

JACQUES DERRIDA

*Sendoffs**

"Coups d'envoi" was published in *Collège International de Philosophie: Sciences, Interscience, Arts*, as part of a "Rapport présenté à M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Ministre d'Etat, Ministre de la Recherche et de l'Industrie, par François Châtelet, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Pierre Faye, Dominique Lecourt," dated 30 September 1982, 105–55. Portions of the report, including "Coups d'envoi," were also reprinted in a booklet titled *Extraits d'un rapport pour le Collège International de Philosophie*, prepared by the College in the Fall of 1983, and parts of "Coups d'envoi" were excerpted as "Légitimité de la philosophie," in *T.E.L. (Temps Economie Littérature)* 8 (25 November 1982): 1,7.

Châtelet, Derrida, Faye, and Lecourt made up a French government "mission" charged with investigating the possibilities and conditions of an International College of Philosophy. The idea for such an institution had grown in some measure out of the militant struggles of the Groupe de Recherches sur l'Enseignement Philosophique (GREPH, founded in 1974) and the Etats Généraux de la Philosophie (1979)—in which Derrida had played a major part—against the attempts made by conservative governments to eliminate or restrict the teaching of philosophy in French schools. A year after François Mitterand's election as president and the victory of a Socialist parliamentary majority in May 1981, the mission was formally created by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the new Minister of Research and Industry. On 18 May 1982, Derrida circulated on behalf of the mission an open letter to interested parties worldwide, citing Chevènement's instructions and inviting potential participants in the College to identify themselves and to propose research and projects (the

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letter was widely disseminated; see, for instance, *La Quinzaine Littéraire* 374 [1–15 July 1982]: 29, and *Substance* 35 [1982]: 80–81). Four months later, after extensive consultations and evaluation of the more than 750 replies to the open letter, the mission recommended the establishment of the College as an autonomous but state-funded teaching and research institution, aimed principally at encouraging and organizing work on (quasi-) philosophical themes or objects not sufficiently studied in existing institutions. Their report, a somewhat technical government document, outlined in its first hundred pages the mission's collective recommendations for the definition, the regulating idea, and the constitution of the College. This was followed by four individual "projections," one by each of the four philosophers, "Coups d'envoi" being Derrida's contribution.

The College was officially founded in Paris on 10 October 1983 and began operating that semester, with Derrida as its first director, followed by Jean-François Lyotard, Miguel Abensour, and others. Today it offers, free and open to the public, without prerequisites, a wide range of courses and research programs, as well as frequent colloquia and lectures, by scholars in its six "intersections": philosophy/science, philosophy/art and literature, philosophy/politics, philosophy/psychoanalysis, philosophy/internationalities, and philosophy/philosophy. It is directed by an Assemblée Collégiale, the current president of which is Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. Its work, particularly the work of its seminars, is documented in a regular series of *Cahiers*. Requests for schedules and other information can be addressed to the College at: 1, rue Descartes, 75005 Paris.

Helpful discussions of the College in English can be found in Steven Ungar, "Philosophy after Philosophy: Debate and Reform in France Since 1968," *Enclitic* 8, nos. 1–2 (1984): 13–26, especially the appendix on the College; and in Vincent Leitch, "Research and Education at the Crossroads: A Report on the Collège International de Philosophie," *Substance* 50 (1986): 101–14.

Work in English by Derrida concerning the College includes: "The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils," trans. Catherine Porter and Edward P. Morris, *Diacritics* 13, no. 3 (Fall 1983): 3–20; "On Colleges and Philosophy," discussion with Geoff Bennington, *ICA Documents* 5 (1986): 66–71; and the interview with Imre Saluszky in *Criticism in Society* (New York and London: Methuen, 1987), 8–24 especially 14–18. In French, see: "Philosophe au collège," interview with Jean-Luc Thébaud, *Libération* 692 (11 August 1983): 15–16; "Popularités: du droit à la philosophie du droit," in Jean-Claude Beaune et al., *Les Sauvages dans la cité* (Seysssel: Champ Vallon, 1985), 12–19; and "Cinquante-deux aphorismes pour un avant-propos," in *Psyché* (Paris: Galilée, 1987), 509–18.

These and other texts related to the College, including "Sendoffs," will appear, along with the rest of Derrida's work on the institutions and teaching of philosophy, in Jacques Derrida, *Institutions of Philosophy*, edited by Deborah Esch and Thomas Keenan, forthcoming in 1990 from Harvard University Press. —The Editors

FOREWORD

I.

The propositions advanced in this chapter claim, certainly, a certain coherence. But it will be neither the coherence of a *system*—even less that of a philosophical *doctrine*—nor even that of a *program*, in the technical and institutional sense we give this word in our Report.

What is called a *philosophical system* constitutes in fact a certain type of coherence or continuous cohesion, a form of *ontological* ordering that has appeared historically, and, we can even say, as linked to the essence of the history of philosophy. In the form of *doctrine*, the system has always linked philosophy to its discourses and its pedagogical institutions. But every consistent discourse, organized or simply gathered together with itself, does not necessarily have the form of a system (perhaps it is even destined to break with this form from the moment it addresses itself to the other). Since the College will be directed toward making the *systemic* idea or project (in general) *one of its themes*, one of the problems to be considered, and since, correlatively, the College should never neglect the questions of teaching, pedagogy, education, doctrinal effects, and all their sociopolitical aims [*finalités*], etc., it could not be a question of imposing the form of a "system" on this research, this history, this "thought." For this very reason, however, the nonsystemic coordination we are going to propose will have nothing of the rhapsodic or the empirical about it either.

Nor will it sketch out a *program*. First, because everything will not be undertaken there in the form of a prescription, with its "objectives" and its end-oriented [*finalisée*] production. Furthermore because, without being necessarily kept there, several research groups—called "programs" in the first part (called "The Regulating Idea") of this Report—will eventually be able to cooperate, communicate, try to cross with, confront, and translate each other there, *but above all without ever renouncing their most precise specificity, their autonomy, and their internal necessity.*

II.

These propositions claim a demonstrative value, a demonstrativity both intraphilosophical and with regard to certain singular borders of philosophy. But this demonstrativity cannot be constantly *exhibited as such* here. This is in keeping with the limits of such a Report, whether it is a matter of the material limits of this chapter or, especially, of those that come with the genre, with the *aim* [*finalité*] or with the *destination* of such a text, with the very nature of the *mission* assigned to it. There is nothing fortuitous in this, for the values of *aim*, of *destination*, like the entire semantics of the mission (placing, emitting, missive, missile, sendoff [*envoi*], etc.), will form one of the essential foci of my propositions or "projections." Referring implicitly but without dissimulation to other work (my own included), drawing directly or indirectly on the lessons of all the discussions in which the Mission has engaged over the course of the last months, I will try to limit myself to practical or technical *conclusions* concerning the research to be instituted in the College, to what in any case seems to me as though it should be given priority. *But the necessity of these conclusions should be capable of imposing itself on the basis of other premises.* My rule here will be: project the necessity of certain research, but always in such a way that one could be convinced of it on the basis of other perspectives or other premises about which nothing will be said, and even without any general "perspective" or "premise" other than the intrinsic merit of such research. The non-systematic unity of this "projection" or "setting into perspective," the possibility of coordination which it might present should thus be considered here only as a *supplementary interest*, a *premium* to which one might attribute all the values one wishes (philosophical, aesthetic, economic, reason, poem, painting, history, etc.).

Contenting myself often with naming or titling, with situating some "*topoi*," I naturally have to leave implicit both the reference to a great deal of work, French and foreign, and the essentials of an analysis of the philosophical, technoscientific, poietic, etc., "fields." We will retain only some indices of these macro- or micro-analyses, which we practice constantly and which orient our approach here: those which have guided us in the definition of the College, its project, its regulating idea, its constitution; those which have been spectacularly confirmed in the course of the Mission; those which have

helped us discover or better situate new orientations; and finally all those which have taken the form of commitments or of research projects (we attach them to this Report and we will refer to them at the right moment).¹ But we neither could nor should have gone beyond this in the course of this Mission. It was not a question for us of drawing a map of French or world philosophy, for example, nor of proposing a general interpretation of it, even if complete abstention or reserve on this matter was impossible. We strove for this, however, for obvious reasons which are recalled in the first part of the Report. Without proposing any sectioning or cartography of the philosophical terrain, we have made use of many works which could have helped us do so, whether we cite them or not. That is the case, notably, with the recent Report by Maurice Godelier and his collaborators.²

We were only able to take account of it at the end of our Mission, but the "upshot" and the recommendations we encountered there were already known to us, at least partially (concerning philosophy, for example). Although the objects of these two Reports are very different, certain convergences appeared to me remarkable and encouraging. We should nevertheless, for obvious reasons, limit ourselves to this general reference, and presume that our reader will be aware of the "Godelier Report."

