REMEMBERING

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At various points in the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein describes the nature of human rationality in terms of our ability to follow rules, of which perhaps the most salient feature is the ability to continue a practice, which he calls the ability to "go on." A number of questions arise in this connection, especially "How does one 'go on'?" What sustains the continuity of our practices and underwrites our ability to follow rules? What is the mechanism by which one "goes on"? One imagines a range of answers of an un-Wittgensteinian sort. If you say that our human practices are expressions of ideologies, for instance, then you might see rule-governed behavior as sustained by power or force. This response may seem convincing because Wittgenstein's description of rules is his answer to the more general need to find a description of knowledge, and claims that practices are shaped by power relations is similarly the reduction of a question about (social) knowledge. From either position one may see our ability to "go on" as a fact about human history, as describing the continuity of our practices over time. Still, the results are the same, the claim being that history, no less than any practice, is also determined by ideologies or power.

Replies of this sort, meant as debunking critiques of rationality, pose a threat to the idea of "ongoingness" which Wittgenstein sees as fundamental to anything we can so much as call a human practice. The threat itself is obvious, even if the defense is not. But what of other possible explanations of the mechanism of "going on"? In this essay I shall explore the possible ways in which the ongoingness of human practices may be said to be sustained by memory. Since knowledge has often been viewed as a form of recollection (e.g., Plato), there is a plausibility to this account of our ability to follow rules which Wittgenstein takes as characteristic of human knowledge. To the extent that one thinks

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of memory as providing the "deep-structure" content or mechanism of our rule-following behavior, however, it differs only slightly in form from the debunking ideological critique of rationality. The correct reply, one can presume from Wittgenstein, is to say that the description of human rationality in terms of our ability to follow rules, as exemplified by our ability to "go on," already accounts for all of human behavior, so that there is nothing "left over" for ideology, or memory, to explain. This means that questions like "How does one 'go on'?" which insinuate a mechanism are ill-formed and ought to be relegated to that region of discourse which Wittgenstein says is "outside of language-games."

Yet while this strategy is correct, it does not give a sense of what may be at stake should we decide to give up the idea that memory provides the content or mechanism of our ability to "go on." Indeed, one can rule out the answer without ever having proposed it seriously, in which case one will have given no reply to a long philosophical tradition. One should know that it counts for nothing to overcome our "bewitchments" where we have never first been bewitched. This is why there is an "interlocutor" in the *Philosophical Investigations,* someone to remind us of the tempting plausibility of the un-Wittgensteinian reply.

I shall proceed with my discussion of remembering in three separate parts. First I shall outline that philosophical-psychological model of memory which might be taken as explaining what is "underneath" or "behind" human knowledge. Beyond showing where this model is flawed, my claim is that it has its beginnings in the conception of knowledge not as a species of rationality but rather as the achievement of certainty about objects and events (in this case, of the past). Yet the "mentalist" model of memory, which is meant to provide this certainty, is the source of a fear of fraudulence, the worry that a machine, as easily as a human, could "go on" by storing and retrieving information. This is the subject of my discussion in the second part of the essay. Finally, I turn from the concept of "conserved information," which is central to that model, to a problem of "concrete" application: the question of the possibility of history. My purpose in this critique of psychological models of memory is not to rule out the fact that we have memories (which in the Proustian sense are not my concern at all) but to say what memory is in terms of our

relationship to the past. For this I prefer to speak of *remembering*, which is itself a (rational) practice—a form, but not a mechanism, of "going on."

This discussion of remembering interlaces with several related concerns, all of which will emerge in due course. I mention them here not to ask for conviction about them in advance, but simply to provide an anticipatory sketch of the terrain. Describing the psychological model of memory, I come to call this an "archive." (Augustine calls it a "cabinet," and also the "belly of the mind.") One characteristic of the archive, for reasons which I will explain, is that its contents are fixed, and if lost cannot be retrieved. This fixedness is meant to guarantee certainty, but it lays bare the possibilities of fraudulence and predeterminism. These are concepts with a wide range of applicability, and I shall attempt to give some idea of that range. They can be usefully viewed in connection with the related concepts of authenticity, which is a validating characteristic of knowledge, while it is not that of certainty, and creativity, which may be taken as a sign or proof that remembering, as a form of rule-following behavior, is not fraudulent. Discussing this particular range of concepts, I have recourse to the idea of improvisation, which I describe as that which is determined, but not *pre*determined (which is what we think of the relationship of present and past in history as), or something which is determined within certain limits or a certain range. Here, the example of telling stories, which we have come to associate perhaps too closely with the act of reading from fixed texts, and which is in fact a form of remembering them, preserves the idea that our ability to "go on" is something like our ability to improvise, hence that it is a form of rationality which could not be predicated of a machine. Following Wittgenstein, one might call the "range" of possibilities open in improvisation a rule, in exactly the sense that in any practice one can be said to follow a rule without being bound, or predetermined, by it.[1]

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[1] I have benefited from Barry Stroud's "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity" and from Charles S. Chihara's "Wittgenstein and Logical Compulsion," both in George Pitcher, ed., *Wittgenstein, The "Philosophical Investigations": A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 477–96 and 469–76, respectively.

I

With the above concerns in mind, I want to begin by tracing the origins of what is sensed as the need to prove the authenticity of our "rule-governed behavior," to clear free of fraudulence and predeterminism, by a demonstrated capacity for improvisation, invention, or other forms of creativity within the range permitted by established social practices. My claim is that the origins of this need lie in a certain conception of what is underneath or behind human rationality, as seen in our ability to "go on." In the case of remembering, which is my specific concern here, it is the idea that there is a storehouse of human experience preserved—either directly, or by schematic impressions or some other traces—as memories, in a timeless warehouse of the past. If our ability to remember is a matter of retrieving this stored information, then it is difficult to distinguish the rational practice of a human from that of a machine. I shall deal at greater length with this matter in the following section. First I want to explain that the origins of this particular model of memory (hence of this idea of what constitutes a rational practice, or our ability to go on) lie in the attempt, visible for instance in Descartes, to overcome scepticism about our knowledge of the past.

