

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AUTHOR OF
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εἰδότες σὖν τὸν φόβυν τοῦ Κυρίου
ἀνθρώπους πείθομεν.—2 Cor. v. 11.

LONDON
BASIL MONTAGU PICKERING
196 PICCADILLY
1876

Recordare, Jesu pie,
Quod sum causa Tuæ viæ ;
Ne me perdas illa die.

Quærens me sedisti lassus ;
Redemisti Crucem passus ;
Tantus labor non sit cassus.

Juste Judex ultionis,
Donum fac remissionis
Ante diem rationis.

. . . .

Preces meæ non sunt dignæ ;
Sed Tu bonus fac benigne,
Ne perenni creme, igne.

Sequent. in Missis Defunc

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE, M.P., ETC., ETC.,

WHO

IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION, INDIFFERENCE, AND UNBELIEF

HAS SHOWN, NOT BY WORD BUT EXAMPLE,

THAT THE HIGHEST QUALITIES OF STATESMANSHIP

ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH

THE HUMBLEST GRACES OF

CHRISTIAN MANLINESS, REVERENCE, AND SIMPLICITY,

This Volume

IS WITH HIS PERMISSION

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.

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PREFACE.

The following essay is reprinted with several corrections and additions and a new Preface from the *Contemporary Review*, where it appeared in consecutive articles during the first four months of the present year, under a somewhat different title, substituted for that which had been originally chosen and is now restored.* In presenting to the public in a separate

* Since the above was written, the appearance of Professor Mayor's "Reply" to my articles, in the current number of the *C. R.* (May 1876) leads me to add a word here as to the change of title. He could scarcely have ventured to twit me, as he does repeatedly in the course of his paper, with the phrase, "eternal perdition"—which he says I "handle, as an x or a y," but which in fact I have not used at all and dislike quite as much as he can—had he seen a letter of mine published in the *Spectator* of Jan. 15, the principal paragraph of which I think it better, for more reasons than one, to reprint here:

"The phrase you quote from the title [viz. 'eternal perdition'] is not of my selection. I had simply entitled the paper, 'Catholic Eschatology and Universalism,' which was altered by the editor, after it had passed out of my control, on grounds which appeared to him sufficient, to 'Eternal Perdition and Universalism, from a Roman Catholic Point of View.' I regret the change of title myself, and fear that the latter part of it especially may give rise to misconceptions, for when I come to examine the authority for the doctrine of eternal punishment, I have purposely avoided discussing it from an exclusively 'Roman Catholic point of view,' for the obvious reason that among Roman Catholics, as such, there is no question on the subject, and my argument is of course primarily addressed to those who entertain doubts or objections, not to those who have none."

form (in accordance with suggestions addressed to me from various quarters) this contribution to a question of such vast scope and momentous interest, and which has of late years been keenly controverted from very opposite points of view, I do not profess to have done more than note the salient points of an argument which might be indefinitely extended. But I am not aware that anything essential to the discussion has been overlooked. The objections urged against any particular Christian doctrine must necessarily fall under one or more heads of a threefold division of testimony, Scriptural, ecclesiastical, and rational. The doctrine of eternal punishment has been assailed on all three grounds, though it may safely be affirmed that nobody would have questioned the evidence of Scripture and Tradition on the subject, who had not a preconceived theory or impression to support. As a

In fact the change of title was made at the last moment by the editor of the *C. R.* without my knowledge or consent, and on becoming aware of it I wrote at once to protest against it, as being (not of course in his intention, but in itself,) invidious and misleading, but the Review was already out, and it was too late to make any correction. Subsequent experience has too abundantly proved that my anticipations were just, and the latest proof is supplied by the use Prof. Mayor has made of the alteration. I am indeed rather surprised that the editor did not think it right under the circumstances to insert a note explaining the mistake into which his contributor had been betrayed, and of which he has taken in more ways than one such ample controversial advantage.

matter of fact no unbeliever entertains any doubt as to what both the Church and the Bible teach about the future punishment of the impenitent, however bitterly he may rail against their teaching; it has been reserved for Christians who wish to reject it, without abandoning their belief in Revelation, to throw dust in other peoples' eyes as well as their own by obscuring what is really a very simple matter with ingenious—though, it may be, unconscious—sophistries, instead of being content, to use Butler's language, with "the plain, obvious, first appearances of things." But even far fetched and artificial objections, when alleged or accepted in good faith, require to be answered, and there can be no doubt that some at least of the objectors are thoroughly in earnest here. And thus it becomes necessary to prove in detail, as it has been vehemenently disputed, that the *prima facie* sense of Scripture and Tradition on the subject is also the true one.

And if it is always wiser to face an objection than to ignore it, there are special reasons for dealing carefully and considerately with the difficulties felt by many excellent persons in receiving the revealed doctrine on the future state of the lost. It has been too often strangely misrepresented by its advocates as well as its assailants, and in this country at all events the main strength of Universalism, so far as it appeals

to Christian believers, lies in popular misconceptions of the truth impugned. What is called orthodox Protestantism has clung with a singular tenacity to the doctrine of eternal punishment, which forms, if I am not mistaken, one of nine articles of faith, constituting the bond of union of the Evangelical Alliance. But Protestants have been apt virtually, though not formally, to associate or even to confound the doctrine with various parasitical accretions of opinion, about the number of the lost, the condition of the heathen world, and the like, which are often as startling and repulsive as they are destitute of any reasonable or authoritative basis. One large section of Protestants has still further compromised the doctrine by identifying it with the immoral heresy of Calvinism, while the great majority of them have done their best to render it incredible by rejecting the complementary truths of Purgatory and prayer for the departed.

There is a story told of a heathen convert in bygone days, who paused in the very act of receiving baptism to inquire what had become of his relations and ancestors who had died without hearing of the Gospel. "They are all in hell," was the reply. "Then," he answered, "I will share their fate." The story may be apocryphal, but it conveys a moral bearing directly on the question before us. To overlay a revealed truth with the arbitrary interpretations of human opinion

or human passion is the surest way to provoke its entire rejection. Just as the Lutheran tenet of justification produced, by an inevitable recoil, the Socinian denial of the Trinity and the Atonement, the crude and narrow eschatology of the Reformers is chiefly responsible for the later outgrowth of Universalism. There is of course a class of Universalists in the nineteenth century, as St. Chrysostom tells us there was in the fourth, probably much the largest class, who need no arguments about the meaning of Scripture but a conviction of the reality of sin. But for the sake of those who shrink in honest doubt from a doctrine which shocks their intellect or conscience, we are bound in charity to explain what it is not, before urging them to accept it as it is. In this case, as so often happens, it may turn out that the real object of their dread or aversion is, not the truth they ignorantly assail, but a caricature of it. That truth indeed, after it is cleared of all exaggerations and misconceptions, remains an unspeakably awful one. God forbid that I should belie the most solemn utterances of our Lord Himself by saying one syllable to detract from its inherent awfulness. But still it behoves us to present His revelation to the mind of the inquirer denuded of all human glosses, whether false or only doubtful, in its divine simplicity, as He has committed it to His Church.

We are often told that the doctrine of eternal pun-

ishment is alienating thoughtful and religious minds from Christianity, and that we must be content to keep silence about it, or surrender it altogether, if we wish to retain their allegiance. As to the policy of silence I have spoken more than once in the course of this essay, and nothing need be added here. But when we are gravely recommended to throw overboard one doctrine, as the safest or sole condition of securing belief in the remainder, the first and most essential question to be asked is whether this is or is not one of the truths included in the Christian Revelation. If not, *cadit quæstio*; if it is, it cannot be sacrificed without virtually sacrificing all the rest. Other truths may or may not be still retained, as portions of our speculative belief, but they are held thenceforth as matters of human opinion, not of divine faith; the principle of authority is gone. And in the next place I should like to know how many of those who are clamorous for the suppression of this doctrine, would be content with the surrender of one article only of our belief. As a rule they openly demand, like Mr. Greg, whose words are quoted further on, the abandonment of a great deal more, and on their own principles they are only consistent in so doing. There is something very suspicious about this offer of a conditional submission, if one obnoxious tenet is thrown overboard, like Jonah, to appease the storm; *timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*

At the same time it is but fair to remember, as has been already pointed out, how largely they are responsible for this new revolt against Christian teaching who make void the word of God through the human traditions of the sixteenth century. The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and their children's teeth are set on edge. But to ask us to abandon the revealed truth of eternal punishment, because Protestant perversions have rendered it well nigh incredible, is like asking us to deny the Atonement because the Lutheran heresy has gone far to identify it with Antinomianism. We cannot burn down the house to roast the pig. A modern American Universalist, who inveighs fiercely against the doctrine, frankly assures us that we must be prepared to abandon with it the "whole redemption-plan," including the Incarnation, the Atonement, the bodily resurrection, and "the grand climacteric of the Church scheme," the General Judgment.* In short we must begin by making a holocaust of our Bibles and our Creeds.†

* Alger's *Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future State*, p. 518.

† The reprint of this Essay was already in type before my attention was called to Dr. Angus's *Three Letters on Future Punishment*, through the courtesy of the author in sending me a copy of the volume. It is a satisfaction to me to find that a writer, whose position differs in some respects widely from mine, has arrived by his own method at conclusions substantially identical with mine as to the bearing of the evidence from Scripture,

It must further be remembered that what has been often remarked of religious truth generally applies with peculiar force to such portions of it as more directly offend the pride or cross the passions of human nature. It is a trite observation enough, but one very apt to be practically overlooked, that the argument for God and holiness is, so to speak, always heavily handicapped, in its appeal to a race of beings who, if Christianity be true, are in a fallen and abnormal state, and whom we may at all events know, without the aid of revelation, to be in a condition far from perfect. The Christian cause is sure, *cæteris paribus*, to appear the weaker in its appeal to a judge who is, however unconsciously, biassed against it. And men recoil with an unerring instinct from any teaching which menaces in the issue their freedom whether of action or of thought. When then the verdict of an "enlightened conscience" is urged against such doctrines as

Tradition, and Reason, though he naturally devotes himself more exclusively than I have done to the consideration of the Scriptural argument. And he has handled it with just that thoroughness, *distinctness*, and grasp of his subject, which one is left to desiderate in the eloquent but vague and unsatisfactory comments of such writers as Mr. Baldwin Brown; while his breadth of view—as exemplified *e.g.* in his reference to the condition of the heathen world—is as refreshing as it is rare in orthodox Protestant theology. I will only call attention here to his searching exposure of the stock argument for Annihilationism—which is, indeed, simply audacious in its ignorance or perversity—from the Scriptural use of such terms as "death" and "destruction."

that of eternal punishment, one rightly desiderates some evidence that an enlightened conscience is not in this case a polite *alias* for interested self-will. That the will does materially affect our intellectual judgments on moral and religious questions, is abundantly certain; were it otherwise, there would be no more moral guilt in heresy than in an erroneous estimate of the properties of an isosceles triangle. And hence the Apostle warns us against "an evil *heart* of unbelief," and our Lord promises that those who *do His will* shall know whether His teaching is from God. And exactly in proportion as those divine warnings and counsels are neglected, does the light that is in a man become darkness, until conscience itself is gradually tortured, as with Balaam, into the lying echo of a perverted will.

I have dwelt elsewhere (in chap. I.) on the internal coherence of the Christian Revelation, which makes it impossible to treat its separate portions as so many isolated truths, any one of which may be dropped out of the system without prejudice to the remainder. Even a human philosophy which lacked this note of consistency would have no claim on our attention. An incoherent system may contain, as false philosophies and theologies often do contain, many scattered elements of truth, but as a system, it is self-condemned. Much more is such a defect absolutely fatal to the

pretensions of what claims to be a divine revelation. Internal harmony is an essential characteristic of that wisdom which proceeds out of the mouth of the Most High, "reaching from one end to the other mightily, and sweetly disposing all things." On this point it may be worth while to cite the testimony of a writer, whose bias is so little in a Catholic direction as Mr Isaac Taylor; "Not one of those schemes of biblical belief which, in the lapse of time, has disputed the ground with the Nicene Faith, recommends itself by that charm of Interior Congruity which this latter so conspicuously possesses. It is this alone that is an Entire Belief, and concerning which it may be affirmed that its elements—abstract, moral, and spiritual,—are in unison."*

There is the more reason for insisting on this view, because it has been one of my chief aims in this volume to show that the question of future retribution cannot be adequately or even intelligibly treated, till it is lifted out of the narrow region of trivialities and wranglings over the meaning of particular texts, and exhibited in its essential relations to the entire scheme of Revealed Truth.† It is necessary of course to exa-

* *Restoration of Belief*, p. 322.

† I subjoin a striking passage from Nicolas's *Etudes Philosophiques*, vol ii. pp. 497,8. "Et ceci nous conduit à une vérité capitale, que, selon nous, on néglige trop souvent dans la polémique chrétienne: c'est que nos mystères ne paraissent si accablants

mine and reaffirm the testimony of Scripture, where it has been, however unreasonably, disputed; but that is part only, and a very subordinate part, of the controversy. The strength of the opposition, *valeat quantum*, does not lie in textual criticism. Neither indeed can we enter into that controversy except, in one sense, under protest. The notion that "the Bible only,"

pour la raison que lorsqu'on les isole ; et cela doit être, parce qu'alors nous ne les mesurons qu'avec des termes de comparaison pris en nous-mêmes, et dès lors hors de proportion avec l'infini ; et parce que d'ailleurs les dogmes chrétiens n'étant que la révélation des attributs de Dieu, qui se confondent dans sa suprême *unité*, les diviser, c'est les dénaturer. Mais si, au contraire, nous les prenons dans leur connexion générale, si nous les mesurons les uns par les autres, et avec une échelle de proportion qui soit de même nature, alors nous les verrons se correspondre, se pondérer, s'engrener réciproquement, devenir *raison* les uns des autres ; leur disproportion particulière disparaîtra dans l'harmonie du tout, et deviendra même essentielle à cette harmonie : comme ces larges fresques des coupoles de nos temples qui demandent à être vues d'ensemble, et du point de vue pour lequel leur effet a été calculé. Ainsi, à côté d'un abîme de justice s'ouvre un abîme de miséricorde ; et ces deux abîmes se comblent réciproquement, parce qu'il faut, comme le dit Pascal, que 'la justice de Dieu soit énorme comme sa miséricorde.' L'enfer ne nous paraît si incompréhensible que parce que nous ne nous faisons pas naturellement une idée suffisante de la gravité du péché dont il est le châtiment, et de la facilité pour nous de l'éviter et de le conjurer. Mais voici le dogme de la Rédemption, qui vient faire disparaître ces raisons d'incompréhensibilité, en nous apprenant que le péché est tel, qu'il n'a fallu rien moins que la mort d'un Dieu pour l'expier, et que les ressources du salut que nous ménage cette expiation sont si inépuisables, que l'homme le plus chargé de crimes peut encore en commettre un plus énorme : c'est celui de désespérer du pardon."

as interpreted by every man's individual judgment, is the rule of faith is—begging Chillingworth's pardon—not less absolutely irrational and in flat contradiction to the plainest facts of history than theologically heterodox. That the teaching of Scripture on this subject is sufficiently unmistakable, has not unfortunately secured it from being mistaken. But the interpretation alike of criticism and of common sense is finally authenticated by the unbroken tradition of the Church.

But neither is submission to Church authority, however important, the only principle at stake here. The root of the matter lies deeper. A passage from a recent article in the *Fortnightly Review*, containing a savage indictment against the Christian Revelation, especially as regards the Fall and its consequences, was quoted near the beginning of this essay. In his latest publication, Mr. Matthew Arnold has cited some kindred passages from the same paper, on which he makes the not unnatural comment; "Only when one is young and headstrong can one thus prefer bravado to experience, can one stand by the Sea of Time, and instead of listening to the solemn and rhythmical beat of its waves, choose to fill the air with one's own whoopings to start the echo."* Perhaps so; but I fear that in this day many, who are no longer young or inexperienced, entertain much the

* See Preface to Arnold's *God and the Bible*, p. xviii.

same estimate of Christian doctrine as Professor Clifford, though a sense of decency or some better feeling may restrain them from "whooping" quite so loud. In the very preface from which my last extract is taken, and only a few pages after it, Mr. Arnold himself thus summarily disposes of one elementary doctrine of the Bible; "Satan and Tisiphone are alike not real persons, but shadows thrown by man's guilt and terror." We are next informed that to listen to Christian theology, which embraces *inter alia* the Bible history and the Athanasian Creed, "is like listening to Cosmas Indicopleustes, the Christian cosmographer, or any other early Christian writer, in a department of science, who goes upon data furnished by a time of imperfect knowledge and boundless credulity."* To believe in the Church, the Eucharist, the Atonement, and "the story of the magical birth and resuscitation of Jesus" (the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and Resurrection) is only explicable by that want of "intellectual seriousness" which is the besetting sin of Christians. "The doctrines of the

* Cosmas was not "an early Christian writer" but a monk of the sixth century, who composed a work—sufficiently absurd, no doubt, when measured by the standard of modern knowledge—under the title of *Topographia Christiana.* We may make Mr. Arnold a present of his quaint geographical heresies, if he thinks it worth while to poke fun at them; but he must be quite aware that they have nothing whatever to do with the Christian doctrines which he is setting himself to explode.

Incarnation and of the Real Presence"—Mr. Arnold has the sagacity to discern their essential connexion—are indeed "beautiful imaginations, but if Christianity depended on them, it would dissolve." All this is tolerably sweeping. Mr. Arnold's language, as a rule, is more decorous, and in a sense religious, than Professor Clifford's;* but I fail to detect any substantial difference between their intellectual estimates of the truth of Divine Revelation. One of them may fiercely repudiate the name of Christian, while the other affects to claim it, but his "Christianity" is avowedly of a kind which resolves every article of the Apostles' Creed (I need say nothing of the Athanasian or Nicene) into a beautiful but baseless "*Aberglaube.*" And it requires a breadth of comprehensive sympathy to which I can make no pretence, to appreciate this new version of the Christianity of the future, with the slight variation of pretermitting God.† With all

* I say advisedly, "as a rule," for indecorous would be a mild censure to apply to the shocking and elaborate parody on the Christian doctrine of the Trinity more than once lugged head and shoulders into *Literature and Dogma.* Such gratuitous outrages upon the faith of Christendom seem hardly congruous with a religion of "culture," "sweetness and light," to say nothing of the strange liberty taken with the name of an estimable living nobleman, from some of whose opinions one may widely differ, but whose lifelong career of active benevolence it is impossible not to respect.

† It may perhaps be replied that Mr. Arnold only rejects explicitly the idea of "a personal God." But until it is shown how

respect for "the religion of Positivism," I have never been able—I do not say to accept, but to understand—a system which, "though it rejects God, will not therefore reject religion."* To me a religion without a worship, and therefore a Supreme Object of worship, is a contradiction in terms.†

And, as regards Christianity, the author of *Supernatural Religion* is, so far, simply repeating what is admitted, or rather asserted, by every Christian apologist, when he opens his attack by insisting that its contents and its evidence are alike essentially supernatural. A creed from which the

an impersonal abstraction—whether called "a stream of tendency," or a "not ourselves," or by any other name of little meaning—can possibly become the object of worship, of love, or of any moral act or sentiment whatever, this must appear to all rational thinkers, whether believers or not, a distinction without a difference.

* Mr. Mark Pattison in *Contemp. Rev.*, for March, 1876, p. 604.

† "The expectation that anything will remain if this be dropped, (viz. '*personal affection* and living communion with an Infinitely Wise and Good and Holy)" and that by flinging the same sacred vestments of speech round the form of some empty abstraction [*e.g.* "a stream of tendency"] you can save the continuity of piety, is an illusion which could never occur except to the outside observer." Rev. J. Martineau in *Contemp. Rev.*, for March, 1876, p. 548 The late Sir Robert Peel is reported to have said, "Take my word for it, it is not prudent as a rule to trust yourself to any man who tells you that he does not believe in a God and a future after death." According to a French atheist writer of the day, virtue and vice are the results of a current of electricity, and are "natural products in the same sense as sugar and vitriol." See Dupanloup's *l'Atheisme*, p. 70.

miraculous, or as Mr. Arnold prefers to call it the "magical," element is excluded is not Christianity at all, and it is a mere wanton abuse of language to call it so. Christianity lives and moves and has its being in an atmosphere of miracle, as bearing His Name who began His earthly course by a miraculous Conception, and closed it by a miraculous Resurrection, and whose parting promise to abide always with His Church is fulfilled in the standing miracle first exemplified in the chalice of the Last Supper,

> The selfsame cup, wherein the faithful wine
> Heard God, and was obedient unto blood.*

The Gospel divested of its "fairy tales" becomes indeed a mere *Aberglaube*, for the moment it ceases to be supernatural it ceases to be true. Yet even so the miraculous element reappears in another shape. For, when the startling success of the hallucination or imposture, whichever it be, still unimpaired after eighteen centuries, is taken into account, one is constrained to exclaim, with one of the ablest and bitterest of infidel writers, that "the inventor of the story is a greater marvel than its hero."† At the same time is is impossible not to detect, alike in M. Comte's atheistic theology, and Mr. Arnold's Bible Christianity with Revelation left out, the involuntary homage extorted

* Hawker's *Quest of the Sangreal.*

† Rousseau's *Emile.*

from outsiders, if not from enemies, to that indestructible religious instinct which both systems as ostentatiously recognise as they entirely fail to satisfy. It is the old story; though he will not listen to God's commissioned messengers, and slays His priests with the sword, "Saul also is among the prophets."

It is currently asesrted that the doctrine of eternal punishment, and indeed of future retribution altogether, is peculiarly repugnant to the spirit of the age; and I quite believe it. The causes are not far to seek. There is something uncongenial to an atmosphere of high intellectual culture and elaborate artificial refinement in an ethical system, like the Christian, based on the acknowledgment of what the Apostle calls the exceeding sinfulness of sin. The conviction of sin, whether original or actual, is abhorrent alike to the pride and sensuality—or sensuousness, if that term be preferred—of the dominant "*Zeitgeist*." The facts, of course, are too obtrusive to be absolutely ignored; but it is felt to be more agreeable to "the dignity of man" to regard evil merely as an accident or a negation or a mistake. A scheme of doctrine which starts from the humiliating confession of "a terrible aboriginal calamity," which unassisted nature is powerless to remedy, and "pertinaciously inflicts upon mankind," as has been said, the unwelcome warning, "Ye must be born again"—your whole nature, passions, affec-

tions, conscience, will, and last, not least, your intellect must be re-born—is resented as both an insult, and a burden too heavy to be endured. In the religion of culture and civilisation, the moral sense usurps the place of conscience, and a refined Utilitarianism supersedes the Law of Right, as the ultimate sanction of morality. And if these substituted principles suffice (at least for the nonce) among the educated few for the regulation of conduct, they tell us nothing of a Maker, a Moral Governor, and a Judge. An impersonal abstraction may be vaguely spoken of, "which makes for righteousness," but we are left without God in the world.* Thus again the religion of culture will patronize a Church which is content to become the humble functionary of the civil power, and to confine itself to the safe and useful duties of a moral police. But supernatural doctrines are an offence to its understanding, and its haughty self-dependence is outraged by the supernatural claims of a priesthood. Sacraments, indeed, and a visible ministry there may be, and ought to be, for without these external badges, as Warburton so admirably pointed out, "Christianity could never have become national, and consequently could not have done that service to

* It is on the argument from conscience that Kant relies for the proof of Theism, that is of a Personal God, in the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft.*

the State, which of all religions the Christian is most capable of performing ;"* but then sacraments must be charged with no mysterious meanings, nor the birthright of all citizens to use or neglect them as they please be narrowed by sectarian restrictictions—that is by the accident of how much or how little they happen to believe. *Sacramenta propter homines* is indeed a familiar principle of moral theology, but *Sacramenta propter bonum reipublicæ* is the principle of a civilised religion. In a polytheistic age it would have offered Christ a niche in its cosmopolitan pantheon; in the present day Christianity is necessarily allowed to be paramount, but then "Christianity is as old as the Creation." That moral residuum is alone eternally true which survives (and how long will it survive?) the elimination of our "magical" stories about the Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ, and the "metaphysical subtleties of our creeds."

I have referred to these points, though it would be out of place to enlarge upon them here, in order to impress on the reader's mind that, just as the doctrine of eternal punishment is no "isolated truth," as it has been ignorantly or perversely designated, but part and parcel of a coherent whole, so too the modern attack upon it is no isolated heresy.† Hell, purgatory,

* Warburton's *Alliance of Church and State*, (Works, edition 1811), vol vii., p. 175.

† It is significant that Mr. Jukes's peculiar scheme of biblical

penance, mortal sin, are alike complacently thrust aside as "spectres of the past," for all alike bear witness to a higher than human authority and an obligatory standard both of truth and right, which man did not discover and cannot alter or evade. Here and there no doubt timid or crotchety thinkers may be found, who have managed honestly to persuade themselves that some form of Universalism is not incompatible with the teaching either of Scripture or of the Church, and who would be really prepared to submit their judgment, if convinced that this is a mistake. Such persons may fairly be allowed the benefit of St. Augustine's well known distinction, *Errare possum,*

interpretation involves our regarding the Fall as, not simply permitted by God, but an essential part of His original "*purpose*, before the foundation of the world," without which He could not "give to man His own righteousness." *Restitution*, pp. 112, 113. This is (1) to make God the Author of sin, and (2) to deny the divine character of the original justice, from which Adam fell. A few pages before (ib. p. 99) the author had gone out of his way to betray his almost incredible misapprehension of the doctrines he assails, by objecting to the Immaculate Conception that it "cuts away the whole ground of our redemption, *for* if the flesh which bore Christ *was not ours*, His Incarnation does not profit us." Except on the theory commonly ascribed to Irving (whether rightly or wrongly I will not undertake to say) but which, I presume, Mr. Jukes would disclaim, that our Lord must have been peccable or He would not really have taken our nature, the criticism is absolutely unmeaning. And even so it would be irrelevant. The Blessed Virgin no more ceases to share our nature by virtue of her Immaculate Conception than a child ceases to be human when it is regenerated in baptism.

hæreticus esse nolo. But they are rare exceptions. The general spirit of the assailing party may be better learnt from a volume of Broad Church Essays, published some years ago, which deserved more attention, as a sign of the times, than, I believe, it succeeded in gaining.* Of the seven contributors, five, including the editor, are clergymen, and their common object is to exhibit and recommend the true ideal of an Established Church, which is very much what Mr. Goldwin Smith somewhere calls "an established chaos."

Voluntary communities, we are told, "are more likely to use their freedom in expelling than in fostering Colensos," and are therefore only tolerable when "accompanied by the *absolute prohibition of the endowment of dogma.*" The editor—who compares the doctrine of eternal punishment to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy—was indeed good enough to allow that the time had not yet come (in 1868) for bringing the question of the Divinity of Christ before the law courts, for a certain economy must be observed as to the time and method of getting rid of "spiritual go-carts"—that is his name for doctrinal beliefs; but then he is careful to add, that, if ever the majority of the nation should become Unitarian, (which, so far as he has a preference about so trivial a point, he appears to think desirable)

* *Essays on Church Policy.* Edited by Rev. W. L. Clay, Incumbent of Rainhill. Macmillan, 1868.

"Unitarian should be substituted for Trinitarian dogmas in the prescribed formularies," because a diversity of belief, or rather of profession, on the subject might endanger the stability of the Establishment, which is the one thing to be maintained at all hazards. And he tells us why; "The one thing *essential* to her [the Church's] Establishment is"—the italics are his own—not any doctrine or doctrines whatever, but "the necessity for ceding the ultimate control over her discipline, her ceremonial, and the articles of her faith to the State." Another clerical contributor, Mr. Berkeley, Vicar of Navestock, is even more explicit. The Legislature, he tells us, is not called upon to determine the truth of a doctrine—that is a matter, of course, of very subordinate interest—but "whether it is a truth of which the conscience of men generally is convinced;" and for this delicate office he gravely assures us that there can be no more suitable tribunal than "a mixed assembly of Anglicans, Nonconformists, Roman Catholics, and Jews," like the House of Commons. But he leaves us in little doubt as to what decisions may be expected to emanate from this Œcumenical Council of the future, when its members pair off into the opposite lobbies on the question, let us say, of the Real Presence or the personality of the Evil One; for "between Catholic principles and Liberal principles there can be no compromise," inasmuch as, the writer adds with

the characteristic modesty of his school, "it is hardly possible that there can be two ways of seeing—namely, *by opening your eyes, and by shutting them.*" Another clerical essayist, Mr. Fowle, Rector of Islip, suggests the consoling reflection to Bible Protestants, that "the doctrine of plenary inspiration has broken like packthread before the rising gales of scientific discovery and historical research." And the editor caps him by stating as "a fact," what is unquestionably true, "that ninety-nine persons out of a hundred, if not nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand, are wholly incompetent to choose their own creed." And as there is no authority to choose for them except the State, which is not called upon or competent to determine the truth of creeds but only what these same nine hundred and ninety-nine incompetent judges happen to think about them, the inevitable conclusion is that they can have no creed at all. It is clear, in short, on the principles of the Essayists, that the great work of the Church of the future, and the grand motive for maintaining unimpaired the essential principle of Establishment, is, not the promotion but the gradual and steady elimination of all religious belief.

Mr. Berkeley has summed up the general result of the volume in the following significant passage with a precision and frankness which leaves nothing to be desired. It has often, indeed, been observed before

that Voltaire was the natural successor of Luther, and the French Revolution of 1789 the second act of the Reformation; but the assertion has generally come from the people who see "by shutting their eyes," that is Catholics, while it has been bitterly resented by those who "open them." Mr. Berkeley judges differently, and, we may at once admit, more correctly:

"We must go either backwards or forwards; we must make election of our principle and method; we cannot, *as Protestants do*, reject the authority of Tradition, whilst we practically assume, on no better authority, all our first principles. Protestantism is becoming more and more restless and irrational, because it has before it an alternative which it has not the courage to face. It cannot, or will not, see that the Reformation was a first step, *and that the second is now to be taken, if the first is not to be stultified.* Protestantism, as a phase of progress, has done its work; it was a protest against Roman aberrations from principles held in common with Rome; *the question now is as to the principles*—and Protestantism is of no avail here. As a consequence it seems to be everywhere playing back into the hands of the Catholic party because it has not faith enough or strength enough to go forward, to be consistent, to become—*what it must become or else fall to pieces*,—Rational Religion. If the Church of England is to be indeed the Church of the

future, it can only be by taking deeper ground than she has taken before; it is *neither as Catholic nor as Protestant* that she will hold her own in the rising generation; she must become the Church whom the truth (?) has made free."

The force and clearness of this bold exposition, from a friendly hand, of the "Liberal" religion of the future will excuse the length of the extract. Before taking leave of the essayists, let me call attention to the editor's jubilation over the fact that the State, by each successive decision of its supreme appellate Court, "is quietly unmaking old orthodoxies," and thus, through "the silent progress of religious rationalism," one doctrine after another is put into the crucible, or as he himself happily phrases it, the dogmatic "kernel" is eaten out of the still "sound-looking nut." And it may be worth while to remind those whom it concerns that the doctrine we are here engaged upon is one of the many elementary truths of Revelation which have thus, during the last quarter of a century, been ruled to be open questions in the Established Church, as also of the deliberate judgment on that state of things recorded again and again in the letters of the late Bishop Gray of Capetown, who showed by his consistent and courageous conduct that he meant what he said.*

* A single extract from one of the latest of those letters (ad-

There are not wanting signs that the practical question which religious persons, in this country and elsewhere, will sooner or later be called upon to face, does not lie between Catholicism and popular Protestantism, which is already in its dotage, but between the former and what I shall take the liberty of calling the great Japanese Compromise. In Japan, as is well known, the Mikado, like the old Roman Emperors, combines in his own person the double office of Sovereign and *Pontifex Maximus*. A paragraph appeared in the *Times* during August 1872, to the effect that "the (Japanese) Government has decided on the promulgation of a new form of religion, after careful consultation with the most noted exponents of each sect, *and all will be compelled to conform thereto*. The new religion will be *enlightened*, *simple*, and *adapted to common sense*, and is likely to meet the approval of all classes." We have heard something, I almost think, of this sort of programme nearer home, and of the resolve, expressly avowed in the interests of "liberty

dressed to Mr. Mowbray, April 24, 1869), shall be given here: "I do not believe that the Church of England, in its present relations with the State, can continue long to witness for Christ. I have publicly said these fifteen years that, if she did not destroy her final Court of Appeal, *it would destroy her*." *Life of Bishop of Capetown*, vol ii., p. 468. It must be remembered also that Bp. Gray died before the Public Worship Act had swept away the last remaining vestiges of the ancient ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Establishment.

of thought," to compel all men to conform to it. Of its ultimate success we can entertain no fear, if only because religion, like nature, is a very stubborn thing; *expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret.* But even a temporary triumph of the Antichristian propaganda would be a serious matter. Three centuries ago the liberal enlightment of Japan was equally impatient of noncomformity, and for the time Christianity was literally stamped out, amid cruelties inexpressibly horrible, in a sea of blood.* Should the age of persecution ever return—and more impossible things have happened—the martyrs will not be wanting, and again, as of old, and perhaps in ways men little dream of, their blood will become the seed plot of the future Church.

While I trust that nothing will be found in these pages inconsistent with Catholic teaching, I need hardly say that what I have written on this solemn subject is unreservedly submitted to the infallible authority of the Church. It is a relief to turn from the din of controversy, and the dreary scepticism of

* For a brief account of the torture and death of the Japanese martyrs, great numbers of whom were children, see Baring Gould's *Lives of the Saints*, vol for Feb., pp. 141, sqq. The persecution was of that thorough kind, which can alone be even temporarily successful, and which our modern "Pope in jackboots" does not seem to have yet seen his way to venturing upon in Germany. It is noteworthy that, as Mr. Gould points out, the Dutch Protestants were "more than half the authors" of it.

an age which proclaims by the mouth of its representative poets and philosophers that its nearest approach to prayer is as the voice of "an infant crying for the light," and its highest attainable worship "chiefly of the silent sort, at the altar of the Unknowable and Unknown," to that simple faith which alone can brace the soul for its lifelong struggle with temptation, and shed over the dark valley of the shadow of death a shining light which brightens continually towards perfect day. In the midst of the resuscitated Paganism, in thought, in sentiment, and in language, which is coming in upon us like a flood, the words of an old prophecy float back upon the memory, like the refrain of some favourite song, familiar from childhood but which can never grow less musical by repetition; "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh shall I behold my God."

H. N. O.

Whitsuntide, 1876.

CATHOLIC ESCHATOLOGY

AND

UNIVERSALISM.

CHAPTER I.

DIFFICULTIES AND MISCONCEPTIONS: PURGATORY.

IT is not necessary to travel beyond the pages of the *Contemporary Review* during the last few years for evidence of a growing revolt in the popular mind against the immemorial belief of the Church, and indeed of the immense majority of Christians, from the Apostles' days to our own, as to the future state of those who die impenitent. In part, of course, this is due to the great wave of sceptical, or rather Pagan, reaction which is sweeping over modern society, of which the signs, both moral and intellectual, are manifold, and the ultimate issue neither pleasant to contemplate nor altogether easy to forecast. I do not, indeed, forget that this Pagan spirit was never wholly extinguished, even during the "ages of faith." In the form of a subtle Manichean dualism it was the inspiring principle of all the heretical sects of mediæval

Europe, and it was still more conspicuously diffused throughout the whole moral and intellectual atmosphere of the period immediately preceding the Reformation. But in this respect the phenomena of the fifteenth century have been, with such variations, of course, as the altered conditions of the age involved, remarkably reproduced in the nineteenth. A straw may show which way the stream is flowing, and one of the lesser indications of that new current of thought, which it is in place to mention here, as it bears on the treatment of the departed, may be found in the startling proposal to revert from the Christian practice of burial to the heathen custom of burning the dead, which it superseded.* We have witnessed a somewhat kindred but still bolder manifestation of the same spirit in the open advocacy of murder and suicide, in certain cases, under the exquisite *sobriquet* of "euthanasia."