1. At the end of every chapter of this "projection," I will multiply the numbered references to the contributions addressed to us during the course of the Mission. All of these documents will be collected as we have indicated, and attached to the final Report. They have extremely diverse forms and functions (letters of support, advice, suggestions, offers of participation or association, very elaborate projects). They have been addressed by individuals (teachers, researchers, students, artists, experts or practitioners), by groups or institutions, from France and abroad. Without picking and choosing from among the different types of correspondence [*envoi*] in my references, I have allowed myself to be guided simply by a classically thematic principle. Of course, it could not be rigorous, given the intersections to which we have appealed from the outset. Certain references will have to appear several times. Nonetheless, it seemed useful to constitute this kind of thematic index, however approximate. It might help the first readers of the Report to form an image of the ensemble of contributions and exchanges to which the Mission has given space. Its interest and scope will be more obvious, and the consultation of the adjoined Dossier may be facilitated. Especially, beyond this first reading, and if the College is created, such an instrument could be indispensable when the time comes to make our first initiatives and it is necessary to make contact again with all our correspondents. [In the absence of the supporting documents, these notes have been deleted from the translation. —Eds.]

2. Maurice Godelier, *Les Sciences de l'homme et la société* (Paris: Documentation française, 1982), 2 vols.—Trans.

III.

Let us recall once and for all: for reasons already stated in the first part of the Report, we will too often be making use of words that we would like to see received without assurance and without tranquility. For it is without assurance and without tranquility that I will speak, for example, of proposals for *research*, properly *philosophical*, *scientific*, *theoretico-practical*, *poietic*, etc., research, or research on a *theme*, or *problematics*, or *field*. Now it is understood: all these words remain for the moment inevitable, but they are for the College titles of problems and problematic titles, including the values of title and of problem: the laws and the procedures of *legitimation*, the *production of titles and of legitimate problems*, these are also what the College will study, analyse, transform all the time, notably in its own space. The concept of *legitimation* itself, which has become so useful and so "legitimate" in so many sociological discourses (sociology of research and teaching institutions, sociology of the arts and culture, etc.), should not remain out of range of this questioning. How has it been constructed? What are its presuppositions and its limits? What is sociology today, the aim and strategy of its "usage"?, etc. We will return to these questions. What we have provisionally and within quotation marks called "thinking," in the first part, should mark the style and the site of such an approach. It proceeds to the limits "on the subject" of all these current values, called "philosophy," "science," "art," "research," "technique," "theory," "practice," "problem," "law," "legitimacy," "title," etc. These precautions are not purely formal. Evidently they do not concern only the vocabulary in which one generally speaks of research and teaching institutions. We will not be able to avoid this lexicon, but we will give it, for anyone who wants to hear, a certain interrogative inflection: what are these things we're talking about—"philosophy," "science," "interscience," "art," "technique," "culture," "production," "theory," "research," etc.? What is an "object," a "theme," a "problem," a "problematic"? How to think the question "what is" concerning them?

These forms of interrogation will assign to the College its greatest and most permanent opening, which it must never suture with the assurance of a body of knowledge, a doctrine or a dogma. Whatever the abstract generality of this axiom, we believe it is necessary to inscribe it in the very charter of the institution, as a sort of founding

contract. That will not prevent—on the contrary—further analysis of the values of *contract*, of *foundation*, and of *institution*.

IV.

Despite the measureless unfolding and the infinite reflection in which these preliminaries might seem to engage, the concrete propositions I will present in this chapter are strictly delimitable: *a four year sendoff*. During the *first four years* of the College, a large number of activities—we are not saying *all the activities*—can be coordinated in a supple and mobile fashion, without ever being constrained by some general and authoritarian planning. *Without being kept there and without renouncing its most precise specificity*, each of the research groups I am going to define will be able to refer to a general and common theme. We could call it a “title,” “category,” “regulating idea,” “problematic,” or “working hypothesis.” Its unity would be only *presumed*, according to different modes, and it will assure, at least during this initial period, a common reference, a principle of *general translation or of possible transfer(ence)* for the exchanges, debates, cooperations, transversal or oblique communications.

V.

Despite these limits, the propositions that follow will traverse an immense and differentiated terrain. But it goes without saying that this territory does not have to be covered or saturated by the College’s research. Conforming to the style proper to this institution, that of *pathbreaking* [*frayage*] or *trailblazing* [*fléchage*], it will be a matter only of *provoking new research* and of selecting *inaugural incursions*. I will not return to what was laid out in the first part, namely the necessity of interrogating and displacing in this respect the ontological encyclopedic model by which the philosophical concept of the *universitas* has been guided for the last two centuries.

DESTINATIONS

Without all this amounting either to *giving the word* or to saying everything *in a word*, from now on I will make all of these proposals converge toward their most simple, most economical, and most for-

malizable statement, namely the category or the theme of DESTINATION.

What does this mean?

For reasons announced in the Foreword, I will dispense with the exercise (which would otherwise be necessary) destined to show that it is not a matter here either of a theme or a category. The philosophical or “thinking” history of the theme, the *thesis* or the *katagoreuein*, would make it clear that the meaning of destination won’t allow itself to be subordinated to them. But this is not the place for that development. Let’s speak in a more indeterminate fashion of a *scheme* of destination, and content ourselves with a single question, in its elementary unfolding: What of destination? What does “to destine” mean? What is “to destine?” What happens to the question “what is?” when it is measured against that of destination? And what happens to it with the multiplicity of idioms?

Let’s not unfold this problematic in its most easily identifiable dimensions yet (destination and destiny, all the problems of the end and thus of limits or of confines, ethical or political aim, teleology—natural or not—, the destination of life, of man, of history, the problem of eschatology (utopian, religious, revolutionary, etc.), that of the constitution and the structure of the sender/receiver system, and thus of the dispatch or sendoff and the message (in all its forms and in all its substances—linguistic or not, semiotic or not), emission, the mission, the missile, transmission in all its forms, telecommunication and all its techniques, economic distribution and all its conditions (producing, giving, receiving, exchanging), the dispensation of knowledge and what we now call the “orientation” [“*finalisation*”] of research or of techno-science, etc.).

Let’s content ourselves for the moment with situating the strategic force of this question schematically, with situating what constitutes, it seems to me, its most unavoidable philosophical necessity as well as its performing and performative value as a “lever.” The word “strategy” does not necessarily imply calculation or warlike strategem, but the question of calculation, including its modern polemological aspect (the new concepts of war, strategy and game theory, weapons production, military techno-science, the economy of military industrial complexes, relations between the armed forces and research in all domains, etc.), should be included in this problematic

network and accordingly be fully welcomed in the College. We will return to this.

The "lever," then: having been gathered and identified in these still "classical" forms (destination and end of philosophy, of metaphysics or of onto-theology, eschatological or teleological closure), the problematic of the limits of the philosophical as such seems to have arrived at a very singular point.

On the one hand, the modern sciences ("human or social sciences," "life sciences" and "natural sciences") are continuing or beginning again to adjust themselves to the problems we have just redirected toward that of destination (aim, limits, teleology of systems). And their irreducibly philosophical dimension is often there, at the moment when philosophy returns, whether or not we want it, whether or not we hold on to the representation of a post- or extra-philosophical scientificity.

On the other hand—and above all—the recourse to a thought of the *sendoff*, of *dispensation* or the *gift* of being, signals today one of the most singular and, it seems to me, most powerful—in any case one of the last—attempts to "think" the history and structure of onto-theology, even the history of being in general. However we interpret them, and whatever credit we grant this thought or this discourse, we should pause before this marker: the "destinal" significations (sending or sendoff, dispensation, destiny of being, *Schickung*, *Schicksal*, *Gabe*, "es gibt Sein," "es gibt Zeit," etc.) do not seem to belong to the *within* of onto-theological philosophemes any longer, without being "metaphors" or empirical or derived concepts either. There is a sense here which is thus not reducible to what the sciences can and should determine of it, whether it is a matter of the empirical sciences, the natural or life sciences, so-called animal or human societies, techniques of communication, linguistics, semiotics, etc. Another thought of the "sendoff" thus seems necessary to the unfolding of the "great questions" of philosophy and of science, of truth, of meaning, of reference, of objectivity, of history.

