



Some Pāli Words

"For an accurate understanding of the original meaning of most of the technical terms of Buddhism, a knowledge of their Sanskrit form is indispensable."

Max Müller, SBE, Vol. 10, liv.¹

In the following article certain Pāli words are discussed, with particular reference to their treatment in the PTS Dictionary and to their translation in the now completed Nikāya volumes of the PTS. References are to the corresponding editions, by volume and page. The discussions of *Attha* (*artha*), *Rasa*, *Vyañjana*, and *Sahājanetta* amount to a first essay in the study of Buddhist rhetoric, and should be read together.

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¹To this I would add that Buddhist doctrine is very largely addressed directly to learned Brahman hearers, already familiar with almost all of the technical terms in their Sanskrit forms and with the Indian rather than the specifically Buddhist content of the words: it follows that the more we can approach the texts from the same point of view, the better we shall be able to grasp them. Buddhism presupposes the Brahmanical position, and for the most part is only in conflict with actual or supposed perversions of this position.

Insofar as Buddhism is an argument addressed to a learned audience, it is an argument that presupposes a knowledge of the Vedas and Upaniṣads; if we are not equipped with a similar knowledge, we can hardly expect to understand more of the Dhamma that is "deep, deep in meaning, transcendental and coupled with negation (*te ye suttantā gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokuttarā suññatā-paññānūtā*, A 1.72, S 1.267, etc.)" than is directly addressed to the "untaught many-folk" (*as-suta puthujjana*, "the man in the street").

In connection with the Buddhist commentaries, it may be remarked here that Buddhaghosa did not know Sanskrit or the history of Sanskrit terms, and in at least some cases interprets Pāli words in a fashion dependent on special usages in his own period; his treatment of *unhiṣu* is a case in point. Hence, what a Brahman auditor face-to-face with the Buddha may be supposed to have understood by a given term may often represent its real value in "original Buddhism" better than the interpretation of a later Buddhist commentator.

SOME PĀLI WORDS

aḥaniṣṭha. The Dictionary misses the full meaning of this word in its context, S v.237, J III.487, etc. It is not "not the smaller, i.e., the greatest, highest," but "amongst whom there is none younger (or lesser) than another." The Devas in question can only be the Maruts, of whom "None is come forth superior or inferior, or is waxen of medium glory" (*te ajy-esthā aḥaniṣṭhasa udbhido*² *madhyamāso mahasā vi vaurdhuḥ*, RV v.59.6), but "as brothers have waxen together," RV v.60.5. As Vāyu is metaphysically the "Cale of the Spirit," so are these Storm winds "Blasts of the Spirit." It will not be overlooked that in MU II.1 Bṛhadratha (of the Īkṣvā-kuvamśa, also the Buddha's), who is about to become an *ūtmajñuh* (Pāli *attūññū*) and *ḥṛtakṛtyah* (Pāli *ḥatakiccō, ḥatam ḥaranīyam*), is reputed a Marut, and *ibid.* VI.30, where he is actually *ḥṛtakṛtyah* ("all in act") and enters through the Sundoor into the Brahmaloḥa, he is no longer referred to by a personal or family name, but only as "Marut." The Buddhist phrase *aḥaniṣṭhāgāmin*, which occurs with *parinibbayan* in a list of designations of "Never-returns" in several contexts (D III.237, etc.), implies accordingly the attainment of the Brahmaloḥa and of companionship on equal terms with the highest Devas, the Blasts of the Spirit, amongst whom there is no distinction of superior or inferior or of early or late comers-in. Quite analogous to this is the position of the Comprehensor, of whom it is often said, e.g., S I.12, that he does not think of himself as "equal, or better than, or inferior to others."

G. P. Malalasekera, in his *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names* (London, 1937), cites from DA II.480, Buddhaghosa's explanation of *aḥaniṣṭhā devā*. In this citation, *sabbeh'eva* should be *sabbe h'eva*. Moreover, B. does not give two different explanations of the name, but only one: the *aḥaniṣṭha* deities are so called because none amongst them is junior in attainment and virtues.³

aḥāliḥo. In S I.11-13, a Yakkhī asks of the Buddha what is meant by the designation of the Dhamma as "intemporal" (*aḥāliḥo*), i.e., "eternal." The Buddha answers that it is only by the understanding of what-can-be-told that eternal life can be attained: "Those who heed only what can be told

²*Udbhidah* in the sense of MU VI.30, *sauram dvāram bhītvā = ūrdhvam. . . yo bhītvā śryamaṇḍalam*, again with reference to a Marut.

³The implications of *aḥaniṣṭha* are similar to those of the well-known Parable of the Vineyard, Matt. 20:1-16. Cf. "for all shall know Him, from the least even unto the greatest of them" (Jer. 31:34), and Augustine's discussion in *De spiritu et lit-teris* 41.

(*akḥḥeyyam*, i.e., the tale itself, *ākhyānam*), who rest on what can be told, who do not fully comprehend what can be told, these come under the yoke of Death: but one who fully comprehends what can be told, makes no debate about the teller (*akḥḥātāraṃ na maññati*, the reference of *akḥḥātāro* being to the Buddha himself, as in Sn 167), reflecting (*iii*) "It is not 'his'" (*tam hi tassa na hoti*), and so makes no mistake (*yena nam vajjā na tassa atthi*)." The Yakkhī does not understand and asks the Buddha "to explain in detail the meaning of what has been said in brief" (*sam-ḥhūtena bhūsitassu vitthāreṇa uttham jāneyyam*). The Buddha then more explicitly states the doctrine of *ākḥimcañña* by means of which he has already answered at one and the same time the Yakkhī's mistaken reference to the Buddha as "surrounded by other mighty Devatās" and her actual question as to the meaning of "timeless" (*akālika*): "He is contrarious (*vivadetha*, with reference to the preceding *vajjā tassa*) who thinks in terms of 'equal, better or worse,'" i.e., who thinks of the Buddha as "someone." Still she does not understand (as before). More explicitly the Buddha says, "He that has done with 'number,' *him* neither gods nor men, whether here below or there beyond, can reach" (*paḥāsi saṅkham . . . tam . . . nājjhagāmuṃ devā manussā idha vā huram vā*). At last she understands the Buddha's meaning (*attham*): "timeless" can only apply to a doctrine that has not been taught by "some one"; the *dhamma* is *akālika* as being, not the "dated" "view" of So-and-so (whether man or personal *ceity* is irrelevant), but Truth itself. Neither the Buddha nor the Dhamma is "in time," but only their manifestations, which must not be taken absolutely, but must be penetrated and seen through. The designation of Dhamma as "timeless" is the Buddhist form of the well-known Indian doctrine of the "eternity of the Veda," for which there are good Christian equivalents, e.g., St. Augustine, *De lib. arb.* 1.6, *Lex, quae summa ratio nominatur, non potest cuiquam intelligenti non incommutabilis aeternaque videri*; *Sum. Theol.* 1-11.91.1, *divina ratio nihil concipit ex tempore*, etc. "Dhamma" could hardly be rendered in Latin better than by *Lex, quae summa ratio nominatur . . . aeterna . . . divina ratio*. The modern scholar's objection to the doctrine of the eternity of the Word, Law, or Dhamma is based on a misunderstanding of what is meant; as remarked by St. Thomas Aquinas, *ibid.*, "the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life (which corresponds to the *vidyā* implied in "Jātavedas" and to "Providence") are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads." The doctrine of the eternity of the *summa ratio* itself is the same as the

Platonic doctrine of ideas; that of its temporal promulgation corresponding to the appearance of the shadows on the wall of the cave. In the Buddhist texts in the same way we find the Dhamma described in one breath as *sandīṭṭhiko*, manifest, and *akālika*, not in time. For, to borrow the words of Augustine, "This wisdom is not made; but it is at this present, as it hath ever been, and so shall ever be" (*Confessions* 1x.10). There are many other texts in which the Buddha identifies himself, the Dhamma, and Brahma; the Dhamma is accordingly temporal and in-temporal, just as the Brahman, single essence with two natures, is *kāla* and *akāla* (MU vi.15, etc.), "time and timeless," and therewith also *sakāla* and *akāla*, "with and without parts." Otherwise expressed, Brahman is on the one hand the audible *brahman* = *mantram*, and on the other silent: *śabda* and *aśabda*, "vocal and silent."

akḥiriyavādu. Just as in Brahmanism (e.g., TB III.12.9.7-8; JUB 1.5.1 2; CU VIII.4.4; BU IV.2.23; KU II.1.4; Kauṣ. Up. 1.4; MU VI.18, 35; BG VI.15, etc.) and in Christianity (I John 3:9; II Cor. 3:17; Gal. v.18; *Sum. Theol.* 1-11.93.6 ad 1 and II.11.130.2), ethical values are in the last analysis to be rejected and all responsibility ceases, so in Pāli Buddhism (M 1.135, 160; M II.36-39; Dh 39, 267, 412; Sn 715, etc.); it follows, indeed, as a matter of course that when the whole burden of *ḥamma* (the operation of mediate causes, or "fate") is laid down forever, the relative factors of this burden (what ought to have been done and was not done, and what ought not to have been done but was done) are likewise discarded; this abandonment of ethical values inevitably accompanying the abandonment of the psycho-physical "self" (Pāli *appātumo*, *pāpa attā*, *anattā*), an abandonment that is styled in Brahmanism "self-sacrifice" or "self-conquest" (*ātma yajña*, *ātma-jaya*), in Christianity "self-annihilation" (Eckhart's "the soul must put itself to death," Christ's "hating one's own soul," and St. Paul's "dividing asunder of soul from spirit"), in Buddhism "self-conquest" (*atta jaya*), "self-dompting" (*atta-damatha*), "self allaying" (*attasamatha*), "self-extinction" (*atta-parinibbāpana*), or more explicitly and technically, the attainment of the "station of not being anyone" (*ākḥimcaññāyatana*).

It will be seen that the ultimate negation of all responsibility is a purely metaphysical and contemplative position: it can have no applicable meaning for anyone who still is "someone," still "active" or, in other words, still "alive." To argue that "I," So-and-so, am not a responsible agent would be a ridiculous confusion of thought: it is only the I that is *not*

a So-and-so that is free of the burden of responsibility, only one born of God, and in the spirit, that cannot sin. To pretend that this can apply to "me" (So-and-so) is to interpret the doctrine of filiation and theosis in the Satanic sense of the paranoiac. There have nevertheless been some modern scholars who have pretended to see in the "That art thou" of the Upaniṣads just such a deification as this; and have been "shocked" accordingly: and some others, the Amaurians for example, who were charged with maintaining that "as every human act is the act of God, there is no distinction between good and evil, and hence Nature should not be refused anything."⁴ We are concerned here only with the latter sort of heretics, those whose heresy or "false view" (*micchā diṭṭhi*) is termed in Pāli Buddhism *akiriya-vāda*, the proposition viz. that inasmuch as deeds are done without a doer,⁵ it does not matter what "I" do, whether good or evil (D 1.53): as against this position, the Buddha proclaims himself a *kiriyavādī*, and an *akiriya-vādī* inasmuch as he teaches both what ought-to-be-done and ought-not-to-be-done (Vin 1.233 ff., and A 1.62); but a *kiriyavādī* only in the sense of "one who teaches that there is an ought-to-be-done" in opposition to the *akiriya-vādī*, whose teaching is that there is no "ought-to-be-done" (D 1.115); these distinctions depending on a word division *akiriya-vādī* (teacher of an ought-not-to-be-done) and *a-kiriya-vādī* (not the teacher of an ought to be done).⁶

In A 11.222, Gotama is accused of *a-kiriya-vāda*, the accuser maintaining that he "teaches that there is no ought-to-be-done with respect to any acts" (*sabbakammānam akiriyaṃ paññāpeti*), and it is of interest that in the course of the refutation the Buddha points out that *akiriya* (the word might be rendered by "laissez-faire" in this context) amounts to an an-

⁴ Maurice de Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, 3rd ed. (London, 1935), p. 235.

⁵ See *ahamkāra*.

⁶ There are actually three different ways in which the *akiriya-vādī* claims irresponsibility (cf. J v.228). In A 1.173, the translation of *akiriya* by "inaction" is mistaken; for inaction we should require *akamma* corresponding to *akarma* in BG 14.16. As a false "view," *akiriya* means "no ought to be done": as a "right view," that there is "an ought not to be done." The three grounds on which an irresponsibility is based are (1) fatalism, actions being the effect of past acts over which we have no control, (2) actions are not our acts but those of the Lord (*issara*), and (3) actions are uncaused and unmotivated (*ahetu, appaccaya*): as against all these the Buddha maintains that "this should be done, should not be done (*idaṃ vā karaṇīyaṃ idaṃ vā akaraṇīyaṃ*)," and it is in this sense also that he calls himself both *kiriyavādī* and *akiriya-vādī*, as above.

nihilation of the world (*ucchedam . . . lokassa*), "of which the very subsistence consists in the verity, i.e., causal efficacy, of action" (*kamma-saccā*, to be understood as in A 11.197-98 with respect to any bodily, vocal, or mental activity, *kāya, vācī-* and *mano-samārambha*), an argument reminiscent of BG 11.8, *śarīra-yātrāpi ca te na prasidhyed akarmaṇaḥ* and 11.24, *utsīdeyur ime lokā na kuryānt karma ced aham*.⁷ It is indeed for this very reason that the Buddha sets the Wheel in motion in response to the desire of all the Devas, voiced by Brahmā, who exclaims that otherwise "the world is lost!" *nassati . . . , vinassati* (J 1.81, S 1.136 ff., M 1.168, etc.). It is expressly stated too that the Buddha "practices what he preaches" (*yathāvādī tathākārī*, A 11.24, reminiscent of RV 14.33.6, *satyaṃ ācur nara eva hi cakruḥ*, and IX.113.5, *satya-vadam-t-satya-karman*): it is as the Arhat, *passim*, that he has "done what was to be done"⁸ (*katā-kicco, katham karaṇīyam*, corresponding to the Brahmanical *kyatakriyah*).⁹

We can see now easily, then, how it can be that while in Ud 70 the notion that "I am the doer" is scouted (see *ahamkāra*), in Ud 45 the man "who even when he acts yet says 'I am not the agent'" (*yo cāpi katvā na karomīti cāha*) is likewise condemned. As in Christian doctrine, the moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, but only dispositively, while they do belong to the active life essentially.

attā. (1) *Attā* can be equated with *kāya* only in the reflexive sense. For example, in D 1.34, *añño attā dibbo rūpī manomayo* corresponds to D 1.77, *aññaṃ kāyaṃ . . . rūpiṃ manomayaṃ* (also in M 11.17). This does not imply that *attā* can be translated by "body," meaning simply the flesh: on the contrary, "body" is used to mean the whole psycho-physical personality, just as in English we speak of "somebody," or as in "gin a body meet a body," and also make use of "soul" in the same way in such

⁷ The Buddha's doctrine was evidently as much misunderstood or wrongly reported by some in his own day, as it has been misunderstood by some modern scholars (notably those who saw in *nibbāna* "annihilation"). In M 1.149, for example, we find him accused of teaching the "cutting off, destruction and becoming naught of existent entities (*sato-satassa ucchedam vināsam vibhavam*)."⁸ He protests that the accusation is "naughtily, vainly, falsely made and contrary to what is fact (*asatā tucchā musā abhūtena*)," for "this is just what I do not teach."

⁸ Not simply, of course, in the sense of "duty done," but that of "having done what was to be done," i.e., "having reduced all potentiality to act" and being therefore "all in act."

⁹ Note the dramatic distinction of *kyatakriyah*, "doer of evil," "worker of witchcraft," in AV 14.17.4.

expressions as "not a soul was to be seen." *Añño attā* and *añño kāyo* are much rather what we mean by "another man," a "new being," than either "spirit" or "body" in the stricter sense of these words. *Kāya* is found again in the general sense of "person" (*quisque*) in M 1.206, where three young men are leading the higher life in one company: one of them says "I live in obedience to the will of these venerable (comrades), surrendering my private will (*sakam cittam*); we, Sir, are many men (*nānū . . . kāyā*, several 'bodies'), but most assuredly one will" (*ekam cittam*). In A 1.168 (cf. II.68, D III.61) we find both *attā* and (instead of *kāya*) *sarira* employed in the same sense of *quis* or *quisque* = *kaścit*: the objection is raised that this is the perfecting of only one person (*ekam attānam . . . parinibbāpeti*), that this is an acquisition of merit affecting only "somebody" (*ekasārīrikam puññāpatipadam; patipanno hoti*); the Buddha shows that the monk's abandonment of the world affects not only himself, but is "everybody-ish" (*anekasārīrikā*).

The Dictionary notes the meaning *quis* or *quisque* only s.v. *tuma* (= *attā* = Skr. *tman* = *ātman*).

(2) One of the most remarkable examples of what C.A.R. Rhys Davids would call a "left in" in late Pāli literature occurs in J VI.252, where *kāyo te ratha-sāññāto . . . attā va sārathi* corresponds to KU III.3, *ātmānam rathinam viddhi, sariram ratham eva tu*. The text is of utmost importance in connection with the "Chariot Parable" elsewhere, notably in S 1.135 and Mil xxvi ff.¹⁰ In the latter passage, so well known, it is shown that just as there is no "chariot" apart from the sum of the component parts to which the name of "chariot" is conventionally given, so there is no "Nāgasena" apart from the psycho-physical components of the variable phenomenon to which the name of "Nāgasena" is conventionally given; the psycho-physical composite is *anattā*, here and throughout our texts; there is nothing but a phenomenon (*rūpa*) to which a name (*nāma*) can be given.

Observe now, that just as the repeated analyses of the psycho-physical constitution of the so-called individual end invariably with the words

¹⁰ We do not overlook that Milinda himself is referred to as the rider, but this is merely to introduce the subject of the parable. If Nāgasena had gone on to apply the parable not only to himself but also to Milinda, it is the psycho-physical personality by name "Milinda" that would have been analyzed, and Nāgasena might well have said to him, *na vo so attā*, "all that is not your essence," still without touching upon the nature of an essence thus defined by elimination, that spiritual essence to which we here, in accordance with J VI.252, refer to as the "rider" or "charioteer."

na me so attā, "that is not my 'self,' or 'spiritual essence,'" so Nāgasena shows that in all that can be named, whether "chariot" or "Nāgasena," no self-subsistent being or persistent substance can be found. Nāgasena no more denies that there may be a charioteer distinct from the chariot, or a principle distinct from all that can be called "Nāgasena," than the words *na me so attā* can be made to mean "there is no *attā*." He leaves out the rider altogether, only because his immediate purpose, like the Buddha's in so many texts, is to break down the belief in a "self" that is either physical or psychic. He has nothing to say, therefore, about a rider to whom no name can be given, that other "self" (*ātman*) of KU II.18 that "hath never become anyone" (*na babbhūva kaścit*), a self that can only be defined by the elimination of all that it is not, but which is assuredly the substance of all those Buddhist saints who, like the Buddha himself, had realized that all phenomena are *anattā*, and had attained to the "Station of Not-being-Anyone" (*ākāṅkacāññāyatana*). And we can well say with Ud 80 that "if there were not this Unborn, Unbecome, Non-effected, Incomposite, there would be no way to escape from this world of birth, becoming, effecting, and composition."

If the Buddha himself is the "most luminous and foremost charioteer" (*sārathi*, Sn 83), if Dhamma is the charioteer (S 1.33), *Attā* the charioteer (J VI.252), and the chariot conversely "enspirited" (*attaniya*,¹¹ S v.6), all these are equivalent formulae: the Buddha is the Spirit, and it is only when He holds the reins, only when the Great Self (*mahattā*, A 1.249) is in control, that the contemplative therewith "drives off and away from this world" in what is called the Brahma-vehicle or Dhamma-vehicle (S v.6).¹²

attha (= *arthu*). In A 1.151, the qualifications of the teacher and the hearer of Dhamma (the Doctrine as taught, *desitam*, *akḅhātā*, etc.) are that each separately and both together must be able to receive (*paṭi-*

¹¹ Certainly not here with any pejorative value! In the many contexts in which *attā* and *attaniya*, "self and self-ish" or "essence and essential" are denied (e.g., M 1.297), the reference is to the composite vehicle itself, the soul-and-body that are "not my very-Self (*na me so attā*)" but the pseudo- or "petty self" (*appānāma*, A 1.249). All our texts maintain that there is no entity of the chariot itself, but only the name and the appearance thereof; none of them affirms that there is no rider.

In S v.6, Woodward's rendering of *attaniyam bhūtam* as "built by self" betrays the meaning: *attaniyam* is "enspirited," *bhūtam* is *geworden*; it is in a vehicle of which *attā* is in control that the contemplatives "drive away."

¹² *Brahmayānam anutaram niyyanti dhira lokamhā.*

samvedeti)¹³ both the *attha* and the *dhamma*.¹⁴ Woodward [translator of *Anguttara Nikāya* in the PTS edition] renders "must be able to penetrate both the letter and the spirit thereof" and adds in a footnote that "*Attha* is the primary, or surface meaning; *dhamma* the applied meaning."¹⁵ He does not realize that his word "hereof" implies that there is a *dhamma* of a *dhamma*. There can be no doubt that what is intended is "must be able to receive both the application and the substance" of the teaching.

In the section immediately following, it is said that the same qualifications are prerequisite if the discourse (*kaṭṭhā*) is to be effective (*pavattanī*, rendered by Woodward "profitable" here and in the similar context A 1.125), i.e., are to *move* the hearer so that action results.

Before going further, let us observe that Skr. *artha* is the purpose, reason, use, value, application, and function, as well as the meaning, of whatever it may be that is referred to:¹⁶ and that whereas in "primitive" thought function and meaning coincide, we who no longer think in terms of adequate symbols are unable to deal with function and meaning by a single act of the mind. This has a marked effect upon our theories of art,

¹³ In *paṭisaṃvedeti*, *prati* is *secundum* and *sam* corresponds to *co* (—*cum*) in *cognoscere: pratisamvid* is *cognoscere secundum rem*. An *adaequatio rei et intellectus* is implied.

¹⁴ Cf. Sn, prose preceding verse 1124, where we find that to every question an answer can be given in terms of *attha* or of *dhamma* accordingly. Dh 362, 363, *attham dhammam ca dipeti . . . tam āku bhikkhūm*. Cf. M 1.37, A. v.329, etc., *attha-veda* and *dhamma-veda*, as knowledge of or devotion to both *attha* and *dhamma*, "the law and the prophets."