But I cannot dwell further on this aspect of the question here, and must content myself with citing a few words from an article in a recent number of the *Fortnightly Review*, in illustration of the present attitude of the infidel school towards Christian Eschato-

* It is my misfortune to differ widely on some points from Bishop Wordsworth, of Lincoln, but he deserves the thanks of all Christians for his manly protest against this revolting suggestion. It is characteristic of Dr. Newman's keenness of intuition that more than forty years ago, in one of his earliest Oxford sermons, preached April 22, 1832, he should have called attention to the true significance of the distinction between Christian burial and "that old irreverence of the funeral pile." *Paroch. Sermons*, vol. i. pp. 318, 319, first ed.

logy. The writer, who is engaged in denouncing not only Revelation but the immortality of the soul, informs us that, according to Christian belief, "the condition of the departed depends ultimately upon the will of a being who a long while ago *cursed all mankind because one woman disobeyed him.* The curse was no mere symbol of displeasure, but a fixed resolve to keep his victims alive for ever, writhing in horrible tortures, in a place which his divine foreknowledge had prepared beforehand." And the Atonement is then explained to mean that, "in consideration of the death of his Son," this same being "consented to feed with the sweets of his favour *such poor wretches as should betray their brethren and speak sufficiently soft words to the destroyer of their kindred*",—in other words, should be base enough to repent and pray.* With these ghastly caricatures of Christian doctrine, as offered by professed unbelievers, we are not now immediately concerned; on the Calvinist hypothesis, from which this writer has apparently drawn his estimate of Christianity, I shall have something to say by-and-by. It is not, however, with this class of opponents that I am arguing now, who can never, indeed, *disprove* the Christian doctrine of the future state, but to whom it cannot be proved, because, while perfectly consistent with reason, it rests for its evidence ultimately on Divine Revelation. But it must be remembered that professed believers are apt to

* *Fortnightly Review*, June, 1875. Here and elsewhere, in quotations, unless it is otherwise specified, the italics are my own.

be more or less influenced, however unconsciously, by the comments of those without; and in dealing with attacks on the received doctrine of the future state from the lips of those who still honestly desire to retain their faith in revelation, it is impossible to leave this consideration out of sight. *Iliacos intra muros peccatur ex extra.* Their objections are often but the subdued echo of an outcry which shocks them, but which has been dinned into their ears till it has frightened, if it has not convinced, them.

In the next place, it is important, for many reasons, to call attention to the extreme *novelty* of Universalism, at all events in this country, as maintained by men professing to accept the Bible; still more within the limits of the Anglican Church. It is said to be the prevalent view among modern Unitarians, and the disciples of a Unitarian preacher named Kelly, who emigrated to America about a century ago, organized the first Universalist congregation there in Massachusetts, which has since developed into a large community, comprehending about 1,000 congregations. But the exception, as so often happens, only serves to prove the rule, for Unitarianism is based on a rejection of the fundamental tenet which lies at the root of the whole Christian system. Among the Anglican clergy I am not aware that any question had been stirred on the subject before the appearance, in 1853, of the late Mr. F. D. Maurice's *Theological Essays*, which raised such a storm about his ears. Yet the tentative and mystical tone, which adds much to the charm and not a little to the obscurity of his writings,

differs widely enough from the peremptory dogmatism of many who now appeal to his authority. What he suggested in devout and diffident language, about the precise meaning of which perhaps no half-dozen readers were ever agreed, is too often nowadays proclaimed on the housetops by writers who certainly have nothing of his diffidence and hardly seem emulous of his devotion. The late Archdeacon Sinclair mentions, indeed, in his interesting book on *Old Times and Distant Places*, that his friend the Rev. Ozias Linley, Fellow of Dulwich, was a strong Universalist; but he does not imply that Mr. Linley ever avowed this opinion in public, and expressly states that he abandoned it before his death. I well remember myself a conversation I had more than twenty years ago, when still at Oxford, with a venerable clergyman, long since removed from us, who had been in his day one of the great lights of the Evangelical party. He was speaking of the essay which contains, I believe, the earliest, as it is also the ablest, of the recent attacks on the received Christian Eschatology, by the late Sir James Stephen, who was a personal friend of his, and for whose judgment he entertained a high respect. But he earnestly deplored and deprecated the line Sir J. Stephen had taken on this subject, and insisted on what would certainly to any ordinary reader appear the overwhelming weight of Scriptural testimony against it I expressed some doubt whether, in the event of Universalism being broached publicly by any of the clergy (Mr. Maurice's *Essays* had not then appeared),

the formularies of the Church of England would be found sufficiently definite to secure the condemnation of their teaching. His answer has often recurred to my memory since, "*As long as we have the Athanasian Creed, it is impossible that any clergyman should be allowed to teach such a doctrine.*" Subsequent experience proves that this good man had not calculated on the future attitude of a large section of the clergy, including many of his own party, either towards the doctrine he was discussing or the most instructive and majestic of the Church's Creeds. And I refer to the circumstance here to show how rapid and how complete has been the change of front. It is true that when, some years later, the Supreme Civil Court, to whose discredited and conflicting decisions Anglicans are expected—and, indeed, expressly required by the joint Episcopal Allocution of March, 1875—to conform their faith and worship, "dismissed hell with costs," the two primates of the day—I say it to their credit—had the spirit to issue pastorals denouncing the nascent heresy;* but it has spread since then in spite of them.

Nor is this all. Although their contention is the growth of yesterday, it is the fashion with our modern Universalists—I am concerned at present with those alone who profess to approach the subject from a Christian standpoint—to speak as if they were in possession, and the *onus probandi* lay on the ad-

* Cardinal Wiseman also took occasion at the time (1864) to issue a pastoral in the same sense.

herents of the traditional faith of Christendom. Such an attitude is, to use the very mildest term, premamature. Thus even Professor Mayor in his review—which is rather, indeed, a summary and panegyric—of Mr. Jukes's book on the *Restitution of all Things*,* writes throughout—as, it is only fair to say, Mr. Jukes himself does not—with a quiet assumption of superiority which implies that the argument from reason, and even from the "general tendency of revelation," is so "overpowering" against the received belief that it is difficult to conceive any one but a fool or a fanatic continuing to uphold it. It is grudgingly admitted that "there are many texts which *at first sight appear* to assert," what they have always been understood to assert; and this "apparent contradiction" is got over by a process of argument which it will be most convenient to notice by-and-by in connection with Mr. Jukes's book, from which it is borrowed. I will merely call attention here to his reviewer's significant remark upon his "very high views of inspiration," and the "mystical" character of a good deal of his argument, neither of which peculiarities, it is hinted—most justly, no doubt—will find much sympathy with those who are the likeliest to avail themselves of his support. If Mr. Jukes's book appealed to none but those who share his devout and mystical temperament, and his profound, though strangely paradoxical reverence for Scripture, there would be little to fear from the result. Far different from his, and even from his reviewer's, is the tone of an earlier

* See *Contemporary Review* for May, 1875.

writer in the same periodical under the signature of *Anglicanus*,* who talks glibly of the "puny and pitiful dimensions" to which orthodox believers have reduced an article of the Apostles' Creed by "a doctrine worthy only of the priests of Moloch;" and after a good deal more rhetorical invective, considerably more pungent than persuasive, proceeds to denounce the teaching of the Athanasian Creed on eternal punishment, which is too awkwardly explicit to be explained away, as creating "an inward revulsion in the minds of all who hear it," and making "one's gorge rise at the very name of it."

It would be difficult to condemn too strongly the presumptuous arrogance—to use no harsher term—of this confident and overbearing tone in the assailants of the all but universal belief of sixty generations of Christians, based, as they have ever been firmly persuaded, on the express declarations of Christ Himself. *Anglicanus* should have remembered that people's gorge may rise at other things besides the doctrine he so vehemently denounces, but appears from his treatment of it so imperfectly to comprehend. And whatever may be plausibly urged against it by a believer in revelation, it is clear that the burden of proof lies exclusively with those who impugn, not with those who defend, the existing faith. The entire weight of Christian tradition—with the solitary and discredited exception of the Origenists, to which reference will be

* *Contemporary Review* for April, 1872. It may be as well to say that the article is understood not to be from the pen of the accomplished dignitary who often adopts the same *nom de plume*.

made later on—and what, to any unbiassed mind, Catholic, Protestant, or infidel, must appear at least the obvious and natural sense of the letter of Scripture, is dead against them. This was fully recognised by the first and greatest exponents of the adverse theory. Sir James Stephen, who, however staunch a Protestant, emphatically disclaimed all sympathy with the arrogance which would reject any part of Divine Revelation on account of its supposed inconsistency with human reason, and was avowedly anxious to be as little as possible out of harmony with the authorised interpretation of it, frankly admits as much. I think indeed that he greatly underrates the force of the Scriptural argument; but he does not attempt to dispute that it is *primâ facie* against him, and only ventures to offer in reply, "with the most extreme diffidence," certain "suggestions or surmises," which he sorrowfully allows to be "opposed to the commonly received opinion of perhaps all the Christian Churches." He does not, after all, profess to be at all sure that he is right; and at the close of his argument he repeats, with a modesty and candour which later advocates of the same cause might do well to emulate, that "he knows how weighty is the presumption in favour of the construction which the Church of Christ has, *in all ages*, given to words which, however understood, are the most terrific which have ever been spoken in the ears of men."* As to Mr. Maurice, his habit of mind led him to read

* See Epilogue to *Essays on Ecclesiastical Biography*, pp. 652—658.

his own opinions instinctively into the great teachers of former ages, both classical and Christian; but if he really intended to deny the doctrine of eternal punishment altogether—a point on which I should be very sorry to have to pronounce—he has said nothing to shake the evidence of Scripture and Tradition in its favour. What he does attack, in pretty sharp language, are some current opinions often carelessly confounded with the dogma, but quite distinct from it. But it is no part of my purpose to discuss the views of a writer whose meaning—however highly one may respect his character and abilities—I share the incapacity of nine-tenths of his readers to understand.

Before entering on any direct examination of the Universalist argument, it will be convenient to notice some of the leading causes which help to account for this modern spirit of antagonism to the dogma of eternal punishment; the more so, as I shall thus have an opportunity of dwelling on another important aspect of Catholic Eschatology, which has a direct bearing on the question. With purely infidel objections it would be impossible to deal here without extending the inquiry beyond all manageable limits. But we can hardly pass over in silence what lies at the root of most of the angry reclamation, from various quarters, against this most awful of revealed truths, and that is a failure to realise either the heinousness of sin or the spotless purity of God. In the startling, but not therefore exaggerated language of the greatest preacher of our own day, sin is "a

traitor's act, who aims at the overthrow and death of his sovereign ; it is that which, *could the Divine Governor of the world cease to be, would be sufficient to bring it about.*"* This is a view of things which the world naturally does not appreciate, and it is therefore voted indecorous "to mention hell to ears polite;" but I have a further reason for referring to it here. There are two schools where the true character of sin may be learnt, Hell and Calvary. The reflection of the eternal fire, which He died to quench for all who will receive Him, pierces the supernatural gloom that hung around the Redeemer's Cross, and bears witness alike to the guilt which demanded, and the Divine charity which offered, that tremendous Sacrifice.

And for this reason, if for no other, Sir James Stephen could hardly have hit upon a more infelicitous objection to the dogma of eternal punishment than that it is at best "a mere isolated truth, standing in no necessary connection with the rest." On the contrary, one primary objection to the Universalist hypothesis, which its advocates usually ignore, is that it disorganizes the entire structure of Christian doctrine, which is not an accidental aggregation of independent atoms, but a coherent whole. Revelation may be accepted or rejected, but you cannot pick and choose, and take as much or as little as you like. A *tinkered* Christianity, which is much in fashion in these days, has as little claim on the judgment of

* Newman's *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*, p. 355.

reason as on the obedience of faith. In this sense too the poet's word's are applicable:

> "High heaven rejects the lore
> Of nicely calculated less or more."

What Luther said of the study of theology may be applied with stricter truth to each separate article of the Creed, *neglectum sui ulciscitur*. For it holds good. in faith as in morals, that to offend in one point is to be guilty of all; and that, for the plain reason that to reject any one point is implicitly to reject the rest. This may be illustrated from a recent controversy on another subject. It is common enough to hear people say that they feel bound of course to hold the general doctrine of the Trinity, but see no reason for accepting all the minute—or as it is sometimes put "precise and presumptuous" — definitions of the Athanasian Creed. The answer to this blundering sophistry is a very simple one. A man may no doubt have a sincere faith in the Holy Trinity who never heard of the Athanasian Creed, or who through ignorance or prejudice dislikes and affects to repudiate some of its particular clauses. But those clauses, which might on occasion be multiplied indefinitely, do not embody so many separate articles of belief. They were constructed in order to bring out, under pressure of various and often contradictory heresies, opposite but harmonious aspects of the same central verity, and accordingly, whoever consciously and intelligently denies any one of them, knowing what he means, has implicitly denied all. The Arians, for

instance, by denying that "the Son is eternal" convicted themselves of implicitly denying, while they professed to admit it, that the Son is God. If any one of the separate propositions which make up the dogmatic statement concerning the Holy Trinity in the *Quicunque vult* did not form an integral and necessary portion of the dogma, in the sense (not that it might not be *omitted* but) that it could not be *denied* without, by implication, denying the dogma itself, it would not be true; for truth is consistent with itself. And the same principle applies to the entire scheme of Christian doctrine; to reject one portion is implicitly to reject the whole. The punishment of the wicked of course presupposes sin, and sin was no part of the original creation of God. But assuming sin, the revealed method of its chatisement becomes part of the Divine order, and to deny this is to change the revealed idea of the nature of sin and of atonement, and therefore of God Himself. In other words Universalism cannot stop at one "isolated" doctrine, but must undertake to reconstruct the whole creed. And we find accordingly, with no surprise, that Universalists have for the most part been Unitarians. The Incarnation indeed might, and according to the Scotist theory (which I have elsewhere given my reasons for believing to be the true one) would, have taken place if man had never fallen. But it would have been under very different conditions. How are we to explain the stupendous mystery of Divine condescension, whereby the Eternal humbled Himself even to the death of the Cross,

if it was not designed to save all who would receive Him from eternal woe?*

And now to come to the causes which have mainly contributed to foster, even in religious and reverential minds, a repugance to the dogma of eternal punishment, I believe they may, broadly speaking, be reduced to two. In the first place all sorts of popular opinions or fancies—pure *idola fori* as they may be termed,—which at best are but accidental accessories of the doctrine, have got mixed up with it in men's minds till they have almost lost sight of its essential meaning. Such are various notions about the place and the exact nature of future punishment, of physical torture, material fire, and the like, which may or may not be true, but are matters of speculation only, on which in all ages different opinions have been maintained by theologians of unimpeached orthodoxy.† Meanwhile the essence of the suffering of

* On the relation of this solemn doctrine to the general system of natural and revealed truth, some very pertinent remarks will be found towards the close of a striking article on "Theodore of Mopsuestia and Modern Thought," in the *Church Quarterly* for October, 1875. On the other hand, it is not a little significant that an able and earnest writer, who avowedly looks at Christianity from a purely external, thought not absolutely hostile, standpoint, classes "Eternal Punishment" with various other Christian doctrines—including "*the Incarnation . . . the Trinity and the Atonement*"—which he regards as alike mischievous or incredible, and desires to see "become simply obsolete." W. R. GREG in *Contemporary Review* for August, 1874, p. 359.

† See Perrone's *Prælect. Theol.*, vol 1. p. 484. That there is some very special and awful significance in the term "fire," which is so persistently applied in Scripture to the punishment of the lost, we can hardly doubt, though we may not know pre-

the lost consists in this—as the word "damnation" (*pœna damni*) indicates—that they will be for ever excluded from the Beatific Vision of God; whatever mental or bodily pains (*pœna sensûs*) they may have to endure besides—and there are no doubt manifold gradations of suffering, as of glory—is subsidiary to this, and may be liable to diminution or relief.* The *pœna damni*, which is common to all, will be differently realised by individuals according to the measure of their guilt. But of the *rationale* of the question, so far as we can form any idea about it, something will be said in the next chapter. One point it may be well to notice at once, because to many minds it has seemed to invest the whole doctrine with a peculiar horror. There is something shocking to our natural instincts in the "damnation" of unbaptized infants, understood in a coarse and popular sense, as when, *e.g.*, Calvin or one of his followers speaks, in perfect consistency with the principles of his horrible theology, of "babes a span long crawling about the floor of hell."†

cisely what it is. It is thought to have been on this account that (with the exception of the breaking of bones, which formed the subject of a distinct prophecy) burning was the only kind of bodily torture to which our Lord was not subjected in His Passion. It was not fitting that His sacred flesh should be touched by fire, of which He spoke as the image or the instrument of the chastisement of those who finally reject Him.

* See Hieron. *Comment. in Isaiam*, cap. LXVI., *ad fin.* This was the general teaching of theologians before Peter Lombard, and has been revived in recent times.

† Not unbaptized necessarily, but non-elect; including, however, all children of heathen parents. I have not been able to verify the quotation, which is given by Lecky, Alger, and others,

But no such monstrosity is involved in the Catholic doctrine. Sarpi says that the Tridentine fathers hesitated whether they should not condemn this Lutheran and Calvinist tenet of the fiery torment of unchristened infants as a formal heresy. St. Bernard, who is quoted by Jeremy Taylor, had said four centuries before, *Nihil ardet in inferno nisi propria voluntas.* Unbaptized infants who have been raised by no sacrament from the condition of original sin, and who, dying before the use of reason, have had no opportunity of corresponding with grace, are indeed "damned" in the sense that they cannot attain to the Beatific Vision, for which their natural capacities do not qualify them. As they had not been raised on earth to the state of supernatural grace, they have no aptitude for the life of supernatural glory. And this is of course, in itself, a most momentous "loss" (or damnation) as compared with the future state of the glorified. But it is no conscious loss to them. Still less does it imply any suffering of body or soul. On the contrary, it is consistent with the highest enjoyment of natural beatitude and with a natural knowledge and love of God.* They are in what would have been Adam's condition, if he had neither

but it is in close accordance with the following "I inquire again how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations, *with their infant children*, in eternal death, but because such was the will of God." Calvin. *Instit.* Lib. III., ch. 23, sect. 7.

* St. Thomas Aquinas says of them, "Deo junguntur per participationem naturalium bonorum, et ita etiam, de Ipso gaudere poterunt naturali cognitione et dilectione." *In 2 Sent. Dist.*, 33, Q. 2, Art. 2.

fallen into sin nor been endowed with original justice. Balmez and other Catholic authorities hold that this principle may be extended to the case of adults, especially in heathen nations, who die with their moral and intellectual faculties so imperfectly developed that they may be regarded as, in responsibility, children.

But the most conspicuous example of this careless or insidious confusion between the essence of the dogma and its purely separable accidents, and which has probably done more than all other misconceptions put together to prejudice men's minds against it, remains to be noticed. The error may, and I hope and believe generally does, arise from ignorance, though it is an ignorance which can hardly be deemed inculpable. Be that as it may, I am not myself acquainted with a single Universalist writer who does not argue as though the doctrine he is assailing involved the damnation of the great majority of mankind. Thus Sir James Stephen, while his argument is directed against the doctrine altogether, begins by misstating it as "that portion of the Christian scheme which is supposed to consign *the vast majority of our race* to a future state, in which woe, immeasurable in amount, is also eternal in duration." And a few pages further on he speaks of "a construction of the words of Christ which would seem to ascribe to the Spirit of Evil an eternal triumph over the Spirit of Good, in the persons of *the vast majority of the race* whom He lived and died to redeem."* Mr. Maurice,

* Epilogue to *Eccles. Biog.*, pp. 653, 656.

I suppose, means the same thing when he denounces "the popular tenet as to the future condition *of the world*," and again when he says that "the religious men, the saved men, are looked upon as *the exceptions to a rule*."* Professor Mayor, in his review of Mr. Jukes, waxes eloquent over this distorted version of the incriminated doctrine, and sums up two pages of declamation in the bitter sarcasm, "This, then, is the result of the glad tidings of great joy, that the annihilation of the race is felt to be preferable to its continuance *on the existing terms*," *i.e.*, of the damnation of the great majority. He even condescends to the shallow and invidious sneer, that it would be the truest kindness of the orthodox to kill all baptized infants before they reach the age of reason. *Anglicanus* goes further still, and with characteristic audacity actually starts from a categorical assertion that the damnation of the great majority "is *necessarily involved* in the doctrine of eternal punishment." We are bidden to "bear in mind" that this is so, as an essential preliminary of the discussion. That is to say, a disputant who knows no measure in his abuse of those who presume to differ from him, opens his attack by parading his abysmal ignorance—for I am bound to suppose it is ignorance—of the first elements of the question he has undertaken to handle. The same assertion is repeated, in much more offensive language, some pages further on. No writer could well differ more widely from *Anglicanus* in his temper and

* *Theol. Essays*, pp. xxvii., 468.

line of argument than Mr. Jukes, who moreover cannot certainly be suspected of wilful misrepresentation. Yet the same fundamental confusion of thought pervades his treatise also. At the very beginning the question is defined to be, "what may or may not be God's mind *as to the mass of humanity;*" and a little further on "the orthodox solution of the mystery," which he is assailing, is explained to be "that the saved are the elect of this and other dispensations, who, as compared with the world, *have hitherto been but a little flock.*"* And the same misapprehension of "the orthodox doctrine" reappears elsewhere in the book, as well as in every other advocate of the same side I happen to have come across.

Now, with writers who controvert the opinion that the majority of mankind will be lost, I should have no quarrel on that account, even if I did not, as in fact I do, myself agree with them. The opinion, whether true or false, is a mere opinion, and has no shadow of claim to be considered part of the revealed faith. It has indeed been widely held, both among Catholics and Protestants, though—for reasons which will appear presently—chiefly among the latter. But I am not aware that it has ever found place in the creed of any Christian community, and it certainly neither does, nor possibly could, appertain to the doctrine of the Catholic Church.† It is a point on

* Jukes's *Restitution of All Things* (Longmans), pp. 3, 26. 3 ed.

† Yet the belief that "the great majority of mankind were to be consigned to horrible and everlasting torment," was one of

which orthodox believers are perfectly free to hold their own judgment or to form no judgment at all. But it is a very different matter when this opinion, instead of being discussed on its own merits, is arbitrarily identified with the dogma of eternal punishment and used *ad invidiam* to discredit it. What would be thought of a controversialist, who, in assailing the Lutheran theory of justification, should deliberately treat the notion that men may safely continue in sin that grace may abound, as an integral and recognised portion of it, and make this assumption the basis of such fiery declamation as *Anglicanus* and Professor Mayor indulge in? Yet this, as Mr. Hallam has shown, is the natural, and has only too often proved the practical corollary of the Lutheran doctrine, though it is not of course what Luther intended or desired. But the opinion that the majority of mankind will be lost is no corollary of the dogma of eternal punishment, and has no further connection with it than that the two may be, and often are, held together. The question of the number of the saved is not indeed, properly speaking, a doctrinal question at all. It depends on a multitude of moral, historical, and practical considerations, with many of which we must

Mr. Mill senior's chief grounds for rejecting Christianity, as recorded and endorsed by his son. See Mill's *Autobiography*, p. 41. It is fair, however, to remember that the elder Mr. Mill "had been educated in the creed of Scotch Presbyterianism," which identifies Christianity with the hideous Calvinist caricature of it, and he never seems to have distinguished the one from the other.

always in this life remain most imperfectly acquainted; and hence no conclusion that may be formed can at best be more than a probable one, still less can it be regarded as a dogmatic truth. To infer from the doctrine that all men who die in a certain condition, of which Omniscience alone can take infallible cognisance in any given case, are eternally excluded from the vision of God, that therefore the great majority of men do actually die in that unhappy condition, is as reasonable as to conclude that because Christ died for all men, therefore all men must necessarily be saved. Yet both assumptions lie at the root of the Universalist argument.

And what makes this arbitrary misconstruction of the dogma all the more effective a weapon in the hands of its assailants, is that they invariably interpret it to imply the damnation, not only of unbaptized infants—a difficulty which has been already explained—but of the entire heathen world, which, without including the large heathen element in countries nominally Christian, still unhappily comprehends more than two-thirds of the human race. This also is purely a matter of opinion, though the opinion has no doubt widely prevailed, especially among Protestants.* It was, indeed, an inevitable and expressly avowed consequence of the teaching of all the leading Reformers on Original Sin and Justi-

* The notion that no grace is given outside the visible Church is not an opinion merely, but a heresy, directly contradicting the Scriptural statement, "Spiritus Domini replevit orbem terrarum." Wisd. i., 7.

fication.* Their violent distortion of the Catholic doctrine of Original Sin reduced all heathen virtues, not simply to "splendid vices," but to acts which Melancthon calls "shadows of virtues," which, according to Calvin, deserve damnation, and which Luther expressly designated "mortal sins." And all chance of recovery from this state was rendered hopeless by their perverse denial, in defiance of the most elementary instincts of natural religion and many express testimonies of Scripture, of that "grace of congruity" which God freely bestows on those who in every nation act up to their imperfect light and feel after Him, if perchance they may find Him—a denial which, as Möhler justly observes, makes any philosophy of history impossible.† The damnation of the entire heathen world, both before and since the

* See a remarkable section on "Heathenism in relation to the Doctrines controverted between the Churches," in Möhler's *Symbolism*, vol. i. pp. 94, sqq. Eng. Trans. Perhaps I may be be allowed to refer, in this connection, to some remarks in my own work on the *Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement* (W. H. Allen & Co.), pp. 206, sqq., on the contrast between Catholic and Reformed doctrine on these subjects.

† A friend, a priest of the Cistercian Order, has kindly supplied me with the following apposite passage from the *Revelations of St. Bridget*, a work highly esteemed in the Church, and examined and approved by the Council of Constance, which solemnly ratified her canonization. Our Lord is represented as saying, "De te autem, Pagane, excipio omnes qui libenter incederent per viam mandatorum Meorum, si scirent quomodo et si instruerentur; qui et opera faciunt quantum sciunt et possunt; hi nullatenus vobiscum judicabuntur." Two centuries later the same view was insisted on by Cardinal Sfondrato in his *Nodus Prædestinationis Dissolutus*, which was attacked, but approved at Rome; and in our own day it has been maintained by Father Gratry. Still more remarkable is the following passage from

Incarnation, became thus a necessary corollary of the fundamental tenets of the Reformers, and was openly proclaimed as such. And the recoil from a conclusion shocking to the mind, and drawn from premisses alike unphilosophical and heterodox, contributed not a little to the attack on a dogma which is in nowise responsible for that conclusion, and which the Reformers did not invent, though in various ways they perverted it. Many Universalist writers again, even of Mr. Maurice's calibre, allow themselves to speak as though the doctrine they are assailing meant that heaven is a chartered monopoly of the "easy respectables," while the rude, and coarse, and ignorant, and blundering, and brutal, whose moral culpability—especially in early youth—may in the judgment of Omniscience be indefinitely lighter, are reserved for the eternal pit. This is but the old story of the

the *Revelations of Sister Emmerich* (ch. 64), "I next saw our Lord with his triumphant procession enter a species of purgatory, which was filled with those good Pagans, who, having but a faint glimmering of the truth, had longed for its fulfilment. This Purgatory was very deep and contained a few demons, as also some of the idols of the Pagans. I saw the demons compelled to confess the deception they had practised with regard to their idols, and the souls of the poor Pagans cast themselves at the feet of Jesus, and adored Him with inexpressible joy. Here likewise the demons were bound in chains and dragged away." The remarkable point to be noticed here is that these Pagans were actual idolaters, but inasmuch as they acted in ignorance and had not sinned against the light, they were not condemned. Dr. Newman quotes a strong passage to the same effect, from an Allocution of the present Pope, in his *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, p. 123. Sister Emmerich died in 1824, and her *Revelations* were published with the approval of the pious and learned Bishop Sailer of Ratisbon.

great lady of Louis XIV.'s court, who met the fruitless exhortations of her confessor to repentance on her death-bed with the startling rejoinder that "God would think twice before he damned a lady of quality." To exhibit such ugly parodies of the doctrine is to refute them.*

The general question of the relative number of the saved and lost has been discussed, as was observed just now, from almost every point of view, and with the utmost variety of result, by Fathers, doctors, preachers, and theologians of the Church, of unquestioned orthodoxy. A great many of these writers are

* A great part of this essay was written before my attention was called to Mr. Baldwin Brown's *Doctrine of Annihilation* (H. S. King & Co.). With the main purport of the volume I am, of course, quite in harmony; but the author also attacks the dogma of eternal punishment, though it is not at all clear what view he proposes to substitute for it. And, in framing his indictment, he begins by including in "the orthodox creed" nearly all the offensive or extraneous matter on which I have been commenting, and also—what is still more important—the hideous theory of Calvinism, which represents "the great multitude of mankind" as condemned to perdition, not by their own fault, but by "the sovereign will of the Creator." (See pp. 2—9 especially.) That *this* "doctrine of devils" is simply incredible I quite agree with him. But it is so far from being the doctrine of the Church—which he also repudiates, but to which very little of his argument applies,—that the Church condemns it as a deadly heresy. Thus, *e.g.*, he speaks (p. 42) of its debasing and brutalising effect, but the only specific instance given is of Lord Byron, who is said—the alleged fact was new to me—to have believed himself "in the Calvinistic sense reprobate," and therefore "to have given all diligence to make his calling and election to perdition sure;" a frightful state of mind certainly, but based (if correctly reported) not at all on the dogma of eternal punishment, but of reprobation. The two are constantly confounded in this volume.

enumerated in a chapter on the subject in a work of the late Dr. Faber's, who himself inclines to the milder view."* The late Father Lacordaire, the very model of priesthood in the modern Church, has devoted a volume of his *Conferences*, that "on the Results of the Divine Government," to an elaborate and minute examination of the subject, which is handled with all his accustomed force and delicacy of touch: and he comes to the conclusion that the great majority of mankind will be saved.† And we may gladly take comfort in the many considerations which seem to point that way. But the subtle operations of the human will, in contact or in conflict with the pleadings of supernatural grace, must ever continue to elude our keenest scrutiny. And where the Church is necessarily silent, individuals have no right to lay down the law, though they are free to form and advocate their own opinions, so long as they do not attempt to impose them on others as anything more than opinions. The Scriptural argument may be urged, and has been urged, on both sides, though I believe myself that Faber's estimate of it is the right one. But in dealing with a question largely depending on facts of which our knowledge cannot fail to be most im-

* *The Creator and the Creature*, by F. W. Faber, b. iii., ch. 2. The author is professedly dealing only with the case of Catholics, but a good deal of his argument has, and is admitted to have, a wider application.

† It should be remembered also that about a third of the human race die before attaining the use of reason, and, therefore, if the great majority are lost, the remnant saved must consist chiefly of baptized infants.

perfect—which, moreover, our Lord, when it was put to Him, met by an exhortation implying distinctly that the time of probation is limited and the work difficult, but as distinctly avoiding any direct reply—it would be alike presumptuous to dogmatize either way.

There is one consideration, however, of such vital importance in itself, as an integral portion of Catholic Eschatology, and having so momentous a bearing on our whole view of the future state, that it requires special notice here; and thus I am brought to the second and most far-reaching and effective of the two causes just now referred to, as having mainly influenced religious minds in their revolt against the revealed doctrine of eternal punishment. That cause lies in the neglect or denial among Protestants of another great Christian truth, attested by heathen philosophy and tradition, no less than by the teaching of the Church, and of which it may indeed be said with terrible emphasis, *neglectum sui ulciscitur*. I mean the doctrine of Purgatory and prayer for the departed. It is certainly a strange Nemesis on those who for upwards of three centuries have been inveighing against this doctrine, as a Pagan superstition, to find themselves constrained suddenly to turn round upon us with the charge that we are, in the courtly phrase of *Anglicanus*, teaching "horrible" and "infamous" doctrines and are no better than "priests of Moloch," if we decline to accept at their bidding an universal Purgatory for everybody. The doctrine of Purgatory, as well as of eternal punishment, is dis-

tinctly laid down in the *Republic* and *Gorgias* of Plato, who distinguishes between curable (ἰάσιμα) sins and the more heinous offences of those who are incorrigible (ἀνιάτοι) and must suffer in an eternal Tartarus. It held a prominent place in the popular belief of ancient Greece and Rome, as also of the East, and it is supported by many express testimonies of Holy Scripture. The commendation bestowed in the Second Book of Maccabees on the "holy and salutary" practice of prayer for the dead, is a familiar but by no means isolated example, nor can its historical testimony to the prevalent usage among the Jews be got rid of by excluding the Book from the Canon. The importance attached in the Old Testament generally, and notably in the Book of Tobias—one of the most touching and instructive narratives contained there—to the burial of the dead, points in the same direction. And the "very considerable" fact, to which Jeremy Taylor refers, that prayer for the departed formed an integral part of the Jewish ritual in the time of our Lord's earthly ministry, who nevertheless never reproved it, would alone be conclusive in its favour.* But we are not left to mere inference here. St. Paul spoke of the fire which should try every man's work, and through which he should be saved, and he has left on record his prayer for his departed friend, Onesiphorus, in language preserved from that day to this in the offices of the Church.† Nor can the passage about those "baptized for the

* *Liberty of Prophesying*, Book i. sec. 20. (Taylor's Works, vol. viii. p. 221, Heber's ed.)

† 1 Cor. iii. 13—15; 2 Tim. i. 18.

dead," which has so sorely perplexed Protestant commentators, be intelligibly interpreted except in this connection.* Another passage of the same kind is cited by Mr. Jukes as an insuperable difficulty to "Protestant orthodoxy," where St. Peter speaks of our Lord proclaiming the accomplishment of His redeeming work to the imprisoned spirits of those whose disobedience was punished by the great temporal judgment of the flood.† To a Catholic reader the sense is obvious enough. And our Lord Himself speaks of sins which are not deadly being forgiven in the next world, and of different degrees of punishment.‡ The unanimous testimony of the ancient Liturgies, which in germ at least are of earlier date than any of the books of the New Testament, is even more explicit.§ Renaudot is quite within the mark in saying, "*Si quicquid antiquissimâ omnium Ecclesiarum traditione stabilitum apud Christianos et observatum est, commemoratio defunctorum fuit ad altare Dei inter sacrorum mysteriorum celebrationem.*"||

* 1 Cor. xv. 29. Cf. Dollinger's *First Age of the Church*, p. 321 (Eng. Trans. second ed.), and for the continuous tradition of the Jewish and Christian Church, cf. ibid. pp. 153, 154.

† 1 Pet. iii. 18—20. Cf. Jukes's *Restitution*, pp. 39, 40.

‡ Matt. xii. 32; Luke xii. 47, 48.

