


HISTORICAL  
DICTIONARY  
OF

SECOND EDITION

# Nietzscheanism



CAROL DIETHE

# Historical Dictionary of Nietzscheanism

*Second Edition*

Carol Diethe

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## Editor's Foreword

Although Friedrich Nietzsche lived and wrote during the second half of the 19th century and although his comments were eminently relevant to that time, much of what he wrote still has vibrant meaning and relevance today. This is somewhat surprising given the disrepute into which Nietzscheanism fell during and immediately following World War II. Something in his writing strikes a sympathetic—or antipathetic—chord in many, so no doubt the interest will survive well into the 21st century and beyond.

This *Historical Dictionary of Nietzscheanism* explores Nietzsche the man as well as Nietzsche the philosopher, describing both his career and his thought. It also presents earlier thinkers who influenced Nietzsche's philosophy, contemporaries who both agreed and disagreed with him, and others who interpreted (or misinterpreted) his philosophy for later generations. It contains a chronology, a general introduction, a dictionary containing numerous concise entries, and an extensive bibliography.

This expanded edition, like the first, is written by Carol Diethe. A graduate of London University, Dr. Diethe has researched, written, and lectured on Nietzsche for many years. During her career, she composed and taught undergraduate and graduate courses on the affect of Nietzsche's thought on European cultural history. Her publications include *Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip* and a translation of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Her biography of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, *Nietzsche's Sister and the Will to Power*, was published in 2003. Dr. Diethe has been on the executive committee of the *Friedrich Nietzsche Society* since its foundation in 1989, when she was elected its first secretary.

Jon Woronoff  
Series Editor

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

Full details of the translations of Nietzsche's works used in this volume are given in the first section of the bibliography. Each major work by Nietzsche has an entry in the dictionary under the English title. The following abbreviations will be used when quoting from Nietzsche's works:

<i>A-C</i>	<i>The Anti-Christ</i>
<i>BGE</i>	<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>
<i>BT</i>	<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>
<i>CW</i>	<i>The Case of Wagner</i>
<i>D</i>	<i>Daybreak</i>
<i>DD</i>	<i>Dithyrambs of Dionysus</i>
<i>EH</i>	<i>Ecce Homo</i>
<i>GS</i>	<i>The Gay Science</i>
<i>HH</i>	<i>Human, All Too Human</i>
<i>HC</i>	<i>"Homer's Contest"</i>
<i>NW</i>	<i>Nietzsche contra Wagner</i>
<i>OGM</i>	<i>On the Genealogy of Morality</i>
<i>OTLNS</i>	<i>"On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense"</i>
<i>TI</i>	<i>Twilight of the Idols</i>
<i>UM</i>	<i>Untimely Meditations</i>
<i>WP</i>	<i>The Will to Power</i>
<i>Za</i>	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i>

## Chronology

- 1844** Friedrich Nietzsche born in Röcken, Saxony, 15 October.
- 1846** Birth of sister, Elisabeth, on 10 July.
- 1849** Death of father, Karl Ludwig Nietzsche, on 27 July.
- 1858–1864** Attends Schulpforta near Naumburg.
- 1864–1865** Attends Bonn University.
- 1865–1868** Attends Leipzig University.
- 1869–1879** Professor of philology at Basel University.
- 1870** Fights in Franco-Prussian War (wounded after two months).
- 1872** Publication of *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*.
- 1873–1875** Publication of *Untimely Meditations*.
- 1878** Publication of *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*.
- 1879** Publication of *Assorted Maxims and Opinions* (subsequently volume 2, part 1, of *Human, All Too Human*).
- 1880** Publication of *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (subsequently volume 2, part 2, of *Human, All Too Human*).
- 1881** Publication of *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*.
- 1882** Publication of *The Gay Science* (subtitle added 1877: “*la gay scienza*”).
- 1883** Publication of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All or None*, parts 1 and 2.
- 1884** Publication of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, part 3.



- 1885** Publication of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, part 4.
- 1886** Publication of *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*.
- 1887** Publication of *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*.
- 1888** Publication of *The Case of Wagner: A Musician's Problem*. Completion of *Dithyrambs of Dionysus* (published in 1891), *The Anti-Christ* (published in 1894), *Nietzsche contra Wagner: A Psychologist's Brief* (published in 1895), and *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is* (published posthumously in 1908).
- 1889** Publication of *Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*. Nietzsche's mental collapse in Turin, 3 January. Nursed by mother (Franziska Nietzsche) and sister (Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche).
- 1897** Death of mother on 20 April.
- 1900** Death of Nietzsche, 25 August.
- 1935** Death of sister on 8 November.

# Introduction

## NIETZSCHE THE MAN

Friedrich Nietzsche was born into a Lutheran pastor's family on 15 October 1844. His paternal grandmother in particular had mixed in high circles. His young mother, Franziska Nietzsche—just 17 when she married his father and 19 when she gave birth to Friedrich—came from a pastor's family that was not only slightly lower on the social scale but also much more zealously evangelical in outlook, belonging to the neo-Pietist persuasion in contrast to the rational Lutheranism of the Nietzsches. Nietzsche's father died when Nietzsche was almost five and his sister, Elisabeth (later to become Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche), was four, forcing the whole family, consisting of Nietzsche himself, his grandmother Erdmuthé, her two unmarried daughters, Auguste and Rosalie, Franziska, Elisabeth, and an elderly female maid, to decamp to Naumburg, Erdmuthé's former home. Eventually, Franziska was able to have her own household in which the devotional atmosphere continued unabated.

Nietzsche entered the village school at Röcken on 15 October 1849, his fifth birthday. When the family moved to Naumburg, he attended the elementary school for three years before spending the two years 1853–1855 at the private establishment of Carl Moritz Weber. He proceeded to the Cathedral Grammar School (*Domgymnasium*) in Naumburg for three years and from thence to the prestigious boarding school at Schulpforta, not far from Jena, where he studied for six years (1858–1864). This was the period when he conceived his profound love for Greek literature and philosophy. He enrolled as a theology student in 1864 at Bonn, where, for a year, he studied philology as his second subject until making this his primary subject at Easter 1865, prior to moving to Leipzig University later that year.

It was only when Nietzsche entered Bonn University that he began to question his religious certainties. By the time he was appointed professor of philology at Basel University at the phenomenally young age of 24, he had lost his belief in God, although he still gravitated toward neo-Pietists in Basel, such as Jacob Burckhardt and Johann Jakob Bachofen. At that time, Basel was an important evangelical center. Among the early Nietzscheans, a focal point of debate was the iconoclasm of Nietzsche's declaration, in *The Gay Science* (1882), that God is dead (*GS*, III: 125). One position commonly adopted was that Nietzsche had simply not meant what he had said and must have retained his Christian beliefs.

After 10 years of university teaching, Nietzsche was forced to retire early on grounds of ill health. He received a pension from Basel University that remained his chief source of income until his death, though by that point the administration of the pension had passed through the hands of his friend Franz Overbeck, his mother, and his sister (by now the widow of the anti-Semitic high school teacher Bernard Förster). Nietzsche would remain a helpless invalid from his mental collapse in Turin in 1889 until he died in Weimar in 1900.

The Basel years (1869–1879) were the years when Nietzsche mixed in society. He had already met Richard Wagner in Leipzig in 1868 and remained for some years a fervent admirer of Wagner's genius, spending Christmas with the Wagners in 1869 and 1870 and visiting them when they moved to Bayreuth, having attended the ceremonial laying of the foundation stone for the *Festspielhaus* in 1872. Nietzsche was entranced by *Tristan und Isolde* (1865), but when he attended rehearsals of *The Ring* at Bayreuth in 1876, he realized that the gulf between himself and the Wagners was unbridgeable: this gulf was made deeper by Wagner's religious theme in *Parsifal* (1882).

Although it has been speculated that Nietzsche was inordinately fond of Cosima Wagner, it is likely to have been because she was a motherly woman, the type of woman toward whom he habitually gravitated. When Nietzsche first met her at the idyllic "Tribtschen" (villa beside Lake Lucerne), she was surrounded by children and animals and indeed was heavily pregnant with Siegfried at that time. Another motherly woman in the Wagner circle, Malwida von Meysenbug, became his close friend and sponsor. During his teaching career, Nietzsche contemplated marriage on several occasions, though possibly the only woman

he would have viewed as really suitable was Lou Andreas-Salomé, whom he met in 1882. Their friendship never became the close collaboration that Nietzsche had hoped it would, and Lou Salomé's suspicion that Nietzsche wanted more than just friendship angered her sufficiently for her to break off all further personal contact with him.

Once Nietzsche had retired, his illness, which manifested itself in migraine, stomach trouble, and sleeplessness and might or might not have been syphilis (this has never been satisfactorily determined), meant that Nietzsche would be essentially alone for the rest of his life. He set about discovering the most congenial spots in Europe and settled on Sils Maria in the Swiss Engadine for the summer and (latterly) Turin in Italy for the winter. He loved the mountains and the sea and went for long walks. When his weak eyes permitted, he read and wrote. All his major works, apart from *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), *Untimely Meditations* (1873–1875), and the first volume of *Human, All Too Human*, are the products of these nomadic, lonely years, although he wrote many letters. Indeed, Nietzsche was never short of friends until the last few months of his life, when he appears to have been bent on upsetting his correspondents in a succession of vitriolic missives.

Surprisingly, in view of some of his misogynist pronouncements, which were inspired by his deep suspicion of nascent feminism, some of his closest friends were women, and, indeed, some of these were active campaigners for women's emancipation, such as Meta von Sallis-Marschlins. The reason for this apparent paradox was that many intelligent women thought Nietzsche's ideas were so liberating for the individual—of either sex—that his defamatory remarks on campaigners for female rights could be brushed aside.

Since Nietzsche had alienated himself from many of his friends in the period before his collapse in Turin, he was to all intents and purposes alone in the city when he collapsed in January 1889 and had to be fetched back to Germany by Overbeck. He was treated in a Jena asylum until it was realized that no improvement was in sight. From 1893 on, Franziska, aided by her daughter, looked after Nietzsche at her home in Naumburg. After Franziska Nietzsche's death in 1897, Elisabeth moved with her brother to Weimar, where she would go on to found a veritable "Nietzsche industry" in the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. Sometimes Nietzsche was virtually "put on show" to special guests who visited the house. Until Elisabeth's death in 1935, this commodious house was virtually a

place of pilgrimage for Nietzsche enthusiasts of every stamp, although Nietzsche himself had died on 25 August 1900.

## NIETZSCHE THE PHILOSOPHER

Nietzsche's publications fall into three natural categories: the early works, 1872–1876, the works of a middle period when Nietzsche was successfully fighting off the shackles of paid employment at Basel, and the final period prior to his mental collapse.

### Phase 1: 1872–1876

In the early work *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), Nietzsche puts forward a metaphysical conception of music derived from Arthur Schopenhauer, but whereas the latter's pessimism offered only renunciation as an escape from the pain of existence, Nietzsche honed his ideas into an affirmative metaphysic. He argued that reality is divided into a world of appearances that we perceive and inhabit—which Nietzsche dubs “the Apollinian”—and an underlying timeless, undifferentiated ground of being corresponding to what Nietzsche terms “the Dionysian.” The apparent order in the Apollinian world is balanced by the chaos, contradictions, and flux of Dionysianism. The two Greek gods represent human qualities and are manifest in our human instincts. Nietzsche's fondness for the figure of Dionysus was such that he later abandoned the mythical dimension and in *The Gay Science* applied the term to “he who suffers from a *superabundance of life*” (*GS*: V, 370). Here, the distinction between aestheticism and the suffering individual no longer applies, since a person who creates his own life is both an artist and a tragic hero. Just before he went insane, Nietzsche conflated the figure of Dionysus with that of Christ and became the apotheosis of his own metaphysics when he signed himself “Dionysus the crucified.”

Nietzsche's next work, *Untimely Meditations* (1873–1875), was less innovative than *The Birth of Tragedy*. Arranged in four essays and at first published separately under the titles “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer” (1873), “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1874), “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1874), and “Richard Wag-

ner in Bayreuth” (1876), it contained a good deal of scorching critique, not always directed at the right target. The praise of Wagner in the last essay had to be shaken off, and the abuse heaped on David Strauss in the first essay masks the fact that Nietzsche had much in common with his skeptic views. Thus, Nietzsche’s bitter attack on Strauss’s *Der alte und neue Glaube*, 1872 (*The Old Faith and the New*, 1873) targeted its author’s intellectual complacency and bad style. In the second essay, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” Nietzsche conceded that every person and every nation needs some knowledge of the past, but this should not force the individual to forfeit the capacity to live a full life. Nietzsche recommended the power of forgetting so that an individual can act in a way that is not motivated by the clutter of an indirect knowledge of history, but from direct experience: “Forgetting is essential to action of any kind” (*UM*, II: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 1). At this stage in his career, Nietzsche was still complimentary toward Schopenhauer and Wagner, so that the previously mentioned essays on both men are little short of hymns of praise, but this situation would change radically: Nietzsche soon came to see Schopenhauer’s pessimism as life denying and Wagner’s sultry romanticism as decadent.

## Phase 2: 1877–1881

In Nietzsche’s second book, *Human, All Too Human* (I: 1878, II: 1880), there is no theme as such, though his observations are organized in sections, a principle he followed in his next works, *Daybreak* (1881) and *The Gay Science* (1882). *Human, All Too Human* was written in an aphoristic style that Nietzsche would subsequently discover best suited his train of thought. It contains a broad range of themes, but the dominant one is a scornful rejection of Christianity. Nietzsche suggests that those who profess a belief in the Christian religion would cease to do so if only they could overcome the “aberration of reason and imagination” (*HH*, I, iii: 135) that makes them seek redemption from being themselves. He declares that the Christian flock has been duped by the (ascetic) priest into a feeling of guilt that weakens the individual and the whole of society. Subtitled *A Book for Free Spirits*, *Human, All Too Human* is exactly that: an invitation to the free and enquiring mind to subject prejudices, customs, and beliefs to scrutiny.

Nietzsche's next work, *Daybreak*, is even less coherently organized than its predecessor, in spite of its apparently tidy division into preface and five books. The critique of morality is a theme continued from *Human, All Too Human*. Society is at a watershed; children do not obey their parents (*D*, III: 176), and the state encourages intelligent people to neglect their talents by keeping abreast of current affairs, thus stifling their creativity: "Our age may talk about economy but it is in fact a squanderer: it squanders the most precious thing there is, the spirit" (*D*, III: 179). The great and the good (Immanuel Kant, Martin Luther, and many others) are systematically picked off as targets for Nietzsche's critique. As a sequel to its "free spirit" precursor, *Daybreak* stands as a compendium of Nietzsche's objections to the *Zeitgeist* and is intended to invigorate debate rather than arouse belief. In fact, *Daybreak* "presents its dominant and recurring subjects in as higgeldy-piggeldy a way as he [Nietzsche] could contrive" (Michael Tanner, *Daybreak*, introduction).

In *The Gay Science* (1882), his third book written in the style of aphorisms, Nietzsche raises his central topic of the death of God, which he sees as a cheerful and liberating prospect for mankind. Rejecting the pessimism of Schopenhauer when faced with nihilism, Nietzsche set himself against both the pretensions of contemporary science and the teachings of transcendentalism represented by Christianity. In declaring that God is dead and that man is therefore free from the repressive restraint manifested by conventional moral strictures, Nietzsche cautioned that man should not run headlong into the straitjacket provided by scientific reason (a popular escape route for many skeptics of his generation). Science could only provide biased answers based on logic: and since man is only partially logical, Nietzsche believed that the answers would necessarily be inadequate. The book records Nietzsche's search for the value of truth and engages with his belief in European decadence, both themes he would cover exhaustively—and no longer in aphorisms—in *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

Book 5 of *The Gay Science* was added to the original four in the second edition of 1887. Nietzsche started on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* early in 1883, immediately after finishing book 4 of *The Gay Science*. This explains why his two major preoccupations in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, eternal return and Zarathustra, make their first appearance at the end

of book 4 of *The Gay Science* (1882) as an apparent afterthought but in fact are intended as a trailblazer for his next book. The unscheduled addition of book 5 of *The Gay Science* takes the thunder out of the first hint of eternal return (*GS*, IV: 341) and dilutes the entrée of Zarathustra (*GS*, IV: 342), which now appear randomly “sandwiched.” The fourth book of *The Gay Science* also introduced the concept of self-creativity, of “becoming who we are” (*GS*, IV: 335), which became a *Leitmotif* in Nietzsche’s thought, reaching its apotheosis in the concept of the *Übermensch*.

### Phase 3: 1882–1889

What Nietzsche brought to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885) was a difference in *tone* as well as philosophical content. The work is written in a dithyrambic style quite unlike the pithy irony of his earlier works. Having suffered the loss of Lou Andreas-Salomé’s friendship in the fall of 1882, Nietzsche included some bitter jibes about women in the first two parts of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (begun in January 1883), most notoriously in the old woman’s advice to Zarathustra if visiting women: “do not forget the whip!” (*Za* I: “Of Old and Young Women”). Although interpretations of this famous passage vary, Nietzsche was canny in placing these words in the mouth of an old woman. That said, most commentators are forced to concede that Nietzsche was virulently antifeminist, if not misogynist; he hated the very idea of scholarly women. This has not necessarily put women off his philosophy. Many early campaigners for women’s emancipation realized that the concept of the *Übermensch*, discussed later, could apply to women just as well as to men and decided to ignore Nietzsche’s antifeminist barbs.

*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* introduces the concepts of the *Übermensch* and the will to power for the first time. It also elaborates on the theme of eternal return that was touched on in *The Gay Science*, where Zarathustra also made a brief appearance. The mention of eternal return in *The Gay Science* is actually a potted version of what Zarathustra will need several attempts to explain. In *The Gay Science*, the demon’s bleak view is as follows:

What if a demon crept after you one day or night in your loneliest solitude and said to you: “this life, as you live it now and have lived it, you will have to live again and again, times without number” . . . the question in



all and every thing: “do you want this again and again, times without number?” would lie as the heaviest burden upon all your actions. (*GS*, IV: 341)

The first mention of eternal return in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, part 3, 1884 (found in the section “Of the Vision and the Riddle”), sees Zarathustra struggling to explain the concept to the dwarf (his alter ego); the dwarf declares that time is a circle, but Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s view appears to see time as infinitely linear. The cosmological physics break down, but the notion of eternal return is rescued by Nietzsche’s invention of the will to power as the driving force in all life (to which he also applies a measure of physics); we learn that eternal return demands a readiness to *will* the return of every detail of our lives (already mooted in the passage from *The Gay Science*): “Alas, man recurs eternally! The little man recurs eternally” (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent”). The affirmative person must *will* the eternal return of everything, however disgusting: “The greatest all too small!—that was my disgust at man! And eternal recurrence even for the smallest! that was my disgust at all existence!” (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent”). Nietzsche elaborates on this when Zarathustra tells the Higher Men, “If you ever wanted one moment twice, if you ever said: ‘you please me, happiness, instant, moment!’ then you wanted *everything* to return!” (*Za*, IV: “The Intoxicated Song,” 10). Everything—even the little man.

Since Nietzsche’s works continued to be met with bland indifference, in 1885 he had to pay for the publication of the fourth part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* himself. It is ironic in view of the subsequent notoriety of the key concept introduced in the work: the will to power. The will to power represented Nietzsche’s method of expressing a form of nonmetaphysical transcendence. He postulated that it operated through all living things, reaching its summation in one man’s exercise of power over another. At best, Nietzsche anticipated that this type of power could be sublimated, so that man would exercise control over himself rather than others. This *Selbstüberwindung*, or self-overcoming, involves suffering and self-control, the type of hardness he believed the ancient Greeks had possessed before Socratic reasoning emasculated their culture. The person able to redirect the will to power in this manner would be the *Übermensch*. The *Übermensch* rather than eternal return was the concept that made Zarathustra a cult book at the turn of the century.

In directing the will to power onto himself, the *Übermensch* wills all things in their totality and for eternity. Thus, the notion of eternal return comes into play as well as the central premise of the *Übermensch*: life affirmation. This affirmation extends to loving one's destiny, whatever it may bring, and is encapsulated in the term *amor fati*. The *Übermensch* will recognize the Dionysian man within himself and will establish his own value system without recourse to outmoded value systems that are dependent on sterile moral judgments no longer applicable to modern man. (Nietzsche was always keen to stress his modernity.) The *Übermensch* will also recognize that his value system belongs to his personal perspective since truth as such is an illusion. Hence the stress on action, on the deed itself, and hence also the stress on the decisive and masterful nature of the Higher Man, who questions the validity of scientific truths and recognizes the will to power as the key value of life. The joyful Higher Man of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is invited to laugh and dance when he understands these strictures. Stepping away from the herd and rejecting the complacency of the Last Man, he forms the raw material for the future emergence of the *Übermensch*.

In the works written after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche elaborated on his theories of morality. For him, morality as such had become defunct. In an age in which science pretended to have solutions to problems, even moral problems, since it purported to provide "the truth," Nietzsche obstinately posed the question why we need a morality at all and challenged the notion that there can ever be an absolute truth. Truth will always depend, to a certain degree, on the perspective of the observer. By the same token, we can never have absolute certainty since knowledge, too, depends on relative perspectives and acts as a brake on activity. Instead of merely echoing the Delphic oracle, "man, know thyself," Nietzsche places the emphasis on activity and advises, "Become who you are." Self-knowledge is an essential prerequisite in this act of becoming.

*Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) provided a new sobriety for Nietzsche after the enraptured heights of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Many of his established themes, such as the dichotomy between appearance and reality, as well as his new theory of the will to power, are taken up again at a different level. He firmly believed that Europe had reached a state of cultural crisis, much exacerbated by such manifestations as democracy and nascent feminism. It has been suggested that Nietzsche's antifemi-

nist remarks in this work are simply a deliberate, masked challenge to provoke debate, and, indeed, the statement on the relativism of truth with which the preface of *Beyond Good and Evil* begins—"Supposing truth to be a woman . . ."—has become a virtual mantra for adherents of the "New Nietzsche." Are we to take this to mean that truth is as unreliable as woman or that the meaning is deeply hidden? The theory of deconstruction put forward by Jacques Derrida makes much of the strategic, marginal positions that can tease out meanings from behind a veil or mask. This is not the place to discuss the political correctness of a theory that equates the fluidity of "truth" with the elusiveness of "woman." Suffice it to say that given Nietzsche's general point that truth is unreliable and his warning that he is simply stating "my truths" about "woman as such" (*BGE*, VII: 231), it is remarkable both that his tone should be so dogmatic and that deconstructionists should have made so much of his riddle.

It is clear that in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche felt a missionary zeal to warn people against blind acceptance of concepts such as "good" and "evil," as they are based on outdated values originally introduced by the ruling group. Using the example of cruelty, Nietzsche points out that we are superficially horrified at the idea, but he then demonstrates how "even the man of knowledge" is constantly (if unconsciously) cruel to himself—"by saying No, that is, when he would like to affirm" (*BGE*, VII: 229), every time he compels his "spirit of knowledge" to run counter to his natural inclination. Sigmund Freud would later develop these ideas into psychoanalytical theories (sublimation, masochism, and so on), quite independently of Nietzsche thought.

In his next work, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), arguably his greatest and certainly the most systematic of all his works, Nietzsche provides his explanation of how man came to internalize warped values and accept them as relevant to him. He does this by tracing the descent of value judgments insofar as they are bound up with morality, which is a good deal of the time. Any idea that forces others to consider the weak or vulnerable in an altruistic way is fair game for Nietzsche's contempt. Aptly subtitled *A Polemic*, *On the Genealogy of Morality* proceeds with such ferocity that Nietzsche has little time for complicated asides on historicism, feminism, nationalism, or other pestilential agents weakening German culture. The burden of his complaint is that Judeo-Christianity has encouraged a slave morality to replace the

master morality that superseded it, in which aristocratic values and the pathos of distance dictated the moral code. Thus, Nietzsche holds that the strong “blond beast at the centre of every noble race” is preferable to the “teeming mass of worms” that is today’s “tame man” (*OGM*, I: 26). Forcing us to consider the virtue of power and the weakness of conformity, Nietzsche presses on with his polemic until nothing short of the value of values is under attack. There are things that set us apart from the animals, such as the right to make promises, which ought to be part of our value system. Instead, suffering is glorified, and natural pleasures are pronounced sinful.

Throughout *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche’s dislike of the fawning resentment inculcated by Christianity explodes in vitriolic forays against the ascetic priest, who has taught man to hate his own body and to mistrust his instincts. Only man can free himself by “killing” God. Then and only then will he be free to make his own morality. The anxiety engendered by this freedom was destined to become the central insight informing existentialism, though in the hands of Jean-Paul Sartre the connection with Nietzsche’s thought became blurred through Sartre’s adoption of a left-wing political stance that would have been anathema to Nietzsche. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s blithe pronouncement that we can construct our own morality, coupled with his overt support for master morality, made him a hostage beyond the grave to National Socialist ideologues. Of course, the latter were more concerned to bury the individualistic *Übermensch* than praise his visionary creator.

Nietzsche’s attacks on Christianity continue in his last works, *Twilight of the Idols* (1889) and *The Antichrist* (1895), where the tone is so rebarbative that some critics have suggested that Nietzsche was already of unsound mind when writing these and the other four short books he worked on in 1888: *The Case of Wagner*, *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, and *Ecce Homo*. Richard Wagner had died in 1883, but in *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche not only declares him sick but also holds him responsible for the cultural sickness in Europe. What is clear is that he could not let go of the Wagners. In *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, the familiar message that Wagner is decadent is more measured, indeed lyrical, in tone, while in the *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, Nietzsche has Cosima Wagner in mind when he alters a poem written earlier, “Ariadne’s Complaint.” In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche is game-

keeper turned poacher in the sense that he provides a critique of all his published works, as well as repeating many ideas in the works already discussed here.

The date of publication of the last three works became problematic when Nietzsche suddenly became insane. The *Dithyrambs of Dionysus* appeared in print in 1891. *The Anti-Christ* was published in 1895, just at the point when Nietzsche's reputation as a philosopher had begun to flourish (a phenomenon his sister was keen to exploit in publishing the manuscript of *The Anti-Christ*, though Franziska Nietzsche would have preferred to burn it). In contrast to the fate of *The Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche had been able to supervise the publication of *Twilight of the Idols* in person, but *Ecce Homo* would not be published until 1908.

At one level, *Twilight of the Idols* is a romp through Nietzsche's pet aversions, constituting the people and ideas he most dislikes. A salient feature of this work is its pace: Nietzsche does not tarry to describe how morality has come about but proceeds to deal what he hopes will be knockout blows to established idols who have founded morality, from Socrates through Kant to the denizens of contemporary Germany, where even skeptics fall back on the ingrained but degenerate principles of Christianity. At another level, Nietzsche tests his readers to the full by representing seemingly contrary positions, for example, on the nature of happiness: "Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that" (*TI*, "Maxims and Arrows," 12). Here, Nietzsche seeks to establish that happiness is not something that can reward belief, as Utilitarianism, redolent with Christian morality, purports, but a natural and original state. The *pursuit* of happiness has the contrary effect of blemishing man's natural state.

Nietzsche deliberately delayed publication of *The Anti-Christ*, although it was completed by the fall of 1888, in order for it to have a greater effect when published. Here, we find further proof of Nietzsche's disgust at man's capacity for *décadence*: a weakened state brought on by a slavish addiction to Christian morality even in the absence of a belief in God (or Christ). In *The Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche decides there are so many versions of Christianity that he will take us back to basics: "The word 'Christianity' is already a misunderstanding—in reality there has only been one Christian, and he died on the cross" (*AC*: 39). Nietzsche stresses that Jesus was a Jew; indeed, his analysis of the

origins of Christianity as a Jewish phenomenon is a central theme in *The Anti-Christ*. What is surprising is his tone of admiration; Nietzsche has plenty of time for Christ but none for Christianity, the reason for that being the monopoly gained by the ascetic priest. All six late works of Nietzsche's last year of sanity betray his inflated sense of self-importance, much mitigated by a style of delivery that is frequently so bombastic as to be pungently funny. As R. J. Hollingdale has pointed out, "The philosopher has not lost his grip on his material, he has tightened it; the notion that there is some defect of intelligence in these last works, that they contain 'nonsense,' is quite false" (R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy*, 1999).

It should be mentioned that although Nietzsche declared at the close of *On the Genealogy of Morality* that he was busy planning a book, "The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values" (*OGM*, III: 27), he never wrote such a work. The text compiled by his sister contains a fund of material from Nietzsche's notebooks that expands on the themes outlined here; the problem is that Nietzsche himself did not see the work into print; indeed, he actually crossed out scores of passages that have subsequently found their way into print and are taken by the unsuspecting reader to be bona fide "text." Such considerations invalidate the very idea that there can be a definitive text of *The Will to Power*. Readers should consult the bibliographical note on *The Will to Power* at the end of section 1 of the bibliography.

However attractive the call for the self-mastery and self-creativity of the *Übermensch* sounds now—and did sound for each branch of international Nietzscheanism discussed later—we should note that Nietzsche had no scruples about the legitimacy of power as executed by the "born organizers" or species of "blond beast" who represented master morality, the antidote to slave morality (*OGM*: II, 17). Such pronouncements provided an open invitation for fascists in general and for Adolf Hitler and the ideologues of National Socialism in particular to co-opt Nietzsche's theory of power for their own agenda. More recent interpretations have leaned toward Nietzsche's general critique of modernity as a fruitful source of inspiration, agreeing with him that the nihilism of modernism is hollow and meaningless unless new values can be found and acted on. The current trend to stress Nietzsche's approval of naturalism and to put the body center stage is a case in point.

## NIETZSCHEANISM IN GERMANY

Apart from the scurrilous attack from Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff occasioned by the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy* in 1872, the reception of Nietzsche's works during his most productive years was characteristically lukewarm. As Nietzsche himself commented shortly before his mental collapse in 1889, he had appreciative readers only abroad (he was thinking in particular of Georg Brandes and August Strindberg). All this would soon change, so that by the mid-1890s Nietzsche's name was becoming familiar in literary and artistic circles. Among philosophers, however, he was frowned on for his lack of a system: indeed, many university departments of philosophy regard Nietzsche as something of an upstart even today. Since Nietzsche deliberately eschewed systems and thought with his pen, a chronological account of his works simultaneously provides a description of the development of his ideas. As Hollingdale has stated, "Nietzsche's philosophy is not a series of conclusions but essentially a developing body of thought." Hollingdale further comments on the necessity of bearing the chronological order of Nietzsche's works in mind with regard to the development of his style, a feature of his work that can be said to underpin literary postmodernism, now on the decline in favor of a "natural" Nietzsche whose interest in natural science has until recently been neglected.

Nietzsche's ideas would have taken root even without his sister's efforts. Georg Brandes has traditionally been seen as the initiator of Nietzscheanism in Germany with the publication of his article *Radikaler Aristokratismus* in 1890, but there were even earlier reactions to Nietzsche's works: 10 reviews of *Beyond Good and Evil* appeared between September 1886 and December 1887, more than for any of Nietzsche's other works at that time. Hermann Conradi encountered Nietzsche's ideas as a student in Leipzig; his novel *Phrasen*, in which the protagonist speaks of "we Nietzscheans," appeared in 1887. In 1888, Carl Spitteler made an early attempt to provide a brief (two-page) overview of all Nietzsche's work published to date in a piece for the first issue of *Der Bund*. By 1888, Carl and Gerhart Hauptmann were early if unappreciative readers of Nietzsche. Ola Hansson and Leo Berg, both fervent Nietzscheans who regarded themselves as pioneers (which they were), wrote appreciations of *Twilight of the Idols* when it appeared in January 1889, just after Nietzsche's collapse in Turin.

Thus, when Brandes's famous review appeared in 1890, there were already a host of Nietzschean enthusiasts in Germany: Detlev von Liliencron, Rudolf Steiner, Arno Holz (though not his cofounder of the Naturalist Movement, Johannes Schlaf, who disapproved of Nietzsche), Julius Langbehn, and Max Halbe. Within four years, the ranks had swelled to include Frank Wedekind, Max Dauthendey, Gabriele Reuter, Arthur Schnitzler, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Kurt Eisner, Bruno Wille, Stanislaus Przybyszewski, Maximilian Harden, Emil Gött, and Ricarda Huch, though Huch subsequently denied that Nietzsche's influence on her had been strong. Nietzsche was a central topic in the cluster round the sensuous poet Richard Dehmel, and he was also discussed in the circle around the composer Conrad Ansoerge in Weimar 1894–1897. Later, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche did her best to make her Saturday salon the intellectual center for Nietzsche debate in Weimar. Nietzsche had plenty of detractors, too, including Paul Ernst, Hermann Sudermann, Eduard von Hartmann, Wilhelm Bölsche, Franz Mehring, and Hermann Bahr.

From 1890 on, Nietzsche entered into mainstream German culture, in spite of the vicious attack on Nietzsche's thought in Max Nordau's *Entartung*, 1893 (*Degeneration*, 1895). This work severely hampered Nietzscheanism, though only temporarily, since there soon appeared a wealth of reviews of Nietzsche's works, his sister having begun to publish the first volumes of a collected edition from 1892 under the editorship of Peter Gast. In 1894, Gast was sacked in favor of Fritz Koenig, who took over the editorship of what would become known as the *Grossoktavausgabe* in 1894. In the same year appeared Lou Andreas-Salomé's quirkily psychological reading of Nietzsche "in his works," *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken* (1894). The reviewers now started to take the secondary works into account: Bölsche welcomed Salomé's interpretation, whereas Fritz Koenig found it a "dangerous book" that sought to sensationalize biographical details in order to invalidate Nietzsche's philosophy through "neurotic female psychology." Heinrich Romundt then sprang to Salomé's defense. From the first, Nietzsche's enemies showed a high degree of *Schadenfreude* by dismissing his writings as the work of a madman: in 1891, Hermann Türck in *Friedrich Nietzsche und seine pathologischen Irrwege* (*Friedrich Nietzsche and His Pathologically Wrong Paths*) wrote about Nietzsche's warped moral strictures as a reflection of his perverted instinct.



During the mid-1890s, Nietzschean themes became commonplace in German literature, as in the novel *In purpurner Finsterniß* (*In Purple Darkness*, 1895) by Michael Georg Conrad and the play *Sozialaristokraten* (1896) by Arno Holz; one should also mention Leo Berg's critical work *Der Übermensch in der modernen Literatur* (1897), which draws on works from European literature such as August Strindberg's *I Havsbandet*, 1890 (*By the Open Sea*, 1984) as well as from the German Naturalist Movement. Nietzsche also influenced the worlds of art and music: Gustav Mahler was so enthralled by Nietzsche's ideas that he almost called his Third Symphony (1896) "The Gay Science" (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*), while that same year Richard Strauss conducted the first performance of his composition *Also sprach Zarathustra*. Julius Langbehn, author of the hugely successful nationalistic *Rembrandt als Erzieher* (*Rembrandt as Educator*, 1890), which was written before his encounter with Nietzsche's thought, was so struck by Nietzsche's predicament that in 1889 he actually made an ill-judged and unsuccessful bid to "adopt" Nietzsche, to try to cure him.

It should be said that in artistic communities such as Worpsswede near Bremen, Langbehn exerted as strong an influence as that of Nietzsche; indeed, Nietzsche's influence was seldom unadulterated, especially after the turn of the century, when the ideas of Sigmund Freud became current. Likewise, the Hart brothers in Berlin used Nietzschean concepts selectively when it suited their notion of a new mysticism as propounded in *Der neue Gott* (1899) by Julius Hart. Hart's liberal circle in Berlin at the turn of the century attracted a variety of left-wing intellectuals such as Gustav Landauer, who took issue with Hart over his criticism of Nietzsche in *Der neue Gott*, rightly pointing out the debt Hart owed to Nietzsche. Nothing better illustrates the divided nature of Nietzsche reception than two works published in 1899. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck's *Tschandala Nietzsche* (1899) was a brief appreciation of Nietzsche's thought, with special reference to the poetic tone of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Here, Nietzsche is hailed as the first to see the direction of European culture with "visionary clarity." Otto Henne am Rhyn's scathing polemic *Anti-Zarathustra* appeared in the same year. This examined *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, and *Twilight of the Idols*. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is damned as full of "trivialities, blasphemies, vulgarities and ambiguities as well as untruths, false assertions, displacements

(*Entstellungen*) of historical facts and meaningless utterances.” Critics of Nietzsche at this time were particularly inclined to dismiss eternal return.

Around the turn of the century, the ranks of confirmed Nietzscheans included Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Martin Buber, Paul Heyse, Christian Morgenstern, Georg Simmel, Carl Gustav Jung, Robert Musil, Hermann Hesse, and Rainer Maria Rilke as well as Karl Kraus, Margarete Susman, Emil Ludwig, Albert Schweitzer, and Max Brod, though not all remained under Nietzsche’s spell: Morgenstern, for example, went over to Steiner’s theosophy. The members of the fin de siècle artistic intelligentsia who were most eager to claim Nietzsche as progenitor were *die Kosmiker* (“the cosmics”), writers and dilettantes who grouped themselves around the poet Stefan George between 1897 and 1904 and included Karl Wolfskehl, Ludwig Klages, Alfred Schuler, Ernst Bertram, and Franziska zu Reventlow.

*Die Kosmiker* claimed Nietzsche as their central source of inspiration, though Klages and Schuler in particular sought to develop a Dionysian ethic along the lines they thought they detected in Bachofen’s *Das Mutterrecht* (*Mother Right*, 1861). The work suggests that “mother right” must have preceded patriarchy during a period when orgiastic pagan rites were presided over by women. (The painter and dramatist Oskar Kokoschka also paid more attention to Bachofen than Nietzsche.) Rudolf Pannwitz, who existed on the fringe of the George circle, saw Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* as “cosmic man,” by which he meant the mythical summation of man in religious terms and the apotheosis of the German in nationalistic terms, while Klages went on to develop his theory of *Lebensphilosophie* in the light of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Bertram’s *Nietzsche. Versuch einer Mythologie* (*Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology*, 1918) became a key work in Nietzsche interpretation, placing Nietzsche firmly within a tradition of *völkisch* right-wing German ideology.

A strong Nietzschean current could be detected in the journals *Die Zukunft*, *Jugend*, *Die freie Bühne*, *Neue deutsche Rundschau*, *Das Magazin für Litteratur*, *Die Insel*, and *Pan*. In the latter, the illustrations of Hugo Hoepfener (Fidus) were characteristically Zarathustran as, for example, the illustration for “Before Sunrise,” a beautifully atmospheric section in part 3. Fidus depicts figures reaching out to the sun, though these same figures often expressed a freedom through nudity that was

more a fashion than it was Nietzschean. The monthly journal *Charon*, published from 1904 to 1914 by Otto zur Linde and (until 1906) Rudolf Pannwitz, attracted poets with a mystical tendency such as Dauthendey and Morgenstern, while the illustrated weekly *Jugend* attracted literary criticism from Nietzsche fanatics such as Dehmel. The influence of Nietzsche, especially his call for the liberation of the instincts, continued to be present in the focal periodical of German expressionism, *Der Sturm*, founded in 1910 by Herwarth Walden. The illustrations in *Der Sturm*, such as those of Ludwig Kirchner and Emil Nolde from the groups known as *Die Brücke* and *Der blaue Reiter*, reflect the growing fascination for Nietzschean-inspired hedonistic dance.

If the music of Arnold Schönberg and his pupil Alban Berg definitively broke away from Wagner under the influence of Nietzsche, a generation of young poets such as Georg Heym and Georg Trakl were likewise inspired by Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* to write a new form of poetry, molding the German language into pleonasms and pruning it for shock effect. Although the most prominent expressionist poet, Gottfried Benn, survived both world wars, many other expressionist poets, such as Alfred Lichtenstein, were killed in World War I; subsequently, drama rather than poetry became the preferred genre of expressionism. Although the new wave of expressionist dramatists such as Frank Wedekind and Georg Kaiser continued to pay homage to both Nietzsche and Freud, by the early 1920s, the influence of Karl Marx was also a factor, as in the dramatic work of Ernst Toller. Franz Kafka's nightmare world depicts the kind of moral jungle where the figure of authority—alias the ascetic priest—crushes the individual. Nietzsche's invitation to visionary creation is perhaps at its most extreme in the work of the architect Bruno Taut, who had a postwar missionary zeal to renew mankind through architecture.

Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's good name is tarnished through her collaboration with the National Socialists in the early 1930s; nevertheless, she must be given due credit for her single-minded energy and determination in establishing the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in Weimar, even though, as Rudolf Steiner observed after he had given her a series of tutorials on Nietzsche's philosophy in 1896, she was just about the last person to be able to understand the subtleties of her brother's thought. Nevertheless, her pioneering work in writing Nietzsche's biography (*Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches*, I: 1895, IIi: 1897, IIIi: 1904), which

drew attention to Nietzsche, should be recognized. Largely because of the success of this biography, early Nietzscheanism in Germany in the mid-1890s was characterized by an interest in Nietzsche the man as well as the philosopher; by the turn of the century, when *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* had become a pathbreaking book for the avant-garde, it was common for the names of Nietzsche and Zarathustra to be regarded as interchangeable. By this time, Nietzsche's impact on early modernism was immense.

While a sick Nietzsche languished in Naumburg, a steady stream of admirers found their way to the town, Rudolf Steiner and the novelist Gabriele Reuter among them. Harry Graf Kessler, who became a staunch supporter of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, visited Elisabeth in Naumburg in 1895, and the visits became almost a stampede when Elisabeth moved to Weimar in 1897. Henri Lichtenberger was just one of the crowd who visited Elisabeth in Weimar in 1898. Thus, the first few years of the new century were Elisabeth's belle époque, in spite of (or possibly because of) the death of Nietzsche in 1900. The following year, Henry van de Velde came to Weimar and was enlisted by Elisabeth to refurbish the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. Other visitors included André Gide in 1903 and Ernst Thiel in 1905. Thiel would become a vital financial backer. Without his help, Elisabeth would not have gained permission from the Grand Duchy of Sachsen-Weimar for the foundation of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* in May 1908.

Nietzsche's works sold well in the years before the war as well as during and immediately after the war, but it is not true that every soldier was issued with a copy of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in his rucksack, though it is true that cheap copies were available. From the first, unscrupulous writers like Julius Langbehn and Paul Lagarde had linked Nietzsche's name with nationalism for their own agenda. During and after World War I, his name was energetically co-opted into the nationalist cause by Elisabeth, but she was by no means alone; Oswald Spengler, who visited the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in Weimar for the first time in July 1920, praised Nietzsche's spirit as typically German, something that would help Germany (at that time bruisingly defeated) to win through in the end. His comments in *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (I: 1918, II: 1923) (*The Decline of the West*, 1934) marked the acceleration of the coupling of Nietzsche's name with that of the German *Volk*, a coupling Nietzsche himself would have resisted.

Nietzsche prided himself on being a good European and was often disgusted by German chauvinism. This did not deter Elisabeth from collaborating with the fascists both out of financial expediency and conviction. Although she admired Benito Mussolini more than Adolf Hitler, Elisabeth gratefully accepted the logistic help offered by the National Socialists; Hitler even helped her from his private purse. The symbiotic relationship ensured that Elisabeth felt important and flattered, and the National Socialists made propaganda by claiming Nietzsche as a proto-fascist. It was also good publicity for Hitler to be photographed beside an endearing little old lady who, though she was childless, seemed to represent German motherhood, casting Hitler as dutiful son. When she died in 1935, the whole administration of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, headed by Max Oehler, was firmly in support of the Third Reich. Hitler and a host of party dignitaries attended Elisabeth's funeral.

The chief National Socialist Nietzschean was Alfred Baeumler, whose principal work on Nietzsche was *Nietzsche, der Philosoph und Politiker* (1931). Alfred Rosenberg enlisted Nietzsche as a profascist in his iconic *Der Mythos des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (*The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, 1930), a work second only to Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (1925–1927) as iconic Nazi text. Heinrich Haertle in *Nietzsche und der Nationalsozialismus* (1937) argued that Nietzsche hated the Jews, but not all National Socialists wanted to claim Nietzsche as one of their own. The principal interpreter of Nietzsche at that time was the right-wing philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose existentialist critique inspired important rejoinders from Karl Jaspers and Karl Löwith. If Heidegger stood to the right in German politics, there was a group of philosophers who stood very much to the left and who gravitated toward the Marxist Max Horkheimer, a philosopher in Frankfurt, to the extent that they are now referred to as the Frankfurt School, even though most of them were obliged to emigrate to America during the 1930s.

The Frankfurt School contained a number of radical Nietzscheans, notably Theodor Adorno, Ernst Bloch, and Herbert Marcuse. Walter Benjamin kept himself at a respectful distance from this debate, though he had fallen under Nietzsche's spell when, as a young man, he visited Nietzsche in Sils Maria. The Marxist critic Georg Lukács was, however, virulently opposed to Nietzsche's influence, which he viewed as a factor in the fascination of Germans for fascism. He makes this argument in *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*, 1954 (*The Destruction of Reason*, 1981).

Conservative thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas criticized the views of the Frankfurt School and queried Lukács' dogmatic approach. Jörg Salaquarda, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, and Volker Gerhart have been the most prominent recent German-speaking Nietzsche scholars.

## NIETZSCHEANISM IN FRANCE

Nietzsche's enthusiasm for French culture expressed itself in his desire for a French readership; he was overjoyed that Hippolyte Taine had become interested in his work (or such was the construction he placed on the notes of acknowledgment Taine sent to him in 1888 in gratitude for the four complimentary copies of Nietzsche's works he had received). Gabriel Monod, who knew Nietzsche personally (Monod had married Malwida von Meysenbug's adoptive daughter, Olga Herzen), made attempts to awaken interest in Nietzsche in France during the early 1890s, but at that time, the only text in French translation was the third *Untimely Meditation*, "Richard Wagner à Bayreuth," translated by Marie Baumgartner while Nietzsche was still in Basel and published in 1877.

Jean Bourdeau was the first to write an article on Nietzsche in French in 1888. In spite of the publication of articles and translated extracts in various journals, notably the *Mercure de France*, Nietzsche was not widely read until the turn of the century, though he already had a devoted following among enthusiasts, including André Gide, who could read German. Henri Lichtenberger's monograph of Nietzsche, *La Philosophie de Nietzsche*, which had appeared in 1898 and was the result of a series of public lectures given at the University of Nancy, soon became vital for the dissemination of Nietzsche's ideas in France among academics, writers, and literary and political critics.

At the same time, translations of Nietzsche's works started to appear: Henri Albert's translation of *Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra* was published in 1898. *Par delà le Bien et le Mal* (translated by L. Weiscopef and G. Art) appeared in the same year. In 1899, there followed another publication by Albert containing, in one volume, his translation of *Le Crépuscule des Idoles* and *Nietzsche contra Wagner* as well as *Le Cas Wagner* (already translated by Daniel Halévy and Robert Dreyfus in 1892) and *L'Antichrist. Aphorismes et Fragments*, translated by Henri Lichtenberger. Also in 1899 appeared A.-M. Desrousseaux's translation of

*Humain, trop humain* (*Le Voyageur et son Ombre*, translated by Henri Albert, appeared in 1902). Henri Albert's translation of the *Généalogie de la Morale* appeared in 1900 and the following year *Le Gai Savoir* and *Aurore*. However, the most significant text to appear in translation, for many French Nietzscheans, was *L'Origine de la Tragédie* (1901), translated by J. Marnold and J. Morland. By 1901, when *Der Wille zur Macht* appeared in Germany, the French "Nietzschéens" had practically caught up with the Germans, and, indeed, a translation of *La Volonté de Puissance* duly appeared in 1903, translated by the indefatigable Henri Albert. As in Germany, it was common for Nietzsche's name to be linked with that of Max Stirner. Henri Albert contributed translations of Stirner to the *Mercure de France*, and in 1904, Albert Lévy brought out his study *Stirner et Nietzsche*.

In general, Nietzsche appealed to the left-wing writers and thinkers in France: Albert and Halévy were socialists, and Desrousseaux was politically active as a socialist deputy. There were also right-wing French Nietzscheans from the very beginning as well, such as the leading members of the nationalistic *Action française* movement, and later in the person of Drieu la Rochelle. Charles Maurras, the leader of *Action française* who cultivated his own brand of paganism, was encouraged to read Nietzsche by Pierre Lasserre and Hugues Rebell. The latter was one of the earliest appreciators of Nietzsche in France, publishing an article on the plans for a collection of translations of Nietzsche into French in the *Mercure de France* as early as 1885. Maurras found in Nietzsche much to counteract the decadence that his nationalistic movement sought to overturn. Lasserre's 1902 publication *La Morale de Nietzsche* was in general well received; he had already published an article, "Nietzsche et l'Anarchisme," in the first volume of the periodical *Action française* in 1900. Both Rebell and Lasserre were bowled over by their first contact with Nietzsche, while Maurras had to overcome initial reservations. Young hotheads like Paul Valéry needed no second invitation (though he later distanced himself from Nietzsche's thought). Initially a prose writer, Valéry did not establish himself as a poet until he was in his forties.

Although Nietzsche's attack on Christianity was his chief asset or main stumbling block, depending on the point of view of the writer or critic, his work was treated with caution by established philosophers. Only Jules de Gaultier in *De Kant à Nietzsche* (1900) and Eugène de

Roberty in *Frédéric Nietzsche* (1902) were prepared to take Nietzsche's philosophy seriously. Both put their own interpretation on Nietzsche's work, with Gaultier judging Nietzsche's thought to be a continuation of that of Immanuel Kant and Roberty hailing it as "a sumptuous social philosophy," as though Nietzsche had intended his elitist ideas, which are, one must remember, directed primarily at the strong individual, to bring about a sociological revolution. It is understandable that socialist critics of Nietzsche should find his comments on aristocratic values a challenge to their interpretations. They were inclined to see Nietzschean elitism as a metaphor for the inner man, a standpoint they could glean from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* rather than from *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

Lichtenberger had set the tone for Nietzsche in *La Philosophie de Nietzsche* by stressing the importance of Nietzsche the man, and, indeed, he advised readers in his introduction to approach Nietzsche's work as "a confession . . . as a sort of intimate diary." Lichtenberger's study was followed by numerous analytic works on Nietzsche in French, most notably Daniel Halévy's biography *La Vie de Frédéric Nietzsche* in 1909 (the same year that Albert's translation of *Ecce Homo* appeared). Nearly all praised Nietzsche's theory of the superman and his bold attempt to revalue values; an exception was V. de Pallarès's *Le Crépuscule d'une Idole. Nietzsche, Nietzscheïsme, Nietzscheïens* (1910), a work in which he attacked Nietzsche and his "disciples," though he refused to give names, in spite of the title of the book. Nevertheless, the argument suggests hostility to the work of men such as Georges Sorel, whose *Réflexions sur la Violence*, written in 1907, had become something of an international cult book. Sorel viewed "the Yankees" as the new supermen in the realm of commerce and industry and thought the antidote to their power would be to verse the masses in organized violence. Sorel tended to appeal to extremists of any stamp: to the extreme right in France (*Action française*) as well as to the extreme left (communism). Pallarès is scathing about "les surhommes," whom he saw as "essentiellement volonté de puissance" with, so to speak, war in their blood.

In the literature of the French avant-garde, the influence of Nietzsche was already manifest in the absurdist plays of Alfred Jarry, notably *Ubu Roi* (1898). Members of the avant-garde such as Jarry and later Dadaists like Guillaume Apollinaire were receptive to Nietzsche's iconoclasm, though as the century progressed, the influence of Sigmund Freud



would subsequently coincide with the emergence of cubism, inspiring artistic manifestations in surreal art that owe more to Freud than to Nietzsche. The surrealists included André Breton, Louis Aragon, Luis Buñuel, Salvador Dalí, and originally Georges Bataille. Nietzsche's influence continued to be felt in the work of modernist writers such as Jean Cocteau and Antonin Artaud. The split amongst the surrealists over which direction the movement should take led to the founding of Breton's *Association* and Bataille's *La Critique Sociale*.

With Nietzscheanism "in the air" in France from the turn of the century on, there can be scarcely a writer or artist who remained completely outside the realm of his influence, though not all were as self-consciously (or distortedly) Nietzschean as Daniel Lesueur (pseudonym for Jeanne Lapauze-Loiseau) in her *Nietzschéenne* (1908) or Mme Anne de Nouailles in, for example, her *La nouvelle Espérance* (1903). La Comtesse de Nouailles was particularly taken by Nietzsche's appreciation of Greek aesthetics, especially all that was Dionysian. Nietzschean slogans like "courage," "energy," and "life" abound in her stories alongside wholly un-Nietzschean scenes of torrid passion. Paul Adam spiced his *Le Serpent noir* (1905) with Nietzschean allusions. A generation of writers who were adolescents in these years, including Alain Fournier and Jacques Rivière, were exposed to the climate of Nietzscheanism. A fuller list of French writers influenced by Nietzsche in the 20th century would include writers and thinkers such as Jean Giraudoux, François Mauriac, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Gaston Bachelard, Drieu la Rochelle, Hans Wahl, Gabriel Marcel, André Malraux, and Georges Bataille, though there was wide divergence in the extent to which they were prepared to acknowledge their debt. As with the essayists, sociologists, and thinkers, their political stance varied greatly.

A radical lessening of interest in Nietzsche occurred as a result of World War I. As in Britain, Nietzsche was held partly responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. Julien Benda in *La Trahison des Clercs* (1927) held Nietzsche, together with Henri Bergson and Georges Sorel, responsible for the culture of belligerence that had made World War I inevitable. Others made attempts to reestablish Nietzsche's reputation in France, notably Geneviève Bianquis (*Nietzsche en France*, 1929), but the name of one Nietzschean stands out: that of Charles Andler, who wrote a variety of works on Nietzsche before his definitive biography, *Nietzsche. Sa vie et sa pensée* (1920–1931). Andler's left-wing stance

went as far as to see in Nietzsche's thought a socialism that envisaged the emergence of the working class of Europe as a class of masters. Another work that dealt with an aspect of Nietzsche's biography—his sojourns in Italy, especially in relation to Wagner—is *Nietzsche en Italie* (1929) by the Wagner enthusiast Guy de Pourtalès. The work of Bernard Groethysen, especially his *Introduction à la philosophie allemande depuis Nietzsche* (1926), acted as intermediary between the German and French ways of thought. Groethysen, who had studied under Wilhelm Dilthey, introduced the French to a new variant of vitalist thought that rejected scientific facts and paved the way for an anti-intellectualism among the French philosophical establishment that would have far-reaching consequences.

During the 1930s, the shift that occurred in philosophy from the theory of knowledge toward protoexistentialism meant that Nietzsche's reputation remained relatively unscathed in France, even though it was clear that the National Socialists were hijacking his philosophy for their own purposes. French commentators felt they had acquitted themselves well if they simply voiced disapproval of such tactics. The work of Andler and that of his "disciple" Bianquis was crucial in maintaining Nietzsche's reputation untarnished. In 1937, Georges Bataille argued, in *Acéphale*, that Nietzsche was a sovereign thinker whose hostility to pan-German militarism guaranteed that he would have been hostile to the National Socialists. Two other notable French works of criticism that denied the link between Nietzsche's thought and Nazism were *De Nietzsche à Hitler* by Marius P. Nicolas (1936) and *Nietzsche* by the Marxist Henri Lefebvre (1939).

Nietzscheanism in France fluctuated with the reception of Bergsonism during the two decades 1930–1950. Although Bergson's philosophy seemed to offer much that would suit the trend away from intellectualism in France, if one considers his insistence on lived experience coupled with intuition within a moral context, interest in his *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion* (1932) was swiftly (if temporarily) superseded by renewed interest in Nietzsche among writers, if not academic philosophers, in the wake of Karl Jaspers's immensely influential interpretation of Nietzsche. Hans Wahl, a professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne, cautiously taught his students an appreciation of Nietzsche through a study of Jaspers's text. Possible rivals in terms of irrational philosophy, such as Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler,

remained little known in France during the 1930s, but there was a strong revival in interest in Nietzsche as a forerunner of existentialism during the 1940s, when Albert Camus, André Malraux, and Jean-Paul Sartre (albeit though the prism of André Gide) looked beyond Jaspers and his praise of Søren Kierkegaard to the source of the essential starting point for existentialism, the death of God: and that source was Nietzsche. Sartre had his own agenda to pursue, which would evolve an ethic of authenticity in which Nietzschean ideas on individualism are displaced.

Writers such as Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille, and Pierre Klossowski maintained interest in Nietzsche during the 1940s, while Geneviève Bianquis founded the *Société française d'études nietzschéennes* in 1946, with its own *Bulletin* as companion publication. This was expanded to the *Études nietzschéennes*, which first appeared in 1948, but this appears to have become defunct, so that a new *Bulletin de la Société d'Études Nietzscheennes* makes its appearance in 1959 and in a "new series" in 1961. Throughout the 1950s, Nietzsche continued to be largely ignored by philosophy departments in French universities, where the professors were more interested in teaching Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl than Nietzsche, in spite of the efforts of individuals such as Hans Wahl, who in the late 1950s held courses on Nietzsche. His *Nietzsche. Introduction à sa philosophie* appeared in 1950. In addition, Bataille's notoriety made sure that Nietzsche's name never sank into oblivion, and in 1966, Jean Granier's substantial *Le problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche* appeared. It was precisely at that moment that a new generation of young philosophers and writers were undertaking research on Nietzsche, among them Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Serres.

The event that renewed French passion for Nietzsche and that stands out as a landmark in European Nietzscheanism was the conference held in Royeumont, near Paris, in 1964. A second conference of great consequence for Nietzsche studies was held in Cérisy-la-Salle in 1972. The proceedings of this conference were gathered into the substantial *Nietzsche aujourd'hui* (1973); the list of contributors provides a "Who's Who" of the New Nietzsche, sometimes also referred to as the "French Nietzsche." Besides Derrida and Foucault, the list includes Gilles Deleuze, Sarah Kofman, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Eric Blondel, and Jean-François Lyotard. By the end of the 20th century, the experimental

theories of “the French Nietzsche” had come to dominate Nietzsche scholarship not just in France but also in the English-speaking world, though not to the exclusion of other interpretations. Nevertheless, in France, the overwhelming pattern for at least two decades was for novelists and writers to be inspired by both deconstructive theories and by the postmodern ethos of the New Nietzsche; practitioners included Marguerite Duras and Michel Tournier, though the influence of Marx, Freud, and Jacques Lacan must be taken into account at all times. Lacan’s pupil Luce Irigaray has engaged with Nietzsche at the level of feminist psychoanalysis. In France, in particular, Nietzscheanism is seldom “unadulterated.” Current French Nietzsche scholars are looking to new fields, as in Laurent Cheronneix’s aesthetic interpretation *Nietzsche: santé et maladie, l’art* (2003), and critiques of individual works have recently appeared, such as Isabelle Wienand’s *Significations de la Mort de Dieu chez Nietzsche d’“Humain, trop humain” à “Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra”* (2006).

## NIETZSCHEANISM IN GREAT BRITAIN

In Great Britain, Nietzsche was first mentioned by a woman, Mary Bright, alias George Egerton, who brought in Nietzsche’s name to support a claim for women to have sexual emancipation in her collection of short stories, *Keynotes*, published in 1893. The first writer to actually use Nietzsche’s ideas was the Scottish poet John Davidson in his *Sentences and Paragraphs* (1893), though it is likely that the poet George Moore, who was a neighbor and friend of Daniel Halévy during the late 1880s, had already heard about Nietzsche by the early 1890s. Halévy published on Nietzsche in French from 1892 on, though Moore did not use Nietzschean ideas in his work until *Evelyn Innes* (1898), where he paraphrases a passage from Nietzsche’s *The Gay Science*. Interest in what was, at the time, termed “Nietzscheism” strengthened with the publication of the first translations of Nietzsche’s works: in 1896, the publishing company Henry and Co brought out *Thus spake Zarathoustra. A Book for All and None*, translated by Alexander Tille, and in the same year, in one volume, Thomas Common’s translations of *The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche contra Wagner, Twilight of the Idols*, and *The Antichrist*.

It is significant that the first English translation of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* had appeared only a decade earlier, in 1886. Several writers, like George Gissing, owed more to Arthur Schopenhauer than to Nietzsche. Fisher-Unwin used the translations by Tille and Common as the material for volumes 2 and 3, respectively, of their ambitiously named project *The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, which appeared between 1899 and 1903. Volume 1 contained *The Genealogy of Morals* and a collection of poems, translated by William Hausmann and John Gray, and volume 4 consisted of Johanna Volz's translation of *The Dawn of Day*. Helen Zimmern's translation of *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* was printed by "The Good European Society" (i.e., Thomas Common) with Darien Press in Edinburgh in 1907 and was then incorporated (as volume 5) into Oscar Levy's pathbreaking 18-volume edition *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, which appeared from 1909 to 1913. This edition, published by T. N. Foulis and still the only complete edition of Nietzsche's work in English, was instrumental in making the works of Nietzsche known throughout the English-speaking world, including countries of the empire such as Australia, where the writer William Baylebridge became a convinced Nietzschean.

The previously mentioned translations, which were widely reviewed in such journals as *The Savoy*, started off a veritable Nietzsche craze in Britain, and by the turn of the century there were two journals openly sympathetic to Nietzscheanism: *The Eagle and the Serpent*, edited by Erwin McCall (1898–1902), and *Notes for Good Europeans*, edited by Thomas Common (1903–1909). Although Nietzsche was certainly not a household name in Britain at large, among the intelligentsia there was a renewed spate of interest in him from 1902 until the outbreak of World War I. Alfred Orage's *The New Age*, established in 1907, was the only journal not to turn against Nietzsche in 1914. Articles on Nietzsche were especially fecund in *The New Age* from 1907 to 1910; most of the translators of Nietzsche contributed pieces, including James Kennedy, Anthony Ludovici, and Oscar Levy. Most of the previously mentioned went on to publish hagiographical works on Nietzsche if they had not already done so: Thomas Common's *Nietzsche as Critic, Philosopher and Poet: Choice Selections from His Works* had appeared in 1901. Orage, who had brought out an appreciation of Nietzsche in 1906 with the title *Friedrich Nietzsche: The Dionysian Spirit of the Age*, published

*Nietzsche in Outline and Aphorism* in 1907, and Kennedy published *The Quintessence of Nietzsche* in 1909, followed by *Nietzsche: His Maxims of Life* in 1913. In 1908, Maximilian Mügge's *Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Work* appeared, and in 1909, Ludovici published *Who Is to Be Master of the World? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, which was followed by *Nietzsche: His Life and Works* in 1910, *Nietzsche and Art* in 1911, and a translation of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's *The Young Nietzsche* in 1912. The right-wing Ludovici clung to his extremist views until his death in 1971.

In Great Britain, as in France, Nietzscheans were at first more prominent on the left than on the right, and distinctions also have to be made between critics and creative writers, since the latter often refused to acknowledge their debt to Nietzsche. Among the critical enthusiasts, the political spectrum went from the socialist Orage on the left to Kennedy on the far right. Among writers, a similar spectrum can be traced from George Bernard Shaw to D. H. Lawrence. A writer such as Wyndham Lewis was probably more influenced by Nietzsche than he admitted, though he set himself up as critic of "the execrable Neech." James Joyce was probably not much influenced by Nietzscheanism, but a number of Fabians were, among them H. G. Wells, Rupert Brooke, Eric Gill, and Shaw, though the latter played down any direct debt, notwithstanding the Nietzschean title of his play *Man and Superman* (1903).

Nietzsche's impact was understood to be in the realm of morals and aesthetics rather than politics. The overriding appeal of the myth of the *Übermensch* remained the central point of interest for British Nietzscheans: it was not for nothing that Kennedy translated Lichtenberger's *La philosophie de Nietzsche* as *The Gospel of Superman* in 1910. Although the terms "overman" (Alexander Tille), "superman" (G. B. Shaw), or "upperman" (George Meredith) were bandied about and, indeed, treated seriously, as with H. G. Wells, Nietzsche's call for a reevaluation of values was central in making his name renowned among the prewar intelligentsia in Britain. Nietzsche's rejection of Christianity through the figure of Zarathustra was accepted as iconoclastic by every Nietzsche enthusiast, though John Cowper Powys was not alone in highlighting a contradiction within Nietzsche himself when he declared that Nietzsche's soul was "riddled with religion" (*Visions and Revisions*, 1915): Lou Andreas-Salomé in *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken* said exactly the same thing. Powys, like many other early Brit-

ish Nietzscheans, including W. B. Yeats, made a comparison between Nietzsche and William Blake as visionary prophets, and Arthur Symons made this comparison in his *William Blake* (1907). Yeats was also the most perceptive British interpreter of the doctrine of eternal return. Incidentally, Symons wrote a play titled *Superwoman* in 1908, but as this was not published, it is not possible to make a comparison between it and Daniel Lesueur's *Nietzschéenne*. The first British novel to have a Nietzschean hero was W. H. Mallock's *The Veil of the Temple* (1904).

Another important field for discussion among British Nietzscheans was the dichotomy between Apollo and Dionysus. The (much-simplified) distinction was usually made between Dionysus, the god of passion, and Apollo, the god of restraint. Most writers or critics who approached the topic did so from the angle of art: it was not always stressed that both gods represent man's instinctual life. Apollo was seen as the god of reason and intellect; Dionysus was linked with pagan abandonment. Sometimes a Southern setting indicated a Dionysian dimension, as with Yeats's poem "The Statues," which includes the geographical dimension of "Asiatic vague immensities." D. H. Lawrence also profiled the elements of a Southern climate such as Africa when describing the unreflecting instinctual life of the native in *Women in Love* (1914), drawing a contrast with the unhealthy inhibitions of the Northerner.

Discussions of Nietzsche in the many articles on him prior to World War I show the characteristic variety of viewpoints so typical of Nietzscheanism: either Nietzsche (often not distinguished from Zarathustra) was deplored as heralding cruelty, or his liberation of the body was ecstatically applauded; his antidemocratic stance tended to be explained away as an aesthetic ploy. Convinced "Nietzscheites" of the period included Havelock Ellis, Aubrey Beardsley, Edward Garnett, Lancelotti Abercrombie, T. E. Lawrence, and George Barker. After Yeats, the writer who was most completely under Nietzsche's spell to an almost pathological extent in 1912 was Edwin Muir. His *We Moderns* (1918), a book of aphorisms that were taken to be a Nietzschean pastiche, deals with Nietzsche *passim*. Muir, a socialist and Christian, found the contradictions in being a Nietzschean too hard to sustain, and he subsequently repudiated his fanatical Nietzsche phase. Clearly, it can never be said that Nietzsche appealed either to the left wing or the right wing exclusively, nor should one forget that there were also plenty of detractors who had no time for Nietzsche's ideas, among them the fanatical Dar-

winist T. E. Hulme, G. K. Chesterton, Thomas Hardy, Arnold Bennett, George Meredith, and Aldous Huxley, though it could be argued that the Nietzschean current in Britain during the years 1896–1914 was so strong that few writers could really claim to have remained unaffected.

World War I was a complicating factor in European Nietzsche reception; nowhere did his reputation suffer more than in Britain, though the “scapegoating” of Nietzsche, which from August 1914 became widespread, was for most people in the general public the first they had heard of the errant philosopher. Robert Bridges and Thomas Hardy were swift to blame the war on Nietzsche, and Oscar Levy labored in vain to convince the British that Nietzsche had no connection with German belligerence. After the war, triumphalism in Britain often combined with anti-Nietzschean pronouncements: in 1921, Nietzsche was relegated to the rank of “shilling shocker” by a correspondent for the *Times*.

During the 1920s, the interest among avant-garde intellectuals shifted away from Nietzsche, whose name was now tarnished, to Karl Marx. By the 1930s, Nietzsche’s name had become so discredited in Great Britain that even firm Nietzscheans such as Herbert Read felt obliged to make defensive remarks about his works. A. H. J. Knight’s book on Nietzsche, published in 1933 under the title *Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche*, breaks the silence that otherwise surrounds the topic of Nietzsche during the 1930s and, moreover, lacks polemical content: a remarkable fact in view of the date of publication. Unlike their French counterparts, British Nietzscheans made no attempt to rescue Nietzsche’s reputation by explaining the extent of the Nazi misappropriation. Father Copleston was alone in his attempt to render Nietzsche theologically harmless; his *Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosopher of Culture* (1942) and *St. Thomas and Nietzsche* (1944) echoed the many similar attempts of French theologians—who were usually Catholic.

The silence on Nietzsche in Britain was finally broken with the publication of F. A. Lea’s *The Tragic Philosopher* (1957). The sympathetic tone was maintained in R. J. Hollingdale’s *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (1965), reprinted in 1999, followed by sympathetic philosophical discussions by Eric Heller, J. P. Stern, David Cooper, and Michael Tanner, all of whom were pioneers in the then hostile climate of the British ivory tower. Hollingdale was the undisputed sage of Nietzsche studies in Britain until his death (28 September 2001). The prolific translator and critic of Nietzsche’s works, he was the first presi-



dent of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society and so venerated that another president has yet to be elected.

In the contemporary field of literature, Sebastian Barker has written a long poem, *The Dream of Intelligence* (1992), portraying Nietzsche's mind on the night of his collapse, and Lavinia Murray's radio play *Nietzsche's Horse* (1997) reproduces Nietzsche's (alleged) conversation with the now legendary beaten horse a few moments before his mental collapse. The play satirically surveys all the horses that could possibly relate to Nietzsche. An author today often makes a casual reference to Nietzsche, expecting the general public to know chapter and verse.

British philosophers today such as Keith Ansell-Pearson and David Owen have tended to support the principles of the New Nietzsche, as did Germanists like Duncan Large, though Paul Bishop and Nicholas Martin (both Germanists) have held firmly to a classical interpretation. The trend among British scholars now, spearheaded by Ansell-Pearson, is to stress Nietzsche's confrontation with the natural sciences (especially Charles Darwin and lesser-known figures like Ruggero Boscovich). The general public has at last been weaned from the lingering impression that Nietzsche was a protofascist. Perhaps the 1995 TV film of Ben Macintyre's book *Forgotten Fatherland: The Search for Elisabeth Nietzsche* (1992) has done more to clear Nietzsche's name than anything else by showing the extent of Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche's manipulation of her brother's work.

## NIETZSCHEANISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Although Nietzsche himself admired Ralph Waldo Emerson, he almost certainly did not know about Walt Whitman, whose vitalism became a cult phenomenon in Germany in 1889, only months before Nietzsche lapsed into insanity. By the same token, he probably did not know much, if anything, about Henry James, his contemporary, nor indeed did Henry James have any direct contact with Nietzsche's work, although Stephen Donadio in *Nietzsche, Henry James, and the Artistic Will* (1978) has suggested that there are parallels in the thought of both on art, indicating influences in common.

As in Great Britain and France, so too in the United States, Nietzsche's impact made itself felt through critics and creative writers rather than

through philosophers; however, much damage was done to Nietzsche's reputation by the early appearance in America of *Degeneration* (1895), the English translation of Max Nordau's *Entartung* (1893). Equally hostile were the reviews of Nietzsche's works that appeared in America during 1896. A shift toward appreciation of Nietzsche then took place: the works of James G. Huneker and Henry L. Mencken are milestones in Nietzsche reception. Huneker's *Overtones: A Book of Temperaments* (1904) contained an essay on Nietzsche, and so did his *Egoists: A Book of Supermen* (1909). Huneker and Percival Pollard attempted to make Nietzsche popular in America by stressing the theme of art in his work. Huneker in turn introduced Mencken to Nietzsche. Mencken, "journalist and jazz-age guru of the American intelligentsia" (Hays Steilberg), was by 1908 busy challenging what he saw as blinkered American puritanical prejudices. Mencken was heavily influenced by Nietzsche's thought, stressing the "Dionysian" premise that "art is not a matter of morality" (Patrick Bridgwater); he also saw the *Übermensch* in terms of a success-seeking materialist.

Mencken was in turn responsible for introducing the novelist Theodore Dreiser to Nietzsche's work. Dreiser's *The Titan* came out in 1914 and *Hey, Rub-A-Dub-Dub!* in 1920. Mencken's influential *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche* had appeared in 1908. The only serious philosophical challenge to Nietzsche's thought was delivered by the Spanish-born George (originally Jorge) Santayana, whose time at Harvard had made him an "honorary" American. In his wartime publication *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1916), written in England, Santayana—who strongly supported the Allies—held that Nietzsche's moral code was partly responsible for the outbreak of hostilities, though he had formerly held many of Nietzsche's views on aesthetics. Mencken influenced two other Nietzscheans, George Jean Nathan and Benjamin de Casseres. Casseres published *The Superman in America* in 1929 and *I Dance with Nietzsche* (privately) in 1936.

Casseres was responsible for introducing Eugene O'Neill to Nietzsche's work. Mencken published three plays by Eugene O'Neill in *The Smart Set* in 1917–1918. The editorial committee of *The Smart Set* consisted of Nathan, Mencken, and another Nietzschean, Willard H. Wright, whose *What Nietzsche Taught* came out in 1915. Mencken was also editor of the *American Mercury*, which not surprisingly printed enthusiastic material on Nietzsche such as that by the essayist and

journalist Randolph Bourne, who shared Mencken's antipathy toward the American puritanical mind-set. Bourne attempted to expand Nietzsche's notion of the "good European" to encompass a pan-American nationalism. His reading of Nietzsche was highly selective: he tended to ignore inconvenient aspects of Nietzsche's thought, such as his anti-democratic stance. Bourne's early death in 1918 at the age of only 32 denied his deliberations on the political aspects of Nietzsche's thought the chance to fully mature.

The reaction of Jack London to Nietzsche's works when he first read them was that he "ate them up" with what must have been an intoxication similar to that experienced by Edwin Muir. The idea of the Superman was what he found most appealing and what he used for his character portrayals in *The Sea Wolf* (1903–1904), *The Iron Heel* (1908), *Martin Eden* (1910) and *Burning Daylight* (1910), but none of these approach the archetypal mythic quality of *Call of the Wild* (1903) and *White Fang* (1906). Nietzsche's influence can also be traced in works of second-rank writers such as Floyd Dell's *The Moon-Calf* (1920) and Ben Hecht's *Erik Dorn* (1921) and *Humpty Dumpty* (1924). The poet John Gould Fletcher was swayed by an enthusiasm for Nietzschean ideas from 1915 on, when he had witnessed the Dionysianism of Vaslav Nijinsky's dancing, itself inspired by Nietzsche. Fletcher's *Parables* of 1925 owes much to Nietzsche's works. In particular, Fletcher here worked out his own religious struggle with the death of God. For O'Neill, too, Nietzsche's programmatic atheism was decisive.

During the 1930s, America received a large number of refugees from Germany who went on to contribute to the intellectual life of the nation. The roll call of writers and thinkers such as Thomas Mann, Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse forces one to reflect on the loss to Germany of such luminaries. All had read Nietzsche and had something relevant (if not always complimentary) to say about his thought. Culturally, too, refugees such as the artist Max Beckmann provided a fulcrum for new trends. Beckmann had already experienced the full force of the enthusiastic Nietzscheanism of German Expressionism. American interest in Nietzsche-inspired dancing in the wake of the expressive techniques pioneered in the United States by Isadora Duncan, herself a Nietzschean, ensured that Beckmann redoubled his interest in painting hedonistic dance scenes, though what

Nietzsche would have made of Beckmann's palpable enthusiasm for jazz remains a moot point.

Nietzsche scholarship took a nosedive during the 1940s; it was politically incorrect to have anything to do with a writer suspected of fascist tendencies. An exception was Crane Brinton's *Nietzsche* (1941). Nietzsche was not really rehabilitated until Walter Kaufmann published his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* in 1950. Kaufmann would become a tireless promoter of Nietzsche through a series of translations of his works. Another major investigation was Arthur Danto's *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (1965), swiftly followed by Peter Heller's *Dialectics and Nihilism* (1966). There followed the work of Sander Gilman, Frederick Love, Herbert Reichert, and Joan Staumbaugh. The pursuit of Nietzsche studies was greatly furthered when Bernd Magnus and Kaufmann founded the North American Nietzsche Society in 1980.

In America today, Nietzsche's work is accepted into the canon of philosophy in a way that it is not in most other countries, including his native Germany. Richard Rorty has investigated irony in connection with Nietzsche, asserting that for Nietzsche, the ironical stance was a way of pursuing theoretical metaphysical discourse. The adoption of the ironic mask and "play" in the metaphorical sense became favored terms in Nietzsche critique. Although Allan Bloom was been critical of Nietzsche's elitism, postmodern philosophers downplayed this aspect of his thought, adopting wholesale the style and methods of the New Nietzsche. This French import has produced awkward linguistic formulations in English, such as "always already" to translate "*toujours déjà*," the term used by Jacques Derrida to create his own perspectivism, which no doubt endeared him to postmodern theorists intent on pressing Nietzsche's perspectivism. Until the new millennium, which brought with it a new direction in Nietzscheanism—away from an insistence on metaphor and toward an attempt to place Nietzsche's thought within the context of natural science—the favored text was universally the suspect *Will to Power*, and the strategic intention was to use deconstruction in order to show that there is never "one truth"; there is no such thing as "the self." Ted Sadler has set himself up in opposition to such practices, arguing that Nietzsche's belief in order of rank overrules his interest in perspectivism. Although the trend in America has been for a wholesale acceptance of the New Nietzsche, a number of scholars held to the more

“orthodox” line of Bernd Magnus and Richard Schacht—Kathleen Higgins, Robert Solomon, Ernst Behler, Tracy Strong, and Christa Acampora, for example. In contrast, Alexander Nehemas, Mark Warren, Gary Shapiro, and Alan Schrift were experimental in their interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism.

A generation of American feminists, among them Ofelia Schutte and Debra Berghoffen, inspired by Lacanian precepts on feminine desire and Derridean suggestions on woman’s veiling techniques (purportedly à la Nietzsche), incorporated a new methodology into feminist academic discourse and applied this to their Nietzsche critique. As Daniel Conway put it, “Nietzsche’s perspectivism . . . provides a promising epistemological model for feminist theories.” For a while during the 1990s, Nietzsche’s name was used repeatedly within a feminist context with seldom a mention of his strong resistance to feminism. Babette Babich has provided an astonishingly eclectic entrepreneurial approach in her Nietzsche critique, ranging from music to science, and has done much to promote the examination of the “natural Nietzsche.” John Richardson, in *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism* (2004), states that Nietzsche was more of a Darwinian than he thought. Eternal return—which, true to its name, comes in and out of fashion—is once again a priority topic, this time with the focus on physics, with the real risk that Nietzsche criticism might become as bogged down in pseudoscience as it did in French feminist terminology. The trend is still to cull passages on eternal return from *The Will to Power*, though Nietzsche had said all he wanted to say in print on the matter in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

## NIETZSCHEANISM IN ITALY

Like Germany, Italy achieved unification during Nietzsche’s lifetime: in 1861, it was constituted as a single state, while Germany was unified in 1871. This colored much of the early Nietzsche reception in both countries. In Italy, the prime disseminator of Nietzsche’s ideas, Gabriele D’Annunzio, was an almost fanatical patriot. The new “radical irrationalism” that D’Annunzio inspired also laid claim to the work of Søren Kierkegaard and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. Partly because of D’Annunzio’s lack of academic credentials and partly because no work of Nietzsche was translated into Italian until *Al di là del bene e del male* appeared in

1898, followed by *Così parlò Zarathustra* in 1899, the Italian scholarly world at first held aloof from Nietzsche's philosophy. Ettore Zoccoli's reserve was typical. Since he could read Nietzsche in German, he had a head start over his compatriots, publishing the first monograph in Italian on Nietzsche in 1898 (*Federico Nietzsche, La filosofia religiosa—la morale—L'estetica*). As professor of moral philosophy in Rome, he had difficulty in accepting Nietzsche's premises and compared Nietzsche's "dilettantish" thought unfavorably with the systems of Kant and Hegel.

The second Italian philosopher to deal with Nietzsche's works was Francesco Orestano. His enthusiasm was probably more damaging than Zoccoli's reserve since he insisted, in *Le idee fondamentali di Federico Nietzsche nel loro progressivo svolgimento. Esposizione e critica* (*The Basic Thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and Its Development: Discussion and Critique*, 1903), on an idiosyncratic and distorted categorization of Nietzsche's works whereby he argued that Nietzsche's thought was a continuation of the Kantian method (rather than a breach with it). As a reaction to this kind of attempt to force Nietzsche to fit into a pattern, the writer and thinker Giovanni Papini announced that a new type of philosophy had been born, yet in *Un uomo finito* (1912), he too used Nietzsche for his own purposes. Prior to his religious conversion, Papini was also instrumental in bringing the ideas of Henri Bergson into Italy through translations of his work. Bergson's *élan vital* added weight to what the futurists, themselves influenced by Nietzsche as the very name of their group implies, would dub "dynamism."

The academic Benedetto Croce had at first discounted Nietzsche, whose work he encountered via D'Annunzio, though as a liberal philosopher, Croce held no truck with any of D'Annunzio's views. Having studied *The Birth of Tragedy* and having found that he agreed with Nietzsche's conclusions about the ancient Greeks, he attempted to bring a more moderate view of Nietzsche to the attention of the public. In effect, Nietzsche served as a pretext or battleground for three familiar conflicts: between the Italian scholastic philosophic tradition, conservative liberalism, and the new avant-garde right-wing nationalism. By this time, however, the Italian socialists had also discovered Nietzsche. Giuseppe Renzi, in a review written in 1905, declared that socialism could find complete vindication in Nietzsche's teaching. With regard to the fascists, the way having been prepared by D'Annunzio, Benito

Mussolini would soon follow, and, indeed, Mussolini was already a fan of Nietzsche in 1908. Later, he had no trouble in construing Italian fascism as a manifestation of the will to power.

As discussed, the extreme right in France in the years prior to World War I construed Nietzsche's influence as irrational and indeed violent (following the lead of Georges Sorel). In Italy, a further complicating factor was produced by the military campaigns conducted prior to World War I. D'Annunzio's *Superuomo* had a decidedly militaristic and nationalistic character, and Orestano followed in the same vein in stressing the mastery of the *Übermensch*. This paved the way for the Futurist reception of Nietzsche's ideas, led by that breaker of tablets in his own right, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti. He admired Nietzsche for his challenge to the status quo but castigated him for his admiring passéist Greek culture. Furthermore, the futurist agenda rejected all university libraries and professors (especially philosophers): everything to do with academia. In short, though Nietzsche had inspired the futurist concept of dynamism as well as (inadvertently) the futurist enthusiasm for war, he too was dubbed passé. Nevertheless, his ideas continued to fuel the general feeling of libertarianism in Italy as in the whole of Europe in the period from the turn of the century to the outbreak of World War I.

During the period between the two world wars, Nietzsche's name was used by fascist propagandists in much the same way that it was in Germany, though alternative interpretations also flourished. In 1924, there appeared a sympathetic discussion of Nietzsche as "over-reacher" in M. Castiglione's *Il poema eroica di Federico Nietzsche (The Heroic Poem of Frederick Nietzsche)*, and in 1927, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches (1895–1904)*, which was highly regarded at the time, appeared in Italian translation, sparking biographical interest in Nietzsche. The work of A. Banfi should be duly acknowledged since his *Federico Nietzsche* (1934) was the first attempt to provide an unbiased, comprehensive overview of Nietzsche's philosophy in Italian; this was followed by L. Guisso's *Nietzsche* (1936). Otherwise there was a plethora of articles and comparative studies. During the war itself, M. Minici's *Nietzsche—D'Annunzio* (1942) was a predictable glorification of war.

After World War II, recriminations in Italy against the fascists necessitated a reexamination of Nietzsche's work. Some writers held him responsible for misleading Mussolini, while others—the

majority—thought that Nietzsche had been exploited. It was a priority for Italian Nietzscheans such as the Marxist R. Cantoni to rehabilitate Nietzsche's good name. While there was a dearth of interest in Nietzsche among English-speaking critics at this time, no fewer than 90 books and reviews on Nietzsche appeared in Italy from 1943 (when the Allies entered Italy) to the end of the 1950s. E. Paci, in his *F. Nietzsche* (1946), attempted to give an overall appraisal. Naturally, there were hostile critics too. Romeo Masini held Nietzsche and Oswald Spengler chiefly responsible for fascism. Other critics, such as S. Solmi, placed the blame on D'Annunzio or regretted that Nietzsche had been led astray during his own lifetime: R. Paoli, in an article written in 1957 ("Wagner e Nietzsche"), thought the friendship with Richard Wagner had been doomed.

Italian interest in Nietzsche during the 1950s was influenced by the existentialist interpretations by Karl Jaspers and Karl Löwith and by Christian interpretations such as those by Otto Flake in his *Nietzsche. Rückblick auf eine Philosophie* (*Nietzsche: A Philosophy in Review*, 1946). Eduard Sturm, in his *Die Nietzsche-Renaissance in Italien* (1991), mentions the work of Edoardo Mirri (*La metafisica nel Nietzsche*, 1961) as part of the Italian attempt to dissipate the negative picture of Nietzsche in Italy, in spite of the best efforts of Georg Lukács, whose *Destruction of Reason* appeared in Italian translation in 1959. Most important of all, however, was the appearance of Heidegger's *Nietzsche* in 1961. This allowed a completely new, metaphysical reading of Nietzsche to take place, and this reading has remained the dominant one in Italy.

The efforts ofazzino Montinari (Florence) were crucial in bringing Nietzsche scholarship up to the present-day standard. Together with Giorgio Colli of Pisa University, Montinari undertook the mammoth task of publishing Nietzsche's complete works in German, Italian, and French (since published by de Gruyter, Adelphi, and Gallimard, respectively). The German version, the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, is now the definitive text of Nietzsche's works in the original German. By 1964, when these editors gave a progress report at the Royeaumont conference in Paris, work was advancing well, though it was only after this progress report that Karl Löwith was able to persuade de Gruyter to become interested in publishing Nietzsche. In 1972, the Colli-Montinari partnership founded the prestigious journal *Nietzsche-*



*Studen* in collaboration with Heinz Wenzel of de Gruyter and Professor Wolfgang Müller-Lauter. Montinari, in his *Che cosa ha veramente detto Nietzsche?* (*What Did Nietzsche Really Say?*, 1975), criticized all critics, from Lou Andreas-Salomé on, who have used Nietzsche as a vehicle for what they wanted to say instead of allowing Nietzsche to speak for himself.

Interest in Heidegger inspired Gianni Vattimo's first book on Nietzsche and Heidegger, *Le avventure della differenza* (1980); this was followed by his study of philosophy as cultural criticism, *Introduzione a Nietzsche* (1985). Vattimo's most recent publication is *Diálogo con Nietzsche. Ensayos 1961–2000* (2002). He was a member of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2004 but continues to have a base at Turin University. Other academics active in Nietzsche studies are Alfredo Fallica (Palermo), Giorgio Penzo (Padua), Vincenzo Vitiello (Salerno), and the controversially left-wing Massimo Cacciari (Venice), as well as Fazio Domenico, whose *Il caso Nietzsche. La cultura italiana di fronte a Nietzsche* appeared in 1998. Claudio Magris is the professor of modern German literature at the University of Trieste and a creative writer in his own right; his *Microcosmi* won the Strega prize in 1997. In *En anillo de Clarisse. Tradición y nihilismo en la literatura moderna* (1993), Magris sees Nietzsche's thought as part of the tradition of nihilism. That Nietzsche's engagement with the natural sciences is the current focus of Nietzschean research is seen in Claudia Rosciglione's *Homo Natura. Autogoliazione e caos nel pensiero di Nietzsche* (2005).

The Italian writers Umberto Eco and Italo Calvi as well as leading academics have contributed to an informed discussion of Nietzsche's significance. The work of creative writers sometimes shows instances of Nietzschean influence filtered through another source, as with Italo Calvino, in his case, the filter being Roland Barthes's version of poststructuralist theory. There has always been a tremendous popular interest in Nietzsche the man in Italy. Wide interest in Nietzsche's collapse in Turin was aroused by A. Verrechia's *La catastrofe di Nietzsche a Torino* (1978). The best example of populist Nietzscheanism is the somewhat tasteless film *Al di là del bene e del male* (*Beyond Good and Evil*) made in 1977 by Liliana Calvani. This sensationalizes the eternal triangle between Nietzsche and his friends Lou Andreas-Salomé and Paul Réé. Italian interest in Nietzsche today is part of a wider interest in Italy in philosophy in general, even in schools.

## NIETZSCHEANISM IN SPAIN AND THE HISPANIC WORLD

Early Nietzscheanism in Spain took place under the shadow of French Nietzscheanism. As in France and elsewhere in Europe, Nietzsche's work was badly received among traditional philosophers: the reserved reaction of Santayana was typical, with the notable exception of José Ortega y Gasset and his student José Gaos. However, among writers and intellectuals, Nietzsche's ideas were received with widespread interest. Max Nordau's *Degeneration* was not translated into Spanish until 1902, but many intellectuals could read it in the original German or in French (from 1893). The criticism Nordau meted out was typical of negative conservative reaction to Nietzsche and proved a temporary setback for German Nietzscheanism, but in Spain, Nordau's critique of Nietzsche—as well as Tolstoy, Ibsen, and Wagner—was sufficient to arouse interest in these writers as challengingly and refreshingly “new.”

The first writer to express an opinion in Spanish was Juan Maragall, founder of the Catalanian movement; in an article of 1893, he welcomed Nietzsche's aristocratism, and in a necrologue of 1900, he again praised Nietzsche, who, for all his inconsistencies, was “an arrow to the other side of the river.” Maragall used a measured tone in his assessment compared to Pio Baroja, who welcomed Nietzsche's egoism and antidemocratism. Baroja, with Azorin (alias José Martín Ruíz) and Miguel de Unamuno, was at the center of the movement known as the “Generation of 1898,” with Ramiro de Maeztu as “the most exalted Nietzschean” (Azorin) of their number. They were characterized by their criticism of what they saw as a stagnant and corrupt society and by their anticlericism, much of it derived from Nietzsche. Azorin and Miguel de Unamuno also had their own ideas about such topics as eternal return, while Baroja was more flamboyant in embracing Nietzsche's concept of power.

Baroja was aided and abetted by Paul Schmitz, later a fanatical anti-Semite and racist from Basel who took up residence in Madrid. The influence of Schmitz in propagating Nietzscheanism in Spain was considerable since he acted as interpreter and publicist for Nietzsche while at the same time providing his own gloss. He ended up by admiring the Third Reich and contributed to the distortion of Nietzsche's reputation that was so flagrant under the National Socialists. This in turn made

Nietzsche a virtual taboo figure after World War II, in Spain as elsewhere. Maeztu, who, like Baroja, was convinced that hierarchical political power would be the only solution to Spain's degenerate culture, has also been accused of laying down some of the ideological nationalistic framework for the later *Falange español*, the Spanish fascist party over which General Francisco Franco assumed leadership in 1937.

The poet Juan Ramón Jiménez, “the patriarch of modern Spanish poetry” (Udo Rukser), testified as to how difficult it was for those who had to rely on Nietzsche in translation to get a proper impression of his work: the translations that began to appear after 1900 were often of poor quality since—unless otherwise stated—they were translated from the French rather than from the original German. The secondary literature on Nietzsche was also primarily French, especially the works by Henri Lichtenberger and Charles Andler. Even at third-hand, however, Nietzsche's ideas made an impact on Spanish intellectual and cultural life. A great stimulus was the appearance of cheap editions of Nietzsche's works, published by Sempere in Valencia. In 1906 alone, Sempere brought out cheap Spanish translations of *La genealogía de la moral*, *El origen de la tragedia*, *Así hablaba Zaratustra*, and *El caso Wagner*. Finally, in 1932, Nietzsche's collected works appeared in Spanish, translated by Eduardo Ovejero Maury and published by Aguilar.

In Latin America, Nietzsche's works became popular in the first three decades of the 20th century. A francophile attitude toward culture guaranteed a lively interest in Nietzscheanism in line with the general tendency of copying Parisian trends. The result, however, in the absence of a strong cultural tradition, was superficial and short lived, not least because the stranglehold of the Catholic Church acted as a brake on Nietzsche reception. The fact that more French was spoken in Latin America than German also had the result of making sure that more intellectuals read Henri Bergson than Nietzsche if they wanted to read philosophy, since Bergson enjoyed high popularity in France during the first decades of the 20th century. Even so, the appearance of the cheap Sempere editions of Nietzsche's works meant that Nietzsche's ideas were at least accessible in places where this would have been unthinkable a few years previously—for example, in Mexico but also in Chile, both formerly cultural nether regions.

The first Latin American writer to occupy himself with Nietzsche's works was the poet Rubén Darío. He, too, belonged to the “Generation

of 1898” movement of anticlerical writers. The Columbian José M. Vargas Vila adopted Nietzsche’s ideas to inflate his own chauvinistic egoism, which reached comical rather than ominous proportions over the building of the Panama Canal (built by 1914, though the official opening took place only in 1920). Vargas Vila called on his compatriots to resist invasion by foreigners, in other words, Yankees. “I am a complete rebel, unconquered. . . . I bring the religion of hate,” he declared in 1903. This “representative of the literary burden of South America” (Alberto zum Felde) lived for most of his life in Paris. The Latin American writer most influenced by Nietzsche was the Argentinian Jorge Luis Borges. Nietzscheanism in South America at the present time is still strongest in Argentina, where numerous works are published on Nietzsche every year.

Some Spanish philosophers emigrated to Latin America after World War II, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, who moved to Mexico, being a case in point. Julián Marias went to America in the late 1940s and spent two decades there. Significantly, the “Generation of 1898” was the best period for Spanish Nietzscheanism, and it is no accident that two prominent recent Spanish philosophers were actually Ortega y Gasset’s students: José Goas, whose main interest was Heidegger (and Ortega himself, whose work he interpreted), and Julián Marias, whose *Historia de la filosofía*, published in 1941 (*History of Philosophy*, 1966), achieved great publishing success. Marias died in 2005. A major Spanish postwar philosopher, Xavier Zubiri, pursued a critique of reality in his *Inteligencia Sentiente: Inteligencia Realidad* (1980); he died in 1983. The most influential Spanish philosopher today is Fernando Savater, whose *Las preguntas de la vida* came out in 1999 (*The Questions of Life*, 2002).

## NIETZSCHEANISM IN RUSSIA

The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 led to a repressive political situation in Russia, in which works of literature were strictly censored. Nietzsche’s works were thus, in the main, censored in Russia from 1872 to 1898; it was only in 1906 that all restrictions on publication were lifted. The earliest popularizer of Nietzsche’s works was Alexander Reingoldt, who translated the aphorisms from *Human, All Too Human*, while Princess Anna Dmitrievna Tenisheva translated some parts of *The*

*Case of Wagner*, which Nietzsche himself had sent her in 1888. During the 1890s, Nietzsche was seen as contraband, mainly because of his attacks on Christianity. This was the time when Russian Marxism (founded by Gyorgy Plekhanov) was formulated and when Russian populism, in which the peasant had been idolized, became unfashionable. Students who went abroad to study, like Lev Shestov and Dimitri Merezhkovsky, read Nietzsche's works with relish, while in Russia itself, a climate of moral censure in which only works critical of Nietzsche passed the censor was exacerbated in 1893 when the translation into Russian of *Degeneration* by Max Nordau was published. Nietzscheanism in Russia thus started off as a movement critical of Nietzsche's thought and differs from the trends discussed hitherto; the very term "Nietzscheanism" was used pejoratively there. However, Russia was not hermetically sealed, and interest in Nietzsche was not so easily smothered, especially as Lou Andreas-Salomé spent the winter of 1895–1896 in St. Petersburg and Georg Brandes visited there frequently.

The trickle of interest became a flood with the publication of what was in many ways an inadequate translation of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* by Iuly Antonovsky in 1898. There followed a decade in which there was frantic interest in Nietzsche among avant-garde circles in Russia. The first critical edition was started in 1909, and there were several others, though none reached completion. By 1911, nearly all of Nietzsche's works were available in Russian. Exponents of symbolism in Russia were particularly under Nietzsche's influence, especially the founder of the group, Merezhkovsky, and his wife, Zinaida Gippius, as were Valery Bruisov and Vyacheslav Ivanov, to say nothing of Alexander Blok and Andrei Bely. The symbolists were dedicated to the reinvention of a new, Dionysian theater. They introduced a heady, occult mysticism into their writing, and this found echoes in the work of the philosophers Vladimir Soloviev and Sergei Bulgakov. The journal *Mir iskusstva* (*The World of Art*) published both symbolist and other avant-garde work by aesthetes such as the theatrical entrepreneur Serge Diaghilev and art connoisseurs such as Alexander Benois, a ploy that caused splits and led to the demise of the journal in 1904. However, there were others to take its place, such as *Zolotoe runo* (*The Golden Fleece*), which continued to foster the new movement in art criticism.