¹⁵ "Letter and spirit" is used in two senses, neither of which is that of "surface meaning and applied meaning." The two senses are (1) the most familiar, and that was developed by Origen (*De principiis*, Bk. 4, cc. 8–20), viz. that the literal meaning is no more than the symbol of the intended meaning, a figure of speech to be interpreted, as for example when it is said that of *samuddu* the *adhivacanam* is *nibhāna*; and (2) that emphasized by St. Augustine in *De spiritu et littera*, in which "letter" refers to the moral law; this is the "letter that kills" inasmuch as it is by this law that the offender is condemned; while, on the other hand, the "spirit" is the Holy Ghost at work within the soul, imparting the knowledge of God by which those who are dead unto sin but live in Christ are liberated from the Law. *Attha* and *dhamma* could be rendered by "letter and spirit" in Augustine's sense, *attha* being the "applied meaning" and *dhamma* the "ultimate meaning": the distinction is that of *ḥarṃakāṇḍa* from *jñānakāṇḍa*, and it may be in this sense that the PTS Dictionary rightly distinguishes, s.v. *Veda*, *attha* from *dhamma* as the letter from the spirit of the Buddha's teaching, though Woodward's note, which gives for *dhamma* the meaning that belongs to *attha*, shows that he is *not* using "letter and spirit" in their original, Pauline sense.

¹⁶ For example, in S 1.34 (also Vin 11.147) *sampassam attham attano* is rendered "seeing his own good," but could also be translated "seeing the meaning of 'self (attā).'"

whether literary or plastic. It must be realized that from the Indian, as from the Scholastic point of view, it cannot be said that the meaning of a phrase has been conveyed otherwise than to the extent that the hearer acts upon what he is supposed to have understood.¹⁷ In other words, the Dhamma cannot be understood apart from its application.

In A 11.7 we find accordingly that the man who has learnt but little understands either the application (*attha*) or the substance of the Law (*dhamma*), and so by his audition (*sutena*) is "unborn" (*unuppanno*, an expression that vividly recalls JUB III.14.8, "Verily is a man unborn insofar as he does not sacrifice"). Woodward's version is "knows not the letter (*attham*); knows not the meaning (*dhammam*)," the very reverse of what is intended. In Ud 70, however, where we have "The blind, the unseeing, know neither the meaning nor what is not the meaning (*attham, anattham*, i.e., how to apply and how not to apply), nor the text itself nor what is not the text" (*dhammam, adhammam*, i.e., do not know when the doctrine has been correctly and when incorrectly stated), Woodward's version "know not the profitable (*attham*) . . . know not *dhamma*" is much nearer the mark. In Ud 6, "He is pure, he is a Brahman, in whom are Truth and Doctrine (*saccam ca dhammo ca*)," *saccam* (= *satyam*) takes the place of *attham*, and amounts to *vera sententia*.

The foregoing interpretations of *attha* and *dhamma* are confirmed by two Jātaka texts. In J VI.389 we find the Bodhisattva instructing a king, Cowell and Rouse translating *attham ca dhammam ca anusāsati* by "used to instruct the king in things temporal and spiritual";¹⁸ the reference is unmistakably to Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstra, a meaning quite in agreement with the relative values found for *attha* and *dhamma* above. Finally we have J VI.251–52, where the king requests the Bodhisattva to teach him *attham ca dhammam ca*, "policy and doctrine" (Cowell and Rouse misrender by "the sacred text and its meaning," reversing the sense of the terms). The Bodhisattva accordingly teaches him how to act; he is to protect Brāhmanas and Samanas; to feed the hungry; he should not put to labor the aged

¹⁷ It is for this reason that the traditional Indian scholar feels that the deliberately objective and detached methods of modern scholarship (adopted, as Jung has said, "partly because of the *misérable vanité des savants* which fears and rejects with horror any sign of living sympathy, and partly because an understanding that reaches the feelings might allow contact with the foreign spirit to become a serious experience") can never lead to more than a superficial grasp of any doctrine. It is only when we ourselves participate in the quest and are hunters ourselves that we can understand the terms of vengery, not as disinterested lookers-on.

¹⁸ The same words occur in J VI.131, where they are rightly translated in the same way.

man, or ox, or horse, but give to each their due, since they served him when they were strong; in short, he is to avoid unrighteousness and follow righteousness. Then "the Great Person, having discoursed to him concerning liberality and morals (*dāna* and *sīla*) . . . proceeded to instruct him in the Law (*dhamma*) by means of the parable of the chariot that grants all wishes." This parable of the chariot begins, "Thy body is called the chariot," and concludes "The Spirit is the charioteer" (*kāyo te ratha-saññātō . . . attā va sārathī*, almost verbally identical with KU III.3; see above, s.v. *attā* [2]). We have here an actual example of what was implied by *attha* and what by *dhamma*.¹⁹

The foregoing analysis will be essential to the discussions of *rasa* and *vyāñjana* below; see also *sahajunetia*.

attham (= *asta*). Pāli *attha* is not only Skr. *artha*, meaning, purpose, etc. (see *vyāñjana*), but sometimes Skr. *astam*, "home." In this sense the word occurs in Sn 1074-76: the Muni, gone out as a flame is blown out by the wind, and released from denomination and embodiment, "goes home (*attham paletī*)"²⁰ and is not reborn (*na upeti saṅkham*, see *saṅkha*); it is asked, In the case of one thus "gone home" (*attham gato*), whether or not he "is" and whether he is forever well; the answer being that "for one 'gone home' there is no gauge, there is nothing by which he can be referred to,"²¹ when all qualities have been swept up, all wordways²² too are swept up." The expression "gone home" derives from

¹⁹ It need hardly be emphasized that in the present article we are dealing entirely with *attha* as contrasted with *dhamma* (or *vyāñjana*), not with *attha* in the very frequent and simple sense of "meaning" for which the example of A v.194, etc., "Here in the world, it is by means of a parable that such men as are of ready wit understand the meaning of what has been said (*upamāyam idhekacce viññū purisā bhāsitassa attham ajānantī*)" will suffice.

²⁰ Max Müller's version in SBE is very defective and far too free. To have "gone home" in this analogical sense is certainly to have "disappeared" from the field of objective perception, whether human or angelic, but we are not therefore justified in translating *attham gato* by "disappeared": it is always important to retain the literal meaning on which all other meanings depend. Nor is Max Müller's alternative, "Has he disappeared, or does he not exist?" the right one: the alternatives are posed with respect to one who *has* "gone home" (*attham-gato, so . . .*), about which "gone home" no question arises, the only question being as to what this "gone home" implies.

²¹ As stated more fully in D XI.68, a *locus classicus*.

²² *Vādapathā*: he has therefore entered into the silence of the unspoken word, *dharma* defined as in *Lalitā Vistara*, text p. 423, "apart from any voice or sound of wordway, though the efficient cause of the voices of all beings (*sarva-ruta-ghoṣa vākpathāmitam . . . sarvasarva-ruta-racanam*)." "Nothing true can be said" of the

Brahmanical sources, where the Gate of the Spirit, the "One Whole: Godhood" is the "home" to which the Sun himself and all separated essences return; for references see "*Svayamātrṇṇā*: Janua Coeli," note 28 [in Vol. I of this edition—ED.].

anātam. The printed text of Ud 80 reads *duddassam anātam nāma, na hi saccam sudassanam*, but what is admittedly the best MS. (A), and also at least one commentary, read *anātam* for *anātam*, and though the commentator understands by *anātam* "unbent," hence "*nibbāna*" (cf. *Kindred Sayings*, I, 236, note 2) and Woodward's rendering "infinite," it is almost certain that the meaning of the whole is, "It is hard to discern what's false, nor easy to discern what's true," and that *anātam* here represents *anṛtam*, the regular antithesis of *satyam* in Sanskrit contexts. The reading *anātam* can be accounted for in two ways, either as an error on the part of the scribe, unfamiliar with the rare word *anātam* (not in PTS Dictionary, nor can I cite it elsewhere than as above)²³ or less probably by the fact that what is *anātam* is also *anātam* = *anṛtam*, as could easily be shown in sense from Pāli sources, e.g., A I.149, where of man's two selves, the "fair" (*kalyāṇa*) is true (*saccam*), the "foul" (*pāpā*) false (*musā*), M I.135, where the psycho-physical ego is "unreal" (*asat*), and similarly Dh 368; or literally from Brahmanical sources, particularly VS 15 and ŚB I.9.3.23, cf. AB VII.24, and ŚB III.9.4.2 ("The Devas are the truth and men untruth").

ahamkāra. Ud 70, "Those who give ear to the notion 'I am the doer' (*ahamkāra*), or are captivated by the notion 'Another is the doer' (*paramkāra*), do not understand this matter, they have not seen the point": in A III.337, *attakāra* replaces *ahamkāra* and means the notion that "a self, or oneself, is the doer"; in S II.252 and parallel passages, it is a question of realizing that "there is no 'I' that does, no 'mine' that is the doer, no latent 'I am' (*ahamkāra-mamamkāra-[asmi-]mānānusayā na honti*),"

dharma *kāya*, but only of *sambhogakāya* or *nirmānakāya*. In the same way the *dhamma* is *akālika*, "not *ex tempore*," but like the *akāla* Brahman of MU VI.15, "without parts," and like the *amūrta* Brahman of BU II.3.1, "immortal."

²³ The contrast of true and false in Pāli is usually *saccam musam*, as in A II.25, an interesting context in which the relativity of "true and false," in the factual sense, is emphasized; the Tathāgata is not circumscribed by these systematic fences (*samvutesu = samvuttesu*); Buddhas are not interested in "facts." In this connection it may be observed that "fact" and "fiction" are both equally what we "make of" our "experience."

whether subjective or objective. The sense makes it clear that *ahamkāra* is really a “Karmadhāraya” compound, and not literally the “ego-factor” or “I-maker,” but the notion that “I am the doer.” Nor can there be much doubt that the same applies in Brahmanical contexts where, just as in many other traditions, the notion that “I am the doer” (*kartāham iti*, BG III.27, where it is inasmuch as he so thinks that the self of the man is “deluded by *ahamkāra*”) is scouted, cf. BG V.8, JUB 15.2, etc. It may be observed that a verification of “not being the doer” can only be made by one who has attained the “station of not being anyone” (*ākṣipcaññāyatanaṃ*). This “I am not the doer” is a metaphysical position, not a moral one, and must not be confused with the *akīriyavāda* heresy, that of the man who in Ud 45 “even whilst acting says that ‘It is not I that am agent’ (*yo c’āpi kartaṃ na korom’iti c’aha*),” and as in D 153 that it is therefore a matter of indifference whether one does good or evil: so long as “I am who I am,” “this man,” I cannot lay down the burden of my responsibility so easily, but only at the end of the road, at world’s end, and as one “born of God,” and no longer “myself,” am I “not under the law” (Gal. 5:18).

ahetuvāda. A *micchā ditṭhi*, in A II.31, S III.73, M III.73, grouped with *akīriyavāda* and *natthikavāda*. Also in M I.408; and synonymous with *ahetukavāda* in S III.210. The denial of causality, i.e., *kamma* as the operation of mediate causes, cf. A I.173 ff., *pubbe katahetu* “by the effect of what was formerly done,” is a denial of the very core of Buddhist doctrine expressed in the so-called confession *ye dharmā hetupabhavā . . .*, Vin I.405, and in countless inscriptions; a refusal to see things *yathā-bhūtam*, i.e., as effects only. The opposite (*hetuvāda* in M I.409 = *kammavāda* in A I.187), the Buddha is a “causalist” (*kammavādi*), that is to say a “determinist” or “fatalist” (in the Christian sense, where “fate lies in the created causes themselves” and “is the very disposition or series, i.e., order, of second causes,” *Sum. Theol.* I.116.2; cf. Boethius, *De consolacione philosophiae* v.6), as regards all things that are *anatta*, i.e., the psycho-physical self composite of the five *khandhas*. It is traditional doctrine that “nothing in the world happens by chance” (Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* LXXXIII.34, approved by St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I.116.1 ad 2); it is only the little-witted (*alpa-buddhayah*) who maintain that the world is not produced in any ordered sequence (*a paraspara-bhūtam*, opposite of *yathā-bhūtam*), but is as it is only as the result of an exercise of free will (*kim anyat kāmuhaitukam*), and this view is tantamount to a destruction of the world

(*kṣayāya jagataḥ*, BG XVI.9). It may be pointed out that it is only on the basis of a world order (*κόσμος, rta*) that the notions of an omniscience and omniscient “Providence” (*prajñā* as in Ait. Up. v.3, and *passim*) are intelligible; if “nothing happens by chance” the *possibility* of a Providence necessarily follows. In other words, it is only from the *hetuvāda*, *kammavāda* point of view that we can understand AĀ II.3.2, where the *avijñāna paśuvah* (= Buddhist *puthujjana*) are said to “become such as they are, they verily are born in accordance with Providence” (*etāvanti bhavanti, yatha prajñam hi bhavanti*); BU IV.4.2, where the *savijñānam* (*saṅgāram*) is “taken hold of by knowledge and works, and antecedent Providence” (*taṃ vidya-karmaṇi samanvārabhete, pūrva-prajñā ca*); and BG XVIII.14, where beyond the four mediate causes (*hetu*) of whatever it may be that a man undertakes there is reckoned as a fifth the “Divine” (*daivyaṃ*, sc. *prajñānam*, and admirably rendered by Barnett as “Providence”). Our principal object in this section has been to bring out the consistency and interdependence of the Buddhist doctrines of *kamma* on the one hand and *sabbāññā* on the other.

ākṣipā. In S II.281, *ākṣipāni paccāḥṣitāni cīvarāni*, the most correct translation would be, I think, “garments of material *calendered* on both sides.”

āsivisa. “Derivation uncertain” according to the PTS Dictionary. In any case, the occurrence of the word is an interesting survival, as is that of *ahi*, both words occurring together in the *Mahāvagga*, Vin I.24–25, where the *ahi-nāga* overcome by the Buddha in the Jatila fire-temple is described as *nāgarājā iddhimā āsiviso ghoraviso . . . makḍḍham asahamāno*. The word occurs in AB VI.1, where the *sarparṣi* and *mantrakṛt Arbuda* is an *āsivisaḥ*, “basilisk”; and in Avestan as *azhi-visha* in Azhi-vishapa. In S IV.172, the *āsivisā* are the four great families of snakes, and represent the Four Great Elements. *Visha* is certainly “poison”; *āsi* is probably Skr. *āśi* or *āśis* (perhaps from *āśi* to “sharpen”), in the sense of “fang.” *Āsivisa* would then mean “poison fanged,” either as adjective qualifying *ahi*, or as noun = snake.

itthattā. The expression *nāparam itthattāya*, constantly concluding the series *kāṇhu jāti, vusitāṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kamaṃ karamāyāṃ* descriptive of the Arahāt, is usually rendered either by “after this present world there is no beyond” or “there is no hereafter for him.” These versions do not

convey the meaning and, on the contrary, state what is precisely the *natthika* heresy, which consists in the denial of a beyond (see *natthika*). The meaning is that "there is no more such and suchness for him henceforth": it is not that there is "no beyond," but that it is improper (*akālam*) to make any affirmation or denial about the state of the Arahāt hereafter, it may not even be said that he does not see or know (D II.68)²⁴; his mode is modeless, we cannot say what he is because he is not any *what*. Far better is the rendering of *nāparam itthattāya* in M I.184 by "there is no more of what I have been"; this, which is true of every death and rebirth, is preeminently true of the thoroughly dead, *parinibbuto*.

Itthattā may be noted in A II.82, with reference to change of occupation: "Dying thence, he is born to this" (*tato cuto itthattam āgacchati*): in the same way D III.126, with reference to the Buddha's descent from the Tusita heaven, "dying thence he entered into this condition of things (*tato cuto itthattam āgato*): *itthatta* as "thisness" being the finite aspect of *tathatta* "thatness," i.e., *nibbāna*; just as one "comes to *this*" state of affairs, so one "goes on one's way to *that*" (*tathattāya paṭipajjati*, D I.175 and S II.199).

Itthatta is thus synonymous with *bhavābhava* (becoming in a given way, or not becoming in a given way), but not with *bhavam ca vibhavam ca* (becoming and not becoming, i.e., existence and nonexistence). Thus in A II.10, *iti-bhavābhava . . . tanhā* (thirst for becoming thus, or not becoming so)²⁵ is a hindrance, the variant *ittha-bhavaññāthābhavam = saṃsāra* occurring in the verses: in Sn 752 it is precisely from this "being in this way or not being in some other way" that the nonreturner is unloosed (*nissito . . . ittha-bhavaññāthābhavam saṃsāram nātivattati*). *Itthatta* is then the condition characteristic of the world, of being in some given way and not being in some other way: one could not wish for a better definition of "things as they are in themselves."

utthāna. Literally "uprising." In M I.354, where it is late at night and the Buddha lies down to sleep in the lion-posture, we have *utthānasaññam*

²⁴ In A I.128, the same craving is called "unseemly" (*na-paṭirūpam*, literally "informal," i.e., ugly).

²⁵ For example, being warm, or not being cold. *Abhava* does not imply any privation of existence but, like *saṃkhāya-vimāto*, implies a not being in any determined manner. *Vibhava* (in Pāli) is "privation of existence," but in Sanskrit "omnipresence"; *vibhū* corresponding to *vikrama*, cf. also *vibhūti* as "power." The two meanings are by no means so contrary as might appear; since only that which is not any thing amongst others can be omnipresent.

manasikarituā, to be rendered by some such phrase as "intent upon the thought of rising (in the morning)." Where the same phrase occurs in Ud 84, the Buddha has lain down in the same posture on his death bed. In both cases he is fully conscious and aware. In both cases, insofar as he is "some one" by personal and family name, there is a death of one consciousness and the arising of another, in accordance with S I.135 (cited, s.v. *natthika*), yet there is this difference that in our second case, the "uprising" which the Buddha expects is not to be in the body; and this leads us to call attention to the parallel use of *utthana* in PB xxv.10.19-21, where it means the cessation of a ritual operation and primarily that cessation which is in order when the sacrificers on their countercurrent (see *samudda*) journey have reached their goal. Similarly in ŚB IV.6.9.7, *sattrotthāna*. Here, of course, *utthāna* as a "standing up" contrasts with *sattra* as sacrificial "session." Now life itself is traditionally a sacrificial session (CU III.17). It is from this session that the Buddha looks forward to a "rising"; he is *not* expecting to "get up again" in the temporal and common sense of the words, but to leave the bodily operation forever. He will, in fact, enjoy the "final reward" (*utthāna-phalam*) of the *ugghaṭṭānānu*; *utthāna* in this context (A XI.135) corresponding very closely to the *utthāna* of PB cited above.

udda. The PTS Dictionary expresses doubt whether *udda* may not be "beaver" rather than "otter." "Otter" is presumably the etymological equivalent. That *udda* is "otter" is placed beyond doubt by the *Dabbhapuppha Jātaka*, where *uddā* catch and eat fish; and by the Bhārhut relief (Alexander Cunningham, *The Stūpa of Bharhut*, London, 1879, pl. 46, fig. 2), inscribed Uda Jātaka, in which two animals, more like otters than beavers, are represented. Beavers are strict vegetarians and neither catch nor eat fish.

Uddāraka in J V.416 is also "otter."

uyyoga. Dh 235-237 is addressed to the man at death's door, for whom the messengers of Yama have come, and who is now come near to Yama. The words "Thou standest at the door of disjunction (*uyyoga-mukhe*), nor hast thou any provisions-for-the-way (*paṭheyyam*, 'fare') are surely reminiscent of KU II.9, where Naciketas stands at Death's (Mṛtyu, Yama) door unfeared. *Uyyoga* (*udyoga*) is primarily and literally any severance of connections such as takes place at a departure, and so implies departure: thus in DhA XI.252, *uyyogesi* is simply "departed" (similarly *udyuj* in ŚB

iv.1.57, and the "Udyoga" Parvan of Mōh); although more specifically, when it is a question of death, *ud̥yoga* is the opposite of that *samyoga* (BG xiii.26) by which the Knower of the Field and the Field itself are connected during life. *Udyuga* in AV v.22.11 may be simply "mortal sickness" in the same sense of "departure";²⁶ *ud̥yuje* in AV vi.70.2, obscure to Whitney, is simply "walks off with," the sense in full being "as the elephant walks away with its mate, keeping close step (*padena padam ud̥yuje*)," or quite literally, "separating (his) foot with her (*hastinyāh*) foot," i.e., striding side by side: *ud̥yuj* with *padam* as object corresponding to *chid* in *pādacchida*.

ḥalyāna. The Dictionary fails to note the very important context. A 1.149, in which the "Lovely Self (*ḥalyānam attānam*)" is distinguished from the "foul self (*pāpam attānam*)"; a distinction parallel to that of A 1.249 between the "Great Self (*mahattā*)" and the "little self (*appātumo*)."

In "Friendship with the Lovely (*ḥalyāna-mittatā*)" and "Lovely Friend (*ḥalyāna mittā*)," I am tempted to see not merely a reference to environment and human relations, but at least an ultimate reference to the "Lovely Self" of A 1.149, with which "Self" one can also be "unfriendly" (S 1.57, *amitten-eva attanā*; cf. BG vi.5-6, *bandhur ātmaiva ripur ātmanah*). Of what other "friendship" could it have been said that "friendship, companionship, intimacy with the lovely" is not the half, but the whole of *Brahmacariya* (S v.2), or that such friendship is "a single condition (*ekādhammam*)" whereby the Aryan Eightfold Path can arise, or if arisen can be perfected (S v.37); or what other "lovely friend" could have been described as the chief external factor in the development of the seven "limbs of wisdom" (S v.101-102)?

It is certainly also the *ḥalyānattā*, *mahattā*—not the *pāpattā*, *appātumo*—that is meant by *attā* in S 1.75 (= Ud 47) which, following BU 11.4, 14.5, and 14.3.21 (*ātmaḥkāma*), praises the *attakāmo*, a term that can be rendered by "self-lover" only if it be understood that all that "is not myself (*na me so attā*)" has been excluded. It is in this sense also that "a man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than he loves any other person . . . more than his neighbor" (*Sum. Theol.* 11-11.26.4); and similarly Hermes, *Lit.* 14.6b, "love thyself, if thou wouldst have wisdom"; cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 11.8, on the two meanings of "self-love." As Scott remarks (Hermes, 11.145), "The man whom the Hermetist de-

scribes as 'loving himself' corresponds to Aristotle's σπουδαῖος, who . . . shows himself to be φίλαντρος in the sense that he seeks τὸ καλόν (= *ḥalyānam*) for himself . . . (and) develops that which is best and highest in himself by religious meditation" (i.e., *ḥhāna*).

ḥāmākāra. "To do what one will does not pertain to the common herd (*na ḥāmākāro hi puthujjanānam*, Sn 351)." This denial of free will to the natural man is paralleled in Vin 1.13, and S 11.66-67, where the proposition, that body, feeling, willing, etc. are *anattā*, not I, nor mine, nor myself (*na me so attā*), is proved by the consideration that were they myself or mine I should be able to say, "Let my body (or feeling, willing, etc.) be thus, or not thus," and it would be so, since nothing can be called I or mine absolutely unless I have full power over it. Sn 351 implies, of course, that a Tathāgata is *ḥāmākāro*, can do what he will; and that this is so is elsewhere made explicit in the lists of *iddhis*, beginning with the formula *aham bhikkhavo yāvudenu āḥarukhāmi*, "I, almsmen, whatever I will . . .," S 11.212, etc. The word does not occur in Brahmanical texts before the Epics, but is the same in effect as *ḥāmācārin*, "mover-at-will," recognizable in RV 1x.113.9 *unukāmatam caravanam*, and thereafter throughout the literature, e.g., JUB 111.28.3, CU VIII.5.4, TU 11.5.

