nietzschean mastery, (3) as Machiavellian, (4) as colonizing "the other," (5) as antihumanist, and (6) as representing the powerful. By the end of the century, proponents engaged in a number of reactive/next-stage strategies. Some theorists advocated fundamental transformations. For example, recognition of the generative and corroborative potential of networked description led to the elevated import of decentering as vital to centering and "the other" as essential to network consolidation. Other representatives merged ANT with additional theoretical perspectives; ambivalence, oscillation, performance, and mobility surfaced as networked possibilities. Finally, sensitive to the betrayal of origins, Latour (1999) simply advocated, "abandoning what was wrong with ANT, that is 'actor,' 'network,' 'theory' without forgetting the hyphen" (p. 24).

— Cassandra S. Crawford

See also Ethnomethodology; Latour, Bruno; Semiology; Social Studies of Science

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AFFECT CONTROL THEORY

Affect control theory links social identities, actions, and emotions in a control system. In a control system, the processes operate to maintain a reference level (like a thermostat setting). In affect control theory, the reference levels are the affective meanings that are linked to labels for identities and actions. People learn these meanings (how good, how powerful, and how active things are) from their cultures. When they enter social interactions, they define situations with verbal labels, such as "I'm a teacher, and the person entering my office is an undergraduate student." The act of thinking about the situation in that way automatically evokes meanings about what teachers and undergraduate students are like on the three dimensions of goodness, powerfulness, and activity levels. The basic principle of affect control is that people expect, enact, and interpret actions that will *maintain* these culturally given meanings for the social identities and actions that occur in the situation. David R. Heise developed the theory from Charles Osgood's work on the semantic differential as a method for measuring affective meanings, from Harry Gollob's research on impression formation, and from William T. Power's control theory of perception.

The maintenance of meaning is what makes affect control theory a control system: The culturally learned meanings are stable aspects of how we think about our social world, and

they act as a reference level for interpreting what happens in social interactions. Events that occur can disturb the way people seem at any given moment (e.g., we can judge that the undergraduate student is lying to us, something we would not expect an occupant of a fundamentally good, slightly weak, very lively identity to do). When interactions are disturbed by events that don't maintain their cultural identity meanings, people tend to do things in ways that restore those meanings. So, a professor who thinks a student is lying to her might create a new event, such as "the professor challenges the student" that, when comprehended, would restore a sense that the student and professor were acting in ways that were expected or right. The theory does not require that this process be conscious: The professor may not be aware of trying to restore his or her identity and that of the student. But the action that will produce restoration is the predicted one.

If a new event cannot be enacted to restore their and others' identities, actors may instead change the way they are thinking about the situation in order to have the social interaction make sense. For example, if we see a news story that a priest has molested a child, this event is very hard to reconcile with our cultural meanings of priests as good, powerful, quiet people and children as good, weak, and lively. The mathematical equations (estimated from people's reactions to many different events) that form the empirical base of affect control theory tell us that good people are very unlikely to do very bad things to other good people. Such events cause massive changes in our impressions about the people involved (making us think that the priest is a much nastier, weaker, more active person than we expect priests to be, among other things). Since we cannot respond behaviorally to such an event, we are likely to try to find cognitive ways of dealing with it by redefining the situation. If the facts are ambiguous, a reader might assume that the action never happened and that the priest is being framed or persecuted. If the action is well anchored in the account, we may hold the parts of the event that we are sure of as given (the child and the molestation) and ask ourselves, "What kind of a person would do such an act?" The theory can model the construction of this new identity. Concretely, affect control theory uses mathematical equations to solve for the three-dimensional profile (of goodness, powerfulness, and activity) that would fit such an event. Such processing would produce an identity more like rapist or fiend than priest. So, when events occur that do not allow behavioral action to restore identity and action meanings, people relabel the situation instead. They come to see the actions in a different light (It wasn't a lie, it was just a misunderstanding) or label people with new identities (He's not a priest, he's a fiend). The theory views social actors as composites of many identities, one of which may be highlighted in a given situation because of institutional or affective constraints.

In affect control theory, emotions that people experience are a combination of the situated identity the person occupies

(which is coded as a position on the three dimensions of goodness, powerfulness, and activity) and the ways in which events have shifted those meanings within the situation. When social interaction is serving to sustain people's identities (as affect control theory predicts that it usually will), emotions are a direct function of the identity meanings. So, acting as a friend will make you feel nicer than acting as a critic. Occupying stigmatized (low-evaluation, low-potency) identities leads to negative, powerless emotions. It makes people feel depressed and anxious. On the other hand, occupying high-status, powerful identities and operating to maintain their meanings leads to positive emotion.

Events fail to support identity meanings when people enter a situation with differing definitions of the situation (I think that you're a chum, while you think that you're my boss); when actions are misinterpreted (Your advice seems like criticism to me); or when physical/institutional constraints keep people from creating confirming events (I have to vote against tenuring a junior colleague who is my friend). After disturbing events, emotions signal both the new impressions that individuals have formed of themselves in their identities and the directions in which their identities have been deflected from their original, fundamental identity meanings. Therefore, a person who has hurt a friend might still view him- or herself as "friend" in the situation, but the transient, situated meanings of that identity after the hurtful act would produce much more negative feelings than the identity usually evokes. The person would feel bad, both because the situated meaning of the identity was negatively evaluated and because the deflection had moved it in a downward direction from an initially positive position.

— Lynn Smith-Lovin

See also Identity; Role Theory; Self; Social Interaction; Symbolic Interaction

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AGENCY-STRUCTURE INTEGRATION

One of the most important developments in recent European social theory has been the move toward an integration of agency and structure theories and theorists. This development parallels the rise of interest found in (generally) American sociology in the micro-macro integration. There are, however, important differences to be noted.

Agency, although it generally refers to microlevel actors, can also refer to macrolevel collectives that act. In other words, any social being, whether an individual or a collective, can be considered to have agency. Similarly, *structure*, although it usually refers to macrolevel structures, can also refer to microlevel phenomena, such as human interaction. Thus, the definition of both structure and agency can refer to either micro- or macrolevel phenomena.

The best way to illustrate what is meant by agency-structure integration is to give several examples of endeavors in this area. Perhaps the best-known effort is found in the work of Anthony Giddens (1984, 1989) and his structuration theory. Broadly, structuration theory is an attempt to theorize the relationship between agency and structure. Giddens draws on an exceptional number of theories, both critiquing them and drawing valuable resources from them. In the end, he rejects all theories with a strong agency or structure bias in favor of his theory, which he claims begins with “recurrent social practices” (Giddens 1989:252). He claims that agency and structure cannot and should not be thought of as separate forces, but rather as a duality existing in a dialectical relationship to one another. The two are indiscernible and coexisting in all forms of human activity.

Although the focus of Giddens’s work begins with recurrent social practices, he is adamant that these practices are recursive. In other words, by engaging in activities as actors, or what he calls “practice,” people are simultaneously constructing their own individual consciousnesses as well as the overall structure. Both consciousness and structure are produced and reinforced by practice, and both affect the way in which practice is played out. Giddens also develops the idea of the “double hermeneutic” to describe the difference in the way actors and sociologists use language. He says we should be concerned with the disparity in the language by which actors describe their own actions and the language used by sociologists to describe those actions. The way in which sociologists articulate what they are studying can have an effect on that phenomenon and hence may alter their findings.

Margaret Archer (1982) has developed another form of agency-structure integration, which looks at the linkage between agency and culture. She uses the term “culture” to refer to nonmaterial phenomena and ideas as opposed to structure, which she defines as material phenomena and interests. Although she acknowledges that the distinction

between culture and structure is a conceptual one, since they are largely intertwined in the real world, she still argues that the two are not interchangeable and should, in fact, be kept distinct.

Archer’s theory focuses on morphogenesis, or the process whereby intricate interchanges in the system lead not only to change in the overall structure of that system but also to an end product of structural elaboration. The opposite of this, morphostasis, refers to an absence of change. The process of morphogenesis involves properties that emerge from actions and interactions but are also distinct from them. It also implies that existing structures can act back on actions and interactions in a dialectical fashion. Both morphogenesis and morphostasis are processes that occur over time and focus on the infinite number of potential structural changes, alterations in action and interaction, and structural elaboration that are possible.

Archer’s theory is an attempt to develop a systems theory alternative to, and a critique of, Giddens’s structuration theory. One of the most distinct differences between Archer’s work and that of Giddens is her case for the benefits of using dualities. Archer believes that agency and culture are indeed separate entities and that denying this separation denies the possibility of examining the effects of one upon the other. She is also critical of Giddens’s theory, as she sees it as too open-ended. In contrast, her theory tends toward structural elaboration.

Another prominent theorist to attempt agency-structure integration is the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990). His theory of habitus and field is animated by his desire to break down what he sees as the unnecessary barrier between objectivism (largely structure) and subjectivism (largely agency). He focuses on the dialectical relationship between the two and what he sees as the outcome of this dialectic, or practice. His theory implies that practice is neither the result of unconstrained free will nor entirely coerced by some outside force.

Bourdieu’s theory is built around what he calls “constructivist structuralism.” He is concerned with the way in which actors view their social world, based on their location in it. This viewpoint, however, is affected by the structure of the social world, which provides both the setting for and the constraints on the perceptions of actors. Bourdieu’s interest lies in the relationship (not always dialectical) between social and mental structures.

Bourdieu uses the terms “habitus” and “field” to describe the two major components of his theory. *Habitus* refers to the cognitive structures people use to deal with the social world. It is a “structuring structure” in that it is both structured by and structures the way actors deal with the outside social world. Each individual has a different habitus, and it is based on the position one has within the larger social environment. In other words, it is affected by things such as age, wealth, sex, physical appearance, occupation,

and so on. *Field*, on the other hand, is not a structure, but rather a term used to describe the series of relationships between the positions in it. It does not describe interactions or social ties between the objective locations within it, but rather exists independently of whatever actors or institutions are a part of it and acts to constrain them. It is a type of battlefield where the positions in it fight to improve their positions by means of drawing upon their stock of various kinds of capital (social, economic, symbolic, cultural).

Jürgen Habermas (1987, 1991) is another contemporary theorist who has tried to integrate structure and agency with his theory of the “colonization of the lifeworld.” Habermas, whose main focus is on communicative action and promoting free and open speech, fears the encroachment of what he calls the “system on the lifeworld.” He defines the system as the realm of formal rationality (using Weber’s terms) and the lifeworld as the realm of substantive rationality. The colonization of the lifeworld, therefore, involves an increase in formal rationality at the expense of substantive rationality. This idea is similar to that of Weber’s on the iron cage of rationality.

The lifeworld is an internal perspective that guides the way actors perceive the outside world (or the system). It is one way (the system is the other) of looking at the same society. Habermas ties it heavily to communicative action and fears that both are becoming increasingly constrained. This constraint, in turn, leads to a “growing differentiation between culture, society, and personality” (Habermas 1987:288).

The system is an external perspective that involves the way an outside actor not involved in society would view things. Although the system is rooted in the lifeworld, it has its own characteristics separate and distinct from the lifeworld. As these components grow and become strengthened through the maintenance-oriented actions of the lifeworld, they become more distant from and impose themselves on the lifeworld. This distancing, in turn, weakens the functions of the system (corresponding to those of the lifeworld) of cultural reproduction, social integration, and personality formation.

Overall, the move toward agency-structure integration in Europe has become what many there consider the major issue in modern social theory. Theorists such as Giddens, Archer, Bourdieu, and Habermas have developed theories that attempt to bring together both agency and structure (although each uses slightly different terms to describe these two concepts) into one integrated paradigm. Paralleling the rise of micro-macro integration in the United States, agency-structure integration is likely to be a focal point in European social theory in the coming years.

— Michael Ryan

See also Bourdieu, Pierre; Giddens, Anthony; Habermas, Jürgen; Habitus; Micro-Macro Integration

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AGIL

Talcott Parsons’s AGIL schema summarizes the four functional requisites or imperatives of any system of action: adaptation (A), goal attainment (G), integration (I), and latent pattern maintenance (L). Also known as the four-function paradigm, the AGIL schema specifies for structural-functional theory the needs of any living system and how that system maintains order in relation to both its external environment and internal organization. Parsons argued that the AGIL schema could be employed in the analysis and study of both abstract systems of action and actually existing, concrete societies. Parsons, in collaboration with Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils, first formulated the AGIL schema in the *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (1953).

One must first locate the AGIL schema at the highest level of abstraction found in structural-functional social theory, the general theory of action. One key tenet of the general theory of action states that any complex of actions or behaviors may be characterized as a system of action in which the parts interact with one another and with the external environment of the system. Each part of the system performs certain functions for the maintenance of the system as a whole. Some of these functions involve the relationship of the system to its external environment, while

others involve the interrelationship of the parts of the system to each other and to the whole. In addition, functions may be characterized as either consummatory or instrumental. The former describes functions concerning the determination of the ends or goals of a system, while the latter describes functions concerning the means with which the system pursues its ends. Four functional requisites of any system emerge from the superimposition of these two distinctions:

- Adaptation is an *instrumental* function by which a system adapts to its *external* environment or adapts the external environment to the system.
- Goal attainment is a *consummatory* function that defines the goals and ends of a system and mobilizes resources to attain them. Goal attainment is generally oriented *externally*.
- Integration is a *consummatory* function that manages the interrelationships of the parts of a system. The integration function maintains *internal* coherence and solidarity within the system.
- Latent pattern maintenance is an *instrumental* function that supplies all actors in the system with a source of motivation. It provides normative patterns and manages the tensions of actors *internal* to the system.

Parsons and his colleagues argued that any system of action could be further broken down into subsystems of action, each of which corresponds to one of the AGIL functions. The *behavioral organism* performs the adaptation function, and although it is the subsystem that adapts to and transforms the physical world, Parsons devoted much more energy to analyzing the other three subsystems. The *personality*, or personality system, performs the goal attainment function insofar as it defines objectives and mobilizes resources for the pursuit of ends. The *social system* performs the function of integration by means of generating solidarity and loyalty, defining acceptable and unacceptable actions, granting rewards, and enforcing constraints. For Parsons, the social system consists of manifold interactions between ego and alter, norms and values, sanctions, status-roles, and social institutions. Parsons insisted that social theorists could analyze many phenomena—from firms to entire societies—as social systems. The *cultural system* performs the function of latent pattern maintenance by supplying motivation to actors through ordered sets of symbols and institutionalized patterns to the system as a whole. Parsons placed a great deal of emphasis on the importance of the cultural system for the stability of action systems.

The four subsystems are analytically distinct from and irreducible from one another, but one must remember that they are interrelated and interdependent in many ways. Note that the four subsystems are each analytical and heuristic tools that do not correspond directly to reality; rather, they are aids for thinking about how systems function.

Parsons argued that just as an abstract system of action can be analyzed in terms of the four functional imperatives and the corresponding subsystems of action, so concrete societies (as opposed to social systems) could be studied in terms of their constituent subsystems. Parsons thus argued that any given society (which could be an empire or a tribe but was generally considered as a nation-state) consists of an economy, a polity, a fiduciary system, and a societal community.

The *economy* performs the function of adaptation by means of the labor through which goods are produced and distributed. The economy thereby assists a society in adapting to and transforming its environment. The *polity*, which Parsons defines broadly to include many forms of defining societal objectives, making decisions, and mobilizing resources (e.g., firms and social movements as well as the state), carries out the function of goal attainment. The *societal community* performs the function of integration and thereby coordinates the various institutions of society and maintains the ties of interdependency between its members. Religion, law, or citizenship in the nation help to create coordination, consent, coercion, and the ties of solidarity that promote stability and order in a society. Here, Parsons's work on the AGIL schema owes a great deal to the thinking of Émile Durkheim. The *fiduciary system* carries out the function of latent pattern maintenance. The fiduciary system is Parsons's formulation of socialization, which he argued was carried out primarily by the family and schools, although other institutions, such as the media, could also contribute to this function. The fiduciary system transmits and instills norms, values, and patterned sets of symbols to the members of a society, thus providing them with motivation.

— James M. Murphy

See also General Systems Theory; Parsons, Talcott; Structural Functionalism

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ALEXANDER, JEFFREY

Jeffrey C. Alexander (b. 1947) is one of America's most prominent social theorists. Throughout his career, Alexander has waged an aggressive campaign in defense of general theory. Steering a middle course between radical relativism (especially in its postmodern form) and traditional positivism, Alexander's postpositivist epistemology, elaborated in the first volume of *Theoretical Logic in Sociology* (1982–1983) and *Fin-de-Siècle Social Theory* (1995), presents a nuanced case in support of decentered reason and the universalizing thrust of social theory, while reproving the reduction of theory to fact. The remaining three volumes of *Theoretical Logic* join postpositivism to an ecumenical impulse that aims at transcending the interminable debates between warring schools. Multidimensionality is the most sophisticated expression of this synthesizing ambition. Alexander depicts social science as a continuum stretching from the abstract to the concrete. Presuppositions are this continuum's most general and decisive element, and action and order are the key presuppositions. Historically, sociologists have addressed action by selecting either rational approaches that portray action as an instrumental adaptation to material conditions or non-rational perspectives that highlight how internal dispositions mediate the relationship between actors and their (external) environments. Order has been addressed by either individualist theories that portray it as the product of individual negotiations or choice, or collectivist paradigms that explain it in terms of the emergent properties of social organization itself. These one-sided depictions of action and order have produced more heat than light, and Alexander offers multidimensionality as a presuppositional synthesis that breaks through this analytic impasse. Multidimensionality actually involves two distinct syntheses, the first (and stronger) of which holds that action is shaped both by rational adaptations to external conditions and actors' subjective commitments. The weaker synthesis recommends a collectivistic stance to order while acknowledging that individualistic theories, with their elucidation of the contingent dimensions of action, supply useful empirical insights into how social structures are (re)produced and transformed.

Multidimensionality's primary purpose is evaluative and prescriptive. Postpositivism holds that social science is a two-tiered process, propelled as much by theoretical logic as by empirical evidence. Consequently, sociological theory and research should be assessed not only by reference to facts but also in terms of their presuppositions. In *Theoretical Logic, Twenty Lectures* (1987) and innumerable other critical readings, Alexander demonstrates how classic and contemporary formulations falling short of multidimensionality are rent by internal inconsistencies, residual categories,

conflated levels of analysis, and empirical anomalies. These weaknesses prompt ad hoc revisions, but so long as the framework's presuppositions fall short of multidimensionality, there are fundamental debilities that no amount of tinkering and fine-tuning can remedy. Ultimately, there is only one viable solution to these theoretical dilemmas and empirical shortcomings: Sociological theory and research must be reconstructed along multidimensional lines.

Alexander's middle-range contributions to the study of social change, culture, and civil society complement his general theorizing. *Differentiation and Social Change* (1990) reconstructs Durkheim's and Parsons's neoevolutionary explanations of modernity, arguing that accounts depicting structural differentiation as an adaptation to environmental exigencies should be supplemented with in-depth, historical investigations that examine how institutional entrepreneurs, research mobilization, coalition formation, and group competition and conflict affect the course of differentiation. He also presents a more inclusive conception of the consequences of differentiation, noting that in addition to increased efficiency and reintegration, highly differentiated societies spawn considerable anxiety, various pathologies, and new forms of conflict within and between differentiated institutions.

Cultural sociology is a principal focus of Alexander's current efforts. Comprised of symbolic sets, culture patterns action as surely as more visible material conditions. The partial autonomy of culture is assured because meaning derives not from the concrete referent signified by a symbol, but from the interrelations of symbols themselves. Culture structures reality cognitively, and it also performs crucial evaluative tasks. In *Durkheimian Sociology* (1988), Alexander argues that sacred symbols supply images of purity and oblige those committed to them to protect their referents from harm. Profane symbols embody this harm, providing images of pollution and danger, and identifying groups and actions that must be defended against. In *Evil and Good* (2001), he asserts that cultural systems are no less preoccupied with the "negative" than they are with the "positive": The bad, evil, and undesirable are central components of all cultural systems and are symbolized every bit as elaborately as the good, right, and desirable. For Alexander, the conflict between good and bad functions inside culture as an internal dynamic; contention and negation are culturally coded and expected; repression, exclusion, and domination are vital elements of symbol systems; and pollution and purification are key ritual processes evident even in ostensibly secular societies. Alexander employs his cultural sociology to shed new light on a variety of phenomena, ranging from Watergate to technology and social theory itself.

Alexander is also investigating the emergence and transformation of civil society. *Real Civil Societies* (1998) describes the civil sphere as an arena analytically and empirically differentiated from other institutions (e.g., the

state and market) and gives particular attention to the solidary aspects of the modern civil realm. Civil solidarity revolves around a distinctive type of universalizing community, an inclusive “we-ness” that comes gradually to be defined and enforced. The growth of the civil realm is far from inevitable, and moments of expansion are frequently followed by periods of particularistic retrenchment. The ebb and flow of civil solidarity are partially due to the interrelations between civil and noncivil spheres, and Alexander examines these boundary relations in terms of three ideal-typical forms: destructive intrusions, civil repairs, and facilitating inputs. He amplifies this model of civil society, contingent conception of inclusion, and systemic analysis of boundary relations by examining the discursive strategies fought by social movements championing a more egalitarian society. In *The Possibilities of Justice* (forthcoming), Alexander presents a provocative reinterpretation of the civil rights movement, emphasizing its ability to translate the exclusion of African Americans into a profane transgression against the sacred core of American civil society.

— Paul Colomy

See also Civil Society; Durkheim, Émile; Metatheory; Structural Functionalism

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ALIENATION

Alienation: a romantic image of great influence, claiming that we are not and cannot be at home in the modern

world, but must be powerfully alienated from it. The idea is connected especially to the work of the young Karl Marx, where it is central to the so-called *Paris Manuscripts* of 1844. It came to represent a key concern into the 1960s, when these writings of the young Marx were first translated into English, coinciding with the emergence of the counterculture across America and Europe. The idea of alienation has significant precedents in the work of Rousseau and Schiller. There, it was the human spirit in struggle against modern civilization. For the early Rousseau, the self was at home in nature; civilization was an artefact, a blot on the landscape. For Schiller, the industrial division of labour resulted in the division or dissection of the human individual. This became a key theme or sensibility in Marx’s work, through to *Capital*: “To subdivide a person is to execute them.” Thus the connection with counterculture radicalism, anticonservatism, and opposition to war and bureaucracy: “I am an individual, do not bend, fold, or spindle.”

The idea of alienation in its broadest use therefore reflects this romantic intellectual theme and its popular rendition into the 1960s. It responds to what Cornelius Castoriadis would call the “demand of autonomy.” By the 60s, it came to represent a more generalized sense of being “out of it.” For Marx, in contrast, alienation had a more precise and detailed meaning; and though the *Paris Manuscripts* are often incomplete, and suggestive more than substantive, Marx’s views on alienation are clear and strong, and typologized. Alienation, for Marx, refers centrally to the alienation of labour. The early Marx holds creative labour to be the essence of humanity. To live is to act, to transform the world and the self. Labour is the medium of this process. Marx thus works out of a tradition of philosophical anthropology, for which humanity is defined as creative or generative and social institutions are subjected to criticism on the grounds that they work against such qualities. What is wrong with capitalism, for the young Marx, is not that it is unfair or inefficient in its distribution, but that it denies the human essence. It denies the right creatively to labour. In the German language, some tension exists regarding what in English we call alienation. Literally, alienation is *Entfremdung*, where *fremd* is strange or alien, which of course presumes this prior original condition. Marx also refers, however, to *Entausserung*, which is usually translated as objectification. Human animals objectify themselves; we make our worlds; the bee makes its too, but we design ours first in our heads. Objectification is not stigmatic or negative in the way that alienation is; it refers to the expressionist sense of *Ausdruck*, that culture results from expressing something that is held to be innate in us (or in some of us).

Marx’s typology of alienation shifts through four stages or movements, all connected to this ontology of labour. As Marx explains it, alienated labour involves, first, alienation

from the object of labour, the thing produced. Alienation is a hard material fact; I produce for the other, for the master; I relinquish control over the results of production. I give over of my self and my labour to the other. I objectify myself, here, but not in circumstances of my choosing; the necessary act of *Entausserung*, or objectification, is turned under the relations of private property into *Entfremdung*. Alienated labour involves, second, alienation from the process of production. Marx's ultimate value concern is with human activity and not the distribution of things. Humans are defined by their creative capacities. To be denied of the process creatively to labour is to be denied our humanity. This is the ontologically most significant aspect of alienation: alienation from the capacity to create, or to transform the world, nature, and culture through labour. Third, Marx insists, there is an additional dynamic. As we are alienated from the results of the process and the process of labour itself, so are we alienated from each other, from our fellows, with whom we ought really cooperate rather than compete or remain indifferent toward. We are therefore alienated from each other in the process of alienated labour. Fourth, Marx argues at a more abstract level (and this category disappears from his later work) that when we alienate our labour, we are alienated from the human essence as species-being (*Gattungswesen*). This seems to be an abstract extension of the previous claim: We alienate ourselves not only from the particularity of our immediate coworkers but also from the generality of humanity as such.

The young Marx retains this kind of cosmological naturalism or humanism. It reflects his conversion via Feuerbach to the idea that we endow God (or capital) with power, denying it to ourselves. In its totality, this argument appeals in its antimodernism. It implies preference for the nonalienated world before capitalism, of a kind that is often associated with Tönnies in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. Where for Rousseau or Schiller, the source of the problem is modern civilization, for Marx it is modernity as capitalism. In Marx's later work, the figure of alienation gives way to that of commodification, where commodification includes the commodification of labour-power. After Marx, with Lukács and via Simmel, the idea refigures as reification, thingification, the transformation of process into an apparently unmovable world of things that appears to precede us and to control us, as if by magic. The idea of the *Fremder*, or stranger, is recast by Simmel as a modern personality-type. Marx's prepossession with labour as the defining activity of humanity becomes a focus of critique for Hannah Arendt and later Jürgen Habermas, where politics or communication is viewed as central rather than labour.

— Peter Beilharz

See also Capitalism; Lukács, György; Marx, Karl

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ALTHUSSER, LOUIS

Louis Althusser (1918–1990) was born in Birmandries, in Algeria, to a petit-bourgeois, Catholic family. His father, Charles Althusser, was a bank manager and had all the traits of the authoritarian colonialist personality. The young Louis was fascinated by monastic life and remained a believer until after World War II.

In 1939, Althusser began his *agrégation* in philosophy at the prestigious École Normale Supérieure (Rue d'Ulm) in Paris, but the war intervened, so it was not until 1946, after a period in a German prison camp, that he could continue his studies, taking his *agrégation* in 1948, the same year that he joined the French Communist Party. After this, Althusser became the *caïman* of the École Normale Supérieure, a position that involved preparing candidates for the *agrégation* in philosophy.

While a student at the École—and still suffering the after effects of being a prisoner of war, manifested in severe bouts of depression—Althusser met his future wife, Hélène Rytman, with whom he had a tempestuous and tragic relationship. It ended in Althusser taking his wife's life in November 1980.

Thus, despite becoming a hard-line Marxist, Althusser's biography points to a supremely tormented and conflicted individual who truly agonised over the state of the world and his own, often less-than-admirable personal traits.

This, then, is the man who became the leading thinker of Structuralist Marxism. As such, he led the movement against the humanist interpretation of Marx's work, an interpretation based on Marx's Hegelian and Feuerbachian early works. Indeed, Althusser, famously, became a theoretical antihumanist, claiming that if Marx was humanist in his theory of capital, he was little different from many other nineteenth-century, including Christian, thinkers. The most important ideas for which Althusser became well-known can be summarised in the following terms: (1) problematic, (2) symptomatic reading, (3) Marx's science (of the mode of production), (4) epistemological break, (5) overdetermination, and (6) ideology. We shall examine each of these in turn.

When considering what distinguishes Marx's theory of history and economic relations from other epistemological and ontological positions, Althusser claims that Marx was not simply the inheritor of the classical political economy framework, nor was he a philosopher in the style of Hegel's idealism and Feuerbach's humanism, even if Marx's early works, such as *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1967) are often couched in the language of Hegel (1770–1831) and Feuerbach (1804–1872). Even if in his early work Marx ponders the nature of the essence of “man,” this does not constitute the core of his originality. Moreover, while at the level of appearance, Marx seems to endorse the idea that the proletariat—like the poor in Christianity—will come to inherit the wealth of society because they are its producers and the revealers of its essence, this does not constitute Marx's originality. Instead, the significant difference that is discernible between Marx's writing of the 1840s and his work between 1857 and 1863, including *Capital*, must be interpreted. In the later writing, Marx is not looking for the essence of “man,” but for the logic of the capitalist system in history. That capitalism is a system has fundamental implications for its theorisation. To explain how Marx's originality might be couched in a language and a terminology that were sometimes evocative of an earlier philosophical era, Althusser uses the term *problematic*.

A problematic marks out a horizon of thought and is the framework within which problems are posed. At a given historical conjuncture, it limits the language and concepts that are available for expressing ideas and problems. It is the precondition of a given theoretical field of inquiry. The point, then, is that Marx was forced to use concepts and language that preceded him, namely, the language, at times, of Feuerbachian humanism and classical political economy. Marx's problematic is not the condition of the labourer or of humanity in general under capitalism, but the idea of a mode of production and its history, which is a structural notion. The real question, Althusser says, has to do with how a mode of production gives insight into the relationship between the material infrastructure and the ideological superstructure of a social formation.

To discern a new problematic in Marx's writing entails reading Marx in a rigorous way so that the similarity between the language of the problematic of classical political economy and that of Marx's problematic are not allowed to be fused together. To enable him to do this from a methodological point of view, Althusser developed the notion of a *symptomatic* reading. Following Freud's method for interpreting dreams, a symptomatic reading is not content with a literal approach to a text, but sees the manifest content as disguising a latent content, the presence of which is signalled by possible inconsistencies, contradictions, and repetitions—in other words, by symptomatic phenomena.

Related to the method of a symptomatic reading is the concept, indebted to Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) and the French tradition of epistemology, of an epistemological break. Just because a single author is deemed to have written a range of works does not mean that they are all derived from the same epistemological source. Thus, the fact that Marx's works up to 1857 rely on an Enlightenment, humanist epistemological framework does not entail that the later works do. There can be an epistemological break between works of the same author, as there can be between the works of different authors.

Part of Marx's new problematic is his discovery of the concept of the mode of production. Althusser reiterates that the mode of production is the unique object of historical materialism and that now, there is no “society,” only modes of production that evolve in history and are immanent at the different levels of the structured, social whole. The social whole is still equivalent to the determination by the economy “in the last instance.” So, the economy is still there as a determining factor, but it manifests itself only in a displaced way.

In other words, the social whole is not an expression, or reflection, of the economic infrastructure. The nature of the economic mode of production cannot be “read off” the surface effects of the whole. Instead, once again, as we find in Freud, there is the phenomenon of “overdetermination,” where the reality of the mode of production is not directly expressed in ideology or consciousness. Only the operation of science can reveal the ways in which a given mode of production impacts on the numerous levels of the social formation. Such a science itself has to avoid the empiricist notion that reality is ultimately directly reflected in symbolic forms. Science is always a construction of reality carried out according to the rule of science prevailing at a given historical moment.

Finally, Althusser in his later work developed a theory of ideology that saw it as being “without history” providing the framework in which people live their relationships to the social reality in which they are located. Subjects are formed in ideology, as it is this that locates them in the system of relationships necessary for the maintenance of unequal class relations. Ideology “hails” people as particular individuals and subjects and, in doing so, forms identities that are functional to the capitalist system of exploitation. Most of all, though, Althusser argues that ideology is not an intellectual illusion, but is a practice—the spontaneous practice through which people live everyday life. Such practices are supported by, and give support to, the “ideological state apparatuses” (school, church, legal system, family, communications, political parties) that ensure that the capitalist system keeps functioning.

— John Lechte

See also Historical Materialism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Political Economy; Social Class; Theory Construction

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ANNALES SCHOOL

The phrase "Annales school" refers to the journal *Annales d'Histoire Économique et Sociale*, founded in France in 1929 by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, and to the work of subsequent French historians such as Fernand Braudel, Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, Jacques LeGoff, Georges Duby, and others who either edited or were closely associated with this journal. The *Annales* school originated in the post-1900 European setting of cultural ferment in which historians and social scientists sought new approaches to the intellectual problems inherited from the past. Febvre and Bloch were both critical of the predominant emphasis on famous persons and events as well as the documentary methods currently advanced by historians such as Langlois and Seignebos. They were both sympathetic to a variety of new intellectual currents, including Henri Berr's quest for a synthesis of historical knowledge, the work of the geographer Vidal de la Blache, the Durkheim school of sociology, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's studies of "primitive mentalities," and the efforts of historians and economists such as Henri Pirenne and François Simiand to create a comparative history informed by scientific methods. Durkheim's *L'Année Sociologique*, founded in 1898, and Berr's *Revue de Synthèse Historique*, founded in 1900, both provided models of broadly interdisciplinary cooperation.

Much of the work leading to the formation and early history of *Annales* was accomplished at Strasbourg, where both Febvre and Bloch taught between 1920 and 1933. The environment there was well suited to new intellectual initiatives. Researchers from a variety of disciplines worked in close contact with one another. These included the historians Henri Bremond and Georges Lefebvre, who both

worked on problems of historical psychology and mentalities, as well as the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who wrote on collective memory, was a member of the Durkheim school of sociology, and was also on the original editorial board of *Annales*.

Although Braudel later protested the designation "school" to describe the work of the *Annales* group, the studies done by *Annales* historians share several distinctive perspectives that make the designation "school" generally convincing, if we are cautious to also take into account the individual and generational differences among its various members. The central orientations promoted by Febvre and Bloch, which initially defined the new approach, included a focus on problem-oriented history; the use of comparative methods in historical research; the development of a more synthetic total history; the creation of a new social history that investigates the lives of previously neglected populations, rather than only rulers and elites; the anchorage of historical research in geographical, environmental (and in the later *Annales* writers, even climatic) contexts; and, finally, study of the "mentalities" informing historical societies.

The second generation of *Annales* historians, under the added influence of Braudel and Ernest Labrousse, supplemented this overall agenda with a focus on material civilization, a strongly quantitative and statistical approach to economic and social history, and an attempt to construct serial histories tracing the precise fluctuations of not only prices, production, and availability of goods but also cultural productions such as publications, religious documents, and so forth. Accompanying these newer empirical foci was a shared delineation of three dimensions of historical time that had been only implicit in the work of Febvre and Bloch. This temporal division included (1) a short term, focused on notable persons and political events (*histoire événementielle*) largely scorned by the *Annales* group; (2) the study of shorter historical periods (e.g., one to two centuries), with a focus on the distinctive outcomes, or conjunctures, resulting from the mutual interconnections of economic and social and, to a lesser degree, cultural processes; and (3) the *longue durée* of history, focused on the impact of enduring geohistorical and civilizational structures. In general, later historians in this group have typically adopted the broad distinction between structure and conjuncture as one of their central organizing motifs.

Despite their common interest in redirecting historical scholarship, Febvre and Bloch each worked in his own distinctive direction. Febvre was a wide-ranging, restless thinker who wrote essays on a variety of topics, often to challenge other historians into new ways of approaching historical questions or establish the importance of new topics. He wrote a study of the Franche-Comté region, a geographical introduction to history published in Berr's series, *L'évolution d'humanité*, and myriad essays exploring

a wide range of historical topics, especially the Renaissance and Reformation. Febvre especially encouraged the study of the emotional climates and moral sensibilities of the past. He urged new historical studies of the history of love, hatred, fear, death, and related emotional states. Although he admired the work of the few previous investigators in these fields, such as Johan Huizinga, he was also critical of that author's book on *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (1919). He thought it provided an excessively schematic depiction of the radical alternation of emotional states in late medieval culture and argued that the ambivalence of emotional structures is found in every civilization.

Febvre was the author or coauthor of several books that figure prominently in current historical and sociological scholarship. His study (with Henri Martin) of *The Coming of the Book* (1958), published after Febvre's death, has received increasing attention more recently. Its focus on changing material culture associated with the explosion of the printed word engaged Febvre's interest in mentalities and added historical substance to the theoretical issues being raised by Marshall McLuhan concerning the orchestration of the senses in various cultures and the rise of modern print culture. However, Febvre's greatest and most enduring work is *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais* (1942). This was also a study of mentalities and for a time, the only substantial one done by the *Annales* group. It also focused on the ideas of elite or literary culture and had strong links to traditional intellectual history. In that respect, it stood out from the later *Annales* investigations of mentalities, which emphasized the study of popular culture and collective psychology. In his work on unbelief, Febvre drew on the Durkheimian conception of basic categories and words as "mental equipment" and argued against the so-called modernity of Rabelais as a forerunner of an atheistic worldview. In Febvre's view, unbelief was impossible in an era saturated in religious sentiment, terminology, and controversy, where the term *atheist* itself was used to register disagreement with an opponent's religious ideas. Febvre also summarized, before McLuhan, the basic theme of that author's later writings when he argued that the sixteenth century saw a shift from the predominance of the ear to that of the eye. Only with the shift in the latter half of the sixteenth century to newer philosophical and scientific ideas, under the influence of figures such as Descartes, does the sixteenth-century mentality undergo a substantial transformation, reflected in the large increase in the number of key terms newly available to later sixteenth-century thinkers.

While Febvre concentrated on early modern-European history, Bloch was primarily a medievalist. Although he was influenced by Marx and emphasized the historical role of the common people rather than political elites, in several respects, he was closer to the sociological approach of the Durkheim school. He developed precise concepts for use in

historical research (e.g., the concept of feudal society), emphasized the importance of collective sentiments and beliefs, and aimed at the creation of a "total history." He wrote an early regional study of the Île-de-France but also advanced the study of comparative history at both the methodological and substantive levels. He carried out comparisons of particular institutions, social groups, and historical processes (e.g., kingship, administrative classes) within the orbit of European civilization (e.g., France, England, Germany) but also ventured into a wider field of comparisons between civilizations (e.g., European and Japanese feudalism). He was interested in technical change but focused on the social and cultural forces that molded technology. For example, he argued that slavery declined in Europe partly because of the influence of Christian ideas, which in turn created a dearth of servile labor and initiated a quest for new laborsaving technologies.

Bloch's first major book, his most Durkheimian work, was *Royal Touch* (1924). It employed the concept of collective representations to examine the collective psychology behind this belief and drew, as well, on Lévy-Bruhl's notion of primitive mentality and J. G. Frazer's studies of sacred kingship. It traced the healing power attributed to kings from the medieval through the early modern period and focused on a comparison of France and England.

Bloch's longest and most important book is the two-volume *Feudal Society* (1939–1940). Although Febvre himself took exception to what he thought was its excessively sociological and abstract presentation of medieval history, it represents Bloch's most successful attempt, and perhaps that of the entire *Annales* school, to write a "total history." Through the use of the concept of a "feudal society," it combines into a synthetic whole the understanding of the environment, economic life, political power, personal ties, social groups and classes, collective beliefs, sentiments and practices, and the work of intellectuals in the European middle ages. It is also a comparative study of societies set within the framework of European "civilization" in its medieval historical form. Although it pays more attention to social groups and to the masses than to the individuals and families in the political elite, it does discuss political organization.

Bloch also wrote more on economic and social history than Febvre. After his departure from Strasbourg in 1936, he assumed Henri Hauser's Chair of Economic History at Paris. In this respect, he was closer than Febvre to the concerns of many later members of the *Annales* school. His book on *French Rural History* (1931) is in some respects his most personal book, because of its focus on rural peasant economy and society with which Bloch identified so strongly. It examined the *longue durée* of history from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries and used the "regressive" method of moving from the known to the unknown, developed by earlier historians such as Frederic William

Maitland, to reconstruct the “original characteristics” of French agriculture.

During the five years between Marc Bloch’s death in 1944, at the hands of the Nazis, and the publication in 1949 of Fernand Braudel’s book on *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World at the Time of Phillip II*, a second generation of *Annales* historians emerged into prominence. Also, several institutional changes took place that affected the group. In 1946, the journal’s title was changed to *Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilizations*, indicating a shift in emphasis from the earlier title. More important was the formation in 1947 of the new Sixth Section of the *École Pratique des Hautes Études*. Febvre became president of the Section as well as director of the Centre de Recherches Historiques, a subsection of the larger Sixth Section. After Febvre’s death in 1956, Braudel became editor of the journal. The new Sixth Section provided the *Annales* group with an influential organizational center from which to disseminate their vision of historical research.

Several other influences within *Annales* were at work in defining the school’s major historical concerns. In particular, the second generation of *Annales* turned toward a strongly quantitative, statistical, and even “materialistic” approach to history and focused heavily on economic history. In this respect, François Simiand, an economist closely associated with the Durkheim school, provided an important inspiration. Simiand had been an early critic of established historiography and, in 1932, had published an influential work on the general movement of prices, where he distinguished between the phases of economic expansion (called “A Phases”) and contraction (the “B Phases”) in longer economic cycles. This distinction became central to later *Annales* historians in their efforts to chart the relationships between price fluctuations and social, cultural, and political changes. Ernest Labrousse was a second influential pioneer of this approach. His work of 1933 on the history of prices and revenues in eighteenth-century France set the tone for many later studies. Labrousse introduced the use of more statistical methods as well as a greater appreciation of Marxism’s contributions (something that Marc Bloch had developed earlier, if to a lesser extent).

After its publication, Braudel’s massive study of the Mediterranean world became one of the major reference points for later *Annales* authors. The book’s geographical focus on a sea as the unifying historical force marked an extension to a new scale of the more limited regional studies done by earlier members of *Annales* and continued by later authors. Its temporal emphasis was decidedly on the *longue durée* of slowly changing, indeed almost stable “structures” emerging around the Mediterranean. However, it also had a second substantial focus on the sixteenth-century “conjunctures” of economic, social and, to a lesser degree, cultural processes. Events, persons, and political processes occupied a distant third place in Braudel’s study.

Perhaps equally important was Braudel’s attention to the spatial dimensions of history.

The book became the subject of widespread praise but also extensive critical commentary. While some of the book’s detailed historical arguments have been challenged, the major criticisms have focused on larger issues of perspective and method. For example, Braudel was thought to be excessively deterministic and place too much emphasis on the long-term “destiny” forged for societies by the Mediterranean environment. The book seemed to be a “history without people.” Braudel’s neglect of actors and events seemed to eliminate the element of voluntarism from history. Despite its chapter on “civilizations,” his study also lacked any fuller engagement with the problem of “mentalities” (one of Febvre’s major interests). In general, the *Annales* group has given much greater attention to the economies and societies subtitle of their journal and much less to the study of their third putative focus, civilizations. However, Braudel was later to give a series of lectures on civilizations, published after his death, which partially remedied this neglect and contains a particularly important introductory chapter on the concept of civilization in history and the social sciences. This chapter draws particularly on the earlier ideas of Marcel Mauss about civilizations.

Braudel followed his Mediterranean work with another, equally ambitious three-volume study of early modern economy and society. While the book focused on Europe, it generally adopted a global perspective and drew in a wider range of comparisons among civilizations. The first volume struck a characteristically Braudellian note with its emphasis on material civilization. The second volume focused on the expansion of early modern commerce, while the third traced the emergence of a world perspective and global socioeconomic system. In this final volume, Braudel resisted the effort to create a more coherent image of the modern capitalist world system, such as the one developed later by Immanuel Wallerstein (under Braudel’s influence). Braudel remained a historian with interdisciplinary and global interests but refused to become a social theorist.

Braudel’s treatise on the Mediterranean encouraged heroic efforts among his compatriots at *Annales*. Between 1956 and 1960, Pierre and Huguette Chaunu assembled a huge study of trade between Spain and the New World and surpassed even Braudel in scope by taking the Atlantic as its geohistorical focus. Chaunu’s work also introduced more explicitly the notions of “structure” and “conjuncture” into *Annales* discourse. While a spatial and geohistorical emphasis had already led Febvre and Bloch to do regional studies, this research trend continued to be a central part of the group’s work, not only in the efforts at a global history in the massive volumes of Braudel and Chaunu but also in more focused studies, for example, by Pierre Goubert on Beauvais, Immanuel Le Roy Ladurie on Languedoc, and Michel Vovelle on Provence.

The third generation of *Annales* historians that began to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s has produced many noteworthy individuals and studies, but perhaps the most famous is Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. His various studies, beginning with his thesis on the peasants of Languedoc, continue Braudel's concern with geohistory but also expand it in a variety of directions not addressed very thoroughly by Braudel. These include a focus on mentalities (e.g., the inquisition and heresy in Montaignou), climatic influences, serial history (e.g., wine harvests), and in general, an effort to achieve the ideal of a "total history" originally called for by Febvre and Bloch. Le Roy Ladurie's book *Montaignou* also attempted to achieve the *Annales* goal of a total history through the intensive study of every aspect of a particular community. This approach resembled the earlier studies of whole communities done by both anthropologists and sociologists. Through the work of Le Roy Ladurie and his talent for reaching wider audiences, the history of *Annales* also became more widely known to the public; indeed, Ladurie became something of a celebrity, much as Foucault and others had done.

One of the major shifts in scholarly focus among the third generation of *Annales* historians has been a greater attention to the problem of "mentalities." This change was in part a reaction against the seemingly exclusive focus of second-generation *Annales* writers on an economically oriented geohistory. However, it was also prompted by the work of historians outside the *Annales* orbit, such as Phillip Aries and Michel Foucault, whose works on topics such as the family, death, and mental illness posed a challenge to the established *Annales* paradigm. Febvre's aforementioned work on the problem of unbelief in the sixteenth century was the outstanding study in this genre, and for a long time, very infrequently emulated. However, the renewed interest in mentalities took a different form. Febvre had focused on major literary figures and elite culture, while the new interest was in historical psychology, popular culture, and what might be called "mass mentalities."

Robert Mandrou, one of Febvre's early associates, had already moved in this direction in his 1961 study of early modern-French popular culture. However, the following *Annales* figures greatly expanded this effort: Jean Delumeau drew on psychological theories to write his history of sin and fear in early modern Europe. Others, such as Georges Duby and Michel Vovelle, introduced Marxian ideas about ideology into *Annales* discourse. Jacques LeGoff, the outstanding medievalist in the group after Bloch, wrote a large treatise on the development of the medieval image of purgatory. This focus on religious ideas was later extended by Delumeau to the study of the history of Christian ideas about paradise. Finally, the renewed study of mentalities was inspired, in part, by the work of "symbolic anthropology," with its focus on ritual, symbol, and collective definitions of reality. In this way, the work of

Annales figures such as Georges Duby, Le Roy Ladurie, and others has been cross-fertilized by the writings of Marcel Mauss, Victor Turner, and Erving Goffman.

The historical focus of *Annales* has been primarily on medieval and early modern Europe. Contemporary society has been given much less attention. Many of their key concepts and methods—the *longue durée*, structure, conjuncture, A and B economic phases, and so on—were better suited to the study of the slow change or socioeconomic fluctuations of premodern agrarian societies. The work of Charles Morazé on *The Triumph of the Bourgeoisie* (1957) was, for a long time, the main exception to this generalization, although more recently, *Annales* figures such as Marc Ferro have written on topics such as the Russian Revolution from a standpoint congruent with the general *Annales* paradigm.

At the time of its inception, the *Annales* approach represented a departure from current practices in history and a new starting point. However, in succeeding as much as they have in defining a new style of historical research for the twentieth century, *Annales* and its approach have themselves become the historical establishment in France, and to a lesser degree and in varying ways, elsewhere in the world, where they have helped promote a new social history. The movement has left behind landmark works by Febvre, Bloch, Braudel, Le Roy Ladurie, and others, which will provide major reference points for historians and continue to be debated during this century.

At the same time, as the *Annales* school has grown, it has diversified its substantive focus. In many respects, its varied objects of investigation have come to resemble the specialties found in the adjacent field of sociology. Issues of the journal have addressed fields such as popular culture, the family, deviance, religion, and a wide variety of other topics, most of which continue to cross established disciplinary lines. In the process, it may have lost sight of at least one of its original objectives, the creation of a total history. This goal has not only been challenged by regional and topical specialization, but attempts have also been made to realize this objective in a different form. The large, synthetic works such as those of Bloch and Braudel have been supplemented by a more comprehensive coverage of analytically distinct subtopics as well as more thorough, if focused, studies on particular communities and regions. In the process, the meaning of a total history has shifted away from the sort of thing represented by Bloch's study of feudal society, or even Braudel's massive studies, and has perhaps come closer to what Le Roy Ladurie accomplished in his study of Montaignou. Whether this indicates a breakdown of one of the *Annales* original objectives or merely the prelude to more synthetic efforts remains to be seen.

— Donald A. Nielsen

See also Certeau, Michel de; Durkheim, Émile; Foucault, Michel; Wallerstein, Immanuel; World-Systems Theory

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ANOMIE

Anomie is a condition delineated by Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). It is closely related to his thinking on the collective conscience. The collective conscience, for Durkheim, represents the common morality, or more specifically, shared understandings, beliefs, norms, and values. In mechanical solidarity, it was strong and was a powerful binding force on people, but it has come to be weakened with the transition to organic solidarity. When this common morality is weakened, one of the things that happens is that people become unclear as to what is appropriate and what is inappropriate behavior; they feel a sense of normlessness and rootlessness. In other words, this lack of clear moral guidelines leaves people with a sense of anomie. Thus, anomie is a condition associated with organic solidarity and with the decline in the power of the collective conscience.

Durkheim's ([1897] 1951) most practical application of the concept of anomie is found in his classic study of suicide. Durkheim argued that there are four types of suicide—egoistic,

altruistic, anomic, and fatalistic—which are determined by the individual's level of integration into and regulation by society. Anomic suicide is most likely to occur when the regulative ability of society is disrupted, when the level of regulation by society on the individual is reduced or is low. During such times, the collective conscience, or the level of collective moral restraint, is weakened, and the passions of the individual are allowed to simply run free with little or no constraint. These individual passions then come to rule the lives of individuals, leading them to a wide range of destructive actions, including suicide, that they might not otherwise commit.

A negative event, such as an economic depression, can lead to heightened levels of anomie. For example, losing one's job for a lengthy period of time, with little prospect of ever recovering it or one like it, can obviously lead to anomie. However, it is important to note that anomie is not precipitated only by negative events. "Positive" events can also lead to a sense of normlessness for individuals who experience them. For example, an economic boom can also radically alter one's sense of what is normal and hence leave one struggling to adjust to a new lifestyle and a new set of norms. Thus, because times are so good, one might change employers, jobs, or even careers, and such changes can also lead to anomie.

Durkheim viewed anomie, and the other problems of the modern world, as pathologies that are not permanent, but rather temporary abnormalities of the social world. Unlike the revolutionary attitude taken by many more radical theorists such as Marx, the far more conservative Durkheim was more concerned with "curing" society than he was in revolutionizing it. This role of a social reformer led Durkheim to propose a number of potential solutions to the social pathology of anomie. He believed that the most important of these involved the role to be played by occupational associations. He saw these associations as being able to bring workers, managers, and owners together into a single, unified group and thus help to restore the collective sense of a common morality. This strengthening of the collective conscience would lead to a decline in the condition of anomie and hence offer a potential "cure."

Robert Merton (1910–2003) was another prominent social theorist who employed and further developed the concept of anomie. Merton made a significant contribution to the structural functionalist approach to which he adhered by extending the idea of functions to also include dysfunctions (negative consequences). The idea of dysfunctions became particularly relevant to Merton in his analysis of the relationship between culture, structure, and anomie.

Merton defined culture in much the same way that Durkheim defined the collective conscience, as a system of norms and values that is present in society and is common to, and governs the behavior of, its members. He defined social structure as the organized system of social relationships in

which the members of a given society are involved. In addition, Merton was interested in the relationship between culturally determined ends and the structurally defined means to those ends. For Merton, anomie occurs when the means available to people make it difficult or impossible for them to achieve the cultural goals outlined by society. This tends to lead to a higher level of deviance among members as they are forced to find alternative (sometimes illegal) means to achieve the culturally prescribed goals. In this way, anomie, as represented by the disjuncture between social structures and cultural goals, is dysfunctional for society.

— Michael Ryan

See also Collective Conscience; Crime; Deviance; Durkheim, Émile; Merton, Robert

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ANZALDUÁ, GLORIA

Gloria Anzaldúa (b. 1942) was among the first writers to critique academic feminism for constructing theory and practice based on white, middle-class, heterosexual experiences and for excluding the experiences of "other" women from its analyses. In *This Bridge Called My Back* (1981), she joined with other women whose voices and experiences had been ignored. This anthology initiated a call for feminists to create theory and practice that address the situations of all women: women of color, working-class women, lesbians, and aging women as well as white, economically privileged, heterosexual women. Only through inclusion can real social change emerge. Indeed, Anzaldúa's writings and theorizing partly reflect her lived experiences as a lesbian Chicana.

Drawing on her own experiences as a Mexican American, lesbian woman, Anzaldúa explores the "borderlands" of experience. She describes the splintered aspects of social identity and refers to borderlands as both physical locations (life in border towns, on the margins of society) as well as the social-psychological states experienced when

one's identity is simultaneously embedded in oppositional racial, political, and historical relations. Her work calls for the constant deconstruction of racial and sexual categories in which binaries limit the imagination of agents. For example, she names binary categories such as white/black or male/female as despotic dualities that enable us to *see* only one or the other, as well as to *be* only one or the other. Her work offers a complex analysis of race, gender, class, and sexual politics that is grounded in her own life experiences and attempts to synthesize the fragmented aspects of social identity.

Anzaldúa offers the physical, mental, and conceptual borders in a new, inclusive intercultural and intracultural analysis of identity: a physical and cultural location she calls "the new mestiza." This new location comprises racial, ideological, cultural, and biological "cross-pollination." Genetic streams and chromosomes cross, mix, and become not an inferior being, but a hybrid progeny she sees as more mutable and richer. In this sense, and from this physical location, an "alien consciousness" can emerge: a new mestiza consciousness that is the consciousness of the borderlands.

Through her work on borderlands and the new mestiza, Anzaldúa critiques the way language has been used to suppress "other" discourses, particularly those groups whose locations and ways of experiencing the world are outside the Anglo/white/Western perspectives. To counter Eurocentric language, Anzaldúa's work celebrates diversity and multicultural experiences, creating texts that integrate Spanish, Mexican, and Native American voices and dialects as legitimate.

Anzaldúa argues that Chicanas are an eclectic cultural/racial/gendered blend of Indian, Spanish, black, and Mexican, who typically learn how to negate their Indian and black heritage and affirm only their Mexican-Spanish heritage. By doing so, Chicanas inadvertently reinforce the racial and cultural hierarchy prevalent in the West, in which light/European culture is conceptualized and privileged as more civilized, progressive, and rational than dark/Indian/black perspectives. For social theorists, Anzaldúa's work is notable for emphasizing the importance of the researcher's life experiences as starting points and grounding points for all theorizing. Her work exemplifies embodied theorizing. She argues that it is only through the body that the social and physical world is experienced. The images and words we use and the stories we tell must arise from the flesh and bone of the body if they are to articulate a lived reality and offer any meaningful transformative power.

Anzaldúa was born in 1942, in Rio Grande Valley, in South Texas. She received her bachelor and master's of art degrees from the University of Texas at Austin.

— Candice Bryant Simonds and Paula Brush

See also Essentialism; Feminism; Feminist Epistemology; Matrix of Domination; Postcolonialism

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AUGÉ, MARC

French anthropologist Marc Augé belongs to the generation of scholars who were trained in the 1960s in Paris—that is, the generation for whom the likes of Louis Althusser, Michel de Certeau, Gilles Deleuze, and Michel Foucault can be counted as teachers and crucial influences or antagonists, as the case may be. A prolific, witty, and complex author, Augé considers himself to be an anthropologist; but his lifelong project has been one of reinventing what it means to anthropology in the rapidly changing times we refer to as “postmodernity.” While his work has only recently come to the attention of mainstream Anglo-American social theory, where it is generally read as part of a tradition of writing on the city and everyday life that includes the writings of Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau, and Guy Debord, it has a very distinguished reputation in France.

Marc Augé’s career can be divided into three stages, reflecting shifts in both his geographical focus and theoretical development: early (African), middle (European), and late (global). This obviously schematic picture is somewhat forced, because Augé never abandoned his interest in Africa and continued to write about it well into the European and global phases. However, it is nevertheless representative of an intellectual trajectory that begins with very localised ethnographic work and culminates in the elaboration of what he calls an “Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds.” These successive stages do not involve a broadening of interest or focus as such, but rather the development of a theoretical apparatus able to meet the demands of the growing conviction that the local can no longer be understood except as a part of the complicated whole.

Augé’s career began with a series of extended field trips to West Africa, where he researched the Alladian peoples and cultures situated on the edge of a large lagoon, west of Abidjan on the Ivory Coast. He spent close to two years there, between November 1965 and May 1967, researching almost every conceivable aspect of the culture and history of the region. The culmination of this endeavour is the masterly *Le rivage Alladian: Organisation et évolution des villages Alladian* (1969). As Tom Conley (2002a) has noted, this work marks a considerable advance on previous anthropological accounts of so-called peoples without history in that it factors

colonial history into its interpretation, along with an analysis of spirituality and kinship. The result, Conley (2002a) says, “is moving and almost cinematographic” (p. x).

The sequel, *Théorie des pouvoirs et idéologie: Études de cas en Côte d’Ivoire* (1975), follows three further field excursions to the Ivory Coast between 1968 and 1971. It was written in the shadow of the student protests of May 1968, which although witnessed only from afar, nevertheless register their effects on this work. “Through the study of ways that a subject can believe in sorcery Augé gathers a sense of the ideology of power as well as the elements that justify it and allow it to be transmitted and reproduced” (Conley 2002a:xii). Augé coined the term “ideo-logic” to describe his research object, which he defined as the inner logic of the representations a society makes of itself to itself. This interest in the “logic” of a particular culture shows the strong influence exerted by Michel de Certeau, who in the same period conducted his own researches into the “cultural logic” of everyday life. A third and final instalment in this series of studies was added in 1977, *Pouvoirs de vie, pouvoirs de mort*.

The second, or European, stage (*La traversée du Luxembourg*, 1985; *Un ethnologue dans le métro*, 1986, translated as *In the Metro*, 2002; and *Domaines et châteaux*, 1989) applies methods developed in the course of fieldwork in Africa. According to Conley (2002a), at least four aspects of this period of Augé’s work appear to have been transposed from the Ivory Coast to Paris: (1) the paradoxical increase in the intensity of solitude brought about by the expansion of communications technologies; (2) the strange recognition that the other is also an “I”; (3) the “non-place,” the ambivalent space that has none of the familiar attributes of place—for instance, it incites no sense of belonging; and (4) the oblivion and aberration of memory. The work in this period emphasises the anthropologist’s own experience in a way that neither the earlier nor later work does. Augé does this by comparing his own impressions of these places with those produced by some of French literature’s greatest writers: Balzac, Flaubert, Nerval, Proust, and Stendhal. What this comparison illustrates is the apparent insuperability of the gap between language and experience. Yet it is that very gap, he argues, that his anthropology must be able to close if it is to be of continuing relevance in contemporary society.

The third, or global, stage (*Non-Places*, 1995; *A Sense for the Other*, 1998; *An Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds*, 1998; and *The War of Dreams*, 1999), is an extended meditation on the disparity between observations made in the course of anthropological fieldwork in the first and the second stages of Augé’s career. It is at least partially the result of his travels; for instance, his concept of the “non-place” refers to those spaces one typically encounters when travelling, such as airports, bus terminals, hotels, and so on, which one remembers only in the generic. Emblematic in this regard is Augé’s marvellous account of the Paris

Métro. “The memorial form of *In the Metro* elegantly betrays the stakes of an enterprise that ties the topological dimensions of psychoanalytic anthropology that Augé had developed in the work on sorcery to the art of fiction” (Conley 2002b:83). Ultimately, his aim is to theorise globalisation as it is lived in properly global terms; it is also an attempt to reinvigorate the discipline of anthropology as a whole. To that end, he deploys a number of novel writing techniques, describing the synthetic results as “ethno-novels.”

Augé is perhaps the first anthropologist to offer a theory of “global society” that isn’t simply an extension of theories primarily developed to explain first-world conditions, such as Marxism or psychoanalysis (for comparable attempts in the field of sociology, think of the work of Bauman, Beck, and Giddens). In this respect, Augé’s proposal (it remains a work-in-progress) not only matches the comprehensiveness of competing theories of a “global society,” it goes a step further than they do and contrives its picture of the world from entirely original sources. Although it remains an open question whether or not Augé’s “Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds” will prove to be of lasting interest, it can nonetheless be said with certainty that this combination of comprehensiveness and originality commands our attention today. Bold theoretical innovations of this nature are few and far between.

Indeed, contemporary anthropology has tended to shy away from both postmodernism and globalisation, believing, as James Clifford has tirelessly argued for the last decade and a half, that uneven economic development means that there isn’t sufficient unity of experience at an anthropological level to speak in “global” terms. By the same token, even those theorists who do accept the idea of globalisation (Appadurai and Canclini), tend to read it in terms of ongoing dialogue between the first and third worlds, thus reinforcing the disunity of experience thesis by other means. As such, anthropology has not been able to produce a theory of society adequate to its globalised nature. Thus, Augé’s position should not be compared with that of fellow postmodern anthropologists such as James Clifford, about whom Augé can find nothing positive to say. For Augé, reinventing anthropology means going back to the basic, defining experience of the anthropological experience, the encounter with the other—but not so as to find reasons not to engage with them, as certain strands of identity politics seem to demand, but to discover how the other *others* us.

— Ian Buchanan

See also Castoriadis, Cornelius; Certeau, Michel de

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AUTHORITY

Questions surrounding the topic of authority have long interested sociologists. Who has it? Where is it derived from? What kinds are there? How is it exercised?

Max Weber was interested in the concept of authority and how it related to what he perceived to be the increasing rationalization of society. He saw authority as the legitimate form of domination (there were illegitimate forms as well), which he defined as the “probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons” (Weber [1921] 1968:212). He outlined three basic types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. Traditional authority is based on a historical precedent and the idea that one should rule because of a long-standing belief system. Charismatic authority is derived from the extraordinary skills or characteristics of the leader, or at least the perception of them by followers. Rational-legal authority, the one most interesting to Weber, is possible only in the modern world and is based on a set of rational rules that are formally enacted. This type of authority represents the most highly bureaucratized, and its increasing presence speaks to Weber’s theory of the increasing rationalization of society.

A conflict theorist interested in issues of authority was Ralf Dahrendorf (1959). He argued that authority was derived from social positions, rather than the characteristics

of individuals. In particular, Dahrendorf was interested in the conflicts between these macrosociologically determined social positions. Authority, to Dahrendorf, implied both superordination and subordination. Hence, those who are in positions of authority rule because of the expectation of their positions and those around them, not because of any internal personal characteristics. Since authority is found in the position, however, those who do not comply with role expectations are subject to scrutiny and removal.

Dahrendorf further argued that authority is not a constant. In other words, a person who possesses authority in one time or place may not possess authority in a different time or place. Furthermore, any relationship of authority is composed of exactly two interest groups. Those with

authority seek to maintain things the way they are, while those lacking in authority seek change. Consequently, any position of authority is always at risk of being overthrown.

— Michael Ryan

See also Conflict Theory; Dahrendorf, Ralf; Herrschaft (Rule); Power; Rationalization; Weber, Max

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B

BARTKY, SANDRA LEE

Educated at the University of Illinois at Urbana (BA, MA, PhD), Sandra Lee Bartky (b. 1935) is a passionate theorist of political responsibility and moral agency. From the late 1950s, she was active in the civil rights movement. Later, she joined her university's chapter of New University Conference, which by her own account led her away from existentialism and into Marxism (Strobel 1995:57). In the 1970s, Bartky's experiences as an activist led to her central role in forming a women's liberation group as well as a women's studies program at the University of Illinois at Chicago, where she began and now continues her academic career. Today, the Gender and Women's Studies Program is a thriving enterprise. Bartky has also participated in the environmentalist movement as well as various antiwar movements. She is also a founder of the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP).

Feminist philosopher and award-winning professor, Bartky stands on the cutting edge of feminist theory. Her work illustrates how a feminist phenomenology, informed by Marxian and other ideas, can promote not only personal transformation but also social change and cultural transformation. Dramatically illustrative is the contemporary classic Bartky has contributed to feminist theory. Widely used in women's studies and philosophy classes, *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression* (1990) is a masterpiece that emphasizes the thoroughgoing embodiment of consciousness. It underscores Bartky's commitment to raising women's consciousness while also influencing the women's movement. Like other feminist theorists but more powerfully than most, Bartky (1990) also has academic goals. She seeks to intervene in "traditional philosophy" as well as in social constructions of the "chauvinized woman." Hers is interventionist social theorizing centered on women's embodied consciousness.

Bartky's theorizing in *Femininity and Domination* revolves around a "hermeneutics of suspicion." Suspicious of her own interpretive stances as well as those endorsed across various institutions, her analytical voice is as careful as it is forceful. At the same time, it is both critical and hopeful, blending a "pessimism of the intellect" with an "optimism of the will." Bartky's own lived experiences, occasionally revisited with disciplined passion, serve her as a theoretical resource, as do her astute readings of Simone de Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon, Michel Foucault, Karl Marx, and Jean-Paul Sartre (among others).

That Bartky's feminist theorizing is fundamentally phenomenological becomes clear in the first essay, "Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness." Approaching social reality as a "social lifeworld" and seeing feminist consciousness as "anguished," "uncertain," and "confused," Bartky argues that feminists are conscious of the same realities as other members of society, but they define those realities differently and respond to them critically. As the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz might have put it, feminists typically bring a distinctive system of relevances to their experiences. The realities they experience as "alien," "hostile," and "unjust" continually sediment their women-centered relevances.

From Bartky's perspective, what fuels feminist relevances is, above all, alienation. Given her alienated, that is, divided or split consciousness, the female person with feminist consciousness is attuned to the deceptive, contradictory character of the social lifeworld. She thus inclines toward wary anticipation of the affronts built into respectable, taken-for-granted practices. Worst of all, perhaps, feminist consciousness includes wariness of one's self that characteristically finds expression in self-vigilance. Bartky concludes that feminist consciousness emerges in a person not only alienated from her world but also split within herself, whose everyday life occasions substantial resistance as well as continual vigilance.

“On Psychological Oppression,” the second essay in *Femininity and Domination*, makes use of Fanon’s theorizing about cultural domination, stereotyping, and sexual objectification. Bartky treats these as the main practices promoting psychological oppression among the persons subjected to them. Exploring how women react to these practices, especially in preoccupation with the appearance of their bodies, Bartky shows that psychological oppression often makes a “viable identity” elusive. She also shows that psychological oppression emanates from how society both affirms and denies women’s humanness. What holds many contemporary women back, though, is not legal, religious, and other formal strictures as much as their own learned sense of inferiority and resultant psychic alienation, each informally enforced and reinforced in everyday interactions and cultural constructions. The costs of alienation run far higher than anguish, hesitancy, and self-doubt, then. They extend to compromising one’s agency (see below) by holding back and stepping aside in ways that help to maintain male privilege.

In another essay, Bartky looks at the connections among “Narcissism, Femininity, and Alienation” by exploring mainstream femininity as narcissistic as well as alienating. Thereafter, she brilliantly explores a prospect few feminist theorists have examined, namely, a “nonrepressive narcissism.” Bartky allows for revolutionizing corporal aesthetics so that body display becomes a pleasurable, playful option centered on self-ornamentation as self-expression. Such a feminist aesthetic could, Bartky argues, fulfill what Marx called an “emancipation of the senses.” At the same time, such an aesthetic could free girls and women from those forms of discipline that feminize their female bodies, namely, practices focusing on the body’s shape and size as well as those involving feminine gestures and ornamentation (McLaren 1993).

The next two essays also engage Bartky in exploring connections between phenomena too often left in separate theoretical niches. “Feminine Masochism and the Politics of Personal Transformation” makes theoretical space for a feminist rendering of how forbidden desires may be necessary in or at least crucial for an individual’s psychic well-being. “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power” takes hold of Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and extends it to encompass distinctively feminine, docile bodies. While overriding the masculinist limits of Foucault’s work, Bartky demonstrates how mundane practices of disciplining their bodies engage women in compliance with patriarchy.

In “Shame and Gender,” Bartky focuses on “emotions of self-assessment.” She observes that these emotions may promote self-obsession of a stagnant, disempowering sort. Given that the self-assessment emotions hold many women back, Bartky calls for a “political phenomenology of the emotions” capable of showing how subjectivity is curtailed and subjection

is heightened by the emotions women commonly learn are proper or even essential to their femininity.

The last of Bartky’s essays in *Femininity and Domination* is perhaps the most daring. “Tending Wounds and Feeding Egos: Deference and Disaffection in Women’s Emotional Labor” considers how women’s moral compasses often falter due to excessive concern about other people’s feelings. Above all, Bartky examines how the cultural mandate for women to tend to the emotional well-being of the men in their lives can compromise their own moral sense. Often, women “have been morally silenced or morally compromised in small ways,” says Bartky (1990), “because we thought it more important to provide emotional support than to keep faith with our own principles” (p. 113). Paradoxically, one principle undergirding the moral sense of many women is that emotional caregiving is a precious and at times pleasurable responsibility. Thus, Bartky advocates closer looks at women’s everyday lives where their subordination becomes woven into their taken-for-granted routines and roles. She ends the essay by arguing that women’s subordination lies not only in women’s embodied consciousness but also in the caregiving and ego-sustaining activities they are often glad to undertake on behalf of others.

From beginning to end, then, *Femininity and Domination* offers brilliant illustrations of how feminism combines critique and resistance (Bartky 1993). Yet some take Bartky to task for her critique of mainstream femininity. One commentator on Bartky’s work, for example, does agree that feminists need a critical posture toward femininity but goes on to argue along lines that cultural feminists often adopt, namely, that femininity comprises values and perspectives that are widely needed and ought to be advocated throughout society (Schweickart 1993). To imply in any way that Bartky opposes femininity across the board, though, is to misread her careful arguments. Bartky is a proponent of everyday activism who is intent on making her work relevant for activists. Respectful of the lived experiences of feminine persons, Bartky envisions a transformation of those aspects of their femininity that diminish their personhood. All the while, she quietly valorizes femininity as a field of practical possibilities superficially appreciated and much exploited by those committed to the patriarchal status quo.

Elsewhere, Bartky (1995) explores the practical possibilities of femininity in and through the concept of *agency*, which implies that a person’s actions are significantly “self-generated and self-determined.” Revisiting Foucault’s work, Bartky concludes that well before his ideas were widely known, contemporary feminist theorists had already affirmed and complicated the matter of human agency. In the aggregate, their work had already problematized everyday life as well as “the normalizing practices of masculinity and femininity, the compulsory imposition of identities,

and the regimes of knowledge and power” that weigh oppressively on girls and women (Bartky 1995:190; cf. Smith 1990).

Ever committed to the feminist project of critique and resistance, Bartky is unafraid to articulate feminism’s own failings. Insisting that feminist theory and theories of sexuality are inescapably linked, as she had already implied in *Femininity and Domination*, Bartky (1995) admits that feminism itself sometimes denies women’s sexual agency. Through its own stances toward women’s sexualities, feminism has sometimes sponsored normalizing notions that treat some choices and options as emblems of feminist consciousness and others as less desirable or even unacceptable among feminists. Thus does Bartky affirm both women’s sexual agency and feminists’ responsibility to support women’s agency in all its diversity.

These ideas on agency are reprinted in Bartky’s (2002) *Sympathy and Solidarity” and Other Essays*. This collection includes three new essays and four other reprints first published between 1997 and 2002. The opening essay, “Suffering to Be Beautiful,” reiterates and updates Bartky’s earlier theorizing about the disciplinary practices undergirding femininity, the costs of deviating from feminine codes, and the need for a revolutionary aesthetic of the flesh. Fresh points punctuate this essay. Bartky (2002) observes, for instance, that women who use cosmetics creatively are more likely to be seen as eccentric, not artistic; that consumerist economies link patriarchy and profit with the linkage mediated by the web of fashion-beauty corporations; and that the imagery and practices of femininity remain racist and classist.

Bartky also revisits Foucault in this collection. “Catch Me if You Can’: Foucault on the Repressive Hypothesis” challenges his interpretation of repression, mostly by drawing on pivotal ideas from Sigmund Freud, Wilhelm Reich, and Herbert Marcuse. Here, Bartky seems more the philosopher than feminist theorist. Yet her theorizing is around issues of sexual repression, which generally affects girls and women more pervasively and consequentially than boys and men.

Bartky’s (2002) next essay is also decidedly philosophical. “Sympathy and Solidarity” uses Max Scheler’s ideas to explore how feminists, as activists more than theorists, can negotiate the terrain of their differences while building up solidarity with one another. Bartky positions this essay on theoretical ground, while emphasizing that the arena between theory and practice is where social movements are built out of the immanent confluence of both.

Although neither of her next two essays concerns building a social movement, each could be used toward that end. Each could also be used to gain insights into the lived experiences and distinctive standpoint Bartky claims for herself. Both essays are self-revelatory beyond what is typical among social theorists. Even many feminist theorists reveal

less of themselves in their work than Bartky shares in “Unplanned Obsolescence: Some Reflections on Aging” and “Phenomenology of a Hyphenated Consciousness.” The former essay delivers what its title promises, namely, reflections, more than a philosophical argument or theoretical exploration. Frank about the deprivations, losses, and suffering that eventuate among most North American adults before they die, Bartky shares her own experiences and expectations as a person growing old. This essay’s narrator is human to the core as she grapples with existential circumstances that are, she assumes, bittersweet at their very best. Throughout the essay, her standpoint is diffusely but strongly feminist, thus underscoring both the nongendered and the gendered aspects of old age.

“Phenomenology of a Hyphenated Consciousness” is an autobiographical discussion in which Bartky writes primarily as a Jewish American woman. Told from the standpoint of a woman who identifies herself as a member of an ethnic minority, this account is a colorful survey of what identity means as a set of practices comprising both conformity and resistance. It also deals with issues about what members owe to those groups whose very existence, never mind history and culture, provides grounds for their own identities.

Bartky’s last two essays also tackle moral issues. Above all, they grapple with the connections among privilege, racism, guilt, and complicity. Arguing that guilt is acceptable as a political motivator, “In Defense of Guilt” focuses on guilt deriving from complicity and guilt based on privilege. Focusing in particular on white-skin privilege, both that essay and “Race, Complicity, and Culpable Ignorance” insist on the moral duty of white North Americans to be active in antiracist enterprises, both in their everyday lives and their politics. These essays, which close out this collection, seal the understanding that feminism in principle concerns women of all hues, all social classes, and all other social, economic, cultural, and political circumstances.

Although some may be hard-pressed to read them as feminist narratives, Bartky’s essays represent feminist theory as the inclusionary, multicultural project it must be in order to be credible and effective. She implies, in fact, that feminist theory must be this way in order to be morally acceptable. Her interventionist theorizing thus comes down to a moral as well as a political project. Bartky’s feminist theorizing offers a moral phenomenology of identity, everyday life, social structure, and cultural transformation.

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Feminist Ethics; Foucault, Michel; Male Gaze; Marx, Karl; Schütz, Alfred; Smith, Dorothy

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BATAILLE, GEORGES

Georges Bataille's (1887–1962) main writings span the period from the late 1920s up to his death in 1962. In his life, he was highly respected by many major authors (Blanchot, Caillois, Leiris, Klossowski), was in prolonged contact with others (Lacan, Benjamin), and was famously criticised (Breton, Sartre). He has had an immense influence on almost all French thought that has emerged since the 1960s, and since being translated extensively in the 1980s and 1990s, this influence has spread to the English-speaking world. What makes him important is the combination of transgressive content and a style that refuses academic convention, with Sade and Nietzsche high on the list of his own sources.

Several major works remained either anonymous (notably, erotic fiction such as *The Story of the Eye* or *L'Abbé C*, generally released under pseudonyms) or unpublished, such as the seemingly complete second and third volumes of *The Accursed Share*. This messiness and lack of resolution indicates something of the content—Bataille's writing is hard to consolidate into a systematic thought—wherever you look, there are paradoxes, contradictions, holes, and things simply not fitting together neatly. Whilst all this would be a problem for traditional philosophy, it is what makes his work exciting for theory, and why his writing seems only to increase in relevance.

Bataille was part of a vibrant network of artists, intellectuals, writers, and oddness that coalesced in Surrealism. Whilst the movement was a vital one for Bataille, with its combination of art, philosophy (outside the official discipline of the same name), interest in the unconscious, and aspirations to revolution, he was to be quickly ejected from the doctrinaire centre of Surrealism, where André Breton would dictate the party line. This continual rebellion can also be seen in Bataille's relation to Hegel, as well as to Marxism, and signals the endless negativity in his thought, a negativity without purpose or ulterior end.

Bataille's interest in philosophical anthropology (Émile Durkheim, Robert Hertz, and above all, Marcel Mauss), culminating in his establishing the College of Sociology (in the late 1930s), and collaboration with Roger Caillois, gives his work another way of creating a total theory but one that cannot be totalized, that is, made into a monumental, logical project in search of truth. Bataille's work, then, takes the theoretical implications of French anthropology and extends those into an ascientific model.

There are other contextual factors: the war (1939–1945), which seems largely to have passed Bataille by despite his forceful and prophetic anti-Nazism of the mid-1930s (see Bataille 1985), and also existentialism, which was unavoidable, in 1940s and 1950s France, at least. Here, too, Bataille could only be against: against the idea of life as project (as this meant you would always be serving a higher utility), against the overly literal idea of *engagement* (political commitment) in art, and against Sartre, who returned the favour in his not wholly inaccurate "review" (Sartre 1947) of Bataille's *Inner Experience* (1988b). There are, despite Bataille, similarities with the existentialist project, especially if we include Heidegger under that umbrella: the centrality of death, the individual as function of the world, negativity, a certain sense of authenticity. Essentially, the link comes down to the role of the phenomenology derived from Hegel, which Bataille continually surpasses without resolving (i.e., he does not seek to "better" Hegel), and existentialism might be asking the same questions as Bataille but not with the same methods or the same outcomes (there can be no outcome for the Bataillean subject; Bataille 1988b:22). His own view of the difference between himself and Heidegger is encapsulated when writing of a possible similarity, "I am not a philosopher, but a saint, maybe a madman" (Bataille 1970–88, V:217).

Bataille's Hegel comes, full with death, from Alexandre Kojève, another key figure in interwar France, and comes heavily leavened with Sade and Nietzsche, both of whom had recently been rediscovered in France. Bataille's peers, with whom he would have extensive exchanges—notably, Maurice Blanchot and Pierre Klossowski—also took up these latter writers. Surrealism, too, was interested in Sade, but whereas Bataille saw him as someone who should inspire fear and horror (yet be read because of that), Surrealism sought to make Sade an early advocate of sexual

liberation (Bataille 1985). After the war, Nietzsche's importance grew incessantly against a backdrop of obligatory Marxism for intellectuals, and Bataille's importance for the next generation perhaps stems from his negotiation of this shift and his implicit refusal of left-wing dogma (if not leftism as such). Bataille established the journal *Critique* at the end of the war, and it would serve as the site of his "canonisation" in the "homage" issue of 1963, which featured essays by established writers but also new ones, such as Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes. He would also appear in key texts by Jacques Derrida (1978:251–77), Jean Baudrillard (1993), Julia Kristeva (1982), Jean-Luc Nancy (1991), and is central to the thought of those writers.

EARLY WORK

Although it is not possible to completely unify and organise his work, Bataille's central theoretical obsessions appear early on and remain present throughout. These are sex and death (with the combination later identified as eroticism), the impossibility of full subjectivity, sacrifice and the sacred (and with them, transgression), death, community, and waste. The articles and stories written in the 1920s and 1930s are amongst the most extreme of Bataille's writings—already, transgression takes on both form and content (*pace* Barthes and Derrida's obsessions with Bataille as a sovereign writer, above all). Much of this work appears in journals (such as *Documents*, which he also edited) that combined art, anthropology, politics, and early forms of cultural theory—all of which Bataille wrote on.

His philosophy is brutal yet intimate; protagonists of fictions, readers, and writers alike are called on to lose themselves and to gradually (but never completely) realise that this is all there is. *The Story of the Eye* has the narrator effectively cede agency to Simone, who, in turn, pursues an understanding that will never come, through an erotic (but not straightforwardly sexual) set of adventures culminating in the rape and murder of a priest in a church. If the question is raised as to how we read Bataille here ("With one hand"? Find the philosophical meaning? Let the text be either "immanent" or simply metaphorical?), then it is raised even more forcefully in the genre—eluding "Solar Anus," in *Visions of Excess* (1985), where the universe, death, sex, and the (lack of) meaning of life literally collide. The novel *Blue of Noon* (written 1935, published 1957) attempts what in some ways is a bolder resonance between the erotic (sex and nonbeing—one form of which is death—together) and the political, as the early days of fascism and the Spanish civil war merge with another passive protagonist's necrophilia, drunkenness, and sex in a graveyard, along with women whose behaviour threatens the boundaries of "civilised" society. Dorothea/Dirty, for example, drunk, vomits out of the window of a room at the Savoy. She's aggressive, will urinate anywhere, and reeks.

For Bataille, following on from Mauss's notion of the "total social fact," we can never separate actions or events from their multiple facets, and the most significant acts are always those at the limits of society. This is how Bataille seeks to combine Marx and Sade, creating a pointless revolution where gratification gives way to *jouissance*, and ecstasy where loss dominates (loss of self, knowledge, control, mastery). Marx did not go far enough with his materialism, and what we need is a lower form, a "base materialism" that would never become gold. It would be the materiality of bodies, dirt, death, and violence that would threaten the system. Beyond the eroticism of individuals, the masses' squalor would be their strength (Bataille 1970–88, II:217–21). This article is what Kristeva bases her notion of abjection on, as that which must be excluded but never can be, as that which can come back to haunt the border between self and other (Bataille 1970–88, II:437).

This materialism, whether in dirt, violence, or eroticism (or some combination), is what Bataille envisages as the *sacred* (although this, like so much in Bataille, is never given a fixed form). Whereas in Durkheim, the sacred is split into left and right, pure and impure, for Bataille, there can be no such division: The sacred occurs where the profane order is threatened by something it excluded. The sacred is always only a threat. Things, people, places are not to be seen as holy—rather, the sacred exists in sacrifice and in death. Sacrifice exists to both summon the sacred and hold it at bay: "The sacred is only a privileged moment of communal unity, a moment of the convulsive communication of what is ordinarily stifled" (Bataille 1985:242). Sacrifice is the key to the existence of society and therefore also to how society can be changed. It is clear to Bataille, after Weber, that capitalism has lost something earlier societies had. Not only that, but fascism was able to grasp the link between violence, sacrifice, and symbolism and forging the kind of community Bataille occasionally seems to be advocating. However, he is forthright in his condemnation of Nazism and uses Nazi misinterpretation of Nietzsche as a way to get to an understanding that could actually account for the movement's strength, in order to stop it (Bataille 1985:137–60). Above all, although it might not come across as important in the wider scheme of things, the problem for Bataille, in his analysis of the early days of the regime, is that Nazism insisted on controlling the sacred, in using it toward other ends. This removes any possibility of it supplying a new form of genuine community.

If Bataille's sacred has a dual reality, then it is in terms of whether it is controlled or uncontrolled. Control of the sacred, power, the pursuit of utility, truth, and fixed meanings all constitute the "homogeneous," whilst the heterogeneous is the realm of what is other, the sacred, the erotic. Institutions (such as the Christian churches or fascism) approach the heterogeneous but only to reduce it. Such a

reduction can also occur if we try to systematize our thinking on “the heterogeneous,” so Bataille (1985) recommends a “heterology”: “Heterology leads to the complete reversal of the philosophical process, which ceases to be an instrument of appropriation, and now serves excretion” (p. 97). But beyond heterology lies Bataille’s major notion: that of a general economy based on loss, waste, death, sacrifice, and sovereignty.

GENERAL ECONOMY

This idea of waste and loss taking precedence over accumulation and gain first appears in full in “The Notion of Expenditure” article of 1933. Here, Bataille criticizes the emphasis on utility, work, and production that has removed all else from modern Western capitalist society. Instead, we need to consider the “unproductive expenditures: luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activity (i.e., deflected from genital finality)” (Bataille 1985:118). Such phenomena, outside consumer society’s sanctioned activities, constitute a way of restoring a gift economy based on *excess* rather than surplus profit. There is a utopian element, in that potential revolt by the wretched masses constitutes a form of “good” expenditure (Bataille 1985:127), but we need to remember that the economy of excess is a violent one, where individuals as much as commodities are at stake.

The general economy emerges whole in *The Accursed Share* of 1947: “the notion of a ‘general economy’ in which the ‘expenditure’ (‘the consumption’), of wealth, rather than its production, was the primary object” (Bataille 1991a:9). The economy, in the contemporary sense, becomes merely a component within, and set against, the general economy of waste. The model of the universe that comes with this is not just about death and decay (although see Bataille 1991b:61–3) but also about giving, with the Sun as the centre of the system. The Sun’s rays mean that life on earth is fundamentally based on excess, on waste, and nothing else: The Sun is mindlessly generous (Bataille 1991a:28–9) and also represents danger—you cannot look directly, cannot therefore comprehend through the most rational of senses.

This senseless giving—pure loss—has formed the basis of many societies, and although Bataille does not suggest we “go back” to some older, better place, other societies have known a better relation to the truer forces of the universe (as opposed to security, wealth, the prioritising of possessions, and possessions as commodities, proper to capitalist society). The Aztecs represent a key example of a sacred community, due to the centrality of sacrifice. Indeed, Bataille’s hyperbolic take on the potlatch relies on the function of sacrifice in Aztec society to generalize itself. According to Bataille, sacrifice is what precedes day-to-day

survival, as life emerges from death and the pointless “exuberance” of bare life. So, it is ordinary human existence that is a by-product, a surplus. For this surplus to be maintained, we must sacrifice the excess (or else there will be war, catastrophe, the Sun going out), and this *apparent* surplus is “the accursed share”:

The victim is a surplus taken from the mass of *useful* wealth. And he is only withdrawn in order to be consumed profitlessly, and therefore utterly destroyed. Once chosen, he is the *accursed share*, destined for violent consumption. But the curse tears him away from the *order of things*. (Bataille 1991a:59)

All humanity risks being merely “things”—once we can be valued, placed in a rank, job, or class, and our relations mediated primarily by utility (see Bataille 1991a:57 and *passim*). Hence, it would be an “orientalist” misreading to suggest sacrifice exists to enforce political power, and Bataille himself distinguishes between Aztec sacrifice and the bureaucratic totalitarianism of the Inca (Bataille 1970–88, I:152–58). In postwar, already-globalizing culture, the answer is not literal sacrifice, but the disposal of excess wealth as a priority, in the form of aid. Bataille’s conclusion is oddly utilitarian: If the West, and in particular America, helps countries such as India, everyone will benefit (Bataille 1991a:39–41, 182). In volume III of *The Accursed Share*, he adopts a slightly more radical position, praising the Soviet Union (itself not unusual at the time) for its annihilation of the bourgeois individual/individualist (Bataille 1991b:345). Bataille’s system may appear to offer a therapeutic violence in order to maintain human society, but other than the Marshall Plan, with its clear economic utility, Bataille is not interested in resolving problematic situations. Even when thinking of political-economic outcomes, the general economy can never be stopped (and should never be). It might even be more consistent to let wars, famines, and catastrophes occur (not easy to write in the aftermath of World War II, however).

In the second volume (and in the similar *Eroticism*, 1987), Bataille turns to the link between sex and death, noting they are essentially linked and insisting that not only does death require sex (for species to continue), but that sex brings death: Amoebae do not die (Bataille 1991b:32). But without death, there would be no individual subjects (Bataille 1987:97). Sex and death seem by-products of our existence, but we, as individuals, are nothing more than a by-product of death. Human existence exists in and because of our fear and horror of death and that it constitutes us as human (Bataille 1991b:61–3). The individual is caught in the double bind that to realise itself, it must lose itself, in sacrifice, in eroticism, in experiences that approach death—in other words, the subject can never be—and this state is what Bataille defines as *sovereignty*.

THE SOVEREIGN SUBJECT

The subject of “restricted economy” is interested in self-preservation and betterment (sometimes of others), but the Bataillean subject is driven, whether they like it or not, to the boundaries of the human: to dirt, to horror, violence, and death. Even the least “Bataillean” wage-oriented “thing” subject has this within them, hence the thrill of violent films, books, or art (Bataille 1991b:107–109). For Bataille, the subject should go further than this, to the point where they lose the project of going further (as even the project of loss implies a goal) and they fail to attain a pure subjectivity. Instead of Hegelian mastery and resolution through the figure of the *Aufhebung* (sublation, or dialectical overcoming), Bataille offers a headless dialectic: Without reason, without end, where death is neither submitted to nor beaten, “the sovereign is he who *is* as if death were not” (Bataille 1991b:222). But what has this sovereign got? Nothing, as sovereignty is “the miraculous reign of unknowing” (1991b:444) and because “unlimited knowledge is *the knowledge [savoir] of NOTHING*” (1991b:439).

Whereas in *Sovereignty*, Bataille tries to construct a model for subjectivity, he has already pursued a parallel project of subjectivity in the *Somma atheologica* of *Inner Experience*, *Guilty*, and *On Nietzsche*, all written during the war. While the outcome is very similar (a subject that loses the self and gains only nothing), the “inner experience” is Bataille’s own, on the grounds that philosophy that does not put the subject at stake is “merely academic.” This work is a nonreligious mysticism, where the experience is what has to be communicated (and communication here is loss, not transmission, of meaning; Bataille 1988b:12). Bataille seeks to understand the nothingness of the universe, such that this bid fail—the whole project turns to nothing, becomes ridiculous, and the “experience” is revealed as not being one, in the normal sense of something an individual encounters. Here, both the individual and the thing encountered undo themselves (Bataille 1970–88, V:443), and this undoing is constitutive of humanity, and always lost to “I” or “us.” “The various separate[d] beings *communicate*, come to life, in losing themselves in the *communication* between one another” (Bataille, 1988a:27).

Subjectivity is loss of self, but also loss of self in actual and metaphorical community (our usual sense of which is reversed in Bataille, but both are there). This loss is troubling, and the ecstatic loss of self is filled with anguish (Bataille 1988b:4, 12). This anguish, this fearful veering between proximity and distance (to the self, to others, to the other) is the vital part of the “experience” and represents the living on in the death and/or absence of God. This living on, when approaching “inner experience” or sovereignty, is fleeting, as opposed to the endless dying of the profane world of truth, economics, and morals: a living in

the instant that cannot be understood or processed, a “being without delay” (Bataille 1988b:47).

These paradoxes, centred on the necessary but unattainable state of sovereignty, indicate a key figure for Bataille: the impossible, where the impossible must become possible (just as with Nietzsche) and then fail to come into being. The important thing is to approach the impossible. This extends to the writing of the experience, or indeed of the general economy, as to write is to limit; to explain is to reduce to meaning and to the realm of knowable objects. Bataille is aware of this betrayal, and it forms part of the way he avoids aspiring to existentialist-style authenticity (Bataille 1988b:60, 1991a:11).

TRANSGRESSION

Whilst working on “the accursed share” (and also what would become *Theory of Religion*, 1992), Bataille also founded, edited, and wrote extensively in the journal *Critique*. As with the writings of the 1930s, anything that had some connection with “the sacred” (i.e., that which is beyond the everyday world of economics, rationality, truth, and religion) could be addressed (see Bataille 1970–88, XI and XII, for these articles). This is mirrored in the books that appear outside of the two “trilogies,” which maintain and expand the miasma of Bataille’s theoretical obsessions.

Aesthetics features heavily, although not as such: Bataille cannot have “an” aesthetics, and this for two reasons: first, art is not autonomous if it is to feature as part of a general economy; second, aesthetic thought would seek to reduce what was “beyond” to a rationalised function, role, or allegorical capacity (what art does, where it fits, what it means). Like many writers, Bataille sees art as essential in the founding of humanity, but art does not signal our transcendence of the animal world; rather, it is a doubled animality and the doubling of the threat of the sacred and death. Prehistoric cave paintings (of Lascaux) distort the faces and heads of the humans depicted while showing the animals in some detail. For Bataille, this signals the distance of the humans from the animal but also that this is not a superior position, but an endlessly threatened one. It also exceeds the simplistic reading of prehistoric art as either “the birth of art” or as having a sacred use-value as an offering for the success of the hunt. Art was always transgressive, and is the figure of the transgression humanity *is*.

The Tears of Eros (1989), Bataille’s final work, attempts again to place art within transgression and sacrifice. Here, Bataille is almost entirely literal minded in claiming that certain artworks, most of which depict acts of death, eroticism, or violence, can convey the experience of those states to the viewer. Central to this is the experience Bataille has on seeing the infamous pictures of an ecstatic man being dismembered in China. This kind of experience is the path to transgression and also indicates, according to him,

something of a key to his thought, as he had seen these pictures before writing and they effectively decided him on the importance of violence, death, and the erotic.

Whilst Bataille is overly interested in the content of works of art, his book *Manet* (1983) is more advanced, focussing on the painting and noting the “indifference” in Manet compared with Goya (pp. 52–5). When Manet paints *Olympia*, he manages to convey an absent presence, such that “what this picture signifies is not text but [text] being wiped away” (p. 67). A similar awareness of form informs *Literature and Evil*, which collects together essays on writers who have privileged freedom, sexuality, the undoing of the self, and that which goes beyond communication (Brontë, Kafka, Blake, Sade, Genet, Michelet, Baudelaire).

Sade is a key figure in the postwar writings (and an obvious influence throughout), supplying a perverse rationale for the heterogeneous approach centred on recurring fascinations: Sade’s life shows a project that refuses to be one, and although he lives the life, to a certain extent, suggested by his philosophy, it is his turn to literature that is important, as the writing itself then becomes the communication of the erotic, of the threat of transgression (mirrored in Bataille’s “turn” or return to art). In Sade, we see a synthesis of philosophy that rejects the academic discipline but uses its methods, and the erotic: His pornography undermines the overbearing, excessive rationalism of the books’ “purpose.” Bataille’s theory and fiction does this, but so does his consideration of fiction and, more important, his choice of subjects and approach to them. Although he would write extensively on the erotic, it would never be to signal liberation. The emphasis on sex and death is not to free us or show us how things really are (even if at times he might seem to do this, he soon undermines himself). He had already distinguished himself from the surrealists on this point (Bataille 1985:91–102) and continued to so do in *Eroticism*. Here, even the usual gothic transgressiveness is made indifferent: Sex and death bring humanity because sexual reproduction is death. This sex/death combination means we are “discontinuous individuals” (Bataille 1987:12). Our discontinuity implies that we search for continuity, which does not mean happy, loving amoebic fusion, but death, and the loss of the integrity of the subject (this process echoes the disfiguring of the cave paintings):

At the moment of conjunction the animal couple is not made up of two discontinuous beings drawing together uniting in a current of momentary continuity: there is no real union . . . both are beside themselves. Both creatures are simultaneously open to continuity. (Bataille 1987:103)

This should not be seen as tragic: It is glorious waste, a version of Nietzsche’s “yes”: Eroticism “is assenting to life up to the point of death” (Bataille 1987:11). The question

might arise as to whether violence and transgression become the new “good,” but there are, ironically, limits on transgression that prevent this. Bataille refers to the pursuit of transgression, the erotic, sacrifice, and so on as being “virtual sovereignty” (1991b:230). Once in the transgressive situation, the actual transgression is where desire, will, and the subject are lost. So, whilst there are privileged routes (including through art) to something superior, this state is not known to the subject, does not last, cannot be mastered as such, and serves only to highlight the infinite realm of impossibility that surrounds the Subject and his or her ridiculous attempts to know it.

If, for Bataille, human society exists thanks to sacrifice, awareness of death, and the futility of eroticism, then it is also clear that human society exists through a suppression of these and other wasteful activities. Societies construct moral systems, devise punishments, religions, and politics to stem the threat of the sacred. In *Inner Experience*, Bataille looked to an individual that would lose him- or herself despite the society around them, replacing it with a community on otherness. In *The Accursed Share*, a distinction is drawn between societies that have been able to maintain a “general economy,” such as the Aztecs, through the institution of sacrifice. *Eroticism* and *The Theory of Religion* continue the meditation on the “institutedness” of sacrifice and its refusal or downgrading (as in Christian ritual). Bataille does not imagine a world containing humans that was, is, or could be free of laws. It is human *society* that invents sacrifice and that comes to exist through sacrifice. Furthermore, there can be no transgression of vital import to “sovereign” humanity without taboo. Sacrifice does not transgress law in the sense of breaking it, but instead “suspends a taboo without suppressing it” (Bataille 1987:36), and this momentarily. This moment is “the festival” where sacrifice, cannibalism, eroticism, and drunkenness occur (pp. 71–2), in “the breaking loose . . . into violence” (p. 52).

The festival is rationally established to maintain order, but the setting aside feeds the opening up of the sacred realm, as within the festival, the boundaries dissolve (Bataille 1992:54). There is nothing purist about the festival. It does not consist of the appearance of holy things normally hidden, but of the profane losing its everydayness, the useful losing its use by being destroyed (p. 56). Even humans have become things, and it is this thingness that is destroyed in sacrifice; “in sacrifice the offering is rescued from all utility” (p. 49). *The Theory of Religion* does not try to perform a historical synthesis, in looking at transgression and the sacred, writes Bataille (pp. 109, 117–19), but it does chart a dialectic, even if a fractured one, wherein religion seeks to control the sacred and succeeds so well that religion also becomes irrelevant: “The real order must annul—neutralize—that intimate life and replace it with the thing that the individual is in the society of labour” (p. 47).

The intimacy here can refer to that (not) present in eroticism but also refers to the same phenomenon as “continuity,” sovereignty, communication: the place where the individual is no longer either individual or Subject. In the case of sacrifice, the sacrificer and sacrificed are both in “intimacy” (p. 44).

Bataille, then, sees human society as having reduced humans to nothing, after the glorious times where sacrifice and “the festival” were the (periodic) norm, and what could be taken, in his writing, to be a form of utopianism, is the question of the value of humans. They need to be less valued to have more worth: In sacrifice, you get rid only of what is worth sacrificing. Modern capitalist society makes it very hard to find things worth sacrificing. Bataille argues that animals were initially venerated, hence the sacrifice (not murder) of whichever animals were deemed sacred. As they lost this value, humans replaced them, only later on, for humans to be *conserved* rather than spent, and then animals turned to again (Bataille 1987:81,88). Christianity cannot even muster that level of sacrifice.

Bataille (1992) does not recommend a return to sacrificial killing, as “killing in the literal sense is not necessary” (p. 45). Eroticism has not gone away and neither has the possibility of excessive behaviour. The way in which the sacred can be approached varies through history but that it must be approached is, for Bataille, imperative for the “sovereign” individual: he or she who would lose the self and endlessly attempt such a loss, always failing, and therefore, in Bataille’s paradoxical terms, succeeding at (not) being sovereign.

— Paul Hegarty

See also Baudrillard, Jean; Collège de Sociologie and Acéphale; Deleuze, Gilles; Derrida, Jacques; Foucault, Michel; Kristeva, Julia; Religion in French Social Theory; Sacred and Profane

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BAUDRILLARD, JEAN

Jean Baudrillard’s (b. 1929) name has become synonymous with the flowering of interest in postmodern theory that occurred in English-speaking countries such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States during the 1980s. At the time, one of his key theoretical concepts, “simulacrum,” was the buzzword of a wildly influential “Baudrillard Scene” that stretched across academic disciplines from science fiction studies to geography, animated interdisciplinary conferences, and spilled out into performance and art spaces. Not even leisure wear was immune as baseball caps emblazoned with *simulacrum* were regularly sighted in North American bohémias. Baudrillard was thought by many to be the ringmaster of the postmodern circus of late capitalism. With the publication of his travelogue, *America* (1986), his reputation went global and earned him the dubious label of “apolitical post-modernist.” However, Baudrillard’s lively account of the rupture of the French Left’s “Union of the Left” strategy engineered by President François Mitterrand between 1977 and 1984, *The Divine Left* (1985), is a truculent commentary inspired by an uninhibited reading of Karl Marx’s writing. It proves rather dramatically that Baudrillard was anything but apolitical.

The Baudrillard of the 1980s is permanently linked with the explicatory work of Arthur Kroker (1986) and the editorial labors of Sylvère Lotringer, both of whose publishing ventures played major roles in bringing his writings to an eager market.

By the 1990s, the “scene” had shifted, but without sacrificing any intensity. The posthistorical Baudrillard of notorious theses about hyperreality (*Simulations*, 1983), the Year 2000 (*The Illusion of the End*, 1992), and the death of the social (*In The Shadow of the Silent Majorities*, 1978)

was much in evidence. The most grievous trend of interpretation that emerged was a widespread conflation of Baudrillard's descriptions with his positions, which reached its zenith with the claims of Christopher Norris (1992) on the occasion of Baudrillard's difficult-to-translate *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (1991), whose play with tenses was completely lost in English. Confusion reigned, despite the remarks of some of his French colleagues, such as activist-intellectual Félix Guattari, that he was not wrong to claim that the war will not have taken place because it was a massacre that should not have happened. In 1999, a book by Baudrillard even made a cameo appearance in the film directed by Larry and Andy Wachowski, *The Matrix*; later, Baudrillard turned down a consultancy role on the sequels.

That Baudrillard's fullest theoretical statements were translated only in the 1990s (*Symbolic Exchange and Death* [1976] 1993, *System of Objects* [1968] 1996, *Consumer Society* [1970] 1998) suggests that a corrective to the buzz of the 80s is long overdue, and a better understanding of his intellectual contributions and development is much needed.

The fanfare of the 80s and 90s should not obscure the fact that the first and second comings of Baudrillard were modest. In 1974/1975, his *The Mirror of Production* (1973) appeared in translation by Mark Poster within the eclectic mix of New Leftism sponsored by the *Telos* collective; the same group later published Charles Levin's translation of Baudrillard's *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (1972), an important collection that broke the mold of Freudo-Marxism by introducing, for the purposes of critically annihilating each, semiology and Marxism.

Now that the dust has somewhat settled, Baudrillard's major contributions to social theory may be stated as three-fold: first, he developed a theory and analysis of consumer society, design, and objects in his books of the late 1960s; second, his mid-1970s to early 1980s work on simulation and his notorious theses about hyperreality remain influential and central to much of today's surveillance and cybercultural theory; third, Baudrillard's poetical and anthropological musings inspired a quirky theory of symbolic exchange and death that still animates his thought. These three key contributions are elaborated upon in the contexts of interpretation delivered below.

YOUNG BAUDRILLARD

Long before Baudrillard became *Baudrillard*, he toiled in obscure lycées teaching language arts for a decade, and then emerged in the 1960s as a translator (German-French) of social anthropology, theatre (minor Bertolt Brecht and major works by Peter Weiss), and some left political theory; he wrote book reviews of novels in French translation by Italo Calvino, William Styron, and Uwe Johnson, for *Les Temps Modernes*. He was a "Germanist" and wrote a preface to photographer René Burri's photo essay of 1963, *Les*

Allemands (*Uncollected Baudrillard*, 2001); here lies a beginning of Baudrillard's hobby of photography, as he now tours exhibitions internationally (*Photographs 1985–1998*, 1999).

Baudrillard's work of the late 1960s is not unusual in its engagement with critical theory. Noteworthy are essays in the journal of urban sociology *Utopie (Le Ludique et le policier et autres textes* 2001) on Herbert Marcuse's meditations on repression in an affluent consumer society, Henri Lefebvre's sociology of the everyday through the myths of system and technique, and the emerging field of media studies. His criticisms of Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan, circa 1967, were prescient. Baudrillard's later books of aphorisms *Cool Memories* (1987, 1990, 1995) borrowed "cool" from McLuhan's concept of low-definition, participatory media.

By 1966, Baudrillard had secured a position in Sociology in the Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines at Nanterre. He taught in the University of Paris suburban campus at Nanterre for 20 years, then took his doctorate at the Sorbonne, and retired from teaching in 1987. However, from 1968, he was also a fixture in Georges Freidmann's Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse at the École Pratique des Hautes Études.

OBJECTS

The structuralist analyses of *The System of Objects* were somewhat aberrant. They didn't strictly stick to descriptions of objective technical structures of technological objects and the rules internal to their systems. Instead, Baudrillard's analyses turned to the everyday experience of objects, that is, shifting from technicity to culture, the essential to inessential. Using the speech–language distinction (the latter is an essential social institution, a system whose rules are subject to separate study; the former is individual and accessory, and receives its unity from language), Baudrillard rigorously explored the cultural backwash of the accessory, secondary meanings corresponding to *speech*, and the drift of objects toward the cultural system, away from their so-called objective, technical structuration, and the stable determinations of *language*.

Baudrillard pursued the inversions of the myths of functionality (a perfectly efficient world without effort), rational design, and technological progress through diverse examples such as the withdrawal of gestural effort in handling objects to a system based on a minimal expenditure of energy, remote forms of control and generalized ease. Likewise, excess accessorization (gadgets) produce an empty functionality diametrically opposed to a unified technical machine, and mass-produced serial objects provide opportunities for personalization by means of the proliferation of marginal differences as distinguishing features (a "smart" refrigerator with an Internet connection, and an

icemaker, in black or stainless steel). A lesson emerged: The greater the demand for personalization, the greater the burden of the inessential over the essential. Baudrillard did not neglect marginal objects such as antiques and collectibles that, in acquiring historicalness, gain significance (signifying time and authenticity) at the expense of practical functionality. His observations about collecting cultures were, however, largely psychoanalytical in inspiration.

This psychosocial reorientation of structuralism in the accommodation of the reflux of what would be otherwise considered external to a system allowed Baudrillard to refigure consumption as an active process, providing social rank through the code of status provided by advertising, which is itself an object to be consumed, perhaps even through its study. Objects dematerialized into signs are consumed and manipulated in their systematic differences with other signs, entailing the abolition of a lived, nonarbitrary, visceral human relationship with objects, from which these signs escape.

The analysis of how purpose becomes counterpurpose developed in *The System of Objects* was deepened in *Consumer Society*. Shedding its structuralist shell, this book contained a more pronounced reliance upon Marxist theories of alienation and reification, heavily augmented by German film and literary sources, especially doppelgänger fantasies that demonstrate capitalist mystifications and introduce the idea of how objects take revenge in an extreme fetishism, a reversal of the subject-object pole later explored fancifully in *Fatal Strategies* (1983). The calculus of objects that is the manipulation of signs, literally a semiurgy of consumption, is a trap and gives to all an alibi for participating in the world (I can't go out because my favorite show is on!). The upshot is that mediatic mass communication replaces metabolic communion.

CONSUMERISM

Consumer Society has many themes, but throughout it, the influence of anthropology began to loom large over Baudrillard's thought. His turn to so-called primitive societies of the gift, which were truly affluent, whose temporality was the rhythm of collective activity before time became money, and whose unity was not aseptitized into cold, clinical communication, provided the groundwork for his theory of symbolic exchange. By contrast, consumer societies are characterized by a massive prophylactic deployment of signs that simultaneously conjure up, and away, the real so desperately evoked by all media (Baudrillard has much to contribute to our understanding of "reality TV," all the way from *An American Family* in the 1970s to French *Loft Story* of 2001). In Baudrillard's work, his theory of symbolic exchange emerged from his theory of consumer society.

What makes *Consumer Society* notable is the ironic inversion of terms guiding its analyses. For Baudrillard,

every social system exhausts itself in its own reproduction or lives only for its negative effects: The real goal of social budgeting is failure, not economic redistribution; affluence cannot exist without its nuisances, like environmental degradation; affluence's meaning is thus waste. Defects are every system's fulfillment. Here, we sense strongly what Baudrillard will later conceptualize in terms of the need to advance extreme hypotheses against positivist and critical theories: to respond in-kind to the enigma of the world. More than any other reader of Baudrillard, Mike Gane (2000) has developed this tendency the most deeply.

In *Consumer Society*, Baudrillard launched an ingenious argument regarding needs. Just as meaning in structural analysis is an effect of interdependent signs, thus, there is no direct correspondence between signifier and signified; specific objects are not produced in relation to definite needs. Taken individually, needs have no identity, because no term in an interdependent system has an identity in isolation. Moreover, since needs can't be pinned down and lack objective specificity, they are always linked to lack, or what they are not.

Enjoyment in consumption is, for Baudrillard, impossible; the same is claimed about self-fulfillment and the liberation of individual needs. One of the greatest ironies and a cogent definition of consumption, Baudrillard claimed, is that industrial production of differences that allegedly allow individuals to be themselves, to have their own styles and personalities, simultaneously erases singular differences between persons for the sake of replacing them with signs of difference, more and more subtly and minutely defined, in conformity with abstract, artificial models. The consequence is that to be yourself under the terms of consumer society is to be what you are not.

In consumer societies, socialization takes place through institutions of mental training, such as credit, and this is simply a form, argued Baudrillard, of social control. Baudrillard was fascinated by the constraints of consumer society, such as the incessant recycling of signs, fashion flavors of the month, combinatorial possibilities of which are predetermined by abstract models to which consumers conform as they live the myth of individuation.

For Baudrillard, consumer society is a kind of quiz show culture in which knowledge is displayed as if in response to a timed question, a perfect analogy to making a selection and purchasing it. Cultural knowledge as a consumer good may be gained through trivia games and middle-brow mass market magazines, equipping each with an identity kit full of prestige elements exchangeable for social status. For example, Baudrillard understood beauty and eroticism as forms of semiotic capital, as signs that may be turned to one's advantage. Health too is a prestige item displayed through fitness. Indeed, when everything is sexualized, sexuality is no longer transgressively explosive but tamed in being integrated into the production of marginal differences.

Here, then, social control takes place by linking emancipation with repression and thus controlling needs by hanging them on the partial satisfactions provided by consumer goods and services. Baudrillard dubbed this combination of gratification and repression “dual solicitude.”

SEMIOLOGY AND MARXISM

For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign contained several important theses. Baudrillard exposed the ideological dimension of use-value, repository of the true idealism in Marxism, exposing it as an abstraction hidden under the cloak of immediacy and particularity and, despite Marx, already infused with equivalence. Baudrillard learned a great deal about the pitfalls of theorizing symbolic exchange from this critique of Marxist myth making. He also showed that Roman Jakobson’s poetic model of communication was perfused with metaphysical presumptions as a result of the terror of the code that privileges the sender over receiver and keeps them in a holding pattern, enforcing the univocity, unilaterality, and legibility of messages, and excluding ambivalence, a principle more virulent than mere poetic ambiguity. Furthermore, semiology was guilty of domesticating signs by the imposition of binaries and arbitrariness, reviving motivation to solve quandaries such as the status of the referent it has itself created in its quest for purity (a system that is psychical and without referents).

Baudrillard’s most important demonstrations were the homology between the sign and commodity forms (exchange-value is to signifier as use-value is to signified) and the limited convertibility between logics of value (use-value, exchange-value, sign-exchange value, and symbolic exchange). Whereas use-value, exchange-value, and sign-value converge in two-sided object forms integrated into a functional syntax and controlled by a code determining their circulation, the latter, symbolic exchange, emerged as the heterogeneous other of homogeneous political economy and semiology, subversive of both theories of value. Baudrillard’s sense of the symbolic is not to be confused with other symbolics in Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva. Baudrillard’s symbolic is opposed to semiology.

The themes of the critique of categories of political economy and the symbolic found their application in Baudrillard’s reading of certain strains of Marxism in *The Mirror of Production*. The fatal malady of capitalism is its inability to reproduce itself symbolically, the relations of which it instead simulates; the failure of historical materialism was that it could not escape the categories of political economy, holding up an insufficiently analyzed productivity and labour as the mirrors of all social activity. In other words, Marxism is haunted by these concepts and remains trapped in the logic of representing what it sought to radically critique. As an alternative, Baudrillard proffered symbolic

exchange: an incessant agonistic cycle perfused with ambivalence. Baudrillard borrowed from Georges Bataille’s general antiproducerist economy of expenditure and Marcel Mauss’s analysis of potlatch ceremonies involving the reckless destruction of wealth in the establishment of rank within the triad of obligations: giving-receiving-repaying. Baudrillard may be productively read as a gift theorist.

SIMULATION

Simulation is the other of symbolic exchange. *Simulacra and Simulation* (1981) and *Simulations* (1983) contain Baudrillard’s best-known theory of the order of simulacra, summarized here:

Law	Form	Sign	Machine
1. natural	counterfeit	corrupt symbol	automaton
2. market	production	icon	robot
3. structural	simulation	two-sided psychical	android
4. fractal	proliferation	metonym/index	virtual

The first order of the counterfeit, the stucco angel, and theatrical automaton, emerges in the Renaissance with the emancipation of otherwise closed, endogamous, and cruel social relations and the surety of motivated signification and static social rank (caste). The second order of production arises with the Industrial Revolution and production, perfect for worker robots, and serial signs of sameness (iconic simulacra) subject to the market forces of fledgling capitalism. The third order is postindustrial, in which mechanical reproduction is transcended, conceived strictly in terms of reproducibility such that representation itself is commodified, with the exclusion of the referent in the rise of the linguistic sign that came to dominate semiological thought, and dichotomaniacal structuralism, a breeding ground for androids who live by the “anterior finality” of the code from which life emanates (operational DNA). In *The Transparency of Evil* (1990), Baudrillard added a fourth level, involving aleatory dispersion by infection, contiguity, and viral metonymy of theories of value, giving rise to the absorption of virtual media technologies (protheses) by human beings without shadows, a topic explored in *The Illusion of the End*. This image of the shadowless man, borrowed from German literature and cinema, expresses the idea that progress may carry on without an idea (in the absence of or indifference to) guiding it.

The third order is by far the most influential. It contains several important, related concepts. By simulation, Baudrillard means that it is no longer possible to distinguish between, for instance, signs and their objects, questions and answers, and doubles and originals, because the

terms in each of these pairs are equivalent to one another. He often expresses this by claiming one of a pair has absorbed the other. The inability to interrogate difference creates confusion. The entire edifice of representation, implying a logic in which images are yoked to a pre-imaged foundation, falters. The so-called postmodern scene is the ruin of representation.

The idea that a question can invent, anticipate, absorb, and regurgitate an answer not only neutralizes interrogation and dialogics, sender and receiver, origin and end alike, but suggests a more general principle: the accomplishment of social control by anticipation. Baudrillard uses the term “anterior finality” to explain that finality is already there, beforehand, determined by the combinatorial possibilities of the code (figured as social and genetic and digital). The code generates messages and signals that are totally pre-programmed for front-end control. This is an influential idea in surveillance literature that Bill Bogard (1996) has developed: Control occurs in advance in the sense that an event is accounted for before it happens, a violation is already committed before its detection, a fact is truer than what it is about, a profile is greater than the person subjugated to it. Baudrillard has taken the semiological principle that all value issues from the code and turned it into a nightmarish principle in which everything appears to be written in advance (hence the precession of simulacra); all signals are suspended in matrices embedded in codes. Symbolic exchange is Baudrillard’s answer to whether or not there remains any hope of opposition.

SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE

The two pillars of *Symbolic Exchange and Death* are named in its title. Baudrillard’s radical anthropology attempts to recover death and use it as a symbolic counter-gift that forces modern institutions, unilaterally giving the gifts of work as a slow death, social security, and maternal ambiance of consumption, to receive and respond to in-kind with their own deaths. Summoning the code or the system to receive the counter-gift makes it strange to itself, having been drawn into the symbolic field in which exchange is a circuit of giving, receiving, responding in-kind and with interest; if the field of dispersion of the code and simulation is the digital, the 0/1 binary, the field of the symbolic is ambivalence, agonism, circuits of obligatory giving, receiving, and returning with interest. The failure to receive the counter-gift and repay in-kind is loss of face—spirit, wealth, health, rank, and power.

Death must be regained through ritual and wrestled away from agencies of *Thanatos* (coroners, funeral parlors, priests). Baudrillard appropriates from anthropological sources symbolically significant practices that he adapts to his own ends, underlining that death is not biological, but initiatic, a rite involving a reciprocal-antagonistic exchange

between the living and the dead. Baudrillard extends this analysis to the desocialization and ghettoization of the dead in the West (where it is not normal to be dead, but rather chronically alive) and tries to lift the social control over death that separates it from life, because it is from this separation that all subsequent alienations arise.

It is incorrect to claim that Baudrillard was promoting simulation. Rather, Baudrillard elaborated new forms of symbolic resistance beyond death by emphasizing the potlatch-like behaviors of the masses in *The Beaubourg Effect* (1977) and *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities*. Baudrillard’s conception of the mass represents a critique of efforts to represent the masses as a source of potential energy in sociology and political theory. But under the terms of third-order simulation, representation is impossible. There is no more real social substance for a discipline such as sociology to represent, except through simulation. Rather, the mass is unreachable, indifferent, opaque, resistant to all entreaties and communications, which are absorbed and disappear. Every attempt in the dark rooms of social science to get the masses to appear by bathing them in an informational emulsion of statistics and surveys merely, for Baudrillard, volatilizes them further. For this reason, Baudrillard entertained the hypothesis that the social no longer exists, because social contracts and relations between state and civil society, public and private institutions and citizens, individuals and groups, have given way to mere points of contact and information exchange between terminals. In the order of simulation, general connectivity rules the day, and in this new kind of postperspectival space, there has been a complete loss of critical distance that would allow for a distinction between the real and its models. And this entails the transfiguration of the real into the simulacral.

Through an antiproductivist conception of agonistic, senseless seduction in *Seduction* (1979), Baudrillard explored consequences of reversing the accumulative and positive dimensions of production. Seduction was not exactly in its own right a power at all, neither negative nor oppositional, but a weak process that removed and annulled signs and meanings from interpretive systems, accountability from systems of legitimation. Seduction works by undermining and diverting, setting reversibility against irreversibility. Seduction resists interpretation. It can be shared, but its exchange is symbolic and involves ritual and obligatory dimensions that ensure that there is no clear distinction possible between seducer and seduced, for there is no difference between victory and defeat.

In addition to turning symbolic reversibility and cancellation against Michel Foucault in *Forget Foucault* (1977), Baudrillard sought symbolic yields in *Transparency of Evil* from an inexchangeable hostage form and the power to designate Evil, to reintroduce this accursed share into the artificially positive paradise of a society that can no longer tolerate negativity.

The Vital Illusion (2000) reveals traces of the need for a symbolic principle by another name by taking refuge in singularity (as in *Paroxysm*, 1997): an eccentric, antagonistic, self-destructing, anomalous figure, irreducible to individuality in a world of cloning, by valorizing imperfection (vernacular language resists universal digitization) and the beautiful frailty of never being fully present to ourselves. These antidotes to nihilism are perhaps best expressed in the idea that the murder of the real, the perfect-crime simulation of the world, of *The Perfect Crime* (1995), is never perfect. Respite is found in a passionate appreciation of the world's illusoriness.

The circle of symbolic exchange threatened to collapse in *The Impossible Exchange* (1999), since now exchange is impossible, the general equivalent displaced, otherness become incomparable, and the condition of thought stuck in a paradoxical inability to confirm itself against any principle in the reigning speculative disorder.

SEPTEMBER 11TH, 2001

Baudrillard's controversial response to the events of September 11th in *The Spirit of Terrorism* (2001) rehearsed his theory of symbolic exchange: The suicide planes that embedded themselves in the twin towers of the World Trade Center were symbolic forces of disorder, issuing counter-gifts of mass death against a system whose ideal is "zero death," as Baudrillard put it, and that tries to neutralize the symbolic stakes of reversibility and challenge.

In the 1970s, Baudrillard used the twin towers of the World Trade Center as emblems of the binary matrix of digitality, the "divine form of simulation," in which competition and referentiality were eclipsed by correlation and replication: The twin towers are signs of closure and redoubling, not of a system that can still surpass itself with original edifices. The twinness of the towers remain for Baudrillard the "perfect embodiment" of today's world order. But there is no longer at the macrolevel two superpowers mirroring one another's irrationality. Binary regulation at this level is over in the triumph of global capitalism. Back in 1976, Baudrillard wrote of the dissuasive hedge against collapse provided by two superpowers. And it is precisely this question of collapse that has animated Baudrillard's theorization of the events of 9/11. Importantly, collapse or crumbling *by itself* is the key challenge to understanding the spirit of symbolic exchange in Baudrillard's account.

The twin World Trade Center towers, which incarnate the hegemony of U.S. empire and monopoly, collapsed, that is, self-destructed. Baudrillard's choice language for describing collapse by itself is "suicide." His impression was that the towers collapsed as if committing suicide. For it seemed to Baudrillard "as if," hedging his bets, the twin towers themselves completed the event by collapsing.

In his theory of death, suicide was a superior kind of subversion in the politics of symbolic exchange circa the mid-1970s. What made suicide subversive and, in reverse, made all subversion suicidal, was that it escaped the monopolistic control over death exercised by contemporary societies of simulation through their sanctioned institutions (which prohibit suicide and either try to exclude symbolic relations or simulate them).

For the West, thinks Baudrillard, symbolic and sacrificial death are difficult to grasp and are distorted in being given a value, by "calculating" their exchange-value (against paradise; against support for their families through individual heroic martyrdom, etc.).

Terrorism challenges the sole superpower with a gift to which it cannot respond except by the collapse of its emblematic buildings. *The Spirit of Terrorism* was written 25 years after *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, but is perfectly consistent with the theory contained therein.

— Gary Genosko

See also Bataille, Georges; Hyperreality; Lefebvre, Henri; Means of Consumption; Media Critique; Postsocial; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Simulation; Structural Marxism; Semiology; Surveillance and Society; Utopia; Virilio, Paul

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BAUMAN, ZYGMUNT

Zygmunt Bauman (b. 1925) is an East European critical theorist and sociologist of the postmodern. Bauman grew up in Poznan, Poland, and moved as a youth to Russia with his family to escape the Nazi invasion. He fought in the Polish army during the Second World War and rose to the level of major, only to be sacked in the anti-Semitic wave of 1953. Bauman turned to social sciences, in the European tradition, where sociology is aligned with continental philosophy. In 1968, having risen to the rank of professor of sociology at Warsaw University, he was again sacked and persecuted, along with other Jewish radical professors, in a subsequent anti-Semitic wave. Together with his family, Bauman left Poland for Leeds, in the United Kingdom, via Tel Aviv and Canberra.

Over the last 30 years, Bauman has become known as one of the most influential of European and especially of British sociologists, for his work is marked by the capacity to negotiate new social problems and forms while radiating these back into the sociological classics of modernism, not least Marx, Weber, and Simmel. The location of his writing is British, but its inflexion is “continental.”

Bauman’s recent work is best known for two things: the sociology of the Holocaust and the scrutiny of the postmodern. In 1989, he published the award-winning *Modernity and the Holocaust*. This book is a passionate yet sober and systematic assessment of the irony in which the Holocaust was so central to modern, organized routines, developing genocide as industrialized killing, and yet so peripheral to sociology, where the Nazi experience was and is still widely viewed as exceptional to its time and place. Bauman’s argument is that the Holocaust is expressive either of the modern project as such or at least of its social engineering logic and conformist imperatives. Bauman aligns the Holocaust with the Milgram and Zimbardo experiments conducted in the United States, in order to follow the question, “We too could have done this,” rather than the more typical response, “This too could have been done to us.”

The Holocaust is universal in its significance, as well as being the exclusive property of Germans, Nazis, and Jews. More generally, it speaks to us not only of ethics but also of modern possibilities. We cannot imagine the Holocaust before the twentieth century. Its conditions of possibility include the mobilized race ideology of Nazism, the murderous will-to-power of the Nazis and the party-state form, the industrial mode of killing or the technology of the camps, and the bureaucratic means of delivering its victims to the death camps. Bauman’s scrutiny of the modern includes all this, for his concern is that the twentieth century makes a great deal more possible, in terms of human destruction, than before. Before the Holocaust, there was the pogrom. What the Holocaust makes apparent is the limited space available to ethical behaviour, not least because the extent of modern bureaucratic division of labour reduces the proximity of human subjects to each other. It is easier to harm others when we cannot see their faces, when we merely press the button. This also helps explain the extraordinary moral process in which, as in the Eichmann trial, nobody is responsible for anything anymore; all of us are merely busy following orders. Bauman’s sociology is a critique of this conformism then or now, whether Nazi and brutal or British and benign.

Bauman’s work on the Holocaust has been widely misrecognized as antimodern, antitechnology, as following the romantic tradition of denying the modern, from Rousseau to Heidegger. More generally, Bauman’s work has been taken as a continuation of the antimodernism of the Frankfurt school, exemplified in Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1948). Bauman is critical of that particular Enlightenment sense, embodied in the spirit of Goethe’s *Faust*, for which everything is possible and the world and human will are without limits. The logic of his particular critique of technology is Weberian. Technology, like rationalization or reason, needs to be driven by values that we have to choose. Modernity becomes increasingly difficult because the political or public space within which to deliberate socially shrinks before our eyes. We do more and more technology simply because we can; there is no rational argument against the endless extension of technology.

Bauman’s critique of modernity is therefore also misrecognized as a simple denial or rejection, as if its motivation were a yearning for return to the past. His argument concerning the postmodern is more complicated than this. It is consistent with the logic of *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Bauman’s is less a critical rejection of modernity than a cautionary tale about the limits and negative effects of high modernism, that project of social engineering, uniformity, and synthetic international architectural style that spread across the twentieth century. Modernism is based on the old Enlightenment maxim, to know the world in order to control it, this, put together with the new means of control developed into the twentieth century. Bauman initially

greet the prospect of the postmodern with some enthusiasm, as it holds the possibility of new openings, not least because it also connects to the post-Marxist possibility of utopia after the collapse of the Soviet fantasy. The postmodern suggests pluralisation of life forms, whereas the modern often seems to be made in the image of a singular logic of control. Bauman's enthusiasms for the possibilities of the postmodern coincides with the hopes of the revolutions of 1989. A decade later, Bauman's optimism for the postmodern subsides, as it becomes more apparent that the postmodern has become consumerized and commodified.

In the longer run, the postmodern becomes a fashion item rather than a social alternative for art, life, or politics. By 2000, Bauman set out to replace the idea of the postmodern with that of "liquid modernity." Here, the argument is that we are still modern and only the forms of modernity change. As Marx and Engels were translated to have said, "All that is solid melts into air." Bauman's claim is that modernism, or high modernity, institutionalises itself as a hard set of institutions, which are now increasingly replaced by sociological patterns where power flows and social relations are always provisional, up for grabs.

If the Holocaust and the postmodern are the themes with which Bauman is most widely identified, then there are other motifs as well. In his own Marxist origins, Bauman places a special emphasis on both sociology and socialism, in a way that connects his work to that of C. Wright Mills and Alvin Gouldner in American sociology. Bauman remains convinced that sociology has a mission; like critical theory, it has yet to deliver on its promise. The prospect of social engineering on a grand scale remains frightening, but we cannot avoid the responsibility of social reform. His work can be viewed as part of critical theory, in the particular sense that it follows the synthesis of Marxian and Weberian themes associated with Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* (1971), and apparent in the more recent work of Agnes Heller and Castoriadis. The path of Bauman's work since the 1970s might be seen as shifting from the Marxian to the Weberian themes in the critique of modernity. Yet Gramsci remains an ongoing influence as an indicator of what Marxism might be capable of as a sociology that takes culture seriously; and Bauman persists in following Simmel in the consistent curiosity as to what kinds of creatures or personality types modern social forms allow or encourage to develop.

Bauman's work can also be viewed as a sociology of modernity as excess or as a critique of modernity as order. More generally, again, Bauman's sociology can be seen as a dialectic of modernity where, as in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, modernity turns against itself, the dark side of modernity overshadowing the bright side of its positive achievements. This affinity with the Frankfurt school does not, however, extend to embracing Adorno's melancholy. Indeed, Bauman solidarises with the moderate optimism in

the critical theory of the earlier Habermas, before Habermas turns away from critical theory to the impossible, because Enlightenment, project of reconstructing the social sciences. Bauman thus combines in temperament a sociologically informed pessimism with an anthropological optimism. Humans, here, are always viewed as endowed with natural intelligence, even as they are educated out of it. This is why culture, or second nature, remains so central.

Bauman has published more than 20 books since his first in English, a study of the British Labour movement published in 1972. These works cover all kinds of themes, from *Socialism: The Active Utopia* (1976) to *Freedom* (1988). For the last several years, Bauman has modified his choice of audience, writing pocketbooks for a wider audience in the European tradition (see especially *Globalization*, 1998, and *Community*, 2000). While the extent of his work can be reduced to the emblems of the Holocaust and the postmodern, as in its more generalized reception, it can more usefully be viewed as spreading across and responding to five main themes: the *modern*, and together with it, *the postmodern*, *Marxism*, *Nazism*, and *capitalism*.

Bauman's critique of the modern commences with his first book on the postmodern; the terms are mutually constitutive, a fact lost on various enthusiasts for the postmodern, which can properly be understood and located only in the modern itself. The modern is the larger category, this not least because Bauman remains conventionally sociological in understanding culture as a subcategory of society. Inasmuch as the postmodern is preeminently a cultural category, referring to art, architecture, writing, or performance, it belongs within the broader project of sociology, alongside economy, state, and civil society. Capitalist economy or commodification drives postmodern culture, at least in the long run. Bauman's initial enthusiasm for the idea of the postmodern is rather that it opens or opens again the possibility of critique or interpretation without making an intellectual claim to power. In the longer run, again, postmodern intellectuals may have made claims to celebrity or influence; but in the beginning of postmodern times, in the middle 1980s, the hope was rather that they would behave like older hermeneuts. For Bauman in 1987, the choice is exactly that for intellectuals, between the tasks of legislation and those of interpretation, or mediation between communities of speech. The full title of the book spells it out: *Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals*. Intellectuals have to choose, here, between state power and ambition, and criticism. The frame of consideration is modern, postmodern—the fusion into postmodern has yet to occur, and this is an exercise in the sociology of intellectuals as such. Bauman here castigates the Enlightenment for the immodesty of its claims, where knowledge was to become not only power but also the claim to state power. At this point, Bauman's critique of modernity intersects with the critique of Marxism, for the

real object of his charge against the ambitions of the Enlightenment is less Diderot than Lenin. *Legislators and Interpreters* is a shadow critique of bolshevism, high modernity par excellence. Bauman's ethical critique of bolshevism, like Nazism here, is that it dichotomises populations into worthy citizens and strangers, and sets out to eliminate these internal enemies, whether Kulaks or middle peasants in the USSR or Jews in Germany.

Bauman's critique of modernity comes to fruition in *Modernity and Ambivalence* (1991), the text that continues the logic of the earlier *Modernity and the Holocaust*. The core of *Modernity and Ambivalence* is a critique of classification and classificatory reason, or what Adorno would call "identity-thinking." Modernity and Enlightenment come unstuck on their own intellectual axes, where any particular thing or phenomenon cannot be viewed as "A" and "B" at the same time. Bauman's case is that humans must learn, rather, to deal with ambivalence, uncertainty, difference, debate, and endless dialogue. Conflict, on this understanding, is normal; the pursuit of social harmony is unachievable. Utopia matters, but only as a goal or goals that can never be reached or realized. Modernity, in this context, rests on an analytical attempt to expunge ambivalence. The end of this road is the point at which sociology meets eugenics. The idea of the postmodern appeals semantically to Bauman, in this setting, as it offers the hope of a world that might embrace ambivalence. Yet the resulting commercialisation of postmodern culture results in indifference rather than in the recognition of difference.

It is for this reason that Bauman finally develops the distinction between what he calls a "postmodern sociology" and "sociology of postmodernism." Bauman indicates his own residual modernity in this distinction, this not least because of his refusal to let go of sociology, itself the paradigmatic modern intellectual discipline. More than any other discipline, sociology is bound into modernity and modernism, from Simmel in Berlin through the Chicago School. Indeed, the closest thing there is to a postmodern sociology in the substantive sense is cultural studies, a field that Bauman backs onto but does not embrace. The ultimate secret to Bauman's taking in of the postmodern is precisely modern, and sociological. For Bauman insists that it is the task of sociology to interpret the forms or cultures that present themselves to us, historically and experientially. The postmodern is a real cultural phenomenon, even if it is not a new social formation. There is no more point in turning our backs on it than on television, rock and roll, or pornography. Bauman therefore advises that we have a choice, between engaging a sociology of the postmodern and a postmodern sociology. A postmodern sociology is part of the culture that it sets out to explain. A sociology of the postmodern, in contrast, sets out from the modern present to take on the problem of interpreting postmodern culture, viewing the postmodern as the problem to be addressed rather than as the interpretative means of explaining it.

Marxism has an especial significance for Bauman as it is also the source of the problem (or part of it) and of its solution. It is the historical source of the problem of communism, or bolshevism; and it is the intellectual source of critical theory, whose purpose is to criticise everything that exists, not least the travails of socialism in power. The critique of Marxism as bolshevism, or Marxist Enlightenment, is the core activity of *Legislators and Interpreters*. The defense of the practice of critical theory is central to works such as *Culture as Praxis* (1973) and *Toward a Critical Sociology* (1976), where the conjunction of critical theory and sociology works against critical theory's risk of opacity and sociology's residual positivism. The limits of bolshevism are more apparent; critical theory, in contrast, is open to the risk of self-righteousness, claiming its own emancipatory credentials too readily against the currents it claims to be merely traditional. The culture of critical Marxism on which Bauman draws is closer to Weberian Marxism, with the distinction that his relation to Weber's texts is more elliptical. Bauman distances Durkheim, whose sociology he connects to structural functionalism and to the everyday problems of modern conformism, and keeps Weber at arm's length. His first book published in English, *Between Class and Elite* (1972), nevertheless indicates even in its title the combination of Marxism and Weberian themes; and Weber's ghost becomes a dominant spirit, not least as Bauman's work proceeds into the 1980s.

If *Legislators and Interpreters* marks a point of break with Marxist and humanist illusion, *Memories of Class* (1982) confirms Bauman's distance from classical Marxism. Like *Postmodernity and Its Discontents*, the title of *Memories of Class* evokes Freud, if less explicitly. The memories involved, memories of class, are both validated and placed in this way, recognised and yet shifted back in time. For Bauman's classical sociological traditionalism is bound up with the concern about oppression and domination, not only to the Marxian concern for inequality, which is reduced emblematically to class. Bauman's earlier Weberian Marxist sympathies leave him open to concerns about exclusion as well as exploitation, and it is precisely this issue that comes to the foreground in *Memories of Class*, where the risk of social exclusion is even more socially dangerous and primitive than the prospect of exploitation on the factory floor. Socialism, in this optic, may be the future horizon of utopia, but it is also the memory of struggles past, against the very introduction of industrialism and the factory system. The problem of socialist politics, to make the connection, lies in its incapacity democratically to mediate past images and future hopes.

Memories of Class is the text where Bauman frontally encounters Foucault, but with the historical sociology twist that one would associate as much with the work of E. P. Thompson. Socialism, for Bauman, emerges as the reaction against industrialism even more than capitalism.

The factory system institutionalises a regime of bodily control of labour that exemplifies modern disciplinarity even more fully than Foucault's stories about prisons and asylums. The result, in all these cases of institutionalisation, is that the new regime becomes naturalized. We love Big Brother, and the workers come to love or at least to depend upon capital. The result, for Bauman, is a kind of corporatism, where the needs of labour are translated into those of capital. Freedom is monetised. The structural consequence of this process is that the organised workers end up within the system, via the wage labour/capital relation. Bauman's sociological focus then shifts to the outsiders, to those who are practically excluded from the wage labour/capital relation. This is a move consistent with his older sympathy with Simmel, and the idea of the stranger. It is also reminiscent of Weber's observation that while capital and labor are asymmetrical relations of domination, labour remains a form of property. In the long run, the language of class becomes limiting, for it brackets out those excluded from the working class who have no claim to property or to organization on its basis.

Bauman returns to these themes in *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor* (1998). Bauman endorses the sense that while the dominant image of earlier capitalism was production, the later capitalism after the postwar long boom is dominated by the image of consumption. If the dominant motif around the First World War is that of the factory, by the 1980s, it is that of the shopping mall. The point is not that we (or some of us) no longer produce, not least of all in developing countries in labour processes not too different from those captured by Marx in *Capital* (1867), or by Dickens in fiction. The point, rather, is that as less of us in Western developed countries are required to produce goods, thanks to the god technology, more of us are compelled to consume. Consumption becomes a matter of duty, thrift, or conservation, signs of a dying past. Postmodern culture is a culture of consumption, of display: Ours is the society of the spectacle. Social status is now reconfigured in terms of the capacity to consume. Success or failure is measured by consumption. To be excluded, for Bauman, is to be a flawed consumer. It is no longer sufficient to be a good worker or a courageous entrepreneur. These days, we all compete by the same standards of consumption, and we all know immediately, by sense-perception, who the losers are.

Exploitation does not cease, in this portrayal of modernity, any more than production does. The shift of emphasis in Bauman's work into the 1990s reflects rather the powerful phenomenological sense that the front stage of capitalism has become even more enchanted than it was in Marx's *Capital*, where the fetishism of commodities reigned. Marx understood that the Dante's inferno of the factory floor lay backstage and that the miracle of capitalist culture was to be located in its remarkable capacity to behave as though this world made us, and not the other way around. The

dramaturgy of the Holocaust and the image of Nazism is better known to us, at least via Hollywood and the now apparently endless documentaries about Hitler. If the couple modernity-postmodernity is as persistent in Bauman's work as the categories capitalism-Marxism, then the Holocaust has a special place, with reference to the idea of a field of modernity itself. Bauman's personal political choice as a youth was simple: communism or fascism. He chose communism, not least because the Nazis were invading Poland, killing Jews, and as they proceeded; and because communism later, after 1945, promised the hope of reconstruction, if not utopia. Warsaw had been levelled by the war; Poland had become the playground, or rather, then, laboratory of the Nazis. Until the writing of *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Bauman had remained closer in his attraction and ethical orientation to the universalism of the left. In 1986, his wife, Janina, published her memoirs of girlhood in the Warsaw ghetto, *Winter in the Morning*. It was the trigger for Bauman's new project, to seek to insinuate the Holocaust in the centre of ordinary sociology. Why? Because for Bauman, the Holocaust was less immediately a German disaster waiting to happen than a modern disaster whose occurrence depended on modern will-to-power, a reactionary modernist ideology, and modern political organizational and technological forms. The Nazis developed a repertoire that relied not only on gas and a reliable railway system but also on cinema and broadcasting; all they lacked was television.

The Holocaust is expressive of modernity for Bauman because it not only indicates the extent of its murderous possibilities but also expresses the modern or Enlightenment drive toward the achievement of the perfect order. The Nazi experience also reflects Enlightenment logic, even if the Nazis publically opposed the principles of the French Revolution, of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The final solution was a rational attempt, using rationalized means of organization, to solve the problem that the Nazis set themselves: to rid their world of the Jews. More, Nazism reflects and extends the social engineering mania that earlier philosophers merely dreamed of; only they defined the problem differently as the end not of poverty or oppression, but of a people. In the framework of Bauman's thinking, Western civilization becomes obsessed with what he calls a "gardening culture," motivated by the desire finally to set things straight, help nature along, and remove all weeds. This gardening imperative, first indicated in *Legislators and Interpreters*, becomes an attitude of all high-modernist strategies, which seek to set the world straight. Bauman contrasts the mania for gardening with the earlier attitude of the gamekeeper. If the final solution involves industrialized killing, then the gardening state pursues industrialized nature with a will to control that only nature can defy. By the time he publishes *Modernity and the Holocaust*, it is the image of the Jews as weeds (or more infamously, for

Goebbels, as rats) that becomes central. Perfection, for the Nazis, meant purity, the absence of especially of Jews and others. If this is Bauman's most Weberian work, emphasising bureaucratic rationality and its indifference to the face of the other, the suffering subject, it is also the book most connected to the legacy of Simmel. *Modernity and the Holocaust* addresses the figure of the Jew as the exemplary stranger in bad times, those who came and stayed and imagined, innocently, that they were Germans, until the Nazis discovered that they were Jews.

The theoretical conclusion to which *Modernity and the Holocaust* reaches is as simple as it is powerful. Sociology in the West has an ethical hole in its heart. Sociology at the end of the twentieth century had still yet to begin to address questions of how we might live, how we might still be responsible for each other. *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989) thus leads directly via *Modernity and Ambivalence* (1991) to *Postmodern Ethics* (1993), where the grandest gesture is simply to call this bluff. We have to confront the fact that sociology cannot respond to the problems of the world only with axioms concerning value-freedom or its ersatz, liberal moralising about the plight of the disadvantaged. Sociology has a social core, in the image of the party of two. Self is constituted only through the other. Ethics is the starting point for all social inquiry, or it should be. Sociology is the field of the social, but it must begin from the individual. To resort too readily to the social is to defer to the kind of conformism where sociology blames everybody but the actor and sidesteps the question of ethical responsibility. Sociology, like its subject, society, too easily reproduces the conformism it sets out to criticise. As Bauman argues, drawing on images from Lévi-Strauss, societies can either assimilate or follow anthropoemic strategies toward strangers, or expel them in anthropophagic manner. Dominant cultures consume the other or evacuate them. Bauman adds the cautionary note that in our own time, stronger states engage in both strategies at once. Assimilation is the safer of these two strategies, though multiculturalism is ethically sounder. Again, Bauman's more general purpose here is to break the modernist conceit for which violence and corruption seem always to happen elsewhere, in less civilized places than our own. Bauman insists rather, in sympathy with Walter Benjamin, that civilization is based upon violence.

Bauman's argument, as ever, is constructed in conversation with various interlocutors. Mary Douglas's work is also central to this approach, not least in its distinction between purity and danger. The Nazi pursuit of the society of perfect order was based on the particular eugenics for which others defiled the purity of the Aryan race. As Bauman argues, in sympathy with this anthropological critique, however, the struggle against dirt is perpetual. Every day we sweep up, every day dirt, like disorder, returns: It is normal. There is an especially brutal kind of utopian

impulse in the Nazi project of absolute imaginary hygiene. This modernising impulse comes together with the most bizarre imagined traditionalism, where peoples organized into races exist entirely separately of each other. It is as though no one moves. In Bauman's view, this is not only counterethical, but counterfactual. Movement is central, and it accelerates, to the extent that it may now be the nature of the process of movement, rather than class or origin, that illustrates both problems of global inclusion and exclusion. Consistent with his interest in the idea that particular social forms bring out particular personality types, Bauman suggests that there are two new personalities encouraged by postmodern times. These are the *tourist* and the *vagabond*. Tourists have the means to move, to consume, to consume the other, to consume the services of the vagabonds, sexual and other. Vagabonds, in contrast, are compelled to move, to keep moving. This is a kind of global reflection of domination, where tourists and vagabonds inhabit mutually exclusive lifeworlds that are nevertheless connected by the dialectics of master and slave.

Capitalism remains the global context within which these practices are acted out. Bauman does not mean to say, therefore, that we are all tourists or vagabonds, let alone that we are all strangers or nomads. These are indicative categories expressing personality types, not analytical categories explaining structures of inequality. Those who stay at home engage in more conventional class relations, with the difference that new middle-class activities, like those of the symbolic analysts who work in information technology, are increasingly given to the patterns of geographical mobility characteristic of tourists. They are no longer citizens; they have no loyalty whatsoever to place or to those who are confined to particular places, towns, cities, or states that need tax revenue bases to supply public infrastructure, schools, housing, and hospitals. No one is responsible for anything anymore. This is not the world of the Holocaust, but the themes are recurrent. Bauman is a critic of communitarianism who is also critical of liberalism. Modern culture is problematic for Bauman because it corrodes traditional identities and loyalties and replaces them with do-it-yourself personality kits to be bought and sold at will, for those who have the capacity to consume. Human beings retain the capacity to do better and to look after each other, but have to struggle against the pressure to conform. The prospect of autonomy depends on the recognition of dependence. That prospect is dimmer now than it may have seemed before, but the margins of hope remain, and it is the task of critical sociologists to exercise and encourage expanded activity within them.

— Peter Beilharz

See also Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Holocaust; Marxism

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BEAUVOIR, SIMONE DE

Most widely known as the author of *The Second Sex* ([1949] 1989) and the intellectual and sexual partner of Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) was a novelist and essayist as well as a feminist theorist and philosopher. Born and educated in private schools in Paris, Beauvoir passed the Sorbonne's *agrégation*, its difficult final examination, when she was 21 years old. Her thesis there was on Leibniz. From 1931 to 1941, she taught school in Marseille and Rouen. Between 1941 and 1943, she taught at the Sorbonne. Widely traveled and influential in her day, Beauvoir was a feminist public intellectual.

Beauvoir's best-known book helped to launch the second wave of feminism. Together with Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), *The Second Sex* stimulated feminist thought and activism during the second half of the twentieth century. Building on the first wave of feminism that lasted from the mid-nineteenth century until the Great Depression, this second wave had the same broad focus as the first. It aimed to further female citizens' rights to control their lives to the same extent and in the same ways that male citizens are legally entitled to control theirs.

Expressed in her memoirs and novels as well as in her philosophical tracts and essays, Beauvoir's feminist theorizing was pathbreaking in the extreme. Abjuring both essentialism and determinism, whether biological or otherwise, Beauvoir adopted a feminist phenomenology capable of probing women's embodied consciousness and lived experiences in ways both philosophical and practical. Appropriating and putting to feminist uses the ideas of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as well as those of Sartre at times, Beauvoir theoretically countermanded the ideas of René Descartes and Sigmund Freud, while putting Karl Marx's ideas to distinctly feminist uses.

Long before it was commonplace to discuss women's embodiment and its ramifications, Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* analyzed women's embodiment by looking at

menstruation, "frigidity," menopause, and beauty; it tackled the experiences of pregnancy and aging before these were widely theorized as institutionally shaped and regulated; it asked hard questions about what love, subjectivity, desire, and work typically mean in the lives of women and men. As she theorized in this masterpiece as well as in her fiction and her other philosophical works, Beauvoir formulated ideas that inspired many later feminist theorists.

Her work opened theoretical pathways for notions such as *maternal thinking*, for instance. Beauvoir ([1949] 1989:655) emphasized that motherhood is the one undertaking where women can harbor no practical hope of "complete liberty." Beauvoir's work also laid grounds for all kinds of feminist literary criticism, such as Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics* (1971). Reading D. H. Lawrence in terms of "phallic pride" and looking at the *myth of woman* in other male writers' works as well, Beauvoir ([1949] 1989:185–237) showed how popular as well as academic culture constructs Woman as Other: that is, woman as different, with man being the standard-issue human being. Thus emphasizing how "woman" is socially and culturally constructed, Beauvoir theorized a great deal not about "laws of nature" or universal differences between women and men, but about "difference[s] in their situations." Assigned different kinds of work in society and expected to exhibit different kinds of commitments and interests, women and men typically develop along different lines.

The final section of *The Second Sex* comprises a long essay on "The Independent Woman" as well as a conclusion. There, Beauvoir reiterates her insistence that women's distinctive embodiment is not the main reason for whatever difficulties and setbacks they experience as women. Instead of physiology or anatomy, Beauvoir emphasizes the "moral tension" that builds up from women's typical responsibilities and the sharp contradictions built into their typical situations.

Besides her well-known contributions to feminist theorizing about women's identities, selfhood, and lived experiences, Beauvoir also contributed substantially to feminist ethics. In *The Ethics of Ambiguity* ([1974] 1994), she emerges as a major theorist of liberation, agency, and the moral self. In this work (as well as elsewhere), Beauvoir rejects the notion of a "core" or "fixed" self. Instead, much like contemporary postmodernists, Beauvoir sees "the moral self as the product of a continuous project, a personal art of living" (Vintges 1999:141). Not unlike Luce Irigaray, another French feminist theorist writing decades later, Beauvoir's ethics links ambiguity "with the female body and desire. . . . For both [theorists], ambiguity, connected with women, is something positive" (Gothlin 1999:93).

Indeed, for Beauvoir, ambiguity is the stuff of life and the heart of matters both human and social as well as feminine.

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Essentialism; Feminist Ethics; Irigaray, Luce; Maternal Thinking; Postmodernist Feminism

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BECK, ULRICH

German social theorist of modernity Ulrich Beck (b. 1944) is an advocate of a cosmopolitan approach to the social sciences. Alongside Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Beck is one of the three most prominent contemporary German sociologists. He recognizes Habermas's influence on his work through his intellectual obligation to the continuation of the Enlightenment project. He distinguishes himself from Niklas Luhmann by grounding his work in a strong subject-oriented approach.

RISK SOCIETY

Ulrich Beck is widely recognized for developing the concept of the *risk society*. Indeed, Beck published *Risk Society* in 1986, and only a few months later, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster confirmed his claim that our society is being transformed by technologies that are beyond our immediate control. Risk societies are borderless societies characterized by the distribution of dangers, rather than the state's distribution of goods. Risks are uncontrolled and the consequences incalculable. Society is being transformed into a risk society or a *world risk society*. Beck continued to develop his thoughts on the transformation of modernity in the books *Reflexive Modernization* and *Risky Freedoms*. One of the central ideas he put forth in *Risky Freedoms* was the importance to modern individuals of "do-it-yourself"

biographies, which are based on his notion of risk and free the individual from determination by society. The old classical elite ideal of relating to one's biography as a work of art has become a necessity in the age of globalization, as people increasingly lack the opportunity to construct orderly and linear self-histories. As such, in his theory of individualization, Beck tries to put the Subject back into social theory. This theory highlights new potentialities of social action, which can no longer be based on the traditional patterns of social participation and political manipulation.

SECOND MODERNITY

In addition to the concept of risk and individualization, Beck also examined the concepts of globalization, cosmopolitization, and "second modernity." For Beck, the term *globalization* refers to a reflexive rather than a linear process, taking the global and the local (or the universal and the particular) not as opposites, but as combined and mutually implicit principles. For him, these concepts indicate a transition between historical epochs, or more precisely, to the transition from a "first modernity," characterized by the congruence between nation and state (with an emphasis on the welfare state), to a "second modernity," characterized by a world society and transnationalism. This does not mean, of course, that the first modernity is over and done with, and it does not mean that we live in a postmodern society in which everything is being deconstructed. Ulrich Beck does not see himself as a postmodern thinker. Indeed, in nearly all of his major works, Beck claims that he is intellectually committed to the project of the Enlightenment. This means that he sees in the European traditions of reason and liberty the chance for people to realize freedom. Unlike postmodern theorists, he does not hold these notions as spurious or as mechanisms of oppression. For Beck, social theory is an instrument of human emancipation. For him, sociology's problem is that it identifies its subject matter, "society," with the nation-state. In this view, the territorial state is society's container—a final victory for Hegel, so to speak. In fact, it was not long ago that sociologists were demanding to "bring the state back in." Ulrich Beck does not want to throw the state back out. But he wants to break the state's theoretical identification with society in order to demonstrate the sociological possibilities of reconstructing the nation-state into a cosmopolitan state to serve the needs of a cosmopolitan society.

COSMOPOLITAN SOCIOLOGY

The cultural, political, and economic processes of globalization are undermining the foundations of the first modernity. Therefore, what Beck refers to as "internal globalization," or even the "cosmopolitization" of nation-state

societies from within, becomes central to understanding contemporary society. In this connection, one central thesis for Beck is the *pluralization of borders*, such as those between nature and society, knowledge and ignorance, subject and object, peace and war, life and death, and We and Other. The concept “second modernity” tries to catch both the continuity with and the epochal break with a first modernity. What remains from the first modernity is the valuation of the single individual and his or her political liberties (individualization). What is new is the spacelessness of capital, labor, and even home that is created through the processes of globalization. Modernity is not over. Indeed, Beck uses the term second modernity to announce that the end of modernity celebrated by postmodernism has not yet arrived.

Beck argues that one can begin to examine the second modernity by employing a new kind of methodology called *methodological cosmopolitanism*, which implicitly provides a critique of *methodological nationalism*. This shift broadens the horizons for social science research. The nation-state-centered understanding of society and politics is replaced by the opening up of that nation-centered perspective. This blurs the traditional distinction between the national and the international and opens new research horizons in the study of inequality and power. Through these concepts, Beck (2002) is able to answer the criticism that his theory lacked a conception of power. In his latest book on power in the global age, he claims that the real power of multinational corporations is not their power to *march in*, but their power to *march out*, or their refusal to enter in the first place, their refusal to invest. They form a network of cooperating actors, none of whom will do business with a country until it meets their standards. And this, according to Beck, is the model of deterritorialized power that states should seek to emulate: something that is built up through networks of cooperation and is exercised through the denial of that cooperation. This is how states could build a counterpower to the power of multinational corporations. States should not strive toward a world state, but rather toward deterritorialized power, toward a network of political cooperation that could exercise the same power of denial and that, once activated, would trump those of the corporations. Beck also emphasizes that while corporations exert this new power, they also have new vulnerabilities precisely because of the moral campaigns to which they can now be subjected. They have a need for legal security with which no one state can provide them. As such, the denial of cooperation can be all the more dangerous for them, the need for it all the more compelling, and the power it wields all the more effective. Similarly, such a network of cooperation—and the denial of that cooperation—could be used by networks of states to force the compliance of noncooperates, not by compelling them through military force, but by denying them the opportunities for development and legitimacy

that they can gain only through being allowed into the network, and making them wither on their own until they give in.

— Natan Sznaider

See also Cosmopolitan Sociology; Habermas, Jürgen; Individualism; Luhmann, Niklas; Modernity; Postmodernism; Risk Society

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BECKER, HOWARD

An American sociologist who has pursued diverse interests over a long career, Howard S. Becker (b. 1928) is a prominent advocate of qualitative research methods in a discipline increasingly given to abstraction and quantification. Educated at the University of Chicago in the 1940s under Everett Hughes, Becker self-consciously inherits from the Chicago School a commitment to fine-grained field studies, and from symbolic interactionism an abiding concern with the intersubjective negotiation of meaning. In addition to definitive substantive contributions to the sociology of education, deviance, and art, Becker has been an

innovative methodologist, explaining the varied virtues of qualitative inquiry, advocating photography as a legitimate and fruitful mode of social research, and encouraging sociologists to view their work as both science and craft.

Becker's early collaborative field studies of medical students and undergraduates at the University of Kansas (Becker et al. 1961, 1968) reveal how differently life in school appears to students and school authorities. While teachers typically see a straightforward relationship between educational goals and the curricular program, students often find that the curriculum inhibits their pursuit of real learning. Undergraduates strategize to make good grades, even when doing so means opting for rote memorization and fluffy course loads, because so many practical rewards are tied to grades, not to what students actually learn. Medical students find that passing their exams and pleasing their superiors are the crucial facts of life in medical school, and so they suspend their idealistic concerns with helping patients in the interest of passing tests and gaining approval. Becker's studies became classics in the study of education and the professions, and also crystallized analytic strategies that would inform his subsequent scholarship. He would continue to examine social phenomena from the standpoint of low-status or marginal groups and use their perspectives to refashion established social science wisdom.

This approach is most clear in Becker's studies of marijuana users and jazz musicians published in *Outsiders* (1963), in which he extended Everett Hughes's notion of career to novel theoretical ends. He argued that unconventional ways of life are the culmination of gradual behavioral trajectories in which people learn, in piecemeal fashion, both to appreciate the pleasures of deviant activity and to redefine conventional practices and values as errant. Becker significantly shifted the terms in which social scientists view deviance: Rather than pathology, deviant behavior is understood as the product of a generic learning process in which people gradually redefine their conceptions of the normal. But Becker went further, politicizing dominant conceptions of normality and deviance. What is deviant, Becker argued, is what powerful social groups *call* deviant; deviance does not inhere in behaviors themselves, but is the product of a labeling process in which some activities are called "inappropriate," "sinful," "unlawful," or "sick." This argument became the genesis for a rich research tradition under the banner of "labeling theory" (ironically, a term Becker himself claims never to have advocated) and also has been deployed and elaborated by scholars of social movements.

The career notion is otherwise extended in *Art Worlds* (1982), a benchmark sociology of artistic production, in which Becker demonstrated that a central task of becoming a professional artist is learning the conventions—the collective agreements about what counts as good work—that obtain within a particular genre. Artistic conventions are intersubjectively negotiated over time but at any given

moment of experience have a strong normative character. Particular works are evaluated as "pedestrian" or "brilliant" in light of the conventions governing a particular artistic community. *Art Worlds* also demonstrated that while primary credit for an artistic production is often given to one person, the work of art is always a collective activity. It involves not only brilliant creators in their studios but also the people who manufacture paints and brushes and stretch canvases, the curators who fashion exhibitions, the dealers who assemble amenable audiences for particular artists, and the critics who are able to explain a particular artwork's virtues. Holding the entire artistic enterprise together are mutual necessity and generally agreed-upon ways of working. No one can keep an art world spinning on one's own, and cooperation requires some degree of common vision. As Becker himself made clear, these insights about the nature of creative production are as applicable to academic communities as they are to artistic ones. Indeed, they form the basis for Becker's general, and disarmingly simple, definition of culture: shared understandings.

As a methodologist, Becker has cheerfully blurred distinctions between art and science. He has advocated the use of photography as a means for both generating social science data and representing research findings, and he has curated a number of photographic exhibitions. With Michal McCall, he experimented with a novel form of oral presentation called "performance science," in which researchers stage their work theatrically (Becker and McCall 1990). He has also encouraged social scientists to view the act of writing as both part of the research act and a distinctive craft. But while he has frequently bucked methodological convention, Becker has remained a committed empiricist, leaving to more radical colleagues the epistemological critiques of ethnographic inquiry that have both enlivened and divided the symbolic interactionist tradition (e.g., Clough 1998).

Becker moonlighted during graduate school as a pianist in Chicago jazz bands, playing at wedding receptions and in middlebrow taverns with constantly changing combinations of musicians. He used this experience as empirical material for his studies of deviance and art, and he has continued to invoke jazz as both case and metaphor in later writing. Jazz performances serve as Becker's guiding image for a general theory of innovation (Becker 2000), one that is equally attentive to the ingenuity of individual actors, the normative rules governing behavior in a particular field of activity, and the larger organizational systems that create the conditions under which people pursue their crafts. Perhaps it is not too much to say that jazz has helped define Becker's general sociological vision, one that is equally attentive to the structure, contingency, and beauty of human collaboration.

— Mitchell L. Stevens

See also Deviance; Hughes, Everett; Labeling Theory; Symbolic Interaction

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BEHAVIORISM

Behaviorism is a philosophy and conceptual framework for the study of behavior. It advocates the use of a natural science approach to establish general laws and principles that explain the causes of behavior—its acquisition, maintenance, and change—without reference to mental events or internal psychological processes. These principles emphasize relationships between behavior and the physical and social environment, particularly the contingencies of reinforcement that control the occurrence, strength, and choice of behaviors.

Behaviorism developed primarily in the United States, originally in opposition to the philosophy of "introspection" as a technique for investigating mental processes (thoughts, feelings, and perceptions). Behaviorists disagreed with both the subject matter of introspection (subjective experience and internal states) and the questionable reliability and validity of the technique itself (critically examining one's own mental processes by "looking inward"). John B. Watson coined the term "behaviorism" in 1913 and developed its earliest form: classical or "S-R" behaviorism, which sought to explain behavioral events in terms of a publicly observable antecedent stimulus (S) that elicited a publicly observable response (R). As this statement suggests, Watson believed that psychology should concern itself solely with publicly observable behavior, without reference to private, mental events, a philosophical position now called "methodological behaviorism."

In the 1930s, B. F. Skinner launched a new form of behaviorism, "radical behaviorism," which became the primary influence on modern behaviorism in the psychological and social sciences. Unlike methodological behaviorism,

radical behaviorism advocates the analysis of *all* forms of behavior, both public and private, as long as they are observable in some way. Although radical behaviorists accept that some behavioral phenomena are private, they believe they can be analyzed and explained by the same principles as public behaviors. In contrast to the S-R model of classical behaviorism, which assumed that behaviors are produced by stimuli in a simple, associationistic sort of chain, Skinner argued that most behaviors are produced by more complex relationships with the external environment. These relationships include not only stimuli that precede behaviors but also, more important, stimulus consequences that follow them and alter the probability of their occurrence in the future. Modern behaviorism is largely the legacy of Skinner, whose work included treatises on the philosophy of behavior analysis, numerous scientific works documenting his experimental analyses of behavior, and practical (and utopian) applications of behaviorism. Most influential was his extensive research on operant conditioning, showing how the consequences of behaviors (in common parlance, the "rewards" and "punishments" that follow behaviors) systematically modify their subsequent performance.

While key principles of behaviorism were originally established in research on animals (particularly Skinner's well-known work with pigeons), extensive work has also been conducted on human behavior, both individual and social. The movement to more complex forms of human behavior led to the spread of behaviorism's influence beyond psychology, to the social sciences. The purest expression of behaviorism's influence on the social sciences is behavioral sociology, a perspective that was most active during the 1960s and 1970s. Behaviorism was also a strong influence on the development of the social exchange tradition in sociology, particularly the social exchange theories of George Homans and Richard Emerson.

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF MODERN BEHAVIORISM

Following Skinner, modern behaviorists make a distinction between two kinds of behaviors: *respondent*, or reflex, behaviors and *operant* behaviors. Respondents are innate, inherited responses that provide automatic behavioral protection and sustenance from birth. They are *elicited* by particular stimuli; for example, a bright light on the eye elicits constriction of the pupil; food elicits salivation. Operant behaviors, in contrast, are voluntary, learned behaviors that are not automatically elicited by a prior stimulus, but are influenced by the environmental events that follow them—their consequences. A child pestering a parent for a cookie, a teacher instructing a class, a husband helping his wife, and two corporate executives negotiating a deal are all emitting operant behaviors: voluntary acts, some quite complex and

comprised of many components, which produce consequent changes in the actor's environment.

Associated with each type of behavior is a conditioning procedure that can be used to influence the occurrence of the behavior. Respondent or classical conditioning consists of pairing a stimulus that automatically elicits a respondent with a new, neutral stimulus, which acquires the ability to elicit the respondent after repeated pairing with the original stimulus. For example, Pavlov's famous experiments induced dogs to salivate in response to a bell by repeatedly pairing the bell with food. Operant or instrumental conditioning, in contrast, consists of modifying the strength (frequency, intensity, or duration) of an operant behavior by altering the relationships between the operant and its consequences. For example, parents may strive to increase their children's study habits or their help with household chores by making some privilege or reward contingent on completion of those activities.

Modern behaviorists are concerned primarily with the causes of operant behaviors: the voluntary actions that comprise the vast majority of human behavior. Behaviorists believe that operant behaviors are "selected" by their consequences at three distinct levels, beginning with Darwinian natural selection. Thus, behavior is a function of an organism's genetic endowment, as evolution selects certain behavioral characteristics over the lifetime of a species; of the organism's environment, as contingencies of reinforcement and punishment select and modify the behavior of the organism during its lifetime; and of the social/cultural environment, as social or cultural contingencies select broader practices affecting the social group of which the individual organism is a member. Although all three levels are important for understanding the full context in which behavior occurs, the middle level—the contingencies of reinforcement that modify behavior during an organism's lifetime—has been the primary focus of behavior analysis.

Contingencies of reinforcement comprise three variables that are defined in terms of each other and that form a single, interrelated system linking behavior and environment: an *operant*, defined as a behavior that operates on the environment to produce some consequence or effect that, in turn, modifies the subsequent occurrence of the operant; a *stimulus consequence*, defined as an environmental consequence or outcome of a behavior that modifies its subsequent occurrence; and a *discriminative stimulus*, defined as an environmental stimulus that marks an occasion on which, in the past, the occurrence of an operant has produced a particular reinforcer. For example, students learn that when in a classroom (a discriminative stimulus), raising one's hand (an operant) is the way to be called upon by the instructor. How the instructor responds to the student's comment or question (the stimulus consequence) will tend to modify its occurrence, either increasing or decreasing the probability of the student's future hand-raising behavior.

All operants and stimuli are members of classes of similar phenomena, defined by the environmental relations in which they participate. Classes of operant behavior are created by differential reinforcement with respect to classes of discriminative stimuli. For example, closing a door with one's foot, hand, or elbow are all ways of responding to a cold draft created by an open door, and all will be reinforced by a reduction in cold. Stimulus consequences are classified by their effects on behaviors: Those that *increase* or *strengthen* the behaviors on which they are contingent are called "reinforcers"; those that *decrease* or *weaken* behaviors are called "punishers." Both reinforcers and punishers can be either positive or negative, depending on whether their effect is produced by presenting (adding) or removing (subtracting) the stimulus, thus creating a fourfold table that classifies stimulus consequences by their effects on behavior (an increase or decrease in strength) and by whether these effects are produced by *presenting* or *removing* the stimuli. A positive reinforcer is a stimulus consequence whose addition strengthens behavior (e.g., approval for work performed); a positive punisher is a consequence whose addition weakens behavior (e.g., a traffic ticket for speeding); a negative reinforcer is a consequence whose removal strengthens behavior (e.g., exempting good students from taking a final exam); and a negative punisher is a consequence whose removal weakens behavior (e.g., losing driving privileges after causing an accident).

Behaviorists study contingencies of reinforcement by arranging the environment, typically in a laboratory setting, so that a relationship exists between an operant (e.g., pecking a key or pushing a button) and the occurrence of some event (e.g., the presentation of food or money). Different kinds of contingencies, called *schedules* of reinforcement, create different relationships between behaviors and consequences and are associated with different effects on behavior. *Continuous* reinforcement delivers a reinforcer after every response, while *intermittent* reinforcement delivers a reinforcer after some but not all responses. Different schedules of intermittent reinforcement describe whether reinforcers are delivered after a fixed (*fixed ratio*) or variable (*variable ratio*) number of responses, or after the first response following a fixed (*fixed interval*) or variable (*variable interval*) interval of time has passed. One of Skinner's most noted contributions was showing that behavior is far more resistant to extinction under intermittent reinforcement than under continuous reinforcement, and under a variable rather than fixed schedule of reinforcement, because it is more difficult to tell when reinforcement has stopped. Variable intermittent schedules can explain, for example, the persistence of both gamblers and door-to-door salespersons.

Context and Choice

In addition to the immediate contingencies of reinforcement that influence behavior, behavior is also affected by

the context within which those contingencies occur. Important aspects of context include an individual's history of reinforcement (including a history of deprivation or satiation for particular events or stimuli), current physiological status, previous environment-behavior interactions, and alternative sources of reinforcement attached to different behavioral choices.

Contextual relations are particularly important for behaviorists' explanations of the complexity and variety of human behavior. Through processes of stimulus-and-response generalization, originally neutral stimuli come to acquire properties of either reinforcing stimuli or discriminative stimuli, and learning spreads from specific behaviors to related classes of behaviors. Behaviorists argue that these processes can account for the rapid acquisition of behaviors during early childhood, the reinforcing or punishing properties that numerous social stimuli come to acquire, and the differences among people in which stimuli or events are reinforcing or punishing.

Very few reinforcers—primarily those associated with survival—strengthen behaviors innately, without learning. Those that do, such as food for a hungry organism, water for a thirsty organism, or warmth for a cold organism, are called primary or *unconditioned* reinforcers. The vast majority of human behaviors respond, instead, to originally neutral stimuli that have acquired either reinforcing or punishing properties over time, through association with primary reinforcers. For example, a mother's smile, associated with food (an unconditioned reinforcer) during nursing, often becomes a secondary, or *conditioned* reinforcer for a child. A particularly powerful class of conditioned reinforcers are *generalized* reinforcers: stimuli that stand for, or provide access to, a wide range of other reinforcers. Social status and money are good examples. While generalized reinforcers are often broad enough to be reinforcing for many people, behaviorists emphasize that what is reinforcing for one person may not be for another. That is, because their *reinforcement histories* differ, people will respond differently to different stimuli; in some cases, a stimulus that is actually a punisher for one person (e.g., scolding) will serve as a reinforcer for another (e.g., a child whose only attention from a parent has come in that form). The effectiveness of established reinforcers or punishers for particular individuals also varies over time, as a function of the individual's recent deprivation or satiation with respect to that stimulus.

Most behaviors of interest to social scientists occur in a context of choice; that is, people choose between alternative behaviors that have been associated with particular consequences (benefits or costs) in the past. Research by behaviorists in the last 30 years has studied choice behavior in the laboratory using *concurrent* schedules of reinforcement, that is, two or more schedules operating at the same time, with each schedule providing reinforcement independently. Interest has focused on how persons allocate

behaviors when faced with different choices, all of which produce reinforcement but on different schedules. The most basic principle that has emerged from this work is that people (and animals) *match* the distribution of their behavior to the distribution of reinforcement. For example, if working at Task A produces reinforcement 60 percent of the time and working at Task B produces reinforcement 40 percent of the time, individuals tend to perform Task A 60 percent of the time and Task B 40 percent of the time. This principle represents a key difference between theories based on behavioral principles and those based on rational choice theories: The matching law implies that humans do not always act to maximize utility (or reinforcement). Rather than selecting the option that would produce the most total reinforcement in the long run (in this example, Task A), people instead respond to the immediate effectiveness of their behavior and to changes in the local rate of reinforcement. Thus, a 60-percent rate of reinforcement will not reinforce every behavior, and when a behavior is not reinforced, people will tend to switch to the alternative. If, on the other hand, both alternatives provide reinforcement after every behavior (a 100-percent rate) but reinforcement for Task A is greater than for Task B, then individuals will perform Task A 100 percent of the time.

Behavioral Sociology and Applied Behaviorism

Behavioral sociology developed in the early 1960s as the application and extension of the philosophy and principles of psychological behaviorism to the study of social phenomena. Broadly defined, the perspective includes social exchange theories that use behavioral principles as their starting point (particularly the theories of George Homans and Richard Emerson), experimental laboratory analyses of social interaction, nonexperimental studies of macro-social phenomena, and field studies in applied settings.

In contrast to psychological behaviorism, the subject matter of sociological behaviorism is typically not individual behavior, but rather the behavior of dyads, networks, or groups. Behavioral sociology, like behavioral psychology, explains these behaviors (which are actually relationships between the behaviors of two or more persons) by reinforcement contingencies. The kind of reinforcement contingencies studied by psychologists and sociologists differs, however. Most behavioral psychologists study how a single person's behavior is affected by *individual* contingencies: relationships in which reinforcers for the person are contingent solely on the person's own behavior. In contrast, behavioral sociologists study how two or more persons' behaviors are jointly affected by mutual *social* contingencies: relationships in which each person's reinforcers are at least partially contingent on the behaviors of one or more other persons.

The structural characteristics of social contingencies define both the kind of interaction produced and the relation between the individuals. For example, social contingencies in which each of two person's reinforcers are contingent solely on the other person's behavior produce the interaction known as *social exchange*; that is, each person's behavior produces outcomes that are reinforcing for the other person, as in Homans's famous example of the exchange of advice for approval. Social contingencies in which the reinforcers of two or more persons are contingent on their *joint* behaviors produce the interaction known as *cooperation*; for example, two people coauthoring a book. The maintenance of social behavior rests on reciprocal or mutual rewards (reinforcement), and the establishment of this reciprocity is unique to social contingencies.

While work specifically characterized as behavioral sociology is now less evident than in the 1960s and 1970s, the influence of behaviorism on sociology is still quite visible in much of the research on the structure and processes of human groups, including theories and research on social exchange, cooperation, social dilemmas, and related topics. This tradition adheres to the emphasis of behaviorism on observable behavior, experimental analysis, the effects of rewards and costs on behavioral choices, and the role of learning and adaptation in the ongoing interaction between individuals and their social environments. Thus, George Ritzer's (1992) characterization of the social-behavior paradigm as one of the three major images of the subject matter of sociology still has merit, although the paradigm is now somewhat of a hybrid, blending behaviorist views with related (but distinct) tenets from rational choice and micro-economic theories.

Both in psychology and in the social sciences, a distinctive feature of behaviorism is the extent to which its principles have been applied to modify behavior and ameliorate social problems. *Behavior modification* refers to the gradual, systematic shaping of behavior toward some previously established state by reinforcing behaviors that successively approximate the desired outcome, while eliminating (when appropriate) existing reinforcement for undesirable behaviors. For example, a hyperactive child might gradually learn to sit and work at a desk for an hour at a time if a parent or teacher reinforces successive approximations of that goal: sitting for 5 minutes, then for 10 minutes, and so on, while simultaneously eliminating reinforcing attention for disruptive behaviors. Behavior modification has been used in numerous therapeutic situations to change behaviors that are self-destructive, address family problems, reduce phobic reactions, improve academic performance, and stop drug abuse, among other things.

The principles of behavioral sociology have also been applied to group interactions, most notably in classrooms. The design of classroom reward structures that use team performance, peer tutoring, and classroom-wide contingencies

to enhance the academic performance of large numbers of students are one primary example. Some applications occur in an even broader social context, such as community recycling or energy conservation programs.

— Linda D. Molm

See also Emerson, Richard; Homans, George; Learning Theory; Social Exchange Theory

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BELL, DANIEL

Daniel Bell (b. 1919) is best known for the conception of postindustrial society found in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973) and for the analysis of contemporary culture found in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976). These are two major case studies in Bell's larger project to theorize macro-social organization. Bell argues that the integration of the three major realms of society—the techno-economic sphere, the polity, and the culture—is not more common historically than a disjuncture between realms. Bell's position contrasts sharply with functionalism and Marxism, both of which emphasize as the typical condition the integration of society in relation either to consensus values and norms (as in the case of functionalism) or a dominant mode of production (as in the case of Marxism). Bell's general conception of social organization, while less rigorously developed than either functionalism or Marxism, provides a preferable level of analytical flexibility.

Bell provides examples of societies in which the three realms are well integrated, mentioning the church-dominated society of early medieval Europe and the bourgeois society that emerged in Western Europe and North America following the Industrial Revolution. However, in the case of the emerging postindustrial society, Bell is clear that the major principles of organization of the three realms are in

conflict. The axial principle of the techno-economic sphere is functional rationality, a combination of efficiency and productivity oriented to material growth. The axial principle of the polity is legitimacy, based on equality and participation and oriented to obtaining the consent of the governed for the use of power. The axial principle of the culture is development of the self, encouraging a denial of any limits or boundaries to experience and a distance from bourgeois norms. From this framework, Bell describes a key contradiction of the emerging postindustrial society: between a social structure based on the discipline of occupational specialization within bureaucratic hierarchies and a culture based on the enhancement and fulfillment of the self and the “whole person.” The two are in contradiction because one requires self-renunciation in the service of institutional goals, while the other promotes an uninhibited pursuit of self-realization. Bell observes that other contradictions also exist in postindustrial society, for example, between the ideal of meritocracy and equality, reflecting the tensions between a social structure of graded occupational specializations and a polity based on equal rights.

Bell’s approach to the study of social change is to extract the underlying principles of change in contemporary industrial societies and to develop a portrait of societies of the future based on the more complete realization of these principles. Industrial society is based on commodity production, a mix of scientific and empirical knowledge in the service of industrial technology, corporations as the key institutions, and market competition as society’s primary steering mechanism. In Bell’s formulation, postindustrial society is based on a shift from goods to services production, the centrality of theoretical knowledge both in the development of new technological breakthroughs and professional services, universities as the key institutions, and the subordination of the market to economic and social planning based on analytical tools. Bell argues that the idea of postindustrial society concerns the means of production only and that postindustrialism can exist in societies marked either by capitalist or socialist relations of production.

Bell used this vision of postindustrial society as a means to define emerging labor and political issues. He argued that the emergence of postindustrial society leads to the emergence of new status groups, notably scientific and professional elites, who would find themselves in conflict at times with older, monied elites but also internally divided by institutional location. He envisioned new opportunities for some groups, notably women, who would be able to compete with men more equally given the new occupational structure emphasizing relations with people and data rather than relations with machines and heavy physical labor. He predicted dilemmas for other groups, such as African Americans, who have been heavily concentrated in manufacturing industries, and technicians, who would find themselves in a cross-pressured social location between

skilled workers and professional elites. Although Bell’s concept of postindustrial society is widely recognized as prescient and instructive, it has been criticized by some for failing to emphasize the preeminence of financial and business services professions in postindustrial society and the declining opportunities for less educated workers in the service sector (see, e.g., Sassen 1991).

A self-described cultural conservative, Bell is deeply critical of the antinomian thrust of contemporary culture—and indeed hopeful of a rebirth of religious sensibility. Bell’s writings nevertheless helped to inform influential analyses of postmodern culture by theorists who were far more sympathetic to contemporary culture than was Bell himself. Following Bell, theorists such as Jean-François Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, and Fredric Jameson also emphasized the hedonistic and antinomian thrust of contemporary consumer culture, the disruption of genres by syncretism in the arts and popular culture, and the compression of time and space due to advances in technology and capitalism’s relentless pursuit of profits. The inspiration provided by the cultural conservative Bell to theorists who embraced the fragmentation of contemporary “postmodern” culture is surely one of the least predictable in the history of contemporary theory, but it attests to Bell’s influence even among theorists who do not share his value commitments or political views.

Bell grew up in a family that would today be considered part of the working poor. His father died when he was an infant, and his mother worked as a pattern maker in the garment industry. Bell attended City University of New York, where he associated with a number of fellow socialist students who would, like himself, later become central figures in New York intellectual circles. These early associates included the sociologist Nathan Glazer, the essayist Irving Kristol, the literary critic Irving Howe, and the political scientist/sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset. Bell’s first career was as a journalist, writing during World War II for *The New Leader* and later for *Fortune* magazine. In 1945, he began to combine stints in academe with his primary work as a journalist. He taught at the University of Chicago from 1945 to 1948 and at Columbia University from 1952 to 1956.

By the mid-1950s, Bell had already established a name for himself as an important social commentator. Early works include *Marxian Socialism in the United States* (1952), an outstanding analysis of the history of Marxist sectarianism. *The New American Right* (1955), which examined McCarthyism, the John Birch Society, and other anticommunist movements and helped to develop the idea that status politics provided underlying motivation for social movements. *Work and Its Discontents* (1956) offered a socialist-influenced critique of the dehumanizing impact of work under industrial capitalism. In 1958, he resigned from *Fortune* to assume a full-time post as associate

professor at Columbia. Bell's first widely cited book, *The End of Ideology* (1960), popularized the idea that all-embracing political worldviews, whether communist, socialist, fascist, nationalist, or liberal, were giving way to technocratic and piecemeal solutions to social and economic problems. A second book written while at Columbia, *The Reforming of General Education* (1966), remains among the most penetrating studies of the impact of demographic and organizational change on higher education in the United States, and an important defense of the arts and sciences. Bell left Columbia for Harvard University in 1969, and there he wrote his renowned books on postindustrial society and contemporary culture. He was appointed Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences at Harvard in 1980 and retired to become scholar-in-residence at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1990.

Bell is often described as one of the leading midcentury intellectuals in the United States. Beyond the valuable ideas found in his books, Bell's influence can be attributed to his service as a government advisor on technology, energy, and social indicators; as an officer and editorial advisor of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; as coeditor of and contributor to *The Public Interest*, a pre-eminent journal of policy and public affairs in the 1960s and 1970s; and as a challenging and dedicated teacher of social analysis.

— Steven Brint

See also Fordism and Post-Fordism; Industrial Society; Postmodernism

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BELLAH, ROBERT N.

Robert Neely Bellah (b. 1927) is an American cultural sociologist and sociologist of religion. His contributions have exerted a supreme influence on American postwar cultural studies and the sociology of religion. His widely acclaimed efforts to explore the intellectual roots of contemporary American culture have been repeatedly awarded. He received the U.S. "National Humanities Medal" in 2000.

Bellah grew up in Los Angeles. What proved to be of some significance for his scientific development is the strong Protestant-Presbyterian climate of the family in which he was raised, which likely prepared him for his academic interest. During the course of the Second World War, his studies in sociology, anthropology, and Far Eastern languages at Harvard fostered a shift away from his familiar religious convictions, toward Marxism. Under the influence of his major sociological teacher, Talcott Parsons, he became acquainted with the works of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim, and finally committed himself to a neutral sociological perspective. He received his PhD in 1955 and, after a brief appointment at the Islamic Institute at McGill University, Canada, resumed his academic work at Harvard until he left for a full professorship at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1967. He taught at Berkeley until 1997.

Bellah's most important contribution to social science is grounded in a single but most consequential idea that he first published in 1967 and later developed in his award-winning book *The Broken Covenant* (1992). He argued for the existence of a "civil religion in America" that, accordingly, would constitute a form of collective religious commitment besides traditional religious practice, on one hand, and patriotism—its secular version—on the other. Bellah's thesis raised a number of theoretical and empirical issues in cultural sociology. Furthermore, it has been the subject of various academic and public disputes and even has produced, in the words of its originator, a "minor academic industry" (Bellah 1992:ix). Bellah's subsequent scientific work can be considered a further elaboration on several tacit issues of his original postulate and his defense against critical objections to that postulate.

Bellah (1971) defined the complex of civil religion as "a set of beliefs, symbols and rituals" and, referring to Durkheim, as a "reality *sui generis*" (p. 171). On the basis of his initial cultural comparison of religious systems, Bellah could avoid the risk of universalizing the results he observed in the American field. He argued that a fundamental structural core problem of any society was the institutionalization of the connection between political and religious functions. All cultural studies had to begin with the study of this problem. In this regard, he took the American society as a unique and unequalled case. Drawing on a close interpretation of inaugural speeches of American presidents from the late eighteenth century to the present, Bellah pointed to the constituents and theological roots of American civil religion. They consisted of a historically relative combination of several intellectual traditions: republicanism, utilitarianism, and liberalism, on one hand, and Judeo-Christian religion, on the other.

Bellah went through a comprehensive historical analysis of the various public manifestations of American civil religion. He observed that it persisted in a distorted form until

the present but had gradually vanished from public as well as individual consciousness and thus had to be recovered. It was invented and shaped by the founding fathers in their public speeches as they appealed to a set of religious and moral values they deemed indispensable for an operative political constitution. Henceforth, civil religion had been reproduced through the institutionalization of public rituals, such as inaugural addresses or holidays, and symbolic forms, such as language. Starting with the event of the American Revolution, which was seen as the final act of the exodus from the old lands, new themes of death, sacrifice, and rebirth as well as new modes of ritual expression were added to the body of civil religion alongside the American Civil War. As a “third time of trial” (1992), Bellah noted the role that U.S. presidents of the twentieth century had been prescribing to themselves ever since World War I. He found that a core theme of original civil religion, namely, the responsibility of any government not toward its proper interests but toward a higher moral judgment, had been exhausted and threatened.

In his later works, Bellah added to his initial historical perspective a genuine sociological approach to the change of American moral and political culture. With a team of five colleagues, he set up a widely discussed empirical study, *Habits of the Heart* (1996), to examine the social forces that could be claimed to be responsible for the abiding rise of individualism in the course of American history. Large-scale processes of economic and industrial expansion that evolved during the nineteenth century generated a “division of life into a number of separate functional sectors: home and work place, work and leisure, white collar and blue collar, public and private” (Bellah et al. 1996:43). Their impact on social life was discerned in the rise of a new form of “expressive individualism” that coexisted alongside the archetype of “utilitarian individualism.” Unlike the latter, the former has no point of reference outside of itself. Bellah’s conviction was that expressive individualism, which is nurtured by several aspects of popular American culture, would finally destroy the civil religious roots of American Republican-Democratic political culture and result in new forms of authoritarian despotism. Consequently, he committed himself to the recovery and renewal of those traditions under threat. Bellah’s significance for the social sciences does not result from his substantial discovery of religious phenomena in modern societies alone, but to a large degree from his highly acclaimed engagement as a public teacher and discussant.

— Bernhard Giesen and Daniel Šuber

See also Durkheim, Émile; Parsons, Talcott

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BENJAMIN, JESSICA

Jessica Benjamin (b. 1946) is a practicing psychoanalyst who is internationally known for bridging classical psychoanalytic theory with feminist thought. She is acclaimed for her efforts to integrate seemingly opposing positions within psychoanalysis, such as the divide between Freudian “drive psychology,” or what is called the one-person model, versus recent “relational theories,” or two-person models. While she aligns herself with object relations theorists (that is, a two-person model that stresses the effects of human relationships on psychic development), she also argues for preserving a focus on how internal psychic conflicts and unconscious fantasies shape psychological life and social interaction. Benjamin embraces both categories of experience—the intersubjective and the intrapsychic—and intertwines them in a multilayered rubric for understanding gender polarities, sexual differences and desire, and male domination (1988).

Benjamin was born in 1946 in Washington, D.C. Her parents were left-wing activists who had immigrated as children from Jewish communities in Russia. Their values played an important role in Benjamin’s life as she pursued her interests in both the politics and psychology of domination. Benjamin received her MA in sociology and philosophy at the Institute for Social Research of Frankfurt, West Germany, and her PhD in sociology from New York University. She uses the German philosopher Hegel and social theorist Habermas to extend relational psychoanalysis and feminist thought. Her first book, *The Bonds of Love* (1988), reconsiders psychoanalytic theories of gender identification and sexual domination in light of philosophical critiques of Western binaries and modes of thinking that pit the self-as-subject against the other-as-object. Her account merges psychodynamic explanations of splitting (the breakdown of self and/or other into two opposing sides, where one side or person is idealized at the expense of the other) with social structures of power and domination that do the same. This book demonstrates the complex web of gender, sexual, and social domination and lays the groundwork for understanding mutual recognition as a human capacity that while not easily realized, can transform unequal relations of power.

Benjamin argues that there is an inherent tension between recognizing the other and asserting the self, which, while not

inevitable, more often than not results in a power struggle. Insofar as psychic and social structures buttress subject/object splitting (e.g., male versus female, mother versus child, giver versus taker, doer versus “done to,” powerful versus powerless), so that individuals are allowed to take on only one role or the other, then the capacity for mutual recognition is thwarted. Similarly, gender and sexual polarities also restrict the range of human identification and desire wherein maleness is posed in opposition to femaleness and homosexuality is posed in opposition to heterosexuality. Benjamin (1995) emphasizes that the ability to “see the world as inhabited by equal subjects” (p. 31) is key to transforming sexual and gender relations that cast women as objects of men’s desire and not as desiring subjects in their own right.

One of Benjamin’s (1995, 1998) most important contributions is to foreground the paradoxical process of recognition and delineate its role in development. Her outline of the developmental trajectory of intersubjectivity and mutual recognition begins with a reconsideration of the mother–child relationship and extant theorizing about separation-individuation. She critiques lopsided accounts, including those of object relations theorists, that center on the child as self/subject moving toward autonomy and separation while portraying the mother as the other/object who either facilitates or hinders this development. Acknowledging pathbreaking findings in infant research (Stern 1985), Benjamin poses an alternative view of mother–child development that emphasizes reciprocity as well as the mutual reinforcement of both the child’s and the mother’s need for and enjoyment of recognition.

While Benjamin (1988) commends the feminist object relational theorists for explaining gender and sexual divisions in terms of the object relation to the mother (e.g., Chodorow 1978), she also emphasizes the symbolic role that the father plays in the separation-individuation phase, especially for girls. She argues that both boys and girls retain their ambivalent early attachments to and identifications with aspects of both parents, and as a result, she views gender “inclusiveness” (fantasies of being both sexes or having characteristics of both sexes) as a desirable as well as necessary aspect of development.

As a theorist and clinician, Benjamin is concerned about the quality of interaction and cocreation of knowledge between two knowing subjects, whose experiences of each other comprise both fantasy and reality. The epistemological and clinical ideal, however, is not to resolve the necessary tension that exists, but to sustain it. For Benjamin, this is the promise of an intersubjective view. Her elaboration of this view is her enduring contribution to a social theory that integrates psychoanalysis, feminist theory, and clinical experience.

— Wendy Luttrell

See also Chodorow, Nancy; Freud, Sigmund; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory

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BENJAMIN, WALTER

Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) was born in Berlin in 1892, the son of a Jewish art dealer. After schooling at a humanistic gymnasium, he studied philosophy and literature at Freiburg and started a friendship with the poet C. F. Heinle. Heinle and his wife committed suicide in 1914, an event that devastated Benjamin, and the memory of the young poet stayed with Benjamin for the rest of his life. Benjamin himself would, even before the fatal day in Port Bou in 1940 when he took a lethal dose of morphine, contemplate suicide in Paris in 1931 in light of the worsening political situation in Germany.

In 1915, Benjamin met Gershom Scholem (1897–1982), whose friendship was decisive, as was his friendship with Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), whom Benjamin met for the first time in 1923. And in 1929, through the aegis of his Russian lover, Asja Lacis, Benjamin met Bertold Brecht (1898–1956) for the first time in the latter’s Berlin apartment. Indeed, at one level, Benjamin’s life was a series of friendships and love affairs initiated and ended. Apart from Brecht, Benjamin met many of the literary figures of the interwar period, including Rilke, Gide, Hofmannsthal, Desnos, Aragon, and Kraus, as well as the philosophers Klages, Wolfskehl, and Ernst Bloch. In addition, Benjamin published, especially between 1927 and 1940, literally dozens of reviews and essays, including pieces on figures such as Baudelaire, Hölderlin, Proust, Green, Valéry, Stephan George, and Kafka.

Benjamin was also very peripatetic. His preferred ports of call, where he could often live cheaply and still write, were Capri, Paris, Moscow, and Ibiza, Spain. Each trip provided Benjamin with fuel for articles, with his posthumously published *Moscow Diary of 1926–1927* being one of his most distinguished efforts in ethnographic description and personal reflection.

Walter Benjamin’s life as an independent scholar unable to secure a permanent academic position is also emblematic

of the thinker. For he stands apart from almost every thinker in the twentieth century in his individual approach to scholarship and writing and in his singular distillation of the nature of modernity.

Characteristic of his singularity is the fact that Benjamin published only two books in his lifetime, both in 1928: a book of aphorisms, *One-Way Street*, and a monograph study, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, initially submitted, then rejected, in 1925 as an *Habilitationsschrift* that would qualify him for a university post. The rest of his writings, including the vast, unfinished Arcades Project, are in the form of essays, articles (academic and journalistic), translations, and fragments, many published posthumously. For Benjamin, the fragment took precedence over the whole, the pastiche and collage over unity, difference over identity. Famously, Benjamin is quoted as saying that he dreamed of producing a book that was nothing but a series of quotations.

In his interest in art, translation, storytelling, memory, time, and tradition, the persona of Benjamin also emerges along with profound insights. These insights are indebted to the rise of modernity itself and the loss of tradition that comes in its wake, a loss that effectively means the loss of the origin—what Benjamin calls, in the field of art, “aura.” We could also see this as the loss of context in which the original was produced in a community, whether this original is a work of art or a story. Also evoked here is the ritual aspect of art, to the extent that art as ritual constitutes community. “In the beginning. . .” so the story goes (and the story itself was the beginning). The story bound people together; it made community and thus the context equivalent to an original understanding.

In his famous essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” ([1955] 1973), on a key aspect of modernity, Benjamin analyses the nature and impact on society of processes of reproduction, notably those of photography and film. A key point is that when the “aura” of the original work of art disappears in modernity, a factor concomitant with techniques of reproduction and, no doubt, with technology in general, the perception of art changes and a certain reversibility develops: The work of art as reproduced leads to the work being designed for reproducibility. For Benjamin, then, it is not a matter of decrying reproduction and the loss of aura, but of understanding the profound impact it has had on the nature of society.

In this vein, photography and cinema—the arts, par excellence, of reproduction—begin to change society because, like the telescope and the microscope albeit in a different way, they reveal a different society, a society not entirely available to ordinary human perception. This is to say that the technologies of photography and cinema extend human perception in the realm of the image, where the image becomes a mirror of society.

Furthermore, though, the audience in the new *technik* of film, organised as cinema, occupies, says Benjamin, the

same position as the camera, and this implies that the audience is not incidental, but fundamental to cinema. Through the camera, film changes the field of perception. In this sense, film is transformative, because it becomes integrated into the audience into itself.

Reproduction figures in three other contexts for Benjamin, and in such a way that it is not subordinate to the original, but reveals and completes it. First, in “the task of the translator” (cf. Benjamin [1955] 1973:69–82), we find that it is not a matter of assuming that every translation is in principle inadequate in relation to the original, but of recognising that the original contains the potential for translation within it. Translation and the original are not opposed to one another, but are complementary.

In Benjamin’s essay, “The Storyteller,” written in 1923, a similar structure is in evidence. Here, what allows the story told by the storyteller to be communicated is not the content of the story, but the story in memory, a fact evoking the story’s transmission, also called “tradition” by Benjamin, which is the afterlife of the story and integral to its being a story. Transmission, the telling, or tradition or, more generally, reproduction, are not distortions of the story’s true message but are part of the message itself. And indeed, on this interpretation of the nature of story, the listener’s place becomes the place of the reproduction of the story. For the listener’s place is where transmission, telling, tradition, and communication come together. Put more schematically, the place of the listener becomes both sender and receiver of the story’s message (which is, in part, the story itself) because, through memory, the contingent listener is the recipient of the previous listener’s telling. In this way, tradition speaks to itself and reaffirms itself as community. In modernity, however, the art of storytelling has gradually disappeared.

In relation to language, as Benjamin understands it, a similar reciprocal scheme of the speaker’s relation to the recipient of language is in evidence. For language is not just an instrument, or medium, of communication; it is the space in which the speaker speaks. That the speaker is *in* language implies that in speaking, “man” reveals himself and that language reveals itself; it is never simply a matter of revealing the objective world. A further point is that unlike the structuralist view, which says that the relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary and therefore that naming is not the essential task of language, Benjamin says that on the contrary, it is in naming things that things become what they are and that as a result, there is an essential link between word and thing.

There are two additional, and important, aspects of Benjamin’s work. One concerns the unfinished Arcades Project, which shows a fascination for the iron and glass of modern city architecture and the consequent interrelation, through the use of glass, between interior and exterior. The second aspect, important for social theory, is Benjamin’s

intelligent article “Critique of Violence” (1996). In it, he points out that violence cannot easily be separated into legitimate, legal violence and natural “illegal” violence. For legal violence weakens the law, rather than strengthens it.

Moreover, law is the result of a prior, mythic violence, violence committed in the interest of creating a particular form of life, rather than preserving pure existence, or “mere life.” From this ancient tradition of myth comes the idea that to live is, constantly, to create new forms of the social world—ultimately through violence, not through the law. For to the extent that the law itself is founded in violence, in the sense that the very presence of the law means that violence has already taken place, it is thus already immanent in the law. Because, in Benjamin’s view, humanity cannot be said to coincide with mere life; the prospect of violence is always present. Indeed, Benjamin goes further and suggests that it is even “ignominious” for humanity to protect existence for its own sake. The sacred thus does not emerge here in the “sacredness of life” for its own sake, but rather in the violent act that creates a new form of life. Such is the view many moderns find so unpalatable.

— John Lechte

See also Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Frankfurt School; Industrial Society; Modernity; Post-Marxism; Sociologies of Everyday Life

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BERGER, JOSEPH

Joseph Berger (b. 1924), theorist and founder of research programs in status processes, served in the U.S. Army in England, France, and Germany during World War II, and studied at Brooklyn College (AB, 1949) and Harvard University (PhD, 1958).

Berger taught at Dartmouth College from 1954 to 1959 and then moved to Stanford University, where he resides today. Berger, Bernard P. Cohen, Morris Zelditch Jr., and other sociologists established a distinctive approach that came to be called “Stanford Sociology.” It entails abstractly conceptualizing aspects of social structures and social processes, developing explicit abstract explanatory principles, and extending and testing theories, often with laboratory methods. While such work was sometimes characterized as experimental sociology, Berger insisted that the true subject matter was the theories, to be tested and extended using all appropriate empirical methods. This approach was at that time relatively unusual in sociology.

Berger’s most significant contributions to theory appear in two programs. Substantively, he pioneered and sequentially developed theories in the Expectation States Theory Program, concerned with the operation of status processes in goal-oriented situations. Philosophically, throughout his career, Berger has been concerned with how sociological knowledge grows and accumulates. Both programs continue today.

THE EXPECTATION STATES PROGRAM IN STATUS PROCESSES

This program encompasses a growing set of interrelated theories aimed at understanding how features of the larger society, including cultural beliefs about statuses, such as gender, race, and age, and social structures, such as the distribution of statuses in a particular situation, affect interpersonal behavior and beliefs leading to a group’s power and prestige hierarchy.

Within the Expectation States Program, Berger, working with Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and others, developed theories to address a wide range of substantive phenomena. Those include, among others, theories on (1) processes by which multiple status characteristics organize interpersonal behavior; (2) how reward expectations form in status situations; (3) processes by which different types of social justice and injustice are created; (4) ways in which expectations formed in one situation transfer to new persons, new tasks, and new status distinctions; (5) ways in which group hierarchies can acquire and lose legitimacy; (6) the effects of public evaluations by outsiders and interactants; (7) processes of social control; (8) interrelations between sentiments and status processes; and (9) processes that create and maintain institutionalized status distinctions. Theories in the Expectation States Program have also served as bases for extensive applications and engineering research (see also Wagner and Berger 2002).

THE PROGRAM IN THEORY GROWTH

Working primarily with David G. Wagner and Morris Zelditch Jr. and building on the research of the philosopher

Imre Lakatos, Berger introduced the idea of *theoretical research programs* (TRPs) into sociology. TRPs are inter-related sets of theories and related empirical techniques and findings. TRPs differ from both *unit theories*, such as Emerson's power-dependence relations, and from *orienting strategies*, such as neofunctionalism and rational choice approaches.

Orienting strategies contain fundamental orientations concerning methods, substance, and goals of sociological inquiry as well as working strategies that provide frameworks for the construction of unit theories. A main distinguishing characteristic is growth patterns. Orienting strategies grow slowly, if they grow at all. Unit theories consist of sets of concepts and principles and associated theory-based empirical models that ground these theories in empirical realities. They grow primarily through confrontation with data, but that offers only limited growth potential. Significant theory growth depends on alternative theories; thus, relations *between* theories in a TRP are crucial.

Berger and colleagues argue that TRPs are the appropriate units to analyze the growth of theories. They conceptualize five types of relations between theories that represent different types of growth. Three of these are *elaboration*, *proliferation*, and *integration*.

Consider unit theories, T_1 and T_2 , which share the same family of concepts and address the same general explanatory domains. *Elaboration* occurs when theory T_2 is more comprehensive or has greater analytic power or more empirical grounding than theory T_1 . Extending a theory of dyadic behavior to larger groups, formalizing a discursively stated theory, and improving its empirical support are examples of growth through elaboration.

We say of two theories T_1 and T_2 that *proliferation* occurs when T_2 adapts and modifies concepts and principles from T_1 to account for quite different phenomena. Unlike elaborants, proliferant theories may share few predictions. The status value theory of justice and the original theory of status characteristics (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972) are proliferants of each other. They deal with different phenomena and share few common applications, but they share core concepts and principles in addition to auxiliary concepts that are introduced to deal with the specific problems in their own domains.

Integration is a relation between three theories, T_1 , T_2 , and T_3 , when T_3 consolidates many ideas in T_1 and T_2 . Integration is a major step in theory growth and usually requires that T_1 and T_2 have well-defined concepts and explicit propositions and are capable of making determinate empirical predictions. Satisfactory integration entails much more than noting similarities between concepts in different theories and arguing that they may be dealing with some common topics. There are various forms of integration, and the form it takes usually depends upon the initial relation of T_1 and T_2 to each other, for example, whether they are

proliferant theories or theories that are independent of each other. Integration is seldom complete; some concepts and principles that are in T_1 or T_2 may be lost in constructing T_3 .

Berger's work here shows that the process of theory growth need not be mysterious and that it is richer than had previously been recognized. It provides a framework for assessing the stage of a TRP's development and identifying promising directions to develop it further.

Joseph Berger's exemplars of sustained, cumulative theoretical research programs are now well established in the "group process" tradition of sociology. In addition to his own contributions, he freely shares suggestions for new problems, experimental designs, interpretations, and theoretical extensions with other scholars. Through them, his ideas live and grow in many areas of sociology. Since nominally retiring in 1995, Berger has published three new books and 12 articles. The flows of invention and imagination continue as strong as ever.

— Murray Webster Jr.

See also Affect Control Theory; Cook, Karen; Distributive Justice; Lawler, Edward; Markovsky, Barry; Metatheory; Paradigm; Power-Dependence Relations; Status Relations; Theory Construction

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BLAU, PETER

Peter M. Blau (1918–2002) was a twentieth-century, Austrian-born, American social theorist who contributed

widely to sociology in the areas of organizational theory, exchange theory, social mobility, stratification, and macrostructural theory. Committed to a nomothetic approach to social science, Blau developed insightful and creative theory, which he rigorously tested through the innovative use of previously underutilized data sources. His empirical work often revealed new insights inspiring modifications to his original theories; this explains the broad scope of Blau's work. The publication of *The American Occupational Structure* (1967), with Otis Dudley Duncan, demonstrated the effectiveness of linear regression and path analysis, thus popularizing those techniques now considered indispensable for statistical analysis in sociology. Two themes that run through Blau's research are the interrelationship between the individual and society, the micro-macro link, and an interest in stratification and equality. In his early work on bureaucracy, exchange, and status attainment, Blau focused on the effect of the individual on macrostructures. Later work focused on the constraints imposed on individuals by society, culminating in a deductive macrostructural theory that conceptualizes social structure as a multidimensional space of social positions characterized by group affiliation, known as "Blau-space," which demonstrates how population structures constrain the choices of individuals and affects their chances for intergroup affiliation, intermarriage, and status attainment.

Blau received his bachelor's degree in sociology from Elmhurst College and his doctorate in 1952 from Columbia University, working with Robert K. Merton. His dissertation was a field study of officials in a federal law enforcement agency modeled on the design of Roethlisberger and Dickson's work on the Western Electric Company. Contrary to the prediction of Weber that the bureaucratization and rationalization of modern life constrained individual freedom, Blau found that officials often circumvented bureaucratic prescriptions and discovered creative informal ways to deal with their cases. The most well-known illustration of this was that agency officials who were officially prohibited from discussing cases with anyone but their supervisors used their lunch hours to discuss cases and exchange advice. This observation became the cornerstone of Blau's exchange theory. Despite the identification of social mechanisms that allowed bureaucrats to create an alternative to proscribed channels, Blau's focus on only one case precluded his ability to generalize or to make any claims about the attributes of bureaucracy characterized by Weber: growth, division of labor, hierarchy, and impersonal automated decision making.

In "A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations" (1970), Blau presented a theory, based on data from 53 state employment security agencies, that explains why the rate of differentiation in organizations declines for large organizations. He found that although differentiation increases in large organizations, it does so at a reduced rate.

The reason: Differentiation creates a need for additional administrative overhead, which undercuts the advantage of the economy of scale provided by a large organization. Reducing differentiation reduces organizational complexity, which eliminates the need for additional administrative costs. Data from other organizations collected over the years have confirmed these relationships.

In 1964, while at the Center for the Study of Behavior Science at Stanford University, Blau turned his attention to exchange theory. At that time, recent work by George Homans and Richard Emerson on exchange relations made exchange a popular topic. Blau's observation about the exchange of advice for deference among officials in the law enforcement agency forced him to think about the relations between the specific personal microlevel exchanges and general exchange patterns inherent in society. In *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (1964), Blau argued that the person-to-institution and institution-and-institution relationships in society are emergent properties of exchange patterns at the microlevel. Blau's work differed from that of Homans's and Emerson's in that his interest in the individual was secondary; his goal was not to develop a microtheory about exchange and status among individuals, but to focus on the sociological level of the institution.

To develop a theory of the emergent properties of exchange, Blau, like Emerson and Homans, began with the motivations for simple dyadic exchanges, assuming that when two parties are engaged in social exchange, it is because there is some reward (intrinsic or extrinsic) for doing so. Once engaged, parties exchange gifts, goods, or services, as well as respect and deference. In contrast to Emerson, Blau's theory did not require that exchange relationships needed to be balanced; rather, Blau characterized exchange relations as a strain toward imbalance. Like the anthropologists Mauss and Lévi-Strauss, Blau relied on the "norm of reciprocity" as an accounting system between parties. When one partner provides more than another can repay, there is an exchange imbalance, which can be offset when the owing partner reciprocates by showing deference or respect. According to Blau (1964), "forces that restore equilibrium in one respect do so by creating disequilibrium in others" (p. 26). When status is conferred from one individual to a second, due to inequality in exchange, the status difference is considered legitimate. When this relationship extends beyond the dyad, it implies legitimized differentiation in social groups and between social structures. So long as institutions with power provide goods and services, they can legitimately maintain their power; failure to provide produces opposition.

To move from the micro- to macrolevel of analysis required Blau to extend his discussion of norms beyond the norm of reciprocity and to other social norms that define the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of members of society. People, according to Blau, could generalize their

sense of obligation to roles in society, allowing indirect exchange relations. At the level of the individual, mutual attraction or need were sufficient to explain the prevalence of exchange relations. At the level of institutions, Blau introduced particularistic or universalistic values to account for integration and solidarity within groups, on one hand, and differentiation and competition between groups, on the other, which characterize exchange between groups. After completing *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, Blau turned his attention to other interests, eventually abandoning his attempt to build a macrolevel theory based on microsociology. Many notions introduced and discussed in this work, such as the relationship between crosscutting social circles, differentiation, and integration, reappear as important features of Blau's future theories.

In the early 1960s, together with Otis Dudley Duncan, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and the National Science Foundation, Blau directed a national survey of stratification and mobility. Similar studies had already been completed in Europe, and this work was designed to allow cross-national comparisons. Duncan, the methodologist on this study, introduced a new measure for social stratification and modified methodologies from regression analyses to improve upon conventional measures. In turn, this allowed Duncan and Blau to extend their analysis beyond the conventional breakdown of mobility tables. First, by constructing an occupational scale, they converted occupation from a categorical to a continuous variable, thus capturing the status structure inherent in occupations and making it possible to analyze occupational data using regression, an analysis method not yet popular in sociology. They also introduced to the field path analysis as a tool to distinguish direct from indirect causes. The success of these approaches in teasing out a causal pattern in their study contributed to the methodology's general acceptance in sociology. Using the father's occupation as the independent variable, the son's occupation as the dependent variable, and controlling for relevant demographic and social variables, Blau and Duncan also showed that except for African Americans, there is a great deal of opportunity and mobility among the middle class in the United States. Conversely, for African Americans, the cumulative disadvantages at all stages of their careers are compounded, thereby limiting their social mobility.

Having established that there are opportunities for mobility in American society, Blau became interested in the deeper questions: In particular, what features of a population are required to allow not only occupational mobility but also opportunities to become friends with or marry people from varied social backgrounds? Blau developed a general deductive macrostructural model based on Georg Simmel's (1955) concept of crosscutting social circles. For this work, Blau's level of analysis was the population, which was divided into different dimensions based on

ethnic, occupational, religious, racial, class, or other social classifications. He then distinguished these dimensions as either heterogeneity, for categorical classifications, or inequality, when categories reflected graduated differences. A third distributional characteristic of Simmel's theory is intersection, which is the degree to which differences between categories are independent.

Blau used these distributional characteristics together with two assumptions about the likelihood of associations to generate a set of theorems: (1) The likelihood of social contact between two individuals is dependent on contact opportunities, or propinquity; and (2) people have a preference to associate with members of their own group; this tendency is known as *homophily*. Based on these assumptions, Blau then generated elementary theorems. The first is that heterogeneity and inequality promote intergroup relations: The more diversity, the more likely a meeting between members of different groups. The second is that although the preference for homophily would imply intragroup relations, multigroup memberships crosscutting social circles promote intergroup relations. In "Heterogeneity and Inter marriage" (1982), Blau and his coauthors, Terry Blum and Joseph E. Schwartz, used data from 125 standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) of the 1970 census to show that inter marriage rates could be determined by the level of heterogeneity in a city, supporting Blau's theory. Blau extended and refined this theory.

In *Structural Context of Opportunities* (1994), Blau expanded and refined his macrostructural theory, examining the implications these influences have on stratification, mobility, intergroup association, power, and exchange. This volume extended the focus on intersection, emphasizing that heterogeneity on the macrolevel is not sufficient to allow integration at the individual level, but that heterogeneity must filter down through the levels of society to allow opportunities for interaction. In this volume, Blau revisited ideas from his earlier work to integrate them into his macrostructural theory. For example, he explicitly discussed the relevance of early exchange theory for his macrostructural theory. Blau's thoughts on exchange processes and motivation had not changed; what had changed was that in his early work, he thought that interaction was the basis of structural patterns, and he illustrated that opportunities for these exchanges are the product of population distributions. Similarly, Blau revisited status attainment, with emphasis on how population parameters allow opportunities for mobility, rather than focusing on the attributes of individuals that promote mobility, as he did in his earlier work.

— Elisa Jayne Bienenstock

See also Emerson, Richard; Homans, George; Lévi-Strauss, Claude; Simmel, Georg; Social Exchange Theory; Weber, Max

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BLUMBERG, RAE

Among gender theorists, Rae Lesser Blumberg (1984, 1978) has been at the forefront of a scientific theory of gender stratification. This theory draws from empirical knowledge of diverse societies, first initiated when she was a peace corps volunteer in Venezuela and now totaling data collected in 38 societies. Her data set now ranges from hunting and gathering, through horticulture and agrarianism, to industrial and postindustrial societies. Her theory is thus designed to explain gender inequalities or equalities in all times and places.

The theory originated in her PhD dissertation, from Northwestern University, in which she drew upon Gerhard Lenski's typology of societal types. But the main impetus to the theory has come from empirical observations and a series of puzzles about the roles played by women in diverse societies and the reactions of men to these roles. Her work was also prompted by her involvement in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In her various academic positions, beginning with the University of Wisconsin, through the University of California at San Diego, to her current position as Kenan Professor of Sociology at the University of Virginia, she has continued to expand her knowledge of diverse societies, especially various levels of women's economic power, while refining the theory of gender stratification.

The theory emphasizes women's degree of control of the means and the distribution of economic surplus. The more women can control their means of economic production and its allocation, the more power and prestige they can gain; and conversely, the less women can control their economic activities, the less prestige and power they will have. This basic relationship is, however, affected by two other variables. One is the level at which control over economic power is nested. Male-female relations are nested in households; households are lodged in local communities; and households and communities are nested inside a class structure that, in turn, is part of a state-based political system. Second is what she terms the "discount rate of women's work." When women have economic power at the household level, it will be discounted or devalued relative to that of men, whereas when women have power at the more macrolevel—say, state power—their power will be enhanced at the household level. Thus, the more women control their productive activities at the macrolevel, the more power and prestige they will have at microlevels.

The key to gender equality, then, is the capacity to gain control of economic power: that is, women's control of their means of production and allocation of their productive outputs. This control is determined, first of all, by women's ability to participate in the economy and, second, by their capacity to mitigate against the discount rate for their labor by holding macrolevel power. Moreover, if women's labor is strategically indispensable, they can gain economic power, with indispensability increasing with high demand for women's labor services; compatibility of work with reproductive obligations; possession of technical expertise; autonomy from male supervision; scale of women's work groups; organization of women to pursue their interests; and avoidance of competition from other sources of labor. Under these conditions, women's indispensability increases. Furthermore, the structure of kinship is crucial. If a kinship system allows women to hold and inherit property, they have greater economic power.

As women are able to gain economic power relative to the power held by men, they will increasingly have control over key issues such as their fertility, marriage and divorce, sexual activity, household authority, educational opportunities and achievements, and freedom to pursue diverse opportunities. And as women are able to consolidate power and control important dimensions of their lives, they will have greater access to valued resources: prestige, power, and ideological support for their rights. Blumberg presents her theory as a series of propositions, and thus, unlike many feminist theories, it is scientific. It seeks to explain the degree of gender stratification; and in so doing, the theory also provides guidelines for reducing stratification.

— Jonathan H. Turner

See also Feminism; Gender; Power

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BLUMER, HERBERT

Herbert George Blumer (1900–1987) was born in St. Louis, Missouri. At age 15, he dropped out of high school to help with his father's cabinetmaking business, but in 1918, he enrolled at the University of Missouri, where he earned his BA (1921) and MA degrees (1922) with Phi Beta Kappa honors. During his time there, he studied with some of the preeminent scholars of the day, in particular Charles Ellwood, a sociologist, and Max Meyer, a behavioral psychologist. He also was an All-American tackle with the Missouri football team and continued his football career at the professional level, playing for the Chicago Cardinals from 1925 to 1933, a time during which he completed his doctoral studies in sociology at the University of Chicago, and was then hired there as an assistant professor. During his faculty career at Chicago (1928–1951), he generated additional income as a labor negotiator, first with the Milwaukee Meat Packer's Union and in the 1940s by chairing the Board of Arbitration for the U.S. Steel Corporation and the United Steel Workers of America. In 1951, he was appointed as the first chair of the new Department of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, where he remained until his retirement in 1967, although he continued his teaching and scholarly writing well into the 1980s. Blumer was one of the premier founding voices of American sociology and was engaged in cutting-edge thinking with the likes of W. I. Thomas, Robert Park, Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales, Robert Merton, George Lundberg, Samuel Stouffer, and William Ogburn. He was president of several scholarly societies and received numerous awards over the course of his career, including the 1983 Career of Distinguished Scholarship Award from the American Sociological Society (see Morrione 1999, for additional biographical information on Blumer).

Initially, through his studies with Ellwood and Meyer, and later with Ellsworth Faris, Robert Park, and George Herbert Mead at Chicago, Blumer became committed to the tenets of philosophical pragmatism and social behaviorism, and he devoted much of his scholarly life to translating and applying pragmatist principles to the field of sociology. Rejecting both idealism (reality is located in people's subjective experiences) and realism (reality is located outside people's experiences), beginning in his master's thesis at Missouri and worked out in a more mature fashion in his

doctoral dissertation at Chicago, Blumer sought a conceptual framework for developing a science of society that acknowledged both human interpretive processes and obdurate social structures. The key to such a framework was the pragmatist contention, expressed most explicitly by John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, that any such science must start with an understanding of human social activity; and in 1937, Blumer assigned the term "symbolic interaction" to the kind of communicative activity engaged in by human beings. Over the course of his career, Blumer worked out a form of action theory, or what today we might call "structuration theory," in an array of substantive areas. Beginning with his classic analysis of concepts (1931), drawing largely from John Dewey, he assessed various methodological procedures in terms of their adequacy for developing sociology into a science, and found each one to be insufficient in and of itself. Following Robert Park, he wrote foundational analyses of collective behavior and mass society, out of which he later theorized fashion as a form of modernity, and conducted early empirical studies of the movie industry and its effects. He articulated pragmatist principles for a sociological social psychology (1937) and developed a theory of race relations that has been enduringly useful (see the essays in *Symbolic Interaction* 11(1), 1988, for assessments of range of Blumer's substantive contributions to sociology).

Blumer also engaged in a number of scholarly debates, some methodological and some theoretical, in which he steadfastly held to his social behavioristic views. In his debates over public opinion (Blumer 1948), he argued that since "publics" by definition are not group centered and "opinions" are typically group related, then public opinion can be usefully studied only in relation to the routes provided by a society's social structure through which public opinion flows. In his debates with Robert F. Bales (1966), he argued that while concepts like culture, status, and role all are useful and capture important aspects of a society, one cannot formulate a unifying theory based on any single one of those concepts.

The beginning point for sociological understanding Blumer (1969:3–6) later articulated was to deal directly with the undeniable facts of interpretation as they are expressed among humans. He sought to capture this fact in three premises, which, succinctly stated, are, first, humans act on the basis of meanings; second, meanings arise from social interaction; and third, meanings can be modified. These premises are ontological claims that signify the primacy of the collective and social rather than the subjective phases of human activity and are written in a way to keep sociological analysis focused on the processes of symbolic communication, the preeminent characteristic of the human species.

The themes found in much of Blumer's writings can be seen as his attempts to develop a recursive theory of social

structure and social action. He argues, for instance, that society is a “framework” for human conduct rather than purely a determinant of it (Blumer 1962:189). While Blumer clearly acknowledges the relevance of social structural arrangements and their often decisive consequences for human behavior, he takes herein an implicit position concerning causal processes. His position, plainly stated, is that human conduct causes social structures, rather than social structures causing human conduct. While Blumer’s viewpoint here has been widely misinterpreted as a form of astructural bias and denial of the operation of a society’s social structure, it more properly should be seen as the grounds of a sociological theory with a behavioristic emphasis on the dialectical relations between social structures and human interpretive processes.

It is important to point out that in formulating his theory of society, Blumer refers to “acting units” when depicting human activity. These acting units can pertain to entities such as individuals, organizations, international cartels, political parties, and so on. By “acting unit,” that is to say, Blumer refers to any corporate entity capable of action, and thus his action theory is applicable at any level of scale. Moreover, while the famous three premises of symbolic interaction previously mentioned have been repeated over and over again, unfortunately one rarely reads about his explicit analysis of the three implications of the joint act. The first implication is that most social conduct exists in the form of recurrent patterns of joint action (Blumer 1969:17). Predictability is the hallmark of society; there are common and shared meanings that underlie coordinated human behavior, and those recurrent patterns suggest the operation of culture and consensus. The presence of these features of society are made possible through human agency and the formation of stable forms of activity. A second implication is that societies possess extended connections of actions in the form of complex interdependent networks, such as divisions of labor (p. 19). These networks and their regularized patterns of conduct, Blumer contends, point to a view of society as composed of institutions that have appropriately led sociologists to focus on societies as forms of social systems (p. 19). The third implication is that social life displays the character of continuity (p. 20). Forms of conduct in one way or another are always connected with previous contexts and forms of conduct, and thus continuity and change must be referenced in the connections with ongoing joint action.

In discussing these three implications of the joint act, Blumer explicitly identifies three standard areas of sociological investigation. The first area is the domain of social organization; the second is the domain of institutions; and the third is the domain of history. These areas of concern, he wrote, require sociological attention because they constitute the “molar units” of society: “institutions, stratification arrangements, class systems, divisions of labor,

large-scale corporate units, and other big forms of societal organization” (Blumer 1969:57). He depicts these molar units as interlinked and interdependent positions or points in an ongoing process of organized action. Thus, not only is there no denial of macrohistorical processes and structures in Blumerian thought, there is an explicit advocacy of their study and significance (Maines 2001).

One of the substantive areas of research that Blumer pursued was industrialization and developing countries (see Lyman and Vidich 1988), and his book *Industrialization as an Agent of Social Change* (1990, published posthumously) is a precise application of what he meant by the statement that “society is a framework for action but not a determinant of that action.” That is, Blumer’s generic theory of society is substantively illustrated in this book, the purpose of which is to analyze industrialization as a cause of social change. Given that this book arguably is his signature statement on the sociological analysis of society, it is well worth detailing the argument he puts forth in it.

Blumer accepts as true that massive social changes follow the introduction of industrialization into a nonindustrial society. These changes include migration to urban areas; disintegration of small rural communities; alternation of authority systems; changes in values; changes in existing institutions, such as the family, church, education, and law; introduction of new forms of conflict; and alteration of occupations, labor force, and the class system. Concerning these issues, Blumer is in complete agreement with other general sociological accounts.

The basic problem with the standard proposition that industrialization is a cause of social change, in Blumer’s view, rests in conceptual ambiguity and faulty causal logic, both of which are easy to sustain if bolstered by a linear and nonrecursive theory of society. The concept of “industrialization,” for instance, typically is merged with self-evident or stereotyped meanings; or it often is equated with other processes, such as economic growth, technological development, or modernization, none of which are isomorphic with industrialization. Moreover, he contends, there is greater confusion in the causal analysis regarding the influence of industrialization on social change. The causal logic-in-use he critiques is as follows: “Subsequent” is equated with “consequent”; and industrialization, because it is prior, is viewed as the cause, while the “consequent” (social change) is viewed as the effect. That causal logic, he argues, is faulty.

With this critique in mind, Blumer offers an alternative theory. Industrialization, he argues, is indifferent to and has an indeterminate relationship to societal effects that may be regarded as social changes resulting from the introduction of industrialization. This is not to say that it is inconsequential. The issue, rather, is identifying those processes and factors that, in fact, mobilize change. Blumer’s elaboration of this issue sets the stage for his theory.

Blumer defines an industrialized economy as one that centers around the use of machines driven by physical rather than human power to produce goods. A machine-driven mode of production thus is at the heart of the concept of industrialization. That mode becomes a system of production entailing three parts: (1) a nucleus of mechanical production, (2) a network of labor through which raw materials are produced for the production and distribution of goods, and (3) an economic service structure made up of banks, credit systems, and so forth that facilitate production and distribution.

Blumer's beginning discussion of industrialization is thus fairly conventional, stressing the centrality of manufacturing to industrialization and the complex economic system that must accompany it. In terms of identifying any empirical instance of industrialization, however, he argues that the analyst can conclude that industrialization is present only under the conditions when manufacturing is present. However, when the attached networks of labor or economic service structure is present but without the presence of manufacturing, we do not have an instance of industrialization. This approach, in Blumer's view, avoids many areas of confusion by remaining close to the empirical nature of industrialization in its historical contexts.

With this conceptualization in mind, Blumer moves to consider how industrialization enters group life. In doing so, he identifies nine points in a society through which industrialization enters and makes actual contact and through which social change occurs. He calls these nine points of entry "the framework of industrialization," which include the following (Blumer 1990:42-9).

First, there is a structure of occupations and positions made up of ownership and managerial jobs, manufacturing jobs, and clerical and professional positions. These positions vary in income, prestige, and norms or performance, and their arrangements thus become part of the stratification system. Second, these positions must be filled. This sets into motion efforts to recruit and allocate personnel, and such recruitment may either preserve the existing status arrangement or become arenas of tension and conflict. The third element pertains to new ecological arrangements. The manufacturing system sets in motion residential change, typically involving migration from farms to mills. Labor market fluctuations may stimulate further migration, and very successful industrial systems may lead to urban density. Fourth, a regimen of industrial work, which refers to internal government in industries, is put into motion. Relations between workers, owners, managers, and supervisors must be regulated, which introduces an authority system. Fifth, a new structure of social relations emerges. New groups and classes of people are mobilized by the introduction of industrialization. Consider the various combinations and permutations of worker-worker relations, worker-manager, manager-manager, manager-owner, and so on. New status

relations lead to the formation of new attitudes, codes of action, and expectations. In short, a new network of social relations is part and parcel of industrialization.

Sixth, new interests and interest groups are formed. Groups differentially located in the emerging industrial stratification system will attempt to use or protect advantages associated with their positions (Blumer 1990:45). These common interests may lead to the formation of groups organized around those interests, and, consequently, they may seek to apply pressure to ensure their interests. Seventh, there are monetary and contractual relations. Industrial transactions are fundamentally monetary in nature, expressing the value of goods and services, and these transactions are contractual, as in wage relationships or sales agreements. Such relations impart an impersonality and legality to group life. The eighth factor pertains to manufactured goods. This is true by definition, but here, Blumer emphasizes consumption rather than production. Lower-priced manufactured goods may outcompete nonmanufactured goods, which may affect consumerism, savings, and standard of living. Ninth, patterns of income of industrial personnel are generated. Income may take a variety of new forms—profits, salaries, or wages—that could influence the personal and community organization of the different categories of industrial personnel. These nine points, Blumer emphasizes, are the major lines along which industrialization enters societal life, with each line being regarded as indigenous to industrialization insofar as each is necessarily involved in the introduction or expansion of a system of manufacturing.

Blumer's next step, having identified how and where in a society industrialization can enter, is to point out that industrialization is not homogeneous. He shows this by referring back to the nine points of entry. For example, there is likely to be variation in the size and number of industries, which would affect new jobs and positions; jobs may be filled by natives or foreigners or be recruited locally or from distant locales; industrial governance can be harsh or benevolent; there is likely to be wide variation in interest group formation and tension; and there typically is variation in types of goods produced. What Blumer is trying to point out here is that industrialization is not a homogeneous agent with a uniform character (Blumer 1990:52). Rather, purely at the level of considering the concept of industrialization itself, there is considerable variation.

How, then, does industrialization function as an agent of social change? Two themes form the core of this phase of Blumer's theory. First, there is a wide range of alternative developments along each of the nine lines, and, second, the industrializing process does not determine the actual line of development. Here, Blumer articulates his thesis of the indeterminate character of industrialization, which portrays reality as an ongoing and emergent process, characteristic of adjustment.

Blumer articulates his position by demonstrating alternative lines of influence at the nine points of entry, hence emphasizing the variability of adjustive processes and the recursive character of social reality. He notes, for example, that alternative lines of influence might be seen in how new jobs and positions are introduced by industrialization. While some of these clearly are the direct result of manufacturing modes of production, they also may be the result of administrative decisions, governmental policy, or traditional practices. That is, the actual links may be directly tied to manufacturing, but they also may be directly tied to nonmanufacturing influences. Thus, industrialization per se is indifferent to the process of changing labor force composition, so long as its occupational needs are met. In this sense, it can be said that industrialization by itself cannot explain the patterns of positions and occupations that come into existence (Blumer 1990:60). Adjustment is a ubiquitous and continuing process, that is, but its contents vary.

Blumer follows this kind of analysis for each of the nine arenas through which industrialization affects a society. It may lead to migration, but other factors operating at the same time may also cause migration to occur; it may mobilize interest group formation, but ethnicity, religion, and other alliances do as well; with regard to monetary relations, it is rare that industries even locate in areas without such relations, and thus causal order is violated. Such tracing of multiple lines of influence is Blumer's basic strategy in support of his proposition that industrialization introduces only a framework of action at each line of entry. There are alternative lines of development at each point vis-à-vis the framework, and thus the industrializing process does not necessarily determine social change and therefore cannot be used to explain the particular alternatives that come into existence.

The locus of causation in Blumer's theory is found in interpretive processes rather than the social structural arrangements indicated by the nine arenas of influence. When discussing alternative arrangements of occupations and positions, for example, he argues that the ways in which those arrangements are socially defined are more crucial in determining patterns of conduct than is the bare framework itself. Furthermore, there are many alternative possibilities in those definitions and in how the structural arrangements of positions and occupations are constructed. These interpretive and definitional mechanisms are the heart of industrial adjustive process, and Blumer (1990:117–21) elaborates those processes by showing how they play out along all nine routes through which industrialization enters preindustrial societies.

This is the essence of the recursive model of social organization that Blumer puts forth. When he points to the nine areas of entry and states that these are the "framework of industrialization," he then writes explicitly about class stratification, political economy, power and authority,

demographic processes and composition, norms, values, and status relations. However, his model emphasizes forms and processes of relatedness. Consistent with his pragmatist roots, Blumer argues that social reality, as activity and ongoing action, is marked by the relations of one acting unit to another. Thus, on a grand scale, as in the case of industrialization, the already established and ongoing social organization—the networks of already operating social acts—is seen in a dynamic relation to the newly developing social acts associated with the areas of action characteristic of industrialization. Also, he views social reality as existing in situations. Whatever is "there" exists *in* a situation. In the case of industrialization, we see actors, or acting units, meeting and handling an unfolding array of situations. New demands for different knowledge are made in relation to what is already known; new positions of authority are encased in relationships to, and not necessarily in opposition to, traditional authority. New patterns of communication, new patterns of transportation, and new means of harvesting natural resources all emerge in relation to what has gone before. All these and countless other aspects of social life are shaped by people engaged in collective action meeting and handling situations. They are shaped in a present situation as they confront actors; they are given meaning in an interpretive process that ties the past to the future.

Insofar as the acts and relations among actors constitute the collective nature of social life, it is appropriate to note that Blumer saw social relations as formative, emergent, and always involved in processes of adjustment. Whether dealing with power groups or conflict or ritualized patterns of cooperation, Blumer never lost sight of the significance of the adjustive processes that comprise collective and joint acts. Joint action and collective activity are essentially adjustive processes. Fitting together lines of action by acting units is both constitutive of social situations and the means by which social situations are handled. And as he argued in *Industrialization as an Agent of Social Change*, such adjustive social action proceeds along infinitely variable, though often patterned, careers. The recursive character of social reality must be viewed in the context of seeing it as an ongoing stream of situations involved in a process of adjustment. Situations are what people confront, and the relational character of reality requires that some form of adjustment be initiated and sustained for some period of time. The outcomes of such ongoing adjustment appear as forms of realities, varying from those that are stable to those undergoing change.

All in all, Herbert Blumer was both of his times and ahead of his times. He clearly was caught up in the interwar debates in American sociology over the proper approach for creating sociology as a science, and here we can understand Blumer admiring the natural sciences, emphasizing precision of measurement, being an unrepentant empiricist, and adopting the pragmatist philosophy of science. However, he

was ahead of his times in his contention that sociology can be a science only of interpretations, and for that matter perhaps only an interpretive science, and that it must be one that respects the empirical facts of the nature of human communicative activity. In this respect, to the extent that late twentieth-century sociology has come to deal more directly with issues of agency and social structures as processes of action, Blumer can be read as a visionary.

— David R. Maines

See also Behaviorism; Industrial Society; Pragmatism; Social Structure

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basically have the same body components, how are bodies marked so as to make us different, excluded, accepted, liked, or reviled? Is the body a biological fact of life or the most basic element in all forms of sociality? These are some of the questions that might interest a sociology of the body.

For all its evident appeal, as an object of social science research, the body has only relatively recently emerged as discrete site of study. This is not to say that the body and bodies, collective or individual, have not been important to sociology, but as an entity or phenomenon, the body has tended to be subsumed within the study of larger systems and abstractions: class, gender, health, sexuality, work, and so on. In general, it is feminism that moved the body to the fore, although again the study of the body tended to be via the examination of various systems of exploitation. Much of feminism's interest in the body was to establish a distinction between culture and biology. Against the idea that "biology is destiny," the body was focused on as a site of cultural inscription and therefore of potential social change.

One of the most interesting insights to have recently emerged is that no one really knows the limits of the body's capacities. This thought originally came from Spinoza, a seventeenth-century Dutch philosopher. It has returned to shake up some of the claims that have been made about the body. To review the dominant ways in which the body has been studied, we can group different approaches under the broad thematics of, on one hand, the body as inscription of power, and on the other, the body as screen upon which the social is projected. Moving beyond these positions, we will also consider how the study of the body is uniquely placed to provide insights into the differences and similarities of our species. As such, the body might provide the basis of a truly expansive project: a sociology of humanity.

BEYOND "DOCILE BODIES": POWER AND INSCRIPTION

In the 1970s, following the publication in English of Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1977), the body became associated with the study of mechanisms of power. A new perspective was introduced into Anglo-American social sciences. This had as its cornerstone the notion of power as all encompassing, seen most clearly in the idea of "docile bodies." In Foucault's conceptualisation, power was no longer seen as something wielded by distinct groups. Previous ideas about power had tended to be influenced by different forms of Marxism. The most prevalent at the time, at least in the areas that were to turn to the body, was a form of structural Marxism introduced by Louis Althusser's (1971) influential theory about ideological state apparatuses. Centrally concerned with how power permeated into society and how individuals were rendered subjects of ideology, Althusser made the crucial distinction between

BODY

WHAT CAN A BODY DO?

Everyone has one. Some people like theirs, but many don't. They have a definite use-by-date, and once they're expired, that's it. What is it about the body that makes it a source of anxiety and pleasure, pain and life? If we all

power wielded through repression and violence, and power in terms of what he called “ideological state apparatuses.” He argued that violent repression was quite rare in capitalist societies and that the real work of ideology was accomplished through education, the family, law, and the media or culture.

Foucault broke with any lingering Marxist tendency, but his ideas may not have had such influence without the accepted notion that power or ideology worked on individuals—in Althusser’s famous phrase, it interpellated individuals as subjects. Against conceptions of the anonymous oppressed mass, the idea that power was linked to a more visceral process was taken up in the many sociological accounts of how power worked across different domains: the workplace, the media, gendered relations, and so on. Althusser’s example of being “hailed” (“Hey you!”), illuminated the body in the process of interpellation. This was a fertile context in which to introduce the idea that power was linked to bodies, or as Foucault put it, “bio-power.” This idea was extended through his analyses of the penal system, as well as those of the clinic and the asylum. This key metaphor of “bio-power” forcefully argued that power worked through rendering certain bodies visible and, in that process, differentiated categories of bodies (the mad, the criminal, the sick, the homosexual).

The emphasis was on categories of bodies, and Foucault was not greatly interested in individuals, nor in any vision of voluntarism. Through networks of discourse, bodies came to be analyzed as a palimpsest or screen upon which orders of knowledge could be read. In many quarters, and especially in feminist thought, this was described, used, and critiqued as “docile bodies”: the body rendered inert through the operation of power and knowledge. This particular reading of Foucault ignored many of his other ideas and paradoxically allowed for an overemphasis on “resistance.” In hindsight, the widespread taking up of the notion of docile bodies may have been due to the way it allowed for the analysis of categories of the oppressed and also introduced a nascent interest in the actual bodies of the oppressed.

EMBODED OPPRESSION/CORPOREAL AGENCY

In this way, the body allowed for a certain questioning of agency to be posed in regard to historical constructions of social identity. The body continued to be viewed as a metonym for the wider workings of power. But equally, this perspective insisted on the ways in which bodies were produced and as such encapsulated certain histories. A prime example could be seen in the many analyses of how different orders of discourse and knowledge had produced women’s bodies. These included critiques of the basis of Western philosophy, with its subsuming of women as a form of life lower than men—as in Plato’s placement of

women somewhere in between animals and plants—through to the Cartesian mind-body split, with its privileging of reason over the corporeal and the association of women with the corporeal. In reaction to this mind-body dualism, the Boston Women’s Health Collective coined the classic feminist slogan, “Our Bodies, Ourselves.”

Following Foucault’s identification of the nineteenth century as a moment of epistemological rupture coinciding with the sciences of man and modern medicine, analysis also focused on how historically, the medical establishment had used women’s bodies. Freud’s interrogations, joined by the experiments of Charcot and others on women’s bodies, constituted a ripe site for the analysis of how knowledge of women’s bodies was a construction by and for men. In the notion of hysteria, for example, many feminists saw a direct reduction of woman as medical science’s pathologized body. This was complemented by numerous studies of how the medical establishment, seen as the province of men, had seized the female body from women, excluding the ranks of female practitioners such as midwives. Conditions such as anorexia nervosa offered key sites through which to analyze the effects of male power and knowledge on women’s bodies.

A feminist interest in anorexia, which can be dated to the early 1980s, is a good example of some of the assumptions that were prevalent about the body. On one hand, anorexia was taken as emblematic of male oppression, especially in regard to the presumed influence of the media. The female anorexic body became a screen on which the effects of patriarchal power could be taken as self-evident. But equally, in some analyses anorexia came to be understood as an instance of female bodily resistance to power. In this vein, it was argued that anorexia was one way, perhaps the only way, that women could have any control over their bodies. In defiance of accepted images of the body beautiful, through starvation women placed themselves beyond the reach of patriarchal power and body norms. In Susie Orbach’s (1978) influential phrase, “Fat Is a Feminist Issue,” by which she meant that either women hid their bodies behind fat to escape the male gaze or, as in the case of anorexia, they starved themselves into invisibility.

In terms of rendering visible regimes of oppression, the body has also been put to use within the areas of postcolonialism, ethnicity, and sexuality. Again stemming from the presupposition that different orders of knowledge produce categories of bodies, the raced, colonized, or sexed body became the object of intense analysis. The same impetus that in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries produced knowledge of women’s inferiority also produced suspect evidence of the supposed inferiority of nonwhite bodies. Indeed, science was put to work in establishing “race theories,” whereby “white” was the means of measurement and all others were (de)graded in terms of their difference. Marking bodies in terms of their bloodlines

became the basis for sets of practices and laws in many, if not most, parts of the world. The discourse of race had real and lasting effects on the bodies of those classified as “not white,” in terms of where they could live, whom they could marry, and more generally whether they were regarded by societies as full members or not, as citizens or not. It could equally be said that this logic resulted in the “Final Solution” and continues in the “ethnic cleansing” of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first. Clearly, how a body is marked, or excluded, has immediate and real effects on individual and collectively excluded bodies.

THE HABITUS-EMBODIED HISTORY

The work of Pierre Bourdieu has been pivotal in furthering the study of how social structures are incorporated and rendered part of the body. A central concept, which he didn't coin but certainly extended, is that of the *habitus*. Bourdieu's analyses, through ethnographic observation or from material gathered by questionnaires, pinpoint the ways in which individuals perceive their bodies within the frames of class, social position, and gender. His accounts demonstrate that these structures are not only abstractions but also radically limit how and where a body can move through social space. In his treatise on how we form and are formed by taste, he extended the earlier work of Norbert Elias on the history of manners. Taste, in Bourdieu's sense, is a dominant and everyday manifestation of how we are judged by our bodies and judge those of others.

The vast number of analyses of injustice and oppression that focused on how bodies are seen, measured, and classified indicates the importance the body has had in social theory. Equally, the ways in which bodies differently, at different times, and individually or as groups resist dominant discourses is an important thematic in sociological accounts. In this, Bryan Turner's work has been pioneering and yielded a journal, *Body & Society*, dedicated to these issues. But can such analyses be said to constitute a sociology of the body? There is now an established subfield of the sociology of the body supported by an institutional network. However, if it is a field, it is always ambiguous in its status. Is the object of study the body *per se*? What are its established methods and methodology? Answering these questions tends to reveal, in the terms of Jean Michel Berthelot (1992), that there are more aporias than consistencies in the sociology of the body. In this vein, it could be argued that the body does not exist as a distinct field, but serves only to enrich other areas of sociology. In terms of its limitations, sociological accounts of the body tend to privilege cultural and social matters. While this is understandable given sociology's mandate, it may also be evidence of the shortcomings of how the body has been studied, which may, in turn, reveal those of the discipline itself.

Michèle Barrett (2000), a British sociologist, recently critiqued what she calls mainstream sociology for what it is missing: “the imaginative, the sensual, the emotional, the other, for that which we cannot control” (p. 14). She reiterates that “Sociology is conspicuously inadequate. . . . Physicality, humanity, imagination, the other, fear, the limits of control; all are missing in their own terms” (p. 19). When she concludes that “sociology has become boring,” she gives as evidence the ways in which areas such as the environment and, we could add, the body, have become boring. Is this the case, and if so, why?

AN EMBODIED SOCIOLOGY

One of the things that may have happened to the sociology of the body as it has become an accepted (if not always respected), established (if still ambivalent) area of study is that it has come to police its own boundaries and set limitations on what can be sociological about the body. Implicitly and explicitly, the body is narrowed down to its social and cultural manifestations and uses. However, against the attempts to fix it in the social, the body continually troubles strict definitions of what is social and what is not. The desire to curtail its study may be a reaction to the splitting away, and the concomitant antipathy, to areas such as sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and more generally to any connection with biology.

There are, however, resources within the history of the discipline that may be mobilized in the service of rendering the study of the body more sociologically dynamic. Prior to the establishment of a sociology of the body, figures such as Marcel Mauss provided key insights into how to study the body and why it was important. Mauss is often best remembered as the nephew of Émile Durkheim, and he did much to propagate his uncle's legacy. However, in his own right, his essay “The Techniques of the Body” ([1935] 1973) can be read, in hindsight, as setting out the sociological relevance of a more widely defined body. Mauss's vision of the discipline was large and eclectic. It was to be the study of the total or complete man—a sociology of humanity. To this end, he advocated a three-pronged approach that combined the physiological, the psychological, and the social. His acute observations of what humans do with their bodies were often gathered from his own experience and supplemented by a range of ethnographic material on cultures around the world. Some of Mauss's material has been shown to be incorrect, but it is only in the detail that he falters. His focus was on why humans do things with their bodies, and how (including detailed observations about techniques such as swimming, squatting, and digging). This compelled an expansive reflection about human behavior as always and simultaneously physiological, psychological, and sociological. In this, Mauss provides inspiration for a more interesting sociology of the

body and an indication of what an embodied sociology might entail.

The distinction between the sociology of the body and an embodied sociology raises a number of issues. If, as we've seen, the sociology of the body tends to sequester the body away from "outside" concerns, an embodied sociology would take as inspirational the ways in which the outside always breaks in—the natural, the physiological, and the affective are forces that remake the social as dynamic and changing. Inspired by ideas about bodies that come from outside the discipline, notably in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, definitions of the body have become more expansive. A body can be anything: "It can be an animal, a body of sounds . . . a social body, or a collectivity" (Deleuze 1992:626). This large definition coincides with the question cited at the outset: What is a body capable of?

If this sounds sociologically unwieldy, it provides an impetus to study the body outside of its neat compartments (work, health, class, gender, etc.). In addition, it offers a rationale for considering how the body invades domains thought to be beyond its ken. For instance, bodily behavior such as affect or emotion pervades all facets of human relations. From politics, the economy, and the environment to consumption, there is no aspect of human life untouched by the affective. And yet mirroring other uses of the body in sociology, sociological accounts by and large carve the emotions off from the corporeal and strictly contain them as social and cultural, away from the biological and the noncognitive. To echo Barrett, what are we afraid of?

There are, of course, good social scientific reasons for the framing of objects of study as distinct. It allows for a corpus of theories and methods to be constituted; it provides the basis from which theories can be built on evidence of recurring similarities and differences in data; it allows for generalizations to be made across very different cases. However, in the case of the body, this compartmentalization may be hampering a wider role. In its richness, its basis in physiology, its continual blurring of where nature stops and the social starts, in its passions, affects, and everyday exigencies, the body may be less a discrete object of study and more of a challenge to sociology to account for what makes human interaction such an exciting field of study.

— Elspeth Probyn

See also Althusser, Louis; Bourdieu, Pierre; Elias, Norbert; Foucault, Michel; Habitus; Male Gaze; Postcolonialism; Power; Self

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BONALD, LOUIS DE

Louis de Bonald (1754–1840) was, with Joseph de Maistre, one of the founders of modern French conservative thought, defending the Catholic monarchy against the secular and democratic claims of the French Revolution. Unlike Maistre, Bonald argued for traditional authority from a rationalist and quasi-scientific position. He sought to create a science of society, understood as a theory of social order, based wholly upon empirical facts and necessary laws. In this way, he became an important forerunner of positivist social science.

Louis-Gabriel-Ambroise vicomte de Bonald was born in 1754 to an old noble family from the south of France. A supporter of the French Revolution in its early stages, he broke with it in 1791 over the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which subordinated the church to the control of the state. After serving for a year in counterrevolutionary armies, in 1796, he published his magnum opus, the *Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux (Theory of Political and Religious Power)*, a systematic statement of the theoretical foundations of French monarchism. Granted amnesty by Napoleon in 1802, Bonald published his other major work, *Législation primitive, considérée dans les derniers temps par les seules lumières de la raison (Primitive Legislation, Considered in the Latest Times by the Sole Light of Reason)*. He gradually came to terms with the emperor as an embodiment of order and authority, joining his Grand Council of the University in 1810. After the fall of Napoleon, Bonald served the restored Bourbon regime in the Chamber of Deputies (1815–1823) and the Chamber of

Peers (1823–1830), arguing the royalist cause both in the government and in his writings. After the 1830 revolution overthrew the Bourbons, Bonald retired to the provincial quiet of his hometown, where he died in 1840.

