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of the center of the maze, "short of which we are still in a duality." Hence we say that the very implications of the phrase "religious tolerance" are to be avoided: diversity of faith is not a matter for unwilling "toleration," but of divine appointment. And this will hold good even if we sincerely believe that other faiths are inferior to our own, and in this sense relatively "evil": for as Augustine says, "The admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which even what is called evil, well-ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good" (Enchiridion XIII), whom St. Thomas quotes with approval, adding that "The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, because of the most beautiful order given to things by God" (Sum. Theol. 1.48.1 and 1.25.6 ad 3). As Augustine also says, "There is no evil in things, but only in the sinner's misuse of them" (De doctrina christiana III.12). As to the sinner's "misuse," who can assure us of that, with respect to which it has been said, "Judge not, that ye be not judged"?

In the matter of direction towards the Kingdom of Heaven "within you," the modern world is far more lacking in the will to seek, than likely to be led astray by false direction. From the Satanic point of view there could hardly be imagined a better activity than to be engaged in the "conversion of the heathen" from one to another body of dogmas: that, surely, was not what was meant by the injunction, "Go thou and preach the Kingdom of God"—or was He mistaken, when He said, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you"?

² Sanskrit hrdayākāše, antarhhūtasya khe.



The "E" at Delphi

The essential procedures of initiatory rites, by which the death of an old man and the rebirth of a new man are effected, and the conditions of access to penetralia, are alike all over the world. Firmicus Maternus, De errore profanarum religionum (ch. xviii), dealing with these subjects, reminds us that there are right answers to the right questions (habent enim propria signa propria responsa), and that the right answer (proprium responsum) is made by the initiand (homo moriturus) precisely as the proof of his right to be admitted (ut possit admitti). A typical example of such a signum and of the wrong and right answers can be cited from the Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brāhmana, III.14.1-5. When the deceased reaches the Sundoor the question is asked, "Who art thou?" If he answers by his own or by a family name² he is dragged away by the factors of time. He should respond, "Who I am (is) the Light thou (art) (ko'ham asmi suvas tvam).

[This note was first published in the Review of Religion, VI (1941).-ED.]

¹ For Firmicus Maternus, see G. van der Leeuw, "The ∑YMBOAA in Firmicus Maternus," in Egyptian Religion, I (1633).

2 "Names are fetters" (AA 11.1.6). God has no personal or family name (BU III.8.8), nor ever becomes anyone (KU II.18), and it follows that there can be no return to God, no deificatio (for which, in Cusa's words, an ablatio omnis alteritatis et dinersitatis is indispensable) for anyone who still is someone. The initiate is name less, is not himself but Agni (KB vII.2.3), cf. Gal. 2:20, vivo autem jam non ego, sed Christus in me. God is a Sea, "nostra pace: ella è quel mare, al qual tutto si move" (Paradiso 111.85, 86); and as the names of the rivers are lost in the sea, so are our names and likenesses lost when we reach Him (A rv.198, Prasna Up. v1.5). "Also sich wandelt der tropfe in daz mer" (Eckhart, Pfeiffe: ed., p. 314), cf. Rünn, "that your drop may become the sea," and "None has knowledge of each who enters, that he is 'So-and-so'" (Odes xn and xv in Divan), and Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching XXXII, "To Tao all under heaven will come as streams flow into a great river or sea." ["He that finds (God) becomes lost (in Him): like a torrent he is absorbed in the Ocean" (Mathrawi v1.4052).] And so, according to the inscription cited by V. Magnien, Les Mystères d'Eleusis (Paris, 1938), p. 334. Pour mon nom, ne cherche Pas qui je suis: le rite mystique l'emmena en s'en allant vers la mer empourprée."

See also Cocmaraswamy, "Akimeanna: Self-Naughting" [in this vol.—pp.], and "Seayamumma: Janua Cecli" [in Vol. I of this edition—pp.].

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As such have I come to thee, the heavenly Light." He (Prajāpati, the Sun) replies, "Who thou art, that same am I; who I am, that same art thou. Enter in." Of numerous parallels that might be cited, perhaps the most striking is Rūmī's myth of the man who knocked at his friend's door and was asked "Who art thou?" He answered "I." "Begone," said his friend. After a year's separation and tribulation he came and knocked again, and to the same question replied, "Tis thou art at the door," and received the reply, "Since thou art I, come in, O myself."

Now there can be no question that the entrance to the temple of Apollo at Delphi was literally a Sundoor, a way into the house or temple of the Sun. The superscription, "Know thyself" (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) demands a knowledge of the answer to the question, "Who art thou?" and may be said, in the veiled language of the mysteries, to ask this very question. The injunction, as Plutarch says, is addressed by the God to all who approach him; and the famous "E" he takes to be their right answer. If now, as he also suggests, "E" stands for EI, and if we take from his various interpretations the meanings (1) the Sun (Apollo) and (2) "thou art,"

The words "Know thyself" are "enigmatic," it would appear, only because they can be taken to refer to a knowledge of either one of man's two souls or selves, the bodily and mortal or the incorporeal and immortal, so often speken of by Plato and in the Vedic philosophy. In Xenophon, Memorabilia 17.2.24 (cf. 111.9.6), Socrates speaks of "self-knowledge" as the knowledge of one's own powers and limitations [cf. Philo, De specialibus legibus 1.44 and Plutarch, Moralia 394c]; but this is in conversation with a conceited man who thinks he already knows himself "who" he is, "Euthydemus" by name. But in Aicihiades 1.130e ff., Socrates says that "he who orders, 'Know thyself,' bids us know the soul," and goes on to say that one who knows only what is of the body "knows the things that are his but not himself" (τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀλλλ' σὐχ αὐτοῦ); cf. BU 1.5.15.

As a parallel to these distinctions may be cited Plutarch's ridicule of these who cannot distinguish Apollo from the Sun (Moralia 3930, 4000), passages that echo Laws 8980, where Plato says that "that body of Helios is seen by all, his soul by none," and recall AV x.8.14: "Him (the Sun) all men see, not all know with the mind."

THE "E" AT DELPHI

and assume that both these meanings are contained in the one enigmatic syllable, we have the *signum*, "Who art thou (at the door)?" and the *responsum*, "The Sun thou art (am I)." It is certain that no other true answer could have been given by anyone "qualified to go in unto union with the Sun."

³ Mathnauī 1,3056-3065; cf. Song of Songs 1:8, "Si ignoras te, egredere."

⁴ That the inscription actually puts this question is explicit in Xenophon, Memorabilia 19.2.24, where Socrates asks Euthydemus, "Did you heed it, and try to consider who you were?" ("ortes eins).

⁵ Moralia 3840 ff. ("The 'E' at Delphi"). It is likewise assumed in Plato (Charmides 1640) that the injunction "Know thyself" is not "a piece of advice" but "the God's salutation (πρόσρησις) to those who enter," and that the words are spoken by the God to those who are entering his temple, "otherwise than as men speak" and "very enigmatically" (αἰνεγματωδέστερον); i.e., "non in doctis humanac sapientiae verbis, sed in doctrina Spiritus" (1 Cor. 2:13).

⁵ JUB 1.6.1.



THE MAJOR ESSAYS