ḥūṭa (as a weapon). *Kūṭa* in Mil 38 is not so much the ridge-pole of a house, but rather synonymous with its roof-plate (*ḥannihā*) to which all the rafters converge. This roof-plate, as we have often shown, represents in the cosmic architectural symbolism for which we have so many data in Indian literature, the Sun; and in microcosmic symbolism the *brahma-randhra*, or scapular foramen, whence the spirit departs when the dying man "gives up the ghost."²⁷ *Kūṭa* is then, like *ḥannihā*, a likeness

²⁷ For further references and detailed analysis see Coomaraswamy, "The Symbolism of the Dome" and "Συναυμπύρημα: Janua Coeli" [both in Volume 1 of this edition—ED.]. In connection with "The Symbolism of the Dome," in which I identified the Rbhus with the three dimensions of space, I should like to add that this interpretation is virtually proved by RV 14.33.5 where, of the three brothers, the eldest proposes to make of Tvastṛ's vessel two, the second three, and the youngest four (one dimension makes of a single point two points separated by a line, a second creates a plane or field of triangulation, a third creates a real space that can be thought of as four-cornered). I ought not, however, to have said that Tvastṛ disliked what had been done: on the contrary, he approves (*panayat*, *Sāyana astaut*, *angirakāra*) and likes (*avenat*, *Sāyana akamayat*, *angirakāra*) the four-fold arrangement. If the Rbhus are also the best friends of the solar Indra, it is likewise because in the beginning he is desirous of a space within which he and his followers may fulfill their purposes.

²⁶ We speak of a dying man as "nearly gone" or in slang as a "goner."

of the Sun, and it may be assumed that like the *kaṇṇikā*, the *kūṭa* may be a perforated form. We understand accordingly that when the Yakkha of J 1.146 "holds a metal *kūṭa*, a mighty sun, of the size of a roof-plate" (*kaṇṇika-mattam mahantam adittam ayakūṭam gaṇetvā*), he is wielding what may be a discus, but is more probably a mace in the familiar shape of a discoid head and provided with a handle passing through its central opening, just as the Axis Mundi passes through the Sundoor, and as the central axis of a house or smoke from the central heartā passes through the eye of its dome, or luffer. The same is to be understood in JB 1.49.9, where a Season, an agent of the Sun, is represented as descending on a ray of light, "armed with a mace (*kūṭa-hastah*)"; and in ŚB III.8.1.15, where "they do not strike the victim with a mace (*na kūṭena praghnanti*)."²⁸ On the other hand, in JB 1.49.2 where "one should strike the victim on the *kūṭa* (*kūṭe hanyāt*)," it is the top of the head that is referred to, in accordance with the microcosmic analogy mentioned above.

gadha (for *gadha*?). In S v.41 the factors of the Eightfold Path are said to "plunge into the Deathless (*amato-gadha*), have their beyond in the Deathless (*amata-parāyana*), to have their last-end in the Deathless

²⁸ Eggeling mistranslates as though the reading had been *kūṭe*. Sāyana's comment, "seizing it by the horn" does not support Eggeling's, nor does it conflict with our own interpretation: one holds the victim by the horn in order to strike it with the mace.

In Oerul's discussion of *kūṭa* (JAOS, XIX, 1898, 114) he renders by "hammer," quite satisfactorily in the ŚB context and JB 1.49.9, and only finds *kūṭe* in JB 1.49.2 difficult because he forgets that *kūṭa* is the head or top of anything. *Kūṭa*, from *kūt*, to be bent or curved, is peak or top because the top of anything such as a mountain, nose, or skull is either an angle or a dome, just as *kūṭi* or *kūṭī* as "cottage" is evidently so called because of its pointed or bent roof (*kutanka*): as the peak of the roof, *kūṭa* coincides with *kaṇṇikā*: and becomes a mace or hammer by analogy because the top of the roof, the aforesaid roof-plate, is actually a perforated disc through which the axis of the house passes (as the Axis Mundi passes through the Sun), the handle of the hammer corresponding to this axis. It follows, in the last analysis, that the mace or hammer as a weapon "derives," like other weapons, from the primordial *vajra*. The mace or hammer is appropriately held by the "Season" of JB 1.49.9 because the Seasons are the "doorkeepers" of the Sun, JB 1.13.2. It is in the same way that Indra's *vajra* becomes a *hammer* in the hands of Thor.

In connection with the equation *kūṭa* = *kaṇṇikā*, it may be remarked that the meanings of *kaṇṇikā* as "earring" and "pericarp of a lotus" are secondary, the primary sense, depending on the etymological connection of *karna* with *śynga* and *āsri* (and Ger. *Eck*), being that of "projection" or "corner" (as in J vi.330). Both *kūṭa* and *kaṇṇikā* are, then, as "point" of the roof, equivalents of *angulus* and *γωνία*, "cornerstone" as interpreted in my "Eckstein" in *Speculum*, XIV (1939).

(*amata-pariyosāna*). The Dictionary does not have *gadha* (from Skr. *gāh*, to dive or plunge into), and treats *amatogadha* here and elsewhere as *amatogudha*, i.e., *-avagādha*. The metaphor is closely related to that of rivers reaching the Sea = Nibbāna (see *samudda*): and corresponds to Eckhart's "Plunge in: this is the drowning" ("in the bottomless sea of the Godhead"). The distinction of a drowning in the Upper Waters from a drowning in the Nether Waters is, of course, well known; the latter corresponds to the shipwreck en route in S IV.179-80.

gavaḅkka. Not in PTS Dictionary. In *Eastern Art*, III (1931), 195, I supposed that no reference for a Pali *gavaḅkka*, corresponding to Skr. *gavākṣa* (e.g., at Mhv II.36) and Prakrit *gavekka*, "bull's-eye window," could be cited. The word occurs, however, in Mhv IX.15, 17.

cetiya. The PTS Dictionary omits to mention that *cetiya* is by no means necessarily a *thūpa*, but in fact more often a sacred tree. The definition of the three classes of *cetiyas* in the *Kalingabodhi Jātaka* (J IV.228) should have been cited. Cf. Coomaraswamy, *Elements of Buddhist Iconography*, 1935, and "The Nature of Buddhist Art" [in Vol. I of this edition ED.]; B. C. Law, "Cetiya in the Buddhist Literature" in *Studia Indo-Iranica* (1937), pp. 42-48; and V.R.R. Dikshita, "The Origin and Early History of Caityas" in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XIV (1938), 440-51. The suggestion that root *cit*, to consider, as well as root *ci*, to build up, enters into the meaning of the word *caitya*, *cetiya*, has been made independently by Dikshita and myself, on the basis of such texts as RV VI.1.5, where Agni is *cetyah* (from *cit*), and ŚB VI.2.3.9, where the courses of the Fire-Altar are "*citayah*" (from *ci*) because they were foreknown in accordance with the injunction "*cetaya-dhvam*" (from *cit*), and the fact that it was *cetayamānā* (from *cit*) that the builders foreknew the courses, and because the *cetiya* is not always in fact a thing "built up," but is always a support of contemplation (*caitya*, as if from *cit*).

jhāna, *saṃāhi*. *Jhāna* is always "contemplation," *jhāyin* (like *dhīra*) always "contemplative." C.A.F. Rhys Davids' and F. L. Woodward's usual rendering by "musing" or "quiet musing" enormously weakens the proper values of these terms.²⁹ Even less appropriate (and it may be added, rather

²⁹ It is regrettable that C.A.F. Rhys Davids has not consistently maintained the position so well expressed in *Kindred Sayings*, 1.68, II. 2, where she explains *bhāvana* as "constructive work (in contemplation, of course) . . . contemplation

“early Victorian”) is Lord Chalmers’ rendering of *jhāyino* by “those who woo Reverie” and of *jhāyī* by “Reverie” (Sn 719, 638). Contemplation, a word of precise meaning in the corresponding European contexts, is anything but “day-dreaming.” *Jhāna* tends towards and reaches its end in *samādhi*.³⁰

Samādhi is etymologically and quite literally “synthesis,” and is generally best translated thus in both Buddhist and Sanskrit contexts: *dharana*, *dhyāna*, and *samādhi* corresponding to the *consideratio*, *contemplatio*, and *excessus* or *raptus* of Richard of St. Victor and other Christian contemplatives; *excessus* and *raptus* imply in the one case a “going out of oneself” and a being “taken out of oneself,” and in either case a consequent “being in the spirit” and thus one’s real “Self,” but of these two terms the latter is unsuited to the Indian contexts, *yoḡa* being an “active” rather than a “passive” or “mystic” discipline.

In *samādhi* there is no longer any object of contemplation; in *avitakka samādhi* one is what one knows; one knows indeed, but it is not a second thing, other than oneself, that one knows; there is *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, as in *divinis*.³¹ The synthetic values implied in the common expression *ajjhatam (adhyātman) susamāhito*, “completely Self-centred,”³² are clearly brought out in A 11.29 (and corresponding AĀ 11.2.1), where all the powers of the soul (the *kusala dhammā*) are referred to as converging to one point, in which they are unified, just as the rafters of a dome converge towards and are joined in the roof-plate. It is upon *jhāna* and *samādhi* that the possession of *iddhis*, which are strictly speaking “powers” of the Spirit and not of the individual self, altogether depends.

means both elimination . . . and . . . creation.” I am appalled by Rhys Davids’ “Dhyāna was not meditation; it was the making attention a *tabula rasa* for psychic communication. It was the later monk who converted this into mental hypnosis,” etc. (*New Indian Antiquary*, II, 1939, 46).

³⁰In S 1.46 a Deva suggests that “He is wake who ‘awakens’ contemplation (yo *jhānam abuddhi buddho*)”; the Buddha assents, with the reservation “Yes, if they be perfectly synthesized, or unified (*sammā te susamāhitā*).”

³¹Cf. A 5.7, where in *avitakka samādhi* the Comprehensor is not aware of anything, and yet not without awareness (*asaññī*). This is the position so fully stated in BU 14.3; although, curiously enough, D 11.127 pours contempt on the saying *passam na passati*, the very words of BU 14.3.23, *na paṇiyati paṇyan*. D 11.127 is a bad example of the tendency of the Pāli texts to pervert the meanings of Sanskrit logoi in order to gain the victory over a straw man.

³²In the sense that “God is in all things self-intent,” “sees only himself,” and that the divine manner of knowing is “not by means of any object external to the knower.”

Tathāgata. In support of the view that the reference of this word is to the Buddha’s advent (cf. my note in BSOS IX) may be cited A 11.23 where the Buddha is “Tathāgata” by virtue of his omniscience, infallibility, and because “as he teaches, so he does” (*yathā-vādī . . . tathā-kārī*, as also in Sn 357): in Sn 430 and Itiv, p. 122, the Buddha is *tathā-vādī*. *Tathā-kārī* and *tathā-vādī* are parallel to *tathāgata*; *tathāgata*, then, from this point of view, would be “He who came thus saying and thus doing.” Sn 957 has *buddham . . . tādīm . . . āgatam*, “Buddha come hither in such a fashion.” S 14.195, *yathāgatamaggo* = Ariyan Eightfold Path, is suggestive. DhA 11.226, *tusitā . . . āgato*, is another sense in which he is “thus-come.” *Lalita vistara*, ch. 26 (Lefmann, p. 423), has *dharmacakram pravartitam, yasya pravartanāt, tathāgata ity ucyate*: “It is because of his turning of the Wheel of the Law (or Principal Wheel) that he is called ‘Tathāgata’; and this is confirmatory of the *tathā-vādī tathā-kārī* explanation, since it is precisely the Dhamma that he teaches and the Dhamma that he “does.” The text is no doubt an echo of D 11.135 (= A 11.24), where all that the Buddha has said, from the time of his Awakening to that of his Decease, “all that is just so and not otherwise, and therefore is he called Tathāgata. For, O Cunda, what the Tathāgata says, he does, and what he does is what he says (*sabbam tam tath’eva hoti, no aññathā. Tasma tathāgato’ti vuccati. Yathāvādī, Cunda, tathākārī, yathākārī tathā-vādī*).”³³ So much for *tathā*. *Āgata* occurs so often in connection with the Buddha’s coming, as to make the word division *tathā-gata* very implausible; that *āgata* is likewise often found in connection with Agni affords additional evidence (*āgamana* is precisely “advent”). The *Tathāgata* is the “Thus-come” with reference to any or all of the “ways” of his coming, but especially with reference to his advent as one who “practiced what he preached.” Cf. *sāgatam (su-āgatam)*, “Welcome,” in *sāgataṃ bhante bhagavato*, D 1.179 = M 1.481; not to be confused with *sugata*, “well-faring” or “well-fared,” a common epithet of the Buddha.

tejanam. I have long had in mind to compile a vocabulary of the Sanskrit and Pāli terminology of archery. The two most difficult words are *kulmala* and *tejana*. Pāli contexts make the meaning of the latter word

³³The concept is Vedic, cf. RV 14.33.6, where (with reference to the Rbhus) *satyam ūcūr nava evā hi cakruḥ*. The perfect correspondence of thought, word, and act is the Tathāgata’s integrity.

The Buddhist “Go thou and do likewise” may be cited from J 11.30, “Those who do what the Buddha has enjoined, follow the path of fortune (*ye ca kāhanti . . . buddhena desiṃ, soṭṭhim pāram gamissanti = nibhānam gacchanti*).”

sufficiently clear. The PTS Dictionary emphasizes the sense of *tij* "to be sharp" and makes *tejanam* the point or shaft of an arrow or the arrow itself: we shall see, however, that it is always a "heating" that is directly referred to and a "straightening" that is implied. We first consider the Sanskrit contexts. *Tejanam* is a factor in the make-up of an arrow, but not any concrete part of the arrow. In RV 1x.111.22 the fletcher (here simply *ḥarmāra*, "wright") plies his trade equipped with "dry reeds, feathers of birds, stones,⁸⁴ and fire" *dyubhiḥ*, i.e., literally, "with flames," and as Sāyaṇa comments *tejanārthābhīḥ*, "for the purpose of heating" (hence as in RV 1.53.4 etc., and in Grassmann's sense 15 for *div*). These four requisites correspond to the four factors of an arrow in AB 1.25, where Soma is the shaft (*śalya*), Varuṇa the feathers, Agni the point (*anīka*), and Viṣṇu the *tejanam* (as he is also in TS vi.2.3.1).⁸⁵ In AB 111.26, where the arrow is resolved into its equivalents, the *tejanam* becomes the blindworm (*andhāhi*). AV vi.57.1 is a protection from the arrow "of a single firing and a hundred shafts (*ekatejanāṃ śataśalyām*)," by which we understand a flight of however many arrows proceeding from any one source (as many rays proceed from one sun), and more especially a protection from sunstroke. In AV vi.49.1, where "the ape devours the *tejanam*" (whatever may be meant), there is not necessarily any reference to an arrow.⁸⁶ In AV v.18.8, the teeth are metaphorically arrows and are *tapasābhīdigdhāḥ*, literally "well smeared by heating," and *ibid.* 15, *iṣur iva digdhā . . . sã brāhmaṇasyeṣur ghorā*, "and like the arrow smeared, so is that arrow of the Brahman terrible." It has generally been presumed that *digdhā* in this and similar contexts (BD v.133, explaining RV vi.75.15 *ālākta . . . iṣvai*; ŚB xiv.9.4.8; R 11.30.23, etc.) means "smeared with poison," and this is no doubt correct in some cases; in M 1.429, *sallena . . . savisena gāhapalepanena* is certainly "with an arrow heavily

⁸⁴ Taken together, reference to stone arrowheads here, and to arrowheads of bronze in RV vi.75.15, implies a "chalcolithic" culture.

⁸⁵ In ŚB 111.4.4.14-15, where it is a question of the making of the *vajra* (incidentally, the archetypal weapon, from which the sword, hammer or mace, and arrow are all "derived"), Viṣṇu is (1) *ḥulmala*, and (2) that which lies "between" Agni and Soma as between day and night. Without discussing *ḥulmala* at length, I will only say that the equation *ḥulmala* = *sandhi* implied here agrees with the meaning of "fastening" (of point to shaft) which I find for *ḥulmala* as a factor in the makeup of an arrow, and with the gloss on AV 11.25.2, rendered by Whitney "thing to fasten (*samśīta*-) tip to shaft,"—not, however, "like a ferrule," but either a cement or glue, or as in AB 111.26 a binding with "sinews" (*snāvaṃi*), as also in M 1.429 *nabhāru*.

⁸⁶ (Vṛṣā-) *kapi*, perhaps a prototype of Hanuman, hence = Vāyu, into whom the Fire (and all other "half-deities") returns when it goes out, being thus swallowed up.

smeared with poison," but it will be seen that there are other ways and for other reasons that an arrow can be "smeared."

We can now take up the Pāli contexts. In M 11.105 and Dh 80 and 145, "Irrigators lead the water, fletchers straighten their shafts (*usukārā namayanti tejanam*), carpenters shape (*namayanti*) the wood, the learned train themselves (*attānam damayanti paṇḍitā*)." It will be observed that *nam* is not here literally to "bend," but to "sway" in the sense of "control" or "manage," and give the proper form to any material.⁸⁷ "Fletchers straighten their shafts" is a legitimate but not a literal translation of what is really "fletchers control their fire"; and this is in some respects a better rendering from the Buddhist point of view, according to which it is precisely by the proper control of the fire of life that the "self" is rectified. What is important in the present connection, however, is the connection of a word implying heat with a metaphor that has all to do with a putting straight, an ordering of things in the way they should go, that is to say, straight to their end.

We can now conclude with the text of J vi.66 and the corresponding representation of the fletcher at work, at Bharhut (Cunningham, pl. 44, fig. 2). The "moral" is one of single-mindedness; the fletcher sees better with one eye closed, sighting along the arrow to see whether it is straight, and disregarding what might be simultaneously seen by the other eye, were it open. The text reads, *tasmīn samaye usukāro angārakūpulle usum tāpetvā ḥañḥikena temetvā ekam akkhiṃ nimiletvā eken'olohento ujum ḥaroti*. "Just then a fletcher, heating an arrow over a fire-pan, and moistening it with paste, had one eye closed and looking with the other was straightening the arrow." It should now be clear how it is that a heating (*tejanam* or *tapas*) is essential to the make-up of an arrow, but not a concrete part of an arrow. It appears also that an arrow may be smeared with a view to temporary softening and not with poison: the expressions *tapasābhīdigdhā* and *digdhā* in AV v.18.8, 15 imply, then, rather a straightening than a poisoning of the Brahman's verbal shafts, which are "terrible," not as being venomous, but inasmuch as they fly "straight to the point." There is no evidence that *tejanam* ever refers to the sharpening of an arrow.⁸⁸ It is often possible to render *tejanam* literally by "heat" or "fire." A rendering by shaft or arrow is possible if we assume the series

⁸⁷ *Nam* is found already in AV 11.25.2, where *śalyām . . . tām susannatām ḥtvā* is rendered by Whitney "having made that arrow well-straightened."

⁸⁸ An arrow is "whetted" literally or metaphorically by an incantation (*brahma-samśīta*, RV vi.75.16) or by "worship" (*upāsānīyam*, Muṇḍ. Up. 11.2.4); just as a sword is "whetted" by an invocation of the Gale, ŚB 1.2.4.5-7.

of associated ideas, heat straightening, straight, and straight-going (*ṛjita*, RV vi.75.12; *ṛju-gu*, cited from a lexikon as a kenning for "arrow"): it is, in fact, in this way that in RV i.110.5, *tejanena* (in spite of Sāyana's *tiḅṅṅanena śastreṇa*) must mean "with a (straight) rod," a rod compared to an arrow or "shaft" of light, *munus tejanena* here corresponding to *raśminā . . . mame* in RV viii.25.18; that *tejanam* in AV i.2.4 (where it is the Axis Mundi, *diva-sḅambha*) is "fiery pillar"; and the *tejanam* in M ii.105 = *śalyām*, "arrow," in AV iii.25.2, as can be clearly seen from the use of root *nam* in both contexts.

sthūpa. The original meaning of *sthūpa*, top, peak, head, dome, etc., may be noted in D iii.117, where Nāthaputta having died, the Nigaṅtha doctrine and discipline are "broken-headed and without protection" (*bhinna-sthūpe appaṅsarane*). In J vi.117, a *vimāna*, palace, is described as *pañca-sthūpa*, "five-domed," a meaning and reference found in the Dictionary, s.v. *sthūpiṅga*. But it makes no reference to *sthūpiṅga* of Mhv xxxi.13, which here appears to be a noun meaning "dome"—the dome, or spire, of a *pūsādu*, palace. The Dictionary knows of *sthūpa* only as "tomb" and "top" (*dhātu-gabbha*). The Buddhist tomb is *dhātu-gabbha* by function, and *sthūpa* by its domed form, which corresponds to that of the cranium.

Dikḅḅhita. The purpose of the present article is to inquire whether or not the regular Buddhist ordination can be equated with initiation (*dikḅḅā*).³⁹ The root occurs in Pāli only very rarely, in *dikḅḅhiu* = *dikḅḅita*. In S i.226, a prophet (*isi* = *ṛṣi*; the word is also used of the Buddha and of Buddhist monks) is *cira-dikḅḅhita*, "long initiated," explained by the Commentator as *cira-pabbajita*,⁴⁰ "long ordained as a Pilgrim." *Cira-*

³⁹ It should be needless to say that "ordination" as such must be distinguished from "initiation" as such: the former, however significant, is merely the conferring of a specific "character" and comparable to the imposition of a new "form" on already "formed" material; the latter is always a second birth, the birth of another and new man, not a reformation of but a transformation of the man that was before. It does not follow that what has been called an ordination (in translation) may not in fact have been an initiation. In any case the Buddhist ordination is not the imposition of a "priestly" character; the monk is not a "priest." For a discussion of Buddhist ordination see *Psalm of the Brethren*, index, s.v. [cf. Theragāliā —fn.].

⁴⁰ The root meaning of *pabbajati* is to "go forth," "go into exile," and of the causative *pabbajeti*, to "be exiled" or "banished," hence technically to abandon the indoor and household life and adopt that of the "unroofed" Pilgrim. The Pilgrim carries his own roof (umbrella) about with himself.

pabbajita contrasts, of course, with *navo acira-pabbajita*, "recently ordained a Pilgrim," in other contexts, both terms being of common occurrence. J v.138-39, reading *cira-dakḅḅhita*, refers to "prophets" (*isayo*) in the following of the Bodhisattva Sarabhangā-Jotiṅṅāla, who is unquestionably a solar principle; and this spelling is of interest because it preserves the form of the root *daḅḅs*, "to be able," the basic value of *dikḅḅita*, "initiated," being precisely "enabled."