The extreme avant-garde in Russia grouped around futurism, founded in Russia in 1913 by Velimir Khlebnikov in conjunction with Alexei

Kruchonikh, Vladimir Mayakovsky, and the latter's mentor, David Burluk. Two central manifestos published in that year stressed the importance of linguistic revisions for Russian cubo-futurism: *Slovo kak takovoye* (*The Word as Such*) and *Deklaratsiya slova kak takovogo* (*Declaration of the Word as Such*). Apart from wishing to insult their bête noire, Pushkin, and other dinosaurs of the 19th-century literary world, the cubo-futurists wanted to liberate the word, and here their program dovetailed with that of the Italian futurists under the leadership of the Italian Marinetti. Nietzsche's influence on the general iconoclastic tone of the movement is unmistakable. Vladimir Mayakovsky, in particular, owed him a great debt, though Russian futurism itself was short lived and was soon superseded by the experiments of the postrevolutionary avant-garde.

The failed Revolution of 1905 had caused much heart searching among all Russian writers, artists, and intellectuals. Some symbolists repudiated their earlier emphasis on individualism, while it led some Marxists "to a greater appreciation of the role of religion, myth, and the irrational in human behavior" (Bernice Rosenthal, ed., *Nietzsche in Russia*, 1986). In 1909, the journal *Apollon* was founded specifically to counteract Dionysian tendencies in literature. The convinced Nietzschean Maxim Gorky now moved closer to the Marxists and denigrated symbolist individualism. However, since Nietzsche was inextricably linked with this type of individualism, his work fell from favor for a few years (coinciding with the outbreak of World War I), only to return to fashion in 1916 with the upsurge in revolutionary fervor, along with the work of Richard Wagner, whose popularity had not been prone to such vicissitudes. Both Bely and Blok interpreted the revolution as the apotheosis of music. The new anarchism of Ivanov and Georgy Chulkov was attacked by Gorky in his newspaper *Novaia zhizn* (*New Life*), though, like them, he backed the Bolshevik revolution. After the Revolution of 1917, the Marxists A. A. Bogdanov and Anatoly Lunarcharsky, both influenced by Nietzsche, founded *proletkult*, an organization for writers of the proletariat. This was rapidly incorporated into official channels by Vladimir Lenin in 1919, especially as the innovative theater production methods of Vsevolod Meyerhold, combined with Ivanov's theories on "collective acting" (a type of audience participation such as that in medieval miracle plays), were becoming extremely popular.

During the 1920s, formalism, which developed during the second decade of the century as a result of the pioneering linguistic work of Roman Jakobson, itself came under attack in spite of the fact that it rejected irrational devices. The trend in Russian culture—soon to become mandatory—was for a new realism and collectivity in literature and art. Eventually, Jakobson and others of the movement would move to Prague to form the Prague Linguistic Circle, which in turn would become the bedrock of structuralism. Nietzsche's ideas were now virtually proscribed: Mikhail Bakhtin was probably the last to discuss him openly, though Leon Trotsky admired much of Nietzsche's thought. With the rise to power of Joseph Stalin, formalism was proscribed in 1930, and *proletkult* was abolished in 1932. The Soviet Empire marked a period in which Nietzsche's works were "on the index" in Russia and the whole of the Soviet bloc, and this situation is only just starting to readjust itself after the breakup of the Soviet Empire in 1989.

## NIETZSCHEANISM IN JAPAN

In Japan, as elsewhere, it was the case that Nietzsche's ideas were attractive to both the extreme right and the radical left. Western backing for China in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War offended the Japanese victors and encouraged a new form of nationalism in the country. An admiration of Germany and its strict Prussian state among certain Japanese academics was strengthened when Raphael von Koeber came to lecture at Tokyo University at the invitation of Inoue Tetsujirō. He introduced Nietzsche into his lectures from 1894 to 1895 and thus acted as Japan's counterpart to Georg Brandes, though it must be added that his primary interest was in Arthur Schopenhauer. Inoue (the Japanese and Chinese invert the order of first name and surname) traveled to Paris and then on to Germany in 1894, returning with a complete collection of Nietzsche's works. However, Inoue decided that Nietzsche displayed "unhealthiness in the highest degree" and ultimately became a right-wing ideologue. The first essay on Nietzsche to appear in Japan, "*Nīche shisō no yunyū to bukkūō*" ("The Reception of Nietzsche's Thought in Relation to Buddhism") was printed anonymously in 1898, but is thought to have been the work of Anesaki Masaharu.

In 1900–1901, three publications pertinent to Nietzsche appeared in Japan, the first a translation by Ueda Bin of Henri Lichtenberger’s essay “Friedrich Nietzsche.” The other two aroused interest in Nietzsche to flash point in 1901 when Takayama Chogyū (who, to make matters even more complicated, just used his given name Chogyū as his pen name) published “*Bunmei hihiyōka toshite no bungakusha*” (“The Man of Letters as Critic of Culture”) and “*Biteki seikatsu o ronzu*” (“On Aesthetic Life”). The ensuing “aesthetic life” row raged among Japanese intellectuals from 1901 to 1903, occasioned by what was perceived to be a Nietzsche-inspired argument attacking Japanese “aesthetic life.” The Japanese establishment was at pains to foster a culture of anti-individualism and did not look kindly on Chogyū’s enthusiastic recommendation of Nietzsche’s “extreme individualism.” Even more shocking was Chogyū’s declaration that the ultimate in human happiness is sexual satisfaction.

What followed was a refutation of Takayama Chogyū by Hasegawa Tenkei, and he was in turn refuted by Tobari Chikufū. The latter, a close friend of Chogyū, has been dubbed “the first Japanese Nietzschean” by Hans-Joachim Becker (*Die frühe Nietzsche-Rezeption in Japan, 1893–1903*, 1983). Ironically, there was no real need for Nietzsche’s name to be dragged through the mud in this particular *Kulturkampf*. After all, only a very few people had read any Nietzsche: the first translations of his works into Japanese began to be published only in 1911. The traditional philosophers in Japan followed the precedent familiar elsewhere of disapproving of Nietzsche, with the notable exception of the young Watsuji Tetsurō, whose *Nichie kenkyū* (*Study of Nietzsche*) was published in 1913. This remained the standard work on Nietzsche in Japan for several decades. Watsuji was familiar with Buddhism as well as the ideas of Bergson; he would go on to write a book on Kierkegaard in 1915. Watsuji was thus able to provide a study of Nietzsche that took account of Buddhism, existentialism (then at its inception), and Bergsonian vitalism, though his stance can really be summed up in one word: anti-intellectual.

The predominance of Marxism in Japanese intellectual thought during the 1920s was followed by the chauvinistic fascism of the 1930s, all but stifling debate. However, after World War II, two philosophers from Kyoto were able to follow the lead of Miki Kiyoshi and engage with Nietzsche: Nishitani Keiji and Tanabe Hajime. Both Nishitani and



Tanabe provided a serious critique of Nietzsche's *amor fati* within the context of a predominantly metaphysical interpretation—Nishitani having studied under Martin Heidegger. Interest in Nietzsche in Japan at the present time is remarkably lively, as witnessed by the study by the Germanist scholar Okochi Ryogi, *Wie man wird, was man ist. Gedanken zu Nietzsche aus östlicher Sicht (How One Becomes Who One Is: Thoughts on Nietzsche from an Eastern Perspective, 1995)*.

### NIETZSCHEANISM IN CHINA

Chinese reception of Nietzsche did not really take off until the year 1907, when Wang Guowei and Lu Xun returned from their studies in Japan. Wang Guowei was a traditionalist who incorporated Nietzschean ideas into a discussion of traditional Chinese poetry, but it became much more common for Chinese Nietzscheans to adopt a reformist attitude and to use Nietzschean ideas in order to attack Chinese conventions and values. In this sense, Lu Xun can be seen as the grandee behind the New Cultural Movement in China that culminated in the (fruitless) student-led demonstrations of 4 May 1919. What the radicals were complaining about was the Chinese tradition that placed little value on the individual and accepted compromise in order to avoid confrontation. The Nietzschean Li Shichen argued that the tradition of Confucianism led to a climate of resentment just as surely as Christianity had led to slave morality.

The subdued intellectual climate of the 1920s in the wake of the movement of 4 May meant that interest in Nietzsche in China was also dampened, only to be revived under the right-wing Kuomintang government, whose selective cull of Nietzsche's pronouncements produced fodder for nationalist propaganda, as it did in Germany and Italy. The philosopher Chen Quan, the leader of the *Zhanguo Ce* clique, hailed Nietzsche as the originator of the concept of the will to power. During World War II, left-wing Nietzscheans such as He Lin and Chu Tunan, the latter a prominent official in the communist government as well as an admirer of Lu Xun, sought to defend Nietzsche's good name and to deny his bellicosity.

The conflict between the Kuomintang and the communists plunged the country into a civil war. This was suspended when China entered

open war in 1937–1945 but was then resumed until the communists were able to oust the nationalists and establish the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of Mao Dzedong (Tse-Tung). The cultural climate now made it received wisdom to be anti-Nietzsche. Known Nietzsche admirers were best advised to make a self-criticism, as the renowned aesthetician Zhu Guangqian did in 1956; he had been confined in the “ox pens” during the Cultural Revolution and had endured beatings and humiliation. He renounced his self-criticism in 1983, regretting his former timidity. He died in 1986.

The fall of the Gang of Four in 1976 saw a brief strengthening of anti-Nietzschean sentiment in China since some of the excesses of the former regime regarding anti-intellectualism were unjustly blamed on Nietzsche. However, Nietzsche’s ideas crept back into fashion under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, who encouraged citizens to “pursue personal betterment” without quite realizing that this was an open invitation to intellectuals to seek improvement in their private, inner lives. Nietzsche seemed to offer a life raft to allow mental escape from the demands and encroachments of economic and technological progress. Between 1985 and 1987, Nietzsche enjoyed popular fame in China. This coincided with serious Nietzsche scholarship; in particular, the Nietzsche scholar Zhou Gouping was the first in China to query the authenticity of *The Will to Power* as a text actually written by Nietzsche. He has subsequently written prolifically on Nietzsche and disseminated his ideas through translations of Nietzsche’s works.

The climate toward Nietzsche in China has changed yet again since the authorities viewed his influence as a contributory factor in the student rebellions of April, May, and June 1989, culminating in the massacre in Tiananmen Square of 4 June. After this, one of the leaders, the lecturer and philosopher Liu Xiaobo, an enthusiastic Nietzschean, was interrogated and imprisoned. Officially, Nietzsche is not welcome in China at the present time; however, unofficially, there is a good deal of interest in his work among radical thinkers and writers.

## NIETZSCHEANISM ELSEWHERE

This volume cannot cover the topic of international Nietzscheanism definitively. Suffice it to say that, from the first, Nietzscheanism had an

international aspect: the example of the Dane Georg Brandes is a case in point. Countless Nietzsche scholars today ignore geographical boundaries when it comes to finding like-minded colleagues. To give just a few examples, the Swede Thomas Brobjer (Uppsala University), an expert on Nietzsche's library, is a keen supporter of the British Friedrich Nietzsche Society, as is Robin Small (University of Auckland). In Portugal, there is a cohort of Nietzscheans led by Nuno Nabais (Lisbon University). His *Metafisica da Trágico: Estudos sobre Nietzsche* appeared in 1997. Following Portugal's lead, Brazil has many keen Nietzscheans at the present time. With regard to creative writing, Iceland's leading writer, Birgir Sigurdsson, premiered his play on Friedrich Nietzsche, *Dynamite*, at the Icelandic National Theater on 27 April 2005, while in January 2006, Nietzsche finally "made it" as the topic on *Mastermind*, the British TV quiz show, a suitably ironic example of Nietzschean mainstreaming with which to end this introduction.

# The Dictionary

– A –

**ABSOLUTE BECOMING.** *See* HERACLITUS; TIME.

**ADORNO, THEODOR WIESENGRUND (1903–1969).** German philosopher. Adorno studied musical composition in Vienna under Alban Berg and was an enthusiastic supporter of Arnold Schoenberg. He joined the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in 1931 and became the member of the **Frankfurt School** most influenced by Nietzsche; he admired Nietzsche's refusal to draw up strict categories, which was precisely what the Frankfurt School tried to do programmatically with its "critical theory." Forced into exile in 1934, Adorno came to England for three years, where he taught at Oxford, eventually joining the members of the institute who had gone into exile in the United States (notably **Max Horkheimer**), though he returned to Frankfurt in 1949. His works include *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 1947 (*Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, 1972; written with Horkheimer), where it is argued that **rationalism** ended by depriving humanity of freedom, and *Negative Dialektik*, 1966 (*Negative Dialectics*, 1973). In the latter, Adorno discusses Nietzsche extensively in the late section on **nihilism**. After the war, Adorno considered to what extent **aesthetics** is justified in a world that had produced Auschwitz. He gave up composing music and declared that poetry could not continue in the face of such inhumanity. At the end of *Minima Moralia* (1951; trans. 1974), a work Terry Eagleton calls "that bizarre blend of probing insight and patrician grouching" (*The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, 1990), Adorno criticized Nietzsche's *amor fati*, finding it irrelevant in the face of the Holocaust. *See also* WHIP.

**AESTHETICS/ART.** It is not an exaggeration to say that Nietzsche's philosophical mood can be gauged at any given time by the position he takes on art. In his early work in particular, he enthused over the public art of the ancient **Greeks**, notably the tragic dramas that placed such a stamp on the conduct of their civic life. He regarded the Germany of his day as culturally impoverished and sought to reintroduce **aristocratic values** to invigorate the **culture** of the nation. Nietzsche is often accused of aestheticism because, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, he avowedly creates "a **metaphysics** of art"; however, this must be seen in relation to his discovery of "the primordial phenomenon of **Dionysian art**" (*BT*, 24) and set within the context of his developing views on Dionysus. His views on art would change dramatically as his thought developed.

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche argues that illusion is vital for the artist, who understands the tragic view of **life** and is able to communicate it to man in a form that he can bear and that circumvents the claims of religion. Thus, art is able to reveal to man the meaning of **suffering**; by identifying with the tragic hero, he can continue as a moral being in the face of **nihilism** and the death of **God**. With **Greek tragedy** and **musical** dissonance in mind, Nietzsche poses the question as to how aesthetic pleasure can be stimulated through "the ugly and the disharmonic" and provides the answer (already mentioned in an earlier section of the same work): "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified" (*BT*, 5 and 24). He goes on to add, "The Dionysian, with its primordial joy experienced even in pain, is the common source of music and tragic myth" (*BT*, 24). The same argument is found in *The Gay Science*: "As an aesthetic phenomenon our existence is still *bearable* for us" (*GS*, II: 107). As he explained in the third of his *Untimely Meditations*, art provided a stimulus for activity as well as respite from the feelings of terror at existence. Nietzsche writes, "The greatness and indispensability of art lie precisely in its being able to produce the *appearance* of a simpler world, a shorter solution to the riddle of life. No one who suffers from life can do without this appearance, just as no one can do without sleep" (*UM*, IV: "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth," 4).

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche makes several critical statements on the harmful aspects of placing art center stage in our

becoming, and he no longer approves of such things as allusion, **veils**, and **masks**: artists “of all ages . . . are the glorifiers of the religious and philosophical errors of mankind” (*HH*, I: “From the Souls of Artists and Writers,” 220). In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, his attention is very much focused on self-creativity: man himself is to become a work of art, while self-**knowledge** is the goal in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. By then, Nietzsche had also become disenchanting not just with **German culture** under **Otto von Bismarck** but also with **Arthur Schopenhauer** and **Richard Wagner**, the men he had viewed as geniuses when he wrote *The Birth of Tragedy*, and his harsh words on aesthetics are now often aimed at them. When he wrote his final works, Nietzsche, though still entirely dedicated to eradicating metaphysics from **morality**, returned to the Dionysian: “—For art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception to exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: *intoxication* [*Rausch*]” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 8). Ignoring the way Nietzsche placed emphasis on the **body**, **Martin Heidegger** insisted on a metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche’s aesthetics. Refer to Philip Pothen, *Nietzsche and the Fate of Art* (2002).

**AFFIRMATION.** Nietzsche’s “cheerful” doctrine (or “**gay science**”) is spelled out most fully in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where, in the face of **pessimism** after the death of **God**, we should “say yes” to life, whatever it brings. Zarathustra declares, “I have become one who blesses and one who says Yes . . .” (*Za*, II: “Before Sunrise”). This love of one’s fate or *amor fati* is the basis for the theory of **eternal eternal**, which the *Übermensch* will embrace willingly, with no regrets, affirming his life in every single detail (even the misfortune of having to share the planet with **herd** man). Zarathustra, the teacher of eternal return, sweeps away all **time** distinctions for this optimistic *Weltanschauung*:

All “it was” is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance—until the sacred will says to it: “But I willed it thus!”

Until the creative will says to it: “But I will it thus! Thus shall I will it”! (*Za*, I: “Of Redemption”).

Nietzsche attacked **Christianity** for engendering a **slave morality** that “says no on principle” to everything that is “other” (*OGM*: I: 10).

All Nietzsche's writings stress that, in the face of **nihilism**, we are free to exult in **life** itself, but from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* on, life affirmation must be linked to the **will to power**, as that is the essence of life. See also *LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE*.

**DIE AKTION (ACTION)**. Weekly journal for politics, literature, and **art**. Founded in Berlin, 1911, by the left-wing activist Franz Pfemfert, the journal published articles in favor of Nietzsche's views, often by **Expressionist** writers who were happy to publish in either *Die Aktion* or the less political *Der Sturm*. During the war, *Die Aktion* held back from the tendency to make a "German" hero out of Nietzsche retrospectively. In an article in *Die Aktion* of 1915 titled "*Die Deutschsprechung Friedrich Nietzsches*" ("Making Friedrich Nietzsche Germanic"), Pfemfert bitterly criticized the patriotic "Nietzsche-German" peddled by **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**. The article provided chapter and verse from *Ecce Homo* to prove Nietzsche's internationalist credentials. *Die Aktion* ceased publication in 1932.

**AMOR FATI (LOVE OF FATE OR DESTINY)**. A concept intimately bound up with the **will to power** and the opposite of **ressentiment**. In his vision of what the *Übermensch* might be, Nietzsche proposed a strong individual who would seize control of his own destiny and **affirm life** in all its aspects. Through such affirmation, life becomes an artifact that can be *made*—so it is up to the individual to create his or her destiny, a desperately painful process: "But my creative will, my destiny, wants it so. Or, to speak more honestly: my will wants precisely such a destiny" (*Za*, II: "On the Blissful Islands"). **Theodor Adorno**, in *Minima Moralia* (1951), criticized Nietzsche's *amor fati* as vexatious since any affirmation of life in a concentration camp was unthinkable. A counterargument to this is that Nietzsche spoke for himself on this issue: "*Amor Fati*: that is my innermost **nature**" (*NW*: "Epilogue," 1); in addition, he could not be expected to foresee an event such as the Holocaust. Refer to Ōkōchi Ryōgi, "*Nietzsches Amor Fati im Lichte von Karma des Buddhismus*" ("Nietzsche's *Amor Fati* in the Light of Buddhist Karma") in *Nietzsche-Studien*, 1 (1972).

**ANDREAS-SALOMÉ, LOU (1861–1937)**. Lou Salomé was born and brought up in St. Petersburg; she married Frederica C. Andreas in

1887. Her mother was German, and her father was from the Baltic, of French Huguenot extraction; he had been sent to St. Petersburg for a military education and later became a general. The honor he received in the storming of Warsaw, 1830, gave him a hereditary title to the Russian nobility. Lou Andreas-Salomé was called many things in her time, but none were as withering as **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's** misleading name for her: *die Russin* (“the Russian”).

The loss of her religious faith was an early traumatic experience for which Lou compensated by developing a somewhat mystical belief in “the all,” in which **women** had a scattered benevolent function throughout the world, in contrast to the focused aggression of men. This notion had much in common with the theories of **Wilhelm Bölsche**. From this standpoint, Andreas-Salomé criticized the radical **feminists** of her day for trying to copy men and for erroneously seeking to pursue careers (a stance that accorded with Nietzsche's view of feminism). Since she had attended Zurich University (though without enrolling for the examinations) and went on to become a prominent writer and practicing psychoanalyst, left-wing campaigners for female rights, notably **Hedwig Dohm**, censured her for her inconsistency, though right-wing feminists such as **Ellen Key** applauded her actions.

Lou Salomé met Nietzsche in April 1882, when they were both guests of **Malwida von Meysenbug** in Rome. Nietzsche appears to have proposed **marriage** during late spring 1882, first through the intermediary **Paul Rée** and then in person, on the pretext that he wanted to protect Lou's reputation in the ménage à trois she now proposed for herself, Rée, and Nietzsche; this never came into operation, though she did live with Rée from the winter of 1882–1883 until her marriage to the academic Fred Charles (later Friedrich Carl) Andreas in 1887. It is beyond doubt that Nietzsche loved this brilliantly clever woman. The famous photograph of Lou Salomé in the cart pulled by Rée and Nietzsche was taken in May 1882 (see the photo spread). The **whip** in Lou's hand has given rise to much speculation. Lou spent a few weeks with Nietzsche in Tautenburg in August 1882, chaperoned by his sister Elisabeth, who took a swift and permanent dislike to Lou and did not hide it. Lou now discreetly distanced herself from Nietzsche, leaving him hurt and surprised when the other two components of the ménage à trois decamped from Leipzig in



November 1882, without him and without saying farewell. He never saw either of them again and never forgave Elisabeth for her hand in the debacle. It has been suggested that some at least of his misogyny is a displaced revenge attack on both his sister and Lou Salomé.

Lou Andreas-Salomé brought out her psychological interpretation of Nietzsche's works in *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken*, 1894 (translated as *Nietzsche*, 1988). It received a mixed reception. Noteworthy is Lou Andreas-Salomé's statement that Nietzsche retained a religious attitude in spite of his overt atheism; this would become a common perception of Nietzsche's thought among some intellectuals who were unwilling to take Nietzsche's pronouncement on the death of **God** at face value. She went on to write a number of novels, including *Ruth* (1895) and *Ma* (1901), in which the freedom of the female protagonist to live **life** according to her own lights is a notable feature, indicating that she was receptive to Nietzsche's advice to her (as in a letter dated the end of August 1882) to "become who you are." This citation from Pindar had already found its way into *The Gay Science* (*GS*, III: 270). Andreas-Salomé's short story *Fenitschka* (1898) deals indirectly with her encounter with Nietzsche. Besides her assessment of Ibsen's female characters in *Henrik Ibsen's Frauen-Gestalten* (*Henrik Ibsen's Female Characters*, 1892), Andreas-Salomé also wrote many articles and reviews. The four essays in *Die Erotik* (1910) are on female **sexuality**. She met **Sigmund Freud** at the Psychoanalytic Congress in Weimar in 1911 and thereafter became his colleague and collaborator. The archive dedicated to Lou Andreas-Salomé is in Göttingen, where she died. Refer to Erich Podach, *Friedrich Nietzsche and Lou Salomé. Ihre Begegnung 1882* (1937); Rudolph Binion, *Frau Lou: Nietzsche's Wayward Disciple* (1968); Ernst Pfeiffer, *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé. Die Dokumente ihrer Begegnung* (1970); Biddy Martin, *The (Life)Styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé* (1991); H. F. Peters, *Lou Andreas-Salomé: Femme fatale und Dichtermuse* (1995), and Carol Diethe, *Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip* (1996). See also FRIENDSHIP.

**ANIMALS.** Nietzsche described man as an animal with primitive instincts that he tamed at his peril. To support this view, he used animal imagery with a distinct symbolism. The **blond beast** represents the

ancient, noble warrior whose rapaciousness is preferable to the decadence of modern man (especially the Christian). Zarathustra's special animals are the eagle and the serpent. The eagle (*Adler*), as a bird of prey (*Raubvogel*), must be set alongside the blond beast or beast of prey (*Raubtier*) (*OGM*, 1:11). In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*—and in *On the Genealogy of Morality*—the eagle preys on lambs, not out of malice but out of strength. Nietzsche's point is that it is just as useless to brand the eagle "evil" for being strong as it is to brand the lamb "good" for being weak, though in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, the example of the lamb is a template for the man of **ressentiment** (*OGM*, I: 13). Zarathustra tells the **higher men** that they must be stouthearted and have "eagles' courage" to stare into the abyss: "Not courage in the presence of witnesses, but hermits' and eagles' courage" (*Za*, IV; "Of the Higher Man," 4). His eagle and serpent comfort him after he has realized the immensity of the task of teaching the doctrine of **eternal return**.

The dog that barks dementedly at the shepherd (Zarathustra) who has swallowed a snake (*Za*, III: "Of the Vision and the Riddle," 2) is probably based on Nietzsche's childhood memory of when his father fell down some steps and set the dog barking. The accident, which damaged Carl Ludwig Nietzsche's brain (though he might already have been ill), was to prove fatal. Nietzsche was left with a (justified) fear that brain disease might be endemic in his family. The serpent that has embedded itself in the shepherd's throat is an allegorical motif to denote the burden that Zarathustra must take on himself before he can become the *Übermensch*. That Zarathustra is the shepherd is clear when he later recalls "how that monster crept into my throat and choked me!" (*Za*, III: "The Convalescent," 2).

The lion (*Löwe*)—which probably inspired the image of the blond beast—symbolizes courage. At the beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra names three metamorphoses of the spirit—"how the spirit shall become a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a **child**" (*Za*, I: "Of the Three Metamorphoses"). A camel is a beast of burden and represents the weight-bearing spirit, heavily laden with the superfluous and weakening things that **Christianity** has taught it, such as "to love those who despise us," while the lion is needed "to create freedom for itself and a sacred No even to duty." But only a child can say "a sacred Yes" (*Za*, I: "Of the Three

Metamorphoses”). As usual with Nietzsche’s symbols, the image of the lion has several layers of meaning. The rampant lion traditionally evokes mettle and can represent male vigor; Nietzsche could also be making a **veiled** and sardonic reference to his unsuccessful proposal (May 1882) to **Lou Andreas-Salomé** at the lion’s grotto (*Löwengarten*) in Lucerne. Zarathustra’s lion is destined to metamorphose into a child, another way of saying that man will have the chance of a new beginning as *Übermensch*. The roar that heralds the arrival of the gentle lion (together with a flock of doves) at the end of the book provides Zarathustra with the sign he needed that his “great noon-tide” has begun (*Za*, IV: “The Sign”).

There are many more animal images in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The ass introduced in part 4 of *Zarathustra* is also a symbolic beast, evoking the humiliation of Christ’s entry into Jerusalem on an ass (Mark 11.7) while also demonstrating the stupidity of Zarathustra’s guests, who have begun to worship the ass (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 1–2). Zarathustra finds them on their knees before the gray ass, in a parody of the golden calf worshipped by the Israelites during the absence of Moses on Mount Sinai (Exodus 32). Zarathustra’s ass has become a yea-sayer, braying “yea” (in German, “IA,” “hee haw,” sounds like “JA”) in answer to the **higher men**, whose litany is a spoof on the **neo-Pietist** way of prayer.

The fate-spinning spider and the cat with hidden claws are evoked at various times in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and elsewhere, sometimes in connection with **woman** and her guile and at other times as pure **metaphor**, as in the description of the passing clouds as “stealthy cats of prey” (*Za*, III: “Before Sunrise”). Meanwhile, an adder’s bite gives Zarathustra the chance to explain his parable that it is better to curse one’s enemy than to love him (*Za*, I: “Of the Adder’s Bite”). Nietzsche usually uses animal imagery to provide a humorous but telling example of the lesson he wishes to convey, which is that man must remember that he, too, is an animal who must retrieve his instinctual **life** or else succumb to *décadence*.

**THE ANTI-CHRIST (DER ANTICHRIST) (1895)**. Subtitled *Curse on Christendom*, Nietzsche wrote this late work as a first installment of a planned four-part *Umwertung aller Werte* (**Revaluation of All Values**). He had mentioned at the end of *On the Genealogy of Morality* that

he was planning “*The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values*” (*OGM*, III: 27), and a note dated 26 August 1888 shows that he still intended to write a work titled *The Will to Power*, but soon afterward he appears to have shelved the idea, probably because he had cannibalized much of the available material for use in both *The Twilight of the Idols* (at that moment under preparation for print) and *The Anti-Christ*. Nietzsche now referred to the first part of *The Revaluation of Values* as “that incredibly serious work,” meaning *The Anti-Christ* (Nietzsche to his publisher, Constantin Georg Naumann, 18 September 1888). Although by September 1888 Nietzsche had abandoned the project of turning his notes into *The Will to Power*, his sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, who published a truncated and inaccurate version of Nietzsche’s chaotic late notebooks posthumously in 1901, insisted from then on that *The Will to Power* was an entirely separate work from *The Revaluation of Values*, “part 1” of which had already been published as *The Anti-Christ*. One of Nietzsche’s original plans for the four parts of *The Revaluation of Values* was as follows:

Book I: The Anti-Christ; Attempt at a Critique of Christianity

Book II: **The Free Spirit**; Critique of Philosophy as a **Nihilistic Movement**

Book III: The Immoralist; Critique of the Most Disastrous Kind of Ignorance, **Morality**

Book IV: **Dionysos**; Philosophy of the Eternal Future

This plan, dated 17 March 1887, reveals an overlap with much of the material subsequently published by Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche as *The Will to Power*, especially in view of Nietzsche’s projections for books 2 and 3 of both works. Elisabeth periodically lamented the (entirely spurious) “lost Dionysus” manuscript for several decades. Yet, however questionable an editor Nietzsche’s sister was, we have to thank her for overseeing the publication of *The Anti-Christ* in 1895 and for dissuading her mother, **Franziska Nietzsche**, from destroying the manuscript on religious grounds.

In spite of the common view that *The Anti-Christ* was a work written when Nietzsche was losing his mental powers prior to his collapse in early 1889, there is no reason to believe that the vitriolic attack on **Christianity** in it is anything other than a culmination of sober deliberation. In the original German, the title *Der Antichrist* offers two translations, “The Anti-Christ” and “The Anti-Christian,”

and probably both are intended. Nietzsche palpably enjoys hurling insults at Christianity throughout the short work. A fatal flaw in Christianity is that it stresses the meaningless of this **life** in comparison with the life to come: “Ah this humble, chaste, compassionate mendaciousness!” (A-C: 44). Paradoxically, in the middle section of the work, Nietzsche provides a moving portrait of Jesus Christ, the unique teacher, a man vastly superior to his followers and completely lacking in **ressentiment**, even in so near a matter as the manner of his own death. Nietzsche declares that the disciples were the first to resent the crucifixion, and ever since, the spirit of revenge has dominated Christian **morality**, encouraging negative values and preventing life **affirmation**.

In his lament that the whole Greco-Roman civilization existed “*in vain*” (A-C: 59), Nietzsche brands the **Jewish** tradition as chief instrument in the downfall of the great Roman Empire and its elite; Judaism, as a **slave** religion dominated by the priest, was the ideal bed from which Christianity could spring. Nietzsche constantly reminds his readers that Jesus, his disciples, and the early Christians were all Jews, as well as Saint Paul, who is singled out as the great destroyer of Rome: “What he divined was that with the aid of the little sectarian movement on the edge of Judaism one could ignite a ‘world conflagration,’ that with the symbol ‘God on the Cross’ one could sum up everything down-trodden, everything in secret revolt, the entire heritage of anarchist agitation in the Empire into a tremendous power” (A-C: 58). The book draws to a close with a triumphant flurry: “I call Christianity the *one* great curse, the *one* great intrinsic depravity, the *one* great instinct for revenge for which no expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, *petty*—I call it the *one* immortal blemish of mankind . . .,” and ends with the reminder, more for Nietzsche than for us, that it is time for a “Revaluation of values!” (AC: 62). But Nietzsche had run out of time.

**ANTI-SEMITISM.** Nietzsche was completely hostile to anti-Semitism, which is one of the reasons why he broke off his **friendship** with **Richard Wagner**. As he wrote in his late essay *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, “Since Wagner returned to Germany he succumbed step by step to everything I despise—even to anti-Semitism” (NW: “How I Detached Myself from Wagner”). Throughout his oeuvre,

Nietzsche criticized the prevalence of anti-Semitism in Germany; for example, in *Beyond Good and Evil* he suggested, “It would perhaps be a good idea to eject the anti-Semitic ranters from the country” (BGE, VIII: 251). Nevertheless, he made a number of remarks that could be used as ammunition for **National Socialism** if taken out of context. For example, Nietzsche was actually *attacking* the typical German attitude to the **Jews** when he used the phrase “Let in no more Jews!” (BGE, VIII: 251). It was Nietzsche’s misfortune that his sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** had married an inveterate anti-Semite, **Bernhard Förster**; this raised her credit with the **National Socialists** as they gained power, making Förster, who died in 1889, into a posthumous hero. Her unscrupulous treatment of Nietzsche’s literary estate included a rapprochement between the National Socialists and the *Nietzsche-Archiv* that inevitably tarnished Nietzsche’s reputation by association. *See also* HITLER, ADOLF.

**APOLLO/APOLLONIAN.** In ancient **Greek** mythology, Apollo was the sun god who ordered **rationalism** and self-discipline in human **nature**. As such, he was the embodiment of male beauty. In Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*, Apollo is the counterpart of **Dionysus**, and both are used as shorthand for the psychic modes of creative experience, with the Apollonian representing clarity of expression through a dreamlike state that incorporates illusion and the Dionysian expressing surrender to orgiastic chaos. Yet, however much Nietzsche tried to make Apollo the counterpart of Dionysus, he remains insipid in contrast to the dynamic, passionate Dionysus.

Nietzsche’s original understanding of Apollo was inspired by the ancient Indian concept of Maya (illusion), which taught that the reality of the cosmos is simply what Isvara (the personal expression of Brahma) has called into being. **Arthur Schopenhauer** refined this by positing that the **veil** of Maya is a protective device for human beings who could otherwise not withstand the force of **nihilism**. Nietzsche surmised that the Homeric Greeks were able to transcend the horror of **life** by an **artistic** form of “wish fulfillment”: “Self-deception is at the heart of the Apollonian solution to **pessimism**” (Julian Ingle, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art*, 1992).

**ARENDT, HANNAH (1906–1975).** German philosopher. A student under **Martin Heidegger**, Arendt completed her Ph.D. dissertation under **Karl Jaspers** at Heidelberg in 1928. She fled to France in 1933 and America in 1941 and was active in publishing as well as being an academic in the field of social thought. Her chief publications are *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1958), *The Human Condition* (1958), *On Revolution* (1965), and *On Violence* (1970). Arendt embraced **Jewish** affairs and in 1961 attended the trial of Adolf Eichmann; in her essay “Eichmann in Jerusalem” (1963), she coined the phrase “the banality of evil” to describe the bureaucratic pettiness of **National Socialist** henchmen. In *The Human Condition*, Arendt contrasted the *Lebensphilosophie* (life philosophy) of Nietzsche and **Henri Bergson** with the labor philosophy of **Karl Marx**. Although Arendt accepted Nietzsche’s doctrine of **eternal return** as a workable philosophy of life, she counted the theory of the **will to power** “among the vices of the weak” and doubted the iconoclasm of Nietzsche’s challenge to tradition because “it lies in the very nature of the famous ‘turning upside down’ of philosophic systems or currently accepted values . . . that the conceptual framework is left more or less intact” (*The Human Condition*).

**ARIADNE.** Greek goddess whose name Nietzsche coupled with that of **Cosima Wagner** in the last letters he wrote before lapsing into insanity. Since Ariadne was abandoned by Theseus on the island of Naxos and rescued by **Dionysus**, it became a puzzle to Nietzsche scholars to sort out the triangular situation in Nietzsche’s case. The diary of **Harry Graf Kessler** (entry of 31 July 1899) reveals that **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** had confided to him that Cosima Wagner was Ariadne, Nietzsche was Dionysus, and **Richard Wagner** was Theseus, a formula subsequently published by **Carl Albrecht Bernoulli** in his two-volume *Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Freundschaft* (1908). However, Elisabeth, no doubt anticipating interpretations such as that of Herbert Walter Brann, who in *Nietzsche und die Frauen* (1976) saw the whole Ariadne issue as an expression of Nietzsche’s repressed erotic feeling for Cosima, concocted a sanitized version excluding Nietzsche in which Hans von Bülow was Theseus and Wagner was Dionysus. After his mental collapse, Nietzsche signed several letters as “Dionysus” and others as “the

Crucified,” and to Cosima, on 3 January 1889, the day he collapsed, he sent a letter that began “To Princess Ariadne, my beloved.”

*Ariadne* was also the title of the *Jahrbuch* of the *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft*, intended as a yearbook, but it actually appeared only once, in 1925 (*Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* Press, Munich). The editorial committee consisted of **Ernst Bertram**, **Hugo von Hofmannsthal**, **Lev Shestov**, Heinrich Wölfflin, and Friedrich Würzbach. In addition to articles by Bertram, Hofmannsthal, Shestov, **André Gide**, and **Thomas Mann**, the volume contains *Das trunkene Schiff*, a translation into German of Arthur Rimbaud’s *Bateau Ivre*, and Friedrich Würzbach’s report on the delegation of the *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* to the Fifth International Philosophy Congress held in Naples in May 1924.

**ARISTOCRATIC VALUES OR THE NOBLE IDEAL (*DIE ARISTOKRATISCHEN WERTE/DAS VORNEHME IDEAL*)**. Nietzsche argued that the noble or aristocratic individual of antiquity was characteristically unreflecting: not weakened by emotions such as **pity**, he possessed hardness of spirit and courage and believed in a natural order of rank. Such men were the creators of values out of **pathos of distance** or acknowledged superiority to those below. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche explains how aristocratic values determined who was “good,” meaning “the noble, the mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded” (*OGM*, I: 2), while a “bad” person was originally just humble or poor “with no derogatory implication” (*OGM*, I: 4). (Nietzsche uses the word *schlecht*, but in English the same argument can be made with the word “villain” from “villein,” a feudal serf.) The sovereign individual of prehistory was someone who could make a promise and “confers an honor when he places his trust” (*OGM*, II: 2). Nietzsche believed that **Christianity**, by preaching humility, had systematically destroyed aristocratic values; this has led to the development of **ressentiment** in the mass or **herd**, where all spontaneity and joy has been expunged from **life**: “Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good . . . whereas you rich, the noble and powerful, you are eternally wretched, cursed and damned!” (*OGM*, I: 7). The antidote is for a **re-valuation of values** to take place and for **master morality** to replace **slave morality**. See also BLOND BEAST; THE GREEKS.



**ART (DIE KUNST) AND ARTISTS.** *See* AESTHETICS.

**THE ASCETIC IDEAL (DAS ASKETISCHE IDEAL).** According to Nietzsche, the ascetic ideal arises when **suffering** is given significance. It comprises all that conventional religions preach to engender suffering in man, who, blindly obeying the **slave morality** that declares such things as pity, humility, and weakness to be “good,” is racked with guilt because he can never achieve the correct level of self-abasement and is doomed to suffer agonies of guilt, simply from acting **naturally**. Formerly, man had no problem with suffering itself: the problem arose when he needed a *reason* for it, and “*the ascetic ideal offered man a meaning!*” (OGM, III: 28). According to the ascetic ideal, the enjoyment of **bodily** pleasures and pursuit of **aristocratic values** are “sinful” and “evil.” Nietzsche points out that “good” and “evil” are not fixed **truths**; there are no moral facts but only interpretations of the same, and “an ascetic **life** is a self-contradiction” (OGM, III: 11). Nietzsche concedes that the ascetic ideal’s imposition of a set of negative values, with the consent of the majority of a given population, indicates that it is remarkably virulent. The ascetic ideal gives substance, meaning, and power to the **ascetic priest**. Nietzsche’s solution is for man to embrace **nihilism** and abandon **ressentiment**. *See also* SEXUALITY.

**THE ASCETIC PRIEST (DER ASKETISCHE PRIESTER).**

Nietzsche argues that it is a paradox that the ascetic priest derives his authority and power from the fundamentally sterile **ascetic ideal**. “It must be a necessity of the first rank that makes this species continually grow and prosper when it is *hostile to life—life itself must have an interest* in preserving such a self-contradictory type” (OGM, III: 11). Hence, Nietzsche surmises that the **will to power** is in operation through this system. Throughout *On the Genealogy of Morality*, he describes the damaging effect the ascetic priest has on the psychological development of a people. Nietzsche’s chief targets are priests of the **Judeo-Christian** tradition, who have denigrated the **bodily** instincts and **drives** and encouraged followers to believe in a **God** who will reward present unhappiness with future bliss. Within this system of **ressentiment**, the weak will become powerful in heaven, and the

poor will be rich. An explanation is provided for their **suffering** in this world: “the ascetic priest is the *direction—changer of ressentiment*” (*OGM*, III: 15). Nietzsche argues that an **affirmative nihilism**, in other words, a healthy acceptance of the death of God, enables people to create their own destinies in the present, without the need for **metaphysical** support. The future will then be built out of creative willing, so that a **revaluation of all values** can take place.

**AZORIN (1894–1967)**. Pseudonym for José Martínez Ruíz, Spanish essayist and novelist. Together with **Pío Baroja** and **Miguel de Unamuno**, Azorin constituted the backbone of the “Generation of 1898” movement in Madrid (described in Azorin’s essay “*La generación de 1898*” in *Clásicos y modernos*, 1913). All of them were influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the ideas of Nietzsche. Azorin was particularly interested in Nietzsche’s stance on ethics. In the autobiographical novel *La Voluntad* (*The Will*, 1902), the protagonist is the philosopher Yuste, who—like Azorin himself—seeks to regenerate Spanish culture. The eponymous hero of his novel *Antonio Azorin* (1903) gave Azorin the idea for his pseudonym. He wrote in a deliberately low-key style as a protest against the high-blown rhetoric common in Spanish literature at the time, and he chose everyday pastoral life for the topic of many essays. With missionary zeal, he joined forces with Baroja and **Ramiro de Maeztu** to write manifestos that were then handed out to leading intellectuals. Azorin later lost much of his enthusiasm for Nietzsche, though he retained a fascination for the doctrine of **eternal return**. Gradually, he turned his attention to other matters and became an outstanding critic of the Golden Age of classical Spanish literature. He thus fell into analyzing the passage of **time**, an attitude that flowed into a “semi-philosophic cyclic view of life in which all things are subject to a law of inevitable return” (D. L. Shaw, *Penguin Companion to Literature*, 1969).

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**BACHOFEN, JOHANN JAKOB (1815–1887)**. Swiss lawyer and private scholar of ancient **Greek** history. Bachofen’s major work, *Das*

*Mutterrecht*, 1861 (*Mother Right Selections*, 1967), had a far-reaching influence on **European culture**. His premise, derived from ancient Greek grave inscriptions, was that society had developed from an original polygamy through matriarchy to patriarchy. He derived this hypothesis from studying the inscriptions on various ancient graves and from reading the ancients, such as Herodotus. In certain tribes, Bachofen proposed, property had been passed from mother to daughter, the left hand had been preferred to the right, and the moon (which had monthly phases similar to a woman's monthly cycle) had been worshipped rather than the sun. Bachofen was no radical; he simply wished to posit that in prehistoric times women had not been subservient to men and that, indeed, a matrilineal matriarchy had flourished. Bachofen's three stages of development in prehistory are the "telluric" period (haeteric **sexuality**, life lived in swamps), the Demeter-based phase dominated by worship of the moon goddess, and the "attic" period, during which there was a shift to sun worship and the patriarchal code.

Bachofen's insistence on the importance of myth no doubt influenced Nietzsche, who was a frequent visitor at the Bachofens' home in Basel when he was a professor there (part of the attraction being the piano playing of Bachofen's musically gifted young wife, Louise). Although Bachofen inspired Nietzsche's dichotomy of the **Apollonian** and the **Dionysian**, he certainly did not seek to overturn the sexual mores in Wilhelmine Germany: indeed, he held patriarchy to be a logical and proper development from the chaos of earlier times. It is therefore ironic that, around the turn of the century, Bachofen's ideas became highly fashionable among sexual libertines, often in conjunction with a misinterpretation of Dionysian ecstasy deemed thoroughly Nietzschean, as with *die Kosmiker*, who advocated a mystical form of cultic and orgiastic free love. Bachofen also wrote *Die Unsterblichkeit der orphischen Theologie auf den Grabdenkmälern des Altertums* (*Immortality in Orphic Theology as Revealed on Ancient Monuments*, 1867). Refer to **Alfred Baeumler**, *Bachofen und Nietzsche* (1929), and Ute Wesel, *Der Mythos vom Matriarchat* (1980).

**BAEUMLER, ALFRED (1887–1968)**. Austrian academic. Baeumler was professor of philosophy at Dresden and Berlin universities. His early work centered on a study of **Johann Jakob Bachofen**, but

he “switched allegiance” to Nietzsche in 1927, as Ernst Niekisch has pointed out (*Gewagtes Leben [A Daring Life]*, 1958). In 1929, Baeumler brought out *Bachofen und Nietzsche*, followed by the influential *Nietzsche, der Philosoph und Politiker* in 1931. He also edited several editions of Nietzsche’s work in 1930–1931 at the invitation of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. Clearly, Baeumler took himself seriously as a Nietzsche scholar, but nevertheless he unscrupulously manipulated Nietzsche’s work so that it fitted in with **National Socialist** doctrine to the point where he argued that Nietzsche, because of what he had said in *On the Genealogy of Morality* about race, nation, and religion, could not have meant what he said in favor of individualism. By giving a point-by-point analysis of great precision, which Crane Brinton, with justified sarcasm, calls Baeumler’s “really great achievement” (*Nietzsche*, 1968, chapter 8: “Nietzsche and the Nazis”), Baeumler was able to square Nietzsche’s pronouncements on the **state** with Nationalist Socialist propaganda, arguing that Nietzsche’s pejorative remarks refer to the Second Reich of **Otto von Bismarck** and Kaiser Wilhelm I, not to the superior Third Reich of **Adolf Hitler**, of which Nietzsche would have approved.

There was enough superficial similarity between a populist interpretation of the *Übermensch* and Hitler’s *Führerprinzip* for Baeumler’s arguments in *Nietzsche, der Philosoph und Politiker* to sound superficially convincing. With a discernible shrewdness, Baeumler refrained from making the **will to power** into a mere slogan, describing it as teaching a **Heraclitan** “world struggle” in which “will as power” affirms itself in all innocence. Through his appeal to the **Greeks** and especially the world of Heraclitus, Baeumler won a degree of intellectual credibility for his statements. It should be noted that he supplanted the popular “Dionysian” interpretations of Nietzsche by treating the *Will to Power* as a serious philosophical work for the first time (though he dismissed **eternal return** as incompatible with the doctrine of the will to power). **Martin Heidegger** and other Existentialist philosophers followed Baeumler’s lead, so that during the 1930s, National Socialist interpretations of Nietzsche appeared alongside Existentialist interpretations and did not always seem to differ in essentials.

**BAKHTIN, MIKHAIL (1895–1975)**. Russian writer who encountered Nietzsche’s ideas as a student at St. Petersburg University during

World War I. During his lifetime, Bakhtin, a teacher by profession, was treated as a political suspect; he was even sent into exile for six years after publication of his major work, *Problemy tvorstva Dostoevskogo*, 1929 (*Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 1984), and his later work, including a controversial Ph.D. dissertation on Rabelais and sundry important essays on literary form, was largely unrecognized. During the 1960s and 1970s, the perceived semiotic links of his work with **structuralism** gave Bakhtin an anachronistic late popularity in which he was hailed as a protoformalist, in spite of his own opposition to formalism. His view of **language** was dialogic: “The words we use come to us already imprinted with the meanings, intentions and actions of the previous users, and any utterance we make is directed towards some real or hypothetical Other” (David Lodge, *After Bakhtin*, 1990). Bakhtin thought that genres other than the novel suppressed the “act” of dialogue and were therefore monologic: only the novel allows polyphony. Its form guarantees that the author is forced to use more than one voice, each of which has its distinctive literary **mask** that prevents the emergence of a dominating authorial voice. With his fascination for the play of opposites, Bakhtin became absorbed by the paradoxes of the carnival, when people en masse wear masks and the distance between them is abolished. Critics have noted that Bakhtin’s pluralism need not be out of line with the tenor of what Nietzsche said about the communal experience of tragedy in *The Birth of Tragedy*. Bakhtin’s insights on the function of dialogue and laughter have been seen as inspired by Nietzsche’s visionary comments, though Bakhtin had little of Nietzsche’s style.

**BAROJA, PIO (1872–1956)**. Spanish novelist. Of Basque descent with anarchist political inclinations, Baroja qualified in medicine at the early age of 21 but soon turned to writing; he published his first book, *Vidas sombrías* (*Barren Lives*), in 1900. Even before the formation of the “Generation of 1898” around the self-styled **Azorin**, Baroja was excited by Nietzsche, as demonstrated in his essay “*El éxito di Nietzsche*” (“The Success of Nietzsche”). In company with his friends in the movement, Baroja delivered a challenge to the stagnant contemporary Spanish literary world. In 1901, he was co-signatory, with Azorin and **Ramiro de Maeztu**, of a manifesto call-

ing for political renewal. However, Baroja was more radical than his colleagues, declaring in the journal *Elektra* in the same year, “If we want to be strong, we cannot be liberal; we must be authoritarian,” a position he claimed to have derived from his study of Nietzsche. His trilogy *La lucha por la vida* (*The Fight for Life*, 1904–1905) dealt with the Madrid underworld. Baroja lived in France during the Spanish Civil War, by this time confirmed in his **pessimism**, as can be seen in his novel *Laura, o la soledad sin remedio* (*Laura, or Solitude without Cure*, 1939). His *Memorias de un hombre de acción* (*Memoirs of a Man of Action*) stretched to 20 volumes.

**BARTHES, ROLAND (1915–1980).** French writer whose academic posts give a clue as to his linguistic preoccupations: after holding several posts in Hungary, he moved to the *École des Hautes Études* in Paris as professor of the sociology of signs, symbols, and collective representations from 1962 to 1976, and was later professor of literary semiology at the *Collège de France*. He established his reputation with *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*, 1953 (*Writing Degree Zero*, 1967); *Mythologies*, 1957 (trans. 1973); *Éléments de sémiologie*, 1964 (*Elements of Semiology*, 1967); *S/Z*, 1970 (trans. 1975); and *Le plaisir du texte*, 1973 (*The Pleasure of the Text*, 1975). Barthes was originally a follower of Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic theory and would later elaborate on **structuralism** in his own way by discussing the codes within a text, to which he referred as *écriture*; he made a further distinction between the *lisible* and the *scriptible* text.

For Barthes, the all-knowing author is displaced, there being no such thing as certainty about what constitutes the human subject, and the work of interpreting meaning is given over to the reader—ideas expressed in the famous essay “The Death of the Author,” first published in the American journal *Aspen* in 1967. Nietzsche is often cited as the progenitor of the fundamental skepticism about “**truth**” to be found in the work of Barthes and his fellow poststructuralists and whose ideas in turn underpin the “**New Nietzsche**.” Barthes stated that the unreadable text can arouse a specific type of rapture or *jouissance*, a feeling of orgasmic bliss that the reader might experience if he or she abandons him- or herself to an interpretation of the scattered codes of a text; however, Nietzsche’s version of Dionysian *Rausch* (intoxication) is far removed from Barthes’s cerebral concept of *jouissance*.

**BATAILLE, GEORGES (1897–1962).** French librarian, writer, and thinker. Originally a surrealist, Bataille founded the periodical *La Critique Sociale* with the express purpose of translating into action the anger that had fired the surrealists. He went on to found the *Collège de sociologie* during the 1930s. Its aims were not dissimilar to those of the **Frankfurt School**, and indeed **Walter Benjamin** and **Theodor Adorno** were occasional visitors at the bimonthly meetings, which were, however, suspended when World War II began. In January 1937, Bataille, in the political review *Acéphale*, which he co-authored with Jean Wahl and Pierre Klossowski, defended Nietzsche from misappropriation by the **National Socialists**. Nietzsche's philosophy was central to Bataille's thought, though he rejected the notion of the **will to power** in favor of a "will to chance," where evil is viewed as a "break with taboo" and is thus a "liberating agent" (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992). Basing his ideas on his reading of Nietzsche, Bataille argued in favor of sexual excess, declaring the total liberation of man to be characterized by laughter, **dance**, and orgy (in Nietzsche's **Dionysian** sense).

Bataille is perhaps best remembered for his heretical challenge to **Existentialist** orthodoxy when, in 1944, he addressed an audience that included **Jean-Paul Sartre**, **Albert Camus**, Simone de Beauvoir, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the link between freedom and evil as **unmasked** by Nietzsche. Bataille's influential *Sur Nietzsche. Volonté de chance*, 1945 (*On Nietzsche*, 1992) presented Nietzsche as the founder of a new pseudoreligion without a **God** in the sense of a Western theological deity. In his idiosyncratic interpretation, Nietzsche's madness was viewed as a distinct blessing; this view was also shared by others, such as **Isadora Duncan** and **Rudolf Steiner**.

**BAUBÔ.** Female headless figure, with face drawn on abdomen, found on terra-cottas from Priene in ancient **Greece**, and mentioned in orphic verse, where she reputedly lifted her skirt to make Demeter laugh. The lewd gesture enabled Demeter to cast off her grief at the abduction of her daughter Persephone, who had been carried away to the underworld by Pluto. The story of the fecundity rites surrounding the Eleusinian mysteries is told in the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*. What was central to the mystery cult was secrecy, and what Demeter

saw on Baubô's belly can never be known. Nietzsche uses the term Baubô to indicate a **veil** that cannot be lifted, a **truth** that cannot be told. He mentions Baubô twice, in the second preface (section 4) to *The Gay Science*, dated 1886, and in the final section of the epilogue to *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, written in 1888, where the relevant wording is identical. He makes the point that the Greeks externalized their fears in a superficial way that was simultaneously deep: for it is impossible to fully **know** a **metaphysical** truth. Refer to **Sarah Kofman**, "Baubô: Theological Perversion and Fetishism," in M. A. Gillespie and T. B. Strong, *Nietzsche's New Seas* (1988).

**BÄUMER, GERTRUD (1873–1954)**. Leading German **feminist**. As a young woman, Bäumer collaborated with **Helene Lange**, coauthoring with her the five-volume *Handbuch der Frauenbewegung* (1901–1906). Bäumer received her doctorate in 1904. She was coeditor of *Die Frau*, the journal of the *BDF (Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine)*, and she also wrote several historical novels. In her *Die soziale Idee in den Weltanschauungen des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die Grundzüge der modernen Sozialphilosophie (The Social Idea in Nineteenth-Century World Views: The Foundations of Modern Social Philosophy, 1910)*, written as a corrective to the **Marxist** brand of **socialism** that she thought had become predominant in contemporary **Germany**, Bäumer saw Nietzsche as providing an antidote to the competitiveness of American consumerism, though she viewed Nietzsche's subjectivism with suspicion. In her autobiographical work *Lebensweg durch eine Zeitwende (Journey through Life at a Turning Point, 1933)*, Bäumer stated that her book *Die soziale Idee in den Weltanschauungen des 19. Jahrhunderts* was intended to investigate "the building blocks from which could be created the intellectual foundation for a German **National Socialist** state" ("*einem deutschen nationalsozialen Volksstaat*"). The work is divided into three parts: individualistic theories, socialist theories, and syntheses of these. Nietzsche is dealt with in the first part, together with such luminaries as **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**, **Friedrich Schiller**, and leading figures of German **Romanticism**. Bäumer insists on the importance, for Nietzsche, of his **friendships** with "representatives of non-humanist **culture**," **Franz Overbeck** and **Jacob Burckhardt**. After the war, Bäumer, who had collaborated with the National Socialists in



her capacity as leader of the *BDF* (as had all those who were prominent in German organizations after *Gleichschaltung* in 1933), was called on to justify her activities at Nuremberg, though she was not convicted of any crime.

**BELY, ANDREI (1880–1934).** Russian writer and critic. Bely's importance lies in the defining role he played as chief architect for the **symbolist movement** in Russia, which was inspired by Nietzsche's description of **Dionysian** ecstasy and intermingled with the Christology of **Vladimir Soloviev**. In 1889, Bely, then a first-year student at Moscow University, was bowled over with enthusiasm for Nietzsche when he read the recent Russian translations of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *The Birth of Tragedy*. He retained this enthusiasm in spite of reservations about Nietzsche's rejection of **Christianity**; in particular, he responded to Nietzsche's insistence, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, on the regenerative power of **music**. Bely would later appropriate the figure of a Dionysian Christ and incorporate it into his own worldview. In his article "Friedrich Nietzsche" (1908), Bely criticized the idea of **eternal return** as "Nietzsche's Golgotha," the place where Nietzsche stumbled and fell.

Bely himself identified with Nietzsche "in person" to an inordinate degree. Nietzsche's invitation for the individual to harken to his or her instincts needed no repetition among Bely's circle, which included **Dimitri Merezhkovsky**, **Vyacheslav Ivanov**, and **Alexander Blok**, though Bely himself did not share Ivanov's full-blooded eroticism: indeed, he verged on the ascetic. A collaborator with Valery Briusov on the journal *Vesy* (*The Balance*, 1904–1909), Bely was a patriot who wished to see a reformed Russian culture that would comprise "freedom, beauty and love" (Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, ed., *Nietzsche and Soviet Culture*, 1994).

Bely first investigated anthroposophy in 1912 and spent the years 1914–1916 with **Rudolf Steiner** in Switzerland, returning to a Russia in the grip of revolution. His tour de force, the novel *Peterburg*, 1913 (*St. Petersburg*, 1957), and his (less innovative) poetry earned him international renown. In his last years he continued to write his memoirs, following the influential *Vospominaniya o Bloke* (*Reminiscences of Blok*, 1922), and literary criticism, as in his major study of Nicolai Gogol, *Masterstvo Gogolya* (1929).

**BENDA, JULIEN (1867–1956).** French-**Jewish** writer and editor of *Les Cahiers des Onzaine* (1910–1914). In his renowned text *La Trahison des Clercs, 1927 (Treason of the Intellectuals, 1928)*, Benda attacked Nietzsche, **Henri Bergson**, and **Georges Sorel** for what he saw as their incitement to bellicosity through their “cult of the warlike instinct” and through their comments on the necessity of violence. More generally in this work, Benda attacked the establishment intellectuals who had abandoned absolute values in order to back the war effort, though his chief criticism was actually directed at Bergson. Benda’s last book, *La Grande Épreuve des démocraties (The Great Test of Democracies)*, was smuggled to New York from Nazi-occupied Paris and appeared in 1942.

**BENJAMIN, WALTER (1892–1940).** German literary theorist and critic. In Berlin, Benjamin associated with **Theodor Adorno**, **Georg Lukács**, and **Ernst Bloch** and became a **Marxist** and member of the **Frankfurt School**. Although sharing the general appreciation of the Frankfurt School toward Nietzsche’s **perspectivism**, Benjamin gradually became critical of Nietzsche’s work, but he defended Nietzsche against the liberties taken at the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. On 18 March 1932, he published an article in *Die Literarische Welt* titled “*Nietzsche und das Archiv seiner Schwester*” (“Nietzsche and His Sister’s Archive”). This was simultaneously an appreciation of two works by Erich Podach, *Nietzsche’s Zusammenbruch (Nietzsche’s Collapse, 1930)* and *Gestalten um Nietzsche (People Close to Nietzsche, 1932)*, and a bitter attack on the activities of the archive under **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**. The article stated, “Nietzsche was worlds apart from the bureaucratic philistinism dominant in the *Nietzsche-Archiv*.” Benjamin, who was greatly influenced by the Jewish thinker Gershom Scholem, emigrated to France in 1933. In fear of deportation in 1940, he headed south but was stopped at the Spanish border, where he committed suicide.

**BENN, GOTTFRIED (1886–1956).** Leading German poet. Benn survived two world wars, during both of which he was active as a trained army doctor. Well before his brief, if intense, flirtation with **National Socialism**, Benn had developed a cynical form of “**nihilistic aestheticism**” in which any topic was deemed ripe for treatment. In spite of

the **Dionysian** intoxication of some of his early poems, Benn did not truly come to grips with Nietzsche's thought until the 1930s, first in essays and then in his poetry. In the essay "*Rede auf Heinrich Mann*" ("Talk on Heinrich Mann," 1931), Benn quotes Nietzsche's words on **art** as "the real task of **life** . . . life's *metaphysical* activity" (*WP*, III: 853), and in his essay "*Lebensweg eines Intellektualisten*" ("An Intellectual's Journey through Life," 1934), Benn again speaks of Nietzsche's "artistic gospel," which gives art the function of a "final metaphysical activity." Benn thus tried to differentiate between his own historical **pessimism** and Nietzsche's historical optimism; he was not interested in Nietzsche's critique of **Christianity** and indeed, as an artist, found moral questions suspect.

Benn thus wilfully ignored Nietzsche's true position in the history of **nihilism**, praising Nietzsche only as a critic of **culture**. In particular, Benn was a real admirer of Nietzsche's skill as "wordsmith," calling him "the greatest linguist since **Luther**" in a lecture delivered in 1952. In the essay "*Nietzsche nach 50 Jahren*" (1950), Benn singles out the theme of **suffering** to make it emblematic of destiny: he argues that the suffering Nietzsche was a representative of the decline of Western culture and as such bore traces of the ancient **tragic** hero. Although the tendency in this essay is to explain Nietzsche away as an ideal ("a dream"), Benn also points out that Nietzsche was not responsible for the use made of his ideas by unscrupulous politicians in the Third Reich.

During his long lifetime, Benn published many poems, the most famous collections being *Morgue* (1912), *Trunkene Flut* (*Drunken Flood*, 1949), and *Fragmente. Neue Gedichte* (1951); his stories display the same realism as his poems. Refer to Ursula Wirtz, *Die Sprachkultur Gottfried Benns. Ein Vergleich mit Nietzsche* (*Gottfried Benn's Use of Language: A Comparison with Nietzsche*, 1972).

**BERG, LEO (1862–1908)**. British writer. As a founding member of the group *Durch* and leading theorist of the **naturalist movement**, Berg's devotion to Nietzsche was almost fanatical. He wrote one of the earliest appreciations of Nietzsche's work in 1889 ("*Friedrich Nietzsche Studie*"), which appeared in the journal *Deutschland*. Here, Berg speaks of the sovereign precision with which Nietzsche, "the greatest virtuoso in the German language," is able to render his ideas

focused and intelligible. In *Der Übermensch in der Literatur*, 1897 (*The Superman in Modern Literature*, 1916), Berg was dismissive of the tendency of writers during the 1890s to render Nietzsche's thought superficial and banal by making everything "**Zarathustran**." His concept of the **Übermensch** was a masterful male in power over the **Untermensch**, and any literary form of the **Übermensch** that did not match up to this model was rejected. Berg himself, however, cannot avoid being labeled tendentious in view of his misogynist pronouncements (which he considered thoroughly Nietzschean). With the hero of *By the Open Sea* by **August Strindberg** in mind, Berg describes Nietzsche's **Übermensch** as "a piece of intelligence turned into nature," whereas the **Überweib** (a term coined with impunity by Berg himself) would remain as "a piece of nature humanized." In his book *Geschlechter (Sexes)*, 1906, Berg gives an acerbic account of the relationship between the sexes, love being—according to Nietzsche, whom he quotes selectively—founded on "primeval hate," so that **marriage** and family life represent an accommodation with the instincts in the interest of the community.

**BERGSON, HENRI (1859–1941)**. French philosopher who lived, worked, and died in Paris, apart from when he was on diplomatic missions to Spain and America from 1912 to 1918. Bergson taught in lycées from 1881 to 1897, at the *École Normale Supérieure* from 1897 to 1900, and at the *Collège de France* from 1900 to 1914. During the first decades of the 20th century, he became the establishment philosopher in France and was regarded as superior to Nietzsche as a philosopher.

In his most famous work, *L'Évolution Créatrice*, 1907 (*Creative Evolution*, 1911), Bergson outlined the principle of élan vital. This owed much to his reading of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where the sun imagery, coupled with the description of the **will to power** as being present in all **life**, find echoes in Bergson's own brand of vitalism. He posited that solar energy was stored in every living organism, to be released in a series of small explosions governed by the will. These constant explosions of irradiated particles are so imperceptible that the impression is one of constant flux: "life is unceasing creation." The faculty that can perceive this pulsating flow of cosmic life is intuition. Élan vital has some affinity with

Nietzsche's theory of **eternal return** in that Bergson, albeit writing from a postrelativity standpoint (Albert Einstein's theory having been published in 1905), attempted to account for time by describing the manner in which the future draws the past after it. To illustrate his point, Bergson gave the famous example of a snowball gathering matter as it hurtles downhill: "My mental state, as it progresses down the road of time, continually swells with the duration it accumulates." Bergson's remark echoes Nietzsche insight, in *The Gay Science*, that accumulated experiences will always prevent us from seeing reality "as it is" (*GS*, II: 57).

Bergson's chief endeavor—and one that was truly Nietzschean—was to reject mechanical and deterministic accounts of evolution. Life itself is a current sent through matter, so that "there are no things, only actions." The intellect is not denied: memory acts as mediator between the intellect and the irrational flow of life. In contrast, Nietzsche wrote with an essentially Newtonian view of physics. Certainly, Bergson's attempt to marry physics with **metaphysics** gave his *élan vital* a certain scientific respectability that is lacking in *Lebensphilosophie*. Although attacked by **Julien Benda** as an irrationalist, Bergson was actually a forerunner of **Existentialism** in his aim "to show that rationality can only be understood when referred to its dynamic, concrete source in experience and action" (I. W. Alexander, *Penguin Companion to Literature*, 1969). Bergson's other major works are *Matière et mémoire*, 1896 (*Matter and Memory*, 1911), and *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, 1932 (*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, 1935).

**BERNOULLI, CARL ALBRECHT (1868–1937)**. Professor of church history at Basel University. A former theology student of **Franz Overbeck** and executor of the latter's will, Bernoulli became something of a cause célèbre when he published his two-volume *Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche. Eine Freundschaft* (*Franz Overbeck and Friedrich Nietzsche: A Friendship*) in 1907–1908. Overbeck, who had died in 1905, had left his correspondence, including the letters he had received from Nietzsche, to Basel University—a priceless treasure that **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** regarded as the rightful property of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. In addition, the correspondence contained remarks that disparaged Elisabeth; she therefore had a

vested interest in preventing publication. Volume 1 of the correspondence had been brought out in 1907, and volume 2 was ready in January 1908, but publication was delayed because Bernoulli and Ida Overbeck resisted the pressure to hand over the letters until Elisabeth won a lawsuit against them, effectively depriving Bernoulli of a good deal of the text for his publication. Finally, in September 1908, Diederichs published the second volume of the correspondence with the relevant sections inked out or, in another edition, left blank. This blatant evidence of censorship gave Bernoulli the moral victory in the affair.

**BERTRAM, ERNST (1884–1957).** German scholar, teacher, and writer. Bertram was a member of the circle around **Stefan George** and was instrumental in causing German interest in Nietzsche to swing to the right from 1918 until the end of the Third Reich. In his acclaimed *Nietzsche. Versuch einer Mythologie* (*Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology*, 1918), which went into seven editions between 1918 and 1927, Bertram systematically claimed Nietzsche as the spiritual incarnation of “**Germanness**,” referring to his *Überdeutschtum* and placing him at the center of a myth about the psychic existence of the German people. Myth, Bertram claimed, had more validity than historical fact. He described Nietzsche as riven by a conflict within himself that gave rise to his subsequent campaigns against **Richard Wagner**, **Arthur Schopenhauer**, **Romanticism**, and **Christianity**. Bertram claimed these as the *roots* for Nietzsche’s ideas, however much he tried to pretend to himself that he had an affinity with **Greece**, Italy, and the Classical South: “Just as he mostly found himself in **Heraclitus**, the essence of the Germans could be found in Heraclitan flux, which meant he could discover the essence of the Germans in himself.” And thus he could meet up with the minds of **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**, **Friedrich Hölderlin**, and **Martin Luther** again. Bertram explains away Nietzsche’s hatred of the Germans as “a manifestation of his asceticism,” psychologically on a par with his hatred of Christianity, Wagner’s music, and **Socratic Platonism**. Nietzsche could not escape his inheritance of Nordic **Pietism**, hence his need to adopt a **mask** behind which he withdrew into madness.

Bertram’s book on Nietzsche found a resonance with **Thomas Mann**, who had touched on similar thoughts in his *Betrachtungen*

*eines Unpolitischen*, 1918 (*Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, 1983), and the two men were close colleagues in the early 1920s but went separate ways after World War I, with Mann diverting his attention to the ailing Weimar Republic and Bertram turning to the right in politics. After World War II, Bertram was investigated for his involvement with **National Socialism**, the chief cause of suspicion being that he had written a book on Nietzsche, who was regarded with deep mistrust by the occupying powers. The fault lay not with Nietzsche, however, but with Bertram's "*völkisch* appropriation of Nietzsche and his transfiguration into a Germanic right-wing prophet" (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992). Refer to Inge Jens, ed., *Thomas Mann und Ernst Bertram: Briefe aus den Jahren 1910–1955* (1960). See also VOLK.

**BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (JENSEITS VON GUT UND BÖSE, 1886)**. Subtitled *Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, Beyond Good and Evil* contains Nietzsche's full-scale attack on **socialism**, **democracy**, and **feminism** as well as his claim to be a good **European** in the **cultural** rather than the political sense. Nietzsche's rhetoric is directed against the cultural degeneration of his day, but he first attacks the Stoics for their wrong-headed "love of truth," which actually amounts to self-tyranny and is, unlike all claims made by the Stoics, against **nature**. Stoical practice is also a manifestation of the **will to power**, for "philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power . . ." (*BGE*, I: 9). Further mentions of the will to power stress its efficiency as a **force** (*BGE*, II: 36) and highlight its capacity to "play the master," whether in the Stoics' "indifference and statuesque coldness towards the passionate folly of the emotions" or in the reduction of emotion to the average mean, "the Aristotelianism of morals" (*BGE*, V: 198). Nietzsche berates philosophers for hiding behind "**masks** and subtlety" (*BGE*, II: 25) to generate misunderstanding. A person who cannot be direct in his dealings builds up a mask that is then projected by others back onto his persona. A central purpose for Nietzsche in this work is to establish how seriously philosophers have mistaken what is "true." We are nothing but our memory and our mental states, combined with the society to which we belong. **Perspectivism**, with Nietzsche, always has this dimension of an assumed **historical** and cultural context.

Some of the passages in this work are notoriously misogynist. From his opening words in the preface, “Supposing **truth** to be a **woman** . . .” (*BGE*: preface), Nietzsche provokes his reader into a debate on **feminism**, attacking the **eternal feminine** and woman’s incapacity for truth: “—her great art is the lie, her supreme concern is appearance and beauty” (*BGE*, VII: 232). Oriental seclusion is Nietzsche’s answer to women’s demand for equal rights (*BGE*, VII: 238/9). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche constantly challenges accepted values, like those enshrined in the terms “good” and “evil.” He highlights the fact that in **slave** and **master morality**, values are reversed: in slave morality, those who are evil inspire fear; in master morality, those who are good inspire fear, while the bad man “is judged contemptible” (*BGE*, IX: 260). Nietzsche condemns the best efforts of English **utilitarians** (commonly viewed as well-meaning) for producing “European vulgarity, the plebianism of modern ideas” (*BGE*, VIII: 253), while in France, those with taste reject “the raving stupidity and the noisy yapping of the democratic bourgeois” (*BGE*, VIII: 254). Today, the word “**democratic**” is so overlaid with merit that Nietzsche would scarcely recognize it. For Nietzsche, democracy heralded a weakening of civilization and signaled a decline in the political organization of the state and in man himself. The result was the “*collective degeneration of man*” (*BGE*, V: 203; italics in the original). He praises the **Jews** for keeping their race strong and pure “by means of virtues which one would like to stamp as vices” (*BGE*, VIII: 251)—that is, by resistance to change. Nietzsche believed that we have reached an impasse: the only way to go beyond **nihilism** is to create new **values** that reach beyond the false or simplistic categories of good and evil.

**THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY (DIE GEBURT DER TRAGÖDIE, 1872).** Nietzsche’s first work of note. Originally subtitled *Out of the Spirit of Music*, Nietzsche altered the title to *The Birth of Tragedy Or: Hellenism and Pessimism* in 1886. Although some have viewed this as Nietzsche’s best work, it aroused bitter controversy when it was first published. **Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff** produced a devastating critique that **Erwin Rohde** attempted to refute. Nietzsche wrote *The Birth of Tragedy* at a time when he was most under the spell of **Arthur Schopenhauer** and **Richard Wagner**.



R. J. Hollingdale comments, “The Wagnerian-Schopenhauerian outlook dominates Nietzsche’s first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, which begins as a study of the **Greeks** and ends as a polemic for Wagnerian opera” (R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy*, 1999). Nietzsche had heard a performance of the introduction to *Tristan and Isolde* in Munich in 1865 and had been struck by Wagner’s use of dissonance to reflect in **music** the chaos and pain of reality. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche seeks to distinguish between two modes of experiencing **aesthetics**. The **Apollonian** is the calm state of lightness and clarity that we experience in certain lucid dreamlike states. It is expressed in Greek sculpture, epic poetry, and Doric architecture—any art form that requires formal control coupled with lightness of feeling. The **Dionysian**, associated from the first page with the art of music, is the state of wild intoxication in which we gain mystical insight into the unified source of all being. Schopenhauer thought music was a **symbol** of the will and could not be represented, but Nietzsche was sure that it could and should, as a necessary part of its manifestation. Music quintessentially represents the *Urgund*, as it is an art that can exist only through performance. Whereas Apollo’s music, set to the lyre, needs words and is thus an imitation of the original, Dionysian music springs from a deep instinctual original base (“*das Ur-Eine*”) that incorporates change and flux as well as the flow of **life**. Here, man can experience *Rausch*:

In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his **symbolic** faculties; something never before experienced struggles for utterance—the annihilation of the **veil** of *maya*, oneness as the soul of the race and of **nature** itself. (*BT*, 2)

Nietzsche established that Dionysian man should recognize within himself the primeval impulses that make him human, however licentious or “immoral” these appear to be on the surface. At some point, he argues, Dionysian abandonment, embracing both ecstasy and cruelty, was supplanted by Apollonian restraint: the ancient Greeks respected their gods and made religion and aesthetics part of their cultural norm, internalizing much of the dynamism that accompanied the dichotomy between Apollo and Dionysus. For Nietzsche at that time, dynamism meant contest, as he set out in an essay written at this time, *Homer’s Contest*. Greek culture had reached its pinnacle in the

**tragedies** that marked the annual public celebration of Dionysus. He believed that Dionysus continued to be the only hero in drama right through to the plays of Euripides, at which point a new **rationalism** emerged, inspired by **Socrates**. In fact, Nietzsche blamed Socrates for the extinction of attic **Greek tragedy**, at its zenith in the work of Aeschylus and his peers, who combined the Apollonian and the Dionysian to the highest degree: Apollonian elements of dialogue and character portrayal are set against a fundamentally Dionysian state of primeval being. In 1886, Nietzsche added an “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” as a preface to the book, where he admitted that he had not used his own **language** sufficiently and that it had been a mistake to bring in Wagner and modern themes.

As regards reception, *The Birth of Tragedy* undoubtedly damaged Nietzsche’s career. He was meant to be an expert on philology; his colleagues expected scholarship from him, not intuition. The book became immensely popular only around the fin de siècle, when it coincided with the rise of the **sexuality** debates and the publication of **Sigmund Freud**’s first book, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900). On its own terms, *The Birth of Tragedy* fails, as the dichotomy between Dionysus and Apollo is not convincing; indeed, in his later work, Nietzsche jettisoned Apollo or, rather, merged his creative function into that of Dionysus. From his comments in the *Will to Power*, it is clear that Nietzsche recognized this and belatedly tried to rationalize his procedure:

I was concerned with nothing except to guess why precisely Apollinism [*sic*] had to grow out of a Dionysian subsoil; why the Dionysian Greek needed to become Apollinian; that is, to break his will to the terrible, multifarious, uncertain, frightful, upon a will to measure, to simplicity, to submission to rule and concept. (*WP*, IV: 1050)

Refer to Karlfried Gründer, *Der Streit um Nietzsches “Geburt der Tragödie”* (*The Quarrel over Nietzsche’s “Birth of Tragedy,”* 1989).

**BISMARCK, OTTO VON (1815–1898)**. German statesman. From the Junker class, Bismarck was appointed prime minister of Prussia by King William I in 1862. From then on, it became his mission to detach Prussian interests from those of the unwieldy but hegemonic Austro-Hungarian Empire; this was engineered by means of the short-lived

Austro-Prussian conflict of 1866, a decisive victory for Prussia, which annexed the German states that had been on the side of Austria. In 1870, a dispute with Napoleon III gave Bismarck another chance for a predatory campaign, this time with France; Nietzsche was called to serve his country in this war, which Prussia won. The four southern states of Germany now joined the North German Federation, so that the solution of *Kleindeutschland*, a “compact” Germany without Austria and under Prussian leadership, first mooted after the 1848 Revolution, was now a *fait accompli*. Bismarck aligned himself with the national liberals to found the Second Reich in 1871, of which he became chancellor until he was unseated in 1890.

Nietzsche had at first welcomed the new Reich but soon came to have deep contempt for Bismarck, even though, like Nietzsche, he was opposed to **socialism** and anarchy. Germany was under an autocratic administration, and the Junker class was overwhelmingly powerful. The laws of the country were still those enshrined in Prussian law in 1794; Germany would wait until 1900 for a new civil code. Nietzsche disapproved of the changes that Bismarck wanted to push through, especially **educational** reform, where the teaching of classical languages was under pressure. He disliked nationalistic jingoism, encapsulated in the refrain, “*Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles,*” and did not want to hear discussions about politics, **democracy**, and so on, though his objections were **aesthetic** rather than political. For all his war rhetoric, Nietzsche disapproved of Bismarck’s militarism, which was backed by a flourishing armaments industry as part of a new and rapid industrialization. As with the rest of **Europe, German culture**—Nietzsche argued—was in rapid decline. He regarded Bismarck as a man incapable of philosophical thought, for all his ruthless “Machiavellianism” and “his so-called *Realpolitik*” (*GS*, V: “We Fearless Ones,” 357).

**BLANCHOT, MAURICE (1907–2003).** French writer and critic. Blanchot’s fascination for **language** coincided with his effort to express “absence” and influenced a generation of practitioners of the *nouveau roman*. His early novels include *Thomas l’obscur* (1941), *Aminadab* (1942), and *Le Très-Haut* (*The Most High*, 1948). He also wrote numerous essays on the practice of writing. Himself deeply influenced by **Jean-Paul Sartre**, Blanchot tried to salvage Nietzsche’s

position within **Existentialism** by emphasizing that man's "negative weakness"—his fundamental dissatisfaction with the world—is linked to the central **affirmation** of the death of **God**. Blanchot argued that **nihilism** is tied to being, not nothingness; eternal return "affirms that the extreme point of Nihilism is precisely where it is reversed, that Nihilism is reversal itself: it is the affirmation that, in passing from the *no* to the *yes*, refutes nihilism . . ." (*L'Entretien infini*, 1969 [*The Infinite Conversation*, 1992]; excerpted in *The New Nietzsche*, 1977). See also ROYEAUMONT.

**DER BLAUE REITER (THE BLUE RIDER)**. Artistic group in Munich, active from 1911 to 1914 and much influenced in every direction by Nietzsche. The group was led by Wassily Kandinsky and Alexej Jawlensky and their respective partners at that time, Gabriele Münter and Marianne Werefkin. Other members included Franz Marc and his wife Maria, August Macke, Elisabeth Epstein, and Natalia Goncharova. Kandinsky's seminal tract, *Über das Geistige in der Kunst*, 1911 (*Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, 1977), refers to Nietzsche by name as having shaken **science** and **moral-ity** through his observations on *Geist*. Kandinsky argued that the painter must paint what he sees in his inner vision, and to that end he commended Madame Blavatsky as having recognized the value of primitivism. The painters in the group chose strong primary colors and tried to convey instinctual feelings. Although many influences came together—clearly, that of the Fauves in France must be acknowledged—Nietzsche's invitation for the old tablets to be broken inspired a wealth of innovatory work within the group. The *Blaue Reiter Almanac* of 1912 was on sale at the *Sonderbund* exhibition in Cologne in that year. This contained Kandinsky's synesthetic *Der gelbe Klang* (*The Yellow Sound*).

**BLOCH, ERNST (1885–1977)**. German philosopher. Bloch thought that **art**, **music**, and poetry constituted the potential for human fulfillment. During the 1920s, as a freelance writer in Berlin, Bloch associated with members of the **Frankfurt School**. He was friendly with **Walter Benjamin**, **Georg Lukács**, Bertolt Brecht, and Kurt Weill. He spent the years 1933–1949 in exile (from 1938 in America). On his return to Germany, he held the post of professor of philosophy at

the University of Leipzig until he fell out of favor with the authorities. He subsequently became professor of philosophy at Tübingen.

Bloch's interest in Nietzsche predated his interest in **Karl Marx**. His first writing on Nietzsche was the essay "*Über das Problem Nietzsche*" (1906), a topic to which he returned in 1935, though with a different stance, with Nietzsche no longer seen as offering utopian hope in his attack on the Wilhelmines. In his essay "*Der Impuls Nietzsche*" (1913), Bloch recognized the importance that Nietzsche had in providing thinkers with a viewpoint that forced a new confrontation with former certainties. Nietzsche's personal struggle against the exact **sciences** that dictate a non-**Dionysian**, dreamless and "correct" world, as witnessed by his whole oeuvre, impressed Bloch so greatly that the whole of his later philosophy was affected, including his Marxism. The 1913 essay excluded mention of the **will to power** and **eternal return**, aspects of Nietzsche's thought that Bloch denigrated in his *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*, 1935 (*Heritage of Our Time*, 1991).

For the rest of his life, Bloch continued to have a bifurcated approach to Nietzsche (in itself, all of a piece with the concept of critical theory). He saw Nietzsche as one of a series of 19th-century philosophers who brought disaster in their wake but also acknowledged "the other Nietzsche" who renewed philosophy and whose riven personality was ipso facto dialectic—and who, like Bloch himself, loved music above all the other arts.

**BLOK, ALEXANDER (1880–1921)**. Russian lyrical poet and man of letters. As the determining spirit of the **symbolist movement** in Russia, Blok was greatly influenced by Nietzsche, about whom he must have heard when he studied philology at St. Petersburg around the turn of the century; at all events, he came to Nietzsche in earnest in 1906 when he studied *The Birth of Tragedy* with his friend **Andrei Bely**. This text was crucial in the development of both men, though they were also deeply influenced by **Vladimir Soloviev**. Blok's early collection of poetry, *Stikhi o prekrasnoy dame* (*Verses about the Beautiful Lady*, 1904), which is characteristically confessional, was written when he first fell in love with Lyubov' Mendeleyeva, whom he married in 1903. The verses proclaim the pure worship of the Virgin or Mysterious Star, and their cultish matriarchal esotericism echoes Soloviev's "incorruptible eternal feminine." Thus, a new wave of

Russian symbolism was constituted, comprising chiefly Blok, Bely, and **Vyacheslov Ivanov** and manifesting a mystical Christian eroticism that also combined a **Dionysian** appreciation of **music**.

For Blok, full of prescience about coming disasters, events came with a musical accompaniment: he was haunted by noises announcing the end of the world. Although he welcomed the 1905 Revolution and was disappointed by its failure, his stance on events in 1917 was fundamentally apocalyptic. There is an underlying sadness in his farcical first play, *Balaganchik (The Puppet Show)*, published in the journal *Torches* in April 1906 and first performed in St. Petersburg in December that same year. The production, staged by Vsevolod Meyerhold, was greeted with a mixed reception, the tragedy of Pierrot and Columbine containing rather too many allusions to the eternal triangle of Blok, his wife, and Bely for comfort. Blok's tragic view of life was confirmed by journeys to Italy (1909), Brittany (1911), and Biarritz (1913). He took a savage pleasure in hearing of the sinking of the *Titanic*, finding it reassuring that the chaotic elements were able to assert their control over rational man. In a final talk on the mission of the poet given in 1921, he stated that the poet should stand at the seashore or in the depth of a forest to listen to the sounds that emanate from chaotic nature. He should then find a harmonious way of imparting these sounds amongst men. Blok's "swan song" thus pays indirect homage to Nietzsche by stressing the need for **art** to mediate between two types of music, the Dionysian and the **Apolonian**. Refer to Raoul Labon, "Alexandre Blok et Nietzsche," *Revue d'études slaves* 27 (1951).

**THE BLOND BEAST (DIE BLONDE BESTIE)**. Nietzsche used this image in two works: four times in *On the Genealogy of Morality* and once in *Twilight of the Idols*. It is by no means a recurrent **metaphor** for Teutonic belligerence; in fact, the contrary is true, as the passages written by Nietzsche make plain. In section 1 of the first essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, the phrase is used three times to represent rapacious but natural man of the noble type familiar to the ancient **Greeks**:

At the centre of all these noble races we cannot fail to see the beast of prey, the magnificent *blond beast* avidly prowling round for spoil and victory; this hidden centre needs release from time to time, the beast

must out again, must return to the wild:—Roman, Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings—in this relationship they were all alike. . . . The deep and icy mistrust which the German arouses as soon as he comes to power, which we see even today—is still the aftermath of that inextinguishable horror with which Europe viewed the raging of the blond Germanic beast for centuries. . . . We may be quite justified in retaining our fear of the blond beast at the centre of every noble race and remain on our guard: but who would not, a hundred times over, prefer to fear if he can admire at the same time, rather than *not* fear, but permanently retain the disgusting spectacle of the failed, the stunted, the wasted away and the poisoned? (*OGM*, I: 11)

In the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche uses the phrase once more to describe how the oldest form of “state” emerged from tyranny:

I used the word “state”: it is obvious what is meant by this—some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and a master race, which, organized on a war footing and with the power to organize, unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws on a populace . . . (*OGM*, II: 17)

Returning to the concept once more in his late work, Nietzsche commented that the Church was responsible for emasculating the Germanic nobility:

In the early Middle Ages, when the Church was in fact above all a menagerie, one everywhere hunted down the fairest specimens of the “blond beast”—one “improved,” for example, the noble Teutons. But what did such a Teuton afterwards look like when he had been “improved” and led into a monastery? Like a caricature of a human being, like an abortion . . . (*TI*: “The ‘Improvers’ of Mankind”: 2)

Although not everyone would agree with Nietzsche that “*not* to fear” is a hideous sign of *décadence*, his remarks clearly lament modern man’s lack of fire in his belly; they certainly do not support the interpretation that Nietzsche approved of a racially superior blond and blue-eyed type, the corruption peddled by the **National Socialists** along with their general misappropriation of Nietzsche’s concept of the **will to power**. In fact, the blondness of the beast harks back to Zarathustra’s lion. That said, Nietzsche scholars often find that their first task is to correct the widespread but erroneous impression that Nietzsche’s works directly incite violence and **war**, led on by the slogan of the “blond beast.” *See also* ANIMALS.

**THE BLUE RIDER.** *See DER BLAUE REITER.*

**BODY.** Nietzsche's chief objection to the **ascetic ideal** was that it taught man to despise his own body. Philosophers have nearly always followed the example of the **ascetic priest** in living a desensitized **life**. Nietzsche resolutely refused to accept the split of body from mind propounded by **René Descartes**, and, in his early works at least, he tried to adhere to the notion that consciousness always has a physiological explanation and is in any case a sign of decline, not advance, in man: "To *have* to combat one's instincts—that is the formula for **décadence**: as long as life is *ascending*, happiness and instinct are one" (*TI*, "The Problem of Socrates": 11). In his later works, Nietzsche's emphasis on **perspectivism** led him to deny the stability of the subject. In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche makes "the body and physiology the starting point" (*WP*, III: 492) for a reconnoiter of the subject. *See also* DRIVE; NATURE/NATURAL.

**BÖLSCHKE, WILHELM (1861–1939).** German biologist. Bölsche, who mixed with the circle around **Richard Dehmel** in Berlin, took an early critical stance toward Nietzsche in his hostile article "*Die Gefahren der Nietzscheschen Philosophie*" ("The Dangers of the Nietzschean Philosophy"), which appeared in *Die freie Bühne* (1893). In his seminal work *Das Liebesleben in der Natur (Love-Life in Nature)*, 1898–1901, Bölsche argues for the interconnection of all living things, regarding propagation of even the humblest cellular structures as "love," and therefore the hope of the planet. His work influenced the thinking of **Lou Andreas-Salomé** in her discussions of female **sexuality**, especially the notion that "evolution is optimism" (Angela Livingstone, *Lou Andreas Salomé*, 1984). For Bölsche, whose other major work was *Die naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Poesie (The Scientific Bases of Poetry)*, 1887, Nietzsche's antipositivism was a cardinal error. Although Bölsche was rigorously positivistic in his approach, he agreed with the **Darwinist** scientist **Ernst Haeckel** that each cell might have a psychic capacity and therefore that there is an unknowable world behind the one that the scientist discovers.

**BORGES, JORGE LUIS (1899–1986).** Argentinian writer. Borges is famed for his short stories, such as the collection *Ficciones* (1962;



trans. 1962). His approach to Nietzsche centered on interpretations of **eternal return**. In an article titled “*El propósito de Zarathustra*” (“The Significance of **Zarathustra**”) in *La Nación* (15 October 1944), Borges suggested that Nietzsche wished to found a new religion with his theory, but in a later critique, in *Historia de la eternidad* (*History of Eternity*, 1953), he gave an explanation of eternal return based on mathematics and physics; the net result is that the physical foundation of the **metaphor** is highlighted, though the religious dimension is not lost from sight. However, Borges, a thorough scholar of Nietzsche, brought his own negatively ironic stance into any discussion of Nietzsche’s ideas. His speculations about man’s absolute freedom in a universe without a **God**, where **life** is a game, owe much to **Jean-Paul Sartre**.

**BORGIA, CESARE.** *See* RENAISSANCE; WAR.

**BOSCOVICH, RUGGERO GUISEPPE (1711–1787).** Dalmatian-born astronomer and mathematician. A Jesuit from humble beginnings, Boscovich became professor of mathematics at the collegium Romanum, Rome, in 1740. He wrote his main work, *Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis* (*A Theory of Natural Philosophy*), in 1758. Boscovich pioneered “geodesy” (the study of the size and shape of the earth), but Nietzsche was interested in his theory of the atom. Boscovitch held that we can know atoms through the mind as point-centers of **force** that are surrounded by alternating fields of attraction and repulsion. He tried to account for all known physical effects as the action “at a distance” of these atomic point-particles, setting up dynamic centers of force. Nietzsche, mistaking the centers of force for particles of matter infused with some kind of power, thought this was as much a breakthrough in science as that of Copernicus when he discovered that the world does not stand still: “Boscovich taught us to abjure belief in the last thing of earth that ‘stood firm,’ belief in ‘substance,’ in ‘matter,’ in the earth-residuum and particle atom” (*BGE*, I: 12). *See also* WILL TO POWER.

**BRANDES, GEORG (1842–1927).** Danish writer and academic. Brandes lectured in literature at Copenhagen University, having been first a journalist. From 1877 to 1883, he lived in Berlin, where he met

**Paul Rée** and **Lou Andreas-Salomé** in 1882–1883. Brandes was the first academic to bring Nietzsche into the public domain with two public lectures in Copenhagen in April 1888; these lectures appeared in the *Deutsche Rundschau* in 1890 as an article titled “*Friedrich Nietzsche. En Afhandling om aristokratisk Radikalisme*” (“*Friedrich Nietzsche: A Discussion of Aristocratic Radicalism*”), placing Brandes, along with **Ola Hansson** and **Paul Ernst**, among the first to provide a critique of Nietzsche’s thought. In this short article, Brandes states that critics usually place the strong hero in one of two categories: either that of Brutus or Caesar; they then proceed to praise Brutus. Brandes declares, “No writer has praised Caesar.” None, that is, until Nietzsche.

Brandes had begun a correspondence with Nietzsche on 26 November 1887, having received a complimentary copy of *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Through Brandes, Nietzsche began a correspondence with **August Strindberg**. Nietzsche’s letter to Brandes of 10 April 1888, written from Turin, provided Brandes with a *Vita* in which Nietzsche suggested that he was of Polish descent, though no corroborative evidence for this has been found.

Brandes remained indefatigable in making propaganda for Nietzsche, visiting London several times in the 1890s and delivering lectures there in November and December 1913, published in 1914 in book form as the highly influential *Friedrich Nietzsche* in English (which contained the now famous essay “Aristocratic Radicalism”). Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** deplored Nietzsche’s contact with **Jewish** “riff-raff” (*Gesinde*) such as Brandes, as Nietzsche angrily relayed to **Franz Overbeck** in a letter written at Christmas 1888, just before his mental collapse. Ironically, **Max Nordau** deplored the fact that a fellow Jew like Brandes could be so taken with Nietzsche’s ideas.

**BRAUN, LILY (1865–1916)**. From an aristocratic background, Lily Braun alienated her family (who subsequently disinherited her) through her Nietzschean-inspired insistence on ignoring social convention in order to live her own life. This meant rejecting the social rules regarding a good match and rejecting the politics of her class—she became a radical Social Democrat. However, her fellow **socialists** (in particular Clara Zetkin) tended to mistrust her creden-

tials and, with **Karl Marx** as their model, remained unimpressed by her openness on **sexual** matters. According to Alfred Meyer, Braun “came to Marx through Nietzsche,” further alienating her colleagues in the party by advocating “a society of superior beings and a rejection of equality, uniformity and of unrelieved collectivity” (Alfred G. Meyer, *The Feminism and Socialism of Lily Braun*, 1985). Braun herself attributed her sexual freedom to Nietzsche, whose critique of **Christianity** enabled her to reject the Christian principles with which she had been brought up. She made her most direct statement that Nietzsche’s philosophy provided the basis for socialist ethics in her autobiographical *Memoiren einer Sozialistin* (1908–1911). Her most important **feminist** work is *Die Frauenfrage* (*The Woman Question*, 1901).

**BREEDING.** See *ZUCHT*.

**DIE BRÜCKE (THE BRIDGE).** Artistic community based in Dresden from 1905 to 1913, comprising Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Erich Heckel, Karl Schmidt-Rottluff, Fritz Bleyl, and later Emil Nolde, all of whom employed the distortions and abstractions that would soon be seen as the hallmark of **Expressionism**, though the typical angularity of the latter did not emerge in their work until late 1909. Woodcuts were the preferred method of composition and often, as with Kirchner and Nolde, depicted scenes of abandoned dancing, inspired by fauvist primitivism in conjunction with **Dionysian** ecstasy. The group was immensely influenced by Nietzsche’s stress on the importance of the instincts and his call for a **revaluation of values**. Their sense of community was their strength and ultimate downfall: they held group readings of Walt Whitman, **August Strindberg**, and **Frank Wedekind**, as well as Nietzsche, and admired Paul Gauguin; they chose common (often erotic) themes and went on excursions together with their respective partners. Ultimately, however, their relationships militated against their individual artistic endeavors.

**BUBER, MARTIN (1878–1965).** German-**Jewish** religious philosopher born in Vienna. In his youth, Buber combined an admiration for Nietzschean vitalism with fervent Zionism, though his desire to see a Jewish spiritual and **cultural** renewal was in conflict with

Theodor Herzl's political attempt to form a legal state of Israel, and he disapproved of Zionist policies toward the Arabs. Buber found his encounter with Nietzsche's atheist thought dramatic and permanently alarming, but he had to agree with Nietzsche's assessment of traditional Judaism as **life-denying**. In his article "*Ein Wort über Nietzsche und die Lebenswerte*" ("A Word about Nietzsche and Life Values") that appeared in *Die Kunst im Leben* (*Art in Life*, December 1900), Buber spoke of Nietzsche's greatness as being "as indefinable as life itself." Convinced that Nietzsche's critique of culture applied as much to Judaism as **Christianity**, Buber increasingly questioned and rejected Talmudic law, preferring to examine man's alienation from himself, from his fellow humans, and from his **God**, expressing these ideas in *Ich und Du*, 1923 (*I and Thou*, 1937). He went on to conduct research into the spiritualism of Hasidic Judaism, publishing *Chassidischen Bücher* (*Hassidic Books*) in 1927.

Driven from his chair in comparative religion at Frankfurt am Main by the **National Socialists**, Buber emigrated to Jerusalem, where he taught at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem from 1937 to 1951, the doyen of the Israeli intelligentsia but still unrepentantly opposed to Israeli politics.

**BUDDHISM.** Religion and philosophy originating in ancient India. The first Buddha was Gautama, a prince also known as Siddhartha (ca. 563–483 B.C.). The Buddha became disillusioned with courtly life and, on an impulse, left his family when he was 29 in order to seek the Way, a fact applauded by Nietzsche: "A married philosopher belongs to *comedy*" (*OGM*, III: 7). After six years of deprivation and meditation, the Buddha became "enlightened," hence his name (Buddha = the Enlightened One). Originally, Buddhism, if not atheistic, had no room for **God**, something that Nietzsche could fully endorse: "how distant **Europe** still is from this level of **culture!**" (*D*, I: 96).

