The Icon Project

Architecture, Cities, and Capitalist Globalization

Leslie Sklair

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I have no formal training in architecture or urban design. Indeed it was John Friedmann, then at UCLA, who first encouraged me to think of myself as some sort of urbanist on the basis of a paper on Shenzhen I wrote in the mid-1980s. Little did we know then what was to come in that obscure Chinese village. Also in California, during my sabbatical in 1986–7, I met Larry Herzog, a genuine urban scholar, who has been a friend and photographic adviser since then. Later, at LSE, I had the good fortune to be able to employ the services of Conor Molony as a part-time research assistant at the beginning of this project. Conor gradually became my architectural mentor (sometimes tormentor) as I grappled with the sociological, symbolic, and aesthetic worlds of architecture. Dr Laura Gherardi worked with me as a postdoctoral research fellow at LSE in 2009–10 and contributed in many important ways to the project. Several colleagues and friends have generously commented over the course of the years on various versions of one or more of the chapters that follow—Marc Blecher, Gregory Bracken, Ray Bryant, Tim Bunnell, Susan Fainstein, Sue Gerhardt, Larry Herzog, Joan Ockman, Davide Ponzini, Kester Rattenbury, Robin Spence, Fran Tonkiss, Elsa Vivant, and Gwendolyn Wright. I owe a special debt to Non Arkaraprasertkul, Diane Davis, Bridget Fowler, and Jill Timms who commented on various drafts of the manuscript. Sharon Zukin provided a unique mix of encouragement and scathing critique in the early stages. In the course of giving talks and participating in panels on various aspects of architecture and globalization at a variety of institutions I can honestly say that I always learned something new (everyone, it seems, has favourite buildings). So thanks to interlocutors at the LSE, Cambridge, Oxford, Strathclyde, Sussex, UCL, Oberlin in London, the V&A and RIBA, University of Southern California, MIT, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School CUNY, Netherlands Architecture Institute, Delft School of Design, National University of Malaysia, Global Studies Association in Prague, Lingnan University in Hong Kong, NYU-Shanghai, Fudan University, and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. I was also privileged to participate in two intense workshops, the first on starchitecture and iconic architecture in Paris in June 2015 (organized by Maria Gravari-Barbas and Cécile Renard-Delautre), the second in Berlin in June 2016 on architecture, meaning, materiality, and power (organized by Martina Löw)—both gave me an opportunity to meet and exchange ideas with many of the people working on what we might call 'social studies of architecture' and its ramifications for the wider society.

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Leslie Sklair
London, summer 2016

THE ICON PROJECT

Introduction

Never before in the history of human society has the capacity to produce and deliver goods and services been so efficient and so enormous, thanks to the electronic revolution that started in the 1960s and the global logistics revolution made possible by the advent of the shipping container. And, paradoxically, never before in the history of human society have so many people wanted goods and services that they cannot afford to buy, largely due to the absolute increases in human populations and the relative ease of communications brought about, again, by the electronic revolution. The results are class polarization and ecological unsustainability, fatal contradictions to the promises of the capitalist system. These contradictions play out in all spheres of economic, social, and cultural life and those who have a vested interest in maintaining the ruling system are constantly attempting to distract attention from its failings. These failings are disguised by the spectacular architecture that now spans most regions of the world, from the great cities of the Global North, to the expanding megacities of the Global South, and the artificial urbanism of the oil states of the Arabian Gulf. Shopping malls, modern art museums, ever-higher skyscrapers, and urban megaprojects constitute the triumphal 'Icon Project' of global capitalism.

On a hot, sunny day in January 2014, I was standing in a long, bustling queue for the Peak tram in Hong Kong. I started chatting with two bright young women, sisters from Guangzhou—formerly Canton, now the third-largest city in China with a population approaching 15 million. It is a short train ride from Hong Kong and sends many tourists there. My new acquaintances told me that their father was an architect, and that this was their first visit to Hong Kong, they wanted to see what the rest of the world was really like. Clearly they were excited by the prospect of visiting the famous Peak—I am not sure they were entirely prepared for the 'Peak experience' that starts with a dramatic entrance and culminates when you get to the top of a spectacular building. And that is when my idea of the Icon Project really began to crystallize.

The Peak Tower, 'a futuristic display of architecture' (according to the informative tourist guide), was designed in 1993 by the British architect Terry Farrell, who redesigned it in 2006. It is now marketed as the most iconic landmark in Hong Kong, its distinctive gondola logo widely disseminated. The Peak experience is a seamless integration of traditional Hong Kong and the Hong Kong of contemporary consumerism. In the Lower Terminus we throng through a Peak Tram Historical Gallery, which serves as a holding area for the people waiting to board. All around us, we see the distinctive 1920s streamlined winged logo of the Tram. The tram itself is a piece of retro infrastructure. On arriving at the Peak, we are immediately confronted with a bewildering bazaar-like labyrinth of kiosks selling a huge variety of Peak memorabilia and other tourist staples. However, those who require official souvenirs (not me) will have to wait until they reach the Official Souvenirs Boutique, several floors up the tower, and pay another entrance fee. From the tram to the Tower and its spectacular 360° viewing platform, Sky Terrace 428 (metres above sea level), we have to negotiate several more floors of shopping, a branch of Madame Tussaud's with a unique 'Scream', the first permanent scare attraction in Hong Kong; a 'Say I Love You at the Peak' Wishing Corner; and the usual array of boutiques and restaurants. In the words of the not exactly modest official guide: 'The Peak Tower is the most stylish architectural icon and landmark in Hong Kong. With an avant-garde design representing the epitome of modern architecture, the spectacular tower has been featured in millions of photographs and post cards across the world.' I lost sight of the women from Guangzhou after we left the Tram, but if the many other tourists from China milling around were any guide, they were loving every minute of the Peak experience. I have often wondered what they told their architect father about their trip, about what was out there in the world of capitalist globalization—a world that Chinese cities are both emulating and helping to create—the world of the Icon Project.[1]

Icons emerge at the meeting point of power, meaning, aesthetics, and taste, where the power of those who dominate the global economy, the meanings produced by its ideologues, and the aesthetics produced by architects create the condition in which the Icon Project thrives. One of the consequences of capitalist globalization is the need to transform the social production, marketing, and reception of iconic architecture. These processes are largely driven by those who own and control most of the land and other resources all over the world, conceptualized here as the transnational capitalist class (TCC). The TCC is organized in four overlapping fractions—corporate, political, professional, and consumerist. In most societies, the TCC has the lion's share of economic resources, political influence, and mass media attention and support.

The question that this book attempts to answer focuses on how the TCC uses architecture in its own commercial interests. Capitalist hegemony, the everyday expression of the power of the dominant class, is made visible by the creation of iconic buildings, spaces, urban megaprojects, sometimes whole cities. My thesis, in a nutshell, is that the TCC mobilizes two distinct but related forms of iconic architecture—unique icons (buildings recognized as works of art in their own right) and successful typical icons (buildings copying elements of unique icons) to spread the culture-ideology of consumerism. Thus: 'Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only *ours* when we have it—when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc.,—in short, when it is *used* by us. . . . In place of *all* these physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of all these senses—the sense of *having*' (Marx 1961: 106, italics in original). The culture-ideology of consumerism relentlessly promotes the view that the true meaning of life is to be found in our possessions. It is the foundation of the capitalist dogma of limitless material growth. As we shall see, in the world of capitalist globalization iconic architecture promotes an insatiable desire for the fruits of consumer culture.

The huge literature on globalization and global cities has so far failed to come to grips with the social production of iconic architecture and its central role in globalizing cities (namely, cities aspiring to global status).[2] With more and more people living in cities all over the world, the Icon Project is an important weapon in the struggle to create and solidify capitalist hegemony, to reinforce transnational capitalist control of where we live, what we consume, and how we think.[3] I define iconic in terms of fame and symbolic/aesthetic significance. The more successfully a building can convey consumer-friendly meanings and consumer-friendly design, ideally combining the comfortable with the spectacular, the more value it will have in the market. For example, the Sydney Opera House, often described as the first global architectural icon, initially provoked a storm of protest against its cost and unusual shape. However, a successful marketing campaign created a high measure of popularity and esteem, at home and abroad. Originally commissioned to boost tourism and Australia's reputation on the world stage, it was promoted with these aims in mind. The Opera House has become a significant consumerist space in Sydney and tourist destination globally. It is to Sydney and Australia what the Eiffel Tower is to Paris and France, an integral part of the brand. This suggests that the more famous a building is the greater will be its commercial potential. And what could be more famous than a global icon?

The Argument

The theoretical framework of the book draws on two of my previous publications: *The Transnational Capitalist Class* (2001) and *Globalization: Capitalism and, Its Alternatives* (2002). My focus is on how capitalist globalization is produced and represented all over the world, especially in globalizing cities, on how the TCC inscribes its own interests on the built environment, and in particular, on what has come to be known as iconic architecture. These questions are approached through two interrelated investigations: (1) how the architecture industry organizes the social production and marketing of iconic architecture, and (2) how the processes of capitalist globalization since the second half of the 20th century have evolved into a complex system in which capitalist corporations increasingly dominate the built environment and promote the trend towards globalizing, consumerist cities. This results in the virtual privatization of public space through a process of creating privileged publics, notably people with money to spend, for new consumerist spaces.

The production and representation of architectural icons in the pre-global era (roughly before the 1960s) were mainly driven by those who controlled state or religious institutions. However, the dominant forms of architectural iconicity for the global era are increasingly driven by those who own and control the transnational corporations, their local affiliates, and their allies in government, the professions, and the media. Historically, in most societies, religious authorities dominated the first era of what we now see as architectural icons, states and empires dominated the second era, and the present era is dominated by the TCC.

Iconic architecture has always been a resource in struggles for meaning and, by implication, for power and profits. Therefore, to explain how iconic architecture works for capitalist globalization, we must ask questions about meaning and power. Temples, cathedrals, and mosques become famous to the faithful, and they convey visions of the gods and the enigmas of the human condition on which all religions rest. Palaces, government buildings, and public monuments become famous to citizens and subjects, and they convey the power and authority of empires and states and the hierarchies on which all forms of class society rest. Shopping malls, corporate headquarters, museums, performance spaces, sports stadia, transportation hubs, and gleaming megatowers become famous to everyone through the mass media. These buildings convey the message that the true meaning of life is in consumerism, the fuel that drives the global capitalist machine and provides the profits for those who own and control the transnational corporations. Whereas the iconic architectures of previous eras (religious and state domination) are often marked with the symbols of the dominating elites, sometimes in combination, the icons of capitalist globalization are more varied in style, a consequence of the corporate capture of the modernist aesthetic and its offshoots. Glass, shiny metals, and spectacular shapes have been mobilized to convey messages of transparency, democracy, and consumer-friendliness in all building types. The electronic revolution that made capitalist globalization possible also makes new forms of iconic architecture possible.

Globalization in its many and varied forms has attracted an enormous literature in recent decades, as exemplified in the contributions to the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Globalization* (edited by George Ritzer, 2012). A Google search on 'architecture and globalization' on 16 February 2014 found over nine million results (in 0.24 seconds; rising to 35.6 million in November 2016). Architects and critics have joined the debate about globalization, and interest in this topic has been growing (e.g., the books by Ibelings 1998; Migayrou and Brayer 2003; Koolhaas and McGetrick 2004; McNeill 2009; Adam 2013), and a substantial periodical literature. There is obviously a good deal of scholarly and mainstream culture interest in the topic.

Sources

In addition to surveys of the literature on architecture and urban design as social and cultural phenomena, both print and online, this book is based on various other types of material. I undertook a series of formal interviews with practicing architects and people working in and around architecture, teaching, writing, promoting, and curating. My respondents, who were from all over the world, were engaged in some or all of these activities. Most of the interviews took place in the United States in 2004; supplemented by a small number in the United Kingdom, China, Hong Kong, and Holland—75 interviews in total. The interviews are cited at appropriate points in the text, identified by codes in square brackets as in [CA1] (see Appendix). The purpose of these interviews was, first, to establish whether the term 'iconic architecture' was becoming part of the discourse of architecture and urban design. An urbanist in one of the leading architecture departments in the United States commented: 'I work at the split where architecture and planning part. My focus is on imagery, and teaching architects about urbanism is an uphill task' [NY4]. This made me ponder if urbanists think more about architecture than architects do about urban design. All my respondents were able to provide their own definitions of iconic. The second purpose of the interviews was to find out if respondents could tell me what buildings or spaces they considered iconic from their own childhood, iconic for architects and/or for the public, and on the local, city, national, and global scales. Every one of them was able to do this, usually with enthusiasm. These interviews provided me with some confirmation of what I already knew from documentary sources, pointers to buildings considered iconic that I had never heard of, and much information and many ideas that are followed up in the book.

In order to research the architecture industry beyond the iconic architects and buildings that attract most media attention, I collected data on the largest architecture firms globally, usually ranked by architects employed. These were obtained from professional and trade magazines, mainly *Building Design*, over the last decade. This data was used to establish the 10 largest firms over the decade (2005–14), and top 10 firms in regional markets throughout this period. This, to my knowledge, is the first systematic attempt to chart the structure and changes in the architecture industry from a sociological perspective, and to compare these measures with the more common measures of architectural prestige and fame. The almost exclusive focus of the media on iconic architecture and starchitects presents a misleading account of the industry and profession as a whole. Very frequent use of two particular publications made it tedious always to list items these refer to in the bibliography, which is long enough already. For ease of reading and reference, most items sourced from the London-based weekly newspaper *Building Design* (now digital) are referenced as *BD* and date. Locating material from *BD* and its predecessor, *World Architecture*, proved to be challenging and I am very grateful to librarians at LSE and other universities in the United Kingdom and United States for their help. Material from the other widely cited source, the 'World's most visited architecture website', is referenced as *ArchDaily* (date). Where it is felt necessary to identify the author of an article from either of these sources, this will be found by the usual method in bibliographical references in text. The websites of architecture firms and a sample of selected quality newspapers around the world were used to establish media exposure of generally recognized leaders in the profession. These searches were supplemented with searches of the LEXIS global database to establish media coverage of architects, buildings, and topics relevant to iconic architecture.[4]

Some of the material in most of the following chapters first saw the light of day as articles in peer-reviewed scholarly journals and invited book chapters (thanks again to anonymous reviewers). All of these publications have been extensively revised, updated, and reformulated for the specific purposes of the present book.

Structure of the Book

Chapter 1 explains the origins of what I rather dramatically term the Icon Project in architecture and urban design. I define iconic architecture in terms of fame and symbolic/aesthetic significance, and show how failure to define the concept clearly has led to confusion in professional and public discussion. Chapter 2 explains how the Icon Project in architecture is socially produced through architecture firms and mass media. This process is shown to work in the production not only of unique icons (works of art) but also of successful typical icons (copies of elements of unique icons). The evidence of several complementary empirical measures shows the importance of three distinct groups of architects—the top four designers of unique architectural icons at the beginning of the 21st century (Gehry, Foster, Koolhaas, and Hadid), a group of about 30 signature architects, and a larger group of firms producing many more successful typical icons. Chapter 3 surveys the sociology of the architecture industry.[5] Here I provide substantive evidence of the unique-typical iconicity distinction and introduce the idea of celebrity infrastructure. Chapters 4 to 7 apply the concept of the TCC to architecture and cities in terms of its four fractions (corporate, political, professional, and consumerist). The final chapter argues that architects and urban designers would work as creatively to provide a built environment fit for an alternative non-capitalist globalization as they currently do for global capitalism. These large transformations are not possible within the framework of capitalist globalization, and some preliminary ideas are suggested about non-capitalist progressive alternative globalizations. All types of architecture, including iconic buildings, would find a place in the new non-capitalist global society.

1

Iconic Architecture and Capitalist Globalization

In previous publications I have set out a theoretical framework to guide substantive research on this qualitatively new phase of capitalism in global perspective (Sklair 2001, 2002). This framework identifies the basic unit of analysis as transnational practices, practices that cross existing state borders and whose agents and institutions include combinations of non-state and state actors (sometimes overlapping categories), at the local, urban, national, international, transnational, and global levels. The key players in the economic sphere are the major transnational corporations; the political sphere is dominated by the transnational capitalist class (TCC); and in the culture-ideology sphere consumerism dominates. The general problem with capitalism, intensified in the era of capitalist globalization, is that it cannot resolve two crises inherent in capitalism as a mode of production and social organization, namely, class polarization and ecological unsustainability. Class polarization is the consequence of the growing numbers of the very rich, the persistence of very large numbers of very poor people, increasing economic insecurity of those in between and widening gaps between the very rich and the rest. The ecological crisis is the consequence of the culture-ideology of consumerism, characterized by an obsession with unlimited growth serviced by a destructive fossil-fuel energy system, defined as an addiction to more and more possessions and to constantly novel experiences (Sklair 2002: esp. 48–53, 2009a; D'Alisa et al. 2014). These are the conditions under which almost everyone in the world today must live.

Architecture has not been exempt from the general pressures exerted by the rise of capitalist globalization. The Icon Project in architecture and urban design driven by the TCC is one important weapon in the struggle to create and solidify capitalist hegemony in the global era. To document and explain how this process works in the field of architecture and urban design is the object of the book.[1] In the pre-global era, the centuries before the start of the electronic revolution in the 1960s, what we now term iconic architecture tended to be the preserve of religious or political elites (Kostof 2000). The pattern of architectural production began to change fundamentally in the 19th century as architects began to organize themselves professionally and this process accelerated dramatically with the advent of modernism in its various guises in the 20th century (Saint 1983; Larson 1993).[2] Architects and architectural styles have always crossed borders, but by the second half of the 20th century national was giving way to transnational architecture. For example, in a history of Brutalism—usually undecorated massive buildings characterized by exposed concrete—written in the 1960s: 'It was not, of course, a wholly British movement—the world of architecture is now so closely-knit by rapid communications that only chauvinism or genuine irrelevance to world problems can keep a movement . . . successfully shut up within the confines of one nation's architecture' (Banham 1966: 134).

This was the beginning of the era of capitalist globalization, and a relatively small group of corporations run by architects and architect-developers emerged to meet the increasing demands for new buildings and renovation of cities after the ravages of the Second World War in Europe and Asia, and modernization projects elsewhere. The dominant drivers of iconic architecture began to shift from religious and political elites to the TCC, led by the corporate elite and supported by its globalizing political, professional, and consumerist fractions.

Architects themselves also began to change, from peripatetic travellers working for domestic and foreign patrons to globalizing professionals, seeking commissions all over the globe and setting up branch offices where there were building booms (McNeill 2009; Ponzini and Nastasi 2011, Adam 2013). Architects have also had to cope with the transformation of their art as buildings commissioned by and sometimes exclusively for the use of religious and political elites and rich patrons declined, and the market for buildings commissioned by capitalist corporations and institutions expanded. Architecture in the era of capitalist globalization becomes increasingly commodified, buildings are turned into commodities to be produced in a commercial marketplace, with exchange value in the form of actual or potential rental income often more important than use value. These changes in architectural production herald a watershed moment in the culture-ideology of consumerism as, increasingly, such buildings become consumerist spaces.

Genuine and pseudo-iconicity are mobilized in the interests of capitalist consumerism to produce profits for those who own and control the buildings but, as I argue in detail throughout this book, this is not always a process that stands apart from or necessarily contradicts the symbolic and aesthetic significance of great architecture. The tensions between architecture as a creative aesthetic and symbolic act and architecture as commodity production have been increasingly detoxified and blended into iconic architecture, in one extreme expression of alienation within capitalist globalization. The media scholar John Fiske expresses this ironically:

> The aesthetics of the Manhattan skyline are an aesthetics of capitalism: they are as ideological as those of the renaissance. The awesomeness of Sears Tower [now the Willis Tower, Chicago] is as attractive as that of Chartres Cathedral—if one is to be oppressed one might as well be oppressed magnificently; one can thus participate in one's own oppression with a hegemonic pride. (Fiske 1991: 214)[3]

It is not the iconic buildings themselves that are the problem—many of them are truly inspiring works of architectural imagination—but the ways in which iconic buildings are framed within the logic of consumerism, the belief system, and cultural context of capitalist globalization. In order to understand the rise of iconic architecture, it is necessary to deal with the perennially contentious question of aesthetics and its relations with power.

Architecture, Power, Aesthetics

Despite the fact that architecture and the built environment confront all of us in our daily lives, they have received relatively little attention in discussions of globalization, capitalism, and especially class. This book rests on the general idea that certain types of architecture can be hegemonic in a class sense. That is, just like other art forms (notably literature, music, painting, and sculpture), certain buildings and spaces can serve specific class interests expressed in their aesthetic and symbolic qualities. This is argued convincingly in a book first published in 1970 on the villa as hegemonic architecture by Reinhard Bentmann and Michael Müller (1992)—the English translation of the third German edition (cited as B&M). This path-breaking study explains how the villa, largely associated with the great architect Palladio, faithfully reproduced the class structures and divisions of northern

Italy in the 16th century. This was the first book to systematically connect a building type and the work of an acknowledged iconic architect to the hegemonic function of architecture for capitalist society.[4] The provenance of the book is an interesting story in its own right. In his foreword, O. K. Werckmeister points out that it was written by two Berlin graduate students in the context of the events of 1968, so it was understandable that an analysis of the villa as a reactionary phenomenon would be connected to Krupp's housing for workers, the Nazi ideology of blood and soil, Heidegger's Black Forest blockhouse, notions of sense of place, and, eventually, to the city penthouse. An introductory essay by David Craven (one of the translators) asks why it took 22 years for this book to be available in English. The answer is a combination of a generally conservative art world rarely open to any critique of Western art, and ignorance in the English-speaking world of the work of post-1968 German art historians. The book is located as part of an emerging Marxist culture critique, specifically the New Art History being developed at the time by Raymond Williams, Terry Eagleton, and T. J. Clark in Europe and James Ackerman in the United States.

B&M start with a discussion around the dream of the countryside,[5] specifically the flight of the bourgeoisie from Venice in the 16th century, and the fact that the economic crisis of 1530–40 coincided with the emergence of the Palladian villa. As mercantile shipping declined and grain and other imports dried up, Venice was forced back on its hinterland, *Terraferma*, and the authorities began to plan their new agrarian economy, with the urban unemployed providing the labour force. The old *Terraferma* feudal class was displaced by a new bourgeoisie of landowners from Venice who settled the countryside and idealized agriculture, thereby creating the economic and ideological foundations of *Villeggiatura* (the country seat). Official aid from the Senate in Venice helped these new settlers from the city to reclaim marshy land, facilitated by advances in hydraulic engineering. Over time, these new landowners built manorial estates and became the new Venetian nobility, with its own rural working class. Palladio derived the ideal geometry of his villas from music theory and Pythagorean arithmetical proportions. This is reflected in the dimensions of the rooms, their decoration, and their extravagant door and window frames. In these ways, rigorous adherence to the conception of the classical idea of order provided an aesthetic rationalization for the irrational social order in the countryside. B&M argue, in apparent revision of Marxist aesthetic theory, that Palladio was both regressive and progressive:

> The attempt to combine this 'illusory utopia' and reality in the same equation so as to establish the 'negative utopia' would appear to have succeeded in the Palladian villa. The other side of the equation is the high artistic quality of these villas, a quality that no sociological method is able to address fully. *This, indeed, was the paradox of the Palladian villa, as Goethe himself rightly felt: Its 'lie' operated by means of its artistic truth; its 'truth' resided in its social lie*. (1992: 93, italics in the original)

The upshot of this argument is that where walls and towers have to defend ideas rather than territory, architecture as a form of ideological hegemony replaces the castle with the residential villa.[6] Thus, 'politics as a work of art, the work of art as an expression of politics, or hegemony as stylistic phenomena, the phenomena of style as hegemony' (B&M 1992: 110).[7] This explains why the villa can be interpreted as a reactionary phenomenon. B&M echo the radical critique that conventional art history, which privileges art for art's sake, is a dead end. 'This initially emancipatory stance protesting late bourgeois society and its models for aesthetic legitimation simply leads to resignation . . . which ends up in the pocket of the bourgeois culture industry' (125). This tendency can also be seen in modern urbanization, the theory of garden cities, satellite towns, and city penthouses, all sharing the same roots as the villa, all embodying the flight from the city. Parasitic on cities, these developments do not destroy cities but hollow them out. 'The penthouse can be ascribed to a special moment of class-based cunning' (136).

A bare summary such as this cannot do justice to the substantive and theoretical richness of B&M's book (even in translation), but its relevance to the study of iconic architecture and capitalist globalization is, for me, profound. It demonstrates the significance of the idea that art in general and architectural forms in particular can act as hegemonic forces and provide a metatheoretical framework for the analysis of iconic architecture in the era of capitalist globalization. Armando Hart Davalos, former Cuban Minister of Culture, argues: 'To confuse art and politics is a political mistake. To separate art and politics is another mistake' (quoted in Craven 1992: 77). The subtlety of B&M's account of how the design of the villa reproduces class interests provides a model for the symbolic/aesthetic significance of iconic architecture. It is true that the officially sanctioned high artistic quality of Palladian villas is something that no sociological method is able to address fully, though this does not mean that there is no place for sociological method in the explanation of how aesthetics work in class terms. The fact that sociologists tend to write about taste rather than aesthetics does not suggest that aesthetics are unimportant; the roots of much of the philosophy of aesthetics, after all, are to be found in thinking about taste. A viable sociological theory of aesthetics requires reflection on the social construction of taste.[8]

My view is that aesthetics cannot simply be reduced to taste, though that is certainly the aim of those propagating the culture-ideology of consumerism in the era of capitalist globalization, a position anticipated in the work of Walter Benjamin,[9] Theodor Adorno, and other theorists of the Frankfurt School. What I have labelled the Icon Project is one manifestation of this for consumerism in general, as is iconic architecture in the field of architecture and urban design in particular. The Kantian categories of universalist aesthetic judgements and beauty and ideas of the sublime appear totally arbitrary to those who have not been socialized to appreciate them or, for that matter, any idea of aesthetics at all. This is certainly the case in judgements of architectural aesthetics which are commonplace both in general conversation and in the literature of architecture (historical and contemporary), usually with little or no attempt at justification outside the realms of the personal tastes of critics wrapped up in subjective criteria.[10] For many philosophers of aesthetics and art, the idea of universalist aesthetic judgement is a contradiction in terms, attempting to reconcile the subjectivity of the emotions generated by aesthetic experience with the objectivity of universalizing rational judgements of beauty. The issues of universal judgements of beauty and superior artistic merit cannot be resolved philosophically, and sociological debates on the topic are bound to be inconclusive. However, we can sensibly research questions of why different groups of people seem to have their different aesthetic preferences, within and between class fractions, without being paralyzed by occasional or even frequent differences in actual aesthetic choices evinced by people with similar levels of education and aesthetic sophistication (whatever this convenient term actually means). In an authoritative four-part review article of the *Oxford Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, the point is made that not one of the 600 entries is actually on aesthetics per se and many entries appear to consider multidisciplinary approaches, including sociology (Silvers et al. 2000; see also Goldblatt and Paden 2011). Non-specialists should feel comfortable in this 'let a hundred flowers bloom' environment.

It is largely, though not entirely, in the power of a hegemonic class to redefine taste or aesthetics to serve its own interests.[11] My contention here is that the four fractions of the TCC, working to propagate the culture-ideology of consumerism, imbue aspirant iconic architecture with aesthetic/symbolic significance in an effort to increase profitability, directly and indirectly. Like Palladio's villas, unique architectural icons can be both regressive and progressive. Perhaps unconsciously, a popular philosopher in a book on architecture and happiness obliquely supports this view, arguing that we can escape the 'two great dogmas of aesthetics: the view that there is only one acceptable visual style or (even more implausibly) that all styles are equally valid [by invoking the mantra] . . . as many styles of beauty as there are visions of happiness' (de Botton 2007: 166). I would add that the dominant vision of happiness globally is that provided by consumerism that places possessions at the centre of our lives. In a refreshing study of aesthetics and urban design in the United States, the point is made even more bluntly: 'In the ideology of American aesthetics, it is understood that those who make taste make money, and those who make money make taste' (Rubin 1979: 360). This is now a commonplace view, and we can confidently replace 'American' with 'global' in most cases. In the era of capitalist globalization, iconic architecture plays a similar hegemonic role to that which B&M demonstrated for the villa in 16th-century Venice. In Venice and the *Villeggiatura*, the point of the villa was to reproduce the class structure of a merchant society emerging from a quasi-feudal social structure, in the symbolism and aesthetically privileged architectural form of the country seat. The point of contemporary iconic architecture is to reproduce the class structure of societies based on globalizing capitalism, still in a formal system of sovereign states, but increasingly represented as a global society of consumers, again in aesthetically privileged architectural form, though not in a singular style, as in the case of the Palladian villa. The next section investigates the role of iconic architecture in maintaining the exquisitely difficult balancing act of simultaneously consolidating the local and national identity of the citizen, on the one hand, with the transnational globalizing identity of the consumer, on the other hand.

The Icon: History and Theory of an Idea

> 'Icon. 1572. 1. An image, figure, or representation; a portrait; an illustration in a book; image in the solid; a statue. 2. Eastern Church: A representation of some sacred personage, itself regarded as sacred, and honoured with a relative worship' (adapted from the *Oxford English Dictionary*, various editions)

> on being described as an icon: 'I think that's just another word for a washed-up has-been' (Bob Dylan, 1998, in Knowles 1999)
>
> 'iconic. An incitement to spend money' (anon. 2004)[12]

What does it mean to say that a building or a space or an architect is 'iconic'? The terms 'icon' and 'iconic' are in common usage for a wide variety of cultural phenomena (Sklair and Struna 2013), and this is particularly true for those in and around architecture. While some of my respondents said they never or rarely used the terms themselves, many more offered their own definitions, for example, 'it is a combination of architectural novelty, visibility and sometimes size' [MA11]; 'the icon is a building that makes you see the world differently, both intellectually and emotionally. But iconic for architects is not the same as iconic in pop culture' [NY10]; 'iconic status comes from all the pieces in the jigsaw coming perfectly together. Architectural properties work together subconsciously so that everything is in proportion' [CA20]. Many were ambivalent, like the architect who asked me: 'Did you know that after the Eiffel Tower the second most popular site in Paris is the grave of Jim Morrison? So much for icons' [CA2].

Many architectural and urban scholars use the terms 'icon' and 'iconic' without defining them. Three examples—in the *Sage Handbook of Architectural Theory* (Crysler et al. 2012), there are at least 19 substantive uses of the terms but in no case with a definition;[13] Dodds uses the terms in his book on the Barcelona Pavilion, but he never defines them (2005: 33–39); and Soja (1996) labels a discussion on Orange County 'Iconic Emplacements' assuming we all know what it means. Distilling the cloudy waters of the literature, I suggest that the idea has two defining characteristics. First, it clearly means famous; and second, a judgement of iconicity is also a symbolic/aesthetic judgement. By this I mean that an architectural icon is imbued with a special meaning that is symbolic for a culture and/or a time, and that this special meaning has an aesthetic component and vice versa, implying a certain fluidity between these categories. The philosopher Nelson Goodman (1988) addressed the issue of 'How Buildings Mean', but this does not help us much to understand 'what buildings mean'—a distinction Lawrence Vale (2008: 3–7) explains with admirable clarity with respect to the Lincoln Memorial. Both the 'what' and the 'how' questions are important in explaining architectural iconicity.