At several points in Descartes' writings, he says that that knowledge which depends on memory requires the confirmation of God. There is a standing debate about the centrality of these remarks to the overall Cartesian project of complete epistemological and metaphysical doubt.[2] On one view, it is *only* such knowledge as depends on memory that requires the confirming validation of God. In one of his replies, Descartes says, "I announced in express terms that I referred only to the knowledge (*scientia*) of those conclusions, the memory of which can recur when we are no longer attending to the reasons from which we adduced them."[3] And in

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[2] See Willis Doney, "The Cartesian Circle," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 16 (1956): 324-88; Harry G. Frankfurt, "Memory and the Cartesian Circle," *The Philosophical Review* 71 (1962): 504-11; Bernard Williams, *Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 190-200.

[3] My citations follow the text of *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (1911; rev. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934). I abbreviate HR, and give volume and page numbers.

a letter of August, 1641, he says that in his doubts he "was dealing only with those things that we remember having clearly perceived earlier, not the things which we clearly perceive at the present moment."[4] But on another, perhaps more usual, view, there is thought to be something larger than the certainty of remembered perceptions at stake in the project of Cartesian doubt. This belief, however, is unfounded; the Cartesian doubt of memory raises concerns at least as large as the holders of the more usual view would wish, although to see why, one has first to see why memory might be the subject of some special, or more restricted, doubt. Why would memories need the confirmation of God any more than "unremembered" perceptions?

The answer to this lies in the temporal aspect of memory. As Russell said in *The Analysis of Mind*, "everything constituting a memory-belief is happening now, not in that past time to which the belief is said to refer."[5] In this description memories are like Cartesian intuitions, "the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, . . . the undoubting conception of an unclouded [*purae*] and unattentive mind, [which] springs from the light of reason alone" (*Regulae*, 3; HR 1: 7). Memories as Russell described them are as certain as Cartesian intuitions, but what is at stake in our doubts about memory is not the memory *experience* (everything of which is "happening now") but the content of the memory-belief. The memory experience can be secured beyond the possibility of a doubt and still there can be room for the sceptical worry which runs thus: How do I know that the world did not spring into existence five minutes ago, complete with a population that "remembered" an unreal past? This doubt remains open because nothing has been said about the content of the memory-belief, which though *happening* in the present makes reference to the past.

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[4] *Descartes: Philosophical Letters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 119.

[5] Russell, *The Analysis of Mind* (New York: Macmillam, 1921), p. 159. See also Norman Malcolm, "Memory and the Past," in *Knowledge and Certainty* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 187–202.

There is a similar difficulty in explaining the certainty of things which we know by deduction. (Deduction, to use Bernard Williams's phrase, is like a chain of intuitions held together by memory.[6]) By "deduction" Descartes understands "all necessary inference from *other* facts which are known with certainty" (italics mine). There are many things, he says, which are known with certainty "though not by themselves evident, but only deduced from true and known principles" (*Regulae*, 3; HR 1: 8). He must find a way to secure the certainty of things which are not intuited, but only deduced. In the *Regulae* Descartes implies that we can be confident in the deductive chain because of our continuous attention to it. Thus what we know in this way is deduced from true and known principles "by the continuous and uninterrupted action of a mind that has a clear vision of each step in the process" (ibid). Yet there are contradictions involved in holding this view. Descartes wants to say that what we know by deduction differs from what we know by intuition because he does not want to have to make the process of deduction the cumulative sum of a series of intuitions; rather, he wants to say that we can be certain of the conclusion of the deduction without repeating the deductive process. We may say that we know P, for instance, where (1) we have shown that P follows from S, which follows from P, which follows from R, . . . which follows from A, *which has been intuited*, and where (2) we *remember* having performed the deduction of P from A before:

> we know that the last link in a long chain is connected with the first, even though we do not take in by means of one and the same act of vision all the intermediate links on which that connection depends, but only remember that we have taken them successively under review and that each single one is united to its neighbor, from the first even to the last. Hence we distinguish this mental intuition from deduction by the fact that into the conception of the latter there enters a certain movement or succession, into that of the former there does not. (*Regulae*, 3; HR 1: 8)

But to say that I can be certain of the conclusion of a chain of deductive reasoning because I *remember* having gone through the individual steps of the chain before introduces memory again *after* the chain of reasoning has been completed, and this posterior

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[6] Williams, p. 192.

recollection of having gone through the chain is indefensible against sceptical doubt. Nor can the process be made recursive where one is dealing with a mixture of step-by-step intuitions and remembered deductions. Deduction, which Descartes says introduces the idea of succession in thought, implies temporal duration, while intuitions are durationless. For the process to be recursive, one must somehow go from deduction (duration) to intuition (durationlessness) while there is no place, in this sense, to go. This is also the problem with Russell's description of memory experience as always in the present and unable to confirm memory-beliefs, which refer to the past. The past to which the beliefs refer is a past of duration; time has elapsed between the *now* of the memory and the *then* to which it refers. But Russell places the whole "memory-belief" in the present, which means that he has somehow gone from a durational past to a durationless present, the "always happening now" of the so-called "memory belief."

In the same paragraph of the *Regulae* from which I have quoted above, Descartes attempts what appears to be a solution to this problem—a solution which also fails. He tries to make deduction a species of intuition, which like intuition is dependent on the "constant attention" of the mind. "The upshot of the matter," Descartes says in a very inconclusive conclusion, "is that it is possible to say that those propositions indeed which are immediately deduced from first principles are known now by intuition, now by deduction, i.e., *in a way that differs according to our point of view*" (HR 1: 8; my italics). Deduction is thus a chain of intuitions not temporally different from intuitions but differing from them only with respect to our vantage point. Then in order to be certain of a chain of deduction one would have to provide for the conservation of the chain of intuitions which comprised it. This conservation may be provided by God. Bernard Williams said that there is a similarity between the idea that God justifies remembered intuitions and the idea of the third meditation that God is needed to conserve *anything* in existence from one moment to the next. But this conservation of intuitions may also be provided by the memory itself. One has to think only that intuitions, which are not necessarily always *present to* the mind, are nonetheless always somewhere (or in some form) *present in* it: "though ideas formerly imprinted are not all constantly in

view, yet in remembrance they are constantly known to be such as have been formerly imprinted, i.e., in view, and taken notice of before by the understanding."