Taking now for granted the reader's knowledge of the significance of initiation in India and elsewhere,⁴¹ we shall argue that *pabbajita* has really the value *dikḅḅita*, and a fortiori that *upasampadā* has that of a more advanced initiation. The first ordinations were necessarily made by the Buddha himself, who used the significant words "Come, mendicant monk (*ehi bhikḅḅhu*)," reminiscent of the welcome, "Come (*ehi*)" addressed by the Sun to the would-be entrant who has rightly answered the question "Who art thou?" (JUB iii.12.5, cf. Rūmī, *Mushnuwī* 1.3602-3). If designations such as "Kinsman of the Sun" (*ādicca-banāhu*) are to be taken literally, as they must be for all those who are not misled by the "historical" form of the "Buddha legend," this is sufficient to show that such ordinations were really initiations and invitations, in the etymological senses of the words: the historical Buddha is surely an euhemerisation of the Vedic Agni,⁴² who is likewise "awakened" at dawn (*uṣar-budh*) and is the "deity of the initiate" (*agni vai dikḅḅitasya devatā*, TS iii.1.3). Nor is anything changed in principle by the delegation of the power of ordination or initiation to others (who are constantly referred to as "Sons of the Buddha," e.g., S i.192), such a transmission being equally necessary and regular in the most unquestionably orthodox conditions, and indeed inevitable if there is to be a transmission of a veritable gnosis from generation to generation.

The original ordinations had conferred *pabbajā* (the status of "Pilgrim") and *upasampadā* ("full attainment," and almost literally the state of being an "Adept") simultaneously. After the delegation of power we find that both are still conferred together, but by a quorum of the mendi-

⁴¹ See the comprehensive series of articles on "Initiation" published by René Guénon in recent volumes of *Etudes traditionnelles*: [see René Guénon, *Aperçus sur l'initiation*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1953), in which the articles cited by Coomaraswamy are collected—fn.]. We hope to publish on some future occasion some of the principal Indian texts in which the subject is treated.

⁴² Cf. Émile Sénart, *La Légende du Bouddha* (Paris, 1875), p. 425: "[Le] t.ōne du Bouddha substitue à l'ancien autel brahmanique; [le Bouddha] perpétue sous une forme nouvelle la présence du feu sacré."

cant monks, upon those who having been tonsured and robed, repeated thrice the formula of "Taking Refuge." We find then that *upasampadā* can only be conferred on the recommendation of a teacher, upon some younger monk who has come to him as a pupil. The teacher is called *upajjhāya*, literally "one who is gone up near to," the pupil a *saddhivihārika*, literally "associate resident," i.e., who lives with the teacher in daily intimacy. The relation is formally paternal; the pupil renders the teacher personal service. Before a teacher can receive any monk as pupil, he must himself have been fully ordained, must have been an "Adept," for at least ten years. Under these conditions he may, when he sees fit, propose the pupil as a candidate for *upasampadā* to the monastic assembly; the pupil, for his part, formally requesting the assembly to "extract me" (*ullumpasūmam*), suggestive of the Brāhmaṇa formula "as a snake (*ahi*) might be freed from (*nirmucyeta*) its slough, or as one might draw (*vivṛhet*) an arrow from a reed (*muñjāt*), so is he liberated (*nirmucyate*) from all evil" (JB II.134, etc.).⁴³ A monk thus fully ordained or initiated might after ten years himself receive pupils. The succession of such Vinaya teachers from Upāli to Mahinda is given in the *Dīpavaṃsa*. All this has the appearance of the regular system of transmission from spiritual father to spiritual son (*guru-paramparā*) in generation after generation, but with a specific adaptation to the more communal character of the Buddhist order of

⁴³ SB III.1.4.1 describes *dikṣā* as an *anugrabhana* or "lifting up" (from this world to that of the gods), and it is to this expression that the Buddhist designation of ordination as an *ullumpana* seems to correspond. A. Préau calls my attention to the fourteenth stanza of the *Pavamārtka-sūtra* of Abhinavagupta, where it is said that it is the function of the mantras, "by their conducive nature (*anugraha-svabhāvat*) to extricate animal-men (*paśūn uddhartum*)."

⁴⁴ This well-known series of similes recurs in M II.17 (and D I.77, cf. 1.34), "I have shown my disciples the means (*paṭipannā*, with reference to contemplative practices already listed) whereby they can create (*abhinimminanti*, *abhi* implying a super- or transformation, where the simple *nimminanti* would mean only a formation) out of this body (the aforesaid *kāyo rūpi cātummahābhūtiḥ*, the formal body based on the four elements) another formal body of intellectual substance (*aññam kāyam . . . rūpim manomayam* = D 1.34 *añño attā dibbo rūpi manomayo*), complete with all its limbs and members, and with transcendental faculties (*abhi-
n-
indriyam*, but in D 1.34 and 1.77 *ahinindriyo*, not deprived of any faculty). It is just as if a man should draw out (*paḍḍheyya* = *pravṛhet*) an arrow (*iṣṭham*) from a reed (*muñjāṃhā*), or a sword from its scabbard, or a snake (*ahim*) from its slough. He is aware that arrow and reed are two different things, that sword and scabbard are different things, that snake and slough are different things; he is aware that the arrow is just what has been extracted from (*paḍḍhohoprabdhā*) the reed, etc." With this body of intellectual substance he enjoys omniscience (*abhiññā*) and is a Mover-at-will as far as the Brahma-heavens (*yāva brahmalokaḥ pi kāyena vasam vattenti*).

"Pilgrims (*pabbajita*)," who from the earliest times were thought of as a "congregation" (*saṃgha*) rather than as solitaries.

There are also internal evidences. Ordination involved the abandonment of one's own and of one's family name (*nāma-gotta*)—"just as when rivers reach the sea, they abandon their name and descent (*pajahanti nāma-gottāni*) . . .," the Pilgrim now becoming a "Son of Buddha" (*sakya puttiya*, Ud 55). Ordination is, in fact, a second birth: we find together with *yato jāto*, "from the time I was born," such expressions as *yato ariyāya jātiyā jāto*, "from the time I was born of the Aryan kin" (*Majjhima Nikāya*, II.103), i.e., as a *sakya puttiya*, a "Buddha-son," and even more explicit the passage in which Kassapa speaks of his perfect mastery and calls himself a "natural son of the Blessed One, born of his mouth, born of the Dhamma, fashioned by the Dhamma, and an heir of the Dhamma" (S II.221).⁴⁵

⁴⁵ In the *Aggañña Sutta* (D III.84), where these formulae recur, it is explained that they are applicable only to those whose faith (*saddhā*) in the Buddha is settled, radical, well-grounded, and such that they cannot be robbed of it. The Sutta as a whole is an admirable description of the Fall and Regeneration of man, though at D III.81-82 it affords a good example of the childish level to which the Pāli texts can descend for controversial purposes; here the Brahman claim to be "Natural sons of Brahmā, born of his mouth, etc." is ridiculed, and refuted (!) by the argument that Brahmans, like other men, are visibly born of woman, despite the identification of Buddha with Brahmā (or Brahman) at III.84. The intention of the Pāli text is evidently to distinguish the Brahman by human birth from the Brahma = Arhat who becomes a son of God by adoption; but in order to make this distinction the real significance of RV x.90 is perverted. Equally childish is the argument of the *Tevijja Sutta* (D I.235 ff.) that the Vedas are futile because of the different "paths" that are taught in their schools; the Brahman protagonist rightly maintains that all alike are straight roads to Brahmā (i.e., Prajāpati), but the Buddha is made to say that this is ridiculous, because the Brahmans themselves do not claim to have seen Brahmā or to know where he is—an argument of really astonishing puerility. In the same way S I.61-62, where it is well said that "World's end is within you," but it is pretended that the Rohita of AB VII.15 did not know this and had thought that World's End could be reached by an actual locomotion. Or again D III.127, where the meaning of *passam na passati* (= BU IV.3.23 *na paśyati paśyan vai*) is distorted. Passages such as these show clearly enough that the Pāli canon includes much that is of purely human, and all-too-human origin. It is in spite of such passages that a fairly thorough study of the Pāli texts has led us to believe that the early Buddhist *dhamma* is essentially orthodox and only superficially heterodox. We believe that the Buddha meant what he said when he affirmed that he "had found the ancient path and followed it" (SE II.106, reflecting BU IV.4.8), viz. that "ancient" (path) which the Brahmans of old are said to have remembered (S IV.117) but which others have forgotten (D III.81-82), the "primordial walk with Brahman" of D III.40. We believe that the Buddha came "not to destroy but to fulfill the law."

Nor is it by any means anyone or everyone that can be ordained. As an example of intellectual qualification there can be cited the case of the "Long-haired Fire-men" (*aggikā jaṭilā*, i.e., Brahman ascetics whose deity was Agni) who could be given *upasampadā* immediately, without the usual four months' probation (*parivāsa*) because they were already *kammavādino* and *ṅiriyavādino*,⁴³ i.e., believed in the "causal origination" of all phenomena whatever, and at the same time that there is an "ought to be done," to be contrasted with an "ought not to be done," or "savoir-faire" to be contrasted with a "laissez-faire" (the opposites of these positions are well known "heresies" from the Buddhist point of view). We need not cite here from the *Cullavagga* the long list of disqualifications, but only say that these may be moral, intellectual, or physical, the physical disqualifications including a great variety of deformities and diseases.⁴⁷

Where, as in Burma, it is the rule for everyone to become a monk for a limited time, or when a Buddhist king is temporarily ordained,⁴⁸ it would appear that this temporary retreat from the world corresponds

⁴³The opposites of these positions are well-known "heresies" (*miccha-ditṭhi*) from the Buddhist point of view, as they must be from that of any orthodox teaching. Expressed in Christian terms, *kammavāda* is the doctrine that all "accidents" are causally originated, nothing whatever happening by chance or because of any direct divine intervention; *ṅiriyavāda* that there is an "ought-to-be-done" and an "ought-not-to-be-done (*akiriyā*)." It should be noted, however, that *akiriyavāda* as a heretical doctrine implies that there is "not-an-ought-to-be-done" and corresponds to the "amoralism" with which the Amarauians were charged in the Middle Ages. In the same connection it should be observed that while the moral values are, if anything, overemphasized in Buddhism (a fact closely connected with its especially Kṣatriya character), it is not pretended that right conduct is of more than a necessary dispositive value in relation to the final attainment: as is clearly shown in the Parable of the Raft (M 1.135), where conduct is a "boat" to be abandoned when the "Farther Shore" has been reached, and in Dh 267, where those who have rejected virtue and vice alike (*yo ca puññāñ ca pāpāñ bahetvā*) can rightly be called "walkers with God in this world" and "mendicant-monks."

⁴⁴*Nāgas* (serpents of partly human character but retaining ophidian characteristics) are disqualified, even though they may be moved by the best intentions. To this corresponds the "folklore" principle, that mermaids cannot as such acquire a "soul," but must be "married" to a human being, at the same time losing their scaly tails, which are changed into feet, so that no trace of their ophidian origin remains. In reality, of course, it is always a Solar Hero that "marries" the mermaid (*nāgini*), and to this situation (that of Apālā in relation to Indra) can be applied the words of Donne, "Nor eve: diaste unless Thou ravish me."

⁴⁵For the cases of Asoka and of the Chinese Emperor Wu-ti, both of whom took orders without effective abdication, see Vincent Smith, *Early History of India* (Oxford, 1924), p. 168.

exactly to that of the Vedic Sacrificer (*yajamāna*)⁴⁹ who devotes *himself* and, being initiated (*dīkṣita*), is during the operation no longer himself, no longer "this man," *un tel*, until when the operation is relinquished he returns to himself, from the Truth to the Falsehood, and becomes once more "who he really is" in the worldly sense, So-and-so by name and lineage.

Buddhist ordination, we conclude, has not only the appearance but also the significance of an initiation. The only possible alternative would be to regard it as a pseudo- or even counter-initiation. The latter alternative is manifestly out of the question:⁵⁰ nor can the former be entertained by anyone who accepts the texts in their entirety, in which the Buddha is described as more than man and as of Agni's and solar lineage.

natthika. Literally a "There-is-not-ist," or a little more freely, "Nothing-morist," the term is used in Sanskrit and Pāli alike to mean approximately what is meant by our "skeptical," "materialist," "pragmatist," or "atheist." The man who maintains "there is no other world (*natthi para loka*)"⁵¹ despite the fact that "there is assuredly another world" (*santam*

⁴⁹In this connection it is worthy of note that *yajamāna* is a form that may be either reflexive or passive, and thus means both "Sacrificer:" and "Sacrificed." That the Sacrificer who is also a Comprehensor of the ritual is really a "sacrificer of himself (*ātma-yajī*)" is repeatedly affirmed (e.g., SB 2.2.6.13-14), and this is also true of the Christian sacrifice (the Mass).

⁵⁰The Purānas, in which the Buddha is reckoned an *avatar* of Viṣṇu, consider that he was born as a deceiver in order to lead astray the enemies of the Devas. We are more inclined to think that (as in Mark 4:11-12) the Buddhist *dhamma* is presented in a form that could easily be misunderstood (cf., for example, D III.40, where it is described as "hard to be understood by you who are of different views, another tolerance, other tastes, other allegiance, and other training"), and that it could have enlightened some ("to whom it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God") and deluded others ("them that are without, lest at any time they be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them"). I have known a modern scholar to admit that "temperament and training" alike prevented his acceptance of traditional points of view. The Indian paṇḍit rarely attempts to correct the European scholar who may entertain what he knows is a false view: one has to ask the right question before one gets the right answer. The Buddhist *dhamma*, in the same way, like many other "secret doctrines," protects its own "secret." What is in any case highly significant is the synthesis of Śaiva and Bauddha cults that is so conspicuous in the Indian Middle Ages.

⁵¹Cf. J 7.228, where the *ucchedāvādī* ("annihilationist," "materialist") is defined as one who maintains that "there is no such thing as going from this world to another; this world is cut off" (*ito paraloka-gata nāma natthi, ayam loka ucchijjati*). In J VI.225 the same heresy is supported by the argument "for who has ever come

yeva, kḥo pana param lokam)⁵² and as against "Arhats versed in the other world" (*paraloka-viduro*) is "a bad-liver, a man of false view (heretic), a denier" (*āussilo . . . micchā-diṭṭhi natthikāvādo*, M 1.403, cf. A 11.31 and S 11.73). *Natthiku* in S 1.95 does not mean "empty of hand" or "one who refuses alms" (1) but a "denier" as above: we cannot understand the translator's comment "we find no parallel to this term." In S 11.17 *natthitā*, "Not-ism," and *atthitā*, "Is-ism," are the two extreme views of denial and affirmation which are popularly maintained with respect to what may be called the question of the reality or persistent identity of the world or of the individual, in which connection it is further debated whether it is the same individual who in this life or in another both acts and reaps the reward of acts, or whether one acts and another reaps. The Buddha teaches a Middle Way⁵³ of "Causal Origination" (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), according to which "things" are to be regarded without any "in themselves"⁵⁴ and only as phenomena (*rūpa*) that have arisen in such and such a way (*yathā-bhūtam*, "as-become"), viz. in an ordered causal sequence. The gist of this doctrine (stated again very clearly in M 1.421) has been admirably summarized by the translator in *Kindred Sayings* [= S]

back thence?" (*kḥo vac hi idhāgato*), an appeal to the common experience that the dead do not return (as stated also in D 11.225 and J 11.242 and in accordance with the normal doctrine of the Brāhmanas and Upaniṣads, ŚE 11.6.1.6, XII.8.1.12, etc., and CU VIII.2.3).

⁵² Cf. Ud 80, *atthi ajātam abhūtam akātam asamkhatam*, "There is an Unborn, Unbecome, Not-made, Without-composition."

⁵³ Boetius, *Contra Folycken* 7, maintains that faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies. Fact and fiction alike are "what we make of" our observations; neither is an absolute, or more than a useful *façon de parler*, neither are any but statistical proofs available for the recognition of fact or fiction. Truth itself is transcendent with respect to fact and fiction alike, as is Goodness with respect to virtue and vice, and Beauty with respect to lovely and unlovely.

⁵⁴ No Buddhist would deny that appearances appear. If our apprehension of these appearances can be corrected by closer observation, it may serve practical ends, but the better observation is still only the actual or theoretical registration of an appearance (shape), and so on *ad infinitum*. This will apply even if "things" are reduced to mathematical formulae, which are still "shapes." The question, "Is there a thing in itself?" is meaningless: we can only ask, "Is there a form corresponding to the matter (dimension or number)?" The traditional answer assumes the existence of such a form or idea of the thing, as its eternal reason; this is a "reality," but observe that we are now no longer dealing with a self-subsistent thing "in itself," but with the thing "in intellect" and consubstantial with this intellect. It is in this sense that the metaphysician is a "realist"; popular and scientific "realism" (= philosophical "nominalism") coincides with "aestheticism" and "sentimentality."

11.22, note: "The subject of the resulting experience is himself the result of the causal experience, as much and as little identical as is, say, the tree with the seedling" (or the child with the man). For us today, whose view is animistic and whose interests are psychic rather than spiritual, and who think accordingly of a sentient identity as persisting through life or even after death,⁵⁵ this would be an "Is-ist" solution.⁵⁶ But for the Buddhist (as for Plato, *Symposium* 207D; cf. Plutarch, *Moralia* 392^B) this does not follow: the persistence of an identity even from day to day is not a "fact" but a merely "conventional truth"; the fact is that, as in the monkey parable of S 11.95, "will, mind, knowledge (*cittam, mano, viññānam*, i.e., the whole mental personality), this every day and every night arises (*uppajjati*) as one thing and is destroyed (*nirujjhati*) as another," and as in the parable of the chariot,⁵⁷ S 11.35, where the name of "essence" (*satta*) is said to be given only conventionally (*sammuccā*) to what is not really a simple substance, but an aggregate. In the same way at death "the soul and body that were in a previous becoming is destroyed without residuum and another steps forward (*purimabhava nāma rūpam asesam niruddham, aññam uppānam*, Vis 413)," and it is a heresy to maintain that "this consciousness (*idaṃ viññānam*) concurs and migrates (*samdhāvati samsā-*

⁵⁵ Few if any materialists have attempted to disprove the immortality of the "soul" by adducing its manifest mutability, or by the argument that whatever has had a beginning in time must also end in time. That the scientist would rather disprove the spiritualist's "phenomena" than disprove the latter's interpretations of them is significant of the former's real position. For the metaphysician the phenomena, however well attested, are of no more interest than any other phenomena; but his interpretation of them is very different from the spiritualist's (cf. René Guénon, *L'Erreur spirituelle*, Paris, 1930). The attitude of orthodox religion (essentially one of indifference) is also very "correct"; in any case only the "intellectual virtues" survive, and these are certainly not those that the "dear departed" are said to display. How far the Buddhist is from the spiritualistic position appears not only in the whole treatment of "individuality" (liberation being precisely from the "personality" for the survival of which the spiritualist adduces "proofs"), but conspicuously in Sn 774, where the question "What shall we come to be after death?" (*kim su bhavissāma iṃ cutāse*) is one that can only be asked by ignorant worldlings.

⁵⁶ The doctrine of "Causal Origination" is expressly described as "profound" and "hard to be understood" by those of an altogether different temperament and training (S 11.92 and 11.267, D 11.40, etc.).

⁵⁷ Plutarch, *Moralia* 392B: "Dead is the man of yesterday, for he is passed into the man of today; and the man of today is dying as he passes into the man of tomorrow. Nobody remains one person, nor is one person. . . . Our senses, through ignorance of reality, falsely tell us that what appears to be, is."

⁵⁸ The "chariot" in Indian scripture generally is the psychophysical vehicle, itself an aggregate, in which the simple substance of the Spirit "rides."

rati) without loss of identity (*anāññam*, M 1.256);⁵⁹ and yet it cannot be said that death is an automatic release from evil and from works (Mil 72) because "beings (*sattā*) are the heirs of acts (*ḥamma-dāyādā*)."⁶⁰ It must never be overlooked that traditional doctrine makes no distinction in principle between our daily deaths and births and death and birth "when the time comes": this together with an understanding of what is meant by the two selves⁶¹ (in Buddhism the great or fair and little or foul selves) are essential to a grasp of any Indian scripture. As to the survival of personality, whether from day to day or life to life, the Buddha teaches a Middle Way of understanding that of continuity without identity.

It remains only to add that the corresponding Skr. *nāstika* and *nāstikya* = *natthiā* are found in Brahmanical contexts. In MU 11.5, *nāstikya* is grouped with fear, hunger, anger, ignorance, etc., in a long list of *tāmasa* qualities; BG 11.42 gives the sense of Pāli *natthika*, but not the word itself, thus, "Flowery words are uttered by the stolid, whose delight is in the literal sense of the Vedas, saying 'There is nothing more' (*nānyad astiti vādinah*)."⁶² In the same way KU 11.6, although not mentioning the term *nāstika*, actually defines the "nothing-morist" in words identical with those of M 1.403 and J v.228 cited above, viz. as one "who holds that 'there is no other world but this' (*ayam loka nāsti para iti māni*)," i.e., who denies that there are possibilities other than possibilities of manifestation. For Manu *nāstikya* is an *ahetuvāda* and effectively an *ucchedavāda*: we find in III.65 that "by the denial of causality, families are soon destroyed (*nāstikyena ca ḥarmānām kulāny āsu vinaśyanti*)," which we understand to mean that to deny the inheritance of the father's karmic character by the son is to deny the reality of filiation, and thus to "destroy the family," as traditionally understood: for from this point of view, where there is no hereditary transmission of a vocation and a character, there is no family line. In the same way Manu VIII.22, a kingdom infested by *nāstikas* is destroyed; in II.11, and III.150, *nāstikas* are grouped with

⁵⁹ Cf. in M 1.366, *alam . . . aññāhattāya*, "Have you had enough of otherness?" i.e., "of the vicissitudes" of life.

⁶⁰ For inheritance in this sense, see BU 1.5.17 and Kauś. Up. 11.15 (*pitūputriyam sampratti or sampradānam*) and JB 1.18.10, *tasya putrā dāyam upayanti*.