There is no singular architectural aesthetic embodied in the architectural icon in the era of capitalist globalization, unlike the styles of previous and to some extent co-existing architectural movements. Iconic architecture is not an architectural style as such, though it shares some of the elements of a style, especially in terms of recognition. In an informative little book, Jeremy Melvin (2005) identifies over 50 architectural styles (he terms them 'isms') organized in five historical periods illustrated with what may be taken as his choice of the uniquely iconic examples of each style. Intriguingly, the book is published by Iqon Editions. In my formulation, it is the unique combination of fame and symbolic/aesthetic significance that creates and sustains the icon. This constitutes my working definition and in what follows when the terms 'architecture' and 'architect' are used it is the iconic that is meant, unless noted otherwise. I deliberately sidestep Pevsner's famous distinction between building and architecture. My less Manichean argument is that there is building, architecture produced by architects, and two types of iconic architecture (unique and typical). Almost anything can be considered iconic by someone, somewhere, sometime. The debates over iconicity in semiotics are peripheral to my argument.

The idea of the icon comes to us with considerable historical baggage though it has attracted little discussion in the social sciences. So, it is necessary to sketch out the history of the idea and show how it fits into the theory and practice of capitalist globalization. However, I must first dispose of an important epistemological question. There is much controversy over the argument that contemporary life is entirely a matter of image and spectacle, a key component of the postmodern turn in cultural theory (Debord [1967] 1995; Harvey 1989b: ch. 4; Lu 2008; Vidler 2008). The importance of drawings, photography, and digital technology in establishing the status of buildings or spaces is widely discussed (Lampugnani 1982; Colomina 1994; Schumacher 1998; Rattenbury 2002). While in no way minimizing the centrality of the image in the production and iteration of iconicity, neglecting what the image is an image of is to misunderstand this centrality entirely. The best analogy is with advertising. The images of advertising may have symbolic/aesthetic qualities whether or not they persuade people to buy the products they represent, but from the point of view of those who drive capitalist globalization the point of advertising is to sell products. If symbolism and aesthetics, for example, figurative or cubist or surrealist or abstract expressionist images, help to sell the product that is fine, but the image serves the circuit of capital and with few exceptions has little independent existence outside this circuit. It certainly does not displace or replace the circuit of capital.[14] Similarly, the point of the images of iconic architecture is to persuade people to buy (both in the sense of 'purchase' and in the sense of 'give credence to') the buildings and spaces and lifestyles and in some cases the architects they represent. Thus, although the images of iconic architecture can be great art, they are not the things they are images of.[15] While, as one architect put it, 'simple iconic images have always drawn the imagination of the people' [MA1], iconicity is not simply a question of image or, by implication, fashion. Iconicity works and persists because the buildings in which it inheres are built by architects and teams of others to symbolize something (possibly several things) and to express aesthetic values, apart from the programme (functions) of the building itself. Under the new conditions of capitalist globalization, the nature and scale of the fame of icons and what they symbolize and express has been transformed by corporate consumerist interests in a historically unprecedented way.

The relation between image and reality is as complex as we wish to make it. Schumacher (1998: 7) argues, 'The worst offence of architectural photography, however, is its ability to make terrible buildings look good . . . photographing a building out of context truly tells a lie', but this begs the question of what, exactly, the 'true' context is. Over half of my respondents brought up this topic. Two examples: 'Kettlestone Manor near Derby, with the front view of the water and the sunny vista. This is the iconic view, not the back door view. So iconic is really the favourite view' [NY20], and 'there is a close relationship between buildings and other media that represent them, so [it is] less iconic buildings than iconic view of a particular building' [MA15] (see also Rattenbury 2002: 57–90 and *passim*).

The images people see of buildings and spaces often do not prepare them for the emotional (in some cases described as spiritual) impact of direct experience. A notable example of a building that has become a frequent object of architectural pilgrimage is Le Corbusier's church at Ronchamp—James Stirling famously had contradictory impressions (Crinson 2010: 57–64). Four of my respondents provided evidence for such responses to iconic buildings. 'At Ronchamp, I had a visceral body reaction, I could not stay, it was too emotional, so I went back the next day' [MA 14]. And at another point on the emotional spectrum: 'I knew Asplund's Law Courts in Gothenburg well from publications, but there is so much more in reality' [UK2]. Others report buildings that do not live up to their image: 'Maybe the house [Case Study House #22 in Los Angeles] is not iconic, but the image definitely is iconic' [CA3]; 'pre-publicity means that most architects who go on pilgrimages to see publicized iconic buildings tend to be disappointed. The idea and representation of these buildings are much better than the physical building' [NY13].[16]

As the citation from the *Oxford English Dictionary* at the beginning of this section makes clear that an icon originally meant a representation. In the Christian tradition, the Eastern Church turned the icon into a representation of some sacred personage, an object of veneration. Iconic in the history of art was applied to the ancient portrait statues of victorious athletes and to memorial statues and busts, so the labelling of sports celebrities as icons today does have classical origins. Iconography and iconology became branches of knowledge dealing with representational art. Ernst Gombrich (1972: 124) explains how the icon is bound up with representation, symbolism, and expression: 'These three ordinary functions of images may be present in one concrete image—a motif in a painting by Hieronymus Bosch may *represent* a broken vessel, *symbolize* the sin of gluttony and *express* an unconscious sexual fantasy.'

The icon as representation has some pedigree in architectural theory. Geoffrey Broadbent (1973), for example, distinguishes four approaches to design, namely the pragmatic, iconic, canonical, and analogical.[17] Broadbent takes iconic to mean copying, and this survives in some architecture schools. In a university-based Internet debate in 2003 iconic design in architecture was defined in the following terms: 'a culture has a fixed image of what an object should be like and . . . subsequent generations of that culture keep on building that object in the same way and with the same shape' (http://www.archnet.org/forum). This topic produced six pages of discussion. However, about two weeks later, 'Why are famous architects famous?' produced 98 pages, suggesting that architecture students are more interested in how architects become iconic than how buildings become iconic (probably still true). This is certainly related to consumerism and the cult of celebrity that accompanies it. ArchNet is a forum organized at MIT for those specifically interested in Islamic architecture and the responses reflected this. One participant identified the icon as a stereotype, as when the word 'mosque' brings up the image of the dome and the minar and all domes and minars look more or less alike (typical icon). Similarly, this participant continues, architecture itself could provide an icon for a culture as the Statue of Liberty became for the United States, Sydney Opera House for Australia, and Mies van der Rohe's reconstructed Barcelona Pavilion (from 1928) for the new post-war Germany.[18] This point stimulated lively debate. It is obvious that if an icon is a type, then it cannot also be something unique as in the examples cited. Within architecture, the iconic has often meant the ordinary, fixed, and constantly repeated—Bob Dylan's 'washed-up has-been'. This sense of iconic recaptures the original meaning, albeit cynically, of the 'Palladian' villa or the mosque or gothic cathedral or even office block that is simply a copy of some archetype of the villa, mosque, cathedral, or office block, because it looks like what it is supposed to be (figure 1.1).[19]

However, contemporary usage usually involves the opposite. For example, when Will Alsop (an architect who has had his own TV programmes in Britain) won the prestigious competition to design the £225m (c. $400m) Fourth Grace project in Liverpool in 2002, his scheme was voted the least popular of a star-studded shortlist in a poll of 15,000 Liverpudlians, well behind Fosters[20] and Richard Rogers. A spokesman for Alsop Architects commented: 'If you propose any icon the instant response is negative because it challenges perception: it is the nature of an icon. None of the other schemes were icons. They were landmarks.' David Dunster, Liverpool University's head of architecture, supported Alsop, saying that most of the other proposals 'were simply repeating things we had seen before and were trying to pass them off on Liverpool' (*BD* 13 December 2002). By summer

Figure 1.1. Palladian-type villa and mosque-type minaret, Regents Park canal, London.

2004, it was announced that funding had been cancelled for the Fourth Grace and other 'iconic' projects by Libeskind and others, leading *BD* (23 April 2004) to ask on its front page (somewhat prematurely): 'End of the iconic age?' (see also Jencks 2005: 144–55; and Jones 2011: ch. 6). Since then, 'the end of the iconic age' has been regularly announced. This repetitive representational sense recalls both the typical icon and the more mundane, even if loved, landmark (Lynch 1960). So for Alsop and his supporters, the iconic means a building or a space (and perhaps even an architect) that is different and unique, recognized to be famous and to have special symbolic/aesthetic qualities—the unique icon in my terms—with the added feature that buildings can be proclaimed iconic by interested parties even before they are built, what we can label aspirant icons. Although the unique icon is clearly the pre-eminent form today, commercial benefit can also be derived from successful typical icons.[21] Perhaps there is a trace of this idea in Beatriz Colomina's analysis of how Benjamin and later Manfredo Tafuri saw authenticity and reproduction: 'The previous existence of a legitimate, original, authentic act against which any "reproduction" is at best a replica and at worst a forgery. Today, [1988] in a stage of late capitalism [I would say 'early capitalist globalization'] production and reproduction stand as two terms within a continuous cycle, their roles overlapping' (Colomina 2002: 208).

All works of art are routinely said to represent, symbolize, or express things or feelings. This is relatively understandable in terms of the visual arts, or even music or dance, in the way that a painting or a sculpture or a symphony or a ballet can represent, symbolize, or express a landscape or a family or, more abstractly, longing or sorrow or love. But how can a building or a space be said to represent, symbolize, or express anything? While the idea of hegemonic architecture proposed by B&M outlined earlier provides one answer to this question, most scholarly and media discussion of it looks elsewhere. Clearly, some buildings actually do look like other things. Frank Lloyd Wright's Guggenheim Museum in New York is commonly said to recall the spiral form in nature, in keeping with Wright's lifelong quest to create an organic architecture; Jorn Utzon's Sydney Opera House has been identified with the sails of a boat, referencing its spectacular location on Sydney Harbour, and with the segments of an orange to explain the solution to an engineering problem; Frank Gehry's Guggenheim Bilbao is said to conjure up images of fish scales recalling the story that his grandmother used to put fish in the bathtub; and Fosters' Swiss Re in London (the Gherkin) is one of the latest phallic representations[22] in a long line of tall buildings. This is because, in some sense, all these buildings actually do look like real or stylized versions of what they are said to look like. We find a rather extreme expression of this in a description of an aspiring icon in China: 'The outstanding aesthetic feature of the Canton Tower is its open steel lattice structure, which has a shape modelled on a female torso with a slender waist, shoulders twisted and turned in relation to the feet, gently leaning in the wind and quickly earned the nickname "the Supermodel". . . . In addition, it functions as a major tourist and entertainment centre' (Schittich and Brensing 2013: 92).[23]

In *Learning from Las Vegas*, Robert Venturi et al. (1977: Part II) famously divided all buildings into 'ducks' and 'decorated sheds'. Ducks, after a drive-in on Long Island in the shape of a duck, are a kind of 'building-becoming-sculpture' where all the architectural systems are 'submerged and distorted by an overall symbolic form'; decorated sheds are buildings where 'systems of space and structure are directly at the service of the program [the functions that the building is intended to perform] and ornament is applied independently of them' (Venturi et al. 1977: 87). For example, Chartres cathedral is a duck (though, confusingly, it is also said to be a decorated shed) and Palazzo Farnese in Rome is a decorated shed. It is easy to dismiss this distinction as a piece of whimsy in a book on the architectural qualities of Las Vegas (perish the thought), but there are at least two good reasons to take it seriously. First, the work of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown (VSB) has been very influential on the thinking of those in and around architecture, not only postmodernists, who fight for the contextualization of buildings, spaces, and architects themselves against the high art canonical view of architecture (Rattenbury and Hardingham 2007).[24]

While duck and decorated shed are unpromising labels for a discussion of iconic architecture, the examples given are highly significant. Most people who read *Learning from Las Vegas* would have heard of Chartres cathedral, certainly a unique icon of the architecture of the Middle Ages and a building still revered for its symbolic/aesthetic qualities by architects and tourists from all over the world. The Palazzo Farnese, less well known outside Italy, is celebrated in architectural history as one of the great monumental palaces of the High Renaissance in Rome. When the original architect (Sangallo the Younger) died, others including Michelangelo helped to complete it. So, both of these examples are great buildings in the commonly accepted architectural sense, and it is the differences between ducks and decorated sheds and not the frivolous labels we need to focus on. The main difference is symbolism. Venturi et al. argue that 'the duck is the special building that *is* a symbol; the decorated shed is the conventional shelter that *applies* symbols' (1977: 87). They illustrate the point with pictures of the 'Long Island Duckling' and a sketch of the building with the words 'Duck' and 'Highway' and a little car from which, presumably the duck can be seen; and a picture of a typical road scene in the United States (now typical all round the world) of petrol stations and large signs advertising various products. They conclude that what is needed is more architecture of meaning, symbolism, representational societal messages (embodied in the latter), and less architecture of expression, abstraction, and abstract expressionism. A good example of this is the relatively new Staten Island Ferry Building just south of Ground Zero in Manhattan. The original architects were VSB, but they withdrew. Nevertheless, the architects who completed it (Frederic Schwartz, a local firm) obviously knew *Learning from Las Vegas*, and they produced a no-nonsense, legible, decorated shed. This can be read as a successful typical icon, it looks like a terminal, given both the decorated shed-ness of its appearance and its status in an iconic location. And, despite the fact that the ferry ride is free, this local icon has substantial value for the tourist trade.

The duck-decorated shed distinction suggests ways of seeing why a few buildings, at least, become iconic under different social systems while the vast majority of buildings do not, as well as suggesting different types of iconicity. If some buildings are both ducks and decorated sheds, we can argue that iconicity may be a way of celebrating special buildings through what they are agreed to symbolize or express. Gombrich (1972: 21) argues that 'iconology must start with a study of institutions rather than with a study of symbols', and though his field of scholarly interest was Renaissance art and architecture, his conviction is just as relevant for contemporary iconic architecture in the era of capitalist globalization. Whereas successful typical icons, like some landmarks, do raise questions about symbolism and expression, unique icons also raise them in different, special, and unique ways. To find these qualities, we must, as Gombrich suggests, start with a study of institutions rather than with a study of symbols, in this case with the institutions of capitalist globalization.

So, there is clearly a good deal of ambiguity if not confusion about the use of the term 'iconic' in and around architecture. For the moment, I want to file away the typical icon[25] and focus on the unique icon that is much more common in discussions of architecture today. The institutional structures that dominate the times and places and audiences of buildings, spaces, and architects make them famous and provide the explanations for their iconicity that symbolic/aesthetic qualities on their own cannot entirely furnish. However, under conditions of capitalist globalization unless these qualities are acceptable to the TCC, it is unlikely though not impossible that large-scale unique architectural icons could be built, given the financial risks involved.

Most of the buildings commonly said to have iconic status are monumental in scale, but this is not a defining characteristic. Certainly, since the last quarter of the 20th century with the invention of new technologies of architectural glass, translucency was a frequent feature of iconic buildings, but it is certainly not a defining feature of iconicity. Nevertheless, as we shall see in subsequent chapters—glass and transparency—a great deal of glass but less genuine transparency, are often important components in the creation of consumerist spaces in iconic buildings in my extended meaning of the term.

The phenomenon of the iconic architect further complicates the issue. Where an architect becomes iconic for a particular building and then makes more buildings that resemble the original icon, this may well be considered repetitive, and so the conferring of iconic status on the subsequent buildings may also confuse typical icons and unique icons. Indeed, such circumstances have been taken to be grounds for rejecting the value of iconicity itself. This calls into question the merits of those who have come to be labelled signature architects, namely architects whose unique signatures, in the sense of recognizable features, are on their buildings. The principals of Foreign Office Architects (FOA), a booming London-based transnational practice, have claimed that with 'iconic architecture . . . Gehry is peppering the world with Bilbao Guggenheim lookalikes and if you've seen one building by Calatrava or Meier, you've seen them all' (quoted in *The Guardian*, 17 November 2003). This would carry more conviction if FOA had not won some prestigious projects and competed unsuccessfully for other major iconic projects. There was no rebuttal from the firm when an FOA project was described as 'iconic'.[26]

The discursive strategy of applying the law of diminishing returns to iconic architects begs the question of what it means to say that an architect is iconic. Certainly a select group of architects throughout history are now being described in this way. But the problem is to explain why, when iconicity is ascribed to one or two buildings of some architects, iconicity starts to spread to all their buildings, past, present, and future. For example, Le Corbusier is definitely considered to be iconic by those in and around architecture today, even for his early and at the time not much noticed buildings, including those that exist only on paper. As the blurb on an enthusiastic book tells us: 'This volume explores an unbuilt yet iconic project by Le Corbusier [the Venice Hospital]' (Sarkis 2001). The French architectural historian Bruno Fayolle-Lussac at the DOCOMOMO Paris Conference in 2002[27] raises the issue of the 'overprotection of the work of Le Corbusier' with respect to his housing estate at Pessac and other sites, arguing that the publicity surrounding the centennial of his birth had the 'perverse effect' of raising their status. The architect-sociologist Philippe Boudon (1972), in what we might call a participant-observation study, shows that what the press, other architects, and the residents thought about their houses—'machines for living in' according to Corbusier—gives some support to the view that his work, in this case, had been 'overprotected'.[28]

This hints at a truly subversive idea: Could Le Corbusier, Mies, or Frank Lloyd Wright, the three undoubtedly iconic architects of the first half of the 20th century, ever design an ordinary or even bad building? This is tantamount to asking if Shakespeare could have created a bad play, Beethoven a bad symphony, Picasso a bad painting, or Bashō a bad haiku. In terms of the history of architecture, theorists and historians alike have to make aesthetic judgements and they do. Wright and Le Corbusier designed many buildings, and not all of them can be discussed in even the biggest book. The textbook by William Curtis (1996) on modern architecture, for example, reproduces images of over 800 buildings, and each one could be considered iconic in symbolic/aesthetic terms for architects. Fame is another matter. It is notable that by and large the same few works of the masters are chosen time and again for textbooks and histories.[29] It would be odd, for example, to discuss Wright without Fallingwater, Guggenheim New York, and Robie House in Chicago; Le Corbusier without Ronchamp, Unité d'Habitation, and Villa Savoye; Mies without the Seagram Building, Barcelona Pavilion, or the National Gallery in Berlin. However, in what could be called the Wright or Le Corbusier or Mies industry in the sense of what we now understand as the culture industries (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997),[30] the more iconic sites of these and other great architects the better, each making its architectural contribution to consumerism. This, then, is the defining feature of architectural iconicity under conditions of capitalist globalization, namely that buildings, spaces, and architects are iconic to the extent that they become famous and symbolize the variegated fruits of consumerism and express them symbolically and aesthetically in spaces that will encourage people to spend. This can be seen in the ever-expanding fast food and beverage outlets and small malls that are attached to many iconic buildings, ubiquitous stretching of brands as gift shops leverage more profits, hiring out spaces for commercial purposes, creating expensive programmes and events. It is important to point out that while many iconic buildings might have originally been relatively non-consumerist, in the era of capitalist globalization they are transformed in consumerist ways, notably as tourist sites. Now that the competing conceptions of iconicity that prevail in discussions of architecture have been set out, we can proceed to deconstruct unique icons in terms of three basic questions: iconic for when, iconic for whom, iconic for where.

Iconic for When

The idea that buildings and architects could be iconic emerged in the 1980s and has accelerated rapidly since then via the Internet. To my knowledge, no building or architect was ever described as such before then, though now it is common to refer to notable buildings, sites, and ruins of antiquity and subsequent cultures all over the world as iconic. One respondent echoed what appears to be a widely held view: 'Modern icons may be more temporary, they come and go. What is a unique structure of the past 50–100 years that is as powerful as the old stuff? As powerful as the Colosseum, Pisa, the Eiffel Tower. Maybe images are as powerful, but I'm not so sure about buildings' [NY14]. For my purposes, it is useful to draw a line between icons of the pre-global era (before the 1960s) and those of the global era. Before the advent of capitalist globalization most iconic architecture was driven by religious or political elites, whereas since the 1960s the dominant driver of iconic architecture has been the TCC, led by the corporate sector. The explanation for this, I suggest, lies in four key elements of what I term generic globalization. These are (1) the electronic revolution that is transforming economic, political, and cultural life all over the world, (2) postcolonialisms, (3) the creation of transnational social spaces, and (4) new forms of cosmopolitanism (Sklair 2009a). The electronic/digital revolution is the most important of these for the way architecture changed at the end of the 20th century. The other three elements will be taken up in subsequent chapters.

The emancipatory potential of generic globalization has been systematically subverted by the TCC in the interests of private profit to the detriment of the common good and the sustainability of the planet. Each of the four dimensions of generic globalization has been undermined through capitalist globalization, and each is also significant for contemporary architecture, opening up new forms of architectural expression and production, for example, through the use of new technologies and new materials. The digital revolution also creates new problems, for example, the widespread and rapid dissemination of images puts a greater premium on visual originality in architecture while at the same time making it much easier to copy, as reflected in the distinction and connections between successful typical icons and unique icons. Capitalist globalization and the culture-ideology of consumerism can accommodate both, profitably.

The Icon Project is a product of this new technological revolution. There is no doubt that the electronic revolution has transformed the practice and the reception of architecture. A very clear statement of the impact of the new technology in architecture is to be found in the research of Stephen Dobney (1995), offering overwhelming evidence of the creation of what Paolo Tombesi (2001) identified as a new international division of labour in architecture. Analyzing the evolution of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), considered by many to be the most successful corporate firm in the history of architecture, Dobney reported that in the 1950s, about 10 per cent of SOM's projects were outside the United States, in the 1970s about 20 per cent, and by the 1990s almost half of the work of the firm was in foreign countries. Supertowers, a SOM speciality, symbolize an epoch of multinationalism and global communications. 'A supertower in a developing area of the world is above all a lightning rod for investment, a hypodermic to inject capital into the economy' (Dobney 1995: 10). More recently, Canton TV Tower in China by Arup was marketed as 'a means to broadcast a message of economic prosperity out into the world . . . harmonious fusion of architecture, structure and symbolism' (Schittich and Brensing 2013: 90).

This experience is common for most of the big architecture firms, and even more common for the production of iconic architecture. At first, computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM), and now advanced digital technology has facilitated qualitatively new patterns of architectural production and communication and ensured their rapid, relatively inexpensive dissemination all over the world.[31] Long-distance relationships between design offices in the First World and low-cost local architects occupying low-cost office space in the Third World are now common. Tombesi (2001: 173) reports that in the United States the transfer of architectural firms' drawings electronically rose from 35 to 83 per cent between 1996 and 1999 (probably almost 100 per cent today transnationally). Not only does digital technology make it possible to build previously unbuildable designs, but these designs can be sent anywhere instantaneously. In a case study of how this has impacted on Indian architecture, Tombesi et al. (2003) show that this has benefited the globalizing commercial as opposed to the domestic traditional segments of the industry, as predicted by the class polarization hypothesis which draws attention to large increases in the numbers of the very rich all over the world and the huge gaps between the very rich, groups in the middle (increasingly insecure), and the poor (Sklair 2002: esp. 48–53).

The use of computers in the design and manufacture of extraordinary buildings began with the Sydney Opera House, the first architectural icon of the global era. The tortuous construction process lasted from 1957 to 1973, surviving the resignation of the architect Jorn Utzon in 1966. Messent (1997: 509) tells us: 'The Opera House could not have been built without computers. If the project had been attempted ten years earlier it simply could not have been done in the way it was because the computers were not available to process the vast quantities of data involved in the structural analysis of the [roof] shells.' A booklet published in 1971 by the Opera House Trust estimated that the calculations carried out on these primitive computers would have taken 1,000 mathematicians more than 100 years to complete. Other notable more recent examples include Fosters Gherkin and Great Court in the British Museum (Sudjic 2010); and Gehry's Guggenheim Bilbao museum and Disney Concert Hall in Los Angeles (Stungo 1999). Gehry (or rather his computer technician Jim Glymph) famously adapted the Computer Aided Three-Dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA) software developed by the French aerospace company Dassault Systèmes (Friedman 1999: 15–17), initially for a monumental fish sculpture for the Barcelona Olympics in 1992. Figures 1.2–1.4 illustrate three of these unique global architectural icons.

With the rise of consumerism and demand for luxury homes, office blocks, and multi-star hotels in the 1990s 'fully computerised new firms rose to industry leadership as exclusive purveyors in India of the latest in fashionable architectural imagery worldwide' (Tombesi et al. 2003: 83). Iconic architecture was increasingly used in more deliberate ways to transform the built environment, particularly in globalizing cities. In his survey of the significance

Figure 1.2. Sydney Opera House.

Figure 1.3. Guggenheim Bilbao. (© Michele Nastasi)

Figure 1.4. The Gherkin.

of digital-based design, Hight (2012: 414) vividly sums up this revolution: 'The emergence of the World Wide Web in the early 1990s may indeed mark a threshold condition in the history of architecture. . . . An architect from 1580 could use the equipment from 1980 with little adaptation to his [*sic*] manner of working . . . [not so when] confronted with the interface for parametric software.' The next step appears to be focused around Building Information Modelling (BIM), heavily promoted by governments, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States. Gehry Technologies offers BIM technology as the latest quality management system in a line that goes back to ISO 9001.[32] An architect who worked on an iconic project in Hong Kong in the 1980s argued that ISO 9001 had changed architecture and does not encourage creativity. The consequent speed-up of construction 'leads to corruption as architects cut fees under competitive pressures. No-one makes any money from building, only from litigation over changes to specifications' [HK1]. Another architect commented that 'the new technology tends to privilege larger and richer firms' [UK4].

Analytically, the four faces of generic globalization could possibly have resulted in a variety of architectural (as well as economic and political) expressions. Given that generic globalization emerged in a world that was already dominated by the capitalist mode of production, it was most likely that the emancipatory potential of generic globalization would be undermined in the era of capitalist globalization. In the 1960s Mao Zedong in China argued that Soviet Communism was just an ideological smoke screen for capitalist-roaders and by 1979, the post-Mao new open door economic policy indicated that China was itself embarking on the construction of a market economy with, it was claimed, socialist characteristics. So, there was little chance that architecture anywhere would escape the constraints of the capitalist global marketplace, notwithstanding the fact that consumerism superficially turns these constraints into promises of limitless consumer choice. As the population of the planet began to swing decisively from rural to urban during the 20th century, the choices that capitalist consumerism offered led, paradoxically, to cities all over the world losing many of their distinctive architectural features and becoming more uniform. This, of course, did not happen by itself. It was planned, driven, and financed in the main from mid-century by an embryonic TCC and its local affiliates, particularly globalizing politicians and bureaucrats operating through a variety of urban growth coalitions.

While the Icon Project is a product of the era of capitalist globalization, its remit reaches as far back as there are notable buildings.[33] There is a surprisingly close consensus about what buildings and spaces constitute the major historical global icons for both professionals and the lay public today, as any history of architecture will confirm. They tend to be monumental buildings that have survived the ravages of time in more or less recognizable form. Only one of my respondents questioned the idea of global iconicity: 'There are no great buildings that can be appreciated across cultures, but maybe there will be in the future as global networks become thicker and more pervasive' [CA5].

The typical list of global icons will include the Egyptian Pyramids and the Sphinx of Giza (these, of course, are the names of building and sculptural types as well as specific icons),[34] as well as the Pantheon and Coliseum in Rome,[35] the Acropolis/Parthenon in Athens, the Taj Mahal, the Great Wall of China and the Forbidden City, Machu Picchu, major mosques of the Islamic world, and gothic cathedrals. Architects, teachers, and critics (and probably advertising and marketing executives as well) spend endless hours trying to answer questions about what makes great buildings great, what makes famous buildings famous, and the nature of the connections between famous and great. What keeps these places famous, leaving aside the question of what keeps them great, is clearly publicity of various types, and ample evidence for this statement will be found in the travel guides and promotional literature of the places where these icons sit. Tourist consumerism, now enhanced by cyber-tourism,[36] ensures that the pool of these historical icons is continually being enlarged—Vale (1999) calls them 'mediated monuments'.[37]

Historically, most national icons start their careers as local icons in capital cities and those cities where holders of economic, political, and culture-ideology power are or were based. Most commonly cited national icons predate the 20th century, and many attempts to build new national icons since then appear to have failed, for example, the belated World War II memorial in Washington and the Millennium Dome in London,[38] though a case could be made for Maya Lin's controversial Vietnam Memorial Wall (Griswold 1986). The truly iconic buildings of the 20th century in most countries today in terms of fame and symbolic/aesthetic appeal to architects and public alike are more likely to be corporate and/or consumerist, for example, the Empire State and Chrysler Buildings in New York (from the 1930s); Lloyd's, the Gherkin, and the Shard in London; the Louvre Pyramids and the Pompidou Centre in Paris; HSBC and Bank of China in Hong Kong; Jin Mao Tower in Shanghai, and the Bird's Nest Olympic Stadium in Beijing.

The advent of modernist architecture at the end of the 19th century and its variants since then have challenged ideas on what constitutes iconic architecture today. This is partly a consequence of the fact that contemporary iconic architecture is now corporate to an extent that is historically unprecedented. While there is little controversy over historical icons, it is common for contemporary buildings that one group considers iconic, in the positive sense, to be considered hideous by other groups. This is embodied in the skyscrapers that proclaim the wealth and power of major transnational corporations, be they banks, manufacturers of consumer goods and services, or, as is often the case, the headquarters of corporations that most people know very little about. For example, Swiss Re, the original main client of the Gherkin in London was hardly a household name (ownership has changed since then). In addition, there are many iconic buildings and spaces—notably shopping malls, cultural centres, and theme parks—that are corporate but not always identified with a specific corporation.

There were, of course, corporate icons before 1960 and religious and political icons after 1960. Brasilia, the manufactured capital of Brazil and a city of iconic architecture, was certainly inspired and built by those in control of the state in the 1960s. However, as Holston (1989) argues, the corporate sector, domestic and foreign, was deeply implicated in the creation of this modernist city despite the statist egalitarian rhetoric of its founders. Subsequent theories of the hundred-mile city, edge city, and so on, suggest that the state (local or national) is increasingly powerless to direct urban planning in any meaningful sense under the conditions of capitalist globalization. Globalizing politicians and officials, professionals, and consumerist elites help to create successful consumerist icons within cities today as long as they do this within the framework set by the corporate sector. The TCC facilitates the production of iconic architecture in the same way and for the same purposes as it does all cultural icons, by incorporating creative artists to construct meanings from beautiful and impressive forms and effectively represent its power in order to maximize commercial benefits for the capitalist class.[39] In these ways, the built environment powerfully reinforces systems of values, and choices of what buildings and spaces become iconic are rarely arbitrary. So, while the Icon Project in architecture is of our time, its scope is conceived for all time.