§ Several specimens are given in Lee's *Christian Doctrine of Prayer for the Departed* (Strahan & Co.), ch. v., but the fact is too notorious to need detailed proof. It is fully admitted in Jer. Taylor's *Dissuasive against Popery*, (Works, *ut.supr.*, vol. x. p. 147.)

|| Mr. Baring Gould, after quoting St. Perpetua's account (A.D. 203) of her visions of her brother Dinocrates, who had died when seven years old, observes with good reason, that "it

In spite, however, alike of this overwhelming weight of external authority, and of the elementary instincts of natural religion, the Reformers—who were much in the habit of acting as though they were the chosen depositaries of a new revelation from on high—made short work of Purgatory and prayer for the dead. And if the Church of England is not committed to any express denial of the doctrine, every trace of it was studiously expunged from the revised Prayer Book of 1552, and under this authorised desuetude it dropped—gradually perhaps, but inevitably—out of the religious faith and practice of the multitude. There must always have been many who, like Dr. Johnson, interceded privately for their lost ones, while many more who dared not rebel against the tyranny of a false tradition groaned in secret under the perverse refinement of superstitious cruelty which, in the hour of darkness and desolation, when all earthly lights are darkened and the stricken heart instinctively turns to God, sternly forbade them to name before Him mother, or wife, or child, or beloved friend, whose name till then had never been absent from their daily prayers. It is customary with Anglicans to talk of "our beautiful Burial Service," and beautiful no doubt it is, so far as language goes; naturally enough, for nearly every word of it, not contained in the text of Scripture, is taken from Catholic sources. Its fault is

is evident from the visions S. Perpetua had of her little brother, that the Church at that early age believed the doctrine of Purgatory, and prayed for the faithful departed." *Lives of Saints*, vol. for March, p. 107.

not of commission but of omission, but the fault is a radical one. It has often been my lot to hear that service read over the graves of those very dear to me, and at such times I have never been able to escape a bitter sense of the unreality of a ritual, however musical in expression, which consigns their bodies to the earth without one syllable of intercession for their parted souls.* A service for the dead which omits to pray for them is indeed, to use the hackneyed simile, like Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark's part left out. And this cold neglect of intercession for the departed has induced a thorougly false habit of mind regarding their present condition and our relation to them. It is in a spirit of unconscious Paganism that we are apt to speak of our lost ones as "*poor*" So and So, forgetting that if indeed they have died in grace, they are the objects of reverence, not of half contemptuous pity, who are passed into no shadowy ghostland of some Homeric Hades,—at best a feeble and aimless mimicry of the true life which is no longer theirs—but are henceforth

> "No part of this half-dead, half-dying world,
> But to the region of the *living* gone
> To pray for us, and to be reached by prayer,"†

* With such pedantic and rigid minuteness in this principle carried out, that while the solemn commendation of the body to the earth is still retained, the accompanying commendation of the soul to "God the Father Almighty," found in Edward VI.'s First Book, was struck out by the Puritan revisers of 1552

† Faber.

resting awhile in the "stillness and seclusion" of the middle home, where, as another poet of our own day has no less beautifully than truly said,

> "Safe from temptation, safe from sin's pollution,
> They *live*, whom we call dead."*

It is in no spirit of captiousness or theological partizanship that I refer to the matter here, nor is it even chiefly in order to emphasize the grave neglect of one of the most obvious and urgent obligations of Christian charity, which has thus been introduced and perpetuated for centuries. But I wished to call attention, to the indirect results of this denial of Purgatory and consequent disuse of prayer for the departed. No portion of the Christian Revelation, as was before observed, stands alone, or can be ignored —still less denied—without the denial reacting on other truths intended to be retained. Let it be granted—as is in fact implied in the Tridentine decree on the subject—that errors or abuses had crept into the current teaching about Purgatory, as there were again erroneous opinions afloat about the efficacy of good works. That was a good reason for explaining, not for rejecting, doctrines which had been misunderstood. Anglicans at least might be expected to remember the principle, which Hooker uses with so much effect against his Puritan assailants, that "the abuse of a thing taketh not away the lawful use thereof." But just as Luther, in his misguided zeal for the inte-

* Longfellow.

rests of morality, invented a new theory of justification, which is proved alike by reason and experience to be profoundly immoral, so did the rejection of Purgatory on the part of the Reformers determine, by an inevitable recoil, the revolt of their children against that dogma of eternal punishment to which they hoped thereby to give additional prominence.

We cannot wonder that it should be so. If the disembodied spirit passes straight from the death-bed to its eternal home, the difficulties of the received belief become well nigh insuperable.* How few comparatively there are who, even to our clouded and partial apprehension, appear fit at the moment of departure for the Presence into which nothing this is defiled can enter! And to imagine, as Möhler expresses it, some mechanical effect in the mere "act of deliverance from the body," or, "some violent mechanical process," or "magical change" immediately following it, is an hypothesis as arbitrary and unphilosophical as it is wholly destitute of Scriptural support. St. Paul speaks of the good work begun in us here being perfected "until the day of Christ;"† and other passages from the New Testament might be quoted to the same effect. And hence from the Catholic doctrine of justification it follows that, for those who have died in communion with Christ but are as yet imperfectly conformed to His

* The moral weight of this argument for Purgatory is strikingly brought out in a passage in Kingsley's *Yeast* (pp. 116, sqq.), and by suggesting in reply that it is better not to think about the matter at all, the author virtually admits that it is unanswerable.

† Phil. i. 6.

likeness, the work of purification must be completed after death. "From this inward justification none can be dispensed; the fulfilment of the law, painful as it undoubtedly is, can be remitted to none. On each one must that holy law be inwardly and outwardly stamped."* And accordingly those Protestants who have most deeply realized this great ethical principle have felt bound to acquiesce in the depressing belief that the immense majority of even Christian adults, and the entire mass of the heathen, will be lost. If it were so, we could but bow our heads and whisper in perplexed submission, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" But we are driven, thank God, to no such terrible alternative. The difficulty is met by the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory. For the sufferings of that intermediate state, as Möhler is careful to insist, are no mere mechanical infliction, nor can man be regarded as other than a voluntary agent in the working out of his own final purification.† The acts of the soul in Purgatory are moral, though they are not strictly speaking meritorious;‡ they do not affect its final destiny, which is already fixed; but the will, now immutably directed towards good, co-operates actively in the divine process whereby the remains of evil habits and inclinations are gradually purged away, till the

* Möhler's *Symbolism*, vol. i. p. 247. The whole section on Purgatory will repay careful study. † Ibid. vol. i. p. 246.

‡ "Post hanc vitam non potest esse meritum respectu præmii essentialis, sed respectu alicujus accidentalis potest esse, quamdiu manet homo in statu viæ aliquo modo, et ideo in Purgatorio potest esse actus meritorius quantum ad remissionem culpæ venialis."—S. Tho. *Summa*, Pars. iv., Dist. 21, Q. 1, Art 2.

perfect image of Christ is reproduced in the soul, and it is made meet for the Beatific Vision and the inheritance of the Saints in light. It is not only, or chiefly, that there is generally a debt of punishment to be paid (*reatus pœnæ*), though this of course is true; there is also a defilement clinging to the intellect and will and affections, the residue of former sin (*reatus culpæ*), which must be eradicated. And that can only be accomplished with the willing co-operation of the soul itself, painfully yet joyfully struggling to burst the fetters wherewith it had bound itself.* Sometimes the work is completed in this life, but oftener it is not. Years or centuries of corrective discipline may be required for some, while others may almost tread unscathed the burning marle of that middle world of cleansing agony, like the three Hebrew boys who were tried as gold in the fire of God's chastening affection, to whom the stifling breath of the furnace seven times heated was as the freshness of the dewy breeze,† nor did its smell pass upon their raiment. And for others again, "one minute's anguish" may do the work of a thousand years, as in the beautiful French legend of "The Faithful Soul," embodied in one of Miss Procter's most exquisite poems. But since Christ was crucified no soul of man, not dying in infancy, was ever sanctified without suffering, whether its fire-bap-

* Remissio peccati in Purgatorio *quantum ad pœnam* est ex parte ignis purgatorii, qua homo patiendo exsolvit quod debet, et ita cessat reatus; sed *quantum ad culpam*, non remittitur per pœnam."—S. Tho. *De Malo*, Q. 7, Art. 2—7, ad. 9.

† "Quasi ventum roris flantem."—Dan. iii. 50, *Vulg.*

tism be endured in this life or in the world beyond the grave.

The aspect of the doctrine on which I have been dwelling is very clearly brought out in Dante's *Purgatorio.** And to many who would never dream of looking at a regular theological treatise, and would hardly understand it if they did, Dr. Newman's masterly poem, *The Dream of Gerontius*, will have come like a new revelation of the whole idea of the future state.† No theologian, in truth, could have more for-

* See a very suggestive commentary by a learned Rosminian and member of the Alighieri family, *I Setti Cerchi del Purgatorio di Dante*, di Paolo Perez (Verona, 1867), with the authorities cited. I will add one short extract—"Mai a rimuovere il secondo impedimento [*i.e.*, the *reatus culpæ*] o sia ogni residua venialità, ogni caligine del intelletto, e grevezza della volontà, si che l'anima spieghi e rechi in atto tutta quella carità che in lei rimane quasi legata, nel Purgatorio non par bastare la sola pena dei sensi; è necessario *qualche atto spirituale*, qualche intimo e profondo esercizio *dell anima stessa*, che la stenebri del tutto, la disgrevi, la infiammie e rapisea nella Verità e Giustizia Suprema, a cui non può ancora del tutto congiungersi." p. 15.

† It is perhaps hardly necessary to notice an ignorant objection sometimes raised against the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory, that the Church has no right to claim jurisdiction over departed souls. Of course not. But the only plausible pretext for this strange misapprehension is based on the fact that Indulgences are granted "applicable to the dead." Every Catholic however knows perfectly well that they can be applied to the dead only *per modum suffragii, i.e.*, that the Church beseeches God to accept them on behalf of the dead, over whom she claims no sort of jurisdiction. This is the teaching of all theologians on the subject, which may be summed up in the words of the Jesuit Gury's *Compendium Theol. Moral* (vol ii. p. 494), one of the most approved and widely used text books of Moral Theology in the Church; "Indulgentia nequit applicari defunctis per modum *absolutionis*, sed tantum per modum *suffragii*; nempe Deum depre-

cibly summed up the philosophy of Purgatory than he has done in the beautiful lines describing the condition of the "happy suffering soul," which is "safe" in that middle home,

"*Consumed, yet quickened,* by the glance of God."

For over all its penal fires is shed "the tender grace" of that light of Divine forgiveness, which to the Christian eye irradiates the site of Nineveh with a far deeper and more abiding interest than any which the archæologist can elicit from the cuneiform inscriptions on its mouldering shrines. There are several passages of *Gerontius* one is sorely tempted to quote, but the poem is in everybody's hands, and my space is limited. I will content myself therefore with referring to the guardian angel's explanation of the "double agony" awaiting his charge, in the lines ending—

"And these two pains, so counter and so keen—
The longing for Him, when thou seest Him not;
The shame of self at thought of seeing Him,—
Will be thy veriest, sharpest purgatory."*

Here then, we have the solution of that agonizing doubt which would else cast a shadow over even the saintliest death-beds. Purgatory serves to illustrate at once the awful purity and the tender compassion of our God. It witnesses to that perfect holiness without which none may see His Face, and to the long-suffering charity which would still at the eleventh hour

cando ut benigne velit talem applicationem acceptare et animabus purgatorii applicare. Ratio est *quia pontifex jurisdictionem non habet in animas defunctorum.* Hinc eas absolvere a poenis velut per sententiam non potest."

* Newman's *Verses on Various Occasions* p. 351.

"devise a way to bring His banished home." We may not dare to penetrate the secrets of His Providence, but we may thankfully gaze with hope as well as awe on what Faber has somewhere beautifully called that "eighth great sacrament of fire," and trust that it will avail for the final purification of countless millions who have partially misused or neglected, or been inculpably deprived of, the seven sacraments of earth. When we contemplate, for instance, the multitudes of this huge metropolis, and consider how large is the proportion of them who in the language of Scripture "know not their right hand from their left," far outnumbering the six-score thousand children for whose sake Nineveh was spared in the days of the prophet Jonas—who are born into an atmosphere charged with impurity and blasphemy, and often, after a few short years of coarse and godless frivolity or unsolaced suffering, sink into an early and what looks like a hopeless grave,—the spectacle would indeed be a heartrending one, if we had not reason to believe that for many of these also, who in the unerring judgment of the great Discerner of hearts have not sinned fatally against the light, there may remain that second baptism of fire, to anneal them for the Presence they had never been taught to recognise on earth. In vast numbers of those neglected children, the street Arabs of our overgrown cities, are latent we cannot doubt, the same admirable moral capabilities which were so nobly exemplified the other day by the boys on the Goliath, and those who know most of them assure us that it is so; but too often, from adverse circumstances and lack of opportunity, their

better qualities remain undeveloped to the last in this world. It would be deplorable to be unable to hope that scope may be found for them in the next. And thus what, as regards ourselves, is a prospect full of deepest awe, and a keen incentive to work out our salvation while it is yet day, enables us to judge hopefully of the future possibilities of others, whose temptations may be stronger and their opportunities far less than ours, but of whom it were no true charity to doubt that they are not at present such as God would have them.

Take again the case of what are called death-bed conversions. I am far from denying that such cases are possible, and may be not uncommon, though there is not perhaps much evidence to show for it. *Nescit tarda molimina Spiritûs Sancti gratia.* The operations of grace cannot be limited by measurements of earthly time, and in that last hour of his extremest need the prodigal may heed the call so long neglected, return to his Father's arms and die forgiven. But the habits and associations of a lifetime are not so easily unlearnt, and the work of sanctification has still to be accomplished. The soul has all the scars of its old sins and corrupt tastes and dispositions still upon it; it is "not pure nor strong enough for bliss," and must be cleansed, and braced, and perfected in the fires of God's righteous correction, before it can bear the unclouded sunshine of His Love.

On whichever side it is looked at, the doctrine of Purgatory is a most helpful, most consoling, most practical, most fruitful, most suggestive, most indispens-

able truth. We can hardly make too much of it, so long as we do not confound the salutary discipline of that intermediate trial-place—as most assuredly it is not confounded in the teaching of Scripture or of the Church—with the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched. So directly did the Reformers contradict the instincts of natural religion as well as the testimony of revelation in their denial of this truth, that many who had been brought up in their tenets rebelled against it. Thus for instance, Swedenborg, whose theological system was mainly shaped by his repulsion from the Lutheran theory of justification, and is, to quote a modern writer, "unquestionably that of a profound thinker,"*—though it comprises errors more fundamental than those he combated—is most explicit in his teaching on Purgatory.† The Danish theologian, Martensen, upholds it, both name and thing, in his *Christliche Dogmatik*: and Rothe, the German Lutheran, takes the same view, in his *Theologische Ethik*, only he wrongly includes it in the idea, to be noticed further on, of a probation continued, in certain cases, after death till a time comes when the whole being is turned to evil (*dämonisirt*) and conversion is no longer possible.‡ Other examples, both from German and English Protestant divines, might be added, of a close approximation to Catholic teaching on this

* *The Unseen Universe* (Macmillan), p. 40.

† See Möhler's *Symbolism*, vol ii. pp. 276, sqq.

‡ The connection of their eschatology with their general teaching is indicated in my *Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement*, pp. 281, sqq.

point. But, without the recognised and regular practice of prayer for the departed, which is its correlative, it cannot be expected to take root in the popular belief. Its standing witness and preservative is found in the Sacrifice of the Mass.*

* I speak under correction, but (putting aside some obscure mediæval sects) I believe I am right in saying that Protestantism offers, with one very significant exception, the first example o the introduction into the world of anything which can fairly be called a religion, whether true or false, without the rite of sacrifice and the practice of prayer for the dead. The one exception, which conspicuously illustrates the rule, is of course Mahometanism, on the true character of which, both ethical and religious, see F. Schlegel's *Philosophy of History* (Engl. Trans.) pp. 326, sqq. It may suffice here to observe that a religion without mysteries finds its natural issue in a "paradise of lust."

CHAPTER II.

THE WITNESS OF REASON.

So much it seemed desirable to say of the errors and mistakes which have fostered, and go far to excuse, the repulsion felt by many devout minds against the dogma of eternal punishment. It may of course be defended, and has therefore been assailed, on the threefold ground of Reason, Tradition, and Scripture; or, rather, it has been controverted almost exclusively on the alleged ground of reason, and then Scripture and Tradition have been ingeniously (I doubt not often sincerely) tortured into conformity with a foregone conclusion, which most assuredly no inquirer who approached those authorities with an unbiassed mind, would ever have deduced from them. But as the doctrine has been assailed all along the line, it will be necessary to follow the Universalist argument through all its various phases. And I will take them in the reverse order, beginning with the ethical objections, and ending with the testimony of Scripture. It must, however, be understood, that I do not profess to *prove* the doctrine on *à priori* grounds; the proof rests on Revelation. It would

be enough to show—though we may, in fact, go further—that it cannot be *disproved* on grounds of reason, and that there are at least equal difficulties in the way of any alternative solution that may be substituted for it. Bishop Bulter has pointed out that, from the nature of the case, a revelation is likely to "contain many things appearing to us liable to great objections," and, accordingly—as might have been expected, but as the advocates of Universalism never care to remember—that Christianity is, and must ever remain to us in this life, "a scheme imperfectly comprehended."* But he further observes, in reference to this very subject, that "Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the *duration* and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and description, as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere Revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked shall be made at the end of this world; that each shall *then* receive according to his deserts." And Revelation has added no fresh difficulty, as will appear more clearly presently, in deciding what could hardly have been determined either way on principles of reason only, that there is no second state of probation before the final doom. The objection, whatever be its force, applies not to the particular period when the sentence is pronounced, but to the fact of its being irre-

* *Analogy*, Part i. ch. 2, note *n*.

versible. And that difficulty runs up into another, which has perplexed philosophers in every age, who have suggested partial explanations of more or less plausibility, but which, with our existing faculties and means of knowledge, can never be adequately solved. "It is fruitless," to cite an able modern writer, "to expect that science should throw any light upon that greatest of all mysteries—the Origin of Evil. We have now come to a region where we must suffer ourselves to be led solely by the light which is given us in the Christian Records."* That light is sufficient for our guidance, but not for our intellectual satisfaction, and it is obscured, instead of being aided, by Universalism. Yet the fact, however inexplicable, is too obtrusively patent to be ignored. Were it otherwise, for one objector who declaims against eternal punishment, which lies beyond our visible cognisance, there would be a thousand denying the existence of evil, which is far harder to reconcile with any *à priori* notions we can form of the eternal fitness of things. This difficulty Christian Universalists are, of course, obliged to leave exactly where they found it. Mr. Mill, in his posthumous theology, or rather negation of theology—for a limited God is in truth no God at all—does honestly attempt to grapple with it; but a solution which begins by sacrificing the principle of theism is clearly worse than none. And that great writer has admitted, with characteristic candour, that if the postulate of theism be once admitted, the ac-

* *The Unseen Universe*, p. 208.

ceptance of revelation is its natural or inevitable sequel.*

It is true, no doubt, as Mr. Jukes observes, that the fact of creation is itself an incomprehensible mystery.† We cannot tell why the Self-existent and Supreme, who had lived for an eternity by Himself, should in the fulness of time have stooped from that Divine solitude to create the worlds, though we may dimly discern that the creative fiat was an overflow of His eternal love. But that does not help to explain the permission of evil, the creation of angels and men who would use their freedom to turn against their Maker. It may be true, again, though this must be matter of speculation only, that for moral beings the "knowledge of evil is [not simply in the existing dispensation, but in itself] essential to the knowledge and experience of some of the higher forms of good," or rather not knowledge of evil merely, but active conflict with it. But, if so, it surely follows that for moral beings probation implies the risk of ultimate failure, and all natural analogy, as Butler has pointed out, would lead us to infer that such is actually the case. To argue that this is impossible, because no creature would have been called into existence which

* "Those who admit an omnipotent, as well as perfectly just and benevolent Maker and Ruler of such a world as this, can say little against Christianity but what can, with at least equal force, be retorted against themselves."—Mill's *Autobiography*, p. 39. The author is recording his father's opinion, but he evidently intends to endorse it. Cf. *Three Essays on Religion* p. 214.

† *Restitution*, pp. 110, sqq.

was not to attain happiness in the end, is not only directly to contradict Scripture, but to make the untenable assumption that the entire purpose of the Creator lies within the grasp of our feeble and finite intelligence. But we may go a step further. The sole reason why the existence of evil does not come home to us as a difficulty, while we shrink from the belief that it will continue to exist for ever, is because the one has been familiar to us from childhood as a fact of daily experience, while the other is not matter of consciousness, but of faith. Once admit, what is evident, that the created will has the power of rebelling against its Maker, and there is absolutely no ground in reason for assuming that the rebellion, and therefore the chastisement, must sooner or later necessarily have an end. Revelation might have told us so, but it has not. Reason, as far as it throws any light on the question, points the other way.

Let us remember, in the first place, what is one of the tritest truisms in ethics, the essential tendency of habits to become inveterate. Every student of Aristotle will be familiar with the principle, and all experience confirms it. But there is no reason for supposing that the laws of our moral being will be revolutionized in a future state. Granting then, for argument's sake, that the time of probation may be indefinitely prolonged after death, what right have we to assume that he who is filthy will not be filthy still? So far as we have any data for judging, the contrary is far more probable. Yet it is certain that without holiness no man shall see the Lord.

How, then, is the indispensable work of conversion and sanctification to be accomplished after death? It can only be in one of two ways. Either the soul must be converted, without its own co-operation, on the Calvinist principle, by an irresistible constraint of grace, or the will must freely respond to the Divine call. It would be quite out of place, and would extend this essay beyond all reasonable limits, to enter here on a discussion of Calvinism, and there is the less reason for it, because no Universalist is likely to adopt that hypothesis, or could consistently do so. It may suffice, therefore, to observe that on the Calvinist theory the indefectible gift is always supposed to be bestowed in this life, nor is there any shadow of ground for assuming that, if withheld here, it will be supplied in the life to come. The process, then, must be effected with the co-operation of the human will. But how can we be sure, to say the very least, that the will which in this world remained obdurate to the last, will certainly in the next world yield to the gracious influence it had finally rejected here? Will conversion be easier after death? That is at best a purely gratuitous hypothesis, nor do Universalists, I believe, generally maintain it. Some of them expressly admit that it is likely to be much harder. Is the severity of punishment to produce the requisite change? There are passages in Mr. Jukes's book which seem to imply that this is "God's way to to free those who in no other way can be delivered."*

* See, *e.g.*, "*Restitution*," pp. 88, 91.

But pain, in itself, has no converting power. Suffering willingly endured has, to be sure, under the Gospel dispensation a salutary, what may be called a kind of sacramental, efficacy, derived from the Passion of Christ. But it works *ex opere operantis* only; its effect depends wholly on the use that is made of it, and it does but harden and brutalize those it fails to sanctify. There is a terrible truth, which experience abundantly bears out, in those inspired words, applicable alike to the state of obstinate sinners in this life and of those who are finally confirmed in their evil will (*obstinati in malo*) in the next, "And they gnawed their tongues for pain, and blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their wounds, *and repented not of their deeds.*"* A soldier's life is a hard and painful one, but the army is no school of saints. In this life bad men are usually made worse by pain; why should we assume that it will certainly transform them in the next? I am speaking, be it remembered, of those who die unconverted, not of the imperfect whose initial conversion is perfected in "the willing agony" of purgatorial chastisement. And I repeat that there is no ground whatever for assuming that the discipline of pain, which only hardened them on earth, will convert and purify them in the world beyond the grave.

There are yet graver difficulties behind. If the term of probation is extended beyond this life, where are we to draw the line? We can fix no period, however

* Apoc. xii, 10, 11.

distant, when all will have been converted, if the human will is to have anything to do with the matter. Is probation then to last for ever? Rothe, as we saw just now, adopts a kind of modified Universalism. Purgatory, including a continued probation for those who die impenitent, is to continue till the end of the present world and the general Judgment. But within that interval a time will sooner or later come for each individual, when his trial is over, and he has either turned to God or become wholly fixed in evil (*dämonisirt*), after which no further change is possible, and he is lost for ever. This looks a more reasonable view than the vulgar forms of Universalism; but what does it really mean? Simply this, that the discernment of Omniscience may be measured by our own. A man dies, let us suppose, after a short life; his character appeared to be a very mixed one, with much of good in it, which might have been developed under more favourable circumstances; his temptations were strong, his religious opportunities small. He was suddenly carried off by accident, as men speak (for the term is, of course, unmeaning in relation to God); he died in sin, and he is lost for ever. Now I am not saying whether such a case ever actually occurred, nor are we authorized, in the absence of a special revelation (which has been given in one instance only), to form judgments about the final rejection of individuals: I have simply drawn out an hypothetical contingency, and I have stated the difficulty very strongly on purpose. It is argued that to all such persons a second trial must in fairness

be allowed hereafter; they have not had time or scope for the full exhibition of their will and character, which can only be ascertained after a longer and more diversified experience. To our apprehension, yes; but we are not appointed to judge the world. The longest and most eventful career does not give full play to the latent capabilities of even a very ordinary character, whence it has almost become a proverb that new and unsuspected powers are often revealed by some sudden change of circumstances or critical emergency. It shows what is in a man, as we say,—shows it to us that is; but do we really imagine—I speak to those who have not yet learnt to resolve their God into "a stream of tendency"—that He to whom a thousand years are as one day cannot, if it so please Him, as infallibly test the entire bent and and purpose of the will by a single trial as after a course prolonged through countless ages? By one sin of disobedience our first father forfeited his birthright; by one sin of pride the rebel angels lost their first estate; by one act of fidelity Abraham was justified, and Michael won that crown of archetypal glory from which Lucifer by transgression fell. But to the all-seeing Eye those acts summed up the character of a lifetime. Adam would have profited nothing by a longer trial, nor Lucifer have unlearnt the perverse resolve to worship self instead of God. If the period of probation is to be limited at all, it matters nothing to the unerring judgment of the All-wise at what precise point the term is fixed. And if, according to Mr. Jukes's view, "the way of restoration is open to

all eternity," and has no limit, it may also have no end. We are confronted at once by a further and insoluble difficulty, which did not at all escape the attention of Origen, although his modern disciples for the most part conspire to ignore it.

The final restoration of all the impenitent, and probably of the rebel angels also—which is, indeed, as St. Augustine urges, implied in the argument*—to life and joy eternal, is the very sum and substance of modern Universalist theology. Origen maintained the more intelligible, though, as Neander calls it, "comfortless" doctrine of a perpetual interchange between recovery and relapse, the will being never immutably fixed, either in good or evil, and the probation of the soul being therefore never closed. The destiny of the creature would thus be an everlasting see-saw between light and darkness, heaven and hell. But, with rare exceptions, those who, in our own day, have revived the negative side of his system, in its denial of eternal punishment, have quietly dropped out the positive side, which is thought too "uncomfortable" to be true.† It is due to *Anglicanus* to say that he is more consistent here. He makes short work indeed, in his usual

* *De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 23. This is fully admitted by Mr. Jukes, *Restitution*, p. 147. Yet, unless the whole Christian doctrine of temptation is also wrong, Satan has not profited by his extended probation yet.

† It must also be remembered that Origen based his theory on the Platonic notion, which nobody maintains now, of the pre-existence of all natural intelligences, angelic or human, in a former state.

jaunty fashion, of the great ethical principle of the permanence of habits just now referred to, or rather ignores it altogether, and seems unable to conceive of any state of the will as final, except by "mechanical fixation;" but he repudiates the purely arbitrary distinction of ordinary Universalism, which affirms the establishment of the just in eternal righteousness, while denying that the evil can become incorrigible, and thus outrages at once the letter of Scripture and the laws of thought. To the Scriptural argument I shall have to revert presently. I will merely say here that Origenism, unscriptural as it is, does less violence to Scripture and is far more logical than the vulgar theory of Universalism. Yet the consequences of accepting it are sufficiently portentous. It must be applied, of course, like Universalism, to the case of angels as well as men. But in every created nature, from the highest to the lowest, holiness is not an inherent virtue, but an accidental grace. And as long as probation lasts the gift may be forfeited. It follows, therefore, that a time may come when the keen intelligence of the mighty Cherubim, wisest and eldest-born of the intellectual creation of God, who through countless ages have gazed in fixed, unbroken trance on the mystery of the Divine Attributes, and grown in wisdom as they gazed, may be turned to folly; when the burning adoration of the Seraphim, the spirits of worship and of love, whose rapt devotion has been fed through countless ages from the Fount of Living Fire, may be centred, like Lucifer's on themselves instead of God.

There is no security for the final perseverance of Apostles, Martyrs, Saints, who are already sun-flushed with the brightness of the Uncreated Vision and sphered within the emerald of the rainbow that spans the everlasting throne; nay, more—shocking as it sounds to say so—the Blessed Mother herself, the crown of all creaturely existence, who bore and suckled the Eternal, may some day come to be thrust into the exterior darkness. This is not the language of rhetoric or fanciful exaggeration; it is a mere statement of part of what is necessarily and confessedly involved in the scheme excogitated, though not publicly taught, by Origen. Yet that system, I repeat, is less arbitrary, less inconsistent with itself and with the letter of Scripture, than modern Universalism.

Another theory has indeed been propounded in these latter days, which it may be as well to notice in passing, though it can hardly be needful to dwell upon it at any length; I mean the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked. A notion so purely artificial and gratuitous in itself, so directly in the teeth of all Scriptural or traditional authority, and so violently opposed to the most rudimentary instincts of natural religion, is never likely to take root and spread.* It

* St. Augustine argues in several places (*De Civ. Dei*, xi. 26, 27; *De Lib. Arbit.*, iii. 6, 7, 8, &c.), that every rational being, from the law of its nature, prefers continued existence, however miserable, to annihilation. Aquinas (*Summa*, Pars I., Q. 53), uses the same argument. This is borne out by the statement of Plutarch, that "the idea of annihilation was intolerable to the

is a mere clumsy attempt to cut the knot of a difficulty which its authors cannot solve, by introducing another and far more fatal one in its place. For it starts by assuming that the soul of man is not created immortal, and thereby cuts at the roots of what is perhaps the most persuasive and universal, if it be not the most logically irresistible, of the arguments for theism. "Heaven lies about us in our infancy," and in every age of the world, and under every corruption of the primæval faith, simple and sage alike have dimly traced those "clouds of glory," which are the token of our immortal birth, instinctive yearnings and visions of an unsatisfied ideal of beauty, telling us from whence the spirit of man has come, and to whom it must at last return. By treating this *testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ* as an idle dream, the dark and atheistic creed to which I am referring saps the very foundations of religious faith and trust.* Like the Calvinist doctrine of reprobation, though in a different way, it strikes not only at the Christian revelation, but at all belief in God. The whole argu-

Greeks, and if they had to choose between entire extinction and an eternity of torment, they would have chosen the latter." See Dollinger's *Gentile and Jew*, vol ii. p. 144. But cf. on the other hand, *Summa*, Suppl. ad Part III., Q. 98, Art. 3.

* It is of course condemned, as Pearson points out, in the last article of the Apostles' Creed. He quotes St. Peter Chrysologus, (*Serm.* 60) "Credimus vitam æternam, quia post resurrectionem nec bonorum finis est, nec malorum." Rufinus (*Com. in Ps.* 1.) gives the same explanation. Socinus insinuated, but shrank from openly teaching, this heresy. See his 6th Epistle to Volkelius, cited by Pearson.

ment of the first chapter of Butler's *Analogy* for "the natural immortality of the soul" must be abandoned, before we can accept it.* And, indeed, the leading preacher of Annihilationism in this country disposes of that argument in three short lines, without giving a hint that he ever heard of it. "We believe," he tells us, "that, the reasonable soul and body having been created to form one man, neither of them *has any natural power* to live apart from the other, or would do so for a moment without *Divine interposition*," by which he evidently means special and miraculous interposition, not the ordinary interposition or concurrence of the Creator, which is necessary at every moment for sustaining the life of the creature. By this "Divine interposition," however, the soul of the sinner is for some unexplained reason to be kept alive

* Butler argues that the destruction of a living being is probably *impossible*. See *Analogy*, ch. i. note b. It is hardly necessary to add that the popular notion of animals having no future life is at best, as he observes, a purely arbitrary assumption: revelation, to say the least, gives no countenance to it, and reason points distinctly the other way. It may be some consolation to us in reflecting on the hideous cruelties to which hundreds of thousands of unoffending animals have been subjected of late years in the torture dens of the Vivisectors,—though it of course affords no excuse whatever for the scientific Torquemadas who authorize or preside over those orgies of blood,—to be able to believe that there is something in store for them beyond the life which has been wrung in slow agony out of their quivering frames. There are some good remarks on the Scriptural aspect of the question in the Rev. G. Wood's *Man and Beast, Here and Hereafter*. On the general question of the capabilities and probable future of the animal creation, the reader will find much of interest in Miss Cobbe's charming little work, *False Beasts and True*.

"until the final judgment," after which, by a second arbitrary fiat of omnipotence, "God can, and will kill it."* As to the Scriptural argument, it is surely obvious on the face of it that the terms "life" and "death," when applied in Scripture to the soul, cannot possibly be taken to mean existence and non-existence, as the Annihilationist theory assumes.† It will be time enough to enter into detailed controversy with its advocates, when they have discovered some better plea than their dislike of the doctrine it has been arbitrarily invented to replace. Yet, monstrous as it is, this theory is less unphilosophical than the modern form of Universalism, in so far as it recognises, while it misapplies, that great ethical law which Universalists so flippantly ignore; viz. "that," in the words of an Annihilationist writer, "the creature may so choose and cling to evil, may become so incorporated and identified with it, and it may come to be so thoroughly both the warp and woof of his inmost self, . . . as that, so far as we can see, there could be no destruction of the evil without destruction of the creature."‡ And therefore the immortal beings who have thus become incorrigible (the ἀνιάτοι of Plato's Republic) must bear for ever the terrible burden they have laid on their own shoulders, not because God has forgotten to be merciful, but because

* *Harmony of Scripture on Future Punishment*, by Rev. S. Minton, p. 19.

† See *e.g.* among numberless passages which might be cited, John v. 24, 25; xvii. 3; Rom. viii. 6; Gal. ii. 19; 1 John iii. 14.

‡ Letter to Archbishop of Canterbury, by Rev. H. H. Dobney, 1864; quoted in MacColl's *Eternity of Punishment.*

it is no longer possible to renew them to repentance.

And here a further remark, bearing on the general question, will be in place. It has been shown that the various antagonistic theories, propounded from time to time by opponents of the Catholic doctrine, are beset by difficulties at least as formidable as any they are intended to remove. To this Universalists are apt to reply that the subject is confessedly a mysterious one, and that they are not bound to clear up the mystery. But that is no answer. *They are certainly bound to explain mysteries of their own making.* It is enough for us, who accept on faith a revealed doctrine, to show that it contains nothing which can be proved to contradict reason, though in fact we can show much more than this. For we start with Bishop Butler's principle—which Mr. Jukes himself admits at the outset, though he seems afterwards to forget it—that no revelation from God can be free from difficulties, and that "there are even difficulties as to the present facts of life, which are quite inexplicable."* But those who

* *Restitution*, p. 3. In his recent strictures on the argument of the *Analogy* ("Bishop Butler and the *Zeitgeist*" in *Contemp. Rev.*, for March, 1876, pp. 582, sqq.), Mr. Matthew Arnold seems wholly to misapprehend the real purport of that treatise. He takes Butler to task for not *proving* the existence of God and of a future life. But it is clear from the whole scope of the argument, and Butler expressly says in several passages, one of which is actually quoted by his critic, that he was not undertaking to prove these truths, which he assumed to be proved on their own proper evidence. His professed aim is to meet objections urged on grounds of reason against the doctrines thus

reject a doctrine claiming—on what every candid inquirer must allow to be in itself an overwhelming weight of evidence—to be contained in the written Word of God, *because of its difficulties, which to them appear inexplicable,* and substitute a new system of their own, very hard, to say the least, to reconcile with the letter of Scripture, and absolutely incompatible with the sense the Christian Church of all ages has put upon it,* cannot consistently take this ground. For all the difficulties in their system they are themselves directly responsible, and they have no claim to a hearing till they have explained them. It has been justly observed, in connection with this very doctrine, that "*he who will believe nothing but that which he can explain, may well be required to explain everything which he believes.*"† Can Universalists meet this obviously reasonable requirement? By their own admission they cannot.