⁶¹ The one an essence (spiritual or intellectual), the other an existence (psychophysical and sensitive). In Christianity, the soul to be saved and soul to be lost in Luke 17:33, or hated, Luke 14:26, the spirit as sundered from soul in Heb. 4:12: the soul to be "hated" being precisely the *psyche* of the "psychologist." So also for Rūmī, "the soul (*nafs*) is hell" (*Muthnuwī* 1.1375): cf. JUB IV.25, *mano narakah*, etc.

thieves, belittlers of the Veda, outcasts, *sūdras*, etc., and in IV.163 and XI.67 *nāstikya* is coupled with belittling the Veda and with murder.⁶²

We conclude that the *nāstika* is a nominalist, a denier especially of any but empirical truths: and that the word can best be rendered by "skeptic," a word that has the further advantage of corresponding in value to Pāli *ditthika*, generally in the bad sense of one who entertains *false* opinions.

nāga. While in the vast majority of cases *naga* as type or epithet of the Buddha or other Arhat is "elephant," there is a text of special interest, the *Vammika (Valmiki) Sutta*, M 1.142-145, in which the *ḥhīpāsava bhikkhu*, i.e., Arahāt, is typified by a *nāga* that is unquestionably a cobra. A certain Deva appears to the elder Kumāra Kassapa and says, "almsman, almsman, this is an ant-hill that flames by day and smokes by night." The Brahman answers, "take a spade, Sumedha, and dig it up."⁶³ The Deva accordingly digs, and unearths a variety of objects, which he is told to

⁶² That from an Indian point of view the lineage ceases as soon as the characteristic habit of the family is neglected is clearly seen in the *Mahādeva Sutta* (M 11.75-83); it is the "lovely custom" (*ḥalyāna vattha*) of this royal line that when the barber finds the first gray hair in the king's head, the king adopts the religious life and hands over the kingdom to his son; this tradition is maintained for 84,000 years, but broken at last, the Buddha remarking "When on the part of one of two successive persons there is a breaking down of such a lovely custom, the former of them is the last (of the line)," *so tesam anuṇṇaviso hoti*. In the same way the carpenter whose son should become a shopkeeper would certainly be considered the last of his line. A memory of the same point of view survives in the attitude of the parent whose son or daughter has committed some heinous offense and who says "you are no child of mine," or even simply "disinherits" the child. The extension of a lineage is literally the repeated rebirth of fathers in sons; each of whom is thought of as taking his father's place in the world. This is the principle of hereditary vocation, and it underlies all the resistance that is offered to the breakdown of the caste system in accordance with which one's function is determined by heredity and not by personal choice. It would hardly be possible to deny that in modern times and before our eyes "civilization" (in this sense, that of the Indian "family and kingdom") has been destroyed by skepticism (materialism), individualism (involving free choice of occupation) and the "rise" (to power) of the proletariat (*sūdra*). In a dictatorship there is government by a single *sūdra*, in a soviet government by a few *sūdras*, and in a democracy government by many *sūdras*, none of these conditions corresponds to Indian conceptions of civilization or order; what the modern terms progress is for the traditionalist disintegration.

⁶³ Chalmers' version confuses the speakers; it is quite clear from the sequence of the text that "Brahman" refers to Kassapa, and "Sumedha" to the Deva. From DhA III.146, we learn that the Deva had been a monk in the time of the Buddha Kassapa and had arisen in the Brahma-world as a nonreturner but not yet fully perfected.

reject, and to dig further. At last he comes to a cobra (*nāga*), and says, "a cobra, your reverence (*bhadante*)." The Brahman answers, "let it be, harm it not, pay it honor."

At this point something is missing; it must be understood that the Deva asks fifteen questions about what has been found, and that Kassapa cannot answer them. The Deva then tells Kassapa to put the questions to the Buddha, whose answer will be convincing. He does so, and the Buddha explains that the interpretation (*adhivacanam*) of the ant-hill is "the body," of the fire "acts," of the smoke "thoughts," of the Brahman "the Tathāgata, the Arahāt, the Fully-awakened"; of Sumedha an "almsman still a pupil," of the spade the "Aryan insight," of the digging "heroic effort,"⁶⁴ of the various objects "bonds, etc. to be rejected," and of the cobra (*nāga*)⁶⁵ "the almsman freed of the foul issues (*khīṇāsava bhikkhu*): Let him be, harm him not, do him honor." We learn from J 1.148 and DhA III.127 that as a result of these interpretations Kassapa became an Arahāt.

In one other context (S v.47, cf. v.53), the attainment of maturity by almsmen is compared to the development of young snakes (or eels)⁶⁶ who are born in the hills and go down to the sea by way of the lakes and rivers, only attaining their full development in the sea, which is here an equivalent of *nibbāna, amata* (see "*samudda*").

It is thus firmly established that *nāga* in the ophidian sense may be the symbol of an Arahāt or Buddha. Further evidence is afforded by Dh 179.

⁶⁴ Digging for buried treasure, in a spiritual sense, appears several times in RV.

⁶⁵ In the chapter immediately following, two Arahāts are described (M 1.151) as "two great *nāgas*," and it is probable that in this case also it is *nāga* as "snake" rather than *nāga* as "elephant" that is meant. In Vin 1.24-25, where the Buddha overcomes Ahi-nāga in the Jaṭila fire-temple, he is referred to as *manussa-nāga* and here *nāga* has certainly its ophidian sense; that the Buddha "fights fire with fire" (*tejasā tejam*) corresponds to TS v.2.4.1, where the kindled Agni and "the Agni that was before *hate one another*." In many other contexts the value of *nāga* is uncertain.

⁶⁶ The word is *nāga*, but the description suggestive rather of an imperfect knowledge of the life history of eels than of snakes. If eels were regarded as "snakes," this may in part account for the characteristic association of *nāgas* with the Waters, but does not affect the symbolic values.

Nāga is probably also "snake" in M 1.386 *nāgassa pantasenassa khīṇasamyojanassa*. Elsewhere *nāga*, as a symbol or epithet of the perfected Buddha or Arahāt, is usually "elephant," and always, of course, where the symbol of the *hatthi-pada* is involved, *nāga* = *hatthi, gaja*. It is from a different point of view, of course, that the elephant's track *can* be followed up, as for example in Mil 346, *yathā pi gajarājasa padam disvāna*, and similar texts corresponding to the doctrine of the *vestigium pedis* in Brahmanical contexts and in Christianity.

"That Buddha whose 'pasture' is infinite (*ananta-gocaram*), being without feet (*apudam*, a kenning for 'snake,' and implying also 'leaving no track'), by what track can you track him down? (*kena padena nessatha*)." This text is closely affiliated to BU III.8.8, where the Brahman is *acaḥsuhśrotram tad apāny apūdam . . . ununtaram*, and Muṅḍ. Up. 1.1.6, where the Brahman is *adrśyam agrāhyam agotram avarṇam acaḥsuhśrotram tad apāny apūdam*, etc., and, it may be added with Shams-i-Tabrīz, "the last step, to fare without feet" and "in me is no 'I' and no 'We,' I am naught, without head, without feet" (Rūmī, *Divān*, pp. 137, 295).

At the same time we have wished to point out the parallel in Greek mythology, where not only may Zeus (= Dyaus Pitṛ = Varuṇa = *apara* Brahman = Buddha *parinibbuto*) be represented as a snake, but the Hero entombed is also a snake: Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (3rd ed., Cambridge, 1922), fig. 96 (the snake is assuredly *within* the tomb) is the very picture of an Indian *thūpa* such as is erected for the Buddha (*passim*), or any *parinibbuto bhikkhu* (Ud 8). Without pursuing the subject further we shall only remark that if the snake is the symbol both of an imperfect nature to be abandoned and of a perfected nature to be realized, this corresponds to the double value of "nonbeing" (1) as a natural evil to be escaped from and (2) as a supernatural good to be attained, and to the polarity that is proper to all "negative" symbols, which imply on the one hand a privation and on the other a freedom from any limiting affirmation.

niccaḥappam. At M 1.249, where, after delivering a discourse, the Buddha says that he composes and settles his heart, focuses it and synthesizes it (*cittam santhāpemi sannisūdemī eḥodī-kuromī samūduhāmī*), and that this is in conformity with the former *samādhi*, "in which *niccaḥappam niccaḥappam viharāmi*," the translator renders by "in which I always dwell." This is to confuse *niccaḥappam* with *niccaḥālam*: the meaning is "which I enjoy, or in which I rest, *whenever I will*." "Always," indeed, contradicts both the sense of the present context, in which the Buddha speaks of himself as entering into this *samādhi* at a certain time, and that of such passages as M 1.482, in which the Buddha's knowledge as a man, as "Gotama, now waking and now sleeping," differs from his knowledge in contemplation.

nibbāyati, nibbāna. It is familiar that *nibbāna* = *nirvāna* implies the extinction of a flame. *Nirvāna* is literally "not-blowing," or more technically,

"despiration": *nibbutam* = *nirvātam* thus corresponding to *avātam* in RV x.129.2, *tad ekam anid avatam* being the exact equivalent of Eckhart's *Dā diu zwei upgründe in einer glicheit sweben gegeistet und engeistet* ("equally spirated, despirated"), *dā ist ein hohes wesen* (Pfeiffer ed., p. 517). The PTS Dictionary, s.v. *nibbāna*, starts, however, with the erroneous statement that *nir-vā* means to "blow," ignoring the regularly privative value of *nis*. Insofar as *nibbāna* depends upon *nirvā*, then, it implies an extinction or death by ceasing to blow, i.e., ceasing to breathe, and not an extinction by blowing "which latter process," as the Dictionary remarks with unconscious pertinence to the history of the idea, "rather tends to incite the fire than to extinguish it": Agni being in fact very often referred to as "quickened" (*jūtaḥ*) or "churned" (*mathitaḥ*) by the Gale (of the Spirit),⁶⁷ *Vāta*, *Vāyu*, *Mātariśvan*, with whom he can also be identified, in accordance with the principle that both Agni and *Vāyu* are "self-kindled" (RV 1.12.6; AB 11.34). Furthermore, the earlier references in the Dictionary are "to the fire going out, rather than to the fire being put out," for which there are excellent metaphysical reasons as well as those "ethical" reasons to which the Dictionary refers. The question of a being "blown out" does not, in fact, arise at any time in connection with the history of *nirvā*. The Dictionary, s.v. *nibbāpeti* (causative of *nibbāyati*), has, indeed, "to make cool by blowing" (this repeats the error noted above) and cites RV x.16.13 *nirvāpaya*, addressed to Agni, who is, as a matter of fact, besought to cool the ground that he has burnt, the still smoldering pyre; but here *nirvāpaya* (causative imperative) is by no means "make cool by blowing," but "make cease to breathe," or "cease to blow," and in this way extinguish his own flames. To "cool," though not by a "blowing" (which would not cool, but only fan the flame) is thus a proper sense of *nirvā*, causative; it occurs thus in J III.157 *sabbam nibbāpuye durum*, "cool all my fever," and survives in Brajabulī, e.g., *nā nibhāy hiyāra āguni*, "It cannot quench the flame at my heart" (S. Sen, *History of Brajabulī Literature*, Calcutta, 1935, p. 406). I cannot believe that *nibbāyati* or *nibbānu* has anything to do with any root (*vr*) meaning to "cover"; for example J VI.196 *jāla . . . nibbāyati* is simply "the fire ceases to draw," and so "goes out."

We can now proceed to notice some of the Pāli and Sanskrit contexts in which *nibbāyati*, or its equivalents, distinctly mean a "going out" of the fire, which is a death in the same sense that we speak of the fire as

⁶⁷ For Agni's despiration, because of which he would go out, and contrasted with his being kept ablaze by fanning or a supply of fuel, cf. ŚB 11.8.3.7.

"dying down." The sense in which the fire "goes out" is almost always, in fact, parabolical, the reference being to the extinction of the flame of life. In M 1.487 the fire is "gone out for want of fuel" (*anāhāro nibbuto*),⁶⁸ that food or fuel, of course, by which the empirical consciousness is supported throughout "life": S 1.159 refers to the "going out of a flame" (*pajjotassa nibbānam*): Sn 19 has "My roof yawns wide, my fire's gone out" (*vivaṭā kuṭi, nibbuto gini*). Needless to say, too, that there are many kinds of "fire," and that in many cases it is specifically the fire of anger (*koḍha*, A 14.96), or more often the fires of passion, delusion, and defect (*rāga moha dosa*, S 14.261) that are extinguished. In Sanskrit contexts *vā*, *nirvā* are usually found with direct reference to spiration, e.g., KB VII.9, where it is a question of the "breaths" (*prāṇaḥ*), and these "though blowing (*vāntaḥ*) in various directions do not blow out" (*na nirvūnti*; Keith's version).⁶⁹ When it is specifically a question of the going out of a fire, which no longer "draws" (air) the usual verb is *udan*,⁷⁰ in which the meanings of "aspire" and "expire" are combined: thus in CU 14.3.1, *yadā ugnir udvāyati vāyum apyati*, "when the Fire gives up its breathing (dies out), it enters the Gale," echoing ŚB x.3.3.8, "when the Fire goes out (*yadā agnir anugacchati*) it is into the Gale that it then blows out (*vāyum tarhi anūdvaṅti*), wherefore they say 'It has expired' (*udavāsīt*)." In the same way for the Sun, Moon, and Quarters "established in the Gale, they are born again of the Gale, forsooth" (*vāyor . . . punar jāyante*, are "born of the Spirit"). "And the Comprehensor thereof, when he departs from this world . . . enters into the Gale with his life-breath, and being in and of it (*etanmaya eva bhūtvā*) he becomes whichever of these divinities he will, and moves at will" (*ilayati, Sāyana samcarati, cestati*).⁷¹ In the same way, Praśna Up. III.9, "For those whose fiery-energy has expired,

⁶⁸ Just as in MU VI.34, "As fire, of fuel destitute, is quenched in its own source, so the will (*cittam*) by the destruction of its versions is quenched (*upaśāmyate*) in its own source." The hermeneutic interpretation of *nibbāna* as *nir-mana*, "without wood," "without fuel," is based on this aspect of the decease of the fire of life. *Anāhāra* = *anābhoga* as interpreted by Paul Mus in the sense "not deriving nourishment from any external source."

⁶⁹ Cf. JUB 1.2.5-6.

⁷⁰ Note that *udāna* in the sense of a "spontaneous utterance" is much rather an "aspiration" (actually, not in the sense of "ambition") than an "inspiration." It is a product of the speaker's own elevation. So C.A.F. Rhys Davids rightly translates *Udāna* (the book so called) by "Verses of Uplift" (ignoring, of course, the vernacular and social meaning of "uplift").

⁷¹ Motion at will being a necessary consequence of consubstantiality with the Gale of the Spirit, which "bloweth where it listeth" (John 3:8), and "as it will" (*yathā vāsam*, RV x.168.4).

so that their fiery-energies are quenched (*tejo ha vā udānas tasmād upa-śāntatejāh*) there is a regeneration (*punar bhavam*), by way of the non-sistence of the powers-of-the-soul in the intellect." There can be no question but that the Buddhist *nibbāyati* preserves the values which are contained in the older texts on *śeṣpiration*.

Our principal purpose in this note, however, is to emphasize that *nibbāna*, and a fortiori *parinibbāna*, is always a death or transformation, and to make it clear in what sense the death is a *summum bonum*, and coincident with a regeneration and the power of resurrection. *Parinibbāna* is, in fact, synonymous with the *parimara* of AB VIII.28, ŚA IV.12-13, and Kauś. Up. II.12,⁷² where "entering into the Gale, and being dead, yet they do not die, because they rise again," with application alike to the divinities and to oneself. *Pari-* is not so much "round about" as (1) "thoroughly," in the sense that "the kingdom of God is for none but the thoroughly dead"; and (2) "towards" or "in," as when we speak of "dying in the Lord": who in these contexts as in those cited above is Brahman identified with "He who blows (*vāti*) here," i.e., Vayu, who does not blow yonder (ŚB VIII.7.3.9), but as *tad ekam*, "That One," "blow-eth *anā* is still" (*anid avātam*, RV X.129.2), nor ever "goeth home," being himself the "home" (*astam*) to which all others return (JUB III.1-3; BU I.5.22), not excepting the Muni freed from mental and physical both (*nāmahāyā vimutto = nāmarūpayā vimutto*), who "as a spark that is sped by the force of the wind 'goes home' and no count can be kept of him" (Sn 1074); they are "gone with the wind"; and, as we know, this expression (*vāyogatah*)⁷³ is the same as "unified" (*ekho bhūtvā*), both of these being common ways in Indian literature of saying "dead."

It must be realized, however, that there are many deaths, of which that death in due course after which one is laid on the pyre is only one

⁷² *Praviṣya vāyau mṛtvā n na mṛchanti, tasmād eva punar aīranti*: one of the finest of the Indian texts on death and regeneration. The regeneration of the Comprehensor (*evagantvā*) at death, when he is "born again" of the fire (and "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God," John 3:3), is prefigured in the ritual, where, for example, inasmuch as the priest repeats the whole of the hymns, "he brings to birth (*pra janayati*) the sacrificer, who is now an embryo, from the Sacrifice as womb," AB VI.9, the Sacrifice itself being identified with the Gale, *ibid.*, v.33.

⁷³ *Vāyogatah*, accordingly, presumes the fulfillment of the wish so poignantly expressed in the Vedic requiems X.14.8 and 16.3, *hiyāvadyam punar astam chi, sam-gacchasva tanvā suvarcā . . . gacchatu vātum ūmā*, "All the accursed (evil) struck away, go home again, be constituted in a lady of glory. . . . Fare thy spirit to the Gale."

amongst many others. All change is a dying, and at the same time involves the birth of a new man (who may be better or worse than the old, but in our contexts which are concerned with true Wayfarers, is always a better man),⁷⁴ as is explicit in S II.95, where "will, thought, discrimination (*citta, mana, viññāna*), all this arises as one and is destroyed as another, every night and every day," and A II.82, where with reference to a change of occupation and status, a man is said to "die to the one and be born to such another" (*tato cuto itthattam āgacchati*).⁷⁵ It is from the same point of view that the application of *nibbuto* and *parinibbuto* to still-living human beings must be understood. The Mahāsambodhi as a *nibbāna* is the death of the Bodhisattva, and the birth of a Buddha, the Wake,⁷⁶ and similarly in the case of others spoken of as *nibbuto* or even *parinibbuto*⁷⁷ here and now.

Parinibbāyati thus implies not merely the death of a self, but like all deaths whatever, the bringing to birth⁷⁸ or making-become (*bhāvanā*) of

⁷⁴ M 1.388-90, however, deals with the case of the man who "goes to the dogs."

⁷⁵ Cf. Augustine, *Contra Max.*, "all change is a kind of death." What is cited above from S and A is stated in almost identical terms by Plato in the Symposium, and by Eckhart, "The soul's progression is matter, wherein she puts on new forms and puts off old ones: the one she doffs she dies to, and the one she dons she lives in" (Pfeiffer: ed., p. 530), like BG II.22 and BU IV.4.4, but no more than either of these a doctrine of "reincarnation."

The formula expressing change of occupation is identical with that in which the Buddha's descent from the Tusita heaven is stated, D II.146, *so tato cuto itthattam āgato* (where it may be further remarked that *itthattam āgato* is tantamount to *tathāgata*); and it is in the same terms that a series of rebirths is described, e.g., DhA IV.51 *tato cutā seṭṭhikule nibbattā*.

⁷⁶ In the same way ordination, in many respects analogous to initiation, is a "birth" (therefore also a "death" of the layman as such), as in M II.103, where we have (1) *yato . . . jāto*, "from the day I was born" and (2) *yato . . . ariyāya jātiyā jāto*, "from the day of my birth in the Noble Race," i.e., as a Sakyaputta, a "Buddha's son," birth in this sense being a filiation. To be awakened is the same as to come into being, RV *passim*, especially in connection with Agni (*uṣar budh*). "Wake" in the sense "to be born" may be noted in *Widsiðh*, line 5, and we can still speak of "waking to the light of day" in this sense [see *Widsiðh*, ed. Kemp Malone, London, 1936—ED.].

⁷⁷ E.g., A II.155, which distinguishes those who are *parinibbuto* "here and now, before our very eyes" (*diṭṭh'eva dhamme*) and those who are *parinibbuto* only "at death" (*khūyassa bheda*). These two *parinibbānas* are again subdivided according to whether they are attained "with means" (*sasankhāra = sasamskāraṇa*) or without, this depending on whether the pupil's powers (*sekha-balāni*) are "dull" (*muḍḍatā*) or "superabundantly manifested" (*ādhimattāni pātubhavanāni*).

⁷⁸ This sense of *bhū* (causative) is explicit in AĀ II.5 *khūmāram . . . bhavayati*. In many other contexts *bhū* (causative) has the creative significance of *ma*, and similarly where it means to "evoke" a mental image.

another self. Every step on the Way uses a "dead self," now seen to be "not mine, not I," as a rung or stepping stone, and it is thus that the Wayfarer's very Self would come into being (*bhūṣṇur-ātmā*, AB VII.15), and is more and more clearly revealed (*āvistarām-ātmā*, AĀ II.3.2): the final product, "when all has been done that was to be done" (*ḥataḥkīcco, katanāṃ karaṇīyam, passim; kṛtakṛtyah* in AĀ II.5 and MU VI.30),⁷⁹ being the Spirit all-in-being, a finished and perfected Self (*bhāvītātā, passim; kṛtātman* as in CU VIII.13).⁸⁰ *Parinibbāyati* in this sense of "bringing to perfection" occurs repeatedly in the striking text M 1.446, where the word is used in connection with each of the ten stages of the training of a noble stallion (and it should not be overlooked that the Almsman whose lower self has been brought under complete control [*attā sudanto*] is often compared to a well-trained steed). What we have wished to bring out, then, is that *parinibbuto* in the sense of "dead" has not the limiting value that is commonly attached to this word,⁸¹ but also implies "regenerate." *Parinibbuto* has both of the values that inhere in the word "finished," which can mean either "dead" (as in the expression, "that was his finish") or "brought to perfection" (in the sense that we speak of a "finished prod-

⁷⁹ AĀ II.5 *ātmā kṛtakṛtyo vāyogataḥ praiti . . . prayann eva punar jāyate*, "the spirit, all in act, enters in to the Gale and departs, and departing, is regenerated": MU VI.30 *kṛtakṛtyo . . . sauram dvāram bhītvā*, etc., "all in act, he breaks through the Sundoor, and follows the path of that one of the solar rays that pierces through the Orb and continues beyond the Brahma world, whereby men attain the highest goal."

⁸⁰ *Kṛtāmā brahmalokaṃ abhīsambhavāmi*, the "answer" to Sn 508, *ḥen' attanā gacchati brahmalokaṃ*.

⁸¹ A limiting value that can only be attached to the event of death by those who see *anattani attānam*, "their self in what is not their self." These must fear death and must grieve, both for their own loss, and for the deceased, who "is no more." It is precisely the same kind of grief that is felt by the profane when a religious "leaves the world" or is initiated, which events are also deaths, cf. JUB III.8.1. On the other hand, funeral rites in a traditional society are occasions, not of grief, but of rejoicing: cf. D II.161, where at the Buddha's decease he is honored as kings are honored "with dancing, singing, and instrumental music." Z. L. C. was at one time living near the Burning Ghat in Benares; she saw many funeral processions and observed that the "mourners'" faces were radiant. Only once she saw an old man weeping bitterly as he followed the corpse. On pointing this out to her old woman servant, the latter replied with scorn, "He is only an ignorant peasant" (or as the Buddhist would have expressed it, an *asuta puthujjana*: it is the "worldly-minded" Devas alone that weep at the Buddha's death, D II.139). The traditional position assumes that the deceased, as *kṛtakṛtyah*, etc., is *vāyogataḥ, punar bhūtvā, udita, amṛta*, the traditional way of life presupposing this as its normal conclusion, death being "the ablation at the conclusion of life's ritual," as in CU III.17.5.

uct").⁸² We need hardly say that all perfection and all peace imply in this way the death of whatever had been imperfect or not at peace;⁸³ all motion ends when it attains the goal to which it was directed; Death is the "Ender" (*antaḥā*), but also the solar Eros, the Great Spirit (*mahātman*) who welcomes the perfected at World's End. *Parinibbuto*, literally "despirated," is thus "finished" in both senses of the word; and it is only if we realize this that we can fully understand why the faithful Buddhist, when he sees the Buddha's tomb (*thūpa*), is moved not by sorrow, but with the "thrill" (*saṃvejana*) of understanding, and exclaims triumphantly, "Here the Tathāgata was altogether finished (*parinibbuto*) with that attainment of despiration (*nibbāna*) that is without residuum of assumption."

nettiyā. *Bhava-nettiyā* is not, as it has been rendered at least once, "the Bye of Existence," but conduits of existence (or becoming, birth). Just as in M II.105, etc., *udakam hi nayanti nettikā*, "irrigators (makers of channels, or 'leads' for the water) conduct the water." *Bhava-netti* is correctly explained in the Dictionary as "leader to renewed existence." But at ŚA II.336, cf. DA 127, etc., it is explained as *raju*, "cord": *bhava-raju* being the cord that ties one to becoming or renewed existence. Similarly at AĀ III.2, where it is explicitly stated that this *raju* = *netti* is the cord "by which beings like cattle tied by the neck, are led to such and such an existence." The Tathāgata is the cutter of this *netti*, D 1.46, which is the thirst for existence (DA 128), and so the cord that leads to it until cut.

