Diu heilige schrift ruofet alzemäle dar üf, daz der mensche sin selbes ledic werden sol. Wan als vil dü dines selbes ledic bist, als vil bist dü dines selbes gewaltic, und as vil dü dines selbes gewaltic bist, als vil dü dines selbes eigen, und als vil als dü din eigen bist, als vil ist got din eigen und allez, daz got ie geschuof.

(Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer, p. 598)

INTRODUCTION

Brahmanism or Hinduism is not only the oldest of the mystery religions, or rather metaphysical disciplines, of which we have a full and precise knowledge from literary sources, and as regards the last two thousand years also from iconographic documents, but also perhaps the only one of these that has survived with an unbroken tradition and that is lived and understood at the present day by many millions of men, of whom some are peasants and others learned men well able to explain their faith in European as well as in their own languages. Nevertheless, and although the ancient and modern scriptures and practises of Hinduism have been examined by European scholars for more than a century, it would be hardly an exaggeration to say that a faithful account of Hinduism might well be given in the form of a categorical denial of most of the statements that have been made about it, alike by European scholars and by Indians trained in our modern sceptical and evolutionary modes of thought.

One would begin, for example, by remarking that the Vedic doctrine is neither pantheistic nor polytheistic, nor a worship of the powers of Nature except in the sense that Natura naturans est Deus and all her powers but the names of God's acts; that karma is not "fate" except in the orthodox sense of the character and destiny that inhere in created things themselves, and rightly understood, determines their vocation; that māyā is not "illusion", but rather the maternal measure and means essential to the manifestation of a quantitative, and in this sense "material", world of appearances, by which we may be either enlightened or deluded according to the degree of our own maturity; that the notion of a "reincarnation" in the popular sense of the return of deceased individuals to rebirth on this earth represents only a misunderstanding of the doctrines of heredity, transmigration and regeneration; and that the six

darsanas of the later Sanskrit "philosophy" are not so many mutually exclusive "systems" but, as their name implies, so many "points of view" which are no more mutually contradictory than are, let us say, botany and mathematics. We shall also deny in Hinduism the existence of anything unique and peculiar to itself, apart from the local coloring and social adaptations that must be expected under the sun where nothing can be known except in the mode of the knower. The Indian tradition is one of the forms of the Philosophia Perennis, and as such, embodies those universal truths to which no one people or age can make exclusive claim. The Hindu is therefore perfectly willing to have his own scriptures made use of by others as "extrinsic and probable proofs" of the truth as they also know it. The Hindu would argue, moreover, that it is upon these heights alone that any true agreement of differing cultures can be effected.

We shall try now to state the fundamentals positively: not, however, as this is usually done in accordance with the "historical method" by which the reality is more obscured than illuminated, but from a strictly orthodox point of view, both as to principles and their application; endeavouring to speak with mathematical precision, but never employing words of our own or making any affirmations for which authority could not be cited by chapter and verse; in this way making even our technique characteristically Indian.

We cannot attempt a survey of the religious literature, since this would amount to a literary history of India, where we cannot say where what is sacred ends and what is secular begins, and even the songs of bayadères and showmen are the hymns of the Fidèles de l'Amour. Our literary sources begin with the Rigveda (1200 or more B.C.), and only end with the most modern Vaiṣṇava, Saiva and Tantric theological treatises. We must, however, especially mention the Bhagavad Gītā as probably the most important single work ever produced in India; this book of eighteen chapters is not, as it has been sometimes called, a "sectarian" work, but one

universally studied and often repeated daily from memory by millions of Indians of all persuasions; it may be described as a compendium of the whole Vedic doctrine to be found in the earlier Vedas, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, and being therefore the basis of all the later developments, it can be regarded as the focus of all Indian religion. To this we must add that the pseudo-historical Krishna and Arjuna are to be identified with the mythical Agni and Indra.

THE MYTH

Like the Revelation (fruit) itself, we must begin with the Myth (itihāsa), the penultimate truth, of which all experience is the temporal reflection. The mythical narrative is of timeless and placeless validity, true nowever and everywhere: just as in Christianity, "In the beginning God created" and "Through him all things were made", regardless of the millennia that come between the dateable words, amount to saying that the creation took place at Christ's "eternal birth". "In the beginning" (agre), or rather "at the summit", means "in the first cause": just as in our still told myths, "once upon a time" does not mean "once" alone but "once for all". The Myth is not a "poetic invention" in the sense these words now bear: on the other hand, and just because of its universality, it can be told, and with equal authority, from many different points of view.

In this eternal beginning there is only the Supreme Identity of "That One" (tad ekam), without differentiation of being from nonbeing, light from darkness, or separation of sky from earth. The All is for the present impounded in the first principle, which may be spoken of as the Person, Progenitor, Mountain, Tree, Dragon or endless Serpent. Related to this principle by filiation or younger brotherhood, and alter ego rather than another principle, is the Dragon-slayer, born to supplant the Father and take possession of the kingdom, distributing its treasures to his followers.2 For if there is to be a world, the prison must be shattered and its potentialities liberated. This can be done either in accordance with the Father's will or against his will; he may "choose death for his children's sake", or it may be that the Gods impose the passion upon him, making him their sacrificial victim.4 These are not contradictory doctrines, but different ways of telling one and the same story; in reality, Slayer and

Dragon, sacrificer and victim are of one mind behind the scenes, where there is no polarity of contraries, but mortal enemies on the stage, where the everlasting war of the Gods⁵ and the Titans is displayed. In any case, the Dragon-Father remains a Pleroma, no more diminished by what he exhales than he is increased by what is repossest. He is the Death, on whom our life depends⁵; and to the question "Is Death one, or many?" the answer is made that "He is one as he is there, but many as he is in his children here". The Dragon-slayer is our Friend; the Dragon must be pacified and made a friend of.

The passion is both an exhaustion and a dismemberment. The endless Serpent, who for so long as he was one Abundance remained invincible," is disjointed and dismembered as a tree is felled and cut up into logs." For the Dragon, as we shall presently find, is also the World-Tree, and there is an allusion to the "wood" of which the world is made by the Carpenter.10 The Fire of Life and Water of Life (Agni and Soma), all Gods, all beings, sciences and goods are constricted by the Python, who as "Holdfast" will not let them go until he is smitten and made to gape and pant:11 and from this Great Being, as if from a damp fire smoking, are exhaled the Scriptures, the Sacrifice, these worlds and all beings;12 leaving him exhausted of his contents and like an empty skin.12 In the same way the Progenitor, when he has emanated his children, is emptied out of all his possibilities of finite manifestation, and falls down unstrung,14 overcome by Death,15 though he survives this woe.16 Now the positions are reversed, for the Fiery Dragon will not and cannot be destroyed, but would enter into the Hero, to whose question "What, wouldst thou consume me?" it replies "Rather to kindle (waken, quicken) thee, that thou mayst eat."17 The Progenitor, whose emanated children are as it were sleeping and inanimate stones, reflects "Let me enter into them, to awaken them"; but so long as he is one, he cannot, and therefore divides himself into the powers of perception and consumption, extending these powers from his hidden lair in the "cave" of the heart through the doors

of the senses to their objects, thinking "Let me eat of these objects"; in this way "our" bodies are set up in possession of consciousness, he being their mover. And since the Several Gods or Measures of Fire into which he is thus divided are "our" energies and powers, it is the same to say that "the Gods entered into man, they made the mortal their house". His passible nature has now become "ours": and from this predicament he cannot easily recollect or rebuild himself, whole and complete. **

We are now the stone from which the spark can be struck, the mountain beneath which God lies buried, the scaly reptilian skin conceals him, and the fuel for his kindling. That his lair is now a cave or house presupposes the mountain or walls by which he is enclosed, verborgen and verbaut. "You" and "I" are the psychophysical prison and Constrictor in whom the First has been swallowed up that "we" might be at all. For as we are repeatedly told, the Dragon-slayer devours his victim, swallows him up and drinks him dry, and by this Eucharistic meal he takes possession of the first-born Dragon's treasure and powers and becomes what he was. We can cite, in fact, a remarkable text in which our composite soul is called the "mountain of God" and we are told that the Comprehensor of this doctrine shall in like manner swallow up his own evil, hateful adversary.21 This "adversary" is, of course, none but our self. The meaning of the text will only be fully grasped if we explain that the word for "mountain", giri, derives from the root gir, to "swallow". Thus He in whom we were imprisoned is now our prisoner; as our Inner Man he is submerged in and hidden by our Outer Man. It is now his turn to become the Dragon-slayer; and in this war of the God with the Titan, now fought within you, where we are "at war with ourselves", 22 his victory and resurrection will be also ours, if we have known Who we are. It is now for him to drink us dry, for us to be his wine.

We have realised that the deity is implicitly or explicitly a willing victim; and this is reflected in the human ritual, where the agreement of the victim, who must have been originally human, is always

formally secured. In either case the death of the victim is also its birth, in accordance with the infallible rule that every birth must have been preceded by a death: in the first case, the deity is multiply born in living beings, in the second they are reborn in him. But even so it is recognized that the sacrifice and dismemberment of the victim are acts of cruelty and even treachery;** and this is the original sin (kilbisa) of the Gods, in which all men participate by the very fact of their separate existence and their manner of knowing in terms of subject and object, good and evil, because of which the Outer Man is excluded from a direct participation24 in "what the Brahmans understand by Soma". The form of our "knowledge", or rather "ignorance" (avidya), dismembers him daily; and for this ignorantia divisiva an expiation is provided for in the Sacrifice, where by the sacrificer's surrender of himself and the building up again of the dismembered deity, whole and complete, the multiple selves are reduced to their single principle. There is thus an incessant.multiplication of the inexhaustible One and unification of the indefinitely Many. Such are the beginnings and endings of worlds and of individual beings: expanded from a point without position or dimensions and a now without date or duration, accomplishing their destiny, and when their time is up returning "home" to the Sea in which their life originated.**

THEOLOGY AND AUTOLOGY

The Sacrifice (yajña) undertaken here below is a ritual mimesis of what was done by the Gods in the beginning, and in the same way both a sin and an expiation. We shall not understand the Myth until we have made the Sacrifice, nor the Sacrifice until we have understood the Myth. But before we can try to understand the operation it must be asked, What is God? and What are we?

God is an essence without duality (advaita), or as some maintain, without duality but not without relations (visistadvaita). He is only to be apprehended as Essence (asti),26 but this Essence subsists in a two fold nature (dvaitibhava);27 as being and as becoming. Thus, what is called the Entirety (ketsnam, pūrņam, bhūman) is both explicit and inexplicit (niruktānirukta), sonant and silent (sabdāsabda), characterised and uncharacterised (saguņa, nirguņa), temporal and eternal (kālākāla), partite and impartite (sakalākalā), in a likeness and not in any likeness (murtamurta), shewn and unshewn (vyaktāvyakta), mortal and immortal (martyāmartya), and so forth. Whoever knows him in his proximate (apara) aspect, immanent, knows him also in his ultimate (para) aspect, transcendent;20 the Person seated in our heart, eating and drinking, is also the Person in the Sun. 49 This Sun of men, 30 and Light of lights, 31 "whom all men see but few know with the mind", 32 is the Universal Self (ātman) of all things mobile or immobile.32 He is both inside and outside (babir antas ca bhūtānām), but uninterruptedly (anantaram), and therefore a total presence, undivided in divided things.24 He does not come from anywhere, nor does he become anyone, an but only tends himself to all possible modalities of existence.26

The question of his names, such as Agni, Indra, Prajāpati, Siva, Brahma, etc., whether personal or essential, is dealt with in the usual way: "they call him many who is really one"; "even as he seems, so he becomes"; "he takes the forms imagined by his

worshippers".30 The trinitarian names-Agni, Vāyu and Āditya or Brahmā, Rudra and Vishnu—"are the highest embodiments of the supreme, immortal, bodiless Brahma . . . their becoming is a birth from one another, partitions of a common Self defined by its different operations . . . These embodiments are to be contemplated, celebrated, and at last recanted. For by means of them one rises higher and higher in the worlds; but where the whole ends, attains the simplicity of the Person".40 Of all the names and forms of God the monogrammatic syllable Om, the totality of all sounds and the music of the spheres chanted by the resonant Sun, is the best. The validity of such an audible symbol is exactly the same as that of a plastic icon, both alike serving as supports of contemplation (dhiyālamba); such a support is needed because that which is imperceptible to eye or ear cannot be apprehended objectively as it is in itself, but only in a likeness. The symbol must be naturally adequate, and cannot be chosen at random; one infers (aveşyati, avahayati) the unseen in the seen, the unheard in the heard; but these forms are only means by which to approach the formless and must be discarded before we can become it.

Whether we call him Person, or Sacerdotium, or Magna Mater, or by any other grammatically masculine, feminine or neuter names, "That" (tat, tad ekam) of which our powers are measures (tanmātrā) is a syzygy of conjoint principles, without composition or duality. These conjoint principles or selves, indistinguishable ab intra, but respectively self-sufficient and insufficient ab extra, become contraries only when we envisage the act of self-manifestation (sva-prakātatvam) implied when we descend from the silent level of the Non-duality to speak in terms of subject and object and to recognize the many separate and individual existences that the All (sarvam= tò nāv) or Universe (visvam) presents to our physical organs of perception. And since this finite totality can be only logically and not really divided from its infinite source, "That One" can also be called an "Integral Multiplicity" and "Omniform Light". Creation is exemplary. The conjoint principles, for example, Heaven and

Earth, or Sun and Moon, man and woman, were originally one. Ontologically, their conjugattion (mithunam, sambhava, eko bhava) is a vital operation, productive of a third in the image of the first and nature of the second. Just as the conjugation of Mind (manas= νοῦς) with the Voice (vāc=διάνοια) gives birth to a concept (samkalpa) so the conjugation of Heaven and Earth kindles the Bambino, the Fire, whose birth divides his parents from one another and fills the intervening Space (ākāša, antarikṣa, Midgard) with light; and in the same way microcosmically, being kindled in the space of the heart, he is its light. He shines in his Mother's womb,4 in full possession of all his powers.44 He is no sooner born than he traverses the Seven Worlds,45 ascends to pass through the Sundoor, as the smoke from an altar or central hearth, whether without or within you, ascends to pass out through the eye of the dome.48 This Agni is at once the messenger of God, the guest in all men's houses, whether constructed or bodily, the luminous pneumatic principle of life, and the missal priest who conveys the savour of the Burnt-offering hence to the world beyond the vault of the Sky, through which there is no other way but this "Way of the Gods" (devayana). This Way must be followed by the Forerunner's footprints, as the word for "Way" itself reminds us, by all who would reach the "farther shore" of the luminous spatial river of life" that divides this terrestrial from yonder celestial strand; these conceptions of the Way underlying all the detailed symbolisms of the Bridge, the Voyage and the Pilgrimage.

Considered apart, the "halves" of the originally undivided Unity can be distinguished in various ways according to our point of view; politically, for example, as Sacerdotium and Regnum (brahma-kṣatrau), and psychologically as Self and Not-self, Inner Man and Outer Individuality, Male and Female. These pairs are disparate; and even when the subordinate has been separated from the superior with a view to productive cooperation, it still remains in the latter, more eminently. The Sacerdotium, for example, is "both the Sacer-

dotium and the Regnum"—a condition found in the mixta persona of the priest-king Mitrāvaruṇau, or Indrāgnī—but the Regnum as a separated function is nothing but itself, relatively feminine, and subordinated to the Sacerdotium, its Director (netr=ἡγεμών). The functional distinction in terms of sex defines the hierarchy. God himself is male to all, but just as Mitra is male to Varuṇa and Varuṇa in turn male to Earth, so the Priest is male to the King, and the King male to his realm. In the same way the man is subject to the joint government of Church and State; but in authority with respect to his wife, who in turn administers his estate. Throughout the series it the noetic principle that sanctions or enjoins what the aesthetic performs or avoids; disorder arising only when the latter is distracted from her rational allegiance by her own ruling passions and identifies this submission with "liberty".*

The most pertinent application of all this is to the individual, whether man or woman: the outer and active individuality of "this man or woman, So-and-so" being naturally feminine and subject to its own inner and contemplative Self. On the one hand, the submission of the Outer to the Inner Man is all that is meant by the words "self-control" and "autonomy", and the opposite of what is meant by "self-assertion": and on the other, this is the basis of the interpretation of the return to God in terms of an erotic symbolism, "As one embraced by a darling bride knows naught of 'I' and 'thou', so self embraced by the foreknowing (solar) Self knows naught of a 'myself' within or a 'thyself' without";50 because, as Sankara remarks, of "unity". It is this Self that the man who really loves himself or others, loves in himself and in them; "all things are dear only for the sake of the Self".51 In this true love of Self the distinction of "selfishness" from "altruism" loses all its meaning. He sees the Self, the Lord, alike in all beings, and all beings alike in that Lordly Self.52 "Loving thy Self", in the words of Meister Eckhart, "thou lovest all men as thy Self".58 All these doctrines coincide with the Sufi, "What is love? Thou shalt know when thou becomest me",54, 158

The sacred marriage, consummated in the heart, adumbrates the deepest of all mysteries.55 For this means both our death and beatific resurrection. The word to "marry" (eko bhū, become one) also means to "die", just as in Greek, τελέω is to be perfected, to be married, or to die. When "Each is both", no relation persists: and were it not for this beatitude (ananda) there would be neither life nor gladness anywhere.56 All this implies that what we call the world-process and a creation is nothing but a game (krigā, līlā, παιδιά. dolce gioco) that the Spirit plays with itself, and as sunlight "plays" upon whatever it illuminates and quickens, although unaffected by its apparent contacts. We who play the game of life so desperately for temporal stakes might be playing at love with God for higher stakes—our selves, and his. We play against one another for possessions, who might be playing with the King who stakes his throne and what is his against our lives and all we are: a game in which the more is lost, the more is won. 67

By the separation of Heaven and Earth the "Three Worlds" are distinguished; the in-between World (antariksa) provides the etherial space (ākāia) in which the inhibited possibilities of finite manifestation can take birth in accordance with their several natures. From this first etherial substance are derived in succession air, fire, water and earth; and from these five elemental Beings (bhūtāni), combined in various proportions, are formed the inanimate bodies of creatures;58 into which the God enters to awaken them, dividing himself to fill these worlds and to become the "Several Gods", his children. 50 These Intelligences 00 are the host of "Beings" (bhūtagana) that operate in us, unanimously, as our "elemental soul" (bhūtātman), or conscious self;41 our "selves", indeed, but for the present mortal and unspiritual (anātmya, anātmāna), ignorant of their immortal Self (ātmānam ananuvidya, anātmajña), and to be distinguished from the Immortal deities who have already become what they are by their "worth" (arhana) and are spoken of as "Arhats" (="Dignities"). Through the mundane and perfectible deities, and just as a King receives tribute (balim abr) from his subjects, ** the Person in the heart, our Inner Man who is also the Person in the Sun, obtains the food (anna, āhāra); both physical and mental, on which he must subsist when he proceeds from being to becoming. And because of the simultaneity of his dynamic presence in all past and future becomings, ** the emanated powers at work in our consciousness can be regarded as the temporal support of the solar Spirit's timeless providence (prajāna) and omniscience (sarvajāāna). Not that this sensible world of successive events determined by mediate causes (karma, adrista, apūrva) is the source of his knowledge, but rather that it is itself the consequence of the Spirit's awareness of "the diversified world-picture painted by itself on the vast canvas of itself". ** It is not by means of this All that he knows himself, but by his knowledge of himself that he becomes this All. ** To know him by this All belongs only to our inferential manner of knowing.

You must have begun to realise that the theology and the autology are one and the same science, and that the only possible answer to the question, "What am I?" must be "That art thou"." For as there are two in him who is both Love and Death, so there are, as all tradition affirms unanimously, two in us; although not two of him or two of us, nor even one of him and one of us, but only one of both. As we stand now, in between the first beginning and the last end, we are divided against ourselves, essence from nature, and therefore see him likewise as divided against himself and from us. Let us describe the situation in two different figures. Of the conjugate birds, Sunbird and Soulbird, that perch on the Tree of Life, one is all-seeing, the other eats of its fruits. For the Comprehensor these two birds are one; to in the iconography we find either one bird with two heads, or two with necks entwined. But from our point of view there is a great difference between the spectator's and the participant's lives; the one is not involved, the other, submerged in her feeding and nesting, grieves for her lack of lordship (anisa) until she perceives her Lord (isa), and recognizes her Self in him and in his majesty, whose wings have never been clipped."

In another way, the constitution of worlds and of individuals is compared to a wheel (cakea), of which the hub is the heart, the spokes powers, and their points of contact on the felly, our organs of perception and action." Here the "poles" that represent our selves, respectively profound and superficial, are the motionless axlepoint on which the wheel revolves—il punto delle stelo al cui la prima rota va dintorno" - and the rim in contact with the earth to which it reacts. This is the "wheel of becoming, or birth" (bhavacakra=ό τροχὸς τῆς γενέσεως 134). The collective motion of all the wheels within wheels—each one turning on a point without position and one and the same in all—that are these worlds and individuals is called the Confluence (samsāra), and it is in this "storm of the world's flow" that our "elemental self" (bhūtātman) is fatally involved: fatally, because whatever "we" are naturally "destined" to experience under the sun is the ineluctable consequence of the uninterrupted but unseen operation of mediate causes (karma, adesta), from which only the aforesaid "point" remains independent, being in the wheel indeed, but not a "part" of it.

It is not only our passible nature that is involved, but also his. In this compatible nature he sympathises with our miseries and our delights and is subjected to the consequences of things done as much as "we" are. He does not choose his wombs, but enters into births that may be aughty or naughty (sadasat)" and in which his mortal nature is the fructuary (bhokte) equally of good and evil, truth and falsity." That "he is the only seer, hearer, thinker, knower and fructuary" in us, on and that "whoever sees, it is by his ray that he sees", who looks forth in all beings, is the same as to say that "the Lord is the only transmigrator", and it follows inevitably that by the very act with which he endows us with consciousness "he fetters himself like a bird in the net", and is subject to the evil, Death, or seems to be thus fettered and subjected.