On the other hand, those who consider the matter calmly, apart from random declamation about "infamous doctrines," "priests of Moloch," and the like, will find nothing unreasonable or improbable in the revealed doctrine. It is always easy to call names, and the *odium theologicum* is by no means a monopoly

evidenced. Mr. Arnold's criticism, whatever be its value, applies much more to the argument of Paley's *Natural Theology* than to the *Analogy*, which a far deeper thinker, Mr. Mill, declares to be, "from its own point of view, conclusive."

* We have seen that this is fully admitted by Sir J. Stephen. Cf. *supra*, p. 9.

† *Personality of the Tempter and other Sermons.* By C. J. Vaughan, D.D., p. 39. The italics are the author's.

of orthodox believers. What, then, is meant by the dogma of eternal damnation? It means, in one word, leaving the sinner to himself. "Ephraim is joined to idols; *let him alone.*" It is no arbitrary infliction of "a vengeful Deity," as scoffers, and others who should know better, are fond of phrasing it; it is simply that God has at length withdrawn from His rebellious creature the care and gracious aid it had pertinaciously despised. The blessing comes from God, the curse from the sinner himself.* Man is neither a self-existent nor a self-dependent being; he is not αὐτάρκης. His being depends on the will of his Creator, his happiness or well-being on union with Him and with those creatures who are given to be his fellows, and on whom he is constrained to lean for support. But man was created a moral and immortal being, placed in a state of probation, and endowed with excellent gifts both of nature and of grace; and on his use of those gifts depends the favour of his Maker. There is no injustice in withdrawing it from those who deliberately abuse their graces and opportunities; and when this abuse becomes final and complete, the isolation from God and from all good must be complete and final also. The soul has missed the final end of its creation through its own fault; it has chosen self instead of God, and it remains for ever miserable. The worm of remorse that dieth not, the flame of burning thirst that is not quenched, the great gulf or

* Hence to οἱ εὐλογημένοι τοῦ πατρός μοῦ in Matt. xxv. 34, corresponds οἱ κατηραμένοι simply in ver. 41.

chasm firmly fixed, express different aspects of the same hopeless, irremediable woe—the conscious loss of God, and all which that loss involves.* It is the idea shadowed out in the words of the Roman satirist, who most nearly of heathen writers touched on the Christian conception of sin;

"Virtutem videant, intabescantque relicta."†

That is the perfect misery of the creature which has failed of its proper destiny, and can no longer console itself with the illusory solace of other creatures for the loss of the Creator, but is compelled henceforth to realize its "eternal damnation," that is, the eternal loss of goodness and of God. It is the misery of which the beginnings are witnessed here on earth, as when Cain was driven forth an outcast from the face of God and man, and complained in the bitterness of his heart that his punishment was greater than he could bear; only that here the curse is never irremediable, though it is constantly tending to become so. Let us take the case, which unhappily is not rare, of a man who has enjoyed the pleasures of sin for a season, and has contrived, while health and friends and outward prosperity lasted, to dream that he is happy, while his affection is centred in creatures and he has forgotten God. By degrees, as age and infirmity creep upon him, his former pleasures pall upon

* "Vermis autem qui non morietur, et ignis qui non extinguetur, a plerisque conscientia accipitur peccatorum, quæ torqueat in supplicio constitutos, quare vitio suo et peccato caruerint electorum bono." Hieron. *Comment in Isaiam*, cap. lxvi. ad fin

† Pers. *Sat.* iii. 38.

his jaded taste; his friends fall off or are removed by death; he suffers perhaps from heavy losses or chronic disease, or he is constrained to learn by experience "how sharper than a serpent's tooth it is to have a thankless child;" and as earthly props are failing him one by one, it becomes daily more impossible, though he struggles hard against it, to stifle the uneasy consciousness that he is without God in the world. The Spirit indeed is striving with him still, and his sorrow might be turned into contrition, but it is not; it is the "worldly sorrow that worketh death." He has fought a lifelong fight against all better influences from within or from without, and it is well-nigh over now. If he were to live a hundred, two hundred, three hundred years, his life would grow continually more unendurable, consumed by the flame of unsatisfied longing, and with the worm of remorse ever gnawing at his heart—till perhaps at last, in sheer desperation, he would attempt, as many have done before, to rid himself of the burden by suicide. But there is no need for that. Sooner or later the moment comes, inscrutable to human discernment but not to the All-seeing Eye, when the measure of his iniquity is full, and his evil choice irrevocably fixed. The Voice to which he would not hearken pleads no more. His soul is required of him, and the rebel spirit returns to Him who gave it. Is this a fancy picture? Yet, unless the act of dying is to effect some magical change,—which there is nothing in reason or revelation to suggest,—such as the sinner was when he passed from earth he must wake in the world unseen;

and therefore, like Dives, he "lifts up his eyes in hell." He had carried it with him.*

We need not rack our brains to devise images of physical torment, which may or may not be accurate: the *pœna damni*, if we will only try to realize it, is quite enough. That "without holiness no man shall see the Lord," is a moral axiom as well as a revealed truth. The kingdom of Satan, like the kingdom of God, is within us. There needs no active infliction of vengeance by an angry Deity. Nay, more; it has been observed by the profoundest of living theologians that no greater punishment could be imagined for an unholy man than to summon him to heaven. "Heaven would be hell to an irreligious man."† And for this reason; if *per impossibile* he could be brought there, not having the nuptial robe of charity, he would find himself in the midst of a society wholly uncongenial to him, whose tastes, habits, sympathies, interests, he neither shared nor understood, whose every thought and aspiration was dominated by one Central Object, and that Object hateful to him. A contrast may serve to illustrate my meaning. It sometimes happens—I have known more than one instance of it myself, and the misery that followed—that a well-nurtured boy, of gentle birth and nature, in a fit of

* Butler argues expressly that there is no ground for supposing that the exercise of our present powers of reflection is even *suspended* by the act of dying. See *Analogy*. ch. i. *ad fin.*

† Newman's *Parochial Sermons*, vol. i. p. 7. See also a very striking passage in Newman's *Callista*, pp. 217, sqq. Dr. Seccombe has shown (*Science, Theism and Revelation*) that modern science tends rather to confirm than to shake the Christian doctrine of retribution. See especially pp. 70—72.

impatience or depression through some misfortune or family quarrel. enlists in the army as a private, and repents at leisure of his mistake when it is too late. All his surroundings are repulsive to him, his companions are worse than none, their ways are not as his, and he would prefer solitude to their company. Turn all this the other way, and it may help to suggest some faint idea of the condition of a reprobate thrust into the company of the saints. The soul of man needs external objects to rest upon, and on earth it is never wholly destitute of them, but on these heavenly objects the impenitent soul could not rest. Everything would but recall with a fresh and piercing anguish the holiness it had forfeited, the God it had forsaken, and would thus intensify the gnawing hunger and burning thirst which thenceforth could never be satisfied. When our first parents fell, they sought to hide themselves from the presence of the Lord; to the lost soul that blissful Presence, from which it is eternally excluded, would only bring the consummation of its woe. To cite the summary of Scripture teaching on this awful subject, given by a writer who never indulges in rhetoric or play of the fancy; "These and other intimations show the condition of those who are irreclaimable, and therefore shut out from the company of the blessed, to be an abiding consciousness of having missed the end of life, a loss of all the heart before clung to; it is an absolute impotence and want of energy, because all the powers of life are withdrawn, and the will is now empty and unfruitful, and only fixed on evil; the constant

burning of unsatisfied passions, and the gnawing pain of a conscience which cannot again be laid to sleep."*

But Universalists tell us they prefer "a more charitable view." Such language is both misleading and invidious. The plea of charity, as they urge it, is not only irrelevant, but unmeaning. There is a previous question, on which all else necessarily depends; what is the true doctrine? It is not charity but cruelty, especially in a matter of such momentous interest, and where a mistake once made may be discovered only too late, to suppress or veil the truth. It has been answered that no supposed moral effect of a doctrine, as a restraint upon sin, is an adequate ground for teaching it. Certainly not, if it is false; but the objection implies—what is often more than implied—that those who suspect, if they do not know this doctrine to be false, insist on the necessity of maintaining it as a moral lever. The folly of such a procedure could only be equalled by its profanity, but who has adopted or advised it? I know of none, and the charge is far too serious a one to be vaguely tossed about without any attempt to prove it.† Origen, indeed, appears to

* Dollinger's *First Age of the Church*, p. 253.

† Since the above first appeared in print, I find that a certain Dr. Thomas Burnet, a *protégé* of Abp. Tillotson's and chaplain of William III., did actually maintain this view in a Latin treatise, posthumously published in 1723, *De Statu Martuorum et Resurgentium.* He argues that the docrine is untrue, but ought nevertheless to be generally preached as a restraint upon vice, and accordingly inserts a severe denunciation upon anyone who shall translate his work into English. Of course I have nothing to say for him; but the case is exceptional, and his name adds no weight to the exception.

have shrunk from publicly proclaiming his peculiar theory,—which, however, was widely different as we have seen, from modern Universalism,—and he speaks of it as being enough for mankind in general to know that sinners will be punished in the next world, and seems to think his own belief about the ἀποκατάστασις dangerous to the unconverted.* But Origen could not be indifferent to the overwhelming weight of Scriptural and ecclesiastical authority against him, and might well hesitate, in the face of an adverse belief so deeply grounded and so universal, to publish a mere private speculation of his own, which he must have felt to be at least uncertain, while he did not doubt that its dissemination would lead to mischievous results. Had the Church accepted, instead of rejecting, his new scheme of eschatology, it would soon have found its way from the cloister into the pulpit.

But, while no moral considerations as to the probable effects of a doctrine can justify the inculcation of what is doubtful or untrue,—and this alone would dispose of the strange insinuation that in speaking of eternal punishment our Divine Lord used threats which were never destined to be fulfilled,—its practical character may supply a strong additional motive for the unreserved proclamation of the truth. And that motive is enforced in the present case by every plea both of charity and justice. It is man, not God, who closes on himself the gates of the eternal prison-house, and there is no surer way of aiding him to do so than to persuade him that it does not exist. It

* Origen, *Contr. Celsum*, vi. 26.

must never be forgotten how enormously every modification of Universalism depreciates the seriousness of life as, not simply the initial stage in a long if not unlimited course of probation, but the one trial time for eternity. We know full well that the temptation often proves virtually irresistible, to put off till to-morrow, even at our cost, an irksome duty which need not absolutely be performed to-day; and it would argue small acquaintance with the weaknesses of human nature to doubt that, of those who are now through the salutary "terror of the Lord" persuaded to repentance, too many would defer the difficult work, if they deemed such postponement to be indeed possible, to the long to-morrow which lies beyond the grave. I do not mean, of course, that such conduct would in any case be justifiable or prudent, still less commendable; but it would inevitably follow from a general acquiescence in Universalism. And we must deal with men as they are, not as they might be or ought to be. Nor must it be forgotten here, though the point will recur presently when I come to the Scripture argument, that He who knew what was in man has again and again used language which, on the hypothesis of a probation prolonged indefinitely after death, loses all or nearly all its force. What mean those repeated warnings about the thief in the night; the sudden return of the master of the house, or of the bridegroom; the two men in one bed, the two women at the mill, the two men in the field, of whom one was taken and the other left; what mean

those reiterated exhortations of Christ and His Apostles to continual watchfulness—but that life is short, the time of death uncertain, and there is no repentance in the grave?

Against such considerations, however, a further objection will be urged. Fear, as the preachers of this new evangel are never tired of assuring us, is a low and unworthy—they sometimes add, a degrading and brutalizing—motive. Certainly it is not the highest. But it is not every one who can follow St. Teresa in her wish to have a torch in her right hand and a vessel of water in her left, that with the one she might burn up the glories of heaven, and with the other extinguish the flames of hell, in order to serve God out of pure love. It is not even every one who can make his own the words of the beautiful hymn of St. Francis Xavier, beginning, *O Deus, ego amo Te.* Most men, even good men, are neither saints, nor at all like saints, nor ever likely in this world to become such, though saintliness is the standard they ought to aim at; and the language of the saints would be an unreality on their lips. But in truth there is a great deal of sheer nonsense, as unscriptural as it is irrational, in this affected contempt for the value of lower motives. Fear and love make up that grace of "piety," or filial devotion to our Almighty Father, which is the crowning gift of the Holy Ghost. And although as men advance in holiness the motive of love increasingly predominates, and fear becomes more entirely filial instead of slavish,

fear of God, which includes the fear of losing Him for ever—that is, of eternal damnation—cannot in this life be altogether cast out, for love is not yet made perfect. Every reader of the Bible must know how persistently this motive is impressed upon us throughout both the Old Testament and the New, and by the mouth of our Lord Himself. Prophets, Apostles, and their Divine Master, alike press upon us the same elementary lesson, that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of His love;" it is the beginning, not the end, but the beginning must come first. That the fear of eternal death is profitable, if not indispensable, for all but very advanced Christians, is the constant teaching alike of Scripture and of the Church, and experience has abundantly confirmed it. If patristic testimony is required, let one of the greatest as well as the most large-hearted of the Fathers, the "golden-mouthed" St. Chrysostom, speak for the rest. The salient points only can be given of a passage too long to quote at length.

"If the mere sight of a dead body so depresses the mind, how much more Hell, and the fire that is not quenched, and the worm that never dieth? If we are always thinking of Hell, we shall not easily fall into it. For this cause God has threatened punishment, for He would not have done so if there was not great advantage in thinking of it. But because the remembrance of it is effectual for good, He has fixed the menace in our souls as a wholesome medicine. Let us not then neglect the great advantage derived from it, but constantly reflect upon it. . . . . But dost thou

fear the painfulness of such words? Hast thou then extinguished Hell by keeping silent, or kindled it by speaking of it? Whether thou speakest or not, the fire will fiercely burn. Let it be continually spoken of that thou mayest never fall into it. It is impossible that a soul anxious about Hell should readily sin; for hear that most excellent advice, 'Remember thy last end, and thou shalt never sin.' . . . . . Let us not remember the Kingdom so much as Hell, for fear has more power than the promise. And I know that many would despise ten thousand blessings, if they were rid of the punishment, inasmuch as it is even now sufficient for me to escape vengeance and not to be punished. None of those who have Hell before their eyes will fall into it; none of those who despise Hell will escape it. Those who despise a threat will soon experience the reality. Nothing is so profitable as to converse about Hell; it makes our souls purer than silver. For hear the Prophet saying, 'Thy judgments are always before me.' And Christ constantly discourses about it. For if it pains the hearer, yet it greatly benefits him. . . . Let us not then avoid discourses about Hell, that we may avoid Hell. Let us not banish the remembrance of punishment, that we may escape punishment. If Dives had reflected on that fire he would not have sinned, but because he was unmindful of it, he fell into it. . . . Let us then, I beseech you, become watchful. Let us keep Hell before our eyes. Let us consider that inexorable account, that by thinking of those things we may avoid vice and choose virtue, and may be able to obtain the

blessings promised to those who love Him by the grace and loving-kindness of our Lord."*

Similar and still stronger passages from his writings and those of other Fathers could easily be multiplied, but there is no need for accumulating detailed proof of what they notoriously taught on the subject. We of this generation have outgrown their narrow creed. In matters of this world we have by no means ceased to recognise the operation of "a lower motive," from which few indeed are wholly exempt, though it takes various shapes, from the vulgar dread of the lash or the gallows to the dread of public opinion in some of its manifold expressions; but it is held nowadays a mark of superior enlightenment or superior piety to discard it in our relations with the next. In nine cases out of ten, where it is not a mere affectation, this arises from thoughtlessness or secret unbelief. Does any man who honestly reflects, I will not say on the infirmity of our fallen nature,—for that may be put aside as a platitude of the pulpit,—but on the infirmity of his own will, and what Scripture calls the

* Chrys. *Hom. III.*, on 2 Thess. II. 1—8. I have followed the translation in the *Library of the Fathers* with a few verbal alterations. It may be worth while to compare the following, out of many parallel passages, taken from *Hom. XV. on the Statues.* 2. "What can be more grievous than Hell? Yet nothing is more profitable than the fear of it, for *the fear of Hell will bring us the crown of the Kingdom.* . . . . Not only does it expel our evil passions, but it readily introduces every kind of virtue. Where fear exists there is zeal in almsgiving, intensity of prayer, tears warm and frequent, and groans full of compunction. For nothing so swallows up sin, and makes virtue increase and flourish, as a perpetual fear."

exceeding deceitfulness of his heart—which are facts not so easily ignored—really imagine that he can afford to dispense with any legitimate motive which may help to repress the tyranny of habit or of passion, and the incessant assaults from within and from without, which beset the soul in its warfare? Or will he seriously maintain that the vague apprehension, which a modified version of Universalism may still encourage him to cherish, of some harder struggle to be endured in the world unseen, can compare for a moment, as a motive power, with the solemn conviction, which has sustained the energies of sixty generations of Christians, and braced the courage of innumerable martyrs on the scaffold or at the stake, that this present life is the appointed season, not of *a* but of *the* probation on which eternity depends? It has been contended, as was intimated just now—I purposely refrain from giving references—that when our Lord threatened the wicked with everlasting punishment, the worm that dieth not and the fire that is not quenched, He sought to restrain them by an imaginary terror, which must therefore have been based on an exaggerated estimate of sin. The suggestion is little short of blasphemous. But those who have ventured upon it at least pay a terrible homage to the strength of that principle, to which the necessities of a theory compel them to assume that He who is the Living Truth condescended thus fraudulently to appeal.

So far, I have been mainly engaged, first, in clearing up difficulties and misapprehensions which stand in the way of the acceptance of the Catholic doctrine as

to the final state of the impenitent, and then in showing that, when rightly understood, instead of containing anything inconsistent with natural reason, it is rather what a full appreciation of all the conditions of the problem would lead us, as it has actually led the great majority of mankind, reasonably to surmise. But the subject is one on which reason alone is incompetent to decide; the ultimate proof must rest on revelation. And accordingly it becomes necessary to examine the testimony of Scripture and Tradition. But first I must repeat distinctly that it is not on that ground the real battle has to be fought. Universalists who argue from a Christian standpoint, with whom alone I am directly concerned here, are obliged of course to profess to reconcile their theory with Scripture; but they did not learn it from Scripture. It is the result of moral and intellectual objections of their own to the received doctrine, often mixed up with misconceptions of its true character such as have been already noticed. Under the influence of these prepossessions they read into the letter of Scripture a sense which no unbiassed critic, of whatever religious opinions, would have found there.*

* There is the clearest evidence in Mr. Jukes's volume that this has been, unconsciously to himself, the process in his own mind. See, *e.g.*, the preface to his handling of adverse texts at pp. 114, sqq. "What saith the Scripture? That is the question, and the *only* question I care to ask here on this subject. *At the same time I confess*," &c., &c.; and he goes on at once to argue through several pages that reason proves the doctrine asserted, as he allows, in the letter of Scripture, which he also confesses that he "cannot perfectly explain" on his own theory, to be *impossible*. He is in fact appealing, though he does not mean

Sometimes, though seldomer, they go on to argue that their interpretation of Scripture is not inconsistent with that of the Universal Church. The *onus probandi* in either case rests entirely on themselves; and in undertaking to show that their view of Scriptural and traditional teaching is untenable, I feel something of the difficulty experienced by reasoners who set out to establish a truism. However, I will do my best. The next chapter will be devoted to examining the argument from Tradition.

it, *from* Scripture to that "verifying faculty" which a very different school would enthrone as the final arbiter of supernatural as well as natural truth.

CHAPTER III.

THE WITNESS OF TRADITION.

Christianity is an historical religion or it is nothing. It was introduced into the world at a definite and ascertainable period, authenticated as a Divine revelation by stupendous miracles, and furnished with a special organization divinely commissioned to promulgate its doctrines and administer its ordinances to the end of the world. If we want to know whether a given tenet is or is not part of the Christian Revelation, we have to inquire whether it is contained in the deposit—to use a well-known theological term—committed by Christ to His Apostles, and through them to the Church of all future ages. It may, indeed, be contained implicitly or explicitly, but it must be there; and for my present purpose it is quite superfluous to enter on the question, which I have discussed elsewhere,* of the limits and conditions of doctrinal development in the Church. The dogma we are here concerned with was taught as explicitly from the beginning as it has been since, and is laid down in language exceptionally emphatic and precise by the Divine Founder of our faith Himself. To reject it as inconsist-

* See Introduction to *Catholic Doctrine of Atonement.*

tent with the supposed "genius of Christianity," or the spirit of the age, and to put another in its place and call that the Christian doctrine, is an outrage, not so much on orthodoxy, as on common sense. Revelation may be accepted or rejected as a whole; it cannot be accepted in principle and reconstructed in detail from time to time, to meet the shifting requirements of each successive phase of thought, for that is to treat it as a mere human philosophy, not as the voice of God. And, therefore, I observed before that a tinkered Christianity has as little claim on our reason as on our faith. Universalism is an intelligible and consistent doctrine in the mouth of a simple theist, though it is not the conclusion which either reason or the general testimony of mankind would naturally suggest. But it is not consistent in the mouth of those who profess to accept the Christian Revelation as a message from God, still less if they also profess to reverence the Church as His messenger. Revelation, indeed, does not and cannot contradict the teaching of natural religion, though it supplements as well as sanctions it. But the first lesson taught us by the natural conscience about the Deity is, that He is "One who ordains that the offender should suffer for his offence, not simply for the good of the offender, but as an end good in itself, and as a principle of government."* And throughout all history that solemn teaching of conscience has been endorsed by the willing or unwilling assent of those to whom it is addressed; an assent far

* Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, p. 386.

too widely spread and too deeply-seated to be disposed of by the shallow and invidious cuckoo-cry of "priestcraft." Plato, as we have already seen, expressly affirms it. The most religious poet of antiquity enforces, the most irreligious recognises while he reviles it.* And this general consent of antiquity —the evidence of ὃ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, to which Aristotle attaches such decisive authority—is the more remarkable, when it avouches a doctrine so unpalatable to the natural man, and which he has so strong an interest in discrediting; as may be further inferred from the significant circumstance that its assailants, among classical authors, are almost exclusively to be found—exactly where we should have expected to find them —among the shallow, the profligate, and the profane.† Julius Cæsar, who made a public profession in the Senate of his disbelief in a future life, was infamous even in that age for the unbridled excess of his name-

* Compare the δράσαντι παθεῖν, τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ, which strikes the keynote of the magnificent Trilogy of Æschylus, with the angry complaint of the great classical prophet of atheism :—

"Nunc ratio nulla 'st restandi, nulla facultas,
Æternas quoniam pœnas in morte timendum."

Lucret. i. 111, 112. Cf. ibid. iii. 36, sqq. ; 1027, sqq. It is hardly necessary to observe how frequently and emphatically the doctrine of future restitution is inculcated in the Odes of Pindar.

† Cicero is far the most respectable authority amongst the ancients who can be quoted on this side. But his language about the future state is too contradictory to carry any weight. (Cf. Newman's *Historical Sketches*, vol. ii. pp. 273, 274.) And, not to enter here on the controversy about his personal character, philosophical depth is the last merit his admirers would venture to claim for him.

less debaucheries.* Plutarch, in his treatise, "On Different Kinds of Fear," draws a contrast, much to the advantage of the latter, between the position of the "superstitious," or religious man, who is haunted by the dread of everlasting torments, and the atheist who is free from all such terrors. In later days professed sceptics and scoffers have reluctantly admitted the force of this deeply ingrained and universal dictate of the natural conscience. Rousseau confessed his ignorance on the subject. When a correspondent informed him that he had ascertained, beyond all doubt, that there was no such thing as hell, Voltaire, whose keener intellect made self-deceit more difficult, replied, "*Vous êtes bien heureux; je suis loin de là.*" Dante's legend over the gates of the Inferno is true to the deepest instincts of humanity, which tell us that, while faith survives among the denizens of that "city of woe" —the faith which believes and trembles,—hope is dead. The Arabian prophet, whose masterful genius constructed a new faith out of the existing religions of the world, by a process of syncretism adapted with admirable skill to meet the intellectual cravings and moral weaknesses of mankind, found it necessary to borrow from Revelation—though he, of course, corrupted all in the borrowing—the doctrine not only of the unity of God, but of fallen angels, of heaven, purgatory, and hell. For the Christian Revelation responds in this respect to the anticipations of reason in every age of the world, and may be regarded as a confirmation and

* See Sueton. *De Vit. Cæs.* i. 49—52.

expansion of the previously existing belief, rather than a fresh addition to it. Of those Pagan authors who assailed the prevalent belief in the eternal suffering of the wicked, there is scarcely one who does not reject the immortality of the soul altogether. On the other hand Celsus, who believed in it, though he ridiculed the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body, expressed his entire agreement with his Christian opponents as to the future condition of the souls of both the just and the unjust.

But it is contended that, after all, this is not the doctrine of Scripture, nor even the authoritative teaching of the Catholic Church. We are assured by one of the latest and most earnest advocates of Universalism, that "it can never be classed under *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.*"* Two pleas only are alleged in support of this startling paradox, and against the overwhelming evidence of a general *consensus* the other way from the days of the Apostles to our own. A question is raised as to the condemnation of Origen by the Fifth Œcumenical Council, and passages from certain of the Fathers are quoted on his side. Both objections shall be examined in their place, but meanwhile it may be observed at once that, even if Mr. Jukes's account of the facts could be accepted as accurate, it would scarcely help his cause. The belief of the Church is not to be collected solely from creeds and definitions of Councils, still less from the explicit agree-

* *Restitution*, p. 97.

ment of every individual writer during the early ages who was not formally condemned. If so, the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation might have been denied with impunity during the first three centuries. Dogmatic confessions soon became a necessity, and have proved in the event an inestimable benefit to the Church; but from the beginning it was not so, and they may even be regarded, from one point of view, as a necessary evil. The rise of heresy was the origin of creeds, and its advance has in the main determined their subject matter and extent. In proportion as the truths formally contained in the letter of Scripture, and generally received among the faitful, were resolved through the process of human speculation into wrong combinations—to adopt a phrase of the late Archdeacon Wilberforce's—the Church was compelled in self-defence to resolve them into the right ones. And hence those doctrines alone which heresy had fastened upon, and especially the fundamental verities of the Trinity and the Incarnation, found a place in the early creeds. Both logically and historically they are the outcome and creation of heresy, and if there had been no heresies there would have been no creeds. But the Church clearly was not bound to formulate a new one to meet the fanatical eccentricities of a clique of unruly monks in Palestine, or the frivolous *insouciance* of the upper ten at Constantinople who

> "Smiled unbelief, and shuddered as they smiled."

This consideration explains, what has often been remarked upon, the almost total omission in the creeds of

any reference to the sacraments, and the complete silence as to the greatest of them all, which had from the first been the centre of the life and worship of the Church. It was not assuredly that she did not know her own mind on a point of such high doctrinal and practical import, or hesitated to proclaim it, but that it was so well known as to be virtually undisputed.* And thus it was only in the sixteenth century, when the invention of a novel theory of justification, and the disparagement or abolition of the priesthood, necessitated a remodelling or complete abandonment of the whole principle of sacramental grace, that any serious controversy arose on the subject, which therefore occupies a prominent place in the Tridentine decrees.†

And the same remark may be applied to the dogma we are now engaged upon, which was first systematically assailed at a still later period, as being inconsistent with the Socinian estimate of the Person and work of Christ. This does not mean that there were no early writers, like Origen, who questioned it, but that they were comparatively few; that they were, and knew themselves to be, contending against the stream of Catholic tradition; that they are almost always incon-

* Abundant evidence of this may be found in Probst's *Sakramente und Sakramentalien, in den drei ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten.* Tubingen. 1872. The *disciplina arcani* of course comes in here also, especially as regards the Eucharist.

† I do not forget the mediæval disputes about the nature of the Eucharistic Presence, which issued in the Lateran definition, but they concerned the philosophical speculations of individual writers, and did not touch the popular belief.

sistent, not only with each other but with themselves* —in which case it is more reasonable to interpret their doubtful statements by those which are in harmony with the received belief, than *vice versa*,—and that they wholly failed to leave their mark either on the *Schola Theologorum* or on the popular belief of the Church. A modern writer, who is both learned and scrupulously accurate, declares that he has "*not been able to discover a single impugner of the dogma of eternal punishment, who is consistent in his denial and at the same time orthodox*" in other respects.† Indeed, heterodoxy on this point almost invariably leads to disbelief of still more fundamental doctrines—such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement—when it does not originally spring from it. Moreover, as Petavius has abundantly shown, far more numerous passages could be cited from ante-Nicene writers which are heterodox, in language if not in intention, on the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, which had not then been formally defined.‡ Of the real mind of the Church, as evidenced by the consent of her representative Fathers, there cannot, as the same great theologian has proved elsewhere, be a shadow of doubt§

* This is the case, *e.g.* with the two Gregories, of Nyssa and Nazianzus, who are the most plausible witnesses alleged for Universalism among early writers.

† Provost Cazenove in *Christian Remembrancer*, for April, 1863, p. 457. The italics are the author's, and his remark applies generally to the present as well as the past.

‡ Petav., *De Trin.* i. 3—5.

§ Petav., *De Angelis*, iii. 8. Take *e.g.* the following from the greatest of all the Fathers, St. Augustine, commenting on Matt. xxv. 41—46. "Dicere autem in hoc uno eodemque sensu, vita

But there is one class of testimonies which is at once so informal and so emphatic, that it has the same sort of cogency as the "undesigned coincidences" of Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*, and is peculiarly to the purpose as illustrating the profound conviction which had penetrated to the very heart's core of the great Christian community. I mean the unpremeditated confessions of the martyrs before their heathen judges, when moreover they were promised the special assistance

æterna sine fine erit, supplicium æternum finem habebit, *multum absurdum est.*" (*De Civ. Dei* xxi. 23.) On which Hagenbach observes (Hist. Doct., vol. i. p. 387). "It is superfluous to quote other Fathers, inasmuch as they all more or less agree." Mr. Lecky makes a similar statement. (*Hist. of Rationalism*, vol. i. p. 342.) I observe, however, that, like Gibbon before him (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 97), he gloats over the well-known and repulsive passage at the end of Tertullian's *De Spectaculis*, which he actually quotes and translates at full length, as a "striking illustration" of the effect of a belief in eternal punishment, traced in the "psychological history of Europe." So well-informed a writer might have been expected to remember the absurdity of citing Tertullian as a representative of Catholic sentiment, especially on a subject so closely connected with the mental idiosyncrasy, which eventually issued in his open avowal of heresy. There is not, I believe, a single passage in the patristic or theological literature of the Church the least like that which Mr. Lecky—going far beyond Gibbon here—selects as a crucial illustration of it. Alger (*Doct. of Future State*, p. 513) quotes the same passage, adding that "*hundreds* of the most accredited Christian writers have shown the same *fiendish spirit*," and again, on the next page, he says, "*Thousands* of passages like these, and even worse, might easily be collected from Christian authors from the days of St. Irenæus." But the few passages he does quote—not one of which however displays the *animus* so offensive in Tertullian—are all taken from modern, and all but one from Protestant writers.

of the Holy Ghost.* From aged men like Ignatius and Polycarp, who had "served Christ these eighty-and-six years," to tender children, like Ponticus and Blandina, who joyfully sacrificed to Him they loved the flower and promise of their youth, all alike are possessed by the same awful and inspiring consciousness that their choice lies between confessing Him before men or being cast out of His Presence for ever. Let St. Polycarp—who, be it remembered, learnt his faith and received episcopal consecration from "the disciple whom Jesus loved" and who lay on His Sacred Heart—speak for the rest. When the proconsul of Asia, after vainly threatening him with the wild beasts, said, "If you despise the wild beasts, I will cause you to be burnt to ashes," the martyr replied, "I fear not the fire you threaten me with, which burns for a moment, and then goes out; you are yourself ignorant of the judgment to come and the fire prepared for the wicked, *which burns for ever and ever.*"† Now I am not discussing here whether these professions of faith, which

* Matt. x. 19, 20.

† See Milman's *History of Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 138. Compare the following specimens, out of many that might be given, in Ruinart's *Acta Sincera Mart.*, p. 133. St. Maximus, being urged by the proconsul to escape torture by sacrificing to the gods, replied, "Hæc non sunt tormenta quæ pro nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi inferuntur, sed sunt unctiones. Si enim recessero a Domini mei præceptis, quibus sum de Evangelio Ejus eruditus, *vera et perpetua mihi manebunt tormenta.*" St. Julius speaks of "pœnam perpetuam;" St. Felicitas and her children of "æternum interitum, æternum supplicium, ignem æternum;" St. Victor of "mortis æternæ mercedem et inexplicabiles sine termino cruciatus."

might be multiplied indefinitely, were right or wrong. It is abstractedly conceivable that the countless soldiers of "the white-robed army of martyrs," who sealed their testimony with their blood, including those who had learnt the Gospel at the feet of the Apostles of the Lord, may have been permitted at that supreme crisis of their lives, and in spite of His express promise of supernatural guidance, to fundamentally misrepresent its teaching, while it has been reserved for our modern Universalists, who concoct their comfortable theories in their easy chairs, to correct their radical misapprehension of the faith for which they were content to die. Be that as it may, it is enough for my argument that, as the two classes of witnesses flatly contradict each other, they cannot both be right.

And there can be no surer test of the belief inherited by the early Church from her first founders and teachers —not as a literary theory or a matter of opinion, but as a certainty dominating the mind and shaping the whole course of life,—than the consentient avowals of those who after witnessing a good confession before the Pagan tribunals gave their bodies to flesh the lions' teeth or feed the flame. Such avowals may be mistaken; they can hardly be shallow or insincere. As regards the fact of the belief which in that age pervaded the entire Christian society, they outweigh the copious testimony—and still more the occasional ambiguity—of Fathers and Apologists, and supply proof which is morally conclusive. Nor is it at all to the purpose to object that this argument, from the testimony of the early martyrs, is irrelevant, because it proves too much.

Men have died, we are sometimes reminded, for the most various and even opposite beliefs, and their constancy affords no evidence of the truth of their creed; men have been burnt, *e. g.*, for denying Transubstantiation and for affirming it, but both doctrines cannot be right. Clearly not; but this is simply to misapprehend the point of the argument. The testimony of the early martyrs does not directly prove the truth of the doctrines for which they suffered, although—considering their numbers, their unanimity, their heroic patience, and the long period over which the persecutions extend—it is usually, and reasonably, cited by apologists as one among the many concurrent evidences of Revealed Religion. But it is not used in the present connection for the purpose of proving *per se* the truth of their convictions, but as illustrating, beyond possibility of cavil, the universal and profoundly realised belief of the contemporary Church in the solemn doctrines to which they bear such unmistakable and consentient witness. Dr. Bright does not at all overstate the facts of the case, when he says that the Church of the Martyrs believed in Hell as intensely as in the Divinity of Christ.* And to those who attach any value to the Vincentian rule this fact would of itself go far towards proving the truth of the doctrine; on the Catholic principle of Church authority it is pretty well conclusive.