This is Locke's explanation in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (2, chapter 10, "Of Retention"). Memory is thus a species of intellection which can be explained like intuitions, in terms of perception: "to remember is to perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness that it was perceived before" (*Essay*, 1, chapter 4). What is striking about the Lockean view, and in one sense proof of its affinity with the Cartesian approach, is that the answers it provides beg the central questions which memory raises, namely the nature of our knowledge of the past. Locke says, "Without this [consciousness that it was known or perceived before], whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this consciousness of its having been in the mind before being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking" (*Essay*, 1, chapter 4). But what is memory if not a "consciousness of its having been in the mind before"? What Locke needs, and what he does not have, is some way *other than remembering* to distinguish memories from present perceptions. Hence Locke's answer about the past—that we know it by memory ("As when our senses are actually employed about any object, we do now know that it does exist; so by our memory we may be assured that heretofore things that affected our senses have existed" [*Essay*, 4, chapter 11])—is unfounded. Since memory is a form of perception, past experiences must be stored if they are to be known in the way that present perceptions are (i.e., with the certainty of intuitions): "Thus, seeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist; and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will also always be true, *and as long as my memory retains it always an undoubted proposition to me,* that water did exist the 10th of July, 1688" (*Essay*, 4, chapter 11; italics added).[7]

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[7] Cf. Aristotle: "No one would say he was remembering what was present, when it was present, e.g. this white thing when he was seeing it; nor would he say he was remembering the object of his theorizing when he was in fact in the act of theorizing and thinking. Rather he says simply that he is perceiving the one, and exercizing scientific knowledge of the other. But when a person possesses scientific knowledge and perception without actually exercizing them, under these conditions

The Lockean model of memory, which for short I will call the "archive" model, is invented when faced with the need to secure the certainty of knowledge which occurs over time, be it memories of the past or a chain of deductive reasoning. This invention is of course prominent in Locke, and the need for certainty which it meets is clear enough both in Locke and Descartes, but it is anticipated in Augustine's *Confessions*, where (book 10) he calls the memory the "belly of the mind." It is like a "great receptacle," he says, a "large and boundless chamber," in which are stored all the images of his past, available for present recall: "when I speak, the images of all I speak of are present, out of the same treasury of memory; nor would I speak thereof, were the images wanting."[8] It is the *images*, he says, which are stored, meaning that the "archive" is not a physical place but an ideal location, "some inner place which is yet no place":

> whatsoever of these I know [literature, the art of disputing, how many kinds of questions there be], in such manner exists in my memory, as that I have not taken in the image, and left out the thing, or that it should have sounded and passed away like a voice fixed on the ear by that impress, whereby it might be recalled, as if it sounded, when it no longer sounded; or as a smell while it passes and evaporates into air and affects the sense of smell, whence it conveys into the memory an image of itself, which remembering, we renew, or as meat, which verily in the belly hath no taste, and yet in the memory still in a manner tasteth; or as any thing which the body by touch perceiveth, and which when removed from us, the memory still conceives. For those things are not transmitted into the memory, but their images only are with an admirable swiftness caught up, and stored as it were in wondrous cabinets, and thence wonderfully by the act of remembering brought forth. (*Confessions* 10: 160)

What is the motive behind Augustine's description of memory in these terms? I said that for Descartes and Locke it is the need

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he remembers in the one case that he learned or theorized, in the other that he heard, or saw, or something of the kind. For whenever someone is actively engaged in remembering, he always says in his soul in this way that he heard, or perceived, or thought this before" (*De memoria et reminiscentia*, trans. Richard Sorabji [London: Duckworth, 1972], pp. 47–48).

[8] I follow the translation of the *Confessions* by Edward B. Pusey (New York: Macmillan, Collier Books, 1961), p. 159. On the question of storage and retention, I have benefited from Norman Malcolm, *Memory and Mind* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 195–212 ("Retention and Storage").

to certify that knowledge which occurs over time, but for Augustine it is a more general need associated with time, namely to provide for the continuity of experience over time. We need to know that we are connected to our past, and that we can project a future also as ours. Augustine wants to know, for instance, how he can be sure that given actions will have given consequences in the future. His answer is that past experiences are stored in the memory: "There be all which I remember, either on my own experience, or on other's credit. Out of the same store do I myself with the past continually combine fresh and fresh likenesses of things which I have experienced, or, from what I have experienced, have believed: and thence again infer future actions, events, and hopes, and all these again I reflect on, as present. 'I will do this or that,' say I to myself, in that great receptacle of my mind, stored with the images of things so many and so great, 'and this or that will follow' " (p. 159).

You might say that the archive model of memory provides Augustine with a pre-Kantian reply to Hume's scepticism regarding causality. I shall return to the idea that memory, as a record of the past, provides for continuity in experience in my discussion of history in the final section of this essay. For now I want to point out that Augustine is forced to revise this model of memory for a number of reasons. The first is a weak argument that it leaves no place for the concept of forgetfulness: "What, when I name forgetfulness, and withal recognise what I name? whence should I recognise it, did I not remember it? I speak not of the sound of the name, but of the thing which it signifies: which if I had forgotten, I could not recognise what that sound signifies" (p. 164). The second and stronger argument is that it provides no explanation of how we can remember things once forgotten. If memory is the storing of past experiences, then forgetting is the loss of those experiences, and there is no obvious way, once lost, by which they might be retrieved: "But what when the memory itself loses any thing, as falls out when we forget and seek that which we may recollect? Where in the end do we search, but in the memory itself? and there, if one thing be perchance offered instead of another, we reject it, until what we seek meets us; and when it doth, we say 'This is it' " (p. 166).

Augustine's arguments are of a structural and functional sort, although they do have epistemological concerns (e.g., the worry

that we might mistake something else for a lost memory, or would have no basis for deciding whether something once forgotten and now remembered—recovered—was indeed what we had first known). A more direct epistemological argument against the archive model of memory, however, can be based on Wittgenstein's critique of a private-language and his arguments against a private rule.[9]

In the *Brown Book*, Wittgenstein describes the case of a man, A, who shows a sample of a piece of cloth to B, upon which B goes and brings more of the material "from memory."[10] Various possible descriptions of B's actions are offered, all of which are felt to be deficient in some significant way. In one case, B is said to perform the action by "remembering" an image of the sample he had been shown:

> 14a) B has a memory image before his mind's eye when he goes for the material. He alternately looks at the materials and recalls his image. He goes through this process with, say, five of the bolts, in some instances saying to himself, 'Too dark', in some instances saying to himself 'Too light'. At the fifth bolt he stops, says, 'That's it' and takes it from the shelf.