Thus he is submitted to our ignorance and suffers for our sins. Who then can be liberated and by whom and from what? It would be better to ask, with respect to this absolutely unconditional liberty,

What is free now and nowever from the limitations that are presupposed by the very notion of individuality (abain ca mama ca, "I and mine; kartā'ham iti, "'I' am a doer")?" Freedom is from one's self, this "I", and its affections. He only is free from virtues and vices and all their fatal consequences who never became anyone; he only can be free who is no longer anyone; impossible to be freed from oneself and also to remain oneself. The liberation from good and evil that seemed impossible and is impossible for the man whom we define by what he does or thinks and who answers to the question, "Who is that?", "It's me", is possible only for him who can answer at the Sundoor to the question "Who art thou?", "Thyself". 82 He who fettered himself must free himself, and that can only be done by verifying the assurance, "That art thou". It is as much for us to liberate him by knowing Who we are as for him to liberate himself by knowing Who he is; and that is why in the Sacrifice the sacrificer identifies himself with the victim.

Hence also the prayer, "What thou art, thus may I be", so and the eternal significance of the critical question "In whose departure, when I go hence, shall I be departing?",4 i.e. in myself, or "her immortal Self" and "Leader". 85 If the right answers have been verified, if one has found the Self, and having done all that there is to be done (kṛtakṛtya), without any residue of potentiality (kṛtyā), the last end of our life has been presently attained.30 It cannot be too much emphasized that freedom and immortality^{ar} can be, not so much "reached", as "realised" as well here and now as in any hereafter. One "freed in this life" (jivan mukta) "dies no more" (na punar mriyate).88 "The Comprehensor of that Contemplative, ageless, undying Self, in whom naught whatsoever is wanting and who wanteth nothing, has no fear of death". ** Having died already, he is, as the Sūfī puts it, "a dead man walking".* Such an one no longer loves himself or others, but is the Self in himself and in them. Death to one's self is death to "others"; and if the "dead man" seems to be "unselfish", this will not be the result of altruistic motives, but accidentally, and because he is literally un-self-ish.

Liberated from himself, from all status, all duties, all rights, he has become a Mover-at-will (kāmacārī), or like the Spirit (Vāyu, ātmā devānām) that "moveth as it will" (yathā vašam carati), and as St. Paul expresses it, "no longer under the law"

This is the superhuman impartiality of those who have found their Self,—"The same am I in all beings, of whom there is none I love and none I hate"93; the freedom of those who have fulfilled the condition required of his disciples by Christ, to hate father and mother and likewise their own "life" in the world. We cannot say what the freeman is, but only what he is not,-Trasumanar significar per verba non si poria! But this can be said that those who have not known themselves are neither now nor ever shall be free, and that "great is the destruction" of these victims of their own sensations.95 The Brahmanical autology is no more pessimistic than optimistic, but only more authoritative than any other science of which the truth does not depend on our wishes. It is no more pessimistic to recognize that whatever is alien to Self is a distress, than it is optimistic to recognize that where there is no "other" there is literally nothing to be feared.94 That our Outer Man is "another" appears in the expression "I cannot trust myself". What has been called the "natural optimism" of the Upanishads is their affirmation that our consciousness of being, although invalid as an awareness of being So-and-so, is valid absolutely, and their doctrine that the Gnosis of the Immanent Deity, our Inner Man, can be realised now: "That art thou". In the words of St. Paul, Vivo autem, jam non ego.

That this is so, or that "He is" at all, cannot be demonstrated in the classroom, where only quantitative tangibles are dealt with. At the same time, it would be unscientific to deny a presupposition for which an experimental proof is possible. In the present case there is a Way prescribed for those who will consent to follow it: and it is precisely at this point that we must turn from the first principles to the operation through which, rather than by which, they can be verified; in other words from the consideration of the contemplative to the consideration of the active or sacrificial life.

THE WAY OF WORKS

The Sacrifice reflects the Myth; but like all reflections, inverts it. What had been a process of generation and division becomes now one of regeneration and composition. Of the two "selves" that dwell together in and depart together from this body, the first is born of woman, and the second from the sacrificial Fire, of which divine womb the man's seed is to be born again as another than he was; and until he has thus been reborn he has but the one, mortal "self"." To sacrifice is to be born, and it can be said, "As yet unborn, forsooth, is the man who does not sacrifice".** Again, when the Progenitor, our Father, "has expressed and fondly (prena, snehavasena) inhabits his children, he cannot come together again (punar sambhū) from them" and so he proclaims that "They shall flourish who will build me up again (punar ci) hence": the Gods built him up, and they flourished, and so does the sacrificer even today flourish both here and hereafter.100 The sacrificer, in his edification of the Fire(-altar) "with his whole mind, his whole self"101-"This Fire knows that he has come to give himself to me"100 -is "putting together" (samdha, samskr) at one and the same time the dismembered deity and his own separated nature: for he would be under a great delusion and merely a brute were he to hold that "He is one, and I another".108

The Sacrifice is something to be done; "We must do what the Gods did erst". 104 It is, in fact, often spoken of simply as "Work" (karma). Thus just as in Latin operare=sacra facere=legorous so in India, where the emphasis on action is so strong, to do well is to do sacred things, and only to do nothing, or what being done amiss amounts to nothing, is idle and profane. How strictly analogous the operation is to any other professional work will be apparent if we remember that it is only when priests operate on behalf of others that they are to be remunerated, and that when men

sacrifice together on their own behalf a reception of gifts is inordinate.¹⁰⁸ The King as the supreme Patron of the Sacrifice on behalf of the kingdom, represents the sacrificer *in divinis*, and is himself the type of all other sacrificers.

One of the strangest controversies in the history of Orientalism turned upon the "origin of bhakti", as if devotion had at some given moment been a new idea and thenceforth a fashionable one. It would have been simpler to observe that the word bhakti means primarily a given share, and therefore also the devotion or love that all liberality presupposes; and so that inasmuch as one "gives God his share" (bhāgam), i.e. sacrifces, one is his bhaktā. Thus in the hymn, "If thou givest me my share" amounts to saying "If thou lovest me". It has often been pointed out that the Sacrifice was thought of as a commerce between Gods and men:100 but not often realised that by introducing into traditional conceptions of trade notions derived from our own internecine commercial transactions, we have falsified our understanding of the original sense of such a commerce, which was actually more of the potlatsh type, a competition in giving, than like our competitions in taking. The sacrificer knows that for whatever he gives he will receive full measure in return; or rather, fuller measure, for whereas his own treasury is limited, the other party's is inexhaustible, "He is the Imperishable (-syllable, Om), for he pours forth gifts to all these beings, and because there is none can pour forth gifts beyond him". 100 God gives as much as we can take of him, and that depends on how much of "ourselves" we have given up. Feudal loyalties rather than business obligations are implied words of the hymns, "Thou art ours and we are thine", "Let us, O Varuna, be thine own dearly beloved" and "Thine may we be for thee to give us treasure":107 these are the relations of thane to earl and vassal to overlord, not of moneychangers. The language of commerce survives even in such late and profoundly devotional hymns as Mīrā Bāī's

Känh have I bought. The price he asked, I gave.

Some cry, "Tis great", and others jeer, "Tis small"—

I gave in full, weighed to the utmost grain, My love, my life, my soul, my all.

If we also remember, what will shortly appear, that the sacrificial life is the active life, it will be seen that the connection of action with devotion is implicit in the very concept of operation; and that whatever is done perfectly must have been done lovingly, and whatever ill done, done carelessly.

The Sacrifice, like the words of the liturgy indispensible to it, must be understood (erlebt) if it is to be completely effective. The merely physical acts may, like any other labor, secure temporal advantages. Its uninterrupted celebration maintains, in fact, the endless "stream of wealth" (vasor dhārā) that falls from heaven as the fertilising rain, passes through plants and animals, becomes our food, and is returned to heaven in the smoke of the Burnt-offering; that rain and this smoke are the wedding gifts in the sacred marriage of Sky and Earth, Sacerdotium and Regnum, that is implied by the whole operation.108 But more than the mere acts is required if their ultimate purpose, of which the acts are only the symbols, is to be realised. It is explicit that "neither by action nor by sacrifices can He be reached" (nakistam karmanā našad . . . na yajñaih),100 whom to know is our highest good:110 and at the same time repeatedly affirmed that the Sacrifice is performed, not merely aloud and visibly, but also "intellectually" (manasā)," i.e. silently and invisibly, within you. In other words, the practise is only the external support and demonstration of the theory. The distinction is drawn accordingly between the true self-sacrificer (sadyājī, satisad, ātmayājī) and the one who is merely present at a sacrifice (sattrasad) and expects the deity to do all the real work (devayāji).113 It is even stated in so many words that "Whoever, being a Comprehensor thereof performs the good work, or is simply a Comprehensor (without actually performing any rite), puts together again the dismembered deity. whole and complete";118 it is by gnosis and not by works that that world is attainable.114 Nor can it be overlooked that the rite, in which the sacrificer's last end is prefigured, is an exercise in dying,

and therefore a dangerous undertaking in which the sacrificer might actually lose his life prematurely; but "the Comprehensor passes on from one duty to another, as from one stream into another, or from one refuge to another, to obtain his weal, the heavenworld"."

We cannot describe in detail the "wilds and realms" of the Sacrifice, and shall only consider that most significant part of the Burnt-offering (agnihotra) in which the Soma oblation is poured into the Fire as into God's mouth. What is Soma? Exoterically, an intoxicating drink, extracted from the juicy parts of various plants and mixed with milk and honey and filtered, and corresponding to the mead or wine or blood of other traditions. This juice, however, is not itself Soma until "by means of the priest, the initiation and the formulae", and "by faith" it has been made to be Soma, transubstantially; and "Though men fancy when they crush the plant that they are drinking of very Soma, of him the Brahmans understand by 'Soma' none tastes who dwells on earth". The plants made use of are not the real Soma plant, which grows in the rocks and mountains (giri, asman, adri), in which it is embodied. 118

The "pacification" or slaving of King Soma, the God, is rightly called the Supreme Oblation. Yet it is not Soma himself, "but only his evil" that is killed:119 it is, actually in preparation for his enthronement and sovereignty that Soma is purified;120 and this is a pattern followed in coronation rites (rājasūya) and descriptive of the soul's preparation for her own autonomy (svarāj). For it must never be forgotten that "Soma was the Dragon" and is sacrificially extracted from the Dragon's body just as the living sap (rasa) is extracted from a decorticated tree. It is in agreement with the rule that the "Suns are Serpents" that have cast and abandoned their dead reptilian skins¹²¹ that Soma's procession is described: "Even as the Serpent from his inveterated skin, so (from the bruised shoots) streams the golden Soma-jet, like a sportive steed".122 In just the same way the procession and liberation of our immortal Self from its psycho-physical sheaths (kosa) is a shaking off of bodies, 123 or as one draws a reed from its sheath, or an arrow from its quiver to find its mark, or as a snake skin is sloughed; "even as the serpent casts its skin, so does one cast off all his evil".224

We can now more easily understand the identification of Soma juice with the Water of Life, that of our composite elemental soul (bhūtātman) with the Soma shoots from which the regal elixir is to be extracted,125 and how and by whom "what the Brahmans mean by Soma" is consumed in our hearts (brtsu).186 It is the life-blood of the draconian soul that its harnessed powers now offer to their Overlord.127 The sacrificer makes Burnt-offering of what is his and what he is, and is emptied out of himself,126 becoming a God. When the rite is relinquished he returns to himself, from the real to the unreal.100 But although in thus returning he says "Now I am who I am", the very statement shows that he knows that this is not really. but only temporarily true. He has been born again of the Sacrifice, and is not really deceived. "Having slain his own Dragon"180 he is no longer really anyone; the work has been done, once and for all; he has come to the end of the road and end of the world, "where Heaven and Earth embrace", and may thereafter "work" or "play" as he will; it is to him that the words are spoken, Lo tuo piacere omai prende per duce . . . per ch'io te sopra te corono e mitrio.181

We who were at war with ourselves are now reintegrated and self-composed: the rebel has been tamed (dānta) and pacified (tānta), and where there had been a conflict of wills there is now unanimity. We can only very briefly allude to another and very significant aspect of the Sacrifice that has been made by pointing out that the reconciliation of conflicting powers for which the Sacrifice continually provides is also their marriage. There are more ways than one of "killing" a Dragon; and the Dragon-slayer's bolt (vajra) being in fact a shaft of light, and "light the progenitive power", its signification is not only military, but also phallic. 123 It is the battle of love that has been won when the Dragon "expires". Soma as Dragon is identified with the Moon; as Elixir the Moon becomes the food of the Sun, by whom she is swallowed up on the nights of their cohabitation (amāvāsya), and "what is eaten is called by

the eater's name and not its own"; ¹³⁴ in other words, ingestion implies assimilation. In Meister Eckhart's words, "There the soul unites with God, as food with man, which turns in eye to eye, in ear to ear; so does the soul in God turn into God"; for "what absorbs me, that I am, rather than mine own self". ¹³⁵ Just as the Sun swallows up the Dawn, or devours the Moon, visibly and outwardly, daily and monthly, such is the "divine marriage" that is consummated within you when the solar and lunar Persons of the right and left eyes, Eros and Psyche, Death and the Lady, enter into the cave of the heart and are united there, just as a man and woman are united in human wedlock, and that is their "supreme beatitude". ¹³⁶ In that rapt synthesis (samādhi) the Self has recovered its primordial condition, "as of a man and a woman closely embraced", ¹³⁶ and without awareness of any distinction of a within from a without. ¹³⁸ "That Self art thou".

No wonder, then, that we find it said that "If one sacrifices, knowing not this interior Burnt-offering, it is as if he pushed aside the brands and made oblation in the ashes"; 189 that this is not a rite to be performed only at fixed seasons, but on every one of the thirty-six thousand days of one's whole life of a hundred years; 140 and that for the Comprehensor of this, all the powers of the soul incessantly build up his Fire even while he is asleep. 141

This conception of the Sacrifice as an incessant operation and the sum of man's duty finds its completion in a series of texts in which each and every function of the active life, down to our very breathing, eating, drinking and dalliance is sacramentally interpreted and death is nothing but the final katharsis. And that is, finally, the famous "Way of Works" (karma mārga) of the Bhagavad Gītā, where to fulfil one's own vocation, determined by one's own nature (svakarma, svabhāvatas τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν, κατὰ φύσιν). without self-referent motives, is the way of perfection (siddbi). We have come full circle, not in an "evolution of thought" but in our own understanding, from the position that the perfect celebration of rites is our task, to the position that the perfect performance of

our tasks, whatever they may be, is itself the celebration of the rite. Sacrifice, thus understood, is no longer a matter of doing specifically sacred things only on particular occasions, but of sacrificing (making sacred) all we do and all we are; a matter of the sanctification of whatever is done naturally, by a reduction of all activities to their principles. We say "naturally" advisedly, intending to imply that whatever is done naturally may be either sacred or profane according to our own degree of awareness, but that whatever is done unnaturally is essentially and irrevocably profane.

THE SOCIAL ORDER

Ethics, whether as prudence or as art, is nothing but the scientific application of doctrinal norms to contingent problems; right doing or making are matters not of the will, but of conscience, or awareness, a choice being only possible as between obedience or rebellion. Actions, in other words, are in order or inordinate in precisely the same way that iconography may be correct or incorrect, formal or informal.¹⁴² Error is failure to hit the mark, and is to be expected in all who act instinctively, to please themselves. Skill (kauialyā=oopia), is virtue, whether in doing or in making: a matter needing emphasis only because it has now been generally overlooked that there can be artistic as well as moral sin. "Yoga is skill in works".¹⁴⁸

Where there is agreement as to the nature of man's last end, and that the Way by which the present and the paramount ends of life can be realised is that of sacrificial operation, it is evident that the form of society will be determined by the requirements of the Sacrifice; and that order (yathārthatā) and impartiality (samadṛṣṭi) will mean that everyman shall be enabled to become, and by no misdirection prevented from becoming, what he has it in him to become. We have seen that it is to those who maintain the Sacrifice that the promise is made that they shall flourish. Now the Sacrifice, performed in divinis by the All-worker (Visvakarma), as imitated here demands a cooperation of all the arts (viiva karmāṇi),144 for example, those of music, architecture, carpentry, husbandry and that of warfare to protect the operation. The politics of the heavenly, social and individual communities are governed by one and the same law. The pattern of the heavenly politics is revealed in scripture and reflected in the constitution of the autonomous state and that of the man who governs himself.

In this man, in whom the sacramental life is complete, there is a hierarchy of sacerdotal, royal, and administrative powers, and a

fourth class consisting of the physical organs of sense and action, that handle the raw material or "food" to be prepared for all; and it is clear that if the organism is to flourish, which is impossible if divided against itself, that the sacerdotal, royal and administrative powers, in their order of rank, must be the "masters", and the workers in raw materials their "servants". It is in precisely the same way that the functional hierarchy of the realm is determined by the requirements of the Sacrifice on which its prosperity depends. The castes are literally "born of the Sacrifice".165 In the sacramental order there is a need and a place for all men's work: and there is no more significant consequence of the principle, Work is Sacrifice, than the fact that under these conditions, and remote as this may be from our secular ways of thinking, every function, from that of the priest and the king down to that of the potter and scavenger, is literally a priesthood and every operation a rite. In each of these spheres, moreover, we meet with "professional ethics". The caste system differs from the industrial "division of labor", with its "fractioning of human faculty", in that it presupposes differences in kinds of responsibility but not in degrees of responsibility; and it is just because an organisation of functions such as this, with its mutual loyalties and duties, is absolutely incompatible with our competitive industrialism, that the monarchic, feudal and caste system is always painted in such dark colors by the sociologist, whose thinking is determined more by his actual environment than it is a deduction from first principles.

That capacities and corresponding vocations are hereditary necessarily follows from the doctrine of progenitive rebirth: every man's son is by nativity qualified and predestined to assume his father's "character" and take his place in the world; it is for this that he is initiated into his father's profession and finally confirmed in it by the deathbed rites of transmission, after which, should the father survive, the son becomes the head of the family. In replacing his father, the son frees him from the functional responsibility that he bore in this life, at the same time that a continuation of the sac-

rificial services is provided for. And by the same token, the family line comes to an end, not for want of descendants (since this can be remedied by adoption) but whenever the family vocation and tradition is abandoned. In the same way a total confusion of castes is the death of a society, nothing but a mob remaining where a man can change his profession at will, as though it had been something altogether independent of his own nature. It is, in fact, thus that traditional societies are murdered and their culture destroyed by contact with industrial and proletarian civilisations. The orthodox Eastern estimate of Western civilisation can be fairly stated in Macaulay's words,

The East bowed low before the West In patient, deep disdain.

It must be remembered, however, that contrasts of this kind can be drawn only as between the still orthodox East and the modern West, and would not have held good in the thirteenth century.

The social order is designed, by its integration of functions, to provide at the same time for a common prosperity and to enable every member of society to realise his own perfection. In the sense that "religion" is to be identified with the "law" and distinguished from the "spirit", Hindu religion is strictly speaking an obedience; and that this is so appears clearly in the fact that a man is considered to be a Hindu in good standing, not by what he believes but by what he does; or in other words, by his "skill" in well doing under the law.

For if there is no liberation by works, it is evident that the practical part of the social order, however faithfully fulfilled, can no more than any other rite, or than the affirmative theology, be regarded as anything more than a means to an end beyond itself. There always remains a last step, in which the ritual is abandoned and the relative truths of theology denied. As it was by the knowledge of good and evil that man fell from his first high estate, so it must be from the knowledge of good and evil, from the moral law, that he must be delivered at last. However far one may have gone,

there remains a last step to be taken, involving a dissolution of all former values. A church or society—the Hindu would make no distinction—that does not provide a way of escape from its own regimen, and will not let its people go, is defeating its own ultimate purpose.¹⁴⁷

It is precisely for this last step that provision is made in the last of what are called the "Four Stages" (asrama) of life.148 The term itself implies that everyman is a pilgrim (framana), whose only motto is to "keep on going". The first of these stages is that of student-discipleship; the second that of marriage and occupational activity, with all its responsibilities and rights; the third is one of retreat and comparative poverty; the fourth a condition of total renunciation (sannyāsa). It will be seen that whereas in a secular society a man looks forward to an old age of comfort and economic independence, in this sacramental order he looks forward to becoming independent of economics and indifferent to comfort and discomfort. I recall the figure of one of the most magnificent men: having been a householder of almost fabulous wealth, he was now at the age of seventy-eight in the third stage, living alone in a log cabin and doing his own cooking and washing with his own hands the only two garments he possessed. In two years more he would have abandoned all this semi-luxury to become a religious mendicant, without any possessions whatever but a loin cloth and a begging bowl in which to receive scraps of food freely given by others still in the second stage of life.

This fourth stage of life may also be entered upon at any time, if and only if a man be ripe for it and the call be irresistible. Those who thus abandon the household life and adopt the homeless are variously known as renouncers, wanderers or experts (sannyāsī, pravrājaka, sādhu) and as Yogīs. It happens even today that men of the highest rank, achievement and wealth "change their lives" in this way; this is literally a dying to the world, for their funeral rites are performed when they leave home and take to the open air. It would be a great mistake to suppose that such acts are in any way

penitential; they much rather reflect a change of mind; the active life having been led in the imitation of the proceeding deity is now balanced by an imitation of the Deus absconditus.

The mere presence of these men in a society to which they no longer belong, by its affirmation of ultimate values, affects all values. However many may be the pretenders and shirkers who may adopt this way of life for a variety of inadequate reasons, it still remains that if we think of the four castes as representing the essence of Hindu society, the super-social and anonymous life of the truly poor man, who voluntarily relinquishes all obligations and all rights, represents its quintessence. These are those that have denied themselves and left all to "follow Me". The making of this highest election is open to all, regardless of social status. In this order of nobodies, no one will ask "Who, or what were you in the world?" The Hindu of any caste, or even a barbarian, can become a Nobody. Blessed is the man on whose tomb can be written, *Hic jacet nemo.*¹⁴⁸

These are already liberated from the chain of fate, to which only the psycho-physical vehicle remains attached until the end comes. Death in samādhi changes nothing essential. Of their condition thereafter little more can be said than that they are. They are certainly not annihilated, for not only is the annihilation of anything real a metaphysical impossibility, but it is explicit that "Never have I not been, or hast thou not been, or ever shall not be". 150 We are told that the perfected self becomes a ray of the Sun, and a moverat-will up and down these worlds, assuming what shape and eating what food he will; just as in John, the saved "shall go in and out, and find pasture". These expressions are consistent with the doctrine of "distinction without difference" (bhedābheda) supposedly peculiar to Hindu "theism" but presupposed by the doctrine of the single essence and dual nature and by many Vedantic texts, including those of the Brahma Sūtra, not refuted by Sankara himself.151 The doctrine itself corresponds exactly to what is meant by Meister Eckhart's "fused but not confused".