Bonald, like other early conservatives, argued against the individualist and utilitarian assumptions of the Enlightenment that only submission to tradition can provide social order. Unlike them, however, his traditionalism is highly rationalized. History, for Bonald, is a thoroughly structured and unitary process, a logical development of the principles of human nature, the gradual coalescence or constitution of society according to its truth. Tradition is precisely the sum of those truths that history has confirmed while shedding all falsified practices and opinions. This deep rational structure is a society's constitution, something that exists prior to any specific legislation or administration, the sum of necessary relations that give society its unity. What Bonald calls the constitution is thus the deep structure of society, the scientific laws of its way of life, manifested in its political, religious, familial, and linguistic institutions.

This argument from unity and necessity led Bonald to extremely monistic conclusions. As history is identified with the unfolding of the general, fundamental, and necessary truth of human society, there is ultimately only one tradition shared by all peoples, albeit encrusted with their deviations, which finds its apogee in the Catholic monarchy and its unrivalled unity of spiritual and political power. Bonald's monism is confirmed by the triadic structures he finds everywhere in society, the relation between power, minister, and subject, in which the first provides agency, the second mediation, and the third obedience. In politics, this takes the form of king, nobility, and people; in religion, of God, Christ, and man; in language, of subject, verb, and object; in the family, of father, mother, and child; in the person, of mind, organs, and passions. Each social sphere is thus the embodiment of the same fundamental structural relations. Social order requires that the third term always be subordinated to the second, and the second to the first. In a very influential book on divorce, Bonald thus argued that it dissolved the necessary relations of society, destroying woman's necessary subordination to man and thus unraveling society into a mass of egoistic individuals. Everywhere, Bonald defended what he saw as the holistic hierarchies of Catholicism, feudalism, and tradition against the individualism of Protestantism, capitalism, and the Enlightenment, which he believed incapable of creating or maintaining a society. Such claims were common among opponents of the French Revolution, but Bonald was unique in arguing them with the language of science.

Bonald contributed significantly to the later development of French sociology, and especially to the ideas of Comte and Le Play, by making society the object of a science concerned with uncovering the general laws of

social organization. This science taught that society is something prior to the individual in history, logic, and morality and that social phenomena are necessarily interdependent and thus to be understood only in a holistic fashion. Social order for Bonald, however, was not only theoretical but also a normative concept. Given his unbending allegiance to authority and to the absolute monarchy in particular, this places severe limits on his relevance to contemporary social theory. Unlike the vast majority of monarchical apologists, however, his defense of social order gave rise to a theory of social order. The deep roots of modern social theory in the reactionary tradition (long ago observed by Karl Mannheim and Robert Nisbet) demand that close attention be paid to the political implications of sociological research.

— Owen Bradley

See also Historicism; Maistre, Joseph de; Positivism; Power; Religion in French Social Theory

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BOURDIEU, PIERRE

Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), Professor of Sociology at the Collège de France, Paris, died on January 23, 2002, aged 71. His death made the headlines on the front page of *Le Monde* and inspired fulsome tributes from all walks of French public life—not least Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, who had himself suffered the sting of Bourdieu's pen and tongue—and from the academic community worldwide. Arguably the last of the great French intellectuals active during the second half of the twentieth century, he remained active and productive to the end of his life.

Whether one admires Bourdieu—and he was capable of inspiring extraordinary loyalty and admiration—or not, his standing as an intellectual of genuinely global significance is beyond question. Widely regarded during his lifetime as internationally among the most important of social scientists, his theoretical legacy appears to be securely established (see Jenkins 2002 and Robbins 1999 for divergent assessments).

Within France, perhaps his major contribution to sociological development was to reject the increasingly aloof

abstraction of the grand social theory that came to be associated with the existentialist, Marxist, and structuralist traditions during the 1960s and early 1970s. In response, Bourdieu asserted the absolute centrality to social thought of critical empirical research (and in this one suspects that his anthropological roots were showing). Philosophy and theory, particularly epistemology and the philosophy of science, were never neglected—given his intellectual formation and background, they could not be—but neither were the nuts and bolts of systematic inquiry.

From his institutional power base in the Centre de Sociologie Européene, he inspired and led a sustained programme of interconnected investigations into many aspects of French life. Early anthropological studies in Algeria and rural France were followed by sociological research, first on the urban proletariat in Algeria and subsequently in France, on topics as diverse as education, stratification, consumption and cultural taste, art, photography, literature, television, and journalism, rounded off by a final massive discipline—defying exploration of the experience of dispossession and exclusion. All of these projects were grist to his intellectual mill. Bourdieu is probably responsible, with Alain Touraine, for the reinvention of critical empirical social research in France.

In the best French tradition, Bourdieu did not neglect the wider context and problems of society, insisting vigorously on the right, indeed the duty, of the public intellectual to intervene in the politics and issues of the day, whether they were poverty, immigration, or globalisation. During the final decade of his life in particular, he appeared to be inspired to do better than the introspective and self-regarding intellectual politics for which *le tout Paris* had long been notorious. Some of his best and most accessible work is to be found in the polemical use of oral testimony in *The Weight of the World* (1999) (*La misère du monde*), which reads like a cross between Zola, Mayhew, and Terkel, or in the short pieces explicitly written as political interventions during this period. In some respects, not least in the language he used, he seemed to have found a new voice.

In the Anglophone world as well, one of Bourdieu's main contributions was to emphasise the necessary and mutual implication in each other of theory and empirical research. This was particularly important for a generation of young scholars on the broad left, such as the Birmingham school of cultural studies in Britain, who were seeking an exit from the sterility of increasingly labyrinthine Marxist theory and legitimisation for actually getting their hands dirty in the field. Unlike much contemporary theory, Bourdieu's arguments were typically rooted in detailed research, taking in every option from ethnographic fieldwork to the large-scale social survey. Furthermore, his insistence on the indivisible unity of theory and research, and indeed, his insistence on a host of other things, was expressed in a language and tone of brook-no-argument certainty that offered a refreshing

alternative to the fashionable indecision and relativism of postmodernism.

Theoretically, Bourdieu's work also struck another note outside France. During the 1970s, Anthony Giddens was developing his notion of structuration, attempting to throw a load-bearing bridge across the abyss that yawned between the great theoretical constructs of social structure and social action, and attracting a great deal of attention for doing so. For a while, certainly well into the 1980s, this was *the* major international social theoretical debate and arena, and Bourdieu was addressing the same issues, albeit from a different direction (Parker 2000).

The final internationally significant dimension of Bourdieu's work was inspired in part by local French traditions in the philosophy of science (particularly the work of Canguilhem). In this respect, Bourdieu made an important contribution to that understanding of sociology, which, beginning with Max Weber and continuing through writers such as Alvin Gouldner, emphasises the necessary reflexivity of the enterprise. This is in part an epistemological position and in part a matter of ethics. It is, par excellence, the ground over which theory, research, and politics confront each other in Bourdieu's work.

BIOGRAPHY

Born in 1930 in the Béarn area of southeastern France, Pierre Bourdieu was the son of a minor civil servant, rural, but more *petit bourgeois* than peasant. In the early 1950s, he studied, together with Derrida and Le Roy Ladurie, among others, at the elite École Normale Supérieure in Paris, finding intellectual and political life there stifling. Graduating as an *agrégé de philosophie*, he refused to write his dissertation in response to what he saw as institutional rigidity and sterility.

After teaching for a year in a provincial *lycée*, he was called up for military service in 1956 and spent the next two years with the French Army in Algeria. It was a transformative experience, politically and intellectually. He elected to spend a further two years there, researching and teaching at the University of Algiers, producing a series of polemical studies of the impact of colonialism and the war on the Algerian peasantry and working class and the French settlers.

Returning to France in 1960, Bourdieu attended Lévi-Strauss's anthropology seminars, read Marx again, and worked for a period as Raymond Aron's assistant. Three years of exile at the University of Lille were rewarded in 1964 by a senior position at L'École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris, his base for most of the next two decades. It was here that the Centre de Sociologie Européene was established in 1968 and where Bourdieu gathered around him a team of collaborators, such as Boltanski, Darbel, de St. Martin and Passeron, who provided the foundation for an increasingly ambitious collective programme of research

and publication, of which he was the obvious focus and leader.

His directorship of the centre continued when, in 1981, he was elected, following typically hard-fought internal politics and in competition with Boudon and Touraine, to the Chair in Sociology at the Collège de France left vacant on Aron's retirement. Now secure in the senior position in French sociology, he further consolidated his position outside France with a series of translations, lectures, and other public appearances. Capable of seeming to be all things theoretical to all people, not least because of his own imaginative and pragmatic appropriation of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, structuralism, Goffman's interactionism, and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, he became a major influence on Anglophone anthropology, sociology of education, and cultural studies.

During the final decade of his life, he increasingly turned his intellectual capital into political impact, writing in the press, appearing on television, and delivering speeches. His politics remained rooted in his early rejection of Stalinism, his experiences of Algeria in the 1950s, and his affinity with student radicalism during the 1960s. Characterised by sympathy for the oppressed and anger about their conditions of life, scepticism about conventional wisdom, and fiery certainty, his political writings of this late period in his life are among his best.

EPISTEMOLOGY

One characterisation of Bourdieu's intellectual trajectory might point to his initial rejection of authoritarian Marxism and existentialism, followed by a further, longer-term move away from structuralism—although he arguably never deserted it altogether—toward his own theoretical and epistemological synthesis of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and interactionism. This synthesis involved a rejection of analytical models that invoked rules supposedly governing behaviour, and an exploration of the generation and pursuit of strategies.

One of the themes informing this journey emerged first on his return from Algeria, in the research encounter with his own society in the shape of the Béarnais peasantry. In identifying himself to some extent with his research subjects, he realised that *they* are no more blindly rule governed than *we* are and that the objectification of "them" in the course of research is in itself a problem. This marked the beginning of a process of epistemological reflection on social science practice that was to continue throughout his career. His "epistemological experiment" of "participant objectivation" required the researcher to "objectify the act of objectification." In the course of research, two steps backward were required: the first from the situation being examined and the second from the stance required by that disinterested examination.

Bourdieu argued that taking the point of view of the detached observer privileges ideals, norms, and values, easily expressed in language and easily formulated as rule-like propositions. Furthermore, questioning encourages informants to produce generalised "official accounts" that reflect what it is believed *should* happen rather than what *does*. As a result, the reality of the analytical model is substituted for an analytical model of reality.

Thus, Bourdieu's basic epistemological precepts are the need for critical vigilance with respect to the implications of the objectification inherent in research and the need to try and "step into the shoes" of others practically (because we cannot read their minds). These inform two other significant aspects of his epistemology. The first concerns the pitfalls of synopsis: the condensation and summary of complex and disparate material within a unified and unifying frame of reference. He had in mind devices such as diagrams, genealogies, and schedules or calendars, and he argued strongly that these "synoptic illusions" are always distortions (albeit perhaps necessary distortions; in his later work, most notably in *Distinction* (1984), he himself resorted extensively to diagrams). This is perhaps most strikingly so in their suppression of the time and timing of human life.

The other epistemological and methodological thread running through much of Bourdieu's work is his distrust of what people say (although, once again, this is not fixed in stone; his last major work, *The Weight of the World*, relies almost totally for its impact and its argument on edited interview transcripts). What really matters, he argued, is practice: what people *do*. This found its way into much of his later empirical research in his extensive reliance on statistical data and analyses.

THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE

Bourdieu's epistemological writings are concentrated in two closely related works, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) and *The Logic of Practice* (1990), which focus on his anthropology and the theorisation of how humans do what they do and how we are to understand the world they construct in so doing. This foundational framework rests on three key equally important concepts: *practice*, *habitus*, and *field*.

Practice is what humans do (and, for Bourdieu, should not be confused with voluntarist notions of "action"). It is improvisatory rather than rule governed; it is embodied; it takes time and is situated in space; it is strategic, in that it goes somewhere, producing outcomes. Bourdieu's emphasis on practice betrays the influence of Marx's early writings, on one hand, and Goffman, on the other. Epistemologically, it is important to attend to what people actually do because of the gulf between official cultural accounts and everyday realities.

To Bourdieu, strategy does not imply deliberation or motivation (indeed, his idiosyncratic understanding of “strategy” is a theme in criticisms of his work). Strategies are, rather, rooted in less-than-conscious “practical logic” (or “practical sense”), the emergent product of encounters between habitus and field. Also called “the feel for the game,” this is the cornerstone of his implacable opposition to rational action theories. Strategies emerge and make practical sense within a world constituted as taken-for-granted *doxa*, “the way things are,” a world in which objective probabilities condition the expectations formed and held by individual subjectivities.

The conditioning of practice by habit is also important and feeds into Bourdieu’s model via the notion of habitus. Not an original concept, in his usage habitus refers to inexplicit embodied generative dispositions and principles of classification—apparently both individual and collective, although the individual is the easiest to grasp—that in a continuously improvised but unreflexive process adjust to objective conditions in any given field of interaction. They appear to generate practice in a way that is somewhat analogous to the relationship between meaningful utterances and deep structures in Chomskian linguistics (or for that matter, the relationship between structure and the manifestations of culture in Lévi-Straussian structuralism). In this process of adjustment between the internal and the external, an ongoing, relatively stable status quo is produced and reproduced. This admittedly somewhat imprecise conceptualisation of habitus provided the kernel of Bourdieu’s attempt to transcend the “ruinous opposition” between objectivism and subjectivism.

The final coordinate of Bourdieu’s conceptual triangle is the field. Loosely defined, this can be thought of as a culturally significant, institutionally constituted arena, a “network of objective relations” characterised by desirable goods and values, accepted ways of doing things, recognised relationships between ends and means, and struggles for access to all of these. Examples might include kinship relations, the political domain, the art world, or formal education. Every field is characterised by its own *doxa* and appropriate habitus, shared among legitimate participants.

Bourdieu draws on metaphors of “the game” and “the market” to characterise the coordinated yet undirected workings of a social space organised as interconnected fields. As in any market, capital accumulation is at stake. Bourdieu, perhaps drawing inspiration from Weber, emphasises the diversity of capitals that may be means and ends in the competitive struggles in all fields: *economic capital*, *symbolic capital* (such as honour or reputation), *social capital* (networks and relationships), and *cultural capital* (such as legitimate knowledge). There is a homology among the basic principles informing different fields that allows participants to move between them and produces and reinforces cumulative patterning effects, of hierarchy in

particular. Habitus is at the heart of the practical logics that create the collective logics of fields and their interrelation.

THE REPRODUCTION OF SOCIETY

To Bourdieu, fields should be understood, perhaps before they are anything else, as systems of power relations. They are also the site and the medium of interaction between the collective—institutions—and individual agents. This is, definitively, a process of *symbolic violence* that allows domination to be achieved indirectly, culturally, rather than through crude coercion. Symbolic violence depends on and must therefore foster “misrecognition” (*méconnaissance*), through which power becomes perceived as axiomatic and/or legitimate rather than arbitrary (and resistible) domination. Nor is it only domination that is arbitrary: the taken-for-granted reality of any social space, *doxa*, is a “cultural arbitrary,” neither natural nor in place because it is in any functional sense “better.”

False knowledge is thus the foundation of both subordination and superordination. Bourdieu explored this at greatest length in his studies of education, most notably in the classic, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (1990). The symbolic violence of the cultural arbitrary doesn’t just happen; it is based in pedagogic action, whether that be family education, formally institutionalised education, or the diffuse education of the peer group and everyday life. For pedagogic work to succeed, it must invoke legitimate pedagogic authority. Its outcome is the inculcation of a fitting habitus, appropriate to the field and the agent’s position within it.

That process of fit and fitting takes place throughout the life course but is most concentrated in early socialisation, whether familial, institutionalised, or diffuse. Hierarchy is obscured and domination experienced as legitimate: Self-limitation and self-censorship are the most effective forms of dispossession, and the social and cultural system is reproduced. Bourdieu argued, in some of his earliest work in Algeria and in later work on schooling and the experience of higher education, that the process that he called “the subjective expectation of objective probabilities” is fundamental to our understanding of inequality and domination.

There is, however, more to it than this. In a further elision of means and ends, the legitimation of domination is also achieved through the medium with and within which pedagogic action works. Particular kinds of symbolic mastery (culture) are privileged as most valuable and most prestigious (and therefore most difficult). According to Bourdieu, the accumulation of cultural and symbolic capital does not permit egalitarianism in this respect, even though it may pay lip service to the principle: Privilege is misrecognised as merit, and cultural heredity determines the survival of the most fitting.

None of this is achieved consciously or knowingly in a conspiracy by the agents involved. Partly because of the

key illusion of meritocracy, partly because many of the victims of the system have a vested interest in the defence of their small gains and minor licences, and partly because the field of institutional education is committed to its own preservation and to safeguarding its own monopolies on competence and legitimate judgement, cultural and social reproduction proceeds through the meshing of tacit compacts and agents' cumulative and mutually confirming axiomatic participation in doxa. Thoughtlessness is the essence of the process.

One of the most consistent themes in Bourdieu's writings on education is that conflict within the fields of institutionalised education is also class conflict. In his studies of the French university system, particularly *Homo Academicus* (1988) and *The State Nobility* (1996), he explores the ways in which culture is simultaneously resource, weapon, and prize in struggles over wider economic and political dominance, struggles in which the elite provides the referees as well as competitors. Spoils internal to the field are also at stake, as revealed in the "conflict of the faculties," the struggles during which symbolic capital and status are accorded to disciplines, careers, and knowledge: As the backgrounds and trajectories of students and staff make clear, this too is fundamentally a class conflict.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Woven deep into the fibre of education are conflicts over language: the language of interaction, of submission to examination, of assessment, and of ambition. All utterances are, in Bourdieu's theoretical scheme, the product of a linguistic habitus at work within a linguistic market and are intimately affected by power relations. What people say—and what they do not say, for censorship is potent here too—is conditioned by their anticipation of its reception by others. Language in use signifies and signals wealth with respect to any of the various capitals mentioned earlier, authority, and the utterer's location in the relevant field. The meaning of what is uttered is not simply a technical function of vocabulary and syntax, but a practical matter of power and position. In this respect, Bourdieu's study of French academic language use in *Homo Academicus* is a useful case study and an excellent example of reflexive sociology (even though he stops short of applying to himself the same critical strictures to which he subjects his peers).

There is more to culture than language, of course. In *Distinction*, one of his best-known books, Bourdieu excavated the complexities of the connections between cultural consumption and class. This a deep and broad work, difficult to summarise and, despite its undoubted flaws, a genuinely important piece of sociology that is likely to survive and be appreciated by posterity. Its project is two stranded, and each prong is ambitious. First, *Distinction* is a vigorous

assault on the notion that aesthetic taste is a natural or sublime impulse, pure and disinterested. Second, it is aimed at nothing less than a reconstruction of Weber's model of social stratification, focussing in particular on the relationship between class and status.

Apropos aesthetics, Bourdieu's key move was to anthropologise "Culture with a capital c," as merely "culture." In the process, the field of Culture, and particularly the field of Art, becomes disenchanting, as another arena characterised by struggles for individual and collective recognition with respect to symbolic capital (status and reputation). Echoing earlier research that he did on the appropriation of photography and the use of art galleries, *Distinction* is based in data from large social surveys, looking at everything from newspapers read to music enjoyed to food eaten. Cultural consumption is dissolved into ordinary consumption of every sort.

Apropos stratification, Bourdieu proposed that class and status can be brought together theoretically by the connections between "class fractions" and "life-styles." In detail, he proposed three broad zones of taste, legitimate (i.e., elite), middlebrow, and popular, within each of which class fractions lived distinct lifestyles. Aesthetic judgements within this system are products of interplays between economic capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. As a general principle, for example, he proposed an inverse relationship between economic capital and cultural capital (more money, less taste).

Taste, Bourdieu argued, is no less than language one of the key signifiers of class identity. Culture is thus something with which we fight, and over which we fight. Only those in the upper reaches of the class system can afford the luxury of aesthetic choices: The "playful seriousness" of the field of Art is a facet of the self-regarding sense of distinction that unites the elite (and notions of the sublime are revealed as yet another weapon in the class struggle). This is conspicuously the case with those cultural "alternatives" promoted and embraced by those members of the elite who, having disappointed themselves in the struggle for mainstream cultural and symbolic achievement, must settle for employment as teachers or social workers.

One of the striking things about this body of work, when set beside Bourdieu's emphasis on practice, is its reluctance to engage with the immediate practices of cultural production. In general agreement with his rejection of models of behaviour as rational action, the closest he gets to this are various discussions about the way in which creative projects—up for arbitration in the marketplace of the field of Art—become classified as legitimate endeavours or not. The adjustments between subjectivities and objective conditions here are produced by something called the "artistic unconsciousness," itself the product of an artistic habitus, taste, inculcated by legitimate education. Artistic creativity is reduced, at best, to the taking of positions in the field.

OVERVIEW

It is obvious from this brief, and incomplete, summary of Bourdieu's life's work that throughout the empirical research into different topics, using different methods, and invoking different disciplinary traditions, there runs a consistent set of theoretical arguments about the implicit and tacit wellsprings of human practice; about the importance of embodiment; about the ways in which humans internalise the outside world and how this affects what they do; about the inevitability of struggles for recognition; about the centrality of culture to politics and stratification (and vice versa); and about the bad faith and disingenuity of legitimacy, whether it be political or cultural.

Bourdieu's work has attracted an equally consistent body of criticism. Suffice it to summarise four critical themes here. First, despite his stated project, there is more than a residue of determinism in his theory: It may help us to understand the reproduction of the status quo but does little to address change or innovation. Second, his opposition to any admission of the rational actor into our understanding of human practice smacks of ideology more than reason. Third, his conceptualisation of habitus as the source of behaviour is at best unclear and at worst mysterious. Finally, his work lacks the concern with institutions and how they work that is necessary to transform his model of fields into a convincing and genuinely sociological account of the human world.

— Richard Jenkins

See also Agency-Structure Integration; Body; Cultural Capital; Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Habitus; Lévi-Strauss, Claude; Social Capital; Structuralist Marxism; Structuration

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BUREAUCRACY

The seminal analysis of bureaucracy lies in the work of Max Weber. Weber, among others (e.g., Simmel), offered a theory of the increasing rationalization of the world. He was especially interested in the structures and ideologies that fostered this growing rationalization, particularly in the West. For Weber, the bureaucracy represents the paradigm of rationalization.

Weber's discussion of the bureaucracy is grounded in his broader interest in authority structures. He outlines three ideal types of such structures based on different grounds for authority: charisma (based on the followers' view that the leader has a unique personality or personal characteristics), traditional (based on a long-standing custom), and rational-legal (based on a set of formal rules, regulations, and offices).

The rational-legal system of authority is the one most common in the West and the one of greatest interest to Weber. Bureaucracy is seen as the organizational form associated with this type of authority. A bureaucracy is, in the most general terms, a type of organization based on formal rules, regulations, written records, and documents; specific functions assigned to specific offices; a hierarchy of those offices; and a system of power and authority built into the hierarchy of offices.

The ideal-type bureaucracy has several major characteristics: (1) There is a contiguous structure of offices that are bound by set rules; (2) each of these offices requires its holder to have a specific level of competence as well as a duty to perform certain functions, the authority needed to execute those functions, and the means of compulsion necessary to perform the functions; (3) the offices are organized in a hierarchy; (4) offices may require those who fill them to undergo training in order to learn the skills necessary to effectively handle their duties; (5) individuals who fill an office are provided with the necessary means to perform their duties, and they do not own the means of production; (6) the office belongs to the organization and may not be appropriated by the individual currently in office should he or she choose to leave; and (7) rules, regulations, administrative tasks, and decisions are all presented and recorded in writing.

Although Weber generally had a bleak and somber view of increasing rationalization, he most often presented its purest form, the bureaucracy, in a positive light. He

believed that there were many advantages to using a bureaucratic means of organization, including maximum efficiency, precision in execution of decisions and functions, stability over time, high levels of predictability, ease of disciplinary control, and an overall greater level of applicability to a broader range of tasks. In addition, because bureaucracies are more concerned with offices than with the individuals who fill those offices, there is generally less discrimination. (Ironically, however, if discriminatory practices or protocols are written into the formal governing of the bureaucracy, they also provide the most efficient means of realizing discrimination.)

Despite all the benefits of a bureaucracy, Weber recognized a number of pitfalls associated with them. For example, there is often a great deal of “red tape” with which to contend when one is dealing with a bureaucratic structure, which can lead to increased levels of stress and inefficiency. The biggest concern for Weber, however, was that the ultimate efficiency of the bureaucracy also makes it nearly indestructible. It has a self-maintaining momentum that is difficult, if not impossible, to stop once it has been set in motion.

Although Weber was primarily concerned with the structure of the bureaucracy, he also theorized a number of effects it would have on the individuals who filled its offices. The structure of the system, claimed Weber, would cause the individuals in the system to view themselves as cogs in the larger machine. This mentality would discourage them from looking for ways out in lieu of looking for ways of moving up in the organization.

Another theorist who was interested in bureaucracies and their impact on the actions of individuals within them was Robert Merton (1968). For example, the “bureaucratic personality” adhered to organizational rules as ends in themselves rather than as means of achieving some goal.

Alvin Gouldner (1954) was interested in the conflict that often occurs within a bureaucracy when there is a change in the status quo. In his analysis of a gypsum-manufacturing plant, he observed a set of informal norms that had developed alongside, and often in contradiction to, the more formal set of bureaucratic rules. For example, tardiness, using company materials for personal uses, extended lunches, and other violations of company protocol were often overlooked by the management. Gouldner labeled this an “indulgency pattern.” When new management came in and no longer indulged these violations, workers became resentful and eventually staged a strike. The concept of an indulgency pattern provides a good conceptual tool for understanding informal rules and how they can develop alongside formal rules in a strict bureaucracy.

Weber’s concern with the increasing rationality of society has been validated over the past century. His analysis of the bureaucracy as the paradigm of increasing rationalization was fitting for his time. Others (Ritzer 2000),

however, have suggested that in contemporary society, the fast-food restaurant, not the bureaucracy (although certainly fast-food restaurants could be considered part of a bureaucracy), is the modern-day paradigm of rationalization.

— Michael Ryan

See also McDonaldization; Merton, Robert; Weber, Max

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BUTLER, JUDITH

Judith Butler’s (b. 1956) intellectual base is philosophy; she is recognized as a postmodern feminist and the canonical queer theorist. Her work is important to social theorists, as she has contributed to the corpus of postmodern knowledge considering sex, gender, the body, and social identity. In accordance with postmodern feminist paradigms, Butler challenges the liberal and radical feminist tendency to employ the sex-gender distinction and thereby separate natural categories of sexual identity from socially constructed gender identities. While Butler identifies several propositions in postmodernism, particularly the French poststructuralism of Foucault that inform her work, Butler has questioned the appropriateness of referring to postmodernism as a coherent and consistent branch of social theory insofar as those labeled as such often do not read each other’s work or base their work on a similar set of presuppositions. Her articulations of the postmodern subject and her treatment of the body and sexuality have rendered her work particularly influential.

Specifically, she has offered an extensive critique of the modernist assumption of a stable, already-constituted subject pre-given as a point of departure for theorizing or for sustained political action. Such a subject is seen as constituted outside of power, confronting power. The modernist claim to a position beyond power, she argues, depends on power, on a kind of cultural imperialism, for its legitimacy. Moreover, Butler refuses to assume a stable subject separate from power; rather, the subject is constituted by the organizing principles of material practices and the institutional arrangements of a power matrix.

In her view, the subject is not a ready-made thing, but a process of signification within a system of discursive possibilities that are regulated, normative, exclusionary, and often habitual. She does not negate or dispense with the notion of the subject altogether, but instead seeks to understand and critique the process of the social production and regulation of certain forms of subjectivity. Significantly, she argues against the notion that power ceases at the moment the subject is constituted; as a signifying process, the subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced again and again. It is in these two notions—of the subject as always constituted by power and the subject as a resignifying process—that Butler's notion of the subject as agent with "permanent possibility" emerges and with that, possibility of critical, transformative, and subversive strategies.

In accordance with her paradigm of power and identity, Butler locates the female/male binary in hegemonic constructions of sexuality and identity, thereby challenging the notion that an essential difference exists between biological sex and socially constructed gender. Her work attempts to deconstruct the accepted relationship between sex and gender, to expose the socially constructed contours of heterosexuality and the female/male binary.

In her view, one can never return the female or male body to a "pure" or natural essence. Sex is always already gendered, as observation and interpretation of the body are two components of a singular process insofar as the body is intelligible only within a socially determined context. Indeed, the concept of naturalized male and female sexual categories is already socially constructed in gendered language. The body is made intelligible through this same gendered language. With the birth of a baby, the body is assigned to a predetermined male or female sexual category. If assigned female, she is immediately called a "girl," wrapped in pink or pastel blankets, given a name that signifies her femininity, and described using feminine gendered language and female sexual categories. Her acts become stereotypically sweet, soft, and charming. Butler (1997) asserts that while language does not bring the body into being in a literal sense, it does make a certain social existence of the body possible insofar as the body is interpellated within the terms of language. According to Butler, one exists not by being recognized, but by being recognizable. The terms that constitute the identifiable body are conventional, ritualistic, and naturalized.

Sex and gender are thereby achieved only through existing hegemonic social polarities. For example, a person can be described as "black," "female," and "lesbian." But these descriptors are significant only in relation to their deviation from the dominant categories of identity: "white," "male," and "heterosexual." Consequently, Butler articulates dominant categories of identity as "regulatory regimes" because they often limit categories of the self to mutually exclusive binaries.

According to Butler, by reinforcing the sex-gender distinction, feminist theoretical explanations of women's oppression are limited to heterosexual male/female binaries. Significantly, Butler's immanent critique of feminism has given considerable attention to what she sees as its heterosexist assumptions: the received notions and restricted meanings of femininity and masculinity that are idealized by the movement. As she sees it, many feminist theorists have assumed "woman" and "man" as fixed, stable, and essential identities. Butler moves beyond liberal and radical stances that link gender to natural sex differences and constructs gender in terms of the body's participation in intensely regulated activities that congeal, or naturalize, over time, thus producing the appearance of natural sex categories. In this sense, her work challenges feminist constructions of sex and gender to posit the body as "sedimented acts rather than a predetermined foreclosed structure, essence or fact, whether natural, cultural or linguistic" (Butler 1988:523).

For feminist theory, Butler's work on the subject has had far-reaching consequences in terms of both the subject who theorizes and the subject who is theorized about. Within any regime of power, subjects are constituted through a set of exclusionary and selective procedures. A subject who theorizes, for example, both produces and is produced by institutional histories of subjection and subjectivation that "position" her as an authorized theorizing subject. Regarding herself as a theorizing feminist involves, for example, positioning herself as "I"; replaying, resignifying, and reworking available theoretical positions; and taking account of the possibilities those available positions exclude. Moreover, who gets constituted as a feminist theorist, who frames the issues, publishes the debates, and popularizes the platforms and for whom, all presuppose the operation of exclusionary procedures that create a domain of deauthorized subjects. In this sense, Butler sees her position in mainstream feminism as "embattled and oppositional" insofar as the movement is normatively white, middle class and heterosexual. The conceptual apparatus produced within this power matrix, the regime of truth it produces, is a precondition of critique. Insofar as she engages in a critical examination of the basic vocabulary and assumptions of the movement, she produces an "immanent critique" aimed at provoking a more democratic and inclusive movement.

Importantly, when a set of expressive categories of gender are idealized and appropriated by feminists, they become hegemonic and establish a normative matrix of prescriptive requirements. Furthermore, Butler does not see such categories as mere descriptions of reality; rather, they produce realities insofar as bodies come into cultural intelligibility through them. They both limit and enable theorists in their efforts to define the female/feminine subject as well as the male/masculine subject. Insofar as they are heterosexist,

such idealized gender categories set up new forms of hierarchy and exclusion, a heterosexual domain that constitutes a new regime of truth. Butler refuses such categorization of identity and pointedly critiques the heterosexist assumptions within feminist theory and politics.

Against the position of identity politics, for example, Butler argues that there is no essential woman constituting the ground and reference point of feminist theory and practice. There is no stable feminine subject that precedes and prefigures political interests, a point from which subsequent political action is taken. For Butler, “woman” does not exist independently of each performance of the stylized acts that constitute gender. The heterosexist, restricted, and normalized meanings of woman do not adequately capture the variety of gender positions that subjects can and do occupy. In this sense, normative categories of sex, gender, and sexuality become subjugating categories and sites of oppression.

Butler argues that feminist theory and political practice should open up subject possibilities. She actively calls for opposition and resistance to the heterosexual matrix and its expressive categories of gender. Insofar as the gendered body is performative, requiring a continuous display of discursive practices and corporeal signs, gender norms are potentially open to perpetual displacement by every performer during every performance. In this sense, performance of gender is always, to some degree, “drag.” Subversive strategies may include parodic performances of

gender that pointedly disrupt the presumed coherence of gendered bodies, categories, and identities.

While every subject position is a potential site of resistance, Butler has given particular attention to the subject positions available to homosexuals. Within the heterosexual matrix, homosexuals are deauthorized, erased from view, placed in an “other” category, and labeled “queer.” For Butler, homosexuals should not passively accept the category of queer; they can and should use it as a site of resistance. Such resistance does not mean doing the opposite of what a category authorizes; it means to become “critically queer” and engage in transformative agency.

— Candice Bryant Simonds and Paula Brush

See also Essentialism; Feminism; Feminist Epistemology; Foucault, Michel; Postmodernist Feminism; Postmodernism; Queer Theory; Sexuality and the Subject

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C

CAPITAL

In social theory, the concept of capital is mainly used in reference to one of the central categories of Marx's critique of political economy. In recent years, there have been discussions about different types of capital, especially about the sources and dynamics of "social capital." Economic and social sciences initially adopted the word *capital* from the language of merchants. Latin in origin, *capitale* meant livestock, counted per heads (*caput*). Since in early times, cattle was the commodity by which all other commodities were valued, later on, *capitale* was used to mean "money" or "investment of money."

In the nineteenth century, "capital" became the epitome of a conception of economy and society that assigned the leading role to the rapidly growing industrial production. Even before, the Physiocrats and, above all, Adam Smith, had emancipated the term capital from "money capital" and used it indiscriminately for money and other objects. For Smith, the concept served as classification term of the entire stock of goods. In contrast to stocks of goods for immediate consumption, by capital, he understood all requirements of production—except natural forces, but including means of subsistence for productive labor—necessary to realize income. Part of these requirements and therefore of capital was the amount of acquired and useable skills of men, anticipating later conceptions such as "human capital" or "intellectual capital."

The classical bourgeois economists, following especially Ricardo, saw capital as accumulated labor, the product of the previous production efforts. Taking it up, socialist authors turned this idea against bourgeois interests and capital itself. Marx postulated a reciprocal logical relation of subsumption between capital and labor. Capital as accumulated, objectified, or dead labor, he called "constant capital" and distinguished it from the "variable capital" of the living

labor. This conceptual subsumption of capital under labor had a critical aim. Essentially, capital was not only a "factor of production," but a genuine social relation: "[C]apital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character" (Marx [1865] 1981:953). To the subsumption of capital under labor, which made the mediation of dead and living labor transparent, corresponded the subsumption of labor under capital. It referred to the real social power of the capital owners to control and use labor power. Capital marked therefore a relation of domination, and the subsumption of labor under capital meant the real subordination of the forms, conditions, and products of labor under the dominant interest of capital accumulation.

Marx's general formula for the circulation of capital was M-C-M': Purchase of commodities is only a means to realize more (') money; the goal is not use-value, but (more) exchange-value. Capital in this generic sense is old; merchants' and usurers' capital, where the function is mediation, not control of production, were already common in early societies. Only the generalization of commodity production and of wage-labor brought the transition to capital in the modern sense. Capital took over the production process itself and transformed it into a direct means of capital expansion. And capital, in the singular, became capitals, in the plural: the reciprocal action of capitals upon each other as competition and constant seeking for profit and ever more profit. The character and the limits of this competition (e.g., the tendency toward "monopoly capital") and also its nexus with other institutional factors and dimensions shape global and national socioeconomic developments and the class structure of modern society.

Therefore, the concept is an important element of sociological class theory and analysis. Those who own capital form the class of capitalists and stand opposite others, most notably the working classes. But what capital do they own,

to what extent, and with what results? Such questions have been discussed lately very often with respect to Bourdieu's differentiation of three capital types: economic, cultural, and social. For Bourdieu, economic capital is not only ownership of the means of production, but all forms of material wealth. Cultural capital can be objectified in books, paintings, works of art, or technical artefacts; incorporated in skills, competencies, and forms of knowledge; and institutionalised in titles, such as professional or university degrees. Social capital, for Bourdieu, the third distinct resource of the struggle for social positioning, results from the use of a network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.

During recent years, "social capital" has been in the centre of a debate in sociological literature that emphasizes its role in social control, family support, and outcomes mediated by extrafamilial social ties (Portes 1998). And recently, terms such as "intellectual" or "knowledge capital" have been taken up again, partly to characterize a new stage of capitalism or even the transition to a knowledge society. Besides the grammatical problem with the first-mentioned term, since every capital is social, the theoretical benefits of such generalizations and more and more metaphorical uses of the capital concept are doubtful. It seems as if capital has become a rather unspecific concept of "resources" or "properties." There is the risk that this may hide the insights of classical social theory within this definite social production relation, which represents, to borrow a formulation from Marx's *Grundrisse*, the general illumination that bathes all the other colours of contemporary society.

— Harald Wolf

See also Bourdieu, Pierre; Cultural Capital; Marx, Karl; Political Economy; Social Capital

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as a critique of capitalism or as a refutation of this critique in the form of academic sociology.

Capitalism is a concept of motion that expresses the dynamic of the modern economy: its tendency of unlimited growth, rapid increase, and incessant mobility and its society-shaping drive of melting all that is solid into the air. The concept expresses at the same time the tensions and conflicts within this motion. As counterconcept of socialism, it is an often-used weapon in political polemics. For some, it is therefore doubtful whether the term possesses sufficient scientific dignity. The word emerged late, around the middle of the nineteenth century, and it was not before the last decades of the nineteenth century that it was introduced into the social sciences. Authors such as Sombart and Weber did a lot for its institutionalization after the turn of the century.

There is no short and easy definition of the concept, accepted in general, for the simple reason that social theory in general, in a certain sense, *is* the attempt at a definition of the origins, nature, and destiny of capitalism. Therefore, what follows is of necessity an extremely selective representation. Its focus is directed toward some central viewpoints, concerning the problematic of capitalism as society, as history, and as presence.

CAPITALISM AS SOCIETY

Contemporary social theory's treatment of capitalism is grounded in its treatment by the classics. It is necessary to refer at least to two of them: Marx and Weber. Other weighty contributions, notably Durkheim's and Simmel's, are not included here. Both Marx and Weber tended, like many social theorists today, to recognize the institution of wage-labor as a core characteristic of modern capitalism. The best starting point to discuss the problems and directions of the theory of capitalism is not, what seems obvious, the concept of capital, but its apparent opposition, labor—if one keeps in mind that this point doesn't exhaust the problematic.

Marx didn't use the term capitalism, but spoke of a capitalist mode of production that consists of specific forces and relations of production. This mode of production was the base of modern commodity-producing society in which the principal means of production were the property of a particular class, the bourgeoisie, and labor power also became a commodity. It was in the labor market where the two fundamental opposing classes of capitalism met, and it was there and in the labor process where they had to cooperate and to struggle against each other at the same time. This ambiguous class relation was the dynamic force behind society's development. Its distinctive features were its capacity for self-expansion through ceaseless accumulation; its continual revolutionizing of production methods, connected with the advance of science and technology as

CAPITALISM

Capitalism is one of the main topics of social theory. For the classics, the nature and future prospects of capitalism were matters of greatest concern. Social theory developed

major productive force; and the cyclical character of its development, marked by phases of prosperity and depression. The theory of capitalism was essentially a class theory and a crisis theory. Advanced capitalism was regarded as containing inherent contradictions (between developed productive forces and fettering production relations, creating increasing crisis tendencies and class divisions) expected to lead to a proletarian revolution and the replacement of capitalism by socialism.

The surface appearances of the market suggested that every exchange between labor and capital was “fair,” but in reality the social relations involved exploitation, alienation, and domination. These historic-specific conflictual relations disappeared from view and appeared as something different, as relations between social individuals and consumers and the realm of commodities they seek to acquire. Labor relations were converted into market and commodity relations, and the products of labor seemed to possess the properties of their producers, to exercise domination over them. Such inversions of subject into object, such processes of personifying things and objectifying people—with the “commodity fetishism,” as Marx called it, as paradigm—were specific characteristics of capitalism. They corresponded to a broad range of ideologies.

For Weber, likewise, capitalism, which he called “the most fateful force of our modern life,” was in the center of his theory. He distinguished between a general concept of capitalism, referring to a wide variety of social and historical settings and the historic-specific concept of modern capitalism, which emerged only in the West. Notwithstanding that it had also irrational features, the central feature of Western capitalism was its “rational” character in contrast with other forms of economy. The most important aspect was the rational organization of formally free labor. Other specifics, for example, separation of firm and household or rational bookkeeping, were relevant only in combination with it. The free-labor market was necessary for the development of an advanced and superior calculability of economic action. This calculability was, in turn, a fundamental component of the rationalization process in the entire society. For Weber, no inherent tendency to final crisis in capitalism could be assumed. He emphasized instead capitalism’s (and its rational bureaucracy’s) superiority and its capacity for self-adjustment, but that didn’t prevent him from a very critical assessment of the outcomes.

Weber’s aim was to elucidate what he called the “spirit of capitalism.” He was interested in its origins (he emphasized the religious), its relevance for the subjects in charge of it, the rationalization of their everyday lives, and their discipline. This thorough questioning of the subjective and objective dimensions of capitalist rationality opened the perspective to further reflections about the crucial cultural orientations of capitalist civilisation, capitalism as worldview,

or a social project looking at and aiming to transform the world in a specific manner. This also raises the question of the spirit of anticapitalism: the ideas and cultural orientations fuelling alternative social projects (Castoriadis 1987).

For Marxian and Weberian theorists alike, the institution of wage-labor was a major factor behind capitalism’s “intensification” and “extensification” tendencies. On one hand, capitalism is constantly driven to enhance its productivity. This compulsion to develop its technical capacities is not only driven simply by competition among capitalists but is also related to the unique role of human labor in capitalist production. Modern capitalism’s dependence on human labor power in commodity form demands that this cost of production be kept as low as possible, through increasing the production of mass consumer goods to reduce the cost of wages or through automation, that is, replacing or diminishing human labor. Such technological development also permits capitalists to circumvent the natural limits of the human body to labor and the tendency of workers to organize and demand higher wages. On the other hand, there is a trend to outward expansion that draws upon new sources of labor. Such an “extensification” of capitalism can take two basic forms: the inclusion of more and more of society’s population segments into the labor market and the reach outside of the society itself toward other societies, thus incorporating ever larger regions of the world into the sphere of capitalism.

Beyond this overview, it has to be considered more precisely what social level is meant if the concept is used. Do we speak of capitalism to characterize an *entire society*, a *specific type* of social order, or of, more or less, crucial *components* or elements of a society? The Marxian tradition, in discussing “progressive epochs in the economic formation of society,” sometimes tended to the former. The “anti-Marxist” notion of industrial society, used as generic term, with capitalism as one variant and socialism as another, both seen as “growth” societies—but capitalism with markets, private property, individual profit seeking, and consumers’ sovereignty in its centre—provides an alternative conception on this same level (Aron 1967). The Weberian tradition, by identifying components of a society (economic institutions) and complexes of ideas as specifically capitalist, tends to the latter. Then, the question of heterogeneous institutions and of their connections—not the least that between capitalism and democracy—and the problem of “embeddedness” (Polanyi 1944) arise. In any case, it is very important to acknowledge the mixed character of contemporary society, even though capitalist forms may dominate. The capitalist economy itself may be broken down into two basic sectors: a big business/monopoly sector versus a small business/competitive sector (and, correspondingly, a segmented, or dual, labor market). In addition, noncapitalist economic structures continue to exist (the self-employed, cooperatives, the public sector).

There are a number of distinct social-economic forms that coexist with capitalism in both complementary and conflictual relations (Braudel 1981–1984). This acknowledgement seems crucial for an adequate understanding of the heterogeneous social currents and structures that correspond and cross over with, but also hinder or oppose, capitalist development, without being deducible from or reducible to it (e.g., the state, democracy, social movements).

Although core institutions of capitalism, such as wage-labor, are based on some invariants, their dynamic interconnections, their relations to the social context, and their outcomes vary immensely over time and space. Comparative studies of divergent capitalisms, which stress this aspect and the problems of failing, retreating, or superior capitalist developments, have attracted great attention (Hall and Soskice 2001). The typologies that are the result of such comparisons sometimes refer to national versions of capitalism, but they usually aggregate national cases into more general categories, contrasting general principles (liberal vs. trust-based capitalism) or regional configurations (e.g., Anglo-American, Nordic, Rhenish, East Asian).

There are, nevertheless, specific permanent capitalist core phenomena. Social theory is trying to elucidate them in terms such as exploitation, alienation, growth, and the power of scientific and technological innovation. *Exploitation* refers directly to social inequality, injustice, and the class character of capitalism. Time after time, social movements have made an issue of this. The early labor movement formulated very clearly what Marx and other social theorists later tried to systematize, for example, the theory of surplus value, which then became a cornerstone of Marxist economics. For Marxism, up to now, in any society where not all available labor time is needed to provide for the direct consumption needs of the population, classes develop around exploitative relations (i.e., the forms of production and control of surplus labor). Different modes of production are defined by specific types of exploitation. Under capitalism, exploitation is hidden by the apparent freedom and equality of the exchange process in which workers freely sell their ability to labor for a wage of equivalent value. The exchange relation is not exploitative, for workers are paid the value of their labor power, but exploitation lies in the fact that having purchased it, capitalists can then use that labor power to produce more than they had to pay for it. So, for Marx, exploitation occurs beyond the market, in the production sphere.

Here, we observe heteronomy and alienation. *Alienation* means the already-mentioned process whereby actors become estranged from the results of their activities (from goods, but also, more generally, from institutions and elements of culture), which then confront them as an independent, objectified force. Marx focused in particular on the alienation effects of the capitalist labor process, which alienates producers from their product (which does not

belong to them); work itself (because it is only something forced in order to survive); from themselves (because their activity is not their own); and from other producers (because of the individualization effects of wage-labor). The term alienation is often linked with *reification* (in German, *Verdinglichung*), used by Lukács ([1923] 1971) to mark the extreme alienation that arises from commodity fetishism and the rationalization process in advanced capitalism. The very notion of capitalism expresses this process, in which all living activity is transformed in a dead thing, a quasi-object: capital.

The perspective on capitalist *growth* or accumulation opens the view to two problems: the role of crisis and the historical transformations of capitalism itself. Economic growth under capitalism has been extraordinary, but also characterized by cyclical, sometimes catastrophic, crisis. After the Great Depression of the 1930s, a widespread view was that capitalism had exhausted its potential for further growth; another, which became dominant, was the Keynesian: Through state intervention and changed social and political structures, crisis could be eliminated. Schumpeter claimed that capitalism's crises are a process of "creative destruction" that lays the conditions for renewed accumulation. Crises are adjustments that are functional for furthering the inherent drive of capitalism to grow. This was linked to the idea that the accumulation process is marked by historical transformations of capitalism itself, distinct phases in which different socioeconomic structures dominate. Kondratiev originated the idea that growth proceeds in a succession of long waves of approximately 50 years' duration, which are linked to scientific and technological innovations and their applications. In the last decades, the negative side and especially the ecological effects of growth have been articulated by social movements and in social theory alike. Capitalist growth seems to involve an unsustainable depletion of the earth's resources, which could produce an insuperable limit to growth as those resources become exhausted.

The last permanent feature mentioned is the rapid and incessant development of technology, of productive forces, and instrumental rationality. One of the most significant transformations in the modern era has been the ongoing *scientific-technological revolution*. This revolution has been a consequence of capitalism's inherent drive for instrumental rationality. Methods of rational mastery and of accounting that made capitalist enterprise possible have been extended and applied to technology and science, and the outcomes reintroduced in the capitalist accumulation process. This problematic is not only very closely connected to the phenomenon of rationalization in the economic domain, which Marx emphasized, but to a more general, civilizational conception of rationalization, which owes much to Weber. Here, science and technology—but also markets and bureaucracies, and discipline and self-discipline—are

understood as forces and components of a specific Western-capitalist pattern of rationalization permeating all spheres of life and linked by the fact that they all further a formal or instrumental instead of a substantive rationality.

CAPITALISM AS HISTORY

Inextricably linked with capitalism as social is capitalism as historical being: in a more abstract sense, the question of its temporality, and in a more concrete sense, the question of its origins and its stages. To begin with the first, capitalism means not only a certain mode of coexistence of specific social elements such as technique, economy, and law, but at the same time a certain mode of succession of these elements, a social-historical temporality: the endless time of infinite progress, total conquest of nature, boundless growth and rationalization leading to a compression of time, quantification, and the representation “time is money.” At one level, this capitalist time is the time of an incessant break, of returning catastrophes and transformations. At another level, it is the time of accumulation as linear universalization, of the negation of alterity, of the degeneration of an “ever more” to an “ever the same.” Both levels are inseparable. Capitalism is their crossover and their conflict (Castoriadis 1987).

The question of the origins and stages of capitalism is contested. Whereas Marx and the Marxist tradition emphasized the existence of inherent features within the economic relations of feudalism combined with brute force (the “primitive accumulation,” part VIII of *Capital*) as leading to the emergence of capitalism, many sociologists have stressed the independent influence of other factors. Weber’s interest was especially directed to this question of the origins of capitalism, which he tried to explain more in reference to cultural-specific dimensions, such as the influence of a new religious ethic (Weber [1904–1905] 1974), the growth of cities, and the formation of a national citizen class in the modern nation-state. As far as further stages of capitalist development are concerned, Sombart ([1916–1927] 1987) introduced the distinction between early, high, and late capitalism. The Austro-Marxist Hilferding distinguished a new phase of “financial capitalism,” emergent by the beginning of the last century and characterized by the formation of trusts and cartels (with a strong role for the banks), protectionism, and imperialist expansion. He later spoke of a further stage of “organized capitalism,” emphasizing in addition an increased state intervention in the economy and the introduction of partial planning. Schumpeter too attributed a fundamental importance to these developments, whereby large corporations came to dominate the economic system in a new period of “trustified” capitalism that he thought would lead to socialism.

Instead, it led to the most successful period of the capitalist economy, the “golden age” of the 1950s and 1960s.

But this “welfare capitalism”—the “monopoly capital” of Baran/Sweezy and others—didn’t have the long-term stability that was attributed to it then by some social theorists. Still predominantly capitalist, it was hence subject to the instabilities of its economy, as became clear with the ever-deeper recessions since the mid-1970s. Much lower rates of economic growth and rising unemployment, creating serious fiscal problems for the welfare state, were the results. At the same time, economic growth itself has come to be more widely questioned in terms of its effects on the global environment, and this fuelled debates about an “alternative economy.” These changes and instabilities of the last quarter of the last century stimulated the development of a new Marxist perspective on the stages of capitalist growth. Within the general framework of this “regulation school,” researchers have concentrated on the analysis of the transformation from a “Fordist” to a “post-Fordist” regime of accumulation. The instabilities are in this view due to a crisis of Fordist accumulation, and one has to look at changes in the capitalist labor process, the international division of labor, and so on, to find the bases of a new capitalist regime of accumulation (Aglietta 1997).

All these changes over the last century were accompanied by important developments in the occupational and class structure, with the decline of traditional manufacturing and the expansion of clerical, scientific, technical, and service occupations. The class structure of advanced capitalist countries shifted to the middle classes. This, and more generally the triumphs of the technosciences, by some interpreted as a movement toward a knowledge-based economy in which information technology plays an increasingly important role (Castells 1996), moved theorists since the 1970s, such as Bell, to the notion of a “postindustrial” society. Earlier discussions about a separation of ownership and control of capital had already led in a similar direction: to the suggestion that contemporary societies might be better referred to as “managerialist” or even “postcapitalist” than capitalist societies. This leads up to the problematic of capitalism as presence.

CAPITALISM AS PRESENCE

What marks our present society as a new stage of capitalist development? What are the specific differences with earlier phases, with what distinct outcomes? The term *globalization*, very popular in the 1990s, produced a broad if probably short wave of literature that doesn’t really answer this question (Guillén 2001). Is global interconnection a new quality of capitalism? The level of cross-border commodity and capital circulation was at the end of the twentieth century roughly as high as at its beginning. But deregulation and the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods currency system brought a real internationalization of financial markets. There was an extraordinary growth of financial

investment in relation to productive investment, which seems to be due to a long-term crisis of profitability. Internationalization of production in the form of transnational firm networks and production chains has reached a new complexity; even production at low-wage locations is now often carried out on high-tech levels. But these processes are concentrated regionally or continentally, and global patterns of division of labor did not really emerge. So, above all, the integration of financial markets and the capitalist penetration of almost all societies—especially after the end of the Eastern bureaucratic systems—have intensified. And there exist global social and economic “standards” that force local actors to adjust, regardless of how artificial those standards are and to what extent they really lead to cross-border transactions.

A very important aspect in this present context has been the sweeping revival of “neoclassical” “free-market” economics and of the utopia of a market society (concerning the origins of this utopia, see Polanyi 1944). A “culture of enterprise,” “individualism,” and the achievements of a more laissez-faire type of capitalism were strongly reasserted. In many countries, this led to policies of privatization, retreat from planning and regulation, and reduced (growth of) public spending. The question is raised as to whether this relegitimation of a kind of pure capitalism is perhaps due to the fact that these cultural reorientations respond to anticapitalist challenges of the last decades and even instrumentalize a certain kind of critique of capitalism, which emphasizes personal autonomy and self-realization. A new turn to the interplay between capitalism, its spirit, and its opposition could thus be seen as a major characteristic of the present situation, resulting in a “new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999). At the same time, we observe socioeconomic stagnation. A sustained renewal of economic growth would seem to depend on an upturn in the long wave, and this requires a new real burst of innovation like those that produced in the past a “railroadization,” a “motorization,” or a “computerization” of the world. But there is little indication of such new development opportunities at present, despite such short-living and hollow phenomena as the “new economy” of the late 1990s, which only underline the problematic; and in addition, there are the well-known constraints imposed by environmental concerns.

The future of capitalism is probably more uncertain than a superficial look and many formulations in the debate about its presence suppose. But one thing is certain: The dark sides of capitalism (exploitation of labor and nature, alienation, oppression) in the future will also induce social movements and social theorists to criticize it and orient themselves toward an alternative type of society. As Schumpeter ([1911] 1934) put it: Orientation and coordination of socioeconomic activity can be achieved in three ways: through capital, through power of command, or

through agreement of all actors concerned. This marks the poles between which the further development will occur and the field of tensions that social theory has to explore.

— Harald Wolf

See also Capital; Fordism and Post-Fordism; Globalization; Historical Materialism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Political Economy; Socialism; Weber, Max; World-Systems Theory

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CASSIRER, ERNST

Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), Jewish German philosopher, was one of the leading proponents of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism and made a significant contribution to a philosophy of culture through his investigations into the role

of symbolic representation in the constitution of human environments. He claimed that “symbolic forms,” such as myth, art, religion, and language, are the irreducible building blocks that frame and structure human perception and cultural reality. Cassirer studied philosophy and science in Munich, Berlin, and Heidelberg. Influenced mainly by the work of his mentor Hermann Cohen, in Marburg, Cassirer successively developed his own stand toward the epistemological issues raised in Kantian philosophy. He taught at Berlin and Hamburg, and after fleeing the Nazi state in 1933 continued his career at Oxford, Gothenburg, Yale, and Columbia. Despite his enforced exile, Cassirer never directly engaged in the political debate of his time. Still, his writings in *Myth of the State* (1946) can be regarded as an attempt to grasp the intellectual roots of a totalitarian state.

While his most prominent contribution to the laying of new foundations of modern European philosophy has to be seen in his attempt to provide a phenomenology of symbolic forms, he also made distinct contributions to the philosophy of science and is still considered to be one of the most intriguing interpreters of Kant. His most influential work is the *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (3 volumes), in which he attempts to give a unified account of the various forms of “symbolic representation.” In volume 1, *Language* ([1923] 1953), Cassirer provides a detailed analysis of linguistic forms and their development throughout history. Volume 2, *Mythical Thought* ([1925] 1955), provides an attempt to outline myth both as a form of thought and perception as well as an all-embracing life form. Finally, in volume 3, *Phenomenology of Knowledge* ([1929] 1957), Cassirer gives an account of the forms of knowledge involved in generating objective and subjective worlds, with special emphasis given to the scientific worldview and its abstract forms of symbolic language.

During the peak of his writing career, Cassirer’s name also became linked with what can be seen as a landmark in European philosophy. In March/April 1929, he engaged in a series of lectures and disputations with his younger contemporary Martin Heidegger at Davos. The Davos disputations marked a first direct encounter between modern and postmodern philosophy. Influenced by this encounter, but more so by his time in American exile, Cassirer provides in *An Essay on Man* (1944), published shortly before his death, a more anthropologically based summary of his thoughts toward a symbolic understanding of human culture and the humanities alike. Cassirer’s ideas on idealization and symbolization influenced Alfred Schütz’s approach toward the structuration of the lifeworld. More recently, after a period of relative obscurity, in which Cassirer’s work lived on mainly through the work of Susan K. Langer, there seems to have been a revival of interest in his ideas during the 1980s and 1990s.

Cassirer’s theoretical approach, though usually located within neo-Kantianism, has some affinities to phenomenology,

too. In the legacy of Kant’s concept of a priori categories, Cassirer’s aim is to analyze the fundamental concepts and categories by means of which the human mind organizes experience and thus human reality. But Cassirer departs from Kant in two crucial points. He does not accept that these fundamental structures of human experience are universal and immutable; rather, they are open to constant development and regional variation. Moreover, unlike Kant, Cassirer is skeptical about the idea of things-in-themselves and instead assumes that reality reveals itself solely through our symbolizations. By placing science in-line amongst other symbolic forms, Cassirer also departs from his fellow neo-Kantians Cohen and Natorp, with their emphasis on cognitive categories. The “Critique of Pure Reason” is extended toward a “Critique of Culture.” In pursuit of this intellectual program toward a “phenomenology of human culture,” he realizes some affinity toward the nonpsychologizing analysis of the configurations of intersubjectivity in the lifeworld as developed in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

Central to Cassirer’s philosophy of culture is the notion of “symbol.” For Cassirer, the symbol, unlike the sign, immediately refers to the various human frames of meaning. This immediate interwovenness between sensory experience and meaning is referred to by Cassirer as “symbolic pregnance.” Stressing the intrinsically formative power of this basic principle underlying all expressions of human culture, he claims that human beings always live in a symbolically mediated milieu that transcends the immediate surroundings and is structured according to layers of significance. The principles of “symbolic pregnance” and “symbolic formation,” according to Cassirer, go through all activities of the human mind, from the basic formations in the prepredicative sphere up to the sophisticated paradigms in science. With the civilization process, the more sophisticated forms of symbolization articulate themselves as a web of “symbolic forms” that each provide a discourse of meaning. Human beings now may switch between the “perspectives” generated by these symbolic forms but never step completely outside them into a world of bare sensation. Cassirer illustrates the formative power of symbolic forms within the cultural construction of reality by referring to a simple curved line. Without changing our spatial perspective, just by moving through different worlds of meaning in our minds, the line reveals itself as a geometrical figure, a mythical symbol, or an aesthetic ornament.

In his late anthropological work, Cassirer refocused his detailed analysis of symbolic forms around the Socratic quest for human self-knowledge. Despite being provided with a rich body of facts, so he argued, philosophy has not delivered adequate insights into the real character of human nature. Cassirer maintains that “reason” is an inadequate concept with which to grasp the variety and richness of human culture. Instead, he suggests that since all social and

cultural expressions of human life are guided by the logic of symbolic forms, the “animal rationale” has to be replaced by the “animal symbolicum” as guiding principle for all future philosophy of culture.

— Jörg Dürrschmidt

See also Culture and Civilization; Neo-Kantianism; Phenomenology; Schütz, Alfred

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CASTORIADIS, CORNELIUS

The leading modern Greek philosopher, Castoriadis (1922–1997) was born in Constantinople, grew up in Athens, and spent most of his adult life in France. He studied law, economics, and philosophy at the University of Athens. His political views were formed in the atmosphere of bitterly divided loyalties in Greece during the 1940s. He was an independent-minded leftist from the beginning and joined the youth wing of the Greek Communist Party when he was 15, turning Reform Communist in 1941. Fed up with communist shenanigans, the following year, he became a Trotskyist. Death threats from both Nazis and communists eventually forced him to flee Athens for Paris in 1945. In France, he joined with Claude Lefort to create the dissident Chaulieu-Montal Tendency in Leon Trotsky’s Fourth International. The pair developed ideas of worker self-management similar to another dissenting Trotskyist, Raya Dunayevskaya, in Detroit.

Concluding that Trotskyism was just another Stalinism, Castoriadis and Lefort founded the group and journal *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (1949–1965). This group attracted a mix of self-management activists and a number of great

writing talents, including Jean-François Lyotard. Castoriadis wrote under the pseudonyms of Paul Cardan and Jean-Marc Coudray. *Socialisme ou Barbarie* made a belated name for itself as an influence on the student revolt of May 1968 in France. Castoriadis’s leftist Hellenism also brought him into close contact with the classical scholars Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Jean-Pierre Vernant. During the *Socialisme ou Barbarie* years, he remained a Greek national and worked as an economist for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He eventually took out French citizenship in 1970 and quit the OECD to train as a psychoanalyst. He started practising in 1974. From 1979, he combined his psychoanalytic practice with the position of Director of Studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. He was an imposing public speaker, and his lectures at the École and in other philosophical and political forums were memorable events.

Castoriadis’s key concept was the autonomous society. His basic idea was that all societies create themselves. They are not produced by God or by gods, by culture heroes, demiurges, and the hidden hand of capital, or by History. However, having formed themselves, most societies hide their own processes of collective self-creation. Castoriadis’s view was a variation on the conundrum of Feuerbach and Marx that what a society creates, creates society. This paradox of creation often causes societies to become alienated from themselves.

A heteronomous society is one that is blindly governed by its own creation. It looks on its own norms and rules and structures in an unquestioning manner. Members of society suppose that principles of social organization are given once and for all. Theocracies, monarchies, caste systems, landed aristocracies, tribes, patrimonial empires, and feudal societies are amongst the legion of types of heteronomous society. Autonomous societies, in contrast, are not just collectively instituted, but can be reformed, revised, and rethought by social actors.

Castoriadis identified two kinds of autonomous society in history. Both were self-organizing societies with a strong sense of civic order. The first was the ancient Greek polis. The second was a cluster of societies that emerged in the West from the twelfth century onward and created modernity. In the latter group, Castoriadis included the Italian Renaissance city-states, burgher cities such as Amsterdam, the American Republic, and Western European Enlightenment states of the period 1750 to 1950. In modernity and antiquity, an exceptionally high level of artistic and scientific output characterized autonomous societies. This was a corollary of the high level of productive imagination required for persistent collective creation. Castoriadis observed that the waning of creative power in the West (certainly in the arts) after 1950 coincided with the spread of postmodern conformism and cults of critical orthodoxy amongst Western intellectuals.

All examples of autonomous societies were located in what Castoriadis called “Greek-Western history.” However, he denied that Greek-Western history had the status of an independent creative force. He was wary of Hegel’s reason in history. Castoriadis therefore insisted that Athens and America, Florence and Amsterdam were *sui generis* creations of their own societies. Sometimes, he came close to suggesting that these societies created themselves “out of nothing” or else in direct democratic assembly. This romantic streak was eventually put to rest in his later philosophy. Even so, while creation was an attribute of the social-historical domain, society rather than history remained for him the prime mover in collective creation.

Castoriadis had a complex view of autonomous societies. He regularly observed that these societies were ambivalent. Slavery was widely accepted in Greco-Roman antiquity. It was an institution not to be questioned. Nonetheless, Stoics and a minority of others did criticize the institution. In modern autonomous societies, bureaucratic imperatives and capitalist drives often present with a mystique of infallibility and intractability. Yet Castoriadis also knew that modern capitalism and administration were highly innovative and drew extensively on the productive imagination of society. If autonomous societies were ambivalent, modern totalitarian states and fundamentalist theocracies were not. They knew no shades of grey. They enslaved their subjects with ideology. The “truth” of the medieval divine law of the theocrat or the lawless dictate of the totalitarian leader was incontestable. For subjects of these regimes to imagine anything else was a crime.

Like George Orwell, Castoriadis despised Western apologists for these regimes. He was equally dismissive of the prophets of chaos that the postmodern West bred. Castoriadis did not equate autonomy with freedom from law. He was not an anarchist. For that reason, he was sceptical of postmodern nihilism. A gifted psychologist, Castoriadis knew that the chaos of the psyche’s id was not a model for human autonomy, but rather for the worst kind of barbarism imaginable. No meaningful society could be created by monadic individuals or by unsocialized psyches and their fantasies of omnipotence. He repeatedly insisted that autonomous societies had form, limit, and shape. What fascinated Castoriadis was how societies give form to themselves. A self-organizing society gives itself an order and a pattern. Society creates what Castoriadis called “imaginary significations.” It does so in part by creating laws and norms for itself.

The most important and most difficult question that Castoriadis posed was: How do we explain the self-organizing capacity of society? If there is no God, no divine law, no transcendent “truth” of any kind, no founder-heroes, classical tradition, or venerable custom to follow, then what gives form or shape to society and stops it from collapsing into the chaotic abyss? In his later philosophical work, Castoriadis spoke of *phusis*, the ancient Greek concept of

nature, as a way of understanding the formative power of society. This nature was not a set of laws. Nature was rather the capacity to create order (*kosmos*).

In this, as in so many other things, Castoriadis was a Greek philosopher par excellence. He did not fit into the tradition of modern French philosophy. He repeatedly criticized the structuralist and poststructuralist French philosophy of his contemporaries. Castoriadis’s precursors were the Presocratics, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Just as Shaftesbury radically reinvented this constellation for eighteenth-century Europe and America, Castoriadis radically reinvented it for the twentieth-century West.

— Peter Murphy

See also Alienation; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory; Social Structure

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CELEBRITY

Celebrity is the attachment of honorific or sensational status to an individual. There are two forms of celebrity. *Ascribed celebrity* refers to the attachment of honorific status to an individual by reason of bloodline. Prince William, Caroline Kennedy, and Jade Jagger possess honorific status because they are physically related to famous dynasties. *Achieved celebrity* refers to the attachment of honorific or sensational status to a person by reason of accomplishments. For example, Pete Sampras and Lennox Lewis are sports celebrities by virtue of their achievements in tennis and boxing; Jennifer Lopez and Brad Pitt are known for their star status in film; Stephen King and J. K. Rowling are famous for writing fiction. *Sensational celebrities* acquire fame for their notoriety. Examples include Lee Harvey Oswald, Mark David Chapman, and Monica Lewinsky. In advanced industrial society based around universal systems of mass communication, the incidence of sensational celebrity probably has a strong propensity to increase. We shall come to the reasons for this below. Generally speaking, the transition from traditional to modern societies involves contraction in the salience of ascribed celebrity and expansion in the concept of achieved celebrity.

Ascribed celebrities predominate in traditional, preindustrial societies organized around relatively fixed and

stable hierarchies of power. For example, in traditional European society, the monarch occupied the head of state and was the recognized representative of God on earth. The emperor occupied the same role in Japan and until relatively recently was considered to be a divine being. The power of ascribed celebrity derives from birthright. It is associated with *court society*, a social formation in which power and influence is mediated through a retinue of lesser ascribed celebrities (in Britain, lords, barons, earls, duchesses, and ladies), who nominally pledge loyalty and allegiance to the monarch. The power of ascribed celebrity usually requires elaborate processes of ritual reaffirmation, with the court and the people obliged to regularly demonstrate fealty and respect through acts of obeisance and voluntary servitude. Because ascribed celebrity is presented as an eternal state of affairs, it is often very intolerant of criticism. Court society acts as a safety valve for criticism, dissipating challenges to the monarch's authority through courtly devices of negotiation and leverage. However, in some cases, court society may operate as a sphere of intrigue that functions to depose the monarch and replace him or her with a more suitable authority figure. In traditional society, the court is the indispensable audience for attributing meaning to celebrity performance. Court circles possess universal literacy and an effective network of power that enables them to report developments to crossroads of influence situated nationally and internationally and, through these means, reinforce or curtail the power of the monarch. Ascribed celebrities are not, in the long run, compatible with mass democracies, since their power is unelected and their authority depends on relations of habit, not accomplishment.

Achieved celebrities predominate in industrial societies in which the political system of democracy and mass communications systems has become generally established in a territorially bounded unit. The elevation of achieved celebrities from the ranks of ordinary people occurs by dint of their accomplishments. These accomplishments are typically represented to us through the various branches of the mass media. The mass media do not simply report newsworthy figures and items. They also engage in the public *construction* and *elevation* of celebrity. This is part of a more general process in advanced industrial society through which achieved celebrity status is commercialized and commodified. By definition, achieved celebrities convey *distinction*, and this is an important asset in media ratings wars. In conditions of *achievement famine*, where the supply of achieved celebrities is insufficient to satisfy media and public demand, the media may resort to techniques of *celebrity improvisation*, through which achieved celebrities are imposed upon the public. Achieved celebrities who are elevated into public consciousness in intense, concentrated bursts of activity are called *celetoids*. Examples of celetoids include one-hit-wonders, have-a-go-heroes,

lottery winners and one-off virtuosos in medicine, sport, or crime. Common to all is the quality of being intensively showcased by the media for brief intervals, after which they are consigned into obscurity.

The development of a *mediagenic* persona is a precondition of durable achieved celebrity. A mediagenic persona may be defined as an individual well versed in a set of coping strategies that elicit relaxed, productive relations with the various limbs of the media. The corollary of this is that the career of achieved celebrity today typically requires teams of specialized *cultural intermediaries* to organize the presentation of the *public face* of the celebrity to an audience. Examples include publicists, stylists, and public relations staff. Lord Byron's experience of waking up in London to find himself famous overnight is now rare. Today, achieved celebrities are mediated to the public through teams of cultural intermediaries who aim to manipulate cultural impact, economic value, and public impressions.

The academic literature has produced three distinctive approaches to explore celebrity: subjectivist, structuralist, and poststructuralist. The *subjectivist* position presents celebrity as the product of an individual's inimitable God-given gifts. The celebrity is understood to be unique. Thus, it is held by some that no one can match Shakespeare's use of the English language in drama and poetry, or box as well as Muhammed Ali, or achieve Sinatra's powers of enunciation in popular music, or surpass Abraham Lincoln's powers of leadership, or embody the ideal of feminine beauty and vulnerability better than Marilyn Monroe. Subjectivist approaches concentrate upon the singularity of the individual. They provide "naturalistic" explanations of the phenomenon, since the role of mass media in manipulating public interest is regarded to be negligible. Instead, fame is explained as the reflection of unique talent or skill. The appeal of celebrity on this account is finally justified by the proposition that the celebrity constitutes a more perfect or accomplished individual who is, however, drawn from the ranks of ordinary men and women.

Subjectivism is best seen as a species of metaphysics, since it makes no pretension to elucidate the relations between a celebrity and a determinate set of historical, social, and economic conditions. Indeed, there is no commitment to historical and comparative analysis or testing propositions that limits the scientific value of the approach. Instead, it advocates a metaphysical belief in the unique talents and skills of the celebrity. Subjectivist accounts are often expressed institutionally through *mystical* cults of celebrity. In these cults, the celebrity is portrayed as possessing superhuman, sacred, or magical powers. Cult membership may involve emulating the fashion, demeanour, vocabulary, and physical appearance of the celebrity. In extreme cases, cult members may employ techniques of cosmetic and transplant surgery to clone their appearance to match the celebrity archetype.

One relatively recent accessory of mystical cults of celebrity is the emergence of celebrity *stalkers*. John Lennon; Rebecca Schaeffer, the television actress; and the popular BBC television presenter Jill Dando were all murdered by stalkers. Monica Seles and George Harrison were the victims of stalker knife attacks. Antistalking legislation in the United States passed in 1994 resulted in the investigation of 200,000 alleged incidents of stalking. Similar legislation in the United Kingdom passed in 1997 resulted in 2,221 convictions. Although not all of these incidents involved celebrities, a high percentage did. Madonna, Brooke Shields, Michael J. Fox, Helen Bonham-Carter, Ulrika Jonsson, and Lady Helen Taylor have all won legal injunctions against stalkers. The stalking of celebrities illustrates the prominence of celebrity figures in the fantasy life of mass populations.

Structuralist approaches argue that celebrities are constructed by cultural intermediaries, such as entertainment impresarios, moguls, and publicists, in alliance with media personnel. The construction of celebrity is designed to captivate public interest for pecuniary gain, but it can also aim to engineer political incorporation. Structuralist approaches privilege the production of celebrity status over consumption. The focus of analysis is upon how the public face of achieved celebrity and the mediagenic persona are assembled and presented to an audience. Adorno and Horkheimer (1948) provide the classic statement of this position in their *culture industry thesis*. They submit that the mass media manipulate the public through the construction of the star system and organized sensationalism. The aim is to use distraction to preclude the development of oppositional consciousness and, of course, to achieve the greater integration of the individual into consumer culture. On this account, celebrities seduce the public into identifying with the social system. An alternative version of structuralist theory is provided by Klapp (1969). He holds that celebrities are the embodiment of social character types in society. They function to personify the abstract types that produce social integration. Thus, Bob Hope and Lucille Ball, "the good Joe"; Ava Gardner and Marilyn Monroe, "the love queen"; and Zsa Zsa Gabor, Katherine Hepburn, and Grace Kelly, "the snob." In embodying social psychology, celebrities provide the concrete role models that reproduce social integration.

One problem with structuralist approaches is that they have difficulty in explaining change and innovation. They privilege the reproduction of social relations and economic power ratios. Similarly, the autonomy of both celebrities and fans tends to be erased. Instead, and problematically, the celebrity and the audience are depicted as the reflection of deep structural influences in society.

The third approach to celebrity is *poststructuralism*. This perspective analyses celebrity as the expression of interconnected systems of representation. Celebrity is understood to emerge from the interplay of narrative systems,

including the network of cultural intermediaries to which the celebrity is attached, the media and, of course, the fans. Unlike structuralist accounts, this perspective stops short of attributing determining power to any agent. The profile and meaning of celebrity are the result of the shifting interplay between systems of representation.

In privileging the level of discourse, poststructuralist accounts neglect the historical and comparative dimensions. A good understanding of the inflection and appropriation of celebrity status in society is achieved, but this produces only a descriptive knowledge. The mechanics of celebrity construction and change are not articulated. The absence of a coherent political economy of celebrity results in a curiously depthless account of celebrity powers of seduction. On the other hand, poststructuralist accounts provide a rich understanding of the collaborative construction of celebrity power, involving cultural intermediaries, the media, and fans. This is in sharp contrast to structuralist approaches, which tend to overemphasize the power of cultural reproduction and manipulation.

Historically speaking, achieved celebrity becomes ascendant only when print culture begins to address a national audience. The development of newspapers, magazines, and journals at the end of the eighteenth century enlarged the public sphere and contributed to the fascination with celebrities. A national-popular audience was created. At the same time, the growth of populations and their concentration in towns and cities contributed to a growing interest in the public face, not only as exemplified by celebrity culture but also as it was represented in the public sphere. The preoccupation with the public face reinforced the tendency for popular culture to be subject to "fashion wars." Achieved celebrities emerged as significant representations of fashion in popular culture.

In the sphere of politics, the military, industry, and the arts, celebrities were regarded as the highest form of public man. Samuel Smiles's (1861) extraordinarily successful book, *Self Help*, offered Victorian readers a compendium of potted biographies of achieved celebrities in all walks of life. The book encouraged readers to emulate the habits and practices of the famous in order to acquire success. Radio, film, and television in the twentieth century made celebrity culture ubiquitous. They also changed celebrity role models. Lowenthal (1961) argued that in the 1920s, the mass media elevated actors, singers, and sports stars above the scientists, inventors, and business leaders that predominated in the celebrity culture of Smiles's day. Riesman (1950) maintained that celebrity culture is a significant factor in the emergence of *other-directed personalities* who consume images of lifestyle and embodiment from the media sphere. The decay of community and the rise of social mobility is associated with the elaboration of celebrity culture as audiences, deprived of role models at home, seek to find them in the celebrity constructions of society.

The rise of celebrity culture coincides with the decline of organized religion. This is not surprising. Celebrities offer narratives of recognition and belonging in secular, multicultural societies in which standards of bureaucracy, anonymity, and high levels of mobility are ascendant. In a condition in which large numbers of the population believe that God is dead, celebrities provide an acceptable substitute. The celebrity relationship is similar to the religious experience in mobilizing intense emotions and concentrating them upon an external figure with whom contact is imaginary and primarily based in fantasy conviction. Celebrities are *elevated* in public culture and presented as noteworthy or glamorous. Elevation is often associated with considerable psychological strains in many celebrity figures. Celebrities in popular entertainment are statistically more likely to die younger and experience divorce and alcohol or drug addiction and to have seriously dysfunctional relationships with their children.

In terms of the psyche, achieved celebrities are divided between a *public face* and a *private self*. The public face is a construction of both the individual intent on attaining achieved celebrity and cultural intermediaries. The private self provides a sense of personal integrity. The relationship between the public face and private self is inherently unequal and may produce disequilibrium in the individual. The public face possesses universal recognition and is the source of celebrity validation. The private self is typically sequestered from the public and provides the individual with the sense of personal substance that is necessary for good mental and physical health. The public face may threaten to overwhelm the private self, engendering feelings of engulfment and annihilation in the latter. The condition creates a strong love-hate relationship with the public. Thus, the celebrity recognizes the public as the ultimate source of pecuniary and status reward but may also blame the public for promoting the loss and disappearance of the private self.

Moralists often point to the rise of celebrity culture as evidence of the trivialisization of public life. In societies where guests on the *Jerry Springer Show* or contestants on *Pop Idol* are habitually elevated as celestoids, there is much superficial evidence to support the thesis of trivialization. But there are obvious dangers in taking the high moral ground with respect to achieved celebrity. Three points must be made. First, achieved celebrity culture is the corollary of democracy. Achieved celebrities become significant only when general principles of freedom and equality are formally established in national culture. Celestoids are generally trivial figures, but their cultural impact reflects the historical tendency toward the equalization of life chances so that even the ordinary and mundane possess cultural interest.

Second, celebrities provide models of emulation in conditions in which other-directed personalities predominate.

In commodified culture, celebrities are important in personalizing social and economic relations. Celebrities are regularly employed to endorse products. The public face of celebrities is one of the essential means through which audiences recognize common attachment and belonging. As such, they are significant sources of social integration by providing focal points for the cohesion of reference groups.

Third, celebrities possess the capacity to enlarge cultural capital as well as impoverish it. Achieved celebrities such as Nelson Mandela, Mother Theresa, and Stephen Hawking are popular icons for social improvement. They offer society a public face of, respectively, nobility, grace, and intellectual brilliance that others seek to copy. In this sense, the celebrity in democratic society acts as the highest form of citizen, spurring others on to higher accomplishment.

Of course, celebrity culture can also be a force for promoting antisocial and divisive role models. Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma bomber; Mohammed Atta, the terrorist ringleader behind the September 11, 2001, attacks on America; and Adolf Hitler all belong to what might be called the “dark side of celebrity culture.” They supply us with role models of violence and evil that undoubtedly find a ready audience in some circles.

However, it does not follow from this that celebrity culture is either inherently bad or trivial. Expressed at its most basic, celebrity means nothing other than cultural impact on a public. The effect of this impact is a combination of the ends of cultural impact intended by the celebrity and his or her entourage of cultural intermediaries and the meaning assigned to fame by the media and the public. So, far from proving the trivialization of culture, the circulation of achieved celebrities and celestoids demonstrates the openness of democracies and the power of audiences to endorse or destroy the heroes and monsters that emerge from the ranks of the people.

— Chris Rojek

See also Consumer Culture; Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Frankfurt School; Media Critique

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CERTEAU, MICHEL DE

Michel de Certeau (1925–1986) was born in 1925 in Chambéry, France. He obtained degrees in classics and philosophy at the universities of Grenoble, Lyon, and Paris. He joined the Society of Jesus in 1950 and was ordained in 1956. He completed a doctorate in theology at the Sorbonne in 1960, for which his thesis topic was the mystical writings of Jean-Joseph Surin. He taught in Paris and San Diego, and died of stomach cancer in 1986. He is especially well-known for his critique of historiography and his analyses of everyday life, particularly its spatial dimension.

Certeau's career can be divided into three stages, with May 1968 as the crucial pivot point. Before then, his work was quite traditional, focused almost exclusively on history-of-religion questions. Then, quite suddenly, it took a very different turn, becoming both contemporary and secular or sociocultural in its interests. After a decade of speculating on social theory topics, Certeau's thoughts returned once more to the history of religion, and he produced what would turn out to be his last book, a two-volume history of seventeenth-century mysticism in Europe (*The Mystic Fable*). A full evaluation of his work, encompassing all three periods, has yet to be written in English. For obvious reasons, social theory has tended to focus on the middle period. But this has sometimes resulted in a distorted view of his work, in some cases giving rise to the mistaken impression that Certeau lost his faith and renounced the church and his association with it. The fact is, he remained a Jesuit until he died.

The first stage of Certeau's career, which extends from his early doctoral research on the Jesuit mystic Jean-Joseph Surin until 1968, culminated in a profound retheorisation of history. The intellectual high points of this period are collected in *L'écriture de l'histoire* (*The Writing of History*), which was first published in 1975. History, Certeau argued, has to be seen as a kind of cultural machine for easing the anxiety most Westerners seem to feel in the face of death. It consists in a raising of the spectre of our own inevitable demise within a memorial framework that makes it appear that we'll live forever after all. However, Certeau's project was never simply to write a history of historiography, as it were; he wanted to understand "the historiographic operation" itself. His principal means of doing this was a strongly Lacanian-influenced, structuralist semiotics. He belonged

to that illustrious generation of semioticians that included Benveniste, Ducrot, Greimas, Lévi-Strauss, and Marin, and his work shows many signs of their influence, a fact that in the present "poststructuralist" era tends to be either overlooked or treated as quaintly old-fashioned.

Yet Certeau's formalism enabled his analyses and gave rise to many of his sharper insights into the day-to-day operations of Western culture. The working premise of his justly famous study of the "historiographic operation" (the keystone text of *The Writing of History*) is precisely structuralist: It takes the position that historiography can be apprehended as a certain type of linguistic system. Envisaging history as an operation is the equivalent, Certeau argues, of understanding it as the threefold relation between a *place*, an analytic *procedure*, and the construction of a *text*. This admits that history is part of the "reality" it seeks to describe and analyse and that "this reality can be grasped 'as a human activity,' or 'as a practice'" (Certeau 1988:57). A line of continuity traversing the three stages of Certeau's career surfaces here, for in trying to articulate the "historiographic operation" for itself, Certeau was effectively trying to describe history in its everyday aspect, namely as a living enterprise.

In Certeau's critique of historiography, we hear the first rumblings of what would become his catchcry in the second stage of his career, namely, the need to reconcile a live culture with a dead discourse. History poses the problem of accommodating death within the living in such a way as to make us realise that insofar as any representation of "living culture" proves itself unable to accommodate death, its discourse is privative. Ultimately, it is this privation of the living that Certeau's "logic of practices," as he characterises it in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, hopes to overcome: The move to logic should be read as an attempt to find an immanent ground capable of thinking death within life. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, especially (but not restricted to) Blanchot, Certeau did not hold the view that the everyday is invisible by definition. His position, rather, was that it is *made* so by the attempt to represent it. So his use of semiotics should be understood in these terms as the conscious effort to avoid duplicating what he saw as the signal error of previous attempts to articulate the everyday and its elements in its "everydayness," namely, their erasure of the very thing they sought to enunciate.

This amounts to insisting that the everyday *is* there, only we're too blind to see it, or else have allowed ourselves to be blinded. This argument is made especially vividly in "The Beauty of the Dead" (reprinted in *Heterologies*), which illustrates the obstinate persistence of an idea current in the middle of the nineteenth century that popular culture needs "saving." Think of the salvage efforts of the brothers Grimm and Hans Christian Andersen, for example. The real problem, though, this article argues, is that most of the available modes for articulating the everyday, due in part to

their pretence to scientificity, are totally inadequate to the task. Clearing away the blinkers is not sufficient in and of itself to attain the clarity of vision Certeau desires; one must conceive of a new conceptual discourse as well. The primary fault Certeau finds with the vast majority of the “older” critical syntaxes (sociology, psychology, and anthropology) is their apparent inability to deal with culture as it lives and breathes. For the most part, he finds that sociocultural analysis treats culture as a static, unliving thing and, what is worse, seems to feel no qualms at all in “killing” culture, as though, in the end, cultural analysis is really just another mode of taxidermy or vivisection.

Certeau’s own gambit is to suppose that culture is at bottom logical, which is not the same thing as rational, but it does share the implication that culture is fundamentally a calculating activity, not a dumb, unconscious one. By further supposing that this logic might be found in nature itself, he makes logic into a kind of living algorithm, like DNA, instead of a dead metaphor, as most types of formalisation result in. The articulation of this primordial understanding of human behaviour would, de Certeau supposes, take the form of a *combinatoire* (combination). Its model, he speculates, “may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (Certeau 1984:xi).

The second stage of Certeau’s career began abruptly. It is literally the stuff of legend that in 1968, when the streets of Paris erupted in a paroxysm of student and blue-collar protest, Certeau underwent some kind of personal transformation, or “shattering” as he called it. Much of this legend stems from the fact that despite his unpromising training in the quite traditional discipline of religious history, he proved better equipped than anyone else to capture the essence of the events with his on-the-spot theorising. He realised that something profound had happened in Paris, and indeed globally, even though the events themselves were denounced as a dismal failure in that nothing much changed. Certeau drew a distinction between the law and its authority, arguing that although the law prevailed during the course of the events of May, its authority was destroyed. The strict letter of the law, he said, depends on our belief in its rectitude for its authority, that is, its ability to compel obedience and compliance. Once that is shattered, the law has only the naked exercise of violence at its disposal.

Although very topical, these essays (*The Capture of Speech*) have been of lasting interest to social theorists for the way in which they inaugurate a new kind of critical discourse, which Certeau himself would develop further throughout this stage of his career. His first real opportunity to do this came in the early 1970s, when he received a large research grant to study French culture on a broad scale and investigate more fully just how much things had changed in

recent times, if it all. Two main collaborators, Pierre Mayol and Luce Giard, were brought onboard, and they contributed two very important ethnographic studies to the second volume, Mayol’s on “living” and Giard’s on “cooking.” The legacy of this work is rich indeed, and it gave us the two volumes of the *Practice of Everyday Life* (a third was planned but never completed). Prepared under different circumstances but still government funded (the OECD this time) is the work on migrants found now in *Culture in the Plural*. This interregnum lasted well over a decade, and it is from this period that we get the bulk of Certeau’s better-known social theory works.

In terms of their uptake in social theory, Certeau’s most important and influential concepts from this period, and indeed overall, are strategy and tactics, place and space, and *la perruque*. All of these terms are problematic inasmuch as Certeau’s definitions tend to be “open-ended,” a fact that has contributed greatly to their ambivalent reception. Certeau (1984) defines strategy and tactics as follows:

I call a *strategy* the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a *place* that can be delimited as its *own* and serve as the base from which relations with an *exteriority* composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) can be managed. (Pp. 35–6)

The essential point to observe is that strategy is a function of place, yet it takes a certain kind of strategic thinking or operating to actually produce a place. Tactics can be understood properly only when read against this background as the presence of a lack.

By contrast with a strategy (whose successive shapes introduce a certain play into this formal schema and whose link with a particular historical configuration of rationality should also be clarified), a *tactic* is a calculation determined by the absence of a proper locus. No delimitation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for autonomy. The space of the tactic is the space of the other. (Pp. 36–7)

The common denominator is the fact they are both determined as *calculations*. In his early thinking on the subject, Certeau toyed with the idea of connecting the notions of strategy and tactics to modal logic and game theory, but this was never brought to fruition. The essential difference between strategy and tactics is the way they relate to the variables that everyday life inevitably throws at us all. Strategy works to limit the sheer number of variables that can affect it by creating some kind of protected zone, a place

in which the environment can be rendered predictable if not properly tame. *Robinson Crusoe* offers an excellent example of strategic thinking. Crusoe is paranoid, and he works through his paranoia by building castles and defensive walls. One can say the same of virtually all the disciplinary procedures catalogued by Foucault: They too are paranoid, but they work through their paranoia by domesticating the body itself. By rendering the body docile, they arrest in advance the very impulse to rebellion.

The use of tactics, by contrast, is the approach one takes to everyday life when one is unable to take measures against its variables. Tactics are constantly in the swim of things and are as much in danger of being swept away or submerged by the flow of events as they are capable of bursting through the dykes strategy erects around itself and suffusing its protected place with its own brand of subversive and incalculable energy. Tactics refer to the set of practices that strategy has not been able to domesticate. They are not in themselves subversive, but they have a symbolic value that is not to be underestimated: They offer daily proof of the partiality of strategic control.

In support of this thesis, Certeau refers to the practice of “la perruque” (sometimes translated as “poaching”; strictly speaking, it should be rendered as “wiggling,” but this lacks a vernacular equivalent in English):

La perruque is the worker’s own work disguised as work for his employer. It differs from pilfering in that nothing of material value is stolen. It differs from absenteeism in that the worker is officially on the job. *La perruque* may be as simple a matter as a secretary’s writing a love letter on “company time” or as complex as a cabinet-maker’s “borrowing” a lathe to make a piece of furniture for his living room. (Certeau 1984:25)

The worker has no compunction about stealing time because he or she does not believe in the job he or she is performing. Put differently, the job holds no authority, and as such it is no longer a vocation in the old sense of being a calling, it is merely that which one does in order to pay the bills. “With variations practices analogous to la perruque are proliferating in governmental and commercial offices as well as in factories” (Certeau 1984:26). The point is that la perruque is not an exemplary instance of tactics in action so much as a symptom of a broader problem, one to which, moreover, Certeau seems prepared to lend an epochal character. And that indeed is how we should understand tactics: as both a symptom and response to late capitalism. Strategy and tactics can also be understood as spatial practices, which, for Certeau, is to say, all practices are spatial practices.

All spatial practice, Certeau (1984) asserts, must be seen as a repetition, direct or indirect, of that primordial advent to spatiality, “the child’s differentiation from the mother’s

body. It is through that experience that the possibility of space and of a localisation (a ‘not everything’) of the subject is inaugurated” (p. 109). In other words, Certeau envisions spatial practices as reenactments of what Lacan called the “mirror stage.” In the initiatory game, just as in the “joyful activity” of the child who, standing before a mirror, sees itself as *one* (it is *she* or *he*, seen as a whole) but *another* (*that*, an image with which the child identifies itself), what counts is the process of this “spatial captation,” which inscribes the passage toward the other as the law of being and the law of place. To practice place is thus to repeat the joyful and silent experience of childhood; it is, in a place, “*to be other and to move toward the other*” (Certeau 1984:109–10). From a psychoanalytic point of view, the mirror stage describes *the* instant of spatial captation: *the* moment, in other words, when children are suddenly able to formulate a clear and workable distinction between their own bodies and their environments, of which they develop an increasingly complex picture as time passes by experimenting with it. This moment, in general, corresponds to what Lacan called “the Imaginary,” which, it must be remembered, is always about to be superseded by “the Symbolic.”

The question that follows is how in this retelling of the mirror stage, the Imaginary is going to be brought under the yoke of the Symbolic. Without ever stipulating that it is this question he is answering, though it seems safe to assume that it is, Certeau suggests there are two main ways in which the anticipatory *gestalt* of that originary moment is rendered concrete. These, in fact, are the two main “practices” he suggests we use to locate ourselves in everyday life: (1) the attribution of place names and (2) the telling of stories about those places (Certeau 1984:103, 121).

In the spaces brutally lit by an alien reason, proper names carve out pockets of hidden and familiar meanings. They “make sense”; in other words, they are the impetus of movements, like vocations and calls that turn or divert an itinerary by giving it a meaning (or a direction) (*sens*) that was previously unforseen. These names create a nowhere in places; they change them into passages. (Certeau 1984:104)

In a pre-established geography, which extends (if we limit ourselves to the home) from bedrooms so small that “one can’t do anything in them” to the legendary, long-lost attic that “could be used for everything,” everyday stories tell us what one can do in it and make out of it. They are treatments of space. (Certeau 1984:122)

It is worth noting that the ethnographic data for both of these practices of place, naming and storytelling, are taken from Pierre Mayol’s account (in volume 2 of *The Practice*

of *Everyday Life*) of the “living” or “inhabiting” practices of the people of Croix-Rousse neighbourhood in Lyon (c. 1975–1977).

The third period of Certeau’s career is also something of a return to origins, or a closing of a circle. It began with Certeau’s return to France after nearly a decade in the United States, teaching at the University of California, San Diego (he replaced Fredric Jameson). By the same token, it revisited the topic with which Certeau’s career began, namely seventeenth-century French mysticism. But as with his critique of historiography, Certeau’s aim was not merely to add yet another catalogue of curiosities to an already well-stocked cabinet. Rather, he wanted to understand the logic of mysticism, to try to understand it for itself, as its own peculiar kind of discourse. In this respect, as he explains in the opening pages of the first volume of *The Mystic Fable*, his aim can best be grasped as the attempt to revive (literally, make live again) the lost discourse known as mystics, which, like physics, metaphysics, ethics, and so on, was once a discipline in its own right. But since in contrast to these other discourses, mystics has, in fact, vanished, Certeau also had to account for its subsequent disappearance. He argued that mystics exhausted itself because its project of trying to resurrect the word of God in an era that no longer knew its God simply could not be sustained. Mystics could through its bold linguistic experiments occasionally evoke the essential mystery of God, but it could not convert that into an enduring presence.

Overlapping the second and third periods was Certeau’s unfinished project on the anthropology of belief. This project would in all likelihood have constituted a fourth period but was cut short. As he was writing what would turn out to be his last books, the two volumes on seventeenth-century French mysticism, Certeau began sketching this project, which was to have been an analysis of heterological thinking in early anthropological discourse. Three essays from this unfinished project are to be found in Certeau’s existing work: One is in *Heterologies* (on Montaigne), another is in *The Writing of History* (on Léry), and a third (on Lafitau), yet to be anthologised, is in an issue of *Yale Journal of French Studies* devoted to the origins of anthropological writing. Each of these essays is concerned with the way these three forerunners to modern anthropology, Montaigne, Léry, and Lafitau, encountered the manifold differences of the New World as alterity and turned that alterity into a means of authorising their own discourse about the Old World.

The intellectual basis of this project can already be seen in his critique of historiography. By defining history as a confrontation with alterity in the psychoanalytic way he did, Certeau furnished himself with the means of answering the question he posed of why we should need history. However, in doing so, he knowingly raised—but never got to answer—a host of more directly philosophical questions

not easily recuperated by the same means. Traditionally, “heterology” designates the branch of philosophy concerned with the Other as that which philosophy relies on without being able to comprehend. Corresponding to the first “problem,” the Other in this case, besides being “what I am not,” “where I am not,” and “when I am not,” is also infinite and radically contiguous. God, obviously, meets all of these requirements, but that does not mean the Other *must be* construed theologically. In fact, an unconscious deification (the structural equivalent of the projection of phantasms in a psychoanalytic sense) is one of the risks of heterology. Begun while still in the United States, the heterological project was put on hold so Certeau could complete his work on mysticism and, regrettably, never resumed. Since he died before formulating either a specific thesis or a particular method, we have no certain way of knowing what he actually intended by the term.

Although Certeau’s work has been widely embraced by social theory, it is difficult to determine his relation to social theory as a discipline. This is because his own intellectual origins and interests grew out of religious history and he really came to social theoretical questions only late in life. His formative influences were not those of social theory, nor was his writing ever intended as a contribution to it. In contrast to the work of people such as Stuart Hall and the other pioneers of what we today know as social theory, Certeau did not interest himself in the politics of identity or anything that smacked of what he saw as an egregious return to a politics of individuality. Indeed, like his contemporary Gilles Deleuze, Certeau was more interested in the impersonal, the nonindividual, that which spoke through the individual subject, rather than what he or she thought or had to say. He wanted to contrive an analysis of culture from the mute perspectives of the body, such as the cry and the murmur, none of which needs to be identified with a specific, knowable individual in order to be apprehended. So for Certeau, it was never a matter of authorising the study of the everyday in its particulars that he had it in mind for his newly inaugurated science to do. Much more boldly, he aimed at the legitimation of the everyday itself as a resource for the primordial understanding of human behaviour.

— Ian Buchanan

See also Augé, Marc; Foucault, Michel; Lacan, Jacques; Lefebvre, Henri

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CHAFETZ, JANET

Among the gender theorists, Janet Saltzman Chafetz (b. 1942) has not only been a commentator on existing approaches (Chafetz 1988), she has also sought to develop a scientific theory of gender dynamics (Chafetz 1984, 1990). Before entering sociology, Chafetz majored in modern European intellectual history, receiving her BA at Cornell University (1963) and MA at the University of Connecticut (1965). This study of history gave Chafetz a sense of the long duration of social processes as she pursued the study of sociology at the University of Texas, receiving her PhD in 1968. She was influenced by Marxist ideas on class, conflict, and change, as well as by feminist anthropologists writing in the 1970s and 1980s. In pursuing her doctoral work, she specialized in social stratification and social theory; and after initially approaching the topic of gender stratification from a social psychological perspective, she returned to her intellectual roots in the 1980s and began to examine gender as a form of stratification from a more macroperspective, where Gerhard Lenski's (1964) macroevolutionary theory of stratification exerted some influence. This rededication to a macrolevel analysis has produced her most important works, which have sought to explain the conditions that either maintain or change gender stratification.

Turning first to the conditions maintaining gender stratification, Chafetz argues that there are two types of forces sustaining gender inequality: coercive and voluntary. Coercive forces revolve around the extent to which males have resource advantages over women at the macrolevel of social organization and are able to use this advantage to control microencounters among men and women, to control elite positions in the broader society, to regulate the opportunities for work for men and women, to define the labor of women in negative terms, and to generate a system of gender ideologies, gender norms, and gender stereotypes that favor men's attributes over those of women. Voluntary forces follow from these coercive forces because once a

system favoring males exists, it constrains the options that women have. When ideologies, norms, and stereotypes portray men and women differentially, socialization will tend to reinforce these cultural definitions, with the result that women will "voluntarily" act in ways that perpetuate these definitions. When adult roles are gendered, the role models for women will also be gendered, with the consequence that women will tend to "choose" female roles and hence sustain the gendered division of labor inside and outside of the family.

When a system of gender stratification is in place, it tends to be self-perpetuating unless other conditions are present. Change in this system can come about as a result of unintended processes revolving around demographic, technological, structural, and political transformations, as well as intended processes stemming from deliberate efforts to alter gender definitions and roles. Unintended change processes that help women include demographic alterations increasing opportunities for women to move out of gendered roles; technological innovations reducing strength and mobility requirements for jobs, while freeing women from domestic activities, that allow women to overcome gendered definitions and roles; and structural changes, such as an economic growth, that create new opportunities for women. Other unintended processes that work against women include deskilling of jobs, as these increase female unemployment, and political conflicts, as these harden gender definitions. These unintended effects simply occur as a result of demographic, economic, technological, and political processes, but much change in gender definitions (stereotypes, ideologies, and norms) and roles (in the division of labor) is intentional, revolving around targeted efforts to alter a system of gender stratification.

One source of intended change comes from elite males who control key positions. When elites perceive that gender inequality threatens their incumbency in elite positions, when elites see gender inequality as thwarting their plans and goals, and when competing factions of elites need to recruit women to their side in conflict with other elites, women are in a position to demand changes in the macrolevel division of labor and in definitions of gender that place them at a disadvantage. Another source of intended change comes from women's efforts to mobilize and pursue their interests, with this mobilization being easier under certain conditions: industrialization, as it increases the number of nondomestic roles; urbanization, as it congregates women who can better communicate their common interests; escalated deprivation among women, as this is experienced collectively through ideological ferment; and positive experiences of empowerment, as some women are able to assume nongendered roles outside of the family.

Yet unintended forces and deliberate efforts to change the content of gender definitions and the macrolevel

division of labor will inevitably threaten interest groups who will mobilize against changes in the existing system of stratification. These countermovements will gain power when a large proportion of women play traditional gender roles and abide by gender definitions, when a significant number of male roles in the division of labor are threatened, and when the women's movement reveals a high degree of internal conflict and has thereby alienated former supporters of change.

Chafetz's theory thus seeks to explain both the reasons for the existence of gender stratification and the forces that must be unleashed for change in this system of stratification to occur. In specifying the conditions that maintain stratification, Chafetz emphasizes what must be changed, and in outlining the unintentional and intentional forces that can change gender definitions and roles, she offers strategic guidelines for how to change gender inequality. By examining any particular empirical case, Chafetz's theory provides insights into why some systems of gender stratification are difficult to change and why others reveal more potential for change. If coercive and voluntary forces sustaining gender inequality are strong while those causing change are comparatively weak, then change is not likely, whereas if the forces maintaining the system are weak and those for change are strong, then change is more likely. The theory thus allows researchers to make predictions about the potential for gender equity or inequity in human societies.

— Jonathan H. Turner

See also Feminism; Gender; Role Theory

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CHODOROW, NANCY

Nancy Chodorow (b. 1944) is an internationally acclaimed sociologist, feminist theorist, and practicing psychoanalyst. She was born in New York City, on January 20, 1944, the daughter of Marvin and Leah (Turitz) Chodorow. She graduated from Radcliffe College in 1966 and earned

her PhD in sociology from Brandeis University in 1975. Chodorow is regarded as a founding scholar of second-wave feminist theory based on her groundbreaking book *The Reproduction of Mothering* ([1978] 1999), an account that challenged normative views about gender: how individuals come to see themselves as masculine or feminine. That work won the Jessie Bernard Award from Sociologists for Women in Society (1979) and was named one of the "Ten Most Influential Books of the Past Twenty-Five Years" in the social sciences (*Contemporary Sociology* 1996). It has been translated into seven languages.

While first making her mark in the field of gender studies, Chodorow's enduring contribution to social theory is her focus on the inextricable links between self and society. The scope of her work is wide-ranging, from her "grand" theory about the social and cultural reproduction of gender identity, difference, and inequalities (1978) to her clinically informed account of psychological gender (a sense that one is male or female) and critique of postmodernism-poststructuralism (1999) to her rethinking of what constitutes sexuality in psychoanalytic thought (1994, 2000) to her most recent reconsideration of the psychology of biological and bodily experiences, such as fertility and aging (2003).

Chodorow was trained in the fields of anthropology and sociology and later trained as a clinical psychoanalyst at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute. Her melding of these disciplines is unique and controversial within the social sciences. She argues that individual feelings, fantasies, and unconscious conflicts are bound up in, but not reducible to, cultural mandates about gender and sexuality and that efforts to explain gendered patterns in psychological life need not be at odds with "clinical individuality and personal uniqueness" ([1978] 1999:xv). Chodorow's keen sense that generalizations and theory building as well as clinical treatment depend upon close observation of individuals who have distinctive, rich inner worlds and who live in a particular place at a particular historical point in time aligns well with developments in the sociology of emotions, psychological anthropology, cultural psychology, and feminist relational psychology, all fields upon which she has had major influence.

Chodorow has had an impact on the field of sociology with her trenchant critique of theories of gender socialization, arguing that boys and girls do not learn to take on masculine or feminine traits by imitating others or because they are forced to do so, but because these gender traits become deeply and personally meaningful to them. Chodorow uses an object relations psychoanalytic perspective to frame her theory of gender. She argues that intrapsychic relational family dynamics (specifically early maternal-child relationships of attachment and separation) result in distinct gendered identities and personalities. According to this view, both girls and boys begin life experiencing a feeling of oneness or identification with their maternal caregiver. Over

the course of their development, however, boys and girls experience themselves differently in relation to their mothers. Equally important, women experience their mothering of boy children differently from their mothering of girl children. This acknowledgment of maternal subjectivity is a key element of Chodorow's theorizing, especially in light of the prevailing idealizations of motherhood that denied other parts of women's lives and identities in favor of children's (insatiable) needs. This axiomatic feature of Chodorow's work—that women bring distinctive desires, meanings, and motives to their experiences of mothering and sense of themselves in relation to their children—set the stage for a feminist rethinking of mother and child development that she and others have developed further (Chodorow and Contratto 1982).

Chodorow identifies certain patterns in the relational dynamic between mother and child as central to understanding gender identity development. Whereas girls establish their sense of self in connection with their female caregivers, boys establish their sense of self through separation. Girls' sense of self and identity is continuous with this early feminine identification, while boys must secure their masculine identity by rejecting or repressing what is feminine in themselves as well as by denigrating it in women. A problematic psychological feature of masculinity is its fragility, the need to constantly protect the boundaries between what is and is not female (and not mother). This point proved especially useful to feminist theorists who sought to account for the persistence of men's derogation and domination of women. These insights into the defenses and conflicts involved in masculine identification set the stage for what would later become a burgeoning field of "masculinity studies." Meanwhile, Chodorow notes that feminine identity is more continuous and complete, but it too is fraught with boundary confusion. Rather than defining the self in opposition, women generally tend to arrive at a sense of themselves in relation to others. This emblematic feature of femininity can be self-sabotaging, including not claiming enough autonomy or agency. Chodorow's effort to "revalue, without idealizing, both female psychology and the mother-daughter relationship that helps to found it" ([1978] 1999:x) became the springboard for a decade of research on girls' and women's development.

Another facet of Chodorow's work has featured the role of relational family dynamics and early gender identifications in shaping adult sexual lives. Joining other psychoanalysts, Chodorow (1994, 2000, 2003) extends upon Freud's legacy, particularly his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905) to argue that sexuality is far more complicated and comprises more than one's choice of sexual object. She argues that like gender identity, sexual identity is highly individual, conflict ridden, and constructed as a "compromise formation" between what is culturally and

psychologically posed in binary terms ("heterosexuality vs. homosexuality"; "masculinity vs. femininity"; "activity vs. passivity"). She identifies universal elements of sexuality that are taken up and combined by individuals in unique, idiosyncratic, and nonsingular ways, including eroticization or one's experiential sense of one's own body, such as pleasure and arousal; one's internal world and mental representations about self in relation to other; one's sense of feminine and masculine identity; one's sense of adequacy or conflict about one's sexual desire; and one's personal sexual fantasies (often filtered but not determined by culture).

The clinical dimension of Chodorow's work, her interest in the subjectivity of both client and clinician and the formative role of transference and countertransference is paramount. But this does not override her persistent search for patterns and explanations about the powerful links between psyche and culture.

— Wendy Luttrell

See also Gender; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory; Sexuality and the Subject

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CITIZENSHIP

Modern political thought has bequeathed two conceptions of citizenship, one leading to a conception of citizenship as participation in civil society and the other a view of citizenship as a legal status based on rights and generally

defined with respect to the state as opposed to civil society. In republican political theory, from classical thought through the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, citizenship has been largely associated with the idea of the participation of the public in the political life of the community. This has given rise to a strong association of citizenship with civil society and in general with a definition of citizenship that stresses “virtue,” the active dimension of what membership of a political community entails. In contrast to this, in fact, quite old tradition, the liberal idea of citizenship is one that emphasizes citizenship as a largely legal condition. In this understanding of citizenship, which had its origins in English seventeenth-century political theory, citizenship concerns the rights of the citizen. In addition to the dimensions of rights and participation, an adequate definition of citizenship will include the further dimensions of duties and identity. A full definition of citizenship, then, includes the four dimensions of *rights*, *duties*, *participation*, and *identity*. The first two of these refer to the formal dimensions of citizenship, while the dimensions of participation and identity refer to substantive dimensions.

Citizenship conceived in terms of *rights* is complicated, since rights take many forms. Four can be specified as of particular salience to issues of citizenship: civic, political, social, and cultural rights. The first three are the classic rights typically part of the liberal heritage and which were the subject of T. H. Marshall’s ([1950] 1992) famous essay on citizenship, *Citizenship and Social Class*. In this account, which has been heavily criticized for its neat evolutionary view, civic rights—the right to free worship, peaceful opposition, free speech, the right to enter contract, ownership of property—are fairly minimal rights. Political rights, on the other hand, refer to the right to vote and the related right to stand for election. Social rights refer to the right to welfare, education, unemployment benefits, and pensions. Finally, cultural rights, which did not figure in Marshall’s framework, entail the right to speak one’s language, the right to express one’s identity, and special representation rights. In general, cultural rights are a more recent addition to the rights discourse and are mostly conceived of as group rights for minorities, in contrast with the individual focus of the traditional rights.

That citizenship entails *duties* was an assumption common to both the republican and liberal traditions. In return for rights, the citizen had to perform certain duties, such as the duty to take up arms, to pay taxes, mandatory education, and the general duty to be a good citizen. However, in the liberal tradition, this dimension was generally downplayed and was, in fact, more strongly present in the republican tradition, with its characteristic notion of the good citizen. The following are the main duties of citizenship: taxation, mandatory education, and in many countries conscription. These are on the whole formal duties, but informal duties can also be mentioned; for example, there is the general

duty to be a responsible, law-abiding citizen and the duty to vote.

Citizenship as participation refers to participation in civil society, such as in voluntary associations or even in social movements. Civil disobedience is also an expression of an active citizenship of participation. The participatory dimension of citizenship is often held to generate social capital.

In more recent times, as a result of new concerns and new theories of citizenship, *identity* has become an important dimension of citizenship. The traditional conceptions of citizenship on the whole did not consider the question of identity and more generally the problem of culture. Today, this question of culture and citizenship is at the fore of debates on citizenship and has extended citizenship, originally attached to a conservative ideology of the polity, into a deeper notion of democracy as entailing social transformation and extending beyond the nation-state to global contexts and cosmopolitan discourses. The relationship between identity and citizenship can vary from commitment to a particular cause, patriotism, loyalty to the normative ideas of the polity, and group-specific identities, such as ethnic ties.

THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP

The main approaches to citizenship have been influenced by political ideology and have reflected major social transformations. It is possible to group the dominant trends into four discourses. These include the *rights discourse of liberal theory*, *classical and modern republican theory*, *communitarianism*, and *radical pluralism*.

Rights discourse has been the dominant approach in citizenship. As noted in the foregoing remarks, it has on the whole reflected liberalism but has also incorporated social democratic political ideology. The liberal heritage gave to the idea of citizenship a strong association with law and a view of the citizen as the bearer of rights. In this view, citizenship is a legal status that defines the relation of the individual to the polity. Although it does entail duties, it is largely seen as one of rights. The traditional rights in liberal theory are the negative rights that specify the rights of the individual to be free of arbitrary violence and the positive rights to exercise political participation by voting. In the liberal tradition, citizenship participation has on the whole been limited to voting. This is because for liberal theory, citizenship is just one dimension of democracy, the others being constitutionalism (or liberal democracy) and the representation of social interests (or parliamentary democracy). However, in the modern democracies, liberal theory has mostly been modified by social democracy, at least as far as the theory of citizenship is concerned. T. H. Marshall reflected this tendency when he wrote his influential work on social citizenship, *Citizenship and Social Class*. In this

account, social rights complement the traditional liberal rights and, in Marshall's evolutionary theory, represent the end of the historical narrative of citizenship as a discourse. Social rights not only complement civic and political rights but are also enabling rights in that they compensate for some of the social disadvantages brought about by capitalism. It will suffice to mention here that this theory of citizenship reduced citizenship to a passive condition whereby the citizen was a recipient of rights and neglected the active dimension, ignoring, for instance, that many of these rights were the product of social struggles; its evolutionary model cannot be so easily applied to many countries that experienced different historical trajectories of rights; and finally, it failed to address other kinds of rights, such as cultural rights.

Classical and modern republican theory differs from the rights discourse in stressing much more strongly the relation of citizenship to democracy. Where the rights discourse reduced this to a minimum, the republican tradition maximizes the democratic nature of citizenship by seeing it as a form of political participation in public life. With its origins in the classical Greek polis, the Roman civitas, and the renaissance city-state, the modern idea of republican citizenship was born with the Enlightenment and the ideas of the American and French Revolutions. In this tradition, the very idea of the republic is inextricably connected with citizenship. However, modern, or civic republicanism, has been a very backward-looking doctrine, seeing citizenship as in decline in modern times. In one of the most famous proponents of republican theory, Hannah Arendt went so far as to see the republican ideal undermined by the social question. According to Robert Putnam in *Bowling Alone* (2000), modern individualism has eroded the ability of contemporary American society to generate social capital. He argued that civic engagement, voluntarism, and associational membership—epitomized in declining membership of bowling clubs, the quintessential feature of white, Anglo-Saxon America—are in decline due to a nascent individualism, and consequently democracy is undermined. What makes democracy flourish is the stable core of a cultural tradition based on common values. But Putnam ignored the fact that modern values are, in fact, often sustained by a high degree of individualism and that conflict is not corrosive, but essential to the modern polity, which cannot rest on the traditional cultural ethos associated with the bowling clubs of Jeffersonian agrarian republicanism. Moreover, it is a view of culture that accepts the exclusion of large segments of the population—women and minorities—from the polity, the values of which are narrow, gendered, and closed to the reality of diversity.

Communitarianism is often associated with civic republicanism but has a quite different approach to citizenship. By communitarianism is meant an approach to citizenship that is largely a corrective to the rights discourse. For this

reason, it is often called simply “liberal communitarianism.” Although there are degrees of tension between the liberal emphasis on the rights of individuals and the communitarian preoccupation with community, the communitarian theory brings an additional dimension to citizenship. Liberal communitarianism has been associated with the writings of Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, and Alisdair MacIntyre, amongst others. These political philosophers oppose what they see as the empty formalism of liberalism and contractualism, especially as outlined by John Rawls. However, the liberal communitarian debate has mostly been on the level of philosophy, rather than in terms of major social and political ideology. Extending the range of communitarianism beyond the liberal communitarian debate, some substantive issues can be pointed to as characteristic of the communitarian approach. There is, first, a strong emphasis on the priority of community against the state. While the earlier liberal communitarian controversy was mostly concerned with the conception of the self, the more recent communitarianism tends to stress skepticism with the state. This is particularly evident in the writing of Amitai Etzioni, who argues for a conception of community based on the values of responsibility, the recovery of a moral voice, and family and civic values. This is a conservative variant of communitarianism that is often indistinguishable from civic republicanism in seeing citizenship as reducible to voluntarism. Thus, against the traditional values of the modern liberal state, communitarians look to a kind of citizenship based on the responsible community, especially in neighbourhood control of schooling and policing. The communitarian idea can also be addressed to a much higher level of community. In many versions, especially where it is close to liberal political philosophy, as in Charles Taylor, communitarianism can reflect a concern with cultural community as a foundation for political community. In this case, it translates into an argument for the need for official recognition of national communities. In these debates, the dividing line between communitarianism and liberalism is a thin one, as is reflected in the writings of Will Kymlicka, for whom the question of community is a matter of groups' rights and is perfectly reconcilable with liberal theory. In this respect, radical pluralism offers a different approach.

Radical pluralists reject the premises of liberalism, civic republicanism, and communitarianism in arguing for a strong notion of differentiated citizenship rights. For pluralists such as Marion Iris Young, liberal theory neglects the question of group rights, reducing rights to the rights of the individual. Moreover, both liberal theory and civic republicanism neglect the need to bring rights discourse into the private domain rather than confine it to the public domain. But while her starting point is community, she rejects the communitarian approach as such because of its concern with large-scale communities and generally national communities,

and has little to say on multiculturalism. According to radical pluralists, the traditional theories of citizenship fail to see that citizenship is often a strategy to separate insiders from outsiders. To make citizenship serve the ideal of inclusion without exclusion, radical pluralists argue for a more differentiated understanding of citizenship that cannot be based on the assumption that all individuals or groups are equal or even that equality is an overriding goal. With this position, citizenship has to address the tension between equality and difference. Radical pluralism has been heavily influenced by feminism, which brings citizenship into cultural areas and, moreover, introduces into it issues that ultimately go beyond the rights discourse. Radical pluralism has also been influenced by theories of radical democracy, whereby citizenship is seen as part of a wider politics of social transformation and thus cannot be constrained by the limits of the existing social and political structures.

NEW CHALLENGES FOR CITIZENSHIP

The concept of citizenship has undergone major changes in the past few decades. The theories discussed in the foregoing indicate how it has changed since about the 1980s, with the rise of communitarianism and, as a reaction to it, radical pluralism. In their different ways, these approaches marked a significant departure from some of the assumptions of the older rights discourse and civic republicanism. However, in more recent times, the discourse of citizenship has been transformed by further developments. Central to these is a growing consciousness that citizenship must address the question of culture and, in addition, a theory of citizenship must address the problem of globalization. The introduction of a cultural and global dimension into the debate on citizenship has been reflected in some of the following developments, which all point to a fundamental rethinking of the very concept of citizenship.

One of the most important considerations is the changed relation of citizenship to nationality. The equation of citizenship and nationality in, for example, Marshall's theory can no longer be taken for granted. Citizenship entails something wider than nationality, in the sense of membership of a state. Many critics, for instance, Jürgen Habermas, have argued that despite the close relationship of citizenship and nationality, the former has a different history.

The separation of citizenship from nationality can be related to a corresponding shift from birth to residence as a criterion of citizenship. Especially in the countries of the European Union, residence is increasingly coming to be the overriding factor in citizenship rights. What in effect is happening is that citizenship is being fragmented into its parts and is no longer exclusively a bundle of rights that is underpinned by a passport. Although still based on the priority of national citizenship, a legally codified European citizenship now exists as a postnational citizenship.

Accompanying the blurring of citizenship and nationality is a blurring of the distinction between the rights of citizenship and human rights. In many countries, as in the countries of the European Union, minorities, migrant groups, and refugees can claim various kinds of rights on the basis of appeals to human rights that are now part of the legal framework of the nation-state. This internationalization of national law has led some to argue that citizenship in its traditional form as entailing a separation of insiders from outsiders has effectively come to an end.

One of the most discussed topics in new theories of citizenship is the challenge of reconciling citizenship to multiculturalism. While some critics, such as Michael Mann and Barry Hindess, see the very concept of citizenship as necessarily entailing exclusion, others, such as Bhikhu Parekh, see it as essential to multiculturalism. In this context, the problem of citizenship is in translating it into collective rights. Some critics argue against the very notion of collective rights on legal, political, and philosophical grounds, while others argue that group rights do not contradict the basic tenets of liberalism. In any case, a new problem for citizenship is in reconciling group rights with rights of the individual. A more general point in this is that the rise of group or cultural rights replaced the previous concern with social citizenship, and as a result, citizenship no longer pertains exclusively to the pursuit of equality, it also pertains to the preservation of group differences (Kymlicka and Norman 2000).

In addition to the question of culture and identity, any account of citizenship today will have to address the rise of global (or transnational) forms of citizenship: citizenship beyond the national state. This may also entail the challenge of new kinds of rights, such as rights arising from the domain of technology, science, and ecology. In this context, four new developments in citizenship theory are particularly salient: the cultural, technological, global, and cosmopolitan faces of citizenship.

Culture and Citizenship

One of the striking developments in recent political discourse has been the increasing confluence of culture and citizenship. Until recently, the concerns of most approaches to citizenship have been quite indifferent to cultural issues and conflicts over identity. As is well known, citizenship has been historically formed around civic, political, and social rights. Even if Marshall's account of the formation of modern citizenship reflected a very one-sided view of what was at best the British experience, it is certainly true that his omission of the sphere of culture was characteristic of most conceptions of citizenship.

Citizenship had been held to be based on formal rights and had relatively little to do with substantive issues of cultural belonging. It was a fairly static concept that reflected

the durability of the existing national state. Although Marshall acknowledged a relation between rights, on one side, and duties and loyalties, on the other, the substantive dimension of citizenship was never central to his conception of citizenship. In the civic republican tradition, which more strongly emphasized participation and an active as opposed to a passive view of the citizen, the cultural dimension of citizenship did not receive much more attention. Until about the late 1980s, multiculturalism and citizenship performed quite different functions. Citizenship on the whole pertained to the national citizenship of an established polity and was generally defined by birth, or in some cases by descent, while multicultural policies served to manage incoming migrant groups. Today, this distinction has virtually collapsed. Migrant groups have become more and more a part of the mainstream population and cannot be so easily contained by multicultural policies; and, on the other side, the “native” population itself has become more and more culturally plural, due in part to the impact of some four decades of ethnic mixing but also due to the general pluralization brought about by postindustrial and postmodern culture. In Britain, for example, there is a greater awareness of the constituent nations of the Union as well as of regionalisation. The focus on production and social class, which informed Marshall’s account of citizenship, has given way to greater interest in subcultures based around leisure pursuits and consumption. In addition, new and more radical ideas of democracy have arisen as a result of the rise of new social movements. The social is now becoming more cultural and with this comes new kinds of participation.

Two broad positions have emerged with respect to citizenship and culture. On one hand, we have an approach that is influenced by sociology and social theory, and on the other hand, we have an approach heavily influenced by political philosophy. For the sociological approach, the real challenge, it would appear, is to bring about inclusion in the sphere of identity and belonging, whereas the culture debate in political theory has to do with extending a more or less already-established framework, the national polity, to include excluded or marginalized groups. It is, in essence, a question as to whether cultural citizenship addresses the new “cultural” needs of the individual/group or the inclusion of excluded groups/individuals. While departing in many respects from the assumptions of multiculturalism, the second approach has mostly remained within the confines of the liberal communitarian debate and is closer to the concerns of multiculturalism, with its concerns around issues of the limits of tolerance, the accommodation of difference, and problems of group representation.

Technology and Citizenship

The question of technology and citizenship is another area in which citizenship has undergone major transformation

but is an area that is relatively undeveloped. As a result of new technologies, such as communication and information technologies, new reproductive technologies, the new genetics, biotechnologies, surveillance technologies, and new military technologies aimed at populations rather than states, technology has transformed the very meaning of citizenship, which can no longer be defined as a relation to the state. The new technologies differ from the old ones in that they have major implications for citizenship, given their capacity to refine the very nature of society and, in many cases, personhood. Having socialized nature, the new technologies have themselves become socialized but without being constrained by civil society. Many of the new technologies are communication technologies, for instance, personal computers, and mobile phones, but others, such as powerful chemical, nuclear, and engineering technologies, have the power to reconstitute the world. In view of these considerations, technology can no longer be seen as neutral or as either good or bad.

Three debates about technology and citizenship can be identified. The first concerns the question of how technology should be controlled. This reflects a largely negative view of technology as a response to risk and victimization. In this discourse, which reflects the liberal conception of politics as restraining rather than enabling, the need for regulation—market, state, self-regulatory—will typically be the main consideration.

A second discourse concerns the question of how access to technology can be widened. In this discourse, which reflects the republican conception of politics as one of participation, we find a positive view of technology as enabling and inclusive.

A third discourse concerns the broader societal question of how technology can be shaped for society. In this context, the question is one of values and the social shaping of technology, rather than simply the accommodation of technology.

With respect to the four dimensions of citizenship, we can see links with technology. Thus, in the area of rights, we find issues of privacy, rights to information, and victimization. In the area of duties, we now find new concerns, such as global responsibility, responsibility to nature, and responsibility to future generations. These are all concerns that go beyond the traditional conceptions of the dutiful citizen. In the area of participation, inclusion is now extended to technology. Finally, in the area of identity, technology has had an impact on citizenship, opening up more and more possibilities for personal lifestyles, consumption, and culture.

Citizens, in private and in public roles, as consumers, as patients, and as university students, are encountering the new technologies more and more, but increasingly through the market. New discourses have arisen tying citizenship to technology on the level of rights, duties, participation, and identity.

Cosmopolitan and Global Citizenship

One of the most discussed of the new faces of citizenship today is the extension of citizenship beyond the nation-state. This conception of citizenship takes two broad forms, which are often conflated. On one side, there is the idea of global citizenship in the more specific sense of a form of citizenship that is located in a transnational space. On the other side, there is the essentially cultural question of cosmopolitan citizenship, viewed as a particular consciousness toward the wider world.

Global citizenship is clearly related to globalization and the growing recognition that citizenship extends beyond the horizons of the nation-state to encompass global forms. One school of thought rejects the very notion of citizenship beyond the nation-state as neither possible nor desirable. Others see new opportunities for citizenship in areas of governance and new social spaces beyond the level of the nation-state.

But rather than seeing global citizenship and national citizenship as exclusive, it makes more sense to see them as embodying different levels of citizenship. It is possible to identify at least three such levels: the subnational level (that is, local or regional), the national level, and the global level. No account of citizenship can ignore the global dimension, although this does not mean that this has made more local forms of citizenship redundant. This indicates a view of citizenship as multileveled, rather than spatially confined to national societies. It also points to a flexible citizenship whereby citizens, especially those affected by transnational processes, negotiate more and more the different levels of governance. This indicates a cultural dimension to global citizenship that is best viewed as constituting a different aspect of citizenship.

Cosmopolitan citizenship is a term that is best applied to the process by which critical and reflexive forms of belonging enter into discourses of belonging. As societies interpenetrate more and more, due not least to processes of globalization, new expressions of citizenship emerge, such as those discussed in the foregoing analysis. The existing literature does not distinguish adequately between cosmopolitanism and globalization. Cosmopolitanism is not found exclusively on the global level but is also to be located on the local and national. It can also entail resistance to globalization.

While the concept of citizenship will continue to be central to political theory, it has only relatively recently entered social theory. Since the early 1990s, in response to major social transformation, the concept of citizenship has entered social theory, providing it with a means of theorizing cultural, economic, and political processes. It is progressively extending into more and more areas of society. Citizenship is also a new area of social research. The interest in citizenship is undoubtedly due to the crisis in

neoliberalism, the growing consciousness that globalization entails new kinds of questions for political membership and new conceptions of personhood. This discussion has shown that citizenship is no longer a bundle of rights defined in terms of nationality, nor is it reducible to a traditional view of civil society, but is a wider and more transformative dimension.

— Gerard Delanty

See also Cosmopolitan Sociology; Feminism; Globalization; Habermas, Jürgen; Social Capital; Taylor, Charles

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CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society refers to the realm of interaction, institutions, and social cohesion that sustains public life outside the spheres of the state and economy. More generally, civil society is a domain of public participation that is founded upon cooperation, empathy, and reciprocity. In some conceptions, civil society is synonymous with social solidarity or community identity. Other conceptions equate civil

society with individual rights and liberties that protect the freedom of the individual and nourish public life. Other conceptions view civil society as a basis for public trust that promotes citizenship and enhances the stability of civic institutions. Still other conceptions emphasize civil society as a complex web of institutions or a dense network of voluntary associations. In short, the notion of civil society is very broad, and scholars use the concept to identify a wide range of empirical cases. No consensus exists as to the theoretical and empirical definition of civil society, nor is there agreement on the analytical distinction between civil society and other political, economic, and social relations. Consequently, different definitions and meanings of civil society reflect different theoretical orientations and empirical specifications about the relationship between the economy, the state, and societal institutions.

Recent years have witnessed an explosion of scholarly research on civil society. These can be organized by five major themes: classical conceptions of civil society, the contribution of Marxian theory, neoconservative and liberal interpretations of civil society, the interplay of the state and civil society, and the linkages between the public and private spheres.

CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The earliest uses of the term in philosophy were to contrast *civil society* with a hypothetical *state of nature*. Adam Ferguson used civil society to contrast Western societies and institutions from more despotic forms existing outside the West. Others, such as Rousseau, Locke, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville, viewed civil society as an inclusive set of private and public associations based on trust and cooperation. Despite their differences, these theorists viewed civil society as a distinctively moral and ethical force that fosters the growth of public space, legal rights and institutions, and democratic political parties. Influenced by Tocqueville, Émile Durkheim identified several domains of civil society: the Tocqueville domain of political society (or the “public sphere”), the family, the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication. For Durkheim, these different spheres of civil society have an internal logic and a set of distinct practices that contribute to social integration, individual autonomy, and societal solidarity.

While some classical theorists viewed civil society as distinct from the economy, other theorists included capitalist social relations within their meaning of civil society. Immanuel Kant conflated civil society with the capitalist middle class, translating civil society as *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, which meant burgher, city-dweller’s society. In Adam Smith’s work, civil society is a distinct sphere, separate from the political sphere, in which market competition and pursuit of individual self-interest would contribute to the

common good of society by promoting economic growth. For Smith, market exchange and competition are what constitutes civil society. Georg Hegel has a radically different idea of civil society. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel maintains that civil society includes all those economic and familial institutions that exist outside the political state. It is a realm of unrestrained egoism, where each person is pitted against one another and the political state mediates particular interest through universal interest. As a sphere of self-interest and individual acquisition, civil society is opposed to political society and therefore separate from it. Thus, for Hegel, the political state mediates the conflicts between the self-interest of the individual and the public obligation of the citizen by promoting the common good.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF MARXIAN THEORY

In the writings of Marx and Engels, civil society refers to the development of a distinct economic sphere in society that emerges as a consequence of the rise of powerful nation-states. The notion of nation-state as separate from civil society is a modern one, according to Marx, because it is only in the postmedieval period that the sphere of interests in civil society, especially economic interests, become part of the *private rights* of the individual and, as such, separable from the *public* domain. At the center of civil society stands the *free individual*, who possesses political rights and liberties based on private pursuit of economic gain. Marx rejects Hegel’s notion that the state mediates private interest by upholding the universal interest of society. Instead, Marx takes the position that the state actively legitimates self-interest in the defense of capitalist social relations. Thus, for Marx, civil society is the ensemble of socioeconomic relations, and the state is a manifestation of these relations and their conflicts. Marx believed that civil society contributed to the erosion of genuine community by fragmenting society into economic, political, and social realms. In his view, civil society constitutes individuals as competitors who seek to maximize their private interests at the expense of the others.

Later Marxian theorists adapted and expanded Marx’s conception of civil society. In Antonio Gramsci’s formulation, civil society merges with the coercive nature of the state and the economic realm of production. Civil society does not just contain individuals but also private organizations, such as corporations. From this perspective, civil society and the state overlap with each other to such a degree that it is difficult to tell them apart. Following Marx, Gramsci argued that equating civil society with reciprocity, cooperation, empathy, public trust, and the like is an ideological mystification. It promotes unequal social relations by legitimating capitalist exploitation of the working class in the name of individual pursuit of private interest. Later,

Louis Althusser developed the concept of the *ideological state apparatus* to refer to the interconnectedness of the state and civil society. In this formulation, civic organizations, such as religious groups, voluntary associations, and political parties, play an important role in gaining consent for the social order without the use of state coercion.

NEOCONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL VIEWS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The relationship of civil society to the state and nonstate spheres (e.g., the economy, law, culture, and so on) continues to animate contemporary theoretical and empirically based research. One perspective embraces a minimal conceptualization of civil society and stresses a theoretical and analytical separation of the civil society from the state. This version, as summed up in Misztal's (2001) phrase "civil society as the antithesis of the state," views civil society as existing independently of the state or with nonstate institutions and practices. This minimal definition of civil society underlies both liberal and conservative critiques of the welfare state in the United States. During the 1980s, neoconservatives launched vigorous attacks on the welfare state for stymieing individual initiative and creating a culture of dependency that eroded the moral and market foundations of civil society. Two central themes are predominant in conservative critiques of the welfare state. First, neoconservatives identify civil society with capitalist markets and accuse state policy of undermining the social values that contribute to a vibrant market economy. In this theme, conservatives argue that capitalist democracies are increasingly unable to satisfy rising demands for more social services while simultaneously sustaining market policies for the maximization of capitalist profit. A second theme argues that a *spiritual* or *intellectual* crisis of legitimacy is threatening capitalist democracies. This crisis manifests itself in a decline in the sense of duty to government, the relativization of moral values, and the erosion of the collective consciousness. The welfare state is indicted for sanctioning a culture of permissiveness that leads to a decline in the ability of traditional institutions such as the family and religion to regulate individuals. In both themes, conservative thought conflates civil society either with *laissez-faire* markets or with sacred cultural values.

A similar conflation has marked influential left critiques of the welfare state. One theme stresses the social control aspects or punitive features of the welfare state, especially their role in regulating the lives of the citizens. Another theme emphasizes the capitalist features of the welfare state, especially their role in reproducing exploitative capitalist relations. In both themes, the state stands over and in opposition to civil society, which is equated with the public sphere, the realm of freedom, solidarity, and plurality. Influenced by Foucault, left critiques argue that the increasing

rationalization of civil society by the bureaucratic state erodes the rich democratic life engendered by voluntary associations and destroys public culture. Jürgen Habermas's (1989) claim that commodification and state rationalization corrupt the public sphere leads him to identify civil society with a network of associations that express civil liberties and universal values. In other similar works, the idea of the civil society as the antithesis of the state is linked to the proliferation of new social movements (NSMs) that seek to reconstitute civil society outside the oppressive power of state regulation and bureaucratic control. Claus Offe's work on postwelfare state economies in Germany and Alan Touraine's discussions of NSMs in France represent recent attempts to revive the public sphere, increase organizational democracy, and expand opportunities for individual expression. These and other theorists criticize left critiques of the welfare state for analytically conflating state and economy with civil society and for underestimating expressive and normative elements of the public sphere.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The rise of NSMs in the West, the collapse of communist regimes, and the wave of democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin America have created the circumstances for scholars to investigate whether the state can actually protect and stimulate the growth of a vibrant public sphere. Some scholars stress the role of state policies and legal guarantees as a condition for democratization. In this conception, the state provides the legal framework and system of public regulations that supply the civil sphere with facilities such as trust, cooperation, reciprocity, and rationalization, among others. This concern has helped researchers of postcommunist societies realize the importance of a strong democratic state for restricting particularism and protecting freedoms. On one hand, the transition from communist rule involves the withdrawal of the state from social life. On the other hand, the establishment of a stable democracy demands that the state play an active role in the creation and protection of political rights and liberties. Civil society is a relatively autonomous domain where different groups advance their beliefs and values in an effort to create new associations and modes of social solidarity. Thus, scholars argue that the development of postcommunist civil society requires a proactive and efficient state that is able to mediate conflicts, foster consensus, and legitimate democratic rule.

The notion of the state as an enabler of civil society is also central to empirical research on voluntary associations in the United States. Ever since Alexis de Tocqueville's famous observations about the strength of civil associations in early nineteenth-century America, voluntary association has been linked to notions of freedom and democracy, and a distinction has been drawn between civil society and the state. In more recent times, under the influence of Jürgen

Habermas and others, the rise of the voluntary association has been linked to the emergence of a liberal bourgeois *public sphere*. Both models imply strong civil societies in which the state plays a small role in social life. Yet other scholars question this notion and argue that the state can actually promote and strengthen civic organizations. The state influences the organizational dynamics of voluntary and nonprofit groups by providing funding and subsidies. The state also secures the conditions for the realization of citizens' rights and individual freedom within voluntary associations through its system of contracts and property rights. This focus reflects a movement away from notions of a single and unitary public sphere. Instead, contemporary theorists argue that civil society consists of multiple and often conflictual public spheres and communities. These different public spheres overlap with each other and with many diverse associations that exist both inside and outside of official institutions. In this view, civil society is a multiplicity of public spheres, communities, and associations that interpenetrate with one another within a larger *national sphere* of civil society (Alexander 1998).

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPHERES

In addition to the rise of NSMs and democratic revolutions in Europe, the renewed interest in civil society is also due to increased sociological interest in the shifting boundary between private and public spheres. Many studies are critical of the conventional public-private dualism and conceptualize civil society as "a realm of social life that contains elements of both public and private without fully being equated with either one" (Wolfe 1997:196). Feminists in particular have shown that the distinction between the private and the public "has been part of a discourse of domination that legitimizes women's oppression and exploitation in the private realm" (Benhabib 1992:93). Meanings of private and public rest on gender-biased notions, with women's activities and practices seen as part of the private domain that exists outside the realm of the public sphere dominated by men's activities. More historical and theoretical studies have shown that the meaning of *public* has changed over time. Several feminist scholars have argued that the public usually means "state related," "accessible to everyone," "of concern to everyone," and "pertaining to a common good or shared interest." *Private* usually means private property, private ownership, or to "intimate domestic or personal life" (Fraser 1992:128). Not all groups have equal choice to define what is private and public. Meanings of private and public and distinctions between them shift over time and reflect conflicts and struggles between different gender groups.

Stress on the crucial role of civility, sociability, and plurality in democratic societies reflects a long-standing interest in the linkages between voluntary associations and civic

engagement. Reflecting Tocqueville, the early Chicago school sociologists viewed voluntary associations as critical to social integration and regulation in an otherwise fragmented and chaotic urban world. The work of Amitai Etzioni and others in sociology's communitarian tradition focus on the interrelationships between economic and noneconomic institutions. Building on this communitarian tradition, Robert Putnam's (1994) research on Italian regional government examines how some institutions can create *horizontal ties* across diverse groups that promote trust and civic embeddedness. These linkages become a form of *social capital* that enhances community competitiveness and local quality of life. Membership in horizontally ordered groups, such as sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual aid societies, cultural associations, and voluntary unions, among others, is an indicator of a high degree of social capital. More specifically, Putnam's work suggests that different community institutional structures can create various levels of civic engagement across locales that enhance local socioeconomic well-being. This theory of civil society holds that local institutions can build economically prosperous communities by increasing civic engagement. In doing so, local institutions may generate diverse forms of capital accumulation as well as provide a safeguard against downturns in the national and global economy.

Empirical analyses of the actual dynamics of civil societies are moving beyond the public-private dualism and eschewing a single-minded focus on the institutions, procedures, and phenomenon of civil society (reciprocity, cooperation, trust, altruism, and empathy). One recent topic of research examines the actual discourses, symbols, and motifs that develop within a variety of public spheres. As reflected in Jacobs's (1996) case study of the Rodney King beating at the hands of police, events in civil society do not have a unitary causal meaning; they are cultural constructions that connect to different communities of discourse. People socially construct an event as a crisis in the context of several different problems that intersect within a variety of public spheres. Some public spheres constructed the Rodney King crisis as a problem of police brutality, of factionalism, and divisiveness. Other public spheres constructed it as a problem of white supremacy, African American subordination, and the need for black empowerment. The different constructions of these social problems depended on the actual event (i.e., the Rodney King beating), the narration of the event by different social actors, and the ability of these actors to draw on codes and narratives that particular communities found persuasive. In short, the same event can be narrated in a number of different ways and within a number of different public spheres and communities. Competing narratives influence not only how individuals will understand an event but also how they will interpret different communities. Events such as the Dreyfus Affair, Watergate, and the Rodney King beating become

important because they are framed in different ways by different public spheres, using narratives of civil society and nation. Understanding the linkages between civil society and constructions of crises not only helps us to recognize that there are multiple public spheres but also highlights how the analysis of symbolic codes and narratives can help explain the dynamics of social problems.

Currently, scholars are expanding beyond a focus on states and economies to include a sociology of relationships among different public spheres, community associations, and patterns of political culture. These linkages are historically contingent and constrained by different legal infrastructures and varying community capacities for political participation (Hall 1995). Lack of attention to the interconnectedness of class, race, and gender is a lacuna of civil society theory. Yet race, gender, and class and their interlocking dimensions are central to the conditions of modern democracy and citizenship. Clear conceptualization, operationalization, and theoretical grounding are important in illuminating the heuristic value and empirical usefulness of civil society. Such a focus helps bridge the gap between normative and empirical theorizing about civil society. How different groups and social movements use the term civil society strategically, to frame social conditions, articulate grievances, and generate collective action is a burgeoning area of research.

— Kevin Fox Gotham

See also Citizenship; State

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CIVILITY

The term *civility* defines a state of cultural refinement associated with good citizenship. Sharing a root with the Latin word for city (*civitas*), it refers to the sophisticated behavior of an urbanite of the times, in contrast with rural coarseness or barbarism. Rules of civility govern areas of personal conduct and behavior in public, including table manners, bodily carriage, dress, conversation, courtship, and personal hygiene. The modern usage of the word can be traced to Erasmus, whose treatise *De civitate morum puerilium (On Civility in Boys)* (1530) described the need to instruct youth to control their behavior and appearance. The term was soon embraced across Europe, and Erasmus's treatise was used as a primer for young men.

Codes of civility are boundary-maintaining discourses that establish and reproduce hierarchical social relationships both within and between cultures. Etiquette and manners are requirements for entry into elite social and political circles. Although it is somewhat paradoxically rooted in self-presentation and performance, civility is understood as an indicator of good breeding. As an adage reminds us, a gentleman is known not by his circumstances, but by his behavior in them. Codes of civility can also be used chauvinistically as evidence of the superiority of one culture to another. Some nineteenth-century Western intellectuals used the rhetoric of civility to legitimate the colonization of Africa, Asia, and South America.

European and American elites have long conceived of their rules of social behavior as transcendent standards, yet the majority of these rules evolved over the past several hundred years. The decentralized and rigidly hierarchical societies of feudal Europe had relatively few constraints on biological processes, emotional expression, and indulgence of appetite, compared with modern standards. Only during the modern period did high levels of social anxiety and low thresholds of embarrassment begin to exert pressure on individuals to control their behavior in public situations. Before the sixteenth century, the passing of gas in public could politely be covered with a cough, but this was taboo by the seventeenth century. Since the time of Erasmus, there has been a steady increase in the pressure to hide bodily functions, to endow public behavior with dignity, and

to conform to established standards of decency, beginning among elites but gradually diffusing to every stratum of society. The compulsion to conform to such standards can reach a fevered pitch of unreason, as in the case of the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe, who died after his bladder burst at a banquet because he felt it would be impolite to leave the table during the meal.

Social theorists have tried to explain how rules for refinement flow from, and contribute to, the political and social context in which they are embedded. They use interpretive methods to suggest how specific rules reflect and reinforce class, gender, ethnic, and other social hierarchies by equating status with performance. Recognizing the reification of such rules by the people who use them, the critical project associated with the term seeks to reveal the historical development of civility and its relation to emerging social contexts. The result is a unique perspective on self-discipline that emphasizes the ways in which social relationships and codified rules of etiquette produce behavior that conforms to established standards.

ETIQUETTE

Modern individuals regularly find themselves in new or uncomfortable social situations with a shallow grasp of the social expectations put upon them. The pressure to conform to the increased expectations of others, uncertainty about one's own social position, and a poor moment-to-moment grasp of social expectations generate the potential for mistakes, embarrassment, and shame. Codes of civility recognize and address this potential for embarrassment by delineating appropriate conduct for social situations, ranging from business meetings to courtship rituals. The formalization of such codes can potentially provide individuals with an inoculation against social embarrassment and a formula for achieving social distinction through particularly astute displays.

The guidance of etiquette books has turned unspoken prescriptions for everyday behavior into codified standards of behavior for a range of social situations. In etiquette books, the codification of standards promises to relieve the anxiety of uncertainty and to navigate potentially embarrassing situations by making the rules of myriad situations explicit. Armed with such advice, individuals may enter social situations confident that they will not say the wrong thing, wear the wrong clothes, or use the wrong fork—information that is vital for modern individuals who find themselves in unfamiliar social situations on a regular basis. (Emily Post noted that no piece of etiquette is less important than which fork we use.)

The original etiquette books were written for Renaissance courtiers. Baldassare Castiglione's *The Book of the Courtier* (1528), Giovanni della Casa's *Il Galateo* (1558), and Stefano Guazzo's *The Civile Conversation*

(1570) all provided instructions to nobility on how to navigate the intricacies of life in the court. The formula was soon applied to national traditions, including the instructions of Lord Chesterfield on how to be an English gentleman, and to other social positions, including servants, children, and women.

As the structure of society changed through the centuries, in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, authors of etiquette books began to address their advice to the uninitiated who sought entry into the social and political elite. By the turn of the twentieth century, the formality of upper-class etiquette was in full retreat as members of the growing middle class, women, and minorities bridled at traditional restrictions on public behavior. While etiquette books remain popular guides to the vagaries of public behavior, manners and etiquette are today marked by a trend toward informality that has relaxed the barriers of inclusion and allowed for a greater tolerance of cultural differences and personal idiosyncrasy.

Methodologically, etiquette books are our best tool for appraising the standards of behavior in historical situations. They supply insight into the values and ethics of the society in which they were written.

THE CIVILIZING PROCESS

In *The Civilizing Process* (originally published in 1939) Norbert Elias outlines a method that may be used to study civility as a developmental process. He treats prescriptive texts on civility as indicators of evolving sets of social relations, substituting a processual account of civilization for a static conception of civility. Elias's magnum opus investigates standards governing the biological aspects of behavior that developed between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century across Europe. His method was to juxtapose the advice offered in the etiquette books circulated over the centuries in order to chart long-running trends in the development of codes of civility. His research revealed that in the Middle Ages, biological functions were spoken of frankly and that rules governing conduct were relatively straightforward. As the feudal age gave way to modern times, however, rules of behavior became more elaborate, and thresholds of embarrassment were lowered.

Elias connected the development of rules of bodily management to the sweeping political and economic changes that Europe underwent as the feudal order gradually gave way to the complexity, diversity, and changeability of the modern social order. Lengthening chains of interdependence—relationships among people across social positions—forced people to rely on others to an unprecedented degree, and ensuring that behavior was consistent and inoffensive became essential to maintaining social order. At the same time, the monopolization of physical violence within the central authority of absolutist states meant that individuals

were required to engage in their social relationships peacefully and legally. It also meant that such rules began to diffuse from social elites throughout the social hierarchy, particularly to the middle classes. Although the analysis echoes functionalism's concerns for social integration and the maintenance of social order, Elias also brings to it the critical sensibility of the Frankfurt school, by attending to the roles that social power and status inequalities play in governing lengthening chains of interdependence.

These macrostructural changes made it incumbent upon individuals to regulate their own behavior in an increasingly stable manner. The consequence is a recognizably Freudian personality structure: Individuals internalize social prohibitions and develop a keen sensitivity to embarrassment and shame. Bodily functions, with their animal connotations, become subject to rigorous control and purity taboos. Moreover, violent emotional outbursts are suppressed by a veneer of civility. In short, social control is maintained not through external forces, but through self-control.

The theory of the civilizing process is notable for its historical breadth and for its synthetic ambitions. Elias places the civilizing process at the top of an agenda for understanding the effects of modern social relations on the personality. The theory has been criticized for neglecting a countertrend toward informality in social relationships and for underplaying the persistence of barbarism in modern social relations (notably the Holocaust). Nevertheless, Elias's interpretive scheme has improved our understanding of why the constraints of civility have evolved and how these constraints function in highly interdependent societies.

DEMOCRATIC CIVILITY

The term civility has also been used in a political context to suggest the relation between power sharing and rules of appropriate behavior. In this context, the term implies a form of cooperation, trust, and tolerance for difference that is necessary for the smooth operation of a political system in a society with multiple social classes, religious affiliations, and national identities. Civility, then, may also be considered as the cultural underpinnings of civil society. While such principles congealed as a set of ideals in Europe of the early modern period, there has been a revived interest in this political brand of civility as a model for balancing interests in a multicultural society. Alexis de Tocqueville sought to show that the egalitarian spirit of American democracy resulted in a very different set of manners than in the aristocratic societies of Europe. Practically speaking, equality means that people from all walks of life can socialize with each other, and as a result their manner tends to be open and socially at ease. The sociologist Edward Shils conceived of civility as fulfilling an essential function for civil society because it allowed for

productive political communication among individuals and groups.

In the political realm, civility has echoes of an elitist politics in which only a few have the grace to participate politically. Conservatives trace the historical decline of political civility to the violence of the French Revolution, when the masses stepped onto the political stage for the first time to replace the aristocracy as the primary force in shaping the policies of the state. This line of argument suggests that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were witness to unprecedented levels of politically motivated violence because political players became adept at using force rather than manners to achieve their aims, and civility gave way to barbarism.

Yet mass political participation does not inexorably lead to political violence. The American case makes clear, however, that political civility works differently in democracies than it did in the autocratic states of early modern Europe. American civility is shaped by the fact that the United States has no aristocracy and that most Americans come from low origins, like their colonial ancestors, who fled religious persecution, had criminal backgrounds, or worked as indentured servants. Throughout the nineteenth century, the code of civility was molded to fit the emerging reality of the American democratic polity. This meant that newly minted members of the middle and upper classes struggled to adopt the manners of the European upper class. However, Americans relaxed those standards. In a multicultural world, civility has meant the cultivation of an attitude of restraint and tolerance. The normative expectation is that such an attitude can bridge cultural and political differences by insisting that ethical rules guide discourse among citizens.

As a normative ideal, the concept of civility lends itself to the debates over civil society and multiculturalism. Here, the discourse of civility offers a modicum of hope that an ethical and political culture equal to the challenges of a multicultural polity is close at hand. The ethical implication of civility is that good manners and self-control can make for better societies.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The concept of civility has theoretical implications for the study of general areas of inquiry, including theories of social change, theories of culture, theories of the self, and theories of modernity. For theories of social change, a focus on civility provides a linkage between changes in social structure and changes in individual behavior. The concept suggests that the structure of social positions has a definite influence on the constraints that individuals place on their behavior. For theories of culture, the concept of civility specifies substance to theories of boundary maintenance and status competition. And for theories of the self, civility is a key term for understanding the relation between ethical

discourse and self-control. The rhetoric of civility suggests a developmentalist approach to understanding the modern social order, one in which the personality is incrementally molded as the forces of the state and market gain prominence over social life.

— Todd Stillman

See also Citizenship; Civil Society

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CIVILIZING PROCESSES

The term *civilizing process* is associated with the work of Norbert Elias (1897–1990) and the research tradition of *figurational sociology*, which he established. In his early magnum opus, *The Civilizing Process* (2000; first published in German in 1939), he studied and sought to explain just one strand of one civilizing process—changing standards of behavior and emotional habitus among the secular upper classes in Western Europe since the late Middle Ages—but he came to consider that he had discovered a more general principle. There are many civilizing processes, in many cultures, over many timescales, and among many social groups, and the theory has been greatly extended both by Elias in his later works and by others inspired by his work.

Many social scientists feel uncomfortable with the use of *civilization* as a technical term. The connotations of collective self-approbation, especially by Europeans and Americans, that have become attached to the word *civilization* certainly complicate the use of the concept of civilizing process as a tool of relatively detached analysis. Elias confronts this problem in part I of *The Civilizing Process*, in which he discusses the origins of the concepts of *civilisation* in France and *Kultur* in Germany. He makes it clear from the beginning that his is not a theory of “progress,” let alone of inevitable progress or of Western triumphalism. Elias was not putting his own moral evaluations of good and bad on the ideas of “civilization” and “civilized behavior,” but showing the social historical context in which all sorts of positive evaluations had accreted around particular

facets of behavior and of cultural expression (and negative evaluations around others). As a “commonsense” (or, in anthropologists’ jargon, *emic*) rather than a scientific (*etic*) concept, the term *civilization* had come to serve a specific social function, expressing “everything in which Western society of the last two or three centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or ‘more primitive’ contemporary ones” (Elias 2000:5). By the nineteenth century, the ways in which people in the West used the *word* *civilization* showed that they had forgotten the long *process* of civilization through which their ancestors’ behavior and feelings had changed and been socially molded from generation to generation. They had come to think of the traits they considered “civilization” as innate in themselves and their fellow Westerners, and, indeed, as inherent in what they unabashedly then termed the “white race.” Elias was, after all, writing in the 1930s as a German Jew who had witnessed firsthand the Nazi seizure of power in his homeland.

In the next and more famous part of the book, Elias sought to document and explain the changes in people’s actual behavior and feelings to which these evaluative connotations became attached. What came to be defined as “superior” and what as “inferior” was, and is, often quite arbitrary. For example, in seventeenth-century French, there were two ways of speaking of a friend, “*un de mes amis*” and “*un mien ami*,” which meant exactly the same thing, but that did not prevent the one from being defined as “the way people speak at court” and the other as “smelling of the bourgeois.” Social competition for “respectability” and the avoidance of shame is indeed a principal driving force in why such distinctions assume importance. Elias’s central concern was with changes in *habitus*, which he defined as “second nature”; it refers to that level of habits of thinking, feeling, and behaving that are, in fact, learned from early childhood onward but become so deeply ingrained that they feel “innate,” as if we had never had to learn them.

For changes in manners in Europe since the Middle Ages, Elias’s principal sources are the numerous “manners books” of Germany, France, England, and Italy, which from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century set out the standards of behavior socially acceptable among the secular upper classes. The earlier ones dealt with very basic questions of “outward bodily propriety,” which it would later become embarrassing even to mention. They told their readers how to handle food and conduct themselves at table; how, when, and when not to fart, burp, or spit; how to blow their noses; how to behave when urinating or defecating or encountering someone else in the act of doing so; how to behave when sharing a bed with other people at an inn, and so on. In earlier centuries, such matters were spoken of openly and frankly, without shame. The impulses and inclinations were less restrained, the commands direct: Don’t slurp; don’t put gnawed bones back in the common pot; don’t blow your

nose on the tablecloth; don't urinate on the staircase. Then, at the time of the Renaissance, change becomes perceptible: The social compulsion to check one's behavior increased. Erasmus showed all the old medieval unconcern in referring directly to matters later too disgusting to mention, and yet at the same time his recommendations were enriched and nuanced by considerations of what people *might* think. He tells boys to sit still and not constantly shift about because that gives the *impression* of always farting or trying to fart. Gradually, thresholds of shame and embarrassment advanced: A long-term trend became evident toward more elaborate codes of behavior, toward more demanding standards of habitual self-control, and toward silence in later centuries on some of the topics that earlier books had discussed at length. Elias in effect provided a historicized version of Erving Goffman's ideas about "the presentation of self in everyday life," but *avant la lettre*.

The advance of the threshold of shame and embarrassment (or of repugnance) involves a tilting of the balance between external constraints (*Fremdzwänge*, literally, constraints by strangers, or more generally by other people) and self-restraints (*Selbstzwänge*) toward the latter having greater weight in the steering of conduct. This changing balance is central to Elias's conception of a civilizing process. There is no zero point, no "state of nature" in which there are no social constraints whatsoever on how people handle eating, drinking, urinating, defecating, spitting, blowing one's nose, sleeping, having sex—things that human beings cannot biologically avoid doing, no matter what society, culture, or age they live in. All societies have always had some conventions about how they should be handled. On the other hand, there *is* a zero point in the individual lifetime: Human infants are born without such habitual constraints and have to learn whatever are the standards prevailing in their time, place, social stratum, national, or ethnic group. Since the *lifetime* point of departure is always the same, if changes take place from generation to generation in the social conventions that children have to learn, changes are especially clear in relation to these universal matters of outward bodily propriety.

Yet Elias's underlying preoccupation, both in *The Civilizing Process* and in his later work, was with "man's inhumanity to man." Aggressiveness, violence, and cruelty are another area of habitus in which he sought to demonstrate a similar long-term process of social molding: not their elimination altogether, but their modeling or molding. This leads in the third part of *The Civilizing Process* to a prolonged discussion of state formation processes in Western Europe, taking his departure from Max Weber's ([1922] 1978:54) definition of the state as an organization that successfully upholds a claim to binding rule making over a territory, by virtue of commanding a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. According to Elias, the taming of aggressiveness is linked to a broad change in the

structure of society. Medieval society had lacked any central power over large territories to compel people to restrain their impulses toward violence, but, he contended, when people in a given territory are effectively forced to live in peace with each other, especially through steady and consistent pressure, then their habitus will very gradually be changed, too (Elias 2000:169). In much more detail than Weber, Elias then proceeds to show the long-term processes through which increasingly effective monopolies of violence and taxation have taken shape. The state formation process was Janus-faced. On one hand, larger territories became internally pacified. On the other hand, the scale of warfare *between states* steadily increased through European history.

If Elias pays most attention to state formation, he sees it as only one important thread interweaving with others in a long-term overall process of social development that enmeshed individuals in increasingly complex webs of interdependence. It interweaves with the division of labor, the growth of towns and trade, the use of money, and increasing population, in a spiral process. Internal pacification of territory facilitates trade, which facilitates the growth of towns and division of labor and generates taxes, which support larger administrative and military organizations, which in turn facilitate the internal pacification of larger territories, and so on: a cumulative process experienced as an increasingly compelling, inescapable force by people caught up in it. Furthermore, according to Elias, the gradually higher standards of self-restraint engendered in people contribute, in turn, to the upward spiral, being necessary, for example, to the formation of gradually more effective and calculable administration.

Elias thus linked questions of violence and state formation through the level of security and calculability in everyday life to the formation of habitus. He argued that as chains of interdependence become longer and webs denser, a gradual shift takes place in the balance between external constraints and self-constraints in the habitual steering of people's behavior. Spreading webs of interdependence tend to be associated with relatively more equal power ratios and *functional democratization*, meaning more and more reciprocal controls between more and more social groups. Less abstractly, more people find themselves having to pay more attention, more often, to more other people. The social web formed by increasing numbers of people tends to be experienced as exerting a compelling impersonal pressure, and to fulfill their needs and achieve their goals with such a web, individual people have to become "attuned" habitually to exercise greater foresight. Conversely, the more unequal the power ratio between groups of people, the narrower are likely to be feelings of mutual identification.

Elias's theory has been extensively debated among historians and social scientists (Mennell 1998:227–50). Social

anthropologists in particular, in view of their own discipline's earlier involvement in ruling colonial empires, tend now to be sensitive to any idea of long-term trends in the formation of human habitus. Hans-Peter Duerr has filled four volumes (1988–1997; cf. Goudsblom and Mennell 1997) attempting to demonstrate that no developmental or comparative pattern whatsoever can be found in what societies find repugnant or shameful. More seriously, the very idea of a long-term European civilizing process has been called in question by the Holocaust, as Zygmunt Bauman (1989) in particular has argued. Like many other sociologists, Elias pondered the Holocaust (in which his own mother died) long and hard, and the results of his thinking are found in his book *The Germans*. Careful reading of *The Civilizing Process* shows, however, that even before the Second World War, Elias was well aware that civilized controls, although they take a great deal of time to construct, may break down quite suddenly. In a note (which certainly deserved to be in the main text), he observed that if the level of everyday insecurity were reverted to its earlier levels, “the armor of civilized conduct would crumble rapidly, and corresponding fears would soon burst the limits set to them today” (Elias 2000:531).

There has also been much discussion of the “permissive society”: The apparent reversal in the course of the twentieth century of the trend toward ever-stricter self-constraint in manners and the expression of emotion has been much discussed. It is now widely accepted, however, that Cas Wouters is correct in arguing that these “informalizing processes” represent a “highly controlled decontrolling of emotional controls” (see Elias and Dunning 1986:63–90; Wouters 1986).

Readers should also be aware of the connection between Elias's theory of civilizing processes and his theory of the long-term growth of knowledge and the sciences, an introduction to which can be found in Elias (1987).

— Stephen Mennell

See also Bauman, Zygmunt; Civility; Culture and Civilization; Elias, Norbert; Evolutionary Theory; Figurational Sociology; Habitus; Historical and Comparative Theory; Individualism

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COGNITIVE SOCIOLOGY

Cognitive sociology investigates the ways in which sociocultural factors shape and guide the process of human thought. While cognitive science studies the neurological mechanics of thinking, cognitive sociology analyzes the ways in which such mechanics are variably executed within different sociocultural contexts. In this way, cognitive sociology backgrounds issues of cognitive universals (i.e., the elements of neural processing that all humans hold in common). Rather, the field systematically maps the differences and distinctions that define the thinking of those in various groups, communities, and locations.

In an attempt to familiarize readers with this approach to thought, this discussion highlights cognitive sociology's intellectual roots, its major areas of inquiry, and accompanying research findings.

ROOTS OF THE FIELD

What is thought . . . and how does one come to study and understand it? For centuries, great thinkers, including Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, grappled with this issue. In so doing, philosophy established what for centuries proved the reigning image of thought, one that stressed the private, the contemplative, and the solitary nature of human cognition. But in the twentieth century, “personalized” models of thought began to lose their appeal, and cognitive science usurped philosophy's dominance of the area. With the advent of the cognitive science paradigm, concerns with “the mind” gave way to the study of “the brain.” “Thought” and “reflection” were reconceptualized as “information processing.” “Individualistic” elements of thinking became secondary to “universal” cognitive mechanisms. In essence, cognitive science presented the human mind as a mechanical device, one unique to a

species. To be sure, cognitive science made many impressive discoveries regarding the act of thinking. But by positioning itself in opposition to philosophy—by demanding a drastic shift from the personal to the universal—many of the field’s discoveries raised additional questions. Those are the questions that the field of cognitive sociology attempts to address.

Cognitive sociology draws from a long sociological tradition, including works by Émile Durkheim, Karl Mannheim, Charles Horton Cooley, George Herbert Mead, Alfred Schütz, and more recently, Peter Berger, Aaron Cicourel, Harold Garfinkel, and Erving Goffman. The field builds on these theorists’ views of social perception, knowledge construction, symbolic communication, and shared systems of beliefs. Using these ideas, cognitive sociologists approach thought as an intersubjective phenomenon, a process that must be studied in light of interaction norms and in concert with the sociocultural environments in which thinking occurs. In this way, cognitive sociologists problematize both philosophers’ personalized models and cognitive scientists’ universal models of thought. For according to cognitive sociologists, thought cannot be approached as merely a subjective or personal phenomenon. Doing so ignores the fact that concepts, symbols, ideas, and memories are often shared and sustained by entire communities. Similarly, thought cannot be analyzed as solely a universal or species-wide phenomenon, for cultural differences and distinction in concepts, symbols, ideas, and memories indicate the absence of a purely natural or essential cognitive base. Put another way, the cognitive sociologist argues that neural processes may be universal, but neural products are not. No concept or idea is universally held. Similarly, while individuals may bring idiosyncratic elements to their thoughts, the building blocks of those thoughts are shared in ways that form culturally based cognitive traditions or thought communities.

AREAS OF INQUIRY AND RESEARCH FINDINGS

The process of thought typically occurs in four stages: the sensation and attention to stimuli, the discrimination and classification of such input, the representation and integration of information, and the storage and retrieval of data. These stages provide a useful organizational frame for this discussion. Using them, we can consider the ways in which sociocultural conditions temper and amend each phase of the cognitive experience.

Sensation and Attention

Sensation and attention are inextricably tied to the internal workings of the brain. Yet considering these processes solely in terms of the brain’s normal capacities or “standard operating procedures” provides only part of the story. For

example, we know that normal brains can sometimes encounter strong sensory signals and yet fail to detect them; they can be primed to certain signals and yet fail to apprehend them. Normal brains can bracket the environment in ways that defy neurological expectation. The brain may focus attention on the seemingly obscure while ignoring the obvious; it may foreground the familiar while backgrounding the novel. In the absence of neural abnormality, why do such “errors” occur? And what explains the fact that such errors are often systematically concentrated in certain social settings and cultural contexts?

Cognitive sociologists contend that processes such as sensation and attention may be as much socioculturally scripted as they are innately inscribed. Social structure and cultural circumstance can systematically pattern the people, places, objects, and events that enter social actors’ awareness. Sensation and attention are strongly influenced by the perceptual filters that permeate different settings and contexts. These filters serve to institutionalize specific “ways of seeing,” directing social actors to some stimuli rather than others.

Sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel has written much on this subject. Zerubavel’s work suggests that perceptual filters are created and supported in a number of ways. First, they may be linked to well-entrenched cultural practices, patterns of behavior that encourage attention to certain people, places, objects, and events while simultaneously obscuring others. For example, a culture may value competition over cooperation, thus encouraging its members to foreground “winners” and background mere “players.” Similarly, perceptual filters may be linked to cultural beliefs that dominate a social context. Thus, a cultural belief that promotes fear of “strangers” may sensitize members to the actions of those who “don’t belong” and desensitize them to the actions (often nonnormative actions) of those who “fit it.” Zerubavel as well as sociologist Karen Cerulo have demonstrated that perceptual filters may be linked to the symbols that operate in various cultural contexts. Symbols can synchronize the attentions of social members, creating a cognitive bond or mobilizing groups to action or “re”-action. Consider, for example, the merging of minds enabled by the American flag following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Finally, some sociologists contend that perceptual filters may be linked to the power hierarchies or organizational structures that order contexts of action. Those who control such contexts, as well as the routinized practices that pattern interactions within them, may define social relevance and irrelevance for social actors, thus directing that which individuals perceive and that which they ignore. Aaron Cicourel’s work on both the juvenile justice system and medical decision making has been pivotal in this regard, and so have Paul DiMaggio, Carol Heimer, and Diane Vaughan’s work on organizational decision making.

In studying the processes of sensation and attention, some cognitive sociologists have also considered the concept of inattention. Zerubavel, in particular, explores social and cultural patterns of denial, indifference, and neglect. He examines the sociocultural strategies that allow actors to exclude or release entities from focused interaction. Like attention, Zerubavel treats inattention as an intersubjective phenomenon. When groups or cultures “turn a blind eye” to certain persons or events or when members of an organization simultaneously “look the other way” in the face of a particular transgression, they are engaging in codenial or group dismissal and, together, allowing certain aspects of social reality to fade from view.

Discrimination and Classification

Cognitive science documents the neural mechanisms by which normal brains recognize similarity and difference. The field identifies the intricate operations involved in making concrete comparisons. In contrast, cognitive sociology considers the “outside-in” of discrimination and classification. Researchers attend to the sociocultural elements that provide the fodder for comparative evaluations, the elements that facilitate the shared understanding of classes and categories. In this way, cognitive sociologists track the institutionalization of categorical boundaries. They probe the ways in which such categories inform behavioral guidelines, evaluative norms, and social organization.

Three distinct trajectories characterize research in this arena. First, many cognitive sociologists study institutionalized *methods* of discrimination and classification. Barry Schwartz or Eviatar Zerubavel’s work on classification, Karen Cerulo’s research on quality evaluation, and Wendy Espeland’s work on commensuration best represent this focus. These sociologists approach thinking and meaning making as an evaluative endeavor, one that requires actors to locate new data relative to other elements of a broader information system. In studying such evaluations, researchers can identify culturally shared “matrices of meaning,” documenting the various ways in which the elements of a matrix come to constitute a category or class and specifying the ways in which various categories or classes come to constitute a broader system.

Karen Cerulo points out that studying methods of discrimination and classification requires specific attention to strategies such as analogical thinking (*X is like Y*), asymmetrical thinking (*X overshadows Y*), metaphoric thinking (*X is Y*), and oppositional thinking (*X is not Y*). Cognitive sociologists argue that these strategies are not merely products of neural design. They represent institutionalized social practices that systematically vary in accord with the structure of the contexts and situations in which they are invoked. Thus, works devoted to the study of analogical, asymmetrical, metaphoric, and oppositional thinking

document situations in which sameness, difference, relative value, and dominance are jointly negotiated by agents in specific social spaces.

In a related line of research, scholars such as Michele Lamont, Judith Howard, and Wendy Espeland have situated the strategies of discrimination and classification in issues of power. Such scholars consider both the symbolic and political nature of differentiation and boundary construction. While they acknowledge that objects, events, and identities are relationally perceived and defined, they emphasize that such definitions are contingent on the power relations among a society’s subgroups and sectors. Approaching discrimination and classification in this way allows cognitive sociologists to problematize the a priori status of certain social groups (e.g., racial, ethnic, or gender groups). The approach allows cognitive sociologists to explicate the boundary work necessary for reifying and reinforcing social categories and to explain the ways in which social categories, once created, can shape the lives of social actors.

Finally, sociological studies of discrimination and classification seek links between classification systems and the sustenance of social organization. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell’s work on organizations and Lynne Zucker’s work on institutionalization represent prime examples of this agenda. Such research has been greatly influenced by Pierre Bourdieu’s analytic concept, *habitus*. *Habitus* is a system of dispositions, a set of generative rules. These rules are not “hardwired” in social actors. Rather, they are socio-culturally based, acquired, and internalized through experience. *Habitus* varies from place to place and from time to time. Thus, social actors from specific social locations share similar habituses, while those in different locations hold contrasting habituses. In this way, *habitus* demarcates sociocultural subsystems: pockets of actors who experience regularities in thoughts, feelings, and aspirations, and actors who when faced with certain ends adopt similar strategies of action and sustain certain organizational structures. In this way, *habitus* serves to re-create local realities; it maintains the structural configurations from which it emerges, even if those configurations fail to benefit those who embrace them.

Representation and Integration

Sensing and attending, discriminating and classifying, these processes are beholden to two important elements of the human brain: the brain’s warehouse of representational constructs (e.g., concepts, frames, formats, and schemata) and its capacity to integrate incoming information with these established constructs. Cognitive scientists tell us that without reference to these “prototype banks,” humans would be unable to sustain attention to certain elements, to make meaning of the distinctions they draw, or to bring

together otherwise disparate elements of experience and reflection.

Knowing the centrality of representation and integration, cognitive scientists have extensively studied the nature of representational constructs. Researchers have identified internal structures of the brain; they have plotted their configuration and explored the ways in which these structures interface both with one another and with incoming data. The importance of these tasks cannot be denied. But a full understanding of cognition demands that, as with other elements of thought, we situate the operation and integration of representational constructs within a sociocultural context. Toward that end, cognitive sociologists begin by problematizing both the stability of representational constructs as well as their “natural” or “essential” constitutions. They explore the reasons why certain constructs, while perhaps universally “hardwired” into human brains, are activated and applied in some settings and not others. And they examine the ways in which mental constructs interface with the external world, thus steering, shaping, and limiting social actors’ attention, discrimination, and subsequently, their attitudes and action. Erving Goffman’s work on “frame analysis” is central to this inquiry. His book proposes a systematic account of the ways in which social actors use representational constructs of expectations to bracket reality and delineate various realms of experience.

This literature is broad and spans a number of substantive areas. Thus, it is not easily summarized. Here, only the work of some of the field’s major contributors are highlighted. Consider those who problematize the stability of constructs and challenge their universal application. Scholars of deviance and social control, for example, Peter Conrad, Allan Horwitz, and Stephen Pfohl, explore the ways in which cultural and historical change can reconfigure both medical and legal constructs of deviance. They study as well the ways in which changing constructs impact strategies of social control. In another arena, scholars addressing new communication technologies, including Karen Cerulo, James Katz, Joshua Meyrowitz, Ronald Rice, and Janet Ruane, document the ways in which technological change can transform the constructs by which we define social groups, communities, and social actors. These scholars argue that new technologies have activated constructs that define connectedness in non-material terms, and consider the meaning of action in non-concrete settings. In yet another area, scholars of time such as Eviatar Zerubavel note that the experience and meaning of seemingly natural temporal constructs, such as hours, days, or weeks, vary across cultures and throughout history. While many argue that time is tied to cycles of nature and biology, Zerubavel’s work effectively challenges this essentialist position, noting the conditions under which various representations of time fall in and out of favor.

Research on representational constructs demonstrates that it is not simply construct content or details (what we

think) that changes with context and period, but the structure or configuration of these constructs as well (the formatting or ordering of content). Aaron Cicourel’s work on language has been central in this regard. Cicourel’s research in both the legal and medical fields shows that aspects of a socio-cultural context (e.g., power relations, economic exchange, etc.) can structure linguistic expression, with different structures variably affecting social actors’ processes of decision making. Cognitive sociologists such as Albert Bergesen and Karen Cerulo have found similar patterns in exploring the structure of aural and visual representational constructs. Their work documents the ways in which changing social conditions (e.g., centered versus noncentered social relations, levels of social disruption, economic position, cultural diversity) influence communicators’ choices of one structure over another, with some contexts encouraging the adoption of basic structures and others encouraging embellishing structures. They note as well the impact that various structures can have on those who see or hear them, with basic designs often generating social solidarity and embellished designs favoring pluralistic relations. In recent years, the study of construct structure has become central to media studies. Works by David Altheide, Karen Cerulo, and William Gamson, among others, illustrate the variety of ways in which media narrators structure the representation of discourse on racial conflict, economic exploitation, violence, and so on. This research demonstrates that format choices can be critical to our understanding of media effects because the spatial and temporal structuring narrative content can systematically alter readers’ and viewers’ interpretations of action.

Storage and Retrieval

For cognitive scientists, the study of both long-term and short-term memory revolves around schemata (elaborate types of representational constructs). Cognitive scientists are interested in identifying the schematic operations that enable memory storage, and discovering the schematic processes by which memories are retrieved. While this agenda is undeniably important, cognitive sociologists contend that these issues require further elaboration. In particular, many suggest a need to reexamine the “neural” nature of memory.

Cognitive scientists argue that memories are acquired via the detailing and definition of schemata; memories are recalled via the activation of completed schemata. But cognitive sociologists note that the detailing and defining of schemata are not simply a matter of neural execution; these processes can be greatly influenced by the sociocultural contexts in which they occur. With regard to detailing, for example, some settings retard detailing; others accelerate and embellish the process; still others affect the character of detailing, making some schemata more rigid and inflexible

in their application than others. Similarly, sociocultural contexts can greatly influence the activation of completed schemata. Social actors clearly invoke specific schemata and withhold others at different historical moments or within divergent social situations. Similarly, certain events take precedence over others in the building of a particular individual's or group's historical narrative. Knowing this, one must acknowledge that sociocultural factors, as much as neural mechanics, influence or pattern the ways in which social actors commit contemporary events to memory. Such factors also affect the ways in which actors reconstruct and commemorate the past.

Maurice Halbwachs was among the first to establish memory as an extraneural phenomenon. He presented memory as a social process jointly executed by members of a group or collective. Halbwachs was concerned with memories that collectivities share as well as the information that is collectively dismissed. Furthermore, he suggested that the substance of collective memories could be systematically mapped with reference to the social and cultural characteristics of the sites in which memories are produced (e.g., power hierarchies, belief systems, division of labor, etc.). Halbwachs's work suggested what Eviatar Zerubavel subsequently identified as "remembrance environments": sites of mnemonic socialization that, in turn, form the basis of mnemonic communities. In studying these mnemonic communities, researchers such as Barry Schwartz, Gary Alan Fine, Jeff Olick, and Barbie Zelizer learn why certain events take precedence over others in the building of a particular group's historical narrative. They also discover the ways in which memories are constantly "made over" in accord with the changing needs of social groups.

Scholars of memory emphasize specific "tools" of memory construction, such as symbols, rituals, and narratives. They study the ways in which such tools develop and the ways in which they can mark a shared history. Furthermore, they examine the way in which these tools enter established cultural fields and stimulate a "conversation" with reigning historical narratives and images. In this regard, these researchers are especially interested in the "politics of memory construction," noting the ways in which the leaders of a collective can deliberately manipulate and exploit historical symbols and narratives for specific political purposes.

Beyond the tools of memory construction, many cognitive sociologists attempt to dissect "processes" of commemoration. Works by sociologists such as Schwartz and Fine, as well as Elihu Katz, Lyn Spillman, and Michael Schudson, for example, highlight the mnemonic practices that social actors use either to sustain or contest reigning histories. In pondering such practices, cognitive sociologists explore the sociocultural "limits" on memory reconstruction. Important works demonstrate that factors such as the structure of available historical schemata, the strength and popularity of reigning narratives, and cohorts' empirical

experiences can limit the ways in which a collective retrieves memories or the success with which it uses existing memories to support a developing discourse.

— Karen A. Cerulo

See also Collective Memory; Frame Analysis; Habitus; Social Constructionism; Symbolic Interaction

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COLEMAN, JAMES

James S. Coleman (1926–1995) is widely considered to be one of the most outstanding sociologists of the second half of the twentieth century. He was born in 1926, in Bedford, Indiana, graduated as a bachelor of science from Purdue University in 1949, had a brief stint as a chemical engineer, and then studied sociology at Columbia University in New York from 1951 to 1955, mainly with Robert Merton, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Martin Lipset. During his lifetime, he published 28 books and more than 300 articles. The publications that had the highest impact were on the sociology of community and education (schools), on policy research, and on mathematical and rational choice sociology. After getting his PhD in sociology in 1955 (Columbia), he spent three years as assistant professor in Chicago, then stayed as associate professor for 14 years at the Department of Social Relations of Johns Hopkins University, and worked as professor of sociology from 1973 to his death in 1995 at Chicago University.

The basic interest that drove Coleman's studies remained virtually unchanged during his career as a sociologist. He

approached social systems as an engineer, trying to understand them by knowing how they can be (*re*)constructed. He went about this interest in three very different ways, and in each of them, he had considerable influence on other scholars. First, social systems are made up of individuals. Even though individuals are likely to have a common human nature, they differ according to how they are “formed” in society, and for a sociologist, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms that form them. Coleman’s answer to this was that in our society, they are mostly formed by the communities and the schools in which they grow up. Thus, community and schools and their interrelation were Coleman’s major subject of empirical research from the beginning to the very end of his career. In his later work on these topics, he developed the concept of “social capital” (especially norms carried by social networks in communities and schools) as an important tool for social analysis. The major books by Coleman on the topic of community and schools are the following: *The Adolescent Society* (1961), *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (the so-called *Coleman Report*, 1966), *Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of Communities* (with Hoffer, 1987).

Second, individual actions and interactions combine to form social systems. How does it work? What mechanisms can we discern? To answer these questions, he developed mathematical models, for example, on diffusion processes, and later worked out rational choice models that allowed him to trace the processes that combine interactions into authority systems, systems of trust, collective behavior, and collective actors (often somewhat misleadingly called “the micro-to-macro link”). The most important book on these topics is his *Foundations of Social Theory* (1990), for which his *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (1964) and *Individual Interests and Collective Action* (1986) were important stepping-stones.

Third, if we know how social systems work, can we improve them by institutional design? Here, the questions that concerned him most were what the pressing social problems are, what we can do to mitigate them, and how research on these two questions (what he called “policy research”) can avoid being co-opted by political interests. With regard to the last point, he argued that the more explicit one can make the mechanisms by which social systems function, the less likely powerful political players will be able either to buy the results they want or bend results to legitimize their plans. In this sense, he clearly saw good fundamental research as the most important basis for policy research, a point of view slowly gaining ground in the social sciences generally. The most important books by Coleman on these questions are *Power and the Structure of Society* (1974), *The Asymmetric Society* (1982), and again, his *Foundations of Social Theory* (1990). In the remainder of this discussion, the three major areas of Coleman’s work will be discussed in more detail. The most cogent criticism

of Coleman’s work will be briefly discussed in the last paragraph. For a more complete description of all points, see Lindenberg (2000).

COMMUNITY AND SCHOOLS

In the field of education and community research, Coleman’s work went through three distinct phases. First, there is his work on peer influence (linking school and community research); second, there is his vast research on the equality of educational opportunity; and third, there is his research on private schools and social capital. His major work on peer influence is his book *The Adolescent Society* (1961), in which he investigated 39 classes in 10 high schools from communities of different sizes. Even as early as 1961, the interest in schools combined his major concerns of system functioning and policy research. Schools, according to Coleman, play a vital role in industrial societies because they dampen or erase the effect of accidents of birth. They create equality of opportunity by teaching knowledge and cognitive skills that are important for society. But how well do they succeed in getting children and adolescents to make full use of this opportunity? He saw a paradox here. Parents and teachers see this opportunity, but pupils’ value systems and the social rewards associated with them often focus on nonscholastic achievements (such as athletics for boys and social success for girls). How is it possible that the value systems of pupils do not reflect the societal importance of scholastic pursuits? In what may be considered one of his best books, Coleman based his answer to this question on a sophisticated empirical analysis of the determinants of status in schools and the conditions under which they operate. He focused specifically on the influence of the community and of the interscholastic athletic competition on the schools’ status system and found that highly mobile communities (with strong status competition) and interscholastic athletic competition create especially strong peer influence and nonscholastic status criteria in schools.

A few years later, Coleman was asked to conduct a large-scale study (with 600,000 students in more than 3,000 elementary and secondary schools) on the equality of educational opportunity (EEO 1966). The focus this time was not to study the functioning of the school or class as a system, but to find facts relevant for social policy: How much do schools overcome the inequalities with which children come to school? Is it true that school inputs, such as teacher quality, class size, equipment, and expenditure per pupil, can overcome the influence of family background on school achievement (verbal and math scores) of the pupils?

Three findings stirred the nation for quite some time after the study came out. First, Coleman found only negligible effects of school inputs on student achievement. Second, family background of the students (especially regarding race) plays (statistically speaking) the most important role

for student achievement. Third, there is an *asymmetric context effect* on student achievement: Weaker students do better amidst better students, but better students are not pulled down by the presence of weaker students. The findings were a big blow to the publicly intended role of the school as the big equalizer of inequalities in opportunity. The asymmetric context effect showed that where the school still can have some effect, it is often obliterated by homogeneity of classes in terms of achievement. The findings remained subject to controversy, and even Coleman himself was later on dissatisfied, mainly by the fact that in this study, he did not investigate schools as social systems. For example, by focusing only on estimating the relative size of factors, he missed out on the possible effects of parents selecting schools and thereby inflating the seeming effect of family background on school achievement. In his third phase of studying schools, he therefore focused more on “mechanisms” rather than factors or “determinants.”

In his third phase of community and school research, Coleman focused on the difference between public and private schools (Coleman and Hoffer 1987). Here, he paid close attention to what he failed to look at in his EEO study: the impact of the fact that many parents select schools for their children (especially when they send them to private schools). If they do, they bring common norms and values (“social capital”) to bear on teachers and students alike, which is important for the scholastic success of their children. Yet the strength of the social capital can vary considerably. Parents may just share common norms and values (in what Coleman called a “value community”), or they also interact with one another and do so in such a way that their common norms and values are reinforced in interaction and directly related to the functioning of children. Coleman called the latter “functional communities.” In a large empirical study, Coleman found, indeed, that functional communities (especially around Catholic schools) created the highest parent involvement in schools and the highest verbal and math achievement. Also, as Coleman had expected, students from disadvantaged families did much better in Catholic schools than in other schools. Value communities did comparatively well with regard to verbal achievement, and public schools (with little or no social capital) showed the poorest results in parental involvement and verbal and math achievement. Because the theory on school and communities was developed together with the empirical study rather than in advance, it is still not quite clear whether or not it is corroborated. However, many scholars have adopted the concept of social capital in their own studies (sometimes referring to network relations rather than values and norms).

POLICY RESEARCH

With regard to policy research, Coleman’s contribution consisted mainly of the theory-guided search for important

policy problems and, on the basis of this analysis, an elaboration of the tasks and preconditions of policy research. The mechanisms that generate problems are explained in his book *The Asymmetric Society* (1982), and both the problems for and the tasks and preconditions of policy research are elaborated in his *Foundations of Social Theory* (1990). The most important policy problems for which sociology can do something, Coleman argued, emerge from the rise of the modern corporation, which is an organization that because of its composition (made up of positions, not people) and legal status can act as an autonomous actor. It can own assets; it can have rights, responsibilities, and liabilities; it can enter into contracts; it can appear before court, be a plaintiff or a defendant; and it can have legally recognized interests. In the twentieth century, this kind of actor grew so much in number (in the U.S., more than 500 percent) and is so powerful vis-à-vis the individual actor that society has become strongly asymmetric. This asymmetry generates important policy problems.

First of all, the “primordial” social structures of family, neighborhood, and church vanish and with it the social resources, norms, and values (in short, the social capital) that are important for human functioning. Second, because corporate actors are so powerful, they strongly affect the fate of natural persons. However, corporate actors are responsible only for certain aspects of persons, say, the safety of the product they sell to a client or the safety of the workplace for the employee. But they are not responsible for a person as a whole and thus not concerned with the question of whether various partial responsibilities add up. Because, compared with corporate actors, families and communities (in which persons matter as “full” persons) have declined in influence, there is a growing vacuum of responsibility for persons as persons. Even worse, corporate actors often can afford not to pay much attention to negative effects of their actions on natural persons (for example, in polluting or relocating offices and plants). When their interests collide, natural persons often do not have the resources to take on corporate actors. Third, corporate actors have a powerful influence on the mass media and on the content of advertising. They can thereby influence the agenda of public attention and what is and what is not legitimate. For example, in market societies, large corporations emphasize the legitimacy and importance of spending money on oneself and of self-indulgence in general, which clashes with familial and community norms of caring for others and repressing self-indulgence. What can be done about these problems? Coleman sees the growth of the state as a response to these problems, with the irony that the individual is increasingly dependent on a supercorporate actor.

Sociology’s task in policy research consists mainly of two things. First of all, because of their power, corporate actors can afford to pay for research in their own favor. It is

therefore sociology's task to lower the asymmetry by providing important information (at least also) to the weak actors and by specifying mechanisms (by which corporate actors affect their environment) to the point where "scientific evidence" cannot be arbitrarily used to back the powerful interests, even if these interests paid for the investigation. In this sense, fundamental research on macro-micro mechanisms is essential for counteracting the corporations' potentially biased and self-serving use of research. Second, sociology must think of institutional substitutes for the eroding of "old" social capital (generated via family, neighborhood, church, etc.), and it must think of social and legal arrangements to make corporations more responsible for establishing and maintaining such substitutes. In the light of these views, it is fair to say that for Coleman, institutional design, based on mechanism revealing research, is the main task of sociology.

RATIONAL CHOICE AND MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY

Coleman's drive to find out how social systems work and how they can be (re)constructed had brought him early on to use mathematics and simulation games (not game theory). However, his emerging view on policy research convinced him that this is not enough for a social science that reveals mechanisms and allows institutional design. He realized that the specification of mechanisms of system functioning requires theory on how the parts of the systems work and how they work together to form the system (see Coleman 1986). The most important parts of any social system are the actors. Looking for a powerful theory of action, Coleman singled out microeconomic theory because it had a number of great advantages. It was simple; it allowed rigorous reasoning; and because of its emphasis on rational choice, it allowed the analysis of interaction in terms of the actors' interests and their power. The workings of interests and power seemed particularly important for dealing with the way corporate actors are constructed and how they act, whereas both aspects also seemed of great importance to the interaction of natural persons (in terms of exchange and collective action).

Using microeconomic theory, Coleman began in the 1980s to work out a theory of exchange and collective action (many articles on which he published in 1986, under the title *Individual Interests and Collective Action*). His magnum opus on the subject came out in 1990, titled *The Foundations of Social Theory*. In this important book, he shows how rational choice theory can be used to build sociological theories of systems step by step, beginning with elementary actions and relations. The basic notion is an elaboration of classical exchange theory: Actors have interests, and they control some resources and events, but they lack something because they are not fully in control of

those resources and events that can further their interests. Some of the resources and events they need to control are partially or wholly under the control of others. To improve their situation, actors thus have to exchange control over resources and/or control over events; that is, they can improve their situation by exchanging control over things that are of little interest to them for control over things that are of great interest to them. Building on this theory, Coleman arrived at structures of action (with a focus on authority, systems of trust, collective behavior, and norms). For example, in his analysis, authority consists of granting the right to control a certain class of one's actions to somebody else provided one has the right to control his or her own actions. Authority thus is an exchange in which the right to control one's actions is traded against some service (such as protection) or monetary compensation (say, in an organization). The elaboration of authority, systems of trust, collective behavior, and norms, in turn, furnish the tools for explaining "corporate action" and important features of "modern society" as they relate to policy research (here, Coleman linked up to arguments previously made in *The Asymmetric Society*). In the last third of the book, Coleman showed how the previous arguments can be made even more precise by using mathematics (inspired by equilibrium analysis in economics).

SUMMARY EVALUATION

On the most general level, the strongest points of Coleman's work are his contributions to sociology as a mechanism revealing social science. On the specific terrain of community and school research, his major contributions are his analyses of how community and schools interact to increase or decrease the accidents of birth (via social systems of peers and school performance). On the terrain of policy research, he made a considerable contribution to our understanding of what generates important policy problems and why fundamental research (i.e., mechanism revealing) is needed to solve these problems. Here, attention to the growth of corporate actors and to the role of social capital belong to his lasting contributions. With regard to rational choice and mathematical sociology, Coleman's work has contributed much to the elaboration of the "micro-macro link" (i.e., showing how more complex social phenomena emerge on the basis of simpler social processes and phenomena).

There are also some limitations of Coleman's work worth mentioning again. First of all, he developed important theories and conducted important empirical research, but this research was mostly used to generate fitting explanations rather than to test theories formulated in advance. There is thus still much in his work that awaits empirical study. Second, even though he believed that the central task of sociology is to come up with institutional design for

solving or mitigating pressing social problems, his concrete suggestions for institutional design are few, and often below the quality of the rest of his work. This is probably due to the fact that the kinds of problems he found most pressing (finding good substitutes for the loss of community) cannot be well described, let alone mitigated or solved by the particular kind of rational choice theory he used (borrowed from microeconomics). This theory assumes that the individual is “naturally” rational (farsighted, with veridical expectations and ordered preferences), so that socialization, norms, and institutions affect only the individual’s preferences and constraints (i.e., resources and control), not the individual’s rationality itself. Throughout his work, he stuck to the view that we should *start* with the assumption of microeconomics that man is wholly free, entirely self-interested, and rationally calculating to further his own self-interests (Coleman 1990:14 and passim). This theory made it difficult, if not impossible, for Coleman to really deal with the problem that was closest to his heart: How to find substitutes for the dwindling social capital of “primordial” social structures, such as the family, the neighborhood, and the church. Particularly, his analysis does not deal with human needs, with the role of social cognition, and how rationality itself is influenced by social conditions. Thus, while Coleman helped advance sociology’s ability to deal with the micro-to-macro link and, along with it, the role of exchange in terms of resources (i.e., scarcity), interests, and control, his particular version of rational choice sociology may turn out to be more of a stepping-stone than a foundation for further developments.

— Siegwart Lindenberg

See also Institutional Theory; Rational Choice; Social Capital; Social Rationality

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COLLECTIVE CONSCIENCE

Collective conscience is a concept developed by Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). Durkheim sees the collective conscience as a key nonmaterial social fact. All social facts, material and nonmaterial, are best understood as external to and coercive of individual, psychological facts. While material social facts have a real, material existence (e.g., a bureaucracy or law), nonmaterial social facts exist within the realm of ideas, the most important of which are often referred to by contemporary sociologists as “norms” and “values” (see Alexander 1988). All nonmaterial social facts, including the collective conscience, are difficult to study because they are intangible and exist within the realm of ideas.

The collective conscience is “the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society” (Durkheim [1893] 1964). As a nonmaterial social fact, the collective conscience is external to and coercive over individuals. However, the collective conscience can be “realized” only through individual consciousness. Hence, the collective conscience of a given society occurs as an external force throughout the entire societal system regardless of race, class, geographic location, economic standing, and so on, but is made manifest only through its realization in the consciousness of the individual.

In his later works, Durkheim progressively replaced the broad concept of the collective conscience with his far more specific idea of collective representations. Collective representations are not found throughout the entirety of a given society, but are instead realized through more specific components of the society, such as religious institutions, the state, and minority groups. They are, in effect, more detailed and specific collective representations.

Durkheim used the collective conscience to develop his arguments on the change of society from mechanical to organic solidarity (arguing that the collective conscience was declining in strength with the decline of the former and the rise of the latter) as an independent variable in his classic study of suicide (for example, a weakened collective conscience is associated with an increased rate of anomic suicide) and in an effort to explain the source of religion in society (for example, the collective conscience manifests

itself in the totems of primitive societies). In all of these cases, however, the source of the collective conscience itself is the same: society. The collective conscience is created or radically changed during times of collective effervescence, those outstanding historical moments when a given collective achieves a heightened level of exaltation.

When the collective conscience of a society is weakened (as Durkheim argued was occurring with the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity), the collective moral constraints on individuals are also weakened, and their passions are allowed to run more freely as a result of the lower level of external restraint. This leaves individuals without a clear sense of what is appropriate and what is inappropriate behavior and threatens them with a sense of anomie. Anomie is thus seen as a social pathology resulting from a decline in the collective conscience and is “curable” only by strengthening the collective conscience or finding other ways of strengthening the common social morality as well as society more generally.

— Michael Ryan

See also Anomie; Durkheim, Émile

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collective frameworks, individuals recall events in light of the standards of those groups in which they are embedded.

As scholars came increasingly to recognize that society was *socially constructed*, this model of memory provided a means by which the interpretations of the “facts” of the past could be theorized—not as representing “truth,” but reflecting the nexus of interests and resources. The social context of remembering determines how individuals and groups conceptualize the past, part of what has come to be labeled *cognitive sociology*.

While impetus for the analysis of collective memory can be attributed to Halbwachs, American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1918) similarly explored the social determinants of judgments of fame in *Social Process*. Among early American studies, W. Lloyd Warner’s (1959) masterful analysis of commemorative rituals in Newburyport, Massachusetts, *The Living and the Dead*, with his focus on the way memories serve the ends of community building, was particularly influential. Although, as Olick and Robbins (1998:107) point out, there is some discussion of social memory in Durkheim, Marx, and Simmel, these passages are few and not linked to the social process of memory.

In the past quarter century, the development of theories of collective memory have quickened, both in the United States and Europe. Special notice needs to be given to the magisterial seven-volume work edited by Pierre Nora, *Les lieux de memoire*, abridged in a three-volume English edition (1996–1998), *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*. Following from Halbwachs, Nora and his colleagues examine the places, events, and symbols of French society. This monumental work is a brave attempt to capture what it means to think of oneself as French. Nationality becomes a form of personal essence.

Such a model is linked to discussions of tradition in the context of citizenship. Benedict Anderson (1991) speaks of nations as constituting “imagined communities.” By this, he refers to a notion, similar to Nora’s, that national identity is grounded in imagination and memory. Often in practice, this linkage of self with nation is grounded in the mundane conditions of civic engagement, a process that Billig (1995) refers to as “banal nationalism,” noting that such images of nationhood are repeated and routinely *flagged* in the media and come to represent the nation to citizens. However, such images are not inherent in the state; both the state and the images that come to constitute it must be constructed and sedimented in light of what appears to be an unchanging historical reality, a process Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) referred to as the “Invention of Tradition.” This creation of common bonds through symbols that can be deployed in the public sphere contributes to the project of nationalism, or in other terminology creates a “civic religion.” As historians have addressed this creation of a national identity or civic religion, the number of case studies of instances of

COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Although once considered a subspeciality within the domain of the sociology of knowledge, the examination of collective behavior or “social memory studies” has developed over the past two decades into a vibrant theoretical domain, linking sociological theory, historical sociology, social psychology, and the sociology of culture. The collective memory approach argues that history enters into social life through the means by which individuals, organizations, and states interpret, recall, and commemorate the past.

The legitimating theoretical text in this field is Maurice Halbwachs’s 1925 work, *The Social Frameworks of Memory*, finally translated into English in 1992. Halbwachs, an influential French follower of Émile Durkheim and Henri Bergson, and colleague of *Annales* historians Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, argued that memory was organized in light of “collective frameworks.” Through

this process have multiplied, notably with regard to American, French, and Israeli society.

While recognizing that memory is socially constructed, scholars differ on their emphasis on whether history is “real.” This debate, serious and intense as it is, should not be pushed too far (Fine 2001). Most accept that the “facts” of history require interpretation, and few would argue that the “facts” of history are determined only by the needs of the present. The obdurate reality of the past and the interpretations of the present create collective memory. However, within this broad consensus, some emphasize the way that knowable past events structure present collective memory, while others place greater weight on the way that the past is reconstructed for present needs, leading to David Lowenthal’s (1985) claim that “the past is a foreign country.”

Once one accepts that the past is to be used by the present, the question is: How? Schwartz (2000) suggests that the past can be treated as a mirror or a lamp, or as a model of society or a model for society. The metaphors suggest that collective memories can represent ways that we believe our present society is or ways that our present society should be—a depiction of the present or the future.

Finally, collective memory can be interpreted on the individual or the collective level: as social psychology or as collective representation. Olick (1999) distinguishes between two classes: what he terms “collected memories” and “collective memory.” The former refers to the collection of memories of the individual; the latter to images of society itself, separate from what individuals believe. Schuman and Scott (1989) argue, following Karl Mannheim, that memory is linked to generational imprinting, what individuals have experienced in their early adulthood. Yet this is not the only possible model of memory. Just as Marx spoke of class consciousness as separate from the belief of any worker, so one might see collective memories as separate from the belief of any citizen. Memories belong to collectivities and not to minds. Collective memories, from this point of view, are a fundamentally sociological construction, rather than belonging to social psychology.

Collective memory, a largely unknown concept a quarter century ago, has emerged as an important nexus between history and sociology, between past and present, and between the citizen and the state.

— Gary Alan Fine

See also *Annales* School; Cognitive Sociology; Collective Conscience; Identity; Nationalism

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COLLÈGE DE SOCIOLOGIE AND ACÉPHALE

Between 1936 and 1939, Georges Bataille (1897–1962), Pierre Klossowski (1905–2001), and Georges Ambrosino edited and published the journal *Acéphale*. On its cover was André Masson’s drawing of a headless man, with a skull covering his genitals. The journal was notable for its recuperation of the work of Nietzsche from its fascist appropriations and for its attempt to explore the radical forms of social order that Nietzsche’s work might herald. In its second issue, in his “Propositions,” Bataille argued that the death of God opened the possibility of the “formation of a new structure, of an ‘order’ developing and raging across entire earth”; this could not be monocephalic, no matter how formally democratic such a political system might be, for “the only society full of life and force, the only free society,” was “the *bi-* or *poly-cephalic* society that gives the fundamental antagonisms of life a constant explosive outlet, but one limited to the richest forms”; after all, “the very principle of the head is the reduction to unity, the *reduction* of the world to God” (Stoekl 1985:198–99).

This concern with “life,” “force,” and “rich social forms” also informed the “Declaration Relating to the Foundation

of a Collège de Sociologie,” in the July 1937 issue of *Acéphale*. This was in the form of a note composed and signed by Ambrosino, Bataille, Klossowski, Roger Caillois (1913–1978), Pierre Libra, and Jules Monnerot, and it included the following dramatic sentences:

1. As soon as particular importance is attributed to the study of social structures, one sees that the few results obtained in this realm by science not only are generally unknown but, moreover, directly contradict current ideas on these subjects. These results appear at first extremely promising and open unexpected viewpoints but for the study of human behavior. But they remain timid and incomplete. . . . It even seems that there are obstacles of a particular nature opposed to the development of an understanding of the vital elements of society: The necessary contagious and activist character of the representations that this work brings to light seems responsible for this.

2. It follows that there is good reason for those who contemplate following investigations as far as possible in this direction, to develop a moral community, different in part from that ordinarily uniting scholars, and bound, precisely, to the virulent character of the realm studied and of the laws that little by little are revealed to govern it.

3. The precise object of the contemplated activity can take the name of Sacred Sociology, implying the study of all manifestations of social existence where the active presence of the sacred is clear. (Hollier 1988:5)

In the event, Caillois, Bataille, and the latter’s old friend Michel Leiris (1901–1990) came to be responsible for the actual organisation of the Collège de Sociologie, which met in Paris between October 1937 and June 1939. Their three signatures appeared on “The Declaration of the Collège de Sociologie on the International Crisis,” in 1938.

COLLÈGIANS

The Collège de Sociologie was not formally affiliated to any academic institution, but the reputations, connections, and networks—political, artistic, and academic—of its initiators and the extraordinary promise of the “note” in *Acéphale* helped bring to its sessions many who were already active in European intellectual life. Lectures were given by Bataille, Caillois, and Leiris and also by Klossowski (who sustained a close relationship with the Collège and whose significance within it is somewhat underestimated), Georges Duthuit, René M. Guastalla, Alexander Kojève, Anatole Lewitzky, Hans Mayer, Jean Paulhan, Denis de Rougemont, and Jean Wahl. Other participants included Ambrosino, Monnerot, Patrick Waldberg

(secretary to the Collège), Jacques Lacan, Georges Dumézil, Jean-Paul Sartre, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Paul-Louis Landsberg, Henri Dubief, Julien Benda, Drieu La Rochelle, Jacques Chavy, Pierre Prévost, Pierre Mabile, and Bertrand d’Astorg. This was an extraordinary collection of philosophers, social theorists, historians, and literary figures, including many Surrealists.

While Caillois, Leiris, and Bataille were all involved with the Surrealist movement and with various left-wing groupuscule, important resources for their work, they also had an intimate relationship with the professional academic world. In 1933, Roger Caillois began his studies at the École Pratique, under Marcel Mauss and Dumézil. In 1936, Caillois finished his degree dissertation (*Les démons de midi*), which also appeared in the *Revue de l’Histoire des Religions*. After the publication of his first work, *Le mythe et l’homme* (1938), Mauss invited him to continue attending lectures and giving reports in the seminars on mythological topics. His *L’homme et le sacré* was published in 1939. From 1931 to 1933, Leiris had been involved in ethnological research in Dakar-Djibouti. In 1933, he started to attend the seminars and lectures of Mauss at the Institut d’Ethnologie, and the following year he published *L’Afrique fantôme*. In June 1936, Leiris received his degree in the history of religion, with a specialization in “religions primitives”; in November 1937, he received his Certificat d’Ethnologie; and for the study “La Langue Secrète des Dogons de Sanga,” in 1938, he received the diploma at the École Pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE), Section des Sciences Religieuses. Bataille had studied together with Alfred Métraux at the École des Chartres. He specialized in the areas of historiography, literary history, and art of the Middle Ages. In addition, he was a trained librarian and archivist. Bataille was responsible for the safekeeping of the medal collection of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. He too attended the lectures of Mauss.

A RADICAL DURKHEIMIANISM

In his “Introduction” to the “Collège de Sociologie” issue of the *Nouvelle Revue Française* (1938, July), Caillois, speaking at least in part for Bataille and Leiris, made it clear that the major focus of the activities of the Collège was to be the study of “the problems of power, of the sacred, and of myths”; this required forms of inquiry that would embrace “a person’s total activity” and would entail working in common with others, “seriously, selflessly, and with critical severity” (Hollier 1988:11). To understand manifestations of the sacred and to explain their attenuation or, indeed, their absence, there was a need to attend to historical and comparative anthropological materials and theories. In practice, this meant drawing on the work on the sacred as developed in the works of Émile

Durkheim, Robert Hertz, Henri Hubert, and Marcel Mauss, and also aspects of the work of Nietzsche, Hegel, and Marx.

Durkheim's focus on how collective assemblies and related collected effervescences can transform collectivities and individuals and the relation between the "sacred" and the "profane" was taken up by the members of the Collège but given a distinctly radical interpretation—sometimes rigorous, sometimes tendentious, sometimes inaccurate, but always imaginative. For example, in his 1937 presentation "Sacred Sociology and the Relationships between 'Society,' 'Organism,' and 'Being,'" Bataille agreed with and developed Durkheim's notion that society was an emergent *sui generis* reality: "Society, . . . combining organisms, at the highest level, makes them into something other than their sum" and that while these human "linear" organisms naively represent themselves to themselves as indivisible unities, they are transformed by their subjection to the "communifying movements" of society, which is a "compound being." Such movements create a feeling of being a "society," but this may be precarious, since "a single society can form several crowds at the same moment," but nevertheless, "there is a particular structure to which institutions, rites, and common representations contribute, which provides the deep support for collective identity" (Hollier 1988:74–84). An indication of the compound nature of societies is that while most contemporary societies are aggregates of other simpler societies, their reorganisation can successfully create a new society on a higher structural scale.

Durkheim argued that society is marked by a profound polarity between the "sacred" and "profane": The distinction was between phenomena or categorisations that are homogeneous internally but heterogeneous each to the other. In his 1933 essays on "The Psychological Structure of Fascism" and "The Notion of Expenditure" (Stoekl 1985:137–60, 116–29), Bataille misread but also provided a critical reevaluation of Durkheim's distinction. For Bataille, the sacred is to the profane as the heterogeneous is to the homogenous. The profane/homogeneous is associated with deferred gratification, analysis and calculation, planning and utility, the production and controlled consumption necessary for the reproduction and conservation of productive human life, and individuals conforming to social roles experiencing themselves as separate self-sufficient subjects who possess and consume objects. The sacred/heterogeneous, on the other hand, is associated with extreme emotions; socially useless activity; unlimited expenditure; excremental and orgiastic collective impulses, such as sexual activity, defecation, urination, and ritual cannibalism; and tabooed objects and their transgression, such as "corpses, menstrual blood or pariahs" ("Attraction and Repulsion I," Hollier 1988: 103–112). The sacred evokes feelings of both attraction and repulsion and is linked with violence and its violent containment; with the cruelty of

sacrificing others; and with the subsumption of individuals within totalising group processes where they fearlessly confront death and are willing to sacrifice themselves or others ("Attraction and Repulsion II," Hollier 1988:113–24; "The Structure and Function of the Army," pp. 133–44; "Joy in the Face of Death," pp. 325–28). It is potentially dangerous and destabilising. While in contemporary societies, sacral processes have become more obscure and suppressed, less obviously religious, they are still present, as can be seen in the way that men are attracted to sacrificial ceremonies and festivals ("The College of Sociology," Hollier 1988:333–41).

Thus, Caillois (1939) argued in "Festival" (Hollier 1988:281–303), that the sacred is a key element both in ordinary life and in the festivals found in "primitive" societies (and to a much attenuated degree in contemporary societies); it had been of greater significance in such "primitive" festivals, but it was also in significant ways somewhat different. Under these circumstances, when ordinary life tends to be regular, busy, and safe, it is part of a "cosmos ruled by a universal order" in which "the only manifestations of the sacred are interdictions, against anything that could threaten cosmic regularity, or else, expiations, redress for anything that might have disturbed it." Then, for individual human beings and for social institutions—both of which get used up and accumulate "poisonous wastes" that are "left behind by every act performed for the good of the community"—regeneration and purification are possible but involve "some pollution of the one who assumes responsibility for this regeneration," for what is unclean often "contains an active principle that can bring prosperity." There is a need for social regeneration because "time is wearing and exhausting." This is made possible by the "popular frenzy" of the festival, which releases an active sacred energy, reversing the normal course of time and the forms of social order. It is associated with widespread excesses and sacrileges, "debauches of consumption, of the mouth or sex" and also "debauches of expression involving words or deeds." Thus, the festival provides "access to the Great Time" and through its holy venues "access to the Great Space"; it is "*Chaos rediscovered and shaped anew.*" It is "the paroxysm of society, which it simultaneously purifies and renews," and it may even change the established social order. For example, if the king, "whose normal role consists in maintaining order, moderation and rules," dies or weakens, then the "strength and efficacious power" of these "are lost" and this opens an "interregnum of a reverse efficacious power; that is the principle of disorder and excess that generates the ferment from which a new, revived order will be born. Caillois, commenting on how modern carnivals are but dying echoes of earlier festivals, gives as an example the joyful destruction of a cardboard representation of a "huge, comical, colorful, king" that no longer has any religious value because "the moment the human victim is replaced by an effigy, the ritual tends to

lose its value for expiation or fertility.” Historically, the sacred has been generated by taboo-violating rituals, and sacrifices have been key elements in festivals that both regenerate the sacred and corral it.

Bataille and Caillois provide a model that presumes a much lower level of integration than does the model found in the dominant discourse in Durkheim. Nevertheless, there the views, however dramatic they might seem, remain in accord with Durkheim’s belief that all forms of social phenomena that keep recurring within societies of a particular species, whether the phenomena superficially seem conformist or deviant, are socially produced and either themselves functional for society as a whole or a necessary concomitant of something that is functional. Thus, for Durkheim, Bataille, and Caillois, such activities are not asocial, but profoundly but differently social. They are sociogenic, renewing, and transforming cosmological social meanings and interpersonal and social relations.

Although, in his book *Miroir de la tauromachie* (1938), Leiris made specific reference to Mauss and Hertz, in his sole presentation at the Collège de Sociologie, “The Sacred in Everyday Life,” his emphasis was quite different; it was micro and personal. He was concerned with the “objects, places, or occasions” that awaken “that mixture of fear and attachment . . . that we take as the psychological sign of the sacred” (Hollier 1988:24). Much of his lecture was devoted to the symbolic meanings and associations of “objects, places or occasions” that he was familiar with in his own early years. This was, indeed, a form of writing in which he was to engage all of his life, from *Manhood* (1939) to the four volumes of *La règle du jeu* (1948–1976), but as a style of engagement, it seemed to have few resonances with the rest of what was happening at the Collège. In fact, Leiris soon distanced himself from the activities of the Collège de Sociologie, but he did so, in a sense, from another place, as a professional ethnologist.

In 1939, in a well-known letter to Bataille, Leiris suggested three major objections to the way the activities of the Collège had developed. It tended to work “from badly defined ideas, comparisons taken from societies of profoundly different natures,” its “moral community” was in danger of becoming a mere clique, and finally, by overemphasising the “sacred,” there was a tendency to subvert Mauss’s idea of a “total social fact” (Hollier 1988:355). Caillois, in his “Introduction” to the writings on Collège in the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, had made clear that the quality of the collective work should be such “that not only can the possible results be substantiated, but that this research will command respect from its outset” (Hollier 1988:11). Later, he too became uneasy about the extent to which this was being achieved, and eventually he also withdrew. Although Bataille, alone of the three, attended the last session, for two years the Collège provided a rich and creative locus for exciting intellectual work, and it can be seen

as an important moment in the individual biographies of Bataille, Caillois, Leiris, and Klossowski and also one of many places where they were involved in collaborative relationships.

THE OTHER ACÉPHALE

One of the peculiarities of the Collège de Sociologie is that despite its desire to operate in a way that was different from normal (social) scientific discourse, the format of its actual meetings (i.e., lectures followed by a discussion), seem to have been very traditional. It is true that one characteristic of the relationship between the texts and the main speakers was that much of the time, there was a significant attenuation of the proprietorial practices associated with the “voice” of specific authors. Bataille, for example, would read and re-present the thought of Caillois, demonstrating what Lévy dismissively describes as a Surrealist “collectivisation of thought” (Lévy 1995:210). Yet there seemed little evidence of specific practices appropriate to producing the sacred or dealing with its “virulence,” and thereby understanding it better. A more thorough investigation of the matter will reveal a more complex and nuanced situation.

First, though, it is worth a short diversion into German literary history. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Alfred Schuler, Ludwig Klages, Karl Wolfskehl, and the poet Stefan George were all key members of a semisecret society, “The Cosmic Circle.” They shared a commitment to a mystical history that valorized the pagan over the Christian, the male over the female, and homoerotic bonding over more conventional heterosexual relations, and a reverence for the Swastika symbol. In 1902, Stefan George had found a beautiful new “protégé” in the person of the 14-year-old Maximilian Kronenberger, and in the following year during Carnival, the two of them attended a “Dionysian” private pageant in honour of the Roman *Magna Mater*, a spirit who supposedly had presided over orgiastic and sacrificial rites, including the sacrifice of children. In 1904, “The Cosmic Circle” disintegrated as a result of internal conflicts, and a few months later, Maximilian was to die of meningitis. George’s response to this tragic and unexpected early death was to develop the cult of Maximin. While admiring Nietzsche, George criticised him because he had not been a loyal disciple of Richard Wagner and he had failed to recruit his own disciples—George believed himself to be a natural leader and self-consciously cultivated disciples. George was “inspired” to develop a cult that intimated that Maximilian had effectively been sacrificed and symbolically transfigured in order to make possible the divine figure of “Maximin,” and George, his priest, shared in his divinity. Subsequently, George became a more and more significant cultural figure, and there is little doubt that there was an elective affinity between his beliefs and those of the Nazi

Party, and there is good evidence that he was a strong Nazi sympathiser (Norton 2002).

Secret societies, talk of human sacrifices, and a celebration of Nietzsche and Dionysus were also to be found in Paris in the 1930s, but in a very different form. In 1936, Bataille had not only begun to publish the journal *Acéphale* but had also founded a secret society also called “Acéphale.” Although it remains shrouded in mystery, many of its members are now known, as are something of its activities (Bataille 1999; Caillois 1975). Among its members were many who participated in both the journal and Collège de Sociologie, including Bataille, Ambrosino, Klossowski, Waldberg, Dubief, Chavy, Leiris and Caillois, although both the latter denied that they were ever members of Acéphale. Others involved included René Chenon, Pierre Dugan (Pierre Andler), Imre Kelemen, Isabelle Farner, Michel Koch, Jean Atlan, Alain Girard, Jean Dautry, Collette Peignot, Jean Rollin, Henri Dussat, and Taro Okamoto.

Bataille himself, in a 1958 “Autobiographical Note,” wrote of forming,

A “secret society,” which, turning its back on politics, would pursue goals that would be solely religious (but anti-Christian, essentially Nietzschean). This society was formed. Its intentions are, in part, expressed in the journal, *Acéphale* . . . The Collège de Sociologie, founded in March 1936, represented, as it were, the outside activity of this “secret society.” . . . Of the secret society, properly so-called, it is difficult to talk, but certain of its members have apparently retained the impression of a “voyage out of the world.” Temporary, surely, obviously unendurable; in September 1939, all of its members withdrew. (Bataille 1986:109–10)

Acéphale’s goals, “*pour changer en nous en joie la torture qui existe dans le monde—en rire heureux le Crucifié—en volonté de puissance notre vieille et immense faiblesse*” (“to change the torture that exists in the world into joy within us—the Crucified into happy laughter—our old immense weakness into will to power”; cited in Galletti 1999:163), were clearly in some sense Nietzschean, and there is evidence that Bataille, like Nietzsche, had little interest in recruiting disciples. Acéphale seems to have been essentially “communifying” and egalitarian (although there were three levels of membership). There were some rules of conduct—for example, its members refused to shake hands with anti-Semites (Surya 2002:239)—and some rituals—some culinary and one involving a pilgrimage to a tree struck by lightning in the forest of Saint-Nom-la-Bretèche. Others were only dreamt of; for example, in 1937, members of Acéphale planned to leave a skull soaked in brine, representing that of King Louis XVI/Louis Capet, in the Place de la Concorde, where he had been

guillotined; and at another time, they intended to leave rags there, soaked in what appeared to be the blood of the Marquis de Sade. Both rituals were to be witnessed by the eight armoured and acephalic figures that watch over the square (Hollier 1988:xxii–xxiii; Stoekl 1985:263). Neither plan was ever realized, but the bloody events associated with the Revolution were already memorialized by Bataille: The last meeting of the “groupuscule,” *Contre-Attaque*, in 1936, was on January 21, the date of the king’s execution. It may be relevant that Bataille’s mother was named Marie-Antoinette. Then, in 1939, the 150th anniversary of the French Revolution, Klossowski, who was definitely a member of Acéphale, presented a paper at the Collège de Sociologie on “The Marquis de Sade and the French Revolution”; and a few weeks later, Caillois presented one on “The Sociology of the Executioner.”

One ritual planned but never realised was a human sacrifice. There was no difficulty in finding a willing victim, but a sacrificer could not be found. Marina Galletti suggests that Michel Leiris, who had already contemplated suicide, may have been a potential victim (Galletti 2003:96), and there is some evidence that Caillois was offered the role of sacrificer. Blanchot points out in *The Unavowable Community* that immediately after the sacrifice, the sacrificer was also expected to kill himself. Perhaps Caillois found this unappealing. There may have been another reason for the failure of the plan, for according to French sacrificial theory, each sacrifice involves not only a victim and a sacrificer (the person performing the sacrificial act) but also a sacrificer (the source of the desire for the sacrifice), and in this case, each member of the group was a sacrificer (each was a source of the sacrificial desire) and presumably—through contagion?—each of them could have been both sacrificer and victim. Under these circumstances, there might have been no record of Acéphale at all, and for that matter, no further intellectual output of any kind produced by its members, the key members of the Collège de Sociologie.

There is reason to be grateful that its members were not able to achieve all of their goals. Ironically, in some ways, Stefan George may have had more success in unleashing aspects of the sacred, because in order to do so, what may be required are both the prior existence of sets of collective rituals, beliefs, and identities, here George’s own practices, and an unpredictable event—in this case, the unexpected but, given the state of medical knowledge at the time, inevitable death of Maximilian. Thus, the sacred may need as one element of its genesis a sense of “the iron hand of necessity shaking the dice box of chance” (Nietzsche 1982:130).

— Frank Pearce

See also Bataille, Georges; Durkheim, Émile; Foucault, Michel; Religion in French Social Theory; Sacred and Profane

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COLLINS, PATRICIA HILL

Patricia Hill Collins (b. 1943), a sociologist and feminist theorist, is chair and Charles Phelps Taft Professor of Sociology in the Department of African American Studies and Sociology at the University of Cincinnati. She received her BA and PhD degrees in sociology from Brandeis University and an MAT degree from Harvard University. Collins has taught at several institutions, held editorial positions with professional journals, and lectured extensively in

the United States and abroad. Her work examines issues of gender, race, social class, and nation, particularly relating to African American women.

Collins's best-known work, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (1990, 2000), theorizes a "black feminist epistemology" that draws on and extends the work of African American intellectuals such as Audre Lorde, bell hooks, Angela Davis, and Alice Walker. Collins's epistemology, based on feminist and Afrocentric standpoints, stresses the importance of self-defined knowledge for group empowerment through personal accountability, experience as a source of wisdom, feminist discourse as a tool for analyzing differences, and an ethic of empathy. *Black Feminist Thought* won the C. Wright Mills Award in 1991. In its 10th-anniversary edition, Collins revises some of her earlier arguments and themes. Still believing that knowledge can foster empowerment, Collins (2000) proclaims: "I now recognize that empowerment for African-American women will never occur in a context characterized by oppression and social injustice" (p. x). She further develops and enhances themes such as empowerment, social justice, and oppression.

Both *Black Feminist Thought* as well as *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice* (1998) involve Collins in exploring the distinctive standpoints and knowledge available to members of subjugated groups, especially African American women. Recognizing their diversity, Collins sees in these women an outlook derived from their lived experiences that is at once critical, self-defining, and resistant. That outlook finds expression in their community work, their music, and their friendships with one another.

It also finds expression in the *motherwork*, which typically comprises raising one's own children while also taking active, overt, reliable responsibility for other children in one's extended family and in the community as well. With her conceptualization of motherwork, Collins overcomes the binaries commonly associated with white, middle-income motherhood. Motherwork blurs the boundaries between public and private, family and community, and self and other. This notion underscores the thoroughly social—indeed, collective—aspects of mothering.

More recently, Collins's work has focused on sexuality as a social force as well as an anchor of identity. In *Black Sexual Politics* (2004), she explores how beliefs about sexuality and sexual behavior deeply affect racial, gender, and social class inequalities in American society. She also delineates how sexual politics intertwine with minority politics in American society.

With Margaret Andersen, Collins has coedited *Race, Class, and Gender* (1995), an anthology widely used in university courses. This best-selling anthology uses a wide array of contemporary and historical readings as well as personal narratives from diverse individuals.

Historically informed and sociologically savvy, Collins's feminist theorizing promotes a multicultural ethic of care that resonates with Carol Gilligan's later work. By emphasizing the intersections among society's institutionalized hierarchies, Collins's theorizing about the *matrix of domination* renders hers a feminist framework that is as much a call to action as it is an insistence on inclusiveness.

— L. Paul Weeks

See also Feminist Epistemology; Gilligan, Carol; Maternal Thinking; Matrix of Domination; Outsider-Within; Ruddick, Sara

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COLLINS, RANDALL

Randall Collins (b. 1941) is best known for his insightful reading of Weber's macrotheory and his proposed strategy to link micro- and macrotheories. Most of his theoretical ideas began to take shape in his widely cited book, *Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science*, published in 1972, soon after he received his doctorate at University of California at Berkeley, in 1969. In this book, he advocates the development of scientific sociology in which sociological research and theory move toward the construction of generalized explanatory theories. By "explanatory," Collins means that these theories should be able to provide the conditions under which certain events will or will not occur, in the form of testable statements. By "generalized," Collins refers to theories of social dynamics that are applicable to all subfields within sociology, and he argues that stratification and organization constitute this

explanatory core in the field. Influenced by interactionists such as Goffman, Collins grounds his theories in the everyday life experiences of individuals, whose patterned interactions maintain these social structures.

Taking Goffman's concept of "encounter," Collins argues that the situation should be the unit of analysis for microinteractions. He constructed the theory of interaction ritual chain by combining Durkheim's ritual theory of social solidarity with Goffman's idea of microrituals in everyday life. Drawing from Durkheim's *The Elementary Form of Religious Life*, Collins identifies the ingredients of an interaction ritual (IR), the assembly of participants in face-to-face interaction, focus of attention, and shared emotional mood, which can be anything ranging from excitement to sadness, and mutual awareness of other participants' emotions. Participation in an IR results in a sense of belonging to the group, which individuals experience as a higher level of emotional energy (EE). A high level of EE is a sense of satisfaction, confidence, and energy, whereas a low level of EE is depression. The more intense the IR, with a clear focus of attention and strong shared emotional mood, the higher the level of EE one will experience. The symbols used in an IR will then take on a sacred quality, thus becoming the symbol representing the group. The strong EE generated in an IR will be stored in this symbol, which serves as a battery of EE, reminding an individual of this particular encounter.

Incorporating Goffman's idea of everyday ritual, Collins argues that IRs generating EE of varying intensity take place throughout one's daily life, going from situation to situation, contributing to the overall EE level of an individual. Collins also argues that humans are attracted to situations with the potential of gaining EE and avoid those in which one will lose EE. One is prone to lose EE in IRs where the symbols used are absent in one's repertoire. This repertoire of symbols, called cultural capital (CC) by Collins, can include any ideas or memories and are often attached with the EE produced in previous IRs, where they were invoked. When one lacks previous exposure to the symbols used in an IR, it becomes difficult for one to experience a strong sense of belonging to the group. For instance, the spouse of the member of a group engaging in a reunion may gain little EE from the IR, unless he or she possesses past experiences similar enough to allow active participation. On the other hand, members of the group will yield much EE from the IR, as they possess memories that are charged with EE generated from the group's previous gatherings.

Collins conceptualizes IRs as units that constitute the microfoundation of macrostructures mediated by mesolevel networks. Collins argues that stratification is sustained through organizations in which IRs are structured along the power and status dimensions. In power rituals, participants can be anywhere between a pure order-giver and a pure

order-taker. The order-giving role leads individuals to identify more strongly with the symbols of the organization, whereas the order-taking role alienates individuals, thus resulting in the difference in outlooks between upper and lower classes. In status rituals, participants vary from being at the core of the group to being at the fringe. The closer one is to the core, the more likely one will yield intense EE and identify strongly with the group symbol. In this way, power and status differences are perpetuated within organizations.

Collins has also constructed a geopolitical theory of state breakdown by elaborating and formalizing Weber's theory of geopolitics. In this theory, Collins applies Weber's definition of the state as an organization with a monopoly of coercive power within a territory. He asserts that states with resource advantage and favorable geopolitical position (where a state does not border with militarily strong enemy states and enjoys natural barriers for defense) are more likely to win wars. As a result, marchland states will eventually absorb the smaller interior states through military victories until they confront each other. When this happens, either a stalemate or a showdown war will result. A showdown war will devastate both sides, whereas a stalemate will involve military buildup on both sides to prevent tipping the balance of power. Such buildup will drain the state's resources in the process and weaken its power, thus creating an opening for domestic rebellion to occur and succeed.

Collins also contributes to the understanding of the rise of capitalism by highlighting Weber's institutional model. Collins argues that it was not the Protestant ethics per se, but a "disciplined, calculating economic ethic" often emphasized in monastic life that brought about the rise of capitalism. More important, however, was the presence of legal and economic institutions that facilitated the emergence of markets of commodity, labor, land, and capital and encouraged entrepreneurial activities. Collins argues that both in medieval Europe and Japan, these conditions came together through the economic activities of large monasteries and hence is able to show that capitalist growth flourished independently in Asia.

— Rebecca S. K. Li

See also Conflict Theory; Durkheim, Émile; Goffman, Erving; Historical and Comparative Theory; Micro-Macro Integration; Weber, Max

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COMMITMENT

Commitment is the tendency to interact with the same partner across repeated opportunities for interaction in the face of an alternative to that interaction.

Commitments are behaviorally demonstrated patterns of repeated interactions in which social actors show favoritism toward certain interaction partners. Commitment requires the presence of at least three social actors. An isolated dyad can repeatedly interact, but those repeated interactions do not constitute commitment. Commitment, as an action, entails choice wherein an actor (or set of actors) elects to continue a pattern of repeated interactions that favor one relation over other alternative relations.

Commitment, however, need not be equated with exclusivity. Within the context of intimate sexual relationships, the conventional definition of commitment entails fidelity and exclusive rights of sexual access, but this is an extreme form of commitment. Commitment is best thought of as existing across a continuum. Two actors who could interact but never do show the lowest possible commitment to one another, while two actors who interact only with each other in the face of alternative opportunities fall on the other extreme and are "perfectly" committed. A wide space of possible "levels" of commitment exists between these two extremes. For example, commitment to a friendship is manifest in friends engaging in a host of social activities, ranging from having lunch together, going to shows, talking over the telephone, or crying on one another's shoulders in times of need. Such a relationship is rarely exclusive, but commitment is nonetheless displayed over time.

Emotions are generated by commitments. Engaging in repeated interactions requires the solution of mutual and sometimes competing interests. Actors who come together over and over again begin to develop emotional responses to the successful completion of interactions and the establishment of an ongoing relationship (e.g., Lawler and Yoon 1996). Often, these emotional responses are commonplace emotions such as satisfaction and happiness.

Positive emotions generated by commitments promote social cohesion and further commitment. As commitments evolve, positive emotions are often generated. These feelings, in turn, affect future decision making. Actors presented with equally desirable alternative relations are likely

to forgo new alternatives in favor of continued interactions within the committed relationship because of the positive feelings developed by that commitment.

Negative effect may also result from commitments; partners can feel exploited, angry, and resentful of the relationship. In many instances, actors continue to participate in relationships despite negative effect directed toward their partners, because the existing relationship seems better than what may be available elsewhere. The negative effect, however, can be a driving force that pushes the dissatisfied actor out of the relationship. If actors are provided with additional alternatives, they may abandon the current relationship for a new one that does not carry the same negative emotional baggage (e.g., Lawler and Yoon 1998).

STRUCTURAL CONSERVATION AND STRUCTURAL EXPANSION

Commitment acts as a force for structural conservation. A direct upshot of a pattern of repeated interactions is that alternative relations are ignored in favor of relations to which an actor has a commitment. Ignoring alternatives allows potential social relationships to atrophy, and committed relations become fortified. Over time, this pattern of differential attention to particular relations can be a force for stability, predictability, social cohesion, and structural conservation.

Commitments, however, can also act as forces for structural change and network expansion. In environments that entail a great deal of social uncertainty, actors depend upon their commitments to navigate within their social worlds. Not all social and economic activity can transpire within the confines of known and well-established partnerships. Often, new partners are desirable, if not essential, and when uncertainty is high, the task of establishing such new partnerships can be a daunting one. Commitments can act as a bridge to overcome such social barriers. New partners can be found through existing commitments. Finding a new partner through an established partner provides a level of information, accountability, and social cohesion that arbitrarily searching for new partners outside of one's existing social networks cannot.

SOCIAL SOLUTION AND SOCIAL PROBLEM

Social life is fraught with uncertainty and the possibility for opportunism. Favors go unreciprocated, "lemons" are sold to customers, colleagues fail to uphold their work obligations, and sexual partners can stray. If social actors are not held accountable for their actions by a governing social order or authority, how can they effectively exchange, interact, and live? One viable option is to form commitments with a known set or subset of possible actors within the existing field of possible opportunities. Repeated interactions (commitment) with known actors allow for the

development of reciprocity, the opportunity to develop realistic expectations for future behavior, norms, social cohesion, and the opportunity to develop strategies for interaction that have predictable contingencies for action.

But not all social outcomes of commitment are optimal or desirable. Inherent to commitments in the face of alternatives is that alternative relations are left unattended. Foregoing interacting across all possible relations can reduce the productivity of a social system. As economists are quick to point out, equilibrium points are achieved in free markets, where all actors have the opportunity to fully explore possible partnerships. Commitments destroy free markets. In the place of a social space in which the maximum returns to interactions may be obtained, a structured environment that restricts access to opportunities is created by the formation of commitments. When actors form commitments, they may not be getting the maximum "returns" to their interactions. Commitments, while keeping us safe from the opportunistic possibilities of social life, also keep us sheltered and living in a world of the best currently available options, not the best possible options.

— Eric Rice

See also Exchange Coalitions; Generalized Exchange; Lawler, Edward; Relational Cohesion; Trust

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COMPLEXITY THEORY

Complexity theory is a unifying theory of the natural and social sciences that seeks to describe and account for the properties of complex adaptive systems in the material, biological, and social worlds. These systems are characterized by emergent properties that are irreducible to the sum of the systems' parts. These properties are evident at the systemic level but are not implicit within the elements comprising the system or through the addition of those elements or the relations between them.

Complexity theory is important because it represents the cutting edge of interdisciplinary research and knowledge exchange. The influential Gulbenkian Commission on the

Restructuring of the Social Sciences, reporting in 1996 and chaired by world-systems sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein and Nobel prize-winning scientist Ilya Prigogine, recommended the removal of barriers between the “natural” and “social” sciences, advocating instead that analysis should focus upon the dynamics of complex systems where the emphasis would be upon contingency, multiple futures, bifurcation, and choice. In this account, the implications of complexity for social theory are clear. Complexity theory represents a turn away from reductionist explanations of natural and social phenomena and a turn toward a dynamic and holistic approach, where structure is inseparable from process.

Complexity theory is a scientific amalgam rather than a discrete body of knowledge; it unites a range of theoretical advances and research agendas across the natural and social sciences. Proponents of complexity theory lay claim to an increasing number of areas of study, including chaos and catastrophe theory, the theory of small-world networks, the study of artificial life, business management, the mapping of cyberspace, the emergence of a global civil society, and the organisation and patterning of cultural and economic globalisation, to name but a few. All of these are synthesised within the “complexity turn.” However, the origin of complexity theory as a descriptive term and organising concept is most closely associated with the foundation of the Santa Fe Institute in 1984, an unrestricted interdisciplinary research unit set up by fellows from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (best known as the birthplace of the atomic bomb). At the core of the Santa Fe Institute are physicists, mathematicians, computer programmers, and systems analysts who have used the exponential growth of computer processing power as a lens through which to interrogate the dynamics of complex systems, from evolutionary development to virus transmission to the rise and fall of ancient civilizations.

Complex systems of the type studied at Santa Fe and elsewhere are ubiquitous in the natural and social worlds; examples include weather systems, neural networks, languages, business organisations, the Internet, social movements, and any other social formation characterised by the defining features complexity theory has helped to identify. Complex systems exhibit a number of important traits that give rise to emergent properties. A complex system normally comprises a large number of elements that interact with each other and with their environment. These internal and external interactions within the system create feedback loops that are incorporated into a process of change and adaptation. Complex systems therefore evolve over time, necessitating that research into complexity take account of the history of a system, which is at least co-responsible for its current state. Therefore, complexity theory places emphasis upon the diachronic as well as the synchronic aspects of a system.

The internal relationships and interactions of the differing parts of a complex system are dynamic and nonlinear, meaning small changes to that system can have disproportionate outcomes, and vice versa. This is commonly known as the “butterfly effect,” where a metaphorical butterfly flaps its wings on one side of the earth and inadvertently causes a tornado on the other. Alternatively, one might think of the small changes in behaviour amongst citizens of Czechoslovakia noted by Vaclav Havel in his account of the Velvet Revolution, “The Power of the Powerless.” Such local behaviour can lead to large changes when repeated and magnified through processes of iteration and interaction. The important precondition for such a theoretical possibility is that a complex system, be it the weather or a political regime, is open and exists in conditions far from equilibrium, thus providing for the possibility of actualising certain immanent properties of the system and leading to unpredictable outcomes, albeit tornados and revolutions are rarely realised. In comparison, a butterfly flapping its wings inside a balloon would have no effect other than to disturb the air around it, because in such an instance, the system would be closed and therefore close to equilibrium. A complex system requires a constant flow of energy to enable the dynamic structure of the system to be reproduced; equilibrium, on the other hand, spells the death of complexity. Complex systems therefore tend toward a space between linearly determined order and indeterminate chaos.

Complexity theory attempts to account for this order on the “edge of chaos” through discernment of the mechanisms and processes underpinning complex systems and the elucidation of the often “simple” rules that give rise to complexity. The simple and the complex are engaged in a permanent dance with each other, and it has been observed that the degree to which something is regarded as simple or complex is often affected by the position of the observer in relation to the system in question. What appears simple from a distance is often revealed to be complex on closer examination, and the apparent complexity of a system can often be described quite simply. One might think of an automobile, which whilst appearing complex can be explained in a linear and simple fashion. Alternatively, an ant colony exhibits a limited number of simple behavioural repertoires based upon biological cues, such as pheromones, but these, in turn, lead to incredibly sophisticated patterns of self-organisation.

The complexity turn has provided a wealth of technical and metaphorical terms and concepts to help describe and analyse the operations of social systems and their various points of connection, exchange, overlap, and cross-fertilisation with biological and material elements of the “natural” world. The most influential of these for social theory have been concepts such as emergence (the irreducible qualities of a system), state space (the state of a system understood through multivariate analysis), strange attractors (the

capacity of an idea, behaviour, or action to perturbate the trajectory of a system between state spaces), and self-organisation (the capacity for order to emerge spontaneously from chaos). The effect of these insights from complexity theory has been to emphasise the contingent quality and vulnerability of systems that might otherwise appear robust, thereby requiring a significant reassessment of our understanding of social change and the previously dominant models of how that change might be achieved.

— Graeme Chesters

See also Emergence; General Systems Theory; Strength of Weak Ties

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COMPULSORY HETEROSEXUALITY

“Compulsory heterosexuality” is a term coined by Adrienne Rich, in the essay “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence” (1980). It refers to the fact that heterosexuality, far from being an innate, natural tendency or a purposeful choice of sexuality, is constructed and enforced as a political institution, much like the institutions of motherhood and family. Rich attempts to deconstruct the power structures that maintain a normative heterosexuality and, in doing so, reveals the underlying supports for male supremacy and heterosexism. Though Rich assumes that identities, including sexual identities, are socially constructed, she also implies that women-centered relationships are more “natural” than male-centered bonds, since the mother-child relationship is primary. She asks “whether the search for love and tenderness in both sexes does not originally lead toward women” (1986:35).

Rich theorizes that the institution of heterosexuality legitimizes financial and political control of women and sometimes even normalizes brutality (including rape) and female submission in the process of maintaining and constructing male power. In her view, this institution is responsible for forcing a shift away from female-centered sexuality, toward male-centered sexuality. The institution of

heterosexuality normalizes the exploitation of women’s domestic labor and the psychological manipulation of the relationship between mothers and daughters. It does so by limiting and controlling knowledge, and by objectifying women and devaluing female experiences and relationships. Rich draws on literature, history, and the social sciences to reinforce her points and to support her claim that liberation can be had only through women-centered relationships.

Rich’s notion of heterosexuality as compulsory disrupts the underlying normative structure of “straight” culture and for this reason is important to feminist theory, queer theory, and critical theory. By examining heterosexuality as an institution that is constructed, the judgments of abnormality and deviance directed toward lesbians (and other non-heterosexuals) are also called into question. Compulsory heterosexuality is also a starting point for reexamining allied institutions such as family, motherhood, and male dominance.

Despite its widespread use in the critical social sciences, Rich’s term has evoked criticism. One criticism concerns Rich’s treatment of identity. Rich shows that hegemonic heterosexual identity is socially constructed but tends to naturalize women-centered identity. This naturalization makes deviant any other constructions of identity, much in the manner that Rich accuses the hegemonic construction of heterosexuality of doing. Thus, in this view, instead of deconstructing a hierarchical power structure, Rich may be read as merely replacing one with another.

A second criticism addresses how Rich gives preference to a specific type of women-centered relationship. She gives primacy to an ideal of female sexuality that valorizes a nearly platonic relationship. She has been accused by some of being antisexual because her formulation of the lesbian continuum rates nonsexual women-identified relationships on the same scale as sexual women-centered relationships. Furthermore, Rich’s views of all pornography as male centered, and thus oppressive to women, and of sexual relations that may echo male sexuality as being male identified, and thus oppressive to women, have oppressed many lesbians, gays, and others who practice different types of sexual relations.

One well-known critique is Gayle Rubin’s “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality” (1984). Rubin argues that Rich’s “correct” relationships for women are just as oppressive as those formed within the institution of heterosexuality that Rich is trying to combat. In this essay, Rubin contends that feminist theory has not sufficiently addressed how sexuality is formed within a political context. In leaving unexamined the assumption of “sexual essentialism,” Rich has opened the theoretical door for alternative forms of oppression that will continue to manifest themselves. Rich’s assertion of the possibility and preferability of egalitarian women-centered

relationships leaves untouched the assumption that sex itself can be dangerous. It also leaves unquestioned the assumption that only those relationships centered on monogamous, long-term bonds free of pornography and sex toys can be liberatory and worthwhile.

Nevertheless, the idea of heterosexuality as compulsory continues to be important to theorizing about how power and privilege are embedded in extant institutions. This concept is central to examining modernist and postmodernist conceptions of social movements, especially regarding the gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender (GLBT) rights movement. That there are some conceptual shortcomings with Rich's notion in no way detracts from her fundamental contribution to queer theory as well as feminist theory. Hers is foundational work that has laid pathbreaking ground for deconstructing hegemonic assumptions about sexual practices and identities.

— Marga Ryersbach

See also Lesbian Continuum; Patriarchy; Postmodernist Feminism; Queer Theory; Radical Feminism

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COMTE, AUGUSTE

Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the grand systematiser of positivism and the founder of a would-be science of society that he was the first to call "sociology," is a formative, if neglected, figure in the development of modern social theory. Described by Althusser as "the only mind worthy of interest" produced by nineteenth-century French philosophy, Comte's thought parallels Hegel's in the scope of its synthesising ambition. His thought similarly bridged between the encyclopedists of the eighteenth century and the currents of historicism and social reform from which the social and cultural sciences emerged in the nineteenth.

Comte was a precursor of Durkheim, an affine (with Saint-Simon) of Marx, and an important reference point for Nietzsche, particularly in his critique of metaphysics as a miscegenated halfway house between theology and science. Both politically and in his conception of the social, Comte attempted to chart a middle course between Enlightenment progressivism, which in his view was vitiated by individualism and had become purely negative after 1789, and counterrevolutionary conservatism, which understood order but not progress and unrealistically sought a return to the *ancien régime*. Hence his explicit debt to both Condorcet and Maistre, and his constant watchword of "order and progress."

Comte's work was driven by a great sense of urgency and mission. In the face of "the great crisis" of European society, his sociology was intended to provide the secure basis for a programme of reconstructive social reform. This would complete the work of the French Revolution and provide the emerging industrial society with an appropriate cognitive, moral, and institutional framework. The establishment of sociology, Comte thought, would also complete the scientific revolution by bringing human phenomena within the orbit of positive study. This, in turn, would make possible a general synthesis of the sciences, whose dissemination through a revamped school curriculum was itself a key element of the program. Most of Comte's voluminous oeuvre, including his six-volume *Système de philosophie positive* and his four-volume *Système de politique positive*, was intended to train intellectual cadres to carry out this work. The religious dimension of his project became explicit in the later part of Comte's career, when he sought to organise positivism—with Humanity as its cultic centre, love as its core principle, and himself as *grand-prêtre*—as a new world-religion to replace Christianity. As indicated, however, by his early essay "Sur le pouvoir spirituel," in 1826, Comte had from the outset conceived his task in quasi-ecclesiastical terms. The scientific intelligentsia, with a corps of generalists at the apex, would replace the Christian church as industrialism's spiritual power, just as positivism and humanism would replace theology as the unifier of thought and feeling.

Comte, born in Montpellier, was the rebellious eldest son of a petit-bourgeois Catholic and royalist family. Following his father's advice, he entered the École Polytechnique in 1815 to study mathematics, with a view to a career as a mining engineer. A moderate but fervent republican and anticlerical, he was, however, expelled after involvement in student protests against the Bourbon restoration, then banned from admission to the civil service exam after he refused to promise good behaviour. He moved back to Montpellier and studied biology for a term at l'École de Médecine before returning to Paris, where he changed his name from Isidore to Auguste and remained for the rest of his life. A restless autodidact, he was at first, via

Scottish political economy, drawn to the Saint-Simonians. In 1817, he became Saint-Simon's secretary, editor, and personal assistant. They had an acrimonious parting in 1824, after Comte accused his mentor of publishing Comte's work under his own name. Thereafter, Comte eked out an existence, partly through the support of his first wife, the free-spirited Caroline Massin, partly through private tutoring, and partly through a post he retained for the following decades as an external examiner (in secondary schools) in mathematics. This was the only regular academic position he ever held, despite, during the 1830s, campaigning aggressively for a professorial chair at the *École Polytechnique*, which he had hoped to use as an institutional base for his wider project of intellectual reorganisation. In 1847, he set up the Positivist Society, which became thereafter his main vehicle and source of financial support.

How much Comte took from Saint-Simon and how much Saint-Simon, during the years of their collaboration, took from Comte, is a matter for debate. Their thinking certainly overlapped. Both linked the upheavals of 1789 and after to the scientific revolution, the decline of feudalism and Christianity, and to the concomitant rise of an industrial (production-based) society. Both saw the need to complete the transformation through the accession to power of the productive classes, on one hand, and the establishment of a human-centric "terrestrial morality" with a unified science culminating in a science of man as its philosophical basis, on the other. Comte diverged from his mentor, however, in his insistence that the intellectual edifice—and especially the science of man—be properly built first, before rushing to offer solutions. These solutions themselves were far more elaborate than Saint-Simon's, and also more puritanical. While some of Saint-Simon's followers preached free love and "rehabilitation of the flesh," Comte's program was increasingly antisexual, and one of his later technological dreams was for sexless procreation, linked symbolically to a proposed cult of *la Vierge Femme*. There were differences too at the level of the system. Comte rejected Saint-Simon's Baconian assumption that scientific knowledge, in all its branches, could be unified into a pyramid of logically connected axioms descending from the most general, which for Saint-Simon was the law of gravity. For Comte, the fundamental sciences and their objects had to be disentangled, and the logic of their interconnected development toward positivity had to be scientifically demonstrated. Hence, too, the importance of actually developing a science of man, core to which for Comte was a science of society, since it was to this domain that the positive study of human knowledge and its history itself belonged.