The idea of knowing something by remembering it is here proved by achieving congruence or agreement: B knows which bolt of fabric to choose when he can match the one he sees before him with the memory-image he has in his mind. But if this is so, then B must also know something else, namely what "agreement" is, what it is for one image to "match" another. One could say that he also "remembered" what this meant, but then one would also have to say that B has a memory-image of what "agreement" is, which he could compare to the agreement he found between the fabric before him and his memory-image. Wittgenstein imagines the need for an infinite regression of memory-pictures in order to account for knowledge in this way: "But had he also a picture of this agreement before him, a picture with which he could compare the agreement between the pattern and the bolt to see whether it was the right one? And, on the other hand,

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[9] See Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982).

[10] I cite from the *Brown Book* (1958; rpt. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), according to section number.

couldn't he have been given such a picture? Suppose, e.g., that A wished B to remember that what was wanted was a bolt of fabric exactly like the sample. . . . Couldn't A in this case have given to B an example of the agreement required by giving him two pieces of the same colour (e.g., as a kind of reminder)?" (*Brown Book*, sec. 17).

This objection is substantially similar to the arguments against a "rule for interpreting a rule" familiar from the *Philosophical Investigations*. A rule is like a sign-post (sec. 85) or like an arrow pointing in some direction: would it take another sign, another rule, to tell us how to follow the first one? In order to follow the arrow, does one imagine oneself in need of a rule that says that one follows arrows from tail to head? And another rule which tells us how to follow rules for following rules for following arrows? At one point Wittgenstein says that "any interpretation hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it support" (sec. 198). This sounds sceptical enough, and in the sense that Hume and Kripke call a solution "sceptical," it is. There is no foundational rule for following rules; to that extent, the idea is sceptical. But it is a solution insofar as it suggests that the practice may be justified without recourse to the mental or metaphysical structures on which one may have expected it to rely. Hence Wittgenstein simply says that " 'obeying a rule' is a practice" (sec. 202). So conceived, the idea of "following a rule" leaves nothing there for scepticism to doubt.

Similarly, one cannot "follow a rule" *privately*, a fact which also turns scepticism on its head: "To think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it" (ibid). If this is so, then one cannot "remember privately" (i.e., have an inner store of memories) either; otherwise thinking one was remembering would be the same as remembering. There is no room for scepticism here because memories are no more a source of knowledge than rules are the source of practices. Gilbert Ryle hinted at this in *The Concept of Mind*. Memories, stored in some "receptacle of the mind," are not the content of our knowledge about the past—not because there is no past, but because there can be no "content" of this kind capable of establishing our knowledge of the past. Hence it is better to speak of *remembering* as a practice, as what we say

about the past, rather than of memories as providing knowledge about the past. Ryle said in this connection that recalling is "going over something, not getting to something; it is like recounting, not researching."[11] As I shall discuss in the sections to follow, memory cannot be thought of as a way for finding anything *out*. This is because the ability to remember, like any other practice, is not a source of knowledge and hence reveals no content *to be* found out. Aristotle said, "He who recollects can move on to what follows from the starting point without the help of someone else."[12] That is as good a description of what Wittgenstein means by a "practice," by "following a rule," as one is likely to find.

II

The conclusion to be drawn from the Wittgensteinian critique of memory as a form of "rule-following" behavior is that no memory-archive is capable of meeting the purpose for which it is designed, namely providing certainty about past experiences. To this extent there is a truth in scepticism; it is that our relationship to the past cannot be described in terms of certainty. But there is a further response to this scepticism which is not a sceptical one, one which says that we are in the sceptical predicament only for as long as we think of certainty as paradigmatic of knowledge. If we can abandon this idea, then we might see that the nature of our knowledge of the past is that of a practical rationality, namely, our ability to sustain the form of life that is called "remembering." Like a narrative, our knowledge of the past depends on our ability to "go on."

It may be objected that an account of knowledge and memory in terms of rationality is inadequate insofar as one could not, on this basis, distinguish the activities of a human from the operations of a machine. I imagine an objection which runs something like this: "Say all you want about rationality and about the ability to 'go on' or 'follow a rule', but there is something which a human being *has*, not something he *does*, which is called knowledge. No

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[11] Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), p. 275.

[12] *De memoria et reminiscentia*, trans. Sorabji, p. 55.

machine could ever have knowledge, no matter what it does, and yet from what you say no one could tell a human being from a computer; in fact my computer would more likely meet your criteria for rationality than some humans: it has a perfect memory and follows rules flawlessly." From what I have said so far this is doubtless true, although not because of anything I have said about humans but simply because machines, according to these criteria, are rational, too.[13] I would not, however, accept the charge that human behavior must be described in terms of knowledge, and not rationality. As I want to explain here, one further reason for rejecting the archive model of memory is that it, and the concepts it invokes, are sources of the idea that human knowledge amounts to something *more* than a rational way of dealing with the world, that knowledge is an essential rather than a practical human capacity.

If I understand the sense of the above objection, it is not directly motivated by worries of an actual inability to tell humans from machines. Rather, the fear is of the loss of certain concepts, or of the usefulness of certain concepts, by which we distinguish the human as such. In general this is a fear of fraudulence, and the characteristic demand associated with it is that of *authenticity.* Nakedly stated, this concept is vague, so I shall try to explicate it more precisely in what follows. We are suspicious of machines and, as I have intimated, of archival memories, because they somehow have it all "there inside from the start," all possible future configurations "symbolized" in some present state, as Wittgenstein said in the *Philosophical Investigations* (sec. 193–94). For this reason they suggest a possibility of fraudulence. While we may be willing to say that machines are rational (indeed, that they are the very epitome of rationality, emblems of it), we are reluctant to say that machines have knowledge: whatever "knowledge" they might have would have to be fraudulent, imitation, fake. Calligraphers are taught to make all the different strokes of the pen in a single motion, in order to demonstrate all the possibilities of the pen. The pen is a machine which the callig-

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[13] The converse of this has been seen as at the root of contemporary irrationalism. As Stanley Rosen put it, it is the conception that "Reason is a machine or machine-like; ultimately, a stultifying poem or human creation." *Nihilism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. xv.

rapher is, as it were, putting through its paces. The calligrapher knows a certain repertoire of pen-strokes, which he is able to make "from memory"; but no one would, I think, want to say that the pen in this case "knows" anything at all.