Iconic for Whom

The obvious way to approach this question is to distinguish between those in and around architecture and the public at large. In what sense can a building be said to be iconic for architects but not for the public or vice versa? The easy answer, the one that bolsters professional confidence and even encourages professional snobbery, is that iconicity is simply a matter of publicity, fashion, and self-promotion by the client or the developer aided and abetted by the architect and by those who produce and market the images. As one historian put it: 'Icons for professionals depend on who has the aura at any given time' [MA6]. Case Study House #22 in Los Angeles by Pierre Koenig was famously photographed by Julius Shulman, as a result of which it 'acquired an iconic force in West Coast Modernism' (Serraino 2002: 127).[40] Pierluigi Serraino distinguishes usefully between technical (professional) and life-style (consumerist) images, using two images of this house to illustrate his point: in the first, there are no people; in the second, there are two fashionable young women, presumably enhancing the symbolic/aesthetic significance of the building and filling in the consumerist life-style content (figure 1.5).



Figure 1.5. Case Study House #22.

This is taken further by Hélène Lipstadt in her study of Eero Saarinen's St. Louis Arch, where she distinguishes between the canonic and the iconic. She points out that '*icon* means one category of things to semioticians, another to software designers, and a third to historians of religious icons' (Lipstadt 2001: 6). The canonic in architecture she defines in terms of what the well-educated architect values most highly, while 'iconic stature is conferred by communities of non-architects . . . iconic buildings are characteristically common and ordinary, and . . . canonic buildings are unique and rare' (11). My findings tell a different story. Documentary sources as well as interviews show that architects, as well as critics, scholars, and others who are professionally involved with architecture, routinely use the term 'iconic' to emphasize the special status of their objects of esteem, often appearing to conflate canonic and iconic. Hundreds of examples accessed from the publications of architects and their websites, architectural historians, and writers on architecture in the mass and professional media prove this point. Anyone interested in following these up is welcome to search 'iconic architecture' on the Internet. In summer 2015, the website of the London-based *Architects Journal* found 1,757 articles that used the term 'icon', and Google found over 4 million results. Even factoring in duplicates and vilifications, there is no doubt that many 'well-educated architects' use the term 'iconic' to describe what Lipstadt calls canonic (and some use the terms interchangeably).[41] She goes on to argue that if her distinction between canonic and iconic is viable, then Bourdieu's theory of taste can be helpful for the sociological study of architecture. Again, I would argue that this is not supported by the available evidence. For example, the Principal of the Chandigarh College of Architecture had no hesitation in calling Le Corbusier's Chandigarh 'an icon of modern architecture' (*The Tribune*, 7 October 2003). Around 2005 the Architecture School in Palermo (Buenos Aires) taught the Great Buildings Perspective as a fundamental method for researching and learning about architecture through study of two 'iconic houses', Palladio's Villa Rotonda and Le Corbusier's Villa Savoye: 'beyond dispute as masterworks for historians, theoreticians, tourists, critics and aficionados of architecture alike' (website no longer available), clearly iconic for both professionals and public. The Bartlett School in the University of London has done something similar, as do many other architecture schools around the world. The website of the Mies Society at the Illinois Institute of Technology proclaimed that 'IIT's main campus is one of the masterworks of iconic architecture'.

Building Design (*BD*) frequently uses the term in this clearly positive sense. For example, 'Architect Colin St. John Wilson will tell the governments of Russia and Finland today why an iconic Alvar Aalto building in Russia must be restored' (28 March 2003). At the DOCOMOMO conference (see note 27) in 2002 Edwin Brierley of Leicester School of Architecture discussed 'the iconic status and historical significance of the Leicester University Engineering Laboratory designed by Stirling and Gowan'. Few members of the lay public, even in Leicester, will have ever heard of this building though Stirling's iconic status ensures that it has been published widely in architectural magazines and books around the world.[42] It is iconic for professionals but probably not for the general public. Unsurprisingly, the evidence also appears to suggest that buildings that are iconic for those in and around architecture but not for the general public are much more likely also to be considered canonic (in Lipstadt's sense) than buildings that are iconic for the general public but not for architects.

Even more intriguing for Lipstadt's thesis is the possibility that while iconic status is conferred without help from the canon, those responsible for the canon might be constrained to confer canonic status on some publicly conferred icons. Such questions may usefully be asked about highly publicized buildings like Gehry's Guggenheim Bilbao and Disney Concert Hall, some skyscrapers in Chinese cities, and new buildings around Ground Zero in Manhattan. The first phase of my interviewing, from January to June 2004, took place in and around Los Angeles, Boston, and New York. This was a time when Gehry was very much in the news for the Guggenheim Bilbao, Disney Concert Hall in downtown Los Angeles (recently opened), and the Stata Center at MIT. While the Guggenheim Bilbao and its consequent Bilbao effect were fast being established as global phenomena, Gehry himself was subject to various forms of criticism from architects and professors. One declared, 'I am totally anti-Gehry and I hate the Stata Center' [MA8], another confessed, 'I feel a rant against Frank Gehry coming on' [NY19]. To anticipate the argument in the next chapter, Gehry provides a good example of an architect who can produce both a unique iconic building and a not entirely successful typical icon in quick succession.

Press coverage and my interviews showed that Gehry and his buildings were widely considered iconic. Gloria Koenig has written: 'It is unusual for a building to achieve status as an icon before it is built, but the Disney Concert Hall has occupied the center of attention since it left the drawing board. . . . [its sails] embody the spirit, exuberance and place that is Los Angeles' (2000: 107).[43] This was despite opposition from the people displaced from their homes in the locality and complaints of glare and overheating from condo-dwellers opposite. It should also be noted that, historically, it is common for the iconicity of buildings to arrive after initial public and also professional opposition, as was the case for the Eiffel Tower (Jencks 2005: 198ff.). Guy de Maupassant often ate there though he didn't like the food because it was the only place in Paris where he didn't have to see it (Barthes 1993: 236). Other buildings that claim global iconicity today were similarly scorned at birth, for example, the Pompidou Centre (Appleyard 1986: 221), the Sydney Opera House (Messent 1997: ch. 4), and the new Scottish Parliament (Sudjic 2005: 170–76). This may have as much to do with the qualities of the public space created as with the building itself. The front of the Pompidou Centre has a large area of public space, often turned into a veritable carnival site, but the most exciting element is the external tubes that carry visitors up and down, a sort of perpetual motion version of the spiral ramp in the Guggenheim New York. The Scottish Parliament sits on a beautiful natural site framed by hills, easily accessed from the city centre, and the building itself genuinely welcomes visitors. Both are moderately consumerist, the Pompidou more than the parliament (figures 1.6, 1.7).

Figure 1.6. Pompidou Centre.

Figure 1.7. Scottish Parliament.

While stimulating and provocative, Lipstadt's distinction between canonic and iconic is too rigid to deal with these issues. It is more useful to distinguish professional icons (the canons of various tendencies within the profession) from public icons. This opens up rather than closes down the possibility that professional icons can become public icons without losing their professional iconicity, in the sense that just because a building or a space becomes famous outside the architectural community it need not lose the qualities for which it became famous in and around architecture. For example: 'icons are created by the publicity machine, but capture the imagination' [MA7], and 'celebrity architects want to control the meanings of their buildings but the public makes its own judgements, particularly for iconic public buildings' [NY18]. While related to the distinction between unique icons and successful typical icons, the distinction between professional and public iconicity is not identical to it. The comments about 'Bilbao Guggenheim look-alikes' and 'if you've seen one building by Calatrava or Meier, you've seen them all' are patently false, ignoring, for example, the different materials used for the Bilbao Guggenheim and the Disney Concert Hall, the different scales of the Stata Center in Cambridge to both of these, and differences of site of popular icons. People who are excited by one building by Gehry or Calatrava or Meier are more likely to be stimulated to search out their other buildings than to think that they have seen them all. In the case of Calatrava, for example, he originally became famous for his bridges, but his appeal has widened since his City of Arts and Sciences in Valencia and his controversial new transportation hub at Ground Zero (figure 1.8). Like almost everything on the site, it is dubbed iconic by the authorities.[44]

The symbolism and aesthetics of unique architectural icons become relevant in terms of the corporate sanction of specific buildings and spaces, where successful crossovers from professional to public iconic status and vice versa happen. Different symbolic/aesthetic qualities may be claimed for professional in contrast to public icons, and this is what makes cases of crossover iconic buildings and spaces venerated by both professionals and members of the lay public particularly significant for questions of taste, high art, and popular culture. Two examples from my interviews illuminate the complexities of this issue: 'The Seagram is an example of a professional icon, but the public sees it as just another glass tower. But there has been an evolution in the appreciation by the lay public of architecture, especially older buildings' [NY6]; and 'For the public, an iconic building can be one that professionals consider ugly or bad. In Rotterdam and in every major



Figure 1.8. Official iconization: Calatrava at Ground Zero.

city there will be buildings loved by the public and hated by architects, for example, Blaakse Bos [nickname for the cube houses] though some architects do like them' [HL2].

This distinction between professional and public iconicity encourages us to think through the processes whereby icons move from one status to the other, the differential processes of social production of icons, and how buildings and spaces might lose as well as gain iconicity. Cutting the iconic loose from its mass public and elitist professional moorings, paradoxically, gives it a powerful explanatory potential when applied in the field of architecture. Analytically, iconicity in architecture may be seen not simply as a judgement of excellence or uniqueness but, like celebrity in popular culture (Sklair and Struna 2013), as a resource in struggles for meaning and by implication for power and profits. Thus: 'iconic: an incitement to spend money' (anon. 2004). The capacity to confer iconic status on a building, space, or architect is an important resource that the TCC can mobilize to facilitate the assimilation of the general public into the culture-ideology of consumerism, to keep people spending to maximize profits for those who own and control transnational corporations and their local affiliates. What is at stake is the future of global capitalism.

The commodification of architecture, like urban boosterism, did not spring new-born into the late 20th century. Nevertheless there is a general consensus that as capitalist globalization began to be the dominant mode of production, distribution, and exchange from about the 1960s, architectural practice also began to change. An architecture professional in New York starkly reported: 'Architects walked away from monitoring construction quality due to fears of litigation and now take less and less responsibility for what is built. Developers keep better control of costs. This is why there is no conglomerate or one-stop-shop for building. Architects are so cheap all developers have some to critique plans' [NY22]. The architect Stephen Kieran goes further: 'The emerging model of the client is that of a buyer of architectural services in a free market. . . . When a tangible image is felt to be lacking, architecture is often turned to today for an associative icon' (1987: 28). The same process was confirmed by a leading architecture professional in the United Kingdom, the deputy chair of CABE (the government-sponsored Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment) who declared that architects must bend to commercialism, feeding the market a pretence of creativity while actually not doing anything risky.[45] The context of his remarks is a discussion of the work of the 'ideas' firm ABK, who failed to win the contract for the extension of the National Gallery in London, built eventually by VSB due, it is said, to the intervention of the traditionalist coterie around Prince Charles (Rattenbury 2002: ch. 11). Noting the absence of 'iconic commercial buildings' in ABK's portfolio, the Commissioner doubted whether any firm rejecting commercialism could survive in the current climate (in *BD* 22 March 2002). The National Gallery in London, like virtually all major museums around the world, has become much more commercialized in recent decades, a theme elaborated with many more examples in chapter 7. The issue of 'iconic for whom' is important precisely because there is ongoing pressure for the answer to be 'for everyone' in general, and for discerning and affluent elites where appropriate.

Iconic for Where

While it is obvious that iconic buildings and spaces have to be located in fixed places, the geography of their iconicity is not always fixed. For example, London Bridge was taken down and reassembled in Arizona (Arnold 2004: ch. 12); Stonehenge was said originally to have been moved from Ireland to England (Ballantyne 2004: 11) and is now being redeveloped as a visitor experience; and a prospective buyer proposed moving the Mies van der Rohe–designed Farnsworth House from Illinois to Wisconsin. Architects are, of course, more mobile than their buildings. And pop-up buildings open a new era in local iconicity.

Architectural icons can have local, urban, national, or global significance and recognition, in any combination. This applies equally to professional icons, public icons, and those that have achieved iconic status in both respects. However, under the conditions of capitalist globalization and the demands of consumerism, the social relations of production of icons tend to be similar whatever the intended or eventual scale of their iconicity. This may not be the case for religious or political icons before capitalist globalization.

As noted above, while most iconic buildings and spaces are landmarks, not all landmarks are necessarily icons for professionals or the public at large. Landmarks tend to be tall in relation to their surroundings; thus there is always an element of this specific vertical materiality that is not necessary for icons, though many iconic buildings are also tall. Local icons are buildings and spaces that are well known within circumscribed areas, in neighbourhoods, cities, towns, and villages, with definite symbolic/aesthetic significance for these places.[46] They might be known to outsiders interested in these locations and some local icons in London or New York or Paris or Beijing will probably be better known than local icons in Greenock (Scotland), Rochester (New York state), Nancy (France), or Tianjin (China), for example.

Many respondents had clearly not considered the idea of local icons: 'Icon is a funny word, I think of icon as transcending the local. But probably every neighbourhood has its own' [NY9]. Another made the interesting point that local icons are becoming more important: 'Now, vernacular spaces are just as important as the grandest houses of the rich. And buildings like the National Museum at Lowell, downtown Patterson, the Tenement Museum in Manhattan, are all important. This can be explained in terms of the entry of white ethnics (Jews, Irish, Italians, and so on) into the universities and professions after World War II and raises the question: what is the stuff of history, and of architecture?' [NY21].[47] More and more frequently, we come across clear attempts in the professional media to produce iconicity at the urban level. For example (in this case, connecting the icon and the landmark), the new Metropol Parasol in Seville is described as follows: 'Civic icon, shady plaza, farmer's market, archaeological museum and belvedere: Seville's newest landmark is versatile and site-specific' (*Architecture Review*, 27 May 2011).

Reference has already been made to the St. Louis Arch (Lipstadt 2001), and another interesting case is Marcel Breuer's Pirelli building on Interstate 95 outside New Haven on the east coast of the United States. This was originally built for Armstrong Rubber in 1969 and subsequently it was taken over by IKEA, who chopped off the back of the building to make room for a car park (ironically, Breuer had been the director of the furniture department at the Weimar Bauhaus in the 1920s).[48] Not only does the building provide the 'iconic gateway' to New Haven (home of Yale University) in the sense that it is locally famous and provides a suitably impressive symbolic entrance to the city but IKEA, like Walmart, 'maintains a uniform, iconic look to their enormous storage' (according to the US national trust website). No difficulty, then, for a well-informed conservation source to mix typical icons and unique icons. The context ensures that we know what is meant. When the Hypo Center in Klagenfurt, Austria, designed by Morphosis of Santa Monica (the firm of Thom Mayne), won the AIA Honor Award in 2003, the Jury's comments explicitly connected local iconicity and city boosterism: 'The structure of the bank's headquarters announces itself as an iconic civic institution. . . . It's a great accomplishment using architecture to put this city on the map' (http://www.aia.org/media.hypo). Similarly, under the title: 'Is the Impending Demolition of Preston [England] Bus Station Justified?' *BD* (14 December 2012) featured a debate between Peter Rankin (leader of Preston Council, in favour of demolition) and Clare Price (conservation adviser at the Twentieth Century Society), who argued that it was a national icon. *BD* comments: 'The demolition of Preston Bus Station is definitely not justified. The BDP-designed building has gone from local icon to national, and indeed international, recognition—it is highlighted in the World Monuments Fund Watch List and the city would be diminished by its loss. . . . It also has strong local support: in a 2010 poll by the *Lancashire Evening Post*, it was voted Preston's favourite building.' These are all examples of the role of iconic architecture in urban growth machines and place marketing, processes that increasingly surface in many guises throughout the world and throughout this book.[49]

Urban boosterism is the most common rationale for socially produced iconic architecture in the era of capitalist globalization. Those who make money out of cities naturally want their cities to be easily recognizable for purposes of commerce, tourism, and investment, as well as civic pride.[50] And for many people there is little difference between these spheres, as Dovey (1999: ch. 11) illustrates for the case of Melbourne. Those driving urban boosterism deliberately attempt to create urban architectural icons in order to draw tourists, convention, and mega-event attendees with money to spend, and the images they project are directed to this end. This is a truly globalizing business, and the mass media and, increasingly, the Internet are full of such claims. The TelstraClear Pacific development in Manukau (Auckland) combines 'theme, iconic architecture, and functionality to showcase your event'. Numerous advertisements for luxury resort hotels in Dubai and elsewhere also promise 'iconic architecture' as one of their many, indeed one of their necessary, attractions,[51] and they can, of course, be found all over North America and Europe (Kearns and Philo 1993; Knox 2011; Derudder et al. 2012: Part III).

A prime example of the centrality of 'iconic for where' in the social production of iconicity is Renzo Piano's very tall glass tower in London, nicknamed the Shard (figure 1.9). *Architectural Review* marked its completion in 2012 with a spectrum of views from key figures in British Architecture.[52] Charles Jencks is critical but positive: 'Effective icons demand some paranoid charge'; Amanda Levete opines: 'In many ways the Shard is a one-liner, but what a line!'; Owen Hatherley warns that 'the Shard is sleek, well-made and evil'; Peter Buchanan argues 'at moments, from a few vantage points, the Shard looks marvelous . . . from other angles and closer, it is a bloated brute'; Richard (Lord) Rogers enthuses: 'The Shard is the most beautiful addition to the London skyline'; Simon Jenkins fumes: 'It was pushed as a symbol of Britain's love affair with financial bling at the turn of the 21st century, with "iconic" celebrities and the eff-you greed of arbitrage. . . . Some people find the Shard beautiful. I am sure I would in the Gulf, as I admire the Burj Khalifa'; Paul Finch observes 'like any icon, the Shard demands attention and has received it in spades'; Sir Terry Farrell recalls, 'I saw the opening-night light show and, although a mere fraction of the size, duration and synchronisation of what happens across multiple bigger towers every evening in Hong Kong at 8pm, it brought drama and spectacle to London's skyline'; Sarah Ichioka philosophizes, 'I've noted with interest how many of the Shard stories in the popular press, those shaping our collective imagination of the building, have juxtaposed the lone figure . . . against its expanse, attempts perhaps to impose some sort of human scale on

Figure 1.9. The Shard. (© Malcolm Chapman/Emporis)

its inestimable volume'; Christopher Woodward accuses: 'The new tower, similarly rudimentary in form, conveys very little except uncurbed greed'; Simon Allford globalizes: 'The Shard exists because London is a global city. . . . The Shard exists because at its best London has always embraced invention and outsiders'; and Patrik Schumacher explains: 'Before offering my critical remarks [formalism and muteness] about Renzo's Shard I would like to express my admiration for his gigantic oeuvre, and unambiguously state that I consider the Shard to be a very impressive achievement and a welcome addition to London's skyline.'

This seems to me a good cross-section of London-based architectural opinion, taking into account the likely attitudes of those in and around architecture and urban design, combining all aspects of my definition of iconic architecture—fame, symbolic/aesthetic significance. Several respondents refer explicitly to the attention already paid to the building (it was the subject of a one-hour TV documentary while it was being built and ongoing coverage in all media), and the commentators agree that, for better or worse, the Shard has already had an impact. One of London's most eminent architecture critics employs the example of the Shard to launch a stinging attack on 'iconic architecture' as a whole (Moore 2016: 317–29). Symbolically, it is seen as an instant expression of London as a global city comparable to other iconic buildings in other global cities. For some it is also an expression of corporate power and greed, bulldozed through by the rich and powerful in the face of local opposition; to others it represents the free-wheeling, innovative spirit of London and those who run and own the city. Aesthetically, it attracted a good deal of positive and negative comment. Schumacher, a partner of the late Zaha Hadid, generously concedes that his criticisms could equally well be made of their own buildings. We can, therefore, conclude that this *Architectural Review* feature represents an important stage in the iconization of the Shard by those who hate it and what it stands for as much as by those who love it and what it stands for, often evoking the symbolic/aesthetic. The worst thing that can happen to an aspirant icon is to be ignored. This, most definitely, has not happened to the Shard. Time will tell whether it will become a global icon, to rival the Gherkin and older icons that make up the London skyline. Works of fiction also provide a rich source of information on local icons. Two examples from two very different genres suffice to make the point. The first is from a classic novel of the Balkans, focusing on an iconic bridge:

> On the level space beside the Mejdan road, the new *han*, freed from its scaffolding, already stood. It was a large building, constructed of the same sort of stone of which the bridge was made. Work was still going on both inside and out, but already from a distance it could be seen how much it excelled in size, the harmony of its lines and the solidity of its construction, anything that had been built or even thought of in the town. That building of clear, yellowish stone, with its roof of dark red tiles and a row of finely carved windows, seemed to the townsmen a thing unheard of, which from now on must become an integral part of their everyday life . . . the bridge itself . . . with all its eleven arches, perfect and wondrous in its beauty, like a new and strange feature in the townsmen's eyes'. (Andrić 1995: 64)

Ivo Andrić won the Nobel Prize in 1961 and the bridge is now a UNESCO World Heritage site. In 2012 it was reported that there were controversial plans to build a historical theme park (Andrićgrad) around the bridge and to turn it into a local or national, and perhaps even a minor global, icon. A film of the book is also being planned. The second example is from a blockbuster novel about an Australian in Bombay:

> Our slum, like many others in Bombay, came into being to serve the needs of a construction site, two thirty-five-floor buildings, the World Trade Centre

> towers, being built on the shore of the Colaba Back Bay. The tradesmen, artisans, and labourers who built the towers were housed in hutments, tiny slum-dwellings, on land adjacent to the site. . . . The companies were happy enough to comply with the laws that made land and huts available because the arrangement was eminently suitable to them in other ways [control of the workforce]. . . . 'Tallest buildings in all India,' Prabaker [friend of the narrator] said with a gesture of expansive, proprietorial pride. He lived in the illegal slum, and had nothing whatsoever to do with the construction, but he boasted about the buildings as if they were his own design. (Roberts 2004: 247, 251)

Documentary and interview evidence suggests that every place has its local iconic buildings and spaces and that these contribute strongly to place marketing and the differentiation of one place from another, an important component of local identity formation (Davis and Libertun 2011). Local urban icons such as the Place Ville Marie in Montreal or the Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam or the Rotunda Tower in Birmingham, for example, enjoy local iconicity though few outside these cities would ever have heard of them or seen images of them. They are iconic for their localities, for the people who see them and use them on a regular basis. Most people are able to name such local icons, buildings, and spaces that everyone in their neighbourhood or even city would almost certainly have heard of, places where young and old would congregate, and places where people would go on special occasions. 'Every representation of Montreal featured Place Ville Marie. Now it seems a bit banal and lost among all the other skyscrapers, but in the 1960s at the time of Expo '67 it was the coolest, hip symbol of world class Montreal. It was regularly called our Rockefeller Center, or our Fifth Avenue, always as a comparison with New York and also Paris to some extent' [NY17] (see also Krinsky 1978; Paul 2004). The Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam, on the other hand, is what we might call a replacement local icon, a stage in iconic succession at the local level. From the 1960s onwards the most prominent local icon had been the Euro Space Tower, a symbol of the new Rotterdam rising from the ashes of the Second World War. Then: 'Erasmus Bridge became the new icon of Rotterdam within its first year, embraced by public, professionals and officials alike. It has replaced the 1960s Euro Space Tower which used to be on every piece of Rotterdam marketing' [HL2].[53] The image of the new bridge is found on the front of the city map that greets you at the airport or train station, on the laundry bags in local hotels, and all over the city. Designed by the prominent Dutch architect Ben van Berkel of UN

Studio the bridge opened in 1996 and was dubbed the Swan after its unusual asymmetrical pylon (figure 1.10).

The image of the Erasmus Bridge is of a sleek high-tech structure of the type generally associated with Santiago Calatrava, a new version of the modernist machine aesthetic of speed and streamlining (Wilson et al. 1986), morphed into the Nike swoosh in the era of capitalist globalization. All over the world this can be observed, as the rough outline of Calatrava's uniquely iconic bridge designs are reproduced in great numbers as typical icons for local communities (see figures 3.6 and 3.7). A different aesthetic prevailed in



Figure 1.10. Erasmus Bridge: place marketing in Rotterdam through the tourist map.

Birmingham, UK, with the first prominent round tower in the city. 'From the 1960s and 70s, when the old Bullring was demolished, the Rotunda Office Tower was built by James Roberts and it became a local icon probably because it was round. When the new Bullring plans were made public, people wanted to keep the Rotunda, so it can be seen as a loved landmark' [UK1]. Other similar local icons have been replaced by a new uniquely iconic and spectacular building, the Selfridges department store, an aspiring global icon (Sari 2004).[54] However, the Rotunda has not been entirely eclipsed locally. In 2005, it was announced that it was being reinvented as a luxury apartment block by the fashionable developers Urban Splash, whose spokesman enthused: 'It's amazing. We've been inundated before we've even done any marketing. Everyone wants to live in an icon' (*Birmingham Post*, 5 September 2005). The comparison between the newly regenerated Rotunda as a local icon and the aspiring global iconicity of Selfridges close by raises issues around class factors in iconicity.[55] These are clear in the case of luxury apartments but not so clear in Selfridges, where the desperately all-embracing grasp of consumerism is involved (figure 1.11).

Figure 1.11. Selfridges, Birmingham.

Another new building in Birmingham raises the additional issue of the transportability of iconicity. The defection in 2003 of the much-admired Ken Shuttleworth from Fosters amid rumours that he had contributed much more to the design of several iconic buildings attributed to Norman Foster than he had been given credit for, is a case in point. Shuttleworth's new building, The Cube, marketed as 'Birmingham's iconic landmark,' is promoted as an urban icon in his home town. With reference to the Gherkin and Hong Kong's Chek Lap Kok airport, Shuttleworth's 'world class portfolio' morphs from Fosters to his own firm MAKE, and The Cube fits perfectly into the orbit of consumerism: 'a world-class destination standing tall across the city's skyline. The outstanding 25-storey structure houses an impressive mix of prime office, retail and restaurant spaces, aspirational apartments, a boutique hotel, exclusive canal side restaurants, skyline champagne bar, luxury spa facilities, and the UK's largest automated car park'.[56]

Can we generalize about what distinguishes local icons from all the other buildings and spaces in a neighbourhood or a city? The idea of the landmark is well developed in urban theory, especially in the work of Lynch (1960). As remarked earlier, landmarks in general stand out and up, and the designation of landmark often has local historical significance, for example, war memorials and clock towers. On the other hand, icons need not physically stand out or up (in the Rotterdam example a tall spire was replaced by a relatively low-lying bridge), but they must have some institutionally sanctioned symbolic/aesthetic significance to be iconic at any level. This is what makes sense of their perceived symbolic/aesthetic qualities, what makes them famous and thus iconic in the local context. In the global era, these processes tend to be driven by the corporate sector, whether or not specific buildings and spaces are sponsored by the state or the private sector or, as is increasingly the case, public-private partnerships of various types, but they always have to be commercially attractive. It is obvious that the business of business is business, less obvious that the business of the state is often driven by corporate and political fractions of the TCC, in urban planning as elsewhere.[57]

National icons historically have tended to be buildings and spaces constructed by the state or religious institutions, usually characterized by great legibility in terms of their monumentality and representational sculptural features.[58] There is now a considerable literature on architecture and power that investigates how buildings and spaces express power relations and how the ordinary citizen or believer can read off political and religious messages from these icons. The iconic architecture of powerful states (including states that have once been powerful but are no longer) frequently crosses borders and the theme of architecture and imperialism has attracted a good deal of scholarly attention. Hirst (2005) provides a wide-ranging reflection on these issues. Buildings and spaces created by state and religious bodies continue to be built, of course, and the study of iconic architecture and capitalist globalization raises questions about whether the processes of iconicity that pre-dated the global era carried over into the global era and persist today. Carol Krinsky, writing about the Rockefeller Center in Manhattan, makes this point as follows:

> For a city to be coherent to its inhabitants and visitors, it needs certain reference points which shape the neighborhoods and mark one's progress around the town. A single tower may suffice, but a clearly definable group of buildings distinct from their neighbors but not totally distinct from them, will provide orientation for a far larger area. Cathedrals and their precincts used to provide the main reference points of this kind. In the modern world it is our office buildings that attract and inspire through their dramatic height, unusual size, or public amenities. (1978: 11)

My only criticism of this statement is that it is not only office buildings, but quite a wide variety of other building types that can 'attract and inspire' in the age of capitalist globalization and that this can be at least partly explained by the new construction possibilities offered by the electronic revolution.

Are there any genuinely global icons? Under the title 'Foster's Swiss Re is World's Most Admired Building' *BD* (9 December 2005) reported the findings of a poll of the world's 200 largest architect firms. The Gherkin was the only 21st-century building and the only British building also named by international architects in their 10 best buildings of all time. The Sydney Opera House was top, followed by the Guggenheim Bilbao, plus some early 20th-century classics (Wright's Fallingwater and Mies's Barcelona pavilion). Such polls are a frequent occurrence in the world of architecture, indeed in many cultural spheres, and are a suggestive if not always definitive indication of how professionals evaluate buildings.

In the aftermath of 9/11 there was a good deal of commentary on what the loss of the Twin Towers meant that is relevant to the question of global icons. An article in the *Dallas Morning News* (18 September 2001) by David Dillon sums up the issues well: 'Iconic buildings tell us where we are, at a glance. The Eiffel Tower, Sydney Opera House, the Gateway [St. Louis]

Arch, the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Typically, they are large and exhibitionistic so that even a partial glimpse is enough to fix our visual and emotional compass. And when they disappear, a psychological gap appears, as if our memories have suddenly failed and we've become disoriented.' One New York architect expressed this strongly: 'The Twin Towers located you in the city, they anchored Manhattan, they were the poster child of iconic buildings' [NY3]. In his chapter 'Walking in the City' the theorist of everyday life Michel de Certeau begins with the view from the 110th floor of the World Trade Center: 'the most monumental figure of Western urban development' (1984: 93; see also Sorkin and Zukin 2002: vii). However, some of my respondents made the case that the Twin Towers became iconic only after 9/11, for example: 'Al Qaeda understood iconography brilliantly. It was not the destruction of the building that was so important but the images of the destruction of it, the semiotics, that had such an effect' [CA3]; and 'the absence of the World Trade Center is more interesting than its presence' [NY1].

The idea that global icons must be tall is very common and connects the discussion of iconicity with that of monumentality, skylines, and what Thomas van Leeuwen (1988) terms 'the skyward trend of thought'. The urban informatics firm Emporis measured the 100 'most impactful skylines' for 2015 by total numbers of floors, making interesting reading. Hong Kong tops the list, New York is second, followed by Singapore, Moscow, Seoul, Dubai, Chicago, Shanghai, São Paulo, and Bangkok—Tokyo was 11th, Shenzhen 15th , London 44th , and Paris 66th (http://www.emporis.com/statistics/skyline-ranking). Recognition of the outline of a building, especially in a skyline, is one of the most popular signifiers of iconicity for the Icon Project. An amusing and not uncommon example of this is the effectively primitive iconography of the Manhattan skyline on humble shop fronts in rapidly gentrifying areas in many cities.