How that can be we can best understand by the analogy of the

relation of a ray of light to its source, which is also that of the radius a circle to its centre. If we think of such a ray or radius as having "gone in" through the centre to an undimensioned and extra-cosmic infinity, nothing whatever can be said of it; if we think of it as at the centre, it is, but in identity with the centre and indistinguishable from it; and only when it goes "out" does it have an apparent position and identity. There is then a "descent" (avatarana) 188 of the Light of Lights as a light, but not as "another" light. Such a "descent" as that of Krishna or Rāma differs essentially from the fatally determined incarnations of mortal natures that have forgotten Who they are; it is, indeed, their need that now determines the descent, and not any lack on his part who descends. Such a "descent" is of one che solo esso a sè piace,154 and is not "seriously" involved in the forms it assumes, not by any coactive necessity, but only in "sport" (krīdā, līlā).188 Our immortal Self is "like the dewdrop on the lotus leaf", 156 tangent, but not adherent. "Ultimate, unheard, unreached, unthought, unbowed, unseen, undiscriminated and unspoken, albeit listener, thinker, seer, speaker, discriminator and foreknower, of that Interior Person of all beings one should know that 'He is my Self' ".157 "That art thou".154

NOTES TO HINDUISM

- 1 RV.X.129.1-3; TS.VI.4.8.3; IB.HI.359; SB.X.5.3.1, 2 etc.
- 2 RV.X.124.4, etc.
- *RV,X.13.4, "They made Brhaspati the Sacrifice, Yama outpoured his own dear body."
 - *RV.X.90.6-8, "They made the first-born Person their sacrificial victim."
- 5 The word dova, like its cognates \$\tilde{v}\colon_c, down, can be used in the singular to mean "God" or in the plural to mean "Gods" or sometimes "Angels"; just as we can say "Spirit" meaning the Holy Ghost, and also speak of spirits, and amongst others even of "evil spirits." The "Gods" of Proclus are the "Angels" of Dionysius. What may be called the "high Gods" are the Persons of the Trinity. Agni. Indra-Väyu. Aditya, or Brahmā, Siva, Vishou, to be distinguished only, and then not always sharply, from one another according to their functioning and spheres of operation. The mixtae personae of the dual Mitravarunau or Agnendrau are the form of the Sacerdorium and Regnum in divinis; their subjects, the "Many Gods," are the Maruts or Gales. The equivalents in ourselves are on the one hand the immanent median Breath, sometimes spoken of as Vārnadeva, sometimes as Inner Man and Immortal Self, and on the other its extensions and subjects the Breaths, or powers of seeing, hearing, thinking etc. of which our elemental "soul" is the unanimous composite, just as the body is a composite of functionally distinguishable parts that act in unison. The Maruts and the Breaths may act in obedience to their governing principle, or may rebel against it. All this is, of course, an over simplified statement. Cf. Note 129.
 - * SB.X.5.2.13.
 - 7 SB.X.5,2,16,
 - *TA.V.1.3; MU.II.6 (a).
 - 9 RV.J.32 etc.
 - 10 RV.X.31.7; X.81.4; TB.H.8.9, 6; cf. RV.X.89.7; TS.VI.4.7.3.
- 11 RV.I.54.5 Ivasanasya . . . Iuspasya; V.29.4 Ivasantam danavam; TS.II.5.2.4 jahjabbyamanad agnisomau nirakramatam; cf. SB.1.6.3.13-15.
- ¹² BU.IV.3.11 mahato bhātasya... etāni sarvāņi nihivasitāni; MU.VI.32 etc. "For all things arise out of only one being" (Behmen, Sig. Rev. XIV, 74). As in RV.X.90.
 ¹³ SB.I.6.3.15. 16.
- 14 "Is unstrung," vyasranisata, i.e. is disjointed, so that having been jointless, he is articulated, having been one, is divided and overcome, like Makha (TA.V.1.3) and Vrtra (originally jointless, RV.IV.19.3, but dissevered, I.32.7). For Prajapati's fall and reconstitution see SB.I.6.3.35 and passim; PB.IV.10.1 and passim; TB.I.2.6.1; AA.III.2.6, etc. It is with reference to his "division" that in KU.V.4 the immanent deity (dehin) is spoken of as "unstrung" (vireniamāna); for he is one in himself, but many as he is in his children (SB.X.3.2.16) from out of whom he cannot easily come together again (see Note 20).
 - 15 SB.X.4.4.1.
 - 10 PB.VI.5.1. (Prajāpati); cf. \$B.IV.4.3.4. (Vṛtra).

- 17 TS.II.4.12.6. It is noteworthy that whereas the "Person in the right eye" is usually spoken of as the Sun or solar Indra, it can equally well be said that it is Susna (the Scorcher) that is smitten and when he falls enters into the eye as its pupil, or that Vṛṭra becomes the right eye (SB.III.1.3.11, 18). That is one of the many ways in which "Indra is now what Vṛṭra was."
- 13 MU.II.6, cf. SB.III.9.1.2. "Mover," as in Paradiso, I.116. Questi nei cor mortali è permotore. Cf. Laws, 898 C.
- 19 AV.X.8.18, cf. SB.II.3.2.3, JUB.I.14 2, mayy etās sarvā devatāh. Cf. KB.VII.4 ime puruse devatāh; TS.IV.1.4.5 prānā vai devā . . . tesu paroksam juboti ("The Gods in this man . . . they are the Breaths . . . in them he sacrifices metaphysically"); KB.VII.4.
- ²⁰ TS.V.3.2.1 Prajāpatiķ prajā srstvā prenānu pravišat, tābbyām punar sambbavitum nālaknos; SB.I.6.3.36 sa visrastaiķ parvabbiķ na šatāka sambātum.
- 22 AA.II.1.8. St. Bonaventura likewise equated mons with mens (De dec. praeceptis II. ascendere in montem, id est, in eminentiam mentis); this traditional image which, like so many others, must be dated back to the time when "cave" and "home" were one and the same thing, underlies the familiar symbols of mining and seeking for buried treasure (MU.VI.29 etc.). The powers of the soul (bhūtāni, a word that also means "gnomes") at work in the mind-mountain, are the types of the dwarf miners who protect the "Snow-white" Psyche when she has bitten into the fruit of good and evil and fallen into her death-like sleep, in which she remains until the divine Eros awakens her and the fruit falls from her lips. Who ever has understood the scriptural Mythos will recognize its paraphrases in the universal fairy-tales that were not created by, but have been inherited and faithfully transmitted by the "folk" to whom they were originally communicated. It is one of the prime errors of historical and rational analysis to suppose that the "truth" and "original form" of a legend can be separated from its miraculous elements. It is in the marvels themselves that the truth inheres: τὸ θαυμάξειν, οὐ γὰο ἄλλη ἀρχή φιλοσοφίας ή αθτη, Plato, Theatetus 1550, and in the same way Aristotle, who adds διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν ὁ γὰφ μύθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίαν, "So that the lover of myths, which are compact of wonders, is by the same token a lover of wisdom" (Metaphysics 982 B). Myth embodies the nearest approach to absolute truth that can be stated in words.
 - 22 BG.VI.6; cf. S.I.57 = Dh.66; A.I.149; Rūmi, Mathrawi I.267 f., etc.
- ²⁸ TS.II.5.1.2, II.5.3.6; cf. VI.4.9.1; \$B.I.2.3.3, III.9.4.17, XII.6.1.39,40; PB. XII.6.8, 9; Kauş, Up. III.1 etc.; cf. Bloomfield in *JAOS*. XV. 161.
 - 24 TS.II.4.12.1, AB.VII.28 etc.
- ²⁵ Mund.Up. III.2.8, Prasna Up. VI.5, and see further parallels in Review of Religion, Nov. 1941, p. 18, Note 2.
 - 26 KU.VI.13; MU.IV.4 etc.
- ²⁷ MU.VII.11; BU.II.3. No trace of Monophysitism or of Patripassianism can be discovered in the so-called "monism" of the Vedānta; the "non-duality" being that of two natures coincident without composition.
 - 28 MU.VI.22; cf. Pras. Up. V.2; Svet. Up. V.1.8; Mund. Up. II.2,8.
 - ²⁹ BU.IV.4.24; Taitt. Up. III.10.4; MU.VI.1.2.
 - 30 RV.I.146.4; cf. John I.4.
 - 31 RV.I.113.1; BU.IV.16; Mund Up. II.2.9; BG.XIII.16.
 - 32 AV.X.8.14; cf. Plato, Laws 898 D. ψυγή μέν έστιν ή περιάγουσα ήμων πάντα.
- 53 RV.J.115.1; AV.X.8.44; AA.III.2.4. Autology (atma-jfiana) is the fundamental theme of scripture; but it must be understood that this Self-knowledge differs from

any empirical knowledge of an object inasmuch as our Self is always the subject and can never become the object of knowledge; in other words, all definition of the

ultimate Self must by by remotion.

Atman (root an, to breathe, cf. ἀτμός, ἀϋτμή) is primarily Spiritus, the luminous and pneumatic principle, and as such often equated with the Gale (vāyu, vāta, root râ, to blow) of the Spirit which "bloweth as it listeth" (yathā vaiam carati, RV.X. 168.4 as in John III.8). Being the ultimate essence in all things, atman acquires the secondary sense of "self," regardless of our level of reference, which may be either somatic, psychic or spiritual. So that over over against our real Self, the Spirit in ourselves and all living things there is the "self," of which we speak when we say "I" or "you," mean this or that man, So-and-so. In other words there are two in us, Outer and Inner Man, psycho-physical personality and very Person. It is therefore according to the context that we must translate. Because the word atman, used reflexively, can only be rendered by "self" we have adhered to the sense of "self" throughout, distinguishing Self from self by the capital, as is commonly done. But it must be clearly understood that the distinction is really of "spirit" (πνεδμα) from "soul" (ψυχή) in the Pauline sense. It is true that the ultimate Self, "this self's immortal Self" (MU.III.2, VI.2), is identical with Philo's "soul of the soul" (worn worns), and with Plato's "immortal soul" as distinguished from the "mortal soul," and that some translators render atman by "soul"; but although there are contexts in which "soul" means "spirit" (cf. William of Thierry, Epistle to the Brethren of Mont Dien, Ch. XV, on this very problem of the distinction of anima from animus) it becomes dangerously misleading in view of our current notions of "psychology" to speak of the ultimate and unipersal Self as a "soul," It would be, for ex: ample, a very great mistake to suppose that when a "philosopher" such as Jung speaks of "man in search of a soul" this has anything whatever to do with the Indian search for the Self, or for that matter with the injunction, I'voot occurrov. The empiricist's "self" is for the metaphysician, just like all the rest of our environment, "not my Self."

Of the two "selves" referred to, the first is born of woman the second of the divine womb, the sacrificial fire; and whoever has not thus been "born again" is effectively possessed of but the one and mortal self that is born of the flesh and must end with it (JB.I.17, cf. John III.6, Gal. VI.8, I Cor. 15.50 etc.). Hence in the Upanishads and Buddhism the fundamental questions "Who art thou?", and "By which self?" is immortality attainable, the answer being, only by that Self that is immortal; the Indian texts never fall into the error of supposing that a soul that has had a beginning in time can also be immortal; nor, indeed, can we see that the Christian

Gospels anywhere put forward such an impossible doctrine as this.

84 BG.XIII.15, 16.

25 KU.H.18.

se BU.IV.4.5.

87 RV.X.114.5, cf. III.5.4, V.3.1.

88 RV.V.44.6.

39 Kailayamālai (see Ceylon National Review, No. 3, 1907, p. 280).

40 Nirukta VII.4, Brhad Devatā 1.70-74; MU.IV.6.

41 RV.III.54.8 vilvam ekam,

42 VS.V.35 jyotir asi vilvarüpam.

43 RV.VI.16.35, cf. III.29.14.

44 RV.III.3.10, X.115.1 etc.

45 RV.X.8.4, X.122.3.

46 For the Sundoor, the "ascent after Agni" (TS.V.6.8; AB.IV.20-22), etc., see my "Svayamätrura"; Janua Coeli" in Zalmoxis II, 1939 (1941).

47 Mārga, "Way," from mṛg = ἰχνεύω. The doctrine of the vestigia pedis is common to Greek, Christian, Hindu and Buddhist teaching and is the basis of the iconography of the "footprints." The forerunners can be traced by their spoor as far as the Sundoor, Janua Coeli, the End of the Road; beyond that they cannot be tracked. The symbolism of tracking, like that of "error" (sin) as a "failure to hit the mark," is one of those that have come down to us from the oldest hunting cultures; cf. Note 5.

48 Lo gran mar d'essere, Paradiso I.113. The "crossing" is the biumoquia of Epinomis 986 E.

⁴⁹ For this whole paragraph see my "Spiritual authority and Temporal power in the Indian theory of Government, American Oriental Series, XXII, 1942."

⁵⁰ BU.IV.3.21 (rather freely translated), cf. I.4.3; CU.VII.25.2, "In the embrace of this sovian One that naughts the separated self of things, being is one without distinction" (Evans, I.368). We are repeatedly told that the deity is "both within and without", i.e. immanent and transcendent; in the last analysis this theological distinction breaks down, and "Whoever is joined unto the Lord is one spirit" (I Cor. 6.17).

⁵¹ BU.II.4 etc. On true "Self-love" see references in HJAS.4, 1939, p. 135.

52 BG.VI.29, XIII.27.

88 Meister Eckhart, Evans I.139; cf. Sn. 705.

54 Mathnawi, Bk. II, introduction.

55 SB.X.5.2.11, 12; BU.IV.3.21 etc.

56 TU.II.7.

⁸⁷ For this whole paragraph see my "Lila" in JAOS.61, 1940.

"Thou didst contrive this 'I' and 'we' in order that thou mightest play the game of worship with Thyself.

That all 'I's' and 'thou's' should become one life."

Růmî, Mathrawi I.1787.

Per sua diffalta in pianta ed in affamo Cambio onesto riso e dolce gioco,

Dante, Paradisa XXVIII.95, 96.

56 CU.I.9.1, VII.12.1; TU.II.1.1. Space is the origin and end of "name and aspect," i.e. of existence; the four other elements arise from it and return to it as to their prior. When, as often in Buddhism, account is taken only of four elements, these are the concrete bases of material things; cf. St. Bonaventura, De red. arisum ad theol., 3, Quinque sunt corpora mundi simplicia, scilcet quatnor elementa et quinta essentia. Just as also in early Greek philosophy the "four roots" or "elements" (fire, air, earth and water of Empedokles, etc.) do not include the spatial ether, while Plato mentions all five (Epinomis 981 C), and as Hermes points out "the existence of all things that are would have been impossible, if space had not existed as an antecedent condition of their being" (Asci. II.15). It would be absurd to suppose that those who speak only of four "elements" were not conscious of this rather obvious consideration.

⁵⁹ MU.II.6, VI.26; that is to say, apparently (iva) divided in things divided, but really undivided (BG.XIII.16, XVIII.20), cf. Hermes Lib. X.7 where "souls are 'so to speak'" (ἄσπες) parcelled out and partitioned off from the one All Soul.

60 Jñānāni, prajfiā-mātrā etc., KU.VI.10, MU.VI.30, Kaus, Up. III.8.

61 MU.III.2f.

62 SB.11.2.2.8, XI.2.3.6 etc. Cf. Notes 199, 204,

63 RV.V.86.5, X.63.4 etc.

64 AV.X.7.39, XI.4.19, JUB.IV.23.7, BU.IV.3.37, 38 etc.

- 46 RV.X.90.2; AV.X.VIII.1; KU.IV.13; Svet. Up. III.15 etc.
- 66 Šańkarācārya, Svātmanirābaņa, 95. The "world-picture" (jagaccitra = noopide νοήτος) may be called the form of the divine omniscience, and is the paradigm, apart from time, of all existence, the "creation" being exemplary, cf. my "Vedic Exemplatism" im HJAS.I, 1936. "A precursor of the Indo-Iranian arta and even of the Platonic idea is found in the Sumerian gish-ghar, the outline, plan, or pattern of things-which-are-to-be, designed by the Gods at the creation of the world and fixed in the heaven in order to determine the immutability of their creation" (Albright in JAOS.54, 1934, p. 130, cf. p. 121, note 48). The "world picture" is Plato's παφάδειγμα αίωνά (Timaeus 29 A, 37 C), Hermes' τὸ ἀρχέτυπον είδας (Lib. I.8) and St. Augustine's "eternal mirror which leads the minds of those who look in it to a knowledge of all creatures, and better than elsewhere" (see Bissen, L'Exemplarisme divin telon St. Bonaventura, 1929, p. 39, note 5); cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I.12.9 and 10, Sed omnia sic videntur in Deo sicut in quodam speculo intelligibili . . . non successive, sed simul. "When the body-dweller, controlling the powers of the soul that seize upon what is their own in sounds, etc., glows, then he sees the Spirit (atman) extended in the world, and the world in the Spirit" (Mahabharata III.210); "I behold the world as a picture, the Spirit" (Siddhantamuktavali, p. 181).
 - 67 BU.I.4.10; Pras. IV.10. Omniscience presupposes omnipresence, and conversely.
 - 68 SA.XIII; CU.VI.8.7 etc.
 - 69 RV.J.164.20.
 - ⁷⁰ RV.X.114.5.
 - 71 Mund. Up. III.1.1-3.
 - 72 BU.II.5.15, IV.4.22, Kauş. Up. III.8 etc.; similarly Plotinus, Enneads, VI.5.5.
 - 78 Paradiso, XIII.11, 12.
 - 78a James 3.6.

№ SB.X.4.4.1.

- 74 MU.III.2; BG.XIII.21.
- 75 MU.II.6, VII.11.8, etc.
- 76 AA.III.2.4; BU.III.8.11, IV.5.15 etc.
- ²⁷ JUB.I.28.8, and similarly for the other powers of the soul.
- 78 Sankarācārya on Br. Sūtra I.1.5, Satyam, netvarād anyaḥ samsārī: this very important affirmation is amply supported by earlier texts e.g. RV.VIII.43.9, X.72.9; AV.X.8.13; BU.III.7.23, III.8.11, IV.3.37, 38; Svet. Up. II.16, IV.11; MU.V.2 etc. There is no individual transmigrant essence. Cf. John III,13 "No man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of (the) Man, which is in heaven." The figure of the land-leech in BU.IV.4.3 does not imply the passing over from one body to another of an individual life other than that of the universal Spirit but only of a "part as it were" of this Spirit wrapped up in the activities that occasion the prolongation of becoming (Sankarācārya, Br. Sūtra II.3.43, III.1.1). In other words, life is renewed by the living Spirit of which the seed is the vehicle, while the nature of this life is determined by the properties of the seed itself (BU.III.9.28, Kauş Up. III.3, and similarly St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 32.11) and so as Blake expresses it, "Man is born like a garden, ready planted and sown." All that we inherit from our ancestors is a character; the Sun is our real Father. Accordingly, as in JUB.III.14.10, M.I.265/6, and Aristotle, Phys. II.2. ανθοωπος γαο ανθοωπον γεννά ήλιος as rightly understood by St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I.115.3 ad 2, and Dante, De monarchia IX, cf. St. Bonaventura, De red. artium ad theologiam. 20. [Wicksteed's and Cornford's remarks in the Loeb Library Physics. p. 126, show that they have not grasped the doctrine itself].

36

81 BG.III.27, XVIII.17, cf. JUB.I.5.2; BU.III.7.23; MU.VI.30, etc. Similarly S.II.252; Udāna 70, etc. To the conceit "T am" (armi-māna) and "T do" (kartā ham iii) corresponds Greek olymus = boga (Phaedrus 92 A, 244 C), for Philo, this olnoic is "akin to untaught ignorance" (1.93); the mind that says "I plant" is impious (1.53); "I deem nothing so shameful as to suppose that I exert my mind or my sense" (I.78). Plutarch couples of must with vioque (II.39 D). It is from the same point of view that St. Thomas Aquinas says that "In so far as men are sinners, they do not exist at all" (Sum. Theol., 1.20.2 ad 4); and in accordance with the axiom Ens et bonum convertuntur that sat and asat are not only "being" and "nonbeing" but also "good" and "evil" (e.g. in MU.III.1 and BG.XIII.21). Whatever "we" do more or less than correctly is 'amiss' and should only be regarded as a thing not done at all. For example "What in the laud falls short is not-lauded, what is overmuch is ill-lauded, what is exactly lauded is actually lauded" (JBJ.356). That what is not done "right" might as well not have been done at all, and is strictly speaking "not an act" (akriam), underlies the tremendous emphasis that is laid upon the notion of a "correct" performance of rites or other actions. The final result is that "we" are the authors of whatever is done amiss, and therefore not really "done" at all; while of whatever is actually done, God is the author. Just as in our own experience, if I make a table that does not stand, I am "no carpenter", and the table not really a table: while if I make a real table, it is not by my self as this man but "by art" that the table is really made. "I" being only an efficient cause. In the same way the Inner Person is distinguished from the elemental self as promotor (kāraritr) from operator (karty, MU.III.3 etc.). The operation is mechanical and servile; the operator being only free to the extent that his own will is so identified with the patron's that he becomes his own "employer" (kārayitr). "My service is perfect freedom".

- 82 JUB.III.14 etc. Cf. my "The E' at Delphi", Review of Religion, Nov. 1941.
- 88 TS.I.5.7.6.
- 84 Pras. Up., VI.3; cf. answers in CU.III.14.4 and Kaus Up., II.14;
- 85 CU.VIII.12.1: MU.III.2, VI.7. For the ἡγεμών, AA.II.6 and RV, V.50.1.
- 86 AA.II.5; SA.II.4; MU.VI.30, cf. TS.I.8.3.1. Kṛtakṛṭṇa, "all in act" corresponds to Pali katamkaraniyam in the well known "Arhat formula".

