MAJOR ESSAYS

Just as, in relation to the Babylonian liturgies, there must also have existed a "wisdom literature . . . not written to be repeated in temples," 18 and as it must be assumed that there existed the concept of a "single God . . . [whose] various aspects were not yet considered separate deities in the Sumero-Accadian pantheon,"18 so in the case of the Vedic liturgies, where the occurrence of the concepts of a "One, that is equally spirated, despirated" (ānīt avātam, x.129.2), and of Agni as "being and non-being in one" (sadasat, x.5.7) cannot be called surprising. We see then in the Brāhmaņas, Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā, and even in Buddhism, nothing but an ultimate recension and publication of what had always been taught, whether to initiates or in those circles the existence of which is implied by the brahmodaya form of many hymns, and by such Brahmans as that one who in RV x.71.11 is referred to as expounding the lore of the genesis (vadati jāta-vidyām), and whom we may assume to have been, like Agni himself, a "comprehensor of the generations of all things (viśvā vēda janimā, VI.15.13; cf. IV.27.1)."

¹⁸ Stephen Herbert Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar* (Oxford, 1914), p. 11. ¹⁹ Henri Frankfort, *Iraq Excavations of the Oriental Institute*, 1932/1933 (Chicago, 1934), I, 47.

[Addendum: Meister Eckhart, Evans ed., II, 153, "Were there an hundred Persons in the Godhead, the man who sees distinctions apart from time and number would apprehend no more than one."]



Vedic Exemplarism

God is the cause of all things by His knowledge. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. (Suppl.) 111.88-3.

The doctrine of Exemplarism is bound up with that of forms or ideas, and has to do with the intelligible relation that subsists as between the forms, ideas, similitudes, or eternal reasons of things (nāma, "name" or "noumenon" = forma) and the things themselves in their accidental and contingent aspects (rūpa, "phenomenon" = figura). This is as much as to say that Exemplarism, in the last analysis, is the traditional doctrine of the relation, cognitive and causal, between the one and the many: the nature of which relation is implied in Vedic Sanskrit by the expressions viśvam ekam (RV 111.54.8), "the many that are one, the one that is manifold" (= Plotinus, "integral multiplicity"), viśvam satyam (RV 11.24.12), "the manifold truth," and viśvam . . . garbham (RV x.121.7), "the germ of all," and more fully enunciated in SB x.5.2.16, "As to this they say, 'Is He then one or many?' One should answer, 'One and many.' For inasmuch as He is That, He is one; and inasmuch as He is multiply distributed (bahudhā vyaviṣtiḥ) in his children, He is many," i.e., as the

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1 "He," in the original, "Death" (mrtyu); "That," i.e., "the Person in the Sun." In order not to complicate the present exposition by a discussion de divinis nominibus, the pronoun has generally been substituted for the name of deity actually employed in the passages cited. I have discussed the use of essential names in my "Vedic 'Monotheism'" [in the present volume—ED.]. The general principle is as follows: deity is everywhere of one and the same form (RV viii.11.8, purutrà hi sadrin asi; 1.94.7, yo viśvatah supratikah sadrin asi), i.e., is perfectly simple but has many names, the application of which inheres not in Him, but in the percipient; "Even as He seems, so is He named" (yādrg eva dadrśe tādrg ucyate, RV v.44.6); ["He Himself is all the gods," BU 11.5.19;] "As He is approached, so He becomes (yathopāsate tad eva bhavati, ŚB x.5.2.20), for example, "Indra art Thou to the mortal worshipper" (RV v.3.1), "Thou art Varuna at birth, becomest Mitra when kindled" (RV 111.5.4 and v.3.1).

"Person in the mirror (ādarśe puruṣaḥ), Who is born in his children in a likeness" (pratirūpaḥ . . . prajāyāmājāyata, Kauṣ. Up. 1V.11).2

The doctrine in these respects cannot be better demonstrated than by means of a diagram consisting of two concentric circles, with their common center and two or more radii, or by the corresponding Vedic symbol of a wheel (cakra) with its felly, hub, and spokes. Such a diagram or symbol represents the universe in cross section, the circles any two levels of reference or "worlds" (loka), or more specifically, the individual and intellectual, or human and angelic (adhyātma and adhidaivata) levels of reference. The whole world, or universe (viśvam), thus represented corresponds to the ensemble of all possibilities of manifestation, whether informal, formal, or sensible; a world (loka = locus) is a given ensemble of possibilities, a given modality. The infinite ocean of all possibility, whether of manifestation or nonmanifestation, is represented by the blank surface of the paper which at the same time interpenetrates and transcends the indefinite extension of the finite universe represented by the diagram; this unlimited surface is unaffected by the extension or abstraction of the diagram, which has no position. Each radius, spoke, or ray represents the whole being of an individual consciousness, its intersection with any circumference the operation of this consciousness at that level of reference: each such point of intersection forming the center of a minor "world," which must be thought of as a smaller circle struck about its own center, on the inner surface of the sphere of which the diagram is a cross section, in a plane, that is, at right angles to the radius or ray that connects the unique center with the point in question.

The unique center is, like the whole diagram, without position in its ambient, "position" having a meaning only upon or within the circumference; and just as this ambient is unaffected by the presumption of a center with or without its dependent radii, so the properties of the unique center once assumed are unaffected by the extension or subtraction of radii. And as the indefinitely numerous points which constitute the surface of

² [Anurūpah, conformable by name; pratirūpa, corresponding form, JUB 1.27 cf. RV v1.47.18; ādarše pratirūpah, "I worship the Being in the mirror . . . I also worship His reflection," Kaus. Up. 1v.11; tvam eva pratijāyase, "Thou alone art counter born (reborn, born in a likeness)," Prašna Up. 11.7. "All mirrors in the universe, I ween, display Thy image with its radiant sheen," Jāmī, Lawā'ih, 26; apratirūpah is foul, deformed, pāpam, evil, improper, BU 1.3.4; na . . . paṭirūpam, "unseemly," "not in good form," A 1.148.

Monier-Williams gives pratimă, masc. creator, fem. likeness; cf. Augustine, De spiritu et littera 37, "This likeness begins now to be formed again in us"; and Paradiso xxvi.106, xxix.142 ff., for "mirror."]

In such a diagram, it is obvious that for every point on the outer circumference there is a corresponding and analogous point on the inner circumference, with only this difference, that on the inner circumference the "points" are more closely packed. If the circumference of the inner circle be reduced, the same condition holds good. In such reduction, there can be no moment at which the "points" of which the circumference (or spherical surface represented by it) is composed can be thought of as annihilated; we can only continue to think of them as more and more densely packed, and finally coinciding in a unity without composition. In other words, all of the radii, all individual principles, and in their total extension, are represented at their common center in principio, in an inconnumerable principle (tattva), which is at the same time an altogether simple substance (dharma) and possessed of a multifarious nature (svabhāva); a single point, and yet for each radius its own and private starting point. In just this sense, "The notions of all created things $(k\bar{a}vy\bar{a}=kavikarm\bar{a}ni)$ inhere in Him, who is as it were the hub within the wheel (cakre nābhir iva śritā, RV viii.41.6);3 "In Him are all beings,

⁸ Similarly, RV x.82.6, "Inherent in the nave(l) of the Unborn, in which insist the several worlds as one" (ajasya nābhau adhi ckam arpitam yasmin viśvāni bhuvanāni tasthuh); or aja may be rendered by "Goat," the reference being to the Sun as Viśvakarma, the "All-maker," in either case.