We are unwilling to say, in other words, that just *any* form of (consistent and coherent) "going on," however rational, will count as knowledge. What is lacking for us to say that machines have knowledge is not any further demonstration of rationality; indeed, that is what the idea of a machine which "has it all there in it from the start" is, like the memory-archive, designed to provide. What is lacking is authentication, and yet the problem with knowledge, as much of Wittgenstein's later writing bears out, is that there are no established criteria for authentication as there are for certainty. But this is not a failing of knowledge, only a consequence of the fact that authenticity is not a type or degree of knowledge, but a relationship to what is known. That is why Wittgenstein presents so many of his examples of knowledge as parables of *learning.* A child is instructed to do something, perhaps arrange colored blocks in order of darkness, or to "add three" to a preceding number. A sign of his rationality will be his ability to continue the practice consistently and coherently (i.e., to "go on" following the rule). But what makes this child's ability different from the rationality of a machine—which may also be configured to "add three" to a preceding number or to arrange blocks by color—is that at some point he is able to go on *on his own.* This is a sign that his relationship to the practice has changed. It is not so much a matter of having learned a new fact of knowledge as a new modality or inflection of it. And that might be taken as a sign of the advancement of knowledge, as evidence of intellectual maturity (which in turn may be a useful description of the difference between humans and machines—that they are divided by an unbridgeable gap of maturity). Then to achieve fully authentic knowledge will require reaching full maturity, which is to say *adulthood.* In Augustine's *Confessions,* the advancement to maturity is a spiritual achievement; it is marked by a change of heart, a Christian "turning," and is seen to require a new relationship to the past. The purpose of remembering the past is not to repeat it, go over it again, but to overcome it; as Nietzsche will later say, the importance of remembering is learning how to forget.

But why are there no criteria which can determine authenticity? It may be felt that criteria, at least as Wittgenstein understands them, are public standards of assessment while authenticity is a private matter, something between me and what I know. Why, then, is there such insistence on the public acknowledgment of any claims to authenticity? Why must Raskolnikov kiss the earth in Haymarket Square? Clearly this is a sign of his changed relationship to certain facts (his responsibility for the murders)—facts about the past which he always knew; but now he remembers those facts, and to authenticate this he acknowledges it in public. Acknowledgment, though not a criterion for authenticity, is certainly evidence of it, and evidence is by definition public. (So the confession, which is a natural mode of authentication, is not, like the diary, a private genre; a confession is either made before someone—even if that someone is only myself—or it is not made at all.) What determines what I know, in the mode of a confession, is as much a fact about me as about my relationship to my audience, who bears witness to me. If there are no criteria for the authentication of knowledge, this is not because that process is private, but because there can be no way to predict its (public) occasions.

The idea of a machine memory (or of a memory-machine, like the archive) as inauthentic can be taken as indicative of a certain defect in the relationship between what it "knows" (the totality of facts which are conserved in it) and its present state. What is lacking is the ability to show that while there may be a connection between the memory or the machine and its present state (e.g., a connection of causality) this is not a necessary connection, i.e., that its present state is determined but not fully determined by those facts, or in another formulation, that it is not *pre*determined by them. What is required, then, as a sign of authenticity, is not faithfulness to the facts but demonstrated freedom or creativity in (re)telling them. That may take the form of improvisation, the concept of which is something "determined but not fully determined," or determined within a certain range. A somewhat older but kindred word for this is "invention," in the musical or rhetorical sense: finding, rather than finding something *out*.

It can easily enough be seen that the ability to invent or improvise becomes increasingly difficult as our relationship to the past is determined by inscribed texts, or by what I have called the

idea of an archive. That there are points in the history of cultures when memories begin to be transmitted primarily by the reproduction of their inscriptions, rather than by "live" telling, is a fact which may be useful for distinguishing, say, the "oral-formulaic" quality of the epic and other "traditional" forms of narrative from the novel as a form of collective remembering.[14] The transmission of a novel consists largely in the private, as opposed to the public, reading of it.[15] When the novel begins, in Cervantes' *Don Quixote,* it shows itself aware of these facts in a number of ways. There are episodes of reading aloud (the tale of the "One Who Was Too Curious for His Own Good," for example) which serve as reminders that the practice of public reading survived the invention of the novel, although in a much diminished form. But the fact that narration in the novel is embedded in writing, hence that it is fixed, significantly alters its vision of remembering as a form of commemoration of the past. Don Quixote longs to be remembered for his chivalrous deeds, as the epic hero would be "remembered" by the ancient bard, but he looks forward to the day when his adventures will be written down. What he does not anticipate is that this form of commemoration opens the possibility of fraudulence, a possibility which was in fact realized with the appearance of a "false *Quixote*" in the years between part 1 and part 2 of Cervantes' novel.

When the transmission of stories is no longer open to improvisation or invention, and when their reception is no longer the occasion of a live telling, the feeling is that the narration of a story may no longer be an authentic form of remembering. Then the telling of stories is directly exposed to the possibility of fraudulence. Since novels are not what Nelson Goodman would call "autographic" at the stage of reproduction, the worry is not that this copy of a text may be forged, but that narration itself may be a fraudulent form of remembering.[16] Borges tells a story, "Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote,*" in which Pierre Menard

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[14] I mean "traditional" in the technical sense, in reference to oral transmission.

[15] Ian Watt has explored some of these matters in *The Rise of the Novel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).