Buildings and spaces that have been used in establishing shots or foregrounded in globally successful films and TV shows are almost guaranteed a type of public iconic status today, though this does not mean that members of the public who recognize the buildings can name either them or their architects. How many people outside Miami who have seen *Miami Vice* know the name of the Atlantis Building or have heard of the architects Arquitectonica? How many outside Los Angeles who have seen *Blade Runner* know the name of the Bradbury Building or its architect, George Wyman; or Batman aficionados recognize the Senate House Building of the

University of London?[59] More perhaps who have seen *Men in Black*, know the names of the Guggenheim in New York and Frank Lloyd Wright (possibly the most famous architect who ever lived). Local and national icons become global icons through a mixture of publicity and the peculiar symbolism/aesthetics of iconicity that is the hallmark of the social production of iconic architecture. But these unique icons are not the only kind of icons that are mobilized to the cause of consumerism and the Icon Project, as we shall see in the next chapter.

2

Two Types of Iconic Architecture

Unique and Typical

The debate around iconic architecture has been undermined by the general failure to recognize that there are and probably always have been two forms of iconicity in terms of fame and symbolic/aesthetic significance. These are (1) unique icons (buildings recognized as works of art in their own right) and (2) typical icons (buildings successfully copying elements of unique icons). My argument in this book is that the transnational capitalist class mobilizes these two distinct but related forms to promote an ideological message, identified here as the culture-ideology of consumerism. This is what I mean by the Icon Project.

The Rise of Iconic Architecture

The rise of iconic architecture can be explained in parallel with the decline of monumental architecture. Since the end of the Second World War and the defeat of the fascist dictatorships in Europe and Japan, debate around monumentality as a public expression of architectural representation has moved on to new ground. Although it has by no means disappeared (conflating monumental with iconic is common), bombastic monumentality has become increasingly discredited as an architectural strategy for those in power. The breakup of the Soviet empire in the 1990s and the creation of new regimes in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and central Asia added some further, often contradictory, elements to the debate (Molnar 2013). Gradually, architectural iconicity began to replace monumentality as the central motif in these discussions. This chapter sets out to show how architectural iconicity has been socially produced by the corporate fraction of the transnational capitalist class in architecture and has begun to replace monumentality as a marker of the global hegemony of the dominant class.

Iconicity in architecture (or indeed in any other field of endeavour) does not simply happen; it is the end result of deliberate practices created by specific people working in specific institutions. Architects often recall the local architectural icons of their childhood. Formal or informal socialization into the field of architecture appears to involve the recognition of architectural icons at all levels, brought to attention not only by teachers and mentors but also by the professional media of architecture and the general coverage of economic, political, and cultural news involving architecture and urban design in the mass media. Think, for example, of the very frequent architectural background establishing shots in TV news and current affairs programmes, which embed city, national, and global political, corporate, and cultural iconic buildings in our brains. The phenomenon of socially produced architectural icons in the global era is theorized here as an attempt to establish the existence of a hegemonic transnational practice explicable in terms of the culture-ideology of consumerism. The first task is to demonstrate that the attribution of architectural iconicity (often dismissed as trivial by scholars and critics) is a genuine social fact that requires proper analysis. We can start with some examples reported in the architectural media since the year 2000, promoting building projects all over the world. They all illustrate input from one or more fraction of the TCC and its local affiliates.

- 'Tony Blair [globalizing politician] stepped in to help Foster & Partners and Arup scoop the £1.2bn commission to extend Beijing airport, which was announced this week . . . the design team has pledged to "create a new icon for China"' (*BD* 7 November 2003: 1);
- 'It took a while for New York's normally gregarious architectural community to open up after 9/11. "For us a lot has changed", says Derek Moore, an associate at SOM [leading corporate architecture firm] whose offices were adjacent to the WTC. . . . The firm had just submitted construction documents for a new Stock Exchange tower ("a new icon of capitalism" says Moore dryly) and that was put on hold' (*BD* 13 September 2002: 11);
- The new Director of the ICA (professional fraction of the TCC) in Boston 'has guided its successful bid to build a new museum on Boston's

waterfront, which will create an iconic presence for contemporary art in Boston' (ICA website, 2003);

- Connecting iconicity with urban growth coalitions and the consumerist city, The Infinity Tower in São Paulo's new financial district 'has already attracted world-class attention. Heralded as an "Architectural Icon" by the South American real estate community, KPF's Infinity Tower rises elegantly some 120 meters above its surroundings to establish a unique identity against the São Paulo skyline' (*ArchDaily* 25 September 2012);
- Reporting on an event to mark the opening of Tadao Ando's Pulitzer Foundation for the Arts (professional fraction of the TCC), *ArchDaily* (2 February 2013) celebrates 'the design and construction of this iconic building'.

These examples—all of which relate to consumerist projects—tell us that serious media, serious institutions, and serious people were already buying into the Icon Project from the year 2000.

Architectural iconicity has been promoted heavily not only in the professional architecture and related media but in all media. The media search engine NEXIS provides a window into this enormous archive. As table 2.1

Table 2.1. Iconic architecture and related NEXIS search terms in the media

Search terms[a]	Results	First result	Notes on first item
Iconic architecture	1,417	1995	On the Sydney Opera House in *Australian* newspaper
Iconic building	3,000+[b]	First 1,000 by 2008	n/a
Architectural icon	2,521	1983	By Paul Goldberger on Yale University in *New York Times*
Iconic architect	336	1996	Profile of Michael Graves in *New York Times*
Starchitect	3,000+	First 1,000 by 2008	n/a
Iconic	3,000+	First 1,000 by 2012	n/a

[a] The settings chosen were: 'Terms and Conditions; *All News, All Languages; Duplicate Options Off; All Available Dates'. Unless otherwise specified, these were the settings for all my NEXIS searches to May 2014.

[b] NEXIS identifies up to 3,000+ results and shows a maximum of 1,000 items for each search but does not show the first citation for such searches.

Source: http://www.lexisnexis.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/uk/nexis/search/editSearch.do?formBeanKey=68_T19918959884&fromResults=true.

demonstrates, there have been many thousands of citations for terms relating to iconic architecture and starchitects (global iconic architects), starting from 1983 and accelerating rapidly since 2000.

Table 2.1 leaves no doubt that media attributions of iconicity have been widespread in architecture and also in the general culture for the last few decades, as Jonathan Meades (2009) bemoans in his wonderfully acerbic article in the *Weekend Australian* newspaper. The table shows explicitly that the concrete (no pun intended) idea of the iconic building is more common than the abstract idea of iconic architecture, with architectural icon coming in between. It also shows that iconic architect is far less cited than starchitect, and there is some indication of the truth of the popular belief that the rise of the starchitect is connected with Frank Gehry and his Guggenheim Bilbao, as elaborated in chapter 4.

Both reflecting and a reflection of media interest are countless lists of somebody's or some organization's choice of iconic buildings, from regular professional evaluations of major architecture prize-winning buildings to the iconic buildings of a city, a country, an era. A Google search in 2014 on the 'ten most iconic buildings' returned thousands of results. Some were scholarly, some quirky, some banal, some esoteric, but all resonant of widespread interest in iconic architecture. For example, skyscrapercity.com invited its aficionados to nominate 'each continent's most iconic building'. A Filipino working in New York City, 'Filipino by Blood, American by Ambition', responded:

North America—1. Empire State Building 2. CN Tower 3. Chrysler Building
Asia—1. Taj Mahal 2. Petronas Tower
Europe—1. Big Ben 2. Colosseum 3. Leaning Tower of Pisa
South America—The bowl-shaped building in Brasilia
Africa—The Pyramids of Giza
Australia—The Sydney Opera House.

This attracted many posts on the skyscrapercity site, and among the more interesting was the following: 'There's more to being "iconic" than age/history. . . . Iconic should be something that first pops into your mind when thinking about that country/continent etc.'[1] Almost everyone chose the Sydney Opera House for Australia. It is easy to dismiss iconicity as an easy target in an era obsessed by celebrity where such phenomena are driven by media that have to have content available 24/7. However, very little attention has been paid to the ways in which architecture firms themselves are active agents in the attempt to create iconicity for their own buildings and, thereby, become enthusiastic partners in the Icon Project.

Iconicity Claims of Top Firms

The examples I have quoted represent a small sample of findings from trawls through architectural print and electronic sources, on top of the findings from my interviews, producing hundreds of positive claims of iconicity. Such evidence suggested that it might be profitable to conduct a more systematic search of the behaviour of architects. To this end, a study of the attribution of iconicity by the major architecture firms was carried out through a survey of their websites.[2] The weekly newspaper for architects *Building Design* has been publishing a World Architecture 100 (cited as BDWA) annually since 2005. The firms surveyed in the sample were the top 10 measured by architects employed for 2008. Gensler was number one, followed by HOK, Nikken Sekkei, Aedas, Fosters, SOM, BDP, RMJM, HKS, and Atkins. An analysis of the presence of the terms 'icon' and 'iconic' on their websites reveals that these terms are commonly used. This permits us to deduce both attitudes towards iconicity of the major firms in the industry and how they communicate their ideas of iconicity.

The terms 'icon' and 'iconic' are almost never defined in these websites, and this is also the case in most of the scholarly literature. For many firms this does not appear to be accidental, as the terms are used in a clearly self-congratulatory fashion—for example, 'the world's first mixed-use high-rise, the John Hancock Centre [in Chicago, built by SOM] is an architectural icon mirroring the collaboration between architect Bruce Graham and structural partner Fazlur Khan' (http://www.som.com).[3] The context in which the terms are used strongly suggests that iconicity is a quality that all top 10 firms are hoping to acquire for their own buildings.

Iconicity often refers to architectural elements of a building. For example:

- 'The roof [of Wembley stadium] is supported structurally by a spectacular 135-metre-high arch that soars over the stadium, providing an iconic replacement for the old building's landmark twin towers' (http://www.fosterandpartners.com);
- 'The showpiece of the project [Victoria Square in Belfast by BDP] is the iconic 37m diameter glass dome which sits on a 24m high circular red sandstone colonnade' (http://www.bdp.com);

- 'The facade [of Tabira-cho Town Hall by Nikken Sekkei] is the building icon made from exposed steel reinforced concrete and vertical curtain wall. There is an iconic penthouse including meeting room and outdoor equipment storage site on the top' (http://ww.nikken.co.jp).

Iconicity is also seen as a quality of a cluster of buildings, 'We designed three iconic buildings [Glasgow Science Centre by BDP]; the country's first IMAX theatre; the Science Mall with hands-on exhibition space, a planetarium, two theatres, lab, café, shop, offices and workshops; and Scotland's tallest free-standing structure' (http://www.bdp.com).

Iconic can also refer to the character of a building, for example: 'This portion [the top of R&F Centre Guangzhou] is also where more articulation takes place and reflects the iconic character of the building both in the day and night time' (http://www.aedas.com); to the silhouette of a building: 'In design building and landscape [Gas Science Museum, Toyosu] are united in such a manner as they look like a natural land mound creating an iconic silhouette when viewed from the other bank, which leaves a deep impression to people' (http://www.nikken.co.jp); and to the shape of a building: 'Al Sharq Tower [in Dubai] is a unique mix of an iconic form, ingenious structure, and spatial qualities of sky-high living' (http://www.som.com). Multiple claims are made for the Iris Crystal Tower in Dubai: 'Its iconic form embodies a strong ecological concept fitting for these demanding times while providing its tenants with state of the art, luxurious, first class commercial facilities' and 'Iconic, visionary design is at the heart of Iris Crystal's identity' (http://www.aedas.com). Even the design of firms is proclaimed iconic: 'Atkins has been involved in Kuwait since 1977 and over the last three decades has developed a reputation for its iconic design' (http://www.atkinsdesign.com).

Significant for the high importance of the iconic in urban design are references to the image of a building in the skyline of a city, for example, on the Victoria Square scheme in Belfast: 'It is an intentional set-piece and has already become an iconic image on Belfast's skyline' (http://www.bdp.com) and, in a wider sense, to the architectural image of a city: 'the project [West Kowloon Cultural District Hong Kong by Fosters] will consolidate Hong Kong's reputation as a cultural destination while providing an iconic architectural image for the city' (see figure 2.1).[4]

It is common for several buildings defined as iconic to coexist in the same city: 'As the most prominent icon on the city's skyline, [Gensler's] Shanghai

Figure 2.1. Promotional DVD for the West Kowloon Cultural District (Roberto Correa).

Tower's transparent spiral form will showcase cutting-edge sustainable strategies and public spaces that set a new standard for green community' (http://www.gensler.com). Iconic buildings in a city can be from different eras and for different audiences (local, national, global). Contemporary globalizing cities compete to accumulate socially produced icons, some of which are successful in the long term, though many are not.

Numerous websites state explicitly that market demand is the driver of this social production of iconicity: 'The design [of Bothwell Plaza in Glasgow] aims to fulfil the European Development Company's aspirations for an architectural icon' (http://www.aedas.com). In recent years such social production of iconicity has accelerated, following the logic that newer iconic buildings can overshadow older iconic buildings and even borrow or steal iconicity from them. This may be the implication of the view expressed by Andrew Barraclough, HOK International Director: 'Nowadays, architectural commissions generally need to make statements; our clients are looking for iconic, landmark buildings' (http://www.hok.com). Another HOK architect, Barry Hughes, discussing the Baku Flame Towers project on CNN's *Great Buildings* series: 'building an "icon" is one of the most intimidating briefs for an architect. It's probably dangerous to try to do something iconic. . . . HOK ultimately created three flame-shaped towers, clad in orange and blue-tinted glass, encircling a honeycomb-roofed podium. . . . The towers' shape was inspired by the city's history of Zoroastrian fire worship and its ongoing connection with natural gas.' This statement expertly combines the rationale for the globalizing Icon Project with the desire to somehow connect icon and locale, historically and contemporaneously.[5]

The main clients in the architectural market of iconicity are corporations, globalizing politicians, and others who own and control real estate in globalizing cities. Following a logic of territorial marketing, iconicity is an investment repaid by the flow of people and profit that the icon is expected to attract. Architectural icons (usually typical icons) are targeted at both the rental market and wealthy investors from all over the world who buy into property in global cities (notably London and New York). The domestic property market in these cities has become a lucrative opportunity for newspaper advertising abroad, circulating images and narratives that surround the design and construction of typical iconic residential towers. Mass media, especially the Internet, make a decisive contribution to global iconicity, promoting buildings on a global scale often during the early design phase (buying off-plan). The more ubiquitous the exposure an icon receives the better for the Icon Project. The architectural icon has to be visible not only from as many points of the city as possible, particularly in its skyline,[6] but also on TV news, backgrounds in TV programmes, newspaper and magazine articles, films, advertisements, and the Internet.

Responding to the widespread criticism that the icon is alienated from its site, top architecture firms have drawn up what we may call a rhetoric of context where iconic buildings presented on their websites are explicitly claimed to be created for the cities that host them. They are said to be appropriate to the time, place, and culture in which they are located:

- 'It has been our ambition from the outset to produce an iconic architecture [Liverpool FC Stadium] absolutely unique to the club', though Liverpool was still waiting in 2016 (http://www.hksinc.com);
- 'The design [Monterrey Tower by HOK, never built] was conceived as an abstract sculpture and is intended to serve as an icon for the city' (http://www.hok.com);
- 'The twisting, sculptural form of Jinling Tower designed to establish an iconic presence in the heart of Nanjing' (http://www.som.com).

To this rhetoric of context I would add what for me is the 'Fallingwater enigma'. Despite having seen images of it, when I first saw Wright's famous house the thought flashed through my head, what is this concrete monstrosity doing in this lovely wood? Of course, I banished the thought immediately, but the basic idea lingers on.[7] Robert Venturi argues powerfully: 'Fallingwater is incomplete without its context—it is a fragment of its natural setting which forms the greater whole. Away from its setting it would have no meaning' (1977: 96). However, my conclusion is that if you like the building it will connect with and enhance its site and the surrounding area and if you don't like the building, you will despise what it does to its location. In my view, unique icons will enhance any site.[8] The idea that a big iconic building would look better in a different place seems weak to me, though as we saw in chapter 1 some experts evaluate the Shard in these terms. Most architects, I assume, strive to ensure that their buildings enhance their sites.

The icon is an investment as well for the architectural firm insofar as it can increase fees by selling not only the building but also identity markers of the place created by the icon. For example: 'This iconic structure [San Francisco International Airport terminal] creates a powerful identity for both the airport and the City of San Francisco' (http://www.som.com). The concept 'social production of iconicity', the first step in the linguistic production of the icon, is justified by the fact that iconicity is a strategic answer to a market demand and by the deliberate intention to build iconic buildings, often described as such even before the building is complete, sometimes when it exists only as a model, on paper, or computer screens.

A partial exception to the ubiquity of the use of icon or iconic is the website of RMJM, a London-based architecture firm, where the terms rarely appeared in 2008–9. However, the firm's University Town Library scheme in China was described as a new 'gateway icon' in 2009. By 2012 RMJM had more than caught up, with an informative item on the difficulties of creating architectural icons, citing the less than enthusiastic reception at the original appearance of the Eiffel Tower and the Empire State Building. Here we learn how the firm is facing the challenge of 'Building the Icons of Tomorrow's Emerging Skylines'.[9]

Table 2.2 presents a summary of the iconicity claims in terms of reference to elements of and attitudes to iconicity in the websites of the top 10 architect firms in the industry in 2008. I interpret this as evidence for the social production of iconicity by the corporate sector, a central feature of the Icon Project.

A first apparent paradox emerges here, namely that an icon is often described as timeless but at the same time responding to current market demand. For example: 'Aedas created an iconic building [R&F Centre Guangzhou] that is commercially efficient, elegant and timeless' (http://www.aedas.com); 'HOK International has presented new images of its London Docklands-based Churchill Place development, inspired by iconic Finnish Modernist Alvar Aalto, who died in 1976' (http://www.hok.com). David Chipperfield, a prize-winning English architect who heads a relatively small firm, interrogates this issue in an interview on the term 'iconic' for the digital magazine *Iconeye*, which markets itself as 'one of the world's finest

Table 2.2. Iconicity claims and attitudes to iconicity of the BDWA top 10 for 2008

Firm	Reference	Attitude
1. Gensler	Building, architectural element, an age	Supportive
2. HOK	Building, style, type of structures, feature, project, architect, landmark, architectural statement	Supportive and critical
3. Nikken Sekkei	Architectural element, silhouette	Supportive
4. Aedas	Building and its character, mixed development, form, design, public sculptures, city's identity	Supportive
5. Fosters	Project, architectural element, beacon, image for a city, brand, replacement, development	Supportive
6. SOM	Design, building, form, structure, firm's historic buildings and design	Supportive
7. BDP	Element/s of a building, cluster of buildings, building	Supportive
8. RMJM	Landmark rather than icon, gateway	Supportive
9. HKS	Architecture, element, life-style	Supportive
10. Atkins	Building, design reputation	Supportive

architecture and design magazines'[10] (typical Icon Project self-promotion). Chipperfield says: 'The sort of new icon architecture . . . has a certain danger that everything has to look spectacular, everything has to look like it's changing the world, even if it's really not doing that much. I'm not purposely avoiding making an icon. . . . Now we have to have an instant icon. It has to say it's an icon at the very point of delivery' (http://www.iconeye.com, icon 008: 2003). Despite Chipperfield, the firms which make such criticisms of iconicity are very often those which at the same time actively support iconic architecture, and thus intensify their own ambiguous attitude towards the trend to the iconic. Emblematic is the case of Rem Koolhaas, who criticized starchitects and architectural icons, proposing instead anti-iconic icons (http://www.oma.nl).[11]

Starchitects and Signature Architects

While there are many architects who have local, city, and national reputations based on the iconicity of their buildings at these scales, there are relatively few architects with truly global reputations. One obvious way of measuring the extent to which architects can be considered iconic from a sociological perspective is the coverage of their work in the mass media. In the social production of iconicity, those who own and control the firms that make up the architecture and architect-developer industry and the media that promote their works have a delicate balancing act to perform. They strive to provide a continuous stream of iconic buildings, spaces, and architects in the knowledge that too few means loss of profits but too many might mean the devaluation of the currency of iconic architecture, a very frequent charge of those who appear to despise the whole idea. Architect Graham Morrison (2004) labelled this phenomenon 'Costa del Icons'. He distinguished between 'true icons' and 'second rate structures', but his distinction appeared to hinge somewhat on buildings he liked and those he deplored. Morrison's intervention also conflated landmarks and icons and was broadly seen as anti-icon per se. The argument continues. This post by Penelope Shaw, in her 'News Junkie' column (*Bdonline*, 17 May 2010), is typical:

> The pedant in News Junkie has just about had enough. The word 'iconic', used by lazy marketing executives to describe everything from buildings to buses, has long since passed into irritating cliché. This week a line was crossed that left News Junkie weeping. [see] www.archicentral.com report of the refurbishment of Florida's 1925 Renaissance Vinoy Hotel, headlined: "Historic Hotel Reopens With Iconic Carpet". It may have taken more than 500 hours to design and it might cover the floor of 'one of America's most famous hotels'. But it's a carpet. And a brand-new one at that. How can it be an icon when no one's even seen it yet? News Junkie would like to appeal for a moratorium on the use of the word 'iconic'.[12]

Notwithstanding the plea of News Junkie, it is common for architecture commentators of various types to compile lists of icons, a constantly changing barometer of changing critical tastes and media attention across national borders. This is both objective in terms of coverage in the architecture and other media, and subjective in terms of the personal preferences of critics and other architectural entrepreneurs. Iconic architects receive significant amounts of coverage in the media around the world, and any new building designed by them will be guaranteed some publicity in professional architecture media and in the mass media of the place where it has been built and, sometimes, in wider markets.

In order to start to provide some quantitative measures for the relative standings of those in this pool of iconic architects a search was made for articles in quality newspapers on the topic. The timescale was initially from the first citation to the end of May 2009, and the sample of newspapers consisted of the online versions of *The Guardian, Times, Le Monde, El Pais, Il Corriere della Sera*, and *New York Times* (in the original languages) plus *Arabic News, The Moscow Times, Chinadaily*, and *Indianexpress*. The searches were focused on three groups: the BDWA top 10 firms for 2008 who, as we have seen, regularly claimed iconicity for their own buildings; a long list of signature architects; and four signature architects (Gehry, Foster, Koolhaas, and Hadid, the starchitects) who appeared intuitively to have attracted most attention—to ascertain if, on this measure, they were a group apart.[13] This was most definitely the case, giving credence to their inclusion in the exclusive category of starchitects. Table 2.3 reproduces the findings on the BDWA top 10 for 2008 and the four starchitects.

It is clear that citations to the works of Gehry, Foster, Koolhaas, and Hadid were most frequent, putting them in a leading group of four far ahead of the BDWA top 10. They were also the only architects on the list cited in all these sources as well as in the English-language editions of *Arabic News, The Moscow Times, Chinadaily*, and *Indianexpress*.[14] These four

Table 2.3. Newspaper coverage of BDWA top 10 (2008) and four starchitects (from first citation to 2009)

BDWA top 10 (2008)	Total citations in newspaper sample	Selected building cited as iconic
1. Gensler	80	Shanghai Tower (Shanghai)
2. HOK	99	Arch, New Wembley Stadium (London)
3. Nikken Sekkei	1	Tabira-Cho Town Hall (Nagasaki)
4. Aedas	6	Iris Crystal Tower (Dubai)
5. Fosters	see below	see below
6. SOM	101	Jin Mao Tower (Shanghai)
7. BDP	22	Glasgow Science Centre
8. RMJM	65	Gate to the East (Suzhou)
9. HKS	4	West Hollywood Hotel
10. Atkins	n/a	Al-Rajhi Tower (Riyadh)
Starchitects	total citations in sample	selected building cited as iconic
Frank Gehry	2,240	Guggenheim Bilbao
Norman Foster	1,704	Gherkin
Rem Koolhaas	1,193	CCTV Beijing
Zaha Hadid	1,183	Rosenthal Arts Center

Sources: See text.

have certainly produced many buildings that are commonly considered to be unique icons and they are discussed in detail under the rubric of starchitects in chapter 4. As table 2.3 shows, apart from Fosters, the BDWA top 10 for 2008 had medium to low coverage in mass media transnationally, both in absolute terms and compared with many of the signature architect firms ranked below the top 10 by size.

The same very small overlap between the largest firms and the starchitects and signature architects in terms of media coverage can also be seen when we consider other recognition indicators. For example, the number of buildings designed by each firm in the BDWA top 10 for 2008 that appear in the *Phaidon Atlas of Contemporary World Architecture* (Phaidon 2005, cited as *PACWA*) shows the same pattern. This impressive book (describing 1,052 buildings from 75 countries): 'an overview of the finest built architecture from around the world completed between 1998 and 2003. The unprecedented global scope of this collection . . . juxtaposes architectural icons with regional masterpieces'. An interviewee at a Dutch architecture institution describing herself as a 'cultural broker for architecture' explained: 'For the Phaidon Atlas I sent the last four Dutch architecture yearbooks to the publishers, and the entries are taken straight from these' [HL3]. Fosters tops the list with 13 buildings, while more than half of the firms in the 2008 BDWA top 10 (Gensler, HOK, Aedas, RMJM, HKS, Atkins) do not appear in *PACWA* at all. The other top 10 firms (SOM, BDP, and Nikken Sekkei) have only one building selected each. The inverse is also the case: among the architecture firms with most buildings in *PACWA* most are not in the BDWA top 10 and the rest have low positions in BDWA (2008) or are not in the top 100 at all. For example, Herzog & de Meuron (51st place) features in 665 newspaper articles and has 8 buildings in *PACWA* and David Chipperfield (76th place) has 243 citations and 3 buildings in *PACWA*, thus confirming their prominent places on the long list of signature architects (see table 2.4).[15]

All of these signature architects have written books and/or have had books written about their works, and all have been designated iconic. However, in most cases they have significantly lower media coverage than the four starchitects and few have more than two globally iconic buildings to their names. The only highly contentious exceptions are Daniel Libeskind, Richard Rogers, and Jean Nouvel. Cécile Renard-Delautre (2015) makes a strong case for Jean Nouvel as the 'French figurehead of starchitecture'—his controversial Philharmonie de Paris concert hall at La Villette (2015) attracted a good deal of attention in the *New York Times*.[16] Libeskind had a great deal

Table 2.4. Long list of signature architects in alphabetical order, NEXIS citations (selected building with 'iconic')

Paul Andreu	319 (National Theatre Beijing, 24)
Arquitectonica	1,487 (Cyberport Hong Kong, 35)
*Arup	3,000+ (Marina Bay Sands Singapore, 534)
Ricardo Bofill	234 (Palais d'Abraxas, 14)
Mario Botta	510 (MART Trento, 19)
David Chipperfield	2,415 (Neues Museum Berlin, 139)
Coop Himmelb(l)au	11 (UFA Cinema Dresden, 1)
Peter Eisenman	934 (Bus Stop Aachen, 60)
Massimiliano Fuksas	429 (Shenzhen Bao'an Airport, 7)
Future Systems	2,568 (Selfridges Birmingham, 81)
Grimshaw	1,299 (Eden Project Cornwall, 70)
Michael Graves	1,625 (Portland Building, 79)
Steven Holl	62 (Bellevue Museum, 5)
Bjarke Ingels/BIG	494 (VM Houses Copenhagen, 48)
Arata Isozaki	661 (Concert Hall Kyoto, 5)
Cui Kai	15 (Commune by the Great Wall, 4)
*Daniel Libeskind	3,000+ (Jewish Museum Berlin, 344)
Miralles & Tagliabue	323 (City Hall Utrecht, 15)
Eric Owen Moss	262 (Hayden Tract, Culver City, 16)
Helmut Jahn	472 (Sony Centre Berlin, 21)
Carlos Ott	135 (Opera Bastille, 10)
Cesar Pelli	1,413 (Petronas Towers, 33)
Dominique Perrault	425 (National Library of France, 16)
Moshe Safdie	995 (Marina Bay Sands, 79)
Snøhetta	816 (Alexandria Library, 76)
*SOM	3,000+ (One World Trade Center, 328)
Bernard Tschumi	539 (Parc de la Villette, 23)
UN Studio/Ben van Berkel	990 (Erasmus Bridge, 21)
Rafael Viñoly	1,478 ('Walkie Talkie' London, 147)
Michael Wilford	423 (Esplanade Singapore, 13)
Tod Williams Billie Tsien	127 (American Folk Art Museum, 35)
Ken Yeang	299 (National Library Singapore, 15)

* indicates 3,000+ results.

Sources: own research; NEXIS settings: industry: architectural services and architectural design, engineering; search for 'iconic' within results.

of press coverage for his Jewish Museum in Berlin,[17] and he has also built Jewish museums in Copenhagen and San Francisco. Éthier (2015) argues that Libeskind's extension to the Royal Ontario Museum created an 'iconic fever' in Toronto, and his unsuccessful bid for the Freedom Tower contract at Ground Zero in New York brought him more publicity. Although he scored 3,000+ on the NEXIS search, and his citations for 'iconic' were 344, putting him just above Koolhaas (see table 4.5), his overall press coverage is well below the top four starchitects. For example, up to mid-2014 he had 1,460 citations in the *New York Times*, compared with 6,790 for Gehry; in *El Pais* there were only 21, far behind the top four starchitects (see table 4.2). In the German *Die Zeit* online Libeskind with 129 citations was in fourth place, and as table 4.2 also shows Norman Foster scored highest by a considerable margin here. And so far Libeskind has not won the Pritzker Prize, an important gap in his CV. Rogers, who has won the Pritzker, also scores highly on several measures, his Beaubourg building (commonly known as the Centre Pompidou) in Paris built jointly with Renzo Piano and the engineering firm Arup, has achieved global iconicity from architects and publics alike and is the third most cited building on the NEXIS site. The importance of the Pompidou is highlighted as follows: 'Arup really took off because of its relationship with Foster, Rogers et al. at a period when architects were doing exciting things. The first example was the Pompidou Centre, where the expression of structure needed an engineer's hand to be articulate' [CA6]. The postmodernist theorist Baudrillard famously savaged the building: 'Beaubourg-Effect . . . Beaubourg-Machine . . . Beaubourg-Thing—how can we name it? (excerpted with commentary in Leach 1997: 198–213). Table 2.5 shows that there are several others with scores of 3,000+ on NEXIS searches for total citations, and relatively high scores on 'icon and iconic' and most cited buildings searches.

In chapter 4 the overlaps and dividing lines between these top signature architects and the four starchitects are further discussed. Here the main focus is on the difference between those who create unique architectural icons (starchitects and signature architects) and those who create typical architectural icons. It is no coincidence that the introductory article to the BDWA (2008) is entitled: 'Not everyone's a starchitect'.