87 Amriativa is literally "not dying", and so far as born beings, whether Gods or men are concerned, does not imply an everlasting duration but the "whole of life". i.e. "not dying" prematurely (SB.V.4.1.1, IX.5.1.10; PB.XXII.12.2 etc.). Thus the whole of man's life (ayus=zeon) is a hundred years (RV.I.89.9, 11.27.10, etc.); that of the Gods a "thousand years" or whatever this round number is taken to mean (SB.X.I.6.6, 15 etc.). So when the Gods, who were originally "mortal" obtain their "immortality" (RV. X.63.4; SB.XI.2.3.6 etc.) this is to be taken only relatively; it only means that as compared with mortal men, their life is longer (SB,VII.3.1.10, Sankara on Br. Sūtra I.2.17 and II.3.7, etc.). God alone, as being "unborn", or "born only as it were", is immortal absolutely; Agni, visvāyas=nvo ulióvsoc, alone "immortal amongst mortals, God amongst Gods" (RV.IV.2.1; \$B.II.2.2.8 etc.). His timeless (akāla) nature is that of the "now" without duration, of which we, who can only think in terms of past and future (bbutam bhavyam), have not and cannot have experience. From him all things proceed, and in him all are unified (eko bhavanti) at last (AA.11.3.8 etc.). There are, in other words, three orders of "not dying", that of man's longevity, that of the God's aeviternity, and that of God's being without duration (on "aeviternity" cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I.10.5).

The Indian texts lend themselves to no illusions: all things under the Sun are in the power of Death (SB.II.3.3.7); and in so far as he descends into the world, the deity himself is a "dying God"; there is no possibility of never dying in the body

(SB. II.2.2.14, X.4.3.9, JUB. III.38.10, etc.); birth and death are inseparably connected (BG.II.27; A.IV.137; Sn. 742).

It may be observed that Gk. abavasola has similar values; for the "mortal immortality", cf. Plato, Symposium 207 D-208 B, and Hermes, Lib. XI.1.4 2 and Ascl. III.40 b.

- 58 \$B.11,3.3.9; BU.I.5.2 etc.
- № AV.X.8.44, cf. AA.III.2.4.
- * Mathnawi, VI.723 f.
- ⁰¹ RV.JX.113.9; JUB.III.28.3; \$A.VII.22; BU.II.1.17, 18; CU.VIII.5.4, VIII.1.6 (cf. D.I.72); Taitt.Up.III.10.5 (like John X.9).
 - P2 RV.IX.88.3, X.168.4; cf. John III.8; Gylfiginning, 18.
 - 98 BG.JX.29.
- ²⁴ Luke XIV.26, cf. MU.VI.28 "If to son and wife and family he be attached, for such an one, no, never at all"; Sn.60; Meister Eckhart, "As long as thou still knowest who thy father and thy mother have been in time, thou art not dead with the real death" (Pfeiffer, p. 462). Cf. Note 193.
 - 95 BU.IV.4.14; CU.VII.1.6, VII.8.4 etc.
 - 94 BU.I.4.2.
- ⁹⁷ JB.I.17: \$B.VII.2.1.6 with VII.3.1.12; BU.II.1.11 and innumerable texts differentiating the two selves. The doctrine is universal, notably Indian, Islamic, Platonic and Christian. Cf. "On being in one's right mind". Rev. of Religioπ, VII.32f.
 - 98 SB.J.6.4.21, III.9.4.23; KB.XV.3; JUB.III.14.8.
 - 99 TS.V.5.2.1, cf. \$B.I.6.3.35, 36; Sankarācārya, Br. Sūtra II.3.46;
 - 100 TS.V.5.2.1.
 - 101 \$B.III.8.1.2, etc.
 - 102 SB.II.4.1.11, IX.5.1.53.
- 108 BU.1.4.10, IV.5.7. Cf. Meister Eckhart, "Wer got minnet für sinen got unde got an betet für sinen got und im dä mite läzet genüegen daz ist nur als, ein angeloubic mensche" (Pfeiffer, p. 469).
 - 104 SB.VII.2.1.4 etc.
- 105 TS.VII.2.10.2. At such a "seance" the Self (Spirit) is the guerdon and it is inasmuch as the sacrificers obtain the Self as their reward that they go to heaven (atma-dakţiṇam vai tattram, ātmānam eva nītvā suvargam lokam yanti, TS.VII.4.9.1, cf. PB.IV.9.19).
 - 106 TSJ.8.4.1; AV.III.15.5.6.
- the transcendental Syllable (aksara=Om) is the source of all uttered sounds (cf. CU.II.23, 24), itself remaining inexhaustible (aksara),—pouring forth but never poured out. [There is no separate word for "gifts" in the original text].
- 107 RV.VIII.92.32 (cf. Piato, Phaedo, 62 B, D), V.85.8 (similarly VII.19.7, Indra) and II.11.1.
- 108 Vator dbārā, TS.V.4.8.1, V.7.3.2; SB.IX.3.2-3; AA.II.1.2, III.1.2; MU.VI.37; BG.III.10.f etc. Wedding gifts, PB.VII.10; AB.IV.27; JB.1.145; SB.I.8.3.12 etc.
 - 109 RV.VIII.70.3.
 - 110 AA.11.2.3; Kaus. Up. III.1.
 - 111 RV.passim; cf. TS.II.5.11.4, 5; BU.IV.4.19.
 - 112 SB.XI.2.6.13, 14. See also my "Atmayajña" in HJAS, 6, 1942.

- 118 SB.X.4.3.24 etc.
- 114 SB.X.5,4.16.
- 115 \$B.XII.2.3.12.
- 116 AB.VII.31; \$B.III.4.3.13, XII.7.3.11.
- 117 RV.X.8.34.
- 118 RV.V.43.4; \$B.III.4.3.13 etc.
- 110 SB.III.9.4.17.18.
- 120 SB.III.3.2.6.
- 121 PB.XXV.15.4.
- 122 RV.IX.86.44.
- 122 TS.VII.4.9; PB.IV.9.19-22; JUB.1.15.3 f., III.30.2; CU.VIII.13, cf. BU. III.7.3 f., CU.VIII.12.1. Attainment of immortality in the body is impossible (\$B.X. 4.3.9 etc.). Cf. Phaedo, 67 C "Katharsis (=fuddba karaya) is the separation of the soul from the body, as far as that is possible".
 - 124 SB.II.5.2.47; BU.IV.4.7, and passim.
 - 125 MU.III.3 f.
 - 126 RV.I.168.3, I.179.5, cf. X.107.9 (antahpeyam).
- 127 Cf. Philo, I.76, "to pour out as a libation the blood of the soul and to offer as incense the whole mind to God our Saviour and Benefactor".
 - 128 SB.HI.8.1.2; TS.I.7.5.2. As it was in the beginning, RV.X.90.5; SB.111.9.1.2.
- 129 The Gods are true, or real (satyam), men false or unreal (antam), AB.1.6, \$B.I.1.1.4, III.9.4.1 etc. [universals are real, particulars unreal]. The initiated sacrificer has fallen away from this world and is temporarily a God, Agni or Indra (\$B.III.3.3.10 etc.); and if no provision were made for his return to the world of men, he would be liable to die prematurely (TS.1.7.6.6 etc.). The redescent is therefore provided for (TS.VII.3.10.4; PB.XVIII.10.10; AB.IV.21); and it is in returning to the human world of unreality or falsehood and becoming this man So-and-so once more that he says "Now I am whom I am" (aham ya evāsmi so'smi, \$B.I.9.3.23, AB.VII.24); a tragic confession that he is "once again conscious of a more limited, even a bodily and earthly life" (Macdonald, Phantaster, 1858, p. 317). For there can be no greater sorrow than to reflect that we still are what we are (Cloud of Unknowing, Ch. 44).
 - 180 TS.II.5.4.5.
 - 131 Purgatorio, XXVII.131, 142.
- 132 BG.VI.7, Jitātmanah prašāntasya paramātmā samābitah, "The Supreme Self of the individual-self is 'composed' (samābitah="in samādbi') when the latter has been conquered and pacified". Observe that to "pacify" is literally to give the quietus. Sānti; "peace", is not for any self that will not die. The root, fam, is present also in samayitr, the "butcher" who "quiets" the sacrificial victim in the external ritual (RV. V.43.3, SB.III.8.3.4 etc.); the sacrificer "quenches" (samayati) the fire of Varuna's wrath (TS.V.1.6; SB.IX.1.2.1); within you, it is the higher Self that "pacifies" the individual self, quenches its fire. Whoever would be "at peace with himself must have died to himself. Cf. Republic, 556 E; Gorgias, 482 C; Timaeus 47 D; and HIAS.VI.389, 1942 ("On Peace").
- 138 Cf. RV.I.32.5 vajrena = II.11.5 vIryena as in Manu I.8 vIryam avasrjat, and in the sense of RV.X. 95.4 snatbită vaitasena. On the fier baiser, Disenchantment by a Kiss, see W. H. Schofield, Studies on the Libeaus Desconus, 1895, 199 ff.
 - 134 SB.X.6.2.1.
 - 135 Meister Eckhart, Evans 1.287, 380. Our highest good is thus to be devoured by

"Noster Deus ignis consumens". Cf. Spaculum, XI, 1936, pp. 332, 333 and, further, Dante, Paradito XXVI.51, Con quanti denti questo amor ti morde! His kiss, who is both Love and Death, awakens us to becoming here, and his love-bite to being there. Cf. my "Sun-kiss" in IAOS. 60, 1940.

138 SB.X.5,2.11, 12,

187 BU.I.4.3.

138 BUJV.3.21.

129 SA.X, of. SB.II.2.4.7, 8; M.1.77.

140 SB.X.5.3.3; AA.II.3.8.

241 SB.X.5.3.12.

162 In fact, just as the forms of images are prescribed in the Silpasāstras, so those of action are prescribed in the Dharma-śāstras. Art and prudence are both equally sciences, differing only from pure metaphysics in the fact of their application to factibilia and agibilia. The fact that there is an application to contingent problems introduces an element of contingency into the laws themselves, which are not identical for all castes nor in all ages. In this sense, the tradition is adaptable to changing conditions, always provided that the solutions are derived directly from the first principles, which never change. In other words, while there can be a modification of laws. only those laws that can be reduced to the Eternal Law can ever be called correct. There is, in the same way, necessarily and rightly, an application of pure metaphysics to the variety of religions that correspond to the variety of human needs, each of which religions will be "the true religion" to the extent that it reflects the eternal principles. In saying this we distinguish between metaphysics and "philosophy" and are not suggesting that any systematic or natural philosophy can presume to the validity of the theology that Aristotle ranks above all other sciences (Metaphysics, I.2.12 f., VI.1.10f).

148 BG.II.50; also "Yoga is the resignation (sannyāsa) of works", BG.VI.2. In other words, yoga does not mean doing less or more than enough, nor doing nothing at all, but doing without attachment to the fruit of works, taking no thought for the morrow; he sees indeed, who sees inaction in action, and action in inaction (BG.IV.18 and passim). This is the Chinese doctrine of was wei.

Yoga is literally and etymologically a "yoking", as of horses; and in this connection it will not be overlooked that in India, as in Greek psychology, the "horses" of the bodily vehicle are the sensitive powers by which it is drawn this way or that, for good or evil, or to its ultimate goal if the horses are controlled by the driver to whom they are yoked by the reins. The individuality is the team, the Inner Controller or Inner Man the rider. The man, then "yokes himself like an understanding horse" (RV.V.46.1).

As a physical and mental discipline, Yoga is Contemplation, dbarana, dbyāna and samādbi corresponding to Christian consideratio, contemplatio and excessus or raptus. In its consummation and total significance, yoga implies the reduction of separated things to their unitary principle, and thus what is sometimes called "mystical union"; but it must be clearly realised that yoga differs from "mystical experience" in being, not a passive, but an active and controlled procedure. The perfected yogi can pass from one state of being to another at will, as for example, the Buddha, M.1.249.

Every Hindu is to some extent a practitioner of Yoga, and just what this implies is admirably stated in Plato, Republic 571 D f., etc oversear corresponding descourses. When, however, it becomes a question of more intensive contemplation, and the intention is to scale the uttermost heights, the practitioner must be prepared by suitable physical exercises, and must especially have acquired a perfectly balanced control and awareness of the whole process of breathing, before he proceeds to any mental exercises; nor can any of these exercises be safely undertaken without the guidance of a

master. Some idea of the nature of the first steps, by which the vagrant stream of thought is arrested and brought under control, will be gained if the attempt is made to think of some one thing, no matter what, for so long a period even as ten seconds; it will be found with surprise, and perhaps embarrassment, that even this cannot be done without much practise.

244 SB.IX.5.1.42. In the same way that the Christian Sacrifice demands the collaboration of all the arts.

145 The best discussion of this will be found in A. M. Hocart, Les Castes, Paris, 1939.

146 AA.II.4.5 (Ait. Up. IV.4) "For the perpetuation of these worlds. For thus are these worlds perpetuated. That is his being born again. This self of his is put in his place for the doing of holy works. That other Self of his, having done what there was to be done, enters into the Gale and departs. That is his third birth", cf. JUB.III. 9.6, MU.VI.30. The inheritance of vocations provides for the continuity of divine service. From the same point of view in Plato, Laws 773 E f., "Concerning marriage . . . it is decreed that we should adhere to the ever-productive nature by providing servants of God in our own stead; and this we do by always leaving behind us children's children's Similarly SB.I.8.1.31 tasmāt prajottarā deveyajyā.

147 On Law and Liberty cf. St. Augustine, De spiritu et littera. It is by the Spiritual Power that the Temporal power is freed from its bondage (brahmaṇaivenam dāmno' pombhanāu muñcati, TS.II.4.13).

148 MUJV.4. See also Sankarācārya, Br. Sātra, SBE. Vol. XXXVIII, Index, s.v. "Stages of life (ālrama)". The first three lead to heavenly states of being, only the fourth, which may be entered upon at any time, to an absolute immortality in God.

On the fourth aframa cf. Plato, "But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain maturity... they should do nothing but (consider all time and all being), unless as a by-work, if they are to lead a blessed life and when they finish crown the life they have led (here) with a corresponding lot there... when they reach that life in which they will be born again" (Republic, 498 C, D with 486 A). True philosophy is an art moriendi (Phaedo, 61, 64, 67).

149 "Blessed is the kingdom wherein dwells one of them; in an instant they will do more lasting good than all the outward actions ever done" (Meister Eckhart, Evans I.102); and as he also says "while other people watch, they will be sleeping", cf. BG.II.69. For those whom we call "useless' are the "true pilots" (Plato, Republic 489 f).

151 BG.II.12.

158 Br. Sūtra II.3.43 f. Das Gupta, Indian Philosophy, II.42 f.

153 Avatarana = κατάδασις, as in Republic 519 D and John III.13. The "return to the cave" of those who have made the "steep ascent" corresponds to the Sacrificer's redescent for which references are given in Note 129.

Avair varies in meaning from "come over" to "overcome", the latter meaning predominating in the earlier texts. The meaning "descend" is often expressed in other way or by other verbs such as avakram or avaithā, prati-i, (praty-)avaraḥ. The earliest reference to Vishnu's "descent" may be TS.I.7.6.1, 2 . . . punar imam loham pratyavaroba, cf. SB.XI.2.3.3 where Brahma imām lohām . . . pratyavait. In view of the later recognition that the Buddha was an avaiāra, cf. J.J.50 where the Buddha descends (orwyba=avaroba) from the Tusita heaven to take birth, the illustration of this event at Bharhut inscribed bhagavo okāmti (=avakrāmati), and DhA.III.226 where he descends (otaritpā=avatīrīvā) from heaven at Sankassa.

For the idea of a "descent" otherwise phrased, see JUB.III.28.4; SB.XI.2.3.3 and BG.IV.5 f. Cf. Clementine Homilies III.20 "He alone has it (the spirit of Christ)

who has changed his forms and his names from the beginning of the world and so reappeared again and again in the world".

188 See Note 57 and "Play and Seriousness" in Journal of Philosophy XXXIX. 550-552. Nitya and līlā, the constant and the variable, are Being and Becoming, in Eternity and Time.

156 CU.IV.14.3; MU.III.2; Sn.71, 213, 547 (like KU.V.11), 812, 845; A.II.39.
 157 AA.III.2.4; cf. AV.X.8.44; JUB.III.14.3; CU.IV.11.1, VI.8.7 f; Kaus. Up. 1:2,
 1.5.6 etc.

168 SA.XIII; and previous note.

"All you have been, and seen, and done, and thought, Not You, but I, have seen and been and wrought... Pilgrim, Pilgrimage and Road Was but Myself toward Myself: and Your Arrival but Myself at my own Door... Come, you lost Atoms, to your Centre draw... Rays that have wandered into Darkness wide, Return, and back into your Sun subside."

Mantiqu't-Tais (tr.Fitzgerald).

BUDDHISM

Waz dunket dich, daz dich aller meist gefüeget have zuo der ewigen wärheit? Daz ist, daz ich mich geläzen hän wä ich mich vant.

(Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer p. 467)

Daz der ungetribenen menschen ist ein griuse, daz ist dem getribenen ein herzenfröide. Ez is nieman gotes rīche wan der ze grunde tōt ist.

(Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer p. 600)

INTRODUCTION

The more superficially one studies Buddhism, the more it seems to differ from the Brahmanism in which it originated; the more profound our study, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish Buddhism from Brahmanism, or to say in what respects, if any, Buddhism is really unorthodox. The outstanding distinction lies in the fact that Buddhist doctrine is propounded by an apparently historical founder, understood to have lived and taught in the sixth century B.C. Beyond this there are only broad distinctions of emphasis. It is taken almost for granted that one must have abandoned the world if the Way is to be followed and the doctrine understood. The teaching is addressed either to Brahmans who are forthwith converted, or to the congregation of monastic Wanderers (pravrājaka) who have already entered on the Path; others of whom are already perfected Arhats, and become in their turn the teachers of other disciples. There is an ethical teaching for laymen also, with injunctions and prohibitions as to what one should or should not do,150 but nothing that can be described as a "social reform" or as a protest against the caste system. The repeated distinction of the "true Brahman" from the mere Brahman by birth is one that had already been drawn again and again in the Brahmanical books.

If we can speak of the Buddha as a reformer at all it is only in the strictly etymological sense of the word: it is not to establish a new order but to restore an older form that the Buddha descended from heaven. Although his teaching is "all just so and infallible", 160 this is because he has fully penetrated the Eternal Law (akālika dharma) 161 and personally verified all things in heaven or earth; 162 he describes as a vile heresy the view that he is teaching a "philosophy of his own", thought out by himself. 163 No true philosopher ever came to destroy, but only to fulfil the Law. "I have seen", the Buddha says, "the ancient Way, the Old Road that was taken by

the formerly All-Awakened, and that is the path I follow"; ¹⁶⁴ and since he elsewhere praises the Brahmans of old who remembered the Ancient Way that leads to Brahma, ¹⁶⁵ there can be no doubt that the Buddha is alluding to "the ancient narrow path that stretches far away, whereby the contemplatives, knowers of Brahma, ascend, set free" (vimuktāḥ), mentioned in verses that were already old when Yājñavalkya cites them in the earliest Upanishad. ¹⁸⁶

On the other hand it is expressly stated that the Brahmans of today—although there are exceptions—have fallen from the graces that pertained to their pure and selfless ancestors.167 It is from this point of view, and in connection with the fact that Buddha is born in an age when the royal caste is more than the priestly caste in honour, that we can best understand the reason of the promulgation of the Upanishads and Buddhism at one and the same time. These two closely related and concordant bodies of doctrine, both of "forest" origin, are not opposed to one another, but to a common enemy. The intention is clearly to restore the truths of an ancient doctrine. Not that the continuity of transmission in the lineages of the forest hermitages had ever been interrupted, but that the Brahmans at court and in the world, preoccupied with the outward forms of the ritual and perhaps too much concerned for their emoluments, had now become rather "Brahmans by birth" (brahmabandhu) than Brahmans in the sense of the Upanishads and Budhism, "knowers of Brahma" (brahmavit). There can be little doubt that the profound doctrine of the Self had hitherto been taught only in pupillary succession (guruparamparā) to qualified disciples; there is plenty of evidence for this on the one hand in the Upanishads themselves¹⁶⁸ (the word itself implies "sitting close to" a teacher) and on the other hand in the fact that the Buddha often speaks of "holding nothing back". The net result of these conditions would be that those to whom the Buddha so often refers as the "uninstructed multitude" must have entertained those mistaken "soul theories" and beliefs in the reincarnation of a "personality" against which the Buddha fulminates untiringly.

It may well be, too, that kings themselves, opposing their arrogant power to sacerdotal control, had ceased to choose their Brahman ministers wisely.169 For that situation Indra himself, king of the Gods, "blinded by his own might" and misled by the Asuras, provides the archetype in divinis. 170 On the other hand, for the "awakening" of a royalty in the Buddha's case we have likewise in Indra the paradigm; for being admonished by the spiritual adviser to whom his allegiance is due, Indra "awakens himself" (buddhvā cātmānam)171, and praises himself, the awakened Self, in lauds in which we find the words, which the Buddha might have used, "Never at any time am I subject to Death" (mṛtyu=māra)172. It will not be overlooked, too, that the Vedic Indra is more than once referred to as Arhat. And if it seems strange that the true doctrine should have been taught, in the Buddha's case, by a member of the royal caste, it is only the same situation that we sometimes meet with in the Upanishads themselves.178 Was not Krishna also of royal blood, and yet a spiritual teacher? What all this amounts to is this, that when the salt of the "established church" has lost its savour, it is rather from without than from within that its life will be renewed.

The scriptures in which the traditions of the Buddha's life and teachings are preserved fall into two classes, those of the Narrow Way (Hīnayāna) and those of the Broad Way (Mahāyāna). It is with the former, and on the whole older texts that we shall be chiefly concerned. The books pertaining to the "Narrow Way" are composed in Pali, a literary dialect closely related to Sanskrit. The Pali literature ranges in date from about the third century B.C. to the sixth A.D., The Canon consists of what are called the "Three Baskets", respectively of monastic regimen (Vinaya), Discourse (Sūtra) and Abstract Doctrine (Abhidhamma). We shall be chiefly concerned with the five classes of the "Discourse" literature in which are preserved what are taken to be the Buddha's actual words. Of the extra-canonical literature the most important of the early books are the Milindapañha and the Visuddhimagga. The great Jātaka

book, largely composed of ancient mythological materials recast in a popular form and retold as stories of the former births, is relatively late, but very instructive both for the Buddhist point of view and as a detailed picture of life in ancient India. All these books are provided with elaborate commentaries in what now would be called the "scholastic" manner. We shall take this literature as it stands; for we have no faith in the emendation of texts by modern scholars whose critical methods are mainly based on their dislike of monastic institutions and their own view of what the Buddha ought to have said. It is in fact surprising that such a body of doctrine as the Buddhist, with its profoundly other-worldly and even anti-social emphasis, and in the Buddha's own words "hard to be understood by you who are of different views, another tolerance, other tastes, other allegiance and other training",174 can have become even as "popular" as it is in the modern Western environment. We should have supposed that modern minds would have found in Brahmanism, with its acceptance of life as a whole, a more congenial philosophy. We can only suppose that Buddhism has been so much admired mainly for what it is not. A well known modern writer on the subject has remarked that "Buddhism in its purity ignored the existence of a God; it denied the existence of a soul; it was not so much a religion as a code of ethics". 276 We can understand the appeal of this on the one hand to the rationalist and on the other to the sentimentalist. Unfortunately for these, all three statements are untrue, at least in the sense in which they are meant. It is with another Buddhism than this that we are in sympathy and are able to agree; and that is the Buddhism of the texts as they stand.