If the Vedic kavayah are in a certain sense the authors of the sūktas, it is rather as finders or inventors (in the etymological sense of invento, discover) than as

and the eye that oversees; intellect (manas), spiration (prāṇaḥ), and noumenon (nāma) coincident (samāhitam, 'being in samādhī'); in him when he comes forth all his children enjoy (nandanti) (the fulfilment of their ends or purposes, by which their will to life is determined); sent by him, and born of him, it is in him that all this universe is stablished, AV xix.53.6-9; and in the same way as the Person, or Man, He is called the "resort of all phenomena" (rūpāny eva yasyāyatanam . . . puruṣam, BU III.9.16).

This inherence in the central consciousness is accordingly the means of a "unified density of cognition" (ekībhūta prajñāna-ghana, Maṇḍ. Up. 5), a "cognitive pleroma" (krtsnaḥ prajñāna-ghana, BU 1v.5.13); "He knows the whole speculatively" (viśvaṃ sa veda varuṇo yathā dhiyā, RV x.11.1), and ab intra, "being provident, even before birth, of all the generations of the Angels" (garbhe nu sann anveṣām avedam ahaṃ de-

composers; theirs is the "prophetic" faculty; and the sūktas themselves are of quickening efficacy; all of which is far removed from conceptions of authorship and "literature" nowadays current. It is as kavi that the Sun "wears the forms of all things in their kind" (visva rūpāni prati muñcate, RV v.81.2), that is, "frees his comrades from the curse" (amuñcat nir avadyāt, RV 111.31.8), from the bonds of Varuṇa (varuṇyāt, RV x.92.14), i.e., from the fetter of Death (bandhanāt mṛtyor, RV v11.59.12); and because, by the mere act of shining, the Supernal Sun thus releases all things from darkness to light, from potentiality to act, he is called, as Pūṣan, the "Son of liberation" (vimuco napāt, RV 1.42.1 and passim).

⁴ AV XIX.53.7, kālena sarvā nandanty agatena, translated above, reflects RV X.71.10, sarve nandanti . . āgatena . . . sakhyā, Kāla ("Time," the "Year") replacing Sakhi (the "Comrade," sc. Varuna, cf. God as the "Friend" in Sūfī parlance). This variant is omitted in Bloomfield's Concordance.

⁵ Sāyaṇa's paraphrase is admirable: dhiyā is ātmānurūpayā prajñayā, 'by his foresight (providence) in his own likeness." Dhi = dhyana = contemplatio. The dhi or dhyana of Varuna corresponds to the adarsa-jñana or "mirror-knowledge" of the jñāna-dharmakāya, which in Mahāyāna Buddhism is also a "knowledge of sameness" (samatā-jñāna), e.g., in the Abhisamayalamkāra (Obermiller, in Acta Orientalia, IX), and a simultaneous act; cf. Lankavatara Sutra 11.115, "Just as waves arise in the sea simultaneously (yugapatkale), as things are seen simultaneously in a mirror or in dream, so is the mind in its own pasture" (cittam svagocare [= svayonau in MU v1.34, where cittam svayonau upaśamyate]). I do not agree with Suzuki that this verse is out of place in its context; the idea is that just as when a breeze springs up, the dawn wind of creation for example, the whole surface of the waters is covered by ripples, which arise all together and not one by one or one after another here and there, so in the world-picture the mind sees all things at one and the same time (yugapatkāle); while svagocare, "in its own pasture," does not mean "in its own sense-fields," but the contrary of this, being equivalent to svastha-cittah, svastha-buddhih, anayasa-cittah, and such expressions employed in connection with dhvāna.

vānām janimāni višvā, RV 1V.27.1);6 in other words, His knowledge of things is not derived from them objectively and post factum, but from their prior likeness in the mirror of His own intellect. Just as the physical sun enjoys a bird's-eye view of this whole earth in its orbit, so the Supernal Sun "surveys the whole" (viśvam . . . abhicaste, RV 1.164.44), being the eye or Aussichtspunkt (adhyaksa) of Varuna or of the Angels collectively (vām caksur . . . sūryas . . . abhi yo visvā bhuvanāni caste, RV vii.61.1; cf. 1.115.1, x.37.1, x.129.7; VS x111.45, etc.), just as, in the Avesta, the Sun (hvare = svar = sūrya) is Ahura Mazda's eye, and in Buddhism, the Buddha is still the "eye in the world" (cakkhum loke). What this eye sees in the eternal mirror is the "world-picture"; "The Primal Spirant (paramātman) sees the world-picture (jagac-citra, lit. the 'picture of what moves') painted by itself upon a canvas that is nothing but itself, and takes a great delight therein" (Sankarācārya, Svātmanirūpana 05); "sees all things at once in their diversity and in coincidence" (abhi vi paśyati and abhi sampasyati, RV 111.62.9, x.187.4; cf. VS xxx11.8, sam ca vi ca eti: and BG vi.20-30).

Taken in and by itself, this First Spirant, without composition (advaita), and at rest (śayāna), is the "living conjoint principle" of St. Thomas (Sum. Theol. 1.27.2c), the unity of the "cohabitant parents" (sakṣitā ubhā . . . mātarā, RV 1.140.3, parikṣitā pitarā, 111.7.1, etc.) who are innumerably named, but typically "Intellect" (manas) and "Word (vāc)," whose conjunction effects what Eckhart calls "the act of fecundation latent in eternity." But this unintelligible unity of the Father (-Mother)8 belongs entirely to the darkness of the "common nest" or

⁶ It is as viśvā veda janimāni that Agni is called Jātavedas, "comprehensor of the genesis of things," RV passim, and as such that he is identified with Varuna, ah intra (111.5.4), being indeed the "comprehensor of Varuna" (1v.1.4); and this "lore of genesis" (jātavidyā) which the Brahman knows in x.71.11 is the same thing as the "hidden names of the Angels" (devānām guhyā nāmāni, v.5.10), as will be evident when we turn to the further discussion of nāma. This divine providence or wisdom is also spoken of as "counsel" (kratu, often, like māyā and śacī, tnet with in pl. and then equivalent to "powers"), e.g., 1v.12.1, "Thou art a Comprehensor by thy counsel, Jātavedas (tava kratvā jātavedas ciķitvān)."

⁷ Manas and Vāc as conjoint pair occur in the Rg Veda, Brāhmaṇas, and Upanisads, passim. Vāc is verbum, and as in Italian, feminine (la parola). Cf. Eckhart, "The Father wantons with the Word"; "From the Father's embrace of his own nature (= svabhāva, prakṛti, Vāc, Sāvitrī, Sūryā, etc.) comes the eternal playing (= nitva līlā) of the Son."

⁸ AV vIII.9.10, "Who knoweth the mithunatva of Virāj?"; cf. JUB 1.54, "They (dual) becoming Virāj (s.) engendered (yonder Sun) (tau virād bhūtvā prājanayatām)" [cf. purutrā . . . abhavat, RV 1.146.5; pururūpa īyate, v1.47.18; and AV 11.1.3].

"matrix" wherein all things come to be of one and the same ilk (yatra viśvam bhuvaty ekanīḍam, Nārāyaṇa Up. 3, cf. RV 1V.10.1 khila, and VS XXXII.8; sarve asmin devā ekavīto bhavanti, AV XIII.4.20).