Nietzsche was interested in Eastern thought in an informed though not particularly scholarly fashion, having been introduced to Indian and Asian culture at school and further influenced by the research of his friend **Paul Deussen**. His remarks on Buddhism are often within the context of a discussion of **Arthur Schopenhauer** and **Richard Wagner**. The Buddha's teaching was that to exist is to suffer; the ego should be eliminated to the point of abnegation or nirvana so that

pain and suffering can cease and enlightenment can take place. Schopenhauer described Buddhist nirvana as the removal of craving and impurities, allowing the will to step down from the ceaseless cycle of *samsara* (perpetual existence); Nietzsche criticized this paralyzing approach to the will, eventually substituting his corrective theory of the **will to power**. The Buddhist perpetual time cycle found some resonance in Nietzsche's notion of **eternal return**, but Nietzsche was not impressed by the Buddhist belief that karma, or action, meets with reward or punishment either in this **life** or in another: his *Übermensch* is much more proactive. Nevertheless, the Buddhist belief that there is no permanent self—no “soul”—is in tune with Nietzsche's insistence that we *are* our **bodies**. Thus, although he felt duty bound to reject Buddhism as **decadent** and **nihilistic**, Nietzsche praised the Buddha's “hygienic measures” (A-C: 20) against depression and found Buddhism infinitely superior to **Christianity**, with its **ascetic priests** and doctrines of guilt and **ressentiment**.

Nietzsche's comments on Buddhism referred to the earlier (Hinayana) Buddhism, which tipped the scales in favor of a clerical elite or, in his words, the “learned classes” (A-C: 21); he almost certainly knew nothing about Mahayana Buddhism, even though his own philosophy had more in common with the latter, especially the Zen thinkers Rinzai and Hakuin. Refer to Freny Mistry, *Nietzsche and Buddhism* (1981), and Robert G. Morrison, *Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Attitudes* (1997). See also AMOR FATI; PITY.

**BURCKHARDT, JACOB (1818–1897)**. Swiss historian. A native of Basel and lifelong resident of the town, Burckhardt was professor of history and art history at Basel University from 1858 until 1893. His most famous work is *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, 1860 (*The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, 1878; reprinted as *Renaissance Culture in Italy*, 1945). In this work, Burckhardt does not, unfortunately, deal with Renaissance art, though he discussed architecture fully in *Die Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien (History of the Renaissance in Italy)*, 1867). His four-volume *Griechische Kulturgeschichte (Greek Cultural History)*, 1898–1902) was edited posthumously by friends.

A bachelor and something of a recluse, Burckhardt did not offer the young Nietzsche the same type of open-house hospitality in Basel

as their mutual colleague **Johann Jakob Bachofen**, but he was an admirer of Nietzsche's work, and his appreciation was of great value to Nietzsche personally. One of the last letters Nietzsche penned in Turin as he sank into mental insanity was addressed to Burckhardt: "I have got rid of Wilhelm Bismarck [*sic*] and all **anti-Semites**" (6 January 1889). Burckhardt was so alarmed at receiving this note that he consulted with **Franz Overbeck**, and the latter journeyed to Turin to collect the sick Nietzsche and escort him home to Germany. Refer to Edgar von Salin, *Jacob Burckhardt und Nietzsche* (1938), and Alfred Martin, *Nietzsche und Burckhardt: Zwei geistige Welten im Dialog* (*Nietzsche and Burckhardt: Two intellectual Worlds in Dialogue*, 1945).

– C –

**CAMUS, ALBERT (1913–1960)**. French writer and philosopher. Born and educated in Algiers, Camus was forced by ill health to abandon his study for the *agrégation*, which would have qualified him to teach philosophy at university; after a trip to the French Alps to regain his health, he began a career as journalist. During World War II he was active in the Resistance in Paris. Camus produced in quick succession the essay *Le Mythe de Sisyphe*, 1942 (*The Myth of Sisyphus*, 1955) and the novel *L'Étranger*, 1942 (*The Outsider*, 1946; known in the United States as *The Stranger*), two works acclaimed for combining philosophy and literature; his second novel, *La peste*, 1947 (*The Plague*, 1948) was equally renowned. In his concept of the absurd (initiated by **André Malraux**), Camus portrays "**meta-physical** alienation and the problem of **suffering**" (J. Cruickshank, *Oxford Companion to Literature*, 1969). The Nietzschean strand in his thought is reflected in his disquiet over the ills of contemporary existence in the light of what he, with Nietzsche, saw as the central fact of **nihilism**. Refer to Bianca Rosenthal, *Die Idee des Absurden. Friedrich Nietzsche und Albert Camus* (1977).

**THE CASE OF WAGNER (DER FALL WAGNER)**. Subtitled *A Musician's Problem*, the work was published in 1891, though it had been written in 1888, the year before Nietzsche's mental collapse. In

1878, realizing that his former mentor had turned **nationalistic** and vigorously **anti-Semitic**, Nietzsche had gradually broken free from the influence of **Richard Wagner**, as the latter ruefully recognized when he received a complimentary copy of *Human, All Too Human*. Later that year, Wagner sent the text of *Parsifal* to Nietzsche, who was disgusted by its piety. “This opera struck Nietzsche as shameful: Wagner was exploiting **Christianity** for theatrical effect” (Walter Kaufmann, *The Case of Wagner*, 1966: Introduction). With the vitriolic *Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche settled the score a decade later, although Wagner, who had died in 1883, was out of reach of his invective. Nietzsche asks rhetorically, “Is Wagner a human being at all? Isn’t he rather a sickness? He makes sick whatever he touches—he *has made music sick!*” (CW: 5). Nietzsche berates Wagner as a consummate actor who dupes and bullies his audience; the sheer weight and profundity of his music bedazzles the listener. Nietzsche demands, “Was Wagner a musician at all?” (CW: 8). Wagner is a tyrant, an actor who hides his musical deficiencies in theatrical effects, and yet it would be too kind to call him a dramatist—Nietzsche thunders theatrically, “Wagner was *no* dramatist”(CW: 9).

In the first of the two postscripts to the work, Nietzsche continues the onslaught, reiterating the phrase: “One pays **heavily** for being one of Wagner’s disciples” (CW: Postscript 1). In the second postscript, Nietzsche cautions his readers not to assume that he approves of other contemporary composers: “*Other* musicians don’t count compared to Wagner. Things are bad generally. Decay is universal. The sickness goes deep” (CW: Postscript 2). There is even an epilogue placed after the two postscripts, indicating that Nietzsche had not quite done with the matter in hand. Here, the enigmatic **Baubô** makes an appearance. Throughout the work, Nietzsche is criticizing the **decadence of German culture** when he speaks about Wagner. Shortly before he went insane, he returned to the topic of his relationship with Wagner just as forcefully, though more eloquently, in *Nietzsche contra Wagner*.

**CHAMBERLAIN, HOUSTON STEWART (1885–1927)**. English writer often cited as one of the ideologues at the root of **National Socialism**. In an essay of 1896 titled “**Richard Wagner**,” Chamberlain spoke of Nietzsche as “one of the most gifted thinkers of our century,” though at that point he only appears to have read “Richard

Wagner in Bayreuth” (the fourth of the *Untimely Meditations*), since he seems to be unaware of Nietzsche’s later vitriol against Wagner. Like Nietzsche himself, Chamberlain was closely involved with the circle round Wagner, albeit at a slightly later date; he enthusiastically endorsed Wagner’s project of recreating a German *Volk* in tune with a mythological past **German culture**.

Chamberlain, who wrote in German and died in Bayreuth, published his groundbreaking *Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts* (*The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*) in 1899. In this work, he mentions Nietzsche only en passant, in a footnote where Nietzsche’s thought is compared to that of **Baruch Spinoza**. The work consciously elaborates a myth of Teutonic racial superiority within a general discussion of creativity. In 1900, Georg Tanzscher, in his *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Neuromantik. Eine Zeitstudie* (*Friedrich Nietzsche and New Romanticism: A Study of the Period*), warned against the Nietzsche-inspired trend toward individualism and subjectivity in such writers as Chamberlain and a host of others (such as **Hugo von Hofmannsthal** and **Stefan George**).

**CHILD.** In the opening section of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, **Zarathustra** declares that the spirit must go through three metamorphoses, from the camel to lion to child. With regard to the child, Zarathustra wants man to become innocent, not in the humbling sense demanded in **Christian** doctrine but so that he can learn to be the **Übermensch**: “A child is concealed in the true man: it wants to play” (*Za*, I: “Of Old and Young Women”). All Zarathustra’s **symbolic** references to the child are targeted at the weakening effect of the Christian image of the child. Nietzsche is also alluding to the newly converted “*Erweckten*,” or neo-**Pietists**, who believed the Christian should be as a child before God, following a command from Jesus that we should “become as little children” before we can enter the Kingdom of God (Matthew 18:3). Nietzsche must have heard his mother **Franziska Nietzsche** reciting this biblical reference on hundreds of occasions. Zarathustra sarcastically echoes it verbatim to his followers, the **Higher Men** (*Za*, IV: “The Ass Festival,” 2); this is one of the reasons why Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** initially found part 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* too blasphemous to publish.



What Nietzsche produces through his child imagery in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a dynamic symbol of untarnished energy: “The child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes” (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). Hence, the metamorphosis of the spirit, in its final stage of a child, will be light-hearted and liberated. No longer burdened by the central statement in the Lord’s Prayer, “thy will be done” (Matthew 6:9–13), the spirit “now wills *its own will*” (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). This is a fundamental premise of the **will to power**.

**CHRISTIANITY.** Nietzsche was from a deeply religious household and did not abandon his faith until 1864. From then on, throughout his oeuvre, though especially in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he tells the world of his contempt for **Christianity** with increasing stridency, finally lodging his harshest invective in the last work published in his lifetime, *The Anti-Christ*. Nietzsche treated the figure of Christ **symbolically** and reserved his fiercest criticism for the writers of the gospels, who “put words” into Jesus’ mouth, insisting that Christ was sacrificed for man’s sins. A disgusted Nietzsche declares, “What atrocious paganism!” (*A-C*: 41). But there was worse to come:

On the heels of the “glad tidings” came the *worst of all*: those of Paul. In St. Paul was embodied the antithetical type of the “bringer of glad tidings,” the genius of hatred, of the vision of hatred, of the inexorable logic of hatred. (*A-C*: 42)

Nietzsche believed that church dogma relied on people accepting the **ascetic ideal** as peddled by the **ascetic priest**. By this means, Christianity had managed to produce a **slave morality** founded on **resentment** that was essentially **life-denying**. This was Nietzsche’s chief objection to it. To counteract Christianity, Nietzsche concentrated on stressing new qualities such as *amor fati*, which would enable people to be in touch with their own instincts and **affirm** life. His call for a **revaluation of all values** was aimed at enabling people to decide for themselves what was good and what was evil. Such a person, who could accept the death of **God** in a positive way and remain free and strong in the presence of the ascetic ideal, creating his own **morality**, would be a potential *Übermensch*. See also LUTHER, MARTIN; PIETISM.

**COGNITION.** *See* KNOWLEDGE.

**CONCEPT (DER BEGRIFF).** In his early (unpublished) essay *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, written in 1873, Nietzsche describes concepts as a framework we use to structure **language**; a weaker man will cling to the framework for security, but the stronger man will smash the frame and rebuild it after his own fashion: “The liberated intellect will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts” (*OTLNS*). Nietzsche’s primary understanding of the term is more physiological than philosophical. In *The Gay Science* (*GS*, V: 355), Nietzsche says that self-consciousness and words go hand in hand, and in *Beyond Good and Evil*, he writes: “Words are sounds designating concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite images designating frequently recurring and associated sensations, groups of sensations. To understand one another it is not sufficient to employ the same words; we have also to employ the same words to designate the same species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our experience *in common*.” (*BGE*, IX: 268).

Although Nietzsche rejected the traditional treatment of the term *Begriff*, or “concept,” to define the essential nature of a thing (roundly slandering the **Kantian Ding an sich**), he frequently makes use of the word either to convey the meaning of an abstract idea, where he imports his **perspectivism** (as with “**knowledge**” or “**truth**”), or else to convey his own **metaphysic** of “fluid meaning.” In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche explains how concepts deceive and ultimately avoid definition. For example, the concept “punishment” has not evolved in a straight, logical line but as a result of the **will to power** having impressed its mastery on something less powerful. The development of a thing or tradition or organ is unpredictable. It does not follow any logical progression since “the form is fluid, the ‘meaning’ [*Sinn*] more so . . .” (*OGM*, II: 12). As a result, Nietzsche continues, “the concept ‘punishment’ presents, at a very late stage of culture [e.g., in **Europe** today], not just one meaning but a whole synthesis of ‘meanings’ [*Sinnen*].” In brief, the genealogy of a concept makes its meaning indefinable; “only something that has no **history** can be defined” (*OGM*, II: 13). The meaning of a concept is at most the value attached to it at a given time. *See also* METAPHOR.

**CONRAD, MICHAEL GEORG (1846–1927).** German writer. Conrad was a teacher at the *Deutsche Schule* (German School), first in Geneva and then in Naples, before establishing himself as a writer in Munich, where he founded the journal *Die Gesellschaft* (*Society*) with Wolfgang Kirchbach in 1885 (publication continued until 1902) and *Die Jugend* (*Youth*) in 1896 (this ceased publication in 1940). In *Der Übermensch in der Politik* (1895), Conrad was hostile toward Nietzsche, although the book's political discussion of the *Übermensch* has little to do with Nietzsche's visionary creation. Like many critics, Conrad deplored the reduction of Nietzsche's thought to banalities without quite realizing that he might be accused of the same thing; however, he vigorously promoted Nietzsche's work in his two journals. His futuristic novel *In purpurner Finsternis* (*In Purple Darkness*), published in 1895, has a Polish hero, "Zarathustra-Nietzischki," a clear reference to the rumor, propagated by Nietzsche himself, that he stemmed from Polish ancestors. The book is full of a wildly visionary "*Zarathustratismus*," a word Conrad coined within it.

**CONRADI, HERMANN (1862–1890).** German writer and early Nietzsche enthusiast. Conradi read *Beyond Good and Evil* in 1886 but was much more impressed by *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which he read in Leipzig, where he frequented the circle of the Danish Wagner admirer Rosalie Nielsen. His poem *Triumph des Übermenschen* (1887) hails *Daseinsfreude* (joy in existence); his novel *Phrasen* (1887), based on his experiences as a student at Leipzig University, documents, albeit unwittingly, the way Nietzschean themes and terminology were being carried over into German literature. He was angered and dismayed by the hostile criticism of his school friend **Johannes Schlaf**, who in 1887 labeled Nietzsche a "parasite" (*Allgemeine Deutsche Universitätszeitung*). Conradi's realist novel *Adam Mensch* (1889) showed great promise, but he died in the following year, aged only 28.

**CONSCIENCE AND BAD CONSCIENCE.** Nietzsche's most consistent explanation of conscience and bad conscience is found in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, where he states, "Bad conscience is a sickness" (*OGM*, II: 19). In prehistory, the system of debt (*Schuld*)

involved payment, and guilt and sin were not part of any transaction. Once **slave morality** had taken hold in **Judaism** and **Christianity**, the **ascetic priests**, eager to seize power for themselves, persuaded the **herd** of its superiority to those of higher rank; it was “good” to be humble and “bad” to fight. The humble would be rewarded for their privations in heaven, provided they acknowledged the reality of sin (also called *Schuld*). Conscience developed as a characteristically negative reaction of **ressentiment** to anything outside this new moral code. Now that the priests had begun to dictate slave values, the denial of man’s **natural drives** crept into **morality**. For Nietzsche, man’s conscience, internalizing this negativity, is the instinct for **cruelty** turned back on itself so that man is harmed and weakened. In this state, he succumbs to the **ascetic ideal**, which teaches him that his own guilt (at being human) has caused his **suffering**:

Man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness—this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of “bad conscience.” (*OGM*, II: 16)

Bad conscience over sins that can never be redeemed places man under terrible and permanent pressure, but at least, Nietzsche remarks sardonically, he is “saved” (*OGM*, III: 28). A cheerful and **affirmative** acknowledgment of the death of **God** is Nietzsche’s remedy.

**CONSCIOUSNESS.** *See* BODY.

**CONTEST.** *See* HOMER’S CONTEST.

**THE COSMICS.** *See* DIE KOSMIKER.

**CROCE, BENEDETTO (1889–1952).** Italian philosopher. Croce was a private scholar in Naples and briefly held a post as minister of public instruction from 1920 to 1921, which he had to relinquish because of his refusal to accept the politics of fascism. The fact that protofascist Italian thinkers and writers such as **Gabriele D’Annunzio** and **Giovanni Papini**, as well as the iconoclast **Filippo Tommaso Marinetti**, had all embraced Nietzscheanism was sufficient to make the young Croce wary of Nietzsche, although he was

receptive to the ideas of the Nietzschean **Henri Bergson**, especially the concept of *élan vital*. Croce was most influenced by **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**, especially Hegel's belief that ideas do not represent reality—they *are* reality; however, unlike Hegel (and like Nietzsche), Croce rejected all forms of transcendence found in **German idealism**. Gradually, after a careful reading of *The Birth of Tragedy*, which he then discussed in an article titled “*Rezensione a F. Nietzsche, Le origini della tragedia*” (“Review of Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*”), which appeared in 1907 in the periodical he had founded, *La Critica*, Croce sought to provide an unbiased critique of Nietzsche. In the light of hindsight, this can be seen to represent the liberal-scholastic tradition in Italian philosophy, as distinct from the irrational and chauvinistic avant-gardism that helped to found the ideological basis for the growth of fascism. Croce's most celebrated work is *Estetica*, 1908 (*Aesthetics*, 1922).

**CRUELTY (DIE GRAUSAMKEIT)**. A fundamental feature of man's condition. Nietzsche cautions that there is no point in being sheepish about “the great Circe ‘Cruelty’” (*BG*, VII: 229), for it arouses in man the type of intoxication that makes **art** possible. Although we turn from the notion in despair, cruelty is part of man's condition, and our body determines our reaction to it. Attic tragedy helped man to deal with his conflicting emotions toward cruelty and **suffering** by allowing him to identify with the tragic hero and thus purge himself of all harmful affects. Nietzsche argued that even **knowledge** can be tainted with cruelty, as when the man of knowledge “compels his spirit to knowledge which is *counter* to the inclination of his spirit and frequently also to the desires of his heart . . .—in all desire to know there is already a drop of cruelty” (*BGE*, VII: 229).

**CULTURE (DIE KULTUR)**. In the early essay “**David Strauss**, the Confessor and the Writer,” written in 1873 just after **German** victory in the Franco-Prussian War and published as the first of the *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche complains that the Germans have lost sight of what German culture is. Having gained victory through military prowess, the Germans risk smothering their *Geist*: “It can only be the result of confusion if one speaks of the victory of German culture, a confusion originating in the fact that in Germany, there no

longer exists any clear conception of what culture is” (*UM*, I: “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer”: 1). This complaint became more strident in Nietzsche’s later works; in *Ecce Homo*, he describes the **nationalism** enshrined in the national anthem, “*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*,” as “this most *anti-cultural* sickness.” Nietzsche saw culture as a unifying principle, and his enthusiasm for **Europe** was grounded largely in his perception that a new European cultural unity was struggling to emerge; it goes without saying that he shunned any political or **democratic** unity.

– D –

**DANCE.** For Nietzsche, a method of liberating both mind and **body**. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the Nietzschean message that we should laugh, sing, and dance is repeatedly spelled out. Such levity will counteract the **heavy knowledge** of **eternal return**: “Better to dance clumsily than to walk lamely” (*Za*, IV: “Of the Higher Man,” 19). It is doubtful whether Nietzsche himself had ever learned to dance, but *The Birth of Tragedy* makes it plain that he had a grasp of its orgiastic potential. During the Modernist period, from 1890 right through to World War II, exponents of “modern” dance, as opposed to ballet, ballroom, or folk dancing, foremost among them the Russian impresario Serge Diaghilev, interpreted “Nietzschean dance” as free movement to **music**, often involving the dancer in a rapture similar to that which possessed the dancers at the festivals of **Dionysus**.

Diaghilev’s *Ballets Russes*, which he founded in 1909 and directed for two decades, took Europe by storm from its headquarters in Monte Carlo. The group’s artists included Igor Stravinsky and **Vaslav Nijinsky**. A more controversial interpretation of Nietzsche’s call for the freeing of the **drives** and instincts would be found in the theory and practice of the Parisian performance artist **Valentine de Saint-Point**. Another convinced Nietzschean was **Isadora Duncan**, who brought a flowingly expressive dance to Germany at the beginning of the century. However, the German-born Mary Wigman (orig. Marie Wiegmann) was considered the prima donna of modern dance. A student of the convinced Nietzschean **Rudolf Laban**, Wigman was renowned for her *Ausdruckstanz* (expressive dance). Her career took

off after World War I. In 1931 she toured the United States, and in 1936 she founded the Hanya Holm School of Dance in New York.

**D'ANNUNZIO, GABRIELE (1863–1938).** Italian writer of poetry, prose, and drama. His early work showed much promise, though this tailed off for the decade 1881–1891, which he spent in Rome. He then read Nietzsche and was set on fire with enthusiasm for his ideas. In an article titled “*Bestia elettiva*” (“The Self-Appointed Beast”) published in 1892, he identified the aristocrat as the “**higher man**” and placed an **antidemocratic** spin on Nietzsche’s use of the term “**slave morality**.” By the term “aristocrat,” D’Annunzio means not the worn-out patrician but rather a new aristocrat whose being “rests on his inner sovereignty.” This *Superuomo*, however, had nationalist features that are thoroughly alien to Nietzsche’s *Übermensch*. Having been temporarily blinded in a plane crash in 1916, D’Annunzio recovered his sight and continued his nationalist activity after the war by leading an expedition to capture and hold Fiume for Italy for two years, from 1919 to 1921. D’Annunzio’s military courage made him into a national hero, but what bemused the reading public of his day was his ability to mix **nationalism** and (in World War I) heroism with an oeuvre characterized by *décadence*.

Inspired by Eleonora Duse, with whom he had a relationship from 1895 to 1904, D’Annunzio produced a number of sensualist plays and his best poetry collection, *Alcione* (1904). Emulating Nietzsche’s call for man to celebrate the **life** of the instincts and ignore conventional **morality**, D’Annunzio went a stage further: to sin, to become a brute, is to become divine. A Nietzschean influence can be traced in the three novels *Il trionfo della morte*, 1894 (*The Triumph of Death*, 1898); *Le vergini delle rocce* (*The Virgins of the Rocks*, 1895) and *Il fuoco*, 1900 (*The Flame of Life*, 1900). Mario Praz interprets D’Annunzio’s work as inauthentically sadistic: unlike A. C. Swinburne and other decadents whom he copied and virtually plagiarized, D’Annunzio described the **cruel** femme fatale without any personal commitment, gratuitously blending torrid morbidity with a Nietzschean “Circe” to produce a “fatal superwoman,” a power-hungry compendium of de Sade’s perversions: “In D’Annunzio the Fatal Woman offers power and empire to the man who is fascinated by her . . . lust is closely connected with the desire for power” (Mario Praz, *The Romantic Agony*, 1970 [1933]).

With his mystical form of **nationalism** and aggressive martial rhetoric, D'Annunzio paved the way for the fascists in Italy and, by implicating Nietzsche, ultimately brought Nietzsche, too, into disrepute, although it could be argued that this was inevitable, given the enthusiasm **Benito Mussolini** had for Nietzsche. Refer to Gaia Michellini, *Nietzsche nell'Italia di d'Annunzio* (1978).

**DARWIN, CHARLES (1809–1892).** British scientist whose revolutionary treatise *On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection* appeared in 1859. As a student, Nietzsche gleaned his scientific background mainly from Friedrich Albert Lange, whose chief work, *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, 1866 (*History of Materialism and Critique of its Present Importance*, 1879), actually mentioned Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* in a footnote added to the 1873 edition. Regarding Darwinism, Nietzsche was content to accept on trust most of Lange's (hostile) ideas on the theory of evolution. It was only much later, in 1887–1888, that Nietzsche acquired a copy of Karl Wilhelm von Nägeli's *Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre* (*Mechanico-physiological Theory of Evolution*, 1884), a detailed study of Darwinism, but apparently he did not see the necessity of reading the original text even though a German translation was available. Nägeli, a distinguished biologist (like most of the scientific establishment of the time), was also critical of Darwin.

Nietzsche found Darwin's theory of natural selection crude, as it deflated man's individual struggle in the universal, teleological quest of evolution; he saw **life** not as a relentless struggle for physical survival but as the manifestation of what he later came to term the **will to power**. In *Twilight of the Idols*, he claims that "the general aspect of life is *not* hunger and distress, but rather wealth, luxury, even absurd prodigality—where there is a struggle it is a struggle for *power*" (*TI*, "The Expeditions of an Untimely Man": 14). Nietzsche supported the **metaphysical** evolution of a **higher man** rather than the physical evolution of the "fitter" man, though had he read Darwin attentively, he would have realized that "the survival of the fittest" is a subordinate point in an argument that gave a clear genealogical tree to evolution and emancipated evolution from the Book of Genesis. In Britain especially, Darwinists such as Thomas Common, who published an



anthology of Nietzsche's work in 1901, were apt to read evolutionism into Nietzsche's thought: "He has completed the work which Darwin and the other evolutionists commenced" (Thomas Common, *Nietzsche as Critic, Philosopher, Poet and Prophet*, 1901).

Recent philosophical studies have reexamined Nietzsche's hostility toward **natural science** and, in particular, his deliberate marginalization of Darwin. John Richardson claims that in spite of his overt attempt to dismiss Darwin's work, Nietzsche's thinking is "deeply and pervasively Darwinian" (John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 2004). See also NATURE/NATURAL; NATURAL SCIENCE.

**DAYBREAK (MORGENRÖTHE, 1881)**. Subtitled *Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, this work, comprising a preface and five sections or books, was begun in Riva, Northern Italy, in 1880, when the newly retired Nietzsche was tired and ill; writing to Georg Brandes on 10 April 1888, he called the work his "Dynamometer," written with least strength and health. It was published in July 1881 "without creating any impression on the contemporary intellectual world whatsoever" (Michael Tanner, *Daybreak*, Introduction), and it has remained Nietzsche's least-read major work. In it, Nietzsche, relishing his unbridled freedom from professional duties, allows himself to ramble through his ideas at his most shrill, although many themes in *Daybreak*, such as hostility to the German **state** and **Christianity**, continue the critique of society he had begun in the *Untimely Meditations* and *Human, All Too Human*. Such critique is also the standard fare of Nietzsche's next work, *The Gay Science*, and *Beyond Good and Evil*.

Essentially, *Daybreak* prepares the ground for Nietzsche's further deliberations on **morality**, especially in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, published six years later, although *Daybreak* lacks the organization of the latter. Nietzsche proposes that morality began with customs and was based on fear and the desire for power: "Originally everything was custom, and whoever wanted to elevate himself above it had to become a law-giver and medicine man and a kind of demi-god . . ." (*D*, I: 9). Nietzsche rules out the **metaphysical** argument that awards man the divine spark, thus setting him above the animal kingdom, the proof of which is morality. The contrary argu-

ment is true: morality belongs to the **animals**, insofar as it consists of customs and is determined by power.

In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche is prone to attack personalities in a way that can deflect attention from his intended point. He enters the fray with an assault on **Immanuel Kant**, who mendaciously held that the “truth” could be known and who, in turn, had been bitten by the tarantula, **Jean-Jacques Rousseau** (*D*, Preface: 3). The latter’s moral pronouncements on the origins of “good” and “bad” are, for Nietzsche, completely self-contradictory (*D*, III: 163). **Martin Luther** and Saint Paul attract scurrilous disdain, Luther for his creed “*credo quia absurdum est*” (I believe, although it is absurd) (*D*, Preface: 3) and Saint Paul for just being himself. The Bible is torpedoed for containing “the history of one of the most ambitious and importunate souls, of a mind as superstitious as it was cunning, the history of the apostle Paul . . .” (*D*, I: 68). **Socrates** and **Plato** are castigated for being “innocently credulous in regard to that most fateful of prejudices, that profoundest of errors, ‘that right knowledge *must be followed* by right action’—in this principle they were still the heirs of the universal madness and presumption that there exists knowledge as to the essential nature of an action” (*D*, II: 116). For a man who claims that nothing can be conclusively known, Nietzsche sometimes adopts a dogmatic tone that all but belies his point. Even so, numerous pithy insights are scattered in this work, as well as rhapsodic passages of great beauty and occasional prophecy, as in the final passage:

*We aeronauts of the spirit! . . . Will it perhaps be said of us one day that we too, steering westward, hoped to reach an India—but that it was our fate to be wrecked against infinity? Or, my brothers. Or?—* (*D*, V: 575)

Not only does Nietzsche correctly infer that air travel is just around the corner (Louis Blériot’s flight from Calais to Dover in 1909), but his metaphor encapsulates our desire to escape the confines of earthbound existence. For truly, if we can do *that*, if only in our own minds, then we are, as Nietzsche maintains, free.

**DÉCADENCE.** In contrast to the designation “decadence” for a sensuous style of art and writing in the late 19th century (such as that of Charles Baudelaire), Nietzsche’s use of the French word *décadence*

acted as a label for all that was weakening in contemporary society and **culture**. **Christianity**, **democracy**, **socialism**, and **feminism** were all signs of decadence and all anathema to Nietzsche, as they contributed to the poisonously weak **morality** of his day (which was also decadent). All things decline, and in that sense, decadence is a natural process. It is when decadence interferes with **life** that it becomes an obstacle. For example, in the late work *The Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche, having lambasted “the holy lie,” examines its purpose and concludes that Christianity has no “holy ends”:

Only *bad ends*: the poisoning, slandering, denying of life, contempt for the **body**, the denigration and self-violation of man through the **concept** sin—consequently its means too are bad. (A-C: 56)

For Nietzsche, perhaps the worst effect of *décadence* was its downgrading of cultural excellence. Because of the many things Nietzsche opposed, contemporary **European** culture was bound to disappoint him, certainly when held against the yardstick of the fearless, **aristocratically** inspired **art** of the ancient **Greeks**. He thought that the spirit of contest that characterized Greek **tragedy** was vital to the production of healthy art. In *Homer’s Contest*, he writes approvingly, “Combat and the pleasure of victory were acknowledged” (HC in OGM), unlike the complacent attitude to mediocre art in his own day.

Of course, Nietzsche’s list of *décadents* is virtually inexhaustible, beginning with Plato and other “priests of *décadence*” (A-C: 55), but his prime target was **Richard Wagner**, even though, between the years 1868 and 1876, he had been determined to see Wagner as the salvation, not just of Western music but of art itself. After 1878, Nietzsche completely turned against his former friend and mentor in the most vigorous language. In *The Case of Wagner* (1888), he dissects Wagner’s ailments and describes his as neurotic: “Wagner est une névrose” (CW, 5). Wagner became sick through dabbling in the philosophy of decadence: firstly, **Schopenhauerian pessimism**, then **nationalism** and **anti-Semitism**, and finally Christianity. In *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, also written in 1888, Nietzsche writes a less polemic and therefore more convincing account of why he thought that Wagner was, as Hollingdale puts it, “part of the artistic decadence of the latter half of the nineteenth century” (R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy*, 1999).

**DECONSTRUCTION.** **Poststructuralist** critical practice. Partly based on Nietzsche's **perspectivism**, which asserts that there is no such thing as the unified subject, deconstruction represents a philosophy of pure textuality. The widely perceived difficulty in the method stems from the fact that the chief exponents of poststructuralism—**Jacques Lacan**, **Jacques Derrida**, and **Michel Foucault**—were not literary critics by discipline (though according to David Lodge in *After Bakhtin*, 1990, it was Derrida's "deepest desire . . . to write fiction"). Deconstruction was first popularized by Derrida, who was in turn directly influenced by **Martin Heidegger**'s attack on the Cartesian notion of the self. For example, Nietzsche had written in his unpublished posthumous notes, "The 'subject' is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum" (*WP*, III: 485). In deconstructive criticism, the only certainty in interpreting a text is the **language** itself; this, rather than the author's intention, is placed under scrutiny, and a variety of meanings that lurk within a text are teased out, with particular reference to **metaphorical** layers of meaning.

**DEHMEL, RICHARD (1863–1920).** German poet. Dehmel wrote with ecstatic flair to demonstrate his belief in mystic priapic eroticism, although he remained committed to **socialism**, as many of his poems demonstrate. He was also a fervent patriot and was awarded the Iron Cross after World War I. His circle of friends in Berlin included Otto Julius Bierbaum, **Detlev Liliencron**, **Stanislaus Przybyszewski**, **Bruno Wille**, **Wilhelm Bölsche**, **Julius Hart** and his brother Heinrich, **Arno Holz**, and **Johannes Schlaf**. Dehmel and Przybyszewski became dissatisfied with the last two named for their theories ensuring the bleakness of the **Naturalist movement**. Dehmel's encounter with Nietzsche precipitated a weeklong "possession," after which he and Przybyszewski strove for a literary renaissance of sensuality and paganism, construing this to be true Nietzscheanism. Dehmel's admiration for Nietzsche had its limits, however: he criticized the latter's vision of the *Übermensch*: "To feel oneself the equal of everyone else, that is true earthly and divine wisdom; the feeling of superiority or inferiority, that is all-too-human" (unpublished letter to Friedrich Binde, 1896). Dehmel's article "*Das Geheimnis Friedrich Nietzsches*" ("Friedrich Nietzsche's Secret") (*Neue deutsche Rundschau*,

1894) is a (favorable) review of *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken* (1894) by **Lou Andreas-Salomé**. Here, Dehmel argued that **Charles Darwin**, not **Zarathustra**, would be the key figure at the end of the century. Refer to Adolf Hösel, *Dehmel und Nietzsche* (1928).

**DELEUZE, GILLES (1925–1995)**. French professor of philosophy at the University of Paris-Vincennes. Deleuze's *Nietzsche et la Philosophie*, 1962 (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 1983) was instrumental in building a bridge from **Martin Heidegger's Existentialist** reading of Nietzsche to **poststructuralist** French thought. Deleuze stressed that it was erroneous to try to understand **eternal return** within the rubric of "return of the same": recurrence is the essence of becoming, which is of necessity differentiated and many-faceted. His favored text is *The Will to Power*, and his method consists of teasing out possibilities by apposition (active/reactive) or by linguistic turns, such as the distinction between *puissance* and *force*. Deleuze gives the rationale that "Nietzsche uses very precise new terms for very precise new concepts," but he has been attacked for abandoning any close reference to Nietzsche's texts in the interest of his own strategy of replacing **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** and **Karl Marx** in French thought with Nietzsche and **Sigmund Freud**. Significantly, Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in *Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie*, 1972 (*Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 1983), challenged the central premise of psychoanalysis: that both power and desire lie within the family structure. What Deleuze/Guattari refer to as a "desiring machine" is their attempt to use the concept of the Nietzschean **will to power** in a way that avoids objectifying desire, as psychoanalysis programmatically does. Deleuze has produced further work on poststructuralist philosophy in *Différence et répétition*, 1968 (*Difference and Repetition*, 1995). See also THE NEW NIETZSCHE.

**DELIUS, FREDERICK (1862–1934)**. British composer born in Bradford, England. Delius's German father took out British citizenship in 1860. Delius was a convinced Nietzschean and ardently applied Nietzsche's philosophy to his own life, as was entirely typical of his generation. It is ironic that by his early sixties he was blind and paralyzed as a result of **syphilis**, his fate mirroring that of Nietzsche

(although Nietzsche's syphilis has never been proved conclusively). He was fortunate to find an amanuensis in the young Eric Fenby, the Delian **Peter Gast**. In an article titled "Delius the Unknown," the late Deryck Cooke wrote, "Consciously, he [Delius] put into practice Nietzsche's heroic **nihilism**: he never expressed a single regret, but lived out his Nietzschean beliefs to the end, in the fearless stoicism with which he faced his shocking affliction, the terrible pain it brought him, and his wretched death" (*The Delius Society Journal*, Spring 2005). Delius set to music various songs by Nietzsche, in particular, "Zarathustra's Night Song," "The Wanderer and his Shadow," "The Lonely One," "The Wanderer," and "Towards New Seas." The first of these, for baritone and orchestra, was first performed in London in 1899; Delius subsequently used it as the finale for the *Mass of Life* (*Messe des Lebens*, 1904–1905) for solo, choir, and orchestra; the first complete performance was held in 1909. Nietzsche was also the inspiration behind *Requiem* (1914–1916). Delius remains an obscure musician, and his works, like the wonderful *Mass of Life* or the even more neglected *Fennimore and Garda* (1910; premiered in Berlin in 1919), are largely unknown to the music public. Refer to Eric Fenby, *Delius as I Knew Him* (1936).

**DEMOCRACY.** In his early and late work, Nietzsche consistently opposed democracy, believing that it brought about a leveling down in society, but in his middle period he was more flexible. His early essays show his belief that the glory of a **state** often comes about at the expense of the weak, but he thought this was a price worth paying since the whole state benefited. His model was the system of government of ancient **Greece**, in part because of the place that was awarded to heroic myth and **art** in that society. He rethinks his strategy in *Human, All Too Human*, resigning himself to the fait accompli of democracy and wishing merely that outstanding individuals will be allowed to "refrain from politics and to step a little aside" (*HH*, I: "A Glance at the State," 439). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche returns to the attack, declaring "the democratic movement is not merely a form assumed by political organization in decay but also a form assumed by man in decay" (*BGE*, V: 203). Nietzsche distinguished between democracy and liberal democracy; his **grand politics** uphold **aristocratic values**. Keith Ansell-Pearson writes, "What

Nietzsche understands by liberal democracy is a society which is based, among other things, on a secularisation of **Christian** values, including a levelling equality, a cult of **pity** and compassion, and an emphasis on privacy and a devaluation of politics as an arena of conflict” (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, 1994). It is significant that Nietzsche’s confrontation with grand politics never strays far from his general concern with the regeneration of **culture**, as he stresses in *Twilight of the Idols*, “Politics devours all seriousness for really intellectual things” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack”: 1). Refer to Lawrence Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics* (1995).

**DEPTH (TIEFE)**. Depth (often translated as “profundity”) was not always a positive attribute for Nietzsche, who praised levity and disliked any affectation of seriousness that made things more ponderous and weighty than need be—“in all taking things seriously and thoroughly [*Tief- und Gründlich-Nehmen*], indeed, there is already a violation, a desire to hurt the fundamental will of the spirit . . .” (*BGE*, VII: 229). He used such words **metaphorically**, and a double meaning is sometimes implied, as in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where the term is bound up with the weighty vision of **eternal return**:

*Woe says: Fade! Go!*  
*But all joy wants eternity,*  
*Wants deep, deep, deep eternity!* (Za, IV: “The Intoxicated Song,” 12)

In *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche accuses **Richard Wagner**’s music of deception by referring to its depth and weight at the same time: “Is a more profound [*eine tiefere*], a weightier effect to be found in the theatre? Just look at these youths—rigid, pale, breathless . . . Wagner’s **art** has the pressure of a hundred atmospheres: stoop! What else can one do?” (*CW*: 8).

**DERRIDA, JACQUES (1930–2004)**. French philosopher. Born in Algiers, Derrida was educated at the *École Normale Supérieure* in Paris and at Harvard. After four years at the Sorbonne (1960–1964), he taught at the *École Normale Supérieure*. Derrida developed a critique of Western philosophy that, following **Martin Heidegger**, he saw as full of “presence,” that is, logocentric assumptions. He did not

agree with Heidegger's premise that it might be possible to return to "some primordial state of Being when **language** was in touch with the ultimate **truths** of experience" (Christopher Norris, *Derrida*, 1987) and developed instead his method of **deconstruction**, a textual strategy based on a philosophical interpretation of the sign. He insisted that no sign is innocent of its antecedents, which are *toujours déjà* (always already) present, an insight that has much in common with Nietzsche's view, in *The Gay Science*, that we can never step aside from our accumulated experiences and hence will never know the nature of true "reality" (*GS*, I: 57). Following Nietzsche, Derrida criticized traditional hermeneutics that purport to reveal "the truth," preferring to accentuate **perspectivism**.

Derrida's most important works are *De la grammatologie*, 1967 (*Of Grammatology*, 1976), and *L'écriture et la différence*, 1967 (*Writing and Difference*, 1978). His most famous work on Nietzsche is *Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche*, 1978 (*Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, 1979), where, in spite of the title, the emphasis on **metaphor** owes much to Heidegger, who is liberally quoted. In *Spurs*, Derrida analyzes Nietzsche's description, in *The Gay Science*, of his sighting of a sailing ship, its white sails like a giant butterfly. As Nietzsche stands in the midst of foaming breakers, his thoughts travel to women and their "effect at a distance" (*GS*, II: 60). Derrida playfully inserts another layer of meaning. The sails remind *him* (Derrida) of **veils**, found in a later section of *The Gay Science*, where Nietzsche, speaking of the veiled realities of **life**, declares, "Yes, life is a **woman!**" (*GS*, IV: 339). (In French, *la voile*, "sail," and *le voile*, "veil," can produce a pun.)

Although the elegance and wit of postmodern discourse reaches its height in Derrida's exegesis, it is a moot point how much of Nietzsche's meaning is really elucidated, for all the stylish rhetoric on Nietzsche's style. That said, no postmodern Nietzschean critique could be considered complete without a reference to Derrida's *Spurs*. Refer to Ernst Behler, *Derrida-Nietzsche, Nietzsche-Derrida* (1988). See also THE NEW NIETZSCHE.

**DESCARTES, RENÉ (1596–1650).** French philosopher and mathematician. Descartes' *Discours de la méthode* (*Discourse on Method*, 1637) contained the famous dictum *cogito, ergo sum* (I think,



therefore I am). His *Principia Philosophiae* was published in 1644. A major work, *De Homine*, was published in 1662, 12 years after Descartes' death; Descartes had hidden the manuscript after hearing that the Inquisition had forced Galileo to abjure his Copernican views put forward in the *Dialogue* (1632). Because the self could not be doubted, Descartes was able to deduce the existence of a perfect **God**; his **metaphysics** paved the way for **rationalism** in modern philosophy. In some theological circles he came under attack for asserting free will and for stating that grace was not necessary for salvation. Although Nietzsche seldom referred to Descartes in his published work, it is abundantly clear that he viewed the Cartesian division of mind/soul (*animus/psyche*) and **body** as fundamentally flawed, not least because Descartes had argued that the mind (or "soul") could control the body through a specious operation of the pineal gland—this was complete anathema to Nietzsche as well as to many of Descartes' contemporaries. Nietzsche wrote, "What Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an *apparent* reality, but a reality *in itself*" (*WP*, III: 484). Nietzsche vigorously challenged the presumption that there is a unified self by insisting on **perspectivism**, thus destabilizing our concept of substance and of reality, and allowing for the merit of illusion, as manifested in **art**, to be recognized. Refer to Lawrence Lampert, *Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes and Nietzsche* (1993). See also SOUL.

**DEUSSEN, PAUL (1845–1919)**. German academic. Deussen, who became professor of philosophy at Kiel, had known Nietzsche at Schulpforta; in 1864, they went to Bonn University together to study theology. This was the period during which Nietzsche lost his faith; Deussen would also later abandon theology. He became an expert on Eastern thought, publishing *Das System des Vedânta* in 1881. Unlike Nietzsche, Deussen never lost his admiration for **Arthur Schopenhauer**; he founded the German *Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft* and remained its president until his death. Deussen's memoirs *Erinnerungen an Friedrich Nietzsche* (1901) contain the description of Nietzsche's visit to a brothel in Cologne in 1865. Deussen reports that Nietzsche asked a cabdriver to take him to a restaurant, only to find that he had been dropped off at a brothel. He was saved from the embarrassing situation when he spotted a piano in the room and

went to play on it. Recovering from his state of shock by immersion in **music**, Nietzsche made good his escape. There is no other record of this incident, but this has not deterred the second-hand anecdote from becoming public property; for example, **Thomas Mann** uses it in *Doktor Faustus* (1947). It has now become part of the confused narrative of Nietzsche's putative **syphilis**. See also FRIENDSHIP.

**“DEUTSCHLAND, DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES” (“GERMANY, GERMANY ABOVE ALL”)**. In 1841, the politically liberal scholar August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben wrote the patriotic poem “*Deutschland über alles*,” which he revised in 1848 to “*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*” to fit a tune written by Joseph Haydn in 1797. The opening refrain continues, “*über alles in der Welt*” (“above all in the world”). The song was a rallying cry in **German** states during the unsuccessful revolutions of 1848 and remained a popular expression of national unity after German Unification in 1871, though it subsequently became increasingly popular among the growing number of German chauvinists so despised by Nietzsche. In 1922, Fallersleben's poem and Haydn's musical setting were adopted as the official national anthem of the Weimar Republic.

Haydn's melody had originally been conceived to honor the Austrian emperor with an anthem beginning, “*Gott erhalte Franz den Kaiser*” (“God Save the Emperor Franz”); this would remain the Austro-Hungarian national anthem until 1918. Its melody was immediately popular, so much so that Haydn developed it as a theme for variations in his *Emperor Quartet*, Opus 76, no. 3. Up to that point, the German national anthem, “*Heil Dir im Siegerkranz*” (“Hail, in Your Victor's Crown”), had been sung to the tune of “God Save the Queen.”

Today, the German national anthem, or “*Deutschlandlied*,” consists of the politically neutral third verse of Fallersleben's poem, as the first two verses can be construed as glorifying German territorial aggrandizement—although that was not the author's intention. Nietzsche was prescient in sensing that the poem's patriotic sentiment was open to misinterpretation. He frequently used the opening phrase “*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*” as shorthand for all that he hated in the Germans. He thought their jingoistic **nationalism** had crushed the traditional creativity of the German *Geist*. “*Deutschland*,

*Deutschland über alles*’ was, I fear, the end of German philosophy” (TI, “What the Germans Lack”: 1). *See also* EUROPE; VOLK.

**DILTHEY, WILHELM (1833–1911).** German hermeneutic philosopher. Dilthey was appointed professor of philosophy in Berlin in 1882. He is best known for his attempt to separate natural scientific analysis, which deals with laws, from social scientific analysis, which deals with motives and intentions. His own position, as set out in his *Einführung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (*Introduction to the Human Sciences*, 1883), was antinaturalistic and consistent with *Lebensphilosophie*. Dilthey envisaged a wide new discipline, “*Geisteswissenschaft*” (“human sciences”), that would comprise **history**, religion, literature, politics, **art**, law, economics, and philosophy. This new discipline would help man to give some meaning to his own life by raising his level of historical consciousness. Dilthey thought that Nietzsche’s lonely struggle toward the attainment of this historical consciousness had caused him go mad. At the beginning of the 20th century, Dilthey’s “irrationalism” was challenged, but the importance of his methodology is now recognized.

**DIODEGENES LAËRTIUS.** Third-century **Greek** historian of philosophy. In November 1866, Nietzsche’s professor of philology at Leipzig, **Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl**, set the topic “*De Laërtii Diogenis Fontibus*” (“Sources of Diogenes Laërtes”) for an essay competition that Nietzsche won. Nietzsche’s essay was published in four parts in 1868–1869. This early success, together with his work on Theognis, impressed Ritschl so much that he recommended Nietzsche for the chair of philology in Basel when it became vacant in 1869.

**DIONYSUS/DIONYSIAN.** **Greek** god of **music** and wine, also known as Bacchus to the Romans. The licentious revels associated with him in Greece were known as *Bacchanalia*. Nietzsche builds his central argument around Dionysus in *The Birth of Tragedy*, where “the Dionysian” is used as a **symbol** to indicate a psychic state of **aesthetic** experience, in this case ecstatic abandonment, or *Rausch* (intoxication), which is often set off against the counterpart dreamlike state of lucid, controlled creativity as represented by **Apollo**. Both states are found in **Greek tragedy**, but Nietzsche gives precedence to the

Dionysian over the Apollonian. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche argued that the Greeks needed a counterbalance to the feeling of **nausea** they experienced when they glimpsed the meaningless of **life**, and this was provided in their art. The Greeks used art as a safety valve that enabled them to act without being inhibited by the terror of existence: “Now the slave is a free man . . . each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the **veil** of Maya had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity” (*BT*, 1).

Nietzsche never lost sight of the figure of Dionysus in his writing, returning to a definition of him in the late work *Twilight of the Idols* as a “wonderful phenomenon” who revealed to us the psychology of the Greeks:

For it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian condition, that the *fundamental fact* of the Hellenic instinct expresses itself—its “will to life.” What did the Hellene guarantee to himself in these mysteries? *Eternal life*, the eternal recurrence of life; the future promised and consecrated in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond death and change; *true* life as collective continuation of life though procreation, through the mysteries of **sexuality**. (*TI*, “What I Owe to the Ancients” 4)

At the end of *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche identified himself with Dionysus: “I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysos [*sic*] . . .” (*TI*, “What I Owe to the Ancients” 4). Several of the final notes he scribbled before he went insane are signed “Dionysus,” though a few are also signed “The Crucified,” with a couple signed for good measure as “The Anti-Christ,” and one “Nietzsche Caesar,” showing a **suffering** Nietzsche still intent on drawing out the dual structure of the relationship between Dionysus and Apollo. Ironically, in view of Nietzsche’s own insanity, the Greeks believed that those who did not welcome Dionysus would be overwhelmed with intoxication and madness.

A fashion for Dionysian cultic myth was prevalent in the **symbolist movement**, as in the circle round **Stefan George** in Germany and **Vyacheslav Ivanov** in Russia. When presenting a gift to the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, **Benito Mussolini** could think of nothing more fitting than a statue of Dionysus (see the photo spread). Refer to William J. McGrath, *Dionysian Art and Populist Politics* (1974); Julian

Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (1992); and Elvira Burgos Díaz, *Dionysos en la filosofía del joven Nietzsche (Dionysus in the Work of the Young Nietzsche)* (1993).

**DITHYRAMBS OF DIONYSUS.** Nine poems of loose structure and varying length that Nietzsche prepared for print in 1888, though they had been written during the years 1883–1888. They were published in 1892 in the first collection of Nietzsche's works, edited by **Peter Gast**. The visionary style pays homage to the **Greek** god **Dionysus**, who first appeared in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* as a counterpart to **Apollo** but who by 1883 had become virtually identical with the *Übermensch*. This explains the many references to **Zarathustra** in the poems, frequently expanding on incidents in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (parts of which are themselves indistinguishable from free verse). R. J. Hollingdale characterized the collection as a combination of "strongly cadenced prose and the style of compressed metaphor" (R. J. Hollingdale, *DD*, Introduction).

The *Dithyrambs of Dionysus* feature only one direct reference to Dionysus when, in the seventh poem, titled "**Ariadne's Complaint**," he replies briefly to Ariadne's much longer lament, finishing with the cryptic remark to her, "*I am thy labyrinth . . .*" (*DD*, "Ariadne's Complaint"). In ancient myth, Ariadne was abandoned by Theseus on Naxos but rescued by Dionysus. The lament in question had first appeared in the section "The Sorcerer" in the fourth book of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in the mouth of the sorcerer **Wagner**/Theseus, at which point Zarathustra/Nietzsche sets upon him. In the *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, the identical lament, now renamed "Ariadne's Complaint," is placed in the mouth of Ariadne/Cosima. The effect is somewhat disturbing. The poetry itself does not reveal Nietzsche's encroaching madness, but the reassignment of the lines to Ariadne indicates an unresolved conflict on Nietzsche's part toward the Wagners.

**DÖBLIN, ALFRED (1878–1957).** German writer. A physician by profession, Döblin took an intellectual rather than an **artistic** interest in Nietzsche as a philosopher. He was a medical student when he first read Nietzsche. Unlike most of his contemporary German writers, he was not spellbound by Nietzsche but instead criticized his tendency to speak in **metaphors**, to exaggerate and generalize. In two es-

says, “*Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis bei Friedrich Nietzsche*” (“Friedrich Nietzsche’s **Will to Power** as Cognition,” 1902) and “*Zu Nietzsches Morallehre*” (“On Nietzsche’s **Moral Teaching**,” 1903), Döblin provides an insightful discussion of Nietzsche by indicating the strong links between Nietzsche’s thought and the biological theories of his time. The will to power is, for example, “an essential striving for accumulation.” The essay on Nietzsche’s moral teaching provides fascinating insights into Nietzsche’s concept of **morality** as “gelebte Metaphysik” (“lived **metaphysics**”). This essay also stresses the biological theme, pointing out that Nietzsche’s instruction to **affirm life** should be narrowed down to a particular sort of life: the sensual. In the essay “*Die literarische Situation*” (1946), Döblin returns to the notion by pointing out that the biological burden of Nietzsche’s **Übermensch** was ignored by the **National Socialists** in favor of “the idea of the Aryan **master**” (*Herrenmensch*), which compromised Nietzsche’s idea and spelled out a “degeneration of Utopia.” Döblin is remembered now as a leading **Expressionist** narrative writer, though the machine aesthetic of his seminal modernist novel *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (1929), in which the city is joint protagonist with the main character, places this novel somewhere between Expressionism and New Objectivity (*neue Sachlichkeit*).

**DOHM, HEDWIG (1833–1919).** German **Jewish** writer and radical **feminist**. Unhappily married to the editor of the satirical publication *Kladderadatsch*, Ernst Dohm, who deceived her even with her own cook, Dohm published her first polemic on behalf of feminism at the age of 30, *Der Jesuitismus im Hausstand* (*Domesticized Jesuitism*, 1863). Dohm attacked **Lou Andreas-Salomé**, of whom she was personally fond, for her apparent hypocrisy with regard to feminism. Andreas-Salomé’s views were extremely close to those of Nietzsche on the topic of women’s emancipation. Dohm subsequently came to attack Nietzsche during the 1890s, chiefly through articles in the periodical *Die Zukunft*. Nevertheless, she paid tribute to Nietzsche for having provided the intellectual insights whereby women could distance themselves from conventional behavior or conventional religious belief. Nietzsche was given full credit for the resulting liberation of the person. Dohm, in particular, heeded Nietzsche’s instruction to “become who you are” (*GS*, III: 270), giving this title to

one of her short novels, *Werde, die Du bist* (1894). Dohm wrote further significant polemical works for the women's movement as well as a trilogy of novels in which the female protagonists try, not very successfully, to be "Nietzschean": *Sibilla Dalmar* (1896), *Schicksale einer Seele* (*Destiny of a Soul*, 1899), and *Christa Ruhland* (1902). Refer to Gaby Pailer, *Schreibe, die du bist! Die Gestaltung weiblicher "Autorschaft" im erzählerischen Werk Hedwig Dohms* (*Write Who You Are! The Formulation of Feminine "Authorship" in Hedwig Dohm's Narrative Work*, 1994).

**DREISER, THEODORE (1871–1945)**. American novelist. Dreiser's writing represented an attempt—mostly frustrated—to overcome the unhappiness of his deprived childhood and achieve material success. A major cause of his unhappiness was the fact that he married a woman he did not love, and she refused to grant him a divorce, thus preventing him from marrying the woman he did love. A friend of **Jack London** and protégé of H. L. Mencken, Dreiser responded to Nietzsche's call for the individual to overcome **ressentiment** and rise above the **herd** in such novels as *The Titan* (1914) and *The "Genius"* (1915). In the 1920s, Dreiser became a socialist and turned away from his advocacy of the rights of the exceptional man, though he continued to engage with Nietzschean themes, as in *Hey, Rub-A-Dub-Dub! A Book of the Mystery and Wonder and Terror of Life* (1920). Here, Dreiser laments the fact that America has not yet brought forth a Nietzsche. Dreiser became increasingly disillusioned with capitalism, expressing this in his novel *An American Tragedy* (1925). Shortly before his death, Dreiser had become so disenchanted with individualism that he joined the Communist Party.

**DRIVE (DER TRIEB)**. Nietzsche held that all our natural instincts, sensual or mental, collaborate to produce thought, but he described human drives in physiological terms and disagreed with **F. A. Lange's** antimaterialist conclusions. For Nietzsche, some drives are beneficial and others are not, but none has an inherent **moral** function; a drive acquires this "when it enters into relations with drives already baptised good or evil" (*D*, I: 38). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche writes, "To our strongest drive, the tyrant in us, not only our reason but our conscience submits" (*BGE*, IV: 158). Nietzsche

approved of strong drives but recognized that within the community the person of strong drives is seen as a threat:

When the highest and strongest drives, breaking passionately out, carry the individual far above and beyond the average and lowlands of the **herd conscience**, the self-confidence of the community goes to pieces . . . consequently, it is precisely these drives which are most branded and calumniated. (*BGE*, V: 201)

*See also* BODY; NATURE/NATURAL.

**DRUSKOWITZ, HELENE (1856–1918).** Austrian writer and philosopher. Druskowitz acquired her doctorate from Zurich University at the precociously early age of 22. Having written several mediocre plays, which incidentally display an affinity with radical **feminism**, she published a collection of three essays on English women writers (George Eliot, E. B. Browning, and Joanna Baillie) and a work on Shelley, *Percy Bysshe Shelley*, all of which Nietzsche professed to like so much that he recommended them to his mother and sister in a letter to them both (22 October 1884). Nietzsche was beginning to feel that in Druskowitz, he might have found the disciple he had wanted—and thought he had found—in **Lou Andreas-Salomé**. Druskowitz then produced several works of high philosophical quality, such as *Moderne Versuche eines Religionersatzes. Ein philosophischer Essay (Modern Attempts at a Substitute for Religion: A Philosophical Essay, 1886)*, which—to Nietzsche’s chagrin—went against his own views; Druskowitz even accused him of incitement to immorality. In an attempt to discuss how moral standards can be upheld in a religious vacuum, Druskowitz placed her faith in the essential goodness of man and his fundamental sense of social responsibility. Her attack on Nietzsche continued in *Wie ist Verantwortung und Zurechnung ohne Annahme der Willensfreiheit möglich? Eine Untersuchung (How Is Responsibility and Accountability Possible without Positing the Freedom of the Will?, 1887)*. Druskowitz became mentally insane during the 1890s.

**DÜHRING, EUGEN (1833–1921).** German philosopher and economist. Having practiced as a lawyer, Dühring lectured at Berlin University from 1864 to 1877. In *Der Wert des Lebens. Eine philosophische Betrachtung (The Value of Life: A Course in Philosophy,*



1865), which Nietzsche possessed and annotated in a cursory fashion, Dühring held that **pity** or sympathy with others is the foundation of **morality**, a view to which Nietzsche was diametrically opposed. Both men rejected **Darwinism**, Dühring for egalitarian reasons, although his ethics of sympathy found no favor at all with Friedrich Engels, who dismissed Dühring's advocacy of harmony between capitalists and proletarians (as set out in *Capital und Arbeit*, 1865) as "vulgar materialism." Nietzsche probably did not read Engels's attack on Dühring in *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung in der Philosophie* (*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, 1877–1878), now universally known by the *soubriquet* of "Anti-Dühring." However, he possessed *Sache, Leben und Feinde* (*Matter, Life and Enemies*, 1882), and in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche attacked "the agitator" Dühring for "the doctrine of revenge" (*OGM*, II: 11) found in that work. Dühring is slandered as "today's biggest loudmouth of morality, even amongst his own kind, the **anti-Semites**" (*OGM*, III: 15). The antipathy might have been sparked by a difference of view between Dühring and Nietzsche on the finitude of **time**. In Dühring's *Cursus der Philosophie als streng wissenschaftlicher Weltanschauung und Lebensgestaltung* (*Course in Philosophy as Strictly Scientific World View and Life Plan*, 1875), which Nietzsche possessed and annotated fairly vigorously, Dühring asserted the infinitude of future time but not the infinitude of time in regress, which would be "senseless." In contrast, Nietzsche's **eternal return** would work only if the infinitude of time were posited in regress as well as forward.

**DUNCAN, ISADORA (1878–1927)**. American dancer. A native of San Francisco, Duncan toured **Europe** at the turn of the century to wide acclaim, especially in Germany. Lightly clad in a flowing tunic, she became the leading exponent of a new form of dancing inspired by the illustrations found on **Greek** vases and other artifacts. As she states in her autobiography *My Life* (1928), Duncan was influenced by Nietzsche, especially by **Zarathustra's** invitation to **dance**. She also responded to members of the Russian **symbolist movement**, such as **Vyacheslav Ivanov**, who were themselves under Nietzsche's spell in their mystic interpretation of Nietzsche's individualism (in their case derived chiefly from *The Birth of Tragedy*). Duncan in her turn influenced the writer Fedor Sologub.

**DURCH.** A coterie founded by Conrad Küster, **Leo Berg**, and Eugen Wolff in August–September 1886 that became the *Genie-Klub*. In 1887, Wolff drew up *Ten Theses* for the society, which established the term “die Moderne” (“the moderns”) to describe the group. The members, including **Arno Holz**, **Johannes Schlaf**, **Wilhelm Bölsche**, **Bruno Wille**, **Gerhart Hauptmann**, **Julius Hart** and his brother Heinrich, as well as the **Max Stirner** enthusiast John Henry Mackay and a series of invited guests, constituted a “talking shop” to develop the theories of the **Naturalist movement** under the leadership of Leo Berg. The group kept minutes of their meetings, where the “modern” ideas of Nietzsche, Stirner, **Leo Tolstoi**, **Henrik Ibsen**, Émile Zola, and Feodor Dostoyevsky inter alia were discussed. Views in the group ranged from vigorously pro-Nietzschean to scorchingly hostile.

**DYNAMITE.** Nietzsche first mentioned the Aristotelian **concept** of *dynamis* (the Greek word for **power**) in 1887 in a note found in the *Nachgelassene Fragmente*: “Dynamis: ‘real tendency to action,’ still contained (*noch gehemmt*) and trying to actualize itself—‘will to power’” (9 [92], Autumn 1887, KSA, 12). The note follows a reference to Otto Liebmann’s *Gedanken und Tatsachen* (*Thoughts and Facts*, 1882) and indicates that Nietzsche was trying to fit the **will to power** into the scientific framework of the physics of **force**, where action is dependent on resistance. He was also aware of the new substance called “dynamite” that Alfred Bernhard Nobel had invented in 1867. Nobel’s formula for “dynamite no. 1,” as he called it, was 75 percent glycerine and 25 percent kieselguhr; this was safer to handle than glycerine alone. Nietzsche could have had the idea of potential explosivity in mind when making the cryptic comment “still contained and trying to actualise itself.” Finally, when he was on the cusp of madness, Nietzsche used the term to refer to himself. Writing to **Helen Zimmern** on 17 December 1888, à propos his recently published *Twilight of the Idols*, he declared, “I am not a man at all, I am dynamite,” repeating the same sentiment in a letter to his old school friend **Paul Deussen**—having just completed *The Anti-Christ*—“I am more dynamite than man” (Nietzsche to Deussen, 26 November 1888). Today, Nietzsche’s iconoclasm is associated with the term “dynamite” on a broader scale. The Icelandic author Birgir

Sigurdsson's play *Dinamit* (2005) deals with Nietzsche's explosive relationships with **Lou Andreas-Salomé** and his sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**.

– E –

**ECCE HOMO (p.h. 1908)**. Subtitled *How One Becomes What One Is*, this was the last of Nietzsche works to be published. Apart from a piece written in his teens entitled *Aus meinem Leben* and a three-page *Vita* enclosed in his letter to Georg Brandes of 10 April 1888 (where he claims Polish ancestry as a Niëzky), Nietzsche did not write an autobiography as such, although *Ecce Homo* has autobiographical elements, discussed below. The work has a foreword, three sections titled “Why I Am So Wise,” “Why I Am So Clever,” and “Why I Write Such Good Books,” followed by ten brief chapters on Nietzsche's individual works, more or less in chronological order. Finally, there is a conclusion titled “Why I Am a Destiny.” It could be argued that Nietzsche was already prey to delusions of grandeur while at work on *Ecce Homo*; certainly, the section headings alone invite this interpretation, yet history has decreed that Nietzsche's overwhelming sense of destiny was perfectly justified.

Nietzsche's purpose in *Ecce Homo* is to give an account of how and why each of his published works was written, with his comments on their contents: in short, he bequeaths his readers a literary autobiography. In the section on *The Birth of Tragedy*, **Socrates**, not **Apollo**, has become the counterpart to **Dionysus**. In the section on the *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche admits that the “warlike” essays (*EH*, “The Untimely Ones”: 1) are really all about himself and his own development. The section on *Human, All Too Human* is likewise autobiographical in that Nietzsche reminds readers what happened to inspire him to write that work—he woke up one day in Bayreuth and realized he was a stranger: “There was nothing I recognized; I scarcely recognized **Wagner**” (*EH*, “Human, All Too Human” 2). *Daybreak*, *The Gay Science*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *On the Genealogy of Morality* all receive surprisingly brief mention, though as one might expect, the section on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is much fuller. Here, Zarathustra has become Dionysus, enabling

Nietzsche (who identified increasingly with Dionysus) to write: “Who beside me knows what **Ariadne** is!” (*EH*, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”: 8)—an oblique reference to **Cosima Wagner**. In the section on *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche attacks the Germans rather than Richard Wagner: “the Germans are *canaille* [rabble]” (*EH*, “The Case of Wagner”: 4). This section of *Ecce Homo* ends with a trumpet voluntary for “the lightning bolt of the *Revaluation*”—later to become *The Will to Power*—but omits discussion of *The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche contra Wagner*, or the *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, all finished but awaiting publication. On the brink of insanity when he wrote *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche, though provocative and reckless, still produced a shrewd critique of his own works. As he remarked to Naumann caustically in a letter dated 19 November 1888 that he might as well write his own reviews, as nobody else had yet done so.

Nietzsche’s heightened state of awareness when writing this work reveals itself in his satirical, self-parodying mood, but he is also more bitter in his attacks than elsewhere, as well as more personal: “To think German, to feel German—I can do anything, but not that” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 2). Unfortunately, some of his remarks on **women** in the third section of *Ecce Homo* are particularly troubling; Nietzsche repeats Zarathustra’s insult from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* about the miracle cure for female ills, pregnancy: “Has my answer been heard to the question how one *cures* a woman—redeems her? One gives her a child” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 5). Of course, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche is not Zarathustra; but in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche is very much Nietzsche when he maligns campaigners for emancipation as sick: “The fight for equal rights is actually a disease: every physician knows that” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 5).

Begun in October 1888, *Ecce Homo* was written hastily in the last months of that year, to be finished just before Nietzsche collapsed into insanity on 3 January 1889. During November and December 1888, Nietzsche plied his publisher, Constantin Georg Naumann, with numerous requests, sending him the manuscripts of *Nietzsche contra Wagner* and *Ecce Homo*, the latter piecemeal. *Twilight of the Idols* having just come out, Nietzsche told Naumann that he would like to delay publication of *The Anti-Christ* so it would have a greater effect when published. He made a similar request in a postcard to

Naumann dated 20 December regarding *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, which he wanted delayed in favor of *Ecce Homo*. He was convinced that *Ecce Homo* would be immensely popular and wanted it to appear simultaneously in **German**, French, and English. He asked **August Strindberg** and **Helen Zimmern** to do the translations, firing off letters to them on the same day even though the work was barely complete. In his letter to Helen Zimmern he wrote, “The book will destroy **Christianity** and **Bismarck** as well” (8 December 1888). The letters betray the same type of hubris that is on display throughout *Ecce Homo*; clearly, Nietzsche was ill and running out of time. However, since the work really did become a bestseller in Germany when it appeared in 1908, much of his ebullient self-belief had substance.

By the end of December, Naumann had the bulk of the manuscript for *Ecce Homo*. At this point, Nietzsche sent an alteration—by registered post—to supplant the third part of “Why I Am So Wise,” where he had given a bland description of his father, mother, and grandmother. Instead, he now wished to substitute some highly vitriolic words on his mother and sister. When **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** finally brought out the work in 1908, she first sent **Peter Gast** to Leipzig to retrieve the alteration from Naumann and destroy it, before printing the original version as though nothing had happened. However, Gast did not destroy the missing page, and it is now in its rightful section in Nietzsche’s work. The following will give an impression of why Nietzsche’s sister wanted to censor the correction Nietzsche had sent to Naumann with such urgency on 29 December 1888:

When I search for the deepest contrast to myself, the incalculable meanness of the instincts, I always find my mother and sister – it would be to blaspheme against my divinity to believe myself related to such *canaille*. . . . I confess that the profoundest objection to “**eternal return**,” actually my most *abysmal* thought, is always my mother and my sister. (*EH*, “Why I am So Wise”: 3)

**EDUCATION.** Nietzsche did not concern himself with pedagogical theory on such topics as maturation, though he had seen the inside of a number of boys’ schools and was well qualified to give a verdict on them. He was more concerned with the philistinism of many teachers and their outmoded methods. All of this came under attack

in his five essays “On the Future of Our Educational Institutions” (*Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungs-Anstalten*), presented as a lecture series in Basel in 1872. (A draft titled “Thoughts on the Future of Our Educational Institutions” was included in the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, 1872.) In these lectures, Nietzsche bitterly criticizes the **German** educational system as a branch of the **state**, intent on seeking to level down **culture** through educational policies that pander to the masses; he would dearly like to substitute an intellectual aristocracy on the model of attic **Greece**. In the third essay of *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche advocated that state institutions should have nothing to do with philosophy since they only contaminate it: “The state never has any use for **truth** as such, but only for truth that is useful to it” (*UM*, 3: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 8). He despaired that German educational institutions could ever become “the vehicles of true education” (David Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche’s Educational Philosophy*, 1983).

Although in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* it is **Zarathustra**, not Nietzsche, who is the teacher, Nietzsche speaks on education with his own voice in his other major works. He repeatedly referred to the need for a more relevant system of education throughout his later work. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche reiterated ideas expressed in 1872: education meant teaching people to live and think independently. What went on in the grammar schools of the time was geared merely to produce conformity and obedience to the new Reich: “Our overcrowded grammar schools, our overloaded, stupefied grammar-school teachers, are a scandal” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack”: 5).

Partly for this reason and partly because of his own bigotry toward **feminism**, Nietzsche repeatedly warned that **women** should not be offered grammar school education, though this was a demand made by nearly all early campaigners for women’s emancipation. Nietzsche was a bitter opponent of female higher education, arguing that emancipated women “want to lower the general rank of woman; and there is no surer means for that than higher education, slacks, and political voting-cattle rights” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books,” 5). One of the reasons why Nietzsche despised the Second Reich was its introduction of two extra years of compulsory schooling for girls (increased from the age of 14 to 16), though university education was not available to them until the turn of the century. The *Abitur*, or

grammar school, qualification was (and still is) the only way to gain entry to a university education in Germany; without it, women could not enter higher education. In Nietzsche's opinion, women were thus spared untold horrors. Refer to Gary Lemco, *Nietzsche as Educator* (1992), and Timo Hoyer, *Nietzsche und die Pädagogik (Nietzsche and Pedagogy, 2002)*.

**EISNER, KURT (1867–1919).** German writer and journalist. Eisner wrote an early and influential review of Nietzsche's work for *Die Gesellschaft* in late 1891 titled "*Friedrich Nietzsche und die Apostel der Zukunft. Beiträge zur modernen Psychopathia Spiritualis*" ("Friedrich Nietzsche and the Apostles of the Future: Contributions to the Modern *Psychopathia Spiritualis*"). Here, Eisner described *Der Fall Wagner* as "the best feature article in German literature," while *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is referred to as "a work of **art** like *Faust*." Eisner urges that a history of Nietzscheanism ought to be written before the moment has passed (!) and sets about drawing up his own list of candidates, to include **Hermann Conradi**, **Ola Hansson**, and **Julius Langbehn**. He also mentions "*die Jungen*" around the radical **Bruno Wille** as disciples of Nietzsche. However, in spite of giving what appears to be fulsome praise of Nietzsche's thought, Eisner ends his article with the words "become soft!" in stark contrast to **Zarathustra's** command: "*become hard!*" (*Za*, III: "Of Old and New Tablets," 29). This article was expanded into a short book the following year, reversing the title to read *Psychopathia Spiritualis: Friedrich Nietzsche und die Apostel der Zukunft* (1892).

Eisner was editor of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* from 1891 to 1893 and collaborated on the **socialist** periodical *Vorwärts* from 1898 until 1905, when he was sacked by Franz Mehring for "revisionism." Eisner continued to pursue his left-wing editorial line while maintaining his admiration for Nietzsche's thought, a common trend in socialist Nietzscheanism. In 1917, he joined the "USPD," or Independent German Socialist Party (*Unabhängige Sozialistenpartei Deutschlands*), of which he became leader. Eisner subsequently led the revolution in Bavaria in November 1918, enlisting the help of his friend and colleague **Gustav Landauer**. This overthrew Kaiser Wilhelm II (who abdicated to Holland) and substituted a short-lived Bavarian Republic, of which Eisner was head. Eisner's embattled

republic paved the way for the first meeting of the National Assembly in Weimar, on 6 February 1919, constituting the fledgling Weimar Republic. Two weeks later, on 21 February 1919, Eisner was assassinated in Munich.

**ÉLAN VITAL.** *See* BERGSON, HENRI.

**ELLIS, HAVELOCK (1859–1939).** British writer and pioneer sexologist. Although a qualified medical doctor, Ellis became a man of letters engrossed with the study of **science** and literature. His interest in Nietzsche was aroused through Nietzsche's call for the individual to live **life** to the full—and a full life included **sexual** fulfillment. In *Affirmations* (1898), Ellis was enthusiastic about Nietzsche's early work but found anything written after 1883 too unrestrained; his essay "Nietzsche" (1909) therefore "leaves out of consideration all Nietzsche's later and greater work" (Phyllis Grosskurth, *Havelock Ellis: A Biography*, 1980). Whatever his reservations, Ellis asserted in a letter to Grant Watson dated 17 September 1917 that he gave Nietzsche "a very high place." Ellis's wife Edith was also a firm Nietzschean; her book *Three Modern Seers: Hinton, Nietzsche, Carpenter* (1910) gives a sympathetic if simplified account of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Interest in Nietzsche in the Ellis household was never far removed from the nascent science of sexology, of which Havelock Ellis was a pioneer. His first book, written in collaboration with John Addington Symonds and titled *Sexual Inversion*, was first published in Germany in 1896 (under a different title: *Das konträre Sexualgefühl*) because Ellis could not find a publisher in Britain for it. When he did, in 1897, he regretted it since Oscar Wilde had only just been released from jail that May, and the book was construed as an apology for homosexuality.

In a variety of other works on sexual or **eugenic** issues, foremost among them *The Task of Social Hygiene* (1912), Ellis pioneered a reforming eugenics movement that would seek to produce the **higher man** or individual, led by the **will to power**. Ellis was a thorn in the flesh of the straight-laced establishment, though he tried to avoid open conflict. He had links with sexologists in Germany, such as Magnus Hirschfeld and the enthusiastic Nietzschean **Helene**



**Stöcker**, the leaders in the field at the time. Like them, Ellis was denounced by the **National Socialists**, and his books were burned in 1933. *See also* SEXUALITY.

**EMERSON, RALPH WALDO (1803–1882)**. American writer and thinker. Nietzsche admired Emerson consistently from his early 20s until his mental collapse, though it is highly unlikely that Emerson could have known about Nietzsche, who was a neglected author in the **Germany** of his day. In 1882, Nietzsche prefaced the original edition of *The Gay Science* with a quotation from Emerson, who had died that April, while in 1888 he commented in *Twilight of the Idols*, “Emerson—Much more enlightened, adventurous, multifarious, refined than Carlyle; above all, *happier . . .*” (TI, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 13).

In 1832, Emerson had resigned his Unitarian ministry and traveled to Europe, meeting William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Thomas Carlyle and returning in 1833. In 1836, he distilled his skepticism into a small book titled *Nature*, which was destined to become an influential work on transcendentalism. Everything Emerson subsequently wrote merely augmented what he had written in *Nature*. His two volumes of *Essays* (1841 and 1844) brought him great renown. Other works include *Representative Men* (1850), where he discusses great men like Napoleon or thinkers who influenced him, such as Plato and Swedenborg. All his work was written with a brilliantly concise and elegant style that strongly attracted Nietzsche, even though his English was not very good. Refer to L. S. Hubbard, *Nietzsche und Emerson* (1958) and George J. Stack, *Nietzsche and Emerson: An Elective Affinity* (1992).

**ENLIGHTENMENT**. **European** rational movement of the 17th and 18th centuries. Nietzsche often speaks of the Enlightenment as a stage on the way to European **Romanticism**, his *bête noire*. As its name implies (French: “*les lumières*”; German: “*die Aufklärung*”), the Enlightenment was deemed to “bring light” into philosophy, politics, and **art** as well as religion. In France, the work of **Voltaire**, Montesquieu, Denis Diderot, and the *Encyclopédistes* is characteristic of the quest to make tolerance a virtue and to codify human **knowledge**, while **Jean-Jacques Rousseau**’s attempt to build a working

faith around his conception of **God in nature** would have seminal influence. The Italian Enlightenment was predominantly journalistic, while that in England was chiefly philosophical: John Locke wrote a blueprint for **democracy**, and Jeremy Bentham drew up the foundations for **utilitarianism**; in Germany, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing made major contributions in philosophy and literature, respectively.

Nietzsche had an ambivalent attitude toward the Enlightenment, mistrusting its reliance on **rationalism**. It asked the right questions of religion and **science** but drew the wrong conclusions; in other words, the laudable quest for “scientific” facts could be “tyrannized over by logic” (*HH*, I: “Of First and Last Things,” 6), while the seeds of skepticism did not lead to a declaration of the death of **God**. In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche posits his *own* philosophy as a new Enlightenment (in spite of its retrograde preoccupation with the **Greeks**), with himself as **free spirit** and leading light, a motif camouflaged in the title given to the second part of *Human, All Too Human*: “*The Wanderer and His Shadow*.” Nietzsche presses his central point that all religion is founded on error; there might even be a **metaphysical** world, “but all that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions *valuable, terrible, delightful* [to people] is passion, error and self-deception” (*HH*, I: “Of First and Last Things,” 6).

**ERNST, PAUL (1866–1933)**. German critic and writer of popular novels and dramas. Ernst became a **Marxist** when a student at Berlin University, though he severed his connections with Marxism at the turn of the century. However, he was still a Marxist when he wrote an early—critical—article on Nietzsche’s thought for *Die freie Bühne* in June 1890: “*Friedrich Nietzsche. Seine historische Stellung. Seine Philosophie*” (“Friedrich Nietzsche: His Historical Position; His Philosophy”). This publication on Nietzsche placed Ernst, alongside **Georg Brandes**, in the van of Nietzsche criticism; it is ironic that Nietzsche collapsed just before his work began to make an impact. Ernst describes Nietzsche prophetically as all set to become “in vogue,” a trend to be resisted because of the brutality inherent in Nietzsche’s “philosophy of **decadence**.” Ernst, who incidentally always recognized the psychologist in Nietzsche, struggles to place the errant Nietzsche within a dialectical framework by highlighting

his faulty evaluation of **master morality**. He deplores Nietzsche's misleading tendency to speak of **power** in a political context when he actually means a social context, making **pessimism** a reassuring "bolster" (*Ruhekissen*) for philistines. Later, in an article titled "*Der Wille zur Macht*" published in *Ethische Kultur* in 1902, Ernst suggested that Nietzsche's desire to be a prophet and ruler did violence to the poet and psychologist within him. Striking out against the current **naturalist movement** then fashionable, especially on the stage, Ernst called for a revival of the classical tradition in German drama, best seen in his *Brunhild* (1909), though his short stories and essays have survived better than his dramas.

#### ETERNAL FEMININE/WOMANLY (*DAS EWIG-WEIBLICHE*).

Nietzsche's phrase refers to the last two lines of *Faust II* by **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe** (published posthumously in 1832), where Mephistopheles, having won his pact with God on points, sees Faust redeemed by the "**eternal feminine**," the apotheosis of Gretchen: "*das Ewig-Weibliche/ zieht uns hinan*" ("the eternal feminine/ draws us aloft"). Mephistopheles is left furious and frustrated. Nietzsche's interpretation of the term "eternal feminine" was idiosyncratic, with an antifeminist barb wholly lacking in Goethe's *Faust*; that said, both men used the term to challenge the blinkered bourgeois **morality** of the Germany of their day. In Goethe's case, that morality ought to have put the child murderer Gretchen beyond the pale: at the end of *Faust I* (1808), she is not just a fallen woman but a *felon*, which is precisely why Goethe places her in the redemptive role, forcing his wealthy Weimar theater audience to show tolerance, willy-nilly.

By contrast, Nietzsche sneered at bourgeois housewives who pretended to be spiritually perfect but were vain and silly; however, there is a good deal of fear and **ressentiment** in his approach. Nietzsche, opponent of women's **education** extraordinaire, considered that women would not want self-enlightenment unless as a new adornment: "—self-adornment pertains to the eternal-womanly, does it not?" (*BGE*, VII: 232). Nietzsche then says what he really believes is going on: "—she is trying to inspire fear of herself—perhaps she is seeking domination." In *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche returns to the theme that women are dangerous to men. He despairs of clever men:

Hardly any of them have character enough not to be corrupted—or “redeemed”—when they find themselves treated like gods: soon they condescend to the level of the women.—Man is a coward, confronted with the Eternal-Feminine—and the females know it.— (CW: 3)

This is very far from what Goethe intended with his “*ewig-Weibliche*.” Nietzsche actually appears to be *jealous* of Goethe—dubbed “Priapus” by his early mentor, Johann Gottfried von Herder, as Nietzsche goes on to remind us (CW: 3). Suffice it to say that Goethe was supremely secure with the opposite sex—unlike Nietzsche.

**ETERNAL RETURN/RECURRENCE.** Nietzsche’s most enigmatic concept. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the doctrine (*Lehre*) is given flesh (having been mooted briefly as “the **heaviest** burden” in *The Gay Science* [GS, IV: 342]), and it then all but disappears from the work he published in his lifetime. There is great confusion as to which term is correct in English, return or recurrence. When Nietzsche uses *ewig wiederkehren* or *ewig wiederkommen*, the translation is “recur, return or come back eternally.” Almost without exception, Nietzsche chooses *die ewige Wiederkunft* (eternal return), stemming as it does from the verb *kommen*, rather than *die ewige Wiederkehr* (eternal recurrence) when speaking of **Zarathustra**’s teaching (*Wiederkunft-lehre*). The default word should be “return” rather than “recurrence” because Nietzsche used the latter so sparingly. In addition, “*Wiederkunft*” suggests a “coming to rest” at a specific moment in **time**, though not in such a way as to negate Nietzsche’s doctrine if we see it in terms of the eternal return of moments. Compare the two following passages:

I: “Alas! Man recurs/returns eternally! The little man recurs/returns eternally!” [“—ach, der Mensch kehrt ewig wieder! Der kleine Mensch kehrt ewig wieder!”] (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent,” 2).

II: “I shall return eternally to this identical and self-same **life**, in that which is greatest as well as that most small, to teach once more the eternal return of all things” [“—ich komme ewig wieder zu diesem gleichen und selbigen Leben, im Grössten und auch im Kleinsten, dass ich wieder aller Dinge ewige Wiederkunft lehre”] (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent,” 2).

To understand Nietzsche’s strategy within the doctrine, it is essential to have a clear grasp of the terms, as discussed previously, and schol-

ars should check their references against the original German. Early Nietzsche critics, foremost among them **Karl Löwith**, **Karl Jaspers**, and **Martin Heidegger**, by frequently using “*ewige Wiederkehr*” in their critique, even when Nietzsche had actually written “*ewige Wiederkunft*,” encouraged a trend that is now virtually ineradicable: the tendency—widespread in Germany—to believe that Nietzsche had presented the doctrine as “*ewige Wiedekehrslehre*.” This has encouraged English critics to believe that “recurrence” is the best translation; indeed, the most recent translation of part of the *Will to Power* renders both *ewige Wiederkunft* and *ewige Wiederkehr* as “eternal recurrence” on the same page, as though they are interchangeable (Rüdiger Bittner, ed., *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, “Lenzer Heide” manuscript, sections 6–7); they are not, however, identical. “Recurrence” is perhaps more elegant but not what Nietzsche usually says.

Nietzsche’s chief explanation of his *Wiederkunftslehre* is found in *Ecce Homo*, where he credits **Heraclitus** as the probable source of inspiration. He also explains how, on contemplating a pyramid-like rock by Lake Silvaplana near Sils Maria in 1881, he conceived the thought of eternal return as “the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be achieved” and made it the founding principle of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*EH*, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”: I). In his notebooks, he made several plans for a whole book to be titled *Die ewige Wiederkunft*, two in connection with poems about Zarathustra and one for a book in four parts. One of the notebooks of summer 1888 again trails *Die ewige Wiederkunft: Zarathustrische Tänze und Umzüge* (*Eternal Return: Zarathustran Dances and Processions*), but nothing came of this.

Although there have been many attempts to explain Nietzsche’s meaning, the main passage revealing eternal return in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is not particularly clear and is open to misconstruction. Zarathustra is accompanied by a dwarf who comments that time is a circle (*Kreis*). Later, Zarathustra sees a man being throttled by a serpent; this turns out to be a vision of Zarathustra himself. So much for the “parameters” of the initiation ceremony:

Behold this moment! . . . From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs *back*: an eternity lies behind us. Must not all things that *can* run have already run along this line? Must not all things that *can* happen *have* already happened, been done, run past? . . . And are not all

things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws after it all future things? Therefore—draws itself too? For all things that *can* run *must* run once again forward along this long lane . . .—must we not all have been here before?—and must we not return [*wiederkommen*] and run down that other lane out before us, down that long, terrible lane—must we not return eternally [*ewig wiederkommen*]? (*Za*, III: “Of the Vision and the Riddle,” 2)

Later in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the reference to the circle is dropped, but the conceit of circularity continues in Zarathustra’s reference to “the ring of eternal return” (“*der Ring der Wiederkunft*”). His refrain to bless the “nuptial ring of rings” that cements his mystical union with eternity is repeated seven times (*Za*, III: “The Seven Seals,” 2), a parody of the opening of the seven seals, Revelations 6–8, and the marriage of the Lamb, Revelations 19:7, and possibly a triumphant gloat that Nietzsche has “outringed” Wagner. Now that Zarathustra has achieved bliss (he has, in effect, wedded himself), the theory itself slips from prominence in Nietzsche’s works, resurfacing in a general way when eternity is discussed (as in *TI*, “What I Owe the Ancients,” 4). The posthumous notes (i.e., *The Will to Power*) contain a number of references, all dating back to the time when Nietzsche was busy with *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. A key feature of the doctrine of eternal return is that the *Übermensch* is someone who can *will* the return of everything (*Za*, II: “Of Redemption”). Zarathustra’s horror at the recurrence of the “little man” is what makes the thought of eternal return so terrible; we cannot “cherry-pick” the moments to be repeated but must **affirm** every single aspect of life, every second.

There are two chief ways in which the concept, as revealed in the previous quotations, has been explained: the **symbolic** or **metaphorical** interpretation and the cosmological or “**naturalistic**” interpretation. Early Nietzscheans pointed toward the symbolism of the serpent and the ring if pressed to explain eternal return but were really more concerned with the *Übermensch* and the principles of *Lebensphilosophie*; eternal return was construed mainly as an ecstatic experience of the *Übermensch*. Karl Löwith first confronted the problem of eternal return at a purely **metaphysical** level in *Nietzsche’s Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen*, 1935 (*Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence [sic] of the Same*, 1997). As mentioned previ-

ously, the title of this book left an indelible but erroneous impression in Germany that Nietzsche's main term for eternal return was *ewige Wiederkehr*.

Martin Heidegger also read eternal return at the metaphysical level, whereby he queried the usefulness or possibility of speaking about consciousness "in time." Heidegger, in his Introduction to *Nietzsche* (1961; trans. 1986), stressed the fundamental connection between eternal return of the same and the doctrine of the **will to power**. Like Heidegger, Joan Stambaugh was preoccupied with Nietzsche's view of time as a phenomenon in *Untersuchungen zum Problem der Zeit bei Nietzsche* (*An Investigation of the Problem of Time with Nietzsche*, 1959), arguing that eternity could never be "in time." Return is the movement of time into eternity, constituting the same in the sense that there is *ultimately* no discrepancy between time and eternity. In her *Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return* (1972), eternal return is also based largely on the will to power.

Pierre Klossowski, in *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux*, 1969 (*Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 1997), viewed the concept of eternal return from a **poststructuralist** point of view best understood through the central symbol of the ring or circle. This stands for the position of the individual who has an identity if included within the circle but none if excluded. Hitherto, **God** provided the basis for self-identity; Klossowski argues that Nietzsche's eternal return destroys identities and makes it impossible for the individual to construct a stable self-identity. For **Gilles Deleuze**, it is not "the same" that returns, nor is it "being"; instead, "recurrence is itself affirmed by the passage of diversity or multiplicity" (Gilles Deleuze, "Active and Reactive," in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David Allison, 1977).

Alongside metaphysical interpretations, eternal return received, from the first, a series of scientific interpretations from thinkers such as **Henri Bergson**. Contemporary critics who take Nietzsche seriously in terms of physics or cosmology point out, as do Milič Čapák in *The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics* (1961) and Bernd Magnus in *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative* (1978), that Nietzsche was still working within Newtonian physics, which means quite simply that he could not be right on what he said about time, though he could make insightful predictions. Alistair Moles argues that Nietzsche anticipated a relational theory of time. Moles

accepts that in Nietzsche's formula, this life is eternal life, and our attitude makes it **heavy** or light, but he goes on to speculate that for Nietzsche, the self is not just eternal but scattered in the universe. Nothing happens to the self by chance: "the self is the boundary point within which the whole of time and space are encapsulated" (*Nietzsche's Philosophy of Nature and Cosmology*, 1990). Drawing on current speculative physics, Moles asserts that the notion of the pulsating universe could give some credence to Nietzsche's statement that events are not just repetitive but recurrent.

Philosophers are still trying to grapple with the concept of eternal return. Robin Small (*Nietzsche in Context*, 2001) has detailed the context of Nietzsche's study of **natural science**, suggesting that he found parallels with the thought of contemporaries such as **African Spir**. John Richardson (*Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 2004) grounds the concept in Nietzsche's quest for **naturalism**, declaring it to be a symptom of Nietzsche's "problem with the past" since retrospection alienates us from ourselves: not all our instincts are good for us. Eternal return can redirect these instincts and let us face the past and go on willing. Paul Loeb, addressing the 15th Annual Friedrich Nietzsche Conference (Cambridge, 2005), called eternal return "the thought that splits the history of humankind in two." Refer to Ned Lukacher, *Time-Fetishes: The Secret History of Eternal Recurrence* (1998), and Lawrence Hatab, *Nietzsche's Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence* (2005).

**EUGENICS MOVEMENT.** In Germany, the movement for a new **science** that could promote the "well-born" (the **Greek** meaning of the term) was pioneered by Alfred Ploetz, who tried to merge **socialism** with **Darwinism** through his biological theories of selection. He set out his ideas in a monograph on racial hygiene with the impossible title *Die Tüchtigkeit unserer Rasse und der Schutz der Schwachen. Ein Versuch über Rassenhygiene und ihr Verhältnis zu den humanen Idealen, besonders zum Sozialismus* (*The Industriousness of Our Race and the Protection of the Weak: An Essay on Racial Hygiene and Its Relationship to Humane Ideals, Especially Socialism*, 1895). He prefaced his book with an aphorism from Nietzsche, a typical example of how Nietzsche's name has been routinely used to bolster various causes of which he would not have approved. In Britain, the



members of Francis Galton's Eugenics Society also included a number of Nietzscheans, such as Maximilian Mügge (who characterized Nietzsche as "the pioneer of eugenics") and **Havelock Ellis**. Mügge, in an article titled "Eugenics and the Superman," which appeared in the *Eugenics Review*, placed a racist construction on Nietzsche's concept of the **will to power**. Eugenacists characteristically insisted on reading Darwinism into Nietzsche's thought in spite of Nietzsche's profound mistrust of Charles Darwin.

Medical enthusiasm for racial improvement increased within the eugenics movement during the 1920s as genetic theories became better understood (but at the cost of popular support), although it should be noted that heredity and "improving the stock" did not yet have the sinister overtones they have today. However, by the 1930s, the German eugenics movement had been usurped by Aryan racism. By contrast, the Eugenics Society in London had acquired several leading socialists as its members (Sidney and Beatrice Webb, H. G. Wells, and **George Bernard Shaw**).

**EUROPE/EUROPEAN.** Nietzsche frequently referred to himself as a good European, often within the context of insulting the **Germans**: "—**grand politics** deceives no one. . . . Germany counts more and more as Europe's flatland.—" (*TI*, "What the Germans Lack": 3). In spite of a flush of patriotic feeling during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, he never conquered his aversion to the average bourgeois German citizen who had rapidly become the backbone of Wilhelmine Germany. In contrast to the Germans, who "have no idea how vulgar they are" (*EH*, "The Case of Wagner": 4), Nietzsche greatly admired the French and felt a cultural affinity toward them, though his heart was always with the ancient **Greeks**. Looking askance at the rising **nationalism** of his day, Nietzsche thought the solution was for Europe to be united. He believed that all great European thinkers had striven for this: Napoleon Bonaparte, **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**, Ludwig van Beethoven, Stendhal (pseudonym for Marie-Henri Beyle), **Heinrich Heine**, **Arthur Schopenhauer**, Eugène Delacroix, and Honoré de Balzac—even **Richard Wagner**. All are "on the whole an audacious-daring, splendidly violent, high-flying type of higher men who bore others up with them . . ." (*BGE*, VIII: 256). He regarded the future of **culture** as a fundamentally European project:

Owing to the pathological estrangement which the insanity of nationality has induced, and still induces, among the peoples of Europe; owing also to the short-sighted and quick-handed politicians who are at the top today with the help of this insanity, without any inkling that their separatist policies can of necessity only be *entr'acte* policies; owing to all this and much else that today simply cannot be said, the most unequivocal portents are now being overlooked, or arbitrarily and mendaciously reinterpreted—that *Europe wants to become one*. (BGE, VIII: 256)

Refer to Ralf Witzler, *Europa im Denken Nietzsches* (2001).

**EXISTENTIALISM.** Founded by the Danish philosopher **Søren Kierkegaard**, Existentialism is an antirational philosophy that emphasizes man's freedom. In the work of its chief exponent, **Jean-Paul Sartre**, this freedom produces anxiety because, in the absence of any **God**, the free individual is forced to take responsibility for his or her actions; deeds, not motives, are what count. Failure to live up to one's freedom leads to inauthenticity and bad faith. In the absence of a convenient moral code such as that provided by religion, the individual—recognizing the freedom of others—is forced to act with altruism, and it is this feature of Existentialism that deviates most from Nietzsche's strictures. Otherwise, the emphasis on freedom owes much to Nietzsche, and the early exponents of Existentialism, such as **Karl Jaspers** and **Martin Heidegger**, whose ideas were crucial for Sartre, were indeed convinced Nietzscheans, as was Sartre before he turned away from Nietzsche toward left-wing politics.

**EXPRESSIONISM.** Modernist movement. German Expressionism was much influenced by Nietzsche, reaching its heyday during the years 1910–1920 (“the Expressionist decade”). The movement was founded on the pathbreaking work of **August Strindberg** and **Frank Wedekind** (in drama) and Edvard Munch (in **art**): the two art groups specifically aligned to the movement were *Die Brücke* and *Der Blaue Reiter*. Nietzsche's iconoclasm inspired a generation of young painters to see with a new perspective; their abstractions, distortions, and use of primary colors represented an attempt to convey this novelty. So too did their choice of subject matter: man in **Dionysian** ecstasy or, more often, man in despair. Painters like Ernst Ludwig Kirchner bitterly attacked **decadent** Wilhelmine society in its death

throes. In art, expressionism gave way to the “New Objectivity” (*neue Sachlichkeit*) of the 1920s.

**Musicians** of the period, such as **Gustav Mahler**, seized on the Nietzschean demand to abandon old values, while the implications of Nietzsche’s “death of **God**” inspired the **nihilism** of **Gottfried Benn**, the movement’s major poet. Other Expressionist poets, all keen Nietzscheans, included Jakob von Hoddis, Ernst Stadler, and August Stramm. Ultimately, however, Expressionism was characterized by anxiety over the new technology and increasing urbanization. **Rainer Maria Rilke** and **Franz Kafka** expressed the dilemma of modern man adrift in an alienating society. A living example of such alienation and displacement was the poet and painter Else Lasker-Schüler. Many Expressionists, especially poets such as **Georg Heym** and Georg Trakl, sensed the approach of war with dread. When World War I did come, it wiped out many Expressionists of greatest potential talent, such as **Reinhard Sorge**.

From being a movement that centered on the lyric and art, Expressionism became a movement dominated by the plays of dramatists such as **Georg Kaiser** and the prose work of writers like **Alfred Döblin**. Its unifying thread remained the influence of Nietzsche, more particularly his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, a work that seemed to offer a way out of some of the predicaments of modernity. However, the “New Man” (*neuer Mensch*) who emerges at the end of some of the most quintessentially Expressionist plays is anything but an *Übermensch* since the social conditions that might allow the *Übermensch* to emerge are not present. The influence of **Sigmund Freud** also gained ground, so that in the works of some Expressionists there is a hybrid Zarathustran/Oedipal conflict, expressed mainly in father–son tension, seen at its most extreme in Walter Hasenclever’s *Der Sohn* (*The Son*, 1914).