Let us emphasize the very visible reference which has just been made to the Heideggerian *path*, and not simply to one or another of its scholastic effects. It seems clear enough that the meditation on the history of being, after the existential analytic, opens the question of the ontological difference onto what it always seems to have "presupposed"—in a sense not purely logical—implicated, enveloped, name-

ly a *thought of the sendoff*, of *dispensation*, and of the *gift* (note, by the way, that it's a matter here of another great text on the gift, which should be read in—very complex—connection with Mauss's "Essai sur le don,"³ that is to say with an enormous corpus of French ethnology and sociology over the last six or seven decades, in its scientific but also in its politicohistorical dimensions; no doubt we would have to encounter and analyze, in the course of that trajectory, the *Collège de Sociologie*⁴ whose title was often recalled during this Mission). The thought of the gift and the sendoff, the thought of "destining" *before* the constitution of the sentence or of the logical structure "X give or sends Y to Z," Y being an *object* (thing, sign, message) between two "*subjects*," the sender or the emitter and the receiver or receptor (ego, conscious or unconscious, Unconscious), *before* this subject/object constitution and in order to take account of it, etc. The same necessity appears, even if in another manner, *mutatis mutandis*, for what I have tried to demonstrate under the heading of *différance* as sendoff, differentiation, delay, relay, delegation, tele- and trans-ference, trace and writing in general, destination and undecidability, etc. These indices should naturally be multiplied; for obvious reasons, I limit myself to the most schematic ones and, openly, to what is closest to me. If I hold to declaring these limits and this proximity, it is, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, in order to lift the limits, to distance them and to disappropriate them. It is in order to call for critical debate about them, for open disagreements and explications, for other approaches, and in order to avoid the disguised recentering or the hegemony of a problematic, a discourse or a history. These risks should be avoided with thoroughgoing vigilance. The translating, transversal, and transferring coordinations we are proposing will operate without a pyramidal effect, in a lateral, horizontal and nonhierarchical way. The scheme I have just designated, at the limits of the "destinal," seems to me capable of putting into question and displacing precisely the topological principles that have dominated all of onto-theology, invested its space and commanded its traditional forms of univerticality, in philosophical

3. See Marcel Mauss, "Essai sur le don" (1925), in his *Sociologie et anthropologie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980); trans. Ian Connison as *The Gift. Forms and Function of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (New York: Norton, 1967).—Trans.

4. See Denis Hollier, ed., *Le Collège de Sociologie 1937–1939* (Paris: Gallimard, 1979); trans. Betsy Wing, as *The College of Sociology (1937–39)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).—Trans.

discourse as much as in research and teaching institutions. It is already clear that one should not accord this general "schematic" and its entirely presumed unity the status of a new general ontology, and even less that of a transcendental phenomenology, an absolute logic, a theory of theories, dominating once again the encyclopedia and all its theoretico-practical regions. But let's go further: this "schematic" should not even be admitted as a new organon. By one of the singular contracts without which no opening of thought and no research would be possible, the College should consider this "schematic" as itself problematic, as *debatable*: through and through, in a fundamental debate that would certainly assume its deliberately "fundamentalist" dimension, as one sometime says, but would also go so far as to question the motifs of "depth," "foundation," of "reason" [*Grund*] in all of its possible translations—and in particular in relation to the distinction between so-called "fundamental" and so-called "applied" or even "end-oriented" research. It is useless to insist on this here: it is a matter of an essential stake touching on the axiomatic and the very future of the College, and its relations to the State (to States), nationalities, "civil societies." A singular and paradoxical contract, we were saying, as well it might be: a commitment never to leave the terms of the instituting contract out of the question, analysis, even transformation, resting in some dogmatic slumber. Doesn't this transform such a contract into a fiction and the regulating idea of the College into an "as if" (let us act *as if* such a community were possible, *as if* the priority granted to "still not legitimated pathbreakings" could have been the object of a consensus *in fine*, *as if* a "general translation" could at least have been attempted, beyond the classical systems and the onto-encyclopedic university whose totalizing model was imposed—even if in its "liberal" variant, that of Schleiermacher and Humboldt—at the moment of the creation of that occidental paradigm, the University of Berlin)? And doesn't this *as if* give such an engagement, and all the legalized contracts it calls for, a touch of the simulacrum? To which we will respond, at least elliptically, this way: on the one hand, far from being absolutely new, this type of singular contract will have characterized *every* philosophical or scientific institution worthy of the name, that is to say, which has decided never to leave anything out of the question, not even its own institutional axiomatic. On the other hand, the reflection on what could link a fictional structure to, for example, such performative utterances, promises, contracts, engagements,

founding or instituting acts, will be one of the tasks of the College, and the richness of these implications is inexhaustible. I will say the same for the reflection on the history and the stakes of the concept of the university since the eighteenth century.

In what follows, my only ambition will be to project some hypotheses. Without being bound by them, those responsible for the College in the future might, if they agree with them, also refer to them as *points of order* for a first movement: a broad discussion, a broad introduction which would also be a four-year "translation." Points of order or of pause, rather than of a planned or uni-totalizing organization. Points of pause, *fermata*, if we want to name precisely those signs destined less to mark the measure than to suspend it on a note whose duration may vary. Rhythms, pauses, accents, phases, insistences—it is with these words and these values that I propose to describe, in their diversity, the possibilities and compossibilities of the College, certain of them at least, during the four years of its instauration.

I. Thinking Destination: Ends and Confines for Philosophy, The Sciences, and The Arts

Under this title, whose slight determination is deliberate, it is a question of designating that research called, in a code that no longer fits here, "fundamental." It is indispensable that it be developed broadly, and to the point of questioning the fundamentalist scheme, such as it has so often been able to regulate philosophy's relation to itself and to other regions of the encyclopedia. Even if we had not been convinced of it in advance, our consultations have provided us with an eloquent proof: the demand for this type of research is very marked today, and it is capable of mobilizing great forces and taking original forms. For reasons and following routes that must be analyzed, this "fundamentalist" thought has given in to a sort of intimidation before the sciences, all the sciences but especially the human and social sciences. It can and should find a new legitimacy and cease being somewhat ashamed of itself, as has sometimes been the case over the last two decades. This can happen without regression and without inevitable return to the hegemonic structure we alluded to in the first part of this Report. Furthermore, this movement is underway. The College should permit it to affirm itself in all of its force: to affirm philosophy and the thought of philosophy. It is not only professional

philosophers who ask this but also a great number of researchers engaged in their scientific or artistic practices.

In the perspective which is thus opening up here, the first "themes" of this "fundamental" research will be organized around this series: *destination* (destiny, destining, sender/receiver, emitter/transmitter/receptor) and *gift* (giving/receiving, expenditure and debt, production and distribution).

The necessary development of semantic, philological, historical, etc., inquiries will apply itself to the "great questions" of which the following list constitutes only an indication.

How can a thought of "destination" concern philosophy, more precisely its own contour, its relation to a thought which would not yet or no longer be "philosophy" or "metaphysics," nor for that matter "science" or "technics"? What of the limits or the "ends" of philosophy, of metaphysics, of onto-theology? What of their relation to science and technics? This enormous network of questions can, we will say (and this goes for everything we advance here), be unfolded for itself, independently of any reference to the scheme of destination. So why not do without the proposed guiding thread? Response: Why not, in fact, if possible? We ought to be able to try that in the College, which is why I proposed that the "scheme" never become a "program" or an obligatory "theme," even if I am convinced that it is more and something other than one "guiding thread" among others.