> Despite the fact that practices have expanded to meet the demands of a global market, there remains a romantic notion, particularly in some elements of the media, of the individual genius architect constantly dreaming up radical ideas for new cultural buildings, while hopping from International airport to International airport, ignoring the cloying jet-lag to sketch. In short, we like to be able to put a—preferably charismatic—face to a—hopefully iconic, most probably civic—building.' (Gibson 2008: 6)

The figure of the iconic architect appears as a modern version of the artist found in romantic literature, sharing the same features of grandeur based

Table 2.5. Architects and firms from NEXIS ranked by most cited

Architect/Firm	Total number of citations	Citations for 'icon and iconic'	Most cited building	Rank of most cited building
Frank Gehry	3,000+	787	Guggenheim Bilbao (2,460)	1
Norman Foster	3,000+	623	The Gherkin (1,815)	2
Zaha Hadid	3,000+	603	Aquatic centre (661)	6
Arup	3,000+	535	Sydney Opera House (447)	7
Richard Rogers	3,000+	388	Pompidou (1,157)	3
Daniel Libeskind	3,000+	380	Jewish Museum (745)	5
Rem Koolhaas	3,000+	320	CCTV (337)	8
Renzo Piano	3,000+	308	Pompidou (821)[a]	4
Herzog & de Meuron	3,000+	287	Tate (153)	12
SOM	3,000+	200	One WTC (164)[b]	11
Santiago Calatrava	2,584	270	Ground Zero (284)[c]	9
Cesar Pelli	1,413	33	Petronas Twin Towers (276)	10

[a] The Shard, also by Piano, the newest icon identified in these searches, had already attracted 567 citations by May 2014.
[b] 'Freedom Tower', the original name (abandoned around 2003), returned 633 items.
[c] This refers to the Transportation hub. 'Calatrava and bridge' returned 942 items.
Source: NEXIS, Index term industry, Architectural Design and Engineering, and Architectural Services, plus search terms as indicated in the text.

on outstanding talent, mobility, distinctive creativity, and inspiration.[18] This leaves us with the problem of explaining the disparity between the size and economic results of the largest transnational architecture businesses, on the one hand, and the relative lack of unique iconicity of their architects and the buildings they create on the other. Frank Gehry, lead architect of a firm never listed in the BDWA top 10, seems to be so famous that his website (first accessed in 2009 and still the case in 2016) contained no images of any buildings, offering only preliminary sketches for the Puente de Vida Museum in Panama (http://www.foga.com). When interviewed by Charles Jencks, noted architectural writer, critic, and entrepreneur, on the elements which make an icon and the origin of the difference between a bad icon and a good icon, Gehry answered: 'It ultimately comes down to the talent of the person who creates it' (in Jencks 2005: 172). The implication of this judgement is that such talent is recognized in an architectural market which is also a reputational market, in which iconicity is a quality of buildings, sites, and architects that are traded.

The evolution of the iconic status of a building often seems to be accompanied by a famous author, whose own story is interwoven with that of the building. How an architect achieves iconic status and, ultimately, becomes a global starchitect are sociological questions with architectural implications as much as architectural questions with sociological implications. The answers to these questions offered in this book implicate not only the most globally iconic architects as participants in the Icon Project in an increasingly celebrity-based culture-ideology of consumerism, but almost all architects who aspire to produce iconic buildings, at the local, urban, regional, national, and global levels. The distinction between and the symbiosis of successful typical iconic architecture and unique iconic architecture are consequences of the fact that architectural iconicity has a market at each of these levels, and the problem is, as with all commodities in capitalist globalization, how to break into the next biggest and more profitable market, optimally the global market. In this respect iconic architecture is similar to most of the other culture industries but, given its presence in the actual and virtual lives of billions of people, it is arguably the most important if largely unrecognized culture industry. Moving more deliberately into the public realm, the concluding section of this chapter examines the several ways in which claims of architectural iconicity are made implicitly in a variety of ventures that are rarely, if at all, perceived in these terms. Nevertheless, they are all part of the Icon Project in architecture.

Architecture Theme Parks and Other Iconic Projects

The efforts of architects themselves, their firms, historians, and critics have always been complemented by those who attempt to promote their own judgements of architectural iconicity to the general public for commercial advantage. In our time architecture theme parks add to these efforts. In his edited book *Variations on a Theme Park*, the architect-critic Michael Sorkin and his colleagues argued that American cities were becoming more like highly consumerist theme parks (Disneyland being the paradigm case).[19] This, they predicted, presaged the end of public space as traditionally conceived in democratic society (Sorkin 1992). The phenomenon has globalized and cities everywhere have now been inundated with the characteristics of theme parks—a topic that I discuss in chapter 5. However, the emergence of architecture theme parks of various types and the architectural messages of other theme parks and analytically similar ventures has attracted little research attention and public scrutiny. A prime example of this is the 120-acre Window of the World (WoW) theme park in Shenzhen (China), about an hour by train and subway from Hong Kong. WoW was opened in 1994, continuing a very long line of Chinese architectural parks and their like: 'The representation of iconic landmarks and spaces from around the globe (in literally diminished form) is an act of symbolic appropriation that recalls in spirit the imperial "theme parks" of the past' (Campanella 2008: 258). This may be true, but for Chinese and foreign visitors alike WoW also projects powerful ideas of architectural iconicity. The buildings and spaces reproduced at various scales (two-thirds in the case of the Eiffel Tower with an elevator to the top to enjoy the view) represent either unique or typical icons. It is also interesting to note that the 'Pyramid at the Louvre' by the Chinese-American architect I. M. Pei is given pride of place at the front of the park and serves as the entrance to the subway station (figure 2.2).

The park brochure lists all the typical and unique icons represented in the park. In my estimation, this shows that 47 out of the 88 installations represent unique architectural icons, and 24 represent typical icons (the remaining 17 cannot easily be classified in these terms, though all are clearly touristic). The context of the park as a whole is consumerist, though not excessively so compared with many others where opportunities to buy are more frequent. However, it is significant that so many of the typical icons are focused on shopping, leisure, and refreshments (e.g., Roman Holiday Plaza, Southeast Asian Waterside Village, Paris Spring Shopping Plaza, Alps Ice and Snow World, and the International Street area). Whatever else it does, WoW transmits the message that there is a whole world outside China that is full of famous buildings and shopping opportunities. A local architect-professor, reflecting the opinion of the architectural professional, commented on WoW: 'the choice of icons was made by stupid people with superficial out-of-date ideas. It is becoming a joke as more and more people

Figure 2.2. 'Pyramid at the Louvre', Window of the World, Shenzhen.

start to find out about the world' [CH3]. This may be true, but WoW and its owners are sociologically interesting.

Overseas Chinese Town Holding Company (OCT), the company behind WoW, while relatively small, seems to me of great significance for the main themes of my book: the corporatization of state enterprises even in China, the importance of tourism and culture industries, the centrality of consumerism, the role of architecture and urban design, and what I have no hesitation in calling the rise of a state-corporate fraction of the transnational capitalist class in China. OCT is a state-owned enterprise in the Tourism and Culture industry sector. It was founded in 1985 and has its headquarters in Shenzhen, the largest of the original Special Economic Zones, where it is listed on the local stock exchange. Best known for its acclaimed theme park of historical Chinese architecture 'Splendid China' (opened in 1989), it has developed into one of the major cultural and tourist real estate developers in Asia. Its website helpfully translated into English (on which this account is based) describes its first major real estate project, the Shenzhen

OCT Resort as follows: 'Located along the beautiful coast of South China Sea and Shenzhen Bay, gathers the most concentrated cultural theme park cluster, cultural-themed hotel cluster and culture & art facility cluster in China. . . . It is among China's first batch of 5A Tourist Attractions, National Civilization Scenic Area and National Cultural Industry Demonstrative Park, serving as a shining and colorful business card for the joyous city of Shenzhen.'[20]

OCT Group adheres to the market-oriented principle while gradually becoming a large-scale state-owned enterprise engaged in cross-sector and cross-industry operation. Since 1985 it has developed three leading major businesses in China—tourism and related cultural industry operations, real estate and hotel development and operation, and manufacture of electronic products. OCT has generated 'some famous brands' (certainly famous in the Pearl River Delta and beyond), such as Konka Electronics; Splendid China, Window of the World, the Happy Valley theme parks chain; Portofino, Interlaken Town, OCT Grand Hotel, Venice Hotel, and City Inn. As this list suggests, tourism is the main business of OCT. The website claims that by 2009 it had catered to 150 million tourists and become the top brand in the travel industry in China. Highlighting the importance of prizes in the industry, we are told that 'in addition to these achievements OCT has focused its urban development activities around the garden city concept and has introduced theme hotels into China. OCT has occupied a top eight position of the world's tourist scenic zone groups, the only enterprise from Asia to do so.' The Group is also active in the museum sector and in the performing arts.

Overseas Chinese Town (Asia) Holdings Limited is subordinate to Hong Kong OCT Group Limited, which serves as the overseas capital platform of OCT. Since 2000, this has resulted in multiple large-scale projects all over China, for example, Beijing OCT, Shenzhen OCT East (the first state eco-tourist pilot zone in China), Shanghai OCT, and many others. The Group received the accolade of one of the top 10 models of state-owned enterprises in China for 2009 and actively publicizes the brands of state-owned enterprises. Happy Valley is clearly promoted as a standardized brand, stretching in many directions. 'In 2009, Happy Valley chain brand issued new images of the mascots—three lovely ants named Huanhuan, Lele and Xiaogu appeared on the front page of Happy Valley chain website. As more and more "valley fans" got familiarized with them, related products were fully loaded on the shelves and became the '"hot catch"' in Happy Valley.' Meanwhile, OCT was also investing in media, comics, and digital entertainment. A cartoon comic book named Magical Army was released in 2008, with plans for a film. OCT also hosted electronic competitions during Shanghai Expo 2010 and DreamHack (the largest computer festival in the world).

OCT's business strategy is elaborated under the slogan (that many International Relations specialists will recognize): 'Fulfil cultural responsibility, promote the soft power of the nation.' Activities such as the Shenzhen Cultural Industry Fair and Shenzhen-Hong Kong two-city biennial exhibition show how the region can become a 'development base' for creative industry and contribute to building Shenzhen into a centre for design. Although this might seem fanciful, James Westcott, one of many journalists beginning to take Shenzhen seriously, wrote in the *Guardian* (15 December 2009) that 'Shenzhen's third biennale of architecture glories in the dizzying excess of China's urban growth' (see also Lees et al. 2016: 136–7). In 2014 it was announced that Pritzker prizewinner Fumihiko Maki had been commissioned for China's first Design Museum in Shenzhen (in collaboration with the V&A). Shenzhen, UNESCO City of Design in 2008, was said to be the home of 6,000 design companies employing over 60,000 people. Shenzhen is now certainly on the global city map.

At the Grand Opening Ceremony for Happy Valley Chengdu in 2009, the OCT website explains how a tourist and entertainment base has been carefully built in Southwest China over the past two decades. 'Happy Valley Chengdu carries forward the management philosophy and innovative ideas of OCT to customize a brand new metropolitan entertainment way for Chengdu, and to shape a CHD (Central Happy District) of the perfect combination of regional characteristic culture and international fashion in Southwest China as a whole.' The idea of a Central Happy District alongside a Central Business District (CBD) in every city in China suggests that OCT might be even more ambitious than its obvious inspirational precursors—Disney and McDonald's—both now established within reach of most Chinese.

There are, of course, many theme parks around the world based on the Disneyland model—in my terms, typical architectural icons—that are often copies of fantasy buildings as much as real buildings, reinforced by strong architectural representation in a wide variety of Disney media—movies, cartoons, books, magazines, merchandise. The Xetulul theme park in Guatemala, a Disney-style amusement park, has a modest mixture of unique and typical architecture, including the Trevi Fountain and the Moulin Rouge. The 'national architecture styles' of France, Germany, Guatemala, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland are represented in their own plazas. If images found on the Internet are to be trusted, this appears to be a well-constructed set of copies of iconic buildings and sites. Jeju Soingook Theme Park in Jeju Island Korea,[21] a major tourist attraction, has around 100 models of iconic architecture from thirty countries. These include Korean icons sharing a lake with London's Tower Bridge, Sacre-Coeur, the Leaning Tower of Pisa, the Statue of Liberty, and the Sydney Opera House, on the same miniature scale. As its name suggests, Miniatürk contains over one hundred replicas at a scale of 1 to 25, mostly icons of Istanbul and the wider Ottoman empire. And while it is not usually seen as an architecture theme park per se, the city of Las Vegas fulfils some of the same functions. The most significant buildings in the city, the casino hotels, exhibit the characteristics of typical icons, notably the Luxor,[22] Bellagio, Caeser's Palace, Mandalay Bay, Monte Carlo, New York-New York, Paris, and the Venetian. All of these examples can be considered corporate projects leveraging the iconicity of the selected architectural icons by copying them and thereby reaping commercial benefits. The building of icons in the city is such a notable feature that the governor of Nevada in the early 2000s joked that 'the unofficial bird of the state should be the construction crane' [US3].[23]

Two original contributions to the representation of architectural icons occur 50 feet above the floor of American Airlines terminal 9 at JFK in New York, and on the floor of the Burlington Arcade in London. For the first, the artist/architect Matteo Pericoli has drawn a remarkable 400-foot mural of 415 unique buildings from 70 cities. Completed in 2007, he named it 'Skyline of the World'. Between 2009 and 2012, travellers could view Pericoli's versions of 45 of these buildings on 5 screens at the entrance to the terminal. The terminal handles over 12 million passengers per year, and while there is no data on how many of them actually see 'Skyline of the World' it is likely to be a large number. Among the buildings illustrated, there are many familiar icons and many that are unfamiliar. The Gherkin, Sydney Opera House, Hagia Sophia, Burj al Arab, Brooklyn Bridge, Eiffel Tower, Empire State Building, and Jin Mao Tower—all widely recognized global architectural icons—sit alongside many that are not. This is one artist's vision of iconic architecture for millions of cosmopolitan air travellers.

The second representation of iconic architecture, woven into a carpet stretching the length of the Burlington Arcade in London beside the Royal Academy, also includes many familiar global icons. While unique in scale, the mural and the carpet are not unique in conception, indeed there seems to be something of an outpouring of iconic city collages, advertising a wide range of goods and services—for example, newspapers, communications, postal services, luxury apartments, parcel services, and investments.[24] Figure 2.3, from Singapore, combines architectural icons to market parcel services , and figure 2.4, from Hong Kong, does the same for luggage.

These iconic collages can be interpreted as both growing recognition of the commercial appeal of images of iconic buildings and, more significantly from the point of view expressed in this book, the ever-expanding reach and ambitions of capitalist globalization and the ever-increasing scope of



Figure 2.3. Iconic cityscape collage: 'easier around the world' (Singapore).



Figure 2.4. Iconic cityscape collage: 'take on the world' (Hong Kong).

the Icon Project. It is also true to say that, outside the relatively small group of industry-inclined architects and business journalists reporting on architecture and the construction industry, there is very little public information disseminated about the firms that actually build most typical icons globally. This is a topic that has received little critical analysis in the huge literature on architecture. Chapter 3 focuses on the biggest architecture firms over the decade 2005 to 2014.

3

The Architecture Industry and Typical Icons

This chapter aims to fill in the substance of the first component of the corporate fraction of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) in architecture and urban design, the major architecture firms. While the starchitects and signature architects who produce unique architectural icons have attracted most media attention, they are a very small group within the profession. Here, the focus is on the much larger group of architecture firms producing the successful typical icons that are transforming cities all round the world in the era of capitalist globalization. Infrastructure is an increasingly large part of this, and I introduce the idea of celebrity infrastructure to highlight how bridges, transportation hubs, and waterside developments are mobilized as the Icon Project strives to turn them into consumerist spaces. Here the focus is more on the projects than the firms. As we saw in the previous chapter, contrary to the claims of many architecture critics and theorists, iconicity is not simply a creation of the media or corporate publicists. Architects play a significant part in the social production of iconic architecture, making some of them active participants in the Icon Project. As Dion Kooijman (2000: 829) argues, 'architecture can form a true part of the "image building" by PR and marketing departments'.

The Sociology of Architecture

Behind the general discussion of the ways in which the four fractions of the TCC serve the interests of capitalist globalization through creating and promoting iconic architecture is the idea that, as well as the symbolism and aesthetics of iconic buildings and spaces, there is something else going on of great significance.[1] Two pioneering studies, Blau (1984) and Gutman (1988), researched architecture as an industry in the United States.[2] Judith Blau focused more on architects themselves, reporting a key finding that 98 per cent of respondents (she surveyed 400 architects in New York) said that architects were distinct from other professionals in terms of the 'mystique of artistic creativity' (Blau 1984: 49), but that most architects never realize this goal. This was seen to be a problem for architecture, particularly in capitalist societies. Robert Gutman, building on this revealing statistic, elaborated on three types of architectural firms, a typology that still resonates. The first type consists of the 'strong-idea firms'. Gutman's examples were the firms led by Richard Meier, Frank Gehry, Robert Venturi, and Michael Graves.[3] These tend to be practice-centred businesses rather than business-centred practices. Second are 'strong-service firms', notably SOM, and they tend to be business-centred practices. The third category comprises 'strong delivery firms', the commercial firms that rarely win major prizes but build the vast majority of big buildings all over the world. Gutman argued that personal inspiration (architect as artist) was being replaced by conventional marketing for architectural services (architect as businessman, rarely woman). Chapters on the construction industry, architect-client relations, competition with other professions, and the public relations of architecture suggested that it was getting more difficult to know what exactly the architect was contributing to big projects (see also Kieran 1987). Much earlier, J. F. Harder (1902: 74) had argued that the fine art view of architects was 'all pretty much a delusion . . . they are in reality fully as keen and of as large capacity in the business of money getting as any other constituency in American affairs'. Ashly Pinnington and Tim Morris (2002) provide an interesting study of the trend from partnership to corporate models of architecture firm organization. Graves, for example, was careful to ensure that he was not held responsible for features of his Portland municipal building that he did not control. One of my interviewees argued: 'Within architecture, it is possible to lose iconic status. Sometimes this is because the images and renderings [illustrations] are better than the actual buildings. The perfect example was the Portland Building by Graves, where the renderings were much better than the end result' [HL1]. Richard Meier, the architect of the new Getty Center overlooking Los Angeles, makes it clear that not everything that appeared on the site was to his liking (Meier 1999). Except for a few special cases, 'the trade press, but even more so magazines such as *Architectural Digest* or the *New York Times*—whose editors regard architecture as if it were furniture, fashionable clothing, or gourmet cooking—ignore the complex relations among the cast of characters who now participate in a major building project' (Gutman 1988: 59). In other words, they treat buildings as though they were the personal creation of one person, rather than the outcomes of protracted and detailed relationships between architects, engineers, clients, builders, plumbers, electricians, and so on.

By the late 1980s, about 30 museums in the United States had important architectural collections, major publishers like MIT Press, Rizzoli, and Princeton had expanding architecture lists, and there were many other manifestations of the commodification of architecture and architects. Gutman reproduces an advertisement for the expensive Dexter shoe, featuring Michael Graves, as a sign of the growing connections between architecture and the world of celebrity (see also Ewen 1988: Part 4; Ghirardo 1996; Naegele 2000). For example, the courtyard at Louis Kahn's Salk Institute—certainly a 20th-century icon in my sense of the term—is often used for celebrity events, for example, American Institute of Architects' graduations, adorned by the presence of Buzz Aldrin, Alan Alda, and Brad Pitt. 'And Richard Gere made a movie here' [CA7]; 'Since 1970, the architecture avant-garde has made itself very well known, so once the stars get commissioned their buildings become iconic' [CA19]. An architectural entrepreneur who locates iconic sites for commercial and media clients in California explained this in terms of the modernist surge in the mid-1990s, when fashion directors became more aware of architecture [CA20]. Gutman concludes, 'There has been a tremendous expansion in opportunities to consume architectural culture over the last few decades' (1988: 93).[4] While Gutman's research is almost entirely based on evidence from the United States, the phenomena he described are now global. Building on the work of Blau and Gutman, my own research suggests that it is necessary to distinguish within the group of strong-idea firms between the starchitects who create most of the unique architectural icons and the signature architects who produce a few unique icons each. Further, the strong service and delivery firms can also produce a form of iconic architecture, conceptualized here as successful typical icons. In the words of an acute analyst of the transition from modernism to postmodernism in the 1980s, 'the architectural sign of the period was less a style than the overabundance of office and retail space, luxury hotels, rich men's homes, and cultural institutions for the elite . . . architectural modernism went from technocratic social engineering to the service of corporate power' (Larson 1993: 244, 246).

The relationship between architecture and big business can be fruitfully explored in the figure of the architect–real estate developer. The pre-eminent architect of real estate development in the second half of the 20th century (the beginning of the global era in my terms) was the Atlanta-based John Portman (Portman and Barnett 1976; Saint 1983: 151–4). Born in 1924, he was renowned for major urban projects all over the world. The Wikipedia entry for Portman cites his ICON [*sic*] project in San Diego (2004–7). The link reads: 'Wikipedia does not have an article with this exact name. Please search for ICON (skyscraper) in Wikipedia to check for alternative titles or spellings' (accessed 20 November 2013). This may be a WikiJoke, but not entirely without significance for my argument. Portman also appears to control three other notable architecture firms (Perkins Eastman, SmithGroup, and HNTB), all privately owned, scant data available. His spectacular atriums are iconic, especially for film and TV producers, his Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles a reference point for those trying to come to grips with the postmodernist turn (notably Jameson 1991). A documentary film in 2011 relates: 'Over 45 years, Portman's iconic urban statements and eye-popping interiors have risen in 60 cities on four continents to redefine cityscapes in America, and skylines in China and the rest of Asia.'[5] Portman endured scathing criticisms on the grounds that his architecture tends to be friendly to the people inside his buildings but unfriendly to people outside, often by turning the back of the building to the street. Nevertheless, he clearly acquired a measure of both typical and unique iconicity. 'Promoted as the heart of an inner city revival, Peachtree Center [Atlanta] abandoned the Modernist slab hotel typology and introduced a grand interior atrium rising up twenty-two stories. In a design reproduced in countless subsequent hotels by Portman and others, the individual rooms overlook the atrium and the glass-encased elevators that sweep visitors up to a revolving restaurant topped by a blue glass dome' (Ghirardo 1996: 12). In this way Portman and others exemplify how 'corporate capitalism had by the 1950s and 1960s forged much the same kind of alliance with modern architectural aesthetics that it had with Keynesian [welfare state] economics' (12). This has morphed easily into accommodation with neoliberal (free market) economics. Kazys Varnelis (2010) recounts that a MoMA retrospective of modern architecture in the 1970s used Portman's Renaissance Center in Detroit for the catalogue cover, highlighting his influence on postmodernism. The younger postmodernist architects were offended by this at the time but, Varnelis argues, history has proved Portman to be a genuine pioneer of the postmodern city. His Hyatt Regency in San Francisco became famous as the site for the vertigo elevator scene in the film *High Anxiety* and was set on fire in *Towering Inferno* (not, one would imagine, unambiguously good publicity for the hotel). Varnelis also suggests that Koolhaas drew on these 'Piranesian spaces'[6] for Eurolille and CCTV. The ongoing success of Portman in Asia brings the story up-to-date. His first major projects in the East were in Singapore, with several buildings in and around Marina Square in the 1980s, and in China from the 1990s, mainly in Shanghai (see Xue and Li 2008) and Beijing (with a 'John Portman Art & Architecture' exhibition in the Capital Museum in 2011).

Portman illustrates very well both the tension between architects who design uniquely iconic buildings and those who design successful typical icons, and the symbiotic relationship they have with each other in the Icon Project. The Peachtree Hyatt Regency and the Bonaventure Hotel are certainly iconic, but not in the way that the Sydney Opera House or the Guggenheim Bilbao are iconic. This is partly due to the nature of their fame. The latter two are known much more widely in a variety of communities than the former two. In terms of aesthetic/symbolic significance they are also different insofar as the latter were designed to be unique, whereas Portman's buildings were designed to be copied by himself and others, indeed to be new typical consumerist icons.[7]

Unique icons and successful copies occupy different spheres of the same aesthetic/symbolic space.[8] Unique icons are proclaimed iconic because they display an original aesthetic, but their symbolism is open, they are enigmatic signifiers.[9] Venturi (1977) comes close to this idea in his 'both-and' rather than 'either-or' analysis of complexity and contradiction versus simplification or picturesqueness: 'A valid [in my terms 'uniquely iconic'] architecture evokes many levels of meanings and combinations of focus: its space and its elements become readable and workable in several ways at once' (16).[10] Successful typical icons reproduce an already successful aesthetic, copying original features, but symbolically they are not intended to be too open or enigmatic. They are expressions of the culture-ideology of consumerism. This symbolic choice is also open for the reception of unique icons and under the conditions of capitalist globalization they too have become consumerist spaces as well as spaces for other experiences. Unique and typical icons both play central roles in the Icon Project, and those who are responsible for them are complicit with the corporate fraction of the TCC in architecture and urban design. The collection edited by Arnold and Ballantyne (2004) approaches the problem of the intentions of the architect and how people experience the architecture in terms of de Certeau's place/space distinction and Foucault's concept of heterotopia: 'a place that is different from itself, on account of the plurality of readings of its events' (Ballantyne 2004: 28), in one sense another version of the enigmatic signifier. A perfect example of this symbiotic relationship between symbolism and aesthetics that is characteristic of architectural iconicity will be found in the booklet sent to Members of the Tate Modern in London, one of the most successful museums in the world. The booklet marks the opening of Switch House—a 10-storey addition to the museum by the original architects, Herzog & de Meuron. The director, Frances Morris, explains the rationale for the new building in terms of the pressing need to have more space to 'situate our iconic artworks' (Tate 2016: 3). The architects concede that the 'exterior shape of the [new] building seems mysterious and confusing . . . sometimes reminds us of a pyramid but also as a tent . . . we like that openness and freedom for various interpretations' (7). They continue, 'the cladding brickwork allows for a double reading: on the one hand it is solid and traditional . . . on the other hand it appears like something light, almost like textile or knitwear' (9). Thus, architects as architects can find something interesting and challenging in the new building, but architects as people, and people in general as consumers, can feel comfortable and homely in the building as well. This is how the enigmatic signifier works in the era of capitalist globalization. Nevertheless, I must make clear that this case highlights the critique of the rather one-sided Frankfurt School culture industries thesis (see note 30 in ch. 1)—there is certainly a great deal of value in the Tate Modern, not least in its architecture which is strikingly original on the outside and has a '*promenade architecturale*' with benches and niches for people to 'meet and hang out' inside.[11] As a museum, it promotes radical artists from all over the world, its exhibitions have won a reputation for inventiveness, and its community outreach programmes are inspiring. Not only did the museum invite 3,000 schoolchildren from around the United Kingdom to a private view of the new building before it opened to the public, but it printed many heart-warming responses of children from a school in Llandudno (a popular tourist destination in Wales) to their day in the museum (Tate 2016: 24). Switch House provides the Tate with more shopping, more entertainment, and more enigmatic signification. The opening weekend was sponsored by the trendy clothing firm Uniqlo, the schools event by Mostyn, a Plus Tate Partner. The Mostyn family are major landlords in Llandudno and appear to control what we might call the urban growth consumerist coalition in the town. The Tate group of museums (like many other museums) has various corporate sponsorship schemes, with 65 members at last count, including some of the biggest companies in the world. Therefore, in my view, despite all its admirable features it can also be seen as part of the Icon Project.

Herzog & de Meuron, while justly celebrated, is a relatively small firm. The biggest firms in the architecture industry are rarely the most celebrated. To explain this apparent anomaly Olds, in his stimulating book on megaprojects in the Pacific Rim, uses the term Global Intelligence Corps (GIC), defined as 'the very small number of elite architectural and planning firms that aspire for prestigious commissions in cities around the world. These firms tend to be synonymous with high-profile charismatic men' (2001: 142). He names Le Corbusier, Gropius, and Mies as historical exemplars, and Piano, Rogers, Foster, Nouvel, and Koolhaas as modern exemplars. The GIC formulation, however, obscures the extent to which these architects connect with capitalist globalization as analyzed here. My contention is that a TCC analysis of architectural iconicity highlights the relationship between iconic architects and big business and through the distinction between unique and typical iconicity, creates a more accurate picture of how the system of iconic architecture works. While Coxe and Haden (1993) and many others show that architectural training and practice have differed in important respects from country to country, my argument here is that more recent evidence gleaned from sources such as *BD, ArchDaily*, and other publications suggests that globally iconic architects, real or aspirant, tend to transcend these differences.

The Architecture Industry in the New Millennium

The sample date of 2008 for iconicity claims by the top 10 firms reported in the previous chapter reflected the lengthy research project that lies behind this book and had nothing to do with the financial crisis that was unfolding at the time. The crisis affected architecture and construction seriously in Western Europe and the United States, but less seriously in Asia, though it was obvious that the profession in the West had been moving East for business since the 1990s at least (Koolhaas and McGetrick 2004; McNeill 2009). Not surprisingly some firms weathered the storm more successfully than others and, in general, those that were able to take advantage of building booms in China, the Gulf States, and other smaller but still profitable enclaves did well over the decade. Compared with most other important industries most architecture firms are privately owned, and many of the most famous and even some of the biggest are named for their founders. This makes the collection of data more difficult in comparison with the *Fortune* Global 500 lists, which are based on widely available statutory annual reports from major corporations (Sklair 2001).

The main sources of industry-level data for architecture come from two publications, both London-based. From the mid-1990s until 2004, the trade magazine *Building* published annual lists of the biggest firms under the title *World Architecture*. Coverage varied from a high of the top 500 (1999) to the top 200 in 2004. In 2005 publication of the lists was taken over by *Building Design* under the title *Building Design* World Architecture 100 (BDWA100). *BD* now appears only in a digital edition, and BDWA100 is sold separately in print and digital forms. The *World Architecture* tables up to 2004 and the BDWA tables since then are largely comparable. They were compiled on the basis of self-reporting by firms with numbers of architects employed as the usual criterion for ranking, and my scores for the decade Top Ten (2005–2014) are based on this. In the interests of clarity, references to the composite 2005–2014 list is capitalized (decade Top Ten), while references to other top 10 lists are not.[12] Fees earned are also included for most respondents (usually in bands, sometimes actual amounts). Numbers of architects employed and fee incomes match fairly closely. In recent years the PR house Camargue has circulated requests for information to thousands of firms in the architecture industry and coverage of the biggest firms appears to be almost complete.