Thus, while the divine intellect and the ideas or forms or eternal reasons apparent to it are one simply secundum rem, the latter are at the same time manifold secondum rationem intelligendi sive dicendi (St. Bonaventura, I Sent. d.35, a. unic., q.3, concl.). As Plotinus expresses it (IV.4.I) "The Highest, as a self-contained unity, has no outgoing effect." . . . But the unity of the power is such as to allow of its being multiple to another principle, to which it is all things."

What is represented in our diagram already presumes the diremption (dvedhā, BU 1.4.3) of those that had been closely embraced (samparisvaktau, ibid.), that is, of knower and known, subject and object, essence and nature, Heaven and Earth, as indicated by the remotion of the circumference from the center. This diremption and divine procession (krama = dvitva, Taittirīya Pratišākhya xx1.16)¹⁰ is coincident with the birth of the Son (Indrāgnī), of Light (jyotis), of the Sun, "Savitr the creator, who wears the visible forms of all things" (viŝvā rūpāni prati muñcate kavih . . . savitā, RV v.81.2); "by the separation of the prior, the latter came forth" (prathamāh . . . krntatrād eṣām uparā udāyan, RV x.27.23). In other words, the act of being implied by the words "I am that I am," "I am Brahman," although entirely one of self-intention, becomes from an external point of view the act of creation, which is at the same time a

9 "Having no outgoing effect," Skr. aviśvaminva.

10 Conversely, "There is no procession of one in samādhi" (kramo nāsti samāhite, Laņķāvatāra Sūtra 11.117). Samādhi corresponds to raptus or excessus in Christian yoga, but metaphysically a con-centration must be distinguished from a religious ecstasy in the etymological sense of the latter word, viz. that of a going outside oneself.

11 "It knew, indeed, itself, that 'I am Brahman,' thereby it became the All' (BU 1.4.10). This does not, of course, represent an empirical consideration of one's own mentality as object, but is the pure act of being, where to be and to know are the same thing; it in no way contradicts Erigena's magnificent words, "God does not know what He himself is, for He is not any what; and this ignorance surpasses all knowledge."

BU 1.4.10, "It became the All" (sa idam sarvam bhavati), corresponds to RV vIII.58.2, "One only Fire is kindled manifold, one only Sun is present to one and all, one only Dawn illuminates this All; that which is only One becomes this All (ekam vā idam vi babhūva sarvam)," and is echoed also in connection with the Buddha, S II.212, "I being One become many, and being many become One (eko pi bahudhā homi, bahudhā pi hutvā eko homi)." Cf. also MU vI.26 and KU v.12, "Who maketh His single form to be manifold" (ekam rūpam bahudhā yah karoti).

generation (prajanana) and an intellectual (mānasa) creation per artem (taṣṭa) and ex voluntate (yathā vaśaṃ, kāmya); for the Son "in whom were created all things" (Col. 1:16) is also their form and exemplar, the whole occasion of their existence, 12 and it is, accordingly, that species and beauty are appropriated to the Son, whom as being the Word, i.e., as concept, Augustine calls the "art" of God. 13

The Son or Sun is thus the "single form that is the form of very different things" (Eckhart, resuming in these words the whole doctrine) ¹⁴ all of which are in his likeness, as he is in theirs—but with this very important distinction necessitated by the inconnumerability of the unique center, that while the likeness in the thing depends upon the archetype, the latter in no way depends upon the thing, but is logically antecedent: "The model of all that is, preexistent, He knows all generations (satahsatah pratimānam purobhur viśvā veda janimā), He smites the Dragon; shining (or 'sounding') forth (pra . . . arcan) from Heaven our Leader, cattle-fain, as Comrade frees his comrades from the curse" (amuñcat nir avadyāt, RV III.31.8; pratijūti-varpasah, III.60.1; ekam rupam bahudhā yah karoti, KU v.12). ¹⁵ The terms "exemplar" and "image," which imply in strictness "model" and "copy," can, however, be used equivocally, and for this reason a distinction is made between the archetype as imago imaginans and the

12 "Exemplar means raison d'être" (exemplar rationem producentis dicit, St. Bonaventura, I Sent., d.31, p.11, a.1, q.1 ad 3); "Idea is the likeness of a thing, by which it is known and produced" (ibid., d.35, a. unic., q.1, fund.2); "Exemplar implies idea, word, art, and reason (idea, verbum, ars, et ratio); idea, with respect to the act of foresight; word, with respect to the act of statement; art, with respect to the act of making; and reason, with respect to the act of completing, because it adds the intention of the end in view. And because all these are one and the same in God, one is often said in place of another" (Breviloquium, p.1, c.8). From these definitions the reader will be enabled to judge of the propriety of the employment of the terms in translation.

13 See Sum. Theol. 1.39.7; the artist, accordingly, whether human or divine, works "by a word conceived in his intellect" (per verbum in intellectu conceptum, ibid., 1.45.6c). Cf. St. Bonaventura, "Agens per intellectum producit per formas, quae non sunt aliquid rei, sed idea in mente sicut artifex producit arcam" (II Sent., d.1, p.1, a.1, q.1 ad 3, 4): "et quia multa sunt cognita, et unum cognoscens, ideo ideae sunt plures, et ars tantum una" (ibid., 1.35, a. unic., q.3 ad 2).

¹⁴ Cf. St. Bonaventura, "Quia vero (exemplar in Deo) infinitum et immensum, ideo extra omne genus. Et hinc est, quod existens unum potest esse similitudo expressiva [= sryamāna] multorum" (Breviloquium, p.1, c.8).

¹⁵ Here the divine providence is directly connected with the act of creation (conquest of the dragon, and release of individual potentialities from the darkness, duress, and deformity or evil of the antenatal tomb, to light and operation). "Cattle" in the Rg Veda are unrealized potentialities of every kind, of which the proceeding principles desire to take effective possession.

imitation as imago imaginata (St. Bonaventura, I Sent., d. 31, p.11, a.1, q.1, concl.). A corresponding ambiguity is met with in Sanskrit, where the distinction must be made according to the context. As imago imaginans, the deity is called "primordial omniform" (agriyam viśvarūpam, RV 1.13.10), "the likeness of all things" (viśvasya pratimānam, RV 11.12.9; cf. 111.31.8, cited above), "the omniform likeness of a thousand" (sahasrasya pratimām viśvarūpam, VS XIII.41), "the counterpart of Earth" (pratimānam prthivyāh, RV 1.52.13), "for every figure He hath been the form (rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva), that is his likeness that we should regard (tad asya rūpam praticakṣanāya), it is by His magic powers (māyābhih) that He proceeds in a plurality of aspects" (pururūpa īvate, RV VI.47.18). If it be asked, "What was the model, what the starting point?" (kā . . . pratimā nidānam kim, RV x.130.3), the answer is, the sacrificial victim; for this image and this likeness by which the Father proceeds is the sacrifice—"yielding himself up to the Angels, he expressed a likeness of himself, to wit, the sacrifice, hence one says, 'Prajāpati is the sacrifice'" (ātmanah pratimānam asrjata, yad yajñām, tasmād āhuh prajāpatir yajñah, SB x1.1.8.3), cf. "Manu is the sacrifice, the standard (pramitih), our Sire," RV x.100.5; where the relation of the one and the many is again involved, for the Father remains impassible, although in a consubstantial likeness (that of the "Year," ibid. x1.1.6.13) sacrificially divisible. But while in these passages there can be no doubt of the priority of the pattern (pratimana, pratimā, pratirūpa), pratirūpa in Kausitaķi Upanisad cited below is no less surely imago imaginata; and although He is the model of all things, no one of them can be called His like, "There is no likeness (pratimanam) of him amongst those born or to be born" (RV 1V.184.12; cf. BU 1V.1.6).16