Comte first sketched out his ideas in "Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société" (1822), the essay that had occasioned the break with Saint-Simon, and in five further "opuscules." These included "Considérations des savants et sciences" (1825),

"Considérations du pouvoir spirituel" (1826), and a review of Broussais's "De l'irritation et la folie" (1828). The importance Comte attached to these early essays is indicated by his appending them to the last volume of *Politique positive*, in 1854. The one on Broussais is especially significant for the development of Comtean sociology. Broussais's principle was that pathological states in an organism were to be understood as different only in degree from normal states. This provided Comte with a means for analysing the effects of endogenous disturbance to the social body as well as a protostructural way to conceive social institutions within any given constellation as at once functionally interrelated but free to vary within determinate limits. The parallel Broussais drew between the physiology of disturbances to the stomach and to the brain also enabled Comte to bring scientific considerations to bear on his own maladies. A lifelong sufferer with stomach pain, he also underwent periods of mania and psychosis. In 1826, he had a full-scale breakdown, which led to his hospitalisation.

Comte's breakdown interrupted the course of private lectures he had begun earlier that year, but he resumed them after his recovery. The course became the basis for his best-known work, *Système de philosophie positive*, published between 1830 and 1842. It was this work that first brought Comte to the attention of a wider public, aided by the highly influential support of John Stuart Mill and Émile Littré, and also in England by Harriet Martineau's condensed (but authorised) translation.

Much in the spirit of Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* and of the encyclopedias it had inspired in the eighteenth century, the *Philosophie Positive* presented a panoramic overview of the state of knowledge, with a view to establishing and advancing a coherent worldview based on a purely scientific outlook. But whereas Bacon's survey had been ground clearing and prospective and Diderot's had been eclectic, Comte's aimed to be fully positive, including with regard to social, moral, and political matters. By "positive," Comte meant not only fact based and scientific but also constructive and affirmative, as opposed to critical and negative. "Positive" also conveyed the sense of definiteness and rigour. But Comte by no means thought that science provided absolute knowledge. Positive knowledge was grounded in phenomena, "*impressions externelles*." For that same reason, however, it was restricted in its truth value to discerning empirical regularities, laws. It gave up the claim to knowledge of essential or hidden causes and thus to the absolute truth aimed at, and claimed for, theistic or metaphysical systems. The spirit of positivism was emphatically "relative" with regard to the collective human observer, and what passed for truth in any age depended on the overall state of cognitive and social development. Comte's positivism was not, then, naively "precritical," as is often supposed. Despite his polemical scorn for German philosophy, with its "vain speculations," there is biographical

evidence that he had read some passages of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The first three volumes of the *Système* treated the results and development to positivity of mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology. The last three volumes did the same for sociology (called "social physics" in volume 1), which Comte himself claimed to be establishing in these pages as a science. These six fundamental sciences, to be distinguished from concrete sciences such as geology, which were hybrids, dealt with distinct but interrelated domains. Together, they constituted an "encyclopedic scale," rising from the most general and abstract (mathematics) to the most specific and complex (sociology). Each succeeding science had its own object-domain and its own set of empirically based laws. Each also made its own, cumulating, methodological contribution to the ensemble of human knowledge—from analysis (mathematics), to observation (astronomy), experiment (physics and chemistry), comparison (biology), and finally, with sociology, to the historical method.

Against mechanical reductionists, it was, indeed, sociology that provided the key to overcoming the splintering of knowledge into specialisms by providing a unifying perspective on knowledge itself. It did so by switching to a social viewpoint and by regarding knowledge as a collective product whose development could be understood as the operation of a law. According to Comte's "law of stages," the collective mind, like the individual mind, passes through three mental states. In infancy, it is theological (the anthropomorphic projection of fictive causes); in adolescence, it is metaphysical (the world ruled by abstract ideas); and in maturity, it is positive (evidential knowledge having the form of laws). The midway stage of metaphysics was required to mediate the two end points, because between theology and science, there was an "epistemological break" (to use the term developed by Bachelard and Althusser), with no direct passage from the one to the other. For this reason, there is an ambiguity in what Comte meant by "metaphysics." On one hand, it designated a distinct type of prescientific thinking, characterised by idealism and essentialism (as in the scholasticism objected to be Bacon); on the other hand, it was a transitory and incoherent mixture of positive, metaphysical, and theistic modes of understanding. In line with the first understanding, Comte also identified metaphysics with "the individual viewpoint," which in modern philosophy had elevated the ego, its "supposed free will," and its ratiocinations into an absolute.

Each fundamental science, in becoming a science, had undergone the three stage process of positivisation, in a historical order determined by its place in the encyclopedic scale. The same applied to "philosophy," by which Comte meant systems of general ideas that synthesised knowledge itself. At this level, though, because of the necessarily sequential positivisation of the individual sciences, the

middle (metaphysical) stage was prolonged. Philosophy could become positive only when all the sciences had been positivised. All hinged, then, on the establishment of sociology, *la science finale*.

Comte's sociology was conceived as an outgrowth of the life sciences. Its starting point was that society was a kind of superorganism to which biological concepts could be applied. There were though two signal differences. First, although the social organism had the equivalent of organs and tissues, with a morphology and physiology and a ruling centre equivalent to the brain, it was a composite being (*un entité composé*), whose individual elements were self-driven. Its "vital unity" was therefore always problematic and depended on the maintenance of a harmonious relation between individuals, and between individuals and society as a whole. Hence, for the achievement of social order, the importance of the social tie and of the institutional and psychological mechanisms necessary to sustain it. What sharpened the problem was the nature of the human psyche. According to a model of "cerebral physiology" that he took over from Gall, the cruder, egoistic instincts were stronger than the higher, social, or "altruistic" ones. The latter, like the former, were hardwired into the brain, which was why (contra Hobbes) sociability and its progressive improvement were possible. However, because of their relative weakness, these higher instincts had to be elicited, exercised, and reinforced if the integration necessary for social tasks were to be achieved. Direct and spontaneous affective ties, especially as developed in the family, were the nursery of higher sentiments. But such ties were particularistic, and the larger the social group, the more they had to be supplemented by an overarching consensus at the level of ideas and feelings. To achieve this was the function of "philosophy" (the currently ruling systematisation of knowledge) and of religion, considered in *Philosophie positive* mainly from its cognitive side.

The second difference, for Comte, between society and the forms of life treated by biology was the human capacity for language. All life forms had a limited ability to modify their milieu in line with survival needs. But language enabled human society to store and increase its knowledge, and so to acquire an ever-increasing power to modify its milieu. Human society therefore had a history, whose direction was determined by the logic of that development together with its effects, back onto the constitution of human society. Discerning that logic was the special province of sociological dynamics. In line with eighteenth-century attempts at universal history, it involved the arrangement of social types, from tribes, to city-states, to nation-states, into a linear sequence, then tracing the institutional changes—familial, political, economic, religious, and cognitive/religious—that ran through them. Contemporary differences between industrial and preindustrial societies were treated as uneven development, registering

the effects of climate, geography, and (though this was downplayed) genetic inheritance.

Overall, then, sociology had two departments: a “statics,” dealing with laws of order (relative to what was deduced to be “normal” for each social stage) and a “dynamics,” dealing with laws of progress. Comte’s construction of different societies into a developmental series was evidently abstract, as was his aprioristic conception of society as a living organism. It is easy to dismiss his model, on both scores, as ideological. But it was not inconsistent with his notion of positivity. Sociology, for him, was a “fundamental” science, having for its object not a concrete entity, but the order prevailing in a general domain of reality. The aim was nomothetic (the establishment of laws) not ideographic (analysis of the singular and concrete). It also accorded with Comte’s insistence that inductivism without theory, including a concept of a science’s specific domain, was blind.

Not just in method, but in substance, Comte’s sociology ascribed a prominent role to ideas. On its static side, ideational consensus was essential for social order. On its dynamic side, mental development was the active historical force. From the law of stages could be derived an account of social progress. Society, in the Comtean narrative, had advanced, first, through three stages of “theism”: fetishism (things identified with spirits), polytheism, and monotheism. Then came a metaphysical stage: the great crisis that Comte placed between the rise of natural philosophy in the Middle Ages and the troubles of his own century. Finally, came the positive stage, which had been struggling to emerge since Bacon, Galileo, and Newton. Current conflicts, including the dizzying parade of constitutions and regimes since 1789, reflected an unresolved clash of ideas. Comte’s sociology was not, however, completely idealist. Practical human needs, in the first instance for food, shelter, and procreation, drove the knowledge process forward. Moreover, if knowledge was theorised and systematised in philosophy and religion as the prerequisite for moral order, it was also, and before that, applied to milieu modification in the world of work (*l’industrie*). Externally, the human story was one of planetary conquest. Within society, the advance of practical knowledge led to both increased specialisation and to the growing prominence within the ensemble of *l’industrie* itself. Corresponding, then, to the decline of theism and its displacement by positive science was the decline, in the temporal order, of a military form of social organisation (of which feudalism was the “defensive” phase) and its displacement by one arising from the world of production.

In its final stage, social development will have been perfected. Not only will industry and positive knowledge have become fully dominant, but the higher, altruistic instincts will have become ascendant over the lower egoistic ones and moral mechanisms will have replaced coercive ones.

Internationally, a peaceful confederation of mini-states will have replaced warring nations, so that humanity will have finally become unified on a planetary scale. At that point, humanity will have taken conscious control over both the planet and its own self-management, and it will be impelled, in this double work, by the desire to satisfy its highest needs. The construct is evidently teleological. Comte’s sociology depicts a process of development that comes to an end when that process is complete. It does so, moreover, from the perspective of the final stage, whose normal form—the health of the most advanced—is normative for both theory and practice. However, the good end to which society ultimately tends is not guaranteed. Progress is not a smooth, cumulative process. Society develops discontinuously, through distinct stages, with transitional periods marked by conflict and instability. In contrast with Marx, correspondingly, such turbulence was always to be regarded as manifesting contradictions of transition—between the old and the new—rather than ones inherent in the organisation, class structure, or property regime of any particular social order.

The final transition, to positivism and industry, was particularly turbulent. In part, this was because of the extent and completeness of the intellectual break that was required. The problem was exacerbated, however, by the growing division of labour that accompanied both industry (Comte esteemed Adam Smith) and the rise of the positive sciences themselves. Differentiation gave rise to an *esprit du détail*, which frustrated the synthetic movement necessary to complete the process. This was the nub of the present crisis. The difficulties of the transition had led to a prolongation that aggravated its disruptive effects. Metaphysics, particularly in the political sphere, had become virulently negative, strengthening the destructive aspect of the transition at the expense of the constructive one. A critical spirit, incapable of building, had combined with rampant individualism in which the “dogma of free enquiry” was the counterpart of political claims for rights, not responsibilities, furthering trends toward moral anarchy. Social solidarity was threatened, as too was the intergenerational solidarity that Comte called “*continuité*.” At the limit, what was at issue was not only the stalling of progress, but society itself—that is, the very life of what was, in every direction, Comte’s foundational term.

Comte’s second major work, *Système de politique positive, ou Traité de sociologie instituant la religion de l’Humanité*, appeared in four volumes between 1851 and 1854.

On one level, *Politique positive* is a straightforward continuation of *Philosophie positive*. Moving from theory to practice, it elaborates Comte’s analysis of the current crisis and spells out in detail the “positive polity” that was destined, if all went well, to resolve it. The immediate context was the revolution(s) of 1848 and Comte’s disappointment in the new Bonapartist regime of Louis Napoleon.

However, as the subtitle indicates, the *Politique positiviste* also marked a fresh departure. While it contained a great deal about the “temporal power,” envisaging a technocracy presided over by a committee of scientists, engineers, and bankers, it gave a central place to religion, and especially to Comte’s attempt to institute a new one.

In the intervening years, Comte had undergone a conversion experience. The occasion for this, from 1844 to 1846, was his extraordinary unconsummated affair with Clotilde de Vaux. Clotilde had drawn him to poetry, romanticism, and sentiment. Grief stricken after Clotilde’s sudden illness and death, Comte had found solace in ritualising and prayerfully evoking her memory. A great light had dawned. Their pure and selfless love was a prototype for the universalised love of Humanity. A passionately felt *altruisme* was the counterpart, at the level of feelings, to the social viewpoint that was bound up with the completed shift to positivism. The founding document of positive religion was dedicated to “*ma sainte ange*.”

The religion of Humanity had three components: a doctrine (sociology and positive philosophy), a moral training and regimen, and a system of worship focused on Humanity. Comte hailed Humanity—past, present and future, and across the globe—as the true *Grand-Etre* in which (citing St. Paul) “we breathe move and have our being.” It should be noted that Comte distinguished between *l’Humanité*, the species in its collective mode, society, and *l’Homme*, the generic species member. In divinising the former, positive religion made subjective an objective reality that was truly, Comte thought, both immanent and transcendent to the individual.

Comte’s new faith drew elements from all the world religions, a syncretism that became increasingly pronounced. But the forms that Comte gave it were adapted mainly from medieval Christianity. Thus, it had a priestly hierarchy independent of the temporal power (centred on Paris and himself), public and private rituals, seven sacraments marking the progress of the individual through the life course, and a full calendar of festivals. Though it turned its face against the “egoism” of the snakes-and-ladders game of salvation, it even had a version of personal immortality, in the solemn posthumous incorporation of worthy individuals into the collective memory. Indeed, from the summit of its final realisation, with most of its history behind it, the Great Being largely existed in that condition. Thus, while positivists were enjoined to love in coming generations as well as the present, its liturgy was dominated by veneration for the past. The Positivist Calendar was a memory palace of past generations. Positivist temples were to honour the dead. In 1853, Comte wrote a *Positivist Catechism* to popularise the new religion, making his appeal especially to women and proletarians. T. H. Huxley characterised it as “Catholicism without Christ.”

While the first *Système* had gained Comte a respectable intellectual following, the second, plus the works that

followed, led to derision except among a small band of converts, and Comte’s reputation never recovered. However, if *Politique positive* had, to put it charitably, a dottily idiosyncratic aspect, it also attempted to address gaps and problems in Comte’s thought, and the relationship between the first and second syntheses is more complicated than it may seem.

A practical problem with the first synthesis was that the relative truths of positive science lacked, indeed forswore, the cosmological absoluteness needed for a foundational replacement of theism. To secure the requisite ideational consensus, an apparatus drawing in people’s subjectivity was needed. Hence the need for a religious supplement to positive philosophy. But this supplement also had to be theorised. Comte therefore expanded his system of categories. To the original binary of thought and action, theory and practice, he now added the dimension of sentiments, with ramifications for every aspect of his system. First, as a cornerstone for a revised sociological statics, he developed Gall’s phrenology into a full-scale positive theory of the “soul.” According to this, there were 10 “affective motors” (from the nutritive and sexual to the industrial and sociable) and a topography of the brain that substantiated Hume’s intuition that passions were stronger than thought and came from physically based drives. In these terms, Comte elaborated the social-psychological function of religion. Religious faith, love plus belief, cathected the cosmos, directed the ego outwards, and secured the ascendancy of social drives within an otherwise disorganised and ego-driven cerebral apparatus. To his account of progress, he also added a narrative of affective progress in which the increasing size of the social group, the socialising rise of *l’industrie*, and successive forms of religious institution drew individuals ever more effectively upward through the “affective scale.” The weaving of sentiments into the picture, finally, led him to propound accounts of the function and history of the (fine) arts, as well as to develop a “positive theory of language,” which traced the rise of abstract signs and emphasised the importance of partially restoring iconic ones.

But the religious turn had implications for more than just the “objective” side of Comte’s system. Positivism’s shift to a social viewpoint implied a change at the level of the affects that could not fail to affect thinking itself. If positivism was a philosophy based on science, it was also based on *altruisme*, and a fully synthesised positivism would have to combine these two elements. From this consideration was born the project for a “subjective synthesis” to complement what Comte now called the “objective synthesis” laid out in *Philosophie positive*. The movement of the subjective synthesis would retrace that of the first synthesis, moving from mathematics and the other fundamental sciences to sociology. However, its aim would be to display each area of knowledge from the point of view of a

subjectivity that was saturated by social feeling and in terms of the contribution each area made to the harmonious and altruistic perfecting of individual subjectivity. Also, because of its address to individual subjectivity, the subjective synthesis would culminate in a seventh science, a composite that he called “*la Morale*,” which had for its object that subjectivity itself. Comte laid out the design for all this in the last volume of the *Positive politique*, and in 1856, he published the first volume of the *Synthèse subjective*, a treatise on mathematics subtitled *Logique positive*, or “Positive Logic.”

The bulk of *Logique positive* is given over to an examination of the development and interplay between arithmetic, algebra, and geometry, with a focus on the metaphors of the languages they employ. Mathematics, for Comte, had a real referent in the actual regularities of *l'ordre universel*. But it also had a fictive and purely symbolic one in the abstract “space” for calculation and figuration that Cartesian geometry, especially, had brought to the fore. The highest educational function of (subjectively synthesised) mathematics would be to harmonise the most abstract dimension of thought with feeling by investing that space with altruistic sentiment. This, in turn, would engender a kind of love for order and harmony in themselves.

As the introduction to the *Positive Logic* makes clear, Comte's treatment of mathematics is linked to a further modification to his schema. The positivist godhead is expanded into a trinity. *L'Humanité*, as *Grand-Etre*, remains at the centre. But to this are now added *l'Espace*, as *Grand-Milieu*, and *la Terre*, as *Grand-Fétiche*. Together, from a human standpoint, they symbolise all of reality. Whence the pedagogical point of the exercise. The seven parts of the subjective synthesis are designed to draw us, by degrees, into an adoring relation with all three. If mathematics inclines us to love *l'Espace*, astronomy, physics, and chemistry will do the same for *la Terre*, and biology, sociology, and *la Morale* the same for *l'Humanité*. But this is not all. For, in making this move, Comte begins to recast positive religion not as a corrected monotheism (as in the *Philosophie positive*), but as a corrected fetishism. Like the primitive belief system Comte attributed to hunter-gatherers, positivism will imagine the universe to be moved by spirits; but this time, these spirits will be consciously understood and related to as symbolic fictions. In Comte's revised picture, the higher forms of theism, with their abstract divinity and egoistic turning away from the world toward salvation, are seen as already beginning to be infected with metaphysics. The metaphysical stage is held to have begun, in fact, not with the rising up of individual reason against monotheism, but with monotheism itself. The story of religious progress gets to be rethought, then, not, as in the thinking of Strauss and Feuerbach, as the Jewish ascent, Christian-Protestant immanence, and humanist demystification of “god,” but as a movement through theism of a dialectical return to society's fetishist origins.

Comte did not intend to write all seven volumes of the subjective synthesis himself. *Politique Positive* was to be regarded as having already accomplished the subjective synthesis of sociology, and the equivalent volumes on astronomy, chemistry, physics, and biology were left to others (none ever took up the challenge). In writing the *Positive Logic*, his plan, rather, was to follow up with two volumes on *Morale*, a “theoretical” one (on the bio-social-historical theory of human nature) and a “practical” one (on the positive system of education). There was, finally, to be a fourth volume, which would complete the system of systems by adding a synthesis of human industry. But of these volumes, he wrote only the titles and headings; and in 1857, Comte died.

Comte's legacy passed most immediately to the Positivist Society. This dwindled to a sect, although its branches in France, England, and elsewhere remained active for a generation and his Parisian house on Monsieur-le-Prince continues to be maintained as a museum and shrine. Positivism found a particularly receptive soil among modernisers in South America. The Brazilian flag is still emblazoned with the motto “*Ordem e Progresso*.” De Coubertin's project for a modern Olympic Games was partly inspired by Comtean ideas. History, however, has not been kind to Comte. His labyrinthine systems building, not to mention his religious programme, fell out of favour even during his lifetime. His positivism has often been confused with the atheoretical empiricism that “positivism” more usually connotes. The organicist and historicist cast of his social thought belongs to a bygone age, as do his “scientific” assumptions about human nature. Libertarians have found his corporatist “sociocracy” repellent.

Yet Comte's influence on the subsequent development of social theory, especially in France, via sociology, anthropology, and the history of science, has been extensive, if largely unrecognised. Aspects of Comte's philosophy of science were taken up by Bachelard, Canguilhem, and Machery. The Durkheimian school, while it rejected Comte's wider system, retained his emphasis on the irreducibility of social facts. It also propounded a liberal and neo-Kantian version of his perspective on the transitional crisis of industrialism. Mannheim's sociology of knowledge owes much to Comte, and much more so Althusser's structuralist attempt to reformulate Marx without Hegel. Nor is Comte only of historical interest. While today, Comte's system is an abandoned ruin, some of its characteristic themes continue to resonate. These range from the place of sociology in reflexive modernisation, and the injection of community values into the polity as a strategy against social dissolution, to the humanist project of a benign globalisation. The clash of “philosophies” about which Comte wrote has changed its masks but has not abated. We do not have to share Comte's inflated role for consciousness or his horror of chaos. But the thinking of

the person who, in the early stages of modern social theory, reflected so single-mindedly on these issues remains worthy of critical attention.

— Andrew Wernick

See also Althusser, Louis; Durkheim, Émile; Maistre, Joseph de; Saint-Simon, Claude-Henri de; Statics and Dynamics

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CONFLICT THEORY

Conflict theorizing originated in Europe in the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Georg Simmel. In its more modern guise, conflict theory is an American invention, despite the fact that its reemergence in the mid-twentieth century was inspired by European and European-origin critics of structural functionalism. Early criticisms of functionalism came from David Lockwood and Ralf Dahrendorf, who argued that functional theory, especially the version practiced by Talcott Parsons, presented an overly integrated view of social organization that could not account for conflict and change. This critique was buttressed by immigrant critical theorists and, curiously, by Lewis Coser, another European immigrant, who argued that both conflict and functional theories were too extreme, requiring an assessment of the functions of conflict. These criticisms became ritualistic attacks on functionalism as American academia emerged from the repression of Marxist (communist-sounding) thought during the McCarthy era in the 1950s and as the student unrest of the 1960s accelerated during the course of the Vietnam War. Functionalism was seen as ideologically conservative and as providing justification for the status quo. All of these

criticisms were overdrawn, and most did not lead to new theorizing but, instead, caused the collapse of functional theorizing, especially the action theory of Talcott Parsons.

Yet the critique of functionalism did legitimate a revival of the European conflict tradition in the United States; and by the mid-1970s, Marx's and Weber's approaches were being recast into modern conflict theory, with occasional use of Simmel's ideas. Three lines of conflict theorizing emerged in America, two devoted to reviving Marx and Weber (again, with Simmelian elements) and a third combining elements of both Marx and Weber. These can be labeled, for convenience, *neo-Marxist*, *neo-Weberian*, and *historical-comparative* conflict theory. Alongside these general theories were more specific theories associated with social movements and identity politics (e.g., ethnicity and gender). Critical theorizing, however, did not enjoy the same revival in America, remaining predominately a European enterprise or being incorporated into the revival of Marxian conflict theory.

NEO-MARXIAN CONFLICT THEORIZING

Within the United States, the Marxian tradition was revived in a number of ways. All variants of this approach emphasized that patterns of inequality generate inherent conflicts of interest that lead subordinates to become aware of their interest in changing the system of stratification through mobilization for conflict.

Positivistic Marxism

The most influential approach was by Ralf Dahrendorf (1959), a European who emphasized Marx's dialectic and blended this imagery with useful elements from both Weber and Simmel. In essence, Dahrendorf tried to abstract above Marx's empirical categories (e.g., proletarians, bourgeoisie) so that they could apply to any pattern of social organization revealing a system of authority, which he labeled an *imperative coordinated association*, or an ICA. The task then became one of specifying the conditions under which subordinates in an ICA became aware of their interests in changing the distribution of authority and, then, in mobilizing to pursue conflict of varying degrees of intensity (emotional involvement) and violence. Dahrendorf's approach was decidedly positivistic in that he generated propositions specifying the conditions under which awareness of interests, intensity, and violence would vary. In addressing the questions of intensity and violence, Dahrendorf borrowed from Simmel's and Weber's respective critiques of Marx, arguing (against Marx) that the more subordinates are aware of their interests and organized to pursue conflict, the less intense and violent is the conflict with superordinates in an ICA; conversely, the less clearly articulated are the interests of subordinates and the less coherent their organization to

pursue conflict, the more violent is conflict when it erupts, especially if (1) rates of upward mobility for subordinates are low, (2) authority is highly correlated with the distribution of other valued resources, and (3) deprivations among subordinates escalate suddenly. A similar effort to use Weber's and Simmel's critique of Marx was performed by the American theorist Jonathan Turner (1975). None of these more positivistic theories was accepted by die-hard Marxists because they underemphasize the evaluative and emancipatory thrust of Marx's ideas.

Analytical Marxism

Eric Olin Wright (1997) is perhaps the most significant American theorist to sustain Marx's evaluation of stratification systems, while trying to take account of the problems that Marx's analysis presents. Wright has, over the last four decades, developed a kind of analytical Marxism that, unlike critical Marxism, does not distrust science. Instead, Wright's Marxism tries to take account of three vexing problems of postindustrial societies: (1) the increasing number of middle social classes (an empirical fact that goes against Marx's prediction of polarization of populations in capitalist societies into only the bourgeoisie and proletariat), (2) the diffusion of ownership with joint stock companies (and the corresponding separation of management from ownership), and (3) the increasing number of individuals employed by government (a nonprofit enterprise). At the same time, Wright wants to retain Marx's idea of exploitation whereby superordinates gain wealth from the surplus value of labor.

The basic analytical scheme emphasizes that the existing class system limits both class formation and class struggle, while class struggle will transform class structure and class formation. For Wright, neo-Marxian theory needs to specify the mechanisms generating class formation and class struggle, within the limitations imposed by the existing class structure. Class formation and struggle are influenced by the *material interests* of actors, or their total package of income from both economic activity and welfare; the *lived experiences* of individuals as dictated by their class location, as determined by their jobs in the highly differentiated economies of capitalist systems; and the *collective capacities* of individuals that become problematic because of occupational differentiation and proliferation of middle classes. Thus, the key forces of class analysis do not line up as neatly as they do in Marxian theory, especially when middle-class families can have contradictory class locations (and hence varying material interests and lived experiences that work against mobilization for conflict) and when government employs a high proportion of the workforce. Wright has posited a number of concepts to take account of these new complexities, but he has not fully been able to sustain the emphasis on exploitation, whether by business

or government. Indeed, because individuals have diverse class locations and lived experiences, they are less likely to use their collective capacities to engage in class struggle.

As the problems of reconciling Marxian categories to modern realities have become evident, an alternative form of Marxian analysis emerged in the 1970s in American sociology. This approach, in essence, shifted the unit of analysis from the nation-state to systems of relations among nations. Immanuel Wallerstein's (1974) work was the most influential, although not the first to adopt this form of Marxian analysis. Wallerstein divided history into the formation of world empires through military activities and world economy composed of core states of approximately equal military power; a periphery of weak states whose cheap labor and natural resources could be extracted through exploitive trade arrangements; and a few semiperipheral states standing between the core and periphery (whether as minor nations in the core area or as leading nations in poor regions). In many ways, the distinction between the core and periphery is similar to Marx's view of the bourgeoisie and proletariat, and the underlying evaluative argument is much the same: As capitalism goes global, the contradictions of capitalism will be exposed as competition between core states increases and as subordinate states resist exploitation, leading to the final collapse of capitalism and the emergence of a socialist alternative. Whatever the merits of the endgame, world-systems analysis has proven to be fertile new territory for Marxian theory. Much of the analysis is highly technical, revolving around cyclical tendencies of world economies (e.g., Kondratieff waves, Juglar cycles, and hegemonic sequences), while other approaches have emphasized the nature of exploitation of poor nations by their dependency on rich countries for technology and capital. Still other approaches have viewed the world system as a kind of dynamic machine whose operation constrains the internal dynamics of societies.

In sum, then, Marx's view of the social universe as rife with conflicts of interests between those who gain wealth at the expense of others persists in theoretical sociology at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The emancipatory thrust of Marx's theory is also retained in most neo-Marxian schemes, particularly as the more positivistic variants have fallen into obscurity or been incorporated into mainstream theorizing, thereby losing their distinctiveness.

NEO-WEBERIAN CONFLICT THEORIZING

Max Weber's implicit critique of Marx appears not only within the more positivistic neo-Marxian camp but also in theoretical approaches more directly in tune with Weber's sociology. Part of Weber's conflict theory reappears in historical-comparative analysis, to be examined below, but in the 1970s, Randall Collins (1975) developed a general

theory of social processes that had Weber's ideas on conflict at its core. Although Collins blended his approach with ideas from microsocial theories and from Émile Durkheim, the basic view of social organization is Weberian. Social reality unfolds at the microlevel through interaction rituals that when chained together, produce stratification systems and class cultures as well as organizational systems, which, in turn, generate more macrostructures that can range from the state and economy to the dynamics of geopolitical systems.

At any level of social reality, there is always inequality in the distribution of material, symbolic, and political resources, with the potential for conflict always present between individuals engaged in face-to-face interaction, within organizations, between classes and class cultures, and between societies. Although Collins used the label of *conflict sociology* for his approach, it is a much more general theory of how macrostructures are built from microlevel encounters. At the microlevel, Collins portrays individuals as seeking to enhance their cultural capital and emotional energy by using their resources to advantage and, if they do not possess resources, to limit their expenditure of cultural capital and emotion in rituals where they are at a resource disadvantage. At the mesolevel of social organization, Collins portrays organizations as control systems, with those having coercive, symbolic, and material resources using their advantage to gain conformity from those who resist these efforts. Early analysis of stratification systems emphasized variations in class cultures, but in more recent work, Collins has challenged the layered view of class hierarchy so prevalent in Marxian sociology. For if one looks at what actually occurs in public spaces, the deference and demeanor patterns typical of clear hierarchies have broken down in modern societies, with those in less advantaged resource positions controlling public and interpersonal space vis-à-vis those who occupy resource-advantaged positions. At the macrolevel, Collins has examined conflict within a society in terms of the ability of state to regulate internal activities, with this capacity resting, in turn, on the level of production in the economy and the level of control by the state of coercive, symbolic, and material resources.

Turning to geopolitics, Collins (1986) has borrowed from Weber's analysis and developed a theory that seeks to explain how empires expand, and when they are likely to collapse. Initial advantages in economic resources, military technology, and geography (marchland advantage) allow a state to expand through military conquest, but as the marchland advantage is lost (with ever-more enemies on its expanding borders) as resources are spent to control territory, as logistical loads of moving resources about the territory increase, as hostile neighbors copy the military technologies of an expanding empire, and as other powerful empires are threatened, the advantages that allowed an

empire to expand are also lost, thereby creating conditions that will lead to its collapse.

COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL CONFLICT THEORY

Theories of conflict within the comparative-historical tradition emphasize two related sets of factors. One set of factors is the conditions that lead subordinate masses to mobilize ideologically, politically, and organizationally to pursue conflict against the state and elites who dominate them. The second set of factors is the forces that lead to the breakdown in the state's power and hence its capacity to control a population. The first factor has a Marxian emphasis, with Weberian refinement, whereas the second is more in line with Weber's concerns about the capacity of the state to dominate a population. Several prominent theorists have worked on specific questions and sets of historical data, but all have been concerned with the likelihood that a revolution will occur. Since revolutions have been rather rare historically, theorists have tended to work with the same societies in which violent overthrow of the state has occurred. And though each theory tends to be somewhat embedded within the specific historical time frames, all of these theories contain implicit theoretical statements that have general applicability to all societies.

MORE MARXIAN THAN WEBERIAN APPROACHES

Moore's Theory of Dictatorship and Democracy. One of the earliest contemporary theories in America is Barrington Moore's (1966) comparative study of the conditions producing dictatorships or democracies, with the implicit assumption that dictatorships would be more likely to generate conflict-producing tensions. If we abstract above the specific historical details, Moore can be seen as borrowing from Marx in emphasizing that the masses will become mobilized to pursue conflict when they constitute a coherent whole in terms of their structural location, experiences, and routines; when they experience deprivations collectively; when they can avoid competition with each other over resources; when traditional connections between subordinates and superordinates are weakening; and when subordinates perceive that superordinates are exploiting them.

Paige's Theory of Agrarian Revolution. Jeffrey Paige's (1975) work on revolts in agrarian societies was one of the first to adapt Marx's ideas to mass mobilizations of peasants in agrarian societies. Arguing that Marx's ideas are more relevant to agrarian than industrial societies, he sought to develop a series of generalizations about conflict between cultivators (agricultural workers) and noncultivators (owners/managers/elites). For Paige, economic exploitation alone will not lead to mass mobilization; rather, revolutionary conflict will occur when economic

conflict moves into the political arena. Like Marx, Paige posits a number of conditions that translate the inherent conflict of interest between cultivators and noncultivators into mass mobilization by cultivators: one is cultivators' receptiveness to radical ideologies, which increases when ties to the land are tenuous and unstable, and decreases when cultivators live on the edge, have few work alternatives, and reside in traditional/paternalistic communities. Another is collective solidarity, which increases when workers have high interdependence and when workers have had past success in collective action. Whether or not mobilization by cultivators will lead to collective action by the mass of workers depends upon the actions of noncultivators. If noncultivators do not themselves possess great economic advantages and, as a consequence, enlist actors in the state to engage in repressive control, then mass mobilization of workers is more likely. Conversely, if noncultivators have resources, can shift to capital-intensive processing of crops (i.e., mechanization), and can afford to hire free labor on open markets, they can engage in less repressive control and force cultivators to engage in collective negotiation.

MORE WEBERIAN THAN MARXIAN THEORIES

Tilly's Resource Mobilization Theory. Resource mobilization theory has been developed outside comparative historical sociology, but one of its creators, Charles Tilly (1978), has used this approach to analyze historical cases. Tilly distinguishes between a revolutionary situation punctuated by demonstrations, riots, social movements, civil wars, and the like against the state, and revolutionary outcomes where there is a real transfer of state power. The first part of his theory emphasizes the conditions that produce a revolutionary situation: multiple contenders to state power, large or elite segments of the population willing to support contenders to power, and inability and unwillingness of the state to use repressive control. A revolutionary outcome decreases when the state can mobilize coercive resources (with a standing army not preoccupied with geopolitical conflict), when it can make strategic but not too costly concessions to potential contenders so as to increase symbolic legitimacy for the state, and when the state is strong fiscally so that it can afford to support its coercive forces while spending resources to make key concessions.

Skocpol's Theory of States and Social Revolutions. Building upon both Moore's and Tilly's theories, with Weber's emphasis on the state's geopolitical situation, Theda Skocpol (1979) has developed an implicit theory of revolutionary conflict. For revolution to occur, the masses must be capable of mobilizing, and the likelihood of such mobilization increases with their ability to generate solidarity, to avoid direct supervision by superordinates, to perform

crucial economic activities for superordinates, and to have organizational resources. This mobilization, Skocpol argues, will lead to full-scale and successful social revolution when the central coercive apparatus of the state is weak, when the state experiences a fiscal crisis, when the state's power relative to dominant sectors of the society is declining, and when the state loses a war and its place in the geopolitical system, thereby undermining further its symbolic and coercive bases of power.

Goldstone's Theory of State Breakdown. Jack Goldstone (1991) adds a new variable to these historical-comparative theories of revolutions in agrarian societies: population growth. There is a lag time between initial population growth and the effects of this growth on political stability. Eventually, the economy cannot meet the needs of the growing population, nor can it provide the state sufficient resources for administration, coercive control, and patronage to elites and non-elites. Non-elites become mobilized to pursue conflict when demand for goods exceeds the capacity of the economy to produce them, when rapid inflation ensues as demand outstrips supply, and when rural misery leads to the immigration of the young to urban areas, where they become concentrated and more likely to mobilize. State breakdown is also related to elite mobilization against the state; and this source of mobilization increases as population growth causes price inflation that forces traditional landholding elites to seek patronage from the state in order to prevent their downward mobility. At the same time, upwardly mobile non-elites benefiting from price inflation in commerce seek patronage from the state as confirmation of their new status as potential elites. State breakdown becomes ever more likely as fiscal crises increase as a result of poor taxation formulas, patronage paid to elites, and military adventurism. And these forces together—mass mobilization, elite mobilization, and fiscal crisis—all act in concert to cause a state breakdown.

DOES CONFLICT THEORY STILL EXIST?

In many ways, conflict theory is an American invention that reflected a particular time: the growing dissatisfaction with functional theory, the repression of all Marxian (communist) ideas in the 1950s, the inability of existing theories (e.g., symbolic interactionism) to provide a viable alternative to functional theory, and the growing unrest embodied in first the student movement and then the anti-Vietnam War movement. In Europe, sociologists and public intellectuals had engaged in conflict-oriented analysis for many decades; and so, there was little need to proclaim a conflict theory that would compensate for past theoretical sins. By the time functionalism had receded in prominence in the 1970s, conflict theory was already waning, although its merger into the theoretical mainstream was not so evident

until the final decade of the twentieth century. Today, the topics emphasized by the conflict theories of the 1960s and 1970s are so thoroughly incorporated into the theoretical canon that they need not be highlighted by the term *conflict theory*. Few sociologists would dispute the centrality to sociological theory of inequality in the distribution of resources (material, political, symbolic) and the tensions that such inequality systematically generates in human groupings. Indeed, a good portion of general theory in many different traditions takes this core idea as its starting point. Conflict theory, therefore, is now so mainstream that it no longer needs to be labeled as distinctive.

What, then, can we take from the several decades of relative dominance of a conflict approach to understanding the social order? First, conflict theory did balance the tendency of functional theory to overemphasize integration, although the criticism was always overdrawn and often worked to push out of the canon some of the important ideas of functional theorizing that, perhaps, will have to be rediscovered in the future. Second, conflict theory encouraged the analysis of conflict dynamics in many substantive specialties of sociology, such as family, gender, education, organizations, law, culture, and communities, and it reinvigorated other areas, such as collective behavior, social movements, ethnic relations, historical sociology, stratification, and political sociology. Third, it was one of the moving forces behind new areas of sociological inquiry, such as world-systems analysis and the study of globalization. And perhaps most significantly, it left behind a series of theoretical principles that can be used in almost any context where inequalities are evident.

What are these principles? They can be found in the explicit statements of the positivistic forms of conflict theory, or they can be extracted from more discursive approaches that do not enumerate explicit propositions. These propositions highlighted the conditions under which subordinates in a system of inequality become mobilized to pursue conflict as well as the conditions that increase or decrease the intensity and violence of the conflict. Conflict theory did less well in articulating the conditions that generate inequality *per se*, although some conflict-oriented theorists did make an effort to specify these conditions beyond what Marx had sought to do in his analysis of capitalism (Turner 1984).

One strength of conflict theory, then, resides in specifying the conditions under which subordinates become mobilized to pursue conflict. Subordinates are more likely to mobilize when inequality is high, when upward mobility is low, when subordinates are in ecological propinquity and can communicate their grievances to each other, when relative deprivation (and the emotions that this generates) is experienced collectively, when superordinates are not in a position or do not have the resources to monitor and control the routines of subordinates, when subordinates possess

organizational, political, material, and symbolic (ideological) resources, when leadership among subordinates can emerge, and when superordinates are unable to repress or co-opt subordinates and cannot institutionalize conflict through law. Obviously, there are more factors involved, but these are the ones that emerged from conflict sociology in America during the middle decades of the twentieth century.

A second area of strength in conflict theory is its ability to specify the conditions under which the emotional involvement and the potential violence to conflict will increase. Emotions are aroused when deprivations escalate suddenly and can be experienced collectively, whereas violence increases when subordinates have begun to mobilize (ideologically, organizationally, and politically) but not to the degree that their goals and means to achieve these goals are clearly articulated.

A third area of strength in conflict theory is specification of the conditions that increase the likelihood of successful collective mobilization. Here, the capacities of superordinates to mobilize become critical. If superordinates are well organized and ideologically unified while possessing material and coercive resources, the likelihood of success in changing the distribution of power and other resources is reduced. If superordinates are highly dependent upon the outputs of subordinates for their well-being and cannot get these outputs from alternative sources, then superordinates will be more likely to negotiate with subordinates, thereby allowing the latter to realize some of their goals. These negotiations will be more successful if subordinates are sufficiently organized to have clear goals that can be subject to negotiation. And if a system of law exists to mediate and enforce agreements, then subordinates are likely to be at least partially successful in realizing their goals.

Again, various theories add refinements to these generalizations, but one point should be emphasized in closing: Conflict theories reveal a bias toward how successful or unsuccessful subordinates will be in mobilizing. When the theories are formally stated, this bias becomes immediately evident because the theories address the conditions under which subordinates will mobilize and be successful in forcing superordinates to redistribute valued resources. One could phrase the matter differently: Under what conditions can superordinates hang on to their privilege and prevent mobilization by superordinates? But this question would go against the ideological bias of the approach as it was initially inspired by Marx. Indeed, conflict theory implicitly adopts Marx's emancipatory goals, even in its more positivistic variants, because it emphasizes what it takes for subordinates to mobilize and be successful. Nonetheless, despite the obvious bias, conflict theorizing dramatically shifted the focus of theoretical sociology toward problems of inequality and conflict.

See also Globalization; Historical and Comparative Theory; Historical Materialism; Power; Revolution; Social Class; Social Movement Theory; State; Structural Functionalism; World-Systems Theory

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social structures, societies require material and symbolic resources that are used to sustain bodies, interactions, institutions, and organizations (Slater 1997). Hence, both historians and anthropologists have well-developed literatures on the material cultures and consumption structures of non-modern societies. To talk of a "consumer culture," however, is generally to make a much stronger set of claims: that initially in the modern West (but now increasingly as a global phenomenon), consumption was separated out from other social processes to become an identifiably separate sphere with recognizable identities, institutions, and values. This is often closely identified with the development of market capitalism. For example, in Marx's somewhat romanticized view, precapitalist society involved production of use-values directly for consumption by the immediate producers or by known others within small communities. The development of markets and the commodity form drives a wedge between production and consumption, as well as introducing a veil of mystification, so that workers produce commodities in exchange for wages that they will spend on consumption goods that they did not produce. Similarly, feminist scholars have focused on the related division between public and private spheres in modern life, which divides public social action (including paid work outside the home) from a private, primarily domestic, sphere of consumption.

In both cases, a sphere of consumption is formed that is closely identified with the reproduction of meaningful everyday lives and identities within modern society (as opposed to the alienated spheres of work and political action); and the figure of "the consumer" appears as an identifiable social role for the first time in history. In positive versions, generally elaborated within liberal and utilitarian thought, the consumer represents an archetypal modern social subject, one who is "free to choose" on the basis of knowing his or her own wants and desires. However irrational these may be, the consumer is able rationally to calculate their intensity (particularly in relation to market prices) and to act accordingly. The consumer therefore contains the substantive underpinnings of the formally rational social subject of modern society. Thus, conventional economics, like liberal political thought, treats the private desires of individuals as sacrosanct and beyond judgement by social analysts or political actors. Similarly, the measure of a good modern social system is its ability to respond transparently and without moral judgement or political direction to the expressed preferences of the sovereign consumer through mechanisms such as markets or elections.

This has been a minority view within modern social thought, however. For the most part, both the consumer and consumer culture have been held to represent a range of debasements and degradations that characterize the modern. First, the consumer is able to act entirely on the basis of their preferences to the extent that they have the money

CONSUMER CULTURE

CONSUMER CULTURE IN CLASSICAL SOCIAL THEORY

Social theory has long debated the claim that consumption plays a uniquely central role in modern Western societies. The terms *consumer culture* and *consumer society* imply that modern social order can be defined by the place of consumption in both social action and social structure. At the same time, this characterization carries a potent moral and political charge: The labelling of modernity as a consumer culture is generally part of an overall critique, or apologetics, for the current state of the social.

Consumption is, of course, essential to any social order: To reproduce themselves as identifiable ways of life and

to finance them. From the eighteenth century onward, this marked a concern with the disintegration of traditional and collective forms of regulation, such as religion, status orders, and heredity, which previously tied consumption to stable social structures (for example, through sumptuary law). From that point onward, there is a continuous literature and debate on luxury and excessive consumption (that is, consumption beyond what had previously been appropriate to a given social status), as well as the fixation of modern subjects on material things and on money. For example, the figure of the “nouveau riche,” from Smollett through Veblen and on to Bourdieu, condenses wide contempt for social climbers whose new money allows them, under modern conditions of market freedom and status disorder, to buy whatever they can afford, without the inherited culture to exercise proper “taste.”

Indeed, the term *culture* is at the heart of critical invocations of “consumer culture.” The very idea of culture arises from the eighteenth century as a romantic appeal to the organic and “authentic” values of the premodern world we have lost within capitalist modernity, with reactionaries desiring a return to that past and radicals hoping to recover true culture in a future beyond capitalist rule by money. Modern consumer culture appears as a contradiction in terms from this point of view: Real culture can take the form only of values adhering to an organic way of life, whereas consumer culture contains merely false and manufactured values whose logic is given by market forces and social instability. An interesting example of this point of view is offered by Durkheim, for whom consumer culture is a pathological stage in the transition to the cult of the individual and to values appropriate to organic solidarity. For Durkheim, the incomplete formation of the modern individual has so far simply released social subjects from traditional regulation and an understanding of the limits of their desires. They now know no bounds. Consumer culture is therefore one example of the kind of sudden reversal of fortune (either positive or negative) that produces an anomic state, a condition without legitimate social or cultural order.

A second line of critique is predominantly, but not exclusively, Marxist, and focuses more on power (though it comes to similar conclusions about the inauthenticity of consumer culture). The supposed freedom of the individual as consumer is merely formal and hence part of the ideological self-representation of capitalism. This is because it is founded on several interconnected forms of alienation that make modern subjects both materially and cognitively unfree. For Marx, these forms of unfreedom stem directly from the commodity form, particularly the commodification of labour as labour power. Marx derives from Hegel a human essence that is grounded in the way humans knowingly transform nature in relation to their needs and, in so doing, increasingly refine an objective world through which

they themselves can develop as a species. However, in market capitalism, this dialectic is broken, on one hand, into the sale of human’s self-making capacity as labour power in exchange for wages and, on the other hand, the purchase of apparently independent consumable objects, goods that have no conscious connection to the workers’ human capacity of creative praxis. In practical terms, this happens under conditions of technical exploitation, such that workers individually receive a wage lower than the value they actually produce and such that collectively, as a class, they are unable to purchase the goods they have produced. Hence, consumer culture involves the production of poverty along with untold wealth.

In cognitive terms, the needs and subjectivity of the modern subject are developed according to the logic of exchange value and the need of capitalists to sell them what they can profitably produce, rather than what their own species evolution would demand. Marx is not a puritan or voluntary simplicity advocate, however. He allocates capitalism a heroic role in developing a historically unprecedented productive capacity to generate new use-values for his core ethical subject, the human who is “rich in needs” (i.e., one who is evolving ever more sophisticated needs in dialectical relation to an ever more refined object world; cf. Simmel’s subsequent theorization of a dialectic between objective and subjective culture; Simmel 1950). The problem for Marx is that capitalist exploitation actually reduces the bulk of the population to “animal needs,” while those who share in its profits develop false needs that dance to the tune of exchange value.

Subsequent Marxist and other critical perspectives have developed one or another of these themes. Most influential have probably been critiques of reification that develop from Lukács (with large borrowings from Weber and Simmel) through the Frankfurt school and on to Habermas. For Lukács, production and exchange under conditions of alienation have produced an object world that is thing-like and appears as if natural, rather than social or historical. Modern social subjects are reduced to a “contemplative attitude,” passively observing and accepting the structure of consumption and their relationship to it. Everyday life, centred on passive consumption, becomes increasingly meaningless and trivial, involving making merely banal choices that have already been structured by the system itself. Much as in later Situationist work on the “society of the spectacle,” adopted fairly wholesale in Baudrillard’s later work on the “silent majorities” of modern consumerism, being a consumer involves passive participation in capitalist self-representation that is entirely false and only partially believed in even by its participants. Moreover, in embracing the consumer role, modern social subjects generally have bargained away real possibilities for social power over their historical fate, giving up battles in the workplace over production and in the political sphere over power in exchange

for the restricted or false power to choose between commodities within their private spheres.

The characterization of consumer culture as a set of false compensations for an actual loss of power and authenticity is even more strongly drawn in Frankfurt school theory. For Adorno and Horkheimer (1979), for example, consumption is part of a mass culture (and culture is dominated by the values and logics of the capitalist structure of consumption of exchange values). Cultural values are elaborated according to the need of the culture industries to produce exchange values with reliable hopes for mass sale. Consumer culture therefore does not simply involve selling cultural goods on the marketing place; it integrates the logic of exchange value at every point in their production and circulation. Consumers themselves are integrated into this logic on the basis of their alienation, in a process described by Lowenthal as “psychoanalysis in reverse”: Reduced by capitalist modernity to powerless disorganization, consumers are offered a range of false promises and temporary escapes from reality, but at a price—the need to work harder for more money to buy more escapism. In Marcuse’s (1964) account, for example, capitalism has already achieved its historic mission to develop the technical capacity to abolish the struggle for existence, but within relations of production that require an ongoing struggle for profit on an expanded scale. The system therefore needs modern subjects to continue to have needs for commodities and to continue to labour for wages. The maintenance of the system therefore requires intensified “surplus repression,” the production of the greater number of needs and wants that the system itself needs and wants. This production of unnecessary needs has to be built upon the individual’s real instinctual basis (e.g., the advertising association of sexual satisfactions with objects such as cars and drinks), but by that very process mystifies the individual’s relationship to their real needs, which are the main source of their ability to oppose the system that mystifies them.

Although derived from quite other branches of Marxism, French regulation theory and other theories of Fordism and post-Fordism play on a similar theme (Aglietta 1979). “Fordism,” for example, is an analysis of capitalist society from around 1880 to the 1970s as a historical compromise in which modern mass production required both subjects who are both docile workers (accepting the discipline of systematised and Taylorized large-scale manufacturing processes) and willing consumers (absorbing the ensuing high-volume, low-unit cost output of standardized goods). Fordism traded workplace meaning and control in exchange for higher wages (stabilized and backed by national collective bargaining between employers, government, and trade unions), providing that workers sought meaning entirely in the buildup of domestic capital through commodity consumption. The shift to post-Fordism ostensibly involves a move from mass consumption to segmented

markets and customised, small-batch production, giving consumers a potentially more creative role, but one still functional to the needs of contemporary forms of production.

Throughout these approaches, the presence of consumer culture signals that the needs of the individual have been made functional to the continuation of capitalist modernity, politically, ideologically, and, above all, economically. Indeed, such approaches can easily be criticised as “productivist” or even economistic: Although consumption plays a central role in the reproduction of capitalist society, its structure, meaning, and dynamic are determined by the moment of production. Consumption is largely studied in terms of the control of producers over consumers, through advertising, design, retail technologies, and broader forms of ideological control. Indeed, the consumer is generally characterized as passive, mystified, inauthentic, and dominated, as a subjectivity to be critiqued and dismantled.

This view of consumer culture has changed radically over the past 20 years, coincidentally with both the rise of a major new research interest in consumption and with shifts from classical social theory (including Marxism) toward postmodern analyses in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the more active construction of the consumer as real agency has survived the demise of postmodern theory. The sources of this new take on consumer culture are various, but central to the story is the rise of (particularly British) cultural studies. This emerging discipline aimed to treat popular culture as an important site and resource for negotiating social conflicts, above all, class and generational struggles (Hebdige 1979; Willis 1990). Rather than dismiss commercially produced culture as irremediably compromised, cultural studies demonstrated how youth and ethnic cultures used the materials at hand by reinterpreting, recycling, and subverting them. The punks’ safety pin jewellery and bin bag clothes turned mundane commodities into tools for mediating a range of social struggles. British cultural studies originally tried to pursue this line of argument through an expanded Marxism, first through structuralist Marxism, which gave greater value to ideological struggles, but at the cost of reducing social subjects to complete passivity. The next step was to use the work of Gramsci to produce far less deterministic theoretical accounts more in tune with the range of case study material that was being produced. By the mid-1980s, this line of development was completely overtaken by postmodern and poststructuralist thought. Some postmodernists, such as Baudrillard (and in a more modulated vein, Jameson), were very close to the reification theorists from whom they derived with a reading of consumer culture as pure symbolic manipulation of passive consumers (whose only “resistance” is to devour more), in which the hyperreality of consumption codes simulates and replaces the social in its entirety.

The main line of postmodern thought on consumption was, however, far more positive. Like subcultural consumption,

even the most apparently mundane and conformist consumption might be read as unpredictable, open-ended, and capable of sustaining subversion and resistance. Starting from research into explicitly cultural consumption (how people read texts such as books, film, and TV), cultural studies made the point that texts (and objects) are contradictory and polysemic entities whose meanings are not necessarily going to be those that the producer desired or intended and that social subjects are also contradictory, open-ended, and underdetermined. No doubt this research agenda has led in some wrong-headed directions. First, it has overstated consumer creativity and agency and understated issues of power and inequality. At some points, it seemed hard to distinguish from liberal (or even from contemporary neoliberal) celebrations of the consumer marketplace as a playground of ironic, reflexive, sophisticated stylists, constructing pleasurable but unconstraining and disposable identities as they desired. The postmodern consumers in their shopping malls were like the old “sovereign consumers” with the addition of a trendy knowingness. Second, both the cultural studies and the postmodern turn tended to confuse social agency with subversion or rebellion. It now seems obvious that consumption requires agency: As anthropology continually shows, in order to consume, people need to make sense of needs, relationships, and objects and establish complex collective meanings and rituals that knit all three together. This requires active, and to some extent unpredictable, acts of interpretation and social negotiation. To expect all such consumption to be subversive as well as active is quite another matter. Indeed, the more radical point now seems to be that all consumption is a site of agency whether or not it also undermines received or imposed meanings. Hence, all consumption—even the most mundane and conformist—needs to be understood in relation to issues of power and constraint.

An important recent focus for exploring these issues has been provided by cross-cultural consumption. Earlier approaches to global consumption patterns increasingly assumed a homogenized market culture across the planet. Marx, for example, saw markets as inevitably dissolving local cultures, creating wage labour and commodity consumption wherever they penetrated. Mid- to late twentieth-century social theory assumed an intensified Americanization of the world, in which American media and commodities imposed both specific consumption patterns as well as a “culture-ideology of consumerism” that placed commodity choice at the centre of social life everywhere. This was strongly attacked, first, by media and cultural studies that emphasised the increasing complexity of global cultural flows (it is hard to sustain the idea of Americanization or a triumph of Hollywood in a South Asia completely dominated by “Bollywood” or a South America dominated by Brazilian and Mexican soap operas). Anthropologists such

as Appadurai (1995) emphasised the importance of regional powers that might be uneven and contradictory with respect to the different components of global cultural flows, such as flows of people, media products, finance, ideology, and so on. Finally, recent globalisation studies have sought to evade an either/or choice between global hegemonies and local autonomy. Instead, the stress has been on the dialectics between local and global, which one would expect to work out differently in different places and different cultural sectors. Consumer culture, from this perspective, is not simply a structure that is imposed or resisted; instead, consumption appears as a terrain on which different social subjects and orders might work out their relations to both local and non-local social processes (Miller 1987). The vastly different meanings and uses to which local people might assimilate global products, such as Coca-Cola or McDonald’s, or global objects, such as the Internet, testify to something more than the fact that things are different in different places. They suggest that consumption mediates global processes.

CONSUMPTION, MEANING, AND IDENTITY

This survey of basic social theoretical positions on consumption has so far paid scant attention to one of the fundamental issues that has concerned them: questions of meaning and identity. A quite pervasive approach to consumer culture starts from the idea that consumption is, or should be, primarily about the satisfaction of needs and that needs, as a concept, point to requirements that are in some respect limited and objective: We can say that “we need food” in a way that we cannot claim to “need” caviar or champagne. The idea of “basic needs” makes an even stronger claim to goods that are existentially or morally necessary to “a human life” (Sen 1985). *Needs* contrasts with terms such as *wants*, *desires*, *preferences*, or *luxuries*: demands for objects that are more subjective or cultural and that are regarded as less essential in some respect. In crude terms, many accounts of consumer culture assume a historical narrative in which greater wealth or productive power has led society out of the realm of necessity toward a condition in which an unlimited or insatiable range of less serious desires for less essential objects has arisen. These desires cannot be adjudicated with respect to objective criteria of need, precisely as neoclassical economists have always argued (except if one invokes ecological limits or the impoverishment of some parts of society to feed the wants of other parts).

A central premise in this line of thought is that one can analytically separate objectively functional goods from goods whose utility is more related to their meaning or cultural value. This has always looked untenable from the point of view of anthropology: No society consumes in a purely functional way in relation to objective needs

(indeed, this idea of function seems peculiar to Western modernity). No society, least of all the most nonmodern, eats “food” simply for caloric or other requirements; rather, their ideas of what is and is not food are developed within complex codes of meaning that generally connect food consumption to both social and cosmological order. As Mary Douglas once put it, “The choice between pounding and grinding [coffee] is . . . a choice between two different views of the human condition” (Douglas and Isherwood 1979:79). Douglas herself favoured provisionally dropping all analysis in terms of function in favour of treating goods entirely as information systems (though this seems equally misguided). Goods are used within social orders to mark out social categories, such as types of person and social status, temporal patterns and structures (daily meals or annual festivals), social occasions and rituals, social boundaries, and so on. Their use and exchange is therefore inseparable from their meaning within local cosmologies. Modern societies are no different in principle, though intensely complicated by the coexistence of plural and changing cosmologies and by the self-conscious and instrumental manipulation of consumption meanings by interested parties. A Christmas turkey in London marks familial relations and events just as surely as a peasant’s goose in rural France, but the same family might also celebrate Dhiwali with their neighbours and buy their turkey from a multinational grocer at the end of a complex chain of provision.

This kind of position has led in several directions. First, the appeal to basic needs has grounded a range of moral-political critiques of consumer culture. A classic example would be Baran and Sweezy’s (1977) neo-Marxist argument that we need to identify desires that are merely occasioned by the sales imperative arising from the commodity form; strip these away and one can return to rationally identifiable real needs. The same kinds of claims lay behind many ecological and voluntary simplicity arguments and equally ignore the fact that all societies, not just market-based ones, elaborate complex cultural systems of needs and wants.

Second, the division between real needs and culturally elaborated desires has formed the basis for arguments about consumption and social status. Most famously, Veblen’s ([1899] 1953) notions of status symbols and conspicuous leisure and consumption reduce consumption to the function of signifying status precisely by demonstrating the consumer’s *wastefulness*, their social distance from any useful labour that might serve to fulfil real needs. Such labour is assigned to women and subordinate males, who act upon an “instinct for workmanship” that is entirely addressed to the efficient, skillful production of utility. Veblen’s hilarious and overwrought satires constantly play upon the utter uselessness of all that goes by the name of culture or taste: It is not only a waste of time and resources, but that is precisely its sole function. Parallels are often

drawn between the work of Veblen and Bourdieu in this regard. Bourdieu (1984) too considers the social organization of taste from the point of view of its role in status competition, in the mapping out of social “distinction.” Consumer tastes are organized in complex and hierarchical systems of categorization such that “taste classifies the classifier”: My own expression of consumer preferences identifies me in terms of my categorization of good and bad taste and distinguishes me in relation to the categorization that you express through your choices. The content of these cultural orders is secondary to their function of social distinction; indeed, cultural value can arise only from social competition over the “hierarchy of (cultural) hierarchies,” not from any substantive or inherent properties of cultural goods. Moreover, the social actor’s accumulation of “cultural capital” within these hierarchies is not the only mode of interconnected social competitions: Bourdieu is equally concerned with the relation between cultural distinction and social, economic, and other forms of competition.

Third, as noted, there is a pervasive assumption that modernity is characterised by its ever-increasingly symbolic or aestheticized character, by the elaboration of cultural desires rather than meeting of basic needs. Obviously, this can involve a pejorative or romanticized view of the nonmodern, as well as some rather grand social structural claims about the nature of the modern or postmodern. The idea that modern consumption involves an expanded realm of meaning and culture actually starts in earliest modernity. Both David Hume and Adam Smith, drawing on even earlier psychological accounts of the basis of moral sense in emulation and interpersonal sympathies, argued that increased “commerce” between people—economic, social, and political—would increase their moral sense and their cultural complexities, producing both more civilized and more peaceful people (Campbell 1989). Marx, as we have seen, placed the man (*sic*) who becomes “rich in needs” through an expanded landscape of social and natural interaction as the aim of species evolution, and Simmel later made a case for increased human refinement through an expanded objective world, typified in the complex and pluralistic sensorium of urban life. In all these cases, consumption meanings, as opposed to functional filling of basic needs, are positively aligned with progress. Simmel’s account, however, offers the most contemporarily resonant version: The expansion of objective culture and sensation is beyond the capacity of subjective culture, beyond the capacity of individuals to assimilate without incurring confusion or “neuraesthesia.” Individuals therefore oscillate between an overexcited state of stimulation and its opposite, the “blasé attitude,” a kind of self-defending blotting out, or “greying out” of all these sensations, so that they all seem in a banal sense to be “the same.” Similarly, Benjamin’s (1989) “flaneur” is not so much a consumer as a scientific observer of the panoply of objects and socialities

of consumer culture: He is a scientist of consumption and the urban scene who goes “botanizing on the asphalt” rather than hectically indulging in consumption himself.

Anthony Giddens’s (1991) work develops a related diagnosis of consumer culture confusion. Today’s “posttraditional” society is marked by the loss of ascribed social status and identities and the increase of social pluralism, mediation, and an attitude of “methodical doubt.” Not only are old certainties lost, but in the new world, subjects are bombarded with images and direct experiences of diverse ways of life and of identities that could be adopted, while modern authorities such as science do not provide final answers, but rather ever-competing truth claims. To return to the example of food, modern eating involves the copresence of myriad ethnic food codes, diverse eating occasions with different and negotiable rules (“grazing” at home, business lunches, family gatherings, etc.), and a confusing welter of mediated food expertise (cooking programmes and editorials, health and diet experts, advocates of organic, vegetarian, or other food philosophies). At the same time, in the absence of ascribed and stable identities, the individual’s consumption is central to their identity construction: for example, their visible appearance is read as the outcome of their individually, freely adopted consumption choices, for which they are ethically responsible (if you are “fat,” it is because you have chosen a certain lifestyle; you could have acted differently through diet or exercise). Consumer culture is therefore something like permanent identity crisis, with a constant state of anxiety and risk attached and little possibility of establishing what is right or correct consumption because there is constant change and competition of lifestyles.

The claim that modern life has become increasingly “aestheticized,” awash with commercial signs and organized increasingly through a semiotic logic, has intensified over the past few decades. Early semiotics attempted to provide a general methodology that addressed the meaningful character of all social objects, their character as signs within language, like codes of meaning, including second-order, ideological organizations of meaning. This methodological argument gradually turned into a set of historical claims about the social transformation of capitalist society, largely through the work of Baudrillard. In his account, the semiotic order of meaning has historically shifted so that the use-value of goods no longer functions as a referent grounded in an objective order of things and needs. Sign-value, the position of goods within malleable codes of meaning, is now primary and socially precedes and directs both interactions with the material world and social relationships. Indeed, social bonds are now constructed through the order of signs (e.g., in the notion of “lifestyle”) rather than through objective structures such as class or gender. In this account, the division between objective needs and cultural wants positively obliterates the social itself.

The idea that symbolic processes, often focused around consumption and marketing, are now central to economic and social life is not peculiar to postmodernism. Theories of post-Fordism, as well as more recent accounts of the information economy, knowledge economy, network economy, or “linguistic capitalism” (see Mark Poster 2001, *What’s the Matter with the Internet?*) all presume an ever-intensifying “dematerialization” of both commodities and their production processes. The claim is that production is now dominated by knowledge and data, with a specific focus on design, product development, and marketing, and that the symbolic aspects of commodities are now central to their production, distribution, and consumption.

Although consumption and consumer culture have a long history within modern social theory, its place has been generally subordinate to grander issues, and its function has generally been ethical and political: Consumption has served as a barometer of sociocultural progress or degradation. The huge volume of literature on consumption produced over the past 20 years or so has been more substantive, more empirical, and more focused on consumption as an issue in its own right. While this has produced some larger social theoretical claims, particularly with regard to postmodernism and post-Fordism, it might well be a sign of the health and maturity of a subdiscipline that it has become less concerned with theory and more focused on middle-range and empirically grounded conceptualisations of contemporary social processes.

— Don Slater

See also Bourdieu, Pierre; Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Frankfurt School; Giddens, Anthony; McDonaldization; Means of Consumption; Postmodernism; Veblen, Thorstein

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CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

Since the early 1960s, beginning with the work of Harvey Sacks and Emmanuel Schegloff, conversation analysis (CA) has grown into an international interdisciplinary enterprise. The approach was inspired by both Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel, largely through their mutual connection with Harvey Sacks, who with Emmanuel Schegloff was a student of Goffman at Berkeley. Goffman and Garfinkel exchanged work in the early 1950s, and the three, Sacks, Goffman, and Garfinkel, met in the late 1950s. From then on, Sacks continued to meet with Garfinkel, and his first studies in the detailed analysis of conversation emerged from the convergence of his Goffman-inspired interest in the moral commitment involved in interaction and Garfinkel's insistence on an ethnomethodological (EM) study of the details involved in the production of that moral commitment, and the fragility of intelligibility that required it.

Since those early days, CA and EM have increasingly staked out separate intellectual ground. CA, largely because it was identified as a rigorous methodology, was taken up into many disciplines, while EM, insisting that it remain a total approach, remained more difficult. The reputation of CA as a rigorous new approach to the study of both language and social order was established in particular through the foundational paper on turntaking, first published in 1977, "The Simplest Systematics for Turntaking in Conversation." Written by Harvey Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson (a student and associate of Sacks at the time), the paper established an "economy of

turns," and preferences related to turntaking orders, as the basic organizing feature of *all* social orders. This article was augmented by important work on assessments by Anita Pomerantz and on presequences by Alene Terasaki, both students of Sacks. Work by Schegloff on repair and conversational sequencing and his sophisticated critiques of established linguistic and philosophical approaches to language was essential to establishing the CA enterprise. Finally, the lectures of Harvey Sacks, given between 1964 and his death in 1975 (carefully transcribed by Gail Jefferson), circulated widely in Xerox form among students the world over for more than 20 years (before finally being published in their entirety by Cambridge University Press, edited and introduced by Schegloff), made a huge impact on thinking about not only conversational orders, but orders of practice in all disciplines.

The basic idea advanced by Sacks was that conversation is orderly in its details and that those details manifest themselves in the form of turn types, turn transitions, membership categorization devices, and many forms of indexicality (words and sentence fragments with multiple possible meanings) designed to guarantee that participants fulfill hearing and listening requirements. According to Sacks, these requirements must be displayed by all participants at most points in any interaction if conversation and interaction are to succeed. This solves the problem posed by ordinary language philosophers as to how persons can know whether or not the other has understood what was said (see Paul Grice for a classic discussion of this problem) and also introduces an inevitable moral dimension to interaction.

According to Sacks, the ability of a speaker to take a recognizably intelligible turn next, after a prior turn (given a sufficient degree of indexicality in the talk), guarantees they have understood. Thus, Sacks argued that speaking in indexical fragments, which linguistically would appear to be a problem, is a highly efficient device for ensuring mutual intelligibility. It ensures that all participants who take turns are fulfilling their listening and hearing requirements and either understand what has been said or display their lack of understanding in their next turn. That is why, according to Sacks, the person who fails to speak at all is so suspicious. Even speaking last demonstrates attention to a long sequence of turns. But not speaking at all or speaking to a different topic (as those we refer to as "mentally ill" often do) demonstrates nothing about one's attention and trustworthiness.

The position taken by Sacks is, in general respects, consistent with Wittgenstein's argument that meaning is established through conventions of use. However, instead of searching for a logical conceptual mapping of use meanings, as Wittgenstein's followers tended to do, Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, and Pomerantz set out to locate specific details of conversational exchange that provided for the recognizability of use conventions to speakers. This

essentially altered the problem of language from logical categorization, what Wittgenstein called “family resemblances” between terms, to documenting situated sequential details—from clarifying concepts to detailing practices. In doing so, CA focused on a phenomenon referred to as “recipient design,” a process in which each speaker, at each next conversational point, designs a turn at talk with the “other,” the recipient and the last turn in the conversation, heard or spoken by that recipient, in view. The recipient, in turn, will hear the talk as oriented specifically toward his or her position in the current sequential ordering of turns in the current interactional situation.

All conversational preference orders have direct implications for what can be done next in conversation and how immediately prior utterances can be heard to follow from those before. The general position on the problem of indexicality and social order was articulated by Sacks and Garfinkel in “On Formal Structures of Practical Action.” They established each interaction as a context for what occurs within it, but a context that is in essential ways independent of broader social contexts, except insofar as they act as, what Garfinkel called, “contexts of accountability.”

Thus, via “context-free/context-sensitive” character of recipient design, it became possible to move away from generalities involved in words and focus instead on the enacted positioning of words in spoken sequences of turns. Each speaker orients toward both the positioning of the other’s turn and the positioning of his or her own turn following an immediately prior turn at talk, and does so such that turns are designed to be recognizable to other participants and responsive to the immediately prior concerns of those recipients (such as an indicated desire to take a turn, a missed turn, a misunderstanding, an indicated or anticipated disagreement, the need to leave, etc.). Thus, the sequential sensitivity of turns not only avoids the problem of adequate conceptual typification but also retains the general context of the immediate situation or conversation, as a whole, while avoiding the problem of “context” conceptualized as a generality.

Much of the sensitivity involved in such practices can be explained in terms of requirements Goffman argued were necessary to preserve the presentational self: preferences that preserve face and prevent embarrassment, for within-turn repair, or repair by speaker with minimal prompt by listener (Schegloff). But other details of conversational sequencing focus more directly on mutual intelligibility, a concern that owes more to Garfinkel: recognizing a conversational move or the relevance of an indexical expression to an utterance two turns earlier. The two concerns, for intelligibility and self, are so closely interwoven in most conversational preference orders that they cannot be separated.

This idea that turntaking preferences require a sensitivity to the intelligibility of conversation and also to the presentational selves of participants presents elements of both

“within-turn” and “between-turn” preference orders that transcend particular conversations. The importance of the “context-free/context-sensitive” character of particular conversations as a context, in place of the more popular but problematic idea of context as shared biographies or shared cultural values, has largely been missed. This has been particularly true in Europe, where the reception of CA and EM has been hampered by the priority placed on politics and morality, essential issues for which they have an enormous potential but have only recently begun to address. This oversight not only colors the perception of CA by sociologists in general but is also shared by many conversational analysts. As a consequence, disciplinary work still struggles with the problem of context (particularly postmodern and interpretive sociologies), while the potential of CA and EM to address contemporary moral questions in ways that avoid this issue goes unappreciated.

The need for a way of understanding context that avoids the problem of shared biography or culture is particularly acute in what are generally referred to as “modern” societies, those in which shared cultures are deteriorating and conversations in public often take place among strangers or mere acquaintances, who have little personal knowledge of each other and thus are depending on displays of practice for a determination of “trust” and intelligibility. Most such conversations depend so heavily on conversational preference orders that it is not necessary for participants to know much about the individual participants in order to understand what they are doing or saying.

Because of this, commitment to interactional orders is a *moral commitment* and as such provides a sound basis for discussions of morality and justice. Many social theorists have made superficially similar arguments. But none have been able to ground them on an approach to language and interactional practice that could provide for the necessity of the moral commitments required. They continue to think in terms of associations (Latour) and the content of dialogue (Habermas), instead of abandoning all conventional forms of thinking about intelligibility, as Sacks did, and focusing on the situated character of conversation. The route to necessity is, ironically, paved with contingency. Any attempt to stop short of a complete embrace of conversational contingencies fails to provide the necessity required for moral argument.

For Sacks, contingencies in the form of indexicality made it necessary for participants to commit themselves to the unfolding orders of conversation. The less indexicality produced, the less moral commitment required. Possibly, this is why those in authority are so fixated on “correct” speech and formal institutional orders. There is so little indexicality in such speech and action that their moral commitments, especially when speaking to persons of so-called lesser status, are virtually nonexistent.

Unlike most theorists who assume a great deal of ambiguity in language use, the idea behind CA is that in

successful everyday encounters, there is very little ambiguity. To be intelligible, interactional moves must be recognizable as moves of a particular sort. Participants typically are engaged in ordinary encounters in which unrecognizable moves are evident, either within turn or within several turns. The unrelenting ambiguity of social life that so many scholars in the social sciences and humanities speak of simply does not exist in most everyday contexts of “ordinary talk.” It does, however, exist in many formal texts, in situations of great inequality, and in settings wherein participants are not able to recognize one another’s moves. There is a very short time span in which unrecognizable moves can be repaired, and when they are not, there are immediate and often elaborate and serious troubles in the immediate conversation. These troubles also tend to attach themselves to the persons who would be said to have “caused” them, through their failure to observe appropriate turntaking practices, creating accounts about such persons whose “face” and “trustworthiness” are thereby implicated.

There is some debate over whether this turntaking system is universal or whether it has minor variations. Some variations seem to occur between groups separated by space and social expectation or by physical impairment. Many conversation analysts, however, take the position that certain basic aspects of the system must be universal. Whatever position one takes on the question of universality, however, one thing is clear; wherever the dynamics of conversation have been studied using CA methods, an “economy” of turntaking accompanied by orders of preference, both within and between turns, has emerged from the data. If the preferences themselves are not universal, or not all universal, the requirement that they be observed in each particular case in order to achieve mutual intelligibility, and the concomitant moral commitment of all parties to the situation to observe them, is a universal. As such, it stands as the only universal established by social science: one with great promise for studies of morality in a modern global context.

The conversation analytic approach promises to explain not only how the mutual intelligibility of words is ordinarily achieved but also why various persons from different social “categories,” including race, gender, and visual and hearing impairments, experience conversational difficulties. Schegloff has recently begun to explore the relevance of “membership categorization” devices/accounts for the understanding of racial and cultural problems. In addition, small differences in the details of preference orders promise to unlock the key to intercultural misunderstandings. The study of preference orders in medical settings has already made a significant contribution to studies of doctor–patient interaction and the delivery of what Maynard calls “bad news” in medical and other settings. Similar advances have occurred in the study of human machine interaction, Internet financial exchanges, and technology and policing.

The great promise of CA, as with EM, goes beyond the study of language to the recovery of Durkheim’s promise that social order itself can be studied empirically and in detail: that “social facts” can be laid bare to social scientific research. It is a promise that Anthony Giddens tried to revive in *The Constitution of Society* (1981), but in that attempt focused too heavily on the Goffmanian conceptual side of things to realize the promise of CA and EM. The project of studying social facts as detailed orders has also been seriously sidetracked by the postmodern rejection of the idea of science as positivist and the belief that all social reality is an ambiguous text. We do often experience social life in this way. However, it is essential to understand that these are points of interactional breakdown, more common as society becomes more global, not normal interaction.

For CA, EM, and Durkheim, the idea of science was never positivist in any current sense. They argued that the intelligibility of both word and action is a mutual construction at all points, severely constrained by interactional preferences at every level. Unfortunately, it is just those details of mutual construction that are overlooked when social orders are reduced, as they usually are, to conceptual abstractions and aggregated across individuals in populations (in an attempt to avoid “positivism”).

The conversation analyst should approach conversation as an ongoing mutual construction according to orders of preference that all participants are committed to. That all conversation analysts do not work in this way is not a failure of the perspective, but rather a consequence of its ready adoption into existing disciplinary frameworks by those who do not understand what it implies theoretically: that social order and meaning are fragile, ongoing constructions that require a deep moral commitment and mutual attention to detailed mutually expected orders of practice at all points.

With CA and EM, the sociological promise is transformed and rejuvenated. Instead of beginning with social individuals and assuming that aggregating their attachment to beliefs and symbols across large numbers of persons will reveal the underlying causal effects of institutions toward which they orient, as Parsons assumed, CA and EM assume that institutions, where they exert an influence on daily life, will, and indeed must, manifest themselves in the details of interaction in order to do so. Persons generally have no conscious knowledge of how this is accomplished, conversational preference orders belonging to a large body of embedded practice that persons learn to employ without conscious thought. Indeed, stopping to think about such things generally makes it impossible to continue, an experience students of CA frequently have when their “seeing” of turns stops their speech. Therefore, interviewing persons to discover their beliefs and values about what they do, a staple of so-called macrosociology, is worse than misleading. What is necessary is to discover those orders, which,

when they are violated, render interaction unintelligible, and how such troubles are repaired. In this way, the underlying social facts of social orders can be laid bare.

Thus, CA does not study a micro-order assumed to accompany a macro-order, an idea that has been popular among sociologists for decades. The idea is that all social orders, including politics, race, inequality, and justice, must be enacted at the level of conversational and interactional orders or they would cease to exist. This is not a reductionist argument either, as many have argued, and it does not begin with the individual. It begins with a more or less universal set of preference orders for enacting conversation and interaction and maintaining intelligible, mutually situated associations between persons. This does not mean that power, inequalities of race, gender, and class, or institutional constraints are not of interest to CA and EM or that manifestations of such constraints cannot be found at work in interaction. If they are not artificial constructs, then conversational interaction is exactly where they must do their work of constraining action. The point is to find these constraints at work in interaction without performing a conceptual reduction or starting with assumptions about macrostructures.

The point of refusing to begin with so-called macrostructures is not to deny that constraints exist beyond local orders of conversation, but rather to argue that treating “macro” structures as independent entities that manifest themselves in beliefs and values of individuals renders the effects of such constraints on persons engaged in the work of producing living social orders invisible. Both CA and EM take these issues seriously as matters that can be discovered only through a close analysis of conversational and interactional encounters. One might say that they take these issues of so-called larger social constraints more seriously than do traditional sociologists, as they have been the only ones to attempt a theoretical reconstruction, from the ground up, so to speak, that would provide a sound empirical basis for understanding such institutional constraints. Garfinkel’s (1967) “Good Reasons for Bad Clinic Records” stands as a landmark paper in this regard.

The incorporation of CA into various disciplines thus presents a problem. Despite the emphasis on methodology in CA, it is not just a methodology. Both CA and EM ask one to think very differently about social order. When they are incorporated into conventional models of social order, as is increasingly becoming the case, they lose much of their explanatory power. This has for many years caused a much popularized rift between EM and CA. The problem is not a principled dispute between the two enterprises as much as a criticism by EM, trying to retain the integrity of studies as a whole, of the way CA has been taken up into disciplines in ways that do not challenge existing disciplinary presuppositions. If CA and EM are taken seriously, then the theory of order and meaning they propose should

challenge any existing disciplinary schema, in much the way that Wittgenstein’s meaning-as-“use” argument challenged the philosophy and linguistics of his own day.

It is also a problem when persons going by the name of CA work without background knowledge of either the settings they are studying or the situations in which their transcripts were collected, treating the transcript itself as a representation of reality. Good conversation analysts do not do this. Both CA and EM require extensive fieldwork, or familiarity with and mastery of, the scene being studied. When such familiarity with the interactional work required on the spot is missing and analysis is done on the basis of transcripts only, without reference to the video or audio-tapes on which they were based, analysis tends to miss just those essential details that the perspective was designed to lay bare. While it is often true that certain things can be seen immediately just from picking up a transcript, what they mean and why they happen is always a situated matter, and there are always details that are apparent only on a hearing or viewing of an interaction.

This does not mean that every situation assumes a different set of preference orders. It does mean that the situation itself, as a situation of a particular sort, places requirements on what participants can and must do, and those must be understood by researchers. These situated requirements, in fact, are the stuff and substance of EM and CA. They comprise the moral fabric of modern life. That each situation requires persons to mobilize a set of resources in ways that will be recognizable to others in that situation is a basic feature of modernity. When CA and EM are incorporated into existing disciplinary ways of working, this empirical/theoretical foundation is lost and both become tame participants in the ordinary positivist enterprises of disciplinary work: just what they had been designed as remedies against. They should offer a new foundation for the discussion of politics and morality in a modern global context, not accommodate an outmoded debate.

— Anne W. Rawls

See also Ethnomethodology; Garfinkel, Harold; Goffman, Erving; Social Constructionism; Social Interaction; Social Studies of Science; Sociologies of Everyday Life

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COOK, KAREN

American social theorist and experimental social psychologist Karen S. Cook (b. 1946) has played a major role in advancing the theory and study of exchange and exchange networks and in developing and using rational choice theory more generally. Cook's substantive work can be grouped into these interconnected areas: exchange and power in exchange networks, distributive justice, generalized exchange, and, most recently, trust.

Educated at Stanford University, Cook first took a faculty position at the University of Washington, where she remained for two decades (she has been at Stanford University since 1998). There, she joined Richard Emerson in theoretical and experimental investigation of exchange networks. They focused on how network structure affects the dependence and thus power of network members, and on justice and commitment within networks.

This work led to the early and arguably most important finding in research on *exchange in networks*: that contrary to what had been thought previously, the most central actor in a network may not be the most powerful actor. Cook et al. (1983) predicted and then showed experimentally that in a five-actor line network (A-B-C-D-E, where each line indicates a possible exchange relation) in which each actor's partners are alternative sources of the same desired resource, most powerful will be the two actors adjacent to the end positions (B and D), not the most central actor (C), as previously thought. The theory follows from the power-dependence principle. End actors (A and E) are much weaker than their partners (B and D) because their partners have alternatives to the end actors as sources for the desired resource whereas the end actors have no alternatives to their partners. The central actor (C) is weaker than its partners (B and D) because in order to obtain anything, it must outbid the end actors (A or E), which again are weak and so inclined to be generous. The same power-dependence logic can be and has been applied to exchange networks of various sizes and configurations.

Following Emerson's death in 1982, Cook continued work on exchange in networks with others, in particular their former student Toshio Yamagishi. They looked first at *positively connected networks*, in which partners of a given network member are complementary, not competing. They reasoned and then showed that in such networks, the central member is the most powerful.

Cook's next step was away from processes in which actors are seeking only to maximize profit. From her earliest

work on social exchange, Cook had been interested in justice and equity concerns, which can arise easily in exchange situations and temper the drive to maximize immediate profit. It was logical therefore to look at *generalized exchange*, an umbrella name for exchange processes that are not directed at maximizing short-term gain. Here, she was in the vanguard of a general move in the social sciences toward a more nuanced view of actors in exchange processes.

Specifically, generalized exchange refers to exchange processes in which an actor gives and is given to in return but what the actor receives is not contingent on what the actor gives. For example, in work published in 1993, Yamagishi and Cook investigated situations in which giving is in a chain, such that A gives to B, B gives to C, and so forth, until some actor gives to A. In addition, they have looked at situations in which group members can provide individually a good that benefits all group members, and at situations in which group members collectively provide a good for one group member at a time. This work contributes to the burgeoning theoretical and experimental literature on social dilemmas: situations in which individual actors are better off if they do not cooperate but if there is not enough cooperation by individual actors, then everyone in the group is worse off. In their research, Yamagishi and Cook showed how the structure of the exchange situation can affect cooperation and the collective outcome.

This research led the way to Cook's turn in the 1990s and 2000s to *trust* as an area of theoretical and empirical research. In their studies of generalized exchange, Cook and Yamagishi uncovered the importance for group outcomes of a general trusting disposition on the part of group members. The role of trust in generalized exchange pointed to the importance of understanding trust processes more generally. Here again, Cook was in the vanguard of a burgeoning interest in trust throughout the social sciences. For her, however, it was a logical fit with her long-standing concerns with justice and equity. These are all processes that contribute to the human ability and tendency to turn exchanges into long-term exchange relations. In studying trust, Cook has been concerned with the specific role of trust processes in exchange, with cross-cultural comparisons of trust, and with the wider implications for a society's functioning of the level of trust in that society.

Cook's involvement in the study of trust exemplifies the role she increasingly has assumed in sociology and the social sciences more broadly. Namely, she has been advocating and facilitating the theoretical advance and expansion of social psychology as well as its use for microfoundations of theory in the social sciences (e.g., her essay in *Contemporary Sociology*, 2000). She does this through her writing, conference participation and organization, and editing of volumes. An important characteristic of this work is that it involves scholars and research across the social sciences. This building

of bridges and integration of knowledge across disciplines, as well as provoking advances in sociological social psychology through challenges from findings in other disciplines, may be as important and consequential for social theory as anything Cook has done.

— Joseph M. Whitmeyer

See also Emerson, Richard; Exchange Networks; Power; Power-Dependence Relations; Rational Choice; Social Exchange Theory; Social Rationality; Trust

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COOLEY, CHARLES HORTON

Charles Horton Cooley (1864–1929) was a prominent member within the founding generation of American sociologists. In 1907, he became a full professor of sociology at the University of Michigan, and in 1918, he was elected president of the American Sociological Association. It was his aim and achievement to apply the ideas of pragmatism in developing a sociological theory of social action, of social order, and of social change, a project he eventually accomplished with his trilogy: *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), *Social Organization* (1909), and *Social Process* (1918). Along with George Herbert Mead, Cooley has influenced the Chicago school of sociology (William I. Thomas, Robert Park) and symbolic interactionism (Herbert Blumer), and he must be regarded as a predecessor of communitarianism (Charles Taylor) because, for him, democracy is a form of life rooted deeply in the social nature of humankind.

TRANSCENDENTALISM VERSUS UTILITARIANISM

Cooley spent almost all his life in Ann Arbor, Michigan. His formative years were characterized by a tension

between the Reconstruction era's individualism and materialism, on one hand, and the competing ideals of transcendentalism, on the other. He intellectually criticized the materialism of economic individualism, and he diagnosed pathological consequences of what he called the "strenuous life" demanded by utilitarian thought. In contrast, he suggested a morality whose point of departure is not private success, but rather overall ideals such as "beauty, truth, and sympathy." Cooley thus developed an alternative outlook that followed his critique of utilitarianism. He found this morality and philosophy further articulated in another American sociocultural tradition, one that competed with utilitarianism: the transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. The American romanticists rejected the utilitarian means of action—power, money, and influence—as they contribute nothing to introspective self-fulfillment or successful communitarian life. Transcendentalists find their orientation through contemplation. They intuitively discover, through the example of nature, what is meant by beauty, truth, honesty, and independence. Though transcendentalists can communicate important insights to society, they do not expect political power, social reputation, or wealth in exchange.

For Cooley, the writings of Emerson and Thoreau took on a significant meaning. They provided him with a historical and practical paradigm that appeared opposed and superior to utilitarianism. However, transcendentalism shares with utilitarianism a basic individualistic tendency, although each conceives the term *individual* differently. In utilitarianism, the self-realization of the individual is achieved by maximizing private ends. In transcendentalism, on the other hand, individualism is suspended in the universality of nature. But in both schools of thought, individuals must prevail in their private objectives against the influence and competition of others. Though Emerson too says: "A man must be a non-conformist," neither transcendentalism nor utilitarianism offers a perspective reconciling "self" and "society" or "individual freedom" and "social order." The problematic individualism of both philosophies motivated Cooley to search for different ideas as sources of his sociology and sociopsychology, which he found in the communally oriented republican tradition, what he called the "great humanistic traditions," and in the philosophy of pragmatism. A central statement in his first major work, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, is that the self is not simply given, as the utilitarians believed, nor can it be set by contemplation, as the transcendentalists believed; rather, the "looking-glass self" can develop only by communicative interaction with its social surroundings.

"Communication," according to Cooley in his 1926 autobiographical retrospective, "was thus my first real conquest, and the thesis a forecast of the organic view of society" (Cooley [1928] 1969:3) he had been working out since his dissertation "The Theory of Transportation" (1894). In this

study, he analyzed the relevance of the transportation system for the structuring of the economy, politics, culture, and the military. The specific form of these social institutions is, from Cooley's perspective of interaction theory, closely tied to the changing means of transportation and communication. Whether new technological developments (for instance, faster transportation links or the introduction of the telephone) contribute to democratization or to an increased surveillance of the population is not determined by the technology, but by societal processes of definition. This is the task that Cooley, from then on, set for himself: the elaboration of the specific character of human communication and its meaning for the identity of the individual and for the structures of society.

COOLEY'S INTERPRETATION OF DARWINISM

At the University of Michigan, Cooley studied with John Dewey. While in Ann Arbor, Dewey had begun to turn away from speculative philosophy, which he later called the "Hegelian bacillus," and started to develop his pragmatic philosophy. Very carefully, Cooley recorded Dewey's lectures "Political Philosophy" (1893) and "Several Lectures on Anthropological Ethics" (1894). In these talks, Dewey discussed the Darwinian paradigm, and he presented the beginnings of a pragmatic theory of "social sensorium," action, and communication. Like many early social scientists, Dewey and Cooley thought that with Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection, both Hume's behaviorism and Hegel's metaphysical idealism could be overcome. Darwinism had indisputably caused a revolution within the humanities—without, however, establishing a new paradigm.

At the turn of the century, Cooley was confronted with a variety of different interpretations of Darwinism. Basic concepts, such as adaptation, selection, evolution, and chance variation, were used very differently. William Sumner and Herbert Spencer saw in the unrestrained "struggle for existence of natural evolution" the only true mode of social change that could secure the permanent social integration of human societies. Lester Frank Ward, in complete contrast, maintained that "natural evolution" had come to a standstill and rational action had become the means for "social evolution." In contrast to Ward's rationalistic theory of social evolution and to all sorts of social Darwinism, for Cooley, the "Theory of Natural Selection" served on one hand to reconstruct the freedom of action through the concept of an active confrontation with the social surroundings, while on the other hand, it helped to realize restrictions and risks of action caused by environmental changes. Darwinism was, for Cooley as well as for John Dewey, the decisive starting point to avoid all empirical and idealistic pitfalls. It pointed a way to make not mind, as in idealism, nor environmental circumstances, as

in naturalism, but rather social action the starting point of their theories.

COOLEY'S "REVOLT AGAINST DUALISM"

The philosophical starting point of Cooley's thought was not Descartes's epistemological doubt, which had characterized wide areas of Western philosophy for hundreds of years. At the end of the nineteenth century, a "revolt against dualism" arose, triggered by the Darwinist revolution and by massive social changes—a revolt that Cooley joined. Descartes's distinction between two autonomous spheres, the human will (*res cogitans*) and the objects of the outer world (*res extensa*), was increasingly called into question. In the first pages of *Social Organization*, Cooley emphatically makes clear the limitations of the dualistic perspective of Descartes' famous dictum, "I think, therefore I am." For Cooley, however, individualism ("I") and rationalism ("I think") cannot be the foundation of philosophy. In dealing with the contemplative methods of Emerson's and Thoreau's transcendentalism, Cooley recognizes that the self is constituted through interaction with its surroundings and that the mind is established within that process of interaction. Hence, the self-regarding method of introspection cannot be the starting point of a scientific process of inquiry. According to Cooley, every act of introspection is not simply a private matter, but rather an act of public communication. Cooley substitutes the Cartesian preconditional singular mind with *processes* of understanding, triggered by problems of action, that create the option of subjectivity. The self is not a priori or given, but a socially constituted "looking-glass self."

In *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Cooley takes up with utmost consistency all of the problems that arose with the decline of Cartesian philosophy. Fundamental thereby are his anthropological reflections on the biological preconditions of man, his theory of understanding and communication, and his explanation of the relationship between individual and society. In all of his books and essays, Cooley furthers these three approaches, themes that resulted directly from his antidualistic, action-centered, and intersubjectivist perspective.

The Anthropological Conditions of Social Action

According to Cooley, humans are determined neither by their environmental surroundings nor by their biological dispositions. Rather, only a person's "lines of teachability" are predetermined through what Cooley calls "heritage" (Cooley 1923:454), and these lines are merely evoked in a person's confrontations with his or her surroundings in daily life. Humans possess no repertoire of instincts that can serve as a guide for solving problems; human problem-solving

abilities develop only with reflection or reference to familiar habits. This “plasticity” and openness of human nature is therefore the condition for the constitution of social rules and institutions, which, in turn, allow humans to control their surroundings. Paradoxically, it is a biological weakness, the lack of extensive instincts, that places humankind in the position to react more effectively to threatening changes than any other species can. With this, Cooley first shows his opposition to a dispositional determinism that causally traces human action to inborn characteristics and attributes, for example, in Cesare Lombroso’s criminology or Francis Galton’s eugenics. Second, Cooley rejects the environmental determinism of naturalism, which attributes no constitutive power to human action and sees the human spirit merely as an empty vessel. Third, he also dismisses a rationalism that neglects all subconscious factors and reduces the natural foundation of man to the unspecified motive of the individual pursuit of pleasure. According to Cooley, none of these theories could sufficiently explain the connections between individual and society. These unsolved problems stimulated Cooley’s vision of an interactionistic social psychology.

The Theory of Communication and Understanding

The path to an interactionistic social psychology led Cooley to reject introspective methods and the philosophy of mind, on one hand, and biologicistic and behavioristic approaches such as eugenics, criminology, mass psychology, the theory of imitation, and the psychology of instinct, on the other. To establish itself on a firm theoretical foundation, interactionistic social psychology needed to determine the “mechanism” of social integration. Cooley was not able to proceed beyond the futile alternatives of “heredity and environment,” “imitation and innovation,” and “suggestion and choice,” key terms in his early thinking, until he discovered the basic elements of his envisioned theory: communication and understanding. The basic medium of social integration, according to Cooley, is not the mental mechanism described by mass psychology (Gustave le Bon), not imitation (Gabriel Tarde), not instincts (William McDougall), not social control in the form of habits (Edward A. Ross), and not a consciousness of kind (Franklin H. Giddings), but rather communication based on “standardized symbols.” Human beings have to “understand” each other to create both a manifest social order and autonomous selves. Only through communication can individuals develop distinct identities as well as social ties to far-reaching normative values. Only if symbols are available that can be understood independently of a single, concrete situation by all interacting participants in the same way can a common orientation toward a generally valid pattern of behavior come about. Only if the symbols used by

one social actor mean the same thing for that actor as they do for any partner in social interaction are both actors able to anticipate each other’s reactions and thus adjust their own actions to accord with this perceived expectation. Through language, social actors are no longer limited to concrete experiences; they do not necessarily need to duplicate others’ experiences to be able to understand them. Rather, through a common background of symbolically structured social knowledge, they can mentally discover the meaning of specific situations outside their direct personal experiences. Every individual perception, whether of symbols or of objects, is thus always a mental process registered against the background of a stock of social knowledge.

The use of significant symbols, however, gives rise not only to the formation of reciprocal expectations of behavior but also to the constitution of distinct identities. This is a paradoxical problem: the problem of intersubjectivity. It means that the subjects must be able to subordinate themselves to one social category while, at the same time, they must also realize that they are absolutely distinct from one another. The use of significant symbols is a decisive factor in the overcoming of this paradox—in making oneself into an object, interpreting one’s own expectations in light of the anticipated expectations of others. Cooley illustrates how identities constitute themselves within the framework of speech acts. As early as his *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Cooley worked with a pragmatic theory of meaning and identity. His central terms “understanding,” “communication,” and “sympathetic introspection” ground and substantiate his radical denouncement of the dualism between nature and nurture, heteronomy and autonomy, human nature and social order, and individual and society.

The Integration of Self and Society

With his “organic view,” Cooley claims to integrate the unity of society and the autonomy of the self. “The organic view,” he said, “stresses both the unity of the whole and the peculiar value of the individual, explaining each by the other” ([1902] 1964:36). According to Cooley, society is neither the sum of autonomous action (as many utilitarians believed) nor an entity distinct from the action of individuals; rather, it manifests a “collective aspect” enlightening the constitution of habits and rules, structures and institutions. Its “distributive aspect,” on the other hand, manifests the constitution of the self, of personal abilities and tastes, through interaction with others. Cooley analyzed how the autonomy of the self and the structures of society evolve jointly through the processes of communication.

On one hand, Cooley’s organic view is opposed to the organicism of Comte, Spencer, and others, as well as to all idealistic concepts of a “social consciousness.” On the other hand, Cooley did not defend any specific form of individualism. First of all, he rejected the “mere individualism” of

the *homo economicus* ideal. Utilitarianism is not able to reconcile the ability of the individual to pursue his or her own ends with the binding character of social structures. For this reason, social structures appear negatively, as restrictions or merely as necessary forces of order. According to Cooley, utilitarian individualism can define freedom only negatively, namely, as an absence of social constraint. Furthermore, Cooley rejected the concept of “double causation,” a notion that signifies the idea of a free individual, on one hand, and an extramundane entity, on the other. He also disliked an evolutionary theory of individualization that he called a “crude evolutionary philosophy,” the “primitive individualism” of which Herbert Spencer was an advocate. Finally, he dismissed the “social faculty” view, which discriminated between biologically given social faculties (herd instincts) and individualistic faculties (egoistic instincts). Further articulating his theory of understanding and communication, Cooley illustrates how individual orientations and social organizations, and socialized individuals and social institutions can develop *simultaneously*.

COOLEY'S PRAGMATIST SOCIOLOGY

Influenced by the pragmatist philosophy that John Dewey was teaching in Ann Arbor and by William James's *Principles of Psychology*, Cooley was in sharp opposition to a formalist and economic utilitarianism that gave priority to the autonomy of the individual without researching the anthropological, rehabilitational, communal, and cultural preconditions of individuality. In *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Cooley analyzes these preconditions in connection with his theory of the “looking-glass self.” Identity, he concludes, is created out of the tension between natural impulses that the individual must actively develop and social structures that he or she must actively appropriate. The given social structures are transformed through this process of appropriation, which is simultaneously a process of self-development, thereby leading to the formation of distinct individualities.

Cooley's approach, however, was controversial. For George Herbert Mead, the critical point of Cooley's theory is that he represents the development of identity as a mental process rather than as a phase of objective experience. In Cooley's eyes, according to Mead (1930), the sole origin of identity lies in a “psychical experience.” Mead, in contrast, maintains that the mental imagination of judgments about oneself is preceded by an “objective phase of experience” that is formed in the process of action. Mead's reproach of “mentalism” refers to statements by Cooley such as “society is mental,” “imagination is the solid facts of society,” and “we know persons as imaginative ideas in the mind.” However, Cooley was not a mentalist; he describes in detail, in *Human Nature and the Social Order*, his understanding of “mind” and “imagination.” *Imagination* is not a

force isolated from the empirical world, but, rather, a practical “intercourse” or an intersubjective “communication.” *Mind* is not a solipsistic entity, but an “inner experience” created in conjunction with the outside world. “The mind,” according to Cooley, “lives in perpetual conversation.” Cooley insists that “society is mental,” because “the human mind is social” (Cooley [1902] 1964:81). The human mind forms itself in the process of action but cannot be reduced to a causal reaction to environmental problems. But objective conflicts of action are, for Cooley, the point of departure for the creation of identity. Cooley without doubt recognized that we are constantly exposed to conflicts, the resolution of which makes up the core of the process of experience. Conflicts are the result of differing attitudes and expectations in specific practical situations of action. They can be resolved if the images used by the respective actors can be reduced to their common experiential content, synthesized to new concepts, and finally, applied to the situation at the foot of the conflict. Accordingly, Cooley labels the dynamic of conflict between individuals as “hostile sympathy,” since deceptions, animosities, and conflicts do not simply threaten social certainties; they are also the condition for the creation of the individual mind—that is, of identity—and of new patterns of behavior. Cooley develops this pragmatistic sociology in his books with great resolution. It was his goal, through his theories of identity, the primary group, the public, the institution, democracy, and social change, to achieve an integration of the sociological microlevel, mesolevel, and macrolevel based on his theory of communication.

The Theory of the Looking-Glass Self

From the social actor's perspective, which Cooley reconstructs in *Human Nature and the Social Order*, the development of identity is linked to the creation of social structures. Cooley shows that the actors can define their identities only within the framework of a social community. The starting point of this process is the mother-child dyad. In the framework of this relationship, a growing solidarity between mother and child parallels the child's increasing competence in using significant symbols. This simultaneous development is itself a necessary prerequisite for the child's ability to adopt the perspectives of other participants in social relationships and thus for the child's capacity to develop a social self. The reciprocal attainment of understanding and interpretation enables individuals to connect with each other in a “vital whole” and, at the same time, to distinguish themselves from others, to develop a distinct “looking-glass self.” The means of socialization are therefore simultaneously the means of individualization. One's social identity develops itself through symbolically mediated interaction with one's surroundings.

Cooley reconstructed three progressive phases of the evolving self: (1) the “sense of appropriation,” which is the

expression of a biologically manifested spontaneity and activity; (2) the “social self,” which is developed by taking in the attitude of others; and (3) the famous “looking-glass self,” which describes neither an “over-socialized self” characterized by passive internalization of given habits and values nor an “unencumbered self” cut loose from all social constraints. The metaphor “looking-glass self,” as Cooley explicitly declared, is meant to represent an open but distinctive self-image created through the imagination and interpretation of the world we inhabit.

[A] “looking-glass self, seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The comparison with a looking glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind. (Cooley [1902] 1964:184)

Like William James (1890) and James Mark Baldwin (1900), Cooley considered the development of the self to be a process of interaction between it and the surrounding world. But unlike James, who saw this process as just the self’s “appropriation” of the world, and unlike Baldwin, who held the methods of “ejection,” “accommodation,” and “imitation” responsible for the constitution of the self, Cooley presented the mechanisms that mediate between self and society as formative activities of communication, sympathetic introspection, and understanding. According to Cooley, the self gains its autonomy when the rules of social control are subject to deliberation by social actors. Cooley’s theory of the self is therefore inextricably linked to his concept of social order and democracy.

The Theory of Social Order

In *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Cooley shows how identities develop in a social context. He pursues this theme in *Social Organization*, although in this work, he is no longer examining the creation of the self, but rather the generation of institutions and social organizations through the collective action of individuals. In *Social Organization*, Cooley is interested in constructing a meaningful concept of community, as well as formulating a theory of public opinion, institutions, classes, and democracy that builds upon this concept.

Cooley’s first step toward his theory of social order is his conception of the “primary group.” It is very important to note that this term is defined neither by racial characteristics nor by culturally given traditions, not by narratively

transmitted rituals or myths. Cooley realized, instead, that the basic means for creating communities is communication in the form of dialogues. He is, in the first place, interested in articulating the universal rules that simultaneously enable both socialization and individualization. This conception of *continuity* between personal identity, primary group (or community), and social organization (or society) is altogether unprecedented. Ferdinand Tönnies, for example, differentiated in a dualistic way between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society). Tönnies defines *Gemeinschaften* as thick organic unities, characterized by hierarchies, habits, moral orientations, and emotions. *Gesellschaft* is, in every sense, just the opposite of *Gemeinschaft*: *Gesellschaften* are controlled by conventions, laws, and public opinion. It is not possible to subsume Cooley’s ideas in this European scheme. Tönnies’s dualism, which was motivated by a philosophical dualism between British natural right theory and attempts to historicize German idealist philosophy, is accompanied by a similarly dualistic theory of action. *Gemeinschaften* are organized by normative action. *Gesellschaften* are integrated by rationality of means and ends. However, for Cooley, whose concept of primary group was motivated, above all, by the new social psychological theory of William James and James Baldwin, the basic mode of action that underlies *Gemeinschaften* and *Gesellschaften*, or primary groups and social organizations, is communication.

The difference between Cooley’s and Tönnies’s respective conception of community leads to very different social-political theories. Cooley analyzed the deep-rooted democratic aspects of primary groups. In his theory, the enlargement of primary-group ideals involves by necessity the enlargement of democracy, whereas no theory of democracy derives from Tönnies’s conception of *Gemeinschaft*. Cooley’s examination of primary-group communication reveals the intrinsically social nature of mankind. He reformulates the postulates of enlightenment, freedom, equality, and solidarity not as natural rights and not as “popular impressions,” but as “sure and sound” sentiments based on experiences available to every member of a primary group.

Thus, we find at the very heart of Cooley’s sociology the question of democracy. His normative demand is to enlighten the democratic options and prerequisites of the constitution of the self, social organizations, and the social process. Democracy, Cooley concluded, cannot be vital solely by means of laws and institutions, and it does not presuppose a common will: Democracy needs a culture rooted in authentically organized primary groups and associations that incessantly define the meaning of important issues and concerns and have the power to create new normative rules and to reconstruct organizations and institutions (negotiated order).

The Theory of Social Change

This process of reconstruction is the main topic of Cooley's third major book, *Social Process*. Cooley defined this "pragmatic method" as the solution of action problems through the invention of new ways, new norms, and new ends. But according to Cooley, it is important to realize that the solution of action problems through the implementation of a new social rule or habit is not just a compromise of incompatible interests. Cooley is not an advocate of a "mere pluralism." Using his pragmatistic theory of action, Cooley conceptualized social change as a fragile process of interaction that is potentially open to permanent reconstruction of personal identities, institutions, and moral orientations.

In *Social Process*, Cooley discusses terms such as "intelligence," "reconstruction," "anticipation," and "creativity." These terms possess central importance for all pragmatists, since a theory of social change, in tandem with a critique of ontological and teleological theories of action, is at the core of pragmatism. Social change is triggered when habits are called into question by conflicts. The destabilization of structures is followed by a phase of reconstruction, in which new orientations and patterns of behavior are created. What Cooley sees as most important in this "tentative process" is the phase of "imaginative reconstruction": In the forming of ideals through a "creative synthesis" of experience lies the possibility of developing improved social rules, the chance of shaping stronger identity, as well as the option of producing human action that is rational. Cooley defines intelligence as the ability to find solutions for problematic situations. "The test of intelligence is the power to act successfully in new situations" (Cooley [1918] 1966:351). However, this should not be understood in a social-engineering context. "Intelligent behavior" does not mean mastering anticipated problems of action, but rather generating inventive solutions for unanticipated conflicts. Intelligent action can thus be described primarily as the discovery of unknown goals, not as the achievement of anticipated ends. Intelligence manifests itself according to the actor's "power to anticipate how . . . elements will work in a novel combination: it is the power of grasp, of synthesis, of constructive vision" (Cooley [1918] 1966:352–53). The rationality of the social world, and hence also of the social sciences, is grounded, according to Cooley, in the creative rather than in the mechanistic or technical development of behavioral patterns.

Cooley's theory of action, particularly the rationality of action, forms the background to his normative concepts of an authentic self that gains consistency through the communicative contact with its surroundings; of primary groups, "where . . . we get our notions of love, freedom, justice, and the like which we are ever applying to social institutions" (Cooley [1909] 1963:32); of a "democracy, in the sense of an active participation of the common people in the social process" ([1918] 1966:248), in which minorities

have the chance to call into question the existing norms of the majority; and of a "process of culture . . . one of enlarging membership in life through the growth of personality and social comprehension" ([1918] 1966:68).

— Hans-Joachim Schubert

See also Mead, George Herbert; Negotiated Order; Park, Robert; Pragmatism; Self; Thomas, William Isaac

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COSER, LEWIS

Lewis Coser (1913–2003) has made many contributions to the field of sociology. He is primarily a conflict theorist, distinctive from most in two respects. First, he describes social conflict as a result of factors other than, simply, opposing group interests. Second, he is concerned with the consequences of conflict. Émile Durkheim's influence on Coser's conflict theory is also quite evident, as Coser repeatedly discusses the functional aspects of conflict and the functional aspects of society.

Born in Berlin, to a Jewish family of bankers, Coser was involved with the socialist student movement, a social protest group that was not met with tolerance by the emerging presence of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime. Coser left

Germany in 1933 and moved to Paris, where he attended the Sorbonne (University of Paris). At the Sorbonne, the study of social theory was almost entirely limited to the works of Émile Durkheim, or as Coser (1993) referred to it, the “Durkheimian magic circle.” Coser was also exposed to the ideas of Karl Marx and came to describe himself as an “unorthodox Marxist with strong admixtures of Durkheimian thought.” After escaping from internment in France as an enemy alien, Coser fled to the United States. In 1954, Coser received his PhD from Columbia, having completed his dissertation under the guidance of Robert Merton. His social-ist writings have always reflected his concern with politics and the links between ideas and the nature of society. In 1954, Coser cofounded, with Irving Howe, the magazine *Dissent*, during the height of the McCarthy “Red Scare.” It was their hope to alert people, especially intellectual spokespersons, to this irrational form of behavior and intolerance, namely a commitment to communism. His academic writings include his first book, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (1956), *Men of Ideas: A Sociologist’s View* (1965), *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (1967), *Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Commitment* (1974), and *Masters of Sociological Thought* (1977).

Coser’s work reflects the conflict perspective and his underlying concern with protecting human freedoms from oppressive power groups. It is obvious that Coser’s life experiences played a significant role in his outlook of social life. He learned firsthand of direct social conflict and the negative effects that dominant groups can have on subordinate groups. Among the academic influences on Coser were Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Karl Marx, Robert Merton, Talcott Parsons, and his wife, Rose Laub Coser. Coser died July 8, 2003, at Mount Auburn Hospital in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The contributions from this “Man of Ideas” will leave a permanent mark in sociology.

In *The Functions of Social Conflict* (1956), Coser defines and relates conflict to the social world, explores the nature of hostility, discusses how conflict can lead to social change, and pays close attention to the role of people’s emotions. Coser defines *conflict* as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. He defines *power* as the chance to influence the behavior of others in accord with one’s own wishes. The level of group power is always relative to other external groups. Agreeing with Simmel that there are aggressive or hostile impulses in people, Coser believes that constant contact in relationships can create conflict and instability within the group structure. The nature of hostility and conflict varies for sociological reasons, including social structural factors that include financial stability, clearly defined societal roles, love and nurture from the family, and practical and emotional support from outside the nuclear family. Coser’s work is an attempt to explain

how structural factors interact with people’s underlying emotions. Coser came to realize that conflict serves many functions. Conflict often leads to social change; it can stimulate innovation; and during times of external (war) or internal (civil unrest) threat, it leads to an increase in the centralization of power.

In *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (1967), Coser discusses his theory of *social change*. Using a variation of the organic analogy, Coser explains that a society does not die the way biological organisms do, nor is there a precise point of birth. Societies change and are altered by social and natural events. Social life always involves change, and this evolutionary process has no set pattern. Coser (1967) refers to Talcott Parsons’s distinction between change *within* a system and change *of* a system, to demonstrate the two different types of social change that can occur. Change *within* a system is very slow and marginal. It involves an adjustment of some type within the system itself (e.g., when individual members of society have deviated from the traditional ways of culture). Change *of* a system involves a more radical change, such as the creation of new institutions within the system. In this regard, the system is actually altered and changed.

Coser believed that *violence* and *conflict*, which are often linked together, can lead to social change. He argued that violence serves three specific social functions to society. The first function is that of violence as achievement. Causing violence is an achievement for some people, and the more they cause, the more they have achieved in their own minds (e.g., terrorist attacks). As Merton articulated in his anomie theory on social deviance, society does not provide equal opportunity for all members to achieve the success goal. Consequently, some people will deviate from the normal expectations of behavior and commit acts of deviance, including violence, as a means of achieving success in life (Coser 1967). The second function of violence is violence as a danger signal. Violence often alerts society and its members of underlying problems that need to be corrected. Violence acts as a warning signal that a number of people in society are frustrated by the social system. The third function of violence in society is that violence acts as a catalyst. This catalyst function can start the process of “correction” in solving a social problem, or it can cause an increased level of violence. Violence arouses the public and informs them that something has to be done. When society unites to solve the problem, the catalyst has completed its job. However, violence can act as a catalyst to cause more problems and attract others to join in the violence. Coser concludes that violence has both positive and negative functions in society and views it as a necessary part of society.

The role of *intellectuals* in society is another important aspect of Coser’s general social theory. He categorizes five types of intellectuals: *unattached* (“independent” from structural constraints); *academic* (attached to educational institutions, with most of those who hold PhD degrees, but

acknowledging that not all professors with PhD degrees are intellectuals); *scientific* (creative intellectuals); *Washington* (both governmental officials and transitional intellectuals); and *mass-culture industries intellectuals* (those involved with production efforts). Coser (1965) states that having intellect is not the same as having intelligence. Intellectuals live for, rather than off, ideas and are found in all aspects of society. *Intellects* help contribute to the change of a society through ideas. Coser fears that American society has become too bureaucratic and that it needs to find a way to inspire others intellectually, in order to end social problems such as inequality.

Lewis Coser has made a number of lasting contributions to sociological thought. His work as a conflict theorist who attempts to incorporate some of the basic constructs of functionalism is a significant donation to the academic world. Many of his ideas remain relevant at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In all societies, conflict is inevitable. Conflict serves to bind members of a group together and is a determinant of boundaries and power. Societies are not born, and they do not die like organisms: They change. Individual members within a society are free to change with the changing system, or they can choose to lag behind.

— Tim Delaney

See also Conflict Theory; Power

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COSMOPOLITAN SOCIOLOGY

WHY IS THERE A NEED FOR A COSMOPOLITAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY?

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we have to redefine and reinvent the social sciences and humanities for

the global world. This is a double challenge: first, to discover and criticize how sociology, political science, history, and so forth are still prisoners of the nation-state and gave birth to a historically mistaken national imagination. Second, how to transnationally redefine the basic theoretical concepts and units of empirical research, such as politics, society, identity, state, history, class, law, democracy, community, solidarity, justice, mobility, military, and household, in a cosmopolitan perspective. This calls for a paradigm shift. This is also a "Cosmopolitan Manifesto for the Social Sciences," not only to renew their scientific standing and public claims but also to bring the social sciences back on the public agenda.

The classics of sociology are so thoroughly pervaded with a spatially fixed understanding of culture that it is rarely remarked upon. It is a conception that goes back to sociology's birth amidst the nineteenth-century formation of nation-states. The territorial conception of culture and society, the idea of culture as "rooted" and "limited," constituted through the opposition of the "We" and "Them," was itself a reaction to the enormous changes that were going on as that century turned into the twentieth century. It was a conscious attempt to provide a solution to the uprooting of local cultures that the formation of nation-states necessarily involved. Sociology understood the new symbols and common values, above all, as means of integration into a new unity. The triumph of this national imagination can be seen in the way the nation-state has ceased to appear as a project and a construct and has become instead widely regarded as something natural. The opposition between national and international has become the internalized compass of the social sciences. A cosmopolitan sociology poses a challenge to this idea that binding history and borders tightly together is the only possible means of social and symbolic integration. This also means that sociological perspectives are geared to, and organized in terms of, the nation-state. All the traditional fields of the social sciences (such as the sociology of inequality, of the family, of politics, of mobility and migration, and so on) are still being researched in the nation-state tradition. The concept of "cosmopolitanization," by contrast, is an explicit attempt to overcome this "methodological nationalism" and produce concepts capable of reflecting a newly transnational world. It consciously develops a new methodology: "methodological cosmopolitanism."

WHAT DOES "COSMOPOLITAN" MEAN IN THIS PERSPECTIVE?

From a national perspective, "cosmopolitan" or "cosmopolitanism" is viewed pejoratively, as an enemy image. "Cosmopolitan" refers to the "global player," the "imperial capitalist," or "middle-class intellectual without local roots" and as such is a loaded concept. It should not be

confused with a global sociology trying to homogenize the world. It is a concept with a long tradition, but not in the social sciences. It goes back to ancient Greek thought, trying to express the transcendence of local limitations in thought and practice. Alexander the Great elevated cosmopolitanism to a political principle. Superseded by Christian Universalism, it became one of the basic concepts of the Enlightenment. With the formation of the nation-state, the concept disappeared from public discourse and was used mainly as a pejorative term. This is beginning to change.

Cosmopolitan Moments

As people try to strengthen the philosophical and historical foundations of the theory of cosmopolitanism, more and more thinkers have been drawing on what they regard as a previous golden moment of cosmopolitan thought, namely, the Enlightenment (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann 1997). However, the Enlightenment's relationship to cosmopolitanism is not the direction taken by cosmopolitan sociology.

Hellenism might be a good starting point for current cosmopolitan sensibilities (Baldry 1965). Besides claiming it as the first golden age of cosmopolitanism, many of the principles that underlie our current theories and practices of cosmopolitanism derive as much from this period as from the cosmopolitan golden age of the Enlightenment. Historically, there are many things we can learn from this period that are often obscured when we study Enlightenment cosmopolitanism alone. The first thing that is obvious when we look at the Hellenistic period is that the rise and spread of cosmopolitan ideas always had a social and political underpinning. This is often less obvious when we concentrate on the abstract philosophy of the Enlightenment. In the Hellenistic period (as opposed to the Enlightenment), cosmopolitan ideas spread among people at all levels of society. And part of the reason they did so is because philosophy became religion, specifically the syncretistic religions that are still considered one of the prime characteristics of specifically Hellenistic culture. It presents, therefore, the clearest historical example of what actually happens when universalistic philosophy and particularistic local cultures exist side by side for centuries: They mix and produce new forms of both. They produce new forms of rooted cosmopolitanism, and they produce new forms of localism that are open to the world. By "rooted cosmopolitanism," we mean universal values that are emotionally engaging, that descend from the level of pure abstract philosophy and into the emotions of people's everyday lives. By becoming symbols of people's personal identities, cosmopolitan philosophy becomes a political and social force. And by embodying philosophy in rituals, such identities are created, reinforced, and integrated into communities. This is what happened in the transition from Greek philosophy to syncretistic religions.

The most important syncretistic religion to grow out of the Hellenistic period was Christianity, a clear combination of universalistic, Hellenistic Greek philosophy (especially Stoicism and neo-Platonism) and local religious beliefs (most notably Jewish Messianism). Together, they changed the elite ethos of Stoicism into the mass religion of Christianity. But what difference does it make for the spread of cosmopolitan ideas? Calling it a secularized religion rather than an abstracted philosophy emphasizes the centrality of emotional engagement and social integration. And it emphasizes that both are bound up with symbol and ritual, not just with spoken ideas. Symbol and ritual are what make philosophy into personal and social identity. And for a cosmopolitan sociology, this is a central point distinguishing it from abstract cosmopolitan ideas.

Moral Cosmopolitanism

For example, one of the leading modern cosmopolitan ideas today is expressed in the concept of human rights. The text most people think of as the founding text of modern human rights campaigning is Kant's *On Perpetual Peace*. But Kant's idea was that a stable and peaceful political order could be constructed only out of nation-states that made mutually supportive vows of nonintervention. This view was embodied to a large degree in the League of Nations and the original United Nations charter and can be considered in many ways to be the beginning of the idea of modern international law, an essential cosmopolitan idea. But there is no escaping that Kant's project regards the sovereignty of nation-states as sacrosanct. However, modern cosmopolitan politics begins with the principle that sovereignty is not the highest principle and is not sacrosanct. Rather, the highest principle comprises human dignity and well-being and the duty to prevent suffering wherever it occurs—to not stand by and allow innocent people to be slaughtered.

So, the philosophical origins of a cosmopolitan sociology lie not only in the French and German Enlightenment, whose ideas it reversed, but mainly in the Scottish Enlightenment, specifically in the idea that there are duties imposed by sympathy and benevolence. Scottish Enlightenment thinkers argued that the social conditions that fostered sympathy were the increase in wealth, the increase in interaction, and the increase in equality, and that all of these conditions would be increased as the market spread. In other words, it was argued that market cosmopolitanism and moral cosmopolitanism were mutually supportive.

Market Cosmopolitanism

History has, in fact, borne that argument out. As the market has developed over the last few centuries, our tolerance for cruelty has dramatically changed. The market does

injure lots of people. But it also brings them within the circle of sympathy. That is, it seems consistently to excite a politically significant mass of people that this harm can and must be remedied. And, crucially, it provides the means to do something about it. It brings people inside the circle not only of sympathy, but of effective sympathy. And this is one of the key social foundations of cosmopolitanism. By moral cosmopolitanism, we mean the belief that our duty to ameliorate the suffering of individuals is more important than any artificial political barrier that may stand in our way.

One of the main parallels between the Hellenistic and Enlightenment moments of cosmopolitanism is that the spread of cosmopolitanism among the population depended on the growth of trade and communication. As Marx once said, the market puts people into contact with innumerable unknown others—and to this we would add, who then become known others through the newly incited movement for reform, which would not have taken place (and would have had no “purchase” to affect things if they did take place) so long as such ill treatment remained outside the market. And for cosmopolitanism to spread widely among the world’s population and become the basis of political mobilization, it needs to be embodied in symbols and rituals so that it can become the basis of personal identity. This last point is important because this is finally the ultimate political foundation of cosmopolitanism: the feeling of individuals that they are doing something wrong by ignoring suffering. Properly mobilized, this is what creates the new political facts that enable cosmopolitan political action.

NEW COSMOPOLITANISM

And this is why a new cosmopolitanism is in the air: Through criticism, the concept has been rediscovered and reinvented. Over the last years or so, there has been a sharp increase in the literature that attempts to relate the discourse on globalization (in cultural and political terms) to a redefinition of cosmopolitanism for the global age.

Thus, cosmopolitanism relates to a premodern ambivalence toward a dual identity and a dual loyalty. Every human being is rooted by birth in two worlds, two communities: in the cosmos (that is, nature) and in the polis (that is, the city-state).

To be more precise: Individuals are rooted in one cosmos but in different cities, territories, ethnicities, hierarchies, nations, religions, and so on at the same time. This creates not exclusivity, but an inclusive plural membership. Being part of the cosmos means that all men and women are equal by nature yet part of different states organized into territorial units (polis). “Cosmopolitanism” ignores an “either/or” principle and embodies a “this or that” principle. These are ancient hybrid, or *mélange*, scale–flow concepts. Thus, cosmopolitanism generates a logic of

nonexclusive oppositions, making “patriots” of two worlds that are at the same time equal and different.

Toward a Cosmopolitan Social Science

What makes cosmopolitanism so interesting for the social and political theory of modern societies is its thinking and living in terms of inclusive oppositions. Nature is associated with society; the object is part of subjectivity; otherness of the other is included in one’s own self-identity and self-definition; and the logic of exclusive oppositions is rejected. Nature is no longer separated from national or international society; either as a subject or object, “We” are not opposed to “Them.” The opposition between war and peace has been overthrown by the one between war and “heroism.” This has clearly methodological consequences. We argue, therefore, that in the social sciences, “methodological cosmopolitanism” is opposed to “methodological nationalism,” rejecting the state-centered perspective and sociological (lack of) imagination. It attempts to overcome the naive universalism of early Western sociology. Methodological cosmopolitanism implies becoming sensitive and open to the many universalisms, the conflicting contextual universalisms, for example, of the postcolonial experience, critique and imagination. Methodological cosmopolitanism also means including other (“native”) sociologies, the sociologies of and about African, Asian, and South American experiences of “entangled modernities” (Therborn 2003). “Entangled modernities” replace the dualism of the modern and the traditional, pointing to and again creating the image of a deterritorialized *mélange* of conflicting contextual modernities in their economic, cultural, and political dimensions.

All of our existing political categories presume the nation-state as the ultimate political reality, and this methodological nationalism is clearly at work in our conviction that the way to clarify any mixture is to segregate out which nation is the influencer and which one is the influencee. The world is generating a growing number of such mixed cases, which make less sense according to the “either/or” logic of nationality than to the “this-as-well-as-that” logic of transnationality. Our intellectual frames of reference are so deeply ingrained that this transnational way of thinking has been comparatively undeveloped. A cosmopolitan sociology is an antidote to ethnocentrism and nationalism. It should not be mistaken for multicultural euphoria. On the contrary, cosmopolitanism starts from the hard-won insight that there is an invariable connection between ethnocentrism and the hatred of foreigners, and tries to advance beyond this sort of “common sense.” For a similar reason, cosmopolitanism is an advance over the concept of “hybridization” because it avoids the dangers inherent in using biological metaphors for human difference.

Institutionalized Cosmopolitanism

The first modern world was a national world. There was a clear division between inner and outer, between domestic and foreign. In that world, the nation-state was the principle of order. Politics was national politics; culture was national culture; and labor, class formation, and class conflict were all primarily features of the nation-state. International politics was a multiplication of nation-states, each defining each other's borders and mirroring each other's essential categories. National and international were two sides of an interdependent whole. It was as impossible to conceive of a nation-state in isolation as to imagine an inner without an outer. Rooted cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is defined against the two extremes of being at home everywhere and being at home nowhere. It means to be engaged in the local and the global at the same time. It is opposed to ethnocentrism but also to universalism, whether from the Left or the Right. When it comes to the critique of imperialism, rooted cosmopolitanism points out that in a postcolonial world, there is no pure, precolonized nation to go back to.

A cosmopolitan sociology means, therefore, that issues of global concern are becoming part of the everyday local experiences and the "moral lifeworlds" of the people. This paradigm change has already been announced by different people in different fields in the social sciences (Appadurai 1990; Archibugi and Held 1995; Beck 2000, 2002; Cheah and Robbins 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). Thus, a cosmopolitan sociology imposes fundamental questions of redefinition, reinvention, and reorganization. These challenges are related to two fundamental processes: globalization and individualization. Globalization is mostly related to space and often defined in terms of "time-space compression" and/or "deterritorialization." But the other side of the coin, individualization, also means the cosmopolitanization of time and collective memory. The experience of a cosmopolitan crisis (world risk society) implies, as well, that more and more people all over the world are reflecting on a shared collective future, which might even contradict nation-based memories of the past. Cosmopolitan sentiment or a cosmopolitan common sense has to be distinguished from *institutionalized cosmopolitanism* through legal institutions such as the International Criminal Court, the human rights regime codified in conventions and courts and multilateral agreements. The European Union and its "cosmopolitan entrepreneurs," the European Commission, Court, and Parliament appear to provide some answers not only to the horrors of the twentieth century but also to the increasing loss of state sovereignty.

The Holocaust, or rather the collective memories that have sprung from it during the last six decades, is a paradigmatic case for the political and cultural salience of cosmopolitan sentiments (Levy and Sznajder 2002). A "cosmopolitan state" not only separating nation and state but also acting transnationally seems to be the next stage in

an institutionalized cosmopolitanism (Beck 2002). Cosmopolitan states connect self-determination with responsibility for those who are not part of the nation-state. And this becomes institutionalized through the human rights regime, which will find a way to civilize a global risk society. And it should not be confused with a "false cosmopolitanism" or global unilateralism, which means nothing but the pursuit of national interest in the name of cosmopolitan values. Another side of "institutionalized cosmopolitanism" is through individualism or internalized cosmopolitanism. Issues of global concerns are becoming part of one's moral lifeworld, no matter if people are for or against them. The cosmopolitan horizon becomes institutionalized in our own subjective lives. A cosmopolitan sociology, therefore, brings the subject back into the social sciences after system theory and poststructuralist theories have tried to construct a social science without subjects.

Cosmopolitanism and Universalism

Cosmopolitanism diverges from universalism in that it assumes that there is not one language of cosmopolitanism, but many languages, tongues, and grammars. Cosmopolitanism means also disputing about its consequences. This paradigmatic reconstruction of social science from a national to a cosmopolitan perspective can be understood and explained as a "positive problem shift" (Lakatos 1970). Previously, the national cosmos could be decomposed into a clear distinction between inside and outside. Between the two, the nation-state governed, and order was established. Thus, there is a strong and hidden relationship between universalism and nationalism. In the inner space of the nation-state, the central themes of sociology, such as work, politics, law, social inequality, justice, and cultural identity, were negotiated against the background of the action. And even here, the national/international distinction always represented a permanent self-affirming prophecy. Against the background of a cosmopolitan social science, it becomes suddenly obvious that it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international nor, in a similar way, to contrast homogenous units. National spaces have become denationalized, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international is no longer international. And therefore, the universalism of social and political theory collapses as well.

— Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznajder

See also Beck, Ulrich; Giddens, Anthony; Globalization; Nationalism; Postmodernism; Risk Society

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CRIME

Crime refers to acts forbidden by and subject to sanctions from the state. In modern societies, the term refers to violations of the criminal law that are punishable by the criminal justice system. The concept predates sociology and has been much studied since the discipline's beginnings. Sociological theories of crime can be divided into those that seek to explain why some individuals commit crimes and those that try to understand crime's place in the larger society.

ACCOUNTING FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

Some theories argue that criminals are different from law-abiding people. The nature of this difference depends

on the dominant scientific models of the time. During criminology's long history, theorists from a great variety of disciplines have speculated that criminals have distinctive racial characteristics, body types, personality types, intelligence levels, or genetic predispositions. Although these theories have attracted some sociological interest, most sociologists have resisted interpretations rooted in the criminal's biology, in favor of explanations that focus on social experiences.

Sociological theories of criminality can be divided into two major schools. The approach now known as *control theory* had its roots in the classical criminology articulated by Cesare Beccaria in the eighteenth century. It argues that crime is an expression of natural, short-term self-interest. In this view, taking what one wants or striking out in anger, the sorts of acts that tend to be defined as crimes, are normal reactions of most organisms. What is remarkable is that most people, most of the time, do not give in to raw self-interest. Rather, socialization leads to self-control; at an early age, most children learn to reign in their self-interested impulses in order to gain adult approval. The contemporary version of this approach, control theory, argues that criminals have had ineffective, erratic socialization, and as a result, they lack self-control and therefore commit crimes.

Social networks play key roles in socializing individuals. During early childhood, the family is the central arena for teaching these limits; parents who love their children, pay attention to them, and offer firm, consistent discipline to instill self-control. Older children influence one another; Edwin H. Sutherland's *theory of differential association* suggested that individuals whose social contacts are mostly law-abiding will become law-abiding, but that those whose associates are involved in criminality will commit crimes themselves. The expectations of a partner in a stable, loving relationship, typically involving marriage and family formation, also can constrain criminality. In addition, other social institutions can foster self-control. School tends to reward students who display disciplined learning habits; later in life, the demands of steady work or military service discourage criminality. Thus, the conventional life course—childhood in a nurturing family, youth spent among peers in school, followed by an adulthood focused around work and a family of one's own—provides a web of social control. To the degree that individuals are deeply enmeshed in this web, they are unlikely to become criminals, but to the degree that individuals have only loose ties to conventional life, the lessons of self-control are less likely to be learned, and crime becomes more likely.

The second major sociological approach to explaining individuals' criminality is *strain theory*. In this model, society places some individuals under strain, and they respond by turning to crime. Thus, individuals who find themselves in difficult circumstances, raised in poverty or in broken families, victims of racial discrimination or class

prejudice, or given few opportunities for education or employment, are more likely to become criminal. Key to strain theory is the notion of blocked opportunities. Rather than viewing crime, as control theory does, as an expression of normal human impulses, strain theory suggests that individuals turn to crime only because they find their access to respectability blocked. In this view, the familiar inverse relationship between social class and criminality is evidence of the blocked opportunities created by inequities in the class system.

The social environment plays a central role in strain theory. Subcultural explanations of delinquency, for example, suggest that lower-class culture celebrates values, such as toughness and fatalism, that make lawbreaking seem more attractive. Similarly, human ecology emphasizes urban geography's role in shaping criminality. Researchers associated with Chicago School sociology demonstrated that crime and other social problems tended to be concentrated in particular areas within the city. Before the Second World War, these patterns were usually explained in terms of social disorganization: In a city characterized by diversity, some neighborhoods might be dominated by the coherent moral codes of particular ethnic groups or social classes, but others, which lacked this sort of moral cohesion, became scenes of crime and disorder. The problem with social disorganization as a concept was that it proved all too easy for ethnographers to describe the culture and social organization of the allegedly disorganized areas.

Modern analysts of crime's spatial distribution tend to focus on both external and internal forces that shape areas. For example, analysts such as William J. Wilson argue that economic forces have fostered contemporary urban ghettos. As the economy provides fewer well-paying manufacturing jobs for individuals with modest educational credentials and as those jobs shift away from central cities, poverty becomes increasingly concentrated in urban areas, with predictable results: Fewer young couples marry; fewer children grow up in two-parent families; and more people turn to illegal activities for income. Such models identify a wide array of ways opportunities can be blocked, fostering strain and thereby making crime more likely.

Recent approaches have explored other ways in which space shapes crime. *Routine activity theory* begins with the observation that crime requires offenders but also prospective targets and the absence of social control. Analysts suggest that these conditions emerge at some times and places due to patterns in people's routine activities. Thus, as the proportion of wives employed outside the home grows, more homes are left vacant during the daytime, creating greater opportunities for residential burglaries. *Broken windows theory* suggests that a neighborhood's tolerance of minor forms of public disorder, such as an unrepaired broken window, signals to potential offenders that there is

no strong social consensus opposing crime and disorder and thereby invites misbehavior. There are, then, a range of theories explaining how social environments shape criminality.

UNDERSTANDING CRIME'S PLACE IN SOCIETY

Unlike theories that seek to account for individuals' crimes, other theorists try to understand crime's role in the larger society. At first glance, crime might seem to pose problems for *functionalist theory*, which views society as a system in which each element serves a purpose or function that contributes to maintaining the system. Crime seems to be dysfunctional for a system built upon moral consensus. However, beginning with Émile Durkheim, analysts have argued that crime serves functions. In *The Rules of Sociological Method* ([1895] 1982), Durkheim argued that crime was an inevitable social fact, that all societies used norms to mark their behavioral boundaries, and that the punishment of violations of those standards fostered social solidarity. Crime, then, was necessary to defining social order. In addition, functionalists often argued that crime served latent functions. For example, corruption, organized crime, and prostitution all offered efficient, albeit forbidden, markets that provided means of circumventing rigidities in the social order.

The principal macrosociological competitor to functionalism has been *conflict theory*. This approach, derived from the writings of Karl Marx, argues that society is best viewed not as a moral consensus, but as a competition among groups, particularly social classes, of different power. For conflict theorists, the criminal law is an artifact of elite interests; that is, elites arrange of the passage of laws that reflect and affirm their interests (e.g., by protecting the institution of private property), and they oversee the enforcement of those laws. In this view, crime may be viewed as rebellious, or at least as prepolitical, expressions of the discontent of the oppressed, while law enforcement is one means by which elites squelch opposition to their institutional control. Conflict theorists argue that often the criminal law ignores the abuses of elites (i.e., acts that should be considered crimes are not forbidden by the statutes) or that the criminal justice system fails to bring sanctions to bear against elite offenders. From this perspective, differences in the criminality of ethnic groups or social classes are products of a social system that disadvantages the powerless while protecting the interests of elites.

Various contemporary approaches derive from conflict theory, such as feminism, critical race theory, and postmodernism. Here, the focus tends to shift from class as the social system's central dimension to gender, race, or even the power to control discourse. In such frameworks, criminality appears as a form of either resistance to or oppression by the dominant order.

CONTROLLING CRIME

In addition to studying crime, social theorists examine the control of crime. Key topics include the creation of criminal laws and the institutions for their enforcement, and the operation of the criminal justice system (e.g., policing, courts, and corrections). Interpretations of crime's control reflect theorists' assumptions about society and about crime: Conflict theorists criticize social control as a tool for protecting elite interests, while those who assign consensus a central role in societal organization tend to accept the need to control crime. Again, this literature is rich, with multiple competing theoretical paradigms for interpreting criminal justice.

— Joel Best

See also Anomie; Conflict Theory; Deviance; Socialization; Structural Functionalism; Urbanization

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CRITICAL PEDAGOGY

Critical pedagogy is a political project that attempts to change the power structures of everyday life, especially in cultural institutions such as those in education and the media. These changes are brought about through critique, resistance, and struggle. It aims to enable people to avoid manipulation and to empower them. Critical pedagogy is closely linked with the history of cultural studies and its democratic idea of a "long revolution."

The history of cultural studies shows that this project, with its intellectual and political nature, has since its beginning been closely linked to questions of education and pedagogy. This is because it originated in the vital and intellectually varied field of adult education in the 1950s in Great Britain. In productive exchange with mature students from working classes, Edward P. Thompson, Raymond Williams, and Richard Hoggart developed their creative ideas on cultural analysis. In the context of adult education, for example, in workers' education, the roles of professor and student were not so clearly defined by hierarchy as in university. These untraditional students who had been denied access to higher education did not accept as inevitable the authority of professors, but rather applied

what they learned to their own life, asked questions in class that had practical relevance to their own experience, and did not accept the borders between academic disciplines. These radical challenges not only made press, radio, and films, and so on themes alongside literature but also made it possible to bring students to view their own lives in the context of unequal social relationships. As a next step, it showed them ways in which their lives could be changed in order to create more social justice and equality. These institutions, alternatives to university, created a space for cultural studies in Great Britain.

In more recent studies, culture is described as a "network of embedded practices and representations (texts, images, talk, codes of behaviour, and the narrative structures organizing these)" (Frow and Morris 2000:316). Culture is the place where power relationships are legitimized but where they can also be challenged and changed. Cultural studies not only analyses but also has an interventionist character. Since the 1960s, the place of the working classes has been taken by new social movements, marginalized minorities, and oppressed groups whose agency ought to be increased by teaching them to socially contextualise their precise situation in life and to recognise and grasp opportunities to change.

THE WORK OF THE CCCS AND ITS PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) was first led by Richard Hoggart and later by Stuart Hall, who also came from the field of adult education and belonged to the New Left. Here, media studies, that is, the analysis of film, television, press, and so on, was an important topic. Questions of pedagogy, however, were explicitly dealt with only in passing, even when the centre became world famous for its studies of youth. There were two essential fields of research, the studies of youth with their model of incorporation and resistance, on one hand, and media research with its textual analysis critical of ideology, on the other. These do reveal characteristics that are relevant for critical pedagogy.

Thus, it is shown, both in the case of young people from the working classes as well as in the case of television viewers, that they are not "cultural dopes," but rather, they create their own culture in dealing with products or cultural texts available to them. Doubtless, in Birmingham, the focus lay on agency that is restricted by social conditions but is at least rudimentarily existent. Following Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, popular culture becomes the "zone of contestation." The interdisciplinary investigations by cultural studies aim to increase autonomy by showing, for example, how news on television is structured ideologically and how it can be treated critically from the background of one's own interests.

Because the research has started from concrete questions with a practical relevance, it is not difficult to form links to the lives of those who have been examined. Thus, cultural studies does not limit itself to the analysis of cultural objects or institutions, but examines how people in different social contexts create and experience culture, and so return the focus to the strength to produce and the power to transform. Stuart Hall has shown that on a theoretical level, the cultural studies project develops between the paradigms of culturalism and structuralism, and this can be seen very clearly both in the studies of youth and in media studies. They make it clear that structures are not independent of history or constantly stable, but rather are always “structures-in-use,” in which the uses cannot be defined in advance (Frow and Morris 2000:326). The interventionist motive of cultural studies, which aims for social change, implies critical pedagogy even if it is not clearly expressed. On the other hand, it is also understandable why supporters of these forms of critical pedagogy native to the United States and arising from examination of the tradition of Western Marxism (i.e., of the Frankfurt school), have taken up cultural studies since the 1980s. Before we turn to these approaches, because they are of particular relevance to our question, we should look more closely in the following section at an example of the further development in the United States of “audience ethnography” that was first initiated in Birmingham.

AUDIENCE ETHNOGRAPHY: POLYSEMIC TEXTS AND PLURAL FORMS OF USE

Hall’s “encoding-decoding” model and the studies by David Morley that followed from it create the basis for a most fruitful and innovative approach to media research: the “audience ethnography.” There was little discussion until this time on its pedagogic potential. Above all, it was John Fiske who emphasized the polysemic character of television programmes in order to reveal the heterogeneous potential of plural forms of appropriation. This was in his synthesising works at the end of the 1980s, which started from a deconstructive analysis of television. These forms of appropriation meant that the programmes were seen differently depending on the social and historical position of the viewer. Reception and appropriation of texts become, in his version, a context-based social practice in which texts are not messages sent out with a fixed meaning, but are given meaning on the basis of social experience in everyday life. Thus, on one hand, Fiske takes up the work of Birmingham and, on the other, Michel Foucault’s division between power and resistance and Michel de Certeau’s analysis of creative everyday practices. “Resistance” can arise in specific historical situations due to discursive structures, cultural practices, and subjective experience. In the cunning and artful use of resources, which are provided by the

(capitalist) system in the form of media texts and other consumables, the everyday participants try to give their own meaning to their living conditions and to express their own interests.

Above all, in his later analysis, Fiske (1994) dedicates himself to specific moments and locations of media use and defines the uniqueness and significance of cultural practices that are performed in a particular place at a particular time. This was a reaction to critics who accused him of assuming that every consumption of popular media would be potentially subversive. It seems sensible to define *resistance* as a possible outcome from popular texts, whereby we need to explain whether the subversive articulation of meaning remains limited to the specific context of the media reception or whether its effects develop into other areas of everyday life. However, the mobilised feelings and negotiated interpretations do not necessarily have to be organised in the sense of empowerment. Douglas Kellner (1995:39) emphasises in his criticism that differentiation needs to be made between the specific conditions of the various forms of resistance and their specific effects. Moreover, Larry Grossberg (1992) points out that it should be investigated how daily life is expressed on the whole with the politics of social formation. Pleasurable appropriation must not result in the disappearance of the preferred meanings dominating texts. Semiotic resistance must not flow into political practice.

Despite the partly justified criticism of “audience ethnography,” this innovative field of research demonstrated clearly that the textual interpretation relevant to everyday life is realized in the text’s social use. Admittedly, it partly ignores the fact that reception and appropriation in the postmodern media world and also the subjectivity of the consumers will be determined by various influences. Thus, the pedagogic interest of cultural studies is aimed primarily at those interpretations and pleasures that can help people to create their own meaning, express their interests, develop their “flight lines,” and broaden their power to act. In this way, texts are integrated into the circulation of interpretations and affective energies within a culture. The political aim of cultural studies is at any time to produce connections between the individual moments of self-empowerment and the surrounding cultural and social processes. In this, it is also necessary to criticize the existing power relationships and to analyse the possibilities of social transformations. Above all, the approach to critical pedagogy developed in the United States is explicitly concerned with that political aim and with the production of a radical democracy.

CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AS CULTURAL STUDIES

The starting point for critical pedagogy in the United States at the beginning of the 1980s was the investigation of the education system carried out by Bourdieu/Passeron and

others, which shows how it contributes to social reproduction and to the maintenance of existing relationships. The supporters of this field critical of ideology did not limit themselves, however, to analysing social reproduction as a structural effect. In analysis of the theoretical and empirical works from Birmingham and in particular the analysis of the reception of Gramsci's hegemony concept and the studies of youth subcultures, schools were analysed much more as hegemonial places of practices, including rituals, ideologies, and lived experience. This was the case in particular in the fundamental work *Schooling as a Ritual Performance* (1986), by Peter McLaren. As Paul Willis showed, the experience of the social world is not deducible from external determinants, but rather, it is contradictory, varied, and changeable. Culture is the field in which structures are experienced, lived, reproduced, and yet also transformed. It is precisely here that the critical pedagogy begins that seeks to develop and support the pupils' critical powers to act in order to develop strategies of cultural and political resistance. Thus, there are many different positions. Here, we will primarily look at those that are closest to the cultural studies project and that link it to critical pedagogy.

In this way, Henry Giroux, one of the leading representatives of this synthesis, had already negotiated in his early work *Theory and Resistance in Education* (1983) between culturalism and structuralism in his efforts to introduce ideology critique to classroom practice. Moreover, the pupils are supposed to reflect in class on their own social experiences. In a process of learning through dialogue, they should first deconstruct their "self" by understanding it in the context of their social relationships. This is the precondition to become potential participants in the historical process and to change existing relationships through criticism and struggle. Giroux's pedagogy of resistance is aligned with the transformation of society and so is linked with hope, transcendence, and utopia.

An intensive treatment of poststructuralist, postmodern, and postcolonial approaches within cultural studies led Giroux (as well as Peter McLaren) gradually to a transformation of his own approach. Today, he presents a critical pedagogy that is explicitly directed at cultural studies. This links the politics of difference with a demand for a radical democratisation of society. On one hand, he emphasises the important significance of cultural studies for the understanding of education, culture, and politics. Thus, his efforts are to make pedagogy an essential part of cultural studies. On the other hand, Giroux criticises the "textualist readings" and the "audience studies" that limit themselves to the analysis of the enthusiastic, subversive use of media. Therefore, he emphasises, for example, in an analysis of the Disney empire, that while many Disney texts do encourage opposing versions, this however does not destroy its power "to monopolize the media and saturate everyday life with its own ideologies" (Giroux 1999:7). Thus, the audience

studies can learn from critical pedagogy that creative and subversive interpretations during reception and appropriation are not enough to better realize democracy.

Critical pedagogy, above all, makes the negotiation and the production of meaning between teachers and pupils its theme, which they critically analyse in the context of discursive practices and power/knowledge relationships. In the age of neoliberalism and increasing privatisation of public spaces, we need to develop an ethic reflecting the relationship between power, the subordinated position of the subject, and social practices. "Critical pedagogy commits itself to forms of learning and action that are undertaken in solidarity with subordinated and marginalized groups" (Giroux and McLaren 1995:32). Starting from contemporary social conflicts, the ethical discourse should not only recognise (ethnic) differences but also show how justice is possible. Furthermore, the learners should examine the multitude of narrations and traditions, which are typical of today's multicultural society, and understand history and their own subjectivity as a place of social struggles. Therefore, students should learn to understand how "conflictual social relations" have determined their habitus. "The task of critical pedagogy is to increase our self-consciousness, to strip away distortion, to discover modes of subjectivity which cohere in the capitalist body/subject and to assist the subject in its historical remaking" (McLaren 1995:74). In this way, the agency of the student should be expanded. On one hand, critical pedagogy is a cultural practice; on the other, it is a form of social memory. This is particularly clear in the "postmodern counternarratives" project in which cultural studies is itself described as a "counternarrative" that rejects the technocratic and market-orientated rationality of teaching and learning in favour of a democratic appropriation of knowledge and cultural texts. This also leads to a pointed criticism of the "corporate university."

Among various political viewpoints, critical pedagogy also leads to an examination of existing theories, which are newly read and reformulated so they can be directed to the specific question. As in Birmingham, borders between disciplines can thus be broken down in order to produce new forms of knowledge that allow more democratic and more just ways of life. Here, critical pedagogy must research a language of political and moral possibilities that overcomes the ironic nihilism and cynicism of postmodern sensibility (Grossberg 1992) and leads to political participation. The promotion of "multicultural literacy" is a matter of particular concern in this. Cultural studies, with its focus on everyday experiences and practices, analyses the conditions of empowerment and creates therefore a basis for practical cultural politics. Therefore, children and young people, who are increasingly socialised by the commercial consumer culture, should, above all, develop a critical agency, acquire cooperative relationships, and direct themselves by democratic values (Giroux 2001).

Popular culture is a focus of the critical pedagogy orientated by cultural studies, in particular the analysis of popular films. Therefore, Giroux reveals the characteristics of the pedagogy of Hollywood in deconstructive and critical analysis. He examines the media politics of representation by analysing the discourse and images of race, gender, class, and sexuality. Thus, he shows, for example, how the media representations of African Americans have produced “a white moral panic.” Giroux (2002) is interested in how films and other media texts mobilise meaning, enjoyment, and identification, which influence the construction of social realities and one’s own definition of oneself. In this way, popular films present a pedagogic space in an “image-saturated culture.”

Here, Giroux coincides with the critical media pedagogy, which Kellner follows in his works on media culture. Kellner also ties up with British cultural studies. However, above all, he links with the Frankfurt school because he feels it is necessary to consider the area of production and the political economy of culture. On the other hand, he strives for a cultural critique that theoretically expresses the present moment in history and thus reveals its utopian possibilities. A critical media pedagogy should empower the viewer to decode the messages, ideologies, and values in media texts, in order to escape manipulation and be able to develop one’s own identity and forms of resistance. In addition, it should initiate and support politically engaged media activism in order to produce alternative forms of culture and counter public spheres, which are of decisive significance in a living democracy (Kellner 1995:337). Here, above all, the pedagogic work of teachers and other “cultural workers” is needed. They should introduce their knowledge and competence to win back public spaces and to create a culture of participation and of active citizenship. By acquiring media literacy in a context of dialogue based on cooperation, understanding of other cultures and subcultures can be awakened and deepened. Admittedly, a deconstruction of the social and political idea of “whiteness” is also part of this. It should be shown that the white cultural practices are limited and historically produced. By individual and collective acts, they are potentially transformable.

In particular, the new media demand the development of new forms of “media literacy” that are appropriate for the interactive fields of computers and multimedia. “Multiple literacies involve reading across varied and hybrid semiotic field and being able to critically and hermeneutically process print, graphics and representations, as well as moving images and sound” (Kellner 2002:96). Kellner is of the view that critical pedagogy directed toward cultural studies must help students in the new millennium precisely in the field of cyberspace. Students need help to develop their own spaces and forms of interaction in order to realize the project of a radical democracy.

Peter McLaren follows another direction. As a reaction to the post-Fordist economy, he requires again in connection

with the works of Paulo Freire, Gramsci, and Marx a “critically revolutionary pedagogy.” It should protect and demand variety and creativity of human action in the era of neoliberal globalisation. To be able to counter that market ideology, McLaren feels it is necessary to once more incorporate and deepen the Marxist analysis of society and the education system.

It must be emphasized that the interests of cultural studies are aimed at a criticism of power and an art of autonomous and creative agency (Winter 2001), which can develop, for example, in the productive and creative examination of media and other cultural forms in everyday contexts. Cultural studies do not proclaim the end of the subject, but rather address a strengthening of “agencies,” of the ability to create their own meaning by interpreting their social situation and themselves. As the works of Giroux, Kellner, McLaren, and others show, media and cultural analysis in the framework of cultural studies should always be integrated with critical pedagogy that opposes the implicit pedagogy of media texts and seeks to intensify or just make possible a productive confrontation. Thus, everyday life is defined as “contested terrain” that should be opened onto collective dialogue so that many different voices can express themselves in order to produce a more democratic and just society.

— Rainer Winter

See also Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Cultural Studies and the New Populism; Hall, Stuart; Hollywood Film; Public Sphere

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CULTURAL CAPITAL

The late Pierre Bourdieu, one of the leading French social thinkers of the twentieth century, developed the concept of "cultural capital" to explain the ability of elite managers and professionals to transmit their privileged status to their children, a process he referred to as "social and cultural reproduction." By "social and cultural reproduction," Bourdieu referred not only to the intergenerational reproduction of family status but also to the reproduction, first, of larger systems of social inequality and, second, of systems of cultural hierarchy (for example, the prestige of high-culture genres such as ballet and classical music compared with chorus lines and hip-hop).

Bourdieu was an abstract thinker with a gift for concrete social analysis. Like his other concepts, cultural capital has both a general definition and specific referents. Most abstractly, cultural capital comprises familiarity with and easy use of cultural forms institutionalized at the apex of a society's cultural hierarchy (for example, orthodox religious doctrines in a theocracy). In his work on contemporary France, Bourdieu used "cultural capital" to refer to familiarity with prestigious aesthetic culture, such as the high arts, literary culture, and linguistic ability. Such "high culture" is often produced by artists who eschew commercial values and claim to pursue art for art's sake. In many countries, it is distributed by nonprofit or public institutions. And its status is ensured by substantial public and private investment in school and university curricula that celebrate it, as well as high-culture programming in libraries and broadcast media and, in many countries, direct government support for high-culture artists and cultural institutions. Consequently, compared with other forms of prestigious knowledge, familiarity with the arts (or an understanding that such familiarity is a sign of distinction) tends to be nearly universal, cross-cutting boundaries of

region, gender, or profession. The precise content of cultural capital, however, differs from society to society (e.g., in Japan, cultural capital includes knowledge of Noh Theatre and tea ceremonies).

Bourdieu asked how high-status people with relatively little personal wealth, for example, managers of publicly held corporations or professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and university professors, are able to pass down their privileged positions to their children. Before the rise of the manager-control firm, transmission of privilege was easy: The owner of a business simply bequeathed it to his (very rarely her) children. Once businesses passed into the hands of shareholders, direct transmission was no longer practical. Instead, Bourdieu argued, families transform their economic capital into "cultural capital" by exposing children to prestigious culture from early childhood on, through household conversations, lessons, and visits to museums and performing-arts events. Thus trained, children possess what Bourdieu called "embodied cultural capital": cultural capital built into their ways of seeing and their schemes of evaluation, which they carry with them wherever they go. (Bourdieu also wrote of "linguistic capital," the ability to speak with confidence, correctness, and grace, which may be regarded as a form of cultural capital.)

When children from privileged backgrounds go to school, their teachers mistake this embodied cultural capital for intelligence or giftedness. Thus, they convert their cultural capital into good grades, encouragement, and admission into competitive academic programs. Success in school facilitates success in later life, especially with completion of university training, at which point embodied capital is supplemented by the *credentialed cultural capital* of degrees and diplomas. (Bourdieu also wrote of "objectified cultural capital," or books, paintings, musical scores, and other physical objects that one needs embodied cultural capital to appreciate, but this plays a less important role in his theory.) After completing schooling, children from high-status families "reconvert" their cultural capital back into economic privilege, completing the circuit of reproduction. Cultural capital remains useful after school, however, enabling its possessors to establish comfortable relations with potential patrons, employers, or marital partners.

In advanced capitalist societies, Bourdieu argued, cultural capital is most important for those members of the "dominant class" (owners of capital, high-level managers, and credentialed professionals) with the least economic capital. Scions of the wealthiest families, he argued, can afford to be casual in their approach to schooling and culture. By contrast, lower-income professionals (educators or librarians, for example) rely almost exclusively on their ability to transmit cultural capital (and with it, school success and an agreeable personal style) in order to ensure their children's success. Bourdieu thus portrayed the "dominant class" as an inverted pyramid: Those with the most

economic capital have the least cultural capital, and vice versa. Corresponding to differences in the volume and composition of capital are differences in values, lifestyles, and tastes: Artists and intellectuals, for example, distinguish themselves from corporate managers by valuing avant-garde art too complex or radical for the latter to understand, and embracing a simplicity of dress and décor consistent with their limited financial resources.

THEORETICAL ORIGINS

Although Bourdieu coined the term “cultural capital,” the notion that culture may represent a source of status or power is rooted in classical social theory, particularly in the work of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Weber wrote extensively about what he called “status groups”: persons connected by a shared status culture (that is, by a common identity, shared values, similar aesthetic tastes, forms of dress or speech, typical pastimes, and collective rituals) that they regard as a source of honor. (Weber’s observation that almost any criterion of distinction, no matter how trivial, can serve as a basis for status group formation is echoed in Bourdieu’s early use of the term “cultural arbitrary” to characterize cultural capital.) Weber also provided a classic account of the Chinese literati that foreshadows Bourdieu’s description of the modern professional who invests intensely in cultural capital as a basis for claims to elite status. Central to Weber’s theory was the insight that status groups use culture as a means of maintaining strong boundaries against outsiders in their efforts to monopolize scarce resources and market opportunities.

From Émile Durkheim, Bourdieu derived the notion that prestigious culture had a *sacred* quality: that it holds itself apart from the everyday world, that cultural symbols embody the power of the group in a physically compelling way, and that command of a group’s most esteemed cultural icons represents a source of power. These ideas are most commonly associated with Durkheim’s *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. But Durkheim explicitly linked curricular change and social power in his posthumously published lectures on the history of higher education in France. Bourdieu was also influenced by Durkheim and Marcel Mauss’s *Primitive Classification*. Onto Durkheim’s observation that taxonomy is central to cultural systems, Bourdieu grafted his own emphasis on culture as a field of conflict, producing the concept of “classification struggle” that figures in his understanding of cultural change.

Bourdieu’s account of cultural capital was also influenced, though less deeply, by Thorstein Veblen, whose *Theory of the Leisure Class* was successfully published in French translation in the 1960s, and by the American economist Gary Becker, whose book *Human Capital* popularized within economics the general notion that nonmaterial resources contribute to social mobility. Although he

acknowledged both as influences, Bourdieu’s understanding of culture was very different from that of Veblen or Becker.

WHAT CULTURAL CAPITAL IS NOT

Cultural capital has entered into the sociological lexicon, but it is often used loosely and incorrectly to refer to any tastes, dispositions, or cultural knowledge that help people get ahead. Used properly, cultural capital refers only to those cultural resources that are, first, institutionalized and, second, broadly understood to be prestigious. For a cultural form to establish legitimacy at the level of the modern national society, its value must be guaranteed by institutions, such as universities, the state, or established churches.

It is also necessary to distinguish between Bourdieu’s ideas about cultural capital and Veblen’s notion of “pecuniary emulation”: competition for prestigious and expensive signs of distinction. First, for Bourdieu, the critical mechanism is the monopolization of cultural capital by status groups, not competition for status between individuals. Second, in arguing that prestigious cultural forms are perceived as sacred, Bourdieu emphasizes that cultural capital must be *legitimate* (that is, widely understood to be intrinsically valuable) and not merely fashionable. Third, it follows that whereas for Veblen, status competition generates an inflationary process in which prestigious cultural goods lose value as they trickle down the class hierarchy, for Bourdieu, the collective action of dominant status groups, backed by institutions and the state, can reproduce cultural hierarchies over long periods of time.

It is likewise important to distinguish between cultural capital and *human capital*, which includes any skills, information, and know-how that contribute to social mobility. Human capital operates in the marketplace and is directly productive. Cultural capital operates through informal social interaction and is only rarely economically productive. (Human capital and cultural capital overlap in occupations, such as finance, sales, or banking, that require incumbents to earn the trust of elite clients.) Put another way, human capital is a semipublic good: Increasing the human capital of individuals enhances the productive capacity of the entire society. (Indeed, economists invented the concept to explain why societies with high levels of formal education had substantially larger gross national products than one would predict based on their physical capital stocks alone.) By contrast, because status groups use it to appropriate economic rents, cultural capital may actually reduce economic productivity by interfering with the functioning of economic markets.

Cultural capital, as sociologists use the term, should also be distinguished from two quite different uses by economists and urbanists. Cultural economists sometimes employ cultural capital to refer to a society’s stock of moral

and aesthetic knowledge, or its “cultural heritage.” Urbanists have used the term (or its cognate, “creative capital”) to refer to the putative economic benefits of arts spending and creative industries for urban economies.

Finally, we should distinguish between cultural capital and social capital. For Bourdieu, the distinction was quite clear: “Social capital” refers to social connections that provide access to jobs and other resources. More recently, however, social capital has been used by authors like James Coleman and Robert Putnam to refer to those features of a social group (including such “cultural” features as trust and normative consensus) that facilitate collective action to produce public goods. Culture in this sense should not be confused with the kinds of prestigious status cultures from which cultural capital flows.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CULTURAL CAPITAL

Although Bourdieu documented differences in tastes and cultural styles among different French “class fractions” (his term for social groups defined largely on the basis of occupation and educational attainment), he opposed the kind of causal modeling that dominates the study of social inequality in much of the world. It was not long, however, before students of social stratification began to test hypotheses derived from his theory with individual level data on family background, cultural tastes and practices, educational attainment, occupational achievement, and other outcomes.

Most of this research has operationalized cultural capital using measures of survey respondents’ participation in high-culture arts audiences. Studies in the United States, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America have documented strong associations between socioeconomic status and cultural capital, as well as significant effects on cultural capital of family of origin. Consistent with Bourdieu’s perspective, as opposed to Veblen’s, the strongest predictor by far is education, with family income playing a minor role. Also consistent with Bourdieu’s approach, and contradicting cognitive explanations of the association between education and taste for the arts, tastes cluster more by prestige (e.g., people who like classical music also like fine art) than by formal similarities (e.g., liking all kinds of music); and attendance at and attitudes toward high-culture arts events are better predictors of school success than are measures of what students know about the arts.

Research also provides much evidence to support the view that cultural capital is a significant predictor of school achievement and educational attainment, as well as some evidence that cultural capital is related to occupational attainment and to the educational level of one’s spouse. Ironically, the ubiquity of such findings poses a challenge to the underlying theory. For if cultural capital were only a means for the well-off to reproduce their status, it would

simply mediate the effect of family background. Yet cultural capital *independently* affects outcomes, serving as a means of upward mobility as well as of social reproduction. If cultural capital is most important when direct inheritance of wealth and position is least practical, its effects should be greatest in socialist societies: Yet studies undertaken during or just after the socialist era in Eastern Europe show effects similar to those found in the West. Similarly, many observers argue that Americans are less familiar with and care less about “high culture” than Europeans, yet the results of empirical studies in Europe and the United States are not markedly different. Moreover, in many studies, gender, a factor that Bourdieu leaves out of his theory, explains as much or more of the variance in cultural capital as does socioeconomic background, with women reading more literature, attending more plays, and visiting more museums than their male peers. These results suggest that internal family processes related to the gender division of household labor play an important and neglected role in cultural reproduction.

In other words, the links between family socioeconomic status, cultural capital, and educational and other outcomes are well established, but the processes that produce these links are poorly understood. Based on existing research, it is still uncertain to what extent cultural capital (1) enhances life chances by enabling its possessors to impress high-status gatekeepers and move easily into elite social circles; (2) serves as an indicator of the “social intelligence” necessary to identify and assimilate prestigious tastes, styles, and knowledge more generally; or (3) represents a proxy for unmeasured factors such as work habits or motivation.

THE FUTURE OF CULTURAL CAPITAL

Although Bourdieu emphasized the stability of cultural capital over processes of transformation, he certainly recognized the possibility of change. It is convenient to use the term *cultural capital regime* to refer to the nature of cultural hierarchy in a given society at a given time. The cultural capital regime includes the content of prestigious culture, the nature and effectiveness of the institutional arrangements that sustain cultural capital’s legitimacy, and the role of cultural capital in processes of social reproduction and individual mobility. Cultural capital regimes may be more or less open with respect to the breadth of cultural contents and competencies included in cultural capital, more or less stratified in the value accorded to different cultural forms, and more or less consequential for the outcomes of stratification processes.

Cultural capital regimes may change as a result of *classification struggles*. Classification struggles entail collective action by subordinate groups to improve their social position and, in so doing, to elevate the prestige and legitimacy of cultural forms associated with their identity

groups. In the United States, the recognition of jazz as a legitimate art form and its embrace by universities, non-profit institutions, and government arts programs was the outcome of successful classification struggles (by artists themselves and as an indirect effect of the civil rights struggle of African Americans).

Cultural capital regimes may also change as a result of *deinstitutionalization*. Classification struggles may modestly expand the stock of legitimate culture without altering other aspects of the cultural capital regime; but if enough of them occur simultaneously, they may undermine the legitimacy of the cultural hierarchy as a whole. Many observers have noted an erosion, in the United States at least, of the cultural hierarchy that privileges traditional European aesthetic forms over popular culture or forms with Asian or African origins. This, they contend, is a result both of classification struggles and of the vast expansion of commercial cultural industries and the segmentation of the cultural marketplace.

Although such claims are plausible, there is surprisingly little statistical evidence that the association between high-cultural tastes and social background has become weaker. But there is abundant evidence that socioeconomic status (and especially educational attainment) is positively related to enjoyment of many forms of popular, folk, or alternative culture, as well as to participation in high culture. According to Richard Peterson, the new cultural elites in the United States are “cultural omnivores,” whose trademark is appreciation of a wide range of cultural forms and an open disposition to the new. Following postmodern theory, cultural omniverousness can be seen as reflecting higher levels of occupational and geographic mobility, more fluid forms of identity, and industrial regimes of “flexible production” suited to fine-grained audience segmentation. Omniverousness also reflects the social networks of highly educated individuals, which tend to be larger and more diverse on many dimensions than those of less educated persons. As Bonnie Erickson has demonstrated, diversity of taste is associated with the size and diversity of one’s social networks.

We must not confuse omniverousness with promiscuity: Omnivores continue to eschew certain low-status activities and genres. Moreover, cultural capital inheres not simply in the culture one likes, but in *how* one appropriates it. Nonetheless, in this view, the cultural capital regime in the United States has become more inclusive; the institutional system guaranteeing the prestige of European high culture has become weaker; and the link between cultural capital (measured conventionally) and life course outcomes should diminish.

Cultural capital, of course, need not be limited to the arts. It is possible (though little, if any, research bears on this) that a deinstitutionalization of high culture has been accompanied by the constitution of new candidates for cultural capital, embraced by parts of the U.S. population but not yet institutionalized in the broader society. One leading

candidate, perhaps dominant among employees of large and midsize firms, is business culture, prizing resourcefulness, independence, group skills, technophilia, and familiarity with business concepts and personalities. A second candidate, based on more explicit cultural struggle, is the religious culture of evangelical Christianity, with its emphasis on scriptural knowledge, distinctive linguistic conventions, and alternative schools, media, publishers, and record companies.

CONCLUSION

Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital is a flexible and powerful tool for understanding the relationship between culture, power, and inequality in contemporary societies. Western societies over the past two centuries have derived their most potent and universal forms of cultural capital from the arts, and most researchers have focused on understanding continuities in the role of cultural capital in the reproduction of social inequality. A broader view of cultural capital, equally consistent with Bourdieu’s approach, might focus more on institutional analysis and on social and cultural struggle and change. Ultimately, a thorough understanding of cultural capital requires attention both to stability and to change to micromechanisms and to macro-historical processes.

— Paul DiMaggio

See also Bourdieu, Pierre; Durkheim, Émile; Postmodernism; Social Capital; Veblen, Thorstein; Weber, Max

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CULTURAL MARXISM AND BRITISH CULTURAL STUDIES

Many different versions of cultural studies have emerged in the past decades. While during its dramatic period of global expansion in the 1980s and 1990s, cultural studies was often identified with the approach to culture and society developed by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, in Birmingham, England, their sociological, materialist, and political approaches to culture had predecessors in a number of currents of cultural Marxism. Many twentieth-century Marxian theorists, ranging from Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, and T. W. Adorno to Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton, employed the Marxian theory to analyze cultural forms in relation to their production, their imbrications with society and history, and their impact and influences on audiences and social life. Traditions of cultural Marxism are thus important to the trajectory of cultural studies and to understanding its various types and forms in the present age.

THE RISE OF CULTURAL MARXISM

Marx and Engels rarely wrote in much detail on the cultural phenomena that they tended to mention in passing. Marx's notebooks have some references to the novels of Eugene Sue and popular media, the English and foreign press, and in his 1857–1858 “outline of political economy,” he refers to Homer's work as expressing the infancy of the human species, as if cultural texts were importantly related to social and historical development. The economic base of society for Marx and Engels consisted of the forces and relations of production in which culture and ideology are constructed to help secure the dominance of ruling social groups. This influential “base/superstructure” model considers the economy the base, or foundation, of society, and cultural, legal, political, and additional forms of life are conceived as “superstructures” that grow out of and serve to reproduce the economic base.

In general, for a Marxian approach, cultural forms always emerge in specific historical situations, serving particular socioeconomic interests and carrying out important social functions. For Marx and Engels, the dominant ideas of an epoch serve the interests of the ruling class, providing ideologies that legitimate class domination. *Ideology* is a critical term for Marxian analysis that describes how dominant ideas of a given class promote the interests of that class and help cover over oppression, injustices, and negative aspects of a given society. In their analysis, during the feudal period, ideas of piety, honor, valor, and military chivalry were the ruling ideas of the hegemonic aristocratic classes. During the capitalist era, values of individualism, profit, competition,

and the market became dominant, articulating the ideology of the new bourgeois class that was consolidating its class power. Ideologies appear natural, they seem to be common sense, and are thus often invisible and elude criticism.

Marx and Engels began a critique of ideology, attempting to show how ruling ideas reproduce dominant societal interests serving to naturalize, idealize, and legitimate the existing society and its institutions and values. In a competitive and atomistic capitalist society, it appears natural to assert that human beings are primarily self-interested and competitive by nature, just as in a communist society, it is natural to assert that people are cooperative by nature. In fact, human beings and societies are extremely complex and contradictory, but ideology smoothes over contradictions, conflicts, and negative features, idealizing human or social traits, such as individuality and competition, which are elevated into governing conceptions and values.

Many later cultural Marxists would develop these ideas, although they tended to ascribe more autonomy and import to culture than in classical Marxism. While Marx's writings abound with literary reference and figures, he never developed sustained models of cultural analysis. Instead, Marx focused his intellectual and political energies on analyzing the capitalist mode of production, current economic developments and political struggles, and vicissitudes of the world market and modern societies now theorized as “globalization” and “modernity.”

The second generation of classical Marxists, ranging from German Social Democrats and radicals to Russian Marxists, focused even more narrowly on economics and politics. Marxism became the official doctrine of many European working-class movements and was thus tied to requirements of the political struggles of the day, from Marx's death in 1883 and into the twentieth century.

A generation of Marxists, however, began turning concentrated attention to cultural phenomena in the 1920s. Perry Anderson (1976) interprets the turn from economic and political analysis to cultural theory as a symptom of the defeat of Western Marxism after the crushing of the European revolutionary movements of the 1920s and the rise of fascism. In addition, theorists like Lukács, Benjamin, and Adorno, who instituted a mode of Marxist cultural analysis, were intellectuals who had deep and abiding interest in cultural phenomena.

The Hungarian cultural critic Georg Lukács wrote important books such as *Soul and Form* (1900) and *Theory of the Novel* (1910) before he converted to Marxism and briefly participated in the Hungarian Revolution. The ultra-Marxist Lukács of the early 1920s intently developed philosophical and political dimensions of Marxism before returning to cultural analysis later in the 1920s. In Russia, in exile, he withdrew internally from Stalinism, while working on a series of literary texts that have underappreciated importance for cultural studies.

Lukács's *Theory of the Novel* connects the rise of the European novel to the emergence and triumph of the bourgeoisie and capitalism. Its highly delineated individual protagonists corresponded to the individualism promoted by bourgeois society, and the lessons learned in the course of the characters' experiences often conveyed useful instruction, reproducing the ideology of bourgeois society. For Lukács, literary forms, characters, and content must all be interpreted as articulations of historical contexts in which narrative itself takes on diverse forms and functions in dissimilar environments. His important contributions for cultural studies in this regard constitute a resolute historicizing of the categories of cultural form and analysis, as well as reading cultural texts within a specific historical milieu and using the interpretations of texts to illuminate, in turn, their historical settings.

Lukács's early historicist cultural studies was enriched in the 1920s in his turn to Marxism, in which he used theories of the mode of production, class and class conflict, and Marx's analysis of capital to provide economic grounding for his sociocultural analysis. History now is constructed by a mediation of economy and society, and cultural forms are understood in their relation to sociohistorical development within a mode of production, while cultural forms, properly interpreted, illuminate their historical circumstances. Thus, Lukács's readings of Balzac, Zola, Thomas Mann, Kafka, and other writers provide models of how to read and analyze critical texts in specific sociohistorical situations.

Lukács's prescriptive aesthetic valorized critical (and socialist) realism as the model for progressive art and assaulted modernist aesthetics, a position that was strongly rejected by subsequent Western Marxists, from the Frankfurt school through British cultural studies. The older Lukács also turned to more dogmatic political forms of Marxian ideology critique and formally renounced his earlier utopianism, which saw literature as a mode of reconciliation between individuals and the world and art as a way of overcoming alienation.

Ernst Bloch, by contrast, stressed the utopian dimensions of Western culture and the ways in which cultural texts encoded yearnings for a better world and a transformed society. Bloch's (1986) hermeneutic approach to Western culture looked for visions of a better life in cultural artifacts, from the texts of Homer and the Bible to modern advertising and department store showcase displays. This utopian impulse contributes to cultural studies a challenge to articulate how culture provides alternatives to the existing world and images, ideas, and narratives that can promote individual emancipation and social transformation, perspectives that would deeply inform the Frankfurt school and contemporary theorists such as Fredric Jameson.

For the Italian Marxist theorist, Antonio Gramsci, the ruling intellectual and cultural forces of the era constitute a

form of hegemony, or domination by ideas and cultural forms that induce consent to the rule of the leading groups in a society. Gramsci argued that the unity of prevailing groups is usually created through the state (as in the American Revolution, or unification of Italy in the nineteenth century), but the institutions of "civil society" also play a role in establishing hegemony. Civil society, in this discourse, involves institutions of the church, schooling, the media, and forms of popular culture, among others. It mediates between the private sphere of personal economic interests and the family and the public authority of the state, serving as the locus of what Habermas described as "the public sphere."

In Gramsci's conception, societies maintained their stability through a combination of "domination," or force, and "hegemony," defined as consent to "intellectual and moral leadership." Thus, social orders are founded and reproduced with some institutions and groups violently exerting power and domination to maintain social boundaries and rules (e.g., the police, military, vigilante groups, etc.), while other institutions (such as religion, schooling, or the media) induce consent to the dominant order through establishing the hegemony, or ideological dominance, of a distinctive type of social order (e.g., market capitalism, fascism, communism, and so on). In addition, societies establish the hegemony of males and dominant races through the institutionalizing of male supremacy or the rule of a governing race or ethnicity over subordinate groups.

Gramsci's key example in his *Prison Notebooks* (1971) is the Italian fascism that supplanted the previous liberal bourgeois regime in Italy through its control of the state and exerted often repressive influence over schooling, the media, and other cultural, social, and political institutions. Hegemony theory, for Gramsci, involves both analysis of constitutive forces of domination and the ways that particular political forces achieved hegemonic authority, and the delineation of counterhegemonic forces, groups, and ideas that could contest and overthrow the existing hegemony. An analysis, for instance, of how the regimes of Margaret Thatcher in England and Ronald Reagan in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s won power would dissect the way conservative groups gained dominance through control of the state and the use of media, new technologies, and cultural institutions, such as think tanks, fund-raising, and political action groups. Explaining the Thatcher-Reagan hegemony of the 1980s would require analysis of the way rightist ideas became dominant in the media, schools, and culture at large. It would discuss the way in which, on a global level, the market rather than the state was seen as the source of all wealth and solution to social problems, while the state was pictured as a source of excessive taxation, overregulation, and bureaucratic inertia.

Gramsci defined ideology as the ruling ideas that present the "social cement" that unifies and holds together the

established social order. He described his own “philosophy of praxis” as a mode of thought opposed to ideology, which includes, among other things, a critical analysis of ruling ideas. In “Cultural Themes: Ideological Material” (1985), Gramsci notes that in his day, the press was the dominant instrument of producing ideological legitimation of the existing institutions and social order but that many other institutions, such as the church, schools, and different associations and groups, also played roles. He called for sustained critique of these institutions and the ideologies that legitimated them, accompanied by creation of counterinstitutions and ideas that would produce alternatives to the existing system.

Gramsci’s critique of the dominant mode of culture and media would be taken up by the Frankfurt school and British cultural studies, providing many valuable tools for cultural criticism. The concepts of ideology and utopia and historical-materialist cultural analysis developed by Lukács and Bloch influenced the trajectory of Frankfurt school cultural studies.

Cultural Marxism was highly influential throughout Europe and the Western world, especially in the 1960s, when Marxian thought was at its most prestigious and procreative. Theorists such as Roland Barthes and the *Tel Quel* group in France; Galvano Della Volpe, Lucio Colletti, and others in Italy; Fredric Jameson, Terry Eagleton, and a cohort of 1960s cultural radicals in the English-speaking world; and a large number of theorists throughout the globe used cultural Marxism to develop modes of cultural studies that analyzed the production, interpretation, and reception of cultural artifacts within concrete sociohistorical conditions that had contested political and ideological effects and uses. One of the most famous and influential forms of cultural studies, initially under the influence of cultural Marxism, emerged within the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, in Birmingham, England, within a group often referred to as the “Birmingham school.”

BRITISH CULTURAL STUDIES

While the Frankfurt school arguably articulates cultural conditions in the stage of state monopoly capitalism or Fordism that produced a regime of mass production and consumption, British cultural studies emerged in the 1960s when, first, there was widespread global resistance to consumer capitalism and an upsurge of revolutionary movements, and then the emergence of a new stage of capital, described as “post-Fordism,” “postmodernity,” or other terminology that attempted to describe a more variegated and contested social and cultural formation. Moreover, the forms of culture described by the earliest phase of British cultural studies in the 1950s and early 1960s articulated conditions in an era in which there were still significant tensions in England and much of Europe between an older,

working class–based culture and the newer, mass-produced culture, whose models and exemplars were the products of American culture industries.

The initial project of cultural studies developed by Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, and E. P. Thompson attempted to preserve working-class culture against onslaughts of mass culture produced by the culture industries. Thompson’s inquiries into the history of British working-class institutions and struggles, the defenses of working-class culture by Hoggart and Williams, and their attacks on mass culture were part of a socialist and working class–oriented project that assumed that the industrial working class was a force of progressive social change and that it could be mobilized and organized to struggle against the inequalities of the existing capitalist societies, and for a more egalitarian socialist one. Williams and Hoggart were deeply involved in projects of working-class education and oriented toward socialist working-class politics, seeing their form of cultural studies as an instrument of progressive social change.

The early critiques in the first wave of British cultural studies of Americanism and mass culture in Hoggart, Williams, and others during the late 1950s and early 1960s thus paralleled to some extent the earlier critique of the Frankfurt school, yet valorized a working class that the Frankfurt school saw as defeated in Germany and much of Europe during the era of fascism and that they never saw as a strong resource for emancipatory social change. The 1960s work of the Birmingham school was continuous with the radicalism of the first wave of British cultural studies (the Hoggart-Thompson-Williams “culture and society” tradition) as well as, in important ways, with the Frankfurt school. Yet the Birmingham project also eventually paved the way for a postmodern populist turn in cultural studies.

It has not been widely recognized that the second stage of the development of British cultural studies, starting with the founding of the University of Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, in 1963/1964, by Hoggart and Stuart Hall, shared many key perspectives with the Frankfurt school. During this period, the centre developed a variety of critical approaches for the analysis, interpretation, and criticism of cultural artifacts (see Hall 1980b; Kellner 1995; McGuigan 1992). Through a set of internal debates, and responding to social struggles and movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, the Birmingham group engaged the interplay of representations and ideologies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality in cultural texts, including media culture. The Birmingham scholars were among the first to study the effects of newspapers, radio, television, film, and other popular cultural forms on audiences. They also focused on how various audiences interpreted and used media culture in varied and different ways and contexts, analyzing the factors that made audiences respond in contrasting ways to media texts.

The now classical period of British cultural studies from the early 1960s to the early 1980s continued to adopt a Marxian approach to the study of culture, one especially influenced by Althusser and Gramsci (see, especially, Hall 1980a). Yet although Hall usually omits the Frankfurt school from his narrative, some of the work done by the Birmingham group replicated certain classical positions of the Frankfurt school, in their social theory and methodological models for doing cultural studies, as well as in their political perspectives and strategies. Like the Frankfurt school, British cultural studies observed the integration of the working class and its decline of revolutionary consciousness and studied the conditions of this catastrophe for the Marxian project of revolution. Like the Frankfurt school, British cultural studies concluded that mass culture was playing an important role in integrating the working class into existing capitalist societies and that a new consumer and media culture was forming a new mode of capitalist hegemony.

Both traditions engaged the intersections of culture and ideology and saw ideology critique as central to a critical cultural studies. Both perceived culture as a mode of ideological reproduction and hegemony in which cultural forms help to shape the modes of thought and behavior that induce individuals to adapt to the social conditions of capitalist societies. Both also conceived of culture as a potential form of resistance to capitalist society, and both the earlier forerunners of British cultural studies, especially Raymond Williams and the theorists of the Frankfurt school, viewed high culture as containing forces of resistance to capitalist modernity, as well as ideology. Later, British cultural studies would valorize resistant moments in media culture and audience interpretations and use of media artifacts, while the Frankfurt school tended, with some exceptions, to conceptualize mass culture as a homogeneous and potent form of ideological domination—a difference that would seriously divide the two traditions.

From the beginning, British cultural studies was highly political in nature and investigated the potential for resistance in oppositional subcultures. After first valorizing the potential of working-class cultures, they next indicated how youth subcultures could resist the hegemonic forms of capitalist domination. Unlike the classical Frankfurt school (but similar to Herbert Marcuse), British cultural studies turned to youth cultures as providing potentially new forms of opposition and social change. Through studies of youth subcultures, British cultural studies demonstrated how culture came to constitute distinct forms of identity and group membership and appraised the oppositional potential of various youth subcultures (see Jefferson 1976 and Hebdige 1979). Cultural studies came to focus on how subcultural groups resist dominant forms of culture and identity, creating their own styles and identities. Individuals who conform to dominant dress and fashion codes, behavior, and political ideologies thus produce their identities within mainstream groups, as members of specific social groupings (such as

white, middle-class, conservative Americans). Individuals who identify with subcultures, such as punk culture or black nationalist subcultures, look and act differently than those in the mainstream and thus create oppositional identities, defining themselves against standard models.

But British cultural studies, unlike the Frankfurt school, did not adequately engage modernist and avant-garde aesthetic movements, limiting its attentions by and large to products of media culture and “the popular.” However, the Frankfurt school engagement with modernism and avant-garde art in many of its protean forms is arguably more productive than the ignoring of modernism and, to some extent, high culture as a whole by many within British cultural studies. It appears that in its anxiety to legitimate study of the popular and to engage the artifacts of media culture, British cultural studies turned away from so-called high culture in favor of the popular. But such a turn sacrifices the possible insights into all forms of culture and replicates the bifurcation of the field of culture into a “popular” and “elite” (which merely inverts the positive/negative valorizations of the older, high/low distinction). More important, it disconnects cultural studies from attempts to develop oppositional forms of culture of the sort associated with the “historical avant-garde.” Avant-garde movements such as Expressionism, Surrealism, and Dada wanted to develop art that would revolutionize society and provide alternatives to hegemonic forms of culture.

British cultural studies, like the Frankfurt school, insists that culture must be studied within the social relations and system through which culture is produced and consumed and thus that analysis of culture is intimately bound up with the study of society, politics, and economics. The key Gramscian concept of hegemony led British cultural studies to investigate how media culture articulates a set of dominant values, political ideologies, and cultural forms into a hegemonic project that incorporates individuals into a shared consensus, as individuals became integrated into the consumer society and political projects, such as Reaganism or Thatcherism (see Hall 1988). This project is similar in many ways to that of the Frankfurt school, as are their metatheoretical perspectives that combine political economy, textual analysis, and study of audience reception within the framework of critical social theory.

British cultural studies and the Frankfurt school were both founded as fundamentally transdisciplinary enterprises that resisted established academic divisions of labor. Indeed, their boundary-crossing and critiques of the detrimental effects of abstracting culture from its sociopolitical context elicited hostility among those who are more disciplinary oriented and who, for example, believe in the autonomy of culture and renounce sociological or political readings. Against such academic formalism and separatism, cultural studies insists that culture must be investigated within the social relations and system through which culture is produced and consumed and thus that analysis of culture is intimately bound up with the study of society, politics, and economics. Employing

Gramsci's model of hegemony and counterhegemony, it sought to analyze "hegemonic," or ruling, social, and cultural forces of domination and to seek "counterhegemonic" forces of resistance and struggle. The project was aimed at social transformation and attempted to specify forces of domination and resistance in order to aid the process of political struggle and emancipation from oppression and domination.

Some earlier authoritative presentations of British cultural studies stressed the importance of a transdisciplinary approach to the study of culture that analyzed its political economy, process of production and distribution, textual products, and reception by the audience—positions remarkably similar to the Frankfurt school. For instance, in his classical programmatic article, "Encoding/Decoding," Stuart Hall (1980b) began his analysis by using Marx's *Grundrisse* as a model to trace the articulations of "a continuous circuit," encompassing "production-distribution-consumption-production" (p. 128). Hall concretizes this model with focus on how media institutions produce meanings, how they circulate, and how audiences use or decode the texts to produce meaning.

In many versions of post-1980s cultural studies, however, there has been a turn to what might be called a "postmodern problematic" that emphasizes pleasure, consumption, and the individual construction of identities in terms of what McGuigan (1992) has called a "cultural populism." Media culture from this perspective produces material for identities, pleasures, and empowerment, and thus audiences constitute the "popular" through their consumption of cultural products. During this phase, roughly from the mid-1980s to the present, cultural studies in Britain and North America turned from the socialist and revolutionary politics of the previous stages to postmodern forms of identity politics and less critical perspectives on media and consumer culture. Emphasis was placed more and more on the audience, consumption, and reception and displaced engaging production and distribution of texts and how texts were produced in media industries.

The forms of cultural studies developed from the late 1970s to the present, in contrast to the earlier stages, theorize a shift from the stage of state monopoly capitalism, or Fordism, rooted in mass production and consumption, to a new regime of capital and social order, sometimes described as "post-Fordism" (Harvey 1989), or "postmodernism" (Jameson 1991), and characterizing a transnational and global capital that valorizes difference, multiplicity, eclecticism, populism, and intensified consumerism in a new information/entertainment society. From this perspective, the proliferating media culture, postmodern architecture, shopping malls, and the culture of the postmodern spectacle became the promoters and palaces of a new stage of technocapitalism, the latest stage of capital, encompassing a postmodern image and consumer culture (see Best and Kellner 2001 and Kellner 2003).

Consequently, the turn to a postmodern cultural studies is a response to a new era of global capitalism. What is described as the "new revisionism" (McGuigan 1992) severs

cultural studies from political economy and critical social theory. During the postmodern stage of cultural studies, there is a widespread tendency to decenter, or even ignore completely, economics, history, and politics in favor of emphasis on local pleasures, consumption, and the construction of hybrid identities from the material of the popular. This cultural populism replicates the turn in postmodern theory away from Marxism and its alleged reductionism, master narratives of liberation and domination, and historical teleology.

Hall's (1988) analysis of Thatcherism as "authoritarian populism" related the move toward the hegemony of the right to shifts in global capitalism from Fordism to post-Fordism, but for his critics (Jessop et al. 1984), he did not adequately take account of the role of the economy and economic factors in the shift toward Thatcherism. Hall (1988) responded that with Gramsci, he would never deny "the decisive nucleus of economic activity" (p. 156), but it is not certain that Hall himself adequately incorporates economic analysis into his work in cultural studies and political critique. For example, Hall's writing on the "global postmodern" suggests the need for more critical conceptualizations of contemporary global capitalism and theorizing of relations between the economic and the cultural of the sort associated with the Frankfurt school. Hall (1991) states:

The global postmodern signifies an ambiguous opening to difference and to the margins and makes a certain kind of decentering of the Western narrative a likely possibility; it is matched, from the very heartland of cultural politics, by the backlash: the aggressive resistance to difference; the attempt to restore the canon of Western civilization; the assault, direct and indirect, on multicultural; the return to grand narratives of history, language, and literature (the three great supporting pillars of national identity and national culture); the defense of ethnic absolutism, of a cultural racism that has marked the Thatcher and the Reagan eras; and the new xenophobias that are about to overwhelm fortress Europe.

For Hall, therefore, the global postmodern involves a pluralizing of culture, openings to the margins, to difference, and to voices excluded from the narratives of Western culture. But one could argue in opposition to this interpretation in the spirit of the Frankfurt school that the global postmodern simply represents an expansion of global capitalism on the terrain of new media and technologies and that the explosion of information and entertainment in media culture represents powerful new sources of capital realization and social control. To be sure, the new world order of technology, culture, and politics in contemporary global capitalism is marked by more multiplicity, pluralism, and openness to difference and voices from the margins, but it is controlled and limited by transnational corporations that are becoming powerful new cultural arbitrators and threaten to constrict the range of cultural expression, rather than to expand it.

CULTURAL STUDIES GOES GLOBAL

The dramatic developments in the culture industries in recent years toward merger and consolidation represent the possibilities of increased control of information and entertainment by ever-fewer supermedia conglomerates. One could already argue that the globalization of media culture is an imposition of the lowest-denominator homogeneity of global culture on a national and local culture, in which CNN, NBC, MTV, the Murdoch channels, and so on impose the most banal uniformity and homogeneity on media culture throughout the world. To be sure, the European cable and satellite television systems have state television from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Russia, and so on, but these state television systems are not really open to that much otherness, difference, or marginality. Indeed, the more open channels, such as public access television in the United States and Europe or the SBS service that provides multicultural television in Australia, are not really part of the global postmodern; they are funded or mandated for the most part by the largesse of state and are usually limited and local in scope and reach.

Certainly, there are some openings in Hall's global postmodern, but they are rather circumscribed, and counteracted by increasing homogenization within global culture. Indeed, the defining characteristics of global media culture are the contradictory forces of identity and difference, homogeneity and heterogeneity, the global and the local, impinging on each other, clashing, simply peacefully coexisting, or producing new symbioses, as in the motto of MTV Latino, which combines English and Spanish: "*Chequenos!*"—meaning "Check us out!" Globalization by and large means the hegemony of transnational cultural industries, largely American, as U.S. cultural industries dominate world markets in film, television, music, fashion, and other cultural forms. Evocations of the global postmodern diversity and difference should thus take into account countervailing tendencies toward global homogenization and sameness, themes constantly stressed by the Frankfurt school.

For Hall (1991), the interesting question is what happens when a progressive politics of representation imposes itself on the global postmodern field, as if the global field were really open to marginality and otherness. But, in fact, the global field itself is structured and controlled by dominant corporate and state powers; it remains a struggle to get oppositional voices in play, and it is extremely difficult in broadcasting, for instance, where there are no public access channels or state-financed open channels, as in Holland. Of course, things look different when one goes outside of the dominant media culture: There *is* more pluralism, multiplicity, and openness to new voices, on the margins, but such alternative cultures are hardly part of the global postmodern that Hall elicits. Hall's global postmodern is thus too positive, and his optimism should be tempered by the sort of critical perspectives on global capitalism developed by the Frankfurt school and the earlier stages of cultural studies.

The emphasis in postmodernist cultural studies arguably articulates experiences and phenomena within a new mode of social organization. The emphasis on active audiences, resistant readings, oppositional texts, utopian moments, and the like describes an era in which individuals are trained to be more discerning media consumers and in which they are given a much wider choice of cultural materials, corresponding to a new global and transnational capitalism with a much broader array of consumer choices, products, and services. In this regime, difference sells, and the differences, multiplicities, and heterogeneity valorized in postmodern theory describes the proliferation of differences and multiplicity in a new social order predicated on proliferation of consumer desires and needs.

The forms of hybrid culture and identities described by postmodern cultural studies correspond to a globalized capitalism with an intense flow of products, culture, people, and identities, with new configurations of the global and local and new forms of struggles and resistance (see Appadurai 1996 and Cvetkovich and Kellner 1997). Emergent forms of cultural studies that combine traditions from throughout the world replicate the structure of an expanding and hybridized global culture, producing more varied forms of cultural studies with the proliferation of articles, books, conferences, and Internet sites and discussions throughout the world. From the 1980s through the present, models of cultural studies expanded the range of theories, regions, and artifacts engaged, providing a rich diversity of traditions, originally deeply influenced by cultural Marxism and then taking a wide variety of forms. Critical cultural studies insisted that the politics of representation must engage class, gender, race, and sexuality, thus correcting lacunae in earlier forms of cultural Marxism. British cultural studies successively moved from focuses on class and culture to include gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, nation, and other constituents of identity in their analyses (see the articles collected in Durham and Kellner 2001).

As argued in this entry, there are many important anticipations of key positions of British cultural studies in cultural Marxism and a wide range of traditions and positions to draw upon for cultural studies today. Consequently, the project of cultural studies is significantly broader than that taught in some contemporary curricula, which identify cultural studies merely with the Birmingham school and their progeny. There are, however, many traditions and models of cultural studies, ranging from neo-Marxist models developed by Lukács, Gramsci, Bloch, and the Frankfurt school in the 1930s to feminist and psychoanalytic cultural studies to semiotic and poststructuralist perspectives (see Durham and Kellner 2001). In Britain and the United States, there is a long tradition of cultural studies that preceded the Birmingham school. And France, Germany, and other European countries have also produced rich traditions that provide resources for cultural studies throughout the world.

At their best, the major traditions of cultural studies combine social theory, cultural critique, history, philosophical analysis, and specific political interventions, thus overcoming the standard academic division of labor by surmounting specialization arbitrarily produced by an artificial academic division of labor. Cultural studies thus operates with a transdisciplinary conception that draws on social theory, economics, politics, history, communication studies, literary and cultural theory, philosophy, and other theoretical discourses—an approach shared by the Frankfurt school, British cultural studies, and French postmodern theory. Transdisciplinary approaches to culture and society transcend borders between various academic disciplines. In regard to cultural studies, such approaches suggest that one should not stop at the border of a text, but should see how it fits into systems of textual production and how various texts are thus part of systems of genres or types of production and have an intertextual construction, as well as articulating discourses in a given sociohistorical conjuncture.

Cultural Marxism thus strengthens the arsenal of cultural studies in providing critical and political perspectives that enable individuals to dissect the meanings, messages, and effects of dominant cultural forms. Cultural studies can become part of a critical media pedagogy that enables individuals to resist media manipulation and to increase their freedom and individuality. It can empower people to gain sovereignty over their cultures and to be able to struggle for alternative cultures and political change. Cultural studies is thus not just another academic fad, but can be part of a struggle for a better society and a better life.

— Douglas Kellner

See also Benjamin, Walter; Cultural Studies and the New Populism; Frankfurt School; Globalization; Gramsci, Antonio; Hall, Stuart; Jameson, Fredric; Lukács, György

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CULTURAL STUDIES AND THE NEW POPULISM

"The cultural turn" in the social sciences recognises that all human practice is mediated symbolically and therefore must be understood as meaningful. This way of thinking can be traced back to Max Weber's switch from economics to sociology and the methodological principles of *Verstehen*. Recent social theory has become yet more concerned with the cultural. The formation of a particular field of education and

research since the 1960s, the interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary or postdisciplinary field of cultural studies, is devoted to the study of the mediating power of signs and symbols in social life. It has a special interest in popular culture and the activity of consumption under late-modern conditions. Although cultural studies is diverse and varied in its concerns, mainstream work in the field is chiefly motivated by sentiments of a populist kind and rarely justifies itself exclusively on grounds of disinterested social science. Cultural studies was originally associated politically with a New Left populism that contested elite culture in academia and sought to politicise the study and practice of popular culture. Since the 1980s, however, cultural studies has been drifting toward a newer kind of populism, recently named “market populism” by Thomas Frank.

CULTURAL STUDIES

What is now known as cultural studies emerged in British adult education during the 1950s. This context provided access to higher education for those who had missed out on university and was especially oriented to working-class self-improvement and egalitarian social reform. The founding figures, Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, and E. P. Thompson, were themselves literary scholars of a leftist persuasion. They were interested in making sense of literature’s social significance and its contribution to what Williams referred to as a “long revolution,” bringing about an “educated and participatory democracy” that developed from working-class cultural traditions and labour movement politics. Hoggart wrote a widely read book, *The Uses of Literacy*, on the role of popular literacy and the impact of “Americanisation,” including Hollywood and rock ‘n’ roll, on working-class culture in Britain. Thompson turned to the discipline of social history and studied how the English working class had made itself culturally during the period of the Industrial Revolution.

Williams was the leading figure in that he sought to theorise the practice of cultural analysis within the specific intellectual circumstances of university English and post-Second World War social democracy in Britain. He argued that the study of culture should be the analysis of relations in a “whole way of life” in order to reveal the “structure of feeling” of a generation, instead of simply conducting endless exegesis and evaluation of a “selective tradition” of great works from the past. Such an argument was hardly novel from an anthropological point of view. It effected, however, a transition from literary criticism to sociology in cultural analysis. No longer could the cultural analyst neglect the social dynamics of culture or ignore what was happening in the present because it was deemed too soon to pass critical judgement. This opened up the range of cultural objects and practices worthy of study, stretching out to include contemporary popular culture in its myriad forms. In Williams’s catchphrase, “culture is ordinary.” According

to Williams’s later formulation of “cultural materialism,” processes of signification should be studied with regard to their actual conditions of production and circulation. And as Williams was to remark toward the end of his life in the late 1980s, the emergence and development of cultural studies itself should be understood in this way.

Cultural studies was first institutionalised at the University of Birmingham, in the West Midlands of England, during the 1960s (see Turner 2003). In 1964, Richard Hoggart founded the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), within the English department. A research fellowship was partly funded through covenant by Allen Lane of Penguin Books, who was grateful to Hoggart for his defence witness at the obscenity trial of D. H. Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, in 1960, and no doubt for the paperback sales of Hoggart’s own *The Uses of Literacy*. The Oxford-educated Jamaican cultural critic and New Left activist Stuart Hall was appointed to the fellowship. With Paddy Whannel of the British Film Institute’s education department, Hall wrote *The Popular Arts*, a guidebook for educators. It applied the Leavisite protocol of “discrimination” to the evaluation of “good” and “bad” texts from mass communications and popular culture, as Hoggart himself had recommended. This approach broke, however, with F. R. Leavis’s actual advice to teachers of English to discriminate against all products of modern media in general by demonstrating their inferiority to literary art.

Research students were recruited to pursue Hoggart’s and Hall’s more open-minded agenda for studying media and popular culture. When Hoggart left Birmingham in the late 1960s to become deputy director of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), Hall succeeded him as director of CCCS. In the 1970s, a distinctly Hallian school of thought gelled at Birmingham, quite different from Hoggart’s revised Leavisism, for which the now defunct centre is chiefly remembered. During that decade, the “Birmingham school,” considered by some to be of comparable significance to the Chicago school of urban studies and the Frankfurt school of critical theory, was formed by a succession of talented young scholars under Hall’s inspirational leadership. These included such illustrious names as Dick Hebdige, Angela McRobbie, David Morley, and Paul Willis. By the time Hall departed for the Open University in 1979, where he participated in the production of its Popular Culture course, the original Birmingham school had peaked and was becoming fragmented with its dispersal. Paradoxically, Birmingham’s influence on the expanding field of cultural studies around the world increased for several years after its effective institutional demise in the 1980s, which preceded the eventual closure in 2002 of the department that had grown out of the original CCCS.

Hall was of a much more theoretical turn of mind than Hoggart. He was involved in disseminating Western Marxist theories of culture and ideology into Britain. Hall also appropriated ideas from French structuralism and semiology in his early work, and in the 1980s and 1990s,

having previously been sceptical, he came increasingly under the sway of poststructuralism, especially the work of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Hall's own encoding/decoding model of television combines a materialist sense of the production and circulation of culture with a semiological sense of the multiple operations of the sign vehicle. This was partly inspired by Umberto Eco's argument concerning the normality of aberrant decoding of media messages in modern, highly differentiated societies. Roland Barthes's essays on myth and naturalising ideology in popular culture and Louis Althusser's structural Marxist theory of ideological state apparatuses and the interpellation of subjects were drawn into a heady mixture of eclectic theorising by Hall and his close associates.

On leaving Birmingham, Hall (1980) distinguished between two strands of cultural studies that had vied with one another at the centre: "culturalism" and "structuralism." Culturalism referred to the British tradition's emphases on agency and lived experience, whereas the continental tradition of structuralism emphasised determinate conditions and unconscious processes. Although Hall favoured structuralism by then, he argued that they both had strengths and weaknesses that could be subsumed and overcome by Gramscian hegemony theory. The struggle for social leadership was in constant political negotiation between dominant and subordinate forces in society whilst simultaneously being played out on the terrain of culture. Hall's much celebrated analysis of Thatcherism as an authoritarian-populist project, which unfolded throughout the 1980s, was already anticipated by the greatest work of the Birmingham school, *Policing the Crisis*, on the "mugging" panic (Hall et al. 1978).

Only recently has Hall come to be assessed in detail as a theorist in his own right (see Rojek 2003). He is a brilliant synthesiser and charismatic proselyte, however, rather than a thoroughly original thinker. His later work on "New Times" and cultural "hybridity" draws on postmodernism and poststructuralism similarly to how his earlier work drew on developments in Marxism and structuralism. Yet Hall's influence is immense, as attested by the work of his former students. In fact, his most significant contribution to cultural studies may be pedagogic, in training a generation of scholars collaboratively who carried the message further afield and in his own standing as a figurehead for cultural studies in the United States and elsewhere.

It is no calumny to say that Hall and his Birmingham students were politically motivated, though quite implausible to suggest they represented a threat to the prevailing hegemony of crumbling social democracy and emergent neoliberalism. These were members of the revolutionary 1968 generation who had benefited from the expansion of higher education and postgraduate grants. They, amongst others, conducted a neo-Marxist intervention in the academy, which entailed critical theorising across disciplinary boundaries and research that was supposed to connect organically with the interests of a succession of subordinate and "popular"

constituencies: the working class, women, blacks, and so forth. In this sense, cultural studies bore a family resemblance to the American radicalisation of sociology in the 1970s.

Some Birmingham scholars favoured textual analysis: others, ethnography. The differences and interplay between the two methodological options are best exemplified in their research on youth culture (see Jefferson 1976). Spectacular subcultures—mods, rockers, hippies, skins, punks, rastas, and so on—were studied as symbolic forms of resistance to capitalism and authority. Hebdige read punk style in dress and music as a set of ironic texts that were resistant to the dull conformity of mainstream and consumerist youth culture. Willis interviewed working-class "lads" about their resistance to schooling and refusal of the myth of meritocracy. The young Birmingham scholars were uncovering popular culture that was not produced by the market, but drew upon its resources to issue subversive messages. For McRobbie, even a romantic and patriarchal magazine for adolescent girls such as *Jackie* enabled working-class girls to resist the oppressive culture of schooling and being forced to read musty tomes like *Jane Eyre* by Leavisite teachers of English. Here, we see the seeds of the new populism that was to become so central to the development of cultural studies as a presence on the curriculum and an attractive field of research.

POPULISM

The Birmingham scholars were at least as concerned with contesting old-fashioned left-wing ideas about culture and society as they were with contesting the culture of capitalism. They were implacably opposed to the standard critical view that capitalism necessarily produces degenerate culture for the masses and that ideological forms simply reflect dominant class interests. The Frankfurt school's mass-culture critique of "the culture industry" was demonised along with Leavisite English as *passé* cultural elitism.

"The superstructure" was also considered relatively autonomous from "the base." Theorists associated with the Birmingham school in the 1970s were much more concerned with developing Marxist analysis of the state and ideology than with analysing late capitalism and its relation to cultural change. There was a peculiarly narrow interest in the nation-state and nationalistic ideology, exemplified by Hall's own writings on the ideological underpinnings of "balance" in public service broadcasting and the Thatcher government's programme of "regressive modernisation." This denial of political economy was modified much later by the "New Times" thesis on post-Fordism and postmodernism in the late 1980s. However, even that shift in perspective was curiously consistent with a long-standing and unusually positive attitude to consumer capitalism in the work of a network of once avowedly Marxist scholars, albeit subsequently "post-Marxist."

For them, the commodity was not just a fetish object, but a sign; and signs are inherently multi-accentual, open to

differential articulation. Thus, commodities were available for appropriation and resignification in the mode of popular resistance, as in the cases of subcultural bricolage, picking and mixing to create new and subversive meanings, and active viewing of popular television genres in, say, women's appreciation of soap opera. Hall always maintained that the growth of mass consumption from the 1950s was liberating for working-class people, whose material conditions had been much poorer in the past. In fact, the market was held to afford greater space for "grounded aesthetics," "symbolic creativity," and, in effect, "common culture" than paternalistic public support for the arts, as Willis later claimed. There were strains of folk culture romanticism in this view of cultural consumption as uncontrollably productive. That represented yet another challenge to orthodox Marxism, its attribution of a privileged status to production over consumption in the real scheme of things. The subordinate and negative term of consumption in binary opposition with the dominant and positive term of production was retrieved and given both feminist and market-friendly inflections. It was a simple inversion similar to and, indeed, connected to the inversion of elitism and populism in cultural evaluation.

This brand of cultural populism (McGuigan 1992, 1997) was taken to a logically absurd extreme by the leading populariser of cultural studies outside the immediate Birmingham school network, John Fiske. For instance, he compared some young people's petty theft in shopping malls to the Vietcong's guerrilla tactics against the U.S. military during the Vietnam War. Such arguments were quite common in the codification of cultural studies as an undergraduate subject during the 1980s and 1990s. It had an obviously popular appeal for a new and less politically radical generation of students and, as it turned out, might be cashed in the labour market for careers in management, public relations, and marketing. Cultural cool would incorporate rebellion into profitable enterprise, though not, of course, in order to encourage pilfering.

Populism is first and foremost a political category with a complex history and quite striking variations in actual politics. It is not necessarily on the Left or on the Right. Populism represents "the people" as an imagined community against the political elite or "power bloc," however that is conceived. In early twentieth-century American populism, the interests of poor farmers and industrial workers were articulated against bankers and big business. Toward the end of the twentieth century, Thatcherism constructed an authoritarian populism that pitted the people against the social-democratic state, at once "setting them free" from overbearing governmental constraint and creating a consumer paradise whilst simultaneously reducing welfare and increasing social discipline in the name of law and order. Hall was accurate in probing the popularity of this right-wing regime. However, the analysis that he produced was narrowly focused upon the cultural politics of the nation-state and insufficiently related to the rise

and globalisation of neoliberalism, particularly spurred on by the collapse of Soviet communism.

Similarly, cultural populism has no necessary political belonging. The Birmingham school legacy placed it on the Left, yet its subsequent fate is not, of necessity, to remain there. According to Thomas Frank (2001):

The signature scholarly gesture of the nineties was . . . the power and "agency" of audiences and fans, of their ability to evade the grasp of the makers of mass culture and their talent for transforming just about any bit of cultural detritus into an implement of rebellion. (p. 282)

Frank may well overstate the case that populist cultural studies has not only met up with but also informed free-market ideology and practice, which is partly what he means by market populism. None the less, it is manifestly evident that a correspondence exists between the populist sentiments of consumerist cultural studies and cultural capitalism, especially in the ways in which meaningful commodities, such as clothing, are designed and marketed to the young and style conscious. This argument is consistent with Naomi Klein's critical analysis of branding culture in *No Logo*. The actual conditions, forces, and relations of production are normally suppressed. They occasionally erupt into public view, however, with various campaigns against the leading brands, the exploitation of sweatshop labour, and the despoiling of natural and cultural environments, a politics of consumption that contests the ideology of consumerism. Primary producers across the globe are exploited fiercely, and investment is pumped into design, advertising, and marketing. Sign-value becomes more important than use-value. It is all about cool style and identity for the freewheeling and imaginary rebel consumer.

The drift into market populism is a discernible trajectory for cultural studies, albeit more pronounced than is normally acknowledged. It is not, however, the only one. Hall's own engagement with the politics of difference retains a critical edge. There are other lines of development as well, most notably multidimensional analysis that brings together political economy, textual analysis, and research on consumption and reception (Kellner 1997). Hall himself has also contributed to such a development with the formulation of the circuit of culture model (Du Gay et al. 1997), which seeks to account for popular consumption in relation to processes of production, representation, identity, and regulation. Serious study of popular culture and consumption is entirely justifiable on sociological grounds. The problem arises, however, when populist sentiments obscure difficult questions of critical analysis.

— Jim McGuigan

See also Althusser, Louis; Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Foucault, Michel; Frankfurt School; Gramsci, Antonio; Hall, Stuart; Marxism; Political Economy; Post-Marxism; Semiology; Social Class; Structural Marxism; Verstehen

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CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

CONCEPTS

Culture is one of the most complex concepts in social theory. In their classical investigation in 1952, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn already listed several hundred definitions which were used in scientific discourse. In the current usage of language, two concepts of culture may be distinguished: (1) *An extended concept of culture* that describes all man-made creations of human living conditions; "culture" here is in contrast to all things found in nature. The spectrum of cultural forms then stretches from house building to the use of tools, clothing, and social manners to state and social institutions up to the spheres of science and art. (2) *A narrow concept of culture*, on the other hand, limits itself to spiritual and artistic aspects. It often carries a connotation of something "higher" and free of purpose. "Culture" in this context is mainly identical with the literature, the fine arts, and philosophy. For a long period of time the extended concept of culture was used mainly in anthropology and ethnology, whereas for the most part, sociology was concerned with the scope of the narrow concept of culture. Today sociological research

attempts to concern itself more with the forms of daily culture, such as table manners, sport types, and interior decorating. In current empirical research the immaterial dimension of culture is highlighted: conceptions, orientations, norms, and values which guide the actions of those involved. As an example, Ronald Inglehart described the change of values in the Western world that have occurred since the 1960s as going from a materialistic to a post-materialistic set of preferences. It has permanent effects on the way people live their lives, whether they are primarily concerned with striving for material goods or if they are looking for self fulfillment, for meaning, and for a better quality of life through preserving an intact environment.

Although the object culture itself has a long historical tradition and the linguistic roots of "culture" and "civilization" are derived from ancient Latin (*colere* [to live, to build in the agricultural sense], *cultus*, *cultura*; *civis* [citizen], *civilis*), the more complex and collectively oriented concept of culture as we know it today was established as late as in the second half of the 18th century. Authors like Johann Gottfried Herder, Denis Diderot, and Thomas Paine wrote about the cultures of peoples and correlated those with a historical perspective of development and progress in contrast to wildness and barbarism. Certain evolving language configurations then resulted in an important differentiation: "Culture" (German "Kultur") was used predominantly in the German speaking region while the term "civilization" (French "civilisation") was more common in the Anglo-Saxon and French regions. Both conceptual traditions contain nearly the same meanings and are often connected with a common European or "occidental" culture.

The differences were only partly accentuated; for example, when the German sociologist Alfred Weber (the brother of Max Weber) in 1912 stated that "culture" marks a step in the development of the process of civilization beyond the necessities and utilities of daily life (a scenario similar to that in Oswald Spengler's influential work concerning the "Decline of the West" (1918)). In the context of the First World War, especially in Germany, there were some nationalistically motivated attempts to distinguish the apparently more valuable (spiritual, moral, inner) German "Kultur" (culture) from the Western "Zivilisation" (civilization) that was negatively described as being "technical" and "superficial." In this "battle of the cultures" German sociologists Werner Sombart, Ernst Troeltsch, and George Simmel, among others, participated while on the French side Emile Durkheim, amongst others, also took a polemic stance.

Later most of these differences were smoothed out. A classical definition as that of the anthropologist Edmond Tyler (1871:1) who defined culture and civilization synonymously as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society," is still often quoted today. In scientific discourse the term "culture" has primarily established itself, whereas the term "civilization" refers to a specific subsection. This is true,

e.g. for Norbert Elias who, in light of the psychoanalytical theory of Sigmund Freud, describes the civilizing process as a process of the continuous regulation of affect and drive.

DIMENSIONS

The term culture always simultaneously describes a *process* and a *result*, a context of action as well as materialized objects, which result from actions. Consequently sociological analysis of culture can concentrate more on the actors and their origin, their patterns of thought and perception, as well as on specific institutions of cultural practices. On the other side it may examine the artifacts: books, paintings, sculptures, or buildings.

An important characteristic of culture and civilization is their normative bias. We mention “higher” or “lower” culture, “art” and “kitsch” when we wish to distinguish valuable from worthless culture. Even at the time the modern notion of culture was established, specific norms were involved when culture and civilization were recognized as being characteristics of the historical progress. The concept of culture in the 19th century always implied a sense of pride, especially amongst the European bourgeoisie about their own achievements. Peoples, nations, and cultures were hierarchically ranked with regard to their proximity to the standards of European or Western civilization. And still in the current debates about the “clash of civilizations” (Samuel Huntington) this normative bias is implied. Foreign political intervention, for example, those of American or British troops, is often justified with the battle of the Western civilization for human rights and against the barbarism of non-Western cultures.

But also within societies, culture is often used as an instrument for social struggles. Different classes, groups, ethnical groups, or regions fight for the recognition of their own culture that expresses itself in language, religious beliefs, and ways of life or specific artistic practices. Culture in this sense does not imply something as a whole, but a heterogeneous area of different habits that reach out for recognition, persistence, and hegemony. It is this aspect of culture that was especially accentuated in the theories of the Marxist tradition, for example by Antonio Gramsci, Pierre Bourdieu, or in the frame of the neo-Marxist criticism of globalization by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Besides this, many authors within the paradigm of British cultural studies regard culture as a permanent battlefield with several groups striving for recognition.

The normative concept of culture is also present at the level of scientific discourse. As such the Marxistically oriented concepts do not see their purpose only in the description and explanation of cultural phenomena, but also in their evaluation. A theory of the “culture of the masses” as developed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno also implies a clear statement against the object it describes. Such a normative statement is not part of the methodology of Max Weber or Karl Popper, who did not turn such statements into a matter of social science, but rather a matter of nonscientific, normative judgments.

When we look for a counter-concept to “culture” that explains *ex negativo* the contours of the term, we usually find the term “structure.” Whereas “culture” in social theory is meant primarily in terms of values and norms, ideologies, religious beliefs, and symbolic forms, “structure” indicates a set of “objectively” determined aspects of the social world. A social structure with stable patterns of social stratification similarly provides the actors with a framework of action as do the institutions and organizations in a society. In the first half of the 20th century a debate took place within anthropological research between “culturalists” and “structuralists.” Culturalists such as Alfred Kroeber, Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict saw in cultural dispositions the determinant factor for guiding human action. In contrast, structuralists such as A.R. Radcliffe-Brown or E.E. Evans-Pritchard saw social structures as decisive. Later more sophisticated points of view were established. The dualism of structure and culture was dropped in favor of an acceptance of their close interdependence in which neither of the two is dominant. Social structure primarily has its impact as a culturally interpreted social structure, and cultural dispositions are part of the ongoing process of structuration of a society (cf. the theories by Pierre Bourdieu or Anthony Giddens). Furthermore, on the one hand Western societies today have completed a pluralization and social mobilization with the result that cultural practices and ways of life, compared to previous social classes, have become a matter of choice. On the other hand, this freedom of selection is still limited by the actor’s economic resources as well as by their level of education. Therefore we cannot make general comparisons or create hierarchies within structure and culture, but must observe how cultural and structural factors work together in their specific social context.

— Ludgera Vogt

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- See Also** Civilizing Processes; Cultural Capital; Cultural Marxism and the Birmingham School; Elias, Norbert; Parsons, Talcott; Simmel, George; Weber, Max

D

DAHRENDORF, RALF

Ralf Dahrendorf's sociological lifework is the result not only of an analytical debate with Karl Marx and Max Weber, on the one hand, and with Talcott Parsons, on the other, but also of the link between politics and science, which he cared about all his life. He rubbed up against Marx; he oriented himself toward Weber; he found his place in the social sciences of the twentieth century by differentiating himself from Parsons; and he unwaveringly tried to advocate freedom in active politics and detected conflict as the creative force of human history. In his opinion, "civil society" is the most reliable anchor of freedom, because besides political democracy and free-market economy it renders the necessary stability to "the building of freedom."

Dahrendorf's scientific and political career is as successful as it is extraordinary: He taught sociology in Hamburg, Tübingen, and Constance. He was the director of the London School of Economics (1974–1984); warden of St. Antony's College, in Oxford (1987–1997); commissioner of the European Community in Brussels (1970–1974); and since 1993, he has been a member of the British House of Lords, as the Lord of Clare Market, in the City of Westminster. The crossing of borders—be it between occupations, nations, parties, or between social science and value judgement—has become his life's motto.

In his sociological analyses, Dahrendorf points out that society is always characterized by two faces that unite static and dynamic components, integration and conflict. Nevertheless, both sides are by no means structures that are self-understood and closed, but "two equally valid aspects of every imaginable society" (Dahrendorf 1958:175). Hence, he focuses on an extension and overcoming of the structural-functional theory wherever its claim of universality hides the immanent capacity of explaining social change

and conflict. However, at no time is the systemic approach as a useful instrument of analysis discarded. However, Dahrendorf (1959) wants to prove, against the structural-functional primacy of integration, that "the 'dynamically variable elements' which influence the construction of social structures do not necessarily originate outside the 'system' but may be generated by the structure itself" (p. 123).

Next in Dahrendorf's development of a theory competing with structural functionalism is the introduction of the notions of power and authority. He assumes that conflict, social change, and societal dynamics originate from power relations. The "basic phenomenon of social conflict" is "not only to be found within established social structures, but above all in 'normal' elements of the social structure, i.e. in relations that are present in any society at any time" (Dahrendorf 1958:216). For this purpose, he depicts *authority*, beside the categories of *norm* and *sanction*, as a basic concept of sociology. In agreement with Weber (1980:28), he defines authority as "the probability that a command with a specific given content will be obeyed by a given group of persons." In contrast to power, authority as imperative coordination is not only legitimized but also bound to positions, not to individuals; thus, power represents only a factual relation, while "authority is the legitimate relation of domination and subjection" (Dahrendorf 1959:166).

Hence, Dahrendorf emphasizes not only the connection between legitimate authority and certain positions or roles but also that there are positions in society linked to the expectation and obligation to exercise coercion. Such positions are typical for "imperatively coordinated associations" (*Herrschaftsverbaende*), defined as "organized parts of institutions with intended permanency." They can be found in the state as the politically organized society as well as in economic and cultural organizations (e.g., companies, schools, churches).

Therefore, Dahrendorf specifies the notion of authority in the way that only institutionalized power relations characterized by stable role expectations are taken into account in the conflict theory to be developed. Thus, the Janus-headed character is a typical element of domination: On one hand, it is a means of force to achieve societal integration, since it serves to secure norms as a sanctioning institution. In this sense, norm and authority may be understood similarly to the social contract that is always followed by the power contract. Such an understanding of domination matches Parsons's idea of its function as a mechanism of social control. Dahrendorf also attributes conflict-prone functions to domination, since the same structure of authority that guarantees integration may also turn into a starting point of antagonisms and conflicts.

In addition to the norm-maintaining function of authority, Dahrendorf stresses its norm-setting character. Since the legitimacy of authority is always precarious, organizations as power associations always imply a latent conflict of interests. If the actors become aware of their latent interests, which are nothing else than unconscious role expectations, these interests become manifest. Thus, the *quasi-group* as an aggregate of incumbents of positions with identical role interests represents the recruiting ground for an *interest group* out of which, as soon as it engages in group conflict, the *conflict group* emerges. The latter is the real agent of social conflict characterized by a structure, form of organization, a program or goal, and a personnel of members (Dahrendorf 1959:180).

Legitimate authority always causes domination of some over others, which is accompanied by the realization of particularistic interests. The inclination to conflict in societal reality is analytically and empirically as relevant as Parsons's harmonious integration of authority into the valid system of norms. Dahrendorf's understanding of the contradicting character of domination, reflecting the "two faces of the social structure" as it does, can also be found at the level of the social role. The sociological concept of role allows Parsons to consider social action as normatively mediated, that is, to be analyzed as a function of expectations. Dahrendorf complements this understanding of role by a "nonintegrative aspect," since roles may potentially have disruptive consequences as well. As roles are "totally, half or not at all accepted by the role incumbents," or even understood as an unreasonable demand, they turn out as an "annoying fact of society" (Dahrendorf 1977).

As a consequence, another problem arises from this arrangement of concepts. Following Max Weber, Dahrendorf first conceived the "imperatively coordinated associations" as legitimate authority relations. Backed up by the existing normative order, the rulers are confronted with the fact of power based on the existing role expectations. Their expectation of obedience of the dominated thus

appears as a complementary result. By recognizing this fact, the question arises as to why the rulers should expect a conflictive elimination of the dominant order by the dominated. In a dominant order characterized by complementary patterns of expectations, there should be no reason for conflicts. Dahrendorf runs into the difficulty of having to attribute conflictive tendencies, for the lack of other reasons, to the unexplorable will of numerous conflict groups or to the interests of certain classes. Critical analyses questioned whether a normative notion of institution, which he takes for granted, does not in the end render the deduction of structurally based interests impossible (cf. Turner 1973; Weingart 1969).

Dahrendorf (1968) tries to escape from this dilemma by inventing the category of "interest," by declaring expected interest orientations as nonintegrative behavioral patterns, and by justifying interest in recursion to Marx as "objective," that is, structural. At this point, he uses Marx's understanding of conflictive classes as agents of societal change whose antagonism derives from structurally mediated relations of production and property. Thus, class conflict is modified into a conflict over the maintenance and/or acquisition of power and authority as the real cause of social conflicts. Following this change, Dahrendorf shows that authority relations and the conflicts they generate can be deduced from structurally mediated, contradicting role interests. Thus, he never tires of emphasizing—against Marx and his modern followers—that domination, not property, is the reason for class conflicts.

In his later works, Dahrendorf (1979) tries to correct the formalism of his conflict theory by a definition of conflicts with respect to their content and the ensuing direction of change. He manages to do so by introducing the notion of *life chances*, since the underlying motivation of social conflicts are the attempts by the rulers to secure those options that have become privileges in the framework of ligatures (social bonds) or—on the part of the dominated—to push through new options even at the expense of existing bonds. On this basis, he has thrown such new questions into the debate as substantive criteria for progress and conditions of freedom in modern society.

— Hermann Strasser and Gerd Nollmann

See also Civil Society; Conflict Theory; Democracy; Marx, Karl; Parsons, Talcott; Power; Role Theory; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Weber, Max

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DAVIS, ANGELA

Angela Davis (b. 1944) is recognized as one of the most influential African American sociologists and political activists to examine the interlocking relations among race, sex, and class. Her work stands among early feminist social theory that successfully moves Marxist frames beyond their economic dimensions. Most significantly, Davis's work expands Marxian categories of class inequality to include an articulation of racism and sexism as inherent features of unchecked, immoral, white supremacist capitalism. Moving beyond an examination of society from the standpoint of the proletariat, Davis posits the proletariat as simultaneously located in complex webs of racial and gender relations, and thus examines society from a multidimensional standpoint, paying significant attention to the situations of black, working-class women and men. Davis's work aims to illustrate and explain how racial and sexual oppression are interlocking and inherent features of U.S. capitalism.

The elemental component of capitalism is ownership of private property. Capitalism transforms material things in the natural world into social and economic commodities to be bought, sold, and owned by individuals. In Davis's examination of American capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism are interrelated insofar as they share the fundamental similarity of being based on domination of one group over another. The success of capitalism as the ruling economic system depends on the subordination of entire groups of persons according to race, nationality, class, and gender. Thus, all forms of social oppression must be examined and recognized as inherent products of unequal socioeconomic relations in which the working class is exploited and objectified for the continuity of bourgeois domination and authority. Moreover, according to Davis, the global economy has extended and strengthened bourgeois rule and authority. Capitalism exploits workers, particularly men

and women of color, in the international community. Capitalism is a root cause of all domestic and international social injustice, including racism, sexism, heterosexism, and violence. To eliminate injustice in the United States and throughout the world, capitalism must be dissolved.

Davis gives considerable theoretical attention to understanding and explaining two interrelated injustices: sexual violence against women, particularly black women, and racism and sexism within the criminal justice system. She links them both to capitalism and traces them back to oppressive practices within the capitalist system of slavery and Jim Crow. Davis argues that contemporary efforts to eliminate sexual violence must begin with an understanding of rape as one element within a complex web of sexual oppression that is connected to race and class oppression. Davis argues that during slavery, the function of rape was to control and subordinate black women. While both black men and black women suffered physical violence and humiliation as slaves, black women had the additional fear of rape by white masters. Under slavery, white men raped black women as an exercise of power and patriarchal rule. But by portraying black women as sexually immoral, white capitalists were able to legitimate their violence. While one function of rape was to control the black female body, another function was to emasculate black men. But again, white capitalists used racist stereotypes of black men as sexual predators and rapists, thereby legitimizing violence against them. Rape, then, functioned to control black women through fear and, simultaneously, to control black men through emasculation. Rape, as Davis put it, was a weapon, part of the "brutal paraphernalia" of white capitalist slavery.

To understand and successfully challenge rape as a contemporary problem means to place it within this historical context. Contemporary stereotypes of black women as sexually available and black men as sexual predators are means used by white supremacist capitalists to terrorize the black community and exercise power over workers. Violence against women is a social fact exercised and perpetuated by the bourgeois class. Rape is a consequence of the ruling capitalist class having the authority to objectify and dominate human bodies, to render some groups inferior, and to maintain a superior position through exploitative labor practices. Connecting rape with power and control, Davis contends that most rapists are not trying to satisfy an uncontrollable sexual passion. Motives for rape are instead connected to men's need to exercise power and control over women through the use of sexual violence.

Capitalist relations in the private sphere are based on the objectification of individuals by means of ownership. Under capitalist heterosexual relations, women are perceived as objects with a specific role to perform for the continuity of bourgeois domination. Bourgeois and working-class men exercise patriarchal authority. Working-class men learn the

ways of the dominant culture in which authority, aggression, and domination are normalized as masculine qualities. Thus, rape, domestic violence, and the objectification of women are understood as the consequence of capitalist patriarchal socialization that teaches men to subordinate women by any means necessary. Consequently, race, class, and gender must be critiqued simultaneously in an effort to expose the ways capitalism exploits and objectifies the female body.

Just as Davis explains sexual violence from the standpoint of slaves, particularly female slaves, within the capitalist system, she also explains the contemporary criminal justice system from this standpoint. Davis is concerned about the overrepresentation of blacks in prisons. She sees the criminal justice system as a racist capitalist tool used to control workers and extract free labor from poor men and women within the prison system. In her historical revisionism, Davis reveals that a clause in the Thirteenth Amendment (which legally abolished slavery) permitted the continued enslavement of persons convicted of crimes. The racism inherent in the criminal justice system, then, is a structure of domination with roots in slavery. It has a vital function of controlling the very men and women who have the revolutionary potential to overthrow capitalism. Insofar as poor black women and men have been incarcerated for nonviolent poverty-related crimes, Davis calls for a “strategy of decarceration” of this population and those imprisoned proletarians throughout the world. She advocates abolishing jails and prisons for a substantial percentage of imprisoned men and women. For example, a vast majority of women prisoners are black women convicted of nonviolent crimes such as drugs, prostitution, and welfare fraud.

Davis advocates global socialism as the solution to inequality. Her version of socialism envisions a world where every form of oppression—racial, sexual, and class—is eliminated and all violence against humankind is obliterated.

Davis was born on January 26, 1944, in Birmingham, Alabama. In 1965, she received her BA from Brandeis University, in Massachusetts; studied at Johann Wolfgang von Goethe University, in Frankfurt, Germany; and received her doctorate at University of California, San Diego. Currently, she is the first African American woman to receive full tenure at University of California, Santa Cruz, and is the presidential chairperson for the African American and Feminist Studies Departments.

— Candice Bryant Simonds and Paula Brush

See also Capitalism; Marxism; Socialism

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DEBORD, GUY

Guy Debord (1931–1994) was a founding member of the Situationist International and author of the influential *La société du spectacle* (1967) (*The Society of the Spectacle*, 1977). Largely self-taught in avant-garde artistic circles, Debord forged a critique of consumer society grounded in the young Marx and influenced by Henri Lefebvre and, through Lucien Goldman, by the young Georg Lukács. Although he denied the accusation (and the praise), *La société du spectacle* was often described as the inspirational philosophy behind the Parisian student revolts of May 1968. At the heart of his theory is the thesis that whereas in Marx’s day, relations between people appeared to them in the fantastic guise of relations between objects, by the mid 1960s, the role of objects had been overcome by the activity of representation. Later in his life, Debord advanced toward an even more radical critique with the theory of the “integrated spectacle,” combining the techniques of totalitarianism and free-market capitalism in a single global system of administration and deception.

Debord came to prominence as an articulate internal critic of the Lettriste International, a politically radical avant-garde movement of the 1950s. The Situationist International was formed as a breakaway group, persisting through splits and expulsions from 1956 to 1972. As editor of the group’s journal, *Internationale Situationniste*, and author of a series of pamphlets, manifestos, and essays, Debord attempted to define an artistic practice that could not be assimilated to bourgeois institutional art, as had been the fate, he believed, of Dadaism, Futurism, and Surrealism. The answer lay in total but ephemeral “situations” in which the deadening hand of capitalism, the state, and bourgeois culture might be temporarily lifted and a glimpse of a utopian future vouchsafed. Debord’s reasoning here was deeply Hegelian, determining the artist’s role as one of negating the existing society. At the same time, reading the contemporary avant-garde of Beckett and Robbe-Grillé as already a negativity in the service of the bourgeoisie, Debord proposed a positive programme of situations, a negation of the negation, as the only truly revolutionary vanguard position.

In the mid-1960s, Debord set out the 221 theses of *La société du spectacle*. Social relations were, he argued, mediated by images, and what had been lived directly had become signs. The dominant mode of production, that is, the ordering of society, was undertaken as an ordering of

signs, and the production of signs was its goal. The society of the spectacle appears to date from the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the move toward a consumption-led economy. Since the 1930s, the spectacle had taken two major forms, that of the European dictatorships, especially Nazism and Stalinism, and that of North American consumer capitalism. Both shared the substitution of signs of life for life itself: advertising and entertainment for desire, architecture and urbanism for community, thrills and shocks for excitement and revolt. Though in his later writings, Debord would boast of his unique outsider status as lifting him above the crowd to see these truths, in *La société du spectacle*, the inference is that an unalienated life can be contrasted with the alienation of wage-slavery and, worse still, slavery to the idols of consumerism. Like fellow Situationist Raoul Vaneigem, Debord contrasts real and false desires, retaining for his nihilistic, avant-garde, and criminal coterie the possibility of a reality from which mass mediation has debarred the bulk of the population.

Turning Marshall McLuhan's "global village" on its head, Debord recruits Marx and Engels's reference in *The Communist Manifesto* to "the idiocy of rural life" to accuse the suburban, fragmented, and mediated society of the 1960s of becoming a "technological pseudo-peasantry." The earlier Situationist interest in urban development had waned in Debord with the extremely rapid integration of urban planning into the French higher-education system and the simultaneous redevelopment of large areas of central Paris and the growth of its encircling suburbs. Where Lukács had identified the alienation and reification of factory labour, Debord pinpointed not only the monotony and isolation of suburban consumption but also the extreme alienation of the commuter, a new product of the separation of domestic and industrial zones in the postwar city. Private transport and television are exemplary technologies, productive of isolation, while increasing productivity leads only to the substitution for the world of the vast concatenation of produced objects whose accumulation reaches such a degree of intensity as to become spectacle. In this way, capital ceases to be the hidden motor of history and becomes consubstantial with the society that is its image.

The political result of this spectacularization is that the working class has been replaced and even opposed by its representation, in the form of both social democrat and orthodox Marxist parties. In Stalinism, this ideological representation becomes the very goal of revolutionary politics, so that actually existing socialism also falls under the regime of the spectacle, distinguished only by the rule of bureaucracy rather than of capitalists.

Far from being the arena of human development, time under capitalism becomes the measure of commodity production, universalized in the world market. Abstract, modular, and irreversible commodity time is complemented by a pseudocyclical consumable time, characterised by

oscillations between work and leisure, by recurrent holidays, and by television "seasons." The time of the consumption of images is the same as the image of the consumption of time; thus, for example, consuming a foreign vacation is indistinguishable from consuming travelogues or holiday snaps. The expropriation of labour time is returned in the form of consumable time, with a contradiction between the irreversibility of commodity time and the pseudocyclical seasons of consumption. Yet this time is alienated from the worker who produced it. Similarly, space has been standardized by its commodification, for example, in the tourism industry, simultaneously eradicating geography and separating inhabited spaces as alienated commodity spectacles. Citing Mumford, Debord criticises contemporary urbanism's "sprawling isolation" as a tool for managing the potential dangers of large aggregates of workers in cities. The new city, however, consumes the old when it reinvents itself as suburban pseudo-countryside. The apathetic pseudopeasantry that inhabits it must, however, be manufactured in the processes of spectacular alienation and consumption, and so are caught in the potentially productive contradiction between the effort required to reproduce their apathy and the constant threat that the city will provide the ground on which historical time might supersede urban geography. Enactments of the contradictions of spectacular space and time formed a key element of Debord's art and a key platform of his politics.

The division of space from time is one of the separations underlying the drive toward culture, which Debord understands as the search for lost unity, a task doomed by its professionalized autonomy separating it from the unity it seeks. Culture thus industrialised has come to the end of its task, either to be subsumed into total history or to become the spectacular repository of the artefacts of the past. As commodified, however, it must logically seek totality, becoming the driving force of the late twentieth century, a prediction borne out by the rise of the information society. Like art that boasts of its autonomy, sociology spectacularises society, reproducing the fragmentation it pretends to analyse through its own fragmentation of analysis, arriving finally at the pessimism of structural analysis. The false optimism of art and the false pessimism of the human sciences are alike cultures of submission. Sociologists of consumerism either contrast the alienated present with an unalienated past, thus making the absent past the centre of the present, or blame the spectator for the triumph of the spectacle, or otherwise falsely distinguish the integration of a total society. Structuralism merely describes, but cannot critique, the frozen time of the integrated society. The theory of spectacle itself will fail unless it is made true by political praxis, that is, by ceasing to be culture, just as art must realize itself by superseding its artistic autonomy.

The purpose of Debord's work in *La société du spectacle* is to create access to history, a time in which revolutionary action might be possible. The achievement of the spectacle

is the realization of a unitary, total ideology, a concrete expression of alienation from one another. Society has become entirely ideological, a space in which no one recognises another and which therefore cannot recognise itself save in the form of commodities: idealised matter and materialised ideas. The self inundated by the present absence of the world and the truth driven out by the real presence of untruth allow only false consciousness, a kind of endemic schizophrenia that only a truly radical politics can destroy.

While the aftershocks of May 1968 still reverberated through France and Italy, where Debord was most active, the Situationist International was dissolved. Although the collapse of the society of the spectacle seemed to be possible, Debord believed that it had begun to assimilate the idea of its own ruin. On one hand, the language of power had shifted toward the creation of new jobs—but jobs destined to produce goods without purpose other than further spectacular consumption. On the other hand, the rise of environmental politics had identified the degradation of urban ecologies, food, air, and water as grounds for a generalized despair and politics of general impotence. Crucially, the critiques of the spectacle had become themselves objects of contemplation in the society of the spectacle itself, the negation of all existing social relations thus an integral part of the spectacle as totality. At this juncture, the organized political activity of the Situationist International had no further basis on which to act, and the group dissolved.

In later writings, Debord maintains his all-encompassing disdain for the contemporary world but more rarely envisages, as he had in *La société du spectacle*, the possibility of workers' councils as a transition to a revolutionary society. Still unclear are Debord's later political affiliations, hotly debated in the French press when he was (probably falsely) implicated in the assassination of publisher and film producer Gérard Lebovici. In *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle*, Debord pleads the necessity for a degree of secrecy because his enemies are as likely to read it as his friends, suggesting some kind of network. The book addresses advances in the spectacularization of society. The most significant change he observes is the integration of two previously distinct modes of spectacular society, the totalitarian and the consumerist. This integration occurred most swiftly in France and Italy, where powerful Stalinist parties hastened its evolution. Governing qualities of the integrated spectacle included the absence or occultation of leadership and the colonization of all remaining areas of social life. Integration of state and economy, now unified, had not only accelerated technological renewal but also imposed a culture of generalised secrecy and particularly removed the possibility of democratic dialogue, even of public opinion. The eradication of history noted in the earlier book had been redoubled by the fragmentation and speed of fashion and news, and by the eternal present that their instantaneous circulation established.

Despite noting in passing that his theses were not considerations on the media, but on a whole society of which the mass media form only a part, media form a central element of the analysis, blamed, for example, for the destruction of communities of discussion. Debord had suffered from the attentions of the press during the Lebovici affair, devoting a short book to analysing the techniques of dissimulation and defamation and refuting their insinuations and accusations (eventually taking several papers to court for libel). This circumstance may explain the drift toward a conspiratorial theory of news media and a gradually lowering opinion of their readers. Image-based media, and even more so the computer, substitute an organised flow of signs for experience and substitute for both reading, which demands judgement, and dialogue, from which logic arises. The global village, like traditional rural communities, is ruled by conformism, boredom, and malicious gossip.

More convincing is the account of the integration of Stalinist techniques with consumerist ones, for example the argument that since democracy is both perfect and fragile, it neither needs to nor can be attacked, citing the change from Nixon's impeachment to Reagan's ability to survive far more damaging scandals. Such too is the ideological function of accusations of "terrorism," an ascription constructed by the "perfect democracy" to legitimate its assaults on its own citizens. The loss of logic brought about by mass media allows such illogical arguments not only to thrive, but to become the hallmark of an irrational society. Of the use of scientists as spin doctors, Debord (1990) notes, with typical epigrammatic flair, "Spectacular domination has cut down the vast tree of scientific knowledge in order to make itself a truncheon" (p. 40).

Debord's virulent attack on disinformation and secrecy rests on the principle that in the spectacle, there is no room for verification and therefore no space for a public argument. Indeed, in a world turned upside down, truth is merely a moment of falsehood. The political scene of kidnappings and assassinations that characterised Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, blamed by Debord on state agencies, creates an atmosphere of mystery that leads toward attitudes of bewildered acquiescence. It may be possible to discern, in these later writings, the analysis of networks of conspiracy and domination as a precursor to theories of the network society. Most of the later writings, however, smack increasingly of disillusion and disdain, an almost aristocratic reservation of terms of praise (generosity, bravery, and intelligence) for a small elite. Debord committed suicide in 1994. As an epitaph, one might take his phrase: "It is beautiful to have contributed to the ruination of this world" (Debord 2001:79).

— Sean Cubitt

See also Alienation; Lefebvre, Henri; Lukács, György; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Media Critique; Modernity; Post-Marxism; Postmodernism; Revolution; Situationists; Structural Marxism

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DECONSTRUCTION

Primarily a philosophical and literary method of critique developed by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (b. 1930), deconstruction aims to expose and destabilize attempts to systematically ground knowledge in an absolute, foundational meaning, logic, or referent. Deconstruction is used to criticize Western culture's search for ultimate meaning or truth, what is often referred to as the "transcendental signified," and the supposed ability to translate this truth through language. The method of deconstruction entails discovering a fundamental binary opposition in an argument or text (such as presence/absence), exposing its hierarchical relationship, revealing the reliance of one concept upon the other, and subordinating the previously dominant idea. Through this method, the binary is relativized and displaced, rendering it meaningless.

Deconstructionists refer to the ambition to discover ultimate meanings and absolute foundations as "logocentrism," which is inextricably linked to phonocentrism, or the favoring of speech over writing. Deconstructionists contend that all significations are a form of writing, thereby undermining the supposed unity of language and meaning in speech acts. Deconstruction finds terms or phrases that supposedly maintain a stable relationship referring to definite objects or ideas and then poses equally valid alternate relationships, destabilizing the system of definite reference. This constant undermining of language leads to Derrida's conception of *sous rature*, or "under erasure." Here, he borrows principally from the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), who would often write the word ~~Being~~ like so, to demonstrate that the term is insufficient but needed. The remnant of the term visible after the erasure is called the *trace*. Important in the concept is the constancy of the erasure of the permanency of the trace, symbolizing the relentless play between presence and absence. Deconstruction does

not aim to simply replace the metaphysical assumptions of Western culture with their perversions; it relentlessly undermines, revealing the ambivalence of language and impossibility of essential meaning.

Deconstruction developed largely in reaction to structuralist and phenomenological thinkers such as Claude Lévi-Strauss (b. 1908), Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), and Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), all of whom sought to discover universal, basic structures of all human life. In his structuralist anthropology, Lévi-Strauss claimed that speech had a kind of primal completeness and innocence. He followed with the claim that writing was a corrupt version of speech that led only to oppression and colonization. Derrida analyzes Lévi-Strauss's argument and shows that "primitive" societies quite often used the spoken word to dominate and that writing could very well be a precursor to verbal communication. Saussure based his theory of language in the stable relationship of signifier-signified, assuming that the signified was ultimate and could not refer to yet another object or idea. Deconstruction revealed the instability of Lévi-Strauss's and Saussure's structuralism, posing different referents, signifiers, and relationships, which opened up the doors to a textual analysis that favored inconsistency, metaphor, and an endless stream of referents and signification.

Deconstruction, as employed by Derrida and the Yale Critics (including Paul de Man, 1919–1983, and J. Hillis Miller, b. 1928), became the key element in poststructuralism and also helped give rise to postmodernism. Whereas previous thought portrayed language as centering on and constraining a definite subject, deconstruction celebrated decentering any such subject and therefore releasing it from any constraint or domination. When fully deconstructed, what lies at the base of any object, be it a text or social institution, is writing. By revealing the unstable and illogical nature of writing within the grand assumptions of Western philosophy since Plato, deconstruction embraces the marginalized worlds of the Other.

Both the natural and social sciences are based on the foundational philosophical concepts that deconstruction scrutinizes. On the most basic level, just like philosophy, the sciences presuppose a definite link between language and meaning. They also view methodologies of observation, interaction, and experimentation as revealing deeper certainties or truths in their respective fields. Deconstruction intervenes to boil everything down to writing and wordplay, exposing contradictions and positing the possibility of alternative meanings and results.

While the concept of deconstruction has had its greatest impact on the fields of literary theory and philosophy, it is significant to many approaches to social theory. Some feminist social theorists have taken aim at the unconsciously assumed superiority of the male in the male/female binary and look to not only reverse the binary or assert female dominance but also question the value of the

dichotomy itself. Similarly, queer theory works to deconstruct the heterosexual/homosexual distinction, while critical race theory deconstructs the white/nonwhite opposition. The central contention of all of these approaches to social theory is that the dominance and exploitation that exists in these relationships is the product of a society that, under the sway of logocentrism, has shut its eyes to alternate forms of life and existence. Yet deconstruction poses no answer or schema that will remedy these woes. Rather, it is an endless act that simultaneously discovers and undermines alternate meanings and realities.

— Zachary R. Hooker and James M. Murphy

See also Derrida, Jacques; Lévi-Strauss, Claude; Logocentrism; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Structuralism

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DELEUZE, GILLES

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) began his career as a professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne, prior to a post at the University of Lyon where he taught the history of philosophy. The first phase of Deleuze's work begins with books on Nietzsche (1983) and Kant (1984), Bergson (1988), Foucault (1988), Spinoza (1990), Hume (1991), and Leibniz (1993). In 1969, at the request of the French philosopher, historian, and social theorist Michel Foucault (1926–1984), Deleuze began teaching philosophy at the University of Paris VIII, a post he held until his retirement in 1987. Following an extended period of respiratory illness, Deleuze took his own life on November 4, 1995. In his early publications, *The Logic of Sense* (1990) and *Difference and Repetition* (1994), Deleuze specified his conception of the “image of thought.” For Deleuze, philosophers such as Plato and Hegel involve themselves with the “dominant image” of thought, which centers on recognition and representation. By contrast, Deleuze's two volumes are a groundbreaking attempt to identify the subject matter of a nonrepresentational image of thought.

The second stage of Deleuze's philosophical production is dominated by his collaboration with the French psychoanalyst,

philosopher, and radical political activist Félix Guattari (1930–1992), in writing *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1984) and *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987). In these books, Deleuze and Guattari began to develop their Nietzschean-inspired, post-Marxian critique and reassessment of the genealogy of desire in contemporary capitalist societies. Indeed, they argued that in the aftermath of the French political and philosophical turbulence produced by the events of May 1968, radical political thinkers should aim to conceive of more creative and variable relations as regards personal and political life.