⁸² "Finished" in these two senses provides us with the reason (*ratio*) of the well-known superstition of the "evil eye." For only that which is imperfect, unfinished (*avarinibbuto*) is still "alive": to recognize that a thing is perfect is as much as to say that it is a finished product, no longer viable because already *geworden was er ist*, already come to its "end." For this reason (of which he may be quite unaware) the craftsman often leaves in his work some small defect, and for this reason that the possessor of a beautiful object does not like to hear it unduly praised, and will even give it away to the thoughtless admirer; or if it can not be given away, takes steps to "avert" the evil eye. We can also see why the "evil eye" does not necessarily imply an evil intention; the evil consequence is the result of what is usually an inadvertent imputation of "finish" in the sinister sense. And as usual, the superstition or "standover" is only really such when its reason has been forgotten: the superstition of the evil eye corresponds to what may have been a matter of fact in a society more sensitive than ours to the direct effects of mental acts, whether expressed or not expressed in words.

⁸³ *Santa*, "at peace," Skr. *śānti*, "peace," from *śam*, always in sacrificial contexts "to give the quietus," to slake, to kill. It should not be overlooked that the victim in these contexts is always, in the last analysis, the sacrificer himself, whose ritual death prefigures his final "rest."

Cf. Itiv, p. 94, *netticchinna bhikkhu*, he who has cut the *netti*, and for whom there is no renewed existence, thirst, or craving, *tanhū*, being got rid of, UdA 272. We never meet with the expression *bhava cakku* (only *mamsa-cakku*); and the Pāli *netta* = *netra* is more often "that which leads," e.g., "reins" (*nettāni*, S 126), than literally "eye," which in any case is a secondary and not a primary meaning of the word.

pacchi. In *ḷilañja-pacchi*, J vi.370, rush-baskets," not, as translated by Cowell and Rouse, "rolls of matting." The baskets of J vi.370, with their lids, are clearly shown at Bharhut, Cunningham pl. 25, fig. 3. The Dictionary thinks the etymology "doubtful," but the root is surely *pracchad*, to cover, envelop, conceal.

pādavāra and *pādacchida*. DhA III.216 describes the Buddha's ascent to the Heaven of the Thirty-three, from Sāvattī. "He lifted up his right foot and set it down on the summit of Mt. Yugandhara, then he lifted up his left foot and set it down on the summit of Mt. Sineru (Meru), and thus in just three stands (*ayo vu pādavārū*) and two strides (*dve pādacchidāni*), he traversed sixty-eight hundred thousand leagues," and there seated himself on Indra's golden throne. Burlingame's version, "in three strides, setting foot on earth but twice," reverses the proper meanings of the two words in question, and is at the same time unintelligible. *Pādavāra* is the pause in walking, when both feet are brought together; there are three such "stands," first at Sāvattī, second on Yugandhara, and third on Sineru. *Pādacchida* is, as the word itself implies, the "separation of the feet" in striding: the word corresponds to *padacchedana*, *padabhājanu*, and *padavibhāga*, denoting the analysis of verse to form a *pada* text, the converse of *padasamsagga*, *padasamdhī* implying the conjunction of the words and corresponding to *pādavāra*. Not only does the corrected rendering make sense, but it enables us to recognize the correspondence of the Buddha's two with the first two of Viṣṇu's three strides; the summit reached by the Buddha on this occasion is solar, like that which he assumes on Mt. Gṛdrakūṭa, not supra-solar, the Heaven of the Thirty-three over which the solar Indra presides being neither a Brahmāloka nor an aspect of Nibbāna.

Pādavāra and *pādavāra* occur also in J 1213 and 506; in the latter context it is especially clear that a pause is implied, the description being of a deliberate walk "as though at every step (*pādavāre pādavāre*) he were putting down a bag of a thousand pieces of gold"—which could not be done without pausing. It may be pointed out that it is, in fact, always with

one foot that a stride is taken, the other being left behind during motion. In the Bhārhut relief (Cunningham, pl. 17, center) representing the subsequent descent at Sāmkassa, we therefore see on the topmost rung of the ladder one foot, and on its lowest rung the other: the descent is made in a single stride; we have the actual picture of a *pādacchida*. It is in the same way that the Sun has regularly "one foot" or ray with which he walks and thus reaches every creature upon whom he bestows his being, RV etc., *passim*, but the feet of Death (who is also the Sun), thought of as planted in the heart (*hrdaye pādāv atihatau*, ŚB x.5.2.13) are two, "and when he separates them, he departs (*āchidyotkrāmati*):" where *āchidya* is rather "separating" than Eggeling's "cuts off," since it is actually a *pādacchida* that takes place at death, when the spirit "strides away (*utkrāmati*)," or as in BU iv.4.3, where "this spirit, striking down the body and dismissing ignorance, striding another stride (*anyam ākrāman ākrāmya*), draws itself together," i.e., enters into its source, returns to itself, *ākramya* again implying a *pādacchida*.

The ŚB text continues, "and when he (Death, the Person in the solar Orb) ascends (*utkrāmati*), this person (in the right eye) dies. Hence they call the former (*etaḍ*) the 'departed' (*pretam*), and say of the latter (*asya*) 'It has been cut off' (*āchedi*)."⁸⁴ The *preta* is the immanent *ātman*, the "ghost" that the man "gives up" when he "expires," "that other self of his" that having done its work "departs" or "proceeds" (*praiti*) when the time comes (AĀ ii.5), while the psycho-physical manifestation is left behind, just as one foot is left behind in striding.⁸⁵

It should be noted that *pāduka* in Pāli is always "slipper," and is not

⁸⁴ Eggeling's version is insufficiently literal, ignoring the distinction of "former" and "latter."

⁸⁵ It is in just the same way that in the introductory sacrifice (*prayansya*), the sacrificer (who has just undergone the ritual death of initiation) "proceeds (*praiti*, AB 1.7)" to the world of heaven—leaving behind him, of course, the human self to which he will only return (as from the truth to what is false) when the operation is abandoned, and he formally desecrates himself (ŚB 1.9.3.23 with VS 1.5, AB vii.24, cf. ŚB iii.9.4.2), the human self that he sacrifices in the rite (as *ātmanyajñi*) so as to be "emptied" of self (ŚB iii.8.1.2). What is thus "left" behind is an *ahī* in the sense of JB iii.77 (*yad ahīyata tad ahīnam ahītvam*), cf. PB xii.11.11, where Kalyāṇa is "left behind, for he had told a lie" (as men do, but the gods do not, *passim*) and becomes a *svitra*, i.e., *ahī*.

Preta is then, at least originally and properly, the immanent deity, the "ghost," i.e., Sanctus Spiritus, that a man "gives up" when he "expires" (*apānati*, *ucchvāsati*, etc.). If *preta* (and especially Buddhist *petā*) comes to mean also "ghost" in a much lower sense, it is in the same way that Yaksa, originally = Brahman, Ātman, Daimon can become also "demon," and that "spirit" can refer to such all-too-human entities as those with which the "spiritualist" concerns himself.

a proper term to be applied to the footprints as represented in art. We find in the literature only *pada* or *pāda* for "footprint" as well as for "foot"; for example, in M 1.175 ff. and S 1.86, *tathāgatapada* and *hatthi-pada* are "Buddha's footprint" and "elephant's footprint." The expression *pada-valāñja* occurs in DhA III.194, and the "foot-trace" left by the Buddha is referred to as a *pada-cetiya*; this last is clearly the term that should be used in iconographic descriptions.

pabbāhati. In the Dictionary, s.v. *pabbāhati*, Skr. *prabarh*, *pravṛh*, as in KU II.13, *pravṛhya* (*anum*). *Pabbāheyya* and *pabbāhā* (v.l., *pavāḥha*) occur in M II.17, meaning "might draw forth" and "drawn forth." The Dictionary reference of *pavāḥha* to *pravṛh* is certainly correct, for the Pāli *muñjamaḥā isikāṃ pabbāheyya* corresponds exactly to *muñjād isikāṃ vivṛhet* in JB II.134 and similar contexts. The metaphor is repeated in D 1.77. The Pāli versions show clearly that the real meaning is not so much "might draw the reed from its sheath" as "draw the arrow from the reed"; if the *isikā* had not been thought of as "arrow," there would have been no point in the words *añño muñjo uṇṇā isikā*. It is plain that when the fletcher goes to the *muñja* marshes to gather shafts, he pulls them from the plants which are left in place, and that what he pulls out is for him the "arrow" and what is left the "plant." The metaphor applies in the Pāli contexts to the drawing out of a supernatural body from this mortal body;⁸⁹ cf. ŚB IV.3.3.16.

pāsa. In J III.282, Francis and Neil misrender *pāsa vijjhitvā* by "which pierced dice"; the Bodhisatta, however, is the subject of *vijjhitvā*, and *sūcim* its object; the meaning is "perforated with an eye." *Supāsium* and *supāsam* below mean "having a well-made eye."

That *pāsa* (Skr. *pāsa*) can mean "needle's eye" is of double interest. In the first place, *pāsa* is essentially "loop," and as such "noose," etc. The application of a word meaning "loop" to the eye of a needle suggests a period when the first metal needles were made of wire with one end bent over to form a "loop" or "eye." And in the second place, because the "eye of the needle" (and such a needle in particular as the Bodhisatta makes in the *Jātaka*, "it cannot be told how, but only that the purposes of the Buddhas succeed [*ijjhanti*"]") is a recognized aspect of the Janua Coeli,

⁸⁹ In these contexts *isikā* is no more "reed" (the plant) than *asi* (sword) is *koṭi* (scabbard), or *ahi* (snake) is *kaṇḍa* (slough).

Sundoor and "narrow gate," and *pāsa* being also "noose" (in the hands of Mṛtyu, Yama, and Varuṇa), we realize that the loop of Death's lasso is still another aspect of the Gate, and that to slip through the noose without its tightening upon you is the same as to have passed through the jaws of Death without their closing upon you, just as the "threading of the needle" is the passage of the Sundoor in the symbolism of embroidery.

So far, of course, with reference to the "last death of the soul," in which the "threading of the needle" is the passage of the Sundoor. To pass through the needle's eye (cf. Dante, *Purgatorio* x.16) or to evade the noose can also be used with reference to any passage, all passages implying change, and all change a dying (to what was before). We are concerned here only with the general symbolic equivalence of the eye of the needle and loop of the noose.

piṇḍika. In J VI.376 it must be the globular termination or finial of the handle of the umbrella, *piṇḍa* being a lump, ball. This is supported by the facts that Skr. *piṇḍaka* is cited from a lexikon as "nave of a wheel," and also as a "round swelling or protuberance," and that in the *Aupapātika Sūtra*, §16, *piṇḍiya* corresponds to *usniṣa* in its later sense of "cranial protuberance." Cf. *sākhā*.

beluva (*-paṇḍu-vīṇā*). The Dictionary has "flute" (twice), but this is only a misprint for "lute." S.v. *vīṇā*, the Dictionary has "lute, mandoline . . . lyre." The *vīṇā* of the text is, however, a postless harp. For this and the Pāli names for other parts and appurtenances of the harp, see Coomaraswamy, "The Parts of a *vīṇā*" in JAOS, LVII (1937), with further references. The Dictionary in particular misrenders *koṇa*, which is not "bow" but "plectrum."

bhū. The following discussion is by no means to be taken as an argument against the general position taken by C.A.F. Rhys Davids in *To Become or Not To Become* (London, 1937); I am in agreement with this position. The discussion is solely with reference to the meaning of the future form *bhavissati* in A II.37, where the Brahman Doua finds the Buddha's wheel-marked footprints and, as he looks at them, says to himself, "It cannot be that these are the footprints of a human being." It

is not denied that *na bhavissati*, although future in form, has here the conjectural value "cannot be," with reference to the present fact, and not to any future becoming; that the footprints *are* surely not those of a man is the point. Before going further it may be remarked that there is no dispute that the future form of *bhū* can have this gnomic value in Pāli; of countless examples, not to mention those given by Rhys Davids herself, I cite only J VI.364, "your name must be Amarā (*tvam amarā nāma bhavissati*)," certainly with reference to present fact; and J VI.365, *udakam na laddham bhavissati*, "It must be that you did not get water," i.e., at the time when it *was* needed for the crops. We find the same usage in Sanskrit already in RV I.164.39, *kim ya karisyati*, "What will he do with the verse?" i.e., what use *is* it to him.

So far so good. But in the following context of A II.38, F. L. Woodward and Rhys Davids (*To Become or Not To Become*, p. 99) have insisted upon rendering *manusso . . . bhavissati* by "will become a human being?" and *na . . . manusso bhavissāmi* by "I shall not become a human being," with specific reference to the future. This is insisted upon in spite of the fact that the Buddha concludes his remarks by saying that all those conditions according to which he might have been a man (or *deva*, *gundhabba*, *yakkha*, etc.) have been killed, "so that I *am* the Wake (*tasmā buddho'smi*)." It is in just the same way that at Mil 346 we find *bhavissati* and *atthi* used synonymously in one and the same connection, and both meaning "must surely be" or "assuredly is." It may also be observed that in J V.317, where a similar question is put to Nanda, he replies that he is, or literally "has become," a man (*manussu-bhūto*).

In our disputed context we have, first, a future with an admittedly present conjectural value; then a series of futures with disputed value; and finally a pronouncement definitely in the present, with respect to the questions and answers that intervene. We cannot but think that our authors force the future sense only because of their extreme unwillingness to allow the Buddha to say of himself, "I *am* not a man, or god, or eros, or daimon." It is true that in innumerable contexts of the Nikāyas it is explicit that a Buddha or Arhat is emancipated from being in *any* given way, is nameless, cannot be reached or understood, and so forth; but all these our authors would reject as interpolations or developments. To me the texts appear to be self-consistent; for me the "higher criticism" of these texts amounts to a dangerous reading out of them whatever does not seem to *us* suitable or true. I take the texts as they stand. But it would seem to be far better to call our passage an interpolation than to trans-

late it in plain contradiction of the syntax. The Buddha is asked "What are thou?" and answers "I am not any what," that is, essentially, as in Sn 455-56 *koçi no'mhi . . . ākimcāno . . . carāmi loke . . . akalla maṃ . . . pucchi gotta-pañham*.

rasa. We shall see that *vyāñjana* is distinguished from *attha* very much as flavor is distinguished from food. In one *Nikāya* text the word *rasa* actually takes the place which is usually taken by *vyāñjana*: this is A 1.36, where "those who get the flavor of the meaning" is *attha-rasassa . . . lābhino*, and here we can hardly fail to remark that *rasa* is used essentially as it is in the later rhetoric. The earlier history of the word *rasa* needs fuller treatment in a separate article, but we do wish to suggest that even in other than, and older than, *Alamkāra* contexts, and even when the reference is to Deity (*so vai rasa*), the word should be rendered in most cases by "flavor" rather than by "essence." The word "essence" is needed in its proper sense for such terms as *bhūtata* ("being," in principle; for *atthitā* we should prefer to say "existence," distinguishing *esse* from *essentia vel quidditas*, i.e., "being in itself" from *ti-bhavābhava*, τὸ ὄν from τὸ φαινομένον). On the other hand, to speak of the "flavor" of knowledge, or of "digesting an idea" (or "assimilation" = *adaequatio rei et intellectus*), or even of "tasting God" ("O taste and see that the Lord is good") is by no means foreign to the genius of European languages, Latin *sapientia* being etymologically a "tastiness," and as St. Thomas Aquinas expresses it, "Quasi sapida scientia, seu scientia cum sapore (Pāli *savyāñjanam!*), id est cognitio cum amore (Pāli *pīti!*)," *Sum. Theol.*, I.13.5, and II-II.45.2-3 with further references.⁵⁷

The *attha-rasassa lābhī* of our text will be, of course, the "Great Self," not the "little self" of A 1.249, the "Fair Self" and not the "foul self" of A 1.149: just as in AV x.8.44 it is the "Immortal, Contemplative Self," the Spirit that is, that is "delighted by the flavor" (*rasena tṛptāh*). The flavor, in other words, is the "immortal" part of the meaning: and just as in the later rhetoric (*Sāhitya Darpaṇa* III.2-3) the "tasting of the flavor" (*ra-*

⁵⁷ Cf. Ibn al-'Arabī, *Tarjumān al-Ashwāq* (ed. R. A. Nicholson, London, 1911) xxv.4, and his own commentary, where "the saliva in which I tasted white honey" stands for the "sciences of communion and converse and speech which leave a delicious taste in the heart."

The mention of honey here reflects the traditional symbolism of bees and honey, where "honey" is the knowledge of things *sub specie aeternitatis*, and in fact that "nectar" (*amṛta*) of which the gods partake and in virtue of which they are "immortals" (*amṛtāsah*).

sāsvādāna) is called the cognate of the "tasting of Brahman" (*brahmāsvādāna*), so here it can be said with Augustine that "even we ourselves as mentally *tasting* something eternal, are not in this world" (*De Trinitate* IV.20).

lekhaṇī. Pencil, crayon, brush,⁸⁸ or any pointed tool used in carving wood or ivory; never "stencil," as also given in the PTS Dictionary. In A II.200, where the making of a dug-out canoe from a tree is described, the *lekhaṇī* is the most delicate of the three tools used before the polishing is done. The log is "hewn with axes," or perhaps "adzes" (*kaṭhārihi tacchetvā*), "cut with chisels (*vāsīhi tacchetvā*)," "graven with the 'spear-point' (*lekhaṇiyā likhivā*)," and finally "smoothed with a round pebble (*pāsānaguleṇa dhopetvā*)." We render *lekhaṇī* by "spear-point," the technical name of a certain wood-turner's tool, bearing in mind that one of the meanings of *likh* is to "turn" (wood or ivory),⁸⁹ and because in the present case, although there is no question of turning, something like a wood-engraver's pointed tool must be meant; and *likhivā* by "graven" in the sense of "graven" image. *Lekhaṇiyā likhivā* might also mean "carved" in the sense of decorated, but this seems unlikely in the present context, where the "graving" is preparatory to smoothing. It is probable that metal tools are implied at this period, but the process described must have come down from prehistoric times, when the same or similar terms could have denoted stone tools. There remains a further and perhaps even more plausible alternative, according to which *lekhaṇiyā likhivā* would mean "painted with a paintbrush": that a polishing with an "agate burnisher" should follow this would be quite intelligible.

vatra. "Vṛtra": J V.153 *indo vatrabhū . . . sukko*: S I.27, *vatra-bhū*.

vaḍḍhamāna. I accept Dr. Johnson's argument (*JRAS*, 1932, pp. 392-98, and 1933, p. 69c) to the effect that the three-pointed symbol sometimes called *trīśūla* or *triratna* in early Buddhist art has properly been referred to as the "*vaḍḍhamāna*." It is perhaps only by chance that we do not find any reference to the symbol in Pāli literature, and hence no occurrence of the word *vaḍḍhamāna* with reference to a symbol. The word occurs in early Jaina literature as the name of a symbol. As regards the word in

⁸⁸ For these senses at a later period see *Technical Studies*, III (1934), 71, 74. *Likh* occurs in Pāli in the senses of draw, write, carve, turn; *lekhaṇī* as pencil or brush in Mhv.

⁸⁹ Cf. JAOS, XLVIII, 263-64.

other senses, and primarily those of the root meaning ("increase"), it is curious that the Dictionary, s.v., equates *vaḍḍhamāna* in Dpv XI.33 with *vaḍḍhana* in Mhv XXIII.33, overlooking that *vaḍḍhamāna* itself occurs in the very next verse of the text in a sense explained in the Dictionary, s.v. *vaḍḍhati*. The word occurs also in Mhv XI.30, where *vaḍḍhamānaṃ kumārīkaṃ* is "a girl in the bloom of her youth" (Geiger, or as I should prefer to say, "a still growing girl"). There is also a Pāli *vaḍḍhamiḥka* meaning a dish from which food is served, and this explains the later Jaina *vaḍḍhamānaga* in the sense of "auspicious vessel" (distinct from *punna-ghata*).

viṭṭamsa. I fail to see why the proposed etymology (*vi tan*) is "not clear": the meaning is "snare" (for birds): it is proverbially "in vain that the net is spread in the sight of any bird"; the Old Testament abounds in references to the *spreading* of nets and snares; and for illustrations of *outspread* snares, see *MFA Bulletin*, No. 210, pp. 50-53.

vyāñjana (contrasted with *attha*). Before we discuss these terms in the Pāli contexts, we must assume the meaning of *attha* in relation to *dhamma* discussed above, s.v. *attha* = *artha*. It will also be advisable to consider the meaning of *vyāñjana* in pre- and post-Pāli contexts in order to put the question (of considerable interest from the point of view of the history of Indian rhetoric) whether or not Pāli *vyāñjana* has really a meaning contradictory of its meaning in these pre- and post-Pāli contexts. The primary sense of the root (*vyāñj*) is to "anoint," and hence to "adorn," "flavor" (drink, food), and "illustrate" or "manifest." For the first three of these values in RV, cf. Grassmann's *Wörterbuch*, s.v. *ūñj*. *Vyāñjana* (n.) is "adornment" in RV VIII.78.2. In the later rhetoric, three kinds of meaning (*artha*) of a proposition (*vācakaṃ*) are distinguished, viz. *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā*, and *vyāñjanā*, respectively literal, figurative, and parabolical (*Sāhitya Darpana*, II.3 etc.), the latter coinciding with what is called the "flavor (*rasa*)" of a poetical text defined as a "statement (having the letter for its body and) flavor as its informing spirit (*kāvyaṃ rasātmaṅ vākyaṃ*)."