Of the texts of the Broad Way, composed in Sanskrit, few if any antedate the beginning of the Christian era. Amongst the most important of them are the Mahāvastu, the Lalita Vistara, the Divyāvadāna and the Saddharma Puṇḍarīka. The two main forms of Buddhism to which we have referred are often spoken of, rather loosely, as respectively Southern and Northern. It is the Southern school that now survives in Ceylon, Burma and Siam. The two

schools originally flourished together in Burma, Siam, Cambodia, Java and Bali, side by side with a Hinduism with which they often combined. Buddhism of the Northern school passed over into Tibet, China and Japan, through the work of Indian teachers and native disciples who made translations from Sanskrit. In those days it was not considered that the mere knowledge of languages sufficed to make a man a "translator" in any serious sense of the words; no one would have undertaken to translate a text who had not studied it for long years at the feet of a traditional and authoritative exponent of its teachings, and much less would any one have thought himself qualified to translate a book in the teachings of which he did not believe. Few indeed are the translations of Indian books into European languages that can yet come up to the standards set for themselves by the Tibetan and Chinese Buddhists.¹⁷⁶

It may be observed that while Brahmanism was at one time widely diffused in the "Greater India" of South East Asia, it never crossed the northern frontiers of India proper; Brahmanism was not, like Buddhism, what might be called a missionary faith. Indian culture reached and profoundly influenced the Far East through Buddhism, which sometimes fused with and sometimes existed side by side with Taoism, Confucianism and Shinto. The greatest influence was exerted by the contemplative forms of Buddhism; what had been Dhyana in India became Cha'n in China and Zen in Japan. 277 We cannot, unfortunately, describe these forms of Buddhism here, but must affirm that although they often differ greatly in emphasis and detail from the Narrow Way, they represent anything but a degeneration of Buddhism; the Buddhisms of Tibet and the Far East are calculated to evoke our deepest sympathies, equally by their profundity of their doctrines and the poignant beauty of the literature and art in which these teachings are communicated. We have only to add that Buddhism had died out in India proper by the end of the twelfth century.

THE MYTH

In asking, What is Buddhism, we must begin, as before, with the Myth. This has now become the Founder's life of some eighty years, into which period the whole epic of the victory over death has now been condensed. But if we subtract from the pseudo-historical narrative all its mythical and miraculous features, the residual nucleus of historically plausible fact will be very small indeed: and all that we can say is that while there may have lived an individual teacher who gave the ancient wisdom its peculiarly "Buddhist" coloring, his personality is completely overshadowed, as he must have wished it should be,178 by the eternal substance (akālika dharma) with which he identified himself. In other words, "the Buddha is only anthropomorphic, not a man". 178 It is true that a majority of modern scholars, euhemerist by temperament and training, suppose that this was not Man, but a man, subsequently deified; we take the contrary view, implied by the texts, that the Buddha is a solar deity descended from heaven to save both men and Gods from all the ill that is denoted by the word "mortality", the view that his birth and awakening are coeval with time.180

Before proceeding to the narrative we must explain how a distinction is made between the epithets Bodhisattva and Buddha. The Bodhisattva is an "awakening being", or one of "wakeful nature"; the Buddha is "awake" or "The Wake". The Bodhisattva is, dogmatically, an originally mortal being, qualifying by the making-become of transcendental virtues and insights for the "total awakening" of a Buddha. Gautama Siddhārtha, the "historical Buddha", is thus himself a Bodhisattva until the moment of his "all-awakening". It is, furthermore assumed that a Buddha is born in every successive aeon, and that Gautama Siddhārtha was the seventh in such a series of prophetic incarnations, and that he will be followed by Maitreya, now a Bodhisattva in heaven. There are other Bod-

hisattvas, notably Avalokiteśvara, who are virtually Buddhas, but are vowed never actually to enter into their Buddhahood until the last blade of grass has been first redeemed.

Previous to his last birth on earth, the Bodhisattva is resident in the Tusita heaven; and there being urged by the Gods to release the universe from its sorrows, he considers and decides upon the time and place of his birth and the family and mother of whom he will be born. A Buddha must be born of either a priestly or the royal caste, whichever is predominant at the time; and the royal caste being now predominant, he chooses to be born of Mahā Māyā, the queen of king Suddhodana of the Sākya clan, at his capital city of Kapilavastu in the Middle Country; and that is to say, whatever else it may mean, in the "Middle Country" of the Ganges Valley. The Annunciation takes the form of "Mahā Māyā's dream", in which she sees a glorious white elephant descending from the skies to enter her womb. The king's interpreters of dreams explain that she has conceived a son who may be either a Universal Emperor or a Buddha. Both of these possibilities are actually realised in the spiritual sense, for while it is true that the Buddha's kingdom was not of this world, it is both as Teacher and as Lord of the universe that he "turns the wheel."

The child is visible in the mother's womb. When the time comes, Mahā Māyā sets out to visit her parents at Devahrada; on her way she pauses at the Lumbini Park, and feeling that her time has come, she stretches out her hand to support herself by the branch of a tree, which bends down of its own accord. Standing thus, she gives painless birth to the child. The child is born from her side. It is not explicit, but can be presumed that the birth was "virgin"; in any case it is interesting that the story was already known to Hieronymus who mentions it in a discussion of Virginity and in connection with the miraculous births of Plato and Christ. 181 The child is received by the Guardian Deities of the Four Quarters. He steps down onto the ground, takes seven strides, and proclaims himself the "Foremost in the World". The whole universe is transfigured

and rejoices in light. On the same day are born the "seven connatural ones", amongst whom are the Bodhisattva's future wife, his horse, and the disciple Ananda. These things take place, not uniquely, but "normally", that is to say that such is the course of events whenever a Buddha is born.

Mahā Māyā's dormition takes place a week after the child is born, and her sister Prajāpatī, and co-wife of Suddhodana, takes her place. The child is taken back to Kapilavastu, and shown to the father; he is recognized and worshipped by the Brahman soothsayers, who announce that he will be Emperor or Buddha, at the age of thirty five. The child is presented in the temple, where the tutelary deity of the Sakyas bows down to him. Suddhodana, desiring that his son may be an Emperor and not a Buddha, and learning that he will abandon the world only after he has seen an old man, a sick man, a corpse and a monk, brings him up in luxurious seclusion, ignorant of the very existence of suffering and death. The first miracle takes place on a day when the king, in accordance with custom, is taking part in the First Ploughing of the year; the child is laid in the shadow of a tree, which does not move although the shadows of other trees move naturally with the sun; in other words, the sun remains overhead. The child at school learns with supernatural facility. At the age of sixteen, by victory in an archery contest, in which his arrow pierces seven trees, he obtains his cousin Yasodhara as wife; she becomes the mother of a boy, Rahula.

In the meantime, on four successive days, while driving through the city to the pleasure park, the Bodhisattva has seen the four signs; for although all such sights have been banned from the city by royal edict, the Gods assume the forms of the old man, sick man, corpse and monk, and the Prince is made acquainted with age, illness, death and the serenity of a man who has risen above these vicissitudes of existence. He goes to his father and announces his intention of leaving the world and becoming a monk, in order to find out the way of escape from subjection to this mortality. The father cannot dissuade him, but keeps the palace gates closed. That night the

Bodhisattva takes silent leave of his wife and child and calling for his horse, departs by the palace gate, miraculously opened for him by the Gods; he is accompanied only by his charioteer.

Now Māra, Death, the Evil, offers him the empire of the whole world if he will return; failing in this temptation, he follows the Bodhisattva, to find another opportunity. Reaching the deep forests, the Bodhisattva cuts off his royal turban and long hair, unbecoming a pilgrim, and these are elevated by the Gods and enshrined in heaven. They provide him with a pilgrim's garments. He sends his charioteer back to the city with his horse; the latter dies of a broken heart.

The Bodhisattva now studies with Brahman teachers and practises extreme mortifications. He finds five disciples, all of whom leave him when he abandons these ineffectual fastings. In the meantime Sujātā, the daughter of a farmer, who has been making offerings to the spirit of a banyan tree, now brings her gift of milkrice, into which the Gods have infused ambrosia; she finds the Bodhisattva seated beneath the tree, and gives him the rice in a golden bowl, and a golden ewer of water. She receives his blessings. He then goes down to the river to bathe, after which he eats the food, which is to last him for seven weeks. He casts the bowl into the river, and from the significant fact it floats upstream learns that he will succeed that very day. He returns to the Tree of the Awakening. At the same time Indra (the Dragon slayer, with Agni, of our former lecture, and the type of the sacrificer in divinis) assumes the shape of a grass-cutter and offers to the Bodhisattva the eight bundles of grass that are used in sacrificial ritual. The Bodhisattva circumambulates the tree, and finally standing facing East finds that the circles of the world about him stand fast. He spreads the strew, and there rises up a throne or altar at the foot of the tree; he takes his seat thereon, determined never to rise again until he has attained the knowledge of the causation and cure of the evil of mortality. It is there, at the navel of the earth, and at the foot of the tree of life, that all former Buddhas have awakened.

Now Māra appears again and lays claim to the throne. The Bodhisattva touches the Earth, calling her to witness to the virtues by right of which he takes it; and she appears and gives witness. Māra, assisted by his demon army, now assaults the Bodhisattva with fire and darkness, and with showers of burning sand and ashes; but all his weapons fall harmlessly at the Bodhisattva's feet. At the first sight of Māra the Gods have fled, leaving the Bodhisattva all alone, but for the powers of the soul, his retainers; now Māra gives up the contest and the Gods return.

It is now nightfall. In the course of the night the Bodhisattva passes through all the stages of realisation until at dawn, having perfectly grasped the cycle of "Causal Origination" (pratitya samut-pāda) he becomes wholly awakened, and is a Buddha. The whole universe is transfigured and rejoices. The Buddha breaks into his famous song of victory:

Seeking the builder of the house
I have run my course in the vortex
Of countless births, never escaping the hobble (of death);
Ill is repeated birth after birth!
Householder, art seen!
Never again shalt thou build me a house
All of thy rigging is broken,
The peak of the roof is shattered:

Its aggregations passed away,
Mind has reached the destruction of cravings.

The Buddha remains for seven weeks within the circle of the Tree of the Awakening, enjoying the gladness of release. Of the events of these weeks two are significant, first the temptation by the daughters of Māra, who attempt to win gain by their charms what their father could not gain by his power: and secondly the hesitation to teach; the Buddha hesitates to put in motion the Wheel of the Law, thinking that it will not be understood and that this will be the occasion of needless anguish to himself; the Gods exclaim at this, "The world is lost", and led by Brahmā persuade the Buddha

that some are ripe for understanding. The Buddha, accordingly, sets out for Benares and there in the "First Preaching" sets the Wheel of the Law in motion, and in the second preaches that there is no individual constant underlying the forms of our consciousness. In other words, in the doctrine of the un-self-ish-ness (anātmya) of all physical and mental operations he dismisses the popular Cogito ergo sum as a crude delusion and the root of all evil. By these sermons he converts the five disciples who had formerly deserted him; and there are now five Arhats, that is to say five "despirated" (nirvāta) beings in the world.

From Benares the Buddha went on to Uruvela, near the modern Bodhgaya, and finds on the way a party of thirty young men picnicking, with their wives. One of them had no wife, and had brought a woman with him, who had just stolen their belongings and run away. All the young men ask the Buddha whether he has seen such a woman. The Buddha replies, "What now, young men, do you think? Which were the better for you, to go tracking the woman, or to go tracking the Self?" (ātmānam gaviş).184 They reply that it were better to seek the Self, and are converted. Here for the first time we meet with the Buddha's doctrine of a real Self. At Uruvelā he reaches the hermitage of a community of Brahmanical Fire-worshippers, and wishes to spend the night in their fire temple. They warn him that it is the haunt of a fierce Dragon that may hurt him. The Buddha thinks not, and retires for the night, seating himself cross-legged and vigilant. The Dragon is infuriated. The Buddha will not destroy it, but will overcome it; assuming his own fiery form, and becoming a "human Dragon", he fights fire with fire, and in the morning appears with the tamed Dragon in his alms-bowl.184 Upon another day the fire-worshippers are unable to split their wood, or light or extinguish their fires until the Buddha permits it. In the end the Brahmans abandon their Burnt-offerings (agnihotra) and become disciples of the Buddha. In this connection we must cite the instance of another Brahman fire-worshipper, to whom in the course of their dialogue the Buddha says,

I pile no wood for fires or altars;

I kindle a flame within me, . . .

My heart the hearth, the flame the dompted self.188

We perceive that the Buddha is here simply carrying on the teaching of the Brahmanical Aranyaka in which, as remarked by Keith, "the internal Agnihotra is minutely described as a substitute for the formal sacrifice". 186

Time will not permit us to relate in detail the later events of the Buddha's life. He gradually builds up a large following of monastic wanderers like himself; somewhat against his will women were also allowed to be ordained as nuns; and by the end of his life there had developed an organised body of monks and nuns, many of whom lived in monasteries or nunneries, which had been donated to the community by pious laymen. The Buddha's life was spent in the care of the monastic community, and in preaching, either to assemblies of monks or to audiences of Brahmans, in disputations with whom he is invariably successful; he also performs many miracles. At last he announces his imminent death. When Ananda protests, he reminds him that while there will be those who are still addicted to mundane ways of thinking and will weep and roll in anguish, crying out "Too soon will the Eye in the World pass away", there will be others, calm and self-possest, who will reflect that all component things are impermanent, and that whatever has been born contains within itself the inherent necessity of dissolution: "Those will honor my memory truly, who live in accordance with the Way I have taught." When a believer comes to visit him, before he dies, the Buddha says, "What good will it do you to see this unclean body? He who sees the Law sees me, he who sees me, sees the Law (dharma)".1866 In announcing his forthcoming decease, the Buddha leaves this message, "Be such as have the Self (ātman) as your lamp, Self as only refuge, the Law as lamp and only refuge".187

He explains that what this means in practise is a life of incessant recollectedness (smṛṭi). The Buddhist emphasis on mindfulness

can hardly be exaggerated; nothing is to be done absent-mindedly; or with respect to which one could say "I did not mean to do it"; an inadvertent sin is worse than a deliberate sin. That means, that one must not simply "behave", instinctively; or as Plato expresses it, "Do nothing but in accordance with the leading of the immanent Principle, nothing against the common Law that rules the whole body, never yielding to the pulls of the affections, whether for good or evil; and this is what 'Self-mastery' means". The At the same time it must not be overlooked that behind this ethical application of mindfulness to conduct there lies a metaphysical doctrine; for Buddhism, like the Upanishads, regards all recognition not as an acquisition of new facts but as the recovery of a latent and umtimately limited omniscience; as in the Platonic doctrine, where all teaching and experience are to be thought of simply as reminders of what was already known but had been forgotten. The sentence of the same time and the platonic doctrine, where all teaching and experience are to be thought of simply as reminders of what was already known but had been forgotten.

Plato, again, continually reminds us that there are two in us, and that of these two souls or selves the immortal is our "real Self".181 This distinction of an immortal spirit from the mortal soul, which we have already recognized in Brahmanism, is in fact the fundamental doctrine of the Philosophia Perennis wherever we find it. The spirit returns to God who gave it when the dust returns to the dust. Γνώθι σεαυτόν; Si ignoras te, egredere. "Whither I go, ye cannot follow me now . . . If any man would follow me, let him deny himself".191 We must not delude ourselves by supposing that the words denegat seipsum are to be taken ethically (which would be to substitute means for ends); what they mean is understood by St. Bernard when he says that one ought deficere a se tota, a semetipsa liquescere, and by Meister Eckhart when he says that "The kingdom of God is for none but the thoroughly dead". "The word of God extends to the sundering of soul from spirit";192 and it might well have been said by the Wake that "No man can be my disciple but and if he hate his own soul" (και οὐ μισεί... r່ານ ຄົດນາດບໍ່ ພັນງາຄົນ). 198 "The soul must put itself to death" — "Lest the Last Judgment come and find me unannihilate, and I be siez'd and giv'n into the hands of my own selfhood".194

THE DOCTRINE

In the Buddha's question cited above, "Were it not better if ye sought the Self?" the contrast of the plural verb with its singular object is precise. It is One that the many are to find. Let us consider some of the many other Buddhist contexts in which our selves, respectively composite and mortal and single and immortal, are contrasted. The question is asked, just as it had been in the Brahmanical books, "By which self (kena ātmanā) 198 does one attain the Brahma-world?" The answer is given in another passage, where the usual formula descriptive of the Arhat's attainment concludes "with the Self that is Brahma-become" (brahma-bhūtena ātmanā); just as in the Upanishad "It is as Brahma that he returns to Brahma". 196 From that world there is no returning (punar āvartana) by any necessity of rebirth.197 Other passages distinguish the Great Self (mahātman) from the little self (alpātman), or Fair Self (kalyāṇātman) from foul (pāpātman); the former is the latter's judge.19a "The Self is the Lord of the self, and its goal".199 In the saying "For one who has attained, there is naught dearer than Self"200 we recognize the doctrine of the Upanishads that the "Self alone is truly dear"201 the Hermetic "Love thy Self", 702 and the Christian doctrine that "A man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than he loves any other person", and i.e. that Self for whose sake he must deny himself.

In the Brahmanical doctrine, our immortal, impassible, beatific inner Self and Person, one and the same in all beings, is the immanent Brahma, God within you. 304 He does not come from anywhere nor become anyone. 305 "That" is; but nothing else that is true can be said of it: "Thou canst not know the maker-to-know what is known, who is your Self in all things". 306 Just as God himself does not know what he is, because he is not any what. 307 The Buddhist doctrine proceeds in the same way, by elimination. Our own constitution and that of the world is repeatedly analysed, and as each one of the five physical and mental factors of the transient

personality with which the "untaught manyfolk" identify "themselves" is listed, the pronouncement follows, "That is not my self" (na me so ātmā). You will observe that amongst these childish mentalities who identify themselves with their accidents, the Buddha would have included Descartes, with his Cogito ergo sum.

There is, in fact, no more an individual than there is a world soul. What we call our "consciousness" is nothing but a process; its content changes from day to day and is just as much causally determined as is the content of the body.*** Our personality is constantly being destroyed and renewed; 110 there is neither self nor anything of the nature of self in the world; and all this applies to all beings, or rather becomings, whether of men or Gods, now and hereafter. Just as it expressed by Plutarch, "Nobody remains one person, nor is one person . . . Our senses, through ignorance of reality, false tell us that what appears to be, actually is". 211 The old Brahmanical (and Platonic) symbol of the chariot is made use of; the chariot, with all its appurtenances, corresponds to what we call our self; there was no chariot before its parts were put together, and will be none when they fall to pieces; there is no "chariot" apart from its parts; "chariot" is nothing but a name, given for convenience to a certain percept, but must not be taken to be an entity (sattva); and in the same way with ourselves who are, just like the chariot, "confections". The Comprehensor has seen things "as they have become" (yathā bhūtam), causally arising and disappearing, and has distinguished himself from all of them; it is not for him, but only for an ignoramus to ask such questions as "Am I?", "What was I once?", "Whence did I come?", "Whither am I going?". 212 If the Arhat is expressly permitted still to say "I", this is only for convenience; he has long since outgrown all belief in a personality of his own.218 But none of all this means, nor is it anywhere said that "There is no Self". On the contrary, there are passages in which when the five constituents of our evanescent and unreal "existence" have been listed, we find, not the usual formula of negation, "That is not my Self", but the positive injunction, "Take refuge in the Self"; 214 just the Buddha also says that he himself has done. 215

The empirical personality of this man, So-and-so, being merely a process, it is not "my" consciousness or personality that can survive death and be born again.218 It is improper to ask "Whose consciousness is this?"; we should ask only, "How did this consciousness arise,".217 The old answer is given,218 "The body is not 'mine', but an effect of past works". 210 There is no "essence" that passes over from one habitation to another; as one flame is lit from another, so life is transmitted, but not a life, not "my" life. 220 Beings are the heirs of acts;231 but it cannot be said exactly that "I" now reap the rewards of what "I" did in a former habitation. There is causal continuity, but no one consciousness (vijñāna), no essence (sativa) that now experiences the fruits of good and evil actions, and that also recurs and reincarnates (sandhavati samsarati) without otherness (ananyam)", to experience in the future the consequences of what is now taking place.222 Consciousness, indeed is never the same from one day to another.228 How, then, could "it" survive and pass over from one life to another? Thus the Vedanta and Buddhism are in complete agreement that while there is transmigration, there are no individual transmigrants. All that we see is the operation of causes, and so much the worse for us if we see in this fatally determined nexus our "self". We can find the same thing in Christianity, where it is asked, "Who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?" to which the remarkable answer is made that "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents: but the works of God might be made manifest in him". 224 In other words, the blindness has "arisen" by the operation of those mediate causes of which God is the First Cause and without which the world would have been deprived of the perfection of causality.225

The Buddha's purpose is to save us from our selves and their mortality. He would go on to say that our subjection to such fatal accidents as blindness is a part and parcel of our identification of "consciousness" with "self". We altogether misunderstand the value

and importance of "consciousness"; "that is not my Self"; and the Parable of the Raft applies as much to consciousness as to ethical procedure; like the raft, consciousness is a valuable tool, a means of operation, but like the raft not to be held on to when the work has been done.226 If this alarms us, as Aristha was frightened because he thought that the peace of Nirvana implied a destruction of something real in himself,227 we must not overlook that what we are asked to substitute for our consciousness of things pleasant and unpleasant—or rather, subjection to feelings of pleasure and pain is not a simple unconsciousness but a superconsciousness, none the less real and beatific because it cannot be analysed in the terms of conscious thought. At the same time we ought, perhaps, to point out that this superconsciousness, or what in Christian theology is called the "divine manner of knowing, not by means of any objects external to the knower", is by no means to be equated with the subconsciousness of modern psychology, with respect to which it has been very truly said that while "nineteenth century materialism closed the mind of man to what is above him, twentieth century psychology opened it to what is below him".218

Our conscious "life" is a process, subject to corruption and death. It is this life that must be "arrested" if we are to live immortally. It will be useless to deal with symptoms; it is the cause or occasion (hetu, nidāna) that must be sought if we are to find the "medecine" that the Buddha sought and found. It is the understanding of things "as become" (yathā bhūtam), and the realisation that "personality" (ātmabhāva) is one of these things, that liberates man from himself. The gist of the Buddhist gospel is resumed in the often and triumphantly repeated words,

Of all things that spring from a cause,

The cause has been told by him "Thus-come";

And their suppression, too,

The Great Pilgrim has declared.