[16] Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), pp. 113-20.

rewrites Cervantes' novel, producing a text said to be word-for-word the same as Cervantes' version and yet "infinitely richer." Arthur Danto said that this is not the case of an imitation of Cervantes' novel, or of a quotation, repetition, or forgery of it: the worry is not that this text may be faked but that a culture of written texts may have no criteria for determining their authenticity.[17]

One could explain Borges's purpose as but one instance of the more general, and generally modernist, charge, that culture or culture in one of its modes has become "exhausted," a word I take from novelist John Barth.[18] Exhaustion is another description for what Wittgenstein meant about the machine—that it has it all *already* in it. But modernist art can, and does, go on cultivating the new, despite its claims that all the metaphors, myths, and plots have already been used. The problem is not that the new is really only a version of the old; if that were so then one would only have to add that what has been used is not necessarily used *up*; the trouble, as I have said, is that we have lost our criteria for determining fraudulence and authenticity. Some would say that the modernist threat of fraudulence is meant to call into question the usefulness of a criterion of "authenticity" for distinguishing what is to count as art by questioning the possibility of art. But the idea of "questioning the possibility of art," like that of "exploring the possibility of a medium of art," is itself a modernist term of criticism; it overlooks the simpler but crucial fact that modernist art does not repudiate art or the demand for authenticity but rather makes the question of its authenticity, and the possibility of its fraudulence, the very point of its existence. Such developments can be said to have shown us new regions of these concepts to be explored, rather than to have precluded further exploration of them.

There is one description which fits the relationship of Pierre Menard's *Quixote* to Cervantes' novel: it is a performance of it. The conditions of performance satisfy the need to account for the

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[17] Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 33–34.

[18] Barth, "The Literature of Exhaustion," *Atlantic Monthly*, 220 (August, 1967): 29–34; cf. "The Literature of Replenishment," ibid. (January, 1980): 65–71.

phenomena which Danto saw as at stake here, namely the changed relationship between the (word-for-word identical) *Quixote* and its two contexts, the world surrounding it in Cervantes' and Menard's versions. But this fact about Menard's *Quixote*—that it is a performance of Cervantes' text—is all but transparent, since writing is a silent, and private, performance. It is a performance which could only be detected by the x-ray vision of a philosophical approach, but then the dependence of art on the theorizing and philosophizing which surrounds it is itself a very modernist phenomenon.

I have said that where narration is transmitted solely by means of the reproduction of inscribed texts the telling is not "live"; but I have also said that Menard's *Quixote* is a *performance* of Cervantes' text. This apparent contradiction only requires the clarification that *Borges's* narration is not a performance, that he only *tells of* one in describing Pierre Menard's *Quixote*. One could say that narrative never really loses its capacity for performance, though, even when it comes to rely on inscription; the performative function is simply separated from the functions of production (composition) and transmission. The printer of the *Quixote*, who is responsible for the transmission of the text, is not performing anything, whereas an epic bard both performs and transmits. The composition of a novel is distinct from both narration and transmission, but for a bard the occasion of performance is also an occasion of composition. In *Don Quixote* and in a long tradition following its example, the novel shows itself aware of the fact that it is not just *any* form of narration, but that it is a book, that it is not just written but printed, manufactured. Diderot acknowledges this in *Jacques the Fatalist and His Master*, and it is largely the point of Don Quixote's and Sancho's visit to the print shop in Barcelona.[19]

A narrative which is transmitted and received by means of inscriptions is unalterably fixed, the process of its composition closed, yet it may still contain a performative dimension, independent of its (re)production. But performance here is no longer "live"; it is rather the performance of a fictional narrator, not an

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[19] See Barbara Herrnstein Smith, *On The Margins of Discourse* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 31.

author-producer, and it shows up as self-conscious narration. Beginning with the *Quixote*, there is a long tradition of self-conscious, performing novelistic narrators. All preserve the idea that narration is originally and inherently a performative mode open to improvisation and invention, in short, that narrative is fixed in, but not bound by, inscription. In the *Quixote*, Cervantes' narrator insists that the account which he has transmitted is the translation of an Arabic history, but we never see or read that history, and he claims to be editing it in the process of retelling it. The narrator in Diderot's *Jacques the Fatalist* intervenes to say that his account is, at various points, open to a variety of possibilities. His purpose is to preserve the sense that narration offers the opportunity for improvisation, that it has a certain freedom within a certain range, so that while it may be determined it is not, as I have said, *pre*determined.

The idea of determinism is not, at least in Diderot's case, necessarily that of something in the past determining something in the future. Indeed, it is not clear whether the Great Scroll to which Jacques so often refers is *already* written or is now *being written*.[20] The idea is rather that an event (without stipulation of time, or of time's direction) is somehow *necessary*. The "fatalism" of Diderot's Jacques, against which the narrator asserts his "freedom," begins from the premise of logical determinism that if something is true it is also necessary, and it moves to the (implicit) claim that if something is *written* it is necessary.[21] By a specious argument which I borrow from Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker for the occasion, one could say that this is because an inscription is something a priori of the highest improbability: simply for it to be such a highly structured object, to have organized information in such a way, it could not have come about by mere chance; the suggestion is that an inscribed organization of information is thus also necessary.[22] In the following pages I will explain how and

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[20] See Robert Champigny, *Ontology of the Narrative* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), pp. 91–95.

[21] See Arthur Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 188. Danto makes specific reference to Diderot in this context.

[22] Von Weizsäcker, "The Second Law and the Difference Between Past and Future," in *The Unity of Nature*, trans. Francis J. Zucker (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1980), pp. 142–43.

why this argument is wrongheaded, but it is enough to point out here that it might serve to explain Diderot's Great Scroll. Jacques thinks that he could circumvent necessity if he could only "disorganize" the Scroll: " 'Savez-vous, monsieur, quelque moyen d'effacer cette écriture?' "

In both Cervantes and Diderot, the presence of a performing narrator who intimates that he may be improvising is a suggestion that the formal continuity of the story, its "ongoingness," is not only consistent and coherent, but also *open*. What does this claim to openness mean? If what I have said about the fear of fraudulence can be granted, then this openness is an implicit suggestion of authenticity. And if that authenticity is to be realized, it is necessary not only to "go on" openly, but to go on on one's own, without reliance on the "script," free of any dependence on stored information. What remains to be seen is how in proceeding without reliance on an archival store of information, one can still be sure of continuity at all—be sure, e.g., that a future is connected to a past. As I shall explain for the specific case of history, the idea of connexity in experience is necessary if one is to speak of such things as "experience" (or in a more Wittgensteinian vocabulary, of "going on") at all. One might put this in other words by saying that in clearing free of determinism, one need not reject the idea that what we do is in fact determined by what we, or others, have done.