German Expressionism contained within it a revolutionary kernel, as witnessed in the movement’s opposition to World War I, and later support for the revolutionary events of November 1918. Indeed, for many dramatists like Ernst Toller, the influence of **Karl Marx** was more important than that of Nietzsche. It is ironic that a movement that began by attacking the decadence of Wilhelmine society with programmatic zeal should in turn be branded decadent by the **National Socialists**. The Expressionist exhibition of *Entartete Kunst*

(“Degenerate Art”), held in Berlin in 1936, produced a further paradox when people gleefully flocked to see it, ignoring Josef Goebbels’s carefully planned rival exhibition of German art (glorifying the *Volks*) that was intended to upstage it. *See also* EISNER, KURT; *DIE KOSMIKER*.

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**FEMINISM.** Nietzsche consistently opposed feminism, which during the 1880s in Germany was still in its infancy (the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein*—General German Woman’s Association—having been founded in 1865 by Louise Otto-Peters), and it is important to understand why. Although Nietzsche liked to see himself as an iconoclast, the **culture** that he admired most was that of Hellenic **Greece**. There, Nietzsche discerned a heroic tradition made possible because **women** accepted their cloistered role as wife and mother. The Greece of **Socrates** and **Plato** was already too “modern” in Nietzsche’s eyes since there is a suggestion, in *The Republic*, that guardian women should be liberated from their domestic duties. Nietzsche’s crusade against **decadent European culture** was thus curiously one-sided. He denied women the possibility of self-development (which they were beginning to demand) but encouraged men to challenge all the accepted concepts of **morality** so that they could create themselves anew and allow the *Übermensch* to emerge.

Nevertheless, many early German radical feminists, such as **Hedwig Dohm**, **Lily Braun**, and **Helene Stöcker**, were firm Nietzscheans. They chose to ignore Nietzsche’s objections to women’s **education** and especially to the woman writer (they were all writers!) because of what he had said about the *Übermensch*. The term is not gendered in German (*der Mann* = man, *der Mensch* = human being), and women did not see themselves as automatically excluded from its benefits. The liberating potential it offered to women cannot be overemphasized. Nietzsche appeared to give such women *permission* to refuse to join the **marriage** mart, to enjoy their **sexuality**, and to reject **Christianity**. Their gratitude easily outweighed their criticism of his recidivist strictures on woman’s role and his slighting references to the “**eternal feminine**.”

Bourgeois feminists, however, such as **Helene Lange** and later **Gertrud Bäumer**, agreed with Nietzsche that woman's role was primarily domestic; like him, they viewed the role of mother as the goal of marriage, though they mistrusted Nietzsche's other comments on the liberation of the instincts and tended to give him a wide berth. Meanwhile, **Ellen Key**, who shared most of the views of the "moderate feminists" on maternal destiny, was a passionate Nietzschean. Such right-wing feminists were, ironically enough, the type of women who aspired to the values that Nietzsche derided as "eternal feminine." There were also creative writers, such as **Laura Marholm** (married to **Ola Hansson**) and **Franziska zu Reventlow**, to say nothing of **Lou Andreas-Salomé**, who identified with the aspirations of the bourgeois feminists because they shared their conservative political stance but were nevertheless overtly influenced by Nietzsche. Possibly without knowing it, Nietzsche was thus attacking a moving target when he made vitriolic antifeminist remarks. More recently, these remarks have been interpreted on a metaphorical level in a critique inspired by **poststructuralist** methods. *See also* FRENCH FEMINISM; THE NEW NIETZSCHE.

**FIVE PREFACES TO FIVE UNWRITTEN BOOKS (FÜNF VOR-REDEEN ZU FÜNF UNGESCHREIBENEN BÜCHERN).** In 1872, Nietzsche, the **Wagners'** guest for Christmas at Tribschen, presented **Cosima Wagner** with a portfolio of five essays as a combined Christmas and birthday present. The manuscripts are as follows: "*On the Pathos of Truth*" (*Über das Pathos der Wahrheit*), "*Thoughts on the Future of our Educational Institutions*" (*Gedanken über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten*), "*The Greek State*" (*Der Griechische Staat*), "*On the Relationship of Schopenhauer's Philosophy to a German Culture*" (*Über das Verhältnis der Schopenhauerischen Philosophie zu einer deutschen Cultur*), and "*Homer's Contest*" (*Homer's Wettkampf*). The second essay was very brief, and Nietzsche expanded it later into a series of five lectures that he delivered in Basel in 1873: "On the Future of our Educational Institutions."

**FORCE (DIE KRAFT).** Not to be confused with **power** (*die Macht*), force is a **concept** Nietzsche commandeers from physics without actually allowing it to be fully scientific: the nearest he comes to

mechanics is when he describes force as requiring resistance in order to manifest itself (in cyclic fashion, or linear, i.e., attraction and repulsion). In August 1881, just when **eternal return** “came” to him as a revelation, Nietzsche studied the work of Johannes Gustav Vogt, whose *Die Kraft* (1878) presented force as a continuum “out there” in infinite space, in a cosmic cycle of becoming. As Robin Small points out, Nietzsche probably hoped Vogt’s propositions might help “his own attempts to provide a physical account of eternal recurrence” (Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001). Actually, Nietzsche took more account of **Ruggero Guiseppe Boscovich**, something **Peter Gast** later deplored, wishing Nietzsche had spent more time studying the work of Julius Robert Mayer, an early propounder of the law of energy conservation. Nietzsche knew Mayer’s essay “*Über Auslösung*” (“On Release”) in *Mechanik der Wärme* (1874) and praised the book to the skies: “You can hear the *harmony of the spheres* in it” (Nietzsche to Peter Gast, 16 April 1881). The allusion to the Aristotelian worldview is not really a recommendation, however. It highlights just how much the idea of “force” remains at the level of ambiguity in Nietzsche’s work, as also the word “strength,” which can be physical or psychological. Nietzsche often uses the noun “*Kraft*” as part of a composite phrase, as in **Homer’s Contest**, where he speaks of a “tournament of forces” (*Wettspiel der Kräfte*). In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche describes how some forces become **master** over others: it is absurd to ask strength (*Stärke*) “not to be a desire to overthrow, crush, become master.” Nietzsche continues,

A quantum of force [*ein Quantum Kraft*] is just such a quantum of drive, will, action, in fact it is nothing but this driving, willing, acting, and only the seduction of language . . . can make it appear otherwise. (OGM, I: 13)

*See also* DYNAMITE.

**FORGETTING.** In *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, forgetting is described as a coping mechanism, enabling us to think we know “the **truth**” if it is agreeable to us and to reject it if not. Our freedom from illusion cannot be achieved until we recognize this process. “So long as it is able to deceive without *injuring*, that master of deception, the intellect, is free . . .” (OTLNS: 2). In the second essay of *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche lambastes **history** because

it forces us to dredge up things that are sometimes best left covered up (*UM*, II: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for **Life**,” 5). In *Daybreak*, he alludes to Lord Byron’s *Manfred*, where the eponymous hero, tormented by his incapacity to forget, unsuccessfully summons up the seven spirits for aid in achieving “forgetfulness” (*Manfred*, Act I)—Nietzsche’s point being that “one may want to forget, but one cannot” (*D*, III: 167). In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche describes how humble, primitive men have been taught to have a “conscience” through having the fear of punishment burned into their brains: “When man decided he had to make a memory for himself, it never happened without blood, torments and sacrifices . . .—all this has its origin in that particular instinct which discovered that pain was the most powerful aid to mnemonics” (*OGM*, II: 3). See also FREUD, SIGMUND; LIES.

**FÖRSTER, BERNHARD.** See FÖRSTER-NIETZSCHE, ELISABETH.

**FÖRSTER-NIETZSCHE, ELISABETH (1846–1935).** Nietzsche’s sister. Two years younger than her brother, Elisabeth was perhaps too emotionally close to Nietzsche for the good of them both. Nietzsche did his best to offer Elisabeth the paternal protection she lacked as a single, fatherless woman in Wilhelmine Germany; in fact, as soon as he entered the charmed circle surrounding **Richard and Cosima Wagner**, he made sure that Elisabeth was also introduced into it. She became friendly with the much older Cosima and through Cosima’s friend **Malwida von Meysenbug** met other luminaries, though there would come a point, from the late 1890s on, when people came to her, as founder of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* (see the photo spread), rather than her sick brother.

Although Elisabeth constantly asserted that she was on the lookout for a wife for Nietzsche, she was delighted to keep house for him in Basel, and her clandestine meddling was a prime reason why Nietzsche’s quarrel with **Lou Andreas-Salomé** in 1882 remained irreconcilable. Nietzsche never really forgave Elisabeth for this, while Elisabeth conducted a lifelong vendetta against Andreas-Salomé. Perhaps to spite Nietzsche, perhaps also because she was running out of time, Elisabeth acquired a husband, the virulently anti-Semitic

Wagner acolyte Bernhard Förster, through a mixture of flattery, bribery, and sheer persistence and married him on 22 May 1885 (Richard Wagner's birthday). Seven weeks later (10 July), Elisabeth turned 39. Nietzsche disliked all his brother-in-law stood for so intensely that he boycotted the wedding, though he was prevailed on to meet Förster once before the newlyweds left Germany on 15 February 1886 to found a racially pure colony in Paraguay. The precarious finances of this venture led Förster (very probably) to commit suicide in 1889; shortly before this, Elisabeth had received news of Nietzsche's mental collapse. She therefore returned to Germany to help her mother look after Nietzsche in Naumburg; after **Franziska Nietzsche's** death in 1897, Elisabeth moved Nietzsche to Weimar, where she established the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in the Humboldtstraße, and this is where Nietzsche died in 1900.

During Nietzsche's last years of life, Elisabeth had been busily supervising the publication of his chaotic posthumous notebooks; the *Will to Power* appeared in 1901. It did not set the world alight in quite the way one might imagine in retrospect; Elisabeth therefore set about the production of an enlarged edition, edited by **Peter Gast**, that appeared in 1906. In order to further what was rapidly becoming a Nietzsche industry, Elisabeth wrote voluminously on her brother, mostly in a biographical vein and not always accurately or truthfully. (Her numerous publications are listed in section three of the bibliography.) To many Nietzscheans, Elisabeth was a scourge, but many others genuinely admired her energy. Whatever their view, they came to the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in a continuous stream to use the library and attend learned talks. By this means, Elisabeth was on close terms with some of Germany's most celebrated writers and philosophers—**Thomas Mann** and **Martin Heidegger**, to name just two—and felt herself the equal of her brother, rewriting or doctoring his work when it suited her so that, for example, she could speak of Nietzsche as a friend of **war** in newspaper articles in 1914 or as a friend of **German nationalism** in 1934. Acolytes twice put her name forward for the Nobel Prize for Literature (1911 and 1923); in 1923, the prize actually went to that other Nietzschean, **William Butler Yeats**.

In 1921, Jena University awarded Elisabeth an honorary doctorate (h.c., or *honoris causae*), but by 1931, the university authorities were so exasperated by their dealings with her that they would have



nothing more to do with her or the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, announcing this in the press and blaming it on Elisabeth, who had frustrated the university's attempt to set in motion a new critical edition of Nietzsche's work by blocking access to the manuscripts. Elisabeth now became, for a variety of reasons, not all of them expediency, a collaborator with leading members of **National Socialism**. Without any prompting, she had become a fervent supporter of **Benito Mussolini**. Her support for the Third Reich endorsed the misappropriation of Nietzsche's ideas by the National Socialists and ultimately ensured that Nietzsche's own reputation would suffer.

Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche met **Adolf Hitler** on a number of occasions. The first was unplanned: in 1932, she had managed to persuade the Weimar National Theater to put on Mussolini's play about Napoleon, *Campo di Maggio* (*The Hundred Days*); Hitler came to her box unannounced. The second occasion was on 2 November 1933, when she presented Hitler with Nietzsche's walking stick and an **anti-Semitic** pamphlet her husband had written and sent to **Otto von Bismarck**. Hitler again visited Elisabeth at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* on 20 July 1934, returning on 2 October that same year with his architect, Albert Speer, to set in motion the building of a *Nietzsche-Memorial*; on this occasion, Hitler was photographed in profile, staring at **Max Klinger's** herm of Nietzsche (see the photo spread). In 1935, Elisabeth sent Hitler a copy of her new book, *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Frauen seiner Zeit*, published the previous year. In this book, she even declared that Nietzsche would have approved of "the laws of the new Reich" and that his views on the role of **German women** tallied with those propounded in the new state. Hitler's letter of thanks is dated 26 July 1935. Elisabeth died suddenly a few months later, on 8 November 1935. There was a memorial service at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* on 11 November at which Hitler and Baldur von Schirach were present. The program for the funeral prints the speeches in full:

Funeral Service in Memory of Frau Dr. h.c. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche

Nietzsche-Archiv, 11 November, 1935

1. String Quartet.
2. Address by the President of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv*, Former Head of Thuringian Government Dr. h.c. Leutheußer.
3. Address by Dr. **Adalbert Oehler**.

4. String Quartet.
5. Address by the Rector of the University of Thuringia at Jena, Professor Dr. Meyer-Erlach.
6. Address by the Gauleiter and Governor of Thuringia, Fritz Sauckel.
7. String Quartet.

Hitler being in the room, each address began with “Heil Hitler!” Elisabeth, having had the foresight to move Nietzsche’s (centrally placed) grave at Röcken to the left, now took the central place in the row of graves that comprised her parents and Nietzsche. Hitler was also present at the ceremony in Röcken and laid a wreath.

After the death of Peter Gast, a page of *Ecce Homo* that Elisabeth had ordered to be destroyed was found among his papers; this is now included in *Ecce Homo* in the most recent English translation (1992); thanks to this, posterity has learned that Nietzsche’s final opinion of his mother and sister was that they were vindictive “rabble” (*EH*, “Why I Am So Wise”: 3). Nietzsche sent the corrective fragment by registered post to his publisher, Gustav Naumann, only five days before he collapsed, with a covering note to say that it dealt with “really urgent matters” (Nietzsche to Naumann, 28 December 1888); on New Year’s Eve, he penned a note to Gast that probably also refers to this: “—Precisely where I can allow no shadow of doubt, I have had the courage to express myself definitively” (Nietzsche to Peter Gast, 31 December 1888). Refer to H. F. Peters, *Zarathustra’s Sister: The Case of Elisabeth and Friedrich Nietzsche* (1977); Ben MacIntyre, *Forgotten Fatherland: The Search for Elisabeth Nietzsche* (1992); and Carol Diethe, *Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power* (2003).

**FOUCAULT, MICHEL (1926–1984).** French philosopher. Foucault taught at the *Collège de France* from 1969 and became a leading exponent of **poststructuralism** intent on revealing the way discourse can become imbued with **power**. In particular, he was concerned with how discourses of “power-knowledge,” such as those within medicine or the penal system, impact the citizen. In his essay “*Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire*,” 1971 (“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 1977), Foucault argued that the **mask** must be removed from the demagogic discourse of history. He applauded Nietzsche for not pretending to write “the **truth**” about **history**: he liked the fact that

Nietzsche's observations were unashamedly biased, and he was not afraid to declare a thing to be nonsense if that was his opinion.

Foucault admired the Nietzsche of *The Birth of Tragedy* and *On the Genealogy of Morality* rather than the Nietzsche of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, stating, "What I liked in Nietzsche is the attempt to bring up for discussion again the fundamental concepts of **knowledge**, of morals, and of **metaphysics** by appealing to a historical analysis of the positivistic type, without going back to origins" (*Foucault Live*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, 1989). Foucault's major works are *Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, 1961 (*Madness and Reason: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, 1965); *Les mots et les choses*, 1966 (*The Order of Things*, 1970); *L'archéologie du savoir*, 1969 (*The Archeology of Knowledge*, 1972); *Histoire de la Sexualité* (I: *La Volonté de savoir*, 1976 [*The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, 1978]; II: *L'Usage des plaisirs*, 1985 [*The Use of Pleasure*, 1990]; and III: *Le Souci de soi*, 1985 [*The Care of the Self*, 1988]); and *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison*, 1975 (*Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, 1977). In all these works, Foucault's method of argument owes much to Nietzsche, but Foucault is perhaps more effective in sociological terms because he concentrates on the repressive practices themselves, refusing any arguments that would sidetrack the issue, such as the function of the instincts and of what we term "human **nature**." Refer to Michael Mahon, *Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject* (1992); Karl-Heinz Geiss, *Foucault—Nietzsche—Foucault. Die Wahlverwandtschaften* (*Foucault—Nietzsche—Foucault: Elective Affinities*, 1993); and David Owen, *Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason* (1994). See also MORALITY.

**FRANKFURT SCHOOL.** The name given to a group of Marxists connected with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in the 1930s and 1940s. The chief members of the Frankfurt School were the Marxists **Max Horkheimer** and **Theodor Adorno**. Other members associated with the school were **Ernst Bloch**, **Walter Benjamin**, and Louis Althusser. Although Althusser seldom directly referred to Nietzsche, the latter's influence is implicit in his work; others, like Adorno, made frequent reference to Nietzsche. Nietzsche's chief attraction was his nonconformist refusal to see things as stable, fixed,

and permanent, a refusal on which the ideas of the critical theorists also rested, though their own program was dedicated to extending the political analyses of **Karl Marx** and Friedrich Engels. They saw Nietzsche as a counterweight to Marx.

**FREE SPIRIT (*DER FREIGEIST*)**. Nietzsche used the term *Freigeist* in two ways (though these often coalesce); the first indicates a religious skeptic in line with the English word “freethinker” and is not particularly complimentary, since such a person is often a **democrat** or other social reformer. The second indicates a “free spirit,” a rebel who shuns society and domestic fetters and rejects all so-called **truth**. Nietzsche mostly used the term in this latter, (for him) positive sense, aligning himself with the freedoms implied. **Zarathustra** describes the free spirit as a social outcast: “the dweller in forests” (*Za*, II: “Of the Famous Philosophers”). It was axiomatic that the free spirit would steer clear of **marriage**.

In 1871, when he was at work on *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche planned to write an essay, “*Die Tragödie und die Freigeister*” (“Tragedy and Free Spirits”), but he shelved it, though the idea did not go away. Writing to a new (and, as it turned out, married) friend Louise Ott, whom he had met in Bayreuth in August 1876, shortly before he fled from **Wagner’s** *Ring*, Nietzsche admitted that the friendship was indeed rather “dangerous” for him: “But for you too, when I think what sort of a free spirit [*Freigeist*] you have bumped into!” (Nietzsche to Louise Ott, 22 September 1876). That same year, Nietzsche began to make notes that would eventually form the first book of *Human, All Too Human*, and this duly appeared in 1878 with the subtitle *A Book for Free Spirits*, complete with a dedication (subsequently dropped) to the kindred free spirit, **Voltaire**. *Human, All Too Human*, *Daybreak*, and *The Gay Science* are sometimes referred to as Nietzsche’s “free spirit” works.

**DIE FREIE BÜHNE (*THE FREE STAGE*)**. German periodical. *Die freie Bühne*, founded under the editorship of Otto Brahm in 1890 and renamed *Neue deutsche Rundschau* in 1895, still exists; it published some of the first reviews of Nietzsche’s works (not necessarily complimentary, as seen in the reviews by **Paul Ernst** and **Wilhelm Bölsche**). The periodical was the mouthpiece for the theater club

“*Verein freie Bühne*,” which was established in Berlin in 1889 to promote the production of plays considered too daring for public performance. Coinciding with the heyday of the **Naturalist movement**, the club flourished for four years in a climate of excitement over the ideas of **Henrik Ibsen** and **Charles Darwin**, besides those of Nietzsche and others of the avant-garde.

**FRENCH FEMINISM.** A critical approach practiced by French philosophers and psychoanalysts in the last quarter of the 20th century. Leading French **feminists** such as **Sarah Kofman**, a distinguished Nietzsche scholar, have greatly influenced the academic discipline of feminist critique in America, and in Britain to a lesser extent. Both Kofman and Bernard Patrat were students of **Jacques Derrida** and use his terminology. **Luce Irigaray** is both a Lacanian analyst and a creative writer. In *Amante Marine de Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1980 (*Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1991), Irigaray uses the linguistic techniques of **poststructuralism**, but adds another dimension that has come to be categorized in a different context as *parler femme*, or “woman speak” (as in the feminism of Hélène Cixous). The problem is that in writing in this special way, Irigaray suggests a biological determinism with which many women would take serious issue. Another (naturalized) French feminist, Julia Kristeva, agrees with Irigaray in accepting woman’s difference (Derrida spells this as *différance* to stress that the “Other” is involved) but argues that the semiotics or linguistic ciphers should receive greater scrutiny. French feminism frequently merged with the “**New Nietzsche**” approach in any engagement with Nietzsche in the last two decades of the 20th century.

**FREUD, SIGMUND (1856–1939).** Austrian founder of psychoanalysis. Freud studied under Charcot in Paris from 1885 to 1886, having established a private practice in Vienna in 1885. He founded the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1902 and the International Association of Psychoanalysis in 1910. In 1911, he held a Psychoanalytic Congress in Weimar, where he met **Lou Andreas-Salomé**, who became a friend and collaborator. Since both Freud and Nietzsche insisted on the dangers for mankind of repressed instincts, there are some startling similarities in their ideas; however, the solutions they offered (for Nietzsche: the activity of the strong individual; for

Freud: the “talking cure,” which he struggled to make medically respectable) could not be more divergent. They also differed strongly on their solution to repressed desires: Nietzsche thought that **forgetting** could be beneficial (indeed, it was an essential part of man’s armory), while Freud devoted his career to finding out how to reveal what the unconscious had repressed.

Freud played down any direct impact Nietzsche might have had on his thinking and avoided Nietzsche’s works; nevertheless, it can be argued that Nietzsche’s influence was unavoidable for any German-speaking intellectual at the turn of the 20th century, even without the hostility of both men, if not to **women** in general, at least to **feminists** (whom they thought were lesbians, one and all). Freud’s discovery of “penis envy” as the driving force in female **sexuality** and, by extension, in the formation of woman’s self-identity (in terms of lack) finds no echo in Nietzsche’s **ressentiment**, a vile emotion derived from 2,000 years of **Christianity**. However, Nietzsche’s praise for what woman *has*—her capacity to give birth—too often dissolves into criticism (which Freud would repeat) of those “unnatural” women who did not desire to have children. Freud’s major works include *Die Traumdeutung* (*The Interpretation of Dreams*, 1900), *Die Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* (*The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, 1901), *Das Ich und das Es* (*The Ego and the Id*, 1923), and *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (*Civilization and Its Discontents*, 1930). Many of these texts first appeared in translation in the Standard Edition of Freud’s complete works, published from 1953 in London, where Freud, as a **Jew**, found refuge from the **National Socialists** after they had invaded Austria in 1938. Refer to Paul-Laurent Assoun, *Nietzsche et Freud*, 1980 (*Nietzsche and Freud*, 1998); Ronald Lehrer, *Nietzsche’s Presence in Freud’s Life and Thought* (1995); and Reinhard Gasser, *Nietzsche und Freud* (1997).

**FRIENDSHIP.** Nietzsche’s personal circumstances largely dictated his attitude toward friendship. Brought up as the only male in his household, his closest friends were destined to be men, possibly, as has been commonly suggested in regard to his relationship with **Richard Wagner**, as an attempt to fill the place of his missing father (who had died in August 1848, when he was nearly four). He

had two close friends at school in Naumburg (Wilhelm Pinder and Gustav Krug) before he was sent to the all-male boarding school at Schulpforta, where he also made lasting friendships not just with fellow students like Carl von Gersdorff and **Paul Deussen** but also with some of the masters, notably Robert Buddensieg. The classical curriculum at Schulpforta encouraged in Nietzsche a love of the **Greek** way of life and inculcated in him a veneration for the Greek **concept** of friendship as practiced by Epicurus and later described admiringly by Michel de Montaigne in his essay on friendship (*De L' amitié*), published in his *Essais* (1580; trans. 1603).

Nietzsche began his studies in Bonn, where Deussen had, like Nietzsche, enrolled as a theology student; both subsequently lost their faith. Nietzsche first met **Erwin Rohde** as a student in Leipzig. **Franz Overbeck**, perhaps Nietzsche's truest friend, was his colleague in Basel; they first met through sharing lodgings. Overbeck and Rohde would also become lifelong friends. Heinrich Köselitz, whom Nietzsche later dubbed **Peter Gast**, was an early acolyte who came to Basel specifically to hear Nietzsche's (and Overbeck's) lectures. Nietzsche first made the acquaintance of **Paul Rée** when the latter spent the summer of 1873 in Basel, and through Rée, in 1882, he met **Lou Andreas-Salomé**, arguably the only woman Nietzsche ever loved in a romantic fashion. Nietzsche's disillusionment on losing not just Lou's friendship (largely through his sister's interference) but also that of Rée made him bitter toward **women** in general.

Suffice it to say that the primacy Nietzsche increasingly awarded to friendship over other relationships (love for a woman, **marriage**, and so on) was more a matter of expediency than choice, especially after he had become critical of those formerly closest to him, namely, his mother and sister. It should be added that in their case, Nietzsche criticized their blinkered mentality without pausing to consider the social pressures that had made **Franziska Nietzsche** into a religious bigot and **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** into a willful philistine. That said, Nietzsche was a lonely figure during the years 1882–1889, cut off from his family and a peripatetic recluse in spite of the devotion of friends like Gast and **Meta von Salis-Marschlins**, whose practical help did not make up for a lack of spiritual affinity. It is all the more ironic that Nietzsche spent the last 11 years of his life in the hands of

(and at the mercy of) his mother and sister. There is no hard evidence to support the speculation that Nietzsche's sexual inclinations came close to a "Hellenic-homoerotic" preference (Klaus Goch, *Nietzsche über die Frauen*, 1992).

**FUTURISM.** Avant-garde movement in the **European art** world that centered on Italy but was also strong in Russia, where "cubo-futurism" thrived under Velimir Khlebnikov and **Vladimir Mayakovsky**. The nearest equivalent to the movement in America was imagism. In Britain, the closest approximation to Futurism was found in the vorticism of Wyndham Lewis. Common to the whole movement was a shared intoxication with speed and dynamism, both associated with machines such as the automobile and airplane. With these new machines went the notion of courage and danger, and here, paradoxically, enthusiasm for technology was combined with an enthusiasm, however superficial, for Nietzsche.

The Futurists pioneered linguistic experiments in which grammar was ignored so that, for example, verbs were replaced by nouns and punctuation was commandeered to make a visual impact on the page. This was all of a piece with the general attack on traditional writing, "those rows of words trooping dutifully off the page which had become the dominant role of communication in European society" (Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, eds., *Modernism*, 1976). In Russian Futurism, "verblessness" was referred to as *bezglagolnost*. The Italian Futurists posited a theory that words existed "in liberty," set free from their everyday meanings: the **language** of poetry was important for the sound the words made rather than for any meaning these words might convey. **Time** itself was viewed as something to be leapt over—into the future.

The Italian Futurists, led by **Filippo Marinetti**, were mindful of Nietzsche's comments on the future but preferred to understand Nietzsche at the level of **Zarathustran** bellicosity. Accompanying the Futurists' stylistic and linguistic iconoclasm went an ideology that praised the strong, heroic leader: here Nietzsche was viewed as a direct precursor of the movement. Nietzsche's ideas on hardness, bravery, and **war** were taken out of context, and the Italian Futurists tended to have a right-wing drift that led straight into the fascist camp of **Benito Mussolini**, himself a Nietzschean.



## – G –

**GAST, PETER (1854–1918).** Pseudonym of Heinrich Köselitz, Nietzsche’s amanuensis. A **musician** and scholar, Gast read *The Birth of Tragedy* in 1873 and, having accidentally met **Franz Overbeck** in Chemnitz at Nietzsche’s publishers (Ernst Schmeitzner), decided to move to Basel, where he attended Nietzsche’s and Overbeck’s lectures. Later, Gast became an indispensable friend to Nietzsche, especially in 1877, the year when Nietzsche was too ill to work but had not yet retired. Nietzsche relied on Gast for the publication of *Daybreak* (1881) and subsequently for help in proofreading all his later works. He encouraged Gast’s pretension at composing opera, calling him “Maestro,” almost certainly tongue in cheek, for there is little evidence that Gast had any real musical talent.

After Nietzsche’s mental collapse in 1889, Gast came to Naumburg in 1891 to collaborate with **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** by transcribing Nietzsche’s manuscripts, illegible to all but himself. In 1893, Elisabeth—then still resident in Naumberg—absented herself to make a final trip to Paraguay, leaving Gast at work on the *Gesamtausgabe* (the first edition of the collected works); he had completed the first five volumes when she returned, but this did not prevent her from dismissing him in favor of **Fritz Koegel**. Because Gast was the only person able to read Nietzsche’s handwriting, he was reinstated at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1900. Elisabeth was discontented with the first edition of *Der Wille zur Macht* (1901; volume 15 of the collected works) edited by Fritz Koegel and Ernst Horneffer and brought out an enlarged second edition in 1906 in conjunction with Gast, expediently praising him in her polemic *The Nietzsche-Archiv: Seine Freunde und Feinde* (*The Nietzsche-Archiv: its Friends and Foes*, 1907), though she actually had a low opinion of Gast (which he reciprocated). The following year, Gast was compromised by letters he had written to Franz Overbeck in which he was frank about Elisabeth’s shortcomings. These letters were part of the Overbeck–Nietzsche correspondence that **Carl Albrecht Bernoulli** was prevented from publishing by Elisabeth’s lawsuit in 1908. Although Gast’s remarks about Elisabeth were not put into the public domain, he quit his post in 1909, maintaining a studied silence thereafter on all matters relating to the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. This account of the

peccadilloes in the early days of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* leaves a bitter taste because it reveals the petty-mindedness that dominated the administration of Nietzsche's literary estate. Refer to Frederick R. Love, *Nietzsche's Saint Peter: Genesis and Cultivation of an Illusion* (1981). See also *ECCE HOMO*; FRIENDSHIP.

***THE GAY SCIENCE (DIE FRÖHLICHE WISSENSCHAFT, 1882).***

(Also known as *Joyful Wisdom*.) Having established his aphoristic style in his previous work, *Daybreak*, Nietzsche was at liberty, in *The Gay Science*, to deal with a great variety of themes with conciseness and considerable wit and polish. The first four volumes of this work were published in 1882, together with a "Prelude in Rhymes." In the second edition of 1887, a fifth book, a preface, an appendix, and further poems were added, and this is the version in common use now. In the five years between the first and second editions, Nietzsche wrote *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885) and *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886). Thus, the last part of *The Gay Science* is enmeshed in a more developed phase of Nietzsche's thinking. In fact, the last section of book 4 (i.e., the last book of the original edition of *The Gay Science*) ends with **Zarathustra's** descent from the mountains (*GS*, IV: 342); *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* begins with the same passage almost verbatim (*Za*, "Zarathustra's Prologue," 1).

The term "**science**" in the title, *Wissenschaft*, actually refers to any form of **knowledge**, and the best translation for *fröhlich* is "cheerful": Nietzsche wanted to convey, in the most affirmative terms possible, his fundamental conviction that there is no transcendental being. Not only is the death of God announced exultantly in *The Gay Science*, but in addition "we have killed him!" (*GS*, III: 125). The madman, having delivered this message, skips from the scene, a prophet who has come too soon: but Nietzsche knew that the fuse he had lit would eventually ignite. The cry that "God is dead" has now become a slogan to characterize his philosophy.

Nietzsche does not just want to wean man from his irrational belief in God; he also wants his "gay science" to counteract **rationalism**, Europe's new mental disease. Indeed, the impossibility of knowing the full **truth** about anything is Nietzsche's perennial theme, although he did not mean that there are no facts, still less that "the truth is what anyone thinks it is" (Bernard Williams, *The Gay Science*, Introduc-

tion). He simply denied that we could truly know “reality.” Too much of our past, right down to prehistory, contaminates our view of even such a simple thing as a mountain or cloud (*GS*, II: 57), an insight that has inspired **Jacques Derrida’s** “*toujours déjà*.”

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of *The Gay Science* remains Nietzsche’s first exposition of **eternal return** in book 4, repeated and expanded in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The demon proposes that the **heaviest** weight man can bear is the one posed by the question “in each and every thing: ‘Do you want this again and innumerable times again?’” (*GS*, IV: 341). In many ways, this succinct portrayal of eternal return is easier to grasp than the more ecstatic elaborations in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. *The Gay Science* has also elicited **feminist** critique through the mention of **Baubô** (Preface, 4) and Nietzsche’s enigmatic declaration, “Yes, **life** is a **woman!**” (*GS*, IV: 339).

**DER GEIST (MIND OR SPIRIT).** Nietzsche had little time for transcendental versions of *Geist* found in **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s** philosophy. In line with contemporary usage, he most frequently used the term *Geist* in connection with all that had been intellectually excellent in **German culture**. In the first of his *Untimely Meditations* on “David **Strauss**, the confessor and the writer,” he argued that German materialism and jingoistic **nationalism** had blocked out the essential nature of his countrymen and diverted them from their spiritual source. Nietzsche proposed a rehabilitation of *Geist* through **art** and culture and later envisaged the project in connection with the emergence of the **Übermensch**. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the development of *Geist* is expressed poetically through **animal** imagery. The *Übermensch* is at first spiritually like a camel, burdened down with “**heavy** things for the spirit”; he must develop the independence of the lion: “the spirit of the lion says ‘I will,’” before he finally achieves the unreflecting **affirmation** of the child, a “sacred Yes” (*Za*, 1: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). Nietzsche’s shorthand for the decline of *Geist* was the phrase “**Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles**.” There are important compounds to be made from *Geist*, such as *Zeitgeist* (spirit of the times) and *Freigeist* (**Free Spirit**), all posing problems for translation because of the dual meaning in English.

**GEORGE, STEFAN (1868–1933).** German poet. In the history of literature, George is best known for his implacable hostility to the **Naturalist movement**; rejecting the trend to portray reality as faithfully as possible, he set about writing poetry for the few, the initiated. He was the dominant figure for the literary organ *Blätter für die Kunst* (1892–1919) and soon founded a coterie in which this exclusive type of lyricism could be indulged to the full. George was an elitist who fully espoused Nietzsche's call for a higher **German culture**. His followers were from widely different backgrounds, a fact that ultimately led to internal strife. **Karl Wolfskehl**, being a **Jew**, was bound to fall foul of the **anti-Semite Alfred Schuler**. Other members of the circle included Friedrich Gundolf, **Rudolf Pannwitz**, and **Ludwig Klages**. George kept himself remote from the most bacchanalian antics of *die Kosmiker*, as the circle round Wolfskehl were pleased to call themselves, though he was present at the party held on 22 February 1903 (see the photo spread). This reserve was increasingly reflected in the rarified nature of his poems, which (like *Algabal*, 1892) are exotically remote in setting and diction, though there is a more prophetic tone in *Der Teppich des Lebens* (*The Carpet of Life*, 1908). In *Der Stern des Bundes* (*The Star of the Alliance*, 1914), George accurately predicts the coming war but stresses that Nietzsche has no part in it (a warning that went unheeded).

During the Weimar Republic, George continued to hold power within his *George-Kreis*, autocratically insisting on **Greek** humanism and striving for a renewal of the German **language**. Like Nietzsche, George despaired of German culture, but both *Der Stern des Bundes* and *Das neue Reich* (*The New Realm*, 1928) speak of a better civilization to come, far from the carnage and brutality of the age. There have been plenty of attempts to pin the **Nationalist Socialist** label on George, but none has stuck. By living his life according to **aristocratic values** and by taking himself off into voluntary exile in Switzerland, albeit shortly before his death, George's life had some similarity with that of Nietzsche, though George was perhaps more austere in his approach to **art**: an **Apollo** to Nietzsche's **Dionysus**. Refer to Stanley J. Antosik, *The Question of Elites: An Essay on the Cultural Elitism of Nietzsche, George and Hesse* (1978); Heinz Raschel, *Das Nietzsche-Bild im George-Kreis* (*The Image of Nietzsche in the George Circle*, 1984); Frank Weber, *Die Bedeutung Nietzsches*

*für Stefan George und seinen Kreis* (*The Importance of Nietzsche for Stefan George and his Circle*, 1989); and Joachim Müller, *Wagner, Nietzsche, George. Das Ende von Musik, Philosophie, Dichtung* (*Wagner, Nietzsche, George: The End of Music, Philosophy, Writing*, 1994).

**GERMAN CLASSICISM.** See GOETHE; SCHILLER.

**GERMAN IDEALISM.** Idealist or transcendental philosophy took off from the cautious point made by **Immanuel Kant** that the only reasonable explanation of experience is a conjunction of what is in the mind with what it perceives to be in the world “outside.” To a certain extent, then, the mind creates its own world. Nietzsche had no time for Kant’s central premise that the only thing we can know for certain is the moral imperative within us. For Kant, this **knowledge** provides a guarantee of man’s freedom. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1763–1814) took freedom as his starting point for his work on ethics and refused to admit that there were things beyond man’s capacity to know. There was no such thing as Kant’s “*Ding an sich*,” which resists assimilation by the mind. He subsumed matter and form under one heading: ego/non-ego. Non-ego remains dependent on the ego that conditions it. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834), commenting on Fichte’s system in *Biographia Literaria* (1817), quipped that a world that did not exist unless he thought it up was “all my I” (a pun on “I” = the ego and “all my eye” = nonsense), which is the position Nietzsche himself took toward it.

Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) made a clean break with Fichte’s ego and described the world in terms of spirit and **nature**. The brain that contemplates nature is at the same time part of it: such contemplation is self-reflective. Furthermore, nature is purposive, an embodiment of the World Soul (*Weltseele*). Although Schelling followed Fichte in making the point that the subject produces the objective world as a means to attaining consciousness, his purpose was to show a development toward harmony and unity. Schelling, who worked briefly with **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** in Jena, shared Hegel’s view of the “Absolute” but not Hegel’s dialectic reasoning; for Schelling, the Absolute was simply the unity of opposites. Schelling’s theory of **art** argued that just as nature was divine cre-

ation, the work of art was a microcosm of the creative act and hence divine. This also gave the creator of Romantic art or fiction a very special status.

Hegel drew together all the strands so far discussed. He rejected Kant's view that there are some things that the human self or transcendental ego cannot know through experience (such as **God**), and he shared Schelling's desire to draw a link between consciousness and the objective world: the world was the expression of a unified "absolute idea," or *Weltgeist*. This could transform religious ideas into **concepts**; our reason is thus the basis of faith. Applying his general principles to **history**, Hegel posited that phases of history are the embodiment of the *Weltgeist*, developing into their opposite (the antithesis) and eventually reaching a synthesis that in turn will resume the dialectical process under the weight of its own contradictions.

Although Nietzsche had no time at all for transcendental arguments that seemed to skirt around religious issues to no purpose, he shared the **Romantic** view of the artist as someone special, indeed, "heroic," even if set apart from his fellow men by sickness or solipsism. However, Nietzsche would argue that his source for this view was the culture of the **Greeks** rather than Idealist **aesthetics**, especially when the principal purpose of such philosophy was religious, as in the case of the theologian **Friedrich Schleiermacher**. Nietzsche tarred Hegel and Schleiermacher with the same brush: "He who has once contracted Hegelism and Schleiermacherism is never quite cured of them" (*UM*, I: "David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer," 6).

**THE GERMANS.** Nietzsche counted it a great misfortune to have been born German. After a brief period of patriotic enthusiasm during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, when he volunteered to serve his country, he set his face against **Otto von Bismarck's** Second Reich, which rapidly came to represent an authoritarian regime. Independence of spirit was discouraged in every sphere: state-run schools, the army, the police, and the church. Nietzsche also abhorred the type of chauvinistic **nationalism** and **anti-Semitism** that was becoming standard in German society and blamed it on ignorance, bad schools, and bad philosophers (especially the **German Idealists**). German **culture** was sick and decadent, making

Germany “**Europe’s** flatland” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack”: 3). Nietzsche declared the vulgar new counterfeit *Geist* to be so unhealthy that it left him gasping for air: “I breathe with difficulty near the by now instinctive uncleanliness *in psychologicis* which every word, every facial expression of a German betrays” (*EH*, “The Case of Wagner”: 3). He admired French taste and would much rather have been French—anything but German. Just before he went insane, he managed to convince himself that he came from a noble Polish family named Niëzky (Nietzsche to **Georg Brandes**, 10 April 1888). “I really think the Germans are a rotten [*hundsgemein*] sort of people,” he wrote to **Meta von Salis-Marschlins** on 29 December 1888; “I thank heaven I am a Pole in all my instincts.”

In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche sums up a thread running throughout his work: German culture is on the decline, and people are asking, “Haven’t you so much as one spirit who *means something* to Europe? In the way your **Hegel**, your Heinrich **Heine**, your **Schopenhauer** meant something? That there is no longer a single German philosopher—there is no end of astonishment at that.” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack,” 4). Of course, Nietzsche was confident that he was the **dynamite** to ignite renewal. In *Ecce Homo*, he rails against German superficiality and vulgarity, but his hidden agenda is a quest to set the record straight: “Ten years—and nobody in Germany has felt bound in conscience to defend my name against the absurd silence under which it lies buried” (*EH*, “The Case of Wagner”: 4). See also “*DEUTSCHLAND, DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES*”; THE STATE; VOLK.

**DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER FREUNDE DES NIETZSCHE-ARCHIVS.** The Society of Friends of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* was founded on 28 September 1926 to protect the interests of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in “troubled times.” **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, **Ernst Thiel**, and **Adalbert Oehler** were made honorary members as were the international luminaries Karl Joel and **Romain Rolland** as well as Anton Kippenberg and Walter Klemm from the Kröner Press. The president was Arnold Paulssen, and members included **Thomas Mann**, **Oswald Spengler**, and Heinrich Wölfflin. Naturally, the Society came to an end with everything else connected with the activities of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1945.

**GIDE, ANDRÉ (1869–1951).** French writer, diarist, and traveler. Gide adopted pagan values after his visits to North Africa in 1893 and 1896. He became an early devotee of Nietzsche, and in his early novel *Les nourritures terrestres*, 1897 (*Fruits of the Earth*, 1949), he recommended “an amalgam of pagan, Nietzschean, hedonistic modes of conduct” (Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, eds., *Modernism*, 1976). Gide’s novel *L’Immoraliste*, 1902 (*The Immoralist*, 1930), as the title indicates, was directly inspired by Nietzsche, who used the term several times in his late works (his description of himself as “the first *immoralist*” occurs in the posthumous *Ecce Homo*, 1908). In its turn, *L’Immoraliste* had a decisive impact on **André Malraux** and **Thomas Mann**. Although he could read Nietzsche in German, Gide, in his *Lettre à Angèle* (1899), expressed his appreciation for the translations that were starting to appear in French, especially those of Henri Albert. Gide himself was particularly influenced by *The Birth of Tragedy*. All his works testify to the struggle he had in maintaining his skepticism and his “immoral” values. Although Gide was largely neglected before World War I, in spite of his having helped found the influential periodical *La Nouvelle Revue Française* in 1908, he became one of the most prominent writers of his day and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1947. Refer to W. Wolfgang Holdheim, “The Young Gide’s Reaction to Nietzsche,” *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 72 (1957).

**GOD.** Nietzsche saw “God” as a concept to be expunged from our consciousness: it was a lie taught by the **ascetic priest** in all religions but most perniciously in **Christianity**. Only man can “kill God” (*GS*, III: 125), a complex task since the very **language** we use contains the assumption that “the self” acts within “the world” in a subject–object relationship where the existence of God is posited. This situation caused Nietzsche to comment, “I fear we are not going to get rid of God because we still believe in grammar” (*TI*, “‘Reason’ in Philosophy”: 5). What Nietzsche seeks to show, writes David Cooper, is that “**metaphysicians**, religious believers and **scientists** are all guilty of misunderstanding the nature of language when they make their claims about substance, God, gravity, or whatever, as stating things as they objectively are” (David Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning*, 1983). Only when we realize that words are simply useful



tools will we be able to understand that **morality** goes beyond such catchphrases as “good” and “evil.”

Nietzsche’s pronouncement that “God is dead” (*GS*, III: 125; *Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 2) liberates man from putative sin. **Nihilism** in this sense does not leave a moral void but allows us to make sense of our existence, whatever **suffering** and pain it entails, and to convert our interpretation of the world into one that allows the **will to power** to flourish.

**GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON (1749–1832).** Germany’s foremost man of letters. A native of Frankfurt, Goethe was invited to visit Weimar by the young Duke Karl August (who awarded him the title “von”) and ended up spending the rest of his life there. The “Sage of Weimar” went through several phases, a pre-Romantic *Sturm und Drang* (“Storm and Stress”), which he virtually founded with his play *Götz von Berlichingen* (1773), swiftly followed by his cult novella *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers*, 1774 (*The Sufferings of Young Werther*, 1957), only to go through a neoclassical phase in the company of **Friedrich Schiller** when the rest of German literature was caught up in **Romanticism**. Goethe wrote dramas, poems, scientific studies, and novels, including the pioneering *Bildungsroman*, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, 1795–1796 (*Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship*; trans. 1824 by Thomas Carlyle). Goethe was a skeptic but not aggressively so: he said that it did not matter what people believed as long as they believed in something.

Goethe’s mastery of other disciplines such as **science** has ensured his status as Germany’s foremost man of letters. He wrote a theory of the spectrum (*Zur Farbenlehre*, 1810) and coined the term *morphology* to describe the way creatures develop, searching in those pre-**Darwinian** days for the *Urbild* or “primordial image,” as in his *Versuch, die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären* (“Attempt to Explain the Metamorphosis of Plants,” 1790). Goethe’s friend, the comparative anatomist Carl Gustav Carus, developed a theory of the unconscious that paid due attention to psychic phenomena; **Carl Gustav Jung** later based his theory of the archetype on some of the ideas postulated by Goethe and Carus.

Nietzsche applauded Goethe for his stature and independence, mentioning him hundreds of times in his works and always with the

greatest respect. Among Goethe's voluminous writings, too numerous to list here, the most important for Nietzsche was *Faust* (I: 1808 and II: p.h. 1832), where "the Earth Spirit" (*Geist der Erde*) uses the word *Übermensch* (in *Faust I*, "Night") to describe Faust. In the play, Faust proves woefully all too human, and Mephistopheles really ought to win his bet: but Faust's sheer striving endears him to God, so that the sinner at the very end of *Faust II*, a play quite different in character from *Faust I*, is redeemed when Gretchen—now the **eternal feminine**—triumphantly carries Faust's spirit aloft. Goethe paid a complex tribute to **women** with this portrayal, and it must be said that Nietzsche's querulous adaptation does him no favors, making him seem envious of Goethe's virile confidence with women. Goethe's Gretchen, the embodiment of the eternal feminine, is the archetypal victim of men's lust and not, as Nietzsche implies when he uses the term, a harpy whom men should fear: "love is merely a refined form of parasitism" (*CW*: 3).

In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche gives Goethe the fulsome accolade that he is "not a German event but a European one . . . he did not sever himself from life, he placed himself within it" (*TI*, "Expeditions of Untimely Man": 49). Most important, Goethe provided a model for the *Übermensch*, as Nietzsche's description in *Twilight of the Idols* makes plain:

Goethe conceived of a strong, highly cultured human being, who . . . dares to allow himself the whole compass and wealth of **naturalness**, who is strong enough for this freedom; a man of tolerance, not out of weakness, but out of strength . . . a man to whom nothing is forbidden, except it be *weakness*, whether that weakness be called vice or virtue . . . (*TI*, "Expeditions of Untimely Man": 49)

Goethe's "strong human being" tallies in many ways with Nietzsche's ideal of the sovereign individual described in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Refer to Hans Erhard Gerber, *Nietzsche und Goethe* (1953).

**GORKY, MAXIM (1868–1936).** Russian writer. Gorky is popularly regarded as the father of Soviet literature. His first novel, *Foma Gordeyev* (1899), provides evidence that he had read Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*, which had been translated into Russian that same year, though from his earlier stories, the ideals of superhu-

man nobility and beauty indicate that he already knew *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* well; this remained his favorite among Nietzsche's works. In this novel, the young Gorky obviously wished to blend Nietzschean-inspired dynamism and ecstatic **Dionysianism** with what he would later refer to as "active" compassion as part of his humanitarianism.

Gorky was convinced that a religion of God-building (*Bogostroitel'stvo*), centered on man, would replace the conventional worship of **God**, and he tried to emphasize Nietzsche's Dionysian principle as being anti-individualistic. He never resolved this contradiction. As his revolutionary fervor grew, Gorky became critical of Nietzsche, repudiating him in the essay "*Zametki o meshchantstve*" ("Notes on the Merchant Class"). Gorky's sympathy with the **Marxist** activists prompted him to take part in the unsuccessful Revolution of 1905, and he was forced into exile. By this time, he had an international reputation as a writer, but this was somewhat dented in 1907 with the publication of *Mat* (*The Mother*, 1947), viewed in the capitalist West as a highly tendentious work. Having returned to Russia in 1913, Gorky openly supported the Bolsheviks but criticized them after the 1917 Revolution for their dictatorial practices. Refer to Betty Yetta Forman, "Nietzsche and Gorky in the 1890s. The Case for an Early Influence," in *Western Philosophical Systems in Russian Literature*, ed. Anthony M. Mlikotin (1970).

**GRAND POLITICS (GROSSE POLITIK)**. Nietzsche disliked politics and advised his readers not to read the daily papers. Having briefly supported the founding of the new **German state** in 1871, he turned away from **Otto von Bismarck's** grand politics with their prescription of "blood and iron" (*BGE*, VIII: 254). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he writes,

It is the age of the masses, they fall on their faces before anything massive. And *in politics* likewise. A statesman who builds for them another Tower of Babel, some monstrosity of empire and power, they call "great." . . . (*BGE*, VIII: 241)

If grand politics are for the masses, **nationalism** and **anti-Semitism** are "small politics" (*EH*, "The Case of Wagner": 2), and the matter could have rested there. However, in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche hijacks his own idea and sees himself as part of the scenario: "Only starting

with me will there be grand politics on earth” (*EH*, “Why I Am a Destiny”: 1). Writing a draft of a letter to Georg Brandes at the beginning of December 1888, he states confidently, “We are part of a grand politics, perhaps the grandest of all.” At the end of the draft, he writes that his new manuscript, *The Anti-Christ*, will be world shattering: “*Große Politik par excellence.*”

**THE GREEKS.** Nietzsche was at home among the ancient Greeks; as a student in 1864, he changed faculty, moving with ease from theology to classical philology after only one semester at Bonn University, the groundwork having been done at Schulpforta. His work on **Diogenes Laërtius** was sufficiently impressive to gain him the recommendation of his tutor, Friedrich Ritschl, for the chair of philology at Basel when he was still only 24; his dissertation was on Theognis, the fifth-century Athenian poet. However, it was the world of **Homer**, peopled by heroes and gods—not always distinguishable from one another—that gripped Nietzsche’s imagination; his distinction between **Dionysus** (Greek god of wine and **music**) and **Apollo** is outlined in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). Here, **music** symbolizes, for Nietzsche, the intoxications and instinctual **drives** that make us human: Dionysus is in each of us. (Just before he went insane, Nietzsche thought he *was* Dionysus.) Nietzsche thought the hardness and courage of the ancient Greeks became softened after **Socrates** had introduced weakening elements into Greek thought, albeit via **Plato**’s dialogues. For Nietzsche, Socrates’ thought, as mediated by Plato, represented the worst kind of **ascetic ideal**.

In his essay *The Greek State* (1871), one of the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, Nietzsche writes that in order to produce **artists** of genius, the Greeks had to leave the work to slaves: “The misery of men living a life of toil has to be increased to make the production of the world of art possible for a small number of Olympian men” (*TGS* in *OGM*). Pre-Socratic Greece had bred heroes whose aspirations revolved around a life of contest and victory. In *Homer’s Contest* (1871), the final essay in the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, Nietzsche praises the way the Greeks understood contest as a positive incentive, not as an invitation to **ressentiment**. Their reconciliation with fate came not from ignorance or naïveté but from a brave acceptance of necessity.

Although Nietzsche altered many of his opinions as he matured, he did not budge on the position of **women**. In an early essay of 1871 found in the *Nachlaß* (which appeared in **Oscar Levy's** *Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* in 1911 under the title "The Greek Woman"), Nietzsche argued that the whole fabric of ancient Greece had been held together by the collective "self-denying ordinance" of the women, who devoted their entire lives to their sons. Thus emerged the heroes who peopled the great legends of ancient Greece. It remained his firm conviction that women in the 19th century had something to learn from the way the ancient Greeks treated their women.

Throughout his work, Nietzsche never lost sight of the enigmatic philosopher **Heraclitus**. In his unfinished essay, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (*Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, 1871), Nietzsche had tried to work on the Heraclitan view of becoming, hoping it might confirm his own view of absolute becoming. His theory of **eternal return**, first mooted in *The Gay Science*, represents a return to **Heraclitan** cosmology. Nietzsche also accepted much of what Democritus (ca. 460–370 B.C.) had to say on the materiality of the atom, while Epicurus (ca. 341–270), whose theories on the atom might also have derived indirectly from Democritus, was a hero who knew how to live and how to philosophize.

Although Nietzsche professed to dislike **history**, he held the historian Thucydides in high regard, especially for his portrait of the ruthless Alcibiades in the *History of the Peloponnesian War*; such a warrior became, for Nietzsche, a template for **master morality**. In his late work *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche confessed, "My recreation, my preference, my *cure* for all *Platonism*, has always been Thucydides" (*TI*, "What I Owe the Ancients": 2). Refer to Victorino Tejera, *Nietzsche and Greek Thought* (1987). See also GREEK TRAGEDY.

**"THE GREEK STATE."** Third essay of the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, written in 1871. Here, Nietzsche argues that modern man is pulled between an inclination for **art** and the necessity for work, a conflict not experienced by the ancient Greek, who left work to the slaves and even regarded art as work; thus, though the Greek regarded it as essential to drop everything if he felt creative inspiration, he was somewhat ashamed by this in the same way that a father

is bashful about procreation even though he has produced a beautiful child. Nietzsche argues that the Greeks saw both work and slavery as a necessary disgrace, accepting the laws of injustice and cruelty. To have cultural production, others had to toil more than their fair share. The Greeks acknowledged that “might is right,” as distilled in Nietzsche’s image of “the conqueror with the iron hand” (*TGS* in *OGM*); accepting art as a tool of the state, each Greek polis set about competing with its neighbor, sometimes with “murderous greed.” Nietzsche argues that “this mysterious connection between the state and art, political greed and artistic creation” (*TGS* in *OGM*) gives a false impression that the state is a mere iron clamp, whereas without it there would be a Hobbesian **war** of all against all. Nietzsche argues in favor of preparedness for war because it keeps a state on its mettle. Deploping the contemporary convergence of liberal politics and a “stateless money aristocracy,” Nietzsche mourns the “inevitable decline of the arts” and quips, “You will just have to excuse me if I occasionally sing a pæan to war” (*TGS* in *OGM*). Nietzsche’s polemic for and against the state is summed up thus:

The state, of ignominious birth, a continually flowing source of evil for most people, frequently the ravishing flame of the human race—and yet, a sound that makes us forget ourselves, a battle-cry which has encouraged countless truly heroic acts. . . . (*TGS* in *OGM*)

*See also* GREEK TRAGEDY; THE GREEKS; *HOMER’S CONTEST*.

**GREEK TRAGEDY.** In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche argued that duality was “the origin and essence of Greek tragedy as the expression of two interwoven **artistic** impulses, the *Apollonian* and the *Dionysian*” (*BT*, 12). He applauded the dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles, where the tragic hero demonstrates Dionysian passion in his struggle against fate and where **cruelty** and **suffering** are presented as part of the human condition. In contrast, **Socrates’** contemporary Euripides heeded the Socratic principle that “**knowledge** is virtue.” Nietzsche writes, “With this canon in his hands, Euripides measured all the separate elements of the drama—**language**, characters, dramaturgic structure, choric **music**—and corrected them according to this principle” (*BT*, 12). Nietzsche blamed Socrates for crushing the spirit of contest in Greek tragedy, not just in general,

through his **rationalism**, but in person, by promoting the interests of Euripides. He even declares that Socrates helped Euripides to write his plays and attended only those dramatic festivals where a new play by Euripides was performed (*BT*, 13). Whether or not Socrates directly caused “the poetic deficiency and degeneration in the work of Euripides” (*BT*, 12), Nietzsche was right to say that the Euripidean hero lacked dynamism, certainly in contrast to a Sophoclean hero like Oedipus.

Whatever the reasons, it is the case that fifth-century Greek tragedy faded out. It is typical of Nietzsche that, true to his avowed dislike of **history** as set forth in the second essay of the *Untimely Meditations*, he preferred to blame Platonic philistinism for Greek cultural decline, ignoring other factors that might have been important, such as the decline of Athens as a city-state. Nietzsche was sure that Socratic dialectic had helped overthrow the awe-inspiring spectacle of man as pawn of the gods, forcing Greek tragedy to bow to philosophy. Not surprisingly, when *The Birth of Tragedy* appeared, it was bitterly criticized by Nietzsche’s colleagues for ignoring historiography. See also THE GREEKS.

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**HABERMAS, JÜRGEN (1929– )**. A “product” of the **Frankfurt School**, Habermas broke new ground in social theory by examining the theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein and postulating that **language** (and not, as **Karl Marx** argued, labor) is a “fundamental, inescapable prerequisite for the reproduction of social life.” In *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, 1981 (*The Theory of Communicative Action*, 1984), Habermas applied this theory to man both as a private individual and as a member of a technocratic society. He criticized Nietzsche for his attack on **science** and for his insistence on man as a being driven by instinct rather than rationality. In *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, 1985 (*The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 1987), Habermas attacked **Max Horkheimer** and **Theodor Adorno** for remaining “trapped within the perspective of Nietzsche’s cultural criticism” (Georg Stauth and Brian S. Turner, *Nietzsche’s*

*Dance*, 1988). In the same work he delivered a devastating attack on **postmodernism**. Like all the members of the Frankfurt School, Habermas mentions Nietzsche frequently but always en passant.

**HAECKEL, ERNST (1834–1919)**. German **scientist** and philosopher. From 1865, Haeckel was professor of zoology in Jena, at that time the center of academic scientific inquiry in Germany. All his life, Haeckel labored over monism, his own response to **Darwinian** evolutionary theory, whereby he reduced **life** to cells in order to build up a coherent and organic whole—with the consequence that society could be spoken of as a *Gesamtperson*. “Haeckel’s synthesis of evolution and cell biology reinforced his position as an ideologist of social evolution” (Paul Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics Between National Unification and Nazism*, 1989). With unflagging energy, Haeckel popularized biology as a discipline and made propaganda for his own social Darwinism as an alternative to the “archaic superstition” (Weindling) of **Christianity**. In his discussion of **women’s** physiology, Haeckel’s theory that woman was less evolved “and, like the savage and the child, more undifferentiated” (Bidy Martin, *Woman and Modernity*, 1991) had far-reaching consequences for “biological” feminism. His most famous work was *Das Welträthsel*, 1899 (*The Riddle of the Universe*, 1900). Nietzsche knew only his earlier work, such as *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* (*Natural History of Creation*, 1868), mainly through the filter of F. A. Lange. During the 1890s, the fusion of Nietzschean idealism with Haeckel’s evolutionary theory was a powerful stimulus to both the **eugenics movement** and its offshoot, the *Neue Ethik* movement, in Germany.

**HAMSUN, KNUT (1859–1952)**. Norwegian novelist. Hamsun was the son of a farmer and led a life of precarious poverty in Christiania (now Oslo) before he was able to earn a living from his writing. He emigrated to America (twice) in order to extricate himself from poverty. The almost surreal quality of *Sult*, 1890 (*Hunger*, 1899) brought about a new respect for subjectivity in some avant-garde literary circles running counter to the **Naturalist movement** then current in literature and was very much in tune with Nietzsche’s individualism as well as with Nietzsche’s admiration for **aristocratic values**. Hamsun’s novel *Mysterier*, 1892 (*Mysteries*, 1927) “was intended as



a demonstration of what the new literature should be” (R. G. Popperwell, *Penguin Companion to Literature*, 1969). His other novels of the period, *Pan*, 1894; trans. 1956), and *Victoria* (1898; trans. 1929), reveal a Nietzschean tendency to privilege the inner **life**. In *Markens grøde*, 1917 (*The Growth of the Soil*, 1920), which is permeated with Nietzschean attitudes, Hamsun attacks normality and praises the exceptional individual. The soil in question is Norwegian soil: outsiders such as the **Jew** and the “Yankee” are despised. This was, however, regarded as his best book, and in 1920, Hamsun received the Nobel Prize for Literature. However, his popularity had already begun to wane. Readers formerly sympathetic to his work shied away from his pro-Nazi attitude during World War II. In 1947, he was fined for collaboration with the **National Socialists**.

**HANSSON, OLA (1860–1925)**. Swedish writer. Hansson became a resident of Berlin and Munich and was one of Nietzsche’s early admirers, publishing in February 1889 an article on Nietzsche titled “*Friedrich Nietzsche: Die Umrißlinien seines Systems und seiner Persönlichkeit*” (“Friedrich Nietzsche: An Outline of the Man and His System”) in the Leipzig periodical *Unsere Zeit*. Here, he reports Nietzsche’s insanity, hoping that it will be temporary. Also in 1889, Hansson married the writer **Laura Marholm**. Hansson’s brief monograph on Nietzsche, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Seine Persönlichkeit und sein System*, 1890 (*Friedrich Nietzsche: His Personality and His System*, 1968), was the first of its kind. Hansson drew comparisons between Nietzsche and the **Naturalist movement** in his article “*Nietzsche und der Naturalismus*,” published in *Die Gegenwart* (1891). Among Hansson’s works that were influential with the Naturalists are *Pariahs. Fatalistische Geschichten* (*Pariahs: Fatalistic Stories*, 1890) and *Alltagsfrauen: Ein Stück moderner Liebespsychologie* (*Ordinary Women: A Piece of Modern Psychology of Love*, 1891).

**HAPPINESS**. A term Nietzsche can use or abuse at will “to denote both something of which he approves and what he regards as its malignant shadow” (Michael Tanner, *The Anti-Christ*, Introduction). A similar term is **depth** (*Tiefe*). On one level, Nietzsche accepted that happiness was a natural state and therefore good, defining it as a *result* (not goal) of a healthy lifestyle:

first example of my “**revaluation of all values**”: a well-constituted human being, a “happy one,” *must* perform certain actions and instinctively shrinks from other actions, he transports the order of which he is the physiological representative into his relations with other human beings and with things. In formula: his virtue is the *consequence* of his happiness. . . . (TI: “The Four Great Errors,” 2)

On another level, Nietzsche believed that decadent religions (**Christianity** in particular) exploit man’s yearning for happiness by promising that **God** will reward their humility. As the satirically named Mr. Nosy Daredevil in *On the Genealogy of Morality* puts it, “Something will one day be balanced up and paid back with enormous interest in gold, no! in happiness. They call that ‘bliss’” (OGM, I: 14). Nietzsche viewed **utilitarianism** as offering a similarly fraudulent promise of happiness both because its basic premise rested on Christian tenets and because it blocked out the spirit of striving and contest essential to the **higher man**. “What is happiness?—The feeling that power *increases*—that resistance is overcome” (A-C, 2).

**HART, JULIUS (1859–1930)**. German writer and critic and supporter of the **Naturalist movement**. Hart was a frequenter of the *Durch* coterie and a major contributor to the Nietzsche-inspired periodical *Die freie Bühne* around the turn of the century. In 1899, Hart published *Der neue Gott (The New God)*, in which he criticized Nietzsche for his “romantic-dilettante-feminine” approach. Hart, in tune with the *völkisch* sentiments currently in vogue, argued that Nietzsche’s “hall of fame” excluded **Germans** of the type Hart wanted to promote: blond Nordic Aryans. Hart considered **Max Stirner** a superior thinker to Nietzsche and, believing Nietzsche to be Polish, pronounced him to be of inferior race. Hart’s book indicates the level of **nationalism** already current in Germany at the turn of the century.

In spite of his attack on Nietzsche, Hart was inspired by many Nietzschean concepts, as demonstrated in the **Dionysian** tone and dithyrambic style of his book. Hart and his brother Heinrich Hart (1855–1906), author of *Das Lied der Menschheit (Song of Humanity)*, 1888–1896, founded *Die neue Gemeinschaft (The New Society)* in Berlin in order to propound their new religion of liberal mysticism among a circle of bourgeois intellectuals, often with left-wing sympathies. The group included men such as **Gustav Landauer** and

Erich Mühsam. The aim of the group was to form a society in which individualism could flourish. Freedom from shackles was expressed symbolically by the shedding of as much restrictive clothing (such as corsets in the case of the ladies) as was considered decent.

**HARTMANN, EDUARD VON (1842–1906).** German philosopher. Nietzsche always referred to Hartmann with contempt, and the antagonism was entirely mutual; Hartmann had harsh criticism for Nietzsche’s ideas in an early review titled “Nietzsche’s ‘neue Moral,’” published in the *Preußischer Jahrbücher* (1891), later calling Nietzsche’s philosophy “moral madness.” Hartmann’s (atheistic) philosophy of the unconscious, as outlined in *Philosophie des Unbewußten*, 1864 (*Philosophy of the Unconscious*, 1884), was based on a fusion of the ideas of **Arthur Schopenhauer**, **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**, and other exponents of **German Idealism**. He held that there were three stages of civilization; in the first, reason and will had become separated; in the second—where man found himself—the will was dominant, and things would have to get worse before they got better; at this point, reason would prevail, and civilization would reach the final stage of Hegelian synthesis. This was a positive outcome, but Hartmann’s description of the will as unruly gave him a reputation as **pessimist**. Hartmann’s work on the phenomenology of moral consciousness was *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewußtseins* (*Phenomenology of Ethical Consciousness*, 1879). Hartmann, like **Eugen Dühring**, offended Nietzsche by stating that there must have been a beginning to **time** and that it could not be counted backward to infinity. The infinity of time in both directions was axiomatic for Nietzsche’s theory of eternal return.

**HAUPTMANN, GERHART (1862–1946).** Foremost dramatist of the German **Naturalist movement**. After achieving some notoriety with his *Vor Sonnenaufgang* (*Before Sunrise*, 1889), Hauptmann produced his masterpiece *Die Weber*, 1890 (*The Weavers*, 1980). As his memoirs make clear, he remained unimpressed by Nietzsche’s rhetoric, especially his “hypocrisy” toward **Richard Wagner**. If Hauptmann, in the heyday of the Naturalist movement, adopted an attitude of benign neglect toward Nietzsche, there was a wide divergence of view among his associates in the *Durch* coterie: some in this circle,

such as **Johannes Schlaf**, were outspokenly hostile, though others, like **Leo Berg**, were strong Nietzscheans. Hauptmann subsequently accepted an invitation to read from his work at the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. Nietzsche did not mention Hauptmann because he collapsed into insanity just as Hauptmann's work was becoming a force to be reckoned with. Because of Hauptmann's attempt to reproduce harsh "reality" on the stage, with characters speaking in dialect, Nietzsche's comments would certainly have been derogatory.

**HEAVINESS (*DIE SCHWERE*)**. As with **depth**, Nietzsche chooses a deceptively simple word to reflect a deeper meaning. "*Schwer*" translates as "heavy," "difficult," or "serious," and although it often appears to be pejorative (and frequently is), as with scholarly punctiliousness or "*schwer nehmen*" (*BGE*, VI: 213), it could also intimate that something is vitally important; in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche introduces the as-yet-anonymous notion of **eternal return** by means of a Trojan horse, "*das grösste Schwergewicht*" ("the heaviest burden"; *GS*, III: 241). When promoted to an allegorical concept as the **spirit of heaviness**, Nietzsche provides **Zarathustra** (and thus himself) with an alter ego or ventriloquist who can voice the thoughts of the "moral" man, laden with cares. The heaviness of the burden is not really the problem; it is being a man that is the difficulty—and breaking free (from **Christianity**) is hard to do.

**HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)**. German Idealist philosopher. Born in Stuttgart, Hegel taught briefly at Jena University, where he worked under the precocious Professor Friedrich Schelling until the latter left Jena in 1805. Not long afterward, Hegel embarked on a peripatetic career that would end with his professorship in 1818 in Berlin, where he lived until his death.

Hegel based his philosophy on the concept of **Geist**, which can be translated as "mind" or "spirit." He rejected **Immanuel Kant**'s limitations on knowledge, arguing in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 1807 (*Phenomenology of Mind*, 1931), that the human mind arises from consciousness through self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and religion to arrive at absolute knowledge. If we can "think thought" (*das Denken des Denkens*), we are already in touch with absolute knowledge (*das Absolute Wissen*). The finite world is a reflection of the mind,

and there is no conflict with religion, for mind/spirit, as part of “*das Absolute*,” transforms religious ideas into **concepts**. Man can think his own being or essence by knowing himself as mind identical with **God**, or the *Weltgeist* (world spirit).

In 1821, Hegel published his major work, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (*The Philosophy of Right*, 1942). Here, he explains the relevance of the dialectic procedure for the state: the *Weltgeist* moves toward its goal, which is the freedom and self-consciousness of humanity, by indirect methods, exploiting the passions of human beings, who scarcely realize they are part of the dialectic process. A people or nation has its own spirit and is linked to the *Weltgeist* in such a way that the vicissitudes of individual states constitute world **history**. At the end of *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel states that the synthesis of history is found in the Prussian state (some have therefore construed him to be speaking of “the end of history” at that point since he implies that the dialectic has wound to a halt), but Hegel apparently said something quite different to his students, and perhaps his contrived ending is just a genuflection to flatter the Prussian king and make sure his job remained secure.

From first to last, Nietzsche dismissed Hegel’s entire system, describing it in 1873 as an infectious disease: “He who has once contracted Hegelism and **Schleiermacherism** is never quite cured of them” (*UM*, I: “**David Strauss**, the Confessor and the Writer”: 6), while in 1882, *Parsifal* is “Hegelei in **Musik**” (letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, 13 July 1882). In *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche thunders,

Let us remember that **Wagner** was young at the time Hegel and Schelling seduced men’s spirits; that he guessed, that he grasped with his very hands the only thing the **Germans** take seriously—“the idea,” which is to say, something that is obscure, uncertain, full of intimations; that among Germans clarity is an objection, logic a refutation. . . . Hegel is a *taste*. (*CW*, 10)

See also GERMAN IDEALISM; ROMANTICISM.

**HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889–1976)**. German existentialist philosopher. Heidegger studied at Freiburg under Edmund Husserl. He then taught at Marburg before returning to lecture and write at Freiburg. His major work, *Sein und Zeit*, 1927 (*Being and Time*, 1949), is a

seminal **metaphysical** enquiry. Heidegger was part of the team working at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* on the publication of a new Nietzsche edition, but he was a misfit for a variety of reasons. According to Manfred Riedel, **Richard Oehler** had denounced Heidegger's *Being and Time* as "**Jewish** philosophy" (Manfred Riedel, *Nietzsche in Weimar*, 2000). For his part, Heidegger disapproved of the money spent on the **Nietzsche-Halle** and did not attend the opening ceremony in 1937; he also thought Baeumler's political approach to Nietzsche was superficial. However, Heidegger has not escaped the accusation of being a fellow traveler who did not speak out against the **National Socialists**.

Heidegger took up the post of rector of Freiburg University in April 1933. In his "rectoral address," he spoke of the German *Volk*, whose time, he made clear, had now come, implying support for National Socialism to the point of endorsing racism. Heidegger had joined the NSDA (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*) shortly before Hitler was elected chancellor in January 1933 (thus before there was overwhelming pressure to do so: Hitler did not assume power until November 1933). He resigned as rector in early 1934 but continued to lecture until 1944. In 1945, he was investigated by the occupying powers and temporarily forbidden to teach. Heidegger was an intensely private man who made few public statements; his defenders describe him as a naive inhabitant of the ivory tower and thus rationalize his support for Hitler and the *Führer* principle, pointing out that this is not evident in his philosophy. His critics point out that if he regretted his brief Nazi past, he never said so.

Heidegger's lectures from 1936 to 1946 form the basis of his substantial work *Nietzsche* (1961; trans. 1979–1986). During the 1920s and early 1930s, Heidegger had been a frequent visitor at the *Nietzsche-Archiv*; in 1931, he was a collaborator on the *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*. His chief interest in this was to have proper access to Nietzsche's posthumous manuscripts, which he viewed as Nietzsche's major work, dismissing all Nietzsche's published works as "a foreground" and declaring, "The actual philosophy remains behind as *Nachlaß*" (*Nietzsche*, 1961: Introduction). He defined the **will to power** itself as "incontrovertibly striving toward the possibility of exercising power, a striving toward the possession of **power**"

(*Nietzsche*, 1961, II). Heidegger took very little notice of Nietzsche's attempts to make power more than **metaphysics** and largely ignored his forays into **natural science: eternal return** as **metaphor** lay at the heart of his study of Nietzsche, and this would fire French enthusiasm—at least within the existentialist circle around **Jean-Paul Sartre** and **Albert Camus**—with a curiosity for Nietzsche's ideas. Heidegger was the first philosopher to make Nietzsche's *Nachlaß* the central focus of his study. **Gilles Deleuze** took Heidegger's ideas a step further in *Nietzsche et la Philosophie* (1963), but the chief heir to Heidegger, in Nietzschean terms, is **Jacques Derrida**. Refer to Eckhard Heftrich, *Durchblicke* (1970; chapter “*Nietzsche im Denken Heideggers*”), and Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (1992).

**HEIGHT.** See HIGHER MAN.

**HEINE, HEINRICH (1797–1856).** German writer of **Jewish** extraction. Heine was made to feel an outcast in Germany, and to circumvent this he converted to Protestantism in 1825. His early poems in *Buch der Lieder* (1827) contain a dichotomy between “Poesy” (poetic sensibility) and realism, while his autobiographical *Reisebilder* (*Travel Scenes*, 1826–1831) display wit and a growing social awareness. In 1831, following the 1830 revolution in France, Heine left Germany for Paris, attracted by Saint-Simonianism, and lived there until his death. Heine published more poetry in France as well as two books on **German cultural history**—*Die Romantische Schule* (1833–1835) and *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland* (1834–1835)—both published originally in French, but his fame was secured with two biting satirical works on Germany: *Deutschland: Ein Wintermärchen* (*Germany: A Winter's Tale*, 1844) and *Atta Troll: Ein Sommernachtstraum* (*Atta Troll: A Midsummer Night's Dream*, 1843–1845).

Heine's attack on Germany met its mark, and it is not surprising that Nietzsche found in him a kindred spirit, making a number of references to Heine in his works that leave no doubt as to his admiration. There are also references to Heine in the unpublished notes. Nietzsche admired the way Heine had assimilated into French culture, becoming part of “the flesh and blood of the more refined and

demanding lyric poets of Paris” (*BGE*, VIII: 254). In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche again praised Heine for showing him what a true lyrical poet was, praising his “divine malice” and wonderful **style**: “and how he handles German!” (*EH*, “Why I Am So Clever”: 4).

**HERACLITUS (ca. 540–480 B.C.)**. Ancient **Greek** cosmologist. Heraclitus developed a doctrine of absolute becoming in which reality is characterized by constant change. Everything in the universe is held in balance, in spite of constant apparent contradictions, as between good and evil, sickness and health, and so on. There might be an impression of stability, but in fact there is only becoming. An oft-cited example is that a man cannot enter the same river twice; the water seems to be the same, but as it is constantly flowing, it will never actually be the same. Plato dubbed this a theory of flux and found fault with it since it contradicted his theory of forms. Nietzsche accepted much of the doctrine of absolute becoming but meshed it in with his own theory of **time** and used it as a basis for his teaching of **eternal return**. Nietzsche first conceived the idea of eternal return in 1881 when writing the fateful book 3 of *The Gay Science* (341/342), introducing as it did both **Zarathustra** and eternal return (at first simply referred to pro tem as “the **heaviest** burden”). In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche reflects that Heraclitus might have been the first to discover eternal return: “this doctrine of Zarathustra *might* already have been taught by Heraclitus. At least the Stoa had traces of it, and the Stoics inherited almost all of their principal notions from Heraclitus” (*EH*, “The Birth of Tragedy”: 3). He also probably linked **Zarathustra** (Zoroaster) to Heraclitus through their joint belief in the primal function of fire as well, as through their notion of twinned opposites (chiefly good and evil) as balancing poles. Certainly, behind *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* we must reckon with the influence of Heraclitus as well as Zoroaster.

It is hard to be precise about Heraclitus’s theory of creation because few fragments of his work survive. He apparently held that fire was the essential force of creation and was the unifying material that held the universe in place. It was associated with rationality. Fire became flame and smoke and entered the ether as air; this air turned to pure fire and returned to the sea. Meanwhile, an equal proportion of earth became sea, and sea became fire. Paul Bishop comments, “Although



‘cold’ and ‘warm,’ ‘damp’ and ‘dry’ were perpetually transforming themselves into each other, the wise soul was ‘dry’” (Paul Bishop, *The Dionysian Self*, 1995).

**THE HERD (DIE HERDE).** Nietzsche mainly indicated his contempt for “the herd” through his spokesman, **Zarathustra**. The lower man or herd man lacks *amor fati*, which means that he has none of the propensity for a cheerful and “willed” acceptance of his fate, unlike the **higher man** or his planned apotheosis, the *Übermensch*. Furthermore, the herd man accepts the **ascetic ideal** and aligns himself with what he thinks is a “free society,” which, however, only encourages the “animalization of man to the pygmy animal of equal rights and equal pretensions” (*BGE*, V: 203). Nietzsche decides that for democrats, socialists, and “*new philosophers*,” herd man is “their man of the future” (*BGE*, V: 203), whereas for Nietzsche he is an object of disgust. In the *Will to Power*, there is a whole section on “The Herd” that finishes as follows:

My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic morality. The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or “the beasts of prey,” etc. (*WP*, II: 287)

*See also* LAST MAN; *UNTERMENSCH*.

**HESSE, HERMANN (1877–1962).** German writer. Like Nietzsche, the son of parents with neo-**Pietistic** sympathies, Hesse had connections to India that come to the fore in *Siddharta* (1922; trans. 1954). The influence of Nietzsche on Hesse is already clear in his earliest novel *Peter Camenzind* (1904; trans. 1961), though Hesse remained preoccupied with matters related to the *Bildungsroman* until he produced his own major novels, beginning with *Demian* (1919; trans. 1958). In 1916, Hesse had a nervous breakdown, adversely affected by family problems and worry about World War I; in the same year, he began his first course of psychoanalytic treatment with J. B. Lang (a pupil of **Carl Gustav Jung**). Hesse was a critic of the political situation in Germany but saw the solution in a betterment of man’s whole **life**—his spiritual life and his appreciation of **aesthetics**. These ideas are expressed in the essay “*Zarathustras Wiederkehr*” (“Zarathustra’s

Return”), published in 1919, where Hesse counsels, “You must learn to be yourself, just as I have learned to be Zarathustra.”

In *Demian*, Hesse introduced the Nietzschean theme of the polarity between **art** and life, a dichotomy present in all of his subsequent work, though his interest in Jung can be traced in all his work written in the 1920s, especially *Der Steppenwolf* (1927; trans. 1965), destined to become a cult book. This novel, which mentions Nietzsche by name several times, portrays a man whose problem is fundamentally that encountered in *Siddharta*: that of “becoming who one is.” Harry Haller believes that he is torn in two; half of him is the instinctive man, the loner, the wolf from the Steppes, while the other half of him hankers for the orderly life of the bourgeois. During the course of the novel, Haller realizes that the dual division is far too simplistic: man consists of a myriad of egos. The theme of duality is taken up again in *Narziß und Goldmund* (1930; trans. 1959), where two friends represent aestheticism in stark dichotomy: Narziß the monk versus Goldmund, the (priapic) world. In *Das Glasperlenspiel* (1943; trans. as *Magister Ludi*, 1950), the theme is taken further; the central character, Knecht, another version of Narziß, ultimately tires of the intellectually barren life he is leading as Magister Ludi. Refer to Herbert W. Reichert, *The Impact of Nietzsche on Hermann Hesse* (1972).

**HEYM, GEORG (1887–1912).** German poet. Heym frequented the *Café des Westens* in Berlin, where he found a ready audience for his poems. He was a member of the *Der Neue Club* founded by **Kurt Hiller** and would later come to be seen as the quintessential poet of German **Expressionism**. Early influences include Charles Baudelaire, **Friedrich Hölderlin**, John Keats, and Arthur Rimbaud, though by 1907, Heym acknowledged in his diary that Nietzsche was one of his heroes. The poetry that Heym began writing in 1899 bears witness to his malaise over **European** warmongering, prophetically expressed in his poem *Der Krieg* (**War**, 1912). Like other writers, but to a remarkable extent, Heym studied Nietzsche’s texts, especially *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and appropriated what he wanted. He was unimpressed by Nietzsche’s ethical arguments and **cultural** critique. Heym drowned in a skating accident in 1912. His only nonposthumous collection of poems is *Der ewige Tag* (*The Eternal Day*, 1911).

**HEYSE, PAUL (1830–1914)**, German writer. Heyse studied Italian and was active as a translator as well as a writer of poetry, prose, and drama. When offered the patronage of King Maximilian II in 1854, he moved to Munich and spent the rest of his life there, becoming a prolific writer at the center of the (then) somewhat lackluster Munich literary scene, where much attention was paid to form. In his novel *Über allen Gipfeln* (*Above All the Treetops*, 1895), Heyse portrays a bourgeois protagonist who makes blustering propaganda for Nietzsche (mentioned by name in the book) and who at first believes that he can stand outside the realm of “good and evil,” only to realize that one can “only submit to the dazzling madness” for a short period. Heyse’s “shallow, moralizing conception” of Nietzsche’s thought (Bruno Hillebrand, *Nietzsche und die deutsche Literatur*, 1878) brings the novel’s rank lower than his best work; it was nevertheless immensely popular with the general reader; *Über allen Gipfeln* reached its 10th edition in 1899. An opponent of the **Naturalist movement**, Heyse was a fading star when he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1910.

**THE HIGHER MAN (DER HÖHERE MENSCH)**. Nietzsche’s term for the embryonic human who, with his courage, cheerfulness, propensity for laughter, and essential nobility of spirit, has the potential to develop into the *Übermensch*, a development contingent on his capacity for the **will to power**, acceptance of **eternal return**, and readiness to adopt the fundamentals of **master morality**. He must seek to construct his own **morality** and create his own destiny by a willing **affirmation of life** and by *amor fati*. His rejection of the life-denying **ascetic ideal** is the first move on the way to higher health.

In book 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, eight higher men visit Zarathustra to partake of a “final supper” with him. During the meal, Zarathustra teaches them the virtues of the higher man: now that **God** is dead, they should laugh and **dance**. Even though they are failures, they have the capacity for self-overcoming. They must avoid the man of **ressentiment** at all costs. So craven are these higher men that Zarathustra has difficulty in stopping them from praying to the ass in his cave (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 1–2); suffice it to say that Zarathustra knows their faults, but he also knows how they can be overcome.

The eight higher men are presumably based on real people, and Weaver Santaniello (S) believes she has unlocked the key to their identities (*Zarathustra's Last Supper: Nietzsche's Eight Higher Men*, 2005). R. J. Hollingdale (H) in the introduction to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* also believed he had broken the code. The results are as follows: the *prophet* is **Arthur Schopenhauer** (H), whereas (S) calls him the *soothsayer* and decides that he is Heinrich von Stein; the *two kings* are any two kings (H and S); the *conscientious man of the spirit* is “probably **Darwin**” (H), whereas (S) renames him the “*bleeding man*” and interprets him as **Erwin Rohde**; the *sorcerer* (H) or *magician* (S) is **Richard Wagner** (H and S); the *last Pope* is imaginary (H) or Franz Liszt (S); the *voluntary beggar* is Buddha/Tolstoi (H) or Jesus/Buddha (S); the *ugliest man* is an atheist (H) or **Socrates** (S); the *shadow* is a freethinker (H) or Moses (S).

Nietzsche uses the term “*Mensch*,” which is not gendered, meaning that the previous comments could apply to a woman just as well as to a man, though Nietzsche does not provide a context inviting one to do so. The higher man’s true counterpart is **herd** man, who will always remain at the level of the herd and obedient to **slave morality**. See also ANIMALS, LAST MAN.

**HILLER, KURT (1885–1973)**. German writer and publicist. Hiller founded a literary group, *Der neue Klub*, in Berlin in 1909 that included the poets **Georg Heym**, Jakob van Hoddis, and Ernst Blass and represented the first wave of **Expressionism**. They aimed at a regeneration of contemporary society, which they (prophetically) held to be heading for disaster. All were avid Nietzscheans, and Hiller, in particular, knew his work well. The group’s heyday was 1910. Its members developed a theory, *der neue Pathos*. This was “an overt expression of Nietzsche’s ‘**will to power**,’ a synthesis of mind and body, of feeling and thought” (Roy Allen, *German Expressionist Poetry*, 1979).

The members of *Der neue Klub* were often members of other clubs or associated with periodicals such as *Die Aktion* and *Der Sturm* at the same time, and all tended to meet at the *Café des Westens*. In 1918, Hiller founded a brand of “activism”; its goals—briefly summarized as having the purpose of bringing back **Geist** into German intellectual discourse—were propounded in his journal *Das Ziel* and his book

*Geist werde Herr (Let Mind Become Master, 1920)*. The Dadaists immediately attacked him for elitism. Hiller was subsequently one of the first of the generation of Expressionists to be arrested by the Gestapo. He spent 15 years in exile in London. His autobiographical *Leben gegen die Zeit (Living Against the Time)* was published in 1969.

**HISTORY.** A dangerous pursuit, according to Nietzsche, though his attitude to history turns out to be ambivalent. Historiography had become a popular new branch of research in Wilhelmine Germany, and Nietzsche regularly registered his objections to it as hidebound and alienating, arguing that historical studies had become too “**scientific**” (in line with **Charles Darwin**’s theories). He also disapproved of Hegelian dialectic, which used history in a new way, as well as the more tangible “dumbing down” of contemporary history. Certainly, **Otto von Bismarck** encouraged a popular chauvinism to celebrate recent events, erecting patriotic monuments (often statues of himself). Another reason for Nietzsche’s objection to history was that he had decided that **forgetting** was essential to man’s psyche, and yet another was that history paralyzes the “**forces of life**” (*UM*, II: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 2) by analyzing dead time (Nietzsche also found fault with philology’s study of dead books). For this myriad of reasons, Nietzsche in the second essay of the *Untimely Meditations*, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1874), listed his five principal objections to history:

It creates that contrast with inner and outer . . . and thereby weakens the personality; it leads an age to imagine that it possesses the rarest of virtues, justice, to a greater degree than any other age; it disrupts the instincts of a people, and hinders the individual no less than the whole in the attainment of maturity; it implants the belief, harmful at any time, in the old age of mankind, the belief that one is a latecomer and epigone; it leads an age into a dangerous mood of irony in regard to itself. . . .” (*UM*: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 5)

Nietzsche—whose favorite thinker among the ancient **Greeks** was the historian Thucydides—was really objecting to historiographers like **Heinrich von Treitschke** rather than history as such.

In favor of history, Nietzsche postulates an **aesthetic** approach to history that prompts us to recognize the whole from a part, a temple from a few pillars; for example, “It is in this ability rapidly to recon-

struct such systems of ideas and sensations on any given occasion . . . that the historical sense consists” (*HH*, I: “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture,” 274). Nietzsche suggests that we can even perform this *Gestalt*-like process on ourselves. However, the attack continues in *Beyond Good and Evil*, where Nietzsche argues that Europeans have been plunged into semi-barbarity through the “**democratic** enlargement” of class and race. As a result of our impure lineage, we “moderns” dislike the all-too-perfect **cultural** achievements that the “historical sense” can provide and reject “good taste”—the cultural equivalent, for Nietzsche, of living dangerously—“we moderns, we semi-barbarians—are only in *our* bliss where we are most—in *danger*” (*BGE*, VII: 224).

**HITLER, ADOLF (1889–1945).** German dictator from 1934 to 1945.

Hitler was originally Austrian and was forced to acquire a German passport in order to pursue his political goals, finally to be achieved when he became *Reichskanzler* in 1933 and *Führer* on the death of Paul von Hindenburg on 2 August 1934. In 1919, having served in World War I, Hitler became a member of the *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, a group of radicals over whom he soon gained control. In April 1920 the party changed its name to *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP; the **National Socialist**, or “Nazi,” party). Its mouthpiece, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, became a daily in 1923. By that time, the NSDAP was strong enough to attempt the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich in November 1923, after which Hitler was imprisoned for a year in Landsberg jail. Here, he wrote *Mein Kampf* (I: 1925; II: 1928). In February 1925, in the first issue of the *Völkischer Beobachter* to appear after the fiasco of the Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler announced a “new” Nazi Party. Opportunists in the party would now routinely claim affinity (however spurious) with Nietzsche’s work as part of the overall strategy of state propaganda.

Although Hitler’s voracious reading included the works of **Oswald Spengler** and **Houston Stewart Chamberlain**, it has never been established whether he actually read anything by Nietzsche. Unlike **Benito Mussolini**, Hitler had not been an avid Nietzschean in his youth, but with his sharp ear for slogans (matched by a sharp eye for logos and other emblems), he was no doubt attracted by the *titles* of Nietzsche’s works, such as *The Will to Power* and *Beyond Good*

*and Evil*, as well as by the general aura of right-wing Nietzscheanism emanating from the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, where Nietzsche's sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** presided over her brother's literary estate. Hitler visited Elisabeth at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* on a number of occasions, each time receiving an ecstatic welcome. In 1934, he posed for a photograph beside **Max Klinger's** herm of Nietzsche.

Hitler's recognition of the propaganda value of Nietzsche's ideas for National Socialism predictably occasioned many attempts to implicate Nietzsche's thought with Nazi ideology; these were so successful that it has been a principal task of all postwar Nietzsche societies—and indeed all “Nietzscheans”—to give an account of how and why it was possible for Nietzsche's ideas to be misrepresented in this way. Refer to Jochen Kirchhoff, *Nietzsche, Hitler und die Deutschen: Die Perversionen des Neuen Zeitalters vom unerlösten Schatten des Dritten Reiches* (*Nietzsche, Hitler and the Germans: Perversions of the New Age by the Unredeemed Shadow of the Third Reich*, 1990). See also ANTI-SEMITISM; BAEUMLER, ALFRED; GERMANS; VOLK.

**HOFMANNSTHAL, HUGO VON (1874–1929)**. Austrian poet, dramatist, and librettist. Hofmannsthal became familiar with the work of Nietzsche in the summer of 1891, corresponding with **Arthur Schnitzler** on the subject. Although Hofmannsthal wrote little about Nietzsche, his name is constantly associated with him, and in 1925 he was a member of the editorial committee of *Ariadne*, the journal of the Munich-based *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* (although only one issue was published). Like **Stefan George** and **Rainer Maria Rilke**, Hofmannsthal rejected the current trends characterized in the **Naturalist movement**, turning to the past for inspiration, and his work displays many features of *Jugendstil*. There is a neo-Romantic eroticism pervading most of his works, the most famous of which are the plays *Der Tor und der Tod*, 1893 (*Death and the Fool*, 1913), and *Jedermann* (*Everyman*, 1911), the latter being the best received of the three plays he wrote specifically for the Salzburg Festival, which he established with **Richard Strauss** and Max Reinhardt. Hofmannsthal had a fruitful collaboration with Richard Strauss as librettist for several of his major operas, including *Ariadne auf Naxos* (1912–1916). Hofmannsthal's concern over the decline of **culture** echoed that of

Nietzsche and was set out in the famous avant-garde essay “*Brief des Lord Chandos*” (1903). Unlike Nietzsche, he retained a religious dimension in his writings, and his work is permeated with **Christian** moral purpose. Refer to Jürgen Meyer-Wendt, *Der frühe Hofmannsthal und die Gedankenwelt Nietzsches* (*The Early Hofmannsthal and Nietzsche’s Thought*, 1973).

**HÖLDERLIN, (JOHANN CHRISTIAN) FRIEDRICH (1770–1843)**. German poet. Nietzsche hailed the “glorious Hölderlin” as a “tragic soul” (*UM*, I: “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer,” 2), and the many references to the poet in his oeuvre demonstrate that Nietzsche not only admired Hölderlin’s work but also felt great personal affinity toward him. Hölderlin’s mother, an impoverished widow, had sought to encourage a priestly calling in her son, but the latter found the pressure of training for the ministry too great, especially in view of his deep admiration for the myths of ancient **Greece**. Hölderlin eventually became a pantheist: in his poems, gods inhabit the earth and sky, the sun and the sea. In this way, by introducing his fellow man to the universe, Hölderlin felt that he was fulfilling the role of priest. **Friedrich Schiller**, who met Hölderlin in 1793, immediately recognized his talent and helped him to find a post as tutor in the house of a banker in Frankfurt; unfortunately, Hölderlin fell in love with the banker’s wife, Susette (the “Diotima” of his work), and was dismissed. Nervously unfit for the travails of this life, Hölderlin became mentally ill in 1802. He is most famous for his novel in letters, *Hyperion* (I: 1797; II: 1799); this and his translations of Sophocles’ *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex* (1804) were the only works to reach print before he went incurably insane in 1806. His most famous poems written before 1802 are “*Hyperions Schicksalslied*” (“Hyperion’s Song of Fate”), “*An die Parzen*” (“To the Fates”), and *Brot und Wein* (“Bread and Wine”); among the best known, written in 1802–1806, are “*Hälfte des Lebens*” (“The Middle of Life”), *Friedensfeier* (“Celebration of Peace”), and “*Der Rhein*” and “*Patmos*” (written 1802–1806). Hölderlin’s play *Der Tod des Empedokles* (*The Death of Empedocles*), which he worked on from 1799 to 1801, remained unfinished. Hölderlin’s work was largely ignored in his lifetime, but Nietzsche’s recognition of him as a kindred spirit helped to establish his reputation early in the 20th century



among Nietzscheans such as **Stefan George**, **Martin Heidegger**, **Gustav Landauer**, Ernst Cassirer, and **Rudolf Pannwitz**. The bold dithyrambs of *Hyperion* no doubt helped to inspire the poetic diction of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, while **Zarathustra's** apostrophe to the rising sun (*Za*, III: "Before Sunrise") is Nietzsche's most obvious testimonial to Hölderlin. Refer to Alfred Kellertat, *Hölderlin: Beiträge zu seinem Verständnis in unserem Jahrhundert (Essays towards an Understanding of Hölderlin in Our Century, 1960)*.

**HOLZ, ARNO (1863–1929)**. German writer. A founding member of *Durch* in Berlin in 1886, Holz initiated the **Naturalist movement** in Germany when, in collaboration with **Johannes Schlaf**, he wrote three novellas subsequently published in 1889 as *Papa Hamlet*. Holz recognized that Nietzsche's ideas were contrary to his own theories. In 1890, in the first review in the *Die freie Bühne* to mention Nietzsche, he remarked that "there was nothing that echoed hollow" than Nietzsche's hammer. Holz remained all his life a "fanatical theorist" of the Naturalist movement (Jethro Bithell, *Germany: A Companion to German Studies, 1962*). In *Die Kunst, ihr Wesen und ihre Gesetze (The Nature and Laws of Art, 1891–1892)*, he set forth the rules whereby **art** should mirror **nature** as faithfully as possible, and in *Revolution in der Lyrik (Revolution in the Lyric, 1899)*, he explains how free verse can form an "acoustic picture," putting this into practice in the collection *Phantasus (1898–1916)*. In his social satire *Die Sozialaristokraten (Society Aristocrats, 1896)*, Holz satirizes the superficial acquaintanceship many were starting to profess toward Nietzsche, who is mentioned several times, as is *The Gay Science* and the concepts **master morality** and **will to power**. The novel is a roman à clef based on Holz himself, **Bruno Wille**, John Henry Mackay, and **Stanislaus Przybyszewski**.

**HOMER**. Ninth- or eighth-century B.C. **Greek** poet and putative author of the epic poems *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*. In his unpublished early work there are two pieces that recount the famous contest between Homer and Hesiod: "*Der Florentinische Tractat bei Homer und Hesiod, ihre Geschichte und ihren Wettkampf*" (1870–1873) and "*Certamen quod dicitur Homeri et Hesiodi*" (1871, both in *KGW* II, 1). In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche demonstrates how and why

Homer's legendary gods lived on through attic tragedy to influence Greek **cultural** life. He thought the polar dichotomy between **Apollo** and **Dionysus** was best expressed in the dithyrambs of Aeschylus and that Platonic/Socratic reasoning had ruined the wonderful Dionysian festivals of **Greek tragedy** and destroyed forever the world of Homer: "Plato *versus* Homer; that is complete, genuine antagonism" (*OGM*, III: 26). *See also* *HOMER'S CONTEST*.