In this chain of causes, to understand which is to have come Awake, it is emphasised that nothing whatever happens by chance but only

in a regular sequence—"That being present, this becomes; that not being present, this does not become".*** To have verified this is to have found the Way. For in "all things that spring from a cause" are included "old age, sickness, and death"; and when we know the cause, we can apply the cure. The application is stated in the cycle of "causal origination" mastered on the night of the Great Awakening. All the ills that flesh is heir to are inseparable from and essential to the process of existence and unavoidable by any individual; individuality is "consciousness"; consciousness is not a being, but a passion, not an activity but only a sequence of reactions in which "we", who have no power to be either as or when we will, are fatally involved; individuality is motivated by and perpetuated by wanting; and the cause of all wanting is "ignorance" (avidya), for we "ignore" that the objects of our desire can never be possessed in any real sense of the word, ignore that even when we have got what we want, we still "want" to keep it and are still "in want". The ignorance meant is of things as they really are (yathābhūtam), and the consequent attribution of substantiality to what is merely phenomenal; the seeing of Self in what is not-Self. ***

In making ignorance the root of all evil, Buddhism concurs with all traditional doctrine. But we must guard ourselves from supposing that an ignorance of any particular things is meant, and especially against a confusion of the traditional "ignorance" with what we mean by "illiteracy"; so far from this, our empirical knowledge of facts is an essential part of the very ignorance that makes desire possible. And no less must another misunderstanding be avoided; we must not suppose that the traditional wisdom is opposed to the knowledge of useful facts; what it demands is that we should recognize in what are called "facts" and "laws of science", not absolute truths but statements of statistical probability. The pursuit of scientific knowledge does not necessarily imply an "ignorance"; it is only when the motive is a curiosity, only when we pursue knowledge for its own sake, or art for art's sake, that we are behaving "ignorantly". In Brahmanical terms, "ignorance" is of Who

we are; in Buddhist language, of what we are not; and these are only two ways of saying the same thing, what we really are being definable only in terms of what we are not.

It is only by making stepping stones of our dead selves, until we realise at last that there is literally nothing with which we can identify our Self, that we can become what we are. And hence the Buddhist emphasis on what in Christian terms is called "selfnaughting", an expression based on Christ's denegat seipsum. "Behold the Arhats' beatitude! No wanting can be found in them; excised the thought 'I am'; unmoving, unoriginated, uncontaminated, very Persons, God-become (brahma-bhūtā), great heroes, natural sons of the Wake; unshaken in whatever plight, released from further becoming (punar bhava), on ground of dompted-self they stand, they in the world have won their battle; they roar the 'Lion's roar'; incomparable are the Wake" (buddbab).*** There is no question here of a post mortem deliverance, but of "Persons" triumphant here and now; nor will it be overlooked that the epithet "Buddha" is used in the plural, and applied to all who have reached their goal.

Of such it is often said that they are "despirated" (nirvāta). The word Nirvāṇa, "despiration", which plays so large a part in our conception of Buddhism, where it is one of the most important of the many terms that are the referents to "man's last end", demands some further explanation. The verb nirvā is, literally, to "blow out", not transitively, but as a fire ceases to draw, i.e. "draw breath". The older texts employ the nearly synonymous verb udvā, to "blow out" or "go out"; when the Fire blows out (udvāyati) it is into the Gale that it expires"; as deprived of fuel, the fire of life is "pacified", i.e. quenched, when the mind has been curbed, one attains to the "peace of Nirvāṇa", "despiration in God". The the same way Buddhism stresses the going out of the fire or light of life for want of fuel; it is by ceasing to feed our fires that the peace is reached, of which it is well said in another tradition that "it passeth understanding"; our present life is a continuity of com-

ing to be and passing away and immediate rebirth, like a flame that goes on burning and is not the same nor yet another flame; and in the same way with rebirth after death, it is like the lighting of one flame from another; nothing concrete passes over, there is continuity, but not sameness; But "the contemplatives go out like this lamp" which, once out, "cannot pass on its flame". Nirvāṇa is a kind of death, but like every death a rebirth to something other than what had been. Pari in parinirvāṇa merely adds the value "complete" to the notion of a despiration.

We say "a kind of death" because the word nirvana can be used of still living things. The Bodhisattva is "despirated" when he becomes the Buddha. Even more significant, we find that each of the stages completed in the training of a royal steed is called a Parinirvana.441 The Buddha uses the word chiefly in connection with the "quenching" of the fires of passion, fault and delusion (raga, doşa and moha). But there is a distinction involved here; the despiration is a present (samdṛṣṭikam) experience in two ways, ethical inasmuch as it implies the eradication of passion and fault, and eternal, i.e. metaphysical, in that it is a liberation from delusion, or ignorance (avidyā); from both points of view it involves an unselfishness, but on the one hand in practise, on the other in theory.*** thus while the denotation is that of the Greek amorbivious (be still, go out, be quenched, of wind, fire or passion), the connotation is that of Greek reliew and relevation (to be perfected, to die). All these meanings can be resumed in the one English word "finish"; the finished product is no longer in the making, no longer becoming what it ought to be; in the same way the finished being, the perfected man has done with all becoming; the final dissolution of the body cannot affect him, however affecting it may be to others, themselves imperfect, unfinished. Nirvāņa is a final end, and like Brahma, a matter about which no further questions can be asked by those who are still on fire.245

In other words, the Way involves on the one hand a practical and on the other a contemplative discipline. The contemplative corres-

ponds to the athlete, who does not contest for the prize unless he is already "in training". When the Indians speak of the Comprehensor (evamvit) of a given doctrine, they do not mean by this merely one who grasps the logical significance of a given proposition; they mean one who has "verified" it in his own person, and is what he knows; for so long as we know only of our immortal Self, we are still in the realm of ignorance; we only really know it when we become it; we cannot really know it without being it. There are ways of life dispositive to such a realisation, and other ways that must prevent it. Let us, therefore, pause to consider the nature of the "mere morality", or as it is now called, "Ethics", apart from which the contemplative life would be impossible. What we should call a "practical holiness" is called alike in the old Indian books and in Buddhist a present and timeless "Walking with God" (brahmacariya).344 But there is also a clear distinction of the Doctrine (dharma) from its practical Meaning (artha), and its is with the latter that we are for the moment concerned.

In agreement with the old Indian theory of the relation of the Regnum to the Sacerdotium, we find a Buddhist king who requests the Bodhisattva to give him instruction both in Ethics (artha) and in Doctrine (dharma), sas and this context will enable us to grasp the distinction very clearly. We find that Ethics is a matter of liberality (dāna) and of commandments (sīla). More in detail, the king is to provide for all his subjects' needs, and to make honorable provision for both men and animals when superannuated and no longer able to do what they did in their prime. On the other hand, the whole of what is here called the Doctrine is stated in the form of the "chariot simile", of which more later.

The terms "commandments" demands a further analysis. These rules of what is sometimes styled "mere morality"—"mere" because although indispensible if we are to reach man's last end, morality is not in itself an end, but only a means—are not quite rigidly fixed; in general, the reference is to the "five" or "ten virtuous habits". As five, these are (1) not to kill, (2) not to steal, (3) not to follow

the lusts of the flesh, (4) to refrain from lying and (5) to refrain from the use of intoxicants. These are essential preliminaries for any spiritual development, and are expected of all laymen. The set of ten includes the first four of the five, and (5) to avoid slander, (6) to refrain from abusive speech, (7) to avoid frivolous converse, (8) not to covet, (9) not to bear malice and (10) to entertain no false views. The last has particular reference to the avoidance of heresies such as the belief in "soul", the view that causal determination cancels moral responsibility, the view that there is "no other world", the view that the Buddha has taught a novel doctrine, the view that he teaches an annihilation or cutting off of anything but sorrow. The foregoing five or ten rules are to be distinguished from the five or ten "bases of training" of the monastic rule; the first five of these are the same as the five already listed, to which are added (6) not to eat at irregular hours, (7) not to attend musical and theatrical performances, (7) to refrain from the use of unguents and ornaments, (9) not to sleep on luxurious beds, and (10) not to accept gold or silver.***

Before we return to the Doctrine we must carefully guard ourselves from thinking that the Buddha attaches an absolute value to moral conduct. We must not, for example, suppose that because the means are partly ethical, Nirvāna is therefore an ethical state. So far from this, un-self-ishness, from the Indian point of view is an amoral state, in which no question of "altruism" can present itself, liberation being as much from the notion of "others" as it is from the notion of "self";247 and not in any sense a psychological state, but a liberation from all that is implied by the "psyche" in the word "psychology". "I call him a Brahman indeed," the Buddha says, "who has passed beyond attachment both to good and evil; one who is clean, to whom no dust attaches, a-pathetic". 248 In the well known Parable of the Raft (of ethical procedure) by means of which one crosses the river of life, he asks very pointedly "What does a man do with the boat when he has reached the other side of the river? Does he carry it about on his back, or does he leave it on the shore?"249 Perfection is something more than an infantile innocence; there must be knowledge of what are folly and wisdom, good and evil, and of how to be rid of both these values, wrong and "right without being righteous" (filavat no ca silamayah, M.II.27). For the Arhat, having "done all that was to be done" (krta-karanīyam), there is nothing more that should be done, and therefore no possibility of merit or demerit; injunctions and prohibitions have no longer any meaning where there is no longer anything that ought or ought not to be done. For there indeed, as Meister Eckhart says of the Kingdom of God, "neither vice nor virtue ever entered in"; just as in the Upanishad, where neither vice nor virtue can pass over the Bridge of Immortality.250 The Arhat is "no longer under the Law"; he is "not under the Law", 261 but a "Mover-at-will" and a "Doer of what he will"; if we find that he acts unselfishly in our ethical sense of the word, that is our interpretation, for which he is not responsible. Only the Patripassian can offer any objection to these points of view.

It must also be clearly realised that it will be convenient at this point to ask, "Who is the Wake?" For the answer to this question will tell us as much as can be told of the those who have followed in his footsteps to the end, and can be spoken of as "World-enders". Who is the Great Person, the Kinsman of the Sun, the Eye in the World, 252 the descendant of Angirasa, the God of Gods, who says of himself that he is neither a God, nor a Genius nor a man, but a Buddha, one in whom all the conditions that determine particular modes of existence have been destroyed. 253 What are these Arhats, who like the Vedic immortals, have won to being what they are by their "dignity"?

The question can be approached from many different angles. In the first place, the Buddha's names and epithets are suggestive; in the Vedas, for example, the first and most of Angirases are Agni and Indra,²⁵⁴ to whom also the designation of "Arhat" is oftenest applied. Agni is, like the Buddha, "awakened at dawn" (usarbudh): Indra is urged to be "of waking mind" (bodhin-manas),²⁵⁵

and when overcome by pride in his own strength he actually "awakens" himself when reproached by his spiritual alter-ego.256 That the Buddha is called "Great Person" and "Most Man" (maha purusa, nṛṭama) by no means tells us that he is "a man", since these are epithets of the highest Gods in the oldest Brahmanical books. Māyā is not a woman's name, but Natura naturans, our "Mother Nature".287 Or if we consider the miraculous life, we shall find that almost every detail, from the free choice of the time and place of birth²⁵⁵ to the lateral birth itself²⁵⁹ and the taking of the Seven Strides,260 and from the Going Forth to the Great Awakening on the strewn altar at the foot of the World-tree at the Navel of the Earth, and from the defeat of the Dragons to the miraculous kindling of the sacrificial firewood,261 can be exactly paralleled—and in saying "exactly" we mean just that—in the Vedic mythology of Agni and Indra, priest and king in divinis. For example, and the single instance must suffice, if the Vedic Dragon fights with fire and smoke,242 and also with women with weapons,248 so does Māra, Death, whom the Buddhist texts still refer to as "Holdfast"; if the Vedic Dragon-slayer is deserted by the Gods and must rely upon his own resources, so is the Bodhisattva left alone, and can only call upon his own powers to assist him.304 In saying this we do not mean to deny that the Buddha's defeat of Mara is an allegory of self-conquest, but only to point out that this is a very old story, one that has always and everywhere been told; and that in its Buddhist setting the story is not a new one, but derived immediately from the Vedic tradition, where the same story is told, and where it has the same significance.265

That the perfected possess the power of motion and manifestation at will is familiar in Christian teaching, where they "shall pass in and out and find pasture"; 200 and such powers are naturally proper to those who, being "joined unto the Lord, are one spirit". 201 The like is repeatedly enunciated in the Brahmanical scriptures, and often in nearly the same words. In an often recurring context the Buddha describes the four stages of contemplation (dhyāna) of

paths of power (rddhipāda) that are the equivalent of the "Aryan Path" and are means to Omniscience, Full Awakening and Nirvāṇa.208 When all these stations of contemplation (dhyāna) have been so mastered that the practitioner can pass from one to another at will, and similarly commands the composure or synthesis (samādhi) to which they lead, then in this state of unification (eko'vadhi-bhava) the liberated Arhat is at once omniscient and omnipotent; the Buddha, describing his own attainment, can remember his "former habitations" (pūrva-nivāsa), or as we should be apt to say, "past births", in every detail; and describing his powers (rddbi), he says that "I, brethren, can realise (pratyanubbū)188 whatever countless powers I will; being many, I become one, and having been many become also one; seen or unseen, I can pass through a wall or a mountain as if it were air; I can sink into the earth or emerge from it as though it were water; I can walk on the water as if it were solid earth; as I can move through the air like a bird; I can touch with my hands the sun and moon; I have power with respect to my body even so far as unto the Brahmaworld".270 The same powers are exercised by other adepts to the extent that they have perfected themselves in the same disciplines and are masters of composure (samādhi); it is only when concentration (dhyāna) fails that the power of motion-at-will is lost. 171 The Buddha employs the old Brahmanical formula²⁷² when he says that he has taught his disciples to extract from this material body another body of intellectual substance, as one might draw an arrow from its sheath, a sword from its scabbard, or a snake from its slough; it is with this intellectual body that one enjoys omniscience and is a mover-at-will as far as the Brahmaloka.278

Before we ask ourselves what all this means, let us remark that supernatural no more implies unnatural than super-essential implies unessential; and that it would be unscientific to say that such attainments are impossible, unless one has made experiment in accordance with the prescribed and perfectly intelligible disciplines. To call these things "miraculous" is not to say "impossible", but only

"wonderful"; and as we said before, following Plato, "Philosophy begins in wonder". Furthermore, it must be clearly understood that the Buddha, like other orthodox teachers, attaches no great importance to these powers and very strongly deprecates a cultivation of powers for their own sake and in any case forbids their public exhibition by monks who possess them. "I do, indeed," he says, "possess these three powers (rddbi) of motion-at-will, mind-reading, and teaching; but there can be no comparison of the first two of these marvels (pratihārya) with the much farther-reaching and far more productive marvel of my teaching"." It will profit us more to ask what such marvels, or those of Christ imply, 200, 272 than to ask whether they "really" took place on some given occasion; just as in the exegesis of other hero-tales it will be much more useful to ask what "seven-league boots" and "tarn caps" mean, than to point out that they cannot be bought in department stores.

In the first place, we observe that in the Brahmanical contexts, omniscience, particularly of births, is predicated of Agni (jātavedas), the "Eye in the World", and of the "all-seeing" Sun, the "Eye of the Gods", and for the very good reason that these consubstantial principles are the catalytic powers apart from which no birth could be; and further, that the power of motion at will, or what is the same thing, motion without locomotion, is predicated in the Brahmanical books of the Spirit or Universal Self (atman) on the one hand, and of liberated beings, knowers of the Self and assimilated to the Self, on the other. Once we have understood that the Spirit, universal solar Self and Person, is a timeless omnipresence, it will be recognized that the Spirit, by hypothesis, is naturally possessed of all the powers that have been described; the Spirit is the "knower of all births" in saecula saeculorum precisely because it is "where everywhere and every when are focussed" and is present undivided as well in all past as in all future becomings;275 and by the same token, we find it spoken of also as "Providence (prajñā) or as "Compendious Providence" (prajñana-ghana) for the very good reason that its knowledge of "events" is not derived from the events themselves,

but the events derived from its knowledge of itself. In all the Brahmanical books the powers that have been described are the Lord's: if the Comprehensor can change his form and move at will, it is "even as Brahma can change his form and move at will; at it is the Spirit, ultimately solar Self (atman) that itself not moving yet outruns others. All these things are powers of the Spirit and of those who are "in the spirit"; and if by far the greatest of all these miracles is that of the teaching, that is simply to say with St Ambrose that "All that is true, by whomsoever it has been said, is from the Holy Ghost". The "signs and wonders" are lightly dismissed, it is not because they are unreal, but because it is an evil and adulterous generation that asketh for a sign.

The Buddha describes himself as unknowable (ananuvedya) even here and now; neither Gods nor men can see him; those who see him in any form or think of him in words do not see him at all. 479 "I am neither priest nor prince nor husbandman nor anyone at all; I wander in the world a learned Nobody, uncontaminate by humanqualities (alipyamāna . . . mānavebhyab); useless to ask my family name (gotra)".280 He leaves no trace by which he can be tracked.261 Even here and now the Buddha cannot be taken hold of, and it cannot be said of this Supernal Person (parama-purusa) after the dissolution of the body and psychic complex that he becomes or does not become, nor can both these things be affirmed or denied of him; all that can be said is that "he is"; to ask what or where he is would be futile.253 "He who sees the Law (dharma) sees me";283 and that is why in the early iconography he is represented, not in human form, but by such symbols as that of the "Wheel of the Law", of which he is the immanent mover. And that is all just as it was in the Brahmanical books, where it is Brahma that has no personal or family name*** and cannot be tracked, the Spirit (atman) that never became anyone—Who knows where he is?265—the interior Self that is uncontaminated, see the supreme Self of which nothing true can be said (neti, neti) and that cannot be grasped except by the thought "It is". It is assuredly with reference to that ineffable principle that the Buddha says that "There is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, incomposite, and were it not for that unborn, unbecome, unmade, incomposite, no way could be shown of escape from birth, becoming, making, composition"; and we do not see what that "unborn" can be but "That" in-animate (anātmya) Spirit (ātman) were it not for whose invisible being (sat) there could be no life anywhere. The Buddha flatly denies that he ever taught the cessation or annihilation of an essence; all that he teaches is the putting of a stop to sorrow.

In a famous passage of the Milinda Questions the old symbol of the chariot is used by Nagasena to break down the King's belief in the reality of his own "personality".200 We need hardly say that throughout the Brahmanical and Buddhist literature (as also in Plato and Philo) 101 the "chariot" stands for the psycho-physical vehicle, as which or in which—according to our knowledge of "who we are"—we live and move. The steeds are the senses, the reins their controls, the mind the coachman, and the Spirit or real Self (ātman) the charioteer (rathi), 200 i.e. passenger and owner, who alone knows the vehicle's destination; if the horses are allowed to run away with the mind, the vehicle will go astray; but if they are curbed and guided by the mind in accordance with its knowledge of the Self, the latter will reach home. In our Buddhist text it is strongly emphasized that all that composes the chariot and team, or bodyand-soul, is devoid of any essential substance; "chariot" and "self" are only the conventional names of constructed aggregates, and do not import existences independent of or distinguishable from the factors of which they are composed; and just as one confection is called a "chariot" for convenience, so ought the human personality to be called a "self" only for convenience. And just as the repeated expression "That is not my Self" has so often been misinterpreted to mean "There is no Self", so the destructive analysis of the vehicular personality has been held to mean that there is no Person! It is complained that "the charioteer is left out". *94

Actually, however, nothing is said for or against the imperceptible

presence in the composite vehicle of an eternal substance distinct from it and one and the same in all such vehicles. Nagasena, who refuses to be regarded as a "somebody" and maintains that "Nagasena" is nothing but a name for the inconstant aggregate of the psycho-physical phenomenon, could surely have said, "I live, yet not 'I', but the Law in me." And if we take into consideration other Pali texts we shall find that a charioteer is taken for granted, and who and what he is, namely one that "has never become anyone". The Eternal Law (dharma) is, in fact, the charioteer;206 and while "the king's chariots age, and just so the body ages, the Eternal Law of existences does not age". *** The Buddha identifies himself-that Self that he calls his refuge207—with this Law200 and calls himself the "best of charioteers", 200 one who tames men, as though they were horses. 800 And finally we find a detailed analysis of the "chariot" concluding with the statement that the rider is the Self (ātman), in almost the very words of the Upanishads. 501 The statement of a Buddhist commentator, that the Buddha is the Spiritual Self (ātman) is assuredly correct. 302 That "Great Person" (mahāpurusa) is the charioteer in all beings.

We believe that enough has now been said to show beyond any possible doubt that the "Buddha" and "Great Person", "Arhat", "Brahma-become" and "God of Gods" of the Pali texts is himself the Spirit (ātman) and Inner Man of all beings, and that he is "That One" who makes himself manifold and in whom all beings again "become one"; that the Buddha is Brahma, Prajāpati, the Light of Lights, Fire or Sun, or by whatever other name the older books refer to the First Principle; and to show that insofar as the Buddah's "life" and deeds are described, it is the doings of Brahma as Agni and Indra that are retold. Agni and Indra are the Priest and King in divinis, and it is with these two possibilities that the Buddha is born, and these two possibilities that are realised, for although his kingdom is in one sense not of this world, it is equally certain that he as Cakravartin is both priest and king in the same sense that Christ is "both priest and king". We are forced by the

logic of the scriptures themselves to say that Agnendrau, Buddha, Krishna, Moses and Christ are names of one and the same "descent" whose birth is eternal; to recognize that all scripture without exception requires of us in positive terms to know our Self and by the same token to know what-is-not-our-Self but mistakenly called a "self"; and that the Way to become what-we-are demands an excision from our consciousness-of-being, every false identification of our being with what-we-are-not, but think we are when we say "I think" or "I do". To have "come clean" (suddha) is to have distinguished our Self from all its psycho-physical, bodily and mental accidents; to have identified our Self with any of these is the worst possible sort of pathetic fallacy and the whole cause of "our" sufferings and mortality, from which no one who still is anyone can be liberated. It is related that a Confucian scholar besought the twenty-eighth Buddhist patriarch, Bodhidharma, "to pacify his soul". The Patriarch retorted, "Produce it, and I will pacify it". The Confucian replied "That is my trouble, that I cannot find it". Bodhidharma replied, "Your wish is granted". The Confucian understood, and departed in peace.***

It is altogether contrary to Buddhist, as it is to Vedantic doctrine to think of "ourselves" as wanderers in the fatally determined storm of the world's flow (samsāra). "Our immortal Self" is anything but a "surviving personality". It is not this man So-and-so that goes home and is lost to view, but the prodigal Self that recollects itself; and that having been many is now again one, and inscrutable, Deus absconditus. "No man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven", and therefore "If any man would follow me, let him deny himself". "The kingdom of God is for none but the thoroughly dead". The realisation of Nirvāṇa is the "Flight of the Alone to the Alone".