The exemplary image, form, or idea is then a likeness in the prior sense of imitable prototype; in fact, "It is inasmuch as God knows His essence as being imitable by this or that creature, that He knows it as the particular reason and idea of that creature" (Sum. Theol. 1.15.2c). An assimilation such as this need not imply a likeness of nature or mode; indeed, minima assimilatio sufficit ad rationem exemplaris (St. Bonaventura, I Sent., d.36, a.3, q.2 fund.). For example, if "He shines upon this world in the aspect of Person" (purusa-rūpena, AĀ 11.2.1), if man is "made in the image and

¹⁶ "No likeness," i.e., no similitudo univocationis sive participationis (St. Bonaventura, I Sent., d.35, a. unic., q.1, concl.); non est similitudo per unius naturae participationem (ibid., d.34, a. unic., q.4 ad 1).

17 "Idea non nominat tantum essentiam, sed essentiam imitabilem," St. Bonaventura, I Sent., d.36, q.2, a.2 ad 1.

In Kaus. Up. 1v.2, "The macrocosm in the Sun, the likeness in the mirror" (āditye mahat . . . ādarśe pratirūpah), pratirūpa is evidently imago imaginata. It is, in fact, as a reflection or projection and, as we shall see, expressively (srjyamāna) that the eternal reasons or ideas (nāmāni) are represented in their contingent aspects (rūpani); a formulation that implies the traditional doctrine of the correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm, as enunciated, for example, in AB viii.2, "Yonder world is in the likeness of (anurupa) this world, this world in the likeness of that," a condition that is clearly exhibited in our diagram by the correspondence of circle with circle, point for point. In what manner the ideas are causal with respect to all their contingent aspects will be apparent when we recall that the central consciousness is always thought of as a Light or Sound, of which the contingent forms on any circumference are projections, reflections, expressions, or echoes thrown, as it were, upon the wall of Plato's cave, or upon the screen of a theater, with only this difference, that the pattern or lantern slide which corresponds to the "form" or "idea" of the picture actually seen is not merely close to the source of light, but intrinsic to the light itself, so that we meet on the one hand with such expressions as "formal light" (Ulrich of Strassburg) and "image-bearing light" (Eckhart), and on the other such as VS v.35, "Thou art the omniform light" (iyotir asi viśvarūpam).18 "He lent their light to other lights" (adadhāj jyotisu jyotir antah, RV x.54.6), "Ye, Agnīşomau,

18 In Scholastic philosophy, the nature of the divine exemplarism is constantly illustrated by means of the likeness of light, e.g., "which although it is numerically one, nevertheless expresses many and different kinds of color" (St. Bonaventura, I Sent., d.35, a. unic., q.2 ad 2); "Exemplary cause, just as physical light is one in kind, which is nonetheless that of the beauty that is in all colors, which the more light they have the more beautiful they are, and of which the diversity is occasioned by the diversity of the surfaces that receive the light" (Ulrich of Strassburg); see Coomaraswamy, "The Mediaeval Theory of Beauty" [in Vol. I of this edition—ED.]; cf. Dante, Paradiso XXXIII.82—90, "One simple Light, that in its depths encloses, as in a single volume, all that is scattered on the pages of the universe."

found the single light for many"; and in the building of the fire altar, the brick laid down "for progeny" and representing Agni is called the "manifold light" (viśvajyotis, SB v111.4.2.25-26).

A subtle problem arises here. For what is meant by the assertion that "The Spirant is interminable, omniform, and yet no doer of anything" (anantas cātmā visvarūpo hy akartā, Švet. Up. 1.9), or, as Eckhart expresses it, by the apparent contradiction of the statements that "He works willy nilly" and "there no work is done at all"? In view of this, that all the personal powers may be described as reaching out to all things (viśvaminva, RV passim, cf. 11.5.2, where Agni viśvam invati), what is meant by the assertion, "At the back of yonder heaven," what they chant is an omniscient word compelling nothing" (mantrayante divo amusya prsthe visvavidam vācam avisvaminvam, RV 1.164.10, cf. 45), and why is the chariot of the Sun, although by nature directed everywhere (visūvṛtam), also described as having no effect on anything (aviśvaminvam, RV 11.40.3)? These questions have an important bearing on the problems of destiny and free will. As follows: the centrifugal procession of individual potentialities depends upon the central unity essentially; their becoming, life, or spiration depends entirely upon the being and spiration of the Primal Spirant, in this sense, that the very existence of individual radii or rays becomes unthinkable if we abstract the central luminous point; 20 and this dependence is constantly asserted, for example, in the designation of Agni as "all-supporting" (viśvambhara).

On the other hand, it is not the single form of all potentialities, making arbitrary dispositions ("Heaven gives no orders"), but the specific²¹ form

¹⁹ I.e., "In the world beyond the falcon," JB 111.268, "there the Sun does not shine" (Mund. Up. 11.2, 10 and KU v.15); in the divine darkness (tamas, passim); "Things belonging to the state of glory are not under the sun" (Sum. Theol., 111.91.1), "One escapes altogether through the midst of the Sun" (JUB 1.3); "No man cometh to the Father save through me" (John 14:6), who as the Sun is the "gateway of the worlds" (lokadvāra, CU v111.6.6).

²⁰ In this case, that of *pralaya* absolutely, all things are returned to the condition of potentiality, and even the first assumption in Godhead, that of light or being, has not been made. The individual is then "drowned," losing "name and aspect," and, if a Comprehensor, is completely enlarged from all necessity without residual elements of existence; or if not wholly and consciously perfected, must await the opportunities of manifestation and experience in a succeeding aeon, when the dawning of another day again effects the Harrowing of Hell.

²¹ Form, idea, reason, species, truth, virtue, and beauty, although not synonymous, are interchangeable terms in Scholastic exemplarism, because one at their source. Species, however, in this sense, does not imply a group within a genus, but what

of each potentiality that determines each thing's individual mode or character, and gives to it its "proper likeness" (sva-rūpam). In other words, God or Being is the common cause of the becoming of all things, but not immediately of the distinctions between them, which distinctions are determined by "the varying works inherent in the respective personalities" (Śankarācārya, on Vedānta Sūtra II.I, 32, 35); they are born according to the measure of their understanding (yathā-prajñam, AĀ (1.3.2); or, as more commonly implied in the Rg Veda, according to their several ends or purposes (anta, artha); "they live dependent on (upajivanti) their such-and-such desired ends" (yam yam antam abhikāmah, CU viii.2.10). So it is said, "Now run ve forth your several ways" (pra nūnam dhāvatā pṛthak, RV viii.100.7).22 "In fine," as Plotinus expresses it (17.3.13 and 15), "the law is given in the entities upon whom it falls; these bear it about with them. Let but the moment arrive, and what it decrees will be brought to act by those beings in whom it resides; they fulfil it because they contain it; it prevails because it is within them; it becomes like a heavy burden, and sets up in them a painful longing to enter the realm to which they are bidden from within," and thus "all diversity of condition in the lower spheres is determined by the descendant beings themselves."28

A doctrine of this kind, which makes each creature the source and bearer, not of its own being but of its own destiny (and this is what one means by "free will," although this is in reality a state of bondage, viz. to the idiosyncracy of the individual will), is common to all tradition, and has been everywhere expressed in almost the same way: for example, "It is manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves" (Sum. Theol., I.116.2); "God's being is bestowed on all creatures alike, only each receives it according to its receptivity" (Johannes Tauler, The Following of Christ, tr. J. K. Morrell, London, n.d., §154, p. 135); "As is the harmony, so also is the sound or tone of the eternal voice therein; in the holy, holy, in the perverse, perverse" (Jacob Boehme, Signatura rerum xvi.6-7); "formal light . . . of which the diversity is occasioned by the diversity of the sur-

is individually specific, and similarly as regards goodness (or perfection) and beauty, things being good or beautiful in their kind (and there is only one of each kind), and not indefinitely.