On the other hand, the PTS Dictionary has under *Vyāñjana*, "Letter (of a word) as opposed to *attha* (meaning, sense, spirit)," and under *Savyāñjana* only "with the letters."⁹⁰ Most of the translators render, ac-

⁹⁰ It would be difficult to reconcile this with S II.51, where it is asked, "Have you declared Arahatta (*ayā aññā vyākatā*), viz. *khiṇā jātī . . . nāparam itthattāya?*"

cordingly, *attha* as "spirit" and *vyāñjana* as "letter."⁹¹ If this could be justified we should be faced with the curious phenomenon of a temporary reversal of the basic meanings of the word *vyāñjana*. We have shown, s.v. *attha*, that the meaning of *attha* is anything but "spirit."

We propose to discuss the word in its Pāli contexts, beginning with the simplest and leading up to the more difficult. In J vi.366, Amara Devī is preparing a rice pudding with milk, and "adds suitable flavoring" (*tadanurūpam vyāñjanam sampādetvā*). When the Bodhisatta closes his teeth on her "flavored pudding" (*savyāñjanam yūgum ulūsi*), his sense of taste is thrilled (*rasa-haraṇiyo*).

In Vin 1.40 an inquirer asks, "What does the Master teach?" The disciple answers, "I am not able to set forth the doctrine to you at length (*vitthārena dhammam desetum*), but I can tell you its purport briefly (*samkhitena attham vaḅkḅhāmi*)." The questioner replies, "Whether you say little or much, tell me in any case the purport (*attham yeva me brūhi*)—in accordance with its intention, I mean (*atthen'eva me attho*)—why should you make a great elaboration (*kiṃ kāhasi vyāñjanam bahum*)?" The answer is the following "doctrinal formula (*āhamma-pariyayam*):" "Of all things that are of causal origin, the Tathāgata has told the cause, and so too has the Great Monk proclaimed their suppression" (the well-known "Buddhist confession" which is found as an inscription on so many examples of Buddhist art, as if this were the essence of their message). There is no question of "spirit and letter" here: what the inquirer

The answer is that this meaning (*attha*) was not stated "In these very words (*etehi padehi*) or with these very trappings (*etehi vyāñjanehi*)." The Buddha responds by saying that by whatever "alternative formula (*pariyāya*, paraphrase, circumlocution)" *atthā* has been declared, one must take it as having been declared.

It may be noted incidentally that Pāli *vyatta* = Skr. *vyakta* (pp. of *vyāñi*), and its opposite *avyatta* are applied to persons, not to statements, as if one should speak of an "explicit, or inexplicit speaker" rather than of "explicit, or inexplicit speech"; that *vyāñjayati* (to "characterize," etc.) occurs only in Commentaries; and that the quite different word *vyākāroti* is rather to "state or propound" than to "explain."

⁹¹ So, I think always, in the PTS translations by C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward. The SBE version of the *Mahāvagga* by T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg is inconsistent: at Vin 1.40-41 (Mhv 1.23.4-5), *attha* is rendered by "spirit" and *vyāñjanu* by "letter," but 1.358 (x.6.2) *attha* is rendered by "letter" and *vyāñjana* by "spirit."

In the last context (text) for *atthupetā ca vyāñjanupetā ca* read *atthupetāvyañjanupetā*, i.e., *atthupetā-avyāñjanupetā*: the contrast is with *atthupetā ca vyāñjanupetā ca*.

really wants to know is "what he must do to be saved." In terms of the preceding reference, he is hungry and wants primarily food, not caring whether it be "seasoned" or "elaborated." *Attham* is here the application, or immediate bearing of the doctrine; *vyāñjanam* its "flavor," and the same as that *attha-rasa* that is tasted only by the few (A 1.36).⁹²

In A 11.160 where we have, "when the analytical factors of the meaning (*attha-patisambhidā*)"⁹³ have been verified (*sacchikātvā*)⁹⁴ both as regards

⁹² Even briefer is the Buddha's enunciation of *kammavāda* in the two words *paṭisamuppannam dukkham*, with respect to which Āraṇḍa exclaims, "It is marvelous, how this whole matter has been stated in a single phrase (*ekena ḅadena*)! Had it been set forth at length, it would have been seen to be deep (*gambhīro*) in fact as well as in seeming!"

⁹³ For the four *patisambhidā* see the PTS Dictionary, s.v. The four are *attha*, *dhamma*, *nirutti* (= hermeneia), *paṭibhāna* ("illumination," a meaning given in the Dictionary (cf. S 1.187 and *Kindred Sayings* [= S], Vol. I, p. 237), in connection with which it may be noted that *pratibhā* in the sense to "flash upon the mind" is hardly "late" Skr., since it occurs in the Upaniṣads). The four meanings would seem to be moral, literal, hermeneutic, and anagogic or parabolical. They are often mentioned in connection with and as if necessary to the attainment of Arahata, in the formula *saha patisambhidāhi arahattam pāpuṇati*, Mil 18, etc. Cf. Dh 352, *nirutti-pada-kovido*, *akḅharānam sannipātam jānā pūbhāparāni ca, sa ve antima-sariro, mahāpāṇi, mahāpuriso ti vuccati*. Here there is an unmistakable recognition of the spiritual value of semantic and grammatical scholarship; but it must be remembered that these sciences cannot be exactly identified with their modern "equivalents," *nirukta* being much rather "hermeneia" than "etymology" in our sense.

The students will find it profitable to compare with this the four meanings, literal, moral, allegorical, and parabolical, in Scholastic Christian exegesis, as defined, e.g., in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* 1.1.10. Most important and of universal application is the proposition that "the parabolical meaning is contained in the literal." For this reason it is very necessary not only to have understood the precise meaning of the Pāli symbols, but also to translate them literally (*ipsae res significatae per voces eūam significant aliquid*).

⁹⁴ We suggest the use of "verify" for Pāli *sacchikāroti* and "verification" for *sacchikiriya* (the so-called "Act of Truth"). Cf. our expression, "to make a thing come true." It should be noted, however, that from the Indian point of view, the possibility of this depends upon truth in the agent, cf. J 1.214 *bodhisatto . . . sacca-sabhāvam ārabhha sacchiriyam karonto*. In other contexts we find that "realization" is expressed by the phrase *yoniso manasikāra*, "an original act of intellect."

The use of *sacchikāroti* in the full sense of the words "hear and understand" may be noted in D 1.150, where the Buddha, "as being one who has verified it by his own extra-generic gnosis (*sayam abhiññā sacchikātvā*)" promulgates the Law and preaches it, lovingly in its beginning, in its middle and in its end, both in its moral and in its spiritual significance (*sūtham savyāñjanam*): and DhA 11.361, where *sakḅaccan nu sunanti* is literally "do not hear with verification," i.e., hear but do not learn.

The same is expected of others: "Whatever Monk or Brahman here and now,

what is laid down (*odhiso*) and what is elaborated (*vyañjanaso*), I then explain them by many alternative formulæ, teach and illuminate them, make them comprehensible, open them up, dissect and spread them out (*aneka-pariyāyena ācikkhāmi, desemi, pakāsemi, paññāpemi, vivarāmi, vibhajāmi, uttāni-karomi*).⁹⁵ *Odhiso* here can only refer to the immediate meaning of the text: *odhi* deriving from *odahati*, Skr. *avadhā*, to "set down," analogous to *abhidhā*, the "literal power" of an expression, or "denotation." It is just in this sense, indeed, that the text itself is a "foot-print (*pada*)," a trace set down and that can be followed up, in the sense of RV x.71.3 *vācaḥ padaviyam āyan*, and of the "*hatthi-pada*" in Pali, *passim*. *Odhi* is thus also, like its Sanskrit equivalent *avadhi*, the object to which the mind is directed, and being thus equivalent to the primary meaning of the text, *vyañjanam* can only be the expanded meaning implied by the phrases concluding with *uttāni-karomi*. *Odhi* referring to the actual wording corresponds to *desanam*, "promulgation"; *vacanam*, "utterance"; *aḅhāyanam*, "narrative"; *kaḅhitam*, "relation"; *padam*, "verse," etc. *Odhi* refers to the "aesthetic surface" of the doctrine, and in this connection it may be pointed out that what is said in words differs in no way in principle from what is represented in plastic art, the interpretation of which from either a strictly aesthetic or a merely anecdotal point of view being equally superficial and insufficient: as *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* II.118-19 expresses it, "the real picture is not in the colors, the principle evades the letter."

We meet with the "four meanings" again in A II.139 in connection with the definition of four sorts of orators (*vādi*), of whom the best is the speaker "who is not brought to a standstill either as regards the practical purport (*atthato*) or the developed meaning (*vyañjanato*): it is impossible for one fully possessed of the four analytical powers (*paḅisambhiddā*) to be brought to a standstill in either of these respects."

In A II.128 the first of four ways that conduce to the preservation of the "True Law (*saddhamma*)" is that condition which exists when the Almsman is in full possession of a text: "with well-put verses and flavorings (*sunikkhittichi pada-vyañjanehi*): for, Almsmen, if the verses and their

flavoring are well put, the practical meaning is likewise easy to follow (*attho pi sunnayo hoti*)."⁹⁶ We hark back in this version to the notion of cooking: considering that *pada* corresponds to the rice, and *vyañjana* to the sauce, and that if these are suitably combined, the intellectual nourishment will be readily assimilated.

In D III.127-28, it is said that Almsmen are to meet together and talk over Doctrine, not contumaciously but "comparing moral (or literal) sense with moral (or literal) sense (*atthena attham*) and implicit meaning with implicit meaning (*vyañjanena vyañjanam*)," the discussion taking such a form as "to such and such a moral sense (*imassa . . . atthassa*) do these, or these other implicit meanings (*imāni vā vyañjanāni etāni vā vyañjanāni*) correspond most closely?" and conversely. Here it may be noted how the genitives imply that the moral or literal and the spiritual or implicit meanings are reciprocal and inseparable; it is never a question of arbitrary explanations but only of an adequate symbolism, in which there is a contrast but never an opposition of "letter and spirit" (Islamic *es-shariyah* and *el-haqiqah*). In S IV.281 and 296, *nānatiḅhā nānavyañjanā* is clearly "different in denotation and in connotation," *ekatthā* in the same context meaning "alike in denotation."

In S V.430, a specifically moral theme, that of *dukkha*, "ill" or "sorrow," is effectively the "moral meaning" with reference to which the Buddha says that "there are definitely various phases and illustrations thereof (*aparimāṇā vaṇṇā aparimāṇa vyañjanā aparimāṇā samkāsānā*), and here *vyañjana* is certainly something like "coloring," "disguise," "shade of meaning," a sense quite in accordance with the root meaning of *vyañj*, "to smear on." Similarly in A II.182, where the Buddha says that "he has taught that such and such a proposition is right (*idam kusalam . . . mayā paññattam*), in countless verses (*aparimāṇā padā*), with countless colorings (*aparimāṇā vyañjanā*) and countless enunciations of the spiritual-meaning (*aparimāṇā dhamma-desanā*)."

The most difficult text is that of Mil 18, where the Buddha's word (*buddha-vacanam*) is learnt by heart at one hearing, is mastered in three months *vyañjunato*, and in another three months *atthato*. We should have expected the reverse order of words. We cannot, however, allow the apparent meaning of this isolated text to override that of so many others, and must conclude that the fully developed meaning is thought of here as having been grasped before the application of it was made.

As we have remarked, in nearly all of the foregoing contexts the translators render *attha* by "spirit" and *vyañjana* by "letter." It is by no means

by his own extra-generic gnosis has verified the meaning of monasticism and Brahmahood, he has 'arrived' (*sāmaññatthā ca brahmaññatthā ca ditḅeva dhamme sayam abhinna sacchikḅatvā, upasampajja viharanti, S II.46*).

⁹⁵ Similarly, S II.28 *suāḅhāyato . . . mayā dhammo uttāno uvāto pakāḅito chinna-pilotiko*, "Doctrine well taught by me, spread out, opened up, illuminated, divested of wrapping."

our intention to suggest that the very words "letter and spirit" are out of place in these contexts, but we do say that if these words are used, it is in precisely the opposite sense, *attha* being the "letter" and *vyañjana* the "spiritual" meaning. For we cannot employ the English words "letter and spirit" vaguely but only in one of two ways, either with reference to "literal meaning" and "inner meaning" (a relation expressed in Pāli by saying that "B is the *adhivacunum*, i.e., interpretation, of A"),⁹⁸ or in that way in which the words "letter and spirit" (or their equivalents) were used by St. Paul (II Cor. 3:6), from whom our use of the words descends. Whoever has any doubt as to the meaning of the words of St. Paul should consider Augustine's treatise, *De spiritu et littera*. St. Paul is not referring to figurative expressions but to the distinction between the moral law and spiritual understanding, the former essential to the active and the latter essential to the contemplative life. It is precisely in the same way that *attha* (as we have seen) refers to things to be done, and *vyañjana* to things to be understood: it would be true to say that in our contexts *attha* and *vyañjana* correspond to what are called *kurma-kāṇḍa* and *jñāna kāṇḍa* in Sanskrit. In Vin 1.40, it is the fact that an injunction to walk in a certain Way is implicit in the formula that makes it *attha* and not *vyañjana*. We can see also why it is that precedence is given to *attha*: it is just as it is for the hungry man, for whom food is the first consideration and flavoring the second; the flavor is better than the food, but not for the hungry man, who is still in need of food, without which he cannot "keep on going"; it is not this "little self," the so-called *attā* or *appullā*, but only the "great self," *mahattā*, "the immortal contemplative self, without desire" of AV x.8.44: that is "satisfied by flavor" only (*rasena tṛptah*). It is from the same point of view that the Buddha so often refuses to discuss ultimates (such as "is or is not" after death) because they do not pertain or conduce to Wayfaring (*maggana*). Virtue is only a means, indeed; it is dispositive, but not essential to the end. But "while we are on the way, we are not there"; virtue is essential to the Way. *Attha* is thus prior to *vyañjana* in practice, but inferior in hierarchy since when the end of the road has been reached there is no more Wayfaring to be done.

⁹⁸ It is in this connection that we find the Buddhist parallel of St. Paul's "the letter killeth," viz. in S 1.11, where "Men aware only of what can be told (*akḅheyya*, the *akḅhānana*, narrative or parable taken historically and literally) live under the yoke of death." This will apply, of course, as much to the understanding of the carved or painted parable as to the spoken symbol.

We have so far discussed *vyañjana* in what may be called its "good" sense, that sense in which the four *paṭisambhidā* are said to be essential to Arahatta. There are also some contexts in which *vyañjana* as "ornament" is disparaged, for example PugA 223, where *paḍaparamo*, "whose ultimate is the verse itself," is explained by *vyañjanapadam eva paramam assa*, "he for whom the verbal ornament only is the prime consideration." That the reference is disparaging is clear also from A 11.135, where the final reward (*utthāna-phalam*) is contingent upon the nature of the mental effort put forth; there are four classes of hearers, "those who understand immediately (*uzghaṭitaññū*), those who understand upon reflection (*vipacitaññū*), those who must be led (*neyyo*, e-duc-ated, the Yakkhī of S 1.11-12 being a good example), and those whose ultimate is the text itself" (*paḍaparamo*, the stupid king of J VI.131 being an example). *Paḍaparamo* is then either "literalist" (as condemned in S 1.11, where indeed "the letter kills"), or in accordance with PugA, the man who cares more about the art of the text than its meaning, and may be compared to the man who in terms of our first citation (J VI.366) might be more particular about the taste of the food than about its nourishing essence. Our immediate concern is with the disparaged *vyañjanapadam* of PugA, where the reference is plainly to artistry considered as the final end of oratory: cf. A 1.72, 11.107 and S 11.267, where a *suttanta* characterized by fine sounds rather than fine thoughts is called *cittakḅhara* (cf. the later *citrakāvya*), and S 1.38, where the syllables themselves (*akḅkharāni*, thought of as sounds rather than as written letters)⁹⁷ are called the "sauce or flavor" (*vyañjana*)⁹⁸ of poetry. In S 11.267 and parallel passages, "the sermons (*suttanta*) preached by the Tathāgata are profound (*gambhīrā*), of profound moral significance (*gambhīratthā*), dealing with the other world (*lokkuttarā*) and bound up with the emptiness of this world (*suññata-paṭisaṃyutta*); but a time will come when they will no longer be regarded as things to be studied and mastered; on the contrary, those sermons that are made by poets in the poetical style (*re suttanta kavikātā kāveyyā*), with embellished sounds (*cittakḅharā*), overlaid with ornament (*citta-vyañjanā*), and spoken by profane auditors (*bāhirakā sāvaka-bhāsītā*), will be considered worthy of study, and the others will disappear."

⁹⁷ The reader will not forget that *akḅsura* is primarily a sounded syllable, and only secondarily a written sign. Indian rhetoric, at least in its beginnings, has therefore more to do with oratory than with "literature" as we think of it.

⁹⁸ This is the Dictionary meaning, s.v. *akḅhara*.

We see nothing in all this that is particularly monastic or puritanical, but only something serious; the repudiation of an art for art's sake and of sophistry and of aestheticism. The Buddhist is the same as the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Scholastic view of rhetoric as the art of giving effectiveness to truth. As Augustine says, "I am not now speaking of how to please: I am speaking of how they are to be taught who desire instruction." *Cittakākhara, citta-vyañjana* are "sophistic" in the sense of Augustine's definition, "A speech seeking verbal ornament beyond the bounds of responsibility to its burden (*gravitas*) is called 'sophistic.'" In the same way, "No matter in what connection, when Buddhas preach the Law, it is upon the Law that they lay weight (*gāratam*, etymologically and semantically the equivalent of Augustine's *gravitas*); they speak as though bringing down from heaven the Aerial River" (*ākāśagangam otārento viya*, DhA III.360).⁹⁹ That the preaching of the Law "pierces the skin and flesh¹⁰⁰ and penetrates to the marrow of the bones" (DhA III.361) recalls St. Paul's "the word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even unto . . ." (Heb. 4:12),¹⁰¹ and St. Augustine's "O Eloquence, so much the more terrible as it is so unadorned; and as it is so genuine, so much the more powerful: O truly an axe hewing the rock!"¹⁰²

On the other hand, it must not be inferred that the art of oratory, rightly used, is in any way disparaged. We find, for example, Mahā Kaccāna praised as the "chief of those who dissect at length the meaning of what has been briefly said (*samkhitena bhāsitaṣṣa vitthārena attham vibhajantiānam aggam*)," Kumāra Kassapa as the "chief of flowery speakers (*citta-kaṭhikanam aggam*),"¹⁰³ and Mahā Koṭṭhita as the "chief of the

⁹⁹ It seems to have been overlooked that this is an allusion to the "Descent of the Ganges," well known in the Epic. The simile is far more tremendous to Indian than it could be to European ears: "speaking as if with the roar of Niagara" would be a weak analogy.

¹⁰⁰ The full sequence frequently occurs: *chavi, cummu, mamsa, nuhāru, atthi, atthi-miñja*, "scarf-skin, skin, flesh, sinews, bones and marrow" (*chavi* is generally "complexion," "bloom," and can only be rendered here by "scarf-skin"). At Vin I.83, the whole formula is applied to the love of a son.

¹⁰¹ The completion of the text, "piercing even unto the dividing asunder of soul and spirit" corresponds exactly to the often repeated theme of Buddhist teaching, *na me so attā, sabbe dhammā anattā, sunnam idam atīna*, etc., and makes the parallel particularly poignant.

¹⁰² The quotations from Augustine are from the *De doctrina christiana*, 4. Cf. the fuller references in *Art Bulletin*, XX (March 1938), 72-77.

¹⁰³ At Mil I, Nāgasena's discourse (*kaṭhā*) is described as "adorned with parables and types (*citra opammekī nayehi ca*)."

Masters of the Four Meanings" (*paṭisambhidappattānam aggam*)," A 1.23-24. We find the Buddha praising an Almsman who "in his doctrinal discourse was demonstrating to the brethren, making the Law acceptable to them, setting them afire, gladdening them with urbane words, well enunciated without hoarseness, with exposition of the meaning, pertinent and unbiased" (S II.280, cf. I.189). The same expressions recur in D II.109, where the Buddha explains that he adapts his teaching to his audience ("Whatever may be their sort, I make myself of the like sort, whatever their language, I speak that language"—i.e., becoming as we are that we may be as he is), "But they knew me not when I spoke, and would ask 'Who may this be that speaks thus, a man or a god?' Whereupon I demonstrated the Law, made it acceptable to them, set them on fire (*samuttejetvā*), gladdened them, etc." The argument is always *ad hominem*: for as *Lankāvātāra Sūtra* II.122 expresses it, "Whatever is not adapted to such and such persons as are to be taught, cannot be called teaching." It is thus that "He preaches the lovely Law, with its moral and spiritual meanings (*dhammam deseti . . . kalyāṇam sūttam savyañjanam*, D 1.250).

It will not be inappropriate to conclude the present article with: "At the close of my discourse I compose and settle my heart, focus and synthesize it (*cittam saṅghāpemi sunnisāderu ekodīkaromi samādahāmi*), in accordance with the former fashion of my interior synthesis (*samādhi*), in which assuredly I abide when and whenever I will (*nicca-kappam nicca-kappam viharāmi*, M 1.249)."

The net result of the foregoing discussion, and that of *rasa*, is to indicate that Pāli *vyañjana* and *rasa* are often very nearly the same thing, a quality that may be regarded either as the most intimate flavor or color of the text, or from another point of view as an overlay of ornament, and thus "too much of a good thing." In any case, *vyañjana* is never "syllable," as it has been rendered at A II.182.

sākhā and *sākha*. Like the Skr. equivalent *śākhā*, the word occurs in Pāli in the primary sense of "branch" (of a tree), but also in Sn 688 as "rib" of an umbrella, and it is probable that this was also a meaning of the word in Skr. The word in this sense is of interest because of the coincident (axial) symbolism of "umbrella" and "tree"; the ribs surround the handle (*daṇḍa*, also "stem of a tree") "as branches surround the trunk of the tree (*vrkṣasya śkandhaḥ parita iva śākhāḥ*, AV x.7.38)," forming a "circle (*maṇḍala*)."¹⁰⁴ Cf. *pinḍika*.

saṅkha. The primary meaning is "number," hence *saṅkham gam*, to "be reckoned" or "accounted," as in Ud 55, "they are accounted (*saṅkham gacchanti*) 'Sons of the Buddha'" (*saṅkham gacchanti*)¹⁰⁴. In this sense *saṅkham gam* is to "be called," to "get a name." It follows that in a more general way to be "numbered" is to exist in the quantitative and dimensional (*nimitta*) universe, *saṅkha* from this point of view being equivalent to *mātrā* ("measure," and etymologically "matter," that which is known in terms of "form and phenomenon," *nāma-rūpa*), in which sense *saṅkha* is almost the exact equivalent of "number" as characteristic of "species" in Scholastic philosophy. To come into being, take birth, and be "named" is a good from some points of view, but never a final good, and therefore from another point of view, that of the man who is seeking to become "no one" (*aḥimcana*), an evil. So in Sn 1074 it is said of the Muni, sped like a flame blown out by the wind, and liberated from name and body (*nāmakāyā = nāmarūpayā*), that he "gets him home (*attham paleu*), he does not get a number (*na upeti saṅkham*)"¹⁰⁵ i.e., he is not cognizable: in the same way it is said of the Arhat, who is past finding out by gods or men in heaven or on earth, that he "has done with number (*paḥāsi saṅkham*, S II.12)"; it is just such as these of whom Brahmā says, in fact, that he "cannot give any true accounting (*saṅkhātum no pi saḥkomi*, etc., D II.218)"; and conversely in S III.35, "Whatever it be that a man takes to bed, it is by that that he gets his number" (*yaṃ . . . anuseti tena saṅkham gacchati*), i.e., his unaccomplished purpose determines his birth¹⁰⁶ (as in MU II.6d).