NOTES TO BUDDHISM

150 Vinaya, I.235 and passim; D.I.52, 68 f.; S.III.208; A.I.62 (Gradual Sayings, p. 57, where Woodward's Footnote 2 is completely mistaken). The Buddha teaches that there is an ought-to-be-done (kiriya) and an ought-not-to-be-done (akiriya); these two words never refer to "the doctrine of Karma (retribution) and its opposite". Cf. HJAS.JV.1939, p.119. That the Goal (as in Brahmanical doctrine) is one of liberation from good and evil both (see Notes 248, 249) is quite another matter; the doing of good and avoidance of evil are indispensible to Wayfaring. The view that there is no-ought-to-be-done (akiriya), however argued, is heretical: responsibility cannot be evaded either (1) by the argument of a fatal determination by the causal efficacy of past acts or (2) hy making God (issaro) responsible or (3) by a denial of causality and postulation of chance; ignorance is the root of all evil, and it is upon what we do now that our welfare depends (A.I.173 f). Man is helpless only to the extent that he sees Self in what is not-Self; to the extent that he frees himself from the notion "This is I", his actions will be good and not evil; while for so long as he identifies himself with soul-and-body (savithāna-kāya) his actions will be "self"-ish.

160 D.III.135 tath'eva boti no affiathā; A.II.23, D.III.133, Sn.357 yathā vādī tathā kārī (cf. RV.IV.33.6 satyam ficur nara evā bi cakraḥ); hence Sn.430, Itiv.122, tathāvādin. In this sense tathāgato can be applied to Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, Sn.236-238.

181 The Dhamma taught by the Buddha, beautiful from first to last, is both of present application (sanditibiko) and timeless (akāliko), passim.

It follows that the same applies to the Buddha himself, who identifies himself with the Dhamma.

100 D.I.150 sayam abhititā sacchikatvā; D.III.135 sabbam . . . abhisambuddham; Dh. 353 sabbavidā bam asmi.

163 M.I.68 f., the Buddha "roars the Lion's roar" and having recounted his supernatural powers, continues: "Now if anyone says of me, Gotama the Pilgrim, knower and seer as aforesaid, that my eminent Aryan gnosis and insight have no superhuman quality, and that I teach a Law that has been beaten out by reasoning (takkapariyāhatam) experimentally thought out and self-expressed (tayam-paṭibhātam), if he will not recant, not repent (titam paṭahati = µzrūvoetv) and abandon this view, he fails into hell": "These profound truths (ye dhammā gambhīrā) which the Buddha teaches are inaccessible to reasoning (atakkāvacarā), he has verified them by his own super-knowledge" (D.I.22); cf. KU.II.9 "it is not by reasoning that that idea can be reached" (naiṭā tarkaṇa matir āpamayā). Mil.217 f. explains that it is an "ancient Way that had been lost that the Buddha opens up again". The reference is to the brahmacariya, "walking with God" (= @e@o.ovovacev, Phaedrus 248 C) of RV.X.109.5, A.V., Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads and Pali texts, passim.

The "Lion's roar" is originally Behaspati's, RV.X.67.9, i.e. Agni's.

164 S.H.106.

185 S.IV.117; Sn.284. In Issisuttaka 28, 29 those who follow this (ancient) Way taught by the Buddhas are called Mahātmas.

100 BU.IV.4.8. As Mrs. Rhys Davids has also pointed out, the Buddha is a critic of Brahmanism only in external matters; the "internal system of spiritual values" he

"takes for granted" ("Relations between Early Buddhism and Brahmanism", IHQ., X,1934, p.282).

In view of the current impression that the Buddha came to destroy, not to fulfil an older Law, we have emphasized throughout the uninterrupted continuity of Brahmanical and Buddhist doctrine (e.g. in Note 299). Buddhist doctrine is original (yoniso manasikāro) indeed, but certainly not novel.

167 Sn.284 f (cf. RV.X.71.9); D.III.81, 82 and 94 f; exceptions, S.11.13; Sn.1082.
168 E.g. MU.VI.29 "This deepest mystery . . ."; BU.VI.3.12; BG.IV.3, XVIII.67.
Yet the Upanisads were actually "published"; and just as the Buddha "holds nothing back", so we are told that "nothing whatever was omitted in what was told to Satjakāma, a man who cannot prove his ancestry, but is called a Brahman because of his truth speaking (CU.IV.4.9). There is no more secrecy, and now whoever is a Comprehensor can properly be called a Brahman (SB.XII.6.1.41).

168 Cf. \$B.IV.1.4.5.

176 BD.VII.54.

171 BD.VII.57.

172 RV.X.48.5.

¹⁷⁸ BU.VI.2.8; CU.V.3-11; Kauş. Up. IV.9 (where the situation is called "abnormal", pratiloma).

174 D.HI.40, cf. S.1.136, D.1.12.

Bhattacharya maintains that the Buddha taught that "there is no Self, or Atman" (Cultural Heritage of India, p.259). Even in 1925 a Buddhist scholar could write "The soul . . . is described in the Upanisads as a small creature in shape like a man . . . Buddhism repudiated all such theories" (PTS. Dictionary, s.v. attan). It would be as reasonable to say that Christianity is materialistic because it speaks of an "inner man". Pew scholars would write in this manner today, but ridiculous as such statements may appear, (and it is as much an ignorance of Christian doctrine as it is of Brahmanism that is involved), they still survive in all popular accounts of "Buddhism".

It is of course, true that the Buddha denied the existence of a "soul" or "self" in the narrow sense of the word (one might say, in accordance with the command, denegal seiptum, Mark, VIII.34!) but this is not what our writers mean to say, or are understood by their readers to say; what they mean to say is that the Buddha denied the immortal, unborn and Supreme Self of the Upanishads. And that is palpably false. For he frequently speaks of this Self or Spirit, and nowhere more clearly than in the repeated formula na me to aità, "That is not my Self", excluding body and the components of empirical consciousness, a statement to which the words of Sahkara are peculiarly apposite, "Whenever we deny something unreal, it is with reference to something real" (Br. Sātra III.2.22); as remarked by Mrs. Rhys Davids, "so, 'this one', is used in the Suttas for utmost emphasis in questions of personal identity" (Missor Anthologies, I, p. 7, note 2). It was not for the Buddha, but for the natibila, to deny this Self! And as to "ignoring God" (it is often pretended that Buddhism is "atherstic"), one might as well argue that Meister Eckhart "ignored God" in saying "niht, daz ist gote gelich, wande beide niht sind" (Pfeiffer, p.506)!.

176 See Marco Pallis, Peaks and Lamas, 1939, pp.79-81.

177 See the various books of T. Suzuki.

178 Dh.74 mam'eva kata . . . iti bālassa sankappo, "I did it', an infantile idea", Cf. Note 163.

¹⁷⁸ Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism, p.65. Cf. A.II.38, 39 where the Buddha says that he has destroyed all the causes by which he might become a God or a man,

etc., and being uncontaminated by the world, "Therefore I am Buddha" (tasmā buddho'smi).

180 Saddbarma Pundarika, XV.1, in reply to the bewilderment of his audience, who cannot understand the Buddha's claim to have been the teacher of countless Bodhisattvas in bygone aeons. In just the same way Arjuna is bewildered by Krishna's eternal birth (BG.IV.4), and the Jews could not understand the saying of Christ, "before Abraham was, I am".

181 Libri adv. Jovinianum, I.42.

182 This is a technicality. See my "Symbolism of the Dome" (Part 3) in IHQ. XIV, 1938 and "Svayamāṭṛṇṇā; Janua Coeli" in Zalmoxis II, 1939 (1941).

188 Vin.1.23 (Mahāvagga I.14), Cf. Vis.393 rājānam gavesitum udābu attānam? CU.VIII.7.1 ātmā . . . anvejtavyab.

184 Vin.I.25 (Mahāvagga I.15). Cf. the similar story of Mogallāna's conflict with the Dragon Rāṣṭrapāla, Vis.399 f.

185 S.J.169. See also my "Atmayajña; Self-sacrifice" in HJAS.VI.1942.

186 Cf. Keith, Aitareya Aranyaka, 1908, p.xi.

One must assume that it is in ignorance of the Brahmanical literature that Mrs. Rhys Davids finds something novel in the Buddha's Internal Agnihotra (Gotama the Man, p.97). In just the same way I. B. Horner (Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected, Ch.II, esp. p.53) can discuss the history of the word arabat at great length without mentioning that in RV.X.63.4 we are told that the Gods (who, in their plurality, had never been thought of as originally immortal) "by their worth (arhanā) attained their immortality"! And in the same way the PTS. Pali Dictionary knows of arabast "before Buddhism" only as an "honorific title of high officials". Buddhist exegesis by scholats who do not know their Vedas is never quite reliable.

1944 S.III.120

187 D.II.101 atta-dipā vibaratha atta-saraņā . . . dhamma-dipā dhammasaraṇā. Cf. Sn. 501 ye atta-dipā vicaranti loke akimcanā sabbadhi vippamuttā; Dh.146, 232 andbakārena onaddhā padipam na gavessatha . . . so karobi dipam attano. The admonition "Make the Self your refuge" (kareyya saraṇattano, S.III.143) enjoins what the Buddha himself has done, who says "I have made the Self my refuge" (katam me saraṇam attano, D.II.120); for, indeed, "as he teaches, so he does" (yatha vadi, tatha kari, A.II.23, III.135, Sn.357); which tathā is often made the basis of the epithet "Tathāgata".

The Buddhist "lamp" texts correspond to Svet. Up. II.15 "When the bridled man by means of his own Self-suchness, as if by the light of a lamp (ātma-tatvena... alipopamena), perceives the Brahma-suchness, unborn, steadfast, clean of all other suchnesses, then knowing God he is liberated from all ills". The Spirit (ātman) is our light when all other lights have gone out (BU.IV.3.6).

188 On sati (smṛti) as "watching one's step", cf. I.Cor.10.31, cf. D.I.70,SBB.III.233 etc. Thus an inadvertent sin is worse than a deliberate sin (Mil.84, cf. 158).

But like the Brahmanical 1mrti, the Buddhist 1ati means more than this mere heedfulness, the padasaññam of J.VI.252. Recollection is practised with 2 view to omniscience or super-gnosis (abbiññā, pajānanā, προμήθεια, πρόνοια). The fullest account is given in Vis.407 f. In Mil.77-79, this is a matter either of intuitive, spontaneous and unaided super-gnosis, or occasioned (kaṭnmika=kṛtrima); in the latter case we are merely reminded by external signs of what we already know potentially. Comparing this with Pras Up.IV.5, CU.VII.13, VII.26.1 and MU.VI.7 ("The Self knows everything"), and taking account of the epithet Jātavedas=Pali jātissaro, it appears that the Indian doctime of Memory coincides with the Platonic doctrine in Meno 81 (μάθησις=ἀνάμνησίς).

- 188 Laws 644, 645.
- 190 Republic 431 A, B, 604 B; Laws, 959 B; Phaedo, 83 B, etc.
- 191 John XIII.36; Mark VIII.34. Those who do follow him have "forsaken all", and this naturally includes "themselves".
 - 192 Heb. IV.12.
- 188 Luke XIV.26, "who hateth not father and mother, and wife and children, and brethren and sisters, cf. MU.VI.28 "If to wife and family he be attached, ffor such a man, no, never at all" and Sn.60 "Alone I fare, forsaking wife and child, mother and father", cf. 38. Cf. Note 94.
- William Blake. Cf. Behmen, Sex Puncta Theosophica, VII.10 "Thus we see how a life perishes... namely, when it will be its own lord.... If it will not give itself up to death, then it cannot obtain any other world." Matth. XV.25; Phando, 67, 68. "No creature can attain a higher grade of nature without ceasing to exist." (St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., 1.63.3). Cf. Schiller, "In error only there is life and knowledge must be death"; and what has been said above on Nirvana as a being finithed. What lies beyond such deaths cannot be defined in terms of our kind of living.
- 195 So. 508 Ko sujjbati muccati . . . ken'attanā gacchati brahmalokam? It is characteristic of Lord Chaimers' attenuations that he renders ken'attanā only as "Whereby?". In the same way the PTS. Dictionary carefully omits the positive references s.v. attā and ignores mahattā. Mrs Rhys Davids has discussed mahattā—mahātmā (e.g. Review of Raligion VI.221), but ignores the nature of the mahiman on which the epithet depends.
- 190 A.H.211 brabma-bhätena attanā vibarati; like BU.IV.4.6 brabmaiva sau brabma-apyesi. Cf. Sa.508 bhagavā bi me sakkbi brabma'jja diļļbo (not, as in Lord Chalmer's version "Beahmā", but Beahma); sakkbi as in BU.111.4.2 sākṣād-aparokṣād-brabma).
- 197 DAL313 tato brabma-lokā patitandbi-vasena na āvattana-dbammo, expanding D.I.156 anāvatti-dbammo; as in BU.VI.2.15 to toju brabmalokeju . . . vasanti, tajārā na punarāvyttib; CU.IV.15.6 imam mānavam-āvartam nāvartante; CU.VIII.15. The only condition superior to this is that of the attainment of the last end here and now, rather than post mortem.
- 188 A.I.57, 58, 149, 249, V.88; Sn.778, 913, cf. Manu XI.230; Republic 440 B; I Cor.4.4. This is the "Ayenbyte of Inwyt".
- 199 Dh.160 attā bi attano nātbo; 380 attā bi attano gati (cf. BU.IV.3.32; KU.III. 11; MU.VI.7 ātmano'tmā netā amptākbyab; RV.V.50.1 vilvo devatya netub, viz. Savity). But in Dh.62 attā bi attano n'attbi, "In self there's naught of Self", cf. S.III.82, 83 yad anattā... na me so attā, "What is not-Self, that's not my Self", the referents are reversed; the Self (ātman) is seifiess (anātmya) as in TU.II.7.
- 200 S.I.75 n'ev'ajjbagā piyataram attanā kvaci . . . attakāmo; Udāna 47; A.12.91 (cf. II.21) attakāmena mabattam abbitkhbahkatā. S.I.71,72, like BG.VI.5-7, explains when the Self is dear (piyo) and not dear (appiyo) to self. On the other hand in A.IV.97 attā bi paramo piyo, the man "too fond of himself" is what is ordinarily meant by the "selfish" man.
 - 201 BU,L4.8, II.4, IV.5.
 - *** Hermes, Lib. IV.6 B.
- ²⁰³ St Thomas Aquinas, Sum Theol., II-II.26.4; cf. Dh.166 (man's first duty to work out his own salvation).
- 204 RV.I.115.1 ātmā jagatai tatībusai ca; SB.X.4.2.27 sarvesām bbūtānām ātmā; BU.II.5.15 sarvesām . . . adbipatih; III.5 brahma ya ātmā sarvāntarah; MU.V.1

viivătmă; BG.VI.29 sarvabbătastham ătmănam, VII.9 țivanam sarvabbătețu; Manu I.54 sarvabbătătmă, etc. This doctrine of one "Sonl" or "Self" behind what appear to be our many different souls or selves can be recognized in Plato (notably Meno 81, describing the universal birth and consequent omniscience of the "Immortal Soul," cf. Note 188), Plotinus (notably Ennauls IV.9 passim, on the "reduction of all souls to one") and Hermes (notably Lib. V.10. A "bodiless and having many bodies, or rather present in all bodies", cf. KU.II.22 alartran larirețu; and X.2 "the essence of all beings". It survives in Dionysius. "Being that pervades all things at once though not affected by them". (De div. nom. II.10)

206 KU.II.18 nāyani kutalcin na babbūva kalcit; II.25 ka ittbā vada yatra tab? VI.13 atti. Cf. Mil.73 bbagani attbi...na sakkā....nidassetum idba vā idba; and Sankara (on BU.III.3) muktasya ca na gatib kvacit.

204 BUJII.4.2; cf. II.4.14, IV.5.15; AA.III.2.4.

²⁰⁷ Erivgena.

208 A.II.177 "I am naught of an anyone anywhere, nor is there anywhere aught of mine"; similarly M.II.263, 264. Plotinus, Enneads VI.9.10 "But this man has now become another, and is neither himself nor his own". Cf. my Äkithcañāl: Selfnaughting" in NIA.III,1940.

204 S.II.13, III.165 etc.

210 S.H.95, villäänam ... rattiyä ca divassassa ca ännad eva upajjati akkaih nirujjhati.

211 Moralia 392 D, based on Plato, Symposium 207 D, R. See previous Note.

²¹² S.H.26, 27. The enlightened disciple does not think of *bimself* as transmigrating, but only recognizes the incessant operation of mediate causes in accordance with which contingent personalities arise and cease.

218 S.J.14.

214 S.III.143. See Note 187.

²¹⁵ D.II.120. See Note 187.

216 M.I.256 (Sāti's heresy).

*17 S.IL.13, II.61 etc.

218 AAJI.1.3 "Man is a product of works", i.e. of things that have been done up to that moment at which we speak (karma-kṛsam ayam purnjab). Cf. Notes 78, 211, 225.

219 S.H.64; A.V.88.

*** Mil.71/2. That nothing but the "fire" of life is transmitted is in perfect agreement with the Vedantic "The Lord is the only transmigrant" and with Heracleitus, for whom the flux is only of the fontal and inflowing fire, πτο αλόνιος = Agni, νίτοῦμαι. Not therefore in disagreement with Plato et al., who certainly did not reject the "flux", but presumes a Being from which all becoming proceeds, a Being that is not itself a "thing", but from which all "things" incessantly flow.

²²¹ M.I.390; S.II.64; A.V.88 "My nature is of works (kammassako'mbi), works I inherit, I am born of works, the kinsman of works, one to whom works revert; whatever work, or fair or foul, I do, I shall inherit". The last must not, of course, be taken to mean that an "I" really incarnates, but only that a future "I" will inherit and perceive, just as "I" do, its own causally determined nature. Cf. Note 212.

222 M.I. 256 f.; Mil.72 n'atthi koci satto yo imamba kaya annam kayam sankamati.

223 S.H.95, cf. Notes 210, 211.

224 John IX.2.

285 Fate is nothing but the series or order of second causes, and lies in these causes themselves and not in God (except Providentially, i.e. in the same way that the Buddha

"knows whatever is to be known, as it has been and will be," Sn. 358 etc., cf. Pras. Up. IV.5) who does not govern directly but through these causes, with which he never interferes (St Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., 1.22.3, 1.103.7 ad 2, 1.116.2, 4 etc.). "Nothing happens in the world by chance" (St Augustine, QQ LXXXIII.qu.24); "As a mother is pregnant with unborn offspring, so is the world itself with the causes of unborn things" (De Trin., III.9,—both statements endorsed by St Thomas Aquinas). "Why then should miserable men venture to pride themselves on their freewill before they are set free?" St Augustine, De trin. et lit., 52). The Buddha clearly demonstrates that we can neither be as nor when we will, and are not free (S.III.66,67), though "there is a Way" (D.I.156) to become so. It is the grasp of the very fact that "we" are mechanisms, causally determined (as stated in the repeated formula, "This being so, that arises; or not being so, does not arise")—the very ground of "scientific materialism"—that points out the Way of escape; all our trouble arises from the fact that like Boethius we have "forgotten who we are", and ignorantly see our Self in-what-is-not-our-Self (anationi attanam), but only a process.

224 M.I.261 nittharanatthàya na gahanatthäya. Cf. Note 249.

with being a misleader and a teacher of the cutting off, destruction and non-entity of what really is" (sato satassa = τὸ ὄντως ὄν); there is here a play on the double meaning of the word venayika, (1) leader-away, destroyer (e.g. of the Ego-heresy, but not of what "really is") and (2) leader-forth, guide, as in M.I.386. similarly S.III.110f.

Cf. BUJV.5.1 (Maitreyi's fear); KUJ.20.22 (even the Gods had doubt of this, "Is, or is not", after passing over); CUVIII.5.3, VIII.9.1. "Yet it would be improper to say even of a Buddha after death that 'He knows not, he sees not' " (D.II.68). His nature cannot be expressed by any antithesis or combination of the terms "Is" or "Is not". He "is", but not in any "place" (Mil.73).

²²⁸ René Guénon, "L'Erreur du psychologisme", *Etudes Tradisionelles*, 43, 1938. "The most evil type of man is be who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state" (Plato, *Republic*, 567 B).

220 M.II.32; S.II.28 and pessim.

⁹³⁰ S.III.162.164 etc. "Ignorance" is failure to distinguish body-and-consciousness from Self.

281 A.IV.195, Dh.243, avijjā param malam; cf. M.I.263. With D.I.70 on the infatuation that results from the indulgence of vision and other senses, cf. Plato, Protagoras, 356 D, "It is the power of appearance (τὸ φαινομένον = Pali τἄρα) that leads us astray", 357 E "To be overcome by pleasure is ignorance in the highest degree", 358 C "This yielding to oneself is just ignorance, and just as surely is mastery of oneself wisdom'" (σοφία = Pali kusalatā). Similarly Hermes, Lib.X.8.9 "The vice of the soul is ignorance, its virtue knowledge", Lib.XIII.7 B where "ignorance" is the first of the "twelve torments of matter" (as in the Buddhist Chain of Causes, cf. Hartmann in IAOS. 60, 1940, 356-360), and Lib.I.18 "The cause of death is desire".