The lists distinguish different types of firms, for example, exclusively architectural, architect-engineer, architect-planner, architect-developer, but the criterion of fee-earning architects generally ensures that it is the architectural activities of multi-sectorial firms that is being measured. In addition, a comparison between the firms dominating the regional markets in 2003 (the earliest date for which information is readily available) and 2014, provides both a useful measure of changes in geographical markets over the period and a picture of firms outside the decade Top Ten challenging their dominance. The significance of this is that the media coverage of architecture tends to focus on starchitects (and, to a lesser extent, signature architects), minimizing the role of other, mostly larger, architectural firms responsible for typical icons in cities all over the world. The tables in this chapter present, as far as I am aware, the first systematic analysis of the top firms in the global architecture industry, with data on their presence in regions over the decade. Table 3.1 comprises all the firms that appeared in all the top 10 lists for the decade from 2005 to 2014. The fact that the data

Table 3.1. BDWA top 10s by architects employed (2005–2014)

	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005
1	Gensler	Aecom	Aedas	Aecom	NikSek[a]	Gensler	Gensler	NikSek	HOK	NikSek
2	Aecom	Gensler	Aecom	Aedas	Aedas	Aedas	HOK	Gensler	NikSek	HOK
3	NikSek	IBI	Gensler	Gensler	Gensler	Fosters	NikSek	HOK	Gensler	Gensler
4	IBI	NS	IBI	NS	HOK	HOK	Aedas	Aedas	BDP	NBBJ
5	Aedas	Aedas	NikSek	IBI	RMJM	NikSek	Fosters	SOM	SOM	BDP
6	P&W[b]	P&W	Fosters	P&T	Fosters	SOM	SOM	BDP	Aedas	Fosters
7	Woods[c]	DP	DP	P&W	IBI	RMJM	BDP	P&W	P&W	P&W
8	Samoo	HOK	P&T	RMJM	P&T	BDP	RMJM	Fosters	NBBJ	SOM
9	DP	Samoo	Samoo	Fosters	HDR	IBI	HKS	RTKL	HKS	P&T
10	P+T	Fosters	HDR	BDP	BDP	HKS	Atkins	HKS	P&T	Daly

Note: Firm name abbreviations apply to all subsequent tables, all other initials are names of firms.
[a] NikSek = Nikken Sekkei
[b] P&W = Perkins & Will
[c] Woods = Woods Bagot

Sources: Compiled from *Building Design* World Architecture 100 (2005–2014).

is based on self-reporting has led to a good deal of scepticism about these, and similar lists among the professionals. In the course of my research, I have come across only two significant omissions, the firms of John Portman and Frank Gehry. I have been unable to establish if these two firms declined to participate. The cut-off point for top 100 entry in 1997 was 80 architects, 90 in 2014, which might have ruled Gehry out. Portman had about 200 staff spread over three companies in the early 1980s (Saint 1983: 152).

A glance at this table immediately confirms an impression of concentration at the top of the architecture industry. Only five of the firms attained the top position and only 21 firms achieved a place in the top 10 from 2005 to 2014, 11 from the USA, 5 from the United Kingdom (including Aedas classified as China/UK), and 1 each from Australia, Canada, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. This, of course, does not reflect the global distribution of generally recognized architectural talent; if it did, firms from many other countries would be represented. What it does tell us is that the biggest firms are from a small number of home bases, and not all of these have large domestic architecture markets. It is another indication of the increasing globalization of the architecture industry, but as with globalization in general it is not equally distributed; indeed it is quite polarized.

From the data in table 3.1, it is possible to work out a plausible ranking of the decade Top Ten firms in architecture from 2005 to 2014. Table 3.2 attempts to do this, operating on the somewhat arbitrary but intuitively appealing method of awarding ten points for first place in the Top Ten, nine points for second place, and so on, for each year. This gives a possible maximum of 100 points and a possible minimum of one point. The actual range for the decade Top Ten is 88 points (Gensler) to 25 points (SOM). The findings suggest that the decade Top Ten in architecture consists of a relatively stable core of the biggest firms, with a smaller number of somewhat less-big firms which, for one reason or another, join the Top Ten on a few occasions and then drop out, sometimes being absorbed by a bigger rival or being displaced by faster-growing firms.

As can be seen by comparing the tables, there is a good deal of overlap between the decade Top Ten and the top 10 for 2014. Five of the decade Top Ten are from the United States, two from the United Kingdom, one from China/UK, and the other two are from Japan and Canada. Table 3.3 shows the performance of the 2014 top 10 over the decade (2005–2014), indicating which firms have maintained their places at the top, which have lost their places, and newcomers to the top positions in 2014.

Table 3.2. Decade Top 10 from BDWA (2005–2014)

	Firm (home office and date of origin)	Total points[a]	Most recent[b]	Times in top ten	Times #1 (highest)[c]	Rank 2014
1	Gensler (USA, 1965)	88	2014	10/10	3	1
2	NikSek (Japan, c. 1900)	81	2014	8/10	3	3
3	Aedas (China/UK, 2002)	68	2014	7/10	1	5
4	HOK (USA, 1955/83)	53	2013	5/10	1	(12)
5	Aecom (USA, 1990)	38	2014	4/10	2	2
6	Fosters (UK, 1967)	35	2013	8/10	0 (3)	(14)
7	IBI (Canada, 1974)	34	2014	4/10	0 (3)	4
8	BDP (UK, 1961)	27	2011	6/10	0 (4)	(34)
9	P&W (USA, 1935)	26	2014	6/10	0 (6)	6
10	SOM (USA, 1936)	25	2009	5/10	0 (5)	(15)

[a] 10 points for first place, 9 for second place, and so on (see text).
[b] Most recent appearance in top 10.
[c] If never top, highest rank achieved (in brackets).
Source: Adapted from *Building Design* World Architecture 100 tables (2005–2014).

Table 3.3. BDWA top 10 2014, decade performance and featured project

	Firm (home office)	Number of times in top 10 (2005–14)	Highest rank	Featured project[a]
1	Gensler (USA)	10/10	1	Shanghai Tower
2	Aecom (USA)	4/10	1	Courthouse CA
3	NikSek (Japan)	10/10	1	Yaesu station Tokyo
4	IBI (Canada)	6/10	3	Scott St Toronto
5	Aedas (China/UK)	8/10	1	Star Centre Singapore
6	P&W (USA)	5/10	5	n/a
7	Woods Bagot (Aus)	1/10	7	n/a
8	Samoo (S. Korea)	3/10	8	Buk Seoul Museum
9	DP (Singapore)	3/10	7	Sports Hub Singapore
10	P&T (China/HK)	5/10	6	n/a

[a] Building illustrated in *BD* company profiles.
Source: Building Design World Architecture 100 (2014).

It is significant that none of the buildings illustrated for the BDWA top 10 in 2014 made much of an impact on the world architecture stage while they were being built or when they were completed, with the exception of Gensler's Shanghai Tower (Gensler 2015). This was marketed on the Gensler website as 'the [Shanghai] skyline's most prominent icon', and it is a spectacular building (see figure 5.9). All the rest are in my terms, successful typical iconic buildings, sometimes quite prominent in their sites, always recalling elements of other unique icons that have attracted acclaim globally. I am making no aesthetic judgement about the architectural merits or otherwise of these buildings, and presumably the *Building Design* staff who chose the illustrations or simply reproduced images sent in by the firms considered them to be good architecture. My point is sociological. Most of these buildings are not destined to be unique icons on the global stage, but they may become successful typical icons, usually for a globalizing city and, occasionally, an architectural icon at the national level, their images perhaps reproduced on stamps, postcard sets, tourist brochures, and advertisements. This line of argument is supported by comparing the total results brought up by a NEXIS search for each of the decade Top Ten firms and their results with 'and iconic', as illustrated in table 3.4.

Table 3.4 shows that some of the larger firms do attract a great deal of general media attention, presumably in commercial and construction media (six have 3,000+ results), but only Fosters scores more than 350 on the 'and iconic' search. All have some 'and iconic' success, with 6 of the 10 scoring more than 100. While not all these items necessarily indicate that they or their buildings are considered iconic, some clearly are. In addition to the obvious iconicity of many Fosters buildings, Gensler's Shanghai Tower, the Bioskin Building and Bank of Chengdu by Nikken Sekkei, the Nanfung Complex by Aedas, Flame Towers in Baku by HOK, and One World Trade Center by SOM, have all been dubbed iconic in the professional and mass

Table 3.4. BDWA decade Top 10 (2005–2014), NEXIS results by firm, and with 'and iconic'

	Firm	NEXIS results	Firm 'and iconic'
1	Gensler	3,000+	154
2	NikSek	305	20
3	Aedas	1,369	161
4	HOK	3,000+	156
5	Aecom	3,000+	270
6	Fosters	3,000+	1,859
7	IBI	1,902	51
8	BDP	2,506	79
9	P&W	3,000+	173
10	SOM	3,000+	328

Source: Adapted from BDWA World Architecture 100 tables (2005–2014) and NEXIS.

media. No doubt there would be a good deal of consensus within the architectural community about which of these buildings could be considered uniquely iconic and which successful (or unsuccessful) typical icons. Those without professional architectural training might be hard-pressed to distinguish between the two categories. Figures 3.1 to 3.3 illustrate this point.

Another distinctive tower designed by SOM (in Dubai) provides an interesting comment on the distinction between unique and successful typical architectural icons. Explaining the decision to change the name from Infinity Tower (of which there are several) to Cayan Tower, the developer says: 'There are more than one tower with the name Infinity and we wanted something different. We are very attached with this unique project and it was a very conscious decision we took. We know there won't be any Cayan Tower in the world and this will be the only one.'[13]

The *World Architecture* and BDWA lists also provide additional data on regional markets and construction sectors. The numbers of relatively smaller firms from a wider variety of home countries competing successfully against the decade Top Ten has been growing. The criterion for ranking in the

Figure 3.1. Baku Flame Towers. (© HOK/Emporis)

Figure 3.2. Nanfung Complex. (© Aedas/Emporis)

regions is fee income, but the fact that fee income figures for 2003 excluded those firms that supplied only income bands and not actual figures makes these rankings less reliable. However, the information available permits us to draw some general conclusions on questions of changes in these architectural markets in this turbulent period. At first sight, tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that changes in the smaller markets were more significant than those in the bigger markets. Gensler and Nikken Sekkei fully justify their places as numbers one and two in the decade Top Ten, while of the other eight only BDP and HOK were top earners (in Western Europe and the Middle East, both in 2003, respectively, and both in the top 10 in other regions).

What is notable from these tables is the changing number of home countries of the firms in the top 10 by region. There were firms from 9 different countries in 2003, but by 2014 there were firms from 17 countries, suggesting that the grip of the biggest firms in some regions was starting to loosen, allowing smaller firms to win contracts even in the largest markets.

Construction sector names vary over time, making comparisons problematic. Gensler occupied the top place in only one sector in 2003 (albeit by far the biggest offices). In 2014 it was number one in offices, hospitality, and retail, suggesting that as the biggest firm in the world it was able to

Figure 3.3. One World Trade Center.

capture market sectors by successfully specializing in several building types. Altogether firms from only six separate home countries were represented in sector top 10s in 2003, with US-based firms dominating (about two-thirds of the places). However, this situation had changed somewhat by 2014, with only 40 per cent of top 10 places occupied by US-based firms, and 11 home countries represented. This may help to explain the surprising finding that there are several firms that were the highest fee earners in various regions or in various construction sectors for 2003 or 2014 that do not figure at all in the decade Top Ten (2005–2014) nor in the full table 3.1 of annual 'top 10s' from which the decade Top Ten was derived.

Table 3.5. BDWA top 10 fee earners in larger regional markets (2003 and 2014)

	North America	**Pacific rim**	**Western Europe**	**Australasia**
	Top Firm / top 10	Top Firm/ top 10	Top Firm/ top 10	Top Firm/ top 10
2003	URS (USA)/ USA10	Nikken Sekkei (Japan)/ Japan5 China3 Australia UK	BDP (UK)/ UK6 USA2 Germany Sweden	HBO + EMTB (Australia)/ Australia8 UK USA
2014	Gensler (USA)/ USA7 Canada2 UK	Nikken Sekkei (Japan)/ Japan4 S. Korea3 China2 USA	Tengbomgruppen (Sweden)/ UK2 Sweden, Austria Germany, Norway USA, Denmark Canada, France	Hassell (Australia)/ Australia7 New Zealand USA, Turkey

Sources: Adapted from *World Architecture* Top 300 (January 2003), *Building Design* World Architecture Top 100 (January 2014).

Table 3.6. BDWA top 10 fee earners in smaller regional markets (2003 and 2014)

	Central and Eastern Europe	**Middle East**	**Central Asia**	**South and Central America**	**Africa**
	Top Firm / top 10	Top Firm/ top 10	Top Firm/ top 10	TopFirm/ top 10	Top Firm/ top 10
2003	Henn(Germany)/ Germany4 USA3, Denmark, UK, Poland	HOK (USA)/ USA7, Canada Kuwait, UAE	HBO + EMTB (Australia)/ USA3, Japan2 Australia India Netherlands China, UK	KMD (USA)/ USA9 Mexico	Stauch Vorster (S. Africa)/ S. Africa6 USA4
2014	Heerim (S. Korea)/ UK3, Turkey2 USA, Portugal Spain, Japan Belgium	KEO (Kuwait)/ Kuwait3 USA3, UAE2 Turkey Canada	Gensler (US)/ USA3, India2 Turkey Australia, UK UK/USA, China	Gensler (US)/ USA6, Mexico UK, Japan Canada	Tabanlioglu (Turkey)/ USA3 S. Africa2 Turkey Portugal Spain, Japan UAE

Sources: Adapted from *World Architecture* Top 300 (January 2003), *Building Design* World Architecture Top 100 (January 2014).

Successful Typical Icons

Many firms outside as well as those inside the decade Top Ten have produced successful typical icons, buildings that have attracted professional and media attention, but not as unique global icons. For example, the Swedish firm Tengbomgruppen was the highest fee earner in Western Europe in 2014 and ranked 27 in the BDWA for that year (it entered the top 100 at number 28 in 2012). Founded in 1906[14] and restructured in 2006, the company cultivates both a global and an ecological profile. A Tengbom-designed office building won the first GreenBuilding certificate ever awarded in the Czech Republic, and the company has also won prizes for green building in Tanzania. Tengbom's Sino Swedish Eco City in Wuxi, China, won the *Architectural Review*/MIPIM prize in the category Big Urban Masterplan in 2011. The Tengbom building in Stockholm for Cannon is an excellent example of the successful typical iconic office building (figure 3.4). It is an interesting variant on the glass box with distinctive large vertical lettering, reminiscent of the eye-catching decorated shed motifs now common in cities all over the world. Irrespective of the professional aesthetic judgement

Figure 3.4. Cannon Stockholm. (© Holger Ellgaard, http://commons.wikimedia.org/File:Canonhuset_2009)

of architecture critics, to the untrained eye the building successfully copies several elements of the globally iconic office block.

Hassell, founded in Adelaide in 1938, was the highest fee earner in Australasia in 2014. A new entry at number 25 in the BDWA for 2014, Hassell designed the Sydney Olympic Park station, a variation on the glass canopies that now embellish railway stations all over the world, a successful typical local icon for which it won national awards from the Australian Institute of Architects (figure 3.5). Its most spectacular recent project is Palm Island near Chongqing, China, a new hospitality precinct mobilizing the attractions of glass and water, again locally successful and typical and unmistakably consumerist.

The final example concerns the work of Stauch Vorster, the only South African architecture firm to have topped a top 10 list (for the Africa region in 2003). This firm appears to show, even if in the exaggerated fashion expressed in a critical local website (posted in 2011), that not all typical architectural icons are successful.

> A commenter noted that Matlosana Mall might be the work of Stauch Vorster Architects. . . . Another mall. No, really, *another* one. Doesn't Klerksdorp already have two? How many malls can a town that size sustain? At least there's a giant, swooshy roof to distract us from what will inevitably be another faceless box in the landscape. Perhaps it's a metaphor for the death of another

Figure 3.5. Sydney Olympic Park rail station. (© J.W. C. Adam, http://commons.wikimediua.org/wiki/File:Olympicrailstationsydney)

> small town centre. The death of responsible urbanism in modern-day South Africa. The death of another investment fund duped into backing 60,000 square metres of unnecessary, ill-conceived, ill-fated retail architecture. (italics in original)[15]

While this may be an example of an unsuccessful typical icon, there are many successful typical icons at the local and city levels playing their parts in the Icon Project.

Celebrity Infrastructure

Of all building types celebrity infrastructure lends itself most to typical iconicity. By this I mean infrastructural elements that are turned into iconic commodities with market value beyond their immediate functions, and thereby become instruments of the Icon Project. We see this when airports become shopping malls, bridges become little theme parks, ports become leisure centres, and power stations become museums. While there is considerable debate over the best and most precise meaning of the term infrastructure, there is general agreement that it includes both physical (hard) and non-physical (soft) components.[16]

Physical infrastructure usually refers to utility plant and transportation networks (power stations, waterworks, roads, railways, airways, and waterways) and the structures that go over, under, and around them (bridges, tunnels, hubs, ports, dams, airports, and stations). Non-physical or soft infrastructure is now probably better termed cyberinfrastructure.[17]

Physical infrastructure did not feature much in medieval conceptions of the seven wonders of the classical world (the exception being the Lighthouse of Alexandria, which actually replaced the Ishtar Gate into Babylon from an earlier list). Of these, only the Great Pyramid at Giza survives as a genuine global architectural icon. Infrastructure plays an important role in more recent empires—as Zeynep Çelik (2008) shows, infrastructure was one of the means by which both the French and Ottoman authorities reinforced imperial power in the 19th century. This is just one example of a phenomenon that occurs throughout the history of imperialism and building.

In 2010 the American Society of Civil Engineers proclaimed seven wonders of the modern world in which no fewer than five were clearly infrastructural: the Channel Tunnel, the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, the Itaipu Dam between Brazil and Paraguay, the Delta and Zuiderzee flood protection works in the Netherlands, and the Panama Canal (the other two modern wonders were the CN Tower in Toronto and the Empire State Building). Another interesting indicator of the emergence of celebrity infrastructure is the Outstanding Structure Award of the International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering (IABSE), awarded annually since 2000. Of the 24 structures honoured up to 2012, 12 were infrastructural (including nine bridges). The list also included Burj Khalifa Tower in Dubai, Copenhagen Opera House, Milwaukee Art Museum, and the Guggenheim Bilbao, all more or less architectural icons in my sense of the term. This suggests a tendency to blur the lines between buildings and infrastructure that mirrors that between architecture and engineering, which, in a sense, takes us back to the origins of architecture and the larger part of its pre-modern history (Wells 2010).

There is a strong case for locating a watershed in the relations between architecture and engineering within the broad spectrum of design modernism that swept through Europe and the United States in the early decades of the 20th century. The impact of the machine in the landscape is vividly illustrated by images of new bridges, dams, highways, and skyscrapers. 'Ultimately, the machine in America helped to generate a new consumerism with increased government regulation establishing a hybrid of capitalism and socialism committed to mass production and mass consumption' (Wilson 1986: 348). The global depression and the Second World War, of course, interrupted the progress of these trends, but they intensified in the decades after 1945, especially when the electronic revolution from the 1960s made it possible to build previously impossible structures. This finds its clearest expression in the sheer volume of iconic architecture and celebrity infrastructure on which iconic architects have worked alongside Arup, the firm founded by Ove Arup in 1963, which is still probably the most famous and iconic firm in the history of the connection between engineering and architecture.[18]

Bridges and Tunnels

Many architects throughout history have been involved in building bridges, notably over the Seine, the Thames, the Huangpu, and in New York, where the Brooklyn Bridge over the East River is generally considered an architectural icon and a symbol of New York.

Matthew Wells (2010: 140ff.) notes the emergence of a new type of 'architectural engineer' at the beginning of the 20th century, centred in the

Technical College at Zurich and epitomized by Robert Maillart (1872–1940). This was a period of substantial modernization of infrastructure in the Third World. Jeffrey Cody (2003: 9–10) shows that 'one significant example of American architecture as an exported cultural product was the railway bridge'. The Atbara Bridge in Sudan and the Goktiek Viaduct in Burma are two among many other projects where US engineers were in competition with British firms (2003: ch. 1), a competitive market for infrastructure that has widened considerably since then. It is in China that we find the clearest evidence for this in the new millennium. Thomas Campanella (2008: 77ff.) explains that Puxi, west of the Huangpu River, is old Shanghai, the treaty-port city of the Bund, while Pudong on the east bank is a post-Mao growth zone. 'Shanghai planners [he writes] have used every form of infrastructure to pull the city's halves into a coherent whole, which is why the Huangpu is the most bridge-and-tunnel-crossed urban river in the world.' While a tunnel might have been cheaper, the authorities chose to build the Nanpu Bridge as the first crossing to Pudong, opened in 1991, followed by another spectacular bridge. Campanella offers a convincing explanation of why this happened: 'Tunnels are not photogenic; they strike no heroic silhouette against the sky, despite whatever ingenious engineering might have gone into their construction. A bridge, on the other hand, is a proud and soaring thing that makes for great publicity shots and tourist brochures . . . [bridges over the Huangpu] became landmarks in China overnight' (Campanella 2008: 77). A glossy oversized book celebrated these bridges, epitomizing the 'infrastructure pride' of China in recent decades. Eventually, tunnels were built to ease the traffic congestion.

In our times, probably the most successful and certainly the most visible builder of celebrity bridges is the architect-engineer Santiago Calatrava, trained as an architect in his hometown of Valencia in Spain, and then as an engineer in Zurich. His architectural signature embodies his working and reworking of the wings of a soaring bird motif, and this is immediately apparent in the many bridges that he has built, in Barcelona, Bilbao, Seville, Valencia, Zurich, Toronto, Dublin, Manchester, Israel, California, the Netherlands, even over the Grand Canal in Venice, and the list goes on.[19] It is evident that any bridge built by Calatrava immediately acquires a certain element of iconicity, and his influence can be seen in bridges all over the world, the typically iconic copies referencing their 'unique' originals (figures 3.6, 3.7).

Nicolas Sarkozy campaigned in 2007 at the spectacular Millau Viaduct, augmenting the celebrity infrastructure status that had already begun to

Figure 3.6. Calatrava-inspired bridge in São Paulo, Brazil (Viviane Riegel).

Figure 3.7. Calatrava-inspired bridge in Putrajaya, Malaysia.

cluster around it since its opening in 2004. It has featured in many media outlets, attracting attention from political leaders as well as design communities from California to China. A stamp was issued in France to celebrate its opening. The bridge was designed by French engineer Michel Virlogeux and Norman Foster (who got most of the Anglophone credit) and won an IABSE Outstanding Structure Award in 2006. Virlogeux, along with two French architects, also designed Pont de Normandie over the Seine outside Le Havre, the longest cable-stayed bridge in the world when it opened in 1995. While the other bridges discussed earlier have experienced a relatively low level of commodification, Pont de Normandie is an excellent example of celebrity infrastructure at a high level of commodification and corporatization, at the local and regional scale. This is not simply a bridge; it has some of the elements of a small theme park, with a video introduction, guided tours, souvenirs, murals and models of the construction of the project, interactive computer graphics, 'diaporamas', restaurant, and an 'engineers garden'. The informative brochure which greets visitors is issued by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Le Havre, a public institution of the French state servicing the industrial, trade, and service providers of its territory. The website of Pont de Normandie links directly with CCI Le Havre, and it is soon obvious that the bridge is an integral part of the tourist and business strategy of the region, fulfilling my criteria of celebrity infrastructure. The bridge is commodified to the extent that vehicles pay to use it (though pedestrians and bikes go free); corporatized to the extent that it was partly financed by corporate investment (sometime part-owned by the Australian Macquarie Group); decidedly run like a profit-oriented business; amplified through consumerism in realms that bridges do not obviously provide; and is clearly being turned into a local/regional icon (figure 3.8).[20]

While not all bridges are as celebrated as the Millau Viaduct or as commercially developed as Pont de Normandie, many are certainly exploited commercially at various scales. For example, the Øresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden (2000) has had a TV crime drama (*The Bridge*) based around it, and it is used in marketing in Scandinavia. It has also received the ultimate accolade in that part of the world: its image was employed to symbolize the connection between Sweden and the rest of Europe in the Eurovision Song Contest in 2013, thereby reaching an audience of many millions. It also won an IABSE Outstanding Structure Award in 2002 and was mobilized in the campaign against independence for Scotland as a curious exemplar of the benefits of international connections. The Vasco da Gama



Figure 3.8. Pont de Normandie.

Bridge in Lisbon exemplifies another route to celebrity infrastructure. Built as an integral physical and symbolic part of an urban megaproject (Lisbon World Fair/Expo '98), it celebrated the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the sea route from Europe to India by Vasco da Gama. It was designed by Michel Virlogeux, with the Portuguese architect Armando Rito. The financing of the bridge was achieved through a build-operate-transfer deal brokered by Lusoponte, a private consortium which takes the first 40 years of tolls from both of Lisbon's main bridges. Lusoponte's capital came from Portuguese, French, and British sources. In contrast to the after-the-event desolation of many other Expo sites, the Lisbon site quickly reopened. It was rebranded as Park of the Nations, along the beautifully landscaped waterfront, retaining the gardens, Oceanarium (the largest aquarium in Europe at the time), an observation tower, funicular, and the Virtual Reality pavilion from the Expo. Other buildings were 'repurposed' (which usually means commercialized). The main entrance was converted to the Centro Vasco da Gama, a regional shopping mall, the main exhibition pavilions became Lisbon International Exhibition Fair, the popular Utopia Pavilion became the Atlantic Pavilion, Lisbon's premier multi-purpose indoor arena, the Knowledge of the Seas (the theme of the Expo) Pavilion became a hands-on science museum, and a new casino was opened on the site. The main public transport hub, Oriente metro station, boasts a Calatrava-designed soaring bird wing roof. In the words of the Park of the Nations website: 'The area today is thriving, modern, stylish, and safe, attracting 18 million tourists a year to its gardens, museums, commercial areas and modern buildings. It has also become permanent residency for up to 25,000 people and one of Lisbon's premier business centres, with many multinational corporations basing their headquarters in its main avenue.'[21] The site as a whole, anchored by its iconic bridge, is an outstanding example of celebrity infrastructure. Even the status of the already iconic Sydney harbour bridge (opened in 1932) has been much enhanced by the global iconicity of the Sydney Opera House, and together they make a spectacular visual image for the city and for Australia as a tourist destination. The redevelopment of the area around the Opera House and Circular Quay, always busy with ferries from outlying districts of Sydney and spectacular cruise liners, exemplifies the atmosphere of consumerism and celebrity infrastructure.

A similar development won the 2013 Aga Khan Award for Architecture. The Rabat-Salé Urban Infrastructure Project in Morocco was commended as 'a sophisticated and cohesive model for future infrastructure projects, especially in places of rapid urbanisation,' and the centrepiece, the Hassan II Bridge, 'has become a new icon for Rabat-Salé, reinforcing a modern, progressive, twin-city identity' (*BD* 9 September 2013). And in China 5 out of the 10 longest bridges in the world today serve the country's high-speed rail network. One of the most celebrated items of celebrity infrastructure in China is the Shanghai Maglev train connecting the airport and Pudong, travelling at speeds in excess of 300 miles an hour. Flying to Shanghai does not stop at the airport.

To conclude this section on celebrity bridges, I would draw attention to the flurry of millennium bridges built in the United Kingdom around the year 2000, notably the so-called 'wobbly bridge' in London (by Fosters Arup, and the sculptor Anthony Caro) and also bridges in Gateshead, Lancaster, Glasgow, Salford, Stockton-on Tees, and York. Similar millennium projects are reported from Ireland, Montenegro, Poland, Spain, the United States, and Russia. The reason why so many bridges were built for the millennium is to be found, I think, in the argument of Campanella cited earlier, namely that bridges are an obvious and photogenic way to win lasting political credit and facilitate tourist and general consumer spending, celebrity infrastructure as an integral part of the Icon Project.

Transportation Infrastructure

It is easy to take transportation infrastructure for granted given its ubiquity in the lives of the majority of the population of the world now living in urban areas, and its effect on everyone, direct and indirect. With the emergence of motorways, autoroutes, autobahns, highways, and all the other long fast roads built to transport people and goods in the 20th century, freeways have acquired an iconicity of their own (Berman 1988: 164–71; Betsky 1997: 244–55). The Los Angeles freeway system, celebrated by Banham (1990) as autopia, has enjoyed celebrity infrastructure status globally almost since its inception, largely due to its Hollywood connection. This is not to say that it and other freeways are universally loved, but they are certainly well known and relentlessly mobilized in the service of consumerism. This is convincingly documented by Catherine Gudis (2004), who shows how in the 20th century freeways were turned into buyways by what I see as embryonic capitalist globalization in the United States. The large claims of Gudis are borne out by the story of how Walt Disney and his entourage flew over Orlando, Florida, in 1963 to prospect for a site on which to build Disneyland East. The clinching argument was the 'way the roads crossed', highlighting the primacy of potential customers. The pro-growth coalition in Orlando had focused on the highway system hoping for such an outcome, given that the state of Florida had a tradition of 'ceding public powers to private firms' (Foglesong 1999: 92). The Disney corporation offered to invest $600m in the state in exchange for enhanced infrastructure, political concessions, and an 'autonomous political district controlled by the company and empowered to issue tax-exempt bonds. . . . The actions by the State of Florida have made Walt Disney World a model both of privatization (as an approach to city building) and deregulation (as a strategy for stimulating tourist development) . . . [in Disney's words] a showcase for free enterprise' (93–94). The Epcot Center, more or less a permanent World's Fair, opened in 1982 and its costs (traffic congestion, low-wage tourist industry, rising house prices, and blocks on effective public planning) were mostly externalized to the public purse, while its profits accrued to the private sector. This would be the urban model for the whole of North America, soon to be globalized by what Zukin (1991) theorized as 'landscapes of power' and Sorkin (1992) 'variations on a theme park'. The developmental, economic, and social impacts of transportation infrastructure are enormous.

In Europe, the EU has been discussing Europe-wide high-speed road networks for decades and a Eurasian transport network is on the table. The enlargement of the European Union has led to even more ambitious plans, including new trans-European transport network (TEN-T) guidelines with respect to seaports, inland ports, and intermodal terminals. All this legislation, of course, is being energetically promoted by corporate lobbying groups from around the world and prospects for expensive celebrity infrastructure seem rosy, even in times of economic austerity. The hotly contested proposed new High Speed 2 rail network in England is a case in point. It is significant that the proposal to create a new city around Euston station (the southern hub of the project) has been sweetened by the suggestion that the original neo-classical Euston Arch regarded as iconic by some influential campaigners be reinstated, presumably to soften the atmosphere created by the forest of tower blocks to be built if the developers get their way.[22] The Pan-American highway system on the other side of the Atlantic, promoted as the world's longest motorable road, is not yet complete and the idea, though controversial, is a powerful symbolic presence (http://brilliantmaps.com/pan-american-highway/).