The author of *Ancient Christianity* will hardly be accused of an overweening reverence for ecclesiastical

* *Faith and Life*, by William Bright, D.D. Prof. of Eccles. History at Oxford, p. 233.

tradition. Let me then sum up the evidence on this point in his very emphatic words, in a later work. After citing the warning of our Lord (Luke xii. 5), to "fear Him, who after He hath killed hath power to cast into Gehenna," he thus proceeds to comment on its unmistakable sense; "Now we of this age may expound as we think fit these appalling words, or may extenuate these phrases;—or, if we please let us cast away the whole doctrine as intolerable and incredible. Let us do so; *but it is a matter of history, out of question, that the apostolic Church, and the Church of later times, took it word for word, in the whole of its apparent value.* It is true that several attempts were made to substitute a mitigated sense; but it is certain that the language of Christ, in regard to the future life, was constantly on the lips of martyrs, throughout the suffering centuries. Often and often was it heard issuing from out of the midst of the fire, and was lisped by the quivering lips of women and children while writhing on the rack."*

It must not, however, be supposed that there was any shrinking from a formal affirmation of the doctrine under review, when occasion for it arose. The Athanasian Creed alone would be sufficient evidence of this. There is no need to enter here into the vexed question of its authorship, further than to observe that recent investigations have proved, almost to demonstration, that it cannot be later than the sixth, and is almost certainly earlier than the middle of the fifth century. And while, like the Apostles' Creed, it has never received

* *Restoration of Belief*, p. 285.

the official sanction of an Œcumenical Council, it has unlike the Apostles' Creed, obtained universal reception both in East and West, with the omission of course, which does not concern us here, of the *Filioque* from the Eastern version of this as of the Nicene Creed. What the *Quicunque vult* teaches on this awful subject there is not and cannot be the slightest doubt; for no words need be wasted on the marvellous discovery of *Anglicanus*,—who seems hardly less ambitious of an unenviable originality than Father Hardouin—that "it teaches annihilation." If so, it must have been composed, not in the ninth century, as Mr. Ffoulkes strangely imagined, but in the nineteenth, when that theory was first openly broached among persons not professing to be atheists.

The condemnation of Universalism, however, in the only case where it challenged any public notice, was prompter and more direct than this. Origen lived before the age of General Councils, nor would there have been any reason for summoning such an assembly on his account. But he was condemned by two local synods at Alexandria, expressly convoked in order to examine his erroneous opinions in the *De Principiis* and the *Stromata*, in 228 and 231.* And though we may heartily sympathize with Dr. Newman's personal admiration for him, and dislike of his leading assailants, both at the time and afterwards, that will not at all prevent our also sharing his decided conviction that, "in the contest between Origen's doc-

* See Hefele's *Conciliengeschichte*, vol. i. pp. 105, 106.

trine and followers and the ecclesiastical power, his opponents were right, and he was wrong."* Some three centuries after the death of Origen, his peculiar opinions, which had attracted little notice at the time, and were still wholly unknown in the West, were revived among the monks of Palestine, and an Origenist party grew up, which gained influence at the Imperial Court, and thus eventually drew on itself the attention of the ecclesiastical authorities. In 543 a synod (σύνοδος ἐνδημοῦσα) met at Constantinople, under the Patriarch Mennas, which pronounced fifteen anathemas on the heresies of Origen and his followers. It is almost certain, though nothing beyond probable evidence is now attainable, that these anathemas belong to the local synod of 543, and not to the Fifth Œcumenical Council, which met ten years later.† But on the other hand, there is no ground whatever, beyond the arbitrary conjecture of some modern critics, for supposing that the name of Origen, which appears with that of Arius, Macedonius, and several other heresiarchs in the eleventh canon of the Fifth Council, is an interpolation; and Hefele, the highest living authority on the history of Councils, thinks it is certainly genuine.‡ And if so, the condemnation was in fact repeated, though without a detailed repetition of the fifteen anathemas, for which there was no call. But the question is of very little consequence, except as matter of historical curiosity. The sentence of a local synod

* *History of My Religious Opinions*, p. 259.
† Hefele's *Conciliengeschichte*, vol. ii. pp. 790, sqq.
‡ Ibid. pp. 898, 899.

would, under ordinary circumstances, have been thought quite sufficient in such a case, and there were special reasons why it should be held sufficient here. For the leaders of the Origenist party had made a formal, though no doubt insincere, submission to the Synod of 543 and its decrees, sacrificing the truth, as they viewed it, to the interests of their cause. And this "hypocritical acquiescence in the condemnation of the Origenistic heresies," as Neander observes, prevented any further steps being taken against them.* To put in motion the machinery of an Œcumenical Council, in order to crush an ephemeral and local phase of heresy supposed to be already extinct, although claiming the shelter of a great name, would have been like crushing a fly upon the wheel. The utmost that could be expected of the Fifth Council was, that it should do what in all probability it actually did, and include the name of Origen in its list of condemned heretics, though personal respect for the man, whose position was very different from that of Arius, Nesto-

* Neander, *Church History*, vol iv. pp. 251, sqq., Bohn's Translation. Neander's testimony is the more important because his own bias is apparently in favour of the Origenist, or rather the Universalist view. This circumstance gives additional weight to his account of the moral temper of the Origenist party of the fourth century generally, who "would fain reason away the doctrine of eternal punishment, simply because it presented terrifying images, which disturbed them in a life too deficient in point of moral strictness and purity." (Ibid. p. 444.) And he goes on to observe how earnestly St. Chrysostom, one of the gentlest of men, felt bound to denounce this "frivolous" way of looking at things. Dr. Cazenove has shown, in the essay already quoted, that there is a strong family likeness in this respect between the earlier and later adherents of Universalism.

rius, and the others here associated with him, would easily have accounted for its omission.* To infer, with Mr. Jukes, from the alleged reticence of the Council, that "the Catholic Church has nowhere asserted" the doctrine impugned by Origen, is about as reasonable as it would be to infer that the Divinity of the Holy Ghost is not a Catholic doctrine, because it is not asserted in so many words in the Nicene Creed, and St. Basil, in a treatise on the subject written against heretics, nowhere expressly calls him God.†

It may be worth while to subjoin here another striking illustration of the belief of the Ancient Church, the more impressive from its purely incidental character. The Synod of Diospolis, summoned in 415 to examine the charges of false doctrine brought against Pelagius, is denounced by St. Jerome, not without reason, as *miserabile Concilium*, for the facility with which it allowed itself to be hoodwinked by the sophistries of the astute heresiarch;‡ but its fault was negligence, not hetrodoxy, and does not affect its witness to the existing faith of the Church. It is, then, a significant circumstance that, when

* This condemnation of Origen was confirmed by the Sixth Œcumenical Council (Third of Constantinople) in 680, and the Seventh (Second of Nicæa) in 787.

† Gieseler (vol ii. p. 103) ascribes the absence of any explicit censure of Origenism at the Fifth Council to the paramount influence of Theodore Ascidas, to which Hefele also refers (*Conciliengeschichte*, ii. 793). The general belief at the time that the fifteen anathemas had been passed at the Council is clear from the statement of the contemporary historian Socrates (*E. H.* iv. 38), who was about fifteen years old when it was held.

‡ See Hefele's *Conciliengeschichte*, vol ii. p. 112.

Pelagius was accused before the Synod of asserting that "at the day of Judgment all sinners should be cast into the eternal fire," as though he meant thereby to deny the forgiveness promised through Christ, he explained his statement by reference to our Lord's words in Matt. xxv. 46,– adding that "whoever teaches otherwise is an Origenist"—and the Fathers at once accepted his explanation as "in harmony with the mind of the Church." On this St. Augustine observes, "Hoc acceperunt judices, *quod revera in Origene dignissime detestatur Ecclesia*, id est quod etiam illi quos Dominus dicit æterno supplicio puniendos, et ipse Diabolus et angeli ejus, post tempus licet prolixum, liberabuntur a pœnis, et Sanctis cum Deo regnantibus societate beatitudinis adhærebunt. Hoc ergo Synodus dixit alienum non esse ab Ecclesiâ, non secundum Pelagium, sed potius secundum Evangelium, quod tales iniqui et peccatores æternis ignibus exurentur, quos tali supplicio dignos judicat Evangelium; et quod *detestabiliter cum Origene sentiat, quisquis dixerit aliquando eorum finiri posse supplicium quod Dominus dixit æternum.*"*

And here a further remark will be in place. The same sort of *ignoratio elenchi* which we noticed just now, in connexion with the testimony of the martyrs, has also been exemplified in objections urged against the appeal to patristic authority. It is sometimes argued that Fathers and Doctors of the Church—say St. Augustine or St. Thomas—have defended the

* S. Aug. *De Gestis Pelagii*, III. 10.

doctrine of eternal punishment on mistaken or inadequate grounds. Be it so, at all events for argument's sake. There is no reason in the nature of things why we should attach greater weight in matters of personal opinion or critical exegesis to a writer of the fourth century than to a writer of the nineteenth of equal learning and abilities; in critical resources, indeed, the latter is likely to have an advantage. Our appeal is not to the private opinions of the early Fathers, but to their evidence. When the Council of Trent forbids Scripture to be interpreted *contra unanimem consensum Patrum*, it does not mean that in doubtful points we are bound by their individual judgments, which are often various or discordant, still less by their reasons for forming them; but that we must accept their consentient witness, where they agree, to the faith of the contemporary Church. And I suppose the Anglican canon, which directs preachers to teach that doctrine which "the Catholic Fathers and ancient Bishops have collected out of Scripture," has the same meaning. When the Fathers speak as individual theologians only, we are free to follow or reject their guidance, and thus for instance the peculiar teaching of Augustine and Aquinas on grace is rejected by large schools in the Church, and in the famous controversy *De Auxiliis* the Roman authorities recognised their right to reject it. But we are not at liberty to reject the unanimous verdict of the Fathers, where they bear witness, not to their own opinions, however weighty and well grounded, but to the faith of the Church. A popular Evangelical dignitary,

whose knowledge of patristic literature was probably derived from the depths of his internal consciousness, excited considerable amusement some years ago by proposing that the Fathers of the Church should henceforth be called "the mothers" on account of the silliness of their writings. If his estimate of their capacities had been as accurate as it was ignorant, that would not affect the value of their testimony to facts, though it might largely detract from our confidence in the soundness of their judgment. And they do not teach the doctrine of eternal punishment as a matter of theological speculation, but as an article of faith. They said of its denial, to repeat the words cited above from St. Augustine, *Hoc detestotur Ecclesia.*

But, in addition to his special pleading about the Fifth Œcumenical Council, Mr. Jukes has detected, as he thinks, another flaw in the evidence for the Catholic authority of the dogma. He cites the opinions of certain Greek Fathers in favour of Universalism. To this objection a general answer has already been given, which would be quite sufficient, even if his extracts were much more numerous and more to the purpose than they are. But without going into minute detail, which would be impossible here, something may be fitly added as to the particular authorities alleged. Origen, whose opinion as well as its condemnation is notorious, may be put aside at once. Of the remaining passages, imposing as the array may at first sight appear, several are inconclusive or altogether irrelevant; more than one is mistranslated, and others are misap-

plied. This criticism has an obvious application to the four first, from St. Irenæus, St. Clement of Alexandria, Theophilus of Antioch, and Athenagoras, as well as to some that follow, not to add that the two last-named writers are too deeply tainted with Sabellianism—in language at least, if not in thought—for their testimony to have much value. But there is no need to press that point. All four writers are simply dwelling on different aspects of the Divine plan of redemption, and none of them say—what is the real point at issue—that everybody will in fact be saved. St. Clement, who in words seems to come nearest to it, is insisting on the great truth of the universality of the propitiation of Christ, as not offered for Christians only, but for the heathen and those who lived before the Incarnation also. St. Irenæus, from whose third book "against heresies" a short and somewhat ambiguous passage is quoted, expressly affirms the eternal punishment of the wicked in the fourth book.* As to the two Gregories, of Nyssa and Nazianzus, it is well known that they sometimes speak doubtfully on this doctrine ; but, on the other hand, they elsewhere most unequivocally assert it.† Still less felicitous is the reference to Theodore of Mopsuestia, "the impious," who was condemned for a whole string of heresies, and all his writings anathematized, in the eleventh canon of the Fifth General Council.‡ Irenæus, who had been already quoted in favour of Universalism, is afterwards

* Iren. *Contr. Hær.*, iv. 28.

† See Petav. *De Angelis*, iii. 8.

‡ Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, vol. ii. p. 890.

by a strange inconsistency and still stranger anachronism, quoted, together with Justin Martyr, as maintaining the modern heresy of annihilation ; but Mr. Jukes evidently misunderstands, and in the case of Irenæus also mistranslates, the passage on which he relies. *Perseverantiâ* does not mean "continuance for ever," which would be *perseveratione*, but perseverance in good, of which, Irenæus says, the wicked render themselves for ever incapable, *i.e.*, they can never be restored.*

Still more marvellous is Mr. Jukes's treatment of the evidence of his last and most illustrious witness from the Eastern Church, St. Chrysostom, who was one of the strongest opponents of Origenism, but is here represented as its advocate. We are informed that, "spite of his popular (?) language as to everlasting punishment, among the accusations brought against him when he was summoned to the Synod of the Oak, *one distinct charge was Origenism.*"† This is (1) a complete misstatement of the facts ; and (2) would be nothing to the purpose, had it been true. In the first place, no "charge of Origenism," distinct or indistinct, was ever brought against Chrysostom at the Synod of the Oak, or elsewhere, but only a charge, alleged by a perfectly unscrupulous assailant, of tolerating or favouring cer-

* That Irenaeus cannot possibly mean to deny the continued *existen e* of the wicked, is further clear from the paragraph just before that quoted (*Contr. Hær.* ii. 34) about Dives, and from several others in the same work, as *e. g.* lib. iv. 27, 28.

† *Restitution*, p. 187. For a specimen of St. Chrysostom's real teaching, see above, pp. 67, sqq.

tain Origenists. "At this Synod," as Neander observes, "no further mention was made of the Origenistic heresies."* In the next place, Mr. Jukes omits to mention that the Synod of the Oak was a mere packed assembly of the partisans of Theophilus of Alexandria, who presided over it, four of them at least being avowed and bitter personal enemies of Chrysostom; that it was got together, under Court influence, for the express purpose, not of investigating charges against him, but of deposing him; that Theophilus himself was a notorious worldling and turncoat, who had not long before himself professed Origenist opinions, and was popularly designated ὁ ἀμφαλλάξ, ὁ κόθορνος;† that all the charges against Chrysostom broke down; and that Pope Innocent I., to whom Theophilus forwarded the iniquitous sentence pronounced against him in his absence, at once rejected it. Yet, on the strength of this "distinct charge" against Chrysostom, which exists only in his own imagination, and would not be worth the paper it is written on if it had been really made, and of purely gratuitous inferences from some passages in his writings, Mr. Jukes announces his "conviction" that the great saint and doctor was an Universalist, while

* Neander, *Church Hist.*, vol. iv. p. 473. Milman says, still more emphatically, "No charge of heresy darkened the pure fame of the great Christian orator."—*Hist. Christ.* vol. ii. p. 148. And again, with special reference to this occasion, "The one crime which could have blinded into hatred the love and admiration of the Christian world, heterodoxy of opinion, *was not charged against him by his most malicious enemies.*"—*Lat. Christ.* vol. i. p. 118. For a full account of this disreputable affair, see Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, vol. ii. sect. 115.

† Neander, *ut supra*, p. 463.

obliged to admit that "in his sermons he repeatedly states [in the most emphatic language, we may add] the doctrine of everlasting punishment." By this ingenious method of interpretation, any one may be made to mean anything.

As to the inference drawn from St. Augustine's "*pacifice disputandum*," that he did not consider the Universalists heretics, it is not only in direct contradiction with his own words a few lines further on, "*Non immerito reprobavit Ecclesia*,"* but shows a complete forgetfulness or misconception of the temper of that great and large-hearted doctor in dealing with honest misbelievers, of however deep a dye, as exemplified, *e.g.*, in the well-known passage, "*Illi in vos sæviant*, &c.," and again in the words used by himself of the Church, "*Amat errantes, odit errores*." Nor was any one accused of Universalism ever acquitted by an ecclesiastical tribunal. The later passages cited by Mr. Jukes from both Greek and Latin Fathers point unmistakably to the doctrine of Purgatory, on which I have already dwelt, and he might have added many more from St. Augustine and others to the same effect.† That it

* *De Civ. Dei*, xxii. 17. Cf. in his *De Gestis Pelagii*, III. 10, "Hoc acceperunt judices quod revera in Origene *dignissime detestatur Ecclesia*," &c., quoted above.

† In his extract from St. Jerome (*Comment. in Isaiam*, cap. 66), Mr. Jukes again misses the point through a mistranslation of the critical word. St. Jerome is stating, without endorsing it an opinion very generally maintained before the time of Peter Lombard, and revived by later theologians, which is referred to above, p. 16, as also by Dr. Newman in the *Grammar of Assent* (p. 417), that the *sensible sufferings* of the lost may, after a time, be diminished or relieved. To render "*refrigeria*" by "restoration" is to give the word a meaning it cannot bear, and to mis-

should not have always been as clearly discriminated from some modification of Origenism then as at a later date, when the advance of theological science and the assaults of heresy had issued in fuller and more precise definitions, is intelligible enough. But still, those who advocate it will almost invariably be found —like St. Augustine himself—maintaining also the doctrine of eternal punishment, and that, not as matter of individual opinion, but as an integral portion of the faith, though they may not have had an equally comprehensive grasp of the mutual relations of different aspects of revealed truth. The course of doctrinal development can neither be anticipated nor arrested in the Church. And it is worth noting how at the Reformation, when the tendency on all sides was to exaggerate differences rather than to minimize them, on this point Catholic and Protestant, Lutheran and Calvinist, Anglican and Puritan, were perfectly agreed.* The only exceptions, which conspicuously

take the entire drift of the passage, besides placing it in flat contradiction to other statements of the same writer. See *e.g.*, his *Comment. in Jonam*, iii. 6—9, where the meaning is quite unmistakable.

* Since the above first appeared, I observe that Dr. Döllinger used precisely the same argument at the Bonn Conference last year, in reference to the doctrine of the Double Procession; "In the sixteenth century the Reformers weighed every Roman doctrine most jealously in the balance; they were greatly disposed to reject as many propositions as possible, as specifically Romish. The Roman Catholic Church *has never been attacked respecting the doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit*; on this point there is no controversy between Catholics, Anglicans, and Protestants."—*Report of Conference at Bonn*, 1875, p. 12.

serve to prove the rule, are found, first among the Anabaptist sectaries, whose wild fanaticism so deeply discredited the German Reformation; and afterwards among the Socinians, whose system is based on a rejection of the first principles of Christianity, and in making the Atonement impossible, ignores the true character of sin and of the Divine Attributes, as exhibited in revelation.

CHAPTER IV.

WITNESS OF SCRIPTURE.

IT is now time to turn to the Scriptural argument, which has exercised and baffled the utmost ingenuity of Universalist special pleaders, so plain and lucid is the witness of the New Testament especially to the apprehension of every unprejudiced reader, whether he admits its Divine authority or not.* But here it may be well to premise one or two explanatory remarks. In the first place, then, there are certain well-known passages in the Gospels, which will at once occur to everybody, and may almost be called the *loci classici* on the subject, round which the Universalist controversy has fiercely raged, as though everything hinged on the exact force of a particular

* Thus, for instance, M. Reuss, a writer named with high commendation in Renan's *Vie de Jesus* (Introd. p. vii.), after citing Matt. xxv. 30—41, and some kindred passages, observes as follows:—"Toutes ces peintures sont claires et simples; elles n'offrent rien d'équivoque; il n'y a pas un mot qui trahisse une arrière-pensée, qui nous fasse entrevoir une signification cachée, qui les réduise à une valeur purement figurée et parabolique. Il est évident que les narrateurs qui nous servent ici de guides, ont pris tout cela au pied de la lettre et qu'il ne leur est pas resté une ombre de doute à cet égard."—*Reuss, Theol. Chrétienne*, tome i. p. 249, 2me. édit.

epithet or the tense of a verb. It has been argued, for instance, that the sense of the word ἄσβεστον, (unquenchable) in Mark ix. 43, 45 (rendered in the English Version "that shall never be quenched") is governed by οὐ σβέννυται in the following verse, and means that the fire "is not quenched" now, but will be quenched hereafter. On the other hand, a recent assailant of the orthodox doctrine, who is evidently not unconscious of the force of this and similar passages, earnestly insists that the question "is not to be settled by isolated texts." I am not aware of any revealed doctrine that rests on isolated texts, apart from the general scope of the sacred volume, and—as of course a Catholic would add—the tradition of the Church which interprets it "according to the analogy of the faith." At the same time there are one or two doctrines, of which this is one—Mr. Jukes suggests a parallel which shall be noticed presently—peculiarly obnoxious to the pride or concupiscence of the natural man, which our Lord appears, if we may reverently say so, to have therefore taken pains to have put on record in words of His own utterance so startlingly emphatic and precise as to exclude all pretext of ambiguity.* These doctrines are not only not inconsistent with the general tenor of Scripture, both in the Old and New Testament, but are entirely borne out

* "Christ on Himself, considerate Master, took
The utterance of that doctrine's fearful sound.
The Fount of Love His servants sent to tell
Love's deeds; Himself reveals the sinner's hell."
Newman's *Verses on Various Occasions*, p. 166.

by it; but they are enshrined—one might almost say, defined—for the guidance of all future ages in certain utterances of Him who is the Way and the Truth to which, in the present case at all events, from that day to this, one meaning and one alone has been affixed by all readers of whatever creed except an infinitesimally small minority, who approached them, for the most part, under the influence of a strong prepossession that their faith in Christ was virtually staked on their managing to persuade themselves that He did not mean what He said. This is a natural inference from the violent, if not savage, terms in which their indictment against the faith of Christendom is usually conveyed.

And here another preliminary remark suggests itself. On the Protestant theory of private judgment —and all Universalists must necessarily occupy the Protestant ground—every Christian, learned or unlearned, is authorized and intended in the last resort to derive his faith from the letter of Scripture, as being the sole divine and infallible authority. Now of course I am not defending a theory which appears to me to refute itself as soon as it is stated, but I wish to point out, what is surely obvious, that Scripture is, on the face of it, unequal to the office assigned to it in the Protestant system, unless it speaks—at least, on all points of vital importance—in language plain and intelligible to the ordinary apprehension of mankind, not in ambiguous oracles which can only be unriddled by the labours of the learned few. Supposing, then, for argument's sake, what I hope pre-

sently to disprove, that scholars might fairly interpret the words of Christ in a sense contrary to what they are sure to suggest to any ordinary reader, it wonld remain true that in their natural acceptation they must inevitably mislead, as they all along have misled, the great body of Christians on a question of momentous practical interest directly bearing on their eternal salvation. Before coming to those subtle niceties of scholarship, on which so much ingenuity has been expended, in the perverse attempt to prove that black is white, I would venture to ask any honest and intelligent inquirer, learned or unlearned, two simple questions; (1) If Christ *had* intended to teach the doctrine of eternal punishment, could He possibly have taught it in plainer or more direct terms? (2) If He did *not* intend to teach it, could he possibly have chosen language more certain *à priori* to mislead, as the unbroken experience of eighteen centuries proves *à posteriori* that it always has misled, the immense multitude of His disciples? To put aside His solemn words with a modern essayist, as "emotional," is either a mere quibble, or means that they are *false;* and the subject is too serious for this verbal trifling. The only available answer is that already referred to, from which some Universalists do not shrink, and which I do not care again to characterize, that for moral and practical purposes He deliberately *intended* to mislead them.

One further observation on the nature of the Scripture argument shall be added before entering on any discussion of particular passages, and it may be em-

bodied in the words of a high Anglican authority, to whom reference has been already made. Hooker is unquestionably enunciating the judgment of reason and common sense, when he lays down the principle "that, where a literal interpretation [of Scripture] will stand, the furthest from the letter is commonly the worst." And this rule has an obvious application to the subtle, not to say sophistical, difficulties that have been imported into the interpretation of the critical term αἰώνιος. Certainly, as Mr. Maurice says, "eternity is not a *mere* negation of time;" the question, however, is not whether it contains, as in relation to the life of the blessed it undoubtedly does, other and higher meanings also, but whether it does not at least *include*, as no one would deny that it does in its application to the Supreme Being, the notion of everlasting duration. And, moreover, it is plain that if it does not include that idea in one limb of an antithetical sentence, neither can it include it in the other. If we may eviscerate the word of all idea of everlasting duration, when applied to the "fire" or "punishment" reserved for the wicked, then neither does it convey any Scriptural warrant for the everlasting "life" of the just:

> "And if the treasures of thy wrath could waste,
> Thy lovers must their promised heaven forego."*

We cannot take as much or as little of a revealed doctrine as we please, and draw a line at the point where, in Neander's language, it becomes "uncom-

* *Christian Year.* Second Sunday in Lent.

fortable." Universalists might with advantage have learnt that lesson from their master, Origen. And to suppose that our Lord used the same word in a wholly different sense in two consecutive clauses of the same sentence, without a hint of any change of meaning, is again to credit Him with the deliberate intent to deceive. It is no answer at all to say with Mr. Jukes that our eternity of bliss does not depend on this promise, but on our "participation in the Divine nature."* Even if it were so, the difficulty would remain that, the word αἰώνιος does in fact convey in one half of the verse a meaning which must be excluded from the other half. But, moreover, we become "partakers of the Divine nature" in this life (2 Peter i. 4) through sacramental union with Christ, which certainly bestows no security for final perseverance. It is urged by the same writer that the righteous "cannot die any more,"† but Scripture also affirms that the worm which torments the wicked "ends not, and their fire is not quenched." To insist on a literal interpretation in one case and repudiate it in the other, is to play fast and loose with what Sir James Stephen justly calls "the most terrific words which have ever been spoken in the ears of man."

But Mr. Jukes is distinguished from the majority of his Universalist sympathizers by too real a reverence for the written word of God to be indifferent to the danger of tampering with its literal meaning. And he accordingly defends himself, as was intimated just

* *Restitution*, p. 68. † Ibid., p. 129.

now, by reference to an analogous case, to which he evidently attaches considerable weight, as he refers to it several times in the course of his work; and I quite agree with him that the analogy is pertinent, though, to my mind, it only serves to clench the argument against him. If, he argues, we are to understand the words of Christ about the eternal punishment of the wicked in a literal sense, why should we not also understand literally His words about the Eucharist, and accept the doctrine of Transubstantiation? Why not, indeed? "Did not our Lord, when He said, 'Take, eat; this is My Body,' know how monstrously the words would be perverted? Yet, though a single sentence would have made any mistake almost impossible, *He did not add another word.*" Nevertheless, in this case also, "the so-called obvious or literal sense *is, beyond all doubt, not the true one.*"* Certainly, I quite agree with the writer that the doctrine of Transubstantiation, or the Real Presence, represents the obvious and literal sense of those most sacred words. And, as he might have further argued, not only "did our Lord not add another word" to guard against this "monstrous perversion" of His meaning, if such it be, but when on His first announcing the doctrine His hearers took offence at it, and many of them eventually forsook him in consequence—as we are told that many reject the Gospel now, on account of His teaching about the future punishment of the lost—He reiterated and enforced His previous statement in stronger and

* Ibid., pp. 100, 141.

more explicit language than before. It is equally true that here also, on Mr. Jukes's hypothesis, His words were for above fifteen centuries all but universally misunderstood, and are still misunderstood by the overwhelming majority of Christians, including the whole Roman Catholic and Eastern Churches, and a considerable section of those beyond their pale. Most assuredly if "Transubstantiation is a mistake," it is, as he candidly admits, "a mistake built on Christ's own words."* And those who do not scruple to credit the Christian Church from the beginning with an unintermittent traditionary error as to the nature of the chief Sacrament of the Gospel may, perhaps, without inconsistency, regard her doctrine of eternal punishment as "another like misunderstanding." To others it may appear that if both Scripture and the Church are such untrustworthy guides, historical Christianity must be in very evil plight.

I have adopted Mr. Jukes's term "Transubstantiation" advisedly, for I quite agree with him that it expresses the only natural and obvious meaning of the words of Christ. A doctrine of the Real Presence, which is not Transubstantiation—I use the term, of course, in its proper theological sense, as defined at the Council of Trent—has always seemed to me, ever since I was capable of thinking on such subjects at all, not so much false as intellectually inconceivable, unless the novel and repulsive theory of Consubstan-

* See the remarkable admissions on this point in the text and note of Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection*, p. 323.

tiation, commonly ascribed to Luther*—which, to say the least, does not at all diminish any supposed difficulties of the received belief, while it directly contradicts the words of Institution†—be admitted as a possible alternative. There is the same sort of shadowy and unpractical character about a belief in the Real Presence which excludes Transubstantiation, as about a belief in the Communion of Saints which excludes their invocation. But there

* I say, "commonly ascribed to Luther," for it is not very clear how far he was himself responsible for it. He appears to have maintained this, or something very like it, in his early work *De Adoratione Sacramenti* (1523), ed. Walch, vol. xix; but he considered it of little consequence whether Transubstantiation was formally accepted or not, so long as the Real Presence was honestly maintained; while against Carolstadt's teaching he protested inflexibly to the last, as a denial of the truth of Holy Scripture, though he would have liked to adopt it if he could consistently have done so. (See Gieseler, *Church History*, vol. v. pp. 338, sqq.) On the other hand, the tenet of Consubstantiation certainly did not find its way into the Confession of Augsburg till after 1540, when the original version had been twice altered by Melancthon, against the wishes of Luther, and both times—especially the second—materially for the worse. It need hardly be added that the new formula wholly failed to preserve any permanent belief in the Real Presence among the Lutherans, who have long since lost both the object and the habit of Eucharistic faith.

† On the theory of Consubstantiation, or Impanation (which is a more offensive form of it) the words of Institution should run—as the words of the Augsburgh Confession, in the form into which Melancthon eventually twisted it, actually do run—"Hoc est Corpus Meum *cum pane*." To extract such a meaning from the inspired formula, "Hoc est Corpus Meum," is to assert the co-existence under the same accidents—that is the identity—of two different substances, which contradicts a primary law of thought. Cf. Note on Transubstantiation in Appendix.

are many, no doubt, who have been brought up (like myself) to repudiate the term, and who continue in words to do so, through the force of early habit and prejudice, while all the time their faith and heart's devotion is centred on the great verity it was designed to guard; just as there were many at the time of the Arian controversy who, from bias of education and the like, had a repugnance to the crucial term ὁμοούσιος, though honestly accepting the Nicene faith of which it has ever since been the symbol; and with such persons, whose real belief was sound, St. Athanasius was disposed to deal very tenderly. On the other hand, there are many who profess to believe in the Real Presence, as there were many then who professed to acknowledge the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, whose actual belief, if it were analysed, would turn out to be quite different. It may well be doubted whether any one who deliberately and intelligently repudiates Transubstantiation, knowing what it means, believes in the Real Presence; or conversely, whether there is any genuine believer in that great Christian verity who does not believe in Transubstantiation, though some accident of training, or early association, or confusion of thought, or misapprehension of its meaning, may lead him to continue in good faith to reject the formula.* As Cardinal Wiseman says, "the one is, in truth, equivalent to the other."† But people often

* As no one now professes to hold Consubstantiation, it is not necessary to consider that alternative. But see on this passage Note in Appendix.

† Wiseman's *Lectures on the Eucharist*, p. 304.

make mistakes in analysing their own belief. So far, then, I agree with Mr. Jukes, that the dogmas of the Real Presence and of eternal punishment stand on the same footing. Both come to us authenticated by the express and reiterated declarations of our Lord Himself, probably because He foresaw that both, though for different reasons, would provoke bitter antagonism; both also are guaranteed by the fullest testimony of the Vincentian rule, *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.* And while both doctrines alike transcend the discoveries, and one the surmises, of reason—for who could have dared to anticipate so wonderful a gift?—neither of them can be even plausibly maintained to contradict it.

The promise of a future life is implied throughout the Old Testament, and the later, especially the Sapiential, Books teach with increasing clearness that "the wicked shall be cast out in his wickedness, but the righteous hath hope in his death."* It is not, indeed, inculcated as a ruling motive of life and conduct with the same dogmatic precision as in the New Testament, and so marked is the reserve of the earlier books on any other than a temporal system of rewards and punishments, that Warburton has ingeniously turned it into an argument for the Divine authority of the Mosaic Law. But his view of the ignorance of the Hebrew and other ancient nations about a future state is extravagant to the verge of paradox, and

* Prov. xiv. 32. The teaching of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus is much more copious and precise.

might almost be classed with Father Hardouin's theory of the Greek and Latin classics, or Whately's *Historic Doubts.** We should not, however, expect to find such explicit teaching as to eternal life and eternal death under the Jewish as under the Christian Dispensation. Yet there are very significant intimations of it even there. Thus Isaias speaks of "everlasting burnings," and Daniel tells us that "those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, some to everlasting reproach." To the redeemed of the Lord is promised "everlasting light," "everlasting joy," "everlasting salvation," while the wicked are threatened with "everlasting reproach and eternal shame, which shall never be forgotten."† Nor is there any reason to question the sense of the Hebrew word translated in this and kindred passages, "everlasting." Its original meaning is "hidden," or, as applied to future time, "indefinite," which would imply the idea of infinite duration, where there is nothing in the context to limit it. The epithet is accordingly applied to the eternal life and nature of God, and to God Himself, in several passages of the Old Testament. In the Psalter it is used to designate the eternal reign of the Messiah.‡ The seven

* See an able and learned critique of Warburton's *Divine Legation*, in *Essays and Lectures*, by the late W. Mills, B.D., who sums up his estimate in the words of Schröckh; "sinnreich genug, aber nur sinnreich."

† Is. xxxiii. 14; xxxv. 10; xlv. 17; li. 11; lx. 19; lxi. 7; Dan. xii. 2; Jer. xxiii. 40.

‡ It is right to explain that I am not myself a Hebrew scholar. For the following references to the *Thesaurus* of Gesenius, and

Hebrew boys, whose martyrdom, together with their mother's, is recorded in the Second Book of Maccabees, died in the confident hope of immortality. The second brother declared, with his last breath, that "the King of the world will raise us up who have died for His laws, in the resurrection of eternal life," and the youngest in like manner spoke of his brethren who had already suffered as "dead under the covenant of eternal life."* Strange were it, indeed, if the chosen people had alone remained destitute of that faith in immortality which survived amid all the aberrations of Paganism, and was more or less distinctly cherished in every nation of antiquity, being but the echo of His voice who never left Himself without witness among men, who speaks not only by His commissioned Prophets, but by the mouth of Greek dramatist, or Cumæan Sibyl, who "casts His

some others, I am indebted to the valuable notes of a sermon on *The Whole Counsel of God* (Rivingtons), by my friend, Dr. Liddon, which he has kindly placed at my disposal:—"Vera æternitatis notio in vocabulo nostro iis in locis inest, qui immortalem summi Numinis naturam spectant, quod vocatur אֵל עוֹלָם Deus æternus, Gen. xxi. 33; Is. xl. 28. חי חָעוֹלָם in æternum vivens, Dan. xii. 7 (cf. הָרָה לְעוֹלָם vivere in æternum, immortalem esse instar deorum [Dei], Gen. iii. 22; Job vii. 16). Cui tribuuntur, וְוֹעוֹה עוֹלָם brachia æterna, Deut. xxxiii. 27, et de Quo dicitur מֵעוֹלָם וְעַד עוֹ לָם אַהָה אֵל Ps. xc. 2, ab æternitate ad æternitatem, Tu es Deus. Cf. Ps. ciii. 17; Ps. ix. 8; x. 16; xxix. 10; xciii. 2."—*Thesaurus*, sub voc. עלם.

* 2 Macc. vii. 9, 36.

shadow even on the unseemly legends of a popular mythology, and is dimly discerned in the ode or the epic, as in troubled water or in fantastic dreams;" stranger still, when we remember that nowhere was that belief more keenly realised than in the land where the Israelites sojourned for four hundred years. For through all the dark idolatries of their Egyptian taskmasters there loomed the vision—grotesque and distorted, it may be, but intensely clear—of future retribution and a world beyond the grave.