Consequently, in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari make an effort to break free from Freud's idea of the unconscious as a “theater” and, in the process, expand upon their immanent model of the unconscious as a “factory” producing desire. Fundamentally developing the field of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari reject “Freudo-Marxism,” or the standpoint that the unconscious is bound up exclusively with “mummy and daddy,” that is, with individuals and societies that have basically innocuous desires that are repressed, but might be liberated by more open-minded social relationships. Alternatively, they seek to demonstrate that the unconscious is crucially related to sociogeographical, historical, collective, and multiple “becomings” (developments without subject or object), desires, and utterances.

Deleuze and Guattari's stance concerning the unconscious stems from their interest in the “machinic production of desire” and especially Guattari's ideas regarding “desiring machines.” For Deleuze and Guattari, the machinic production of desire and desiring machines are models for a pioneering approach to psychoanalysis wherein they would be equipped to take apart the French therapist Jacques Lacan's (1901–1981) linguistic and structural conceptual system to facilitate new theories of politics and psychoanalysis.

As the landmark companion volume to *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* introduces their reconsideration of the notion of “system” using the idea of the “rhizome,” a meandering, horizontal underground structure, similar to the stems of plants such as the iris, whose sprouts grow into new flora. Deleuze and Guattari present and organize *A Thousand Plateaus* as a rhizomatic sequence of “plateaus,” a concept formulated by the English anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1904–1980), that indicate what Bateson labeled a “block of intensity,” such as a family quarrel, which is not arranged around a moment of termination. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Bateson's plateau contests the propensity of Western philosophy to associate language and events with external or transcendental purposes, rather than assessing them as a complex of interactions that constitute the spaces where they exist and in terms of their inherent worth. In the end, therefore, the plateaus, which emerge from the rhizome,

come to stand in *A Thousand Plateaus* as the definitive representation of innumerable multiple becomings.

In the last period, Deleuze's texts are immersed in aesthetic issues concerning, for example, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1986) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1989). Yet Deleuze's final collaboration with Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (1994), remains one of the most salient illustrations of his important ideas regarding the function of philosophy. Even so, in this theoretical and sometimes confusing, but strangely candid and entertaining book, Deleuze and Guattari make it difficult for readers to evaluate their contributions to social theory, given that *What Is Philosophy?* offers both an introduction to philosophy and a multifaceted extension of the authors' long-established themes. Somewhat predictably, then, critical reactions to *What Is Philosophy?* fluctuate between declaring it the forerunner of an imaginative body of thought focused on the creation of concepts and condemning it for its promotion of a hermetically sealed philosophy that concentrates on the endless propagation of ideas that are of dubious contemporary social significance.

Deleuze and Guattari's theory-laden reluctance to acknowledge the emergence of new attitudes in a relentlessly shifting social environment is thus nowhere more obvious than in *What Is Philosophy?* in which they critique the poverty of postmodern philosophy wherein events are converted into exhibitions and concepts become profitable commodities. Hence, the answer to the question *What Is Philosophy?* has nothing to do with a celebration of postmodern philosophy and everything to do with an interrogation of the formation of concepts, of philosophy as an event. Deleuze and Guattari's ultimate conception of philosophy accordingly appears to reveal them not as Nietzschean oriented, post-Marxian radical thinkers and activists, but as critically inclined academic philosophers. On balance, however, it is difficult to identify how many of Deleuze's contentions in particular were projected as genuine assaults on postmodern philosophy and how many were yet further examples of Deleuze expressing the deep affection he had for the history of Western philosophy.

— John Armitage

See also Foucault, Michel; Lacan, Jacques

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DEMOCRACY

Democracy, from Greek *demokratia* (literally, “rule by the people”), is a very old word commonly used in ancient political typologies in which three modes of rulership, by the one, the few, and the many, were cross-classified with good and bad variants, the “bad” being those in which selfish rulers enhanced their own wealth and power at the expense of the common good. Ancient authors collectively were taxonomically ambiguous, some using democracy to denote the good and some the bad variant of rule by the many. Ancient authors also advanced various ideas about what made democracy more or less workable. Some argued that all political arrangements were dependent on the virtue of the rulers and that democracy therefore depended on virtue-inculcating civic education for the many who ruled. Aristotle advanced a more structural thesis: that democracy was workable if wealth were distributed fairly evenly so that the moderation of a numerous middle strata would outweigh the twin tendencies of the vengeful poor to aim at expropriation of the rich and of the fearful rich to take drastic action in self-protection.

Educated Europeans over more than two millennia were likely to know not only the term and its frequently negative flavor but also have a general idea of the governing institutions of its leading exemplar, Athens: much decision making by an assembly of the citizenry, most official positions chosen by lot for sharply limited terms and subject to recall by aggrieved citizens, and a few particularly sensitive or skill-demanding positions chosen by election. They would also have been broadly aware that political rights were for Athenians, not foreigners (including resident foreigners); adults, not children; men, not women; and the free, rather than the slaves. In the 1700s, those who studied political systems would have learned that democracy was impractical on a scale larger than a single city and, even where practical, had so many negative consequences (the poorer majority could easily plunder the better off; mob rule interlaced with demagogic tyranny was likely to be commonplace) that it was just as well there was little democracy to speak of in modern times and none at all on the scale of early modern Europe's emerging national states.

In the 1780s, nonetheless, in the course of political struggles, some people in the Low Countries began to call themselves and to be called “democrats,” and the question of democracy was reopened as people considered anew the government of national states in a revolutionary age. By the early 1790s, new constitutions had been written in the United States, Poland, and France. Many would soon follow along French lines as France's armies dominated Europe. By the time conservative forces had defeated the French in Europe, they too found themselves attempting to stabilize political systems by writing their own constitutions.

Still other attempts were made to organize the newly independent states of Latin America. All this turbulence generated much new thought on democracy: on how to bring it about, on how to make it work well, on how to keep it within bounds, on how to avoid it.

The subsequent history of democracy, of the ebb and flow of political systems claiming to be democratic, and of change in the institutions that people have regarded as essential to democracy has been a turbulent one and has continued to be marked by social conflict, including war and revolution. Learned reflection on democracy since the 1780s, partly in consequence, has been permeated by considerable disagreement on such matters as the circumstances that favor or impede it; the processes that bring it into existence, transform it, or terminate it; and even how to give it precise definition.

DEFINITION

For at least four reasons, *democracy* and kindred terms such as *democrat* and *democratic* have proved resistant to consensual definition by social scientists.

First of all, from the revolutionary moment of the late eighteenth century, “democratic” has been a term of approbation or disapprobation deployed in political conflicts in support of or in opposition to particular rulers, movements, policies, regimes, or entire systems of rule. It has therefore been a term used by actors as much as analysts and, like other such terms, has been implicitly and explicitly redefined as it has been deployed in struggles.

Second, the transference of a terminology developed for ancient city-states to the developing national states in the late eighteenth century posed the challenge of identifying analogous institutions, a conceptual issue exacerbated by both the changing character of the chief ancient exemplar and the enormous gaps in detailed description and knowledge of it. Nineteenth-century champions and opponents of democracy had a good deal of wiggle room in precisely what they might choose to mean by that term.

Third, the known institutions from antiquity and the comments upon them by ancient and modern writers were so varied that individual writers might place very different weights on different institutions and practices. For one analyst, for example, severe term limits might seem an essential feature of a democratic order; for another, intensive citizen participation would be the key; while a third might stress the zones of citizen equality. Even before the revolutionary eighteenth century, democracy was a multifaceted concept, and the accumulated history of conflict and debate since that time has generated no consensus on the weighting of the different facets.

Fourth, modern democracy (and ancient democracy, for that matter) seems inherently to have been subject to change born of conflict. Very few people in the twenty-first century,

including social scientists, would be comfortable characterizing as democratic any of the political arrangements widely characterized by that label in, say, the early nineteenth century. In the new United States, for example, slavery was widespread, women had no vote and limited property rights, voting was often public, and organizations for the purpose of contesting elections were commonly regarded as scandalous.

One important methodological consequence is that although there have been many very impressive and valuable comparative studies deploying quantitative measures of democracy (developed by collecting data on a variety of indicators and aggregating them according to defined rules), even researchers devoted to such methodologies (a subset of the much larger number of all students of democracy) are not even close to agreeing on a common measure. Creative comparativists, in fact, continue to create new measures that are as plausible as those they rejected but no more likely to achieve universal acceptance.

Among the elements that analysts have identified as defining characteristics of democratic rule have been freedom, equality, accountability, competition, and authoritative decision making.

Freedom

Persons subject to democratic authority would enjoy protected spheres within which governmental authority would be sharply circumscribed and defined by laws so that actions of authority would be predictable. Such freedoms commonly include freedoms to express oneself in various media, to engage in varied and self-chosen religious practices, and to be able to defend oneself against accusations of criminality. Some theorists do and others do not regard extensive property rights as essential to viable democracy. Since collective purposes generally imply some limitation on each of these areas, the precise sphere of freedom from state constraint is inherently subject to considerable conflict and redefinition. In addition, in many notions of democracy, positive freedoms to participate in political decisions are very salient. In focusing on what citizens may safely do, we tend to use terms such as “civil rights”; in focusing on constraints on what government may do, we speak of the “rule of law.”

Equality

Some significant class of persons subject to democratic authority is regarded as of equal standing for many purposes. One very important purpose is participation in political action, yet precisely who is regarded as having a right to forms of participation, such as electing or being elected, is limited in every political system. All democratic political systems have a class of members called “citizens,” but only a subset of citizens have full rights to participate. “Universal suffrage,” for

example, connotes the egalitarian aspect of democratic procedure, yet nowhere has this come close to describing who actually gets to vote, for below some age threshold, some citizens are denied such rights everywhere. In many times and places, other social categories have been excluded from voting rights. As for noncitizens, the question of which rights do and which do not extend to them has no universal answer. Generally speaking, different classes of noncitizens will differ in rights from each other; states commonly differentiate among long-term noncitizen residents, tourists, and illegal entrants. Some of the complexity inherent in democratic notions of equality has been clear at least since the time of Alexis de Tocqueville, who saw equality and freedom as often in conflict. In no twenty-first-century political system that makes democratic claims, for example, is slavery permitted, which means that the freedom of some to the enjoyment of property does not extend to any property in other human beings and the radical denial of those others' freedom. All twenty-first-century democracies, therefore, at least implicitly acknowledge some basic rights of even noncitizens.

Accountability

Incumbents of office are accountable to the citizenry directly or indirectly by virtue of being accountable to other officeholders, who, in turn, are accountable to the citizenry. (Although, to take one important example, it is quite rare for generals to be elected officials in modern democracies, unlike Athenian practice, most students of democracy regard it as a significant limitation to the depth of democracy when generals are not accountable to those who are elected.) One subject that was the occasion of considerable thought by students of democracy in the early twentieth century, and has remained so, is whether the bureaucratized structures of rule making and rule enforcement that characterize all modern states can really be made accountable to citizens or whether their formal accountability (to elected executives or executives named by elected parliaments) is inevitably a legitimating fiction. We may call this the issue of "responsible bureaucracy."

Competition

Since office is not held by right and citizens have rights of participation, open competition for office is an important process in all modern democracies, much more so than in ancient democratic practice. Competition, freedom, and equality as defining principles have complex relationships. To the extent that there are heritable differences among citizens in wealth or other resources, some, including but not only Marxist theorists, would argue that equality in political competition is inevitably a fiction and often a fraud. On the other hand, measures aimed at reducing such disparities (including progressive taxation, welfare transfers, and

regulation of political campaigns) are likely to be attacked as infringing on the freedoms of some.

Authoritative Decision Making

Although more likely to be implicitly presumed than explicitly indicated, the entity to which "democratic" applies is widely taken to be one capable of enforcing decisions even against the wishes of at least some of those regarded as members. In consequence, some analysts would not regard as democratic a state whose military or police was not subject to the authority of elected officials, and others would similarly not regard as democratic a political entity that was under the rulership of another (a colony, for example), regardless of how its officials were chosen. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, therefore, discussions of democracy were largely discussions of the allegedly sovereign states, rather than such nonstatal modes of social existence that anthropologists have characterized as "hunters and gatherers" (sometimes highly egalitarian) or the modes of local decision making in substatal structures such as villages (sometimes involving widespread participation). To the extent that transnational structures of decision making become more significant in the twenty-first century, the question of their democratic character will loom increasingly large for democratic theorists.

TRANSFORMATION

The history of modern democracy has been a history of change for several reasons. First of all, the legitimating claim by government that it rules on behalf of "the people" encourages people to demand that government actually rule on their behalf. Social movements have therefore been part and parcel of the fabric of life under democratic government, and such movements have often led to alteration in the specific institutions of government.

Second, that same legitimating claim leaves open many questions: Who are the people on whose behalf the government rules; how is their will to be made known; and over what is that government to rule? The degree to which these contentious issues are inherent in democracy is strongly suggested by the frequency with which governments that claim to represent the people alter both definitions of citizenship and rules defining precisely which citizens can vote.

Third, opposing parties in conflict often take heart from differing aspects of democracy. People in boardrooms may decry the undemocratic behavior of disruptive protestors who flout regulations arrived at by democratically elected officials, while the protestors in the street decry the undemocratic secrecy and elitism of decision makers who ignore popular input. People on the losing minority side of some contentious issue may decry the majority of the day for riding roughshod over minority rights; but should minority

sentiment prevail in the halls of power, we will hear denunciations of the authorities for flouting majority wishes. Well-off minorities taxed to support poorer people may denounce majoritarian tyranny that restricts their freedom, while champions of the poor may denounce existing arrangements as an affront to human equality. The notion that a government governs, that the people have a voice, that the majority is weighty, that minorities have their rights, that freedom is a high value, and that equality is fundamental are all part of democracy and often in conflict with each other.

From conflict, comes change. Important innovations have included the writing of constitutions; the development of election-contesting political parties; the expansion of political rights to include citizens regardless of wealth, property, and education; the expansion of political rights to include women; the abolition of slavery; the development of mandatory and effective secrecy in voting. The pioneering places in launching such innovations have generally not been the great world powers of the moment. On the other hand, the capacity of wealthy and powerful states to impose their institutions by force, their capacity to provide poorer states with needed resources, and the degree to which they appear models of success have given those states a vital role in the world history of democratization.

The conflictual history of democratization has also meant that it has ebbed as well as flowed. Elites resisting threats to their wealth and power; rulers enhancing their own prerogatives; antidemocratic mass movements, for whom democratic practices provide opportunities as they do for democratic movements; champions of excluding portions of the population from political rights; revolutionaries convinced that democratic liberties perpetuate the entrenched powers of the wealthy; reactionaries convinced that democratic liberties facilitate the cause of fearsome radicals; and militaries seeing themselves as guardians of the national spirit have all fought democracy at various times and places and have all made gains at various times and places. Women with property who had gotten the right to vote in revolutionary New Jersey, for example, lost it in 1807; nonwhites who had voting rights in parts of South Africa in the early twentieth century lost it for generations later on. On a transnational scale, democracy advanced and receded in several great waves during the twentieth century. Although there was a significant democratic expansion at the end of the First World War, for example, dynamic anti-democratic forces were soon ascendant and far fewer people in Europe in 1942 were living in countries with much claim to democracy than had been 20 years earlier.

STRUCTURE, CULTURE, AND PROCESS

By the late nineteenth century, a strong tradition of social science research into actual democratic practices had

emerged and continued to inspire work into the twenty-first century. One central theme of such research was the exploration of forms of action that developed within and around formal constitutional structures. How did groups organize to influence elected officials? How did legislatures and executives negotiate their relationships with each other? How did career bureaucrats coexist with elected officials? How did voters make choices among parties? How did parties organize their activities? In what ways were voters' choices shaped by their social categories, for example, class, gender, ethnicity, age, education, region, or religion? Such work was increasingly likely to use the full panoply of developing social science methodologies: statistical analyses of surveys, extended interviews with key informants, and critical scrutiny of documentary sources.

A second theme reached back into the concerns of ancient political thinkers with the main lines of variation of human power relationships. What kinds of social arrangements encouraged democratization? The central empirical datum around which this tradition developed was the uneven democratization of the national states, some of which were plainly of a more democratic character than others. For the historically minded, contemplation of the nineteenth century added the plain observation that some of the states had *become* more democratic than others. The temporally clustered transnational bursts of democratization and de-democratization of the twentieth century kept such questions very much alive as each burst called attention to the divide between countries that had or had not democratized and de-democratized in each of these episodes.

By the early nineteenth century, observers were connecting features of modern social structure to democratized politics. One intellectual landmark was *Democracy in America*, by Tocqueville, who argued that increasingly powerful national states and a whole host of associated economic and cultural changes spelled the doom of the mix of monarchical and aristocratic traditions by which most of the world's larger states had been governed. He therefore defined his purpose as understanding why democratization seemed to work rather well across the Atlantic rather than generate the turbulence he saw in his native France. Another was the writings of John Stuart Mill, who explored the nature of representative institutions, the attributes of democratic citizenship, and the cultural barriers that in his view made democracy unsuitable for a large portion of humanity, notably those places ruled by his native Britain.

For twentieth-century American social science, the defeat of fascism in the Second World War, the durability of postwar communist rule, and the postwar endings of colonial rule impelled a great deal of reflection on the conditions for democratic viability. Seymour Martin Lipset's *Political Man* may stand as a benchmark for this tradition, summarizing a great deal of research and deploying bold hypotheses connecting social structure and culture to

democratic politics. On the social structural side, Lipset argued that the evidence suggested strongly that wealthy modern countries were the places democracy had most securely taken root. Their resources meant a larger pie to divide, reducing the violence of conflict; their tendency to have large middle strata reduced the potential violent polarized confrontations of rich and poor; their social complexity meant many people would be in multiple social categories, inhibiting the potential for social polarization. On the cultural side, Lipset looked for values of tolerance and negotiation fostered, he held, by education and particularly common among the middle classes in prosperous capitalist societies. While every one of these propositions has been challenged repeatedly, the central empirical claim of a considerable correlation of national wealth and democratic government has stood up quite well, although many other ways of explaining this connection have been put forward.

By the 1970s, a new theoretical tradition was emerging. The closing down of many recent democratizations in poorer countries, generally by military coup or presidential expansion of powers, led some scholars away from enduring structures or cultures that might nurture democracy and toward processes that might bring democracy to an end. The subject of *transitions* was emerging, antidemocratic transitions first of all. An important subtradition of studies of civilian-military relations explored the thinking and forms of political action of militaries and their relations with civilian allies. When a new democratizing wave occurred, beginning in the 1970s, and proved to be geographically the most extensive such wave, many scholars readily embraced the study of democratic transitions. In method, such studies were often comparative.

In light of the vast geographic, structural, and cultural variety of the nondemocratic regimes that were or that appeared to be democratizing, the question of paths from various starting points to democracy became one important focus of such work. As of 1970, several southern European countries were far from democratic; most Latin American countries were ruled by generals; and Europe east of Germany was ruled by communist parties. By 1990, Spain, Portugal, and Greece had democratic governments; all Latin American countries were ruled by civilians (and most claimed the democratic mantle); communist rule was no more in Eastern Europe; and democratic movements were running strong in parts of Asia and Africa.

Did such diverse starting points suggest different paths? And, some were increasingly inclined to ask, were there different end points as well? Could it be said despite all this flux that there was some more or less stable configuration beyond mere transition that could be called *consolidation*, a state of affairs in which major political actors regarded democracy as, in a much-cited phrase, “the only game in town”—an orientation that helped *keep* it the only game in town?

This new body of work paid considerable attention to the strategic calculations of political actors in dealing with each other and the collective consequences of their strategies. Political scientists became fond of applying models derived from game theory to lay bare the structure of interest and strategy of multiple political actors. One issue occupying many in this young tradition was whether democracy could be “crafted,” that is, whether wise players could deliberately bring successful democracy into existence, a notion far removed from the sense of the overriding importance of ambient structure and culture that characterized the previous generation of scholars. Some combined the stresses on crafting, strategic games, and consolidation to conceptualize a consolidated democracy as a situation that, once brought into existence, would have the stabilizing property that it would be against any major actor’s self-interest to defect.

In part because examining small numbers of players was easier with such tools, participants in this new movement were very likely to focus strongly on the thinking and action of elites. Much more attention, for example, would be given to the strategic thinking of the leadership of socialist parties than to the situations and thinking of people earning their living in factories and fields. The stress on elites may have reinforced the emphasis on short-run processes, just the sort of thing one could learn about in interviews with key participants. With so many recent cases since the early 1970s on various continents to consider, to be a respectable student of transitions was to be a comparativist. The summa of this reflection on short-term dynamic processes was Alfred Stepan’s and Juan Linz’s *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*.

EMERGING DIRECTIONS IN THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY

After a quarter century of reflection on transitions and two-and-a-quarter centuries after modern democrats took on that label, some new directions of thinking about democracy seem to have been emerging as the twenty-first century began. It may be too early to describe these directions as a school of analysis, but against the background of other work, some features of this thinking could be discerned. *It kept the spotlight on the conflictual history of democratizations*, including war, social movements, and revolutions, and tried to locate elite deals, when these existed, within a larger context of contention. Like the recent shift toward a focus on transitions, *it kept the spotlight on dynamic processes*, rather than regarding the goal of research as the delineation of democracy-supporting structures and culture, and rather than regarding as the goal of theory the identification of necessary or sufficient structures and cultures. But *it turned the spotlight on a much longer time span*, looking for longer-term alterations in conflictual patterns, for

example, considering why and how women's suffrage has become part of what most twenty-first-century democrats would regard as essential traits of a democratic order. In doing so, this new thinking was prone to paint a picture not of democratic advance punctuated by pauses, but one of advances, retreats, and a very great deal of moving sideways. It therefore was very skeptical about whether consolidation was a concept with any utility. While treating comparison as a useful tool, it *turned the spotlight on transnational connection as well as comparison*. Prompted by the sense, growing since the 1970s, of an increasing density of economic, cultural, and political connection across national frontiers, students of democracy pondered the consequences of "globalization," considering issues such as the creation of transnational structures of decision making and the development of transnational social movement action. And in considering transnational context, diffusion, organization, and contention, these students occasionally faced forward as well as backward and tried to build on historical understandings to speculate about the possible paths for democratization in an emerging global age.

— John Markoff

See also Civil Society; Historical and Comparative Theory; Power; Social Movement Theory; Tocqueville, Alexis de

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DERRIDA, JACQUES

French philosopher Jacques Derrida (b. 1930) is the admired yet controversial author of more than 30 books. He was educated at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he studied under and later taught alongside his friend Louis Althusser. His work has provoked lasting reassessments of key theoretical notions, especially those associated with ethics and politics, including the concepts of the human, of justice, responsibility, decision, and the institution.

Derrida's mode of inquiry begins with a question about the ideality of literature. Literature's ideality manifests a condition of repeatability across time and space that guarantees the exceptional singularity of a work or an author, while at the same time robbing it of assured meanings and contexts. This observation would have been of little consequence outside literary theory had it not led to a reassessment of the kinds of ideality assumed and promoted by various philosophical traditions, from Socrates to Sigmund Freud and beyond. The ideality of philosophy, represented traditionally by concepts such as logos, form, type, and especially concept, would, as Plato taught, have exerted their influence on the empirical and finite world from an ungraspable vantage point above and beyond the temporal and spatial universe. Consequently, the ideal in philosophy corresponds to a quest for the value of pure presence. This imposes what Derrida calls the "closure of Western metaphysics," which institutes a sharp divide between the transcendental and the empirical. Even Martin Heidegger, who had identified the metaphysical tradition with the determination of being as presence, repeats the transcendental-empirical dichotomy by attempting to rethink being as finitude and by attempting to rethink time on the basis of the future rather than the present.

However, if one asks the question, explicitly banned by Plato in *The Republic* and again in *The Laws*, of the relationship between philosophy and literature, one finds a situation where it is no longer possible to radically distinguish between the two kinds of ideality that supposedly separate them. Derrida coins the term "logocentrism" to designate the teaching of a philosophical tradition whose aim is to maintain the value of presence and the ideality of its concepts above and beyond perceived erosions of its purity by various kinds of impure derivatives. Typical of logocentrism are the attempts to separate literature from philosophy, rhetoric from logic, and mythos from logos. A further term, *iterability*, which designates the repeatability and singularity that characterises literature's ideality, also serves to designate the deconstruction of logocentrism. The philosophical tradition is maintained not by the ideality it teaches, but by the kind of ideality it distinguishes as literary or rhetorical. Thus, iterability is not to be opposed to logocentrism as its scourge, but must be reassessed as the

condition of possibility for all that is affirmed under the term *logos*.

Derrida's writings of the 1960s perform the deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition through an exploration of its insistent and each time singular attempts to separate the iterability of writing from the values of continuity and presence, especially where these values are suggested by an erroneous belief in immediate correspondence between intentional meaning and the spoken word. Derrida shows that certain predicates identified with a wide range of supposedly prosthetic phenomena (for instance, every kind of telecommunication and every kind of motorised technology) have been systematically, yet without rigorous philosophical grounds, separated out from phenomena determined by the value of presence (including the ideas of the human, reason, life, breath, and thought). The value of presence also tends to turn up as a kind of radical absence from the finite and/or empirical world (as e.g., God, the infinite, eternity, and spirit).

Derrida published three key texts in 1967. *Speech and Phenomena* is Derrida's examination of the problem of the sign in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. It is a close reading of a short section from Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, in which Husserl distinguishes between expressive and indicative signs. The former supposedly guarantee the inherence of full meaning, while the latter are tainted by the constant possibility of empty (i.e., meaningless) repetition. However, because no sign escapes the repeatability that allows it to function as a sign, Husserl's distinction collapses. The focus on the sign is at once unavoidable and deceptive. It is unavoidable because the traditional dichotomy between ideality as transcendental presence and the ideality of repeatable empirical signs infects philosophical and social thought through and through. It is deceptive because a detailed focus on signification in a milieu characterised by the so-called linguistic turn and various structuralist and poststructuralist revolutions risks a continued domestication of the problem, which concerns the basis of human experience and action generally.

Of Grammatology is a study of the role and status of writing in the history of the so-called human sciences, in which Derrida demonstrates that whenever writing is identified as a dangerous yet useful prosthetic addition to a purer, more original state of affairs (i.e., a kind of pure presence), the maintenance of whatever it is that is opposed to writing requires the same predicates that are inevitably attached to it: repeatability in principle ad infinitum; potential absence of sense, reference, addresser, and addressee; and irreducibility to context. These possibilities can no longer be considered as the scourge of rational communication, but rather as conditions of its possibility.

Writing and Difference collects a series of articles written between 1962 and 1967. Highlights include two articles with polemical aspects. "Violence and

Metaphysics" constitutes a serious engagement with the notion of the ethical in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas; and "Cogito and the History of Madness" takes Derrida's former teacher Michel Foucault to task for performing a gesture against René Descartes that repeats exactly the gesture that Foucault criticises in Descartes. In each case, a text is revealed to be performing a kind of ethical violence of the kind it ostensibly abhors.

Early reception of Derrida in Anglo-American academic institutions generally failed to pick up on what is nonetheless clearly marked in these early texts, that is, a concern for what we can retrospectively call an ethics of the relation to the other. Particularly in the polemical articles, an affirmation of the kind that becomes increasingly familiar in Derrida's later works emerges, in which a term that has been philosophically impoverished, abhorred, scorned, hypostatized, contained, excluded, or otherwise neutralised turns out to designate the actual conditions of possibility for whatever has been distinguished from it (usually as its opposite).

The possibilities of ethical decision and independent action reside in notions such as iterability, deconstruction, and *différance*, singular coinages that cleverly and often wittily deform existing concepts. These terms are governed by the conditions of possibility that they designate. *Différance*, for instance, performs the combination of spatial differing and temporal deferring implicit in the French verb *différer*, by drawing attention to the fact that the difference between the two is merely a matter of repetition, according to which one decides its meaning in an exorbitant determination granted by what remains undetermined in it each time. Exorbitant determination in Derrida is a possibility of repetition that, as such, perpetually defers a final determination but insists on repetitions that are at least minimally different from what they repeat.

In later work, this logic is brought forcibly into the political and ethical spheres. In *Specters of Marx* (1992), Derrida insists on a notion of the future, according to which the predictable future tense is outstripped by the incalculable, messianic *a-venir*; the "to-come." The undecidability that lurks in this "to-come" constitutes a powerful if inevitably paradoxical ground for consideration of social relations in their particularity.

— John William Phillips

See also Deconstruction; Logocentrism; Poststructuralism

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DEVIANCE

Deviance refers to normative violations that may elicit social control sanctions. Most sociologists understand the term's domain to include crime, mental illness, alcohol and drug abuse, and sexual misbehavior; some definitions also include stigmatized conditions such as obesity and disability, or positive deviance, such as being too bright. Disagreements about the precise definition of deviance have been common throughout the concept's history.

THE ORIGINS OF DEVIANCE

The term *deviance* emerged in the United States after the Second World War. The new concept reflected that period's interest in macrosociological, functionalist Grand Theory. Talcott Parsons was one of the first to use the word in an article in a major journal. Deviance was a sociological abstraction; it referred to rule breaking or violations of important social norms that might lead to social control sanctions. Its proponents anticipated the concept of deviance would help analysts recognize similarities among different sorts of rule breaking within the social system.

Although Durkheim discussed the functions of "crime" in *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), he was referring to a broad range of forbidden behaviors, to what would later be called "deviance." Durkheim's emphasis on social consensus made him a forefather of the structural functionalism that guided sociological theory in the postwar years, when the concept of deviance emerged. In this view, applying sanctions to rule breaking offered society a means of both maintaining social order and reaffirming its moral consensus.

The term deviance had its roots in statistics, where *deviation* refers to variation from the mean. This usage conveyed implications of scientific authority and objectivity, and these connotations carried over as "deviation" and "deviate" became metaphors for describing people or behavior that differed from the normal. This was consistent with the functionalists' posture of dispassionate objectivity and their preference for deductive reasoning. Deviance offered a way of talking about moral issues in seemingly scientific terms.

The initial post-World War II studies of deviance focused on another Durkheimian concept: *anomie*. Robert K. Merton's essay "Social Structure and Anomie" (1938) became a leading reference for theorists of deviance. (Merton had not used the word deviance, but he had spoken of "deviate behavior and aberrant conduct.") Merton argued that any culture articulates goals for society's members, while social structure provides an approved set of

institutionalized means for achieving those goals. Individuals who accept both the approved goals and the approved means are conformists, but there are other possible, anomic adaptations: Innovators accept the approved goals but reject the means; ritualists reject the goals but embrace the means; retreatists reject both the goals and means; and rebels simultaneously both accept and reject both goals and means. This typology suggested that different forms of rule breaking involved different responses to anomie: Thieves might be innovators, whereas drug addicts were retreatists. Merton's formulation and the idea of anomie influenced many of the early analysts of deviance. In particular, concern about gangs and juvenile delinquents flourished during the 1950s, and sociological interpretations of delinquency made frequent reference to both anomie and Merton's typology.

THE LABELING APPROACH

The functionalists' formulation came under attack with the rise of the *labeling perspective*. This approach challenged the conceptual viability of the standard definition of deviance as rule breaking. In *Outsiders* (1963), Howard S. Becker argued that deviance could be defined only in terms of societal reaction. That is, individuals became deviant not because they broke important norms, but because they were labeled as rule breakers and treated as outsiders. What made an act deviant was the reaction to it, how others defined it. Although similar arguments appeared in the work of earlier sociologists, particularly Edwin M. Lemert, it was not until the early 1960s that labeling emerged as a major approach to the study of deviance.

Labeling was not a formal theory so much as an orientation. It was inductive, grounded in observations of deviants and social control agents. Instead of viewing deviance as an objectively recognizable quality of behavior, it emphasized the role of social interaction in defining rules, in identifying and sanctioning rule breakers and in responding to those labels. Erving Goffman's *Stigma* (1963) offered a key concept: Coping with labels' stigmatizing power was central to the experience of being deviant. The new approach inspired a rich variety of historical and ethnographic studies, and labeling's rise to prominence during the 1960s was fostered by a rebellious culture that supported challenging orthodoxies such as functionalism. Labeling offered an alternative perspective to mainstream sociology's vision of a society founded upon moral consensus; its viewpoint seemed to fit the tumultuous times.

CRITIQUES OF DEVIANCE

Labeling's triumph was short-lived. The social conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s led to a resurgence of conflict approaches within sociology that, in turn, inspired critiques of both anomie and labeling. *Conflict theorists*,

who returned to prominence during this period, argued that rules were created by elites and designed to protect elite interests and that social control agents ignored elite deviance while repressing rebellion in the name of social order. In this view, labeling's interest in marijuana smokers, police officers, and other offenders and social control agents with little power ignored the greater crimes of elites. The labeling theorists stood accused of having bought into the existing social order; from the perspective of conflict theory, the labeling theorists were no more critical of elite domination than were their functionalist predecessors.

Feminism offered a second critique. It charged that the sociology of deviance had tended to overlook both society's harsh treatment of female deviants and its failure to protect women from victimization. Functionalism had neglected women, but so had labeling's advocates, whose sympathies for deviants had led them to ignore rape, battering, and other violence against women. Like the conflict theorists, feminist critics argued that labeling was oblivious to key inequities in society.

Third, social movements for gay rights and disability rights led to an *identity politics* critique of the sociology of deviance. In this view, sociologists who defined homosexuals or the disabled as deviants failed to recognize that they were better conceptualized as political minorities than as rule breakers. This critique was particularly severe in that it challenged the very legitimacy of the concept of deviance: If rules and moral categories should be seen as essentially arbitrary manifestations of a political order, how could sociologists confidently characterize an activity or condition as deviant? Like conflict theory and feminism, identity politics criticized the sociology of deviance for uncritically accepting conventional standards of morality.

A fourth critique came from *mainstream* sociologists who argued that the labeling approach was narrow in that it ignored traditionally central topics such as the causes of deviance. Mainstream analysts sought to translate the labeling approach into testable hypotheses about the operation of social control systems and then test them using the regression-based techniques that greater computing power was making practicable. These empirical studies offered only weak and inconsistent support for labeling's claims.

IS DEVIANCE "DEAD"?

By the mid-1970s, social theorists seemed unable to resolve a fundamental issue: the definition of deviance. Arguments that deviance could be defined in terms of either rule breaking or societal reaction had been challenged from several theoretical camps, but there was no generally agreed-upon alternative definition. While sociologists continued to offer courses on deviance and to study crime and other phenomena considered to be deviant, the concept of deviance was less often at the center of their analyses. Occasional efforts to articulate new theoretical approaches to the study

of deviance failed to capture the imagination of the discipline in the way the anomie or labeling had. Some analysts shifted to less disputed terrain, locating their work within the sociology of social problems or medical sociology (studies of medicalization focused on how medical authorities assumed control of some forms of deviance). Most researchers defined their work in terms of the substantive issues they studied, so that there was a marked revival in criminology and the study of crime, and parallel developments in the sociological literatures on mental illness, substance abuse, and so on. In other words, sociologists continued studying phenomena nominally thought to be deviant, but they were less likely to try to overtly locate their research within some broader theory of deviance. After the 1970s, appearances of the term deviance in sociology's flagship journals began to decline; sociologists were simply using the word less often.

Deviance, then, occupies an anomalous position as a theoretical concept. It is certainly part of the standard vocabulary of sociology, but there is no consensus regarding how it ought to be defined or which issues are central to its study, and there seem to be few efforts to either revive old perspectives or devise new theoretical agendas. In 1994, Colin Sumner published *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary* and touched off a small literature debating whether the idea of deviance was "dead." Obviously, crime, mental illness, and other behaviors classified as deviant have not vanished, and sociologists continue to study those phenomena. The issue is whether those sociologists will continue to find the concept of deviance useful. While the discipline seems reluctant to abandon the notion of deviance, sociologists also seem uncertain how to best put it to use.

— Joel Best

See also Conflict Theory; Crime; Durkheim, Émile; Feminism; Goffman, Erving; Labeling Theory; Merton, Robert

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DIALECTIC

The dialectical mode of logic has its strongest roots in the works of G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx. Hegel was a dialectical idealist principally concerned with a dialectic of ideas.

Marx combined Hegel's sense of dialectical thinking with the materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach to produce dialectical materialism. This shift from a concern with ideas to what many social scientists would consider a more grounded materialistic approach is what makes the dialectical thinking of Marx, not Hegel, most relevant to social theory.

Dialecticians take a relational view of the social world. Their focus is not on any one aspect of that world in isolation, but rather on the relationships among and between various elements, as well as on the totality of social relations and its relationship to those components. Furthermore, they emphasize reciprocal relations among and between the various elements. There is a heightened attention to the ways in which effects flow back and forth between the various entities involved in a relationship, rather than a focus on one-sided causal explanations. This sense of reciprocal relations also explains why a dialectical approach does not see clear-cut dividing lines between social phenomena. Objects in the social world are not seen as existing independently, but rather as blending into one another in innumerable and frequently imperceptible ways.

Another feature of the dialectic is a concern not only with the present relationships between social phenomena but also with how they relate to both past and future social phenomena. This means that objects in the social world exist in a dialectical relationship to one another across both space *and* time. For example, in addition to outlining what he saw to be the dialectical relationship between capitalists and the proletariat (in a dialectical fashion, exploitative actions taken by the capitalists serve to make it increasingly likely that the proletariat will eventually come to rebel and overthrow the capitalist economic system), Marx was also concerned with dialectically tracing the history of changes in society from primitive through feudal to capitalist society. While he shied away from utopian blueprints of the future communist society, Marx did see it emerging dialectically out of both the advances (for example, technological) and downfall of capitalist society. Thus, there is a dialectic between capitalism and communism, and the latter could not emerge without the former. (Of course, history seemed to prove Marx wrong as communist societies, or at least those that purported to be communist, emerged in societies such as Russia and China that had never been capitalist, while it did not emerge in the advanced capitalist societies such as Germany and the United States.) However, such considerations of the future do not imply any inevitabilities. Indeed, the very nature of dialectics, and continuing dialectical relationships, precludes the possibility of *any* inevitabilities.

Dialecticians are interested in the relationships between actors, between structures, and between actors and structures. Although Marx eventually focused a greater amount of attention on social structures, he still manifested a great concern with the relationships between actors and the ways

in which they were affected by and were able to affect the large-scale social structures on which he focused.

Another critical component of the dialectic is a concern with conflict and contradiction. Dialecticians do not see social phenomena as inevitably weaving nicely together or, as a structural functionalist might, as being different organs of the same social body. Instead, they view various aspects of society in constant conflict with one another. Each aspect of society, as well as the society as a whole, is riddled with contradictions. Thus, as mentioned above, Marx saw a contradiction in capitalism between capitalists and proletariat and that contradiction would be the system's eventual undoing; the capitalists were creating their own gravediggers. In other words, what is necessary for capitalism to succeed (exploiting the working class) is also what is necessary to undo capitalism (creating the conditions that would lead the working class to revolt).

Another aspect of dialectical logic, and Marxism more generally, that sets it apart from many other modes of analysis, especially a Weberian approach, is a belief that values should be an integral component of any research endeavor. Many scientists, including sociologists and social theorists, believe that their work should be "value-free." That is, they do not feel that larger social values, or their personal feelings or opinions, should affect their study of the social world. On the other hand, Marx did not believe that it was desirable, or even possible, to separate values or his own personal feelings from his work. He thought that the best research would come from social scientists who were the most passionate about their topics of study. Even Weber, who is most often associated with the idea of value-freedom, believed that social analyses should be "value-relevant." That is, they should relate to the pressing issues and widely shared beliefs of the day.

Overall, the dialectic is a useful way of thinking about the social world, and it offers a number of approaches that stand in distinction to, and offer advantages over, the more widely used and broadly accepted causal mode of thinking.

— Michael Ryan

See also Capitalism; Historical Materialism; Marx, Karl; Marxism

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DILTHEY, WILHELM

Much of the space for humanist social thought was cleared by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), through his attack on the fundamental assumptions of positivism as well as his formulation of a critical method, *hermeneutics*, by which the works of free human consciousness could be understood.

The first tenet of positivism is that the world is made up of “out there” objectively knowable “facts.” Dilthey undercut this notion by asserting that the subject matter of the human studies was not mere facts of nature, but rather objectified expressions of the human mind. The second central assumption of positivism is that these facts are explainable or determined by general causal laws. In contrast, Dilthey asserted that while we can explain the natural world, human action must be understood through an interpretive rather than a causal logic. In demonstrating and specifically describing such an interpretive procedure, Dilthey provided an epistemological and methodological grounding for a humanistic science of the person and of the social world. His ideas illuminate the works even of his critics, and his influence, though largely unacknowledged, continues to be widespread in all the human studies.

LIFE

If Kant’s work can be said to close the Enlightenment and usher in the nineteenth century, Dilthey’s writings may be seen as a watershed between nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought. Like Kant and Hegel, born to a Protestant family, Dilthey seemed destined for a theological career until his interest in history and philosophy turned him toward academics. In 1867, he was appointed professor of Philosophy at Basel, whence he moved to Kiel, Breslau, and finally to Berlin in 1882, where he stayed until his death.

Recognition of Dilthey’s importance, and indeed his own period of greatest productivity, began late in his life. Though his *Life of Schleiermacher* came out in 1870 and the *Introduction to the Human Sciences* in 1883, the bulk of his works appeared only when he was in his 60s and 70s, from 1893 to 1911. It was also in this period that Dilthey’s speculation crystallized into a unified vision of his task. His last years were a fevered rush to define a new logic for the humanities, a *Critique of Historical Reason* following Kant’s critiques of pure and practical reason, which would be “objective” and rigorous yet independent of either natural science or positivism. He spent almost no time either propagating his own work or even defending it from his critics. But despite the incompleteness and disorder of his writings, Dilthey laid out a program and method the depth and influence of which are still unfolding today.

THE NATURE AND LOGIC OF THE HUMAN STUDIES

In *The Rise of Hermeneutics* (1900 [1996]), Dilthey states the problem he hoped to solve:

Action everywhere presupposes the understanding of other persons; much of our happiness as human beings derives from being able to feel the states of mind of others; the entire science of philology and of history is based on the presupposition that such reunderstanding of what is singular can be raised to objectivity. . . . And when the systematic human sciences go on to derive more general lawful relations and more inclusive connections from this objective apprehension of what is singular, the processes of understanding and interpretation still remain basic. Thus these disciplines, like history itself, depend for their methodological certainty upon whether the understanding of what is singular may be raised to the level of universal validity. . . . Human studies have indeed the advantage over the natural sciences that their object is not sensory appearance as such, no mere reflection of reality within consciousness, but is rather first and foremost an inner reality, a nexus experienced from within. . . . Thus the problem is: How can one quite individually structured consciousness bring an alien individuality of a completely different type to objective knowledge through such re-creation? What kind of process is this, in appearance so different from the other modes of conceptual knowledge? (Pp. 235–36)

Dilthey’s solution to this problem was not a checklist of techniques, but rather a part intuitive, part systematic interpretive method that he demonstrated in his historical writings and commented upon extensively throughout his later years. At the heart of this interpretive procedure, or hermeneutic, are the concepts lived experience, objectification, and understanding.

Lived Experience. There are two words in German for “experience”: the conventional one, *Erfahrung*, and the technical one, *Erlebnis*, used by Dilthey. The verb *Erleben* is itself fairly recent, formed by adding the emphatic prefix *er-* to the verb “to live.” Hence, the term suggests neither merely “experience” nor “life” alone, but the involvement in, the “lived experience” of, some whole unit of meaning as, for example, a work of art, a love affair, or a revolution. The lived experience is thus a subject-object unity. *Erlebnis* does not appear over against us as an idea or intellectual construct, or as a psychological act *about* something else. It is rather an experiencing of “content” as itself meaningful or, conversely, an experiencing of meaning as imminent in content. It is not given to us, but rather exists for us by virtue of the fact that we are aware of it, that we have it as

in some sense belonging to us. “In itself, purely as *Erlebt*, it is not given and not thought” (Dilthey 1957–60, VI:314; Hodges 1969:40). Instead, it is comprehended as something lived in and through: “The consciousness which I have in having it (an *Erlebnis*) is not, strictly speaking, a consciousness of it at all, but simply the consciousness which belongs intrinsically to it. It may be described as an ‘immediate knowing’ (*Innewerden, Innesein*)” (Hodges 1952:39). “In other words, the [lived] experience does not stand like an object over against its experiencer, but rather its very existence for me is undifferentiated from the *whatness* which is present for me in it” (Dilthey 1957–60, VII:139; Palmer 1969:109).

It is in this subsoil of prepredicative consciousness, a subsoil that Husserl and Heidegger were later to mine, that all predicative thought, including that of social theory and the natural sciences, must take root. But for the human studies, this lived experience is paramount, for the very interpretive categories of these disciplines must be derived from it. Memory, intention, meaning, cannot be imagined except in terms of the presentness and contextual structure already implicit in *Erlebnis* as we enter into it.

Objectification. *Ausdruck* is usually translated as “expression.” We choose the term *objectification* to distinguish Dilthey’s meaning from the more narrow usage of the term *expression* in romantic theories of art, which see the expression in subject-object terms as a kind of spontaneous outpouring of feelings on the part of the artist. Dilthey’s intention is broader and more subtle. For him, an objectification is not merely the overflow or representation of a person’s emotions, but a concrete embodiment of meaning.

Such objectifications are divided into three categories: ideas, actions, and “objectifications of lived experience.” Ideas are “mere thought content,” abstractions independent of any specific time-place, and hence easily and directly communicated. Actions embody intentions. They are *for* (or against) something; hence, their contextual meanings cannot be understood in terms of their given “presentness,” which does not, perforce, include the something else that they are “for.” Last, there are objectifications of lived experience, which range from the spontaneous expression of inner life, such as gestures, to conscious articulations embodied in systems of religion, law, or works of art. But while most fully expressing inner lived experience, this third type of objectification is the most difficult to understand, “for it rises out of the depths which consciousness never lights up” (Dilthey 1957–60, VII:207; Palmer 1969:113).

Understanding. Understanding (*Verstehen*) refers to one mind’s engaging another mind. We know that other minds exist by analogy to our own mental life. We *understand* other minds by immersing ourselves in the interpretive

study of their external cultural-historical objectifications. Dilthey, following Schleiermacher, sees this “real transposition” of minds not as the “I-It” objectivity of the natural sciences, but as an intersubjective relationship between “I” and “Thou.” Knowledge of others (and hence of ourselves) is not gained either through introspection or by some direct metaphysical communication with the mind of the other person. On the contrary, it is achieved through the interpretive study of the objectifications or expressions of that other mind, expressions that can be found in the “social-historical world,” the world of art, religion, law and politics, of language and gesture, of the shared community of experience in its living (and hence historical) aspect.

Such a process depends upon two important facts: first, that human nature is everywhere the same (that is, that psychological differences between groups are ones of degree rather than quality) and, second, that every expression of the mind is continuously linked to some such mental component (Dilthey 1957–60, V:329). This allows the *possibility* of understanding; but Dilthey goes on to tell us how understanding may be achieved. A lived experience, we saw earlier, is a basic meaning unit possessing a web of inner structural connectedness of its own. Thus, understanding lies in grasping the essential reciprocal interaction of the parts and the whole. As meaning is contextual, so understanding is a process of clarifying and expanding the contextual relationships of the meaning unit under study.

To illustrate this interpretive procedure, Dilthey speaks of autobiography, biography, and history as expanding circles of meaning context (Dilthey 1957–60, V:206–25). Similarly, he calls Homer, Shakespeare, and Goethe the three greatest poets: Homer, for seeing human action as an expression of consciousness; Shakespeare, for showing that human consciousness can change; and Goethe, for showing that consciousness changes in the cultural-historical world. The process of interpretation begins with a preliminary overview of the subject matter as a whole, which guides us in determining the denotative meaning of its parts (that is, the relationship of the symbols to the things symbolized). This, in turn, helps us clarify our idea of the whole, which must, if possible, be conceived so that all the parts can be understood in terms of it. We can thus claim to understand an objectification only when this inner structural meaning can be seen in and illuminated by each of the parts. Thus, Dilthey closes the “hermeneutic circle,” arguing that the relation between part and meaningful whole is not merely an intellectual relation, but it is a lived connection whose significance is derived from life as it is lived (Dilthey 1957–60, VII:240; Hodges 1952:151).

In this sense, all interpretive knowledge is circular, a kind of discovery of forms by looking in a faceted mirror. Yet though we can apprehend only versions of our own likeness, this very restriction turns the unrelieved historicity of human existence into an opportunity for enriched

understanding, providing that the correct interpretive procedures are employed. For Dilthey, these procedures are both those of more traditional logical and grammatical interpretation, as well as social and psychological. The “grammatical” interpreter approaches the “texts” of history, art, or conduct with the aim of reestablishing the connections between the parts, and between them and the whole. The social-psychological interpreter tends to make of him- or herself an analogue of the “world” of the social-historical actors. Each procedure is incomplete without the other, but together they enable an understanding not only of “the unity of the works” themselves but also as they existed “in the mentality and development of their authors” (Dilthey 1957–60, V:331; Bergstraesser 1947:97). If we cannot live the lives of others with the original experience of them, we can, through interpretation, attain a second naïveté. It is through interpretation that we can see and hear again, that we can come to understand others and, thence, ourselves.

DILTHEY'S IMPACT ON HUMANIST SOCIAL THOUGHT

A direct influence of Dilthey, or at least a parallel development, can be seen in virtually all twentieth-century thinkers concerned with the understanding of human life in its actual passage. In sociology, Dilthey's praise of Simmel's insight into formal structures and his stress on meaning and understanding adumbrated the later efforts of Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, and their followers. In his methodological writings, Weber drew on Dilthey to wage a two-front war: on one front, against reductivistic empiricism and on the other, against subjectivistic idealism. Of social psychologists and symbolic interactionists, the theories of William James and George Herbert Mead are influenced by those of Dilthey; the symbolic interactionist movement was further enriched by Robert Park and Ernest Cassirer, both of whom were nourished on Dilthey's thought. Similarly, concepts such as Thomas's “definition of the situation,” Cooley's “sympathetic introspection,” Znaniecki's “humanistic coefficient,” MacIver's “dynamic assessment,” Sorokin's “logico-meaningful analysis,” and Mead's concepts of mind, self, and society, all are in the Diltheyian tradition.

From about 1930 to 1960, this more humanistic sociology was eclipsed in the United States by a resurgence of Comteian systems theory under the aegis of Talcott Parsons. Then, largely inspired by Alfred Schütz and other European emigres, there emerged in the 1960s a “new wave” of critical and interpretive social thought and, concomitantly, a revival of Dilthey as a source of philosophic foundations. This “new wave” has many factions and goes under various labels. It has been called phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology, and the sociology of the absurd, and the social construction of reality, existential sociology, and social constructionism most generally.

It thus seems clear that Dilthey exerts a continuing influence on humanist social thought. Perhaps because his works are so scattered and so little available in English, his importance has been inadequately recognized to date. With the further development of these disciplines, however, Dilthey's heirs will likely reinterpret their own intellectual history, and the founder of the “human studies” will at last be paid his due.

— Richard Harvey Brown

See also German Idealism; Hermeneutics; Historicism; Rhetorical Turn; Verstehen

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DISCOURSE

Discourse, a term associated with the linguistic turn in social theory, has come into use as a way of rethinking method and measurement in the social sciences. Discourse, however, should not be confused with ordinary language use in speech, writing, or conversation. Discourse properly refers to the practical use of language (broadly conceived) for the purposes of examining or otherwise criticizing the normal course of actions. Here, actions would include, of course, the action of writing or speaking, as well as political, economic, and social actions. The English language term, discourse, derives from a now obsolete Latin word,

discurs-us, which included among its meanings “running to-and-fro.” When used in social theory, discourse, thereby, might best be restricted to practices of language that run “to-and-fro” with the social actions under consideration; that is, a discursive practice goes forward-and-back over the subjects of social theoretical work.

The classic source of discourse theory is the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). Saussure’s distinction between speech (*la parole*) and the whole of language itself (*la langue*) was of particular importance to later theories of the social semiotics of meanings in all forms of human communication. The basic Saussurian principle is that speech is the practical work whereby the speaker adduces the semantic elements (words and meaningful sounds) from his or her general knowledge of a language (e.g., English) according to applicable grammatical rules. Thus, an utterance is produced by a largely unconscious process of selecting elements from a storehouse of a language’s rules and contents.

“I saw a cow.” The utterance communicates because the speaker uses the first-person pronoun, *I* (while not using some other pronoun, such as the third-person *he*). The communication process works when those addressed share enough of the socially arbitrary mastery of the English language (*la langue*) to be able to decode the utterance (*la parole*) by recognizing the difference between the meaning produced by the first-person singular, *I*, linked in the speech chain to a certain past-tense verb, *saw*, for which the predicate is an arbitrary but common name (or noun) for a reasonably well-known object, *cow*. The discursive feature of even so simple an utterance is in the practical ability of the speaker and the one addressed to know enough of the rules of speech to make and receive sense. Here, Saussure would seem to have been influenced by Émile Durkheim, in that the social or moral contract of the speech community is fundamental. In this, Saussure’s linguistics differs from Noam Chomsky’s, where the emphasis is on an innate, deep structural grammar. For Saussure, therefore, discursive competence is fungible in that the communication can work well enough even when the rules are misapplied, as when a child overgeneralizes the rule for regular past tenses, while using an irregular name for the predicate: “Daddy, I see-d a moo-moo.”

The discursive aspect of communication is itself important to critical social theory in that it is always possible for speakers to master the vocabularies and grammars to such a degree that they can talk about and refer to the rules themselves in order to reformulate the language for special (including politically radical) situations, as in a metaphoric denunciation: “The President of the Republic is a fat cow.” Such an utterance “to’s-and-fro’s” with ordinary language in potentially powerful or dangerous ways. The metaphoric cow might be relieved of his power. The metaphor maker (literally, “the poet”) might land in jail, or worse.

Discourse theory entered social theory initially through the early writings of the French anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss

(1958), whose structural method took culture as the virtual equivalent to a language (*la langue*), in which the structural elements could be detected in the systematic analysis of articulated cultural units or mythemes (the Oedipus myth, for example). The so-called poststructuralist revolt was, in many ways, an appreciative objection to the objectivist features of Lévi-Strauss’s method. Most notably, Jacques Derrida’s “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1966), generally regarded as the poststructuralist manifesto, was largely directed at Lévi-Strauss. The most thorough classic statement of a sociological theory of discourse was Michel Foucault’s *Archaeologie du savoir* (1969), in which Foucault, somewhat abstractly, developed a robust theory of discursive practices within discursive formations. Though Foucault was anything but a strict Saussurian, one can still see the traces of the *la parole/la langue* dichotomy in his practices/formation idea. By contrast, Jacques Lacan’s (1966) psychoanalytic theories of the mirror stage and of self-formation as a discourse with the unconscious Other is directly indebted to Saussure.

It might also be said that Erving Goffman’s own turn to discourse theory was, if not influenced by the French, clearly a parallel development in which social theory is relocated in relation to forms of talk (Goffman 1983). Subsequent developments in American conversational analysis and ethnomethodology, inspired to some degree by Goffman and Durkheim, were discourse theories of a parallel kind to the French. In the United Kingdom, Anthony Giddens (1984:41–92) was among the first to develop a robust theory of discourse as the critical dimension of social talk. In Germany, Jürgen Habermas’s (1970) early theories of linguistic competence, while more expressly Chomskian in appearance, also took up the competence/performance theme to be found in classic discourse theory. In France, Pierre Bourdieu’s famous distinction between the *field* (*champ*) and the *habitus*, with its emphasis on practices as a way of resolving sociology’s awkward relation to the objectivist/subjectivist dichotomy, contains a hint of the poststructuralist ideas of his contemporaries in Paris (Bourdieu 1972).

The social theory of discourse is misunderstood when taken as an argument that all of social thought must rely solely on language. It is well understood when it is taken as a contribution to the empirical study of the ways languages (of all kinds) and their performances are important indices of the social things they may (or may not) represent, that is, indices of that which can never be positively grounded. Discourse theory may thus be the foremost source of the crisis of representation in empirical social science.

— Charles Lemert

See also Bourdieu, Pierre; Butler, Judith; Derrida, Jacques; Foucault, Michel; Giddens, Anthony; Goffman, Erving; Habitus; Lacan, Jacques; Rhetorical Turn; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Semiology

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DISNEYIZATION

"Disneyization" refers to "the process by which the principles of the Disney theme parks are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world" (Bryman 1999:26). The term was devised as a parallel concept to George Ritzer's (1993) notion of "McDonaldization"; indeed, the foregoing definition is an adaptation of his definition of McDonaldization. The term does not refer to the spread of theme parks throughout the globe, though that is undoubtedly happening, but to the diffusion of the principles that the Disney theme parks exemplify. The Disney theme parks are merely emblematic of the large-scale principles to which the term refers.

In outlining the nature of Disneyization, Bryman identifies four components of the process:

1. *Theming*. This term refers to the application of a narrative that is largely external to the object to which it is applied but infuses that object with an exotic aura. Thus, the Disney theme parks are themed in that the different regions of the parks are portrayed in motifs such as foreign adventure, "the Wild West," and the movies.
2. *Dedifferentiation of consumption*. This feature is concerned with the hybridized nature of many areas of social and economic life that previously have been separate. In the Disney theme parks, this component is revealed in the way it is difficult to disentangle its nature as an amusement park from its apparent context of shopping and eating opportunities. As a

consequence, the domains of amusement park, shops, and restaurants become elided, and the distinctions between them blurred.

3. *Merchandising*. This refers to the promotion of goods that take the form of and bear copyright images and logos, an area in which the Disney Corporation has been preeminent. It is most obviously manifested in the Disney theme parks in the wide range of merchandise sold that features park logos and, indeed, Disney images more generally.
4. *Emotional labor*. Emotional labor is concerned with the way employees in service occupations frequently are constrained to exhibit emotions of a particular kind. In realms like the Disney theme parks, employees are enjoined to exhibit positive emotions to create a more uplifting experience for visitors. The presentation of an animated demeanor to visitors may often be at odds with how employees feel about their work and the visitors with whom they are interacting.

Disneyization is meant to be clearly distinguishable from the apparently similar term "Disneyfication." The latter is often employed to refer to cultural products such as fairy tales and the process by which they are transformed by the Disney Corporation into a clearly identifiable Disney product. Moreover, Disneyfication is frequently a negative term, referring to a bowdlerization and infantilization of the item to which it has been applied. Instead, Disneyization is meant to be neutral in tone and to be concerned with large-scale changes in society.

A distinction may usefully be drawn between *structural* and *transferred* Disneyization. The former has to do with a constellation of underlying changes that the Disney theme parks exemplify. Transferred Disneyization occurs when the principles associated with the Disney theme parks are relocated into another sphere, such as a shopping mall. Thus, two separate processes may be at work in the spread of Disneyization: One set of processes reflects the fact that there are several changes of which the Disney theme parks are emblematic; the second recognizes the success of the Disney theme parks and the likelihood that many of its ingredients can be copied and relocated.

Shopping malls and the large Las Vegas hotels are among the most significant sites of Disneyization referred to in Bryman's work. More recently, Alan Beardsworth and Alan Bryman (2001) have suggested that zoos have been undergoing a process of Disneyization. They are increasingly themed in terms of both rhetorics of conservation applied by zoos to themselves and areas within zoos that are frequently themed (e.g., rain forest, Africa, the Savannah). They exhibit dedifferentiation of consumption in that they increasingly incorporate nontraditional zoo

features, like amusement park attractions, while at the same time, non-zoos often incorporate the exhibition of animals. Merchandising is a growing feature of zoos, and there is evidence of greater use of emotional labor.

Matthew Robinson (2003) has suggested that the American criminal justice system can usefully be described in terms of undergoing a process of Disneyization. For example, he argues that American criminal justice is themed through the operations of the mass media that identify issues and problem areas that should be highlighted for political leaders and the American people. In an ironic twist, given the influence of Ritzer's notion of McDonaldization on the concept of Disneyization, Alan Bryman (2003) has argued that McDonald's restaurants are becoming Disneyized. He shows that they are increasingly themed reflexively and in terms of motifs, such as the family, are involved in merchandising and the dedifferentiation of consumption (most notably in the distribution of toys), and make use of emotional labor.

Whereas McDonaldization is rooted in traditional associations with modernity and rationalization, Disneyization relates much more closely to the consumerist ethic. Disneyization is part and parcel of a process of injecting the consumption process with new experiences for the consumer, in particular through the creation of entertaining encounters. As such, Disneyization serves as a mechanism for differentiating companies' products and services that might otherwise not be distinguishable from each other. In this way, it is closer to the post-Fordist economy, with its emphasis on differentiation and customization, than to Fordism, with which McDonaldization is more closely aligned.

— Alan Bryman

See also Consumer Culture; Enchantment/Disenchantment; Fordism and Post-Fordism; McDonaldization; Means of Consumption; Modernity

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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Perhaps one of the most debated concepts that arises in discussions of society and social interaction is that of distributive justice. Philosophers and researchers alike would agree that societies and interaction *should be* just. They may, however, disagree about what constitutes a just society or what forms of interaction are fair. Questions of distributive justice pertain to the creation and evaluation of the wide array of distributions of benefits and burdens to groups and to individuals. As such, they underlie fundamental issues regarding the evaluation of inequality at societal and interpersonal levels, which, in turn, influence the maintenance of social order or the fomenting of social change. Groups and individuals readily decry distributions that they perceive to be unfair, potentially upsetting the status quo and stimulating change.

Although distributive justice issues apply to multiple levels of analysis, three fundamental questions cross-cut these levels. The first, "What is justice?" addresses the problem of conceptualization. Abstract principles define what is just or fair, but they are often prescriptive or normative and thus may fail to capture what people believe to be just. Indeed, despite the existence of justice rules, evaluations of justice are typically subjective. The second key question, "Why do people differentially perceive injustice?" provides a basis for exploring factors shaping the subjective evaluation of injustice. And finally, the third question underlies the potential for maintaining social order or stimulating social change: "How do people respond to perceived injustice?"

Social psychologists, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and others employ a variety of theoretical ideas to address these questions. Guillermina Jasso's (2001) theoretical framework for justice analysis offers building blocks relevant to each of these questions. Justice theory and research apply to many diverse social domains, including interpersonal dynamics, organizational policies, criminal justice, and income inequality. Indeed, the application of distributive justice principles, implicitly or explicitly, to concerns about housing, the availability of health care services, trade-offs to protect the environment, affirmative action, and so on constitute issues of social justice.

DEFINING JUSTICE

The philosophical treatise of Aristotle, who admonished people to treat equals equally and to treat unequals unequally, provides the basis for much distributive justice analysis at the individual level. Aristotle's advice implies that justice is proportional and comparative. The first characteristic ensures that people's deserts (positive outcomes such as rewards, honors, prestige) should be in proportion

to what they contributed (e.g., effort, ability, expertise). The second characteristic requires that individuals or groups compare their outcomes (commensurate to contributions) with others'. What individuals conceive of as their contributions and deserts, as well as their choice of comparison, ultimately affects whether they evaluate a distribution as fair or unfair.

Social contractarian philosophers (e.g., Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes) move away from emphasis on deserts that may create a society in which justice stems primarily from self-interests. Instead, they stress that a just society must encourage rational people to find compromises to avoid the devastation wrought by the pursuit of divisive self-interests and thereby to maximize both their own and others' interests.

Twentieth-century philosophers John Rawls and Brian Barry reiterate the centuries-old concern that justice is more than the pursuit of self-interested deserts. Rawls theorizes that when individuals are unaware of what positions they are likely to occupy in society (i.e., they are behind a "veil of ignorance"), they tend to agree to a distribution of inequalities that benefits the most disadvantaged members of society and that ensures equality of opportunities and of rights to liberty. Like Rawls's veil of ignorance, Barry emphasizes the importance of impartiality in determining a just distribution. A consequence of the approaches of the social contractarians and current philosophers is that proportionality is not the only rule defining what is just.

Conceptions of distributive justice that underlie theory and research in the social sciences stem from the prescriptive notions offered by philosophers. Abstract qualities of justice involve an emphasis on the promotion of collective welfare (not simply individual welfare), impartial consideration by those affected, and consensus among those affected that a particular rule ensures or reflects the first two qualities.

Many distribution principles may constitute justice, but three stand out: equity, equality, and needs. Equity exists when outcomes are proportional to contributions, especially in comparison to another individual. An equal-distribution rule, in contrast, warrants that all recipients receive the same level of outcomes. And, a needs-based distribution principle suggests that outcomes are commensurate with needs. One of these three principles may be normative for a given situation and thus create expectations for what type of distribution will be just. When actual outcomes are congruent with those based on such normative expectations, justice exists.

In the social sciences, responses to the question, "What is just?" involve asserting a particular distribution rule to be just, then focusing on consequences of violating that rule or examining the conditions under which one principal or another is evaluated as just. Theory and research pertinent to this second response often focus on allocations of rewards in small groups and of income in society.

From Jasso's (2001) framework, the abstract building blocks for considering what is just involve the observer, who makes judgments about justice, and the rewardees, who are recipients of the distribution. The observer's beliefs about the just reward, when applied to the rewardees, creates an observer-specific, just-reward function, which represents a correspondence between the just reward and rewardees' characteristics. The set of resulting just rewards results in a just-reward distribution. The formalized just-reward function captures what others have conceptualized informally as allocation preferences or choices among distribution rules.

At the interpersonal level, Gerald Leventhal's (Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980) theory of allocation preferences systematizes many prior findings. Generally, empirical research demonstrates that individuals who are recipients of rewards often, but not always, opt for distribution principles that provide them with a larger share of the outcomes. For example, high performers in a group would prefer an equitable distribution, whereas low performers would prefer an equal distribution. Leventhal's expectancy-value model derives preferences based on people's expectancies about how well a particular distribution principle will fill goals of varying levels of importance or value. Although fairness may be a goal in an allocation situation, other goals (e.g., self-interest, obedience to authority, expedience) also exist.

Leventhal and other researchers identify conditions that highlight the importance of the pursuit of justice or the just reward, including role demands that emphasize fairness, the need to rectify a currently blatantly unfair distribution, attention to the welfare of other group members, the open discussion of distribution principles in the group, and concern with self-presentation or politeness. The latter three conditions reinforce the quality of justice that emphasizes concerns with collective welfare. In studies in which individuals are impartial nonrecipients of rewards or are charged with allocating in a manner that ensures fairness, a clear pattern of what constitutes fairness emerges. Under conditions of promoting productivity, people agree that equity is fair, whereas under conditions of promoting group solidarity or social welfare, consensus rests on equality and a needs-based distribution, respectively.

With regard to specification of what is just at the macrolevel of income distributions, no one theory emerges to predict what types of distributions are fair. Although still under development, Jasso's (2001) just-society theory may ultimately provide rigorous guidelines. Currently, there is evidence of a general belief that economic inequality is fair. Such a belief stems from assumptions about equality of economic opportunities and personal responsibility for one's fate. These assumptions reiterate the fairness of equitable distributions in productivity situations. Studies on the fairness of particular incomes, given a cluster of characteristics,

such as occupation, education level, marital status, sex, and family size, show that merit and, to some extent, needs are important fairness principles in assessing income inequalities. Moreover, such principles are especially relevant to judgments about what is fair for others, whereas what is fair for oneself is heavily affected by one's income level. Thus, despite general ideas about what is just, evaluations of actual distributions often differ.

PERCEIVING INJUSTICE

What people perceive as just or unjust constitutes a subjective evaluation. Even when work group members agree in principle that equity is fair, they may differentially evaluate their own or their coworkers' outcomes when the actual distribution is made. Such differential evaluations reflect what Jasso (1980) captures as the magnitude of injustice associated with discrepancies between reality and justice ideals. Moreover, the differing judgments themselves stem from a number of factors: diverse motivations, variation in perceptions of relevant inputs and/or outcomes, and distinctions among comparisons invoked. Although the distribution assessed may vary from rewards in a small group to income in society, most of the work on this second question rests in the realm of social psychology.

In her fully mathematized theory of distributive justice, Jasso (1980) highlights the justice evaluation (J). Represented by the formula $J = \theta \ln(\text{actual reward/just reward})$, where the actual reward pertains to outcomes received and the just reward is the amount considered fair, the J represents the observer's judgement that someone (including oneself) is justly or unjustly rewarded. The signature constant θ functions as a framing coefficient, which indicates whether the observer designates the reward as a good or as a bad, and as an expressiveness coefficient, which pertains to the observer's style of expression, transforming the experience of the justice evaluation into the expressed evaluation. The formula detects degrees of underreward or overreward, and the logarithmic function indicates that underreward injustice is felt more intensely than overreward. Although the justice evaluation is observer- and rewardee specific, they may be arrayed across observers to create a matrix or combined into an index to capture the overall injustice in a group or society. This formula has been used in a variety of studies, often as a predictor of reactions to perceived injustice.

Other work examines justice evaluations by focusing on individual factors or situational conditions that create variation in evaluations of justice. In effect, such efforts facilitate understanding elements of what may constitute ideas about the just share or about the signature constant. Although paradoxical, there tends to be an egocentric bias in what individuals judge as just: People tend to judge a larger amount to themselves as fair than they judge as fair

to others. Also, there is evidence that group members tend to emphasize inputs on which they or their group rate highly, thus entitling them to higher outcomes in an equitable distribution. Thus, self-interested motivations may shape evaluations of justice.

In addition, how people process information in the situation may affect their views of whether a distribution is fair or unfair. Some researchers have linked attribution analysis, the assessment of perceived causes, to understanding perceptions of inputs and, consequently, evaluations of reward distributions. Workers who perceive inputs to be internally caused and thus under the control of individual actors (e.g., work ability, work effort) are likely to use them as the basis for judging an equitable distribution as fair. Inputs occurring by chance are external to actors and are an insufficient basis for claiming equitable rewards. Other researchers examine how agency-oriented individuals, who emphasize achievement and success, differentially perceive compared with community-oriented individuals what is important in ensuring a just distribution. These orientations have been linked to gender differences as a means to explain variation between males and females in their assessments of reward distributions.

Justice judgments also stem from several types of comparisons: internal comparisons to oneself across time; local comparisons of outcomes, or the ratio of outcomes to inputs to one other actor; referential comparisons to abstract others with the same social characteristics to determine "what people like us normally get"; and group level comparisons that assess how well one's group fared compared with another group. The first three types of comparisons allow assessment of an individual's own situation, whereas the last draws attention beyond the individual's situation (and constitutes what relative deprivation theorists refer to as a "fraternal comparison").

Few studies focus on choice among comparison types. Thus, whether individuals specifically select a comparison that produces an evaluation of injustice that may serve their self-interests or whether perceptual biases in the processing of information slants comparison choice remains unknown. There is, however, some evidence that group comparisons are more likely with increasing group identification. Although studies typically circumscribe the nature of the comparison that individuals may make, theorists predict that the magnitude of injustice will be greater if all comparisons demonstrate that an individual is unfairly rewarded.

When observers assess an outcome distribution, to the extent that they vary in their motivations, their perceptions of the context, and the comparisons that they invoke, they are likely to have different ideas about what constitutes a just share. As a consequence, the comparisons between the actual amount and the just amount is likely to produce differential evaluations of whether the distribution is just. Subjective evaluations of injustice inspire reactions.

REACTIONS TO INJUSTICE

Reactions to injustice are emotional, psychological, and/or behavioral. They may involve only one actor addressing what he or she perceives to be unfair, or they may take the form of collective action to right injustices affecting a larger number of individuals or groups.

Using the justice version of her comparison theory, Jasso couples the justice evaluation function with other postulates to make predictions, at both the individual and the societal level, about reactions to perceived injustice. The model uses calculus to deduce predictions about individual level justice evaluations and probability distributions to create predictions about the distribution of justice evaluations at the macrolevel.

Previous, less mathematical theorizing focused largely on reactions to perceived inequity. Work by J. Stacy Adams, by George Homans, and by Elaine Walster and her colleagues (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978) suggests how individuals would respond if they perceived that their outcomes-to-inputs ratio were less than or greater than a comparison-other. Although all of the theorists propose that individuals are likely to feel some distress if treated inequitably, Homans details emotional reactions. He argues that individuals who perceive themselves to be underrewarded are likely to feel angry, whereas those who perceive themselves to be overrewarded are likely to feel guilty. Empirical studies confirm his prediction regarding anger, but findings regarding guilt are more inconsistent, perhaps because overrewarded actors easily rationalize their greater rewards.

Adams and Walster and her colleagues address individual psychological and behavioral reactions to inequity. Both assume that individuals are likely to choose the least costly method of justice restoration. Although behavioral responses (such as changing inputs or altering outcomes) may have the greatest impact, sometimes individuals may be more likely to opt for psychological means to restore injustice, such as altering their perceptions about their own or their partners' inputs or outcomes or changing their comparison-other. Most studies on reactions to inequity constrain the measurement of responses to behavioral ones. A number of studies bear out predictions that overrewarded individuals will increase their inputs or alter outcomes for others, while underrewarded actors are certainly likely to increase their own outcomes if the opportunity arises. Little research, however, addresses psychological reactions or compares the conditions under which behavioral or psychological responses are more likely.

The exploration of underlying cognitive processes provides a basis for examining why people do not always respond behaviorally to perceived injustice. Borrowing from attribution theory, some theorists argue that perceiving another person as responsible for an inequity increases feelings of distress and helps to direct the most effective

means of response. In contrast, making an external attribution of the injustice decreases the impetus to respond. Some evidence indicates that attributions do mediate responses to inequity under certain conditions.

The perception that others are also unjustly treated is a precursor to collective responses. Such a perception may stem from referential and/or fraternal or group level comparisons. Although collective responses to concrete issues of injustice (e.g., ethnic strife, worker strikes) depend upon power processes, resource mobilization, and organizational tactics, and so on, experimental coalition studies attest to the role of a collective sense of injustice. Often, the collective responses to injustice are examined as parts of larger social movements (e.g., civil rights, environmentalism).

DEVELOPING TRENDS

Although various theoretical perspectives and much empirical literature have addressed the key questions about distributive justice, the endeavors have been somewhat disjointed. Jasso's (2001) theoretical framework of justice analysis holds the promise of integration. Other existing efforts fill gaps in traditional theorizing and integrate other, mostly social psychological, concepts.

Traditionally, at the abstract level, justice processes include recognizing objective circumstances defined by a given distribution, the subjective evaluation of that distribution as fair or unfair, and emotional responses followed by psychological or behavioral reactions to the injustice. To date, studies have hardly addressed the mediating roles of subjective evaluations and emotional responses or assessed the entire model at once. And processes underlying the subjective evaluations as well as those involved in the choice among reactions remain to be more thoroughly investigated.

Links to other areas are a means to create a clearer understanding of what is just and to identify conditions creating diverse evaluations of injustice or types of reactions. Recent developments focusing on the role of collective sources of legitimacy as well as the resolution of conflict over justice claims is a way to ensure that the meaning of justice extends beyond individual interests alone. Research on the group value model of procedural justice (i.e., the fairness of procedures involved in decision making and treatment of people) reinforces the importance of the group and social relationships in understanding justice processes. This model also underlies efforts to link justice processes to issues of individual and group identity. Insofar as "justice judgments . . . are the 'grease' that allows groups to interact productively without conflict and social disintegration" (Tyler et al. 1997:6), theoretical and empirical work on distributive justice will continue to be integral to a variety of social issues.

— Karen A. Hegtvedt

See also Cook, Karen; Homans, George; Procedural Justice

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DRAMATURGY

A *dramaturgical* approach, both in sociology and elsewhere, treats everyday behavior as a theatrical performance. Although a little too familiar, it is still worth recalling the soliloquy in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*, in which we are instructed:

All the world's a stage
 And all the men and women merely players;
 They have their exits and their entrances;
 And one man in his time plays many parts.

In fact, Shakespeare appears to have been so taken with the comparison between theater and life that he had a Latinized version of the first line inscribed above the entrance of The Globe Theatre (Evreinoff, in Brisett and Edgley 1990). Evreinoff also informs us that Erasmus of Rotterdam predated Shakespeare, having made much the same point about the beginning of the sixteenth century, when he asked rhetorically whether our lives are any more than performances in which we wear different masks. And no doubt others predate him. Among more recent playwrights, perhaps Luigi Pirandello deserves special mention for having pushed the comparisons between on- and off-stage performances about as far as they can coherently go in his *Six Characters in Search of an Author*:

In the social sciences, *dramaturgy* is strongly associated with the work of Erving Goffman, who developed the term in part as a general extension of symbolic interactionism and in part as a development of the dramatism approach pioneered by Kenneth Burke, in the 1940s. For Goffman, the application of a theatrical vocabulary to the social world was one way of exploring the symbolic interactionist framework associated with the ideas of George Herbert Mead, Herbert Blumer, and Everett Hughes, which he had encountered as a student at the University of Chicago, in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, it is also apparent that Goffman's dramaturgy owes much to Burke's dramatist perspective, as he himself acknowledged.

Burke (1969) argued that there are five key dramatist terms: *the act*, *scene*, *agent*, *agency* (i.e., the instruments used by the agent), and *purpose*. He proposed that they could be combined to form a "grammar of motives." The five terms can be combined in different ways, with different emphases and in the context of different empirical settings, thus producing myriad transformative possibilities. By using his five key dramatist terms, Burke hoped that his simple model could be used to understand a wide variety of social situations. Burke was certainly ambitious, believing (unlike Goffman) that the use of theatrical concepts might enable us to grasp the motives people had for their actions.

ERVING GOFFMAN'S DRAMATURGICAL ANALYSIS

Goffman outlined the principles of dramaturgy in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959). Insofar as the language of the theater is understood metaphorically, Goffman's analysis is based on four assumptions: that there is a transfer of meaning from one term to another, that the analysis is literally absurd, that it is nevertheless meant to be understood, and that it is self-consciously "as if" (Brown 1977:80–85). As long as these four assumptions are preserved, *The Presentation of Self* is not in danger of confusing a person with an actor or everyday life with the theater. However, precisely because Goffman is so persuasive, there is a tendency to take the analogy to be more revealing than it actually is.

In *The Presentation of Self*, Goffman developed themes that he had initially explored in his doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, *Communication Conduct in an Island Community* (1953). *The Presentation of Self* outlines six dramaturgical principles that can be used to redescribe everyday events as theatrical performances. They are the performance, the team, the region, discrepant roles, communication out of character, and impression management.

Goffman suggested that people, that is, "performers" and their various "audiences," frequently believe that what is being staged is the "real reality." This is easier to achieve if the performers' performances are "sincere" rather than

“cynical,” that is, if the performers believe in the parts they play. Each person, Goffman reminds us, is etymologically a mask, and therefore a certain amount of theatricality is inevitable. Performances are bolstered by “fronts.” There are three kinds: “settings,” such as props; the “expressive equipment” of each performer, his or her clothing, age, speech patterns, and so on; and “manner,” the performer’s style. These three components of a front are usually encountered together as part of a person’s “routine.” They allow the “dramatic realization” of the performance, which is also an “idealization” of it, as it puts the performance in the best possible light.

Goffman also suggested that “mystification” surrounds many performances. This describes the practices whereby audiences are kept at a distance in order to preserve the elements of each performance that might collapse under close scrutiny. For example, Goffman mentioned the advice given to the King of Norway; namely, that he should avoid familiarity with the “people” for fear that they find him a disappointment. For many performers, it seems, the only mystery is that there is no mystery, and thus their main dramaturgical problem is to prevent the audience from discovering this.

Performers rarely take to the stage alone, performing instead in a troupe that Goffman referred to as a “team.” Each team has the character of a secret society, both because the performers’ fates are tied together in their joint performances and because each performer is privy to discrediting information about the other performances by other team members. Each team is organized by a director, who both allocates roles and serves as an informal party whip, disciplining unruly or dissatisfied team members.

Performances take place on- and offstage. Goffman (1959) distinguished between the front region, in which performers are fully aware that audiences are watching them, and back regions, in which front-stage performances are “knowingly contradicted” (p. 114) as a matter of course. A “guarded passageway” protects the back region by restricting physical and visual access from the front stage. Nevertheless, various people with “discrepant roles” find a way of gaining access to the team secrets hidden away back there. These people include informers, shills, spotters (who check up on performances to protect audiences), shoppers (members of other teams), service specialists (such as hairdressers), confidants, and colleagues (pp. 145–59). Goffman distinguished five kinds of secrets that backstage intruders try to discover: “dark secrets” that are incompatible with a team’s image, “strategic secrets” about a team’s plans, “inside secrets” about team membership, “entrusted secrets” that demonstrate trustworthiness within the team, and “free secrets” that do not discredit the team and hence are not protected.

The general concern of the actor in Goffman’s dramaturgical world is “impression management.” This is an

umbrella term to cover all the ways by which people attempt to control what audiences know about them. It is jeopardized either by impressions that performers unwittingly “give off” or by “communication out of character.” In addition to protecting individual and team performances, impression management also protects the general sense everyone has about what is taking place. To this extent, audiences and performers often work together to sustain a desired drama of social life, even after it becomes apparent that everything is a sham. For example, parents of ambitious but untalented musicians learn to listen sympathetically as each child gives ear-splitting public performances, and each child continues despite knowing that no impression management can cover up the missed notes and muddled score.

In *The Presentation of Self*, Goffman (1959) was careful to point out the limitations of the dramaturgical metaphor. Revising Shakespeare, he warned that “all the world is not, of course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it isn’t are not easy to specify” (p. 78). And toward the end of the book, he cautioned that dramaturgy is merely a “rhetoric and a maneuver” and the resulting analyses should only be pursued with an “eye to taking them down” (p. 246). Dramaturgical analysis aims simply to uncover the various manipulations by which people alter their audiences’ perceptions of them. Goffman offered no view about the morality of these manipulations, although he certainly implied that a wise member of the audience is able to “see through” the presentations of self by others and, to this extent, cannot be “taken in.” Understood in this way, although without the specific concern for the preservation of political power, Goffman is a latter-day Machiavelli.

Much later in his career, Goffman returned to the questions of the limits of the dramaturgical metaphor. In the preface to *Frame Analysis* (1974), he reminds us again that all the world is not a stage: We need real parking lots, cloakrooms, insurance, and so on. He then tried to specify the ways in which the theatrical and everyday worlds are quite different. He began by rethinking the definition of the performance. He suggested that we should define the performer negatively, as the person who is granted special and exclusive permission by the audience to present a drama. This permission reveals the “frame” that defines the nature of the performance. Thus, to use one of Goffman’s examples, when John Gielgud played the role of Prince Hamlet, this involved make-believe, whereas John Smith playing the role of father does not. Furthermore, Gielgud’s personal identity remains separate from the characters he played, unlike Smith’s. To keep these distinctions clear, Goffman reserved the term “role” for specialized stage and nonstage functions, “person” for the possible subject of a biography, and “character” for the stage version of that biography. Thus, although Gielgud plays both the stage role of Hamlet and the nonstage role as actor, his biography is

based only on the latter. Nevertheless, it is true to say that Gielgud's fictional portrayals of characters from Shakespeare do constitute a part of his own biography.

Goffman also explored the conceptual limits of the dramaturgical notion of a role. In the chapter on "Normal Appearances," in *Relations in Public* (1971), he examined the implications of the fact that "self-enactment" cannot be part of the role of "acting natural" (pp. 268–77). Self-enactment occurs whenever people consciously try to play the part of themselves. The resulting performances are quite different from the well-rehearsed routines that are performed more or less effortlessly on other occasions. When self-enacting, people's performances soon appear, even to themselves, as something alien, false, and mere "show" (p. 270). Thus, people experience dramaturgical discomfort whenever they continue to play roles that are no longer appropriate. Changing circumstances requires new roles, otherwise people become aware of both the possible immorality of their performances and of the technical skills required to perform them. Self-enactment produces the anxiety-producing sense of being "on" and is different from the low-key casualness that is evident in much interaction (see Messinger et al. in Brissett and Edgley 1990). For example, teenagers may have little sense of self-enactment when talking with their friends but find themselves tongue-tied when on dates.

In a development that threatened to overextend the dramaturgical metaphor, Goffman (1961) suggested that "role distance" is integral to role analysis. Role distance involves "disdainful attachment" (p. 98): It occurs whenever people separate themselves from the roles that they are presently performing. Thus, whatever sense of style we associate with a person is apparent though role distance, since everything else "belongs" to the role and not the person. To simplify one of Goffman's extended examples, much of what surgeons do during surgery is required of them by the professional role they play. However, what nurses, patients, and others think about individual surgeons is determined by the sense they have of each surgeon as a "character" who is more than the role of surgeon. This requires each surgeon to exude a personal style that Goffman claimed was nevertheless part and parcel of the professional role, since without it the person-as-surgeon appears wooden and lifeless, and hence fails to perform the role in a satisfactory way.

Hochschild (1979) has pointed out that in analyzing roles, Goffman's comparison of on- and offstage acting assumes that there is only one model of acting in the theater, whereas in fact there are two competing schools. The "English School" focuses on outward demeanor and hence is compatible with Goffman's concern with everyday impression management. However, the "American or Stanislavsky School" favors "deep acting," in which actors perform on the basis of personal memories that connect them to the parts they are performing. Hochschild's

distinction points the way toward a more elaborate dramaturgical account of acting, in which the performance is not just a snapshot of impression management but also a rich narrative of the person that extends back and projects forward in time. Hochschild uses this distinction to show that the sociological study of emotions is compatible with dramaturgical analysis.

Throughout his work, Goffman considered dramaturgical action as a form of strategic interaction. Dramaturgy should therefore be understood as goal-directed, instrumental action. It is a general term for one of the ways by which, alone or in concert with others, people seek to bring about certain ends. This suggests that the metaphor of the theater is subservient to the metaphor of the game, since dramaturgical manipulation is understood by Goffman as one of the things people do get what they want. It is a "move" in the game of everyday social interaction. This is an argument that Goffman first aired in his dissertation and then explored at length in two books: *Encounters* (1961) and *Strategic Interaction* (1972). The latter book's title is, in fact, Goffman's suggestion for the successor to Blumer's term "symbolic interaction." It weds Goffman's own work to the version of game theory associated with Thomas Schelling and others.

Since dramaturgy is a form of strategic interaction, ritualistic, normative behavior is nonstrategic, because it is pursued without extrinsic goals. Instead, normative behavior is a goal in its own right. This suggests that Goffman's overall sociology may be profitably understood as consisting of two broad elements: the strategic and the normative (or the "ritualistic"). Whereas the former is goal directed, the latter is not. In strategic interaction, the person's aim is to achieve the advantage provided by a certain result. By contrast, a person who acts normatively understands adherence to the norm as an end in itself rather than as a way of advancing a cause.

DRAMATURGICAL ANALYSIS AFTER GOFFMAN

Dramaturgical analysis can either be extended empirically by using dramaturgical ideas in new settings or conceptually by extending new terms. Sociologists have made extensive use of dramaturgical ideas in a wide variety of studies concerning organizational, cultural, and political life (see Brissett and Edgley 1990 for a representative selection). Psychologists have been more interested in testing dramaturgical terms in experimental settings to establish their validity (see Leary and Kowalski 1990 for an overview). As mentioned earlier, Hochschild (1979) has attempted to advance the conceptual framework of dramaturgical analysis by connecting it to an emerging sociology of emotions. Harré (1979) has made extensive use of dramaturgy (and Goffman's work in general) in his ambitious reworking of the field of social psychology.

CRITICISMS OF DRAMATURGICAL ANALYSIS

There are four broad criticisms raised against dramaturgical analysis. The first is that the concepts are assembled in a disorganized way, with the result that no formal theory emerges. This is particularly frustrating for social scientists wishing to quantify and test hypotheses. As with much qualitative sociology, dramaturgy is suggestive but difficult to test. Since all metaphorical analysis is “literally absurd,” it is reasonable to expect (as Goffman did) that the analysis will at some point break down, ideally in revealing ways. The second criticism is that dramaturgical findings are obvious and therefore trivial or that they are not obvious but trivial anyway. This puts dramaturgical analysts in a difficult position: If their findings ring true, they are dismissed as obvious, but if they ring false, they are simply wrong. A third criticism is that dramaturgical analysis uses an impoverished model of the self, seeing each of us as primarily shallow and manipulative. The source of dissatisfaction here is with the dramaturgical focus on the presentations of self rather than on the self who is doing the presenting. Critics (Glover 1988) have suggested that dramaturgical analysis needs to develop this “missing” theory of the self if it is to be a compelling contribution to sociological theory. A fourth criticism is that dramaturgy offers merely a photograph of social life when what is required is a full-length feature film. This suggests a merger of sociological and historical approaches, as it argues for the expansion of dramaturgical analysis beyond the narrow confines of social situations established by Goffman. However, it would be wrong to overstate these criticisms. Since the concept of dramaturgy continues both to be useful in empirical research and the subject of lively conceptual debate, the future of dramaturgical analysis seems assured.

— Philip Manning

See also Game Theory; Goffman, Erving; Impression Management; Mead, George Herbert; Symbolic Interaction

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DU BOIS, WILLIAM EDWARD BURGHARDT (W.E.B.)

William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) Du Bois (1868–1963), historian, sociologist, race man, social theorist, poet, journalist, political, and civil rights leader, was the first social theorist of the earliest generation of American academic sociologists to have deservedly earned a global reputation. Though generally ignored by American sociologists, Du Bois was highly regarded in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and Africa well before the value of his ideas and life’s work were seriously considered by the white mainstream in his native land. His voluminous writings made enduring contributions to urban ethnography, race theory, the social history of slavery and Reconstruction, and the literary revolution in the 1920s known as the Harlem Renaissance.

W. E. B. Du Bois (pronounced “du-boyz”) was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, in 1868, in the early years of the post–Civil War era of Reconstruction of the South. Though he grew up in near poverty, as a child, Du Bois was little exposed to the terrors of white racism that contributed to the nation’s civil war. He was accepted in the local Massachusetts schools, where prejudice against the Irish ran deeper than it did against blacks. Du Bois excelled as a pupil. He began his career as a published writer when, still in high school, he served as a correspondent for New York City’s *Globe*, a prominent black newspaper. His intellectual promise led him in 1885 to Fisk University, in Nashville, Tennessee, where he took an undergraduate degree in 1888, then to Harvard University, where he took a second BA degree in 1891. These early experiences fixed the two contesting themes of Du Bois’s intellectual work. At Fisk, a traditionally Negro college, he experienced the pain and pleasure of the African American life in the South. Most notably, he was permanently affected by summer work among the rural poor of Tennessee. At Harvard, the most European of American cultural institutions, he learned the high values of Western culture, which were applied to his postgraduate scholarly training in economic history at

Harvard and in Germany (1892–1894). Thereafter, he finished doctoral studies at Harvard in 1895. His thesis, *The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1638–1870*, became the first of his published scholarly books (Du Bois 1896).

Du Bois's first teaching position was at Wilberforce University (1894–1896), then a small and religiously enthusiastic college in rural Ohio, though he couldn't stand the place. Still, this was when he married Nina Gomer, his wife of 53 years. In 1896, he accepted the offer of a research position at the University of Pennsylvania. Though the University paid him scant attention, the post allowed him to conduct fieldwork in Philadelphia's predominantly Negro Seventh Ward. This work led to *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899), which may justifiably be considered the classic work of urban ethnography in America. His first two books solidified his reputation as a scholar. But there was more soon to come.

Du Bois's international recognition as a new and insistent voice in American racial politics owed to a small collection of large essays that appeared in 1903 as *Souls of Black Folk*. Notwithstanding the prevailing racism of the day, *Souls* was widely acclaimed by writers as different as Max Weber in Germany and Henry James, the American expatriate living in England. The lead essay in *Souls*, "Of Our Spiritual Strivings," contains Du Bois's elegant description of the double-consciousness (or, "twoness") concept that now pervades social and race theories as well as sociological social psychology: "One ever feels his twoness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder" (Du Bois 1903:3). The words are as much poetry as social theory. The concept itself may well have been derived as much from literature as from social science. Yet among the influences on Du Bois's double-consciousness idea was, surely, his teacher at Harvard, William James, the acknowledged founder of self-theory in the social sciences. Du Bois put his theory of the Negro self to an important sociological purpose, one that conveyed the unique social place of the Negro in American life as an heir equally to African and European diasporas. This is where the two contesting themes of Du Bois's life and thought came into their creative tension. At Fisk, he learned the woes of the Negro in the South, and at Harvard, the hopes of European civilization. This, of course, is why the title's key word, *Souls*, is plural; hence, also, the book's striking literary qualities. Each essay is prefaced with several lines of poetry from European high culture, juxtaposed, without gloss, to a bar of unmarked music from the sorrow songs of Negro slavery. These, in turn, foretell the powerful effect of *Souls of Black Folk*, in which Du Bois tells the story of the suffering of the American Negro under slavery and after, while writing with the literary grace of the Victorian gentleman he was. In

many ways, these competing cultural commitments apply as much to his way of living as to his literary style and social theory. Few of Du Bois's qualities of genius have been more controversial or as poorly understood.

Du Bois is frequently criticized for his emphasis on the liberating value of higher education entailed in the double-consciousness concept in *Souls*. His own term of reference for the cultural politics to which he held in that period is the "Talented Tenth" strategy. He was convinced that higher education in the best schools, according to the prevailing cultural values inherited from Europe, was the essential means unto the racial uplift of the Negro race in the United States and worldwide. In the early years of the twentieth century, when Du Bois was most attached to the Talented Tenth strategy, African Americans were but two generations removed from the legal end to slavery in 1863 and the failure of Reconstruction in 1877. When the American Civil War ended in 1865, almost 4 million freed men and women were cut loose from the plantation system, with no education to speak of and few economic prospects. The feudal agrarian economy of the South was in ruins. What industrial jobs there were in the North were given over to white immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. The insidious Jim Crow system of legalized race segregation had been codified by the 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision of the United States Supreme Court. The question of racial uplift was a matter of urgency. Du Bois's solution was to encourage the higher education of the most talented (tenth) of African Americans in order to provide the race as a whole with the professional and intellectual leadership the masses required.

In his day, Du Bois's emphasis on cultural training ran against the grain of Booker T. Washington, the principal and founder of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. Unlike Du Bois, Washington was born to slavery. Like Du Bois, he was educated and refined in manner. But Washington's Tuskegee philosophy was to focus racial uplift exclusively on agricultural and industrial education. The idea was that with so many so poor, the Negro in America had to concentrate on the basic skills necessary for economic survival and competition, which meant, necessarily, preparing for work in a white-dominated economy. It was, of course, a view that seemed the more reasonable in the post-Reconstruction South, while Du Bois's was the more reasonable to a freedman bred and educated in Massachusetts. However reasonable Washington's view may have been for the time and place, he played his hand heavily. For the better part of two decades, from 1895, when he declared his "Atlanta Compromise" (in which blacks would work with whites for economic good but keep themselves socially separate), until the years just before his death in 1915, Booker T. Washington was *the* black Man in America. Through him, all political appointments to federal and many local offices were cleared. If a president were to

invite a black man to dinner in the White House, as Theodore Roosevelt did in 1901, it was necessarily Washington who was invited. His stature as the (in the expression of the culture) H.N.I.C. of black America was exceptional. Du Bois's Talented Tenth doctrine was a direct challenge to Washington's authority and social position. The third chapter of *Souls*, "Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others," was the opening shot in a rivalry that was ultimately resolved as much by the rise of industrial America as by Washington's death. Du Bois's key role in the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1910 was chief among the enduring institutions that grew out of the conflict with Washington. Still, Washington was far from the last to criticize Du Bois for adopting a culturalist approach to racial politics.

One of the ironies of Du Bois's life is that he died in Accra, Ghana, in exile from the America he sought to redeem in his youth. Word of his death came just before the civil rights march on Washington in August 1963, where Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his "I Have a Dream" speech. The civil rights movement of the 1960s brought Du Bois's ideas back into currency in the United States he had abandoned in disgust, yet it also led to a more aggressive black radicalism beside which the Martin Luther King of "I Have a Dream," and even the Du Bois of *Souls* and certainly Booker T. Washington, would pale. The offshoot of the Black Power movement was a long period of rejection of mere culturalist approaches to racial uplift in favor of the struggle for economic justice. The ideas of Kwame Ture (Stokely Carmichael) and the Black Panthers, not to mention Malcolm X and the varieties of black nationalist movements, were, after 1965, of quite a different order from the earlier cultural doctrines, with respect to which Du Bois's Talented Tenth strategy had been too readily assimilated to the integrationist philosophy of the early civil rights movement. As a result, Du Bois's early thinking was painted as politically naive, thus casting a cloud of misinterpretation over Du Bois's *Souls of Black Folk*.

Du Bois never was a mere culturalist. The double-consciousness concept in *Souls* makes no sense at all without its concluding words of lament: "two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder" (Du Bois 1903:3). The two souls are held together in the dark body, which was subjected to the crushing effects of abuse at hard work for unlivable wages. The two-souls concept was, thus, an idea rooted in the needs of the times and not an essentializing commitment to culture over economic materialism. In fact, Du Bois's essays in that book, especially those in the earlier chapters, would have made no sense in his day without the accompanying economic and social histories of Reconstruction, of Jim Crow segregation, and of Booker T. Washington's political compromise with white power. Though, over the

years, Du Bois would grow ever more sure in the materialism of his social theory, his early training in Germany and at Harvard in economic history planted the seeds of a late-blooming turn to a kind of Marxism that was, in its way, every bit as unorthodox a materialism as his cultural politics were anything but mere idealism.

Du Bois's most important contribution to social theory, apart from the ideas themselves, is that more than any of his time, and most since, his sociology was edited in the cutting room of lived history. No other sociologist of his day, or since, was more compelling an actor in world history over so long a run. Just as *Souls*, when read as a text out of context, might appear to be both culturalist and elitist, so too might his later writings appear out of context as vulgar materialism. As a social theorist, W. E. B. Du Bois is easily misunderstood and difficult to classify because he fought so doggedly in relation to the political and economic needs of the world's black people. The most important of his political activities was his 25 years as editor of *Crisis* magazine, which Du Bois founded shortly after he and others organized the NAACP in 1910. *Crisis* quickly became not only the official house publication of African America's most important secular institution but also the one publication every black American either read or heard tell of, thereby making Du Bois their spokesman. Almost immediately, Du Bois's influence waxed, as Booker T. Washington's began to wane.

It was Du Bois, not Washington, who led the opposition to Marcus Garvey's somewhat zany, but very popular, Universal Negro Improvement Association (1914–1923) and Du Bois who successfully urged black men to fight in World War I. Others, including Washington, would have been able to take the lead against Garvey's return-to-Africa movement or in mobilizing the troops, but few (perhaps none at the time) could have performed the role Du Bois played after the war in the Harlem Renaissance. By the 1920s, his own literary reputation was well established. This allowed him to use the pages of *Crisis* to encourage new writers such as Langston Hughes, Jessie Fauset, and Nella Larsen, among many others, who became stars of the New Negro movement. As many have pointed out, Harlem in the 1920s became the "Black Capitol" of the world. At the least, it had become the center of black cultural capital in the United States. Harlem's cultural flourishing thus represented the decisive shift of African Americans' center of cultural gravity from the rural South to the urban North. No one was better prepared than Du Bois to appreciate both experiences. Typically, he did not hesitate to deploy his personal knowledge and literary gifts in the service of his life's work as a race man, as one whose life was devoted to the advancement of Negro America (a devotion symbolized by his successful struggle to introduce the capital "N" in the word Negro, in order to transpose the word from a common slur into a dignified name).

Still, his aloof manner as well as his superior intellectual background often put Du Bois at odds with blacks as well as whites in the NAACP. After 25 years, this led to his resignation as editor of *Crisis* and his return in 1934 to the academic life, as chair of the Department of Sociology at Atlanta University (an institution he had left in 1910 for political and literary work in New York). He thus began a second academic career at the age of 66 years. At an age when most men retire, Du Bois began work on his greatest scholarly book, *Black Reconstruction* (1935), a book that could well have been considered, had it not been ignored for so long, the *locus classicus* of social history in American sociology.

In *Black Reconstruction*, Du Bois took on three challenges at once. First, he defied the then-dominant Columbia University tradition of Southern history, which colluded (not quite unwittingly) with the gross racist interpretation of Reconstruction's failure as being the result of the greed and ignorance of the freed men and women it was intended to serve. Du Bois countered with the evidence and the argument that Reconstruction's collapse in 1877 was brought about by complex political and economic forces that overwhelmed both the black and the white working classes in the South, thus restoring the planter class to power, if not quite to its antebellum excesses.

Second, the form of Du Bois's argument in *Black Reconstruction* was rigorously structural, thus anticipating by some four decades the emergence of a structural theory in American social thought. The key to that argument was the way he used history to explain what thereafter became the obvious. Though the Civil War freed some 4 million blacks, they were freed with few cultural or economic resources of their own. Any class of people so weak could hardly be blamed for the collapse in 1877 of the federal government's Reconstruction programs in the post-Civil War South. On the contrary, Du Bois argued that the freed people of the American South made many economic, cultural, and educational contributions to the region and the nation in barely more than a decade's time. The failure was due to economic forces superior to the power of any one class of people to resist. The cause, if there was a first cause, was the Long Depression that began in 1873 and cast a shadow over global markets until late in the century. Lack of investor confidence led to a run on the banks that led, in turn, to a severe economic and industrial downturn. Jobs were lost, productivity declined, and savings disappeared—a crisis that, of course, hit the poor, white, and black of the South with particular brutality.

Du Bois's sociological explanation of the collapse of Reconstruction was brilliantly subtle. He saw that the poor whites were just as devastated by the economic consequences of war and depression as were the impoverished blacks. In fact, he showed that it was precisely this shared economic misery that led in the first place to the nomination

and election of Andrew Johnson to the vice presidency of the United States. Johnson, a self-made man from Tennessee, having descended from poor white circumstances, came to political power on the heels of *white* hostility to the reigning class of white planters. Hence Johnson's political value to Abraham Lincoln's campaign for reelection in 1864. When Lincoln was assassinated in April 1865, Johnson assumed the presidency, a political station he was ill equipped to manage. His vulnerability caused Johnson to give in to the pressures of the ascendant class of white aristocrats in the South, the very hatred of which had led to his success in the first place. Johnson's impeachment in 1867 was brought on by U.S. Congress. Thus, well before the economic crisis in 1873, Reconstruction was already subject to political attacks. The end came in 1877, a decade after Johnson's impeachment order, when the inconclusive presidential election of 1876 was resolved early in 1877 by the notorious compromise that gave the presidency to Rutherford B. Hayes, a Republican (then the liberal party in the U.S.), at the price of abandonment of federal Reconstruction programs in the South. The poor blacks were thus abandoned, and the white aristocracy restored to power. The gains for blacks in the South were, as a consequence, overwhelmed by the rapid emergence of local Jim Crow laws enforcing political, social, and economic segregation.

This, then, was the story Du Bois told of Reconstruction and its failure, with his usual literary and theoretical sophistication. On the surface, it may (even today) appear to be straightforward historical narrative. But Du Bois knew that there is nothing straightforward about historical narrative. The facts always demand a narrative frame, and this is the work of social theory. Though the term "social theory" was not used then as it is now, it is exactly what Du Bois did in *Black Reconstruction*. He provided a nuanced economic and political framework that shed explanatory light on a tragedy of American history that had previously been left to the pseudoscientific whims of racial bias. By extension, the formal contribution of the book is to have demonstrated empirically that social process is never merely local or episodic, never the result of any one class of social actors, but always also structured by larger social forces, of which the economic and the political were prominent.

Thus, third, *Black Reconstruction*, apart from breaking the pragmatist mold of American social thought, challenged with comparable force the vulgar Marxism that prevailed in Europe and parts of the United States during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Though Du Bois did join the United States Communist Party near the end of his life, he was anything but a doctrinaire Marxist. *Black Reconstruction* clearly uses the language of Marx, especially in its depiction of post-Civil War strife as a class of white and black workers opposed to the dominant class of landowners. More generally, there can be little doubt that Du Bois was

heavily influenced by socialist and Marxist ideas, especially in the years after *Souls* and the founding of the NAACP. If in the first decades of the twentieth century, he held firmly to the value of cultural advancement as the guiding strategy of the American Negro, even then he never failed to see the structural effects of economic injustice (as his argument with Booker T. Washington makes clear). By the early 1930s, while preparing *Black Reconstruction*, Du Bois was just as clear that an economic materialism was a necessary component of any reliable social theory. But this vision was not founded in doctrine so much as real politics, and Du Bois's politics were always at least racial.

At no point is the subtlety of Du Bois social theory more in evidence than in his rethinking of the structural foundations of white racism with respect to what David Roediger has called the "racial wage." If the poor white workers hated the dominant white planter class, why did they express their hatred so viciously against the black workers, who suffered as they did? Jim Crow was enforced by threats and killings brought down by poor whites who did the planter class's lynching for them. Why? Because, Du Bois showed, the white working class in the South was bought off by the privilege of being white. They were poor, true; but at least they got to be white. The racial wage was payment in-kind of social privilege for the costs of economic misery. This is not a concept that could have been forged by any strict version of economic materialism. Rather, the racial wage is social theory in which, as we would put it today, economic and political realities were supplemented by the power of cultural and social privilege. Du Bois's social theory was, already in 1935, well along the way toward a sophistication that would not come to mainstream sociology and much of social theory until the 1960s and later. He was, thus, among the first to show that the older nineteenth-century dogmas that set Hegelian idealism against Marxian materialism were completely insufficient to the social facts.

Black Reconstruction, thus, succeeded on three fronts: to transform the dogmas of historical research, to deploy a robust structuralism, and to broaden social theory's core methodological concepts. Though it would be a good many years before his successes would be recognized, they stand today as witness to the value of social theory executed from the standpoint of the theorist himself. It would be a stretch to claim that Du Bois was a witting precursor of the standpoint feminism that came into its own in 1970s. But it would not be strange to say that he was among those of his social position who realized that abstract social theory was worthless insofar as it necessarily displayed the effects of a falsely scientific removal from the events under examination. Du Bois was not the least interested in the kind of sociology of knowledge that led to today's modern and postmodern social theories, but he did, in effect, hit upon the values for which these later developments came to stand.

There is, however, one further major contribution Du Bois made to social theory: that of being one of the first thoroughly global social theorists of the twentieth century. Though Marx's and Weber's ideas in particular came to be applied to global theories of economic and political domination, neither Marx nor Weber (nor for that matter, Durkheim) were social theorists who thought with explicit reference to global realities. Du Bois did. In a clearheaded way, Africa was always on his mind. Even in *Souls*, Du Bois was thinking as a son of Africa when he opened the book with the famous line about the problem of the twentieth century being the problem of the color line. He did not limit the color line to America. Though that book was about the American Negro, it was already framed in global terms. The American Negro was first and foremost descended of Africa; hence the beautiful passage by which Du Bois (1903) introduces his double-consciousness idea: "After the Egyptian and the Indian, the Greek and the Roman, the Teuton and the Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born within a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world" (pp. 2–3). The double consciousness, while the result of the veil of racial oppression, was also a strength. The Negro's second sight was, at least in part, a gift of being an American, yes, but also of being outside white America—always a Negro, always African as well. The dogged strength came from the innate sense of the power of the Negro's "otherness," as we say today. This was 1903, three years after Du Bois had traveled to London to participate in the first of five Pan-African congresses he would lead over the first half of the twentieth century.

Still, and again, it is in *Black Reconstruction* where one finds the earliest, most striking evidence of Du Bois's global thinking. As in all his major works, the question of political progress was never far from his mind. In the great book of 1935, when the economic crisis was itself a global question, Du Bois put forth his hope for the American Negro. In chapter 7, "Looking Forward," he offers the promise of a new industrial democracy overcoming the greed of the capitalist class. It must be remembered that the book, while written in the midst of the Great Depression of the 1930s, was a look back in time to the effects of the Long Depression of the 1870s on the prospects of the black worker. Thus, while the liberating prospects of industrial democracy were projected back to the conditions of the nineteenth century, they were focused by the economic crises of the twentieth. And though the language in "Looking Forward" is trained on the postslavery prospects of freed people in the United States, the analysis is thoroughly global. One might call it simply the Marxism to which Du Bois held, were it not, again, for the fact that the underlying concern was the liberation of black freed people. As a result, the analysis behind the history of an American problem is the rough outline of an interpretation of economic realities from the point of view of the global

economic system, that is, of the colonial system born and bred in the slave trade. If these themes are somewhat muted in 1935, it may have been because Du Bois had already declared himself a global thinker, if not a nationalist, in *Darkwater* (1920). Here, especially in the ironic essay “Souls of White Folk” (pp. 29–52) and the thoroughly Africanist essay “The Hands of Ethiopia” (pp. 56–74), the theory of race is set in global terms, with Africa and the slave system at the center of the discussion. Then, 20 years later, in *Dusk of Dawn* (1940), Du Bois picks up the same themes, with ever more force.

Hereafter, Africa is more and more and the center of his writing and thinking, culminating in *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa Has Played in World History* (1947). Though the essays in this collection are perhaps not as elegant even as those in *Dusk of Dawn* (in 1947, Du Bois was 79 years old), there is no mistaking his decisive turn of thought, a turn that anticipated the great and enduring work of another Africanist, Immanuel Wallerstein. It may be too strong to suggest that Wallerstein’s magisterial study of the *Modern World System* (the first volume of which appeared in 1974) was indebted to Du Bois’s earlier work. But Wallerstein’s work was surely forged in the same African furnace. Wallerstein’s early work on Africa was based on research in Ghana (where Du Bois spent his last years). More to the point, the key historical fact of the emergence of capitalism as a world economic system in the sixteenth century was the world slave trade triangle that Wallerstein, more than anyone, brought to the center of social theory. Who but Du Bois, among social theorists, had grasped the outline of the world system before Wallerstein did his work? Thus, to the other contributions must be added the early recognition and documentation of the outlines of a theory of globalization.

Some would argue that Du Bois was of little importance because “no one” read him until recently. But this is to ignore the fact that near the end of his life, Du Bois was celebrated the world over. When in 1958 and 1959, he went on his last world tour, he was greeted with acclaim that astonished him. In the Soviet Union, Europe, and China, in particular, his work over the years was known. This surely is one of the many reasons that Kwame Nkrumah invited him to Ghana in 1961 to live out his years working on his *Encyclopedia Africana*. Du Bois readily accepted the invitation, in large part out of disgust with America for its regressive politics. He had been indicted in 1951 as an “unregistered foreign agent,” and his passport revoked. Though he eventually won the court case, it was the final straw on a back already heavily laden with political grief.

W. E. B. Du Bois renounced his American citizenship to live and die in Ghana, where he is buried in Accra, facing the sea. In his 95 years, he lived through each and every critical moment on the long road from slavery to civil rights: Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the urban migrations, the

Harlem Renaissance, the Depression and the wars, the anticommunism terrors, and the early beginnings of the civil rights movement itself. At every turn, he was a force to be reckoned with. He died, at long last, working on the compendium of social theory and scholarship that had always fueled his political pursuits.

— Charles Lemert

See also Davis, Angela; Globalization; Marxism; Pragmatism

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DURKHEIM, ÉMILE

Émile Durkheim (1858–1916) was the founder of theoretically grounded empirical sociology in France. He acknowledged the opacity of the social world and identified the ways in which an excessive reliance on experience tended to lead to a misrepresentation of its nature. He developed his own unique form of “scientific rationalism” in order to discover and clearly present its inherent properties, modes of existence, and forms of organization.

Durkheim was born in a small town in Alsace-Lorraine, in a family of modest means; his mother supplemented their family income with her embroidery shop. His father, grandfather, and great-grandfather were rabbis, but Émile decided while still a schoolboy that this was not to be his vocation. After attending his local school, he went to Paris to study and at his third attempt, gained admittance to the École Normale Supérieure. While he found the style of education there too humanistic and literary, he gained immensely from working with the historian Fustel de Coulanges and with the neo-Kantian philosopher Émile

Boutroux. At that time, and indeed subsequently, he was also strongly influenced by Charles Renouvier, another neo-Kantian philosopher. In 1885, he visited Germany for a year, and then on his return, he taught philosophy for a short time in the Lycée de Troyes. In 1887, Durkheim was appointed to a post as chargé de cours of social science and pedagogy at the Faculty of Letters at Bordeaux, where he stayed for 15 years. In 1902, he returned to Paris and was appointed as chargé de cours in the Science of Education at the Sorbonne. While he was made a Professor of Education in 1906, it was only in 1913 that he was given the title of Professor of Education and Sociology.

His specific conception of the nature of social order was first sketched out in his 1887 essay "The Positive Science of Morality in Germany" but more fully developed in *The Division of Labor in Society* ([1893] 1984). In this book, he examined "the connection between the individual personality and social solidarity," arguing that there are two different kinds of society, grounded in different kinds of social solidarity, that is, forms of social regulation that lead individuals to engage in activities that create feelings of identification with other members of society and with society as a whole. In each case, moreover, the dominant legal system is both an index of and a source of the form of solidarity. The first of these, *mechanical solidarity*, is a form of social unity based upon the similarity of individuals who share a uniform way of life and have identical beliefs. Repressive law, particularly criminal law, is of particular importance in such societies. The second, *organic solidarity*, is present when there is extensive social differentiation, including specialist hierarchical organizations run by individuals whose responsibilities reflect their relevant personal skills, the development and valorization of autonomous personalities, and an exchange of goods and services leading individuals to recognize that they are also mutually interdependent and have shared interests. Restitutive law, where law intervenes not so much to punish transgressors as to facilitate a return to a just status quo ante, is more characteristic of these societies. While such societies may function smoothly, they may not. This is particularly true in the case of organic solidarity, where there may be what Durkheim describes as "pathological forms of the division of labor." One is the anomic division of labor, when individuals suffer from a lack of moral and social relatedness; they cannot see the relationship between their specialized activity, that of others, and the goal of an enterprise as a whole, and the extant forms of regulation are inappropriate for the key forms of social organization. But perhaps the most significant is the "forced division of labor," where the existence of large social inequalities and the institution of inherited wealth means that better qualified but less prosperous people are unjustly displaced from senior decision-making positions by members of wealthy families who have little natural ability and/or little commitment to working

hard at self-development, but have bought advantage for themselves. True organic solidarity requires the appropriation, redistribution, and abolition of inherited wealth.

As he made clear in *The Division of Labor*, Durkheim ([1893] 1984) subscribed to the Kantian view that science "presupposed a complete freedom of mind" and that "we must rigorously submit ourselves to the discipline of methodic doubt" (p. xxix). In *The Rules of Sociological Method* ([1895] 1982), he explicitly addressed the development of research methods that are appropriate to sociology's system of concepts, true to its epistemological protocols, and adequate to the ontology of the social. His "scientific rationalism" involved the belief that "considered in the light of the past," human behavior "is capable of being reduced to relationships of cause and effect" and that these, in turn, "can then be transformed into rules of action for the future" (Durkheim [1895] 1982:33). (Yet as can be seen in his discussion of the forced division of labor, to adequately analyze the ways in which the social world is intractable is to also identify its immanent possibilities, which may be realized or thwarted.) He agreed with Comte that societies are subject to natural laws and that these are irreducible to physical, biological, or, indeed, psychological, laws. He argued that while society cannot exist without conscious human individuals, it is not merely their sum. In the same way that "in the living cells there are only molecules of crude matter," and yet "they are in association" and "this association" causes "new phenomena which characterize life," the mode of association of human individuals also creates "a specific reality which has its own characteristics." Indeed, association can be constitutive of some of the properties of its elements. Thus, "The whole does not equal the sum of its parts; it is something different, whose properties differ from those employed displayed by the parts from which it is formed" (Durkheim [1895] 1982:128). Each science has its own order of reality; the interconnectedness of the elements of this realm constitutes its determining principle and its province proper. Sociology has its own social facts, which are supra-individual although always existing in and through symbolic representations, only partially accessible to perception, and which, like all aspects of reality, impose severe limits on what people can do. The existence of these social facts justifies the creation of sociology, "the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning" (Durkheim [1895] 1982:45).

A society is a territorially located entity with an internal milieu and an external environment, including other societies. For it to function effectively, for it to reproduce itself, and for it to develop, it is essential that it encompass a complex of social institutions and social forms that work in a sufficiently complementary manner. What it consists of, how it works, and indeed whether it works need, however, to be discovered. In exploring the answer to such

questions, Durkheim recognized that there may be some social phenomena that are common to all societies, for example, the definition of some acts as criminal, and, relatedly, the presence of a collective consciousness. Others may be specific only to some societies. Methodologically, the strategy he advocated was, first, to work out features common to all societies; second, to tentatively identify different species of society, in part by identifying significant and enduring differences between them; third, within each particular species, identify those societies at a similar state of development; and then, finally, fourth, compare the similarities and differences between them. Then, it may be possible to identify a social phenomenon and define it as normal (or as a necessary concomitant of some social phenomenon that is normal) for a society of a particular species at a particular level of development. Some phenomena appear only in societies of a particular species, and others, while appearing in all societies, do so quite distinctly in societies of different species; for example, while crime exists in all societies, a relatively high crime rate may be normal for a society based on organic solidarity (at a particular level of development), but it would be abnormal for any society based upon mechanical solidarity.

In a systematic empirical study, *Suicide* ([1897a] 1951), Durkheim used his theoretical framework to explore a phenomenon to be found in all types of society, suicide; he defined this as “all cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he knows will produce this result” (pp. 313–14), to show that the most private of human decisions, whether to live or to die, usually explained by the particular experiences and consciousness of the individual, was best understood as an effect of social relationships. Durkheim believed that he had identified four main forms of suicide, egoistic, altruistic, anomic, and fatalistic, and that their relative frequency in any particular society was the effect of the relations between social phenomena, such as the degree of social integration, and the relative strength of social orientations, such as egoism and altruism. This study is theoretically, methodologically (in his development of multivariate analysis), and empirically rich but also somewhat confused and confusing. This confusion can be seen in his treatment of fatalistic suicide. Anomic suicide, on one hand, occurs when there is a lack of adequate social regulation of the passions and/or when these latter are excessively stimulated, thereby creating a continual and inescapable sense of dissatisfaction. (In this text, as opposed to many of his other writings, there is little concern with how social regulation is produced or whether it is just.) Fatalistic suicide, which merits only a footnote in the chapter on anomic suicide, on the other hand, “derives from excessive regulation, that of persons with their futures pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by excessive discipline. It is the suicide of very young husbands, of the married woman

who is childless.” Durkheim ([1897a] 1951) sees this as of little contemporary importance, although it might have historical interest, for example, “the suicides of slaves . . . or all suicides attributable to excessive moral or physical despotism” (p. 276). Yet if we again think of the implications of his discussion of the contemporary phenomenon of the “forced division of labor,” it is clear that there are many, indeed whole social classes, that see “their futures pitilessly blocked.” Indeed, one might suggest that far from being the opposite of anomie, fatalism hides anomie under conditions of forced solidarity.

Nevertheless, in *Suicide*, Durkheim made some of his clearest statements about the dynamic nature of social life, for example, through his use of the concept of social currents, and also of society as being different from the sum total of the representations that are in the consciousnesses of individuals.

The social fact is sometimes so far materialized as to become an element of the external world. For instance, a definite type of architecture is a social phenomenon but it is partially embodied in houses and buildings of all sorts which, once constructed, become autonomous realities, independent of individuals. It is the same with the avenues of communication and transportation, with instruments and machines used in industry or private life which express the state of technology at any moment in history, of written languages, etc. . . .

The material forms [legislation] assume are . . . not merely ineffective verbal communications but active realities, since they produce effects which would not occur without their existence. They are not only external to individual consciousness, but this very externality establishes their specific qualities. Because these forms are less at the disposal of individuals, individuals cannot readily adjust them to circumstances, and this very situation makes them more resistant to change. (Durkheim [1897a] 1951:313–14)

From 1897, much of Durkheim’s energies were expended, along with a select group of colleagues, including Marcel Mauss, Paul Fauconnet, Henri Hubert, and François Simiand, in the development of *L’Année Sociologique*. He continued to write articles and deliver courses of lectures until 1917, and some of them were to be published posthumously, for example, *The Evolution of Educational Thought* (1938), and *Pragmatism and Sociology* (1953). In 1912, he published his final and powerful book, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. In the 1890s, Durkheim had initially defined religion, somewhat broadly, as a form of custom that regulated both consciousness and conduct, one premised upon “faith,” that is, “any belief experienced or accepted without argument” and imposed by “a collective discipline,” and hence it might

involve a belief in God or an ideal like progress or beliefs and practices relating to “the flag, the country, this or that political organization, or hero, or historical event.” Then, in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, he added that religion as such is based upon metaphorical and symbolic thinking, and the attributes assigned to deities and the feelings that people have in relation to these are real enough, but displaced in “the divinity” are “only society transfigured and transformed.” Religious “feelings” do not require a belief in divine beings: “There can be no society which does not experience the need at regular intervals to maintain and strengthen the collective feelings and ideas that provide its coherence and its distinct individuality” ([1912] 1995:429). The specific collective representations produced will depend upon the nature of the social order.

The sacred is a way of conceiving of, and relating to, a realm of things (objects, places, beings, rituals, images, words) replete with high and potentially creative and/or destructive energy. Human beings feel the need to treat these with deference and/or caution and to take particular care that the sacred does not come in contact with its other, the profane. Although this latter seems to have something of a residual character in that it is that which threatens, undermines, or abolishes the sacred, destroying its essential attributes, at times, the (sacred) Gods need (profane) humanity, and hence the sacred is not simply something defined by its superiority to the profane. Since a purely hierarchical distinction between the two is inadequate,

Nothing but their heterogeneity is left to define the relation between the sacred and the profane. . . . What makes this heterogeneity sufficient to characterize that classification of things and to distinguish it from any other is that it has a very particular feature: It is absolute. (Durkheim [1912] 1995:36)

But the source of such feelings is crucial, for, generally, Durkheim believes that the sacred is organized in and through religions. Religion is something created by the community, for the community. A “religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community, called a Church, all those who adhere to it” (Durkheim [1912] 1995:44). While in many ways powerful, this definition is somewhat ethnocentric, fitting rabbinic Judaism and Christianity well but not other religions, such as classical Daoism. These latter emphasized transformative practices of the self and created competing schools based upon rival techniques of accomplishing this, rather than doctrinal differences. Another problem with Durkheim’s definition is that this obscures the significance of syncretism, a general characteristic of religions, which becomes particularly noticeable when they have proselytized in new cultures; for

example, “Our Lady of Guadalupe” is, for many, both Mary, mother of the son of the Christian God and the mother of the ancient gods of the Mexican people.

But there is perhaps a more profound problem because, as Durkheim himself suggests, the sacred and profane can be produced in many different ways and contexts at any one time within a culture. After all, a sense of the sacred, as opposed to the profane, is likely to be generated in collective assemblies, and given the proliferation of secondary groups in complex societies, there will be many of these and many potentially rivalrous sacred symbolic objects. Furthermore, transgressive practices are also likely to be found in collective milieus. In fact, Durkheim ([1912] 1995) himself recognized that “religious forces” themselves are of two kinds, both subject to various taboos, and what at first seem quite distinct prove to be two varieties of the same genus, the sacred:

Some are benevolent, guardians of physical and moral order, as well as dispensers of life, health, and all the qualities men value. . . . On the other hand there are evil and impure powers, bringers of disorder, causes of death and sickness, instigators of sacrilege. . . . But although opposite to one another, these two aspects of religious life are at the same time closely akin. (pp. 412–13)

Thus, in Durkheim’s work there are two divisions, one between the sacred and the profane and the other within the sacred.

Many of these ideas were subsequently taken up by other social theorists, for example, Robert Hertz ([1907] 1960), who identified the division within the sacred as that between the right and the left sacred:

The right . . . the idea of sacred power, regular and beneficent, the principle of effective activity, the source of everything that is good, favorable and legitimate; . . . the left, this ambiguous conception of the profane and the impure, the feeble and the incapable which is also maleficent and dreaded. (p. 100)

The ideas were further developed by radical thinkers such as Georges Bataille and other members of the *Collège de Sociologie*.

This is a useful place to turn toward Durkheim’s political views. During the Franco-Prussian War, he saw his home province occupied and then ceded to Prussia (and, relatedly, he saw anti-Semitism at work); the collapse of the “the imperial façade” of France’s Second Empire; the election of a conservative monarchist national assembly; and the tragic and bloody suppression of the Paris Commune, where 20,000 to 30,000 people died. He became a lifelong Republican and Democrat, and he was always committed to the major principles of 1789. During the postwar reconstruction, he strongly supported the Republic and was

only too aware how narrowly the Republicans avoided defeat in 1877. In the 1890s, he was a committed Dreyfusard, publicly opposed to the conservative Catholic reaction, and this was the occasion for his writing one of his most subtle works, "Individualism and the Intellectuals" ([1898] 1973). In this, he distinguished between "the narrow utilitarianism and utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists" and the individualism of Kant and Rousseau. Durkheim notes that both these latter recognized the production of the individual by society; that is to say, the individual's rights and capacities, including the ability to understand and be accountable for one's actions, derive from society and that "the only moral ways of acting are those which can be applied to all men indiscriminately; that is which are implied in the general notion of 'man'" (p. 45). In such societies, the collective conscience still valorizes the collectivity, but it treats "the human person" as "sacred" so that "an attempt on man's life, on a man's liberty, on a man's honor inspires us with a feeling of horror in every way analogous to that which the believer experiences, when he sees his idol profaned" (Durkheim [1898] 1973:45). It is worth noting that while this was an occasion when Durkheim developed and consolidated his relations with many members of the Jewish community in Paris, he himself always remained an atheist and one who believed that if there was an appropriate object of religious respect in his day, it was the social individual and the society, that is, the Republic, and not any religious deity.

In *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (1957), Durkheim developed an innovative and underappreciated theory of the democratic state. A political society, he argued, "is one formed by the coming together of secondary social groups, subject to the same one authority which is not itself subject to any other superior authority duly constituted" (Durkheim 1957:44). The state must be an effective organizing centre, separate from the rest of society. It must, through deliberation, produce collective representations distinguishable "from the other collective representations by their higher degree of consciousness and reflection" (Durkheim 1957:50). This is best achieved through democracy, which requires the creation of institutional sites for dialogues between the state, subcollectivities, and individual citizens, where,

Through the communication set up between those governing and the citizens, the latter are able to judge of the way in which those governing carry out their task, and knowing the facts more fully, are able to give or withhold confidence. (Durkheim 1957:108).

Paul Hirst's recent book, *Associational Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance* (1994), explicitly develops these Durkheimian ideas.

Durkheim also had a lifelong involvement with socialism. As early as 1882, he had intended to write a thesis on

"Individualism and Socialism," although this never came to pass. In the mid-1880s, he extended his beliefs to include the reformist socialism of his friend Jean Jaurès, and during his visit to Germany in 1885/1886, he studied the writings of Karl Marx and the "Socialist of the Chair" Alfred Schaeffle, writing an appreciative review of the latter's work. From 1883 through to 1906, he had many committed socialist students; and from 1908 to 1914, many of his colleagues on *L'Année Sociologique*, such as Simiand, Hertz, and Hubert Bourgin, were members of the Groupe d'Études Socialistes. Durkheim showed sympathy to their ideals but kept a certain distance. In 1893, he published a "Note on the Definition of Socialism," and in 1895 to 1896, he lectured on the history of socialism, particularly the thought of Sismondi, Saint-Simon, and the Saint-Simonians. He prepared a course for 1896 to 1897 on Fourier and Proudhon, which he never delivered, and he intended to devote a further course to Lasalle, Marx, and German Socialism.

Nevertheless, in the *Division of Labor*, he made positive use of Marx's work, and more significantly, he advocated the abolition of inherited wealth, a position to which he remained committed throughout his life. In 1905, he commented that history suggests that socialism is not something "contrary to the nature of our societies, but rather, "it accords with their natural evolution." In 1915, he advocated "the formation of a new Socialism which goes back to the French tradition." Two years later, the year of his death, he wrote that "economic activity must be socially organized."

But Durkheim was critical of those who believed that class conflict was the major agent of effective social change, fearful of the potentially vicious conservative reaction to any attempt at revolutionary action, as had happened in the case of the Paris Commune. He believed that a republican democracy, nonstatist socialism, and a meritocratic-based distribution of social roles and social rewards constituted the natural evolutionary potential of societies characterized by organic solidarity. There was clearly something technocratic and authoritarian about his understanding of socialism. Moreover, there was a tension between his somewhat extrasocial understanding of individual merit and his more sociological analyses of the socially enriching effects of a diverse social life, the constitutive role of discipline, and the development of socially ordered desire in determining the capacities of members of different social groups; for example, as he himself acknowledged, in the Roman Empire, over time, the plebeians were able to make serious claims to increased political and religious participation, because as a group, they had developed their abilities. Furthermore, he also suggested that in sufficiently developed versions of such societies, the principle of meritocracy would be softened by one of charity that shifts the principle of social reward nearer to the idea "from each according to their means, to each according to their needs."

Yet in his 1897 review of Antonio Labriola's "Essay on the Materialist Conception of History," Durkheim distinguishes his position from (a somewhat reductionist) Marxism. In contradistinction to the postulate that "in the last analysis historical development depends upon economic causes," Durkheim argues that "religion is the most primitive of all social phenomena" from which "emerged, through successive transformations, all the other manifestations of collective activity—law morality art science political forms, etc.," for "in principle everything is religious." Furthermore, "at the origin, the economic factor is rudimentary, while by contrast religious life is rich and pervasive," and it is "probable that the economy depends on religion rather than vice versa" (Durkheim [1897b] 1982:173).

But perhaps more reconciliation between the Durkheimian and Marxist traditions is possible than might be expected. There is little to be gained by arguing over ultimate origins: Much as the incest taboo, language, and kinship relations constitute a system within which each term is unthinkable without the other (and hence must have been born at the same moment), religion and socially organized material economic activity may each be unthinkable without the other. As Marx and Engels pointed out in *The German Ideology* ([1845] 1976:35–6), all forms of human activity, however spiritual, depend upon the production and reproduction of living human beings, which require sustained access to, and action upon, the natural world, and the social organization of these transformative acts. But as Durkheim points out, social organization requires language, classificatory schema, cosmologies, and committed collective action for their renewal and adaptive and transformative modification, and these are all intrinsically connected to religion. Religion is itself fundamentally premised upon the distinction between sacred and profane domains and activities. Here, we might borrow from Georges Bataille the notion that this latter distinction can be interpreted as one between the heterogeneous (feelings of both attraction and repulsion to totalizing group processes; taboos and their transgression; unlimited expenditure; extreme emotions; excremental and orgiastic impulses; violence and its violent containment; death, self-sacrifice, and the cruel sacrifice of others) and the homogeneous (deferred gratification; analysis and calculation; planning and utility; "self-sufficient" subjects possessing and consuming objects) (Bataille [1933] 1985). It is not surprising, then, that there is often a conflation of the profane and the mundane. The sacred and profane need each other both categorically and organizationally. Sacralizing practices and transformative productive activity cannot be thought, and cannot exist, independently of each other. Of all sociologists, Durkheim communicates most effectively a sense of the dynamic and constitutive power of the social.

— Frank Pearce

See also Anomie; Bataille, Georges; Collective Conscience; Collège de Sociologie and Acéphale; Comte, Auguste; Marx, Karl; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Sacred and Profane; Saint-Simon, Claude-Henri de; Social Facts

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E

ECOFEMINISM

Introduced by Françoise d'Eaubonne (1974), *ecofeminism* refers to a strand of feminist theory and activism that incorporates ecological concerns, emphasizing interrelationships and interdependence. Less rooted in academic circles than most expressions of feminism, ecofeminism builds up around the core assumption of interlocking hierarchies. The pivotal hierarchy involves human beings exercising dominion over all other life forms, with male human beings also dominating female human beings. Typically, ecofeminists assume that girls' and women's subordination is intricately linked not only with that of other human groups but also with the subordination of other animate forms.

Thus, ecofeminists largely share the premise that a worldview justifying domination and control of "nature" is part and parcel of the ideological apparatus taken to justify the subordination of girls and women to boys and men. As Noel Sturgeon (1997:23) emphasizes, ecofeminists theorize fundamental connections among the ideologies used to justify all the major social hierarchies, such as age, race, social class, gender, and sexual orientation. In addition, ecofeminist theory largely presupposes that humankind has been defined in sharp contrast not only to what is natural but also to what is feminine.

In North America, ecofeminism emerged out of women's communes and is rooted in the women's spirituality movement, the women's health movement, and women's environmentalism, as well as various peace and antimilitarist movements, including the nuclear freeze movement. The formal event often seen as launching North American ecofeminism was "Women and Life on Earth: Ecofeminism in the 1980s," a conference held in Amherst, Massachusetts, in 1980. Organized by Ynestra King, Anna Gyorgy, Grace Paley, and other women activists from various

social movements, including the environmental and feminist movements, this event began galvanizing women wanting to make their ecological voices heard beyond as well as within male-dominated environmentalist organizations. Over time, such ecofeminists have forged an ambitious global movement with diffuse goals, reflecting both ecological and feminist values (Sturgeon 1997).

Unlike many expressions of feminism, ecofeminism is not foremostly a Northern phenomenon. Women in the Southern Hemisphere, motivated to resist the environmental degradation wrought in their countries by global capital and international policies favoring the North, are organized and active as ecofeminists. Its global nature ensures cultural, racial, and ethnic diversity among ecofeminists that exceeds the diversity typical among other types of feminists.

Stylistically and formally, ecofeminists also exhibit significant diversity. Sturgeon (1997:24) emphasizes that in some measure, the writings of extremely different scholars and activists express ecofeminist concerns. She mentions, for example, Rachel Carson, Mary Daly, Donna Haraway, Vandana Shiva, Starhawk, and Alice Walker. Adding names such as Susan Griffin, Mary Oliver, Adrienne Rich, and Joni Seager not only extends the ecofeminist list but also illustrates how poetry, as well as essays, case studies, and other modes of knowledge construction figure prominently in ecofeminism. Diverse modes of activism also find expression among ecofeminists, profoundly evident when one draws from the past to extend the list of ecofeminists still further. Chris J. Cuomo (1998) includes Jane Addams, Alice Hamilton, Florence Kelley, and their close associates on the list because their work was both significantly women centered as well as sensitive to how ecological conditions either promote or undermine both individual and collective health.

Politically, ecofeminists exhibit great diversity. One good source for surveying that diversity while also learning a

great deal about ecofeminist practices is Greta Gaard's *Ecological Politics: Ecofeminists and the Greens*. Besides providing a compact chronology of ecofeminism's first 20 years as an identifiable movement, Gaard offers an introductory essay that carefully surveys various strands of ecofeminism. Ranging from liberal ecofeminism through radical and socialist ecofeminisms, among others, ecofeminism in Gaard's hands proves to be as politically variegated as the settings around the planet where it has taken root.

Emphasizing that feminist theory must form part of the foundation of any democratic theory, Gaard also implies that ecofeminism is a foundational feature of any effective environmentalism. These two notions find rigorous expression in her closing chapter, "Democracy, Ecofeminism, and the Nader Presidential Campaign." Interestingly, Ralph Nader's vice presidential running mate in the 2000 campaign was ecofeminist Winona LaDuke. LaDuke (1997:37) emphasizes that consumerism in the United States necessitates intrusive meddling in the affairs of other countries and thus antidemocratic policies and practices. The upshot of Gaard's concluding chapter resonates with LaDuke's prodemocracy, social justice standpoint: Diversity is a biocultural resource that must be protected as well as celebrated. Gaard concludes, then, on a note that emphatically demands diversity as a practical as well as an ethical necessity.

Influential as it has been over the past three decades, ecofeminism is often the target of critiques that carry more than a modicum of validity. Perhaps the most common criticism is that ecofeminism presupposes an essentialist position on gender, whereby women and men are taken to be innately and therefore universally different in ways that have social and psychological ramifications. Although some ecofeminists do adopt such a position, ecofeminists engage in considerable internal debate over essentialism, particularly around issues of whether women are inherently more caring than men and more closely connected with the earth and "natural" processes. These debates sometimes exhibit a maternalist dimension whereby women's mothering is seen as the "natural" conduit to their greater propensity for caregiving and keener connection with "nature."

Like many twenty-first-century ecofeminists, Stacy Alaimo (2000:13) advocates a nonessentialist position that vastly complicates commonsense, taken-for-granted beliefs about gender, nature, and ethics. She argues against feminist projects oriented toward either emphasizing or deemphasizing women's connections with nature. Alaimo's postmodernist emphasis is on conceptual transformations, so that concepts now gendered, such as nature and mind, are reworked to encompass diverse groups of human beings and nonhuman beings as well. She favors conceptual implosion instead of essentialist assumptions.

A more subtle, indeed implicit, reservation that other feminists sometimes have about ecofeminism concerns the

latter's spiritual dimension. Although far from all varieties of ecofeminism comprise a concern with spirituality, ecofeminism does have the distinction among feminisms of explicitly addressing spiritual as well as ethical issues, particularly issues of environmental ethics. An influential anthology that illustrates the range of spiritual issues that concern some ecofeminists is *Ecofeminism and the Sacred* (1993), edited by Carol J. Adams. First known for her ecofeminist advocacy of vegetarianism, Adams emphasizes the diversity of ecofeminist perspectives on women's spirituality.

Several contributors to Adams's anthology provide examples of the richness ecofeminists bring to matters of spirituality and, at times, religiosity. Rosemary Radford Ruether, a prominent ecofeminist theologian, offers an ecofeminist conceptualization of God as an immanent, creative, sustaining force in the universe that is neither female nor male nor even anthropomorphic. Other contributors offer an ecumenical ecofeminism that intertwines Buddhism and feminism around the practice of compassion, an ecofeminism intertwined with Judaism, and an exploration of the connections among sacredness, ecofeminist ethics, and shamanism. By and large, Adams's anthology richly illustrates that ecofeminists offer diverse concepts, principles, and practices when it comes to questions of spirituality, ecofeminist activism, and everyday life. All the while, its inclusion of spiritual issues makes ecofeminism attractive to those whose propensity is a faith-based activism or politics. Noteworthy in that regard, perhaps, is the inclusion in this anthology of Shamara Shantu Riley's exploration of "Afrocentric Ecowomanism."

Diverse and recent, ecofeminism is well suited to the twenty-first century. Its global reach and environmentalist focus make it a feminism increasingly meaningful. In her classic *Silent Spring* (1962), Rachel Carson noted how soil itself involves a community of intertwined lives. In theoretically and politically rich ways, ecofeminism extends that insight to the human community, insisting that across the globe, humankind and other life-forms also constitute a web of interconnected lives.

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Essentialism; Feminism; Feminist Ethics; Gender; Maternal Thinking

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ECOLOGICAL THEORY

The sociological versions of ecological theory connect social entities with their environments. While most modern applications of ecological theory have been studies of populations of business firms, there is a recent trend toward applications in sociology more broadly conceived. The two fundamental processes in ecological theory are *adaptation* and *selection*. Adaptation is the process by which a social entity changes in order to survive optimally within a given environment. Selection is the process through which entities that are less fit (i.e., less adapted to a set of environmental conditions) survive at lower rates than entities that are more fit, and therefore become less prevalent in the population.

At the population level, adaptation and selection are logically related. Adaptation at one level is typically created by selection at the next lower level of analysis. For example, when an organization adapts to its environment by seizing strategic possibilities and implementing a change in its goals, products, or members, its behaviors or members are being selected by environmental conditions. The lower level (behavioral or constituent) is being selected, producing adaptation in the form of changes at the organizational level. Conversely, organizations that do not adapt to the environmental conditions will survive at lower rates, producing a shift in the population distribution of organizations.

As a dynamic theory of social process, ecological theory is an explanation of the evolution of social forms. The theory argues that social forms (often organizations or associations, but see the concluding section of this essay) change over time as they compete for resources in an environment. The competition among entities that drives modern theories within this school of thought is *ecological* competition as opposed to *economic* competition. That is, ecological competition does not require a conscious orientation toward the competition, or even an awareness of it. All that is required is a population of social entities that use the same resource dimension, where there is some limit on the availability of that resource and there is some inertia in the ability of entities to shift from one resource or place to

another. Formally, two populations of social entities compete if growth in one of them decreases the rate of growth in the other one.

The concept of *niche* summarizes the fact that social entities have a location within an often multidimensional resource environment. Ecological competition occurs among all entities that use the same resources (occupy the same niche). The *fundamental* niche is the hypothetical location in the multidimensional resource space that a population would occupy if it had no competitors. When observed, however, populations are constrained by competition with other entities that use parts of the same niche. Their observed location is the *realized* niche.

SOCIOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EVOLUTIONARY IDEAS

While modern ecological theories in sociology borrow sophisticated models from the study of biological systems, the first clear applications of ecological ideas to social systems predates Charles Darwin's pathbreaking work. These precursors clearly had a direct impact on Darwin's thinking. Thomas Malthus first noted in his 1798 *Essay on the Principle of Population* that if there were no check on human population growth, it would outstrip the resources upon which the population depended, with resultant starvation and ill health. He described an exponential curve that growth would follow until a population reached the depletion of the resource base. Darwin took the basic principle from Malthus's writing: Any population that does *not* display geometric growth must be producing many more offspring in one generation than will reproduce to form the next generation. Therefore, the interesting question became for Darwin: What determines which prospective parents will reproduce? Darwin needed only to add principles of variation and inheritance to develop his theory of evolution.

Writing at roughly the same time as Darwin in the mid-1800s, Herbert Spencer built on the Malthusian insight about the mathematical properties of unrestricted growth to produce a systematic and elaborated treatment of the relationships among social system growth, differentiation, and survival. Like Darwin, he noted that unrestricted capacity for reproductive growth did not appear to lead inevitably to population collapse due to lack of resources. Like Darwin, he was led by Malthus's observations to focus on the adaptation and selection that occurred as a population was pressured by resource limitations. Spencer not only coined the famous phrase "survival of the fittest" but also developed a comprehensive view of how social entities grow and differentiate within the limits of an environment, creating coordination and control problems that lead either to dissolution or (if the control and coordination problems are solved) to new growth. Indeed, Jonathan Turner has argued that Spencer's First Principle on the causes of social differentiation

embodies the abstract proposition that is refined in modern ecological modeling. That principle states that the degree of social differentiation among members of a population is a positive, additive function of (1) the size of that population, (2) the level of resource scarcity in its environment, (3) the concentration of the population in the environment, and (4) the level of integration among the subparts of the population. We will find that early ecological theorists in the United States emphasized the adaptive principles implied by (1) and (4), while the theoretical developments since the 1970s have emphasized the selective, competitive processes implied by (2) and (3). The most recent attention to niches as social positions may represent a reintegration of these two emphases.

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL

Ecological theory began its rise as a dominant theme in U.S. sociology when Robert E. Park joined the country's first sociology department at the University of Chicago in 1914. Park became part of the Chicago school, a group of researchers, including W. I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, and Earnest W. Burgess, who collected detailed data on the urban community in which they were enveloped and developed concepts to describe the rich information they encountered. Park focused on four major social processes: competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. While the three latter processes were cultural and often conscious, Park modeled the competitive process directly from biological ecologists and argued that it was "interaction without contact." He used plant communities reaching for a share of sunlight as analogous to the individuals striving for valued resources, often unaware of the others who were similarly striving and limiting the availability of those resources. He believed this ecological competition to be a universal phenomenon, dominated by location, position, and interdependence in ecological communities. It was the fundamental process on which all conscious social actions, such as conflict over status, accommodation to limit conflict, and cultural assimilation of new groups, were overlaid.

In addition to developing the concept of nonconscious, ecological competition, the Chicago school mapped the spatial arrangements in urban communities, systematically relating those patterns to the natural features of the environment, the functional relationships among social institutions, and the temporal patterns of immigration. This work initially inspired Amos Hawley, who would develop the new field of human ecology through the middle of the twentieth century.

HAWLEY'S HUMAN ECOLOGY

Amos Hawley's early work began with a focus on spatial distributions in urban environments, but he soon

abandoned that static spatial approach to study the processes of variation, adaptation, and selection that shape any population at equilibrium with its environment. Hawley's theory followed Spencer in suggesting that adaptation occurs through the formation of interdependencies among the units in a population. Relationships among differentiated subunits increase the viability of a population in an environment, allowing it to grow larger. The capacity for interdependence is increased by technological increases in communications and technology, which determine how large a system can develop before it reaches the upper limit that can be sustained by the environment. Since technology determines the upper limit of the equilibrium that can be attained, much of Hawley's writing concentrated on the shifts between equilibria produced by technological innovation. His thinking on this theme was notably influenced by the social evolutionary writing of his colleague at the University of North Carolina, Gerhard Lenski. Change came either from environmental shifts or from the spontaneous invention of new cultural technology.

While Hawley recognized the expansive quality of social populations in a restricted environment and the resulting competition among groups, his writings emphasized the pattern of symbiotic and commensalistic relations that develop in a population in its collective response to a habitat. His work, especially in later years, emphasized adaptation as a change of organization in response to the environment somewhat more than the competition among units within the population.

The human ecology tradition gave rise to at least three relatively distinct modern variants. The first two, developed by the team of Michael Hannan and John Freeman, on one hand, and by Howard Aldrich, on the other, were both labeled the *population ecology of organizations*; they share a common concern with the dynamics of change, primarily within populations of business organizations. They differ, however, in their relative emphasis on the adaptation of individual organizations to environmental conditions (Aldrich) as opposed to the selective survival of varying organizational forms in different environments (Hannan and Freeman). The third tradition, developed by Miller McPherson, emphasizes ecological communities composed of multiple populations interacting in a collective system and is more explicitly applicable to a wide variety of social forms. There has been significant convergence in recent work as all three traditions come to focus on the concept of niche and on the networks through which information and other resources are transmitted.

All of the modern ecological theories depart to varying degrees from Hawley's human ecology in emphasizing selection over internal structural change as the basis for most shifts in the characteristics of social systems. They show their theoretical lineage most clearly in adopting (indeed, carrying to extensive empirical usage) the principle

that populations of social systems are the appropriate unit with which to study ecological processes of change. The modern variant of organizational ecology that is closest in orientation to Hawley's emphasis on internal structure and systematic adaptation of social entities to environmental conditions is Howard Aldrich's population ecology of organizations.

ALDRICH'S EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

Aldrich argues that an organization (1) is a purposive system that at least appears directed toward some common purpose, (2) has boundaries and exhibits boundary maintenance, and (3) has a set of activity systems that create a stable technology for accomplishing work. While organizational goals, boundaries, and internal structures are not considered fixed, they represent for Aldrich a key set of variables that may be studied in relationship to the environment over time. Thus, Aldrich sees the ecological model as a useful supplement to the Weberian model of internal organization, rather than a replacement for it.

The ecological model that Aldrich derives from the natural selection mechanism of biological ecology is shared with the other two modern sociological research traditions using ecological theory. He explains organizational change by examining the nature and distribution of resources in organizations' environments. Variation is the first requirement: Variation within and between organizations is the basis of natural selection by the environment, while variations across environments are necessary if externally induced change is to occur. More than some of the other modern strands of ecological theory, Aldrich's work encompasses the entire range in which variation can occur, from the activity routines and goals that make up internal structure of organizations to the organizations themselves or the industry groupings in which their forms can classify them. Selection by the environment can occur at each of these levels, affecting population distributions of internal structures, organizations, and societal levels, respectively. Like Hawley, Aldrich continues to stress the importance of communication technology and other cultural knowledge on a unit's ability to respond to and even shape its environment.

He also develops six dimensions of the environment, namely, capacity, homogeneity, stability, concentration, domain consensus, and degree of turbulence, which he argues might allow us to identify niches that could support new organizational forms even before they were occupied by actual organizations. These dimensions also represent a provisional inventory of variables that could be searched for selective influences from the environment. Finally, Aldrich notes that retention is necessary, in combination with variation and selection, to drive a population ecology model of organizational change. Again, he uses a Weberian institutional approach for discussing retention, as opposed

to the more inertial imagery in the other two modern strands of ecological theory (see below).

Indeed, in his most recent book, Aldrich (1999) labels his approach "evolutionary" rather than ecological to encompass his six levels at which the processes of variation, selection, and retention can operate. The ecological level is the most macrostructural form, but institutional, interpretive, organizational learning, resource dependence, and transaction cost economic perspectives are also incorporated in the more general treatment of the selective and retentive processes. Aldrich spends considerable space discussing the institutional and interpretive processes that shape how managers can (or cannot) change organizations from within. He also focuses on individual and organizational networks, taking an approach that is based more on information/resource flows than on the selective mechanisms that form the core of more purely ecological-evolutionary approaches (for instance, see discussion of McPherson's theoretical model below). Therefore, he tends to discuss how embedding in personal networks spurs entrepreneurial behavior or how connections with other organizations give businesses a competitive advantage, rather than how the global structure of social networks shape populations of organizations. Like Hawley, Aldrich emphasizes the complexity of internal structures and how they lead to adaptation within a given environment.

HANNAN'S AND FREEMAN'S ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY

By far the most organized, prolific research tradition in modern ecological theory is the population ecology of organizations developed by Michael Hannan and John Freeman and their colleagues and students. While based explicitly on Hawley's human ecology (both Hannan and Freeman were graduate students under Hawley at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), this tradition shifts the focus even more thoroughly from adaptation to selection. The roots of the new perspective lay in several works from the mid-1960s. Most notable was Stinchcombe's 1965 chapter, which developed two themes that would be central to organizational ecology: (1) Organizations display considerable inertia in their forms and practices that keeps them from responding effectively to organizational changes, and (2) organizational deaths are a key feature that shape populations of firms. The primary focus of Stinchcombe's paper, the "liability of newness," or higher failure rates of new entries into an organizational field, has been the subject of a great deal of empirical exploration and theoretical debate. The relationship between age and death rates is complicated by the need to control for the effects of size, density, and other factors that become important in a more complete consideration of the process by which organizational populations are formed. However, the suggestion that organizations

were more persistent than malleable and that their deaths were an important variable to study led the way toward a revolutionary focus on selective processes in evolution.

To a remarkable extent, a 1977 paper in the *American Journal of Sociology* by Hannan and Freeman laid out the research agenda for the new organizational ecology that they and their students would build. The paper cataloged internal and external reasons why organizations would display considerable inertia, and argued forcefully for a shift to theories that emphasized selection rather than adaptation as the main mechanism through which organizations respond to environmental pressures. They pointed out that the appropriate unit of analysis for such a selection-oriented ecology was the population of organizations that were relatively homogeneous in their environmental vulnerability and had similar “blueprints” for organizational action; studying the responses of a single organization could tell one relatively little about how selection shaped organizational form. They did note that selection took place at the level of organizational routines within organizations and that selection at one level was analogous to adaptation at the next higher level of analysis, but their primary motivation of explaining the variety, distribution, and change over time in organizational forms was clearly anchored at the population level of organizations.

Hannan and Freeman (1977) revisited Hawley’s principle of ecological isomorphism, which suggested that organizational form will reflect the environmental conditions in which it exists. But they revised the interpretation of that principle to emphasize selection. The *environment* was what optimized the fit between form and resources, not the internal adaptation of the organization itself.

Two sets of theoretical ideas that would spawn major research streams appeared in the 1977 paper. The first centered around a logistic growth curve that a population traced toward the upper limit of the carrying capacity of the environment for that organizational form. Hannan and Freeman (1977) introduced the Lotka-Volterra equations from population ecology to describe how competitors reduced the resources available for a population, thereby limiting its growth. They suggest that their simple competition theory could yield (and in fact did) a powerful description of how populations of organizations grew from the introduction of a new form (which they link to a release of constraints at some higher level) and its ultimate equilibrium size.

The second major theoretical idea Hannan and Freeman introduced in this landmark paper was their niche theory. Niches refer to the combinations of resources in which an organizational form can survive and reproduce itself. A fundamental niche is the range of resources that would allow survival in the absence of competitors and is a function of the organization’s action routines and their requirements. The realized niche is that area in the resource space in

which the population outcompetes other populations; it is the niche in a resource environment that includes competitors. Hannan and Freeman (1977) argued that different types of environments tended to select for generalists and specialists (i.e., organizations that have wide and narrow niches, respectively). They made predictions about the stability and uncertainty of environments (more changeable environments tend to favor generalists), about the *grain* of an environment (or how often it changes state in either temporal or spatial terms), and about the effects of convex and concave fitness sets (i.e., whether or not it is possible for one organizational form to do well in more than one state of the environment).

Each of the major ideas introduced by the 1977 paper, organizational inertia, the competition theory, and the niche theory, led to a tightly integrated, cumulative research program. After asserting in their original statement that organizations’ adaptability to environmental conditions was limited, Hannan and Freeman (1984) later made it explicit that inertia was not just an assumption of their ecological theorizing, but an ecological, selective process in its own right. Looking at populations of organizations rather than tracing the life course of a single, large, successful firm was a key element of their contribution. The argument was that organizations become increasingly inert over time as procedures, roles, and other structures become embedded in a more elaborate organizational form. Therefore, organizational change is less likely as an organization ages. This “clock” of inertia gets restarted when a major change occurs, since the structure is regenerated when such a major change occurs. The theory also predicts that larger organizations will be less likely to change, because of the structural differentiation that comes with size. Here, the selection-based theory makes a different prediction than a more adaptation-oriented view (e.g., Aldrich, following from Hawley, would predict that larger organizations were more likely to change, because of their access to resources). Empirical evidence here has been mixed. The core prediction of the structural inertia theory, better supported by evidence from a variety of industries, is that change is risky: Core changes in organizational structure and substantial diversification both increase the probability of organizational death.

The competition thread of the Hannan/Freeman organizational ecology concentrated most heavily on the effects of density within an organizational form on the founding and death rates within that niche. It represented a substantial departure from the earlier studies of organizational mortality, which concentrated on internal factors (and implied control by managers of those factors) rather than the organizational environment. Drawing on the concepts of carrying capacity, competition, and legitimation, an S-shaped curve described the growth rate of organizations of a given type. When a new type of organization develops, it at first

lacks legitimacy. Founding rates may be high, but so are deaths. If some initial entrants have success, however, the legitimacy of the form increases and new entrants have a lower death rate. Growth (the excess of foundings over deaths) in this middle part of the curve is at its highest rate. As the density of organizations within the niche increases, eventually the available resources become limited and the population reaches an equilibrium where foundings roughly equal deaths. The empirical strategy was to define a population by a general institutional label (roughly corresponding to industry) and to track its population from the initial foundings to the present. Studies of organization forms as varied as labor unions, semiconductor firms, newspaper publishers (in Argentina, Ireland, San Francisco, and Elmira, NY), fraternities and sororities at the University of California at Berkeley, domestic airlines, commercial banks, microbreweries, banks, and life insurance companies follow this general pattern.

The competition theory also predicts that the density of organizations in the niche when an organization is founded will have lasting effects on its probability of demise. Being founded in a dense, competitive environment places stresses on an organization's initial development. It was hypothesized (and found) to have a lasting negative effect on organizational mortality.

Most of the research on competition has focused on intrapopulation dynamics, or the effect of a population's density on its vital rates of founding and death. Much less attention has been paid to the interdependence among populations, which is important when their fundamental niches overlap substantially. The complexity introduced into the ecological model by considering legitimacy, a cultural force of commensal impact, makes the interaction of populations (or subpopulations) more difficult to predict. One subpopulation may serve to legitimate another while simultaneously using resources that limit the other's growth. Empirical studies have explored interactions between subpopulations in labor unions, breweries, banks, and life insurance companies. In some cases, researchers found strong interdependencies (e.g., the relationship between craft and industrial unions), while in others there were no observable cross-effects (e.g., commercial and savings banks).

The empirical work on the third theoretical domain, niche theory, concentrated on variability and grain of the environment. Variability constrains niche width, whether or not it is predictable. The fact that stable environments favor specialists is common to many theories that link organization and environment. The prediction that uncertainty favors generalists over specialists *only* when the variations have "course grain" (i.e., when typical durations in a particular environmental state are long relative to the typical lifetimes of organizations) is unique to the ecological approach. Studies of restaurants and semiconductor firms confirmed the predictions.

A somewhat different conception of the niche has developed through Carroll's work on resource partitioning (Carroll 1985). Here, the environment is conceptualized as more uniform than sharply granular in its adaptive demands. In addition, the focus is on the realized niche rather than the fundamental niche. Here, Carroll noted that generalists might actually benefit from their participation in a variety of environmental states if they enjoy economies of scale and scope. If scale provides strong advantages, then a large organization will generally have a larger realized niche than a smaller organization with the same fundamental niche. The empirical difficulty is that only realized niches can be observed straightforwardly. It is therefore difficult to study communities of organizations that compete: The lack of overlap may be because their fundamental niches do not overlap or because their competition has led to competitive exclusion where only one organization survives in a given domain.

One topic that has received relatively little attention in Hannan's and Freeman's population ecology tradition is the structure of larger communities of organizations. Aldrich and his colleagues made some attempts to examine the emergence of new organizational forms, while Hannan and Freeman called in their early statements for research on properties of communities such as dimensionality and complexity. The third major modern strand of ecological theorizing deals explicitly with this level of analysis.

MCPHERSON'S ECOLOGY OF AFFILIATION

McPherson's (1983) ecology of affiliation linked individuals and the social groups to which they belonged into a community system. Based, like Hannan and Freeman, on the Lotka-Volterra competition equations from population ecology, the basic image of the ecological model of association is that individuals flow into and out of organizations as a result of processes of competition and connection. Competition among groups occurs through the fact that many groups vie for the time and other resources of individuals. The connections among individuals created by social network ties are the proximate mechanism through which individuals enter and leave groups. The interplay between these two processes generates hypotheses about which members will be most likely to exit, what kinds of people are most likely to join, which groups are most likely to grow or decline, how groups will change their composition over time, and what kind of groups are most likely to die or be created. The model explicitly connects the social network connections among individuals to the individual level processes of recruitment and departure, and the organizational level processes of stability and change, and growth and decline. The model is inherently multilevel, with formal links between the individual, organizational, population, and community levels. It effectively uses the

fact that human time and attention are limited resources required by virtually all social groups to link these groups into a community ecology. The major theoretical argument in this work was the insight that organizations compete ecologically in a niche space defined by the characteristics of the people in the community.

In the ecology of affiliation model, the underlying resource space in which social entities compete is structured by the social network. It makes considerable use of the fact that social network ties are not distributed randomly. Instead, people associate with others who are similar in sociodemographic characteristics. This tendency for network relations to form locally in social space is known as the *homophily principle*. Since individuals close to one another in a sociodemographic characteristic are similar, homophily implies that ties are local in social space. As a result of homophily, the probability of a tie between two individuals decreases with social dissimilarity—their distance from one another in a multidimensional social space. Ties tend to connect close neighbors, spanning relatively short distances.

Voluntary associations as well as most groups and organizations generally recruit through the network ties of their members, as do firms, social movements, and religious cults. An important result of this fact is that new members replicate the characteristics of old ones. Because of the homophily principle, friends and acquaintances who join the group through their connections to present members will be similar to their contacts within the organization. This phenomenon provides the stability (termed “retention” in Aldrich’s ecological discussion) as groups perpetuate themselves over time.

Recruitment through homophilous ties guarantees that the new recruits to a group are never a random sample of people. Instead, each organization recruits from a characteristic region of social space; this region is the organization’s niche in the ecology of affiliation model. At any time, individuals in the niche are at the highest probability of becoming members because they are most likely to be connected by a homophilous network tie to a present member. New members of the group come mostly from inside the niche, rooting the organization in that neighborhood.

If only recruitment processes governed the group, eventually the group would spread throughout social space by growing at the edges. The group would grow continuously at the edges and eventually spread through the system. Since members at the edge of the niche have contacts outside the niche, these outside contacts would be drawn into the group over time, enlarging the niche. The group would have members of all levels of education, age, sex, and so forth. Instead, group homogeneity occurs through selective attrition. Research shows that members at the center of the niche remain longer than those at the edge and that members who are in regions of competition between groups

leave groups at higher rates. In addition, membership duration in voluntary groups is mediated by social network ties. First, ties between comembers in an organization lengthen the membership of both members. Second, ties between members and nonmembers shorten the duration of the members. Both effects are cumulative; the more such ties, the greater the effects on membership duration.

The balance between these effects—internal network ties keeping members in the group and external ties pulling members out of the group—produces different results for individuals in the center of the niche as opposed to the edge of the niche. Since the homophily effect means that most of the social network ties of egos will be nearby in social space, people in the center of the niche will be connected mostly to others in the niche of the group. Groups are localized in social space by the homophily principle. They are made different from one another through ecological competition, as shown below.

Because of the localization of activity in sociodemographic space, the ecology of affiliation model represents organizations as hyperboxes existing in K -dimensional space. The dimensions are defined by the social, spacial, and temporal characteristics of the individuals in the community. The competitive dynamics in the model are based on the idea that groups that overlap in the space will be competing for the same kind of members; over time, groups will exert pressure on the resources in the community. The net effect of these pressures will be a dynamic equilibrium in which groups are pulled toward one another by the presence of available potential members and pushed away from one another by the competition for the time and resources of the individuals. When too many groups occupy the same region of social space, groups in the overlap will find it more difficult to recruit new members and more difficult to retain the ones they already possess. There is strong empirical evidence for this competitive effect at the individual level: Members in regions of high overlap leave the group at a significantly higher rate than members in regions of less overlap.

The net result of these competitive forces is the movement of groups around in the space, in response to the temporary over- or underabundance of groups in relation to potential members. Researchers found that groups move away from highly overlapped regions by losing more members than they replace and will move toward less overlapped regions by recruiting more members than they lose.

One of the most interesting features of McPherson’s ecological model is that it should apply to any social entity that (1) spreads or recruits through social networks and (2) competes with other similar entities for a social actor’s time, energy, or attention. In recent years, researchers have successfully applied the model to the composition of occupations, religious congregations, musical tastes, and social attitudes. The model can explain the relative wages of

occupations through its processes of recruitment, attrition, and the resulting competition. In principle, almost all the social entities that have been studied in social surveys can be modeled by the theory.

NEW THEORETICAL WORK: TOWARD SYNTHESIS

Two developments are currently bringing together the research traditions that have dominated ecological modeling since the late 1970s. The first is a new focus on the niche and its different conceptualizations. Researchers are developing formal theories that link the niche width theory of Hannan and Freeman, the resource-partitioning theory of Carroll, and the network niche theory of McPherson's ecology of affiliation. This development offers the opportunity to unify the central concept underlying the different ecological models, allowing each to be cast in terms of both fundamental and realized niches. The second development is Turner's (1994) synthesis of ecological selection arguments by Spencer, Durkheim, and the modern ecological theorists into an ecology of macrostructure. By reintroducing the more macro-organicist arguments from the earlier theorists, this work has the potential to explain macrostructural differentiation. By taking the ecological analysis to a system level, Turner shows the potential of these ecological ideas to relate population characteristics such as size and other structural features to the number, diversity, coherence, and generality of corporate groups.

— Miller McPherson

See also Evolutionary Theory; Hawley, Amos; Spencer, Herbert; Strength of Weak Ties

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EISENSTADT, SHMUEL N.

Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt (b. 1923) is one of the founders of comparative analysis of civilizations. His works rank among the most essential and influential contributions to comparative cultural sociology since World War II. Eisenstadt's efforts to bring forth the theory and methodology of cultural comparison have been internationally renowned and honored with several highly acclaimed awards, such as the International Balzan Prize in 1988. He is the author of several standard books on the field of macrosociology, such as *The Political Systems of Empires* (1963), *Tradition, Change, and Modernity* (1973), *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations* (1978), and *Patterns of Modernity* (1987).

Eisenstadt's scholarly interests have been shaped by his biographical background. Coming from a Jewish family that escaped from Poland to settle in Israel during the course of the Second World War, the young student witnessed the political struggles that preceded the establishment of the Israeli state. In the early 1940s, Eisenstadt began his studies of history, Jewish history, and sociology of culture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he received his PhD in sociology in 1947. Although taking many temporary appointments abroad, he taught at the Hebrew University until 1990.

Eisenstadt's intellectual roots are grounded in the predominant sociological approaches of the postwar period. He initially came into contact with these through his academic

teachers Martin Buber and Richard Kroebner and, afterwards, during his postdoctoral studies at the London School of Economics, through Edward Shils. Shils provided a genuine macrosociological approach that incorporated the classical sociological concepts of Weber and Durkheim within a structural-functional framework developed by Parsons. As a consequence of these influences, Eisenstadt's theoretical work is marked by a rare ability to integrate new theoretical concepts and methodological tools into his empirical approach so that his sociological theory progressed in tandem with empirical advancement. For this reason, it would be distorting to assign any single theoretical paradigm to his varied labors.

Since his research beginnings, Eisenstadt has subscribed to a macrosociological comparative analytic perspective, wittingly carrying on an endeavor that Weber's sociology of religion had prefaced. The first results of his enterprise, after having examined the questions of the absorption of new immigrants in Israel as well as the problem of generations before, were summarized in *The Political Systems of Empires* (1963). It not only presented the analytic tools of cultural comparison but also contained a catalogue of sociological problems that Eisenstadt was to flesh out systematically in the subsequent years by turning to a variety of historical subjects. Eisenstadt's comparative analysis of the social structure of empires described a set of institutional and cultural preconditions. He detected at the core of any system of empire the need to preserve and maintain resources that would be free of control by any traditional or rurally oriented social group. Thus, the formation of unprecedented social institutions such as bureaucracies, standing armies, and groups of political entrepreneurs was explained with reference to the functional need for "free" resources.

Eisenstadt went deep into historical detail to elucidate the prevailing circumstances that determined developments in Egypt, Rome, Byzantium, Russia, and Europe. He thereby hinted at the cultural dimension of social actors and their respective cultural visions that, consequently, had to be conceived of as an autonomous social factor. Here, having left the grounds of strict structural-functional analysis, at least implicitly, Eisenstadt steadily extended his focus on the significance of cultural views and their carrier groups for the structuring of societies. Simultaneously with the elaboration of a systematic approach to civilizational comparison, he conducted comparative research on prophets and intellectuals. The results have been summarized in Eisenstadt's most prominent concept of "axial age civilizations" (1986). The "axial age," a term invented by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers, is defined by a revolutionary breakthrough that took place in almost all important cultures around the first millennium B.C. It proceeded from the institutionalization of a fundamental tension between the transcendental order, on one hand, and the mundane order, on the other. The vision of a transcendental order that

would be realized on earth was generally carried by autonomous intellectual elites who strove for a reorganization of societal centers. According to Eisenstadt, this constellation brought about new types of civilizational dynamics that, subsequently, would force the analyst to focus on the interweaving of cultural and social structural dimensions of human interaction and social order.

Eisenstadt took up this perspective in his successive endeavors to explore the impact of such struggles on urban structures and hierarchies. In particular, he studied patron-client hierarchies and the social dynamics of revolutionary processes (1978). From these special cases, his attention turned toward a reappraisal of the concept of modernization (1987). Against the classical theory of modernization, which assumed a perpetual motion toward differentiation and progress, Eisenstadt established the view that one specific type of civilization originated in Europe and spread throughout the world. As patterns of modernization became incorporated in different societies, they would be, according to Eisenstadt, confronted with specific sets of symbolic and institutional premises and thus bring about particular civilizational composites. The traditional picture of a royal road toward modernity was systematically replaced by the image of "multiple modernities" (2002). Exemplifying a special case, Eisenstadt drew attention to Japanese civilization. Despite the lack of axial-age transformation in its history, it exhibits institutional structures typical for such societies. That is, it shows a transparent conception of a strong chasm between the transcendental and the mundane order.

— Bernhard Giesen and Daniel Šuber

See also Civilizing Processes; Culture and Civilization; Modernity; Parsons, Talcott; Weber, Max

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ELEMENTARY THEORY

Elementary theory is a theory for human activity in social relations embedded in social structures. The theory

takes the following form: Fundamental concepts are introduced by interpreting network points and arcs such as those of Figure 1. Derived concepts are built up, first, from combining fundamental concepts and, later, from combining fundamental concepts and concepts already derived. For example, the Points A and B become *social actors* as formulations are introduced for *preference system*, *belief system*, and *decisions*. Then the *sanction* displayed in Figure 1.a is an act that positively affects the preference state of B, the actor receiving it. By contrast, the sanction of Figure 1.b negatively affects the preference state of B. Sanctions may also affect the preference state of the transmitting actor. Moving one step further, as shown in Figure 2, sanctions can be paired to define three basic types of social relationships: exchange, coercion, and conflict.

a. Positive Sanction



b. Negative Sanction




Figure 1 Types of Sanctions


An orienting perspective associated with this formalism is a view of society common to the classical theories of Marx, Weber, Simmel, and Michels. As a part of that view, analyses begin by assuming that the interests that actors pursue are not carried by actors from one social location to another. Instead, interests are embedded in social relations and reflected in actors while acting in that relation. *Interests* are valued states that actors seek. For example, when any of the four classical theorists found that masters exploited their slaves and capitalists profited from their workers, they framed their explanations, first, in terms of values and beliefs embedded in master-slave and capitalist-work relations. Nevertheless, classical theorists also understood that at times, values and beliefs acquired at one social location affect actions in another.

Like classical theory, elementary theory builds its simplest explanations by reflecting actors' values and beliefs from relations and structures. For example, in the coercive relationship of Figure 2, C has an interest in gaining D's positive sanction by threat of the negative sanction that D has an interest in avoiding. When sanctions are quantitative, elementary theory seeks to relate the size of positive sanction that D will send to the size of negative that C has as a

a. Exchange



b. Coercion



c. Conflict




Figure 2 Three Types of Social Relations

threat. The interests in seeking large positives and avoiding any negatives are embedded in the relation displayed. Nevertheless, paralleling the classics, when actors carry interests to a relation, elementary theory can be used to build the more complex models needed to accurately predict behavior.

Beyond recognizing that actors' interests are in social relations, classical theory understood that the conditions under which interests are pursued are given by the social structures in which relations are embedded. Sharing that understanding but using concepts as simple and few in number as possible, elementary theory builds models for social relations in social structures as shown in Figure 3. Then, modeled structures are made dynamic so that they can be compared with corresponding social structures in the world for explanation, prediction, and theory testing.




Figure 3 A Branch Connected at A

Models are dynamic when actors decide and act. Those decisions and actions are produced by applying two principles and resistance equations used as laws.

RATIONALITY AND POWER IN SOCIAL RELATIONS

When actors face an array of fixed parameters, as in choosing among structures or relations in which to act, Principle 1 applies and asserts that *all social actors act to maximize their expected preference state alteration*. Principle 1, as a rationality principle, brings actors to the relations in which they face each other. Taken alone, however, that principle is not enough to explain or predict behavior in relations such as coercion and exchange, where motives are mixed. For example, motives of both actors are mixed in the capitalist-worker exchange relation. The capitalist seeks the labor of the worker but wants to pay as little as possible for it. The worker seeks as large a wage as possible and exchanges labor for it. Said somewhat differently, both capitalist and worker want to exchange, but seek different and opposed terms of that exchange. Weber referred to mixed-motive relations such as these as ones in which actors' interests are opposed but complementary.

The resistance factor to the right of Equation 1 captures the mixed motives of an actor who *competes* to gain higher payoffs but *cooperates* to arrive at agreements. Let P_i be Actor i 's payoff from a possible agreement, $P_i max$ be i 's best possible outcome, and $P_i con$ be i 's payoff at confrontation when no agreement occurs. $P_i max - P_i$ is then i 's interest in gaining a better payoff, and $P_i - P_i con$ is i 's interest in avoiding confrontation. Resistance, R_i is

$$R_i = \frac{P_i \max - P_i}{P_i - P_i \text{ con}} \tag{1}$$

Principle 2 asserts that agreements occur at the point of equal resistance for undifferentiated actors in a full information system. Setting A's and B's resistance equal to each other gives

$$R_A = \frac{P_A \max - P_A}{P_A - P_A \text{ con}} = \frac{P_B \max - P_B}{P_B - P_B \text{ con}} = R_B \tag{2}$$

In Figure 3, three identical relations are connected at A, and resistance is now applied to any one. B has a resource worthless to B but worth 10 to A, while A's resources are a loss of 1 to A when transmitted and a gain of 1 to B when received. To solve for x , the number transmitted by A in exchange for B's resource, we note that $P_B = x$ and $P_A = 10 - x$. Assuming that one resource is the smallest

unit, $P_B max = 9$ when $x = 9$, and $P_A max = 9$ when $x = 1$. $P_A con = 0$ and $P_B con = 0$ when no sanctions flow. Therefore,

$$R_A = \frac{9 - P_A}{P_A - 0} = \frac{9 - P_B}{P_B - 0} = R_B$$

and

$$R_A = \frac{9 - (10 - x)}{10 - x} = \frac{9 - x}{x} = R_B$$

and $P_A = 5$ and $P_B = 5$ when A pays 5 for B's sanction.

For elementary theory, all mixed-motive relations, including the exchange relation just analyzed, are by definition *power relations*. As in all theoretically pure exchange relations, there is no condition of the exchange relation that advantages one actor over the other. Therefore, the *equiresistance* solution is defined as *equipower*. In coercive relations such as those of Figure 4, however, C, the coercer, is exercising power by threat of the negative over the coercee Ds.




Figure 4 A Coercive Branch Connected at C

In Figure 4, there are three identical coercive relations, and now resistance will be applied to any one. Here, let x be the number of sanctions sent by D under threat by C. Therefore, $P_C = x$ and $P_D = -x$. Since the strength of the negative sanction is -10 , D will send, at most, 9 positives to C. Therefore, $P_C max = 9$. Since sending the negative is costly, it is possible that C will not send it even though no positives are received. Therefore $P_D max = 0$ when no actions flow. At confrontation, the negative sanction is transmitted, and $P_C con = -1$, while $P_D con = -10$. Therefore,

$$R_C = \frac{9 - x}{x - (-1)} = \frac{0 - (-x)}{-x - (-10)} = R_D$$

and $x = 4.5$. That result means that D, the coercer, transmits 4.5 positive sanctions to C such that $P_C = 4.5$ and $P_D = -4.5$.

STRUCTURAL POWER CONDITIONS

An important set of structural power conditions are contingencies across the relations *connected* at a node. Six types of connection are defined by N , M , and Q . Those three quantities define the maximum and minimum numbers of relations in which an actor at a node can engage. N is the number of relations connected to the node. M is the maximum number of relations in which the actor can benefit. Q is the minimum number of relations in which agreement must be reached for i to benefit from any one. By definition, $N_i \geq M_i \geq Q_i \geq 1$ and

- i is inclusively connected if $N_i = M_i = Q_i > 1$
- i is exclusively connected if $N_i > M_i \geq Q_i = 1$
- i is null connected if $N_i = M_i > Q_i = 1$
- i is inclusive-exclusively connected if $N_i > M_i \geq Q_i > 1$
- i is inclusive-null connected if $N_i = M_i > Q_i > 1$
- i is singularly connected if $N_i = M_i = Q_i = 1$

The six types are exhaustive of the conditions that can be defined by the three quantities.

Null and exclusive connection are defined by comparing N , the number of relations incident at a node, and M , the largest number in which the actor at the node can benefit. When the two are equal, the connection is null and all relations are independent. Exchange or coercion goes forward in each relation exactly as it would had the other relations not be present. It immediately follows that the resistance is applied to null-connected exchange and coercive structures exactly as it was to individual exchange and coercive relations above, respectively.

By contrast, as will be shown shortly, resistance finds that exclusively connected nodes are advantaged by that condition. For example, outside the laboratory, an array of circumstances determines the sizes N and M . When a firm has exactly M suppliers for N components, it is null connected, but if it has a surplus of suppliers, $N > M$ and the connection is exclusive. In the laboratory, M , N , and Q are set as initial conditions.

Inclusive connection occurs when Q , the minimum number of relations that must be completed, is larger than 1. In experiments and outside, $Q > 1$ may indicate a "threshold effect." Alternatively, outside the lab, when the firm that must have $Q > 1$ components to assemble, it is inclusively connected to its suppliers. When $N = M = Q > 1$ in simple structures, the inclusively connected node is disadvantaged.

RESISTANCE IN POWER STRUCTURES

Now resistance is applied to predict outcomes for exchange and coercive relations in structures with each of the type of connection. Not to be discussed here is null

connection, which, as explained, was already implicitly covered in the application of resistance to isolated relations. When both actors are singularly connected, the relation is a dyad, and that too has already been covered. The structures discussed will be simple 3-branches like Figure 3 or 4. Beyond the four connection types, two further structural power conditions related to the types will be considered: hierarchy/mobility and ordering.

Exclusion

The Figure 3 branch network is exclusively connected when A can exchange with only one or two of the Bs, that is to say, when $N = 3$ and $M = 1$, or $M = 2$ and $Q = 1$. Consider the latter and call the structure Br321. In fact, Br321 is a *strong exchange structure*, where A is the high power position that will have offers that are exclusive alternatives. As a consequence, once A has received two offers, A's P_{con} for the third is not zero as in the dyad, but increases to the best of the two offers in hand. Furthermore, the most that the third B can hope to gain is just less than that offered by the other Bs. Therefore, P_{max} for the third B is deflated. Both effects shift the point of equiresistance in a direction favoring the high power position at the expense of the low power positions.

Let P_A^{t-1} be the payoff to A from one of A's exclusive alternatives at time $t-1$. Then $P_A^{con} = P_A^{t-1}$, the cost of confrontation for A at t is the alternative payoff already offered at $t-1$. The P_{max} for B now has an upper bound: $P_B^{max} < P_B^{t-1}$, which is the payoff to B of an offer just better for A than A's alternative payoff. Thus, the resistance expression for a strong power structure where R_A^H is the resistance of the high power A and R_B^L is the resistance of any low power B is:

$$R_A^H = \frac{P_A \max - P_A}{P_A - P_A^{t-1}} = \frac{P_B^{t-1} - P_B}{P_B - P_B^{con}} = R_B^L \quad (3)$$

Taking the calculations from Equation 2 as the point of departure,

$$R_A = \frac{9 - (10 - x)}{(10 - x) - 5} = \frac{4 - x}{x} = R_B$$

and $P_A = 7.5$ and $P_B = 2.5$. These values indicate the beginning of the power process, for at $t+1$ there are new negotiations, and plugging in the values just calculated now gives $P_A = 8.5$ and $P_B = 1.5$. For this iterative process, the end point of $P_A = P_A^{max} = 9$, and $P_B = 1$ is only a step away.

The analogous *strong coercive structure* is conceptualized in the following way. Figure 4 is a Br321 strong coercive structure when C receives positive sanctions from two Ds and negatively sanctions the third. The strong coercive structure is analogous to the strong exchange structure because the high power position reaches agreements with two of those low in power and is in confrontation with the third. As already mentioned, unlike exchange, where confrontation is the absence of sanction flows, for coercion, the confrontation state is the transmission of the negative sanction by the coercer.

Once again, those who are low in power make a series of better offers to the high power position. Treating the calculations for the coercive dyad as the first step, at t , the C has two offers of 4.5, and

$$R_C = \frac{9 - x}{x - 4.5} = \frac{-5 - (-x)}{-x - (-10)} = R_D$$

Now $x = 7.1$, $P_C = 7.1$, and $P_D = -7.1$. As in exchange, in the coercive structure the process goes forward until $P_C = P_C \text{ max} = 9$.

Whereas strong coercive structures are as easy to construct in the lab as are strong exchange structures, such is not the case outside, and as a result they are not as frequently found. The difference lies in this: Outside the lab, the necessary confrontations for exchange can be costless because no sanctions flow for them. By contrast, for coercion, there is always a cost because confrontation is the transmission of the negative sanction. There is an important exception, however, when relations are reversed.

Imagine the Figure 4 structure with the three relations reversed such that there is a single coeree and three coercers. Consider the *strong coeree structure* in which only one C can benefit from the D's positive sanction and the others are excluded. Then x , the size of the sanction sent by D, declines to zero as the Cs bid. When states are coercers and mobile corporations coerees that can choose the state in which to locate, the coeree central structure explains the often-observed fact that, when locating, corporations pay no taxes. Somewhere Weber noted that it was the mobility of capital between the small states of early modern Europe that was decisive for capitalist development.

Hierarchy/Mobility

While not a type of connection, elementary theory suggests that mobility in hierarchies is analogous to exclusive connection and identical in its quantitative effect when subordinates compete to move up. Recognizing

hierarchy/mobility allows the theorist to infer that organizational hierarchies, like ideal typical bureaucracies, have centralized control. By contrast, feudal structures, in which all own their positions and subordinates are not mobile, do not have centralized power. Of course, there were power differences in feudalism, but they can be traced to differential ownership of land and the military forces consequently supported.

Inclusive Connection

The Figure 3 exchange network is *inclusively connected* when A must exchange with all three Bs to benefit; call that network Br333. Examples include the manufacturer who needs all of an array of parts from single suppliers, and the boss with irreplaceable subordinates working in highly interdependent jobs. Assume that A exchanges first at equipower such that $P_{Ab} = 5$. Since A loses the value of its first exchange if its second exchange is not completed, for the next exchange, $P_{AB \text{ con}} = -P_{Ab} = -5$ and

$$R_A^I = \frac{P_A \text{ max} - P_A}{P_A - (-P_{Ab})} = \frac{P_B \text{ max} - P_B}{P_B - 0} = R_B \quad (4)$$

Since for the first exchange, $P_{Ab} = 5$, for the second,

$$R_A^I = \frac{9 - (10 - x)}{(10 - x) - (-5)} = \frac{9 - x}{x} = R_B$$

$P_A = 4.13$ and $P_B = 5.87$, and the peripheral B is exercising power over the central A.

More generally, the inclusion effect increases with the number of exchanges. For example, for the third exchange, the payoffs from the first two could be lost, $P_{AB \text{ con}} = -(5 + 4.13)$ and $P_A = 3.65$. Since the peripheral exchanging last gains most, all have an interest in outwitting the others. Thus, exchanges approach simultaneity, and A's payoffs across exchanges become increasingly similar. Then Equation 5 is used for all exchanges:

$$R_A^I = \frac{P_A \text{ max} - P_A}{QP_A} = \frac{P_B \text{ max} - P_B}{P_B - 0} = R_B \quad (5)$$

Coercive structures are inclusively connected for the same reasons as are exchange structures and with the same direction of effect. The inclusively connected C in Figure 4 still exercises power by force threat, but to a lesser degree due to inclusion. If agreements are simultaneous, use

Equation 5 together with the initial conditions for coercive relations to calculate C's payoffs. When $Q = 3$ as it does in Figure 3, $P_C = 3.37$ and $P_D = -3.37$.

Ordering

The order in which exchanges must occur, though not a type of connection, is a power condition. If A of Figure 3 must exchange with B_1 before B_2 and with B_2 before B_3 , then A is most disadvantaged in the first exchange, less so in the second, and exchanges at equipower in the third. In fact, power effects in ordering are identical to those of inclusion, but in reverse, and Equation 4 applies. Ordering explains why *gatekeepers*, who control access to valued things they do not own, can gain fees from clients. Examples range from the patrons of antiquity to corrupt officials today.

Inclusive-Exclusive Connection

The 3-branch of Figure 3 is the smallest network in which inclusive-exclusive connection can occur. Called Br322, A exchanges at most with two Bs and must complete both to benefit from either. Since A has three opportunities to exchange and must make only two, the first exchange is not affected by inclusion. With the completion of that exchange, $Q = 1$ and inclusion does not affect the second exchange. By contrast, exclusion affects three exchanges. Thus, in Br322 and all inclusive-exclusively connected networks, A is high power and gains maximally exactly like the exclusively connected A. An inclusive-exclusively connected coercer, such as C in Figure 4, is also unaffected by inclusion and benefits maximally.

Inclusive-Null Connection

The 3-branch of Figure 3 is also the smallest network in which inclusive-null connection can occur. Called Br332, A can exchange with all three Bs and must complete two exchanges to benefit from either. Since A has three opportunities to exchange and must make only two, the first exchange is not affected by inclusion. With the completion of that exchange, $Q = 1$ and inclusion does not affect the second exchange or third exchange. Thus, A is equipower with the Bs exactly like any A that was null connected. An inclusive-null-connected coercer, such as C in Figure 4, is also unaffected by inclusion and gains payoffs wholly as a consequence of threats to transmit negatives in each relation.

EXPERIMENTS AND OTHER APPLICATIONS

With one exception, resistance predictions for structures discussed above have survived experimental tests. The

exception is the impact of inclusion on coercive structures that has yet to be studied. Whereas elementary theory is an evolving theory, that evolution has now reached the point that with the exception just noted, experimentally tested theory covers all structural power conditions thus far discovered. Models for those power conditions now form a set of tools awaiting use in the natural settings of institutional and historical-comparative investigations. In those natural settings, investigators cannot empirically sort one structural power condition from another. Thus, it is important that experiments have already studied structures where multiple power conditions are present.

— David Willer

See also Exchange Networks; Graph Theoretic Measures of Power; Network Exchange Theory; Power; Power-Dependence Relations; Rational Choice; Social Exchange Theory

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ELIAS, NORBERT

Norbert Elias (1897–1990) was born in Breslau, Germany, in 1897. After studying medicine and philosophy at Breslau University, Elias turned his attention to the problem of long-term changes in what was assumed to be the constancy of human emotions and affects. He left Germany in 1933 as a refugee from the Nazi regime and continued his research, first in France and then in London. The result of this research was *The Civilizing Process*, which was published in 1939. After World War II, he worked as a sociologist in Uganda and at the University of Leicester, United Kingdom. He died in Amsterdam, Netherlands, in 1990, leaving a rich legacy of conceptual innovations that continues to be developed, usually under the terms of civilizing and decivilizing processes, and figurational sociology.

In *The Civilizing Process*, Elias argued that changing patterns of manners and emotional economies in the European Middle Ages were connected to transformations

in power ratios and the monopolization of violence in the context of state formation. In so arguing, Elias established the themes and conceptual structure that would be elaborated and built on in subsequent works, including *The Established and Outsiders*; *The Society of Individuals*; *Time: An Essay*; *Mozart: Portrait of a Genius*; *The Germans*; and *What Is Sociology?* This thematic elaboration included the problems of restraint, a relational theory of power, and the formation and transformation of groups and their identities, all of which also contained a critique of the underlying assumptions of the classical sociological tradition. His critique of this tradition begins this discussion of his work.

ELIAS'S CRITIQUE OF SOCIOLOGY

The historical analysis of the emergence of the concept of civilization in Norbert Elias's work is underpinned by a complex three-sided theoretical strategy that emerges under his formulation of civilizing processes. Elias introduces the notion of civilizing processes as a corrective to three images and intellectual paradigms that have dominated the human and social sciences, whether they are imbedded in philosophy, sociology, or psychology. These three images and intellectual paradigms are methodological individualism, systems theoretic approaches, and units of analysis that place the emphasis on the investigation of the immediate present. Elias develops a three-dimensional counter-paradigm of civilizing processes that concentrates on the following aspects of human association: relational and power interdependence between social actors, which dissolves the distinction between individual and society; the interrelation between processes at the levels of social development and psychologically located drives and affects; and change and innovation over time. Before presenting Elias's paradigm of civilizing processes in more detail, it is worth presenting an outline of his critiques of the three images and intellectual paradigms mentioned above.

Epistemological individualism is formed on the basis of the position of an individual "I," who either establishes for himself or herself the principles through which knowledge is formed (Descartes) or has these principles structured immanently within, often in an unknown way (Kant). In these cases of the philosophy of the subject, the principle remains the same: Knowledge, perceptions, or actions stem from an act of individual effort on the part of the social actor, who is perceived as a self-contained unit. Elias terms this image of self-sufficient containment "homo clausus" (Elias 1991:18, 196–202; 1994:xlii).

Whilst systems theory approaches often draw on this image of homo clausus in order to present a social system as a self-contained unit from which it develops its own system-generating capacities, it portrays an added dimension—that of social abstraction. To be sure, as Elias (1978a)

makes clear, "It is the task of every sociological theory to clarify the characteristics that all human societies have in common" (pp. 227–28). However, a systems analysis, and here Elias has Parsons's work in mind, is faced with a double problem. The first problem involves the core functions that are attributed to a social system by the social theorist, which become the "motor," or first principle, and gives this system its coherence. The second problem stems from the first. First principles and core functions become static concepts that are applied to all societies, irrespective of their histories and specific social dimensions. This type of static application has the effect of reducing societies to the actions and relations between chemical-like properties. Social theory becomes social chemistry, in which theoretically derived abstract principles are applied to all societies at the cost of an understanding of the specific conditions of a particular society (Elias 1978a:227–28; 1987a:223–47).

This ahistorical approach is related to another problem in sociological research in which the time horizon, if not extracted altogether, concentrates on immediate and present conditions. This "retreat of sociologists into the present," or "hodiocentrism," as Elias terms it, generates an arbitrary temporal cleavage between past and present, and draws on the immediate present for the solution of problems from the vantage point of short-term trends. According to Elias, this retreat either truncates a more informed understanding or views the present as a sufficient and self-contained condition. It is the temporal form of homo clausus (Elias 1987a:223–24).

Elias responds to these three intellectual currents and self-images in three interconnected ways. Instead of an image of homo clausus, Elias develops a counterimage of "homines aperti," or open human interdependency (Elias 1978b:125, 135). In response to systems theoretic approaches, of which Parsons's work is paradigmatic, Elias posits a multidimensional approach whereby a number of functions are identified by him as necessary for the functional reproduction of any given society. Moreover, he also argues that this multidimensionality dovetails with the psychological formation of social subjects. Furthermore, Elias argues that long-term studies often articulated in centuries, rather than in years or decades, yield understandings about both the continuity and dovetailing of social and psychological processes and their change over time. According to Elias, only long-term process sociology of this type can yield knowledge concerning the complex interactions between any present and its past. However, for Elias, the unit of time analysis is not the most fundamental issue. Rather, for him, studies of the *longue durée* are indicative of human imbeddedness in its rich and constitutive historicity. His analyses of social processes are studies directed to this historicity and the changes that occur to it over time. This radical historicism is infused into Elias's overall approach.

For Elias, human association is the outcome of figurations that entail transformations in power struggles and strategies of inclusion and exclusion between groups, and changes in the regime of affects over time. In linking figurations, transformations of power, and transformations of affects together, Elias develops an integrated theoretical strategy termed the “civilizing process,” which addresses the sociological and psychological dimensions of human life that are themselves imbedded in long historical networks of human interdependence (Elias 1978a, 1982). The following discussion will concentrate on the human self-image of homines aperti or figurational forms, and on the civilizing processes that these figurational forms both give shape to and are, in turn, shaped by.

CHAINS OF INTERDEPENDENCE

Elias effects a paradigm shift from an image of a closed, self-contained individualism (*homo clausus*) to an image of human beings imbedded in open relations, or what are posited by him as open social figurations (*homines aperti*). Every human being, for Elias, is already imbedded in a double form of opening; on one hand, “every human individual is from birth to death part of a figuration” that, on the other hand, he or she “co-determines in various and changing ways” (Arnason 1987:444). This image of a mutually determining openness is the core aspect of Elias’s theory of civilizing processes and the theory of social and psychological formation that is internal to it.

These open figurations mean that for Elias, each social actor is connected to other social actors by virtue of “invisible” chains of social interdependence, which are general and specific. They are general in that these chains denote functionally orientated and derived interdependencies as social actors move in and out of social roles and social functions. As Elias (1991) states,

Each individual, even the most powerful, even a tribal chief, an absolute monarch, or a dictator, is a part of [a chain of interdependence], the representative of a function which is formed and maintained only in relation to other functions which can only be understood in terms of the specific structures and the specific tensions in this total context. (pp. 14–15)

As this quote indicates, they are specific in that social actors are born into particular chains of interdependency, with their own specific historicities and interlinkages, and without which he or she could never become fully human. In a manner similar to Émile Durkheim in “The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Condition,” Elias (1991) argues that “only in relation to other human beings does the wild helpless creature which comes into the world become the psychologically developed person with the character of

an individual and deserving the name of an adult human being” (p. 21).

Chains of interdependency, then, denote both socialization and individualization. Social actors are born into chains of functional interdependencies in which their habits and self-perceptions are shaped by the others around them. However, in so moving around these interdependent social networks, they become known as particular social actors with particular roles and histories, and as such also shape the particular figurations in which they are located.

For Elias, this double-sided capacity for both being shaped and shaping denotes the essential dynamic capacity of social actors. It also denotes their capacity for power. Rather than viewing power as something that belongs to someone or to a social system and can be one-sidedly imposed by this person or social system simply as domination, Elias (1991) argues that power is intrinsic to the capacity of social actors themselves to “influence the self-regulation and the fate of other people” (p. 52), who, in turn, are doing likewise. Chains of interdependence are simultaneously forms and chains of power. In this sense, figurations are constituted as power ratios or balances between social actors or groups with their relative strengths and weaknesses, strategies, and counter-strategies. However, Elias does not view power simply as a strategy or a series of rational choices made by social actors in a zero-sum game. Rather, his model of power also subtly builds in the forms of self-perceptions and definitions that are internalized by groups and projected upon others as a code-termining, nonrational, and noncalculative dimension. In developing and deploying these perceptions and definitions of self and other, social actors and groups attain a coherent identity that forms and maintains a boundary between “us” and “them,” or “established” and “outsiders.” In Elias’s view, the development of perceptions that form and maintain identity of both self and other is an integral part of any figurational form (Elias 1994, 1996).

The outcome of these ratios of power with their identity-securing aspects is the formation of monopoly mechanisms (Elias 1982:104–116). Elias does not necessarily equate power only with the development of state forms, even though these are a fundamentally crucial monopoly innovation at the level of social institutions, as *The Civilizing Process* suggests. Rather, for him, monopoly mechanisms potentially take shape in all areas where interweaving occurs: throughout the human life cycle and in all social domains. Moreover, these figurations develop over time and in often unforeseen ways. The greater the number of actors or groups within any one figuration, and thus the “longer” or more complex the figurational chains, the more indeterminate and unpredictable the outcome of the balances of power—if one can speak of outcome at all. It is more appropriate here to speak of increasing shifts in these balances over time as the figurations become increasingly more complex.

POWER AND CONTROLS, INVOLVEMENTS AND DETACHMENTS: CIVILIZING PROCESSES

In light of the above remarks, power is not a “thing” or an instrument for Elias. As a concept, it is a shorthand and, as he points out, often a rigid way of capturing the major characteristic of all human relationships (Elias 1978b:74). Instead of speaking about power externally imposed, Elias proposes that we speak of figurations, ratios, and balances that are internal features of any social relation. Nor is power blunt. The very fact that human beings are caught up and are constituted through human figurations entails, for him, that ratios of power occur both socially, through the inventions of institutions through which power can be monopolized and wielded more effectively, and psychologically, in the way habits and dispositions are internalized to historically mold instincts and emotions.

Elias’s basic thesis is that there is a link between the long-term structural development of societies and changes in people’s psychology and their *habitus*. His basic proposition is as follows:

If in this or that region the power of central authority grows, if over a larger or smaller area the people are forced to live in peace with each other, the molding of affects and the standards of the drive economy are very gradually changed as well. (Elias 1978a:165; Rundell and Mennell 1998:26)

Elias explores this basic thesis through what he terms the “triad of basic controls,” and these apply to all societies no matter what their condition of material or cultural life. These three aspects of basic human social controls refer to, first,

The extent of its control-chances over non-human complexes of events . . . [second], by the extent of its controls-chances over inter-personal relationships . . . [and third] by the extent to which each of its members has control over himself as an individual.” (Elias 1978b:156)

The first two control mechanisms are the basic feature of a society’s sociogenesis, whilst the third is the social actor’s psychogenesis. Sociogenesis emphasizes the overall structure of a social field or figuration, rather than “society.” This social field can be territorially defined, for example, through the formation of states; but it can also refer to particular social relations between groups and actors within a field, for example, between classes, between sexes, between those who are “inside” and those who are “outside,” and between those who specialize in the formation of knowledge (Elias 1982, 1987a, 1994). Furthermore, and importantly, Elias emphasizes not only the social field but also its long-term historical genealogy, development, and

transformation. The aspect of psychogenesis emphasizes the balances, tensions, and conflicts between malleable human drives and those drive controls that become ingrained and learned during the development of the human personality. In other words, interactions between human beings necessarily transform drives through the development of regimes of drive control and self-restraint. There is thus an intersection between sociogenesis and psychogenesis: Sociogenesis entails that psychological transformations are themselves both historical and structural. Internal transformation and molding occurs, for Elias, in the context of preestablished historical settings. Elias conceptualizes the combination of sociogenesis, psychogenesis, and the triad of basic controls under the more general and extensive formulation of civilizing processes.

Changes at the level of social structures or institutions brought about by transformations in the balances of power between human groups create tensions within this structure and also effect the balance of self-control or self-restraint of those individuals within the given social field. This tension is conceptualized by Elias in terms of involvement and detachment, or in terms of lesser or greater degrees of control, especially at the level of cognition and identity formation. In Elias’s view, “involvement” denotes an unreflected self-centeredness in terms of the solipsistic construction of human knowledge to the point of self-enclosure and affects the forms of knowledge that may develop. Involved knowledge, according to Elias is typified by high levels of phantasmagoria of the natural world through the imaginative figurations of human “reality” upon it in the form of magic and myth. It refers to “beliefs and practices which indicate that human persons experience themselves as directly involved and participating in [natural] processes” (Elias 1987b:102, 35, 97–103).

Here, human figurations and power do not dissolve, nor do they fail to exist. Rather, according to Elias, they are subsumed to the dynamic of undifferentiated identification with, and emotional partisanship for, the “we,” often in the form of a club, a party, a *fuehrer*, or a nation-state. Here, the figuration is constituted through the movement between gratification, self-esteem, and devotion to a collective. In conditions of involvement, all social relations are constituted as undifferentiated states of singular immersion in a continuum of identity. In other words, an involved condition is an undifferentiated one, characterized by a lack of emotional detachment by those on the inside and a fixed and hostile position toward those who are “outside” (Elias 1987b, 1996). Even worse, according to Elias, it can become pathological, in which another cannot even begin to enter. In this latter condition, patterns of interaction are exemplified by self-enclosure or encasement on each side of the interaction, in which reactive, mutual hostility erupts. Here, violence is an outcome of a set of increasingly enclosing social relations between self and other, rather than a precondition for these social relations.

Detachment is the process through which the circle of mutual encasement, or what Elias terms “encystment,” is broken. In this sense, Elias’s notion of detachment is a theory of reflexivity in which he brings together increasing capacities for objectification with increasing capacities for figurational, cognitive, and psychological differentiation. It has the following characteristics: increasing orientations toward reality and control of objects qua objects and thus what he terms “autonomous valuation,” as distinct from heteronomous evaluation; increasing capacities for distance or perspective; increasing differentiation at the level of both ego formation and ego identity, such that the ego can separate and develop distinct from alter; the recognition of others as external entities; and a capacity for self-observation (Elias 1987b:116). It is thus internal to increasing the scope of the chains of interdependency, as we shall see below.

Moreover, according to Elias, the capacity for detachment and the form of reflexivity to which it gives rise rely on increasing forms of restraint. From the side of the development of sociogenesis, Elias argues that two social institutional complexes were historically invented that engendered new patterns of social restraint, which led to increased detachment and social interdependence. These new institutions were the state and the towns. There are some affinities with Max Weber’s theory of state formation. Both argue that the state is a social form that has control over territory on the basis of monopolizing the use of force, which is accompanied by a legitimating claim. However, for Elias, the figurational forms of the occidental courts of the great feudal lords and the later courts of the absolutist states are paradigms for an analysis of the historical development of civilizing processes. They are internally related to the development of detached or more “rational” forms of thinking and the transformation of the regime of affects and emotions. Increasing territorial control became homologous with increasing internalized self-control (Elias 1978a, 1982).

Moreover, state formation and the internal pacification of a territory that it facilitated through its monopolization of violence (in the form of war) and money (in the form of taxation) enabled individuals to become enmeshed in larger and wider social networks, institutions, and patterns of interaction, including the division of labor, trade, monetary exchanges, and bureaucracies. In other words, the history of civil society, or what emerged in Marxian terms as the development of capitalism, according to Elias was reliant upon the internal pacification of territory, which only the formation of the absolutist state could provide. This places the social field of the state at the center of theories of capitalist development, rather than viewing it as derivative force. The result is an image of historical development—for the modern West at least—that is multidimensional, as social forces interweave with each other, producing cumulative effects at both the social and psychological levels.

In this way, chains of interdependence between the participants in social figurations, whether these be trade, war, or intimate conduct, simultaneously become both more centralized and controlled, and more extensive and functionally differentiated. The “monopoly mechanism” does not lead to a decrease in the variety and forms of interactions within a given social field. Quite the opposite. According to Elias (1982), a paradoxical movement occurs in social fields that are structured in terms of detached figurations: There are “diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties” (p. 251). From the side of the institutional organization of social power, a functional “simplicity” emerges through the monopolization of means and functions, especially in terms of martial and fiscal control, that assists the stabilization of social conduct. At the same time, though, distancing between social actors increases the scope for experimentation, differentiation, and variety of social conduct, because social relations become predictable given that the propensity for violence outside socially prescribed and ritualized forms of conduct is minimized.

Moreover, this monopolization of physical violence also creates a pacified social space in which “the moderation of spontaneous emotions, the tempering of affects, the extension of mental space beyond the moment into past and future” could occur (Elias 1982:236). Elias exemplifies this social space by the court, and he terms its new economy of affects “courtly rationality.” Courtly rationality involves a shift from involved physical and emotional interaction in which a propensity to violence is always present, and not simply just below the surface, to detached, symbolic interaction that also might be termed mannered and representational or symbolizing interaction (Elias 1982a:281; 1987a:339–61).

Elias argues that as webs of interdependence become denser and more extensive, a shift gradually takes place in the balance from external constraints imposed by others to constraints imposed by oneself. *The Civilizing Process* begins with the development of social conventions concerning activities such as eating, washing, and toileting in order to show that as patterns of interdependence become more stabilized, each of these “natural acts” become increasingly subject to external and internal stylization and self-restraint. For Elias, this is not merely a matter of socialization; socialization itself belongs to a long history of affect control that cannot be separated from the histories of the way in which violence and affect regimes are gradually restrained and “civilized.”

This historical development of new, detached forms of self-constraint can be highlighted, for example, through Elias’s discussion of the emotional economy of love. What he perceptively terms “aristocratic romanticism,” rather than courtly love, is in his view, one of the outcomes of the long process formation of court society as it develops out of the knightly elite. In his view, the emergence of the

European form of courtly love is symptomatic of the double shift toward detached interdependence and self-constraint. Whilst courtly love refers to the sexual balance of power within the figuration of the courtly elite, Elias argues that this form of love emerges out of a figuration of power between three forms of knightly existence that begin to become distinguishable between the eleventh and twelfth centuries: Knights of lower status who ruled small amounts of territory, a smaller number of knights of high status who ruled over great territories, and a middle strata with little or no land, who put themselves in the service of the higher-status knights. The tradition of vassalage and the troubadour knight—the *Minnesingers* who sang at court and directed his erotic attention toward the wife of the nobleman, the lady—was formed out of this dependent relation and in the direction of ritualized and constrained patterns of interaction. In this context, aristocratic romanticism became reliant on representational and symbolizing forms in the style of lyric poetry and *Minnesang* and, later, the romantic novel. According to Elias, aristocratic romanticism is in part the outcome of a concealed resentment by those on the periphery of the court who yearn nostalgically for an idealized past (Elias 1982:66–90; 1983:214–67).

THE HUMAN SELF-IMAGE OF RESTRAINT

The central image that emerges in Elias's construction of the civilizing process is one of constraint. This is the way in which he, for example, portrays aristocratic romanticism: It is a movement "toward a greater conversion of external to internal compulsions" (Elias 1983:221). However, it is more than simply a constraint from the use of physical violence, especially if this constraint is viewed as imposed by structural or institutional means. Rather, as the quote immediately above implies (as well as the brief discussion of the sociogenesis of aristocratic romanticism above), there is also a reorganization in the internal pattern of self-constraint and a movement from involvement to detachment. A pattern emerges typified as an active self-disciplining and self-constraint or internal participation, in which short-term impulses are subordinated to middle or more distant goals. As Elias notes (1982), "These self-constraints . . . tend toward a more even moderation, a more continuous restraint, a more exact control of drives and effects in accordance with the more differentiated pattern of social interweaving" (p. 243). Furthermore, for Elias, self-constraint entails a developed capacity for hindsight and foresight, in other words, reflexive detachment from others. As indicated above, this is the primary indicator of detached relations to the world and to the self.

Elias does not draw on the language of repression, with its reliance on a metapsychological image of a naturalistic substratum of drives, to enact this constraint. Rather, for him, the model is a developmental one in which a reciprocal

process of maturation and learning occurs. In Elias's view, the biological propensity for maturation within the human animal cannot be separated from a learning capacity through which "unlearned forms of steering conduct become subordinated to learned forms," to the point where, for the human being, genetic rigidity gives way to not only malleability but also learning. Learning becomes, for the human being, the sole requisite and means for survival (Elias 1987a:345). Moreover, this learning occurs only in the context of other human beings. Only through learning situations in the context of human groups can "the natural human structures which remain dispositions . . . fully function" (Elias 1987a:347).

As Elias points out, the biological process of maturation and the social process of learning dovetail, but not always in a straightforward manner, without scars and painful memories (Elias 1982:244–45). In an argument that is at times quite close to Jean Piaget's, Elias posits that learning takes place in specific social contexts and intersects maturational plateaus within the human animal, which can either be blocked or advanced, depending on the nature and the context of the learning. There is a tension here at the intersection between psychogenesis and sociogenesis, which plays itself out in terms of a tension between forms of involvement and forms of detachment.

There are, then, two background presuppositions that are anchored firmly and deeply within Elias's work. First, Elias argues that a permanent question mark must always be placed over the survival of human beings and groups, especially in civilizational terms. In Elias's (1988) terms, the civilizing process is always under threat; it "is never completed and constantly endangered" (p. 177). In this context, Elias locates violence, including war, with its own technologies and logic or way of thinking, in a sociological context in which human aggression is the result of chains of interdependency. Against classical Freudianism, Elias argues that conflicts trigger aggression, rather than the other way around, and that these conflicts are aspects of figurations between human beings that become institutionalized as social structures. From this perspective, the monopolization of violence by the state is a "socio-technical invention of the human species" (p. 179), and for Elias, arguably the most important one.

Yet as Elias points out, human beings do live together in situations of relative peace. While the logic of the human *anthropos* is violence, civilization, in Elias's view, is not a constant war. Rather, as the preceding analysis has implied, according to Elias, human sociability has been achieved through, in the first instance, civilization processes that all societies and social actors undergo, and in more complex contexts through an institutional innovation at the level of social structures where the state, especially, has monopolized the use of violence. This monopolization becomes the basis for a transformation in patterns of interaction, which

themselves are shaped by patterns of restraint. External monopolization of violence is accompanied by an internal pacification.

The task, though, for Elias is not only to investigate the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of violence but also to posit a “hinge” through and around which they combine and mutually interconnect. Processes of sociogenesis and psychogenesis go hand in hand with a principle of coordination or steering. In Elias’s view, this principle of coordination is fear. It is the conduit “through which the structure of society is transmitted to individual psychological functions . . . without the lever of these men-made fears the young human animal would never become an adult” (Elias 1982:328).

Moreover, this economy of fear is a broader and deeper explanatory device than models that rely on or emphasize the rationality of social interactions and social forms (no matter how this rationality may be theorized). In this way, rationality and societal rationalization are outcomes that develop from a prerational basis of fear. Elias goes on to argue that the strength and the combinations of internally and externally derived fears are not only socially determined; in being so, they determine the fate of social individuals.

The emotional economy of fear is the hermeneutical glue that binds Elias’s civilization paradigm together. Constraint, and thus detachment, grows out of fear. Human beings become human only inasmuch as they are located in webs of interdependency, and fear is the means that maintains and extends the interdependent webs. This is what every human being or group learns through. It also propels human beings and groups into figurational actions.

— John Rundell

See also Civility; Civilizing Processes; Culture and Civilization; Figural Sociology; Habitus; Power

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EMERGENCE

Emergence is a social process that results in global system properties that are based in individuals and their interactions but cannot be explained or predicted from a full and complete knowledge of these individuals and their interactions.

The bird flock is a classic example of emergence. When we see the “V” shape overhead, we typically assume that one bird is the leader and the other birds have taken position behind the leader, intentionally forming a “V” shape. However, ornithologists have recently discovered this is not the case: Each bird is only aware of the immediately contiguous birds, and each bird follows a simple set of rules, adjusting his flight based on the movements of the nearby birds. No bird is the leader, and no bird is aware that a “V” shape exists. The “V” shape *emerges* out of the local decisions of each bird. The bird flock is *self-organizing*, with control distributed throughout the system. This simple phenomenon demonstrates the key features of emergence: Higher-level phenomena emerge at the group level; interaction among individual components is a central factor in this emergence; and multiple levels of analysis must be taken into account, including a component level and a system level.

Emergence is a contemporary approach to one of the most fundamental issues in sociological theory: the relationship between the individual and the collective. This relationship was a central element in the theorizing of the nineteenth-century founders of sociology, including Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Marx, and was central, if implicit, in many twentieth-century sociological paradigms, including

structural functionalism, exchange theory, and rational choice theory.

Emergence is a new theoretical approach; it has many manifestations and is still developing. For example, emergence has been used in contradictory ways by collectivists and individualists. Collectivists use theories of emergence to argue that social systems are collaboratively created by individuals yet have properties that are not reducible to individual action. In contrast, methodological individualists accept the existence of emergent social properties yet claim that such properties can be reduced to explanations in terms of individuals and their relationships.

In the 1990s, complex dynamical systems researchers began to develop theories of emergence that help to provide some clarity to these competing accounts. Several contemporary studies of complex systems have explored emergence, including cognitive science, artificial life, and computational modeling of societies. These studies are beginning to provide new perspectives on important unresolved issues facing sociology: the relations between individuals and groups, the emergence of unintended effects from collective action, and the relation between the disciplines of economics and sociology.

Complex systems researchers outside of sociology have found that the emergent higher level may have autonomous laws and properties that cannot be easily reduced to lower-level, more basic sciences. For example, cognitive scientists generally agree that mental properties may not be easily reduced to neurobiological properties, due to the complex dynamical nature of the brain. In an analogous fashion, some sociologists use complex dynamical systems theory to argue against attempts to explain societies in terms of individuals.

Classic examples of social emergence include traffic jams and residential segregation patterns. Most complex social groups have emergent properties. For example, the property "being a church" is an emergent property of a group; it is emergent and irreducible in part because it is found in groups with a wide range of individual beliefs and dispositions. The same is true of properties such as "being a family" and "being a collective movement." Small groups often possess emergent microsocial properties; the properties of "being an argument," "being a conversation," and "being an act of discrimination" are emergent from symbolic interaction. In fact, most social properties of interest to sociologists seem to be emergent.

— R. Keith Sawyer

See also Complexity Theory; General Systems Theory; Individualism; Network Exchange Theory; Rational Choice

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EMERSON, RICHARD

Richard Marc Emerson (1926–1982) is best known as a sociological theorist of the twentieth century for his work on power. His primary contributions to social theory derive from his work on power-dependence relations and social exchange. In the 1960s, together with George C. Homans and Peter M. Blau, he developed a sociological version of exchange theory that became one of the dominant modes of theorizing about social relations and social structure in the social sciences. Emerson's most highly cited paper is his article on power-dependence relations published in the *American Sociological Review* (Emerson 1962). This article became a citation classic in 1981 just prior to his premature death.

Emerson completed his undergraduate degree with a major in sociology at the University of Utah, where he had grown up in the Mormon community, though he never accepted the religion as his own. His mother and her relatives raised him. If he had not studied sociology, he said he would have become a sculptor. His early interest in art was later revealed in his spectacular photographs of remote mountain villages in Pakistan and their inhabitants. Growing up in Utah near the mountains of Salt Lake City influenced his life in many ways. Not only did he serve in the elite 10th Mountain Army Division in World War II, but he also became an avid mountain climber. Emerson, like others who had participated in World War II, returned to head off to college, supported by the GI Bill. The war, however, had other major effects upon this cohort of scholars. Some, like Emerson, returned interested in exploring the social factors they had seen in action during the war. Social cohesion, normative pressures, performance under stress, small-group behavior, responses to authority and leadership, and conformity were all topics that became popular in social science circles after the war. Research was funded by the government to find out what made for effective performance under circumstances of war and how citizens could resist undue pressure for conformity on the part of charismatic leaders. These themes drew the attention of Emerson as a young

theorist and continued to weave their way throughout his own theoretical and empirical work during his lifetime.

Emerson completed his MA in 1952 and his PhD in 1955, from the University of Minnesota. He turned down opportunities to do graduate work at Harvard and Berkeley after the war because Minnesota offered financial assistance. His master's thesis was titled "Deviation and Rejection: An Experimental Replication," under the direction of Don Martindale, a theorist, and Stanley Schachter, a young faculty member in psychology. Schachter later became one of the most prominent social psychologists of his generation. From Schachter, Emerson learned the experimental method, which he used in his doctoral dissertation research. His PhD thesis was an extensive field and experimental study of the determinants of social influence in face-to-face groups. The field study included an investigation of Boy Scout troops in what was to be one of his few empirical examinations of social influence outside of the laboratory. Emerson's most famous field study was his investigation of communication feedback and performance in groups under stress on Mt. Everest, for which he was awarded a Hubbard Medal on behalf of the National Geographic Society, by John F. Kennedy, in 1963.

Mountain-climbing expeditions were great sources of sociological wisdom for Emerson. As a member of the 1963 Everest expedition, the first to successfully place an American at the mountain's peak in an ascent up the west ridge, Emerson was not only a climber but also the team researcher. In fact, this expedition was one of the defining moments in Emerson's career. On the climb, he practiced his newly minted skills as a sociologist. He was funded by the National Science Foundation to study performance in high-stress environments, and he used the opportunity to develop his ideas about the effect of uncertainty on perceptions of success. He also examined the impact of different types of performance feedback on effort. The diaries his climbers kept to chart their progress were invaluable sources of data for Emerson's first major foray into field research, after his frustrating experience studying Boy Scout troops for his doctoral thesis.

After finishing his PhD at Minnesota, Emerson became a junior faculty member at the University of Cincinnati, and he received tenure in 1957 based primarily upon his doctoral work. Before moving to the University of Washington in the mid-1960s to be closer to snow-capped mountains again, he published his two famous papers on power. The first was the highly cited (Emerson 1962) paper on power-dependence relations published in the *American Sociological Review*. The second was an empirical test of this theory published in *Sociometry* (Emerson 1964).

The importance of this work was that it challenged the predominant view of social power in the social sciences, a view that located power in the person or institution in control of significant modes of influence or valued

resources. Political scientists as well as sociologists at that time primarily looked for the characteristics of individuals and institutions that determined who (or what) was most powerful. To turn the analysis of power on its head, Emerson argued that power did not reside in the person or the institution, but in the relationship between individuals or between individuals and the institutions in which they were embedded. To say Actor A had power identified the power holder but not the recipient of the exercise of power. For Emerson, power was a relational concept. Actor A had power over Actor B only to the extent that B was dependent upon A for resources or actions of value to him or her. In this sense, the power of A over B derived from B's dependence upon A, hence the phrase "power-dependence relations." He went on to theorize about the determinants of power in such relations and the features of the relationship that affected the exercise of power.

Another major influence on Emerson's work was logical positivism, which had made inroads into the social sciences in the 1960s with the publication of several key books by Kuhn (1962) on scientific revolutions and by Popper (1961) and, later, Hempel (1965) on the logic of scientific explanation. The emphasis on deductive theorizing in these books influenced subsequent work by Emerson, perhaps most evident in his companion papers on social exchange published in 1972, in *Sociological Theories in Progress*, volume 2. In these papers, he develops a deductive theory of social exchange behavior (part I) and social relations and exchange networks (part II).

In part I, Emerson derived propositions concerning behavior in social exchange relations from principles of social behaviorism made popular by B. F. Skinner and applied to social exchange by Homans (1961). Emerson focused on the rewards and costs that drove actors to engage in particular exchange relations. In addition, he introduced the concept of balanced exchange relations into the theory, articulating balance as the state in which the actors in the relations are equally dependent upon each other for resources of value. (Resources can be anything of value, including valued activities or behaviors, in addition to material things.) Emerson linked imbalance in exchange to differential degrees of dependence upon the relationship, thus creating a power differential within the exchange relation. The less dependent party to the exchange is the more powerful actor. In this way, he broadened his earlier conception of power to apply to social exchange relations. He also argued that power imbalances in relations as well as networks of exchange tended to create pressures for structural change. Social structural change was thus a key dependent variable in his theory of exchange.

Despite the prominence of Emerson's earliest work on power-dependence relations, his most enduring contribution in the social sciences may be these two theoretical papers on social exchange relations and social exchange

networks. They influenced the subsequent development of exchange theory within sociology and stimulated a long tradition of important research on social exchange, network determinants of power, and related work on coalition formation, social cohesion, commitment, trust, and solidarity in exchange relations. Research by Cook, Lawler, Molm, Whitmeyer, Yamagishi, and others derives in differing ways from Emerson's seminal work. The work of Friedkin, Markovsky, Skvoretz, Willer, and Yamaguchi, among others, was also influenced by Emerson's work.

One of Emerson's final papers, written just before his death (and later published in 1987) focused on the determinants of value in social exchange. It is an interesting theoretical exploration of the different types of value that can inhere in goods or resources being exchanged. It contains some of the best insights into questions of value and its determinants in social exchange to be found in the field. This is a complex topic theoretically, as well as in terms of measurement issues. Only recently have researchers returned to theoretical and empirical efforts to investigate the determinants of value in social exchanges.

Emerson's main legacy will be his work on power, dependence, and social exchange networks. Though Blau also wrote on exchange and power, Emerson conducted more controlled experimental and fieldwork than the other major exchange theorists to test propositions derived from his theory. He also continued to work to link his laboratory findings to real-world analogues, including social processes in the remote mountain villages of Pakistan, where he often did fieldwork on the structure of the power relations and authority in various communities. Emerson is one of the more important twentieth-century social theorists of social interaction and social structure.

— Karen S. Cook

See also Blau, Peter; Commitment; Cook, Karen; Exchange Networks; Homans, George; Lawler, Edward; Molm, Linda; Network Exchange Theory; Power-Dependence Relations; Social Exchange Theory

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EMOTION WORK

Emotion work is the effort involved in manipulating the emotions of oneself and others. Created by Arlie Hochschild, the idea of emotion work fits under the broader umbrella of "emotion management," the work required to generate feelings that are "appropriate" for a situation. Hochschild's conceptualization of emotion management develops a social constructionist view of emotions that builds from Erving Goffman, Sigmund Freud, and Karl Marx. In expanding this work to create her model, Hochschild makes distinctions between "surface-acting" and "deep-acting," as well as "emotion work" and "emotional labor."

According to Goffman, people seek deference from others, prompting interaction. Through interaction, we try to manage the impressions of ourselves formed in the minds of others, and these interactions arouse emotions within ourselves. When impression management is successful, it fosters positive emotions, and when it fails to meet expectations, it fosters negative emotions, such as embarrassment. Thus, Goffman suggests a sociology of emotions based on social interaction. Implicit is the idea that interactions occurring externally to the individual act as an emotional stimulus. Though interactions are interpreted cognitively according to the definition of the situation, they also stimulate an emotional response. This elicitation-response conceptualization is shared with the psychophysiological tradition of William James, who connects emotions to environmental stimuli. However, Goffman's emphasis on *social* interaction, prefaced by impression management, represents a break from psychophysiological approaches. Successful acts of impression management create smooth interactions and elicit positive emotions, and vice versa. These interactions occur externally to the individual yet act as a stimulus resulting in an internal emotional response.

Where Goffman breaks from psychophysiological approaches through an examination of social interaction,

Hochschild makes a second break through a consideration of social structure in the form of “feeling rules.” Feeling rules outline how people ought to feel in particular situations, providing an idealized (and even normative) guide for how we label, assess, manage, and express our emotions. Bound with feeling rules, emotions serve a “signal function,” signaling an “inner perspective” that we “apply when we go about seeing,” informing our actions and interactions (Hochschild 1983:229–30). Here, Hochschild builds heavily on Freud, but whereas Freud views the signal function of emotions as marking unconscious libidinal drives, Hochschild’s emphasis on feeling rules places emotions within a knowable social world.

Hochschild argues that people actively manipulate their emotions to match feeling rules. Following Goffman, Hochschild recognizes that one mode of emotion management involves the *outward* production of expressions for the sake of interaction. Hochschild labels efforts to manipulate emotions through impression management “surface-acting.” Through surface-acting, we manufacture an external facade to control interaction, arousing an internal emotional response. Using the lens of surface-acting, Cahill and Eggleston (1994:304) examine how wheelchair users manage the emotions associated with helping behavior. They document how wheelchair users “cover their embarrassment with good humor” as a means to control interactions and reduce the emotional discomfort of the wheelchair user and the helper.

Moving beyond Goffman, Hochschild identifies a second mode of emotion management that she labels “deep-acting.” Where surface-acting involves the management of emotion from the “outside-in,” deep-acting involves the management from the “inside-out.” Through deep-acting, people work on their *internal* emotional states prior to interaction with others. Deep-acting often involves altering cognitions about a situation, helping us to manipulate baseline feelings and generating emotions that match feeling rules. In turn, these manipulated emotions serve a signal function, indicating the proper line of interaction. Using Hochschild’s concept of deep-acting, Pierce (1995) analyzes the emotion management of law students during a mock trial:

Before a cross-examination, Tom, one of the students, stood in the hallway with one of the instructors trying to “psyche himself up to get mad.” He repeated over and over to himself, “I hate it when witnesses lie to me. It makes me so mad!” The teacher coached him to concentrate on that thought until Tom could actually evoke the feeling of anger. (p. 62)

With the help of the instructor, Tom turns inward, altering his cognitions to foster anger that fits the feeling rules for cross-examination. Pierce goes on to describe how Tom uses his anger to intimidate and confuse the witness.

In addition to surface- and deep-acting, Hochschild (1983) distinguishes between “emotion work” and “emotional labor.” While feeling rules govern emotion management in private life (emotion work), emotions may become commodified in the public sphere, resulting in emotional labor, defined as the management of emotions for the sake of economic exchange. The economic power of customers and employers enable them to enforce feeling rules to their benefit, coercing employees into emotional labor they would not otherwise perform. Drawing from Marx, Hochschild argues that emotional labor can cause a worker to become alienated from his or her emotions. When an employee performs emotional labor, the product of the labor *is* the emotion. However, because the produced emotion has exchange value, it no longer belongs to the employee, but rather to the employer and the paying customer. Without ownership over their own emotional products, Hochschild argues that alienation puts service workers into an unnatural and unhealthy emotional haze. However, subsequent research has questioned the distinction between emotion work and labor, suggesting that our efforts to manage emotions with our friends and family can be just as alienating as our efforts with paying customers.

Noting that research on emotion management typically focuses on individual actors, Lively (2000) argues that more attention should be paid to “reciprocal emotion management,” involving the mutual efforts of people to manage each other’s emotions (p. 32). It is also typical for studies of emotion management to stress the initial evocation of an emotion. Consequently, Hallett (2003) encourages researchers to take a “second step” into ongoing interactions, arguing that ongoing interactions serve as an additional emotional stimulus that feeds back into a felt emotion, amplifying it.

— Tim Hallett

See also Dramaturgy; Goffman, Erving; Marx, Karl; Social Constructionism; Social Interaction; Symbolic Interaction

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ENCHANTMENT/DISENCHANTMENT

Among the better-known concepts of Weberian theory are those of enchantment and disenchantment. German theorist Max Weber posits that the “enchanted” world of the past, in which spirits roamed and magical beliefs were a part of individuals’ routine experience, grew progressively more “disenchanted” with the development of modern capitalism and the concomitant rise of formal rationality exemplified by, among others, the bureaucracy.

The Weberian perspective posits that premodern societies were more “enchanted” than modern societies. Traditional societies or communities, which tended to be small and homogeneous, embraced magic and mystery. They were guided by substantive rather than formal rationality: Individuals and societies defined and pursued goals based on abstract teachings, such as the ideals and ideas of religion.

Weber’s work links the development of capitalism to an enchanted world: The early Calvinists, who gave birth to the “Protestant ethic,” from which capitalism in its modern form grew, saw economic success as leading to salvation. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber highlights the way in which the Protestant ethic transformed work into a religious “calling.” Calvinists believed that worldly success was a sign that God looked favorably upon them, and they stressed the accumulation of wealth, though they were, at the same time, hostile to the enjoyment of wealth. Their work was characterized by methodical enterprise and commitment to profit for the sake of investment and growth, rather than conspicuous consumption.

Weber’s work shows that the religion and spirituality that motivated capitalist enterprise contributed to the development of a rationalized world that, paradoxically, had little need for religion or magical beliefs. The ethics and values present at the birth of modern capitalism fell away, as capitalism did not need the support of religious beliefs anymore. Rather, the institutions of capitalism needed the support of rational structures, including bureaucracy and rational-legal political authority.

Capitalism, according to Weber, is supported by the development and spread of bureaucracy, which is based on rules and regulations and the paramount goals of efficiency and predictability. Furthermore, modern capitalism is supported and fostered by rational-legal authority in the political realm. The rise of rational-legal authority and its triumph over traditional and charismatic authority are also signs of the triumph of formal rationality. Notably, both charismatic and traditional authority have elements of enchantment that permeate the relationships between leaders and followers: In the former, there is a belief in the singular power of the leader, and in the other, a veneration of tradition and the leader who embodies that tradition. By contrast, rational-legal authority is based, like bureaucracy,

on rules, regulations, and authority that are attached to positions, rather than particular individuals.

From the Weberian perspective, modern societies have replaced substantive meaning with formal rationality, which is efficient and well suited for capitalist enterprise but devoid of meaning and oriented toward profit for its own sake. Randall Collins (1986) writes of Weber’s dystopian vision of modernity that “It is a world without magic, a world in which the hard forces of the market and the pressures of bureaucracy give a secular equivalent to individual powerlessness under God’s predestination” (p. 59). Weber (1991) himself suggests near the end of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* that “In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport” (p. 182).

Disenchantment, then, is a characteristic of the modern, rationalized world. Highly rationalized systems are efficient, predictable, calculable, and exercise a degree of control over human endeavor and labor. They have been stripped of surprise: As George Ritzer (1999) writes, “Rational systems have no room for enchantment. It is systematically rooted out by rational systems, leaving them largely devoid of magic or mystery” (p. 62). Ritzer suggests, however, that enchantment is important to the control of consumers in a modern, consumption-based economy. Consumption is in no small measure a response to a fantasy about the item being purchased and its effect on the consumer him- or herself. Enchanted settings can foster spending, and consequently, the “new means of consumption” attempt to “re-enchant” rationalized settings. These “cathedrals of consumption” draw the consumer in by linking goods with fantasies: At Disney World, one can ostensibly realize childhood fantasies at the Magic Kingdom; and Nike Town, a sports “superstore,” strives to convince consumers that they will be able to “Just Do It” if they just buy enough of the sports equipment being peddled. These new means of consumption ensure that consumption is a central part of the “entertainment” the consumer enjoys: it is no coincidence that the first venue visitors to Disney World encounter is Main Street, USA, which is lined with shops. These rationalized structures are re-enchanted, though in ways which are themselves rational.

It is interesting to contrast Marx’s and Weber’s perspectives on religion and magical beliefs and capitalism. Marx’s perspective on religion sees it as a by-product of capitalism in the sense that it is the “opiate” of the masses, leading them to believe that they ought to accept their humble place in society. Weber’s perspective, however, holds that religion and religious beliefs are the seeds of modern capitalism and its supporting structures. While religion is present at the origin of capitalism, its centrality and its contribution to systems of value and meaning fade as formal rationality

ushers in a disenchanting modern world. In the former, religion helps support capitalism after its inception, while in the latter, it is a seed from which capitalism itself springs.

— Daina Stukuls Eglitis

See also Means of Consumption; Rationalization; Ritzer, George; Weber, Max

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ESSENTIALISM

Essentialism is a theoretical concept denoting a primacy of essences, that is, a permanent, unchanging, and "real" core that lies "behind" temporary, changing appearances. The concept is most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the fixed properties that define a given entity.

Historically, the most common theories of essentialisms are the Platonic doctrine of universal types and the originally Aristotelian doctrine that things in a particular category all have at least one common characteristic without which they could not be members of that category. But the concept is also ambiguous and has inspired a large amount of debate. Locke defined essence in two parts: nominal essence and absolute essence. A nominal essence refers to a conceptual entity defined or produced by language. That is, nominal essence of a thing includes those attributes perceived to be necessary to it and without which it would cease to be the same thing. An absolute essence refers to a *real* entity defined by internal, objective, and intrinsic properties on which the thing depends. Here, Locke distinguishes between the ontological and linguistic orders and essentialism and demonstrates that it is equally important to investigate their complicities as types of essentialisms.

The concept of essentialism has been particularly important to feminist theory and debates concerning modern social theory and postmodern social theory. While the concept of essentialism is used in a variety of ways, it is most frequently deployed in opposition to the concept of social constructionism. Essentialism, similar to modern social theories, assumes a stable, coherent, and knowable self. While the characteristics of this self are not agreed

upon, modern social theory would assert that this self is conscious, rational, autonomous, and universal—no physical conditions or differences substantially affect how this self operates.

These assumptions, while not indicative of all essentialisms, stand in opposition to postmodern theories. In the latter, the concept of the self is severely severed; in its place emerges ideas about multiplicity, fragmentation, social change, and flexibility. Not only is the self built up in social interactions, that is, constructed, but it is also fragmented, unstable, irrational, and constantly changing. This emergent concept of selves as multiple and fragmented are embraced by most constructionist theorists (with roots in the symbolic interactionist theory of George Herbert Mead), many of whom align themselves with postmodernism. Such articulations of the self threaten theories of social and political change that rely on identity politics as a foundation from which to articulate political demands.

As poststructuralism and postmodernism emerged in social theory, Western feminist theorists, driven by convictions that politics and theory should work together for political and social change, engaged in extensive debate concerning the meaning of gender, race, and other identity components and their place in political work. In terms of gender, essentialist theories assume a pure or original femininity, a female essence (or core self) that exists outside the bounds of the social and is therefore untainted by history and culture. This belief can be found in discourses of feminist theory that rely on the unity of its object of inquiry (women) even when it is attempting to demonstrate differences within this category. At the same time, in feminism, the essentialist idea that womanhood is taken to be an absolute substance in the traditional metaphysical sense is not only strongly contested, but the very meaning of womanhood varies. Some feminists have presumed a unity of specific properties, qualities, and attributes of woman, thus deploying selective essentialist logic. Thus, while the concept of essentialism has been primary to understanding the category "woman" in feminism, it is not only a contested term but also one that has undergone much revision.

Most of liberal, radical, and cultural feminism rests on a belief that a woman has an essence that consists of specific inborn attributes, which define across cultures and throughout history her unchanging being, in the absence of which she ceases to be categorized as a woman. Here, the female body unproblematically defines the feminine. In poststructural feminism, often termed "anti-essentialist feminism," gender is an emergent property of experience. Constructionists refuse essence as itself a historical construction. The project is to demonstrate how taken-for-granted "kinds" are themselves effects of discursive practices, that is, to reveal the production and organization of differences and to refuse explanations that rely on "nature" to do their work.

In feminist theory, the concepts of essentialism and constructionism are intertwined with debates concerning nature/nurture, biological/social, sameness/difference(s), and modernism/postmodernism. The idea that men and women, for example, are classified and identified as such on the basis of transhistorical, eternal, immutable essences has been unequivocally rejected by many anti-essentialist poststructuralist feminists concerned with resisting any attempts to naturalize human nature. Furthermore, for the essentialist, the body occupies a pure, presocial, prediscursive space. The body is “real,” accessible, and transparent; it is always there and directly interpretable through the senses. In contrast, constructionism is a belief that there are no natural facts of femaleness and instead femininity is a socially produced characteristic. The body, for the constructionist, is never simply there; rather, it is always already culturally mapped and subject to sociopolitical configuration. The idea that the body is biologically fixed and contains the true essence of maleness or femaleness as well as heterosexuality, homosexuality, and racial properties is thus rejected by anti-essentialists as biologically determining and politically problematic.

Feminist theory has developed within these struggles over the question of essence and its accompanying question of the meaning of the category “woman.” Debates among and between essentialist and constructionist feminisms have been the bedrock of feminist social theory throughout the 1980s and 1990s. At its core is not only a debate about whether “woman” is an essential characteristic or a socially constructed subject but also a debate concerning how to deploy, use, or “take the risk” of essentialism for political ends. A central argument here is *strategic essentialism*, espoused by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in which feminists are urged to strategically use essentialism to enable political ends.

Thus, a central issue emerges: If woman is made and not born, as Simone de Beauvoir argued in her 1954 book, *The Second Sex*, then questions emerge regarding in what ways gender is a sociocultural construction. If gender and sex are not innate features, then where do they come from? How are they enacted?

— Laura Mamo

See also Beauvoir, Simone de; Body; Feminism; Identity; Mead, George Herbert; Postmodernism; Postmodernist Feminism; Social Constructionism

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ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

Ethnomethodology, literally “the study of ethno-methods” or “members’ methods,” derives from a collection of investigations conducted by University of California, Los Angeles, sociologist Harold Garfinkel in the 1950s and 1960s, published in 1967 under the title *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, which is universally taken to be ethnomethodology’s foundational text. The term “ethnomethodology,” coined by Garfinkel in tandem with his readings of the ethnoscience literature in anthropology, names investigations into an empirical domain of concrete social practices essential to, and productive of, the perceived stability of everyday practical action and practical reasoning. Accordingly, ethnomethodologists are directed to a specific topic or subject area: empirical practices whereby people find themselves in orderly, everyday, and familiar social circumstances in whose terms they can regularly display ordinary social competence. Generally, these practices are considered to be invariant and common to all societal members, including professional social scientists.

For nearly 40 years, Garfinkel’s work has inspired generations of diverse ethnomethodological research around the world, with special concentrations at various campuses of the University of California (Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, San Diego), University of Manchester, Boston University, University of Wisconsin, University of London, and the Palo Alto Research Center (California). Ethnomethodology has influenced virtually every substantive area of sociology, as well as cognate disciplines such as communications, education, medicine, law, and cognitive science. As of 2002, the number of ethnomethodological publications—individual and collected articles, books, and other monographs—is reasonably estimated at well over 2,000.

Ethnomethodologists differ widely with respect to the significance of their studies for social theory and theorizing. Some have written that no theory at all is necessary to link the disparate studies, either to inform the basis of the studies or to summarize them on behalf of wider, overarching principles; some of these commentators come close to saying that ethnomethodology is atheoretical. Although *Studies in Ethnomethodology* is freighted heavily with citations to social phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (and indebtedness to Aron Gurwitsch and Edmund Husserl), Garfinkel

himself has sometimes suggested that in their empirical concreteness, ethnomethodological studies speak for themselves, recommending that students and readers go directly “to the studies.” Some, however, have more fully developed the phenomenological themes, drawing especially on Gurwitsch’s notion of “functional significance” in Gestalt contexts to describe how people collaboratively assemble perceptual fields experienced as stable, connected, and internally consistent. Others have drawn upon historicism in Karl Marx and Max Weber as partial rationales for ethnomethodological studies, carefully distinguishing such theorizing from the types of theory the studies themselves lead to, for example, the turntaking model in conversation analysis. Still others have argued that ethnomethodology goes directly to the heart of classical theoretical issues, notably those of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Most recently, Garfinkel (2002) has written that ethnomethodology is a fulfillment of Durkheim’s mandate to examine “social facts” and that it studies “the phenomena of ordinary society that Durkheim was talking about” (pp. 92–3), characterizing his own early studies as “working out Durkheim’s aphorism” from the start.

These debates notwithstanding, ethnomethodologists are in general agreement in rejecting comparisons between their program and other contemporary developments, such as symbolic interactionism (or social psychology generally), cognitive psychology, “microsociology,” dramaturgical sociology, most phenomenological sociology, individualistic or subjectivist sociologies, postmodernism, or any but the most highly qualified readings of the term *social constructionism*. Most definitely, ethnomethodology is not a research method, its practitioners having engaged in a wide variety of methods in their studies, and ought not to be confused with a generic commitment to “qualitative” sociology.

ORIGINS IN PARSONS

Whatever ethnomethodology’s continuities or discontinuities with other schools, it most certainly owes its origins to conventional theoretical concerns and sociological problems, particularly those that preoccupied Garfinkel’s teacher and dissertation supervisor at Harvard University, Talcott Parsons. Garfinkel attributes his earliest initiatives to Parsons’s *The Structure of Social Action*, which outlines what later became Parsons’s functionalist sociology.

Parsons begins with society as an observed “factual order” of patterned, standardized, coordinated behavioral routines and asks, following Hobbes, how such a thing is possible. He answers this question in terms of another order, “normative order,” or a culture of norms and values, which both transcends societal members generationally and assimilates to members’ consciousness through socialization and internalization. Members thereby follow norms and values not only as a matter of necessary adaptation to

real culture but also as a matter of subjectively given voluntary compliance. By this reasoning, a deductive causal link exists between behavioral prescription and actual behavior as it happens. Moreover, since subjectivity amounts to internalized culture, it contains objectively identifiable material. Thus, Parsons seems to have solved the classic philosophical problem of intersubjectivity, which asks how people know what is in one another’s minds: They know because their subjective content derives from the same objective material, namely, a shared culture of norms and values.

Garfinkel’s investigations broke with Parsons’s theory at almost every turn, including the background premise of society as factual order, the existence or stability of a body of rules, possible deductive links between the two orders, and the Parsonian vision of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In one such study, Garfinkel asked student researchers to code events at a mental health clinic to discover the standardized routine whereby patients were processed through various treatment stages. While both clinic members and coders took this standardized routine for granted and could fully understand and appreciate it, coders were nevertheless unable to document it without grounding their documentation in “loose” knowledge of clinic routines, which was itself uncoded. Every effort to capture the uncoded knowledge with precise methodological criteria, in turn, depended for its adequacy on yet further uncoded knowledge of the clinic for determining that coded versions were coded correctly. Thus, the actual work of the clinic (as well as the work of the coders) remained undescribed. It escaped detection even as it was counted on to produce evidence of standardized routine. Garfinkel calls this work “ad hoc” practices.

Similar ad hoc practices became evident in Garfinkel’s investigations of rule-governed behavior in which people presumably “follow” norms or depend upon them for future action. Here, he found a chronic incompleteness in rules, both in their length and their number and in the clarity of any particular rule in advance of its application. When playing tic-tac-toe with his students, Garfinkel would periodically erase his opponent’s mark, replacing it with one of his own; players would invariably see that as a rule violation even though nobody could strictly document the rule either as written someplace or as learned sometime in the past. Likewise, in chess, replacing an opponent’s piece with an identical piece from the box was seen as a violation even though it did not affect the outcome of the game and no rule forbidding it could be documented. In such cases, rules were imputed by players as “known in the first place” and “there all along” even as they were produced for the very first time to cover a precise contingency.

In general, Garfinkel found that people do not so much follow rules as use them, invoke them, or make them up for practical purposes—to instruct others, to account for

behavior in retrospect, to anticipate future behavior, to normalize, to restore temporarily disrupted order, to find fault, to explain or describe, to repair damaged rapport, on and on—but never as a necessary or sufficient prerequisite to action. At the same time, some of his experiments reveal that where people most seriously take institutionally prescribed rules for granted, presumed rules can sometimes be openly violated with little or no consequence; such was the case with his students' bargaining for merchandise in department stores in apparent violation of the "one price rule" (so-called by Parsons). Thus, Garfinkel concludes that standardized society and standardized expectations are "attributed" standardizations, whose self-evident and commonsense status is based solely in people's mutual avoidance of situations in which they might otherwise learn about them. He suggests that these avoidance strategies are proportional to the degree to which people take their knowledge of social standardizations to be important and incorrigible.

Also instructive is Garfinkel's reworking of intersubjectivity from Parsons, who viewed it as shared subjective material. In searching for shared material, Garfinkel asked participants in a conversation to write down what they said in one column and what they "understood they were talking about" in another. The second column read like a detailed clarification of the first, which, in turn, could be read as shorthand for what was intended in the actual conversation but unnecessary to delineate. Yet this expanded version of the conversation was itself indefinite and could be seen as shorthand for "something more," which Garfinkel then asked subjects to write as a third column. Subjects eventually gave up on the task of "finishing" this ongoing clarification process, complaining that it was impossible. For Garfinkel, the impossibility resided not in the massive complexity of intended material, but in the "branching texture" of the experiment itself, the writing, which in each case produced the "more" that needed to be clarified; as subjects performed the task, they generated the as yet unfinished task that needed to be done. Garfinkel concludes that intersubjectivity or "shared agreement" does not consist of overlapping subjective content or material at all: It is, rather, an operation, a procedure, a practice, an active moment-to-moment production.

Thus, the Parsonian edifice was challenged in all of its details. Society as patterned behavior, culture as norms and values, subjectivity as content, and intersubjectivity as shared culture—all these were found by Garfinkel not to be really "there" for science as empirical phenomena. Instead, their perceived factual status and stability are ongoing, moment-to-moment accomplishments of societal members' ad hoc practices. These practices are social, accountable, invariant to culture, and omnipresent ("no time-out") in the embodied lives of societal members. And they are empirical, subject to sociological analysis.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Social practices are also, in Garfinkel's term, "irremediable," which is to say that there is no alternative to them; they do not resemble something else that could be substituted for them; and they resist strict nomenclatures or typological analysis. This has been troublesome to the traditional social sciences, whose practitioners, says Garfinkel, run up against these practices constantly but view them as flawed, sloppy, commonsensical, or otherwise less than adequate to the tasks of their sciences. In their efforts to rid themselves of sloppy commonsense methods, social scientists, with varying degrees of self-acknowledgment, engage in these very practices. While ignoring them in their texts, they sometimes allude to them in methods appendices (where they again engage in the same practices while ignoring them), regarding them as second-best shortcuts or approximations to what social science might someday achieve with improved measurement and standardized conceptual vocabulary. But they are always treated as nuisances, things to be gotten out of the way for improved formal theory or scientific understanding. Garfinkel analogizes these efforts to tearing down the walls of a building in order to see what holds the roof up.

Social scientists are not alone in their awareness of social practices while strategically overlooking them or treating them as sloppy, imprecise, or second-best. Societal members in general know of the practices, and they are their virtuoso practitioners. But they seldom, if ever, talk about them (save in highly specialized situations, such as those requiring the adroit undermining of someone's credibility, and even here they are treated as exceptional). Members do not make their practices primary topics of discussion and are generally uncomfortable when anyone forces them into the limelight. In fact, active concealment of the practices is itself part of the very practices; not camouflaging them is almost certain incompetence. Thus, Garfinkel identifies as a key feature of these practices their "uninteresting" character. Members' discomfort can be illustrated with an experiment in which Garfinkel (1967) had students seek clarity from unsuspecting subjects to mundane utterances such as "How are you?" and "How are your Med School applications coming?" (pp. 42–3). These experiments, innocent as they seem, left subjects bewildered and angry. Similarly, Garfinkel's efforts to get jurors to talk about their actual practices of deliberation, as opposed to the way they describe them in idealized accounts, "rapidly used up interview rapport" (p. 113).