III

A more or less contemporary version of the psychological model of memory as the "conservation of information" (Piaget) raises a number of questions about our relationship to the past, in particular problems of history. These arise whether one thinks of information as experiences directly impressed and conserved in memory or whether one thinks of information as in-forming, and of memory as the conservation of forms, as in Piaget's model of the conservation of structural schemata.[23] I have already said something about one of these problems—determinism—in connec-

[23] Piaget, *Biology and Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

tion with Diderot. Wanting to free himself of biological determinism, Piaget says that "one can only use the term 'memory' where information from an external source is conserved (otherwise anything to do with heredity would be mixed up in memory)" (p. 185). But historical determinism remains a specter for as long as our relationship to the past is seen as a function of conserved "information." Here, information is taken to be a measure of form, a fixed inscription being highly formed; it carries maximum "information." If history is taken only in the most general sense as "what happens," then anything that happens and is also inscribed (i.e., is "conserved information") appears necessary because such instances of high information could not happen by "mere chance." But as I said earlier, this argument is specious. The surface flaw is obvious enough: it associates the probability of the occurrence of an object with the truth content of that object. This is not inconsistent with the concept of "information" that it invokes. What is specious about the argument is the conception of "information" itself, as well as the inference that our knowledge of the past is in fact "information," a measure of form. Those are the assumptions, I have been saying, that are at fault in the various versions of the "archive" model of memory.

What may not be entirely clear, however, is how a Wittgensteinian model of remembering as a rational practice, such as I have been describing, could account for history at all. In this final section I want to say something about the possibility of history, given these views of memory, and, in particular, about the usefulness of Wittgenstein to explain a "nonpsychology past." These are matters worthy of some attention because it has been thought that Wittgenstein's methods, themselves so unhistorical, are also ahistorical at heart. John William Miller said of the methods of "logical grammar" which Wittgenstein uses in order to discriminate objects or concepts that "such procedures do not include the humanities or the historical past. They show one how one changes opinions about particular things, but not how one changes one's general orientation. That cannot be done by a closer discrimination of particular objects."[24] The assumption

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[24] Miller, *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 96-97.

here is that historical knowledge is qualitatively different from Wittgensteinian "grammar." It is said that children have a knowledge of facts and logical grammar ("Children pick up much information of this simple sort and may show surprising knowledge of autos, baseball records, the place to look for frogs, the hermit thrush, or the lady's slipper." [p. 97]) but that historical knowledge, and humanistic concerns, are for the age and moods of the adult. It has also been said that history is a "late product" of man as such. If so, then Wittgensteinian grammar must be for the child in us. But given the cultural climate and age in which Wittgenstein wrote, the studied avoidance of "dialectics" and "metaphysics" (also in this sense "late" products of man) should be thought of as an expression of hope that, while historical, we are not like the men Nietzsche described as "born with grey hair."[25]

What one might call, after Wittgenstein, "historical grammar" is what can or cannot be said about the nonpsychology past. While our relationship to this past may take the form of remembering, it is not determined by memory. In fact, the "grammatical" model can provide a more convincing explanation of history than the memory model can. If our relationship to the past is through a memory-archive, then it is impossible to account for the place or position of the individual in history: the individual simply has not experienced, hence has no memory of, events beyond his own life. Indeed, the memory model also makes problematical the idea of an individual having a life-history at all, by tacitly assuming that his psychological history is the same as the history of his life. These two—the *individual in* history and the *history of* the individual—must be kept clearly apart, but the memory-archive model gains access to an idea of history through their conflation, by arguing, for instance, that since I can only remember the experiences of my life, then history must be the history of my life.[26] Of course, the argument is not made as crudely as this, but this is the implication of a vision which sees the psychological subject as the subject of the "story" of history. There is nothing which says that history has a subject at all.

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[25] I follow the translation of Peter Preuss, *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), p. 44.

[26] See Roy Schafer, "Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue," *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1980): 29–53, for a lucid discussion of related questions.

Consider in this regard the account given in book 10 of Augustine's *Confessions*. Attempting to provide for the simple continuity of past, present, and future, Augustine says, "Out of the same store [of memories] do I myself with the past continually combine fresh and fresh likenesses of things which I have experienced . . . and thence infer future actions, events, and hopes, and all these again I reflect on, as present. 'I will do this or that . . . and this or that will follow' " (p. 159). I have already cited this passage in its larger context but I refer to it again to point out the key elements which Augustine sees as sustaining the connexity of experience over time. The present is connected to the future in the form of pre-diction (though not predetermination), and the past is connected to the present by a storehouse of memories; both of these relationships are secured, and the unity of the whole is provided, by what he calls "reflection," which takes place in a timeless present ("all these again I reflect on, as present"). In this way, Augustine can be sure that his past is in fact his, that he can project a future course of actions also as his, as connected to his past. (These are the facts that phenomenology knew so well how to say.) But the model cannot be extended, without the confusions mentioned above, to account for the possibility of history as such, i.e., as independent of my experience.[27]

By "accounting for the possibility of history" I mean the need to explain a relationship between the present (and my position in the present) and the past, where the present is determined but not *pre*determined by the past. Following Wittgenstein, one may call this a "grammatical" relationship. It means that there are prior constraints, not on what I may do, but on what I may call what I do. I can for instance set sail from Europe bound for the Far East and find America in my way, but nothing I do will count as my having discovered America; that is a description which, for reasons of history, I cannot give to what I may do. Or I can reason from certain mathematical and scientific propositions to $E = mc^2$, but nothing I do will count as, or may be called, my having discovered the theory of relativity. The more familiar question raised in this regard concerns the status of scientific theories, and

[27] I should add that I do not mean to imply that Augustine was attempting to account for history. Still, the objection stands.

whether these are objectively true or valid only in relation to historical communities. Anyone who follows Wittgenstein will be inclined to say the latter, but unless one also says that history is not "subjective," then it becomes difficult to distinguish that position from historical relativism, which so easily slides into nihilism. I can do experiments, draw schematic diagrams, propose conclusions, and so on, but no chemistry I do today will count—as chemistry, as science—if in doing it I insist that phlogiston exists. That there are *only* certain things which can fit certain descriptions, and that there are certain things which *cannot* fit certain descriptions, are facts of the logical grammar of history. This is a "grammar" in which my language conforms to the world in the way that there is a conformity of "inner" and "outer" sense for Kant.