It is very remarkable that not only does the Evangelical Prophet break off abruptly, once and again, from words of consolation and hope, to utter the stern denunciation "No peace, saith my God, to the wicked," but after the final promise of the glory of the Gentile Church and "the new heavens and new earth," which shall abide for ever, he actually closes his inspired utterances with the solemn warning, thrice repeated by our Lord Himself, of the eternal judgment reserved for transgressors, whose "worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched."* And thus the Prophecy of Isaias, and the Sermon on the Mount, are alike concluded with menaces of awful doom, telling in the one case of the undying worm, in the other of the house built on the sand, whereon the rain descended, and the waves and winds beat upon it, "and it fell, and great was the fall thereof."† Most assuredly, if such declarations are to have any

* Is. xlviii. 22; lvii. 21; lxvi. 24; cf. Mark ix. 44, sqq.
† Matt. vii. 27.

meaning, "there is thunder on the horizon as well as dawn." Those who would interpret the Gospel as a promise of unconditional forgiveness, and can discern no attribute but mercy in the all holy God, are not delivering in its divine simplicity the message He proclaimed of old by the mouth of His Prophets, and in these last days has revealed to us by His Only Begotten Son, but putting their own arbitrary glosses on His most solemn words.

But it is to the final and fullest revelation of God in the New Testament that we naturally turn for the most explicit information on this momentous question. Nor shall we turn in vain. The word αἰώνιος (eternal) is used no less than seventy-one times in the New Testament. In fourty-four of these cases, twenty-three of which occur in the writings of St. John, it is an epithet of ζωὴ (life); in nine other places it is applied to the "redemption," "salvation," "glory," "abode," "inheritance," or "consolation" reserved for the blessed; in seven to the "fire," "judgment," "punishment," or "destruction" of the impenitent; in one passage it is used of God the Father, and in another of God the Holy Ghost. In two places only is it even fairly arguable that it *may* (not *must*) have a figurative or indefinite meaning, short of the full sense of everlasting, but both are denuded of all but a merely rhetorical force by so explaining it. The first occurs in the Epistle to St. Philemon, whom St. Paul exhorts to receive back his runaway slave Onesimus, "to keep for ever (ἵνα αἰώνιον αὐτὸν ἀπέχῃς), no more as a slave, but a brother beloved in the Lord." Here it

is hardly possible to doubt that Bretschneider and Huther are right in referring the word to the new bond of eternal union, now established between master and servant by the conversion of Onesimus to the Christian faith.* In the other case, the well-known passage in St. Jude about the cities of the plain, there is still less pretext for reasonable doubt. According to the ordinary punctuation, which is that of the Vulgate and the E.V., they are spoken of as "enduring the penalty of eternal fire." Even so, the natural interpretation is that given by Alford (*in loc.*), "undergoing the punishment, as may even now be seen, of eternal fire; of that fire which shall never be quenched." But I must venture to dissent from Alford in thinking that here also Huther is clearly right, when he suggests that the comma is misplaced, and that πυρὸς αἰωνίου should be construed with δεῖγμα instead of with δίκην. The meaning will then be that the temporal judgment of Sodom and Gomorrha is "a sample or type of the eternal fire" of hell.†

There is, however, another and more critical pas-

* Bretschneider (Lex. *in voc.*) translates "illum in sempiternum, scilicet quia Christianus factus jam vitæ æternæ particeps erat." Huther (*in loc.*) says, "Die christliche brüderliche Verbindung in die Ewigkeit reiche." So, too, Bloomfield (*in loc.*); and Alford, who quotes St. Chrysostom to the same effect; Lightfoot (*in loc.*) says, "The sense of αἰώνιον must not be arbitrarily limited. Since he left, Onesimus had obtained eternal life, and eternal life involves eternal interchange of friendship. His services to his old master were no longer barred by the gates of death."

† Huther, *Brief des Judas*, p. 217. Cf. 2 Peter ii. 6: ὑπόδειγμα μελλόντων ἀσεβεῖν τεθεικώς.

sage, where it has been ingeniously argued that αἰώνιος cannot bear its proper significance. Most entirely do I agree with Mr. Baldwin Brown that "everlasting punishment is about the most misleading term that could possibly be employed, if what was to be understood was literal destruction."* But then it is difficult to see what else it can mean except a punishment which lasts for ever. Here Mr. Jukes interposes with the objection that κόλασις is always used of corrective discipline, which must therefore be temporary; and he dismisses, with something like a sneer, the perfectly legitimate comment of—it is no disparagement to him to say—a much higher authority than himself in linguistic criticism, Archbishop Trench, who is in fact merely enunciating a familiar truism when he insists that the rules of classical Greek cannot be transferred without reserve to the Hellenistic Greek of the New Testament.† This very point has been dwelt upon by

* *Doctrine of Annihilation*, p. 88. The Annihilationist argument from the use of ἀπόλλυμι and its derivatives is something more than infelicitous. There is no ground whatever for restricting the sense of the term in Hellenistic more than in classical Greek, where it far oftener bears the sense (like our own word "ruin") of moral than of material destruction. See *e. g.* Luke xv. 24; xix. 10.

† Trench's *Synonyms of New Testament*, quoted in *Restitution*, p. 130. Mr. Jukes speaks as if the "proper sense" of every Greek word was precisely the same in every writer, from Homer to St. John of Damascus, and calls it a "shift" to deny this amazing paradox. It may be added that, even in classical Greek, the term does not convey any connotation of benefit to the offender, as may be gathered from the examples cited in Liddell and Scott, under κόλασις and κολάζω. And there is only one other passage in the New Testament, where it is used of

another distinguished scholar, who is widely enough removed in theological sympathy from either of the writers just named. Professor Jowett, in his essay "On the Interpretation of Scripture," expressly cautions us against the danger of reading the New Testament "under a distorting influence from classical Greek," and he adds—what is very much to the purpose here—that "the logical power to perceive the meaning of words *in reference to their context*," is no less requisite than classical learning.* For the context is conclusive against Mr. Jukes's interpretation of κόλασις in Matt. xxv. 46. The epithet αἰώνιος, which everywhere else in the New Testament conveys the full idea of "everlasting," would alone determine the sense of κόλασις; but, moreover, in the antithetical clause of the same verse κόλασιν αἰώνιον is contrasted with ζωὴν αἰώνιον; and it is indeed very observable, as has been before intimated, that nowhere in the New Testament are any other or stronger epithets employed to describe the eternal beatitude of the just than the eternal chastisement of the lost. And, further, in the parallel passage to this, five verses earlier, we have instead of κόλασιν αἰώνιον, but unquestionably used as a strictly synonymous expression, τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον, τὸ ἡτοιμασμένον τῷ διαβόλῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ) Matt. xxv. 41.)† And this again is explained by the

the punishment of the wicked (2 Peter ii. 9); elsewhere we have ἐκδίκησις or τιμωρία. The word employed for corrective chastisement in the New Testament is παιδεύω.

* *Essays and Reviews*, p. 391.

† St. Augustine, in dealing with a sophistical distinction suggested by Origenists in his own day, and which modern Uni-

"quenchless fire" (τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἄσβεστον) and undying, worm of Mark ix. 43, 44, 46, 48. There is nothing whatever in these strictly parallel passages to suggest the notion of corrective and remedial chastisement, but the reverse; nor in the words ὄλεθρος, κρίσις, and κρίμα with which αἰώνιος is elsewhere joined, as *e.g.* where it is said that sinners "shall pay the penalty of eternal destruction from the face of the Lord and the glory of His power."*

There is in short nothing anywhere in the language of the New Testament to suggest that αἰώνιος ever means less than everlasting. Those who would affix to it a more limited sense have brought this interpretation from elsewhere to the sacred text; they have not found it there.† And they are compelled, on their

versalists have revived, had pointed out that these passages mutually explain each other: "Neque illud dici hic poterit, in quo nonnulli seipsos seducunt, ignem æternum dictum, non ipsam pœnam æternam . . . ut videlicet ipse ignis æternus sit, combustio vero eorum, hoc est operatio ignis, non sit in eos æterna; cum et hoc prævidens Dominus, tanquam Dominus, sententiam Suam ita concluserit dicens, 'Sic ibunt illi in combustionem æternam, justi autem in vitam æternam. Erit ergo æterna combustio, sicut ignis."—*De Fide et Opp.*, c. 15.

* 2 Thess. i. 9.

† Thus Schleussner (*Lex. in* N. T., p. 67) says, "αἰώνιον in N. T. 2, dicitur omne quod est finis expers, maxime id, quod est post hujus vitæ mundique decursum eventurum. Huc pertinent omnia illa N. T. loca, in quibus formulæ: πῦρ αἰώνιον, κρίσις αἰώνιος, κόλασις αἰώνιος, ζωὴ (δόξα, σωτηρία) αἰώνιος reperiuntur, v. c. Matt. xviii 8; xix. 19; xxv. 41, 46; Marc. iii. 29; Rom. ii 7; 2 Tim. ii. 10; Heb. v. 9. Quemadmodum enim formulis πῦρ αἰώνιον et sqq. pœnæ perpetuæ peccatorum, quas impii post hanc vitam luent, *sorsque eorum misera futura non interrupta* indicantur, ita opposita formula ζωὴ αἰώνιος

own hypothesis, to draw an arbitrary distinction between the use of the word as applied to the future destiny of the righteous and of the lost. Even in Plato the word is used in the same sense;* but it does not often occur in classical Greek. And if its meaning is not so definitely fixed in the Septuagint, so neither had the idea of the eternal world been then so prominently put forward. It was the special office of the Gospel, as St. Paul tells us, "to reveal life and incorruption," that is, immortal life, with a distinctness and fulness of divine sanction previously unknown.† And hence terms which had before been used in a looser or lower sense, or scarcely used at all, such as χάρις, πίστις, ἀγάπη, πνεῦμα, σωτηρία, ζωὴ and others that might be mentioned—of which αἰώνιος is one—received a new force, and passed, as the recognised symbols of great spiritual truths, into the intellectual currency of Christendom. A modern Ameri-

perennis felicitatis piorum post mortem status et conditio significatur, quæ 2 Cor. iv. 17 αἰώνιον βάρος δόξης, Luc. xvi. 9 σχηναὶ αἰώνιοι, Heb. ix. 15 αἰώνιος κληρονομία, et 2 Pet. i. 11 αἰώνιος βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ appellatur." In like manner, again, Bretschnèider (*Lex. Man.* in v.), after quoting all the passages in which the word αἰώνιος is applied to blessedness or woe, observes, "Αἰώνιος in formulis ζωὴ αἰων. πῦρ αἰων. δόξα αἰων. κόλασις, ὄλεθρος, κρίμα, κρίσις αἰων. *sempiternum nunquam finiendum* indicare dubio caret, quum præmia æque ac pœnæ post resurrectionem sempiternæ quoque haberentur a Judæis. Vid. test. Aser. in Fab. Cod. Pseud. V. T. i. p. 693, potissimum Psalter, Salom. Ps. 3, vers. 13, 15, 16, ubi ἡ ἀπώλεια τοῦ ἁμαρτωλοῦ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα; piorum ζωὴ αἰώνιος autem οὐκ ἐκλείψει ἔτι."—P 31.

* Plat. Tim. 37, κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς αἰωνίας φύσεως.

† 2 Tim. i. 10.

can writer, who inveighs fiercely against the doctrine of eternal punishment, makes short work of this testimony of Scripture. He combats its natural meaning, indeed, on *à priori* grounds, and urges the common Universalist sophistry that everlasting need not mean lasting for ever. But his real argument is a much simpler, and *ex hypothesi* a more forcible one. The Orientals, Greeks, and Jews, who had derived their belief from "fallible sources,"* also maintained the doctrine of eternal punishment, and it is reasonable to suppose that similar language was "employed by the Saviour and the Evangelists in conformity with the prevailing thought and customary phraseology of their time;" and accordingly, if our Lord did mean what He said, "we regard it not as a part of the inspired utterance of Jesus, but as an error which crept in among others from the surrounding notions of a benighted Pagan age."† No answer, of course, can be attempted, within the limits of the present inquiry, to an argument which ignores not only the inspiration of Scripture, but the Divinity of Christ.

* It is most probable, however, considering the universality of this belief, that it was derived from primitive tradition.

† Alger's *Critical History of Doctrine of Future State*, pp. 525, 526. The writer admits that the final rejection of the lost is certainly taught by St. Paul, St. John, the authors of the Apocalypse and the Second Epistle of St Peter, is implied in the First Epistle of St. Peter, and is probably intended by St. Jude. Of course he thinks them all mistaken. The teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews on the subject he considers ambiguous.

But it would be a grievous mistake to imagine that the question turned simply on the exact force of the word αἰώνιος. The "worm that dieth not," the "fire that is not quenched,"* the "great gulf firmly fixed," the wrath of God that "abideth" on the disobedient and unbelieving, are expressions hardly less significant. Nor can this last declaration of our Lord apply to the present life only, where there is still place for repentance; for whereas it is said of the believer that "he *hath* eternal life" already begun in him, of him who refuses to believe it is said, not simply that he hath it not, but that "he shall not see life," referring clearly to those who eventually die in their sins.† Still more emphatic is our Lord's solemn warning, recorded in all the three Synoptic Gospels,‡ of the unpardonable sin, which shall be forgiven neither in this world nor in the world to come: and if in some respects it offers difficulties of interpretation, in its bearing on our present subject it is clear enough. To these pas-

* Mark xix. 44, sqq. In the parallel passage of the Old Testament (Is. lxvi. 24) the Hebrew verb is in the future tense: our Lord, to whose mind past, present, and future are eternally one, uses the present, οὐ σβέννυται. Wordsworth (*in loc.*) observes that ὁ σκώληξ αὐτῶν "intimates that as the instrument of punishment is eternal, so they who suffer it will exist for ever."

† John iii. 36. This passage is of course equally fatal to the Annihilation theory. Compare ἤδη κέκριται in verse 18. "He is already judged" by his own act in deliberately choosing evil; ἀπειθῶν includes the ideas of unbelief and disobedience—the moral rejection of the truth. Cf. Eph. ii. 2; v. 6, υἱοὺς τῆς ἀπειθείας rendered in *Vulg.* "diffidentiæ," in E. V. "disobedience."

‡ Matt. xii. 21, 22; Mark iii. 28; Luke xii. 10.

sages, may, of course, be added—for I am not now arguing with those who dispute the authority or inspiration of any of those books which Protestants equally with Catholics accept as making up the New Testament—the familiar denunciations, in the Apostolic Epistles and the Apocalypse, of the eternal punishment both of the impenitent and the apostate angels. For no distinction can be drawn; Universalists must be content, as was intimated before, to extend to the devils as well as the damned the benefit of their speculations or their doubts. Whatever Scriptural or moral plea may be urged in the one case is equally available in the other, and both classes alike are consigned, in the final sentence of Christ, to the same "everlasting fire." But St. Peter speaks of the fallen angels being "lowered into hell by cords of darkness, and reserved for judgment;" and St. Jude of their being "reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, for the judgment of the great day."* In the Apocalypse "the devil is cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever" (εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων); all who are not written in the book of life are similarly "cast into the lake of fire;" unbelievers and sinners of various kinds are assigned "their portion in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, which" (it is thrice repeated) "is the second death;" and of all these it is said that "the smoke of their torment goeth up for ever and ever, and they have no rest day nor

* 2 Peter ii. 4; Jude 6.

night."* And the inspired writer, be it remembered, is speaking of a period after the close of the present dispensation and the General Judgment. It is often replied that this is all "Eastern imagery," and if the comment merely referred to the outward clothing of the idea, it might be allowed to pass as at once obvious and irrelevant; but I have yet to learn that inspired writers can indulge in a style of sensational rhetoric on the most awful subjects—and that is what such criticisms really mean—which would be disgraceful in the penny-a-liner of a daily newspaper. The sensible images employed may vary, but only as they conspire to adumbrate with increasing clearness the several aspects of a common and irreversible doom.† To use the words of Tertullian on another subject, "*Si omnia figuræ, quid erit illud cujus figuræ?*"

To these, again, must be added all those passages, far too numerous to be even indicated here, many of which will at once occur to every reader of the Bible, both in the Old and New Testament, especially the latter, where we are bidden to work out our salvation while it is yet day, to remember that time is short, to

* Apoc. xx. 10, 15; xxi. 8; xiv. 11. It should be observed that precisely the same expression, "day and night" (ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς,) is used of the eternal adoration of the angels and saints before the throne of God. Apoc. iv. 8; vii. 15. Cf. also, as bearing on the Annihilationist theory, Apoc. ix. 6. "And in those days men shall seek death, and shall not find it; and they shall desire to die, and death shall flee from them."

† This whole class of passages, as well as that noticed in the following paragraph, are entirely passed over by Mr. Jukes in his enumeration of "texts of Holy Scripture said to be opposed to" Universalism.

redeem it, to watch, to pass our time of earthly sojourning in fear, not to neglect the day of visitation, to hearken while it is called to-day, and the like, all of which point, more or less directly, to this life as the appointed period of probation for eternity, unless we are prepared to resolve the solemn utterances of Prophets, Apostles, and Him who sent them, into the empty verbiage of a modern fashionable preacher. And these reiterated exhortations derive additional emphasis from the significant fact, which some Universalists have expressly acknowledged, and all are compelled tacitly to admit, that *no single passage can be cited, either from the Old Testament or the New, which even hints at a continued or second probation after death.* Those which were before referred to as bearing on the continued cleansing and perfecting of the elect in Purgatory, do not speak of them as still on their trial.

There is, however, one most solemn parable, or, rather, narrative—for it has always been regarded in the Church as based on actual facts—which appears to have been uttered by our Lord, and preserved in the Gospel of St. Luke, for the express purpose of warning us that life is the time of trial, and that after death it will be too late to change. There have been, I believe, some few Catholic writers who, misled by the seeming anxiety of Dives for the salvation of his brethren, have supposed that he might be in Purgatory.* But the language and whole tenor of this

* For the real drift of this petition of Dives, see Trench, *On*

narrative, and the all but universal interpretation put upon it, negative any such idea. It does not seem even to have occurred to St. Augustine or St. Thomas, both of whom assume the contrary, as in later times does Massillon.* Nor is it at all more to the purpose to refer, with Mr. Jukes, to the allegorical interpretation which St. Augustine and some other Fathers have put upon it, though it has never been the dominant one, as representing the Jewish and Gentile Dispensations. For those who so understand its primary intention are so far from excluding the more direct and obvious sense, that they assume it as the basis of their explanation. On that theory, to cite Archbishop Trench's words, "it will not, indeed, any longer be the ultimate aim of the parable to teach the miserable doom which must follow on the selfish abuse of worldly goods, the living merely for this present world, but yet more strikingly, *that miserable doom is assumed as so certain and evident*, that it may be used as the substratum on which to superinduce another moral, through which to afford another warning."† The same learned writer dwells on the force of the terrible words, to which the English rendering does very inadequate justice—μεταξὺ ἡμῶν καὶ ὑμῶν χάσμα μέγα ἐστήρικται, κ. τ. λ. It would hardly be possible to describe in plainer terms

the Parables, p. 477, and cf. Isaac Williams, *Commentary on Gospel Narrative*, vol. v. p. 385.

* S. Aug. *Serm.* 41; S. Tho. *Summa*, Suppl. ad Par. iii., Q. 98, Art. 4.

† Trench, *ut supra*, p. 460.

the eternal separation of the lost from the company of the Saints.

And, lastly, there is one passage which, notwithstanding Mr. Jukes's ingenious endeavour not to explain, but to explain away its unmistakeable meaning, would alone be conclusive as to the teaching of the New Testament on this subject. Our Lord said of Judas Iscariot, that "it were good for him if he had never been born."* No Christian will dare to attribute to the words of Christ, especially on so awful a theme, a mere rhetorical or dramatic force. And yet, if they are really true, they are decisive of the question before us. If the soul of Judas is hereafter, at however inconceivably remote a future, and after whatever countless ages of purgatorial suffering, to be restored to the light of His countenance, "in whose presence is the fulness of joy," it is simply untrue to say that it were better for him never to have been born.† Who counts the billows when the shore is won? who would cast back a moment's regret at the all but interminable vista of cleansing agony, through which he had passed at last into the light of the Beatific Vision and the sinless charities of his immortal home? We have every reason to believe that for many the remedial

* Matt. xxvi. 24; Mark xiv. 21.

† The saying of our Lord, sometimes referred to as analogous, about those who put stumbling blocks in the way of His little ones (Matt. xviii. 6), is only partially parallel. For He is there speaking, not of a particular individual, but of a certain class of sins, the meaning evidently being that a violent death is in itself a less evil than living on to commit them.

chastisements of Purgatory will be indeed terrible; but for him who has to endure the very heaviest of them it is ten thousand-fold better that he *has* been born. A thousand years are as one day, nay, not one "million-million-millionth part" of a second, when weighed in the balance of eternity, and the past would soon fade into an imperceptible speck on the ocean of a boundless beatitude. If the soul of man is immortal, Judas lives; if Christ spoke truly, he lives in everlasting woe. We may dispute this if we please, because, like every doctrine about the future state, it involves difficulties we cannot explain, or because "it makes one's gorge rise" to contemplate revelations not pleasant to flesh and blood. And from a merely external or infidel point of view, it may be natural or permissible or plausible, though scarcely reasonable, to do so. But let us at least understand quite clearly what we are doing. We are not merely rejecting the teaching of the Universal Church in all ages, though we are of course rejecting it; we are not merely rejecting the most solemn declarations of Prophets and Apostles, though we are rejecting these also; we are deliberately repudiating His most express, most precise, most emphatic, most awful words, reiterated again and again, whom Christians worship as the Consubstantial Word and Wisdom of the Eternal God.

Nor shall we do justice to the force of this cumulative evidence if we fail to notice that, so far from being based, as Universalists have paradoxically objected, on isolated texts, it is precisely in the harmony of Scripture teaching throughout that its main strength con-

sists. Even if there were no particular passages so clear and emphatic as to be alone, in the absence of any authoritative interpretation to the contrary, decisive of the question—and we have seen that there are several such—the general tenor of the sacred volume would be fatal to the Universalist gloss which may be plausibly affixed by an ingenious advocate on a few isolated texts. In every variety of form, by type, by parable, by prophecy, by exhortation, by warning, no less than by direct doctrinal statement, the inspired writers under both dispensations conspire to inculcate —one might almost say to inflict—upon us the same solemn truth. There are numberless passages, unmeaning or hopelessly obscure at best on the Universalist hypothesis, all pointing in the same direction and for the interpretation of which one doctrine alone supplies the key; and their concurrent testimony is the surest guarrantee of its being the right one. If that doctrine be denied, we certainly cannot, to use the phrase of a distinguished essayist, "interpret the Scripture, like any other book;"* on the contrary its language throughout on the future state of the impenitent becomes about the most misleading that could well be imagined. Particular texts have been cited with more or less plausibility by Arian and Socinian controversialists in disparagement of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and the orthodox have always been accustomed to reply, not only that the more explicit statements of Scripture testify to its truth, but that no other doc-

* Prof. Jowett in *Essays and Reviews*, p. 377.

trine will harmonize and adequately explain the various intimations on the subject found in the sacred text, as a consistent whole. And the same answer applies, with at least equal force, to the Scriptural plea for Universalism.

It would be easy enough to lengthen out the Scripture argument in detail, but it is scarcely necessary to do so. Certainly, if the proverbial jury could be impanelled of "the first twelve men who pass under Temple Bar"—whether learned or unlearned would matter little, though an acquaintance with the original languages would make the case still clearer to them—and were bidden to declare, not what they themselves believed, but what they judged to be the teaching of Scripture on this subject, there cannot be a doubt of their verdict. I am not of course prepared to defend the Protestant aphorism, "*Bonus textuarius bonus theologus*," but in this case the *bonus textuarius*, being otherwise unbiassed, could hardly go wrong. As little can we doubt the judgment of any critical scholar, who had no special thesis to maintain.* And their

* One of my critics, in the *Academy* for April 9, observes that I have concluded my papers (in the *Contemporary Review*) "without grappling with the *real strength* of" my "opponent's position on purely Biblical grounds," but he does not unfortunately go on to explain in what that "real strength" consists. And until he has done so, it is at least premature to complain of my omitting to "grapple" with an argument, which, in the opinion alike of all Christians who are not Universalists and all Universalists who are not Christians tells entirely, and very strongly on my own side. Such attempts as have been made to break its force in the interests of Universalism, I have noticed here.

interpretation of the sacred text would coincide, as we have already seen, with the sense always put upon it by the Universal Church. It may be added that the force of this Scriptural testimony becomes all the more overwhelming when we remember, what is certainly true, though at the first blush the statement may appear paradoxical, that the ultimate source of the infidel objection to the dogma of eternal punishment is to be found, not in the dictates of reason, but in an unconscious abuse of the revelation against which it is directed. It has been pointed out that those heathen writers, who recognise a future life, with scarcely an exception assert or imply also the future retribution of the wicked, which to their minds contained nothing inconsistent with that great law of retributive justice stamped in characters too terribly legible to be ignored on the whole face of nature. But the Creator has revealed Himself by His Prophets, and still more through the Incarnation of the Eternal Son, as a God who is rich in mercy; and men who have heard the revelation, and rejected it, proceed to turn it against the Giver. They act like those modern unbelievers who undertake to construct a system of perfect morality independent of the Gospel, as though they could rid themselves, if they wished it, of the religious traditions which a life of eighteen centuries has ingrained into the conscience of Christendom. Mill, in discussing "the utility of religion," candidly admits the religious origin of the received morality, though he appears strangely to imagine that now "mankind have entered into the possession of it," they can safely

afford to dispense with the foundation on which the superstructure has been raised, which is much like expecting a plant to blossom when the root is dead.

And if this is true of avowed sceptics, much more of course do those who assail the dogma of eternal punishment from a professedly Christian standpoint base their objections on the revelation of the mercy of God, whom they have come to regard, with Mr. Maurice, "in the character of the God of salvation, *and only in that character.*" They can cite no direct evidence from Scripture on their own side, and they are obliged to admit that there is the strongest *primâ facie* evidence in the letter of Scripture against them. But they appeal from the letter to what they call the spirit of its teaching, and rely on those passages which speak of the everlasting love of God, of His mercy enduring for ever, of His taking no pleasure in the death of a sinner, and the like, forgetting that such declarations are perfectly reconcilable with these which tell us that He is just as well as merciful, that He is not mocked, and that men shall reap what they have sown. Of those passages which are most plausibly cited on the Universalist side, such as Rom. v. 15—21, viii. 19—23, the utmost that can fairly be alleged is, not that they must bear such a meaning, or even that it is the obvious one; but only that they might be so interpreted if the interpretation were not inconsistent, as it is, with the express declarations of Scripture elsewhere, and did not place the teaching of the Apostles in direct contradiction to that of their Divine Master. It is a rule not merely of Scriptural exegesis

but of common sense, to interpret what is doubtful or obscure by what is clear and explicit, not *vice versâ*. But generally speaking, the radical fallacy which underlies the Universalist exegesis is an habitual confusion of thought between the fact and the ultimate result of Redemption. Thus, for instance, Mr. Jukes has filled several pages, and might have filled many more, with passages from the Apostolic Epistles asserting the universality of redemption, or of the offer of grace, or the will of God that all men should be saved, or the duty of praying for all.* Such statements are conclusive against the Calvinist or Jansenist heresy that Christ died only for the elect; but they leave untouched the further question, which depends not on the will of God but of man, whether all will in fact avail themselves of the proffered gift. We only see here another instance of that inveterate tendency, which has already so often come before us, both in the arguments of Universalists and of those who use the doctrine of eternal punishment as a pretext for assailing Christianity altogether, to confound Christian orthodoxy with Calvinism. If man is a moral

* *Restitution*, pp. 21—25. Exception might be taken in detail to Mr. Juke's application of some of these passages. Thus *e.g.* πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις (Romans viii. 22) does not mean all mankind, but all animate and inanimate nature (see Alford *in loc.*); and so again in John xii. 32, many of the ancient MSS., including the *Codex Sinaiticus*, read πάντα ("omnia," *Vulg.*) not πάντας. Alford retains the πάντας of the *textus receptus*, but marks it as doubtful in his earlier editions. It is unnecessary, however, to go into points of detail here, as the Universalist application of the passages alleged is sufficiently disposed of by the considerations dwelt on in the text.

agent, free to accept or refuse the gracious offer of redemption—and this is the constant and emphatic teaching of Scripture throughout—no multiplicity or distinctness of assertions of the universality of that offer can prove anything as to its universal or general acceptance. "How often would I have gathered thy children, *and ye would not.*" The real question is, not whether the salvation of all men is the will of God, as undoubtedly it is, but whether He wills to force salvation on unwilling recipients. Such a view is not only in direct contradiction to the letter of Scripture, but to all we know both of the Divine Nature and of our own.

The fact is that many who, in Butler's words, "make very free in their speculations with the Divine Goodness," by goodness mean good nature. But, not to speak of the impossibility of a system of ethics built on this fallacy, and ignoring that principle of righteous indignation against wrong so deeply implanted in human nature, it is abundantly clear, unless the Bible be one long lie from beginning to end, that the Divine Goodness does not mean that. To quote the perplexed admission of a leading opponent of the doctrine we are considering, "Retribution is stamped on every page and line of that awful volume; and he who does not discern that impress on the sacred text must interpret it by some canons of criticism which would be universally rejected, as altogether extravagant and wild, if applied to any other writing."* It is "the

* Sir J. Stephen's *Essays, ut supr.* p. 652.

song" alike "of Moses and of the Lamb"—the testimony of both Dispensations—"*Just and true* are Thy ways, Thou King of the nations."* And thus, as I observed at the beginning, so far from the doctrine Universalists assail being "an isolated truth," it runs up into the mystery of the Divine Attributs, and its denial involves a reconstruction, not only of the Gospel Economy, but of the revealed idea of God. We may no more deny that He is just than that He justifies the believer. And "it may turn out in the day of account that unforgiven souls, while charging His laws with injustice in the case of others, may be unable to find fault with His dealings severally towards themselves."†

Before we quit the Scripture argument, one other point deserves to be noticed here. It is significant, but perfectly natural, that a denial of the Personality of God should go hand in hand with a denial of the personality of the Evil One; neither truth is compatible with a refusal to recognise the Christian idea of sin. "Satan and Tisiphone," we are blandly informed by the apostle of this new evangel, "are alike not real persons."‡ Certainly, if God is not "a real Person," there is no ground for believing in the personal existence of His great enemy, expressly as He has revealed it in every page of Scripture. It would be to revive

* There is a *var. lect.*, ἐθνῶν αἰώνων, ἁγιῶν, but it does not affect the point.

† Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, p. 416. This is indeed implied in Matt. xxii. 12, ὁ δὲ ἐφιμώθη.

‡ Preface to Arnold's *God and the Bible*, p. xxvii.

the Persian Dualism, with Ormuzd left out.* We have outgrown these old-world superstitions, whether Biblical or other.

> "Esse aliquid Manes et subterranea regma
> Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum ære lavantur."†

There are not, indeed, wanting, even in this enlightened age, sufficient indications (φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσι) of the presence and operation of those fallen spirits, whom it is the present fashion to relegate to the nursery with a smile or a sneer.‡ I will not discuss whether, after making full allowance for the—doubtless innumerable—cases of trickery and illusion, there is not something in the pretensions of modern Spiritualism, as of witchcraft formerly, which cannot be thus explained, or whether, if it be so, diabolical agency is not the simplest or only available explanation.§ In

* Curiously enough a revival of the exploded Dualistic heresy is the conclusion to which Mill's posthumous *Essays on Religion* seem to point.

† Juv. *Sat.* ii. 149, sq.

‡ See *e.g. Contemporary Review* for February, 1876, art. "Demonolatry, Devil-Dancing, and Demoniacal Possession," by Dr. (now Bp.) Caldwell.

§ It is hardly necessary to observe that the detailed and reiterated statements of Scripture, both in the Old and New Testament, make a wholesale rejection of the reality of witchcraft and demoniacal possession impossible without rejecting Revelation altogether. I am, of course, well aware of the total and contemptuous rejection prevalent now-a-days, even among nominal Christians, of every form of supernaturalism, or as the *Times* recently expressed it, with a characteristic and studied infelicity, "these relics and survivals of heathenism." Thus a recent scientific writer, in the *Fortnightly Review* for August, 1872 (p. 134), consigns "*a belief in the efficacy of prayer*" with belief in "*witches*," "ordeals," "astrology," &c., to the common

spite of the not very philosophical attitude of *incredulus odi*, maintained by our scientific leaders towards all things "in heaven and earth" which do not fall under their "philosophy," and which causes them contemptuously to refuse all investigation of an unfamiliar and unwelcome phenomenon, there are many men of by no means contemptible intellect or acquirements, who have come to think that there is something in it. It would be obvious also to refer in this connection to the simply diabolical *cruelties*,—for cruelty is generally felt to be a peculiarly *devilish* vice,—which under various pretexts have been perpetrated by men in most ages of the world, and are unhappily perpetrated in our own day in the name of a science as godless as it is inhuman.* But I do not press these

limbo of "recognised superstition." If such theorists believe in the Bible, they have not yet explained how their faith and their logic are to be reconciled.

* See *e.g.* the almost incredible horrors recorded in *Evidence given before the Royal Commission on Vivisection*, by G. R. Jesse. (Pickering.) It is apparently mutilated in the Official Report. Or again, cf. Extracts from the Report appended to *Statement* issued by Society for Protection to Animals Liable to Vivisection. Well, indeed, may Professor F. Newman say, "Behold, a new horror has risen upon us,—Cruelty in the garb and pretensions of Science! . . . . Science has become a rival of the tortures of the Inquisition, and by increase of knowledge has learnt to torment still more ingeniously." And he proceeds to expose with just severity the flimsy hypocrisy of the conventional plea for those foul atrocities in some possible future relief of human suffering. On the contrary, indeed, "An inevitable logic would in a couple of generations unteach all tenderness towards human suffering, if such horrors are endured, and carry us back into greater heartlessness than that of the worst barbarians. *No black art of magic and sorcery, no cruelty of false religion, can surpass the cruelty of*

points here. What I wish to insist upon is, the close and almost inseparable connection between a denial of eternal punishment and a denial of the existence and agency of the fallen angels. Both truths are open to the same objection from their supposed inconsistency with the wisdom and benevolence of God, both are alike offensive to human pride, both are shrouded in the darkness which surrounds the insoluble mystery of the Origin of Evil. And the Scriptural Satan, be it remembered, has nothing of the gloomy grandeur of the half human hero of *Paradise Lost*, who is a kind of denaturalized Achilles, nor even that lingering "touch of nature" which inclines the readers of *Faust* to own a certain kinship to Mephistopheles; still less, of course do he and his fellow conspirators bear any resemblance to the grinning fiends of modern sceptical buffoonery. Not "less," indeed, "than Archangel ruined," who was once the Son of the Morning, and essayed in daring pride to "exalt his throne above the stars of God," but with nothing angelic in his nature now save that keen and subtle intuition of a spiritual intelligence, which is henceforth the instrument of an unmixed and untiring malignity against God and all who love Him. Those who would dissolve the Evil Spirit into an evil principle or influence, which being impersonal must inevitably sink into a mere negative abstraction, or, in the words of a writer already quoted, "a shadow thrown

heartless science." Prof. Newman in *Fraser's Magazine*, for April, 1876, pp. 533, 534. Already, as we have seen, some of our scientific guides are advocating murder under the pretty *alias* of "Euthanasia." Cf. also Mr. Auberon Herbert's admirable Letter, reprinted from the *Times* of Jan. 17th, 1876.

by man's guilt and terror,"—for evil has no substantive existence of its own—cannot possibly appreciate the revealed reality of sin, and are only consistent therefore in repudiating the revelation of its eternal consequences.