More recently, Garfinkel has characterized traditional social science as "the worldwide social science movement" and collected all of its variations under the rubric "Formal Analysis." While claiming no critique of the standard social sciences and declaring nothing less than enthusiasm about

their discoveries and accomplishments, he nevertheless maintains that their commonality resides in their unwillingness to see order in “the concreteness of things.” Rather, they find order as outcomes of methodological procedures by which they transform “the concreteness of things” into categorical phenomena legislated by the terms and protocols of their respective disciplines. Thus, the “concreteness” of what they study, as well as their own actual real-time methods of transformation, escapes notice. The worldwide social science movement necessarily and purposefully ignores the foundations of social order, which are the methods of its production.

Partly because of such observations, ethnomethodology has often been read as making general criticism of the social sciences. Such readings are less likely when considering that the practices of Formal Analysis and of commonsense knowledge of everyday social structures are, according to ethnomethodologists, fundamentally identical practices. To criticize either would be to criticize both, which would ultimately be to criticize the human species for being what it is and doing what it does. Given that social practices are irremediable and without alternatives, such critique would be internally self-defeating on its face. What Garfinkel proposes is investigations of these practices as topics in their own right—not to overcome them, but to learn about them.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL STUDIES

Ethnomethodologists have made social practices the focus of studies in a vast array of social settings, including schools, hospitals, families, informal face-to-face interaction, correctional facilities, police work, legal work, a suicide prevention center, social welfare agencies, bureaucracy generally, jury deliberation, congressional hearings, a teacher training program, doctor–patient interaction, courtrooms, Azande witchcraft rituals, mathematical proofs, deductive logic, and “social problems” recognition and discovery—as well as settings in which standard social scientists do the work they do, keep the records they keep, develop their tables, and write their reports.

Over the past two decades, a substantial subset of ethnomethodological literature has been devoted to the sociology of the “discovering sciences,” including astronomy, optics, biology, and neurology. An early progenitor of these studies was an analysis of audiotapes that apparently resulted from a tape recorder having been inadvertently left in the “record” mode during an actual pulsar discovery at Steward Observatory. The astronomers later described their discovery in their journal article, where the pulsar had the quality of being “already out there before its discovery.” Garfinkel and his colleagues described, in their journal article, the discovery as it revealed itself in real time on the tapes, comparing it to the active work of a potter shaping a piece on a

wheel. In a brief rejoinder, one of the astronomers wrote, in essence, that the ethnomethodologists had gotten it right but that to notice such things is dangerous. This was clearly intended as wry humor, but it does point suggestively to members’ discomfort with topicalizing the practices they know so well.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL TERMINOLOGY

Despite the difficulty of its texts, ethnomethodology has remained remarkably free of jargon or special vocabulary, due in part to its resistance to exchanging concrete data for formal theory that could once again camouflage social practices as its main topic. More often, vocabularies come and go with the times and depending on how various authors decide to put their phenomena to their reading audiences. In *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Garfinkel called social practices the use of “et cetera,” “let it pass,” “unless” (each of these a variation on the practice of allowing incompleteness and ambiguity to count as complete and clear with the anticipation of future elaboration as needed), and “factum valet” (once something otherwise prohibited is done, it counts as in accordance with general stipulations). Other terms that have been used to name ethnomethods include “members’ methods,” “glossing,” “ad hocing,” “the documentary method of interpretation” (following Karl Mannheim), “prospective/retrospective determination” (following Schütz), “invariant procedures,” “artful practices,” and “ritual practices.” In various ways, such coinage describes how people allow here-and-now particulars to count as consistent with, and as evidentiary documents of, previously taken-for-granted presuppositions and commonsense background knowledge.

To lay emphasis on the nature of their topics and to avoid misunderstanding, ethnomethodologists have attached to ethnomethods modifiers such as “in situ,” “in vivo,” “incarnate,” “concrete,” “empirical,” and “endogenous.” This is to show that the practices under investigation are actively organized in and of themselves, in the moment, here and now, rather than “in conformity” with exogenous patterns or other transsituational rules or structures. To isolate the topic, the term “respecification” is often used to qualify members’ vocabulary and members’ phenomena to show that for everything that members orient to as factual and real, there is a separate domain of social practices that members know about but ignore; thus, for example, bureaucratic stability or the work routines of the discovering sciences are “respecified” for ethnomethodological study. That members’ phenomenal worlds are always analyzable in sets of two in this manner has led to the expression “Lebenswelt pairs,” where the phenomena of one pair member are actively produced in and by the other even as that includes concealing that very activity from view. Recently, Garfinkel has begun to use various symbols to

qualify standard English, such as asterisks (e.g., order*), and different brackets and parentheses to identify respective members of Lebenswelt pairs and to draw distinctions between concrete practices and the achieved products of both everyday members of society and Formal Analysis.

Two of the most famous ethnomethodological terms came out of *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, these being “indexicality” and “reflexivity” (Garfinkel used the term “indexical”). Both of these owe to the fact that members’ practices are to a large part linguistic in character and that it is through the use of language that members produce and describe the factual status of their phenomena for themselves and each other. Language includes the broad array of words, concepts, categories, recipes, theories, formulas—all manner of conceptual resources, including those of the natural and social sciences—which members mobilize as background knowledge to classify matters before them into instances of the familiar or routine.

For reasons similar to those identified with respect to rules, language resists formal deductive codification. When Garfinkel says semantic expressions are “indexical,” he means that they are context-dependent for their specific here-and-now sense and that they are at the general level equivocal and imprecise. Garfinkel states that efforts to replace indexical expressions with “objective” (context-free) ones have failed because all expressions are indexical: Attempts to remedy this, an important preoccupation of Formal Analysis, inevitably result in further indexical expressions as the clarifying material. Moreover, he says, contexts are themselves specified with indexical expressions, including the fact that “context” is itself indexical, which is to say that there is neither a finite set of contexts nor such a thing as context-in-general. Thus, whatever clarity is displayed in language, it is an achieved clarity, an occasioned clarity, which, even where members take it as crystal clear (for the moment), is a clarity-for-all-practical-purposes.

If members mobilize indexical expressions to generate the factual status of what they describe, it follows that what they describe has no particular identity (as opposed to any other) independent of that productive work. Thus, there is an interdependence, even an equivalence, between descriptions-of-social-settings and social-settings-as-described. Herein lies the crux of Garfinkel’s use of the term “reflexivity.” In a nutshell, he asserts that descriptions of a setting are part of the very setting they describe. The factual order of a setting is what it is by virtue of its members’ descriptions of it. There is no way to get outside of social practices to discover the objective ordering of the setting “really” in the sense that it would have that particular identity independent of somebody’s situated description. Because traditional social sciences try diligently to do this, early ethnomethodologists sometimes referred to them as “folk-sciences,” or sciences from within that which they study.

All of this is to say that the constraint upon members’ descriptions does not derive passively from objects described, but rather from the fact that members’ descriptive work is a collaborative effort. Thus, while one could argue that something can be “different things for different memberships,” it does not follow that it can be whatever anyone wants it to be or however anybody describes it or that it is all a matter of individual interpretation. From the outset, social practices, for Garfinkel, were, above all, “accountable” practices. Members find as much constraint exercised on their productive work as sociologists have ever suspected. The ethnomethodological offering is that the constraint does not come from beyond the aggregate, from outside the immediate setting, from transcontextual norms or linguistic rules or cultural prescriptions, or from concepts and principles described “in general” by the social sciences. Rather, the constraint comes from within the exercise of the very practices that are constrained. Members constrain one another much as jazz musicians constrain one another’s improvisation, without outside forces determining what the band as a whole will have played. In that sense, each person working in the aggregate bumps up against massive social force, which in its empirical detail is no different from the work of other members of the aggregate.

CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

One of Garfinkel’s close collaborators and coauthors in the 1960s and early 1970s was Harvey Sacks, who had studied with Erving Goffman and drawn inspiration from Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Ordinary Language Analysis school of philosophy. By the mid-1970s and Sacks’s untimely death, he and others (Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson) had developed a “turntaking” model of ordinary conversation, together with ways of transcribing audiotapes faithful to conversational detail theretofore unimagined. From this beginning, conversation analysis (CA) proliferated into a huge literature that is at once exemplary ethnomethodology and tangential to it. The two often appear side by side at scholarly conferences and paper sessions, as well as in edited volumes, and they are generally associated with one another in everyday professional discourse (“ethno/CA”). Yet conversation analysis has to a large degree taken off in a disciplinary direction all its own, even though many conversation analysts would not attempt to teach it to students without a heavy background in Garfinkel’s sociology. Also, while many non-CA ethnomethodologists are content to call CA a “type” of ethnomethodology, others criticize it for being overly “canonical” or for treating microsociological structures in standard sociological ways.

Conversation analysts transcribe the actual sounds of conversation, including nonverbal sounds, such as stutters, false

starts, repetitions, precise pronunciation (including the drawing out versus punctuating of syllables), silences, interruptions, and the passage of time, measured sometimes down to thousandths of a second. What they find in their transcripts is order entirely and visibly the doing of conversants themselves. This is to say that it is an order actively produced by conversants as they engage in conversation, not an order that conforms to exogenous patterns of conversational activity. It is an order “in and for itself,” not an example of general order that could be described in a theory. Most important, it is a collaboratively produced order, a social order whose production appears to be distinct from culture and may, in fact, warrant recognition as “species-specific behavior.”

It is a counterintuitive order as well, involving units of time impossible for anyone to imagine, much less keep track of. Thus, it is an order conversants cannot possibly know about in so many words. In fact, untrained readers of conversation analytic transcripts often have a difficult time reading them fluently or in ways that actually make sense as a conversation, though hearing the tapes themselves usually clears that up. Moreover, the conversants themselves seem to “experience” the order even as they attribute to it their commonly known repertoire of structural terms, sometimes as matters internal to the conversation (such as interruptions or embarrassing silences) and sometimes as cultural matters external to the conversation (including institutional reality and the so-called micro- and macrostructures of standard sociology). That there could be an equivalence or articulation between counterintuitive, empirically produced conversational order and nonempirical structural order nevertheless oriented to by conversants as real and intractable is one of the more intriguing questions raised by conversation analysis. If this is so, these conversational practices are at least some of the members’ methods Garfinkel writes of. But whether or not this is so is still a matter of some debate.

— Richard A. Hilbert

See also Conversation Analysis; Discourse; Garfinkel, Harold; Parsons, Talcott; Social Studies of Science

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EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

The theory of evolution or “the Modern Synthesis” can be applied to any system that changes, with the theory part of evolution used to explain how these changes occur. It is the unifying theory for disciplines as diverse as genetics, archaeology, primatology, biology, paleontology, systematics, and ecology. It is flourishing in psychology, economics, and anthropology and is slowly making inroads into sociology.

Historically, the word *evolution* was derived from the Latin verb *evolvere*, or an “unfolding process.” In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, this usage was combined with a theory of progress to promote a new scientific theory that higher forms had slowly developed out of lower forms. Evolution was also the centerpiece for the first social science paradigm, which viewed human societies as evolving from simple to complex forms. Three of sociology’s founding fathers, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Émile Durkheim, imported this original definition of evolution into their theories of society. Unfortunately, early evolutionary ideas became intermingled with racism and Social Darwinism as aboriginal peoples were characterized as biologically inferior to members of Western populations.

By the mid-nineteenth century, natural scientists realized that evolution involved much more than an unfolding sequence from simple to complex forms. Charles Darwin in *On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection* (1859) provided the first meaningful understanding of evolution, by proposing that the environment itself is the agent for evolution by “selecting” for survival those members of a population with useful or adaptive traits. Darwin named this process *natural selection*, because it shapes the traits of a species for a local environment. Traits with adaptive value enhance *fitness*, or an organism’s ability to leave behind offspring.

Darwin’s theory of natural selection accounted for the “survival of the fit” but not the “arrival of the fit,” or how variations were transmitted to the next generation. In 1866, Gregor Mendel discovered that what are now called “genes” preserve and transmit heritable traits by self-replication. By the 1940s, Darwinian selection and Mendelian genetics were merged into the integrative theory of evolution, or the Modern Synthesis, which rests on the idea of adaptation and change through natural selection. Today, the Modern Synthesis recognizes four agents of evolution: (1) natural selection, (2) mutation, (3) gene flow, and (4) genetic drift. Natural selection is the primary agent, favoring individuals better able to survive in a local environment. Yet evolution, or what Darwin called “a descent with modification,” is a population concept, because each new generation is the genetic product of the last breeding population, or *deme*. To capture this process at the population level, biologists adopted the term *gene pool*, or the

pooling together of genes from breeding members of a local population. Selection, however, can only fine-tune the existing variation in a population. New variation must come from other sources, which is why evolution involves *mutation*, which increases variation by adding new genetic material to a gene pool; *gene flow*, which increases variation through the exchange of genes between demes or local gene pools; and *genetic drift*, which increases the likelihood of random fluctuations in gene pool frequencies.

Evolutionary theorizing in sociology applies modern evolutionary theory to questions of interest to sociologists at the macrolevel of social organization, in which theorizing addresses many of the same questions as the first sociological theorists—namely, the long-term movement of societies—but adds concepts from the Modern Synthesis to explain how societies have adapted to diverse environments. At the microlevel of social organization, the structure and dynamics of communities and organizations are analyzed in terms of competition and selection in resource niches. Some microperspectives have also sought to explain human behaviors as outcomes of selection on early hominids and humans, while other microperspectives revive concerns of early theorists with human nature, seeing natural selection as having programmed certain human propensities that, in turn, interact with and constrain sociocultural organization.

Modern evolutionary sociologists can be distinguished from their nineteenth-century counterparts by their rejection of simple biological analogies and deterministic models of social change, their precise and synthetic application of modern evolutionary concepts, their sophisticated research methods, and their emphasis on co-evolution, in which both biological and cultural forces are seen as important. Using modern evolutionary theory, four broad-based orientations are now evident in sociological theory: large-scale social evolutionary approaches, human sociobiology approaches, human nature approaches, and human ecological approaches.

SOCIAL EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES

Within this approach, theorists focus on the processes that underlie long-term, macrolevel societal change. Concern is not with progress, per se, but with directional trends in world history as an outcome of adaptation and change.

Gerhard Lenski is among the first modern sociologists to use evolutionary theory to study societal change. In his now classic book *Power and Privilege* (1966), Lenski argued that a society's subsistence pattern, or the way it obtains food and other resources, is the driving force for change. Lenski also linked the degree of surplus with the amount of power and privilege in a society. To profile variations in economic patterns, Lenski assembled a topology using four

primary subsistence modes: hunting and gathering (or food collecting), horticultural/pastoral (simple herding or garden farming), agrarian (farming with animal sources of energy), and industrial (machine-based factory agriculture and production). Of the four, hunting and gathering had the least surplus and the least inequality, with inequality steadily increasing until the industrial age, in which it declined slightly. Over the past 35 years, Lenski, in collaboration with Jean Lenski and Patrick Nolan, developed *evolutionary ecological theory*, a cohesive and integrated theory grounded in the idea that subsistence patterns are the key to understanding the origin, development, and extinction of societies. This theory assumes that human societies are unique because in addition to having a social dimension in common with animal societies, each human society also has a cultural dimension to create its own "sociocultural" package. In every human society, this package is assembled from (1) its social and cultural legacies, (2) its present-day social and physical environment, and (3) its pool of genetic traits. A population for Lenski and his associates is an entity with a certain size and migration pattern. It also possesses a gene pool of traits shared by the entire human species, along with some distinctive genes. Culture is the preserver of technological and ideological information; material products are the output of its technology; social organization is composed of networks of social relations; and social institutions are combinations of the above components.

What accounts for social variety and change? Sources of change include the local, physical, and social environment itself, the extinction of cultural and social characters, and inventions and new discoveries. Whether a society will change rapidly or very slowly depends on population size, the environment, contact with other societies, and cultural formations as they shape attitudes of societal members about change. For example, innovations with adaptive value will compete with earlier ones, as was the case with the horse-drawn buggy and automobile, and cultural adaptations typically accumulate in ways that increase complexity over time. While adaptation and evolution occur only at the societal level, change is not seen as progress, as in nineteenth-century evolutionary models. Instead, selection can operate to either preserve or change societal traits, and selection can lead to adopting innovative ideas that change a society.

Lenski and his associates also apply evolutionary concepts to understand large-scale societal change in the world system of societies. While only a few societies in human history have changed, those that did usually began with new technologies that allowed them to support larger populations and engage in territorial expansion. Such expansion led to contact with less technologically developed societies and, in the end, to their extinction or conquest—a point that Herbert Spencer originally made with the concept "survival

of the fittest.” Thus, advances in subsistence technology are similar to genetic changes in biological evolution; and like biological evolution, there is no goal to societal evolution. Moreover, no assumptions about societal growth and increased complexity are made, as alterations in technologies, culture, social structure, and environment can also destroy a population. And just as in biological evolution, extinction is the fate of most societies, leaving behind those with more advanced technologies that enable them to out-compete and survive.

Stephen Sanderson also applies a materialist view of social change but prefers to view human history in terms of “social transformations.” Humans tilt toward the “law of least effort,” Sanderson says, making hunting and gathering an ideal society because humans labor very little and have an easygoing, nomadic lifestyle. Only a series of dramatic global changes, he argues, would cause humans to abandon this successful lifestyle for an unknown one involving more work. Yet once humans became sedentary, a cycle of social transformations was activated that began with simple horticulture, then agriculture, and finally advanced forms of agriculture.

While subsistence technology is one catalyst for social change, Sanderson also includes ecological agents and population demographics as primary causal agents. Evolution occurs in response to the adaptations of a society, and Sanderson distinguishes between an *adaption*, in which individuals acquire a new technology and respond to new conditions to meet their needs, and *adaptiveness*, in which new traits actually benefit the entire society, rather than individuals.

For Sanderson, individuals are the unit of adaptation, as is the case in biological evolution, because only individuals have wants and needs. In seeking to meet these needs, humans maximize benefits and minimize costs. Humans thus drive the creation of social institutions, but once these structures are in place, they exert a feedback effect that can lead to the “law of unintended consequences.” Thus, social evolution is the result of a dialectical interplay between individuals and social structure. And as in biological evolution, it is always the population that evolves from generation to generation. Sanderson also emphasizes that societies are integrated into a world system of societies, and this integration affects evolutionary dynamics. While the trend in social evolution has been toward change, there are long periods of history in which little change is evident. And while evolution is usually toward further growth and development, societal regression and devolution can occur, as was the case in the fifth century A.D., with the fall of the Roman Empire. Even today among the world system of societies, the average world citizen is less free and less affluent than in food-collecting times. Sanderson sees biological and social evolution as similar in that both involve the process of change and adaptation over time.

In Lee Freese’s depiction of social evolution, change can only be developmental, revolving around a *Lamarckian process* in which one generation of acquired traits is freely transmitted to the next generation. Adhering closely to the Modern Synthesis, Freese emphasizes that societies are always tethered to an *ecosystem*, or a natural formation built around the relationships among plants, animals, geophysical processes, and geographical space. Humans will dominate any ecosystem, but adaptation in a local habitat will always depend upon (1) harvesting enough food to feed a population and (2) keeping mortality rates in balance with fertility rates. Taken together, these two processes put a constant “push and pull” on the way humans organize, with resource potential tending to move upward and births and deaths waxing and waning throughout human history. Thus, human adaptation in a habitat begins with what Freese calls a “sociocultural system” and its initial connection with its environment, or the “biophysical system.” Each system must respond to the challenges of the other, and this interdependence creates a synergism that gives rise to what Freese calls a “biosociocultural regime.” The biosociocultural regime is the evolving unit in human social evolution, an emergent product of three reciprocal influences: (1) the adaptation of sociocultural phenomena to biophysical phenomena, (2) the interactions between biophysical and sociocultural phenomena, and (3) the fusion of sociocultural with biophysical phenomena.

In sketching just how biosociocultural evolution occurs, Freese relies on Alfred Lotka and his law of energy transformations for organic evolution. Lotka’s principle of evolution operates under the following conditions: (1) An environment has a quantity of free energy ready to be released; and (2) individuals within species and between species compete for this energy. Those with the most efficient energy-capturing systems are favored over other organisms, and as long as there is a residue of untapped and available energy, natural selection will work to increase and preserve those with the most efficient means of capturing energy available. The result is to increase the total mass of the system and, with it, the total energy that moves through the system. Applying Lotka’s law to his theory of self-organizational dynamics, Freese argues that selection operates by contributing to the restructuring of structures, with biosociocultural regimes as the evolving unit in social evolution. Yet evolution itself occurs because of self-reorganization of matter: energy forms that generate the complex interactions between biological-physical-sociocultural assemblies.

Looking at historical trends for sociocultural development, Freese suggests that social change comes about because of the association “between “sociocultural-demographic development/dissolution” and human energy expropriation. For example, given a disparity between population size and available resources, something must

change for continued energy capture. If not, access to resource potential will decline and human mortality will rise, setting into motion biophysical and sociocultural interactions to reorganize the subsistence mode to conform to changing circumstances. Thus, beginning with hunting and gathering, each new regime evolves through a system of self-reorganization when triggered by disturbances in ecosystem equilibrium—that is, when energy expropriation goes beyond sustainable limits. Freese stresses, however, that a sequential replacement for every biosociocultural regime is not inevitable. For example, hunting-and-gathering societies kept within sustainable limits for most of human history. Then, about 10,000 years ago, crucial dynamics forced this societal type to shift to a horticultural mode in many ecosystems. Agrarian societies are also sustainable if there is a steady-state subsistence base. This is because, in Freese's model, the maximum capture of energy is not assumed. What is assumed is that species that do maximize their energy flow will have a selective advantage. Yet when societies move toward ever-greater energy capture, as has occurred over human history, inevitable instabilities in the world system of societies will become evident.

SOCIOBIOLOGY APPROACHES

The Modern Synthesis was originally assembled to explain Darwin's concept of differential reproduction, or fitness, as the key to understanding organic evolution. The social behavior of an animal was rarely considered. This changed in an effort to solve a puzzle: In the struggle for survival, how can *altruistic* behaviors in animals be explained? That is, if organisms are designed to promote their own reproductive success, why help others to survive and incur costs to one's own fitness? In 1962, the biologist V. C. Wynne-Edwards tackled this problem by arguing that in the "struggle for existence," selection can favor "group-related adaptations," or traits causing individuals to act in ways that favor the "good of the group" or the "good of the species." *Sociobiology* was born in a rebuttal against this group selection argument, with critics charging that individuals are the only unit of selection. George C. Williams carried this debate further by proposing that selection does not involve individuals or groups, but "selfish genes." This logic of *genetic selection*, in which selfish genes compete, was carried even further by W. D. Hamilton and his concept of "inclusive fitness," or "kin selection," which viewed sociality itself as a strategy whereby individuals can maximize their own genes by cooperating with blood relatives. Individuals who have common genes will be altruistic toward each other because this altruism is an effective strategy initiated by selfish genes to enhance their fitness. Last, Robert Trivers coined the term "reciprocal altruism" to explain how even dyads can maximize their genic fitness

through long-term exchange relationships with nonrelatives. Other sociobiology theorists expanded these ideas, adding mathematical tools and sophisticated modeling techniques mostly borrowed from neoclassical economics. While the early sociobiology explained social behaviors in terms of costs and benefits, with individuals striving to maximize their fitness through selfish genes, contemporary sociobiology is concerned with the interactional effects of both genes and culture.

Human Sociobiology Approaches

Pierre van den Berghe has been among the most persistent in promoting sociobiology in sociology. For van den Berghe, the key question is: Why are humans social, especially since humans, like all animals, are designed to enhance their own genetic fitness? For van den Berghe, human sociality has selective value because in the past, this adaptation enhanced fitness, or the ability to survive and reproduce in a local environment. For van den Berghe, three mechanisms underlie human sociality: (1) kin selection, (2) reciprocity, and (3) coercion. *Kin selection* refers to helping close relatives who share genes. *Reciprocity* denotes an exchange relationship between unrelated individuals who enhance each other's fitness through reciprocal, long-term relationships. *Coercion* refers to a compulsory relationship that allows some individuals to increase their fitness at a cost to others. For example, upper-class solidarity can be explained by a power alliance that allows individuals to collectively promote their interests at the expense of lower social classes.

Van den Berghe has applied sociobiology theory to traditional sociological problems such as family, ethnicity, and sexual selection. However, he does not see human beings as inflexible and argues that human predispositions can be modified in very complex ways by both cultural and ecological conditions. For example, an intricate feedback exists between "nature" and "nurture" such that ideology can override the genes' drive to replicate themselves, while new technological developments, such as contraceptives, can derail the reproductive process. In fact, van den Berghe places such a strong emphasis on the power of culture that modern humans, he says, may no longer be maximizing their genetic fitness.

Joseph Lopreato also advocates a creative alliance between sociobiology and traditional sociology. Lopreato maintains that although all biological organisms have evolved as a result of natural selection, some behaviors are neutrally adaptive, with a tendency only for animals to maximize their fitness. Organisms, he says, have primary constraints that override the maximization of fitness, such as the availability of resources, limitations on survival and reproduction, and in the case of humans, a penchant toward "creature comforts" with the advance of technology. In fact,

Lopreato and various coauthors maintain that the human species is actually predisposed toward a “two-child” reproductive strategy. By using a historical comparative perspective to examine population trends over time, Lopreato and his associates found that fertility rates roughly track mortality rates. Thus, in traditional societies, the pattern is for high mortality and high fertility, with the number of births exceeding the number of deaths by only a small margin, merely generating an equilibrium between fertility and mortality. For example, when the European population in the fourteenth century declined because of disease, the fertility rate dramatically picked up until the population returned to its earlier size.

This tendency toward equilibrium suggests that organisms have an inherent regulating mechanism, or an evolved set of cognitive attributes, to regulate fertility on the basis of specific environmental conditions. This predisposition to regulate fertility is activated by the environment, allowing individuals to chart the best reproductive strategy. Using the idea of a “two-child psychology” for humans, Lopreato argues that the reproductive pattern of human females is toward a near-average of two children. And although rapid sociocultural change may temporarily derail this predisposition, equilibrium is eventually restored. For example, in developing countries, a high fertility rate is not yet balanced by a low mortality rate, because of rapid medical advances. Yet balance will be restored as individuals reset their evolve predisposition to chart the relationship between fertility and mortality.

Evolutionary Psychology

The application of evolutionary psychology to human behavior is a recent addition to the variety of approaches that fall under the umbrella of sociobiology. Evolutionary psychologists maintain that the human brain is not a general processor, as traditionally assumed, but rather is structured around a number of discrete modules or psychological mechanisms that evolved to resolve crucial problems of adaptation during human evolution. These domain-specific modules are cognitively tuned toward the food-foraging lifestyles of hunters and gatherers, because 99 percent of human evolutionary history occurred within this societal type. Behavioral propensities of contemporary humans are then explained by modules (often unspecified) that evolved to enhance the fitness of hunter-gatherers over the course of hominoid and human evolution.

HUMAN NATURE APPROACHES

The belief that human behavior is solely the product of socialization is being challenged by theorists who argue that humans share a common *human nature*, or a shared set of genetically based behavioral proclivities. These

approaches stand in contrast to sociobiology, because they do not adopt assumptions about selfish genes and tendencies to maximize fitness.

Richard Udry is a strong proponent for bringing biology back into sociology. If human bodies are the product of evolution, he argues, propensities for certain kinds of behavior must be a product of natural selection and hence common to all members of the species. The goal of a biologically informed sociology is to understand how biological processes interact with psychological and sociological processes, especially with respect to behaviors that have demographic consequences for social organization. Udry sorts human predispositions into two types: (1) genes shared by all human beings and (2) genes that account for small differences among humans. In research designs, Udry studies the way humans make voluntary choices and how these are affected by biological predispositions generated by hormones and neurological processes. For example, Udry recently proposed a biosocial “theory of gender” that looks at the relationship between “gendered behaviors” (or sex-typed social behaviors) and biological sex. What lies at the heart of gender in most mammals, Udry says, is “sex-dimorphic body structures” and “sex-dimorphic reproductive behaviors,” or the traits that differ between males and females. Humans and nonhuman primates share nearly the same hormonal structure, and in primates, sex-dimorphic behaviors have been linked to two phases of the primate life cycle: (1) midpregnancy, when the testicles of a male fetus produce testosterone to form the genitals and to make the brain masculine and (2) puberty, when the sex hormones trigger physical changes for both males and females that are responsible for adult-dimorphic behaviors. Since primates and humans are genetically very close, it is logical to assume that sex-dimorphic-linked behaviors stemming from hormones also play a role in human behavior.

To appreciate how gendered behaviors are guided by human predispositions, Udry conducted a thought experiment: Assume that biologically based, gendered behaviors exist in all societies. Then, imagine a hypothetical society that over time adopts three distinct gender ideologies: (1) a traditional division between male and female roles, (2) a unisex or single-gender role, and (3) a society allowing individuals to follow their own behavioral proclivities. In each of these phases, what would the behavioral distributions be like for each sex? Udry predicts the following patterns: The traditional gender phase would have powerful norms against gendered predispositions among some individuals that conflicted with socially invented gender norms. The single-gender phase would have norms preventing any type of segregated roles, again forcing individuals to suppress their predispositions outside unisex roles. The open-society phase would lack any gender-based norms, permitting individuals to follow their genetic predispositions. Thus, in all three phases, a “gendered structure”

would exist, but social constraints in the first two phases would override biological proclivities of individuals, while in the third phase, they would have free expression. Yet most sociologists, Udry says, would see all three phases as culturally determined, because a concept of human nature is missing from most sociological models. For Udry, an understanding of human predispositions is crucial if we wish to enhance our understanding of why some males act in a more masculine way, why some females act in a more feminine way, and why some male and female behaviors are so dramatically similar despite wide differences in gender norms.

Theodore Kemper has also explored the interaction between biological and cultural forces by introducing the idea of *socio-bio-social chains*, in which a feedback cycle exists between human biology and social traits. For example, Kemper found an association between male dominance in a social encounter and heightened elevations of male testosterone, a relationship common to other male species. In addition, Kemper's work on the biology of human emotions has led to the conclusion that all humans have four primary emotions: anger, fear, depression, and satisfaction, which he sees as biologically linked to the outcome of many social encounters. Emotions such as shame, guilt, gratitude, love, and nostalgia are secondary, because they are more socially grounded and grafted onto the primary emotions. For Kemper, human predispositions guide humans toward certain behavioral characteristics, although these predispositions can be overridden by sociocultural processes. Thus, whether a predisposition is expressed or repressed will depend upon the values and norms in a society.

Alexandra Maryanski turns to field studies on non-human primates to study the biological basis of human sociality. In particular, she emphasizes the importance of comparing monkeys (who make up 70 percent of all primate species) with the tiny hominoid family composed of gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, gibbons, and humans (who make up only 5 percent of primate species). Humans are especially close to chimpanzees, sharing 99 percent of their DNA, a legacy that reflects their recent separation from a common ancestor about 5 million years ago. Comparative research on the social network patterns of humans' hominoid relatives suggests that humans are predisposed toward weak ties, individualism, and restricted kinship networks. This stands in contrast to our monkey relatives, whose social network patterns reveal strong and extended kinship ties and collectivism. The orangutan, for example, is a close relative to humans but is nearly solitary; and overall, there are few strong ties, little extended kinship, and a lack of group continuity over time in all species of apes. Maryanski suggests that humans, to some degree, retain these propensities for weak ties, anatomy, individualism, and mobility in space and that collectivism in humans

is more a product of culture and socialization than of biological drives for higher sociality. Maryanski feels that a comparative study of primates allows sociologists to better understand human nature, because in the behavior of apes, it is possible to see propensities of human ancestors without the confounding effects of culture and complex social structure.

In the same vein, Jonathan Turner argues that if the ancestors of humans were predisposed toward weak ties, how did they become more social in environments in which sociality and tight-knit organization would promote fitness? Since natural selection is conservative and can only modify existing structures, Turner contends that the easiest route to increased sociality, and hence reproductive success, was to heighten the emotional capacities of early human ancestors. Thus, by first fostering greater cortical control over emotions and then rewriting the brain for increased emotionality, more stable and cohesive social structures could be fashioned, enabling the ancestors of humans to forge more cohesive bands that could adapt to open-country conditions on the African savanna.

ECOLOGICAL THEORIZING

The Chicago school (1915–1950) adopted many Darwinian ideas, particularly the view that groups compete for space in urban areas, leading to patterns of differentiation (the equivalent of “speciation”), invasion, and succession. The real estate market in urban areas was seen as the way in which competition for resources is institutionalized. Models of urban growth and differentiation continue to this day, but an entirely new branch of *human ecology* was pioneered by Michael Hannan and John Freeman when they began to conceptualize organizations in ecological terms. Organizations were seen as occupying varying resource niches; rates of survival and failure were viewed as the result of competition for resources in a particular niche; and structural variations were conceptualized as phenotypes subject to selection pressures. This new form of ecological theorizing revolutionized the study of organizations, because it focused less on the internal dynamics of organizations and more on the external environment as it exerted selection pressures on organizational structures. In contemporary ecological theory, the level of competition within a resource is viewed as a function of the size of the population of organizations as well as the actual number or density of organizations in a niche relative to available resources. Survival and failure in a niche is not only the result of the level of competition but is also related to the structure of the organizations (as either specialized or generalized) and patterns of fluctuations in the resources available in niches.

More recently, Amos Hawley, one of the key founders of contemporary urban ecology, has taken ecological theorizing

to a more macrolevel, much in the vein of Herbert Spencer and Émile Durkheim. Here, the internal structure of societies is viewed as an outcome of competition and selection as these are influenced by transportation technologies, population size, markets, productivity, size of territories, and other forces that the first evolutionary theorists in sociology emphasized.

— A. R. Maryanski

See also Ecological Theory; Paradigm; Social Darwinism; Spencer, Herbert

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others to gain better outcomes than the outcomes possible through independent action. An exchange network approach to coalitions differs from other coalition approaches by focusing on the structural embeddedness of the causes and consequences of coalition formation. In the coalition studies that permeated social theory during the 1950s and 1960s, the cause of coalition formation (power or resource inequalities) was normally given as initial conditions. In contrast, exchange theories treat initial inequalities as endogenous, determined by actors' locations in social structures.

Given the interrelatedness of coalitions and power, coalition processes figured prominently in early exchange approaches, especially Richard Emerson's work. But there have been relatively few contemporary investigations of coalition processes from an exchange network approach. Some have suggested that the relative absence of work on coalitions can be attributed to contemporary exchange researchers' obstinate focus on developing precise predictions under clearly specified scope conditions. Until recently, this focus has been on predicting structural determinants of power inequalities when actors negotiate independently, thus leaving coalitions (and related forms of collective agency) for future study. Following the development of several highly precise exchange network theories, researchers began to call for a focus on scope extension. These calls resulted in several studies that brought coalitions back in to the study of power and exchange.

In the first empirical study of exchange network coalitions, Cook and Gillmore (1984) tested a key principle of Emerson's work: the likelihood that structurally disadvantaged actors form coalitions is positively related to the level of power inequality in the network. In the experimental test, potential coalition members faced various levels of power disadvantage vis-à-vis the potential coalition target. As predicted, as power inequality increased, so did the frequency of coalition formation. Once formed, coalitions successfully eliminated power inequalities.

Cook and Gillmore's findings underscore early theorists' emphasis on the relation between power and collective action. But their findings may overestimate the ease with which structurally disadvantaged actors can form coalitions to countervail power. One reason is that high-power actors amass resources from repeated instances of power exercise. These resources may then be used to thwart attempts by the less powerful to form coalitions. Subsequent research, however, has focused on a more subtle reason that the Cook-Gillmore findings may evoke undue optimism for low-power actors seeking to countervail power inequalities. In their study, the individual and collective interests of potential coalition members were perfectly aligned; if either of the two low-power participants did not join the coalition, both suffered poor exchange outcomes. These outcomes were considerably improved when both

EXCHANGE COALITIONS

A coalition is a group of two or more actors (persons, organizations) working collectively against one or more

joined. But subsequent research shows that coalition formation in exchange networks, like other forms of collective action, can pose a “social dilemma,” or conflict, between individual and collective interests. This is because successful exchange coalitions can create a niche for “free riding,” or gaining the collective good (better exchange outcomes) without absorbing one’s share of the collective costs (sharing profits from exchanges with other coalition members).

Brent Simpson and Michael Macy (2001) tested whether occupants of low-power positions could overcome social dilemmas to form coalitions. For a network containing three low-power actors, they predicted stable, two-person coalitions with the third low-power actor free riding. This prediction stemmed from a demonstration that a coalition of two would transform the structure from unequal to equal power—that the third low-power actor’s coalition membership would be superfluous created an opportunity for that actor to gain better exchange outcomes (the collective good) without sharing profits from exchanges with coalition members (i.e., without paying a share of the collective costs). In contrast to these predictions, however, they found three-person coalitions to be somewhat more stable than two-person coalitions.

Simpson and Macy suggested two potential explanations for the surprising stability of three-person coalitions. Exchange networks, by definition, entail repeated interaction. Thus, the “shadow of the future” may assuage incentives to free ride. As an alternative to this “enlightened egoism” account, they suggested that social identity might play a role in coalition success. In exchange coalitions, social identity would lead potential coalition members to care not only about their own outcomes but also about those of fellow low-power actors.

At first glance, application of the social identity concept to explain coalition patterns may seem at odds with the traditional exchange theoretic assumption of egoism. Simpson and Macy connect exchange networks to identity processes in the following way: Social identity results from perceptions of similarity and “common fate.” Phillip Bonacich (2000) has shown that exchange networks generate different “latent classes” of positions (e.g., “workers” vs. “capitalists”) whose payoffs are linked through common fates (e.g., a worker’s wage is affected by her negotiations with a capitalist *and* by the capitalist’s negotiations with other workers). Exchange structures may therefore generate social identification through the realization of common fate. Identification, in turn, is expected to attenuate the social dilemma entailed in coalition formation. A study by Simpson and Macy is largely supportive of the predicted effects of social identity on coalition success.

While most exchange coalition research has restricted coalition formation to low-power actors, Bonacich (2000) turned this restriction into a question to ask who *will* form

coalitions with whom in exchange networks? Consistent with the pattern assumed in prior work, Bonacich predicts that members of latent classes (e.g., low-power actors) will form coalitions against other latent classes (high-power actors). While largely supportive, his results showed one exception. When a latent class consisting of a single actor is especially vulnerable to a coalition of a larger (but otherwise weaker) class, that actor will attempt to circumvent the coalition by forming agreements with one or more members of the larger class. This finding suggests that exchange coalition researchers may usefully incorporate “divide and rule” type tactics in their future work.

Research on coalition formation in exchange networks is still in its infancy. But a recent surge of work on this issue suggests a return to the focus of early exchange approaches on the dynamic interplay between power and coalitions.

— Brent Simpson

See also Elementary Theory; Exchange Networks; Network Exchange Theory; Power; Power-Dependence Relations; Social Dilemma; Social Exchange Theory

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EXCHANGE NETWORKS

An exchange network is a special case of a social network in which the nodes of the network are social actors (e.g., persons or groups) and the lines connecting the nodes are possible interactions between particular actors that may occur during the process of social exchange. Exchange networks may be complete, in which case they allow interactions between all pairs of actors, or incomplete, in which case they prohibit interactions between some pairs of actors. Hence, an exchange network is a structure of social constraints on the process of social exchange that unfolds

among a group of actors. Research on social exchange networks has focused on the question of how variation in the structure of an exchange network affects the outcomes of the social exchange process that occurs among the actors in the network. This research has been pursued mainly with experiments, in which small groups of subjects have participated in a social exchange process that has been specified by the experimenter and that unfolds in a network structure that also has been specified by the experimenter.

The domain of possible exchange processes and structures that might be studied is large, because there are many forms of social exchange and varieties of structural constraint. In the experiments on exchange networks that have been conducted to date, much research has focused on one type of exchange network, referred to as a “negatively connected” exchange network, which is relatively simple to construct in laboratory settings. In rough outline, the experimental design for a negatively connected exchange network involves a small group of subjects who are assigned to particular positions in an exchange network; the exchange network constrains the pattern of interpersonal communication among the subjects (i.e., who can communicate with whom in the network), and the subjects are instructed to attempt to reach an agreement on the division of a pool of resources with one of the persons with whom they may directly communicate (i.e., an agreement on the fraction of the resources each actor will receive). There is a resource pool, usually of the same size, associated with each pair of persons who are in direct communication. The subjects are instructed that each subject may make at most one agreement with the other subjects, and they are promised a monetary reward according to the amount of resources they personally acquire from this agreement. Presumably, the subjects are motivated to reach agreements and maximize their payoffs. Depending on the structure of the exchange network, one or more agreements may be formed among the subjects, but no subject can be involved in more than one agreement. Indeed, some subjects may not be able to form an agreement, and if they do not, they receive no monetary payoff. An experimental trial with a particular group of subjects ends when no more agreements can be achieved in the group. Each group of subjects typically participates in numerous experimental trials, usually under the same structural conditions (same network, same position assignments, same rules of exchange), so that anything that happened on previous experimental trials may affect subjects’ behavior on subsequent trials. Thus, the subjects may modify their behavior over the experimental trials in an effort to increase the amount of resources they acquire; for instance, subjects who were excluded from agreements on a trial might modify their behavior (offer a greater proportion of their available resource pools to other persons) on the next trial in order to increase the possibility of reaching an agreement with one of the persons with whom they are in communication.

Research on exchange networks became very active when it was discovered that standard measures of the structural centrality of positions in a social network did not reliably predict the payoffs that actors received from their social exchanges in negatively connected exchange networks. The most structurally central positions in an exchange network were not necessarily the most powerful positions with respect to the payoffs they received from the social exchange process. For instance, in the exchange network A-B-C-D-E, standard measures of structural centrality (e.g., closeness and betweenness measures) indicate that C is most central and suggest that C will be most advantaged in bargaining for resources, but it turns out that B and D are the most advantaged positions in this network. The structural power of these positions stems from the vulnerability of the persons in positions A and E, who may be excluded from receiving any payoff on a particular trial if the persons in positions B and D choose not to form an agreement with them. Under the conditions of a negatively connected exchange network, actors in positions B and D may never be excluded from exchange agreements. Many researchers were intrigued by the failure of standard measures of structural centrality to predict power in exchange networks and have sought to develop more refined structural theories of the origins of power in exchange networks.

Different researchers have developed different theories and have sought to eliminate alternative theories through comparative work. Indeed, the field of work that developed on structural power in negatively connected exchange networks presents an instructive and fascinating case of the process of theory competition in social science. However, the winnowing and refining of exchange theories has included not only the development of theories specifically formulated to deal with negatively connected exchange networks but also the development of broader theories that also might apply to different types of exchange networks.

— Noah E. Friedkin

See also Cook, Karen; Elementary Theory; Graph Theoretic Measures of Power; Network Exchange Theory; Network Theory; Social Exchange Theory

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EXPLOITATION

Exploitation is a particularly important component of Marxian theory. Some observers would say that it lies at the very heart of Marx's theory. Marx was a humanist who saw capitalism as preventing people from achieving species-being, or their true potential as human beings. A major roadblock to species-being for Marx is found in the structure of the capitalist system and the way in which it is constructed. That system not only permits and exacerbates the exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalists, but is also, in fact, based on that exploitation.

Marx's labor theory of value asserts that labor is the source of all wealth. Hence, the surplus value of the capitalist is derived from that labor and therefore from the exploitation of the worker. Capitalists are able to purchase labor power from workers, who can bring to the market only their own labor power. Capitalists are then able to pay the worker less than the value they produce and can keep the rest for themselves. This is what Marx meant by "surplus value," which he saw as "an exact expression for the degree of exploitation of labor-power by capital, or of the laborer by the capitalist" (Marx [1867] 1967:218). Although some of this surplus value extracted from the labor process is used by the capitalist to pay for overhead (rent, interest on loans, utilities, etc.), the most important component is profit.

Although some profit is used by the capitalists for personal consumption, its most important use is as reinvestment in the system to accelerate its growth. Therefore, the greater the exploitation of the worker, the more the system is able to grow and the more the worker becomes exploited, creating a vicious cycle of capitalist growth and heightened exploitation of the proletariat. At first, capitalists are driven to lengthen the working day to increase exploitation, since

the proletariat ends up working the additional hours for the capitalist in the production of surplus value. However, this route to the heightening of exploitation is eventually closed off as the state is forced to intervene through the law to limit the increasingly long workday. Capitalists are then forced to look for ways of improving the production process (e.g., through technological advances). Such improvements make it possible for the proletariat to produce more in less time. It takes progressively less time for the proletariat to produce enough value to cover the cost of their subsistence, with the result that an increasing proportion of the workday is devoted to the production of surplus value.

Following Marx's idea that capitalism carries within it the seeds of its own destruction, the increased level of exploitation over time also leads the proletariat to resist the system. Marx foresaw a time when, eventually, the two classes would come into open conflict with one another, and given the enormous numbers of the proletariat and the declining numbers of the capitalists (many of whom over time would tumble into the proletariat as they lost out in the competitive world of the capitalist economic system), he felt that the proletariat would emerge the victors. Their victory would mean the end of capitalism and of the exploitation inherent in it, and the creation eventually of a communist system that, ideally, would be free of such economic exploitation, indeed, all forms of exploitation.

— Michael Ryan

See also Alienation; Capitalism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Political Economy

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FAMILY WAGE

The ideal-typical construction of the family wage is one designed for a male breadwinner to support his wife's in-home caretaking responsibilities. The initial impetus for the family wage can be traced to the increased industrialization and labor activism in the early 1800s. With the shift from the agrarian eighteenth century to the early industrialization of the nineteenth century in the United States and Britain, there developed a view of separate spheres that ideologically located the primary role of women within their homes. The ideological separation of public and private spheres provided justification for employers to deny employment to married women, to regulate the type of work women performed, and to treat women as secondary workers who were supplementing the wages of the primary worker, namely, the male head of household.

The family wage ideology first developed in connection with pressures to increase the wages for workers in the growing industrial sector. Labor activists and social reformers both emphasized the importance of so-called living wages for the economic survival of working-class families. The family wage ideology was used to justify an increase in the wages of male workers, who would then be able to support their dependent wives and children. The assumption of the family wage ideology was that all women workers would eventually become wives and mothers. Therefore, a woman would indirectly benefit from a male wage earner's income if it were adequate to support a dependent wife and children. Single women workers did not require a family wage, since it was presumed that they did not have households to support. Economists and labor organizers built their arguments for a family wage on beliefs that an increase in women's employment would lower wages for all workers and would upset the so-called natural order. The

employment of married women would also take a toll on the well-being of their children; therefore, a family wage was viewed as an effective economic solution to a social problem.

However, for many male workers, the idea of the "family wage" rarely translated into the income needed for a single wage earner to support an unpaid caregiver and children. Payment of a family wage was dependent on a number of criteria set by employers that distinguished between worthy and unworthy workers. For example, in the Ford Motor Company, only male workers who could demonstrate that they were over the age of 22, married, and taking care of their families in a manner acceptable to company representatives could qualify for the family wage (\$5 a day in 1914, when it was established). Women were initially not covered by the family wage policy, but after protests by reformers such as Jane Addams, the policy was amended to include women, though only those who could demonstrate that they were sole providers for their families.

In the case of the Ford Motor Company, the family wage reduced turnover and mitigated against threats of unionization at the time. However, the wage set at one moment in time inevitably became devalued during periods of economic downturn and inflation, thus requiring ongoing demands for wage increases to keep up with the cost of living. Despite the family wage's short-lived existence and circumscribed reach, it had a very significant effect on women's labor market participation and income. It helped keep women's wages low and support continued discrimination against married women workers. According to the ideology of the family wage, women's relationship to the paid labor market was defined as peripheral to male wage earners. Women's economic needs and work experiences were masked in discussions of the family wage. In fact, many working-class women continued to work for wages because the family wage never materialized for many male

wage earners. Furthermore, discussions of the family wage failed to acknowledge the economic needs of single mothers and wives of unemployed male workers. Since the construction of the family wage was designed to support so-called respectable households (as defined by white, middle-class values), recent immigrant families and African American families rarely received a family wage.

An extension of the ideology undergirding the family wage can be found in the development of protective legislation that prohibited women's employment in a number of economic sectors. Protective legislation also limited the number of hours women could work and further constrained their ability to participate on a par with men in the paid labor market. Union organizers and social reformers recognized the difficulty in their efforts to regulate the hours and health and safety for all workers and therefore began to advocate for improved working conditions for women and children. While many of these efforts were eventually broadened to include all workers, the ideology that women, like children, need special protection in the workplace continued to shape women's labor force participation long after the original legislation was passed.

The family wage also shaped family policy and welfare legislation. For example, until the later part of the twentieth century, social security programs viewed women primarily as dependent on male wage earners rather than as wage earners in their own right. This gender ideology also infuses contemporary welfare policy that is designed to support marriage as a solution to poverty for single mothers and their children. The emphasis on the two-parent, male-and-female household form as manifest in the family wage ideology reproduced the gender division of labor inside and outside the home.

— Nancy A. Naples

See also Gender; Industrial Society

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FEMINISM

In Western societies, feminism remains a predominantly modern set of ideas and practices both derived from and opposed to the Enlightenment. Born of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century liberalism as well as nineteenth-century radicalism, *feminism* comprises counterhegemonic ideas about gender as well as practices aimed at undermining its hierarchical role in human affairs (cf. Grant 1993). By and large, feminism revolves around Simone de Beauvoir's ([1949] 1961) idea that women are made, not born. Rosi Braidotti (1993) has further modernized that idea by emphasizing the "distance between Woman and real women" (p. 8), that is, the gap between the idea of "woman" and the actualities of women's experiences and lives. Luce Irigaray (1985) has also further modernized Beauvoir's observation: "Becoming a woman really does not seem to be an easy business" (p. 66). Such becoming entails learning ideas and practices not necessarily conducive to a woman's well-being. Thus, feminism commonly involves disidentification with some of the core values and standard practices in society (Braidotti 1993:2).

Joan Wallach Scott (1996) characterizes feminism as "a site where differences conflict and coalesce, where common interests are articulated and contested, where identities achieve temporary stability—where politics and history are made" (p. 13). Thereby, she implies the ideas and practices anchoring virtually all varieties of feminism. First, feminism grapples with the commonalities and differences among women as well as between women and men. Second, it raises questions about and takes positions on consciousness, values, and desires among girls and women. Third, it addresses issues of power, domination, and hierarchy in connection with girls' and women's identities, opportunities, and outcomes, both as individuals and as members of groups respectively subordinated to boys and men. Finally, feminism is always interwoven with politics and history. Its most widely known practices are public and political, and its challenges to historical patterns are part and parcel of its public identity.

Like feminist theory anchored in academe, feminism consistently involves "the challenge of social change" (Phelan 1994:31). As such, feminism has spawned social movements spanning the globe from the mid-nineteenth century onward. In the United States, for instance, a women's movement began in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. That *first wave* of North American feminism ended with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which formalized women's right to vote. With the publication of Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*, in 1949, and Betty Freidan's *The Feminine Mystique*, in 1963, the theoretical and rhetorical grounds were laid for the *second wave* of modern Western feminism. The women's movement,

which had largely languished between 1920 and 1960, was revitalized during the 1960s. In the United States, the establishment of the National Organization for Women (NOW), which Freidan helped to found, was pivotal in that revitalization.

By now, with the passage in most Western societies of substantial legislation further formalizing women's rights, a *third wave* of feminism has emerged. Originating most discernibly in the early 1980s, this last feminist wave of the twentieth century has as its hallmark an emphasis on diversity. Feminists of color as well as young white feminists, who were also active in the first and second waves, have spearheaded this third wave. In the process, they have laid the foundations for more multicultural—indeed global—feminisms during the twenty-first century.

Regardless of which wave of feminism is under consideration, feminism consistently manifests itself as a mult textured set of ideas and practices. Commonly observable in liberal, radical, cultural, and postmodernist varieties, feminism comprises multiple strands of thought and multiple strategies for achieving social change and cultural transformation.

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Liberal Feminism; Postmodernist Feminism; Radical Feminism

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FEMINIST CULTURAL STUDIES

Feminist cultural studies refers to a set of intellectual engagements that aim to call attention to women's cultural experiences, to justify further exploration of women's experiences of cultural formations, and to use women's experiences to formulate new theories of culture. It is a broad field

of study that is situated at the intersection of women's studies and cultural studies, both of which are projects that are intimately tied to the possibility of political change. Since its emergence in the late 1970s, feminist cultural studies has been successful not only in expanding the study of women but also, and perhaps more important, in establishing gender as a key mode of analysis within cultural studies projects more broadly. The force of feminist cultural studies has not simply formulated a field within a field, it has changed the shape of the field altogether.

At the heart of feminist cultural studies analyses rest these questions: What forces have served to reproduce present social and cultural systems? What forces are responsible for the reproduction of the oppression of women? What action should be taken to combat patriarchy and the reproduction of women's oppression? To answer these questions, feminist scholars in cultural studies turn their attention to the everyday lives of women. This method follows the work of early cultural studies scholars, for whom it was necessary to pay attention to the everyday lives of workers in order to understand how they experienced, coped with, and challenged structures of inequity and oppression. Among the objects of study commonly examined by feminist cultural studies are diverse topics such as advertising, art, shopping malls, film, fashion, romance, reproduction, literature, race, television, magazines, youth subcultures, soap operas, pornography, housewifery, colonialism, postcolonialism, materialism and class, and postfeminism. Potentially the whole spectrum of cultural objects, practices, and texts constituting a society provide the materials of cultural studies, and so the materials of feminist cultural studies are nearly as broad.

CULTURAL STUDIES

Often described as anti- or adisciplinary, cultural studies is best explained as a loosely connected set of questions that are approached with loosely connected methods of analysis. Definitions of cultural studies place less emphasis upon which objects should be studied and more emphasis upon how intellectuals consciously negotiate and attend to the way that culture informs, constructs, constrains, and enables our experiences of the world, each other, and ourselves. As it emerged at the University of Birmingham's Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), in the mid-1960s, cultural studies took as its formative texts the work of Raymond Williams (*The Long Revolution*, 1961), E. P. Thompson (*The Making of the English Working Class*, 1964), and Richard Hoggart, the center's first director (*The Uses of Literacy*, 1957).

What drew together these cultural theorists was their clear focus on revisiting the cultural categories established by historical materialism in the form of New Left political commitments. Through work that insisted upon the social

significance of literature and the value of popular culture, Williams, Thompson, and Hoggart developed sophisticated understandings of the relationships among subjects and the state, workers and owners, cultural superstructure and material base. Beyond fleeting references to feminine existence, however, these works are largely founded upon masculine experiences of culture. That is, the formative texts of cultural studies turn their attention to class antagonism generally to the exclusion of sex/gender antagonisms. For scholars of culture to study women, the ideas about culture derived from Williams, Thompson, and Hoggart had to be mingled with the work done by women on women, work that is situated in a variety of fields, including history, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy.

FEMINIST "INTERRUPTION"

Second-wave feminism emerged in the mid-1960s in Europe and North America. While first-wave feminism was concerned with suffrage and the demands of middle-class white women for political, educational, and employment parity to men, second-wave feminism was more committed to identifying patriarchy and providing solutions to patriarchal social formations. The theory of patriarchy not only offered an explanation of the current situation of women and cultural frameworks but also provided an explanation of the perpetuation of the system and thus was an attempt to provide options for transforming the system. Although a wide variety of feminisms and feminist explanations emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s (i.e., liberal, radical, Marxist, socialist, and lesbian separatism), the approaches that had the most impact upon early feminist scholars in cultural studies were those that directly addressed issues of class and historical materialism.

In 1974, a group of women students at CCCS formed the Women's Studies Group, which eventually produced the first text of feminist cultural studies, *Women Take Issue: Aspects of Women's Subordination*. Styled along the lines of the working papers in cultural studies regularly produced by CCCS, the volume included essays such as Dorothy Hobson's "Housewives: Isolation as Oppression," Angela McRobbie's "Working-Class Girls and the Culture of Femininity," and Janice Winship's "A Woman's World: *Woman*—An Ideology of Femininity," which attends to the ideological production of femininity in women's magazines. At the heart of *Women Take Issue* was an insistence upon the possibility of merging feminist politics and scholarship with the leftist, class-based analyses to which cultural studies at CCCS was committed. That is to say, the volume sought to prove the possibility of joining together Marxism and feminism in an effort to forge a space for the study of women by women within the center.

The authors of *Women Take Issue* recognized that understandings of social formations ought to be understood as constituted through the articulation of both gender and class

antagonisms. Although from a contemporary cultural studies perspective, such a claim seems self-evident, in the late 1970s, it encountered a rocky reception at the center. Stuart Hall, who was the director of CCCS from 1969 to 1979, famously described *Women Take Issue* as an interruption into the center's scholarship and politics. It was, he explained, a thief in the night: "It broke in; interrupted, made an unseemly noise, seized the time, crapped on the table of cultural studies" (Hall 1992:282). From Hall's perspective, *Women Take Issue* was the first of two major interventions in the work of CCCS. The feminist demand to account for gender was the first intervention; the demands in the essays of *The Empire Strikes Back* to account for race was the second intervention. These two interventions as well as political developments in both the United States and the United Kingdom effectively transformed the work of cultural studies, which was no longer so fully committed to the analysis of working-class cultural formations.

WOMEN'S GENRES

In the early 1980s, there emerged within the field of cultural studies a widespread interest in media texts and the audiences that consumed them. For feminist scholars in women's studies, the notion that analysis of mass media might reveal the workings of larger social and political structures prompted a number of new questions: What is the nature of women's relationships with mass media? How do popular novels, television programs, and films relate to female audiences? How do they construct female audiences and feminine subjectivity? How do female audiences respond to and perhaps renovate the messages encoded in mass entertainment? One of the important successes of feminist cultural studies was to reveal the patriarchal ideological messages encoded in mass cultural forms. Another success was its insistence that feminine audiences were not passive receptacles for these messages. Studies such as Ien Ang's *Watching Dallas*, Dorothy Hobson's *Crossroads* (a study of a long-running British soap opera), and Janice Radway's *Reading the Romance* argued that female viewers and readers were active negotiators of cultural messages. Taken a step further, many feminist cultural studies revealed feminine audiences engaged in oppositional and compensatory viewing and reading practices. As Radway, for example, argues, the romance novel is not simply a site at which women are inculcated into the language of romance, it is also a means by which women take time out of the drudgery of housework and dull jobs to care for the self. This work not only insisted upon the value of studying women's relationships to popular or mass culture but also suggested that such a project demanded new theories of spectatorship and reception based upon feminine experience.

A problem pointed out most forcefully by Hazel Carby was that these modes of analysis and conceptual frameworks

were based on a particular experience: that of white women. Carby's essay "White Women Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood" was a part of *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain* (1982), a set of working papers in cultural studies produced by CCCS. Carby points out that the theories of patriarchy that so fully informed feminist cultural theory throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s failed to recognize the ways that systems of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism complicate any simplistic theory of the distribution of social power. For women such as Carby, it was not only important to recognize the material and ideological particularities of black women readers and spectators but was also important for black feminist critics to formulate possibilities for re-creating images of women and to rally for change. As an intervention in feminist cultural theory, the politics of difference suggest that the frameworks through which experience had been examined and understood regularly rendered particular gendered experiences invisible.

POSTSTRUCTURALISM

Within feminist cultural studies, poststructuralism expands the critique of "woman" as a monolithic category, a critique that was already developing out of the feminist politics of difference. Alliances with poststructural theories of culture are, in a sense, uneasy for feminist cultural studies insofar as poststructuralism pushes social construction to its logical conclusion and raises the question of what Tania Modleski has called "feminism without women." Feminist philosophers influenced by poststructuralism set out to expose the ways in which the term *woman* is an effect of discourse and insisted that feminist women approach the term with a healthy dose of skepticism. Put another way, women such as Judith Butler (*Gender Trouble*, 1990) and Denise Riley (*Am I That Name?* 1988) argued that uncritical and unreflective deployment of the category "woman" risks reinscribing precisely those distinctions and divisions that feminist politics purport to transform.

Feminist poststructural analyses of gender and gender identity as products of discourse have come under broad critique by a number of feminist scholars who suggest that this approach so fully deconstructs the category of woman that no position remains from which women can speak. Moreover, critics suggest that feminist poststructuralism abandons women's material existences and seems to suggest that women exist only at the level of language or discourse. As a rejoinder to poststructural theories of feminine subject constitution, some critics have insisted that feminist cultural studies has lost track of historical materialism. Feminist cultural theory has, they argue, become dislodged from the real material lives of women.

One answer to this problem is a return to Marxist and New Left analyses of culture. For critics such as Rosemary

Hennessey (*Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism*, 2000), feminist cultural studies, and cultural studies in general, has fallen into a trap of neoliberalism that has abandoned concrete struggles for symbolic contests over cultural power. Teresa Ebert (*Ludic Feminism and After*, 1996) similarly denounces the poststructural move in cultural studies as an evasion of historical materialism and an affirmation of bourgeois individualism. Rather than identifying economic exploitation of the labor of working women, feminists informed by poststructuralism turn their attention to feminine subjectivity, to the production of women subjects, and to discursive negotiations of power. Another answer to the challenge that feminist cultural studies has lost track of material existence of women has been to integrate the suggestions of poststructuralism with analyses of local, specific, and personal existences of women. Elspeth Probyn (*Sexing the Self* 1993), for instance, integrates the poststructural with the notion of a structure of feeling in order to consider how the critic can think the social through herself—through her own embodied, material existence in cultural space that has been discursively produced. Finally, another answer to the challenge has been a return to feminist ethnographies: critical ethnographies that recognize how audiences, communities, research subjects, and researchers are discursively produced but insist that those discursive productions are experienced as lived realities.

— Michelle Meagher

See also Butler, Judith; Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Feminism; Gender; Hall, Stuart; Postmodernist Feminism

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FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Feminist theories of knowledge and knowledge construction have built up around challenges to the presupposition

of gender neutrality within “standard epistemology” (Code 1993:20). Feminist epistemology comprises two main areas, feminist standpoint theory and feminist science studies. These epistemological enterprises overlap considerably, but not every feminist standpoint theorist contributes to feminist studies of science, or vice versa. Moreover, a few feminist theorists (e.g., Grant 1993) resolutely oppose feminist standpoint theory.

By no means does feminist standpoint theory represent a single theoretical position. Nor does it postulate anything decidedly universal or unquestionably legitimate. Such knowledge claims would be equivalent to the positivistic claims that feminist standpoint theorists critique, such as claims to value-free objectivity or to a standpoint representing “No One Nowhere” or “Everyone Everywhere.” As Christine Delphy (1984) points out, the very idea of a universal standpoint derives from “a very precise social position: the position of dominance” (p. 157). Rejecting that institutionalized standpoint, feminist standpoint theorists aim to create systematic grounds for representations of social realities that are less false, partial, and distorted than those deriving from universalist, positivist approaches.

Feminist standpoint theory encompasses distinctive theoretical developments that extend epistemological stances rooted in modern Western philosophy, including the Enlightenment to a significant but limited extent (Harding, in Hirsh and Olson 1995:25). Feminist or not, standpoint epistemology commonly rejects and always problematizes the notion of a universal knower or a universal standpoint that allows for ahistorical generalizing across cultures. For standpoint epistemologists, “Knowledge is always *relative to* (i.e., a perspective *on*, a standpoint *in*) specifiable circumstances” (Code 1993:40, 41), thus yielding a *mitigated relativism*. Karl Marx’s emphasis on the standpoint of the proletariat and Georg Hegel’s emphasis on the dialectical dialogue between master and slave laid crucial grounds for contemporary standpoint theory.

In general, feminist theory tilts toward standpoint epistemology inasmuch as it insists on the need to look at social and other realities from girls’ and women’s points of view. In particular, some feminist theorists have explicitly extended standpoint epistemology so as to provide grounds for feminist methodologies, feminist research methods, and feminist hermeneutics. Their theoretical endeavors promote more inclusive knowledge, reinforce the dialectical connections between critical social theory and social research methods, and raise consciousness about the structures of domination that devalue women as knowers and as “objects” of knowledge. Typically, their work emphasizes that a standpoint is something that members of subordinated groups *achieve* as an outcome of their struggles within the structures of domination that relatively disempower and otherwise disadvantage them.

Among these theorists are Patricia Hill Collins, Nancy C. K. Hartsock, Hilary Rose, and Dorothy E. Smith.

(Interestingly, neither Collins 1998:195 nor Smith 1997:393 identifies herself as a standpoint theorist, but each is widely seen as having contributed substantially to this part of feminist epistemology.) Although each makes distinctive contributions to feminist standpoint theory, these feminist theorists share a commitment to constructing women as “insiders,” whose social subordination undermines their full-fledged membership in society. Instead of treating women’s experiences as different from, variations of, or deviations from men’s experiences, these theorists make women’s experiences the stuff of theory construction. Feminist standpoint theorists insist, then, on treating women’s experiences as a fruitful starting point as well as a worthy terminus. Thereby, they counteract the standpoint characteristic of social theory, that is, a masculine standpoint.

A common assumption among feminist (and other) standpoint theorists is that one stands to learn more about social reality by adopting the standpoints of those whose social identities cast them as outsiders, marginal members, or peripheral participants than by adopting the standpoint of dominant members. On average, members of subordinated groups have to learn a substantial amount about the structures that inferiorize them, alongside all that they also learn from their own lived experiences that contradict or demystifies those structures. As Joan Wallach Scott (1991) emphasizes, however, “experience” is an unreliable instructor. Conditioned within the very structures that devalue and discriminate against diverse groups, experience is a significant but contradictory source of insights into social realities. Typically, then, feminist theorists give some credence to both standpoint and experience in their frameworks. As Annie G. Rogers (1993:268) observes, “social location” or any other facsimile of standpoint does offer distinctive insights but is no substitute for lived experiences.

Sensitive to that circumstance, both Collins and Smith have constructed particularly powerful frameworks for articulating the distinctive knowledge available to members of oppressed groups in and through their lived experiences. Drawing on Georg Simmel’s notions about marginality, creativity, and culture, Collins talks about how “outsiders within” are capable of building up rich reservoirs of practical knowledge about their social worlds. She conceptualizes the outsider within as a cognitive agent capable of forging knowledge that is useful as well as distinctive. The “outsider within” is a member of an organization who, belonging to a historically excluded or marginalized grouping, is treated as simultaneously inside and outside the social relations and culture of the organization. Typically, women in the military or on construction crews occupy such a position. Like other outsiders within, they find that their experiences commonly take shape around their insider/outsider positioning. Theoretical hazards may evenuate if the linkage between social marginality and “epistemic privilege” is stretched uncritically (Bar On 1993), but

Collins anchors her theorizing in the lived experiences of women of color so as to forestall such hazards.

Smith (1990) uses the notion of bifurcated consciousness to similar theoretical effects. The *bifurcation of consciousness* refers to the shifts in consciousness that occur, more among women than men, as individuals cross the boundaries between worlds where abstractions prevail (bureaucracies, for example) and those where concrete details are unavoidable (cleaning house, for example). Typically, women's everyday experiences make it possible for men to pursue policy making, management, supervision, and other aspects of the relations of ruling, the very structures that subordinate women. At the same time, the labor typical among women, both unpaid and paid, enables men to continue dominating the scientific production of knowledge where abstract reasoning (or "abstract masculinity") holds sway. Thus, women's labor typically provides the material and social-psychological infrastructure undergirding abstractions about social relations that, in turn, characterize women as "different" or "inferior."

Among social scientists, for instance, women often experience bifurcated consciousness as they encounter social theory that fails to question the grounds of its own existence. More than men's, women's unpaid labor is likely to involve them to some extent in providing the necessary conditions for the production of concepts, explanations, and other abstract constructions of social realities. Their resultant standpoint equips them to theorize that women's practices emanate at least as much from the gendered division of labor and distribution of power as from any innate or essential differences between women and men. In any case, Smith insists that women have variegated standpoints, rather than a unitary one reflective of universal experiences. What she emphasizes is the likelihood of more rigorous social theory when women's standpoints are taken into systematic account. She thus distinguishes a specifically feminist standpoint from a women's standpoint, which is where her methodology begins.

For Smith (1999), beginning inquiry from the standpoint of women means never leaving behind the body and never abandoning the actualities of women's lives in favor of "text-mediated discourses" (pp. 4–5). It means forswearing human beings as "objects" of study. Smith inveighs against focusing on explanations of members' actions and interactions. Instead, her priority is to explain social realities for members whose lives both affect and are affected by those realities. Smith is "not proposing just an alternative method of inquiry; rather, [she is] also looking for a revision in the relations of knowing" (p. 94). She insists that social research can and should challenge rather than reinforce the relations of ruling. Put differently, Smith argues that using the relations of ruling as the typical standpoint in social research has promoted the *objectification* of human beings and their lived experiences. She aims to reorient social

research by adopting not the standard standpoint, but the "standpoint of those who are ruled" (p. 16).

More than Collins and most other feminist standpoint theorists, Smith has contributed to feminist science studies. Not unlike Collins, Smith contends that social inquiry has generally excluded members of subordinated groups, particularly women. As Smith (1987) puts it, women stand "outside the frame" wherein sociological knowledge gets produced. Smith's critiques of sociological research in particular give way to an overarching rejection of business as usual in social research. Her commitment to creating a women-centered methodology derives in part from her lived experiences as a single parent from a working-class background, making her way through academe as a sociology student. Her own bifurcated consciousness led her to "institutional ethnography" as an alternative to masculinist approaches that ignore women or represent them as "different." *Institutional ethnography* begins from women's lived experiences so as to have grounds for linking the embodied actualities of their everyday/night lives to the institutional structures making up society's *relations of ruling*, or its hierarchies of domination and control, including ideologies, discourses, and texts.

Smith's unflinching critiques of sociological research have full-blown parallels in Sandra Harding's critiques of scientific research. In *The Science Question in Feminism* (1986), Harding discusses five distinct projects central to feminist science studies. The first project focuses on documenting the gender inequities in science education, research funding, and science careers. The second revolves around critiques of how science has been used (and abused) in support of sexism, heterosexism, racism, and other ideologies used to justify hierarchy and inequality. The third project in feminist science studies is to problematize the idea of "pure science" in general and the idea of gender-neutral science in particular. Disclosing the cultural aspects of science, mostly by interpreting scientific texts, is the fourth project. (One excellent example of such textual work is Ann Graham Brock's *Mary Magdalene, the First Apostle*, 2003, an analysis of "resurrection witness narratives" from the New Testament of the Bible and other sources that argues for recognizing Mary Magdalene as the first of Jesus's apostles.) The fifth project is constructing alternative epistemologies (Harding 1986), the pivotal project in feminist standpoint theory and a high priority in feminist science studies as well.

Harding (1986) makes explicit the great irony typically left implicit in feminist science studies, namely, that "natural science, presented as the paradigm of critical, rational thinking, tries to suffocate just the kind of critical rational thought about its own nature and projects that it insists we must exercise about other social enterprises" (p. 36). Natural scientists largely fail, in other words, to acknowledge that their work is a social undertaking. Harding further

notes the irony that experimentation plays only a small part in sciences such as astronomy, which are nevertheless seen as rigorous and objective.

Harding delineates feminist empiricism as an alternative to science as it has been institutionalized. *Feminist empiricism* challenges such science by showing how untenable its foundational assumptions are. These assumptions include, first, that the social identity of the researcher is irrelevant in the research process; second, that scientific methods can override the infiltration of androcentrism (male-centered stances) into research; and third, that science can be separated from politics for all practical purposes. Challenges to these assumptions take many forms in feminist science studies. One fruitful endeavor has been the investigation of how scientists use metaphors in their texts. As Harding (1986) indicates, Mary Hesse undertook this approach during the 1960s by looking at how metaphors convey values. Evelyn Fox Keller's *Reflections on Gender and Science* (1985) is another exemplar of this approach. Keller and Helen E. Longino (1996) generalize that feminist science studies build up around awareness of how modern science rests on "a conceptual structuring of the world—for example, of mind and nature—that incorporate[s] particular and historically specific ideologies of gender" (p. 2).

Some of the most powerful illustrations of the intersections between science and ideologies of gender lie in the work of Donna Haraway. Widely known for "Manifesto for Cyborgs," Haraway casts "the feminist standpoint through the antimyth of the cyborg—a position on the boundaries of established cultural categories" (Hennessey 1993:17). Haraway (1991) defines the *cyborg* as a "cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" (p. 191).

Haraway's cyborgian stance is much at work in *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science* (1989), her pathbreaking analysis of primatology as a storytelling enterprise. Treating science as narrative, Haraway explores the history and practices of primatology with a view toward illuminating how primatological stories address not only "nature" and "animals" but also gender and race. Given the multilayered character of these stories, Haraway finds there is a blend of science and fiction, with blurred boundaries between the two. Similarly, these stories blur the boundaries between nature and culture.

Haraway's analysis makes clear that primatology in particular and science in general are social and cultural undertakings whose meaning extends beyond hypotheses, methodologies, data, and data analysis. Science is an institution that interplays with other social institutions while reinforcing the social hierarchies that find expression in them all. With her emphasis on *situated knowledges* based in communities of knowers, Haraway argues forcefully for the "privilege of partial perspective." Hers is a scientific realism rooted in attunement to science as nothing more

and nothing less than a social institution incapable of offering an ahistorical, comprehensive standpoint on any topic of inquiry. Her cyborg is thus "committed to partiality, irony, intimacy and perversity" as well as to what is "oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence" (Haraway 1991:192). Haraway's epistemology is thus postmodernist in the extreme. It blends supposedly contradictory elements and exults as much in what is modest as in what is visionary, albeit partial.

Haraway's disclosures in the interviews making up Thyrza Goodeve's *How Like a Leaf* (1999) further amplify these understandings while also giving them some autobiographical texture. There too Haraway (1992) implies time and again a core claim threaded through her work, namely, that "an adequate feminist theory of gender must *simultaneously* be a theory of racial and sexual difference in specific historical conditions of production and reproduction" (p. 95). Thus does the postmodernist Haraway affirm the theoretical necessity of the modernist Collins's *matrix of domination*.

— Mary F. Rogers and Jennifer Pemberton

See also Collins, Patricia Hill; Essentialism; Harding, Sandra; Hartsock, Nancy; Matrix of Domination; Postmodernist Feminism; Smith, Dorothy

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FEMINIST ETHICS

Feminist ethics encompasses a number of philosophical approaches that aim to illuminate the moral worlds of a wide variety of women. According to feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar, proponents of feminist ethics typically fault traditional ethics for failing to take women's moral

perspectives and experiences as seriously as men's. Specifically, they claim that traditional ethics has focused much more on men's interests and rights than on women's; has ignored most of women's everyday moral work, particularly their caregiving work; has suggested that men are on average more morally developed than women; has privileged phenomena considered "masculine" over phenomena considered "feminine" (so that independence is voiced over interdependence, separation over connection, mind over body, culture over nature, war over peace, and death over life); and, finally, has esteemed styles of moral reasoning associated with men rather than women, thereby overestimating reason's role in ethics and underestimating emotion's role (Jaggar 1991).

Feminist approaches to ethics, as well as debates about the allegedly gendered nature of morality, are not contemporary developments. A variety of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinkers, such as Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Catherine Beecher, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Anna Julia Cooper, all discussed what is probably best termed *woman's morality*. Each of these thinkers pondered questions such as: Are women's feminine traits the product of nature or culture? Are all of women's feminine traits desirable, or are some of them undesirable? Is there a gender-neutral standard available to separate "good" feminine and masculine traits from "bad" ones? If moral virtues as well as psychological traits are connected with one's emotional repertoire, indeed, with one's physiology as Aristotle and Aquinas suggested, should not we expect men and women to excel at different moral virtues as well as to manifest different psychological traits? Should all individuals be urged to cultivate precisely the same set of psychological traits and moral virtues, or should there be room for specialization, provided that this specialization does not split along gender lines?

With respect to the kind of questions about women's morality posed above, Wollstonecraft and Mill disavowed the separate virtue theory according to which morality differs according to gender. They sought to develop a single *humanist* ethics for women as well as men. Unlike Wollstonecraft and Mill, Beecher gladly maintained a separate virtue theory for men and women with the qualification that women's virtues are no less important to society than are men's. In fact, she suggested that women's other-directed virtues are superior to men's self-oriented virtues. Building on Beecher's ideas, Gilman envisioned an all-female utopia, called "Herland," in which it is "safe" for women to be maternal because they have full economic, political, and social power. In a similar vein, Stanton speculated that until women have the same political and economic power as men have, it is problematic for women to specialize in "Christlike" benevolence. Specifically, in reassessing Mark 12:43–44, in which Jesus praises a widow for giving her last few coins to the poor, Stanton commented

that sometimes an oppressed group cannot afford to be entirely good—not without harming itself. Conceding that the widow's small gift was indeed a precious one, Stanton nonetheless cautioned women to realize that in a patriarchal society, few women have the political and economic means to practice benevolence without being taken advantage of by men.

Subsequent to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, feminist ethicists have developed not one, but several approaches to ethics, including those sometimes labeled “feminine,” “maternal,” “political,” and “lesbian.” *Feminine* approaches to ethics stress the value of human relationships and put a premium on moral virtues that tend to strengthen people's commitments to each other. *Maternal* approaches to ethics focus on the value of one type of human relationship in particular, namely, the mother–child relationship. *Political* approaches to ethics emphasize the task of eliminating socioeconomic, political, and cultural systems and institutions that maintain male domination and female subordination in the public and private domains. Each of these feminist approaches to ethics brings feminist ethicists closer to their joint goal of creating a gender-equal ethics. Finally, *lesbian* approaches to ethics use feminine, maternal, and political lenses to explore territory previously unexplored: the moral domain of women who love women exclusively or primarily.

FEMININE APPROACHES

Of the various approaches to feminist ethics developed in the twentieth century, those labeled “feminine” most clearly maintain that biological and/or cultural differences between men and women are the foundation of men's and women's respectively different moral identities, behaviors, and styles of reasoning. Moral psychologist Carol Gilligan is a key figure in the development of a feminist feminine ethics that recognizes the disadvantages as well as advantages of being a person who cares (Gilligan 1995). Gilligan has claimed that because women have traditionally focused on the needs of others, they have developed an ethics of care that stresses the importance of creating and sustaining a strong network of human relationships. In contrast, because men have traditionally focused on competing in the public world, where people often are tempted to “get ahead” by unfair means, they have developed a language of justice that emphasizes adherence to agreed-upon rules or contracts (Gilligan 1982). According to Gilligan, widely accepted scales of moral development, for example, Lawrence Kohlberg's Six-Stage Scale, are constructed to recognize and validate the voice of justice but not the voice of care. As a result, those who speak the language of care (typically women and members of other subordinated groups) do not generally reach beyond Kohlberg's third stage of moral development, in which people confuse being

moral with pleasing people. On the other hand, those who speak the language of justice (typically men) routinely rise to Kohlberg's fifth stage of moral development, in which people make and keep promises, or even the sixth, in which people adopt universal ethical principles. Not surprisingly, Gilligan has recommended that Kohlberg recalibrate his scale of moral development to weigh women's morality as accurately as men's.

Nel Noddings, a philosopher of education, has also endorsed a brand of feminine ethics that emphasizes care as a benchmark of moral development. In her estimation, it is in striving to provide care and in being sincerely grateful for receiving care that we achieve our full moral potential. Although there is much to recommend Noddings's ethics of care, including its emphasis on the role of feelings, needs, impressions, invitations, and ideals in the moral life, it is not clear that it unambiguously serves the best interests of women. Although Noddings insists that caregiving is a fundamental human activity, virtually all of the caregivers she praises are women, some of whom seem to care too much—that is, to the point of imperiling their own identities, integrity, and even survival in the service of others. Moreover, although Noddings claims that the one caring needs to care for herself, she sometimes conveys the impression that self-care is legitimate only insofar as it enables the one caring to be a better carer. Finally, Noddings suggests that relationships are so important that *ethical diminishment* is almost always the consequence of breaking a relationship, even a bad one (Noddings 1984).

MATERNAL APPROACHES

Closely related to feminine approaches to ethics are maternal approaches to ethics. These approaches regard the conceptual, metaphorical, and imaginative ideal of the practice of mothering as exemplifying human moral reasoning at its highest level. Sara Ruddick, Virginia Held, Caroline Whitbeck, and Eva Kittay are four recognized maternal thinkers. In one way or another, each claims that if everyone thought in the manner in which “good” mothers think about their children's survival, growth, and social acceptability, our relationships in both the private and public world would be much improved.

There are several problems with maternal approaches to ethics, however. First, not all mothers are good mothers. Some of them are very bad mothers whose moral reasoning falls very short of any recognized ideal. Second, maternal approaches to ethics sometimes imply that biological mothers are the “best” kind of mothers, thereby devaluing nonbiological mothers and/or men who mother. Third, and probably most significantly, the mother–child relationship is fundamentally asymmetrical, and modeling all human relationships, particularly those between adults, on the mother–child relationship may not serve the human community

well. In fact, the features that tend to make a mother–child relationship work are often the ones that may damage or destroy a relationship between two adults. For an adult relationship to work, both parties must be responsible for each other; neither must presume to know the other’s “good” better than the self knows it; and both must behave equally well, since the manipulations, name-calls, and temper tantrums parents expect from children are not ones that one adult should display unchallenged toward another adult (Grimshaw 1986:251).

POLITICAL APPROACHES

Unlike feminine and maternal approaches to ethics, political approaches to ethics focus not so much on questions of goodness as of power. They emphasize the ways in which traditional approaches to ethics maintain a status quo oppressive to women. Finally, and most important, they produce specific guidelines for action intended to weaken rather than strengthen the present systematic subordination of women.

Among other feminists, liberal, radical, Marxist-socialist, multicultural, global, and ecological feminists have provided different explanations and solutions for this state of affairs. Liberal feminists have charged that the main cause of female subordination is a set of informal rules and formal laws that block women’s entrance and/or success in the public world. To the degree that women are not permitted to flourish in places such as the academy, the forum, the marketplace, and the health care arena, women will not be able to achieve their actual potential. Therefore, women will not become men’s full equals until society accords women the same opportunities it accords men.

Radical feminists have insisted that women’s lack of adequate educational, occupational, and political opportunities does not fully explain female subordination. Rather, women’s reproductive and sexual roles and responsibilities best explain why women are relatively powerless and largely confined to the private or domestic realm. As radical feminists see it, all systems and structures that in any way restrict women’s sexual and procreative choices must be eliminated in order to truly liberate women from male control. Unless women are truly free to have or not have children, to have or not have sex with men, “Woman” will remain the “second sex,” subservient to the will of the “first sex”: that is, “Man.”

In contrast to liberal and radical feminists, Marxist and socialist feminists have claimed women cannot achieve equality with men in a society where the wealth produced by the powerless many ends up in the hands of the powerful few. The capitalist system is the primary enemy of women and must be replaced with a socialist system if women are ever to be liberated. No longer economically dependent on the powerful few, the once-powerless many

(a class to which far more women than men belong) will be free to pursue life plans that serve their own best interests.

Although multicultural feminists have affirmed the general thrust of liberal, radical, and Marxist-socialist feminist thought, they have also faulted these theories to the degree that they are inattentive to issues of race and ethnicity. For example, in the United States, the oppression of African American, Native American, Asian American, and Latina/Hispanic women differs from that of white women. Commenting on how racial and ethnic inequities compound gender inequities, philosopher María Lugones, an Argentinean woman who has lived in the United States for several years, observes that Hispanic women have to participate in the Anglo world whereas Anglos do not have to participate in the Hispanic world. An Anglo woman can go to a Hispanic neighborhood for a festival, and if she finds the celebration overwhelming or otherwise displeasing, she can simply leave and write off the evening as a “waste” of time (Lugones and Spelman 1992:382–83). There is no way, however, that a Hispanic woman, particularly a poor one “without papers,” can so easily escape Anglo culture. Like it or not, the dominant Anglo culture sets the terms for her survival as one of its minority members. Only when the dominant Anglo culture voluntarily or involuntarily gives up its power over the so-called Other will a Hispanic woman have the same choices and rights an Anglo woman has.

Although global feminists have found multicultural feminists’ discussions of women’s oppression persuasive, they have nonetheless added that even this enriched discussion remains incomplete. All too often, feminists in one nation fail to look beyond their own borders. For example, U.S. feminists have not always been aware of how extensively women in some other countries are oppressed. While U.S. feminists struggle to formulate laws to prevent sexual harassment and date rape, thousands of women in some other countries are being sexually tortured on account of their own, their fathers’, or their husbands’ political beliefs. Similarly, while U.S. feminists debate the extent to which contraceptives ought to be funded by the government or distributed in public schools, women in some other countries have no access to contraception or family-planning services whatsoever.

Ecofeminists have concurred with global feminists that it is important for all feminists to understand how women in developed nations sometimes inadvertently contribute to the oppression of women in developing nations. When a wealthy U.S. woman seeks to adopt a Central American child, her desire might prompt profiteering middlemen to prey on pregnant Central American women, the poorest of whom are receptive to the argument that their children would be better off in the arms of wealthy U.S. women. What ecofeminists add to this analysis is that in wanting to give her child the best of everything, an affluent woman

might close her eyes to the ways in which the human desire for “more” can and does damage not only the less fortunate segments of the human community but also many members of the greater animal community and the environment in general. The bigger and “better” one’s home, the more natural resources and animal products are probably necessary to maintain it. Thus, ecofeminists urge women to frame their considerations of power relations between men and women globally rather than locally, since we are all involved as world citizens in everything from international trade to environmental responsibility.

Finally, and much in contrast to ecofeminists, postmodern feminists have concluded that all attempts to provide a single explanation for women’s oppression are doomed to fail because there is no one entity, “Woman,” upon whom a label may be fixed. Women are individuals, each with a unique story to tell about a particular self. Women must, in the estimation of postmodern feminists, reveal their differences to each other so that they can better resist the patriarchal tendency to center, congeal, and cement thought into a rigid “truth” that always was, is, and forever will be.

LESBIAN APPROACHES

Lesbian approaches to ethics are to be distinguished not only from feminine and maternal approaches to ethics but also from (heterosexist) political approaches to ethics. Lesbian feminists have generally regarded feminine and maternal approaches to ethics as espousing types of caring that contribute to women’s oppression. They have insisted that lesbians should engage only in the kinds of caring that will not bog them down in a quicksand of female duty and obligation from which there is no escape. Lesbian feminists have also taken exception to those political approaches to ethics that represent heterosexual relationships as generally ethically acceptable even in a society where men dominate women. As they see it, heterosexism in particular, rather than sexism in general, is the primary cause of women’s subordination to men, and distancing themselves from men is the best course of action for women who wish to develop themselves as moral agents.

Although lesbian feminists want power, they claim they do not want the kind of power that has enabled small, elite groups to impose their self-serving “morality” upon the masses. On the contrary, they want the kind of moral power that would permit even the most vulnerable and imperiled individuals to make free choices. Specifically, lesbian ethicist Lucia Hoagland has claimed that although a lesbian cannot always control the situations in which she finds herself, neither is she doomed to fall victim to them. She can instead affect them, if only by changing her attitude toward them. For Hoagland, a fully feminist approach to ethics does not involve people making rules for other people to follow. Nor does it involve some people sacrificing

themselves on other people’s behalf. Instead, says Hoagland, a fully feminist approach to ethics has to do with people making their own choices, no matter the constraints of their situation, refusing either to dominate or to be dominated (Hoagland 1989).

While feminist approaches to ethics are all women centered, they do not impose a single, normative standard on women (or others). Nor do they offer a unitary interpretation of what constitutes a voluntary and intentional choice, an illegitimate or legitimate exercise of control, or a healthy or a pathological relationship. Rather, feminist approaches to ethics offer women (and men) a variety of accounts that validate women’s moral experiences in a way that points to both the weaknesses and strengths of women’s traditional “feminine” values and virtues. In addition, they suggest a variety of means, some of them more feasible than others, to achieve the essential goal of feminism, namely, gender equality. By revisioning the moral world, feminist ethicists have made up for some of the gaps, primarily the gender gaps in traditional ethics. Moreover, they have challenged others to see the holes they have missed and to fill them with the kind of insights that will contribute to the shaping of an ethics that serves all human beings equally well.

— Rosemarie Tong

See also Compulsory Heterosexuality; Ecofeminism; Gilligan, Carol; Gilman, Charlotte Perkins; Maternal Thinking; Ruddick, Sara

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FIGURATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

Figurational sociology is a term used for the research tradition stemming from the work of Norbert Elias (1897–1990), especially his theory of *civilizing processes*, and the sociologists who work in it, taking its name from their use of the distinctive word *figuration*. Critics of the group of researchers who had gathered around Elias and Johan Goudsblom in Amsterdam in the 1970s were the ones who first described what they did as "figurational sociology," but the label stuck and came to be used by friend and foe alike. Elias himself, however, did not much like it and advocated instead the term "process sociology." But Elias always denied that he wanted to create a "school" of sociology. His ambition was less modest: He wanted to reform the habits of thought of sociologists at large.

Elias began to use the word *figuration* in the 1960s. He was, as much as anything, attempting to avoid using the word *system*, with its connotations of teleology, of consensus, and particularly of stasis that had been so current in the heyday of Parsonian functionalism in sociology. At first he wrote *configuration*, but then dropped the *con*, pointing out that it implied a figuration or pattern *with* something else, whereas he wanted to signify the social patterning *in itself*.

In the early part of his career, particularly in Frankfurt (1930–1933), Elias had come into contact with pioneers of *Gestalt* psychology such as Max Wertheimer, and arguably the terms *figuration*, *field* (in Kurt Lewin, and perhaps more recently in the work of Pierre Bourdieu), and *matrix* (central to the theory of group analytic therapy, in which Elias played a founding role along with S. H. Foulkes, in the 1940s and early 1950s) all represent attempts to render some of the connotations of *Gestalt* into English. The key feature they have in common is that they are all associated with attempts to break away from the *homo clausus* assumption, which Elias contended were so prevalent in the social sciences and of which he was so critical.

Elias always considered himself a sociologist, not a "social theorist," and had a low estimate of the potential contribution of philosophical reflection to the understanding of human society if it were divorced from the empirical investigation of human social interdependence. Throughout his career, Elias argued that the whole central tradition of modern Western epistemology, from Descartes through Kant to twentieth-century phenomenology, was misconceived. It was based on asking how a single, adult, human

mind can know what it knows. Elias called this the model of "homo clausus," the "closed person," and found it lurking in much of modern sociology. He argued that social scientists must instead think in terms of "homines aperti," "open people," and in particular of "long lines of generations of people" building up the stock of human knowledge. His crucial point, however, was that the image of homo clausus corresponded to a mode of self-experience that was not a human universal, but was a social product, particularly of European society from the Renaissance onward. The development of this culturally specific human self-image among the secular upper classes in Western Europe was a key theme of his magnum opus, *The Civilizing Process* ([1939] 2000), which figurational sociologists take as their paradigm in precisely Kuhn's sense of a major research achievement: While offering an answer to some questions, it raises many other issues for further research.

The following are four guiding principles of "figurational" sociology:

1. Sociology is about people in the plural, human beings who are interdependent with each other in a variety of ways and whose lives evolve in and are significantly shaped by the social figurations they form together.
2. These figurations are continually in flux, undergoing changes of many kinds, some rapid and ephemeral, others slower but perhaps more lasting.
3. The long-term developments taking place in human figurations have been and continue to be largely unplanned and unforeseen.
4. The development of human knowledge takes place within human figurations and is one important aspect of their overall development.

But what does a "figurational" or "process" sociology look like in practice? One of its aims is the discovery of "sequential order," or a "structure of processes," within processes of development. Thus, figurational sociology usually has a historical component, although the time span can vary from centuries (as in the case of *The Civilizing Process*) to a few years. Perhaps the most long-term of long-term figurational viewpoints is Johan Goudsblom's study of the significance of fire in social development, which traces the gradual development of a human species monopoly of the active use of fire since the era of *Homo erectus*, how this tilted the power ratio (another characteristic "figurational" concept) between humans and other animals, how this skill interwove with further biological evolution, and how it later played its part in patterns of domination in agrarian and industrial societies. Eric Dunning has continued his work with Elias on the sociology of sport, violence, and civilization, ranging from the ancient world to contemporary soccer

hooliganism. Abram de Swaan has compared the development of collective provision for public health, education, and income maintenance in Western Europe and the United States from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century, showing how this was associated with a widening of the scope of “mutual identification” (one of the key ideas of *The Civilizing Process* was that with the lengthening of “chains of interdependence” in the course of social development, *ceteris paribus*, the extent of mutual identification between human beings would widen). Stephen Mennell has attempted to explain the development of different cuisines and attitudes to eating in England and France over the same period, and Wilbert van Vree has tackled the emergence of rules for the conduct of business, public and private, also during the same time frame. Jan-Willem Gerritsen offers empirically founded sociological insights into the regulation of the two major “intoxicants,” alcohol and opiates, in industrial societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A final example to demonstrate the breadth of figurational sociology is Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh’s work on the dynamics of relations between the superpowers since the Second World War, but drawing again on deeper historical perspectives.

— Stephen Mennell

See also Civilizing Processes; Elias, Norbert; Evolutionary Theory; Habitus; Historical and Comparative Theory; Individualism; Parsons, Talcott; Structural Functionalism

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integration of the Hollywood studio system, to today’s new and largely unchallenged global vertical integration (of media producers, delivery systems, and outlets), motion pictures have been marked by the enmeshment of artistic and business practices. Indeed, it is important to recognize the film industry *as* industry, as the institution that established the constraints within which Hollywood films are defined aesthetically and ideologically. One of the key ways this process becomes visible to moviegoers is through film promotion, an increasingly dominant aspect of the film industry’s operations in the contemporary market.

Early on, the motion picture industry maximized the reach of its product by developing flexible systems of production improvising on the Fordist model, which enabled films to sell on a year-round basis, thereby establishing Hollywood’s control of this new medium. By the early 1920s, Hollywood exported American films throughout the world, and late in the same decade, the coming of sound solidified U.S. control over the world market.

The Hollywood film industry during the classical era was defined by theater ownership. The five major studios were those that were fully vertically integrated, controlling the worldwide distribution of their films and owning the prime exhibitor chains: Paramount Pictures, Loew’s/MGM, Fox (later 20th Century-Fox), Warner Bros., and RKO. The “little three” nonvertically integrated studios, Columbia, Universal, and United Artists, didn’t own any of the exclusively first-run theaters. The meat and potatoes of the film industry’s revenues came from these urban picture palaces, where the major studios reaped 75 percent of the average box office receipts.

The decline of the classical studio era was initiated by the now well-known Paramount consent decrees, the antitrust actions that divorced motion picture theater ownership from the production companies. This move was a component of President Franklin Roosevelt’s massive efforts to end the Great Depression. Other factors, such as the postwar baby boom and migration to the suburbs, contributed to the subsequent reduction in movie attendance. Another factor was increased television viewing, but the idea that the film industry and television were bitter competitors at this time has been rebutted by recent research demonstrating the early and far-reaching involvement of the film industry in television. The studios did, however, respond to the coming of TV by various product differentiation efforts (along with more famous gimmicks, such as 3-D), which resulted in important and long-lasting improvements to cinematic production values, such as the use of wide-screen, Panavision lenses, and Eastmancolor.

Although the postdivestiture film industry entailed less apparent studio control of individual films, with independent producers packaging films to be distributed by the studios, the major Hollywood production companies remained all-powerful. They increasingly incorporated television

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From the patent wars that marked their emergence, through the antitrust legislation that challenged the vertical

production within their scope of activities, a wise strategy considering that since the 1960s, most movies have been seen by home audiences.

The current, "New Hollywood Era" is generally considered to have begun with the emergence of blockbuster production, distribution, and marketing practices, coinciding with the release of *Jaws* in 1975. Movie attendance again has reached high levels, and technology enables ever more dazzling spectacles through advances in special effects and other innovations. Most important, the current film industry enables new modes of spectatorship, with the coming of cable and pay television, satellite TV, and the video market. By 1986, for example, video income exceeded theatrical box office income for the studios, and even box office flops are now ensured some degree of long-term profitability.

These new systems of film consumption contributed to the formation of corporate conglomerates that encompassed all media. Indeed, the new "Big Six," consisting of Disney, Fox, Universal Studios, Paramount Pictures, Sony (Columbia), and Time/Warner, are again fully vertically integrated, controlling a large percentage of worldwide film production as well as having interests in various forms of motion picture exhibition and delivery, while their foreign offices work together to cement control of international distribution. Their individual power is consolidated by the systems of cooperation provided by their lobbying arm, the Motion Picture Association of America, such that basically the same corporations control the film industry as did in 1930. Although some have tried, no new corporation has been able to thrive in this atmosphere of entrenched oligopoly.

The promotion of motion pictures has been integral to Hollywood control of the industry from the beginning, and from 1913 on, the theatrical movie trailer has been one of the most visible ways movies are advertised. As such, they are an important "genre" of film production: Watching trailers can help illuminate some of the film industry's strategies for attracting and controlling audiences. Currently, market studies generally place trailers second behind TV advertising (with newspapers third) for generating audiences, and they are seen as highly cost-effective, since they use only about 5 percent of the advertising budget of a given film.

In fact, trailers are a quintessential cinematic practice, uniting spectacle and the promotion of spectacle, and since this combination is now a pervasive feature of popular media as a whole, the presence of trailers as a long-standing precursor to this aspect of commercial culture makes them a fascinating subject of popular culture in their own right. They are, moreover, an increasingly visible one, since DVD ancillary materials and premium movie channels often incorporate theatrical trailers as added value.

The first-known trailer was merely a title that "trailed" at the end of the last reel of a 1913 serial, *The Adventures of Kathlyn*, announcing the next episode of the cliff-hanger.

Silent-era trailers were usually not more than a few clips from the film strung together. But the coming of sound allowed for new forms of address to audiences, and a now familiar rhetoric emerged, using narration, titles, and graphic motifs to exhort audiences to "See!" the film, among other imperatives, often somewhat in the manner of a circus barker. Indeed Frank Whitbeck, head of MGM's trailer department from 1934 through 1957, was a former Barnum & Bailey circus barker. During the classical studio era, some studios (notably MGM and Warner Bros.) had their own trailer departments, while others engaged a company called National Screen Service to create trailers from clips the studios provided (sometimes augmented with specially shot footage of audiences or documentation of the filmmaking process). The look, however, was consistent regardless of a trailer's provenance. Trailers became familiar to audiences as part of a larger film bill that included not only features but usually cartoons, newsreels, and travelogues. As early as 1928, the industry took note that trailers were often applauded by movie audiences, so it has long been understood that these short films can be entertainment in their own right in addition to being advertisements.

Various rhetorical textual features quickly became standard in classical era trailers and continued throughout their history in some form, such as the use of alliteration and hyperbole ("It has the burning brand of *greatness* on it!"—*The Big Country*, 1958); thematic graphic motifs and scene-setting visual lists, to emphasize genre elements; intertextual references to earlier performances by stars ("Starring Brian Donlevy, the Great McGinty, back in politics and tougher than ever!"—*The Glass Key*, 1942); and an enigmatic presentation of story elements that withheld the story's outcome ("What are the forbidden secrets in the letter?"—*The Letter*, 1940).

Like the rest of the film industry, trailers underwent a sort of "identity crisis" following the antitrust actions and concurrent rise of television, which signaled the end of the classical studio system in the late 1940s. Trailers for films made in the 1950s and 1960s evidence a confusion about how to bring audiences into the theaters, as new techniques and formulae were tried. Notable trailers from this era include one for *One-Eyed Jacks* (Lou Harris for Paramount, 1961), which inaugurated the dynamic use of still photographs instead of footage, and Pablo Ferro's innovative trailers for films such as Stanley Kubrick's *Lolita* (1962) and *Dr. Strangelove* (1964). National Screen Service lost its dominance, and small boutique ad agencies began to compete for campaigns. Increasingly, studios began to hire competing agencies or even (in more recent years) competing producers within an agency to create trailers from which they would choose.

The job of the trailer has always been to conform to the other elements of a film's ad campaign as delineated by publicity materials, such as pressbooks. Around the same

time that television advertising became common for films (the early 1970s), the studios began to make serious use of market research techniques, and a variety of television and print ads were produced to address specific demographics. But until the advent of digital technology in the 1990s made multiple trailers less expensive, there was usually only one theatrical trailer produced per film, so the trailer's job as the centerpiece of the ad campaign has been to try to appeal to every possible audience for the film. They are thus an interesting barometer of the Hollywood film industry's changing notions of its audience.

One of the most frequent complaints about contemporary trailers, "They give too much away," is usually rebutted by the industry with statistics that demonstrate that the more audiences see of a movie in advance, the more they want to see it. Another factor is that while in the classical Hollywood days, the trailer tended to withhold story outcomes because the story was the "product," increasingly in recent years the "product" of theatrical movie attendance is the *event* of going to the movies. The movie event can be just as exciting for audiences whether or not the story is known, as exemplified by the massive trend toward repeat viewing engendered by the blockbuster phenomenon. Contemporary blockbuster trailers sometimes work synergistically with the film plots themselves to evoke moviegoing as an impending event, such as those for *Twister* (1996) and *Signs* (2002).

Today, marketing is sometimes considered the motor driving the contemporary movie industry, rather than its servant, and to the extent that Hollywood marketing departments often determine whether or not a film is viable for a studio to "greenlight," this is probably true. The global movie marketplace is, moreover, increasingly dominated by films produced in the United States, and the international versions of trailers for American films have had an impact on the marketing practices of other countries. As the Internet becomes more integrated in movie marketing, trailers find new venues and participate in enhanced word-of-mouth networks, such as the unprecedented Internet-driven campaign for *The Blair Witch Project* in 1999. As one of the most audible "voices" of Hollywood film as an industry, trailers have demonstrated throughout their history Hollywood's knack for making its own particular conceptions of entertainment seem natural and sufficient to satisfy the needs of all audiences.

— Lisa D. Kernan

See also Internet and Cyberculture; Media Critique; Political Economy

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FORDISM AND POST-FORDISM

Generally used to refer to the organizational structure of production and consumption, the concepts of Fordism and post-Fordism have been applied to describe other institutional arrangements from the state to education to culture, art, and the media. Historically, the Fordist mode of production and consumption emerged in America during the turn of the twentieth century, when Henry Ford established mass production techniques in his automobile factories. Ford based his production techniques on a model of scientific management that was informed by the research of Frederick Taylor. According to Taylor, the productivity of workers could be increased if each component of the production process was broken down into simple, repetitive tasks. This assemblyline labor method meant that workers did not need to acquire specialized skills to perform their jobs and that managers could achieve absolute control over the movements of workers. Equipped with the knowledge of sequence and timing, managers had the ability to measure and predict productivity levels with precision and ensure that production quotas were achieved with minimal problems. Thus, the rigid production process of the assembly line was matched with a hierarchical model of management and decision making.

Recognizing the critical relationship between production and consumption, or supply and demand, Ford instituted a fixed wage of \$5 per day for his workers. It was Ford's vision that if workers made a fair wage, they would be able to purchase the automobiles they assembled. The automobiles produced at Ford's factories were cheap in price and homogeneous in design, and the fact that they were mass produced provided consumers with a large quantity of them to mass consume. As other manufacturers began to imitate Fordist production and consumption methods, a largely unskilled but unionized industrial workforce began to emerge that earned enough in wages to support a stable, mass consumer market.

The Fordist mode of production operated relatively well in an era dominated by large-scale, capital-intensive industry. However, by the 1980s, Fordism began to be challenged by a number of critics who suggested that it was too rigid for the economic growth of advanced industrial societies. Michael Piore and Charles Sabel presented one of the first critiques of Fordism in *The Second Industrial Divide* (1984), in which they introduced the theory of flexible specialization to discuss the changing organizational forms of economic activity in advanced industrial societies. According to Piore and Sabel, two seemingly contradictory developments are beginning to make Fordism obsolete: the reemergence of craft production and the introduction of new technologies in the manufacturing sector. Both developments are seen as a result of the changing tastes and demands of consumers and the rise of segmented marketing techniques. Both are also characterized by flexible specialization methods. On one hand, the reemergence of craft production (the second industrial divide) is coming to supersede mass production (the first industrial divide). On the other hand, large firms are beginning to use new manufacturing technologies to meet the specialized desires of various consumers. Interestingly, the second industrial divide requires skilled workers whether they engage in craft production or perform technological jobs. Piore and Sabel feel that workers in the second industrial divide experience more autonomy than those working under Fordist conditions. They have more control over the production process and also increased solidarity with other workers, even if they are not unionized.

Not all critiques of Fordism are as optimistic of the potential of post-Fordism, particularly in terms of empowering workers, as Piore and Sabel. For example, David Harvey argues in *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1990) that workers in a post-Fordist world may have more flexible options in terms of part-time or temporary employment but that this flexibility is countered by less job stability and few benefits, including no prospects for health insurance, vacation leave, pension, or retirement funds. Harvey refers to the economic processes that are undermining Fordism as “flexible accumulation,” which is characterized by high levels of structural unemployment, fluctuating job skills, a larger service sector, stagnant wage levels, and the decline of trade unions. The economic regime of flexible accumulation is also distinguished from Fordism by what Harvey calls “time-space compression.” According to Harvey, the dimensions of time and space are increasingly shrinking under flexible accumulation. Communication and information technologies are allowing us to make decisions that cover a large area of space in less time. Thus, a manager in the United States can speed up production in her factories in Thailand with the click of her computer mouse or a call on her cell phone. While employers may benefit from the flexibility of subcontracting part-time and temporary

employees around the world to meet production quotas, the power of workers seems to be even more curtailed than it was under Fordism.

Other writers have focused more on the political implications of the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism than Piore and Sabel, and Harvey. Scott Lash and John Urry highlight the diminishing power of the nation-state and the decline of class-based politics in their book *The End of Organized Capitalism* (1987). The flow of capital and corporate power have come to transcend the boundaries of the nation-state, leaving national markets and workforces vulnerable to the whims of international capitalists and managers. Under the regime of organized capitalism, the nation-state had the power to regulate big business, protect workers, and provide for those in need through welfare programs. Furthermore, organized labor and other interests groups could use the nation-state as a site to articulate their grievances against business practices or national policies. The growing tendency toward disorganized capitalism has therefore eroded not only the power of the nation-state but also the public sphere or civil society more generally. It has also effectively ended welfare benefits in many advanced industrial countries.

Some question whether or not a clear transition from Fordism to post-Fordism has, in fact, occurred. For example, George Ritzer demonstrates in *The McDonaldisation of Society* (2001) that the fast-food industry is structured according to Fordist principles, particularly in terms of the homogenization of products, workers, and consumers. According to Ritzer, other sites of consumption in contemporary society are also McDonaldisated, including shopping malls, airports, amusement parks, and even universities. While many of these dream worlds appear fantastical on the surface, they are all rationally planned and regulated, striving toward manipulating the sale of products and the motion of consumers.

— Wendy A. Wiedenhoft

See also Consumer Culture; Disneyization; McDonaldisation; Means of Production

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FOUCAULT, MICHEL

Michel Paul Foucault (1926–1984), social historian, philosopher, psychologist, and political activist, was one of the most original of the post–World War II French social theorists. Though Foucault is commonly considered a post-modern or poststructuralist, he was an independent thinker, whose writings cannot be easily classified. He was, for example, indifferent to the term *postmodern*. If there is justification for such a label, it is because Foucault's thinking has been fundamental to the reassessment of modernity's most cherished principles. His 15 books and hundreds of essays and interviews contribute significantly to such familiar, if disturbing, trends as the critique of the Subject as a foundation of epistemology and moral philosophy; the transformation of historical method toward a postpositivist method of genealogical research; the early development of what came to be called "queer theory" as a radical suspension of doubt as to the instability of analytic categories; as well as the rethinking of modern political and cultural sociology.

If a label must be used, then *poststructuralism* is slightly more accurate. Foucault was associated with the famous 1968 *Théorie d'ensemble* manifesto, which included among its contributors Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan, among others, who proposed a radical departure from then-dominant schools of thought in France: structuralism and existentialism. Thereafter, post-structuralism came to embrace efforts to work beyond the famous objectivist/subjectivist dichotomy in social thought. On balance, however, it is recommended that readers think of Foucault as *sui generis*: a social theorist of multiple interests who made varied contributions to social theory, none of them suitable to any one category.

Foucault was born to a bourgeois family in provincial Poitiers. His early schoolwork was undistinguished. Eventually, his intellect began to flourish under the care of priests in a local Catholic school. Thereupon, he was sent to Paris, as are many of provincial France's most brilliant young people. Foucault completed his secondary education at the prestigious Lycée Henri IV, in the heart of Paris. Thereafter, from 1946 to 1950, he studied at the École Normale Supérieure, France's elite school of higher education in the arts and sciences. In this period, he suffered episodes of poor mental health and was frequently at social odds with fellow students. Still, after an initial failure, in 1951, Foucault passed France's most competitive and distinguishing postsecondary examination, the *agrégation de philosophie*, an achievement that virtually assures career success, especially for intellectuals.

The French traditionally refer to the years of schooling as one's "formation." Foucault enjoyed an excellent formation during the school days in Paris, where he encountered firsthand the teachings of Jean Hyppolite, Louis Althusser,

and Georges Canguilhem, all of whom encouraged his gift for rethinking the terms of classical social thought. Though he remained faithful in spirit to his teachers, Foucault always fashioned his own, hard-to-define positions, based on prodigious reading and an incautious willingness to engage the political and social experiences of his time: the decolonizing war in Algeria, the events of 1968, prison reform, and, above all, the queer revolution (which must be understood as having to do with much more than sex, or even sexualities).

Michel Foucault began his university teaching at Lille in 1952, but in 1955, he turned to government service as a cultural attaché to French foreign missions in Uppsala, Warsaw, and Hamburg. In Uppsala, he began the archival research for the first of his enduringly great works of social history, *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (partially translated into English as *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* 1965). The years abroad gave Foucault the freedom to deepen his understanding of psychology, to begin his research career, and to enjoy the pleasures and risks of gay sexual life. In 1960, he returned to France to assume a teaching post in philosophy and psychology at Clermont-Ferrand. In 1961, *Folie et déraison* was published, and the year following, it was presented and defended as his thesis for the *doctorat d'état*, France's highest postgraduate degree.

Immediately, Foucault's reputation grew as more and more of his writings appeared: *Maladie mentale et psychologie* (1962), *Raymond Roussel* (1963), *Naissance de la clinique* (1963), *Les mots et les choses* (1966), and *L'archaeologie du savoir* (1969). Translations of the latter three of these books established Foucault's international reputation as a revolutionary social thinker and historian: *Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (1973), *The Order of Things* (1970), and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972). By the end of the decade, Foucault's stature in France led to his election in 1969 to the most important academic post in France, the Collège de France. His inaugural lecture on December 2, 1970, "L'ordre du discours" (translated with *Archaeology of Knowledge* as "The Order of Language," 1972), brought to an end Foucault's early, more formalistic period.

Social theorists are tempted to turn to *Archaeology of Knowledge* as a guide to Foucault's method. Though the book is as rich in brilliant insight as it is elegantly difficult in literary style, it is not the best access to Foucault's developing social theory. A much better source is his book of 1975, *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (translated as *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, 1977). Foucault's history of the early modern prison as an institutional setting designed to provide constant moral surveillance of the prisoner was at once the culmination of earlier thinking and the first step to the important later histories of sexualities.

One might describe the important early works as the first fruits of the mentors of his schooldays, Canguilhem and Althusser, who were, respectively, preoccupied by the history of the sciences and the political workings of knowledge and ideology. Foucault's early studies of madness (*Folie et déraison*), the hospital (*Birth of the Clinic*), the social sciences (*The Order of Things*), and the prison (*Discipline and Punish*) were, if taken together, a systematic recalibration of the social history of the early modern culture and political economy. In them, Foucault more or less intentionally set about to answer the question that since Karl Marx's *German Ideology* (1848) had troubled critical theorists of the industrial order. If, as Marx said in his famous inversion of Hegel's method, ideas and knowledge generally are but the reverse image of the actual power relations in society, then how is one to account for the apparent fact that on the surface, the modern world claims to be more reasonable and fair, while underneath, it is just brutal as any other? Foucault's answer turned on the key word *discipline*. The modern factory system, for example, required laborers disciplined to the conditions of factory work. The first generations of industrial laborers were largely recruited from the countryside, where work is scheduled more according to daily and seasonal cycles of rural life. Industrial life, by contrast, moves relentlessly to supply the demands of an abstract, timeless market. As a result, the modern world had to retrain its workers and the population as a whole.

Foucault held that the so-called human (or social) sciences were crucial to the task of redisciplining the cohorts of workers new to the modern system. This meant, most fundamentally, disciplining how they thought of the means of controlling their laboring bodies: hence the unique importance of the hospital and the prison. Where medical practices (and what today we call the "health care system") monitored the levels of health and well-being in the population, the prison controlled the bodies of those deviant to the emerging norms of the socially disciplined life. Thus, more broadly, one can see that Foucault's choice of topics in the early work—mental health, the hospital, the human sciences, and the prison—was far from accidental. By these studies, Foucault was working through a comprehensive solution to the first-and-foremost question of any social science of the modern world. Where Marx put the query in the classical terms of the relations between ideal and material factors in society, by Foucault's day, the question had long been transposed into one of the relations between power and knowledge (or ideology). The question itself had two variants, one being: How does power use knowledge? This, of course, is the question provoked by the Nazi reign of terror across Europe (and was the central question of the German school of critical theory). The second variation on the theme was: How can knowledge be liberated from the distorting effects of power? This was, to a degree, the American variant, for it was in the United States

after World War II that the social-scientific ideal that pure, uncorrupted social knowledge could perfect society was put into play.

One can readily see why a thinker like Foucault might only have arisen in France in the generation after Nazi occupation. In a sense, the foundational experience of the French intellectual during the occupation was the underground resistance movement. This was in contrast to the Americans who thought of themselves as heroic conquerors of evil and the German intellectuals who were forced to quit their native society for England or the United States. The French experience thus explained the starkly different, and rival, schools of French social thought in the postwar era. On one side, structuralisms, such as the cultural theories of Claude Lévi-Strauss (who suffered the war in exile), were attempts to rethink the structural whole of culture with respect to its hidden members. On the other side, existentialisms, such as that of Jean-Paul Sartre (whose war experience was shaped by the Resistance), emphasized a radical consideration of the moral choices made in the flux of historical action. A scant generation later, the name "poststructuralism" came to be affixed to those, such as Foucault, for whom the war had faded as a defining experience. They sought to reconstruct both society and social thought, which led them to develop a theoretical position that was at once structural and existential, without being either objectivist or subjectivist.

Foucault's early emphasis on discipline as the principal desideratum in the study of modern social life was therefore a topic poised between the two extremes. He chose not to study either the structures of power or the contents of knowledge, but to investigate the history of modern power's relation to knowledge. The effect of Foucault's work through *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) was to move the human sciences to the center of social theory without falling into the trap of writing either a mere history of ideas (in effect, a sociology of knowledge) or a social history of the social sciences (a kind of sociology of social sciences). Rather, he took the emergence of the social and human sciences (in the broadest possible senses of the terms) to be a (if not *the*) watershed change by which modern society came into being (in its broadest possible sense).

If the central issue in the social study of the industrial society was how to discipline workers, then the institutional spheres in which this took place had to be the disciplines. How were workers disciplined through disciplinary knowledge? (And note that the knowledge in question is *savoir*; the practical knowledges of daily life.) Of course, the disciplines to which Foucault referred were at once the formal academic ones (such as ethnography and political economy) and the applied professional ones (such as medicine) and the quasi-professional ones (such as what Americans call, oxymoronically, "administration of justice"). Here, one sees the irony in Foucault's method: To collapse *discipline*,

in the sense of the application of power to behaviors, into the practical work of the *disciplines* is to collapse power into knowledge in a way that permits rigorous (if untraditional) empirical examination. Thus, compounding irony upon irony, the clever methodological shift also marks the beginning of what many came to call a “postdisciplinary” approach to knowledge that refuses to accept either artificial lines drawn among the officially sanctioned academic fields or the line customarily drawn between the academic sciences (*connaissances*) and practical knowledges (*savoirs*).

Thus, the reader can appreciate that though books such as *Archaeology of Knowledge* are intensely theoretical (and to some impenetrable), Foucault’s theoretical position was forged on strict empirical grounds. Plus, in contrast to many widely read and productive historians, Foucault is known to have done the archival work himself, which itself led to striking discoveries, such as the eerie historical tales of the hermaphrodite, *Herculin Barbin* (1982), and of the parricide in *Moi, Pierre Rievère ayant égorgé ma mère, ma soeur et mon frère . . .* (1973), both published separately with Foucault’s comments. The surprises that come to the archivist come in part to relieve the boredom. Archival work is hard, slow, and tiring, but it has its own distinctive methodological benefits.

Work in historical archives requires a special type of mental alertness: realizing that one is traveling through layer upon layer of historical time, back to events reported in archival texts of the near or distant past. To work on a daily basis with fragile pages of letters or court documents (or poor facsimiles thereof) is to experience the strange effect of the past on the researcher. One digs through the layers to find documents as real as any one finds today. But always the question is: In what does the truth or reality of the text subsist? It is never, for example, possible to fact-check an ancient text by asking its authors what they meant. Archives of the historical past are, strictly speaking, unguarded by the voice of an author. In other words, they are pure discourse, outside the sphere wherein anyone can second-guess the meanings. In contrast, even, to literary texts, where one is tempted to imagine what the poet meant, it is nearly impossible to attribute meanings to the archival texts. Most of the time, the author or authors are unknown. When they are known, usually (as in the case of private letters) the texts convey meanings outside and often at odds with the exterior record of their public lives.

The interpretation of texts without authors is closer, thereby, to natural history and astronomy than to survey research or ethnography. It is, in short, to use the word Foucault made famous, closest of all to the work of the archaeological digs of the physical anthropologist, wherein the story of unknown and unknowable ancients is told by the cracks and fissures in the dry bones, shards of pottery, broken tools, and weapons. The story of the first man is a

story without an author. Foucault chose his terms prudently when he described his method, first, as an “archaeology” and later as “genealogy.” Both terms owe to the influences of the *Annales* school of historiography (of which the great French historian Fernand Braudel is the acknowledged founder, and today, Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems analysis is the intentional successor). The latter term, *genealogy*, captures a bit more of the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche. In the background, however, one can discern the traces of Marx’s historical method and Freud’s psychoanalysis, both of which reconstruct a practical knowledge of hidden pasts by digging through the layers of dirt (bourgeois deceptions and mental repressions) under which they are buried. The method, however, is not to be confused with German hermeneutics, wherein the effort is to uncover by intersubjective decipherment the original truths. Archival archaeology is dirty work, done without instructions.

In Foucault’s method, the truth of the archival past is a truth that survives on the wings of the descriptive presentation of the facts, that is, on the descriptive work permitted in a given historical time by the predominant community of discourse. Whether in sciences or practical life, certain things cannot be said, however true they may be. Thus also, the strangely brilliant quality in all of Foucault’s methods: The prevailing norms do not always allow the ancient truths to be told. Hence, madness was not originally a disease, even a disorder; and punishment was a cruel public spectacle without the least consideration of rehabilitating the interior attitude of the criminal. Likewise, medicine before the modern era was a kind of epidemiological study (often of humors or fluids, only later of germs) in a world in which, remarkably, the body was not a significant etiological site due to moral restrictions on the physical examination of bodies. In a similar fashion, what we today call the “social sciences” were, in the classical era, the formal classification of naturally occurring forms that corresponded to abstract types, as opposed to the empirical examination of variances as they occur in the evidentiary record. When one works in archives, the labor is so time-consuming that as much as one would like to, it is impossible to go to ancient court records looking for some preconceived form. One can only read, and take notes, and read, then (as Max Weber once said) wait for the idea to occur to you. This is what allowed Foucault to discover what others overlooked. His archaeological method was thus a very modern, if late-modern, empirical method—one by which the evidence, being hidden below the layers of records stacked upon each other (often literally), is to be interpreted only when the researcher awaits the surprise.

Thus, all of Foucault’s historical books begin with a surprise story, each meant to call the reader into the lower strata of the historical evidence he then recounts. *Discipline and Punish*, for example, starts off immediately with the shocking story of the torture on March 2, 1757, of the regicide Damians. The account of the murderer’s flesh being

torn with pinchers and worse excites the reader with terror and pain. But soon after, quiet is restored as Foucault calmly recites the rules for the care of prisoners according to Leon Faucher. In the space of three pages, time shifts to 1837, precisely 80 years after Damiens's torture. The new punitive rules are more those of a monastery than of the public torture. In the 80-year interim (which included, of course, the American and French Revolutions), the modern world had settled uncertainly into place. The power to punish had been transposed into a faith that the body is the mere surface upon which control does its disciplinary work without bloodletting. The new faith is a social science of sorts. It is, in Foucault's most famous concept, the work of *power/knowledge*, in which the dichotomous terms are joined, if not quite fused, in one operation. Methodologically, the shift could not be predicted on the basis of abstract theories or principles. It surfaces only when one traces the layers of the archival record back through years until one comes upon the irregularities when, in the example, punishment as a public display of power gradually receded behind the prison walls and (at least originally) the criminal was subjected to the surveillance of those with the moral knowledge to correct his moral attitude and to discipline the misbehaving body.

In the years after his election to the Collège de France, in 1969, Foucault's work held true to the general principles of the early period but changed discernibly as to subject matter and even method. The changes, though necessary to note, were not anything of the kind his teacher, Louis Althusser, attributed to Marx (in *Pour Marx*, 1965) from a youthful humanist to a mature scientist. Foucault was far too insistently original to allow his life, much less his work, to be subdivided. Yet he was a man of the world, and the events into which he was more and more drawn had their effect. By the early 1970s, Foucault had become one of France's most celebrated public intellectuals and the proper successor to Jean-Paul Sartre—and in France, the public intellectual is a role that invites serious political responsibilities. At the same time, in the decade after the revolutionary 1960s, French social thought came more and more into the international spotlight, especially in the United States. Translations of Derrida, Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, and later Pierre Bourdieu soon appeared in English within months of original publication in French. This was the period when the term *poststructuralism* assumed its notoriety in the English-reading world. Though French social theory was poorly understood, especially in the United States, there was a good reason that young academics took it to heart as they sought to rebuild their adult lives after the political failures of their youth. The 1960s had been, for Americans in particular, their time of revolutionary pathos, a time that marked the lives of a later generation of young Americans to much the same degree as World War II and the wars of decolonization had influenced an earlier generation of Europeans. Above all, for Americans

who had been culturally or politically revolutionary in the 1960s, the 1970s were a time of stock taking. With the election of Richard M. Nixon to the American presidency in 1968, the United States began a long period of conservative withdrawal from the progressive dreams of the 1960s. The axis of hope had rotated from America to Europe. For American intellectuals, the prefix *post* had a special appeal. It was a time when ideals had to be assessed; hence the turn to European social thinkers who were in recovery from the effects of the war.

What the so-called poststructuralism movement offered was exactly what it intended to offer: a new way of thinking in robustly structural terms that also permitted access to the personal or subjective elements in social life. One should note that chief among the slogans of the new social movements of the 1970s were phrases such as “personal politics” and “participatory democracy.” Of all the social theorists that came to their fame in France in the time, Foucault's writings were in many ways the more accessible to American sensibilities (not to mention British philosophical tastes that, even by the early 1970s, were a bit trapped in analytic methods and cautious about Continental cultures). One direct consequence for Foucault, as for Derrida and others, is that they were drawn more and more into American university life. For Foucault, the regular visits, especially to the University of California at Berkeley, were a relief from the pressures at home and a free space to explore his own personal politics—to both creative and tragic ends.

When *Surveiller et punir* appeared in 1975, Foucault had less than a decade to live. The AIDS virus that killed him was unknown at the time. He was, like many others, drawn into a new kind of politics in which the struggle was to overcome the subjugation of subjecthood that Foucault considered the fundamental evil of modern culture. One of the most frequently cited passages in his study of prisons is the interpretation of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon, that deceptively intrusive early form of prison architecture in which the prison population was exposed to the continuous gaze of the powers, an arrangement that allowed power “to induce . . . a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault 1977:201). Hence is given another of Foucault's famously duplicitous ideas: that in the modern world, subjects are created by subjugation. The observing prison was also a figure for the working of power throughout the modern society. From this adumbration of his concept of power/knowledge, Foucault stepped off toward the work of his last years.

In 1976, *La volonté de savoir* (translated as *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, 1978) announced Foucault's plan of teaching and research. This book became, at once, the locus classicus of queer theory and of the theory of the instability of analytic categories. In effect, by arguing that knowledge is behind (even) the power of sex in the social whole, Foucault showed that queering, in addition to being

a sexual practice, was also an undermining of the idea that analytic differences (including that between truth and power) could be kept separate and pure.

Just as important, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*, was also Foucault's most explicit and powerful theory of sociology's most urgent question: How does power work? After the revolutions of the 1960s, social and political theorists were forced to explain the obvious weakness of the classic top-down concept of power. Both Marx and Weber were responsible for the idea that power is domination and thus that it is a conscious, intended, and downward exertion of force upon those in the weaker power positions. What the new social movements did, however, was to invoke the fact that women, homosexuals, workers, racial minorities, and colonial subjects rebelled late in the history of their oppressions because in some fashion, they had colluded with those who controlled their destinies. Power thus had to be as much from the bottom up as from the top down. This led to Foucault's completely original dismissal of the so-called repressive hypothesis on power.

The surprise at the beginning of *La volonté de savoir* is the subversion of the idea that the Victorian Age was repressive. On the contrary, talk about sex was everywhere in the nineteenth century, as it had been through the ages. But Foucault's most striking example is that of the medieval Christian church's confessional, which served to encourage people to talk about sex as the subtly powerful method for regulating sexual behavior. In this, Foucault breaks with his earlier method by reaching back before even the classical era, to the medieval church and, eventually, to the Greeks. Dominant powers, whether the capitalist class in the modern era or the priestly class in the Middle Ages, had no choice but to regulate sexual practices, because sex is necessarily central to their need to regulate the growth of populations, whether of workers or adherents. Pure repression, thus, is impossible. Without sex, no babies; the population dies off, and the system collapses.

Power cannot easily regulate intimate behavior, even by the most repressive measures. The bedroom is beyond explicit top-down force. Controlling sex requires cooperation of the subjects of the realm. Hence, Foucault's (1978) stunning announcement that the modern subject—so proudly advertised as the new, liberated man—was, in fact, still a subject in the medieval sense: "An immense labor, to which the West has submitted generations in order to produce—while other forms of work ensured the accumulation of capital—men's subjection: their constitution as subjects in both senses of the word" (p. 60). The confessional was thus the precursor to the nineteenth-century factory school and the diffusion of self-help and therapeutic practices in the twentieth century. Power regulates sex (hence: reproduction) by forming subjects who willingly subject themselves to the prevailing regime of power. How is this done? The only way it can be done: by inducing the subjects to talk

about sex, to talk in ways that adjust sexual behaviors to the needed level of fertility. This explains the French title of the book, *La volonté de savoir*: The Will to Knowledge. This play on Nietzsche's idea of the Will to Power served to revolutionize the sociology of power, even to suggest that power/knowledge was at work well before the industrial system was to assert that the modern world worked according to a virtually universal requirement of social power.

After the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, 1976, there was a long wait for Foucault's next books. He was, in these years, as productive as ever as an essayist, activist, teacher, and researcher. The demands on him in France had grown to a degree that lesser men would have found them unbearable. He spent more and more time at Berkeley. San Francisco drew him not only for the pleasure of the intellectual company at the university but also for the sexual pleasures of the gay community, in the days before AIDS was known to be what it has become.

When back in France, Foucault made the time to research the history of sexuality. Then, he worked mostly in the archives of the Catholic tradition and turned ever more back to the Greeks. Slowly, the concept power/knowledge was transposed into *governmentality*. Foucault meant to make the workings of power in the formation of subjecthood ever more concrete. In a sense, governmentality is a term that drops the irony and wordplay in favor of a specific historical claim. The governing of a people depends on the way people govern themselves. The second and third volumes of the sexuality project, *L'usage des plaisirs*, 1984 (*The Uses of Pleasure*, 1985) and *Le souci de soi*, 1984 (*The Care of the Self*, 1986), ended up quite different in subject and nuance from the original plan. Foucault's history of sexuality had become, in effect, a history of the Self as the simultaneous object and subject of power. "Short of being the prince himself, one exercises power within a network in which one occupies a key position" (Foucault 1986:87). Power, then, is more explicitly the work of governing—still a work that entails knowledge and discourse, but a work that issues in an ethic of care for the self, an ethic that assures the possibilities of sexual pleasures.

Those pleasures, in the end, killed Foucault. He died of AIDS on June 25, 1984, just as his books on the care of the pleasuring self appeared.

— Charles Lemert

See also Body; Discourse; Genealogy; Governmentality; Power; Queer Theory; Social Constructionism; Surveillance

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FRAME ANALYSIS

Frame analysis is the study of the frames, or fundamental schemes of interpretation, by which people in social situations make coherent sense of what is occurring in those situations. Frame analysis assumes that social events and personal experiences may be understood by social actors in a variety of ways but that such understandings have their own structure and coherence, which can be systematically described. The concept was initially coined and developed by Erving Goffman (1974) but since the mid-1980s has predominantly been used in the study of social movements, and to a lesser extent in narrative and discourse analysis as well as communication studies.

GOFFMAN'S FRAME ANALYSIS

In Goffman's original formulation, frame analysis was a method for studying "the organization of experience," echoing concerns raised by William James and early phenomenological philosophers such as Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz. For Schutz, individuals could experience the "multiple realities" of everyday life, dreams, hallucinations,

revery, and such; Goffman borrowed and expanded this notion to include the different realities of jokes, rehearsals, parodies, plays, and a host of other interpretations of situations that are less "primary frameworks" than simple, everyday life. In this, Goffman also continued sociological interest in the "definition of the situation," a concept that recognized the problematicity of the coherence and meaning of a social scene, and his own social dramaturgy, which actively explored the metaphor of "life as theater." Goffman also drew on Gregory Bateson's ideas about the play as an unserious version of a real event, and the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel.

Goffman's primary concern was the ontological status of the social scene, that is, the "realness" of what is happening. For instance, a play about Winston Churchill is in some sense less "real" than the life depicted therein; and a rehearsal for the performance is less "real" than the opening performance itself; and if the actors begin joking during the rehearsal, what they do is clearly still another step removed, even if the jokes continue to be about Churchill himself. Such transformations of similar actions by a reconsideration of their meaning Goffman called "keying," using a musical metaphor. The "frame," in this case, is the internal logic of the situation that supports a given ontological level (as reality, performance, rehearsal, or joke). Similarly, Goffman examined the various external boundaries of a scene, for instance, between actors and audience: A scene in a play may intentionally provoke laughter among the audience, and although the *actors* pause to allow for the laughter, their *characters* must not recognize the people laughing as being there. Goffman used such distinctions as clues to the structure of social life generally. For Goffman, a social event, a "strip" of activity that is somewhat arbitrarily cut out of the flow of human life, thus has both an internal syntax and an external boundary whose recognition, following implicit rules, are part of what creates the event itself. Goffman detailed many of the rules that govern a wide range of such levels of reality.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

In the late 1970s and increasingly throughout the 1980s, frame analysis, based loosely on Goffman's original concept, became a popular research tool among social movement scholars, who realized that political power often lies in a movement's ability to impose situational definitions or interpretations, or "frames," onto otherwise ill-defined events and experiences. As in Goffman, the "frame" metaphor continued to be ambiguous, referring both to the internal logic of arguments, as in the structural frame of a house, and to the boundary by which issues or events are separated out for attention or defined as a scene, as in the frame of a painting. The use of frame analysis was in part a reaction against what movement scholars regarded as the mechanistic or excessively causal explanations of either rational

choice theory or resource mobilization theory in the study of social movements. In contrast, frame analysis emphasized agency, the free choice of both activists and audiences (especially of potential participants in a movement), the importance of meaning and interpretation in human events, and the cultural backgrounds out of which varying interpretations of events could arise or within which interpretations could be accepted. Frame analysts studied, for instance, how activists devised arguments that would appeal to broad publics; how media organizations interpreted public events in politically consequential ways; and how various audiences responded to different appeals and interpretations. In America, for example, movements often frame their arguments as a fight against “injustice” and cast arguments drawing on widely held values, such as individual rights, equality of opportunity, or freedom from government intervention. Scholars examined how the “alignment” of frames with the fundamental values of audiences affected acceptability and how frames could be extended or reshaped. The underlying message of frame analysis in social movements theory is that a movement’s audiences—members, potential members, opponents, and the public at large—are affected by the interpretation they place on events, and the interpretations (a) can be shaped deliberately by movement activists and (b) frequently rest on emotional and symbolic responses to messages as much as on logical or empirical grounds.

— Daniel F. Chambliss

See also Discourse; Goffman, Erving; Social Movement Theory

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FRANKFURT SCHOOL

The “Frankfurt school” refers to a group of German American theorists who developed powerful analyses of the changes in Western capitalist societies that occurred since

the classical theory of Marx. Working at the *Institut für Sozialforschung* in Frankfurt, Germany, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, theorists such as Max Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, and Erich Fromm produced some of the first accounts within critical social theory of the importance of mass culture and communication in social reproduction and domination. The Frankfurt school also generated one of the first models of a critical cultural studies to analyze the processes of cultural production and political economy, the politics of cultural texts, and audience reception and use of cultural artifacts (Kellner 1989, 1995). The approach is valuable in that it links the reading and critique of cultural texts with economic analysis of the system of cultural production and social analysis of uses and effects of media culture. This systematic approach combines social theory with cultural criticism in a synoptic approach that overcomes the one-sidedness of many positions within cultural studies and media critique.

Moving from Nazi Germany to the United States, the Frankfurt school experienced firsthand the rise of a media culture involving film, popular music, radio, television, and other forms of mass culture (Wiggershaus 1994). In the United States, where they found themselves in exile, media production was by and large a form of commercial entertainment controlled by big corporations. Two of its key theorists, Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, developed an account of the “culture industry” to call attention to the industrialization and commercialization of culture under capitalist relations of production ([1948] 1972). This situation was most marked in the United States, which had little state support of film or television industries and where a highly commercial mass culture emerged that came to be a distinctive feature of capitalist societies and a focus of critical cultural studies.

During the 1930s, the Frankfurt school developed a critical and transdisciplinary approach to cultural and communications studies, combining political economy, textual analysis, and analysis of social and ideological effects. They coined the term “culture industry” to signify the process of the industrialization of mass-produced culture and the commercial imperatives that drove the system. The critical theorists analyzed all mass-mediated cultural artifacts within the context of industrial production in which the commodities of the culture industries exhibited the same features as other products of mass production: commodification, standardization, and massification. The culture industries had the specific function, however, of providing ideological legitimation of the existing capitalist societies and of integrating individuals into their way of life.

For the Frankfurt school, mass culture and communications therefore stand in the center of leisure activity, are important agents of socialization and mediators of political

reality, and should thus be seen as major institutions of contemporary societies, with a variety of economic, political, cultural, and social effects. Furthermore, the critical theorists investigated the cultural industries in a political context as a form of the integration of the working class into capitalist societies. The Frankfurt school theorists were among the first neo-Marxian groups to examine the effects of mass culture and the rise of the consumer society on the working classes that were to be the instrument of revolution in the classical Marxian scenario. They also analyzed the ways in which the culture industries and consumer society were stabilizing contemporary capitalism and accordingly sought new strategies for political change, agencies of political transformation, and models for political emancipation that could serve as norms of social critique and goals for political struggle. This project required rethinking Marxian theory and produced many important contributions—as well as some problematical positions.

The Frankfurt school focused intently on technology and culture, indicating how technology was becoming both a major force of production and formative mode of social organization and control. In a 1941 article, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” Herbert Marcuse argued that technology in the contemporary era constitutes an entire “mode of organizing and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an instrument for control and domination” (p. 414). In the realm of culture, technology produced mass culture that habituated individuals to conform to the dominant patterns of thought and behavior, and thus provided powerful instruments of social control and domination.

Victims of European fascism, the Frankfurt school experienced firsthand the ways the Nazis used the instruments of mass culture to produce submission to fascist culture and society. While in exile in the United States, the members of the Frankfurt school came to believe that American “mass culture” was also highly ideological and worked to promote the interests of American capitalism. Controlled by giant corporations, the culture industries were organized according to the strictures of mass production, churning out mass-produced products that generated a highly commercial system of culture, which, in turn, sold the values, lifestyles, and institutions of “the American way of life.”

The work of the Frankfurt school provided what Paul Lazarsfeld (1941), one of the originators of modern communications studies, called a “critical approach,” which he distinguished from the “administrative research.” The positions of Adorno, Lowenthal, and other members of the inner circle of the Institute for Social Research were contested by Walter Benjamin, an idiosyncratic theorist loosely affiliated with the institute. Benjamin, writing in Paris during the 1930s, discerned progressive aspects in new technologies of cultural production such as photography, film, and

radio. In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1969), Benjamin noted how new mass media were supplanting older forms of culture whereby the mass reproduction of photography, film, recordings, and publications replaced the emphasis on the originality and “aura” of the work of art in an earlier era. Freed from the mystification of high culture, Benjamin believed that media culture could cultivate more critical individuals, able to judge and analyze their culture just as sports fans could dissect and evaluate athletic activities. In addition, Benjamin believed, processing the rush of images in cinema created subjectivities better able to parry and comprehend the flux and turbulence of experience in industrialized, urbanized societies.

Himself a collaborator of the prolific German artist Bertolt Brecht, Benjamin worked with Brecht on films, created radio plays, and attempted to use the media as organs of social progress. In the essay “The Artist as Producer” ([1934] 1999), Benjamin argued that progressive cultural creators should “refunction” the apparatus of cultural production, turning theater and film, for instance, into a forum of political enlightenment and discussion rather than a medium of “culinary” audience pleasure. Both Brecht and Benjamin wrote radio plays and were interested in film as an instrument of progressive social change. In an essay on radio theory, Brecht anticipated the Internet in his call for reconstructing the apparatus of broadcasting from one-way transmission to a more interactive form of two-way, or multiple, communication (in Silberman 2000:41), a form first realized in CB radio and then electronically mediated computer communication.

Moreover, Benjamin wished to promote a radical cultural and media politics concerned with the creation of alternative oppositional cultures. Yet he recognized that media such as film could have conservative effects. While he thought it was progressive that mass-produced works were losing their “aura,” their magical force, and were opening cultural artifacts for more critical and political discussion, he recognized that film could create a new kind of ideological magic through the cult of celebrity and techniques, such as the close-up that fetishized certain stars or images via the technology of the cinema. Benjamin was thus one of the first radical cultural critics to look carefully at the form and technology of media culture in appraising its complex nature and effects. Moreover, he developed a unique approach to cultural history that is one of his most enduring legacies, constituting a micrological history of Paris in the eighteenth century, an uncompleted project that contains a wealth of material for study and reflection.

Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno answered Benjamin’s optimism in a highly influential analysis of the culture industry in their book *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which first appeared in 1948 and was translated into English in 1972. They argued that the system of cultural production

dominated by film, radio broadcasting, newspapers, and magazines was controlled by advertising and commercial imperatives, and served to create subservience to the system of consumer capitalism. While later critics pronounced their approach too manipulative, reductive, and elitist, it provides an important corrective to more populist approaches to media culture that downplay the way the media industries exert power over audiences and help produce thought and behavior that conforms to the existing society.

The Frankfurt school also provides useful historical perspectives on the transition from traditional culture and modernism in the arts to a mass-produced media and consumer society. In his pathbreaking book, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Jürgen Habermas further historicizes Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of the culture industry. Providing historical background to the triumph of the culture industry, Habermas notes how bourgeois society in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was distinguished by the rise of a public sphere that stood between civil society and the state, and mediated between public and private interests. For the first time in history, individuals and groups could shape public opinion, giving direct expression to their needs and interests while influencing political practice. The bourgeois public sphere made it possible to form a realm of public opinion that opposed state power and the powerful interests that were coming to shape bourgeois society.

Habermas notes a transition from the liberal public sphere that originated in the Enlightenment and the American and French Revolutions to a media-dominated public sphere in the current stage of what he calls "welfare state capitalism and mass democracy." This historical transformation is grounded in Horkheimer's and Adorno's analysis of the culture industry, in which giant corporations have taken over the public sphere and transformed it from a site of rational debate into one of manipulative consumption and passivity. In this transformation, "public opinion" shifts from rational consensus emerging from debate, discussion, and reflection to the manufactured opinion of polls or media experts. For Habermas, the interconnection between the sphere of public debate and individual participation has thus been fractured and transmuted into that of a realm of political manipulation and spectacle, in which citizen-consumers passively ingest and absorb entertainment and information. "Citizens" thus become spectators of media presentations and discourse that arbitrate public discussion and reduce its audiences to objects of news, information, and public affairs. In Habermas's (1989) words: "Inasmuch as the mass media today strip away the literary husks from the kind of bourgeois self-interpretation and utilize them as marketable forms for the public services provided in a culture of consumers, the original meaning is reversed" (p. 171).

Habermas's critics, however, contend that he idealizes the earlier bourgeois public sphere by presenting it as a forum of rational discussion and debate when, in fact, many social groups and most women were excluded. Critics also contend that Habermas neglects various oppositional working-class, plebeian, and women's public spheres developed alongside the bourgeois public sphere to represent voices and interests excluded by this forum (see the studies in Calhoun 1992 and Kellner 2000). Yet Habermas is right that in the period of the democratic revolutions, a public sphere emerged in which for the first time in history, ordinary citizens could participate in political discussion and debate, and organize and struggle against unjust authority. Habermas's account also points to the increasingly important role of the media in politics and everyday life and the ways in which corporate interests have colonized this sphere, using the media and culture to promote their own interests.

The culture industry thesis described both the production of massified cultural products and homogenized subjectivities. Mass culture, for the Frankfurt school, produced dreams, hopes, fears, and longings, as well as unending desire for consumer products. The culture industry produced cultural consumers who would consume its products and conform to the dictates and the behaviors of the existing society. And yet, as Walter Benjamin pointed out (1969), the culture industry also produces rational and critical consumers able to dissect and discriminate among cultural texts and performances, much as sports fans learn to analyze and criticize sports events.

In retrospect, one can see the Frankfurt school work as articulation of a theory of the stage of state and monopoly capitalism that became dominant during the 1930s. This was an era of large organizations, in which the state and giant corporations managed the economy and in which individuals submitted to state and corporate control. This period is often described as "Fordism," to designate the system of mass production and the homogenizing regime of capital that wanted to produce mass desires, tastes, and behavior. It was thus an era of mass production and consumption characterized by uniformity and homogeneity of needs, thought, and behavior, producing a mass society and what the Frankfurt school described as "the end of the individual." No longer was individual thought and action the motor of social and cultural progress; instead, giant organizations and institutions overpowered individuals. The era corresponds to the staid, conformist, and conservative world of corporate capitalism that was dominant in the 1950s, with its organization men and women, its mass consumption, and its mass culture.

During this period, mass culture and communication were instrumental in generating the modes of thought and behavior appropriate to a highly organized and massified social order. Thus, the Frankfurt school theory of the

culture industry articulates a major historical shift to an era in which mass consumption and culture were indispensable in producing a consumer society based on homogeneous needs and desires for mass-produced products, and a mass society based on social organization and homogeneity. It is culturally the era of highly controlled network radio and television, insipid top-40 pop music, glossy Hollywood films, national magazines, and other mass-produced cultural artifacts.

Of course, media culture was never as massified and homogeneous as was portrayed in the Frankfurt school model, and one could argue that the model was flawed even during its time of origin and influence and that other models were preferable, such as those of Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, Ernst Bloch, and others of the Weimar generation, and, later, British cultural studies. Yet the original Frankfurt school model of the culture industry did articulate the important social roles of media culture during a specific regime of capital; and it provided a model, still of use, of a highly commercial and technologically advanced culture that serves the needs of dominant corporate interests and plays a major role in ideological reproduction and in enculturating individuals into the dominant system of needs, thought, and behavior. Moreover, its many theorists and texts provide a treasure-house of ideas, methods, and models that can still be applied in a wide range of projects within cultural studies and critical social theory today.

— Douglas Kellner

See also Benjamin, Walter; Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Habermas, Jürgen; Hollywood Film; Political Economy; Popular Music; Television and Social Theory

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FREUD, SIGMUND

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), one of the figures who has shaped the intellectual landscape of contemporary thought, is the founder of psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalysis*, as it is commonly known, is a form of psychotherapy ("analysis") that operates through the investigation of the human psyche. It also offers a rich theory of the development and function of the psyche.

Coming from a middle-class Jewish family, Freud originally trained as a doctor and adhered to a nineteenth-century scientific ideal for his whole life. His interests soon focused on mental illnesses, especially neuroses, and after a short stay in Paris where he studied with Jean-Martin Charcot, he set up a private practice in Vienna, where he was to spend almost all his life. Initially influenced by Joseph Breuer, a Vienna consultant, he eventually developed his own technique and ideas largely on his own. The first major statement of psychoanalysis was *The Interpretation of Dreams*, published in 1900. From then onward, Freud produced a constant flow of publications, tirelessly developing, questioning, and reformulating his own theoretical concepts. Psychoanalysis gradually gained an international audience but remained outside institutionalized medicine and university teaching. Freud, having fled occupied Vienna in 1938, died in London a year later. Psychoanalysis, while still largely marginal to official institutions, was to gain unprecedented growth after World War II, both as a therapeutic technique and as a theory of the psyche.

Freud's intellectual honesty precluded a well-polished theoretical edifice, and the vast domain of inquiry he opened up is still, more than a half century after his death, both fascinating and open to interpretation, not least regarding the relationship between the psyche and the social.

The analytic process, based on the person's own free association of thoughts, led Freud to postulate the existence of the "unconscious" as a specific level of operation of the

psyche, irreducible to consciousness, which it underlies. Dreams are the “royal road” to the unconscious, and their analysis is the basis for Freud’s inferences. The unconscious is always/already represented. That is, the unconscious is never a field of pure psychical energy, but it always refers to representations or images. These follow a specific mode of functioning, different in a number of aspects from that of conscious thought (some of its features being condensation, displacement, timelessness, exemption from contradiction, and disregard for external reality). At the same time, the unconscious in Freud’s early work is primarily the repressed; it comprises thoughts, representations, images, and so on, which have been hidden from consciousness as a defensive act to prevent unpleasure. In many cases of neurosis, the lifting of repression is the primary means of analytic cure. The repressed usually has a sexual content, overt or covert. This led Freud to the assumption that the sexual drives, or libido, constitute the form of psychical energy relevant to the functioning of the unconscious.

Freud’s distinction between consciousness and the unconscious, known as his first topography, appears to be exactly that: It indicates location, levels within the psyche, and their corresponding modes of functioning. The analysis of the unconscious in particular as a level irreducible to consciousness marks Freud’s great contribution. However, a crucial question remains open: Can we discern within the unconscious a form of agency, or is it only on the level of consciousness that a subject can be said to exist? While Freud does not broach the question directly, he does so implicitly. The ultimate function of a dream is to satisfy “an unconscious will.” Although this wish may originate in the organic substratum of the psyche, all too often it expresses a subject’s wish qua subject. In the very formulation of a wish, a form of subjectivity is always implied and, moreover, this “subject” in the dream takes a certain representational form, an “image.” Also, the function of repression, which occurs totally within the unconscious, presupposes a subject performing it. There is, therefore, an implication of a form of subjectivity within the unconscious, a subjectivity different from that of consciousness.

Freud was soon to pose the question in a direct way, gradually elaborating a whole revised theory of the psyche. He introduces specific agencies with distinct functions, the ego, superego, and id, overlapping the previous distinction between consciousness and the unconscious. The ego is the agency of reason and consciousness, the bearer of the “reality principle” but also of unconscious defensive mechanisms. The superego, a “grade in the ego,” is the result of the Oedipal phase and condenses aggressive/prohibitive impulses toward the ego, while the id has no organisation and represents the “chaotic” instinctual energy. The ego is also a “reservoir” of psychical energy that, although libidinal (i.e., sexual) in origin, is dissociated from its initial

function and is directed to objects solely by the ego. At the same time, the superego condenses the death, or aggressive, drive. Thus, the two agencies correspond to the dualism of instinctual energy introduced by Freud at about the same period, the life and death drives. Both the ego and the superego develop out of the id and always remain connected with it.

The id seems to be a residual category in the new topography. It retains the attributes of the unconscious in general, but all the significant functions previously attributed to the unconscious (regression, for example) are now located in the unconscious part of the ego. Even unconscious thoughts and impulses can be properly attributed to the ego rather than to the id. The ego and superego perform all the critical functions within the psyche, whether conscious or unconscious, and are behind all the processes Freud theorises. In contrast, the id is not an agency and has no function proper.

In this context, we could see the id in primarily a developmental sense. It is the background out of which the agencies proper of the psyche emerge. Once these elements have been formed, the psyche, for all significant purposes, corresponds to them. The id remains simply the connecting layer between the organic impulses (“somatic influences”) and the psyche proper.

If so, the central role in the second topography is that of the ego, which constitutes the main agency within the psyche. In it, Freud encapsulates almost all the functions that involve subjectivity in his first topography. The ego is both conscious and unconscious, and not only covers all the functions of consciousness, including the sense of self, but also the unconscious/defensive/repressive operations previously observed. Thus, a form of subjectivity is not only directly addressed; it effectively becomes the defining principle behind the new classification.

Freud proposes also a specific mechanism of construction of the psychic agencies, that of identification. Originally developed in relation to narcissism and melancholia, the mechanism refers to the internalisation within the psyche of “abandoned object cathexes.” This internalisation constructs a subagency of the ego that Freud initially terms “ego ideal” (the ideal the ego aspires to) and later collapses into the superego, to reinstall it again as a distinct part of the superego. What is at stake is the way these internalised elements function within the psyche. The ego ideal functions in a positive way and employs libidinal energy; the ego aspires to be its ideal and identifies with it in the common usage of the term. The superego functions aggressively against the ego; it interdicts and prohibits, employing aggressive psychical energy. Freud vacillates between the two ways of internalisation, but it is obvious that he does not want to abandon either. It is significant that in his account, the very formation of the superego as the outcome of the Oedipus complex also requires positive identifications with the parents of both sexes.

Freud does not fully clarify what exactly is identified with and internalised. It can be persons (“objects”), elements of behaviour or character of these persons, relationship(s) between the psyche and these persons, and also abstract elements uniting a group, such as a nation or race. The factors influencing the actual choice of objects also remain insufficiently discussed. Surely, already-internalised elements exert an influence, but other factors have to be significant as well.

Identification is not restricted to the early, formative years. Indeed, one of the most detailed analyses of the process concerns the creation of group or social ties (from ephemeral groups to race, class, nationality, etc.). Identification continues to operate throughout life and refers, therefore, not only to the initial formation or structuring of the psyche but also to its continuing functioning.

The importance of identification becomes obvious: Despite its ambiguities, it constitutes a crucial mechanism of building and maintaining, mostly unconsciously, a form of subjectivity within the psyche. Consciousness is part of this subjectivity and can emerge only after a primary form of an (unconscious) subject is already there. After the second topography, it becomes clear that the Freudian unconscious does not refer to all the processes of the mind that escape consciousness, for instance, cognitive processes of an instrumental type, but only to those that have to do with the psychological agencies and thus with some form of subjectivity. Conversely, only part of these agencies and their “history” can become conscious. Thus, the form of subjectivity theorised by Freud is very different from the traditional model of the self-present subject of modernity. Freud does not add to a self-transparent subject a dark side of drives and the unconscious. Consciousness is but a surface aspect of an integral whole and can never be fully dissociated from the nonconscious aspects.

At this point, the question of the relationship between the Freudian theory of the psyche and the (social) environment can be posed. The *structure* of the psyche, that is, the development and functioning of separate entities and levels, is based on an internal dynamic but requires a supporting environment, which also influences the respective strength of the psychological agencies. As for the *content* of these agencies, that is, the actual objects cathected and later internalised to construct them, they can never be determined in advance and are always socially and culturally specific. Thus, the very constitution of the psyche requires an (external) environment not only to support its development but also as a source of the elements that make it up. What “constructs” the psyche comes not from within, but from without.

Freud’s ambivalence on the type of function, positive or oppressive, these elements have within the psyche is of importance here. In his work on *Civilization (Kultur)*, Freud seems to adopt the prevailing model within sociological literature (from Rousseau to Durkheim) that conceives the

social as operating oppressively by setting norms and (prohibitive) rules, which the person internalises, and he correlates the social solely with the superego. He goes so far as to connect the emergence and severity of the superego with the emergence and advance of civilisation. However, it was only a few years earlier that he developed a theory of group ties depending on positive identifications, in the sense of ideals. It would be misleading, therefore, to see Freud as supporting a view of the social as a system of internalised norms alone, in the way Talcott Parsons appropriates his theory. The social environment is also (if not more importantly) the source of powerful positive identifications.

The continuity of the process of identification throughout life is also of great importance. Psychoanalytic literature has understandably neglected this continuity, since for the analytic process, the crucial role lies in the early formative years. But a theory of social action has to take into account that identification, perhaps oriented more to abstract elements relating to group ties, remains a powerful determinant of the orientation of action alongside any instrumental or rational considerations of the actor. A social environment as a source of objects to be identified and interact with is, therefore, necessary for both the construction and the continuing function of the psyche.

Thus, the Freudian model can be seen as a theory of a form of subjectivity that is both limited and contingent on an external domain of “objects.” It corresponds not to a static, given, and self-transparent entity, but to a dynamic whole in a precarious equilibrium. Without fully departing from the modern conception of the subject, Freud radically subverts it, also providing a starting point for the theorisation of the interplay between the “psyche” and the “social.”

— Kanakis Leledakis

See also Castoriadis, Cornelius; Chodorow, Nancy; Kristeva, Julia; Lacan, Jacques; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory; Žižek, Slavoj

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G

GAME THEORY

Game theory is a branch of mathematics dealing with how rational and interdependent actors make decisions in situations in which their interests conflict or converge. Although the theory is normative, describing how rational actors behave, its concepts and methods have proved to be useful in all the social sciences. Recently there has been great interest in evolutionary game theory, which describes how apparently rational action can evolve through natural selection from the actions of less-than-rational actors.

Game theory is based on the assumption that interdependent actors make independent decisions based on their own interests. The scope of the approach can be widened by assuming that individuals care about the interests of others but at a cost; such a theory will be more complex and difficult to test. An important limitation of game theory is that it does not account for what individuals value; what has utility is exogenous to the theory. This means that even if game theory were completely accurate, there is much it would not account for in the determination of human action.

Game theory should be distinguished from the more inclusive category of rational choice. While game theory always involves interdependent individuals making strategic choices in reaction to others' choices, theories of rational action can be used to prescribe rational action in games against nature—where nature is a probabilistic but non-strategic actor. In sociology, rational choice seems often to refer simply to the assumption that actors are self-interested and that much social action can be explained without recourse to norms or culture.

Game theory is also not equivalent to microeconomics, which also assumes rational actors but which also typically uses the assumption of perfect competition within a market of many buyers and sellers. In a perfectly competitive market, all actors are faced with a set of prices that they

cannot change by their own actions. Thus, members of a market do not behave strategically any more than single people interact strategically with the weather; they react to it but do not influence it. Although the two are often merged under the concept of rational choice, game theory is inherently more sociological because it deals with relationships.

The tree diagram shown in Figure 1 is meant to describe the major areas of game theory.




Figure 1

The concept *game* refers merely to a situation in which the outcome for a set of actors is a well-described consequence of their decisions and, possibly, of chance. In cooperative games, actors can make binding agreements, whereas in noncooperative games, they cannot. Zero-sum games are a special type of noncooperative game in which one actor can gain only at the expense of others. In N-person games, there are three or more interdependent actors, a situation usually requiring different models. A *solution* is an outcome satisfying specified criteria. Much of game theory is a description of solutions and their properties. The hope is that these solutions will describe the outcomes of interactions involving rational actors. The outline

in Table 1 shows the types of solutions appropriate under the different conditions.

Table 1

Cooperative games	
N-person	Core, kernel, bargaining set, Shapley value
Two-person	Nash bargaining solution
Noncooperative games	
Zero sum	
N-person	von Neumann and Morgenstern solution
Two-person	Minimax theorem developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern
Non-Zero-Sum	Nash solution, evolutionary stability

COOPERATIVE GAMES IN SOCIOLOGY

The main topic of cooperative game theory is the formation and stability of coalitions based on the distribution of voting power. The solution concepts in cooperative game theory (core, kernel, bargaining set, and others) depend on the idea that participants compare what they can earn in a coalition to what they could earn in other potential coalitions. The Shapley value is a calculation of what an individual actor contributes on the average to the coalitions of which he is a member. Political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists have successfully used game theoretic concepts to predict coalitions in legislatures and in laboratory experiments. Cooperative game theory has also been used to understand the distribution of power in exchange networks.

A limitation of many of these models is that they depend on the game being cast in characteristic value form. The characteristic value for a potential coalition is the value it can achieve regardless of the actions of those not in the coalition. The characteristic value is what the members could split among themselves if the coalition were to win. Thus, games analyzed in characteristic value form must be about something like money. Ideological preferences for coalition partner, loyalty, and desired states achieved by all members of the coalition cannot easily be represented. Even when this condition is met, there is the often questionable assumption that those outside the coalition will seek to minimize the profitability of those in the coalition.

Although not created for that purpose, these cooperative game solutions implicitly describe norms of distributive

justices. For example, the kernel is based on the assumption that individual power within a coalition is based on what an individual can achieve outside the coalition. In this sense, it is a sophisticated mathematical model of Richard Emerson's assumption that the power of A over B equals the dependence of B on A. The Shapley value can be interpreted as describing the creation of a status expectation in which individuals' expected rewards and status reflect their value to an entire set of coalitions.

NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES IN SOCIOLOGY

Cooperative game theory has gone out of fashion in economics. Enforceable agreements can be violated if actors are willing to pay the costs. Thus, noncooperative game theory would appear to be more valid than cooperative game theory in most circumstances. The key solution concept in noncooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium. Consider n players $\{1, 2, \dots, i, \dots, n\}$, each of whom has chosen a strategy s_i . A set of strategies for all the players is $s = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_i, \dots, s_n\}$. The payoff to player i is $\pi_i(s)$. A set of strategies $s^* = \{s_1^*, s_2^*, \dots, s_i^*, \dots, s_n^*\}$ is a Nash equilibrium if for every player i $\pi_i(s_1^*, s_2^*, \dots, s_i^*, \dots, s_n^*) \geq \pi_i(s_1^*, s_2^*, \dots, s_i, \dots, s_n^*)$ for every alternative strategy s_i . In other words, given the strategies of the other players, no single player has a unilateral incentive to change its strategy if others do not. Nash's very important theorem says that all finite noncooperative games have Nash solutions in pure or mixed strategies.

Consider the following simple example, which I copy from Gintis (2000:28–29). A town has one Main Street a mile long. Two competing businesses simultaneously and in ignorance of the others decide where to locate on the street, which means choosing a position from 0 to 1 mile. Once having made a decision, neither can change. Each gets the business of the homes nearer to it. For example, if the two businesses are located at positions x and y , where, if $x > y$, the first business, located at x , will get $1 - x + (x - y)/2$ proportion of the business, while the other will get $y + (x - y)/2$ proportion of the business.

The unique Nash solution to this game is for each to choose the middle of the block: $x = y = 1/2$. Suppose, for example, that $x \neq y$. Then it is in the y player's interest to relocate closer to the x player and for the x player to relocate closer to the y player. Now suppose that $x = y \neq 1/2$. Then it is in the interest of each player to move closer to the center. The only pair of locations in which neither player has an incentive to change is $x = y = 1/2$. Note that neither actor wants to be near the other and that there are no conformity pressures producing the uniformity in location. Thus, the Nash equilibrium, assuming individual actors who independently react to one another, could be an explanation for uniformities containing no assumptions about group processes like norms or leadership.

More will be said about the well-known Prisoners' Dilemma game in the following sections, but it is worthwhile introducing this well-studied game here. The Prisoners' Dilemma is a two-player noncooperative game in which each player has two strategies: to cooperate (C) and to defect (D). The outcomes are given in the Table 2. The two symbols in each cell refer to the rewards of the row and column player under that combination of actions. For example, if the row player chooses *D* while the column player chooses *C*, the row player earns *t* while the column player earns *s*.

Table 2

		Player 2		
		C	D	
Player 1	C	r, r	s, t	C
	D	t, s	p, p	D

The condition for a Prisoners' Dilemma is that $t > r > p > s$ (and that $t + s < 2r$). It is easy to verify that there is only one Nash equilibrium in this game: both players choose to defect.

ITERATED VERSUS ONE-SHOT GAMES

Repeated, or iterated, games can have fundamentally different properties than one-shot games. For example, consider the Prisoners' Dilemma, in which the two individuals play twice. A complete description of a strategy has to describe what a player does on the first play of the game and in the second game, in which both players know what their partners have done in the first game. Each player now has eight strategies: the player can cooperate or defect on the first play, can cooperate or defect on the second play if the partner has cooperated on the first; can cooperate or defect on the second play if the partner has defected in the first game. Write this as *X**Y**Z*, where *X* is cooperation or defection on the first move, *Y* is what a player does on the second move if the partner cooperated in the first game, and *Z* is what the player does if the partner defected in the first game. Figure 2 shows the payoffs to the row player for each combination of strategy of the row and column players. 1 = CICC, 2 = CICD, 3 = CIDC, 4 = CIDD, 5 = DICC; 6 = DICD; 7 = D IDC, 8 = DIDD.

The first strategy always cooperates. The eighth strategy always defects. The second strategy is the well-known tit-for-tat; it cooperates on the first move and behaves on the second move the same way the other behaved on the first.

This is a more complicated game than the one-shot version. Instead of there being one strategy, defection, that is best under all circumstances, the best strategy depends on the strategy of one's partner. For example, against the

$$\begin{pmatrix} 2r & 2r & r+s & r+s & s+r & s+r & 2s & 2s \\ 2r & 2r & r+s & r+s & s+t & s+t & s+p & s+p \\ r+t & r+t & r+p & r+p & s+r & s+r & 2s & 2s \\ r+t & r+t & r+p & r+p & s+t & s+t & s+p & s+p \\ t+r & t+s & t+r & t+s & p+r & p+s & p+r & p+s \\ t+r & t+s & t+r & t+s & p+t & 2p & t+p & 2p \\ 2t & t+p & 2p & t+p & p+r & p+s & p+r & p+s \\ 2t & t+p & 2t & t+p & p+t & 2p & t+p & 2p \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 2

uniformly cooperative strategy 1, the best alternatives are to defect in both games (strategies 7 and 8). On the other hand, if one's partner is using tit-for-tat (strategy 3), the best alternatives are to cooperate in the first game and defect in the second (strategies 3 and 4).

In this game, the only Nash equilibrium is for both players to defect on both plays. In fact, it is easy to show that if both players know the exact number of plays, the only Nash equilibrium is for both players to defect in all games. Because of this result and because often future interaction with the same partner is uncertain, iterated games are usually described in terms of the probability (*W*) that another interaction will occur. Expected payoffs for different strategies can then be calculated. For example, suppose we consider the three strategies Unconditional Cooperation, Unconditional Defection, and Tit-for-tat. Figure 3 shows the expected payoffs for the row player for all combinations of strategies of the row and column players.

	Cooperation	Defection	Tit-for-tat
Cooperation	$\frac{r}{1-\omega}$	$\frac{s}{1-\omega}$	$\frac{r}{1-\omega}$
Defection	$\frac{t}{1-\omega}$	$\frac{p}{1-\omega}$	$t + \frac{\omega p}{1-\omega}$
Tit-for-tat	$\frac{r}{1-\omega}$	$s + \frac{\omega p}{1-\omega}$	$\frac{r}{1-\omega}$

Figure 3

The Nash equilibrium now depends crucially on the value of *W*. For sufficiently small values, mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium pair. For sufficiently high values, tit-for-tat by both players is the only Nash equilibrium. There is more incentive to cooperate in long-lasting relationships.

THE FAILURE OF RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE ADVENT OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY

The rationality assumption upon which game theory is built has failed in many empirical tests. For example, in

one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma games, some subjects cooperate. In the *ultimatum game* (Gintis 2000:253), one subject offers another the distribution of a good. If the second rejects the offer, neither receives anything. The second player should accept any offers, but experiments show that subjects typically reject offers below 30 percent. Individuals often behave altruistically and are concerned not only with maximizing their own rewards but with equity, equality, and maintaining reciprocity. Moreover, it is too easy for advocates of game theory, and rational choice in general, to rescue their models, when it fails an empirical test, by admitting other forms of utility (Green and Shapiro 1994).

The evolutionary approach to game theory allows for strategies that would violate assumptions commonly made about rational actors. As Thomas Schelling has pointed out, it can be rational to be irrational. Reproductive success is substituted for the assumption of hyper-rational actors with unlimited computational abilities. Moreover, the success of a strategy in a changing ecology of strategies is stressed, rather than competition among strategies.

Evolutionary game theory is based on the assumption that the units embodying strategies differ in how successfully they reproduce themselves. In the biological world, organisms that consume more calories may leave more progeny. In the social world, more successful strategies may be more widely imitated. Even if evolutionary game theory does not describe actual social or biological evolution, it can be seen as a way of exploring and exposing the weaknesses and strengths of a set of strategies under the condition that they are interdependent—that the success of a strategy depends on the population in which it is found.

The replicator dynamics is one well-explored approach to exploring these interdependencies. The assumption is that all the members of a generation can be scored on their fitness and that the representation of each strategy in the succeeding generation is directly proportional to its success. Define the following terms:

- $p_i^{(t)}$ = the proportion at time t with strategy i
- $u_i^{(t)}$ = the average utility at time t of those with strategy i
- $u^{(t)}$ = the average utility at time t of all actors

The replicator dynamics updates the proportions using each strategy according to the following rule:

$$(0.1) \quad p_i^{(t+1)} = \frac{u_i^{(t)}}{u^{(t)}} p_i^{(t)}$$

Consider the following illustration. Suppose that an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game consists of equal percentages of three kinds of actors: those who always cooperate, those who always defect, and those who always use tit-for-tat. The individuals randomly play others. If $t = 5$, $r = 3$,

$p = 1$, $s = 0$, and $\omega = 0.99$, the expected payoffs per interaction (from Figure 3) for the cooperative, competitive, and tit-for-tat actors is 20, 24.67, and 23 respectively per interaction, while the overall average is 22.56. Using equation (0.1) the new percentages are 29.6 percent, 36.5 percent, and 34.0 percent. More successful strategies have become relatively more frequent.

Plotting the proportions of the three strategies over time creates an interesting and unexpected pattern.




Figure 4

At the beginning of the sequence, defection increases its representation because of the presence of cooperators, who can be exploited because they do not learn to adjust their behavior. As the cooperators become less prevalent, the defectors do less and less well, eventually disappearing entirely despite their early successes, leaving the population to the cooperators and tit-for-tat players.

Another valuable concept from evolutionary game theory used to evaluate strategies in an ecological context is *evolutionary stability*. Imagine a homogeneous population all of whose members use the same strategy. Now imagine that, through mutation or transgression from another population, a new strategy appears. It will become more frequent if it does better than the existing strategy. A strategy is evolutionarily stable with respect to a set of other strategies if it cannot be invaded; its members do better in this context than any new strategy introduced in small proportions. Letting $u(x,y)$ be the utility of strategy x when faced with strategy y , the condition for evolutionary stability is as follows:

$$u(x,x) \geq u(y,x) \text{ for every alternative } y.$$

$$\text{If } u(y,x) = u(x,x) \text{ for any } y, u(x,y) > u(y,y)$$

A little thought shows that these two conditions guarantee that the evolutionarily stable strategy will do better than any invader.

The greatest use of game theory by sociologists, especially its evolutionary version, has been to examine the relative strengths of strategies in Prisoners' Dilemma situations. There is a vast literature, inspired by Robert

Axelrod's work, to which many sociologists have contributed.

— Philip Bonachich

See also Coleman, James; Evolutionary Theory; Exchange Networks; Generalized Exchange; Homans, George; Rational Choice; Social Dilemmas; Social Exchange Theory

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GARFINKEL, HAROLD

Born on October 29, 1917, in Newark, New Jersey, Harold Garfinkel is widely known as the father of ethnomethodology (EM). Scholars associated with EM work in all areas of intellectual enterprise, including most sub-disciplines of sociology and many other disciplines as well. Popular research areas typically associated with micro, or qualitative, sociology, usually thought of as quite distinct, are often closely associated with EM.

Garfinkel's groundbreaking approach toward social practices, beginning in the 1930s and 1940s was the first to take up Durkheim's idea that the key to social order in modern times was the study of social practices. In explaining what he meant by practices that could not be reduced to propositions, Durkheim ([1893]1933) focused on science, arguing "that to gain an exact idea of a science one must practice it, and, so to speak, live with it. . . . [I]t does not entirely consist of some propositions" (p. 362). He argued that along with theoretical science, "there is another, concrete and living, which is in part ignorant of itself, and yet seeks itself; besides acquired results there are hopes, habits, instincts, needs presentiments so obscure that they cannot be expressed in words, yet so powerful that they sometimes dominate the whole life of the scholar" (p. 362). Durkheim's emphasis on practice was largely ignored until Garfinkel.

The close study of practices now making headway in many disciplines owes much to Garfinkel's pioneering work. Terms such as *workplace studies*, *the shop floor problem*, *conversational sequencing*, and the *presentational self* appeared originally in Garfinkel's writings. However, because much of this work remained unpublished, and highly controversial, Garfinkel is often not adequately cited by developing areas of research that he has directly inspired.

As a student of Talcott Parsons in the late 1940s, Garfinkel was one of the first to challenge Parsons's view of social order as based on the relationship between individuals and institutional beliefs and values. Garfinkel argued, by contrast, that each next situation posed constraints of its own, and that the key to social order was to document those constraints, not treat the alleged beliefs and values of actors as evidence of the efficacy of institutional orders of belief. Garfinkel insisted on the adequacy of description and a focus on contingent empirical detail. Parsons relied on conceptual categories and generalization. The clash between their two positions would develop into one of the most important theoretical debates of the twentieth century. In his doctoral thesis, Garfinkel took on Parsons more or less directly. However, Garfinkel later withdrew from the conceptual debate, maintaining that his position could only be demonstrated empirically.

While Garfinkel is generally classified as a thinker of the late 1960s and coupled with Erving Goffman's interactionism, most likely because of the impact of *Studies in Ethnomethodology* in 1967, his position has its roots in an earlier period. Although interpretations of Garfinkel's work often attempt to derive it from the ordinary language philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the theory of accounts of C. Wright Mills, or cast it as a reaction to Parsons, Garfinkel was more a contemporary of Wittgenstein and Mills, doing his first writing in the late 1930s, than a student of their work, and his position had already been conceived, at least in outline, before he went to Harvard to work with Parsons.

According to Garfinkel, his later work on accounts, and "contexts of accountability," owes as much, or more, to a business course taken at the University of Newark in 1935 called *The Theory of Accounts* as it does to Mills or to Kenneth Burke, whose work he studied later. The course dealt with double-entry bookkeeping and cost accounting. From this course, Garfinkel came to understand that even in setting up an accounting sheet, he was theorizing the various categories into which the numbers would be placed. Choosing, for instance, to place an item in the debit or assets column was already a social construction. Furthermore, that construction was accountable to superiors and other agencies in complex ways.

Garfinkel's first publication, "Color Trouble," examining the role of accounts in the interactional production of

racism, was completed in 1939, published in 1940; his second, an article based on his MA thesis (1942) on intra- and interracial homicide, was published in 1949. Both articles involved arguments that focused on the role of institutional accounting practices in the interactional construction of everyday life, and on racism in particular. Mills's theory of accounts first appeared in the *American Sociological Review* in 1939 and 1940. While Wittgenstein's "Blue and Brown Books," dictated between 1933 and 1936, were only available as mimeographs and were not published until 1958. *The Philosophical Investigations* did not appear until 1945.

During the 1930s, Garfinkel, Wittgenstein, and Mills, following independent lines of thought, confronted the problematic legacies of empiricism and neo-Kantianism, seeking a solution to the problem of meaning in the apparent contingencies of the recognizability of social forms of language use and social practice. By then it had become clear to all three that rules, reference, and individualism were not solutions to the problem of meaning. Treating intelligibility and social order as fundamentally a matter of matching concepts with reality or logic was the problem, not the solution.

Each independently embraced the social as an alternative approach to the great philosophical questions of knowledge and meaning. Instead of forcing a conceptual, or cognitive, order on experience, the apparent contingencies of social practice would, they argued, provide an adequate foundation for a theory of meaning, and in the case of Mills and Garfinkel, for a theory of social order as well. In fact, Garfinkel was working out what would become ethnomethodology in a manuscript completed in 1949. After the unexpected deaths of Mills and Wittgenstein in the 1950s, their work was left in the hands of followers who quickly retreated from a direct confrontation with social contingencies. This left only Garfinkel, in the postwar period, to continue the push toward a detailed study of social practices as a solution to the great theoretical problems of meaning and social/moral order. Many scholars with an initial interest in Wittgenstein and Mills turned toward Garfinkel at this time, which partially accounts for attempts to respecify Garfinkel's work in Wittgensteinian terms.

Garfinkel's position should be seen as developing over a period of seven decades from a focus on the role of accounts in the organization of social order and perception in the late 1930s and early 1940's, to an interest in all aspects of embodied social practice and perception in the production of witnessably recognizable social phenomena by 1949, and finally, to a fully articulated view of the autochthonous order properties of phenomenal fields and oriented objects by the year 2002, with the publication of his second book, *Ethnomethodology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aporism*. Over time, his arguments impacted first one, then another developing sociological interest. Work on the significance of accounting practices was influenced by Garfinkel's early writings on accounts.

His writings on "degradation ceremonies" (1956) and "Agnes" (1967) influenced the development of labeling theory. The "trust" paper impacted several developing areas of sociology and also game theory (although not in ways that Garfinkel approved).

The paper "Good Reasons for Bad Clinic Records" in *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967) contributed to early studies of institutional accounting practices. The impact of that paper on medical sociology and studies of policing has been profound. The argument with regard to "documentary methods," combined with the work on accounts, impacted on the development of institutional ethnography, an important new area of research spearheaded by Dorothy Smith. Garfinkel's focus on reflexivity impacted the development of interpretive sociology in general, while his interests in respecifying the natural sciences helped to shape sociological studies of science, aided by the research of Michael Lynch. His more recent work on the "shop floor problem" significantly impacted on studies of technology in the workplace, as reflected in the seminal work of Lucy Suchman and her colleagues (formerly of Xerox Parc, now at Lancaster, UK), and has attracted scholars from computing sciences and engineering to EM.

It was in 1954, two years after completing his dissertation, while working with Fred Strodbeck and Saul Mendlovitz on the "jury project," that Garfinkel came up with the name ethnomethodology. The word itself represents a simple idea. If one assumes, as Garfinkel does, that people must work constantly to achieve the meaningful, patterned, and orderly character of everyday life, then one must also assume that they have some methods for doing so. If everyday life exhibits a patterned orderliness, a recognizable coherence, as Garfinkel believes it does, then it is not enough to say that individuals randomly pursuing shared goals under institutional constraints will do similar things enough of the time to manifest detailed patterns of orderliness in society, an approach characteristic of Parsonian and quantitative sociology. Garfinkel argues that members of society must, in fact, actually use shared methods to mutually construct the meaningful orderliness of social situations.

EM, then, is the study of the methods people use for producing recognizable social orders. *Ethno* refers to members of a social or cultural group (or in Garfinkel's terms, members of a local social scene) and *method* refers to the things members routinely do to re-create recognizable social practices. *Ology*, as in the word *sociology*, implies the study, or logic, of these methods. Thus, ethnomethodology means *the study of members' methods for producing recognizable social orders*.

Although often thought of as such, EM is not itself a method. It is an attempt to preserve the "incourseness" of social phenomena, a study of members' methods based on the idea that a careful attentiveness to the details of social phenomena will reveal social order. The word *ethnomethodology* itself does not name a set of research methods

any more than the word *sociology* implies a specific set of research methods. Ethnomethodologists have done their research in many ways. The object of all of these research methods, however, is to discover the things that persons in particular situations *do*, the methods *they* use, to create the patterned orderliness of social life. Not all research methods are capable of revealing this level of social order. But many methods can. The main rule for EM is that methods that rely on retrospective accounts, or individual reports, of social order cannot reveal members' methods. The method used must preserve the details of local order production as it moves forward "over its course."

Ethnomethodologists generally use methods that require immersion in the situation being studied, the ideal being to gain competence as practitioners of whatever social phenomena they are studying. This ideal is referred to by Garfinkel as "unique adequacy." When the subject of research is something that most persons participate in regularly, like ordinary talk, the game of tic-tac-toe, driving, or walking, unique adequacy can be assumed for most persons (persons with disabilities, who lack ordinary competence, may nevertheless have revealing understandings of these common tasks). However, with regard to practices that have specialized populations, like science, computer engineering, or policing, unique adequacy can be hard to achieve. An ethnomethodologist pursuing unique adequacy within a specialized population may spend years in a research site becoming a competent participant in its practices, in addition to collecting observational, documentary, and audiovisual materials. Ethnomethodologists have taken degrees in law and mathematics, worked for years in science labs, become professional musicians, and worked as truck drivers and in police departments in an effort to satisfy the unique adequacy requirement. The current appeal of EM to persons working already in computing sciences, engineering, and in medical professions partially addresses the difficulty of such studies. Instead of beginning in sociology and then being required to learn another profession, they come to sociology with a prior competence in professions.

Ethnomethodology does not focus on the individual, as has often been claimed. It involves a multifaceted focus on the local social orders that are enacted in various situations. The individual persons who inhabit situations are of interest only insofar as their personal characteristics reveal something about the competencies required to achieve the recognizable production of the local order that is the object of study. Garfinkel refers to persons who inhabit, and through their activities "make" and "remake," social scenes as *local production cohorts*. The cohort is there to reproduce the coherence of a scene that was there before they came upon it (made by others) and will be there after they leave (again made by others). When any individual leaves the freeway, for instance, the traffic is still there on the road.

EM is also not engaged in a cognitive, or conceptual, mapping of reality, as many have argued. It is Garfinkel's position that a focus on the cognitive and conceptual is the problem with scientific sociology, not a solution. Garfinkel's focus is on embodied, endogenous, witnessable practices. It is ironic that having identified the conceptual and cognitive as *the* problematic approach that originally made the problem of meaning and order appear unsolvable, Garfinkel has so often been identified as a cognitivist. This is due particularly to the work of Aaron Cicourel, whose cognitivist interpretation of Garfinkel's position appealed immediately to a discipline heavily invested in conceptual versions of social reality. Over the years, this cognitivist misinterpretation has stood in the way of an appreciation of the true empirical character of Garfinkel's position. This cognitive misinterpretation is similar to the general misinterpretation of Durkheim's own empirical argument as a conceptual one (see Rawls 1996). As Garfinkel is attempting to respecify the empirical aspects of Durkheim's position, the irony is doubled.

According to Garfinkel, the result of ethnomethodological studies is the fulfillment of Durkheim's (1895) promise that "the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle." Where Garfinkel parts company from Durkheim is in replacing the assumption that social order is the result of a harmony between practices and *institutionalized* forms of regulation, with the proposal that *social facts are orderly endogenous products of local orders*, as the achievement of the immortal ordinary society. For Durkheim, specifying the harmony in details of practice was the solution to addressing the problems of political order in a modern context ([1893]1933). As the only one to take up and follow through on this specification of details, Garfinkel's relevance to current debates over globalization should not be underestimated. Contrasting a practice view of social order with a belief-driven view may provide essential support for liberal democratic arguments about justice. The basic lack in moral and social theorizing about modernity is any sense that there is a universal moral necessity embedded in the contingencies of things as they are. Garfinkel promises to deliver such moral necessities and to ground them in the detailed contingencies of modern life.

— Anne W. Rawls

See also Conversation Analysis; Ethnomethodology; Phenomenology; Smith, Dorothy; Social Constructionism; Social Interaction; Social Studies of Science; Sociologies of Everyday Life

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GENDER

Simone de Beauvoir claimed, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." Corresponding to this, one is not born, but rather becomes, a man. Beauvoir's claim is important because it is among the first statements in modern feminism to draw attention to "woman" as a social, rather than natural, category of being.

In the broadest sense, gender has been employed by social theorists to denote a distinction between the biological categories of female and male and the socially constructed categories of woman and man (or girl and boy). In this juxtaposition, while sex is assumed to represent a biological difference, gender is used to define those socially constructed feminine and masculine modes of behavior considered normal and natural for females and males. Thus, gender varies dramatically across societies and throughout human history.

The analysis of gender involves studying the normative conduct associated with males and females, the relative valuations of masculinity and femininity, and the social processes whereby males and females learn normative behaviors. Gender constructions thus relegate female and male bodies to discrete and often intensely regulated masculine and feminine types. Indeed, feminist studies have exposed the typically rigid constructions of masculinity and femininity. For example, within the United States, especially in studies focused on the white middle class, research has revealed that femininity demands that girls and women be passive, caring, sensitive, and gentle. Conversely, masculinity demands that boys and men be aggressive, individualistic, and rational. The bodies of females and males exhibit femininity and masculinity through both actions and culturally appropriate clothing and adornment. Gender is revealed to involve the management of situated conduct in adherence with normative conceptions of masculinity and femininity. Gender is thus seen as a highly significant dimension for understanding how the body becomes a social fact.

Interactionists such as Candace West and Don Zimmerman argue that males and females actively *do* gender. From their perspective, gender is a set of complex activities that, when routinely accomplished, are cast and experienced as expressions of masculine and feminine *natures*. Yet, while social theorists treat gender as a social construction, studies reveal that gender is *experienced* by many people in everyday life as natural and essential, not as put on or performed. Gender theorists have tried to understand how and why gender is experienced as natural. Their attention focuses on socialization practices. For instance, research has revealed that in the United States, at birth, a male baby is immediately referred to as a boy or girl, wrapped in a gender-coded blanket, given a name that is gendered, and described using gender-specific language such as "handsome and smart," or "sweet and fragile." All of these activities seem natural, and insofar as they are done over and over again, the "boying of the boy" and "the girling of the girl" are normalized and naturalized.

In addition to studying the socially produced differences between masculinity and femininity, sociologists also study how these differences are linked to inequality, power, and domination. Feminist sociologists are interested in revealing whether, why, and how feminine qualities, practices, and accomplishments are socially and historically subjugated or valued, celebrated or negated. R. W. Connell has argued that while there is no single form of masculinity or femininity, there are culturally dominant normalizations of gendered identity that he characterizes as hegemonic. Significant work among feminist sociologists has revealed the ways in which gender constructions relegate women into subordinate and unequal social relations with men, thereby instantiating the belief that men "naturally" possess a superior nature in comparison with females. Masculine bias has been exposed in dominant ways of knowing, experiencing, and acting. Dorothy E. Smith has been particularly concerned with the consequences of women's intellectual subjugation. She points out that women have been systematically excluded from doing the intellectual work of society. For example, most sociology and history are constructed from the standpoint of men and are largely about men. There are relatively few women poets, and the records kept of those few are haphazard. In comparison with how men's intellectual history is recorded and taught, relatively little is known about women visionaries, thinkers, and political organizers. By examining gender relations, feminist sociologists, activists, and writers produce strategies to challenge the negative conceptions and invisibility of women's intellectual accomplishments.

Approaches to understanding the connections between gender and sex, gender differences and gender inequality, vary widely. Gender has been studied as a central problematic within various branches of feminist social theory, including liberal feminism, radical feminism, existential

feminism, psychoanalytic feminism, socialist feminism, postmodern feminism, and queer theory. In addition, gender has been studied as a significant feature of area studies such as the sociology of the family, work, politics, race, and class relations. Approaches to gender in liberal feminism, radical feminism, and postmodern feminism is the focus here.

LIBERAL FEMINISM

Classical liberal thought holds a conception of human nature that articulates the distinctness of human beings in the capacity for rational thought. Rational thought was considered a characteristic of men's nature, while women were seen as naturally emotional and incapable of rational thought. A woman's ovaries, uterus, and capacity for reproduction were seen as peculiarities of females that naturally limited her rational capacities. In contrast, men were seen as worldly, open, and capable of higher cultural production. Observed differences between men's and women's emotional and intellectual lives supported this claim.

Beginning with Mary Wollstonecraft, however, this view was challenged among liberal thinkers advocating social change and sex equality. Wollstonecraft observed that women in her society lack virtue, rationality, and full personhood; women overindulged in idle activities. Although Wollstonecraft does not describe the social distinction between males and females as "gender" roles, she nevertheless saw men's and women's differences as socially constructed. She believed that men would develop similar inferior natures if they were relegated to the domestic sphere and denied opportunities to enhance their capacity for rational thought through education and work outside the home.

Arguing that the basic capacity for rational thought is natural to all human beings, liberal feminists locate the cause of observed differences between men and women not in differences in their natural capacities for rational thought but rather in women's comparatively limited social opportunities for developing their capacities for rational thought. In other words, liberal feminists believe that women have the same capacities as males for rational thought, but biological reproduction and corresponding sex-specific roles limit their opportunities. Liberal feminists assume that the sexual division of labor is a natural effect of women bearing children; men and women have different social roles to perform as a consequence of their different reproductive roles. Masculine and feminine genders thus correspond with this sexual division of labor; women's different gender identity is grounded in biological reproduction and in the mundane and repetitious acts of housework and mothering. With control of reproduction, however, the classic liberal assumption that biology is destiny is undermined. Men and women need no longer be confined to sex-specific roles and

narrow gender identities. Liberal feminists recognize that women can develop and possess the same qualities seen as inherent to men if they are allowed the opportunity to become educated on an equal basis with men and are able to work outside the home. Liberal feminists have advocated social change in women's educational, political, occupational, and economic opportunities. They argue that as more women enter the public spheres of education and work, and thereby become the social equal of men, the status of women would simultaneously rise.

One major assumption of liberal feminism is that the masculine qualities possessed by men are superior and therefore more desirable than the feminine qualities possessed by women. In addition to this, liberal feminists largely assumed that reproduction was an impediment to equality, and that only through reproductive control could women achieve equality. Significantly, women were conceptualized as having similar desires, essences, and mental capacities as men. These are issues radical feminists would challenge.

RADICAL FEMINISM

Like liberal feminist theorists, radical theorists employ gender to differentiate the qualities of males and females that are biologically determined from those that are socially constructed. They also theorize that natural sexual differences are directly linked to normative gender practices. But unlike liberal feminists, radical feminists challenge the notion of women's biological inferiority, the assumed superiority and desirability of masculine traits, and the notion that equality can or should be achieved by opening male-defined opportunities to women.

Radical feminists argue that there are essential, natural differences between males and females, but that these differences in and of themselves do not render women inferior to men. Nor are the activities that women perform in and of themselves less desirable or important in comparison with those of men. Radical feminists understand women as not only different but oppressed, as kept in a subservient place, pushed down within patriarchal power structures. Women's oppression is understood as a complex matrix of female subordination and misogynist constructions of the qualities possessed by women. Patriarchal domination is linked to strict adherence to gender roles in which masculinity is expressed through male bodies as powerful, rational, and dominant. Conversely, expressed femininity demands that women adhere to passive, gentle, emotional, and communal practices. While masculine rationality, authority, individualism, and power are rewarded in a patriarchal capitalist society, the different feminine qualities possessed by women are devalued and used to justify their subordination and degradation. Binary gender differences are problematic insofar as the feminine qualities seen as biologically natural

to females are degraded, devalued, and expressed as inferior while masculine qualities seen as biologically natural to males are esteemed, valued, and expressed as superior.

Radical feminists claim the personal is political, making a direct connection between gendered experience and the sociopolitical structures of capitalist patriarchy. Insofar as authority and superiority are attached to the male body and masculine gender attributes are valued within male-dominated structures, radical feminists explain women's experienced oppression as an inherent feature of the interlocking structures of capitalism and patriarchy. Research reveals how men and masculinity express domination, control, power, and authority over all things, including less powerful women. Kate Millet located women's oppression in patriarchal relations between women and men. Significantly, men are dominant in both the public and private spheres. Within the gender binary, men wield power over women as society rewards masculine qualities with economic mobility and social authority. For Millet, women can experience full personhood and social affirmation only by ending the practice of gender segregation in which men ultimately control, define, and dominate women. Hartmann argued that job segregation by sex is the primary mechanism in capitalist society that maintains masculine superiority insofar as it enforces lower wages and unpaid labor for women. Low wages and unpaid labor force and legitimate women to marry for economic survival, thereby ensuring that emotional and interpersonal experiences are tied to capitalist patriarchy. As Catherine MacKinnon argued, heterosexual relations are rooted in inequality and female subordination, making sexuality as we know it an expression of male domination. In order to understand women's oppression, one must acknowledge the ways in which the objectification of the female body is connected to domination and violence against women.

Significantly, radical feminists treat the valuation of male gender roles as superfluous insofar as women and men have learned to evaluate their collective identities within patriarchal, misogynist frames. Women, they argue, need to reclaim, rename, redefine, and revalue their sexual and gendered identities. By doing so, they will begin to appreciate emotionally and socially the inherent differences between men and women and value self-defined frames of womanhood.

POSTMODERN FEMINISM

Postmodern feminists challenge both liberal and radical constructions of the relationship between biological sex and socially constructed gender. Unlike both radical and liberal feminists, postmodern theorists challenge the notion that an essential difference exists between biological sex and socially constructed gender categories, thus rendering relatively inconsequential questions over whether women and men are essentially the same or different. The problem is

this: When social theorists and people in everyday life compare sex with gender, we are not comparing something natural with something social; rather, postmodern theorists claim that we are comparing something social with something else that is social. For postmodernists, embodied traits do not exist independently of observations and interpretations of those traits; they are part of the same social process. The ways in which a society constitutes biological categories and criteria are learned, defined, and enacted by given agents situated in specific sociohistorical settings. For example, Christine Delphy's research exposed the ways in which the "natural appearance" of the body is defined according to socially constructed biological criteria.

Postmodern theorists claim that theoretical explanations of women's oppression are wrongly limited to heterosexual male and female binaries. Moreover, the binary sexual categories of female and male are mediated through gendered language. Butler posits the body as constituted and recognized through language. Insofar as language is a social product, the body is a social construct. Butler asserts that language sustains the body. Only by being interpellated within the terms of language does a certain social existence of the body become possible (Butler 1997). Nicholson (1992) questions the very distinction between sex and gender, claiming that the body is always interpreted socially; rather than seeing sex as somehow separate from gender, sex is subsumable under gendered interpretations. In this sense, the natural categories of the body are understood as "sedimented acts rather than a predetermined and foreclosed structure, essence, or fact, whether natural, cultural, or linguistic" (Butler 1988:523). This stance challenges the notion that the body represents a natural entity unaffected by gender. Joan Scott (1988) defines gender as the social organization of sexual differences but further posits that gender is the knowledge that establishes meaning for bodily differences. We cannot see sexual differences except as a function of our knowledge. Knowledge is not pure and cannot be isolated from its implications in a broad range of discursive contexts.

In the most basic sense, postmodern feminists define gender as constructed and instantiated through participation in intensely regulated activities that congeal over time and thereby produce the appearance of naturalized categories of sexual identity. The body, moreover, expresses meaning dramatically. Gender management is performative; men and women actively perform gendered behavior deemed appropriate for a male or female sexual category. Gender is, then, instituted through the stylization of the body. Gender is constituted in the bodily gestures, movements, and enactments that are routinized, sedimented, and rendered mundane. Through this same process, bodily acts constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self.

See also Beauvoir, Simone de; Feminist Epistemology; Liberal Feminism; Postmodernist Feminism; Radical Feminism; Smith, Dorothy

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GENEALOGY

Genealogy, a concept given sociological currency by Frederick Nietzsche and revived by Michel Foucault, refers to the most important methodological innovation of the so-called poststructuralist tradition of French social theory of the late twentieth century. In *Genealogy of Morals* ([1887] 1927), Nietzsche executed his famous sociological investigation of the origins of European "moral prejudices." At some risk, one might even call Nietzsche's essays on good and evil the first deconstruction of the classical vocabulary of modern culture. In effect, as he says at the opening of *Genealogy of Morals*, the concept of the Good owes, not to an essential goodness, but "to the good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they themselves were good." By thus situating one of the modern world's most essentializing philosophical categories

in the historical system of social stratification, Nietzsche may well have been the first implicit sociologist of culture.

Methodologically, a genealogy traces the elements of culture, including practices as well as concepts and norms, back to their origins in a historical social arrangement. In this respect, the origins are decidedly *not* first causes or any similarly abstract and reductive first principles of human agency. In this, it may be said that Nietzsche completed the work begun by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Kant, most notably, demonstrated that knowledge arises neither in synthetic experience nor in an analytic a priori. Rather, knowledge, like morality, is based on a synthetic process that has the effect of being a priori without being analytically abstract. In this sense, Kant went beyond the early modern debates between Cartesian rationalisms and Lockean empiricisms. Still, Kant did not take the final step toward an explicit sociology of thought or morality. His famous categorical imperative (to act as though one's moral practices were necessary for the good of the social commonwealth) was a backhanded way of preserving moral absolutes as if they were practically attainable by the reasonable judgments of the social actor. Nietzsche, a full century later, took the next step. Concepts, including moral ones, arise not in essential categories of the good, the true, or the beautiful but in the social hierarchies whereby historically specific versions of the concepts dominate.

Curiously, Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* appeared in 1887, between the publications of two other great works of nineteenth-century skeptical social theory, that is, 20 years after the first volume of Marx's *Capital* (1867) and just more than a decade before Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* (1899). Both Marx and Freud claimed, in their ways, to have perfected a robust critical method for diagnosing the hidden, prior existing origins of superficially apparent social forms and behaviors. Yet, both Marx and Freud remained faithful to the Enlightenment method of asserting the true or the good with reference to an (at least) quasi-transcendental principle. This is the effect of Marx's allegiance to value producing labor as the first principle of essential humanity and Freud's to the Ego as the protector of human reason between the moralizing demands of the Superego and the presocial impulses of the Id. By focusing sternly on the social origins of ideas, Nietzsche's genealogical method provided subsequent social philosophy with a powerful critical tool at the expense of sacrificing claims to positivist empirical or even analytically realist truths.

With the guarded exception of Max Weber, whose sociology of the moral contradictions of modern society were evidently influenced by Nietzsche, early twentieth-century social theory largely ignored Nietzsche's method. In Weber's case, the German hermeneutic method represented still another attempt to study positive factual appearances with reference to their hidden meanings. Weber's famous principle of methodological understanding (*verstehen*) was

an early sociological contribution to the interpretive social theories that flourished in the twentieth century in Europe and in America as various offshoots of philosophical pragmatism. Yet, in contrast to Nietzsche's genealogical method, interpretive (or hermeneutic) sociologies share many of the limitations of classically modern variants of the method of investigating origins—a method, it must be said, that owes its staying power to the *prima facie* reasonableness of the now notorious dichotomies. When, for example, knowledge, as well as moral action, is taken to be the objective effect of subjective action, then necessarily the ontological division of the phenomenal (if not noumenal) world into subjective and objective spheres is a compelling (if tacit) assumption.

The plausibility of Nietzsche's critical method gained ground in Europe, after World War II, when, because of the effects of the war itself, twentieth-century skepticism toward the neatly dichotomized social state was fully justified. If an irrational subject like Hitler could dominate the objective structure of Europe, then obviously a naïve faith in the ability of the human subject to know or make good the objective society must be severely qualified. This was the political soil from which sprang writers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and others in the poststructuralist moment of the late 1960s in France. The French social theorists who rose to prominence in the wake of the revolutions of May 1968 were all, one way or another, indebted to Nietzsche—but not to Nietzsche alone. Their philosophical reaction to waves of existentialist subjectivisms (Sartre, for example) and linguistic structuralisms (Lévi-Strauss, for example)—both of which were filtered through the varieties of Marxist and linguistic theories then current in France—required the new social theorists to reconsider the whole of modern philosophy and social thought. They were in their ways equally indebted to the background register of Marx and Freud, as well as to the distinctive French schools of literary and historical method, as they were to Nietzsche.

In many ways, Michel Foucault was the purest of the impure Nietzscheans. It is well known that Foucault's initial use of the genealogical method was actually called archaeology, as in his notable work of 1969, *L'Archéologie du savoir* (The Archaeology of Knowledge). He later abandoned the term *archaeology* for *genealogy* as part of his own shift away from a pervasive, if implicit, structuralism in his early writings, most notably his 1966 archaeology of the human sciences, *Les Mots et les choses* (*The Order of Things*). After *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, itself a strikingly abstract and quasi-objectivist book, Foucault turned to genealogy in his four-volume history of sexuality (of which three were published at the time of his death in 1984). The shift may have been due to a heightened poetic sensibility to his new subject. One might think that the method of the human sciences, in which archival work is prominent, could be more readily subsumed under the rubric of an archaeological dig through layers of dirt. But it is harder still to think of the

social history of sex and sexuality as buried under layers of dirt. Sex, at least, is constantly bursting out—literally, *jouissance*, coming—into the open of active human relations. But more important were the methodological demands of his social study of sexualities that led Foucault back, before the classical period of modernity, to the Greeks. More so, he sought to investigate sexuality in relation to the play of power on the self. This could hardly be done under the assumption of a categorical social self, the lineage of which could be traced through the ages to some foundational moment in the political economy of ethics or of divine imperatives. Hence, the misunderstanding of Foucault and others as blind critics of human subjectivity. On the contrary, his work was a genealogy of the ways such originating causes as The Subject came to subjugate the varieties of subjecthood. This, quite obviously, required a method sufficiently flexible to permit historical study of various and changing family names used to describe human subjecthood. Genealogy locates the kinship lines among those practices that, in effect, liberate the human self and those that oppress (or subjugate, that is, make subject to). As in all kinship lineages, the relations are complicated, even perverse, so much so that Foucault came to realize in his last writings (1984) that the history of sexualities was necessarily an ethic of the Self.

The genealogical method may have been less explicit to other of the French social theorists; still, its influences are well in evidence. Jacques Derrida, with whom the term *deconstruction* has come to be linked, is a philosopher intent upon rereading the classic figures of modern social and philosophical thought. To deconstruct is not to take apart, therefore, but to recompose by taking seriously the hidden layers of meaning in the major theories that have influenced the modern world. Strictly speaking, a genealogical method serves to relativize hitherto existing concepts and values but in the strict sense of putting their component elements in their proper fragmented *relations* to each other. Hence the affinity between archaeology and genealogy as methods that do the dirty work of shifting through the dust of the years under which lie buried the forgotten members of the social practices that determine our fate.

The most explicit, if confusing, application of the genealogical method, thus understood, are the major works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, most especially *Milles Plateaux* (Thousand Plateaus) (1980), where the whole of social and philosophical theory is presented according to their many and inscrutable layers of formation. Hence the importance of the genealogical method to social theorists in such fields as cultural and human geography, as well as sociology, ethnology, and history.

— Charles Lemert

See also Deleuze, Gilles; Derrida, Jacques; Discourse; Foucault, Michel

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GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY

The goal of general systems theory (GST) is to model the properties and relationships common to all systems, regardless of their specific components, or the academic disciplines in which they are studied. Thus, while physical, biological, or social systems may appear to be quite different in terms of their components and relationships, they all may display certain common properties. The study of these common properties is the goal of GST.

A system is defined as a bounded set of components and the relationships among them. Generally, the internal components of the system are assumed to be interrelated in such a manner that when the value of one of the components is changed (for example, by an external force), the value of one or more of the other components also changes, often in such a way as to offset the effects of the externally induced change.

BASIC DEFINITIONS

Components

System components are the internal entities that are located within a system's boundaries and which are interrelated. The system components are generally assumed to be of the same basic nature, but there may be occasional exceptions to this rule. For example, in social systems, the human individual is often (but not always) chosen as the basic system component. Other hierarchical social levels, such as the group, organization, or society, could be chosen alternatively as system components. System components are often referred to alternatively as system units, with the words often being used interchangeably.

Concrete and Abstracted Systems

Systems in which the internal units are empirical objects, such as living organisms or mechanical entities, are

often referred to as concrete systems. One of the most fundamental concrete social systems is the family. The components or units of the family system are the individual family members, who are related to each other in a specific way. Other examples of concrete living systems would be an ant colony or a pod of pilot whales. Concrete systems may be referred to by a variety of names, such as physical systems, empirical systems, "real" systems, biological systems, social systems, or veridical systems.

Not all systems are concrete systems. The components of some systems may be concepts, theoretical terms, variables, or abstract symbols. Such systems are called abstracted systems. Other names for them are abstract systems, theoretical systems, conceptual systems, or symbol systems. As with concrete systems, abstracted systems are comprised of a set of interrelated components. However, abstracted systems differ from concrete systems in at least two ways. In abstracted systems, the components are non-empirical entities such as concepts or variables. Secondly, in an abstracted system, the boundary may not be visible or empirically determinable. While concrete systems are generally situated in physical space-time, abstracted systems may be situated in analytically constructed space, such as "social space" or "psychological space." Some examples of components for abstracted systems are the social role, the unit act, or the concept.

While abstracted systems and concrete systems exist in different spaces, they are not necessarily completely unrelated. For example, the definitions of the abstracted system and the concrete system can be used to illustrate the relationships between a social position (such as a status or role) and an incumbent. A concrete statement would state that "George W. Bush is the president of the United States." Here the emphasis is not on the office or role of president but is on the concrete individual (George W. Bush). The parallel abstracted statement would state, "The presidency is occupied by George W. Bush." Now the emphasis is on the abstracted role (the presidency) and not on the concrete individual who is temporarily occupying it (George W. Bush). Indeed, the abstracted social structure, such as the system of unwritten roles in a bureaucracy, while existing in "social space," may have more longevity than the concrete individuals who may occupy the respective positions only a short time. Thus, the abstracted social system (of roles) may be semipermanent and long lasting, while the concrete social system (of specific individuals) is limited by the life span of the particular incumbent.

Open and Closed Systems

Systems have been traditionally dichotomized as being either "open" or "closed." The extreme case of a closed system is a so-called "isolated" system. In an isolated system, the boundaries are totally closed and impermeable, so that

the system is totally isolated from its surrounding environment. Such an isolated system does not permit flows of either matter-energy or information across its boundaries. Thus, an isolated concrete living system is, over time, potentially unsustainable, as the internal components of the system are deprived of the necessary materials such as energy (food or fuel) that are needed to sustain life.

In contrast to closed or isolated systems, social systems are generally viewed as open systems. Open systems have boundaries that are open to flows (inflows, outflows, and through-flows) of matter-energy and information. For example, consider a social system such as a manufacturing plant. This organization generally has inputs of matter-energy in the form of raw materials (for example, wood) and outputs of finished products (for example, chairs). Its boundaries are open to both inputs and outputs.

The classical open/closed system dichotomy is inadequate for the analysis of modern social systems, because many systems are alternatively open and closed. The social system typically does not leave its boundaries either permanently opened or permanently closed. In reality, the social system opens its borders to inflows of energy and information that it needs to function properly, and closes them to energy and information flows that could impede its functioning. The boundary of the modern social system must serve as an efficient screen to prohibit the input of harmful or inferior matter-energy or information while facilitating the input of necessary or useful matter-energy or information.

It is a misnomer to term a social system *open* if this implies that the system is always open. A social system with perpetually open boundaries would have great difficulty surviving, unless its external environment was permanently friendly. For example, consider the case of a modern bureaucratic system such as a university. The university must be open, to ensure the free exchange of information (ideas). However, if its boundaries were always completely open, there would be no way to exclude harmful information such as computer viruses. Similarly, while the boundaries must be open to matter-energy inflows, they must be able to exclude harmful matter-energy, as contaminated food, raw materials of inferior quality, or human intruders.

While perpetually closed borders would threaten the survival of a social system, at least in the long run, perpetually open borders would threaten system survival also, but in different ways. While the closed system would exclude all inputs (either proper or improper), the open system would fortuitously enable needed inputs but would unfortunately allow improper inputs of matter-energy or information as well, even those that might threaten the well-being of the social system.

Entropy

There is a very fundamental difference in the internal structures of open and closed systems. According to the

second law of thermodynamics, entropy will eventually tend toward a maximum in an isolated (completely closed) thermodynamic system. Entropy can be defined as a measure of disorder in a system. Thus, a system that has reached maximum entropy is in a state of complete disorder. Maximum entropy can be compared to system death. A system in a state of maximum entropy is completely lacking in structure or organization, and is basically in a random state of disarray, or maximum decay. A concrete physical system in maximum entropy has in effect expended all of its energy resources. Since it is closed, there is little hope of reversal, and it will essentially remain in a state of maximum entropy, unless its boundaries are somehow opened so that new energy (and information) can be used to renew the system (assuming that it is not beyond repair by this time).

In addition to thermodynamic entropy, statistical entropy has also been defined. Statistically, maximum entropy occurs in a set of categories, when all categories have an equal probability of occurrence. For example, if a system of individuals were distributed into four categories, each would have an equal probability of being in each of the four categories. Since maximum entropy exists, we have no ability to predict that the person is any more likely to be in one given class than any other of the possible classes. This is essentially a case of randomization.

But while it is true that the second law of thermodynamics predicts an eventual tendency toward maximum entropy in physical systems, and certainly in isolated thermodynamic systems, this is not true for social systems. Social systems routinely display an increase, over time, in organizational structure and complexity that is indicative of entropy decrease, rather than increase. How can social systems decrease in entropy when the second law says that they should increase in entropy? The answer is that by continually bringing in new energy and information from its environment, the social system can offset this internal entropy increase, and actually decrease in entropy over time.

The opposite of maximum entropy is minimum entropy, or (in some cases) zero entropy. In thermodynamics, minimum entropy is simply a state of maximum order, displaying a perpetual abundance of the required energy, so that energy shortages can never occur. Returning to the example of four categories, minimum entropy occurs statistically when all persons are in one category and none in the others. Zero entropy statistically represents complete predictability, so that the social class position of each individual can be predicted with absolute certainty (no errors). This is in direct contrast to maximum entropy, which represents a complete lack of predictive ability.

Equilibrium

In thermodynamics, maximum entropy is defined as equilibrium. This is in effect the state of complete disorder,

where all energy resources have been depleted and no organizational structure remains. From the standpoint of systems theory, equilibrium is very undesirable, as it in essence represents the complete dissolution or destruction of the system. However, note a curious feature of maximum entropy: Since entropy cannot increase further, the system is ironically stable, even peaceful, even though it is technically a dead system, or a nonsystem. This connotation of stability in the term *equilibrium* greatly attracted social theorists who were looking for a way to signify stability and balance in social systems. They erroneously characterized society as being in equilibrium, not knowing that this meant maximum entropy and system death. They really did not need the equilibrium concept at all, as they were primarily interested in system stability, balance, and integration. They were not seeking a social system in equilibrium, but rather desired a system far from equilibrium, or one that was low in entropy, highly organized, and stable. This is more or less the opposite of the equilibrium concept that they were using.

After the concept of social equilibrium was strongly criticized, social equilibrium theorists searched for acceptable alternatives to equilibrium that might be less vulnerable to criticism. They turned to concepts such as moving equilibrium, homeostasis, and “steady state.” *Moving equilibrium* is the term for a series of successive equilibrium states within a given system. The theory is that even though the system may not return to its original equilibrium state, it may still achieve a new, or moving equilibrium. Homeostasis is a term denoting balance or health in an open system. The concept was originally developed for biological systems (organisms), but was applied in sociology by Talcott Parsons and others. The notion here is that the system maintains a set of interrelated variables (such as blood pressure and body temperature) within given parameters. An external change that upsets this balance in one variable (for example, body temperature) would make changes in the other variables in order to restore this balance (and thus the health) of the system. Steady state is a similar notion, referring to the static state (such as temperature) attained by a nonliving system. None of these substitutes for equilibrium satisfied the critics of the equilibrium concept, and probably never will, as the applications of equilibrium to social systems exhibit inherent fatal flaws.

Cybernetics and Sociocybernetics

Nonliving control systems such as the thermostat are termed *cybernetic systems*. The nonliving engineering system studied by cybernetics focuses on control, or “steering” of the system. The cybernetic system contains a central control mechanism (a “servomechanism”) such as a thermostat, and works through a series of interrelationships called feedback loops. A simple cybernetic system such as

the room thermostat will contain at the minimum a positive and negative feedback mechanism. When the room temperature increases, the thermostat will sense this and activate the negative feedback loop so that the air conditioning turns on, which will offset or rectify the heat increase and restore the steady state temperature.

Sociologists have used principles from cybernetics to study the social system, calling this approach sociocybernetics. Sociocybernetics uses cybernetic principles such as feedback and control, often referring to the latter as *steering*. The idea is to examine ways in which the society is guided or controlled. Sociocybernetics relies rather heavily on the concept of second-order sociocybernetics. First-order sociocybernetics refers to the practice of the social system observing itself, which can be studied generically under the notion of self-reference. However, systems often have difficulty observing themselves, for a number of reasons, including problems in boundary determination. Second-order sociocybernetics is the practice of an external observer who observes the system observing itself. This often enables a clearer, and perhaps less biased, view of the actual practices of the social system.

Complexity Theory

Complexity theory is a relatively new approach that focuses on the mathematical analysis of complex systems, including the construction of computer models of modern society. Although there are different variants of complexity theory, one of the main ones is centered in the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico. One of the chief concepts of complexity theory is the notion of the complex adaptive system (CAS). Another is the concept of entropy. CASs repeatedly adapt to their environments. Over time, the living system such as the social system tends to increase in size and complexity, thus being more organized, and decreasing in entropy.

For example, as a bureaucracy grows, it will become highly complex, differentiated, and specialized, with a rigid and codified structure and a full set of written rules and regulations. Such complex social systems can take quite a toll on the environment, exhausting energy resources such as fuel and water. Since the complex social system is generally immobile, it necessarily pollutes its local environment, unless intensive care is taken and generous resources are allocated for refuse removal. Thus, as a social system becomes increasingly differentiated and grows in size and complexity, it continually adapts to its environment, modifies the environment (both positively and negatively), and readapts to this newly modified environment. This is a continuing process that proceeds in perpetuity, unless the CAS fails to meet its needs and thus falls prey to maximum entropy, a state that it generally cannot recover from.

Some systems are completely self-sufficient, satisfying all of their own needs. These are known as totipotential

systems. For example, a totipotential family would grow all of its own food, plow with farm animals, and so forth, so that it need not rely on any other social system. In contrast, a partipotential living system meets some of its own requirements. It is partially self-sufficient, relying on exchanges with other social systems to provide the needed goods and services that it is unable to provide for itself.

Most large complex systems have internal subsystems. Subsystems are contained within the larger host system and often serve some function for the larger system. Internal subsystems may help the CAS adapt to its environment. A societal system that appears unitary may have an internal hierarchy composed of nested subsystem levels such as the organization, group, and individual levels.

Autopoiesis

Some systems are said to be autopoietic. An autopoietic system is a self-reproducing and self-organizing system. That is, the system reproduces the components that produce it. There is general agreement that cells are autopoietic and can reproduce themselves. However, opinion is divided about whether social systems are autopoietic. A number of scholars think that they are, while others disagree. Much of the controversy over whether social systems are autopoietic centers around the nature of the components, or basic units of the social system, as defined above. While some scholars say that the individual is the basic unit of the social system, others disagree. They claim that the basic component of the social system is not the individual, but some other social entity, such as the social role, status, the unit act, or the communication. As long as scholars disagree over the basic component (and thus the basic definition) of the social system, they will probably be unable to agree whether the social system is autopoietic or not. The debate is currently unresolved.

EQUILIBRIUM THEORY

Spencer

Systems theory has a long history in sociology, beginning in the nineteenth century with the work of scholars such as Herbert Spencer and Vilfredo Pareto, who both emphasized the concept of equilibrium and both applied principles from thermodynamics. Spencer relied primarily upon the first law of thermodynamics (the conservation of energy). Spencer viewed social equilibrium as a somewhat utopian state of social harmony, balance, and integration. In an evolutionary sense, the society would not begin in equilibrium but would evolve toward this state over time. The attainment of equilibrium would be a crowning achievement for the society. Equilibrium was seen as a sustainable stable state that could be maintained once it was attained. But even before the initial publication of *First Principles*,

Spencer was informed by a colleague that equilibrium in physics connoted not an idealistic state of integration and stability in a system but rather system dissolution, according to the second law. Spencer was shaken by the realization that the concept he had relied upon to signify the ultimate achievement of social integration actually implied the opposite in its original physical definition. He continued to use the concept of equilibrium, trying mightily to resolve this contradiction, but was never able to do so satisfactorily. Thus, Spencer ended his career still mired in the “Spencerian Dilemma” of how to apply the equilibrium concept in a manner that is directly opposite to its actual meaning.

Pareto

Pareto was an Italian mining engineer before turning to the study of sociology. He developed a rather elaborate equilibrium analysis. Pareto presented the notion of social equilibrium as an established fact. He chided theorists who worked without the concept of equilibrium as being mired hopelessly in a search for imaginary causes, when the use of the equilibrium concept would single-handedly provide the explanations they were seeking. Pareto’s equilibrium analysis is in some ways more sophisticated and detailed than Spencer’s, yet remains vulnerable to criticism. For one thing, Pareto did not entirely avoid the Spencerian Dilemma, nor did he address the issue, preferring to ignore it entirely. He also angered students of social change by postulating a rather automatic and quick return to the status quo once equilibrium was disturbed. Further, his practice of developing an analytical model, claiming it to be empirically applicable, but not providing specific empirical examples, makes Pareto highly vulnerable to charges of reification. That is, critics can say that his model is purely theoretical and that empirical application is thus illegitimate.

Parsons

While dismissive of Spencer’s work, Parsons curiously fell prey to the ghost of the Spencerian Dilemma by making an inappropriate definition of equilibrium a central feature of his very definition of social order. Parsons featured the notion, apparently borrowed from Pareto, that when social equilibrium is disturbed, internal forces will work to restore order, thus apparently ensuring return to the status quo. The implication seemed to be that even if a society is threatened by a coup, it can easily thwart it and return to “equilibrium” (the status quo) through the activation of forces already operative in the society that work to maintain social equilibrium. Parsons says that societies must have a tendency to “self-maintenance” (equilibrium). He notes, though, that this equilibrium need not be “static” or “stable,” but can be “moving equilibrium.” In the final analysis,

Parsons seems to have devoted more attention to defending against criticisms of his equilibrium concept than did his predecessors such as Spencer and Pareto. Parsons' equilibrium analysis was widely criticized on a number of grounds. Probably the most vocal critics were conflict theorists, who saw the automatic return to equilibrium as an unwarranted emphasis on stability, which seems to deemphasize (or even preclude) the possibility of social change. He was also subject to the same criticisms as earlier equilibrium theorists—using the thermodynamic concept of equilibrium improperly and reifying the analytic equilibrium model by inappropriately applying it empirically.

While Parsons tried mightily to salvage the equilibrium concept, in the end, he, along with Spencer, Pareto, and other equilibrium theorists, became mired in its flaws. He attempted to avoid criticism by moving beyond thermodynamic (closed system) equilibrium to the concept of homeostasis, and moving equilibrium. The result was an eclectic congeries of equilibrium concepts in which Parsons generally retained his old equilibrium definitions while adding new ones to defend against criticism. This is a dangerous practice because, for example, it ended in his confusion of closed-system equilibrium with open-system homeostasis. By continually extending the definition of equilibrium to include nearly every type ever used by systems theorists, Parsons simply diluted the concept and lessened its rigor and specificity while failing to satisfy his critics. Ironically, all of this confusion could have been avoided by eschewing the concept of equilibrium altogether. Parsons used two related concepts of equilibrium. One featured the notions of “return to order” and “self-maintenance” and never satisfied critics. The other simply used equilibrium as a synonym for balance or stability. Parsons could have avoided a lot of criticism by simply using the term *social balance*, or even *integration*, without labeling them with the term *equilibrium*.

Functionalism

Functionalism was a reigning sociological paradigm during the mid-twentieth century, as exemplified by the work of Parsons (1951). Although not all functionalists were equilibrium theorists, functionalism did imply at least an implicit systems analysis. Basic functionalism enabled the analysis of part/whole relationships. The whole (the social system) would have certain needs, requisites, survival requirements, equilibrium requirements, or other requirements that would be generally expressed in terms of the “state” (such as a state of equilibrium or a state of integration) of the system as a whole. The whole was composed of internally related subsystems that were (either individually or in concert) fulfilling some survival function for the whole (social system, or society). If the part (such as an educational institution) did not fulfill its function

adequately, then the system whole would falter at the very least, and in the worst instance, would fail to survive. Thus, in the equilibrium approach to functionalism, the function of the internal components was to ensure the maintenance of social equilibrium, thus ensuring societal survival.

CURRENT APPROACHES

Bertalanffy

Social systems theory remained hobbled by the Spencerian Dilemma and the specter of the second law of thermodynamics until the publication of *General System Theory* by Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Bertalanffy's work was generally well received, and unlocked some important doors for social systems theorists. For one thing, it solved the Spencerian Dilemma by presenting evidence, based on Ilya Prigogine's Nobel Prize-winning work. Prigogine showed that while entropy in open systems such as social systems does increase internally in accordance with the second law, importation of energy can offset this entropy increase, thus allowing the society to increase in complexity. In addition to removing this barrier, Bertalanffy also employed the analysis of information, which had been generally lacking in thermodynamic discussions of systems. Still further, Bertalanffy smoothly integrated the notion of entropy into the analysis of social systems. In one fell swoop, then, he rid social systems theory of the hindrance of thermodynamic equilibrium and moved beyond this to the dual analysis of entropy and information. This was a great leap forward for social systems theory.

Miller

The most notable contribution after that of Bertalanffy was the monumental publication of James Grier Miller's *Living Systems*. Miller followed Bertalanffy in applying entropy and information in the analysis of social systems. He also presented a comprehensive format of seven hierarchical levels and 19 subsystems (later expanded to eight levels and 20 subsystems). Of the 20 subsystems, two of them (the boundary and reproducer) process both matter-energy and information. The 18 remaining subsystems process either matter-energy or information. The matter-energy processing subsystems are the ingestor, distributor, converter, producer, matter-energy storage, extruder, motor, and supporter. The information processing subsystems are the input transducer, internal transducer, channel and net, decoder, associator, memory, decider, encoder, output transducer, and timer (added later to the original list of 19). These are said to be 20 “critical” subsystems, meaning that they are required for the maintenance and survival of every living system. In addition to the 20 critical subsystems, Miller presented eight hierarchical nested system levels,

meaning that each higher level of system includes all the lower ones as subsystems. The original seven levels are the cell, organ, organism, group, organization, society, and supranational system. The community level was added later, in between the organization and society.

The basic notion of living systems theory (LST) is that the 20 critical subsystems always operate at each of the eight levels to maintain the system and ensure its survival. If one subsystem is missing, it potentially endangers the survival of its larger system, and thus must be replaced. There is usually a “one-level drop-back” in living systems analysis. For example, if one analyzes the society as a living system, the subsystems of interest are generally one level lower, at the organizational level. LST is an implicit variant of functional theory, although Miller himself never recognized this. LST is clearly a type of part-whole analysis (as is functionalism). Further, the term *subsystem* is somewhat of a misnomer as applied in LST. Consider the example of the decider. Deciding (decision making) is a process (function) rather than a concrete subsystem. If the group is the focus of study, the decider function is a critical function that must be fulfilled by someone one level below the group level, that is, some person. Technically, the person (organism) is the subsystem, not the decider.

Luhmann

Niklas Luhmann’s contributions to GST are summarized in the monumental *Social Systems*. His contributions are numerous and complex. He is particularly famous for his presentation of society as an autopoietic system. Although a lively debate continues over whether societies are autopoietic, Luhmann firmly believes that they are. The debate centers around the proper component for the social system. Luhmann says that the proper unit or component of the social system is not the individual, act, or social role, but is instead the communication (utterance). Such communication in the form of an utterance is central to the existence of society and is indispensable. However, the utterance is not permanent. Thus, if society is built around such temporary utterances, which disappear almost instantaneously, it follows that society is autopoietic and must continually reproduce itself, by reproducing the components (utterances) that produce it.

The concept of autopoiesis has multiple advantages for Luhmann. It enables a clear analysis of social reproduction. It also facilitates a cogent analysis of social communication. Further, it serves as an excellent framework for the analysis of self-reference, including analysis of the notion of second-order sociocybernetics. Still further, it goes beyond traditional open or closed systems analysis by portraying the social system as simultaneously both open and closed. That is, Luhmann represents the autopoietic system as being organizationally closed. The internal autopoietic

organizational processes by which the system ensures its reproduction are closed to the external environment (including external observers) and to other social systems. Yet, simultaneously, the system’s borders remain open to exchanges of energy and information with its external environment. Furthermore, even subsystems, particularly differentiated functional subsystems such as law or medicine, can have their own exchange relationships with the external environment, perhaps independently of the relationships of the larger society. The autopoietic model allows Luhmann to transcend the old part-whole analysis of functionalism with its overemphasis on system internals.

Bailey

Kenneth D. Bailey introduced social entropy theory (SET) in the 1990s with the publication of *Social Entropy Theory* and *Sociology and the New Systems Theory*. SET moves beyond classical functionalism and equilibrium theory in a manner that complements other modern social systems approaches such as those of Bertalanffy, Miller, and Luhmann. SET focuses on the concept of social entropy. Equilibrium theorists seemed to be enamored of the equilibrium concept through a false belief that it connoted social integration and harmony. They likewise shunned the entropy concept, as they perhaps felt that it had too many negative connotations and was strictly a “physics” concept. The social application of equilibrium proved to be a dismal failure, because entropy was the more appropriate concept all along. Entropy should have been originally applied in sociology instead of equilibrium.

The concept of entropy in general, and social entropy in particular, remains controversial, as do other concepts such as social autopoiesis. Verbal theorists in sociology may resist entropy as a quantitative thermodynamics concept, while physicists may reject the notion that entropy can be applied in social theory. In reality, it has been well established in GST and SET, and is widely accepted by many social theorists, that complex social systems such as modern bureaucracies are indeed low-entropy systems, which function well far from equilibrium. In fact, low-entropy social systems such as huge modern complex bureaucracies are very low in social entropy but are some of the least fragile and most robust social systems in existence and are very difficult to destroy.

The process of building a low-entropy social system is generally the same as building a low-entropy physical system. This fact gives rise to the possibility that it was merely a historical occurrence that the concept of entropy was discovered first in thermodynamics rather than in another discipline. That is, the fact that entropy was discovered first in thermodynamics does not constitute evidence that the concept is not applicable in other fields. In reality, the processes of entropy production or entropy decrease are generic processes that necessarily exist in any system

where energy and information are processed (and that includes all living systems and probably most nonliving systems). Thus, entropy is a central concept for the analysis of any system that is constructed and maintained through the expenditure of energy and information, whether these structures are physical, biological, or social.

Whether the system is a physical system (such as a huge modern building), a biological system (such as a person), or a social system (such as a huge bureaucracy), the entropy analyses are similar. In all three cases, the system, whether physical, biological, or social, can only reach a high degree of complexity, and thus a low level of entropy, through continuous expenditures of energy, which are coordinated with the appropriate information. If energy and information are available to the system and are used properly, then the system can increase in complexity and decrease in entropy, regardless of whether it is identified as a physical system, biological system, or social system. Thus, at least three types of entropy must be analyzed by general systems theorists: physical entropy, biological entropy, and social entropy.

— Kenneth D. Bailey

See also Structural Functionalism; Luhmann, Niklas; Pareto, Vilfredo; Parsons, Talcott; Spencer, Herbert; World-Systems Theory

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call this pattern a system of “generalized exchange.” Systems of generalized exchange have been a puzzle for social exchange theorists because such systems are only possible through a process of *indirect reciprocity*.

Social exchange theory classifies exchanges into two categories: restricted (direct) exchanges and generalized (indirect) exchanges. A restricted exchange involves only two actors. The first actor gives resources to the second actor, and then the second actor gives resources to the first actor. If A gives to B, then B gives to A. In contrast, a generalized exchange (indirect exchange) involves more than two actors. Moreover, there is no relationship between the person who receives a resource from someone else *and then* to whom that person eventually gives resources. If A gives to B, B does not give back (reciprocate) to A. Instead, C, a third party, may give to A. Thus, reciprocation is indirect. A eventually receives resources in this system, just not from B. Instead, A receives resources indirectly from B *through* C. “If I see burglars in my neighbor’s house, I have the duty of doing something about it (e.g., calling the police), not because I expect any reciprocation—of whatever type from my unfortunate neighbor—but perhaps because I expect any neighbors of mine to do the same thing if they see burglars in my own house” (Ekeh 1974:206).

Social exchange theorists have distinguished three major forms of generalized exchange. The first form is referred to as chain-generalized (network-generalized) exchange (Ekeh 1974; Yamagishi and Cook 1993). Suppose there is a network structure of three actors: A, B, and C. In this exchange system, A gives resources to a designated recipient (B) in the network. B does not reciprocate directly. Instead, A may receive resources from another actor (C) in the network who occupies a position that permits C to give to A. The examples of chain-generalized exchange include the Kula ring described by Malinowski and matrilineal cross-cousin marriage described by Lévi-Strauss. The second form of generalized exchange is referred to as group-generalized exchange (Ekeh 1974; Yamagishi and Cook 1993). In this exchange system, group members pool their resources, and then all members receive benefits that are generated by pooling. One example of group-generalized exchange is maintaining a clean bathroom in a shared apartment. A second example of group-generalized exchange is the gathering of villagers to build a barn for each villager, one at a time. The third form of generalized exchange is referred to as pure-generalized exchange (Takahashi 2000). Pure-generalized exchange is network-generalized exchange without a fixed network structure. In this form of generalized exchange, each actor can give resources to any member of the group. The example of the witness of a burglary given above (by Ekeh 1974) is an instance of this form of generalized exchange. Since there is no fixed network structure, pure-generalized exchange is characterized by unilateral resource giving, which is sometimes considered to be altruism.

GENERALIZED EXCHANGE

Everyday people help others without expecting benefits in return from them in the future. Social exchange theorists

Originally, generalized exchange, especially network-generalized exchange, played a prominent role in social exchange theory in anthropology. Classic examples include the Kula ring and matrilineal cross-cousin marriage. These theorists argued that the function of generalized exchange is to enhance solidarity and morality among members of the exchange system and to contribute to the integration of society (Ekeh 1974).

However, a fundamental question remains. That is, how is generalized exchange possible among self-interested actors? Since earlier anthropologists adopted the perspective of functionalism that assumes that each aspect of society exists because it is integral to the survival of a society, this question did not pose a problem for them. Social exchange theorists, however, do not take on a functionalist perspective, but instead assume individuals in society are self-interested actors. Since the unilateral resource giving (that is characteristic of generalized exchanges) is beneficial to a recipient but costly to a giver *and* since actors are assumed to be self-interested, social exchange theorists are puzzled by the existence of patterns of generalized exchange. Put differently, because there is no direct reciprocity between two actors in generalized exchange systems, then any member of the generalized exchange system can free ride. In this sense, generalized exchange involves a social dilemma (Yamagishi and Cook 1993).

In the last 10 years, much research has focused on the social dilemma that characterizes generalized exchange systems, especially network and pure-generalized exchange systems (e.g., Takagi 1996; Takahashi 2000; Yamagishi and Cook 1993). Although no definitive solution to the social dilemma has been proposed, researchers generally agree that some kind of mechanism, either at the micro (actor) level or at the macro (societal) level, that allows actors to give to those individuals who gave to others in the past is necessary for the emergence of generalized exchange. If actors adopt this kind of selective giving strategy, those who give to others will receive resources from others, while those who do not give to others will be ostracized. When such a strategy is adopted (or such a mechanism is in use), the unilateral resource giving that constitutes generalized exchange systems can be beneficial to each actor.

While social exchange theorists examine the selection strategy as a way to explain the social dilemma characteristic of generalized exchange systems, evolutionary biologists have made developments as they study indirect reciprocity. The question of resource giving in social exchange theory *is* the question of altruism in evolutionary biology. While social exchange theorists recognize that it is disadvantageous for an actor to give a resource to an actor who will not give in return, evolutionary biologists recognize that it is disadvantageous for an actor to be altruistic to other actors. Put differently, just as resource giving in generalized exchanges has been a puzzle for social exchange theorists,

altruism has been a puzzle to evolutionary biologists. Except for kin selection established by William D. Hamilton, the explanation of altruism between dyads is the only one that was established before the 1990s. Biologists, such as Robert Trivers, call this type of altruism reciprocal altruism, and it is possible when actors adopt the tit-for-tat strategy. Given repeated interaction between two actors, to give when the other actor gives to you and to not give when the other actor does not give to you is beneficial to both actors in the dyad.

However, this situation is what I referred to earlier as a restricted exchange. To explain altruism beyond dyads, researchers have begun to shift their focus to indirect reciprocity (e.g., Leimar and Hammerstein 2001; Nowak and Sigmund 1998). Indirect reciprocity is essentially unilateral resource giving in pure-generalized exchange. Although no definitive answer to the question of altruism beyond dyads has been proposed by evolutionary biologists, their general argument corresponds with the ideas espoused by social exchange theorists. That is, some kind of selective giving strategy (i.e., to give to a giver and to not give to a nongiver) makes indirect reciprocity possible among self-interested actors.

— Nobuyuki Takahashi

See also Social Dilemmas; Social Exchange Theory

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GERMAN IDEALISM

In the history of modern philosophy, the period known as German Idealism refers primarily to the thinking of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1849), Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775–1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

Hegel (1770–1831). These authors raised the question of the universality of logos, using reason comprehensively to understand reality. The intention was to overcome the gap between subject and object, mind and matter, freedom and nature. This was an attempt to establish a basic unity of fundamental philosophy and diagnosis of the time, the synthesis of which creates the idea of freedom.

KANT

Immanuel Kant's philosophy, which is generally considered to be part of German Idealism only with some reservation, had, with the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781, started the movement. The French Revolution, with its attempt to universalise civil liberty and equality for its citizens, served as the historical background to the movement, and the movement ended with Hegel's death in 1831. Nevertheless, Idealism should not be understood as an outdated, self-contained phenomenon of modern philosophical thinking. Its ways of looking at problems, its ideas and theories have proved innovative to the present day.

An analysis of idealistic philosophy, mainly Kant and Hegel, can be found in the sociological discourse of Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, George Herbert Mead, Alfred Schütz, Jürgen Habermas, and Niklas Luhmann.

Kant's new foundation of philosophy takes as its starting point the tradition of the philosophy of pure reason, and at the same time contemplates its historical decline. Since Aristotle, the highest method for reasoning had been metaphysics, which was intended to examine being as such, and was understood as a philosophy of the basic structures of reality. However, the age of modern, exact, natural sciences presented this philosophical discipline with difficulties. What knowing really means was demonstrated by non-philosophical sciences. The new foundation for philosophy was to be achieved by reason's critical self-examination, that is, by reason's critical reflection upon itself. Philosophy was to satisfy the advanced scientific paradigms of physics and mathematics. According to Kant's metaphysics, a science must cope with the question of whether human reasoning can achieve the knowledge relevant to reality without having to depend on the use of experiences. Kant calls it knowledge gained from pure reason. The addition of the word *pure* to *reason* means that reason is independent of any experience through sensual perception. Kant's aim is to test the range of human reasoning with regard to knowledge of reality but independently of information that can only be gained by using the senses.

The transcendental question is concerned not with the objects of knowledge but rather with the conditions that make knowledge possible in the first place. It must be accepted that we can only speak of real knowledge in view of the world of experience, which, on the whole, is the

subject of empirical science. The world of possible objects of experience is pre-given by the intuitions of space and time (the modes in which sense perception and thinking happen), as well as by the categories of the mind that function as the unifying and ordering forms of manifold sense data. In transcendental philosophy, categories are the most general forms of reality. Categories are forms of propositions and forms of concepts from which all other concepts can be derived. They constitute *ur*-forms of being and of the objects of knowledge. These a priori achievements of subjectivity are examined by transcendental reflection. Transcendental reflection is about the constitutional conditions of the knowledge-conveying subject-object relationship. It comprehends objects as appearance to a subject and does not venture to formulate propositions on the things in themselves, as they would be, independently of how they appear to any cognitive subject. Neither does the analysis of our faculties of understanding warrant a concept of purely rational subjectivity without reference to the world of experience. Subject and object are meaningful only if thought of in relation to each other. Pure reason, which transcends the empirical-object-orientated understanding, and is therefore called transcendent, cannot even be understood by critique-aspiring theoretical philosophy.

Where theoretical knowledge reaches its limits, practical philosophy begins for Kant (*Critique of Practical Reason* [1788]2002). It is the task of moral law (*Sittengesetz*) to uncover the not empirically restricted and therefore unconditional role of reason. The incontestable validity of the categorical imperative here serves as a starting point. In very general terms, it says: Act in such a way that the maxim of your actions could at the same time, and at any time, find acceptance as the principle of a universal law. In this formula, Kant interprets the moral *ought to*, immediately felt firsthand by everyone, as the expression of humanity's being destined to be rational. Conscience thus serves as an instance, which shows that prior to all substantiation and indoctrination, the feeling of moral obligation forms part of anyone's experience. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant lays the foundations for a pure-reason-orientated philosophical interpretation of the unquestionable certainty of an obligation to moral action. The categorical imperative requires action of which only the form is prescribed, while the content is given in the respective mutable and subjective maxims (principles of action/*Grundsätze des Handelns*). In practice, one should follow only such rules as could be valid for everyone. Thus, the principle of reason is already implied in concrete action because reason itself has universal validity. The freedom of the will to act according to universal rational rules, however, presupposes freedom as the faculty of determining one's will irrespective of changing individual interests and the dominant influence of the environment. Freedom is not pre-given; as practical autonomy it must be acquired. One must accept freedom to make the

practice of reason possible, and reason must guide practice so that freedom can be. Freedom, then, means freedom from other-determination and the freedom to self-determination. However, it seems that even everyday observations teach us that all acts are influenced by external causes. To solve the problem, one must accept a double nature in humans, who by virtue of their cognitive faculties, are capable of autonomous reasoning while at the same time remaining subjected to the laws of the empirical world, of which they are a part. This postulate of a double nature only makes sense when a bridge between the two sides seems thinkable. In view of the tensions between the rational and the empirical, the rift between the causal necessity of nature and the unconditional determination of the will, Kant suggested a solution in *The Critique of Judgment* ([1790]2000). Judgment, which generally serves to adapt and to relate the universal and the concrete to each other, or the faculty to think the particular as contained in the universal, affords the possibility of transcendental sense giving.

FICHTE

Post-Kantian idealism begins with Fichte. No other term is more connected with Fichte's work than that of *Wissenschaftslehre* (science of knowledge). Fichte tried to elevate philosophy to a systematic science of conditions necessary for substantiated knowledge and rational acts. For Fichte, philosophy is *Wissenschaftslehre*, meaning that it does not deal with objects, like other sciences, but is the science of knowledge itself. Its function, therefore, is to establish basic principles by virtue of which all knowledge can be substantiated but which themselves cannot be substantiated any further.

For Fichte, the ultimate principle, from which all knowledge comes, cannot depend on any further presupposition. Such a principle is not a given structure that can be traced in consciousness; it is rather more one that each consciousness must create itself. Instead of being based on a factual thing (*Tatsache*), *Wissenschaftslehre* is based on a factual act (*Tathandlung*), which means an activity of the human mind that is not a particular mental (psychical) act but is expressed in all acts. This act is expressed in the sentence "I am I." The "I" does not exist until it actively understands itself; and insofar as it makes itself to the "I," it relates to nothing but its own identity. Therefore it is in the "I" that posits its being as its very own that oneness is first produced as a principle. The "I" is no substance, but pure activity. Any knowledge of anything presupposes the positing of a knowing "I." *Positing* for Fichte is synonymous with recognising as real. The "I" should not be understood empirically, but transcendently, which means it provides the conditions for all knowledge.

The "I" not only posits itself, it posits everything else against itself in that it refers to itself as "I." The positing of

the "I" is thus at the same time a counter-positing of the "Not-I." Thus, in one and the same act, negation supervenes on identity, negation that in a step-by-step development determines all reality, beyond the absolute *ur-act* in relation to that act. With the "I," Fichte gains a basic unifying principle from which all parts of philosophy can stringently be derived. In its core, Fichte's philosophy is the "science of experience." This means that it is a theory with the help of which it can be explained how experience as consciousness of objects is possible. As Fichte wanted to solve this problem without presupposing things in themselves, he could refer to nothing that was not a spontaneous mentally active "I." The concept of "I" is thus comprehended so broadly that the self-and nature-positing "I" ceases to be the individual subject of cognition, in that it presents itself as supraindividual reason. Fichte presented the first implementation of this program in 1794 in *The Science of Knowledge: With the First and Second Introductions* (*Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* [1794]1982).

The central task of the theoretical science of knowledge theory,—namely, to make understandable consciousness of objects solely out of the "I," that is, without the assumption of a consciousness-independent reality—meets with the difficulty that actually the objects are experienced as something separate from the "I." Fichte wanted to solve this problem by characterizing the "I" as a striving one, and argued that striving cannot be thought of without a counter-striving that needs to be overcome. As human beings are called upon to fulfill themselves as free individuals, one must assume that there is something upon which their striving for freedom must prove itself. The impulse that leads to a restriction of purely mental activity springs from moral consciousness. As morality commands us to extend the compass of the freedom of the "I," some barrier (i.e., nature) must be assumed that moral acts endeavour to overcome.

Fichte developed these thoughts in his work *Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre* (*The System of Moral Philosophy According to the Knowledge of Science* [1798]1995) from 1798. Freedom subsists independently of nature. According to the absolute autonomy of the "I," an act is moral when it overcomes all dependency of the "I" on nature. The basis of all action is the moral drive. It is a combination of a natural drive, from which it derives the subject matter on which to focus, and a pure drive, by which it is formally determined to posit as purpose nothing other than the autonomy of the "I." The act is defined by the concept of duty. However, one must always assess possibilities of actions. According to Fichte, we should opt for the possibility most suited to render us independent of sensual inclinations, and our conscience will tell us which possibility that is. It is only when the act is guided by conscience or the consciousness of duty that it has a moral character. Everyone's striving for freedom must be restricted so that equality of freedom is guaranteed. The

ultimate aim of moral endeavour is to subjugate nature to reason. Each person should see himself or herself as the means to this objective.

SCHELLING

Schelling, who found that Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics went too far, tried to reform speculative philosophy. In contrast to Kant's criticism, Schelling assigned to philosophy the task of determining the essence and form of reality independently of experience. In so doing, he tried, within the framework of a pantheist view of the world, to merge the I-philosophy that he found in Fichte with the speculative philosophy of nature (*Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* [1797]1966; *Einleitung zu einem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* [1799]1966). The problem was to reconcile Fichte's "absolute-I" with Spinoza's (1632–1677) "infinite substance." For Spinoza, this substance is indivisible (not spatial), unchangeable (not temporal), and determined by itself (not other-determined). Consciousness of self always springs from an act of reflection and therefore needs an other, a "non-I," against which it defines itself. What underlines this is a bipartition that must be overcome by reverting to a basis that contains no opposite any longer because this basis undertakes and carries out all limitations and definitions within itself. One of Schelling's crucial problems is, therefore, to conceive a unity of the opposites of subject/object, mind/nature, and ideal/real.

Natural philosophy is at first introduced as a kind of supplement to Fichte's science of knowledge, then as an independent system that leaves Fichte's philosophy behind it. For Schelling, nature as subject is absolute productivity; nature as object is merely product. The whole of nature is animated by productive life. Even so-called inorganic material is merely just un-woken, sleeping life. An evolution takes place in nature whereby the lower forms are accepted into the higher ones, while everything is embedded in the eternal substance (or the absolute). Schelling's natural philosophical speculations were guided by the notion that the difference between the world of mind and that of matter belongs to the surface of reality only, their common ground being neither material nor mental; in the latter, subject and object, mind and matter, freedom and nature coincide.

Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* ([1800]1978) marks the transition from the philosophy of nature to the philosophy of identity. Self-awareness is regarded as the supreme principle of knowledge. This produces not only itself but also, through unconscious production, the world of objects. The "I" as subject is identical with the "I" as object in that by thinking about itself, the "I" makes itself into its own object. Schelling's problem of the unity of opposites gives rise to the question of what principle

underlies this unity. The basis of his philosophy of identity is that everything that is, is one in itself. Absolute identity is also understood as the point of indifference where all opposites behave indifferently. For Schelling, reason is total differentiatedness of the subjective and objective, mind and matter. There can be nothing that is not reason, and everything that is, is within reason.

HEGEL

The philosophy of Hegel is generally seen as the culmination and completion of Idealist philosophy. The task of philosophy, for Hegel, is to grasp its own time in thoughts. Hegel thus places his own thinking under a historical rubric. He found himself confronted with quite a number of systems that all claimed to be true. With respect to these rival alternatives, the idea of philosophical truth must, according to Hegel, be upheld. Nevertheless, the historical dimension in which this idea inevitably occurs cannot be denied. The postulate of undiminished truth must therefore be reconciled with the concession of its being historically conditioned. Only when system and history, originally separate areas, are brought together can the chances for a new philosophical beginning, nursed since Kant, be fulfilled.

The *Phenomenology of Mind* ([1807]1988) is a comprehensive introduction to Hegel's philosophy. As far as philosophy is concerned, it is his main aim to show that the true form, in which truth exists, can only be the scientific system of this form. For Hegel, real knowledge is the knowledge that shows or understands how the absolute comes into its own in the finite and the particular (singular), because the absolute is the reality of mind, an energy that harbours its own telos. In this real knowledge, philosophy becomes science as system. It can become science and system only when the absolute has constructed reality as mind and become transparent to itself. The reformation of philosophy to science is *retroconnected* to the history of mind. Science, as the manner in which mind comprehends itself, takes up in the internal necessity with which it forms its system that external necessity in which time and history have led mind to its completion. According to Hegel, external necessity equals internal necessity, just as the history of mind equals system.