In the United Kingdom, the new millennium saw a flurry of projects, driven at least partly by the celebrity-obsessed 'cool Britannia' mentality of the then New Labour government (1997–2010) and its corporate partners. 'If ever there was an opportunity to enrich British infrastructure in the new spirit of architecture, the millennium has delivered it. . . . A dozen or so "landmark projects" including a couple of bridges, several art galleries, museums and theatres, the showplace stations for the new Jubilee line, and a multitude of community, civic and environmental projects where the architecture ranges from the distinguished to the mundane' (Papadakis 2000: 6). Among the designers were most of the best-known architects in Britain, featuring what were to become some of their most iconic contemporary architectural icons, notably Fosters (Millennium Bridge, Canary Wharf tube station, Great Court at the British Museum), Grimshaw (Eden Project), Hadid (Mind Zone in the Millennium Dome), Herzog & de Meuron (Tate Modern), Miralles (Scottish Parliament), Rogers (Millennium Dome), Wilford (Lowry Centre in Manchester), Marks and Barfield (London Eye), Hopkins (Westminster tube station), and, of course, Arup, involved in many of the most high-profile projects. The 2012 London Olympics stimulated a new burst of celebrity transportation infrastructure and most contracts had been signed before the ongoing financial crisis that began in 2008.[23] Redevelopment of the St Pancras–King's Cross transport hub was already underway due to the relocation of the London end of the Eurostar rail link from Waterloo station to St Pancras International. John McAslan & Partners, the lead architects and master planners for the transformation of King's Cross Station, successfully combined reuse, restoration, and new build to transform the station and create a spectacular Western Concourse, immediately dubbed an 'iconic architectural gateway' to the city in time for the Olympics. That this was deliberately designed as what I term celebrity infrastructure is strongly supported by the following statement: 'The phrase "architectural" icon has certainly become rather debased, but there is no doubt that John McAslan + Partners, Arup, the contractors and ultimately Network Rail, ultimately sought a new concourse whose very presence would be iconic, an architectural brand mark signifying a step-change in the aesthetic and operational quality of a massive intermodal transport hub at the nexus of London's newest creative industries hotspot' (Schittich and Brensing 2013: 49). London's own version of the bullet train, the Javelin, transported around 100,000 passengers daily to the Olympic Park from St Pancras in seven thrilling minutes. For many this was an exciting part of the Olympic experience, an exercise in celebrity infrastructure creation. The Javelin is being integrated into rail services to the south coast and there are ambitious plans to repurpose the Olympic park. The company operating the Javelin, Southeastern, is part-owned by SNCF, which runs the high-speed rail system in France. There are normally surcharges on high-speed lines; celebrity infrastructure like all iconic projects comes at a price. And in Hong Kong, the mass transit system (MTR) is developing 'small town' projects around its subway stations. Transport is no longer the most important part of its business, so MTR becomes the developer of consumerist space, interior as well as exterior. This is symptomatic of more general trends.

While roads of all types are as old as civilization itself, and trains arrived in the 19th century, airports are an invention of the early 20th century. In her fascinating analysis of the evolution of airports, Lucy Budd (2012) explains how they were transformed from simple flying fields to 21st-century aerocities, connecting globalizing cities, celebrity infrastructure, and tourism and signalling the importance of newly created retail space and mixed-use development for the culture-ideology of consumerism. It is no great surprise that these aerocities are among the largest buildings in the world, a title that Terminal 3 of Dubai International Airport claimed in terms of total floor area in 2014. No doubt it will soon be overtaken in this global megaproject competition by even larger celebrity infrastructures.[24] Also in this category is the enormous Osaka-Kansai airport, built in the 1990s and designed by Renzo Piano. The project necessitated the construction of an artificial island, which began to sink as the enormous structure was put in place. Shortly after it opened in 1994, the Kobe earthquake struck, devastating the region. However, the airport survived almost intact due to its advanced engineering.[25] Near enough to be a competitor, the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok, designed by Fosters, is notable for its thrilling atrium and retail opportunities. The architects helpfully posted endorsements of the building from architecture writers on their website.[26] With a distinctive logo, a variation on the Nike swoosh, it boasts its own World Trade Centre, with full business and leisure facilities. With no trace of irony, HKIA markets itself as a Green Gateway. All of the recently built and planned aerocities will have some measure of at least regional celebrity infrastructure about them, given their centrality in the global systems of tourism and business travel driven by consumerism. Also spectacular and also prize-winning was Kurokawa's Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), with its locally referenced 'Islamic-style domes' and its effective bringing together of the high-tech airport and the jungle outside (Citibank looks after your money and the architecture lets you enjoy the jungle in comfort).[27] In 2006 Richard Rogers and his team won the RIBA Stirling Prize for their Terminal 4 at Madrid Barajas airport, widely regarded as a spectacular space (figures 3.9, 3.10).

The latest, at time of writing, is the spectacular new Bao'an airport serving Shenzhen designed by the Fuksas team from Italy, instantly dubbed iconic and recruited to the Icon Project in Shenzhen.

Arguably the most globally iconic piece of celebrity airport infrastructure, at least for those in and around architecture, is the old TWA terminal

Figure 3.9. KLIA.

Figure 3.10. Barajas Madrid.

at JFK in New York, designed by Eero Saarinen (1956–62). With its soaring concrete bird-like winged roof, it appears in most glossy picture books of the best in 20th-century architecture, a clear sign of unique iconicity (e.g., Glancey 1998: 104; Tietz 1999: 73; Jencks 2005: 29–31; Thiel-Siling 2005: 90–1). Efforts to save what *The Architect's Newspaper* of New York called Saarinen's 'icon of both modern air travel and modern design' have been gaining momentum ever since it was threatened with demolition when Pan Am went out of business in 1999 (see Ho 2004). After a few years of use as a venue for innovative art installations, in November 2011 the partially reconstructed building was opened to the public for three hours and drew large and enthusiastic crowds of architects and nostalgic travellers. The New York Port Authority, owner of the site, was reported to be looking for private companies to repurpose the building, for example, as a hotel or restaurants, perhaps spaces to relax before catching a shuttle to another terminal, all high-end consumerist options. The TWA terminal may not be saved as celebrity infrastructure, though its iconic status will surely survive.

Water-Based Infrastructure

In her insightful analysis of the building of the Marathon Dam near Athens, Maria Kaika tells us that the contract was won by the New York–based Ulen & Co. in 1926 on a budget that exceeded the stock and reserve funds of the National Bank of Greece (no comment). This project was emblematic in three ways. First, it was obviously a historically symbolic location; second, it established water control as a generator of modernization outside the city, which thus became separated from nature; and third, 'the beginning of the 20th century heralded a period when technology asserted its own aesthetic value, acquired its own aesthetic expressions and was fetishized and admired in and of itself. . . . While cars embodied an individualized technological sublime, dams evinced a collective sublime' (Kaika 2005: 127). All visible parts of the dam were covered with the same type of marble as the Parthenon, thus turning it into a shrine for modern Athens, to which locals and tourists made pilgrimages in large numbers until the 1970s. From Athens to the west of the United States, huge dams were built and became famous. In his evocation of the machine in the landscape in the first half of the 20th century, Richard Wilson (1986: 90–91) points out that the first issue of *Life Magazine* in November 1936 featured Margaret Bourke-White's iconic photograph of the gigantic Fort Peck Dam on its cover. The combination of machine monumentality and streamlining, reinforced by such icons of architecture and engineering as the Hoover (1936), Aswan (1970), Itaipu (1983), and Three Gorges (2009) dams, created the conditions for varying degrees of celebrity infrastructure status for all of these. They are all tourist sites, at the very least. The Hoover Dam is well developed commercially, attracting visitors from far afield (including overspill from Las Vegas); the Aswan Dam has spawned a thriving tourist industry with an international airport, museums, and local antiquities; Philip Glass has written a symphonic cantata to celebrate the Itaipu Dam; and the Three Gorges is already the subject of more than one film, notably the documentary *Up the Yangtse* (2007). This focuses on the transition from a peasant-based economy to consumer capitalism and portrays the human cost as well as the technological achievement of the project. It was featured at the Sundance festival and earned critical acclaim outside China, though information on its reception in China is more difficult to find. Dams (indeed most celebrity infrastructures) are regularly featured on *National Geographic*'s *MegaStructures* TV series, screened all over the world (http://natgeotv.com/uk/megastructures).

Waterfront developments are now common components in many globalizing cities, usually seen as an integral part of urban regeneration (Meyer 1999; Kostopoulou 2013). Starting in my own birth city Glasgow, the Clyde Waterfront project extends for 20 kilometres to the sea in an attempt to transform what was once known as the 'workshop of the empire'. The Clyde, where some of the biggest ships of the first half of the 20th century were built, had fallen into dilapidation when in 1983 an entrepreneurial Labour local administration launched the 'Glasgow's Miles Better' advertising campaign, now widely regarded as one of the first and most successful attempts to rebrand a post-industrial city. The iconization of the architect/designer Charles Rennie Mackintosh (and, to some extent, his wife Margaret) was and still is an important part of this project, stimulating scholarly comparisons with Bilbao and Barcelona (Gomez 1998; Knox 2011: 196–7). Clyde Waterfront takes the process further, bolstered by around 200 projects great and small, including residential, retail, campus building, and entertainment in various guises, the typical elements of the mixed-use fantasy city (Hannigan 1998). Architectural icons (self as well as critically bestowed) include the new Transport (now Riverside) Museum, another controversial design by Zaha Hadid. Fosters Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre contains the Clyde Auditorium, known locally as the Armadillo, marketed by the local authority as Glasgow's most iconic building, seen by millions in TV coverage of the Commonwealth Games in 2014. A new mega entertainment venue, The Hydro (named for a Scottish power company), whose skin apparently shimmers with 12.8 million colours followed. Eager not to miss the opportunity to leverage industrial Glasgow's glorious past, the Titan crane was reinvented as a monumental sculpture. In the words of *BD*: 'Scotland's own "Angel of the North" [is] now set to become the icon at the heart of a wider £450 million regeneration project' (14 January 2005). In 2007 the crane was listed as a Category A historical structure and refurbished as a tourist attraction and shipbuilding museum. Clyde Waterfront is funded by Scottish national and local government, and Enterprise Scotland. This independent state agency was set up specifically to be business (i.e., private enterprise) friendly, reminiscent of the organization of Le Havre CCI around Pont de Normandie. In this sphere the political fraction of the TCC (globalizing politicians and officials) often drives celebrity infrastructure, always with the collaboration if not major investment of the private sector. The success in capturing the Commonwealth Games for Glasgow in 2014 and the concomitant building of new facilities imbued Clyde Waterfront with the prospect of further celebrity infrastructure.

Indeed, everywhere we find a river, a lake, or a coast there is the potential for waterfront development, as already seen in Lisbon and Sydney. The list includes major high-profile cases such as South Street Seaport and Battery Park City in New York, Baltimore Harbor, Seaport Village in San Diego, Lakeside in Chicago, and Melbourne (for which see Dovey 2004). Similar projects were constructed in Toronto, Cape Town, Docklands, the South Bank, and Thames Gateway (all three in London), Salford Keys in Manchester, Cardiff Bay, Amsterdam, and the Marne Valley east of Paris, plus smaller, but locally important waterfront developments such as Port Louis in Mauritius and Fremantle in Australia. All these, at the very least, tend to become locally iconic and sites of conflict between corporate interests and indigenous culture. For example, in their case study of the Golden Horn Cultural Valley project, Gunay and Dokmeci (2012) provide an interesting discussion of the competing claims of corporate consumerist interests and culture per se in the quest for Istanbul's place in the hierarchy of global cities.

There are, of course, exceptions. Wendel (2012) offers a trenchant analysis of the Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans before and after the 2005 hurricane. This is an object lesson in the political economy of infrastructure and architecture in times of strife. For decades the Lower Ninth had been officially assumed to be unviable, and thus easy to categorize after 2005 as not worth rehabilitation. However, this class-biased and racist assumption was challenged by community organizations and architects (Wendel refers to 'untethered architecture'). Unlike in more prosperous areas of New Orleans, architecture's autonomy in the community was not disconnected from the infrastructure it relied on. The hurricane showed that infrastructure is closely connected with social justice issues and cannot be isolated from architecture as a private domain. Working with local organizations and local architects, Brad Pitt's 'Make it Right' Foundation began to rebuild communities in New Orleans and created what Wendel terms green 'iconicity' in the Lower Ninth (545). Night lighting from solar panels provided a positive symbol for the recovering neighbourhood. Between December 2006 and November 2011 'Make it Right' rebuilt 75 of a projected 150 safe, energy-efficient, and affordable homes for families who had lost everything to Hurricane Katrina. It is ironic that Brad Pitt, a genuine celebrity who had previous architectural involvement with Frank Gehry, could be instrumental in creating a new type of celebrity infrastructure from the devastation of New Orleans.

Most of the networks, structures, and hubs I have discussed, to reiterate the main point of my celebrity infrastructure thesis, are integral parts of consumerism and the Icon Project as they drive the relentless quest for private profit, often subsidized by and almost always enthusiastically facilitated by the globalizing political fraction of the TCC. Celebrity infrastructure is to some extent a creature of typical iconic architecture, leveraging the relative simplicity and reproducibility of bridges, transportation hubs, and waterfront developments. What they all have in common is that they enable the expansion of consumerist space (particularly retail and entertainment space) where little or none had existed before. This can be seen as a spectacular success for the Icon Project.

The next chapter focuses on starchitects and their role in the corporate fraction of the TCC. It compares the career trajectories and works of Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, the two undisputed starchitects of the first half of the 20th century (though they were considered in these terms only after they died) with contemporary starchitects and their works, routinely designated in these terms. Today, the starchitect cadre of the corporate fraction of the TCC has many distinctive architectural characteristics, but it is also fulfilling a key function for capitalist globalization through its participation in the Icon Project.

4

Corporate Starchitects and Unique Icons

Although some find it unpleasant and others find it flippant, the term 'starchitect' is theoretically useful for the sociology of architecture. It connects the world of the architect with the world of celebrity, and it connects architecture as an esoteric aesthetic practice with architecture as an industry in the public eye. Over the last few years, the term has become well established in the mass media and in trade publications, and it is also, slowly, starting to be taken seriously by scholars in and around architecture (e.g., McNeill 2009, Ponzini and Nastasi 2011; Knox 2012; Gravari-Barbas and Renard-Delautre 2015). The quest for fame, of course, is not new. Leon Battista Alberti, universal man, prodigious self-promoter of the early renaissance, and still an architectural notable, wrote an allegorical play on fame in the 1440s, recently reprinted (Alberti 1987).[1] Neither Frank Lloyd Wright (1869–1959) nor Le Corbusier (1887–1965, Corb) shunned publicity; both were what we would now call celebrities. Their rivalry is well documented, mostly in arguments around different conceptions of modernism—they never met. Noting that Wright called the Villa Savoye, one of Corb's most celebrated buildings, 'a box on stilts', the cultural historian Nicholas Cox Weber, in his life of Corb, comments: 'Today, it is an icon of twentieth-century design and has spawned countless imitations all over the world' (2008: 288; see also Etlin 1994). Wright and Corb died around the time capitalist globalization was beginning to establish itself as a truly global system, and their own lives contained significant measures of socially produced iconicity. Although these terms were not used about them during their lifetimes, they can be considered proto-global and proto-iconic architects, by which I mean that the terms 'global' and 'iconic' are fruitfully employed today about them and their surviving architectural works. So, before considering the starchitects of our time, it is instructive first of all to delve briefly into the careers of these two most iconic architects of the first half of the 20th century. Wright and Corb both enjoy institutional legacies and continue to have plenty of enthusiasts. First, let us look at Wright and what we may without much exaggeration term the Frank Lloyd Wright (FLW) industry.

Frank Lloyd Wright and the Frank Lloyd Wright Industry

When Wright died in 1959, a matter of weeks before his Guggenheim Museum in New York opened, he was already a legend in the United States and abroad.[2] It may be helpful, at this point, to explain that this is my own favourite building and, in my view, his crowning achievement. In a very real sense, it is the reason I wanted to write this book. The images and emotions of an afternoon in 1960 spent wandering up and down the famous spiral ramp somehow lodged themselves in my subconscious to emerge 40 years later with an intense urge to research iconic architecture and capitalist globalization. A professor in New York recalled seeing Wright's Guggenheim for the first time as a child: 'It was an incredibly tempting space, you want to roller skate down it. This was the first building I was aware of as an architectural object' [NY19]. On my most recent visit (spring 2012) my feelings about this building were, if anything, more intense, though the adjoining structures had changed somewhat over the years (figure 4.1).

Wright's own factually unreliable autobiography, first published in 1932, revised in 1943, and reissued in a 'definitive' posthumous edition (Wright 1977), complements many published accounts of his life and works, specialist studies by architects on his buildings, and the archive of his life in many media. Twenty years after his death, an annotated Wright bibliography (Sweeney 1978) already included more than 2,000 items. The FLW industry has expanded rapidly since then, including novels (mostly about his tempestuous sex life), an opera (Muldoon 1993), plays, and, of course, 'So Long, Frank Lloyd Wright'—Simon and Garfunkel's perennial classic. In 1991 the American Institute of Architects called him 'the greatest American architect of all time'; he famously considered himself 'the greatest architect who ever lived'.

Figure 4.1. Guggenheim New York.

This level of attention is due to at least three factors: his prodigious architectural productivity, the theatricality of his personal life, and the institutional legacy he left behind. The most important factor today is the institutional legacy supported, as it is, on the bulwarks of his iconic buildings. The Spring 2015 issue of the *Frank Lloyd Wright Quarterly*, a magazine published by the FLW Foundation, listed 72 Wright sites open for public access. This is remarkable for the work of a single architect, as several Wright sites have a body of professional staff and all involve enthusiasts and volunteers. These sites range from the globally iconic Fallingwater, which celebrated its 75th anniversary in 2011, to the locally iconic Park Inn Hotel in Mason City, Iowa. What these buildings have in common are that Wright designed them and that they have both been expensively restored, the former arguably the most famous private house ever built, the latter a small hotel. Fallingwater has been voted the most important building of the 20th century in a poll conducted by the American Institute of Architects and, despite its relatively remote location, attracts more than 100,000 visitors a year (figure 4.2). To quote the marketing blurb in 2012: 'Fallingwater has joined a rapidly growing list

Figure 4.2. Fallingwater.

of interactive apps catered to architects and architecture fanatics. Brought to you by <planet architecture>, you may now explore the iconic 1930's Pennsylvania home right from your media device. Get a behind-the-scenes tour through hundreds of photographs, floor plans, archival drawings, VR panoramas and over 25 minutes of video clips from the documentary film.'

The Park Inn Hotel, now marketed as 'Wright on the Park' (with his adjacent City National Bank building), has also been restored and transformed into a 'boutique hotel' at a reported cost of $18 million. This is a Prairie School building—(Wright's attempt to create an original aesthetic for the United States characterized by horizontal lines and flat roofs evoking the prairies)—currently taking reservations and encouraging enthusiasts to join in FLW conservancy work. All over the United States, notably in Buffalo and in California, Wright buildings have been restored. He designed over 1,000 projects in his career, fewer than half of which were actually completed. It is entertaining if fruitless to speculate how many buildings of any living architects today will survive more than 50 years after their death.

If we are to understand the contemporary iconicity of Wright and his architecture, the significance of his two homes and workplaces (in Spring Green, Wisconsin, and in Scottsdale, Arizona) cannot be overestimated.[3] In 1932, threatened by severe financial crisis, Wright and his energetic third wife Olgivanna established a student fellowship programme in their family home in Spring Green (which he had occupied, off and on, since 1911) under the aegis of the Frank Lloyd Wright School of Architecture. Taliesen, inspired by his Welsh heritage, was more than an extended architecture master class for awe-struck apprentices. It was an attempt to mould a new culture of art and communal living, albeit on a rather hierarchical, almost feudal, model based on manual labour, architectural practice, and cultural inspiration. The programme attracted an impressive array of students from all over the world, and in the mid-1930s a winter camp was established in Arizona (Taliesen West) to shelter the Wrights from the rigours of Wisconsin winters, to which everyone decamped until spring arrived again in Spring Green. Hundreds of students and other enthusiasts have passed through the Taliesen experience, and it survives as a School of Architecture at Scottsdale to this day. The FLW Foundation, to which Wright bequeathed his considerable archive with the express purpose of carrying on his work after his death, was established in Taliesen West and has evolved over the decades as the centre of Wright scholarship and inspiration, despite economic difficulties. In 1990 a campaign 'Arizona Celebrates Frank Lloyd Wright' was launched. As the eminent critic Paul Goldberger (1990) reported in the *New York Times*: 'Joining the trend toward the marketing of architect-designed objects, the foundation has begun to license certain Wright furniture, fabrics and tabletop objects for reproduction. Taliesin West now has a bookstore, which looks all too much like the shops spawned by cash-hungry museums all over the country: it stocks Frank Lloyd Wright sweatshirts, coffee mugs, yo-yos and teddy bears.' According to staff, visitor numbers in the early 2000s rose from 40,000 to 120,000 a year, and revenues from $200,000 to $2 million. The Wrights' living room, previously off-limits, is now the mainstay of the tours [US2]. In 2012 in collaboration with Columbia University and MoMA, the Taliesen archive moved to New York. This is clear evidence of an ever-increasing interest in Wright and the marketability of his reputation.[4]

Legally separate from but otherwise intimately connected with the Foundation, Taliesen Associated Architects (TAA) was founded by Wright in the 1930s. After his death, it attempted to carry on his architectural legacy while subject to a good deal of criticism. In a highly regarded study of Wright's life and work, Twombly excoriates the 'post-Wright' work of TAA: 'Helped by its design insensitivity and by several of its own structures, an artsy commercialism is insinuating its way through Wright's landscape, slowly but inevitably encasing his legacy in middle-brow, slickly veneered ticky-tacky, a kind of Playboy Club moderne without the bunnies' (1979: vi–vii). Even some buildings that were completed while Wright was still alive in the 1950s or shortly after his death on the basis of his designs are not exempt from criticism. Twombly explains this in aesthetic/symbolic terms, citing the crude circularity evident in the Annunciation Greek Orthodox Church in Wisconsin, the Grady Gammage Auditorium in Arizona, and the plan (never realized) for greater Baghdad (1979: 350–1). It is a measure of Wright's iconicity that these designs (which never achieved iconicity much beyond the local level), appear to have done no lasting damage to his reputation. Indeed, in a process that repeats in the careers of contemporary starchitects, the mistakes are forgiven though not always forgotten and the iconicity increases. Twombly comments: 'By the 1960s Wright's once controversial and mind-boggling designs were so familiar to many Americans that major corporations [Goodyear, Atlantic-Richfield, Mobil Oil, General Motors] could appropriate them to hawk their wares' (1979: 398, and 399–407). However, opinion on the architectural record of TAA is divided, and there are those who consider that the firm contributed to bringing Wright up to date. TAA was disbanded in 2003. The photographer Julius Shulman recounted a visit to the drafting room at Taliesen, noting that Wright was very ambivalent about students trying to reproduce 'his style' of building. Wright asked why anyone would want one of his disciples to design a house for them when they could have him [CA16].

The relationship between very famous architects and their 'disciples' is usually fraught with difficulties. In Wright's case, this is exemplified in research on the Monona Terrace project in Madison, Wisconsin, completed in 1997 by TAA from drawings first made by Wright in 1938 and revised more than once by him in the 1950s. Documentary evidence reinforces the argument that what eventually got built can be reconciled with at least some of his design concepts, though critics remain unconvinced that this is a genuine Frank Lloyd Wright building. Mollenhoff and Hamilton (1999) in their study of Monona Terrace suggest that Wright's anxiety to get something actually built in the state of his birth before he died may have compromised the aesthetic integrity of the project. His friend and biographer Brendan Gill comments: 'Wright having been turned into a commodity more "commercial" than he ever succeeded in being in life, some of the products that he lent his talent and name to in the nineteen-fifties are today being manufactured and profitably marketed' (Gill 1987: 18). This is not incompatible with the view from Taliesen West: 'Frank Lloyd Wright is iconic because all his work is based on principle. That is why interest in the work and the man will continue to grow' [US1].

The Foundation at Taliesen West continues to run an impressive educational and cultural programme along the lines created by Wright and Olgivanna in the 1930s. All the media of dissemination that we will find for the four contemporary starchitects dealt with in this chapter are evident in the FLW industry today: a constant stream of biographical material, student memoirs, vanity publications, critical articles in specialist journals, profiles of the buildings, textbook discussions, news items in architectural, cultural, and mass media (notably on conservancy work on the older buildings), plus, of course, all the fruits of the digital revolution. These include an eBook on Taliesen West, and a DVD on Fallingwater available as an iPad and iPhone app. The *Frank Lloyd Wright Quarterly* regularly advertises new FLW-branded products, on sale in the stores at Taliesen West, major Wright sites, and many cultural venues in the United States and abroad (e.g., Cité de L'Architecture in Paris). The fall 2000 Frank Lloyd Wright Gallery catalogue from Marshall Field's department store chain in the United States had 35 pages of goods for sale. When the chain was acquired by Macy's, this appears to have been discontinued, though items from the catalogue are briskly traded on e-Bay. The Chicago-based ShopWright company directly supports the restoration, preservation, and education programmes of the Frank Lloyd Wright Trust through the sale of an impressive array of Wright-themed products (shopwright.org). A benefit dinner on 17 June 2009 to mark the exhibition 'Frank Lloyd Wright: From Within Outward' at the Guggenheim New York advertised tickets ranging from $100,000 for signature sponsors to single places at $1,000. And in June 2017 a major retrospective to commemorate Frank Lloyd Wright's 150th birthday will open at MoMa in New York. Frank Lloyd Wright was an iconic architect on a global scale during his lifetime, and his iconicity has been maintained, even enhanced, since his death by a thriving FLW industry.

Le Corbusier and the Corb Industry

The Le Corbusier Foundation (FLC) in France has created a Corb industry similar in some respects to the FLW industry but on a smaller scale. The current reputation of Le Corbusier is probably higher than that of FLW in architectural circles, especially outside the United States,[5] but the level of commercial exploitation of his name, while evident, is not so high. As in the case of Wright, legacy was deliberately planned. 'Having become Le Corbusier, without direct heirs and driven by the fear that his carefully conserved archives and works be scattered after his death, he spent the last fifteen years of his life conceiving and implementing, down to its smallest details, the project of a Foundation that would bear his name' (FLC website). The Foundation lists its activities as follows: maintaining buildings open to the public, *Maison La Roche* and Corb's apartment at 24 rue Nungesser et Coli in Paris, the Petite Maison at Corseaux (Switzerland), and Maison Jeanneret. This is a little misleading, as 78 buildings are listed as extant by FLC and illustrated on the website. Villa Savoye, Ronchamp, and Unité d'Habitation apartment block in Marseilles are undoubtedly global icons, and the latter has a hotel floor where we can (and did) enjoy bed and breakfast and gourmet dinners. The Foundation publishes a series of guides to the buildings with Birkhauser, and oversees a professional programme of conservation of the architectural work spanning four continents and eleven countries. In summer 2015, FLC facilitated a major exhibition at the Pompidou Centre offering a 'new interpretation' of Le Corbusier's life and work.

Le Corbusier has been more influential on architecture outside his homelands (he was born in Switzerland and lived for most of his life in France) than Wright, who built little outside his native United States. While he was well-known in Europe and Latin America (Eggener 1999a), there is no work on Wright comparable with Quezado Deckker (2001) on Corb's influence on modernism in Brazil, or in India.[6] Exhibitions and conferences around the world on Corb's work are frequent and numerous. He is, not surprisingly, a notable presence in the magnificent Cité de L'Architecture space in Paris, complete with a reconstruction of an apartment from Unité d'Habitation. Villa Savoye, saved from dereliction by the French state, is now a popular, if low-key, tourist attraction. More than 70 events marking the 125th anniversary of Corb's birth were organized in London alone. Brand-stretching outside the realm of architecture includes the Corbusier chaise longue, often described as a design icon of the 20th century (https://iconicinteriors.com/about_us/meet_the_designers/le_corbusier/), Corb greetings cards, and IsabellaOliver.com fashion wear. And a Lego version of the Villa Savoye is on sale in the iconic Villa Savoye (see figure 4.3).[7]

FLC has coordinated applications to UNESCO seeking World Heritage status for Corb's works. Bodies from six countries (Germany, Argentina, Belgium, Japan, Switzerland, and France) have joined forces in this undertaking, indicating the transnational reach of his legacy. UNESCO has twice rejected the application. The US government has also nominated 10 Wright

Figure 4.3. Buy your LEGO Villa Savoye at the Villa Savoye.

sites for World Heritage status. The Corb application succeeded in 2016, but Frank Lloyd Wright will have to wait, perhaps until the United States regains its vote at UNESCO.

While there are interesting comparisons to be made between the much-discussed urban visions of Corb (Ville Radieuse) and Wright (Broadacre City) in the 1930s, suffice it to say here that the Radiant City vision has been blamed and celebrated in equal measure for all that is wrong with and much that is right with cities today. Peter Hall sums up Corb's contribution as follows: 'The evil that Le Corbusier did lives after him; the good is perhaps interred with his books, which are seldom read for the simple reason that most are almost unreadable' (1996: 204). What Le Corbusier never had was the Taliesen factor, and with all that Taliesen brings to the equation, FLW probably still has the edge in the public sphere. Nevertheless, if the sincerest compliment is imitation, as figures 4.4 and 4.5 show, they both still enjoy a high measure of iconicity.[8]

Table 4.1 reproduces a NEXIS search on Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier showing total results on the architect name searches and breakdowns of results on four buildings 'and iconic', all in my terms unique

Figure 4.4. Guggenheim New York 'Love It! Bite It!', edible dog chews. (© Liu Wei, 2005. Image courtesy of the Saatchi Gallery, London)



Figure 4.5. Bank of America 'Ronchamp' in Palm Springs.

Table 4.1. Wright and Le Corbusier: NEXIS totals and results for four icons 'and iconic'

	Total	Iconic	Iconic	Iconic	Iconic
Wright	1,803	Guggenheim New York 998	Fallingwater 328	Robie House 83	Unity Temple 22
Le Corbusier	1,193	Chandigarh 186	Ronchamp 69	Villa Savoye 65	Unité d'Habitation 37

Source: NEXIS.

global architectural icons. The relatively high scores for the Guggenheim in New York and Fallingwater reflect the fact that these buildings are in the public realm outside their localities in a way that the Robie House and Unity Temple (professional icons for architects) are not. This is also the case for all four Corb icons, professional icons but with limited exposure in the wider public realm. The specialist literature would show different results, for example, William Curtis in his authoritative textbook of 1996 devotes one chapter to Wright, three to Le Corbusier, and one more on Wright, Corb, and Mies.

Table 4.1 shows that it is difficult to sustain iconicity in the public sphere after the death of the architect and especially for older buildings that never got the level of media attention bestowed on unique icons today when they were unveiled. Nevertheless, these two giants of 20th-century architecture are by no means forgotten. Their scores in the public media are substantial though, as we shall see, well behind the performance in this arena of the top starchitects and signature architects of today, despite the textbooks and professional journals.

The proliferation of signature architects and starchitects in the era of capitalist globalization cannot be entirely explained by an increase in architectural genius. It is to more efficient and more ubiquitous methods of marketing made possible by the electronic revolution and their economic, political, and culture-ideology consequences that we must turn if we are to understand the changes that have taken place since the middle of the 20th century. The Icon Project works through signature architects and starchitects, as it does through the firms discussed in the previous chapter, but in different ways.