**HOMER'S CONTEST (HOMERS WETTKAMPF)**. Early essay of 1872 and the fifth of the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*. The title refers to a legendary contest between **Homer** and Hesiod, but this only receives oblique mention in the essay itself. Nietzsche admired the way the **Greeks** viewed struggle and argued in *Homer's Contest* that contest was essential to the Greek way of life. He believed that what made Greek **art** so spectacular was the annual festival of **Greek tragedy**, which motivated direct competition between dramatists in open contest. Nietzsche propounds the significance of the Greek goddess Eris (envy), who has a dualistic nature: the good Eris spurs on the individual to competitive feats, as approvingly recounted in Homer, whereas the bad Eris encourages the individual to resent the prowess of others. Such poisonous resentment lies at the heart of Nietzsche's later conception of **ressentiment**. Setting aside his arguments for the strong individual, Nietzsche argues that the Greek state toppled the preeminent individual precisely so that competition would not dry up—"to renew the tournament of forces" (*HC* in *OGM*). Such was the positive spirit produced by contest among the Greeks: "How wonderful!" Nietzsche exclaims (*HC* in *OGM*). This is the key to Nietzsche's constant references to struggle and to his assumption that **suffering** and even **cruelty** are necessary to the human condition and something that we can **affirm**. "Without envy, jealousy and competitive ambition, the Hellenic state, like Hellenic man, deteriorates" (*HC* in *OGM*). *See also* *THE GREEKS; THE GREEK STATE; PLATO; SOCRATES*.

**HORKHEIMER, MAX (1895–1973)**. German social theorist. In 1930, Horkheimer became the leading figure of the **Frankfurt School** when he succeeded Carl Grünberg as director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, the first **Marxist** research center affiliated

to a major university in Germany. In 1933, Horkheimer, like most of his colleagues, was forced to emigrate, working at Columbia University until 1949. In 1934, Horkheimer published *Dämmerung. Notizen aus Deutschland* (*Twilight: Notes from Germany*) under the pseudonym Heinrich Regius, where he acknowledged the potential for Nietzsche's elitist philosophy to be transformed into praxis by the proletariat, since it could thereby shake off the false consciousness of its "**slave morality**." A similar argument occurs in the essays "*Autorität und Familie*" and "*Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung*" ("Egoism and the Freedom Movement"), where Horkheimer sees his own theory—that bourgeois **morality** has systematically destroyed human **drives**—confirmed by Nietzsche. Nevertheless, in essays such as "*Traditionelle und kritische Theorie*" (1937), Horkheimer criticized Nietzsche for not paying sufficient attention to the total structure of the society he attacked. As Peter Pütz has argued, Horkheimer's whole notion of a "social totality" is so all-embracing as to virtually exclude everything else (Peter Pütz, "Nietzsche and Critical Theory," *Telos* 50, 1981–1982). In collaboration with **Theodor Adorno**, Horkheimer wrote the influential *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 1947 (*Dialectics of the Enlightenment*, 1972), which came out two years before both men returned to Frankfurt.

**HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN (MENSCHLICHES, ALLZUMENSCHLICHES, 1878–1880)**. Subtitled *A Book for Free Spirits*, this was Nietzsche's second book. The first part, published in 1878, bore a dedication to **Voltaire**. In 1879 and 1880, respectively, the appendices *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* and *The Wanderer and His Shadow* were published separately. Finally, the whole work was republished in 1886, with the appendices incorporated as parts 1 and 2 of volume 2 and the dedication to Voltaire removed.

As Richard Schacht has pointed out with reference to this work, Nietzsche was seen at the time as a professor of philology who had not lived up to his early promise and had so far only published one book, "the scandalous *Birth of Tragedy*" (Schacht, *Human, All Too Human*, Introduction, 1996). Nietzsche had tried and failed to transfer to the chair of philosophy at Basel when it became vacant. Undeterred, he had switched his private allegiance to philosophy, and *Human, All Too Human* was the first of a series of philosophical works

that consist of aphorisms of varying length: *Daybreak* (1881), *The Gay Science* (1882), *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), and *Twilight of the Idols* (1889). *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885) and *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887) differ in departing from the aphoristic style. The first volume of *Human, All Too Human* is divided into nine sections, plus an epilogue, a format echoed in *Beyond Good and Evil* and *Twilight of the Idols*. That said, the aphorisms in *Human, All Too Human* have more in common with *Daybreak* and *The Gay Science*, these sometimes being referred to as the three “**free spirit**” works sandwiched between *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. All three are pungently provocative. In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche’s criticism of Christian **morality** is succinct and deadly:

Go through the moral demands exhibited in the documents of **Christianity** one by one and you will find that in every case they are exaggerated, so that man *could* not live up to them; the intention is not that he should *become* moral, but that he should feel *as sinful as possible*. (HH, I, “The Religious Life,” 141)

Nietzsche certainly knew that his book would challenge the **Wagners**. Cosima, born a Catholic, had become a fervent Protestant, while the Master himself had jettisoned his atheism to share his wife’s increasing piety. Perhaps Nietzsche felt that his book, with its attack on what passed for morality in society, might make the Wagners revert to their former broad-mindedness. He did not realize how much both Wagners would take offense. In the event, he was completely ostracized, and the friendship was not resumed. Cosima refused to read *Human, All Too Human*, while Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** was likewise scandalized, not least because of some hostile comments on **women** to be found in the section “Woman and Child.” Here, **marriage** is denigrated as a trap for the (male) **free spirit** but prescribed as woman’s true destiny. Women’s emancipation is rejected out of hand:

*On the emancipation of women*—Are women able to be just at all, since they are so accustomed to loving, to at once taking sides for and against? (HH, I, “Woman and Child,” 416)

Such comments would become amplified in Nietzsche’s later works, but there is also a wealth of insightful comments on themes, such as the order of rank and the nature of friendship, that can be said to

constitute Nietzsche's "thought" without, of course, that thought ever becoming a "system."

– 1 –

**IBSEN, HENRIK (1828–1906).** Norwegian poet and playwright. Ibsen spent nearly three decades of his life abroad (1863–1891); in Italy, he wrote *Brand* (1866; trans. 1891) and *Peer Gynt* (1867; trans. 1892), and in Germany, he wrote many of his major works, including *Et Dukkehjem* (1879; trans. 1880 as *Nora: A Play in Three Acts*); *Gengångere*, 1881 (*Ghosts*, 1890); and *Hedda Gabler* (1890; trans. 1891). Above all, *Ghosts* was a major influence on the **Naturalist movement** in Germany.

Nietzsche castigated Ibsen as a campaigner for female rights (which Ibsen avowedly was not) and associated him with **democracy** and other perceived horrors, ignoring Ibsen's message—similar to his own—of the sovereignty of the individual. In fact, Nietzsche's resistance to Ibsen set him alongside the most philistine of his compatriots, who insisted that Ibsen write a "happy ending" for the German version of *A Doll's House* (*Nora oder ein Puppenhiem*, 1880) before the play could be performed in Germany. Nietzsche's most scathing attack is found in *Ecce Homo*, where he calls Ibsen "this typical old maid" (*Jungfrau*) and accuses him of being an example of the whole class of malevolent "idealists" intent on poisoning **culture** (*EH*, "Why I Write Such Good Books": 5).

Ibsen was much discussed in the circle of *Die Jungen*, a group of early "Nietzschean" writers and artists who, from 1888, congregated with **Bruno Wille** and **Wilhelm Bölsche** at Friedrichshagen, the artists' colony near Berlin. This group, largely unaware of Nietzsche's hostility toward Ibsen, was particularly impressed by *En Folkefeinde*, 1882 (*An Enemy of the People*, 1939), taking it as "a manifesto for the superiority of the creative individual over the people, who were 'herd animals'" (Paul Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism*, 1989).

**INSTINCT.** See DRIVE.

**IRIGARAY, LUCE (1932–)**. Belgian-born **feminist**, philosopher, and psychoanalyst. A student at **Jacques Lacan's** *École freudienne* in Paris, Irigaray has consistently adopted the position that **women** are biologically different from men and that they think differently. Irigaray's importance for **poststructuralism** lies in her premise that philosophy in the West (and this includes the work of Lacan and **Jacques Derrida**) is grounded on the suppression of **sexual** difference, which means, in effect, that women have to conform to rules laid down by men. In *Speculum* (1974; trans. 1985), Irigaray analyzes the analysts and concludes that **Sigmund Freud's** account of sexuality is male. In the essay *Ce Sexe qui n'en est pas un*, 1977 (*This Sex Which Is Not One*, 1985), Irigaray argues that women, unlike men, do not have one center of sexual pleasure but many; woman's sexuality is therefore diffused throughout her **body** and less focused. In her speech, woman arranges her thoughts in a more diffused way—which men are wont to call illogical because they do not understand the “psychic organization” of how women think (Margaret Whitford, *Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine*, 1991). Women should therefore seek to speak in their own medium rather than use the logocentric speech of males, as the latter simply reinforces women's exclusion from the patriarchal order. In this way, women will be able to express their own physique: the female writer will be able to “write the body.”

To demonstrate this method of writing, Irigaray took issue with Nietzsche in her psychological novel *Amante marine de Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1980 (*Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1991). The sea is a reference point to both Jung and Nietzsche; as Paul Bishop writes, “Jung defined the ‘world of water’ (the Collective Unconscious) in terms identical to Nietzsche's visions of the Dionysian realm . . . where subjectivity and objectivity are dissolved in an all-embracing unity” (Paul Bishop, *The Dionysian Self*, 1995). Irigaray associates “the feminine” with fluidity and places Nietzsche in an element hostile to him—water—in order to interrogate him on a personal level; meanwhile, she seeks out the mother of **Dionysus** in the ocean depths. Addressing Nietzsche directly, Irigaray inquires whether “the unexplored reaches of the farthest ocean are now your most dangerous beyond?” At a profound level, Nietzsche's fear of the ocean depths is equated with his fear of woman; Irigaray feels that she can help him (retrospectively) to overcome this fear.

**IVANOV, VYACHESLAV (1866–1949).** Russian poet and philosopher. Ivanov’s engagement with Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* dated from 1891. With the publication of his first volume of poetry in 1901, Ivanov, who was living in Paris at the time, was recognized as a major **symbolist** poet. Like **Dimitri Merezhkovsky**, Ivanov pursued the notion of a “Christian **Dionysus**.” Still in Paris, his lectures on the contrast between the **suffering** of Christ and the cultic worship of Dionysus formed the basis for his study *Ellinskaya religiya Stradayushchego*, 1904–1905 (*The Hellenic Religion of the Suffering God*, 1917). On his return to Russia in 1904, Ivanov and his wife Lydia Zinovieva-Annibal (who always wore Greek costumes for their effect) hosted a Wednesday salon in which a new cultic worship on the lines of the pre-Socratic Greeks was proclaimed. Ivanov believed in the social cohesiveness of cultic myth and ritual. Enthusiastic visitors to “The Tower” included **Andrei Bely** and **Alexander Blok**.

Unlike Nietzsche, whose Dionysus was the antithesis of Christ, Ivanov saw Dionysus as the forerunner of Christ and wanted to reform society with a new, mystical religion, fusing seeming opposites such as male and female, human and divine. The medium by which the individual could step outside him- or herself was **sexual** orgasm, and sexual sublimation was at the heart of *sverkhindividualizma* (“supraindividualism”), enthusiastically proclaimed by Ivanov and his coterie. However, having been first drawn to Nietzsche’s ideas on individualism, Ivanov came to reject Nietzscheanism as egotistic, especially after the failed Revolution of 1905, though his fascination for all things Dionysian continued unabated, as in the essay *Nitsshe i Dionis* (*Nietzsche and Dionysus*, 1909).

Ivanov now lent his weight to the movement for “mystical anarchy” propounded by Georgy Chulkov. What Ivanov wanted to see was a new concept of Dionysian theater with full audience participation. To this end, he supported the theatrical section of the “Commissariat of Enlightenment” after the Revolution of 1917 but became disillusioned with politically motivated Soviet adaptations of his work. In 1924, he left Russia to settle in Italy, where he converted to Catholicism. Ivanov can be viewed as one of the most influential disseminators of Nietzschean ideas in modernist Russia. Refer to Edith Clowes, *Revolution in Moral Consciousness: Nietzsche in Russian*

*Literature 1890–1914* (1988), and Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, ed., *Nietzsche and Soviet Culture* (1994).

– J –

**JARRY, ALFRED (1873–1907).** French writer. Jarry’s best-known work to Nietzscheans is the proto-absurdist play *Ubu roi*, 1896 (*Ubu Rex*, 1968), though his novel *Le Surmâle*, 1902 (*The Supermale*, 1968), should by rights hold that position. In the latter, the title alone is sufficient to suggest Nietzschean influence. The hero or “super-male,” Marceuil, declares at the outset that, having discovered the secret of maintaining his energy through “perpetual motion food,” the act of love has no further significance “since it can be carried on indefinitely.” The rest of this farcical novel is taken up with Marceuil’s attempt to prove the truth of this statement. Much of the dynamism of the plot is inspired by **futurist** theories on the machine aesthetic, beginning with a cycling event and ending with a machine that kills Marceuil in a fatal embrace. Although at first sight wholly un-Nietzschean in its vulgarity, one must remember the general misconception at the turn of the century that the Nietzschean *Übermensch* was a sexually potent, predatory male—a figure that Jarry proceeds to burlesque.

**JASPERS, KARL (1883–1969).** German-born philosopher. Having initially pursued a medical training and written a work on clinical psychiatry, Jaspers turned to philosophy and was appointed professor of philosophy at Heidelberg University in 1922. A central point in Jaspers’s philosophy is his distinction between Being (*Dasein*) and Existence; the latter is the central focus for our lives. His three-volume work on **existentialism**, titled *Philosophie*, appeared in 1932 (trans. 1969), and in 1938, his *Existenzphilosophie* (*Philosophy of Existence*, 1971) was published. In 1937, Jaspers—whose wife was **Jewish**—was banned from lecturing on **Hitler**’s orders and stripped of his professorship. He parted company with his former friend **Martin Heidegger** when the latter became a **National Socialist**. After the war, Jaspers tried to reawaken the German conscience with his



*Die Schuldfrage*, 1946 (*The Question of Guilt*, 1947), but this largely fell on deaf ears. Discouraged, Jaspers emigrated to Basel in 1948, though he did not take out Swiss citizenship until 1967, after hostile German reaction to his polemic, published in that year, *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* (trans. as *The Future of Germany*, 1967). Jaspers had published 30 books when he died.

In 1936, Jaspers published his work on Nietzsche under the title *Nietzsche. Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens*, 1936 (*Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, 1965). This work places Nietzsche squarely within Existentialism. Jaspers discusses Nietzsche's interrogation of reason itself: Nietzsche sought to reach "existence" (*Sein*) beyond reason, as witnessed by his rejection of religious faith based on the **metaphysical "truth" of God**. For Jaspers, Nietzsche enables thought to transcend values and truths. Refer to Richard Lowell Howy, *Heidegger and Jaspers on Nietzsche: A Critical Examination of Heidegger's and Jaspers' Interpretations of Nietzsche* (1973).

**JEWS/JUDAISM.** Nietzsche admired the Jews as an intelligent race and seemed to think they were a **nationality**, so that, for example, he described a friend, **Helen Zimmern**, as Jewish rather than British. This was a common view in his day and does not indicate prejudice. German nationality was passed down from the father through the blood relationship, hence the subsequent **National Socialist** stress on "blood." Compare France and Britain, where, then as now, citizenship has been granted automatically to a person born in that country. Suffice it to say that Nietzsche vigorously rejected **anti-Semitism** on numerous occasions, though this did not prevent him from attacking Judaism as a religion quite as pestilential as **Christianity** (which it had spawned).

The burden of Nietzsche's hostile comments on Judaism is usually an attack on the priestly caste per se. Nietzsche excoriates the **ascetic priest**, especially the Jewish priest of Old Testament times (such as Moses, bringer of the kind of law tablets that **Zarathustra** comes to destroy), and blames him for bringing about the **slave revolt in morality**, with its resultant attitude of **ressentiment**. The latter produces a negative stance toward **life** in which weakness and humility are praised as "good" and the **aristocratic values** decried as "bad." The

“Jews” (Nietzsche here includes Jesus, St. Paul, and the disciples as well as all the early Christians) have poisoned man’s **naturally affirmative** attitude to life with their perverse and mendacious inversion of **values**: “—their prophets fused ‘rich,’ ‘godless,’ ‘evil,’ ‘violent,’ ‘sensual’ into one and were the first to use the word ‘world’ as a term of infamy” (*BGE*, V: 195). Henceforth, man has been doomed to deny himself the pleasures of the flesh. Moreover, since he can never be perfect, man must suffer from the guilt of sin: “the priest *rules* though the invention of sin—” (*A-C*: 49).

Nietzsche’s refusal to build a system allowed him certain inconsistencies, as in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, where, notwithstanding his attack on the ascetic priest, he asserts that he has “every respect” for the Old Testament (*OGM*, III: 22). Early in the 20th century, this statement became a platform for Jewish Nietzscheanism such as that represented by the liberal rabbi Cesar Seligmann, who stressed that Nietzsche preferred the Old Testament to the New. First-generation Zionists such as **Max Nordau** and Theodor Herzl rejected Nietzsche’s **immorality**, but second-generation Zionists looked to him as an iconoclast. **Martin Buber** in particular, who “maintained a passionate and changing relationship to Nietzsche over the years” (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992), was a fervent Nietzschean in his youth. Refer to Werner Stegmaier and Daniel Krochmalnik, *Jüdischer Nietzscheanismus* (1997); Jacob Golomb, *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture* (1997); and *Nietzsche and Zion* (2004).

**JIMÉNEZ, JUAN RAMÓN (1881–1958)**. Spanish poet. Jiménez’s early work reflected the influence of impressionism, but a change took place in his work in 1917 with the publication of *Diario de un poeta recién casado* (*The Diary of a Recently Married Poet*). His revolutionary way of looking at poetry, jettisoning flowery **language** and examining each word for its integrity, stems from an admiration for Nietzsche, whom Jiménez always viewed as central to modernism. Jiménez was also greatly influenced by **José Ortega y Gasset**. Between the wars, he founded a number of reviews that encouraged other Spanish poets. He left Spain during the Civil War and went to live in Puerto Rico. Jiménez, the “patriarch of Spanish literature” (Udo Rukser, *Nietzsche in der Hispania*, 1962), won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1956.

**JOYFUL WISDOM.** See *THE GAY SCIENCE*.

**JUNG, CARL GUSTAV (1865–1961).** Swiss psychiatrist. Jung studied at Basel and Zurich and in 1900 joined the staff at the Burghölzli Clinic in Zurich; here, he developed the theory of “blocked” associations, terming such a manifestation a “complex.” Jung worked with **Sigmund Freud** from 1907 to 1912, when he became convinced that not all dreams could be given a **sexual** interpretation. His book *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*, 1912 (*Psychology of the Unconscious*, 1916), ran counter to much of Freud’s theory of neurosis. After the breach with Freud, Jung remained in Zurich, where he worked at the psychiatric clinic and lectured at the university, becoming professor of psychology in 1933 (promoted to professor of medical psychology in 1944). In *Psychologische Typen* (1921; trans. 1923), Jung outlined theories such as the introvert/extrovert division of personality.

Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious supposes that there are certain pieces of information passed on in the form of archetypes through succeeding generations by way of the unconscious. By the time he wrote *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Jung had edged away from his earlier biology-based theories and had actually moved back in time to seek inspiration from the **Romantic Naturphilosophie** of F. W. J. Schelling and Carl Gustav Carus and the theories of **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**. Jung maintained that the archetypes bring about real events. He frequently examined myths and fairy tales to find reasons for human behavior, and it was in this quest that he became interested in Nietzsche’s work, especially the figure of **Dionysus**. In his essay *Wotan* (1936), Jung stressed the importance of the Dionysian archetype on the collective behavior of the **German** people. Jung understood Dionysus/Wotan as a manifestation of **National Socialism** but also as a manifestation of **Geist**, thereby disclosing “his desire to re-enlist that same Dionysian energy in a creative and positive form” (Paul Bishop, *The Dionysian Self*, 1995). Jung’s lectures on “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra,” given during the years 1934–1939, are published in the substantial two-volume *Nietzsche’s “Zarathustra”*: *Notes of the Seminar Given in 1934–1939* (1989), edited by J. L. Jarrett. Refer to Patricia Dixon, *Nietzsche and Jung: The Quest for Wholeness* (1990) and *Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a*

*Deeper Night* (1999); Richard Noll, *The Jung Cult* (1994); and Lucy Huskinson, *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self and the Union of Opposites* (2004).

**JÜNGER, ERNST (1895–1998).** German writer of great longevity. Jünger's work was deeply influenced by Nietzsche's ideas on heroism. His life was as colorful as his plots: at the age of 16, he joined the Foreign Legion (his parents retrieved him), and in 1914, he volunteered to serve in World War I. Many times wounded and decorated for his courage, Jünger, in his **war** memoirs *In Stahlgewittern*, 1920 (*The Storm of Steel*, 1929), describes the violence at the front with "clarity and a fastidious exhilaration" (Malcolm Humble/Ray Furness, *Introduction to German Literature*, 1994). This work was followed by *Der Kampf als Inneres Erlebnis* (*Conflict as an Inner Experience*, 1920); *Das Wäldchen 125*, 1925 (*Copse 125*, 1930); and *Feuer und Blut* (*Fire and Blood*, 1926), all of which portray the heightened awareness that accompanies danger and savagery, enabling Jünger to promote war to an **aesthetic** experience. *In Stahlgewittern* was later reissued as *Ein Kriegstagebuch* (*A War Diary*) in 1942. Although in these works Jünger belongs to the radical right in his hostility to **democracy**, his acceptance of totalitarianism ran counter to Nietzsche's ideas on individualism. Nevertheless, his acceptance of **aristocratic values** set him apart from the populist ideology of **National Socialism**.

Jünger's programmatic anti-individualism is found in *Die totale Mobilmachung* (*Total Mobilization*, 1930), which, prophetically, calls for total mobilization in order to counter the coming catastrophe, *Der Arbeiter* (*The Worker*, 1932) and *Blätter und Steine* (*Leaves and Stones*, 1934), all representing a degree of authorial approval for fascist dogma, though Jünger actually criticized the National Socialists for falling short of his ideal. Indeed, *Auf den Marmorklippen*, 1939 (*On the Marble Cliffs*, 1947), has been considered subversive and sometimes seen as a veiled critique of Nazi tyranny; here, Jünger accepts the need for beauty, whereas the former works had simply exulted in might and **power**.

*Heliopolis* (1949) is Jünger's most Nietzschean novel; set between the overthrow of the first world empire and the foundation of the second, it presents the reader with a Utopia built up of conversa-

tions, monologues, and symbolic descriptions. The struggle between the protagonists, the *Landvogt* and the Proconsul, in this city of the future has been construed as a reflection of **Adolf Hitler's** struggle to wrest power from Paul von Hindenburg. Bithell remarks, "It is the world of the Superman" (Jethro Bithell, *Germany: A Companion to German Studies*, 1962).

– K –

**KAFKA, FRANZ (1883–1924).** Czech writer. Born in Prague into a German **Jewish** family in which the father, a shopkeeper, was authoritarian to the point of tyranny, Kafka suffered agonies of insecurity and inferiority. He developed a neurotic attitude toward his writing whereby, during his creative periods, he felt guilty about withdrawing into his **art**, but when he tried to live a "normal" life, he felt that he cheated his own creativity. His engagement to his fiancée, Felice Bauer, foundered on this ambivalent attitude to **life** and art, and he never married, though he had several relationships. His characters, such as Josef K. in *Der Prozeß*, 1925 (*The Trial*, 1935), and Gregor Samsa in *Die Verwandlung*, 1916 (*The Transformation*, 1933), are riven by guilt, whether real or imagined. Their lives collapse to the point where the only positive thing they can do is accept death. Kafka shared this self-destructive attitude. Never robust, he was unfit for combat in World War I; he died of tuberculosis.

Kafka's writing career spanned the years when early Nietzscheanism was at its height. Although the influence of **Arthur Schopenhauer** and **Søren Kierkegaard** is clear in Kafka's writings, the influence of Nietzsche also "looms very large" (Frederick Karl, *Franz Kafka: Representative Man*, 1991). Kafka's heroes inhabit a world in which the Nietzschean priestly veto, inherent in the **ascetic ideal** and **ressentiment** and akin to **Jacques Lacan's** *nom du père*, has become terrifyingly sinister. Nietzsche's critique of social control is never far away. Furthermore, Kafka's insistence on the demands of art as a way of life is not far removed from Nietzsche's own espousal of art as the antidote to *décadence*. What Kafka gives in his best work is an indication of the way **power** undermines the individual in society. In *Das*

*Schloß*, 1926 (*The Castle*, 1930), K's quest for meaning is fruitless, but he is portrayed as noble simply for having embarked on his search. Refer to Wiebrecht Ries, "Kafka und Nietzsche," in *Nietzsche-Studien* 2 (1973); Patrick Bridgwater, *Kafka and Nietzsche* (1974); and J. M. Hawes, *Nietzsche and the End of Freedom: The Neo-Romantic Dilemma in Kafka, the Brothers Mann, Rilke and Musil* (1993).

**KAISER, GEORG (1878–1945).** German **Expressionist** dramatist. For Kaiser, Nietzsche was a uniquely "substantial and enduring influence" (R. C. Helt and C. Petty, "Georg Kaiser's *Rezeption* of Friedrich Nietzsche," *Orbis Litterarum* 38, 1983). Like all the German Expressionists, Kaiser read *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and was especially interested in the concept of the *Übermensch*. The two strands of influence, that of anarchistic **socialism** as heralded by his friend **Gustav Landauer** and that of Nietzschean liberation as construed by Kaiser himself, converge in his play *Von morgens bis mitternachts*, 1912 (*From Morn to Midnight*, 1920). Here, Kaiser's characteristic irony is seen to good effect: the would-be *Übermensch*, a petit-bourgeois tyrant at home but a docile bank clerk at work, is the man least likely to fulfill the role, and indeed, he fails miserably. Kaiser himself, however, had delusions that he could assume the role of *Übermensch*, as witnessed by the defense he made at his trial for fraud in 1920. Here he claimed that he was an extraordinary **artist** like Heinrich von Kleist or Georg Büchner, to whom the ordinary rules of society did not apply. An unimpressed judge sentenced him to several months' imprisonment.

Such hubris in a man whom one critic termed a "pathologically introverted egoist" (W. Steffens, *Georg Kaiser*, 1969), coupled with his practice of living as a virtual recluse, meant that Kaiser's plays took on a curiously impersonal atmosphere, exacerbated by his interest in the intellectual arguments put forward by **Plato** on behalf of **Socrates**. This applies to his most renowned works *Die Bürger von Calais* (*The Burghers of Calais*; written in 1912 but not performed until 1917) and the "Gas trilogy" (*Die Koralle*, 1916; *Gas*, 1917; *Gas II*, 1918). The dichotomy between man's cruder instincts (as represented by Kaiser's version of things Nietzschean) and intellectual reflection (as represented by Platonism) is often found in Kaiser's works.

Kaiser represents a divided stance on the **woman** question, possibly because the received misogyny that he derived (perhaps unconsciously) from both Plato and Nietzsche was not out of kilter with the main thrust of Wilhelmine bourgeois society at large. Hence, in *Der Präsident* (1905), he shows a remarkably ambivalent attitude to such matters as the debate about unmarried mothers and vacillates on the **eugenic** debate in *Die Versuchung* (*Temptation*, 1909). Kaiser's tendency to mock his own characters meant that serious issues emerged repeatedly, only to be debunked; thus, the Nietzschean concepts that impressed him—"the idea of a better humanity to come and, immediately related to this—the concept of a higher form of health" (G. C. Tunstall, "The Turning Point in Georg Kaiser's Attitude to Friedrich Nietzsche," in *Nietzsche-Studien* 14, 1985) are systematically put forward and then undermined. Refer to Frank Krause, ed., *Kaiser and Modernity* (2005).

**KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804).** Perhaps Germany's greatest philosopher. Kant never left his native Königsberg, where he taught logic and **metaphysics** at the university. Kant's chief works are the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 1781 (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1933), in which he doubted the possibility of metaphysical **knowledge**, including the knowledge of **God**, and demonstrated the limited nature of such cognition, and the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 1788 (*Critique of Practical Reason*, 1956). In the latter, he identified practical reason with **morality**, defining the categorical imperative as a universally binding law. Although he went no further than to posit the existence of certain things that remain outside the grasp of the mind, Kant's influence on **German Idealism**, indeed the whole of **Romanticism**, was immense. Blackall writes,

Kant believed that **science** had proved that there is a real world of objects outside us, but its reality is nevertheless encompassed by our experience of it. What we experience is therefore: things as they *appear* to us. . . . But if they are things-as-they-*appear*, then there must be "things-in-themselves" [*Dinge an sich*]. (Eric A. Blackall, *The Novels of German Romanticism*, 1983)

Tanner notes, "The thing in itself is unknowable: the sensations we actually experience are produced by the operation of our subjective mental apparatus" (Michael Tanner, notes to R. J. Hollingdale, trans.,

*Twilight of the Idols*, 1990). Nietzsche is more explicit, calling the “*Ding an sich*” “that *horrendum pudendum* [horrid shameful part] of the metaphysicians! The error of spirit as cause mistaken for reality! And made the measure of morality! And called *God!*” (*TI*, “The Four Great Errors”: 3)

It is debatable how closely Nietzsche read Kant; many scholars believe that he possibly relied on **Friedrich Albert Lange**’s *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 1866 (*History of Materialism*, 1877), as his primary source. Nietzsche’s own copy of Lange’s book is the 1887 edition, but he read Lange and grappled with Kant’s philosophy (whether in primary or secondary sources) much earlier. Whatever Nietzsche’s source for his knowledge of Kant, the latter’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790 (*Critique of Judgement*, 1952), which inspired **Friedrich Schiller** to formulate his own ideas on **aesthetics**, could have had the same effect on the young Nietzsche. For Kant, the universal standpoint in aesthetics is achieved through “disinterestedness” (*Interesselosigkeit*), whereby desire is separated from the contemplation of an object of beauty. R. Kevin Hill has suggested that Nietzsche must have studied Kant thoroughly so that he could take up his own position on aesthetics in *The Birth of Tragedy*:

Kant’s transcendental principle of judgment, that we must judge the world to display an elegance satisfying our cognitive interests, is the beginning of the early Nietzsche’s conception of the world as a work of art. (R. Kevin Hill, *Nietzsche’s Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought*, 2005)

Possibly the early Nietzsche derived more from Kant than he was later prepared to admit. Certainly, he mentions Kant’s third Critique in the notebook he kept in Chur (1877) when he visited the library there to work on *Human, All Too Human*. In the latter, he declares Kant’s morality (i.e., the categorical imperative) to be “a very naïve thing” (*HH*, I: “Of First and Last Things,” 25). He returned to a critique of Kantian aesthetics in *On the Genealogy of Morality*:

Kant, like all the philosophers, just considered art and beauty from the position of “spectator,” instead of viewing the aesthetic problem through the experiences of the artist (the creator), and thus inadvertently introduced the “spectator” himself into the concept “beautiful.” . . . Kant said, “Something is beautiful if it gives pleasure *without interest*.” Without interest! (*OGM*, III: 6)



Nietzsche berates Kant for his blockade on our sense impressions and repudiates Kant's censorship on what we can know, especially as Kant leaves room for God in the equation: "There is no knowing: consequently—there is a God; what a new *elegantia syllogismi!*" (*OGM*, III: 25).

In his late work *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche again refuted Kant's premise that it is beyond our capacity to know about the intelligible world:

History of an Error: The real world, unattainable, undemonstrable, cannot be promised, but even when merely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperative. (*TI*, "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth": 3)

Nietzsche's own project consisted of a direct challenge to Kant's attack on materialism. Philosophy should be founded on observations and experiment; **truths** and judgments are relative **concepts** and should be gauged by whether or not they are **life affirming**—and the same **perspectivism** applies to moral judgments. Nietzsche felt he had shown us the way by introducing the world to *Zarathustra*: "Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA" (*TI*, "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth": 3). Refer to Olivier Reboul, *Nietzsche Critique de Kant* (1974).

**KESSLER, HARRY GRAF (1868–1937)**. German scholar. Kessler, who was born and died in France, was a Nietzschean from his student days. In his memoirs (written in 1935), he described the climate of Nietzscheanism at Leipzig University in 1889–1890 as "messianic," with Nietzsche striking him and fellow students (among them **Raoul Richter**) "like a meteor." He first approached **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** in 1895, when she still lived in Naumburg, in the hope of acquiring work by Nietzsche to publish in the periodical *Pan*. In 1897, Kessler and **Meta von Salis-Marschlins** helped Elisabeth purchase the house in Weimar destined to become the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, with Kessler in the position of adviser. In this capacity, he and Elisabeth agreed with other patrons on such matters as the provision of a monthly grant for the poet **Detlev von Liliencron**.

In 1900, Kessler met Henry van de Velde in Berlin and arranged for him to meet Elisabeth, at which point the three of them planned

a **cultural** collaboration for a “new Weimar.” The result was Van de Velde’s move to Weimar and his work refurbishing the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. In 1902, Kessler was appointed honorary director of the *Museum für Kunst und Kunstgewerbe* in Weimar. Kessler and Van de Velde were entrusted with plans for a *Nietzsche-Memorial* in 1911, but these were shelved when Elisabeth objected to the scheme (which included a sports stadium) as too ambitious. Van de Velde left Germany in 1917, but Kessler continued his close collaboration with Elisabeth, though the center of power shifted in a different direction when **Max Oehler** became archivist in 1919. Gradually during the 1920s, Kessler became disillusioned with the direction in which the *Nietzsche-Archiv* was heading. When the **National Socialists** came to power, he went into exile in Paris.

**KEY, ELLEN (1849–1926).** Swedish-born **feminist**. Key represented the right-wing “faction” in European feminism in the first decades of the 20th century. In her major work, *Kvinnorörelsen*, 1909 (*The Woman Movement*, 1912), Key argues that maternity provides a conscious desire in **woman** to uplift the race as well as her own **life**. A convinced Nietzschean, she writes,

The finest young girls of today are penetrated by the Nietzschean idea that **marriage** is the combined will of two people to create a new being greater than themselves. . . . Nietzsche has the most profound conception of parenthood and **education** as the means whereby humanity will cross over the bridge of the men of today to the superman. (Ellen Key, *The Woman Movement*, 1912)

Like Nietzsche, Key disliked and mistrusted **socialism**, but Nietzsche’s pronouncements on woman’s role went further, recommending the cloistered treatment of women, as in ancient **Greece**. During the first years of the 19th century, Key was in friendly contact with **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, who, though she had remained childless, agreed with Key’s “moderate” (actually, conservative) feminist stance. Elisabeth invited Key to speak at the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, though in the event the talk was canceled, as Key was indisposed on the day. It is a paradox that the (male) sexologists of the day, whom one might have assumed to be liberally minded toward women’s emancipation, in fact insisted that a woman’s role was maternal and that a career woman was a **sexual** freak. The leading

sexologist **Havelock Ellis** was a keen admirer of Key's work and translated *The Woman Movement*.

**KIERKEGAARD, SØREN (1813–1855)**. Danish philosopher regarded as the founder of **Existentialism**. Kierkegaard's coinage "existential" emphasizes man's tragic situation in a religious world that denies his psychological needs. Like **Franz Kafka**, Kierkegaard in his youth was dominated by his father, a rich and ostensibly devout merchant in Copenhagen. Kierkegaard's "moment of truth" (he called it "the great earthquake") came when he realized that his father suffered under an unbearable weight of guilt for having once cursed **God**. Kierkegaard further realized that his fiancée, Regine Olsen, would not be able to comprehend the full terror of this curse and broke off with her for that reason, though he did not forgive himself. The polarity between responsibility and freedom, conflicting strands in man's psychological makeup, weave through his major works from *Enten-Eller*, 1843 (*Either/Or*, 1944), to *Frygt og Bæven*, 1843 (*Fright and Trembling*, 1941). In the former, Kierkegaard is tormented by his shabby treatment of Regine, and in the latter, he finds religion paradoxical because faith in an ethical God can force an individual to perform unethical acts (as with Abraham and Isaac).

In 1844, Kierkegaard published *Philosophische Smuler* (*Philosophical Fragments*, 1936) and *Begrebet Angst* (*The Concept of Dread*, 1944). In the *Philosophical Fragments*, he took issue with **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**, who argued that man has little chance of acting freely in the great cosmos. Kierkegaard insisted that faith presupposes free will, which is the only thing that gives **Christianity** any meaning; man might be riven, but he is free, even if this cannot be proved by logic. In *The Concept of Dread*, Kierkegaard's analysis of man's anxiety, or "angst"—now a household term but in 1843 a unique idea anticipating depth psychology by well over half a century—was too avant-garde to be properly grasped. Increasingly lonely and misunderstood, Kierkegaard castigated the Danish Church for not addressing man's spirituality.

In *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, 1846 (*Concluding Unscientific Postscripts*, 1941), Kierkegaard returned to deliver what he believed to be a knockout blow to Hegel. In this work, Kierkegaard also acknowledged his former writings, these having appeared

under various noms de plume. This did not alter the fact that he remained entirely neglected by his contemporaries; it was 1877 before **Georg Brandes** published the first book on his life and work. Brandes subsequently tried to introduce Nietzsche to Kierkegaard. In a reply to Brandes from Nice dated 19 February 1888, Nietzsche promised to address “the psychological problem of Kierkegaard,” intending to use Brandes’s book on Kierkegaard as reading matter for his next trip to Germany; of course, that was not possible since by the time Nietzsche returned to his native land in 1889, he had lost his mind.

Kierkegaard was not properly “rediscovered” until the 20th century, inspiring modernist “angst” in Franz Kafka and a generation of pre-World War I writers. After World War II, Kierkegaard’s thought became an influential pillar of Existentialism, influencing Karl Barth, **Martin Buber**, **Karl Jaspers**, and **Martin Heidegger** as well as **Lev Shestov**. Refer to Tom P. S. Angier, *Kierkegaard Either/Or Nietzsche*. (2006)

**KLAGES, LUDWIG (1872–1956)**. German psychologist and philosopher. From 1895 to 1915, Klages propounded an irrationalist form of *Lebensphilosophie*, founded on a distorted rendering of Nietzsche’s thought. At the turn of the century, he was also a leading member of the *Kosmiker*, an eccentric group around **Stefan George** in Munich to which he introduced **Franziska zu Reventlow** in 1899. As a virulent **anti-Semite**, Klages inevitably quarreled with **Karl Wolfskehl**, who was of **Jewish** descent, although there was the added complication that Reventlow was first a mistress of Klages and then of Wolfskehl. In January 1904, there was a crisis within the group, caused when **Alfred Schuler** threatened Wolfskehl with physical violence. At this point, Klages broke with George, though all remained convinced Nietzscheans.

Klages was interested in the different egos that made up a character and in 1905 founded a center for characterological study in Monaco. In 1919, he moved the center to Milchberg in Switzerland, where he died in 1956. His book *Prinzipien der Charakterologie* (*Principles of Characterology*) appeared in 1910. Klages became a cult philosopher during the years of the Weimar Republic as well as a renowned graphologist; his book *Handschrift und Charakter* (*Handwriting and Character*, 1921) had gone into 13 editions by 1929.

**Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** was a member of the *Graphologische Gesellschaft* in Weimar.

For Klages, Nietzsche was “the great herald of the cosmic soul” (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992). His seminal work on Nietzsche was *Die psychologischen Errungenschaften Nietzsches* (*Nietzsche’s Psychological Achievements*, 1926). In this work, Klages rejects the strident and masterful Nietzsche of the **will to power**, thus distancing himself from many contemporary Nietzsche enthusiasts, in order to portray a mythological character with mystique in his blood and cosmic significance—all themes that Klages had in common with Schuler. Although **Georg Lukács** tried to label this work a forerunner of **National Socialism**, its occult mysticism is actually more in tune with the matriarchal arguments that **Johann Jakob Bachofen** had put forward in *Das Mutterrecht* (*Mother Right*, 1861).

Klages believed that the **concept** of *Geist* sets man apart from the animals and underlies the human capacity to think and to will. It also causes man’s estrangement and his desire for immortality. In *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele* (*The Mind as Opponent of the Soul*, 1926), his most famous work, Klages “made the distinction between **life-affirming Seele (soul)** and life-destroying *Geist* (mind)” (Aschheim). For Klages, *Geist* was **Socrates** and will to power, **Christianity** was dry intellect, while *Seele* was the vastly superior **Dionysian Rausch**. He continued this theme in *Geist und Leben* (*Mind and Life*, 1935) and *Die Sprache als Quell der Seelenkunde* (*Language as the Source of Knowledge of the Soul*, 1948). Klages also wrote *Rhythmen und Runen* (*Rhythms and Runes*) in 1944.

**KLINGER, MAX (1857–1920)**. German painter, sculptor, and graphic artist. Klinger was employed as professor of art theory at the *Königliche Akademie der graphischen Künste* (Royal Academy of Graphic Arts) in Leipzig. Inspired by Nietzsche’s work from 1894 on, he worked on a portrait of Nietzsche for several years, though he was unable to finish it during Nietzsche’s lifetime. However, with Nietzsche’s death mask, which he cast in bronze in Paris in 1901, and with the help of several photographs, Klinger was able to make busts of Nietzsche and a marble herm for the reading room of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, which he completed in 1905—too late for the cer-

emonial opening of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1903. For that occasion, Klinger substituted a provisional marble bust of Nietzsche instead. The 1905 herm is still in the *Nietzsche-Archiv*; **Adolf Hitler** posed beside it when he visited the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1934. From 1914 to 1919, Klinger worked on an even more lavish herm (with carved relief on its marble pillar) commissioned by Alfred Kröner, Nietzsche's publisher in Leipzig. This now stands in the reception hall in the *Schloß Anna Amalia* in Weimar. Klinger's portrait of Nietzsche was finally completed in 1914.

**KLOSSOWSKI, PIERRE.** *See* ETERNAL RETURN.

**KNOWLEDGE (DIE KENNTNIS) / COGNITION (DIE ERKENNTNIS).** In Nietzsche's early writings from 1870 on, it is already clear that he viewed the drive for pure knowledge negatively, since it caused man to ignore such questions as the **value of life** and the importance of illusion in favor of the “**scientific**” quest for absolute certainty. For Nietzsche, knowledge can be acquired only through **metaphor**. By seeking to know, we accept false premises about **truth** and thus create damaging obstructions in our own psyche, with the result that “‘knowledge’ is inimical to authentic living” (David Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy*, 1983). In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche examined how knowledge arose from error:

Origin of Knowledge [*Erkenntnis*].—Throughout immense stretches of **time** the intellect produced nothing but errors; some of them proved to be useful and preservative to the species: he who fell in with them, or inherited them, waged the battle for himself and his offspring with better success. (*GS*, III: 110)

Nietzsche provides us with a catalogue of these errors: “—that there are enduring things, that there are equal things, that there are things, substances, and bodies, that a thing is what it appears, that our will is free, that what is good for me is good absolutely” (*GS*, III: 110). Eventually, all evil things become subordinated to knowledge and are finally regarded as “good.” The person who realizes this and turns his knowledge onto himself will become suicidal. “Oh Zarathustra: Self-knower! . . . Self-hangman! . . .” (*DD*, “Amid Birds of Prey”).

Nietzsche's view that knowledge was essentially an illusion remained consistent; he repeats the same arguments in the early piece *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense* and in the mature work *On the Genealogy of Morality*. The latter work begins with Nietzsche's lament: "We are unknown to ourselves" [*wir sind uns unbekannt*] (*OGM*, Preface). In a late note from his *Nachlaß*, Nietzsche encapsulated his view: "Knowledge and wisdom in themselves have no value; no more than goodness: one must first be in possession of the goal from which these qualities derive their value or nonvalue . . ." (*WP*, II: 244). See also PERSPECTIVISM.

**KOEGEL, FRITZ (1860–1904)**. German editor who helped **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** to establish an archive for Nietzsche's works. Elisabeth's self-imposed task of bringing out a collection of Nietzsche's works would have been easier if she had not regularly sacked her editors. In August 1892, she gave **Peter Gast** the task of working on a collected edition while she absented herself to Paraguay, but on her return in September 1893, she decided to fire Gast. When, in April 1894, Elisabeth placed Fritz Koegel in charge of the editorship of Nietzsche's posthumous estate, the archive consisted of a couple of rooms in **Franziska Nietzsche's** house in Naumburg. In 1895, Koegel brought out eight volumes (part 1) of *Nietzsches Werke*, which he had prepared in collaboration with Eduard von der Hellen, and four volumes (part 2) that were the result of his own work: the *Nachlaß*. Volumes 9 and 10 appeared in 1896, and volumes 11 and 12 appeared in 1897. After this monumental achievement, Koegel was in turn dismissed in July 1897, ostensibly for not producing *The Will to Power* but really, as Elisabeth admitted in a letter to **Rudolf Steiner** dated 8–23 September 1898, because she did not like his fiancée, Emily Gelzer. In a letter to Joseph Hofmiller (28 October 1897), Koegel commented on Elisabeth's three-volume biography of her brother (1895–1904) shortly after the appearance of the second volume that year:

I want to put straight the main traits of Nietzsche's personality which Frau Förster, in her Biography, makes up, flattens out, twists and falsifies: out of prudery, ignorance and vanity.

Elisabeth had earmarked Steiner for Koegel's post, but Steiner declined to be recruited, having realized that it would be impossible to work with her. It was not until October 1898 that the new editor,

Arthur Seidl, began work. Seidl handed in his notice after a year, to be replaced by Ernst Horneffer, who took over the task of completing the three remaining volumes of the first edition; by 1901, Gast, having been reinstated to continue editing the *Nachlaß*, *The Will to Power* entered the public domain as volume 15 of the collected works. Elisabeth continued to make bitter—and unjust—comments on Koegel's editorship long after his death in 1904.

**KOFMAN, SARAH (1934–1994).** French philosopher. The daughter of a rabbi who was deported to Auschwitz, Kofman spent her childhood in Paris in hiding, emotionally torn between her adoptive and her real mother. She studied philosophy in Paris and taught in Toulouse and Paris (*Lycée Claude-Monet*) before being appointed to a lectureship at the Sorbonne in 1970. Her first two books, *L'enfance de l'art: une interprétation de l'aesthétique freudienne* (*The Infancy of Art: An Interpretation of Freudian Aesthetics*, 1970) and *Nietzsche et le métaphore*, 1972 (*Nietzsche and Metaphor*, 1993), established her as a major post**structuralist** philosopher; she thereafter embarked on a fruitful collaboration with fellow **deconstructive** theorists **Jacques Derrida**, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Jean-Luc Nancy, though she remained her own woman, “resisting the seductions of Lacan’s Freud and Derrida’s Heidegger” (Duncan Large, Kofman obituary, *The Guardian*, 3 November 1994). Kofman’s major work on Nietzsche, *Nietzsche et la scène philosophique* (*Nietzsche and the Philosophical Scene*), was published in 1979. She similarly kept her independence within the women’s movement. Her *L'Énigme de la femme: La femme dans les textes de Freud*, 1980 (*The Enigma of Woman: Woman in Freud's Writings*, 1985), is a seminal text.

Kofman suffered from ill health and depression and committed suicide in October 1994, a few months after she had addressed the Fourth Annual Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society of Great Britain at Swansea (15–17 April) with a paper on “Nietzsche and the **Jews**.” Many English-speaking Nietzsche students best know Kofman in connection with Nietzsche for her essay on the Greek mythological figure **Baubô**, printed in M. A. Gillespie and T. B. Strong, eds., *Nietzsche's New Seas* (1988).

**KÖSELITZ, HEINRICH.** See GAST, PETER.



**DIE KOSMIKER** (“THE COSMICS”). Avant-garde group based in Schwabing, Munich’s Bohemian quarter, flourishing from 1897 to 1904, led by **Alfred Schuler**, though it was **Rudolf Pannwitz** who thought up the name. Pannwitz declared that Nietzsche was “cosmic man,” and one of the more outlandish aims of the group was to harness cosmic energy through the use of myth and the study of pagan cults. The other members of the group, which remained for seven years within the ambit of **Stefan George**, were **Ludwig Klages**, **Karl Wolfskehl**, and **Franziska zu Reventlow**. All knew the work of **Johann Jakob Bachofen** as well as they knew (or thought they knew) the work of Nietzsche, and all dedicated themselves to a lifestyle of free, “hetaeric” love, which was construed as being far more emancipatory for **women** than the campaign for women’s rights. It was also considered to be suitably **Dionysian**.

A characteristic tenet of the group was that a nation, or *Volk*, had its own characteristic blood: if some elements became dominant in the blood at any time, this would cause the *Volk* to behave in a certain way or certain events to take place. Hence, a buildup of heathen elements occasionally erupted in every century, causing a “flash of blood” (*Blutleuchte*). For 19th-century Germany, the 1880s had been just such a *Blutleuchte*, producing Ludwig II of Bavaria (who died in 1886) and Nietzsche, whose best works were produced during that decade. There were various tensions in the group, caused not just by Reventlow’s passionate affair, first with Klages and then with Wolfskehl (amongst others), but also by the virulent **anti-Semitism** of Schuler, Wolfskehl being a **Jew**. In 1904, at one of the group’s orgiastic parties, Schuler threatened Wolfskehl, who fled for his life, and Klages quarreled with George in the same year. George tended to keep aloof from the extravaganzas of *die Kosmiker*, but he was present at their party, held in full Bacchic regalia, on 22 February 1903.

**KUNDERA, MILAN (1929– )**. Czech writer. Kundera’s early work *Zert*, 1967 (*The Joke*, 1982), caused him to fall foul of the communist authorities since it was seen to epitomize the rebellious spirit of the Prague Spring of 1968; it became a cult work and is still perhaps his best-known novel. Although there are Nietzschean references in Kundera’s novels, his most sustained use of a Nietzschean concept is found in *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* (1984; both a best-

seller and a box office hit at the cinema). This novel first appeared in French translation in 1984, Kundera having taken up residence in France in 1975 as an exile from communist Czechoslovakia; the Czech version, *Nesnesitelná lehkost bytí*, was published in Toronto in 1985.

In *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, the protagonist, Tomas, believes that an action such as adultery has significance only if it is repeated; for him, **life** is priapically joyous, and he would have no problem in **affirming** life eternally, in spite of the mundane job to which he has been relegated. Not surprisingly, his wife Tereza takes a different view: she suffers constantly from her husband's infidelities. For her, destiny is **heavy**, everything matters; unable to accept the Nietzschean **concept** of *amor fati*, she remains unreconciled to her fate until a final twist at the end of the plot. Reference to Nietzsche's doctrine of **eternal return** is made in the title itself and explained on the first pages of the book. We live in a world that presumes the nonexistence of return; not for us "the heaviest of burdens" (*GS*, IV: 341); our lives are "splendid lightness." Kundera demands, "But is heaviness truly deplorable and lightness splendid?" (Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, 1984).

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**LABAN, RUDOLF (1879–1958).** Slovakian-born pioneer of modern **dance** technique. With his system of "Labanotation," first published as *Kinetographie Laban* in 1928 and still in use today, and with his theory of *Eukinetik* that he developed in collaboration with his student Mary Wigman, Laban codified and structured the dynamic physical expression of modern dance, today understood more simply as "body language." Laban, an enthusiastic Nietzschean, felt that the purpose of rhapsodic gesture in dance was to make the dancer aware of transcendent powers and to convey these to those who watched. Wigman actually thought that when she danced, she was possessed. Laban's obsession with dance continued into the period of the Third Reich, and he became director of the *Deutsche Tanzbühne* in 1934. In 1936, he orchestrated the introductory dance sequences for the Olym-

pic Games to be held in Berlin; these were based on Nietzschean themes from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. This “massive dance display” (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992) was performed prior to the games and aroused official suspicion; Laban was promptly declared an enemy of **National Socialism**. He went into exile in England, living in Devon from 1938 and moving to Surrey (where he died) in 1953. The Dance School Laban founded in London still flourishes.

**LACAN, JACQUES (1901–1981).** French psychoanalyst. Lacan’s weekly seminars, which began in 1951, attracted many of the most prominent intellectuals in France: **Jean-Paul Sartre**, Simone de Beauvoir, Claude Lévi-Strauss, **Roland Barthes**, Louis Althusser, Michel Merleau-Ponty, Julia Kristeva, and **Luce Irigaray**. Lacan founded the *École freudienne* in Paris in 1964; here he reinterpreted **Sigmund Freud** in line with **structural** linguistics. In 1980, he disbanded it for lack of rigor toward Freudian theory. His chief work, *Écrits* (1966; trans. 1977), where his essays and lecture notes were published, brought him much acclaim, and he dominated French cultural life in the 1970s. His central insight that our **knowledge** lacks any fundamental structure, since we ourselves are inherently divided and split, inspired him to seek a new stage of infantile development in psychoanalysis, that of **language** acquisition. Because there is always a gap between wanting something and putting that wish into words, we never actually achieve our desire. **Women** need to traverse an extra stage of language acquisition because all discourse is necessarily patriarchal; it is impossible to step outside speech and avoid the patriarchal veto. Even if the father is absent, women enforce the *nom du père*, or “name of the father.” In addition, Lacan, like Freud, insisted on woman’s castration, taking this further in his theory of the transcendental phallus (that woman can appropriate), so that it becomes “the **metaphor** for metaphor” (Kelly Oliver, *Womanizing Nietzsche*, 1995). The complex Lacanian “other” became a common term in New Nietzsche critique, which insists that women devise coping strategies to circumvent their marginalization and that Nietzsche understood the way women play the power game effectively, albeit cleverly **masked**. American academics seized on European (mainly French) theory during the last two decades of the 20th century, so that

“theory,” by its very “difficulty and esotericism,” became tyrannical in its own way (David Lodge, *After Bakhtin*, 1990).

**LAGARDE, PAUL DE.** *See* VOLK.

**LANDAUER, GUSTAV (1870–1919).** German man of letters. Of **Jewish** descent, Landauer did not belong to any established political party: indeed, he opposed the Social Democratic Party. His belief in individualism, sometimes labeled anarchistic, owed much to Nietzsche. He was acquainted with the works of Nietzsche by 1890, the year he started work on his novel *Der Todesprediger* (*The Preacher of Death*), the title of which alludes to a section in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*Za*, I: “On the Preachers of Death”). The novel ends with a suitably Nietzschean message of reawakened **life** after the protagonist has contemplated suicide. When, at the turn of the century, Landauer frequented the circle around **Julius Hart**, he disagreed with Hart’s harsh criticism of Nietzsche in *Der neue Gott* (*The New God*, 1899), commenting that Hart had foolishly laid himself open to the *praise* of philistines such as Otto Henne am Rhyn in his *Anti-Zarathustra* (1899). Also in 1899, Landauer met (and shortly afterward married) Hedwig Lachmann, poet and translator of Oscar Wilde’s *Salome*. Lachmann had, for the previous decade, frequented avant-garde circles in Berlin, especially the group around **Richard Dehmel**, a fervent Nietzschean.

In 1904, Landauer and his wife translated Oscar Wilde’s *The Soul of Man under Socialism* (1892), “a work which combines socialist and individualistic ideas in a manner calculated to appeal to Landauer and the expressionist generation” (Rhys Williams, “Culture and Anarchy in Expressionist Drama,” in S. Behr et al., *Expressionism Reassessed*, 1993). Landauer’s essay *Die Revolution* (1907) seeks “to define **Geist** as the necessary basis of **culture** in a nation” (Williams). Landauer cites medieval **Christianity** as an example of how *Geist* can permeate a nation in a benevolent way—by allowing gifted individuals to emerge and flourish—and he attacks the **socialism** of his day, believing that politics are not the solution: only free individuals can submit themselves to the dynamism of *Geist* and regenerate society. Landauer’s call for a new “socialism” is slightly misleading, as he means by that term a convergence of individuals who can be the

antidote to the causes of alienation in society (capitalism, materialism, and so on).

In 1908, Landauer established the *Sozialistischer Bund* in Berlin; two of the members, Erich Mühsam and **Martin Buber**, had previously been comembers, with Landauer, of Hart's circle. Also in 1908, Landauer gave a lecture, *Aufruf zum Sozialismus* ("Call to Socialism"), that he published as a book in 1911. Landauer's visionary socialism inspired a generation of Expressionist writers, and it would have been intriguing to watch his later development. He was murdered during his involvement with **Kurt Eisner** in establishing the ill-fated *Räterepublik* in Munich in 1918.

**LANGBEHN, JULIUS (1851–1907)**. German author and **cultural** critic. Langbehn is best known for his enormously successful *Rembrandt als Erzieher* (*Rembrandt as Educator*, 1890), which ran through 40 reprints in the first year. Although the title of this work sounds like an imitation of Nietzsche's third essay in *Untimely Meditations*, "Schopenhauer as Educator," Nietzsche is mentioned only once in the whole work, whereas **Arthur Schopenhauer** and **Richard Wagner** receive adulatory coverage. Langbehn "borrowed" Rembrandt from the Dutch in order to make the central—*völkisch*—point that a nation's "ordinary folk" in the countryside were immune from the corruption that Wilhelmine politics harbored. Only the pure, simple, and healthy *Volk* could undo the evils of corruption in imperial Germany. Langbehn hailed Rembrandt's (Dutch) landscapes as *typically German*. One reason why the **Germans** found Langbehn's book so fascinating was that Schleswig-Holstein had been regained by Germany from Denmark in 1866, vastly increasing Germany's stock of flat agricultural land.

Langbehn viewed Nietzsche's tirades against the Germans and against **nationalism** per se as mistaken, and, on hearing of Nietzsche's mental collapse in 1889, he made up his mind to cure Nietzsche of these ideas, along with his insanity. Langbehn's attempt to "adopt" Nietzsche is an astonishing episode in Nietzsche's biography, especially as Langbehn regarded himself as a true Aryan as against Nietzsche's (putative) Polish descent. Nevertheless, Langbehn was convinced that he could bring Nietzsche around to his own way of thinking. He tried to persuade **Franziska Nietzsche** to hand over Nietzsche's pension and to put Nietzsche into his care. If

Franziska Nietzsche was uncertain about the offer, **Franz Overbeck** was not. He wrote to Erwin Rohde (27 January 1890), “[Langbehn] seems to be a quite unique lunatic—art historian, Schleswig Holsteiner, apparently a professional **anti-Semite**.” Nietzsche lashed out against Langbehn when the latter visited him at the mental hospital in Jena, and the idea of adoption was swiftly abandoned.

**LANGE, FRIEDRICH ALBERT (1828–1875).** German philosopher and **socialist**. In his *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, 1866 (*The History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Present Importance*, 1877), Lange held that our **bodily** senses produce our ideas and argued in favor of **Kantian** Idealism, in which the world as we perceive it is the product of our own minds: even our own bodies are unknown to us. Nietzsche read the work in 1866, as soon as it came out, finding it “very useful as a source of both instruction and stimulation” (Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001). In the same year, Lange left German academic life to work for a democratic newspaper in Switzerland.

In 1867, Lange published *Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus* (*A New Contribution to the History of Materialism*) and became professor of philosophy at Zurich University in 1870. He resigned from that post in 1872, angered by Swiss support for France in the Franco-Prussian War. Returning to Germany, Lange became professor of philosophy at Marburg University and effected a Kantian revival there. Nietzsche did not agree with Lange’s refutation of materialism, though he valued him as a philosopher. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche writes, “If one is to pursue physiology with a good conscience one is compelled to insist that the organs of sense are *not* phenomena in the sense of some idealist philosophy: for if they were they could not be causes!” (*BGE*, I: 15). Refer to George J. Stack, *Lange and Nietzsche* (1983).

**LANGUAGE.** Nietzsche criticized the fact that we continue to believe that language can convey meaning in an objective sense. He insisted on the **perspectivism** imposed by language. In *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, Nietzsche wrote a brilliant exposé of his theory of language, though he never published it. Here, he argues that language is always couched in **metaphor**. In our use of language, we

trap ourselves within **concepts** to help us to make sense of the world and forget the original meaning of words in order to make **life** bearable. A concept is thus a residue of a metaphor, and a word is really a metaphor of a metaphor, since the actual starting point for language is just a nerve stimulus. Daniel Breazeale has argued that Nietzsche “wished to *expose* the unsuspected role which language has played in forming our thoughts and our conception of reality in order to try to *escape* its transcendental distortions” (Daniel Breazeale, “Introduction,” *Philosophy and Truth*, 1991).

Regarding language acquisition, Nietzsche approached the topic in a conservative manner: “Learning many languages fills the memory with words instead of facts and ideas, while the memory is a receptacle which in the case of each man can take only a certain limited content” (*HH*, I: “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture,” 267). It is extraordinary to find Nietzsche placing a *numerus clausus* on the memory and just as astonishing to find him anticipating a “new language for all” in the same passage. It would be almost another decade before Ludwik Zamenhof (alias Doctor Esperanto) published *Dr. Esperanto’s International Language* in 1887. As usual, Nietzsche’s heart is with the ancient **Greeks** and the French, who wisely “learned no foreign languages” (*HH*, I: “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture,” 267). See also STYLE; TRANSLATION.

**THE LAST MAN (DER LETZTE MENSCH)**. Sometimes also referred to as “the ultimate man,” the last man, as portrayed in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, is characterized by complacency: he believes himself to be happy and wishes to remain as he is, lacking all passion and commitment. **Life** is uniform and secure: “Everyone wants the same, everyone is the same” (*Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 5). The last man rejects the striving that the **Übermensch** would have to undertake in order to overcome himself (*Selbstüberwinden*) and to create his own **morality** after the death of **God**. For the last man, active striving ceases with the death of God, and he sinks into irredeemable mediocrity. When Zarathustra describes the monotonous but pleasant life of the last man, he is horrified to discover that the crowd around him is thrilled by the idea and demands, “Give us this last man, oh Zarathustra . . . make us into this last man! You can keep the *Übermensch!*” (*Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 5). See also THE HERD.

**LAWRENCE, DAVID HERBERT (1885–1930)**, English writer. The son of a Nottingham collier who studied at Nottingham and was for a while a teacher in Croydon, D. H. Lawrence first stumbled across Nietzsche's work in the Croydon Public Library. Thereafter, Lawrence pursued many of the precepts familiar to Nietzsche scholars, agreeing with Nietzsche's critique of **Christianity** as a weakening religion (he had "outgrown" Congregational chapel by the time he left the university). While at work on *Women in Love* (1914), Lawrence became absorbed with the **will to power**, which he used in his own way, often to indicate a physical form of bullying. Lawrence's wife Frieda was German by birth, and she also knew Nietzsche's work. Although Lawrence denied that Nietzsche had exerted much influence over him, it is impossible to overlook the influence in *Women in Love*. Colin Milton, who insists that "Nietzsche's influence on Lawrence was profound" (Colin Milton, *Lawrence and Nietzsche*, 1987), points out that Lawrence probably needed to distance himself from Nietzsche, especially during World War I, when Nietzsche came under attack in Britain as one of the instigators of the war.

Lawrence linked the polarity between **Apollo** and **Dionysus** to the **will to power**—at least in *Women in Love*—and demonstrated its operation through **art**. It is significant that both **W. B. Yeats** and Lawrence relate their understanding of Apollo and Dionysus to aesthetics. In the essay "The Study of Thomas Hardy" (1915), which contains a wide-ranging critique of modernism, Lawrence returns to the link between art and the will to power and draws conclusions from it about the battle between the sexes, a major theme throughout his work. Other influences on Lawrence were **Charles Darwin**, **Sigmund Freud**, and Wilhelm Reich.

By the time he wrote *Aaron's Rod* (1922), Lawrence had become critical of the doctrine of the will to power, but he always respected Nietzsche's central tenet that the **life** of the instincts is the pathway to health. His conviction that modern society systematically thwarts an individual's emotions, **sexuality**, and creativity led him to make many journeys in later life, notably to Mexico, Australia, and Italy, in search of a more "**natural**" habitat. His most celebrated novel is *Sons and Lovers* (1913), and his most notorious is *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (1928).



**LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE (LIFE PHILOSOPHY).** This movement arose in the 1870s and lasted through to the turn of the century and beyond it, in varied form, to the period of the Third Reich. It stressed irrationalism above all: the primacy of intuition over the intellect, of direct experience over rational consideration. Nietzsche's thought was hailed as a forerunner to *Lebensphilosophie*, but there are sharp distinctions; where the movement diverged from Nietzscheanism was chiefly in its attitude toward mythology. The occult was seen as a means of gaining access to mystical powers. Those in the movement (whether consciously or not) included **Stefan George**, **Eduard von Hartmann**, **Wilhelm Dilthey**, **Ludwig Klages**, **Max Scheler**, **Alfred Schuler**, **Georg Simmel**, **Oswald Spengler**, **Martin Heidegger**, and **Karl Jaspers**. Members of the group tended to subscribe to Nietzsche's concept of **aristocratic values**, and some, like Schuler, looked on themselves as saviors of the German *Volk*. **Georg Lukács** was a hostile critic of the movement, attributing the rise of **National Socialism** itself to life philosophy. *Lebensphilosophie* is distinct from the élan vital of **Henri Bergson**. Refer to Karl Albert, *Lebensphilosophie* (1995).

**LEVY, OSCAR (1867–1946).** German-born critic and man of letters. According to Patrick Bridgwater, Levy was “the greatest Nietzschean of them all” (*Nietzsche in Anglosaxony*, 1972). Born in Stargard, Pomerania, into a family of Orthodox **Jews** who were nevertheless proud of their **German** nationality, Levy studied medicine at Freiburg University but then settled in London in 1892. His interest in Nietzsche began in 1893 when he was introduced to Nietzsche's thought and conceived the idea of translating Nietzsche's works into English. In 1908, Levy visited Weimar to negotiate the rights for the English translations with **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, a process he found extremely difficult. However, his 18-volume edition of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* appeared in London from 1909 to 1913, the result of two decades of lonely pioneering work. His elation on completing the English edition was shortly matched by distress at being held responsible for introducing Britain to Nietzsche's malignant philosophy, thought by many Britons to have laid the intellectual groundwork for World War I. Levy was also an opponent of Zionism, which he attacked in the journal *The New Age*. He was a bitter opponent of

**nationalism** and racism and was often uncomplimentary toward the class-ridden society of contemporary Britain. He left England in 1921 but, after living in Italy and the south of France, returned to Oxford, his home, until he died. Although he wrote numerous polemical articles, his great and pathbreaking achievement was the collected edition of Nietzsche's works in English. Refer to Uschi Nussbaumer-Benz, "*Oscar Levys nietzscheanische Visionen,*" *Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung: Sonderdruck* 36 (1997).

**LICHTENBERGER, HENRI (1864–1941).** French academic and man of letters. Lichtenberger was an early admirer of Nietzsche's work, which he read in the original. His *La philosophie de Nietzsche* (1898), based on a series of lectures he gave at the University of Nancy, was influential in making Nietzsche known to French readers at the turn of the century. The book appeared in German in 1899 with an introduction by **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, and it has been mistakenly assumed that she translated the work, whereas the translator was actually Friedrich von Oppeln-Bronikowski. Lichtenberger maintained close links with Elisabeth over the next three decades. Lichtenberger was a Germanist whose interest was by no means confined to Nietzsche; he published many works on German literature, such as *Richard Wagner poète et penseur* (1898) and *Heinrich Heine penseur* (1905). He also wrote works on the links between French and German literature, such as *L'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui dans ses relations avec la France* (*Germany Today in Her Relationship with France*, 1922).

**LIES.** In *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, Nietzsche maintains that when we use **language**, we lie without realizing it because our way of forming **concepts** is closely linked to self-deceit in order to make **life** bearable. The weaker man will devise a number of **masks**, lies and deceptions to hide from himself the fact that language cannot deliver "the **truth**." In contrast, the free intellect will smash the framework of concepts and "will now be guided by intuitions rather than concepts" (*OTLNS*, 2).

In spite of his own engagement with **metaphysics**, Nietzsche vehemently declared that metaphysics (which he often equated with religion) was a grand lie from its inception, the instigator being **Plato** with his real world and world of appearance. In contrast to the Pla-

tonic certainty of there being a “truth” that was “good,” Nietzsche proposed that there were also lies that were good. The “holy lie” that there is a metaphysical world was not just **decadent** and wrong but also futile, since it had no particular purpose beyond arousing disgust in man at his own **body**. “—Ultimately the point is to what *end* a lie is told” (A-C: 55).

**LIFE.** The cornerstone of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Because **God** is dead and there is no afterlife, Nietzsche lays stress on accepting whatever life brings in an **affirmative** manner, even if that involves pain and **suffering**. He terms such an acceptance of one’s fate *amor fati*. Tracing his thoughts back to the ancient **Greeks**, who faced the absurdity of their fate bravely, aided by the **Dionysian** festivals, Nietzsche counsels his fellow men to reject the **ascetic ideal** and the **ressentiment** it engenders and embrace life joyously. Freed from the burdens imposed hitherto by a **metaphysical** system of rewards and punishments that weaken by association with guilt and sin, man can and should make his own life into a work of **art**. Like **Zarathustra**, man should laugh and **dance** and enjoy **sexuality**, for life itself is fluid and beautiful: “Yes, life is a **woman!**” (GS, IV: 339). The bodily **drives** are good and healthy and lead to a higher form of humanity: the **higher man** and, ultimately, the *Übermensch*, who will say “a sacred Yes” to life (Za, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). By contrast, man should avoid life-denying **nihilism** and have nothing to do with fraudulent religions like **Christianity** that sap vitality and redirect that building block of all life, the **will to power**, away from its proper path.

**LIFE AFFIRMATION.** See AFFIRMATION.

**LIFE PHILOSOPHY.** See *LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE*.

**LILIENCRON, DETLEV VON (1844–1909).** German officer, civil servant, and writer. An early admirer of Nietzsche, Liliencron was born in the same year as Nietzsche and, like him, fought in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). He is best known for his poetry. For example, the collection *Adjutantenritte* (*The Adjutant’s Rides*, 1883) ranks as a pioneering introduction to what would soon become the **Naturalist movement** in Germany. His prose is also of high qual-

ity, as in *Kriegsnovellen* (*War Stories*, 1894). His originality and his enthusiasm for Nietzsche's thought made an impact on the generation of younger poets writing in the 1890s, such as Gustav Falke and Otto Julius Bierbaum, and Liliencron was frequently invited to give paid readings from his works. Even so, he never earned enough from his poetry to feed his family in comfort, and this gave rise to his deep depressions. These were made worse by his loss of faith, not just in **God** but also in man. In 1900, he was awarded a stipendiary grant from the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, where he occasionally gave readings from his works; the committee at that time consisted of **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, **Harry Graf Kessler**, Hans Olde, Elise Koenigs, and Hans Rathmann.

**LI SHICHEN (1892–1935)**. Chinese writer. The editor of the leading journals such as the *People's Bell* and *Chinese Educational Review*, Li Shichen enjoyed a brilliant if short career as a writer and critic. He was a major player in the New Culture Movement in China, which centered on the reform attempts of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, and remained a prolific writer during the 1920s. He repeatedly attacked decadent Chinese customs in the wake of neo-Confucianism. The latter produced a **slave morality** similar to that described by Nietzsche in relation to **Christianity**. Li Shichen particularly criticized the Chinese propensity to avoid confrontation and accept compromise. All the abortive attempts to reform Chinese **culture** from 1898 to 1919 are disparaged in his *Charon zhexue chance* (*Outline of the Superman Philosophy*, 1931), though in view of Li Shichen's high-profile conversion to **Marxism**, David Kelly has questioned his steadfastness "in following Nietzsche's demand for apolitical self-realization" (D. A. Kelly, "Nietzsche in China: Influence and Affinity," in G. Parkes, ed., *Nietzsche and Asian Thought*, 1991). See also LIU XIAOBO; LU XUN; MAO DUN; ZHOU GUOPING.

**LIU XIAOBO (1955–)**. Chinese academic. Liu Xiaobo was a lecturer in philosophy at Beijing University and leader of the April–June 1989 student rebellion, which resulted in the Tiananmen Square massacre of June Fourth, after which he was imprisoned. Prior to that he had written a number of radical articles, though none of them specifically devoted to Nietzsche. His most substantial work was his

popular *Xuanze de pipan* (*Critique of Choice*, 1988), which by the time of the Tiananmen uprising was so oversubscribed that it was already a collector's item. This work continues the criticism, begun by radicals such as Lu Xun and Li Shichen, of the lack of individualism in Chinese **culture**. David Kelly writes, "Many of them tended to look to Nietzsche and avant-garde **aesthetic** experience for the keys to the liberation of consciousness" (D. A. Kelly, "Nietzsche in China: Influence and Affinity," in G. Parkes, ed., *Nietzsche and Asian Thought*, 1991). Kelly laments Liu's inability to construe as ironic or ambivalent Nietzsche's own stance on individualism, which often amounted to "a vulgarized derivative of the **nihilist** project." At the present time, the study of Nietzsche is discouraged by the authorities in the People's Republic of China, which does not mean that there is not lively interest in Nietzsche among Chinese radical intellectuals. See also LI SHICHEN; LU XUN; MAO DUN; ZHOU GUOPING.

**LONDON, JACK (1876–1916)**. American writer. Jack London was extremely popular with his fellow working-class readers, for whom he religiously wrote 1,000 words a day. What drove him on was not the creative urge as much as the power of the dollar: his works made a lot of money. "If they're any good, I publish them," he said. "If they're no good, I shall still publish them." Needless to say, his works are of uneven quality and are beset with the inner contradiction that came from his simultaneous adoption of Nietzschean elitism and mythic **Darwinism**, as in *The Sea Wolf* (1903–1904), *White Fang* (1906), and *Call of the Wild* (1903), and a fervent **socialism** that he stumped the country to popularize (found in *The People of the Abyss*, 1903, and *The Iron Heel*, 1907). Through these works, London prophesied a fascist revolution.

Being a **Marxist**, Jack London was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's favorite author, but paradoxically, the witch's brew of paradoxes that he embodied would become standard for the protofascist: one only has to think of **Filippo Tommaso Marinetti** or, indeed, London's fellow Americans Frank Norris and **Theodor Dreiser**. The contradictions come to the fore in a story like *Call of the Wild*, in which a dominant leader (in this case, the massive dog Buck, who reverts to savagery) is heralded. London's call for virility and action derived directly from his reading of Nietzsche.

**LÖWITH, KARL (1897–1973).** German philosopher. Löwith's early fame rested on his *Max Weber und Karl Marx* (1932; trans. 1982). A student under **Martin Heidegger** along with **Hannah Arendt** and **Karl Jaspers**, Löwith left Germany when **Adolf Hitler** came to power, arriving in the United States by a circuitous route (he was a professor in Sendai, Japan, from 1933 to 1935). He spent four years, 1942–1946, in the United States before returning to a chair at Heidelberg University. Löwith's autobiography appeared under the title *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933*, 1985 (*My Life in Germany before and after 1933*, 1994). Löwith is renowned for his interpretation of Nietzsche's concept of **eternal return**, which he elucidates in *Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen*, 1935 (*Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, 1997). For Löwith, Nietzsche's problem lay in his attempt to reconcile the anthropological side of his argument with the cosmological, so that the **will to power** was construed as a law of **nature**.

Ultimately, Löwith argued that Nietzsche had failed in his attempt to retrieve "natural man," pointing out that Nietzsche's experience of the death of **God** resulted in the **metaphysical** homelessness of modern man, the breach between him and the pre-Socratic world being unbridgeable. At **Royeaumont**, Löwith returned to the same theme, arguing that it is misleading to think that one can trace Nietzsche's thinking on eternal return back to the **Greeks**, especially **Heraclitus**. The Greeks, using pre-Platonic and pre-Christian modes of thought, experienced fear and respect when contemplating eternal destiny; for them, man was a productive part of nature. For Löwith, Nietzsche's stance on the creative will still smacks of the Christian perception of the all-powerful God of the Old Testament. Löwith's other works, such as *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche*, 1941 (*From Hegel to Nietzsche*, 1989), demonstrate his position as **cultural** historian and essayist rather than as a systematic philosopher.

**LUKÁCS, GEORG (1885–1971).** Hungarian-born Marxist writer. Lukács was a renowned critic of German literature in such classics as *Theorie des Romans* (1920; trans. as *The Historical Novel*, 1969). In his early works, Lukács displayed an appreciation of *Jugendstil* and *Lebensphilosophie*. The perspective of his literary criticism in works such as *Die Seele und die Formen*, 1911 (*The Soul and the*

*Forms*, 1974), clearly show the influence of Nietzsche. However, as a leading communist in the Hungarian Commune (1918–1919), he denounced his former **aestheticism** and turned to the influence of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** and **Karl Marx**. When the Hungarian government was overthrown in 1919, he went to Vienna for 10 years. Here, he published the still-influential *Geschichte und das Klassenbewußtsein*, 1923 (*History and Class Consciousness*, 1971), which displays his unique Marxist philosophy of history.

From Vienna, Lukács went to Berlin and Moscow, returning in 1945 to Hungary, where he became professor of aesthetics and **culture** at Budapest University. As a participant in the Hungarian uprising in 1956, Lukács was arrested and deported but allowed back to Budapest the following year. By this time, Nietzsche's elitist ideas were anathema to him. Lukács created a spectrum of thinking in the communist world that criticized Nietzsche largely as a result of his argument, in *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*, 1954 (*The Destruction of Reason*, 1981), that Nietzsche's irrationalism had started a dangerous trend in German philosophy by encouraging the emergence of *Lebensphilosophie* and had masked the sinister aspects of **National Socialism** when these manifested themselves.

**LUTHER, MARTIN (1483–1546)**. Dissenting monk whose rift with the Catholic Church brought about the Reformation. In 1517, Luther had famously pinned his 95 Theses (mainly attacking papal indulgences) to the church door in Wittenberg and was called to account by the Church authorities. In 1521, Luther was arraigned at the Diet of Worms, where he refused to recant; he was kidnapped for his own protection and imprisoned for a year at the Wartburg, where he translated the New Testament into German. This was published in 1522; his translation of the Old Testament from Hebrew was published in 1534. He married Katherina von Bora, a former nun, in 1525. Luther's Reformation succeeded because he had the support of the German people and powerful friends, all of whom believed he was in the right to challenge orthodox dogma.

Nietzsche's family was Protestant (in German: *lutherisch*), with a lineage of pastors; as a child and young man, Nietzsche believed he had a calling to the ministry. His reaction to religion was all the more bitter when, as a theology student in Bonn in 1864, he lost his faith.

Thereafter, **Christianity** was, for Nietzsche, an intolerable burden on mankind, and he attacked Luther for halting the complete collapse of the Church:

Luther, this calamity of a monk, restored the church and, what is a thousand times worse, Christianity, at the very moment *when it was vanquished*—Christianity, this denial of the will to **life** become religion! (*EH*, “The Case of Wagner”: 2)

However, Nietzsche greatly admired Luther’s Bible and praised its **language**: “Compared with Luther’s bible, almost everything else is merely ‘literature’” (*BGE*, VIII: 247). *See also* PIETISM.

**LU XUN (or HSÜN) (1881–1936)**. Chinese short-story writer whose supreme mastery of form was recognized by the repressive communist government, an ironic fact in view of his relentless criticism of the denial of individuality in China. However, **Liu Xiaobo** has asserted more recently that Lu Xun’s criticism of sterile traditional Chinese **cultural** norms was a non sequitur that failed to evoke any new evaluations of culture from him. Lu Xun came into contact with Nietzsche’s ideas when a student in Japan; he probably knew only *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in any depth. Lu Xun’s notion of genius, which rests on an understanding of **Zarathustra** as a spiritual leader and moral aristocrat vastly superior to the mob, is derived from **Leo Tolstoi**’s humanism as well as from Nietzsche’s *Übermensch*. Lu Xun’s essays, which provided a critique of Nietzsche from 1907 on, were an important factor in fueling Chinese interest in Nietzsche, which in turn informed the failed attempt to achieve reform known as the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919. Marián Gálik writes of the Chinese, “Lu Xun was a saint for them: all his actions and writings were allegedly without faults and no blots were to be found on his past” (Marián Gálik, “Nietzsche’s Reception in China,” *Archiv Orientáli* 70, 2002). *See also* LIU XIAOBO; LI SHICHEN; MAO DUN; ZHOU GUOPING.

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**MAEZTU, RAMIRO DE (1874–1936)**. Spanish journalist. Maeztu was the most enthusiastic Nietzschean of the Spanish “Generation of 1898” movement that revolved around **Azorin** and writers of like



mind in Madrid. Like **Pio Baroja**, Maeztu admired what he thought was the salient feature in Nietzsche's philosophy: **power**. He was also an advocate of **Max Stirner**. His first book, *Hacia otra España* (*Towards Another Spain*, 1899), refers to the "great Nietzsche," and he himself was spoken of as "the Spanish Nietzsche." In articles written around the turn of the century, Maeztu emerged as "the advocate of the will to power, of health and renewal" (Udo Rukser, *Nietzsche in der Hispania*, 1962), and he made no secret of his support for the anarchist cause.

Fluent in English, Maeztu was a foreign correspondent based in England from 1905 to 1919; he was a correspondent in France and Germany during World War I, after which he wrote, in English, *Liberty and Function in Light of War*, also published in Spanish as *La crisis del humanismo* (1919). Here Maeztu, having converted to Catholicism, argued for a return to Catholic values and authoritarianism, thus breaking with his radical friends. Despite his religious conversion, Maeztu's sympathy for Nietzsche's point of view was not fully withdrawn. Maeztu's conservatism, as manifested in the right-wing journal *Acción Española*, which he founded and edited, and his belief in hierarchy and authoritarianism meant that he was a target when the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, and he was shot by Republicans.

**MAHLER, GUSTAV (1860–1911)**. Austrian composer. As a student at the Vienna conservatoire, Mahler had contact with the Pernerstorfer circle, where the ideas of Nietzsche were excitedly received as early as 1875–1878; in fact, the group read Nietzsche's works as they appeared. Their enthusiasm for a "**Dionysian**" form of **art** found its echo in Mahler's **music**. Mahler conducted in Prague, Leipzig, and Budapest during the years 1891–1897 and at the Imperial Opera in Vienna from 1897 to 1907. From 1907, Mahler lived in America. His Fourth Symphony is considered his best, but Nietzscheans will be more interested to know that the influence of Nietzsche was such that, inspired by *The Gay Science*, Mahler initially gave his Third Symphony (first performed as a whole in 1902) that same title, though he later thought better of such an obvious allusion to Nietzsche's work. Mahler is renowned for his *Lied von der Erde* (*Song of the Earth*, 1908), a symphony for solo voices and orchestra,

and his *Kindertotenlieder* (*Songs for Dead Children*, 1905). Refer to Eveline Nikels, *O Mensch! Gib Acht! Friedrich Nietzsches Bedeutung für Gustav Mahler* (*O Man! Attend! Friedrich Nietzsche's Importance for Gustav Mahler*, 1989).

**MALRAUX, ANDRÉ (1901–1976).** French writer and political activist. Several generations of French readers have looked up to Malraux as the epitome of the committed writer. He deservedly enjoys a reputation as man of action, although he did not belong to any political party, in spite of his activity as a leading antifascist during the 1930s (the Spanish Civil War and the Resistance of World War II). What motivated him to inaugurate the concept of “the absurd” in literature was his horror at the carnage of World War I. His most acclaimed novels are *Les conquérants*, 1928 (*The Conquerors*, 1929); *La voie royale*, 1930 (*The Royal Way*, 1935); *La Condition humaine*, 1933 (*Man's Estate*, 1948), which attacked the Kuomintang revolution in China and won the *Prix Goncourt* in 1933; *L'Espoir*, 1937 (*Days of Hope*, 1938); and *Les voix du silence*, 1951 (*The Voices of Silence*, 1953). In his novels, the **metaphysical** alienation of the **European** is always the undercurrent; the Nietzschean influence manifests itself through a hedonistic acceptance of death as the only escape from this alienation. His heroes have the will to conquer and the courage of the *Übermensch*. John Burt Foster writes, “For the young Malraux, precociously making his way in a postwar Paris of avant-garde movements, Nietzsche was a central intellectual experience” (John Burt Foster, *Heirs to Dionysus*, 1981). Refer to Horst Hina, *Nietzsche und Marx bei Malraux* (1970).

**MANN, HEINRICH (1871–1950).** German writer. Heinrich Mann was a novelist of left-wing persuasion and, in *Der Untertan*, 1918 (*Man of Straw*, 1946), a harsh critic of the **nationalistic** ideology propounded by his brother **Thomas Mann** in *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (*Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, 1918). Heinrich Mann was an effective critic of bourgeois society, as in his early novel *Professor Unrat* (1905), which provided the model for the film *The Blue Angel* (starring Marlene Dietrich). As young men, both Heinrich and Thomas Mann were deeply influenced by Nietzsche. Heinrich's early poem “*Bekehrungsgeschichte*” (“Account of a Con-

version,” 1891) registers his approval of things **Zarathustran**. At that point, Nietzsche’s message to “become who you are” (*GS*, III: 270) was applied to the creative and responsible individual, and slogans like the “**blond beast**” or the *Übermensch* were seen in context as part of Nietzsche’s provocative irony.

Both Heinrich and Thomas Mann were forced to take stock of Nietzsche in the light of **National Socialism**, which manipulated Nietzsche’s thought in a manner, as Heinrich Mann wrote in the essay “Nietzsche” (1939), that would have disgusted Nietzsche himself. In spite of seeing the dangers inherent in taking Nietzsche “at his word,” Heinrich Mann respected and admired Nietzsche and ultimately blamed the Germans for having chosen to misunderstand his message. Thomas Mann also edged toward that position. Refer to Rudolf Walter, *Nietzsche—Jugendstil—Heinrich Mann. Zur geistigen Situation der Jahrhundertwende* (1976).

**MANN, THOMAS (1875–1955)**. German writer. The doyen of 20th-century German literature, receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1929, Thomas Mann was an early admirer of Nietzsche’s works, especially *The Birth of Tragedy*, though he was also deeply influenced by the work of **Arthur Schopenhauer** and **Richard Wagner**. Michael Beddow writes,

Mann’s indebtedness to Nietzsche encompasses both the content and the means of his fiction through all its phases, and it colours his reception and use of every other intellectual—and artistic—influence on his work. (Michael Beddow, *Mann: Doctor Faustus*, 1994)

Mann achieved early success with his chronicle of a family through several generations, *Buddenbrooks* (1901; trans. 1924), a work in which his characteristically ironic style is already well developed and his preoccupation with Nietzsche is apparent. He did not fight in World War I. In 1918, despairing of the **German cultural** vacuum, Mann brought out his *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (*Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, 1983), where he publicly sided with Nietzsche’s low estimation of German intellectual **life** and appealed for a more elevated culture to develop: one that was “more German” and less democratic. In the aftermath of the war, Mann agreed wholeheartedly with the mythical dimension awarded to Nietzsche by **Ernst Bertram**. Mann was also—like Bertram—a frequent visi-

tor at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* during this period of his life and was on the committee of the *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* when it was formed in 1919. The right-wing views expressed in *Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, which incidentally deepened the rift between Thomas Mann and his brother **Heinrich Mann**, coincided with Mann's distrust of **democracy**, and he was a harsh critic of the Weimar Republic in its early years; however, the conversations about the future of culture in *Der Zauberberg*, 1924 (*The Magic Mountain*, 1927), reflect Mann's nascent reconciliation with his brother's views. In particular, the murder of the **Jewish** foreign minister, Walter Rathenau, in 1922 forced Mann to revise his political opinions.

Thomas Mann left Germany in 1933, though he did not express public opposition to the **National Socialists** until 1936. In exile in America, he came to blame Nietzsche for much of the chaos of the Third Reich, as is manifest in his essay (written in English) *Nietzsche's Philosophy in the Light of Our Experience* (1947). In private correspondence, however, Mann was less damning of his former idol, lamenting the fact that Nietzsche's ideas were taken literally by a gullible nation that did not deserve to have such a thinker. This ambivalent attitude is seen in Mann's novel *Doktor Faustus* (1947; trans. 1949), in which the protagonist bears many traits of Nietzsche (including suffering from **syphilis** contracted in a brothel). However, Leverkühn (= "live boldly") is a **musician** rather than a philosopher. Adrian Leverkühn's music is closely modeled on that of Arnold Schönberg, who was angry that Mann did not properly acknowledge the debt. **Theodor Adorno** tutored Mann in musicology for the purposes of the novel. The two men had become friendly in 1943. A noteworthy feature of *Doktor Faustus* is that the reader tends to sympathize with the main character, Leverkühn (alias Nietzsche), who has sold his **soul** to the devil. In his long essay *Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus* (*The Genesis of Doktor Faustus*, 1949), Mann wrote, "There is so much of Nietzsche in the novel that people have pretty well dubbed it a Nietzsche novel." Refer to Christoph Schmidt, *Ehrfurcht und Erbarmen in Thomas Manns Nietzsche-Rezeption 1914–1947* (*Reverence and Mercy in Thomas Mann's Nietzsche-Reception 1914–1947*, 1997).

**MAO DUN (1896–1981)**. Pseudonym for Shen Yen-ping, Chinese academic. Mao Dun was the first to introduce young readers of the

May Fourth Movement (1919) to Nietzsche in a long essay titled *Nietzsche's Teaching*, which was heavily based on Anthony M. Ludovici's book *Nietzsche: His Life and Works* (1910). Mao Dun paraphrased Ludovici and used his translations of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as the source material for his own Nietzsche quotations in his article. Mao Dun was fascinated by the concepts of **slave** and **master morality** and the *Übermensch* but misunderstood the latter as "Nietzsche's evolution theory"; he wrongly assumed that Nietzschean ethics were to be imposed on the mass and also misunderstood the **will to power**. He grappled with the **revaluation of values** and declared that Nietzsche "worships **force**." When he finally realized the aristocratic nature of Nietzsche's work, he drew back from Nietzsche research. As Marián Gálik points out (*Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens/Hamburg*, 1971), Mao Dun was a child of his time: he and others in the May Fourth Movement subsequently worked hard to found the Chinese Communist Party and saw China's way ahead as being part of a **socialist** movement. Although Mao Dun's foray into Nietzscheanism failed at almost every level, a start had been made to open up Nietzsche studies in China. See also LI SHICHEN; LIU XIAOBO; LU XUN; ZHOU GUOPING.

**MARCUSE, HERBERT (1898–1979)**. German philosopher. Marcuse studied philosophy at Berlin and Freiburg, joining the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in 1933, whereby he became a leading figure in the **Frankfurt School**. Of **Jewish** descent, Marcuse fled from **Adolf Hitler's** Germany via Geneva (1933) to America (1934). Here, he worked in various American universities, ending with the University of California at San Diego. Marcuse was sympathetic to Nietzsche's central belief that the enrichment of society could come about through **aesthetics**. In "Über den **affirmativen Charakter der Kultur**" ("On the **Affirmative Character of Culture**," 1936), Marcuse applauded Nietzsche's attack on **Kantian** "disinterested satisfaction," albeit from a distinctive **Hegelian/Marxist/Freudian** perspective. By 1968, when students who were rebelling in Germany and Paris looked to Marcuse as a spokesman for the "New Left," Marcuse had written two influential works, *Eros and Civilization* (1955) and *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). Here, he criticized the way contemporary

society produces impoverished individuals: people are not free, for capitalism controls all areas of their **life**. *See also* ADORNO, THEODOR; HABERMAS, JÜRGEN; HORKHEIMER, MAX.

**MARHOLM, LAURA (1854–1900)**. German writer and journalist. Marholm married the Swede and fellow writer **Ola Hansson** in 1889. She was, like him, a firm Nietzschean. Her right-wing stance on **feminist** issues exasperated the more radical feminists such as **Meta von Salis-Marschlins**, who criticized Marholm's *Buch der Frauen* (*Book of Women*, 1894) for perpetuating the myth that **woman's** happiness lay in and through man. Although Marholm's book *Wir Frauen und unsere Dichter* (*We Women and Our Writers*, 1895) deals exclusively with works by male writers such as Gottfried Keller and **Henrik Ibsen**, her analysis of their female protagonists is perceptive. Marholm and Hansson became the central pivots of the Friedrichshagen group, an artists' colony outside Berlin that included **Julius Hart** and his brother Heinrich. The group provided a forum for the discussion of Nietzsche's ideas.

**MARINETTI, FILIPPO TOMMASO (1876–1944)**. Italian writer. Born in Alexandria, Egypt, and educated at French schools, Marinetti founded **Futurism** when he arrived in Italy in 1909. Greatly influenced by the flamboyant work of **Gabriele D'Annunzio**, himself a Nietzschean, Marinetti created his own coterie that same year in a manner he hoped would top anything this rival could manage. He wrote his first novel, *Mafarka le futuriste*, 1909 (*Mafarka the Futurist*, 1997), in French since at the time he was still more comfortable with French than with Italian (his secretary translated it into Italian in 1910); it was banned when it first appeared in Paris, and at the ensuing trials for obscenity in Milan, Marinetti basked in the publicity. As well as being an openly misogynist and arguably pornographic work, *Mafarka the Futurist* is the first text in which Marinetti describes **war** as "the sole hygiene of the world." He repeats this sentiment in *Fon-dazione e Manifesto del Futurismo* (*Founding Manifesto of Futurism*; written in that same frantic year, 1909); many more would follow in Marinetti's tireless attempt to shock the bourgeoisie, ecstatically heralding technological "progress" (the motorcar and airplane) with grammar-defying linguistic iconoclasm. Other Futurists were re-

cruited, such as Umberto Boccioni, Gino Severini, Carlo Carrà, and Giacomo Balla. The most Nietzschean of the group was, however, the **dancer Valentine de Saint-Point**.

Marinetti denied the influence of Nietzsche on his work. This disclaimer was partly to set himself at a distance from D'Annunzio and partly in support of the Futurist program, which demanded that universities be closed and libraries demolished, while philosophy as a discipline was declared "passé." However, there are certain things Marinetti has in common with Nietzsche, such as the belief that **women** have a flagrant drive for pregnancy, making them potential predators on the male, which indicates a close knowledge of Nietzsche's work. Marinetti—a model paterfamilias in his private life—portrays his protagonist Mafarka as a ludicrously virile warrior king who, armed with a penis 30 cubits long, proceeds to rape and kill at will, finally constructing his own son, Gazourmah, so that he does not need to have anything more to do with female genitalia. The strength of Nietzsche's *Übermensch* is reduced to "unthinking brutality" (Carol Diethe, "Sex and the Superman," in G. Day and C. Bloom, *Perspectives on Pornography: Sexuality in Film and Literature*, 1988). Marinetti borrowed from both Nietzsche and **Henri Bergson** in portraying Mafarka's will as a physical **force** that can "breathe **life**" into Gazourmah. He also appreciated the poeticism of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, emulating the exquisite section "Before Sunrise" in that work by providing Mafarka with a similar epiphany. However, he was also inspired by the cult of violence introduced by **Georges Sorel** and allowed himself to be seduced by fascist propaganda. Ironically, although Marinetti had supported **Benito Mussolini's** rise to power, the latter considered him too extreme to be trusted and relegated the Futurists to a fringe position in the fascist state he founded in 1922.

**MARRIAGE.** Nietzsche had an aversion to the "net of spider-webs" (*HH*, I: "**Woman and Child**," 427) that constitute marriage, though he did propose to two women: in 1976 to Marie Trampedach (whom he had barely met and who was already secretly engaged) and in 1882 to **Lou Andreas-Salomé**. On both occasions, there was haste and clumsiness, no doubt occasioned by the sense that he was threatening his **free spirit** status. In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche

stresses that “the free spirit hates all habituation and rules, everything enduring and definitive” (*HH*, I: “Woman and Child,” 427), making him unsuitable for the commitments of marriage. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche has subtly changed his objection to marriage, now stating that a philosopher ought not to marry; in fact, “the philosopher abhors marriage, together with all that might persuade him to it” (*OGM*: III: 7). In the same passage, he voices his approval of the **Buddha**’s abandonment of home and family to gain freedom from domestic ties. Nietzsche’s rejection of marriage on personal and intellectual grounds contrasts with his equally vigorous view that a woman ought to embrace her maternal and domestic role rather than seek emancipation. Clearly, he did not anticipate that a woman might become either a free spirit or a philosopher. See also EDUCATION; ETERNAL FEMININE/WOMANLY; FEMINISM.

**MARX, KARL (HEINRICH) (1818–1883)**. Founder of a social system that, after his death, his collaborator Friedrich Engels (whom he first met in Paris in 1844) was the first to propound as a worldview; thereafter, Marxism developed into the defining political system of many socialist parties. A decisive moment for Marx was his encounter with the philosophy of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** at Berlin University in 1836, but in the early 1840s—like his fellow “Young Hegelians”—he came under the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach. Marx now reappraised Hegel’s thought and forged his own characteristic system in which Hegelian dialectic is combined with Feuerbach’s materialism. Marx envisaged a class struggle between capitalism and the proletariat that only world revolution could resolve, resulting in a classless, communist society.