In all cases, foci of reflection should be instituted wherever the question of the *end and ends* of the philosophical as such can *take place*, wherever the limit, the borders, or the destination of philosophy is at stake, wherever *there is cause or space* to ask: Philosophy *in view of what? Since and until when? In what and how? By whom and for whom?* Is it *decidable* and within what limits? In fact and by rights, these *topoi* will also be sites of the College's vigilant reflection on itself: on its own aim, on its destination (today and tomorrow) as a *philosophical site*, on what legitimates it and then confers on it its own power of legitimation, on what decides it politics and its economy, on the forces it serves and the forces it makes use of, on its national and international relations with other institutions. *Destination* and *legitimation*, thus, of the College itself: these are not problems to treat secondarily there or to dissociate (in the space of a sociological analysis, for example) from the major interrogations on the essence and the destination of the philosophical. Furthermore, as noted above the concept of "legitimation," so common today, calls for

a reelaboration in its construction and its usage. Starting with the "open letter" [of 18 May 1982] through which we made public the object of our Mission and opened a discussion, we have emphasized ways of research whose *legitimacy* has not yet been recognized. It remained to specify, which a simple letter of this type could not do, that the College would not keep itself simply outside any process of legitimation, that is, within the illegitimable. Even were we to want it, this seems absolutely impossible. The most ruthless critique, the implacable analysis of a power of legitimation is always produced in the name of a system of legitimation. It can be declared or implicit, established or in formation, stable or mobile, simple or overdetermined—one cannot not know it, one can at most deny it. This denegation is today the most common thing in the world. Making it a theme, the College will try to avoid this denegation, insofar as this is possible. We already know that the interest in research not currently legitimated will only find its way if, following trajectories ignored by or unknown to any established institutional power, this new research *is already underway and promises a new legitimacy*, until one day, once again . . . and so on. We also know—and who wouldn't want it?—that if the College is created with the resources it requires and, above all, if its vitality and richness are one day what we foresee, then it will become in its turn a legitimating instance that will have obligated many other instances to reckon with it. It is this situation which must be continuously analyzed, today and tomorrow, to avoid exempting the College as an institution from its own analytic work. In order to track without complacency the ruses of legitimating reason, its silences and its narratives, it would be better to begin in the knowledge that we do so from an authorized, that is to say accredited, site; and from one which is accredited to confer accreditations, even if in a form or according to procedures and criteria completely different from—indeed incompatible with—current practices. Not telling (itself) too many stories about its own independence from this or that power of legitimation (dominant forces of society, institutions, university, State, etc.) is perhaps the *first* condition of the greatest possible independence, though that does not preclude looking for others. What we propose is not the utopia of a wild non-institution apart from any social, scientific, philosophical, etc., legitimation. It is a new apparatus, the only one capable of freeing, *in a given situation*, what the current set of apparatuses still inhibits. Not that the College

is today the only or even the best form of institution possible in this respect. But to us it appears indispensable to the given set. And it is, moreover, for that reason that the necessity has been able to make itself felt, even as a symptom.

What I have just said about *legitimation* is easily transposed in terms of *orientation*. The ruses of the orientation of research must give rise to a new strategy of analysis. The opposition between end-oriented research and fundamental research has doubtless always been naive and summary. It is today, in all domains, startlingly obvious. We must yet again reelaborate this problematic from the fundamentals up, and that is finally what I propose here, at the same time as I insist on the *topoi* of a "fundamentalist" research-style. Which ones?

A

The questions of metaphysics and of onto-theology everywhere they can be recast: new approaches or connections. The interpretations of the "entire" history of philosophy (teleology, periodization, "epochalization," historical and systematic configurations).

B

The problematic of the *completion or of the limit of philosophy* (teleological or genealogical interpretations, critique, deconstruction, etc.). With the proper names appearing here only as indices, we can thus recommend coordinated and intertwined work on Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Marx, Comte, Nietzsche, Husserl, the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein, Russell, Heidegger, etc. There is a great deal of room for original research in these directions, especially if it practices grafting, confrontation, or interference. This is almost never done rigorously and deliberately in France; it would break with homogeneous traditions and with institutions closed in on themselves.

This research would put "major," that is to say already recognized and well-known sites into "configuration." We will recommend later initiatives of another style; they will have in common a concern to analyze—even sometimes to put in question—the processes by which philosophical problematics and traditions become dominant: How and under what conditions are discourses, objects, and philosophical institutions formed? How do they become "philosophical"

and how are they recognized as such? Under what conditions do they impose themselves (and on whom?) in order to minoritize or to marginalize other ones?

Each time one of these questions finds an original, interesting, and necessary determination, a *research group* might be created, of greater or lesser dimensions, longer or shorter duration. The example I am going to specify was imposed on me primarily by the *scheme of destination*, but it should be able to be translated, transposed, and multiplied. Research organized into one or many seminars, one or many programs, short-lived or long-term, should be able to correspond to each of the “proper names” just listed and to the movements of thought they represent.

C

Take the example of Heidegger. Around his work and its “problematic” (like those of other thinkers listed), a Program could be organized by the College, then transformed into a relatively independent research center, linked by contract to the College under conditions to be studied. In this case as in others, the College would have the role of provocation and initial organization. In the process which would make the Program into a Research Center, the work would first off be magnetized by these questions about the limits, ends, and destinations of onto-theology. It would treat, among others, each of the following “themes,” which are all strongly marked in the Heideggerian text:

- The interpretation of the history of Being. Meaning and truth of Being.
- Thinking, philosophy, science.
- Thinking, philosophy, poetry.
- Technics and metaphysics.
- The work of art.
- Language, languages, translation (beginning with the theoretical and practical problems of translating the corpus being considered). Technics and translation (formal and natural languages, problems of metalanguage and translation machines).
- The political: what, *for example*, of Heidegger’s political thought, its relations with his thought in general and with his political engagements on the other hand? (The same questions impose themselves, naturally, for other thinkers.) As for Heidegger, what of his “reception”

in France? What will have been its singular destiny? We would thus follow the history and the course of his "legacy" over the last fifty years, during which it will have, in one way or another, traversed all of French philosophy in an alternation of eclipses and reappearances, different each time and always highly significant, even today. Such research should naturally be coordinated with work that takes a fresh look at this century's history, at the constitution of a thematic of modernity or postmodernity in Germany and elsewhere, and at the analysis of the phenomena of totalitarianism, Nazism, fascism, Stalinism, without limiting itself to these enormities of the twentieth century. There again, we might see the originality of the paths to be broken, the specific necessity which will impose them on the College, especially in the active and intense crossings between all these different research efforts. Although we have proposed the example of Heidegger, such crossings should traverse other problematics, past or contemporary, around the destinal limit of philosophy (Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, Comte, Nietzsche, Husserl, the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, the Frankfurt School, etc.) as well as work on the genealogy of these dominant problematics, of their domination itself. In all these efforts, the rigorous distinction between internal and external reading should not be disregarded, but neither should it be treated as a dogma. This problematic, like that of "context" and of contextualization in general, requires a new elaboration.

- The reason of the university. All these "philosophies" carry with them, whether thematically (Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, at least) or implicitly, a discourse on reason which is also a discourse on the university, an evaluation of or a prescription for the destiny of the modern university, its politics (notably in its relations with the State and with the nation), and the organization of relations between philosophical and technoscientific research. The constant reflection of the College on its own mission, its aims or its eventual "orientation," should pass by way of, among other things, an encounter with these thoughts which are all thoughts of the university.

Such research communities exist nowhere, as far as I know, neither in France nor anywhere else. Outside of informal groups and dispersed initiatives, the only organized research depends on narrowly specialized centers, most often incapable of the opening, the mobility, and the intertwined or diagonal approaches we are proposing here. The difficulty for them (and this stems more often from institutional mechanisms than from people) is to *mobilize* this re-

search, which sometimes becomes pure philology, without philosophical ambition, even if it is armed here or there with modern technology; the difficulty is to measure this research against the most serious stakes, today's and tomorrow's. No one should read in these last remarks a will to discredit historicizing attitudes or interest in the past as such, rather the contrary. The paradox is that, in France at least, historical, philological, even "archival" work—despite the premium of positivity which it receives in many institutions—remains very deficient in the domain we have just invoked. In any case, for reasons that the College should analyze, there are enormous and inadmissible delays here—beginning with that of the publication and translation of the fundamental corpus of the twentieth century. Its translation remains largely incomplete, dispersed, heterogeneous. This deficiency is not only serious in itself, but also in what it signifies or entails for philosophical or scientific research. To cite only these examples, we know that this is the situation of the works of Freud, Wittgenstein, and, precisely, Heidegger, which need a complete and, insofar as possible, homogeneous translation, based on the scientific and complete edition of his writings (now underway). In all these tasks, the College could associate its initiatives with those of other research institutions (CNRS and universities).

D

Numerous indications permit us to affirm that such programs and centers would be active and efficacious, that they would attract many researchers and would bring together many specialties—those of philosophers, but also of philologists, historians, poetics, linguists, logicians, political scientists, and theorists, sociologists, translators, writers, etc. . . . They ought thus to be structured in their own identity and at the same time traversed by all the other axes of research. But this should be able to be said of all the research groups we will be led to determine.

Another indicator, particularly exemplary in this respect, would be that of "women's studies"—even though, at least at first glance, it does not have a direct relation with the preceding example. I consider this relation essential, but without attempting to demonstrate it here I will recall only a few obvious things. The institutional underdevelopment of these studies in our country is scandalous (in comparison, for example, with the United States for the university, and with the richness and force of these "studies" in France outside of

public institutions). As the "Godelier Report" recalls, in France there is only one "women's studies" research group accredited by the former government (directed by H el ene Cixous, at the University of Paris VIII). On the other hand, it is too evident that if women's studies should, for this very reason, be developed extensively in the College, they should also expand, without dissolving, into all the other sites of research.