A central concept in this context is Hegel's dialectic. He comprehends dialectics as a set of laws that underlie the nature of thinking and reality itself: each thesis contains its own antithesis; both are sublated with the synthesis. Sublation here has the triple meaning of rescission, conservation, and elevation to a higher level. What is thus sublated is mediated, that is, something in which the determinacy of its origin is still inherent. Dialectics exposes contradictions (e.g., finite-infinite) as moments of transition to a whole, whose every last step has left behind the two preceding ones without relinquishing their meanings. For Hegel, the

phenomena in history are not accidental appearances but necessary phases of the unfolding of a richer organon. History properly understood, that is, properly interpreted, constitutes the remembrance of mind.

Mind, having alienated itself from itself and externalised itself, has reconciled with itself again and reverted to itself. Hegel's thinking describes the process by which mind dismisses itself into the for-it-alien nature, and through the course of history gains consciousness of itself within the human mind. At the end of this going-inside-itself is the self-knowing mind, the absolute as identity of identity and the nonidentity. In philosophy, mind cognises itself as subject and as substance. The subject, which thinks the world and itself, coincides with the substance of the world. This is where mind finds the identity of being and thinking, because substance is the self-unfolding mind as self-conscious whole.

Hegel distinguishes three steps of mind's relation to itself: humanity, which exists at first as a natural soul (anthropology), at the stage of emerging consciousness (phenomenology) separates itself from immediate existence, and sets itself at variance with it until, as an intellectual being (subjective mind), it cognises its own intellectual substance as identical with its conscious (thinking and willing) behaviour. The structures of the objective mind, meaning the forms made by human society (law, morality, decorum), go through the same development. The third step is a synthesis of the first two. In concrete decorum (regarding family, society, and state) a unity of law-abiding behaviour and moral suasion is crucial. Above the structures of objective mind stand the three forms of absolute mind, that is, the forms of contemplation, imagination, and knowing of the absolute identity of subject and substance. In art, this unity is just contemplated, the ideal shines through the material; in religion it is imagined in a transcendent person, who is at the same time God (meaning thinking of thinking) and human (meaning sensual existence); only in absolute knowledge is this unity known as complete identity of subjective (human) and absolute (godly) mind, only here does man's, the finite being's, elevation to the infinite reach its aim. Freedom for Hegel consists in that humanity cognises this essential identity with the absolute and identifies itself with forms of the objective mind and their will (state and law), these forms being actually also created by the absolute.

For Hegel, the state is the reality of concrete freedom (*Philosophy of Right* [1821]1967). It guarantees the unity of the individual with the universal. The individual will is free if it agrees with the universal reasonable will. The good exists in the deliberate subordination of the individual with the universal. Hegel means this when he defines true freedom as the universality that determinates itself. In the state, the community has—by reasonable judgments—priority to the individuals. Those can only have truth and morality as members of the public community. In the ethical state, they

don't behave anymore as party to a contract, but as parts of an organism. Hegel refuses to reduce the public legal order to a social contract, because with that the community compared with the individuals and their interests will be looked at as secondary. According to the doctrine of the social contract, the task of the state is limited to creating a legal frame and to guarantee that—within this frame—the individuals can follow their interests unchecked and develop unrestrained. For Hegel, however, the state exists neither for the sake of the citizens nor exist the citizens for the sake of the state. The state is an entity, where the individuals are integrated so that—in order to be able to develop as ethical personalities—they are as dependent on the state as the state is on them.

Hegel's analysis of the state refers to two more terms: family and civic society. The family is based on the consciousness of the solidarity of the family members and their mutual love, so that individuals see themselves not anymore as isolated persons but as members of the entity. As soon as the children are grown, they leave the family and face each other as special persons with their own interests. Their relations aren't anymore regulated by the direct sensation of their solidarity but by appropriate regulations for the compensation of their interests. The order formed this way is called civic society. The harmony between individual interests and the common interest becomes reality in the state, whose purpose is the common interest as such and therefore substance of the presentation of special interests.

For Hegel, the whole system can altogether be understood as self-constitution of the absolute. Absolute knowledge is God's self-consciousness within the human being. The essence of God, however, as he is mind, is nothing but such consciousness of self. The system is not so much a form given from outside, but more an inner orientation to the whole. Hegel sees in it the only possible forms of representation of truth in science.

— Marcus S. Kleiner

See also Frankfurt School; Habermas, Jürgen; Luhmann, Niklas; Marx, Karl; Morality and Aesthetic Judgment; Phenomenology; Philosophical Anthropology; Simmel, Georg; Weber, Max; Schütz, Alfred

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GIDDENS, ANTHONY

Anthony Giddens (b. 1938), internationally famous British sociologist, innovative publisher, public intellectual, and, until recently, Director of the London School of Economics, has, since the early 1970s, been the author of a remarkable succession of seminal contributions to social theory. In founding the tradition of structuration theory during the 1970s, and developing it in the 1980s, he provided an original and systematic means to combine the central sociological concepts of structure and agency. Structuration theory synthesises a rich array of philosophical and sociological approaches to create a theory of social life that places socially situated practices at its core in order to avoid an exaggeration of either the subjectivism of an overly agency-based approach or the objectivism of an overly structure-based approach. Giddens used this theory, *inter alia*, to challenge a whole series of central axioms inherited from the sociological classics and beyond, from Marx and Durkheim to Schütz, Parsons, Merton, Althusser, and Foucault. In the same year, 1985, as he became the first head of the new faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Cambridge University, Giddens joined with his colleagues John B. Thompson and David Held to found Polity Press, which was to become one of the world's leading social science publishers. Closely involved with commissioning and editing, Giddens was instrumental in making many of the continental European and American sources for his own philosophical and theoretical syntheses accessible to a much wider audience than hitherto. His extensive historical sociology, also developed during the late 1970s and 1980s, famously challenged core ingredients of historical materialism and argued for a distinctively pluralistic approach to causation. Four major works on late modernity and its

politics written in the 1990s, beginning with *The Consequences of Modernity*, dissected and analysed the major institutional forces and life experiences of what he calls the “runaway world,” highlighting the roles of institutional reflexivity, risk, and trust within this nexus. Most lately, his role as a public intellectual has come to the fore with a series of popularly targeted publications that have been translated into countless languages and whose influence has been felt in the corridors of power from London and Washington to Brasilia and Seoul. The first of these, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, began life as an attempt to give logical rigour to a series of seminars he took part in during the late 1990s that included Tony Blair, the Clintons, and members of the British and American cabinets. In 1999, he was invited to present the BBC's prestigious Reith Lectures. The focus was on globalization, and three of the five broadcasts were delivered outside London, from Delhi, Hong Kong, and Washington, with simultaneous presentation and debate on the Internet.

ONTOLOGY, SUBJECTIVISM, AND OBJECTIVISM

Throughout Giddens's work is an emphasis on the need to describe more carefully and to explore more fully the rich array of ontological concepts relevant to social life—concepts that delineate the nature of social entities that are the object of a sociologist's attempts to gain knowledge. Coupled to this has been a critique of other theories that are too flat or one-sided, that emphasise certain aspects of social relations to the exclusion of other significant aspects. Giddens aimed to combine many different aspects of social ontology into an approach that would recognise the contribution of each but not to the detriment of any of the others. Thus, whereas Marx and many Marxists were said to have often emphasised the economic over other aspects of social life, Weber to have emphasised power and especially administrative power, Durkheim and Parsons to have emphasised the normative dimension and the internalisation of values, Giddens wanted to keep open a place for all of these in his ontology. And also, whereas structuralists and poststructuralists—from Saussure through Barthes and Derrida—were said to have emphasised the importance of language systems over other determinants of social life and practices, and interpretivists and ordinary language philosophers—from philosophers such as Winch and Austin, to phenomenologists, symbolic interactionists, and ethnomethodologists—to have emphasised hermeneutics, shared understandings, and/or ordinary language over all else, Giddens wanted to combine their emphases with an equal emphasis on the institutional, material, and power dimensions of social life. He also wanted to bring in from other disciplines novel aspects of ontology that he felt had been neglected by social theorists working in the domains he was most interested in. Thus, for example, he enlisted

the aid of geographers, historians, and philosophers in bringing notions of time and space into the central heartlands of social theory.

The concern with ontology is central to structuration theory. The initial impetus for the construction of structuration came from Giddens's dissatisfaction with the divide between objectivist and subjectivist explanations of social phenomena that he had encountered in his early work both on the social causes of suicide, much of which is collected in the edited volume *The Sociology of Suicide* (1971), and on the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century classics of sociological theory, of which his still widely used *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (1971) is the fullest expression. This dissatisfaction was coupled with an insistence on the differences between the natural and social sciences and the centrality of human social activity and intersubjectivity to the subject matter of the social sciences. The problem, for Giddens, with objectivism is that it places all the emphasis on impersonal forces and subjectless structures, in which agents, if they are considered at all, are no more than the playthings or puppets of reified social systems. The problem with subjectivism is the converse one that it reduces the whole of social life to the actions of individual agents or groups, their actions, interactions, their goals, desires, interpretations, and practices. Thus, subjectivism uproots agents from their sociostructural context, treating them as deracinated, free-floating individuals, whereas objectivism treats them so derisively that they sink without trace, conceptualised as if they lack the autonomy to cause even the slightest ripple of disturbance on a social surface determined wholly by powerful and impersonal systemic tides. Giddens wants to find a way of avoiding the reification involved in objectivism and the voluntarism involved in subjectivism. He sees conventional uses of structure as most often falling prey to the sins of objectivism. This is the case in central aspects of Durkheim's work and in aspects of Marx's, for example, and also in later self-consciously structuralist or structural-functional forms of thought. On the other hand, many of the various schools of interpretative sociology most often fall prey to the sins of subjectivism. The strategy Giddens pursues in order to overcome the misconceptions in each is to attempt to produce a social theory that conceptualises structures without reification and agents without voluntarism. To do so, he draws from what he considers to be the best from the insights of both objectivist and subjectivist social theories.

STRUCTURATION THEORY

There are three central texts in the formulation of structuration theory. The first, *New Rules of Sociological Method* (1976), engaged with various "interpretative" schools of thought in philosophy and social theory in what

Giddens saw as an exercise in the clarification of logical issues that would help to create the structuration synthesis. In *Central Problems in Social Theory* (1979), published three years later, Giddens employed the same strategy but this time in relation to structuralism, poststructuralism, and functionalism. *The Constitution of Society* (1984) is widely seen as the fullest presentation of structuration theory, a major statement of sociological theory. At the centre of Giddens's synthetic reconceptualisation of the structure-agency couplet is the notion of "the duality of structure." Through this notion he conveys the idea that structures are both the *medium* and the *outcome* of social practices. They serve as the "medium" of action as they provide, through memory, the bases upon which agents draw when they engage in social practices. Structures are also the "outcome" of these actions; they are produced by social practices whether or not this was the intention of the actors engaged in the practices. These structures, in turn, act as the medium for the next round of agents' practices. This is the structuration cycle. It is what is meant by the term *structuration*. Neither structures nor agents are given primacy; each requires the other.

In a "stratification model of the agent," Giddens conceives agents as possessing motives and wants, as having a good deal of knowledge about their social circumstances, as being competent enough to grasp their own hierarchy of purposes and the trade-offs between purposes that are necessary in situated contexts, and as being routinely engaged in the reflexive monitoring of their actions and circumstances. The consciousness of the agent also has three overlapping components. The first of these is the *unconscious*, within which Giddens gives an important role to "ontological security," which he interprets as being closely dependent upon the ability to trust in the predictability and rationality of routines. The second, and arguably the most important, is *practical consciousness*, which refers to the tacit knowledgeability that an agent brings to the task of "going on" in everyday life, a practical type of knowledge that is usually so taken for granted that it is hardly noticed, if at all, by the person exercising it. Giddens's formulations here emerge from a creative combination of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Winch, and the ethnomethodology of Garfinkel, and they integrate a notion of the activity of agents as always taking place within a successive flow of time with a sense of the messy immersion in moments of practical engagement from which it is often difficult to gain critical distance or reasoned discursive clarity. Thus, finally, practical consciousness is distinguished from discursive consciousness, which points to those moments when agents are able to give verbal expression to their knowledge about the social conditions of their action and the ways that they "go on" within those conditions. Agents often have much more practical knowledge than they can give discursive expression to. However, whereas with the unconscious there is a bar of

repression that prevents its articulation, the boundaries between practical and discursive consciousness are potentially more fluid and shifting.

The transformative potential of any action will depend upon the capabilities of an agent and, in order to be drawn upon, these capabilities will have to be perceived in the requisite manner within the phenomenological frame of the agent in question. There is thus a very close relationship between capability and knowledgeability. Giddens sees agents as always rooted in a structural context, and he also conceives them as always and inevitably drawing upon their knowledge of the structural context (structure as medium) when they engage in any sort of purposeful action. He analytically divides these structures-within-knowledgeability into three different types: the structures of domination (power), signification (meaning), and legitimation (norms). These structures involve phenomenologically inflected “stocks of knowledge” about the external context and conditions of action. This is knowledgeability about the distributions and configurations of power, meaning, and norms within the terrain of action. The distinction between these three types of structure is only an analytical one, and all would inevitably be involved in any social action. Giddens refers to these structures-within-agents as “virtual” in that they provide the conditions that guide the actions and make them possible, and it is only their traces within the actions they give rise to that have an empirical reality in the social world. The structures are therefore said to exist in memory traces within the agents and as “instantiated” in actions. Giddens also uses the term “resources” to refer to the structure of domination, within which he includes both control over economic, or allocative, power resources and control over people or authoritative resources. He uses another term, that of “rules,” as shorthand to refer to the structures of both signification and legitimation. Agents’ drawing on rules and resources is thus an alternative formulation synonymous with their drawing on structures. Agents, for Giddens, are thus neither free-floating subjectivities nor are they objectively determined by structures. Rather, social practices are the skilled accomplishments of capable agents who know a good deal about their circumstances but whose knowledgeability is nevertheless bounded by unknown conditions and consequences of action and whose capabilities are bounded by the limits of their power resources. Structuration theory is a hermeneutically informed social theory which gives pride of place to a careful interdependency between agents, practices, and their situated, structural contexts.

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Giddens’s encounters with the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century classics of sociological theory, mentioned

earlier, provided not only one of the impulses to the logical clarifications and reconceptualising that gave rise to structuration theory but also acted as the basis for his reconstruction of historical sociology and for his analysis of the emergence of modern institutions in *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (1981) and *The Nation-State and Violence* (1985). The relationship of structuration theory to these substantive studies is in terms of a set of broad philosophical principles that act as a background point of reference rather than as a theory that is systematically applied. This is because the interest here is not in the hermeneutically informed analysis of the duality of structure, involving structure as the medium and intended or unintended outcome of actions. Rather, the historical sociology treats institutions as chronically reproduced rules and resources and is concerned with typology, comparison, and the large societal trends and forces of change rather than in the fine-grained processes of structuration. The main purpose is to critique theories of an evolutionary, functionalist or otherwise reductionist nature, as mentioned above, and instead to emphasise that social development is the product of a plurality of factors and processes. To this end, Giddens develops detailed distinctions between types of societies, with band societies and settled agricultural communities at one end of the spectrum, through city-states, empires, and feudal societies categorised as “class-divided” societies in the middle, to capitalist and socialist industrial societies at the other end of the spectrum. To avoid reductionist or monocausal accounts of historical change within and between these different types of society, Giddens advocates their analysis on the basis of an institutional schema that mirrors the rules and resources of structuration theory, but without direct recourse to the hermeneutic-structural moment of the duality of structure. Thus, one should look at political institutions (domination/power—authority), economic institutions (domination/power—allocative), legal or sanctioning institutions (legitimation/normative), and institutions dealing with the symbolic or discursive level (signification). This allows for the recognition of the multicausal nature of historical change.

A central organising theme that enables Giddens to draw these analytical categories together in his substantive accounts of social change focuses on those factors that enable a society to extend its reach across space and time. This is from writing and printing, for example, to roads and railways and, later, the separation of transportation and communication through the development of electronic media. Such reach becomes deeply embedded in social relations through the spread of administrative power that it allows, together with the accompanying increase in the capacity to store information that can be used to facilitate such power and to increase the spread of surveillance. As societies increase their time-space distancing, they replace their reliance on social relations based on the presence-availability of others

and come to rely much more on interdependencies based on systemic relations between people who are not only physically distant from each other but who also often have no direct social relationship with each other at all. The centralisation and expansion of administrative power is one of three important factors, according to Giddens, in the development of capitalist and industrial societies in Europe. The other two factors are the development of abstract codes of law, closely connected to the notion of sovereignty, and growth in the apparatus of fiscal management, stemming from the need to raise taxes on a grand scale due to involvement in large-scale wars within an emerging European state system. Administrative, legal, and fiscal powers were themselves aspects of the growth of first, absolutist, and then capitalist states whose frontiers developed into borders as the nation-state system became increasingly consolidated. The mutual consolidation of capitalism, industrialism, and the nation-state was contingent, in turn, upon a wider geopolitical context in which, for the first time, Europe was not threatened militarily from the East and when its relative naval strength was unparalleled. All of these forces were, for Giddens, at least as significant as economic forces in the development of capitalism in Europe. The military sphere itself had been strengthened by more systematic techniques of administrative discipline and by technological advances affecting warfare. The latter, for Giddens, were more important than technological changes affecting industrial production.

Giddens's view of history is presented as multicausal, contingent, and episodic. It is implicit in the above that he also sees societies as open and susceptible to exogenous influences. This permeability naturally increases along with the time-space distancing of social relations. He sees the military, trade, cultural, and other interconnections, or time-space edges, between similar societies and between different kinds of societies, as a potent source of social change throughout history. Against evolutionary theories that see single societies as undergoing an unfolding of nascent tendencies already within them, Giddens sees systems of relations between states as not only the environment for the emergence of, for example, capitalist societies but also as the condition or source of such development. Hence, the wars and the preparation for wars between European nation-states were themselves a primary stimulus for the concentration of administrative resources and fiscal reorganisation that consolidated absolutism as the shell for the initial development of capitalism.

LATE MODERNITY: STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS, SELF-IDENTITY, AND INTIMACY

There are clear continuities between Giddens's earlier historical and institutional sociology and *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990). Here, as in *The Nation-State*

and *Violence*, Giddens characterises modernity in terms of four sets of institutional clusterings that all possess their own dynamic and independent logics but that mutually affect each other. These are capitalism, industrialism, the capacity for surveillance and administrative control, and the general centralisation of the means of violence, including military power. These are each connected to parallel institutional dimensions of globalization: the world capitalist economy, the international division of labour, the nation-state system, and the world military order. In the era of late modernity, especially in the last 20 to 30 years, there have been significant changes in the character of these dimensions and an intensification of their effects both in terms of the extent of their spatial reach and in the extent to which they have penetrated, connected and unsettled the local, everyday practices of people in countless distant localities. Giddens theorises the dynamism inherent in these institutions of late modernity in terms of disembedding mechanisms, institutional reflexivity, and trust in environments of risk.

The notion of disembedding mechanisms draws attention to the way in which systemic social activities are "lifted out" from localised contexts as they reorganise social relations across large time-space distances. There are two main forms of such mechanisms: expert systems and symbolic tokens. Expert systems accompany the particular form that the intensification of the division of labour has taken in the information and service age, and refers to the systems of professional expertise and technical accomplishments that organise so much of contemporary life. They are embodied in doctors, accountants, lawyers, administrators, and scientists of countless specialisms, engineers, nutritionists, economists, and so on. Symbolic tokens are media of interchange that have an impersonal currency and can be passed around without regard to the specific characteristics of the agents who handle them in any particular situation. The main symbolic token discussed by Giddens, as with Marx, Simmel or Parsons, is that of money, which is a form of time-space distancing in that it provides "the means of connecting credit and liability in circumstances where immediate exchange of products is impossible" (1990:24); the token's meaning, value, and function transcend the exigencies of particular circumstances. Expert systems, likewise, purport to provide guarantees of expectation across distanced time and space, although the "guarantee" here takes the form of the impersonal nature of the tests that we expect to be applied to technical knowledge and the debates about such tests that take place within the public sphere.

Both forms of disembedding mechanism rely on trust, and this intertwines with the notion of risk in late modernity as both refer to situations of uncertainty. Uncertainty stems from a situation in which these abstract systems solicit active trust from their clients in the context of dramatically increased reflexivity, which they play a major part in bringing

about. We are aware, on the one hand, that experts, from geneticists to food or nuclear scientists, not only routinely disagree with each other about interpretations of states of affairs and the appropriate course of action, but also that even consensual knowledge is necessarily provisional and today's interpretations may well give way to different assessments of truth tomorrow. On the other hand, we place our trust in symbolic tokens, knowing that the future is open and uncertain, dependent upon complexly coordinated agents, from local finance companies to transnational banking and credit corporations, whose own categories and finite and revisable conceptions of what they are doing will determine whether trust was merited. The tokens and regimes of expertise of abstract systems circulate in a way that escapes the control of any of their practitioners and clients.

In traditional milieu in which the authority of social conventions are accepted unthinkingly, simply because this is how things have always been done, notions of risk and trust in the sense Giddens uses them do not exist. Risk is not the same as danger; it refers, rather, to perceived potential dangers that people seek actively to assess and confront. Risk is endemic to late modernity because social relations are radically disembedded, reliant on abstract systems, and saturated with information relating to a future whose constitution is understood as being dependent upon how we actively assess and confront it. Giddens draws on the general ontology of reflexivity in structuration theory but imbues it with the specificity of the scale of knowledge and information available in the posttraditional milieu of late modernity. Here decisions are taken on the basis of more or less continual reflection on the conditions of one's own actions. Reflexivity here involves the adoption of categories and forms of knowledge that we inherit as structures from the past and use, as agents, to construct the future. We are forced continually into the reflexive appropriation of knowledge in conditions of uncertainty that have been constructed in major part by our own past use of scientific, technical, and other knowledge to manufacture this future. Instead of Weber's "steel-hard" cage of bureaucratisation in which everything is controlled and regimented according to a fixed set of relayed rules, the chronic reflexivity of late modernity has bequeathed to us a world that is lurching from one crisis to another. Attempts in late modernity to control the social and natural worlds have manufactured a catalogue of dangers and anxieties with respect, for example, to the threats of nuclear war, ecological calamity, uncontainable population explosion, the collapse of the global financial markets, the corruption of food chains, or the emerging risks and dilemmas associated with genetic engineering.

In *Modernity and Self-Identity* (1991) and *The Transformation of Intimacy* (1992), the duality of structure returns, employed as the framework from which to generalise about the effects of the large structures of late modernity—its

reflexive dynamism and distanced impersonal forces—upon the phenomenology of everyday life. Giddens argues that the self in late modernity becomes a "reflexive project" where the individual attempts to make life choices and engage in life planning on the basis of all kinds of new information about clothes, health, fitness, food, style, cultural taste, the propriety of modes of acting in a range of circumstances, divorce, illness, beliefs, bereavement, and so on. Against this backdrop, Giddens devotes large sections of *Modernity and Self-Identity* to the discussion of self-help and therapy manuals, written by "experts," which not only portray an area but also help to constitute the activities they deal with. This is the case for all kinds of globally and locally mediated information of which the collage effect created by television is a particularly distinct example of the juxtaposition of settings and lifestyle choices. The emergent lifestyle decisions are not just about how to act but also about who to be (p. 81). The individual is faced with the challenge of attempting to maintain a coherent narrative of self-identity in conditions characterised by constant change, a plurality of lifestyle choices, and the multiple milieus of action attendant on the complex regionalisation of activity settings in late modernity. This reflexive project creates novel existential dilemmas and anxieties as it takes place in a situation of greater and greater uncertainty, what Giddens calls methodological doubt, where even the most reliable authorities can only be trusted "until further notice" (p. 84). This is a world in which communal, kinship, friendship, and sexually intimate relations have all been restructured by the forces of late modernity. They have all been affected by the empty, unmoralised, and instrumental character of abstract systems that explicitly overcome dependency upon personal ties, but there have been positive as well as negative transformations emerging from this process. Giddens concedes that communities of place and kinship relations no longer play the roles they did in the structuring of day-to-day life, but argues that there is a strong tendency for personal relations between friends and sexual intimates to be positively transformed. Free from the constraining expectations and fixed normative scripts of traditional obligations, individuals see the self and personal relations as projects to be "worked on," that rely on active trust and a genuine opening out towards the other. Such relationships involve both risk and trust where the latter has to be positively won through a mutual process of self-disclosure. Erotic involvements are a particular focal point for such self-disclosure, and Giddens sees a strong trend towards what he calls "pure relationships," a term that has nothing to do with sexual purity but refers to a relationship that is communicative, democratic, egalitarian, and entered into for its own sake. It is a relationship whose continued existence relies on both parties continuing to derive sufficient intrinsic satisfaction to want to remain within it.

RISK, REFLEXIVITY, AND THE POLITICS OF LATE MODERNITY

The themes of the reflexive appropriation of knowledge in conditions of uncertainty and the dynamic impersonal forces of the runaway world are ones that Giddens pursues in his writings on politics in the context of late modernity, *Beyond Left and Right* (1994), *The Third Way* (1998), and *The Third Way and Its Critics* (2000). He argues that the theme of risk unites many otherwise disparate areas in a fundamentally altered terrain of politics; from the challenges of welfare state reform, through the regulation of the world's financial markets, to responses to rapid technological change, ecological crises, and geopolitical strategies. The collapse of communism is just the most powerful and visible indicator and consequence of global transformations that have made the old "left" and "right" distinction outmoded. The feasibility of traditional social democratic politics is also seen to have been eroded by the disembedding and chronically reflexive forces of globalization, with Keynesian economics now impossible in the face of the massive expansion of international trade, the growth and power of transnational companies, and the size, speed, and sophistication of the international financial markets. Many of the nation-state's former powers have either been lifted outwards to the supranational level and/or downwards to the local level.

Giddens argues that the wholesale reflexivity that lies behind these global structural changes calls for a commensurately reflexive political response in which there is a demand to give reasons for actions, to articulate the nature of commitments, and to assess the implications of these for those whose values are different. Science and technology are key areas that should be opened to political scrutiny. In these conditions, dialogue becomes central. Giddens argues for links between intelligent and generous-minded civil associations within states and a cosmopolitan engagement with groups, ideas, and contexts in the international sphere. Fundamentalism, for Giddens, is a refusal to dialogue in social conditions in which such a refusal is only a short step away from intolerance of difference and violence. "No authority without democracy" and "the democratisation of democracy" become key demands of "the third way" in a society where what used to be fixed by either nature or tradition is now subject to human decision. Giddens also stresses the importance of the active engagement of citizens, and this is an important principle behind his support for a conception of a social investment state in which Social Democrats accept many of the Right's criticisms of the welfare state, including the bureaucratic, inflexible, and impersonal nature of its institutions, the fostering of a passive culture of welfare dependency ("no rights without responsibilities"), and its failure to engage with wider emotional, moral, and cultural concerns.

There are also many other issues emerging from within late modernity that do not fit into the traditional left-right mould, including ecological, gender, sexual, ethnic, and general lifestyle issues. Giddens sees a broadening out of social democratic politics to include what he calls life politics, or the politics of self-actualisation, alongside the more conventional emphasis on emancipatory politics with its emphasis on inequality and social justice. Inequality, in turn, should not be seen just in terms of wealth but also in terms of social well-being, happiness, and autonomy in the context of a postscarcity politics. Identifying modes of political engagement that have a particular importance in modern social life, Giddens develops a typology of actors who mirror the main institutional dimensions of modernity and globalization. These are ecological movements (industrialism), labour movements (capitalism), free speech/democratic movements (surveillance and control), and peace movements (military power). In line with his multi-causal approach, Giddens sees each as analytically and at least in part historically separate and autonomous from the other. Within the frame of a notion of "utopian realism" in which hard-headed analyses of existing situations are placed alongside ideas and ideals about what could be the case, Giddens argues that the interests and power of business corporations, national governments, public opinion, and international organisations must all realistically be taken into account in developing prospects for any conceivable renewal of social democracy. Central to Giddens's conception of politics within modernity is the view that we cannot simply "seize" history and bend it to our purposes. Politics needs to be more pragmatic and circumspect in its ambitions. This is because of the limits to the tractability and malleability of the abstract systems of late modernity, of the inevitability of unintended consequences, and, due to the paradox of wholesale institutional reflexivity, of the constant undermining of a stable environment by the very ideas, lessons, concepts, theories, and findings that are meant to try and give it some stability. The most that we can hope to do is to steer the juggernaut, to minimise high consequence risks, and to envisage alternative futures within the bounds of utopian realism, without illusions and without guarantees.

— Rob Stones

See also Hermeneutics; Historical and Comparative Theory; Modernity; Risk; Social Space; Structuration Theory; Time; Trust

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GILLIGAN, CAROL

Carol Gilligan, an internationally acclaimed feminist psychologist, is a professor at New York University. She was born on November 28, 1936, in New York City, the daughter of William and Mabel Friedman. She attended Swarthmore College, graduating summa cum laude with a B.A. degree in 1958. In 1960, she earned an M.A. degree from Radcliffe College, and in 1964 was awarded a Ph.D. in clinical psychology by Harvard University. In 1986, she became one of the few women to be awarded tenure at Harvard, in the Graduate School of Education. Gilligan has drawn upon her knowledge of literature, clinical psychology, and social psychology to reshape the field of what is now called relational psychology. Her pathbreaking research on identity and moral development and the

psychology of girls and women challenged traditional theories of developmental psychology, and has had a profound impact on educational practice. Gilligan's first book, *In a Different Voice* (1982), is considered a classic text in second-wave feminist theory for its critique of andocentric assumptions about human development. It has been translated into 15 languages.

Gilligan's scholarship divides into three phases. Each phase contributes to a new framework for understanding self and identity construction, relationships, and human development. *In a Different Voice* represents the first phase, where Gilligan reacted to existing research that was void of women and women's voices. The second phase of her research focused on girls and women in educational contexts that lead to the development of a voice-centered model of relational psychology. This work took form in the Harvard Project on Women's Psychology and Girls' Development—a collaboration between Gilligan and numerous doctoral and postdoctoral students. The third phase is represented by *The Birth of Pleasure*, published in 2002, in which Gilligan focuses on relationships, specifically love, from a multidisciplinary perspective, including psychology, literature, and social-cultural analyses. In this same year, she debuted her first play, an adaptation of Hawthorn's classic love story, *The Scarlet Letter*.

Gilligan's place in psychology began with her challenge of Lawrence Kohlberg's and Erik Erikson's theories, which she argued cast women as falling short of men in terms of moral reasoning and the negotiation of identity and intimacy. She criticized Kohlberg's theory of development on three accounts. First, she called attention to the fact that Kohlberg's theory was derived from interviews solely with privileged white men and boys. She asked a question that became the hallmark of "woman-centered" analysis: What happens to psychological theories when women rather than men are the subjects of study? Second, she pioneered a new approach to the study of moral development. Rather than asking women to solve scripted moral dilemmas, Gilligan interviewed women making crucial, real-life, emotionally charged decisions about which they were torn (e.g., whether or not to have an abortion). She traced the complexities of how the women talked about making choices in situations when none of the choices were good. In these situations, the women expressed a tension between maintaining their relationships with others and attending to their own individual needs. Gilligan argued that the women's struggle defied conventional assessments of moral reasoning. Thus, in her third challenge to Kohlberg's account, she disputed his view that an individual's concern with individual rights and rules is a higher stage of moral thinking than is a concern with care and relationships.

Gilligan proposed an alternative paradigm—what she called the development of voice—for understanding the relationships between gender identity-formation, moral

development, and competing ethical concerns. Citing the work of Nancy Chodorow and Jean Baker Miller, Gilligan argued that female gender identity is established via embeddedness in relationship, whereas male gender identity is formed through separation and autonomy. Gilligan argued that this pattern of self and identity development gave rise to differences in the way women and men perceive and think through moral dilemmas. She defined two distinctive conceptions of morality: (1) an ethic of care, associated most often with women, in which concerns about maintaining relationships predominate, and (2) an ethic of justice, associated most often with men in which concerns about individuals and rights predominate. Gilligan argued that both conceptions are crucial for moral reasoning, and together can fuel political and social change.

Gilligan's work was at once heralded for recognizing the value of women's caretaking experience and criticized by those who viewed her characterization of gender-based constructions of self and styles of moral reasoning as essentialist. Some critics also argued that rather than stressing the elimination of gender difference, Gilligan's work celebrated that difference as a source of moral values, resulting in an overvalorization of women's propensities for connection and care. These debates notwithstanding, Gilligan's theory became infused into legal, religious, medical, business, and education discourses and ethical debates.

In the next phase of her research, Gilligan developed her notion of voice as the centerpiece of a psychological understanding of girls' and women's development. Gilligan actively contributed to numerous studies of girls that identified two features of their adolescent development: the simultaneous power of girls' resistance and their loss of voice (defined as an increasing inability to speak their minds truthfully for fear of either coming into conflict with significant others or authorities). Gilligan and her colleagues noted recurring patterns of psychological resistance and disassociation in girls' development, whether the girls were talking about school, work, family relationships, sexuality, friendships, or trauma. They argued that the adolescent girls in their studies articulated a double consciousness—a knowing and not knowing—that served to both protect and undermine girls' sense of self. A key paper in this phase of work is Gilligan's 1990 Tanner lecture, "Joining the Resistance: Psychology, Politics, Girls and Women," given at the University of Michigan and published in the *Michigan Quarterly Review*, in which she tied girls' increasing suppression of their knowledge (loss of voice) to their initiation into an image of ideal womanhood. The relational crisis for girls in adolescence, Gilligan argued, is that a new worldview is imposed on girls that calls into question what they have previously known and how they have acted, including their ability to freely speak, express anger, and negotiate conflict. Moreover, girls in adolescence learn from the women in their lives—including

mothers, teachers, and therapists—to separate themselves from their own knowledge and potential resistance. Gilligan's work inspired a new characterization of adolescence as an untapped and unrecognized time in girls' lives where psychological resistance can intersect with social and political resistance, if adults support it. Gilligan's work was at once well received by a large public audience that appreciated her insights into the gender politics of development, and was criticized by those who, finding fault in her research methods and sampling procedures, argued that her claims about girls and women were overgeneralized.

During this second phase of work, Gilligan refined a methodology and style of argument that traces multiple, and oftentimes conflicting, voices that comprise any given individual's sense of self and the world. Through her numerous collaborations with researchers, teachers, and artists, and inspired by literary theory, narrative analysis, and the language of music (voice, resonance, counterpoint, and fugue), Gilligan and her colleagues developed *The Listening Guide*. This approach stressed that each person's voice is unique, embedded in history and culture and in that person's particular relationship with self and others. It utilizes a clinical method of interviewing adapted from both Freud and Breuer's studies of hysteria and Piaget's approach to understanding children's conceptions of the world (Gilligan et al. 2003). *The Listening Guide* provides a framework for sequential and multiple codings of interview material, and is intended to guide the researcher's attention to subtle manifestations of voice (including attempts to speak and silence) and to tune into different layers of meaning and interpretation. The framework for attentive listening is grounded in three key questions: "Who is speaking and to whom, telling what stories about relationship, in what societal and cultural frameworks" (Brown and Gilligan 1992:21). *The Listening Guide* has been used to study a range of psychological phenomena, including depression, marital conflict, adolescent sexuality, and trauma.

In the third phase of her work, Gilligan elaborates on her critique of patriarchy as being more than a social system of hierarchy between men and women and among men. She contends that patriarchy also orients people to relationships, specifically adult heterosexual love, in ways that undermines human connection. In *The Birth of Pleasure*, Gilligan draws upon her extensive knowledge of myth, legend, and literature to identify underlying psychological patterns in Western cultural images and narratives about love in which passion is wedded to tragedy and love is tied to loss. By exposing these associations, Gilligan calls for a new understanding of the psychology and politics of heterosexual love.

Whereas Gilligan has often been noted for her insight into the problem of gender difference, in *The Birth of Pleasure*, she clearly frames her project as one about the

problem of relationship. She clarifies her view of gender identity construction, noting that men and women experience distinct relational crises in the course of human development. She argues that boys suffer a break in relationship in early childhood when they must renunciate their love and dependence upon mothers and cover up their fears of vulnerability in order to attain the patriarchal ideal of masculinity. Girls' relational break occurs later, triggered in adolescence when social pressures to conform to a feminine ideal take precedence. In both cases, a fundamental split between social and inner selves occurs, and individuals lose connection with themselves and others. Gilligan notes this pattern among the couples she interviewed about their marital problems, which grounds her analysis of love. The men with whom she spoke appeared to disguise their vulnerabilities in relationship and thus lost a full sense of themselves and their partners, whereas the women suppressed their knowledge and desires in order to stay in relationship, which resulted in a sense of disconnection from themselves and their partners. In both cases, love led to loss. But it is Gilligan's utilization of the dramatic narrative framework of Greek mythology, specifically the story of Psyche and Cupid, through which she explicates her theory of love. In her rereading of this classic tale, both parties refuse to abide by the patriarchal laws of love that prohibits mutual recognition. According to Gilligan, patriarchy interferes with men's and women's abilities to see the other for who she or he is, and instead, puts demands upon each gender to see each other according to idealized images of manhood or womanhood. Gilligan reads the Psyche and Cupid myth as a morality tale in which their willingness and courage to resist patriarchal impositions on love is what fuels their passion and eventually leads to connection and pleasure rather than loss and tragedy (i.e., Pleasure is the name given to the daughter conceived through Psyche's and Cupid's triumph of love).

In this third stage of work, Gilligan carries forward her interest in the symbolic nature of human consciousness, the power of resistance, and the power of voice to bring dissociated parts of the self into conscious awareness. Writing in an imaginative and speculative style, Gilligan moves from psychologist to philosopher, arguing that love can (and should) be governed by freedom (i.e., individual preference and mutual recognition), liberty, (i.e., openness and honesty), and the pursuit of happiness (i.e., pleasure)—all principal tenets of democracy.

— Wendy Luttrell

See also Essentialism; Gender; Relational Psychology

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GILMAN, CHARLOTTE PERKINS

Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860–1935) lived a turbulent life during turbulent times for women and men of color, white women, and other oppressed groups in the United States. Her family ties as well as her proliferation of social theory, journalism, and fiction give her a profound prominence among late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century intellectuals in the English-speaking world. Her father, Frederick Beecher Perkins, was related to Henry Ward Beecher, Catherine Beecher, and Harriet Beecher Stowe, who wrote *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Among feminist theorists and readers, Gilman's novella *The Yellow Wallpaper*, [a first-person narrative about confinement for mental instability] is likely as familiar as Harriet Beecher Stowe's work. Broadly based on her own lived experiences, *The Yellow Wallpaper* helped to legitimize women's breaking silence about emotional and other forms of abuse endured not only at the hands of male partners but also within the strictures of androcentric institutions such as medicine and religion.

One of Gilman's book-length studies focuses on androcentric culture. In *The Man-Made World Or, Our Androcentric Culture* (1914), she analyzes how one sex has "monopolized all human activities, called them 'man's work,' and managed them as such" (p. 25). Insistent that the women's and the labor movements reflect the "same world-progress," Gilman sought similar progress in the institutions of marriage and family. Crediting men with shifting

the family “from an institution for the best service of the child to one modified to his own service,” Gilman spoke cultural heresy when she insisted that neither friendship nor love needs “a head” so, “Why should a family?” (pp. 27, 43). Elsewhere Gilman (1903) had argued that marriage and family have “not developed in proportion to our other institutions” (p. 10), thus implying the centrality of these institutions in women’s subordination.

Gilman’s theoretical prowess also took aim at the institution of religion. In *His Religion and Hers: A Study of the Faith of Our Fathers and the Work of Our Mothers* ([1923]1976), her heresy is less metaphorical. Here she offers not only a critique of androcentric religion but also a pathbreaking analysis of what we today call “normalization” and “masculinization,” twin cultural and political processes that socially construct girls and women as deviations from or inferior versions of what is meritorious and desirable. Gilman talks about “men assuming themselves to be the normal human beings, deprecating the influence of women as ‘feminine,’” and about “masculinization” as a social fact that “we do not yet recognize.” (p. 83).

While married to her first husband, Charles Walter Stetson, and writing as Charlotte Perkins Stetson, Gilman published *Women and Economics: A Study of the Economic Relation between Men and Women as a Factor in Social Evolution* (1898). Again her analysis was pathbreaking. Above all, she recognized the economic value of women’s unpaid labor in the home. Near the beginning of this work she announces that “[f]or a certain percentage of persons to serve other persons, in order that the ones so served may produce more, is a contribution not to be overlooked” (p. 13). Gilman also recognized the “wide, deep sympathy” women are capable of feeling for one another and how that feeling can fuel women’s movements (p. 139).

The single best source for surveying Gilman’s life and ideas is Patricia Madoo Lengermann and Jill Niebrugge-Brantley’s (1998) *The Women Founders: Sociology and Social Theory, 1830–1930*. In their text/reader, these authors/editors offer a rich biographical sketch of Gilman, survey the major assumptions and themes undergirding her work, and discuss her theorizing in connection with both canonized social theory and feminist social theory. Their incisive chapter also includes excerpts from three of Gilman’s books, including a volume not discussed here (*Human Work* [1904]). In addition, they offer a useful bibliography that includes two feminist biographies of Gilman.

For all that is said about women’s continuing marginalization in the worlds of social theory, high-powered scholarship, and other forms of knowledge construction, nothing is more powerful than the brute facts of sensory data. Gilman’s work is inarguably important and substantially pathbreaking. Original copies of her books are still shelved in the open-access areas of the Van Pelt-Dietrich Library Center at the University of Pennsylvania. Users had underlined

and highlighted these decades-old texts, and little had apparently been done to protect and preserve them.

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Maternal Thinking

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GLOBALIZATION

Globalization refers to the worldwide diffusion of practices, expansion of relations across continents, organization of social life on a global scale, and growth of a shared global consciousness. As new forms of communication and transportation enable individuals and groups to overcome spatial constraints and cross nation-state boundaries in their activities, “supraterritorial” relations increase (Scholte 2000). Conventionally associated with economic integration in a world market, globalization more broadly comprises many such forms of connectedness. Together, these mark the drawing together of the world as a single society. This is experienced as the “compression” of the world, which gives rise to a widespread intensification of “consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson 1992). Since it transforms the context of human experience, globalization ushers in a “global age,” the interpretation of which will require new ideas and concepts (Albrow 1997).

Reflecting a perception that Cold War conflict would give way to consolidation of a new world order through greater integration, the term *globalization* came into regular use at the end of the twentieth century. Yet it is a contested concept. Scholars have debated the meaning, origins, causes, extent, and consequences of globalization. For

example, while some treat globalization as a post-World War II phenomenon, others seek its origin in the European explorations of the sixteenth century. Some explanations of globalization stress particular causes, such as technological advances or the interests and ideology of economically dominant groups, while others portray globalization as the outcome of multiple, intertwined forces. Some theories argue that globalization entails increasing homogeneity of institutions, worldviews and lifestyles, but others predict greater diversity. Influential accounts of globalization vary along such lines, thus far precluding the rise of a single integrative view.

In public debate, globalization has come to be associated with the liberalization of markets, the privatization of assets, the growing power of multinational corporations, and the intensification of competition, summarized under the common, often pejorative, label “neoliberalism.” Current debate centers on the costs and benefits of the changes captured by this label, with some presenting a defense focusing on benefits such as increased liberty and individual choice (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000), while larger groups focus on costs such as increases in poverty, environmental degradation, and destruction of local cultures (Broad 2002). One strand of work in academic social theory converges with negative public responses to globalization insofar as it systematically critiques the neoliberal form of globalization as an ideological project, from an egalitarian moral and political standpoint (Falk 1999). A particular focus of such academic responses has been the cultural imperialism commonly associated with globalization defined in this critical fashion, more specifically, the homogenizing effects of the structural dominance of Western media corporations and the substantive similarity of Western-produced media content. Critics of such diagnoses, in turn, have raised questions both about the actual extent of Western dominance in global media and about the implied view of globalization as a single ideological thrust, unilaterally imposed by a dominant center, with uniform results among passive recipients. In this way, particular analyses of media in globalization reflect the larger disagreements about the meaning and direction of globalization.

All interpretations of globalization recognize that it captures a change in human experience. It minimally refers to transformations in everyday life around the world, involving increased supraterritoriality through global diffusion, interdependence, organization, and consciousness. Globalization in diet is evident, for example, in the way people on different continents enjoy sushi, Maine fishermen’s earnings from tuna depend on prices set in Tokyo, fishing in coastal waters is subject to global rules, and Asian countries are recognized as centers of global cuisine. Sports become globalized as some games diffuse to far-flung places, cross-border competition intensifies, worldwide rules are standardized by international organizations,

and peak sports events become the focus of global attention. Certain social problems similarly globalize, as is apparent in the spread of the HIV virus through travel and tourism, the resulting interdependence among AIDS sufferers, state governments, and pharmaceutical companies, and the concomitant efforts of international organizations to mobilize a global campaign based on global awareness and the application of universal principles—a pattern replicated in the global repercussions of and response to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Global cuisine, global sports, and global epidemics thus manifest features of the overall globalization process. The process encompasses a wide range of experience beyond such cases, from transactions in financial markets to chat and research on the Internet, from the production of sneakers in global commodity chains to the spread of illicit drugs through global networks, from ties among diaspora communities of migrants to links among business consultants across world cities. The hallmark of such phenomena is that more and more interactions have a supraterritorial quality.

The processes that comprise globalization vary in several ways (Held et al. 1999). Some originated centuries ago, others in the nineteenth century, yet others in the twentieth; for example, the consumption of sugar globalized long before sushi. A practice can become supraterritorial without involving every single region or country; note that, until recently, football (soccer) had not significantly penetrated the United States. Globalization also varies in the degree to which it affects a particular type of activity; as a rule, major sports are more intensely globalized than diet and diet more than health care. Similarly, globalization varies in how broadly it affects the way of life of a group. Historically open societies, such as some small European countries, tend to be more deeply integrated into globalization processes, while others have remained more isolated. Globalization also differs by institutional sector, hence creating “disjunctures” between global “flows”; technological, economic, political, and religious globalization proceed unevenly and intersect in distinct ways within particular communities (Appadurai 1996). In short, globalization is an internally complex process that produces locally variable consequences.

No contemporary theory fully explains globalization in all its complexity. Influential accounts of globalization analyze it selectively. Because most operate from different premises and conceptualize globalization in different ways, they serve as partly complementary rather than strictly rival theories. Within sociology, three types of theory stand out.

Immanuel Wallerstein (1974–1989) and his colleagues have adapted a form of materialist analysis to the study of globalization, which they treat as a new word for the long-term process by which the capitalist world economy has spread across the globe. This world economy is a system geared toward the accumulation of capital by dominant

classes on the basis of a single division of labor across regions, supported by strong states in the wealthy “core,” stabilized by intermediate “semiperipheral” areas acting as a buffer, supplied with cheap labor and raw materials by the “periphery,” and bolstered by a common ideology on the part of ruling groups. The system is subject to cyclical crises, shifts in hegemony, and variable resistance by exploited groups. In this neo-Marxist vision, capitalist globalization reproduces hierarchies of economic and political domination yet ultimately will succumb to contradictions that lead to a new type of global system. One empirical implication is that, while individual countries may advance economically, globalization is bound to exacerbate inequality within societies and across regions. Relevant research on inequality and poverty has produced mixed results, indicating both the possibility of gains through trade and investment and the likelihood of uneven benefits, increased volatility, and economic exclusion.

John Meyer and his colleagues (1997) have adapted a form of institutional analysis to the study of globalization, showing how a set of models and principles that comprise world culture are enacted around the globe. They describe globalization as the crystallization of a decentralized world polity in which bureaucratized states institutionalize a common understanding of collective purpose and progress, the individual universally acquires sacred status, organizational practices become increasingly similar, and international nongovernmental organizations elaborate knowledge and principles to guide global action. This polity expanded after World War II and has become deeply entrenched, yet it is subject to change as states compete for resources, groups make competing claims, and contradictory world-cultural principles give rise to contestation. In this neo-Weberian vision, globalization produces a more rationalized world in which purportedly autonomous individuals are embedded in institutions bound by global rules and scripts. An empirical implication of this analysis is that state authority expands even as transnational actors increasingly define and address global issues beyond the control of states. Relevant research on the status of nation-states in globalization has shown both the increased power, resources, and legitimacy commanded by states and the proliferation of problems, organizations, and forms of identity that transcend territorial states.

Roland Robertson (1992) and his colleagues have adapted a form of cultural or interpretive analysis to the study of globalization, showing how the world becomes compressed and consciousness of the world as a whole spreads. He describes the crystallization of a global field in which individuals and societies become part of a larger system of societies, identify themselves in relation to global standards, and formulate contending views of the desirable world order. The compression of the world took off with the technological and organizational changes of the late

nineteenth century and accelerated by the end of the twentieth century. In this analysis, which draws on Durkheimian and Simmelian ideas, globalization produces a more integrated yet also differentiated world society. An empirical implication is that group identities are reshaped as local cultures particularize universal symbols through “glocalization” while, under some conditions, the relativization of old identities triggers a religiously oriented search for fundamentals. Relevant research has demonstrated both the global “creolization” of cultures (Hannerz 1996) and the global sources of reactive fundamentalist movements.

In accounting for globalization, scholars are trying to discern the shape of a new world order. Three lines of work are especially noteworthy. For some, the key thrust in globalization is the rise of a global civil society, the expanding sector of border-crossing nongovernmental voluntary associations in which individuals gather to develop new perspectives and new policies on global issues, ranging from the environment to women’s rights to HIV/AIDS. Others focus on the rise of global governance, in particular new rules and regulations that could be brought to bear on global economic activity and intergovernmental financial institutions. Still others study the possibility of a global ethic, a set of moral principles that could guide more integrated global institutions or provide a basis for global citizenship. In each area, scholars not only describe actual developments but also contribute normative ideas that further the cause of civil society, governance, and ethics. Much of the work of social theorists in these areas is not ideologically or politically neutral. They contribute to the global consciousness that is one of the hallmarks of globalization itself.

Even as they work on new substantive issues, most students of globalization operate within a long-standing tradition of social theory, the quest by Western intellectuals to understand the early stages of modernizing change. For all their differences, early theorists interpreted this change as an epochal transformation creating a new social order marked by the heightened significance of economic productivity and competition, a reduced integrative role for religion, greater autonomy for the individual, and reintegration of societies in the form of nation-states. Much of the older social theory also had a critical thrust, showing how societies suffered from unresolvable contradictions or fell short of realizing universal values. Several of these themes remain relevant to the study of globalization. For example, scholars now examine the question of continuity by asking whether globalization marks a qualitative change in social relations. The place of market institutions in social life is an ongoing concern. Scholars are also trying to explain how seemingly destabilizing change can give rise to new forms of order. Like many of their predecessors, they critically expose the inherent tensions, discontents, and unintended consequences of globalization, and in doing so they serve as intellectual allies of social movements pressing similar views in public discourse.

Yet globalization also recasts the agenda of social theory. For example, whereas social theory once focused on the rise of individual, state-organized societies, it now must address the implications of a change of scale in supraterritorial social relations. While modernization could once be treated as change within a single civilizational arena, students of globalization must now examine how world order can arise in the face of civilizational differences. Critiques of globalization that reprise standard anticapitalist, particularly Marxist, social theory have to draw the necessary lessons from the sobering historical experience of attempts to construct alternative societies. Though most contemporary scholarship adapts conventional terms to the new global circumstance, the very relevance of older ideas, linked to the study of state-based societies, is now in question.

Social theory once aspired to produce one grand account of human affairs. In the era of globalization, Western confidence in the viability of this aspiration has diminished. Yet, given the momentum of current globalizing forces, the future prospects of social theory as an intellectual tradition depend on its ability to produce increasingly effective and comprehensive accounts of globalization.

— Frank J. Lechner

See also Capitalism; Civil Society; Modernity; Rationalization; World-Systems Theory

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GOFFMAN, ERVING

Erving Goffman (1922–1982) was one of the most important sociologists in the twentieth century. The focus of his work was the organization of observable, everyday behavior, usually but not always among the unacquainted in urban settings. Using a variety of qualitative methods, Goffman developed classifications of the different elements of social interaction. The hallmark of his approach was the assumption that these classifications were heuristic, simplifying tools for sociological analysis that did not capture the complexity of lived experience. In addition to the study of everyday social interaction, Goffman retained a strong interest in the sociology of mental illness. This began in the 1950s when he conducted ethnographic research at a large hospital in Washington, D.C. He considered the study of everyday interaction and the study of mental illness as two sides of the same coin. The intellectual context of Goffman's work was both the narrow sociological concerns of the 1950s and 1960s and the broad scholarly concerns of this era. This vantage point allows us to understand his work as an extension and integration of the perspective of symbolic interactionism, the methodological assumptions of Chicago Sociology and the sociology of Emile Durkheim and Georg Simmel, both of whom he greatly admired. However, his work should also be understood as a reaction against three dominant intellectual traditions of this time. The first is the "grand theory" of Talcott Parsons, the second is the psychoanalytic approach of Sigmund Freud, and the third is the positivistic, quantitative trend of many social scientists of this era. Goffman's work is therefore a response to these three gravitational pulls. Goffman made a concerted effort to engage in sociological research that did not acquiesce to the demands of these research traditions. In addition to the literary quality of his writings, the elegance of his formal sociology, and the subtlety of his observations, the theoretical sophistication of his work has assured a continuing audience for his work after his death, even though there is to date no "Goffman School" of sociology to extend his research.

BIOGRAPHY

Erving Manual Goffman was born on June 11, 1922, in Mannville, Alberta, Canada, the second of two children. His parents, Max and Ann, were Jewish and among the 200,000 Ukrainians who moved to Canada between 1897 and the beginning of World War I. Erving had one sister, Frances, who later became an actress. Max Goffman was a shopkeeper, Ann Goffman a homemaker. They raised their family in Dauphin, near Winnipeg, where Erving attended St. John's Technical High School. As befits a school with this name, Goffman's first intellectual interest was the natural sciences. In 1939, while far away from the tumultuous events in Europe, Goffman enrolled at the University of Manitoba, where he pursued an undergraduate degree in chemistry.

Perhaps the beginning of Goffman's interest in sociology occurred in 1943–1944, when he worked temporarily at the National Film Board in Ottawa. In addition to the inherently sociological nature of film, as both a record and as an interpretation of social life, Goffman met Dennis Wrong during this time. This chance meeting with someone who will also be remembered as a key North American sociologist was the impetus for Goffman to leave Manitoba and enroll at the University of Toronto, where he studied anthropology and sociology. Goffman was fortunate to study under two eminent social scientists at Toronto: C. W. M. Hart and Ray Birdwhistell. At this time, he obtained a thorough grounding in the work of, among others, Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Warner, Freud, and Parsons. During his studies, Goffman also developed a close friendship with Elizabeth Bott (now Elizabeth Bott-Spillius), who went on to become a leading Kleinian psychoanalyst, based in London.

After graduating from the University of Toronto in 1945 with a degree in sociology and anthropology, Goffman began graduate study in sociology at the University of Chicago, one of the centers of sociological research in the United States, and a department already with a rich tradition dating back to the mid-1890s. The University of Chicago was at that time a hive of activity, with its student numbers swelled to near breaking point by the G.I. Bill. Under these trying circumstances, the close mentoring of students by professors was almost impossible and was replaced by close intellectual friendships among students, who learned to rely on themselves (Fine 1995). Goffman did not initially thrive in this uncertain environment. However, he gradually settled into the rhythm of graduate school life, taking numerous courses, most notably Everett Hughes' seminar, "Work and Occupations." According to Burns (1992:101), it was here that Goffman first encountered the idea of the "total institution" that later became the conceptual cornerstone of *Asylums* (1961), his idiosyncratic ethnography of St. Elizabeth's hospital.

In 1949, Goffman successfully completed all the requirements for his master's degree, including a thesis. This unpublished manuscript played an unexpectedly large part in his intellectual development, as it is his only research project that employed interview, survey, and quantitative data. In the thesis, Goffman analyzed interview responses from middle-class Chicago women to a then popular radio soap opera called *Big Sister*. Following the lead of his advisers, Goffman attempted to use—and failed by his own estimation—a then popular measure called the Thematic Apperception Test. His dissatisfaction with his own findings grew into general dissatisfaction with the analysis of variables, marking a significant moment in his intellectual development.

For his doctoral dissertation, Goffman chose to study rural life in the Shetlands Islands. This was a far cry from the hustle, heterogeneity, and sprawl of Chicago life. Instead, in December 1949, Goffman arrived on the Island of Unst, a small, static community. In his published work, Unst is often referred to as "Dixon." His research was sponsored by the Department of Anthropology and the Committee on Social Science Research at the University of Edinburgh. While masquerading as a student of agricultural techniques, Goffman actually studied social interaction among the islanders. After initially suspecting that he was a spy, the islanders warmed to Goffman, who stayed there until May 1951.

For reasons that are no longer clear, Goffman did not return immediately to Chicago, but moved instead to Paris, where he spent a year preparing the first draft of his doctoral dissertation. Upon returning to the United States, Goffman married 23-year-old Angelica Choate, whom he had met earlier at the University of Chicago, where she was pursuing an undergraduate degree in psychology. Unlike his own modest upbringing, Angelica came from a prominent American family, some of the members of which were significant shareholders in media companies. Erving and Angelica had one child, Tom, who was born in 1953, the same year that Goffman was awarded his doctorate from the University of Chicago. Although Goffman was at this time far from being an influential sociologist, his personal transformation was striking. He was no longer a boy from a poor and undereducated family. Through both education and marriage, he was now part of an intellectual and economic elite.

Goffman's dissertation was a mixture of observations and classifications: part case study, part general theory. As such, it was the forerunner to nearly all his later work. It was also perplexing to his examiners, who had expected a traditional community study. Nevertheless, the dissertation was approved, and soon after Goffman began working for Edward Shils. In 1955, Goffman left Chicago and moved with his young family to Washington, D.C., where he conducted ethnographic work at St. Elizabeth's Hospital. This

project was one of several qualitative sociological studies funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) at this time, and it was impossible for anyone to know then that the ensuing book—*Asylums* (1961)—would become one of the most influential pieces of sociology in the twentieth century.

On January 1, 1958, Goffman began work at the University of California at Berkeley at the invitation of Herbert Blumer, who had himself moved to California from Chicago. Goffman's academic career progressed very rapidly, and he became a full professor in 1962. In the decade from 1959 to 1969, Goffman published seven significant books—a remarkable achievement. In addition to his considerable academic success, Goffman also showed himself to be a knowledgeable and successful investor on the stock market. In his spare time, he collected antiques and enjoyed playing poker and blackjack, the former badly, the latter well. Goffman's social interest in blackjack later became a scholarly one: He returned to school to earn certification to become a blackjack dealer, a position he occupied periodically at the Station Plaza Casino in Las Vegas, where he was later promoted to Pit Boss. This experience was intended as research for an anticipated ethnographic project of the social world of the gambler. However, nothing was ever published, although his paper "Where the Action Is" touches upon the topic.

Although the 1960s were a time of intellectual and career success for Goffman, he also experienced tragedy. In 1964, his wife Angelica killed herself after struggling with mental illness. Goffman's reflections on his own experiences of living with someone who is mentally ill are captured, albeit in a detached way, in his 1969 paper, "The Insanity of Place."

In 1966, Goffman spent a sabbatical year at the Harvard Center for International Affairs at the invitation of Thomas Schelling. During this year, Goffman prepared two papers on game theory, which were published together in *Strategic Interaction* (1969). In 1968, Goffman resigned from Berkeley in order to accept a Benjamin Franklin Chair in Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania. Faculty in the sociology department opposed his appointment, and Goffman was initially housed in an office of the Anthropological Museum, whose letterhead he happily used. He continued to be a very productive scholar, publishing *Relations in Public* (1971), *Frame Analysis* (1974) (his hoped-for magnum opus), *Gender Advertisements* (1979) and *Forms of Talk* (1981).

In 1981, he married the linguist Gillian Sankoff, with whom he had one daughter, Alice. Tragically, it was a short marriage, as Goffman developed a stomach cancer that killed him on November 20, 1982, at age 60. In the year of his death, he had been elected president of the American Sociological Association. One of his duties as such was to give the presidential address. He had prepared this ahead of

time, but spent his final weeks revising the manuscript. He chose a nostalgic title, "The Interaction Order," which was the title of the conclusion to his dissertation almost 30 years earlier. It symbolized the unity and consistency of his intellectual interests. In keeping with his detached and reflexive manner, Goffman anticipated the posthumous reading of his paper at the upcoming annual meeting and added a Goffmanesque preface concerning the difficulties of such presentations.

CENTRAL THEMES

The Interaction Order

Goffman's overarching theme is the investigation of face-to-face interaction, primarily among the unacquainted. At the beginning and end of his career (but not in the middle), he referred to this as the study of the interaction order. The burden of this investigation was the classification of the different elements of face-to-face interaction. The subsidiary tasks involved the use of theatrical and game metaphors to explore deception in the social world and an analysis of the role of reflexivity in sociological investigation, particularly as revealed by the "framing" of social life. In addition, Goffman made significant contributions to the related fields of the sociology of mental illness and the sociology of stigma.

Goffman's primary ambition was to establish the study of face-to-face interaction as a substantive concern in its own right. This flew in the face of both grand theorists, such as Parsons, who—while admiring Goffman's analyses—nevertheless wanted to absorb this and other fields into a larger theory, and of politically minded sociologists of all persuasions who judged Goffman's analyses to be as trivial as those of his intellectual predecessor, Georg Simmel. The subtlety of Goffman's observations was largely lost on the former, whereas the quiet tone of moral outrage was lost on the latter.

The interaction order is a conceptual map to each and every occasion of face-to-face interaction. This map is therefore intended to cover behavior in, among other places, restaurants, elevators, stadiums, and dinner parties. Literally speaking, all face-to-face interaction requires the "copresence" of participants, that is, people must sense that others are close enough to them to be able to register whatever it is that they are doing. In *Behavior in Public Places* (1963:13–22), Goffman distinguished three types of copresence: the "gathering," the "situation," and the "social occasion." For Goffman, a gathering is simply a coming together of two or more people, a situation occurs whenever there is "mutual monitoring," and a social occasion is bounded by space and time and is likely to involve props or special equipment. Thus, a social occasion such as a birthday party becomes the background against which gatherings

and situations can occur. For each of these types of copresence, there are distinctive patterns of “communication traffic order,” which Goffman called “situational proprieties” (p. 24). These patterns are “focused” when there is a single focus of attention and “unfocused” when there is not.

Focused interaction occurs when people “extend one another a special communication license and sustain a special type of mutual activity” (1963:83). This involves “face-work” of various kinds among friends, acquaintances, and, under special circumstances, the unacquainted. The initiation and continuation of unwanted focused interaction was for Goffman an interesting topic in its own right.

Unfocused interaction predominates in urban settings where people are unacquainted with each other. Even if efforts are made to slow down the flow of information, people “read” each other through “body idiom” and perceived “involvement.” Through our body idiom, people glean information about us by judging us against conventional standards. Our body idiom therefore consists of impressions that either we willingly give or inadvertently give off (Goffman 1959:13–14). Involvement refers to the attention we give—or fail to give—to the social situations in which we find ourselves. It is an internal state that others perceive through observable, behavioral markers. Frequently, people simultaneously manage both a main and a side involvement, as when a student listens to a lecture and doodles on a notepad at the same time. The group and the present situation determine what constitutes a dominant involvement. By contrast, a subordinate involvement is whatever the group tolerates once appropriate respect is shown for the dominant focus of group attention.

Ritual regard for the unacquainted is preserved in unfocused interaction through civil inattention. This involves initial eye contact among the unacquainted and then a studious looking away. The function of civil inattention appears to be to display mutual regard and the absence of threat. It is as if the person were saying: “look at me, remember my face if you wish because I will not harm you in any way.”

Goffman extended the analysis of the interaction to the presentation of relationships in public settings. Understood thus, we are sign vehicles: our body idiom conveys information about ourselves and our social relationships. This will often be sensitive material that has to be handled delicately by others, with appropriate ritual care. In *Relations in Public* (1971), Goffman used an ethological perspective to analyze how people negotiate their way around often packed urban spaces, mark their territories while so doing, signal their relationships to others by various “tie-signs,” and manage their appearances so as to appear normal or unremarkable. By these elaborate means, we all contribute to what Herbert Spencer called in the prominent quotation given at the beginning of his book, the “government of ceremonial observance.” To fail to do so sounds alarm bells for

others because it threatens the predictability and routinization of everyday encounters. Thus, Goffman was able to show the interwoven complexity, necessity, and fragility of ordinary behavior.

Goffman’s analysis of the interaction order presents a set of classifications with which to continue the investigation of face-to-face interaction. He assumed that there would be both further conceptual and classificatory refinement and increasing levels of empirical detail. Particularly through the work of ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, some of whom trained with Goffman, empirical specification has occurred, but the former project of conceptual refinement has not seen the same level of progress, or even interest.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND STIGMA

Goffman began fieldwork in 1955 at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, a large facility housing about 7,000 patients. It is important to remember that this research was conducted at a time when psychiatry was heavily influenced by psychoanalysis, just before the rise of psychopharmacology. Psychoanalysis and psychiatry were therefore interwoven fields at the height of their prestige. Sociology was then a small but emerging discipline thought to have connections to the study of interpersonal difficulties. Goffman was, then, unwittingly ideally placed to study the final moments of the mental hospital as it was then understood. His perspective was somewhat different: As a product of the Chicago School of Sociology, he understood himself to have a special obligation to side with the underdog and to criticize institutionalized authority. Curiously, while he conducted research at St. Elizabeth’s, Michel Foucault was conducting similar research at a mental hospital in Paris, although the similarities between Goffman’s and Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power were not to become evident until much later.

Goffman spent about a year and a half at St. Elizabeth’s, collecting the ethnographic data that informed *Asylums* (1961). As with his dissertation, this book is highly unusual: It provides very little detailed information about the hospital; rather, it conveys a “tone of life” (Fine and Martin 1990:93). Goffman investigated the characteristics of “total institutions,” of which he took St. Elizabeth’s as an exemplar. All total institutions sequester inmates, set schedules, and monitor behavior. Inmates are subjected to “batch living” and its attendant indignities. Goffman drew on both his own data and research from other total institutions, such as monasteries, prisons, and boarding schools to produce a general theory of the characteristics of the total institution.

Asylums promises an analysis of the prepatient, inpatient and ex-patient phases of the “moral career” of the mental patient; in point of fact, it only delivers the first two.

Goffman provided a subtle and moving account of the process whereby a person can become a candidate for institutionalization. Prepatients pass through a “betrayal funnel,” as the people they trust most—family and friends—conspire against them, reporting their questionable actions to physicians and other members of the “circuit of agents” who often play a decisive role in the decision-making process.

Once institutionalized, inmates experience “civil death” as they lose many of the freedoms that had taken for granted. There is a further “mortification of self” as patients are standardized: They are given regulation clothes and subjected to a myriad of indignities. Uncooperative patients are punished by being placed in an unpleasant ward, ostensibly for their own good. Patients may advance through the ward system only through good behavior, taken by the psychiatrists as indicative of improving mental health.

Over time, patients at St. Elizabeth’s—as at other total institutions—are offered privileges for good behavior, as shown by following the house rules. In its own way, acquiescence to privilege is as demeaning as the mortification of self. Both phases of total institutional life demonstrate to inmates that they are less than they took themselves to be. As Goffman put it, the total institution is a “forcing house” for changing people. In the face of these overwhelming challenges, inmates must either accept a massively diminished sense of self or insulate themselves from the social psychological threat posed by the total institution itself. The latter is achieved without direct confrontation by what the patients at St. Elizabeth’s called “playing it cool” (1961:62–3). This consisted of a set of strategies designed to restore a sense of autonomy and self-worth to the patient. Ironically, Goffman suggested, hospital personnel often misunderstood these strategies, mistaking them as further evidence of mental illness.

Asylums remains a controversial book. It is a provocative new approach to ethnography, in which the traditional case study is transformed into comparative analysis, producing an ethnography not of a place but of a concept, in this case, that of the total institution (Manning 1992). Goffman’s findings are also controversial because they suggest that psychiatrists may have weak clinical knowledge. The central issue for Goffman is that although everyone commits “situational improprieties,” only some of these cases of inappropriate behavior are considered by psychiatrists (and others) to be symptomatic of mental illness. Psychiatrists need but lack a “technical mapping” that could distinguish symptomatic from nonsymptomatic situational improprieties. Thus, the occasionally transparent, often latent, message of *Asylums* is that psychiatrists lack a scientific understanding of mental illness and rely instead on lay interpretations. As a result, Goffman thought that psychiatrists routinely misunderstood the behavior of their patients. This aspect of Goffman’s work put a special burden on his

analysis to demonstrate how sociological knowledge can undermine psychiatric knowledge. Probably he failed to do this; however, his analysis of St. Elizabeth’s did contribute positively to the reevaluation of psychiatry and the treatment of the mentally ill.

In the early 1960s, Goffman also analyzed the interpersonal management of stigma. *Stigma* (1963) emerged out of lectures he gave at the University of California at Berkeley. He defined a stigma as a “deeply discrediting” attribute in the context of a set of relationships (1963:3). He distinguished three types: abominations of the body, blemishes of character, and tribal stigmata (1963:4). The focus of his analysis was primarily the stigmatized person’s techniques of “information control” by which discrediting, undisclosed information could be managed. Goffman recognized that the management of potentially damaging information was critical for three aspects of our identity: the personal, the social and the ego. Our personal identity is that which makes each of us unique; it consists of “identity pegs” (such as fingerprints) and life histories (1963:57). Our social identity is that which others understand about us by virtue of the groups to which we belong. Our ego identity refers to that which we think about ourselves. Goffman introduced the term “identity politics” to characterize the interactions between the stigmatized, the “normals” and the “own” (who understand the world of the stigmatized without being stigmatized themselves). In the latter part of *Stigma*, Goffman suggested that we are all, to some degree, stigmatized. At best, we are “discreditable” if we are not already ‘discredited.’ Thus, there is a continuum rather than a binary opposition between normals and the stigmatized. Among the stigmatized are “normal deviants,” who share the perspectives of normals, and “social deviants,” who rebel against conventions.

METAPHORICAL INVESTIGATIONS: THE DRAMATURGICAL AND THE GAME THEORETIC

In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), Goffman outlined a conceptual framework in which any occasion of face-to-face interaction can be interpreted as a theatrical performance. Expanding the ideas of Kenneth Burke, who pioneered a “dramatistic” approach, Goffman developed his own “dramaturgical” investigations based on six themes: the performance, the team, the region, discrepant roles, communication out of character, and impression management. These themes had initially been explored in his dissertation. Here they are separated from a case study and presented instead as general theory. *The Presentation of Self* offers redescriptions of familiar events in which there is a heightened sense of suspicion. Nothing in Goffman’s dramaturgical world is quite what it seems. Rather, we are all portrayed as performers enacting rehearsed lines and roles in places that are carefully constructed in order to maximize the potential for deception.

Goffman suggests that as performers we both knowingly give and unwittingly give off impressions. Because nearly all of us are skilled in the arts of impression management, we monitor all aspects of the behavior of the people we encounter. Goffman's actors seek to deceive others while seeing through the deceptive practices of others. Even when among team members in backstage areas, our performances are not necessarily more authentic, although there we often "knowingly contradict" (1959:114) our front stage behavior. Goffman's dramaturgical world is thus one of misdirection in which general suspicion is necessary. In fact, Goffman developed an interest in espionage practices precisely because he recognized these as extensions of everyday behavior. This way of thinking was perhaps part of a broader cultural shift in the United States: The safe assumptions of mainstream Americans in the 1950s were being challenged by the radicalized generation of the 1960s. To some degree, Goffman gave expression to this emerging sentiment.

There is a clearly a literary quality to all of Goffman's published work, and this in part explains their success. The broad appeal of his investigation of everyday conduct is a version of Freud's appeal—and in fact Goffman emerged at the peak of American interest in Freud and psychoanalysis. In this sense, all of Goffman's work involves the elaboration of apt metaphors. Nevertheless, theatrical and game metaphors are given pride of place.

Goffman clarified the main terms of game theory, establishing appropriate definitions for players, moves, and rules (1969). Players can represent themselves or others. They may be pawns that may be sacrificed or merely tokens who express a position. A player may be a "nuncio" who can only represent a party or a "procurator" who can negotiate for a party but cannot represent it. Goffman identified five basic moves in social interaction: the unwitting, the naïve, the covering, the uncovering, and the counter-uncovering move (1969:11–27). Each is designed either to achieve some advantage directly or to reveal the strategies of other players. These moves are used in social worlds, or as Goffman called them, "situated activity systems." Each of these is regulated by internalized norms known by each system's members.

Goffman speculated that game theory was a possible successor to Blumer's symbolic interactionism. Rather than focusing on the production of meanings, the definition of the situation and relevant symbols, as Blumer advocated, Goffman proposed the study of "strategic interaction" using the vocabulary outlined above. For unclear reasons, neither Goffman nor anyone else developed this proposal, and the relationship between symbolic interactionism and strategic interaction has been largely ignored.

FRAMES AND REFLEXIVITY

Goffman expected *Frame Analysis* (1974) to be his crowning achievement: The 586-page book took a decade

to prepare and marked a subtle departure from his earlier work. In this project, Goffman emphasized reflexive aspects of social life, that is, the ways in which what we think about what we do affects the performance of the activity itself. This was showcased in the book's preface, in which Goffman interrogated the idea of writing a preface itself.

Goffman defined a frame as a way of organizing experiences: We use frames to identify what is taking place. For example, a story may be a joke, a warning, a lesson, an invitation and so on. Frame analysis is therefore the study of the "organization of experience." The most fundamental frameworks are "primary frameworks," which reveal what is really happening either in the natural or social world. The meaning of a primary framework can be challenged in various ways. It can also be "keyed": This occurs when its meaning is transformed into something patterned on but independent of the initial frame. For example, a keying may convince us that what appears to be a fight is in fact just play. However, caution is needed because every keying can itself be rekeyed. In addition to keys, there are "fabrications." These are frames that are designed to mislead others. Fabrications are benign when they are for the benefit of the audience or exploitative when they are for the benefit of the fabricator. In an attempt to prevent the keying, rekeying, and fabrications of frames, we often attempt to anchor them so that audiences can accept them as real.

Goffman extended this analysis into an investigation of various kinds of talk. These essays were published together as *Forms of Talk* (1981). The central theme of the five essays was the footing of talk. This referred to the participant's projected self during a conversation. Thus, we can change footing by realigning ourselves. This is simply another way of discussing a change in the relevant frame for events. Goffman gave the example of then President Nixon commenting on the dress style of the reporter, Helen Thomas. Goffman argued that this interlude was intended by President Nixon to be a brief time-out from the formal duties of the day, a moment in which he could reveal himself as an ordinary, if sharp-witted, man who could thrive without the protection of presidential authority. Goffman suggested that in this, President Nixon failed, as his performance was too wooden and his jokes were laughed at only out of respect for his office. This small example, taken from one of his final projects, epitomizes his overall concern: the development of general classifications to be used to understand concrete examples of the interaction order.

— Philip Manning

See also Blumer, Herbert; Dramaturgy; Frame Analysis; Impression Management; Mead, George Herbert; Symbolic Interaction; Total Institutions

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GOLDSTONE, JACK

Jack A. Goldstone's (1953–) work is exemplary of a long and distinguished mode of sociological theory pioneered by such as giants as Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Max Weber. Like the founders of modern sociology, Goldstone develops theories of macrosocial processes designed to explain outcomes of exceptional interest. He has been particularly concerned with understanding why and how revolutions occur in specific places and times, the factors that promote smaller-scale revolts and social transformations, and, most recently, the emergence of the Industrial Revolution in England. Goldstone's explanations invoke general theoretical concepts, but they are also firmly grounded in the histories and empirical details of actual cases. As a result, his work simultaneously speaks

to social theorists committed to explaining worldly transformations and historians who care deeply about the specific events of individual cases.

The eldest son of German Jewish immigrants who spent World War II in China, Goldstone studied with Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Theda Skocpol, and George Homans at Harvard University, and it was here that he cultivated an interest in macro-comparative sociology. He taught at Northwestern University before coming to the University of California at Davis, where he was a professor of sociology and the founding director of the Center for History, Society, and Culture. In 2003, Goldstone joined George Mason University as the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Professor of Public Policy and Eminent Scholar.

One major strand of Goldstone's work focuses on the causes and outcomes of revolutions in the early modern world. In *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, which received the 1993 Distinguished Scholarly Publication Award of the American Sociological Association, he shows how a common pattern was at work in the production of revolutions in both European and non-European societies. Whereas much social theory—both Marxist and liberal—identifies revolutions as critical turning points in long-term social change and the emergence of the modern world, Goldstone argues that the major revolutions in world history were brought about by cyclic demographic changes impinging on structural factors common to agrarian-bureaucratic regimes across Europe and Asia. In particular, population growth produced revolution by triggering a cycle of state financial crises, intra-elite and elite-state conflict, popular opposition, and transformative ideologies. This theory of revolution is notable not only for its parsimony but also for the fascinating vision it offers of gradual, long-term changes operating on several levels of analysis that combine together to produce sudden episodes of dramatic transformation.

Goldstone has been at the forefront of theoretical efforts to link the study of revolutions to other social phenomena. He has shown that social movements and popular protest may emerge from similar causes and that revolutions can be seen as instances where social mobilization receives societal support and where the state response to mobilization is weak or inconsistent. Likewise, he has examined how his basic theory of revolution can be used to explain smaller-scale forms of collective action such as prison riots. If the real test of a theory is its ability to be extended to diverse phenomena, including phenomena at different levels of analysis, then Goldstone's work on revolution fares remarkably well.

A central theme in much of Goldstone's scholarship entails rethinking received theories of Western modernization. In the work on revolutions, he challenges the notion that events such as the French Revolution should be conceived as a breakthrough to a new mode of production. Instead, he shows that even the great revolutions are best conceived as crises of state breakdown in agrarian societies.

Patterns of revolution found in the Western world also apply to non-Western societies that are often regarded as following fundamentally different routes of modernization.

To the extent that new modes of social organization emerge from revolutionary crises, Goldstone argues that it is due to cultural conditions and elite alignments. In particular, the challenges of stabilizing power and solving societal problems in the aftermath of revolutions promote innovative solutions and/or deeply reactive responses. Thus, in countries where conservative elites and traditions dominated, the aftermath of revolution often saw the reinforcement of past practices and beliefs (e.g., counter-reformation Europe, Ottoman Turkey, Qing China). Indeed, no revolution—not the English, or the French, or even the American—created a definitive break with the past or fully undermined prior elites. At best, revolutions in modern world history have set in motion ideological and elite conflicts that evolved into stable republican institutions over many decades, often after further episodes of revolution, autocracy, or civil war.

Goldstone's recent work on industrialization also challenges the idea that the origins of the modern world can be found simply in capitalism or in revolution. Instead, to explain the Industrial Revolution, he insists that we need to understand how discoveries allowed the harnessing of fossil fuel through engines, and we must come to terms with the unique cultural and social milieu that produced that breakthrough. The breakthrough to industrialization occurred only in seventeenth and eighteenth century England, where a peculiar combination of conditions was located: religious pluralism and tolerance that was supportive of new, particularly Newtonian, cosmologies; an engine and instrument-based variant of mechanistic science that developed experimentation and machine construction to very high levels; a broad dissemination of mechanical knowledge and interests throughout society, including to artisans and entrepreneurs; and a social order that encouraged a high level of exchange and cooperation among artisans, entrepreneurs, and natural philosophers. All these conditions coming together in one place—a very unlikely and perhaps accidental mix—produced the first generation of widespread engineering talent based on precise experimental methods and theories of mechanics, and hence the steam engine in particular and industrialization in general.

Goldstone's scholarship is situated squarely within the classical tradition of social theory in which major concepts and explanatory hypotheses are grounded in the histories of concrete cases. The approach here is one of moving back and forth between theory and history, confronting initial theoretical hunches with evidence until plausible explanatory accounts are rendered. In methodological writings, Goldstone uses the phrase "detective method" to characterize this approach to theory building in which potential explanations are systematically evaluated in light of fine-grained evidence from the historiography. His methodological writings have emphasized the ways in which comparative-historical

researchers rely on both deduction and induction to formulate hypotheses, and how these scholars have increased our knowledge by combining different methods of causal analysis to rigorously test competing hypotheses.

— James Mahoney

See also Eisenstadt, Shmuel N.; Historical and Comparative Theory; Homans, George; Revolution; Social Movement Theory

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GOULDNER, ALVIN

Alvin Ward Gouldner (1920–1980) was an American sociologist who made his early and lasting mark in the field of industrial sociology. A few years after graduating from City College of New York, where he received a bachelor of business administration degree in 1941, Gouldner began work on a master's degree in sociology at Columbia University. By this time, industrial sociology had become an established subfield within sociology, growing in large part out of the earlier Hawthorne experiments conducted between 1927 and 1932 and Elton Mayo's program of human relations management that developed shortly thereafter. With his business background and interest in applying theory to this newly burgeoning area of concern, Gouldner found a supportive and sympathetic mentor in Robert K. Merton, who had joined the Columbia faculty in 1941. Merton (1982) was impressed by the seriousness and scholarly acumen of the young Gouldner, and under his guidance, Gouldner completed his MA thesis in 1945.

Over the next few years, Gouldner took a number of positions while working on his Columbia dissertation under Merton. From 1945 to 1947, he served as resident sociologist on the American Jewish Committee, then as an assistant professor at the University of Buffalo from 1947 to 1951. In 1951 and 1952, he worked as a consulting sociologist at Standard Oil Company in New Jersey, then as an associate professor at Antioch College from 1952 to 1954. During these years, some

of Gouldner's first scholarly articles were published in such journals as *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* (in 1946), *American Journal of Sociology* (in 1947), and *American Sociological Review* (in 1948) (see Chriss 1999 for a thorough bibliography of Gouldner's work).

In 1953, Gouldner completed and successfully defended his doctoral dissertation, which he titled "Industry and Bureaucracy." Robert Merton, serving as committee chair, was impressed with the dissertation and informed Gouldner that with only minor revisions, he should have not one, but *two* books ready for press. And indeed, a year later both *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* and *Wildcat Strike* were published from the dissertation. In *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, the more famous of the two books, Gouldner conducted a case study of a gypsum plant undergoing changes in management and plant operation. His main finding was that management succession tends to lead to higher levels of bureaucratization within organizations.

Through the 1950s and into the early 1960s, Gouldner continued to cement his position among the intellectual leadership of the field of industrial sociology while also contributing important insights to another field, sociological theory. These accomplishments led to his becoming professor and chairman of sociology and anthropology at Washington University in St. Louis beginning in 1959. A year later, he published "The Norm of Reciprocity," which still stands today as one of the most frequently cited articles in sociology. In this paper, Gouldner focuses on the ways in which functionalist theorists tacitly invoke the concept of reciprocity but formally neglect to define and elaborate upon it. Saying that A is functional for B assumes that B reciprocates A's services, but also that B's service to A is contingent upon A's performance of positive functions for B. Gouldner, however, echoing a Marxist strand of critique of functionalism's assumptions about functional reciprocity, points out that if B is significantly more powerful than A, B can force A to benefit it with little or no reciprocity. This illustrates how social order is possible not only through consensual reciprocity—the explanation functionalists tend to favor—but also through outright force or coercion where reciprocity may hardly be present at all.

By the early 1960s, Gouldner pretty much left the field of industrial sociology behind, choosing instead to explore issues in social theory, including not only the issue of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960) but also the status of both functionalism and Marxism in contemporary sociology, the nature of values in social theory, the role of intellectuals in modern society, the interplay between science and ideology, ancient Greek thought, and the sociology of knowledge.

The radical ferment of the 1960s prodded Gouldner into publishing, in 1970, a blistering attack against Talcott Parsons and American sociology titled *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. Gouldner's major point of contention

against Parsons and the functionalists was that, in placing an overweening emphasis on the importance of normative consensus in assuring social order, functionalism was ideologically and politically conservative, which was contradictory to the liberal and even radicalizing ethos that marked sociology as a discipline circa the late 1960s. This signaled a pending crisis in functionalism and, since Gouldner equated functionalism with sociology's establishment, for sociology more generally.

Gouldner was not only a virulent critic of functionalism, however. From approximately 1962 forward he unleashed a virtual tirade against all systems of thought that lacked the reflexivity to peer into and confront their own assumptions, anomalies, and contradictions. This is seen, for example, in Gouldner's attacks on (1) the doctrine of objectivity and value neutrality in science, (2) the secrets of organizations and the pathological consequences of these for social service agencies in particular, (3) partisanship for the dispossessed and downtrodden in society, especially to the extent that research on such populations is funded by the welfare state, (4) the sociological establishment, and (5) Marxism (see, e.g., Gouldner 1970, 1973, 1980).

Gouldner's program of critique culminated in the final chapter of *The Two Marxisms*, published in 1980, the year of his death. This chapter, titled "Nightmare Marxism," analyzed what went wrong with a theory that began with such high hopes of ending human oppression and fulfilling the Enlightenment ideal of the perfectibility of humankind. Like each of the systems of thought mentioned above, Marxism, too, was never reflexive enough to solve, much less recognize, some of the deeply disturbing paradoxes residing in the theory's infrastructure. For example, how could the intelligentsia, most of whose members came from privileged, bourgeois backgrounds, elude their own social being to give expression to the consciousness of the proletariat? This contradicts what Marxism states overtly, namely that social location gives rise to consciousness, to a particular way of seeing and understanding the world. This garbled account of the origins of Marxism points to weaknesses in the entire Marxist analytic, according to Gouldner, and partially accounts for the nightmarish regimes of terror that have emerged under Critical Marxism in various times and places in the world.

Taken as a whole, Gouldner's body of work represents some of the most important and innovative contributions to sociology and social theory in the postwar era. It is very likely that Gouldner's own difficult personality, which included not only verbal but also physical altercations with colleagues and students at Washington University and elsewhere, contributed to the reduced visibility of his ideas in theory and organizational studies beginning shortly after his death. However, interest in Gouldner appears to be on the rise again, and his programs of reflexivity and social critique are likely to be taken up anew as social scientists

continue to grapple with explanations of human society in the new millennium.

— James J. Chriss

See also Functionalism; Marxism; Merton, Robert K.; Parsons, Talcott

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GOVERNMENTALITY

Governmentality, a term appearing in the later works of Michael Foucault, refers to the ethical practices whereby individuals form and care for the self as it is affected by the wider array of social powers and knowledges. Governmentality came to replace Foucault's more famous concept power/knowledge (*pouvoir/savoir*) in the empirical volumes of his history of sexuality (Foucault 1985, 1986).

The deep background of the theory of governmentality is the long history of social theory's attempt to find a mediating position between the objective structures of social power and the subjective elements of selfhood. In his theory of power/knowledge, Foucault was one of the first in the late modern era to show that social theories of knowledge must perforce be theories of social power. In this he was able to advance the idea by drawing upon the distinction made in the French language between formal or scientific knowledges (*connaissances*) and practical knowledges of daily life (*savoirs*). This made it possible to avoid an oversimplifying notion of ideology that invites the suggestion that knowledges are all of one kind, thus uniformly susceptible to the distortions of political and economic interests.

Foucault's theory of power/knowledge, though often stated in highly abstract terms, was a direct outcome of his empirical studies in the history of modern social forms, including its forms of culture and knowledge. Thus,

even before the expression came into explicit use in *Archaeologie du savoir* (1969), his early studies of madness, the hospital, and the human sciences were, in effect, a history of the forms of power at play in the modern era. He saw, quite clearly, that the traditional top-down idea of power (commonly associated with Karl Marx) is unable to account for the fact that, in the modern system especially, individuals subject *themselves* to power. At the beginning, for example, the urban migrations for work in the factory system were, in principle, voluntary (if only in the sense that agrarian labor was disappearing). Hence Foucault's idea that in modernity power works often in a gentle way by applying itself to the practical knowledges taught (or absorbed and otherwise learned) by ordinary men and women in the course of daily life. To work in a factory is both to learn a different method of ordering daily life and to subject oneself to a new regime of power.

Power/knowledge eventually gave way to governmentality in the second and third volumes of Foucault's history of sexuality (1985, 1986). Though he used the earlier expression in the first volume (1978), once he immersed himself in the research on sexual practices and self-care, he came to see what was at work, from the earliest, even with the Greeks. Selfhood had always been less a form of knowledge as such than a practical ethic. The effect of this insight was that in the third of his sexuality studies (1986), he seems to have lost interest in sexuality and turned to a general theory of the self and self-formation.

Governmentality is a concept of rich potential (largely unrealized in Anglophone social theory) for theories of the social self. It invites a vastly more complex and broad-ranging social psychology than is permitted, for example, by the concept *socialization*. Governmentality allows social theory to avoid the dead end of supposing that the social self is formed by the introjection of structured cultures and their social values. Instead of the wider social forces intruding upon the self, or offering the self an array of social opportunities, governmentality allows social theory to locate the formation of subjecthood at an earlier, if preconscious, point in the social development of the individual. When, in the earliest months of life, individuals learn to govern themselves, they are learning as well the play of social power mediated by even the gentlest of parental gestures. When, later in development, the individual is said to become a self, or to "have" a self, he or she can be seen as having achieved a degree of ethical competence in governing oneself in relation to the power plays to which one is subjected and into which one inserts oneself. The affinities to power/knowledge are apparent, as are the ways a theory of governmentality seeks to rethink the social self in political terms.

— Charles Lemert

See also Foucault, Michel; Power; Surveillance and Society

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GRAMSCI, ANTONIO

Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), the leading Italian Marxist of the first half of the century, became one of the most influential thinkers on cultural studies from the 1980s. Earlier grouped together with Georg Lukàcs and Karl Korsch as Western Marxists because of a shared sense that it was culture, not political economy that was central to social reproduction of bourgeois societies, he is principally known for the *Prison Notebooks* and associated with the idea of hegemony. The *Prison Notebooks*, composed while Gramsci was a guest in Mussolini's jails, are highly suggestive but frequently and radically incomplete. They reveal a sophisticated and historically sensitive mind engaging with the details of Italian society and culture, but they do not contain a developed theory of hegemony. Hegemony is defined in one place in the *Prison Notebooks* as coercion plus consent; the state is understood as dictatorship plus hegemony. The point is that while in Eastern experiences, such as Russia prior to the October Revolution, culture is secondary to force in securing social reproduction, in Western cases the balance works the other way around. We are not forced to consume; we like to consume. Television rules, not tanks, at least in the centres of the world system. Gramsci does not, however, subscribe to the idea of the cultural dope, or to Marcuse's thesis in *One-Dimensional Man* that we cannot break free of this system of near-total incorporation. Hegemony, or domination, is based on a shared common sense that naturalises this world, that tells us there will always be bosses (and they will always be men). Hegemony is much more than brainwashing; it appeals because it taps into a system of needs and justifies the necessity of this world on the grounds that it is impossible to imagine any other, let alone realise it.

Hegemony, for Gramsci, is not natural, but constructed. It depends upon daily reinforcement, in education, work, in advertisements, and soap opera. Gramsci takes belief to be central to social reproduction and is therefore one of the first Marxists properly to acknowledge the significance of popular culture and folklore. If you want to understand gender and domesticity, read the women's weeklies. Dominant groups and classes have to build hegemony to project their own form of dominance and the subordination of the subaltern

classes. Hegemony is therefore mediated by the *historic bloc* or class coalition that constructs it. If hegemony rules, for Gramsci, then counter-hegemony must also be possible. This raises the question of agency—who will change the world?—which Gramsci answers ambiguously. Sometimes it is the Italian Communist Party, or New Prince; sometimes the agent looks more like the people, the popular alliance, or rainbow movement. Intellectuals have a key role in this process, for they are organizers who work with ideas. Gramsci thinks of the new, innovative intellectuals as organic, as opposed to the old clerical or civic category of traditional intellectuals. In terms of social theory, Gramsci is evidently a Marxist, with the difference that he sets his project against the economic legacy of orthodox Marxism. This is what explains the double message of his 1917 essay on the Russian Revolution, “The Revolution Against Capital.” Gramsci supported the Bolsheviks, because they had the nerve to act, to seize power, and because they acted against the Second International's orthodoxy, for which Marx's *Capital* was correct: You only had to wait for revolution. The Russian revolution was also a revolt against this determinist reading of *Capital*. Gramsci's early Marxism rested on this voluntaristic, grassroots sympathy with the council movement, closer to syndicalism. The Party, or Modern Prince (after his fellow Italian, Machiavelli), became necessary to follow the Bolshevik example and to countermand Mussolini's fascist party.

The interest in culture and solidarity or social reproduction aligns Gramsci's thinking with Émile Durkheim. Hegemony might be viewed as a parallel for *conscience collectif*, and like Durkheim, Gramsci views socialism as a better way to organize modernity, with the difference that Gramsci insists on viewing the new order as a proletarian order. The image of the subaltern classes becomes increasingly significant in the *Prison Notebooks*, 15 years after his conciliatory period after World War I. The subaltern classes indicate to Gramsci the ongoing pertinence of the peasants, or of precapitalist modes of production in modernity. Gramsci rejects the Eurocentrism of other period socialists, for whom the peasants were part of the problem, and only the revolutionary proletariat could be its solution. In *The Southern Question* ([1926]1995), Gramsci makes clear his insistence that the world-system plays itself out locally in the exploitation of Southern Italy by the North. Underdevelopment is built into capitalism, or modernity; Marxists henceforth must frontally address this problem, rather than seeing the future of a modernizing proletariat as an alternative bourgeoisie, or even as joining in a new historic bloc with the bourgeoisie and against the peasants. Yet Gramsci remains a modernizer, as well as a populist. Though Lenin and Trotsky enthused for Taylorism, Gramsci is the first Marxist to develop a stronger argument for Fordism as a social model, an image of new society, a new culture as well as a new political economy. Italy had its

own avant-garde, and its own futurism, its own automotive and industrial revolution with Fiat rather than Ford at the forefront. Gramsci wanted more of this, not less. He was a modernizing Marxist, but one who retained a sense that the modernity of the cities needed to take the peasants with it. Like the contradiction between democracy and bolshevism in his political thought, these contradictions in his sociology were never resolved.

— Peter Beilharz

See also Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Lukács, György; Marxism

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GRAPH THEORETIC MEASURES OF POWER

Power is a topic of long-standing interest in sociology, and its nature, causes, and consequences are approached through a variety of theoretical perspectives. A particularly fruitful definition, attributable to Max Weber, treats power as the ability of individuals or collectivities to exercise their will over another, even against the will of the other.

Graph theoretic approaches to explaining and measuring power have attracted significant interest due to their conceptual precision and predictive accuracy in experimental tests. Graph theory is a branch of mathematics that focuses on properties of graphs, which it defines in terms of sets of points and lines, or *vertices* and *edges*, respectively. This makes it very useful for the description and analysis of social networks that typically represent social actors (individual or collective) as points or *nodes*, and their relationships (directed or nondirected) as lines or *ties*.

In general, graph theoretic measures of power determine the relative levels of power for each position in a network. They do so by taking into account certain attributes of the network structure and aspects of a position's location in that structure. This is in contrast to more individualistic approaches to power that focus on attributes of actors such as personal charisma or negotiation skills.

Graph theory provides methods for describing and deriving a wide array of network structural properties. Some of these properties are quite simple and intuitive. For example, the *geodesic* between two points is simply the minimum number of ties that separates them; the *indegree* of a network node is the number of its ties from other nodes; and the *density* of a network is the ratio of the number of existing ties to the number of possible ties. At the other extreme, some graph properties are much more complicated and esoteric. However, theories of power in social networks usually employ relatively simple graph theoretic measures.

There are two important precursors to graph theoretic approaches to power: measures of *prestige* and measures of *centrality*. Prestige measures usually entail directed ties, for example $A \rightarrow B$. Prestige may be assumed to accrue to one who is chosen by many others, such as to a person who is a key source of information. More sophisticated measures account for an actor's prestige in terms of the level of prestige of the actors who select him or her.

In contrast to prestige measures, centrality measures are designed to capture the degree to which a given actor is well connected to the rest of the network. These measures typically employ nondirected or mutual ties. Similar to the case for prestige, more sophisticated measures may be designed to take into account the centrality of not only the focal actor, but also the centrality of actors with whom the focal actor has ties.

Because power is not identical to centrality or prestige, it stands to reason that it is not measured the same way. Even if we suspect that centrality is essential for power, it would not make sense always to equate them. For example, while being tied to others with high centrality may raise one's own centrality, being tied to others with high power may diminish one's own power.

Graph theory does not specify which network properties and measures may be useful for detecting power. Such directives must come from substantive theories of power. Moreover, any theory of power in networks must have certain elements in addition to graph theoretic measures (or measures based in any other logical or mathematical system) in order to generate hypotheses that are testable in social settings.

The relationship between network exchange theory (NET) and its graph-theoretic power index (GPI) illustrates the foregoing point. Although several theories employ graph theoretic methods to explain power phenomena in exchange networks, NET is among the most explicit and thoroughly tested. First, NET includes definitions for its key terms, imbuing with sociological relevance the abstract concepts it borrows from graph theory. For instance, the notion of a *graph* containing *vertices* connected by *edges* is implemented as a *network* containing *positions* (occupied by *actors*) that are in *exchange relations* with one another.

Second, NET includes provisional *scope conditions* that describe and delimit properties of the actors and social

exchange settings to which the theory's authors are willing to commit the theory at a given stage of its development. In this case, the scope conditions specify the kinds of shared norms or rules that govern negotiations between actors in positions linked by network ties. For instance, the theory may be applied to "resource pool" networks wherein a certain number of resource units are associated with each potential exchange relation, and the two relevant actors may negotiate the allocation of resource units within a specified period of time. The pool is replenished at the start of each new exchange period, permitting the analysis of sequences of exchanges having long-term consequences.

Third, the first of several axioms in NET specifies the procedure used to calculate GPI for each position in the network. The procedure is an algorithm for tallying each position's direct and indirect ties. Each position's advantageous paths to other positions, both direct and indirect, add to its GPI; disadvantageous paths subtract from its GPI. Once these values are calculated, additional axioms determine whether the network will remain intact and, if not, what the new GPI values will be for positions in the smaller networks that emerge.

Finally, the last of NET's axioms asserts that relative GPI values will translate into relative accumulations of resources obtained through negotiation and exchange. This completes the bridge from the abstract realm of graph theory to the concrete realm of observable phenomena and testable hypotheses—a bridge that any graph-theoretic measure of power must build in order to make a contribution to sociological theory.

— Barry Markovsky

See also Exchange Networks; Network Exchange Theory; Power-Dependence Relations; Theory Construction

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green movements are collective actors engaged simultaneously in conflictual contestation and cooperative capacity building informed by ecological and environmental paradigms. The conflictual spheres engaged with are diverse, including economics, formal politics, social relations, culture, gender, science, and technology in relation to the organic realm most frequently referred to as nature. The primary issue focus of a movement combined with its prioritised mode of engagement result in a highly differentiated green movement milieu. This has been theorised as a number of discrete single issue movements engaged in specific conflicts and as a network of networks (Melucci 1996). The notion of a network of networks provides a means of articulating the diversity of movements engaged within a domain where cooperative capacity-building activities take place. Capacity building here is understood as the cumulative potential of green movements to define, formalise, and mobilise social force around ecologically and environmentally defined stakes within specific spheres of engagement. This is a historically constituted process incorporating sources of green critique formalised and engaged with since the nineteenth century and earlier (Wall 1994).

AN ANATOMY OF GREEN MOVEMENTS

Green movements became theoretically important as one of the "new" collective actors to emerge from the constellation of protest movements of the 1960s with theoretical implications for approaches towards transformative social actors. Throughout the 1970s, green movements assumed a variety of forms, including formal political parties seeking electoral recognition such as the U.K. Green Party and Germany's Die Grunnen; mass membership campaigning organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth usually known as social movement organisations (SMOs); and more loosely organised movements lacking formal membership structures like the 1970s antinuclear movements. In advanced industrial societies, these movements coexisted with long established organisations focussed on "conservation" of the "natural environment" by intervening through formal channels such as planning inquiries and political lobbying (McNaghten and Urry 1998). Green movements marked a shift to a wider range of interventions, including the pursuit of media coverage, often utilising direct action to heighten the profile of "green" concerns within the public sphere. Significant cleavages shaping the green movement milieu included debates between those advocating alternative trajectories, for example, alternative technology and those emphasising the need for more fundamental changes in consciousness, values, and the economic order. Gender represented a further significant divide, with the eco-feminist movement emphasising the centrality of patriarchal political, economic, scientific, and military institutions in subordinating and exploiting both the "natural" and social order.

GREEN MOVEMENTS

GREEN MOVEMENTS DEFINED?

The diversity of stances on green movements makes a unitary definition problematic. For present purposes, however,

Throughout the 1980s, the consolidation of neoliberalism in the United Kingdom and United States coincided with the inclusion of prominent environmental issues, particularly climate change, within the global political arena. Following the demise of Soviet communism, green movements were identified as the most significant ideological challenge to the resultant neoliberal orthodoxy. The UN-sponsored Rio Earth Summit of 1992, which endorsed sustainable development, biodiversity, and rain forest protocols, has been theorised by Maarten Hajer in terms of the ascendancy of the green agenda, marking a transition to ecological modernisation and as the global capture of the green movement and the influential “think global, act local” philosophy by Klaus Eder. The subordination of the measures adopted at Rio to economic global regulatory regimes pursued through the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and consolidated through the successor organisation, the World Trade Organization (WTO), became prominent within a more globally engaged green movement increasingly aware of connections between environmental and social justice (Harvey 1996) through increasing links with indigenous peoples’ movements in the developing world and the engagement of people of colour with environmental issues, particularly toxic waste disposal in the United States.

The increasing engagement of 1970s movement actors within formal political and regulatory initiatives at both national and global levels during the 1980s coincided with the emergence of a second wave of modern green movements lacking formal membership structures. Earth First!, an American movement emphasising direct action, was the most prominent example, quickly spreading to other industrialised nations (Wall 1994) and hybridising to create a diverse direct action milieu widely theorised in terms of identity, neotribalism, culture, and reflexive subjects. This marked a major shift in the tactics and level of engagement of green movements. Tactically and strategically, the adoption of direct action repertoires represented alienation from and skepticism about formal political initiatives in the environmental arena. Whilst green movements had hitherto engaged with relatively macro level issues such as global warming, and high prestige modernist technologies such as nuclear power, mundane features of modernity such as road building, shopping malls, and airport locations became increasingly contested. Activist engagement in these areas increased contacts with sections of local communities opposed to contested developments reemphasising work on community activism and cross class alliances.

GREEN MOVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT

The 1980s diversification of green movements within the developed world coincided with the rise of environmentally engaged indigenous peoples and workers’ movements

responding to modernisation agendas pursued under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). Here, rain forest clearance, high-impact infrastructure developments, genetically modified seed programmes, the assertion of trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPs), and the consolidation of free trade zones, notably the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were prominent. In the developing world, these movements represented the simultaneous development of class relations and environmental engagement as wage relations and forms of substantive rationality displaced tradition. According to the late Chico Mendes, a Brazilian rubber tapper simultaneously pursuing trade union recognition and rain forest protection, support from Northern green movements played a crucial role, signifying the emergence of a global civil society. Feminist and eco-feminist analyses have focussed on the linkages between the developed and developing countries in terms of gender issues (Mies & Shiva 1993). In Mexico, the Zapatistas’ resistance to the impact of NAFTA, in conjunction with a range of movement actors from around the world, was influential in consolidating what became known as the Anti-Globalisation Movement. By 1996, the initial conflictual agenda of this movement, the contestation and disruption of global economic and political fora, had been formalised and the 1999 Seattle meeting of the WTO targeted as the first such engagement. Theoretically, the increasingly networked nature of green movements elevated debates on the importance of civil society and particularly the emergence of a global civil society to a position of prominence with Castells (1997) arguing that neoliberal ascendancy unifies the movement milieu around a common opponent.

THEORETICAL STAKES AND ISSUES

The significance of green movements within social theory is a contested area structured around a number of key questions, which are addressed from a range of perspectives. Key here are the following: Is there a unified green movement or a number of green movements constitutive of a wider movement milieu? If there is a single unified green movement, how is it constituted as a coherent collective actor? What is the relationship between green concerns over the “organic” and social realms? Do green movements represent reformist agents of modernisation or a systemic source of critique and transformation incompatible with capitalism?

In terms of social theory, these and other issues have been engaged with across the sociological canon, invoking a wide range of philosophical traditions and debates. Given the engagement of green movements with environmental concerns, the dominance of the natural sciences in this area and the historic tendency for the social sciences to metaphorically appropriate key concepts and methodological

means of engagement from the natural sciences (Urry 2003), tensions between modernist and postmodernist approaches have become increasingly prominent. Here postmodernist critique and rejection of all foundationalist knowledge claims are particularly significant as green agendas were initially defined by Western technocratic expert-driven discourses operationalised through the global regimes mentioned. From the 1990s, the question of whether existing theoretical concepts and methods were adequate to address the global arena within which green movements situate themselves assumed increasing importance. The new divides introduced resulted in a range of competing stances with little prospect of any unifying theory to date.

THE VARIETY OF GREEN MOVEMENTS

Environmental and ecological paradigms exert a major influence on green movements. Environmental paradigms prioritise technological solutions to environmental problems identified and defined through substantive scientific rationality granting primacy to human interests and needs. An early formulation of this position can be found in the American human exceptionalist paradigm (HEP). Ecological paradigms, by comparison, include the impact of human societies upon the organic realm, questioning wider society/“nature” relations, arguing that human activities should be constrained to secure the integrity of the biosphere. The new environmental paradigm (NEP) formalised this position within American sociology. European approaches toward these paradigms emphasise the ontological status of individuals focussing particularly upon issues of consciousness founded in ego-based and transcendent forms of self with implications for the kinds of material, social, and cultural issues formalised and the resultant axes of social and movement solidarity (see Fox 1990).

THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF GREEN MOVEMENTS

Two major theories accounting for the origins of green movements in advanced industrial societies were advanced during the 1970s. The notion of a counterculture was introduced by Theodore Rosak. The emphasis on culture and a shift in consciousness were developed in a variety of ways, with Ronald Inglehart’s notion of a transition to postmaterial values being particularly influential. Whilst countercultural stances emphasised the role of youth in movements at a time when generational differences were considerable, work on value shifts associated with environmentalism extended beyond a particular generation revealing marked gender, age, and occupational class profiles. The transition to postmaterial values was, however, conditional upon an affluent life style associated with the middle classes.

Following World War II, the increasing prominence of the middle classes arising from significant changes in

occupational structure and educational provision within advanced industrial societies resulted in Marxist-based analyses identifying a New Left. The American civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and events in Paris in 1968 directed theoretical attention towards the emergence of new collective actors constituted around race, gender, student, peace, and environmental movements. Members of the Frankfurt School (notably Marcuse and Habermas) were central in arguing that marginal groups in society now had transformatory potential irrespective of capitalist society’s ability to absorb protest through repressive-desublimation. Claus Offe provided a coherent account of the relationship between class structure and the emergent green movement in Germany, identifying a coalition of decaying classes—the peasantry, propertied land holders, and sections of the urban middle classes, particularly those employed in service sector locations distant from the point of direct production. Offe’s schema applied particularly well to Germany and France but less directly to countries where a residual peasantry no longer existed, underlining the importance of specific national characteristics in the expressive form taken by green movements.

In Germany and France, urban middle classes identified a range of quality of life issues organised at a community level, becoming particularly influential in Germany at the federal level of the state. The centralised nature of the French state confined the impact of the French green movement on the formal political system to the local level. In all industrial societies, environmental issues assumed prominence through developments in knowledge production as new technologies and techniques contributed to a rapid growth in environmental science. The rise of green movements occurred during a set of intense expert-led debates on environmental issues and their relation to human activity, with nuclear energy being prominent (Welsh 2000).

This period coincided with consolidation of the main environmental SMOs and Green Parties mentioned earlier. Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace both formed in 1969 in the United States and Canada respectively. The British Green Party formed in 1973 whilst the German Die Grunnen emerged following fragmentary electoral successes between 1977–1980. The institutional consolidation of elements of the green movements can be seen as a test of classical pluralist models of interest representation, though there is no consensus on the success or otherwise of established social and political systems to accommodate these interests. Membership and electoral support for green parties has fluctuated widely, and political representation is largely dependent upon the presence of proportional representation. The European Union thus has a small caucus of green MEPs, and Die Grunnen were influential in the German coalition government, which formally announced the end of nuclear power. Whilst green movements are widely regarded as socially and politically progressive, it is

important to recognise the existence of extreme right-wing green movements and parties within advanced industrial economies. The end of Soviet communism witnessed the rise of eco-nationalist movements in countries previously, with the CCCP adding a further dimension to such expressions (Tickle and Welsh 1998).

MODERNITY, POSTMODERNITY, AND GREEN MOVEMENTS

Postmodernism's rejection of metanarrative and foundational knowledge claims fundamentally challenges the modernist environmental paradigm. In particular, the idea of science as a prioritised form of green knowledge, notions of a single unified green movement, linear modernist progress, and arguments about the social importance of "simulacra" and "hyper-real" phenomena generated through increasingly sophisticated electronic media challenged ideas of an organic domain existing as an unmediated reality. Niklas Luhmann's work, with its emphasis on self-regulating or autopoietic systems, was particularly influential in theorising green movements and postmodern politics. The postmodern emphasis on consumption and social identities based on life style were influential in at least two ways. First, notions of identity and life style politics were applied to the increasingly hybrid green movements merging environmental, cultural, and social protests that emerged from the 1980s onwards. Second, notions of ethical and green consumption gained prominence as consumer demand and life style choice were presented as adjuncts to the green business movement. The postmodernist arguments about self-regulating hybrid social forms whilst sharing many points of contact with the ecological paradigm, particularly an emphasis on the local and difference, rejected the prioritisation of ecological systems, with Bludhorn postulating the emergence of a postecological politics.

Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens' reflexive modernisation theories—the critical realignment of modernity—were a response to postmodernist positions emphasising the importance of risk and trust relations. Here, green movements are central to the realignment of the otherwise runaway juggernaut of modernity as knowledge becomes a key resource and means of mediating the relationship between the present and future with unavoidable moral and ethical dimensions. Green movements combined with a more critical approach to knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge, in conjunction with increased public awareness of risk through media intervention, are thus regarded as key agents of social change. In terms of the anatomy of green movements sketched here, the key issues are shaped by the publics and movements that gain expression through the process of reflexive modernisation. In particular, these issues are shaped by problems such as what kind of gendered,

ethnic, and North/South balance is achieved, and questions such as whether a reflexive capitalist modernity is compatible with sustainable futures (see McKechnie and Welsh in Dunlap et al. 2002).

Whilst the place of green movements within postmodern and modernist theorisations is widely regarded as incompatible, it has been argued (Lash and Urry 1994; Urry 2003) that the issues posed by postmodernist accounts constitute global material forces, characterised as flows in a set of exchange relations increasingly organised around symbolic or "sign" values. Here, green movements represent both a material and symbolic challenge to established social and political systems as the bearers of a cultural politics with sufficient liminality to exercise a critical reflexive project. The consolidation of the alternative globalisation movement (AGM) through proactive networks such as Peoples Global Action (PGA) and World Social Forum (WSF) from the mid-1990s onwards serves as an exemplar of these processes indicating the increasing engagement of green movements at the global level. From this perspective, green movements are an example of a Meluccian "antagonistic movement," challenging what is socially produced as well as the goals and direction of development at both a high level of abstraction and via concrete contestation around specific sites. As a "planetary action system," the conflictual and capacity-building activities of the AGM thus renders visible the functional and dysfunctional implications of global neoliberalism as an economic, political, and social system articulating environmental, ecological, and social justice movements as a network of networks.

Ultimately, green movements engaged from both environmental and ecological paradigms raise issues of interest representations that established theories of social and political systems are ill equipped to address. The primary sociological focus upon the interests of extant individuals coordinated as collectivities within discrete societies and nations is ill equipped to address intergenerational issues and transboundary flows, with consequences for individuals not yet born. Here, Barbara Adam's (1998) work on the importance of the temporal dimensions of environmental change provide one means of engagement. The recent move to global contestation by green movements, the use of computer-mediated communications, enhanced spatial mobility, and the adoption of network forms resonates strongly with analytical themes central to complexity theory which seems set to become a key theoretical resource for twenty-first-century social science and the study of green movements (Urry 2003).

— Ian Welsh

See also Civil Society; Ecofeminism; Frankfurt School; Globalization; Habermas, Jürgen; Network Theory; Social Movement Theory; Strength of Weak Ties

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H

HABERMAS, JÜRGEN

Today, Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929) is the best known representative of critical theory or the Frankfurt School. At the center of his theory of modernity is the explication of a twofold concept of society combining action and system theory. Two forms of integration correspond to these paradigms in social theory: social and system integration (Habermas 1981:223ff.). Mechanisms of social integration refer to orientations of actors constituting the societal order of values, norms, and communicative process. In contrast, market exchange and power as mechanisms of system integration transcend the orientations of actors and integrate nonintended contexts of action through functional networks. Whereas socially integrated interaction remains at least intuitively understandable for actors and can therefore be captured meaningfully, system integrated contexts lie beyond the self-explication of actors and can only be explained from the point of view of the observer.

Hence, two concepts of society can be assigned to these mechanisms of integration: The central idea of social integration points in conjunction with communicative action to the concept of the *lifeworld*. In contrast, system integration refers to the concept of a boundary-maintaining system that connects consequences of social action functionally. However, it is always the same one and only society that is described by these diverging categories. From the internal point of view of actors, society is seen as a sociocultural lifeworld, while from the observer's point of view, it is regarded as a social system. By means of this conceptual duplex, Habermas describes all kinds of societies as systematically stabilized contexts of socially integrated groups.

For Habermas, a differentiation of lifeworld and system has developed in the process of social evolution. In primitive societies, social and system integration are closely related, while in the course of societal development, the mechanisms of system integration become disconnected

from social integration. With the transition to modernity, these two principles have become largely separated. In contemporary societies, lifeworld and system exist in opposition to each other.

Private sphere and political-cultural public represent the institutional orders of the lifeworld. In these primarily socially integrated areas, the symbolic reproduction of society takes place (i.e., the tradition and innovation of cultural knowledge, social integration, and socialization). Therefore, symbolic reproduction not only represents just one but several functions which modern lifeworlds serve (Habermas 1992:77). The lifeworld consists of *culture*, *society* and *personality* (Habermas 1988:99). With these three elements, modern lifeworlds develop the educational system, the law, and the family as institutions highly specialized to fulfil these functional specifications. According to Habermas, these lifeworld components remain connected to each other through the medium of language. Colloquial language imposes strict limits on the functional differentiation of the lifeworld so that its totality is not endangered.

With regard to the reciprocal interpenetration of lifeworld discourses, Habermas (1985:418) speaks of the ability of intersubjective self-understanding of modern societies. Thus, the borders between the socially integrated areas remain open. All parts of the lifeworld refer to one comprehensive public, in which society develops reflexive knowledge of itself. Although the lifeworld is structured by communicative action, it does not, however, constitute the center of modern societies. Habermas sees the potential of rationality as highly endangered because the communicative infrastructure of lifeworlds is threatened by both colonialization and fragmentation.

Outside of the lifeworld, the capitalist economy and public administration are situated. These two functional subsystems of society use money and organizational power as their media of exchange. They specialize in the material reproduction of the lifeworld. Between economy and

private households, on the one hand, and public administration and political-cultural public, on the other hand, exchange relations exist. Habermas conceptualizes economy and politics as open systems that maintain an intersystemic exchange with their social environments. From the point of view of the economy and the political system, the lifeworld is just a societal subsystem. From the vantage of the lifeworld, the economic and administrative complex appear as rationalized contexts of action which transcend the intuitive understanding of actors.

As the media-based exchange relations between the lifeworld and system illustrate, the separation of system and social integration is, even in contemporary societies, far from complete. The economic and administrative complex remain connected to the lifeworld as the systemic media money and organizational power are in need of an institutional anchorage in the lifeworld. Although communicative action, on the one hand, and capitalist economy and political administration, on the other, are asymmetrically related, the lifeworld remains, in contrast to the functional subsystems, the more comprehensive concept of social order. Only by anchoring legal institutions in the lifeworld, markets and the authority of the state can persist (Habermas 1992:59). This is why the areas of system integration are constituted legally.

In his study *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (1992), Habermas points to the importance that the theory of communicative action attributes to the category of law. Modern law is connected with both the lifeworld and the functional subsystems, hence serving intermediary functions between social and system integration. Lifeworld messages must be translated into the language of law before they can be understood in economy and politics. Modern law works like a transformer that guarantees that normative messages circulate throughout society.

Habermas's theory of modernity has been criticized in many ways. One important line of criticism refers to the normative texture of the theory of communicative action. Rational potential of reflexivity is only imputed to the socially integrated lifeworld even though lifeworlds constitute only a part of modern societies. Also, the categorical distinction between functionally specialized subsystems (economy, administration, politics) and the specific parts of the lifeworld (education, law, family) is not as clear as it may seem at first glance. According to McCarthy (1986:209ff.), only a gradual distinction can be observed between these areas. Education, law, and family also suffer from unintended consequences of social action. At the same time, economy and public administration remain, just as the communicative structure of the lifeworld, dependent on the use of ordinary language.

— Gerd Nollmann

See also Frankfurt School; Luhmann, Niklas; Parsons, Talcott; Verstehen; Weber, Max

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HABITUS

The concept of habitus is characterised by a useful degree of imprecision that has allowed it to be taken up by a range of very different social theorists, in very different contexts. It addresses the need to think about humans without resorting to the gnostic mysteries of psychoanalysis, on the one hand, or the implausible clarity of rational actor theories, on the other. The closest one might be able to come to a generally acceptable definition of habitus would focus on those aspects of human behaviour and cognition that are inexplicit, less than fully conscious, ungoverned by deliberate decision making, and bound up with and in the embodied encounter with others and the environment. Any lack of conceptual clarity thus arguably has its origins in the indeterminacy of what the notion is attempting to grasp.

Deriving from philosophy—being used by, among others, Hegel and Husserl—habitus, in its original Latin meaning, refers to the habitual or typical state or condition of the body. The notion came to prominence and found its widest currency, however, within twentieth-century social theory. Following occasional mentions by Weber, Durkheim, and Mauss, the first extensive sociological use of the concept can be found in Norbert Elias's work on "the civilising process" during the 1930s. Acknowledging habitus as a concept capable of individual and collective application, Elias talks about our "second nature," "an automatically-functioning self-restraint, a habit that, within certain limits, also functions when a person is alone" (Elias 2000:117). Rooted in early socialisation, according to Elias, the embodied disciplines of thoughtless habit create the everyday possibility of ordered, complex, and intense social life. This was also later emphasised by Berger and Luckmann in *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966:70–85). It is, arguably, a key theme that lurks, semiacknowledged at best,

below the surface of most interactionist sociology, not least the work of Erving Goffman.

An increasingly common item in the modern social theory vocabulary, habitus owes its popularisation to the late Pierre Bourdieu (so much so that he is often taken to be the concept's originator). A key component in his project of developing a sociological understanding of human practice that transcends the "ruinous opposition" between individualistic voluntarism and structuralist determinism, the notion of habitus is threaded in and out of his extensive and broad-ranging legacy of empirical studies. The concept's outlines and ramifications were developed most thoroughly in his foundational theoretical statements, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977), and *The Logic of Practice* (1990).

What Bourdieu encapsulates in habitus are those aspects of human beings that are neither fully conscious nor unconscious, neither collective nor individual (or, perhaps, both simultaneously). Definitively located in embodied individuals, these are inculcated during primary and secondary socialisation, although Bourdieu goes out of his way to avoid the word. In early childhood, the foundations of sociality, from language to morality, are learned, only to be forgotten as the condition of their durability and power. Unreflexively, they are constituted in and through habituation and habit formation.

Habitus is defined by Bourdieu as "an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted" (1977:95). This is central to his vision of human beings as internally in tune, albeit perhaps nonreflexively, with the external material conditions of their existence. Habitus comprises both classificatory schema and practical dispositions, both generative of action and each inextricably implicated in the other. They are subject to a continuous, if less than conscious, process of adjustment to the objective realities of the world to which each individual belongs. These schema and dispositions—notably in the case of the fundamental taxonomies that combine classification and disposition most completely—are transposable, applicable across a widely range of social fields. It is partly in these all-purpose bodies of knowing and doing that the collective logic of practice of any group—"culture"—can be said to exist.

In deference to the word's Latin roots, embodiment is utterly fundamental to Bourdieu's model of habitus. The body is the point of view of the human encounter with the world and the locus of the most consequential practical taxonomies: up/down, left/right, front/back, and male/female, for example. For Bourdieu, the body, exemplified in habitus, is a practical mnemonic, on and in which the foundations of culture are produced and reproduced. Habitus also generates *hexis*, locally distinctive shared ways of being in the world, the complex nonverbals of human practice.

Practical dispositions are not, however, to be understood as rules. Nor are they anything to do with conscious rational

decision making. Habitus is the framework within which humans improvise their way through life, a facilitatory capacity that allows locally specific learned practices and the classificatory architecture of knowledge and cognition to adjust to the demands, possibilities, and impossibilities of actual settings and contexts, in such a way that meaningful, mutually sensible responses emerge and can be acted on. Any particular habitus will be more or less compatible with any specific social field, depending on origins and history. It is in this sense, although this is perhaps the most obscure aspect of Bourdieu's writings on the topic, that habitus can be said to be collective as well as definitively individual.

Bourdieu used this basic model to analyse a range of topics: peasant marriage strategies, the layout of North African houses, the appreciation of high art, formal education, cultural consumption, stratification, and gender domination, to mention only some (see Jenkins 2002). In its appropriation by Anglophone sociology, much of the subtlety of the concept has been diluted, the result being a somewhat mystified version of anthropology's omnibus model of culture. The abiding significance of habitus is likely to be its emphasis on the embodiment of cognition and its evasion of any either/or choice between conscious rationality and the unconscious as the wellsprings of human behaviour.

— Richard Jenkins

See also Bourdieu, Pierre; Elias, Norbert; Goffman, Erving; Symbolic Interaction

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HALL, STUART

Born in Kingston, Jamaica, Stuart Hall's (b. 1932) contribution has been threefold: He is (1) a founding father of cultural studies, (2) a major, largely synthetic theorist of culture and race, and (3) a leading black public intellectual. He was educated in Jamaica College, an elite school in the West Indies with a long tradition of training professionals

and colonial administrators. He migrated to England in 1951, enrolling as a Rhodes scholar at Merton College, Oxford. Here he became involved in British and Jamaican politics and embarked on a PhD studying the relationship between Europe and America in the novels of Henry James. What he calls “the double conjuncture” of the Allied invasion of Suez and the Soviet repression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 provided a fillip to his political activism.

In 1957, he quit Oxford and cofounded and coedited the *University and Left Review (ULR)*, a publication that presented “New Left” thinking on politics and the arts. In 1960, the *ULR* was merged with the *New Reasoner*, dominated by an older group of intellectuals, notably John Saville and Edward and Dorothy Thompson, to form the *New Left Review*. Between 1960 and 1962, Hall edited the journal, publishing articles on popular culture, housing, politics, and dissent, especially the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Hall is unusual among intellectuals of his generation in having a background in which prominent media experience preceded an academic career.

In 1962, Hall was appointed to teach media, film, and popular culture at Chelsea College, University of London. He also engaged in collaborative research for the British Film Institute into the popular arts. In 1964, he accepted the post of research fellow at the newly established Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. Founded by Richard Hoggart, the Centre sought to examine culture, especially working-class culture, through a mixture of political, sociological, and literary perspectives. Hall succeeded Hoggart as director in 1968.

Under Hall’s influence, intellectual labour in the Centre became more theoretical and political. A dialogue between a variety of approaches from continental traditions, including Volosinov’s “multiaccented” approach to linguistics, semiotics, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Poulantzas, Lukács, Althusser, Gramsci, and many others, was attempted. It was layered on to the native tradition of British *culturalism* that purported to understand “the whole way of life” of the people, as embodied in the writings of Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson. The model of intellectual labour was borrowed from Gramsci’s concept of the *organic intellectual*, which emphasizes the requirement of the intellectual to operate at the cutting edge of new ideas and constitute the transmission belt of knowledge to the working class. The concept gives pronounced importance to the political responsibilities of the intellectual. To some extent, the intellectual labour conducted in the Centre during Hall’s time can best be understood as an attempt to fuse elements of continental structuralism and poststructuralism with the domestic tradition of culturalism and socialist humanism. However, by the mid-1970s, when arguably the Centre began to produce its most important work, the theoretical rudder behind research and debate was Althusserian “scientific”

structuralist-Marxism uneasily combined with Gramscian culturalism. During this period, Hall and his associates made a number of key interventions into British cultural and political life, notably through innovative and challenging studies of schooling (Hall and Jefferson 1990), ideology (Hall, Lumley, and McLennan 1978), and state formation (Hall, Langan, and Schwarz 1985). Hall (1973) also achieved a minor *success de scandale* in the field of mass communications research, with his encoding/decoding model of the media message. This was an explicitly political reading of the media that attacked professional notions of media objectivity and transparency and sought to elucidate the mechanisms of media manipulation and the demystification of media messages.

However, perhaps the most important publication to emerge was *Policing the Crisis* (Hall et al 1978). This densely argued, consistently politically engaged book combined textual analysis, cultural interpretation, historical analysis, and political commentary to produce a compelling set of arguments about British state formation and cultural regulation. Following Gramsci, but also clearly operating in the Althusserian tradition, the authors presented the unfolding British crisis in politics, society, and culture as the consequence of a shifting “war of position and manoeuvre.” Hegemony was depicted as the result of multiple compromises and concessions between the state, the capitalist class, and the working class. The formation of the *representative-interventionist state* is traced back to the 1880s. One of its main preconditions was the creation of a new *social bloc* in culture and the body politic, intent on winning support from the working class. Hegemony is accomplished by a *complex unity* of social, political, and economic alliances. However, following Gramsci, it is theorized as a conditional phenomenon. Hall and his associates argued that this unity was buckling in the 1960s and 1970s under the strain of wage inflation, low economic growth, the high cost of the welfare state, and militant trade unionism. The result was the revitalization of the Right, which was symbolized in the rise of Thatcherism with its candid repudiation of welfarism, stringent controls on wage bargaining, privatization programme, and “heroic” attack on trade union rights. *Policing the Crisis* aligned itself with the struggle for popular democratic socialism. It is perhaps the high-water mark of work in the Centre, and although many of its assumptions and propositions are now challenged, it remains a remarkable achievement.

Although the Centre is primarily remembered for its publications on culture, it was also an innovative training centre. Under Hall’s directorship, the hierarchy between staff and students was softened in favour of a collaborative approach to research and publications. In addition to lectures and seminars the subgroup was an essential part of the teaching regime. Subgroups were organized around areas of thematic research in culture, such as policing, the media,

schools, and feminism. Curriculum development and collaborative research was sponsored by partnerships between staff and students. They operated with a self-image of “inventing” cultural studies as they went along, a heady rubric that was legitimated by the relative absence of academic studies of popular culture and that generated a huge amount of intellectual excitement and ferment. A tribute to these methods is the large number of Birmingham alumni who moved on to become key figures in cultural studies both nationally and internationally: Phil Cohen, Hazel Corby, Paul Gilroy, Larry Grossberg, Dick Hebdige, Angela McRobbie, David Morley, Frank Mort, and Paul Willis.

In 1979, Hall left Birmingham to become professor of sociology at the Open University. His thought remained politically oriented and was exploited and developed along three fronts. Firstly, he explored the phenomenon of Thatcherism, especially in relation to its legitimacy with working-class voters, that is, the main victims of cuts in welfare provision and wage restraint. Drawing on the work of Gramsci and Poulantzas, he developed the concept of *authoritarian populism* to refer to voluntary support for policies of nationalism and statism that oppose welfarism and trade union rights. In a series of articles and lectures, he dismantled the popular appeal of Thatcherism and revealed its cultural and historical elisions. At this time, Hall was an extremely important, courageous voice on the Left in Britain, countering the Thatcherite logic that “There is no such thing as society” and “There is no alternative” to the deregulated market.

Secondly, and conversely, his (Hall and Jacques 1990) “New Times” thesis berated the Left for repeating the mantra of class analysis. It stopped short of abandoning the relevance of class in social development. However, in an evident concession to postmodernism, Hall emphasized the significance of fragmentation, globalization, mobility, post-Fordism, the aestheticization of everyday life, and new social movements in decentring traditional concepts of identity, including class identity.

Thirdly, he wrote more systematically about race and ethnicity. He (1992) related racism to the dominance of Western epistemology and its historical expression in colonialism. He identified “new ethnicities” in British society associated with the emergence of black British culture. He introduced the term *hyphenated identity* to describe the status of British-born black immigrants. His work on racism made extensive use of the concepts of diaspora and hybridity borrowed from postcolonialism. He applied the concept of *institutionalized racism* to apply to the taken-for-granted assumptions of racial superiority engrained in legal, social, and political categories. He was also a major participant in the Parekh Report (2000) on the future of multicultural society, a document that included many detailed policies designed to achieve racial justice in work, education, and politics.

Hall’s post-Birmingham thinking on politics and social theory was heavily influenced by the linguistic turn in Western Marxism, especially the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). The latter, via an engagement with Lacan and Foucault, stressed the “radically contingent” character of social formations and cultural articulations. From them, Hall assigned greater significance to the symbolic in cultural analysis and gravitated towards a view of identity as multiple, discontinuous, fragmented, and always and already, “under erasure.” His later work amounts to a critique of identity thinking, especially as it is enunciated in the notion of Western white superiority.

An avaricious thinker, Hall has often committed the mistake of trying to assimilate fashionable new ideas by alloying them to traditional arguments and concepts. His (1986) exposure to poststructuralism and postmodernism has led him to declare that he is now in favour of “Marxism without guarantees,” a curious appellation that demonstrates Hall’s habit of wanting to have his cake and eat it. The attempt to merge Althusserianism with Gramscianism in the 1970s is another case in point. The structuralist bent in Althusser, which is revealed in his discussion of ideology, interpellation, and the ideological/repressive state apparatus, is in a state of considerable tension with Gramsci’s interpretive, contingency-sensitive Marxism. Hall was never going to preside over a happy marriage between these contrary elements, yet he devoted considerable energies to doing so. His appetite for new ideas and antiessentialism resulted in a high degree of slippage, both in the meaning that he attached to key concepts, such as *hegemony*, *conjuncture*, and *articulation*, and his propositions about social-democratic transformation. His later years have been marked by an attack on identity thinking that is nonetheless attached to a politics of socialism. This leaves Hall’s politics awkwardly placed in a wishful state of seeking a rainbow coalition of dissenting, repressed elements whose identity is “always and already” “under erasure.”

His commitment to the linguistic turn has left his theoretical work peculiarly bereft of an empirical dimension. His propositions are not based in qualitative fieldwork or quantitative research. He has used political engagement as the pretext for “testing” his ideas, a practice that more empirically minded social scientists would perhaps deem to be luxurious.

Yet Hall’s work also resonates a level of general vitality and specific attention to the detail of normative coercion that makes it a valuable resource in the study of culture. His attempt to produce a historically informed reading of culture reached its fullest expression with *Policing the Crisis*. Notwithstanding that, an appreciation of history, theory, and ideology permeates his work on culture and lifts it above what might be called alfresco studies of popular culture that perhaps engage too ingenuously with the enthusiasms of cultural actors. His emphasis on the *social*

imaginary, the category of utopian theorizing about emancipatory politics that mixes social science with the humanities, is also inspirational. In his teaching, Hall championed social inclusion and launched sallies against time-worn hierarchy. In his writing and politics, he railed against ascription and inherited authority, in favour of collaboration and a unity composed of living through and with difference.

— Chris Rojek

See also Althusser, Louis; Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Cultural Studies and the New Populism; Gramsci, Antonio; Marxism; Media Critique

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HARDING, SANDRA

Currently a professor of social sciences and comparative literature at the University of California, Los Angeles, Sandra Harding also serves as the director of the UCLA Center for the Study of Women. She earned her PhD in philosophy from New York University and spent the first part of her career at the University of Delaware, where she taught philosophy.

Well known and widely influential in connection with feminist standpoint theory, Harding has also played a pivotal role in feminist science studies. In the former arena, Harding stands out for acknowledging that embodiment bears different consequences for boys and men than for girls and women. From their distinctive forms of embodiment

flow ramifications not only for the "social relations" typical of each gender but also for the "intellectual life" typical of each (Harding 1994:21). Yet scientific methodology presupposes that researchers are interchangeable (Harding 1991b:51). Both as a feminist critic of the institution of science and as a feminist standpoint theorist, Harding rigorously challenges that presupposition. Her work revolves around a productive rejection of that taken-for-granted tenet of the scientific infrastructure.

Harding's (1990:86) work emphasizes *principled ambivalence*, albeit implicitly most of the time. That concept serves her in a double-sided way. On the one side stand her methodological and feminist principles evocative of keen disenchantment with how science has been institutionalized. On the other side stand the ethical principles pivotal in Harding's work, namely, equality, diversity, and community (both scientific and feminist). She insists, for example, that "the subject of feminist knowledge . . . must be multiple and even contradictory" (1991b:284). Equality and diversity demand no less, and community presupposes such real-world subjects rather than their oversimplified theoretical counterparts.

Like other feminist standpoint theorists, Harding argues that women's diverse and often contradictory positions in various social worlds provide them with distinctive, significant insights. Although that argument broadly undergirds feminist theory as well as other feminist scholarship, she is particularly emphatic about how women's "self-contradictory identities and social locations" (1991a:103) can serve them as epistemological resources.

Harding's work also pays some attention to men's identities and even their feminism. Emphasizing the experiential, practical grounds of gender, she notes that commonplace notions about masculinity largely derive from how often men oversee things, while notions of femininity come mostly from women's caregiving (1990:98). She concludes that engaging in both kinds of practices promotes feminist values and knowledge. Much of her work implies that such practical inclusiveness promotes a kind of multicultural or border-crossing consciousness. Yet such consciousness is not easily won. She explores, for instance, how readily some Euro-American feminist theorists simultaneously "appear to overestimate their own ability to engage in antiracist thought but to underestimate men's ability to engage in feminist thought" (1991b:277).

Ever the critical thinker committed to incorporating the multiple contradictions built into both our everyday lives and our social theories, Harding brings to feminist theory a liveliness of intellect that has imploded academic stances toward gender, science, identity, hierarchy, and social theory itself. Her own overriding goal has been to overhaul science as well as social theory so as "to make sense of women's social experience" (1986:251) Given the pervasive use of gender as a basis of social differentiation and the

division of labor in society, gender stands at the center of Harding's work just as it remains pivotal to how "humans identify themselves as persons, organize social relations, and symbolize meaningful natural and social events and processes" (1986:18).

More than most feminist theorists, Harding establishes forceful parallels between the uses of gender in society and its uses in science and social theory. Her work shows that to illuminate social reality necessitates organizing one's approach around girls' and women's distinctive knowledge. Without centralizing their knowledge, it implies, social theorists are doomed to perpetuate the distortions of science and theory institutionalized on narrowly masculine bases. In her own words, she seeks "an end to androcentrism, not to systematic inquiry." Like other standpoint theorists as well as most feminist theorists, she knows that such a shift will "require far-reaching transformations in the cultural meanings and practices of that inquiry" (1986:10). All the while, however, she insists that standpoint theory is "science-based," even though the science it promulgates leaves behind the male-centered grounds of modern science. (Harding in Hirsh and Olson 1995:25)

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Feminist Epistemology; Minnich, Elizabeth; Smith, Dorothy

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HARTSOCK, NANCY

Political theorist and activist Nancy C. M. Hartsock is renowned for her development and ongoing elaboration of feminist standpoint theory and her theoretical articulations concerning power and epistemology in Western culture. At the foundation of Hartsock's social theory are the beliefs that theory plays an important part in political action for social change and that social theorists must respond to and concentrate their energies on problems of political action as they arise in the context of social change. Her social theory works the tensions between theory and praxis, arguing that feminist theory must guide and participate in real-world social, political, and economic change. Her theoretical work examines relationships between theory and praxis, feminism and Marxism, and postmodernism and politics.

Hartsock's theorizing examines how we construct and are constructed by social relations of power and how to intervene in these relations. She thus pays close attention to relations of domination: How are these constructed, maintained, resisted, and transformed, particularly along race, class, and sexuality lines? Questions of power are inseparable from questions of epistemology. That is, how one conceptualizes power always includes specific theoretical assumptions. Therefore, she focuses attention on such questions as how knowledge is constructed, which methods are best for social research, how to create alternative epistemologies and ontologies, and how to understand the relationship of theories of knowledge to lived experience.

Hartsock was born into a lower middle-class family in Utah on February 13, 1943. She earned a BA from Wellesley College, a women's college in Massachusetts, and a PhD from the University of Chicago in political science. Her doctoral dissertation, titled *Politics, Ideology, and Ordinary Language: The Political Thought of Black Community Leaders*, combined her academic and activist work to argue that black community leaders were as much political thinkers and theorists as Locke, Rousseau, Mill, and others. This work launched a career based around the belief that feminist theory is social praxis. Beginning in the 1970s, Hartsock worked as a social activist in the civil rights, student, and antiwar movements in the United States.

Also during the 1970s, Hartsock became involved in the feminist movement emerging both on and off university campuses. She started a consciousness-raising group—a bedrock of second-wave feminism—in 1970. At this time she was hired as the first woman assistant professor at the

University of Michigan in the Department of Political Science. She and her colleagues there began a subfield in political economy with a stated purpose of educating black and women scholars. While on leave in 1973 in Paris, Hartsock taught herself Marxist theory by reading original works by Marx and members of the Frankfurt school. She then moved to Washington, D.C., where she was first exposed to feminist theory in a seminar taught by Charlotte Bunch, a founder of the Furies, a lesbian separatist group. In 1973, with Charlotte Bunch and others, Hartsock founded *Quest: A Feminist Quarterly*, to both connect theory with activism and to explore questions of power and leadership in the context of divisions along lines of race, class, and sexuality. She is the author of *Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism* (1983b), *The Feminist Standpoint Revisited* (1998), and coeditor of *Building Feminist Theory* (1981). She is currently professor of political science and women's studies at the University of Washington.

Standpoint epistemology as articulated by Hartsock (1983b:117) reworks Marx's historical materialism from a feminist perspective to explicate the "genderedness of relations of domination and offers the concept of feminist standpoint to account for the gendered form of power relations." In doing so, Hartsock adheres to two central Marxist traditions: that social relations structure (not determine) the ways we understand the world, and that concepts and categories both structure and express the ways we interact with the world. She argues that epistemology develops from material social life. Marxist theory provides alternatives to the Enlightenment account of what counts as truth or knowledge. It also offers a basis for more nuanced understandings of subjectivity and allows for a better understanding of the connections between knowledge and power, particularly privileged knowledge.

Hartsock's most influential contribution to feminist theory is her articulations of and continuous development of standpoint theory. As originally developed in her 1983 article "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism" (1983a), standpoint theory articulates the concept of a feminist standpoint—standpoint produced by a collective subject, or group that is marked as different or inferior in society. Developed through both critique and borrowing of Marx's historical materialism and Lukac's accounts of the proletarian subject, Hartsock argued that material life structures and constrains understandings of social relations. One's position in systems of domination shapes one's understandings of social life. The vision or perspective of those in ruling positions structures the material conditions in which all people must work. Therefore, the vision available to oppressed groups must be struggled for and is an achievement that requires analysis. As an engaged vision, the potential understanding of the oppressed, the adoption

of a standpoint, makes visible the inhumanity of relations among human beings and carries a liberatory potential (a "yearning," in the words of bell hooks). Hartsock's argument is that women's lives contain possibilities for developing critiques of domination and visions of alternative social arrangements. That is, for Hartsock, a feminist standpoint offers a deeper understanding of social life than that available to Marx's and Lukac's proletariat. Women's social experience of power is different from men's social experience and, as a result, is different from men's social theories.

Building on Hartsock's work, feminist standpoint theory argues that "truth claims" originate from and are justified by persons in privileged social positions. The two main assumptions in feminist standpoint theory are that knowledge is grounded in historical sociopolitical locations and that women occupy a social location that affords them a multifaceted access to social phenomena. In making these assertions, feminist standpoint theory challenges the "masculinist" definition of truth and method embodied in modern Western science and epistemology by creating an alternative method grounded in the "truth claims" of women's lives (however diverse those lives are).

As initially articulated in the 1980s, feminist standpoint theory appeared incongruous with postmodernism and poststructuralism in its inability to attend to difference. Early standpoint theorists (i.e., Dorothy Smith and Sandra Harding) argued that women, as a marginalized group, possess a unique perspective from which to see the world. Over the past two decades, standpoint theories have been critiqued and, at times, reformulated by scholars who work in the tradition of material feminism but who are also influenced by postmodernism. The critiques differentially argue that standpoint theories assume embodied knowledge, construct an essentialist view of identity and identity politics, and obscure multiplicity and difference by constructing a universal women's experience, and are unable to see standpoint as constructed and fluid. However, some feminist theorists argue that feminist standpoint theories do attend to difference by defining knowledge as particular rather than universal, truth as situated, perspectival, and discursive, and subjects as constructed, not transcendent (i.e., Susan Hekman). Patricia Hill Collins, Chela Sandoval, and Donna Haraway attempt to resolve some of these assertions with the respective concepts of "the matrix of domination," "situated knowledges," and "oppositional consciousness." In Hartsock's most recent work, *The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays* (1998), she revisits standpoint theory in light of these reformulations and other postmodern critiques. Accounting for multiple subjects, Hartsock reasserts her idea of standpoint as a group-based, collective position, not an individual one. In addition, she engages with postmodern theories and asserts her suspicion of postmodernism's rejection of the unified subject at the

precise time of the emergence of other knowledges, such as postcolonialism.

Nancy Hartsock's current work examines the complex dynamics of women, commodification, and globalization. Taking Marx's understanding of the circulation of commodities as a starting point, she theorizes that women's involvement in the circulation of commodities is much more complex than men's: Women sell their labor power, just as men do, but unlike men, women are involved in the reproduction of labor power, in biological reproduction, and in social reproduction more generally. Furthermore, women are commodities in the way that few men are. Hartsock explores the ways in which dynamics of commodification and the circulation of commodities allow for women's involvement in informal spheres, export processing zones, varieties of trafficking in persons, and allow for their labor to be used to take up the slack when structural adjustment policies are put into effect in both the global North and South.

—Laura Mamo

See also Collins, Patricia Hill; Feminism; Feminist Epistemology; Harding, Sandra; Marxism; Smith, Dorothy E.; Standpoint Theory

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HAWLEY, AMOS

Amos H. Hawley was born in 1910 in St. Louis, Missouri. He acquired the BA degree from the University of Cincinnati (1936) and the MA (1938) and PhD (1941) degrees from the University of Michigan. He stayed on at the University of Michigan as a faculty member until 1961. Professor Hawley joined the faculty of the University of North Carolina in 1966, becoming Kenan Professor of

Sociology in 1970. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, past president of the Population Association of America (1971) and the American Sociological Association (1978). He is the author of over 150 articles and books.

Hawley was the major theorist in human ecology during the period from 1950, when he published *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure*, until the late 1970s, when the population ecology of organizations began to dominate this branch of macrosociology. Human ecology is the study of how populations organize to adapt to their environments. Hawley argued that adaptation to the social and physical environment was always a collective phenomenon for humans, accomplished through social organization. Hawley's perspective is firmly macrosociological in that the relationships among individuals are structures that respond to changes in the social, technical, and physical environment. These structures are independent of the people who inhabit them, have properties that are not reducible to those individuals, and survive generations of successive replacements. Organization can both grow (expanding toward the maximum size that can be supported by the environment at a given technology) and evolve (add information from the environment to create new technology and thus new potential for growth). Hawley was a parsimonious, elegant thinker who believed that a unified theory composed of definitions, assumptions, and hypotheses derived from these elements could apply across systems and time periods. The latest comprehensive statement of his theory was in 1986, in a slim volume entitled *Human Ecology: A Theoretical Essay*.

The human ecology tradition began in the Chicago school, with the work of Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess. Hawley studied under R. D. McKenzie, a Chicago graduate, at the University of Michigan. His early work followed the Chicago school in focusing on spatial distributions in urban environments. Soon, however, he decided that the static, spatial emphasis of that work was less interesting than the study of change, structure, and functioning of the social system in an environmental context. He explicitly borrowed from bioecologists the idea that variation, adaptation, and selection were the processes that shaped any population in interacting with its environment.

Hawley's theory can be summarized in three general propositions covering adaptation, growth, and evolution. The first postulate states that adaptation occurs through the formation of interdependencies among the units in a population. Relationships form to increase the viability of a population in an environment. The second proposition is that system development continues until it reaches the upper limit that can be sustained by the environment, given a certain technology for communication and transportation (the cultural tools most relevant to relationship formation). The evolution proposition suggests that when systems acquire

new information (technology), the process in the first two propositions is resumed until a new equilibrium is reached.

Which aspects of these functional relationships dominated in his theory varied over the course of his career. In his early work, Hawley retained some of the fascination that early human ecologists had held for the spatial arrangement of activities in an urban environment, and how they were related to the physical and technological features like transportation links (river, rail, etc.). He abstracted that earlier concern into a more general conceptualization of an environment that provided combinations of conditions that, although constantly subject to change, were always limited in the opportunities they afforded living populations. The basic processes of ecology for Hawley were the collective, organizing, expansive quality of social groups in an restricted but ever-changing environment. The crowding of organisms subsisting upon limited resources resulted in competition, a struggle for survival. In human ecology, the community is the pattern of symbiotic and commensalistic relations that develop in a population, in its collective response to a habitat. Community organization constitutes the adjustment of the community to that environment. The pattern of relationships in the community as an aggregate represented a collective organization that had properties that could not be derived from the sum of its individual parts.

In later statements of the theory, Hawley's work shifted emphasis from competition to adaptation. The general meaning of change remained the same—it was an irreversible shift in the pattern of relationships among the units in a population. While early statements focused on changes that were prompted by environmental variations over time, later statements gave more attention to internal growth that occurred as a population matured and maximized its use of environmental resources. Thus, competition with other units in the environment became somewhat less important than internally generated developments. Possibly influenced by his colleague Gerhard Lenski at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Hawley's last theoretical statements emphasized the role of technology (especially communication and transportation modes) in limiting internal adaptation to an environment. New technologies could dramatically expand the types of collective organization and allow populations to grow.

From the beginning, Hawley had argued for a seamless theoretical connection to general ecology—human ecology was a third branch of a tripartite structure that included plant, animal, and human ecologies. In his last book, Hawley details the distinctiveness of humans; he places more emphasis on culture (again, often focusing on the technology of communication and transportation that expands the range of possible interrelationship structures within an environment). In earlier works, human behavior was seen as more parallel to animal behavior. In his last

book, culture is synonymous with the concept of ecosystem. However, even in his last treatments, Hawley focuses on positive, cumulative change in response to technological innovation and environmental shifts.

While he is careful to note that these responses are probabilistic as opposed to deterministic, his formal theory emphasizes large-scale, long-term changes in society in response to impersonal structural forces. Critics have complained that his theory ignores human agency—a feature that many macrosociologists are likely to count an advantage. For example, to Hawley, norms are reflections of systematic behavior patterns evoked by the functional interdependencies that developed in relation to an environment. Processes of stratification and other social arrangements simply reflect functional relations. Therefore, norms had a structural-functional quality that has struck some critics as an overly determined view of human social organization. Hawley might not argue with this assessment: He is a dedicated macrosociologist, and does not want to explain social organization with reference to the characteristics of the units from which it was composed. Rather, he remains steadfastly at the population, organization, and environment level for both causes and outcomes.

— Miller McPherson

See also Ecological Theory; Park, Robert; Spencer, Herbert; Urbanization

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HELLER, AGNES

Agnes Heller was born in Budapest, Hungary, in 1929 and is a member of the Budapest School, a loosely connected group of intellectuals whose identity revolves around the association with their former teacher Georg Lukàcs and the experience of "really existing socialism" under the domain of the former Soviet Union. The experience of really existing socialism, analysed by Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller, and Görgy Márkus (1983) in *Dictatorship over Needs*, contributed to an understanding and critique of the totalitarian version of modernity, which has been

subsequently accompanied by the experience and critique of the liberal-democratic one. This double experience culminated in Heller's *A Theory of Modernity* (1999).

Heller's critical theory of modernity is also accompanied by a philosophical anthropology grounded in needs and feelings, of which *A Theory of Feelings* (1979) is central. Heller's philosophical anthropology also opens onto a paradigm of social action articulated in terms of ethics, morals, and the self-responsibility of the reflexive and self-authoring subject. Each aspect of her work is underscored by her project of value rationality, which is spelt out in "Towards a Marxist Theory of Value" (1972), *Radical Philosophy* (1984), and *The Power of Shame* (1985). Heller's critical theory and its main concerns can be illuminated through her theory of modernity and, for her, its central value category of freedom.

In Heller's view, modernity is not a problem to be solved, managed, or negated. Nor is it an unfinished project. Rather, it is an unresolvable paradox or double bind. For her, the paradox of modernity stems from its founding principle of the value of freedom—it is a foundation that can provide no foundations (Heller 1999:4, 54).

In a similar position to post-Marxian and post-Parsonian interpretations of modernity, Heller's version is multidimensional and loosely configured. It does not "fit" together. This entails that the paradox of freedom—or the double bind of modernity—is infused in all of the loosely configured, yet nonetheless constituting, dimensions that are conceptualized by her in terms of the logics of technology, the division of positions, functions, and wealth, and political power and domination. Accompanying these logics are the technical and historical cultural imaginaries and the constituents of contingency and critique. These logics, imaginaries, and constituents interact and compete and resist overall coordination and integration.

What makes modernity especially dynamic, according to Heller, is the way that freedom is mobilized as a project for both contingency and critique. For Heller, one of the principles of modern freedom is the principle of contingency. Drawing on the work of the neosystems theorist Niklas Luhmann, Heller argues that there is no fixed, predetermined telos to a modern person's life and its social location. It is not only that modern social arrangements replace premodern status hierarchies with ones that are determined by functions, but more so that this process is open-ended. Modernity is also the only period in history where all traditions and established norms, rules, and beliefs have been called into question and delegitimated. This critical deconstruction concerns, especially, those rules, norms, and beliefs referring to truth, goodness, and justice, which, by being increasingly subject to immanent and substantive criticism, lose their static character and become dynamic.

Under the weight of contingency and critique, needs, not all of which can be satisfied, expand exponentially. In

premodern societies, the context into which one is born is the constant position from which needs are interpreted and understood. For Heller, the contingent nature of modern societies into which human beings are born entails that needs and their interpretation are opened. To be sure, for Heller, all needs in all social and historical contexts are subject to interpretation and evaluation through value categories that indicate whether they are socially recognized and can be satisfied and are viewed, for example, as good or bad, or right or wrong. Values are the social a priori and, as such, provide life with meaning in both positive and negative terms that can also take the form of stories and narratives.

Heller argues that the main interpretative and evaluative framework of needs in modernity is derived from the value of freedom. However, this open-ended freedom through which needs expand and the contingency that accompanies it can be experienced as unease, dissatisfaction. Modern societies are characterised by Heller as dissatisfied societies.

In Heller's view, there are two predominant vantage points from which possible need satisfaction can be interpreted in modernity. One can interpret needs, so she argues, by viewing freedom from a particularistic vantage point. This vantage point entails that needs will be interpreted and evaluated not only according to one's own self-interest but also according to the taken-for-granted norms and rules of the particular context or way of life in which one is contingently situated. For example, need satisfaction may be particularistically interpreted from the vantage points of technical mastery or the accumulation of political power or wealth.

However, needs and the feelings of dissatisfaction that arise when they are not met can also be interpreted from a position that abstracts from a particularistic vantage point. They can be reorientated by reflexively interpreting freedom in universalistic terms. For Heller, the content of this universalistic version of freedom refers to humankind as a whole and as an end in itself (Heller 1984:124). This universalistic interpretation denotes Heller's own value stance, commitment, and utopian horizon. She accords the value of freedom in modernity a double-sided impetus. It is a universalistic value ideal that is instituted and becomes the socially recognised frame of reference. As such, it is a value ideal that social actors themselves can move or, in her terms and following Kierkegaard, leap towards. In leaping towards the value ideal of universalistically interpreted freedom, Heller further argues that modern social actors shift from being particularistic individuals to personalities. In her view, becoming a personality entails that modern social actors become ends for themselves, are unique, can change their contingency into a destiny, have a depth of feeling, and have a constancy and reflexivity regarding the value of freedom. Heller recommends that these two aspects of the cultural value ideal of freedom and personality can come together in a plurality of forms of life and a

community of people who are ends in themselves and treat others also as ends. As such they form social and personal relations based on the principle of symmetrical reciprocity.

Heller's image of freedom as a value ideal combines the historicity of values and philosophical anthropology in order to respond to the dilemma and legacy of the Kantian distinction between the noumena and phenomena. For her, freedom is a historically created, culturally embedded, and shared empirical-universal value, and as such, one of the Archimedean points in modernity, but one that cannot be grounded. It can only be interpreted. Nonetheless, social actors can interpret freedom and judge actions from a universalistic perspective, which provides them with meaning beyond particularism. Yet, modern social actors are not, in the first or final instance, determined by freedom. They leap towards it to become someone beyond their own horizon of needs—a good person. In this way, and in Heller's view, there is always the possibility of not only an interpretative-reflexive relation to needs and values but also a qualitative relation to oneself, to others, and to the world.

— John Rundell

See also Democracy; Luhmann, Niklas; Lukács, György; Modernity; Postmarxism; Weber, Max

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HERMENEUTICS

The term *hermeneutics*—the theory or science of interpretation—comes from Hermes, the ancient Greek messenger of the gods. Since the words of the gods were not intelligible to mortals, Hermes had to interpret their meanings and make them accessible to human understanding. The origins of hermeneutics also is associated with Greek poetics and rhetoric. Poetics is the theory of meanings made through words or other symbols, as in the Greek *poieo*, "to make." Rhetoric refers to the art of reaching prudent judgments in matters where absolute knowledge is

impossible. It is therefore an art of verbal persuasion rather than of cognitive domination through definitive proof. Hermeneutics also has roots in the Hebrew interpretation of the Talmud. These various traditions of interpretive knowledge were fused in the West in biblical hermeneutics, which began when early Christian Jewish scholars of the Roman empire combined Greek poetic and rhetorical methods of criticizing texts with the Hebrew tradition of interpreting religious scripture. As religion became the hegemonic ideology in the West, biblical hermeneutics (along with revelation) became the dominant form of knowledge.

Modern hermeneutics begins with Schleiermacher, who codified traditional hermeneutics into a systematic and critical method of biblical interpretation. Wilhelm Dilthey noted that historical knowledge is akin to biblical knowledge insofar as they both depend on the interpretation of written texts. Dilthey thus developed and extended Schleiermacher's critical and systematic biblical hermeneutics to what were then called the historical or human sciences—those disciplines that studied the embodied or objectified expressions of human mind. This included history, of course, but also archaeology, literary criticism, anthropology, sociology and others. Hermeneutic theory and method was further developed by Edmund Husserl, and by Martin Heidegger, who conceived of the natural sciences as symbolic constructions of a sacral Be-ing. Contemporary postmodernists, rhetorical theorists, cultural anthropologists, symbolic interactionists, and deconstructionists also, in their various ways, operate within and extend this tradition.

In contemporary theories of knowledge, hermeneutics usually is opposed to positivism, neopositivism, and rationalism. The positivist approach to knowledge and society has been criticized by neopositivist sociologists and philosophers themselves. For example, Karl Popper and other critical rationalists modified some of the basic assumptions of earlier positivist thought: The idea of causality was qualified by theories of probability, and canons of proof and verifiability were largely replaced by those of disproof and falsifiability. Likewise, Thomas Kuhn stressed the communal aspects of scientific activity and the consensual character of scientific truth.

Such circumspection would seem to safeguard contemporary positivists against criticisms from nonpositivist points of view. However, thinkers in the hermeneutic tradition have challenged the foundationalist assumptions of the positivist method and metaphysic. These critics have argued that the subject matter of social science—human conduct—cannot as such be known through purely objective methods and that, indeed, the more objective our observations, the further we are from what we want to know. The views of humans as objects, and of statistical experimentalism, deductive functionalism, or structural linguistics as explanatory ideals, say these critics, beg the very questions that the human studies should address.

The hermeneutic epistemologies that provide the bases of such critiques today include pragmatism, ordinary language analysis, existentialism, phenomenology, the philosophic history and sociology of science, rhetorical theory, and neo-Marxist critical theory. Though sometimes antagonistic to each other, philosophers as diverse as Dewey, Wittgenstein, Dilthey, and Husserl affirmed the basic hermeneutic assumption that commonsense understanding of experience is the framework within which all inquiry must begin and to which it must return. John Dewey spoke of this framework as the social matrix within which emerge unclarified situations that may then be transformed by science into justifiable assertions. Ludwig Wittgenstein referred to knowledge as a “form of life.” Edmund Husserl wrote of the “life-world” within which all scientific and even logical concepts originate.

The philosophic opposition between positivism and hermeneutics can be seen in the clash between the scientific or mechanistic image of persons and the image that is manifested in everyday life. This manifest image is expressed most directly when we observe everyday accounts of behavior: “Why does she study hard?” “Because she wants to get into college.” “Why does he walk that way?” “He’s trying to look cool.” In the positivist view, however, such accounts of behavior couched in ordinary language can never be granted the status of knowledge. Instead, they represent an obstacle to the acquisition of empirically grounded explanations because they refer to mentalistic concepts (such as wanting or trying). The job of positivism is to purge language, at least scientific language, of such usage. Language must be made objective; the word must refer to the thing or to the specifiable relation between things, preferably in an operationalized form.

Difficulties emerge when one attempts to put this principle into effect. A basic problem occurs for positivists when they confuse motion with action, or reflex with conduct. For example, a woman holding her arm out, palm forward, might be warding off a mugger, drying her nail polish, hailing a cab, or admiring a ring. Yet if mind is reduced to body, there is no way to distinguish these actions. Instead, say hermeneutic thinkers, the above instances must be seen as acts, not motions, and hence they cannot be explained in terms of causes. Indeed, the terms of the thing-world of cause and effect do not allow us to know or even name what these actions are and mean. Because actions are essentially normative and bounded by rules in contexts, it is logically impossible to explain human conduct if we restrict ourselves to the vocabulary of physical science. There is no way of deducing from physiology whether an extended arm is a sign for traffic to halt or for Nazis to salute. Instead of having the character of self-evident physical facts (whatever these may be), action must be understood in terms of reasons, rules, and projects, which themselves are problematic constructions. For example, whether a case is to be one

of “suicide” or “accidental death” depends upon the reconstruction of a context of meaning and the attribution of an intention. It depends, that is, on hermeneutic interpretation. Thus the very possibility of a social *science*, at least on the positivists’ model of physical science, is called into question. In contrast to the positivist model, then, hermeneutics insists that a sufficient explanation of action must include the notion of consciousness, in the sense of intentionality. Indeed, if we allow that intentional description is essential to the understanding of action, it becomes questionable whether positivists, because they disavow the concepts of agency and intentionality, are able to account for human conduct at all.

But hermeneutic thinkers are themselves vulnerable to critique, for in some ways their theories are reverse images of what they scorn. For example, in place of positivism’s brute facts as a foundational datum for the human sciences, hermeneutic thought often posits brute interpretations. Social historians of knowledge have linked science to communitarian practices, but they have tended to see this scientific community as abstracted and disconnected from a larger political economic context, much as positivists view science itself. In place of Descartes’s *a priori cogito* of the individual, then, hermeneutic thinkers have tended to posit an *a priori* collective *cogito* of the community of social actors. In this reductive hermeneutic, no exterior viewpoint is provided for critically assessing the accounts of agents. Such a hermeneutic can treat understanding and meaning, but it cannot distinguish *misunderstandings*, *noncomprehensions*, and *false* meanings from correct ones.

By contrast, a dialectical, critical hermeneutic reveals not only the logical limits of positivism, but also the factual limits of subjective idealist social science. Society is not only praxis but also practico-inert. It is in part like nature. To the extent that society is the product of conscious human intentions, a subjective hermeneutics better encompasses what is salient. But history also is made behind the backs and against the wills of even powerful persons. More important, history—especially history of the *longue durée*—is also made before the eyes but below the awareness and intentions of virtually everyone. Language-interpretive social theory does capture what is or can be communicated. But much, perhaps most, of what goes on is not and cannot be stated, and at least part of what is stated misinterprets this unstated and often unmentionable domain. The solution, however, is not to seek an extralinguistic, positivistic philosophy of science to provide transcultural rules of interpretation, because in such philosophies the subject matter of language games and cultures ceases to exist or is reduced to a set of behavioristic signals.

Thus, on the one hand, we see an objectivistic positivism that seeks only laws about facts and a subjectivist hermeneutics that pursues only interpretations of meanings.

Many social thinkers have sought to bridge this chasm, starting perhaps with Max Weber. But critical, dialectical hermeneutic thinkers have themselves perhaps gone furthest in this direction. For example, by returning to the original hermeneutic metaphors of textuality and translation and of language as symbolic action, thinkers such as Kenneth Burke, Pierre Bourdieu, and Richard Harvey Brown have viewed the obdurate, structural, or factitious aspects of social reality as the master plots or grammars of social texts while construing the cultural objects or meanings thereby generated as akin to acts of speech. Humans thus create meaning, but the structures of possible meanings in turn generate what is and can be human. Such an approach preserves the interpretive power of an earlier hermeneutic but also, dialectically and critically, expands the hermeneutic circle to include “forces,” “causes,” or “factors” that, at least initially, are largely invisible to social actors.

— Richard Harvey Brown

See also Dilthey, Wilhelm; Positivism; Positivismstreit; Pragmatism; Rhetorical Turn; Sociologies of Everyday Life; Symbolic Interaction; Verstehen

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HERRSCHAFT (RULE)

According to general agreement, herrschaft is a basic category of sociological theory, a pivotal concept of political sociology and one, if not *the*, primary object of political science. How herrschaft emerges and elapses, above all how it constitutes itself, are key questions of political life. Who rules and who is being ruled is crucial in political thinking, but the word is often used without reflection or critique.

In general, herrschaft is understood as an asymmetrical social interrelation between one party issuing commands and the other party acting in obedience to orders. In this sense, a person, a group, or an organization can (temporarily) impose subordination upon others and expect that they will comply. It is an institution when characterized by regularity and success. Regardless of whether the ruling entities are represented by persons, or take an anonymous form, they provide a social world of chaos alternating with a stable structure.

Herrschaft is an important element of social order, a field of force around which societal connections and tensions are arranged. In this context, herrschaft is normally understood as a vertical (top-down) relation. However, it can also be regarded as a horizontal relation of equals, where those who rule and those who are ruled coincide and alternate (periodically or constantly). Most doctrines of rule from classical to modern times delineate a social and political order, where a consistent and commanding subject issues orders to specific consignees who obey (or disobey). The political function to come to authoritatively binding decisions, enforced upon the other societal systems, is granted to the ruling system (analogous to the political system in general).

The particular interest of political theory was directed toward the formulation of a typology of modes of herrschaft (aristocracy, monarchy, democracy, technocracy, etc.), initially pictured in a recurring cycle, then in an evolutionary line. In modernity, herrschaft is basically problematic, that is to say, exposed to systematic skepticism and potential overthrow. Questions of participation in and exclusion from herrschaft respectively are being discussed publicly, whereas the assessment of (governmental) power of herrschaft and coordination of (civic) power are of interest in particular. The question is if this political-theoretical concept of herrschaft is still significant for the social world at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT

Valuable clues to this hardly surveyed topic are offered by the historical development of the concept of herrschaft. In ancient Greece, *arché* (verb: *archein*, e.g., in oligarchy [rule of the few] or anarchy [without rule]) meant beginning/origin/principle as well as rule or government. Archons were military commanders and supreme civil servants. Their capability was the “being able to begin” and, according to classical perception, a specific privilege to rule and a sign of politics as such (Arendt 1965). With the terminology of *krátos/kratein* (force/power/rule, e.g., in aristocracy [rule of the best or the aristocrats], democracy [rule of the people]), an until then unknown awareness of ability evolved since the fifth century B.C., especially in the Attic polity in dramatic literature, in the practical-political reform works, and in the

political theory of Aristotle. The classical concept of herrschaft in the polity marks the moderate center between anarchy and tyranny. (Eu)Nomistic systems, provided qua divine law, were gradually replaced by “cratistical” systems, whereupon democratic forms, forms of rule of the people, established themselves for the first time in world history. Political relations of herrschaft (that is, reasonable and belonging to the public sphere) are differentiated from violent master-servant-circumstances, which are limited to the “economic,” that is, home economic sphere.

Herrschaft was a concept of order and reform, born in a crisis, designed to overcome and prevent states of confusion and crisis (or chaotic states without rule). The Roman Republic took up this tradition. In the Latin words *dominium* (property right over goods) and *imperium* (exertion of public force), herrschaft in a political sense is set off against the domestic authority of the paterfamilias, who ruled over persons and inanimate objects (property), as well. The German term *herrschaft* (from *her*, exalted, dignified, then following *herre*, one in high and superior position) still refers to the aspect of domestic authority over family and menial staff as well as free followers. What is meant is a personal and mutual relationship, entitling the following the right to resist should the master fulfill poorly. All traditional forms of herrschaft can still be related to this particular authority of the master, starting with the paterfamilias in the agrarian domestic economy up to sovereigns of an extended and delimited territory. This relationship is an example of the doctrines of authority that led up to the conservative theories of natural law of the eighteenth century usually expressed as an idea of rule in a communal sense (Tönnies [1887]1957). (This concept was unquestioningly associated with the subordination of women.) The *patria potestas*, derived from the home economy, is extended by an official apparatus into a political union. By this, housemates turn into subjects. As a characteristic of the Western societies, a corporative patrimonial system was formed, resisting the attempt of making absolute the central powers and, furthermore, inaugurating a civic control of power and democratic participation. With the establishment of sovereignty, merging anterior singular rights, herrschaft gained a spatial-territorial dimension, giving way to an abstract and rational concept of state in modern times. The underlying separation of private and public is influential in political theory (e.g., of civil society) up to today.

Herrschaft tends to a specific form of representation as well as to a specialization of staffs and formal bureaucracies. Political herrschaft is thus centralizing and eccentric at once, as the role of the sovereign prominently stands out from the repertoire of social roles and claims an exceptional status. In modern times three problems arise from this: (1) the depersonalization of patriarchal, aristocratic, and monarchal herrschaft, (2) the permanent compulsion to legitimize herrschaft, and (3) the problem of bureaucracy.

The process of modernization can be interpreted as an attempt to neutralize herrschaft, in which course the congruity of those ruling and those ruled and the complete elimination of personal (masculine) herrschaft was striven for, through an anonymous, that is, indifferent to persons or gender, rule of law.

CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVES

The political science emerging in this process of modernization itself focused on three basic perspectives. Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and others accentuated the aspect of efficient governance and the art of ruling, ensured by a (legitimate) state-run monopoly on force. Out of the perspective of most contract theories, the emphasis was rather placed on the difficulty of the “masters” to obtain acceptance from the free citizens, who agreed upon a (at any time alterable) ruling entity voluntarily. Here, herrschaft is bound to the act of civic agreement. From a class-theoretical point of view, herrschaft is ascribed to a lack of socioeconomic parity, and the utopia of a society requiring no herrschaft at all is picked out as a central theme.

First Perspective

The mainstream opinion refers, above all, to the sociological concept of herrschaft, established by Max Weber at the beginning of the twentieth century and proliferated throughout the world due to the intensive reception of Weber in system theories and theories of social action. Within the basic concepts of sociology, Weber (1968) differentiates amorphous power (as “every chance to enforce one’s own will within a social relationship even against antagonism, whatever the chance should be based on”) from the *more precise* conception of herrschaft as “the chance to find the obedience of assignable persons for an issued order of specified content.” The facts of herrschaft are thus necessarily tied in with “the current existence of *one* who rules over *another* successfully” (Weber 1968). Weber envisages herrschaft as an actor-based and antagonistic relation, institutionalized in the form of leadership, guaranteeing “the inventory and prevalence of its order within a geographical region continuously by exerting and threatening to use physical force on the part of the administrative staffs.” Herrschaft is thus closely associated to the state as a “compulsory political organization with a continuous organization (*politischer Anstaltsbetrieb*) . . . , if and insofar as its administrative staff upholds a claim to the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber 1968).

The difference between a “true” relation of power and mere use of force lies in the prerequisite “minimum of *intention* to obey as an *interest* (external or internal) in

obeying" (Weber 1968:157; emphasized in the German original) of the one who is ruled. The "motifs of compliance" range from dull habituation to rational consideration. Why people voluntarily give obedience to authority figures, thus accepting (or believing in) the fundamental inequality of those who rule and those who are ruled, was already labeled as the "mystery of rule" (1574) by the philosopher Etienne de la Boëtie. To be ruled in this sense seems to be emanating from a rational calculation of end and means. This is also postulated by the notion of a social contract of individuals making a rational choice and enabling collective action (Coleman 1973).

Out of this leading and predominantly psychological (or socioreligious) perspective on the recognition of herrschaft, Weber classified three types of legitimate herrschaft: First, rational (or legal) herrschaft is based "on the belief in the legality of lawful order (*gesetzte Ordnungen*) and the right to claim allegiance (*Anweisungsrecht*) by those who base themselves on the authority of this order"; second, traditional herrschaft is based on "the mundane belief in the sanctity of ever since valid traditions and the legitimacy of those thus called to authority"; third, charismatic herrschaft is based "on the extraordinary devotion to a person's sanctity or heroic power or exemplary personality and the order revealed or created through this."

The three forms of herrschaft are gathered from empirical evidence and claim timeless and universal validity in the abstraction of a pure or idealized type. Weber nevertheless proceeded on modern and thus known conditions so as to work out the evolutionary dynamics in the evolution of forms of herrschaft, the culmination of which—formal rationalization—was to have existed exclusively in the Western hemisphere. In his opinion, the transition from government to persons to the administration of objects (Schluchter 1972) was most likely accomplished through rational-legal herrschaft by "decree," that is through an impersonal and systematic order, fitted with the following three characteristics: formal law, methodical organization of administration, and habitual *Fachmenschentum* (body of professional specialists who base their practice on systematic theoretical knowledge acquired through formal education). Bureaucracy is considered to be *the* specific means to transfer communal action into rational and organized societal action. Bureaucratic systems existed everywhere and at all times. The quality of formal rationalization through an enforcement of the rule of generally binding legal norms for all citizens, created by trained jurists, was typical for the West. Therefore, the most important feature of modern bureaucratic herrschaft is that "statutes" can be altered freely in accordance with the will of political communities and that this is performed in conformity with definite rules and transparent and affirmable procedures. For Weber, the bureaucratic staff of administration was a prominent instrument for the enforcement of rational herrschaft. Along with

this, the bureaucracy's tendency to make itself autonomous becomes apparent. The disquieting question is raised: Who rules the existing bureaucratic apparatus? Weber answers in his political papers with the postulation of a charismatic augmentation and parliamentary supervision of bureaucracy in order to thwart its inherent dynamics.

Second Perspective

With regard to bureaucratic herrschaft, Weber was above all interested in the relationship between the "professional specialists" (*Fachmenschen*), tending toward autonomy, and the external authority of a political leader. According to his concept, the grounds of validity are missing that could answer the old question of why people obey. Rational herrschaft also has a spiritual basis (*intention* to obey and *belief* in legitimacy), yet this political-religious precondition is often converted into administrative terms and ontologized. Thus, the view became prominent that a rational bureaucracy was legitimate ipso facto and consequently also a legal order as such. Those ruled over are mentioned only marginally in the tradition of political thought founded by Weber. Weber is therefore criticized that he has linked the criterion of legitimacy to the forms of rule in such a definite manner, and thus also blended them with order and obedience, that the entire field of cooperative, civic, democratic forms of government with its peculiar rightfulness stayed almost entirely out of his horizon.

The democratic legitimacy of a citizen's society cannot relate to a hierarchical conception of state that is in conformity with rule. It is rather bound to the notion of an articulated and constitutional accord of free and equal citizens. At this Weber's critics refer to the "Old European" tradition of thought in the polis outlined in the beginning, which they extend over the horizon of the early civic revolutions and republics, above all in the United States (Arendt 1965). This pointed perception reflects the delusional overreach of bureaucratic herrschaft in the twentieth century. Arendt talked, only seemingly paradoxically, about the no man's rule (*Niemandsherrschaft*) of bureaucracy, bringing about organized irresponsibility of the individual and allowing bondage in its severest form. Authoritarian and dictatorial herrschaft is characterized by a qualitative augmentation of the element of force of the state's apparatus and the walling-off of ruling elites from all forms of democratic participation and supervision. From this, one has to discern totalitarian herrschaft, its substance being a polycratic apparatus of ideology and terror under the control of a charismatic leader. National socialism and Stalinism can both be classified under this heading, despite all dissimilarities. No longer is bureaucracy at the center of this, but rather the totalitarian movement or party, constantly revolutionizing itself and pressing ahead. So as to achieve its objectives, the movement can make use of industrial-bureaucratic methods (as, for example, at the cold-blooded

implementation of the national socialist program of mass destruction), with the described dialectic of rationalization resulting in an extreme. The double experience of totalitarianism in this century has brought the so far most destructive combination of magical charisma and bureaucratic rationality to the world.

Third Perspective

Since early modern times and especially with the onset of the eighteenth century, the legitimacy and justness of herrschaft has been exposed to doubt in principle. The historicization of herrschaft, that is, the relativization of its historical genesis as arbitrary and man-made, affects the recognition of the grounds of validity: Herrschaft must now justify itself permanently and is constantly scheduled to be replaced, if necessary with a revolutionary act of starting anew. With this turn taken, the modern concept of political herrschaft actually evolves, no longer springing from individual qualities and connections, but being a public issue of all equals, which can thus dissociate itself from all forms of domestic violence and can justify no terms of thralldom whatsoever. With the fundamental transformation of herrschaft, only governance in the name of the people is possible; even modern military dictatorships and totalitarian regimes (named "people's democracies") relate to this principle *pro forma*.

As to the question of inevitableness of herrschaft, there are two schools of thought: One postulates the universality and inevitableness of *arché*, thus restricting itself to the criticism of unjustified herrschaft, and favoring the procedural sound guarantee of its strict temporal limit and supervision of contents (e.g., Dahrendorf 1964), whereas from an anarchistic perspective, herrschaft is criticized as a whole and the project of a society without herrschaft is pursued instead. In anarchistic (or syndicalist) counterculture, modern forms of anarchy, which were to have existed before and outside of Western modern times, are rehabilitated. Anarchism and Marxism are concordant with the notion of a state without rule at the beginning and the end of history. With the destruction of class society and the deceasing of the state as its most important instrument of repression, the phenomenon of herrschaft loses its authorization. In Marxism, however, this is replaced by the rule of labor, that is, the herrschaft of the immediate manufacturer, abolishing the industrial terms of herrschaft in capitalistic company organization. The elaboration of the ruling class has, in addition to its (limited) analytical dimension, the character of being a concept used in contest, bringing the agonal dimension of herrschaft back into play. The dictatorship of the proletariat, designated for the transition period, emerged in the political systems of truly existing socialism and postcolonial one-party systems as a particularistic neopatrimonial system, again exercising herrschaft by

persons. The polemics over the political class in Western liberal democracies have also emphasized this personal quality of political elites and established them as a (questionable) norm for legitimate herrschaft.

RECENT TENDENCIES

The deceasing of (state-run) herrschaft, forecast and programmatically striven for by anarchistic and socialistic literature, could as well come about without any revolutionary impetus. Max Weber left hardly any doubt that the future of rational herrschaft was poor due to intrinsic reasons and that the modern attempts to neutralize herrschaft could be foredoomed. On one hand, there is a tendency toward involution of bureaucratic herrschaft, which can be defined in more detail by the (1) deformatization of law, (2) disenchantment of the state, and (3) transition from bureaucracy to specialist rule and technocracy respectively. On the other hand, one cannot but notice a tendency toward repersonalization of herrschaft.

For a long time, the sociology of law stated a renunciation from juridical formalism, that is, to forsake the interior systematics of law by pluralizing, moralizing, and materializing the legal sphere. The loss of the law systems' autonomy as a whole is generally considered possible. This rests on a faulty adaptation of the law system to the changing social environment, whereupon a teleological opening occurred in economic, labor, and social law, as well as in criminal law, associated with the influence of socioscientific disciplines in a narrower sense, than on the failure of the juridical profession. With reference to the consequences it caused, law has to meet more prerequisites of value-oriented rationality, has to be more flexible with regard to situations, and has to be more reflexive. And one could just as well see this tendency as a gain in rationality.

Only seemingly paradoxical, the standardization of formal law is accompanied by regulating further and an (by all means quantitative) increase in the significance of bureaucracy. The expansion of the welfare state and the increase in regulatory state functions have led to a gain of competency for, and a spread of, bureaucracies, but at the same time, caused a widespread pluralization and thus the disenchantment of the state apparatus as a whole. In the course of this relative marginalization, the administrations were no longer separated from societal interests, but reflected this complexity even internally. The state is no longer represented as an oppressor, but acts as a coequal negotiating partner with nongovernmental organizations, without whose cooperation it would suffer the loss of its interventionist and controlling capacity entirely.

Associated with this is the bureaucratic specialists' inevitable loss of competency because of the complex matters of scientific, technical civilization, due to which they have to ask for the advice of external experts (e.g., on the "state of the

art”) and have to face up to external critique (e.g., from “ethical commissions,” parliamentary hearings, the environmental movement and its opposing experts). The *Fachmenschentum* (body of professional specialists who base their practice on systematic theoretical knowledge acquired through formal education) of state-run bureaucracy fails to manage the complex problems of mass societies and the unintended intended consequences of bureaucratic action.

Relativization and internal fragmentation of the ruling system proceed further than ever imagined by a bureaucracy-centered model. Generally, one can say that the border between politics (as a sphere of the public exercise of herrschaft) and nonpolitics (as private sphere) has become more fluid and more permeable in the process of reflexive modernization (Beck 1992). With this standardization, a level of subpolitics is generated. Modernization theories reflect that the disjunction of spheres has to be qualified and reversed to a considerable degree. The reorganization of state, adjusting herrschaft (or authoritative leadership) to management and transferring control reflexively to the self-organization of a polycentrically networked societal structure in a next step, has major consequences for government studies and policy research, which has corrected its conventional perspective on herrschaft in accordance with participatory politics “from below” as well as by network analysis.

Genuine charismatic herrschaft depends upon the specific qualities of the ruling personality, by virtue of which he or she is set apart from ordinary people and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. Above all, such leaders bring about poorly differentiated magic communities.

However, considering charisma, the creative dimension of herrschaft, as well, can be illustrated: In a world, with its inhabitants usually adapted to stability and reproduction, charismatic personalities initiate sudden innovations. In connection with political religiosity, this can also be a feature of posttraditional societies. Charismatic herrschaft is able to link to bureaucratic mass parties as well as to the pacifist or militant countercultures. There is, furthermore, a desire for an existential representation of herrschaft and a representation of herrschaft by persons. At present, this comes to light in three conceptions:

First, in the form of universalistic personalism of modern presidential systems: Democracy’s victory in postcommunist and postauthoritative societies of Eastern Europe and South America has generalized charismatic ruling characters of this type, which are today making use of “telecratic” means by way of electronic mass media so as to secure mass loyalty. Forms of national populism and Caesarism, derived from pseudo-charisma, also strengthen the dictates of repersonalization of herrschaft in contemporary mass democracies.

Second, with the inversion of privacy and politics, as postulated by the New Social Movements: In this process,

which was accelerated by a change in values, the attention for, especially, the specific gender characteristics of ruling persons increased. From a feminist perspective, masculinity is understood as an essential feature of the apparatus of rule and the state as a “brotherhood,” even in its unconscious and formalized components. The term is used to criticize the standard form of patriarchal structures of rule, which have a forming influence on the conservative features of bureaucracy. Generally, the New Social Movements have highlighted the personal qualities of functionaries, by taking up the identity and authenticity as leitmotifs of politics.

Third, in communitarianism: Otto Gierke’s theory of associations (*Genossenschaftstheorie*) and the polemics of Otto Hinze against Max Weber’s sociology of authority rehabilitated the “Germanic” notion of an association as a counter-concept to the “Roman” idea of herrschaft (and society). Against the ascending degree of the abstraction of herrschaft, this critique stresses the personal and sensual qualities of community ties and is influential in current debates between liberalism and communitarianism.

POSTSTRUCTURALISM

The effort to capture the waning power and the compulsory nature of formal bureaucratic herrschaft, the problems of which were emphasized earlier, can be felt on all sides. This is especially the case in the approach of the poststructuralists. Above all, the work of Michel Foucault (1978) is an attempt to repeal the general matrix of a binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled and extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body. One must suppose, rather, that the manifold relations of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, in limited groups and institutions are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. Here, the organization of herrschaft does not seem to be a rational system of law, but rather an ensemble of all the diffuse persons and means that can be used in order to exert power. From this conception, there is a line to system theories. In neuronal networks, the synthesis of highly complex and parallel processes of the brain are not attributed to an intelligent authority, but rather interpreted as a self-organizing, “emerging” process of assessment and selection. However, contemporary political theory and sociological diagnosis of time are characterized by a double paradox: While herrschaft becomes ubiquitous and abandons the shell of its central structure, the political elites lose their eccentric character as specialized representatives of herrschaft and at the same time seem to cause a desire for their personal-charismatic reincarnation.

See also Bureaucracy; Foucault, Michel; Marx, Karl; Modernity; Power; State; Tönnies, Ferdinand; Weber, Max

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HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE THEORY

Historical and comparative theory seeks to identify patterns and causal relationships in long-term social processes, such as the rise of democracy, industrialization, the expansion of the working class, the development of welfare states, or national revolutions.

Patterns and relationships are sought and tested through the detailed study of historical narratives and by examining long-run data describing economic, social, political, cultural, demographic, or other social features over time. Historical and comparative theory thus differs from deductive social theory, which draws conclusions from formal models of social behavior. It also differs from branches of social theory focusing on data from experimental or field observations of social behavior and from theory resting mainly on statistical analysis of survey, demographic, or other data drawn from relatively narrow time frames.

Historical and comparative theory relies heavily on the work of historians and often draws upon archival materials. Yet it does not simply seek to generalize from historical data. Rather, historical and comparative theory is as often concerned with the key *differences* among various social contexts—seeking explanations of why democracy arose in some places but not others or why revolutions are relatively

rare—as with broad similarities. Historical and comparative theory seeks to combine an understanding of the social behavior of individuals, groups, and organizations and their responses to various social conditions with identification of specific, contingent, historical facts regarding particular societies and time periods, in order to explain long-term trajectories of social change.

Comparative and historical theory developed with the beginnings of sociology in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the birth of sociology was largely motivated by a problem in comparative and historical theory: How do industrial societies—with their factories, extensive wage labor, representative government, and financial capital—differ in their organization and dynamics from earlier societies dominated by agriculture, peasant labor, aristocratic and monarchical government, and landed wealth, and what is the likely future trajectory of industrial societies?

Historical and comparative analysis of critical historical events, or of issues in politics, economy, and religion, was not new in the nineteenth century. Such comparisons stretch back to the earliest systemic reflections on human societies. Herodotus pointed to differences in the Greek versus Persian political systems and culture to explain the outcome of the Persian Wars; Thucydides similarly explored the fundamental differences between the history and political systems of Sparta and Athens in his history of their great conflict. One can find historical and comparative analysis in the works of later Roman historians, in the social analysis of the fourteenth century Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun, in the political analysis of Machiavelli and Montesquieu, the economic analysis of Adam Smith, and in the political theory of James Madison. Yet none of these thinkers, nor any before them, had a clear sense of social change as making an unprecedented break with the past. For them, historical and comparative analysis was used to illustrate the variety of organizational forms and their differences, or to identify unchanging characteristics of the human condition and seek solutions to universal problems. The historical and comparative theory launched in the nineteenth century differed from all prior social analysis in seeing history as having a long-term trajectory, in which certain social forms and organizations would permanently give way to others. The task of the new historical and comparative theory, and its distinctive contribution to social theory, was to describe this long-term trajectory, to identify its key motors and turning points, and to project, as best as one could, its future direction.

The most influential founders of this enterprise were Marx and Tocqueville. Both of them treated feudalism not merely as one among many systems of social organization, but as a specifically time-bound mode of social order, which was in the process of being replaced in its entirety by a new social system. Tocqueville believed that he saw that future order in the egalitarian society of nineteenth-century America; Marx believed that he saw that future order in the

factory slums of nineteenth-century Lancashire. Thus Tocqueville, first in his account of the legal, political, and cultural order in America, and then in his account of the reasons for the collapse of feudalism in France, laid out a view of history in which egalitarian impulses would inevitably spread globally and transform societies, producing antifeudal and eventually ethnic conflicts as they did so. Marx, in his accounts of the historical development of capitalism, similarly mapped out a long-term view of history, although in his view it was capitalist practices of production that would inevitably spread globally and transform societies, producing class conflicts.

Succeeding generations of scholars continued to develop theories of these long-term changes. Durkheim and Tonnies stressed changes in the modes of social interaction as key to the change, with preindustrial society based on conformity, and stable, small-scale social structures giving way to industrial society based on individuality, specialization, and far more complex and rapidly changing social relationships. Weber argued that a further critical feature of this change was a long-term and systemic process of rationalization, embracing the economic, political, and ideological organization of social life. Elias pointed to a variety of changes in social interaction as creating a distinctively modern and “civilized” mode of social relations.

It would be incorrect to see these as theories of social progress, if by that is meant continuous improvement of the human condition. Marx (in the medium term) and Tocqueville and Weber (in the longer term) were quite pessimistic about many characteristics of the long-term processes they described. Marx warned of increasing misery for workers under capitalism before their final liberation. Tocqueville feared a “tyranny of the majority” and shrinking individual liberties if egalitarian impulses went unchecked. Weber expressed fears that spontaneity and personal freedom would be hemmed in by increasingly complex, interlocked, and demanding social structures, which could continue to function only at the cost of prescribing ever stricter roles for the individuals who constituted them. What was important to these theorists was correctly identifying the critical trends and driving forces in long-term historical change. None of them saw the transition from agrarian to industrial society as unambiguously good.

In the middle of the twentieth century, historical and comparative theory moved toward a more optimistic synthesis, especially strong in sociology and political science, led by such figures as Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset, Gabriel Almond, Alex Inkeles, and Samuel Huntington, known as modernization theory. Borrowing elements from the theories of Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, modernization theory argued that all societies could be located on a trajectory from “traditional” (i.e., preindustrial) to “modern” social organization. The former was more conformist, hierarchical, hereditary,

authoritarian, religious/magical, rural, and poor. The latter was more individual, egalitarian, meritocratic, democratic, secular/rational, urban, and economically productive. Although conflict might attend the transition from traditional to modern forms of social organization, it was argued that movement along this trajectory was the inevitable course of social evolution.

However, actual events soon contradicted the projections of modernization theory. In the communist party-states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the military dictatorships of Brazil, Argentina, Spain, and Portugal, authoritarian and conformist regimes persisted for many decades in societies that were otherwise rational, meritocratic, urban, and economically advanced. Moreover, even the most “modern” country in most respects, the United States, instead of becoming more secular, experienced religious revivals and extensive popular religiosity. Fundamentalist religiosity also grew in industrializing, urbanized states in the Middle East such as Iran, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. In addition, although in modernization theory violent political upheavals were supposed to occur only against traditional regimes, in societies undergoing the transition from traditional to modern social organization, in the late twentieth century a host of states with modern economies and social structures, including communist party-states, military dictatorships, and populist Presidential regimes—even modern democracies such as Northern Ireland—were toppled by revolutions or wracked by religious and ethnic warfare.

In response to these events, the universal trajectory model of modernization theory was abandoned, and historical and comparative theory set about to more closely examine particular long-term historical processes, with an eye to searching out multiple trajectories and explanations that highlighted historical differences as well as similarities.

One typical line of research was in the historical and comparative theory of revolutions, developed by Barrington Moore Jr., Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, and Jack Goldstone. While political scientists and psychologists were seeking a general model of “revolution,” asking why ordinary people would adopt rebellious attitudes toward state authority, without much attention to the internal structure of either society or the state, historical and comparative theory sought to identify the key actors, groups, and relationships that had actually created revolutions in specific historical contexts. Comparative and historical theorists were not so much concerned with explaining “revolution,” in general, as with explaining the variations in the causes and outcomes of particular revolutions of great historical significance.

Moore argued that Marx had been correct in identifying class conflicts as the motor of revolutions, but had erred in simplifying class structure into a two-party model of bourgeois capitalists versus feudal lords, or workers versus

capitalists. Moore claimed that in the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, the relevant classes included capitalists, landlords, urban workers, and peasants, and that instead of there always being a single line of cleavage and a single outcome, it was possible for various coalitions and conflicts among these actors to arise, with each pattern producing a different historical trajectory and a different outcome. Thus capitalist democracy was only one possible outcome of modernization, arising specifically when capitalists joined with workers to overturn the power of landlords and their control of peasant labor. Where landlords joined with capitalists against workers, or landlords captured political power and so both retained control over peasant labor and dominated capitalists, other, nondemocratic forms of society were likely to emerge even as industrialization took place.

After Moore, further developments in the historical and comparative theory of revolution occurred by adding additional elements. Tilly and Skocpol argued that Moore had neglected important variables. Tilly stressed that revolutionary groups needed organization, and the ability to mobilize substantial resources, if they were to effectively challenge state authorities. Skocpol pointed out the role of the state as an autonomous actor in the formation of revolutionary situations, demonstrating that as much as any class actor, state leaders themselves often faced dilemmas and took actions that catalyzed revolutionary conflicts. Skocpol also argued that revolutionary outcomes were constrained by the social base of the revolutionary movement, and the old regime's level of economic development. Goldstone highlighted the importance of long-term demographic trends in undermining social, political, and economic structures, thus creating conditions in which states became vulnerable, and in which new coalitions of elites and popular groups were likely to form. In contrast to Skocpol, he further argued that the ideologies of revolutionary leaders, and their efforts to keep the allegiance of their followers in the course of revolutionary struggles—and not mainly the revolution's social base—shaped the degree of radicalism or conservatism in postrevolutionary state reconstruction.

The origins and outcomes of revolutions was only one process studied by historical and comparative theorists after the breakdown of modernization theory. However, it was fairly typical of one mode of argumentation in historical and comparative theory. In this mode, studies generally took off from earlier arguments by Marx, Durkheim, Tocqueville, or Weber, enriching those arguments by introducing additional variables or focusing attention on previously neglected relationships. The result was to build richer and more sophisticated explanations for the similarities and differences in the trajectories of a particular class of events or processes.

Another example of this mode is the analysis of state building, in which Tilly examined state development in

Europe from 1400 to 1900 and claimed that the variety of state structures, from democratic to authoritarian, resulted from different strategies pursued by state leaders, relying on either the accumulation of financial capital resources or of coercive bureaucratic/military resources or some combination of both. Dietrich Reuschmeyer, Evelyn Stephens, and John Stephens, drawing on comparative studies of state building in Europe and Latin America, added the insight that democratization was unlikely to last unless it was founded on a coalition of workers and elites bound in effective political parties. Skocpol, studying state building in Europe and North America, further presented evidence that the growth of welfare policies in modern states depended on the mobilization not only of workers but also of women seeking to reshape structures of family support.

Yet in addition to this mode of argument, adding factors and mechanisms to enrich and correct existing explanations, historical and comparative theory also has simplifying modes, in which historical trajectories are explained as variations of a single master process. Perhaps the most influential example of this mode of historical and comparative theory is the "world system" theory developed by Wallerstein. This theory explained the rapid growth of European economic and political power in contrast to the rest of the world as the result of Europe's core position in global trading networks, which were intentionally structured so as to convey global production surpluses away from peripheral regions to the system's core.

Wallerstein argued that this process began in the sixteenth century with the importation of bulk grains produced in Germany and Poland into Western Europe, mainly through Antwerp and Amsterdam. This trading circuit reinforced the power of landlords in Eastern Europe, producing a power structure favorable to authoritarian control and preservation of a rural peasantry, while conversely producing opportunities in Western Europe, initially mainly Holland, for the expansion of manufacturing, finance, and long-distance trade. Thus a "core" region developed around the Dutch cities, with growing wealth and diversified commercial enterprise, which drew on a "periphery" in Eastern Europe that supplied raw materials while remaining under more traditional political and economic authority. In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as European trade expanded to include increasing exports from the New World and Asia, the core of the system expanded to include London and the Eastern seaboard of the United States, which became major centers for exporting manufactures in exchange for raw materials produced in the colonial periphery. In the twentieth century, the world-system became truly global, with a Western core in Western Europe and North American, and a smaller Eastern core region in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, dominating manufacturing and finance, and the raw-material supplying periphery comprising the rest of the world.

“World-system” theory has spawned a large body of scholarship seeking to demonstrate how such unequal trading patterns account for a host of political and economic relationships throughout history. However, it has not gone unchallenged; Goldstone’s comparative analysis of European and Asian economic development from 1500 to 1850 argues that Europe’s critical advantage came not from unequal trade but from pioneering breakthroughs in the utilization of steam power, and that unequal trade relations between Europe and East Asia did not develop until *after* Europe used its edge in steam power to dominate global manufacturing and transport. Thus a second mode of theory development in historical and comparative theory is the proposal and testing of hypotheses regarding whether a particular master process is indeed the most important driver of specific historical changes.

Other examples of “master process” models are Collins’s model of intellectual development, in which the evolution of philosophical discourse within Europe, China, Japan, and the Islamic world is presented as following the same basic pattern of alternatively focusing and dividing attention in a limited “attention space” supported by a fluctuating material base; Mann’s model of the growth in the size and complexity of states from ancient Mesopotamia to the twentieth century as driven by increases in the same four basic means of projecting power (political/administrative, economic, coercive, and ideological); and Eisenstadt’s model of the rise and decline of agrarian/bureaucratic empires as resulting from the constitution and dissolution of cultural/political centers through cycles of competition among elites for control of “free resources.” These works do *not* argue that all trajectories of social change follow the same course; rather they aim to explain the diverse trajectories of historical societies by showing how the operations of a single master process, working through different conditions in different societies, produced the variety of observed trajectories of change.

A third mode of historical and comparative theorizing is the strategic case study, in which a specific historical case of societal development is explored to cast light on a particular, theoretically framed problem. For example, Seymour Martin Lipset examined labor politics in the United States in order to ask why the development of socialism was so weak in the United States; Robert Bellah examined the cultural belief system of Tokugawa, Japan, in order to ask why Japan had moved more rapidly than other Asian nations in developing industrial capitalism; Neil Smelser studied the effects of the early British factory system on family structure in order to ask how the modernization of production technology interacted with change in other spheres of social life; and John Markoff examined the course of the French Revolution of 1789 in order to ask how much of revolutionary policy was determined by class interests prior to the revolution and how much was the

result of unexpected responses to social and ideological conflict produced by the revolution itself.

Clearly, historical and comparative theory is not uniform in its approach. Indeed, Tilly has attacked historical explanation by means of master processes, as smacking of ill-founded universalism, preferring to see various historical trajectories as generated by different combinations of discrete social mechanisms and relationships. Wallerstein, by contrast, has argued for the need to have sweeping theories to organize the flood of historical facts and to unite historical diversity into comprehensible patterns. In part, this reflects different approaches to projecting future trajectories as well, with Tilly arguing for the difficulty of prediction, given that many different combinations of basic social mechanisms and relationships can arise, while Wallerstein claims to derive a clear vision of the future development of the world-system from his unified theory.

Nonetheless, the most influential recent works in historical and comparative theory share the following characteristics: (1) They acknowledge a variety of historical trajectories in the development of political systems, economic organization, cultural values, and how they combine to constitute particular concrete societies. Indeed, they take the goal of explaining such variety as primary, rather than seeking universal templates for all social change. (2) They generally focus on one aspect or process of social change—e.g., revolution, state building, economic growth, democratization—and seek to explain how that aspect or process originated and developed toward particular outcomes in different societies. (3) They are primarily inductive, developing limited generalities or identifying recurrent patterns among historical trajectories through detailed examination of empirical data on those trajectories.

Historical and comparative theory has been attacked by social scientists from varied directions. On the one hand, experts in statistical methods have argued that the inferential basis of historical and comparative theory is inadequate, since generalizing from a handful of cases—and most works of historical and comparative theory comprehensively examine less than a dozen cases—is logically suspect. Given that chance variation can strongly affect outcomes in small numbers of cases, drawing “large conclusions from small n’s” will often be misleading. On the other hand, social theorists who use more deductive methods—such as rational choice theory—have argued that the inductive method of historical and comparative theory is open to biased or incoherent selection of data from the cases under study and thus is incapable of leading to reproducible and cumulative results. Without a shared theory to guide the proposal and testing of hypotheses, each researcher may find his or her own unique way or even get lost in the mass of historical data.

Both of these criticisms, however, misconceive the goals or procedures of historical and comparative theory.

Statistical inference from a small number of cases is only defective if one's goal is to estimate average characteristics in a larger universe of similar cases from which the sample is drawn. Thus if there were some uniform and universal process of "revolution," and we wished to infer the characteristics of all "revolutions" from a small sample, we would have a problem of logical inference. However, historical and comparative theory starts by granting that specific cases of a given phenomena—such as revolution—may vary widely in respect to important characteristics. What is important for the theory is to map and explain those variations. Thus the historical and comparative theory of revolutions may first seek to work out the reasons for the similarities and differences between the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Chinese Revolution of 1949 by analyzing their various constituent social conditions and relationships (e.g., the formation of specific coalitions, the resources of various actors, and the choices they faced). When confronted with another revolution—such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979—the question is not whether the characteristics of that case fully conform to the characteristics of the other three (which is not likely), but whether the similarities and differences from the other revolutions can in fact be explained by some combination of the conditions and relationships used to explain the variation in the previous cases, or if still other factors need to be introduced. If so, the theory needs to be altered or enriched; but the problem of inferring universal characteristics from a small sample does not arise—that is a wholly different problem, and generally inapplicable to the issues pursued in historical and comparative theory.

In regard to the alternative criticism, it is true that there is a danger that if historical and comparative theory descended into complete and unbridled induction, its results would lack coherence. But again, that is not how historical and comparative theory proceeds. Historical and comparative theory does not select cases, or data within cases, at random. Instead, it generally focuses on major historical processes for which there are prior explanations, generated by historians, other social scientists, or other historical and comparative theorists. Research proceeds by juxtaposing the prior explanations with new cases or combinations of cases and seeking the adequacy of prior explanations. Progress then accrues in one of two paths. Existing explanations may be enriched and made more complex by adding additional factors in order to create new combinations of explanatory factors that will extend the accuracy and/or range of explanation of the cases under study. Or existing theories may be altered or combined to produce a simplifying master process theory that explains the pattern of events within and across cases in terms of variations on a single general process. Either way, the result is progress in accumulating insights, and explanatory breadth, around a shared core of common issues and problems.

Historical and comparative theory has become the primary method of theorizing about large-scale and long-term historical processes. By inductive study of multiple cases of such phenomena as industrialization, state building, democratization, nationalism, and revolutions, and testing propositions regarding how well various combinations of social factors, mechanisms, and master processes account for specific social changes, historical and comparative theory seeks to explain the varying trajectories of such phenomena across societies and over time.

—Jack A. Goldstone

See also Civilizing Processes; Collins, Randall; Durkheim, Émile; Elias, Norbert; Goldstone, Jack A.; Historical Materialism; Marx, Karl; Parsons, Talcott; Tilly, Charles; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Tönnies, Ferdinand; Wallerstein, Immanuel; Weber, Max; World-Systems Theory

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HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

Historical materialism (aka. histomat) is the metatheory of societal development that undergirds the Marxist "research programme" on the genesis, structure, and change of social formations, from primitive communism to the advanced communist society of the future. Although Marx himself modestly described the materialist conception of history as the "guiding thread" of his studies, the materialist conception of history is not simply a heuristic tool for the analysis of history, but presupposes and projects a substantive onto-theo-teleological philosophy of history with a practical intent.

Through a cross-reading of Hegel's dialectical philosophy and Feuerbach's materialist anthropology, the young

Marx initially developed historical materialism as a philosophical anthropology and only later, from 1845–1846 onwards, as a philosophically informed sociological theory of historical development. Marx outlined the principles of historical materialism in systematic fashion only twice: first, in the first part of *The German Ideology* (1845–1846) and next in the famous “Preface” to *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859).

In the *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845), which Engels published in 1888 as an appendix to one of his own books on German philosophy, Marx presented in shorthand the philosophical-anthropological foundations of the dialectical theory of historical praxis that subsequently will inform his more systematic sociological formulations of historical materialism, as well as the concrete historical research that is built on it. In an unsurpassed attempt to synthesise the materialist tradition of philosophy (from Democritus to Feuerbach) with the dialectical one (from Heraclites to Hegel), he insists with Feuerbach on the sensuous nature of human activity and adopts a materialist position that puts Hegel “back on his feet.” Against Feuerbach he recovers the “rational core” of Hegel and proposes a dialectical correction of Feuerbach’s contemplative materialism that is able to take into account the dynamic nature of human activity and history.

While the *German Ideology* (1845–1846) was left to the “gnawing critique of the mice” and remained unpublished until 1888, the result of the philosophical reflection on—and clarification of—the fundamental principles of historical materialism could immediately be felt in the “mature writings” of Marx, to start with the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), where the materialist-dialectical conception of history is presented in terms of the history of class struggle. Although class analysis is part and parcel of the materialist conception of history, it is surprisingly absent from the Preface to *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), the *locus classicus* of historical materialism where Marx ([1859]1971) sums up the general results of his investigations in a justifiably celebrated and controversial passage:

“In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis, on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary their social being that determines their consciousness (pp. 20–1).

In this canonical passage, the main tenets of historical materialism are articulated in terms of a complex of relations between the “economic structure of society” and its

“ideological superstructure.” That the former determines, or better, conditions the latter is the central thesis of historical materialism. The economic structure of society is usually defined in terms of the conjunction of the “forces” and the “relations of production.” Referring to all the factors that contribute directly to the process of material production, the “forces of production” include both the means of production (natural resources, tools, and machinery) and labour power (physical strength, skills, and technical knowledge). Relations of production are human relationships of power over persons and productive forces that regulate production and distribution. Together, the relations and the forces of production comprise the mode of production and form the real basis or the ground on which the superstructure of any social formation rests. The superstructure that arises on this basis comprises the legal and political institutions (Althusser’s “ideological apparatuses of the state”), as well as the legal, political, religious, or philosophical ideas, theories, and ideologies that are necessary for maintaining the conditions of material production and overall reproduction of the social formation. Although the superstructure is “in the last instance” (Engels [1845–1846]1972:294) determined by the economy, the relative autonomy of the superstructure is not denied thereby: Althusser has shown that the economic determination allows for the dominance of culture, as was the case in the Middle Ages when religion functioned as the first and main instance of determination.

Having articulated the relations of determination in the topological scheme of the basis and superstructure, Marx next introduces the dialectic between the forces and the relations of production as the mechanism of societal development. As the forces of production develop, they enter into contradiction with the existing relations of production (which “turn into their fetters”) and the intensification of this contradiction leads to the breakdown of the existing mode of production and its superstructure. This contradiction is resolved in favour of the forces of production, and new, higher relations of production, whose material preconditions have “matured in the womb of the old society itself,” emerge that better accommodate the continued growth of society’s productive capacities.

In order to avoid the classic fallacies of economism, productivism, reductionism, and determinism with which Marxism is often associated, it should, however, be stressed that the more sociological formulations of historical materialism are embedded in the more philosophical versions and that Marxism itself is a dialectical materialist theory of historical praxis that analyses the “laws of historical development” in order to participate in the revolutionary transformation of the capitalist mode of production.

— Frédéric Vandenberghe

See also Alienation; Capital; Capitalism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Post-Marxism; Structural Marxism

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HISTORICISM

The English term *historicism* came into use at the beginning of the twentieth century as a translation, on one hand, of the German term *Historismus* (as used by Wilhelm Dilthey, Ernst Troeltsch, Friedrich Meinecke, and others), and of the Italian term *storicismo* (Benedetto Croce), on the other. The term *historism* is also frequently used in English, and in German the term *Historizismus* is sometimes found. In both languages, the meaning of the term is often identical, sometimes different, and quite frequently completely opposing. In other words, here one can find an ambiguity and confusion of concepts remarkable even in the cultural sciences.

Originally, the German term *Historismus* denoted the view that ideal (*geistige*), cultural, and social realities cannot be described and explained by means of general theories and therefore cannot be assessed by universal norms either. From their historical nature derives the necessity, it was argued, to understand and judge them in their particularity and individuality. Therein the specific privilege and the essential dignity of these realities can be seen (as in Leopold von Ranke's famous aphorism according to which each epoch was "immediate to god" [*unmittelbar zu Gott*]). If in contrast to this it is referred to the "problems of historicism," as especially in Ernst Troeltsch, the central point is that historicism does imply or must lead to relativism, cognitive or explanatory as well as ethical.

Obviously, negatively connoted is the English term *historicism* in the sense in which Karl Raimund Popper brought it into the discussion. Popper uses it to describe a position that is diametrically opposed to historicism in the sense of a historical relativism. He means the view—represented by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill, and then by Karl Marx and the Marxist theorists of history—that the process of history is throughout determined by general laws and that any science of history must therefore rely on these laws in its explanations and predictions. Popper's criticism of this view (in Miller 1985:298) is that the evolution of human society is a "unique historical process," and that it is logically impossible

to account for unique processes by going back to universal laws. There may be observable and even explainable "trends," but trends, according to Popper, are no laws.

More recently, in certain circles a use of the term *historicism* has become common and dominant that comes close to the meaning of historicism (as relativism) but that is meant in a thoroughly programmatic and affirmative way by its protagonists. Initially, this view arose in literary studies, namely in the United States, before it gained a more widespread influence in the cultural and social sciences, where it provoked vehement controversies. Its credo is closely related to that of postmodernism, and it essentially consists in a radical rejection of an "objective" historical knowledge. This is explained by the peculiarity of historical facts as well as by the historicity of the historical cognition itself.

As far as the new historicism aims at the historical constructedness of ideas and beliefs in general, and the relationship between structures of domination and modes of cultural production in particular, there exists an obvious affinity to what is called ideological analysis in historical cultural sociology, which on its part has been influenced and/or challenged particularly by Marxist thinking. The theoretical and methodological problems posed by the historicity (or historical "reflexivity") and the critical intention of such analyses have led to very fundamental and almost endless discussions in sociology. New historicism seems to have been rather insensitive or uninterested with regard to these problems. This may account for the fact, that, at least in the social sciences, it has not established itself as a really new and durable "paradigm."

— Johannes Weiss

See also Comte, Auguste; Dilthey, Wilhelm; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Paradigm; Postmodernism

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HOLLYWOOD FILM

The historical development of Hollywood cinema, including the art and business of filmmaking along with the

popular experience of film viewing, has influenced every aspect of social life in North America—and increasingly around the world—for more than a century. In continuous efforts to reach the widest possible audiences, the Hollywood film industry from the outset sought to create marketable products, to which end it moved to standardize all phases of the manufacturing and distribution of motion pictures. By 1930, the industry, galvanized by the dominant seven studios (MGM, Columbia, Twentieth Century Fox, Warner Brothers, RKO, Paramount, Universal), was able to achieve its goal of a commercially successful popular entertainment medium. In this context, filmmaking evolved through a merger of commercial and aesthetic impulses, with the former typically enjoying the upper hand. The studio system, erected on a foundation of rapidly produced, formulaic pictures for mass audiences, was drawn toward a variety of easily identifiable genres: Westerns, thrillers, horror films, musicals, comedies, dramas, and so forth. This Hollywood synthesis lasted from the 1920s until well into the 1960s. Filmmakers employed narrative traditions taken from literature and drama wedded to technical and managerial techniques that were integral to American capitalism. By the 1930s, Hollywood cinema had become the largest popular entertainment form in the United States, spreading to the rest of the globe during the post-World War II years—a trend later heightened by the video revolution, computer technology, and other elements of economic globalization.

As a general medium, cinema was broadly understood (by producers, viewers, and critics alike) as the most powerfully “realistic” of all cultural media insofar as it was able, through mechanical reproduction, to capture events, actions, and experiences drawn from people’s everyday lives and give them larger-than-life representation on celluloid. It fell mainly upon the director to integrate the multiple dimensions of filmmaking into a visibly attractive whole, replete with quickly paced images, star performers, sound effects (after 1929), and compelling story lines. From this standpoint, film was the one medium within which widely diverse art forms could be brought together: photography, theater, writing, acting, music, and editing. While realism was typically the basis upon which filmmakers arrived at an end product, their work also engaged the realm of illusion and fantasy made possible by increasingly sophisticated movie imagery. The great classic directors, later recognized as auteurs—Fritz Lang, Alfred Hitchcock, Billy Wilder, Howard Hawks, Frank Capra, John Ford—achieved their enormous cinematic impact precisely through their capacity to merge “realism” and “formalism” while, for the most part, adhering to the rather strict genre system established by the Hollywood studios. If the film medium was unparalleled in its popular reach, it simultaneously operated to help legitimate dominant American institutions and values: the patriarchal family, conventional

images of male heroism, patriotism, the work ethic, redemptive violence, and of course happy endings. The great power of ideological hegemony exercised by Hollywood filmmaking during the heyday of the studio system cannot be stressed enough.

By the end of World War II, an array of legal, technological, and social developments converged to undermine the structural foundations of the studio system. The federal antitrust suit against Paramount in 1948, combined with the growing power of labor unions and rebellion against factory-like conditions of studio production, encouraged the practice of freelancing within Hollywood filmmaking. The arrival of television in the early 1950s cut deeply into movie attendance revenues, forcing the movie executives to rethink long-standing practices. These and related factors laid the groundwork for erosion of the traditional studio system, paving the way toward a new, more variegated, and creative era of film production that eventually became known as the New Hollywood. The old factory system of filmmaking came to make less sense in a context of rapid economic changes and social explosions that swept the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s. As independent filmmakers gained broadening leverage in Hollywood, the center of power gradually shifted in favor of an entirely new generation of producers and directors with enough reputation and financial backing to create their own artistic styles and challenge many Hollywood conventions, including the genre formulas. The breakup of institutional and cultural restraints associated with the studio system set the stage for more extensive artistic freedom for producers and directors, leading in turn to the simultaneous economic and cultural transformation of Hollywood.

The New Hollywood gave rise to films that were more visually arresting, thematically challenging, and stylistically individualized than what the studio system had generally produced. Films like *Bonnie and Clyde* (1967), *The Graduate* (1968), and *Easy Rider* (1968) set the tone for a new wave of creative, rebellious filmmaking that readily cut across the classical genres, followed by pictures like *The Godfather* (1972) and then blockbusters such as *Jaws* (1975), *Star Wars* (1977), and *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* (1977). The New Hollywood auteurs, led by Francis Ford Coppola, Steven Spielberg, George Lucas, and Martin Scorsese, were typically graduates of the leading film schools, as were the majority of producers, writers, and editors of the period. Creativity, irreverence, and experimental approaches ruled the day, with huge budgets often matched by equally huge box-office revenues for pictures that frequently won praise from critics and mass audiences alike. Coppola (b. 1939) emerged as the vanguard figure of this group, the mentor to an entirely new breed of directors. The architect of the several *Star Wars* episodes, Lucas (b. 1944) eventually came to exercise vast financial and creative influence over the U.S. film industry, emerging as

the CEO of Lucasfilm, the largest independent studio in the world. Other auteurs of the 1970s and beyond—for example Scorsese (b. 1942)—achieved the bulk of their initial auteurial status by boldly affirming the quality of their cinematic art over commercial pressures. Other directors who self-consciously set out to depart from conventional Hollywood filmmaking included Woody Allen, Mike Nichols, Robert Altman, Warren Beatty, and Brian DePalma. But working in a distinctly corporate milieu, it was still much harder for American directors to sustain the kind of independent auteurial status enjoyed by Europeans of the Italian neorealist school or the French New Wave. An industry driven by orderly pursuit of profit and mass influence clearly established limits on creativity and autonomy, meaning that technical flourishes, social themes, and political content of movies would inevitably run up against strict organizational and financial limits. The collapse of the old studio system did not usher in an era of filmmaking free of commercial imperatives even as the new generation of producers, directors, writers, and actors sought to establish new thresholds of artistic creativity. The central objective of the Hollywood film industry remained, as it always had been, to achieve the broadest mass audiences, in the United States and abroad.

The historic turn away from the old studio culture, with its conformist filmmaking and formulaic genres, in the direction of the New Hollywood was made possible by the terrain carved out by creative European directors (Federico Fellini, Vittorio De Sica, Francois Truffaut, and others), along with dramatic changes in American society (the Vietnam War, insurgent social movements, the counterculture). This turn was given its main impetus in the 1970s but continued well into the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in trends toward what can be called postmodern cinema. A more socially conscious, innovative film industry that gained mature expression through the New Hollywood auteurs never really disappeared, even in the midst of growing corporate power throughout the cultural scene. Within a nascent independent filmmaking milieu, and among a good many mainstream filmmakers too, images of social life now tended to be more fluid, open, and subversive, representative of an increasing distrust of power and tradition—hallmarks of the famous postmodern turn in culture generally speaking.

Both within and outside the film legacy, this postmodern shift represents—in its vast complexity and diffuseness—a fundamental trend in American society, first taking hold in the 1970s as a deep response to ongoing structural changes: the post-Fordist economy, globalization, the informational revolution, heightened patterns of consumption, increasing social atomization. This development was readily visible in the spheres of art and architecture, academia, mass media, popular culture, even politics. Perhaps nowhere was it more visible than in the world of cinema that, in its elaborate

celebration of images, glamour, and spectacles, arguably contained strong elements of the postmodern ethos from its very beginnings. Film culture always contained strong elements of voyeurism. The well-chronicled history of Hollywood filmmaking has been one long testimony to the immense power of visual images to evoke popular emotional responses, and this would become a central ingredient in postmodern cinema.

While never a main current of the film industry since the 1970s, postmodern cinema engaged some of the most influential directors of the period: Woody Allen, Robert Altman, Martin Scorsese, Ridley Scott, Oliver Stone, Spike Lee, the Coen Brothers, David Lynch, Mike Figgis, and John Waters. As a vital dimension of media culture with its strong emphasis on new modes of technology, commodification, and the society of the spectacle, filmmaking by the turn of the twenty-first century celebrates increasingly diverse, experimental, in some cases subversive forms of aesthetic representation. Despite its location within the larger corporate structure, it often questions established social hierarchies and discourses while at the same time depicting a society (accurately enough) in the midst of turmoil, chaos, fragmentation, and violence—a Hobbesian social order that gives rise to and sustains a popular mood of anxiety, cynicism, and powerlessness, no doubt enhanced by the events of 9/11 and their aftermath.

Postmodern cinema has become undeniably part of a universe of stable references in the form of highly integrated structures, a vast network of economic arrangements, and a global communications system tied to expanding corporate media empires. It is this labyrinthine framework—profit-driven, oligopolistic, global, and ideologically dominant—that so thoroughly establishes and delimits Hollywood filmmaking agendas. This system has dramatically extended and rationalized its operations through the workings of global competition, technological refinement, and assimilation of immensely diverse markets and “constituencies”—a process just taking off at the start of the twenty-first century. The growth of autonomous spaces available for independent and semi-independent cinema within this huge corporate aegis can be understood as part of such a historical context. It is a reality that contrasts with the common view of media culture as monolithic, rigidly commodified, and totally resistant to incursions from outside the fortress. A more nuanced and contextualized understanding of film production can help explain why postmodern cinema, though often culturally subversive, turns out to be so economically assimilated and politically ambiguous—why it can be simultaneously progressive and regressive, experimental and conformist, novel and mainstream.

Postmodern cinema reflects and helps reproduce this milieu through its embrace of disjointed narratives, dystopic images, technological wizardry, and motifs dwelling upon mayhem, ambiguity, death of the classical

hero, and breakdown of dominant values or social relations. These features permeate much creative filmmaking of the period—from *Taxi Driver* to *Pulp Fiction*, from *Who Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest?* to *Thelma and Louise*, from *Blade Runner* to *American Beauty*. They virtually define the films of Allen, Stone, Waters, Quentin Tarantino, and the Coen Brothers. Yet, while such film culture calls into question certain manifestations of class and political power, it simultaneously negates prospects for collective identity and subjectivity required for effective social change; its cultural radicalism is never translated into anything resembling political radicalism. On the contrary, postmodern cinema more often than not encourages a certain flight from politics—a cynical, detached, disempowering attitude toward the entire public sphere typical of an increasingly depoliticized society.

— Carl Boggs

See also Cultural Studies and British Cultural Studies; Debord, Guy; Fordism and Post-Fordism; Postmodernism; Situationists

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HOLOCAUST

THE HISTORICAL MARKERS OF THE HOLOCAUST

No mass killing has stimulated more historical, theological, or philosophical reflection than the systematic destruction of almost 6 million European Jews. One result of this attention is that it has become the only such massacre to receive its own name. Even thinkers who are ideologically against construing the Holocaust as unique are now constrained by language to designate it so every time they use the term. This inherent uniqueness is a large part of why

social theory, concerned as it is with universal and generalizable propositions, has largely shied away from the subject. On the other hand, the Holocaust has over the last three decades gradually come to be understood as an epoch-making event that plays a defining role in the self-understanding of the Western world. As such, it casts a wide shadow on social theory. The Holocaust gained this symbolic stature not only from the staggering number of people killed but because of the clarity of its genocidal intentions and its unprecedented use of modern industrial means of mass extermination.

The Holocaust thus put modernity, the primary analytic and normative framework for social theory, into question. The way in which it shed light on basic questions of morality, reason, and humanity made it into a paradigmatic test case for the relation of modernity and social theory. For thinkers who take this view (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944; Arendt 1963; Bauman 1989), the mass murder of European Jews by the Nazis must be considered not solely as a German-Jewish tragedy but as a tragedy of modernity itself. In this regard, social theory can help explain the Holocaust and how the Holocaust has called into question several of the core theoretical concepts of social theory.

The term *Holocaust* is somewhat of a misnomer. It originates from the Greek term *holokauston*, which means burnt whole, implying a religious sacrifice. Given that the Nazi mass murder was not a sacrifice, but rather motivated by an anti-Semitic ideology whose main objective was the physical elimination of European Jewry, many prefer to refer to it as a genocide or by the Hebrew word *Shoah*. Nevertheless, Holocaust has remained the central term in the English-speaking world, whence it has spread to other parts of the world, and it is now the most widely used term for the mass murder of Jews in Europe. Nazi Germany also targeted other minorities such as Gypsies and homosexuals, as well as political opponents and large segments of the Slavic population it had subjugated in the course of its military expansion during World War II. But its main focus and most systematic efforts were reserved for the attempt to render Europe *Judenrein* (free of Jews). Approximately 6 million European Jews, out of an initial population of 10 million, perished in the Holocaust.

Amidst Germany's expansionist policies during World War II, the extermination of the Jews was conducted in parallel with a total war of destruction in Eastern Europe. Fully aware that such an endeavor would put strains on Germany's war effort and its resources, the Nazis were eager to find ways to kill such large numbers of people in more efficient ways. Toward that end they employed mobile death squads and specially designed gas chambers in death camps such as Treblinka, Belzec, Majdanek, and Auschwitz. Such camps have become the symbol for the barbarism of the Nazis. Inmates of those camps endured unimaginable sufferings (such as starvation, beatings,

torture, and medical experiments) before they were led into the gas chambers. After the gas killed them, they were burned in nearby furnaces. Prior to being cremated, the Nazis made sure to strip the dead of their last possessions, removing gold teeth from the corpses. The cruelty and obsession with which the Nazis persecuted the Jews is evidenced in the way they heightened their efforts to kill as many as possible when it became evident that Germany was losing the war. Shipping Jews eastward to the camps remained a priority even when these very same trains were needed for critical military purposes. Given the logistical efforts involved in the systematic murder of millions of Jews, the Nazis frequently had to rely on help from the regular German army as well as from willing collaborators from the countries they occupied. Despite the scope of this bureaucratic-industrialized execution, the murder of the Jews did not lead to any significant attempt to halt the death factories. The primacy of killing and destruction has caused many observers to evoke the image of hell, a concept beyond the analytical tools of social theorists.

THE HOLOCAUST AS METAPHYSICAL OR AS GERMAN-JEWISH EVENT

Despite, or maybe because of, the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust, social scientists did not study, let alone explain, how the Holocaust could happen and what its broader implications for the study of human behavior, reason, and morality were. Instead, reactions veered into the metaphysical and neglected the particular historical and German-Jewish components in favor of universalized and general statements. A “metaphysical secret” poses a lesser challenge to the basic assumptions of a field, or so social theorists at the time thought, than the pursuit of explanations for why these very assumptions about human behavior and morality were negated by a historical incident. Can social theory provide explanations, or is the Holocaust a unique event outside of historical and social understanding? Two central themes provide some insight into the relationship of the Holocaust and social inquiry. One is the challenging question of whether the Holocaust is part of modernity or the opposite, a return to barbarism, representing the breakdown of modernity. Another relates to the question of whether the Holocaust should be understood as part of Jewish-German history or rather as a universal event with implications for the understanding of modern society.

While the study of the Holocaust was initially bracketed, both conceptually as well as empirically, social scientists did explore the workings of Nazism. In his writings and radio addresses during World War II, Talcott Parsons sought to understand Nazism as the outcome of Germany’s special path to modernity. Here barbarism is the counter-principle of modernity. In the historiography of National-Socialism, this approach is called the *Sonderweg* (special path), that is,

the deviation of Germany from the civilizing path of modern, liberal societies. Especially Parsons’s essay of 1942, “Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany,” explains the differences between Germany and Anglo-Saxon democracies in terms of Germany’s interdependent feudal, militaristic, bureaucratic, and authoritarian features. One appeal of the National-Socialist movement consisted of its mobilization of the extremely deep-seated romantic tendencies of German society in the service of a violently aggressive political movement, incorporating a fundamentalist revolt against the whole tendency of rationalization in the Western world, with democracy as its deepest institutionalized foundation. These were the specific features of pre-Nazi Germany that differentiated it from that of other Western countries. In *The Germans*, Norbert Elias (1996) followed on this path and analyzed the historical conditions in Germany leading to what he called “the deepest regression into barbarism in the 20th century.”

Among the first systematic studies on the Nazi State was Franz Neuman’s *Behemoth*, first published in 1942. The book could, of course, not be concerned with the mass killings of the Jews, but it instead explored the functioning of the totalitarian Nazi State, which would in the later work of one of his students, Raul Hilberg (1961), be referred to as the Destruction of European Jewry. Neuman’s main thesis, which is central to current global concerns about international law and its enforcement, was that the Nazis were oblivious of international conventions. The Nazis looked at international law as a mixture of British imperialism and rootless Jewish spirit. Consequently, for Hilberg, the abolishment of international law and legal equality was the beginning of the destruction process. Hilberg identified the pillars of the destruction process in the party-elite, bureaucracy, army, and industry, constituting the Behemoth. He never regards those structural elements as reifying ones but emphasizes the creativity of the bureaucrats, their willingness to act. Hilberg’s studies, even though intentionally focusing on the perpetrators and not on the victims, presents us with a social analysis of the destruction process, taking action and structure both equally into account.

MODERNITY AND BARBARISM

However, this nation-specific focus remained the exception. Social scientists and theorists turned their attention toward universal (and thus generalizable) features of Nazism. It was within the broader theme of modernity that social theorists started to pay more attention to the Holocaust and its effects on the relationship of modernity and social theory. Looking at some of the principal social theorists who have tackled the phenomenon of the Holocaust, we can identify two ambivalent conceptualizations of modernity. One perceives of modernity as the realization of progress and is firmly embedded in the

Enlightenment ideals; the other focuses on barbarism as the flip side of these processes. A central question that links the two is whether barbarism constitutes a separate breakdown of civilization or whether it is very much part of modern rationalization and bureaucratization itself.

The founding fathers of sociological theory are firmly embedded in the first camp. For them, civilization is the guiding principle of modern society. Barbarism is its counter-principle. Progress and civilization are not merely the outcome of modernity but its constitutive principles. Preindustrial societies are seen as lacking in reason, rationality, and progress, to mention a few of the core ideas of modernization theories that dominated the social sciences after World War II. To be sure, the founding fathers were aware of the costs that modernity could incur: Weber's "Iron Cage," Marx's "alienation," and Durkheim's "anomie," to name but a few, are evidence for the ambivalence with which modernity was perceived. But ultimately, they all stressed the potential of modern society to become the bearer of Enlightenment ideals. Accordingly, most social scientists viewed the Holocaust as an aberration and a perversion of these ideals. In contradistinction, social theory after the Holocaust has been engaged in an ongoing debate about the relationship of barbarism and modernity. Rather than viewing the Holocaust as a deviation from the emancipatory path, barbarism and civilizational breaks are perceived as inherent qualities, and for some even as inevitable outcomes of modernity and Enlightenment. The works of Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Zygmunt Bauman exemplify this debate, casting a wide shadow on theoretical discussions of the human condition, morality, the role of reason and rationality, as well as a continuous reassessing of Enlightenment values as such.

According to Adorno's and Horkheimer's study of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944), barbarism is an immanent quality of modernity, rather than its corruption. In their view, civilizational ruptures inhere, at least potentially, in the processes of rationalization and bureaucratization that characterize modernity. It is the breakdown of reflexivity within modernity that facilitates the destructive potential of modernity. This has little to do with German peculiarities, but is related to the Western process of instrumental reason and Enlightenment.

It was Hannah Arendt who embodied both, the Enlightenment with a strong skepticism, in her political and social theory. An article published in 1950, "Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps," provides first clues. Arendt claims that the concentration camps are beyond understanding, if we remain within the conventional social scientific assumptions of rationality. Why? Because, according to her, most of our actions are of utilitarian nature. Totalitarianism, or in this case, the camps, do not fit this utilitarianism. According to Arendt, it seemed as if the Nazis were more concerned with running extermination factories than with winning the war. Her initial thoughts on

the Holocaust were echoed in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) and *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963). The ambivalence between the above mentioned frames of civilization and barbarism remained the primary organizing principle for her thoughts on the Holocaust. For Arendt, the Nazis and Eichmann as its personification represented the breakdown of the Enlightenment and democracy, of critical judgment and of reason. Nazism, for her, was nothing particularly German, but rather a manifestation of totalitarianism. Universalizing the phenomenon did not preclude her from recognizing its singular features. She perceived the uniqueness of the Holocaust not only to consist in the scope and systematic nature of the killings, but in the very attempt to deny humanity as such. Conventional categories of crime become irrelevant, a view that was later incorporated into the legal canon through the concept of "crimes against humanity." Arendt's own ambivalence about whether the Holocaust was beyond comprehension or required a new vocabulary is evidenced in her shifting understanding of the nature of evil. In her work on totalitarianism in 1951, she had called attention to the notion of "radical evil," but by the time she observed the Eichmann trial in 1961, she emphasized the "banality of evil" and Eichmann as its personification.

In his famous *Obedience to Authority*, Stanley Milgram (1973) tried to operationalize Arendt's thesis. As a social psychologist working within a behaviorist framework, his findings were clear-cut: Given the right circumstances, everybody has the potential to turn into an Eichmann, or in Milgram's more specific setting, to administer painful and even deadly electric shocks. The historian Christopher Browning (1992) put this theory to the test in his study titled *Ordinary Men*. Researching a German killing squad in Eastern Europe, Browning argues that bureaucratization diminishes our sense of personal responsibility.

Zygmunt Bauman's (1989) arguments in his book *Modernity and the Holocaust* express a radicalization of the modernity equals barbarization thesis. Here we have traveled from one extreme of the continuum, namely the assumption that barbarism is a counter-principle of modernity, to another extreme, namely Bauman's view that modernity equals barbarism. The Holocaust is no longer a perversion of the principles of rationality but rather its direct outcome, insofar as it provides the necessary logistics for its execution. Furthermore, Bauman suggests that the inability of the social sciences to grasp the essence of the Holocaust is also a function of its sociological approach to morality as such. He objects to a historical understanding of the moral foundations of modern society. He argues that distance between people prevents all moral relations between them. Instead, he stipulates a presocial morality or an unsocialized self based on unconditional responsibility for the other. Consequently, he views modernity not as the foundation of morality but as a main source of its corruption. For Bauman, the lessons of the Holocaust have to lead to a postmodern

ethics, making his arguments part of the postmodern turn. If Arendt focuses on the *human condition*, emphasizing the social and political environment by which morality is circumscribed, Bauman stresses *human nature*, conceived as an ahistorical and ultimately ontological category.

FROM POSTMODERNITY TO REFLEXIVE MODERNITY

Questions of modernity and humanity continue to loom large over attempts to grasp the meanings of the Holocaust. It is, therefore, not surprising that self-critical evaluation rather than metaphysical abdication resonates in a booming literature that focuses, among other things, on questions of representation and the Holocaust in popular culture (e.g., Friedlander 1992) and the role of collective memory and commemoration (e.g., Young 1993). Recent post-Holocaust studies have also paid attention to the role of gender (Ofer and Weitzman 1998), to changing perceptions of the Holocaust and the impact of cosmopolitan memories on the institutionalization of human rights regimes (Levy and Sznajder 2002), as well as on the fate of other minorities (Porter and Hoffman 1999). Together this growing body of literature in Holocaust and comparative genocide studies has made its way into school and university curricula.

What many of these recent works share is an increasingly reflexive perception of modernity. On this view, the project of modernity is realized precisely through the memory of and self-conscious realization of the barbarism that has plagued it since its inception. It is a self-critique of the anticivilizational potential that it contains. By recognizing (and thus acknowledging) its own destructive tendencies, it no longer operates within a rigid dichotomy of modernity and barbarism. The iconographic status of the Holocaust, as the incarnation of evil, has greatly contributed to new political sensibilities as well as to growing scholarly attention to the dynamics of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and the nation-transcending significance of human rights.

— Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder

See also Bauman, Zygmunt; Frankfurt School; Modernity; Parsons, Talcott; Postmodernism

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HOMANS, GEORGE

American social theorist of the twentieth century, George Homans (1910–1989) was the founder of behavioral sociology, the first and arguably the most prominent sociological exchange theorist, and the architect of a highly controversial approach to theory construction in sociology. Homans was the first sociologist to outline the sociological implications of psychologists' work on learning or behavioral theory, particularly the operant conditioning paradigm of B. F. Skinner. These psychological principles of behavior formed the foundation of his theory of social exchange, which was most fully explicated in *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* ([1961] 1974). A strong methodological individualist who believed that explanations of all social phenomena could be derived from axioms about the behavior of individuals, Homans promoted his conception of theory in a large number of works, including "Contemporary Theory in Sociology" (1964b), "Bringing Men Back In" (1964a), and *The Nature of Social Science* (1967).

In addition to his theoretical contributions, Homans is known for his insightful descriptions of the structure and processes of human groups, particularly his book of the same name, *The Human Group* (1950).

Homans was educated at Harvard, where he became a junior member of the Society of Fellows. The society eschewed traditional graduate training and the PhD, which Homans never received. Originally a student of literature, Homans's first introduction to the discipline of sociology was through the writings of Vilfredo Pareto. After Homans coauthored a book on Pareto, Pitirim Sorokin invited Homans to become an instructor at Harvard, where he served

on the faculty from 1939 to 1980 (with an interruption for service as a lieutenant commander in the Navy during World War II). Along with Talcott Parsons, Homans was a founding member of the Department of Social Relations at Harvard. After that department's demise, he became the first chair of the newly formed Department of Sociology at Harvard.

During these years, Homans made significant contributions to three major areas of sociological inquiry: the description and analysis of social structures and social processes in small human groups, problems of theory and methods of theory construction, and the development of an exchange theoretic approach based on the principles of behavioral psychology. The first of these contributions took place during his early years of work and was the product of an inductive strategy in which Homans abstracted theoretical generalizations from descriptive studies of actual behaviors of groups in various settings. *The Human Group*, published in 1950, is the exemplar of this period. The second and third contributions took place more or less coterminously, as Homans shifted to a more deductive theoretical strategy and, at the same time, applied this strategy in developing a new theory of social exchange. This theory was first outlined in his 1958 article, "Social Behavior as Exchange," and later elaborated in *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (1961), which he revised in 1974. Homans's new theoretical strategy emerged from his long-standing criticism of most sociological theory, especially the structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons, Émile Durkheim, and Claude Lévi-Strauss. Homans's own theorizing was marked by several distinct characteristics: an emphasis on the *explanation* of relationships rather than mere categorization, the derivation of lower-order propositions from general axioms, and—most controversial of all—the use of principles from behavioral psychology as the general axioms.

THE EARLY INDUCTIVE WORK ON SMALL GROUPS

In his early work, Homans concentrated on analyzing the structures and processes of relatively small human groups, typically using observational data collected and reported by others. His mentors and colleagues at Harvard introduced him to a number of field studies of both modern and aboriginal human groups, and his long periods at sea while in the Navy gave him an opportunity to reflect upon these studies at length. Homans became convinced that the then dominant view of "cultural uniqueness" was wrong, and that common concepts united these diverse and often geographically distant groups. Upon returning to Harvard, he began to explore these ideas more systematically in *The Human Group*.

Homans approached this task inductively, beginning with the observations of the actual behaviors and activities of people in concrete settings and then developing generalizations from these observations. He organized his analysis

around three main concepts and the interrelations among them: activities (what people do in particular situations), interaction (how activity by one person influences activity by another), and sentiments (actions indicative of the internal psychological states of the people involved in activities and interaction). These three elements, which continued in redefined form in Homans's later work, comprised an internal group system; that is, changes in one element tended to produce changes in another. The elements could be organized and elaborated in various ways, producing new forms of organization and group structure.

Five case studies comprise the core of *The Human Group*. They range from a factory work group (the Bank Wiring Room in the Hawthorne Western Electric Plant) to a street gang (the Norton Street Gang described in William Whyte's *Street Corner Society*) to a primitive society (the Tikopia family described in Raymond Firth's famous ethnography) to a New England community. Based on descriptive summaries of these case studies, Homans then abstracted a set of general propositions that described the empirical regularities that he or others had observed. Each summary and set of generalizations built on the previous ones, by attempting to either confirm or qualify the earlier ones, and then adding further generalizations induced from the new case study. The result was a large number of clearly stated generalizations, firmly anchored in empirical observation, that provided a foundation for more abstract theoretical development.

In addition to providing insightful descriptions of group process, *The Human Group* began to reveal Homans's concern with the nature and shortcomings of sociological theory. His own emphasis on the importance of clearly defined concepts, and explanation in the form of testable propositions, was also evident, as was his firm belief in grounding theory in the empirical world.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOMANS'S VIEWS ON THEORY

The propositions that Homans developed in *The Human Group* were only the beginning of his theoretical development. Influenced in part by opposition to the sociological theory of his day, and in part by readings in the philosophy of science, Homans gradually turned from induction to deduction and the advocacy of formal, axiomatic theory. Homans's close association with Talcott Parsons at Harvard was instrumental in this development. While Homans admired much of Parsons's work, he was highly critical of his style of theorizing and, more generally, of the structural functionalism then dominant in sociology. He believed that Parsons's "theories" were merely conceptual schemes that named and categorized phenomena while ignoring the *relations* between phenomena. Homans believed that theories should explain phenomena and that explanation required

not only concepts but propositions linking concepts to one another. As he further argued in *The Nature of Social Science*, explanation—and theory—must consist of showing that one or more propositions of a lower order of generality can be deduced, logically, from more abstract propositions at a higher order of generality. The lowest order propositions are those that describe actual events in the empirical world; that is, the kind of propositions that Homans developed in *The Human Group*. Showing that it is possible to deduce an empirical pattern from a set of more general propositions and axioms, Homans argued, is equivalent to explaining the pattern.

The most controversial aspect of Homans's developing views on theory was his argument that psychological, not social, principles must form the axioms from which propositions about social interaction and social institutions are derived. This position reflected the British individualistic tradition of Herbert Spencer and explicitly opposed the French collectivist tradition of Durkheim and Lévi-Strauss. Indeed, some have argued that Homans's views were developed in explicit reaction to the neo-Durkheimian views of Lévi-Strauss. Whereas Durkheim believed that social facts must be explained by other social facts, and that their study comprises the distinct subject matter of sociology, Homans argued that it is impossible to explain *why* social facts cause other social facts without reference to individual behavior. According to Homans's brand of "methodological individualism," social phenomenon are always the result of aggregated individual actions. Social structures and institutions are created and sustained by the behaviors of individuals, and the highest order principles in sociological theories must therefore be about individual behavior. Consequently, Homans argued, it is essential that we bring people and their fundamental patterns of behavior back into sociological analysis.

HOMANS'S THEORY OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE

Homans's own efforts to follow this charge are best exemplified by his first (1961) and second (1974) editions of *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*. In this work, undoubtedly Homans's best known and most important, he developed a theory that envisioned social behavior as "an exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two persons" (1961:13). Homans saw exchange processes not as the exclusive domain of the economic marketplace but as an integral part of all social life; that is, he argued that all interaction involves individuals exchanging rewards (and punishments) and seeking profits. These rewards include not only the monetary rewards of economic exchange but social and psychological rewards such as status, approval, and satisfaction. Homans's conception of exchange departed in two important ways from the collectivistic tradition of

Lévi-Strauss. First, Homans believed that individual self-interest, not collective or symbolic forces, provided the motivation for social exchange. Second, he believed that exchange theory should emphasize two-party exchanges between individuals, not the generalized exchanges on which Lévi-Strauss had focused. Accordingly, he largely confined his theory to direct exchanges in dyads and small groups.

Homans's aim in this work was to explain how fundamental processes of social behavior, such as conformity, power, and justice, arise out of social exchanges between individuals seeking rewards. Toward this end, he proceeded to show how established empirical propositions about these phenomena (including those developed in *The Human Group*) could be derived from a small number of general propositions—the propositions of behavioral psychology. His trio of key concepts from *The Human Group*—activities, interactions, and sentiments—reappear in *Social Behavior*, redefined for the new exchange framework and integrated with other concepts from behavioral psychology, such as stimulus, reward, punishment, cost, and value. Human activity is directed toward seeking rewards and avoiding punishment, interaction becomes the social exchange of mutually rewarding actions (at some cost), and profits (rewards minus costs) are measured against expectations, producing emotions of anger or pleasure.

The first edition of *Social Behavior* was based primarily on principles of operant psychology developed through animal research, particularly the famous pigeon studies of B. F. Skinner, another of Homans's colleagues at Harvard. This edition most clearly reflects Homans's belief that there is no clear distinction between the behavior of humans and other animals, and that both can be explained by the same principles. As the field of behavioral psychology expanded to include substantial research on humans, Homans also drew on this work. Thus, the 1974 revised edition of *Social Behavior* omitted a chapter on animal learning that was in the first edition and added the role of modeling or vicarious learning.

One of the most distinctive and controversial features of Homans's exchange theory was his belief that nothing emerges in social groups that "cannot be explained by propositions about individuals as individuals, together with the given condition that they happen to be interacting" (1974:12). Thus, he believed no new propositions were necessary to explain social exchange, other than recognizing that human needs are satisfied by other people, and that people reward and punish each other. He did, however, integrate some elementary economic principles into his largely behavioristic approach, specifically some assumptions about rational calculation of the likely outcomes of alternative behaviors. His version of economics was a modified one, however: People try to obtain rewards, but do not necessarily make choices that maximize profits; people do

not always make long-run or rational calculations; and people exchange both tangible and intangible commodities, including such social rewards as approval, advice, status, and compliance.

Homans's integration of operant psychology and microeconomics (and a few ideas from balance theory) produced six propositions that he argued could be used as basic axioms for deriving sociological theory. Briefly stated, these propositions make the following assumptions about human behavior:

1. Persons tend to perform actions the more frequently those actions have been rewarded in the past (Success Proposition).
2. People are more likely to repeat previously rewarded actions in the presence of stimuli that were associated with rewards in the past (Stimulus Proposition).
3. People are more likely to perform actions that produce outcomes they highly value (Value Proposition).
4. The value of a reward declines the more frequently a person has received it in the recent past (Deprivation-Satiation Proposition).
5. Rewards that are less than expected, or punishments that are greater than expected, produce anger and aggression; conversely, rewards that are greater than expected, or punishments that are less than expected, produce pleasure and approving behavior (Aggression-Approval Propositions).
6. Choices between alternative actions are determined by the relative value to a person of the actions' outcomes, multiplied by their perceived probability (Rationality Proposition).

Propositions 1 through 4 restate, as propositions, basic principles of behavioral psychology, particularly the well-known relations between reinforcement, discriminative stimuli, and behavior. They reflect the key assumption of operant learning: that individuals (both human and animal) tend to repeat behaviors that have produced desirable consequences in the past. Proposition 6, on the other hand, reflects the assumption of microeconomics or rational choice theory that individuals rationally calculate and compare probable future payoffs from alternative actions, and make choices based on those calculations. Homans appeared to adopt both assumptions, as have other exchange theorists: Sometimes humans act on the basis of past consequences, without calculation and perhaps even without awareness; at other times humans engage in rational calculation and comparison of probable future outcomes.

Proposition 5 introduces comparisons between expectations and outcomes that are not really part of either operant psychology or microeconomics, although they were based on Skinner's observations of how pigeons reacted when they did not receive expected rewards. (Homans, of course, believed humans would behave the same.) Proposition 5 is of particular importance because it is the basis for one of Homans's most enduring theoretical contributions: the concept of *distributive justice*. Distributive justice is the principle that rewards should be distributed in proportion to investments, or costs; thus, distributive justice obtains when the profits (rewards minus costs) of two persons are equal. If a person receives less (or more) than expected, based on this principle, then injustice obtains. Proposition 5 predicts that a person whose rewards fall below expectations is likely to feel anger and to display some form of aggressive behavior toward either the source or the beneficiary of the injustice.

After introducing these propositions, Homans then applied them to fundamental group processes: power and authority, cooperation and competition, status, justice, leadership, conformity, and, in his last chapter, to institutional processes. His descriptions show the centrality of small groups in social life and the ubiquity of exchange processes in both micro and macro structures. In Homans's view, more complex forms of social organization are built from the same "elementary forms" of social behavior that underlie processes in small groups. Thus, the group is a microcosm of society at large, and the needs of individuals are central to both.