In November 1847, Marx, at the time based in Brussels, inaugurated the “Communist League” in London; the members were a motley band who invited Marx to write a declaration of their principles and gave him the deadline of February 1848, which (Engels having contributed a number of ideas) he only just made. The *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* (trans. as *Manifesto of the Communists*, 1883, and as *The Communist Manifesto*, 1888) was destined to become the most influential political pamphlet of all time. Having taken an active part in the Revolutions of 1848, Marx fled to England with his family to spend the rest of his working life mainly in the British



Museum, where he wrote the three-volume *Das Kapital* (*Capital*), only the first volume of which was published in his lifetime (I: 1867 [trans. 1888]; II: 1885 [trans. 1907]; III: 1894 [trans. 1909]).

Nietzsche knew the thought of Ferdinand Lassalle and **Eugen Dühring** sufficiently well to reject **socialism** outright; he had nothing but contempt for “the doctrine of equality . . . there exists no more poisonous poison” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 48). However, there is no mention of Marx (or Engels) in either his work or correspondence. Even given the fact that Marx died in exile in London, it simply cannot be the case that Nietzsche was not familiar with some of his ideas. It is possible that when he snarled about socialism and **democracy** he was reacting to news from abroad; it was easy to dismiss socialism in the **Germany** of his day, **Otto von Bismarck** having actually made it illegal for the 12 years from 1878 to 1890. At all events, Nietzsche’s insistence on **aristocratic values** marks a complete contrast to Marx’s rhetorical invitation at the end of *The Communist Manifesto*: “working men of all countries, unite!” Refer to Nancy S. Love, *Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity* (1986).

**MASK** (*DIE MASKE*). The most famous reference to the mask occurs in *Beyond Good and Evil*: “Everything profound loves the mask . . .” (*BGE*, II: 40). There is a level of play on the word *tief* here (translated as “profound,” where “**deep**” might be simpler; Nietzsche is suspicious of anything “serious”). The onlooker who sees a person’s mask also helps to create it, so that the person wearing the mask might well be mistaken for someone different: “Every profound spirit needs a mask: more, around every profound spirit a mask is continually growing, thanks to the constantly false, that is to say *shallow* interpretation of every word he speaks, every sign of **life** he gives” (*BGE*, II: 40). A mask can also provide the privacy of distance, or transfiguration; it can release a person from the straitjacket of formal behavior by letting him wear the fool’s cap and bells (*GS*, II: 107), and by the same token it can reflect the many facets of a person’s character. As in ancient **Greek tragedy**, where the actors wore masks, the mask can help creativity at the **Dionysian** level of abandonment. A mask is not necessarily visual: for **language** can also mask thought: “Every philosophy also *conceals* a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding-place, every word also a mask” (*BGE*, IX:

289). Nietzsche's playfulness with the **metaphor** has led scholars to presume that he himself often adopts a mask. As he remarked, "Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood" (*BGE*, IX: 290).

**MASTER MORALITY (DIE HERRENMORAL).** In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche argues that two centuries of **Judeo-Christianity** have wiped away our understanding of how **morality** came about. In pre-Christian times, what was "good" was what the ruler, the strong man, dictated to the weaker underling. Christ's doctrine (and Nietzsche stressed that Christ was a **Jew**) overturned this morality, to replace it with a doctrine of **ressentiment**: the weak man was not made any physically stronger, but his **sufferings** were now valued as "good," and God would recompense him in the afterlife, whereas the master could now be as rich or as strong as he liked, and he would be still valued as "bad" in terms of trying to enter heaven. It was now in the strong man's interest to affect a **slave morality**. For Nietzsche, who believed that force must out, Christianity had fatally weakened the human psyche and damaged society. He wanted to see a return of the proud "sovereign individual" (*OGM*, II: 2), who can give his word independently of the **ascetic ideal** and freely create his own morality; it is from these ranks that the *Übermensch* will emerge and **aristocratic values** will be retrieved. Nietzsche's exhortation to the strong individual to master himself was enormously attractive to early Nietzscheans, and those who were not enthralled by **Dionysus** eagerly entered the "superman" camp. However, after two world wars involving **Germany**, it is sometimes difficult to argue the innocence of Nietzsche's master morality. *See also* THE BLONDE BEAST; THE GREEKS.

**MAYAKOVSKY, VLADIMIR (1893–1930).** Russian writer. Like all those in the Russian **Futurist** movement, Mayakovsky was deeply influenced by Nietzsche's iconoclasm. With his instrument, the "de-poeticized word," Mayakovsky set out to shock the ordinary reader and insult the symbolist sensibility with such lyric poems as *Voyna I mir* (*War and the World*, 1915–1916; the title is a play on *War and Peace* by **Leo Tolstoi**). The complete break with tradition and convention left an anarchic center at the heart of the Russian Futur-

ist movement, which was soon to be overtaken by the events of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Mayakovsky supported the Bolsheviks and, with tireless communist propaganda, devoted his energy to the formation of the new Soviet state, though party eyebrows were raised with the publication of his satirical masterpieces *Klop* (*The Bedbug*, 1928–1929) and *Banya* (*The Bathhouse*, 1929–1930). Mayakovsky was too dynamic for the demands of communism and too sensitive to his disappointments in love; disappointed with the world in which he lived, he committed suicide in 1930.

**MEREZHKOVSky, DIMITRI (1865–1941).** Russian writer and critic. Merezhkovsky helped to found the school of **symbolism** in Russia with his wife Zinaida Gippius, whom he married in 1889. They publicized a mystical form of apocalyptic **Christianity** that preached a forthcoming Third Revelation. With its emphasis on creativity (both **aesthetic** and **cultural**), individuality, and the enjoyment of **sexuality**, this mystical “new religion” was constituted along the lines spelled out by Nietzsche in his critique of Christianity or, rather, Merezhkovsky’s understanding of that critique. In 1901, Merezhkovsky, Gippius, and their friend Dimitri Filosofov founded the Religious Philosophical Society in St. Petersburg. This became a coterie of intellectuals until it was banned in 1903. In 1905, Merezhkovsky’s trilogy *Khristos i Antikhrist* (trans. 1928–1931) was published. Here, “the attempts to reconcile the **Greek** cult of the **body** with the Christian cult of the spirit” (R. D. B. Thomas, *Penguin Companion to Literature*, 1969) provided the book’s dynamic dichotomy, expressed in terms of Christ and Anti-Christ, and this would underpin all Merezhkovsky’s later creative work, such as *Iisus neizvestny*, 1932–1933 (*Jesus the Unknown*, 1937). He was also known for his interpretations of the Russian masters in essays on **Leo Tolstoi**, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Nicolai Gogol, and Mikhail Lermontov. In 1917, Merezhkovsky bitterly opposed the Bolshevik revolution. In 1919, he emigrated to Paris, where his political position veered ever closer to the extreme right, until he hailed **Benito Mussolini** and **Adolf Hitler** as possible destroyers of communism. The general title he chose for his two historical novels published in 1924–1925, *Rozhdenie Bogov* (*Birth of the Gods*), echoes Nietzsche’s title for *The Birth of Tragedy*.

**METAPHOR.** Figure of speech that throws more light on a thing or on a proceeding; by doing so, it draws a comparison between disparate things, whereas a simile compares like with like (e.g., as good as gold). For example, when **Zarathustra** says of love between man and woman, “It is a torch which should light your way to higher paths” (*Za*, I: “Of **Marriage** and Children”), there is no real torch, but the image encapsulates the function of love as spiritual guide. Christ used a metaphor when saying “I am the **truth**,” a statement guaranteed to mobilize Nietzsche into a counterattack: “This immodest man [Jesus] has long made the cock’s comb of the little people rise up in pride.” (Man does not have a cock’s comb, but the metaphor throws light on his **slave values** by suggesting that he does.) Nietzsche’s images are often multilayered in this fashion. He asserted that there could be no authentic **knowledge** without metaphor, hence the importance he afforded to **art**. As Erich Blondel points out, “Only art, by virtue of its acknowledged metaphorical character, is true” (E. Blondel, “Nietzsche: **Life** as Metaphor,” in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David Allison, 1977). Blondel likens the function of metaphor to “the capacity to forget,” of which Nietzsche says, “**forgetting** is essential to action of any kind” (*UM*, II: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of **History** for Life”: 1). Metaphor allows man to stand back from his **suffering** and to act instinctively; it is the antithesis of **science** or religion, both of which teach false truths in order to place man in a **moral** straitjacket. It has a liberating function because it does not seek to be what it is not; in fact, “the height of metaphor is to forget that it is such” (Blondel, 1977). *See also* SYMBOL/SYMBOLISM.

**METAPHYSICS.** Branch of philosophy that deals with abstract **concepts** such as **knowing** and being, or “first principles.” Nietzsche attacked metaphysics at its heart by arguing that we can never know the **truth** of anything. He pilloried **Plato** for having posited two distinct worlds: the real and the illusory, the latter housing pure forms such as “the good,” and he attacked religion for arguing that the “other” world was *better*, thus giving a spurious value and higher meaning to **suffering**. In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche classed metaphysical enquiry as an attempt “to glorify the origin”—hence his disparaging biblical reference: “In the beginning.—” (*HH*, II: 2, “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” 3), the opening words of Genesis. However, as

many critics have argued, Nietzsche's own writings contain metaphysical elements: the "Ur-Eine," or grounding principle, found in *The Birth of Tragedy*, is a case in point. The doctrine of **eternal return** is arguably pure metaphysics, in spite of current attempts to explain the theory through physics. One could also say that Nietzsche needed the **Dionysian** principle as others need religion—or even that Dionysianism is a form of paganism, Dionysus being, after all, a **Greek** god.

**MEYSENBUG, MALWIDA VON (1816–1903).** German **feminist** and writer. Meysenbug had been forced into exile in London from 1852 to 1859 as a result of her activity during the 1848 Revolution; as governess to the daughters of the widowed Alexander Herzen in London, she became devoted to the youngest child, Olga Herzen, so much so that Herzen subsequently allowed her to adopt Olga. A member of the circle of friends close to **Richard** and **Cosima Wagner**, she met Nietzsche at the laying of the foundation stone for the *Festspielhaus* in Bayreuth in May 1872. By this time, Meysenbug had become a patron to young intellectuals, and in this capacity she invited Nietzsche, **Paul Rée**, and Arnold Brenner to spend the winter of 1876–1877 with her in Sorrento. Another result of her generosity as hostess meant that Nietzsche and **Lou Andreas-Salomé** were introduced to one another at her house party in Rome, early in 1882.

Meysenbug's autobiographical *Memoiren einer Idealistin* (*Memoirs of an Idealist*) was published in 1876, with a sequel *Der Lebensabend einer Idealistin* (*Twilight Years of an Idealist*) published in 1898. *Memoiren einer Idealistin* became a seminal work for early German feminists. In particular, Meysenbug's influence on **Meta von Salis-Marschlins** should be noted, in view of the latter's importance for Nietzsche after his mental collapse. Nietzsche insulted most of his friends during the last months of his life, and Malwida von Meysenbug was no exception. However, what appears to have saddened her most was his breach with Wagner. Her description of her friendship with Nietzsche is found in *Individualitäten* (*Character Studies*, 1901).

**MILL, JOHN STUART (1806–1873).** English **utilitarian** philosopher. The son of the philosopher James Mill, John Stuart Mill was a child prodigy who could read Greek texts (including **Diogenes Laërtius**) in the original by the age of seven. Later, Mill regretted the

austerity of his early life and avidly read literature and poetry (the latter was something his father abhorred as the enemy of **truth**). In spite of some reservations, Mill became an adherent of Jeremy Bentham's **utilitarianism**. In 1851, Mill married Harriet Taylor, and for the next seven years until she died, he wrote little; however, in his subsequent work he asserted that his theories owed much to his late wife. Mill's essay *Utilitarianism*, published in 1861, was an attempt to clarify and improve Bentham's theories into his own system, although critics have argued that Mill only did so at the expense of departing from Bentham's "single principle" that the measure of right and wrong is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Mill's most renowned essay is *On Liberty* (1859). Here, he wrote in the first chapter that "the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it" (Mill, *On Liberty*, 1975 [1861]). *The Subjection of Women* was written in 1869. Here, Mill argued that the human species would be improved "through the better and more complete intellectual **education** of women" (Mill, *The Subjection of Women*, 1975 [1869]). These extracts show Mill to be a liberal thinker rather than a strict utilitarian, but even so, Nietzsche was entirely hostile to his work. Unlike Mill, Nietzsche opposed further education for girls and was therefore on a collision course with Mill on a number of issues.

Nietzsche thought the utilitarian premise was bound to create a nation of mediocre individuals, declaring: "the spirit of respectable but mediocre Englishmen—I name **Darwin**, John Stuart Mill and **Herbert Spencer**—is starting to gain ascendancy in the mid-region of **European** taste" (*BGE*, VIII: 253). In *The Will to Power*, there are several acerbic comments on Mill's misguided altruism modeled on the biblical "Golden Rule" (Matthew 7:12). Nietzsche thunders, "Against John Stuart Mill:—I abhor his vulgarity, which says: 'What is right for one is fair for another'" (*WP*, IV: 926). For Nietzsche it was axiomatic that people were *not* equal (otherwise there would be no place for the *Übermensch*); he also increasingly—and wrongly—conflated **socialism** with utilitarianism. In his rogues' gallery titled "My Impossibles," he summarized his verdict on Mill as "*John Stuart Mill: or offensive clarity*" (*TI*, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man": 1).

**MORALITY.** Nietzsche thought that the standards of right and wrong ought not to rest on **metaphysical** arguments, and he was at pains to expose what he saw as the fraudulent link between morality and the priesthood. From **Plato** on, Nietzsche argues, philosophers have assumed that our moral sensibility sets us apart from the **animals** and is proof of man's divine origin. Nietzsche argues the contrary: that there is no metaphysical connection between mankind and morality, and any customs that guarantee codes of conduct have been forged at the animal level and stem from fear and the quest for **power**. Morality has developed out of custom, and "any custom is better than no custom" (*D*, I: 16). Significantly, Nietzsche subtitled *Daybreak Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* and added the comment in *Ecce Homo*, "With this book my campaign against morality begins" (*EH*, "Why I Write Such Good Books": 1). With himself as immoralist in mind, Nietzsche gives his definition of the free man: "The free human being is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend on himself and not upon a tradition . . ." (*D*, I: 9).

Nietzsche explains the emergence of morality in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Here, he argues that **master morality** was superseded by **slave morality** as a result of the **Jewish** "slave revolt," after which morality can define itself as "good" only by denigrating others as "bad." It is thus quintessentially a morality of **ressentiment** arrived at through perverse valuations, hence the need for a wholesale **revaluation of values**. Nietzsche's final argument in *On the Genealogy of Morality* is that both **Christianity** and morality must be overcome. Their relentless search for "the **truth**" will finally provide the answer that there is no such thing, and "self-overcoming" will be the logical result: "All great things bring about their own demise through an act of self-sublimation: that is the law of **life**, the law of *necessary* 'self-overcoming' in the essence of life. . . . Christianity as a *moral-ity* must also be destroyed" (*OGM*, III: 27). Nietzsche believed that all religions inculcate a feeling of weakness and guilt, whereas "all *healthy* morality is dominated by an instinct for life" (*TI*: "Morality as Anti-Nature": 4).

**MORGENSTERN, CHRISTIAN (1871–1914).** German writer. Morgenstern began as an ardent follower of Nietzsche, as his letters demonstrate: the first mention of influence is in a letter to Marie

Goettling of 1893. Morgenstern's first work, *In Phanta's Schloss. Ein Cyclus humoristisch-phantastischer Dichtungen (In Fantasy Castle: A Humorous Literary Fantasia, 1895)*, was dedicated to Nietzsche, and a copy was sent to **Franziska Nietzsche**. Morgenstern subsequently published his work in *Charon*, the journal edited by **Rudolf Pannwitz** from 1904 until 1914. By that time, he had turned away from Nietzsche to the spiritual and anthroposophical world of **Rudolf Steiner**. Refer to Rudolf Meyer, "Christian Morgenstern und Friedrich Nietzsche," *Goetheanum* 9 (1930).

**MUSIC.** Nietzsche was a proficient pianist and liked to improvise in a grandiose manner. While still a teenager (1861–1864), he wrote several *Lieder* and in 1862 two spirited Polish dances, but his compositions are disappointingly languorous. That said, the way to his heart was through music; his profound admiration for **Cosima Wagner**, as the daughter of Franz Liszt, survived his veneration and subsequent rejection of **Richard Wagner**, while his relationship with several young women flourished on the basis of a shared interest in the piano: Nietzsche delighted in playing duets with Louise Bachofen, the young wife of **Johann Jakob Bachofen**, and proposed **marriage** to Marie Trampedach in Geneva in 1876 in a flurry of delight at her musical expertise, little realizing that she was already secretly betrothed to her piano teacher.

Nietzsche's relationship toward Wagner was at first one of fervid admiration, but this would eventually turn to criticism when Wagner embraced **nationalism**, **anti-Semitism**, and finally, in *Parsifal*, **Christianity**. Even before Nietzsche met Wagner in 1868, he admired the latter's introduction to *Tristan and Isolde*, which he first heard in Munich in 1865. Wagner's deliberate use of dissonance in that piece gave Nietzsche an essential insight into the nature of human existence. Having up to this point agreed with **Schopenhauer's** pessimistic view that man will experience more pain than pleasure in his benighted **life**, Nietzsche realized that pain or dissonance is an essential part of human experience, to be embraced rather than renounced. From this insight stemmed Nietzsche's preoccupation with **Dionysus**, the **Greek** god of music, and with his antithesis, **Apollo**. The preoccupation found its first expression in *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music* and ended when Nietzsche "signed off"



as a philosopher, describing himself as “Dionysus the crucified” in one of his last notes before his mental collapse. In *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, completed shortly before he went insane, Nietzsche gave a definitive account of his objections to Wagner’s music: it is “a woman” (NW, “A Music without a Future”), Nietzsche snarls. *Nietzsche contra Wagner* is more succinct and deadly than *The Case of Wagner*, where Nietzsche the physician diagnosed Wagner’s disease as *décadence* with some vestige of courtesy.

Nietzsche’s innovatory introduction of music into philosophy as a central plank of an affirmative **metaphysics** has had a lasting effect on **European culture**. Almost without exception, any interest in **Apollo** that Nietzsche could muster was destined to pale in comparison to the sheer dynamism of “**Dionysian** histrionicism” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 10). Toward the end of the 19th century, a groundswell of enthusiasm emerged for orgiastic Dionysianism, as with “*die Kosmiker*.” Scarcely any European exponent of music at that time could avoid some connection with Nietzsche’s Dionysus: one thinks of **Frederick Delius**, **Gustav Mahler**, and **Richard Strauss** (and, among philosophers, **Theodor Adorno** and **Ernst Bloch**). Refer to Babette Babich, “Nietzsche and Music” (*New Nietzsche Studies*, 1996); Stefan Sorgner, “Nietzsche,” in *Musik in der deutschen Philosophie* (2003); and Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche and Music*, trans. David Pellamer and Graham Parkes (2004).

**MUSIL, ROBERT (1880–1942).** Austrian writer. Musil lived in Vienna until the *Anschluss* (1938), when he moved to Zurich. Having first read Nietzsche in 1898 at the age of 18, Musil subsequently acknowledged that the influence of Nietzsche on him had been great if unfocused. He was first a lecturer of engineering at a technical college; later his interest turned to philosophy and logic and especially psychology. Musil achieved notoriety through the work *Die Verwirrungen des jungen Törleß*, 1906 (*Young Törless*, 1955), which portrays the sexual perversions of certain inmates of a boys’ boarding school. There is a strong Nietzschean undercurrent in this novel since the eponymous character has to “become who he is,” as in Nietzsche’s *The Gay Science* (*GS*, III: 270).

In the substantial yet unfinished three-volume *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (I: 1930; II: 1933; III: p.h.; *The Man without Qualities*,

1953–1960), Musil’s protagonists attempt to apply Nietzschean concepts to their own behavior in a way that is much more reflective than that shown in earlier attempts by writers such as **Michael Conrad**. In Musil’s novel, Clarissa tries to lead a “Nietzschean” **life** without properly understanding the creative struggle involved, so that what she thinks is “Nietzschean” is actually private egoism, whereas Ulrich’s attempt to be **affirmative** also falls short of the mark because he does not understand Nietzsche correctly. Ulrich sees the wider dimension to the demand to “say yes to life” (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”), but he is too conscientious (and also too pedantic) to be able to put that demand into practice. Refer to Charlotte Dressler-Brumme, *Nietzsches Philosophie in Musils Roman “Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften”* (*Nietzsche’s Philosophy in Musil’s Novel “The Man Without Qualities,”* 1987).

**MUSSOLINI, BENITO (1883–1945)**. Italian dictator. Mussolini began his career as a **Marxist** activist and was also a writer and critic. An early appreciator of the way Nietzsche’s philosophy could be adapted to his own ideas on the use of violence, Mussolini published *La filosofia della forza* (*The Philosophy of Force*, 1908) and several essays on Nietzsche, including the biographical essay “La vita di Federico Nietzsche” in *Avanti* (1912). In *Itinerario nietzschiano in Italia* (*Nietzsche’s Itinerary in Italy*, 1939), Mussolini made touristic propaganda out of Nietzsche’s frequent sojourns in Italy, the only country to give his philosophy “free rein.” Mussolini thus deliberately misconstrued and manipulated Nietzsche’s ideas on **war** and violence in a way similar to that adopted by **Adolf Hitler**, though both men came to their conclusions independently.

The son of a blacksmith and an active **socialist** as a young man, Mussolini was expelled from the socialist movement for advocating Italian intervention in World War I. In 1919 he formed the *Fasci di Combattimento*, a violently **nationalistic** anticapitalist fascist group waging a campaign of terror against the socialists. Many landowners and industrialists gave the group their backing, as did the army and police, with the result that in 1922, after his “March on Rome,” which directly inspired Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch the following year, Mussolini was invited to become prime minister by the king of Italy. He declared himself dictator in 1925, and all opposition parties were

suppressed in 1926. Hitler was fired with admiration for the powerful Mussolini and copied many of the demagogic trappings that the latter had developed, though they did not actually meet in person until June 1934 in Venice.

**Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** had nurtured a penchant for Mussolini since his early rise to fame. In 1931, she was enraptured to receive a telegram from Mussolini congratulating her on her 75th birthday. She duly sent Mussolini a telegram in 1933 to congratulate him on his 50th birthday. As a convinced Nietzschean, Mussolini was pleased to demonstrate support for the work of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, which during the Third Reich had become something of a fascist enclave. He maintained his connection with the Nietzsche-Archiv even after Elisabeth's death in 1935. When the two dictators met for the 13th time in 1943, Hitler gave Mussolini a specially bound copy of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. By then, Italy had become "no more than a client **state of Germany**" (James Taylor and Warren Shaw, *A Dictionary of the Third Reich*, 1987). On Mussolini's return to Rome after this meeting, he was deposed and exiled.

Hitler arranged for Mussolini to be freed, and the two men met for the last time in July 1944. That January, Mussolini, a man deposed by his people and with no real power, still had sufficient influence to expedite a statue of **Dionysus** to the *Nietzsche-Archiv* to honor the centenary of Nietzsche's birth: it was intended to have pride of place in the **Nietzsche-Memorial** then under construction beside the **Nietzsche-Archiv**, but the collapse of Italy and Germany halted all plans. The incident bears witness to Mussolini's reverence for Nietzsche, but it is extraordinary that he could bother with such trifles when his own countrymen were baying for his blood. In April 1945, he was captured and shot by Italian partisans while trying to escape to Switzerland. Today, Italy boasts a cohort of excellent Nietzsche scholars, and Nietzsche's reputation is no longer linked to fascist misuse.

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**NATIONALISM.** The common impression that Nietzsche was a firm **German** nationalist came about through the agency of **Elisabeth**

**Förster-Nietzsche**, who, during World War I, insisted that her brother would have approved of Germany's belligerence. Nietzsche had comments to make on **war** that can be misconstrued, but nationalism is not a charge that can be made against him. He abhorred German chauvinism and hoped it could be contained by a greater acceptance of **Europe**-wide values. In spite of an initial enthusiasm for the new German Reich under **Otto von Bismarck** during the Franco-Prussian War, in which he (briefly) served his country, Nietzsche came to view nationalism as the chief destroyer of Germany's proud intellectual heritage, its *Geist*. Politically, he tried to hold himself aloof from the "**Grand Politics**" that the Second Reich had carved out for the masses (although this in itself was a political stance). He thought **cultural** renewal could come about only through a return to the **Greek** model for **art**, **culture**, and **education**. Many find it a paradox that Nietzsche, who claimed the future as his own, wanted to take his country *backward*, hence his contempt for **socialism**, **democracy**, and **feminism**. However, Nietzsche attacked **anti-Semitism**, and it is ironic that he is sometimes mistaken for a nationalist. *See also* "**DEUTSCHLAND, DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES**"; **NIETZSCHE-ARCHIV**; **VOLK, DAS**.

**NATIONAL SOCIALISM / NATIONAL SOCIALISTS.** The National Socialist government that came to power in 1933 did not suddenly invent an ideology to underpin the Third Reich: many of the slogans, such as **Volk**, "blood and soil," had all been well rehearsed previously in works by such thinkers as **Julius Langbehn**, **Oswald Spengler**, and **Martin Heidegger**. The attraction of Nietzsche as ideologue for the National Socialists was not immediately apparent, and there were several National Socialists who strongly advised against the appropriation of Nietzsche: Christoph Steding, in *Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur* (*The Third Reich and the Sickness of European Culture*, 1938), warned that Nietzsche was an enemy of the **German** state, had hated **Otto von Bismarck**, was **pro-Jewish**, and, as a philosopher of **culture**, was **decadent**. Ernst Nolte writes that for Steding, "the true Nietzsche remained **Jacob Burckhardt**'s friend and **Johann Jakob Bachofen**'s colleague, a leading pathfinder for the 'Africanization' of West Europe and Germany" (Ernst Nolte, *Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus*,

1990). Ignoring such reservations, **Adolf Hitler** sensed the propaganda value of co-opting Nietzsche into the National Socialist camp and included his name in speeches on key occasions, even though it is doubtful whether he actually read anything by Nietzsche.

National Socialist ideologues were not squeamish about twisting Nietzschean themes into Nazi propaganda. The title alone of *The Will to Power* had obvious attractions for the National Socialists, who seized on Nietzsche's usage of "will" to support their own agenda, culminating in the title of Leni Riefenstahl's famous film of the Nuremberg rally of 1934, *Triumph des Willens* (*Triumph of the Will*). Heinrich Haertle's *Nietzsche und der Nationalsozialismus* (1937) provided a catechism for Nazi Nietzscheans; with blatant guile, Haertle argued that Nietzsche hated Jews, as did A. Rosenthal in *Nietzsches europäisches Rasse-Problem* (1935); Rosenthal also pursued a vendetta against the Japanese. W. Lemke, in *Entwicklung des Staatsgedankens bei Friedrich Nietzsche* (*The Development of the Idea of the State with Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1941), argued that Nietzsche showed a clear preference for Roman culture over the **Greek**—which is simply untrue. Lemke's book was an attempt to rationalize Nazi iconography, such as marching cohorts and the importance of banners and flags, none of which has any resonance in Nietzsche's work.

The man in charge of making Nietzsche's ideas seem to conform to National Socialism—and with the best brain to do so—was **Alfred Baeumler**, whose book *Nietzsche, der Philosoph und Politiker* (1931) was "the orthodox Nazi interpretation" (Crane Brinton, *Nietzsche*, 1968, chapter 8: "Nietzsche and the Nazis"). Baeumler accepted Nietzsche's love of Greece and made capital out of it, arguing that the will to power chimed in with ancient Greek philosophy, resulting in a **Heracitan weltkampf** (world struggle) that could be summed up as "*die Welt als Tat und Gerechtigkeit*" (the word as deed and judgment) or even "*die Welt als Kampf*" (the world as struggle); Baeumler soothingly reminded his readers that Nietzsche's comments on the state referred to Bismarck's Germany alone. Occasionally, Baeumler struck a killer blow with an accurate observation (albeit out of context): "One cannot understand Nietzsche's life or work if one does not take into account what value the experience and concept of struggle and victory have for him" (Baeumler, 1931).

Both Baeumler and Haertle were close associates of **Alfred Rosenberg**. In *Der Mythos des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (*The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, 1930), Rosenberg invoked Nietzsche's name on several occasions, diluting Nietzsche's individualism into a personalized, anguished scream against society and implying that Nietzsche was racist and would have supported attempts to subdue lesser races for the good of the **Volk**. Nietzsche's name was often used indiscriminately like this for political propaganda: for example, Johannes Müller-Rathenow's 70-page booklet *Nietzsches Sehnsucht nach dem kommenden Führer* (*Nietzsche's Longing for the Coming Leader*, 1936), dedicated "To the Great Leader" ("*dem großen Führer*"), is a paean of praise to Nordic man led by the incomparable Hitler, and the author could have omitted any reference to Nietzsche, either in the title or in the rest of the book.

By resurrecting her nationalist husband **Bernhard Förster's** reputation, **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** gained status in her own right in the Third Reich even without the added kudos of her famous brother. Her admiration for **Benito Mussolini**, her reverence for Adolf Hitler and her friendship with Wilhelm Frick ensured that the *Nietzsche-Archiv* was a Nazi stronghold even before *Gleichschaltung* in 1933. Her death in 1935 was followed by an elaborate funeral attended by Hitler to enhance the propaganda value of the event. In the same year, **Richard Oehler** published an influential pro-Nazi study of Nietzsche's philosophy, *Friedrich Nietzsche und die deutsche Zukunft* (*Friedrich Nietzsche and the Future of Germany*, 1935). Right to the very end of the war, the *Nietzsche-Archiv* continued to applaud National Socialism with no regard whatsoever for the damage done to Nietzsche's reputation. *See also* NATIONALISM.

**NATURALIST MOVEMENT.** European movement in literature and the arts. Nietzsche, for whom **nature** was the basis of **life** rather than material for an effete art movement, detested the Naturalist movement's attempts to portray **life** in the raw under a spurious scientific banner. The ideological base for the Naturalist movement was formed by Hippolyte Taine's theory of heredity, and the movement was just reaching full swing in **Germany** at the time of Nietzsche's mental collapse in early 1889. Adherents of the movement were usually to the left in politics and regarded their artistic efforts as

**science** based. In German literature, Naturalism consisted chiefly of plays that sought to faithfully render “reality.” In 1890, **Arno Holz** devised the formula “**Art = Nature minus X**,” having already printed the three experimental novellas *Papa Hamlet* in 1889, a joint venture with **Johannes Schlaf**, in an attempt to reproduce reality “exactly as it is.” The milieu for German Naturalist plays is usually working class, and every attempt is made to convey authentic speech patterns. The major German Naturalist dramatist was **Gerhart Hauptmann**, though **Hermann Sudermann** was enormously successful in his day, as was Max Halbe with his play *Jugend* (*Youth*, 1893).

Although the austerity of mood within the movement resulted in most Naturalists approaching Nietzsche with caution or disapproval, his ideas were eagerly discussed in fringe groups such as *Durch* and periodicals such as *Die freie Bühne*. Beyond German borders, Naturalism enjoyed more success, as in the novels of Émile Zola or the plays of **August Strindberg**. It ran counter to *l’art pour l’art* (as in the poems of Charles Baudelaire) and attracted its opposite in the form of *art décadent* and *Jugendstil*, where fantasy and decoration were all-important.

A feature of European Naturalism was its tendency to evoke fear of the femme fatale in the wake of the nascent science of sexology and the burgeoning **feminist** movement. All things were deemed possible because naturalism sought to copy life itself. Clearly, the art world of early modernism was fast moving and fluid—and all roads would eventually lead to the Rome of **Expressionism**. **Otto Weininger** provides an example of a philosopher and art critic who passionately (though serially) espoused **Arthur Schopenhauer**, **Friedrich Nietzsche**, **Richard Wagner**, and **Henrik Ibsen**—in that order. Nietzsche attacked the whole nascent modernist movement in general; Naturalism, summed up in one word, “Ibsen” (his *bête noir*), was just one of the trends he despised. That said, his own views sometimes merged with those of the Naturalist movement, for example, in the belief that the battle of the sexes was innate to humankind. *See also* WOMAN.

**NATURAL SCIENCE.** Nietzsche did not read much natural science at school and was a mediocre mathematician. His research into the natural sciences was therefore a deliberate attempt to shore up other

topics that he wished to discuss, since he found himself surrounded by a lively mechanistic movement, and he began to read on the subject from 1862. In 1866, Nietzsche read **Friedrich Albert Lange's** *History of Materialism* as well as Democritus on the theory of the atom. He and Overbeck read and discussed **African Spir's** work at Basel in the early 1870s, and Nietzsche planned more study of natural science, but his duties as professor of philology at Basel University (from 1869) temporarily prevented this; it was not until 1871, when he was working on the (unfinished) "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the **Greeks**," that his interest in natural science really took off. In 1875, Nietzsche read and enjoyed the positivistic **Paul Rée's** *Psychologische Beobachtungen* (*Psychological Observations*); he approached Rée in late October that same year, and the two became friends. Meanwhile, Nietzsche was acquiring and reading the work of the hapless **Eugen Dühring**, soon (1878) to be comprehensively pilloried by Friedrich Engels.

By 1881, Nietzsche had conceived the thought of **eternal return**, and much of his reading was now directed at searching for support for this theory, some of which he thought he found in the work of **Ruggero Guiseppa Boscovich** and African Spir. Somehow, he needed to glean a physics of **time** travel. He had already begun with Democritus and his theory of the atom. For Democritus, who based material **knowledge** on the reality of sight and touch, nothing existed but atoms and space: everything else was opinion. In Isaac Newton's law of gravitation, action between atoms is supposed to be action at a distance (rather than colliding activity). Boscovich was among the first European scientists to accept Newton's theory; he held that we can know atoms through the mind as point-centers of **force**. Nietzsche makes no mention of his (English) contemporary Michael Faraday. He overestimated Boscovich when he praised him for liberating us from the old beliefs about "matter" (*BGE*, I: 12).

From 1881 to 1883, Nietzsche read about physics, physiology, biology, and **Darwinism** (which he rejected, along with the Darwinist popularizers T. H. Huxley, **Ernst Haeckel**, and **Herbert Spencer**). But another topic now fascinated him: the physics of force. Nietzsche's problem in **science** was that he always tended to veer toward psychology: when he examined force, it did not remain a causal scientific concept but became **metaphysical**. Furthermore,



Nietzsche overlays force with the **will to power** and an engagement with “change,” as encountered in **Heraclitan** absolute becoming. In Robert Mayer’s essay “*Über Auslösung*” (“On the Release [of Energy]”), Mayer distinguishes between “latent” and “living” force, a formulation guaranteed to give Nietzsche ideas. John Richardson has recently argued that Nietzsche, a **scientific** naturalist manqué, “conceives will to power ‘metaphysically’ as a universal force more basic than Darwinian selection” (John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism*, 2004), while Keith Ansell-Pearson, in *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition* (1997), using the language of modern biotechnology, has given an account of Nietzsche’s struggle with Darwinism—especially the issue of natural selection—largely because he misunderstood it. Refer to Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context* (2001).

**NATURE/NATURAL.** To the extent that Nietzsche denied **metaphysics** and any suggestion of the supernatural and earnestly enquired into **natural science**, he can be viewed as a “naturalist” philosopher, though the term “naturalism” meant something specific in his day, and he would have rightly denied any affinity with the **Naturalist movement**. Nor did he endorse theistic naturalism as presented by **Jean-Jacques Rousseau**; for Nietzsche, there was no law of nature because there was no lawgiver: thus, nature is “redeemed” (*GS*, III: 109). However, like Rousseau, Nietzsche believed that man’s original physiological state, before his corruption by civilization, was healthy and **happy**, and this encapsulates his idea of what is natural. He also noted Rousseau’s **concept** of a return to nature, but, mindful of the egalitarian barb in Rousseau’s thought, he declared, “I too speak of a ‘return to nature,’ although it is not really a going-back but a *going-up*” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 48). Parting company with Rousseau, whose critique of the theological establishment did not preclude a **God** accessible through “feeling,” Nietzsche excised God completely and blamed **Christian morality** for poisoning man’s natural instincts:

I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, that is all *healthy* morality, is dominated by an instinct of **life**. . . . *Anti-natural* morality, that is virtually every morality that has hitherto been taught, revered and preached, turns on the contrary precisely *against* the instincts of life. . . . (*TI*: “Morality as Anti-Nature,” 4)

For Nietzsche, **Charles Darwin** was the enemy of naturalism, while Napoleon, “a piece of ‘return to nature’” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 48), was a summation of it. He lamented that degeneration was bound to continue since even the skeptics of his day still paid lip service to an ineradicable Christian morality. *See also* BODY; DÉCADENCE; DRIVE.

**NAUSEA (DER EKEL)**. The feeling of disgust experienced by those who realize the full weight of **nihilism**. Not only is **life** meaningless, but it is, as **Zarathustra** discovers, a cycle of **eternal return** in which even “the little man recurs eternally” (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent”). The cure lies not just in **art**, as with the ancient **Greeks**, who used their **Dionysian** festivals to suspend their horror at life’s absurdity, but also in creativity, the act of making our own lives into works of art. Rather than allowing ourselves to be bowed down by **pessimism**, we should learn to be superficial “*out of profundity*” (*GS*, Preface: 4): we should sing and **dance** because, as **Zarathustra** says, “the complex of causes in which I am entangled will recur—it will create me again!” (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent”). *See also* AMOR FATI; DIONYSUS; DER ÜBERMENSCH.

**DIE NEUE ETHIK (THE NEW ETHICS OR NEW MORALITY MOVEMENT)**. This movement centered round the *Bund für Mutterschutz* (“League for the Protection of Mothers”), founded in 1904 by Ruth Bré, whose belief in social engineering caused her to be replaced as leader in 1905 by the pacifist **Helene Stöcker**. That same year, Stöcker founded the journal of the league, *Die neue Generation*. The aims of the league were to give practical help to single mothers, but some of the ideology behind this was the Nietzsche-inspired belief that **women**—even single women—had a right to enjoy their **sexuality**. The catchphrase of the group was “*sich ausleben*,” which means that every individual has the right to live **life** to his or her full potential. This—and the group’s advocacy of a woman’s right to abortion—was complete anathema to leaders of the bourgeois **feminists** such as Helene Lange and **Gertrud Bäumer**. The *Bund für Mutterschutz* tore itself apart with internal splits on issues such as the **eugenics movement** and birth control, culminating in a damaging court case in 1910, but *Die neue Generation*

continued during and after the war as a radical publication under the editorship of Stöcker.

**THE NEW NIETZSCHE.** In the 1960s, **Jacques Lacan**, together with his fellow **structuralists** Claude Lévi-Strauss and Louis Althusser, drew on Ferdinand de Saussure's late 1950s ideas on linguistics and applied them to psychoanalysis, anthropology, and political economy, while in literary theory, **Roland Barthes** developed his own theory of structuralism, in which **language** was reduced to signs, and ownership of the text was confiscated from the author. This laid the foundation for the "New Nietzsche" method of analyzing Nietzsche's work among French and American theorists, the foremost practitioner being **Jacques Derrida**. "New Nietzsche" criticism aimed to unmask or **deconstruct** Nietzsche's use of language while using his comments on **perspectivism** to support **poststructural** theory. Derrida argued that Nietzsche used language as a strategy in the same way that a **woman** uses her marginal—and **masked**—position. Derrida's reading leans heavily on the work of **Martin Heidegger**, who highlighted Nietzsche's use of **metaphor** and hailed the *Nachlaß* (which contains the material for *The Will to Power* and much else besides) as Nietzsche's most important work. To deconstruct the text, Derrida developed his own terminology (where *toujours déjà* was a sine qua non), centered on the ever-present sign. Another work of note in this connection is Jean-Michel's *L'Enjeu des signes. Lecture de Nietzsche* (*The Stake of Signs: Reading Nietzsche*, 1971).

Since there is no single "**truth**," as Nietzsche frequently asserts, no writer can "own" his or her text, which will have as many meanings as it has readers. Although Nietzsche said nothing on the latter point, this did not prevent the structuralist Roland Barthes from declaring the author "dead." Barthes also asserted that we communicate through a variety of unspoken signs, by recognizing and interpreting certain images. This "sign language," operating at a subliminal level in everyday life, has implications for the writer and, in particular, for the interpreter. Thus, Nietzsche's challenge to "truth" has been the starting point for a new way of interpreting not just the Nietzschean text but all writing.

Other philosophers who have contributed to the postmodern debate of which the "New Nietzsche" is part are **Gilles Deleuze**, **Luce**

**Irigaray, Sarah Kofman, Jean-François Lyotard, and Paul de Man.** Lyotard suggested how moral decisions can be made by an imaginative use of the **will to power** in the absence of firm “truths,” while de Man took the rejection of traditional hermeneutics to extreme limits by challenging the assumption that beliefs can be true, though neither he nor Derrida went so far as to assume that truth does not exist. **Michel Foucault**, in various works, elaborated on how power operates in society, but his engagement with Nietzsche is found most systematically in *Nietzsche, Freud, Marx* (1964). Although not all critics of the “New Nietzsche” agreed with Heidegger’s **metaphysics**, the latter’s general hypothesis that the posthumous works contained Nietzsche’s “real” philosophy was generally accepted. Its dubious status as part of Nietzsche’s oeuvre was not always mentioned, although Heidegger had pointed this out in his introduction to *Nietzsche* (1961).

“The New Nietzsche” was not universally popular with critics, even in France. Jean Granier, in *Nietzsche* (1982), declared that in comparison to the sober research of German Nietzsche critics, the “picturesque” devices of his French colleagues were unhelpful publicity stunts, with no place in Nietzsche critique. Nevertheless, the critical methods of deconstruction and poststructuralism became received practice in **postmodern** Nietzsche criticism until the end of the 20th century. *See also* FRENCH FEMINISM.

**NIETZSCHE, FRANZISKA (1826–1897).** Nietzsche’s mother. Franziska Oehler came from a large family; her father, David Ernst Oehler, was a **Lutheran** pastor, as was her husband, Carl Ludwig Nietzsche, whom she married when she was still only 17. Widowed in 1849, Franziska was forced through financial necessity to live with her mother-in-law, Erdmuthe Nietzsche, first in Röcken and then in Naumburg, until she was able to run her own household in Naumburg. It was her deepest wish that her son Friedrich would follow family tradition and become a pastor. Her own faith was firmly allied to neo-**Pietism**, a fact calculated to estrange Nietzsche from her in later life. However, he continued to respect her and tried to show affection, in spite of the fact that her religious stance was the summation of all he despised in **Christianity**. Some recent critics have blamed much of Nietzsche’s (supposed) emotional insecurity on his overstrict and overzealous mother. During the last eight years of her

life, however, Franziska was greatly admired for devotedly nursing her mentally ill son at her home in Naumburg.

Franziska was shocked by her son's unpublished manuscripts and might well have burned *The Anti-Christ* if the decision had been left to her. It is perhaps fortunate that she did not know about his late correction to a page in *Ecce Homo*, in which she and her daughter **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** are described in bitter terms. Elisabeth, who had none of Franziska's scruples, made sure that not just the *Anti-Christ* but the entire *Nachlaß* was preserved for posterity, though she had ulterior motives for doing so: soon after Nietzsche's mental collapse, she had realized the potential financial gain to be had from Nietzsche's royalties. In 1897, Elisabeth successfully wrested the guardianship of Nietzsche (as well as the rights to his work) away from her mother and into her own hands. This could perhaps have hastened Franziska's death from cancer of the womb. Refer to Adalbert Oehler, *Nietzsche's Mutter* (1940); Jørgen Kjaer, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Die Zerstörung der Humanität durch Mutterliebe* (*Friedrich Nietzsche: The Destruction of Humanity through Mother Love*, 1990); and Klaus Goch, *Franziska Nietzsche. Ein biographisches Porträt* (1994).

**DAS NIETZSCHE-ARCHIV.** Nietzsche's home in Weimar from 1897 to 1900. The *Nietzsche-Archiv* is the audacious name given to the detached house in Weimar (no. 36, Humboldtstraße) by **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**. In 1897, **Meta von Salis-Marschlins** purchased the house that had until then been known as the "*Villa Silberblick*" to create a home for Nietzsche, his sister, and the archive material. She had intended to stay at the house herself occasionally but found that she could not get on with Elisabeth and allowed the latter to buy her out. Elisabeth took on a costly loan and was never really free of financial worries—often self-inflicted—thereafter. For example, in 1902–1903, she employed Henry van de Velde to refurbish the main rooms in grand fashion. The name *Nietzsche-Archiv* should not be confused with the archive housing Nietzsche's manuscripts, the *Goethe-Schiller Archiv*, also in Weimar and administered by the *Stiftung Weimarer Klassik*.

By 1893, after her final visit to Paraguay, Elisabeth had established the beginnings of an archive in her mother's house in Naumburg,

where early Nietzscheans such as **Rudolf Steiner** and the writer **Gabriele Reuter** had come from Weimar to pay their respects. As the archive material grew, Elisabeth moved into another house in Naumburg, before her final move to Weimar after the death of her mother. Nietzsche was now in Elisabeth's sole care, and she had a free hand to run what would soon become "the Nietzsche industry."

Elisabeth made propaganda for Nietzsche's works in her own way by publishing biographical accounts and by inviting others to publish their memoirs of her brother. She also tirelessly saw to the publication of Nietzsche's complete works, though her capricious and bossy manner meant that this project was constantly interrupted. In 1908, with the generous financial backing of the Swedish financier Ernst Thiel, a **Jew**, the *Nietzsche-Archiv* was given the status of research center by the state of Sachsen-Weimar and now held the institutional title of *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv*. The latter was properly constituted with a committee, but even so, Elisabeth managed to have overall control. Anybody who wanted to consult material on Nietzsche at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* had to be on good terms with Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche.

In spite of the continued generosity of Thiel, who ensured that the *Nietzsche-Archive* carried on until the end of World War I, Elisabeth would soon find her resources wiped out by the financial collapse of 1923 as a result of the inflationary crisis produced by the introduction of the new *Rentenmark*. From then on, the *Nietzsche-Archiv* was constantly short of funds; the small grant awarded to Elisabeth by General Paul von Hindenburg in 1926 was not sufficient to meet her needs, and Thiel could no longer help. Elisabeth's enthusiastic rapprochement with **National Socialism** was now fueled by both admiration and expediency. Elisabeth first approached Wilhelm Frick, finance minister of Sachsen-Weimar and an early adherent of National Socialism, for financial support; eventually, **Adolf Hitler** himself promised (and delivered) adequate funding, some of it from his private purse.

The death of Elisabeth in 1935 did not interrupt the activities of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*; work continued on the *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe* until the collapse of the Third Reich. Thus, the cultivation of a Nietzsche cult, heavily overlaid with Nationalist Socialist propaganda, continued as before under the auspices of Elisabeth's

cousins, Richard and Max Oehler, as witnessed by the quasi-religious ceremony to mark Nietzsche's birthday in 1942. This took place at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* on 18 October, that being the nearest Sunday to Nietzsche's actual birthday (15 October). In 1944, Nietzsche's centenary year, there were high hopes that the stately hall or *Nietzsche-Gedenkhalle* (the Nazi-funded **Nietzsche Memorial**) would be ready in time for the birthday celebrations, but in the event, they were held in the National Theatre in Weimar. The *Nietzsche-Archiv* today is the premises of the *Nietzsche-Kolleg*, founded in October 1999 as an institution to run regular Nietzsche seminars, with a budget to further Nietzsche research. The house is also a museum, visited by Nietzsche scholars and by Van de Velde enthusiasts alike. Refer to David Marc Hoffmann, ed., *Zur Geschichte des Nietzsche-Archivs. Chronik, Studien und Dokumente (On the History of the Nietzsche-Archiv: Chronicle, Studies and Documents, 1991)*.

**NIETZSCHE CONTRA WAGNER.** Nietzsche assembled this brief work late in 1888. By using passages from a number of earlier works, he sought to demonstrate that his opinion of Richard Wagner had not changed substantially over the years. The work had been partially printed when Nietzsche collapsed on 3 January 1889. It finally came out in 1895 in the *Grossoktavausgabe*, edited by **Fritz Koegel**. Although Walter Kaufmann dubs it “perhaps his most beautiful book” (Walter Kaufmann, *CW*, Introduction), it is really a long essay in nine short chapters (plus the foreword and epilogue), containing a small portion of poetry. As in *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche challenges Wagner's role in the German **musical** canon, criticizing “Wagnerian drama” as an opportunity to strike attitudes: “Expression at any price and music in the service of attitude—*that's the limit . . .*” (*NW*, “Wagner as Threat”). Such music can appeal only to the mass, the immature, the blasé, those who are sickly or stupid—Wagnerians, in short.

As in *The Case of Wagner* written earlier in the same year, Nietzsche berates the Germans, including himself: “All of us all endorse the average” (*NW*, “*The Psychologist Speaks*”: 2). He laments the fact that we cannot bear to see the naked **truth** anymore and asks rhetorically if truth is a **woman** with something to hide. “Perhaps, speaking Greek, her name is **Baubô**? . . .” (*NW*, “Epilogue”: 2). Only

the ancient **Greeks** were able to cope with unveiled reality: “these Greeks were superficial—out of **depth** . . .” (NW, “Epilogue”: 2). That was what made them **artists**.

**DIE NIETZSCHE-GESELLSCHAFT.** First Nietzsche Society. Founded in Munich in 1919 by Friedrich Würzbach, who was then chair, the committee comprised **Ernst Bertram, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Lev Shestov, Thomas Mann, Richard Oehler,** and Heinrich Wölfflin. Würzbach was also a coeditor (with Richard and **Max Oehler**) of the 23-volume *Gesammelte Werke* published in Munich (1920–1929). As Würzbach was responsible for volumes 18 to 19 (both published in 1926), he asked **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** for sight of the original manuscripts, only to be told that the relevant volumes (15 to 16) of the *Grossoktavausgabe*, edited by Otto Weiss in 1911, were definitive (in other words, Elisabeth did not want to reveal the extent of her cut-and-paste techniques or admit to the chaotic state of the source material). This was the first clash of many between the *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* and the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. The latter had the backing of the *Gesellschaft der Freunde des Nietzsche-Archivs*. On 15–16 October 1927, the three separate entities were still on sufficiently cordial terms to celebrate what would have been Nietzsche’s 83rd birthday by holding a combined conference in Weimar. Papers were read by **Oswald Spengler, Max Scheler,** Hans Prinzhorn, and Friedrich Würzbach. **Harry Graf Kessler** noted in his diary, in dismay, that Spengler had actually managed to make Nietzsche boring. The *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* was forced to cease its activities by the Gestapo in 1943, but after the war, Würzbach managed to revive it. He died in 1961; the society was dissolved in 1964 and removed from the register in 1965, only to spring back into life in 1966 (led by Michael Schweiger); it was reregistered in 1969 as the *Nietzsche-Kreis* and is now known as the *Nietzsche-Forum*, Munich. *See also* ARIADNE.

**NIETZSCHE MEMORIAL.** In 1911, a subcommittee of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* made plans to erect a monumental Nietzsche Memorial. **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** at first agreed that this could be built in the grounds of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, but she did not want a costly edifice. **Harry Graf Kessler**, chair of the com-



mittee that boasted as honorary members **André Gide**, **Hugo von Hofmannsthal**, **Gustav Mahler**, Emile Verhaeren, Walther Rathenau, and Eberhard von Bodenhausen, ignored Elisabeth's wishes and planned a grand temple to be designed by Henry van de Velde and set in a stadium where, among other things, sporting activities could take place. Plans for this temple were dashed by the outbreak of World War I, and, of course, Elisabeth's lack of enthusiasm was a decisive factor.

In October 1934, **Adolf Hitler** visited Weimar in the company of Albert Speer with the specific purpose of setting in motion further plans for a memorial building, a *Nietzsche-Gedenkhalle*, to be constructed beside the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. In the summer of 1935, Hitler again inspected the site with Speer, a few months before Elisabeth's death. In May 1936, Paul Schultze-Naumburg presented new plans, but these received Hitler's approval only in April 1937. Work then began, with an inaugural dedication of the building on 3 August 1938; Hitler sent a message of goodwill. **Richard Oehler** referred to the building as being then under construction when he gave the annual speech to commemorate Nietzsche's birthday at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1938.

In 1944, there were hopes that the centenary of Nietzsche's birthday (15 October) would be held in the new *Nietzsche-Gedenkhalle*, but it was not quite finished, though a (damaged) statue of **Dionysus**, donated by **Benito Mussolini** for the proposed 1944 "Dionysus celebration," had actually been imported from Italy at the end of January 1944. Risking his life while the British carried out a bombing raid on Weimar, **Max Oehler** collected this statue from the railway station and transported it to the site of the *Nietzsche-Gedenkhalle*. The statue did not fit in its allocated place, and the memorial hall was still not complete, so that the centenary of Nietzsche's birth was finally celebrated in the Weimar National Theater, followed by a ceremony at Nietzsche's grave in Röcken. The building intended as the "Nietzsche-Temple," or *Gedenkhalle*, was, until recently, used as a radio station, and the statue in question is now housed in the Pergamon Museum in Berlin. Refer to Jürgen Krause, "*Martyr*" und "*Prophet*." *Studien zum Nietzsche-Kult in der bildenden Kunst der Jahrhundertwende* ("*Martyr*" or "*Prophet*": *Studies on the Nietzsche-Cult in the Arts at the Turn of the Century*, 1984).

**NIHILISM.** With his pronouncement in *The Gay Science* that “God is dead,” Nietzsche accepted **Arthur Schopenhauer’s** atheism while rejecting the latter’s **pessimism**, where the word “nada” (*OGM*, III: 26) sums up a weakening form of nihilism. Keith Ansell-Pearson writes, “Nihilism describes a condition in which there is a disjunction between our [inherited] experience of the world and the conceptual apparatus we have at our disposal . . . to interpret it” (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, 1994). Thus, Nietzsche’s nihilism seeks to be **life affirming** by finding new ways to interpret the world we live in and new **moral** values to suit our new circumstances. The word first appeared as a theme in his notebooks for 1880 and 1882, appearing in print in 1886 in the relatively late work *Beyond Good and Evil*, where it is used in conjunction with a discussion of **perspectivism**: a philosopher is self-defeating if he “would rather lie down and die on a sure nothing than on an uncertain something . . .” (Nietzsche means **African Spir**, who conducted a relentless quest for certainty). Nietzsche declares, “This is nihilism and the sign of a despairing, mortally weary **soul**” (*BGE*, I: 10). Nihilism is a major theme in *The Will to Power*.

Nietzsche argues that rather than reach despair because there are no certain **truths**, we must pass through nihilism to find a new way of making values. We *ought* to approach nihilism in a positive frame of mind, jettisoning outworn judgments, but we *don’t* because the origins of our morality are too caught up in a past genealogy that we do not understand. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche seeks to unravel two centuries of **Judeo-Christian** falsehoods so that we can overcome nihilism and become the valuers of values (and not priests, philosophers, or politicians). “Nihilism is the state reached when the highest values of humanity devalue themselves” (Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Introduction,” *On the Genealogy of Morality*). This devaluation paves the way for a **reevaluation of all values** that will include such **concepts** as the *Übermensch*, **eternal return**, and the **will to power**.

**NIJINSKY, VASLAV (1890–1950).** Russian dancer of extreme talent and sensitivity. Having grown up in poverty, Nijinsky responded to Serge Diaghilev’s checkbook overtures and became an inaugural member of the **dance** troupe *Ballets Russes*, founded in Paris in

1909. The position involved him having to accept Diaghilev as lover, which he did reluctantly. When Nijinsky married in 1913, Diaghilev fired him from the troupe, even though this meant that he lost its best dancer, Nijinsky having acquired the **Dionysian** sobriquet “*le dieu de la danse*” (“the God of dance”). Nijinsky put on a season with his own troupe in New York but had no business ability, and, in 1917, haunted by the war, he retired to St. Moritz with his wife and child. Here, under circumstances not unlike those of Nietzsche himself, whose work had always fascinated him, he went insane. His diary, begun in 1917, shows the inner conflict he suffered in St. Moritz, where, unable to dance, his creativity was thwarted. When he danced, Nijinsky had an outlet for “the rhythmic, violent Dionysian upsurge of the vital energies” (Colin Wilson, *The Outsider*, 1956); deprived of this means to express his creativity, he brooded on religious matters, ultimately spending the rest of his life in a sanatorium in London, where he died. Brought up a Catholic, Nijinsky mentions **God** repeatedly on every page of his diary.

**NISHITANI, KEIJI (1900–1990).** Foremost contemporary Japanese Nietzschean philosopher. Inspired by *Nīchie kenkyū* (*Research on Nietzsche*, 1913) by Watsuji Tetsurō, Nishitani read *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* “over and over” as a young man in Kyoto, having learned German in order to do so. Nishitani is noted for his works on Nietzsche, beginning with an essay titled “*Nīchie no Tsuaratsusutora to Maisutā Ekkuharuto*” (“Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and Meister Eckhart,” 1940). *Nihirizumu*, 1949 (*The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism*, 1990), deals with **amor fati**, **will to power**, and **eternal return** from a perspective that includes the **Buddhist** dimension of “karma-tinged understanding of fate” (Graham Parkes, “Nietzsche and Asian Thought,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, 1996), as well as a solid grounding in Western thought, Nishitani having studied under **Martin Heidegger** from 1937 to 1939. *Shukyo to wa nani ka*, 1961 (*Religion and Nothingness*, 1982), remains Nishitani’s magnum opus.

**NOBLE IDEAL.** See ARISTOCRATIC VALUES.

**NORDAU, MAX (1849–1923).** Pseudonym for Max Simon Südfeld, German critic and man of letters. Nordau was first a journalist and

then a peripatetic medical practitioner, settling in 1880 in Paris, where he again turned to writing. Of **Jewish** descent, Nordau was, with Theodor Herzl, a leading Zionist. He made his name with the publication of his cultural critique *Die konventionellen Lügen der Menschheit* (*The Conventional Lies of Humanity*, 1884) and wrote a variety of plays, stories, and the novels, including *Die Krankheit des Jahrhunderts* (*The Sickness of the Century*, 1889) and *Gefühlskomödie* (*Comedy of Feeling*, 1892). He became notorious as the author of the two-volume *Entartung*, 1892–1893 (*Degeneration*, 1895), in which he created a sensation by insulting most of the leading cultural figures of the time, including **Henrik Ibsen**, **Richard Wagner**, Oscar Wilde (then on trial for indecency and subsequently imprisoned), Franz Liszt, Émile Zola, and, of course, Nietzsche.

Nordau brands Nietzsche and Wagner “egomaniacs” and **anti-Semites**, an accusation justified only in the case of Wagner. He concentrated his attack on Nietzsche by way of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and *Twilight of the Idols*, all of which are dismissed as the work of a madman. Nietzsche’s ethics are denounced as sadistic, the myth of the *Übermensch* as “megalomaniac.” Biting scorn is reserved for Nietzsche’s **style**. Nordau’s attack on Nietzsche was influential in slowing the growth of Nietzscheanism, especially in America, where there were fewer Nietzsche enthusiasts of the caliber of **Georg Brandes** or **Oscar Levy** to deflect the critical blast.

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**OEHLER, ADALBERT (1860–1943)**. Cousin of the brothers **Richard** and **Max Oehler** and of Nietzsche and **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**. After Nietzsche’s mental collapse, Adalbert Oehler was his legal guardian (with **Franziska Nietzsche** and **Franz Overbeck**). In the disputes between Franziska and Elisabeth over the future of Nietzsche’s works, Adalbert Oehler took the part of his aunt rather than his cousin Elisabeth, publishing a sympathetic portrayal of Franziska in *Nietzsches Mutter* (1940). A lawyer by profession and one-time *Oberbürgermeister* (mayor in chief) of Weimar, Adalbert Oehler became head of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* when this

was set up in 1908 to further Nietzsche research. He published comparatively little of importance for Nietzsche scholars, apart from the slim brochure *Nietzsches Werke und das Nietzsche-Archiv* (1910), in which he spells out his intention to promote Nietzsche research through the newly founded *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv*. His manuscript *Das Nietzsche-Archiv in Weimar* (1910) remains unpublished. After Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's death, he wrote the likewise unpublished, typewritten account "*Zur Geschichte des Nietzsche-Archivs*" ("On the History of the Nietzsche-Archiv," 1936).

**OEHLER, MAX (1875–1946).** Cousin of **Adalbert Oehler**, Nietzsche, and **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** and brother of **Richard Oehler**. A career soldier, Major Oehler first helped in the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1908 while on leave from the army (April–December). His major work, *Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ritterordens (A History of the Teutonic Order)*, was published in two volumes in 1912. He served in World War I and became archivist at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1919, having been demobilized. He coedited the 23-volume *Gesamtausgabe* of Nietzsche's works (1920–1929) with Friedrich Würzbach and his brother Richard.

Max Oehler worked tirelessly beside his cousin Elisabeth until her death in 1935, publishing a variety of works on Nietzsche, such as his slim volume *Nietzsches Philosophisches Werden (Nietzsche's Emergence as Philosopher, 1926)*. He presented this adulation of Nietzsche to Elisabeth to mark her 80th birthday. After her death, Max Oehler became director of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. He held that position until condemned to deportation by the postwar Soviet command. He appears to have perished at Buchenwald and is presumably buried there in *Speziallager no. 2* and not (as alleged by H. F. Peters in *Zarathustra's Sister, 1977*) in the cellar of a house close to the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. Max Oehler's daughter, Ursula Sigismund, who died in 2006, was a successful writer. Her novel *Zarathustras Sippschaft (Zarathustra's Clan, 1992)* includes her childhood memories, which centered on Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and the work of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*.

**OEHLER, RICHARD (1878–1948).** Cousin of **Adalbert Oehler**, Nietzsche, and **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** and brother of **Max Oehler**. Richard Oehler occupied himself with Nietzscheanism from

an early age, writing his Ph.D. dissertation on “*Nietzsches Verhältnis zur vorsokratischen Philosophie*” (“Nietzsche’s Relationship to Pre-Socratic Philosophy”) for the University of Halle-Wittenberg in 1903 (this was later published as a book, *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Vorsokratiker*, 1904). Oehler became a librarian, working mainly in Frankfurt from 1903 to 1945 (in the position of director, 1927–1945). Always concerned for the fortunes of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, he approached Ernst Thiel for financial assistance in 1907; his brother **Max Oehler** traveled to Sweden to negotiate (successfully) with Thiel. An ally of his cousin Elisabeth in her quarrel with **Carl Albrecht Bernoulli** over the unpublished Nietzsche-**Franz Overbeck** correspondence, which led to Elisabeth’s successful court action, Richard Oehler published his contribution to the polemic, “*Zum Kampf gegen das Nietzsche-Archiv*” (“The Attack on the *Nietzsche-Archiv*”) in the *Jenaische Zeitung*, 30 April 1908.

During the 1920s, Richard Oehler was coeditor of the 23-volume *Gesamtausgabe* of Nietzsche’s works (1920–1929); he was also a very early **Nationalist Socialist** sympathizer. In 1935, he wrote *Friedrich Nietzsche und die deutsche Zukunft* (*Friedrich Nietzsche and the German Future*), which consists of excerpts from Nietzsche’s writings with a biased commentary to demonstrate how Nietzsche’s thought anticipated Nationalist Socialist doctrine. The book has a photograph of **Adolf Hitler** as its frontispiece. With a list of contents including such topics as “Air Purification,” “Healthy Values,” “Leaders and Led,” “Natural Order of Rank,” and “The Masters of the World,” the book was promoted in the National Socialist publication *Geistige Arbeit* (*Intellectual Pursuit*), with masterly understatement, as being “partly philosophical, partly political.” Oehler argues that Nietzsche’s **master morality** found its apotheosis in the **Germans** as the master race. In 1938, Richard Oehler gave a talk at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* that combined an overview of the main slogans of “Nietzsche-**Zarathustra**” with a description of the plan for the **Nietzsche Memorial** at that time under construction. The talk was published later in 1938 as “*Die Zukunft der Nietzsche-Bewegung*” (“The Future of the Nietzsche Movement”).

**O’NEILL, EUGENE (1888–1953)**. America’s leading dramatist between the two world wars. O’Neill traveled much in his youth (his

father being the famous actor James O'Neill), and it was only after an attack of tuberculosis at the age of 24 that O'Neill settled for writing as a career. Influenced by **Henrik Ibsen** and **August Strindberg** as well as by Nietzsche, he dealt with a variety of themes; the earlier plays challenge hypocrisy in society. Nietzsche's influence, especially the concept that **Dionysian** ecstasy can break through the "veil of Maya" to discover the tragic problems of existence beneath our consciousness, can be traced in *Emperor Jones* (1920), *The Hairy Ape* (1922), *The Fountain* (1925), *The Great God Brown* (1926), and *Lazarus Laughed* (1927). Like Nietzsche, O'Neill rejected formal religion and advocated a life in which the instincts and passions would be allowed to thrive. His characters often fail to achieve this end and are finally destroyed by their own frustrations, like Abbie in *Desire under the Elms* (1924) and Lavinia in *Mourning Becomes Electra* (1931). Lavinia's plea to Peter, "Can't you forget sin and see that all love is beautiful?" meets with decisive rejection. See also BODY; DRIVE.

**ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY (ZUR GENEALOGIE DER MORAL, 1887)**. Subtitled *A Polemic*, written in 1887, and widely regarded as Nietzsche's most significant philosophical achievement, the *Genealogy* is divided into three essays, each of which has subdivisions of several pages in length. There are no aphorisms in the work, and the argument is coherent, with none of the haphazard shower of insights familiar from works such as *The Gay Science*. In the first essay, titled "'Good and Evil,' 'Good and Bad,'" Nietzsche is at pains to demonstrate how the current state of **slave morality** came about. He argues that before the advent of the **ascetic priest** there was a natural order of rank in which born leaders, "the noble, the good, the beautiful and the happy" (*OGM*, I: 10), gained power as of natural right and exerted their mastery through the natural functioning of **master morality**. Although the Germanic "**blond beast**" might be feared, the automatic functioning of the **pathos of distance** ensured that he was simultaneously respected.

The "slaves' revolt" in morality came about when the **Jews** were victorious in putting an end to master morality with the argument, "Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good . . ." (*OGM*, I: 7). Inherent to this doctrine was the

negative function of **ressentiment**: “Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is ‘outside,’ ‘other,’ ‘non-self,’ and *this* ‘no’ is its creative deed” (*OGM*, I: 10). In this way, the spirit of resentment has triumphed in **morality** for the past 2,000 years, vexatiously pervading **Christian** morality. Nietzsche observes of the man of resentment: ‘His soul *squints*’ (*OGM*, I: 10).

In the second essay, “Bad Conscience,” Nietzsche reflects on why we humans, distinguished from other **animals** by the ability to make a promise, should connive in our subjugation by accepting a morality that represses our instincts, so that conscience is essentially “bad conscience.” Whereas in ancient times we could externalize **cruelty** and **suffering**, these are now turned inward against ourselves. Nietzsche cautions that when man learned to turn the other cheek and became submissive, it was at terrible cost to his inner **life**:

Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be “tamed.” . . . (*OGM*, II: 16)

Unable to repress his natural urges but just as unable to view them as “good,” man was doomed to a life of despair. Filled with bad conscience, man obeyed the priest and blamed *himself* for his sickness, a great nausea occasioned by his *Schuld* (debt or guilt) before God.

“The **Ascetic Ideal**,” the topic of the third essay, feeds on weakness and submission. As Nietzsche observes, “Satisfaction is *looked for* and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice” (*OGM*, III: 11). Nietzsche points out that the ascetic priest is successful on his own terms; he has a **will to power** that is able to manifest itself *because* of the self-loathing of the downtrodden. We can recognize them by “that glance which is a sigh. ‘If only I were some other person’ is what this glance sighs . . .” (*OGM*, III: 14). Nietzsche pours out abuse on “these failures” who “have taken out a lease on virtue to keep it just for themselves” (*OGM*, III: 14). He dreads the day when the happy, healthy, and powerful begin “to doubt their *right to happiness*” (*OGM*, III: 14). Only the realization that there is no God can allow man to walk free from the negative moral-



ity of the ascetic ideal and allow him to construct his own morality. And as Nietzsche had already pointed out in *The Gay Science*, only we can kill God (*GS*, III: 125).

Although the *Übermensch* is only mentioned once in the *Genealogy*, in connection with Napoleon, that “synthesis of *Unmensch* (brute) and *Übermensch*” (overman) (*OGM*, I: 16), Nietzsche clearly foresees a man of the future who will overcome the ascetic ideal: “this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and nothingness—he must come one day . . .” (*OGM*, II: 24).

**ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE (ÜBER WAHRHEIT UND LÜGE IM AUSSERMORALISCHEN SINNE).** Essay written in 1873 in which Nietzsche stressed that in spite of humanity’s drive for absolute **truth**, there is really no such thing. All of us are caught in the nets of **language** and are unaware of the way we twist and turn for meanings. The drive for **knowledge**, entwined with the quest for truth, is dependent on language, which is rhetorical and incapable of delivering a “truth” stripped of **metaphor**. Nietzsche cites a host of figures of speech to show the fluidity of meaning in language:

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensual force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins. (*OTLNS*: 2)

Nietzsche proposes that we should grasp the problem posed by the “fluid meaning” of **concepts** and evaluate the usefulness of both truth and **lies**. Some fictions are necessary to human **life** and are thus converted into “truths.” Although they are lies and illusions, they at least have value. In the same way, concepts provide a structure for thought. Man has to have some security so that he can sit at “this” table by “this” window; he must forget that the words or designations are mere metaphors, otherwise he will have neither repose nor security. **Forgetting** is therapeutic in that the free intellect can become creative by smashing the framework of concepts and giving full rein to intuition. *See also* FREUD, SIGMUND.

**ORTEGA Y GASSET, JOSÉ (1883–1955).** Spanish philosopher. Ortega y Gasset studied at Madrid and Germany, becoming professor of metaphysics at Madrid University in 1910. With his sound knowledge of German, acquired when he was a student at Marburg, he disseminated Nietzsche's ideas in Spain through numerous articles; he also wrote on **Wilhelm Dilthey**, **Oswald Spengler**, and Edmund Husserl. Like Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset saw a European **culture** in decline; Nietzsche inspired him to challenge people to think for themselves. He gave diagnostic portraits of Spanish and European life in such works as *España invertebrada*, 1921 (*Invertebrate Spain*, 1937), and *El tema de nuestro tiempo*, 1923 (*The Modern Theme*, 1931).

It became a persistent theme in Ortega y Gasset's work that we can very easily learn from **history**. Borrowing from Nietzsche, he proclaimed a heroic culture founded on an **aristocratic** elite, but he combined this with a staunchly Republican stance that declared both communism and fascism to be hostile to civilization. The masses should not be allowed to remain as the **herd**: they should become a "*pueblo organizado*" (an organized people), while the aristocracy ought to renounce their privileges in favor of a life of active example. These ideas form the plot of the influential *La rebelión de las masas*, 1930 (*The Rebellion of the Masses*, 1932). Although the contradictions in Ortega y Gasset's political stance are obvious, he had a major influence on the fall of the monarchy in Spain, and his *La rebelión de las masas* was "a virtual Bible for the Falangists" (J. B. Trend, *Penguin Companion to Literature*, 1969). However, when Ortega y Gasset was given a post in the fledgling Republic in 1931, he lost interest in politics and left Spain for Argentina during the war years. In 1948, he founded the Institute of Humanities in Madrid.

**OVERBECK, FRANZ CAMILL (1837–1905).** German theologian. Nietzsche met Franz Overbeck in 1870 when the latter arrived in Basel to take up his post as professor of theology at the university. Overbeck lost his religious faith, though the process was more gradual than with Nietzsche; he was nevertheless allowed to continue in his post. He became a close friend of Nietzsche, sharing the same lodgings until 1875. He married Ida Rothpelz in 1876. Ida Overbeck, as Nietzsche's confidante, tried to warn Nietzsche not to place too great a trust in his sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**. Overbeck

administered Nietzsche's pension while Nietzsche led a peripatetic life once he had taken early retirement in 1879 and remained a tireless friend to Nietzsche during the latter's insanity. Responding to Overbeck's urgent enquiry in late 1888 as to his health, Nietzsche wrote back, on or around 29 December 1888, that he was "not a man, but a destiny." This—and a worrying letter from Nietzsche to **Jacob Burckhardt** dated 6 January 1889 that the latter showed to Overbeck in alarm—precipitated Overbeck's timely decision to fetch Nietzsche home from Turin. Thereafter, Overbeck was Nietzsche's trustee jointly with **Franziska Nietzsche** and **Adalbert Oehler**.

Before he went insane, Nietzsche had often written to Overbeck and his wife in disparaging terms with regard to his sister, and this occasioned Overbeck's public letter in 1904 in response to the publication of Elisabeth's biography of Nietzsche, *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsche's* (Ilii), in which she gave a false picture of her close relationship with her brother in the later years. This open letter in turn alerted Elisabeth to the existence of the Overbeck–Nietzsche correspondence. Overbeck left this correspondence to Basel University when he died the following year. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche was convinced that this was by rights the property of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, and in 1908 she began a lawsuit against **Carl Albrecht Bernoulli**, then executor of Overbeck's will. Elisabeth pursued the lawsuit as the bitterest vendetta and won a pyrrhic victory when Bernoulli was forbidden from printing the specific passages to which she had objected. Refer to Andreas Urs Sommer, *Der Geist der Historie und das Ende des Christentums: Zur "Waffengenossenschaft" von Friedrich Nietzsche und Franz Overbeck* (*The Spirit of History and the End of Christianity: On the "Comradeship in Arms" of Friedrich Nietzsche and Franz Overbeck*, 1997). See also FRIENDSHIP.

**OVERMAN.** See *DER ÜBERMENSCH*.

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**PANNWITZ, RUDOLF (1881–1969).** German philosopher of culture. Pannwitz was an associate of the circle round **Stefan George**; from 1904 to 1906, he coedited the journal *Charon* with Otto zur

Linde. The poets associated with this publication included Max Dauthendey, **Christian Morgenstern**, and Richard von Schaukal. In his autobiographical *Grundriß einer Geschichte meiner Kultur 1881–1906* (*Sketch of a History of My Culture 1881–1906*, 1921), Pannwitz relates that he was deeply impressed when a school friend lent him *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; *Daybreak* likewise made a huge impact on the young scholar. Pannwitz wrote several plays between 1904 and 1910, five of which were published in 1913 under the title *Dionysische Tragödien*.

Pannwitz tried to give expression to the idea of the *Übermensch* as the herald of a mythic, cosmic religion: “For Pannwitz, this led to a kind of mystic Oriental religion blending individualism with **German** regeneration” (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992). In *Einführung in Nietzsche* (*Introduction to Nietzsche*, 1920), Pannwitz claimed Nietzsche as a “semi-divine” **European** thinker, “not a prophet for the *Volk*” but “a prophet for prophets,” ideas still prevalent in *Nietzsche und die Verwandlung des Menschen* (*Nietzsche and the Transformation of Man*, 1943). In his essay “*Nietzsche und die Gegenwart*” (“Nietzsche and the Present Day”), published in the collection of essays *Der Nihilismus und die werdende Welt* (*Nihilism and the World of Becoming*, 1951), Pannwitz speaks of Nietzsche’s place as a poet beside **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**, **Richard Wagner**, **Martin Luther**, and **Friedrich Hölderlin**, although in philosophy, he credits Nietzsche with iconoclasm in creating “the first **life** philosophy.”

**PAPINI, GIOVANNI (1881–1956)**. Italian man of letters. Papini wrote prolifically on philosophical subjects. He also cofounded influential literary reviews such as *Leonardo* and *Lacerba*. Although assertive, not to say arrogant, in his views, Papini was prone to frequent changes of mind. An early cosmopolitan defender of Nietzsche’s originality against attempts by Italian philosophers to absorb Nietzsche into the canon, the young Papini was enormously successful in bringing Nietzsche’s iconoclasm into focus. In his article “*Al di là della vita*” (“Beyond **Life**”; *Leonardo*, 7, 1903), he describes the **will to power** as a “dithyrambic apotheosis of evolutionary naturalism” that allows a deed to come about. Human willpower is sovereign in lending a practical potential to theoretical laws and certainties, by means of

what Papini dubs *pragmatismo magico* (magic pragmatism). This concept relies heavily on the work of the American pragmatist William James, but Papini characteristically adapted the notion, “shifting the emphasis from internal psychological reality to the outside world and affirming that in certain men, the will has the magical power of transforming external things” (Cinzia Sartini Blum, *The Other Modernism*, 1996). He also made his own use of Nietzsche’s ideas to generate an antipositivistic renewal in philosophy. After the publication of **Henri Bergson’s** *Creative Evolution* (1907), much of Papini’s Nietzscheanism was filtered through Bergson’s viewpoint. Papini published selections of Bergson’s work in Italian in *Filosofia dell’ intuizione* (*The Philosophy of Intuition*, 1909).

Papini supported **futurism** under the leadership of **Filippo Tommaso Marinetti** and accepted the **nationalistic** stance this entailed, only to withdraw support from the movement in 1913 with a panache reinforced by the title of his ensuing polemic, *Stroncature* (*The Decapitator*, 1916). His conversion to Catholicism, after being a convinced atheist, was all of a piece with his contradictory yet exhibitionist personality; nevertheless, his *Vita di Christo*, 1921 (*The Story of Christ*, 1923), became a best-seller. After his conversion, his mysticism transformed the *Übermensch*, formerly his ideal of the man of action, into a Christ-like figure. In *Un uomo—finito*, 1912 (*A Man—Finished*, 1924), he sees himself as **Zarathustra** with outstretched arms “like a crucified Titan.” Papini later merged into the fascist ranks, winning the **Mussolini** prize for a fascist interpretation of Dante in 1933.

**PATHOS OF DISTANCE (DAS PATHOS DER DISTANZ).** The indispensable consciousness of superiority whereby order of rank is maintained so that **aristocratic values** can flourish. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche points out that in ancient times, the **concept** had a supramoral or nonmoral dimension of the type “might is right,” so that a “good” man was a “strong” man. This produced echelons in society: “The pathos of nobility and distance is . . . the continuing and predominant feeling of complete and fundamental superiority of a higher ruling kind in relation to a lower kind, to those ‘below’—that is the origin of the antithesis ‘good’ and bad” (*OGM*, I: 2). See also **PITY**; **SIMMEL**, **GEORG**.

**PARMENIDES.** See SPIR, AFRICAN.

**PERSPECTIVISM.** Claimed as an essential fact of Nietzsche's theory of **knowledge**, "perspectivism" is a word used tantalizingly rarely in Nietzsche's published works; it is most frequently found in *The Will to Power*. Walter Kaufmann's translations often render words like *Optik* as "perspective," giving the misleading impression that Nietzsche uses the term more than is the case. In a fragment of 1881, Nietzsche describes how prone we are to accept the evidence of our eyes: "This mirror image of the eye [represents] our poetic-logical power to ascertain the perspectives to all things by means of which we *keep ourselves alive*" (KSA, 9, 15 [9]). The point is not that we see correctly but that what we think we see is **life-promoting**. Several years later, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche declares, "There would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective evaluations and appearances" (BGE, II: 34). Nietzsche dismissed contemporary philosophers who "speak even of perspective with an arrogant disdain"—those meant (according to Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001) are **Friedrich Albert Lange** and Gustav Teichmüller. Suffice it to say that Nietzsche used the term "perspectivism" here to refute **Kantianism** of the type represented by Lange. Nietzsche viewed consciousness as a sign of decline and preferred to trust human instinct rather than Kantian abstraction.

Nietzsche's insistence on perspectival interpretation of sense experiences was an important grounding for his **nihilism** and was closely linked to his rejection of absolute **truth**: there are no facts, "only interpretations" (WP, III: 481). In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, he sought to establish a perspectival method of **moral reevaluation** that would go beyond such simplifications as "good" and "evil." Keith Ansell-Pearson comments, "Such a mode of thinking recognizes the conditionality of human forms of knowledge and is not concerned with absolutes, moral or otherwise" (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, 1994). In sum, Nietzsche perceives perspectivism as a vital part of his new kind of philosophy, and it permeates all his thinking, implicitly if not explicitly.

**PESSIMISM.** Nietzsche first encountered the **concept** of pessimism as a student in Leipzig in 1865, when he read **Arthur Schopen-**

**hauer's** *Die Welt als Wille und Erscheinung*, 1819 (*The World as Will and Representation*, 1969). He was immediately captivated by Schopenhauer's central tenet, the will to **life** (*Wille zum Leben*). Like Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was an atheist, but unlike Nietzsche, he held that man suffers permanent pain through his predicament. To reduce the pain, one must reduce the intensity of the will, and if a man can truly free his intellect from the will, then he is a genius. More realistically, the most we can expect to do is lead an ascetic life and sympathize with the sufferings of others.

Nietzsche never lost his respect for Schopenhauer's dedication to his task, but he disagreed with his philosophical conclusions. He could not accept Schopenhauer's central tenet that life is fundamentally evil, and though he had his own theory on **suffering**, he argued against compassion or **pity**. In his mature work, Nietzsche refuted Schopenhauer's thesis with his own concept of the **will to power**, which is in essence the **affirmation** of life and not its abnegation. What Nietzsche had to develop in his thought was how, in the wake of the death of **God**, he could steer humanity away from a life-denying pessimism toward a positive form of **nihilistic** pessimism. His solution was a **revaluation of all values**; the new **morality** that would emerge would lack all **metaphysical** overlay. (Critics have been swift to point out that Nietzsche's concepts of the *Übermensch*, **eternal return**, and the will to power do, however, sometimes strain in the direction of metaphysics.)

**PIETISM/NEO-PIETISM.** Two dominant and related strands in German **Lutherism** that must be placed within the **cultural history** of **Germany**. These terms often arouse hostility and bemusement in equal measure, as the word "pietist" is used differently in English. Pietism in Germany sprang up during the 17th century as a reaction to the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and Lutheran scholasticism. The center of faith was the inner religious life, nourished by biblical devotional study. The Pietist placed him- or herself unconditionally in the lap of Jesus, just as a **child** would trust its mother. Pietism developed a specific vocabulary to reflect this doctrine of obedience and surrender, and "child" is a major term within this. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche parodies Christ's call for us to be childlike when *Zarathustra* begins his discourse by calling for man to meta-

morphose into a child—but only so that he can later become the *Übermensch* (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”).

Pietism was the dominant trend in German religious life until the onset of the **Enlightenment** brought with it a more rationalist approach, albeit characterized by a “**deep** and pervasive **moralism**” and an attack on **Christian** “mythology” (Claude Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 1972). From the outset, Pietism was split into radicals (centered on the University of Halle) and moderates, centered at Herrnhut among the Moravian Brothers (known as “the quiet people”) and led by Graf Zinzendorf, a major influence on the mild and tolerant theologian **Friedrich Schleiermacher** (as well as John Wesley). The division continued in neo-Pietism, with Schleiermacher in Berlin claiming that it was possible to be religious without actually believing in **God**, while a more radical, evangelical group of “the Awakened” (*die Erweckten*) followed the Berlin University Professor Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg, a bitter opponent of Schleiermacher. This reactionary branch of neo-Pietism, to which **Franziska Nietzsche** adhered, stood opposed to the type of Lutheran rationalism with which Nietzsche’s grandmother, Erdmuthe Nietzsche, was familiar. Nietzsche came to despise his mother’s unquestioning faith, with its “rabid support of the alliance between throne and altar” (John E. Groh, *Nineteenth Century German Protestantism*, 1882). Radical neo-Pietists saw the need for religious conversion as paramount (including the conversion of **Jews**), and numerous missionary societies were organized along the lines of the *Evangelische Missionsgesellschaft*, founded in Basel in 1815 and at its height when Nietzsche became a professor there in 1869. Nietzsche found himself at the operational center of European evangelical neo-Pietism, and many of the **friendships** he forged in Basel were with nonradical neo-Pietists, such as **Johann Jakob Bachofen** and **Jacob Burckhardt**.

Nietzsche knew from his reading of the Irish historian William Lecky (1838–1903) that Methodism was a similar form of Protestantism to radical neo-Pietism. In his discussion of the Calvinist George Whitefield’s “hell and damnation” preaching methods in *Daybreak* (*D*, I: 77), he alludes to Ferdiand Löwe’s pamphlet *Entstehungsgeschichte und Charakteristik des Methodismus* (*History of the Rise and Nature of Methodism*, 1880), which was a translation of the ninth



chapter (“The Religious Revival”) of volume 2 of Lecky’s *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (8 vols., 1878–1890). Nietzsche’s attack on **Christianity** had a broad edge, but he usually meant Protestantism, especially of the zealous, authoritarian, evangelical kind that provoked guilt and the fear of condemnation: and this was radical neo-Pietism, as described here.

At the ass’s festival in part 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the eight higher men recite a litany typical of an evangelical “awakening,” not to worship Christ but in honor of “a perfumed ass.” Zarathustra finds them reciting, “Amen! And praise and wisdom and thanks and glory and strength be to our God for ever and ever!” (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening”). With supreme irony, Zarathustra rebukes the higher men: “Everyone would adjudge you, with your new faith, to be the worst blasphemers or the most foolish of old women” (*Za*, IV: “The Ass Festival”). As Nietzsche’s works became increasingly anti-Christian, he lost many friends; **Franz Overbeck** was his only Basel acquaintance who kept in touch with him to the end, perhaps because he, too, had lost his faith.

**PITY (DAS MITLEID)**. An affect to be avoided on a number of counts. First, it is demanded in **Christian morality** and has infected other areas such as **Arthur Schopenhauer**’s philosophy and English **utilitarianism** and is therefore suspect per se (*D*, II: 132); second, it is useless, for we do not actually **suffer** with the sufferer; he or she has to cope with the pain alone, in view of which our pity merely increases the sum total of suffering in the world. Thus, the person feeling pity is at risk of becoming sick and depressed (*D*, II: 133). In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche points out that the pitier often has an ulterior motive, that of feeling helpful and of being needed—both of which are weakening (*GS*, IV: 338)—while in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche reminds his readers that **democracy** and **socialism** breed a “religion of pity, in sympathy with whatever feels, lives, suffers,” and thus induce a particular brand of weakness into Europe, “a new **Buddhism**” (*BGE*, V: 202). The infection permeates “our entire literary and artistic decadence from St. Petersburg to Paris, from **Tolstoy** to **Wagner**” (*A-C*, 7). The solution is to adopt the **pathos of distance** and to steel oneself to **Zarathustran** hardness: “So be warned against pity . . .” (*Za*, II: “Of the Compassionate”).

**PLATO.** Born around 428 B.C. of **aristocratic** descent, Plato was horrified at the trial and execution of his teacher, **Socrates**, in 399 B.C. In 387 B.C., he founded the Academy in Athens, and apart from a brief intervention in the political life of Syracuse in 367 B.C., he devoted his life to teaching and writing. Much of his work, written in a characteristic form of dialogue, reflects the ideas of Socrates, and it is often impossible to unravel the Socratic from the Platonic. With this proviso, we speak now of Platonic “forms” (or ideas) as unknowable entities in the nonreal world: for example, such abstracts as “the good” and “the **truth**.”

Although in his early essay on *The Greek State*, written in 1871, Nietzsche respected Plato’s attempt to envisage a state led by a philosopher ruler, he never surmounted his prime objection to Plato’s **metaphysics**, in which the real world, where change is constant, is separated from the “intelligible” world (of forms), where there is no change. In *Daybreak*, he wrote,

If we are not to lose ourselves, if we are not to lose our *reason*, we have to flee from experiences! Thus did Plato flee from reality and desire to see things only in pallid mental pictures; he was full of sensibility and knew how easily the waves of his sensibility could close over his reason.—Would the wise man consequently have to say to himself: “I shall honour *reality*, but I shall turn my back on it *because* I know and fear it?” (*D*, V: 448)

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche denounces Plato’s invention of “pure spirit and the good in itself” that forced Plato into “standing truth on her head and denying *perspective* itself, the basic condition of all **life**” (*Beyond Good and Evil*, Preface). On the same note, Nietzsche in his late work *The Anti-Christ* attacks Plato as a liar: “The ‘holy lie’—common to Confucius, the Law-Book of Manu, Mohammed, the Christian Church: it is not lacking in Plato. ‘The truth exists’: this means, whenever it is heard, *the priest is lying . . .*” (*A-C*: 55). See also THE GREEKS.

**POLITICS.** See BISMARCK, OTTO VON; DEMOCRACY; GRAND POLITICS; STATE.

**POSTMODERNISM.** Allied to the movements in the **arts** known as **structuralism** and **poststructuralism**, postmodernism, which, taken

literally, would refer to works from approximately 1950 on, undermines all the traditional certainties such as those inherent in humanism. In architecture, postmodernism attacks the arrogance of the “International” style and favors witty references to mass **culture** in commercial architecture. In literary criticism, postmodernism has come to mean something slightly different, largely because Nietzsche’s thought has been used as the fulcrum for debate. Existing texts or ideas are examined at the margins for hidden signifiers so that new interpretations can be teased out. Postmodern critics subvert **language** itself to this purpose. Following the Nietzschean premise that **truth** must be interrogated, “**New Nietzsche**” scholars have followed the **deconstructive** practices of French philosophers like **Jacques Derrida**. Their justification is that Nietzsche, too, embarked on a subversive process whereby he questioned the foundations of truth, language, and **morality**. Although Nietzsche’s role has thus been seen as crucial for postmodernism, the emphasis placed on *The Will to Power* as his central text has worried more traditional contemporary thinkers.

**POSTSTRUCTURALISM.** In general, the term given to literary theories prevalent during the 1970s that superseded the more linguistically rigorous **structuralism** but, more specifically, the umbrella name for the **deconstruction** of **Jacques Derrida**, who leaned heavily on Nietzsche’s thought and method (his “**style**”) for his own interpretative practices, as did **Michel Foucault** and **Roland Barthes**. Poststructuralism makes “theory” the chief repository of all “meaning,” applying not just to verbal **language** (often referred to as “discourse”) but also to any sociocultural signifying system. The human being is “decentered,” with no unified or coherent identity; he or she is controlled by the power structures at work during any given period. By extension, the author of a text is “dead.” The individual reader is free to enter the text and its complex scattering of signifiers, an experience that can allegedly amount to orgasmic bliss or *jouissance*. Texts themselves cross boundaries of genre and become simply *écriture*. Since it is given that no text means what it appears to say, a variety of interpretations are inevitable. *See also* POSTMODERNISM.

**POWER (DIE MACHT).** As with **force** (*die Kraft*), Nietzsche tried to acquire sufficient **scientific knowledge** to fuel a physical description

of the way power operates its control. Of the works he read relating to the subject, the one he seems to have found most useful was Robert Julius Mayer's essay *Über Auslösung* ("On Release") in *Mechanik der Wärme* (1874), dealing with the accumulation and discharge of force. Here, Nietzsche found his predilection confirmed for a hierarchy of power in which some forces direct and some drive. In a fragment from 1881, Nietzsche points out that many people think "more power" implies "more force" when, in fact, more is less, for example, when the person with most power at his fingertips, say, a machine operator, just needs to use the slightest touch (*KSA*, 9, 11 [25]). In 1888, Nietzsche returned to the same problem of power, but now the essential ingredient of will is present:

We do not know how to explain a change except as the encroachment [*Übergreifen*] of one power [*Macht*] upon another power [*Macht*]. . . . The will [*Wille*] to accumulate force [*Kraft*] is special to the phenomena of **life**, to nourishment, procreation, inheritance. . . . Should we not be permitted to assume this will as a motive force in chemistry, too?—and in the cosmic order? (*WP*, III: 689)

In this passage we see just how easy it was for the **National Socialists** to cull slogans from *The Will to Power* when, in fact, Nietzsche's intention in this case is to explain chemistry and cosmology in his own terms. Central to Nietzsche's argument is the quest for hegemony: "opposites, obstacles are needed" (*WP*, III, 693), and within that, the crucial factor is quantity. For Nietzsche, the material world is driven not by mechanical laws but by the operation of "quanta of force [*Kraft-Quanta*], the essence of which consists in exercising power [*Macht*] against other quanta of force [*Kraft-Quanta*]" (*WP*, III: 689). In spite of his constant attempts to amass scientific knowledge, Nietzsche, who was a mediocre mathematician and no more than an amateur enthusiast in **natural science**, found it difficult to explain **eternal return** or the will to power in any convincingly scientific way. Refer to Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context* (2001).

**PRZYBYSZEWSKI, STANISLAUS (1868–1927)**. Polish writer. Przybyszewski wrote in both Polish and German and was as well known to his contemporaries for his provocative Bohemianism as for his novels and plays. He first read Nietzsche's works in the early 1890s. In 1892, he published *Zur Psychologie des Individuums. I:*

*Chopin und Nietzsche, II: Ola Hanson*; here the word “individual” stands for what would normally be termed “genius.” Catching sight of the sick Nietzsche in Weimar, paraded by **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** like a freak attraction, Przybyszewski was struck by the tragedy of Nietzsche’s situation. Believing (as many did at the time) that Nietzsche was of Polish extraction, Przybyszewski thought there was much to link him to Nietzsche’s “Slav” cast of mind and to his use of **language**. Together with his friend **Richard Dehmel**, Przybyszewski set himself against the austere theories of the **naturalist movement** propounded by **Arno Holz**, and espoused an **aesthetic** form of decadent Satanism, believing this to be true Nietzscheanism. His chief works in German are *Totenmesse* (*Mass for the Dead*, 1893), *Satanskinder* (*Satan’s Children*, 1897), and *Androgyne* (1900).

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**RACISM.** See ANTI-SEMITISM; EUGENICS MOVEMENT; NATIONALISM; NATIONAL SOCIALISM; *VOLK, DAS*.

**RATIONALISM.** Philosophical stance that relies on reason to search out **truth**. Starting with **Socrates**, Nietzsche picked off every rationalist thinker who crossed his path, accusing each one of various **life-denying** doctrines. Under “**science**” or “**Darwin**,” he attacked the fashion of his day for rationalism, convinced that it destroys the human spirit and fails to make any allowance for the human imagination, the life of the passions, or the capacity for health-giving **Dionysian** intoxication. His rejection of “truth” is allied to his denial that reality has a logical structure. Addressing “the realists,” Nietzsche uses an argument that would later be developed by **Henri Bergson** and **Jacques Derrida** when he points out that we can never capture pure reality because our past will always color the present moment:

Your love of “reality,” for example—oh, that is an old, ancient “love!” In every experience, in every sense impression there is a piece of this old love; and some fantasy, some prejudice, some irrationality, some ignorance, some fear, and whatever else, has worked on it and contributed to it. (*GS*, II: 57)

Nietzsche's solution lay in skepticism and **perspectivism**, but critics of the latter stance have accused him in turn of irrationalism. *See also* DESCARTES, RENÉ; ENLIGHTENMENT; *THE GAY SCIENCE*.

**REALITY.** *See* RATIONALISM; PLATO.

**RECURRENCE.** *See* ETERNAL RETURN.

**RÉE, PAUL (1849–1901).** German **Jewish** philosopher. Nietzsche first met Rée in 1873 when the latter visited Basel for the summer. Writing to **Erwin Rohde** (then in Kiel) on 5 May 1873, Nietzsche declared Rée to be a “thoughtful and gifted man” and made a point of reading his publications when they appeared. In 1875, Rée published his *Psychologische Beobachtungen* (*Psychological Observations*) and, in 1877, *Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen* (*The Origin of the Moral Sensations*; both essays contained in *Paul Rée Basic Writings*, trans. Robin Small, 2003). Nietzsche, Paul Rée, and Albert Brenner spent the winter of 1876–1877 with **Malwida von Meysenbug** in Sorrento and were able to fully discuss their ideas on **morality** on this occasion (Meysenbug in her memoirs, published 1876, dubbed her house party an “idealists’ colony”). Between 1875 and 1882, it could be said that Rée’s compassionate psychological observations on morality had some credence with Nietzsche. However, Rée was Nietzsche’s rival for the hand of **Lou Andreas-Salomé** in 1882, which ultimately divided the two men irreconcilably, a fact that saddened Nietzsche deeply. Rée in his turn felt hurt and rejected when Lou Salomé married Fred (later Frederick) Andreas in 1887; he thereafter became a practicing doctor. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche—referring to *The Origin of the Moral Sensations*—decisively rejected Rée’s “altruistic evaluation” (*OGM*, I: 5), though without his characteristic animosity toward ideas he disliked. Rée died of a fall in the Swiss Engadine in circumstances that do not rule out suicide. Refer to Robin Small, *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship* (2005). *See also* FRIENDSHIP.

**RENAISSANCE.** “Rebirth” of **European**—especially Italian—**culture** after the medieval period. The Renaissance was not univer-

sally so described until the Basel professor **Jacob Burckhardt** established it as a period of time roughly coinciding with the 15th century. Nietzsche read his colleague Burckhardt's work with close attention.