²² In this connection may be noted KU rv.14, "Just as water rained upon a lofty peak runs here and there (vidhāvati), so one who sees the principles in multiplicity (dharmāny prthak pasyan) pursues after them (anudhāvati)."

^{23 &}quot;According to their receptive powers," Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV.1.

faces that receive the light" (Ulrich of Strassburg; see Plotinus, IV.4.8); for, as Macrobius says, unus fulgor illuminat, et in universis appareat in multis speculis (Somnium Scipionis 1.14). We find this point of view also in Islam: the creative utterance, kun, "Be," causes or permits the positive existence of individuals, but in another sense (that of mode), they are causes of themselves "because He only wills what they have it in them to become" (Ibnu'l 'Arabī, as cited by R. A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism, Cambridge, 1921, p. 151).

That we do what we must is a matter of contingent necessity (necessitas coactionis), altogether distinct from the infallible necessity (necessitas infallibilitatis) with which He who acts "willingly but not from will" (Eckhart), "does what must be done" (cakrih . . . yat karisyam, RV vII.20.1, cf. I.165.9 and vI.9.3), viz. "those things which God must will of necessity" (Sum. Theol. I.45.2c); the individual is then only freed (mukta) to the extent that the private will to which he is in bondage consents to His who wills all things alike, a condition implied in RV v.46.1, his condition "who hath what he will, for whom the Spirit is his will, who doth not will" (āpta-kāmam ātma-kāmam akāmam, BU Iv.3.21); as Boethius expresses it, "The nearer a thing is to the First Mind, the less it is involved in the chain of fate." It is because these considerations can hardly be made intelligible without reference to the concept of the relation of the one and the many, proper to Exemplarism, that we have thought it proper to refer to the matter in the present connection.

As to our rendering of ātman: in the citation from Tauler, above, "being" or "essence" corresponds to ātman as the suppositum of accidents and sine qua non of all modality (-maya). We have experimented elsewhere with a rendering of ātman by "essence," but propose in future to adhere to a more strictly etymological equivalent, more especially inasmuch as the ātman doctrine in the Rg Veda must be considered in connection with x.129.2, ānīd avātam, equivalent to "at the same time ātmya and anātmya," or "equally spirated, despirated." The word ātman, derived from an or vā, to "breathe" or "blow," is, in fact, more literally "spirit," spirant, or spiration, and hence "life." This Spirit or Gale (ātman, prāna,

²⁴ The translation of ātman as "Self" is unsatisfactory in any case, and mainly for two reasons: (1) that it introduces an altogether unfamiliar terminology, one that lends itself to misunderstandings connected with the connotation "selfishness," and (2) that the reflexive use of ātman, which underlies the rendering "Self," hardly occurs in the Rg Veda. Ātman is "spirit," as this word is used, for example, in the trilogy, "body, soul, and spirit (rūpa, nāma, ātman)."

vāta, or vāyu) is, as may be understood from what has been said above, the only property that can be shared and is thus apparently divided, as Being amongst beings, the breath of life in breathing things; cf. BD 1.73, "Spiration (ātman) is said to be the only participation (bhaktih) that can be attributed to the three great Lords of the World" (the functional Trinity). In RV 1.115.1, "The Sun, as being the spirant (ātman) in all that is mobile or immobile, hath filled Midhome and Heaven and Earth" (the "Three Worlds," the Universe); in x.121.2, "The Golden Germ (hiranyagarbha, Agni, the Sun, Prajāpati) is the bestower of spiration" (ātmadā); Agni in this sense is "a hundred-fold spirant (śatātmā, RV 1.149.3)," that is, he has innumerable lives or hypostases, as many, in fact, as there are living things (antar āyuṣi, RV 1v.58.11), to each of which he is a total presence (as can be clearly seen in our diagram), although as we have seen, each is but a participant (bhakta) of his life, for though "all is offered, the recipient is able to take only so much" (Plotinus, vi.4.3).25 In JUB 111.2-3, "Spiration (ātman) both of Angels and mortals, Spiritus (ātman) arisen from the sea, and which is yonder Sun"26 may be read in connection with \$B v111.7.3.10, "Yonder Sun connects (samāvayate)27 these worlds by a thread (sutre),28 and what that thread is is the Gale" (vāyuh); cf. ibid. 11.3.3.7, "it is by His rays (rasmibhih) that all creatures are endowed with their spirations (pranesu abhihitah), and so it is that the rays extend downwards to these spirations." These texts recall RV 1.115.1, cited above, and 111.29.11, "formed in the Mother, He is Mātariśvan (= Vāyu, Spiritus) and becomes the draught of the Gale in its course" (vātasya sargaḥ); cf. vii.87.2, "The Gale that is thy breath (ātmā te vātah) thunders through the Firmament . . . and in these spheres of Earth and loftv Heaven are all those stations dear to thee." In RV x.1684. "This Angel, the spiration of the Angels (ātmā devānām), Germ of the World (bhuvanasya garbha = Hiranyagarbha) moves as He will (yathā

²⁵ "All beings are not their own being, but beings by participation" (Sum. Theol. 1.44.1c); "Creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being" (ibid. 1.45.4 ad 1); [but (ibid. 1.45.1c), "Creation is the emanation of all being from the Nonbeing, which is nothing." Also, "To create is to make something out of nothing"; and 1.45.4 ad 3, "Creation is the creation of Being, and not only of matter." Cf. BU 11.1.20 and CU v1.10.2, "All creatures have come forth from sat."]

²⁶ Cf. ibid. III.32, where the Angel's omniformity (sarvam rūpam) is illustrated by the five exemplata, "and what his single form is, is the Spirit (tad etad ekam eva rūpam prāṇa eva)."

²⁷ Samavāga is "perpetual co-inherence," and in the symbolism based on weaving is illustrated by the relation of thread to the cloth.

²⁸ The doctrine of the "thread-breath" (sūtrātman) recurs in BG v11.7, cf. x.21.

VEDIC EXEMPLARISM

 $va\acute{s}am$),²⁹ His sound $(gho_{\dot{s}}\bar{a})^{30}$ is heard but never his likeness $(r\bar{u}pam)$, so let us offer with oblation to the Gale $(vat\bar{a}ya)$."