Homans's exchange theory provoked strong criticism from sociologists, both those who were opposed to his behaviorist framework and those who believed he had misused operant principles. First, his "rationality proposition" raised the kinds of questions often directed at rational choice theorists about whether people actually calculate rewards and costs in a rational way. Second, numerous critics charged that his reasoning was tautological. In restating behavioral principles of reinforcement, stimulus discrimination, and satiation, Homans transformed definitions into propositions. For example, reinforcement is defined as a stimulus that increases the frequency of behaviors on which it is contingent; thus, Homans's Success Proposition—which relabels reinforcement as reward—is true by definition. Third, Homans's advocacy of psychological principles as the axioms for sociological theory led, not surprisingly, to charges of reductionism. Homans did not deny the existence of groups, institutions, or emergent properties, but he believed that they must be explained by propositions about the behavior of individuals. Not only did Homans believe in explaining macro phenomena with micro principles, but his deductive systems often took as givens many of the phenomena that sociologists were interested in explaining. For example, in order to apply his propositions, he would

typically make assumptions about what behaviors people in pre- or postindustrial societies reward, what outcomes people in those societies find rewarding, and often what forms of social organization support certain reward structures. His critics charged, consequently, that he was ignoring the very questions that sociologists ought to be addressing. Homans replied that no theory can explain everything.

— Linda D. Molm

See also Behaviorism; Distributive Justice; Social Exchange Theory

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HUGHES, EVERETT

Everett Hughes (1897–1983), an American sociologist, was a key figure in the transition period between the classical Chicago School of the 1920s and 1930s and the second Chicago School. A Chicago PhD, Hughes began his career in Canada at McGill University in Montreal (1927–1938), where he had a major, career-long impact on French- and English-language sociology, chiefly via *French Canada in Transition* (1943), his study of the industrialization of French Quebec by British and American capital during the 1930s. In 1938, he returned to the University of Chicago, where he remained for most of the rest of his career (1938–1961). While Hughes was not generally regarded as a systematic theorist, there is in his writings a theoretical frame of reference, interpretive institutional ecology (Helmets-Hayes 1998), that was an elaboration of the classical

human ecology approach made famous by his mentor, Robert Park. Interpretive institutional ecology combines aspects of Park's human ecology with the anthropological and sociological functionalism of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Émile Durkheim, George Simmel's formalism, and elements of interactionism drawn from W. I. Thomas, and C. H. Cooley. Hughes developed the approach in stages and by accretion over his career and applied it, often piecemeal, in a variety of sociological specializations: race and ethnic relations, work and occupations, education, medicine, and organizations. The significance of Hughes's approach to the history of Chicago sociology is twofold. First, in the 1940s and 1950s, the classical Chicago School split in two. Under the influence of Roderick McKenzie, Amos Hawley, and Philip Hauser, the "mapping" part of human ecology came to look more like factorial ecology and demography. At the same time, some sociologists such as symbolic interactionist Herbert Blumer ignored the ecological aspect of the approach and focused almost exclusively on the face-to-face lifeworlds of individuals and groups. By contrast, Hughes's interpretive institutional ecology retained the dualistic and totalising character of the original. Second, the layered, dualistic character of the perspective allowed Hughes to strike a balance between the so-called scientific and interpretive orientations to the discipline. It also allowed him to employ a variety of research techniques (participant observation, interviews) and data sources (official statistics, archives) in his work. His preferred methodology, however, was fieldwork, and he is famous for training several generations of field workers in Canada and the United States (e.g., Howard Becker).

Interpretive institutional ecology is a multilayered, essentially mesosociological approach that focuses on the typical dynamics and processes of social interaction at three levels of social reality. Its starting point, illustrated in *The Growth of an Institution: The Chicago Real Estate Board*, completed in 1928, and *Boys in White: Culture in Medical School*, published in 1961, is the single institution (a "going concern" or "enterprise") or a small cluster of institutions (an "institutional setting"). Within institutions (e.g., a hospital), people interact via several sets of overlapping, competing, and complementary institutionalised social roles and relationships (doctor/patient, coworker, friend) while pursuing multiple careers—occupational and otherwise (e.g., as doctor and mother). The focus on selves pursuing careers within institutions, especially at work, but elsewhere too (e.g., medical students), is central to the analytic logic of interpretive institutional ecology. It provides an entrée both to the individual self and the structure and history of occupations, institutions, and societies.

The second level of analysis is the macrosociological one. Here Hughes uses ecology and functionalism to analyse the "natural history" of institutions; that is, the typical processes by which they originate, do or do not

become formalized, and then change as they struggle for survival within a set of complex, constantly shifting natural and social environments (physical space, demographics, economic development, government policy). Institutions come into being, Hughes says, because, on the one hand, they satisfy the needs of groups and individuals. They survive, once established, because their members adopt strategies to survive as individuals and to help the organization deal with ecological contingencies. Hughes draws on Durkheim's concept of the division of labour and Radcliffe-Brown's concept of function to describe this process of ecological and functional adaptation. Institutions specialize within society and individuals assume specialized positions within institutions in order to survive. Institutions survive because they serve "functions." The best example of Hughes's macrosociology is the political economy-style analysis of the industrialization of French Quebec that he developed in *French Canada in Transition*, where he described the development of an ethnic division of labour within which French-speaking Quebecers ended up in a dependent and subordinate position in the occupational and class structures of Quebec society because modern, industrial capitalist production relations were imposed from without by foreign (British and American) capitalists.

Hughes's approach contains a macrosociology as well. He stresses that institutions are continually "in process," not just because they mindlessly adapt to their external environment but because they are made up of intelligent, reflective, adaptable agents (individual selves) who continuously and actively define and redefine situations, negotiate meanings, assume and reconstruct roles, and pursue careers in order to survive. In so doing, they create internal pressure for institutional change. The major sources of this interpretive aspect of Hughes's perspective are C. H. Cooley, Georg Simmel, and W. I. Thomas. Hughes was influenced by Cooley's work on institutionalisation and the social nature of the self and from Thomas took the notion of "the definition of the situation." His debt to Simmel was twofold: social interaction must be examined in processual terms and the primary theoretical purpose of sociology is the description of the recurring forms of social interaction.

The theoretical-methodological key to Hughes's approach is its focus—in particular, but not exclusively—on the single institution. For Hughes, the institution constitutes the "real world" venue where people deal in a pragmatic way on a daily basis with the questions of meaning construction, the production of social order, and so on that constitute the heart of sociological theory. Institutions are the settings that individuals come under the simultaneous, direct, and conflicting influence of, on the one hand, his or her self that has the experience, freedom, and capacity to construct a lifeworld within and across a set of careers, and, on the other, the constraints placed on that freedom and possibility by the existence of objectively real

formal and informal roles, statuses, and interests that are among the defining characteristics of institutions. Hughes grants to agents the freedom to construct social reality, but not with unfettered agency. First, people are subject to forces that they do not know about and could not control as individuals if they did (e.g., demographic and ecological factors). Second, people do not possess equal power to define situations (e.g., workers and bosses). Third, the subjective realities and "definitions of the situation" people construct are often similar because they are chosen from obdurate aspects of culture (e.g., norms, roles) that impose on people's consciousness and will.

— Rick Helmes-Hayes

See also Ecological Theory; Park, Robert

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HYPERREALITY

Hyperreality is a concept most closely associated with the work of one of today's most preeminent postmodern social theorists, Jean Baudrillard (b. 1929). Most simply, it means more real than real (e.g., the realities depicted in "reality television" shows). However, there is much more to the context and uses of this term that help give it deeper and richer meaning.

For Baudrillard, the contemporary world is one where modernity has given way to implosions, simulations, and a sense of hyperreality. He argues that there is no longer any truth or reality, and so signs no longer stand for anything;

they no longer represent anything that is real. Instead, we live in “the age of simulation” (1983:4). At first, these simulacra are reproductions of actual objects or events. Eventually, these simulacra come to mask and pervert a basic reality, and then to mask the absence of a basic reality, and finally they bear no resemblance at all to anything existing in reality. The simulacra come to refer only to themselves and other simulacra and put “an end to meaning absolutely” (1983:11).

All of these simulacra begin to implode with what is left of reality. In this way, the differentiation that characterized modernity has given way to the dedifferentiation characteristic of a postmodern turn in society. With simulations and reality imploding in on one another, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between that which is real and that which is simulation. Since simulations often seem more real than reality itself, they come to dominate society and people are left without reality, with only hyperreality. Hyperreality is not something that is produced but instead is “that which is always already reproduced” (1993:73).

Baudrillard gives many examples of the hyperreal in today’s society: Disney World, where it is cleaner, safer, and

people are nicer than in the “real” world; television, which is arguably the ultimate simulation and sensationalizes “reality”; and even all of America itself, where Baudrillard “sought the finished form of the future catastrophe” (1989:5).

Even hyperreality itself has the ability to become hyper-real. Baudrillard speaks of the ecstasy of objects, their propensity to go beyond themselves and proliferate to the highest degree. In other words, the beautiful as more beautiful than the beautiful in fashion, the real as more real than the reality of television, sex as more sexual than the sex in pornography. Thus, ecstasy ends up producing hyperreal hyperreality.

— Michael Ryan

See also Baudrillard, Jean; Postmodernism; Simulation

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I

IDEAL TYPE

Max Weber (1864–1920) coined the concept “ideal type” as a methodological device within his brand of “interpretive (*verstehende*) sociology.” Both concepts—ideal type and interpretive sociology—have given rise to grave misunderstandings. The word *ideal*, to begin with, has nothing to do with the colloquial adjective *ideal*, as in “He is an ideal husband, she is an ideal teacher.” Colloquially *ideal* is a normative value judgment. Weber, however, meant by ideal type what he also called “pure type,” a concept that is strictly analytical—an artificial construct that does not contain any value judgment about reality. On the contrary, ideal types are predominantly ruled by the rationality of logic. They are indifferent as to positive or negative value judgments. “There are ideal types of brothels as well as of religions.” Moreover, in a typically neo-Kantian vein, he emphasized the fact that an ideal type should not be viewed as a “picture” (*Abbild*) of reality but rather as a willful distortion of it. From a specific point of view, which is always necessarily guided by values, certain dimensions of reality are overemphasized, while other dimensions are on purpose kept in the background.

Weber was philosophically driven by the neo-Kantian question of how one could possibly arrive at a rational, scientifically satisfactory knowledge of a reality which is, as is the case with human behavior, predominantly irrational. His answer is not really satisfactory, as he acknowledges himself, but the best he could think of. An ideal type is in a sense an artificial model. For instance, one constructs types of human behavior that indicate how people would act if they would act in a purely functional-rational manner. Nobody acts in such a way, not even in the world of science or in modern bureaucracy. But that is precisely the point: By comparing reality as we experience it in everyday life predominantly in an irrational manner with the ideal type of

a radically rationally behaving human being, we begin to *understand rationally* this predominantly irrational behavior because of the *difference* between the constructed ideal type and the experienced reality. Ideal types are, in Weber’s own words, “conceptual means for the comparison and measurement of reality,” which, due to their general character, are able to highlight the particular features of the object under investigation. This throws a specific, typically neo-Kantian light on the notion of an interpretive (*verstehende*) sociology: Understanding (*Verstehen*) is *not* a method but it is the *aim* of Weber’s brand of sociology. Its method is the comparison of the constructed ideal types with the experienced reality. There is thus not “a method called *Verstehen*.”

Usually Weber placed concepts that he viewed and used as ideal types between quotation marks. Quite often he also constructed matrices of ideal types. For example, he distinguished four ideal types of human social action based upon four ideal typically distinguishable expectations: (1) “goal-rational behavior” oriented towards an explicit aim; (2) “value-rational behavior” carried by a rational belief in ethical, esthetic, religious, or other values; (3) “affectual behavior” driven by emotional expectations; (4) “traditional behavior” founded upon deeply rooted habits. Equally well known is the ideal typical matrix of (1) traditional; (2) charismatic; (3) legal-rational legitimacy. If one focuses on actual human behavior or the actual exercise of legitimacy in historical reality, one will never find a precise duplication of these ideal types in reality. Yet, by placing the ideal typical and generalized matrix upon reality, which is a historical and experienced reality, one will begin to *understand* its typical developments and its typical constitution and thus its historical particularity.

Weber believed that the ideal typical method could be helpful to the cultural sciences, which, unlike the natural sciences, are dealing with a subject matter—human behavior, social and cultural reality—that is characterized by values

and meanings and by events and phenomena that are particular and unique and in that sense irrational. He refused to abandon the natural-scientific objectivity by surrendering to the subjectivism of empathy (*Einfühlung*), yet he also realized that the neopositivist subjection to the methods of the natural sciences remained highly unsatisfactory when one deals with human beings, human behavior, social and cultural realities. The method of ideal types offered a solution: These conceptual models were natural-scientific in that they were general, in a sense timeless, yet in their confrontation with historical and experienced reality, they yielded cultural-scientific knowledge (understanding) of what is particular, unique, and specific.

There remains an irritating fact. Since they are artificial constructions, ruled by the laws of formal logic, they can in actual fact neither be verified nor be falsified. The only criterion by which they can be judged is their *heuristic use* or *uselessness*. Does the ideal typical matrix yield rational understanding, or does it not? That is the “verifying” or “falsifying” question!

This may well be the crucial test for most of social theory. Tocqueville’s “aristocracy” and “democracy,” Durkheim’s “mechanic” and “organic solidarity,” Toennies’s “*Gemeinschaft*” and “*Gesellschaft*” Maine’s “status” and “contract.” These are ideal types that for many decades have helped sociologists grasp rationally the extremely complex, and in many respects irrational, process of modernization. One can easily add contemporary examples of such ideal types. Weber, however, was the first and actually the only theorist who designed an ideal type methodology.

— Anton C. Zijderveld

See also Durkheim, Émile; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Tönnies, Ferdinand; Weber, Max; Neo-Kantianism; Verstehen

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IDENTITY

Identity can be thought of as the cover term for the names humans impute and avow in the course of interacting with others and orienting themselves to their various social worlds. A central principle of interaction between humans, or humans and the other objects that constitute

their world, is that interaction is minimally contingent on the identification of the objects involved. In other words, before we can act toward or interact with some object, it must be situated in time and place. To do so is to give the object a name in the sense of classifying it as a member of a particular category (e.g., a soldier, a woman, a man, a chef, a student, and so on). Such naming entails the imputation and/or avowal of identities.

Not all identities are the same, however, as there are at least three types of identity that are featured in the relevant literature on identity in the social sciences: social identity, personal identity, and collective identity. The three types are often interconnected and overlap in the fashion of a Venn diagram. From a sociological standpoint, *social identity* is the foundational or anchoring concept in that it is grounded in and derives from social roles, such as police officer, physician, or mother, or broad social categories, such as gender, racial, ethnic, and national categories. This structural grounding is captured in the parallel concepts of “role identities” and “categorical identities.”

Interactionally, social identities can be both imputed or avowed. They are imputed when ego assigns to alter an identity based on alter’s presumed category membership (She is a feminist!) or the role alter is thought to be playing (She is a teacher!) or the role ego would like alter to be playing, which is referred to as altercasting (You are my friend, aren’t you?). In each of these cases, a social identity is ascribed to others, and interaction is likely to proceed in terms of this identity.

Social identities can also be avowed or claimed, as when ego announces, “I am a Serb” or “I am a wine connoisseur” or “I am a professor.” It is because of such category-based avowals that some social psychologists define social identity in terms of self-definitions or identifications associated with social category memberships, or as one’s self-concept derived from one’s knowledge of membership in a social group, as well as the emotional significance that this membership produces.

But such self-definitions are perhaps more appropriately conceptualized as *personal identities*, which also include aspects of one’s biography and life experiences that congeal into relatively distinctive personal attributes that function as pegs upon which social identities can be hung (Goffman 1963). The importance of distinguishing between social and personal identities rests not only on the fact that the latter are self-designations rather than other-attributions, but is also suggested by the observation that individuals sometimes reject other-imputed social identities, especially when they imply social roles or categories that are demeaning and contradictory with an idealized self-concept (Snow and Anderson 1987). Such observations suggest that personal identities may sometimes be grounded in social identities that derive from role incumbency or category-based memberships but without necessarily being determined by those social identities.

The term *self-concept* has been used to explain the negotiation or compromise that is reached between an individual's ideal conception of the self and the information they receive from the social world, with the resulting negotiation capturing the tension that often exists between an individual's social and personal identities. The psychologist Erik Erikson can be read as attempting to conceptualize this tension or discordance with his concept of ego identity, which functions to ensure sameness and continuity in one's identity.

Collective identity, the third major type of identity, overlaps with the kindred concepts of social and personal identities but yet differs from them. It is loosely defined as a shared sense of "we-ness" or "one-ness" that derives from shared statuses, attributes, or relations, which may be experienced directly or imagined, and which distinguishes those who comprise the collectivity from one or more perceived sets of others (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Identifying with a collectivity is often based on an individual's social identity, such as identifying as an ethnic minority or a citizen of a particular country, but such category-based associations do not automatically give rise to collective identity. Instead, the development and expression of collective identity is often triggered by contests pitting one group against another, as in the case of the World Cup and the Olympics, by unanticipated events, such as the World Trade Center terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or by threats to group or community integrity or viability, as in the case of much social movement activity. A significant part of the power of collective identity comes from the collective solidarity, efficacy, and agency it provides, which individuals are not as likely to experience via their personal or social identities.

DIMENSIONS OF VARIATION

Identities vary not only typologically and contextually but also in terms of a number of contrasting dimensions. These dimensions of variation include salience, commitment, pervasiveness or comprehensiveness, and cohesiveness.

Identity salience refers to the relative importance or prominence of any single identity (e.g., mother, teacher, pastor, student) in relation to other identities, which have been conceptualized as being ordered in a salience hierarchy (Stryker 1980). The higher the placement of the identity within the hierarchy, the greater its prominence and the more likely it will be invoked. The relative salience or prominence of an identity is the result of a number of factors. These factors include the extent to which the individual's own view of self supports the identity, how much the individual's view is supported by relevant others, and the degree to which individuals have committed themselves to the particular content of the identity.

The observation that individuals have differing levels of commitment to various identities suggests the variable

concept of *identity commitment*. Identity commitment is related to identity salience in a cause/effect manner: Those identities to which an individual is most highly committed are most likely to be salient in the individual's identity hierarchy. One is committed to an identity to the extent to which one's relationships with others is based on that particular identity (Stryker 1980). For example, a father shows commitment to his parental role as it is the basis of his relationship with his children and influences his relationship with various others, such as his spouse. Therefore, the father identity becomes more salient within his identity hierarchy based on his commitment to this role. To the extent that commitment to that role falters, so will the relative salience of the corresponding identity.

Individual identities also differ in their level of *pervasiveness or comprehensiveness*. Pervasiveness or comprehensiveness (Cornell and Hartman 1998) are parallel terms for the observation that any particular identity may vary considerably in terms of its situational relevance or reach and the corresponding degree to which it contributes to the flow of interaction in various domains of social life. Metaphorically, a relatively pervasive or comprehensive identity can be thought of as a "thick" identity in that its band of influence is quite broad or wide (Cornell and Hartman 1998). For example, Middle Eastern, Islamic immigrants into the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century may have experienced that their ethnic and religious identities congeal into a pervasive social identity in a majority of their social interactions apart from their contrary interests and respective personal identities.

Finally, individual identities may vary in their level of *cohesiveness*. Identity cohesiveness refers to the extent to which separate identities are tightly or loosely interrelated.

PERSPECTIVES ON IDENTITY

How identity is conceptualized and analyzed is based in large part on one's orienting perspective. There are three broad perspectives in the study of identity: essentialist, dispositional, and constructionist. The *essentialist perspective* reduces the sources of identity to a single determinative attribute regarded as the individual's or collectivity's defining essence. Essentialist perspectives encompass both structural and primordial logics. Structuralists understand identity to be rooted in elements of the social structure, such as in roles, networks, and broader social categories, such as social class, ethnicity, and nationality. Alternatively, primordialists understand identity as deriving essentially from presumed biological givens, such as sex and race. Neither of these essentialist variants ignores historical factors or social changes, but these factors are treated more as intervening variables that affect the relative salience and pervasiveness of the structural or biological roots of identity.

The *dispositional perspective* posits a connection between various personality traits or tendencies and behavioral prospects. This perspective is based on the idea that certain social psychological traits or states predispose individuals to adopt or claim some identities over other possibilities. According to the authoritarian personality thesis, for example, dogmatic and insecure individuals are highly susceptible to identification with extremist social movements. In general, there are at least two major dispositional hypotheses. One is the troubled or spoiled identity thesis, which holds that individuals with unsatisfactory or stigmatized identities are open to and likely to be searching for more satisfactory identities. The other dispositional thesis is that individuals look for and adopt identities that verify their existing identities or self-concepts.

Standing in contrast to both the essentialist and dispositional perspectives is the *constructionist perspective*. It holds that there is considerable indeterminacy between identities and their theorized ascriptive, structural, and personality moorings. From this perspective, identities are regarded as the product of negotiation, interpretation, and presentation rather than biologically preordained, structurally given, or dispositionally determined (Cerulo 1997). Language and interactionally based discursive processes, such as framing, figure prominently in identity construction.

Although the analytic utility and credibility of these perspectives vary among scholars, it is arguable that together they contribute to a fuller understanding of identity than is provided by just one of them. For example, while it is historically indisputable that ethnic and national identities are constructed (Cornell and Hartmann 1998), they are not fabricated whole cloth apart from past and current cultural traditions and structural arrangements and the flow of political events and happenings, which together exercise constraint on the interpretive processes associated with identity construction.

IDENTITY PROCESSES

Identities are acquired, managed or negotiated, and transformed through a variety of social processes that cluster into at least two basic sets. One set of identity processes pertains to the acquisition or adoption and change or transformation of identities. The major associated processes include role transition, identity consolidation, socialization, and conversion. *Role transition* and the change in corresponding role identities are operative as individuals progress through the life course, transitioning, for example, from adolescent to adult, from single to married, from childless to parent. Often associated with such basic life course changes are various rites of passage ceremonies (e.g., bar mitzvahs, confirmations, weddings) that signal and celebrate transition from one core role identity to another. Another form of role transition associated with identity change is role exiting, as when one leaves the

priesthood, the convent, or various nonreligious professional occupations (Ebaugh 1987). Not all identity changes are associated with life course role transitions or role exits, however. Sometimes individuals merge two identities into a single salient one through a process of *identity consolidation*. This can involve the blending of two relatively congruent identities, as in the case of the public scholar or student athlete, or two seemingly discrepant identities, as in the case of "Jews for Jesus."

Undergirding many role transitions as well as both group-based new identities and identity consolidations is the process of *socialization*, which involves learning the various behaviors and perspectives associated with particular role identities and the development of the relational commitments that increase or intensify an identity's relative salience. The identities of a sports team member, a fraternity or sorority member, a soldier attached to a particular unit (e.g., platoon, company, division), or even a professional sociologist are difficult to understand apart from the interactive and socialization processes in which their development and salience are grounded. *Conversion*, which can be thought of as a form of socialization, is usually applied to more radical transformations of identity. The hallmark of conversion is the adoption of a new universe of discourse or informing point of view and a corresponding reconstruction of one's biography, such that the old self or identity is jettisoned in favor of a new or dramatically revitalized identity. Such dramatic transformations are typically associated with religious and self-help contexts and organizations, but may also occur in political groups. Whatever the organizational context, the result is the development and adoption of a highly salient and often pervasive identity, so much so that conversion has been conceptualized in part as entailing the "ubiquitous utilization" or "embracement" of a "master identity."

Identities are not only acquired and changed through the processes of role transition, identity consolidation, socialization, and conversion, but they also are managed, sustained, and negotiated through a variety of additional processes. These processes, which constitute the second general set of identity processes, can be thought of as forms of identity work. *Identity work* includes the range of activities individuals and groups engage in to give meaning to themselves by selectively presenting, negotiating, and sustaining identities congruent with their interests (Snow and Anderson 1987). Included among these activities are the construction and display of physical settings and props, as in the case of driving a conspicuously high-end automobile; the arrangement of appearance as exemplified by cosmetic face work; selective association with other individuals and groups, as when making a point of being seen "hanging" with some individuals rather than others; and verbal constructions and assertions, as when chanting at Olympic contests, "USA, USA, USA" or announcing "I am" or "am not" a person of a particular social category. Referred to as

identity talk, this fourth type of identity work has been found to be widely practiced, even among the downtrodden and stigmatized, as in the case of the institutionalized mentally ill and the homeless. Each of these types of identity work can facilitate individual or group embracement of or distancing from imputed or avowed identities (Goffman 1963; Snow and Anderson 1987).

CONTEXT

The stability or fragility of personal, social, and collective identities is historically contingent, with some periods rendering matters of identity much more problematic and fragile than other periods. Sociological and psychological commentators on the relationship between social context and identity have suggested that late modernity is one of those particularly volatile moments (Giddens 1991), as evidenced by, among other things, “identity crises,” “dilemmas of identity,” “identity politics and movements,” and “collective searches for identity.”

Underlying this apparent proliferation of identity problems and concerns in so-called late-modernity or post-modernity are numerous well-chronicled sociocultural challenges and changes: state breakdown, increased immigration and refugee flows, multiculturalism, technological advances such as the Internet, globalization, ethnic revitalization, and movements against socioeconomic and political exclusion. The confluence of such factors loosen in some instances and shatter in others the cultural and structural moorings to which identities were once anchored, thus giving rise to the construction, reconstitution, extension, negotiation, and challenge of various combinations and permutations of identities. Because of such factors and trends, it is clear that identity-related issues are particularly relevant to social life as we move deeper into the new century.

— David A. Snow, Sharon S. Oselin,
and Catherine Corrigan-Brown

See also Gender; Nationalism; Role Theory; Self and Self-Concept; Social Interaction; Social Movement Theory; Symbolic Interaction

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IDENTITY POLITICS

Identity politics is a term most frequently used in disciplines with strong roots in poststructuralism—feminist theory, queer theory, and multicultural theory, among others. During the second wave of feminism, and the 1970s and 1980s more generally, there was increasing attention given to those categories of people who had long been left out of the view of study. There was a concern to give voice to those who had long been silenced. Intersections of race, sex, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and nationality were among the many identities that began to draw the attention of social scientists. This focus on cultural identities represented a marked shift from the economic and political based analysis that had dominated the sciences to this time. This assertion of the individual, and especially of those individuals who were outside of the social norm, caused great instability in the comfortable split between the personal and the public, the family and the nation, and the state and the civil worlds.

Feminists were among the first to assert that “the personal is political.” They gave rise to a notion of identity politics based on the unique social locations of a given individual. The claim to identity was seen as a political assertion rather than a personal claim because identity also brings with it membership in community. In turn, membership demands equality with others in that group, and so those with identities that disrupt the status quo are seen as a threat to the hegemony of the ruling class. Allowing members of a social minority equal claim to social goods would call for a reshaping, often a radical reshaping, of societal values, norms, and even sometimes laws.

A culture of identity politics represents a multicultural approach calling for loyalty to various, and often multiple, categories of one’s identity. This challenges the foundations of the modern nation-state, which, it has been argued, is supported by the existence of homogenous group identity. Who is to be included for membership has always been an important social question, but the dawn of the era of identity politics seems to usher in a new hope for those who

have long been left out in the cold of the social world. Feminists, people of color, gays and lesbians, and ethnic minorities are among the many who have been eager to embrace such a politics in order to gain a voice and end their historical silence. At the same time, theorists have recognized the limits of identity politics and the view of personhood and community that it endorses. Identity politics, it is argued, promotes the notion of stable, essential identities and as such privileges difference over the reconciliation of difference. To counter this trend, some theorists have proposed a “relational” politics, which assumes that identity is always the product of relationship and therefore never an essential aspect of a person’s identity. In contrast to an identity politics that seeks to assert individuality, relational politics aims to overcome the ever-present threat of interpersonal conflict by privileging the flux relationship and social “conversation” over the stability and privilege of identity.

— Michael Ryan

See also Butler, Judith; Collins, Patricia Hill; Feminism

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IMPERIALISM

The term *imperialism* has been used in many ways, but virtually all refer to the coercive incorporation of territories, along with their economies, social formations, and political systems, into wider structures of power dominated by “foreigners.” So defined, imperialism is as old as recorded history, and the causes of particular episodes, widely separated in time and space, may be very different. These causes may also be represented differently, depending on the analytical approach: for instance, whether it is that of political economy, historical sociology, realist international relations, or cultural theory.

Nevertheless, some form of economic determination is evident in most studies of imperialism, including work on capitalist imperialism in the modern period, which has attracted the bulk of critical attention. In large part, this is

because Marxian theory has been the dominant approach and has proved extremely influential on historians, social scientists, and cultural theorists concerned with imperialism. The chief exception to this is provided by realist international relations theorists, but even here there are some, like Robert Gilpin and Justin Rosenberg, who have endeavored to fuse political realism and economic determinism in dealing with issues central to imperialism. Much earlier, Joseph Schumpeter’s attempt to trace modern imperialism back to a tenacious feudal overhang has also found an impressive following. But here, too, there has been a tendency to integrate Schumpeter’s ideas into a form of economic determination.

Because of the intellectual dominance of Marxism in the treatment of imperialism, we concentrate here on Marxian interpretations, which we classify into four types: original, classical, neo, and post. The concluding section outlines some possible future scenarios that are suggested by these theories.

THE ORIGINAL VERSION

Marx wrote about modern imperialism in two contexts: the origins of European capitalism and its extension to the rest of the world. His analysis of the “primitive accumulation of capital” includes the role that colonialism played in the creation of the capitalist mode of production in Western Europe. The accumulation of nonlanded property through tribute, pillage, slavery, and the slave trade facilitated the employment of land and labour under capitalist relations of production in Europe. Once the system was established, Marx argued, imperialism proper proved indispensable in spreading capitalist relations throughout the globe. Marx claimed that all non-European societies lacked internal dynamism, so that imperialism was essential to introduce progress. On these matters he did not depart significantly from the dominant liberal opinion of the early nineteenth century, as reflected for example in James Mill’s writings on India.

In Marx’s account of imperialism, it is the general acquisitiveness fostered by capitalism that propels its geographical expansion, rather than its contradictions or any particular conjunctural events. These may play some role in explaining capitalist imperialism, but only with regard to its specific forms and precise chronology. Sometimes capitalism can insinuate itself into existing exchange relationships in precapitalist economies and, by its superior efficiency, transform them into capitalist exchange relations. More frequently, capitalist penetration is impeded or wholly blocked by the operation of precapitalist systems, and in these cases some form of imperial domination and forceful restructuring along capitalist lines is essential for expansion to proceed. In both circumstances, capitalism will ultimately act as a solvent on established modes of production, as well as

creating the basis for economic, cultural, and political modernity. Destruction tends to precede reconstruction not only for obvious reasons of sequencing but also because imperialism itself initially exhibits many precapitalist features, reflecting the imperfect transformation of the metropolitan centres, and these wither only as capitalism is purified on its home ground. Thus, while many of the phenomena associated with precapitalist forms of imperialism remain evident for long periods, including tribute and outright theft, for Marx their significance is totally different from that in precapitalist imperialism. Ultimately, as genuine capitalist expansion into new territories takes place, a duplication of European achievements will occur, including rapid and sustainable economic growth.

While Marx was certainly wrong to view societies outside Europe as a homogeneous, static unity, much of what has occurred in the last 150 years is broadly consistent with his forecasts. Capitalism was spread by imperialism, and it has been associated with fast economic growth, by long-run historical standards. Material progress has been widespread, especially in terms of improved life expectancy, the extension of literacy, and mass urbanisation. Thus, even though Marx's understanding of the non-Western world was seriously flawed, his principal claims about the causes and effects of imperialism remain defensible.

CLASSICAL MARXIAN THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM

The chief limitation of Marx's account of imperialism lies in his treatment of the imperial centres. He shared liberal, Cobdenite beliefs about the anachronism of war as a means of resolving conflict between capitalist states, and he confidently anticipated the erosion of all forms of national identity, so that imperialism itself would disappear as capitalism became universal. Not surprisingly, then, with the appearance of growing tensions between advanced capitalist powers after 1900, his original analysis was revised by some of his followers, notably Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, in a great debate on the causes and consequences of imperialist rivalry that raged between 1910 and 1917.

None of these classical Marxian theorists denied the truth of what Marx had said about imperialism, but their attention shifted toward explaining intercapitalist conflict, which they believed to result from the centralisation of capital and the exhaustion of new imperialist outlets in non-European regions, so that "late starters" like Germany and Japan had to challenge the established imperialist powers by force. The basic ideas of Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin were broadly similar, and owed much to the work of contemporary liberal anti-imperialists, especially J. A. Hobson, whose *Imperialism: A Study* (1902) was widely read in both liberal and Marxian circles. Imperialism was now linked directly to the economic contradictions of advanced European capitalism,

in Hobson's case a strong tendency to underconsumption in the metropolitan countries resulting from the maldistribution of income. (The German Marxist Karl Kautsky had made a similar case as early as 1884 in his analysis of the French colonization of Indochina). Luxemburg took the argument even further in her *Accumulation of Capital* (1913), using Marx's two-sector models of accumulation to claim—wrongly—that the continued expansion of any capitalist economy was in principle impossible without constant access to new noncapitalist markets. Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin took a slightly different position, pointing to other causes of economic crisis, including disproportionality between sectors and the falling rate of profit. Hilferding's classic text *Finance Capital* (1910) contained a subtle and eclectic account of Marxian crisis theory. But they all agreed that increasing imperialist rivalry was an unavoidable feature of mature, or "overripe," capitalism.

According to the classical Marxists, these underlying economic causes were translated into domestic and international politics in the following way. The growth of monopoly in advanced capitalism had increasingly fused economic and political structures, aligning each national bourgeoisie with its state, undermining the previously vibrant cosmopolitan disposition of the capitalists and weakening liberal institutions. Capitalist acquisitiveness remained resonant, but it was now projected overwhelmingly outwards, to the world economy. Since almost the entire globe had been colonised, any further expansion of one advanced capitalist state brought it into direct conflict with one or more of the others. A new structural incompatibility within capitalism had matured. The economic forces promoting enhanced global integration remained undiminished, but they were divided between sovereign political authorities that could continue to grow rapidly only at each other's expense. The further development of the productive forces was fettered by the boundaries of existing states, or their empires, and a resolution of this contradiction was possible only through warfare.

As World War I overwhelmed the international socialist movement, Karl Kautsky sought desperately to show that imperialist conflict was not inevitable. Kautsky pointed to the strong possibility of an "ultra-imperialism," a sort of global cartel of the leading capitalist powers that would agree to the peaceful partition of the world and to a harmonious division of the spoils of imperialist penetration. Bukharin and Lenin denied that this was possible, invoking the "law of uneven and combined development." Bukharin's *Imperialism and World Economy* (1915) developed this concept in some depth and was an essential source for Lenin's much more celebrated pamphlet, *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), published in the following year. Just as cartels were weakened and eventually destroyed by differences in the cost levels and rates of

technical progress in individual companies, they argued, so international agreements between imperialist powers would founder on the conflict between new and dynamic capitalist states and the less progressive, longer-established powers with a large vested interest in the status quo. These arguments, developed during World War I, were vindicated, so many Marxists believed, by the events that led up to World War II.

NEOIMPERIALISM

The apparent relevance of classical theories of imperialism waned after 1945, where the Pax Americana established what Paul Sweezy described as “superimperialism.” The United States became the “dominant firm,” to pursue the cartel analogy, taming the relations between advanced capitalism states and promoting decolonisation. The principal concern of theorists of imperialism now turned to explaining the apparent failure of imperialism to transform the economic and political structures of the third world. The main thesis of Paul Baran was the “underdevelopment” of the periphery, which, he suggested, had continued after formal decolonisation. Baran, whose influential *Political Economy of Growth* appeared in 1957, saw exit from dependence on the world economy, and emulation of the Soviet model, as prerequisites for genuine development. The problem for the core capitalist states, on the other hand, was to maintain third world incorporation into the circuits of capital, contain the expansion of Sovietised economies, and eliminate nationalist resistance to global market forces. All of this required them repeatedly to apply extra-economic coercion similar to that used in the imperialist era.

Proponents of neoimperialism maintained that much of what Marx and the classical Marxist theorists of imperialism had said was untrue, and this included much of their analysis of conditions within the advanced capitalist states. In particular, they claimed, the European and North American working classes had been substantially incorporated into the system through rising living standards, welfare provisions, and the freedoms afforded by liberal democracy. Baran saw the most significant form of exploitation as the extraction of surplus from the periphery by the core capitalist powers. This was the chief cause of continuing underdevelopment, and it meant that capitalism was polarised internationally, so that nation-states were the principal actors, not social classes. Other Marxian theorists stressed the consequences of “unequal exchange” between North and South. High-wage countries exported commodities containing relatively little labour and imported goods that embodied much larger amounts of low-wage labour. Thus Northern workers had a profound material interest in preserving neoimperialist relations, since their high living standards depended upon it. They had more in common with their own capitalists than with workers in the South.

The evidence on third world development does not obviously refute the neoimperialist analysis. There has been rapid economic progress in many parts of the world but relative or absolute stagnation in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa and a tendency for advanced capitalist economies to grow faster than the global average. The forces of divergence appear stronger than those of convergence. And military intervention by core states has quashed many attempts to break with the capitalist world market. This was not simply a matter of countering Soviet expansionism, but also targeted a wide variety of movements aiming at independent national development.

The real weakness of neoimperialist theories lies in their exaggeration of the importance of the transfer of surplus from South to North, either through trade or by means of direct investment and the consequent growth of third world debt. No convincing account was ever provided as to why, once extracted, surplus was not used to finance accumulation in the periphery (thereby engendering development) but was instead retained in the core to increase investment and consumption there. True, markets in low-wage regions are restricted by the very fact of their poverty, but this is not inconsistent with the use of cheap labour to produce goods (and, increasingly, services) for export to the metropolitan countries. It was precisely such a process of export-oriented industrialisation that transformed the economies of East and Southeast Asia in the second half of the twentieth century. Moreover, the surplus produced in the South is much too small to account for the prosperity of advanced capitalist areas, which extends far beyond the small “labour aristocracy” that was supposed to share in the proceeds of imperialism in the classical writings of Lenin and before him of Friedrich Engels. The first laws of accumulation are arithmetical, and with core economies now constituting close to three-quarters of world output, it would take an unrealistically large share of the surplus component of the remaining one-quarter to make any substantial difference to the level of mass consumption in the metropolitan regions. This is not to deny that Northern workers benefit from unequal exchange with the South. But the overriding problem for most peripheral economies has been their inability to produce a surplus, or to use it productively, not the fact that it was siphoned off overseas. Better to be part of the system of global exploitation than to remain outside it; better to be Malaysia than Burma, rather China than Chad.

POSTIMPERIALISM

The influence of neoimperialist theories has dwindled with the economic success of the East Asian NICs (newly industrialising countries), the failure of import substitution strategies of industrialisation elsewhere, and the stagnation and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Increasingly, Marxists have come to argue that the world is

now postimperialist. Decolonisation has substantially ended foreign domination, generalised the system of states, and elevated the power of the world market, so that the entire globe is now subject to “the dull compulsion of economic forces.” In short, the claim is that Marx’s original analysis has proved to be broadly correct. Western capitalism has created a world in its own image, where coordination is primarily economic and where cultural homogenisation is proceeding apace. Unlike labour, capital has no homeland, no particular national loyalties, no reason other than profit opportunities to prefer one location to any other. Marx was right about the global dynamism of capitalism but distinctly premature in predicting its downfall. All this was first argued by Bill Warren in his book *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism* (1980), and it has been restated in postmodern terms by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000). Orthodox liberals and proponents of globalisation would substantially concur, differing only as to implications for radical politics.

AND THE FUTURE?

It is easy to make a persuasive case for the continuing relevance of Marx’s original position. The grand design of U.S. strategic planners mapping out the structures they desire for the future world system is entirely consistent with his expectations. Backward capitalism is to be purified of precapitalist remnants and illiberal practices. Advanced capitalist states will cooperate on matters economic and military. Technologies for global surveillance and the projection of armed force on a worldwide scale, already exceedingly highly developed, will improve and be used to generalise the conditions of law and order that already prevail at the core. If this grand plan succeeds, imperialist wars will not recur, and growth rates will be such that income levels converge much more rapidly than they have done hitherto. Institutional differences between capitalist states are already being eroded, and this process will be reinforced. International organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO) are increasing their powers and evolving into agencies of world government. The remaining barriers to capital mobility will disappear as property rights become secure, so that the comparative advantages of what are now peripheral economies will constitute a powerful basis for rapid economic development.

It is also very easy to construct a diametrically opposite scenario. Uneven development continues in a context of separate states, many of which remain powerful and particularistic. Monopoly capital forms intimate relationships with domestic political authorities, strengthening the political, institutional, and cultural differences between states and reinforcing the material basis of national loyalties. Integration into the world market remains incomplete, and the lack of jurisdictional unification means that distinct

political units meet at many points of friction. Environmental degradation gives rise to a global Ricardian stagnation, but this induces violent conflict (for example, over water resources) rather than ushering in the peaceful and unchanging “stationary state” anticipated by John Stuart Mill. Differences are resolved by armed force, as in the past. Thus, a persuasive case can be made for the continuing relevance of the classical view of imperialism, as reinterpreted by realist theorists of international relations and by Marxian writers such as Rosenberg and the “world systems” theorist Immanuel Wallerstein.

Nor does this end the indeterminacy. It is not yet possible definitively to reject neoimperialist theory. The forces of polarisation that underpin the divergence in growth rates appear to be very strong, and not easily reversible, so that many of the inequalities present in the world economy could increase still further. Thus, while Marx’s original analysis remains convincing, neither a new classical era of imperialist conflicts nor a continuation of neoimperialism can be readily dismissed.

— Michael C. Howard and John E. King

See also Capitalism; Globalization; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Postcolonialism; World-Systems Theory

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IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT

The term *impression management* is associated with the work of the influential post-World War II sociologist, Erving Goffman (1922–1982). It is central to his dramaturgical

approach, as outlined in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), in which social interaction is analyzed as a set of theatrical performances. Impression management is an overarching term that characterizes the wide variety of strategies used by people to control the ideas others have about them. It is concerned with the general ways in which people present themselves in public settings. Goffman's work has fostered extensive research in the social sciences (see Brissett and Edgley 1990). Goffman described people as "sign-vehicles" about which others attempt to gather information. Interpreting this information is complicated because some impressions are planted or "given" by the person, while others are unwittingly "given off." Successful impression management therefore involves two things: giving impressions that audiences falsely believe are given off and reading the different types of impressions provided by others. Goffman's dramaturgical work questioned what lay beneath the appearances of American society, and in this sense it contributed to what the philosopher Paul Ricoeur has called the "hermeneutics of suspicion."

Impression management is critical if the prevailing definition of the situation is to be sustained. To this extent, all participants find themselves motivated to sustain each other's presentations of self, even in circumstances where impression management has failed. For this reason, impression management involves a concern for individuals, for the "teams" to which they belong, and to the audiences who observe their performances.

"Actors" or "performers" in Goffman's dramaturgical world are "sincere" if they believe in the parts they play or "cynical" if they do not. Their performances are bolstered by various "fronts" that are intended to sustain a sense of authenticity. These fronts consist of supportive "settings" that serve as stage props and the "personal fronts" of the actors themselves, a term Goffman reserved for all aspects of physical appearance. By these means, performers "dramatically realize" their performances. Audiences are left with an idealized view of not only the performer but of the character who is thought to be portrayed by the performance. This illusion can only be sustained through a process Goffman referred to as "mystification." This describes the different means by which the audience is kept at some distance from performers, who can thereby sustain the performed illusion.

In one sense, impression management describes the performances given front stage by teams, performances which are "knowingly contradicted" backstage. In another sense, however, impression management may be an inescapable feature of all social interaction, and if so, the backstage team behavior is not itself any more real than front stage performances. Rather, it is simply different from and incompatible with front stage presentations of self.

Goffman emphasized that although impression management is often the preserve of the individual, it is also the case

that individuals are often acting to preserve the impressions audiences have of the teams to which they belong. To this extent, impression management requires dramaturgical loyalty, discipline, and circumspection. These are necessary to "save the show" (Goffman 1959:222). It is also the case that an audience will often have to save the show itself—and will normally do so willingly. Goffman emphasized this feature of impression management because it reveals the investment that we all have in the staged production of social reality.

Commentators on Goffman's account of impression management have explored three issues: the underlying sense of self it implies, its moral implications, and its empirical ramifications. Goffman's model of self is in a sense contradictory one. On the one hand, impression management requires each person to be a talented manipulator of social situations and expectations. On the other hand, Goffman was not interested in the internal workings of the person, and stated publicly that his focus was limited simply to each person's publicly observable performances. That is, the analysis of impression management only considers the person as a set of roles and therefore has no broader view concerning the nature of identity. Goffman had no way of considering how we change roles, grow into, or suit them. Thinking about a person's impression management therefore offers a snapshot of social reality, not a film of it. This limitation is part and parcel of dramaturgical analysis in general, and a source of frustration for those interested in individual psychology.

Several commentators—notably MacIntyre (1981) and Glover (1988)—have investigated the moral implications of impression management. They suggest that the actor in Goffman's dramaturgical world is a cynical manipulator, incapable of genuine feelings. The self who manages his or her impressions is a shallow creature without any sense of tradition, culture, or morality. However, it may be more appropriate to suggest that the idea of impression management reveals little or nothing about the self. Goffman's dramaturgical focus is not the self but rather presentations of self.

Both sociologists and psychologists have developed our understanding of impression management through empirical studies. For example, Lofland (1998) among others has developed Goffman's work through her ethnographic investigations of urban life. Among psychologists, a field of study known as IM has emerged to explore impression management through detailed empirical studies (see Tesser and Felson 2000). In summarizing the psychological literature, Tseelon (1992) distinguishes between "essentialist" and "pragmatist" views, suggesting that psychologists have generally assumed that each manager of impressions has an underlying self, whereas sociologists have generally seen the self as a social construction.

— Philip Manning

See also Blumer, Herbert; Dramaturgy; Goffman, Erving; Mead, George Herbert; Symbolic Interaction

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INDIVIDUALISM

ANCIENT AND MODERN INDIVIDUALISM

There are two broad definitions of individualism. In political terms, it is a political doctrine associated with liberalism that emphasises the autonomy, importance, and freedom of the individual in relation to society and state. Secondly, it is the culture associated in modern society with private property, consumption, and subjectivity. Individualism is often thought to be an important component of Western culture per se with its origins in both Greco-Roman civilization and Christianity. However, the doctrine had its modern roots in seventeenth-century religious dissent, especially the Protestant sects, and it is interpreted as a fundamental ideology of capitalism. In economic theory, the fictional character Robinson Crusoe is often taken to be the quintessential representative of individualistic capitalism.

As a term of condemnation, *individualisme* was employed in France to criticize the rational individualism of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Edmund Burke (1729–1797) believed that individualism and the promotion of individual interests undermined the commonwealth and created an uncivil and unstable society. Nineteenth-century French sociology emphasized the importance of social solidarity against the rise of egoistic forms of individualism, and the sociology of Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) can be interpreted as a sustained intellectual attack on utilitarian individualism represented by Herbert Spencer (1820–1895). Although the analysis of individualism has played a significant analytical role in the development of sociological theory, the ideological and intellectual relationship between individualism and sociology

is often contradictory and antagonistic. As a result, understanding the relationship between “the individual” and “the social” remains an ongoing issue in sociological theory. Individualism has also had an important impact on economic theory, because the concept of utility has been important to the development of assumptions about market exchange, consumer sovereignty and consumption preferences, and on political theory where it underpins the contemporary notion of rights.

The modern emphasis on subjectivity, the individual, and privacy is often contrasted with the classical world, where these values were reversed. The “quarrel between the ancients and moderns” compared the respect for public institutions and public space in the ancient world with the emphasis on conscience and individual subjectivity in modern society. Benjamin Constant (1988) argued that the liberty of the ancients, which arose from their active engagement in politics, required them to sacrifice their personal interests to the polis. By contrast, the moderns pursue their personal pleasures and regard politics as merely a means to protect their private lives. The concept of individualism is thus interconnected with a range of other key concepts in social and political theory such as privacy, rights, and social contract. In contemporary thought, individualism is closely associated with privacy, because private space outside the public realm is assumed to be important for cultivating and protecting the individual from political scrutiny and interference. Both privacy and individualism are in turn associated with the liberalism of political philosophers such as John Locke (1632–1704). In liberal political thought, the protection of the rights of individuals is held to be essential to guard against the threat of arbitrary rule and authoritarian regimes. Rights refer to the legal entitlements of free and rational agents, who combine through a social contract to form a state, whose sole purpose is to guarantee their enjoyment of these privileges.

Understanding the origins of individualism typically involves a contrast in social and political theory between the public and the private within the ancient world. In classical Greece, private affairs were often negatively defined in opposition to the public sphere and public duty. The private arena was associated with deprivation (*privatus*) and the public sphere was one of freedom and reason, where citizens congregated for political debate, economic exchange, and entertainment. The autonomous individual could only exist and develop in the public domain. In political philosophy, the contrast between the ancient world and modern society has been an important aspect of the theory of totalitarianism. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1958) Hannah Arendt argued that people in modern society are forced out of a shared public world into a lonely, isolated, and interior space. In their isolation, pressures toward uniformity undermine their individual autonomy, and they are psychologically exposed to totalitarian social forces. The

private space of the Athenian household was governed by the stubborn necessities of life—procreation, production, and consumption. It was only when men left the privacy of the household that they emerged from these biological necessities to participate in politics as free individuals. This clear distinction between private and public in the classical world has been confused in modern times by the emergence of “the social.” In modern society, human beings are bound together, but the common threads are paradoxically the private desires of consumption and a common mass culture. In a mass society, the social becomes the basis of mass conformity and the moral calling of the political sinks into petty politics. The pressures from standardized consumer taste slowly undermine individualism.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

From this brief sketch of the origins of the debate about individualism, we can see that the notion of individualism has become interconnected with a range of fundamental terms in political and social theory. It is as a result subject to considerable conceptual confusion. It is important to establish a clear distinction between four separate issues (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1986). We need to distinguish (1) an emphasis on the individual as an autonomous agent with a distinct identity, (2) individualism as a social and political ideology with various national traditions, (3) individuality as a romantic view of the uniqueness of the person requiring education and cultivation, and (4) individuation as a process whereby people are standardized by a bureaucratic process. There is in addition an epistemological theory (methodological individualism) that argues that all sociological explanations are reducible to the characteristics of individuals. We shall briefly explore these issues before turning more directly to the analysis of individualism in sociological theory.

The cultural emphasis on the individual is seen as a defining characteristic of the West. The idea that Western culture recognized the importance of the individual is often associated with Christian soteriology, where individual salvation has been a fundamental doctrine. In theological terms, the free will of individuals to determine their own religious fate has of course been contentious, but as an evangelical religion, the conversion of individuals has been a prominent aspect of Christianity as a whole. To be saved, the individual had to be distinct, separate, and responsible. Historians have also claimed that the practice of the confessional was a unique aspect of the Western tradition, underwriting the notion that each individual has a separate conscience. The confessional, like devotional reading of scripture in private, developed as an internal and reflexive discourse of the individual consciousness. Despite the processes of secularization, this emphasis on the individual continues as a tradition, for example, in both natural and

common law. The individual was critical to the emergence of both natural and human rights. By contrast, Chinese and Japanese cultures do not emphasise the autonomous individual but value social responsibility. Louis Dumont in *Essays on Individualism* (1986) contrasted the hierarchical caste society of India with its emphasis on the social whole over the individual and modern society, where the social whole is subordinated to the individual.

In the European tradition, individualism as a doctrine has been a major aspect of social thought. In *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, C. B. Macpherson (1962) argued that the political philosophy of Locke legitimised private property rights, and hence individualism was a necessary condition for the rise of a capitalist market. The liberalism of later writers such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and James Mill (1773–1836) was associated with utilitarianism, which proposed that institutions were useful if they contributed to the general happiness of society, but they denied the reality of collective entities. Rights were “nonsense on stilts” (Waldron 1987). For J. S. Mill (1806–1873), individualism had a distinctively political dimension, and defended the rights of the individual to liberty and freedom. He sought to protect individual conscience against the mass opinion of a poorly educated public. An important exposition of individualism was developed by Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) in *Four Essays on Liberty* (1969), where he argued that “negative liberty” that had occupied political philosophy up to J-J Rousseau (1712–1778) involved freedom from various constraints, whereas the modern notion of positive liberty was concerned with self-realisation and self-development. The notion of positive liberty is not necessarily associated with laissez-faire individualism, which implies that individuals can do what they like, provided their freedom does not constrain the liberties of others.

The development of individualism corresponds closely to the rise of Western capitalism from the early seventeenth century. Max Weber (1864–1920) in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930) showed how Calvinism challenged traditional authority by claiming that the salvation of the individual could not be guaranteed by the institutions of the church such as the sacraments. Each individual would stand alone before God on the day of judgement and would be held responsible for his or her sins. Protestantism fostered a radical version of religious individualism that profoundly shaped Western attitudes towards political and social institutions. The emphasis on the individual and the anxieties that surrounded lack of certain knowledge of salvation was part of a “tragic vision” that in France characterised the Jansenists, the philosophy of Pascal, and the tragedies of Racine (Goldmann 1964). In “early modern religion,” the Reformation was a critical turning point, because it made salvation potentially available to everybody, regardless of his or her social status. The

emergence and differentiation of the “individual” from “society” is an important component of the general development of religion.

There are, however, problems with this periodization of individualism. There were obviously variations between different societies and different religious traditions. For example, Alan MacFarlane (1978) has claimed in *The Origins of English Individualism* that English society was individualistic as early as the thirteenth century, where there was an early form of the nuclear family, no extended family, and the separation of the farm and the family, indicating the appearance of a separate economy. These structural conditions favoured the development of individualism before the Puritan revolution. MacFarlane’s argument is a useful corrective to the conventional view, but other historians claimed that he underestimated the importance of communal values and community sanctions on individual belief and practice in medieval society. By contrast, there are equally strong arguments that a coherent doctrine of individualism was a product of the secular philosophers of the Enlightenment such as David Hume (1711–1776).

The idea of individuality was part of the Romantic tradition, and in Germany individuality (*Individualität*) was associated with the cultivation of the sensibility of the individual through education, personal discipline, and travel. In the Romantic tradition, this cultivated singularity (*Eigentümlichkeit*) was contrasted with the cold rationalism of the Enlightenment notion of the individual. Perhaps the most important statement of individuality is to be found in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, whose criticisms of modern society (or nihilism) called for a revaluation of culture in which the moral standing of the individual depended on the inner cultivation of “the soul” (Thiele 1990). Nietzsche feared that the standardization of modern culture would destroy the autonomous individual, and against modern philistine values he promoted the idea of the Overman (*Übermensch*), who would constantly struggle to re-create himself in the face of modern ennui and mediocrity.

Individuality was associated with the debate between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*. Thus, *Kultur* referred to those aspects of society that were highly valued and was associated with the development of individuality, or more precisely personality. Education (*Bildung*) and moral training were fundamental to the social creation of personality and self-discipline. *Bildungskultur* was the pinnacle of national aspiration, the epitome of national self-respect and achievement in German high culture. Culture required cultivating the raw potential of the self in order to produce the educated, disciplined personality. By contrast, *Zivilisation* had a negative significance, referring to the technological growth of a crass commercial society and to the utilitarian tradition of economic individualism. In the early part of the twentieth century, *Zivilisation* was increasingly associated with the negative features of American industrial civilisation

that had destroyed cultivated taste by promoting a commercial society based on popular culture and naive enjoyment. The cultural industry had in America become the entertainment business. Both the Frankfurt School and conservative critics shared this cultural rejection of American civilisation. For example, the legacy of *Bildungskultur* is manifest in criticism of the shallowness of American society and its false individualism in the philosopher Martin Heidegger’s objections to modern technology.

Finally, we can recognise a process of standardization in contemporary societies that we can define as individuation, namely the treatment of individuals as uniform and equal objects. The development of modern bureaucracies has played a significant role in the surveillance and control of people through individuation. The key elements of the process are directly related to the growth of social citizenship when people acquire National Insurance numbers, passports, taxation codes, identity cards, permanent addresses, and identity cards. We have also recently seen the development of DNA testing and electronic tagging as methods of control through individuation. The process is paradoxical because citizenship is important for acquiring social benefits and resources, but it is also an aspect of modern regulation. Individuation thus differentiates people by giving them a unique identity (such as a National Insurance number), but at the same time achieves a detailed scrutiny of the individual. This process is closely associated with a sociopolitical context that Michel Foucault has called “governmentality.”

INDIVIDUALISM IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Possessive individualism and laissez-faire individualism have been regarded as an ideological defence of private property, the market, and industrial capitalism. The sociological tradition has interpreted individualism primarily as a radical doctrine that has corrosive effects on the social order, because the idea that every individual has opinions that are important is a threat to tradition and authority. In this respect, individualism is often associated with egoism. Durkheim in *Suicide* (1951) claimed that individualism, egoistic expectations of the business cycle, anomie, and weak social solidarity produced high rates of suicide. Individuals with weak social connections were particularly prone to commit “egoistic suicide.” By contrast, the legacy of Max Weber has been associated with “methodological individualism,” namely with the view that all sociological concepts refer to or can be reduced to the characteristics of individuals. Weber claimed that he wanted to rid sociology of “collective conceptions” and to develop causal arguments based on the social actions of individuals. Weber’s interpretative sociology of action in *Economy and Society* (1978) developed the ideal types of capitalism, bureaucracy, and market to avoid the reification of concepts that

was characteristic of positivistic versions of the social sciences.

The development of sociological theory has involved various attempts to resolve this dilemma of collective and individual concepts of social institutions. Weber, for example, has been criticised for an artificial and historically static construction of the individual and society. In *The Society of Individuals*, Norbert Elias (1991) criticised Weber for his inability to reconcile the analytical tensions between “the individual” and “society.” This failure to deal successfully with this artificial division was part of a general weakness of sociological theory. Elias’s solution was to analyse the two concepts of individual and society as historical constructs that arise from social processes. The balance between society (we) and the individual (I) is not fixed, and hence what he called “process” or “figural sociology” was designed to explore the we-I balance in different social configurations such as feudalism or bourgeois society.

In *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), Talcott Parsons developed a systematic criticism of the assumptions of utilitarian individualism. His argument had two major components. First, if economic actors are rational, then they will act in a self-interested manner to maximise their resources. If these assumptions are correct, then human beings will use force and fraud to achieve their individual ends. Therefore, economic theory cannot explain social order. Secondly, Parsons observed that to solve “the Hobbesian problem of order,” economic theory had to introduce additional assumptions such as “the hidden hand of history” or “sentiments” to explain how social order emerged. However, these additional assumptions were not compatible with the initial assumptions about self-interest and maximisation. Parsons’s criticisms were important in the development of the sociological tradition that denies “society” is simply an aggregate of self-interested economic actors. Society can only exist where there are shared traditions, cultures, and institutions.

The concept of the social actor in both Weber and Parsons was an analytical construct that emerged from their engagement with economic theory. It is possible to defend both Weber and Parsons against Elias. In his sociology of religion, Weber developed the notions of “personality” and “life orders” in which a personality structure is not a given but is cultivated through education and discipline. “Personality” stands frequently in opposition to the “life orders” of the economy and the state, and with the growth of capitalism, personality is threatened by the regulatory impact of the practical rationality of the secular world. Different cultures have different life orders that produce different personalities. The violent personalities of medieval society are replaced by new life orders that emerge with new social technologies. In his studies of the Protestant sects, Weber examined the historical development of the ascetic personality in relation to the life orders of

emerging capitalism. Weber’s articles on European and American sectarianism were part of a larger project on the sociology of life conduct (*Lebensführung*). It is not possible, therefore, to interpret Weber’s sociology as yet another conventional dichotomy of the individual and society; the dichotomy for Weber was thoroughly anthropological and historical. Similar arguments might be developed in relation to Parsons, who thought of personality as a type of institution and hence did not conceptualise society as simply a collection of individuals.

TOCQUEVILLE, INDIVIDUALISM, AND AMERICAN CULTURE

There has been a persistent theme in modern sociology arguing that nineteenth-century individualism was undermined by the growth of mass society in the twentieth century. The debate starts with Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), who in *Democracy in America* (1969) believed that the lack of centralised, bureaucratic government in America had encouraged individual initiative and that voluntary associations had flourished to solve local, community problems. Civil society flourished as a result of these associations, and individualism had not been crushed by centralised administration. However, the emphasis on equality, while a revolutionary doctrine, also threatened the individual with mass opinion. Tocqueville’s fears for individual opinion in a mass democracy influenced liberals such as Mill towards universal suffrage in Britain.

Critical theorists in the twentieth century continued to study the impact of mass society on individuals. C. Wright Mills (1956) in *The Power Elite* claimed that individuals were increasingly manipulated by public opinion in a society where elites controlled the channels of information. David Riesmann in *The Lonely Crowd* (1950) analysed the American personality as the other-directed character, because it depends on constant approval and affirmation from others. Other-directed personalities are conformist, and hence American society was stagnating. In *The Organization Man* (1956), W. H. Whyte described the company executives of corporate America, who are mobile, disconnected from their local communities, and dedicated to personal achievement within the organization. These organizational commitments encouraged conformity and alienated these executives from family and community. In *Habits of the Heart*, Robert Bellah and his colleagues (1985) undertook an influential study of contemporary attitudes towards politics that was intended to replicate Tocqueville’s study. They found that Americans were alienated from politics at a formal level, but their commitment to society was expressed through a multitude of local and informal associations.

Sociology in the 1950s created a picture of social standardization or individuation that apparently undermined the raw individualism of early capitalism. Contemporary

sociological studies have drawn on the theory of postindustrial society to argue that modern patterns of employment, for example, in the service sector, are fragmented and do not require loyalty to the company. Work in the 1990s has become casualised, part time, and discontinuous. The alienated individual of mass society has been replaced by a workforce that has no sense of identity with the company, and many people no longer have an experience of a lifetime career. A sense of stable and continuous identity is eroded by the impact of technology on careers. The implication of these studies of postindustrial work is that the rugged individualism of early capitalism is being replaced by postmodernity. As a result, contemporary social thought has conceptualised the individual as an uncertain, anxiety-ridden personality whose roots in society have been dislocated by the speed of technological change, the erosion of the community, and the secularisation of traditional culture.

As a result, the modern individual is once more disconnected from the community and trapped by a variety of contradictory processes. There is a widespread view in sociology that modern cultures of consumption are subject to global processes of standardization, for example, as a consequence of McDonaldization, and individual preferences are simply manufactured by modern advertising. At the same time, modern cultures are becoming hybrid and differentiated by globalization. Global hybridity and cultural simulation are eroding the national and communal roots of identity. These social processes are producing postmodern individualism in which the emphasis on subjectivity in popular culture occurs alongside a global monopolization of information, the standardization of cultural production and consumption, and the rise of electronic surveillance of individuals, especially deviants and criminals. Postmodern individualism appears, therefore, to be an example of the dangerous public world that was analyzed in Arendt's study of the roots of twentieth-century totalitarianism.

— Bryan S. Turner

See also Capitalism; Civilizing Processes; Democracy; Frankfurt School; Governmentality

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INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Industrial society is based on an economic mode of production that relies primarily on machine technology for the production of goods. Although the embryonic origins of the process of industrialization can be traced back to earlier periods—some historians push back to as early as the thirteenth century, while others move the date forward by some centuries—the period between 1750 and 1850 is generally considered to mark a watershed event of world historic importance, as the Industrial Revolution swept first through Britain and then elsewhere in Western Europe and North America. Although critics contend that the term *revolution* is inappropriate insofar as it implies rapid social change of an unprecedented and violent nature, social theorists have tended to side with the view advanced by social historian Eric Hobsbawm (1969), when he contends: “The industrial revolution marks the most fundamental transformation of human life in the history of the world recorded in written documents” (p. 13). Seen in this light, it is parallel in its monumental impact to the shift in preliterate times from hunting and gathering societies to agrarian societies.

Industrial society proved to be extraordinarily dynamic, encouraging rapid and ceaseless technological innovation and mechanization that led to levels of economic productivity never before realized. In a relatively short time, industrial society transformed work as self-sufficient artisans gave way to wage laborers working in the new factory system. This was part of the restructuring of the class structure and a new division of labor, which saw an explosion in the size of the working class and the consolidation of economic

power in the hands of the emergent capitalist industrial class. The factory became the new locus of work, which was increasingly rationalized and subject to new modes of control and surveillance. At the same time, new modes of transportation and communication emerged, signalling the beginning of a process of reducing the impact of geographic distance on economic development. Industrialization was intimately related to urbanization, as the factory system was heavily concentrated in cities. This led to a major demographic transformation of society. The impact of these changes was not confined to the economic realm, but rather reverberated throughout the entire social order. Industrialization led to the rise of mass markets and thus to new patterns of consumption. It impacted politics and culture and penetrated into the intimate realm of domestic life. At the same time, in the interest of obtaining raw materials, cheap labor, and potential new markets for goods, it spurred a process of global penetration into nonindustrial parts of the world.

There were those who clearly benefited from industrialization and those who were losers. The major beneficiaries were the owners of industrial enterprises and the financiers who provided the capital for business ventures. This era witnessed the expansion of the middle class and a rise in its standard of living. Among the losers were the landed aristocracy, who did not sink into oblivion, but in the political struggles of the period saw their dominance erode. The economic viability of the artisans was undermined by industrialization, as the waves of machine-breaking episodes by members of this class between 1810 and 1830 attests. As empirical studies in the nineteenth century such as Friedrich Engels's *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1844) and Charles Booth's *Life and Labor of the People of London* (1889–1891) indicated, the lives of the urban working class was characterized by low wages and poor work conditions, inadequate housing, crime, disease, and other manifestations of grinding poverty.

PREINDUSTRIAL VERSUS INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

The birth of sociology occurred during the Industrial Revolution, as intellectuals sought to make sense of the dramatic changes that were sweeping across Western Europe. Among the progenitors of modern sociology, Henri Saint-Simon (1760–1825) is generally credited with first giving substance to the concept of industrial society. He did so by presenting a sharp and essentially ahistorical distinction between feudal society and industrial society. The former he characterized as rooted in tradition, militaristic, and concerned primarily with consumption, while the latter undermined tradition, was peaceful, and centered around production. His approach didn't seek to account for the process of social change that led from one type of society to the next, but rather focused in generally dichotomous terms on the

differences between them. The construction of contrasting typologies would characterize the work of other nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social theorists. This includes Henry Sumner Maine's distinction between societies based on status versus contract, Ferdinand Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft* versus *Gesellschaft*, Herbert Spencer's militant versus industrial, and the most consequential of such typologies, Émile Durkheim's mechanical versus organic.

Durkheim contended that preindustrial and industrial societies can be distinguished by contrasting modes of social solidarity—mechanical for the former, organic for the latter—that in turn reflect differences in the division of labor. Preindustrial societies are characterized as having relatively simple social structures with a minimal amount of labor division. Clans, tribes, villages, and other forms of what Durkheim called “segmented societies” relied minimally, if at all, on external social organizations, instead functioning as small networks for the provision of life's basic necessities. Segmented societies were not economically interdependent to any significant degree. The solidarity that bound people together was connected to the sameness of their lives. People were bonded together by commonly held values or what Durkheim, borrowing from Rousseau, referred to as the “collective conscience” (Durkheim [1893] 1964). In contrast, modern industrial societies are defined by their increasingly complex social structures and by an ever more refined division of labor. Industrial societies necessitate the specialization and compartmentalization of work, and with this arises a growing interdependency. The new reciprocity characteristic of social relations is precisely the quality of industrial societies that establishes the basis for organic solidarity. The differences in the functions performed by societal members produce individual differences, thereby serving as a stimulus to individualism. Industrial society is characterized by heightened complexity and differentiation, an increased dependence on society, and at the same time a growing level of individual autonomy.

Durkheim focused on the social problems that were endemic to industrial societies. In so doing, he sought to distinguish those problems from temporary ones resulting from the rapid transition from preindustrial to industrial society, where the eroding of mechanical solidarity left a vacuum while a new moral order based on organic solidarity had not yet emerged. In combating the problems associated with the two pathologies he saw as most significant—*anomie* and *egoism*—he argued that sociology had a role to play in clarifying moral issues and in formulating reform-oriented social policy. His concern for facilitating the emergence of a new moral order consonant with organic solidarity led him to embrace a version of conservative socialism similar to that of Saint-Simon.

A contrasting perspective on industrial society can be seen in the work of two other classic figures in the formative

period of sociology: Karl Marx and Max Weber. It is different in two significant ways. First, it seeks to offer a historical account of the rise of industrial society. Second, while the first approach conceptually decoupled capitalism from industrial society, another line of thinking concerned itself with *capitalist* industrial society.

Marx identified three precapitalist economic formations—Asiatic, ancient, and feudal—as the sum total of historically specific predecessor modes of production. Little attention in his work was paid to the distinctive characters of these modes. Moreover, despite attention paid to the transition from agrarian feudalism to industrial capitalism, discussions concerning the transition from one economic formation to another remains problematic. This is due in no small part to the fact that his primary focus was the capitalist mode of production. Moreover, it was the unique dynamics of capitalism that were of primary concern, and not the dynamics of industrial society in general. He depicts capitalism as a type of industrial society characterized by class divisions that are defined in terms of the private ownership of the means of production by the hegemonic capitalist class. Because capitalists compete with other capitalists, they are forced to constantly upgrade the means of production by introducing technological innovations in order to gain a competitive advantage. In this sense, capitalism proved itself to be the most highly dynamic and productive economic system in history, creating the preconditions for postscarcity societies.

However, there was a darker side to capitalist industrial society. The implication of this system for workers is that they lose the ability to own the fruits of their labor and the capacity to control the labor process. By being forced into the world of wage labor, they are devalued to the level of a commodity—a “thing”—through the process of “universal salability.” The major theme in Marx’s critique of capitalism in his early writings is that workers suffer from alienation in such a society. Although Marx never repudiated this more philosophical argument, at the forefront of his later economic writings was the concept of exploitation. In the quest for profit, the capitalist invests money not in order to produce something of use value but to make more money. Disputing the idea that profit arises in the exchange between producer and consumer in the marketplace, Marx insisted that it occurs in the sphere of production, in the exchange between the capitalist and the laborer. He rejects the claim of classical economics that the exchange of labor for wages was an equal one, contending instead that for capitalism to function, the exchange was of necessity unequal to the advantage of the capitalist. Surplus value—calculated as the ratio between necessary labor time and surplus labor time—is in Marx’s view the ultimate source of profit. In *Capital*, he argued that surplus value should be treated as a measure of the rate of exploitation, which is predicated on the view that the inherent relationship

between capitalist and worker is like that between a vampire and its victim (Marx [1867]1967:257).

Marx was convinced that industrial society could be freed from its capitalist mooring via the revolutionary actions of a class-conscious proletariat, and that by so doing, a new type of socialist industrial society could emerge that would overcome both alienation and exploitation. While he avoided descriptions about exactly how such a society would be structured, it was clearly seen as classless, a situation made possible by transferring the means of production from private to public hands.

By training an economic historian, Weber did devote considerable attention to preindustrial social formations. His major contributions to the study of industrial society are twofold. First, in his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* ([1904/1905] 1958), he sought to counter a materialist interpretation of history that he associated either with Marx or with the heirs of Marx. He did so by suggesting that ideas constitute an equally powerful force in shaping patterns of social change. Specifically in this case he contended that there was an elective affinity between the religious ethic that emerged as a consequence of the Protestant Reformation and what he called “the spirit of capitalism.” While he did not claim that this was in itself a sufficient account of the rise of industrial capitalism, he did see it as an important part of the puzzle, one overlooked by Marx’s materialist theory of social change.

Second, Weber was the first scholar to stress that modern bureaucratic organizations were an essential component of capitalist industrial society. In making this case, he depicted bureaucracy as Janus-faced. On the one hand, it is as central to the modern economy as is the machine, while simultaneously it represents a threat to equality and individual freedom. Weber agreed with Marx’s general characterization of the class structure of capitalist society, and he saw the potential for considerable class conflict. However, he did not share Marx’s belief that class conflict could provide a way to resolve the central problems of capitalism: exploitation and alienation. The egalitarian and emancipatory aspirations of socialism could not be realized, in his opinion, in no small part because of the necessity of bureaucracy, which entails decision making in terms of a hierarchical chain of command. Replacing a market economy by a command economy, as he saw unfolding in the Soviet Union, would increase bureaucratic decision making rather than reduce it.

THE LOGIC OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

As the orientation of democratic socialist parties and left-wing unions in the most advanced industrial nations became increasingly reformist throughout the first half of the twentieth century, coinciding with the emergence of welfare states, industrial conflict became institutionalized, as reflected

in collective bargaining agreements that recognized and legitimized the union movement while simultaneously defining the goals of organized labor in nonrevolutionary terms. With the Hawthorne studies being perhaps the paradigmatic example, within the social sciences less attention was paid to theories of industrial relations than to applied research into the workplace and worker/management relations. "Scientific management" contributed in significant ways to the rationalization of the work process and the organizational structure of the corporation. One can detect within the arena of industrial relations a divide between sociologists operating from consensus versus conflict perspectives.

Theoretical attention turned to the rising significance of the managerial classes and of professional experts. This could be seen in the first half of the twentieth century in the work of figures such as Thorstein Veblen and Joseph Schumpeter. Veblen viewed the owners of business enterprises as increasingly anachronistic and predatory, and thus not one of the "productive classes." He argued that the development of industry was predicated on its capacity to continually introduce new technological developments, which in turn made necessary the expansion of the cadres of engineers and technicians with expert knowledge. For Veblen, the central struggle of industrial societies would be between the owners driven by pecuniary interests and the experts who promoted industrial interests. Although he wrote about the "soviet of engineers and technicians," it did not appear that he thought of the experts as a revolutionary class. While it is clear that he thought their power in industrial society was as desirable as was the reduction in power of the business classes, Veblen did not actually explore the nature of the relationship between the owners and the experts.

In a parallel analysis, Joseph Schumpeter pitted capitalist entrepreneurs against the managerial class. In his perspective, the entrepreneurial class played a crucial historical role in the formative period of industrialization. Its willingness to take risks in the competitive market made possible a dynamism that promoted the continual enhancement of methods of production. However, its one essential role came to an end as a consequence of its success. Schumpeter treated the bureaucratic corporation as one of the central achievements of the entrepreneurial class. In these organizations, the managerial class came to occupy an increasingly powerful position, and the entrepreneurs became increasingly irrelevant. This shift from owners to managers is what James Burnham called the "managerial revolution," viewed by some commentators as tantamount to a "Second Industrial Revolution." From this perspective, there was considerable support for the view that the political challenges to industrial society had been overcome as a managerial welfare state assumed the role of broker, mediating the competing claims of rival interests in the industrial sector.

At the same time, a group of theorists, shaped to significant extent by evolutionary functionalist theory, began to argue that industrialization as a worldwide process could be seen in terms of convergence. This orientation suggested that there might be different roads to industrialization, with the expectation that the outcomes would nonetheless begin to parallel one another. The idea of convergence prompted the search for universals of industrial development, as could be seen in the work of a variety of influential figures at the middle of the twentieth century, including Raymond Aron, Seymour Martin Lipset, John Kenneth Galbraith, Clark Kerr, and Harold Wilensky.

POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Beginning in the 1960s, a growing number of social scientists began to embrace the notion that industrial societies had reached a watershed, setting the stage for the emergence of a novel phase of industrial development. Picking up on earlier themes, they began to attempt to give name to this new society. Peter Drucker, for example, defined it as a "knowledge society," while Ralf Dahrendorf called it a "service class society," Zbigniew Brzezinski the "technetronic era," and still others signalled a sense of rupture by calling it *posteconomic*, *postbourgeois*, *postscarcity*, and so forth.

By far the most influential characterization of contemporary advanced industrial societies is *postindustrial*. This term received theoretical articulation at approximately the same time by Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine. Bell's central claim is that whereas industrial society was a goods-producing society, postindustrial society is knowledge producing. Knowledge is key to directing patterns of innovation and change, as well as for social control. Postindustrial society presumes the existence of a highly educated professional class that possesses the scientific, technical, managerial, and administrative training needed to ensure that the economy will function productively. The viability of postindustrial society depends on whether or not this professional class is in a position to ensure that rational decisions are made and implemented, decisions that stress efficiency, calculability, and control.

Such an economic system requires more highly centralized coordination than was the case in the earlier stages of industrial development. This can only occur when a new symbiotic relationship emerges between the economy and the polity, one in which the state serves as the "cockpit" of the new industrial order. Technological development operates in Bell's view with a logic of its own and is the primary vehicle shaping economic change. Postindustrial society is characterized by appreciably greater control over society and nature, control that establishes the possibility that postindustrial society will also be a *postscarcity* society.

At the same time, Bell locates the sources for potential social divisions and conflict—due, he contends, to a lack of

synchronicity in the key sectors of society: the economy, polity, and culture. Problems arise because each functions according to different “axial principles.” While a postindustrial economy needs to be guided by instrumental rationality, the polity in democratic societies is guided by principles that promote equality and citizen participation. Thus, there is an inherent tension between the need for decision making by meritocratic knowledge elites versus the demand for citizen involvement. Similarly, there is a tension between the axial principles of the economy and the culture, the latter being described in terms of a premium placed on the quest for emotional self-expression and individual fulfilment. Bell does not develop to any significant degree an analysis of the implications of these potential sources of conflict. Although he refers to these as the “cultural contradictions of capitalism,” in fact he skirts the issue of the role that capitalism may have played in generating these contradictions. This is because capitalism drops out of his analysis, thus locating him in the theoretical tradition closest to Durkheim.

Touraine’s take on postindustrial society begins with the claim that it is a society of “pure change, without structure.” This suggests an openness that accords a greater role to agency than one finds in Bell. Touraine agrees with Bell that the state plays an increasingly central role in societal decision making. However, rather than being intrinsic to economic development, he views the state as playing a more central role in effecting social domination. Domination takes three forms: social integration imposed in terms of the requisites of programmed production, the cultural manipulation of needs and attitudes, and the efforts of those key players at the intersection of the corporate and state spheres to enhance their capacity for social control by promoting a situation characterized as “dependent participation.” In short, Touraine presents a leftist response to Bell’s thesis, one that locates the sources of social conflict not in axial principles but in terms of the struggle between the dominant class—which he defines as the technocracy—and sectors of the dominated classes.

In spite of the manipulative power of the dominant class to marginalize conflict, Touraine has seen in a variety of new social movements—ethnic, feminist, antinuclear, peace, environmental, consumer, and organized labor—the potential for serious challenges to the hegemony of the dominant class. His understanding of the self-production of society is articulated in collective rather than individual terms, with postindustrial society thus being characterized in terms of the struggle for control over the future directions of social change.

Despite the obvious differences between Bell and Touraine, they share one thing in common: Capitalism evaporates from their theories of postindustrial society. In contrast, it has been placed center stage by a variety of currently active theorists rooted in the Marxist and/or Weberian traditions. This is, for example, evident in discussions initiated by British neo-Marxists about what they characterize as the

shift within the sphere of production from “Fordism” to “post-Fordism.” Fordism refers to the mechanized production methods associated with the assembly line and the utilization of methods of scientific management. The interventionist state that Bell argued was central to postindustrial society was clearly necessary for Fordist production, entailing both the implementation of Keynesian economic policies and the administration of an expanding welfare state in order to ensure societal stability. However, changes brought about by automation and the global exportation of manufacturing operations to less developed nations where labor costs were considerably lower led to a process of deindustrialization, depicted by economists Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison as a systematic process of disinvestment in the manufacturing sector.

Deindustrialization set the stage for the advent of post-Fordism, a somewhat imprecise term that refers to new manufacturing techniques that rely on flexible, decentralized, specialized, and just-in-time production methods. Industrial enterprises, increasingly reliant on new information technologies, require expanded cadres of knowledge experts, but a much smaller blue-collar workforce. At the same time, the introduction of neo-liberal economic policies—seen most explicitly in the economic policies of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States—signalled a new relationship between the state and the economy. Neo-liberalism involved a frontal assault on the welfare state, with the unbridled competitive market becoming not only the dominant force shaping the economic sphere but also spilling into other sectors of society as well.

With these trends in mind, Scott Lash and John Urry (1987) contend that we are moving into a third stage in the history of capitalist industrial society. If the era of Marx can be seen as the period of liberal capitalism, and the era of Fordist methods as the period of organized capitalism, they suggest that since the 1960s, this second stage has given way to “disorganized capitalism.” Moreover, disorganized capitalism resonates with the culture of postmodernity, rather than being at odds with it. In other words, contrary to Bell, Lash and Urry, and similar commentators such as David Harvey and Fredric Jameson, see postmodernity as a reflection of the functional requisites—or the “cultural logic”—of contemporary industrial capitalism.

AN INDUSTRIALIZED GLOBAL ECONOMY

One problematic feature of postindustrial theory is that it focuses on national economies. Thus, the claim that the manufacturing sector has declined at the same time that the information sector has grown is true only at the level of the nation-state. This has led globalization theorists to call for “unbounded” social theories that recognize the expanding reality of global fields of action, networks of

interaction, and organized practices. Though there are varied accounts at present about the contours of a global economy, there is general agreement that new communications and transportation technologies make possible its emergence, facilitating the footlooseness of corporate capitalism.

Some theorists, including Anthony Giddens, view the globalization of industry as occurring haphazardly rather than being shaped to any significant degree by particular collective social actors. Others counter this position by suggesting that an increasingly powerful transnational capitalist class guides the emergence of global capitalism. Leslie Sklair (2001) is perhaps the key spokesperson for the latter position. He contends that this class, operating across national borders and no longer tied to particular nation-states, is intent on creating a global economy without borders. From this perspective, what we are currently witnessing is an unfolding process that is far from complete, but constitutes a qualitative shift in industrial capitalism from an international to a global system. To provide a structure to the changes under way, the transnational capitalist class has created organizations such as the World Bank, the WTO, and the IMF and institutional frameworks such as GATT and NAFTA. In a theoretical argument located within the Marxist tradition, Sklair seeks to counter the anarchical view of globalization by indicating the capacity of the most powerful social actors to impose the sort of order they prefer on the emergent global economic system. At present, theoretical work on economic globalization is only beginning to be translated into research agendas.

— Peter Kivisto

See also Bell, Daniel; Bureaucracy; Durkheim, Émile; Marx, Karl; Postmodernism; Touraine, Alain; Weber, Max

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INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Institutional theory examines the processes and mechanisms by which structures, schemas, rules, and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It asks how such systems come into existence, how they diffuse, and what role they play in supplying stability and meaning to social behavior. It also considers how such arrangements deteriorate and collapse, and how their remnants shape successor structures.

One of the dominant theoretical perspectives at the end of the nineteenth century, institutional theory was eclipsed by other approaches during the first half of the twentieth century. In recent decades, however, institutional theory has experienced a remarkable recovery, entering the new century as one of the most vigorous and broad-based theoretical perspectives in the social sciences.

Institutional theory is not a single, unified system of assumptions and propositions, but instead a rather amorphous complex of related ideas—a broad theoretical perspective or family of approaches. Older, nineteenth-century versions built on and incorporated contributions from economists, political scientists, and sociologists. Contemporary versions have drawn renewed energy from developments in cognitive psychology, ethnomethodology, the new cultural studies within anthropology and sociology, evolutionary and transaction-cost economics, and recent advances in social history.

Although diverse, institutional arguments cohere around the central tenet that “institutions matter” in accounting for social behavior. Institutional arguments exhibit a lean common core of assumptions: (1) institutions are governance structures, embodying rules for social conduct, (2) groups and organizations conforming to these rules are accorded legitimacy, a condition contributing to their survival, (3) institutions are characterized by inertia, a tendency to resist change, and (4) history matters, in the sense that past institutional structures constrain and channel new arrangements. Built on this bedrock are diverse approaches that vary along important dimensions: individual actor versus structural approaches, debates over the bases of institutional stability, the role of rational choice versus more relaxed theories of decision making, the relative importance of interests and ideas, and divergent views concerning the appropriate level of analysis.

Contemporary approaches can be roughly categorized into three clusters based primarily on which aspects of governance structures are privileged. Rational-choice theorists emphasize the regulatory aspects of institutions and focus attention on the design and construction of institutional frameworks to support collective action. Normative theorists attend to the ways in which values and commitments generated in interaction shape, undermine, and augment

formal and official regimes. And cultural-cognitive theorists stress the importance of widely shared assumptions and beliefs and the construction of social identities as the underpinnings of social order.

Many substantive arenas have been informed by institutional analysis, including modernization processes at the global level, emergence of international regimes, structuring of organizational fields, competition among organizational forms (or populations), design of organizational structures, and the diffusion of innovations among social entities.

EARLY INSTITUTIONAL THEORISTS

Many of the best known and most influential social theorists working at the turn of the nineteenth century were institutionalists albeit of varying flavors. Economists such as Gustave Schmoller, John R. Commons, and Thorstein Veblen emphasized the importance of examining the historically varying rules governing economic transactions, and suggested that the role of rationality had been overemphasized and that of habit and convention neglected in the examination of economic behavior. These theorists, and their intellectual descendants—including Joseph A. Schumpeter, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Gunnar Myrdal—departed from the assumptions guiding mainstream economists by emphasizing indeterminacy over determinacy in causal models, exogenous over endogenous determinants of preferences, behavioral realism over simplifying assumptions, and a greater interest in examining change and variation over place and time rather than stylized models of economic equilibrium.

Also active at the beginning of the twentieth century were a number of political scientists who examined the construction and functioning of political institutions ranging from the legal structure of constitutional systems to the activities of administrative agencies. Theorists such as John William Burgess, Woodrow Wilson, and Westel Woodbury Willoughby stressed the study of formal political structures, providing configurative descriptions of intricate systems of interlinked rules, rights, and procedures. These efforts were overshadowed and eventually supplanted by the development within political science of the behaviorist approach, which diverted attention from institutional structures to political behavior, including voting, party formation, public opinion, and informal influence.

By far the largest and most influential collection of early institutional scholars were the giants of sociology, including Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Horton Cooley. Particularly in his early work, Marx noted the role played by ideological structures, which rose to provide justification and legitimacy to (exploitative) political and economic systems. Durkheim, primarily in his later work, stressed the pivotal

role played by symbolic systems—systems of belief and “collective representations”—that, although a product of human interaction, are experienced by individuals as objective “social facts.” These “crystallized” systems, perceived by the individual to be both external and coercive, are social institutions. Weber embraced the institutionalist argument that the study of economic and political systems needs to be historically informed and comparative. His studies on the effects of religious belief systems on economic behavior and on the rise of “rational-legal” administrative systems provided the foundation for decades of productive comparative scholarship relating cultural systems and social structures. Spencer viewed societies as organic systems made up of specialized subsystems, each of which fulfilled its functions through distinctive institutional arrangements. He, along with his intellectual colleague, William Graham Sumner, carried out comparative studies of these institutions as they varied across societies. Cooley emphasized the interdependence of individuals and institutions—the extent to which individuals create great institutions, including language, government, religion, and laws, which, in turn, constrain and guide individual behavior.

More so than was the case in economics or political science, sociologists continued the tradition of institutional research uninterrupted through the twentieth century. Scholars such as Everett C. Hughes, Talcott Parsons, George Herbert Mead, and Alfred Schutz continued to examine the interdependence of institutions and individuals, Hughes and Parsons emphasizing more the macro-micro direction, Mead and Schutz, the micro-macro influences. Much research in arenas as varied as industrial relations, occupational systems, stratification, race relations, marriage and family, and gender takes account of the pervasive influence of institutional frameworks on social life.

MODERN THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS

These many threads of institutional scholarship have evolved into three principal contemporary strands of theoretical work: *rational choice* approaches, favored by most economists, many political scientists, and a smaller number of sociologists; *normative* approaches, pursued primarily by sociologists and some political scientists; and *cultural-cognitive* approaches, developed by cultural anthropologists and sociologists and utilized particularly by organizational sociologists and management scholars.

Rational Choice Theory

Institutions are viewed as governance or rule systems created by individuals seeking to promote or protect their own interests. Although institutions regulate and constrain individuals, under some conditions individuals recognize that their goals can be more effectively pursued through

institutional action. This explains why individuals are motivated to construct systems that constrain their own behavior. Early, more heroic versions of rational actors assumed that the individual actor engages in utility-maximizing behavior, guided by stable preferences and possessing complete knowledge of the possible alternatives and the consequences associated with each choice. These have been replaced with models acknowledging that individual rationality is “bounded” by information and calculation limitations. Nevertheless, individuals are seen as intendedly rational, doing the best they can to satisfy their wants. More so than the other approaches, rational choice theory embraces an atomist view, focusing on individual preferences and choices as the basis for explaining social behavior, including the construction and utilization of institutions.

The most widely employed variant of rational choice theory is *transaction cost economics*, inspired by the work of Ronald Coase and elaborated and enriched by Oliver E. Williamson. Building on the earlier insights of Commons, Williamson argues that economic behavior consists fundamentally of transactions—exchanges of values among individuals. To safeguard the interests of the parties, more or less explicit contracts are devised to govern behavior. As the transactions become more complex and the outcomes more uncertain, the cost of negotiating and policing contracts increases. Individuals are motivated to construct governance structures (regulative institutions)—for example, property rights protections, organizational hierarchies, trade associations, political regimes—in order to reduce such transaction costs. The task of the institutional scholar is to determine what types of governance structures are best equipped to address what types of transaction costs.

Transaction cost economics has been employed to address a wide variety of economic problems, including the design of market systems, corporate structures, labor contracts, franchise bidding, antitrust law and enforcement regimes, and the formation of alliances. A growing number of political scientists, including Elinor Ostrom, Terry Moe, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Barry Weingast, have adapted this theory to account for the regulation and structure of public organization, including the design of treaties and alliances among nations, legislatures, cabinets, committees, and administrative agencies.

Two other subfields of economics also embrace a rational choice perspective in accounting for the design of institutions. *Principal-agent theory* is designed to address situations in which one party, termed the “principal,” seeks to achieve some outcome but requires the assistance of others, termed “agents,” to carry out necessary activities. The theory provides guidance for the construction of control and incentive systems—regulative institutions—that attempt to align the interests of the cooperating parties. A second approach, *game theory*, conceptualizes the problem of pursuing one’s interests in interdependent situations as a

set of games between actors. The problem for actors is to construct a payoff matrix (distribution of rewards) that will enable them to achieve their interests with minimal costs. In one influential study, Robert Axelrod employed the Prisoners’ Dilemma situation to evaluate the conditions under which individuals who pursue their own self-interest in the absence of a central authority will devise incentives to reinforce cooperative behavior.

Normative Theory

A second cluster of theorists emphasize that institutional systems rest primarily on a normative foundation. Normative systems are composed of shared norms and values that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life. Rules are not simply externally enforced, but internalized by actors. Informal systems of interpersonal ties and mutual obligations are central components of viable institutions.

Long an important tradition in sociology, particularly schools associated with Chicago and Columbia University championed the normative view of institutions. At Chicago, Robert E. Park, Everett C. Hughes, Erving Goffman, and Howard S. Becker carried institutional analysis forward. Most of this work was of an ethnographic character, and much focused on the microprocesses by which individuals attempt to limit the power of institutions, making room for more creative and personal arenas of action. At Columbia, Robert K. Merton provided leadership to an important cluster of organizational sociologists, including Peter M. Blau, James S. Coleman, Alvin W. Gouldner, and Philip Selznick, who examined the interdependence of formal and informal systems of conflict and cooperation. Selznick developed the most explicit theory of institutionalization as the process by which, over time, organizations, created as technical systems, become “infused with value.” Vested interests are created, sunk costs exist in the form of capital equipment and member training, allegiance is developed to leaders and values, commitments are made to external parties, and, overall, the behavior of the organizations becomes more predictable and stable. This version of institutional theory has been carried on and enhanced by the work of Jerome Karabel, Charles Perrow, and Arthur Stinchcombe, among others.

Within political science, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen have challenged the turn toward individualistic, utilitarian, and functional arguments characteristic of rational choice theorists to advocate a return to a recognition that important values are embedded in institutional systems. Most social organizations, political and economic, are governed by rules, and most participants within organizations view themselves as carriers/spokespersons for them. Decisions made by these participants are less likely to be governed by a “logic of instrumentality,” involving

calculated choices to maximize that individual's utility, than by a "logic of appropriateness." Participants determine the nature of the situation, reflect on the nature of their own role or identity, and act accordingly. Most behavior, most of the time, is governed by routines, procedures, conventions, roles, and rules, as emphasized by the earlier work of Herbert A. Simon.

Historical institutionalism is a related approach pursued by political scientists and political sociologists. This school emphasizes the extent to which existing institutional systems affect subsequent arrangements and directions of change. Thus, decisions made in the early stages of institutional development will continue to influence later decisions; and even when existing systems are overturned, they will affect efforts to devise replacement structures. Such effects reflect "path dependence" in a series of actions, as initial institutional choices have continuing effects on policy choices and governmental performance. Research by Peter A. Hall, Stephen D. Krasner, and Theda Skocpol, among others, document these processes across a wide variety of governmental systems.

Cultural-Cognitive Theory

Cultural-cognitive theory represents the most recently developed conception of institutional structures and processes. The theory draws on the seminal work of Peter L. Berger in phenomenology, the ethnomethodological studies of Harold Garfinkel, and the cultural anthropology of Mary Douglas and Clifford Geertz, who stress the semiotic dimensions of cultural systems. The core elements of institutions from this perspective are the shared conceptions that define the nature of social reality. This reality is developed in social interaction among individuals as they create and share interpretations of what is going on, on both micro and macro levels. Over time, on a micro level, individuals create and come to share common understandings of the nature of their situation (playground, workplace), and these understandings are passed along to others who join the group. Similarly, at more macro levels, people create shared symbols (language) and shared understandings (religion, science) that define social reality, shaping the understandings and cognitive processes of participants.

These ideas have been vigorously pursued by sociologists, who have applied them to the analysis of organizations, organizational populations, nation-states, and, more generally, to the diffusion of innovations among social entities defined as similar. Paul J. DiMaggio, Walter W. Powell, John W. Meyer, and W. Richard Scott, among others, have pursued the development and application of these arguments at the organization level. Meyer and Scott stress the extent to which organizational structure and behavior is shaped not only by technical considerations but also by cultural rules promulgated within their wider environment

regarding "rational" organization. In this view, rationality is often a cultural construction, beliefs taking the form of rules specifying procedures that are asserted to produce desired ends. DiMaggio and Powell delineate the various mechanisms—coercive, normative, and mimetic—by which organizations are induced to embrace these rules, and point out that rules vary across industrial sectors or fields occupied by organizations. Institutional pressures exist in all fields that induce organizations to conform to cultural rules, to become isomorphic to these models in their structures and procedures. Such conformity brings legitimacy, which, in turn, affords access to resources needed to survive.

This work challenges views privileging individual actors as the focus of action. Rather than being agents, individuals are more often subjects: recipients of scripts that they enact as constructions of institutionalized cultural environments. Similarly, individual organizations are viewed not as autonomous, instrumental actors but rather as embedded in, shaped and permeated by, wider institutional environments.

Other sociologists, including Glenn C. Carroll, John Freeman, and Michael T. Hannan, examined the emergence and growth of distinctive types (populations) of organizations. Although early models were based on ecological arguments, as advanced by Amos Hawley and other urban sociologists, that emphasized the role played by competition over resources, Carroll and Hannan recognized that the growth of new populations of organizations was also shaped by the growing acceptance and recognition of these forms as appropriate vehicles of collective action. "Social fitness" was as important as economic efficiency in determining the survival of a new organizational form. The increasing prevalence of an organizational form signals its increasing legitimacy, particular arrangements coming to be seen as the "natural" way to organize to perform certain activities. In addition to the effects of increased density on vital rates of foundlings and failures, other ecologists such as Joel A. C. Baum have examined the role of institutional embeddedness—the effects of numbers of ties between a population of organizations and its institutional environment—in enhancing survival chances of the form.

Meyer and colleagues have applied cultural-cognitive arguments to examine the effect of developments in cultural rules at the world-system level on the characteristics of nation-states and societal systems. As first described by Immanuel Wallerstein, the absence of a unified sovereign for the world system allows greater play for cultural models touted as universal rules. The models are generated and promulgated by a wide range of quasi-governmental and nongovernmental interest groups and associations. Rather than viewing nation-states as independent actors, Meyer and associates, including John Boli, Francisco O. Ramirez, and George M. Thomas, see these units as embedded in a wider, rationalist culture that largely determines the forms

they may assume and the success of their endeavors. What kinds of administrative agencies and programs are adopted by states, what rights are accorded their citizens, how educational systems are structured, what data systems are created to monitor progress—these and many other features more closely reflect the number and range of linkages between a given nation and the world system than that nation's economic development or specific societal needs. These structures and programs are adopted by nation-states to signal that they are legitimate players on the world scene.

Arguments stemming from cultural-cognitive versions of institutional theory have rejuvenated studies of the diffusion of innovations. Early studies of diffusion were informed largely by network theory or by arguments stemming from regulative and normative conceptions of institutions. Cultural-cognitive theory points out that, in order for ideas to flow among entities, those entities must be theorized to be similar and the innovations themselves must be theorized as functionally effective, accounts being devised concerning what components are necessary and how they are aligned to be effective. The more modernity is touted as a desirable general value, the more pressure is placed on units—individuals, organizations, nation-states—to embrace the latest innovation. And the more widely broadcast such innovative models are within a society, the less important specific relational ties or network locations are in accounting for instances of diffusion. Relational models need to take into account the effects of the wider cultural context.

LEVELS OF APPLICATION

Institutional theories have been applied to a wide variety of social phenomena, ranging from interpersonal to world-system levels. Ethnomethodologists conducted detailed studies of the emergence through interaction among workers of informal rules and routines that helped them make sense collectively of their common enterprise. Lynne G. Zucker devised experiments to demonstrate how standards thought to reflect more impersonal organizational roles were more likely to resist change attempts and to be transmitted to successors than standards associated with individual judgments. Game theoretic models also focus on interpersonal systems. Some game theorists embrace a more formalist approach, examining the possibility of designing rule systems that can lead to specified equilibrium outcomes. Others take a more behaviorist stance, examining the emergence of unplanned and unintended social conventions that act to regularize the conduct of participants.

Much research guided by institutional arguments has been conducted at the organization level. Early research by normative theorists such as Selznick examined the ways in which ideological and interpersonal commitments evolving over time between individuals within and external to

organizations constrained degrees of freedom of subsequent action. Selznick's approach spawned an active school of organizational studies as sociologists carried out natural histories of organizations, principally schools and voluntary agencies, to document the ways in which these systems develop distinctive "character structures"—institutionalized routines and scripts that channel and confine action possibilities. More recent managerial research has continued and extended this tradition to examine the development and function of corporate culture. In other research utilizing normative models, following in the tradition of Weber, Reinhard Bendix conducted historical, comparative research on the varying normative underpinnings that legitimate authority systems within organizations. Later scholarship by Mauro Guillén examined factors affecting the diffusion across selected societies of major managerial models, such as scientific management and human relations.

Williamson's transaction cost version of institutional theory has guided much research at the organization level. "Make or buy" decisions—whether to produce goods and services within a firm or to purchase them from others—can be viewed as reflecting more fundamental decisions concerning where to locate the boundaries of the organization. Transaction cost arguments also inform the design of organizational structures—whether to employ a unified or multidivisional model, a hybrid or an alliance structure. Political scientists, as noted, have adapted transaction cost models to guide studies of political structures. In one interesting application, Terry Moe's study of federal agencies in the United States such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency suggests that when there are strong ideological differences between parties, it is rational for politicians to devise inefficient agencies for fear that the opposition could employ an effective agency to pursue its goals.

The advent of cultural-cognitive models has encouraged organizational scholars to shift attention from the individual organization to the organizational population and organizational field level. In order to show that organizations embody cultural models developed and promoted within the environment, wider lenses are required along with comparative and historical studies. Studies of a diverse range of organizational populations—including automobile companies, banks, brewers, day care centers, thrift companies, publishing houses, semiconductor firms, and trade associations—have employed time series (frequently, event-history) data, often extending over the entire history of the form, to examine factors affecting the populations' growth and decline. As previously noted, while early theories focused primarily on competition for scarce material resources, later work has attended to institutional factors affecting population processes.

Organizational field (or community) research attends to wider arenas containing numerous types of interdependent

organizations performing similar or related functions and linked by a common meaning system. Among the fields that have been empirically examined are alternative dispute resolution, art museums, transnational commercial arbitration, environmental regulation in U.S. chemical and petroleum industries, health care systems, mutual fire insurance companies, Norwegian fisheries, radio stations, Scottish knitwear, and solid waste management. Studies examine the emergence of a stable interaction order, shared meanings and institutional logics, a division of labor among organizations exhibiting a limited set of organizational archetypes or models, and overarching governance structures. As they mature, fields are expected to become more highly structured over time, although fields often decline and disintegrate.

Research has also been conducted at the societal level, examining nationwide frameworks around which business or other forms of activity are organized. For example, Neil Fligstein has examined the evolution during the twentieth century of the “field” of largest U.S. corporations. Models of corporate governance have evolved from early periods emphasizing entrepreneurial control to later models of manufacturing, sales, and financial controls. Regulatory policies pursued by the U.S. government have been greatly influential in affecting what models of organizing are selected. Comparative studies by scholars such as Nicole Biggart, Gary G. Hamilton, and Richard Whitley have examined the effects of wider institutional structures and the organization of economic activity in Europe and Asia.

At the international level, political scientists—both rational choice and historical institutionalists—have developed competing versions of regime theory in order to account for the development of rule systems and ordered patterns of interaction between nation-states. Scholars in this area examine the creation and operation of trade agreements, treaties, and broader multipurpose entities such as the European Union. Rational choice theorists examine the motives leading self-interested nation-states to cooperate in establishing such binding institutions as well as the regulatory systems designed to curb opportunism and enforce compliance. Historical institutionalists focus on the effects of prior conditions and experience on regime design and attend to the unexpected, historically contingent evolution of the cooperative framework. Political sociologists have examined the rise in the number and influence of international nongovernmental associations as well as the increasing use of standardization regimes as a substitute for market and bureaucratic controls.

CONTINUING ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS

Viewed as a complex of ideas, there seems little doubt but that institutional theory has generated much interest and spawned much productive scholarship, particularly since

the 1980s. However, it remains the case that the collection of ideas is distressingly diverse and, as has been detailed, contains inconsistent and conflicting assumptions and arguments. It is not obvious that the differences separating the rational choice, normative, and cultural-cognitive variants of institutional theory will be quickly or easily resolved. In addition to these internal conflicts—family quarrels—institutional arguments share certain common features that critics have identified. Two criticisms are considered and efforts to address them briefly described. First, it is noted that institutional theory is too preoccupied with controls and constraints and neglectful of the importance of choice and innovation. Second, critics point out that institutional theory gives too much attention to stability and not enough to the sources of change.

Constraint and Agency

Throughout the history of social science, there has been an abiding tension between theories that emphasize stability and order and those that emphasize choice and innovation. Institutional theory has consistently emphasized order, although rational choice versions insist that the creation of controlling structures is motivated by self-interest and requires human agency: the ability of actors to “make a difference” in the flow of events. Normative and cultural-cognitive theorists counter by pointing out that actors are always embedded in ongoing social systems that shape their interests and restrict their choices. These positions are combined and somewhat reconciled by Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration. He points out that all behavior is grounded in some ongoing social structure but that this structure is continually being reproduced and altered by participants’ behaviors. Structure is both the context for and the product of action. Moreover, structures are constituted so that some occupants are better situated to propose new rules or ways of acting than are others. In short, agency is socially constructed. Not only human, but also social and cultural capital varies over time and place. Whereas early theory and research emphasized commitments and constraints on individual actors and pressures toward isomorphism on organizations, more recent work stresses individual differences in the attributes and relational connections of individuals and organizations. Arguments promulgated by Christine Oliver raise the possibility of strategic action in institutional contexts.

Institutional Change

During the early decades of institutional theory, if institutional change was considered, it was to examine the spread or diffusion of given forms or processes—the study of convergent change—as institutions become more firmly entrenched. More recent theory and research gives increasing

attention to deinstitutionalization and discontinuous change processes. The erosion of beliefs and rules and their replacement by new models and forms may be due to endogenous strains and conflicts or to the intervention of external forces or actors. Change is often initiated by the collective mobilization of disadvantaged actors who challenge existing systems and truths. The examination of such processes is well under way as a result of increasing interaction and collaboration of institutional and social movement scholars. Change also occurs when boundaries buffering social fields or sectors are breached, allowing ideas and actors from one sector to penetrate another. For example, fields long controlled by professional logics—including accounting, medical care, and publishing—have increasingly been destabilized and reorganized under neoliberal market and managerial logics.

Institutionalists have also attended to the three great transformations currently under way in sociopolitical arrangements at the international level: the fall and dismantling of the Soviet Union with its ramification for Eastern Europe; the surprisingly rapid evolution of the common market and the design of new political institutions for Western Europe; and the economic modernization of China and other East Asian countries. Among the common themes in the work of such scholars as David Stark and John L. Campbell are the ways in which previous political and economic institutions continue to influence emerging ones; the extent to which cultural and political processes influence the creation of market regimes; and the innovative ways in which existing social and cultural building blocks are reassembled and redesigned, through processes termed “bricolage,” to form new institutions.

— W. Richard Scott

See also Ethnomethodology; Historical and Comparative Theory; Rational Choice; World-Systems Theory

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INTERNET AND CYBERCULTURE

As the new technologies associated with personal computers have proliferated over the last few decades, along with the emergence of a communications infrastructure designed to allow these computers to support a global network of information and cultural exchange, the resulting Internet has evolved to become an important commercial and noncommercial aspect of everyday life all over the world. “Cyberculture” has become a sort of catchall used to characterize the wide diversity of online Internet experiences available, in both their popular and fringe aspects, and it represents a blossoming transdisciplinary academic field of study that is attempting to chart the Internet’s history, theorize the rich array of individual and social meanings that the network affords, and imagine the future developments that may occur as Internet technology comes to dominate social life.

Though it has a variety of historical antecedents, the Internet proper began as a Cold War project in decentralized communications by the U.S. Department of Defense in the 1960s. Named Arpanet (it was the computer network for the DOD’s Advanced Research Project Agency), during the 1970s it expanded to become an international communications hub for research specialists in both universities and the military, at which time e-mail (electronic mail) became ubiquitous and Usenet (newsgroups devoted to postings around a specific topic) was created. The term *Internet* was

not itself uttered to describe the network until 1982, and it was not until 1991 that the World Wide Web (WWW or “the Web”)—the series of associative multimedia pages that most people now consider iconic of the larger Internet—was established by Tim Berners-Lee. Interestingly, the hypertextual form of the WWW’s interlinking pages, as well as its ability to condense vast libraries of information that could be personalized into efficient research and publication tools, had been envisaged as early as 1945 by the scientist Vannevar Bush in his essay “As We May Think.” The term *hypertext* was itself coined as early as 1965 by the Internet developer and theorist Ted Nelson.

During the late 1980s, BBS (bulletin board systems) hubs represented the leading edge of the technology fringe in which an underground network of technically sophisticated professional users and computer literate youth professed a veritable “gift economy” of pictures, simple games, and electronic communication over extremely slow networks. Alongside the rise of the Web during the 1990s, varieties of multiuser dungeons (MUDs) appeared that allowed people to explore basic virtual environments and interact with one another in real time. Corporate culture also increasingly colonized the Internet with Microsoft’s Bill Gates, on the one hand, symbolic of a new economic form of computer ideologue/tycoon, and with America Online’s “You’ve got mail!” aesthetic, on the other, indexical of the popular post-1994 boom of the WWW in which mass marketing and electronic commerce have joined communication and research as major activities for Internet users.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Internet has matured to become a multifaceted, socially, and politically complex environment of over 500 million users. While corporate forces rapidly built a larger and speedier Internet for the new millennium, subcultural forces have sought equally to borrow the new online environment for their own sociopolitical intentions. Thus was the case, infamously, with the peer-to-peer (P2P) client Napster, which allowed approximately 60 million users at one point to share and freely trade a variety of multimedia files directly with one another. Recently, the Internet phenomenon of blogs (web logs, journals, and diaries) in which so-called bloggers self-publish, trade media stories, and offer a variety of commentary on social life, appears to be the latest version of a noncommercial Internet craze. The related growth of the Indymedia network (<http://www.indymedia.org>) appears to be one of the most promising current developments for those who aspire to a democratic network of critical and politically informed citizen-users.

Finally, no discussion of Internet cyberculture would be complete without mention of “hacker culture”—technically sophisticated computer users who can establish and/or penetrate networks of secure (i.e., private) information. Computer network hacking has become a major political threat, with governments and corporations increasingly

concerned about the ability of terror groups to compromise systems of classified information and release computer viruses (small programs that arrive via e-mail) that can cause massive disruption of the Internet and its underlying networks. Infamously, in 2002, after a U.S. spy plane was downed over China, groups of Chinese hackers released the Code Red virus into U.S. networks, thereby temporarily crippling Internet activity, business, and governmental operations. Governments and corporations also use the Internet as a way to gather sensitive information on people, however, and so a new collective of pointedly political hackers have banded together under the moniker of “hacktivism” to inform Internet users of potential risks and to protect people from being electronically monitored.

Such recent Internet developments evoke William Gibson’s 1984 coining of the science fiction literary genre of *Cyberpunk*, in which hegemonic transnational powers battle for world control through sophisticated virtual networks of information (i.e., cyberspace), and individual hacker rogues attempt to subvert that space for their own ends amidst a sprawling techno-urban dystopia. Gibson, probably more than any other author, is directly responsible for the *cyber* prefix that has come to dominate contemporary digital discourse. Yet it appears to originally hail from Norbert Wiener’s 1948 reintroduction of the term in the founding of Cybernetics, the field devoted to the study of communication and control in living beings and human machinery. Other descriptions of the Internet and cyberculture, as in Daniel Bell’s notion of the postindustrial “information society,” Manuel Castell’s similar “network society,” and Al Gore’s vision of an “information superhighway,” reference the cybernetic model of information control, oriented process, and feedback navigation. Marshall McLuhan’s idea of an electronic “global village” is also foundational for the field but should not be linked directly to cybernetic origins.

Recently, cyberculture studies has emerged as an important new field of cultural research. David Silver (2000) has produced a useful framework for disciplinary work that outlines three distinct theoretical periods. Initial work on cyberculture tended to be popularizing and introductory. William Gibson’s metaphor of the “frontier” figured prominently, and two distinct camps emerged that either celebrated the Internet as digital utopia (e.g., Kevin Kelly, Nicholas Negroponte, Bill Gates) or reviled it as cultural dystopia (e.g., Kirkpatrick Sale, Neil Postman). In the mid-1990s, an academic turn occurred in the field in which the Internet was examined both as a form of virtual democratic community (e.g., Howard Rheingold, John Perry Barlow) and as a space in which to construct and experiment with new online identities (e.g., Sherry Turkle). Finally, contemporary debate surrounds a critical phase of cybercultural studies that seeks to examine questions of access (i.e., “digital divide”), as well as the cultural, political, pedagogical, and economic

factors that frame online interactions, digital discourses, and Internet designs (e.g., Mark Poster, Douglas Kellner, Kevin Robins, and Frank Webster).

Thus, as cyberculture research continues into the next decade, it is expected that questions of race, class, gender, and other differences will be more thoroughly brought to bear in theorizing the Internet and its culture of communication, education, business, and ludic gaming. Additionally, research will begin to be done that analyzes the ecological relationship between an increasingly technological global culture and the corresponding state of the planetary environment upon which it is built and depends.

— Richard Kahn

See also Bell, Daniel; Consumer Culture; Globalization

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INTIMACY

Intimacy is a quality of a social interaction based on the reciprocal interpretation of the actors. While there is an emphasis on the intersubjective construction of this quality, the idea of intimacy depends on the collective representation or the symbolic code on how to define, construct, and express intimacy, which varies in different cultures. In modern societies, it is based on an interaction that is both extraordinarily meaningful to the actors and restricted to a small number of persons. Even though intimacy can emerge in brief encounters, it is regarded more likely that intimacy is experienced in subsequent interactions. This shapes a specific type of relationship, an intimate relationship. Social relations tend to become distinctive in either non-personal or intimate relations with only very few types in between.

Intimacy and intimate relationships become crucial for the social structure and the creation of social order. Moreover, there is a cultural appreciation of establishing intimate relationships during the course of life. In fact, the emergence of this form of intimacy is closely connected to

the evolution of modernity as described by classical and modern theories.

First of all, intimacy occurs simultaneously along with a sociostructural individualization. Émile Durkheim notes that the division of labor leads at the same time to an increase of both dependency among people and autonomy for individuals. This development provides the basis for intense personal relationships.

Georg Simmel explains individualization by the fact that extended group affiliations and social contacts tend to shape a unique pattern for every single person. Consequently, persons become individualized since they do not share the same experiences. Furthermore, he makes the point that social life in the modern metropolis is grounded in the great number of persons living in spatial closeness. This environment creates both freedom and loneliness and, primordially, shapes intellectualistic, distant, relationships. However, it also intensifies emotions due to the extended variety of external and internal stimuli. Simmel also depicts the dyad as a special social form the structure of which mainly consists of the number of persons involved in this relationship. In a "society of two," as Simmel puts it, the relationship rests exclusively on the individuality of the two persons and cannot be maintained by any structure for groups of a larger size.

Generally, intimacy is often connected with modern types of gender and family relations. In particular, neo-Marxian and feminist theories stress the connection with the material world of production and consumption. Intimate relationships among members of the nuclear family shape the essence of the private sphere (Jürgen Habermas). However, the value rationality of intimate relationships is exploited by capitalism and social power, because this sphere functions as a resource for both the re-creation of human labor and a consumer market.

Last, the idea of intimacy is enhanced by the spatial (e.g., private family houses) and temporal (e.g., distinction between work time and leisure or individual time) organization of modern life as well as by the impact of mass media (e.g., novels and romances) and scientific methods (e.g., psychoanalysis to analyze the innermost self) on everyday life.

In contemporary sociological theory, three European sociologists, Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck in cooperation with Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, paid special attention to the significance of intimacy. While Beck-Gernsheim and Beck stress the impact of modern structures on intimate love relationships, applying many characteristics from the classical concepts of individualization, Giddens emphasizes intimacy as a feature of personal relationships in late modernity.

On the one hand, Beck-Gernsheim and Beck point to the weakened ties to kinships and traditional groups of reference, while on the other hand, they point to chances for

selective affiliations. In modern life, individuals become more independent of personal support and solidarity due to granted rights but also dependent on nonpersonal organizations due to their integration into polity and welfare systems. Additionally, there is an increase in chances to pursue flexible life courses or life styles but also a requirement to make individual choices, including making individual selections of mates. However, this gives rise to the idea that it is difficult to find matching partners and that there is a scarcity of chances to establish intimate relationships.

Anthony Giddens (1992) points out that the character of a modern dyadic relationship is a “pure relationship.” It is based on transactional negotiation of personal ties by equals. This means that the relationship itself is a subject of constant reflection and creates a lasting demand wherein it is necessary to discuss all matters of personal importance in order to maintain intimacy. Consensus and agreement on the conditions of the relationship among the intimate partners are crucial. The partners have to “work” on their relationship. While peer groups are hardly supporting factors, professional counseling and the self-help literature become popular. As long as they experience intimacy, the partners are highly committed to each other. Otherwise, a relationship cannot claim to be maintained when this basic quality is no longer experienced. The pure relationship requires autonomous and self-reflective individuals who are able to engage in self-disclosure in order to establish an “authentic” interaction. This implies that models of social roles and status interaction are superseded by the individual creation of structures. In particular, gender roles do not apply to the idea of a pure relationship since they are in contradiction to the required equality of the partners. Consequently, the pure relationship is not restricted to heterosexual partners.

The rise of modern intimacy has an impact on a wide range of personal relationships, especially friendship, marriage, and sexual relations that are either influenced or replaced by the idea of intimate relationships.

— Kornelia Hahn

See also Civilizing Processes; Commitment; Individualism; Modernity

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IRIGARAY, LUCE

French psychoanalyst and philosopher Luce Irigaray is a central theorist in debates that shape the contours of Western feminist theory, including essentialism/antiessentialism, poststructuralism, psychoanalytic feminism, and issues concerning the sex/gender system and corporeality raised by queer theory and feminist theories of the body. Irigaray’s work emphasizes questions concerning relationships among language and bodies, specifically male and female bodies and masculine and feminine language. Her focus is on the female body and how it has been constructed in phallogocentric systems of thought, especially Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In feminist social theory, Irigaray is part of New French Feminism along with Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and Monique Wittig.

Born in Belgium in 1932, Irigaray moved to France in the 1960s where she received her master’s degree and subsequent first doctorate in linguistics. She earned a second doctorate in philosophy at the University of Paris VIII. While in France, she attended several psychoanalytic seminars with Jacques Lacan, and she trained and became a psychoanalyst. Irigaray’s work has influenced the feminist movement in France and Italy for several decades. In the 1980s, she spoke in support of the Italian Communist Movement, touring and lecturing in Italy. Irigaray has conducted research over the last decade at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique in Paris on the difference between the language of women and the language of men, which includes speakers of many different languages.

Central to Irigaray’s work is critiquing phallogocentric systems of language and culture and theorizing sexual difference as the single most important issue of our age. She theorizes the question of a female or feminine *sexuality* and what a feminine *jouissance* (sexual pleasure) might be when defined on its own terms. In *The Speculum of the Other Woman* (1985), Irigaray provides an analysis and feminist critique of sexual difference in Western thought from Freud (back) to Plato. Using psychoanalytic methods, she argues that throughout the history of Western thought, the feminine and femininity have permanently been excluded from language, representation, and culture. Language has been appropriated by a singular subject—the masculine subject—and defined by its parameters. The exclusion of the feminine and femininity constitutes the foundation of patriarchy upon which phallogocentric social relations depend. Here, within the purview of the masculine, master subject, the world looks like him and the feminine as a mere copy of the selfsame but with a lack, reduction, and deficit.

Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, Irigaray proposes the process of specularization as central to the repression of women. As such, Western philosophy or philosophical

speculation is at once specularizing—a mirror back to the self and specular—invoking the presence of an absence coded as feminine. The concept of specularization is used to argue that philosophy, in its blind-spots, does not understand or provide a means to understand sexual difference. Instead, it speaks volumes about “universal sexual indifference” and hom(m)osexualite (a desire for the same). Her goal is to devise a method whereby the masculine does not determine everything and philosophy can change to hear and see and understand the feminine.

Irigaray takes Freud as an example of the “mono-subjective, monosexualized, patriarchal and phallogentric” nature of philosophy. Freud is central to Western philosophy in his analysis of the unconscious, and thus the subject divided. Freud defined sexual difference through the masculine: the One sex. She then travels from Freud back to Plato to illustrate the absence of the feminine upon which Western thought rests.

In *This Sex Which is Not One* (1985), Irigaray questions the assumption that female sexuality is dependent upon male sexuality and asks: Where is female sexuality located? Where does female pleasure reside? What is female desire and how does it look? Irigaray argues that in the Western phallogentric model, the sexuality that gets privileged is based on looking: having a penis, and thus male sexuality, is privileged because the penis can be seen. Female sexuality, in contrast, is based on having nothing, setting up the simple binary opposition of penis/nothing and paralleling the notion of the female as defined by a lack or deficit.

Reworking Freudian theory, Irigaray argues against the idea that women are always trying to fill this lack and fulfill the desire to have a penis (e.g., by having a baby, by finding a husband, or by gaining masculine rights and privileges). Irigaray writes against this Freudian conceptualization by distinguishing between female desire and female pleasure. According to Irigaray, female sexual pleasure, or female *jouissance*, is of a different order, in a different economy than male sexual pleasure, based on the different configurations of female and male bodies. Man must have an instrument with which to touch himself, she argues. If his pleasure is indeed based in the penis, then something else—a hand, a vagina, language—has to touch the penis in order to produce pleasure. Woman, however, touches herself all the time—the structure of the female genitals provides constant autoerotic contact, as “at least two” lips are always pressing against each other and providing pleasure.

From these early books and an analysis of the “One,” Irigaray provides an analysis of sexual difference based on how two are different. In doing so, she affirms certain characteristics of the feminine subject—a subject previously deprived of self-representation or self-affection. Mimicry is proposed as a strategy to subvert patriarchy. If woman is the mirror by which the philosopher ensures his own image,

as Irigaray argues, by altering the mirror as concave (a speculum), this image can be reshaped as well. The speculum rather than a flat mirror will bring forward that which has previously been unseen and ignored by the philosopher who desires the same or his own image. Thus, woman, previously not one singular thing or the “nothing” through which the philosopher gains subjective presence, instead emerges as plural, more than one, not one. To listen to the philosopher’s claim of a nothing with another ear is to hear a different language of a self that remains unheard in Western thought (i.e., *The Sex Which Is Not One*).

How can Western philosophy then see and hear the feminine? Irigaray argues that while we cannot step outside Western philosophy, we can go inside via the speculum and the method of specularization to alter Western discourse. Irigaray uses the term *Parler femme*: speaking (as) woman to illustrate how to restore feminine genealogies. In *Sexes and Genealogies* (1993) and *Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference* (1993), Irigaray revises Freud’s Oedipus complex and the incest taboo in which the father forbids bodily encounters with the mother (matricide according to Irigaray), sons actively find replacement mothers, and daughters become replacements for others. Irigaray contends that neither mothers nor daughters have a name of their own, a sex of their own, and thus neither can be “identified with respect to the other.” In contrast to Lacan, Irigaray argues that the idea of woman as outside or other always threatens subversion, thus transforming masculine Western culture. We must stop killing the mother and exiling daughters as replacements for other sons and instead invent words that speak to mother-daughter relations, thereby restoring feminine genealogies. Here, Irigaray proposes a direct link between women, feminine sexuality, and the body. She grounds the feminine in women’s experiences of female sexuality and the body, particularly women’s “two lips”—an experience which is plural, dispersed, and multiple. Speaking the feminine, speaking (as) women, can thus transform masculine culture. Writing and speaking as a woman can be a form of subversion.

Finally, Irigaray seeks to create a world of sexuate beings, distinguishing between the Je-elle (I-she) and the je-il (I-he). According to Irigaray, by saying I-she and I-he we make visible that the subject is two. The singular, here, is finally abandoned in favor of two beings and a new understanding of subjectivity and objectivity. In *Democracy Begins Between Two* (2000), Irigaray asserts that we differ from each other but are also different within ourselves. Here, Irigaray affirms the Other and argues that only by being the Other can we change Western culture.

— Laura Mamo

See also Body; Essentialism; Feminism; Kristeva, Julia; Postmodernism; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory

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J

JAMESON, FREDERIC

Fredric Jameson is generally considered to be one of the foremost contemporary Marxist literary critics writing in English. He has published a wide range of works analyzing literary and cultural texts and developing his own neo-Marxist theoretical position. A prolific writer, he has assimilated an astonishing number of theoretical discourses into his project and has intervened in many contemporary debates while analyzing a diversity of cultural texts, ranging from the novel to video, from architecture to postmodernism.

Born in 1934, Jameson grew up in southern New Jersey and attended Haverford College, where he majored in French. He then went to Yale, where he received a PhD for a dissertation on Jean-Paul Sartre, which became his first book, *Sartre: Origin of a Style* (1961). After intense study of French literary theory in the 1950s, in the 1960s Jameson began an enduring engagement with Marxian theory. He studied two years in Berlin, where he was deeply influenced by the New Left and antiwar movements. In 1970, he published *Marxism and Form*, which introduced a tradition of dialectical neo-Marxist literary theory to the English-speaking world. Since articulating and critiquing the structuralist project in *The Prison-House of Language* (1972), Jameson has concentrated on developing his own literary and cultural theory in works such as *Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist* (1979), *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (1981), and *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991). Studies of Theodor W. Adorno, *Late Marxism* (1990a) and *Brecht and Method* (2000) continue his intensive work in Marxist theory and aesthetics, and *A Singular Modernity* (2002) engages the debates over the postmodern through critical analysis of discourses of modernity and modernism.

Jameson has characteristically appropriated into his theory a wide range of positions, from structuralism to

poststructuralism and from psychoanalysis to postmodernism, producing a highly eclectic and original brand of Marxian literary and cultural theory. Marxism remains the master narrative of Jameson's corpus, a theoretical apparatus and method that utilizes a dual hermeneutic of ideology and utopia to criticize the ideological components of cultural texts while setting forth their utopian dimension, and that helps produce criticism of existing society and visions of a better world. Influenced by Marxist theorist Ernst Bloch, Jameson thus has developed a hermeneutical and utopian version of Marxian cultural and social theory.

Dialectical criticism for Jameson involves thinking that reflexively analyzes categories and methods while carrying out concrete analyses and inquiries. Categories articulate historical content and thus must be read in terms of the historical environment out of which they emerge. For Jameson, dialectical criticism thus involves thinking that reflects on categories and procedures while engaging in specific concrete studies; relational and historical thinking, which contextualizes the object of study in its historical environment; utopian thinking, which compares the existing reality with possible alternatives and finds utopian hope in literature, philosophy, and other cultural texts; and totalizing, synthesizing thinking, which provides a systematic framework for cultural studies and a theory of history within which dialectical criticism can operate. All these aspects are operative throughout Jameson's work, the totalizing element coming more prominently (and controversially) to the fore as his work evolved.

From the 1970s to the present, Jameson has published an increasingly diverse and complex series of theoretical inquiries and cultural studies. One begins to encounter the characteristic range of interests and depth of penetration in his studies of science fiction, film, magical narratives, painting, and both realist and modernist literature. One also encounters articles concerning Marxian cultural politics, imperialism, Palestinian liberation, Marxian teaching methods,

and the revitalization of the Left. Many of the key essays have been collected in *The Ideologies of Theory* (1988), which provide the laboratory for the theoretical project worked out in *The Political Unconscious*, *Fables of Aggression*, and subsequent texts. These studies should be read together as inseparable parts of a multilevel theory of the interconnections between the history of literary form, modes of subjectivity, and stages of capitalism.

Jameson's theoretical synthesis is presented most systematically in *The Political Unconscious*. The text contains an articulation of Jameson's literary method, a comprehensive inventory of the history of literary forms, and a hidden history of the forms and modes of subjectivity itself, as it traverses through the field of culture and experience. Jameson boldly attempts to establish Marxian criticism as the most all-inclusive theoretical framework as he incorporates a disparate set of competing approaches into his model. He provides an overview of the history of the development of cultural forms and concludes with articulation of a "double hermeneutic" of ideology and utopia—which critiques ideology while preserving utopian moments—as the properly Marxian method of interpretation.

Jameson employs a Lukács-inspired historical narrative to tell how cultural texts contain a "political unconscious," buried narratives and social experiences, which require sophisticated literary hermeneutics in order to be deciphered. One particular narrative of *The Political Unconscious* concerns, in Jameson's striking phrase, "the construction of the bourgeois subject in emergent capitalism and its schizophrenic disintegration in our own time" (p. 9). Key stages in the odyssey of the disintegrating bourgeois subjectivity are articulated in George Gissing, Joseph Conrad, and Wyndham Lewis, a story that will find its culmination in Jameson's account of postmodernism.

Indeed, Jameson's studies on postmodernism are a logical consequence of his theoretical project. Within his analysis, Jameson situates postmodern culture in the framework of a theory of stages of society—based on a neo-Marxian model of stages of capitalist development—and argues that postmodernism is part of a new stage of capitalism. Every theory of postmodernism, he claims, contains an implicit periodization of history and "an implicitly or explicitly political stance on the nature of multinational capitalism today" (1991:3). Following Ernest Mandel's periodization

in his book *Late Capitalism* (1975), Jameson claims that "there have been three fundamental moments in capitalism, each one marking a dialectical expansion over the previous stage. These are market capitalism, the monopoly stage or the stage of imperialism, and our own, wrongly called postindustrial, but what might better be termed multinational, capital" (1991:35). To these forms of society correspond the cultural forms realism, modernism, and postmodernism.

Jameson emerges as a synthetic and eclectic Marxian cultural theorist who attempts to preserve and develop the Marxian theory while analyzing the politics and utopian moments of a stunning diversity of cultural texts. His work expands literary analysis to include popular culture, architecture, theory, and other genres, and thus can be seen as part of the movement toward an interdisciplinary cultural studies as a replacement for canonical literary studies.

— Douglas Kellner

See also Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Frankfurt School; Political Economy; Postmodernism; Sartre, Jean-Paul

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K

KRISTEVA, JULIA

Psychoanalytic theorist, linguistic scholar, and philosopher, Julia Kristeva theorizes relations among psychic desire, the body, sexuality, and culture. She has contributed extensively not only to philosophy, linguistics, and psychoanalytic theory but also to literary and cultural theory as well as feminist theory. Her publications explore topics such as the relationship of semiotics and subjectivity (*Revolution of Poetic Language*, 1974), depression and melancholy (*Black Sun*, 1987), maternal experience and abjection (*Powers of Horror*, 1980), national identity and territorial space (*Strangers to Ourselves*, 1989), literature and sensation (*Time and Sense*, 1994), and the practice of psychoanalysis (*New Maladies of the Soul*, 1993).

Kristeva was born in 1941 in Bulgaria. In the mid-1960s at the age of 25, she was granted a doctoral research fellowship that enabled her to emigrate to Paris. In Paris, she worked with Roland Barthes, a central figure in structuralism and literary theory, and Jacques Lacan, a leading psychoanalytic theorist. She was involved in leftist French politics, completed psychoanalytic training, and was inducted into the French *legion d'honneur*, the highest cultural honor in France. She is currently professor of linguistics and humanities at the University of Paris VII and a frequent visiting lecturer at Columbia University.

Kristeva's first major publication, *Revolution of Poetic Language* (written in 1974 as her doctoral dissertation and published in 1984), began her theoretical work in semiotics and psychoanalysis. In this work, she proposes a new semiotics she terms *semanalysis*. Semanalysis argues that meaning is a signifying process rather than a sign system. Semanalysis explores the relationship between language and subjectivity by combining the semiotics of Charles Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure with the psychoanalysis of Freud, Lacan, and Melanie Klein. Semanalysis asserts

that subjectivity is formed in conjunction with language acquisition and use and that all signification is composed of the "semiotic" (*genotext*) and the "symbolic" (*phenotext*).

Incorporating Lacanian psychoanalysis, Kristeva further distinguishes the semiotic as the pre-Oedipal stage of human development and the symbolic as the post-Oedipal stage. The semiotic, which refers to the bodily drive as it produces signification or meaning, is associated with the rhythms, tones, and movement of signifying practices. As bodily drive, the semiotic is also associated with the maternal body, considered by Kristeva to be the original source of rhythms, tones, and movements for every human being. In this theorization, the semiotic (*genotext*) represents biophysiological processes constrained by social and cultural norms. The semiotic is prediscursive and cannot be reduced to language systems. In contrast, the symbolic element of signification is associated with the grammar and structure of language. The symbolic (*phenotext*) element exists within the larger semiotic (*genotext*) and makes reference possible.

Signification and meaning require both the semiotic and symbolic. The semiotic and the symbolic represented departure points for Kristeva to bring the body back into discourse through the speaking subject. She argues that the speaking subject is a divided subject consisting of a conscious mind containing social constraints and an unconscious mind consisting of biophysiological processes (i.e., Freudian drives). While traditional semiotics could not deal with desire or transgression from social norms, semanalysis rests upon a split subject—a socially-shaped, biological being that is always negotiating inner desire and social norms. Semanalysis launched Kristeva's theoretical work on the connections between mind and body, psyche and soma, nature and culture, and materiality and representation that comprise her scholarship.

In *New Maladies of the Soul* (1993), Kristeva analyzes what she views as a loss of meaning and emptiness in

contemporary life. She asks, Where does the soul reside? Her answer requires her to theorize the space between the biological and social. She argues that the soul mediates between one's body, interactions with others, and representations of oneself. In doing so, she continues her projects of understanding psychic life and theorizing relations between the body and subjectivity. Kristeva argues that drives constitute the bridge between soma and psyche, between the body and representation. She challenges the notion of a unified, fixed subjectivity and argues that the logic of language is already at work at the material level of bodily processes. From Kristeva's perspective, bodily drives make their way into language. Therefore, she insists that bodily drives are discharged in representation and that the logic of signification is already operating in the material body. Kristeva is arguing that subjectivity or identification does not originate in biology; rather, subjectivity is constructed in the symbolic.

Following Melanie Klein and in contrast to Freud and Lacan, Kristeva emphasizes the maternal function and its importance in the development of subjectivity and access to culture and language. Freud and Lacan maintained that the child enters the social by virtue of the paternal function, specifically paternal threats of castration. This is incomprehensible for Kristeva, who believes that if our only motivation for entering the social is fear, more of us would be psychotic. In "Motherhood According to Bellini," written while she was pregnant in 1975 and later published as part of *Desire in Language* (1980), she constructs a theory of maternity. Childbirth is not motivated by penis envy, as Freud argued, but instead pregnancy and childbirth can bring back primal homosexual bonds by reuniting a woman with her own mother. In *Tales of Love* (1983), she addresses the Freudian-Lacanian notion that paternal threats provoke the child to exit the safety of the maternal body. Kristeva formulates the maternal body as operating between nature and culture, thus rejecting the reduction of maternity to nature. She argues that mother is primarily a speaking subject, even if she is not the subject or agent of her pregnancy and birth. The maternal body, with its two-in-one or other within, represents all subjective relations. Each one of us is a *subject-in-process*, always negotiating the other within. Like the maternal body, we are never completely the subjects of our own experience. Kristeva's notion of a subject-in-process counters traditional notions of an autonomous unified (masculine) subject.

Kristeva's theoretical work attempts to understand the earliest development of subjectivity, prior to Freud's oedipal situation or Lacan's mirror stage. In *Tales of Love* (1983) and *Desire in Language* (1980), she argues that maternal regulation exists prior to paternal law; therefore, she calls for a new discourse of maternity, beyond religion and science, that acknowledges the importance of the maternal function in the development of subjectivity and in

culture. Kristeva states that the maternal function cannot be reduced to mother, feminine, or woman—anyone can fulfill the maternal function. She makes this claim by arguing that the mother's relation to the infant is a functional relationship of meeting the child's needs. This function is separate from both love and desire. As a woman and a mother, a woman both loves and desires and as such she is a social and speaking being. As a woman and a mother, she is always sexed. But insofar as she fulfills the maternal function, she is not sexed. Thus, the maternal function does not require a particular sexed being; men or women can fulfill this function.

Despite her extensive theorizing on maternity, female sexuality, love and desire, Julia Kristeva and Western feminism have an uneasy relationship. While she is interested in the question of what it means to be a woman, she is equally committed to dismantling all ideologies, including feminist theory. Her theoretical work emphasizes phenomena where language and the psyche are under stress. For Kristeva, precisely these phenomena offer possibilities for transformation. In *Powers of Horror* (1980), she formulates the notion of *abjection* as a psychic operation whereby subjectivity is constituted. Abjection creates women's oppression in patriarchal cultures. Women are reduced to their reproductive/maternal functions, and it becomes necessary for women to abject the maternal function in order to become subjects. This matricide, central to the creation of subjectivity in patriarchal culture, leads to *depressive sexuality* because women are unable to abject the maternal body with which they identify as women. Kristeva argues that in order to escape this matricide, a new discourse of maternity is required, a discourse in which relations between mothers and daughters do not prohibit lesbian love between women.

In *New Maladies of the Soul* (1993), Kristeva theorizes "women's time" and asserts that female subjectivity seems linked to both cyclical time (menstruation, pregnancy, repetition) and monumental time in the sense of eternity through motherhood, reproduction, and the genetic chain. The time of history and language, however, is linear. Her goal is to emphasize the "multiplicity" of female expressions, to avoid essentializing or homogenizing "woman," and to recognize sexual difference. In a singularly interesting move, she projects that a new generation of feminists will have the task of reconciling "maternal" time with linear time. Unless women are able to theorize the continued desire of women to have children, religion, tradition, and mysticism will remain the primary sources of theorizing about this phenomenon.

In dialogue with Western feminism, Kristeva argues that there are three phases of feminist theorizing. She rejects the first phase for what she sees as its attempt to create universal equality and its blind spot to sexual differences. Rather than reject motherhood, Kristeva argues a new discourse of maternity is necessary; real female innovation (in whatever

field) will only come about when maternity, female creation, and the link between them are better understood. She rejects the second phase of feminism for what she sees as its goal to create a uniquely feminine language. Rather than assert that language and culture are patriarchal and must be displaced, she insists that culture and language are the domain of speaking beings and women are primarily speaking beings. She therefore endorses what she sees as the third phase of feminism in which identity, difference, and their relationships are theorized. Here neither identity nor difference is privileged. Instead, multiple identities, including multiple sexual identities, get priority.

— Laura Mamo

See also Body; Feminism; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory; Sexuality and the Subject

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L

LABELING THEORY

Labeling theory (also referred to as societal reaction theory) analyzes how social groups create and apply definitions for deviant behavior. The approach examines how deviant labels emerge, how some social groups develop the power to impose deviant labels onto selected others, and the consequences of being labeled deviant.

Sociologist Howard Becker is credited with the most influential formulation of labeling theory, which appears in his book *Outsiders* (1973). According to Becker, deviance is not an intrinsic feature of behavior. Acts and individuals are not inherently deviant until some social groups can successfully define them that way. Labeling theory here builds from the symbolic interactionist tenet that people define and construct their identities from society's perceptions of them. Social groups project rules and definitions onto otherwise neutral behaviors to create deviance. Labeling theory addresses this transformation process and researches its aftermath.

Labeling theorists reject the idea that deviance is an objective phenomenon. They criticize accepting prevailing definitions of deviance as unproblematic and taken-for-granted categories. Labeling theorists instead suggest that deviance is relative and that no universal consensus exists regarding whether any given behavior is deviant. For example, acts defined as self-mutilation, such as branding, may be viewed as deviant or as a proud affirmation of membership in a tribal culture. What is considered deviant also changes over time. Homosexuality is no longer identified officially as a mental disorder in the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, though it once was.

The relativity of deviance suggests that social groups work actively to enshrine some definitions for what is deviant into law while eliminating competing alternatives.

Labeling theorists investigate the social process of how deviant labels emerge. They refer to those who advocate particular constructions of what is deviant as *moral entrepreneurs*. Agents of social control who enforce the resulting standards are *rule enforcers*. Labeling theorists emphasize researching the motives and tactics that moral entrepreneurs use in their attempts to institutionalize their criteria for deviance.

Labeling theorists see deviance as relative not only in content but also in enforcement. Howard Becker (1973) suggests four categories of labeling. People who do not deviate are *conformists*. People who are labeled deviant even when they do not break the rules are *falsely accused*. People who are caught breaking the rules are *pure deviants*. People who break the rules without getting caught are *secret deviants*. Labeling theorists attempt to explain patterns of selective enforcement of deviant behavior. They reject studying the potential causal motivations of deviant individuals themselves, for example, avarice or mental illness, and focus instead on how authorities may selectively impose a deviant status onto some people but not onto others.

Why does the labeling spotlight shine more brightly on some than on others? Stereotypes about gender, race, class, and who fits preexisting stereotypes of deviants influence the labeling process. Being labeled deviant may depend more on individual demographics than on someone's actual behaviors. Rule enforcers may target particular groups in advance as likely deviants, as in racial profiling, which make any subsequent discoveries of deviance in sync with their initial expectations.

One consequence of labeling people deviant is increasing the likelihood of future deviant behavior. Labeling theorists suggest a sequential shift from *primary* to *secondary deviance*. When people are initially labeled deviant, society treats them differently—with greater suspicion and restrictions—and with lower tolerance for any further offenses. The

pejorative labels (“addict,” “juvenile delinquent,” “prostitute”) that deviants receive may prevent them from being successfully integrated into society. This rejection encourages further deviant behavior, as other deviants may become one’s only available companions and illicit activities the only accessible source of income. Deviant labels bestow a stigmatizing master status onto individuals that amplify the potential for subsequent acts of secondary deviance.

How do stigmatized groups respond? Labeling theory emphasizes the reciprocal relations between rule enforcers and those that they label. Some labeled groups may decide to actively organize resistance to their stigmatization, as have various groups of homosexuals, marijuana users, prostitutes, and obese persons. Others may embrace a definition of themselves as *outsiders*, with their secondary deviance developing into full-blown careers in deviance, by committing completely and openly to a deviant identity.

Labeling theorists emphasize that a power inequality exists between those who have the power to impose labels and those who are stigmatized by them. They believe that moral entrepreneurship serves the vested interests of some at the expense of others. Labeling theorists decry an encroachment of social control based on artificial determinations of what is deviant. Some argue, for example, that psychologists and psychiatrists dispense labels for deviance in the guise of medical diagnoses such as attention deficit disorder or mental illness. By labeling these people’s behaviors deviant, these professionals can claim a beneficial jurisdiction. Other labeling theorists criticize official statistics of crime and deviance as selective and biased, for example, pointing out that street crimes are emphasized more than “crime in the suites,” a distinction that benefits powerful social actors. Some labeling theory adherents advocate decriminalizing “victimless crimes” to lessen the detrimental effects of stigmatizing people who engage in those acts. In turn, some criticize labeling theory for being overly sympathetic to deviants and viewing them as not warranting their social marginalization.

Critics from the Left acknowledge that labeling theory expresses sympathy for marginalized outsiders, but they criticize labeling theory for not paying enough attention to sources of structural power in capitalistic societies that ostensibly embed labels. A methodologically based critique also argues that difficulties in quantifying labeling theory’s contributions make empirical tests of the theory problematic. Labeling theory has also been criticized for failing to explain why people initiate acts of deviance and for overestimating the causal impacts that stigmatization has in prompting secondary deviance. Despite these proposed shortcomings, labeling theory remains an influential approach in research and teaching, especially in the sociology of deviance.

— David Shulman

See also Becker, Howard; Crime; Deviance; Social Interaction

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LACAN, JACQUES

Jacques Marie Émile Lacan (1901–1981) ranks among the most important and original psychoanalytic thinkers. His career spanned over 50 momentous years of French intellectual history (from Surrealism and phenomenology to structuralism and poststructuralism), while his enormously influential seminar combining a careful rereading of Freud with the elaboration of his own conceptual innovations ran nearly 30 years (1953–1980). By the 1960s, unofficial transcripts of Lacan’s seminars were being widely circulated and discussed, and the publication of his massive *Écrits* in 1966 (selections translated into English) was a major intellectual event. Lacan’s rebellion against the “ego psychology” of the International Psychoanalytical Association was easily identified with the student revolt of May 1968. He was both critical and supportive of the students. He honored their strike against the university system by suspending his seminar and signing a letter of solidarity, but he also publicly criticized their underlying motivation. “I won’t mince my words,” he told an audience of student admirers, “What you want is another master.” Nevertheless, Lacan’s fame and influence continued to grow. In the fall of 1975, he was invited to the United States to deliver highly publicized lectures at Yale, Columbia, and MIT. But perhaps the ultimate validation of his claim to being the French Freud came in 1978 when Lacanian psychoanalysis became the orthodox theory and practice of the new Department of Psychoanalysis at the University of Paris VIII-Vincennes.

Lacan was born in Paris on April 13, 1901. His father, Alfred Lacan, was the Paris sales representative for a large provincial manufacturer of vinegar and other food products. The Lacans lived a comfortable bourgeois existence marred only by stifling Catholic religiosity and constant domestic squabbling between the families of Jacques’s parents. During his 1961 seminar, Lacan, who never spoke of his personal life, angrily referred to his paternal grandfather as

an “execrable petit-bourgeois” thanks to whom “I started cursing God at a very precocious age.” Nevertheless, young Jacques attended a prestigious Jesuit school, the Collège Stanislas, where he was inculcated with conservative Catholic religious, social, and political values while excelling in religious studies and Latin. He also developed a more independent and subversive passion for Spinoza and Nietzsche.

Lacan took up the study of medicine in 1920 and specialized in psychiatry from 1926. During this period, he began to associate with Surrealist writers and artists. He became a friend of André Breton and Salvador Dalí, met James Joyce (later to figure prominently in Lacan’s 1975–1976 seminar), and was present at the first public reading of *Ulysses* in the famous bookstore Shakespeare & Co. In 1932, Lacan completed his doctoral thesis on paranoia, a study that influenced the development of Dalí’s “paranoid-critical” method of representation. During the 1930s, Lacan began to synthesize French psychiatry, the ideas of Freud, and the phenomenological psychology of Eugène Minkowski, Ludwig Binswanger, and Karl Jaspers. Although his relationship with his mentor, the eminent and eccentric psychiatrist Gaëton Gatian de Clérambault, was deeply conflictive (resulting in Lacan’s failing his *agrégation*, an event that effectively excluded him from the highest levels of the psychiatric profession), Lacan later claimed Clérambault to be his only real master in psychiatry. Lacan singled out Clérambault’s concept of “mental automatism” (by which psychosis was explained in terms of external formal elements beyond the conscious control of the subject) as the closest French psychiatry came to a structural analysis of mental functioning. During the 1930s, Lacan began to study the philosophies of G. W. F. Hegel, Martin Heidegger, and Henri Bergson. Lacan also attended several of Marxist political philosopher Alexander Kojève’s famous lectures on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* delivered between 1933 and 1939.

Around the same time that he completed his thesis in psychiatry, Lacan began his training analysis with Rudolph Loewenstein (later an influential proponent of ego psychology in the United States) that continued until 1938. In 1953, Lacan, together with many colleagues, left the official French psychoanalytic society, the Société Parisienne de Psychanalyse, to form a new group, the Société Française de Psychanalyse. After years of continued conflict, primarily over his use of variable-length sessions, Lacan was struck off the list of training analysts of the SFP. This event marked his final break with the International Psychoanalytical Association, and in 1964 Lacan founded his own group, the École Freudienne de Paris (EFP), serving as its sole director until he summarily dissolved it in 1980. Only months before Lacan’s death on September 9, 1981, Lacanian psychoanalysis was reorganized as the École de la Cause Freudienne (ECF) directed by Lacan’s

son-in-law, Jacques-Alain Miller, who also edits the authorized versions of the master’s seminars (several volumes are available in English). Acrimonious splits have produced numerous Lacanian associations in France and elsewhere: in addition to Miller’s École Européenne de Psychanalyse (EEP), the most important are the École Lacanienne de Psychanalyse (ELP) and the Centre de Formation et de Recherches Psychanalytiques (CFRP).

Lacan was a masterful teacher who expressed his major ideas in the form of succinct statements, algorithms, and diagrams. Among the first and most famous is the claim that the unconscious is structured like a language, that is to say, the subject is created in and through language, and the mind, like language, works by means of relationships of association (metonymy) and substitution (metaphor). Following Ferdinand de Saussure, Lacan sees language as a system of signs, constituted by signifiers (S = acoustic images or sounds) and signifieds (s = meanings or ideas). The linguistic system is self-referential and “differential,” since the value of each sign depends upon the entire system of signs, that is, upon its difference from all other signs—when we look up a word in a dictionary, we find only more words.

Focusing on how we are constituted as subjects by language, Lacan stresses the primacy of the speech act, of the signifier over the signified:

$$\frac{S}{s}$$

This formula expresses how a flux of signifiers (words) and a flux of signifieds (other words) come to be fixed in a distinct relation of meaning. In developmental terms the infant learns language by making signifiers of the stream of sounds issuing from Mom:




Figure 1 Suture

The vector S-S’ is a stream of words emanating from Mom’s mouth. These signifiers will become my native language, but initially they are external or Other to me (thus, language is the discourse of the Other, Mom is the locus of

the code, the one who knows, or is presumed to know, the meaning of it all, hence the use of the capital letter O). As a child I seek to please Mom, but to satisfy her desire I must discover it. Thus, I take some action (vector Infant $\$$) in relation to Mom's noises. My action intersects with Mom's discourse at O, and on the basis of her reaction, I retroactively organize the stream of signifiers into a coherent idea or signified, s(O), the signified of the Other. I learn (am compelled) to articulate my needs, feelings, desires in the language of the Other, and in doing so I presume, without ever being certain, that I am thereby satisfying (m)Other's desire. As the movement of the subject vector suggests, meaning is attained retroactively as I am sewn or "sutured" into the language of the Other. I am also alienated by language. No longer a full subject, unified in my being and my meaning, from now on I am a barred subject, $\$$, whose being is barred from itself by my identification with the system of meanings of the Other. I am either in the realm of authentic being or in the realm of alienated meaning; there is no possibility of being in both realms simultaneously:




Figure 2 Alienation in Language

The language of the Other or the Symbolic Order not only sutures me into a system of meaning, but it is also a Law of Desire that disciplines my most intimate enjoyments and bodily pleasures (what Lacan calls "jouissance"). As a child, I must pass through a process of separation from the emotional intimacy I had with Mom and of identification with the prescriptions and proscriptions of desire imposed by society itself. The Law of Desire is organized around the Phallus within a patriarchal order Lacan calls the Name of the Father. The process by which Dad intervenes in the intimate relationship between myself and Mom results in my giving up my intimacy with Mom and assuming a gendered identity organized around the Phallus, henceforth pursuing objects of desire that are socially acceptable substitutes for the lost jouissance of my relation with Mom (the maternal Thing).

The diagram in Figure 3 is to be read from left to right. As a developing infant, I experience the tension between the signifiers of the social-paternal (Name of the Father)




Figure 3 The Paternal Metaphor

and the intimate-maternal (Desire of the Mother) realms while attempting to hold on to my privileged role as the sole object of Mom's desire (Desire of the Mother) and the jouissance of this relationship (Signified to the Subject). The outcome, of course, is the metaphorical substitution of the desire of society (Name of the Father) for the Desire of the Mother ____ which is repressed, literally unsymbolizable (U), while the emotional satisfactions of the maternal relation are henceforth to be sought in objects organized around the Phallus.

The Phallus both is and is not the male genital. It is the penis insofar as actual sex differences are necessarily involved in the process by which all children separate from Mom and become social, gendered subjects. The process involves the ultimately accurate perception of the child that it is not the sole object of Mom's desire, that the child and Mom are not complete and fulfilled in and by themselves, that Mom is lacking something that I cannot supply, and that something is provided Mom by Dad. What can it be but the penis?

However, the Lacanian Phallus is not the anatomical penis insofar as the Phallus itself is the signifier of a lack; it "stands in for" the lost jouissance but it is not itself that jouissance. The Phallus is not the real Thing, the promised unity of Being and Meaning; it is merely a social construction, a metaphor that never succeeds in actually providing the emotional satisfaction we all seek. Nor is the real Thing a Phallus, a fact Lacan expresses as the difference between "being" and "having" the Phallus. Prior to the Paternal Metaphor, I *was* the Phallus for Mom. However, after accepting my symbolic mandate as a gendered social subject, I can only *have* the Phallus (if I'm gendered male) or attempt to *be* the Phallus for a man (if I'm gendered female).

In short, Lacanian theory describes the working of a patriarchal social order, but it does not, as it is sometimes accused of doing, endorse patriarchy. The Law of Desire is organized around the Phallus, Φ , insofar as we are all socialized within a patriarchal order, but there is no biological essentialism at work. Rather, "masculine" and "feminine" positions are social and logical constructions that Lacan insists are asymmetrical and internally deadlocked. Genders are neither complementary nor are they capable of providing the real Thing, the unity of Being and Meaning. Lacan flatly insists "there is no sexual relation," only the gendered alienation of "formulas of sexuation":

Men	Women
$\exists x\Phi x$	$\overline{\exists x\Phi x}$
$\forall x\Phi x$	$\overline{\forall x\Phi x}$
S 	$S(\emptyset)$
Φ	$\mathcal{L}a$

Figure 4 Formulas of Sexuation

The masculine and feminine positions of a patriarchal society are described here in terms of the logic of set theory. With respect to the set of all men, the first formula states, “There is one man who is not subject to the phallic function”; that is, there must be an origin that is external to the set of all men—for patriarchal mythology, a masculine God the Father, for the infant, the all-powerful pre-Oedipal father. The lower formula reads, “All men are subject to the phallic function”; that is to say, all masculine social subjects within the set identify with the phallic Law of Desire. They are all S and firmly identified with the illusory conviction that they have the Phallus.

On the side of the feminine, the formulas are stated in the negative. The upper formula reads, “No single woman is completely beyond the phallic function”; in other words, no woman completely escapes being defined by the masculine Law of Desire. However, the second formula states, “Not all of woman is defined by the phallic function”; there remains something that escapes the masculine-centered system of meaning and resists it. “Woman” is the signifier of an act of repression, a hole or lack at the heart of the masculine discourse of the Other, $S(\emptyset)$.

In short, women are not as completely integrated into the Symbolic Order as are men. The notation $\mathcal{L}a$ states, “The Woman does not exist” for Man, S , except as an enigma. For Man, Woman exists as a fantasmatic object of desire (what Lacan calls object a), an object the masculine order can define only in terms of Man, specifically in terms of a dependent relationship of Woman to Man. In contrast, for Woman, the choices are either to attempt to achieve fulfillment by satisfying a man (being the phallus, Φ , for a Man) or to remain an enigma, a meaningless cipher to the masculine social order of meaning. There is no biological essentialism at work here; as Lacan demonstrates by way of male mystics, males and females may logically assume either a masculine or feminine position. Nor is the content of either position essentialist.

Lacan reconceptualizes the Freudian id, ego, and superego in terms of three modalities or “registers” of human reality: the Real (the unsymbolizable, emotional Being of the Subject), the Imaginary (the realm of conscious representations), and the Symbolic (the realm of language and internalized social prescriptions and proscriptions). Psychically, this schema reverses the positivistic relations of science (truth) and ideology (desire) by equating the truth of the Subject with the Real (unconscious, unsymbolizable) and the Imaginary with illusion or alienation from the truth (consciousness, ego identifications).




Figure 5 Schema L

Lacan represents the development of the Subject in the form of two diagrams, the so-called L and R schemas.

The neonate subject, S , exists in a close, symbiotic relation to Mom, o' the distinction between itself and Mom is not yet clear and the relation between them is emotionally direct and immediate, that is Real. However, the child eventually grasps himself or herself as distinct from Mom, and this inaugurates the second developmental stage characterized as a binary relationship between Mom, (m)Other and the child as ego, o . Lacan refers to this break in the Real relationship as the Mirror Stage—likening it to the point at which the child comes to see his or her reflection in a mirror as his or her own self and identifying with this image.

The ego is founded upon such identifications, visual and verbal, but Lacan sees these identifications as Imaginary, since the Real of the self is not that image in the mirror nor those cooings and cajolings of Mom. Mom is now the all-powerful, all-knowing (m)Other, the object of identification for the child as ego (imaginary axis), as well as the Real emotional object of desire for the child as id. The child now exists in a binary relationship experienced in narcissistic terms as an unmediated and unequal relation of two selves. The child separates and individuates itself from Mom, but remains in the privileged emotional position of being, at least in fantasy, the sole object of her desire. Mom’s desire is a mystery the child seeks to understand and to satisfy,

and in the process it acquires a richer sense of self through innumerable identifications with her and her values.

The binary, unmediated relationship between the child and Mom must be interrupted and terminated by a third stage, socialization and sexualization, which we have already described as the Paternal Intervention. Dad embodies the Symbolic Order, O, the Law of Desire that explains and defines Mom's lack in terms of the Phallus, and that compels the child to give up the Real experience of the maternal Thing and to accept socially defined gender roles and objects in return. The discourse and rules of the Other, superego, are internalized by the ego (the symbolic axis) while the pre-Oedipal desire for mother—the intimate Real jouissance of being the phallus for Mom—is repressed. The outcome of the process of subjectification may be represented in a modified form of Lacan's R Schema:




Figure 6 Schema R

The Lacanian subject (RSI) is a totality that only exists as the structural relationship of three distinct yet interdependent registers (Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary). The repressed pre-Oedipal jouissance between Mom, (m)Other, and the narcissistic infant ego, o, constitutes the Real register. In the Symbolic register, the child has internalized its gendered place and function within society and become a social subject, $\$$, alienated or barred from its Real truth, but able to pursue other, substitute objects of desire, objects *a*. The child has become a “signifier for other signifiers,” a social subject able to communicate with other social subjects using their common language, the discourse of the Other. However, psychologically speaking, such communication is alienated or “empty” speech devoid of the emotional truth and authenticity of Real or “full” speech (as in the transference of the analytic situation, for example). Empty speech is the realm of the Imaginary register, the realm of an alienated ego that imagines its meaning is its being, an ego that is constituted by the Other, by the history

of the child's identifications with Other images and signifiers (ultimately with an unchanging, “unary” signifier, the child's legal name). The Imaginary realm of the ego, of consciousness, is separated from Real being by a Wall of Language, yet it is Real being that accounts for the incomprehensible feelings and desires the Subject attaches to its interactions with others.

Not only does the Symbolic Order constitute the meaning of the Subject as a signifier for other signifiers, but it also disciplines the Subject's very being, a process Lacan calls Symbolic Castration. Both processes are represented in a simplified version of Lacan's Graph of Desire.




Figure 7 The Graph of Desire

The lower portion of the graph depicts the suturing of the Subject into the system of signification. We have already seen how the infant becomes a Subject, $\$$. Here the Subject is shown learning the Symbolic order and thereby identifying with his or her place and function within it, I(O). Every iteration, every new signification, further inscribes the Subject in the Symbolic Order and expands the ego's concept of itself and of reality. The superego command “Speak!” is both enabling, since the Subject is able to function socially by means of language, but also alienating and disabling, since all speech is that of the Other.

At some point, the subject experiences a certain existential deficiency or lack in the system of meaning. As Mom's desire had been a mystery for the infant, so the meaning of the Symbolic Order itself is a mystery to the Subject. The Subject has a desire for meaning and a desire to do the right thing. Thus he or she asks of the Other, “What do you want?” Since there is no ultimate meaning, since there is no reason for its existence, since the system is completely arbitrary from the perspective of the individual, the Other does not have the answer and the Subject must invent one: the

fantasy, depicted by the formula $\$ \diamond a$ (the Subject desires object a). If the existential question is “Why am I a man?,” then the fantasmatic answer may be “To find a woman.” Woman in such a case is the fantasy of Man, the reason for his existence. The object, object a , is not simply an actual, concrete woman; rather, it is an actual woman upon whom the Subject projects his fantasy. Thus, object a is a sublime, fantasmatic quality, something in the object more than the object itself.

Of course, desire is more than an intellectual desire for meaning; it is also a matter of emotion, a matter of jouissance. The upper portion of the graph deals with the being of the Subject—how the body, its pleasures and pains are disciplined by society. The Subject experiences intense pleasures and traumatic pains that Lacan calls jouissance. The experience of jouissance is inexplicable, an un-signifiable hole or a lack in the discourse of the Other, since the discourse of meaning is incommensurable with being. Of course, the parents and later society respond to my enjoyment by making prescriptive and proscriptive demands upon my enjoyment, demands to which I conform out of my desire, d , for the desire of the Other.

Thus is produced the Drive, represented by the formula $\$ \diamond D$ (the Subject desires to meet the Demands of the Other). Retroactively, my experience of pleasure is disciplined by the Demand of the Other. My original experience of pleasure is redirected or rechanneled into acceptable forms and onto acceptable objects—that is, signifiers within the Law of Desire organized around the Phallus. Genital sexuality replaces the pre-Oedipal jouissance associated with part objects during infancy and with the intimate jouissance of Mom. Thus at $S(\emptyset)$, the jouissance that was originally un-signifiable is now signified, but only in the language of the Other’s Demand. The Other commands us, “Enjoy!” but only within the Law.

Henceforth, my experience of enjoyment, for example, my relations with women who attract me in certain mysterious ways, serves to reinforce my subordination to the Demand of the Other. Lacan explains the attraction in terms of the fantasy $\$ \diamond a$. Although my jouissance has been disciplined by the Demand of the Other, I have hung on to it unconsciously; it is the mysterious Thing that attracts me to certain women, a little piece of Real enjoyment that I have refused to give up. It is the emotional component of my fantasy; it is the object a , the real Thing I project onto certain women, thereby endowing them with the power to attract me. Object a is the Real foundation, the fantasmatic support of my identity, and the less I understand it, the more tenaciously I cling to it. Every experience of enjoyment $S(\emptyset)$ reinforces the fantasy $\$ \diamond a$, the fantasy reinforces the meaning of Other’s discourse, $s(O)$, and ultimately my ego identification with the Other, $I(O)$.

Clinically speaking, the goal of Lacanian analysis is to work through the fantasy, to experience the dissolution that

attends the disillusion, to understand that “there is no Other of the Other” (there is no external, ultimate locus of the Truth), and to live accordingly. In terms of social theory generally, Lacan’s work has been influential in the field of cultural studies and in the social sciences, where it has functioned as a theory of ideology and as a method of ideology critique (often in conjunction with the work of Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser and/or other feminist, postcolonial, or poststructuralist theories).

— Robert Resch

See also Freud, Sigmund; Irigaray, Luce; Poststructuralism; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Structuralist Marxism; Žižek, Slavoj

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LATOUR, BRUNO

Bruno Latour (b. 1947), French social theorist of science, technology, and politics, was at the forefront of the development and refinement of actor-network theory (ANT) and the emergence of science and technology studies (STS) in Europe. His work has been influential in North American science studies, and many of his concepts have

traveled across disciplinary divides. Latour was born in Beaune in the Burgundy region of France, to a family noted for their wine production. Educated in Dijon, he was trained in philosophy and received his PhD from the University of Tours in 1975. During his military service, which brought him to North Africa, Latour became interested in developing anthropological models to examine modern knowledge-producing institutions and practices. He has developed a critical perspective on not only the production of knowledge in the natural sciences but the social sciences as well. He is deeply concerned with rethinking the relationships between two of the central organizing concepts of modernity: Nature and Society. Latour argues that both the natural and the social are coproduced over different spaces and at different times, leading to the formation of what he terms “collectives.” The collective is not synonymous with society, but rather provides the conditions of possibility for sociality and relations between humans and nonhumans. Latour is critical of the master narratives of modernity, such as progress and transcendence, but he is also skeptical of the claims of radical postmodernists, whom he sees as too pessimistic, and abdicating the work of producing new collectives that could create alternative futures.

Latour’s work was introduced in English with the publication of *Laboratory Life* (1979). In this text, Latour and coauthor Steve Woolgar took on the perspective of a “naïve” anthropologist inside of a neuroendocrinological lab in the United States. By “naïve,” the authors meant that they would pay close attention to the ongoing day-to-day work of scientists as forms of cultural practices. The authors focused on following the scientists across different domains of activity, including running experiments, writing papers, raising money, and speaking to different audiences. Latour and Woolgar argued that rather than being bounded by the traditional divide of science and society, which dominated functionalist sociological explanations of science (à la Robert Merton), scientists actively constructed the boundary between science and society and utilized either side as a resource, depending on the demands of the situation. Thus, “nature” emerges as a product of laboratory work, not as a precondition. However, the authors did not reduce scientific work to the subject; rather, scientists succeed through establishing links with other powerful actors and accumulating scientific credit (or capital), which must be continually reinvested in order to strengthen and expand their network of links. The network sustains and fortifies the actor, but the network is not reducible to static concepts, such as social structure. Latour and Woolgar pointed out that they are opposed to using the concept of “social factors” to explain science, since that replicates and reverses the very problem they are seeking to overcome, namely how to explicate the activity of science without recourse to nature (or society).

Laboratory Life was one of the first ethnographies of modern bench science. Latour’s work at this point coincided with others who were also exploring the worlds of modern science through forms of participant observation, such as German sociologist Karin Knorr Cetina. Knorr Cetina, influenced by symbolic interactionist and phenomenological theories of social action, argued that the scientific method must be understood as a locally produced social practice. Bench scientists produce temporary *stabilizations*, which are often deconstructed by scientists themselves, as they travel through different symbolic economies. Knorr Cetina’s ethnographic work, *The Manufacture of Knowledge* (1981), argued for *methodological intersubjectivity*, or establishing a tight contact point with the social phenomenon under investigation, through close observations of lab practices and interactions. This position is closely aligned with Latour and Woolgar’s anthropological naïveté.

In his next series of writings, including “Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Hands and Eyes” (1986), *Science in Action* (1987) and *The Pasteurization of France* (1988), Latour began to examine the deep intertwining of science and politics, as well as to develop a rich conceptual lexicon to describe his epistemology. In revealing the contours of lab culture, Latour had placed emphasis on the processes of *translation*. Translation involves the processes of converting the cacophony of objects and materials used for experiments into relatively simple *inscriptions*, such as graphs or sequences. Inscriptions that are simple, portable, and obdurate, and can be recombined with other inscriptions, comprise what Latour called “immutable mobiles.” Immutable mobiles are easily packaged, circulated and proliferated, and tend to accumulate in *centers of calculation*. Inscriptions, and the devices that produce them, are part and parcel of political methods of intervention in the world. In other words, the production of scientific knowledge is not solely a technical enterprise; rather, the processes of scientific knowledge production coconstruct both social and technical orders. In addition, Latour stresses the conflictual aspects of technoscience. Drawing heavily on military metaphors, he emphasizes how scientists must enlist allies and cut off opponents in the struggle over *obligatory points of passage*, or nodes that stabilize a network of *actants*, a term drawn from semiotics that is useful for Latour, as it covers whatever is represented within a network, including both humans and nonhumans.

Latour set out to clarify his politics of science by coining the term *technoscience*, which is a fusion of the words *technology* and *science*, in order to indicate that the disparate and motley collection of actants that make up scientific practice does not easily bifurcate into pure and applied research. This becomes a methodological point for ANT: Sociologists of science and others must

not simply replace internalist explanations of scientific activity, such as great minds or transparent proof, with externalist arguments, such as the force of ideology or the power of capitalism. Since boundaries are constantly being modulated by humans and nonhumans, the analyst should not foreclose a boundary by explaining it through recourse to either social factors or natural facts. Technoscience operates precisely through the simultaneous production of an internal and an external, or both nature and society.

Latour elaborated his technoscientific politics in *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993). Here Latour argues that we can think of modernity as a *constitution*; it is a mechanism for sorting and classifying, but also for power and control. He claims that the concept of “modern” refers to two separate processes: *translation*, which constructs hybrid objects, such as transgenic animals, and *purification*, which is the process that separates humans (Culture) from nonhumans (Nature). The process of translation has accelerated the creation of *quasiobjects* and *quasisubjects* that inhabit modernity. The use of the prefix *quasi-* is important for Latour because it represents the provisional nature of hybrids within networks before they become solidified (or *black-boxed*) as unyielding objects or volitional subjects.

We Have Never Been Modern appeared at the beginning of what was called the science wars, disciplinary (and individual) conflicts over differing representations of science. In a simple sense, the science wars pitted analytic philosophers of science and their allies in the history of science against theorists of knowledge and science (and its consequences) from cultural studies and sociology influenced by poststructuralism, feminism, and/or postmarxism. In response to this skirmish, Latour wrote a series of essays over the 1990s devoted to understanding what was at stake in these debates, compiled in *Pandora's Hope* (1999). Latour argued that the science wars were a symptom of the changing relationships within technoscience. He has continued in this direction with *War of the Worlds* (2002), in which he calls for a *multinatural diplomacy*. He claims that diplomacy is now necessary to acknowledge the war going on not over scientific facts but rather over *states of affairs*. Instead of bringing closure, facts have led to more intense squabbles over what constitutes reality. Latour also argues that the resolution will not be found through multicultural tolerance, since that perspective assumes a plurality of cultures undergirded by a singular Nature. Rather, he emphasizes that it is time to recognize and endorse many possible natures that are part of the process of building new collectives.

— Chris Ganchoff

See also Actor Network Theory; Merton, Robert; Postsocial; Social Studies of Science

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LAWLER, EDWARD

Edward J. Lawler, born in 1943, is an American theorist and experimental sociologist. He links properties of social structure to individual perceptions, emotions, and attributions to explain a range of social phenomena. Working primarily within the social exchange tradition of sociology, he has developed numerous theories that relate social structure to bargaining, voluntarism, commitment, emotion, and micro social order. He has authored several books, including *Power and Politics in Organizations* (1980) and *Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes* (1981) (both with Samuel B. Bacharach). He is the founding editor of *Advances in Group Processes*, the 2002 winner of the Cooley-Mead Award for lifetime achievement, and most recently the Martin P. Catherwood Professor at Cornell University. Lawler is currently the Dean of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell.

Lawler adopts a holistic approach to understand links between social structure and human behavior. Ontologically, he begins with the notion that structures of power, dependence, and opportunity exist at the macrolevel and these are “real” in the sense they shape opportunities and constraints for individuals. Structures guide, but do not entirely determine, the course of social interaction. Undergirding this structural orientation is the interactionist assumption that humans perceive, interpret, judge, and emotionally react to the conditions of structure. His theoretical focus is on how relatively macro phenomena (i.e., coalitions, power,

solidarity, order) are created, maintained, and destroyed by relatively microlevel phenomena (i.e., perceptions, cognitions, strategies, emotions). His theorizing synthesizes principles of social networks, organizations, identity, judgment, attribution, and emotion.

Educated at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Lawler's early career focused on mechanisms wherein power structures and coalition opportunities shape partner perceptions and strategies in negotiation. His early streams of work focused on two interrelated dimensions of power. First, a power-dependence branch emerged to link structural dependence to perceptions of power, and importantly, the strategies people adopt in bargaining. This work was pioneering because it made the negotiation *process* central in social exchange theory. A second branch of Lawler's theorizing dealt with punitive power. Here he brought Richard Emerson's power-dependence theory to bear on notions of deterrence and conflict spiral in political science. From this emerged a theory of bilateral deterrence, which resolved a number of seemingly contradictory findings.

Lawler also has made important strides toward understanding commitment in nested social groups, such as academic units within a college, departments within an organization, or communities within a city. His *theory of affective attachments* embodies four principal ideas. First, structural limitations on choice and freedom provide actors with a general sense of control over their environment. Second, "flexible" choice situations that foster a sense of self-control result in positive emotions, while "inflexible" choice situations that lessen a sense of control result in negative emotions. As such, emotions follow from decision-making autonomy within some larger hierarchical structure. Third, positive emotions tend to strengthen affective ties to collective units, whereas negative emotions tend to dampen affective ties to collective units. A primary theme in Lawler's work is that emotional reactions are a fundamental basis for commitment and solidarity in groups and organizations. Finally, relative to more distant units, social units that are more proximate to the actor tend to receive more credit for choice and positive emotion.

Since the early 1990s, Lawler (along with colleagues Jeongkoo Yoon and Shane Thye) has developed and systematically tested a *theory of relational cohesion* that provides an account of commitment in social exchange relations that incorporates emotions. This theory provides an alternate view of commitment in exchange, compared to traditional accounts that focus on uncertainty reduction and trust. The theory of relational cohesion presumes that actors are driven initially to maximize their self-interest. That is, the theory claims actors exchange initially so they can produce benefits not otherwise attainable. The theory also recognizes, however, that actors have the ability to experience, interpret, and reproduce emotional reactions to exchange outcomes. The orienting idea is that the very act of exchange represents joint social activity, characterized by problems of coordination

and uncertainty. As such, when exchange is successful, actors should experience positive emotional reactions; when exchange is unsuccessful, actors should experience negative emotional reactions. Over time, the emotional reactions from joint social activity should determine the bonds individuals form to one another, and to the relation itself.

Many of these ideas are brought together in Lawler's recently developed *affect theory of social exchange*, which places an emoting actor at the very core of social exchange theory. The affect theory asserts that different forms or types of social exchange (e.g., productive, negotiated, reciprocal, and generalized) entail tasks with different degrees of jointness. As such, tasks that involve more jointness ostensibly promote a stronger sense of shared responsibility for the results of exchange. Thus, the theory predicts more jointness and shared responsibility in negotiated exchange (e.g., when A and B jointly decide on how to divide a common good) than in reciprocal exchange (e.g., when A and B give one another unilateral benefits, noncontingently, through time). The theory asserts that shared responsibility, in turn, promotes attributions of emotion to relevant social units, because these are the context for actors' common focus and activity. The theory can help explain when and how social networks of interdependent actors become groups on a cognitive or behavioral level (see Lawler 2001).

— Shane Thye

See also Commitment; Emerson, Richard; Power; Power-dependence Relations; Relational Cohesion; Trust

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LEARNING THEORY

Learning theory is one of several consequentialist modes of explanation in the social sciences, along with functionalism, expected utility, game theory, and conflict theory. In consequentialist explanations, actions are explained in terms of the outcomes they produce. An obvious problem is

that the explanatory logic runs in the opposite direction from the temporal ordering of events. Actions are the explanandum and their outcomes the explanans. This explanatory strategy collapses into teleology unless mechanisms can be identified that bridge the temporal gap. While expected utility theory and game theory posit a forward-looking and analytic causal mechanism, learning theory provides a backward-looking and experiential link.

In forward-looking rationality, the link from actions to their explanatory consequences is the analytical ability of purposive actors to reliably predict the outcomes of alternative choices. With a perfect grasp of the logical or mathematical structure of a well-defined problem and complete information about inputs to the model, the likely consequences of alternative courses of action can be known before the fact. The ideal type is “the neoclassical economic model in which rational agents operating under powerful assumptions about the availability of information and the capability of optimizing can achieve an efficient reallocation of resources among themselves through costless trading” (Axelrod 1997:4). The consequences that matter are not the actual ones (which have not yet occurred), but those that are predicted. Outcomes that arise behind the backs of the actors, such as the unintended collective benefits of the “Invisible Hand,” cannot attract the choices that produce them, an insight made famous by Adam Smith.

Forward-looking calculation is mainly applicable to skilled entrepreneurs, political strategists, military leaders, or game theorists. In everyday life, decisions are often highly routine, with little conscious deliberation. These routines can take the form of social norms, protocols, habits, traditions, and rituals. Learning theory explains how these routines emerge, proliferate, and change in the course of consequential social interaction, based on *experience* instead of calculation. In these models, *repetition*, not prediction, brings the future to bear on the present, by recycling the lessons of the past. Through repeated exposure to a recurrent problem, the consequences of alternative courses of action can be iteratively explored, by the individual actor (reinforcement learning) or by a population (evolutionary learning). Individual learning alters the probability distribution of routines competing for an actor’s attention. Population learning alters the frequency distribution of routines carried by individuals competing for survival, reproduction, or social influence. Reinforcement learning is not limited to human actors but may be applied to larger entities such as firms or organizations that adapt their behavior in response to environmental feedback. And evolutionary learning is not limited to genetic propagation. In cultural evolution, norms, customs, conventions, and rituals propagate via role modeling, occupational training, social influence, imitation, and vicarious learning.

Whether the process is individual-level reinforcement, genetic propagation, or cultural evolution, the underlying

learning principle is the same: adaptation to environmental feedback. Positive outcomes increase the probability that the associated routine will be repeated or reproduced, while negative outcomes reduce it. For example, a firm’s problem-solving strategies improve over time through exposure to recurrent choices, under the relentless selection pressure of market competition. Suboptimal routines are removed from the repertoires of actors by learning and imitation, and any residuals are removed from the population by bankruptcy and takeover. The outcomes may not be optimal, but we are often left with well-crafted routines that make their bearers look much smarter than they really are (or need to be), like a veteran outfielder who catches a fly ball as if he or she had calculated its trajectory.

The most elementary principle of learning is simple reinforcement. Thorndike (1898) first formulated the theory of reinforcement as the “Law of Effect,” based on the principle that “pleasure stamps in, pain stamps out.” If a behavioral response has a favorable outcome, the neural pathways that triggered the behavior are strengthened. This connectionist theory finds contemporary expression in the error back-propagation used in artificial neural networks. These models show how highly complex behavioral responses can be acquired through repeated exposure to a problem.

Reinforcement theory relaxes three key behavioral assumptions in models of forward-looking rationality:

1. Proximity replaces causality as the link between choices and payoffs.
2. Reward and punishment replace utility as the motivation for choice.
3. Melioration replaces optimization as the basis for the distribution of choices over time.

1. *Proximity, not causality.* Compared to forward-looking calculation, the law of effect imposes a lighter cognitive load on decision makers by assuming experiential induction rather than logical deduction. Players explore the likely consequences of alternative choices and develop preferences for those associated with better outcomes, even though the association may be coincident, “superstitious,” or causally spurious. The outcomes that matter are those that have already occurred, not those that an analytical actor might predict in the future. Anticipated outcomes are but the consciously projected distillations of prior exposure to a recurring problem. Research using fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) supports the view that purposive assessment of means and ends can take place *after* decisions are made, suggesting that “rational choice” may be not so much a theory of decision but a theory of how decisions are rationalized to self and others.

Reinforcement learning applies to both intended and unintended consequences of action. Because repetition, not

foresight, links payoffs back to the choices that produce them, learning models need not assume that the payoffs are the intended consequences of action. Thus, the models can be applied to expressive behaviors that lack a deliberate or instrumental motive. Frank's (1988) evolutionary model of trust and commitment formalizes the backward-looking rationality of emotions like vengeance and sympathy. An angry or frightened actor may not be capable of deliberate and sober optimization of self-interest, yet the response to the stimulus has consequences for the individual, and these in turn can modify the probability that the associated behavior will be repeated.

2. *Reward and punishment, not utility.* Learning theory differs from expected utility theory in positing two distinct cognitive mechanisms that guide decisions toward better outcomes: *approach* (driven by reward) and *avoidance* (driven by punishment). The distinction means that aspiration levels are very important for learning theory. The effect of an outcome depends decisively on whether it is coded as gain or loss, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, pleasant or aversive.

3. *Melioration, not optimization.* Melioration refers to suboptimal gradient climbing when confronted with what Herrnstein and Drazin (1991) call "distributed choice" across recurrent decisions. A good example of distributed choice is the decision whether to cooperate in an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game. Suppose each side is satisfied when the partner cooperates and dissatisfied when the partner defects. Melioration implies a tendency to repeat choices with satisfactory outcomes even if other choices have higher utility, a behavioral tendency March and Simon (1958) call "satisficing." In contrast, unsatisfactory outcomes induce search for alternative outcomes, including a tendency to revisit alternative choices whose outcomes are even worse, a pattern called "dissatisficing." While satisficing is suboptimal when judged by conventional game-theoretic criteria, it may be more effective in leading actors out of a suboptimal equilibrium than if they were to use more sophisticated decision rules, such as "testing the waters" to see if they could occasionally get away with cheating. Gradient search is highly path dependent and not very good at backing out of evolutionary cul de sacs. Course correction can sometimes steer adaptive individuals to globally optimal solutions, making simple gradient climbers look much smarter than they need to be. Often, however, adaptive actors get stuck in local optima. Both reinforcement and reproduction are biased toward *better* strategies, but they carry no guarantee of finding the highest peak on the adaptive landscape, however relentless the search. Thus, learning theory can be usefully applied to the equilibrium selection problem in game theory. In repeated games (such as an ongoing Prisoners' Dilemma), there is often an indefinitely large number of analytic equilibria. However, not all these equilibria are learnable, either by individuals (via reinforcement) or by populations (via evolution). Learning theory has also been used to identify a

fundamental solution concept for these games—stochastic collusion—based on a random walk from a self-limiting non-cooperative equilibrium into a self-reinforcing cooperative equilibrium (Macy and Flache 2002).

— Michael W. Macy

See also Behaviorism; Conflict Theory; Evolutionary Theory; Game Theory

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LEFEBVRE, HENRI

Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991) was a French Marxist philosopher and sociologist whose prolific and diverse body of work contributed to a critical theory of the various dimensions of human existence under modern capitalism. Despite the fact that Lefebvre was the author of more than 60 books, and that he engaged with and contributed to some of the key theoretical currents of the past century, an appreciation of the full span of his thinking in the English-speaking world remains obscured by the partial and fragmentary state of available translations of his writings. Three principal thematic axes cut across the range of his work: Western Marxism, everyday life, as well as spatiality and the urban. Binding them to one another is his conception of capitalist modernity, which he understands as being shaped by the perpetual tension between modernism (triumphalism, the cult of the new, abstraction, technicism, instrumentalism, homogenization, etc.) and romanticism (tragedy and nostalgia, naturalism, expressivism, authenticity, personal revolt and imagination, etc.).

Lefebvre can be understood as a Western Marxist who, along with other Central or Western European thinkers,

formulated a critique of and alternative to Soviet Marxism's orthodox economism and statism. His stance towards Marxist theory was complicated by and filtered through his difficult relationship with the French Communist Party (PCF), of which he was a member—and at one point, its leading intellectual figure—from 1928 until his break with and eventual expulsion from it nearly three decades later. Influenced by Marx, Hegel, and Nietzsche, his heterodox and pluralist “dialectical materialism” stressed the problematic cultural and existential dimensions of the capitalist mode of production. The humanist thrust of Marx's early writings was important for Lefebvre, who foregrounded and generalized the concept of alienation to the extent that the latter became, in his hands, the defining sociocultural consequence of modern capitalism blocking humankind's authentic self-actualization. From Hegel he derived a dialectical perspective aimed at pinpointing the continuous existence of contradictions, as well as of possibilities of negation and transcendence (*Aufhebung*) amidst the social, while Nietzsche's vitalism was visible in Lefebvre's fascination with the disruptive, transgressive force of human creation. Placing agency and praxis at the heart of Marxism, Lefebvre highlighted the creative and revolutionary drive that underpinned both artistic avant-gardes (particularly Dada, surrealism, and situationism) and radical political struggles against the established social order, such as the 1871 Paris Commune, the May 1968 student revolt, as well as the ecological and urban movements of the 1970s and 1980s.

The second notable aspect of Lefebvre's work is his groundbreaking critique of everyday life, an area that theoretical investigations had hitherto either neglected or analyzed in a purely descriptive fashion (e.g., through phenomenology and ethnography). He contended that, far from being banal or derivative, everyday life was a fundamental arena of social action outside the immediate sphere of production, an arena whose importance was recognized in conjunction with the consolidation of modern society in the twentieth century. On the one hand, Lefebvre conceived of everyday life as impoverished and inauthentic because gradually colonized by the dual dynamics of commodification and bureaucratization, thereby resulting in the rise of a “bureaucratic society of organized consumption.” Partly through the symbolic-cum-linguistic media of advertising and marketing, the process of alienation impacts individuals and groups in their daily lives, and thus extends into the cultural and affective domains the condition of socioeconomic domination institutionally established by the capitalist economy and the liberal-democratic state. On the other hand, Lefebvre believed that, since it could never be fully captured by capitalist modernity, everyday life was the soil within which could be imagined substantial forms of resistance and disalienation. Everyday life sustains the collective memory of alternative practices and beliefs, fosters

consciousness of the immanent contradictions of the current social order, and most crucially, nurtures the elaboration and performance of subaltern strategies or spontaneous “moments” of escape from, subversion of, or rupture with the totality of the existing social order (for example, in popular festivals and political revolutions).

Spatiality and the urban constitute the third theme around which Lefebvre's thinking can be organized. For him, space is neither passive nor given, but a vital dimension of social life that is produced through politicoeconomic relations and, moreover, a locus for the exercise of power through which such relations are constituted, reproduced, or contested over time. Lefebvre offers a triadic framework of analysis of the production of space, according to which a society's spatial practice (the perceived) is shaped by the dialectic between its representations of space (the conceived) and its spaces of representation (the lived). While the former refer to the dominant ordering of space, the instrumentalized and homogenizing notions of “abstract space” promoted by technocratic experts and socioeconomic elites, the latter are the alternative counter-sites (“heterotopias”) sustaining the unifying “differential space” remembered, experienced, and symbolically imagined in every life (through art, communes, festivals, etc.). Integral to Lefebvre's spatial theory is his analysis of the process of urbanization. Following agricultural and industrial stages of production, the possible advent of a full-blown urban society should be contemplated today—a prospect whose implications cannot be adequately grasped by the technocratic sciences of urbanism, planning, and architecture. Therefore, Lefebvre urges the undertaking of an “urban revolution” that would oppose hegemonic representations of space by mobilizing citizens to defend “the right to the city”: a project consisting of participatory self-management, popular appropriation of space, and embrace of the differential, unexpected reality embedded in the urban sociocultural form.

In its many facets, Lefebvre's thought aims to foster a “permanent cultural revolution” that would work toward individual self-realization and collective autonomy. His openness toward multiple acts and places of opposition, creation, and radical transformation place him at the cusp of Marxism and postmarxism. If changing the world is a precondition to changing thought and life, he reminds us that the reverse, in its myriad complexity and rich promise of articulating poesis and praxis, is no less true.

— Fuyuki Kurasawa

See also Alienation; Capitalism; Marxism; Postmarxism; Situationists; Sociologies of Everyday Life

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LESBIAN CONTINUUM

The *lesbian continuum* is a term coined by Adrienne Rich (1986) in "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence." By constructing sexual identity along a gradient, it offers an alternative to traditional binary classifications of sexual identity. This concept was formulated with the intent of including women who do not ordinarily think of themselves as lesbians, specifically women who identify as heterosexuals. One rationale for this concept was to find similarities among heterosexually identified feminists and lesbian-identified feminists in building women-centered community. The notion of a lesbian continuum is used primarily in feminist studies, women studies, lesbian studies, and queer theory.

This continuum conceptualizes lesbian identity as more than desire for particular sorts of sexual intimacies and relationships. In the spirit of the "personal is political," sexual orientation is examined within a feminist framework, and intimate relationships are defined as including much more than sexual intimacy. Furthermore, Rich seeks to give voice to lesbians and women-identified activists as political agents by defining lesbianism as something other than the female counterpart of male homosexuality.

Thus, for Rich, lesbianism is a political, personal, and purposeful commitment that places women in the center and is not dependant upon their relationships to men. Relationships to and connections with other women are the central aspects that Rich uses in defining what it means to be lesbian in a patriarchal society. By defining lesbianism so broadly, Rich aims to reconceive eroticism in female terms. This continuum is also, then, an attempt at redefining sexual and intimate relationships beyond a phallic, goal-orientated conception of sexuality. Joy, empowerment, and self-actualization found in and constructed through being female with other females in resistance to the misogynist construction of what it means to be female are the goals and processes of what Rich means by *being* lesbian.

A positive aspect of this idea is its tendency to call for a more inclusive type of identity politics. Rich's concept encourages organizations to build coalitions across more stringently defined sexual identities. This is important because identity politics has often been exclusionary and less effective as such. However, defining a lesbian as

any woman who is women-identified can dilute the self-affirming effects of identity politics.

One controversial aspect of the lesbian continuum has to do with the mainstream marginalization of lesbians and the silence surrounding their sexuality. Historically, lesbians have been considered invisible and silenced since many of their erotic relationships were categorized as mere friendships that could not be anything more. Many argue that to define lesbianism as women who are women identified, thus including heterosexuals and many nonsexual relationships, at best compromises our insights into and at worst negates the possibility of intimate sexual practices between women. This point becomes even more pertinent when feminist and lesbian theories critique hegemonic sexuality as phallically identified and defined.

Another negative aspect of this idea is that it can be used to justify further marginalizing those who are not considered "acceptable" in their sexual practices. This is problematic throughout communities of minorities. Simplistically, the lesbian continuum can be seen as contributing to the divide between sexual minorities who argue they are no different than anyone else and those who claim difference because of who they are sexually. Furthermore, the potential to undermine the binary categorization of heterosexual and homosexual remains unfulfilled since the boundaries are only drawn differently instead of questioning the assumptions that uphold these categories. In light of these arguments, the lesbian continuum can be seen as further justifying puritanical ideas regarding sexual practice and romanticizing, if not prioritizing, nonsexual attachments. It can also be criticized, as Gayle Rubin (1997) does in an interview with Judith Butler in *Feminism Meets Queer Theory*, as contributing to a feminist rhetoric that condemns sexual difference. Rubin uses "sexual difference" as an alternative for the more typical labels of pervert, deviant, and, more positively, the idea of sexual diversity while emphasizing that these differences are constructed as such by the very patriarchal structures and ideas that feminist theories work to combat.

— Marga Ryersbach

See also Compulsory Heterosexuality; Feminist Ethics; Queer Theory; Radical Feminism

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LEVELS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The word *structure* comes from the Latin verb *struo*, to join together, build, arrange, or order. *Struo* is related to the Greek verb *stornymi*, to spread smooth or level (Rosen 1980: 32). Etymologically, structures are constructed unities that exhibit an internal architecture by virtue of having their component parts smoothed out into levels by the reticulating operations of analysis and synthesis. When these operations are performed over the domain of social relationships, intergroup relations, and social institutions, the result is an analytical model of the levels of social structure. By levels of social structure one means the layered demarcation of the elemental and supervening components of a complex association (however defined analytically) into a series of units of increasing scale and complexity. The differentiated and/or encompassing elements, units, and relations constitute a social ontology offered up as a template for further analysis, explanation, and theoretical integration.

Levels of structure can be found in all the sciences. In biology, the series runs as follows: molecule, cell (subsuming cellular organelles), organ, organism, population, species, community, and biotic environment. Each level incorporates the prior one as its working parts in a new relational configuration and exhibits new emergent properties as a consequence of their dynamics. Although many scientists believe that analysis “cuts reality at the joints”—making levels of structure the ontological building blocks of the world—levels schemes undergo dramatic revision over time. Even determining the number of levels is problematic. In the biological series above, some scientists consider cellular organelles a level and population a sublevel, while others see a confusing mixture of two series, the genealogical and the ecological. Particularly in the social sciences, it is wise to think of levels epistemologically—as analytical efforts to break a complex whole into articulated parts until a base of interacting elements is fixed by postulation.

Levels talk in the social sciences ranges from indistinct hand-waving to well-ordered models of the levels of social structure. The latter efforts hue closely to the implicate order of the biological series above. Most begin with a postulated analytical primitive (either an element or a process) that gives rise to the smallest unit of social structure, which is then “aggregated” or “compounded” into the complete series. Alternatively, the most comprehensive unit is demarcated first and the series unfolds by subdivision. Few concepts qualify for this kind of treatment. The most common are family, territory, role, system, and social relationship. Mixed series may represent synthetic efforts or reveal analytical confusion. A metatheoretical literature now exists to evaluate levels schemes (Kontopoulos 1993; Luhmann 1995). Successful efforts accomplish the following tasks. They

- Demarcate the major units and levels of structure of theoretical interest (the social ontology)
- Explain the emergence of more complex units from the dynamics of the antecedent level(s) (upward structuration)
- Describe the internal relations, processes, and systemic effects at each level (system dynamics)
- Explain how antecedent units are transformed by being integrated into more complex units (downward structuration)
- Use the levels scheme in the explanation of social facts

Five groups of models of the levels of social structure, 13 models in all, are presented next. The 13 were selected for their heterogeneity, influence, and ability to illustrate metatheoretical issues. Levels schemes that include social structure as a level of reality without decomposing it into sublevels unique to itself are omitted from consideration, as will be idiosyncratic schemes that incorporate dialectical or dualistic elements or combine vertical and horizontal planes (e.g., Gurvitch 1950). For a discussion of the relationship between levels talk and theory integration, see Ritzer (1981).

1.1 *Household, village, polis*: Aristotle, *Politics*, 335–322 B.C.

1.2 *Family* (household), *gens* (a descent group like a clan), *phratry* (a union of several gentes), *tribe*, and *polis* (city-state): N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, 1864. Mechanism: federation through religious rites.

Aristotle understood that the household and village were *transformed* by being incorporated into the polis: The household’s constitutive relations—identified by Aristotle as master and slave, husband and wife, and parent and child—were in the polis subject to new principles of justice. Today this transformative process is called “downward structuration” (Kontopoulos 1993). Finding in ancestor worship the wellsprings of the patriarchal authority and social solidarity that were generalized from one level to the next, Fustel de Coulanges showed how the universalism of the polis allowed new kinds of association such as the guild to form. In rites of consecration he identified a key mechanism of “upward structuration.”

1.3 *Horde, family or house, clan, tribe, nation*: Lewis Morgan, *Ancient Society*, 1878. Mechanism: partitioning due to population pressure.

This is virtually the same series as Fustel’s, but geared to the anthropological record and postulating the existence of a formless, sexually promiscuous “horde” as the primordial whole from which the family first emerged by subdivision.

As analytical devices, levels schemes strive to multiply units composed of the same basic substance. The driving force behind them is logical order, however, not descriptive accuracy. The horde, which Émile Durkheim recognized as a theoretical fiction, is a classic case of analytical postulation. Variations of Model 1.3 can be found in Durkheim, Henry Sumner Maine, and Herbert Spencer, all of whom saw segmental social organization giving way over time to territorial organization and the ramiform division of labor.

2.1 *Vill, hundred, shire, kingdom*: Anglo-Saxon England.

2.2 *Commune, canton, district, department*: post-Revolutionary France.

2.3 *Precinct, ward, municipality, county, state, federal government*: American federalism.

Juridical and administrative jurisdictions enclose one another in scope and authority while preserving the relative autonomy of the encapsulated units. Once in place, political parties (and other large-scale corporate groups) can align their units into the prevailing territorial structure. The Chinese Communist Party, for example, organized itself from center to periphery as follows: central committee, regional committee, district committee, and village-level party branch. The last was divided into five groups of cadre, each with its own leader, working in the local peasants' association, the women's association, and so on. One can hardly imagine social structure today in the absence of such intraorganizational relationships as diocese and parish, national headquarters and local chapter, and corporation and subsidiary. Nevertheless, social theorists treat territorial jurisdiction as a constitutional backdrop to social organization. They include it as a structural principle or resource, but concentrate on the inter- and intraorganizational dynamics allayed along its spine. Because political and administrative offices are implicated in hierarchies of caste, class, and estate, some analysts treat territorial unit structures as vehicles of social stratification.

2.4 *Domus* (household: headed by a *paterfamilias*), *vicus* (village: priest), *civitas* (city: bishop), *provincia* (district or principality: archbishop), *communitas totius orbis* (Christendom: Pope): The theocratic order of the *corpus mysticum Christi*, twelfth century.

While piggybacking off the territorial-administrative organization of feudal Europe, this ecclesiastic hierarchy overlays a temporal order with a spiritual one, for the purpose of controlling the former normatively. It represents a paradigm for levels schemes that terminate in an immaterial realm of forms or values that, in some fashion, guides or patterns the social series ascending toward or descending from it.

3.1 *Famille, college* (association of three or more persons of like status), *corps* (union of several *colleges*), *communauté* (local community), *république* (commonwealth): Jean Bodin, *Six livres de la République*, 1576.

3.2 *Familia, collegium* (unitary body or corporation), *civitas* (community), *provincia* (province, governed by an assembly of the estates), *republica* (sovereign state): Johannes Althusius, *Politica*, 1614. Mechanisms: contract and consent.

These are two mixed types of levels scheme. Although both rejoin the territorial scheme of the sovereign state, their heightened emphasis on voluntary associations anticipates the emergence of civil society. *Colleges* include guilds, trading associations, and synagogues, while *corps* amount to federations of such entities extending across provinces. Althusius occasionally proclaims that the supervening units spring from a social compact among delegates representing the units on the prior level.

4.1 *Role, collectivity, institution, society*: Parsons's (1959) "four levels of structural organization."

4.2 *Societal values, institutional patterns, collectivities, roles*: Johnson's (1985) "four levels of social structure."

This is the most widely adopted levels scheme in post-war American sociology. Many sociologists still equate macrosociology with the analysis of institutions, and define institutions as an implicate order of organizations, groups, and status positions such as lawyer and client. This scheme is significant in three respects. First, by making "social institutions" the penultimate level of social structure, it liberated structural analysis from the inclination to privilege either kinship or territorial unit structures. Intermediate levels of structure reside *within* institutions, and the number of levels depends on how authority is delegated in each one. Second, the relative equality of institutions differentiates social structure *horizontally* as well as vertically, evoking the image of a catalog of collectivities displayed in coordinate space. Third, the analytical primitive is a patterned set of social actions, a role, not something decomposable into persons. Since roles are comprised of norms, the entire series can be recast as a descending specification of immaterial forms or values, as Model 4.2 illustrates. Both models envelop the social series in a formative cultural one, following Parsons's cybernetic hierarchy of behavioral, personality, social, and cultural systems.

5.1 *Exchange relations, network structures* (sets of connected exchange relations), *groups* (network structures organized for collective action), *corporate groups* (hierarchies of groups incorporated in a division of labor): Cook and Emerson (1984).

5.2 *Social relationships, social networks, intraorganizational relations, interorganizational relations, societal stratification, the world system*: Prendergast and Knottnerus (1994).

In Model 5.1, network structures arise from power-balancing operations in exchange relations, groups from coalition formation in “negatively connected” exchange networks, and corporate groups from “productive exchange” in “positively connected” network structures, which centralizes power. The distinction between positive and negative connection has been shown by David Willer to be an artifact of experimental procedure. Without that interior scaffolding, Model 5.1 make cuts as qualitative as those in Model 5.2. The latter, a synthetic effort, begins broadly with social relationships, then veers toward political economy, in effect positing the polity and economy as primary institutions. Model 5.2 terminates in the open environment of the world system, rather than in a bounded totality called society.

Social structure has always been understood as a phenomenon of levels. The prevalence of levels talk in the history of social thought indicates the power of analysis to disarticulate, smooth out, and unify the domain of observations, interventions, and reflections on patterned social interaction called the theory of social structure.

Like any simplifying device, models of the levels of social structure can occlude as well as amplify perception. While the paradigm of the implicate order—the series of Chinese boxes of greater scale and inclusiveness—has had a long run, many doubt its applicability to the fluid processes of relationship-formation evident in society today. The most popular metaphor for the implicate order today, “nesting,” suggests an untidy articulation, with significant overlaps between planes. In “messy and refractory” social structures, Harrison White argues in *Identity and Control* (1992), “[T]here is no tidy atom and embracing world, only complex striations, long strings reptating as in a polymer goo, or in a mineral before it hardens.” White draws upon polymer chemistry for metaphors to describe the evolution of the units of social structure he calls disciplines, ties, institutions, and styles. While occasionally calling these “levels,” White’s main point is the obsolescence of the original, architectural metaphor of levels.

Fashioning alternative metaphors matters less to other critics than analyzing social structures as accomplishments of knowledgeable human agents who discover, implement, and legitimate structural principles of hierarchy, incorporation, and/or loose coupling. This subjective point of view has yet to open up the black box of actors’ levels talk, or its derivatives in social theory.

— Christopher Prendergast

See also General Systems Theory; Luhmann, Niklas; Network Exchange Theory

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LÉVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE

Claude Gustave Lévi-Strauss (b. 1908) is the social anthropologist who introduced a new approach, called French structuralism, for the study of kinship, mythology, and art of aboriginal people. Besides anthropology, the new approach has impacted the other social sciences as well as literary, philosophical, linguistic disciplines and the field of comparative religion.

BIOGRAPHICAL AND INTELLECTUAL ITINERARY

Lévi-Strauss was born in Brussels, Belgium, to a French Jewish family as a son of an artist and intellectual. At the age of six he moved with his family to France, where he studied law and philosophy from 1927 to 1931 and frequented the philosophical circle of Jean-Paul Sartre and developed a strong sympathy for Marxism. He had also an extensive exposure to literature and music, both classic and contemporary. After receiving his “aggregation” (a pre-doctoral degree) in philosophy at the Sorbonne in 1931, he taught philosophy for two years in Secondary Schools

(Lyceums). In 1934, he went to teach sociology at the University of São Paulo in Brazil, where he became interested in anthropology and made several expeditions among the tribal societies of Central Brazil. Military service took him back to France in 1939, and in 1941 he immigrated to the United States to teach as a visiting professor at the New School for Social Research in New York City until 1945; the influence of the structural linguist Roman Jakobson during this period marked a turning point in Lévi-Strauss's intellectual itinerary. After the war, Lévi-Strauss returned to France and became an associate director of the Anthropological Museum (Musée de l'Homme) in 1947 and the founder of the influential anthropological journal, *L'Homme*. In 1948, he published *La Vie Familiale et Sociale des Indiens Nambikwara (The Social Life of Nambikwara Indians)* and received a doctorate from the University of Paris. In 1949, he published the seminal work *Les Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté* that was republished in revised form in 1967. The work was eventually translated in English in 1969/1990 as *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* by J. H. Bell, J. R. Von Sturmer, and R. Needham, the latter a professor of anthropology at Oxford University and a frequent critic of Lévi-Strauss; the controversies that surrounded the translation of the work is an indication of the technical complexity of the work as well as the difficulty of accurately rendering the "structuralist" nuances of the French text, especially by scholars of different orientation.

In 1950, Lévi-Strauss became director of studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (until 1974), and in 1952 his *Race et Histoire* was published by the UNESCO (the English translation *Race and History* was published in 1958). He founded the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Sociale du Centre national de la Recherche Scientifique, de l'École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales et du Collège de France, which he directed for 25 years. In 1955, he gained wide recognition with his biographical account, the *Tristes Tropiques* (reissued in new French editions in 1973 and in 1984); in this work he explained the origins of his intellectual itinerary and shared his reflections on the humane qualities of aboriginal cultures, which are very tangible at a stage of rudimentary cultural development. The wide appeal of the book produced various English translations as *A Word on the Wane*, as *Tristes Tropiques*, as *Tristes Tropiques: Life in the Brazilian Jungles*, and as *Tristes Tropiques: An Anthropological Study of Primitive Societies in Brazil*; the book saw various reprints. In 1955, he puzzled anthropologists and folklorists with his essay, "The Structural Study of Myth" (see below), where he offered a novel explanation of the Oedipus myth based on his own interpretation and application of the structural linguistic approach of Jakobson and Troubetzkoy. In 1958, he published a collection of essays that was translated in 1963 as *Structural Anthropology*, where he explains his own brand of structuralism, and

especially his notion of structure and structural methodology. In 1959, he was appointed to the prestigious chair of social anthropology at the Collège de France, where he taught until 1982. In 1962m he continued to revolutionize the field of anthropology with *La Pensée Sauvage* (translated as *The Savage Mind* in 1966 and revised in the French edition in 1968) and *Totémisme Aujourd'hui (Totemism)* showing among other things the rigorous and classificatory nature of the concrete logic of aboriginal people. Lévi-Strauss forays into the concrete logic of aboriginal mind culminated in the four volumes of *Mythologiques (Introduction to a Science of Mythology): Le Cru et le Cuit* (1964, translated as *The Raw and the Cooked*), *Du Miel aux Cendres* (1967, translated as *From Honey to Ashes*), *L'Origine des Manières de Table* (1968, translated as *The Origin of Table Manners*), and *L'Homme Nu* (1971, translated as *The Naked Man*). In this impressive corpus, Lévi-Strauss shows that underlying a great variety of mythological narratives one can identify recurring logical structures that deal with existential issues common to Northern and Southern American Aborigines. In 1973, a second volume of *Anthropologie Structurale (Structural Anthropology)* appeared in French containing theoretical and methodological essays as well as essays on mythology, ritual, and humanities; in the same year he was elected to the Académie Française. In the two volumes of *La Voie des Masques* (1975, reissued in a revised French edition in 1979 and translated as *The Way of the Masks*), Lévi-Strauss dealt with the art, mythology, and religion of the Northwest Coast Indians. In 1983, he published a collection of essays, *Le Regard E'loigné* (translated as *The View from Afar*), and in 1985 *La Potière Jalouse* (translated as "The Jealous Potter, University of Chicago 1988); in the latter book, Lévi-Strauss shows similarities and equivalences in Northern and Southern American Indian myths that deal with themes of marital jealousy, pottery, and origin stories. *Histoire de Lynx* (published in 1991 and translated as *Story of Lynx*) shows how stories of the conflict between the Coyote and Lynx elucidate the role of twins in Amerindian mythology; oppositional dualities of social life are resolved through dualistic processes that underlie origin myths. *Regarder Ecouter Lire* (published in 1993 and translated as *Look, Listen, Read*) is a set of essays on French art, music, and literature and deals with the role of art in Western society. Lévi-Strauss has also published various lectures, interviews (one in 2000), and essays, some of which in cooperation with others. His continuing intellectual vitality is demonstrated by the recently translated essay, "Hourglass Configurations," where he shows that hourglass configurations in shrines and roof frames represent forms of the universe (earth and heaven) that are similar in details in the Far East as well as in America; hence, symbolic transformations are at work not only in mythology but also in architecture. He is currently listed in the Laboratoire de Anthropologie Sociale as honorary professor at the Collège de France, as

honorary director at l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, and l'École Pratique des Hautes Études, as well as a member of the French Academy.

ON DEEP STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURAL METHODOLOGY

One of Lévi-Strauss's central contentions is that since both language and mythology are expressions of the human mind, linguistics can provide a methodology to understand the rules according to which mind structures culture.

From the linguists Ferdinand de Saussure, Roman Jakobson, and Nikolai S. Trubetzkoy, Lévi-Strauss took the notion that the meaning of linguistic units is not intrinsic to each unit but derives from the relationships of similarities and differences among their constituent elements. Language is not just an aggregate of elements, but a structured totality governed by its own internal laws; the "structure" of the language does not refer to empirically observable linguistic patterns but to the functional relationships among their constitutive "elements." It follows that the structure of culture is the principle (or logical model) that accounts for the apparently heterogeneous content of culture; however, structure is not a "form" independent of the content but the content itself apprehended at the level of its logical organization (hence, logical structures are real structures). By focusing on the logic underlying the variety of observable cultural systems, one can see underlying structural similarities, differences, and variations among a variety of sociocultural systems; the rules of transformations of one phenomenon into another or the syntax of their transformations constitutes a second order level of structure (Rossi 1974:90). Underlying structures operate at the subempirical level insofar as they consist of relational similarities or differences among the elementary components of the data. The key issue is, then, what kind of methodology is suited for determining the elementary units of cultural data. We know that the starting methodological point for Lévi-Strauss was linguistics. The large number of words present in any language is based on the combination of a few phonemes—phonemes being the smallest segment of sound by which a native speaker can distinguish one word (meaning) from another: in English, *b* and *p* are two phonemes and *bet*, *pet* are two different words, so *big/pig* and so on). In 1930, Jakobson and Nikolai S. Trubetzkoy showed that the "distinctive features" of phonemes (such as vowels, consonants, and others) are organized in "bundles" of oppositions, like the above example *b* and *p*; it is not sounds as such but the structured combinations of a small number of "distinctive features" of sounds that are the phonological basis of language. Noam Chomsky has argued that there exists a number of complicated rules that govern the formation of phonemic patterns. By analogy (since the issue of the linguistic accuracy of French structuralism is besides

the point) Lévi-Strauss hypothesizes that a myth can be broken down in constituent units (mythemes); the key to understand the overall meaning of the myth is to uncover the way mythemes are organized or relate to each other; the mytheme is the shortest meaningful sentence of the mythological narrative. Through trial and error and intuitive analysis, Lévi-Strauss identifies in the Oedipus myth episodes that overstress family relations (Oedipus marries his mother, Cadmos seeks his sister); he places these elements in column *a*. Lévi-Strauss also detects episodes that underrate family relations (Oedipus kills his father, Eteocles kills his brother); he places these elements in column *b*. Lévi-Strauss also finds episodes describing the killing of monsters that seem to suggest the denial of the mythological origin of humans from underground; these elements are placed in column *c*. Finally, Lévi-Strauss detects names like Labdacos, Laios, and Oedipus that appear to indicate difficulties in standing upright and walking straight, which seems to suggest a mythological origin of humans from the underground; these elements are placed in column *d*. The items located in the four columns make sense only when they are considered in relationship to each other: As in social life, both the overstressing (column *a*) and the underrating of family relationships (column *b*) occur, so both mythological knowledge (humans are born from One, the underground—column *c*) and empirical knowledge (humans are born from two people—column *d*) can co-occur. The logical structure of the myth that appears confusing at the level of the surface content of each column becomes very clear when we focus on the relationships of similarity and difference among the four columns: *a* is to *b* as *c* is to *d*. Social life validates cosmology by the similarity of logical structure, that is, by being self-contradictory in a similar way. If Lévi-Strauss is right, the Oedipus myth is an intellectual device for reconciling contradictions and dilemmas in human experience. The humans that are born from an incest are born from one person (from a woman), since cultural rules prohibit incestual relations. But they are also born from two people, a man and a woman, according to biology and empirical knowledge. Isn't this an elegant solution to the (apparently) problematic relationship between science and religion? The burden of disproof of this kind of analysis rests with Lévi-Strauss's opponents, who must show that different logical analyses produce more parsimonious explanations of the myth. One opposition seems to be truly irreconcilable: structural analysis that searches for logical (and real) structures versus empirico-experimental methodology that is anchored on verifiability criteria of knowledge, and hence, is limited to the study of empirically observable structures. Can the latter methodology ever deal with the deep structural meaning of cultural systems? On what verifiable basis can empirical methodology deny the plausibility of a deep structuring of cultural systems after claiming to have identified marvelous structural

laws in the cosmic and biological realms at the atomic and subatomic level?

LÉVI-STRAUSS AND SOCIOLOGY

Levi-Strauss's fascination with deep structures and cultural codes has found some pioneer echoes in sociology through essays by Terry N. Clark, S. N. Eisenstadt, M. Godelier, Charles Lemert, Fred E. Katz, Talcott Parsons, and Arthur L. Stinchcombe, among others (see Rossi 1982). Notwithstanding a renewed interest in the sociology of culture, no visible substantive work in sociology has followed this early effort, not even after a dialecticized development of the structural mode of analysis (Rossi 1983, 1993). One is hard pressed to find Lévi-Strausseean traces in American sociological analyses, outside of passing references in treatises on the history of sociology and in graduate syllabi on sociological theory. Lévi-Strauss continues to be listed as a representative figure in the tradition of Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss that focused on collective representations and their classificatory functions. In American sociology, Lévi-Strauss is usually portrayed as interested in the cognitive aspects and deep meaning (logical structure) that underlie the overt content of symbolic systems. The prevailing trend in American sociology is to focus on the behavioral aspects of social relationships and even on nonrational aspects of culture. However, the scope of this mode of inquiry is severely limited by the stringencies of "quasiscientific" methodology. Will the inner logic of culture (and of the human agency) ever become part of sociological inquiry if the latter remains anchored on these epistemological foundations?

— Ino Rossi

See also Durkheim, Émile; Religion in French Social Theory; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Semiology

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LIBERAL FEMINISM

Rooted in the humanism of the Renaissance and the person-centered, rights-oriented liberalism that emerged in Western thought during the Enlightenment, liberal feminism first found widespread expression during the nineteenth century in Western societies. Liberal feminism is that strand of women-centered ideas and practices focusing on achieving equal rights between female and male citizens as well as equal opportunities and outcomes for similarly situated females and males while deemphasizing the cognitive and psychological differences between females and males. This strand of feminist theory is the most widely known. Neither separatist nor radical, liberal feminism is fundamentally and sometimes passionately reformist. Liberal feminists work within the system. To what extent they identify with the institutional order and in what ways they work for social change within it are matters that differentiate one grouping of liberal feminists from another.

What puts them together on the same broad part of the political spectrum is their feminist articulation of classically liberal notions. Over the past several centuries, liberalism, with its emphasis on political freedom and citizens' rights, became politically foundational in as well as an antecedent condition of modern Western democracies. Becoming hegemonic during the nineteenth century as a centrist ideology, with socialism to its left and conservatism to its right (Wallerstein 1995:1), liberalism was likely a necessary condition for the first-wave feminism that eventually gained Western women the franchise. Among the latent functions of that first wave of feminism was that it made liberal feminism a more or less given ingredient of modern society (Frazer 1998:52).

Characteristically, even in its liberal versions, feminism has consistently criticized the Enlightenment values giving rise to it. Liberalism may have been a necessary condition for the emergence of a viable women's movement, but it was far from sufficient. The very values that liberals propounded were able to gain popular support in part by ignoring issues of gender injustice as well as racial and other forms of institutionalized inequality. The various rights guaranteed to white male citizens were monolithically withheld from their female counterparts as well as their male nonwhite counterparts. From the start, then, feminism was both enabled and constrained by liberal discourses.

Even today, liberal feminism continues to exhibit an ambivalent relationship with the liberalism that helped to spawn it.

All the while, its core assumptions do remain discernibly liberal. Foremost among them are assumptions about the primacy of the individual, generally articulated in one version or another of individualism; the separation (and thus the separability) of the public and private spheres and of the political and social spheres; the rationality of the self-interested, free-willed citizen; and rights protected impartially under the law and legal processes. From a liberal feminist perspective, what these assumptions amount to are male-centered, male-advantaging precepts that need to be reformed in egalitarian directions so as to have really fair systems. The notion of the individual cannot fairly be bereft of the possibility of pregnancy and birthing any more than it can be bereft of some notion of the common good or the person as a community member; the notion of a private sphere reliably and clearly separable from the public sphere must be chastened so as to enable governments to redress the kinds of violence and abuse that occur in intimate relationships, whether family- and household-based or not; the notion of rationality cannot be gender-inclusive without leaving some room for an ethic of care and practices of caregiving alongside concepts of self-interest and personal autonomy; to a substantial extent the law must be seen as a social institution with historically and culturally specific flaws that have to be remediated in order to promote gender equality and justice.

Similarly problematic are liberal presuppositions that, left uncritically accepted, largely operate against women's collective interests. Paramount among these is the presuppositions of hierarchy, which in turn presupposes an unequal distribution of rewards such as income, honor, and power. In a gender-unjust society, liberal feminists accept these presuppositions, just as they accept the aforementioned assumptions. Yet their acceptance rests on a critical, at times ambivalent, consciousness that in turn fuels their commitment to reformist changes that will make the hierarchies less androcentric and the distribution of rewards less biased in favor of males. Thus, liberal feminists withhold their full support from ideas such as meritocracy while working for social changes that more or less guarantee equality of opportunities and outcomes between women and men. Put differently, liberal feminists largely accept the status quo *except for its gender-biased practices and structures*. Instead of attacking or even rejecting the notion of hierarchy or inequality of outcomes, then, liberal feminists critique the observable gender biases of extant hierarchies and the gender-unequal distribution of opportunities and rewards.

Liberal feminists thus have no fundamental quarrel with well-established liberal notions. Their dissatisfaction lies with the gender biases in the social arrangements of those

societies that are supposed to function as liberal democracies. To that extent, liberal feminists have been the main proponents of such notions as equal pay for equal work, equal standards for admission to postsecondary education, equal funding of females' and males' athletics in schools, and equality of opportunities for jobs, promotions, and benefits, including pensions and other retirement perquisites.

Among feminist theorists, liberal stances are common, if not predominant, in the Northern Hemisphere. Throughout feminist theory, the conceptual and axiological scaffolding of liberalism is widely operative, albeit in reworked terms with different twists. Barrie Thorne's *Gender Play: Girls and Boys at School* (1993) or Martha Nussbaum's *Women and Human Development* (2001), for example, are illustrative. As Mary F. Rogers (2001) pointed out elsewhere with respect to other studies, such works challenge "some fine print on the social contract, not its fundamental terms." Social theory, with its tradition of social critique, readily accommodates such theorizing. Ultimately, liberal feminist theory serves as a corrective to the gendered character of social theory by counteracting its masculinist underpinnings without insistently challenging its heterosexism, ethnocentrism, or class biases. For the most part, liberal feminist theory tends to reflect the outlook of relatively privileged women from European cultural and political traditions, and thus fails to contest social theory at its roots, even while counteracting its gender biases. Put differently, those feminists who identify themselves along more than one axis of oppression appear to be underrepresented among liberal feminist theorists, where heterosexual, middle-class, white-skin, and able-bodied privilege are more or less taken for granted.

Yet liberal feminist theory is far from uniform. Its theoretical variegations lie along a *liberal continuum* built up around *more or less* acceptance of institutionalized hierarchies other than the gender. As Zillah Eisenstein (1981) implies, a liberal feminist continuum includes at least three sets of theorists, namely, *radical liberal* theorists and *status quo liberal* theorists with *progressive liberal* feminist theorists in the middle. To some degree, all these theorists presuppose or even apply liberal notions of "freedom of choice, individualism, and equality of opportunity" while disagreeing about the racial, class, and other biases that they entail (Eisenstein 1981:229). Thorne's and Nussbaum's aforementioned works lie on the middle ground of the liberal continuum, with Nussbaum more firmly positioned among status quo liberal feminists insofar as she explicitly, though not uncritically, invokes universalist values.

Yet full-fledged status quo liberal feminists go much further than that, with the end result that their work gets little attention within feminist theory. Camille Paglia's *Vamps & Tramps* (1994), Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's *Feminism Is Not the Story of My Life* (1996), and Joan

Mandle's *Can We Wear Our Pearls and Still Be Feminists?* (2000) exemplify such theorizing. None of these theorists pays sympathetic attention to lesbians, straight women of color, or any other grouping of women disadvantaged by more than gender. The vocabulary of oppression and domination has no place at this end of the liberal continuum.

At the radical liberal end of the continuum stand those feminist theorists who insist that feminism must be about a great deal more than gender because women make up substantial proportions of nearly every subordinate group in society except prison inmates. What might be called *race-class-and-gender feminists* occupy this part of the continuum. These theorists may address sexuality, age, disability, or other hierarchies, but their main focus is the intersections among race, social class, and gender. Perhaps exemplifying this part of the continuum is Patricia Hill Collins whose work revolves around theorizing an everyday *politics of empowerment* based on resistance to the stereotypes and constraints that African American women, in particular, face. Of late, says Collins (1998), these stereotypes and constraints amount to a *politics of containment* based on less overt, surveillance-driven modes of controlling African American women, whether they be mothers on welfare or professors in academe. Collins (1998:34, 35) also sees racism, mixed with sexism and classism, in current moves toward privatization in the United States as so-called market forces are alleged to be more responsible than policymakers and corporate executives for persistent inequality. With the public sphere more and more functioning as a site of subordination and surveillance, Collins (1998:228, 153) calls for a reoriented and visionary pragmatism as well as critical attention to how oppressive hierarchies are continuously constructed in tandem with one another.

Her focus on the interconnected character of social hierarchies is a hallmark of Collins's work. That concern could move her beyond the liberal continuum, but for the most part it does not. Despite her recurrent attention to social class, sexual orientation, and women of color other than African Americans, Collins does center her framework on African American women and thus around a racially specific grouping of women. That circumstance, plus her failure to challenge hierarchy generically, leaves Collins positioned on the liberal continuum, albeit at its left end.

Most liberal feminist theory lies somewhere between the relative extremes exhibited by sociologists Patricia Hill Collins and Joan Mandle. Regardless of where we look on the liberal feminism continuum, though, challenges to that hegemonic variety of feminist theory abound. These challenges have taken most dramatic shape around postmodernism as an anti-Enlightenment perspective. Further challenges lie with multicultural and postcolonial feminist theorists demanding attention (postmodernist or not) to racial/ethnic and other hierarchies historically created by internal as well as global colonialism. Here works such as

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999) are pivotal. Then, too, theorizing from lesbian (Judith Butler, for example) and psychoanalytic (Jessica Benjamin, for example) perspectives challenges liberal feminist theory. Considered from the vantage point of liberal feminism, these other strands of feminism represent more or less oppositional discourses where liberal feminism represents little more than a critical discourse.

One concern linking these various challenges to liberal feminist theory is their rendering the public/private binary problematic, sometimes problematic enough to warrant discarding the distinction. Carole Pateman (1979) offers one of the most influential, rigorous critiques of this binary. She emphasizes how liberal theorists routinely invoke the "state" in uncritical, taken-for-granted fashion. On that basis, they typically juxtapose the state as an impartial, objective arena anchoring political life with the private sphere as an emotional, subjective arena. Pateman (1979:173) argues that if the political is conceptualized as more than a state-centered arena, the divide between the political and the private spheres dissolves. With it goes the closely related division between the public and the private spheres. Barbara Marshall (1994:9, 10) implies that both binaries function to establish conceptual boundaries around the nation-state and that neither holds up well in the larger problematic concerning the relationship between individuals and their society.

This latter relationship is the generic concern that inspires a great deal of postcolonial as well as lesbian feminist theorizing. Perhaps no other theorist has covered as many bases and carved out a more complex opposition to liberal feminist theory as Shane Phelan, who writes foremostly but far from entirely from a lesbian feminist perspective. The opening sentence of Phelan's first book reads, "Lesbian feminism began with and has fueled itself by the rejection of liberalism." (1989:3) Thereafter, Phelan positions herself among the many contemporary as well as historical thinkers—Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche—whose work is marked as much by their rejection of liberalism as anything else. Like postmodernists and social constructionists, Phelan (1989:4) notes how law and public policy cannot get to the grounds of the institutional order or social life because neither focuses on discourses or language. Worse, liberalism fails to provide any standards, any grounds for articulating the common good, any values capable of illuminating oppression. Its seemingly "neutral rules flow from the denial that a common good beyond the sum of individual desires exists." (Phelan 1989:17) Before long, Phelan (1989:17–18, 20ff.) links liberalism with positivism as systems of thought supposedly promoting impartiality and objectivity.

All of this is more or less standard fare among critics of liberalism. In *Getting Specific* (1994), Phelan adopts a more pointedly postmodernist voice intertwined with her lesbian

feminist one. There she rejects dualistic thinking in favor of an emphasis on liminality, where the boundaries between categories are fluid and unclear. Rejecting the “bait of identity,” Phelan emphasizes persons’ multiple embodied identities and social positions that often entangle them in contradictions that can become the basis of alliances across their supposed differences. Within this framework, the private and the public spheres bleed into one another as outcomes of the discursive systems and institutionalized hierarchies implied in Pateman’s critique. The “private” becomes a sociopolitical fiction that stymies common action and shared commitments while failing to promote citizens’ development and well-being.

Yet Phelan does not entirely reject the private/public distinction. Her theorizing is more radical than that. Explicitly in her earlier work and implicitly in her later work, she abjures any wholesale rejection of theories that distinguish between the public and the private realms. (1989:47) Indeed, she (1989:156) holds that the greatest weakness of liberal theory is the kind of agent it presupposes, namely, “the reasonable, liberal man.” In the end, then, Phelan (1989:139, 155) says that we must “rethink” the public/private distinction and that we need to retain the “liberal *sentiment*” that whets our civic appetites for all the uncertainties and conflicts characteristic of public life in democratic societies.

Phelan’s position reminds us that at its best, critical social theory forswears easy judgments and either/or thinking. So, too, with feminist theory. At its best, it is neither liberal nor radical, neither modernist nor postmodernist, neither psychoanalytic nor Marxian in straightforward, unadulterated ways. Instead, it is variegated to the extent needed to address whatever social complexities and ethical perplexities its promulgators have adopted as their focus. The limitations of liberal feminism hold these and many more lessons that continue to stimulate feminist progress, both within and beyond the academy.

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Benjamin, Jessica; Butler, Judith; Postmodernist Feminism; Radical Feminism

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LIFEWORLD

The lifeworld, or the world of everyday life and commonsense realities, is a concept that comes from the work of phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), and has been developed for sociology by the phenomenological sociologist Alfred Schütz (1899–1959). Schütz was concerned with the domain (the world of everyday life, the commonsense world) in which individuals grapple with the consciousness of others while living in their own stream of consciousness. The lifeworld to Schütz represented an intersubjective terrain in which people both created their social realities and were simultaneously constrained by those social and cultural structures already in place. It was in existence long before our birth, but we do have the power to act back upon it. Furthermore, each of us has our own individual lifeworld, although many of the same elements are common to all actors.

In this domain, people operate with what he calls the “natural attitude.” That is, they take the world around them for granted. They do not doubt its reality or existence until such time as a problematic situation arises. It is only then that they cease to rely on “recipes” for handling routine situations and must develop creative ways of handling the problems they encounter.

There are six basic characteristics of the lifeworld. First, it involves what Schütz labeled as “wide-awakeness” (1973:213), or the state of consciousness during which actors devote all of their resources and attention to living life. Second, the actors accept without question the existence of the lifeworld. Third, and most important to Schütz’s definition of what characterizes the lifeworld, actors do work. Work here is considered any nonphenomenological action taken by the actor with the intent of causing something to happen by virtue of that action. Fourth, the self understood through the work one does comes to be experienced as the total self. Fifth, the lifeworld involves

social actions and interactions that occur in the shared world of communication and social action. Sixth, the timelines of actors intersect with the overarching timeline of society.

Another important social theorist concerned with the concept of the lifeworld is Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). Although Habermas is focally concerned with free and open communication and communicative action more generally, he has also contributed greatly to the concept of the lifeworld. Habermas contrasts the lifeworld, seen as the world from the perspective of the subject acting within it, with the system, or the world from the perspective of an uninvolved observer. Although two different concepts, Habermas does contend that there is only one society, and that the system and the lifeworld are simply different ways of looking at that singular society.

The lifeworld is where speaker and hearer meet (Habermas is especially interested in communication) and where it is possible for them to reach agreement or understanding. There is a wide range of unspoken presuppositions and mutual understandings that must exist and be mutually understood for such communication to take place.

A major concern for Habermas is what he termed “the colonization of the life-world” (1987). This implies that the system and its (formally) rationalized imperatives are increasingly coming to dominate and do violence to the lifeworld. This “violence” against the lifeworld by the system is most clearly evident in the ways in which communication is restricted and increasingly less directed toward a goal of consensus. In turn, this violence also produces a series of “pathologies” and crises within the lifeworld that cause serious social problems.

The goal of the future, according to Habermas, should be a world in which the system and the lifeworld are able to enrich one another (are recoupled) and neither is dominated by the other. The two ways of looking at society need once again, as they were in primitive society, to become intertwined. The easiest way of achieving this goal is promoting more free and open communication and resisting the increasing rationalization forced upon the lifeworld by the system. This action has already been undertaken by many social movements that arose at the borders between the system and the lifeworld. Habermas also suggests implementing “restraining barriers” that restrict the effects of the system on the lifeworld and “sensors,” which would enhance the effects of the lifeworld back on the system. Although he doubts the possibility of saving the lifeworld in the United States, Habermas does hope that Europe has the possibility of creating a world in which both lifeworld and system are able to coexist without doing violence to one another.

— Michael Ryan

See also Habermas, Jürgen; Phenomenology; Schütz, Alfred

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LINDENBERG, SIEGWART

Siegwart Michael Lindenberg was born in Munich in 1941 and educated in both Germany and the United States, receiving an MA in sociology from the Mannheim School of Economics in 1966 and a PhD in sociology from Harvard in 1971. His first faculty position was assistant professor of sociology at Princeton from 1969 to 1973. He then moved to Groningen University, where he is currently professor of sociology. While at Groningen University, he cofounded and codirected the Interuniversity Center for Social Science theory and Methodology (ICS), a major research graduate education center focusing on developing and extending formal social theory, and making that theory relevant to public policy issues.

The range of Lindenberg’s work is broad, including macro-social analyses of revolts and social revolutions, the role of the state in structuring market economies, determinants of group solidarity, and female labor market participation. It also includes organizational-level analyses of cooperation and conflict in contractual relationships, governance of employment relationships, and contributions to the new institutional economics. Finally, it includes microsocial-level analyses of preferences and preference formation, selective attention, and short- versus long-term rationality. Despite the diversity of these topics, Lindenberg’s body of work is based on a tightly integrated theoretic core, and thereby demonstrates the broad scope of this body of theory. The key ingredients of this core are a theory of bounded rationality (Lindenberg 2001a) and a theory of interdependencies and groups (Lindenberg 1997). There is only room to present the former in limited detail.

His analyses depart from the core assumption of behavior as goal-oriented activity, an orientation that places him within the theoretic domain of rational choice. He fleshes out this conception in ways that represent a stark departure from the rational maximizing models of neoclassical economics. A consistent theme running through all of Lindenberg’s work is the challenge of reconciling rigor with realism. That is, how to construct models simple enough to remain analytically tractable while not being so unrealistic as to be trivial. To provide guidance in striking an appropriate balance, he introduced what he terms the “method of decreasing abstraction” (Lindenberg 1992a), a

theory construction principle that underlies much of his work. This principle is based on two insights. First, it is incorrect to merely dismiss the economist's conception of rationality as incorrect, because there are identifiable contexts within which it fits quite well, including some of the traditional explanatory domains of economics and even some areas of traditional concern to sociologists. Instead, analyses should identify the contexts in which these simpler, unbounded, conceptions of rationality are appropriate (e.g., generally conditions where information is abundantly available and motives are instrumental) versus contexts in which they break down and more complex bounded concepts of rationality are needed. Second, he emphasizes the need to do more than merely contrast the (generally) unrealistic instrumentally oriented economic view of social actors with an equally (generally but not always) unrealistic stereotype of social actors as oversocialized creatures who absorb their beliefs and preferences from those around them. Instead, he proposes a sequential form of analysis in which simple rational maximizing approaches are the models of first resort. They are given this position of priority because of their superior tractability. If they fail to provide an adequate explanation, as can generally be expected to be the case, the analyst does not then switch to an oversocialized view of actors, but instead draws from a hierarchically arranged menu of options for making the model both more complex and more realistic. In essence, this menu involves fleshing out the vague conception of bounded rationality propounded by Herbert Simon, based on specific mechanisms by which rationality departs from simple optimizing. It is in identifying these mechanisms that Lindenberg made his contributions to microsocal analysis, and it is in applying these principles to larger-scale phenomena that he has made important contributions to organizational and macrosocial analysis. Having these fleshed-out conceptions of bounded rationality also allows one to judge how bounded even the simplest model must be in any particular analysis (using what he calls "the principle of sufficient complexity"; see Lindenberg 2001a).

One mechanism identified by Lindenberg as underlying bounded rationality is selective attention, for which he proposed a theory of "framing" (2001a). Though the theory defies brief exposition, the essential idea is that the multiple goals that could potentially govern behavior compete for control. For example, goals such as earning money, enjoying leisure, helping friends, and fulfilling religious ideals may offer conflicting guides to action. The goal that wins this contest moves to the foreground and thereby determines the frame-governing action, including determining what aspects of the situation are relevant (i.e., selective attention) and what pieces of knowledge become mobilized. As a result, the orientation of action is self-seeking or altruistic, cooperative or competitive. However, the subordinate goals do not wholly lose influence, for

depending on their weight relative to the dominant goal, the subordinate goals influence the selection of alternatives, thereby skewing choices in a predictable way from exclusive pursuit of the dominant goal to the direction of the subordinate goals.

This theory of framing has been tested in a variety of contexts, and also provides the basis for analyzing other aspects of bounded rationality, including orientations toward short- or long-term rationality, which is treated as determined by whether the contest to control framing is won by long- or short-term-oriented goals. Of particular interest are three "master frames," that is, abstract dominant goals. The strongest such frame is the *hedonic* frame (with the goal "to feel good/better"), followed in strength by the *gain* frame (with the goal "to improve one's scarce resources"). The a priori weakest frame is the *normative* frame (with the goal "to act appropriately"). A stronger frame will displace an a priori weaker frame unless the latter is supported by social, structural, or institutional flanking arrangement. This allows a new look at institutional analysis (see Lindenberg 1992b). This theory of framing also provided the basis for a more nuanced theory of intrinsic motivation than that which has dominated the social psychological literature (Lindenberg 2001b).

A second basic mechanism upon which Lindenberg focuses is preference formation and change (the so-called theory of social production functions, SPF; see Lindenberg 2001a). Like many of Lindenberg's theories, this takes the form of a hierarchy, in which each level represents resources for higher level goals. The highest-level *substantive* goals are universal, including preferences for subjective, physical, and social well-being. These resemble Gary Becker's concept of general preferences, which are also seen as part of the human condition. Below the highest-level goals are levels of (socially determined) instrumental goals, the most important of which are multifunctional (for example, they serve both physical and social well-being, such as a good partner relationship). Individuals are assumed to seek "improvement" in goal realization rather than "maximization," which renders social reference points essential for goal pursuit. For this reason and because of the socially determined instrumental goals, most preferences are grounded socially rather than psychologically, changing with social conditions. In fact, his theory of bounded rationality can be seen as a theory of "social" rationality (as opposed to "natural" rationality). Though as presented in this manner, Lindenberg's approach to preference change may appear excessively abstract, its applicability to explain macrosocial phenomena is nicely illustrated by the explanation it and his theory of framing provide of revolts and social revolutions (Lindenberg 1989). The basis for revolution, he argues, is created by a state crisis—generally including a fiscal crisis—in which the social production functions are changed to the detriment of multiple groups,

eventually producing a shift of frame. Revolution then becomes, at first, not the product of collective action organized at the group level, but instead, parallel sets of individual collective actions, thereby explaining how revolutions can appear centrally coordinated in the absence of unified leadership or control. In this way, Lindenberg offers a theoretic account of macrolevel social change that is grounded in microlevel social action and cognitive processes, combining action and structure within the one theoretic account.

— Douglas Heckathorn

See also Social Movement Theory; Social Rationality; State

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LOGOCENTRISM

The term *logocentrism* is derived from the Greek word *logos*, which means word, speech, or reason. The term most commonly refers to philosophy's relentless search to find true meaning within the realm of theory and ideas. Concomitant with this search is a disdain for the material

world of practice. Synonymous with logocentrism is phonocentrism (the favoring of speech over writing) and the metaphysics of presence (the belief in a reliable, apparent relationship between signifier and signified). The French thinker Jacques Derrida (b. 1930) (along with his deconstructionist followers) developed the concept of logocentrism in an effort to critique, relativize, and contextualize Western philosophy.

One of the main features of the structuralist approach to society and philosophy, as advocated by thinkers such as Claude Lévi-Strauss (b. 1908) and Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), is the discovery of binary oppositions that organize life and how we understand it. Examples of this are reason/superstition, order/chaos, male/female, and so forth. In each one of these binaries, one term is dominant over the other, adding a hierarchical dimension to the structuralist approach. This privileging of one term over the other is another way in which logocentrism is understood.

Logocentrism is not only the privileging of one idea or social category over another but also the favoring of one word over another word, which may imply the favoring of one kind of reasoning or argumentation over another. The structuralists, along with the rest of philosophy and science since Plato, have distanced their writings from literature by claiming to place an authoritative meaning behind the language they use. Reading science or philosophy then becomes theological in the sense that we are constantly in search of what the author "really meant." Given the ambiguities that exist when a reader independently interprets a text, philosophy has always favored speech over the written word, viewing the latter as an unfortunate necessity. In a lecture, for example, one can seemingly explain, field questions, and clarify with ease. Philosophy has always operated in the binary hierarchy of speech over writing but has never realized that both are equally subject to the whims and limitations of language. Meaning can never be truly and reliably expressed if one plays with language (whether spoken or written) enough. This deconstructs yet another binary that has always been assumed as true, namely, meaning over language. Inextricably linked with logocentrism, Derrida calls this disdain for the written word and favoring of the speech act phonocentrism.

Logocentrism implies that the binary oppositions that organize our lives are reliable and descriptive of how things really are. For example, consider the West/East dichotomy. The West has often been associated with progress, science, reason, and culture, while the East is often characterized as backward, mystical, superstitious, and natural. This method of understanding the world has been called the metaphysics of presence. In other words, some form of putatively pure presence (e.g., speech or the male genitalia) is assumed to be superior to its purported binary opposite (e.g., writing or the female sex organs). According to deconstructionists, this metaphysics has always been the basis of philosophical

and scientific thinking. While this mode of thought provides a very easy way to process and view the world, it never adequately describes the complexities of society, and it arbitrarily constructs oppressive hierarchies.

The metaphysics of presence can also be criticized on an even deeper level. If one says, "I exist, here and now," one vocally affirms one's presence. However, there is a minuscule period of time between the thought and its utterance. Therefore, words (signifiers) can never really be descriptive of any particular present (signified). We assume the two different presents as one for sanity's sake, but this is indicative of our desire for coherent and reliable descriptions that can sometimes lead us astray, as exhibited in the West/East example. It is for these reasons that the poststructuralists such as Derrida have aimed to deconstruct and displace the metaphysics of presence, realizing its arbitrary, limited, and oppressive nature.

The exposure of the logocentric nature of philosophy not only reveals the favoring of meaning over language, presence over absence, and speech over writing but also a slew of other hierarchical binary oppositions. Derrida aims to upset these hierarchical relationships by showing that each term is equally necessary, rendering the binary questionable for any descriptive or epistemological purposes. In his view, the two terms of a binary opposition define themselves against each other (which he calls supplementarity), and any hierarchy is therefore merely arbitrary. Derrida favors language, writing, the absent, the empty, punning, metaphor, and wordplay over the absolutism of philosophy in its attempts to discover and describe things like reason, progress, and spirit.

The concepts of logocentrism, phonocentrism, and the metaphysics of presence have all only recently been developed, as the poststructuralist school of thought needed a vocabulary to describe the conditions it sought to critique. However, these terms are subject to the same metaphysics they aim to deconstruct; they too are mere words, subject to the frivolity of language, which can never really adequately describe or represent a true reality. Thinkers like Derrida are aware of this, though. The exposure and deconstruction of logocentrism is not meant to be another grand "end all" narrative of philosophy. It simply aims to heighten our awareness of the world and the methods we use to understand and describe it.

— Zachary R. Hooker and James M. Murphy

See also Derrida, Jacques; Deconstruction; Lévi-Strauss, Claude; Postmodernism; Poststructuralism; Saussure, Ferdinand de; Structuralism

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LORDE, AUDRE

Poet, social critic, activist, teacher, and warrior are some of the words that have been used to describe Audre Lorde (1934–1992). Born in New York City to West Indian parents, Lorde's ideas have become crucial to feminist theory and women's studies. As an African American, lesbian feminist, Lorde was marginalized in a variety of communities. Thus, she spent her life fighting against marginalization and the practices that silence marginal voices.

Lorde attended Hunter College from 1951 to 1959, where she majored in literature and philosophy. She earned her master's degree in library science from Columbia University. In 1968, she left her position as head librarian at the University of New York to accept the position as poet-in-residence at Tougaloo College in Mississippi. There, she published her first volume of poetry, *The First Cities*. Later in her career, she held the post of Thomas Hunter Chair of Literature at Hunter College.

Along with her poetry, Lorde wrote much about the sexism in mainstream white culture, African American culture, and in feminist and lesbian movements. Her prose emphasized the importance of stronger voices for black women in general, and all marginalized groups in particular. Lorde cofounded Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press with Barbara Smith, which explicitly focused on publishing works by women of color. She organized the Sisterhood in Support of Sisters in South Africa, established the St. Croix Women's Coalition, and helped to build coalitions between Afro-German and Afro-Dutch women. Lorde was married for eight years and had two children, Elizabeth and Jonathon. She died in 1992 of breast cancer. Shortly before her death, she took the name Gambda Adisa, Warrior: She Who Makes Her Meaning Known, in an African naming ceremony. When she died, she was living in St Croix, Virgin Islands, with her life partner. Over her lifetime, she had won many honors and awards, and since that time she has had literary awards and activist organizations named in her honor.

One can best become acquainted with the themes in Lorde's work through her biomythography, *Zami: A New Spelling of My Name* (1982). Lorde created the term

biomythography to describe how her own life story connects to history, biography, and personal memories. In this work, one learns how Lorde came to develop an ethics of reflexive action and how she regularly sought to break the silences often imposed upon marginalized social groups. In this work, Lorde also challenges static sexual binaries. A superficial analysis of her work can lead one to assume that she is promoting the sort of sexual essentialism that is found in some of Adrienne Rich's work. However, while Lorde does value women-centered relationships, she does not do so at the expense of attributing universal characteristics to members of any human group.

Sister Outsider (1984) is a compilation of some of Lorde's most important essays. These essays are central to contemporary feminist theory and other work concerned with social justice. From this volume, the essay "Poetry Is Not a Luxury" is a standard citation for many who contend that poetry, prose, and other creative forms of self-expression interconnect with political activism and self-reflection. "Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power" is another work that is widely cited in both feminist and queer theory. In this essay, she examines the power that can be found when one embraces one's sexuality. Lorde purposefully uses the word *erotic* because of the debates, then and now, concerning women's sexuality. In feminist theory, there is the contention that sex, pornography, and thus the erotic can never be an avenue of liberation because these terms and actions are defined within a patriarchal and thus misogynist context. As such, there can be no strength found by dwelling in a sexualized body. However, Lorde reclaims the erotic as it is derived from its Greek root, *eros*: "the personification of love in all its aspects—born of Chaos, and personifying creative power and harmony. When I speak of the erotic, then, I speak of it as an assertion of the life force of women" (1984:55). For Lorde, the erotic fuses women's creative powers with their sexuality, making women-identified love a source of empowerment instead of subordination.

Another crucial and often cited essay is "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House." This essay is used by some feminists to discuss the complexities of agency within a postcolonial framework. She argues here that one cannot expect to destabilize and critique the hegemonic culture and its oppressive forces by using the very tools that this culture has promulgated. In exploring this issue, she points to the unacknowledged racism that had become a part of feminist academic practice, and appeals for more inclusive, affirming visions of feminist theory. She argues for valuing differences and embracing the "other" when building communities, and for a more reflective commitment to the practices of living the motto: "the personal is political."

While Lorde thought of herself foremostly as a poet, her prose is important because it grapples with the complexities of oppression. *The Cancer Journals* (1980) and *Burst of Light* (1991) bring to the fore the question of how politics

and structures of power frame our perceptions and, thus, our responses to diseases such as breast cancer. Lorde challenges our common practice of hiding disease and its after-effects. She challenges the cultural dictates about how women should look and act during and after illness, and works, again, to bring voice to those unable to speak.

Lorde's work continues to influence social theory. For example, in *The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics*, Arthur Frank (1995) draws on Lorde's essays about her experience of cancer to illustrate "quest narratives" and their ethical possibilities. He builds upon her call for voices as well as her idea of biomythography. He names the latter "automythology," contending that metaphor and storytelling have in them the power to heal and, therefore, even the most challenging stories must be heard. Allan Johnson (2001) is another who uses Lorde's ideas. In *Privilege, Power, and Difference*, he discusses the complexities of privilege and oppression, and like Lorde, emphasizes the taken-for-granted paths we walk in maintaining the institutions that continue to legitimate inequitable social structures.

The ease with which Lorde's essays, poems, and theory translate into disciplines besides women's studies and feminism is testimony to her keen dedication to promoting social justice and unearthing practices of oppression and silencing. Noteworthy, in particular, is how she contributes to postmodernist and postcolonial genres.