228 S.III.83.84.

258 In AB.III.4 Agni, when he "draws and burns" (pravān dahati) is identified with Vāyu. In KB.VII.9 the Breaths "blow" (vānti) in various directions, but "do not blow out" (na nirvānti). In JUB.IV.12.6 "Agni, becoming the Breath, shines" (prāņo bhūtvā agnir dīpyate). In RV.X.129.2 ānīd avātam, "not blowing" is very near in meaning to nirvātam: cf. BU.III.8.8 avāyu... aþrāņa. The word nirvāņa does not occur in the Brahmanical literature before BG.

234 TS.II.2.4.7 udvāyes, "if the fire goes out"; KB.VII.2 udvāte'nagnau "in what is not fire, but gone out".

²⁸⁵ CUJV.3.1 yadā agnir udvāyati vāyum apyeti. In having thus "gone to the wind" the fire has "gone home" (JUB.HI.1.1-7), cf. Note 304.

286 Pras. Up.III.9: MU.VI.34.

221 BG.VI.15; BG.II.72 brabma-nirvanam rechati.

288 M.I.487 etc. and as in MU.VI.34.1. cf. Rūmī Mathanvi 1.3705:

230 Mil.40,47,71.72.

240 Sn.135 nibbanti dhirë yathëyam padipo (deictic); Sn.19 vivatë kuji, nibbato gini. "Man, like a light in the night, is kindled and put out" (Heracleitus, fr. LXXVII).

242 M.J.446.

242 A.I.156. In the series rago, doso and mobo, mobo (delusion) can be replaced by its equivalent avijjā, ignorance (e.g. Itivuttaka, 57) and it will be the more readily seen that freedom from rago and doso is a moral virtue, and freedom from mobo == avijiā an intellectual virtue.

In nearly the same way *ltivatika* 38,39 distinguishes between the two Nibbānas, (1) present, with some residue of the factors of existence, and (2) ultimate, without any residue of factors of existence. This, also, marks the distinction of Nibbāna from

Parinibbana, so far as this can be really made.

348 M.I.304; S.III.188. Cf. BU.III.6 (Brahma). Cf, James III, 6,

244 Sp. 567 brahmacariyam samditthikam akālikam. Cf. AV.XI.5; CU.VIII.5.

245 J.VI.251/2.

246 PTS. Pali Dic., s.v. silä. In greater detail M.I.179,180.

247 Udāna 70.

248 Dh.412; cf. Sn.363, Mil.383 and next Note. "Apathetic", i.e. "not pathological", as are those who are subject to their own passions or sym-pathise with those of others.

²⁴⁹ M.I.135; like the raft, "right is to be abandoned, and a fortiori wrong", "I need no further rafts" (Sn.21). Cf. Dh.39,267,412; Sn.4,547; M.II.26,27; TB.III.12,9.8; Kaus.Up.III.8; KU.II.14; Mund.Up.III.1.3; MU.VI.18 etc.; Meister Eckhart, passim.

Similarly St Augustine, De spir. et lit., 16, "Let him no longer use the Law as a means of arrival when he has arrived"; Meister Eckhart, "If I intend to cross the sea and want a ship, that is part and parcel of wanting to be over, and having gotten to the other side I do not want a ship" (Bvans II.194). In the same way the discriminating consciousness (viñiānam=1shihā, S.III.140,142=sanijāā, BU.II.4.12 and wholly inferior to pañihā, prajhā) is a very useful means of crossing over, but nothing to hold on to thereafter (M.I.260, see Note 226). "Consciousness" is a kind of "ignorance", ceasing at our death (BU.IV.4.3); accordingly aridysyā mṛtyum ilrīvā, vidyayā mṛtam ainute (Išā Up.11, MU.VII.9).

250 CU.VIII.4.1 etc. Meister Eckhart, "There neither vice nor virtue ever entered in".
250a It will be seen that this is, strictly speaking, an improper question; a Buddha is no longer anyone.

251 Gal.V.18.

²⁵² Cf. TSJI.9.3, II.3.8.1,2 II.5.8.2. The expression "Eye in the World" amounts to an equation of the Buddha with Agni and the Sun.

253 A.H.37.

254 RV.I.31.1 (Agni), I 130.3 (Indra).

²⁵⁶ RV.V.75.5 (in order that he may overcome Vrtra). Bodhin-manas suggests the Buddhist bodhi-citta. Mil.75 assimilates buddhi, Buddha.

256 BD.VII.57 14 (Indra) buddhvā ātmānam. The Jātaka tales include many of the Buddha's former births as Sakka (Indra). In the Nikāyas Sakka acts as the Buddha's

protector, just as Indra acts for Agni; but it is the Buddha himself that overcomes Māra. In other words the Buddha is comparable to that Agni who is "both Agni and Indra, brahma and historia". In M.I.386 the Buddha seems to be addressed as Indra (purindado sakko); but elsewhere, e.g. Sn.1069 and when his disciples are called sakya-puttiyo, "sons of the Sakyan", the reference is to the Sakya clan, whose name like Indra's implies a "being able".

251 Māyā is "magic" only in the sense of Behmen, Sex Puncta Mystica, V.1.f. ("The Mother of eternity; the original state of Nature; the formative power in the eternal wisdom, the power of imagination, a mother in all three worlds; of use to the children for God's kingdom, and to the sorcerers for the devil's kingdom; for the understanding can make of it what it pleases"). Mäyä, in other words is the Theotokos and mother of all living. As Maia was the mother of Hermes (Hesiod, Theog.938). Of whom else could the Buddha have been born? That the mothers of Bodhisattvas die voung is really because as Heracleitus says (Fr.X), "Nature loves to hide". Māyā "vanishes" just as Urvasi, mother of Ayus (Agni) by Pururavas, vanished, and as Saranyū vanished from Vivasvān; Māyā's svamūrti Pajāpatī taking her place (BC.I.18, II.19,20) as Saranyū's savarņā took hers. The eternal Avatāra has, indeed, always "two mothers", eternal and temporal, sacerdotal and royal. See also my "Nirmanakāya". IRAS, 1938. Māyā, being the "art" by which all things or any thing is made (nirmita, "measured out"), and "art" having been originally a mysterious and magical knowledge, acquires its other and pejorative sense (e.g. MU.IV.2) in the same way that art, artifice, craft, cunning and sleight, are not only virtues essential to the maker by art (artifex), but can also imply artfulness, artificiality (falsity), craftiness, guile and trickery; it is the bad sense, for example that "Consciousness is a glamour" (māyā viņa viāfiānam, Vis.479, S.III.142), while on the other hand Wycliffe could still render our "wise as serpents" (Matth.X.16, cf. RV.VI.52.15 abimāyāb) by "sly as serpents".

205 Cf. JUB.III.28.4, yadi brābmaņa-kule yadi rāja-kule, līke J.I.49, khattiya-kule vā brābmana-kule.

259 RV.IV.18.2 (Indra) pārivāt nirgamāņi; BC.I.25 (Buddha) pārivāt sutab. So too both Agni (RV.VI.16.35 garbbe mātub... vididyntānab) and the Buddha (D.II.13 kucchi-gatam passati) are visible in the womb. Many other parallels could be drawn.

200 RV.X.8.4 (Agni) sapta dadbişe padāni, X.122.3 (Agni) sapta dbāmāni pariyan; I.I.53 (Bodhisattva) satta-pada-vītibārena agamāsi.

261 TS.II.5.8.3, cf. I Kings 18.38.

202 RV.I.32.13.

268 RV.V.30.9, X.27.10.

244 RV.VIII.96.7; ABJII.20 etc.

260 Cf. RV.III.51.3 where Indra, elsewhere vytra-ban, etc., is abbimāti-ban, similarly IX.65.15 and passim. Abbimāti (=abbimāna, MU.VI.28, i.e. asmi-māna), the Egonotion, is already the Enemy, the Dragon to be overcome.

206 John X.9,14; Pargatorio XXVII.131. Cf. SA.VII.22; Taitt. Up. III.10.5.

247 I Cor.6.17.

зея S.П.212 f., V.254 f., A.І.170, І.254 f., etc.

Iddbi (Skr. rddbi, from rddb, to prosper, emporwachsen) is virtue, power (in the sense of Mark V.30, δύναμις), art (e.g. skill of a hunter, M.I.152), talent or gift. The iddbis of the Iddhi-pāda, "Footing of Power", are supernormal rather than abnormal. We cannot take up here at any length the apparent difficulty presented by the fact that iddbis are also attributed to the Buddha's Adversary (Māra, Namuci, Ahi-Nāga), except to point out that "Death" is also (in the same sense that Satan

remains an "angel") a spiritual being and the "powers" are not in themselves moral, but much rather intellectual virtues. The Buddha's powers are greater than the Adversary's because his range is greater; he knows the Brahmaloka as well as the worlds up to the Brahmaloka (i.e., under the Sun), while "Death's" power extends only up to the Brahmaloka and not beyond the Sun.

240 For the earlier history of this power see W. N. Brown, Walking on the Water, Chicago, 1928. This is primarily the power of the Spirit (Genesis, 1.2). It is typically of the unseen Gale (Vāyu) of the Spirit that motion at will is predicated (RV.X.168.4 ātmā devānām yathā valam carati . . . na rāpam tasmai). In AV.X.7.38 the primal Yalesa (Brahma) "strides" upon the ridge of the sea; and so, accordingly, the brahmacāri, ib.XI.5.26, for "Even as Brahma can change his form and move at will, so amongst all beings can he change his form and move at will who is a Comprehensor thereof" (\$A.VII.22); "The One God (Indra) stands upon the flowing streams at will" (AV.III.3.4, TS.V.6.1.3). "Self-motion (tò mòrò mvoữv) is the very word and essence of the Soul" (Phasadras 245 C f.).

This is like all other forms of levi-tation, a matter of light-ness. Thus in S.I.1 the Buddha "crossed the flood only when I did not support myself or make any effort" (appasifiham anāyāham ogham stari); i.e. not bearing down upon the surface of the water, cf. St Augustine, Conf.XIII.4 superferebatur super aquas, non ferebatur ab eis,

temquam im eis requiesceret.

Mil.84.85 explains the power of travelling through the air, "even to the Brahmaworld", as like that of one who jumps (langbayati), resolving (cittam sppadati) "There will I alight", with which intention his "body grows light" (Adyo me labuko boti), and it is similarly "by the power of thought" (citta-natena) that one moves through the air. Lightness (lagbutes) is developed by contemplation (Svet.Up.II.13); all the powers (iddbi) are resultants of contemplations (ibana, cf. Note 270) and depend upon it, so that it can be asked "Who sinks not in the gulf without support or stay?" and answered "One who is prescient, fully synthesised (susanabiso), he may cross the flood so hard to pass" (oghain tarati duttaram, S.I.53, where the application is ethical). The notion of "lightness" underlies the ubiquitous symbolism of "birds" and "wings" (RV.VI.9.5, PB.V.3.5, XIV.I.13, XXV.3.4 etc.). And conversely, to reach the world of the unembodied one must have cast away "the heavy weight of the body" (rūpa-garu-bbāram, Sdhp.494), cf. Phaedrus 246 B, 248 D where it is the "weight of forgetfulness and evil" that arrests "the soul's flight", and St. Augustine Conf.XIII.7 quomodo dicam de pondere cupiditatis in abruptam abyssum et de sublevatione caritatis per spiritum tunm qui superferebatur super aquas.

Otherwise stated, the power of levitation is exercised "by an envelopment of the body in the (tarn-) cloak of contemplation" (jbāna-veṭbasena sartram veṭbetvā, J.V.

126), where the power is at the same time one of dis-appearance.

270 S.V.25_ f., A.I.254, S.II.212, M.I.34 and passim: explanations, Vis.393 f.

²⁷¹ Failure follows want of "faith"; or any distraction from contemplation, as in J.V.125-127.

272 RV.JX.86.44: JB.II.34: SB.IV.3.4.5: AB.JJ.39-41: VI.27-31; KU.VI.17 etc.

278 As Sankara explains in connection with Pras.Up.IV.5 it is the mano-maya asman that enjoys omniscience and can be where and as it will. This "intellectual self or body" (2880 astà dibbo rapi manomayo, D.I.34, cf. I.77, M.II.17) the Buddha has taught his disciples how to extract from the physical body; and it is clearly in this "other, divine, intellectual body", and not in his human capacity, not at all times or under all conditions "whether in motion or at rest, or sleeping or waking" (carato ca me tijthato ca initiassa ca jāgarassa ca) but "when he will" (pāpade akankhāmi, as in the idābi contexts) that the Buddha himself can recall (anussarāmi) his own former

births, without limit, can survey "with the divine eye, transcending human vision" the births and deaths of other beings, here and in other worlds, over and beyond which he has verified here and now the double liberation (M.I.482). The expression "sleeping or waking" lends itself to a lengthy exegesis. Note that the order of words connects motion with sleep and immobility with waking. This means that as in so many Upanisad contexts, "sleep", that sleep in which one "comes into one's own" (swapiti = svam apita, CU.VI.8.1, SB.X.5.2.14) it is not the sleep of exhaustion, but the "sleep of contemplation" (dbyāna) that is intended; it is precisely in this state of "sleep" in which the senses are withdrawn that there is motion-at-will (supto . . . prānān grbītvā sve larīre yathā-kāmam parivartate, BU.II.1.17), in this contemplative sleep that "striking down what is physical, the Sunbird, the Immortal, goes where he will" (dbyānatīva . . . svapno bhālvā . . . sarīram abhīprabatya . . . iyate mpto yairā kāmam, BU.IV.3.7,11.12).

274 A.I.171,172 (of the three powers, of remembrance of births, reading the thoughts of others, and teaching (adesa-pāṣibāriyam), the latter is the most considerable and most productive (abhikāakasam) ca paṇisasaram ca).

275 AV.X.8.1,12; KU.IV.13; Praś.Up.IV.5, etc.

278 SA.VII.22.

277 BU.IV.3.12; išā Up. 4; MU.II.2.

278 St Ambrose, gloss on I Cor.12.3.

276 M.I.140, 141 The Buddha is ananuveijo, "past finding out", similarly other Arahats are traceless (vațiam tesam n'atthi pannāpanāpa). S.I.23; Vajracchedika Sātra; cf. S.III.IIIf., and Hermes Lib. XIII.3.

280 Sp.455,456,648.

281 Dh.179 (sam buddham anantagocaram apadam, hena padena nessatha); like Brahma, BU.III.8.8, Mund.Up.I.2.6; Devas JUB.III.35.7 (na . . . padam assi, padena ha vai punar mṛṭyur anvesi); Gāyatrī, BU.V.14.7 (apad ass, na hì padyase, Sāyaṇa nesinesy-āsmatvas). All this has to do with the originally and ultimately footless (ophidian) nature of the Godhead, whose vessigia padis mark the Way only so far as up to the Sundoor, Janua Coeli. Cf. Note 279.

282 S.III.118 tathagato anupalabbbiyamano.

283 S.III.120 yo kho dhammam passati mam passati.

284 BU.III.8.8; Mund Up.I.1.6; JUB.III.14.1; Rūmī, Malbsawi I.3055-65.

285 KU.II.18,25; cf. Mil.73, the Buddha "is", but "neither here nor there"; in the Dhamma-body alone can be be designated.

288 BU.IV.4.23; KU.V.11; MU.III.2 etc.

287 Udāna 80; CU.VIII.13.

288 Taitt. Up. II.7, cf. Note 197.

289 M.J.137-140, cf. D.H.68 and passim.

290 Mil.26-28; S.I.135; Vis.593,594.

201 E.g. Laws 898 D f., Phaedens 246 E-256 D, cf. Note 293.

202 "As which" if we identify ourselves with the "personality"; "in which" if we recognize our Self as the Inner Person,

Atman, Sun), the Breath to which "no name can be given" (AA.II.3.8), or the Spiritual Self (Atman, KU.III.3; J.V.252) or Dhamma (S.I.33). The skilled charioteer (susarathi) guides his horses where he will (RV.VI.75.6),—just as we

might now speak of the skilled driver of a motorcar or aeroplane as roaming where he likes.

So Boethius, De consol., IV.1:

Hic regum sceptrum dominus tenet Orbisque habenas temperat Et volucrem currum stabilis regit Rerum coruscus arbiter.

The contrast of good and vicious horses (the senses) in KU.III.6, Dh.94 and Svet. Up.II.9, cf. RV.X.44.7 parallels Phandrus 248 E.

²⁰⁴ Mrs. Rhys Davids, Milinda Questions, 1930, p.33. [It must be remembered that Mrs. Rhys Davids was a spiritualist. In answer to ber words on the title page of Sākya might be cited Vis.594 "There are Gods and men who delight in becoming. When they are taught the Law for the cessation of becoming, their mind does not respond"].

208 S.I.33 dhammāham sārathim brūmi: cf. Jātaka No. 457. dhammo na jaram upeti; So.1139 dhammam . . . sandifthiham ahāliham.

204 D.II.120 katam me sarayan attano.

dbammam passati. Similarly D.III.84 Bbagavato'mbi . . . dbammajo . . . Dbammakāyo iti pi brahmahāyo it pi, dbammabbāto iti pi; S.II.221 Bbagavato'mbi putto . . . dbammajo; S.IV.94 dbammabbāto brahmabbāto . . . dbammaiāmi tatbāgato: A.II.11 brahmabbātiena attanā; S.III.83 brahmabbātā . . . buddbā. Thete can be no doubt whatever of the equations dbamma=brahma=buddba=attā: as in BU.II.5.11 ayam dbarmab . . . ayam ātmā idam amytam idam brahma idam sarvam. In Dh.169, 364. (II.25.2) dhamma is clearly the equivalent of brahma, ātman. A Buddha is whatever all or any of these terms denote, and by the same token "not any what" (akimcano, Dh.421, Sn.1063), and "without analogy" (yatsa n'atthi upamā kvaci, Sn.1139).

"That which the Buddha preached, the Dhamma MRY Egogiy, was the order of law of the universe, immanent, eternal, uncreated, not as interpreted by him only, much less invented or decreed by him" (PTS. Pali Dic., s.v. Dhamma).

200 Sn.83 buddbam dbammasāminam vītatanbam dipaduttamam sāratbīnam pavaram. Dbammasāmi=RV.X.129.3 satyadbarmendra, RV.X.129.3,8,9 "the one King of the world, God of Gods, Satyadbarmā", cf. I.12.7, X.34.8; and the dbārmas-tejomayo'mṛtab paruṣab . . . ātmā . . . brabma of BU.II.5.11. The Buddhist Dbamma (νόμος, λόγος, ratio) is the eternal Dharma of BU.II.5.23 ("him, Vâyu, Prāṇa, the Gods made their Law"); and BU.I.4.14 "There is nothing beyond this Law, this Truth"; Sn. 884 "The Truth is one, indeed, there is no other".

800 Vin. I.35 etc.

201 J.VI.252 kāyo te ratha . . . attā vā sārathi, like KU.III.3 ātmānam rathinam viddiri, farīram ratham. Cf. Plato, Laws 898 C.

202 Udana 67 Commentary.

808 Suzuki in JPTS, 1906/7, p.13.

804 Sn.1074-6 nāmakāyā vimutto, attham paleti, na upeti saukham . . . attham gatassa na pamāņam atthi.

Mund.Up.III.2.8,9 nāmarūpād vimuktab . . . abīto bhavati; Bg.XV,5 dvandvair vimuktab.

305 John XIII.36; Mark VIII.34. Whoever would follow must be able to say with St. Paul, "I live, yet not I, but Christ in me" (Gal.II.20). There can be no return to

God but as of like to like, and that likening, in the words of Cusa, demands an ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis.

#06 Meister Eckhart.

att Enneads VI.9.11.

The foregoing notes and references are far from exhaustive. They are intended to assist the reader to build up a meaning content for several terms that could not be fully explained in the lectures as delivered, and to enable the scholar to follow up some of the sources. In the lectures, Pali words are given in their Sanskrit forms, but in the Notes the Pali is quoted as such. I have taken pains to collate the Buddhist and Brahmanical sources throughout: it might have been even better to treat the whole subject as one, making no distinction of Buddhism from Brahmanism. Indeed, the line is coming when a Summa of the Philosophia Perennis will have to be written, impartially based on all orthodor sources whatever.

Some notable Platonic and Christian parallels have been cited (1) in order to bring out more clearly, because in more familiar contexts, the meaning of certain Indian doctrines and (2) to emphasize that the Philosophia Perennis, Sanātana Dharma, Akāliko Dhamma, is always and everywhere consistent with itself. These citations are not made as a contribution to literary history; we do not suggest that borrowings of doctrines or symbols have been made in either direction, nor that there has been an independent origination of similar ideas, but that there is a common inheritance from a time long antedating our texts, of what St Augustine calls the "wisdom that was not made, but is at this present, as it hath ever been, and so shall ever be" (Conf.IX.10). As Lord Chalmers truly says of the parallels between Christianity and Buddhism, "there is here no question of one creed borrowing from the other; the relationship goes deeper than that" (Buddha's Teachings, HOS.37, 1932, p.xx).

The following abbreviations are employed:

RV., Rg Veda Sambitā; T.S., Taitirīya Sambitā (Black Yajur Veda); A.V., Atharva Veda Sambitā; TB., PB., SB., AB., KB., JB., JUB., the Brābmaņas, respectively the Taitirīya, Pašcavimša, Satapatha, Aitareya, Kauṭītaki, Jaiminīya, Jaiminīya Upanitad; AA., TA., SA., the Araynakas, respectively the Aitareya, Taitirīya end Sākkhāyana; BU., CU., TU., Ait., KU., MU., Praš., Mund., Išā., the Upanitads, respectively the Brhadāraynaka, Chāndogya, Taitirīya, Aitareya, Katha, Maitsi, Praina, Mundaha and Ilāvāsya; BD., Brhad Devatā; BG., Bhagasud Gitā; Vin., Vinaya Piṭaka; A., M., S., the Nikāyas, respectively the Anguttara, Majihima and Samyutta; So., Sutta Nipāta; DA., Sumangala Vilāsini; Dh., Dhammapada; DhA., Dhammapada Aithakathā; titv., Isivattaka; Vis., Visuddhi Magga; Mil., Milinda Patho; BC., Buddbacarita; HJAS., Harvard Journal of Athatic Studies; JAOS., Journal of the American Oriental Society; NIA., New Indian Antiquary; IHQ., Indian Historical Quarterly; SBB., Sacred Books of the Buddbists; HOS., Harward Oriental Series.

Uttişibata jägrata prāpya varān nibodbata (KU.III.14) Ya suitā ta pabbnijatha (Itiv., p.41)