Similarly in later texts: "For that sharing out his spiration, or himself (ātmānam vibhajya, cf. bhakti in BD 1.73), He fills these worlds, it is said that as indeed sparks from fire and as light rays from the sun, so from Him in the course of his procession (yathā kramanena) the spirations and other powers of perception (prānādayah) go forth again and again" (abhyuccaranti punahpunar, MU v1.26). Much later: "That (viz. the principle, tattva, called Sadāśiva, the 'Eternal Śiva') becomes by inversion (viparyayena)³¹ and in the splendor of its practical power (kriyā-

²⁹ "The wind bloweth as it listeth," etc. (John 3:8). Cf. Prose Edda, Gylfi 18, "He is so strong that he rears great seas, but strong though he be, yet may he not be seen, therefore is he surely wonderfully shapen"; and Rūmī, Dīvān, "Foamed the sea (âb, Skr. ap), and at every foam-fleck, something took figure and something was bodied forth" (Ode 19); "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters" (Genesis).

³⁰ Ghoṣā is to be noted here, as the "voice" of the Gale. This Ghoṣā is the mother of Hiraṇyahasta, Savitr, the Sun, and one with Vadhrimatī and Vāc: cf. RV 1.116.13 and v1.62.7, where the Aśvins hear the call of Ghoṣā, the soughing of the dawn-wind (vasarhā vātaḥ, RV 1.122.3) of creation, the breath of Vāc, "Whose breathing is the Gale, whenas I take in hand to shape the several worlds" (vāta iva pravāmi, etc., RV x.125.8).

**I "By inversion" or "by revolution" (viparyayena) involves the notions of the "face" and "back" of God—the Janus symbolism—and is reminiscent of RV IV.1.2, "Do thou, Agni, turn round thy brother Varuna (bhrātaram varunam agne a vavrtsva)," and thus, indeed, "the kingdom is reversed" (paryāvart rāstram, RV X.124.4), dominion passing from the "Father" or "Elder Brother" to the "Son" or "Younger Brother" (both relations as well as that of consubstantiality are predicated of Varuna and Agni in the Rg Veda).

It is the "rotation" of this central principle, "the axle-point on which the aeviternal substances depend" (anim na rathyam amrtadhi tasthuh, RV 1.35.6)-Dante's "il punto dello stelo al cui la prima rota va dintorno"-that initiates the revolution of the Wheel of the Year, "mounted whereupon the Angels move round all the worlds" (KB xx.1). It must not, however, be overlooked that the "rotation" of a point means nothing secundum rem; the unique center, though the prime mover, is by no means the primum mobile, but in itself immoveable. It is only when the radii are projected and circles struck, that is, when diremption of essence and nature has taken place, that we are given the two points d'appui indispensable for leverage and local motion, and only from an exterior point of view that we can speak of a rotation of the axle-point, or distinguish "face" and "back" in the Supreme Identity (tad ekam): it is the felly, not the axle-point, that actually turns, impelled by the will to life in individual principles. That is why at the same time that the Supreme Identity is spoken of as turning from interior (guhya) to exterior (avis) operation (vrata) at will (yatha vasam), the Rg Veda also treats of the separation of Heaven and Earth, that is to say of creation, as being effected by the several desirous principles, whose co-creative activity—the

śakty-aujjvalaye, cf. ujjvalati in MU v1.26) the form of the universal demiurge of things in their manifested likeness (vyaktākara-viśvānusamdhātrrūpam), and this is the principle called 'Lord'" (īśvara-tattvam, Mahārtha-mañjarī xv, Commentary);³² virtually identical with the formulation of Philo, according to whom "two powers are first distinguished (σχίζονται) from the Logos, viz. a poetic, according to which the artist ordains all things and which is called God; and the royal power of Him called the Lord, by which He controls all things."³³

From all of the foregoing passages it is evident that as in Scholastic and Neoplatonic, so also in the Vedic tradition, it is a formal light that is the cause of the being and becoming of all things (as light, the cause of their being, as formal the cause of their becoming); the fontal raying of this primal light seeming to be an actual expression or emanation (srsti) and local motion (caranam, gati), although really this Agni, even while "He proceedeth foremost, still remains in his ground" (anvagram carati kseti budhnah, RV 111.55.7), "While yet abiding in the Germ, He is repeatedly born" (RV v111.43.9); cf. Plotinus (1v.3.13), "abiding intact above, while giving downwards," and Eckhart, "The Son remains within as Essence

operation of "mediate causes"—is brought forward in the first and subsequent sacrifices, by which the unitary principle is intellectually contracted and identified, as, for example, in x.114-5, "By their wordings they made him logically manifold who is but One," and x.90.11 and 14, "They subdivided the Person . . . thought out the worlds," and thus in fact by their thousand years' session "expressed everything" (viśvam asrjata, PB xxv.18.2). It is just because of the distinction of these two points of view (secundum rem and secundum rationem intelligendi sive dicendi) that one can ask in brahmodaya, as in RV x.129.7, whether, indeed, the world was expressed from within or determined from without.

The ontology of RV x.90.14, lokān akalpayan, and x.114.5, bahudhā kalpayanti, is preserved in Lankāvatāra Sūtra 111.77, "The being of the three worlds is conceptual (vikalpa-mātram), without external validity (bāhyamartham na vidyate); it is as a concept that it is seen pictorially (vikalpam dršyate citram)."

³² Kashmir Series XI (Bombay, 1918), 44; rūpam is here imago imaginans. Other instances of the persistence of the exemplarist concept in later literature may be cited in the Kādambarī (Parab's ed., Bombay, 1928, p. 10), where King Śudraka is compared to God, "whose abundance (vasatā, cf. Vedic Vasu, Vasistha) displays the likeness of every form" (prakaṭita-viśvarūpākṛteh), and in Śakuntalā 11.9, where the heroine is so beautiful that she seems to have been "intellectually created by Brahmā" (manasā kṛtā vidhinā), to be, that is, rather a divine idea than a mundane actuality.

⁸³ Émile Bréhier, Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris, 1925), p. 113. "Two powers," i.e., spiritual and temporal, brahma and ksatra.

and goes forth as Person . . . other, but not another, for this distinction is logical (Skr. vikalpam), not real (Skr. satyam)."

As Plotinus expresses it (v1.4.3), "Under the theory of procession by powers, 34 souls are described as rays." In other words, the animating (jinva, codana, sava) principle is both a living and a vocal power, and the light of the world. Āyu, "Life," and Viśvāyu, "Universal Life," are constant epithets of Agni, who is "the one life of the Angels" (asur ekam devānām, RV x.121.7) and "the only guardian of being" (bhūtasya . . . patir ekah, ibid. 1), and manifests himself as Light (jyotis, bhāna, arka, etc.), whether of the Fire-flash or the Supernal Sun; brahmaṇa vācaḥ parama vyoma, TS v11.4.18. As in John 1:1-3, "In principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deum erat verbum . . . Omnia per ipsum facta sunt . . . Quod factum est in ipso vita erat; et vita erat lux hominum." 86

This equivalence of life, light, and sound must be taken into account when we consider the causal relationship of Vedic $n\bar{a}ma$, "name" or "noumenon," to $r\bar{u}pa$, "phenomenon" or "figure," which is that of exemplary cause to exemplatum; for while $n\bar{a}ma$ involves the concept primarily of thought or sound, $r\bar{u}pa$ involves the concept primarily of vision. Not that light and sound are strictly speaking synonymous (for though they refer to one and the same thing, they do so under different

⁸⁴ "Powers," in Skr. śaci, śakti, svadhā, vibhūti, kṣatra, etc. "It is the manifestation of their (the devas') powers that their names are various" (BD 1.71).