— Marga Ryersbach

See also Essentialism; Postcolonialism; Radical Feminism

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LUHMANN, NIKLAS

Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998) was a German sociologist who gained worldwide reputation for his theory of social

systems. He studied and received a doctoral degree in law, started his professional career in public administration, and became a professor of sociology in Bielefeld—one of Germany's younger reform campuses—in 1968. His devotion to systems theory connects him with Talcott Parsons, who he came to know while studying public administration in Harvard from 1960 to 1961. It is important to stress that Luhmann's understanding of social systems has only a little in common with Parsons's concepts. The reception of systems theory in American sociology is guided by the critique of functionalism in the 1960s and later by Habermas's reading of Luhmann. Whereas earlier controversies have led to the rejection of functionalist thought, Habermas quite unjustifiably downgrades Luhmann's social theory to a special tool suitable for analyzing functional subsystems of society (in contrast to what Habermas calls "life-worlds"), disregarding his attempt to develop a social theory that follows Schutz's (1932) phenomenological sociology.

There are two important lines of argument that explain Luhmann's relation to Parsons and Schutz. The first concerns the theoretical and methodological status of "meaning" and "understanding," the second is the problem of intersubjectivity. Even though both Parsons and Schutz claimed that it was the perspective of the actor that should guide sociological research, Schutz disputed that Parsons's theory was an analysis *adequate to meaning* (Schutz and Parsons 1977:57ff.). Phenomenological sociology and its interpretive variants have stressed against structural functionalism that sociological explanations must aim at meaningful adequacy. It is hardly known that Luhmann clearly supports Schutz's side in his discussion of Parsons and tries to develop a theory that will help interpretive sociology to find a way of making generalizable observations of modern society.

For Luhmann, there can be no doubt that sociological theories will inevitably lead to some kind of alienation of meaningful first-order expressions because in research individual motives must be subsumed under more general categories to be part of sociological explanations. While many social scientists continue to use Weber's problematic ideal-type concept, Luhmann (1990:53ff.) believes that the interpretation of action as a means-ends-relation is a far too special and selective view of human behavior to be able to constitute a basic analytical tool. Undoubtedly, the causal relation between means and ends provides evidence to the observer, but it is not fundamental enough to reconstruct the broad ways in which meaning appears in the social world. Instead, Luhmann sees the attribution model of social action as it is applied in social psychology as suitable for achieving meaningful *and* causal (i.e., generalizable) adequacy in sociological research. This model yields four types of conduct out of the interaction of internal versus external, and stable versus variable interpretation. Internal attributions of behavior will appear as action based for example on ability

and/or effort. External attributions are interpreted as "experiences" of the world, for example as luck or fate. Hence, social action is not an ontologically, unquestioned given object of sociological research but a first-order interpretation based on the internal attribution of conduct. It is for this reason that Luhmann (1995:137ff.) places his level of analysis on social systems, or, to be more precise, on communication instead of social action.

From Luhmann's point of view, systems theory helps distinguish between the mental level, on the one hand, and the social level, on the other hand. This clear distinction reminds us that sociological explanations are—as Weber and Durkheim told us—based on the social rules that govern the attribution of meaning. Mental idiosyncracies are of no interest to sociology. Therefore, the advantage of using systems theory appears as methodological—not only by providing a clear-cut distinction between the social and the mental level but also by breaking down, as Weber had intended by his notion of "social relations," the complex object of "society" into smaller units of observation, which Luhmann calls different kinds of social systems: face-to-face interactions, formal organizations, and functional subsystems of society. Such a theoretical use of the term *system* has nothing in common with Parsons's notion of "action as a system."

Nevertheless, Luhmann's solution of the problem of intersubjectivity must also be understood in the context of the discussions between Parsons and Schutz. From Durkheim, sociology has inherited the difficult task of explaining the social by the social. Even today, there is a lot of uncertainty about this task as sociologists do not seem to have clear-cut distinctions that identify the social as the social and distinguish it from the nonsocial. At first sight, it seems surprising that it should be the phenomenological tradition that could help overcome this difficulty. Husserl's and Schutz's discussion of intersubjectivity is clearly oriented to the self-contained realm of consciousness. From this phenomenological concept of meaning, the problem of intersubjectivity can only be solved by referring to social typifications that selectively represent subjective meaning. However, on this basis, the social can neither be distinguished from the nonsocial nor can the level of intersubjectivity be revealed.

Therefore, Luhmann takes Parsons's side against Schutz in this question and reinterprets phenomenologically the Parsonian distinction between the psychic and the social system. Both systems constitute two separate levels of meaning. Therefore, the distinction between psychic and social systems is not—as in Parsons's AGIL-scheme—meant analytically but rather empirically: Luhmann (1995:12) assumes that there are psychic and social systems in the real world. Both consciousness and communication are based on meaning, but each has its own logic and dynamic. Only communication—and not consciousness—forms the

desired “intersubjective” level of the social at which sociological explanations must be found. This solution of the intersubjectivity problem makes obsolete the struggle between “subjective” and “objective” terminologies. It is closely linked with the tradition of objective hermeneutics and Bourdieu’s analysis of habitus as incorporated social rule structures (Schneider 1991).

Luhmann’s strictly phenomenological understanding of meaningful psychic and social systems makes it inevitable to conceptualize both levels as autopoietically closed systems *at the level of meaning*. Autopoietic closure refers only to meaning, not generally to causal influences from outside. This distinction matches Weber’s stress on keeping apart the meaning attributed to behavior and other causal influences on behavior for a complete sociological explanation. As Luhmann (1973:195; 1995:166) never grew tired of underlining, communication-based interactions and organizations are open to external (social, psychological, biological, chemical) conditions and causal influences (e.g., class and educational distributions). From this meaning-based point of view, it is the distinction between meaning and causal influences that opens the realm of genuine sociological analysis.

At the same time, causality itself is an interpretive instrument of social action, not an objective feature of an ontologically given external world. Thus, causality has a twofold meaning in sociological research (Luhmann 1970). On the one hand, there are “objective” causal influences on social action as measured by scientists. On the other hand, it refers to meaningful causal attributions in a situation. Even though there has been widespread criticism of the term *autopoietic closure*, it was rarely considered that this category matches one of the major results of phenomenological theory discussions of the 1960s: sociology interprets a social world that is meaningful. As a selective means of ordering human experience, meaning constitutes sociology’s only way of making contact to the social world.

Luhmann’s concept of understanding follows Schutz, who had objected against Weber’s methodology that ideal-type understanding is not a privilege of the social scientist. Rather, in everyday life, actors themselves apply interpretive schemes to grasp the meanings of what they do. They possess numerous recipes for responding to each other, but could not explain the inherent knowledge stocks as theories to an observer. Luhmann integrates this idea into his concept of communication. He does not abstract from the perspectives and orientations of the actors. On the contrary, he insists on practical first-order understanding as the object of sociology. Accordingly, communication consists of three combined elements: utterance, information, understanding. The meaning of behavior is constituted by the *communicative* act of *understanding* that follows the actor’s *utterance of information* (Luhmann 1995:139ff.). Selective understanding constitutes meaningful social rules

that help actors build up certainty about what to expect in the social world. Luhmann defines meaning phenomenologically as a means of selection. As has been noted recently, his stress of the *selective* character of understanding shows an amazing similarity to developments in expectancy-value models that aim at predicting human behavior in social research.

Luhmann’s postulate to ground sociological analysis in communicative attributions paves the way for theoretical and empirical generalizations. He makes three basic statements on the empirical distribution of practical first-order interpretations of behavior: First, in the course of societal evolution, there is a general trend towards more internal attributions, so that today even most sociologists believe that it is quite natural to regard “social action” as the unquestioned object of research. The reason for this is obvious: In modernity, we are increasingly used to see humans as shaping the world. Especially formal organizations are based on the assumption that any kind of conduct can be interpreted as decisions so that people can be held responsible. Whatever kind of causalities and strains our conduct may underlie, the basic trend in modern times is our assumption that the social world is constituted by human action. Attributions to nature and god do not disappear completely but require a highly specialized social context to reach support.

It would be a mistake to assume that all actors can actually shape the world according to their intentions in situations that are attributed internally. Luhmann has always been skeptical towards voluntaristic reifications. The internal attribution of meaning as responsible action is just one suitable way of interpreting the social world. Therefore, freedom does not indicate the absence of causal strains upon human conduct or the final appearance of voluntarism in the social world. Rather, Luhmann sees freedom as a mere correlate of this general trend towards the praxis of internal attribution. It is a reflex of social structure, not the rise of human emancipation from external influences, that makes us describe ourselves as “free individuals.” The recent discussion of *individualization* reflects just one more step in this direction. This step seems to concern especially the roles of women who increasingly join the world of educational and work organizations.

Second, in modernity, interpretation of conduct depends on the context of media of exchange. For example, conduct that appeals to “truth” leads to external attributions as experience for both Ego and Alter. We believe that truth must be found by scientists, not produced by social action. In scientific discussions, we will publicly discuss competing accounts of truth while we assume quite naturally that the reason for rival concepts is not our dislike or hate of each other but rather our belief that the rival has not reached the externally given instance of truth. In contrast, conduct in the functional area of “power” accounts for interpretations as action for both Ego and Alter because political

communication (and organizational behavior generally) aims at collectively binding decisions, which, as action, aims at determining ways of action by citizens and members (Luhmann 1997:332ff.).

Third, as Luhmann (1973) shows in a major investigation in the German civil service, attributional preferences and “styles” are distributed according to hierarchical positions in organizations and, therefore, class specific. Civil servants were asked to determine in what they saw the reasons for their own and their colleagues’ promotions or the absence of promotions. More specifically, the interviewees had to locate the perceived causes of promotions according to the Heider attribution model. The general result of this study showed that servants were more inclined to attribute promotions internally the higher their position, success, upward mobility, satisfaction, and positive attitudes towards the organization were. Those who reached higher levels prefer internal attributions of their professional careers as resulting from effort and ability. The lower the position, the more servants tended to interpret their life course as externally dominated by fortune, chance, and conduct of others they cannot control—a tendency that has recently found support in longitudinal mobility research.

Luhmann does not, as Parsons might have, take this result to be a proof of the view that in modern society, “effort makes a difference.” He preferred to refrain from normative statements of this kind and was content to interpret his findings on German civil servants as supporting attribution theory, which predicts that, just as sociological theory does, attributional preferences are not randomly distributed in society but rather in a socially structured way. It is the elaboration of such “subjective” meaningful preferences that Weber wanted sociologists to pursue by combining social regularities with meaningful rules. From this point on, more theoretically informed empirical investigations would have been desirable. However, Luhmann was not a great fan of the messy business of data collection, and chose to further develop his communication theory and his theory of society.

The term *structure* refers to another dimension of Luhmann’s system theory constituting another concept completely different from the Parsonian tradition. Even today, many social theorists use the terms *system* and *structure* in similar ways. Parsons’s system theory was concerned with structures and functions necessary to sustain system maintenance. Systems were considered as stable relations of elements in functional interdependence. In this view, structures guarantee the order of the social world and deserve primary sociological interest.

Luhmann’s system theory takes a radically differing point of view by downgrading the importance of the term *structure* by defining social systems as meaningful systems of communication. Social systems are not based on structures, but on event-based communicative elements (usually

reduced to “action”) that exist only for a moment and then disappear. Therefore, the term *structure* has only a derived status in his systems theory (1995:278). Meaningful structures are produced and reproduced by social attributions of experience and action. In Luhmann’s understanding of social systems, communicative events have a kind of “ontological” priority in comparison to structures. This is why he considers his theory of event-based social systems as poststructuralist. Structures exist in social action as meaningful expectations of expectations; there are no structures beyond those expectations that we can experience in the phenomenologically given world. The question as to whether structures are stable in time or in how far they are overlapping in society cannot be answered theoretically but must be analyzed empirically. There is no reason why certain rule expectations should not have a high degree of social and temporal generalization and others may underlie rapid social change. For social theory, it is important not to decide this matter in general terms or, as Parsons did, to maintain contrafactually that there must be more generalized structures if modern society is to be more and more differentiated. Instead, Luhmann wants to provide categories suitable for more detailed empirical research. In contrast to Parsons, Luhmann (1995:75ff.) maintains that (national) societies are not and need not be based on a stable value consensus. On the contrary, our contemporary social world can only be understood as a world society that must deal with the problem of its permanent disintegration, widespread exclusion, and ecological risks never known in this way before. Thus, sociological theory cannot normatively warrant persistence of social order. This makes his social theory highly suitable for comprehending our times in the sense of the new world disorder.

Against the new structuralism as the mainstream in empirical sociological research, Luhmann insists with Weber and Schutz on the meaningful character of structures in the social world. Therefore, interpretive schemes are the primary object of sociological research. However, this kind of reconstructive research into social attribution practices has so far mostly taken place in cognitive psychology.

Unfortunately, Luhmann’s (1982) theory of social differentiation belongs to the best known parts of his work in Anglo-Saxon sociology. Much more than Parsons, he views the functional differentiation of society as its primary feature. Some scholars consider Luhmann’s theory of modernity and his seeming obsession with functional differentiation as one-sided. Luhmann was not particularly interested in class stratification, social inequality and inter-generational mobility. He did not dispute that there is still widespread inequality in modern society, but, for Luhmann, (1997:1055ff.), social stratification will hardly help in elaborating upon a general theory of modernity.

See also General Systems Theory; Habermas, Jürgen; Parsons, Talcott; Phenomenology; Schütz, Alfred; Social Structure; Verstehen; Weber, Max

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During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, he was nominated minister of culture in the government of Imre Nagy. Following the Soviet intervention, he was first interned in Romania, then under the condition of "internal emigration" in Budapest. He died in 1971.

Lukács's volume of essays, *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), was the founding text of a new interpretation of the meaning of the Marxian legacy, usually referred to as "Western" Marxism. In it he radically criticised the positivist-scientific interpretation of Marx's theory, prevalent both in the 2nd and the 3rd Internationale. Marxism, for Lukács, offered a solution to the unresolved dilemmas of the Enlightenment and German Classical Idealism, dilemmas that were ultimately rooted in the internal contradictions of bourgeois society. These seemingly abstract speculative difficulties cannot be solved in theory alone, but must be overcome in a practice that radically transcends the horizon of this society. Marxism is the theory of the revolutionary praxis of the proletariat that can abolish its situation as a dominated and exploited class only by abolishing the reified logic of historical development that had reached its culmination in capitalism. Under conditions of reification, individuals and their collectivities become dependent objects of the power of those very social conditions and institutions that they themselves have created in their social—but not collectively organised—activities. Their fate is determined by the laws of separated institutional spheres—first of all the laws of the market, over which they have no control. Overcoming such a situation of reification requires the development of an adequate ("imputed") class consciousness. This class consciousness cannot be the mere reflex, or the simple recognition of the economic interests, of the working class. It can only develop in a progressive fusion of the material practice of class struggle and revolutionary theory.

Lukács's pre-Marxist works dealt almost exclusively with problems of literature and aesthetics. He treated, however, the problems of artistic modernity in the context of a broadly conceived cultural crisis. Modernity dissolved any shared framework of a common culture, able to orient the everyday life of the individuals. As such, it was impossible for individuals to endow their life with stable, unique meanings and to achieve genuine mutual understanding. At the same time, in his works of this period—primarily in *The History of the Development of the Modern Drama* (1911) and in *The Theory of the Novel* (1916), he gave new direction to the sociology of literature. He emphasised that the social-historical significance of a work is not primarily located in its explicit or implicit "message," in its meaning-content, but in its form, in the way that it creates this meaning. In the later book, he disclosed the historical grounds and significance of the shift from the classical epic to the novel as the leading genre of a "world abandoned by God." He also followed up the fundamental generic transformation

LUKÁCS, GYÖRGY

György/Georg Lukács (1885–1971) was a Hungarian philosopher, one of the leading theorists of Western Marxism. Born in 1885 Budapest, he spent long stretches before and during World War I in Heidelberg, Germany, on the fringes of Max Weber's intellectual circle. Lukács returned to Hungary in 1917 and joined the newly formed Communist Party in 1918. In 1919, he became responsible for cultural affairs during the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic. After the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, he emigrated to Vienna, Berlin, and after 1933 to Moscow. Following the sharp condemnation of his theoretical and political views by the Comintern in 1928, he completely withdrew from direct political activity. He returned to Hungary in 1945, but with the consolidation of the Stalinist regime there, he was again forced from public life.

of the novel form from Cervantes to Dostoyevski as aesthetic solutions to the ever more tragic quest of its hero, the “problematic individual” who is in search of a meaning for his or her own life.

After his Marxist turn, Lukács conceived these cultural antinomies as expressions of much deeper contradictions in human historical development. The concept of reification offered a key to the disclosure of this ground and simultaneously opened up a perspective upon the possibility and conditions of its overcoming.

Reification in Lukács has certain affinities with the Marxian concept of alienation, elaborated primarily in Marx’s early manuscripts, at this time unpublished and unknown. Lukács himself arrived at this conception through a philosophical generalisation of the Marxian theory of commodity fetishism that he connected to Weber’s critical notion of formal rationalisation.

Reification is the central structuring category of capitalist society. It is both an objective and subjective phenomenon. Objectively, it refers to the transformation of the social world of human relations and institutions into a “second nature” as a realm of dead objectivity with its own laws independent of the will and consciousness of the subjects. Intimately connected with the ever-expanding division of labour and capitalist market economy, it involves the elimination of the qualitative and individual characteristics of all products of human activities, making them standardised and interchangeable commodities, and rendering the labour of their production an abstract activity. Subjectively, it implies the fragmentation and depersonalisation of the individual, the ultimate bearer of conscious rationality. The exercise of reason then becomes equated with the performance of formal operations, allowing the calculative prediction of the behaviour of its object—ultimately amounting to a contemplative attitude. In its totality, reification designates the ever-growing formal rationalisation of all the separated social spheres and institutional units, while their global interaction remains a matter of pure accidents.

Reification of consciousness is an all-encompassing phenomenon—it characterises the immediate, empirical consciousness of the worker no less than that of the capitalist. The difference between them consists in their respective potential to overcome this standpoint of immediacy. The bourgeois is imprisoned in the world of reification that is the realm of its domination. This is because the capitalist can still find forms of activity—both as entrepreneur and as consumer—that it can, at least superficially, regard as the expressions of its free subjectivity. The wage-worker, however, who under the conditions of modernity is also posited as a formally free subject, cannot identify any sphere of its life-activity that it could consider as autonomous, its own. In life, he or she is always a mere object of personal and, above all, impersonal powers exercised upon him or her. The wage worker’s recognition of this contradiction, the

consciousness of itself as mere commodity, is the initial step towards the emergence of a mediated, “imputed” consciousness. This consciousness finds its expression in the economic class struggle that, in itself, cannot transcend, or even significantly modify, the structure and the power relations of capitalist society. Precisely through the lessons of its ultimate failure, this consciousness can become a major stimulus furthering the process towards genuine emancipation.

The imputed consciousness of a class represents its maximal cognitive potential, the highest level of insight into social reality that its structural position in society still allows it to achieve as an objective possibility. The imputed class consciousness of the proletariat is the collective recognition of its world historical mission to become the Subject-Object of a history now collectively made. Its actual realisation can only be the outcome of a protracted learning process, the result of a constant interaction between the actual experiences of the class struggle and theoretical insights that both form and inform each other. In *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács makes strenuous efforts to indicate at least the potential stages of such a process, but in this he undoubtedly fails. Ultimately he “reifies” the notion of imputed consciousness, ascribing to it a separate empirical reality in the form of the Party of a Leninist type as its living and knowing embodiment. Thereby his whole conception also acquires some teleological features, not unlike those assumed by Hegel.

History and Class Consciousness immediately became the object of sustained dogmatic attacks from the side of leading personages of the Russian, Hungarian and German Communist Party. When Lukács emigrated to the USSR, he was forced to renounce the book for its “idealist aberrations.” While this was a “self-criticism” under duress, Lukács could acquiesce in it with relative ease, since in the meantime he himself moved away from some of the book’s political and theoretical premises.

After his withdrawal from political activity, Lukács similarly abandoned the minefield of Marxist philosophy and general social theory. From the late twenties on, his work was essentially restricted to the field of literary criticism and aesthetics. In his theory of literary realism and its aesthetic generalisation, the conception of the artistic mimesis, he consistently argued for the defetishising capacity of the genuine artwork, in no way identical with its direct, political message.

It was only at the very end of his life that he again returned to the great theoretical issues raised in *History and Class Consciousness*. In the large manuscript *The Ontology of Social Being* (published posthumously in 1976), he again raised—now with a systematic intention—all the great questions that animated the essays of the earlier volume. The central category of this work, that aimed at the general characterisation of the human historical-social form of life as a *sui generis* ontological sphere, a specific way of being,

was that of labour. Labour, as the fundamental form of human activity, represents the fusion of causal determination and conscious teleology. As labouring, objectifying beings, humans are historical and “answering” beings, always acting in the field of some—more narrowly or broadly circumscribed—possibilities, individual and collective alternatives. The work was directed against all those theories—be they existentialist or critical—that transformed alienation into an inescapable human and historical fate. Alienation never can be total—there are always resources for resistance against attempts at the total manipulation of human beings—resources to which the great works of cultural formations, like art and philosophy, bear witness. Lukács, however, could not undertake the intended fundamental revision of this manuscript. It remains, rather, a document of his internal intellectual struggle with those elements of a dogmatic Marxism that during the long decades of an always partial, resisting and external accommodation to the ideological practices of Stalinism, he nevertheless, unwittingly, internalised.

— György Markus

See also Alienation; Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Heller, Agnes; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Social Class; Weber, Max

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MADNESS

In contemporary language, the term *madness* is often used synonymously with words such as *mental illness* and *psychopathology* to refer to disordered mental states and abnormal behaviors. However, while these terms designate medical and psychological conceptions of internal disorder, the concept of madness as examined in social theory is much more encompassing. Rather than attempting to explain biological or psychological causes of mental illness, social theories of madness try to understand the history of madness and the social mechanisms by which madness has been defined and regulated. From this view, it is assumed that the experience and social engagement with madness changes over time and place. In some religious traditions, madness is understood as demonic possession or divine inspiration. In other contexts, madness has been conceived as mystical experience. And in more contemporary circles, madness has been likened to biological illness, the causes of which are to be found in brain chemistry. In general, social theories of madness have examined problems such as the way that the understanding of madness has changed across societies and cultures; the way in which disciplines such as medicine, psychology, and psychiatry have shaped the meaning of madness and the treatment of the mad in the modern West; the various institutions and technologies, such as the asylum, that have been used in the confinement and treatment of the mad; and the ways in which the mad have described their experiences and challenged conventional understandings of madness.

The focus on the concept of madness also implies a critical stance toward standard definitions and treatments of mental illness. In the late 1950s and 1960s, as a medical model of psychiatry, based in biological explanations of mental illness, gained prominence, a group of psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists spoke out against conventional

definitions of mental illness, thereby articulating an anti-psychiatry. They argued that mental illness is not a disease like tuberculosis or cancer, but rather, to use Thomas Szasz's terms, it is a problem in living that emerges out of social relationships and particular forms of social organization. In arguing against the medical models of mental illness, antipsychiatry also took a powerful stand against aggressive biological treatments of mental illness. In the 1960s, this emerged as a challenge to techniques such as lobotomy and electroshock therapy, and in the early twenty-first century, this emerges as a challenge to the pervasive use of pharmaceuticals to treat and manage mental health. Indeed, in the most radical versions of this critique, psychiatry and its technologies are not viewed as cures and helpful treatments but rather as a violent means of social control central to the management of modern capitalist societies.

FOUCAULT'S HISTORY OF MADNESS

Michel Foucault's *Madness and Civilization* (1965; published in French as *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, 1961) is a central work in the study of madness and is often cited as a key text in the anti-psychiatry literature. The book is a historical review of the transformation of psychiatric discourses about madness from the Enlightenment to the end of the nineteenth century. Foucault challenges the conventional view that psychiatry has become better able to cure mental illness over time. Instead, he sees psychiatry as a discipline that has used the tools of science and reason to exert increasing control over definitions of madness and the mad.

According to Foucault, in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the mad lived freely in plain sight of all people, and their behaviors were interpreted to have rich meanings. The mad said and did things that could be wise or foolish, but most important, the strange actions of the mad signaled the presence of a world beyond this one. The

turning point in Foucault's history of madness comes with the "great confinement." In the seventeenth century, France and other European states created a network of workhouses, madhouses, and prisons to lock up and put to work social misfits, the unemployed, and the mad. It was in the workhouses and madhouses, which were later to become the asylums and mental hospitals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that psychiatry began to define modern madness through systems of classification and treatment. While the discourses of madness have significantly changed across the modern period, a common argument throughout Foucault's analysis is that madness has increasingly lost its capacity to speak for itself. Rather, madness became the silent "other" of reason. That is, madness has been interpreted, regulated, and controlled through reason, and in particular through the deployment of reason in scientific and medical fields. Nevertheless, Foucault suggests that because of the intricate structural relationship between reason and madness (madness is defined through reason, and reason comes to know itself as the opposite of madness), it becomes impossible to conquer or to overcome madness and the threats that it poses to reason. Here, then, Foucault champions the irrationality of madness, and through *Madness and Civilization* aims to recover the silenced history of the mad.

Though very influential, *Madness and Civilization* has also been criticized, most notably for its historical inaccuracies. For example, commenting on Foucault's description of the great confinement, historian Roy Porter argues that this account is simplistic and overgeneralized. While there is evidence that something like a great confinement occurred in France, the same pattern of institutionalization did not occur in other parts of Europe such as Russia and England. The historical sociologist Andrew Scull has made a similar critique. In order to correct historical inaccuracies, Scull has written several histories of psychiatry—especially focused on the emergence of asylums in nineteenth-century England and America—that closely describe institutional and political-economic factors that contributed to the emergence of modern psychiatry and its institutional forms.

MADNESS, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

In addition to providing alternative histories and accounts of psychiatry, social theorists argued that madness was a product of, and means of control in, modern societies. In these accounts, madmen and madwomen were often portrayed as pained but revolutionary characters whose madness was a response to oppressive social conditions. This idea was elaborated by the psychiatrist R. D. Laing. In early works such as *The Divided Self* (1959) and *Self and Others* (1961), Laing developed an existential-phenomenological theory of schizophrenia. This theory of schizophrenia challenged

reductive psychoanalytic and biological theories of mental illness. In contrast to the medical model that sees schizophrenic delusion and hallucination as meaningless and incomprehensible—the product of biological dysfunction—Laing argued that symptoms of schizophrenia were interpretable and that they usually pointed back to distorted relationships and double-bind scenarios. For Laing, then, schizophrenia was not a product of biological or psychological dysfunction but a response to problems in human relationship, which could ultimately be traced to problems in the larger social fabric. In addition to his examination of microsocial relationships, in books such as *Politics of the Experience* (1969), Laing went "macro" to argue that schizophrenia was a product of an alienating and fragmenting capitalist society. At the same time, Laing's interpretations of the experience of schizophrenia became increasingly esoteric. The so-called sane members of society were dupes of the Western capitalist system. They had unwittingly agreed to live inauthentic existences. In contrast, the schizophrenic, though clearly mad and in a state of suffering, struggled for authenticity in the midst of an alienating society. Indeed, for Laing, the ego-loss, regression, and delusional thinking of schizophrenia were near-mystical experiences that put people in touch with elements of existence denied under the capitalist order.

This heroic vision of schizophrenia has been influential among postmodern social theorists such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. In their two-volume series *Schizophrenia and Capitalism* (1972, 1980), Deleuze and Guattari combine the work of Nietzsche and Marx in a critique of modern capitalism and Freudian psychoanalysis. They argue that conventional psychoanalysis is complicit with modern capitalism. Rather than encouraging people to act upon and realize a diversity of desires, psychoanalysis channels desire to that which is acceptable within a modern social order and the family structure (a triad of "mummy-daddy-me") that supports it. This constraint is embodied in the liberal and capitalist ideal of the self-contained, repressed, individual self. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari envision a self that is continually opened to the multiple flows and forces of desire. In place of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari propose a "schizoanalysis." Here, the ego-loss of schizophrenia serves as a model for social relations. The schizophrenic, they argue, is not constrained by an internal desire for self-control—a fascism of the self—but rather lives as a "body without organs," a person without definition or desire for definition, always open to the play and transformation afforded by the multiplicity of desire. Social revolution, the challenge to capitalism and state oppression, comes by way of undermining categories essential to the modern self, its supporting philosophies and political-economic arrangements.

The connection between madness, social control, and social change has also been elaborated by feminist theorists. While, as Jane Ussher (1992) argues, the antipsychiatrists

pointed to problems in capitalist society as the source of madness, many feminists pointed to the problem of misogyny. Already in the nineteenth century, Charlotte Perkins Gilman had described relationship between madness and patriarchy in her novel *The Yellow Wallpaper*. Gilman's narrator searches for independence and equal participation in the public sphere but is infantilized and deemed ill by her husband and doctor. In the end, the narrator achieves a perverse freedom when she descends into madness. Here, then, women's madness is both the product of, and an escape from, patriarchy.

In the 1970s, works such as *Women Look at Psychiatry* (Smith & David 1975) and *Women and Madness* (Chesler 1972) echoed Gilman and documented the ways in which psychiatry reproduced patriarchal abuses. For Phyllis Chesler, patriarchy operates in the nuclear family but also in the mental asylum and psychotherapy session, where women occupy subservient positions and suffer both psychological and sexual abuse. In a no-win scenario, women who step out of their feminine role to assume aggressive male characteristics are labeled psychotic, and women who fully accept and perform the passive female role are deemed neurotic. Insofar as women's lives and relationships are mediated through men, they remain incapable of developing as individuals. Drawing from Greek mythology, Chesler contrasts the twentieth-century society with Amazonian societies in which women were free to relate to one another as full individuals. A recovery of this Amazonian ideal is Chesler's first hope for women's psychological healing.

Chesler also points out that in patriarchal societies, psychiatry operates by a double standard. Men's deviance is more often labeled criminal, and women's deviance is more often attributed to psychiatric disturbance. Ussher (1992) takes note of this double standard and traces it to the very definition of woman. In a patriarchal society, the discourses of madness operate such that to be woman is to be the "other" to man and reason. Furthermore, in this equation, to be woman is to be mad or at least always vulnerable to madness. In particular, madness and woman are united through biological theories of mental health. Constructions such as postpartum depression, premenstrual syndrome, and menopause cast women's experience of their body and social relationships in medical-psychiatric terms. In this language, women are seen as naturally or biologically predisposed to bouts of strange, unpredictable, moody—that is, mad—behavior. As such, critics of this psychiatric discourse argue that women's freedom from madness can only be achieved through a deconstruction of the categories that have bound madness and femininity for so many years.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MADNESS

Social psychologists have also provided social accounts of mental illness through the lens of labeling theory and symbolic interactionism. In *Being Mentally Ill*, Thomas

Scheff (1966) argued against biological accounts of mental illness to claim that mental illness is a social construct that emerges through the labeling of deviant behaviors. The beginning of a social career as a mental patient begins when the label "mentally ill" is applied to certain kinds of behaviors that Scheff calls residual norm violations. In a study titled "On Being Sane in Insane Places," David Rosenhan (1973) applied this labeling theory to understand the inner workings of mental hospitals. A number of pseudopatients surreptitiously gained admittance to mental hospitals across the United States, where they were readily labeled schizophrenic. These pseudopatients found that the label "schizophrenic" shaped all aspects of life in the mental hospital, including the way that even seemingly normal behaviors were interpreted by hospital staff.

Most notably, however, in his book *Asylums* (1961), Erving Goffman provides a detailed analysis of the "moral career" of the mental patient as it unfolds in the mental hospital. Central to his analysis is the idea that the mental hospital is a total institution organized to undermine and attack the patient's sense of self. In the hospital ward system, patients lose their individuality and sense of self-control because all aspects of life are regulated and submitted to communal pressures. Moreover, the most intimate, shameful, and normally hidden aspects of the patient's life are opened up to scrutiny by psychiatrists, nursing staff, and other patients. Through interactions with psychiatric professionals and the creation of case records, the patient's life story is retroactively created. Consistent with the work of labeling theorists, Goffman argues that the mental hospital does not cure mental illness but instead turns the merely deviant into the certifiably mad. Patients resist these institutional attacks upon the integrity of the self by telling counter-stories—what Goffman calls apologia or sad tales. In the end, however, the mental patient's attempt to protect the self against the psychiatric labeling process is futile. The attacks on the self are persistent and deeply institutionalized, and mental patients eventually learn not only that they are mentally ill but that in the mental hospital the self is "a small open city" (p. 165) arbitrarily defined and redefined by social and institutional powers.

DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE RISE OF PHARMACEUTICALS

As the history of psychiatry shows, for several hundred years the asylum has assumed a central position in the constitution and regulation of madness. However, beginning in the 1970s, as part of a more general social process called deinstitutionalization, mental hospitals in the United States began to close down en masse. In turn, outpatient facilities and a growing range of psychopharmaceutical medications assumed a prominent role in the treatment and management of mental illness. Where critics of the mental hospital saw

this as a victory over oppressive institutions, sociologists such as Andrew Scull argue that deinstitutionalization is an equally irresponsible and dangerous development. Rather than seeking reform, the state has abandoned responsibility for the mentally ill. By contracting mental health care out to private agencies and relying upon drug treatments, the state has given vulnerable members of society up to the contingencies of the free-market economy.

Deinstitutionalization also signals a more general medicalization of society and psychic life. As psychiatry moves out of the asylum, its means of classification increasingly impact people's everyday understanding of themselves. In this context, where Foucault's early work on *Madness and Civilization* was an inspiration to the antipsychiatry movement, his later, poststructuralist, writing on the relationship between power, knowledge, surveillance, and discipline has now become crucial in understanding the new social life of madness. In particular, the sociologist Nikolas Rose has used Foucault's later work to show how disciplines such as psychology, and psychiatry—the “psy” disciplines—have reshaped the subjectivity and selfhood not only of the mad but of all members of Western culture. Recent attention to the biomedicalization of society has also impacted conceptualizations of madness. Pharmaceuticals such as Prozac and Paxil have become increasingly popular and central to the way that people imagine their inner workings and understand their everyday lives. The category “mentally ill” is no longer reserved for those committed to psychiatric asylums or diagnosed by doctors. Rather, as psychiatric and pharmaceutical discourses proliferate and extend their social reach, members of a society are increasingly compelled to understand their suffering through the languages of illness and deficit. In this, a new morality is emerging whereby the individual is tasked with an unprecedented expectation of control and surveillance. In these discourses, one's knowledge of self and others is increasingly mediated through the delivery and advertising of the drugs and devices to treat illnesses and symptoms newly being defined.

— Jeffrey Stepnisky

See also Deleuze, Gilles; Deviance; Foucault, Michel; Goffman, Erving; Labeling Theory; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory; Total Institutions

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MAISTRE, JOSEPH DE

Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821) was one of the founders of French conservative thought, a powerful critic of Enlightenment rationalism, of democracy, and of the French Revolution in particular. At the same time, however, as a highly sophisticated theorist of social violence and political authority, he was one of the originators of French sociology. Maistre, that is to say, was a *philosophical* conservative: his defense of order against disorder entailed a powerful effort to *theorize* social and political disorder and in that way to find order within human excess itself.

Maistre's greatest importance for the development of social theory is found in his sociology of religion or religious sociology: his sociological account of religious practices, especially in their more extreme forms, which insists that religion, understood in the broadest sense, is the defining foundation of all social organization. The force of his analysis is manifest in its significant influence on such major figures in the sociological tradition as Auguste Comte, Georges Bataille, Carl Schmitt, and René Girard—all of them, like Maistre, working on the blurred and often equivocal borders of religious, social, and political questions. At the same time, Maistre's occasionally exorbitant defense of royal sovereignty and papal infallibility has inspired French reactionary thinkers from monarchists like the young Félicité de Lamennais to fascist sympathizers like Charles Maurras, who have often found in his words justification for discarding his in fact quite moderate practical politics. For perhaps what most defines Maistre's theoretical style is the veritably classical calm with which he responded to the most excessive forms of human behavior. He was a theorist of barbarity, not its advocate.

Maistre was born on April 1, 1753, in Chambéry, the capital of Savoy, a French-speaking province of Piedmont-Sardinia. His family was granted noble status in 1778 for the work of his father, François Xavier, a senator in the Savoy Parlement, in revising the royal constitution. Maistre's youth presaged a conventional provincial life: membership in local religious confraternities followed by legal training in Turin. From 1772 to 1792, he served in the Savoy Parlement, rising to the rank of senator in 1788. Two engagements, however, qualified this outwardly traditional life: Masonry and the Enlightenment. Maistre's personal library was among the largest in Savoy, featuring an unusually high proportion of Enlightenment works alongside a

much smaller number of professional and pious literature; thus, before becoming one of the Enlightenment's staunchest critics, he had been one of its most avid followers. Maistre, moreover, was closely engaged with Masonry between 1772 and 1792. His later dismissal of this involvement as a mere social game seems belied by his initiation into a highly esoteric lodge in 1778, in which he rose to the highest grades. Thus, alongside a professional and religious trajectory squarely located within the *ancien régime*, Maistre took part in some of the most forward-looking intellectual and social movements of his day. This balance was ruptured in 1792, when French revolutionary armies invaded Savoy, broke the traditional framework within which Maistre had lived, and turned him against the enlightened views of his youth.

Thus began 20 years of exile. Maistre seems to have experienced emigration as a liberation from provincial life, an opening onto a wider European world, where he produced all of his major writings. For several years he worked as a correspondent and propagandist for the Sardinian monarchy, living in Switzerland and Northern Italy. It was during this period that he wrote *Considerations on France* (1797), a sociological and religious critique of the revolutionary project. Nonetheless, fellow monarchists viewed him with suspicion from the start, both for his earlier reformist views and for his insistence on recognizing the realities of the French Revolution. In 1802, Maistre was appointed Sardinian ambassador to St. Petersburg (the only remaining source of counterrevolutionary funding other than London), where he frequented the francophone court and salons and wrote his greatest works, notably *The Pope* (1820) and the *Saint-Petersburg Dialogs* (1821). It was only with some reluctance that Maistre left Russia after the defeat of Napoleon. His last years were spent in Turin arranging his children's future and the publication of his works. He died on February 16, 1821.

Maistre's thinking belongs to a particular school of conservative thought known as traditionalism. Simply stated, traditionalism insists that it is tradition and not reason that determines the course of human action. Within the traditionalist argument, it is useful to distinguish between its descriptive and normative claims. The first asserts that it is tradition that shapes institutions and behaviors; this broad outlook was central to the development of nineteenth-century historical thinking and has obvious significance for sociology and anthropology. Yet traditionalists insist not merely that the past *does* shape the present but that it *should* do so, and that is what makes it a conservative and often reactionary argument. There are, of course, many versions of just what tradition includes. Maistre's version was, for its day, extraordinarily broad: not only the Catholic monarchy (as with the other great founder of French conservative thought, Louis de Bonald) but also Greek philosophy, Hindu cosmology, Judaism, Islam, and early Christian

heresy. His defense of tradition extended to traditional societies ravaged by Western expansion. The breadth and force of Maistre's traditionalism can be seen in what is perhaps the keystone of all his social theory, his theory of sacrifice.

Maistre was the first to develop a sociologically oriented theory of sacrifice based not only on local tradition (in his case, Judeo-Christian Europe) but also on global religious practices. He thus made use of recently translated Vedic and Mesoamerican sources alongside Greek and Christian authors (among the latter, Origen, the great heterodox neo-Platonist was the great influence). But why sacrifice? Maistre was convinced that social unity ultimately rests upon religion, understood in the broadest sense as the sanctioned source of society's symbolic and imaginary cohesion. This religious order rests in turn upon ritual, upon the communal practice that establishes and reestablishes religious unity. And ritual, finally, rests upon sacrifice, where the symbolic order of religion comes into contact with bare life and restores human disorder to union. The argument reflects the religious bases of Maistre's theory, yet it also demonstrates his effort to find a social logic within religious practices. This assertion of the universal need for sacrificial ritual rests upon specific anthropological claims, claims radically opposed to the Enlightenment's happy view of human nature. For Maistre, human existence is of its nature imbalanced, disordered, and ambivalent. This is what it is to have a body, blood, and life. Thus, in sacrifices, body, life, and blood are spent to redress life's excess and disproportion. This moment of expenditure, however, must have a measure if it is to restore good order, and that is the role of ritual. Regardless of human intentions, however, the balancing continues. That human violence has its measure—this was Maistre's guiding idea on religion, history, and politics. Because disorder has its logic, it is capable of being understood.

Maistre finds this measure of sacrificial violence in two paired ideas, substitution and reversibility. Substitution, since become a staple of religious sociology, concerns the manner in which victims of sacrifice are chosen. The logic of substitution demands, first, that the victim must stand outside the community in order to channel social violence outward and, second, that the victim must, however, resemble that community in order to serve as its representative in the ritual expiation. Thus, Maistre points out that animal victims are always chosen from among the most "human" species. More broadly, substitution explains why marginal social groups, neither inside nor outside the community, are especially vulnerable to its violence. Reversibility, on the other hand, asserts that the innocent victims of sacrifice somehow compensate or redeem the faults of the guilty. The dogma of reversibility is primary, for it alone gives meaning to sacrificial substitution: Only if the innocent pay for the guilty does sacrifice have any meaning at all or even any effect beyond shunting social violence onto convenient victims.

Much of Maistre's writing on social questions consists of the application of this sacrificial paradigm to European institutions, tracing the workings of substitution and reversibility in capital punishment, warfare, and revolutionary violence. In each case, he underlines the way in which inherent human excess and barbarity are channeled, given shape and meaning, through the imposition of customary ritual forms. These ritual forms provide the only means for limiting a social violence that is ultimately ineradicable. Rituals must therefore be defended, violent as they are, if worse violence is not to ensue.

Maistre's sociology of religion provides the basis of his theory of constitutions, which is at bottom a theory of social order and of how it is shaped historically by ritualized behavior and mythological imagination. For Maistre, a constitution is neither a set of legal prescriptions nor even exactly a form of government. It is rather a certain consistency in what is done, thought, and lived within a given society, a cohesive cluster of norms, habits, expectations, and unexamined beliefs inherited from tradition. What distinguishes the English and French constitutions is thus not positive laws but ways of life—how being in France differs from being in England.

Maistre strongly rejected the notion that constitutions must be declared in writing. What holds society together is not its written laws but its tradition, which as a prelogical and symbolic order cannot be wholly reduced to a document. Indeed, social order cannot be the product of legislation, since legislation itself presupposes an existing society. The chief failing of written constitutions is that they bear no sanction, which means they may be unwritten. Only what remains unwritten (custom, belief, tradition) cannot be erased. The essence of a constitutional or fundamental law is precisely that no one has the right to abolish it.

Much of Maistre's criticism of written constitutions is directed against the theory of the social contract, which presents social order as having originated in the rational decisions of contracting individuals, who, as its creators, have the right to annul and reinvent it. Yet, that is to subject social order to passing political whims. Against Locke and Rousseau, Maistre argued that because a constitution is precisely what exceeds the sum of its subjects, it cannot be the product of individuals' decisions. Because its function is to restrain the divergent wills of the population, it cannot have a democratic origin. Indeed, Maistre's theory is designed to remove power from people's hands and to vest it somewhere free from human intervention. While people certainly play a role in the growth of constitutions, they do so in unintentional ways, for fundamental institutions remain precisely what is subtracted from the sphere of conscious decision. Constitutions are rather shaped insensibly over long spans of time by all the complex contingencies of its history. Thus, Maistre adduces the English constitution, which is not the written product of a single rational agreement

but rather a complex unity of Roman, Saxon, Danish, and Norman customs, the privileges and prejudices of all social classes, wars, revolutions, and so on.

This historicist argument entails the view that the origins of constitutions cannot be pinpointed. Yet Maistre also implies that the invisibility of the origins of power is actively pursued as a legitimation process essential to social order. While he never states outright that traditional authority is illegitimate (that would be to forsake conservatism), he does assert that the actual origins of established power are always inglorious, hybrid, and bloody. Every order begins in violence, and the question is thus how it becomes legitimate.

The answer is found in what Maistre calls "legitimate usurpation." This refers to the originary violence that establishes legal authority and which thus cannot be justified by any existing legitimacy. The originary usurpation is therefore neither legal nor illegal, legitimate nor illegitimate, but a-legal and a-legitimate. Legitimacy arises as these violent origins recede: The legitimacy of a given power or social order is the invisibility of the violence that precipitated it. Legitimacy derives not from proximity to origins but from distance from them.

Yet if no constitution has pure origins, every constitution relies on a myth of the purity of its origins. The defining feature of the history of a given constitution, then, is that it sutures its past, erases its scandalous contingency, and finally emerges as an unquestionable norm. This is the function of what Maistre calls the "fables" or "political mysteries" surrounding and divinizing the birth of power. Fables they may be, but they are no less precious, for they alone, by eliciting subjects' consent, keep us from falling back into the violence that defines human nature and human history.

Maistre's doctrine of constitutions explains his rejection of the revolutionary project of 1789. Much of the strength of his interpretation of the French Revolution derives from his traditionalist argument, which places revolutionary events firmly within a historicist framework. Unlike most contemporaries on both the Right and the Left, Maistre understood the Revolution not as a momentary act of will, whether good or evil, but rather as the result of a long-term history. He points in particular to the effects of Protestantism, royal absolutism, and the Enlightenment, each of which served to dissolve traditional communal bonds in favor of the individual and the state, and to the failures of the old regime social elites who abandoned responsible guardianship of the political mysteries in favor of flippancy and materialism. The resulting anarchy of opinion and abuse of power, he believed, made a revolution inevitable.

The dissolution of social order and cultural tradition, Maistre argued, returned France to the violent chaos of origins. In his eyes, the Revolution is not a leap forward but a

leap back, not progress but a primitivist return to the most barbarous forms of sacrificial violence, which replaced the beneficent artificiality of custom with the remorseless logic of victimization. The Terror thus becomes a sacrificial crisis, such as inevitably follows the collapse of traditional authority. Yet, as a sacrificial act, the Terror must also be understood as a form of cleansing violence, and the Revolution as a whole, as an outgrowth of French history, must have its place in the evolution of tradition. The victims of revolutionary violence pay the debts of the monarchy, compensate for its excesses. Once the sacrificial dynamic is concluded, Maistre hoped, France would be returned to health.

As an important consequence of this sacrificial model of revolution, Maistre opposed any armed counterrevolution. The revolutionary dynamic must be allowed to play itself out until order restores itself of its own accord. Because the return to traditional order means a restoration of social equilibrium, retribution must be avoided: Revenge would only exacerbate and prolong the crisis. Thus, he forcefully rejected the offer of a position as prosecutor of Savoyard rebels, condemning the bad faith and stupidity of the monarchy's drive for vengeance, which only demonstrated that the royalists themselves had been overcome by the intransigent revolutionary mentality.

Maistre's qualified response to the French Revolution demonstrates that he was more a philosophical conservative than a political reactionary, a theorist of human violence rather than its advocate. While his rejection of democracy consigns him to the monarchic past, his effort to find an order within social disorder remains highly significant for the development of modern social theory, which owes far more to the conservative tradition than is commonly recognized.

— Owen Bradley

See also Bataille, Georges; Comte, Auguste; Historicism; Religion in French Social Theory

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MALE GAZE

Laura Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (1975) was one of the first scholarly attempts to reference male gaze, the visual and controlling viewpoint associated with hegemonic masculinity and male dominations. Mulvey's pioneering work fused feminist and psychoanalytic theory with theories of film spectatorship as she examined the progression of "looks" in classical narrative cinema. In her classic model of the gaze, Mulvey considered gendered identity and "sexual looking" as elements of "woman as spectacle" for the pleasure of men (p. 10). First, she suggests that the controlling look of the camera itself is voyeuristic and male because most directors are men. Second, the looks exchanged between cinematic characters are structured so that the male characters most often *look* while the female characters are *looked at*. Finally, spectators respond to the standpoints of the camera and characters by identifying with the male and his gaze.

Utilizing Freud, Mulvey also contends that the male unconscious seeks two forms of scopophilia (visual pleasure). Voyeurism, the first of these, seeks to exercise power over its object by marking "her" as "the bearer of guilt" (Mulvey 1975:11). Fetishism, the second form of visual pleasure, marks the female as object of desire at the level of spectacle. A masculine subject emerges through a narcissistic identification with male characters and an objectification of female characters. Thus, woman as passive spectacle and object and man as active voyeur and subject together constitute a proprietary "male gaze."

While Mulvey is credited with the phrase "male gaze," the concept of the gaze is drawn from the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. Lacan's gaze acknowledges that "things look at me, and yet I see them" (1977:109). The Lacanian gaze both projects itself onto objects and reads those objects for their meanings. The notion of gaze also informs the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre. As he noted, the look of the Other is the domain of domination and possession.

By aligning knowledge with power, Michel Foucault presented a model for discussing objectification without drawing on existentialism or psychoanalysis. According to Foucault, power constitutes the very subjectivity of the subject. Vision, as a means to objectify, may reinforce as well as help produce patriarchal power relations. In *Discipline and Punish* ([1975] 1995), Foucault discusses Jeremy Bentham's "panopticon," the prison where inmates are continually observable. He treats the panopticon as an example of the controlling gaze, which guards use as a means of constant surveillance. If inmates know that they can be observed at any time, then discipline becomes internalized as they become self-policing subjects. Foucault highlights the power that lies at the root of the gaze. In *The Birth of the Clinic* ([1963] 1994), he declares that "the gaze

that sees” through active vision becomes a “gaze that dominates” (p. 39).

Theorists often distinguish between the look (associated with the eye) and the gaze (associated with the phallus). Of all the sensory organs, vision most readily confirms the separation of subject from object. The spatial dynamics of vision allow for considerable distance, whereas a relative contiguity is usually required between subject and object with all of our other senses.

These and other thinkers portray the male gaze as a socially constructed mode of objectification. The male gaze looks at a female person as an erotic or aesthetic object. Within a regime of institutionalized heterosexuality, women face pressures to make themselves “object and prey” for men (Bartky 1998:72). Sandra Lee Bartky builds on Foucault’s insights about the nature of disciplinary society when she asserts that “a panoptical male connoisseur resides within the consciousness of most women” (p. 72). Women learn to appraise themselves through male eyes within a patriarchal culture. The mass media, for example, promote women’s bodies as objects of men’s desires as a means to satisfy the male gaze (Johnson 1997:38). The gaze is not a mutual reflection, even though both women and men are appraised using male-identified cultural standards. The gaze that appropriates the Other is masculine.

— L. Paul Weeks

See also Bartky, Sandra Lee; Body; Cultural Studies and the New Populism; Foucault, Michel; Lacan, Jacques; Sartre, Jean-Paul

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of the historical record. For another, he argues—indeed demonstrates—that social life can only be understood once attention is paid to the interaction of different types of social power. Furthermore, he extends Weber: He adds military power to the political, economic, and ideological types distinguished by his predecessor and goes beyond him in a series of middle range theoretical contributions all his own. Finally, he replaces the rather decisionistic, implicitly authoritarian politics of Weber with modern social democratic principles—in part taken as sociology, in part as prescriptions that he has sought to justify.

Mann was born in 1942 to a lower middle-class family. He attended Manchester Grammar School and then studied history at Oxford—where a lifelong commitment to socialist values was made, interpreted at the time in the form of loyalty to the British Labour Party. He became a sociologist by accident, but his political values can be seen in the fact that his first three books—*Workers on the Move* (1973), *Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class* (1973), and *The Working Class and the Labour Market* (coauthored with Bob Blackburn in 1979)—concentrated on the class presumed by Marx to be the agent of a new world. Mann’s democratic instincts produced a very convincing picture of the realities of working-class life—as an attempt to manage the complexities of an unfair environment, subject to force and fraud but rarely indoctrinated into any dominant ideology, and essentially without an alternative ideology of its own. There is a sense in which this general view undermines hopes for socialism; certainly Mann’s empiricism made him a somewhat marginal figure on the British Left.

These early books appeared whilst Mann lectured at Essex University. Thereafter he moved to the London School of Economics and in 1986 to the University of California, Los Angeles, where he has remained. It is in the latter institutions that his major work has appeared. *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1, *From the Beginning to 1760 AD* (1986) was extremely well received (albeit the fact that it is an account of “the rise of the West” is likely to lead to it being ever more criticized), not least since its theoretical contribution necessarily stood out clearly, given the sheer range of material covered. *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2, *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (1993) had less success, perhaps because Mann’s relentless empiricism produced an account of great complexity. His initial plan to have a first volume on power in agrarian societies followed by a second dealing with power in industrial societies had clearly fallen before the discovery that economic change did not necessarily create movement in other realms. Mann will give us a new volume on power in the twentieth century, but three books will appear before he completes his principal work (with a fourth volume on social theory still being a possibility). *Fascists* (2004) and *Murderous Ethnic Cleansing* (2004) from a pair examining the horrors of the twentieth

MANN, MICHAEL

Michael Mann is our Max Weber. For one thing, he equals the great German sociologist in range and in command

century by means of very detailed case studies. Both books are made striking by his insistence on understanding the motivation of people whose actions he loathes; he is particularly impressive in demonstrating that fascism had genuine moral appeal. The material in these books will certainly be used in the third volume of his major work, as will that in a series of essays that doubt the extent of globalization of the world—that is, that argue that geopolitical frames and national interests retain considerable power to structure our future. *Incoherent Empire* (2003) is a political intervention deeply critical of American foreign policy.

Mann's initial starting point was anti-Parsonian: Societies are less "systems" than places where different sources of social power interact. Negatively, Mann suggested that we rarely have unitary identities. This was wholly salutary in showing that classical sociological theory reified the nation-state—thereby failing to understand most of the historical record. Positively, Mann's purpose has been that of explaining why a particular source of power gained dominance at a particular moment of history—as was the case, for instance, with ideological power both at the time of the emergence of world religions and in modernity in the case of the two revolutionary forces of bolshevism and fascism. Notable contributions have been made to understanding the four sources of power upon which his work depends, perhaps especially in the case of ideology, where Mann offers an anti-idealist view concentrating on the means of communication. At a more specific level, three contributions are, as noted, especially novel and noteworthy. First, his sociology of nationalism is the most sophisticated to date, stressing as it does the impact of micromotivation and of macroconditioning by geopolitical forces. Second, no scholar has shown more thoroughly the ways in which social movements—whether of gender, nation, or class—gain their character as the result of the nature of the regimes with which they interact. Finally, his notion of caging—of the attempts by states to enclose actors, from feudal lords to capitalists, capable of living in larger societies together with the ways in which those so enclosed come to identify with their bars—is extremely suggestive, a truly useful tool for sociological thought.

Mann is sometimes mistakenly taken to be an analytic historian. In fact, he seeks to expand sociological theory by considering nothing less than the complete historical record. He is perhaps less convincing on distributive than on collective power—and this despite analyses of ethnic cleansing and of state power in general. Nonetheless, his work renews the classic sociological questions more than that of any other living sociologist. His work is demanding, but it is likely in the long run to be extremely influential.

— John A. Hall

See also Democracy; Historical and Comparative Theory; Power; Weber, Max

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MANNHEIM, KARL

Karl Mannheim was born in Budapest, Hungary, on March 27, 1893, into a middle-class Jewish family. He received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Budapest and early in his academic career worked under the renowned Marxist György Lukács. Following the takeover of Hungary in 1919 by a communist, anti-Semitic regime, Mannheim was forced to relocate to Heidelberg, Germany. It was here that he met his future wife and fellow academic (with a doctorate in psychology), Juliska Lang. In 1930, he was appointed to the position of director of the College of Sociology at Goethe University in Frankfurt, sharing a building with the famed Institute of Social Research and its critical theorists. Again, however, when Hitler came to power, anti-Semitism forced Mannheim to flee his home in 1933 for England. He lectured at the London School of Economics and later held a full professorship at the University of London. Suffering from a heart defect from birth, Mannheim died on January 9, 1947, at the age of 53.

It might seem as though Mannheim was cursed from birth; however, many of his "curses" turned out to be blessings in disguise, at least for his intellectual career. Although his Jewish background forced him to relocate many times, this relocation helped expose him to a variety of ideas. There is a marked transition in his work from philosophy (Hungary) to sociology (Germany) and finally to the application of sociology (England). It was also his refugee status that probably led him to one of his most formative ideas, the "socially unattached intelligentsia" (discussed later).

Although Mannheim is not considered by many to be an important figure in sociology, a number of aspects about his career and contribution to the field run counter to this argument. Most important, Mannheim is the person primarily responsible for the creation of the subfield of the sociology of knowledge. Additionally, it was Mannheim's persistence that helped this subfield establish itself, and it is considered an important area of study today.

Given the early guidance of Lukács, it is no wonder that one sees a heavy Marxian influence on Mannheim's work. In fact, he credits Marx with creating the forerunner to the sociology of knowledge with his theories on ideology. The key to distinguishing Mannheim from Marx, however, is that Mannheim created the sociology of knowledge largely in opposition to Marx's theories of ideology. Thus, although Marx believed that ideologies were consciously undertaken distortions of reality that sought to benefit the ruling economic class, Mannheim believed that many distortions are not conscious but rather emerge from certain social blocs and consequently are one-sided and appear to reflect self-interestedly the interests of that class. Such ideologies, however, are not necessarily rooted in economics (e.g., they can be based on generations, political viewpoints, or race) and are not necessarily blatant attempts at hegemonic control. Consequently, Mannheim defined the sociology of knowledge as the study of "the relationship between human thought and the conditions of existence in general" (1936:277).

Another distinguishing feature of Mannheim's approach was that it was markedly sociological (as opposed to ideological). For example, he favored an extrinsic perspective, one available primarily to "unbiased" sociologists, as opposed to an intrinsic perspective that tends more frequently to create biased interpretations. Furthermore, he believed that the individual actor is the mediator between the purely empirical social world and knowledge. This reflected Mannheim's concern with existentialism and the social determination of knowledge.

Mannheim had a great interest in using empirical research in the sociology of knowledge. He was not, however, a positivist. He found value in phenomenology and sought to integrate a more Marxist approach with phenomenology. He also favored using a historical approach to discover the social roots of knowledge and how the relationship between ideas and their sources in the social world change over time.

Reflecting an early interest in a sort of metatheory, Mannheim did a sociology of the sociology of knowledge. For example, he argued that only during the unique social situation of the time (specifically heterogeneous, dynamic thought and the increased potential for social mobility) could the sociology of knowledge have arisen. It was especially a rise in social mobility that spawned such an interest in this topic as more people came into contact with a wider variety of other types of people and ideas. Mannheim clarified this, however, by stating that only vertical mobility led to this interest. Unlike horizontal mobility, which leads people to see that other people think differently but not to question their own ways of thinking, vertical mobility causes people to view some ideas as having more social worth than others. This is particularly important in situations where those ideas emanating from the lower social

strata rise to the same level as those with origins in the controlling strata.

Another important distinction made by Mannheim is between relativism and relationism. Relativism is the idea that everything is relative to everything else and hence nothing can ever be used as a standard by which to judge anything else. Relationism, however, is the idea that everything is related to everything else in one way or another on a vertical and horizontal level and there is the possibility of determining right from wrong in a given social situation and particular historical moment. Mannheim favored relationism, as it is a more dynamic concept that solves the intellectual crisis of not being able to know the truth, yet still leaves room to adjust what is "true" to the circumstances of a given time and place.

Based on his ideas on relativism and relationism, Mannheim further posited that the sociology of knowledge could be used either evaluatively or nonevaluatively. For example, an evaluation can be made of something if it is seen as maladjusted. Mannheim outlined three conditions that might lead to such a maladjustment: the persistence of norms that are no longer applicable to the contemporary situation, adhering to absolutes that although they may have had value in one social setting are no longer valuable in the current social setting, and attempting to analyze present realities with forms of knowledge that are not capable of making sense of them.

The intelligentsia is a group of people who were of particular interest to Mannheim. This is because he envisioned their task as making sense of the world for the rest of society. Unlike other societies throughout history, the contemporary world has an intelligentsia that is relatively socially unattached. In other words, they are derived from a wider range of social strata and are more loosely connected to one another than in previous times. This has had a contradictory effect in that although there are now innumerable competing ideas arising from the intelligentsia and it is harder to find a solid "truth," the newfound interdisciplinary perspective has also allowed the members of that group to move beyond the need to find such a definitive answer. In particular, the sociologist is heralded as the solution to the problem of intellectual chaos.

Another key concept in the sociology of knowledge is that of the *Weltanschauung*, or the organized entirety of ideas of a given time period or social group, which, in turn, is derived from a series of reciprocally, mutually related parts. Although the *Weltanschauung* is emergent and so greater than the sum of its individual parts, any one of those parts can be analyzed in isolation to give us an idea of the larger whole. It is the documentary meaning, which is derived from the "document" of a cultural product, that allows us to get a sense of the larger whole. This is opposed to the expressive meaning, which is found in the intentions of the actor, and the objective meaning, which is inherent in

the object. The documentary meaning, then, is most useful not when it helps us to understand an idea in isolation but rather when it helps us to understand its role within the larger *Weltanschauung*. Thus, Mannheim also sees the sociology of knowledge as a unique subdiscipline interested in the dependence of each idea or location on the unique social group from which it arose and sets about determining the historical evolution of a given idea system.

One of Mannheim's most important and best-known works is *Ideology and Utopia* (1936). An ideology for Mannheim is a type of *Weltanschauung* that obscures the present by attempting to make sense of it through the past. Ideologies are most widely propagated by those in power who wish to maintain the status quo. A further distinction is the difference between particular ideologies, which are the ideas of a particular group we are not in favor of and are deliberate distortions, and total ideologies, which belong to an entire sociohistorical bloc and are not generally viewed as purposeful distortions. This is a further difference between Marx and Mannheim. The former was concerned only with particular ideologies, while the latter introduced total ideologies as a subject of the sociology of knowledge.

In contrast to ideologies, utopias make sense of the present by transcending it in a futuristic orientation. They are most commonly espoused by those seeking revolution and social change. Furthermore, they have the ability to affect action and give rise to change. The consequence of change, however, is often that the utopia becomes the ideas of the new ruling class and is transformed into an ideology that then gives birth to another utopian idea system. One of Mannheim's greatest fears was a decline in utopias and their revolutionary possibilities for change.

It is difficult to differentiate between an ideology and a utopia. They are generally, in fact, labels that come from an opposing group. It is often the success or failure of an idea system and those who promote it that determines how it will be classified. Thus, Mannheim suggested that the only true way to know the difference was through the clearer vision of historical hindsight. In the meantime, however, the job of the sociologist of knowledge is not to determine what is an ideology and what is a utopia but rather to unmask the distortions in, and sources of, a given system of ideas.

This leads to the question, From where do ideas emerge? Mannheim's general answer is that they emerge from competition with other ideas. This competition between ideas is crucial to change and growth. It is also another way in which both the production of ideologies and utopias is ensured, as not only ideas but also the groups behind those ideas compete for control.

Paralleling a worry of Max Weber, Mannheim was concerned that the world is becoming increasingly disenchanted. That is, there is a decline in both utopias and ideologies. There is, however, hope as those groups that still feel unfulfilled in their desires remain a potential source of

enchantment and re-enchantment. Additionally, the idea of "socially unattached intellectuals" comes up again as the group with the greatest potential to understand, lead, and revolutionize society.

Another of Weber's influences is seen in Mannheim's work on rationality and irrationality and on the further subdivision of these into substantial (more phenomenological) and functional (more empirical) levels. Substantial rationality occurs when thought shows signs of insight into the interdependent nature of factors in a particular situation; it is creative and original. Substantial irrationality occurs when there is falseness or no thought at all, as with thinking dominated by impulses, drives, and emotions. Functional rationality is largely efficient in that it is an action (or series of actions) that leads to, or moves toward, the realization of a predetermined goal. Functional irrationality is all else that disrupts the functionality of a system. It should be noted, however, that that which is deemed functionally irrational by one group may be deemed functionally rational by another. For example, slavery was functionally irrational for blacks in the South but functionally rational for their white owners.

Similar to Weber's concept of an iron cage and Ritzer's theory of McDonaldization, Mannheim sees a danger associated with increasing rationality. For example, self-rationalization leads individuals to control their feelings and impulses in order to achieve an outside goal. Even further than that, however, is self-observation, which seeks to actually transform the self in order to become more rational. The increase in functional rationalization, and related types, can have the negative effect of reducing substantial rationality.

His later years in England saw Mannheim's interest in applying sociology to the real world grow as he sought to offer a means of planning and reconstructing the social world. He offered a system of "democratic planning" as opposed to either *laissez-faire* or totalitarian methods. This democratic planning would, in fact, be a kind of "control of control" that would prevent situations like the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany from recurring. Mannheim did not offer a formal, grand theoretical plan to restructure society but rather offered guidelines for what such planning should include. Most important, he argued that any plan should not be stagnant or one-sided but should instead rest on the interdependence of all viewpoints and be open to dynamism and criticism. The key to ensuring this, he posited, was an integrated approach to education that would teach all of us to accept and honor the viewpoints and fundamental rights of others.

Although Mannheim clearly made many great contributions to the field of sociology, his work has at least as many critics as supporters. One of the strongest criticisms is that although he is revered as the founder of the sociology of knowledge, he never offered a formal definition of what

exactly he meant by “knowledge.” Similarly, Mannheim often used other terms and phrases, many of them contradictory, to describe his area of interest. Additionally, he was not very clear about the actual relationship between knowledge and society. Regardless of these criticisms, however, there can be little doubt that Karl Mannheim made a lasting contribution to the discipline of sociology and the ways in which those in many fields understand the production, use, and origin of knowledge.

— Michael Ryan

See also Enchantment/Disenchantment; Lukács, György; Marx, Karl; Rationalization; Utopia; Weber, Max

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MARKOVSKY, BARRY

Barry Markovsky (b. 1956) is a social theorist and proponent of integrating theory with empirical research to develop social structural theories that span multiple levels of analysis. His theoretical work has contributed to the explanation of such diverse social phenomena as power, influence, status, legitimacy, equity and justice, and social solidarity.

Markovsky’s approach to social theory was shaped by his training in theory construction at Stanford University and especially by his mentor, Bernard P. Cohen, whose influential book, *Developing Sociological Knowledge* (1989), provides techniques for sociologists who do empirical research to build testable theories. The theory construction approach sees theory not as a separate subfield of sociology but rather as a part of sociological methodology that can be practiced by all sociologists. Theoretical and empirical methods are integrated into theoretical research programs that both develop theories and cumulate knowledge.

From the beginning of his career, Markovsky has made important contributions to established theoretical research programs. Joseph Berger and his colleagues developed status characteristics theory to explain how macro social structure is imported into small groups to shape the behavior of individuals working together. Markovsky joined the research team while still a graduate student and led the development of research explaining how the imported social structure of work groups reproduces itself as individuals leave the group and are replaced by others.

Theory construction uses the tools of symbolic logic and mathematics to explicate causal relationships among social variables. Markovsky contributed to metatheory (theorizing about how theories are developed) by showing that an adequate social theory necessarily involves analysis at multiple social levels. While macro social structure cannot be reduced to microinteraction among individuals, neither are the two independent systems.

Markovsky conceived social structure in ways that span levels of analysis to establish new theoretical research programs. With David Willer and other colleagues, he developed network exchange theory, which has quantified the effects of social structure on the power of individuals in networks. Even in small groups, social structure can often produce larger effects on behavior than can the characteristics of individuals. In other networks, however, social structural effects are dampened, allowing individual propensities freer reign. Network exchange theory explains how the pattern of structural relationships that represent any particular network determines the power of the various positions within that network. Moreover, as the theory has developed through empirical validation of its various aspects, it can accurately predict the relative power of different network positions.

In perhaps his most dramatic demonstration of the relationship among social processes at different levels of analysis, Markovsky showed that social structure has physiological effects on feelings of injustice that can then alter social interaction among individuals in ways predicted by theories of equity and distributive justice. By explaining physiological reactions as consequences of social structure as well as causes of social behavior, he presaged recent research on complex interactions between social processes and physiological development.

The best illustration of Markovsky’s structural approach to social theory construction may be the theory of group solidarity that he developed with Edward Lawler. Durkheim initiated the sociological study of group solidarity as the affective ties that bind individuals to groups. He proposed that mechanical solidarity emerges from the positive emotion engendered by group members engaged in similar activities, while organic solidarity emerges less strongly from the interdependence of group members created by the division of labor. Modern theories of group

solidarity such as those of Michael Hechter and James Coleman had focused on the interdependence that is characteristic of organic solidarity. These “utilitarian” theories proposed that solidarity exists to the extent that a rational actor would contribute resources to the group. Thus, they emphasize group norms and sanctions against free-riding members that provide incentives to contribute to the group. Markovsky and Lawler’s theory formalized the earlier understanding of group solidarity as primarily emotional in origin, the group-feeling that emerges as members work together. These theories suggest that solidarity results when affective bonds tie members to a group over and above the prospect of individual material gain.

To precisely define solidarity, Markovsky and Lawler’s theory first separated it from the related concept of group cohesion, the forces that bind a group together. They define *cohesion* as the degree to which members are directly related to other members, that is, the “reachability” of the group. *Solidarity* is then specified to obtain in groups that have high reachability and unity of structure. That is, solidary groups have direct relations among group members and a relative absence of cliques or subgroups. Note how well this formal definition captures Durkheim’s original conception of mechanical solidarity as arising in communal groups where all members interact directly with each other as they work on the same tasks. By precisely defining solidarity in relation to the structural properties of groups, the theory gained access to the powerful mathematical tools being developed to analyze properties of naturally occurring social networks. The theory then proposes ways in which emotions engendered during interactions among group members result in individuals forming affective ties to the group as an entity in itself.

Markovsky also contributed to the development of computer simulation as a theoretical tool to help guide social research. Computer simulation as practiced in the social sciences can be primarily empirical, using a continuing stream of data to build models of social phenomena, modeling the economy, for example. Markovsky, however, promotes simulation as a way to specify the assumptions and propositions of a theory by creating virtual actors that embody them. Then as a computer simulation runs, its results represent predictions of the theory. The advantage is that the computer can keep track of the relationships and sequence of interactions among the actors producing testable predictions rigorously derived from the theory. In contrast, a human theorist—unable to manage the complex relationships of many variables through a sequence of interactions—must make intuitive leaps to reach such conclusions. Markovsky’s X-Net simulator for exchange networks embodies the theoretical elements of network exchange theory to make predictions about the amount of resources that various network positions can acquire through a series of exchanges. Another advantage of computer simulation for theorists is its flexibility.

A theorist can change one element of the theory and then, by running the simulation, quickly see how that change will alter the theory’s predictions. The X-Net simulator proved its worth to the development of network exchange theory as it was extended to predict power more precisely in network structures that produce subtle power differences among network positions.

— Michael J. Lovaglia

See also Graph Theoretic Measures of Power; Lawler, Edward; Network Exchange Theory; Theory Construction; Willer, David

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MARX, KARL

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is widely known as the founder of scientific socialism, a revolutionary critic, in his own words, “of all that exists.” Born in Trier, close to the home of the French Revolution, formally educated at Bonn and Berlin, he was initially one of the Young Left Hegelians. His early political journalism led to exile in Brussels, Paris, then finally in London. The circuit was fateful, from German philosophy to French socialism and British political economy. While Lenin later popularised the idea that Marx’s work was a combination of German idealism, French utopian socialism, and British radical political economy, it may be more useful to view these as items on an itinerary. Certainly Marx’s travel and life path was essential to the development of his thought, even if much of it was unplanned. The *Paris Manuscripts* of 1844 have the radical

flavour of Paris as much as the ruminations of the *Grundrisse* (written between 1857 and 1858) ([1953]1973) are evocative of Marx's years spent working in the silence of the Reading Room of the British Museum. Marx was an outsider, whose life took him from the Rhineland to the homeland of the Industrial Revolution in league with his comrade, Friedrich Engels, who was a textiles manufacturer, a capitalist in Manchester. Engels's life experience of the factory production process, as well as his friendship and financial support, were crucial to the fulfillment of Marx's project. There would have been no Marxism without Engels.

Marx's work was much more than German philosophy, French socialism, and British political economy, and while his theory can be characterised as the critique of political economy, bourgeois society, and capital, there are various other aspects that elude Lenin's easy additive formula. Marx was as deeply influenced by the French Romantic Enlighteners such as Rousseau as by the German Romantics such as Schiller. He was as profoundly struck by the philosophical materialism of Feuerbach and even more influenced by the idealism of Hegel. His prose style is animated by Goethe and Shakespeare. His cultural universe, along with that of the German Enlightenment, was formed by the images of classical antiquity and especially by the work of Aristotle. Even as late as *Capital* (1867), Marx is still working in the wake of Aristotle's images of value and of the human as a political creature, or city dweller. Marx's social theory is a brilliant synthesis of Western and critical culture, though its focus is at once specific as it is general: capitalist production itself. Capital, and capitalist production, are at the centre of Marx's work.

If German philosophy opens the stage, and French politics brings Marx to socialism, then it is the critique of political economy that sustains his work from 1844 on. Marx's major works in the critique of political economy—the *Paris Manuscripts*, the *Grundrisse*, the 1859 *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*, and *Capital* (1867)—can be seen as ongoing instalments in the research program that dominated his life from 1844. Of course, for Marx, it was a political program too. For knowledge was revolutionary, and the purpose even of the heavy tomes of *Capital* was to bring on the revolution. The *Paris Manuscripts* saw Marx establish the basic ethical problem of capitalism as private property. The basic problem with capitalism was not that it exploited workers economically by extracting surplus value from them, though it did this too. The real problem was that *alienation* denied the possibility of human autonomy, whether in the act of labour, in the appropriation of its material result, in the alienation from other actors or from the species of humankind. The limit of Marx's argument is that it posits an anthropological holism for humans as the image of all things. The implication of the *Paris Manuscripts* is that socialism would involve some kind of return or recovery of

an original state or condition, where the division of labour could be rolled back and specialization overcome. Marx's early work contains a kind of romantic antimodernism. The positive aspect of Marx's early humanism lies in its insistence that social institutions and the prospect of social change result from willed human activity. Humankind solves only such problems as it sets itself. The urgency of this sense is apparent in Marx's famous Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach—"the philosophers have interpreted the world, thus far, the point, however, is to change it." This was the Marx who later most fully inspired the Western Marxists, such as Gramsci and Lukács, just as the image of alienation hit home on its first English translation into the 1960s to coincide with the radicalism of the social movements that also valued dreams of autonomy and freedom above all else.

By the time of the *Grundrisse*, and after the failure of the 1848 revolutions, urged on by *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848, Marx shifted the focus of revolutionary change from agents to structure, from proletariat to the revolutionary logic of capital itself. *The Communist Manifesto* is a key juncture here, for its mood shifts from condemnation of capitalism to the celebration of its revolutionary dynamo. From this point on, it becomes clear that capitalism for Marx is the precondition of socialism, not its negation. Marx is never without ambivalence, however, and so it is also here, in the *Manifesto*, that Marx revives Goethe's image of the sorcerer's apprentice, indicating a capitalist world not only out of control but beyond control.

The 1859 *Contribution* is best read as a prelude to *Capital*. Its most notorious feature is its *Preface*, where Marx indicates the project of what later is identified as historical materialism. More powerfully, the *Preface* indicates Marx's turn away from Hegel, away from the idea of civil society as a distinct sphere of activity or enquiry, and his turn into political economy itself as the key to social explanation. As Marx puts it, he now believes that the anatomy of bourgeois society is to be found in political economy. In the cruder language of later Marxists, economic base determined political superstructure; economy determined politics and culture. This was a vital moment in the development of Marx's social theory. It signalled the turn away from politics or culture into economy or production. This was the moment of the birth of economism. It was also a significant methodological step in the direction of monocausal explanation. Modernity, for Marx, henceforth meant capital, and this became the lasting strength and weakness of his legacy. Into the twenty-first century, the power of capital via globalization would be overwhelming, as would the larger theoretical sense that modernity was multifocal, vitally propelled not only by capitalism but also by the state and civil society, where only state and civil society might still hope to civilize capitalism.

In the *Grundrisse*, we watch Marx in his theoretical laboratory, puzzling over method, money, the transition from

feudalism to capitalism, and pondering the possibilities of a technologically driven transition from capitalism to socialism via automation. But *Capital* remains his greatest work, the pinnacle of his achievement, at least in its first volume, the only one published under Marx's authority in Marx's lifetime. In *Capital*, structure rules; this is a lifetime away from the passionate prose protesting alienation of the *Paris Manuscripts*, where the sensuous suffering of human creatures dominates. *Capital* is a work of the finest precision, logic, and choreography. Marx plays with Hegelian imagery, shifting as the text proceeds from the level of appearance (the commodity) to that of essence (the capitalist production process). His point in this elaborate form of presentation is that there is a logic of capital and a best single interpretative way into the labyrinth of bourgeois society. The image of the single commodity leads to the brilliant idea of the fetishism of commodities. Whatever the changes across the path of Marx's work, these consistencies persist. Marx's early encounter with Feuerbach leaves him ever aware of the problem of human projection, where we ascribe to what we create (God, capital) the power to create us. Authorship or agency become subsumed in structure. Marx's journey in *Capital* leads through phenomenological appearance to the descent, as in Dante's *Inferno*, into the living hell of the factory. History, or civil society or state, only enters marginally here, in the tenth chapter on the struggles over the length of the working day or the seventh part on enclosure and the primitive accumulation of capitalist relations. Then, remarkably, socialist revolution arrives unannounced in chapter 32 of *Capital*. This is the lyrical passage where the negations are negated, and the expropriations expropriated, the death knell of private property is sounded. Socialism arrives from within the heart of the capitalist vampire.

Perhaps the arrival of socialism as the culmination of *Capital* is less surprising read immanently than contextually, against the larger body of Marx's work. Marx's sense is that the internal logic of capital, toward self-valorization, is also a logic of self-destruction. The idea of "creative destruction" is associated formally with the work of Joseph Schumpeter, but it is also already active in Marx's thinking in *The Communist Manifesto* and *Capital*. Socialism is immanent within capitalist production. This is the conceptual origin of what later becomes known as "automatic Marxism," the idea that socialism is the rational kernel within capitalism, whether emerging through capitalist collapse, through the tendency of the profit rate to fall, through the development of automation, or through the development of proletarian cooperation within the factory. These later Marxian axioms are, however, clearly at variance with the ethical imperative in the early work, where socialism or social change is conceivable only as the result of willed human action or praxis. The later Marx still believes that the emancipation of the working class can only be the work

of the working class itself, but the image of action is framed by that of structure, history, or capital. The distinction between systemic evolution and proletarian revolution becomes blurred.

These tensions between the logic of the work of the early Marx and that of the later Marx became controversial into the 1960s with the English-language translation of Marx's early works. The general tension in debate among Marxists then was described as that between humanism and structure. Structuralist Marxism became intellectually dominant, not least because of its scientific credentials and the failure of the events of May 1968 to become fully revolutionary. Althusser claimed that the earlier Marx was not only a liberal but a different kind of thinker whose later work depended on intellectual rupture after the works of transition such as *The German Ideology* (1845). The question now arose whether Marxism was science or ideology. Marx and Engels liked to think of theirs as scientific socialism, as opposed to the blueprinting desires of their utopian opponents. Marx's work can be associated with the image of *Wissenschaft*, a nonpositivist cultural sensibility that indicates that knowledge is a work of craft and not of proclaiming the truth. At the same time, aspects of his later work bear undeniable resemblance to positivism as we know it in the lawlike sense, claiming to detect the future of humanity through the extrapolation of economic trends such as the concentration of capital and the polarization of classes. Even the 1848 *Communist Manifesto* is structured on the logic of necessity, here indicated by the polarization of bourgeoisie and proletariat into warring camps. As the even younger Marx put it, it was not for him a question of what the proletariat chose but what it was compelled to do.

By the 1980s, Structuralist Marxism had been overtaken by poststructuralism. Humanist Marxism became the object of ridicule in these circles, castigated for the naïveté of the idea that humans create their world. The very idea of humanism became laughable. The mature Marx replaced the young Marx, now to be replaced by Nietzsche, or more literally by Foucault.

A third perspective in the young versus mature Marx controversy asserted continuity, though more along conceptual than political lines. Alienation, for example, could be viewed as an earlier version of the idea of community fetishism. Marx's work could be viewed in its continuity not only as the critique of political economy but as the critique of ideology.

The early Marx criticises bourgeois ideology as false, a representation of the particular interest of the bourgeoisie as though it were general, or universal. Later, in *Capital*, the idea of commodity fetishism also addresses the problem of the way in which capitalist ideology or culture naturalises the existing order of things. At the same time, there is a shift of emphasis from the idea of praxis or sensuous human activity to that of structure across Marx's work and

a corresponding shift from a primary to a secondary emphasis on the role of ideology. For the later Marx, it is the case that bourgeois society reproduces itself less through ideas than through the dull compulsions of everyday life. On this view, the problem is less that capitalism needs to dupe its bearers into inner consent than that there are simply no alternative options available. Capitalism is not the main modern game, it is the only game. The issue is less that we deeply believe in capitalism than that we know no alternatives. For Marx, and those who immediately follow him, however, the alternative is latent within capitalism as socialism itself. The shifts of emphasis across Marx's work remain clear. The early Marx focussed on politics and journalism; the later Marx, on political economy and science. The early Marx focussed on alienation, the later Marx on commodification or reification (the latter becoming a key clue for Lukács). The early Marx privileged activity, or anthropology; the later valued structure. The early Marx was a voluntarist; the later was a structuralist.

There are many Marxes, both in Marx's work and especially for us, who come later. The humanist and ethical impulse of the early Marx was valued politically by the Marx Renaissance in Eastern Europe in work of critics like Heller and Bauman, whose goals were emancipation from the communist regimes that claimed to speak in Marx's name. The later Marx was refigured intellectually as structuralism, where together with Saussure and Freud, Marx's *Capital* was taken as a theory of the commodity sign and the capitalist structure behind it. At the same time, there were other Marxes in Marx's own work. There is the Marx of Rousseau, insisting on direct democracy, or of Schiller, denouncing the fragmentation of the specialized division of labour. There is the classical Marx with Aristotle, denouncing the idea that a shoe is made for exchange, rather than for wearing or spitting at the very idea of the division of labour, insisting that to subdivide a person is to execute that person. There is the Marx (and Engels) of *The German Ideology*, puzzling over anthropology both in its philosophical and physical senses. There is the Marx of the late *Ethnological Notebooks* (1879–1880), now reading Russian, whose thought-processes are so cosmopolitan that he shifts between four languages in one sentence of writing. There is Marx the historian, where some of his finest interpretative moments are registered, for example, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (1852), in images of antiquity and masking that pervade in an anticipation of the idea of the invention of tradition. Elsewhere, for example in *The Civil War in France* (1871), Marx both essays contemporary history and shows his hand politically, claiming the Paris Commune as a limited model of socialism.

The question of Marx's political theory is less clear than is his social theory. Marx's social theory begins with the critique of political economy and ends up within it. His political theory is closer in its general sentiments to

Rousseau's enthusiasm for direct democracy. His reflections on the state vary, from the cruder instrumentalist view that the state is merely the tool of the ruling class, to the more nuanced view that it is space for middle-class reformers such as the factory inspectors in *Capital*, or the idea that the state is contested and has its own interests in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*. What is notable here is that the more historically engaged Marx's work becomes, the more classes appear above and beyond the two-class model of the *Manifesto*, and the more complex the role of the state accordingly becomes. If Marx does not have a single, coherent theory of the state, nor does he have a clear theory of politics. His earliest journalism suggests the politics of reform. *The Communist Manifesto* announces the arrival of the Communist Party, but this is a small group of like-minded individuals, not a modern organized party; it precedes the mass party as an organizational form. The Communist Party as Marx conceives it theoretically is the same as the class. As is later the case in the spontaneism of Rosa Luxemburg, the party is the mass, is the class.

This is a hiatus in Marx's thinking that is never resolved. After his death, the German social democrats develop the organised mass party form, and the bolsheviks counterpose the vanguard or combat party to it. Marx has no concept of the vanguard or dictatorial combat party. His use of the image of dictatorship of the proletariat is a metaphor, reminiscent of the Roman history he grew up with in Trier. His model of local democracy, developed in *The Civil War in France*, is based on the three Rs of socialist democracy: rota, recall and relativity (rotation of leaders who are open to recall and paid wage relativity with ordinary workers). Marx has no theory of representative democracy, though he does endorse the idea of an electoral path to socialism late in life, an idea that Engels carries on and Kautsky builds into the culture of classical German social democracy.

By default, there are three avenues of change suggested in different parts of Marx's work. The first, and most powerful, is indicated through the critique of political economy that culminates in *Capital*. Here socialism is the evolutionary stage that follows capitalism, and emerges from within it, embryonically. Organic language, even gynecological, is powerful in Marx's work. The second, which coexists with this image of evolution and also comes to fruition in *Capital*, is the path where proletarian consciousness emerges in and through the production process—cooperation of labour on the factory floor leads to self-management, to the regime of the direct producers. The third, and most troubling, indication of the path of possible change connects consciousness less directly to the proletariat than to the intellectuals who understand capitalism theoretically through the prism of scientific socialism. By the time of the 1859 *Preface*, Marx seems to understand social change as occurring in that moment when structure and agency coincide. If socialists make history but not just as

they please, then socialists—proletarians and intellectuals together—make history when the time for socialism is ripe.

Marx never resolves this question of consciousness, or agency versus structure. If Marxism offers the correct reading of history, and the necessity of socialism is written into the very order of things, why bother with social science at all? Whatever the scientific claims of Marxism, its status as utopia persists. Indeed, there are at least five different images of utopia spread across Marx's work, changing as its own colour does from red or green to grey, as Marx becomes increasingly reconciled to industrialism across the path of his work. The *Paris Manuscripts* contain the image of utopia as the labour of craft. In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels offer a second utopia, where they play with the utopia of Fourier in the famous imagery where one could be hunter, herder, fisher, and critic across the path of a single day without ever becoming just one of these. Here the image is that human society should be based on difference, sensuality, and horticulture, Renaissance Man rather than Sparta. By the *Grundrisse*, Marx begins to anticipate a third utopia, shifting freedom beyond labour and into creation itself; automation makes it possible to glimpse utopia beyond labour. By the third volume of *Capital*, later again, Marx confirms in a fourth image of utopia this sense that freedom exists beyond the necessity of putting food on the table. Labour gives way to capital just as freedom gives way to necessity. Labour has to be minimized, rather than returned to its medieval form on this latter account. Marx's utopia, finally, makes peace with industrialism in *Capital* rather than seeking to overthrow it. Thus, the Marx that appealed so deeply to the student movement of the 1960s was the early Marx, the countercultural Marx, whereas the Marx of the intellectuals in the French Communist Party was the author of *Capital*, who showed how hard it was to change the world.

The fifth final, and suggestive, image of utopia in Marx is more provisional. It comes in the form of a theoretical dispensation to his Russian followers who, late in his life, wrote asking Marx's advice. Would they have to wait a hundred years more for the development of capitalism in Russia before their great-grandchildren could make socialism there? Probably, in retrospect, Marx should have remained theoretically consistent with the logic of his position, for which socialism necessarily followed capitalism, even more emphatically at the end of his life. The advice that he gave to his Russian followers was more politically supportive than it was theoretically consistent. Marx's letters to Vera Zasulich indicated that perhaps the Russians could short-circuit the process of capitalist development through the alternative development of the traditional collective form of property holding, the *mir*. The image of a local Russian socialism is implicit retrospectively in Lenin's New Economic Policy in 1921. Then Stalin—in this at least a good Westernizer—began the ruthless path of

Soviet forced industrialization and collectivization into the later 1920s. The figure of Marx now became an icon for a regime that forced labour and destroyed freedom rather than cultivating creativity of any human kind, which did more damage to its people in the name of primitive socialist accumulation than the developmental path of pioneering British capitalism ever achieved.

Marx's political legacy follows out through the tradition of classical social democracy. Hijacked by the bolsheviks after 1917, Marxism became globally synonymous with communism of the Soviet kind. Marx's work, which had emerged as a critical theory via the critique of political economy, was transformed by the bolsheviks into an ideology of state power for the modernizing project of third world regimes. Marx's critical legacy was maintained on the margin, by libertarians and social democrats, and extended later by the legacies of Western Marxism and critical theory. *Post-Marxism* became its caricature into the new century, after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of turbo capitalism under the aura of globalization. The post-Marxists are often entirely orthodox; they presume that Marx and Engels already grasped the essential reality of our contemporary world, today, within the prose imagery of *The Communist Manifesto*. They agree that Marx's best diagnosis is summed up in the maxim "All that is solid melts into air." But this is a mistranslation, both in the literal and the historical or theoretical sense. Rather, Marx says in the German original that all that stands, estatelike, disappears like vapour. The image is specific, and refers to capitalism's dissolution of feudalism, not to a universal axiom concerning the imperative of change. The more powerful image in *The Communist Manifesto* remains that of the sorcerer's apprentice. The power of the critique of capital, alienation, and commodification make it impossible to imagine modern social theory without Marx, even as we now imagine modernity differently into a new millennium.

— Peter Beilharz

See also Marxism; Post-Marxism; Socialism

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MARXISM

Marxism is the organized movements and theories established in Karl Marx's name, claiming to follow and set into practice his theories after his death in 1883. Marx is reputed to have said, in disgust at the quality of thinking of his French followers, that if these were Marxists, then he was not a Marxist at all. Marx and Engels nevertheless set about seeking to establish Marxism as a scientific rather than merely utopian socialism, and set out equally to place Marxism as the leading force in the formative international workingmen's movement. The history of Marxism is caught up with the history of the four internationals.

During his later life in exile in Britain, Marx's influence on the German social democrats took time to consolidate. The combined German Marxist party was formed in 1875. By the turn of the twentieth century, the German social democrats had become the first mass political party in the world and the subject of Roberto Michels's pioneering study in political sociology, *Political Parties*. It was a Marxist party, a party claiming to follow Marx. During Marx's lifetime, the more immediate object of struggle was the First or Workingmen's International. It was replaced by the Second International in 1889. As the German Social Democratic Party came to dominate global Marxism in this period, so did it dominate the Second International. The Second International collapsed in 1914, when German social democrats voted in parliament for war credits for World War I. With their successful seizure of state power in October 1917, the bolsheviks replaced the German social democrats as the dominant Marxist movement and in turn established the Third Communist International in 1921. Under Stalin, the Comintern became the arm of Soviet imperialism and was disbanded by Stalin in 1943 as a peace gesture to the Allies. In 1938, Leon Trotsky, the great bolshevik revolutionary forced by Stalin into exile in Mexico, proclaimed the Fourth International. International Trotskyism, taking its cue from Trotsky's 1938 *Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution*, proceeded to split multiply across the remainder of the twentieth century, often over the question whether to work within the larger socialist or labour parties or to work independently or follow other successful revolutionary movements such as those in

Cuba or Nicaragua. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is widely interpreted as indicating the end not only of communism or socialism but also of Marxism, though Marxism as a theory has become a permanent fixture in the academy, and its presence as the remaining critique of dominant global capitalism persists.

Marxism as a movement or series of movements has been different and had a distinctive fate than any other such social theory. The social theories of Durkheim and Weber generated no isms or ideologies to follow them. The only other social theorist to have a public influence in any way comparable to Marx was Freud, not at the level of state power or politics, but in the extraordinary spread of psychoanalysis, particularly in America. Marx's work, which proclaimed itself as a critique of ideology, follows the peculiar historical path in which it becomes an ideology, first of reform or opposition with the German social democrats, then of revolution and state power with the bolsheviks. By the 1930s, Soviet Marxism became the face of the most brutal state power alongside the Nazis, though it is important to recognise that there were always those Marxists who repudiated bolshevism from the start, and others who paid with their lives for standing against Stalinism in the name of Marxism and socialism. Marxism has always been a contested legacy.

The history and significance of Marxism after Marx is by no means limited to the Internationals, though it is often connected to them. German or classical social democracy, and then bolshevism or communism, became major historic facts and institutions of the twentieth century. Viewed as a social theory or set of social theories, Marxism proliferated in various ways as critiques of the world rather than as ideologies of movements seeking to change it and institutionalise alternative regimes of state power. While there is a long tradition of conservative thinking that views Marx's work as the necessary and sufficient precondition of Soviet communism, there is also an alternative stream for which Marxism is best understood as critical theory, for which the Frankfurt school is the exemplary tradition. For the critical theory of the Frankfurt school, Marxism was a German movement whose moment was lost in the failure of the labour movement to preempt Hitler and begin to install international socialism first. Viewed from the perspective of Gramsci or later, Habermas, the central weakness in Marx's theory was its economism, or its lack of theory of politics. Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach insisted that the point was not to interpret the world but to change it. But how? And who were the actors responsible for initiating change? Marx's fatal decision to locate the anatomy of civil society in political economy resulted in the assertion of the necessity of proletarian revolution, and ascribed the role of revolutionary agent to the proletariat, whether they wanted it or not. Socialism, counterposed to capitalism, subsumed the idea of democracy to itself but failed to specify the

mechanisms by which democracy could be promoted and extended. The standard Marxist contempt for representative democracy always left these Marxists on the outside.

The classical Marxists of the German Social Democratic Party followed Marx's economistic sensibility, for which socialism followed capitalism as evening follows day. The German social democrats, especially Karl Kautsky, who became its leading theorist and codifier, read Marx as Darwin and viewed Marxism as an evolutionary theory: first feudalism, then capitalism, within which would mature and finally emerge socialism, by definition an industrialized large-scale utopia. Capitalism was merely a husk, a cover for the next stage. This meant, for Kautsky, that the German social democrats were a revolutionary but not a revolution-making party (his predecessor, August Bebel, was fond of the view that socialism would fall into the laps of socialists like ripe fruit). Social democracy in Germany became an alternative culture, a society within a society, a project of internal institution building rather than revolution. For Kautsky, the long-term scenario was one in which class polarization would naturally divide the two great classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, diminishing the numbers of the former as it increased those of the latter, to the point at which the vast majority of the population would be not only proletarian but also socialist, for here the continuity of identity was presumed. This kind of "maturational socialism" by the 1890s resulted in the culture of fatalism that called out the Revisionist controversy, in which the major actors were not Kautsky, who sat in the middle, but Eduard Bernstein, arguing for reform, and Rosa Luxemburg, advocating revolution. Bernstein's diagnosis of the situation for socialists was exactly the opposite of Kautsky's: There was no process of class polarization, the middle class was growing rather than shrinking, capitalist crises did not worsen, socialist revolution was not around the corner, and therefore the challenges of democratic politics moved centre stage.

Bernstein's was a rare voice, arguing that socialism was desirable rather than necessary: Its prospects depended not on guarantees of necessity or assurances that capitalism would collapse but on the expression and articulation of popular will (what Gramsci would later call "counterhegemony"). The pragmatic Bernstein, witnessing the inconsistency between the Social Democratic Party's revolutionary rhetoric and its reformist practice, argued for bringing rhetoric into line with practice. Rosa Luxemburg argued to the contrary, that if practice failed to live up to revolutionary claims, then practice should move left, not theory accommodated right. The dispute was as telling as it was lively, for it served to highlight Marx's fateful legacy: The SPD had no theory of transformative politics. Bernstein argued, by default, for the introduction of a politics of citizenship, which looked to his opponents and others like the substitution of liberalism for Marxism. Bernstein was

ridiculed as a reformer, and charged with Fabianism to boot. The controversy was dual in nature. It involved not only reformism but also revisionism. To call practically for reforms was one thing. To insist that the theoretical tradition of revolutionary Marxism be revised, brought formally into line with this reformism, was another. Bernstein sought both to pursue political reform and to reform or revise Marxist orthodoxy, to mainstream Marxism as social democracy. Luxemburg had little better to offer, except for the telling critique that an accumulation of reforms would not add up to the qualitative social change that Marxism had stood for, this accompanied by a spontaneist insistence that the mass would indeed rise as a class, where no vanguard party would be necessary. Luxemburg remained revolutionary to the end; she remained a vehement critic of bolshevism, of Lenin's dictatorship, and of what she called Soviet barracks socialism.

Kautsky was practically the victor of the reform versus revolution debate, as its result by default was to restate the status quo: Social democracy was a revolutionary but not a revolution-making party. The contradiction was crowned in the 1890 Erfurt Program, where Kautsky's revolutionary maximum program was followed by Bernstein's minimum program, with no transitional program in between. The impasse was broken by the bolsheviks, with the theory and practice of the revolutionary combat party exemplified in the October Revolution. The German social democrats were eclipsed globally by the success of the bolsheviks in 1917 and then destroyed locally by the Nazis after their rise to power in 1933. The greatest institution of classical or European Marxism was no more. Its strongest, indirect legacy was to occur elsewhere, by transmission, in Sweden, where the Swedish Social Democratic Party, guided by the para-Keynesian ideas of Ernst Wigforss, became the natural party of government, opening the way to the project of wage earners' funds via Rudolf Meidner into the 1980s. [The Swedish Social Democrats had a clearer sense of purpose than their German teachers ever achieved. Their sense of mission was, first, to pursue political democracy or citizenship, then social democracy or social rights, and last, economic democracy, or social ownership. Theirs was a Marxist program that put muscle on T. H. Marshall's 1950 statement *Citizenship and Social Class*, and was only to be eroded by the new wave of globalization into the 1980s.]

Lenin had imbibed social democracy from Plekhanov, the Russian equivalent of Kautsky. As late as 1899, Lenin still argued forcefully in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* that capitalism came before socialism, and must do so; there were no shortcuts to socialism. Lenin was a social democrat, and his party was called the Russian Social Democratic Party. The breach in this position arrived in 1902, in *What Is to Be Done*, where Lenin introduced the idea of the revolutionary combat party. Doubtless conditions in Russia did not favour the early emergence of liberal

democracy; but Lenin turned the small vanguard party of activists into a virtue. The party was the solution to the problem of the missing theory of politics in Marx. It was only in 1917, however, that Lenin finally decided the time to seize power was ripe; the other bolshevik leaders demanded they wait, and Trotsky did not become a bolshevik until mid-1917, earlier showing solidarity with the Mensheviks, whose theory and politics were closer to those of the mainstream German social democrats. Lenin's political flexibility saw him argue for both the seizure of power in 1917 and for the introduction of capitalist economic elements in the New Economic Policy of 1921. The period of War Communism intervened.

The young Trotsky had argued a position similar to Luxemburg's, railing against Lenin's dictatorial style in his 1904 *Our Political Tasks*. In the 1905 revolution, his politics were more like Gramsci's in his conciliar period with the occupation of the factories of Turin in 1918. This most intellectual of Marxists, Trotsky favoured the intellectual climate of Vienna until becoming more bolshevik than the bolsheviks after 1917. His exceptional skills as military commissar during the civil war did not translate into ordinary political corridor skills; he was exiled by Stalin in 1927 and murdered on Stalin's orders in Mexico in 1940. Trotskyism became the standard halfway house for disillusioned bolsheviks. Having pioneered Marxist historical sociology in the fine volume of essays *1905*, Trotsky also generated one of the most powerful if ultimately unconvincing works of Marxist political sociology in his critique of the Soviet Union, *The Revolution Betrayed*, which claimed that the U.S.S.R. was in transition from capitalism to socialism, more socialist than not, as its property forms had been nationalized and it formally remained a workers' state, even if deformed in its institutions and political life. Trotsky's embrace of bolshevism saw him accept the single most central principle, which he hitherto vehemently rejected—the centrality of the party. As he later was to put it, none of the bolsheviks could be right against the Party; this was a matter of “my party, right or wrong.” Trotsky became the most bolshevik of bolsheviks, arguing for the militarization of labour and the Americanization of bolshevism, waxing lyrical in *Literature and Revolution* for the developmentalist utopia where humans and nature would be engineered to perfection. Marginalized politically, Trotsky was left with these fantasies while Stalin actually set about forcing industrialization and collectivization onto the Russians.

Into the 1930s, Stalinism became the dominant form of Marxism in the Soviet Union, the Third International, and the international Marxist movement. The Comintern became the global tool of Soviet power, and Stalinism became the dominant left ideology. Stalin insisted on the possibility of the construction of “socialism in one country,” resisted by Trotsky, reviving the earlier slogan of Permanent Revolution, for which socialism would be international or it

would not be at all, while all revolutions that commenced as bourgeois in the twentieth century would be compelled to become socialist in character. Plainly, Stalin's sense of realpolitik was more acute than Trotsky's, but the extent of the crimes to which Stalin was prepared to go, not least in engineering famine in the Ukraine in the name of attacking the middle peasantry and escalating the levels of incarceration in prison camps opened by Lenin, placed Stalin on a level of barbarism similar to that achieved by Hitler, perhaps worse. Marxist theory under Stalin was reduced to the hackneyed clichés of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, indicating alleged laws of nature and society that must be obeyed. Socialism entered its blackest moment. There were always voices of dissent, but too many socialists were suckers for the image of success implied and the aura conferred by Soviet state power. Stalinism was criticised and opposed by Trotskyists, earlier by the left opposition of Kollontai, by left radicals like Victor Serge and Ante Ciliga, by the council communists from Anton Pannekoek in Holland to Paul Mattick in the United States, by the Frankfurt school and Korsch, in a more compromised way by Western Marxist Lukács, whose peace with bolshevism was made early and adhered to.

Western Marxism, so-called after the fact, refers to the thinking of Europeans such as Gramsci, Lukács, and Korsch. If the axis of world Marxism had shifted to the East with the bolsheviks, and even if bolshevism was for these theorists exemplary in its activism, a new sense emerged that bolshevism could not serve as a universal model. In the East, in Russia, the old regime was rotten and could be knocked over. In the West, it was dug in, implicating individuals and classes as consumers and voters. As Lukács argued in *History and Class Consciousness*, the founding text of Western and Weberian Marxism, reification ruled in the West. To change the Western world would depend on understanding how it worked, and how in particular culture socialized individuals into accepting it. The revolution in the West would be slow. Within the communist sphere of influence, the Italian communist leader after Gramsci, Palmiro Togliatti, proclaimed polycentrism or the multiplicity of communisms into the 1950s, and alternative variations on the communist theme were exercised by Kardelji in Yugoslavia as socialist self-management, under Imre Nagy in Hungary and in Poland. Dissident reform communists emerged in each of these experiences, opening the way to the East European critical theory of the Budapest school and the Polish radicals including Zygmunt Bauman. Radical Trotskyists broke with Trotsky to form Socialisme ou Barbarie with Castoriadis and Lefort in France, differently with Michel Pablo in Algeria, C. L. R. James and Raya Dunayevskaya in the United States. Communism in America never held the appeal of Marxism, though some great thinkers like W. E. B. Du Bois joined the Communist Party of the United States of America.

Other American intellectuals supported Marxism and then turned. Among the more powerful thinkers involved were Sidney Hook, Max Eastman, and Daniel Bell. American Marxism was strong in political economy, as in the work of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy on capitalism and imperialism, and later in the world systems analysis of Immanuel Wallerstein and his cothinkers. Maverick sociologists connecting Marx to the mainstream included C. Wright Mills and Alvin Gouldner. The intellectual influence of Trotskyism as the party and nonparty loyal Marxist opposition was extraordinary. Its ambit included figures of extraordinary appeal, like Trotsky's biographer, Isaac Deutscher, American Trotskyists such as Irving Howe, and a whole generation of writers and theorists such as Perry Anderson connected with the British *New Left Review*. The Marxist economist most influential on the work of Fredric Jameson, Ernest Mandel, was a lifelong Trotskyist activist. Alternative trends flowered in Paris via the influence of Lefebvre, and earlier, Hyppolite and Kojève, who pioneered the French reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and influenced a whole generation that would later become largely structuralists.

The Soviet hegemony over the Left was only really loosened by the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and the emergence of a serious rival Stalinism or Marxism-Leninism with Mao Zedong Thought. Marxism appealed to the Western Left, it seems, not least because of its apparent romanticism or exoticism. The image of intellectuals forced to engage in backbreaking field labour in the so-called Cultural Revolution was perversely attractive to those who at the comfort of their metropolitan distance imagined this to be a new social experiment in overcoming the division between mental and manual labour. Romantic intellectuals of the Left have long harbored sympathies for the idea of the revolution, the revolutionary rupture as new beginning, whether in the new calendar of the French Revolution or the Year Zero of Pol Pot's Kampuchean disaster two centuries later. The connections were more than incidental—Pol Pot's theorist, Khieu Samphan, learned his Marxism in Paris. In terms of the politics of Marxist social theory, Maoism offered the communist insiders an apparently radical precedent from within the tradition with which to criticise Soviet Stalinism. For even despite his precipitous voluntarism, Stalin believed that economy ruled. Khrushchev inherited his sense that Soviet communism would beat capitalism by economic indicators. Mao, in comparison, argued that politics should be placed in charge—better red than expert.

Whether leading French Marxists like Louis Althusser really believed in the superiority of Mao Zedong Thought or not, the precedent provided by Chinese "purism" gave them a radical stick with which to beat stodgy Soviet Stalinists like Brezhnev, whose corruption became legendary. For all the distaste Althusser had for humanist

Marxists like Sartre, this was one thing they had in common. Third world Marxism appealed. In Sartre's case, the most striking filiation was with Frantz Fanon's advocacy of therapeutic anticolonial violence in *The Wretched of the Earth*. Here the logic was as simple as it was devastating. If civilization, or capitalism or imperialism destroys us, then the only solution is self-evident: We from the margins have to destroy it first, or before there is any further damage. Marxists from the West, even Trotsky, had always stood against individual acts of violence and terror, on the grounds that it was the system that needed changing. Kill the tsar, and there was always a little tsar behind him. Decolonization brought with it a sense of moral urgency where, as for Fanon, the sense of emancipation was more directly caught up with the capacity or need physically to remove the master. Sartre sympathised; others, like Camus and Orwell, were horrified. For them, the very idea of exemplary violence spoke only of the reproduction of terror, not release from it. By the 1960s, the old working-class movement of the centres was looking bourgeois, complacent, and incorporated. Such was the message of Marcuse's widely influential *One Dimensional Man*. Marx had ascribed the role of social actor to the proletariat; Lukács built a theory around this. If the working class failed to act, then given the necessity of socialism, another actor must logically step up to fill its place. By the sixties, the proletariat had become a systemic insider for radical Marxists; the change agent would have to be outsiders, the equivalent of the lumpen proletariat, the social scum, or proletariat in rags derided by Marx as agents of reaction rather than revolution. The transference of authority from the nineteenth-century proletariat to the late twentieth-century marginals made sense, but only within the limited logic of a politics where collective interests, or their absence, were presumed to be the key motivational force explaining social change. Thus, the wretched truly became the inheritors of the world. Third worldism shifted hemispheres after 1959, to take in enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution, though its dynamics were different and less ideologically driven. Cuba never quite had the appeal of China for Western radicals; support for Cuba was often more a matter of solidarity with a small power on the doorstep against the might of the United States. The retrospective enthusiasm for Che Guevara as a lost icon is similar in stature only to the cult of Trotsky and, photographically, to the cult of Jimi Hendrix.

As labour had become integrated into capitalist society especially after World War II, so did the social democratic parties become integrated as systems managers of the mixed economies. The German social democrats gave up all formal or rhetorical connection to Marxism after 1959, though Marxists and Trotskyists continued to work through its youth sections. The same process occurred in the labour parties of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Marxism as a theory revived into the sixties, with the translation of

Marx's early *Paris Manuscripts*, Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*, and books by Andre Gorz, Harry Braverman, and the American Monthly Review school. Journals proliferated, such as *Studies on the Left*, *Telos*, *Socialist Register*, *Marxism Today*, and *New Left Review*. Gorz revived the old German Social Democratic Revisionist debate, practically, by introducing arguments for what he called "revolutionary reforms," which sounded like Bernstein's project of accumulating reforms but claimed to escalate them together in a spirit closer to Gramsci's. Later, into the 1980s, these hopes helped fuel Left popular arguments for an Alternative Economic Strategy, which would consolidate and extend the national basis of social democratic reform by developing industry policy and self-management. *New Left Review* became a meter of Marxist theory, beginning with a more humanist and local phase, partly driven by the Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Movement, through to the headier days of Vietnam. The fare shifted from thinkers like Sartre to tougher French communists such as Althusser. Within the Marxist tradition of social theory, this marked a reversal, back to the image of scientific socialism.

Althusser's politics were those identified with Mao and Lenin, but his intellectual imperatives were closer to Lacan, Spinoza, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. His arrival coincided with the structuralist wave, when thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, and Lacan became extraordinarily influential in Paris, and, by English relay, throughout its intellectual dependencies. Structuralism did not break in America until the arrival of its literary turn, in deconstruction, and via Yale and then through the American travels of Foucault. Marxist structuralism was a peculiar mix of these structural orientations, which were often explicitly denied by thinkers such as Althusser, and the more conventional period communist interests in Gramsci, Lenin (but not, in Paris, Trotsky, who belonged to the Trotskyists), and Mao, together with the powerful image of the Cultural Revolution. Freud sat in the back of this grouping, as structuralist Marxism's interest in culture and consciousness included curiosity concerning psychology and the mind. How did capitalism subject us, make us subjects of its processes, make us love consumption? How could we break out of capitalism? The moment of break, apparently, came in 1968, when student strikes in Paris drew 10 million workers onto the streets; but the Communist Party leadership, wary of adventurism, failed to push the masses forward, and de Gaulle eventually sent the workers back to their homes with increased wage packets. May 1968 encapsulated the whole problem, for Marxists. It proved that the capitalist world could stop and that extraordinary creative energies might be released as a result; and it proved that, once the party was over, the world would go back to capitalist business as usual. Perhaps May 1968 was the last chance at *revolution*; perhaps it represented larger historical forces of modernization and smaller cultural moments of

efflorescence. Whatever the case, the French Communist Party made it plain that it did not want to lead a revolution. The leading communist parties, those of France and Italy (followed by Spain), had become, in period talk, social-democratized. They were managerial institutions, working a particular cultural and economic constituency connected to radical intellectuals and the working-class movement, whose purpose was like the labour parties to protect their interests and advance them where this could be done without risks of repercussion.

The image of social democracy they called up was somewhere between the fin-de-siècle achievements of the German society within a society and the postwar German image of sound corporate management and growth. The Latin communist parties made their last bid for increased power into the seventies in the form of the French Union of the Left and the Italian Historic Compromise. The French Union of the Left involved a coalition with the French Socialist Party, from which the Communist Party had split in 1920. The Italian Historic Compromise was partly referred back to the Gramscian idea of historic bloc, expanded to take in all larger political parties in an alliance of national popular unity. Generically, this movement became known as Eurocommunism, to set it apart from Soviet communism. The initiative at first stalled and was then taken over by changes in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, which saw communism marginalized as a world force. Perhaps this was inevitable, as communism represented a global attempt on the part of the bolsheviks and then Stalin and his followers to universalize the particular experience of the Russian Revolution. It was the phenomenon of the Russian Revolution that prompted Max Weber to comment to his younger friend, Lukács, that this experience would set socialism back one hundred years.

Marxism, itself the product of intellectuals as much as the workers' movement, lives on in a cultural form in universities and their milieu, not least as post-Marxism. Indeed, Marxism has become part of the popular culture it articulated, in the sense that economy rules, and globalization with it. What has gone is the idea that Marxism offers an alternative way of life, rather than a critique of actually existing capitalism. Marxism as a social theory remains influential in the critique of capitalism and imperialism; through its influence in sociology, not least in league with the insights of Weber that were connected by Lukács and driven on by the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt school; in cultural studies, via Gramsci, geography via Lefebvre, and so on. In less explicit ways, the influence of Marxism can be encountered in mediated forms in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, where cultural capital reflects capital in Marx's sense, and social action is circumscribed still by senses of economic interest, as in the sociology of Alain Touraine, where the idea of a single central social actor or subject for

each phase of societal development still echoes Marx, long after the dream of revolution has evaporated.

— Peter Beilharz

See also Exploitation; Historical Materialism; Marx, Karl; Post-Marxism; Socialism

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MATERNAL THINKING

A term coined by Sara Ruddick (1980; 1995), maternal thinking refers to the values, intellectual capacities, and metaphysical attitudes that may arise from the daily work of mothering children, whether that work is done by women or men or by biological or adoptive mothers. In developing this concept, Ruddick drew on the philosophical traditions of Wittgenstein, Winch, and Habermas, which treat thought as arising from social practice. At the same time, she contributed to the strong current within 1970s and 1980s feminist scholarship that highlights the value of activities conventionally associated with women.

Maternal practice, Ruddick argues, is governed by three universal but culturally and historically shaped “demands” of children. First, children demand preservation. Protecting a child in the face of life’s fragility produces the attitude of “holding;” of viewing the world with an eye toward keeping the child safe, knowing one cannot completely control the environment. Second, children demand nurturance. Helping the child grow physically, intellectually, and emotionally requires the capacity to welcome and understand complex, unpredictable change, both in children and in oneself. Third, children demand training so that they may achieve social acceptance. Fostering the child’s moral and social development requires cultivating openness to the child’s potential, including the child’s potential difference from oneself. A mother also needs to

model conscientiousness, resisting blind acceptance of her community’s values.

Ruddick emphasizes that mothers are not inherently peaceful; some mothers neglect or abuse their children, and many mothers support the military actions of their sons, lovers, and states. Nonetheless, she proposes that maternal thought can be a resource for peacemaking. Drawing on the ideas of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., she identifies four principles that may arise from efforts to protect, nurture, and train children: renouncing violence against the vulnerable, resisting injustice in one’s home or community, seeking reconciliation while holding people responsible for their actions, and keeping the peace when justice has been attained.

The greatest challenge for maternal thought is moving beyond protecting, nurturing, and training one’s own children at the expense of others, thereby perpetuating racism, classism, and other forms of injustice and violence. And yet Ruddick finds that maternal thought can be a resource for a broader politics of resistance. For example, the Madres of Argentina, who resisted their government’s kidnapping, torturing, and murdering of “the disappeared,” connected their fight for their children to the violence others suffer worldwide. Ruddick also claims that when mothers develop a feminist consciousness, they come to see clearly the harm they have suffered as well as inflicted on others, and they may come to understand connections between those forms of violence and state-sponsored violence. While feminism itself does not necessarily oppose all forms of violence, a maternal politics informed by feminism encourages the extension of local concerns to a global concern for all children.

In theorizing maternal thinking, Ruddick claims universality not for mothers’ situations but for children’s demands for preservation, nurturance, and training. She also acknowledges that she theorizes as a white, heterosexual, partnered, middle-class American woman. Some feminist critics, however, find that Ruddick’s theorizing slips too easily into generalizing from privileged mothers’ circumstances. Patricia Hill Collins, for instance, developed the concept of *motherwork* based on the experiences of poor and working-class mothers of color in American society. These mothers struggle for their children’s survival, teach their children to preserve their identities in a racist society, and fight for empowerment in a society that exploits their labor.

Other feminist scholars who focus on women’s social locations modify rather than criticize the concept of maternal thinking. For example, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1996) explores maternal thinking under conditions of severe deprivation in Brazil. Rather than seeking to preserve life, extremely impoverished mothers develop the mental habit of “letting go,” of resigning themselves to the deaths of infants who “need” or “want” to die. Scheper-Hughes finds

a convergence between this form of maternal thinking and military thinking in that both develop a concept of acceptable death.

Eva Kittay (1999) takes up the issue not of mothers' radically different circumstances but of children's, pointing out that Ruddick's concept of maternal thinking presupposes an "intact" child. When a child is severely disabled, the work of preservation persists for the child's entire life. The work of fostering development requires imagining not eventual independence but development of *this* child's capabilities. This may mean, for example, enhancing the child's capacity for joy. The work of training requires negotiating the child's social acceptance. This may mean both normalizing the child and accepting what is normal for *this* child. It may also mean challenging institutionalized discrimination so that others may accept the child as he or she is. In theorizing maternal thinking in this way, Kittay seeks concepts of equality and justice that include the fact of dependency in our society and that respect the work of caring for dependents. In her recent work, Ruddick commends this revision of the concept of maternal thinking.

— Susan E. Chase

See also Collins, Patricia Hill; Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Ethics; Ruddick, Sara

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of privilege are related to one another in ways that make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand one without paying attention to its connection to the others.

In the simplest sense, in our lives as individuals, there is no social situation in which people perceive and treat us in terms of a single characteristic such as being white or female or gay. For example, people are unlikely to experience me as simply a man or a white person but instead will form complex impressions based on a larger set of characteristics. Even if their attention is drawn to some particular aspect of my social identity—such as my gender—they will nonetheless experience me as a man of a certain race and class and sexual orientation, not as some kind of "generic" man who is at that moment neutral or invisible in relation to other characteristics related to privilege.

The complexity of social identity in relation to privilege makes it likely that people will belong to both privileged and subordinate categories at the same time. Some people—such as middle-class, straight, white Anglo men—may belong only to privileged groups, while others—such as lower-class lesbian women of color—may belong only to subordinate groups. But most people—such as working-class white men or professional women of color—will fall somewhere in between, making for complex and sometimes confusing lives. Working-class white men, for example, may be acutely aware of their subordinate position in the class system but oblivious to their access to male privilege and white privilege. Not only that, but their acute awareness of class disadvantage may make them bristle at the idea that they have access to any form of privilege.

This combination of defensiveness and blindness to privilege is a frequent source of conflict and division as subordinate groups try to organize against their own oppression. The women's movement, for example, continues to struggle with the perception among women of color that their interests are routinely subordinated to those of white women, especially white women of the upper middle and upper classes.

The matrix of domination also points to the complexity of privilege on the level of social systems, where various forms of privilege intersect in complex and powerful ways. Many people believe, for example, that the origins of racism and white privilege are primarily a matter of race itself—going back as far as human awareness of racial differences—and are rooted in an inherent human tendency to fear those unlike themselves. The history of racism, however, shows that the origins of white privilege and whiteness as a social identity are fairly recent and cannot be separated from the development of capitalism and the social class system among whites in the United States during the nineteenth century. At the core of white privilege and racism was the institution of slavery, driven primarily by the desire among whites for rapid economic growth and by the development of technology such as the cotton gin that made the massive enslavement of Africans a lucrative enterprise.

MATRIX OF DOMINATION

First introduced by the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins, the matrix of domination is a concept that draws attention to the inherent complexity of privilege as it operates in social systems and shapes people's lives. The basic idea is that various forms of privilege—such as those based on race, gender, class, ethnicity, or sexual orientation—do not exist independently of one another in the social world or people's experience of themselves. Instead, various forms

The various forms of white racism that accompanied slavery—the devaluing and oppression of African Americans and the violence directed at them—were primarily ways to justify and enforce a system of economic exploitation based on race.

The connection between race and class is more complex than this, however. The white working class was encouraged to incorporate whiteness into their social identity as a mark of superiority and pride. This was done in large part to compensate them for their oppression as workers under the industrial capitalist system, thereby defusing discontent that might otherwise erupt in rebellion against capitalism and class privilege.

Racism also had the effect of dividing the working class along racial lines so that white workers were encouraged to focus suspicion and hostility on people of color rather than on the capitalist class. When white unions went on strike, for example, owners often resorted to the tactic of using people of color as strikebreakers both to resume production and redirect white hostility.

Class and race continue to interact in powerful ways. Much of the opposition to affirmative action, for example, comes from white male working- and middle-class workers who experience people of color and white women not as allies in a class struggle but as competitors and adversaries defined by race and gender.

In these and other ways, the concept of the matrix of domination clarifies the complexity of privilege as it shapes both individual identity and the distribution of wealth, power, and prestige in social systems. It focuses attention less on individual sources of privilege and oppression in isolation from one another than on interlocking systems with multiple dimensions. In this way, it draws attention to the problem of privilege itself—regardless of the form it takes—as one of the most powerful sources of division, injustice, and unnecessary suffering in the human experience.

— Allan G. Johnson

See also Gender; Social Class

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McDONALDIZATION

According to George Ritzer, with whom the academic use of the term originates, McDonaldization is "the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world" (Ritzer 1993:1). As such, McDonaldization does not refer to the spread of McDonald's restaurants throughout the world, and nor does it refer to the fact that more and more areas of life are copying McDonald's. It is undoubtedly the case that the latter happens, but it is only part of what Ritzer means by McDonaldization. Instead, McDonaldization refers to the diffusion of the principles that the restaurants exemplify.

Ritzer sees McDonaldization as an aspect of the continuing rationalization of more and more areas of social life. This process has been identified by many of the early classical sociologists like Max Weber. The term was devised in large part as a medium for helping students and others to understand the process of rationalization. The process of McDonaldization draws on a number of developments that precede the emergence of fast-food restaurants. Ritzer singles out scientific management, Fordism, and bureaucracy for special mention as precursors of McDonaldization. The first of these, which was expounded by Frederick Winslow Taylor at the turn of the twentieth century, called for the breaking down of work tasks into minute components, which were then reassembled in the most efficient combination. Fordism was influential in the spread of McDonaldization in building upon scientific management by recognizing the need for fragmented jobs to be linked together so that a standardized product could be manufactured through a continuous production flow. Regarding the notion of bureaucracy, McDonaldization takes inspiration from the regulation of organizational behaviour through rules and regulations as well as through tight managerial control. Thus, these three influences, all of which are features of creeping rationalization, are seminal influences on the process of McDonaldization, though they predate the first McDonald's restaurant by many decades.

McDonaldization has to do with the spread of *the principles* of the fast-food restaurant. As such, McDonald's merely acts as a symbol for these developments. It is, of course, a very high-profile symbol, but the point is that McDonald's itself only exemplifies the principles. Ritzer outlines four dimensions of McDonaldization, all of which can readily be seen in a McDonald's restaurant:

Efficiency. This refers to the implementation of the optimum means for a given end. A McDonald's restaurant is efficient in a number of ways but particularly in the sense that it is geared to allowing a large number of people to be supplied with food. It is efficient from the point of view of both the restaurant and the consumer.

Calculability. This means an emphasis on things that can be counted. In the specific case of McDonald's restaurants, this is revealed in a number of ways. The restaurants used to proclaim the number of millions and later billions of burgers that McDonald's had sold. But more significantly for Ritzer, they convey the impression that the consumer is getting a *large* amount of food for a *small* expenditure of money (e.g., Big Mac).

Predictability. When you go into a McDonald's restaurant, anywhere in the world, you will not encounter any great surprises. Minor national variations are sometimes introduced, but by and large, the menu will be familiar to anyone who knows McDonald's fare. Not only that, but if you do order a Big Mac, it will be the same in terms of size, contents, taste, appearance, wrapping, and even how it was cooked and put together as one bought anywhere else.

Control through nonhuman technology. Both customers and workers are controlled through nonhuman technologies. Customers in a McDonald's restaurant are controlled through the queuing system, whilst workers are controlled through production technologies that measure the precise amount of ketchup or the cooking time.

McDonaldization is evident not just in the spread of such principles in fast-food restaurants but in its diffusion in many spheres of modern life. Thus, Ritzer and various other writers have considered its flow into areas such as theme parks, higher education, sport, health care, shopping, tourism, and even birth and death (Ritzer 2000, 2002; Smart 1999). Of particular interest is Ritzer's (1998) suggestion that American sociology has been mechanized. For example, it exhibits predictability by virtue of the standardized format of journal articles, which are further rationalized by the peer review process, while the computer and software, as nonhuman technology, control the writing process. One might add that the growing use of online reading of journal articles constrains the reader too.

Ritzer writes very much as a critic of McDonaldization, though he also displays a grudging admiration for it. The critical hue is apparent in his identification of what he terms "the irrationality of rationality" in relation to McDonaldization. The irrationality of rationality seems to serve as a further dimension of McDonaldization in some of Ritzer's writings. The point is that frequently McDonaldization leads to the *opposites* of the four features. In other words, it frequently

leads to *inefficiency, unpredictability, incalculability, and loss of control.* In the case of the rationalized jobs that are so central to McDonaldization, the irrationality of rationality is revealed in the fact that McDonaldized work is invariably dehumanizing. This in turn leads to a high labor turnover and frequently to difficulty in finding replacements.

McDonaldization has been criticized on several counts. It is sometimes accused of not taking the perspective of the user into account and of instead placing the emphasis on Ritzer's own views about others' experiences. He has been accused of providing a simplistic view of the globalization process that takes little notice of local adaptations to the global spread of McDonaldization's principles. It is also sometimes suggested that Ritzer minimizes the role and significance of countervailing trends, such as post-Fordism with its implications of variety and customization in place of standardization and the mass market.

Ritzer's writings on McDonaldization have provided a provocative concept that encapsulates several trends in modern society but in a manner that is accessible beyond the academy.

— Alan Bryman

See also Bureaucracy; Disneyization; Fordism and Post-Fordism; Globalization; Means of Consumption; Ritzer, George; Weber, Max

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MEAD, GEORGE HERBERT

George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) was a philosopher who had been influenced initially by positivistic psychology but eventually developed a unique perspective that combined the pragmatism of John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Josiah Royce into a social psychology with elements of the biological and evolutionary sciences. Some pertinent details of Mead's life are worth reviewing as a backdrop to understanding what led him to develop this novel position.

Mead, born in 1863 in South Hadley, Massachusetts, had been exposed to both religion and higher education

throughout his formative years. His father, Hiram, was chair in Sacred Rhetoric and Pastoral Theology at Oberlin College beginning in 1869. Mead's mother also taught at Oberlin, and she was devoted to ensuring that young George was guided through a daily routine of prayer, study, and good works. Although Oberlin College was well known for its religious orthodoxy, it also emphasized the social obligations of living as a Christian, and this included a rather "radical" commitment to the emancipation of blacks and women (Joas 1985:15).

Given this set of circumstances, it was already decided that George would himself attend Oberlin College, where he received his bachelor's degree in 1883. Because Darwinism was in full ascendancy as an intellectual worldview at the time Mead began his university studies, he was confronted with the seeming contradiction between a life devoted to Christian charity informed by the word of God, on one hand, and the secular "truths" represented in Darwinism and Spencerian evolutionism, on the other. Early on, then, Mead showed a concern for the sources of moral values in a rapidly secularizing world, and, as we shall see, much of his mature, later work was dedicated to working out this issue.

After college, Mead tried several things, including teaching grade school, working in railroad construction, and working as a surveyor and a private tutor (Miller 1973). None of these were rewarding, however, and in 1887 he returned to secular education by enrolling in graduate school at Harvard University. The spirit of social reform of the era lent a certain respectability to professors who felt inclined to engage in social advocacy, and Mead was drawn to Harvard faculty who shared this sentiment, including Josiah Royce, George Palmer, William James, and close friend and fellow graduate student Henry Castle (Wallace 1967). (Mead never actually studied with James, but did tutor his children [Joas 1985:17]). At Harvard, Mead initially was interested primarily in philosophy, psychology, and languages, including Greek, Latin, German, and French.

A year later, after winning a prestigious Harvard scholarship that allowed him to study abroad, Mead had decided that the study of physiological psychology would be useful insofar as this field promised to deliver empirical insights into all manner of human behavior, including the genesis and development of human morals and values. At the time, Wilhelm Wundt, at the University of Leipzig in Germany, had established an experimental laboratory for testing the propositions of physiological psychology, and Mead studied there during the winter semester of 1888/1889. A year later, Mead transferred to the University of Berlin, where he studied with Wilhelm Dilthey, among others. This was important insofar as Mead's enthusiasm for the positivistic orientation of physiological psychological was tempered somewhat by the more "descriptive" psychology espoused

by Dilthey, one that utilized the interpretive methods of the humanistic sciences (Joas 1985:18).

Although still without an advanced degree, Mead returned to the United States in 1891 and accepted an instructor position at the University of Michigan to teach philosophy and physiological psychology. It was there also that Mead met his lifelong friend and colleague, John Dewey. Dewey, who shared with Mead an abiding concern with social democracy and morality, was teaching courses in ethics and psychology at Michigan, and it was in these courses and more informal contacts that Mead began putting together the theoretical approach that was to become social behaviorism.

SOCIOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

In 1894, Dewey agreed to become head of the philosophy department at the University of Chicago, and he brought with him Mead, who was given the rank of assistant professor of philosophy. What Mead had needed all along to bring together the many disparate strands of his training was a philosophical focus, and this came in the form of pragmatism, a perspective that was sponsored by many of the Chicago faculty with whom Mead worked and studied, including Dewey, James Tufts, and James Angell (Miller 1973:xxii). Pragmatism is an American movement in philosophy, founded by C. S. Peirce and William James, marked by the doctrine that "truth" is preeminently to be tested by the practical consequences of belief. From this perspective, history and the human condition are neither the result of mechanical necessity (as in positivism or as implied in the spatiotemporal framework of physics) nor the movement toward a known or fixed goal (as in Platonism or Hegelianism), but instead is a process conditioned by human thinking and action (Miller 1973:xxiv). In other words, rather than positing the intervention of external forces, pragmatism focuses on flesh-and-blood human beings doing things together in the here and now to create and modify a shared reality, an ongoing social world. Mead (1929–1930) favored pragmatism because he felt both neo-Hegelianism and Darwinism, positing master trends seemingly decoupled from the willful actions and interventions of human beings, were incompatible with democracy.

Mead would remain at Chicago until his death in 1931. During the decade before his death, sociologists at the university started noticing his work because it seemed to represent a new and important type of social psychology, one that emphasized the importance of the social environment in helping to shape and form the individual (Cook 1993). Hence, many within sociology embraced Mead as one of their own. Sociologists, as well as many economists, psychologists, education researchers, and even theologians at Chicago, felt that the pragmatic social psychology Mead and his associates in the philosophy program were

developing promised to resolve all philosophical questions through analyses of practical action.

For sociologists, most importantly, Mead's work seemed to resolve—or at least cast in a new light—the question of how the impulsive, biological organism acquired the capacity for self-awareness, purposive behavior, and moral discrimination (McKinney 1955). In developing such concepts as the social act, the self, and mind and thinking (all of these to be discussed more fully below), Mead forcefully argued that meaning is neither biologically given nor simply a psychical addition to an act. Rather, meaning arises in and through social acts and social relations, where human beings actively participate in the meaningful construction of their world through the exchanging of significant symbols, whether verbally through language or nonverbally through gestures. Through the medium of society—the organization of perspectives of real individuals—the impulsive organism becomes a rational actor (McKinney 1955:149). This perspective became immensely influential within sociology, leading directly to the development of symbolic interactionism as fashioned by Herbert Blumer and other of Mead's students.

THE SOCIAL ACT: THE PRECONDITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

As we have seen, although Mead was a social psychologist whose writings sociologists at the University of Chicago and elsewhere deemed relevant to their own work, he was also a social behaviorist because of the seriousness with which he viewed the writings of Charles Darwin, even though he ultimately rejected Darwin's functionalist psychology, which asserted that consciousness is a precondition of the social act. Mead (1934:18) argued instead that the social act is the *precondition* of consciousness. Elements of both Mead's social psychology and social behaviorism led him to an interest in physiological psychology, and it should be reiterated that that interest arose because he was convinced that philosophical problems could be clarified and given empirical referent with help from the biological and evolutionary sciences (Joas 1985). The biological sciences were important to Mead to the extent that philosophers (with the exception of the pragmatists) and social scientists had tended to neglect corporality, or the body, in developing explanations of social behavior.

This concern is forcefully illustrated in *The Philosophy of the Act* (1938), where Mead argued that it was important to deal conceptually with two aspects of human perception of the social world and objects (including self and fellow human beings) contained therein. On one hand, there is perception arising out of immediate experience, namely, situations in which an organism makes no differentiation between itself (its body) and objects as seen or manipulated by it within immediate perceptual range. In effect, immediate

experience is equated with bodily activity, where the organism deals directly with things rather than with signs of things (Tibbetts 1975:224–5). On the other hand, there is perception that arises through reflective analysis (or intelligence), whereby human beings make clear distinctions between that which lies within the experiencing subject (subjectivity) and that which lies outside the subject (objectivity, represented by other physical or social objects and one's own body).

MIND AND BEHAVIORISM

Mead raises this classic subject-object dualism, however, not merely to reaffirm its long-standing position in descriptions of the human condition in philosophy, the humanities, and the sciences but to suggest that there is never really any way of going beyond, or leaving behind, the brute reality of the physical realm within which human beings conduct their social activities. Although it is true that the evolutionary adaptation and upgrading of the human brain provides for complex symbolic communication that elevates humans above the animal level, and because of this it becomes important to take account of internal perceptual experience, it should never be forgotten or overlooked that humans are social animals as well, and hence attention to behavioral activity taking place via organism-environment transactions is equally important to the social analyst (Feffer 1990; Tibbetts 1975.)

This reflects, in essence, a debate between a purely physiological or behavioristic approach to explaining human behavior (as represented in Darwin or John B. Watson) and the social psychological behaviorism that Mead was attempting to develop. As a type of positivistic theory, behaviorism suggests that one may develop general explanations about human behavior if one assumes that human beings—like other animals—respond to external stimuli in the same way. That is, human beings will repeat behavior that is pleasurable or rewarding and desist from or try to avoid behaviors that are painful. This is known as the stimulus-response (S-R) theory, namely, that as sentient life-forms, human beings are predictable insofar as pleasurable stimuli will produce certain forms of concrete, observable behavior and painful stimuli will produce other types.

The more interpretive, social psychological theory that Mead was developing, in contrast, influenced by Dilthey and Dewey among others, suggests that the behaviorist or S-R approach leaves one crucial element out of its explanation: human cognition. From the social psychological perspective, the S-R approach is overly deterministic in that it sees human beings as empty vessels being buffeted about by various external stimuli. This, Mead would contend, is simply not an accurate portrayal of human behavior. Between the external stimulus (S) and the response (R) of the organism to that stimulus is the cognitive process at

work within the organism (O), whereby the organism *interprets* what the stimulus *means*. As Cook (1993:75) has noted, in emphasizing “mind,” and the internal conversation between the “I” and the “me” that takes place with any meaningful human social action, Mead argues that the standard behavioristic explanation of human behavior—which was dominant in psychology and the social sciences at the time Mead was writing—renders human beings as merely passive recipients of external stimuli. Rather than human beings receiving external stimuli in such mechanical fashion and responding to these stimuli in predictable ways, human beings are constantly adjusting themselves to objects in the social environment—which includes inanimate objects, living organisms, other human beings, and one’s self—through a mindful process of taking into account these objects and taking the role of, or attitude of, these others. As such, mind is a temporal extension of the environment of the organism. As Miller (1973:203) goes on to explain, because human beings are conscious of their intentions prior to acting and as they reflexively monitor their behavior, they can either continue on with the intended course of action or modify it as the situation warrants. In essence, this control over behavior reflects the social component of the mind.

Thinking, as mindful activity, involves a conversation between the objects immediately available in the social environment (representing the “generalized other” or the “me”) and the person (the “I”).

REFLEXIVITY AND THE SELF

To reiterate this element of his social psychology, Mead argues that the essential condition for the appearance of mind is that the individual, in acting toward and adjusting to objects in the social environment, also takes into account himself as an object in relation to the other objects present. Hence, a self arises, one in which knowledge of the thinking self accompanies the “brute” realities of the physical organism moving about in space and time (Mead 1938:367–8).

This most essential characteristic of mind and mindful activity, which serves to separate humans from lower animals, is accomplished via the human capacity for reflexivity or “reflexiveness.” Reflexivity was especially important both to Charles H. Cooley’s “looking glass self” and of course to Mead in developing the concepts of mind and self. In Cooley, persons develop a sense of self by seeing themselves in the reflection of others’ attitudes and behaviors toward them. Likewise, Mead argued that it is by means of reflexiveness—the turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself or herself—that persons are able to take the attitude of the other toward them. “Reflexiveness,” according to Mead (1934:134), “is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of

mind.” The human being is an object to himself or herself, or, similarly, the human being may become the object of his or her own action (Blumer 1969:62). However, this self-interaction is not merely an internal, psychological phenomenon but a *social* process out of which arises the self. As Blumer (1969:63) explains, the “ego” as such is not a self; “it would be a self only by becoming reflexive, that is to say, acting toward or on itself.” Mind and self are not simply givens in the biological makeup of human beings; they arise out of participation in group life (Blumer 1981:140). In suggesting a convergence of Cooley and Mead on the concept of reflexivity, however, it should be noted that Mead (1956:293–307) distanced himself from what he considered to be Cooley’s overemphasis on consciousness and “psychophysical parallelism” represented in ordinary psychology.

As we have seen, Mead emphasizes that the self—to be distinguished from the physiological organism—is not given at birth but arises through developmental stages through social experiences and activities. Most important, the self is an *object* to itself, which thereby distinguishes it from other objects as well as from the physical body. But how does a self become an object to itself? The self is experienced as an object not directly but indirectly from the particular standpoints of other members of the same social group. Before becoming a subject to himself or herself, the person first becomes an object to himself or herself, and this is accomplished by taking the attitudes of other individuals involved in the same groups or shared social activities (Mead 1934:138). In essence, the self is a social structure that arises in and through communication and social experience.

PLAY, GAME, AND THE GENERALIZED OTHER

An important set of background factors in the genesis of the self includes the activities of play and game. The *play stage* occurs early in the lives of children when they typically begin to play with imaginary friends or take on various roles such as mother, father, police officer, teacher, or even cartoon characters. The importance of communication and the significant symbol are obviously important here, to the extent that “when a child assumes a role he has in himself the stimuli which call out that particular response or group of responses” (Mead 1934:150). In other words, the child is aware of and can use on some level a set of stimuli that call out in the child the sort of responses they call out in others. When simultaneously playing the roles of teacher and student, for example, the child may call roll as the teacher and respond with a “Here” or “Present” as the names of each child in the class are read. Saying something as one character is the stimulus that calls out a response for the next character, and that response in turn is a stimulus for the next response or set of responses. As this conversation

of gestures progresses, a certain organized structure arises in the child and his or her “others.” This organized structure is in essence the first glimpse of a developing self. Rather than straight S-R in the behavioristic sense, a self develops as conversations between a number of role personae are engaged by the individual, thereby emphasizing cognition and mind, reflecting in essence the improved S-O-R pattern of stimulus-organism-response.

The fuller development of the self, however, does not occur until the child has reached the *game stage*. In order to participate in organized games, the child must be able to take the attitude of everyone else involved in the game. For example, in a simple game such as hide-and-seek, the child must be able to take the attitude of those in one of two distinct roles, namely, hider or seeker. In more complex games typical of organized sports, the child must be able to take the role of multiple positions simultaneously. For example, in order to play the game of baseball competently, a person must be able to anticipate what each position on the field will do at the crack of the bat. By doing this, by putting himself or herself in the shoes of everyone else on the team, the person develops a highly organized set of responses (rules) by which he or she is now able to look back upon himself or herself from the vantage point of all the other positions.

Through the process of socialization, as we continue to move out beyond the limited experiences of family and peer groups to a wide assortment of persons and social situations that mark life in a modern, culturally diverse society, we continue to take on the attitudes of diverse individuals and groups and to reflect back upon our selves from their vantage points. This organized community or social group that delivers to the individual his or her unity of self Mead termed the “generalized other.” In essence, the attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community (Mead 1934:154).

THE SOCIAL NATURE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT

Ethics and human values were issues that Mead kept at the forefront throughout the development of his theoretical system. As Morris (1934:xxxi) has suggested, “Mead, in common with all pragmatists since James, held an interest theory of values: that is good which satisfies an interest or impulse.” Kant’s categorical imperative is paradigmatic of a philosophical—rather than an empirical or “scientific”—approach to the question of ethical behavior and values, and as we have seen, Mead was attracted to science and the promise of empirical evidence as a way of overcoming the “speculative” insights of idealistic systems of thought, whether in the guise of social philosophy or theology. Even so, for the most part, contemporary symbolic interactionists (such as Blumer) who consider Mead (along with James,

Dewey, and Cooley) to be the intellectual founders of the perspective take to heart Kant’s universalizing notion of the categorical imperative. Indeed, Mead’s generalized other finds close affinity to Kant’s categorical imperative. For example, Mead (1934:386) once stated, “One should act with reference to all of the interests that are involved: that is what we could call a ‘categorical imperative.’”

Hegel was opposed to Kant’s “reflective philosophy,” and especially the famous distinction Kant made between noumena and phenomena. Noumena are “things-in-themselves,” and these are distinguished from “phenomena,” which are those objects that like-minded persons—whether scientists or laypersons—come to some agreement over and treat as if they were objectively “real” and hence knowable. As Mead (1934:379) emphasized, Kant assumed human beings are rational to the extent that in determining the conditions of our existence, we take into account (ideally) the attitude of the entire community. Where Mead attempted to go beyond Kant is by suggesting that morality or sociability is not something that arises out of individual activity or thinking that presumably takes into account the actions of others (society)—this was the same mistake Cooley made in equating the self to attitudes (pure reflection) rather than actions or social process—because this gives universality only to the *form* of the judgment of “ought.” But as Mead (1934:379–80) states, “However, we recognize that not only the form of the judgment is universal but the *content* also—that the end itself can be universalized” (emphasis added). In this “kingdom of ends,” Kant assumes that human beings apply rationality to the form of their acts in pursuing the “ought,” which cumulatively produces moral behavior and the good life. Mead went further than Kant insofar as Kant is unable to state the end in terms of the object of desire of the individual.

The question then becomes, How are we to determine the sort of ends toward which our actions should be directed if we are to preserve an ethical way of life? For this Mead turns away from Kant and toward Dewey. Well before Mead began writing about the self, Dewey had been exploring the philosophical implications of human sociability and cooperation. From Mead’s perspective, Dewey and the pragmatists offered a way of establishing the natural origins of social cooperation without invoking Darwin, Kant, or the utilitarians. Mead’s theory of the social self is in essence an effort to explain the social nature of ethical conduct not in strictly behavioristic or individualistic terms. For Mead, communication—which is the major tool through which cooperation and shared social worlds are forged—does not arise out of competition (“survival of the fittest”) nor in imitation (Tarde), but in constructive cooperation. Rather than a prudent strategy for individual survival or dominance, sociability was actually present with the appearance of language. Rather than the lower-level conversation of gestures in which animals engage, human desires are laden

with emotions, and the significant symbols that arise in human communication externalize these otherwise private or internal plans of action. According to Mead's theory of self, it is through the response of others that we become aware of our own attitudes and selves. Importantly, we cannot know ourselves without first being involved in symbolic communication with others. But since sociability is already implicated in human communication—from the pragmatic perspective, communication is a “tool” that persons “use” in everyday life—it precedes conscious rationality (Feffer 1990:242).

CONCLUSION

Mead's years at Chicago were marked by wider efforts at social amelioration and the progressive agenda of social restoration. His interest in pragmatism was not only theoretical; for example, he served as treasurer of Jane Addams's social settlement at Hull House, one of the most visible examples of the kind of moral consciousness that could be assured through good works. Rather than bringing an external set of standards to bear, workers at Hull House and the burgeoning social services more generally achieved the philosophical “ought” through work in the community and neighborhoods wherever needs were most acute. For Mead, the settlement house effort reflected how the community ought to form a new moral judgment (Cook 1993:102). Indeed, nearly all members of the philosophy department at the University of Chicago—with Dewey and Mead leading the way—participated in the social reform movements sweeping across Chicago and the rest of the country beginning in the late 1800s.

The basis of human cooperation is at the heart of Mead's theory of self: Knowledge of the other's role, although a necessary but not sufficient condition, is the starting point of ethical reciprocity (Feffer 1990:252). Role taking is not only something that occurs naturally in the human condition; it also provides a means by which human beings are able to cooperate and ideally realize the democratic ideals of the just and good life. For example, the notion of “rights” makes sense only to the extent that self-consciousness arises as we take on the attitude of others, that is, as we assume the attitude of assent of all members of the community (the “generalized other”). Mead held out hope that this generalized other would expand outward from communities to nation-states and eventually to the global level. As he (1959:195) stated, “The World Court and the League of Nations are other such social objects that sketch out common plans of action if there are national selves that can realize themselves in the collaborating attitudes of others.”

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See also Behaviorism; Pragmatism; Symbolic Interaction

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MEANS OF CONSUMPTION

When studying the capitalist economy from a conflict perspective, attention has historically been focused on issues relating to the means of production. According to Karl Marx, classes are defined by their relationship to the means of production. Control of the means of production is a key to power, and private ownership of the means of production underpins class oppression and exploitation. Clearly, production is an important part of the capitalist

economy and an important part of a sociological analysis of capitalism.

Marx's work, while focused on production, does not neglect consumption. Basic consumption, from the Marxist perspective, is utilization of use-values either in productive consumption or individual consumption. Instruments of labor, tools, and raw materials (the means of production) are used up in productive consumption—the product of which is the final good itself. Individual consumption is the process in which products are used to satisfy human needs or wants directly.

Marx understood the term *means of consumption* as “commodities that possess a form in which they enter individual consumption of the capitalist and working class” ([1884]1981:471). Marx's definition of the term focuses on the end products of the production process, though he makes a distinction between the consumption of different classes, suggesting that subsistence consumption (“necessary means of consumption”) is characteristic of the working class, whereas consumption of luxury goods is the privilege of the exploiting capitalist class, which exchanges the surplus-value denied to the laborers for its consumption excesses.

From Marx's perspective, capitalism is poisonous to human creativity. Under capitalism, humans strive to make money in order to survive and to consume, but mass consumption of mass-produced commodities is not a creative process. It is, however, a critical function for the capitalist system. A condition of production in capitalism is “[t]he discovery, creation and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself. . . . [Capitalism involves] the developing of a constantly expanding and more comprehensive system of different kinds of labor, different kinds of production, to which a constantly enriched system of needs corresponds” (Marx [1857–1858]1973:409)

Consequently, Marx's own definition of the means of consumption as commodities that possess a form in which they enter individual consumption falls short. That is, it focuses on the end product that flows into the marketplace. It does not attend to the way that “new needs,” which ensure that the end products of consumption realize their use value and enrich the capitalist class, are ever more efficiently made accessible and desirable to individual consumers.

Sociologist George Ritzer has expanded Marx's concept of the means of consumption. Ritzer argues that a focus on the means of consumption is particularly pertinent in modern society because “in recent years, to the degree that production and consumption can be clearly separated, production has grown increasingly less important (for example, fewer workers are involved in goods production), especially in the United States, whereas consumption has grown in importance” (1999:55). Ritzer distinguishes between the end product (the commodity itself that “enter[s] individual consumption”) and the means of

consumption that facilitate the consumption of goods—for instance, the shopping mall, the theme park, or the Las Vegas casino.

For Ritzer, the “new means of consumption” are “those things that make it possible for people to acquire goods and services and for the same people to be controlled and exploited as consumers” (1999:57), and he points out that the new means of consumption are a phenomenon particularly characteristic of the post–World War II era, a time period when consumer incomes and appetites are on the rise. A place like a mall offers the consumer buying options and opportunities, but at the same time, it is part of a system of consumer control, as consumers are seduced into buying what they do not need, thinking that they need what they only want and spending beyond their means, all of which enrich those who control the means of production.

The concept of the new means of consumption integrates ideas from German sociologist Max Weber about rationalization, enchantment, and disenchantment. The Weberian perspective holds that premodern societies were more “enchanted” than modern societies. Earlier, societies or communities, which were often small and relatively homogenous, operated on ideas that were magical and mystical. These entities were guided by substantive rather than formal rationality. That is, individuals and societies defined and pursued goals based on abstract teachings, such as the ideals and ideas of religion. Even early capitalism was linked to an enchanted world: The early Calvinists, who gave birth to the “Protestant ethic” that spurred capitalism, saw economic success as leading to salvation. They searched for signs to guide them in their quest. While they were constructing a “rational” economic system, they also were powerfully influenced by magical thinking.

Modern capitalism loses enchantment. It is a highly rationalized system. Highly rationalized systems are characterized by efficiency, predictability, calculability, and control, none of which are magical. Enchantment, however, is important to the control of consumers: Consumption is, at least in part, a response to a dream or fantasy about the item being consumed and its effect. Being in an enchanted setting can foster spending, and the “new means of consumption” attempt to “re-enchant” rationalized settings. This is done through the creation of spectacular consumption venues. For instance, Disney simulates a kind of childhood dream world (think of the Magical Kingdom), Nike Town is a sports fantasy, Las Vegas aims to bring to a single city the dazzle of Egyptian pyramids, New York's towering buildings, and Paris's Eiffel Tower. Even the Internet features “magical” consumption sites that lure children in particular, combining games and visual stimulation with entreaties to purchase products with a click of the computer mouse. These new means of consumption ensure that a central part of the “entertainment” experience is consumption itself, opportunities for which abound and are integrated into the “fun.”

The dual concepts of the means of production and the new means of consumption are important to a broad analysis and understanding of the modern capitalist economy, in which the central role of production has shifted to open up a more pivotal role for consumption.

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See also Marx, Karl; Marxism; Means of Production; Rationalization; Ritzer, George; Weber, Max

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MEANS OF PRODUCTION

In Marxist theory, the “means of production” characteristic of a society is fundamental to understanding all other political, economic, and social relations. The means of production consist of a combination of “subjects” and “instruments” of labor. Subjects of labor are “the things worked on” because they are the literal subject of the productive effort. Raw materials are an example of subjects of labor. The oil pumped out of the ground or the trees that are harvested in forests are raw materials. So too are slabs of lumber, though the slabs of lumber are themselves the product of an earlier labor process. Instruments of labor include tools that “work on” the subjects of labor such as the lathes that turn the lumber into bowls or the mechanical robots that bolt the door to a car on the assembly line.

The means of production is more than a description of the production process. For Marx, it is the key source of conflict in class relations because if one class of people owns the means of production and another class creates the products through their labor, then the stage is set for class conflict. Marx and Engels observe in *The Communist Manifesto* (1983) that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (p. 108). Throughout history, classes have stood “in constant opposition to one another” because of the conflict inherent between the owners of the means of production and the people who work for the owners (p. 109). Class conflict emerges directly from oppression by those who own the means of production of those who do not. Under feudalism, class struggle takes place between the landowners and the serfs or peasants. The transformation from feudalism to capitalism changes the class structure and gives birth to “two great hostile

camps, [to] two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat” (p. 109). These classes are defined by their relationship to the means of production: The former owns the means of production and the latter must work for the owners in order to survive.

In capitalism, labor power and the means of production are purchased by the capitalist, who sets the exploitative productive process in motion. Capitalists control production and the resulting product is their property: They expropriate the surplus value of the product. That is, the worker is paid less than the value of his or her work—the difference between what is paid and the value produced is “surplus value.” In “Wages, Price and Profit” (1983), Marx writes that “The *surplus value*, or that part of the total value of the commodity in which the *surplus labor* or *unpaid labor* of the working man is realized, I call *Profit*. . . [T]he very fact of the possession of the *instruments of labor* enables the employing capitalist to produce a *surplus value*, or what comes to the same, to *appropriate to himself a certain amount of unpaid labor*.” (p. 61). Expropriation of surplus value by the bourgeoisie exploits the workers who produce but do not own the fruits of their labor.

Proletarians cannot produce for themselves because they do not own the materials and implements that make up the means of production. Proletarians own their own labor power, which they are “free” to sell and are compelled to sell in order to survive. Because capitalists only pay the proletarians subsistence wages in order to protect their own profits, the proletarians and their class cannot gather enough money to purchase their own means of production and they are tied to the exploitative conditions set down by the capitalist owner. The fundamental interests of capitalists and workers are in stark opposition to one another.

Karl Marx predicted that as capitalism progressed, fewer people would have the opportunity to own the means of production and competition would push more people into the proletariat to labor as wage workers toiling for the profit of others. As he writes in “Wage Labour and Capital” (1983), “The capitalist takes the worker into his workshop or factory, where all the things necessary for work—raw materials, auxiliary materials (coal, dyes, etc.), tools, machines—are already to be found. Here the worker begins to drudge” (p. 147). The consolidation of capital in the hands of an elite was predicted to contribute to the conditions leading to an ultimate revolution of oppressed proletarians who would usher in socialism and resolve the fundamental contradiction between the public process of production and the private ownership of the means of production. The socialist order would eliminate the private ownership of the means of production and end the exploitation of the working classes, into whose hands the means of production would pass.

While Marx’s predicted revolution has not been realized in advanced industrial societies, his work continues to offer a

critical perspective on modern capitalism. Marx recognized the consolidation of capital as a process in capitalism. In the United States, for instance, ownership of automobile, media, and a host of other industries is concentrated in the hands of a small elite. Small, family-owned pharmacies and hardware shops, a staple in many towns and cities in the past, have been increasingly replaced by large chain stores, with which they cannot compete. Marx predicted that even members of the professions would become wage laborers. In modern society, fewer physicians, for instance, own their own means of production (having private practices) because intense competition has pushed more doctors into the service of health maintenance organizations, which set their wages and the conditions of their work.

Marx's concept of the means of production is important to an understanding of economic and social relations historically and today. While modes and means of production change across time and space, Marx maintains that those who own the means of production exploit, by definition, those who do not. Consequently, conflict is inevitable until the abolition of private property. This concept remains an important analytical tool for constructing a critical perspective on capitalist society.

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See also Alienation; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Means of Consumption

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MEDIA CRITIQUE

Media critique derives from two major concerns: the content of the media and its impact on audiences. It is no surprise, then, to find that the social sciences and the media share a great deal of history and a number of preoccupations to do with modernity, technical innovation, and the complexification of daily life. The social sciences have divided and refashioned people and societies, as have

media practice and critique, and frequently in related ways. Each operates in the context of divisions of labor and commercial and governmental determinations.

In the twentieth century, with the maturation and standardization of social science method and its uptake by the U.S. military, commercial, and governmental worlds, media audiences have come to be conceived as empirical entities that can be known via research instruments derived from sociology, demography, psychology, and marketing. Such concerns have been coupled with a secondary concentration on content. Texts too are conceived as empirical entities that can be known via research instruments derived from sociology and literary criticism. Critiques of the media have come from within discourses of the social derived from the psy-complexes (psychoanalysis, psychology, and psychiatry), sociology, economics, communication studies, anthropology, and the humanities (literature, cinema studies, media studies, and cultural studies). The six principal forms of critique are (1) the borrowing of ethnography from sociology and anthropology to investigate the experiences of audiences, (2) the use of experimentation and testing methods from psychology to establish cause-and-effect relations between media consumption and subsequent conduct, (3) the adaptation of content analysis from sociology to evaluate programming in terms of generic patterns, such as representations of violence, (4) the adoption of textual analysis from literary and critical theory, Marxism, and linguistics to identify the ideological tenor of content, (5) the application of textual and audience interpretation from psychoanalysis to speculate on psychic processes, and (6) the deployment of political economy to examine ownership, control, regulation, and international exchange.

Following an illustration of the shared history of modernity, social sciences, and the media, certain developments across methods and disciplines that have both exercised the media and been exercised by them are summarized, prior to the focus on two key components of media critique: audiences and texts. For the most part, first world theory will be referred to, albeit in a way that depends on, and feeds into, third world media practice and theory.

THE MODERN AND THE MEDIA

In the nineteenth century, it was taken as read in the West that media audiences were active, given their frequently unruly conduct at cultural events such as theatre and sport. But the emergence of public education, which took as its project uplifting and hence disciplining the working class, shifted that rhetoric. This was achieved via literary criticism (distinguishing morally, intellectually, or socially "improving" texts from others) and psychology (distinguishing mentally, intellectually, or socially compliant populations from others). Social psychology emerged because

of anxieties about “the crowd” in a rapidly urbanizing Western Europe. Elite theorists from both Right and Left feared that newly literate publics would be vulnerable to manipulation by media demagogues (Miller 2003). This notion of the suddenly enfranchised being bamboozled by the unscrupulously fluent has recurred throughout the modern period. It inevitably leads to a primary research and policy emphasis on audiences and texts: where they came from, how many there were, what they were made up of, and what happened because of them.

These criticisms were articulated to the arrival of new technologies. Consider the advent of telegraphy in the nineteenth century. It enabled a massive increase in the velocity of information flowing across the United States. Newspaper journalism became less deliberative and more instantaneous, which drew critiques of the shift from public affairs to popular *minutiae*. As the telegraph became connected with the new dissociabilities and insensitivities of modern life, its permissive connection to the production and circulation of truth was brought into question, singled out for the way its relay of market sensitivities disturbed business operators. Nineteenth-century neurological experts attributed their increased business to the telegraph and such factors as the growth of periodical literature, science, and education for women. The telegraph’s presence in saloons enabled a huge expansion in working-class betting on sporting events. While its generic messages of goodwill for such events as birthdays became highly marketable and standardized, the prospect of individual marks—seemingly enhanced through popular education—was devastated by the very industrialization that had produced it. Through the latter part of the nineteenth century, the United States and Western Europe saw spirited debate over whether the new popular genres such as newspapers, crime stories, and novels would breed anarchic readers lacking respect for the traditionally literate classes. The mass media posed a threat to established elites by enabling working people to become independently minded and informed, and distracted from the one true path of servitude. It was feared that this *Leserevolution* would produce chaotic, permissive practices of reading in place of the continuing study of a few important hermeneutic texts by the elite’s intellectual fraction. By the 1920s, the spread of the car and the radio were thought to have produced a technical and moral deskilling of the workforce, with ease and automation displacing thrift and responsibility, and emotions experienced through simulation. The evidence lay in women’s use of cosmetics and men’s taste for action adventure films. By 1940, the telephone had been decreed responsible by critics for the abolition of loneliness, the emergence of the city, the decline of the country, the growth spurt of the skyscraper, the democratization of everyday life, and the destruction of the family.

Broadcasting was more frightening and promising, more contagious and withering, than the essentially private life of

reading and talking. Not surprisingly, the excitement about broadcasting increased many times when images were added to sounds. As television came close to realization, it attracted particularly intense critical speculation. Rudolf Arnheim’s 1935 “Forecast of Television” predicted that the new device would offer viewers simultaneous global experiences, transmitting railway disasters, professorial addresses, town meetings, boxing title-fights, dance bands, carnivals, and aerial mountain views—a spectacular montage of Broadway and Vesuvius. A common vision would surpass linguistic competence and interpretation. “[T]he wide world itself enter[ing] . . . our room” via TV might even bring global peace with it, by showing spectators that “we are located as one among many.” But this was no naive welcome. Arnheim warned that “[t]elevision is a new, hard test of our wisdom.” The emergent medium’s easy access to knowledge would either enrich or impoverish its viewers, manufacturing an informed public, vibrant and active—or an indolent audience, domesticated and private (Arnheim 1969:160–63). Today’s model would be accusations that an “MTV generation” or “Internet surfers” can process trivia exquisitely but lack powers of concentration and the capacity to separate important knowledge from dross. Same discourse, new object.

These concerns are perhaps best expressed in ideas about the media as cultural industries, “which employ the characteristic modes of production and organization of industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural goods and services, generally, although not exclusively, as commodities” (Garnham 1987:25). The idea that culture industries “impress . . . the same stamp on everything” derives from the 1930s and 1940s Frankfurt school critical theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1977). Their theory of production-line culture says that because demand is dispersed and supply is realized, management operates via an administrative logic. This is socially acceptable because it is said to reflect the already-established and -revealed preferences of consumers, a reaction to their tastes and desires. But for Adorno and Horkheimer, such an account denies a cycle of power. They see consumers as manipulated through the mobilization of cultural technology by those at the economic apex of production. Whenever it is claimed that technology has an innate logic, this is an instance of “domination” masquerading as choice in a “society alienated from itself.” Coercion is mistaken for free will. Culture becomes one more industrial process subordinated to the dominant economic forces within society calling for standardization. The one element that might stand against this leveling sameness is “individual consciousness.” But that consciousness has itself been customized to the requirements of the economy and media production. As the following two sections indicate, these anxieties attained particular focus when they were turned onto audiences and texts.

AUDIENCE

Concerns about audiences include psychological, sociological, educational, consumer, criminological, and political promises and anxieties. These have been prevalent since silent cinema's faith in "the moving picture man as a local social force . . . the mere formula of [whose] activities" keeps the public well-tempered (Lindsay 1970:243); through 1930s social research into the impact of cinema on U.S. youth via the Payne Studies that helped to institutionalize symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1933); to post-World War II anthropological concerns about Hollywood's intrication of education and entertainment and the need for counter-knowledge among the public; moral panics about links between media violence and real violence; and later, the impact of first world media on third world people.

Testing the relationship between the media and their consumers has produced two main forms of analysis: spectatorship theory and audience research. Spectatorship theory speculates about the effects on people of films, using psychoanalysis to explore how supposedly universal internal struggles over the formation of subjectivity are enacted onscreen and in the psyches of watchers. The spectator is understood as a narratively inscribed concept that can be known via a combination of textual analysis and Freudianism.

Psychoanalytic film theory argues that the gaze in film "belongs" to the heterosexual male viewer and his onscreen brothers. The cinema is seen as a sexual technology, a site where practices that construct sex and desire through such techniques as confession, concealment, and the drive for truthful knowledge about motivation, character, and occasion. The reproducibility of virtuosic performance provided by electronic technology has produced an era of performativity. Both simultaneity of instant reception and longevity of recorded life come with electronic media. The technology of visual reproduction enables a multiplicity of personalized perspectives inside a world of commodity reproduction. This position has been criticized for neglecting both women's active address and engagement with film, and crucial social differences within genders that are not about the getting of sexuality, but are to do with race and class.

Conversely, audience research is primarily concerned with questioning, testing, and measuring the number and conduct of people seated before media texts. Audiences participate in the most global (but local), communal (yet individual), and time-consuming practice of making meaning in the history of the world. The concept and the occasion of being an audience are links between society and person, at the same time as viewing and listening involve solitary interpretation as well as collective behavior. Production executives invoke the audience to measure success and claim knowledge of what people want. Regulators do it to organize administration, psychologists to produce

proofs, and lobby groups to change content. Hence the link to panics about education, violence, and apathy supposedly engendered by the media and routinely investigated by the state, psychology, Marxism, neoconservatism, the church, liberal feminism, and others. The audience as consumer, student, felon, voter, and idiot engages such groups. This is Harold Garfinkel's ([1967]1992) notion of the "cultural dope," a mythic figure "who produces the stable features of the society by acting in compliance with preestablished and legitimate alternatives of action that the common culture provides." The "common sense rationalities . . . of here and now situations" used by people are obscured by this condescending categorization (p. 68). When the audience is invoked as a category by the industry or its critics and regulators, it immediately becomes such a "dope."

Two accounts of the audience are dominant in academia, public policy, and social activism. In their different ways, each is an effects model, in that they both assume the media *do* things *to* people, with the citizen understood as an audience member at risk of becoming a "dope," abjuring both interpersonal responsibility and national culture. The first model is the *domestic* effects model, or DEM. Dominant in the United States and exported around the world, it is typically applied without consideration of place and is universalist and psychological.

The DEM offers analysis and critique of such crucial citizenship questions as education and civic order. It views the media as forces that can either direct or pervert the citizen-consumer. Entering young minds hypodermically, the media both enable and imperil learning and may even drive the citizen to violence through aggressive and misogynistic images and narratives. The DEM is found at a variety of sites, including laboratories, clinics, prisons, schools, newspapers, psychology journals, media organizations' research and publicity departments, everyday talk, program-classification regulations, conference papers, parliamentary debates, and state-of-our-youth or state-of-our-civil-society moral panics. The DEM is embodied in the nationwide U.S. media theatrics that ensue after mass school shootings, questioning the role of violent images (not hyper-Protestantism, straight white masculinity, a risk society, or easy access to firearms) in creating violent people.

The second means of constituting dopes is a *global* effects model, or GEM. The GEM, primarily utilized in non-U.S. discourse, is specific and political rather than universalist and psychological. Whereas the DEM focuses on the cognition and emotion of individual human subjects via observation and experimentation, the GEM looks to the knowledge of custom and patriotic feeling exhibited by collective human subjects, the grout of national culture. In place of psychology, it is concerned with politics. The media do not make you a well- or an ill-educated person, a wild or a self-controlled one. Rather, they make you a knowledgeable and loyal national subject, or a naïf who is

ignorant of local tradition and history. Cultural belonging, not psychic wholeness, is the touchstone of the GEM. Instead of measuring responses electronically or behaviorally, as its domestic counterpart does, the GEM interrogates the geopolitical origin of media texts and the themes and styles they embody, with particular attention to the putatively nation-building genres of drama, news, sport, and current affairs. GEM adherents hold that local citizens should control the media because their loyalty can be counted on in the event of war, while in the case of fiction, that only locally sensitized producers make narratives that are true to tradition and custom. This model is found in the discourses of cultural imperialism, everyday talk, broadcast and telecommunications policy, unions, international organizations, newspapers, heritage, cultural diplomacy, and postindustrial service-sector planning (see Dorfman and Mattelart 2000; Schiller 1969).

The DEM suffers from all the disadvantages of ideal-typical psychological reasoning. It relies on methodological individualism, thereby failing to account for cultural norms and politics, let alone the arcs of history that establish patterns of imagery and response inside politics, war, ideology, and discourse. Each massively costly laboratory test of media effects, based on, as the refrain goes, “a large university in the Midwest,” is countered by a similar experiment, with conflicting results. As politicians, grant givers, and jeremiad-wielding pundits call for more and more research to prove that TV or electronic games make you stupid, violent, and apathetic—or the opposite—academics line up at the trough to indulge their contempt for popular culture and ordinary life and their rent-seeking urge for public money. The DEM never interrogates its own conditions of existence—namely, that governments and the media use it to account for social problems, and that the domestic screen’s capacity for private viewing troubles those authorities who desire surveillance of popular culture. As for the GEM, its concentration on national culture denies the potentially liberatory and pleasurable nature of different takes on the popular, forgets the internal differentiation of publics, valorizes frequently oppressive and/or unrepresentative local bourgeoisies in the name of maintaining and developing national culture, and ignores the demographic realities of its “own” terrain.

The DEM/GEM share the dominant ethos of U.S. communication studies, in contradistinction to more populist, qualitative theorists like Marshall McLuhan (1974), who argue for intense differentiation between the media. Whereas radio, he said, was a “hot medium” because it contained a vast array of data that led the audience in a definite direction that was explicitly defined, TV was “cool,” as it left so much up to the viewer to sort out (p. 31). The latter perspective offered a way in to research too via three other model audiences: the all-powerful consumer (invented and loved by policymakers, desired and feared by corporations), the all-powerful interpreter (invented and loved by utopic

cultural critics, tolerated and used by corporations), and the all-powerful closed-circuit surveyor (invented and loved by the state and corporations, feared and loathed by dystopic cultural critics). These models have a common origin. In lieu of citizen building, their logic is the construction and control of consumers. These perspectives pick up on Garfinkel’s cultural-dope insight and take the reverse position from rat-catching psy-doomsayers. Instead of issuing jeremiads, this line claims that audiences, like neoclassical economics consumers, are so clever and able that they make their own meanings, outwitting institutions of the state, academia, and capitalism that seek to measure and control them. Néstor García Canclini (2001) notes in this context that “We Latin Americans presumably learned to be citizens through our relationship to Europe; our relationship to the United States will, however, reduce us to consumers” (p. 1).

TEXT

At the level of the text, media critique divides between systematic forms, such as content analysis and semiotics, and more impressionistic methods, such as psychoanalysis and thematic interpretation. Content analysis is chiefly undertaken within sociology and communication studies, and it has been put to a variety of purposes. For example, a violence index has been created to compare the frequency and type of depictions of violence on U.S. TV news and drama with actual crime statistics. Content analysis of media texts has also been applied to representations of gender and race (Tuchman, Daniels, and Benet 1978).

Semiotics was systematized for cinema by Christian Metz (1974) and has since been deployed, using a variety of other linguistically based norms, to explain many other media. Examples of such systematic approaches to form and style can be found in narratology. Narratives tell stories through an aetiological chain of cause-and-effect via a linear trajectory from the establishment of questions or problems to their resolution. A film moves from a presumed state of normalcy, or equilibrium, for the characters, prior to the text, to a disequilibrium set up in the opening of that text, and then through a series of maneuvers that results in the achievement of a goal and a new equilibrium. Classical narrative cinema focuses on central characters, their attitudes to the events going on around them and their participation in conflicts. The success or otherwise of films frequently depends on their ability to engage dual forms of verisimilitude—looking like a familiar genre, and also resembling the mental processes of ordinary human experience.

Much academic narratology is linked to formalism, which divides narratives in two. The *fabula* or story concerns the chronological unfolding of relations between characters, or actants. This is the immanent structure of the story, the spirit-within that impels a text forward. When that basis becomes orchestrated, it is transformed into a *syuzhet*,

or plot (the movement from what is told to how to tell it). The *syuzhet* animates the *fabula* via an array of artistic devices, such as parallelism, retardation, defamiliarization, and so on: in short, sources of aesthetic pleasure that do not simply move the narrative forward. Understanding a narrative is more than following the trajectory of a story. It depends on reading a film horizontally as well as vertically—the narrative thread only makes partial sense of a text, along with an attempt to remember, for example, the overall conduct of a specific character.

Methods of narration are influenced by the use of camera, and here questions of style arise. Subjective narration, which clearly locates the vantage point or enunciation within a character in the diegesis, often involves point-of-view shooting, whereas hidden enunciation is mimetic and favors objective camera. In subjective narration, the camera takes on the function of that character's vision in the text. Conversely, omniscient and objective narration are frequently achieved through a point-of-view that comes from nowhere, outside the action and seemingly without a particular perspective or form of knowledge. But this narration can be interpreted to bring out the site of enunciation, if we examine factors such as the height of the camera. The eye-level shot is taken with the camera horizontal to the ground as if it were in the room in human form, but without being seen, or reacting to what occurs in front of it. The high-angle shot is taken from above the action. It can emphasize the insignificance of the human actants as opposed to commercial, natural, or architectural features in the frame. Conversely, low-angle shots are tilted up to cover the action, which can deflect it with a certain glow as well as highlighting size and speed.

Consider the above in the light of how the class analysis of film may involve a number of moves: literally observing how a class acts on screen—its clothing, gesture, movement, work, leisure, home life; seeing who controls the means of communication behind a film—technicians, producers, directors, censors, shareholders; analyzing the ideological message of stories—personal transcendence versus collective solidarity, the legitimacy of capitalist freedoms, or the compensations in family and community for social inequality; and noting which interests are served by government-sponsored national film industries—local bourgeoisies, men, whites, distributors, the people. In textual terms, those films that foreground class through theme or identification do not exhaust the list of films ready for class readings. Patterns of speech or costume may not only signify the immediate referent of social position but go beyond that to the trappings, logic, and operation of capitalism: how the clothes were made, or the housing conditions that go along with the accent. We might think here of the James Bond series' obsession with small differentiations of social position through food, alcohol, cars, and the way that hotel staff and other employees are easily ordered about. Some of us deem it important that Sean Connery

orders the Dom Perignon '52 and George Lazenby the '57. The price paid for attending a film (exchange value) takes over from the desires exhibited in the actual practical utility of what is being purchased (use value). This price expresses the momentary monetary value of that need, rather than its lasting utility. The notion of built-in obsolescence and value bestowed via a market is in fact a key to all commodities, popular or otherwise. They elicit desire by wooing consumers, glancing at them sexually, and smelling and looking nice in ways that are borrowed from romantic love but then reverse that relationship: People learn about correct forms of romantic love from commodities, such as love scenes in movies.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most significant innovation in recent media critique has been a radical historicization of context, such that the analysis of audiences and texts must now be supplemented by an account that details the conditions under which a text is made, circulated, received, interpreted, and criticized. The life of any media text is a passage across space and time, a life remade again and again by institutions, discourses, and practices of distribution and reception—in short, all the shifts and shocks that characterize the existence of cultural commodities, their ongoing renewal as the temporary property of varied, productive workers and publics, and their stasis as the abiding property of businesspeople.

The crucial link between theories of audiences and texts—one that abjures the idea of the dope—may come from such specifications. For instance, Jacqueline Bobo's (1995) analysis of black women viewers of *The Color Purple* shows how their process of watching the film, discussing it, and reading the novel drew them back to Alice Walker's writing, with all three processes invoking their historical experience in ways quite unparalleled in dominant culture—a far cry from critics' dismissal of the movie. These women "sifted through the incongruent parts of the film and reacted favorably to elements with which they could identify" (p. 3).

This is the abiding lesson of media critique: Each medium's promiscuity points every day and in every way toward social reality. The media are three things, all at once: *recorders* of reality (the unstaged event), *manufacturers* of reality (the staged and edited event), and *part of* reality (reading the paper as a bedroom event on a Sunday morn, or attending a protest event over sexual, racial, or religious stereotyping). As media forms proliferate and change, their intermingling with social change ensures an ongoing link between social theory and media critique.

— Toby Miller

See also Cultural Marxism and British Cultural Studies; Hollywood Film; Male Gaze

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MERTON, ROBERT

Robert K. Merton is among the most influential sociologists of the twentieth century. He is the founder of a sophisticated variety of structural functionalism, the originator of modern sociology of science, and a prolific contributor to the conceptual and theoretical resources of several sociological disciplines.

He was born on July 4, 1910, in Philadelphia, and died February 24, 2003 in New York. He graduated from Temple College in 1931 and pursued graduate study at Harvard University, where in 1936 he defended a doctoral dissertation on *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England*. Merton's thesis about the influence of puritan, pietist religion on the emergence of experimental natural science is still vigorously debated. In 1941 he moved to Columbia University, where he was to remain on the faculty of the Sociology Department for 38 years until his retirement. He has received the highest forms of academic recognition, among them 24 honorary doctoral degrees. In 1994, the president of the United States granted him the top academic honor, the National Medal of Science. His books have gone through multiple foreign editions, with *Social Theory and Social Structure* ([1949] 1968) appearing in more than 20 languages. In the Books of the Century contest organized in 1998 by the International Sociological Association (ISA), this volume was among the top five, which also included work by Max Weber and Émile Durkheim.

Merton is often referred to as a modern sociological classic for two main reasons: first, he made a lasting substantive contribution to general sociological theory, as well as some more specific theoretical contributions to various sociological subdisciplines (in particular the sociology of science and the sociology of deviance, where strong Mertonian schools are still operating), and, second, he exemplified a unique, classical style of sociological theorizing and concept formation.

Merton has elaborated two theoretical orientations: functional analysis and structural analysis. For him, functionalism meant the practice of interpreting data by establishing their consequences for the larger structures in which they are implicated. In 1949 he published his famous paradigm for functional analysis, where he outlined a flexible, undogmatic, deeply revised version of functionalism that allowed for the conceptualization of social conflict and social change. He put an emphasis not only on functions but also on dysfunctions of various components in the social system, and what he called "the variable balance of functional consequences." He argued that the components of a social system may appear not only in harmonious but also in conflictual relations. The effect of a specific balance is not necessarily equilibrium, order, and continuity (as in the earlier structural functionalism), but sometimes disequilibrium, disorder, disorganization, and consequently social change. A quarter century later in 1975, he wrote an important paper, "Structural Analysis in Sociology" (in Merton 1986), which presented a correlative sociological orientation, emphasizing the network of relationships within which components of the system are located. Structural analysis is a natural, complementary outgrowth of functional analysis. Whereas functional analysis specifies the

consequences of a social phenomenon for its differentiated structural context, structural analysis searches for the determinants of the phenomenon in its structural milieu. The best example of Merton's structural functional analysis is his famous theory of anomie. Understood as a structural condition of dissociation between cultural demands of success and the actual opportunities for success, anomie is shown to generate various forms of deviant conduct—innovation, ritualism, retreatism or rebellion—depending on the wider structural context within which it appears ([1938] 1996:132–52). In turn, these various ways of departing from established normative order have different effects on the functioning of the whole system, sometimes leading to social change. Obviously, both orientations refer to the different sides of the same coin: they scrutinise two vectors of the same relationship, between a social phenomenon and its structural setting.

Merton's thought is deeply rooted in the classical sociological tradition of the nineteenth century, which he synthesizes and extends. He attains balanced, intermediate positions on various traditional issues and unravels entangled premises to reach their rational core. He has a strong aversion to extremes. The most famous illustration of this is his strategy of middle range theory based on the rejection of both narrow empiricism and abstract, scholastic theorizing. The systematic quality of his work is emphasized by the repeated use of what he calls "paradigms," introduced long before and different in meaning from Thomas Kuhn's famous use of the term. By paradigm Merton meant heuristic schemes intended to introduce a measure of order and lucidity into qualitative and discursive sociological analysis by codifying the results of prior inquiry and specifying the directions of further research. This allows him to introduce a further measure of order and systematization into the classical heritage. The synthesis becomes much more than a summary of earlier ideas. It brings about their selective and critical reformulation and cumulation.

Central to Merton's contributions are his introduction of neologisms to identify and designate new sociologically significant aspects of social life. A number of these have entered the vocabularies not only of social science but the vernacular of everyday life. These include manifest and latent functions, dysfunctions, self-fulfilling prophecy, homophily and heterophily, status-sets and role-sets, opportunity structures, anticipatory socialization, reference group behavior, middle-range theories, sociological ambivalence, local and cosmopolitan influentials, obliteration by incorporation, and many others.

Merton's most important service to the development of contemporary sociology is his vindication of the classical style of doing sociology and its heritage of theoretical ideas. In his work, paradigms of classical thought gain new vitality, as they are shown to be fruitful both in the explanatory sense, as means for solving the puzzles confronting

social actors, and in the heuristic sense, as means of raising new questions and suggesting new puzzles for solution.

— Piotr Sztompka

See also Anomie; Deviance; Social Studies of Science; Structural Functionalism

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METATHEORY

The prefix *meta* connotes "after," "about," and "beyond," and is often used to describe "second-order" studies. Let *S* denote a given type of phenomena. The study of *S* constitutes the first-order study *S*₁, and the study of *S*₁ constitutes the second-order study *S*₂. Second-order studies are thus the study of studies. However, not all studies of studies fall into the category of metastudy. A given *S*₁ can be a legitimate subject of such fields as history, literature, logic, and philosophy. Metastudy differs from other types of second-order studies in that it entails a high level of reflexivity embodied in the critical self-examination by those engaged in the first-order studies. Examples of discipline-wide metastudies include metaphysics, metaanalysis, metaethnography, and metasociology.

Metastudies are mostly conducted to examine the problems encountered in the first-order studies. Thomas Kuhn, an eminent philosopher of science, pointed out that science progresses in a succession of paradigm replacement, which takes place in a discipline when the existing research tradition has failed to meet the challenges of emergent research problems. Metastudies are the conscious efforts made by the practitioners of a troubled field to reexamine, reflect on, and redirect the stalled first-order studies in the field. In other words, metastudy is "a reflective return to the foundation of science and the making explicit of the hypotheses and operations which make it possible" (Bourdieu 1971:181).

Metatheory is a subtype of metastudy that focuses on the examination of theory and theorizing. The rise of metatheory in social science was primarily the result of the persistent failure of social science to uncover the general laws of society that can be used for social prediction, design, and engineering. Such failure had been initially attributed to the deficiencies in the methodology of theorizing, which led to the emergence of a theory construction movement aiming to model social theorizing after theory formation in natural science. When the allegedly improved techniques of theory construction again failed to produce the desired outcome, social scientists began to look beyond the issues of methodology to engage in metatheoretical reflections.

While metatheorizing takes place in virtually all fields of social science, it has been particularly common in sociology. The prevalence of metatheorizing in sociology is believed to be related to the following factors. First, sociological phenomena are culturally diverse and historically specific, such that they disallow the formation of nomological or deductive theories. Second, sociologists themselves are members of the society they attempt to theorize, and the vested interests and engrained values the theorists hold impede their efforts to attain scientific objectivity in theorization. Third, sociological theory is constitutive of social reality, for the acceptance of a theory can transform what that theory bears on. The combination of these three factors has made metatheorizing a constant condition of theory construction in sociology.

The beginning of metatheorizing in sociology can be traced to the work of Auguste Comte, who announced the birth of sociology in his metaphysical reflections on the trajectory of the progress of human knowledge. Paul Furfey (1965) played an important role in defining a unique disciplinary space for metasociology, which consisted of a metatheoretical component. Metatheorizing as a distinctive subfield within sociology was formalized in the early 1990s. In 1988, George Ritzer published an article in *Sociological Theory*, delineating for the first time the parameters of metatheory as a subdomain in sociology. The subsequent years witnessed the publication of a series of articles and books on the same subject, which gave rise to the coming of age of sociological metatheorizing.

Ritzer (1988) divides sociological metatheorizing into three basic types, labeled respectively as M_u , M_p , and M_o . M_u , which stands for “metatheorizing for better understanding of extant theory,” comprises four subtypes, each representing a different analytic dimension. The internal-intellectual dimension involves the mapping of the cognitive structures of sociological theory using a variety of conceptual tools, such as “levels,” “paradigms,” and “micro-macro” linkages. The internal-social dimension involves the study of the social networks of sociologists in order to understand the social dynamics of “doing theory” in the real world. The external-intellectual dimension involves examining the influence of

other academic fields on the formation of sociological theory. And the external-social dimension involves making sense of sociological theory in the context of the larger society, for example, linking the underlying features of a theory to the characteristics of the sociohistorical setting in which the theory was created. M_p , which stands for “metatheorizing as a prelude to theory development,” critically assesses the existing body of theoretical literature for purposes of creating new theories. Such literature reviews differ from exegetical commentaries in that they are normally regarded as an integral part of theory construction. Finally, M_o , which stands for “metatheorizing in order to establish overarching sociological perspectives,” aims to develop general theoretical orientations that serve as “frames of reference” for specific sociological research. Positivist, hermeneutic, critical, and postmodern perspectives are the four major metatheoretical orientations in sociology today.

Metatheorizing has been criticized by some scholars as a nonproductive or even counterproductive intellectual exercise. It has been described as consisting of mere commentaries on the works of the past and philosophical debates over unresolvable issues. These charges are not entirely unfounded, but they are not fair criticisms of metatheorizing as a whole, for as is true of any other field of academic endeavors, there are good as well as bad practices in metatheorizing. As a form of reflexive returns upon the practice of theorizing, metatheory has proved to be indispensable to the construction of theories that are useful for guiding social practice in the human lifeworld.

— Shanyang Zhao

See also Bourdieu, Pierre; Psychoanalysis and Social Theory; Ritzer, George; Theory Construction

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MICRO-MACRO INTEGRATION

One of the most important developments in recent sociological theory has been the move toward an integration of

microlevels and macrolevels of analysis. This does not mean to imply that there was a hard and fast line between microlevel and macrolevel perspectives previously, it was indeed a continuum, but rather that the integration of the two has come to be a larger focus than either one of them individually. It was this primary focus on either micro or macro theories that was one of the major splits in sociology until the 1980s, when the integration first became a focal interest.

Ironically, the founding fathers of sociology (Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel) were concerned with linking the micro to the macro and vice versa in their theories. Marx was clearly interested in the ways in which the capitalist society affected individual workers and their lives. Durkheim was interested in how the collective conscience manifested itself in individual-level consciousness. Weber was pessimistic about the strengthening iron cage of society and its effects, especially the imposition of limitations on the individual. Finally, Simmel was concerned with the tragedy of culture, or the growing distance between macrolevel, or objective, culture, and microlevel, or subjective, culture. It was in the years following their deaths that the emphasis these founding four had placed on the micro-macro linkage slowly eroded and a strong distinction between micro and macro sociology emerged.

Macrolevel theories that took center stage during the last century included forms of neo-Marxian theory (Engels), structural functionalism (Parsons), network theory (White, Boorman, and Breiger), structuralism (Mayhew), and conflict theory (Dahrendorf). Microlevel theories that developed alongside these included exchange theory (Homans), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel), and symbolic interactionism (Mead, Blumer).

However, during the 1980s and 1990s, there was a notable turn in the work of sociology toward more integration. Two approaches were taken toward this goal. The first involved integrating existing micro- and macrolevel theories. The second was to develop new theories to deal with the linkage between micro- and macrolevels. There is clearly a marked difference of approach here, but both had the same goal of a new sociology that would, much like it had in the beginning, be concerned with the relationship between micro- and macrolevel phenomenon.

It would be helpful now to give a few examples of attempts at micro-macro integration. George Ritzer (1979, 1981) has developed an integrated sociological paradigm that is based on a fourfold table outlining what he sees as the four major levels of sociological analysis. The table involves a horizontal continuum from objective to subjective and a vertical continuum from macroscopic to microscopic. This creates four quadrants for social analysis: macro-objective (society, law, language, bureaucracy), macro-subjective (culture, norms, values), micro-objective (patterns of behavior, action, interaction), and micro-subjective (beliefs,

perceptions, various facets of the social construction of reality). Although Ritzer argues that each of these levels is important in and of itself, the most important analysis lies in the dialectical relationship among and between the four levels.

Another prominent theorist, Jeffrey Alexander, has also created an attempt to integrate micro- and macrolevel sociology by offering what he believes is the “new ‘theoretical logic’ of sociology” (1982:xv). Alexander’s multidimensional sociology, as he terms it, most directly refers to his view of levels of social analysis in multiple dimensions. Like Ritzer, Alexander creates a fourfold table, but with slightly different continua. The horizontal for him is a continuum representing the problem of action. Alexander envisions action ranging from an instrumental, or materialist, level to a normative, or idealist one. The vertical is a range depicting levels of order from a collective, externally created order to an individual, internally created one. The intersection of these continua create four distinct levels of social analysis: collective-instrumental (material structures), collective-normative (norms), individual-instrumental (rational action), and individual-normative (voluntary agency). These are not much different from those created in the paradigm by Ritzer, except in the emphasis Alexander gives to the collective-normative level. Alexander is critical of both levels involving the individual, as he says that they are unable to deal with any unique characteristics of collective phenomena. He is also critical of the collective-instrumental level because it eliminates much chance of individual freedom. Alexander believes that the collective-normative order, however, allows for both an understanding of social order and macrolevel phenomenon while still leaving room for individual autonomy and maneuverability.

James Coleman (1986, 1987) also sought to deal with the issue of micro-macro integration by creating a model that sought to deal with the micro- to macrolevel problem. Coleman uses Weber’s work on the Protestant ethic as an illustrative example and envisions macrolevel phenomena (e.g., a religious doctrine) affecting the microlevel (individual values), which in turn affects another aspect of the microlevel (orientations to economic behavior), which in turn again affects the macrolevel (producing the capitalist system). This model is weak, however, in that it does not allow for a dialectical relationship and grants priority to micro- to macrolevel influence.

Allen Liska (1990) sought to correct the problems in Coleman’s theory by adding a direction of influence from macrolevel phenomena to other macrolevel phenomena. He also outlines three potential ways for describing the macro level: as an aggregation, or the sum total of individual components resulting in a group characteristic; structural, or the relationship between individual members of a group, and global, or what are generally termed emergent

properties such as language. The implication is that those theorists who focus on the macrolevel should incorporate more of a focus on aggregation, and those who focus on the microlevel should include more contextual factors.

Randall Collins is another social theorist to take on the task of integrating micro- and macrolevel phenomenon, although he grants heavy priority to the microlevel. In fact, Collins's major essay on the topic was titled "On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology," and he himself calls his effort a "radical microsociology" (1981a, 1981b). Collins believes that all macrolevel phenomena can be understood as combinations of microlevel phenomena. His focus is on interaction, chains of interaction, and the "marketplace" where such interaction takes place. This theory is similar, at least in one sense, to Coleman's in that it is limited by only trying to explain how the micro affects the macro.

Although the distinction between micro and macro is generally thought of in terms of American sociology (see Ritzer and Goodman 2004), at least one European theorist, Norbert Elias, has attempted to solve this dilemma as well. Elias (1978, 1986) was a German theorist (who did most of his work in England and the Netherlands) who did most of his major work during the 1930s. His major contribution to the question of micro-macro integration came in his concept of the figuration. The concept of a figuration was developed to ease the differences between the concept of the "individual" and "society." Figurations are processes (Elias preferred the term *process sociology* to refer to his work) that involve the interweaving of individuals. They are neither more than, nor less than, these interrelationships, but instead they are those interrelationships. They are not planned and occur at every level of society. Elias does not deal with either individuals or society as autonomous entities but instead with "the relationship between people perceived as individuals and people perceived as societies" (1986:23). He views individuals as open and interdependent and believes that the reasons they come together to form specific figurations should be the key question in sociology.

Overall, there have been a number of attempts to integrate the micro- and macrolevels of theory and the work of their representative theorists since the early 1980s (although some did seek to answer this question even prior to that). Harkening back to similar efforts made by some of sociology's most prominent figures, recent theorists have sought to show how both levels merit attention but that the greatest level of focus should be on the ways in which they interact with one another.

— Michael Ryan

See also Agency-Structure Integration; Alexander, Jeffrey; Coleman, James; Collins, Randall; Elias, Norbert; Metatheory; Ritzer, George

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MILLS, C. WRIGHT

C. Wright Mills (1916–1962), the prolific and controversial American sociologist, is best known for his work on the structure and distribution of power in the United States and his critique of theory and method in mainstream sociology. Between 1940 and 1962, he authored or edited twelve books, published nearly 200 articles, commentaries, and reviews, and was working on several major projects when he died of a heart attack at age 45.

Mills was born in Waco, Texas, to a doting mother and a father who was a rising insurance salesman. Mills describes himself as a shy and introverted youngster who admired his father's intelligence and integrity. He was sent to Texas

A&M but transferred to the University of Texas, Austin, where he studied philosophy and economics.

Mills left Texas with both a BA and an MA for the interdisciplinary program at the University of Wisconsin in the 1940s, where he worked most closely with Hans Gerth, a German émigré influenced by the Frankfurt school, with its varying blends of Marx, Weber, and Freud. Several commentators suggest that Mills's work is a unique blend of midwestern populism, American pragmatism, and German sociology.

Mills defined himself as a political radical in the early 1940s by the time he came out of graduate school to take an assistant professor position in sociology at the University of Maryland. He moved in left political circles when he relocated to New York in 1945, where he worked at the Bureau of Applied Research and then joined the Columbia faculty in 1946, working his way to an appointment as full professor in 1956.

Mills's first major book, the *New Men of Power* (1948), assessed the radical political potential of union leaders and found it limited. Mills soon thereafter abandoned the Marxian hope for the working class as the key agent of major social change, calling it a "labor metaphysic." *White Collar* (1952) soon followed, a comparison of the old middle class of small businesspeople with the new middle class of white-collar employees, seeing the latter as trapped between unions and big business, politically dependent and directionless, and driven by a new status. He later described the book as an attempt to make sense of his experience in New York; others thought the experiences of salespeople like his father influenced this work.

Mills next folded his analyses of union leaders and white-collar workers into his major empirical and theoretical work, *The Power Elite* (1956), which rejected both pluralist and Marxist analyses of the American power structure in favor of an institutional analysis that placed power in the hands of an increasingly intermingled leadership group based at the top of large corporations, the executive branch, and the military services. This "power elite" shared similar experiences in managing large institutions and their desire to keep the system running smoothly. The people at the top did what they wanted to, and were increasingly irresponsible, practicing a "higher immorality."

The book received strong reactions from those Mills criticized as well as more disinterested observers, and made Mills into something of a celebrity. He then wrote a little-known reply that became the basis for *The Sociological Imagination* (1959). Mills attacked the overly abstract "grand theories," and in particular the work of Talcott Parsons, the leading theorist of the day. For Mills, Parsons's ahistorical attempt to classify concepts in order to develop a general theory provided little if any understanding of social reality or pressing social issues. Mills also was very critical of the use of a narrow survey method

he called "abstracted empiricism," arguing that it tends to lead to mundane research of no consequence in creating a theory or understanding of social problems. Instead, Mills spoke of the need to define sociology as the intersection of biography and history, employ a wide range of methods, strive for intellectual craftsmanship, and engage the general public on the basis of both rational values and solid social science.

At the same time, Mills began to try to make political sense of the post-Stalin Soviet Union and other political changes. He wrote what he called his "pamphlets," *The Causes of World War III* (1958), an attack on the Cold Warriors for "crackpot realism," and *Listen, Yankee* (1960), an attempt to keep the United States from crushing the Cuban Revolution. In 1960 he wrote a "Letter to the New Left" in Great Britain and then published a revised version in 1961 for the American New Left, which viewed him as one of their key inspirations.

Still, he continued his academic work as a sociologist. He had decided he had to come to terms with Marxism, and the result was his last book, *The Marxists* (1963), in which he criticized the "sophisticated Marxists" for trying to save a failed model. He nonetheless declared himself a "plain Marxist," meaning he worked in the spirit of Marx and used his method to create the kind of model that would capture current historical realities.

Mills's place in sociology is hard to assess, partly due to his self-presentation as a rebel and dissenter. By refusing to work with graduate students at Columbia in the 1950s because he thought they were too set in their thinking, there were few new sociologists to further develop his theoretical ideas. In addition, although often claimed by young radical sociologists as the "father of radical sociology," it was mainly Mills's critique of mainstream sociology, not his theoretical insights, that had the greatest impact on radical sociological research.

Nevertheless, when all is said and done, several of Mills's early essays remain classics that continue to be cited in the literature. Some of the ideas and findings in the *Power Elite* have been assimilated into mainstream political sociology. Many of his key ideas, such as the power elite and the sociological imagination, are widely employed. *The Sociological Imagination* continues to be used in sociology courses to inspire students to think for themselves and see the exciting possibilities that exist within sociology for understanding—and even changing—society. Most of all, though, Mills will endure as a symbol of the upstart, hard-working iconoclast who jumps through all the academic hoops, challenges the mainstream of the discipline, and attempts to reach larger publics on the basis of both his values and ideas.

— G. William Domhoff

See also Marx, Karl; Parsons, Talcott; Power

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MINNICH, ELIZABETH

Elizabeth Minnich, a graduate faculty member at the Union Institute in Cincinnati, is the author of *Transforming Knowledge* (1990). This study pivots around issues of curricular transformation in particular and knowledge construction in general. Educated in the liberal arts at Sarah Lawrence College (BA) and in philosophy at the New School for Social Research (MA and PhD), now named New School University, Minnich situates herself theoretically between modernism and postmodernism. She argues, for instance, that the “heady postmodern attack on universals *per se*” may be misguided inasmuch as “it may not be universals that are the problem but . . . *faulty* universals and the particularities they frame” (p. 56)

Arguing that equality entails not sameness but the “right to be different,” Minnich goes on to argue that “[f]aulty generalizations by those in power create and express not dualisms, but hierarchical monism” (p. 70). By hierarchical monism she means that “supposedly parallel categories . . . do not name parallel groups; the categories are indeed paired, but they are not expressions of a complementary dualism, nor even an oppositional one.” Paired categories, such as women/men, refer not to anything “separate but equal” but to hierarchies that socially construct not only difference but also inequality. Worse, one category in these hierarchical pairs gets represented as the “real thing” (p. 73) with the other category being some lesser version of that thing, whether it be theologian, citizen, or assembly line worker.

On these (and other) bases, Minnich returns to faulty generalizations. She says their theoretical damage gets done through “circular reasoning in which the *sources* of standards, justifications, interpretations, reappear as *examples* of that which is best, most easily justified, most richly interpreted by those standards” (p. 84). Middle-class standards of cleanliness, child rearing, and religiosity, for example, are often used to denigrate and regulate the lives of lower-income persons and families. Middle-income experts of all sorts promulgate those standards that in turn are used to bolster and justify their own moral and political authority. Closer to home is the substantial segregation

of feminist theory in textbooks and curricula, as if it is an inferior version of theory or social theory. Minnich’s work shows how social realities such as feminist theory get represented as specialized versions of social theory, as if scholars get more insights into social realities from masculinist than from feminist texts.

In the end, Minnich deems it unnecessary to “undo all universals” (pp. 180–81). Instead, she urges that we “particularize accurately” so as “to demystify the functions of power and hierarchy.” In her view, that strategy enables us “to cease turning difference into deviance” and equality into sameness, while also enabling us “to live and work with more complexity and fineness of feeling and comprehension, taste and judgment” (p. 184).

— Mary F. Rogers

See also Feminist Epistemology; Feminist Ethics

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MODERNITY

The term *modern* and its derivatives are not new, and they are ambiguous in their meanings, especially if one considers the globe’s competing worldviews and cosmologies. Whereas modernity has had for some time a positive connotation in the West, particularly among the more educated classes, the same cannot be said about the notion as understood in other parts of the world, where, until very recently in their long cultural histories, the cardinal virtues of social and intellectual life have always been stability, continuity, and predictability. The very notion that “change is natural and good,” accepted almost without reflection by many citizens of Western nations for the last several centuries, has been wholly repugnant, even inconceivable, to those billions of Asians and Africans who devoutly followed the doctrines of Confucius, Buddha, Hinduism, or Islam. The famous Chinese curse “May you live in interesting times” wryly captures this widespread human sentiment. This basic contradiction between worldviews, perhaps more than any other single factor, has sparked the repeated cultural and political conflicts among cultural zones of the world, where, in most other ways, life might have been viewed in similar, even sympathetic, terms. Thus, the concept of modernity is not of merely analytic or academic interest. Considered broadly, it contains one of the major keys toward understanding why geopolitical and cultural instability has become the standard condition of

international affairs, particularly during the last two centuries. If static certitude characterized the ancient civilizations in Egypt, Persia, China, and India, dynamic shifts in actions and meanings identify “the way we live now” (to borrow Anthony Trollope’s title from 1875).

The question of what exactly *modernity* means—when it began, how it has developed, where it leads—has perplexed intellectual historians for decades, if not centuries. A platitude holds that whatever is “modern” (“from the fifth century Latin term *modernus* which was used to distinguish a Christian present from a Roman, pagan past” [Smart 1990:17]) is always relative to any period of interest. For instance, Henry Fielding’s *Tom Jones* seemed to its readers stunningly “modern” in 1749, so much so that Edward Gibbon in his *Autobiography* (1794) claimed that this “exquisite picture of human manners” would outlast the mighty Austrian empire in significance. The unrivalled eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* argued in 1910 that “the methods of fiction have grown more sophisticated since his day . . . but the traces of *Tom Jones* are still discernible in most of our manlier modern fiction.” Now, though, the novel (and famous filmed version) seems trapped in almost formulaic predictability, and as such bears the marks of an art form that is no longer in any ordinary sense “modern.”

Yet a purely relativistic viewpoint does not take one very far in understanding the concept, even if “that gallery of echoes called modern thought” (Durant 2001:24) proves to be entirely derivative rather than original in nature. There are indeed authoritative analyses, which over the years have proposed signposts on the road to (Western) modernity that still bear consideration, even after the ideological onslaught called “postmodernism.” John Herman Randall’s beloved textbook, *The Making of the Modern Mind* (published in 1926 when he was 27), is one such standard interpretation. Whereas today even informed readers might cite 1500 as the earliest possible date for the origin of what is modern, Randall seconds Charles Homer Haskins’s famous claim (*The Renaissance of the 12th Century*) that it began much earlier: “The chief pathfinder of this *via moderna*, William of Ockham [1300?–1349?], left his pupils in control not only in Oxford but in Paris itself, the former stronghold of the Thomists. The new modernism stood for a skeptical empiricism that completely demolished in the fourteenth century the great systems so carefully erected the century before. Gone were all the necessities of reason, all metaphysical entities and distinctions. *Nothing could be accounted real in nature that was not an observed fact or relation between facts. Experience was the only test of physical truth*” (Randall [1926]1976:211–12; emphasis added). It would seem that William of Ockham had anticipated the major premises of Francis Bacon’s scientific method by 300 years and of Descartes’s empirically based rationalist philosophy by 350. Moreover, his understanding

of verifiable truth, often considered the hallmark of modern thinking, coincides with those common among Enlightenment *philosophes* 500 years after his death. During a time in Europe commonly thought to be trapped by the iron grip of Catholic orthodoxy, its two most important universities were home to viewpoints we would now see as distinctly modern.

In 1950, another celebrated historian of ideas, Crane Brinton, offered a subtler analysis of the transition from the medieval to the modern, which is closer to current verdicts than Randall’s. For him modernity was first indicated by “an awareness of a shared newness, of a way of life different from that of one’s forebears—and by 1700 awareness of a way of life felt by many to be much *better* than that of their forebears—this is in itself one of the clearest marks of our modern culture.” He understood that the relationship between the medieval and modern worldviews is distinguished only with great difficulty, that “we cannot define *modern* neatly . . . we face the problem of disentangling *modern* from *medieval*.” Distinguishing one epoch from another simply reflects “our rhetorical habit of thinking” more than actual, demonstrable sociopolitical change: “The modern is not a sunrise ending the medieval night. The modern is not the child of the medieval, nor even the medieval grown to manhood” (p. 256). More precisely, Brinton believed that “the medieval view of life was altered into the eighteenth-century view of life. This eighteenth-century view of life, though modified in the last two centuries, is still at bottom *our* view of life, especially in the United States. The late fifteenth, the sixteenth, and the seventeenth centuries are from this point of view essentially *transitional*, essentially the years of preparation for the Enlightenment” (pp. 258–9). Though often voiced with less conviction, this has become the more or less standard view among social theorists and other intellectual historians in the half century since Brinton wrote.

In 1923, Virginia Woolf ([1923]1984) famously observed, “I will hazard a second assertion, which is more disputable perhaps, to the effect that on or about December, 1910, human character changed. . . . And when human relations change there is at the same time a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature. Let us agree to place one of these changes about the year 1910” (pp. 194–5). From an entirely different cultural tradition, Theodor Adorno anointed 1850 as the beginning of the modern period, at least for the things he cared and knew the most about: Western literature, music, philosophy, and the social theories that sprang up to interpret them during the mid-twentieth century. More provocatively, Oscar Wilde had argued in 1891 that “[p]ure modernity of form is always somewhat vulgarising. It cannot help being so. The public imagine that, because they are interested in their immediate surroundings, Art should be interested in them also, and should take them as her subject-matter. But the mere fact

that they are interested in these things makes them unsuitable subjects for Art. . . . Modernity of form and modernity of subject matter are entirely and absolutely wrong” (pp. 18–19). Less flamboyantly and more rigorously grounded, the contemporary historian Paul Johnson (1991) decides in his weighty treatment, *The Birth of the Modern*, that “[m]odernity was conceived in the 1780s” (p. xvii). He then illustrates to his own satisfaction that 1815 through 1830 were the pivotal years, at least in the West, during which time the idea of modernity lost its purely theoretical quality and succeeded in transforming an encyclopedic range of social and political practices. Another trustworthy historian not long before had observed that “a case can be made for calling the seventeenth century the first ‘modern’ century, ushering in the new Modern Age, that in certain respects has still not run its course. The grounds for giving the seventeenth century a modern label are partly psychological, namely that during those years educated people in increasing numbers began to think of themselves consciously as ‘Moderns,’ as distinguished from ‘Ancients’ (Baum 1977:27). Seconding this judgment, John Crowe Ransom (1984) held that even “Milton felt the impact of modernity which is perennial in every generation; or, if it is not, of the rather handsome degree of modernity which was current in his day” (p. 70), that is, between 1608 and 1674.

Less dramatic but more precise than all such postulations, the indispensable *Oxford English Dictionary* claims that the word itself is pronounced “moden,” without an *r*, and that it originates from *modo* (“just now”), and by analogy from the Latin, *hodiernus*, in turn from *hodie* (“today”). Hakewill wrote in the dictionary in 1635, “Yea but I vilifie the present times, you say, whiles I expect a flourishing State to succeed; bee it so, yet this is not to vilifie modernity, as you pretend,” the first identified instance of its use in this way. Historians claim that the onset of “the modern period,” at least in the Occident, may have begun in 1455 when Gutenberg printed his Bible and a flood of books shortly engulfed the literate world; it may have begun with the projection technique of mapmaking created by Gerardus Mercator in 1569, or the equally important invention of the maritime chronometer in 1735 by John “Longitude” Harrison, making long sea journeys less dangerous; perhaps it began when North and South America were stumbled upon by European navigators in the late sixteenth century; or modernity may have been inaugurated with the discovery of certain fundamental medical facts, like William Harvey’s analysis of the circulatory system in 1628.

Another common argument holds that Descartes established modernity for the intellectual class in 1641 when he published his treatise on epistemology and was firmly anchored by the time Kant offered his revolutionary *Critique of Pure Reason* to the learned world in 1785. Equally plausible, historians of science would claim that modernity in its most profound sense grew out of advances

in technical practices and theorizing beginning with the astronomical pronouncements of Copernicus (1514), Kepler (1596), and Galileo (1632), or the general “scientific method” as laid out by Bacon in 1605. As Hegel ([1840]1995) put it, “What Cicero said of Socrates may be said of Bacon, that he brought Philosophy down to the world, to the homes and everyday lives of men” (p. 175).

Among literary scholars, “modernism” (which is not necessarily synonymous with either “modern” or “modernity,” nor surely “modernization”) can be dated by the poems of Baudelaire (1857) and Rimbaud (1870), the writings of Ezra Pound prior to the Great War, the first novels of James Joyce (1910–1922), or the journal *Blast*, edited by Wyndham Lewis just following the First World War. Naturally, historians of photography, film, music, dance, and all the other arts can pinpoint when modernity began for them and their particular mode of expression, and none of them would agree, of course. Alternatively, military historians might hold that the first “modern” wars occurred during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when new and unprecedentedly ferocious weapons were initially fielded (high explosives, 70-mile range artillery, the machine gun, the battleship, poison gas, the tank, and so on).

Thus, as we have now seen, both scholars and the literati have tried to summarize the multivalent phenomenon of modernity for at least two centuries. Many of their conclusions, taken in the round, have been concisely restated by Richard Tarnas (1991) in a widely read popularization, where he summarizes the entire process: “And so between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, the West saw the emergence of a newly self-conscious and autonomous human being—curious about the world, confident in his own judgments, skeptical of orthodoxies, rebellious against authority, responsible for his own beliefs and actions, enamored of the classical past but even more committed to a greater future, proud of his humanity, conscious of his distinctness from nature, aware of his artistic powers as individual creator, assured of his intellectual capacity to comprehend and control nature, and altogether less dependent on an omnipotent God. The emergence of the modern mind, rooted in the rebellion against the medieval Church and the ancient authorities, and yet dependent upon and developing from both these matrices . . . established the more individualistic, skeptical, and secular spirit of the modern age. Out of that profound cultural transformation, science emerged as the West’s new faith” (p. 282). For Tarnas, there are eight (partially redundant) foundational beliefs and practices that created the modern world, including (1) the godless impersonality of the universe, i.e., *deus absconditus*, (2) secular materialism triumphing over sacred spiritualism (3) science’s victory over religion, (4) the struggle between subjective mind and objective world and the desirability of nature being dominated by humankind, (5) irrational emotionality held to be inferior to

rational control (“the modern cosmos was now comprehensible in principle by man’s rational and empirical faculties alone, while other aspects of human nature—emotional, aesthetic, ethical, volitional, relational, imaginative, epiphanic—were generally regarded as irrelevant or distortional for an objective understanding of the world”; p. 287), (6) the conviction that our mechanistic universe lacks “deeper” meaning, (7) the amoral, natural, evolutionary theory displaced ethics, and (8) a secular utopia via the domination of nature became preferable to a supernatural afterlife (pp. 282–90). Though one could quibble whether these are exhaustive, Tarnas has surely found the largest themes of a purely intellectual nature as the medieval became the modern over time. What he did not treat, of course, are the sheerly demographic, sociopolitical, or military causatives that also fed into this overheated cultural pot during the last several centuries.

All that said, though, it is nonetheless difficult now for us to determine exactly what constituted modernity for Hakewill in 1635, yet following his inauguration of the term, a great many thinkers and artists have chimed in with their own thoughts on the matter. Hegel surely deserves a hearing, since his ideas influenced nearly every subsequent social theorist and philosopher who discussed the issue, either as followers of his ideas or as repudiators. Habermas’s (1987) opinion is typical: “Hegel was the first philosopher to develop a clear concept of modernity” (p. 4). Hegel’s (1995) least ambiguous statements appear in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* delivered in Berlin during the 1820s. Here modernity is characterized as “the opposition between thought and Being, the comprehending of whose unity from this time forward constitutes the interest of all philosophies. Here thought is more independent, and thus we now abandon its unity with theology.” More generally, “All that is speculative is pared and smoothed down in order to bring it under experience” (pp. 160, 162). Along with nearly everybody writing since, he holds that “with Descartes, the philosophy of modern times as abstract thought properly speaking begins” (p. 166). More important, particularly as his ideas influenced Marx and many others, is the closely paired sociological observation that “no one can suffice for himself; he must seek to act in connection with others. The modern world is this essential power of connection, and it implies the fact that it is clearly necessary for the individual to enter into these relations of external existence; only a common mode of existence is possible in any calling or condition” (p. 169). For Hegel, then, modernity means not only severing ties with theology and giving Descartes credit for opening the rationalist escape from mythologized thinking. It also includes embracing one’s role as a Burger—a citizen or bourgeois member of society—because postfeudal social relations (meaning a *relatively* unconstrained give and take) had finally become possible in parts of Europe and North

America. The need for “connection with others” and a “common mode of existence” illustrates Hegel’s vital point that for the first time in Western history (except for a brief moment in Athens), people could speak to each other as political equals in what came to be called “the public sphere.” Not only could they do so, but increasingly they were expected to do so as part of the “social contract.” This development in citizen participation, along with the possession of private property, both under a published code of rights (for adult males, at least), became the political foundation on which modernity rested.

Yet there are many other ways to understand the meaning of modernity, viewed either as a great collective achievement or as an ambivalent, even dangerous, experiment in Western hubris. A hint of this nagging worry about its “ultimate meaning” is apparent in Kristeva’s (1981) remark: “Modernity is characterized as the first epoch in human history in which human beings attempt to live without religion” (p. 33). While hardly any longer intellectually surprising—and also an exaggeration empirically speaking—such a realization continues existentially to bother many denizens of the modern period, since ethically correct behavior can no longer be tied to doctrinal directives in the way it is imagined to have been done during the Middle Ages. To move through life with nothing more concrete for guidance than so-called situational ethics is a frightening, even debilitating, prospect for many people—which is perhaps why Kristeva writes “*attempt* to live without religion,” as if doing so altogether has not been an entirely successful enterprise.

Perhaps the most thoroughgoing and profound sense of despair at the cost modernity has wrung from the certainties of religiosity was voiced by Kierkegaard (1967–1978) in the 1840s. His critique of “the modern temper” is brittle and brilliant: “In contrast to what was said about possession in the Middle Ages and times like that, that there were individuals who sold themselves to the devil, I have an urge to write a book: *Possession and Obsession in Modern Times*, and show how people *en masse* abandon themselves to it, how it is now carried on *en masse*. This is why people run together in flocks—so that natural and animal rage will grip a person, so that he feels stimulated, inflamed and *ausser sich*” [beside himself] (1968: vol. 4:4178). Not only did Kierkegaard find reprehensible the manic conformity and mob behavior typical of his era, but he also saw in these new developments a generalized abdication from moral autonomy and that strong sense of self with which his father’s Pietism had inculcated him as a boy, and from which he never really escaped. His most famous diatribes against modernity as he witnessed it appear in *The Present Age* ([1846]1978), a long review-essay that wandered far from its assignment: “The present age is essentially a sensible, reflecting age, devoid of passion, flaring up in superficial, short-lived enthusiasm and prudently relaxing

in indolence” (p. 63). On one hand, he found modern times to be a sad era of collective manias and animal thoughtlessness, yet on the other, he bridled at the smug, passionless dullards who constituted the Danish bourgeoisie among whom he lived. Both ailments of the soul, he thought, were due to a lack of scruples and enough resolution to live by them. He also earned permanent obloquy from the liberal mindset when he blasted equality as a pointless societal goal and one that would inevitably lead to individual slavery at the behest of social organization: “The dialectic of the present age is oriented to equality, and its most logical implementation, albeit abortive, is leveling, the negative unity of the negative mutual reciprocity of individuals (p. 79).

Kierkegaard’s denunciation of modernity, in style and substance, did not begin with him nor end with his death in 1855. A very recent example, somewhat less florid and impassioned but similar in tone, comes from John Lukacs (2002), an American historian. Proclaiming “It’s the End of the Modern Age,” Lukacs states that “the widespread usage and application of the adjective to life and art, such as ‘modern woman,’ ‘modern design,’ ‘modern architecture,’ ‘modern art,’ and so on, appeared mostly in the 1895–1925 period” (p. B11). He further believes that a series of readily identifiable periods and the qualities that made each distinctive from the others have exhausted themselves. He explains: “During these past 10 years (not *fin de siècle*: *fin d’une ère*), my conviction hardened further, into an unquestioning belief not only that the entire age, and the civilization to which I have belonged, are passing but that we are living through—if not already beyond—its very end. I am writing about the so-called Modern Age.” Historians as much as social theorists enjoy pontificating about “the end of” this and the “origin of” that, yet Lukacs’s argument cannot easily be dismissed. In his view, “the Modern Age (or at least its two centuries before 1914)” ought to be thought of principally as “the Bourgeois Age,” which he describes as follows: “[It] was the Age of the State; the Age of Money; the Age of Industry; the Age of the Cities; the Age of Privacy; the Age of the Family; the Age of Schooling; the Age of the Book; the Age of Representation; the Age of Science; and the age of an evolving historical consciousness. Except for the last two, all of those primacies are now fading and declining fast” (pp. B7, B8, B11). Sentiments such as these might be interpreted as the disillusioned swan song of an elderly student of cultural change, yet Lukacs is hardly alone in believing that globalized consciousness, economics, and militarization have rendered what he calls “the Bourgeois Age” permanently irrelevant to the human future, particularly in the richer countries.

Of course, postmodernists—from whom Lukacs distances himself—have been arguing a similar position for at least 25 years. The most famous among this disparate group, Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984), gives his versions of

why “modernity” is over and a new social formation is in place, and he does it by contrasting his view with that of his archrival: “Jürgen Habermas thinks that if modernity has failed, it is in allowing the totality of life to be splintered into independent specialties which are left to the narrow competence of experts, while the concrete individual experiences ‘desublimated meaning’ and ‘destructured form,’ not as a liberation but in the mode of that immense *ennui* which Baudelaire described over a century ago (p. 72). The heated debate between Habermas and his French adversaries about the political meaning of the postmodernist credo is complex, but the gist revolves around the former’s continued faith in the Enlightenment, in reasoned action and communication, and in a neo-Kantian ethics predicated on individual autonomy and resistance to prepackaged ethical formulae, spoonfed to citizens through mass media. For the postmodernists, the rational horse is out of the behavioral barn, and it makes no sense to call out for its return. As Lyotard put it: “Is the aim of the project of modernity the constitution of sociocultural unity within which all the elements of daily life and of thought would take their places as in an organic whole? or does the passage that has to be charted between heterogeneous language games—those of cognition, of ethics, of politics—belong to a different order from that? . . . Modernity, in whatever age it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and without discovery of the ‘lack of reality’ of reality, together with the invention of other realities” (pp. 72–73, 77). It is these “other realities,” of course, that are of primary interest to Lyotard, but which Habermas finds politically debilitating, even irresponsible. It is troubling, to say the least, that a major philosopher of cultural change should apparently praise a reality that “lacks reality,” even if one is clear on his intended meaning. For modernity, as Tarnas pointed out above, rests first of all on a social agent who can readily distinguish what is “empirically” real (e.g., political-economic interests) from what is unreal (e.g., supernatural beliefs and yearnings). When the “border lands” (a favorite postmodernist metaphor) become blurred between the real and unreal, the true and false, the past and future, then social action of a responsible type—the Enlightenment style that Hegel, Marx, or Habermas would appreciate—becomes extremely difficult to manage. Perhaps this is the gist of what has been said lately by Lyotard, Derrida, and others who think similarly.

Not since the Second World War has a French/German intellectual and cultural split been so keen and obvious in its ramifications as in this case. And because of the fireworks involved, it has drawn widespread attention. Recently, one noted British political theorist, Alan Ryan (2003), had this to say: “Habermas’s wish for a ‘modern’ Germany brings us to the point at which his politics and his philosophy meet. Habermas’s political views are, viewed from a sufficient distance, quite simple, though in close-up

they are anything but. He is—and this is why the comparison with Dewey is inescapable—a theorist of ‘modernity’; in shorthand, that means he thinks that the modern social and political world is fated to operate without philosophical or religious reassurance, that there can be no transcendental guarantees that what we take to be true, good, beautiful, and just really are so. To philosophers like Heidegger, the absence of transcendental guarantees was a source of anguish. To Dewey, it was just a fact about the world” (p. 46). By working Dewey into the equation, Ryan manages to hint at a possible “solution” to the dilemma posed by the modern era. If religious anchors to morally correct action have been lost to the heavy seas of modernist thought and the sometimes dreadful historical events to which they helped give rise, one can either retreat nostalgically to some form of ersatz religiosity or can accept the foundationless condition of secular life, much as Voltaire did, and bravely carry on, free of any illusions. Except, perhaps, for the singular and essential illusion that one can indeed persevere without the aid of transcendental guarantees. Mark Lilla (2002) recently captured this set of phenomena succinctly: “Throughout the nineteenth century, Hegel had been understood, correctly or not, as having discovered a rational process in world history that would culminate in the modern bureaucratic state, bourgeois civil society, a Protestant civil religion, a capitalist economy, technological advances, and, of course, Hegel’s own philosophy. This was the prophecy, and when it was first distilled from Hegel’s works it was welcomed throughout Germany. As the prophecy approached fulfillment near the end of the nineteenth century, horror set in and a deep cultural reaction followed. Expressionism, antimodernism, primitivism, irrationalism, fascination with myth and the occult—a Pandora’s box of movements and tendencies was opened. The horror was genuine: if Hegel and his epigones were right, the whole of human experience had been explained rationally and historically, anesthetizing the human spirit and foreclosing the experience of anything genuinely new, personal or sacred. It meant in Max Weber’s chilling phrase, ‘the disenchantment of the world’” (p. 61).

The conviction that modernity, despite all its patent advantages over the medieval, necessarily brought with it an intimidating, fearsome prospect for humanity’s future, was first detailed by a social theorist in 1887. In that year Ferdinand Tönnies published *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, a highly influential tract that caused Durkheim to push theorizing in precisely the opposite direction as hard as he could—celebrating rather than disparaging major social change in his time. Simultaneously, it also motivated Weber to word carefully his reflections about the process leading to what Lilla called “disenchantment,” a loose translation of *Entzauberung*: the removal of magic from the world. Tönnies moved from his native German village to Berlin and back, and during this hegira he

experienced the same urban anomie that Durkheim had identified while studying suicide from his position in France. Tönnies ([1887]2001) summarizes his theory: “The theory of *Gesellschaft* takes as its starting point a group of people who, as in *Gemeinschaft*, live peacefully alongside one another, but in this case without being essentially united—indeed, on the contrary, they are essentially detached. In *Gemeinschaft* they stay together in spite of everything that separates them; in *Gesellschaft* they remain separate in spite of everything that unites them. As a result, there are no activities taking place which are derived from an *a priori* and predetermined unity and which therefore express the will and spirit of this unity through any individual who performs them. Nothing happens in *Gesellschaft* that is more important for the individual’s wider group than it is for himself. On the contrary, everyone is out for himself alone and living in a state of tension against everyone else” (p. 52). This brilliant and bitter denunciation of contemporary urban life served as a backbone to twentieth-century social thought, even if unattributed to its author. Virtually every subsequent theorist assumed the essential validity of this viewpoint, even as they altered its terminology to suit their own purposes.

Yet there were strong voices of dissent, most notably Georg Simmel’s. For him (as for Marx, for whom the bucolic life was the preserve of society’s least intelligent members), urbanity opened salutary opportunities for thought and action that had been previously unimagined. And the money economy, vilified by Marx and many others on the Left, Simmel also understood to be a motor of endless change, experimentation, and a generalized enlargement of social possibility. He was perfectly aware of its dangers to the social fabric and wrote perceptively about the condition of urban poverty amidst great wealth. Nevertheless, on balance, Simmel thought that modernity brought with it freedom from any number of shackles, social and intellectual, and was therefore to be embraced, not repelled. Moreover, he believed (as did Weber) that wishing for a nostalgic return to *Gemeinschaft* would accomplish little, since the forces of rationalization, once unleashed, could never again be contained. As Simmel (1971) put it, in his inimitably speculative style: “The dynamic vital character of the modern life-feeling, and the fact that it is manifest to us as a form of vital *movement*, consumed in a continuous flux in spite of all persistence and faithfulness, and adhering to a rhythm that is always new—this runs counter to the Greek’s sense of substance and its eternal outline. The great task of modern man—to comprehend the eternal as something which immediately dwells within the transient, without its having to forfeit anything for being transplanted from the transcendental to the earthly plane—is alien to him [the Greek] through and through.” For Simmel, the key difference between Greek and modern thinking is that “the former involves a much slighter theoretical awareness of the creativity of the soul.”

And in summary, “[T]he great problem of the modern spirit comes forward here as well: to find a place for everything which transcends the givenness of vital phenomena within those phenomena themselves, instead of transposing it to a spatial beyond (pp. 238, 243).

In short, modernity offers boundless chances for humans to create and re-create their environments and themselves; it also makes available, as Goethe’s Faust learned 200 years ago, an equal likelihood for catastrophe, for the individual in their most private moments, as well as the megalopolis wherein they struggle to survive.

— Alan Sica

See also Capitalism; Citizenship; Frankfurt School; German Idealism; Individualism; Industrial Society; Marx, Karl; McDonaldization; Postmodernism; Scottish Enlightenment; Secularization; Simmel, Georg; Urbanization; Weber, Max

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MOLM, LINDA

Linda D. Molm (b. 1948) is an American sociologist who has examined fundamental processes within social exchange relations. After receiving her BA in 1970 from the University of North Dakota, Molm completed her doctorate in sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, in 1976. Her interest in social exchange theory first blossomed in the late 1970s. Since that time, she has engaged in three systematic research programs that have significantly increased our understanding of social exchange processes. Molm’s systematic approach to the growth and testing of theory has resulted in the elaboration and proliferation of exchange theory. In particular, her theoretical contributions have focused on the power-dependence tradition within exchange theory. While each of Molm’s three research programs has separately made contributions to power-dependence theory, together they constitute an impressive intellectual contribution to this tradition. Her first research program undertaken between the 1970s and 1980s examined the development, maintenance, and disruption of social exchange relations. From the 1980s to the 1990s, she examined the role and use of coercive power in exchange relations. The book that resulted from this research, *Coercive Power in Social Exchange* (1997), was recognized with the 1998 Theory Prize. Finally, her most recent research program has begun the process of comparing reciprocal and negotiated forms of social exchange.

Molm’s three research programs on exchange theory have shared several common features. Perhaps one of the most important features distinguishing her research programs from other exchange traditions has been her focus

on reciprocal exchange relations. Several classical social exchange theorists, including Homans and Blau, developed their theories around a conception of social exchange as a reciprocal exchange. Molm's research stands apart from the work of other contemporary exchange researchers in its focus on the reciprocal form of exchange. In addition, her research has examined not only issues of power in social relations but also other fundamental issues of concern to the classical theorists such as risk, trust, and fairness (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000). While many other exchange researchers have maintained their focus on issues of power in social exchange, Molm's research has dealt with a wider array of topics of concern in social exchange. This broader focus has expanded the potential scope of social life to which exchange theory can be applied and exemplifies yet another contribution of Molm's work.

While the overarching contributions of Molm's three research programs are significant, additional consideration must also be given to the individual contributions of each research program. Her first research program began in the late 1970s by examining the development of social exchange relations over time and under differing structural conditions. This research program progressed to study the maintenance and disruption of exchange relations. The systematic nature of Molm's theoretical development is evidenced by her initial emphasis on dyadic exchange relations. Her later research programs expand on the structures of exchange relations analyzed. Results from several studies demonstrated the inherent fragility of reciprocal exchange relations. Additionally, she found that changes in reward structure produce very different effects than the same structures in the absence of change.

Building on this initial research program, Molm transitioned to the study of larger structures of exchange networks, although her focus continued to be on the analysis of the exchange relationship. This second systematic research program, for which she is currently best known, examined the effects of coercive power in social exchange, and her work on this topic culminated in an award-winning book (Molm 1997). Also referred to as punishment power, coercive power indicates one's control over negatively valued outcomes, whereas reward power refers to control over positively valued outcomes. The main theoretical contribution of this research program was to expand the scope of power-dependence theory to include coercive power. Through her systematic study of coercive power, Molm found that interactional dynamics would be dominated by reward power when both reward and coercive power are present. In this extension of power-dependence theory, Molm argued for an expansion of the concept of power to include strategic power use. Earlier research had considered power use to be an inevitable consequence of structural power differences, whereas Molm found coercive power to be used in a strategic manner. The third key finding from

this research was about the importance of risk as a constraint on the use of coercion in exchanges.

Molm's current research program builds on her previous work by relating differences between forms of exchange to the concept of risk as well as issues of power and justice. This comparison between negotiated and reciprocal forms of exchange illuminate the differences between exchanges where the terms are explicitly bargained and exchanges where actors initiate exchange without explicit knowledge of their partner's intention to reciprocate. While still in its initial stages, this research program has yielded several significant findings. First, the research has demonstrated that the relation between the structure of power and power use depends on the form of exchange, reciprocal or negotiated. In addition, the form of exchange determines the inherent risks actors face, as well as actors' responses to this risk, including affective responses. Finally, the form of exchange affects actors' feelings of trust, commitment, liking, and fairness. In this ongoing research program, Molm will continue to compare these two forms of exchange, and her future findings will likely continue in her tradition of making important contributions to power-dependence theory.

— Gretchen Peterson

See also Power-Dependence Relations; Social Exchange Theory

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MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT

Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), was born near Bordeaux into an aristocratic family. With the death of his father in 1713, he became the lord of the family estate, and with the death of an uncle a couple of years later, he became a baron and President à Mortier of the Parlement in Bordeaux—a post that he would later sell, claiming his interests in law were more theoretical than practical. His first major work, *The Persian Letters* (1721), was a literary success, and he became the

darling of several exclusive Parisian circles. After extensive travels in Europe, Montesquieu wrote a historical study titled *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and on their Decline* (1734). His most important work, and the one that will be considered here, was *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), a vast, sprawling work, composed of 31 books and the product of 15 years of labor, the last few years marked by failing eyesight. The fact that this work was condemned by the church did not prevent Montesquieu from becoming director of the Académie Française during the year prior to his death. His last work, an “Essay on Taste,” was written for the *Encyclopédie* edited by Diderot and D’Alembert.

The Spirit of the Laws is often considered the inaugural work of a specifically *social* science, not just because of its content—the reestablishment of political thought on the basis of an analysis of all known societies—but above all, because of its method. Émile Durkheim (and later, Louis Althusser) claimed that Montesquieu was the first to apply “social” laws to the study of society, rather than juridical, political laws (considered as tainted by a teleological, and thus metaphysical bias). A close reading of *The Spirit of the Laws*, however, reveals a more complex picture.

In the opening paragraph, Montesquieu establishes a hierarchy of laws corresponding to the chain of beings: at the top are the laws regulating God’s actions, then the laws of matter, followed by angelic moral laws, the bestial laws of passion, and at the bottom, positive human laws. This hierarchy, unlike more traditional hierarchies, is based not on degrees of moral perfection but on degrees of determinacy. Humans are at the bottom because they are the least determined of beings, for they alone are subject to every type of law. Human societies are subject to the “laws” of climate, geography, population, material culture, commerce, mores, morality, religion, sentiment, and reason. The effects of the interaction of all these laws, in all their complexity, are potentially limitless. Humans, being subject to a surfeit of different lawlike determinations, do not necessarily obey any of these laws. As such, they cannot, by themselves, provide collective existence with a principle of order, coherence, or truth; at most these laws provide a post hoc principle of intelligibility. This is the source of Montesquieu’s much vaunted empiricism. One is not limited to the study of those “facts” that suggest collective life is orderly, meaningful, or just. One can study all the facts because they can all be rendered comprehensible when related to general laws.

This excess of lawlike determinations provides humans with their margin of freedom. Humans, Montesquieu insists, are the only beings capable of deluding themselves, even to the point of ignoring the most basic exigencies. Such “symbolic” freedom also enables humans to re-present these multiple general laws and to reflexively refashion them into meaningful wholes, notably through the establishment of

the political-juridical sphere with its positive laws. The recourse to the latter is made all the more imperative by the need to confront the violence that Montesquieu claims (in opposition to Hobbes) arises with the emergence of social life. The empire of positive laws, however, cannot but remain fragile. Not only do the multiple, “social” determinations threaten to deflect or counter the intentions of the legislator, but these determinations mould the political laws from within. For they contribute to the formation of the “general spirit” that underlies the laws and gives them their force. As such, the leverage afforded positive laws remains limited and context dependent. Montesquieu constantly seeks to give advice to the legislator, but most of this advice consists of warnings about legislative hubris.

Once the “epistemological” foundations have been established in Book 1, Montesquieu must systematically think the multiplicity of “social” facts in relation to a limited number of political forms. In Books 2 through 13 he begins with the political forms and examines their internal consistency in relation to their underlying “spirits,” which provide a sort of condensate of the different lawlike determinations. In Books 12 to 25 he changes directions, and examines all the “social” factors, moving from the most material (climate) to the most ideal (religion), in relation to their impact on the political realm. In the last six books, he returns to the problematic of positive law.

There are three basic political types or forms: republics, monarchies, and despotism. Prior to Montesquieu, despotism was seen not as a type of political regime but as, at best, the corruption of a regime type. For the forms of power appeared inconceivable outside the laws that sustain them—and despotism is lawless. By granting despotism full categorical dignity, Montesquieu produces a revolution in the conception of power. Not only does he separate power from positive law, but he suggests that, left to itself, power seeks to overcome the restrictions of the law in pursuit of its own unlimited dominion. Despotism, in effect, reveals the essence of power and, as such, haunts all political formations, carrying forward the violence of society’s origins into the relations of rule. Indeed, Montesquieu stresses that despotism is not just the most primitive but the most common form of regime.

Henceforth, the problem is not to create a “good power,” that is, a power that lives up to the law of its concept. Nor is it to eliminate power; that would only render positive law powerless. Rather the problem is to contain power. Positive law by itself is not up to the task, as its dependence on power renders it too vulnerable. A “means” must be found to buttress the law if it is to restrain power’s unlimited expansion. In principle, every nondespotic regime has, in its own manner, established such a means. The system of checks and balances, whose elaboration had such an influence on the American founding fathers, is but the most famous.

If power negates the law under despotism, the relation of power to law is rendered positive in the other regime types. In republics, particularly democratic republics, power and law are equated by being generalized and fused within the figure of the citizen. In monarchies, by contrast, the separation of law and power is maximized; for feudal law, the basis of modern monarchies, was only established, according to Montesquieu, when monarchic power was at its nadir, thus permitting the establishment of “intermediary bodies.” This same relation of power to law provides a key to the comprehension of the “spirits” corresponding to the regime types. In despotism, the spirit is fear—the fear resulting from the violence of a will unbounded by the law. At the same time, the despotic will corresponds to an original, narcissistic self-love that would submit everything to its own desire. In republics, whose spirit is virtue (understood as the law’s internalization), the love of self is replaced by a love of the law, or of the community established by the law. With monarchies and their spirit of honor, one returns to self-love, but this time a self-love mediated by the recognition of the other and, thereby, tied to the norms of a social code. In the creation of a self-image that, in the name of honor, would resist an excessive dependence on both monarchical favor and the letter of the law, Montesquieu detects the emergence of a certain individual freedom.

Montesquieu extends his comparison of regime types along several dimensions, and according to a multitude of factors. Consider, to give but one example, what he says about how each type institutes its temporal dimension. Despotic regimes appear indifferent to time: in their violence, they tend toward their self-destruction, but in their artlessness, they constantly reemerge. Democratic republics, by contrast, would arrest time. Once the original legislative genius (a Solon, Lycurgus, or William Penn) has established the constitution, time would be frozen under the sign of the law. Monarchies alone bear a relation to time that supposes historical continuity. In the much misinterpreted last two books, Montesquieu examines the origins of the European monarchies, which he sees as the bearers of “Western exceptionalism.” Unlike much of the Enlightenment, he does not attribute the singularity of the West to the heritage of the classical world, whether republican or imperial. Nor, unlike the aristocratic opposition, does he attribute it to the influence of the Germanic invasions *per se*. Instead, he looks to the evolution of feudalism for the emergence of a law, and with this law, an institutional structure, that developed relatively independently of the place of political power represented by the monarch.

Within each of the major regime types, Montesquieu discovers important variations. China, for example, presents the paradox of a moderate despotism. With its ritualized civility, it constantly re-creates from below the social bond that the despotic will would erode from above. Commercial

republics, to provide another example, temper the bellicosity, asceticism, and egalitarianism of the “purer” type of democratic republic. The most important variation, however, is presented by England, which, even as it is characterized as a republic disguised as a monarchy, appears less as a mixed regime than a regime *sui generis*. The object of the English regime, Montesquieu states, is liberty, even “extreme liberty.” The “constitution,” which counters power with power through a system of checks and balances, is only one of the preconditions of this liberty. Another precondition is the rise of a conflictual politics, which, in turn, supposes a partial deidentification with the place of power on the part of a populace jealous of its liberty. At a more general level, Montesquieu points to the unprecedented energies released by the emergence of a new form of individualism characterized by a general restlessness. And on a darker note, he speaks—in direct contrast to the *joie de vivre* of the French—of the signs of a collapse of sociality and the spread of melancholia.

Within contemporary social theory, Montesquieu’s name remains honored, but *The Spirit of the Laws* is little read, and rarely in its entirety. This is a pity. It was, arguably, the first work in which the discovery of the “social” is clearly discernible. Moreover, it suggests that this discovery first emerged as a division internal to the “political,” as the latter’s delineation of its own other. For a specifically social analysis appears here as the consequence of political theory’s critique of the limits of its own abstraction and volition. Montesquieu was not, contrary to Durkheim, the precursor of the scientific study of society, seeking to replace political theory with social science. Nor did he oppose the political and social as two mortally hostile domains (as, in very different terms, did Marx and Hannah Arendt). He was far more interested in articulating the relation between the two domains in their difference, and he did so with a subtlety, sobriety, and imagination that to this day remains unparalleled.

— Brian C. J. Singer

See also Althusser, Louis; Democracy; Durkheim, Émile; Historical and Comparative Theory; Individualism; Power; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; State

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MORALITY AND AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

What is at stake in the relationship of morality and aesthetic judgement is the hospitality of nature to the aesthetic ends of humanity. The affiliation of morality (the rational self-determination of the will) and aesthetic judgement (the designation of nature or its artistic representation as beautiful or sublime) emerged as a pressing concern within Enlightenment philosophy. The core of the Enlightenment project as it developed in its English, French, and German forms was an absolute faith in the capacity of reason to overcome the prejudice and superstition of the Middle Ages, to establish moral, political, and normative systems that would liberate humanity from its dependence on unquestioned forms of authority, and to establish by science and experimentation the rational order that underlies the affairs of humans. The importance of aesthetic experience in this project is the possibility it offers of unifying the apparently disparate realms of history and nature: of showing that the unfolding of human affairs toward the ultimate ends of peace, security, and universal recognition is inscribed in the rational order of the world. Thus, insofar as the Enlightenment project attempted to expound a unity between the ultimate ends for which human beings were created, the aesthetic experience we have of nature was understood as configuring, or symbolizing, the moral integrity of the human will.

The exemplary text here is Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* (1790). In the first part of the book, "The Analytic of the Beautiful," Kant attempted to set out the a priori conditions of the judgement of taste—the estimation of an object or its artistic representation as beautiful. For Kant, this judgement is independent of all interest, presents itself as a demand for the assent of all men, and follows not from the theoretical cognition of the object but from a certain harmony of the faculties of understanding and intuition. The feeling of delight that arises from my contemplation of a beautiful object, in other words, immediately refers my judgement to the intelligibility of nature, and so to a common sense of the aesthetic possessed by all rational beings. Insofar as I am moved to apply the concept of the beautiful to those objects that produce in me the feeling of delight, I can be said to be responding to a purposiveness in nature that exceeds the mere excitation of

sensory interest. The tasteful contemplation of a nude, for example, would arise from its formal characteristics of line and symmetry and not from the immoral desires that the female body is wont to provoke. Both my disinterested pleasure in the beautiful and the pure desire I experience in the moral law, therefore, are related to what is literally unrepresentable: the supersensible conditions of unity and finality that cannot be schematized by the understanding. Thus, the acquisition of taste allows me to apprehend the real of sense as the embodiment of a divine purpose (the idea of nature), and to recognize its beauty as the symbol of the moral law.

The second part of *The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, "The Analytic of the Sublime," is also concerned with the purposiveness of nature—although this time the feelings provoked are disturbing rather than pleasurable, and gesture beyond the regulative organization of taste. For Kant, the subject's encounter with the awesome magnitudes (a storm at sea, a snow-capped mountain range) through which nature signifies its totality produces a sense of terror at the loss of the serial time that is the imagination's a priori principle. The immediate (or reproductive) synthesis of the magnitudes that reason demands of the imagination in the presence of the sublime does violence to the successive (or compositional) time that is the condition of phenomenal experience. Yet for Kant, this feeling of terror is not unmixed; for it is simultaneous with a sense of exultation in reason's capacity to conceive of nature as an intelligible totality. Imagination, in other words, experiences metaphysical distress at its loss of reproductive intuition; for serial time, which conditions the synthesis of sense-data by the understanding, is threatened by the overwhelming simultaneity of compositional magnitudes. Reason, on the other hand, feels a certain exultation at its capacity to recognize the intelligibility of nature. Thus for Kant the sublime copresence of pleasure and pain that arises within the cognitive subject refers its freedom beyond mere sensory satisfaction and toward the higher moral ends for which humanity was created (peace, cooperation, universal respect).

In *The German Ideology* (1847), Karl Marx implicated the aesthetics in the general determination of bourgeois culture to mystify and reconfigure the fundamental conflicts of capitalism. Kant's affiliation of aesthetic sensibility, moral culture, and historical progress, therefore, appeared as an ideological form that is complicit with the radical individualism of civil society. This relationship between the tasteful reproduction of reality and the persistence of a certain moral self-satisfaction was taken up by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944). In a powerful elaboration of Marx's ideology thesis, they argued that new media technologies had all but completed the integration of the masses into the rationalized economy of capitalist production. The films, television, and radio programmes produced by what Horkheimer and Adorno called "culture industries"

presented the satisfactions of corporate capitalism (cheap cars, convenience foods, fashionable clothes) as universally desirable. Popular culture, in other words, simply reproduces the unity of mass taste with the satisfaction it receives in the consumption of mass-produced commodities. The broadcast media that Horkheimer and Adorno discuss in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, therefore, function to reify the human ties in which culture originates: The individuality each of us values so highly becomes no more than a reflection of the standardized ideals of masculinity, heroism, sexuality, and beauty presented in Hollywood films. The kitsch romanticism of popular aesthetics functions to obscure the rationalized-functionalized-technological organization of human relationships and so to suspend the possibility of moral judgements on the reifying powers of corporate capitalism.

Walter Benjamin, in his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" (1939), however, argued that new image technologies—particularly film—opened a sphere of representation whose relationship to the masses is originally political. His claim is that the kinaesthetic register of film marks a departure from conventional standards of artistic creativity, standards that seek to preserve the *aura* of things, and opens the possibility of mass reflection on the technological body of human society. Art, for Benjamin, has always been characterized by a loss of the distance that sustains direct perception of beautiful and sublime objects; for insofar as it accomplishes its representation precisely by evoking what is no longer present to the viewer, it has from the beginning involved processes that mediate the aura of the object. Modern technologies like film and photography, however, have fundamentally transformed the artifice of art: They no longer seek to preserve the distance that is assumed in the perception of the beautiful and the sublime; rather, their capacity to anatomize objects through close-up shots, slow motion, and multiple camera angles destroys the aura of the people and objects that are represented. What is significant here is the transformation of the viewing community that is entailed in this shift toward technological reproducibility: for once the image has been intensified and disseminated in the medium of film, its reception is no longer limited to those who have the taste and leisure to appreciate artistic representations of the good society. For Benjamin, therefore, a moral politics could not simply recapitulate timeless images of bourgeois taste (as in the interior scenes of bourgeois art), nor should it seek to present itself through the technological revitalization of aura (the fundamental intention of Nazi propaganda films). Rather, its morality would consist in responding to the exigencies of the present: in provoking the masses to imagine the possibilities of dwelling, habitation, community, and participation that are opened by new technological means.

Benjamin and Adorno's remarks on the fate of the aesthetic have been taken up in the modernity-postmodernity debate that has occupied the social sciences for the last 20 years. On the Adornian side of the debate, a number of

theorists have sought to extend the culture industry thesis to the increasing media saturation of postmodern societies. Fredric Jameson in *Postmodernity, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991) analyses the loss of transformative power that the image undergoes as new technologies remove every trace of moral, political, and existential significance from its reproduction. Postmodernist art, he argues, is utterly depthless; it has, without irony, reproduced the style of the pop video and the Hollywood B-movie and is now incapable of provoking any kind of moral or political reflection in the masses. This decline of the image into depthless simulacra of love, sex, and beauty is taken up by Zygmunt Bauman in *Postmodern Ethics* (1993). He argues that in our media-saturated world, we confront each other merely as surfaces; I notice you only if you amuse or arouse me and vice versa. Any sense of ethical responsibility tends to be dissipated in the aesthetic distraction that constantly traverses the masses in postmodern societies. The consequences of this distraction are addressed by Keith Tester in *Media, Culture, and Morality* (1994). He argues, echoing Adorno's remarks on cultural criticism, that modern cultural studies reflect the trivial aestheticism they purport to criticize: Their obsession with style, fashion, and consumption is ultimately a symptom of the collapse of culture into the amorality of the market. In his later work, especially *Moral Culture* (1997), Tester examines the impact of the mass media on our capacity to think, feel, and act morally, and in particular how television has turned us into bystanders who remain indifferent to images of war, famine, and genocide.

On the Benjaminian side of the debate, Jean-Francois Lyotard has argued that the technological expansion of capital cannot consign art exclusively to the realm of the kitsch and the decorative. In *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute* (1988), he claims that the feelings of agitation that belong to the experience of the sublime are increasingly provoked by the disordered economy of capitalism. As the system expands through the use of digital, informatic, and computer technologies, the self is dispersed across radically heterogeneous regimes of discourse: Each of us experiences the dissidence between the economic demands of work, the affective demands of family and interpersonal relationships, the political demands of citizenship. For Lyotard, these conflicts are characterized by their radical unresolvability: There is no universal language into which it is possible to translate the conflicts between race, gender, democracy, and economy. This unresolvability is what marks the return of a certain affiliation between morality and the sublime. For Lyotard, the violence through which capital has subjected every form of cultural and ethnic difference to the demands of frictionless technological production engenders unforeseeable moments of *shock* that are akin to the sublime agitation described by Kant. The postmodern artist, then, has a responsibility (which cannot be totally erased by the temptations of the art market) to express this disarming experience: to respond to those

others who are silenced in the aesthetic and linguistic regimes of liberal capitalism.

— Ross Abbinnett

See also Benjamin, Walter; Capitalism; Civil Society; Frankfurt School; Individualism

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