II. *Destination and Orientation*

The "themes" we will situate under this title should by right not be dissociated from the preceding ones, with which they can cross at many points. But an original inflection will mark their treatment. It will be a matter of reactivating or reactualizing categories said to be classical by adjusting them, if possible, to new objects, putting them to the (transforming or deforming) test of situations which may seem unprecedented or specific. All the themes and problems which organize the great philosophical tradition, from Aristotle to Kant, from Leibniz to Hegel and to Marx, from Nietzsche to Bergson, etc., around *teleology* and *eschatology*, *ends* and *aims*, will have to be mobilized in directions as numerous and different as modern biology and genetics, biotechnology, biolinguistics, and "biotics." A new reflection on law in relation to the technoscientific mutations of medicine will open as well onto the ethnical and political dimensions of a thought of destination. As for examples, we suggest engaging in very precise research at the intersections of the following paths:

A

The philosophical *implication* of the life sciences. In this "domain" of uncertain frontiers, the richness and the acceleration of "discoveries" *engages* philosophy more than ever in its most essential and most critical questionings. We say "implication" and "engagement" in order to mark the fact that it is doubtless a matter of something other than an epistemological reflection which *follows on* scientific production. Without disputing the necessity of such an epistemology, in this domain and in all others, must we not also take into account the possibility of "philosophical decisions" opening and orienting new scientific spaces? Here it would not necessarily be a matter of spontaneous or dogmatic philosophy, of residues of pre-critical philosophy in the activity of scientists, but of inaugural philo-

sophico-scientific approaches productive, as such, of new bodies of knowledge. While this possibility can claim a noble history in all domains of scientific theory, it seems particularly rich and promising today in all the spaces which put the life sciences in communication with other sciences and emerging technical mutations (sciences of language, physics, computing, etc.). The dissociation between all these investigations and all these resources, like that between philosophy and these techno-sciences, has to do more often with socioinstitutional effects of the scientific or technical community than with the intrinsic nature of the objects. The College could play a vital role in this regard.

B

The philosophical, ethico-political, and juridical problems posed by new medical technologies. The foundations of a new *general deontology*. Whether it is a matter of demography (in all its dimensions, from the distribution of nutritional resources to birth control worldwide), gerontology (the science of aging in general and not only of "old age"—of which theoretical and institutional developments have a worldwide breadth often disregarded in France), genetic manipulation, the enormous problematic of prostheses and of organ transplants and grafting, biotics (biocomputers with synthetic genes, constitution of "artificial senses"), or euthanasia—each time the philosophical stake is obvious. It is not posed simply in terms of knowledge or of mastery but, demanding in this regard the highest competence, it calls as well for ethical interpretation, for taking sides and decisions. It also supposes putting back into play the whole fundamental axiology concerning the values of the body, the integrity of the living, "subject," "ego," "conscience" or "consciousness," individual and community "responsibility." Linked with these are all the questions of a politics of "health" (society's rights and duties with regard to what we call "health," but also the reelaboration of its very concept and those of a politics of research in this domain (priorities, orientations, articulations with military-industrial research).

C

Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis. Certainly we will be attentive here to link them to the research we have just situated, to link them to each other, but also to dissociate them in their most jealous and irreducible originality. This said, in both cases, whether it is a matter

of knowledge, "theoretical" discourse, technique, or institution, the necessity of a philosophical discussion is widely recognized and called for by the "practitioners" with whom we have been in contact during our consultations, most widely by those—and they are very numerous in every domain of research—who "deal" today with psychoanalysis in one way or another. Whether we interrogate literature or linguistics, history, ethnology or sociology, pedagogy or law, the very axiomatic of research finds itself transformed in every way by it. Let's not insist here on something so obvious. I will only emphasize a point on which the future directors of the College should remain particularly vigilant. This has recently been verified on the occasion of the discussion organized by Maurice Godelier and Gérard Mendel: many psychoanalysts are very concerned to preserve what is in their eyes the irreducible singularity of their discourse and their practice. The majority of psychoanalysts want to maintain the greatest independence with regard to social public health organizations or public research institutions. Whatever one thinks of these very complex problems, with which I prefer not to engage here, it seems to me desirable in any case that the College never consider them "resolved" in any way; in other words, that it maintain a policy of reserve and abstention about them, which does not mean that it not pose them in a theoretical mode, rather the contrary. But it should not seek to determine some social inscription of psychoanalysis, for example by means of some kind of link between the College and a group of analysts or an analytic institution as such. All research contracts will be made with individuals or with groups *interested* in the psychoanalytic problematic, but not with psychoanalysts *as such* (even if they are that in fact and if their work in the College concerns the institution or history of the analytic movement). There is nothing paradoxical in this. The recommendation which I am formulating here, in the interest of everyone and first of all the College, addresses a request often formulated by psychoanalysts. A good number among them have told us that they prefer to work in these conditions rather than in a space which would be reserved for them by statute, in the CNRS, for example, or in other research institutions. Whether wrongly or rightly, they fear being too (theoretically) hemmed in and too (sociopolitically) engaged there, and they prefer more open and more multiple exchanges with philosophers, researchers in the social sciences and it must be strongly emphasized, in the life or "natural" sciences as well, in France and abroad. This international dimension

takes on certain particular aspects here to which some of our correspondents have repeatedly drawn our attention.

D

Law and philosophy of law. There is a spectacular deficiency in the French field here, something of which we were convinced at the start of our mission and which has received the most emphatic confirmation. Many philosophers and jurists regret it and propose that a special effort be launched in this domain. This effort might first be undertaken in the directions we have just indicated by taking account of the legal problems posed by certain modern (technical, economic, political, artistic) mutations. The themes of destination, the gift, and thus exchange and debt lend themselves to this in a particularly privileged way. We should not speak only of the "comparative," ethnosociological, and historical approaches this requires, but also of certain less classical ones, for example, those based on "pragmatic" analyses of the structure of juridical utterances. Inversely, we will also study the juridical conditions of the constitution of artworks or of the production and reception (or destination) of works. Not to mention all the possible connections with a political, even theologico-political, problematic. To limit ourselves to a few indicative examples, here are some "modern" provocations to this new philosophico-juridical reflection, accumulated in their apparent diversity: the phenomena of the totalitarian society, new techniques of physical and psychic torture, new conditions of the investment and occupation of space (urbanism, naval and air space, "space research"), the progress of computerization or informatization, the ownership and transfers of technology, the ownership, reproduction and distribution of artworks under new technical conditions and given new materials used in production and archiving. All these transformations in progress call for a thorough reelaboration of the conceptuality and axiomatics of law, international law, public law, and private law. A new problematic of human rights is also underway, progressing slowly and laboriously within the major international organizations. It seems that French philosophy has not been terribly interested in this so far. This deficiency is often dissimulated behind the classical eloquence of declarations in favor of human rights. However necessary they are, such declarations no longer take the place of philosophical thought. Such thinking has to measure itself today against a situation without precedent.

E

The police and the army, warfare. Here too, technological mutations in progress are profoundly transforming the structures, modes of action, stakes, and aims. Philosophical reflection seems to be keeping too great a distance from research already underway on this subject in numerous French and foreign institutes.

The College should make possible confrontations between experts (on the police, different police forces, prison institutions, armies, modern strategy and polemology) and other researchers, especially philosophers. The directions of research are numerous and diverse, as important projects which have come from France and abroad remind us. There is practically no theme evoked by this "projection" that should not, in one way or another, cross with the problematics of the police, the army, and warfare. Warfare in all its figures, which are not metaphors (ideological warfare, economic warfare, broadcast warfare). Biocybernetics, so-called "smart" weapons, and self-guided missiles would here be only the most conspicuous and determined paradigms of a problematic of the "sendoff" or "launch" and of the "destination" in this domain. In fact the field extends to the regions of game theory, the politics of (military-industrial) research, psychoanalysis, semiotics, rhetoric, law, literature, and the "status of women."

III. Languages of Destination, Destinations of Language

"Language"—the word is understood here in its most open sense, beyond the limits of the linguistic and the discursive proper, in their oral or graphic form. The values of "information," "communication," "emission," and "transmission" will be included here, certainly, in *all* their forms, yet they will not exhaust it. That is to say directly that, under the title of "language," the study of all "destinal" significations or operations (destining, sending, emitting, transmitting, addressing, giving, receiving, etc.) can and should in turn traverse *all* the College's fields of activity. And we have laid down the principle, in the first part of this Report, that this activity would not only be theoretical study but also, connected to it, "creation" and performance. Referring for convenience to classical categories, let us indicate the titles and the principal paths of these intertwined research efforts.