¹⁰⁴ It is in this sense that, in RV IX.61.7, Soma is "reckoned with the Ādityas (*sum ādityebhir akhyata*)."

¹⁰⁵ *Na upeti saṅkham*, like MU VI.20 *nirāmakatvāt asaṅkhyah*, "out of count, because without a self": Sn 1076, *na pamānam atthi*. S IV.376-77 is explicit: the Tathāgata is "free of any reckoning" (*saṅkhāya-vimutto*) in terms of any one of the five *khandhas*, *rūpa*, *vedana*, etc., i.e., has no psycho-physical "number." "Number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident: added to being" (*Sum. Theol.* I.30.3): "quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam dimensionibus" (*De ente et essentia* III.1), i.e., inasmuch as all things are *mmittāni*, "measured out."

It will be seen from what follows that like all other negative symbols, to be without number (the same as to be nameless) can have either a "good" or a "bad" meaning; *asaṅkhyah* corresponding to *amātra*, and *ajāta*, etc. In the same way there is an *asat* (nonbeing) that is "naughty" (because of privation of being) and an *asat* (nonbeing) that is also a plenum (*pūrnam*) because not limited by a being in any way (*iti-bhāva*).

¹⁰⁶ The idiom corresponds to that of "as one makes one's bed, so must one lie upon it." The corresponding word *anusaya* denotes the condition in which a man is naturally found, and from which he is summoned to arouse himself; and it is no doubt in the same sense that the New Testament "Arise, take up thy

There is, however, another use of the word, or rather of the corresponding verb, of no less interest, occurring in Sn 351, "To do what one will does not pertain to the common herd; it pertains to Tathāgatas to do what is correct," or more literally, "calculated" (*na kāmākāro*¹⁰⁷ *hi puthujjanānaṃ, saṅkheyyakāro ca tathāgātānaṃ*). *Saṅkheyya* here can only be understood as equivalent to *prameya* in the sense of "correct" (an absolute *pramāna* is, in fact, attributed to the Buddha; all that the Buddha says or does is said or done well). The converse of the text is also, of course, implied: what is done by the untaught many-folk is informal, *apatirūpa, asaṅkheyya*,¹⁰⁸ the Buddhas do what they will. In the same sense, *saṅkha* must mean what is "right," one might even say "mathematically right" since it is precisely a question of "number," in Dh 267, where "he who has ousted good and evil, the walker-with-Brahma, whose course in the world is 'calculated' (*saṅkhāya loke carati*), he is rightly called an 'Almsman': or conversely, "wrong" when "calculating (*saṅkhāya*)" implies "with ulterior motives," as in A II.143. The use of *saṅkheyya* and *saṅkhāya* in the good sense corresponds to that of *saṅkhyānam* and *asaṅkhyānam* in JB II.69 and 73, where in opposing rites what is done by Prajāpati in good form overcomes what is done by Death informally, and what is "in order (*saṅkhyānam*)" being immortal (*amrtam*) and what is "inordinate (*asaṅkhyānam*)" mortal (*martyam*)—a distinction corresponding to that of *satyam* from *amrtam*. It is in the same sense that in an unidentified sūtra (A. F. Rudolf Hoernle, *MS. Remains of Buddhist Literature from E. Turkestan*, Oxford, 1916, I, 98-100), *saṅkhyām gacchati* is "reaches fullness."

samala. This word is cited for the sake of the light it throws on Skr. *śāmūya*, *śāmūla*. The Dictionary omits to note the immediate Skr. equivalent, *śamala*, but gives the meaning, "impure, contaminated, Vin 15." We have also *sandhi-samala-samkūṣira*, with the general sense of "garbage

bed, and walk" should be understood. *Saṅkha* is, in fact, virtually synonymous with *anusaya*, Skr. *anusaya*, as "bed," karmic consequence, and finally "repentance" inasmuch as it is from this predestined condition that one uprises. Similarly *śāya*: see *karmāyaya* as used by Patañjali, *Yogasūtra* [*The Yoga-System of Patañjali*, tr. J. H. Woods, Cambridge, Mass., 1914, IOS 17] II.12 ff. (rendered by Woods "latent deposit of karma"), and the discussion by Jaideva Singh in *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, VIII (1939).

¹⁰⁷ *Na kāmākāro*, as in CU VIII.1.6, *ihūmānum ananuvīdya . . . sarveṣu lokeṣu akāmācāro bhavanti*, "not having known the Spiritual-Self in this life, do not become 'Movers-at-will' in any world."

¹⁰⁸ In very many contexts, of course, *asaṅkheyya* is simply "incalculable," i.e., of indefinite (not infinite, however) extent: for example, where *asaṅkheyya = kappa*.

heap" in S 11.27c, M 1.334 and D 11.160; and *dharmmo asuddho samalchi cintito*, "an unclean doctrine conceived by foul minds" in Vin 1.5, S 1.137. It seems impossible to doubt that in RV x.85.29 *sāmulyam* is not (as commonly rendered) "woolen," but "filthy,"¹⁰⁹ the reference being in fact to the "snake-skin" that Kṛtyā must be thought of as shedding when she "has gotten feet" (*padvatī bhūtvī*), all in accordance with the well-known formula for procession from ophidian potentiality to human actuality; or that in JUB 1.38.4, *sāmūla-parṇabhyām* is not, as rendered by Oertel, "with a woolen shirt(?) and a leaf," but "(clad) in dirty leaves."

samuḍḍa (as *adhivacanam* of *nibbāna*). In Buddhism, as in Brahmanism, the Pilgrim's "Way" considered as a voyage (*yana*, in this sense) may be related in three different ways to the flowing river of life and death. The journey is either upstream to the waters' source; or over the waters to a farther shore; or downstream to the sea. This use of symbolisms which are contrary in their literal but unanimous in their spiritual sense very well illustrates the nature of metaphysics itself, which is not, like a "philosophy," systematic, but is always consistent. All that we have to be careful of here (as in any work of art) is to make use of our symbols consistently: it is only, for example, in the second case, that of "crossing over," that the symbol of the "bridge" can also be employed; it would be incongruous to speak of the "bridge" in connection with a going up or down stream.¹¹⁰

In the first case, the symbol is of a procedure against the stream, and the Buddhist Wayfarer is accordingly referred to as an "Upstreamer" (*paṇisoto* or *uddhumsoto*, with *anusotagāmī*, "drifting with the current" as opposite). Without going into the history of the underlying thought at great length, we may observe that in RV x.28.4, *pratīpam śāpam nadyo vahanū* ("the rivers carry the foam against the current"), is already a paradox to be explained. Whatever this may mean, the text of 'IS VII.5.7.4, "The heavenly world is counter-current (*pratīkūlam*) hence" is explicit: and it is precisely in this sense that in PB xxv.10.12-16 the Sacrificers, going "counter-current" or "upstream" (*pratīpam*) along the whole course of the Sarasvatī (the River of Life), reach the heavenly world (it is clear

¹⁰⁹ The Vedic and Brāhmana associations of "wool" are regularly with purity and purification. Sāyana appears to be perfectly correct in his gloss *sāmulyam* = *sāmūlam* = *śaṣṭram malam, śarīrāvachchannasya malasya dhāraṅgam vastram*, "foul body, or garment reeking of the foulness of the body that was covered by it."

¹¹⁰ Or only if we see in the river itself the "bridge" and Axis Mundi.

from verse 11 that the Sarasvatī is coincident with the Axis Mundi):¹¹¹ it is impossible to reach the goal "downstream." The symbolism here is one of return to the river's source, the Fons Vitae, Varuṇa's abiding place *sindhunam upodaye* (RV VIII.11.2), the "Well of Honey in Viṣṇu's highest place (*viṣṇoḥ pade purame madhva utsah*, RV 1.154.5)," the Perennial Spring of Plotinus, *Enneads* III.8.10, etc. Among the Christian parallels may be noted Ruysbroeck, "a perpetual striving after the unattainable—this is 'striving against the stream'" (*Spurkling Stone*, ch. 9; cf. JB 1.85, *pratīkūlam uḍḍyan . . . samaṣṭiyā*); Dante, *Purgatorio* 1.40, "Against the dark stream fled the eternal prison"; Blake, "Jesus died . . . he strove against the current of this wheel."

More familiar is the symbolism of the "Farther Shore," to be reached in various ways, whether by raft, ship, bridge, or ford, and in connection with which we meet with a great variety of terms such as *tara, tarana, tāra, tīran, tīrtha*,¹¹² *trātr*, etc., deriving from *tr*, to "cross over." In this case the Waters to be crossed are specifically the River of Death (M 1.225-27; DhA 11.275, etc.), or as more fully explained in S IV.174-75, the Great Flood of Water (*mahā uḍaḥannavo*) is the flood of will, birth, opinion, and ignorance (*kāma, bhava, aīṭṭhi, aviṣṭā*), the Hither Shore represents "embodiment" (*saḥkṛāya*), the Farther Shore *nibbāna*, and the "Brahman who has crossed and reached the farther side and stands on solid ground (*tinno pāramgaṇo thale tīthati brāhmaṇo*)" is the Arahāt. The formula of crossing over to a farther shore or haven of safety occurs so repeatedly in Buddhist and Brahmanical contexts alike that no further examples need be cited here. The metaphor of the saving "ship" (Pāli and Skr. *nāvā*) is preserved in our "nave" (of a church).¹¹³

¹¹¹ Coincident, then, with the Shaṅk of Light, the Bolt and Sacrificial Post that strikes downwards from the zenith to the nadir of the universe, and which must be reversed by those who would ascend. The digging out and setting upright of the Post in AB 11.1-2, etc., has the same spiritual significance as the words "counter-current," etc., discussed above; cf. Coomaraswamy, "Inverted Tree" [in Vol. 1 of this edition; the symbols discussed in this entry are also treated in "The Sea," Vol. I of this edition.—ED.].

¹¹² *Tīrtha* is "crossing place"; *tīrthakara* virtually synonymous with "pontifex," "pontiff." *Tārā* is "Savior," and also "star," cf. the Virgin as Stella Maris. *Trātr* is ferryman or savior. *Tarana* is crossing; hence *avataraṇa*, "crossing back," i.e., the "descent" of a Savior. *Tīran* is "crossing" in S V.24 (where we have "few are they of mortal men who have reached the Farther Shore"). Our "term," Lat. *terminus*, is cognate.

¹¹³ As in the well-known Parable of the Raft (M 1.135), the crossing over is here by means of a raft, for which there is no more use when the Farther Shore has been reached, and as in Revelation 21:1, "there was no more sea." The

Less familiar, though by no means rare in Buddhist contexts, is the metaphor of a gliding downstream to a *nibbāna* represented by the Sea, not here as a mass of waters to be crossed, but itself the last end. This value of *samuḍḍa* (Sea) is overlooked in the PTS Dictionary. In S v.39-40, we find "just as rivers lean, tend, and gravitate towards the sea (*samuḍḍa-ninnā, -poṇā, -pabbhārā*)," ¹¹⁴ just so the Almsman who cultivates the Aryan Eightfold Path "leans, tends, and gravitates towards Nibbāna"; similarly S v.134. In the same way in the parable of the Log, S iv.179-80, floating downstream on the Ganges is gliding towards Nibbāna; the dangers are of stranding on either shore, being taken by those (men or gods) who dwell on these shores, ¹¹⁵ stranding on a shoal (*thale ussādisati*), ¹¹⁶ sinking in mid-stream (*majjhe saṃsādisati*), ¹¹⁷ or of rotting within, and if all these dangers are avoided, then "shall ye lean, tend, and gravitate towards Nibbāna." It is clear that the stream is here no longer Māra's, as in M i.226 (*mārassa sotā*), but rather the Flood of Merit (*puññassa dhārā*) of A ii.56. In S v.47, cf. 63, young followers of the Eightfold Path are compared to the young Nāgas (snakes, or rather eels; see *nāga*) born in the Himālayas and who, as they grow bigger, make their way down to the Sea and there attain their full dimensions, the Commentary equating *nāga* with *yogāvaca* and *samuḍḍa* with *nibbāna*. In DhA iii.230 ff.

Waters to be crossed are represented in the Gospels (John 6, etc.) by the Sea of Galilee; cf. W. Norman Brown, *Walking on the Water*, London, 1928, pp. 20 ff.

¹¹⁴ The words *-ninnā, -poṇā, -pabbhārā* or their equivalents, *mutatis mutandis*, occur elsewhere, notably in the well-known metaphor of the rafters that converge towards and rest in the roof-plate of the dome, and it is thus that the powers of the soul converge towards and come to rest in *samādhi* (SA viii.8, M i.322-23, Mil 38, etc.).

¹¹⁵ The interpretation (*adhivacanam*) of "this shore" is *ajjhaitikānam āyatanānam* and of "that shore" *bāhīvanam āyatanānam*, i.e., these internal (microcosmic) and those external (macrocosmic) conditions. This provides us with good evidence for what can be inferred in many other contexts, viz. that *ajjhaitikam . . . bāhīram* correspond to *adhyātmam . . . adhedevatam* as, e.g., in JUB iii.33, where the two words have precisely the implication of "subjective" and "objective" that is fundamental to Pāli *ajjhaitikam* and *bāhīram*, as in M i.421, where the five elements as they are within you (i.e., microcosmically) are contrasted with the same as they are outside you (i.e., macrocosmically).

¹¹⁶ Observe that *thale* ("aground") here has the exactly opposite spiritual meaning of *thale* ("safe ashore") in S iv.174-75 cited above. In this connection cf. René Guénon, "Du Double Sens des symboles," in *Études traditionnelles*, XLII (1937).

¹¹⁷ "Drowning in the nether waters": here the symbolism coincides with that of crossing over, and if one falls from the ship or bridge or if one sinks while "walking on the water," he may be drowned.

the significance of the downstream voyage, here in a boat, is the same, but the value of *nāga* is reversed; ¹¹⁸ because of a sin by which the voyage is interrupted the novice is reborn as the Nāga Erakapatta.

Finally, the foregoing texts in which *samuḍḍa* = *nibbāna*, and even more literally Ud 55, "Just as rivers lose their former names and clan names (*purimāni nāma-gottāni*)" ¹¹⁹ when they reach the sea, and it is accounted only "The Great Sea," correspond exactly to the better known "Just as these flowing rivers that tend towards the sea, when they reach the sea are gone home, and their name and aspect (*nūma-rūpa*) are broken up, and only 'the Sea' (*samudram iti*) is spoken of" (Prašna Up. vi.5, etc.), as well as to the almost identical images employed by Dante, Eckhart and Ruysbroeck. ¹²⁰

It may be added that where symbolism of a going downstream to the Sea is employed as above, a return to the source would be equivalent to "backsliding (*apāya*)," and that we actually find the expressions "counter-current" and "back-flowing" used accordingly in AV x.1.7, where the evil powers are enjoined to return "upstream counter-current" (*pratikhālam udāyyam*), and AV iv.17.2, where *punahsara* = apotropaic.

sahājanetta. Sn 1096: two MSS. read *sahajanetta*. We should render "possessed of the innate eye," i.e., as the Commentator implies, "of spontaneous omniscience." We do not agree with the Dictionary's "lit. 'coinciding eye,'" but take *sahaja* in its usual sense of "connatural," "inborn," and hence as in the later rhetoric, not acquired (*ahāryā*) or learnt (*au-*

¹¹⁸ The two values of "*nāga*" are the same as those of JB iii.77 and PB xxv.15.4, where a distinction is made between those snakes (*akhi*) that are "left behind" (*ahiyata*) and the others (*sarpa*) who, inasmuch as they "creep on farther" (*atī-sarpanti*), vanquish death and become Adityas (like the Buddha, *udicca-banāhu*).

¹¹⁹ Cf. JB i.13.5-6, *Tam hūgataṃ prechutū, kus tvam usi. Su yo hu nānū vū gotreṇā vā prubrūte . . . tam itavas . . . padgghītam*—i.e., in answer to the question "Who art thou?" he answers by his own or his clan-name, he is dragged away by the representatives of time. For many other parallels see "*Ākimcarīṇa*: Self-naughting" [in this volume—ED.].

¹²⁰ Cited in Coomaraswamy, *A New Approach to the Vedas*, 1933, pp. 15, 16. It may be added that in JB i.173-75, where the Sacrificers are on their way to heaven and ask, "Who shall be able today to swim away out of the open jaws of the crocodile?" with reference to the "crocodile standing in the one and only way, against the current, with open maw" (*ekāyane siṃsumārī praiṣṣam vyādāya tiṣṭhati*), it is clear that the motion of the sacrificers themselves, on the one way, is downstream to the sea; the crocodile (*siṃsumārīn* — *makuru* — *mṛtyu* = *sūryu*) is the keeper of the Gate, which is in this case the "mouth" of the river (as we should say, although it is rather the mouth of the sea into which the river pours).

padetikkā) but "natural (*sahajā*)" illumination (*prātibhā*). That is the terminology of the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, ch. 2, where also *sahajā* is equated with *sārasvata*, tantamount to "communicated by Sophia." The parallel as regards *prātibhā* is fully justified by M 1.240, "There flashed upon me spontaneously three parables unheard ere now (*iisso upamā paṭibhamsu anacchariyā pubbe assutapubbā*)."¹²¹ This is, of course, a quite different thing from the ability of the charioteer, well versed and expert in his art, to answer any question on the subject "on the spot (*thānaso*)," without "taking counsel (*cetaso parivittakkaṃ*)"; though this facility born of application and practice provides an analogy for the Buddha's ability to "answer on the spot (*thānaso . . . paṭibhātī*)" as he can because "he has fully penetrated the realm of the Law (*dhammadhātu . . . suppaṭividdhā*, M 1.396)," or as elsewhere stated because he *is* the Law (S III.120 *yo dhammam passati mam passati*, cf. D III.84). There are other ways in which the Buddha's power of immediate response is expressed, for example S II.105, "Origination, origination": so saying, there arose in me, brethren, a vision in matters of the Law unheard ere now (*pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakḅhum udupūdi*), gnosis, prescience, science, light arose (*ñāṇaṃ, paññā, vijjā, āloko udapāde*).¹²² Observe that "unheard before," while implying literally "not to be found in *śruti*, and therefore to be regarded as *smṛti*," does not imply "original" in our individualistic sense, which conceives of a property in ideas, but an exegesis suited to the present conditions and audience, and authoritative precisely because "original (*yoniso*)" in the true sense of the word, that of "deriving from the source"; it is not a question of what we call "inspiration" but rather of infallibility,¹²³ comparable to that of the Christ when he says, "as my Father hath taught me, I speak" (John 8:28), or that of St. Paul when he says, "I have the mind (*νοῦς*) of Christ" (1 Cor. 2:16).

Sahajanetta can also be explained in agreement with what has been said above, s.v. *nettiyā*, but as having a more explicit reference to the epithet *caḅḅhum loke*, "Eye in the World,"¹²⁴ so often applied to the

¹²¹ D III.127, nothing is to be added to or taken away from the promulgated Dhamma; D III.135, all that the Tathāgata has said, from the night of the Awakening to that of the Total Desperation, "all that is just so and infallible" (*sabbuṃ tam tath'eva hoti, no aññathā*).

¹²² *Caḅḅhum loke* is not noted in the PTS Dictionary. It occurs in D II.159, Sn 599, etc. Cf. S I.138, *buddhacaḅḅhumā lokaṃ volokento*; S I.134, *sabbhaṃ passati caḅḅhumā*. Out of countless Brahmanical texts I cite only AB 16, "The Eye is the Truth deposited among men" (with reference to Agni), and RV VII.61.1, *caḅsur . . . sūryas . . . ubhi yo viivā bhuvanāmi caḅur*. With *sahajanetta*, *caḅḅhum loke*, etc., cf. *caḅḅhubhūte nānu-bhūto* in M I.111, S II.255, etc.

Buddha in other contexts, an epithet that in pre- and non-Buddhist contexts would be applicable only to the Sun or Agni; in this case *sahajanetta* would be more literally "born as the Eye," or "Eye by Nature" than "possessed of the innate eye." The distinction is hardly material.

suññatā. "Emptiness" (*suññatā*) in Pāli contexts is not the metaphysical Zero (Nonbeing as the principle of Being, Infinite Possibility as distinguished from Indefinite Actuality), but a characteristic of this world, as in S IV.295-96, where it has been explained that when the Almsman returns from a deathlike Contemplation in which consciousness and feeling have been arrested, "three touches touch him," "emptiness (*suññato*)," "formlessness (*animitto*)," and "making no plans (*appaṇihito-phasso*)," and he discriminates (*viveka*) accordingly; and the meaning of "emptiness" is explained at M 1.29, "emancipation of the Will by Emptiness (*suññatā ceto-vimutti*)" being consequent upon the realization that 'this world is empty of spirit or anything spiritual' (*suññam idam attena vā attaniyena vā*); *suññatā* is synonymous with *anattā*, of which it really only paraphrases and isolates the privative *an*. It is no doubt in the same sense that in A 1.72, "the texts are coupled with 'emptiness' (*suttantā . . . suññatā-paṭisaññatā*)"; there is, in fact, nothing more characteristic of Buddhist teaching that its constant resort to negatives (above all in the sense of the word *anattā*), which even some contemporary hearers found perplexing. The denial of spirituality to contingent things in particular is a denial of any real essence to these things in themselves, and thus forms the basis of the more sweeping *sūnyavāda* doctrine which in the Mahāyāna denies not any "value" but any essence to even the Buddha's appearance and to the promulgation of the Dhamma itself. If such a doctrine disturbs us, it may be found more palatably expressed in the *Vajracchedikā Sūtra* thus, "Those who see me in the body (*rūpeṇā*) and think of me in sounds (*ghosaññā*), their way of thinking is false, they do not see me at all. . . . The Buddha cannot be rightly understood (*ṣṣu boddhum*) by any means (*upāyena*)."¹²⁵ Not that "means" are not dispositive to a right understanding,¹²⁶ but that if regarded as ends, even the most adequate means are a hindrance. In such a radical iconoclasm as this all traditional teachings are finally agreed. What is true of ethics is also true of the supports of contemplation: as in the well-known Parable of the Raft, the means are of no more use when the goal has been reached.

¹²⁵ A. F. Rudolf Hoernle, *MS. Remains*, I, p. 270.

¹²⁶ Cf. Mund. Up. III.2-4, *etair upāyair yatate yastu vidvān . . . viśate brahma-dhāma*.

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