Nietzsche does not make constant reference to the Renaissance in his work but nevertheless pronounced it "the golden age of this millennium": "The Italian Renaissance contained within it all the positive forces to which we owe modern culture" (*HH*, I: "Tokens of Higher Culture," 237). Nietzsche's list of these forces includes the liberation of thought, disrespect for authorities, victory of **education** over the arrogance of ancestry, and enthusiasm for **science**. Burckhardt was scrupulous in arguing that an age has its own character and is not automatically better than the preceding age, and Nietzsche echoes this thought in *Twilight of the Idols*, where he reflects on the vitality of the Renaissance: "—Ages are to be assessed according to their *Positive forces*—and by this assessment the age of the Renaissance, so prodigal and so fateful, appears as the last *great age*" (*TI*: "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 37).

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche praised the works of early Renaissance practitioners (especially Dante, Raphael, and Michelangelo), lamenting the fact that there will never again be such a species of **art** in which the falsehood of "the beyond" is so gloriously portrayed (*HH*, I: "From the Souls of Artists and Writers": 220). He had high praise for Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) and for that handbook for the future **Übermensch**, *Principe*, 1513 (*The Prince*, 1532), not just for its ruthless politics but also for its **style**. Nietzsche set Machiavelli on the same pedestal as the ancient **Greek** Thucydides because they shared an "unconditional will not to deceive themselves and not to see reason in *reality*—not in 'reason,' still less in '**morality**'" (*TI*, "What I Owe the Ancients": 2). The comparison to Thucydides is significant; this was the Greek writer he most respected. Nietzsche did not hesitate to use the word "Machiavellism" to describe **Otto von Bismarck's** *Realpolitik* (*GS*, V: "We Fearless Ones," 357).

The fact that Nietzsche placed "Cosimo" on his reading list in 1879 (meaning Cosimo di Medici), probably referring to Alfred de Reumont's book on Lorenzo di Medici (1874), though he made no further comment on the Medicis, indicates that he had more pressing concerns on his mind than a complete survey of Renaissance

culture. Indeed, Machiavelli's prince and the warlike Cesare Borgia (ca. 1475–1507) probably incorporated “Renaissance man” for Nietzsche, with Borgia earning his highest admiration:

One altogether misunderstands the **beast of prey** and man of prey (Cesare Borgia for example), one misunderstands “**nature**,” so long as one looks for something “sick” at the bottom of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growths, or even for an inborn “hell” in them: as virtually all moralists have done hitherto. (*BGE*, V: 197)

In *The Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche blamed the **Germans** for not reaping the harvest of the Renaissance. For Nietzsche, the Renaissance was a period when **Christianity** was revalued and an attempt was made to bring about a victory “of the opposing *values*, the *noble values* . . .”—the sort of victory that could entertain the idea of “*Cesare Borgia as Pope*. . . . Christianity would thereby have been abolished!” (*A-C*: 61). Instead, **Martin Luther** tried to reform Rome and, when that failed, brought about the Reformation, making the Renaissance “an event without meaning, a great *in vain!*” (*A-C*: 61). See also ARISTOCRATIC VALUES.

**RELIGION.** See BUDDHISM; CHRISTIANITY; LUTHER, MARTIN; PIETISM; ZARATHUSTRA/ZOROASTER.

**RESSENTIMENT.** Nietzsche always used the French term to express what he asserted to be the source of negative moral values in society. In German there is no real equivalent to the term, though in English, “resentment” comes close. Nietzsche uses “ressentiment” to express an attitude of **life** rather than a specific emotion related to jealousy. The term is intimately bound up with Nietzsche's concept of **herd** men, who unquestioningly accept the **slave morality** of **Christianity** (or any religion) as peddled by the **ascetic priest**. Slave morality, described at length in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, encourages man to despise his own **body** and his instinctual life, so that he learns to say “no” to all that is noble and healthy (in Nietzsche's definition). The solution lies in Nietzsche's concept of higher health for the **higher man**, who, by creating his own destiny, will **affirm** and love **life**. Thus will come into being the *Übermensch*, the apotheosis of the **will to power** to whom resentment is anathema. Refer to Esam Abou El Magd, *Nietzsche. Ressentiment und schlechtem Gewissen*



*auf der Spur* (Nietzsche: *In Search of Ressentiment and Bad Conscience*, 1996). See also **AMOR FATI**; **CONSCIENCE AND BAD CONSCIENCE**.

**REUTER, GABRIELE (1859–1941)**. German writer. Reuter’s novel *Aus guter Familie* (*From a Good Family*, 1895) was a best-seller. The chief character in this novel, Agathe Heidling, is unable to heed the Nietzschean message to “become who she is” and ends up as a mentally unstable spinster, having been “cured” of what her family construe to be hysterical demands for wider horizons: “her will is broken,” we are told ominously. Reuter herself was a convinced Nietzschean who also studied the work of **Max Stirner**. Although she was fundamentally apolitical, believing that radical **feminist** activity would sap her creative powers, Reuter portrayed strong female characters who either make their way in the world—like the unmarried mother, Cornelia Reimann, in *Das Tränenhaus* (*The House of Tears*, 1909)—or are untrue to their inner core, succumbing to sickness like Agathe Heidling or Frau Bürgelin in *Frau Bürgelins Söhne* (1899).

Reuter, in the company of her friends **Fritz Koegel** and **Rudolf Steiner**, met the mentally ill Nietzsche when he was in the care of his mother and sister in Naumburg in 1894. Reuter lived in Weimar at that time, though she moved to Munich and subsequently had an illegitimate daughter under circumstances similar to those related in *Das Tränenhaus*. Her appreciation of the liberating potential of Nietzsche’s philosophy never waned. “Just to be able to say ‘I will’—and not ‘I can’—that sums it all up” (Gabriele Reuter, *Ellen von der Weiden*, 1900).

**REVALUATION OF ALL VALUES (DIE UMWERTUNG ALLER WERTE)**. Also known as “the transvaluation of all values.” English speakers should bear in mind that “*Wert*” also translates as “worth.” Ignoring the theories of value in 19th-century European political economy based on the economics of Adam Smith, Nietzsche resolutely concentrated his attack on the outmoded values of Christian **morality**. Having established that **God** is dead, it was Nietzsche’s central concern that the individual should be self-reliant in terms of **morality** rather than succumb to the weakening effects of the **ascetic ideal**. In this way, **nihilism** could be pursued in an **affirmative** rather

than **pessimistic** climate. Those unwilling to make the journey would remain in the **herd**. In *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche challenges us to go beyond such clichés as “good” and “evil” and undertakes his quest to find the origin and function of values.

In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche examines the etymology of the terms “good” and “bad” and links both of them to **power**. In former times (well before **Christianity**), **master morality** dictated what was to be seen as “good.” **Slave morality**, as set forth in the New Testament, avenged itself by declaring that slave characteristics (weakness, humility, poverty, **pity**, and so on) were “good.” In this way, early Christianity brought about **ressentiment** and slave values:

People have taken the *value* of these “values” as given, as factual, as beyond all questioning; up till now, nobody has had the remotest doubt or hesitation in placing higher value on “the good man” than on “the evil,” higher value in the sense of advancement, benefit and prosperity for man in general (and this includes man’s future). What if the opposite were true? (*OGM*, Preface: 6)

Nietzsche argues that modern man has been forced into a **life-denying** posture that has extinguished **aristocratic values**; these can be retrieved at an individual level in the self-creativity and self-overcoming of the *Übermensch*. Only then can “value” depend on the valuer, as it should. The danger is that it is not possible to have a society in which everybody decides what constitutes morality on an individual basis. Had Nietzsche lived to write *The Will to Power*, the book was scheduled to have the subtitle *Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values*. The notes left behind and posthumously assembled into the text of *The Will to Power* devote large sections to nihilism (book 1), revaluation of values (book 2), and, of course, the **concept** of “**the will to power**” (book 3).

**REVENTLOW, FRANZISKA ZU (1871–1918)**. German writer. A rebel from an aristocratic family that eventually disowned her for her profligate behavior, Franziska zu Reventlow came to a knowledge of Nietzsche via **Henrik Ibsen** (as did many others): she began to frequent the Lübeck Ibsen Club in 1889. From 1893 to 1895, she studied **art** in Munich, interrupting her studies to marry Walter Lübke, by whom she was swiftly divorced for adultery in 1896. Her son Rolf,

the great joy of her life, was born in 1897. Her autobiographical novel *Ellen Olesjerne* (1903) portrays these events. In Munich, Reventlow's hetaeric **lifestyle**, which she considered truly Nietzschean, was now an established fact; when Reventlow met **Ludwig Klages** in 1899, she became the female focus of the *die Kosmiker*, a group notorious for their erotic adventures and for a free lifestyle that was based on a pagan reading of **Johann Jakob Bachofen** and a **Dionysian** reading of Nietzsche. Reventlow and *die Kosmiker* believed that sexual promiscuity actually *was* female emancipation, a view at odds with German **feminism**, which Reventlow predictably despised.

Reventlow's affair with Klages and his quarrel with **Karl Wolfskehl**, with whom she also had an affair, are portrayed in her novel *Herrn Dames Aufzeichnungen (Mr. Lady's Jottings)*, (1913), a deliberate roman à clef. The novel also describes one of the orgiastic parties held by *die Kosmiker* at which a quarrel between Wolfskehl and **Alfred Schuler** nearly led to violence. As a result of this, *die Kosmiker* broke up in 1904. Reventlow went to live in Ascona in 1910.

**RICHTER, RAOUL (1871–1912)**. German academic and man of letters. Richter, a well-known lecturer at Leipzig University, read Nietzsche from 1889–1890 on. His monograph *Friedrich Nietzsche. Sein Leben und sein Werk. 15 Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universität Leipzig (Friedrich Nietzsche's Life and Work: 15 Lectures Held at Leipzig University)*, (1903) was extremely popular. Richter correctly assessed the importance Nietzsche would have as progenitor of a “truly **scientific** ethics of the future.” He also warned against those who tried to invalidate Nietzsche's late works because of his mental illness. However, in an essay titled “*Nietzsches Stellung zu Entwicklungslehre und Rassentheorie*” (“Nietzsche's Position on Evolutionary Doctrine and Racial Theory”), published in 1906, Richter claimed that Nietzsche belongs in the tradition of racial theory stretching from Joseph Arthur Gobineau right through to **Richard Wagner** and **Houston Stewart Chamberlain**. In this essay, Richter wrote, “Nietzsche was the first to highlight the close connection between racial anthropology and biological ethics (indeed, religion); before him, the significance of race for ethics had been made clear, but in an anti-biological manner (by Wagner), as it had been made clear, in a pro-biological manner, albeit without stress on ethics or re-

ligion (by modern anthropology).” Richter was present at Nietzsche’s burial in Röcken on 28 August 1900 and contributed condolences to the commemorative volume *Zur Erinnerung an Friedrich Nietzsche* (*In Memory of Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1900).

**RILKE, RAINER MARIA (1875–1926).** Austrian symbolist poet. Born in Prague into a family of civil servants, Rilke was sent to the (for him) highly unsuitable military training schools at St. Pölten and later Mährisch-Weißkirchen. He studied privately for his *Abitur* and then studied literature and art history. He met his first lover, **Lou Andreas-Salomé**, in 1897 when he was just 21 (she was 38). Together they traveled to Russia in 1899–1900. The high point of their trip was their meeting with **Leo Tolstoi**. In 1900, Rilke settled in the artists’ colony of Worpswede, where he married the sculptor Clara Westhoff, but his poetic nature could not tolerate domesticity, and he left her in 1902, apparently without acrimony on either side. In 1905, Rilke became Auguste Rodin’s secretary in Paris before embarking on journeys to North Africa, Egypt, and Spain. His *Neue Gedichte* (*New Poems*, 1907) sought to introduce readers to an entirely new way of looking at objects, whether inanimate or animate.

From 1911 to 1912, Rilke lived in Duino Castle on the Adriatic and wrote his famous *Duineser Elegien* (1923) there. These give an intensely personal account of what it is like to struggle with the problems of the new era. The “Angels” of the poems have been compared to Nietzsche’s *Übermensch*, though “the vital distinction between the two is that the Angel is fantasy and the *Übermensch* a prophecy” (Keith May, *Nietzsche and Modern Literature: Themes in Yeats, Rilke, Mann and Lawrence*, 1988). A much more accessible treatment of the same theme is found in Rilke’s only prose work, *Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge* (*The Jottings of Malte Laurids Brigge*, 1910). This is the work that most reveals Rilke’s debt to Nietzsche, though insofar as documentation of the debt goes, there is little beyond the certainty that, by 1904, Rilke was intoxicated by Nietzsche. After his one novel, in which the hero finds that he must either adapt to the demands of urban life or live within his own hermetically sealed imagination (Malte does the latter), Rilke began to write in a mode that made him, in Nietzschean terms, “the St. Francis of the **will to power**” (Erich Heller, *The Disinherited Mind*, 1961).

He thus shared Nietzsche's abhorrence of the **cultural** decline of the age but posed gentler solutions that are, in his *Sonette an Orpheus* (*Sonnets to Orpheus*, 1923), so personal and obscure as to virtually elude interpretation. More can be gleaned about Rilke's personal opinions as a young man from his autobiographical novella *Ewald Tragy*, which he wrote in Munich in 1898 but which was not widely known until 1958.

**RITSCHL, FRIEDRICH WILHELM (1806–1876)**. German philologist. From 1839, Ritschl taught Latin and **Greek** at Bonn University. Nietzsche, who enrolled at Bonn University in 1864, found refuge in Ritschl's discipline when he abandoned theology after the first semester. In 1865, Ritschl quarreled with his colleague Otto Jahn and accepted the offer of a chair at Leipzig, where Nietzsche and several other students joined him. Ritschl encouraged his most able students, and he thought highly of Nietzsche, giving him as the topic for a prize-winning essay the ancient historian of philosophy **Diogenes Laërtius**, knowing this would be suitable for Nietzsche—who won the competition. Ritschl subsequently recommended Nietzsche for the chair of philology in Basel, which Nietzsche accepted in 1869 when he was still only 24. Ritschl and his wife Sophie were hospitable toward Nietzsche, and Sophie Ritschl was a close friend of Otilie Brockhaus, **Richard Wagner**'s sister. When, in 1868, Wagner came to Leipzig to visit his sister, Sophie Ritschl arranged for Nietzsche to meet Wagner. Nietzsche was thus heavily in debt to both Professor Ritschl and his wife for contacts that changed his life.

**ROHDE, ERWIN (1845–1898)**. Professor of philology in Kiel, Tübingen, and finally Heidelberg, where he was vice-chancellor from 1894 to 1895. Rohde became a well-regarded established academic who would look back on his friendship with Nietzsche with some concern and not a little nostalgia. This friendship began during Nietzsche's student days at Leipzig University, from 1865 to 1869, and was cemented by a common interest in **Arthur Schopenhauer** rather than in philology, which both of them were studying. In 1869, Nietzsche was appointed professor of philology at Basel University. Rohde traveled to Italy in the same year; on his way back, he visited Nietzsche in Basel and was introduced to **Richard** and **Cosima**

**Wagner**, thus entering the “magic circle” that would soon decamp to Bayreuth. Rohde maintained his friendship with Cosima Wagner and **Franz Overbeck**, whom he had met (again through Nietzsche), until his death.

Rohde followed Nietzsche’s career with interest, having been one of the first to appreciate his genius. He wrote a favorable review of *The Birth of Tragedy* that appeared in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (25 May 1872), around the same time as the devastating attack on Nietzsche made by **Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff**. Rohde’s first attempt to counter the attack found no publisher, but in mid-October he was able to bring out his 48-page pamphlet *Afterphilologie. Zur Beleuchtung des von dem Dr. phil. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff herausgegebenen Pamphlets: “Zukunftsphilologie! Sendschreiben eines Philologen an Richard Wagner”* (*Inferior Philology: An Illumination of the Pamphlet Published by Dr. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff: “Philology of the Future! Open Letter to Richard Wagner from a Philologist”*). This merely spurred Wilamowitz-Möllendorff on to new heights of vitriol. Rohde now settled down to his academically conservative career, giving many guest lectures and publishing *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (*The Greek Novel and Its Antecedents*, 1876) and, much later, *Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen* (*Psyche: The Greeks’ Cult of the Soul and Belief in Immortality*, 1894). See also FRIENDSHIP.

**ROLLAND, ROMAIN (1866–1944)**. French novelist and dramatist and renowned humanist. Rolland was an admirer of Nietzsche from his youth, and it is perhaps ironic that in 1889, just when Nietzsche had cut himself off from many of his good friends (prior to becoming insane), Rolland took Nietzsche’s place with one of them, **Malwida von Meysenbug**, becoming her close friend and protégé until her death in 1903. What the much older Malwida enjoyed most about their friendship was their shared interest in **music**, and Rolland frequently played the piano for her, especially pieces by **Richard Wagner**. Rolland was professor of the history of music at the Sorbonne from 1904 until 1910 and wrote his best work during this period, the most renowned being the substantial novel *Jean-Christophe* (1904–1912), for which he received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1915.

He also wrote biographical works on Ludwig van Beethoven (1903), Georg Friedrich Händel (1910), and **Leo Tolstoi** (1911), among others, as well as successful plays.

Although he continued to read Nietzsche attentively and with appreciation, by late 1914 Rolland had reassessed his earlier opinion, believing that Nietzsche bore some responsibility for the moral collapse of Germany. He associated with **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** during the 1920s but withdrew his support from the *Nietzsche-Archiv* when Elisabeth and those close to her openly welcomed Fascism. In a letter to **Max Oehler** on 4 August 1933, he resigned from the *Gesellschaft der Freunde des Nietzsche-Archivs* because of what he saw as the group's glorification of **Benito Mussolini**.

**ROMANTICISM.** European movement in literature and the arts in reaction to the **Enlightenment**. Romanticism in Germany emerged in the first decade of the 19th century, often in the more mature works of writers and artists who had been young at the time of the French Revolution in 1789. **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe** and his close friend **Friedrich Schiller** (who bypassed Romanticism proper in favor of neoclassicism) had belonged to the “Storm and Stress” movement (*Sturm und Drang*), the curtain-raiser for German romanticism. **Immanuel Kant**'s transcendental philosophy provided the keystone for the work of J. G. Fichte (1762–1814) and Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854), but **German Idealism** would reach its apotheosis in the work of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**. The theologian **Friedrich Schleiermacher** was also an inspiration, especially to Protestant romantics.

All German romantics had an appreciation for the wonders of **nature**, and some felt, with Schelling, that nature was a manifestation of the Divine. Ludwig Tieck (1762–1814) and his friend and fellow ironist Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) were drawn to the rituals of Catholicism and converted to Rome, while others, like Clemens Brentano (1778–1842), were Catholic already, and others still, like Novalis and Kant, had been brought up in **Pietist** homes. All sought to restore the sense of the miraculous that had been banished in the Enlightenment. Novalis, whose real name was Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772–1801), best represented the prevalent cult of inwardness. German Romanticism came in many forms, but there was always an accent on the role of the imagination: **rationalism** was shunned. Ev-

ery German Romantic, as yet waiting and longing for unification, felt subjected to the whim of the ruler of his or her particular state (there were 48 after the Congress of Vienna in 1848). The ebullient **nationalism** of Joseph von Eichendorff (1788–1857) would turn to dismay at the failure of the revolutions all over Germany in 1848.

Nietzsche scatters hostile references to many of the Romantics throughout his work but rarely states his true objection to Romanticism as such. There were aspects of the movement that he surely shared, such as an appreciation of nature and a loathing for rationalism, but the religious overtones pervading the movement were anathema to him, while his reaction to Romantic philosophy was intense antipathy, though as the first essay of the *Untimely Meditations* shows, Nietzsche had some respect for Kant but none for Hegel and Schleiermacher. He no doubt also rejected the Romantics' (sporadic) concern for the common man as opposed to the **aristocrat**. In *The Gay Science*, he provides us with one telling objection: Romantic art is full of **suffering**, but it is a yearning of "reduced vitality" in comparison to the **Dionysian** suffering that stems from "overflowing vitality" (*GS*, V: 370).

The only Romantic writer Nietzsche really admired was Lord Byron (1788–1824). In *Manfred* (1817), Byron portrays a tragic hero wracked by guilt, a noble spirit who degrades himself by calling on Arimanes (Ahriman) to conjure up the spirit of his dead sister, Astarte. On his throne of fire, Arimanes, the spirit of evil, seems quite powerful enough to overturn the wise lord of Zoroastrianism, Ahura Mazda. (He also owes something to John Milton's Satan in *Paradise Lost*.) Nietzsche will have recognized the **Zarathustran** references in *Manfred* even if the British public largely did not; certainly, Byron's short drama inspired Nietzsche's thoughts on Zarathustra and the perpetual conflict between good and evil:

I must be profoundly related to *Byron's* Manfred: all these abysses I found in myself; at the age of thirteen, I was ripe for this work. I have no word, only a glance, for those who dare to pronounce the word "Faust" in the presence of Manfred. (*EH*, "Why I Am So Clever": 4)

Refer to Karl Joël, *Nietzsche und die Romantik* (1923).

**ROSENBERG, ALFRED (1893–1946)**. Ideologue of **National Socialism**. Born in Russian Estonia, Rosenberg had fought in the



Russian army during World War I, but after the Russian Revolution of 1917, he fled to Munich and, full of **anti-Semitism** and anti-Bolshevism, became a member of the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP) in April 1920. Rosenberg, now editor of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, took part in the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 and was appointed leader of the NSDAP while **Adolf Hitler** was in prison. His attempts to form a new National Socialist Freedom Party came to nothing, since “Rosenberg was incapable of administering or leading” (James Taylor and Warren Shaw, *A Dictionary of the Third Reich*, 1987). He made his mark by writing the famous *Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, 1930 (*The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, 1982). Here, he argues, the Nordic races have been prevented from rising to power by inferior races that Germany was duty-bound to repel. Rosenberg speciously invokes Nietzsche’s name at key points in his narrative. Diffuse though it was, the book became accepted as the unofficial manifesto of the National Socialists, second only to Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*.

Rosenberg was a welcome guest when he visited the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in May 1934 in the company of the jurist Hans Frank, a virulent anti-Semite who later became governor of Poland. In 1941, Rosenberg was appointed minister of the occupied Eastern territories, though he was actually all but snubbed by both the military and the SS (*Schutzstaffel*) executive. As aide to Hitler, he attended the celebration of the centenary of Nietzsche’s birth at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* and made a speech about Nietzsche’s role in Germany’s destiny; this was printed in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of 17 October 1944. In the same year, his book *Friedrich Nietzsche* appeared in the official National Socialist Press (*Zentralverlag der NSDAP*). At the Nuremberg trial in 1946, Rosenberg was found guilty of war crimes in Eastern Europe, and hanged.

**ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES (1712–1778)**. French writer and philosopher. Rousseau’s romantic novel *Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse*, 1761 (*Julie, or the New Éloïse*, 1968), was sensationally popular when it appeared. His *Du Contrat Social*, 1762 (*The Social Contract*, 1913), is credited with having provided ideological tinder for the French Revolution, something that Nietzsche could not forgive: “The bloody farce enacted by this revolution, its ‘immorality,’ does

not concern me much: what I hate is its Rousseauesque *morality*. . . . The doctrine of equality!" (*TI*, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 48). However, Nietzsche's chief criticism against Rousseau was not that he "called forth the Spirit of the Revolution" but that he halted progress: "It is this spirit that has for a long time banished the *spirit of the Enlightenment and of progressive evolution* (*HH*, I: "A Glance at the State": 463). Although Nietzsche agreed with Rousseau that man's **drives** have been warped by hypocritical religious codes, the recidivism in Rousseau's call for a "return to **nature**" contrasted with Nietzsche's advocacy of a return to nature as "a *going up*." Nietzsche demands rhetorically, "Rousseau—where did he really want to return to?" (*TI*, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 48).

Since Rousseau admired certain features of ancient **Greek** society, comparisons have been made with this aspect of Nietzsche's thought, but Rousseau's **democratic** political stance was at odds with that of Nietzsche, whose views on the **higher man** with **aristocratic** potential do not square with Rousseau's populism or with Rousseau's appeal to "feeling" as the criterion of existence (which was sometimes merely a rationalization of his own emotionalism). In fact, Nietzsche dismissed Rousseau's "unbridled vanity and unbridled self-contempt" (*TI*, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 48) and much preferred the work of Rousseau's rival and antagonist, the fellow **free spirit Voltaire**. It must be added, however, that in *Émile* (1762; trans. 1930), which purports to provide a blueprint for the **education** of a young gentleman, Rousseau gives a misogynist account of women's artifice that does not differ in essentials from Nietzsche's view of **woman** as displayed in his comments on the **eternal feminine**. Refer to Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche contra Rousseau: A Study of Nietzsche's Moral and Political Thought* (1991).

**ROYEAUMONT.** Venue near Paris of a decisive conference on Nietzsche held in 1964. Officially the Seventh International Philosophical Colloquium, the conference was devoted entirely to Nietzsche. There were several veteran Nietzscheans among those present, including Jean Wahl and Gabriel Marcel. The international delegation included **Karl Löwith**, Gianni Vattimo, Giorgio Colli, and Mazzino Montinari; it was here that the latter decided to bring out a critical edition of Nietzsche's works. Jean Beaufret drew parallels between

the work of **Martin Heidegger** and Nietzsche, and **Michel Foucault** spoke on Nietzsche, **Sigmund Freud**, and **Karl Marx**. Pierre Klossowski gave a paper on the concept of **eternal return**. The collected papers of the conference, titled *Nietzsche: Cahiers du Royaumeumont* and published in 1967, mark the beginning of what has latterly been known as the “**New Nietzsche**,” though the term itself is now becoming dated. It should be mentioned that the **existentialist** dimension to Nietzsche reception has been sustained in the works on eternal return of Klossowski (*Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux*, 1969; *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 1996) and **Maurice Blanchot** (*L’Entretien infini*, 1969), both of which appeared in the wake of “Royaumont.”

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**SAINT-POINT, VALENTINE DE (1875–1953)**. French **dancer** and theorist of dance. Saint-Point adopted Nietzsche’s ideas when she became a temporary member of the Italian **futurists** clustered around **Filippo Tommaso Marinetti**. In this capacity she accepted the misogynist rhetoric implicit and explicit in that movement, and indeed, in her outrageous “*Manifesto della Donna futurista*” (“Manifesto of Futurist Woman,” 1912) and “*Manifesto futurista della Lussuria*” (“Futurist Manifesto of Lust,” 1913), she delivered the most anti-feminist avant-garde documents to have been inspired by Nietzsche (which is saying something). In the “Manifesto of Futurist Woman,” she welcomed the irrational “essence” of **woman**, “the great galvanizing principle,” and in the “Futurist Manifesto of Lust,” she went so far as to say that after a battle, it is normal for men to rape the female survivors “so that **life** can be recreated.” She despised women who wanted to protect their sons from the battlefield and called for women to rediscover their own violent potential.

The only truly Nietzschean aspect of these texts is the correct assumption that Nietzsche recognized female **sexual** desire as **natural**. However, Saint-Point’s linkage of this desire with violence, which her use of the term “lust” seeks to convey, is entirely her own. In early 1914, having been attracted to Eastern mysticism, she moved to Egypt, where she became a Muslim and an Arab nationalist, using the name Rahouya Nour el Dine.

**SALIS-MARSCHLINS, META VON (1855–1925).** Swiss **feminist**.

From the Swiss aristocracy, Meta von Salis first met Nietzsche in Sils Maria when she was studying at Zurich University, though she had already met **Franziska Nietzsche** and **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** in Naumburg and was a friend and admirer of **Malwida von Meysenbug**. Meta von Salis helped Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche to purchase Villa Silberblick in 1896 so that a home could be provided for the sick Nietzsche and the growing archive of his works; shortly afterward, she became disenchanted with Elisabeth and withdrew her friendship. In her short monograph *Philosoph und Edelmensch. Ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik Friedrich Nietzsches (Philosopher and Gentleman: A Contribution on the Characteristics of Friedrich Nietzsche, 1897)*, Meta von Salis raised controversial feminist issues by endorsing Nietzsche's comments on the stupidity of many society **women**, although she herself was an active campaigner for women's rights until the turn of the century. However, the chief burden of her monograph on Nietzsche is wholehearted support for his notion of **aristocratic values**. *See also* FRIENDSHIP.

**SALOMÉ.** *See* ANDREAS-SALOMÉ, LOU.

**SANTAYANA, JORGE (LATER GEORGE) (1863–1952).** Spanish philosopher born in Madrid. Santayana came to the United States to study at Harvard, completing his Ph.D. there under the pragmatist William James. He taught with James and Josiah Royce as a professor of philosophy from 1899 to 1911. His humanist thought, as expressed in *The Life of Reason* (1905–1906), was characteristically skeptical: the world of the spirit was nonexistent. Santayana shared much in common with Nietzsche in this work, declaring reason to be random and wholly inadequate to provide meaning for **life**. He also examines **aesthetic** principles in a manner similar to that of Nietzsche, though unlike Nietzsche he adhered to **Arthur Schopenhauer's pessimism**. To his colleagues' surprise, Santayana returned to Europe permanently in 1912. He spent the war years in Oxford, where he wrote *Egotism and German Philosophy* (1916). Here, he turned against German philosophy and included Nietzsche's attack on **morality** as one of the causes of World War I. He finally settled in Rome in 1924. In his four-volume *Realms of Being* (1928–1940),

Santayana held that matter is prior to the other realms and conducted an ontological survey of naturalist metaphysics with great aplomb. During World War II, Santayana rented rooms in a Catholic nursing home. When Rome was liberated in 1944, he found that he was something of a cult figure with Americans, many of whom came to Italy to pay him their respects. *See also* RATIONALISM.

**SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL (1905–1980).** French philosopher and author. Sartre's first novel, *La Nausée*, 1937 (*Nausea*, 1965), began a trend whereby he expressed his deepest philosophical convictions through creative work, as in the plays *Les Mouches*, 1943 (*The Flies*, 1946), and *Huis Clos*, 1945 (*In Camera*, 1946). The tenets of the philosophical school of **existentialism** that Sartre founded are set out in *L'être et le néant*, 1943 (*Being and Nothingness*, 1957). Sartre even founded his own journal to further the movement, *Les temps modernes* (*Modern Times*). In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre describes the way an individual has to accept his contingent position in a world without **God**; only by acknowledging responsibility for his or her own action can that individual be "authentic." Although there is clearly a debt to Nietzsche on the question of **nihilism** and, indeed, authenticity (what else is the self-created *Übermensch* if not authentic in that sense?), Sartre was also deeply influenced by Edmund Husserl and **Martin Heidegger**. Indeed, his ideas on **metaphysics** are directly inspired by Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, 1927 (*Being and Time*, 1949).

After World War II, Sartre embraced **Marxism**, though he was critical of the French Communist Party, making a complete break with it in favor of Maoism in 1968. By this time, both he and his long-term friend and partner, Simone de Beauvoir, had turned their backs on Nietzsche, whose lack of political commitment was no longer in accord with their philosophy. *See also* NAUSEA; SOCIALISM.

**SCHELER, MAX (1874–1928).** German philosopher and sociologist. As a professor at Cologne University, Scheler was at first a phenomenologist, though he soon went beyond the ideas of his teacher, Edmund Husserl, and for a time, notably during World War I, embraced Nietzscheanism, as in *Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg* (*The Genius of War and the German War*, 1915). This is a hymn to *Lebensphilosophie* in a context that insists on

debating the meaning of the war. For Scheler, it meant either a new beginning for **Europe** or the end. In *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen*, 1915 (*Ressentiment*, 1961), Scheler thought that **resentiment** was produced by a **culture** that despised the **body**—here he concurred with Nietzsche’s views on the harmful effects of suppressing man’s instincts, as set out in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. However, Scheler laid the blame on the bourgeoisie rather than on **Christianity**.

Scheler was at pains “to identify the crucial differences between the **animal** and the human world” (Georg Stauth and Brian S. Turner, *Nietzsche’s Dance*, 1988), and in *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, 1928 (*Man’s Place in Nature*, 1962), he criticized earlier philosophical systems, which he believed had omitted the biological and **sexual** side of **life**. In 1920, Scheler converted to Catholicism and for four years concentrated on religious philosophy until, in the last four years of his life, he became interested in the sociology of **power**. His major work was *Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens*, 1926 (*Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*, 1980).

**SCHILLER, FRIEDRICH (1759–1805)**. German writer. A native of Marbach, in 1789 Schiller settled at Jena, where he taught **history** at the university until he finally moved to Weimar in 1799 to be near his great friend, **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**. After his “Storm and Stress” play *Die Räuber* (*The Robbers*, 1781), Schiller wrote high-minded dramas such as *Maria Stuart* (1800) as well as a number of poems. Among the latter is “*An die Freude*” (“Ode to Joy”), which features climactically in Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony and was much admired by Nietzsche.

Nietzsche’s engagement with Schiller comes into play over Schiller’s seminal work on **aesthetics**, *Über naive und sentimentale Dichtung* (*On Naive and Sentimental Writing*, 1795–1796). In this work, Schiller discusses a “naive” or spontaneous aesthetic outpouring that sounds similar, in many respects, to Nietzsche’s **metaphysical concept** of **Dionysus**, but Nietzsche’s description of the **Apollonian** bears no resemblance to what Schiller understood by “sentimental,” in its 18th-century meaning of “reflective.” Although much of Schiller’s argument on what constitutes beauty was inspired by the work of **Immanuel Kant**, Nietzsche, in *The Birth of Tragedy*

(*BT*: 7/8), found Schiller's judgment on tragedy eminently sound. However, in his late work *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, Nietzsche is critical of "Schiller, the 'noble' Schiller, who lambasted the ears of the Germans with big words" (*NCW*: 3). Refer to Nicholas Martin, *Nietzsche and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics* (1996).

**SCHLAF, JOHANNES (1862–1941)**. German writer. A sharp critic of Nietzsche in a very early review of *Beyond Good and Evil* for the *Allgemeine Deutsche Universitätszeitung* that appeared in 1887, Schlaf continued his attack in an article titled "Prüderie" written for *Die freie Bühne* in 1890, where Nietzsche and **Dionysus** are both described as "sick and unfree victims of prudery." Schlaf, in conjunction with Arno Holz, was the theoretical founder of the **Naturalist movement in Germany**. Their plan was to invigorate the language of drama through *Sekundenstil*, a **style** that "laboriously produces the impression of every ticking second of time" (Jethro Bithell, *Germany: A Companion to German Studies*, 1962). Their pioneering three novellas appeared under the title *Papa Hamlet* in 1889. In 1907, Schlaf again attacked Nietzsche with his substantial book *Der "Fall" Nietzsche. Eine "Überwindung"* (*The Case of Nietzsche: An "Overcoming,"* 1907). Here, he dubs Nietzsche "the last Romantic," "the last Humanist," and a "pure example of hopeless European decadence," though he finally concedes that "the ending of *Zarathustra* is great." See also WIDMAN, JOSEF VIKTOR.

**SCHLEIERMACHER, FRIEDRICH (1768–1834)**. German theologian. From early youth a nonradical **Pietist**, Schleiermacher became professor of theology at Halle University in 1801 but moved in 1807 to Berlin, where he became pastor of Trinity Church in 1809 and professor of theology at Wilhelm von Humboldt's new university in 1810. Schleiermacher argued, in his *Reden über die Religion (Lectures on Religion, 1799)*, that an individual needed an intermediary to act as a guiding light in order to achieve self-knowledge and that self-knowledge was tantamount to religion: indeed, one scarcely needed **God** in order to be religious. Feeling was all. The usual intermediary, however, was Christ. Signs and symbols illuminated the inner path that brought about a revelation (*Offenbarung*), producing a sense of wonder that, for Schleiermacher, had a religious connota-

tion. Schleiermacher argued that slumber is the epitome of the rest (*Ruhe*) so prized by the Pietist and that dreams are merely the vehicle for signs and wonder to break down the gulf between the individual and the Divine.

Commonly held to be the father of modern Protestantism, Schleiermacher was a gentle, some would say holy, man; he was revered among the **German Romantics** and much loved in Berlin, where 20,000 to 30,000 mourners joined his funeral procession. In sum, the tolerant Schleiermacher was hard to dislike, though Nietzsche occasionally made the effort, chiefly attacking Schleiermacher's mysticism. He said it all in **Ecce Homo** when he placed Schleiermacher's name on his index of "unconscious counterfeits": "Fichte, Schelling, **Schopenhauer**, **Hegel** and Schleiermacher deserve this epithet as well as **Kant** and Leibniz: they are all mere **veil-makers**" (*EH*, "The Case of Wagner": 3; "Schleiermacher" literally means "veil maker"). Paradoxically, both Schleiermacher and Nietzsche wished for the same thing for their fellow humans: self-knowledge. *See also* GERMAN IDEALISM.

**SCHNITZLER, ARTHUR (1862–1931)**. Austrian **Jewish** writer. Schnitzler was an eminent physician before the success of his early plays *Anatol* (1892; trans. 1982) and *Liebelei*, 1896 (*Playing with Love*, 1914), led him to become a full-time writer. The notorious play *Reigen*, 1900 (*Merry-go-Round*, 1953), now known as *La Ronde* (1955), exposes **sexual** hypocrisy at every level of society. As the correspondence between Schnitzler and **Hugo von Hofmannsthal** demonstrates, Schnitzler was reading Nietzsche attentively in 1891 and was particularly struck by *Beyond Good and Evil*. He alludes to Nietzsche directly in his short story *Sterben* (*Dying*, 1894), but apart from that there are no specific references to Nietzsche in Schnitzler's work until *Der Weg ins Freie*, 1908 (*The Road to the Open*, 1923), an autobiographical novel. Schnitzler introduced a Jewish theme into the play *Professor Bernhardt* (1912; trans. 1927), but his reputation rests on his "subtle portrayal of erotic entanglements and sexual frustration in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna" (Malcolm Humble/Ray Furness, *Introduction to German Literature*, 1994). Refer to Roland Duhamel, "Schnitzler and Nietzsche," in *Amsterdamer Beiträge zur neueren Germanistik* 4 (1975).



**SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR (1788–1860).** German philosopher.

A native of Danzig, Schopenhauer's chief work was *Die Welt als Wille und Erscheinung*, 1819 (*The World as Will and Representation*, 1969). Here, his **pessimistic** philosophy is expounded in four books dealing in turn with the theory of **knowledge**, the philosophy of **nature**, **aesthetics**, and ethics. Schopenhauer asserts that the world is "representation," that is, the creation of our perceiving mind. The only way we can have knowledge is through the self: either the self as object in space and **time** or the inner self as repository for sensations and desires—in other words, the will. **Body** and will are thus inseparable. The will is an appetite for **life**—*Wille zum Leben*—that causes conflict between individuals, since all are blindly driven by their will. The result of this inevitable conflict is **suffering**, which is not fortuitous but the purpose of existence. Pain is the essence of life. The only amelioration of the situation can come about through contemplation of the will by means of the intellect.

Deeply influenced by Vedantic and **Buddhist** thought, Schopenhauer recommended the suspension of the will by contemplation as a form of negation or nirvana. The will can be negated only by an ascetic lifestyle. To "will less," we must sympathize with the **suffering** of others. The good man will practice altruism, chastity, and fasting. **Happiness** is a reduction in the level of pain; sometimes this can be achieved through the "disinterested" contemplation of a work of **art**, which can lift the **veil** of Maya (illusion) so that the individual can perceive reality as illusion and thus achieve self-consciousness. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche also used the **concept** of "the veil of Maya," but he denied the value of Schopenhauerian compassion, and, though like Schopenhauer he held art in high esteem, nothing came higher on his list of priorities than life itself: one's life was, in fact, a work of art, something one "created."

In his later works, Nietzsche attacked Schopenhauer with great gusto, but as a young man he was under his spell. Part of the attraction of **Richard Wagner** for Nietzsche when they met in 1868 was that Wagner was also a convinced Schopenhauerian. In "Schopenhauer as Educator," the third essay of the *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche berates society for its poor level of **education** and faulty understanding of philosophy, hardly mentioning Schopenhauer, though he is still an admirer, but in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche makes an apology to

his readers for having been misled by Schopenhauer (and Wagner): “It is obvious that at that time I misunderstood what constitutes the veritable character both of philosophical pessimism and German **music**,—namely, their *Romanticism*” (*GS*, V: 370).

It is plausible that Nietzsche’s **antifeminism** stemmed at least in part from Schopenhauer, who, like Nietzsche, had a difficult relationship with his mother and sister but, unlike Nietzsche, made a complete and acrimonious break with both women. Schopenhauer accused his widowed mother, the novelist Johanna Schopenhauer, of “loose living” and left his beloved Weimar for good, losing touch with his sister Adèle, who was also a putative writer. For whatever reasons, both men came to be counted as the two great misogynists of their age. Refer to Otto Most, *Zeitliches in Europa in der Philosophie Nietzsches und Schopenhauers* (1977) and Christopher Tonaway, ed. *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator* (1998). See also PITY; *DER ÜBERMENSCH*.

**SCHULER, ALFRED (1865–1923)**. German thinker and private lecturer. In 1897, Schuler became the leader of *die Kosmiker*. This newly founded esoteric group was convinced that an orgiastic heathen lifestyle could rekindle the “fiery blood” (*Lebensglut*) of ancient civilizations. From the Reformation on, only certain rare individuals could experience an ancient *Blutleuchte*, or flash of blood. To reinforce his point, Schuler declared that he was a reincarnation of a Roman legionary and dressed accordingly, even when not at a party. Schuler spoke of the mystical unifying powers of *Volk* that a group of initiates could summon; he was so sure of his capacity to reawaken hidden occult creative powers that he planned a special cultic dance to heal Nietzsche, though it was not actually performed. *Die Kosmiker* sought to awaken a new Nietzschean consciousness based on the life of the instincts and inspired by mother right, as expounded by **Johann Jakob Bachofen**. **Jews**, being fundamentally patriarchal, were much vilified within the circle, in spite of the fact that **Karl Wolfskehl**, who had founded the group with **Ludwig Klages**, was a Jew. The quarrel between Schuler and Wolfskehl flared up at a party held in January 1904 that nearly ended in violence, with the result that the group broke up, unable to resolve the internal conflicts brought about by the **anti-Semitism** of Schuler and Klages. Schuler, in particular, was rabidly anti-Semitic, in-

sulting all those, dead or alive, whom he considered to be unresponsive to vitalism: he even labeled **Martin Luther** a Jew. He despised individualism, departing here from Nietzsche, who was otherwise hailed as “cosmic man” within the group. Refer to Baal Müller, ed., *Cosmogonische Augen. Alfred Schuler. Gesammelte Schriften (Cosmogenic Eyes: Alfred Schuler: Collected Works, 1997)*.

**SCIENCE (DIE WISSENSCHAFT)**. This term merely designates academic **knowledge** in German (in contrast to the process of cognition) and is usually used with a cognate (as in *Naturwissenschaft* = **natural science**); it is far less strong than the English term “science.” According to Nietzsche, the broader field of science (“systematized knowledge”) has—like **morality** and **Christianity**—led man down fallacious paths, frequently passing off manipulation as “the **truth**” when only **art** is true because it embraces **metaphor**. Hence, the whole scientific quest is one that Nietzsche rejects outright for its harmful effects on **culture**:

Science [*Wissenschaft*] is related to wisdom as virtuousness is related to holiness; it is cold and dry. . . . As long as what is meant by culture is essentially the promotion of science, culture will pass the great **suffering** human being by with pitiless coldness, because science sees everywhere only problems of cognition [*Erkenntnis*] and because within the world of the sciences suffering is really something improper and incomprehensible, thus at best only one more problem. (*UM*, III: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 5)

Nietzsche points out that although we pride ourselves on the impartiality of scientific knowledge, our faith in science still rests on a **metaphysical** foundation, contaminating our drive for knowledge from the outset. Refer to Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer, *Nietzsche and Science* (2004). See also DARWIN.

**DIE SELBSTÜBERWINDUNG**. See *DER ÜBERMENSCH*.

**SEXUALITY**. Nietzsche praised the instinctual **life** and heralded sexuality as joyful and **natural**. He attacked the attempts of the **ascetic priest** to poison the pleasures of the flesh and was viewed by many early Nietzscheans as the herald of erotic libertarianism. Although there are passages in Nietzsche’s works where a hetaeric lifestyle

for women is advocated (e.g., *HH*, I: “Woman and Child,” 424), Nietzsche, the Wilhelmine gentleman, remained fundamentally puritanical in matters concerning **woman’s** maternal function. He resolved the conflict by positing the idea that the sexually aroused woman wants nothing other than to be impregnated: “Has my answer been heard to the question how one *cures* a woman—‘redeems’ her? One gives her a child” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 5). Forgetting his own maxims on freedom for the individual, Nietzsche castigated **feminists** as lesbians “incapable of giving birth.” He was also (but less stridently) scathing of effeminacy in men (*OGM*, III: 26). If we disentangle the misogyny from Nietzsche’s remarks on sexuality, we are left with a clear plea for frankness in a domain where pleasure, not bad **con-science**, should dominate. *See also* SYPHILIS.

**SHAW, GEORGE BERNARD (1856–1950)**. Irish playwright. Shaw’s Fabianism acted as a filter to his reception of Nietzsche. He first heard of Nietzsche in 1890 but read nothing by him first-hand until 1896. Having, to his great satisfaction, shocked the British public with *Plays Pleasant and Unpleasant* (1898)—*Mrs. Warren’s Profession* was banned—Shaw turned his attention to the **eugenics movement** and developed his own theory of the **life force**, a **power** that, with the help of those concerned, raises individuals to a higher and better existence. Although Shaw asserted that Nietzsche had exerted little influence over him, the title for his play *Man and Superman* (1903) is clearly borrowed from Nietzsche; however, the creative revolution he seeks to postulate owes more to **Charles Darwin** and **Henri Bergson** than to Nietzsche. Possibly Shaw’s admiration for **Henrik Ibsen**, whom Nietzsche loathed, persuaded him to keep Nietzsche at a safe distance, and there is little discernible influence in such plays as *Pygmalion* (1912) or *Saint Joan* (1924), which are arguably Shaw’s masterpieces.

**SHESTOV, LEV (1866–1938)**. (Actual surname: Schwarzmann.) Russian writer and thinker much influenced by Nietzsche. Himself an adherent of the “new religion” propounded by **Dimitri Merezhkovsky** and his circle, Shestov, who read Nietzsche in the late 1890s, abandoned **rationality** in favor of a questing faith that has been compared to the thought of **Søren Kierkegaard**, though Shestov did

not read the latter until the late 1920s. Shestov admired Nietzsche's uncompromising refusal to place any faith in **eternal truths** and in *Dobro v uchenii gr. Tolstogo i F. Nitshe: Filosofija i tropoved*, 1900 (*The Good in the Teaching of Tolstoi and Nietzsche*, 1969), contrasted Nietzsche's honest quest for new **values** with the "implicit substitution of goodness for **God**" (Edith Clowes, *Revolution in Moral Consciousness: Nietzsche in Russian Literature 1890–1914*, 1988), as found in the work of **Leo Tolstoi**. Both Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche are favorably compared to Tolstoi in *Dostoevskii i Nitshe: Filosofija tragedii*, 1902–1903 (*Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: The Philosophy of Tragedy*, 1969).

**SIMMEL, GEORG (1858–1918)**. German cultural critic, essayist, and early sociologist. Simmel's work was truly interdisciplinary, though he is best known for his investigation into the impact of money relations within society, as in *Die Philosophie des Geldes*, 1907 (*The Philosophy of Money*, 1978). Of **Jewish** descent, Simmel tried to confront the issues of modern urban life from the standpoint of *Lebensphilosophie*.

Simmel was a firm Nietzschean, at pains to defend Nietzsche from the accusation that he encouraged egoism. His strongest polemic was directed at **Ferdinand Tönnies**, whom he accused of having wrongly tarnished Nietzsche with the accusation of immoralism. For his part, Tönnies denigrated as superficial what Simmel most valued in Nietzsche's work: the **concept** of *Vornehmheit*, or "distinction." Tönnies, whose ideal was that of *Gemeinschaft* (community), was offended by Nietzsche's pronouncements on "the **herd**," whereas Simmel thought that the **pathos of distance** was essential so that the individual could be disentangled from the herd. Simmel's views on Nietzsche are found in his collection of printed lectures titled *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche. Ein Vortragszyklus*, 1907 (*Schopenhauer and Nietzsche*, 1986). Simmel here criticized Nietzsche for failing to recognize the similarity between his own views and the tenets of **Christianity**, as both place value on inner qualities. By the same token, Simmel accused **Max Stirner** of sophistry regarding the individual. Refer to Klaus Lichtblau, "Das Pathos der Distanz: Präliminarien zur Nietzsche-Rezeption bei Georg Simmel" ("The Pathos of Distance: Preliminary Remarks on Georg Simmel's Reception of Nietzsche"),

in Heinz-Jürgen Dahme and Otthein Rammstedt, eds., *Georg Simmel und die Moderne (Georg Simmel and the Moderns, 1984)*.

**SLAVE MORALITY (DIE SKLAVENMORAL).** Nietzsche thought the **ascetic ideal** inculcated a servile **morality** in **Christianity** and all other religions that taught believers they would be rewarded in another **life** for privations endured in this life (thus nurturing their **ressentiment**). The clergy has secured control over the anxious and **suffering** flock, or **herd**, by telling them that their own sins have caused their suffering. A perverted view of what is right or wrong, good and evil, has been the result. Nietzsche argued for a **revaluation of values**, believing that slave morality was anti-**life** and produced “bad **conscience**” and negative values:

The beginning of the slave revolt in morality occurs when *ressentiment* itself turns creative and gives birth to values. . . . Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant “yes” to itself, slave morality says “no” on principle to everything that is “outside,” “other,” “non-self”: and this “no” is its creative deed. (*OGM* I: 10)

Nietzsche’s antidote to herd man and, by extension, to the problem of slave morality is the *Übermensch*, a hypothetical man of the future whose **natural** superiority will manifest itself in **master morality**.

**SOCIALISM.** The General German Worker’s Association (*der Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeiterverein*) was founded in 1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle, a rival of **Karl Marx**; the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*) was founded by August Bebel and Karl Liebknecht in 1869; the two parties merged in 1875 into the Socialist Workers’ Party (*Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei*). In 1890, this became the German Social Democratic Party (*Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* [SPD]) when the *Sozialistengesetz* was revoked. The latter was a law whereby **Otto von Bismarck** had banned socialism during the years 1878–1890. The new party adopted the Erfurt program, which vaunted the Marxist doctrine of abolition of class rule and of class itself.

Nietzsche repeatedly insulted socialism in his work, linking it to his fear that **Europe** was on a downward slide toward *décadence*, and much of his philosophy was intended as a corrective to this danger. It is obvious why Nietzsche, firmly convinced of the benefit of

**aristocratic values** and deeply suspicious of any form of altruism, should loathe the burgeoning new movement. He lumped it together with **utilitarianism**, **democracy**, and (illogically, in view of Marxian hostility to religion) **Christian morality**, seeing socialists as would-be philanthropists set on weakening society by encouraging mediocrity. The Marxist doctrine of economic equality was anathema to Nietzsche, who saw it as an example of **ressentiment** that would give power to **herd** man: “Whom among today’s rabble do I hate the most? The Socialist rabble” (A-C, 57). Nietzsche’s chief aspiration was that the solitary *Übermensch* should create his own fateful destiny. Had he been more interested in daily politics (he refused to read the newspapers), he would have been even more worried about the inroads Marxism was making into **German** politics. *See also* THE STATE.

**SOCRATES (ca. 469–399 B.C.)**. Ancient **Greek** philosopher. Although we can glean his opinions only secondhand from **Plato**’s Dialogues, it is clear that Socrates believed that man should acquire **knowledge** by a method of logical thinking. He instructed others by feigning ignorance and by thus drawing out their opinions and exposing their inconsistencies. He insisted that he was no cleverer than other men; he simply knew the extent of his ignorance better. His method of questioning was sometimes intrusive and resented; finally, he was accused of corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to death by drinking hemlock. Nietzsche found the whole **concept** of Socrates’ philosophical method repugnant, especially the placing of the **drives** on a lower scale than intelligence. Nietzsche thought this denial of the instincts ran directly counter to the **Dionysian** impulse in **Greek tragedy**, and in his later works the dichotomy between **Apollo** and Dionysus, as set out in *The Birth of Tragedy*, became a dichotomy between Dionysus and Socrates. Nietzsche blamed Socrates directly for the extinction of Greek tragedy, which had originated as a festival in honor of Dionysus and died out by the end of the fifth century B.C., with no apparent explanation. To Nietzsche it was anathema to preach the superiority of dry logic over the **body**, but he had some admiration for Socrates, too, since the latter’s belief in a system of nobility of spirit was not unlike Nietzsche’s own belief in **aristocratic values**. Refer to Hermann Josef Schmidt, *Nietzsche*

*und Sokrates. Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Nietzsches Sokratesbild (Nietzsche and Socrates: Philosophical Investigations into Nietzsche's Portrayal of Socrates, 1969); Werner J. Dannhuser, Nietzsche's View of Socrates (1974); and Michel Guérin, Nietzsche: Socrate héroïque (1975).*

**SOLOVIEV, VLADIMIR (1853–1900).** Russian philosopher. Soloviev was strongly influenced by **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** and **Friedrich Schleiermacher**. A devout Protestant, Soloviev turned from an early radicalism to a complicated **Christian** humanism in which he tried to reconcile his admiration for Nietzsche's vitalism with his disapproval of what he saw as the egoism of the *Übermensch*. Using the idea of correspondences, Soloviev thought that man should be in harmony with his surroundings, just as plants and animals are with cosmic development; he would become man-**God** through a secularized version of *sobornost*, a term that originally referred to the unity of man and God through the sacrament of Holy Communion.

Soloviev's mysticism deeply influenced **symbolism** in Russia, in particular the work of the writers **Vyacheslav Ivanov**, **Alexander Blok**, and **Andrei Bely**, especially in its insistence on the matriarchal principle enshrined in the transcendent image of "Divine Sophia." Naturally, there is a conflict here with Nietzsche's disapproval of anything that smacked of the "**eternal feminine**." Soloviev's encounter with Nietzsche was further complicated by the fact that his figure of the Anti-Christ is, like Milton's Satan, essentially dynamic and compelling. In his utopian and futuristic *Short Tale on the Anti-Christ* (1900), the final part of *Tri razgovora (Three Conversations)* set in the 21st century, Soloviev portrays an Anti-Christ, also referred to as an *Übermensch* and as a man of the future, who is in conflict with the forces of good and is ultimately vanquished.

Although Soloviev was not opposed to **Darwinism** as such, his ideas led to a reaction against materialism in Russian intellectual circles. In his positive and **affirmative** form of Christian philosophy, he preached that the end of the world would bring about the end of death and that, after a struggle between the powers of good and the powers of evil, God's reign on earth would be established. *See also* GERMAN IDEALISM.



**SOREL, GEORGES (1847–1922).** French thinker. Sorel founded the revolutionary syndicalist movement in France. His thought provided a decisive intellectual stimulus for **Benito Mussolini**. From 1896, Sorel undertook a reinterpretation of **Marxism**, declaring central tenets such as the general strike to be myths to inspire the working class to direct action. Sorel rejected the belief that Marxist theory could have a scientifically exact application. His principal work, *Réflexions sur la violence*, which appeared in newspapers in 1906 and in book form in 1908 (*Reflections on Violence*, 1972), contained a brief chapter on Nietzsche, from which one can deduce that he merely used those of Nietzsche's ideas that coincided with his own purpose: notions such as **master morality**, contempt for the **herd**, and the justification of violence. For Sorel, the equivalent of the strong, marauding heroes of **Homer** were the “modern Yankees,” the new supermen in the world of commerce and industry, and the antidote to their power lay in the organized violence of the masses. Sorel's work appealed to extremists both left and right in France (*Action Française* as well as the communists) and was assumed to be inspired by Nietzsche's irrationalism, although the crudeness of Sorel's political stance was fundamentally alien to Nietzsche's thought.

**SORGE, REINHARD (1892–1916).** German dramatist and poet of central importance for **expressionism**. Sorge used stark methods of character portrayal (his characters were referred to by common rather than proper nouns) within the scenario of a dream world. He broke new ground with his one “hit,” *Der Bettler* (*The Beggar*, 1910), in which the typically expressionist father–son conflict is central to the plot. Two earlier plays, *Odysseus* and *Prometheus*, show the influence of Nietzsche, but Sorge subsequently turned away from what he saw as the harshness of Nietzscheanism and converted to Roman Catholicism. In his *Gericht über Zarathustra. Eine Vision* (*Judgement on Zarathustra: A Vision*, 1912), he attacked Nietzsche. Nevertheless, in Sorge's plays, “a desire for self-expression is found, a vital release stemming above all from Nietzsche” (Malcolm Humble/Ray Furness, *Introduction to German Literature*, 1994). Sorge's short life ended when he was killed in active service at the front: he was 24.

**SOUL.** Nietzsche regarded the teaching that man has an immortal soul as pernicious, since that gave **Christianity** the excuse to preach that the soul was eternal and therefore needed salvation. In addition, he objected to the “**scientific**” arguments that atoms could have a soul, a view held from antiquity. Democritus had speculated that sensations are produced by emissions from other atoms on the atoms of the soul; for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, monads (divisible atoms) can have a soul. Nietzsche coined a phrase for this branch of error: “*Seelen-Atomistik*” (“soul atomism”). It needed surgical removal, “a remorseless war of the knife” (*BGE*, I: 12):

Let this expression be allowed to designate that belief which regards the soul as being something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an *atomon*: *this* belief ought to be ejected from science [*Wissenschaft*]! (*BGE*, I: 12)

However, Nietzsche goes on to say that the soul can survive as a hypothesis and suggests **concepts** that science could usefully embrace: “mortal soul,” “soul as multiplicity of the subject,” and “soul as special structure of the **drives** and emotions” (*BGE*, I: 12). He quite happily used the term on many occasions throughout his works, often expanding it into a phrase, such as “living touchstones of the soul” (i.e., **consciousnesses** that will overcome **morality**; *BGE*, II: 32), while expressions like “**Greek** soul” are legion. At the end of the day, though, Nietzsche believed that “there is no soul” (*NW*, “Where I Make Objections”). His main objection to **René Descartes** was the latter’s presumption that man was a union of body and mind/soul (the two being equivalents). “If we relinquish the soul, ‘the subject,’ the precondition for ‘substance’ in general disappears” (*WP*, II: 485). *See also* NATURAL SCIENCE.

**SPENCER, HERBERT (1820–1903).** English sociologist who preempted **Charles Darwin** and Alfred Russel Wallace with his ideas on evolution, though his theory that evolution took place through the inheritance of acquired characteristics was forced to give way to the Darwinian discovery of natural selection. (Spencer, not Darwin, coined the phrase “the survival of the fittest” in his *Principles of Biology*, 1864.) Nietzsche wrote of Spencer’s theory—within the context of a critique of **democracy**—“this is to misunderstand the essence of **life**, its *will to power*” (*OGM*, II:

12). Spencer predicted that individualism (which he vigorously advocated) would come into its own only after an unwelcome period of **socialism** and war. Nevertheless, Nietzsche insisted on classing him as a **utilitarian** socialist: “Our Socialists are *décadents*, but Mr. Herbert Spencer is also a *décadent*—he sees in the victory of altruism something desirable! . . .” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 37).

**SPENGLER, OSWALD (1880–1936)**. Spengler is best known for his celebrated *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (I: 1918; II: 1922; *The Decline of the West*, 1934), a work that examines **culture** from both a diachronic and a syncretic angle: ancient civilizations are scoured to see what made them rise and decline, while contemporary cultures, such as that in North America, are examined for explanations of cultural stagnation. Nietzsche is mentioned sporadically throughout *Decline of the West*, where the argument ranges from penetrating to obscure and even banal: some rather obvious remarks are made to prove the point that the diet of a people or **Volk** alters their thought processes. For Spengler, the national priorities are “the maintenance of the blood, the succession of the generations, the cosmic, **woman**, and **power**.” Spengler’s idiosyncratic exegesis covered all **art** forms—**music**, architecture, even handwriting.

Spengler’s central premise is that Faustian man, in contrast to **Apollonian** man, whose belief in technology has become a materialistic religion, has been in decline since 1789. With this central premise that since the French Revolution culture has sunk into mere civilization, Spengler also differentiates between “totem,” the **affirmative** attitude of the man of action, and “taboo,” all that is bureaucratic and negative. The totemic aspect underpins Spengler’s own form of *Lebensphilosophie*. Spengler argues that “good” and “evil” are taboo concepts, unlike the totemic “good and bad.” Civilization is “the extinction of nobility,” and “nobility is cosmic and plant like.” Spengler’s hatred of the priesthood exceeds even that of Nietzsche. Spengler is again on the attack in *Der Mensch und die Technik*, 1931 (*Man and Technology*, 1932), where he spells out the evils of technology and, incidentally, reopens the question of diet. Carnivores seek prey, but vegetarians *are* prey. Man is a beast of prey, but more so in some races (**master** races) than others.

In July 1920, Spengler was an honored guest at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* when he visited Weimar. In 1923, he was invited to join the committee of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv*, and he was also invited to join the committee of the *Gesellschaft der Freunde des Nietzsche-Archivs* when it was formed in 1926, but he became increasingly ill at ease with the strident tone of **nationalism** to be found at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* and resigned from his position on the executive in 1935. Although he had coupled Nietzsche's name with that of the German *Volk*, Spengler became disillusioned with **National Socialism**. His *Jahre der Entscheidung* (*Years of Decision*, 1933) provoked a government ban on his work. A broken man, Spengler withdrew into isolation.

**SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632–1677)**. Jewish philosopher resident in Holland who abandoned Judaism in favor of an atheistic pantheism. His significance for **European** philosophy was such that all later philosophers built on his system. His most renowned work is his *Ethics* (1677). As Nietzsche told **Franz Overbeck** in a letter of 30 July 1881, he was at one with this “most abnormal, most solitary thinker” on five principal points: “[Spinoza] . . . denies free will; purpose; the moral world order; the unegoistic; evil; . . . in sum, my solitude [*Einsamkeit*] . . . is now at least shared [*eine Zweisamkeit*].” Beyond this, Nietzsche was critical of Spinoza's doctrine that all we know, whether mind or matter, is a manifestation of an all-embracing **God**. Spinoza's method also comes under attack because of his use of mathematical terminology that Nietzsche denigrates as “hocus-pocus,” while sneering at the way Spinoza “encased and **masked** his philosophy” (*BGE*, I: 5). Refer to William Wurzer, *Nietzsche und Spinoza* (1975).

**SPIR, AFRICAN (1837–1890)**. Russian veteran of Sebastopol and private scholar. Spir renounced his naval career in 1856 and in 1867 emigrated to Germany and later Switzerland. Spir's intention in his chief work, *Denken und Wirklichkeit, Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie* (*Thought and Reality: Attempt at a Renewal of Critical Philosophy*, 1873), expanded and reprinted as the first two volumes of the *Gesammelte Schriften* (1883–1884), was to “present a metaphysical system which rests on a sharp and uncom-

promising separation between the world of appearance and absolute reality” (Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001). A religious man, Spir believed in **God** but did not believe that God had any control over external causality. In *Forschung nach der Gewissheit in der Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit* (*Investigation into Certainty in the Cognition of Reality*, 1869), he postulated that certainty is “the sole aim of philosophy” (Small). Spir’s teaching has common points with that of Parmenides, who held that the changing forms of all things are really part of one single, eternal reality or “being,” so that claims of change or nonbeing are illogical. Spir proclaimed the Parmenidian principle of identity as the fundamental law of knowledge, and he, too, denied that change was a property of the real world (as distinct from the world of appearance). However, Spir rejected the Parmenidean denial of the reality of change in the case of time. Small writes that Spir “insists on the empirical reality of time while denying its *a priori* status. . . . Succession in time is given to us immediately, and so its reality is undeniable” (Small). Spir pressed on with the task of demonstrating the delusions of the empirical world by using the only method of investigation at hand, our immediate knowledge:

Our individuality could not subsist without the natural delusion by virtue of which we appear as substances in our self-consciousness . . . without this delusion we would not be ourselves, and there would be no question of our ego. Our existence is therefore inseparable from our self-consciousness, or rather, our existence consists of it. (A. Spir, *Denken und Wirklichkeit*)

Nietzsche admired much of Spir’s work, which he discussed with **Franz Overbeck** in Basel, but he thought that Spir’s relentless quest for certainty, proceeding by the statement of strict facts and logically controlled inferences, would lead to an enervating **nihilism**. What influenced Nietzsche in particular was Spir’s view of time in relation to absolute becoming; Spir thought “becoming” was self-evident because our mind thinks it. Making his own way between Parmenides and Spir, Nietzsche—who much preferred **Heraclitus**—wrote,

Parmenides said, “one cannot think of what is not”;—we are at the other extreme, and say “what can be thought of must certainly be a fiction.” (*WP*, III: 539)

**SPIRIT OF HEAVINESS (*DER TRAGENDE GEIST/ GEIST DER SCHWERE*)**. Also translated as “the spirit of gravity.” This allegorical figure—Zarathustra’s alter ego or inner voice—is first encountered as the weight-bearing camel in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The camel takes on its **heavy** burden with masochistic willingness, similar to that of a zealous religious man who is told to observe an impossible string of religious observances and who cannot do enough to oblige. In the section “Of the Three Metamorphoses” in part 1, Zarathustra questions whether the motive is “to debase yourself in order to injure your pride?” The camel is transformed into a rebellious lion that resists the religious commandments and bellows, “I will!” (Clearly a reference to the Lord’s Prayer: the lion will no longer say “Thy will be done.”) However, it is the innocent **child** who will be the new beginning, the “sacred yes” (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”), with no burden of guilt. Right at the outset, Nietzsche sets out his stall: to make man aware that after the death of **God**, there is no need to carry the burden of the outmoded **morality** that went with him.

In “The Vision and the Riddle,” the weight-bearing spirit reappears as a dwarf who refuses to understand Zarathustra’s vision of **eternal return**; Zarathustra angrily calls him the spirit of heaviness or gravity, but the problem belongs to Zarathustra, and it is this: how can he endure the terrible thought of eternal return? We encounter the concept of inner struggle again in book 3, where Zarathustra’s soliloquy details Nietzsche’s own opinion of the weakening effects of morality: only at an individual level can we break free. “This—is now *my* way: where is yours?” (*Za*, III: “On the Spirit of Gravity,” 2).

**SPITTELER, CARL (1845–1942)**. Swiss writer. Recognition came late to Spitteler: he was 74 when he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1919. His early work, published on his return to Germany after eight years as private tutor in Russia, was a pseudo-classical epic *Prometheus und Epimetheus* (1880–1881), written in a dithyrambic **style** so close to that of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that it was taken to be an imitation of Nietzsche, until it was pointed out that it had been published two years before Nietzsche’s work. Spitteler corresponded with Nietzsche in cordial fashion (albeit on

the unedifying topic of publishers). In an early article on Nietzsche titled “*Nietzsches Abfall von Wagner*” (“Nietzsche’s Defection from Wagner”) and published in *Der Bund* on 8 November 1888, Spitteler acknowledged that Nietzsche earned his wholehearted respect for his critique of Richard Wagner. For his part, Nietzsche wrote to Spitteler’s friend **Josef Widman** (15 September 1887) that “he would not have guessed that a contemporary **German** writer could produce such fine work.” Spitteler went on to write his magnum opus, the epic poem *Olympischer Frühling* (*Olympian Spring*, 1900–1910), in “bumping Alexandrines” (Jethro Bithell, *Germany: A Companion to German Studies*, 1962). Spitteler achieved growing recognition in the circle round **Michael Conrad**, all of whom contributed to the journal *Die Gesellschaft*, but he was never “in fashion.” Refer to Richard Oehler, “Nietzsches Zarathustra und Spittelers Prometheus,” in *Ariadne* (1925).

**THE STATE.** Nietzsche made a clear distinction between the state and a nation or people (**Volk**). The function of the state is to prepare a breeding ground for the genius, but only **culture** can go on to produce that genius. It is typical of Nietzsche that from first to last, his engagement with politics merges into a discussion of **culture** and is always measured against the gold standard of the ancient **Greek** state. In an early essay, *The Greek State*, written in 1872 as one of the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, Nietzsche stated that Greek cultural excellence depended on work being left to the slaves so that the **artist** could work untrammled. This is how the genius was able to flourish in ancient Greece. Nietzsche had kind words for **Plato**’s ideal state because it nurtured the **aristocratic** class from which artists are selected, but he blamed Plato for “excluding the inspired artist entirely from his state” in favor of “the genius of wisdom and **knowledge**,” no doubt at the behest of **Socrates**.

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche assessed what happens when a state founded on religion becomes secular, warning that “if religion disappears the state will unavoidably lose its ancient Isis **veil** and cease to excite reverence . . . modern **democracy** is the historical form of *the decay of the state*” (*HH*, I: “A Glance at the State,” 472). He has harsh words for **socialism**, which serves to show “what danger there lies in all accumulations of state power,” and argues

for “as little state as possible” (*HH*, I: “A Glance at the State,” 473). Nietzsche’s praise for the Greek city state is now limited because he disapproves of its desire for stasis, but even so, he remarks, Greek culture evolved “*in spite of the polis*”—one only needs to remember Thucydides’ account, making Athens “rise resplendent once again” (*HH*, I: “A Glance at the State,” 474). By the time he wrote *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche had come to view the state as “the coldest of all monsters” (*Za*, I: “Of the New Idol”) and German culture under the Second Reich as pretty much a lost cause.

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche stressed that he was a good **European** (*BGE*, VIII: 241) and backed the idea of European unity, largely because its culture, if not its politics, strove in that direction. Nietzsche certainly hated **Bismarck** and had no time for democracy or **grand politics**. A major reason for his support for Europe was that it would dilute the **Germans** and “their stupidity and dull-mindedness, their coarseness in more delicate affairs” (*UM*, 3: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 6). In his late work, Nietzsche saw the state as the very antithesis of culture: “Culture and the state . . . are antagonists. . . . In the **history** of European culture the rise of the Reich signifies one thing above all: *a displacement of the centre of gravity*” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack”: 4). See also “*DEUTSCHLAND, DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES*”; GERMANY; GRAND POLITICS; VOLK, DAS.

**STEINER, RUDOLF (1861–1925)**. Austrian thinker. Steiner lived in Weimar from 1890. A passionate **Goethe** scholar, he was also a very early Nietzschean, writing an article titled “*Nietzscheanismus*” in 1892: many more would follow, as would the monograph *Friedrich Nietzsche. Ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit*, 1895 (*Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter for Freedom*, 1960). His *Die Philosophie der Freiheit* (*The Philosophy of Freedom*) appeared in 1894. Steiner and other early Nietzscheans such as **Gabriele Reuter** began to visit **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** while Nietzsche and his sister were still in Naumburg. The attraction was not so much the possibility of seeing the sick Nietzsche as of seeing some of the manuscripts as yet unpublished, most notably *The Anti-Christ*. Steiner attempted to tutor Elisabeth on Nietzsche’s philosophy (she was at work on his biography), only to conclude that she was the least apt person he could imagine for such an undertaking.



By December 1896, Elisabeth's intrigue had caused a crisis between herself and her editor **Fritz Koegel**, whom she had hoped to replace with Steiner, but although Steiner became a frequent visitor at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* after Elisabeth and Nietzsche had moved to Weimar in 1897, he realized that his beliefs did not tally with Nietzsche's elitist philosophy. Steiner believed that we gain new insight into spiritual matters through intellectual training and that anybody can do this, if taught. From 1892, he had belonged to the theosophical movement, eventually becoming leader of the German Theosophists, though he later broke with them to develop his own teaching, Anthroposophy—the **knowledge** produced by man's higher self. In 1912, Steiner founded the Anthroposophical Society. He went on to found a school near Basel (the "Goetheanum") that was destroyed by fire in 1922 but was rebuilt and inspired a chain of Rudolf Steiner schools with enlightened **educational** principles.

**DIE STIFTUNG NIETZSCHE-ARCHIV (NIETZSCHE-ARCHIV FOUNDATION).** The *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* was founded on 6 May 1908 in order to regularize the description of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* as a center for Nietzsche research. The chair of the committee was **Adalbert Oehler**. In theory, this organization should have taken over responsibility for publishing Nietzsche's works from **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**; in practice, Elisabeth remained in full control. By 1909, the other members of the committee were **Harry Graf Kessler**, **Raoul Richter**, **Hans Vaihinger**, **Max Oehler**, Hermann Gocht, and Max Heinze. The various appointments on this committee are something of a political barometer for the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. In 1923, conflict arose between Adalbert Oehler and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche over the dispute with the Kröner Verlag, with Oehler resigning the chair of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv*, which Elisabeth transferred to her old friend Arnold Paulssen; he, however, handed the position on to Richard Leutheusser in the same year. In 1923, **Oswald Spengler** was invited onto the committee. He gave a talk at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in February 1923 on the theme "*Blut und Geld*" ("Blood and Money"), a theme chosen by Elisabeth with some prescience, since the inflation during that year was halted by the introduction of the *Rentenmark* on 15 November, overnight bankrupting the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv*. Spengler resigned his position in 1935.

Although Elisabeth died in 1935, the links she had cultivated with leading **National Socialists**, not least **Adolf Hitler**, guaranteed that the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* would be smiled on during the Third Reich. The painstakingly slow work on the *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*, begun in 1931, continued, with **Martin Heidegger** a key collaborator. After the election putting Hitler in power (January 1933), the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* was openly pro-**National Socialist** and remained so after the death of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. In 1942, Günther Lütz, minister for education and *Volksbildung*, joined the committee of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1942 at the suggestion of Richard **Oehler**. All activity of the organization ceased at the end of the war.

**STIRNER, MAX (1806–1856)**. German thinker. Stirner was an anarchic philosopher whose programmatic “selfishness” is set out as a philosophy in *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*, 1845 (*The Ego and His Own*, 1912). This book lapsed into obscurity for several decades until interest in it was renewed at the end of the 19th century, largely through the efforts of John Henry Mackay. Stirner declares, “I am unique. Nothing concerns me more than myself.” Although Stirner is much neglected today, frequent comparisons were made in the early years of Nietzsche reception between Stirner the egoist, who does what is right for himself alone, and Nietzsche’s *Übermensch*. A debate raged over whether Nietzsche had read Stirner without admitting to his influence, with Anselm Ruest, in *Max Stirner: Leben, Weltanschauung, Vermächtnis*, 1906 (*Max Stirner: Life, Worldview, Legacy*), concluding that Nietzsche kept silent through fear that Stirner’s philosophy would be “misused” to justify crimes. Refer to R. Schellwein, *Max Stirner und Friedrich Nietzsche* (1892) and A. Lévy, *Stirner et Nietzsche* (1904).

**STÖCKER, HELENE (1869–1943)**. German writer and **feminist**. Stöcker studied in Bern for her doctorate since German universities were not open to **women** students until the turn of the century. From 1896 to 1899, she was research assistant to **Wilhelm Dilthey** and by this time a convinced Nietzschean; she had also met Minne Cauer and been won over to feminism. Paradoxically, when she was at the height of her feminist activity, Stöcker was on good terms with both

**Lou Andreas-Salomé** and **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, neither of whom had any time for feminism (or for each other). Stöcker was almost fanatical in the quantity of lectures on Nietzsche that she gave all over **Germany**. Her friendship with Elisabeth began in 1895 and lasted until 1911, by which time Elisabeth had realized just how radical a feminist Stöcker was. A typical “radical bourgeois” in her stance, Stöcker glossed over the misogynist comments Nietzsche had made on women because she believed that his remarks on individual freedom far outweighed his apparent misogyny. A popular phrase she and her friends used (Andreas-Salomé included) was *sich ausleben*, to live one’s **life** to the full; Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche found the **concept** deeply shocking.

Stöcker was a leading light in the *Neue Ethik* movement. In 1905, after sending out fliers to potential supporters, Stöcker (with Max Marcuse) took over the leadership of the *Bund für Mutterschutz* (“League for the Protection of Mothers”), founded the previous year, and became editor of the league’s journal, *Die neue Generation*. Scandalizing the “moderate feminists,” she advocated free love and every woman’s right to sexual enjoyment, whatever her marital status might be. Stöcker became an internationally known pacifist during and after World War I. Apart from a great deal of journalistic work, she also wrote creatively. Her novel *Die Liebe* (*Love*, 1922), deals imaginatively with her affair with **Alexander Tille** in 1900, based as it was on “their common passionate Nietzscheanism” (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992). Like everything else she wrote, the novel contains references to Nietzsche and a liberal amount of Nietzschean philosophy à la Stöcker.

**STRAUSS, DAVID (1808–1874)**. German philosopher and theologian.

A native of Ludwigsburg, Strauss studied at Tübingen, where he later taught, and at Berlin, where he came under the influence of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**. He rejected the historical value of the gospels and attempted to use a dialectic method to explain religious myths, arguing that conflicting forces could lead to a higher religious synthesis. After the publication of *Das Leben Jesus, kritisch bearbeitet*, 1835 (translated by George Eliot as *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, 1846), he was persona non grata among Protestant theologians, and the invitation he had received in 1839 to take up a

chair at Zürich University was withdrawn, as was his post at Tübingen University. Claude Welch states that Strauss, in his *Life of Jesus*, opened a new era in theology by asking “how the historical figure of Jesus could be available as an object for faith” (Claude Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 1972). In later life, Strauss softened his tone to suggest that all religions are based on ideas and not facts and had become a convinced atheist by the time he published *Der alte und neue Glaube*, 1872 (*The Old Faith and the New*, 1873). Nietzsche bitterly attacked this late work in the first essay of the *Untimely Meditations*, “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer,” not for its content but for its **language** and method, providing numerous examples of bad **style**, wrong use of words, mixed **metaphors**, repetition, meaningless phrases, and elementary grammatical mistakes.

**STRAUSS, RICHARD (1864–1949).** Viennese composer. Strauss read Nietzsche as a young man in Egypt in 1892–1893, finding in his works confirmation for his own nascent rejection of **Christianity**. Strauss became famous among Nietzscheans as the composer of the tone poem *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, which was premiered in Frankfurt am Main in November 1896, with Strauss conducting. His latent Nietzscheanism is also evident in *Guntram* (1893). Strauss was so captivated by all things Nietzschean that he traveled to Sils Maria to absorb the atmosphere of the place where Nietzsche had lived during the last summers of his active life, prior to his mental collapse in 1889. Strauss insisted on the importance of Nietzsche’s ideas for modern music and in turn persuaded **Gustav Mahler** and other young composers such as Alban Berg to become Nietzscheans in their approach to **music**. His most sensational success was his music drama *Salome* (1903), which used Hedwig Lachmann’s translation of Oscar Wilde’s play as the libretto. His collaboration with **Hugo von Hofmannsthal** as librettist resulted in the successful operas *Elektra* (1909), *Der Rosenkavalier* (1911), and *Ariadne auf Naxos* (1912–1916). During the Third Reich, Strauss compromised himself by writing music in line with the wishes of **Adolf Hitler**.

**STRINDBERG, AUGUST (1849–1912).** Swedish writer. Nietzsche read Strindberg in 1888 and was so impressed that he began a cor-

respondence with him. Nietzsche wanted Strindberg to translate *Ecce Homo* into French, but in the event, his mental illness intervened, and the work was not even published in German until 1908. The two men never met.

Strindberg wrote chiefly plays based on his own somewhat distorted perception of the battle between the sexes, as in *Fröken Julie*, 1887 (*Miss Julie*, 1964). Strindberg's work has much in common with the style of the **Naturalist movement**, though unlike the German naturalists, he greatly admired Nietzsche's writing. His novel *I Havsbandet*, 1890 (*By the Open Sea*, 1984), depicts a lonely **Übermensch** in conflict with his **natural** surroundings on the remote East Skerry, rejected by his fellow men. Alex Borg, superintendent of fisheries, is the first of a long line of misogynists in literature directly inspired by what was perceived to be Nietzsche's misogyny. Borg despairs of finding "a **woman** with sufficient brain to acknowledge that her sex is inferior to his" (*By the Open Sea*). During the 1890s, Strindberg turned to religion, especially the mysticism of Emanuel Swedenborg, whose influence can be detected in *Till Damascus*, 1898–1901 (*The Road to Damascus*, 1959). This play takes the form of a "station drama" and in turn influenced the **expressionists**. Strindberg's impact on literary modernism was arguably as great as that of Nietzsche. Refer to Carl Stecker, *Nietzsche und Strindberg* (1921).

**STRUCTURALISM.** A movement in literary criticism initiated by Roman Jakobson during the 1920s. Jakobson's thesis was that prose, which moves forward "essentially by contiguity," is quite different from poetry, which literally creates its own world. He characterized poetry as "obeying immanent laws . . . its communicative function reduced to a minimum" (Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, eds., *Modernism*, 1976). Although Jakobson put Russian formalism "on the map" with his careful theories of **language**, applying these to literature to produce dazzling insights, he was forced to leave Russia and settled in Prague, forming there the pivot of the Prague Linguistic Circle. In the 1950s, interest in structuralism shifted to Paris, where Ferdinand de Saussure, with his theory of semiotics, had introduced the distinction between *parole* and *langue* as a linguistic model. Claude Lévi-Strauss built on this model to found his own

method of interpreting linguistic signs to analyze **cultural** phenomena such as mythology. Structuralism purported to be a **scientific** linguistic practice, but it was superseded by a more general trend toward **deconstruction** and **poststructuralism**, both of which were more reliant on Nietzsche as an inspiration for the central insight that there is no such thing as “the **truth**.” Poststructuralism cannot be properly grasped unless its roots in structuralism are understood.

**DER STURM.** Weekly journal founded and edited by Herwarth Walden in Berlin in order to promote avant-garde **art** and writing. The etchings of graphic artists such as Ludwig Kirchner of *Die Brücke* were often used as illustrations. The first issue, published on 3 March 1910, printed Oskar Kokoschka’s provocative one-act play *Mörder Hoffnung der Frauen* (*Murderer, Hope of Women*) on its title page. (Paul Hindemith composed an opera of the same title and based on the play in 1927.) Given **Zarathustra**’s belligerent prescription for the warrior in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the play owes a clear (if distorted) debt to Nietzsche in its misogyny and violent ending, in which the warrior strides off, killing people “like flies” (*Mörder Hoffnung der Frauen*). After this *succès de scandale*, the journal settled down to being characteristically pro-Nietzschean, and there was a “Sturm gallery” above the press where avant-garde paintings were exhibited. The gallery hosted the **Futurist** traveling exhibition in 1915. *Der Sturm* ceased publication in 1931.

**STYLE.** Nietzsche’s most revealing comments on style are found in *Beyond Good and Evil*, though his views are inherent in everything he wrote. For Nietzsche, style depended on *tempo*, which “has its origin in the character of the race” (*BGE*, II: “The Free Spirit,” 28). He argues that bad translations usually come about because it is impossible to translate the original’s “brave and happy *tempo* (which leaps over and puts behind it all that is perilous in word and deed)” (*BGE*, II: “The Free Spirit,” 28), an example being found in Machiavelli’s *Principe*, which “cannot help presenting the most serious matters in a boisterous *allegriissimo*.” He also praises Petronius, a first-century Roman with the “feet of a wind,” for “his *presto* in invention, words ideas,” and for his wonderful gift of “making everything *run!*” Since a German is incapable of *presto*, he is also incapable of “the most

daring and delightful nuances of free, free-spirited thought” (*BGE*, II: “The Free Spirit,” 28). Culturally, the Germans have tended to respect turgid prose as a sign of high intellect.

Anyone who has read Nietzsche in the original will be aware of his polished style and will recognize in the description given here of *tempo* and *presto* much of Nietzsche’s own aspirations as to style. The morphology of the German language encourages an inventive approach (as in *Übermensch*, *Ummensch*, *Untermensch*), and Nietzsche exploited this to the full. His style consists of hurtling down the page at headlong speed, swerving from one idea to another with grand finesse while scanning the horizon for a pun, changing gear with foreign words, coining new ones when these run out, and adding dashes, rows of dots, brackets, exclamation marks, question marks, italics, bold, different fonts—absolutely *anything* but a full stop: until Nietzsche, superbly in charge of his text, which in spite of the pace has remained grammatically impeccable throughout, chooses to prove that the brakes still work.

Thankfully, Nietzsche does not employ all of these tactics all of the time; he is enunciating his philosophy, not (or not necessarily) playing a game with the reader. Sometimes his style is rhetorical, but at other times it is confidential, as if the reader were there beside him: “Have you heard. . . ?” he demands. Very few writers can emulate Nietzsche’s confidential *tone*, to say nothing of his style. A quick speed is what Nietzsche wants, in contrast to other German philosophers with their lugubrious tedium. In fact, even today, German critics of Nietzsche often display exactly what he criticizes. **Postmodern** French critics like **Jacques Derrida**, mindful of Nietzsche’s comment that thought and style belong together, have tried to emulate Nietzsche’s style with great success, but the method is somewhat unsuitable for the English language, which, though it can understate with superb irony, is squeamish with subordinate clauses and likes to reach the end of a sentence with its grammatical modesty intact.

**SUBJECT.** See DECONSTRUCTION; DESCARTES, RENÉ; PERSPECTIVISM.

**SUDERMANN, HERMANN (1857–1928).** German writer. Sudermann began his career with the novel *Frau Sorge*, 1887 (*Dame*

Care, 1902). His first play, *Die Ehre*, 1889 (*Honor*, 1915), was followed by the deliberately **decadent** *Sodoms Ende* (1890–1891), where an early reference is made to Nietzsche’s ideas, ironically at a time when Nietzsche, having become insane at the beginning of 1889, could not appreciate it. The hero in the play, Willy Janikow, is described by his girlfriend as “a god . . . who can do anything,” but a cautionary note is struck by Janikow’s fellow painter, Reimann, who has little time for geniuses “**beyond good and evil**, as they now say.” Behind the name “Sodom,” Sudermann thinly disguised contemporary Berlin society, and the police promptly banned the play. The work that made Sudermann famous Europe-wide was his next play, *Heimat*, 1893 (well known in Britain as *Magda*, 1923). With this play, Sudermann took up a central role in the **naturalist movement**. See O. Bockstahler, “Nietzsche und Sudermann,” in *German Quarterly* 8 (1935).

**SUFFERING.** Nietzsche regarded suffering and **crudelty** as fundamental to humanity. **Pity** at another’s suffering is a weakening effect that **democracy** and **socialism** have inherited from **Christianity morality**, when what is needed is “to remain spectators of suffering, to *let* suffer” (*BGE*, V: 202); not for nothing did Aristotle refer to **Greek tragedy** as a purgative for the emotions (*A-C*: 7). Nietzsche lambasted Christianity because it preached that man was guilty of his own suffering through sins that had to be atoned. This was the cue for the **ascetic priest** to lay his hands on man. The **ascetic ideal** makes man responsible for his own suffering, which is eventually channeled into **ressentiment**: “It was suffering and impotence—that created all afterworlds” (*Za*, I: “Of the Afterworldsmen”). Nietzsche’s solution that “**God** is dead” released man from guilt but not from suffering. However, by self-overcoming, the **Übermensch** will be able to **affirm life** and love his fate, whatever it brings. The **artist** is able to present the tragic aspect of life in the form of illusion. This is something that man can understand and emulate to the point of making his own life an **aesthetic** phenomenon. “As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us” (*GS*, II: 107). See also *AMOR FATI*.

**SUPERMAN.** See *DER ÜBERMENSCH*.



**SYMBOL/SYMBOLISM.** A symbol was originally a token used in **Greek** society; for example, parting lovers might break a ring in two, with the intention of reuniting it when next they met. For them—and for them only—it symbolized fidelity; otherwise, it was just a broken piece of metal. In contrast to **metaphor**, a symbol starts off with a concrete person or thing that comes to represent something else. Nietzsche’s use of symbols is a complex part of his figurative imagery by means of which familiar things, such as the sky, a **veil**, the **blond beast**—even the song “*Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles*”—acquire a symbolic meaning to the point of becoming coded messages in his philosophy. Nietzsche also frequently used personification and symbolical allegory. **Zarathustra’s animals** are personified allegory since they speak and think like people and stand for ideas far more complex than their animal nature could comprehend; an example is Zarathustra’s ass when it brays “yea” in a spoof on **affirmation** (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 2). However, Nietzsche’s iconography is never static. For example, **Richard Wagner** at first symbolized **art** for Nietzsche, only to become the symbol of *décadence* at a later stage.

**SYMBOLIST MOVEMENT.** An international movement in the arts, especially poetry, that began in France in the wake of Charles Baudelaire’s pathbreaking *Les fleurs du mal* (1857). This collection contains the poem *Correspondances*, where the term **symbolism** is used in a special way. According to Baudelaire, who drew on the ideas of Jakob Boehme and Emanuel Swedenborg, everything in the **natural** world has a reciprocal correspondence in the spiritual world. Jean Moréas in *Le Figaro* on 18 September 1886 was the first to define the movement. Symbolist poets from the 1890s on hailed Nietzsche as a liberator of the senses; their approval was often couched in terms of homage to **Dionysus**. The poets most obviously part of the movement were Paul Verlaine, Arthur Rimbaud, Stéphane Mallarmé, and **Paul Valéry**. The chief distinguishing feature of these poets was their use of words as magic symbols that could convey a transcendental reality. In Germany, the major symbolist poets were **Stefan George** and **Rainer Maria Rilke** and in Russia **Dimitri Merezhkovsky**, **Vyacheslav Ivanov**, **Alexander Blok**, and Valery Briusov. The leading Russian symbolist theoretician was the writer

**Andrei Bely.** In America, the poet Arthur Symons should be mentioned and in Britain **W. B. Yeats** and Ezra Pound. Later writers such as T. S. Eliot and Dylan Thomas continued the tradition.

**SYPHILIS.** It is commonly held that Nietzsche suffered from syphilis and that this occasioned his migraines, his eye and stomach trouble, and his final collapse into insanity, but the case is not proven. According to **Paul Deussen**, in *Erinnerungen an Friedrich Nietzsche* (1901), Nietzsche told Deussen that he had sought refuge in playing the piano when duped into entering a brothel by a malicious cabdriver in Cologne in February 1865. This story, which might well be true, proves nothing apart from setting a seedy framework for what comes next. In 1890, the clinic in Basel to which **Franz Overbeck** took Nietzsche, having rescued him from Turin, recorded that Nietzsche himself had volunteered that he had suffered from two “specific infections.” At the clinic in Jena where Nietzsche was taken soon afterward, the documents record “1866, syphilitic infection,” which would date the supposed infection(s) to the time of Nietzsche’s transfer of studies from Bonn to Leipzig University.

In the train home from the Jena clinic, Nietzsche declared to his mother that he was “22 years old,” a seemingly silly thing to say, but not if his subconscious was unearthing unpleasant things from 1866. However, Nietzsche was a sick man and not really in a fit state to give his medical history to anyone. After Nietzsche’s death in 1900, **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** tried to rewrite the medical history of her brother’s mental collapse; letters went back and forth between Binswanger (in charge of the Jena clinic), Overbeck, and **Peter Gast**. In this context, Overbeck assured Gast on 21 May 1905 that Binswanger had told him in strict confidence that Nietzsche’s illness was caused by lues (another word for syphilis), while Binswanger, probably not wishing to be sued by Nietzsche’s sister, now maintained that there was no clear evidence one way or the other. That is still the case after well over a century.

A further complication comes from **Richard Wagner**’s physician, Dr. Eiser. Wagner, believing that Nietzsche’s headaches came from excessive masturbation, engineered a meeting between Eiser and Nietzsche in Rosenlaubad in August 1877. The Eisers stayed for four days at the resort, and Nietzsche went to see Eiser, firing off excited

letters to friends to say that he had at last found a decent doctor. Having examined Nietzsche, Eiser dutifully reported to Wagner on 26 October 1877 that Nietzsche definitely did not practice harmful masturbation. After all, Eiser wrote, Nietzsche had assured him that he had had “clap” during his student days and had had sex in Italy on doctor’s orders. What is astonishing is that while Eiser believed Nietzsche’s statement (though Nietzsche was probably fibbing), and while Wagner believed Eiser’s *compte rendu* (though Eiser was breaking his Hippocratic oath), and while Nietzsche believed Wagner’s bona fides until he found out his real motive, *all three* seem to have genuinely believed that masturbation is a far worse plague than a dose of venereal disease. Of course, syphilis has symptoms that *could* tally with Nietzsche’s affliction. Refer to Pia Daniela Volz, *Nietzsche im Labyrinth seiner Krankheit* (1990), and Richard Shain, *The Legend of Nietzsche’s Syphilis* (2001).

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**THIEL, ERNST.** *See* NIETZSCHE-ARCHIV.

**THUCYDIDES.** *See* THE GREEKS.

**THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA.** *See* ZARATHUSTRA, *THUS SPOKE*.

**TILLE, ALEXANDER (1866–1912).** German writer and thinker. Tille, “a Social Darwinist of the most extreme kind” (R. Hinton Thomas, *Nietzsche in German Politics and Society 1890–1918*, 1980), spent the decade 1890–1900 teaching at Glasgow University until the students rebelled against him for his pro-Boer sympathies (the Boer War lasted from 1899 to 1902). In 1895, Tille became editor of the English translation of Nietzsche’s works and was himself the first translator of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* into English (*Thus spake [sic] Zarathustra. A Book for All and None*, 1898). In 1894, he gave lectures on Nietzsche to the Goethe Society in Glasgow in which he zealously insisted on Nietzsche’s social **Darwinism**. Tille’s major work, *Von Darwin bis Nietzsche. Ein Buch Entwicklungsethik* (*From*

*Darwin to Nietzsche: A Book on Evolutionary Ethics*), appeared in 1895. Here, Tille argued that a physiologically higher form of human being was also the **moral** goal of mankind.

Tille was prepared to face the brutal consequences of his elitism: believing that **nature** should be helped in the removal of the weak so that the strong could flourish, he spoke of the beneficial effect of the slums of East London because they cleansed the nation of undesirables. In this sense, he ran directly counter to the movement for social welfare that gathered pace from 1890. Although a passion for Nietzsche was a link between himself and **Helene Stöcker** during their brief love affair (they met in 1900), Tille was more inclined than Stöcker to find fault with Nietzsche for having harbored a feudal concept of **aristocracy** instead of treating elitism on its own merit. Tille himself, as leading member of the *Altdeutscher Verband* after 1898, argued for a racial (but not **anti-Semitic**) pan-**German** evolutionary ethic in which service to the *Volk* constituted service to mankind.

**TIME.** Nietzsche approached the question of time from the viewpoint of “becoming” (or “occurring”: *Geschehen*, as he termed it), on the same lines as the absolute becoming posited by **Heraclitus**. In a note written in 1881, Nietzsche gave the example of the growth of a tree to explain how we fail to perceive the passage of time, even when it is happening before our eyes:

Every moment the tree is something *new*: we confirm the shape because we cannot perceive the slightest absolute movement: we stick through it a mathematical average line, we *add on to it* lines and surfaces based on what our intellect says, which is an *error*, and assume it is the same and static, because all we *see* is something static and we only *remember* when something is similar (the same). But really it is different: we must not let our skepticism be transferred to essence. (KSA, 11 [293])

At around the same time as this quote, Nietzsche conceived the doctrine of **eternal return**, first mooted in *The Gay Science* and later expounded in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In the latter, the dwarf speaks of time as a circle (*Za*, III: “Of the Vision and the Riddle,” 2), but this is not Nietzsche’s view. Nietzsche conceived time as both linear and infinite and, as such, infinitely divisible. He found no objection to counting back into infinity or forward into infinity and

viewed countable time as separate from the events within it, which were finite. In 1883, at work on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche wrote in his notebook, “An *endless process* can not be thought of in any other way than as *periodical*” (KSA, 10: 15 [18]). Thus, although Nietzsche claims that the world can contain only a finite number of elements, his procedure of counting forward and back to infinity does not rule out the fact that “the period of recurrence must be finite at any given time, although always open to increase” (Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001). On these terms, there is no contradiction between eternal return and Nietzsche’s view of time as infinity. Refer to Nicholas Rennie, *Speculating on the Moment: The Poetics of Time and Recurrence in Goethe, Leopardi, and Nietzsche* (2005). See also HERACLITUS; NATURAL SCIENCE; SPIR, AFRICAN.

**TOBARI, CHIKUFŪ (1873–1955).** Japanese academic. A native of Hiroshima, Chikufū studied German at Tokyo University and became a high school teacher at Yamaguchi. On his return to Tokyo for further study in 1899, he became a member of the editorial team on the journal *Teikoku bungaku* and in 1900 published three essays on German literature, “*Doitsu no bankin bungaku*” (“On Recent German Literature”), which centered chiefly on **Hermann Sudermann**, then popular in Japan. Chikufū later became embroiled in the **aesthetic life** debate within academic circles, which from 1901 to 1903 centered on a misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s ideas. Chikufū stood on the side of his friend Takayama Chogyū, who was accused of immorality, and lost his own post as a consequence. His interest in Nietzsche continued, and he published partial translations of Nietzsche’s works: *Human, All Too Human* in 1906 and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in 1907 (the latter in full in 1921). In 1924, during his visit to Germany and Italy, Chikufū visited **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** at the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. He is well regarded as the editor of a German–Japanese dictionary.