As well then on this account as because the final impenitence and hopeless doom of Satan and his ministers are asserted, if possible, in still more explicit terms than the future doom of impenitent sinners, and are beset with similar if not more serious difficulties—for to the former no offer of redemption has been vouchsafed—it is of the highest importance for the Universalist argument to set aside all the Scriptural intimations about them as spurious, or metaphorical, or untrue. Nevertheless, it is scarcely conceivable that any honest believer in Revelation should question—certainly no disbeliever would for a moment doubt—what is in fact the teaching of the Bible on this subject, reiterated in a variety of forms, and with unmistakable emphasis, in every book from Genesis to the Apocalypse.* No theory of inspiration, however lax, could be regarded as even intelligible, which eliminated or resolved into metaphor the countless statements, not only of doctrine but of fact, involving the personal existence and active energy of the fallen spirits. Those who do

* Alger (*Doct. of Future Life*, p. 304) fully admits that the existence "of the evil spirits with an archdemon over them" was held by all the Jewish Prophets and Christian Apostles. "The popular denial of it is the birth of a philosophy much later than the Apostolic age."

so must assume a position against which any argument would be idle which starts from the acknowledgment of the truth of Divine Revelation. Yet unless a clean sweep is made of the Scripture doctrine about the Tempter and his satellites, a denial of eternal punishment will lodge us in contradictions more hopeless than any it can be imagined to remove. And on a denial of the personality of the Tempter must inevitably follow a denial of the Fall and of original sin; would follow, if facts were not too strong for us, the shallow optimism which declares that "all men are born good," and denies the origin and existence of evil altogether.

CHAPTER V.

CONCLUSION.

It is the tendency of a civilised age to put aside and ignore the severer aspects of religion, whether natural or revealed. Every religion, true or false, except Mahometanism, has had its sacrifices, which foreshadowed and are summed up in the great Sacrifice of Calvary, and thus bore witness to the judgment of God against sin, and the need of atonement. These principles are not superseded, but confirmed, by the fact of an Atonement having now been actually offered; nor did the Redeemer die, as the literature of the day would represent Him, as "the great Martyr," but as an Atoning Sacrifice. Neither, on the other hand, does it follow that because the sacrifice was freely offered for all, its benefits will be in fact applied to all without any conditions on their own part. There is nothing in reason to authorize or suggest such an anticipation, and—which is more important—Scripture conclusively refutes it. The question, be it remembered, is not—at least for a Christian—how far the doctrine of retributive justice suits a recent and not particularly respectable phase of contemporary sentiment, belonging to the second half of the nineteenth century, and compounded in varying

degrees, partly of open or latent scepticism; partly of a distortion of certain aspects of revealed truth sheltering itself, consciously or unconsciously, under forms of abstract reasoning; partly of a misplaced sentimentalism; partly, but very incidentally and subordinately, of a studied misapprehension of the sense of some passages in the New Testament; partly, and very considerably, of a deliberate refusal to recognise what revelation and the natural conscience conspire to teach of the true character and ultimate consequences of sin.* There is much in the temper of the age, its impatience of dogma, its disesteem of grace, its habit of measuring everything by purely natural standards, its exclusive devotion to physical science, its love of ease, its false refinement and hypocritical reserves, and even in its laudable anxiety for the relief of bodily suffering, which tends to shape the whisper of its many voices into an echo of the Tempter's flattering promise, "Ye shall not surely die." Whatever may be the virtues of the existing *Zeitgeist*—and I have no desire to disparage them—

* Dr. Vaughan observes very justly, in a Sermon which has already been quoted; "May it not well be imagined that it was one of the objects of Revelation to correct our inadequate conceptions of the enormity of sin by the very disclosure on which we have dwelt? to prove to us the real nature of sin, by lifting the veil which concealed from us its destiny? *to show it as it is, by showing what it will be*? . . . He who has lived for one day in God's presence will view sin in that light in which no created being can as yet behold it. He who has approached on earth the nearest to that presence, has approached the most nearly to that divine appreciation."—*Personality of Tempter*, &c., pp. 52, 53.

one at least is wanting. Like the Evil One, when he appeared to St. Martin in the simulated form of the Redeemer, it lacks the crown of thorns.

But if there is a prevalent disposition at the present day to dispute the Catholic dogma of eternal punishment, there is no sort of agreement among the disputants as to what shall be substituted in its place. The vulgar form of Universalism differs fundamentally, as we have seen, from Origen's view; Rothe's modified Universalism differs again from that; and the theory of a late Anglican essayist about "germinal souls" constitutes a fourth variety. Mr. Baldwin Brown appears to repudiate all these views, as well as the doctrine of the Church, but omits to specify any of his own. Mr. Maurice on this, as on most subjects, is inscrutable to all but the initiated. There are some who deny future punishment altogether, and hold that at the moment of death every one will enter on a state of endless beatitude; but this notion is too monstrous in itself, and too glaringly in the teeth of Scripture, to be a common one.* Others adopt, with Mr. Jukes, the ordinary scheme of Universalism, according to which a discipline of suffering is necessary for the impenitent after death, which in some unexplained way will invariably

* It is, however, the present teaching of the great body of American Universalists that there is no punishment of sin except in this life, but a continuous sleep from death to the resurrection. The smaller sect of Restorationists, who split off from the main body in 1840, still maintain the doctrine of a temporary punishment of sin after death.

bring about their ultimate sanctification. Others confine this second stage of probation to certain classes of sinners only, and limit the period to the duration of the present world. Others, with *Anglicanus*, have revived the teaching of Origen—deprived, of course, of its Origenist basis in the preexistence of souls—and maintain that there is no fixed condition, either of good or evil, hereafter, but a perpetual probation prolonged throughout eternity. But this is too "uncomfortable" a solution to become popular. Others have invented the atheistic theory of annihilation, which cuts at the roots of all natural religion. Some include the fallen angels as well as wicked men in the final restoration; some do not; and many, if they spoke their minds freely, would deny the existence of the Evil Spirit and his satellites altogether, though it is affirmed or implied again and again in every book of the Old and New Testament from Genesis to the Apocalypse. Some, again, profess to discover their Universalist theology in Scripture, while others, more consistently, claim, with Bishop Colenso, the right of revising its statements by a "verifying faculty" of their own. And thus we heard the other day of an expurgated edition of the Bible being published with some two hundred and fifty entire chapters, and portions of many more, omitted, in order to eliminate all Scripture teaching about the evil spirits and the punishment of the lost. Some think repentance will be easier after death, some that it will be much more difficult. There are some, finally, who are content with repudiating all existing solutions

of the question, orthodox or heterodox, without being prepared to offer any of their own. The prospect, on the whole, is hardly an encouraging one. It is a fresh and conspicuous illustration of what has so often been observed, that error is manifold, while truth is one. The doctrine of the Church about the future state is as intelligible as it is reasonable, but there is a very Babel of confusion in the jarring and incoherent utterances of the rival disputants who reject it.

The mystery of evil remains, indeed, and must as yet remain unsolved. Its possibility is implied in the existence of a finite and created will, free to resist the perfect will of the Creator. Why this was permitted we cannot certainly know, though we know the fact, and can discern "as through a glass darkly" that the permission of sin and its eternal chastisement subserve in some way the general purpose of His moral government, which we so imperfectly comprehend.

> "Evil itself Thy glory bears,
> Its one abiding fruit."

For, inasmuch as God is a "just Judge," whose "judgments are true and righteous," if evil exists it must be punished, and if it becomes ineradicably fixed in the will, the punishment must be eternal, for in that case—as the advocates of annihilation argue, so far rightly—the destruction of the sin would involve the destruction of the sinner. As the tree falls, so it must lie; the principle of life is extinct; it may be broken up and burnt, but no kindly sunshine or refreshing shower can infuse fresh sap into the withered trunk or clothe it with the verdure of another spring.

Nor can any but an atheist consistently object, that to say this is to impugn the benevolence of the Deity. The acknowledged facts of creation and of human life alone suffice to prove conclusively, as Butler and others have shown, that benevolence is not, what Socinianism assumes it to be, the sole rule of Divine Governance, and does not in the Divine Nature, any more than in our own, exclude or override the principle of justice.* We might have doubted, perhaps, had we been left to those original informants, whether the principle of justice did not reign exclusive and supreme, whether "nature, red in tooth and claw," would suffer us to believe that the righteous indignation of the All-holy against sin was tempered by compassion for the sinner. Revelation has removed that agonizing doubt, but not by denying that the Lord God, merciful and gracious, is also the Holy and Just One, who will not clear the guilty. It is true that His several attributes, as our finite minds are compelled to regard them, are not really distinct but one with Himself, and are merged in His adorable Simplicity. And no theist could doubt, what revelation expressly assures us of, that in His government, as in His Nature, mercy and justice are perfectly reconciled with each other. But we cannot pretend to trace out in detail the harmony of a vast system, of which only a portion, and for aught

* See Sermon on "Justice as a Principle of Divine Governance," in Newman's *University Sermons*. This point is noticed, I observe, in the excellent and very temperate *Sermon on Universalism*, by the Rev. Flavel S Cook, which led to his prosecution by Mr. Jenkins and condemnation by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

we can tell, a very small portion, is as yet disclosed to us. Meanwhile, we do know that, in order to arrest the progress of that tremendous conflict initiated by the perverse will of the creature, the Creator vouchsafed to submit Himself to the laws of His own creation, and to die a malefactor's death. No more amazing proof could have been given of the intensity of the evil, or of His will to save to the uttermost all who do not obstinately refuse His gracious offer. But as St. Augustine says, "He who made us without ourselves will not save us without ourselves," and it is difficult to see how He could do so conformably with the laws of the nature He has given us. For it must be remembered that, while the blessing is from God, the curse is from man himself. It is not as when the first creative fiat of Almighty Charity was breathed over the stillness of the dead eternities, to call light and life and harmony out of chaos. This time the fiat of eternal death issues from the will, not of the Creator, but of the creature who has preferred darkness to light, and has deliberately rejected the Love that wooed but failed to win him. Most entirely would I repeat and make my own the words with which Faber closes his discussion of the relative numbers of the saved:—"As to those who may be lost, I confidently believe that our Heavenly Father threw His arms around each created spirit, and looked it full in the face with bright eyes of love in the darkness of its mortal life, and that of its own deliberate will it would not have Him."*

* Faber's *Creator and Creature*, p. 368.

Nor must it be forgotten that the curse of sin does not affect the sinner only. If for himself the consequence of his act extends beyond the grave, so for others also, and in many ways, "the evil that men do lives after them," not in memory only, but in the influence it continues to exert, and that too often for unborn generations. Thus a drunken or profligate parent transmits the seeds of disease and death, physical and moral, to his children's children. An evil example is quoted and followed, in a circle more or less wide according to the position of its author, while he is mouldering in his grave. When Dives wished to send a messenger from the world unseen to warn his brethren, he knew that the misery his example was entailing on them would aggravate his own. Or, to take a case familiar to everybody, a profane or immoral poem may be ruining the souls of others for years or ages after the poet himself has passed to his account, and while perhaps the permanent mischief he has wrought is gratefully signalized by a memorial column. We know, indeed, that when a man has repented, these consequences of his guilt will not eternally haunt him; yet even so "God is not mocked," and the forgiven but irrevocable past may have to be expiated, here or hereafter, in tears of blood.* And, meanwhile, this consideration alone would be enough to dispose of the flimsy sophistry which represents sin as beginning and ending with itself, or demurs to its punishment reaching into the next life. And it

* "De *propitiato peccato* noli esse sine metu." Ecclus. v. 5.

derives additional and solemn force from the words used by our Lord about those who cause His little ones to offend, and still more from His description of the Last Judgment, where the final sentence is made to turn on the services rendered or refused—how much more, therefore, on the injury done?—to His brethren. In this subordinate sense it is also true that no man liveth and no man dieth to himself.

It is no part of my present purpose to enter on any detailed discussion of the future sufferings of the lost, or to touch on those various questions as to the place, nature, diversity, intensity, and possible alleviation of their secondary punishments, which are freely controverted within the limits of the faith. If we contemplate the essential blessedness of the redeemed in heaven, where "each is with the other, and all are with their Lord," and then reverse the picture, we shall understand wherein consists the essential misery of those who, having neglected so great salvation, and wilfully sinned against the known truth, have fallen short of the promise of their eternal inheritance. For such we are assured there remains no further hope, but a dreadful judgment and the wrath of the devouring fire, for they have trampled under foot the atoning Blood, and blasphemed the Spirit of grace,* though the infidel cry, "*Ecrasez l'infame!*" may never have fallen from their lips. The great harvest, which is the end of the world, is past; the summer of grace is over, but they would not be

* Heb. x. 26—31. ἐκδοχή in verse 26, does not mean "expectation," but reception. See Alford, *in loc.*

saved. And just as "to him there is eternal glory, who was tried and perfected, who could have transgressed and transgressed not, who could have done evil and did it not;"* so will it be part of the everlasting agony of the lost to "remember," with Dives, that in the day of their visitation they were called and would not listen, and the words, "How often I would, and ye would not," will ring in their ears for ever like the archangel's trump of doom. They will weigh, accurately but too late, the profit and the cost, and will appreciate at its true value the bauble for which they bartered eternity. The varieties of character, and circumstance, and position are all but infinite, and the sin which fixes the aversion of the soul from God and seals its final destiny may assume ten thousand forms. It may be the monster ambition which wades through torrents of blood to an imperial throne, or "the petty but conscious dishonesty, which looks God full in the face, and then asks a halfpenny too much for a pound of sugar." The profit of all alike will be lighter than vanity, when weighed in the balances of the world beyond the grave, and all alike are so far decisive of the eternal future, as they express the ultimate condition and settled character of a soul that has "forgotten God." For it is clear from the history of Judas, as well as from several intimations in Scripture—and, indeed, the fact was familiar to heathen moralists—that a time may come even in this life, not when God would refuse pardon to the penitent,

* Ecclus. xxxi. 10 *Vulg.*

but when repentance, as distinct from mere remorse (the μεταμέλεια of Judas), becomes morally impossible. And hence, according to the well-known comment of Quesnel on the Penitent Thief, "one sinner is converted at the hour of death, that none may despair, and one only, that none may presume."

And now it is time to bring this discussion to a close, though I am well aware that much might be added, and that I have not been able to do more than draw attention to the salient points of the controversy. My first and second chapters are occupied respectively, with considering those difficulties and misconceptions which have interfered, even in serious and religious minds, with the acceptance of the revealed doctrine, among which must be classed the neglect of the correlative truth of Purgatory; and then with examining what is the real witness of reason and human experience on the subject. In the third and fourth chapters it has been my object to show that, in spite of much ingenious special pleading, there can be no room for any plausible doubt as to what that doctrine is, whether tested by the letter of Scripture or by the consentient interpretation always put upon it in the Church. And here, be it observed, I do not mean simply the Roman Catholic Church, about whose teaching on the subject there is, of course, no question, but I am employing the term in the widest sense that can intelligibly be put upon it—which is explained by Dr. Newman, in the *Apologia*, to be that of "the whole body of English divines, except those of the Puritan or Evangelical School—the whole of Chris-

tendom, from the Apostles' time till now, whatever their later divisions into Latin, Greek, or Anglican."* It might indeed be used here, in the still wider sense in which Sir James Stephen admits that "the Church of Christ in all ages," or "all the Christian Churches," are against him. And, therefore, I have purposely refrained from all reference to the decrees of later Councils, such as the Fourth Lateran and the Florentine, which have touched on the question, as being neither necessary for my argument, nor likely to carry decisive weight with those to whom it is principally addressed, and have made very sparing use of later Catholic writers. But while the testimony and tradition of the Church in all ages has been unanimous on this subject, it is only in comparatively recent times that it has come to the front as a topic of theological or philosophical speculation, because there was no call for elaborate vindication of a doctrine which had never been systematically disputed before the rise of Socinianism. Of modern works, the former of which, however, I have not had an opportunity of consulting myself, except at second-hand, I would mention Passaglia's treatise *De Æternitate Pœnarum*, and M. Nicolas' *Etudes Philosophiques sur le Christianisme*, especially the latter, which has chapters on Hell, Purgatory, and the Immortality of the Soul. To Dr. Cazenove's essay, which originally appeared in the *Christian Remembrancer*, and has since been separately pub-

* *History of My Religious Opinions*, p. 315.

lished I have already referred, as well as to other English writers who have more or less directly dealt with the question. But as the objections are constantly repeated, with some variety of form, though there is little novelty in the substance, the answer also requires to be stated afresh from time to time.*

I do not know then that any apology is needed for offering a fresh defence of the ancient truth, in view of these renewed assaults. As a matter of fact, special circumstances, not of my own seeking, and of no interest to the public, led to my undertaking the task. But when it is remembered what momentous issues are at stake in the controversy, both directly and indirectly, by the admission no less of the assailants than of the defenders of the revealed dogma; how bitter, persistent, and virulent has been the attack upon it for some years past; what a large amount of adventitious support Universalism has derived from the ignorant or studied misrepresentations of objectors, and sometimes also of apologists, who habitually mix up the inculpated doctrine with matters of doubtful or erroneous opinion which have no necessary connection with it,

* This essay was completed before my attention was accidentally drawn to Dr. Pusey's very powerful and eloquent University Sermon on *Everlasting Punishment* (J. H. Parker & Co., 1860), to which I may refer in illustration of several portions of the argument. Suffice it to add here that the preacher's comments on the illusory notion that those who wish to compound for the rejection of such Christian doctrines as are peculiarly distasteful to them will retain their belief in the remainder, have been but too abundantly justified during the intervening decade. My obligations to Dr. Liddon's valuable Sermon on the same subject (now unfortunately out of print) have already been acknowledged.

and not unfrequently even identify it with the exploded heresy of Calvinism; how strong an interest men have, or think they have, in getting rid of an unwelcome truth; and, last but not least, how eagerly these objections have been seized upon by infidel writers—who are quite sharpsighted enough to perceive that this doctrine is part and parcel of the Christian Revelation—in order to discredit Christianity altogether, if not also, with more plausible consistency, to forge weapons for the modern crusade against the first principles of theism * when all this is borne in mind, there is surely no need to apologize for coming forward in defence of a truth of such vital importance, and thereby in fact in defence of Christianity itself, which is implicated in the Universalist indictment. That there is much room for apology for the imperfect discharge of a work of such grave responsibility no one can feel more keenly than myself. But I had rather say something to the purpose, though it might have been much better said by others, than remain silent in the face of an acknowledged and pressing danger. And considering that, during the last three years, not to speak of Mr. Jukes's and other kindred writings, no less than four articles in an Uni-

* Some illustrations of this have been given above. Take another specimen from Mr. G. J. Holyoake's *Logic of Death*, p. 6. "If man fell in the Garden of Eden, who placed him there? It is said (in Scripture) God! Who placed the temptation there? It is said, God! Who gave him an imperfect nature—a nature of which it was foreknown that it would fall? It is said, God! *To what does this amount?*" The author's reply to his own queries may readily be conceived. Meanwhile a further question may be pertinently asked here—from whom did he learn his atheistic "logic?"

versalist sense have appeared in the *Contemporary Review* alone, while nothing has been urged in reply, it is surely time that the other side should be heard also.

Of course I am well aware of the objection which is constantly urged against bringing forward this doctrine publicly at all. We are told that it is out of harmony with the spirit of the age, and that the result of proclaiming it is to repel the more reflective and intellectual minds from Christianity altogether. Now if such objectors mean to imply that the doctrine is not true, that, as I have observed elsewhere, would be alone a conclusive reason against teaching it, whatever may be its supposed effects. But these are two quite separate questions, and it is mere disingenuous shuffling to confound them. Let us at least be honest with ourselves, our neighbours, and our God. I am assuming now, what it has been the object of this essay to prove to all who accept the Christian Revelation as such, that the doctrine *is* true. The question remains whether, by a sort of spurious *disciplina arcani*, we are to withhold it, *although* it is true, not from unbelievers only—for in the present day such a distinction, even if it were suggested, would be impracticable—but from the faithful also, lest those to whom it appears "a hard saying" should turn away from Christ. Surely the question answers itself. Every age has had its own peculiarities of thought and temper, and to each in succession some particular aspect of Divine Revelation has appeared specially repugnant; nor have we any reason to anticipate that it will be otherwise in

the future, when a generation has grown up that knows not Tennyson and Darwin. The objector's standpoint varies from age to age; the fact of an opposition between the spirit of the world and the Revelation of God does not change. But God must have known this when He gave His Revelation at first, and in fact there is abundant evidence in the New Testament that He both knew and meant to forewarn us of it; yet He does not therefore issue a new version of the Gospel once or twice a century, adapted to the shifting requirements of the contemporary *Zeitgeist.* And if He does not do so, we certainly have no authority to do it for Him. Clearly not; for when once God has spoken, our responsibility ends; the fact that He has spoken is our warrant for delivering His message, whether men choose to listen to it or not. Supposing, therefore, for argument's sake—what I do not admit for a moment—that the chief or only result of proclaiming this revealed truth was to repel men from the Christian faith, that would be no excuse for keeping silence. Duties belong to us; results to God.

Nor is it needful to repeat here what was said before of the importance of fear as a motive in the spiritual life, to which Scripture, Fathers, and experience alike testify, and of the fine irony of assuming that the average religious condition of the great mass of professing Christians is such as to exempt them from all necessity for dwelling on the prospect of rewards and punishments as an incentive to holiness, as though they were already, like St. Paul, lifted into a third heaven of devout ecstasy. Some indeed there are in

every age, the favourites of their Lord, who seem even now, like Xavier or Francis of Assisi, to live in the λαμπρὸς αἰθηρ of a world instinct with the music of unearthly voices, and flushed with a sunlight unseen by mortal eyes, on whose very face and form men gaze in wonder or in reverence or in awe, "as it had been the face of an angel." But is this the ordinary condition of Christians, or is not the question the severest satire on their state? Suffice it to add, what is mere matter of common sense, that if indeed so terrible a doom awaits the finally impenitent, the surest guarantee for escaping it hereafter is not to forget it now. When mankind are moving on the brink of a precipice, I fail to discern the "charity" of forbidding us to warn them of their peril. How indeed that warning may be most suitably enforced, and how far, *e.g.*, it is desirable to enlarge on the sensible imagery of future suffering and the like, are questions of detail, chiefly for the discretion of preachers, which lie beyond the range of dogmatic faith, and need not be raised here. The point I would insist upon, in reply to a popular and plausible fallacy, is simply this; that, if the doctrine of eternal punishment be a revealed verity, it is treason to God and treachery to men to withhold or disguise or tamper with it, because we may choose to think it better to leave them in ignorance of what He has thought it better to reveal.

The suicidal facility of those timid or traitorous apologists who fondly hope to preserve the future of Christianity by meeting its assailants half-way, and

hrowing overboard one doctrine after another in the idle hope of thereby saving the remainder, is in fact simply playing into their hands. And hence a recent contributor to the *Fortnightly Review*, who is airily engaged in disposing of all posthumous terrors, has extended his contemptuous patronage to "*la souplesse de Protestantisme*," which kindly allows "the wiser among us to drop hell out of the Bible quietly."* It is merely one instance, as this able writer takes care to remind us, of that inveterate habit of a certain class of modern religionists of trying to creep out of their own skins, and virtually applying to each dogma in turn, as it comes before them, the admirable summing-up of Dr. Brownside's University Sermon in *Loss and Gain* —perhaps some of us have heard or read not very dissimilar discourses elsewhere—to the effect that all would go well, if only theologians and Churches would agree—"not, indeed, to give up their own distinctive formularies—no; but to consider their direct contradictories equally pleasing to the Divine Author of Christianity." For myself, I must honestly confess that I prefer open infidelity to a process of latent decomposition, "sapping"—not exactly "with solemn sneer," but with polite innuendo—"a solemn creed." It is a very illiberal and unfashionable avowal, no doubt; but there is something, to my mind, peculiarly repulsive in the spectacle of scepticism masquerading in a surplice.

I have not attempted the impossible task, which has

* *Fortnightly Review*, for January, 1876, p. 125.

baffled philosophers of every sect and age, of explaining the mystery of evil. It was enough to insist on the fact, which, taken in connection with the express statements of Scripture, would amply suffice to throw the entire burden of proof on those who deny the doctrine of eternal punishment. That obligation they cannot meet: their arguments are purely destructive. In reply, it has been proved against them that this doctrine, like the Christian Revelation whereof it forms an integral portion, does not contradict, though it transcends reason; I speak of course of the revealed doctrine itself, not of any popular exaggerations or perversions of it. It has been further proved that all other solutions of the question which have been suggested are open to objections at least equally weighty, and—what is still more important—that none of them even touch the root of the difficulty, which runs up into the familiar and hopeless *crux* of all philosophy and all theology, the Origin of Evil. Here we find ourselves in presence of a portentous fact, which believers and unbelievers are alike compelled to recognise, but which neither can adequately explain Revelation lightens the difficulty without professing to remove it; Universalism does but play with it; Atheism substitutes a worse. Meanwhile, if we "do not ask to see the distant scene," and will submit to receive in faith what God has told us, enough is revealed for our present guidance,—as much, we may be sure as suits our present state. "To man He hath said, Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom: and to depart

from evil, is understanding."* For fuller light we may well be content to wait till the dawn of the everlasting morning breaks over the Eastern hills, and the shadows flee away.

* Job xxviii. 28.

APPENDIX.

NOTE ON TRANSUBSTANTIATION.

WHEN the passage on Transubstantiation at pp. 106 sqq., originally appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, criticisms on it were privately addressed to me, which I should be exceeding sorry, on every account, to seem to treat with disrespect. My language, indeed, was carefully chosen, with a view of giving as little offence as possible, consistently with the maintenance of an important truth, to those whom I should be sincerely grieved needlessly to offend or pain. But it expresses, not a passing opinion, but a deliberate conviction, matured through many years, and I cannot alter or unsay it. At the same time a few words of explanation may be fitly added here. The reason of my referring to the subject at all was of course, as is stated in the text, the circumstance that Mr. Jukes has repeatedly—and from his own point of view, fairly enough—dwelt upon it, as supplying a plausible, if not conclusive, answer to the Scriptural evidence of the doctrine of eternal punishment. The letter of Scripture , as he justly argues, asserts Transubstantiation or the Real Presence, as strongly as the eternal punishment of the lost, and if the former doctrine is wrong, why not also the latter? To which the obvious reply is, from my point of view, If the former doctrine is *right*, why not the latter? But the point which has been especially criticized is my acceptance of Mr. Jukes's use of Transubstantiation, as a term virtually synonymous with the Real Presence, and "expressing the only natural and obvious meaning of the words of Christ." To this point then I will now address myself. It

would of course be quite out of place here to enter on a theological dissertation on the doctrine of the Eucharistic Presence, which would, indeed, require a volume to itself. It must suffice to explain briefly my reasons for saying what I did.

And first, at the risk of seeming to be egotistic, it has become necessary to premise a word of personal explanation. In saying that, apart from the modern theory of Consubstantiation—which certainly has no authority, and never had any attraction for me—a doctrine of the Real Presence which is not Transubstatiation is intellectually inconceivable to me, it is obvious that I was speaking only for myself, though I cannot think my individual experience in the matter to be at all peculiar. It is simply the fact that, when I was confirmed and made my first Communion at Harrow, as a boy of fifteen, I believed just what I believe now about the Sacramental Presence, and worshipped my God as present under the consecrated species, though I should, no doubt have expressed my belief inaccurately, and should, of course, have shrunk from using a term which I had been taught to regard as erroneous. And as soon as I came to think and read on theological subjects, years before I left the Church of England, I definitely and consciously accepted the Tridentine doctrine, feeling (as I do still) that I could believe nothing else without becoming a Zuinglian. I never hesitated to avow this plainly to others, and stated expressly to those who had a right to question me that I signed the 39 Articles in the sense of Tract XC., as condemning certain vulgar errors (real or supposed), not the Tridentine exposition of Eucharistic doctrine, which had not been published when the Articles first appeared.

How far that view of subscription is a tenable one is no longer any concern of mine; I honestly thought it was at the time, as did and do others who are better qualified to judge;* and I am inclined to think so still. But that is

* See *e.g.*, the late Bp. Forbes's *Explanation of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, vol. ii. Art 28; and Cobb's *Kiss of Peace*, with *Sequel*. The

neither here nor there. The facts are what I have stated, and if I was mistaken, which I do not think, it cannot be helped now.

Let us pass on to the general question. Not only is any other idea of the Real Presence (except, perhaps, Consubstantiation), inconceivable to my mind, but I think history proves that wherever Transubstantiation has been rejected, belief in the Real Presence has not been able to hold its ground. It must be remembered that the Eastern Church, when called upon to repudiate the Protestant views of Cyril Lucar, expressly adopted that term (μετουσίωσις) in the "Orthodox Confession," confirmed by the Synod of Bethlehem in 1672. And we may readily account for her not having had occasion to adopt it earlier from the theological stagnation which had prevailed in the East from the time of St. John of Damascus, the last Eastern theologian, in the eighth century, to which Dr. Dollinger (in his Address before the Munich Theological Congress of 1863) and others have drawn attention. The formula has therefore the full sanction of what Anglicans must regard as the whole Catholic Church except their own comparatively small section of it. But this by the way. The necessity of definition arose much earlier in the West, through the Zuinglian speculations (if one may be allowed a convenient anachronism) of such writers as Scotus Erigena, Berengarius, and Ratramnus; and hence the Lateran formula of 1215. Language may no doubt often be found in previous writers which is at least verbally inconsistent with that formula, just as there are numerous examples in ante-Nicene writers of language inconsistent with the Nicene Creed. But the late Archdeacon Wilberforce has shown most satisfactorily to my mind, in his work on the Eucharist (published while he was still an Anglican), that the Tridentine doctrine supplies

evidence collected in Part II. of the *Sequel* that the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation was—whether wilfully or not is another question—fundamentally misapprehended by the English Reformers, and notably by Cranmer, is simply conclusive.

the true key to interpret and harmonize their seemingly discordant statements, just as the ὁμοούσιος supplies the true interpretation and harmony of the teaching of the early Fathers on the Coequal Divinity of the Eternal Son. Both definitions may be, and have been, repudiated or sneered at as "metaphysical," and we all know how Gibbon makes merry *more suo* over the faith of Christendom depending on "the difference of a single diphthong." But experience proved that the Church was right, and that on the whole, and in the long run—for individual exceptions, few or many, will occur to every rule—acceptance or rejection of the ὁμοούσιος was a sure criterion of orthodoxy on the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. And in the same sense I think experience has proved that the acceptance or rejection of Transubstantiation is an unfailing test, in the long run, of belief or disbelief in the truth of the Real Presence.* It must also be remembered that, although the Christian Revelation itself is not progressive, having been given once for all, our apprehension of it is. And it would not therefore be at all wonderful if St. Thomas *e.g.* apprehended the nature of the Eucharistic Presence more exactly than St. Augustine or St. Ambrose, just as St. Athanasius had a clearer view of the relations of the Divine Persons in the Trinity than Justin Martyr and Origen.

Whatever may have been Luther's precise opinion on the subject, about which I am unable to speak with confidence, he certainly considered a belief in the Real Presence essential, and the original statement of the Confession of Augsburgh as presented to Charles V., in 1530, was at least perfectly orthodox, as far as it went. "De Cœnâ Domini docent, quod Corpus et Sanguis Christi *vere adsint*, et distribuantur vescentibus in Cœnâ Domini, *sub specie panis et vini*, et improbant secus docentes." But the italicized words were erased by Melancthon in the following year, and he

* I have dwelt on this analogy in the Introduction to *Catholic Doctrine of Atonement*, pp. 29, sqq.

was suffered to tamper still further with subsequent editions —notoriously as matter of policy, to conciliate the Calvinists and Zuinglians—till at last after 1540 it distinctly embodied the new compromise of Consubstantiation; "De Cœnâ Dimini docent, quod *cum pane et vino* vere *exhibeantur* Corpus et Sanguis Christi vescentibus in cœnâ Domini." It need hardly be added that the next generation of Lutherans had lost all faith in the Real Presence. In the Church of England that belief died out of the popular creed for three centuries, from the Reformation till the Tractarian revival. It survived no doubt more or less definitely among individuals, and in particular schools, like that of the Caroline divines, and—speaking simply for myself—I should account for its surviving at all, partly from the language of the Catechism (compiled by Bp. Overall) which is orthodox as far as it goes, and is in general use, while probably not one layman in a thousand ever looks at the 39 Articles;* partly and from the fact of the Anglican Church having (as I believe) retained a true priesthood, whereas the Lutherans unquestionably had none, and therefore of course had no Eucharist. Still the Real Presence, I repeat, died out of the popular faith of England, and it is very observable that whenever Anglican divines who hold it attempt to put their belief into a definite shape, they seem from the necessity of the case, as disclaiming Transubstantiation, to fall unconsciously into an assertion of Consubstantiation, though they carefully avoid the word. Thus *e.g.* a Declaration was put out some years ago, with the signature of all the leading High Church clergy, which is reprinted in the Appendix to the *Life of Bishop Gray*, distinctly teaching the doctrine of Consubstantiation. And I have read a Sermon preached and published by the late Rev. J. C. Chambers of St. Mary's, Soho, which elaborately defends the same view. Other examples could easily be given; nor do I see myself how it could possibly

* It has been observed that the Catechism, being *later* than both Articles and Liturgy, may be fairly regarded as supplying an authoritative comment on them. See *Kiss of Peace*, p. 52, and *Sequel*, sec. iii.

be otherwise.* The substances of the bread and wine must either be present or absent. If they remain, and the Body and Blood of Christ are also present, we are lodged at once in Consubstantiation, or in the still more objectionable theory of Impanation, which is a kind of Sacramental Eutychianism. And it may be well just to observe, though I have no intention of entering here on a theological argument, that whatever intellectual difficulties may be urged against the Catholic formula apply at least as strongly—I should say myself far more strongly—to the Lutheran.† In either case a miraculous action is assumed, though not a miracle which appeals to the bodily senses; and of course, if miracles are impossible, there is an end of the matter. But I am not arguing with infidels here, and if once miracles

* On the other hand the tendency of Anglican writers to lapse into unconscious Zuinglianism is notorious. Take *e.g.* the following passnge from a laudatory review in the *Guardian* of April 12, 1876, of *The One Offering* by Rev. F. M. Sadler: "The Sacrifice on the Cross cannot be represented without *the symbols* of the Body which hung on it, and the Blood which was there shed. But the bread and wine are not *the symbols* of that Body and Blood, until they have *become such by consecration.*" On the contrary, by consecration the bread and wine become the Reality of which they were before the symbols only; otherwise there could be no true Sacrifice. In just the same way an article on "Church Innovations" in the April No. of the *Quarterly Review*—which is, or was, supposed to represent, like the *Guardian*, a moderate High-Church line—speaks of the Eucharist (p. 530) as "the reception of *the symbols* of Christ's body and blood." Such language needs no comment.