A more formal and theoretical account of what can and cannot be said, in this historical sense, is given by Michel Foucault in his description of the "historical a priori" and the "rarity of statements" which he elaborates in terms of the "Archive."[28] This term is infelicitous, from my point of view, because Foucault means by it anything *but* what I have called the "archive." "The archive," he says, "is not that which . . . safeguards the event of the statement, and preserves, for future memories, its status as an escape; it is that which, at the very root of the statement-event, and in that which embodies it, defines at the outset the *system of its enunciability*" (p. 129). This is, in other words, a "condition of reality for statements" (p. 127), which is to say not a condition by which they represent reality, but a condition for them to be (to count as) statements at all. As he puts it in another place, it is the "law of what can be said" (p. 129), where what can*not* be said is what Wittgenstein would call speech "outside of language-games." I pick up this description in particular because the concept of "law" corresponds roughly to the Wittgensteinian idea of a grammatical "rule" and, together with that idea, preserves the concept of "necessity" or "order." This is an order which conforms to the grammar of "language," to what can or cannot be said. Foucault calls this "discourse," a function for which Wittgenstein reserves the term "language-game."

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[28] Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), pp. 126–31.

The idea of "going on" by invention or improvisation, following but not bound by "laws" or "rules," frees one from historical determinism, but it remains to be said that these laws or rules determine the rationality of that process; without laws there would be no history but only "nonsense" or "noise," a cacophony of discrete events. But most philosophical models mix rationality with the idea of Reason and Reason with teleology and totalization, and so do not admit that there can still be something like "history" even where there are discontinuities, ruptures, and breaks. One thinks of Hegel and the process he describes as Spirit returning to itself in a totalizing procession of historical cultures and individuals. The process is totalizing because the progress of Spirit ("going on") is the work of recollection, the self-incorporating process of remembering—thus a "going on" which is also a "going back."

Making obvious allusions to Hegel, although not discussing history per se, Kierkegaard described a different way of "going on," which he called "repetition" and which he explained as "forward recollection." There are reasons to link "repetition" and Wittgenstein's concept of a "rule," which is based on our ability to perceive the "same." In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein says that "The use of the word 'rule' and the use of the word 'same' are interwoven" (sec. 225); in order for there to be such a thing as a "rule" there must exist the "same."[29] (How different, then, one remarks, is Wittgenstein from Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, who will not grant the existence of the "same." But one must also add that in Wittgenstein one is not bound by adherence to the "same"; one need only know that it exists in order to "go on" with a practice or continue "following a rule.") Kierkegaard finds in repetition both the possibility of history and grounds for rejecting the "archive" model of memory on which it might be based. Repetition provides for the minimal connexity necessary for the concept of "history" to make sense at all. Without repetition, he says, life would simply be "a tablet on which time writes something new every instant," which is to say that every event would be *sui generis*, absolutely new, unconnected

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[29] See Kripke, *Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language*, who provides some further discussion of this.

to any preceding event and hence to any historical past. Without repetition there would be no past. For the same reason, and in the same passage, he says that this tablet would be a "memorial volume of the past," an inert and senseless archive, which is to say, something destructive of the past.[30]

Nietzsche similarly railed against our having "monumentalized" the past in *The Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life.* Picking up Nietzsche's theme, Foucault described this as the condition of our having "memorized" the past, our having transformed it into a document. (See *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* p. 7: "History, in its traditional form, undertook to 'memorize' the *monuments* of the past, transform them into *documents,* and lend speech to those traces which, in themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in silence something other than what they actually say; in our time, history is that which transforms *documents* into *monuments.*") Nietzsche described the case of a man who wanted to "feel everything historically," but the burden of such a complete, monumental, memory of the past is so great that the man is unable to sleep. That is one image of what it might be like to be so bound by memory that one could no longer "go on"; it is taken up by Borges in his story of Funes, the man with total recall, and more directly with reference to history in García Márquez' *One Hundred Years of Solitude,* where a plague of insomnia is visited on the town of Macondo. Nietzsche's solution to the problem was to say that what we need, if history is to be useful for going on with life, is not just to remember, but to remember how to forget. Here Nietzsche's advocacy of the will to power (e.g., choosing what to remember, and how, and also choosing what to forget) sets itself up as the ground of hope that history would be unpredictable, hence that it would be undetermined by anything except the creativity of those involved in remembering it.

These were Nietzsche's ways of ensuring that our historical continuity would not itself be perpetuated fraudulently; hence they were his guarantees of authenticity. Is it not a danger, though, that in learning how to "forget" we may lose the concept of history itself? Yet we need not necessarily think of ourselves as having

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[30] Kierkegaard, *Repetition,* trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 131.

been born late, as fulfilling Hesiod's prophecy—having been born with grey hair—in order to preserve the idea of a connection to the past. For that we need only think of ourselves "genealogically," as ancestors of ourselves. To insist on familiar concepts once again, our historical continuity is determined in just the way that a genealogy is determined: who we are depends on who we, as a species, were; but it is not *pre*determined in the sense that it has no finality which might be summarized in advance. You might say that history is then a "finding" (to recall the concept of invention once again) in which there is no finding anything *out*. This is not because history is illusory or nihilistic but because there is nothing there, behind or beyond our historical continuity, *to be* found out.

What can be said of our ability to follow rules or to "go on," as Wittgenstein used those terms to refer to local practices, can also be said of our collective practices over time. To say that we can, and do, "go on" in the historical sense does not ask for a deeper content or mechanism to explain that continuity. It is simply a description of the fact that there can be such a thing as history, the perpetuation of human practices, at all. To say that human history is a form of "rule-following behavior" or of "on-goingness" over (historical) time is already to explain whatever there is of history, as an idea, which might stand in need of account. History itself has no content of collective memories and is not an archive of the past, yet one may still speak of history as a practice, as what we do in the way of remembering (and also forgetting) the past.[31]

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[31] For a contrasting examination of many of the issues I have raised, see Edward S. Casey, "Keeping the Past in Mind," *Review of Metaphysics* 37 (1983): 77-95.