A

Philosophy of language. What can its specificity be, if it is neither simply an epistemology of linguistics nor a linguistics? How is this "specificity" constituted? History and analysis of its problematic and categories in relation to all the forms of *teleology*. What is a sender, a receiver, an emitter, a receptor, a message, etc.? How are their "pragmatic" unity and their conceptual identity constituted? Across all the dimensions of this analysis, (metaphysical, psychosociological, psychoanalytic, technoeconomic), we will encounter the problems of decidability and undecidability. We will recognize them in their logical or semantic forms, in pragmatic paradoxes, or again in the interpretation of "works of art."

B

Linguistics. As with all the "immense domains" which I am naming here, it is a question of signaling what the College's precise angle of approach should be. We will not cover all the territory of linguistic research there, nor will we teach all of Linguistics, even supposing that this could be done anywhere. We will try rather, while providing an "initiation" to linguistic research in its newest directions, to interrogate linguists, during debates with other researchers, philosophers or not, on the subject of philosophy in linguistics and linguistics in philosophy. Not only in terms of the dogmatic presuppositions on each side. Other modes of implication are at least as interesting, as much from the historical as from the systematic point of view. We can interrogate anew, for example, the inscription of philosophical discourse in a natural language and in the "philosophy of language" it tends to entail; we can interrogate the philosophical decisions, assumed or not, of every linguistics. These decisions are not inevitably negative ("epistemological obstacles"), and not necessarily to be confused with the philosophical discourse or reference *exhibited* by linguistics ("Cartesian linguistics," "Rousseauist linguistics," "Herderian," "Humboldtian"). In medieval thought, so neglected by French academic philosophy, these explorations would doubtless be among the most fruitful. But these are only examples.

C

Semiotics. We can transpose here what has just been said about the philosophical stakes of linguistics. The field will be larger since it

covers not only linguistic systems but also nonlinguistic sign systems. We will be particularly interested in *intersemiotic* functionings (speech and gesture, formal graphs and natural or ordinary language, works of art with multiple inscriptions: text, painting, music, etc.). The reflection will thus extend—in a nonencyclopedic but incursive mode, let's not forget—to all systems of signals and all codes, from those of genetic information to the necessary problematic of "artificial intelligence." We will not consider as secured or guaranteed any of the philosophical axiomatics with which all the research in progress is engaged, beginning with the opposition between the "artificial" and the whole series of its others.

Likewise, we will not be content to sift and orient, at the start, the impressive range of this "field" by reference to questions of "destination." We will leave open, and constantly reopen, the question of knowing whether the thought of language depends on "philosophy," semiotic theory, or linguistic theory, and whether it is limited by their horizon.

D

Pragmatics. Despite everything it can share with a linguistics, a semiotics, a general semantics, or a philosophy of language, pragmatics is developing today, especially outside France, as a relatively original discipline. Whether it concerns enunciation ("speech acts") or a more complex semiotic context (including for example gestural behavior), it seems to me that it is effecting a general redistribution of great consequence today. Besides its own rich results, it entails an essential coimplication of "disciplines" that formerly compartmentalized or protected themselves in the name of their own scientificity. That is why pragmatics seems to me to require a particularly sensitive place in the College, that of a "crossroads" of heavy traffic (philosophy, semantics, linguistics, semiotics, artistic theory and practice, interpretation of juridical performatives). Given the importance of the stakes, given the place that the College should grant to the "performative" dimension (cf., the first part of this Report), and given as well that dispersed work is proliferating today without specific institutional resources (based on Austin's theory of speech acts and its tradition, but sometimes deviating from them to the breaking point), the College should create a site of coordination and, later, a real Research Center which, though outside the College, would re-

main associated with it. Numerous proposals in this direction, sometimes highly elaborate, have come to us; we foresaw that, and we sought out and called for them.

E

Technology of telecommunications. "Fundamental" reflection on the concepts of "communication" and "long-distance communication," on the no doubt structural and thus irreducible links between *technē* in general and "telecommunications," from its "simple" and "elementary" forms. In other words, the technology of telecommunications is not one technology among others; whence the link between this problematic and that of distance, of oriented spacing and thus of destination. Among all the possible foci of this reflection, let us signal these, which are among the most necessary today (and tomorrow).

1. Aims, structures, and putting into practice of all *modes of archiving*—and thus of communication (philosophical, scientific, artistic, etc.). Since the necessity of this work and these experiments is too obvious with regard to new techniques (microfilm, data banks, telematics, video), I prefer to insist on the *book* (history of writing and history of the book; the model of the book and its effects on the structure of works and discourses, especially philosophical discourses; the technical and political problems of the culture of the book; the crisis and the future of publishing in general, and of scientific, philosophical, or literary publishing in particular; national and international dimensions of the problem—dominant languages and minority cultures, etc.). Of course, these questions can no longer be considered today as annexes in a research institution such as the College. They will thus be treated in all their breadth and acuity, with the special help of experts (experts in the new techniques of archiving and distribution, printers, publishers, librarians, etc.). These initiatives will be coordinated with those which can be undertaken elsewhere (for example in CESTA, CREA, the Ministry of Culture, and the Direction du Livre).⁵

5. CESTA, the Center for the Study of Advanced Systems and Technologies, and CREA, the Center for Research on Autonomous Epistemologies, are both housed in the same buildings as the College, 1–5 Rue Descartes, the former Ecole Polytechnique. The Direction du Livre is a subsection of the French Ministry of Culture that supervises, supports, and studies various aspects of book production and distribution. It is

2. The *mass media*. Philosophical and scientific reflection, theoretical, empirical, and experimental "Mediology." Among the countless tasks required in this domain, the College could first of all privilege the "cultural," artistic, scientific, and philosophical aspects. This will lead it to a much closer analysis of the relations between "media" culture, research, and teaching. Without a "reactive attitude, without "rejection" (which is in any case doomed to powerlessness), faced with the extension of the mass media, the College will pose the "deontological," "ethico-juridical," or "ethico-political" problems associated with such an extension. It will attempt to propose new uses for these technical possibilities (public or private) and will seek to arrange access to them. What goes for the mass media goes as well for other more diverse and less widespread modes of communication, for example the private or "free radio" stations, or for all the techniques of telecommunication. A great deal of work is underway in foreign universities and in other French institutions: the College should associate itself with it while maintaining the originality of its own approach.

3. *Computer science, telematics, robotics, biotechnologies*. In liaison with other research centers, particularly with the whole CESTA network, the College should participate, in its style and with its resources, in the ongoing scientific and philosophical reflection on "orientation," the modes of production and appropriation of new techniques whose spectacular acceleration is transforming the whole of culture and knowledge. This work should, as much as possible, connect technical initiation—the provision of basic proficiency—with philosophical analysis (ethical, juridical, political) of the stakes.

F

Poietics. In what may be a somewhat conventional manner, we choose this term to regroup everything that concerns, in classical terms, theories of art and artistic practices. The title "poietics" at least has the merit of recalling a double dimension: theoretical and necessarily discursive research on the one hand, and experimental, "creative," and performative research on the other.

The College's projects (at least such as they have been interpreted

affiliated with the Centre National des Lettres, a semiprivate organization run by both the Direction du Livre and publishers, which supports such activities as the publication of journals and the activity of small presses, etc. —Translators' note.

and represented by our Mission) have elicited spectacular interest in these domains. The research proposals in this domain have been more numerous and more eager than in any other, above all, we must note, on the part of French researchers or artists. We could have expected this. It confirms, among other things, the difficulty these initiatives have in finding a site—and support—in this country's theoretico-institutional topology.

We insist that, whenever possible, the College seek in these domains to associate itself with the numerous initiatives underway in Paris and above all regionally and abroad, whether public (for example, those sponsored or supported by the Ministry of Culture) or private. Privileged attention will be accorded to those which bring "theorists" together with "creators"—who are sometimes one and the same.

Besides all the "great questions" to be reactivated (origin of the work of art, meaning, reference, art and truth, art and national culture, etc.), what all this research will have in common will concern primarily:

- the structures of destination and orientation ("aim of the beautiful," with or "without a concept"): Who produces what? Destined for whom? Theories of reception, "taste," the art market, the phenomena of evaluation, legitimation, distribution, etc;
- the thematic of destination (destiny, law, chance and necessity) within works and on the "production" side;
- the interpretation of works and the philosophy or hermeneutics involved there. Transformation of "art criticism" in the new audiovisual spaces of the press and publishing;
- mutation of the arts (of forms and materials) following scientific and technical advances;
- critique and transformation of the customary classification of the arts.