† There is no need to discuss here whether Consubstantiation or Impanation is, as St. Thomas argues, abstractedly impossible. But it is at all events clear that if a *change* takes place by virtue of consecrations, as the Church has always believed, and as the words of Institution distinctly imply, that change can be nothing else than Transubstantiation. Consubstantiation is not a change, for the substances of bread and wine are supposed to remain unchanged, while another substance is added to them or infused into them. If on the other hand the bread and wine "*become*," or "*are made*,' or are "*changed into*," the Body and Blood of Christ, as all the ancient Liturgies, Eastern and Western, expressly affirm in accordance with the divine formula—"Hoc *est* Corpus Meum," the original substance must necessarily give place to that which by consecration supersedes it; for it is simply inconceivable that the two should underlie the same accidents, or in other words that a substance should at the same time and in the same sense be itself, and be something else also. Such a statement is a contradiction in terms.

are admitted, the difficulty vanishes. Dr. Newman seems to me to dispose of it in two or three sentences of the *Apologia*: "What do I know of substance or matter? Just as much as the greatest philosophers, and that is nothing at all; so much is this the case, that there is a rising school of philosophy now, which considers phenomena to constitute the whole of our knowledge in physics. The Catholic doctrine leaves phenomena alone. It does not say that the phenomena go; on the contrary, it says that they remain; nor does it say that the same phenomena are in several places at once. It deals with what no one on earth knows anything about, the material substances themselves."* I am conscious then of no intellectual difficulty in accepting the doctrine of the Real Presence in the only sense in which it conveys any intelligible meaning to my mind, though I should feel the greatest possible difficulty in forming any other conception of it.† Transubstantiation, like many other Christian doctrines, transcends, but in nowise contradicts reason; any theory which maintains the reality of the Presence, and yet excludes Transubstantiation, must inevitably contradict one of the first laws of thought.

Nor is there any force in the common objection urged

* *History of My Religious Opinions*, pp. 239, 240.

† I may refer in this connection to the lucid and masterly vindication of the doctrine of Transubstantiation in Mr. Cobb's *Kiss of Peace, with Sequel* (Hayes). See especially the fourth section of the Sequel, answering objections to the doctrine. The author's argument against the possibility of any other conception of the Real Presence appears to me not more admirable for its clearness than absolutely unanswerable. Cf. also, as to philosophical objections to the doctrine, the first and second chapters of Dalgairns on *Holy Communion* (Duffy). There is one scheme of philosophy (if such it can be called), and one only, which is really inconsistent with the doctrine. and it is one which no Christian, or rather Theist, can possibly accept; I mean the theory, not only that our present knowledge embraces nothing beyond phenomena—that is quite another question—but that nothing else *exists*. In that case there is an end of course of Transubstantiation, and of much else besides, including —be it said with reverence—Almighty God himself. As to the objection sometimes alleged against Transubstantiation, that it destroys the outward sign of the Sacrament, see note F, "On the Use of the word, Phenomena," in *Holy Communion*, p. 420, 3rd ed.

against "defining the mode of the mystery." It would be enough to reply that to *deny* Transubstantiation is just as much defining the mode as to affirm it. But in fact the Church does not attempt to define the *mode* of the mystery, but only to state *in what the mystery consists.* So entirely is this the case that there is actually a Question in the Tridentine Catechism (*Pars II.. cap. IV., Q.* 41) headed, "Modus Transubstantiationis et loci, quo Christus est in hoc Sacramento, *curiosius non inquirendus.*" And in the body of the Question occurs this sentence; "Verum, *quid hoc sit*, fide cognoscendum est: *quomodo fiat*, non curiosius inquirendum." That is exactly my own feeling about the matter. I neither ask nor wish to know, *how* this sublime mystery is accomplished, but unless I know *what* is accomplished there is nothing for my faith to rest upon.* To use the words of Cicero, "Hoc sum contentus, quod etiam si *quomodo fiat* ignorem, *quod fiat* intelligo." Zuinglianism and Transubstantiation are alike consistent and intelligible beliefs, though not of course alike compatible with the teaching of Revelation, but there is no logical standing ground between the

* The theological doggerel ascribed to Queen Elizabeth ("Christ's was the mouth that spake it," &c.) is of course true enough, as far as it goes, but then it goes such a very little way as to offer no help whatever for settling our belief. For it is *equally* true, whether the words of Christ mean a real or only a figurative presence, and one naturally wishes to know something more than that. Very different is the testimony—all the more impressive from its purely incidental character—of the epitaph inscribed by Pope Damasus on the sepulchre, in the Cemetery of St. Calixtus, of the martyred acolyte-boy Tarcisius, who let himself be trampled to death in the streets of Rome (255 A. D.), while carrying the Holy Viaticum to confessors in prison, rather than betray to the heathen the adorable Burden cradled on his virgin heart;

> Tarcisium sanctum Christi Sacramenta gerentem
> Cum malesana manus peteret vulgare profanis,
> Ipse animam potius voluit dimittere cœsus,
> Prodere quam canibus rabidis *cælestia membra.*

Clearly, in the middle of the third century, tender children (Tarcisius is said to have been only eight years old) understood the truth of the Real Presence so well that they were content to die for it. This epitaph is given in Probst. *Sakramente*, p. 243.

two.* A theory of the Real Presence which excludes Transubstantiation is either illusory, or involves as direct a contradiction of the primary laws of thought as to say that two and two make five. Nor can it be said that this is a mere scholastic dispute. The Real Presence is either a portentous falsehood, or, like the Incarnation from which it springs, is a fundamental verity of the faith, and is also the very meeting point of Christian belief and Christian devotion. Jesus in His adorable Sacrament (*Gesu Sacramentato*, as the Italians love to call Him), is the Divine Centre alike of our worship and spiritual life. And the Real Presence means Transubstantiation, and from the nature of the case can mean nothing else. Moreover the reality of the Sacrifice, with which I am not here concerned, but which is no less important, depends essentially on the reality of the Presence. To be obliged to dispute at all about this great mystery of faith, which should be the subject not of argument but of adoration, and which—like the mystery of the Holy Trinity—the early Christians were content to adore in silence, must ever be painful to a reverent mind. But "a necessity is laid upon us": the fault in either case lies, not with the orthodox, but with those whose perverse denials have troubled the simplicity of our ancient faith. When heretics wrangle, the Church is constrained to define, and theologians to defend her definitions; otherwise the most sacred truths would evaporate in a haze of empty verbiage. But the task is at best an unwelcome one. Let me conclude this note in the touching words of one of the ablest and most exhaustive of modern treatises on the subject:—

"Oh! how unwelcome to the believer in the Real Presence is all this clamour of disputation which unbelief forces upon him! How bitter is the task of defending polemically a

* There is no need to consider "Virtualism" in this connection, because it excludes the Real *Presence* equally with Zuinglianism, though it implies a higher view of the *effects* of the Sacrament, admitting the *virtus*, but denying the *res Sacramenti*.

truth in itself so peaceful, loving, and divine! How gladly, when his task is over, does he take refuge in the Sacramental Presence of his Saviour, and there, where the twin lights burn upon the Altar, or the soft glow of the sacred lamp keeps watch before the Tabernacle, hold converse with Him whom his soul longeth after. There, wearied with the strife of tongues, he forgets all in sweet communion with the loving Son of Mary. There argument is hushed in adoration, and logic lost in love. There all is still, save the beatings of an aching heart, as it pleads for those whose eyes are holden that they should not see, and hearts hardened that they should not feel the true Personal Presence of Jesus the Incarnate God, as He visits His faithful yet on earth in His own sweet Sacrament of Love."*

* *Sequel to Kiss of Peace*, p. 497.

POSTSCRIPT

ON PROFESSOR MAYOR'S "REPLY."

The whole of the following Essay was in type, and the whole Preface written, before the appearance of Professor Mayor's "Reply" to the original articles in the *Contemporary Review* for May. There is no room, therefore, for more than a brief notice of it here, but this is the less to be regretted as his paper contains little in the way of argument to call for any fresh notice at my hands. In the first place my critic has professedly confined himself to "the argument from reason," and I have throughout maintained that the real proof of the doctrine of eternal punishment rests on Revelation, as ascertained from the testimony of Scripture and Tradition, though it is, of course incumbent on orthodox believers to show in the case of this, as of every other doctrine, that it does not contradict reason, and they can in fact show a good deal more. But with the evidence of Scripture and Tradition Professor Mayor does not attempt to deal; he admits indeed implicitly that tradition is against him, and implies, if I rightly understand him, that he should equally feel bound to reject the doctrine, if he was convinced that it is taught in Scripture—a view which

Mr. Jukes, whom he professes to be supporting, emphatically disclaims. In the next place, although his paper is entitled "an argument from reason," he has seldom handled any reasoning of mine without so distorting or isolating it from the context as wholly to obscure its point. And I am sorry to be obliged to add, in spite of his indignant disclaimer of the charge of "declamation," brought against some passages in his previous article, that more than half his second paper is filled with mere declamatory rhetoric, too often not only irrelevant but studiously invidious—quite as irrelevant and invidious as the passage I had before animadverted upon, suggesting that the orthodox ought in consistency to murder all christened babies—while even when he is not declamatory, he is still apt to be entirely beside the mark.* One is compelled to desiderate throughout—I will not say the courtesy which is always so desirable in controversy, for that is after all a subordinate matter—but the common fairness which is essential to all profitable discussion.

Nor is the explanation far to seek. My critic is probably guiltless of any personal feeling towards myself, but he appears to be possessed by that blind hatred of

* It is amusing to observe that, while Prof. Mayor sharply vindicates his own right to the free use of what he calls "illustration and appeal to the feelings," and what I call declamation, he takes me severely to task for using "illustrations" at all, which is, he says, "all very well *in a sermon*." His own style of "illustration" would be equally out of place everywhere, except perhaps at the Old Bailey; but is truth less important in a sermon than in an essay? Dr. Newman, to whose Sermons he is referring, would hardly accept this defence.

the revealed doctrine so common among disbelievers in eternal punishment, while he also suffers what has been characterized, in a greater divine than himself, as "a chronic disease of Popery on the brain." He is evidently unable to consider with calmness, I do not say a Roman Catholic argument—for my argument goes for the most part, as I carefully explained, on ground common to all upholders of historical and scriptural Christianity—but an argument urged by a Roman Catholic. He must be perfectly aware that the doctrine for maintaining which he so bitterly assails me, is that of all the standard Anglican divines, including even Archbishop Tillotson, who is sometimes mistakenly cited on the other side*; he must be aware that it is the doctrine of the most eminent living divines of his own Communion, men like Dr. Pusey and Dr. Liddon, from whom he may widely differ, but whose teaching he would scarcely venture to denounce in the language he has thought it becoming to lavish upon me†; he must also be aware that it is the doctrine of the great body of "orthodox Dissenters," some of whose

* See some very strong passages quoted from his Sermons in Bright's *Faith and Life*, p. 239.

† I had quoted a striking passage from the works of another Anglican divine of high repute, differing widely indeed from those above named, though not less widely from Professor Mayor—Dr. Vaughan, now Master of the Temple. On this my critic observes that Dr. Vaughan's maxim is perfectly just, but "entirely wide of the mark" in my application of it. He forgets to add, what I had expressly stated, and what he could easily have verified for himself, that the application is not mine but the author's own. A more signal instance of—to say the least—*suppressio veri* could hardly be imagined.

works are at this moment lying before me. Nevertheless there is hardly a page of his indictment into which he ~~does~~ not lug, head and shoulders, a reference to Papal Infallibility, or the Vatican Council, or "Jesuit teaching," or "begging priests," or the "Holy Inquisition," or something else, having just as much or as little to do with the subject under review, as the law of gravitation or the fifth proposition of Euclid. Into such irrelevant issues he can hardly expect me to follow him. But in one sense he has judged wisely. Anybody who chooses to flare the red flag in the face of the British bull may reckon with tolerable confidence on its stamping and foaming at the mouth. How far the process is likely in the present case to elucidate the question in dispute rather than to incapacitate those concerned for forming an impartial judgment upon it, is another matter, which need not be debated here. If Professor Mayor thinks his method of controversy—it is the *method*, not the argument that constitutes the speciality of his philippic—worthy of the subject and of himself, so be it; it is not my business, nor is it in my power to bring him to a different mind. Meanwhile he is more than welcome to a monopoly of his peculiar tactics, and to any temporary triumph it may secure him.

But, while there is little in his attack which is not answered by anticipation in my essay, and much in his manner of conducting it to deprive him of any claim to serious notice, I think it due, not so much to myself as to the grave importance of the higher interests at stake, to exhibit a little more in detail the real charac-

ter of his so called "Reply." I certainly shall not follow him into a discussion of the merits or demerits of Dr. Littledale's article on "Ultramontane Literature," which is as germane to the subject as a former paper by the same clever writer on "High Life Below Stairs."* Nor is it my business to dispute his estimate of the proper office of tradition in the Church of England, further than to observe in passing that it evidently differs widely from that of many living divines of his Church, whose names are, I believe, better known in theology than his own. Still less do I care to join issue with him as to the critical or intellectual weight of individual Fathers or of patristic literature as a whole. The late Lord Macaulay thought St. Augustine's Confessions were written "in the style of a field preacher;" Professor Mayor compares him to a correspondent of the *Guardian*. Neither comparison strikes me as a happy one, but both are equally and absolutely irrelevant to the matter in dispute. I referred to the Fathers, as I took care to explain, not for their individual opinions but for their consentient testimony to the faith of the Church.† Nor shall I stop to canvass the relative merits of the *Dream of Geron-*

* It is characteristic of my critic that, while himself almost identifying Paganism with "Ultramontanism," he complains of my "seeming to confound" it with infidelity. On the contrary I have kept them quite distinct. Paganism is of course one phase of infidel thought, and in my opinion a prevalent one just now, but it is one only.

† This point is more fully dwelt on in the present volume, but it was quite clearly brought out in the essay as originally published.

tius and a poem, of which I know nothing beyond the extracts cited by my critic, by the Rev. E. H. Bickersteth. These *obiter dicta* and others like them, which occupy a good deal of space in the "Reply," are mere padding, which may help to foment *odium theologicum* but can contribute nothing to the force of the argument. If however Mr. Bickersteth's poem teaches the eternal perdition of the lost, *in spite of their genuine repentance*—as seems to be implied in the passages quoted and the reviewer's comments on them—so far from the doctrine thus stated being "free from many of the objections which apply to it in its common form," it appears to me to be as portentously incredible as it is—I believe—absolutely novel.

And now, in order to dispose of less important matters first, let me refer to my assailant's method of personal disputation. When he opens with an implied complaint that I did not examine more minutely the contents of a previous article of his, he seems to forget that my professed aim was to discuss the general question of Universalism, and that I was only so far concerned with that particular paper as forming a portion, and a very small portion—not to my mind the most remarkable—of the Universalist literature of the day. Moreover, as it was mainly occupied with reproducing and endorsing Mr. Jukes's views,* I ex-

*. On referring again to Prof. Mayor's former paper, I find that the greater part of his argument is either quoted or paraphrased from Mr. Jukes's book, while the remainder, whatever may be thought of its intrinsic force, contains nothing which has not long been familiar to all who are conversant with the ordinary Universalist objections.

plained that it would be more convenient to notice them in connexion with Mr. Jukes's own work on the subject. But what I wish to insist upon here is that my assailant hardly ever has the patience to examine any statement or argumnet of mine without first misstating it. I don't mean that he actually misquotes, but he does what is almost, if not quite, as bad; he misrepresents and misapplies. I have referred elsewhere to his strictures on my use of "the phrase, eternal perdition," which I have never used at all; but the fault there is rather the editor's, in omitting to correct him, than his own, for he was not of course bound to have seen my letter to the *Spectator*. No such excuse can be pleaded in the cases I shall mention now. I had happened to speak of Sir James Stephen as the "earliest and ablest" of modern Universalist writers, whereupon my critic observes that I "consider *all* which has been urged by later writers had been *already* put forward in a better form by Sir James Stephen," and proceeds with much solemn satisfaction to refute the patent absurdity he had put into my mouth by observing, what "may be tested by any competent person, that Mr. Jukes has brought forward many considerations which were not noticed by Sir James Stephen." No doubt; it would be strange if he had not said more in a volume of 200 pages than Sir James Stephen in a short "Epilogue." And if I thought he had introduced no fresh matter I should hardly have expended so much time and I trouble on examining the value of his arguments. But still venture to think that Sir J. Stephen is far the abler writer of the two, and—which was my special point

—that his tone in handling this solemn doctrine is far more becoming in every way than that usually adopted by modern Universalist advocates, and notably by my present assailant, though I am glad to say that here Mr. Jukes has much more in common with Sir J. Stephen than himself. It was quite open to him of course to differ from me on both points; it was not open to him to put nonsense of his own invention into my mouth in order to have the amusement of refuting it, of which proceeding this is by no means a solitary instance.

I referred just now to Professor Mayor's *suppressio veri*, in regard to my quotation from Dr. Vaughan. He is not much happier in his comments on my reference to Bishop Butler, whom he evidently esteems much less highly than my Oxford training has led me to do. He represents me as citing Butler's authority mainly for a point quite incidentally noticed, viz., the testimony of heathen writers, on which I have dwelt myself in another article and in a totally different connection. I referred to it there simply for the purpose of pointing out, with Butler, that in teaching the eternity of future punishment Revelation had introduced nothing new or foreign to the existing ideas of mankind. All this is, to say the least, culpably careless, but there is worse to come.

My critic, whose standard of courtesy is on a par with his standard of fairness, says that my essay is *either* "like the talk of a blind man about colours,"* or else, accord-

* My argument is elsewhere described as "some Sunday school phrases."

ing to the usual result of "Jesuit training," (the advantage or disadvantage of which I never happen to have enjoyed for a single day) it shows that I have "*lost the natural power of distinguishing between good and evil, truth and falsehood.*" And he gives soon afterwards an illustration of this pleasant dilemma from my criticism of the fundamental principle of Origen's eschatology, which had been reaffirmed by a recent writer in the *Contemporary Review*, whom I quoted, that there is no fixed state of future beatitude or punishment, but a perpetual oscillation between the two. My assailant, quietly suppressing the fact, which stared him in the face on my page, that this was the very essence of the teaching of Origen, the great father of Universalism, and had been lately revived by *Anglicanus*, treats it as a proof of the "want of reality running through the whole [of my] argument," that I should notice it at all, as though I had simply constructed a man of straw for the sake of knocking him down. This is a method of controversy difficult to characterise as it deserves in becoming language, and as I am no more enamoured of the manners than of the opinions of my critic, I shall not further describe it. Another example of—to say the very least—his utter recklessness of statement occurs on the next page. He is attacking my criticism of the Annihilationist heresy, which I regard as sapping the foundations of all natural religion, and he says: "The [viz. my] *second argument* is that St. Augustine, and Plutarch, and Aquinas *hold* that every rational being, from the law of its nature, prefers eternity of torment to extinction. It is *thoroughly characteristic of the*

writer [viz. myself] that he *appeals to authority* on a matter of this kind, and that he reports such a verdict *without misgiving*." It is, I am sorry to say, "thoroughly characteristic" of my critic that this passage is almost as full of misstatements as of words. The "argument," if it was used as an argument at all, would be my fifth, not my second, for four had been mentioned in the sentence to which the passage my critic so hopelessly muddles is appended as a foot-note. The opinion to which I have referred is *not* that of Aquinas, nor—so far as I know—of Plutarch, who only says in the passage I have quoted from Döllinger that it was prevalent among "the Greeks;" nor is it my own opinion. And so far from "reporting it without misgiving," my short note ends with referring against it to a passage in the *Summa* which contains —as my critic would have seen, if he had taken the trouble to look it out—a refutation of it, and to my own mind a conclusive one. There was no "argument," still less "appeal to authority," as my critic absurdly calls it, at all, but merely a passing reference in a note to the fact that a particular opinion, to which I in nowise committed myself, had prevailed extensively, as supplying a collateral and *ex abundanti* illustration of the strength of that instinctive conviction of immortality to which I *did* appeal in disproof of Annihilationism. And this must have been obvious to any ordinarily intelligent reader. I again forbear to characterise Professor Mayor's method of distorting my words. I will only add that, if by immortality he supposes me to mean "*necessary* immortality"—the italics

are his own—in the sense of immortality independent of the will of God and beyond His control, with which monstrous absurdity he charges me by direct inference, his indictment is as baseless as it is gratuitous. The word "impossible" indeed occurs in one of my notes, but it is given as Butler's word, not mine, and is of course therefore used in the sense of Butler in the passage to which I have expressly referred, and part of which my critic quotes and admits not to bear the meaning he chooses to father upon me, which would conflict—as he must well know—with the first principles of theism. Moreover I spoke expressly of man being "*created* immortal," which implied that his immortality is the gift of God, though not, as Annihilationists maintain, a gift peculiar to the elect. Here again my meaning was patent to any one not resolved to misconstrue it.

By this time my readers will be as heartily tired as I am of this exposure of my assailant's habitual misrepresentations. I will only add one more exceedingly characteristic example before proceeding to yet graver causes of complaint. I had referred, as many writers have before me—such as *e.g.*, Dr. Liddon, Dr. Bright, and Mr. Isaac Taylor—to the remarkable evidence afforded for the universal belief of the early Church in the doctrine of eternal punishment, in the recorded confessions of the martyrs before their judges or at the stake. Professor Mayor does not of course attempt—for he knows he cannot—to dispute the facts, and he therefore finds it convenient, and thinks it decent, to dispose of them by attributing to me the "degrading" no-

tion that the martyrs were *not* inspired by "the sight of Jesus standing at the right hand of God," &c., but *only* by "fear of hell torments."* I shall waste no words in commenting on this.

Here I would gladly stop. It has been shown how little Professor Mayor can be relied upon for common courtesy, common patience, or common fairness in dealing with an opponent. But he is guilty, as was intimated before, of offences still more serious than these. I have no reason to suspect him of personal animosity towards myself: his animosity is partly against the doctrine he so bitterly assails, still more against the Church with which, in assailing me, it suits his purpose to identify it, though I had pointedly disclaimed arguing the matter on grounds exclusively Roman Catholic. It is this feeling, amounting apparently almost to a passion, that has blinded him to the systematic violation of those received rules of controversial morality, which at other times he would, I doubt not, feel no temptation to ignore. His paper is throughout a conspicuous illustration of that deeply reprehensible method of procedure which a high authority has described as "poisoning the wells." He cannot be ignorant that the doctrine he is assailing is that of the Universal Church of Christ, however he may choose to define it, from the Apostles' days to

* The special character of the evidence derived from the confessions of the martyrs is more fully dwelt upon in the present volume, though not of course in reply to Prof. Mayor, for the whole was in type before his article appeared. But the purpose for which alone it was cited was perfectly clear before.

our own; he knows perfectly well that it was the only tolerated teaching in his own Church till some twenty years ago; he knows perfectly well that its denial is still regarded as heterodox by the overwhelming majority of Anglican authorities and recognised divines, and was officially condemned as such by the two English primates as lately as 1864; he knows equally well that it is the received belief of the great body of Protestant Dissenters: and that by all these alike it has ever been regarded as the plain and unmistakable teaching of Holy Scripture. Now, mark me—I do not say that he was therefore bound to accept the doctrine himself. It was no doubt open to him, as a Protestant, to summon all witnesses human or divine—whether Scripture, Church, Fathers, Tradition, or general experience and consent,—as he claims to do, before the supreme tribunal of his individual reason and judgment, and to reject them all. But I do say that under these circumstances to discuss the question (except as regards Purgatory, which occupies a comparatively small portion of my argument, and less than a page of his own)* as in any sense a specifically Roman Catholic one, *which he does throughout*, to seek to enlist on his behalf the no Popery passions of Brit-

* It is eminently characteristic of my critic, that he goes out of his way to repudiate all sympathy with what he calls *more suo* "the Romish doctrine of Purgatory," while in his former paper he had expressly insisted on the "remedial punishment" of sinners after death, and that too one "sufficient to *burn in* the lesson of repentance even in a Nero or a Jezebel." If that is not purgatory, without the name, I should like to know what is; only he makes it universal. He is hard to please.

ish Philistinism by a perpetal running fire of flings at the Inquisition, the sale of Indulgences, the Jesuits, Mariolatry, "an infallible Church," etc., etc., was a method of procedure not more unphilosophical than in itself profoundly immoral, which could only tend to the stifling of genuine discussion, not to the elucidation of truth. One is inevitably reminded of the feat of a veteran statesman some five and twenty years ago, who essayed to satisfy the formidable panic he had himself created by "chalking up No Popery, and running away." It was the fate of that statesman some twenty years later to have to acquiesce in the solemn reversal by Parliament of the policy into which he had managed to entrap it, and I can wish nothing better for my present assailant than that he may live to regret, if not to retract, the serious error he has fallen into. He has committed an outrage on the recognised rules of controversial morality almost if not quite unexampled in modern literature. One notorious case of the kind will indeed occur to everybody, but as the writer is now removed from us, and was on other grounds deservedly respected, I do not wish to recall his name in such a connection.

In the first instance I shall notice of this attempt to "poison the wells," my critic has ingeniously combined the double advantage of a side thrust at the credibility of his opponent, and at the credibility of his argument. I am politely represented as "one who *is equally sure of the ultimate safety of himself*, and the ultimate ruin of others." And this

"obliviousness" of moral principle, or "hardened complacency" is then pleasantly illustrated by reference to "the officers of the Holy Inquisition." Now I shall leave the Holy Inquisition—which, like more than half the details of this rambling indictment, is simply thrown in *ad invidiam*—to take care of itself. But on the other point I have a word to say. There is little evidence enough, I fully admit, in either of Professor Mayor's articles of even a superficial acquaintance with the elements of theology. But still he can hardly be unaware that no one but a Calvinist or a Universalist can with any consistency profess to be "sure of his own ultimate safety"; he must certainly have known that such a notion is utterly incompatible with the whole line of argument adopted throughout the essay on whose author it has suited him to father it. Considering the transparent motive of this sinister suggestion, and the kind of subject matter he was dealing with, its moral character is such as I do not care further to dwell upon. Meanwhile I shall bear with equanimity a taunt which, as my assailant knows well enough, in spite of "the Holy Inquisition," can only strike those at whom it is aimed through the sides of such Anglican divines as Dr. Liddon, Dr. Cazenove, and Dr. Vaughan, and such Nonconformist divines as Dr. Angus.

This is bad enough, but even this is not the worst, Not content with seeking to discredit his opponent by personal misrepresentation coupled with an irrelevant appeal to the fiercest theological passions, Professor Mayor next makes an elaborate attempt to pre-

judice the whole argument by forcing on the Catholic doctrine an arbitrary gloss of his own, which he knows to be peculiarly offensive, and might have known, if only from the authorities cited in the essay he was criticising, to be absolutely untrue. I had spoken of the relative numbers of the saved and lost as an open question lying beyond the range of revealed doctrine, and I took occasion in doing so to avow my own agreement with those Catholic divines—some of whom I cited by name, while I referred to several more —who hold that the majority will be saved. My critic, who betrays no acquaintance with any of them, first observes with a sneer that Balmez—a distinguished Spanish theologian whom I had quoted—has, he fears, "allowed his humanitarian feelings to carry him beyond the limits of safety," that is Catholic orthodoxy, whereof he, Professor Mayor, is of course the rightful judge. And then he alleges against me the authority of Dr. Newman, from whom he quotes a sentence (without giving the reference) which has not the remotest bearing on Dr. Newman's opinion as to the question itself, still less on his opinion as to the doctrine of the Church about it. What he may think on the former point I do not know: that on the latter point he would say precisely what I have said—that the question lies outside the range of Catholic dogma —I have not the slightest hesitation in affirming. But my critic goes farther still. Not content with foisting into the Catholic doctrine an opinion which has never formed and never could form any part of it, he proceeds to interpolate into the discussion of a totally

distinct question—for reasons sufficiently intelligible —the familiar maxim, *nulla salus extra Ecclesiam*, in order to force upon it an ignorant gloss of his own, which every theologian would at once reject; which is little, if at all, short of downright heresy; and which, as he might have learnt from the latest and perhaps most widely read work of the only Catholic divine with any of whose writings he betrays even a superficial acquaintance, has been expressly and officially repudiated by the present Pope himself. Professor Mayor may, for aught I know, dislike and disbelieve as heartily as some others of his coreligionists those clauses of the Athanasian Creed which unequivocally enunciate in another form the very principle he so ignorantly parodies, but at all events he cannot deny that it is just as much a formal and authoritative document of his Church as of ours.* It is difficult to believe in the seriousness or

* An Anglican friend reminds me that this same principle is laid down in the most express terms in so well known and standard a classic as Sir W. Palmer's *Treatise on the Church of Christ*, which is, or was within my memory, on the examination list of English Bishops for their ordination candidates. In vol I. ch. I. sect. 3, the author thus defines the principle in precise accord with the teaching of Catholic theology: "I maintain that salvation is only offered in the Church of Christ by divine revelation, and that all men to whom the Gospel is preached must be members of this Church, *when sufficiently proposed to them*, on pain of being excluded from the favour of God for ever." He adds that "these are indeed the sentiments of all the Fathers and Doctors of the Church." Then he goes on to show that all Protestant Communions maintain this principle as stringently as the Church of Rome, and quotes the following Question and Answer from Nowell's Catechism, which was approved by authority under Queen Elizabeth; "Q. Is there no hope of salvation

good faith of a writer who persists in the whimsical affectation of assuming that he—a Protestant of the Protestants—understands our doctrines better than we do ourselves, nay better than the whole body of Catholic theologians past and present put together, with the Pope at their head. Yet he repeats again and again in various forms the same absurd mistake, which any child in a Catholic poor school could have corrected, that it is of the essence of Catholic doctrine to believe in the eternal damnation of every one who dies outside the pale of the visible Church, and therefore, of course, of all the heathen. "The fixed abode of sin and misery remains *for all* who are *extra Ecclesiam*, as well as for a certain portion of the professing members of the Church." And he even has the assurance to allege the Catholic belief in "their hopeless destiry" as an explanation of that feeling of "intolerance" towards members of other communions of which his own article offers so abnormally conspicuous an example. It is not, or once was not, I admit, wholly unknown for a controversialist to assume the right of defining his adversary's position before undertaking to refute it, and it secures him of course an easy victory. But, moral considerations apart, it has one little drawback, that, after all is said and done, he has refuted nobody but himself.

The fact is that the belief that the immense majority of mankind will be lost, including the entire Heathen

out of the Church? A. Without it there can be nothing but *damnation, destruction*, and *perdition*." The italics are his own.

world—which comprises over three-fourth's of mankind —is a direct and acknowledged corollary of the teaching of all the great Protestant Reformers, though not of course of that evanescent rationalistic residuum which many of their modern followers have quietly substituted for it.* I cited high Protestant authorities on this point, whom my critic naturally ignores. On the other hand I cited two eminent Catholic divines of our own age, Möhler and Lacordaire, and might have cited were it worth while many more, including so unexceptionably "ultramontane" a witness as Cardinal Manning, who emphatically condemns this "narrow" notion in a recent volume of Sermons. But it would be mere waste of words to do so. It suited my critic, as it has suited many Universalist writers before him, studiously to confound the doctrine of eternal punishment with the wholly distinct question of the relative number of the lost ;† and it further suited his pur-

* Most of them also, holding the Pope to be Antichrist, held that all Catholics will be lost.

† It did not enter into the scope of my argument to examine in detail the bearing of Scripture on this latter point, and still less of course shall I discuss it here. But I referred to two Catholic writers of our own day, Lacordaire and Faber, who have discussed it, and avowed my own agreement with their conclusions, while fully admitting that there is room for difference of opinion. As for my assailant's extravagant contention that the Scriptural evidence is equally strong for the damnation of the majority as for the doctrine itself, it would be quite enough to ask any one capable of appreciating the force of evidence to compare his summary of the former, comprised in three lines, with my account of the latter in the fourth chapter of this work, not to dwell on the discriminative test of the interpretation always put upon it in the Church. But the subject cannot be pursued here.

pose to mix up the latter question with another, to which I had not adverted and had no occasion to advert—the limits and prerogatives of the Visible Church—in order to affix to a trite theological axiom a meaning which he knew to be invidious and ought to have known that every theologian would repudiate. He might as well insist on forcing upon the trite constitutional axiom, "the King can do no wrong," the literal interpretation that we blasphemously ascribe to our Sovereigns the divine attribute of impeccability. Now I am fully prepared to credit my assailant with a vast range of theological ignorance, natural and acquired; but even if he knew no more about the matter than could be gathered from the very essay he was at the time ostensibly engaged in reviewing—which is a somewhat extreme supposition—he still had no excuse for thus piling blunder upon blunder, in the hope of crushing his opponent under the superincumbent mass. But what then? It is a way he has of flourishing his red flag, and it may possibly win him a momentary success of a kind we need not envy him. He has thoroughly mastered the familiar maxim that, "if you throw plenty of mud, some will stick," with the practical corollary applicable to his own case that the adhesive quality of the mud is likely (at least in this country) to be strengthened if the victim pelted chances to be a Catholic.

Out of many more that are open to criticism, there is only one further passage in Professor Mayor's "Reply" that I shall stay to notice here. For it is of course out of the question to enter into any discussion of the doctrine

itself with a disputant who shows himself so little able to appreciate its bearings, or respect its solemn character. I had spoken of the Calvinistic tenet of arbitrary reprobation with the abhorrence which I feel for it, and which my critic intimates that he should have considered, in a writer who agreed with him, "the voice of a healthy moral sense." But in me, who do not agree with him, it is only the hollow parrot cry of the Jesuit —trained slave of "an infallibile Church," who has "lost the natural power of discerning between good and evil." And why? *Because there are no greater difficulties moral and intellectual in the Calvinist doctrines than in the doctrine of eternal punishment.* "The *sole* distinction is that *the infallible Church* has pronounced in favour of the one and against the other."* That is to say; there is *no more* difficulty in believing that by an arbitrary and irreversible decree, antecedent to and wholly irrespective of any merits or demerits of their own, God has before the foundation of the world absolutely doomed a portion of mankind (according to Calvin the overwhelming majority, "with their infant children") to everlasting damnation, than in believing, what He has revealed, that those who by a persistent misuse of their free will and scornful neglect to the last of the longsuffering forbearance of God and the grace which continually called them to repentance, have finally rejected Him, will be finally

* Elsewhere, when I am dwelling on a moral fact confirmed by all human experience, my critic again warns me off the ground with an impatient sneer at my "usual air of confidence as the *spokesman of an infallible Church.*"

rejected by Him. If my critic does not mean this, he is indulging in mere empty verbiage. If he does mean it, he appears to me to be beyond the reach of argument. At all events I feel that there is such an entire want of any common ground between us in our most rudimentary ethical conceptions, that it would be as hopeless for me to argue the matter with him as to discuss the theory of numbers with the gifted arithmetician in the *Happy Land* who maintained that two and two sometimes make four and sometimes make five. Yet one more extract I will give, from this writer who is so glib in denouncing my "confidence," "violence," and "want of reality," to show the utter futility of attempting any rational discussion with him. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; *where the Church of Rome is, there is none.*" It follows of course by direct and necessary inference, that where the Church of Rome is, the Spirit of the Lord is not; but where the Spirit of the Lord is not, there can be no grace, and therefore no salvation, and therefore no Roman Catholic can be saved. My critic will say, no doubt, that he does not *mean* this, but he *ought* to mean it, and the only reason why he does not mean it, is because he does not really believe the reckless and rancorous declamation which flows like vitriol from his pen.

Here then I gladly take my leave of a writer who combines, in a way I do not remember to have ever met with before, the narrow intolerance of a Calvin with the arrogant disregard of all authority other than that of his own reason, which dis-

tinguished Socinus, and whose theological antipathies appear to be keen and unmeasured in proportion to his inacquaintance with theology. His "Reply" is a curious "survival" of a style of literature which one had hoped was almost extinct, and I sincerely regret, for his own sake, and still more on account of the higher interests involved, that he should have selected one of the most solemn doctrines of Christianity as the occasion for reproducing it. The subject of my essay lies far apart from these pitiful jealousies of religious partisanship. The argument is addressed to those who have sufficient generosity to listen without impatience, and sufficient candour to reply, if they desire to reply, without travestying alike their arguments and their creed, even to writers so unfortunate as to maintain convictions and belong to communions different from their own. Happily I have reason to know that there are many such, in spite of the elaborate pains taken by my present critic to prove that he is not one of them.

THE END.