**TOLSTOI, LEO (1828–1910).** Russian writer of world stature. Although Tolstoi is known chiefly for novels such as *Voyna i mir*, 1863–1869 (*War and Peace*, 1957), and *Anna Karenina* (1877; trans. 1954), he was also a **moralist** and thinker. A patriot who fought in the Crimean War, Tolstoi was an **aristocrat** who owned several hundred

peasants. In his later life, Tolstoi increasingly occupied himself with their welfare, to the point where he actually dressed as a peasant and worked in the fields. At this point he was excommunicated from the church for his unorthodox views, though he was profoundly religious in his own way. With his interest in humanism and his sense of social and **cultural** decline, Tolstoi came to see in Nietzsche's philosophy a dangerous moral confusion. Nietzsche for his part had a low opinion of Tolstoi's altruistic "**pity**" (*OGM*, III: 26). In his essay "*Chto takoe iskusstvo?*" ("What Is **Art**?," 1897–1898), Tolstoi declared that he found his own previous work worthless. He lambasted the selfishness prevalent in Russian society and held Nietzsche (and **Richard Wagner**) responsible. He even felt a similar sentiment toward **Maxim Gorky** and Anton Chekov, the young writers dearest to him. Clowes writes that Tolstoi died "convinced that the world was becoming insane: the strongest proof was the widespread popularity of Nietzsche" (Edith Clowes, *Revolution in Moral Consciousness: Nietzsche in Russian Literature 1890–1914*, 1988).

**TÖNNIES, FERDINAND (1855–1936)**. German social theorist and philosopher. Tönnies's best-known work is *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Abhandlung des Communismus und Socialismus als empirischer Kulturformen*, 1887 (*Community and Society: An Examination of Communism and Socialism as Empirical Forms of Culture*), in which he introduced the distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society). It is perhaps not surprising that Tönnies gravitated more toward Friedrich Engels (whom he visited in London in 1894) than Nietzsche, in view of Nietzsche's aversion to **socialism** and given that *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft* was written while socialism was actually forbidden in **Germany** (1878–1890). Although as a student in 1873 Tönnies had read Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* and found it a revelation, he took a more censorious line in his book *Der Nietzsche-Kultus* (1897), not necessarily toward Nietzsche's ideas (though some of these, such as the **concept of master morality**, are challenged) but toward interpretations of these ideas by so-called followers of Nietzsche. During his career, Tönnies became known internationally as an expert on Thomas Hobbes. From 1913, he taught at Kiel University (as *Privatdozent*) until the **National Socialists** removed him from teaching in 1933.

**TRAGEDY.** *See* GREEK TRAGEDY.

**TRAGIC HERO.** *See* AESTHETICS; GREEK TRAGEDY.

**TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.** *See* GERMAN IDEALISM.

**TRANSLATION.** Although Nietzsche, as a philologist, was technically a linguist, his interest in classical texts lay in their content and not in their **language**, which—as an expert in **Greek** and Latin—he rather took for granted. He knew virtually no English and was not even competent in French, but he enjoyed reading texts translated from other languages and did not routinely complain about the quality of translation, though this was often poor. The one point he did make forcefully, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, concerns **style**: “That which translates worst from one language into another is the tempo of its style, which has its origin in the character of the race, or, expressed more physiologically, in the average tempo of its ‘metabolism’” (*BGE*, II: 28). Nietzsche goes on to explain that the **German** language—ponderous and clumsy—is unsuited for lighthearted writers such as Aristophanes and Petronius.

Of course, Nietzsche wanted only the best when it came to translations of his own works. In 1875, Marie Baumgartner had competently translated the third of the *Untimely Meditations* into French, but just before he went insane, Nietzsche raised his sights, approaching **August Strindberg** to do the French translation of *Ecce Homo*. At the same time he asked **Helen Zimmern** to do the English translations of *Ecce Homo* and *Twilight of the Idols*; he was hoping Hippolyte Taine would do the French translation for the latter. On 8 December 1888, he frantically sent letters to all three personages. Three weeks later he would lose his mind.

**TREITSCHKE, HEINRICH VON (1834–1896).** German academic thinker and writer. Treitschke taught history and politics at several universities, beginning with Leipzig in 1859 and finally ending in Berlin, where he spent the rest of his career lecturing; he was also a member of the Reichstag from 1871 to 1884. Treitschke’s influential five-volume *Deutsche Geschichte im 19 Jahrhundert*, 1879–1894 (*History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*, 1915–1917), was

not yet finished when he died; the work bristles with Prussian authoritarianism, though it deals only with the period up to 1848. As professor of history at Heidelberg University from 1867 to 1874, Treitschke disapproved of what he saw as Nietzsche's cavalier and speculative approach to philosophy, and Nietzsche reciprocated this hostility. Having founded the *Verein Deutscher Studenten* in 1880, Treitschke emerged as a fanatical **anti-Semite**, giving **völkisch** speeches to packed audiences. Treitschke was all that Nietzsche loathed; it is therefore ironic that **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** found people to believe her when she insisted that Nietzsche's work had an affinity with that of Treitschke. It is technically true that both men had an interest in the politics of **power**, but Treitschke pressed for colonial aggrandizement, seeing Germany's destiny as fulfilling the legacy of the Holy Roman Empire (the First Reich, founded in 1800 by Charlemagne, or *Karl der Grosse*), while Nietzsche groaned at the thought of "**Deutschland, Deutschland über alles.**"

**TRUTH.** Nietzsche suggested that there was no such thing as "the truth": we impose meaning on our world by using a **language** that gives the illusion of being absolute but is in fact a **perspective** and no more; words themselves are **metaphors**, though we are so accustomed to them that we do not see them as such. However, we conveniently forget these details in our desire to think that we know the truth, while all the time we are merely tailoring language to fit in with our relationships with other people. "Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force . . ." (*OTLNS*, 2). What interested Nietzsche was not the absolute value of truth but rather its significance for human existence; he was at pains to challenge dogmatists by demonstrating the provisional nature of our assumptions. Nietzsche used the trope of "**woman**" to uphold the fluidity of truth:

Supposing truth to be a woman—what? is the suspicion not well founded that all philosophers, when they have been dogmatists, have had little understanding of women? That the gruesome earnestness, the clumsy importunity with which they have hitherto been in the habit of approaching truth have been inept and improper means for winning a wench? (*BGE*, Preface)



The use of the trope “woman” in this controversial manner mobilizes the type of metaphor that, Nietzsche warns, lies hidden in language, making our drive for truth impossible. In *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, Nietzsche proceeds on the same quest, again asking rhetorically, “Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons *not to let her reasons be seen?* . . . Perhaps, speaking Greek, her name is **Baubô**?” (NCW, Epilogue: 2).

Nietzsche’s point is not to attack real women who try to conceal their thoughts or actions but to praise the **Greek** way of life, where a superficial stance was viewed as healthier than one of **depth**, points made at the end of *Nietzsche contra Wagner*. Truth is elusive because our method of knowing is limited by our capricious, value-laden use of language, which goes hand in hand with our self-consciousness. We are condemned to live in a fog of **concepts** unless the intellect can break free. See also DECONSTRUCTION; FORGETTING; PERSPECTIVISM; ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE.

### **TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS (GÖTZEN-DÄMMERUNG, 1888).**

Aptly subtitled *Or How to Philosophize with a Hammer* (1888) on account of Nietzsche’s economical method of hammering home concise philosophical reflections, the work is a fruit of Nietzsche’s last year of sanity, a period when he experienced a heightened awareness of reality before the sudden collapse of his mind. The passages in which he explains the philosophical treatment of “reality” are a case in point. **Plato** is attacked for elitism: “The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man—he dwells in it, *he is it*,” while **Christianity** promises “the real world” later on as a reward but does not deliver. **Immanuel Kant**’s real world is just as unattainable but is also “a duty, an imperative” when reduced to thought. At last, skepticism burns away the gray of dawn: “Cockcrow of positivism.” Finally, we abolish the real world and, with it, the apparent world: a time ripe for the entrance of *Zarathustra* (TI, “How the ‘Real World’ at Last Became a Myth”). Nietzsche distills the wisdom of 2,000 years into one page of dense reflection.

Some early Nietzsche scholars, especially theologians at the turn of the century, have tried to pass off *Twilight of the Idols* as the product of a diseased brain, but the admittedly strident tone merely accentuates themes that Nietzsche had repeatedly dealt with in

earlier works, such as his contempt for Christianity as “*hostile to life*” (*TI*, “**Morality as Anti-Nature**”: 3). With scathing comments, Nietzsche dismisses a host of luminaries in the history of ideas, such as **Socrates**, **Arthur Schopenhauer**, and **John Stuart Mill**; we have “*Carlyle*: or pessimism as indigestion,” “*Zola*: or delight in stinking,” “*Sainte-Beuve*—fundamentally a **woman**,” and *George Sand*, “this prolific writing cow” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 1–6).

In addition, Nietzsche has an inexhaustible supply of invective with which to insult **Germany** or, more specifically, German **culture** under **Otto von Bismarck**’s Second Reich. The Germans’ taste in **music** is pedestrian (“constipated, constipating”; *TI*: “What the Germans Lack”: 2), their **educational** standards mediocre. Philosophy is being devoured by politics: “*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles* was, I fear, the end of German philosophy” (*TI*: “What the Germans Lack”: 1); culture and the **state** are antagonistic. **Richard Wagner** escapes most of the diatribe only because Nietzsche had just devoted the whole of *The Case of Wagner* to a withering exposé of his former mentor. Only **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe** escapes censure, and then only because he was “not a German event but a **European** one” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 49). One factor of major significance is that at the end of this work, Nietzsche returns to a favorite theme when he defines “that wonderful phenomenon,” **Dionysus**, as “the older Hellenic instinct, an instinct still exuberant and even overflowing: it is explicable only as an *excess* of energy” (*TI*, “What I Owe to the Ancients”: 4).

– U –

**DER ÜBERMENSCH (DER MENSCH = HUMAN BEING).** The English translations “Superman” and “Overman” misleadingly suggest a gendered male. **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**, in the first part of *Faust*, had already used the term *Übermensch*. Nietzsche adopts the term to name the hypothetical individual whom he proposes as an antidote to the **cultural** and **moral** pigmy spawned by **European *décadence***. This strong man of the future is to be produced through the nurturing of certain qualities such as self-mastery, courage, and “hardness.” The latter quality is a response to the Christian belief

that meekness is a virtue, in line with the perverted values “good” and “evil”: Nietzsche thought that **Christianity** had encouraged a **slave morality** in thrall to the **ascetic priest**. Turning all this on its head, Nietzsche advised the individual to accept the death of **God** in a positive way and reject restrictions on his instinctive **life**. He should create his own life and, in fact, his own values. Only in this way could he become the noble *Übermensch* as taught by Zarathustra in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 3 and 7). This self-creativity involves other facets of Nietzsche’s thought, since the will must be employed to **affirm** life: the *Übermensch* is thus a repository of the **will to power**.

Unlike the “**last man**” who has accepted his lot and who regards himself (mistakenly, in Nietzsche’s view) as contented, the *Übermensch* will be the epitome of striving. By conquering negative tendencies in his psyche to the point of sublimation through *Selbstüberwindung* (self-overcoming), he will be beyond the pettiness of **ressentiment** engendered by slave morality. Although the *Übermensch* thus anticipates the man of the future, there is a real justification for saying that he also looks backward to the ancient **Greeks**, who acted fearlessly and without reflection. It was this type of independence that Nietzsche labeled “**aristocratic**.” With the **revaluation of values**, poised between past and future, Nietzsche inferred that the circumstances for the emergence of the new type of man had not yet evolved. *See also* UNTERMENSCH.

**ULTIMATE MAN.** *See* THE LAST MAN.

**UNAMUNO, MIGUEL DE (1864–1936).** Spanish writer and academic. Unamuno became professor of Greek at the University of Salamanca in 1891–1892; he became rector there in 1900. Like the Italian **Benedetto Croce**, he admired the works of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**, but like Croce’s fellow Italian **Giovanni Papini**, Unamuno was drawn to the ideas of **Henri Bergson** and William James. With his good knowledge of German, Unamuno was able to read Nietzsche in the original and came to admire him as a scholar of Greek as well as a defender of the instinctual **life** against **scientific** encroachments. However, like Papini, Unamuno underwent a religious conversion at the turn of the century. The inner conflict to

which this gave rise is the topic of his *Amor i pedagogia* (*Love and Pedagogy*, 1902), where the attempt is made “to reconcile man’s irrational, subconscious, intuitive **drives** and longings with the impositions of **scientific, rational, logical** and analytical thinking” (Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, eds., *Modernism*, 1976).

Having come down against scientific reasoning, Unamuno was able to adopt an antirationalist stance in his *Vida di don Quijote y Sancho*, 1905 (*The Life of Don Quixote*, 1927). In his renowned *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*, 1913 (*The Tragic Sense of Life*, 1958), Unamuno treated Nietzschean themes of existence rather than abstract thought: like Nietzsche, he thought philosophy should have a practical application and made this a theme in many of his works. Unamuno’s attacks on totalitarian politics caused him to fall foul of the military directorate of Primo de Riviera, and he lived in exile in Fuerteventura from 1924 to 1930; he had again been apprehended and was under house arrest when he died. Refer to Augustín Izquierdo Sánchez, *Nietzsche y Unamuno* (1992).

**UNTERMENSCH.** Nietzsche casually mentioned the *Untermensch* in *The Gay Science* when he remarked that polytheism had made the first move toward establishing the individual’s rights by allowing people to invent their own gods, heroes and **Übermenschen**, as well as “*Neben—und Untermenschen*” (“almost-humans and undermen”; *GS*, III: 143); he is referring to the worship of goblins and the like. He is not making a racist statement; rather, the reverse is true—he is saying that polytheism has been beneficial in the **history of culture**. The term *Übermensch* was first used by **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe** in *Faust I* (1808); Nietzsche coined *Nebemensch* and *Untermensch* by analogy, a common feature of his writing **style**. We should note that when Nietzsche wanted to provide a contrast to the *Übermensch*, he did not use the term *Untermensch* (although it is an easy mistake to infer that he must have done) but instead used expressions such as **herd man** (to denote the inferior man who follows the mass) and **last man** to denote the complacent person who has ceased to strive. By the end of the 19th century, the **eugenicists** were using the term *Untermensch* to denote a degenerative or inferior type of individual. It acquired racist overtones under **National Socialism**, where Heinrich Himmler used it to label Russians, Slavs, and **Jews**.

**UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS (UNZEITGEMÄSSE BETRACHTUNGEN, 1873–1875).** Nietzsche's second book, consisting of four separate essays (though 13 had been planned) on the parlous state of **German culture**, individually titled "**David Strauss**, the Confessor and the Writer" (1873), "On the Uses and Disadvantages of **History for Life**" (1874), "**Schopenhauer as Educator**" (1874), and "**Richard Wagner** in Bayreuth" (1876). They were not printed together in book form until 1893. In the first essay, Nietzsche provides so hostile a critique of Strauss's literary method that even he, in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff dated 11 February 1874 (the day after Strauss had been buried), confessed that he felt somewhat uneasy. Strauss had given expression to his skepticism in *Der alte und neue Glaube*, 1872 (*The Old Faith and the New*, 1873), and it was this work, somewhat rambling and complacent, that had offended Nietzsche and sparked off the essay. Nietzsche's quarrel was not with the content of the work; indeed, both Nietzsche and Strauss became more convinced in their atheism the older they became. Nietzsche shared the view Strauss had put forward in his major work *Das Leben Jesus, kritisch bearbeitet* (1835; translated by George Eliot as *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, 1846) that much of the gospel story began as a myth created by the **Jews**. Nietzsche the philologist simply could not forgive Strauss for his barbaric cultural philistinism: in other words, his bad **style**.

The second essay warns that the contemporary pursuit of history weakens all creativity within society and is "hostile and dangerous to life" (*UM*, I: "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," 5). In Germany especially, Nietzsche argues, there is little **original artistic** work: all is foreign borrowing, reflecting the universal rage for ease and comfort. Worse still, philosophy has been tamed, reducing people to the level of automatons. Nietzsche sighs, "Are there still human beings, one asks oneself, or perhaps only thinking-, writing- and speaking-machines?" (*UM*, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," 5). For Nietzsche, the pursuit of cultural history neuters the enquiring mind, producing a race of eunuchs. The cure is to give life precedence over the quest for **knowledge**.

The last two essays are panegyrics on Arthur Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner and were rapidly overtaken by events since Nietzsche would soon turn against both mentors. In "Schopenhauer

as Educator,” Nietzsche applauds Schopenhauer for recognizing that human **suffering** sets man apart from the beasts: “As long as anyone desires life as he desires happiness he has not yet raised his eyes above the horizon of the **animal**” (*UM*, III: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 5). Nietzsche writes that Schopenhauer was blessed with the innate propensity to become a philosopher and to understand **truths** that escape other scholars, who are “greedy for posts and honors, cautious and pliable, ingratiating towards those with influence and position” (*UM*, III: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 7), yet there is scarcely a mention of Schopenhauer’s actual teaching in this work.

In “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” there seems to be little Wagner cannot do: “He is master of the arts, the religions, the histories of the various nations, yet he is the opposite of a polyhistor, a spirit who only brings together and arranges: for he is one who unites what he has brought together into a living structure, a *simplifier of the world*” (*UM*, IV: “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” 4). Nietzsche’s praise is directed at Wagner’s unique concept of theater, in which he fuses **music** and life, life, and drama; indeed, Wagner is the only perfect dithyrambic dramatist since Aeschylus. Perhaps blinding himself to Wagner’s vanity, Nietzsche forges a link with the preceding essays in his disparaging comments on scholars and philosophers who seek fame and recognition: “the sole purpose of their work is to create for the present day an illusory reputation for wisdom” (*UM*, IV: “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” 6). The essay ends with Nietzsche’s praise for Wagner as “not the seer of a future, as he would like to appear to us, but the interpreter and transfigurer of a past” (*UM*, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth”: 11). Nietzsche seems to infer that some knowledge of cultural history, which he has been at pains to disparage in all four essays, *does* have its uses when revealed to us by a genius like Wagner. Clearly, Nietzsche did not feel at ease with this essay, which appeared in July 1876, just before he went to Bayreuth to see the first performance of *The Ring* (from which he fled in horror). His relationship with Wagner was ruptured after that experience.

**UTILITARIANISM.** The movement in English philosophy represented by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and **John Stuart Mill** (1806–1873). Jeremy Bentham proposed an ethic that bypassed the question of motive: he held that it was possible to do the right thing for the wrong

motive. In his *A Fragment on Government* (1776), Bentham asserted that the measure of right and wrong is “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” Things are to be measured and judged on their actual and potential consequences. However, even Bentham found it difficult to hold to this simple formula. Nietzsche’s critique of this notion in his notebook (Spring 1888) is largely justified:

The value of an action must be judged by its consequences—say the Utilitarians—to judge by its origins implies an impossibility, namely that of *knowing* its origins. . . . One does not know the origin, one does not know the consequences: does an action then possess any value at all? . . . (WP, II: 291)

When John Stuart Mill tried to redefine utilitarianism in his essay “Utilitarianism” published in *Fraser’s Magazine* in 1861, he provided a succinct exposition of the theory as an ethic for ordinary human beings, but he also insisted that utility did not exclude the pleasures; moreover, some pleasures were more valuable than others. Critics have argued that the bare bones of utilitarianism depend on quantity alone and preclude value judgments on quality. Nietzsche thought Mill’s theories would lead to a “weakening and abolition of the *individual*” (D, II: 132).

– V –

**VAIHINGER, HANS (1852–1933).** German philosopher. Vaihinger came to Nietzsche through his study of **Immanuel Kant** when he was professor of philosophy at Halle University. In his immensely influential *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, 1911 (*The Philosophy of ‘As If’*, 1924), Vaihinger, a convinced Nietzschean and admirer of **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, raised challenging questions such as whether, in view of Nietzsche’s antithetical stance toward the **truth** of any proposition, one should not also suppose that he might have posited the existence of **God** through dialectic reasoning. Vaihinger’s analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of **knowledge** centers on what he calls “the doctrine of conscious illusion.” He denied that his philosophy amounted to skepticism; it is a rational way for man to avoid conflict in an irrational world if he willingly accepts irrational answers to problems that have no rational solutions. In his popular *Nietzsche als*

*Philosoph* (*Nietzsche as Philosopher*, 1902), Vaihinger asserted an affinity between Nietzsche's philosophy (a positive version of **Schopenhauer's** main tenets) and **Darwinism**. This explained Nietzsche's attack on **moralism, socialism, democracy**, humanism, intellectualism, **pessimism**, and **Christianity**. In a specially revised war edition of this much-reprinted brochure, with an introduction for soldiers at the front, Vaihinger argued that Nietzsche was a pure philosopher whose ideas ought not to be confused with the aggression of men such as **Heinrich von Treitschke** or Friedrich von Bernhardi.

**VALÉRY, PAUL (1871–1937)**. French poet and man of letters. In his youth, Valéry was a friend of Stéphane Mallarmé and through him published **symbolist** poems and essays until he suddenly stopped writing in 1896, remaining silent for two decades. In 1912, **André Gide** presented Valéry with a volume of his own "*Vers anciens*," and this apparently persuaded Valéry to overcome his reservations about the literary life. By 1925, Valéry was a celebrity, being elected to the *Académie Française* in 1926. However, he was never secure financially and was always under pressure to publish for a livelihood. This did not stop him from pursuing his lifelong hobby of annotating his every thought in a series of notebooks (*Cahiers 1894–1945*), published posthumously. These journals, of which there are 29, reveal his interest in Nietzsche and his acceptance of Nietzsche's low opinion of the **cultural** state of modernity. Like Nietzsche, "[Valéry] wrote mordantly about the contemporary world" (W. N. Ince, *Penguin Companion to Literature*, 1969). Refer to Eduard Goède, *Nietzsche et Valéry* (1962).

**VALUES.** See REVALUATION OF ALL VALUES.

**VEIL (DIE SCHLEIER)**. Like the **mask**, Nietzsche sees the veil as a means of protection or disguise. In **Arthur Schopenhauer's** interpretation of **Buddhism** and Eastern thought, without the veil of Maya or illusion we are forced to acknowledge **life** as purposeless and **nature** as hostile to mankind, with nirvana or subjugation of the **will** as the only escape. In contrast to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche embraced relativism cheerfully and hated all attempts to deliberately obscure meaning. He held the theologian **Friedrich Schleiermacher** in contempt, punning at his expense in *Ecce Homo* (*EH*, "The Case



of Wagner”: 3)—“Schleiermacher” means “veil maker.” Nietzsche uses the veil metaphorically to suggest that life, like a **woman**, veils its beauties: “Yes, life is a woman!” (*GS*, IV: 339), but unpredictable things happen when the veil is lifted: when **Baubô** shows her naked belly. *See also* DERRIDA, JACQUES.

**VEREIN FREIE BÜHNE, DAS.** *See* DIE FREIE BÜHNE.

**VOLK, DAS (PEOPLE OR FOLK).** A **concept** that became linked with Nietzsche’s name through the popularity of the work of critics such as Pierre de Lagarde, author of the influential *Deutsche Schriften* (*German Texts*, 1878), and **Julius Langbehn**, who wanted to follow the lead announced by **Richard Wagner** of regenerating **German culture**. To many who were not familiar with Nietzsche’s rejection of Wagner, Nietzsche’s diatribe against degenerate German **culture** appeared to be in agreement with the proto-**nationalism** of such men as **Houston Stuart Chamberlain**. The specific notion of the *Volk*, first mooted among right-wing intellectuals dissatisfied with the demands of the 1848 bourgeois liberals, was adopted by students of the *Kyffhäuser Bund* in 1881 and came to indicate the special relationship of the German people to the soil of their land through their blood. Nietzsche’s brother-in-law **Bernhard Förster** peddled a racist version of folkish nationalism, and Nietzsche made his objections to it quite explicit. However, it resurfaced as a dominant theme in the works of **Oswald Spengler** and **Martin Heidegger**, both on the fringes of politics, and in the work of other ideologues of **National Socialism**, such as **Alfred Rosenberg** and, indeed, **Adolf Hitler** himself.

**VOLTAIRE (1694–1778).** (Pseudonym for François-Marie Arouet.) Leading French writer of the **Enlightenment**. Voltaire’s chief works in this connection were the *Lettres philosophiques* (1734) and the *Dictionnaire philosophique*, 1764 (*Philosophical Dictionary*, 1962), while his most famous work is the biting satirical tale *Candide* (1759; trans. 1959). In the *Lettres philosophiques*, Voltaire, after spending two years in England from 1726 to 1728 (when he was temporarily banished from Paris), wrote what amounts to a paean of praise for English politics and society. In these “letters,” which are really short essays (a method Nietzsche adopted), Voltaire found the

English attitude to trade healthy as opposed to the reactionary attitude of the French **aristocracy** and admired English toleration of other faiths; he had fulsome praise for the pioneering work of John Locke and Isaac Newton. In the *Philosophical Dictionary*, Voltaire mounted a broadside challenge to the French establishment (notably the orthodox Church and the **State**). His entry for “*Bien (tout est)*” neatly persiflaged the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose philosophy that “all is for the best, in the best possible of all possible worlds” is also attacked in *Candide* in the figure of the ridiculous philosopher, Pangloss. Voltaire was also an ardent propagandist for the theater and wrote several plays in which he upheld the “Unities” or rules of French tragedy, to which **Richard Wagner** was implacably opposed. He also wrote works on **history**.

Nietzsche paid homage to Voltaire by dedicating the first edition of *Human, All Too Human* to him, possibly as a deliberate attempt to annoy Wagner; if so, it worked: Wagner was duly alienated. Ultimately, Nietzsche would find that more separated him from Voltaire than attracted him, although he certainly took Voltaire’s side in the struggle against his antagonist, **Jean-Jacques Rousseau**. However, Voltaire’s pursuit of theism was, for Nietzsche, a non sequitur since it failed to kill off **God**; thus, Voltaire remained steeped in the orderliness of the Enlightenment in a way diametrically opposed to Nietzsche’s extravagantly **Dionysian** approach to life:

Oh Voltaire! Oh humanity! Oh imbecility! There is some point to “**truth**,” to the *search* for truth; and if a human being goes about it too humanely—“*il ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien*” [he only seeks what is true in order to do good]—I wager he finds nothing! (BGE, II: 35)

Of course, to call someone a “seeker after truth” represented a grand insult in Nietzsche’s worldview, but he was more generous to Voltaire in *Ecce Homo*, acknowledging him as a “*grandseigneur* of the spirit” (EH, “*Human, All Too Human*”: 1). See also FREE SPIRIT.

– W –

**WAGNER, COSIMA (1837–1930)**. The daughter of Franz Liszt, Cosima divorced Hans von Bülow in order to marry **Richard**

**Wagner** in 1870. When she first met Nietzsche in May 1869, she was heavily pregnant with Siegfried; by then, she already had three daughters, one of them (at least) Wagner's child. Much has been made of Nietzsche's affection for Cosima; the medical records show that Nietzsche said on entering the Jena mental hospital 27 March 1889 that "his wife Cosima Wagner" had brought him there. Cosima has also been entangled in the mystery of how to interpret Nietzsche's puzzling references to **Ariadne**. What must be borne in mind is that Cosima was utterly devoted to Wagner and supported him in every way. She exerted herself to shore up his finances, particularly with regard to the Bayreuth venture in 1872. Furthermore, Cosima became a widow in 1883, the year after Nietzsche's disastrous attempt to come close to **Lou Andreas-Salomé**. Nietzsche therefore had ample opportunity for a rapprochement with Cosima, though Cosima, who was now busy forging a cult in Wagner's memory, would have certainly repulsed any advances; after the publication of *Human, All Too Human*, she regarded Nietzsche as "infectious" (Joachim Köhler, *Nietzsche and Wagner: A Lesson in Subjugation*, 1998).

It seems clear that Nietzsche held Cosima partly responsible for what he thought was the master's rejection of atheism. Cosima had converted from Catholicism to Protestantism in order to marry Wagner, and Nietzsche presumed that her religious bent had encouraged Wagner to adopt his final position in search of Christian redemption, as witnessed in *Parsifal* (1882). For her part, Cosima no doubt thought that Nietzsche had been a treacherous friend to her husband. In 1876, when Nietzsche went to Bayreuth to hear *The Ring*, he was put off by what he heard at the rehearsals and fled, pleading ill health. **Malwida von Meysenbug's** attempts to smooth over the cracks in the relationship between Nietzsche and the Wagners when they were all in Sorrento in October and November 1876 were not successful, and Nietzsche did not meet the Wagners in person again, though on 19 December 1876 he sent his customary birthday congratulations to Cosima (her birthday fell on 25 December). Thus, Nietzsche did not openly quarrel with the Wagners, but the antagonism was palpable and, indeed, mutual.

To the horror of **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, her former friend Cosima destroyed all of Nietzsche's correspondence to the Wagners. However, since Nietzsche often kept copies of the letters he sent, it is

clear that Nietzsche sent a number of letters to Cosima in the period just before his mental collapse. These late missives from Turin reveal Nietzsche's conflicting emotions toward his former friend: deep respect for Cosima as well as bitter anger toward her for corrupting Wagner with religiosity and, in the final analysis, a sense of betrayal because Cosima did not match up to Nietzsche's fantasy image of her as "Princess Ariadne, my beloved" (3 January 1889).

**WAGNER, RICHARD (1813–1883).** German composer. Wagner's impact on 19th-century **music** was monumental. His first opera of international repute was *Der fliegende Holländer* (*The Flying Dutchman*, 1843); there followed *Tannhäuser* (1845), *Lohengrin* (1850), *Tristan und Isolde* (1865), *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg* (*The Mastersingers of Nuremberg*, 1868), *Der Ring des Nibelungen* (*The Ring*, 1876), and *Parsifal* (1882).

Nietzsche first met Richard Wagner in Leipzig in November 1868. The friendship between them, in which Wagner was at first very much the senior partner or father figure, continued for several years, at a level of intimacy evidenced by the fact that Nietzsche spent Christmas of 1869 and 1870 with the Wagners at Tribschen, a house of modest size on Lake Lucerne. Nietzsche was thus privileged to hear the first performance of the "Siegfried Idyll," which Wagner had composed for his wife's birthday (25 December 1870) and had arranged to be played on the stairs at Tribschen so that **Cosima** would wake up to the sound of the music. Nietzsche was also present at the ceremony in Bayreuth in 1872 when the foundation stone for the *Festspielhaus* was laid—a momentous occasion for the Wagners (see the photo spread). At this event, Nietzsche met the Wagners' friend, **Malwida von Meysenbug**, who became a close friend of his own.

Nietzsche gradually realized the depth of the gulf that separated him from the **nationalistic** and **anti-Semitic** ideas of the Wagners. He disliked the nationalistic overtones present in *The Ring* and fled from Bayreuth before the opening night in August 1876. That fall, Nietzsche spent the winter with Paul Rée and Malwida von Meysenbug at a villa in Sorrento; by coincidence, the Wagners spent several weeks late October and November 1876 at a nearby hotel. Nietzsche and Wagner were able to meet, and Wagner explained his plans for

*Parsifal* to Nietzsche. The following year, in a letter to Cosima (10 October 1877), Nietzsche genuflected toward the “glorious promise of Parcival [*sic*],” but his comments became bitter after Wagner had sent him the score. In a letter to Reinhardt von Seydlitz (4 January 1878), Nietzsche, having skimmed through it, declared, “More Liszt than Wagner”—an insult to Cosima’s Catholicism, which Nietzsche saw as a decadent influence on Wagner.

Nietzsche’s turn away from Wagner was gradual and painful. He had eulogized Wagner in *The Birth of Tragedy*, and the encomium continues in the fourth essay of *Untimely Meditations*. Slight irritation has set in by *Daybreak*: there is in Wagner’s music “a compulsive and importunate restlessness.” (*D*, IV: 218). The attack begins in earnest in part 1 of volume 2 of *Human, All Too Human*, published in 1879. (Volume 1 [1878] had been Nietzsche’s first work to be published after the fiasco of his flight from *The Ring* at Bayreuth.) Nietzsche pulls no punches: “Richard Wagner, seemingly the all-conquering, actually a decaying, despairing **romantic**, suddenly sank down helpless and shattered before the **Christian** cross” (*HH*, II: Preface, “Assorted Maxims and Opinions,” 3). In *The Gay Science*, Wagner is found guilty of **Schopenhauerian** compassion, but Nietzsche still struggles to remain polite: “Let us be loyal to Wagner in that which is *true* and original in him” (*GS*, II: 109). He need not have bothered to be civil; the Wagners had decided after their first encounter with *Human, All Too Human* that Nietzsche was completely beyond the pale.

Wagner is parodied as the “sorcerer” (one of the **higher men**) in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 1–2). By then, Wagner was dead, and Nietzsche could and did say what he liked about him, making no attempt to hide his contempt for his erstwhile mentor. In 1888, he wrote two works of Wagner critique: *The Case of Wagner* and *Nietzsche contra Wagner*. In the former, he particularly objected to Wagner’s return to a mystical brand of Christianity in *Parsifal*, calling the opera “Music as Circe . . . *the stroke of genius* in seduction” (*CW*, Postscript), and in the latter, Wagner “as danger” sums up the diatribe (*NCW*, “Wagner as Danger”: 1). Refer to Frederick R. Love, *Young Nietzsche and the Wagnerian Experience* (1963); Roger Hollinrake, *Nietzsche, Wagner and the Philosophy of Pessimism* (1982); Franz-Peter Hudek, *Die Tyrannei der Musik*.

*Nietzsches Wertung des Wagnerschen Musikdramas* (1989); Dieter Borchmeyer and Jörg Salaquarda, *Nietzsche und Wagner: Stationen einer epochalen Begegnung* (1994); and Joachim Köhler, *Nietzsche and Wagner: A Lesson in Subjugation*, trans. Ronald Taylor (1998). See also FRIENDSHIP.

**WAR.** Nietzsche is often accused of bellicosity, but his intention is always to show how necessary it is for the decisive man of action to gain **power**. In his praise for the “**blond beast** of prey,” he singles out ruthless warriors who have gained mastery by conquest: Alcibiades, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Cesare Borgia, and Napoleon: these are men he would like to see reflected in the *Übermensch*. Indeed, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the argument is made—albeit in the mouth of Zarathustra—in favor of the hard and strong individual: “What warrior wants to be spared?” (*Za*, I: “Of War and Warriors”). In volume 1 of *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche drew up the balance sheet for and against war:

War—Against war it can be said: it makes the victor stupid, the defeated malicious. In favor of war: through producing these two effects it barbarizes and therefore makes more **natural**; it is the winter or hibernation time of **culture**, mankind emerges from it stronger for good or evil. (*HH*, I: “A Glance at the State,” 444)

In part 2 of volume 2 of *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche saw war as energizing: “To nations growing wretched and feeble war may be recommended as a remedy . . .” (*HH*, II: “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” 187). Yet in spite of this rhetoric, Nietzsche was a pacifist in his private life; he disliked **Otto von Bismarck**’s warmongering intensely. Having served briefly in the Franco-Prussian War as a medical orderly, where he found the plight of the wounded soldiers execrable, he was invalided out and wrote to his friend Carl von Gersdorff, “I shall have to content myself with watching and sympathizing from a distance” (letter of 22 October 1870). Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** vexatiously described Nietzsche as a war lover during World War I, ignoring his use of the term as a **metaphor** for strength and implying that he would have backed **German** aggression (whereas the opposite is true). Partly through this conduit, for decades Nietzsche was viewed in intellectual circles in Britain as a chief instigator of World War I.

**WEBER, MAX (1864–1920).** German sociologist. Weber was professor of political economy at Freiburg and Heidelberg but retired from teaching in 1898 after a nervous breakdown. He is regarded as the founder of sociology as an academic discipline in Germany. He is noted for such works as *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, 1904–1905 (*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 1930), and *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (I: 1922 II: 1925; *Economy and Society* I: 1947; II: 1963 incomplete). Like Nietzsche, Weber was fascinated by the role of **science** as a **force** within **culture**. Nietzsche's chief influence on Weber was in the area of political sociology and centered on the ethics of responsibility. Nietzsche's **Übermensch** has been seen as important for Weber's concept of charisma within political leadership, while Weber's **concept** of the pariah (especially within **Judaism**) is construed as similar to Nietzsche's concept of **ressentiment**. A fruitful comparative study can be made between Nietzsche's *On The Genealogy of Morality* and Weber's *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 1920–1921 (*The Sociology of Religion*, 1966). Refer to Robert Eden, *Political Leadership and Nihilism: A Study of Weber and Nietzsche* (1983); Andrea Germer, *Wissenschaft und Leben. Max Webers Antwort auf eine Frage Friedrich Nietzsches (Science and Life: Max Weber's Answer to One of Nietzsche's Questions*, 1994); and David Owen, *Nietzsche, Weber and Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason* (1994).

**WEDEKIND, FRANK (1864–1924).** German avant-garde dramatist. Wedekind's *Frühlings Erwachen*, 1890 (*Spring Awakening*, first translated as *The Awakening of Spring*, 1916), anticipated **Sigmund Freud**'s theories on children's sexual urges by more than a decade. Wedekind closes the play with a strange figure of a **masked** man, incorporating "**life**," who was modeled on Nietzsche's philosophy (the figure tells the protagonists not to commit suicide but to go out into the world and live). Another Nietzschean theme is indicated by the prevalence of the *Gewaltmensch* (tyrant) in Wedekind's plays, the type of "fat cat" capitalist such as Dr. Schön in *Erdgeist*, 1895 (*Earth Spirit*, 1914). Such men are the strong men in his plays (Schön is as near to a hero as one is likely to get in Wedekind's drama), but it is worth remembering that among the **socialists** in the 1890s, Nietzsche's **Übermensch** was sometimes referred to (disapprovingly)

as a *Gewaltmensch*. Wedekind, who liked to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, no doubt intended both interpretations.

A similar ambiguity is found with Wedekind's female characters, especially Lulu, the protagonist in *Erdgeist* and its sequel, *Die Büchse der Pandora*, 1904 (*Pandora's Box*, 1918). Wedekind, like Nietzsche, found Wilhelmine prudery disgusting and hypocritical and endorsed Nietzsche's opinion that **women** should be acknowledged as **sexual** creatures—that they should “think with their flesh”—but he then debunked lascivious women throughout the plays. Lulu is the first of many principal characters in Wedekind's plays whose high libido causes her death, with many jokes against her. In addition, Wedekind, like Nietzsche, thought that the scholarly woman was an aberration (as demonstrated by the lesbian character Gräfin Geschwitz in the “Lulu plays”). Wedekind's ruthless mockery holds up a mirror to Wilhelmine society in a uniquely sardonic and effective way. His critique is much more acclimatized to the demimonde of society than Nietzsche's, which is fundamentally an **aristocratic** concern for **culture**, combined with a call for the assertion of the instincts. Refer to Richard Arthur Firda, “Wedekind, Nietzsche and the **Dionysian** Experience,” in *Modern Language Notes* 87 (1972).

**WEIGHT.** See HEAVINESS; SPIRIT OF HEAVINESS.

**WEININGER, OTTO (1880–1903).** German philosopher. An adherent of the views of **Immanuel Kant** and **Arthur Schopenhauer**, Weininger tried and failed to inhabit a Kantian realm of ideas, viewing **life** as a dualistic struggle between the divine (“*das All*”) and chaos (“*das Nichts*”). In his notorious *Geschlecht und Charakter*, 1903 (*Sex and Character*, 1906), Weininger starts with a viable premise similar to that adopted by **Havelock Ellis**, namely, that homosexuals should be treated with more respect; he then gives a highly questionable analysis of blood plasma in order to conclude that, on grounds of mathematics, a strongly masculine man should mate with a strongly feminine **woman**, though other configurations are tolerable as long as the ratio “adds up” to 10. Weininger then argues at a tangent for the rest of the book; having introduced the idea of femininity, he is at pains to prove that woman is a predator of man through her desire for sex and, ultimately, for a child, in order to fulfill her destiny.



Throughout his book, Weininger makes frequent, if spurious, references to Nietzsche to support his ideas: both thinkers identify real problems, such as the marginalized position of women in society, only to lay the blame on women themselves. Having pronounced on woman's lack of creativity throughout the centuries, Weininger concludes that women are inherently inferior to men in intelligence. In fact, woman lacks intelligence to the point where one cannot speak of her as having a character. Weininger demonstrates **Jewish** self-hatred when he argues that a Christian woman, however inferior she is to a (Christian) man, is still superior to a Jewish man. Converting from Judaism to **Christianity** in 1902 (on the day he passed his doctorate), Weininger revised his view on Nietzsche, now berating the **God**-slayer and Jesus-attacker in *Über die letzten Dinge* (*On Last Things*), a diffuse commentary on the contemporary art scene completed in August 1903, two months before he shot himself. In this work, published posthumously, Weininger rates **Henrik Ibsen** and **Richard Wagner** higher than Nietzsche. Refer to Kurt Rudolf Fischer, "Experiences with Nietzsche and Weininger," in *Nietzsche and the Austrian Culture*, ed. Jacob Golomb (2004).

**WHIP.** In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the old crone with whom Zarathustra has been bantering has the last say in their exchange when she declares, "Are you going to **women**? Don't forget the whip!" (*Za*, I: "Of Old and Young Women"). It is not clear from the German whether the whip belongs to Zarathustra or to "women" in general, so the translation "Don't forget *your* whip" is quite misleading. Nietzsche could well be saying that women have the whip hand, a view he airs in *Ecce Homo*, where woman is declared "a little beast of prey!" (*EH*, "Why I Write Such Good Books": 5). Adorno presumed the worst:

He fell for the fraud of saying the "feminine" when talking of women. Hence the perfidious advice not to forget the whip: femininity itself is already the effect of the whip. (*Minima Moralia*, 1951)

In either case—woman as victim or woman as femme fatale—the image is troubling, even if one allows for Nietzsche's *rancune* at his failure to win over **Lou Andreas-Salomé**. Nietzsche devised the scenario for the famous photograph of Lou perched in a cart pulled by himself and **Paul Rée**, taken in Lucerne in May 1882 (see the photo spread), and the whip brandished by Lou actually has a rose at the tip:

grotesque rather than perfidious. Refer to Carol Diethe, *Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip* (1996).

**WIDMAN, JOSEF VIKTOR (1842–1911).** German writer and academic. Widman studied in Basel under **Jacob Burckhardt** at the *Gymnasium*, became headmaster in Bern in 1868, and eventually became editor of the periodical *Der Bund*, published in Bern. Although he was a novelist and playwright in his own right, he is best remembered as the author of the review of *Beyond Good and Evil*, “*Nietzsche's gefährliches Buch*” (“Nietzsche's dangerous book”), which appeared in *Der Bund* on 17 September 1886, the earliest review of any of Nietzsche's works. (Nietzsche had asked his then publisher, Gustav Naumann, in a letter of 2 August 1886, to send Widman a review copy of the book in question.) Widman acknowledged Nietzsche's talent, though, as the title of the review also indicates, he had certain reservations and increasingly distanced himself from Nietzsche's thought. In his play *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 1893), Widman pilfered Nietzsche's title in order to turn it on its head, while in *Der Heilige und die Tiere* (*The Saint and the Animals*, 1905), one of the characters proposes an alternative to Nietzsche's “death of **God**”: a “godless **Christianity**.” Widman's friend **Carl Spitteler** in the periodical *Die Gesellschaft* defended Widman against various scurrilous attacks. See also SCHLAF, JOHANNES.

**WIGMAN, MARY.** See DANCE.

**WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORFF, ULRICH VON (1848–1931).** German philologist. At the time of his vitriolic attack on Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*, Wilamowitz-Möllendorff had only recently acquired his own doctorate in philology (1870) and was employed in Berlin, though he was later professor in philology at Greifswald University from 1883 before moving to Göttingen. He had known Nietzsche at Schulpforta, though he was four years his junior. Nietzsche had actually sent Wilamowitz-Möllendorff a copy of *The Birth of Tragedy*, knowing that he would be interested. The bitterness of the ensuing debate took Nietzsche completely by surprise. In Wilamowitz-Möllendorff's 32-page polemic *Zukunftsphilologie! Eine*

*Erwidrung auf Friedrich Nietzsches "Geburt der Tragödie"* (*Philology of the Future! A Response to Friedrich Nietzsche's "Birth of Tragedy,"* 1872), Nietzsche's ideas are spurned as "nonsense, stupidity, fairy tales, hallucinations, distortions," and Nietzsche is accused of "childish naivety" and ignorance about **Homer**, Euripides, and **Greek tragedy** in general. This attack occasioned an impassioned defense from **Richard Wagner** in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (open letter of 23 June 1872) and, after publication difficulties, from **Erwin Rohde**, in turn provoking Wilamowitz-Möllendorff to return to the attack in February 1873 with his even shorter *Zukunftphilologie! Zweites Stück. Eine Erwidrung auf die Rettungsversuche für Fr. Nietzsches "Geburt der Tragödie"* (*Philology of the Future! Part Two: A Response to the Attempts to Rescue Friedrich Nietzsche's "Birth of Tragedy"*).

**WILL TO POWER (DER WILLE ZUR MACHT).** Concept first mentioned in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* within a psychological and organic context. The will to **power** is the driving element in all **life**: "Where I found a living creature, there I found the will to power" (*Za* II: "On Self-Overcoming"). **Arthur Schopenhauer** had posited the will as a "thing in itself" that manifested itself in the individual as the "will to life," over which that person had no control. Nietzsche sought to go beyond Schopenhauer's **pessimistic metaphysics**. In the **higher man**, the will is contingent on **affirmation** of life, *amor fati*, and acquires added significance through its link to **eternal return**. The higher man is fit to hear Zarathustra's teachings on the **Übermensch**:

To redeem the past and to transform every "it was" into an "I wanted it thus!"—that alone do I call redemption! Will—that is what the liberator and bringer of joy is called: thus have I taught you, my friends! (*Za*, II: "Of Redemption")

In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche paved the way for his concept of the will to power by describing the human condition as a worship of **force**: "we must assess to what extent precisely force (*Kraft*) has been overcome by something higher, in the service of which it now stands as means and instrument!" (*D*, V: 548). Here, he suggests that force can be measured in rational terms; it excels when it is employed "for its own constraint," as the genius or great man has already grasped. In posit-

ing a “victory over force” (*Sieg über Kraft*; *D*, V: 548), Nietzsche uses the **language** of contest so dear to him from his study of **Greek culture**. There are echoes of this in *Human, All Too Human*: “There exists a *defiance of oneself* of which many forms of **asceticism** are among the most sublimated expressions” (*HH*, I: “The Religious Life,” 142).

R. J. Hollingdale points out that between *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche arrived at the hypothesis that all actions are motivated by the desire for power. Hitherto, power has been expressed through **morality**; now Nietzsche wants to posit “a possible reality deprived of all metaphysical support” (R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy*, 1999). The hardest task is to exercise power over one’s self; the man of strong will, though dangerous, is preferable to the man of weak will, who is only half alive. The *Übermensch* has overcome most obstacles in overcoming himself; he is the epitome of the will to power. Volker Gerhardt argues that in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, “the will to power provides, simultaneously, the internal and external conditions that make the idea of the *Übermensch* possible” (Volker Gerhardt, “*Wille zur Macht*,” in *Nietzsche-Handbuch*, 2000). For Keith Ansell-Pearson, the *Übermensch* has yet to emerge: “There has never been an *Übermensch*, Zarathustra says, for man has yet to learn *how* to go under” (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, 1994).

In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, the will to power is discussed in connection with the emergence of **master** and **slave morality** through the influence of the **ascetic ideal**. The latter harnesses it in a corrupting sense and thus denigrates life instead of affirming it. Nietzsche insists on an affirmative use of the will and on a **revaluation of all values**. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche criticizes the subject who merely confuses cause and effect, as though willing is sufficient to produce action, with the result: “L’effet, c’est moi” (*BGE*, I: 19). At the same time, he is keen to correct the teleological argument that the basic drive in organic beings is self-preservation: “A living thing desires above all to vent its strength—life as such is will to power—” (*BGE*, I: 13). This encourages Nietzsche to use the vocabulary of physics (force, energy, and dynamism) for something that can be thought only from a human perspective. The notion is put succinctly in *The Anti-Christ*:

What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness?—The feeling that power *increases*—that resistance is overcome. (A-C, 2)

Several passages in *The Will to Power* pursue this interpretation: “The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it” (WP, III: 656); the idea is then expanded and reinforced:

The will to power manifests itself as will to nourishment, to property, to tools, to servants (those who obey) and masters: the **body** as an example.—The stronger will directs the weaker. There is absolutely no other kind of causality than that of will upon will. (WP, III: 658)

See also DYNAMITE.

**THE WILL TO POWER (DER WILLE ZUR MACHT).** Title of the compilation from Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks prepared for print by Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** and her team at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* (Heinrich Köselitz alias **Peter Gast**, Ernst and August Horneffer). The work was first published posthumously in 1901 as volume 15 of the *Grossoktavausgabe* and was divided into 483 sections. Elisabeth and Gast brought out an expanded version in 1906 with 1,067 sections, in volumes 9 and 10 of the pocket edition, and the latter is the source for the Kaufmann/Hollingdale translation cited in this Dictionary. Many of the expansions were achieved by dividing up longer sections from the 1901 version, while some of the material from the 1901 version was axed. Some of the source material from the notebooks found its way into Elisabeth’s two-volume biography of her brother, *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches* (1895–1904), without annotation. The bibliographical nightmare has not yet been satisfactorily resolved.

Although Nietzsche announced his intentions at the end of *On the Genealogy of Morality*—“I refer you to a work I am writing, *The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values*” (OGM, III: 27)—he never actually wrote the work, though he continued to fill many notebooks with jottings on random themes (among shopping lists and the like); frequently, whole pages were crossed out. This mass of chaotic notes is the material that was “laundered” to produce the work we now refer to as *The Will to Power*, creating the impression that Nietzsche

had left behind a coherent text. Technically, it is possible to say that Nietzsche *did* write the material for *The Will to Power*, as long as it is understood that the neat compilation by that name is a manufactured text. Many scholars dislike quoting from it for these reasons. Subsequently, there were editions by **Alfred Baeumler** (1930), Friedrich Würzbach (1940), and Karl Schlechta (1956).

Nietzsche had made 25 outlines for his new venture; Elizabeth selected one of these, dated 17 March 1887, which divided the *Will to Power* into four main sections with the following headings:

Book I: **European Nihilism**

Book II: Critique of the Highest Values Hitherto

Book III: Principles of a New Evaluation

Book IV: Discipline and Breeding [*Zucht*]

The first publication in 1901 carried the subtitle *Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werte* (*Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values*). Elisabeth then muddied the waters by claiming, in *Das Nietzsche-Archiv. Seine Freund und Feinde* (*The Nietzsche-Archiv: Its Friends and Foes*, 1907), that Nietzsche meant by “*Umwerthung aller Werte*” a quite separate, vast work of which *The Anti-Christ* was to be the first of four parts. To be fair to Elisabeth, Nietzsche, having used up much of the available material in preparing *The Anti-Christ*, had given a similar impression to **Paul Deussen** in a letter dated 26 November 1888. It is assumed that Nietzsche abandoned his plans for a book called *The Will to Power* in the autumn of 1888.

Because of the nature of the raw material, *The Will to Power* can manifest only an *apparent* coherence; however, **Martin Heidegger** was convinced that Nietzsche’s best work lay in the *Nachlaß*; it influenced his seminal work on **metaphysics**, *Being and Time* (1927). In his seminal *Nietzsche* (1961), Heidegger made frequent reference to the source material we now know as *The Will to Power*. Heidegger influenced the **poststructuralist** “**New Nietzsche**” readings by such writers as **Gilles Deleuze** and **Jacques Derrida**, who in turn influenced a distinct trend in **postmodern** American Nietzsche criticism. The current trend is to mine the *Will to Power* for Nietzsche’s references to the **natural sciences**.

Nietzsche had introduced the concept of **will to power** in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* within the context of the emergence of the *Über-*

*mensch*. The latter receives scant attention in *The Will to Power*, while **eternal recurrence** is treated in only 16 of the sections, with half a dozen more perfunctory mentions. Apart from the passages that concern the **concept** of the will to power, *The Will to Power* has major sections on **nihilism**, **pessimism**, *décadence*, **Christianity** and the death of **God**, **truth**, appearance and reality, good and evil, and **master**, **slave**, and **herd morality** as well as other topics that can be aligned with the published versions of Nietzsche's works. Its aphoristic status, together with familiar subject matter in reasonably chosen compartments and the seemingly obligatory insults directed at **women**—"weak, typically sick, changeable, inconstant" (*WP*, IV: 864)—all create the impression that *The Will to Power* must have been a manuscript ready for publication when Nietzsche went insane, whereas the contrary is true. Refer to "Bibliographical Note on *The Will to Power*" at the end of section 1 ("Nietzsche's Works") in the bibliography.

**WILLE, BRUNO (1860–1928)**. German man of letters. From a theological background, Wille was at first active for the *Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) before heading *Die Jungen*, a group of dissidents within the Socialist Party in the early 1890s. The group rejected the **Marxist** theory of collectivity and insisted on Nietzschean individualism, summed up by Wille as a "stirring of the will" and exemplified in his play *Die Jugend* (*Youth*, 1891). *Die Jungen* founded a periodical, *Der Sozialist*. In the ensuing struggle between Marxists and anarchists for the soul of *Der Sozialist*, victory went to the anarchists, among whom Wille was now numbered. His *Philosophie der Befreiung durch das reine Mittel. Beiträge zur Pädagogik des Menschengeschlechts* (*Philosophy of Liberation by Pure Means: Contributions on Human Pedagogy*, 1894) contains liberal mention of Nietzsche, though Wille probably knew only the first three parts of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Wille agreed with Nietzsche's denigration of the stultifying **morality** of bourgeois society and saw himself as the "modern **Zarathustra**" (R. Hinton Thomas, *Nietzsche in German Politics and Society 1890–1918*, 1980). His poems reveal a strong social conscience, while his novel *Offenbarungen des Wacholderbaums* (*Revelations of the Juniper Tree*, 1901–1903) portrays the type of synthesis of man with the **natural** world (as propounded by **Wilhelm**

**Bölsche**) in a dithyrambic **style** that reveals a pantheistic, mythological yearning for oneness and abandonment.

**WOLFSKEHL, KARL (1869–1948)**. German poet. A native of Darmstadt, Wolfskehl knew nothing about Nietzsche until 1892, **Henrik Ibsen** being at that time considered the enfant terrible of the age. Wolfskehl rapidly became a virtual disciple of Nietzsche, his admiration strengthened by his friendship with the poet **Stefan George**, who was his fellow student at Darmstadt. In 1898, Wolfskehl, together with **Ludwig Klages**, founded *die Kosmiker* in Munich. This outlandish group held an annual fancy-dress party characterized by **Dionysian** excess. The party held in January 1904 ended in a violent clash between Wolfskehl, who was **Jewish**, and **Alfred Schuler**, the leading member of the group, who was a virulent **anti-Semite**. As a result of this rift, the group ceased to exist. Wolfskehl's poetry consisted of epics on medieval **Germanic** themes, and he remained staunchly patriotic, even when the **National Socialists** forced him into exile. He took refuge in New Zealand, where he lived until his death.

**WOMAN (DAS WEIB)**. Ostensibly, Nietzsche had a high regard for woman's reproductive function. Philosophers have been keen to tie this to his insistence on creativity. At the level of **metaphor**, Nietzsche used the trope "woman" to demonstrate the unreliability of **truth**, inspiring the deconstructive practices of **Jacques Derrida** and the **poststructuralists**. "Woman as truth," derived from the provocative first words of *Beyond Good and Evil* (*BGE*: Preface), went on to become the mantra of postmodern Nietzschean critique. Nietzsche took pleasure in damning the frippery of the "**eternal feminine**," which was a corrupted version of **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's** "*ewig-weibliche*." He ignored Goethe's humane portrayal of Gretchen, preferring to ridicule the very notion that a woman could "redeem" man.

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra declares "woman needs children," a sentiment echoed in *Ecce Homo* (*EH*, "Why I Write Such Good Books": 5), but at the same time he insinuates that this need makes woman a predator on man. There is a note dated 1885 (curiously, not included in any *Will to Power* compilations) in which Nietzsche brings a new slant to the argument, querulously insisting that childbirth is woman's bounden duty:



A woman wants to be a mother, and if she does not want this, even though she can, she almost belongs in prison as a general rule. (*KSA*, 11: 34 [153])

It is obviously not possible to ignore Nietzsche's misogynist comments on women; this quote cannot be viewed as metaphor, nor can Nietzsche's scathing comments on the society women of his day. Indeed, the insincere behavior of such women was often dictated by the male-determined values of the **marriage** mart. Nietzsche admitted as much when, in *The Gay Science*, he lamented the way young girls were brought up to be totally ignorant "*in eroticis*" (*GS*, II: 71). Paradoxically, he opposed the one thing that would have freed women from their degrading search for a husband—higher **education**: "When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexuality" (*BGE*, IV: 144). Nietzsche's hostility toward **feminists** hardened as time went on: "'Emancipation of women'—that is the instinctive hatred of the abortive (*missrathen*) woman, who is incapable of giving birth, against the woman who has turned out well (*wohlgerathen*)" (*EH*, "Why I Write Such Good Books": 5). Lower-born women escaped his censure.

At the personal level, however, Nietzsche liked the company of educated and well-bred women, such as **Lou Andreas-Salomé** and **Meta von Salis-Marschlins**. The peace of his summer retreat at Sils Maria was sometimes ruptured by the arrival of female Ph.D. students from Zurich University, eager to make his acquaintance—and fully aware of his published remarks on women. Nietzsche was invariably polite to these pilgrims, enjoying their intelligence and perhaps their adulation; the man of **dynamite** (as he described himself to his **Jewish** friend **Helen Zimmern**) was nothing if not a gentleman. Refer to Carol Diethe, *Nietzsche's Women* (1996). See also BAUBÔ; FEMINISM; SEXUALITY; THE NEW NIETZSCHE.

– Y –

**YEA-SAYING.** See AFFIRMATION.

**YEATS, WILLIAM BUTLER (1865–1935).** Irish poet. Yeats's early poetry is characterized by its lyrical exoticism, though a new clarity

is found in the poems written from 1914 on. A feature of Yeats's life was his unsuccessful attempt, over several decades, to persuade the Irish nationalist Maud Gonne to marry him. An early disseminator of Nietzsche's ideas in English, Yeats was fascinated by the distinction between **Apollo** and **Dionysus** and appears to have fully understood Nietzsche's complexities since he began to use the image of the **mask** as a favorite device: Apollo's dream-state recognition of the world, or his adoption of the mask, contrasts with Dionysian ecstasy and abandonment. In "Among Schoolchildren" (1928), Dionysian abandonment (*Rausch*) is endorsed: "O **body** swayed to **music**, O brightening glance / How can we know the **dancer** from the dance?" In "The Hour Glass" (1903), Yeats gives his version of what **eternal return** might mean in terms of an hourglass, which, if constantly reversed, can run on forever, a vision taught by **Zarathustra** and parroted by his **animals**:

You teach that there is a great year of becoming, a colossus of a year:  
this year must, like an hour-glass, turn itself over again and again, so that  
it may run down and run out anew. (*Za*, III: "The Convalescent," 2)

However, it would be wrong to think that Yeats took the whole notion of eternal return from Nietzsche. Already in his poems of the late 1880s, there are allusions to the myth, showing that he and Nietzsche were probably using common sources: Pythagoras, **Heraclitus**, and possibly Orphism. The clearest celebration of eternal return is found in Yeats's poem "Dialogue of Self and Soul" (1933), where the "Self" declares, "I am content to live it all again / And yet again." Yeats gradually drew away from Nietzsche, possibly influenced by his wife, who was a spiritualist medium and whom he married in 1917. He returned to Nietzsche's ambit in 1928, so that a Nietzschean trace can be found in the last collections of poems *The Tower* (1928), *The Winding Stair* (1933), and *Last Poems* (1935). Refer to Otto Bohlmann, *Yeats and Nietzsche: An Exploration of Major Nietzschean Echoes in the Writings of William Butler Yeats* (1982).

– Z –

**ZARATHUSTRA/ZOROASTER.** Founder of the ancient Persian religion Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrians worship fire and revere the elements. The historical Zarathustra, born circa 660 B.C., taught that

the world is divided into two opposing realms of good and evil, or light and dark (personified as Ormuzd and Ahriman, respectively): he exhorted his followers to do good and to fight evil. Nietzsche's Zarathustra challenges such **moral** certainty by implying that we must first discover what is good and what is evil. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche was keener to debunk **Christianity** than to undermine the teachings of Zoroaster, hence Zarathustra's constantly provocative anti-Christian rhetoric: it is better to receive than to give; it is foolish to love one's neighbor; **pity** is harmful. "Man must grow better and more evil—thus do *I* teach" (*Za*, IV: "Of the Higher Man," 5). Zarathustra's age (he is 30, like Christ when crucified) and his invitation to his followers to liberate their instincts in laughter and **dancing** now that "**God** has died" (*Za*, IV: "Of the Higher Man," 2) is further evidence of persiflage. Nietzsche's Zarathustra exults in the individualistic ecstasy of **life affirmation**, as in the sublime moment in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* when Zarathustra awaits the rising sun (*Za*, III: "Before Sunrise") in what is surely an attempt to pay poetic tribute to the ancient prophet Zarathustra.

**ZARATHUSTRA, THUS SPOKE (ALSO SPRACH ZARATHUSTRA, 1883–1885).** (Subtitled *A Book for All or None*). Although in many ways *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is Nietzsche's hardest book to read, it represents the high point of his artistic endeavor, written in a **dithyrambic** style, with extensive use of **metaphor** and **symbolic** imagery (as, for example, the **child** and **animals**). In spite of the poetic manner, this is perhaps Nietzsche's most deeply philosophical work; in it, Nietzsche sets out the theory of the **will to power** for the first time and elaborates on the doctrine of **eternal return**, introduced briefly in *The Gay Science* under the description of "the **heaviest** burden" (*GS*, IV: 341), after which Zarathustra is introduced in a passage identical to the one at the beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*GS*, IV: 342).

Although Zarathustra makes much of eternal return, Nietzsche scarcely mentions the **concept** afterward in his published works, though it occurs frequently in his notebooks dating from 1883 to 1885, familiar now as part of *The Will to Power*. The same is true of the **Übermensch**, rarely mentioned in the later works, while the main reference in *The Will to Power* is, significantly, a note dated 1884

(when Nietzsche was at work on part 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*): “Not ‘man’ but *overman* is the goal!” (WP, IV: 1001).

Zarathustra’s definition of the will to power is deceptively simple: it is in every living creature. Wherever things are perishable, there is a will to power. Zarathustra states, “Where there is perishing and the falling of leaves, behold, there sacrifices **life** itself—for the sake of **power!**” (*Za*, II: “Of Self-Overcoming”). As he developed this theory, Nietzsche made it sound more complex and abstract, but he never repudiated Zarathustra’s initial statement that the will to power resides in all things that have life: “Only where life is, there is also will, not will to life, but—so I teach you—will to power!” (*Za*, II: “Of Self-Overcoming”). Moreover, “willing liberates,” as Zarathustra declares twice (*Za*, II: “Of Redemption”; *Za*, III: “Of Old and New Tablets,” 16). As such, it is a creative act. By seizing his destiny, by loving fate (Nietzsche’s *amor fati*), man creates his own life.

The *Übermensch* unites eternal return and life **affirmation** because, as Zarathustra remarks, “all joy wants the eternity of all things” (*Za*, IV: “The Intoxicated Song,” 11). The main point is not what eternal return is but rather what the attitude of the *Übermensch* toward it should be. The *Übermensch*—who remains a prototype—must judge by a new set of values in the wake of the death of **God**. Aware that atheism can lead to a life-denying **nihilism**, Nietzsche wishes to substitute new, life-affirming values in a world without the tyranny of God; the *Übermensch* must shake off the repression of outworn moral codes and retrieve the life of the instincts that has hitherto been denied.

As Zarathustra makes clear, man is a bridge between **animal** and *Übermensch* (*Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 4), but nothing is simple, for man is also an animal. From the outset, Zarathustra declares that man must pass through three metamorphoses until his spirit can be liberated: from camel to lion to **child** (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). Zarathustra has retained the fearless innocence of the child; he prefers to speak to his animals, the snake and the eagle, rather than to men. He laments the presence of the **herd** who cannot think for themselves; he even feels horror at the thought of eternal return because he will be obliged to will the return of herd man: “The greatest all too small!—that was my disgust at man! And eternal recurrence

even for the smallest! That was my disgust at all existence!” (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent,” 2). Just as, according to Christian doctrine, Christ reluctantly shouldered man’s burden of sin, Zarathustra recoils from what he must now do. It is typical of Nietzsche’s narrative strategy that his eagle and snake give the most lucid summary of eternal return:

Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally and we ourselves with them, and that we have already existed an infinite number of times before and all beings with us. (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent,” 2)

Under Zarathustra’s tuition (in the controversial part 4), eight **higher men** learn how to become the *Übermensch*. They assemble in Zarathustra’s cave for Zarathustra’s “last supper”: men Zarathustra would deride if he did not **pity** them. No certainty as to the identities of these inauspicious personages can be established; they include (probably) **Richard Wagner**, **Arthur Schopenhauer**, and **Charles Darwin**. The point is that they are so ridiculously in need of something to worship that they even start to worship the ass in Zarathustra’s cave (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 1–2; here, Nietzsche satirizes the radical neo-**Pietism** of his day, which insisted on conversion or “awakening”). In spite of their atavistic stupidity, Zarathustra finds the higher men amusing and gives them prolonged instruction on how to emerge as *Übermenschen*. Much of this consists of doing the opposite of what **Christian morality** would demand. Nietzsche delights in rewriting passages from the Bible for satirical effect: for example, “man does not live by bread alone, but also by the flesh of good lambs” (*Za*, IV: “The Last Supper”) is a parable of Christ’s riposte to Satan (Matthew 21:2), where Christ is referring to Deuteronomy 8:3.

Readers of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are often shocked by what Zarathustra has to say about **women**. In the autumn of 1882, **Lou Andreas-Salomé** abandoned Nietzsche in favor of **Paul Rée**; Nietzsche never saw either of these two friends again. It was a devastating experience. This—and a growing realization of the gulf between himself and his sister, who was planning marriage to **Bernhard Förster**—no doubt sharpened his misogyny. Zarathustra’s remark, “Everything about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: it is called pregnancy” (*Za*, I: “Of Old and Young Women”), is

echoed in *Ecce Homo* (EH, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 5). However, the common perception that Zarathustra takes a **whip** to woman is only partially true. The old crone to whom Zarathustra has been bragging is a match for him and answers Zarathustra by telling him, “Are you going to women? Don’t forget the whip” (*Gehst Du zu Frauen? Vergiß die Peitsche nicht; Za, I: “Of Old and Young Women”*), leaving a yawning ambiguity over who actually possesses the whip.

Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** was shocked at the content of part 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* but was not able to suppress it, as it was already in the public domain. The work went on to become Nietzsche’s best-known (though probably least understood) work. The *Übermensch* heralded by Zarathustra caught the imagination of an era, making *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* a cult book from the late 1890s to this day. In the first decade of the 20th century, no German work of literature, **art**, or **music** was complete unless it displayed a reaction to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; the examples in this Dictionary are legion. Moreover, the influence of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* was Europe-wide, as in such random examples as **Fredrick Delius** and **August Strindberg**. The only thing that could sway a German creative artist away from enthusiastic Zarathustrianism would be an even greater enthusiasm for Dionysianism in *The Birth of Tragedy*; this would particularly apply to the *Kosmiker*.

The famous myth that every German soldier had a copy of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* when he went to the trenches in World War I is a myth, but many did buy the cheap edition specially printed for the purpose. There were over a quarter of a million copies in circulation by the end of the war. Nietzsche’s sister Elisabeth did much to tarnish Nietzsche’s reputation during that war by writing articles liberally citing a bellicose Zarathustra as though he were identical to Nietzsche, selecting such warlike comments as “Man should be trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warriors: all else is folly” (*Za, I: “Of Old and Young Women”*). One could just as easily pick a less bellicose reference to illustrate Zarathustra’s vision: “This is how I would have man and woman: the one fit for war and the other fit for bearing children, but both fit for dancing with head and heels” (*Za, III: “Of Old and New Tablets,” 13*). See also ZARATHUSTRA/ZOROASTER.

**ZHOU GUOPING (1945– )**. Chinese writer and academic. Zhou Guoping studied at Peking University from 1962 to 1967 in what was then the People’s Republic of China; his scholarly career began in 1978. In 1986, Zhou Guoping published his most successful book, *Nietzsche at the Turn of the Century*; this had sold 115,000 copies by 1997. *The Complete Works of Zhou Gouping* in five volumes was published in 1996. The Nietzschean impact is seen in at least five books of his essays; he has also done numerous translations of Nietzsche into Chinese. The 1980s was the heyday of Nietzsche studies in China, with Nietzsche enjoying fame in the years 1885–1887 “like a pop star” (Cheung Chiu-yee, *Nietzsche in China*, 1992), but the era was cut short by the Tiananmen Square massacre of 4 June 1989. See also LI SHICHEN; LIU XIAOBO; LU XUN.

**ZIMMERN, HELEN (1846–1934)**. Writer and translator. Zimmern was the author of a work on **Schopenhauer** (*Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and His Philosophy*, 1876) that **Richard Wagner** held in high esteem and the translator of several other prominent authors (including Gotthold Ephraim Lessing). Nietzsche had first met Zimmern in Bayreuth in 1876. They became better acquainted when Zimmern spent her summer holidays of 1884 and 1886 with their mutual friends Emily and Mrs. Fynn in Sils Maria. On 19 September 1886, Nietzsche wrote to his mother **Franziska Nietzsche** from the Engadine to express relief that there were still **Jews** in the world: to him, Zimmern was “not an Englishwoman—but a Jewess!” For Nietzsche, Jewishness was a **nationality** (a view reinforced a second time in the same letter). Nietzsche kept in touch with Zimmern and was keen for her to translate his last work, *Ecce Homo*, into English, as his letter to her of 8 December 1888 demonstrates. In the end, nothing came of this, as the work was not published until 1908.

Zimmern was an obvious choice when **Oscar Levy** sought a translator for *Beyond Good and Evil*. She translated the work in 1906, but publication was delayed because Levy had difficulty negotiating the rights with **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**. The work was finally published at Levy’s financial risk by “The Good European Society” (actually, a one-man operation in the person of Thomas Common) and appeared in 1907 in Edinburgh (T. N. Foulis and Darien Press). The work would later be incorporated into the fifth volume of *The*

*Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, edited by Levy in 18 volumes, which appeared in London from 1909 to 1913. *See also* DYNAMITE.

**DIE ZUCHT/ZÜCHTUNG (BREEDING).** Term used by Nietzsche in a non-Darwinian sense to discuss how humankind in general can be improved through the emergence of a new type of **aristocratic** man, the *Übermensch*, as he explains in *The Anti-Christ*:

The problem I raise here is not what ought to succeed mankind in the sequence of the species . . . but what type of human being one ought to *breed*, ought to *will*, as more valuable, more worthy of **life**, more certain of the future. (A-C, 3)

Nietzsche linked the question of breeding to **woman's** function as child bearer, arguing that society would only become more decadent if women abandoned this role in order to pursue **education** and seek careers of their own. For this reason he bitterly opposed **feminism**. Nietzsche could not know that the **science** of genetics would be discovered around the turn of the century, thereafter placing his ideas within a context of racist social engineering that he had not intended. For example, those most active in the *Neue Ethik* movement claimed inspiration from Nietzsche, while in Britain, members of the **eugenics movement** insisted on placing a Darwinian construction on Nietzsche's **will to power**. Refer to Gerd Schank, *Rasse und Züchtung bei Nietzsche* (2000).





## Glossary of Terms Used by Nietzsche

Some of the terms Nietzsche used, such as the “will to power,” have come to have the status of slogans, and some are now used incorrectly, such as the “blond beast.” Some defy correct translation and have been kept in the original, whether that is Latin (*amor fati*), French (*le ressentiment*), or German (*der Geist; der Übermensch*). The glossary is provided for convenience, but the definitions are not comprehensive, and the full entry should be checked in the dictionary for a proper understanding of the term.

***amor fati***: Love of destiny, often linked to the notion of living dangerously.

**become who you are**: Nietzsche often used this phrase from Pindar to encourage his friends to break free from social norms. “*What does your conscience say? Become who you are!*” (*GS*, III: 270).

**blond beast (*die blonde Bestie*)**: Proud warrior to be found among the ancient Greeks as well as early Germanic tribes and Nietzsche’s explanation for why Germans were feared in the world.

**Christianity**: Chief source of man’s estrangement from his own instincts through the ascetic priests’ inculcation of bad conscience.

**cognition**: Mental process by which knowledge is acquired.

**democracy**: Ruinous to culture because of the leveling down it brings in its wake.

**“*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*”**: “Germany, Germany above all”: refrain of the German national anthem and Nietzsche’s shorthand for his dislike of German chauvinism.

**Dionysus**: In Nietzsche’s early work, the symbol for man’s primeval instinctual drives; in his later work, a symbol of creativity combined with suffering.

**eternal feminine (*das Ewig-Weibliche*)**: Nietzsche’s code for the shallow concerns of society women. The term is borrowed from Goethe,

who introduced it at the end of *Faust* to denote woman's power to save man from his baser desires and actions.

**eternal return** (*ewige Wiederkunft*): The repeated return of one's fate at any moment, in the same format, *ad infinitum*. Willing acceptance of this doctrine will mark out the *Übermensch*.

**feminism**: Anathema to the elitist Nietzsche because of the feminists' demands for equal rights.

**der Geist**: Mind/spirit in the dynamically creative sense. Nietzsche often used the term in relation to Germany, with a tone of despair at his country's cultural decline.

**God**: Dead, according to Nietzsche; killed by man's intelligent reflection.

**herd** (*die Herde*): Group of people who can neither create nor suffer in a dynamic fashion, preferring to be led.

**higher man** (*der höhere Mensch*): Any person responsive to Zarathustra's command that the instinctual life must be obeyed.

**knowledge** (*die Kenntnis*): Knowledge at a personal level, often self-knowledge.

**last man** (*der letzte Mensch*): Any complacent person who believes him- or herself to be content.

**life-affirmation**: An active, creative, and instinctual attitude to life. Although claimed as forerunner of the *Lebensphilosophie* movement in German philosophy, Nietzsche did not share the interest in the occult that came to be one of its characteristic features.

**master morality** (*die Herrenmoral*): Acceptance of order of rank through the acknowledgment of aristocratic values and the noble ideal.

**metaphor**: The true vehicle of language, enabling man to comprehend his condition in a meaningful way.

**morality** (*die Moral*): A set of false values peddled by the priest in any religion, in contrast to the new morality of ethical independence to be acquired by the *Übermensch*.

**nausea** (*der Ekel*): Disgust at the petty and degrading concerns of (herd) man.

**nihilism**: a positive concept, liberating man from the shackles of a belief in an afterlife.

**pathos of distance** (*das Pathos der Distanz*): Feeling of superiority within the hierarchical order in human relations.

- perspectivism:** Acceptance that there are no absolute truths, so we should concentrate on seeing in a life-affirming way, as we cannot see “the whole” correctly.
- pessimism:** Philosophical doctrine that pain is the essence of life, as expounded by Schopenhauer.
- rationalism:** Austere and misleading belief that we can use reason to search out “the truth.”
- ressentiment (resentment):** At one level, any poisonous jealousy as opposed to the healthy form of envy that can inspire competition. Specifically used to designate Christianity’s fraudulent morality, where the poor and weak are promised rewards in a heaven *that does not exist*.
- reevaluation of all values (die Umwertung aller Werte):** Process necessary to overturn the false values of morality as taught by the life-denying ascetic priest.
- science (die Wissenschaft):** Form of knowledge or wisdom that omits a deeper recognition of man’s needs; “scientific” knowledge should be more “cheerful.”
- slave morality (die Sklavenmoral):** Humble and unthinking obedience to a religious code or ascetic ideal.
- truth (die Wahrheit):** Never an absolute with Nietzsche but instead dependent on the perspective of the subject and often masked.
- der Übermensch:** A hypothetical “supra-human being” who, through conquering himself (*selbstüberwindung*), will sublimate the will to power.
- will to power (der Wille zur Macht):** The basic drive in all living things.
- woman (das Weib):** Sometimes refers to “real” women, at other times is a trope for elusive truth.
- Zarathustra:** The great “yea-sayer” to life, whose teaching anticipates the *Übermensch*.
- die Zucht:** Breeding along aristocratic rather than racial principles as recommended by Nietzsche.



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## INTRODUCTION

The young Nietzsche's knowledge of philosophy and world literature was acquired gradually and not necessarily at the instigation of his tutors. His classical education at Schulpforta no doubt equipped him with a thorough knowledge of the Greeks that colored all his later work (his engagement with Socrates developed into a lifelong argument). His knowledge of the ancient classics enabled him to move from theology to classical philology after only one semester at Bonn University. He had an intimate knowledge of the New Testament (but preferred the Old) and studied German classical writers such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller. To supplement this prescribed reading, Nietzsche read foreign authors in translation, among them William Shakespeare, Lord Byron, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Friedrich Hölderlin. The really major influence on his thought did not come until late 1865, when Nietzsche, who had followed his professor, Friedrich Ritschl, to Leipzig, read Arthur Schopenhauer and was introduced into other fields of philosophy, such as that of Immanuel Kant and of Eastern thought as well as Baruch Spinoza and the German Idealists. He also became familiar with the ideas of Charles Darwin during his student days through his reading of the works of Eduard von Hartmann and especially F. A. Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart* (*History of Materialism and Critique of Its Meaning Today*, 1866); indeed, he was content to accept most of Lange's scientific discussion on trust.

The next truly momentous intellectual encounter for Nietzsche as a young man came when he met Richard Wagner in November 1868. Wagner was, of course, a prolific writer as well as composer, and his nationalism and anti-Semitism cannot have entirely escaped Nietzsche even at the beginning of their friendship. Yet for nearly a decade, Nietzsche was a passionate advocate of the master's art until he finally repudiated all that Wagner stood for. He now set his face resolutely toward French moralist thinkers, such as Michel de Montaigne and Blaise Pascal. He greatly admired Voltaire, while his engagement with Jean-Jacques Rousseau was conducted at the same level of productive argument reserved for Socrates. However, not all Frenchmen received his praise; for example, Joseph-Ernest Renan and Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve were given short shrift. Nevertheless,



it remains true that Nietzsche was familiar not just with the major thinkers of French thought, whether Enlightenment thinkers or 19th-century writers such as Hippolyte Taine, Charles Baudelaire, Gustave Flaubert, Guy de Maupassant, and Paul Bourget, but also with some lesser-known writers and critics like Eugène Fromentin. He was also familiar with British utilitarianism (which he disliked); in fact, there was scarcely a major international writer or thinker to whom he did not refer. Although this volume cannot pretend to deal exhaustively with the full list of thinkers to whom Nietzsche made reference, the chief allusions are included where appropriate in the relevant sections of the Dictionary.

Since the historical situation with regard to major works of Nietzsche reception is given by country in the introduction, this is not repeated here, though perhaps it is admissible to remind readers that, ironically, the rivalry between Lou Andreas-Salomé and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche produced, respectively, the first psychological interpretation of Nietzsche's works, *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken* (1894), and his first biography, *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches* (1895–1904). There has since been a steady stream of books on Nietzsche's philosophy, on his life, or on both, in addition to the vast literature of works comparing other writers with Nietzsche. For his biography, the standard work is likely to remain Curt Paul Janz's three-volume *Friedrich Nietzsche Biographie* (1978–1979), currently being translated into English. For his life and work, scarcely any book has approached in popularity Walter Kaufmann's *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (1950). Several other works on Nietzsche's life and work deserve to be mentioned, including R. J. Hollingdale's *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (1999) [1965].

By far the most entries in the Dictionary refer to writers and thinkers of German origin. Two recent works in this connection are Ernst Nolte's *Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus* and Anatol Schneider's *Nietzscheanismus: zur Geschichte eines Begriffs* (1997), though the first port of call for detailed information is Richard F. Krummel's two-volume *Nietzsche und der deutsche Geist* (I: 1974; II: 1983). However, this takes the reader only up to 1918, a major drawback shared also by Richard Hinton Thomas's *Nietzsche in German Politics and Society 1890–1918* (1980). Bruno Hillebrand's *Nietzsche und die deutsche Literatur* (1978), which ends with the Third Reich, is a rich source of primary extracts

on Nietzsche. Steven Aschheim's excellent *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890–1990* (1992) has become the standard reference work for its field, since it covers a whole century and contains an excellent overview of Nietzsche's impact in every area of German cultural life. No book in English specifically on Nietzsche and the National Socialists exists, but there is a chapter on "Nietzsche and the Nazis" in the revised version of Crane Brinton's *Nietzsche* (1968) [1941], which is a good introduction to the topic, and the same applies to the relevant sections in Kaufmann's work. For those who read German, Nolte's work, mentioned previously, as well as Bernhard H. F. Taureck's *Nietzsche und der Faschismus. Eine Studie über Nietzsches Philosophie und ihre Folgen* (1995) and the relevant sections in Manfred Riedel's *Nietzsche in Weimar—Ein deutsches Drama* (1997) are available. Recently there has been a great deal of interest in the reception of Nietzsche among the Frankfurt School; the standard work on this area is *Nietzsche's Dance* (1988) by Georg Stauth and Bryan S. Turner. The contemporary situation regarding Nietzsche reception is well covered (for those who read German) in Sigrid Bauschinger, ed., *Nietzsche heute. Die Rezeption seines Werkes nach 1968* (1988).

For an overview of Nietzsche's philosophy, the general reader could not do better than read Keith Ansell-Pearson's *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker* (1994). This work patiently explores the major concepts of Nietzsche's works with admirable clarity. A very useful, if controversial, short guide to Nietzsche's philosophy is provided in Michael Tanner's *Nietzsche* (1994), though J. P. Stern's *Nietzsche* (1978) is much less acerbic. *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche* (1996), edited by Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins, provides a well-selected collection of essays on central aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy. The individual chapters cover most areas of Nietzsche's thought as well as the reception of his ideas in the 20th century. Those who wish to study special areas of Nietzsche's philosophy should examine section five of this bibliography.

Tanner's rejection of *The Will to Power* as a proper work by Nietzsche has set him in opposition to many contemporary scholars who wish to pursue a metaphysical reading of Nietzsche in line with the emphasis placed on *The Will to Power* by postmodern critics. The essential fact to grasp with poststructuralist, deconstructive, and postmodernist interpretations of Nietzsche is that all interpretations are filtered through the

perception of Heidegger, who insisted on a metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche's work. French interpretations, which are painstakingly described by Alan D. Schrift in his *Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* (1990), are further complicated by the strength of existentialism in France as well as the post-Freudian school of psychoanalysis as represented by the work of Jacques Lacan. The "feel" of recent French interpretations of Nietzsche is therefore very different from that of German interpretation, which seeks to stress mainly the societal significance of Nietzsche's thought. Recent English-speaking Nietzsche criticism has tended to follow the French rather than the German model. Three collections of essays should be mentioned in this connection: *The New Nietzsche* (1985), edited by David Allison; *The Fate of the New Nietzsche* (1993), edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson and Howard Caygill; and *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Thought* (1993), edited by Paul Patton. Alexander Nehamas provided a digestible introduction to the "New Nietzsche" in his *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (1985), though this is now rather out of date.

The first edition of this *Historical Dictionary of Nietzscheanism* was the first of its kind and remains unique for readers of English; since its publication in 1999, two publications have appeared that will be of interest to readers of German: the *Nietzsche Handbuch: Leben-Werk-Wirkung* (2000), edited by Henning Ottmann and containing a wealth of contributions from various scholars, and the first volume of the *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch (Abbeviatur-einfach)*, (2004). The latter is so detailed that the first volume provides definitions of only 70 entries. Full details are found in the bibliography in section one.

It is not been possible in this book to mention the many articles on Nietzsche that exist on virtually every topic; readers are directed to the excellent journal *Nietzsche-Studien* and other journals listed in section eight. As a compromise, relevant articles are mentioned in the Dictionary when no book linking the subject under discussion to Nietzsche exists. For example, the Dictionary lists the principal thinkers and writers influenced by Nietzsche (e.g., Carl Gustav Jung) and gives brief information about their chief works, their writing on Nietzsche (if any), and pertinent secondary literature that specifically deals with the influence of Nietzsche on that writer or thinker or vice versa: for example, Jung's lectures on Nietzsche given during the years 1934–1939

are published in the substantial two-volume *Nietzsche's "Zarathustra:" Notes of the Seminar Given in 1934–1939* (1989), edited by J. L. Jarrett. See Patricia Dixon, *Nietzsche and Jung: The Quest for Wholeness* (1990) and *Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night* (1999), and Paul Bishop, *The Dionysian Self: C. G. Jung's Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche* (1995).

Details of an author's work in the Dictionary are normally given in the original language first, with the date of first publication, and then the English translation with the date of first publication if that exists: for example, Lou Andreas-Salomé, *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken, 1894* (*Nietzsche*, 2001 [1988]). If a work does not exist in English translation, my own translation of the title is given *before* the date of publication, unless the meaning of a title is so obvious that it does not need translation. Titles are divided from subtitles by a colon for English and American works and by a period for most other languages.

### Nietzsche Libraries and Societies

In Germany, the main library for Nietzsche manuscripts is the *Goethe-Schiller Archiv*, Weimar, not to be confused with the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, which is the house where Nietzsche died and where his sister “held court.” The *Nietzsche-Archiv* is now the premises of the *Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche*, which holds a regular *Nietzsche Kolloquium* currently supervised by Rüdiger Schmidt, though it does not have a Nietzsche library. That is housed in the *Anna Amalia Schloß*, Weimar, administered by the *Stiftung Weimarer Klassik*. The person to contact there is Erdmann Wilamowitz-Möllendorff. Nietzsche's manuscripts are housed in the *Goethe-Schiller-Archiv*, Weimar. The *Kolleg Friedrich Nietzsche*, the Nietzsche library in the *Anna Amalia Schloß*, and the manuscript library in the *Goethe-Schiller-Archiv* are all administered by the *Stiftung Weimarer Klassik* ([www.weimar-klassik.de](http://www.weimar-klassik.de)).

In the United Kingdom, there are no special collections of Nietzsche's works, though every university library will have a reasonable selection, and the British Library can offer logistical advice. In the United States, the University of Illinois has the main Nietzsche library. There is also the library of a private collector, Earl R. Nitschke, 1324 E. Bennett Avenue, Mount Pleasant, MI 48858. The following details give information on Nietzsche societies and their websites:

- Nietzsche-Kolleg*, Weimar (in the *Nietzsche-Archiv*). Chief executive Rüdiger Schmidt. Founded 1999. Information: kolleg-nietzsche@t-online.de
- Nietzsche-Forum*, Munich. President Dr. Maria Friedrich. Founded 1999; formerly *Nietzsche Gesellschaft* (first Nietzsche Society, founded 1919). Website: www.nietzsche-forum.de
- Förder- und Forschungsgemeinschaft Friedrich Nietzsche*, Naumburg. President: Professor Volker Caysa, Secretary: Ralf Eichberg. Founded 1994. Website: www.nietzsche-gesellschaft.de
- Nietzsche-Kolloquium. Stiftung Nietzsche-Haus*, Sils Maria, Switzerland. President: Karl Pestalozzi. Founded 1980. Website: www.nietzschehaus.ch
- Friedrich Nietzsche Society*, UK peripatetic. Chair: Greg Moore. University of St. Andrews; Secretary: Jim Urpeth, Greenwich University. Founded 1989. Website: www.fns.org.uk
- North American Nietzsche Society*, Urbana, Illinois. President: Richard Schacht, University of Illinois. Founded in 1980. Website: www.phil.uiuc.edu/nietzsche
- Nietzsche Society*, New York. Executive Secretary: Babette Babich, Fordham University. Founded in 1996. Website: www.Fordham.edu/gsas/phil/nns/nnsaim
- Österreichische Nietzsche-Gesellschaft*, Vienna. President: Hans Gerald Hödl. Founded in 2002. Information: hans.hoedl@univie.ac.at
- Nietzsche Research Group*, Nijmegen, Holland. (Work in progress: *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch*, begun 2000.) Ed. Paul van Tongeren. Nijmegen University: www.ru.nl/filosofie/Nietzsche

Note: Works from which references and quotations are cited in this volume are indicated by abbreviations in parentheses following the title. A citation from *KSA* indicates that there is no English translation available.

## 1. NIETZSCHE'S WORKS

Nietzsche's works are listed in the first part, together with the translations currently available in the English language. Mention is made in the introduction of the first translations of Nietzsche's works, since it was frequently the case that Nietzscheanism itself was truly launched in a foreign country only when translations of his works became available. The second part of section 1 gives details of Nietzsche dictionaries and bibliographies of Nietzsche's works. William Schaberg's *The Nietzsche*

*Canon: A Publication History and Bibliography* (1995) is unsurpassed as an authority on the publishing history of Nietzsche's individual works. The *Weimarer Nietzsche-Bibliographie*, edited by Erdmann von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (4 vols.), is a complete compendium of primary and secondary works published from 1867 to 1998. Work is proceeding on post-1998 entries.

## A. Translations in German

*Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW)*. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967–.

*Briefe. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGB)*. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975–.

*Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA)*. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980. Identical to *KGW* but without Nietzsche's Lectures, Philologica, and Early Writings.

*Sämtliche Briefe. Kritische Studienausgabe (KSB)*. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986. Identical to *KGB* but without the letters to Nietzsche.

## B. Translations in English

*Complete Works*. 18 vols. Ed. Oscar Levy. London: Macmillan, 1909–1913.

*Complete Works*. Ed. Bernd Magnus. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995–.

*Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Trans. and ed. Christopher Middleton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

## C. Individual Works

*The Birth of Tragedy (BT)*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1966.

*The Birth of Tragedy*. Trans. Shaun Whiteside. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993.

*Untimely Meditations (UM)*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

*Unfashionable Observations*. Trans. Richard Gray. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995.

*On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life* (second essay of *Untimely Meditations*). Trans. Peter Preuss. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980.

- Human, All Too Human I and II (HH)*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Includes *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* and *The Wanderer and His Shadow*.
- Daybreak. Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality (D)*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Joyful Wisdom*. Trans. Thomas Common, ed. Kurt Reinhardt. New York: Ungar, 1960.
- The Gay Science*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974.
- The Gay Science (GS)*. Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, ed. Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. In *The Portable Nietzsche*. New York: Viking, 1954.
- Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Za)*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961.
- Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Trans. Graham Parkes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Beyond Good and Evil (BGE)*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Penguin, 1973.
- Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1966.
- Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. Marion Faber. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- On the Genealogy of Morals*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1989 [1967].
- On the Genealogy of Morality*. Trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998.
- On the Genealogy of Morality (OGM)*. Trans. Carol Diethe, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 [1994]. Includes the essays *The Greek State (TGS)* and *Homer's Contest (HC)*.
- The Case of Wagner (CW)*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1966.
- Twilight of the Idols (TI)*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2003 [1968].
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- The Anti-Christ*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. In *The Portable Nietzsche*. New York: Viking, 1954.
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- Nietzsche contra Wagner (NCW)*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1966.

- Dithyrambs of Dionysus (DD)*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Anvil Press Poetry, 2001 [1984].
- Ecce Homo (EH)*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967.
- Ecce Homo*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Penguin, 1979; reprinted 1992 with introduction by Michael Tanner.
- The Will to Power (WP)*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1967. *Note*: The Kaufmann/ Hollingdale translation of Nietzsche's *Will to Power* (1967) followed the 1906 second edition of the *Grossoktav* collected works (first edition: 15 vols., Leipzig, 1894–1904; second edition: 19 vols., Leipzig, 1901–1913). This 1906 edition, though flawed, has become canonical. The precise details of its flaws are not yet known, as even Colli/Montinari used guesswork to collate the *Will to Power* manuscripts according to approximate dates; it is not likely that anyone can be more precise. The *Werke Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW)* still lacks the commentary to Volume VIII (which contains most of the source material for what we know as *The Will to Power*). When Mazzino Montinari died in November 1886, it was decided that instead of the planned *Nachbericht* to Volume VIII, the notebooks *themselves* for 1885–1889 should be printed as Volume IX of the collected works, in such a way as to indicate the confusing status of the manuscripts. This has been achieved mainly by using different colored inks and fonts in order to date the material. Five volumes of *KGW IX* are now in print; a *Nachberichtband* will appear last. Although interesting in themselves, these five volumes have been criticized for being too comprehensive; for example, the content of each scribbled page is sacrosanct, even if Nietzsche has merely jotted down that he needs a toothbrush. Hollingdale commented with great prescience in his introduction to the translation: “an arrangement that was really faithful to the manuscripts would not be an arrangement at all, but simply chaotic—and almost literally unreadable.” The Sturge/Bittner edition *Writings from the Late Notebooks* (2003) promised much in terms of making *The Will to Power* coherent to the English reader but contains selections only. It thus takes its material from *KGW* methodically but piecemeal, starting with April/June 1885. The Kaufmann/Hollingdale (1967) translation, lacking access to the actual notebooks for 1883–1888 languishing in Weimar in what was then East Germany, worked mainly from the 1906 publication, also using Alfred Baeumler's edition (1930), that of Friedrich Würzbach, titled *Umwertung aller Werte (Revaluation of all Values)*; first published in 1940) and that of Karl Schlechta (1956). Strictly speaking, to find the source material for the whole conceptual framework of *The Will to Power*, one should go back even further, to the fragments of summer 1881, when Nietzsche, at work on *The Gay Science*, conceived the advent of Zarathustra and the idea of eternal return. In April 1882, he met Lou Andreas-Salomé, after which he had no



inner peace until January 1883, when true work on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* began, with the will to power and *Übermensch* by now fully intact (e.g., KSA 10, 10 [25]). These notes are printed as *Nachgelassene Fragmente* in KGW V/VII and KSA 9/10/11. The material now known as “the late notebooks” (the source for the Sturge/Bittner edition) is found in KGW VIII (KSA 12). In the new “differentiated” volumes KGW IX, of which 13 are planned, there is overlap at Fragment group 34, some of which appears already in KGW VII/3 (KSA 11).

- Philosophy and Truth: Selection from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*. Trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979. Includes the essay *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (OTLNS)*.
- Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. Trans. Marianne Cowan. Chicago: Gateway, 1962.
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## 2. BIBLIOGRAPHIES, DICTIONARIES, AND REFERENCE WORKS

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## About the Author

Carol Diethe (B.A, M.A., and Ph.D., London University). Originally a philologist, Carol Diethe devoted her academic career to the teaching of European cultural history at Middlesex University. She devised and taught undergraduate and graduate courses introducing students to Nietzsche's thought within the cultural context of his life and times. She wrote her Ph.D. on the sexual politics of German expressionism (subsequently published under the title *Aspects of Distorted Sexual Attitudes in German Expressionist Drama*, 1988), before turning her interest to Friedrich Nietzsche, translating *On the Genealogy of Morality* in 1994 (second edition 2006). She then published a monograph on Nietzsche's attitude toward the women of his generation and their attitude toward him (*Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip*, 1996). Dr. Diethe's monograph *German Women Writers of the Nineteenth Century* appeared in 1998; in the same year, her translation of Filippo Tommaso Marinetti's novel *Mafarka the Futurist* was published. After writing a study of German feminism (*The Life and Work of Germany's Founding Feminist: Louise Otto-Peters*, 2001), she brought out a biography of Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche (*Nietzsche's Sister and the Will to Power*, 2003). A founding member of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society in Great Britain, she was elected its first secretary in 1989 and is UK reviews editor for the *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*. She is currently translating volumes 9 and 17 of the stanford edition of *Nietzsche's Collected Works*. She has a daughter and son and lives in the Scottish Highlands with her husband.



Lou Andreas-Salomé, Paul Rée, and Nietzsche, 1882.



The Statue of Dionysus for the Nietzsche Memorial, delivered to the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1944.



**The *Nietzsche-Archiv* today (formerly Villa Silberblick).**



Hitler staring at Max Klinger's bust of Nietzsche, taken in 1934.



Stefan George with Franziska zu Reventlow, Oscar Schmitz, Alfred Schuler, and others at a party held by *die Kosmiker* in Karl Wolfskehl's flat in Munich, 22 February 1903.



Richard and Cosima Wagner, 9 May 1872.



Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche at the doorway of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, 1904.





A sick Nietzsche on the arm of his mother, Franziska Nietzsche, 1892.