While the necessity of a different philosophical questioning is perceptible in all the arts, and while it is primarily the "creators" who have insisted on this, the urgency is doubtless most marked in literature or poetry and music. During the last two decades, proliferating work has mobilized great resources (philosophy, human sciences—linguistics, psychoanalysis, etc.—logico-mathematical sciences), generally outside academic institutions or their customary divisions. An entity which we could call "literature and philosophy," for exam-

ple, while it is practically recognized in foreign universities (especially in the United States), remains contraband in our country. We have received important projects leading in this direction; others, just as new and as necessary, bring together music and philosophy, musicians, music theorists and philosophers in an original way. But without a doubt, analogous attempts might be made with the visual arts, the so-called spatial arts, the theater, the cinema, and television.

IV. *Translation, Transfer(ence), Transversality*

Under this title we will indicate and recommend all the transferential proceedings which, *as such*, define the precise specificity of an *international* College open first of all to *diagonal* or *transversal* interscientific research. Translations, then, in the triple sense, whose division we borrow for convenience from Jakobson: *intralinguistic* (phenomena of translation—commentary, reformulation, transposition—within the same language), *interlinguistic* (in the common or “proper” sense of the word, says Jakobson: from one language to another), *intersemiotic* (from one semiotic medium to another, for example speech/painting), but translations also in the larger sense of the transfer of a model or paradigm (rhetoric, art, sciences).

Here are some exemplary directions. It is understood that they should cross with other paths situated under other titles and orient themselves according to the general scheme of “destination.”

A. “Fundamental” research on language, the multiplicity of languages, and the general problematic of translation. History and theories of translation, in its linguistic, philosophical, religious and political, poetic dimensions. Contemporary problems of state languages and minority languages (extinction and reawakening, participation in the international scientific and philosophical community, domination and appropriation of techno-science by language).

B. Setting up specialized *centers for linguistic training*, for French or foreign researchers, inside the College or in association with it.

C. *The modern technology of translation: theoretical problems.* Translation machines, “artificial intelligences,” programming—in a determined language—of data banks and other modes of archiving or communication.

D. *Languages and philosophical discourse.* The role of natural (national) languages in the constitution of the philosophical as such;

history of "philosophical" languages; the political, theologico-political, and pedagogical dimensions: how does a philosophical language become dominant? This work will be coordinated closely with work in the so-called "comparatist" problematic and on the philosophical institution (see below). Each time the question already posed will be recast: that of the processes by which "philosophical objects" are formed and legitimated.

E. "*Comparatism*" in *philosophy*: an empirical and uncertain title, but research whose necessity admits of no doubt. The urgency, especially in our country, makes itself felt massively, and the testimonies here are numerous and eloquent. Everywhere it has imposed itself, for better or worse, the word "comparatism" has certainly covered approaches that are difficult to delimit, not quite sure of the existence of their object, and even less of their method.

Nevertheless, as is sometimes the case, this fragility or this empiricism has not prevented some work from imposing itself in strange institutional conditions which would justify an entire study. It is doubtful that "comparatism" *as such* has much meaning in philosophy, but the very critique of this vague notion should itself be produced in the course of analyses which are today too underdeveloped in the West, and particularly so in France (we are speaking of philosophical analyses and not only of "culturological" ones). Let us situate this schematically.

a. *On the difference between thought (in general) and philosophy.* On systems of thought which are not necessarily limited to the "philosophical" form as it was born and has developed under this name in the West. All of these "thoughts," if not strictly philosophical, are not necessarily reducible to what, from a philosophical standpoint, we name with categories like "culture," "world view," ethico-religious "system of representations," in the West and elsewhere. Often the attempts to think beyond the philosophical or beyond what links metaphysics to western techno-science bring to light affinities with non-European (African or Far Eastern) thought. Systematic work and exchanges at these frontiers should cross with others which we might entitle:

b. *Philosophical systems and religious systems*, within and outside the West. Renewal of theological research (to link up with the renaissance of religious and theologico-political movements all over the world).

c. *Philosophical systems and mythological systems.*

d. *Philosophy and ethnocentrism. Problematic of ethnophilosophy* (a wide and exemplary debate which has developed in Africa starting from the critique, by Paulin Hountondji, of Tempels's *Bantu Philosophy*.⁶ This could be developed in relation to the questions posed by a (semantic, linguistic, ethno-culturological) study of the signification attached to gestures and discourses of destination (giving/receiving, emitting, transmitting, sending, addressing, orienting).

e. *Philosophical "transcontinentality."* On the difference (intra-philosophical and intra-European in its manifestations, even if it affects philosophical institutions that are non-European yet constructed on a European model) between philosophical traditions. What does this difference consist in, once it is no longer determined on the basis of objects or "contents" alone, nor simply of national languages, nor finally of doctrinal conflicts? Over the centuries what I propose to call *philosophical continents* have been constituted. This movement has accelerated and its traits have made themselves apparent in the last two centuries. "Continent": the metaphor, if it were simply geographical, would not be rigorous; it is justified to the extent that geographical or geographico-national limits have often surrounded traditional entities and institutional territories (French, German, Anglo-Saxon philosophy, etc.). Today it is just as difficult to get through the "customs" and the "police" of these philosophical traditions as it is to situate their borderline, their essential trait. An analysis (which we cannot undertake here) would show, it seems to me, that these frontiers do not depend strictly on language, nationality, the types of objects privileged as philosophical, rhetoric, the socioinstitutional modalities of the production and reproduction of philosophical discourse (in the educational system and elsewhere), or general historico-political conditions. And yet the accumulation and intrication of all these conditions have engendered these "continental" formations so closed in on themselves. Their effects are multiple and already interesting in themselves. This original quasi-incommunicability does not take the form of a simple opacity, of a

6. See Placide Tempels, *La Philosophie bantoue*, trans. A. Rubbens (Elisabethville: Editions Lovania, 1945); *Bantu Philosophy*, trans. Colin King (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1959). And see Paulin J. Hountondji, *Sur la "philosophie africaine"* (Paris: François Maspero, 1976); *African Philosophy*, trans. Henri Evans with Jonathan Ree (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), especially chapters 1–3. —Eds.

radical absence of exchange; it is rather the delay and disorder of all the phenomena of translation, the general aggravation of all the misunderstandings. They do not obtain only or essentially between countries or national philosophical communities. To the extent that each of the great traditions is also represented within each national community, the frontiers are reconstituted inside each country, in diverse configurations.

Inversely, following a process which is also interesting, this situation is slowly beginning to evolve. Certain philosophers are more sensitive to it here and there. Movements are beginning to reflect on and transform this "babelization." An urgent, difficult, original task, without a doubt that of philosophy itself today, if some such thing exists and has to affirm itself. It is in any case the first task for an International College of Philosophy, and the most irreplaceable. Even if the College had been created only to this end, its existence would be completely justified.

Starting with its first four years, the College should prepare the following initiatives:

- *Setting up international working groups*, including each time French and foreign researchers. They will work in France (in Paris and as much as possible outside of Paris) and abroad. Competencies will not only be philosophical, but also, for example, linguistic. They will seek the cooperation of other experts, in France and abroad. All of them will work to analyze and transform the situation we have just been describing. They will take initiatives and multiply proposals concerning exchanges, cooperation, meetings, contracts of association, translations, and joint publications, in all the domains of interest to the College. As the College's constant perspective, this thematic and problematic of "intercontinental" difference will be a high priority program during the first years. Everywhere such groups can be constituted, each time according to original modalities, they will be—in (Eastern and Western) Europe and outside Europe, whether it is a matter of philosophy in the strictly occidental sense or (see above) of nonphilosophical "thought."

- *A program of large international colloquia* will be organized as soon as the College is created, as its very inaugural act. It will not be a matter of colloquia in the traditional form (formal juxtaposition of large lectures and panels). Those organized by the College will be the culmination of two or three years of intense work, in France and

abroad, with their active preparation entrusted to specialized philosophers. Periods of study in residence toward this end should be the object of agreements and support in France and abroad: study in residence at the College for several foreign philosophers, abroad for as many French philosophers. It seems to me that the first large meetings of this type should concern first of all French and German thought, French and Anglo-Saxon thought. We will make sure that the most diverse currents of thought are represented there. But particular attention will naturally be given to the most alive and the most specific, whether it is dominant in academic institutions or not. And starting with the preparation of these two large colloquia, setting up other groups should give rise to future meetings (Italy, Spain, Latin America, India, the Arab countries, Africa and the countries of the Far East, etc.).