³⁵ Cf. MU v1.26, as cited above. In Christian iconography, in representations of the Annunciation, the Spirit (dove) moves on the path of a ray that extends from the Supernal Sun to the Virgin, while in representations of the Nativity a similar ray (which is in fact coincident with the axis of the universe, the trunk of the Tree of Life, Gnostic σταυρός, and the "one foot" of the Sun) connects the Bambino with the Sun. Even in the case of ordinary conceptions the Spirit is the animating power, Sum. Theol. 111, q.32, a.1, agreeing with KB 111.3, "It is spiration (prāṇā), verily the conscious Spirit (prajāātman) that grasps and quickens the flesh."

and this life was the light of men." See also René Guénon, "Verbum, Lux, et Vita," Le Voile d'Isis, XXXIX (1934), 173, and P. Mus, "Le Buddha paré," BÉFEO, XXVIII (1928), 236, n. 4, "la voix et la lumière . . . deux manifestations connexes d'une même nature transcendente." It may be noted that in RV x.168.4, cited above, one and the same verb śrnvire, "is heard," is employed in connection with both sound and appearance; while alternatively in 1.164.44, one and the same verb dadrise, "seen," is similarly employed. ["La parole est vie, elle possède toute vie, elle est toute vie" (Willem Caland and Victor Henry, L'Agnistoma (Paris, 1906–1907), I, 232, quoting Aśvalāyanaśrautasūtra v.q.1).]

aspects), but that the utterance fiat lux and the manifestation lux erat by no means imply a temporal succession of events; the utterance (vyāhrti) of names and the appearance of the worlds is simultaneous, and, strictly speaking, eternal. Thus we find in JUB 111.33 that "The Sun is sound; therefore they say of the Sun, 'He proceeds resounding'" (yaādityassvara eva sah, tasmād etam ādityam āhus, svara etīti): the humming of the world wheel is the music of the spheres. It is, in fact, hardly possible to distinguish the roots svar, to "shine" (whence sūrya, "sun"), and svr, to "sound" or "resound" (whence svara, "musical note") and also in some contexts to "shine." The like applies in the case of root arc, which means either to "shine" or to "intone," and to its derivatives such as arka, which may mean either "sheen" or "hymn." There is also a close connection, and was probably an original coincidence, of the roots bhā to "shine" and bhan to "speak." Even in English we still speak of "bright" ideas and "brilliant" sayings.

The shining of the Supernal Sun is then as much an "utterance" as a "raying"; he, indeed, "speaks" (mitro . . . bhruvāṇah, RV III.59.1; vII.36.2; 1.92.6), and what he has to say is "that great and hidden name (nāma guhyam) of multiple effect (purusprk), whereby thou dost produce all that has come to be or shall become" (RV x.55.2) ("The Father spoke himself and all creatures in the Word, to all creatures in the Son," Eckhart). The name or form of the thing is thus prior—prior, that is, in hierarchy rather than in time—to the thing itself, and is its raison d'être, whether as pattern or as name; and it is accordingly as an expression (srṣṣṭi) or utterance (vyāhṛti) that the thing itself is manifested or evoked; "in the beginning this universe was unuttered" (avyāhṛti, MU v1.6).

In the concluding paragraphs of the present essay we shall accordingly assemble certain of the Vedic texts in which the doctrine is explicit or implicit that the utterance of a name is of creative efficacy. For example, "He by the names of the four (seasons) has set in motion his ninety coursers, as a rounded wheel" (RV 1.155.6), viz. the Wheel of the Year, as made up of four ninety-day seasons; it is "by those four titan names immaculate (asuryāṇi nāmādābhyāni . . . yebhiḥ), that He well knows, that thou, Indra, hast performed all thy mighty deed" (karmāṇi cakartha,

⁸⁷ That is to say "now"; that "now" of which a temporal experience is impossible, being only of a past and a future, and where becoming never stops to be. We have discussed elsewhere (*The Rg Veda as Land-Náma-Bók*, 1935) the proposition enunciated by Sāyaṇa and others that the Veda deals only with what is eternal (nityam), and shall return to the subject.

RV x.54.4; cf. III.38.4, x.73.8); it is after these hidden names that the maker of all things names, that is, creates, the Angels, being devānām nāmadhāh, RV x.82.3; it is by recourse to Agni that these Angels "get for themselves those names by which they are worshipped sacrificially, and thus contrive their own well-born embodiment" (nāmāni . . . dadhire yajñiyāny, asūdayanta tanvah sujātāh, RV 1.72.3); 38 it is inasmuch as he "knows the distant hidden names (apīcyā veda nāmāni guhyā) that Varuṇa propagates the multiplicity of notions of created things (kāvyā puru . . . puṣyati), even as Heaven (i.e., the Sun) propagates their aspect (rūpam), "39 which "notions of created things" (kāvyā = kavikarmāni, see n. 4) "inhere in him as hub within the wheel" (RV VIII.41.5 and 6). The productive activity of the co-creative principles is similarly nominative (nāmadheyam dadhānāḥ, RV x.71.1); "What was the bovine virtue (sakmyam goḥ, cf. śagmyena, III.31.1) of the Bull and Cow,

38 Here the sequence of ideas corresponds to that implied in the Scholastic dictum, "the soul is the form of the body."

39 As in RV v.81.2, where the Sun visva rūpāni prati muñcate; "He illumines (bhāsayati) these worlds . . . incarnadines (rañjayati) existences here" (MU vi.7); "This supremely pure splendor of the impartible essence illumines all things at once . . . the patent of his power, resplendent in luminous detail" (Eckhart).

⁴⁰ Cf. CU vi.1.4, "Modification is a matter of wording, a giving of names to things" (vācārambhanam vikāro nāmadheyam, reminiscent also of RV x.125.8, where the Word, Vāc, speaks of herself as ārambhamānā bhuvanāni; ārambha has been defined as evocation, "mental initiation of action"). It is on the basis of the magical efficacy of enunciation that the employment of words of power in ritual depends: for example, PB vi.9.5, "By saying born' (jātam iti), he brings to birth (jājanat)," and ibid. vi.10.3, "In saying 'lives' he puts life into them that live." Cf. Lankāvatāra Sūtra, vi, p. 228, "When names are enunciated, there is the manifestation of appearance (nimittābhivyañjakam), there is concept (vikalpah)."