*V. The Institutional Orientations of Philosophy
(Research and Teaching)*

These two are oriented, to begin with, by the problematic of *destination* (constitution of senders and receivers—individual or collective “subjects”—, units and legitimation of messages, structures of transmission and reception, etc.). Research of great breadth will be brought to bear on the history and system of philosophical institutions, whether of teaching or research, French or foreign. On the one hand “theoretical” (much, if not everything, remains to be done in this domain), they will also be largely practical and experimental. They will aim to develop and enrich philosophical research and teaching. The President of the Republic invited this and expressly committed himself to it in his letter of 8 May 1981 to GREPH. This necessity was recalled by the Minister of Research and Industry, in his letter to the Mission of 18 May 1982: “At a time when the government is preparing to extend the study of philosophy in secondary education, it is important that research devoted to this discipline be assured of the conditions and instruments best suited to its scope.” And the Minister specified further on that the College should be “inclined to favor innovative initiatives, open to the reception of unprecedented research and pedagogical experiments. . . .”

The reference I make here to the projects and early work of the *Groupe de Recherches sur l'Enseignement Philosophique* (GREPH) and to the *Etats Généraux de la Philosophie* (1979) has only an *indic-*

ative value.⁷ Other paths are possible and the College should vigilantly maintain an opening for them.

Everyone who wants to participate in this research should be provided with the means to do so, particularly secondary school teachers, university and lycée students.

In order to give a schematic idea of such research, I will cite the opening of GREPH's "Avant-Projet"⁸ in the hope that this group be associated with the College, under conditions that guarantee at once maximum cooperation and strict independence on the part of both.

Preliminary Proposal for the Constitution of a Research Group on Philosophical Education.

Preliminary work has made it clear that it is today both possible and necessary to organize a set of research investigations on what relates philosophy to its teaching. This research, which should have both a critical and a practical bearing, would attempt initially to respond to certain questions. We will define these questions here, under the rubric of a rough anticipation, with reference to common notions which are to be discussed.

1. What is the connection between philosophy and teaching in general? What is teaching in general? What is teaching for philosophy? What is it to teach philosophy? In what way would teaching (a category to be analyzed in the context of the pedagogical, the didactic, the doctrinal, the disciplinary, etc.) be essential to the philosophical operation? How has this essential indissociability of the didactophilosophical been constituted and differentiated? Is it possible, and under what conditions, to propose a general, critical, and transformative history of this indissociability?

These questions are of great theoretical generality. Obviously they demand elaboration. . . .

In opening up these questions it should be possible—let us say

7. See the collective volume from GREPH called *Qui a peur de la philosophie?* (Paris: Flammarion, 1977) and the proceedings of the June 1979 *Etats Généraux de la Philosophie* (Paris: Flammarion, 1979). Minister Chevènement's letter is quoted in Derrida's "lettre circulaire" of 18 May 1982 (see headnote). English translations of selected texts from GREPH and the *Etats Généraux*, as well as François Mitterrand's May 1981 letter to GREPH, are forthcoming in Derrida's *Institutions of Philosophy*. —Eds.

8. The complete French text can be found in *Qui a peur . . .* , 433–37; English translation by Rebecca Comay in *Institutions of Philosophy*. —Eds.

only *for example* and in a very vaguely indicative way—to study not only:

a. models of didactic operations legible, with their rhetoric, their logic, their psychagogy, etc., within written discourses (from Plato's dialogues, for example, through Descartes's *Meditations*, Spinoza's *Ethics*, Hegel's *Encyclopedia* or *Lectures*, etc., up to all the so-called philosophical works of modernity), but also

b. *pedagogical practices* administered according to rules in fixed places, in private or public establishments, since the Sophists, for example, the Scholastic "quaestio" and "disputatio," etc., up to the courses and other pedagogical activities instituted today in colleges, *lycées*, grade schools, universities, etc. What are the forms and norms of these practices? What are the effects aimed at and the effects obtained? Things to be studied here would be, for example: the "dialogue," maieutics, the master-disciple relationship, the question, the interrogation, the test, the examination, the competition, the inspection, publication, the frames and programs of discourse, the dissertation, the presentation, the lesson, the thesis, the procedures of verification and of control, repetition, etc.

These different types of problematics should be articulated together, as rigorously as possible.

2. How is the didactico-philosophical inscribed in the so-called instinctual, historical, political, social, economic fields?

How does it *inscribe itself* there, that is to say how does it operate—and represent (to) itself—its inscription, and how is it inscribed in its very representation? What is the "general logic" and what are the specific modes of this inscription? Of its normalizing normativity and of its normalized normativity? For example, the Academy, the *lycée*, the Sorbonne, preceptorships of every kind, the universities or the royal, imperial, or republican schools of modern times all prescribe, according to determined and differentiated paths, not only a pedagogy which is indissociable from a philosophy, but also, at the same time, a moral and political system that forms at once both the object and the actualized structure of pedagogy. What about this pedagogical effect? How to de-limit it, theoretically and practically?

Once again, these indicative questions remain too general: above all, they are formulated by design according to current representations and thus must be specified, differentiated, criticized, transformed. They could, in fact, lead one to believe that it is essentially, indeed uniquely, a matter of constructing a sort of "critical theory of philosophical doctrinality or disciplinarity," or of reproducing the tra-

ditional debate, regularly opened by philosophy, on its "crisis." This "reproduction" will itself be one of the objects of research. . . .

The preceding questions should thus be constantly reworked by these practical motivations. Also, without ever excluding the importance of these problems outside of France, we would first of all insist strongly on the conditions of philosophical teaching "here and now," in today's France. And in its concrete urgency, in the more or less dissimulated violence of its contradictions, the "here and now" would no longer be simply a philosophical object. . . .

1. What are the past and present historical conditions of this teaching system?

What about its power? What forces give it its power? What forces limit it? What about its legislation, its juridical code and its traditional code? Its external and internal norms? Its social and political field? Its relation to other kinds of teaching (historical, literary, aesthetic, religious, scientific, for example), to other institutionalized discursive practices (psychoanalysis in general, so-called training analysis in particular—for example, etc.)? From these different points of view, what is the specificity of the didactico-philosophical operation? Can laws be produced, analyzed, tested on objects such as—but these are only empirically accumulated indications—for example: the role of the *Idéologues* or of a Victor Cousin, of their philosophy or of their political interventions in the French university; the constitution of the philosophy class; the evolution of the figure of the philosophy professor since the nineteenth century, in the *lycée*, in *khâgne*,⁹ in the *écoles normales*, in the university, at the Collège de France; the place of the disciple, the student, the candidate; the history and function of

a. the programs of examinations and of competitions, the form of their tests (the authors present and those excluded, the organization of titles, themes and problems, etc.);

b. the juries of the "inspection générale," the consulting committees, etc.;

c. the forms and norms of evaluation or of sanction (grading, ranking, comments, reports on competitions, examinations, theses, etc.);

d. the so-called research organisms (CNRS, Fondation Thiers¹⁰ etc.);

9. Two years of post-*baccalauréat* preparation for the entrance examination of the humanities section of the *Ecoles normales supérieures*. —Trans.

10. The Centre National de Recherche Scientifique and the Fondation Thiers, independent though closely linked, provide permanent and part-time positions for researchers, who do not necessarily teach within the framework of these institutions. —Trans.

e. research tools (libraries, selected texts, manuals of the history of philosophy or of general philosophy (their relations with the field of commercial publishing on the one hand, with the authorities responsible for public instruction or national education on the other);

f. the places of work (the topological structure of the class, of the seminar, of the lecture hall, etc.);

g. the recruiting of teachers and their professional hierarchy (the social background and political stances of pupils, students, teachers, etc.).

2. What are the stakes of the struggles within and around philosophical teaching, today, in France?

The analysis of this conflictual field implies an interpretation of philosophy in general, and consequently, taking positions. It thus calls for action.

As far as France is concerned, it will be necessary to connect all this work with a reflection on French philosophy, on its own traditions and institutions, especially on the different currents which have traversed it over the course of this century. A new history of French thought in all its components (those which have dominated it and those which have been marginalized or repressed) ought to orient an analysis of the present situation. We will trace these premises as far back as possible, while insisting on the most recent modernity, on its complex relation to the problematics of philosophy and its limits, to the arts and sciences but also to French sociopolitical history and to the country's ideological movements, as much those of the French right, for example, as those of French socialisms.

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