The doctrine of ideas, inseparable from that of exemplarism, recurs in traditional teachings at all times. As remarked by E. Gilson, "Le mot idée remonte à Platon, mais la chose elle-même existait avant lui, puisqu'elle est éternelle. On doit d'ailleurs supposer que d'autres hommes les avaient connues avant lui, de quelque nom ils les aient désignées, car il y eut des sages antérieurement à Platon et en dehors même de la Grèce, et il n'y a pas de sagesse sans la connaissance des idées" (Introduction a l'étude de Saint Augustin, Paris, 1929, p. 257). The doctrine, for example, appears already in the Sumero-Babylonian conception of creation as a terminology or determination, for "the Babylonians regarded the name of a thing as its reality . . . to name a thing practically means in their theology to determine its essence" (Stephen Langdon, Sumerian Epic, Philadelphia, 1915, pp. 39-40, cf. idem, Semitic Mythology, Boston, 1931, pp. 91, 289). In the Clementine Homilies, in connection with the doctrine of the True Prophet, similar to the Indian "Eternal Avatar," we find with reference to Adam's calling of things by their names, "He himself, being the only true prophet, fittingly gave names to each animal, according to the merits of its nature, as having made it."

that they measured out by names (a namabhih mamire), making a manifested image in it" (ni . . . mamire rūpam asmin, RV 111.38.7), "Then verily they recollected (amanuat) the distant name (nāma . . . apīcyam, admirably rendered by Griffith's 'essential form') of Tvaştr's Cow within the mansion of the Moon" (RV 1.84.15), "When he (the Sun) upstood, all things him adorned; who moves self-luminous, indued in glory; that is the Bull's, the Titan's mighty form, it is the Omniform who takes his stand upon his aeviternities" (mahat tad vrsno asurasva nāmā, ā višvarūpo amṛtāni tasthau, RV 111.38.4, where Viśvarūpa must be Tvastr, and amrtani, pl., contrasts with an implied anantatva in or as which the Asura lies recumbent, ante principium); "The Son (the Sun) in Heaven's light determines the Father-Mother's third hidden name" (dadhāti putrah pitror apīcyam nāma trtīyam adhi rocane divah, 1x.75.2, where dadhāti . . . năma is the same as to be nămādhāh in x.82.3, as cited above); and all this is at the same time a creative recollection in the Platonic sense, as in RV x.63.8, where the Viśve Devāh are "mindful of all that is mobile or immobile" (viśvasya sthātur jagataś ca mantavah). It is "by wordings" (vacobhih) that they "think Him out as manifold who is but One"41 (RV x.114.5); that He, indeed, appears at all depends upon the ritual incantation, "And sundry sang, they brought to mind the Great Chant, whereby they made the Sun to shine"42 (arcanta eke mahi sama manvata, etc., RV viii.20.10); "by an angelic utterance they opened up the cattle fold" (vacasādaivyena, etc., RV IV.I.15).43

⁴¹ That this is possible depends on His Protean nature, who is "omniform" (viŝvarūpa, passim), and is "man-made" in the sense that He assumes the forms that are imagined by His worshippers.

⁴² "For that God is God he gets from creatures. . . . Before creatures were, God was not God" (Eckhart).

⁴⁸ Intellect being identical with its noumenal content, the intellectual creation so often referred to in Vedic tradition is essentially the same thing as a creation by the utterance of a name or names. The intellectual creation is typically per artem, as for example in RV 1.20.2, "they wrought by intellect" (tataksur manasā), where √taks implies the use of an axe on wood, viz. that "wood from which they fashioned Heaven and Earth," RV x.31.7. The intellectual operation is, moreover, strictly speaking a conception; what is formulated in the "heart" by the application of manas to vāc is literally a generation and a vital operation; as in BU 1.5.7, "The Father is manas (intellect), the Mother vāc (Word), the Child prāṇa (life)." [The new born Kumāra (Agni) demands a name, for it is "by name that evil is smitten away," i.e., by name that there is procedure from potentiality to act, SB VI.1.3.8-9.] In RV x.71.2 there may be noted the expression manasā vācam akrata; manasā kr being parallel to haste or panau kr, to "marry," where kr, to "make," has a value comparable to that of "make" in the modern erotic vernacular. Cf. Sum. Theol. 1.45.6c, where the artist is said to operate by a word conceived in his

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The "names" or noumena of things are, moreover, everlasting, and in this respect unlike the things themselves in their contingent manifestation: "When a man dies, what does not go out of him is his name (nāma; similarly BU III.1.9, manas), that is endless (ananta), and inasmuch as what is endless is the Several Angels, thereby he wins accordingly the endless world (anantam lokam)," BU III.2.12; in other words, his name is "written in the Book of Life." From the point of view of the desirous principles, in potentia but eager to be in act, the possession of a "name" and corresponding entity is naturally the great desideratum, and what they most fear is to be "robbed of their names"; cf. RV v.44.4, "Krivi in the forest steals away their names (krivir nāmāni pravane musāyati)."

On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that individuation and identification are specific limitations, implying the possession of only a particular ensemble of possibilities to the exclusion of all others. "Speech (vāc) is the cord, and names (nāmāni) the knots whereby all things are bound" (AA 11.1.6). Liberation (mukti), then, as distinguished from salvation, is something other than a perpetual and ideal being still oneself and, as it were, a part of the world picture; liberation in the fullest sense of the word is a liberation not merely from phenomenal becoming, but from any noumenal determination whatever.45 The cycle that must for the Wayfarer begin with the audition or the finding of a name, must for the Comprehensor end in silence, where no names are spoken, none is named, and none remembered. There knowledge-of, which would imply division, is lost in the coincidence of knower and known, "as a man locked in the embrace of a dear bride knows naught of a within or a without" (BU 17.3.21); There "none has knowledge of each who enters, that he is so-and-so or so-and-so" (Rūmī); the prayer of the soul is an-

intellect (per verbum in intellectu conceptum), that is, like the Father and Divine Architect, per artem and ex voluntate, both with knowledge and with will; the consciousness of the artist being in either case a conjoint principle, and the "work" (karma) the artist's child.

44 Hence the distress of the Devas at Agni's hesitation in RV x.51, and their corresponding fear when the Buddha, who is the same as Agni usarbudh, hesitates to set in motion the Wheel of Order, by which the Way is to be opened for them to proceed.

15 "Released from form or aspect (nāmarūpad-vimuktaḥ), the Comprehensor reaches thus the heavenly Person beyond the yon, knowing the ultimate Brahman, he indeed becomes the Brahman" (Muṇḍ. Up. 111.2.8-9; [padam gacchanty anāmayam, BG 11.51]).

swered, "Lord, my welfare lies in thy never calling me to mind" (Eckhart). If what of the Supreme Identity is manifestable appears to us to be contrasted into variety and individualized, the doctrine of Exemplarism, common to both the Eastern and the Western forms of a common tradition, exhibits the relation of this apparent multiplicity to the unity on which it hangs, and apart from which its being would be a pure nonentity; and furthermore, inasmuch as the last end must be the same as the first beginning, the way is pointed out that leads again from multiplicity to unity, from the semblance to reality. As in AĀ 11.3.8.3, 4, "The Makers, laying aside the Yes and No, what's 'blunt' and what is veiled of speech, 46 have found their quest; they that were held in bond by names are now beatified in that which was revealed; they now rejoice in what had been revealed by name, in that in which the host of Angels cometh to be one; putting away all evil by this spiritual power, the Comprehensor reaches Paradise."47

⁴⁶ I.e., abandoning all dialectic; cf. BU 10.5, "laying aside both innocence and learning, then is he a Silent Sage." *Krūra* and *ulbaṇiṣnu*, rendered tentatively by "blunt" and "veiled," seem to imply *pratyakṣam* and *parokṣam*—all that is formal, no longer significant for one to whom the content of all form is immediately present.

⁴⁷ The text is difficult, but there can be no doubt that Keith correctly explains that it means "they rose above mere names to the unity of brahman or prāna." Cf. khila ($= n\bar{\imath}da$), RV IV.10.1, and yatra viśvam bhuvaty ekanīdam, "Where all abides in one nest," Nārāyaṇa Up. 3, previously cited.