The Rise of the Starchitects

I have defined iconic architecture in terms of a combination of fame and symbolic/aesthetic significance.[9] The work of globally iconic architects is now commonly referred to as starchitecture, and these architects are referred to, not always benevolently, as starchitects. It is no coincidence that the Wikipedia entry on 'Starchitect' opens with an image of Gehry's Guggenheim Bilbao and focuses its definition on 'The Bilbao Effect and the rise of "wow-factor" architecture'. Wikipedia gives us a fair representation of current media representations of the topic:

> Starchitect. . . . is a portmanteau used to describe architects whose celebrity and critical acclaim have transformed them into idols of the architecture world and may even have given them some degree of fame amongst the general public. Celebrity status is generally associated with avant-gardist novelty. Developers around the world have proven eager to sign up 'top talent' (i.e., starchitects) in hopes of convincing reluctant municipalities to approve large developments, of obtaining financing or of increasing the value of their buildings. A key characteristic is that the architect's designs are almost always iconic and highly visible within the site or context. As the status is dependent on current visibility in the media, fading media status implies that architects

> lose 'starchitect' status—hence a list can be drawn up of former 'starchitects'. (Wikipedia, 'Starchitects', accessed 17 April 2013)[10]

I make no apology for citing Wikipedia here and elsewhere, for this is where most non-specialists get their information. While the term 'iconic' is part of the definition of starchitect, it is not defined, a feature common in such discussions among journalists, bloggers, and scholars. The four architects who top the list of media attention since 2000 are Frank Gehry, Norman Foster, Zaha Hadid, and Rem Koolhaas, all of whom continued to design buildings that are generally recognized to be iconic globally into the 2010s. These four have been chosen from among the dozens that could be candidates, not because I consider them necessarily to be the greatest of contemporary architects but because since the turn of the 21st century they have produced most of the architectural icons most recognized and publicized at the global level. Table 4.2 reports the results of online searches on these four starchitects in major newspapers in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany from the 1980s to May 2014. The trend since 2009 (reported in table 2.3) only reinforces the primacy of these four in terms of media attention. As with all online media searches covering thousands of items, it is difficult to distinguish between articles largely about the named architect or building and those simply mentioning the architect or building. Further, slightly altering the search terms can result in dramatic differences in results. However, there is no reason to believe that mistakes here would make any great difference to the rankings between the four starchitects or in comparison with media searches on the long list of signature architects.

Not all architects who have produced architectural icons are global starchitects in this sense. In 10 years from now, some from among those

Table 4.2. Top four starchitects by newspaper coverage in Europe and United States (from first online citation to May 2014)

Starchitect	New York Times	Le Monde	Cor. della Serra	El Pais	Die Zeit	The Guardian	London Times	Total
Frank Gehry	6,790	259	115	401	138	265	224	8,192
Norman Foster	6,360	242	161	337	213	404	257	7,974
Rem Koolhaas	1,730	256	64	191	142	144	106	2,633
Zaha Hadid	1,490	106	136	220	117	269	189	2,527

Source: newspaper websites.

in the long list of signature architects (table 2.4) or some total newcomers might well join or displace the four that led the field at the beginning of the 21st century. For example, the increasingly visible Russian architect Boris Bernaskoni (whose website promises 'simple and iconic') has worked with major architects and architectural entrepreneurs, with Foster for the INTECO project in Moscow, with Zumthor, Chipperfield, and Sejima, and with Betsky for the Venice Biennale. He was chosen to design the Russian Pavilion for Shanghai Expo 2010. While these are solid first steps on the long march to starchitect status, his eventual success is not guaranteed.[11] In 1995, in discussion with Philip Johnson, the most influential architectural entrepreneur of the 20th century, Charles Jencks identified Stern, Koolhaas, Pelli, Rogers, Piano, Foster, Eisenman, and Pei 'on airplane magazines the most powerful global architects' (Jencks 1995: 21). Gehry was identified as one of yesterday's men and Zaha Hadid did not merit a mention (but see Jencks 2005: 156–60). In this chapter, I show that while the long list changes regularly, my four-starchitect short list has survived well into the second decade of the new millennium.[12]

In addition to media attention, global starchitects meet the following four criteria at all geographical scales (local, urban, national, and global):

fame in terms of prestigious prizes, dissemination of information about their iconic works through their own publications and publications by others,[13] exhibitions of their work;

brand-stretching within the culture-ideology of consumerism;

recognition of and debate about the significance of their work (buildings, designs, writing), in terms of symbolic/aesthetic qualities;

global reach of their legacy in terms of the concentration of their iconic buildings in globalizing cities and their influence in terms of the global culture of capitalist consumerism.

It is important to distinguish between the empty celebrity that distorts judgements of value in our media-obsessed times and the concept of fame as used here. While the top four global starchitects are implicated in empty celebrity to some extent, their fame is mainly based on substantial artistic achievement, and their standing in the profession is recognized by the award of the most prestigious prizes and accolades it has to offer. A good proxy for such architects of iconic buildings is the list of winners of the Pritzker Prize and other major prizes, notably the Stirling Prize or the RIBA Royal Gold Medal in the United Kingdom, the Gold Medal of the American Institute of Architects, the Praemium Imperiale in Japan, and equivalent awards in other countries.[14] Starchitects are not simply famous for being famous. So far, two of the four (Gehry and Koolhaas) have received the ultimate accolade of virtual appearances on *The Simpsons* TV show. However, as Willis (2001: 33) notes, 'Since there is no governing body of independent critics—critics untainted by the need to sell magazines, to make academic reputations, or to market their own professional work—assigned to assess the output of each architect, the apportionment of fame is never fair.' I make no judgements as to fairness in this book. For all four, the dissemination of information about their iconic works takes many forms. It is the mark of starchitects that their works and ideas migrate from specialist publications in architecture and design to the more general cultural media and even, on occasion, into the 'news'. An important form of dissemination is major exhibitions of their work, notably in the great museums and galleries of the world. Of particular relevance for the attempt to explore the connections between iconic architecture, starchitects, and capitalist globalization is the phenomenon of brand-stretching, namely where starchitects move outside the realm of architecture as such and display their talents as designers in other areas, often by invitation (illustrated in Gravari-Barbas and Renard-Delautre 2015: 16). While not entirely a phenomenon of the global era (think Michelangelo), it has certainly grown exponentially in recent decades. Fame and celebrity in architecture is analyzed within the context of consumerism.[15]

More or less any architect who gets the opportunity to design a very big, expensive, especially unusual or sculptural building in a globalizing city will be accorded some measure of fame, sometimes apparently irrespective of the perceived qualities of the architecture. This explains the hostility in some sections of the architectural profession to the very idea of iconic buildings and starchitects.[16] Global recognition of and debate about the significance of the work of architects in terms of cultural meanings and aesthetic qualities is as contentious in architecture as it is in all other fields of creative endeavour (the visual arts, literature, music, even academia). What distinguishes our four starchitects is that they and their works have attracted considerable critical attention at the global level for both the aesthetic qualities of their creations and their wider cultural symbolic significance. All of them have many specialist monographs devoted to their works, they feature prominently in textbooks of contemporary architecture, in specialist architecture and design journals, magazines, and books, especially in publications about their major buildings. One of the key indicators of starchitect status is media (newspaper, magazine, TV, and Internet) coverage of their newest buildings. Examples range from Larson's analysis of the *Progressive Architecture* awards (Larson 1993: appendix and passim) to glossy profiles regularly published in the Spanish bilingual magazine *El Croquis* of actual and potential Pritzker prizewinners. An architect professor comments, 'Koolhaas, Hadid, Herzog & de Meuron etc. are quoted extensively through their exposure in *El Croquis* but there is more focus on detail than on buildings as a whole' [MA14].

The final criterion of global iconicity is the global reach of legacy. Here the dead have a great advantage over the living in the sense that death itself confers something of a legacy, at least for a short time, on the recently deceased (on architect obituaries, see Fowler 2007: ch. 3). However, the living while they live can and certainly do make strenuous efforts to build their legacy by extending their global reach in terms of the location of their buildings in globalizing cities and the influence of their work in the global culture of capitalist consumerism. As we shall see, the four starchitects have all designed unique architectural icons in globalizing cities in Asia, Europe, and the Americas (indeed, this statement is almost a virtuous tautology, part of my definition of global starchitect).

The pinnacle of achievement for an architect is the annual Pritzker Prize, often referred to as the 'Nobel Prize' for architecture. The winners are labelled 'Laureates'. In my view, it is no mere coincidence that the prize was first introduced in 1979, as the consumerist consequences of capitalist globalization were beginning to come on stream globally. A study of its richly illustrated and regularly updated website from which most of the information that follows is taken is a revealing introduction to this topic (http://www.pritzkerprize.com/). The prize is worth $100,000, a grand medal, and a great deal of positive publicity to the winner. It is sponsored by the Hyatt Foundation, whose hotels have featured in the glitzy award ceremonies. The prize is awarded by an independent jury of experts, 'recognized professionals in their own fields of architecture, business, education, publishing, and culture' and the prize ceremonies traverse the globe in a variety of iconic architectural settings. Jury membership during the early years of the 21st century included the chairman, Lord Peter Palumbo (a powerful developer and architectural entrepreneur who personally has owned houses designed by Frank Lloyd Wright and Mies van der Rohe); Alejandro Aravena (an innovative architect who runs a design 'Do Tank' in Chile supported by the Catholic University and the Chilean Oil Company and Laureate in 2016); Shigeru Ban (Japanese architect and Pritzker Laureate 2014); Rolf

Fehlbaum (chairman of Vitra furniture company and Vitra Design, sponsors of small-scale iconic architecture);[17] Carlos Jimenez (Dean of Architecture at Rice University, Texas); Juhani Pallasmaa (a Finnish architectural critic and academic); plus other Pritzker Laureates (e.g., Renzo Piano and Zaha Hadid); and Karen Stein (formerly director of the art publishers Phaidon, now an architectural entrepreneur in New York). In 2013 two new members were recruited. The first was Kristin Feireiss, an architecture curator, writer, and editor, former commissioner of the Dutch Pavilion at the Venice Architecture Biennale in 1996 and 2000; and a 2012 member of the International Jury for the Architecture Biennale in Venice. Since 2007 she has served in the European Cultural Parliament, and in 2013 she was named a Knight of the Order of the Netherlands Lion. She has written on sustainable affordable housing and the social responsibility of architects. The second new member was Ratan Tata, Chairman Emeritus of Tata Sons, the holding company of the Indian conglomerate Tata Group, also a member of the board of directors of Alcoa and the international advisory boards of Mitsubishi Corporation, JPMorgan Chase, Rolls-Royce, Temasek Holdings, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore. He serves on the board of trustees of the University of Southern California and Cornell. His $25 million endowment at Cornell (where he studied architecture) provides financial aid to undergraduates from India, with preference given to students in the College of Architecture, Art, and Planning. In my terms, Mr Tata is clearly a member of the TCC, linking all four fractions for architecture. While all these judges are clearly distinguished in their respective fields, the general tendency, I would argue, is as much towards the business of architecture and how it serves consumerism as it is towards the purely artistic.

Being a Pritzker winner may be considered a necessary but by no means sufficient condition to achieve the status of starchitect. For those with knowledge of recent architectural history this will be obvious, as some of the winners are almost entirely forgotten today, apart from in their own countries or, in a few cases, specialists on particular styles. Again, the NEXIS search engine provides supportive evidence. Table 4.3 lists the winners from 1979 to 2015 with results on name searches 'and iconic'.

The methodology on which my ranking of the four starchitects is based is not flawless. It does not always distinguish between articles exclusively on Gehry, Foster, Koolhaas, and Hadid or mere mentions of their names. However, it is safe to assume that this is the same for all the architects and that there are no major differences between the nature of newspaper coverage of these four

Table 4.3. Pritzker prizewinners, NEXIS results (and with 'iconic')

1979	Philip Johnson	2,623 (190)
1980	Luis Barragán	389 (5)
1981	James Stirling	1,264 (10)
1982	Kevin Roche	494 (32)
1983	Ioeh Ming Pei	1,523 (124)
1984	Richard Meier	2,276 (165)
1985	Hans Hollein	270 (16)
1986	Gottfried Boehm	36 (0)
1987	Kenzo Tange	436 (37)
1988	Gordon Bunshaft	268 (25)
1988	and Oscar Niemeyer	1,137 (92)
*1989	Frank O. Gehry	3,000+ (3,000+)
1990	Aldo Rossi	581 (23)
1991	Robert Venturia	1,295 (107)
1992	Alvaro Siza	464 (37)
1993	Fumihiko Maki	602 (43)
1994	C. de Portzamparc	398 (21)
1995	Tadao Ando	1,133 (78)
1996	Rafael Moneo	712 (29)
1997	Sverre Fehn	76 (4)
*1998	Renzo Piano	3,000+ (33)
*1999	Norman Foster	3,000+ (3,000+)
*2000	Rem Koolhaas	3,000+ (3,000+)
*2001	Herzog & de Meuron	3,000+ (3,000+)
2002	Glenn Murcutt	778 (47)
2003	Jorn Utzon	573 (94)
*2004	Zaha Hadid	3,000+ (3,000+)
2005	Thom Mayne	821 (50)
2006	Paulo Mendes da Rocha	15 (14)
*2007	Richard Rogers	3,000+ (3,000+)
2008	Jean Nouvel	2,291 (207)
2009	Peter Zumthor	664 (34)
2010	Kazuyo Sejima	624 (33)
2010	and Ryue Nishizawa	369 (13)
2011	E. Souta de Moura	17 (1)
2012	Wang Shu	181 (17)
2013	Toyo Ito	818 (68)
2014	Shigeru Ban	785 (40)
2015	Frei Ottob	1479 (5)
2016	Alejandro Aravena	n/a

[a] As an apparent riposte to the male chauvinism of Pritzker Prize jurors who denied petitions to name Denise Scott Brown with her partner Robert Venturi for the prize in 1991, the rules of the AIA Gold Medal award were changed to allow joint winners (Venturi and Scott Brown) in 2016.
[b] Otto died shortly after his prize was announced. His NEXIS results are from https://www.nexis.com/search/loadForm.do?rand=0.11993311494606917.
*indicates more than 3,000 results

Table 4.4. NEXIS results for 'starchitect' and most cited building

Architect/Firm	'Starchitect' citations	Most cited building
Frank Gehry	858	Guggenheim Bilbao (2,460)
Norman Foster	633	The Gherkin (1,815)
Zaha Hadid	608	Aquatic centre (661)
Rem Koolhaas	413	CCTV (337)
Daniel Libeskind	300	Jewish Museum (745)
Jean Nouvel	267	Torre Agbar (85)
Renzo Piano	258	Pompidou (821)
Santiago Calatrava	235	Ground Zero (284)
Richard Rogers	203	Pompidou (1,157)
Herzog & de Meuron	190	Tate (153)

Source: NEXIS.

starchitects and coverage of the other signature architects who also receive a great deal of attention, but as we have seen there are significant differences in the amounts of coverage. Table 4.4 reports the results of a specific NEXIS search on the extent to which the label 'starchitect' is attached to the names of prominent architects. This confirms the pre-eminence of Gehry, Foster, Koolhaas, and Hadid. The table also indicates that while the best-known buildings of other signature architects might be cited more than some of those of the four starchitects (though Guggenheim Bilbao and the Gherkin always come out on top), this is not enough to displace them as the top four starchitects.

The following profiles of Gehry, Foster, Koolhaas, and Hadid attempt to detail what makes the difference.

Frank Gehry (Home Office Los Angeles)

Frank Gehry (b. 1929, Toronto) will always be best remembered for one building, his Guggenheim Bilbao Museum (1997), and for the Bilbao effect it engendered. Jencks starts his book *The Iconic Building* (2005) with a discussion of the Bilbao effect and a conversation with his friend Frank. This has certainly become one of the most referenced buildings in history. In its first 10 years, it is said to have attracted more than 10,000 press articles from all over the world, 60 per cent from outside Spain, and put Bilbao on the global map as it was commissioned explicitly to do (del Cerro 2006: 102–3, listing over 50 media sources, but with no specific reference for the number

10,000, though the figure seems to be generally accepted). Even if it is exaggerated, there is no doubt that the Guggenheim Bilbao is the most widely reported work of architecture built in our era and that a 'Bilbao effect' exists. Gehry's Pritzker Prize was awarded in 1989, some years before Bilbao, mainly for his influential work in California, Germany, and Switzerland. In terms of fame, it clearly is an advantage for any creative talent to be based in Los Angeles. As the architecture critic of the *LA Times* asserted, 'Gehry's Guggenheim Bilbao opened in Spain, reaffirming Los Angeles as a center of architectural creativity even though the fruits of that labor were 5,800 miles away' (Ouroussoff 2001). Gehry's most important works in the United States are clustered around Los Angeles, notably his innovative residential designs and his Disney Concert Hall. As befits a global starchitect, there are many books and articles written about him, covering his work and his life. The contrast between the promise of his radical past and his anti-social architecture in Los Angeles, for example, is critically assessed by Mike Davis (1992: esp. 236–40). More recently, the compromises with big business and rich clients that he has made to further his career have brought censure, expressed by one urbanist as: 'Capitalizing on his icons, the less iconic his work is going to be' [NY19]. Nevertheless, he has maintained a slightly raffish image. This is well illustrated in the accomplished documentary film *Sketches of Frank Gehry* made by his friend the late Sydney Pollack (2007), which no doubt introduced the man and his works to wider audiences. Gehry has been exhibited all over the world in many major museums, notably the Guggenheim in New York (for which he designed the hugely popular BMW/Lufthansa–sponsored 'Art of the Motorcycle' exhibition in 1998 which travelled to Chicago, Bilbao, and Las Vegas). In addition, he has been the subject of one-man shows in Tokyo and all over Europe, including Berlin, Paris, Madrid, and Barcelona. He has also contributed a design for the prestigious London-based Serpentine Gallery annual temporary pavilion series, as have Zaha Hadid and Rem Koolhaas.[18]

While the Gehry brand is now coterminous with the Guggenheim Bilbao, before this the Norton House in Venice Beach and the Binoculars Building in Santa Monica (the artists Claes Oldenburg and Coosje van Bruggen designed the binoculars) were early expressions of his talent. The Binoculars Building was owned by the agency that produced Apple's 'Think Different' advertising campaign in the late 1990s and Gehry featured on the billboards, as did Frank Lloyd Wright, Buckminster Fuller, and other dead white male creative geniuses. This campaign marks an important globalizing moment in the insertion of iconic architecture into the culture-ideology of consumerism. While the origins of this process can be discerned in previous centuries, the Apple campaign and, especially, the Guggenheim Bilbao took it to a qualitatively new level. Gehry confirms this: 'Since Bilbao, I get called to do "Frank Gehry buildings". They actually say that to me' (quoted in Jencks 2005: 9).[19] The Guggenheim Bilbao has made Gehry into one of the most successful brands of our time, despite the hostility of some architects and culture critics. As noted earlier, he is very much in demand to design aspirant icons: for example: 'Gehry to Design Sydney's Next Architectural Icon' (reported from the *Sydney Morning Herald* in *ArchDaily* 30 November 2012).

Gehry's brand-stretching has developed in several directions. His retail centre for the Barcelona Olympic Village speaks of his versatility, and his Louis Vuitton Foundation building in Paris in 2014 speaks of his attachment to the luxury goods market (Hawthorne 2014). He designed and lent his name to a line of Tiffany jewellery that includes rings, necklaces, bracelets, earrings, and cuff links incorporating his trademark fish motifs. The Tiffany website once featured an eight-minute film in which Gehry and others discuss the process of creating the jewellery. He has also designed and exhibited furniture and lamps. Finally, his positive/negative watch (retailing around $150) is a major contribution to lazy time telling, simply indicating minutes past or before the hour. Never one to stand still, Gehry co-founded and chaired Gehry Technologies, whose mission statement aspired to transform the building industry and the practice of design. It brought some of the most prestigious designers in the world onto its board of advisors, including Ben van Berkel, David Childs, Zaha Hadid, Laurie Olin, Moshe Safdie, and Patrik Schumacher.

The Bilbao effect has had a significant influence in the debate on the role of iconic architecture on globalizing cities, actual or aspiring, all over the world. In California, and probably for the United States as a whole, his cultural significance is bound up with a range of iconic buildings from beach houses to public buildings. I have already cited Koenig to the effect that Disney Concert Hall was iconic before it left the drawing board. As demonstrated in chapter 2, it is not unusual for a building to be dubbed iconic before it is built, though it is difficult to hang on to that status. However, the elaborate celebrations of its tenth anniversary reported in the *Los Angeles Times* (20 September 2013) suggest that Gehry's unique icon has succeeded. One item in the coverage was headlined: 'Disney Hall's architecture, not its music, lures many,' echoing the iconicity of Wright's Guggenheim in New York. Gehry's extraordinary building is, even by American standards, highly consumerist, its two entry plazas: 'will be invitations to passersby to come into the complex and enjoy the numerous amenities, including a gift shop, a restaurant and café' (Koenig 2000: 115). Most new cultural spaces all round the world are much more consumerist than was previously the case and most old cultural spaces (museums, performance spaces, even libraries) are in processes of transformation in the service of consumerism (see chapter 7). Allied with the name of Disney, Gehry's concert hall in Los Angeles is clearly a prime example. The Fred and Ginger building in Prague (the design references the dancers) is a more modest European example of how urban growth coalitions look for a Frank Gehry building to raise the profile of their globalizing cities. A mixed-use tower, marketed as 'New York by Gehry' (Goldberger 2011), reiterates this dancing theme for Manhattan, shimmering by night and day as seen from Brooklyn across the river or approaching or walking across the Brooklyn Bridge (itself a New York icon). The building is largely a very tall high-end residential tower, with a public school in the lower five floors, valet parking, and street-level retail.

Despite the number and variety of his buildings, discussion of his work always appears eventually to return to Bilbao. According to Jencks (2005: 9), 'Frank Gehry, a Los Angeles designer in his mid-seventies, changed the course of architecture with his museum at Bilbao.' While this may be an exaggeration, it is not a wild exaggeration. The interesting fact from my perspective is that while Gehry spectacularly breaks with the right angle and symmetry in his architecture, he is no longer seen as commercially difficult or risky but, as one architect put it, 'can Gehry produce outside of the brand?' [CA1]. Perhaps this is partly due to his reputation for being both high-tech and creative. His use of software developed by the French aerospace company Dassault, 'a machine for realizing curves', combines the materiality of manufacturing industry with the aesthetics of elegance in a way that has proved remarkably profitable and popular. This has not prevented one of his buildings at UC Irvine being torn down in the 1980s because it leaked or him being sued for another leaky building (the Stata Center at MIT) in 2007, but these are minor blemishes on an otherwise glittering career. In this context, it is interesting to contrast the fortunes of Gehry with another unconventional architect from Los Angeles, Eric Owen Moss, who, while a highly respected signature architect, is not a global starchitect.[20]

With investment from a small developer Moss designed the locally and professionally iconic Hayden Tract buildings in Culver City. Gehry had Disney and the Guggenheim. Perhaps the creations of Moss are too unique (Goldberger 2010).

No less an authority than Norman Foster has asserted: 'The museum in Bilbao leads to a new era in building' (quoted in Stungo 1999: 10).[21] Wherever buildings are built that replace right angles, indeed any angles, with glorious, soaring curves the Guggenheim Bilbao and the name of Frank Gehry will live on. For the general public, however, his ultimate cultural accolade was when he featured in the TV series *The Simpsons* in 2005. According to Marge Simpson, he was the 'best architect in the world'—sadly, this ended badly, as his proposed cultural centre was turned into a prison.

For some years, Gehry has worked with the architect manqué Brad Pitt, an association with its own powerful cultural significance. And in London, Gehry's participation in yet another scheme to redevelop the Battersea Power Station elicited the following enthusiastic comment from the developer: 'It will be absolutely amazing and extraordinary. . . . It really is so exciting that we will have Frank Gehry's first building in London, right next to the power station. It will become another icon, so you'll have two icons sat side by side. What could be better than that?' (quoted in Wainwright in *The Guardian*, 31 October 2013).

Norman Foster (Home Office London)

Norman Foster (b. 1935, England) has all the usual trappings of professional and public fame. He has won major honours in his homeland. He was elected to the Royal Academy in 1991, became Lord Foster of Thameside (though he went into tax exile in Switzerland in 2010 he still retains the title but not the seat in the House of Lords). His Pritzker Prize arrived in 1999. The prize ceremony took place in Berlin, where he is especially revered (though not by all) for his reconstruction of the Reichstag dome (figure 4.6), one in a succession of major cities (including Hong Kong, London, and Beijing) to have succumbed to his talents. Like all Pritzker Prize events, it was attended by the great and the good from architecture, government, and big business. In his acceptance speech, he recorded his early debts to Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier.

Figure 4.6. Fosters Reichstag dome in Berlin.

In 2007, Prestel, a high-quality arts and architecture publisher, brought out a two-volume retrospective (retailing at £100) on Foster's top 40 projects. It was reviewed in the prestigious *Royal Academy Magazine*:

> 'Fosters', to give it the brand, is the top large firm around. It trumps American competition such as SOM, KPF and HOK with ease. It is more versatile than Richard Meier and Rafael Viñoly, more elegant than Jean Nouvel and Richard Rogers and more adept at iconic building than Renzo Piano. Foster may not have reached the sculptural virtuosity of Frank Gehry, Rem Koolhaas, Zaha Hadid and Daniel Libeskind, but then he doesn't intend to. The impressive fact of his career is the combination of output *and* quality. (Jencks 2007: 80)

This is a telling comment from someone who is at the heart of the culture of starchitecture, identifying by name the top four global starchitects and other signature architects confirmed by my media searches, and conceiving Fosters as a globally iconic architectural brand, as it surely is.

While he had previously designed some critically acclaimed buildings, notably the Willis Faber office in Ipswich (1975), it is generally accepted that the breakthrough for Foster was in 1986. This was the year of his

HSBC building in Hong Kong, as well as his friend and erstwhile colleague Richard Rogers's Lloyds building in London, and Stirling and Wilford's Staatsgalerie in Stuttgart. All three great buildings were celebrated in a large exhibition, 'New Architecture: Foster Rogers Stirling,' at the Royal Academy in London in 1986. In the words of a shrewd architectural historian: this heralded a 'new star system, of iconic newsworthy representatives of the profession' (Rattenbury 2002: 141 and *passim*) and a new lucrative alliance between iconic architects and visionary developers, including the chair of the Pritzker Prize jury, Lord Palumbo. Since then Foster's work has been exhibited all over the world in globalizing cities in Europe (including London, Glasgow, Berlin, Paris, Barcelona, Munich, Venice, Sofia), Asia (Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo), and North America (New York, Boston).

Fosters is certainly one of the most recognizable brands in architecture. Commenting from an industry perspective, Reinke acutely observed that the design of the Gherkin and many other contemporary office buildings 'is being informed not necessarily by daylighting, net to gross ratios, utilisation or flexibility for a multiplicity of occupants and tenants. The *raison d'être* is rather to create an identity; a brand which generates powerful imagery in the cityscape relating to a specific organisation or corporation. The fundamental principle: an iconic shape supersedes a well-planned and rational workplace.'[22] The architect, no doubt, would claim all these qualities. In 2012 the Gherkin won the first 10 Year Award of the Council on Tall Buildings. Clients who wish to name their buildings as 'designed by Norman Foster,' rather than simply by Foster & Partners, are rumoured to have to pay £1 million pounds extra on top of the normal architect fee. The Fosters brand has even been compared to that of David Beckham! Foster has been associated with an impressive array of products in addition to the strictly architectural, including a range of plumbing fixtures with the iconic designer Philippe Starck, office furniture and artefacts, dining trays, sculpture, a private jet, luxury yachts, and cars. Foster and Aston Martin combined to design an allegedly eco-friendly new London bus, and artist Meschac Gaba has sculpted hair braids of the Gherkin, Wright's Guggenheim, and the Eiffel Tower, august company indeed. It is also interesting to note that Foster is also in the business of designing wineries (as are Gehry and Hadid), a high-end consumerist market that has attracted several fashionable architects. There is no good reason why starchitects, or anyone else, should not engage in brand-stretching. These facts about Foster and the others are relevant only insofar as they serve to confirm the importance of the contentious notion of the architectural brand, and its role in consumerism as defining characteristics of the starchitect (McNeill 2009; Ponzini and Nastasi 2011; and chapter 7 in this volume).

The work of Foster has had impact in both high architectural and mass culture circles. There are many examples, random facts that weave themselves into a more coherent narrative of cultural significance: the Gherkin has already been used as a cultural locater in several films and TV programmes, notably *Basic Instinct II* and Woody Allen's *Match Point*. Its distinctive shape has become an established item on the iconic skyline of London advertising a variety of goods and services (figure 4.7).



Figure 4.7. Fosters for personal problems. (© Alex Beaumont/Lloyds Pharmacy)

Foster was awarded the commission to redesign Parliament Square in 2007, after winning the masterplan competition for Trafalgar Square (two of the most iconic locations in London) and featured in the *Sunday Times* (London) UK Rich List and the top 50 for the *Sun* newspaper's 'Greatest Living Briton' award. He is not only one of the best-known architects in the world but a public figure in the globalizing cities where his signature buildings have had an impact.

Foster's principal claim to symbolic/aesthetic significance in the architectural field rests mainly in the combination of elegance and strength that marks his high-rise office buildings, notably HSBC in Hong Kong (one among several buildings said to have reinvented the skyscraper), Commerzbank in Frankfurt, Hearst Tower in New York, and, perhaps his crowning achievement, the Gherkin.[23] However, his work has also been subjected to negative criticism. This may be a function of the large number of commercial buildings he has put his name to as well as his presence in so many globalizing cities. *BD* runs an annual poll on the UK's worst buildings, and in 2007 Foster's More London project was voted the fourth worst project of the year. Many of his proposed buildings have also proved controversial: three Foster high-rises were implicated in a row over secret plans for unwelcome towers in the east end of London; his design for the Clarence Hotel in Dublin was said to threaten the city's heritage; and in New York elite warring factions mobilized for and against a Foster Tower planned for 980 Madison Avenue on the Upper East Side. Perhaps the most sustained critique of his work involved his attempts to renovate old New York icons: 'Only weeks after revealing their designs for 425 Park Ave., soon to be New York's latest "Iconic" Building, Foster & Partners have now taken a stab at one of New York's oldest iconic buildings: Grand Central Station' (*ArchDaily* 20 October 2012). And on Foster's renovation plan (now abandoned) for the New York Public Library, Michael Kimmelman, architecture critic of the *New York Times*, spoke for many when he wrote: 'To me, what results is an awkward, cramped, banal pastiche of tiers facing claustrophobia-inducing windows, built around a space-wasting atrium with a curved staircase more suited to a Las Vegas hotel' (quoted in *BD* online 6 February 2013).[24]

The living can and certainly do make strenuous efforts to build their legacy for posterity. In the case of Foster, the endowment of the RIBA Norman Foster & Partners Scholarship to assist young architects to expand their horizons is a clear step in this direction. However, this form of legacy-building is rather unusual during the lifetime of the subject, and there are many more indirect indicators of the likelihood that an architect will leave a lasting legacy. First, of course, are the iconic buildings, which will long be associated with the name of the starchitect, especially those situated in major globalizing cities. Foster has designed many such projects, notably in Hong Kong, London, New York, Beijing, and Berlin. Potentially just as important are the as yet unbuilt projects that may or may not come to fruition. The news emerged in 2008 that he and Zaha Hadid were allegedly prime candidates for one of the most high-profile projects on earth, the redevelopment of Mecca. An immense new structure is planned around the central Haram mosque to accommodate up to three million people. While the project is highly controversial, if it were to be realized it would make a tremendous contribution to the legacy of both architects. With similar global impact, commissions to build in Moscow (the tallest building in Europe), in Hong Kong, Shanghai, New York (on the World Trade Center site), and the new Nou Camp, home of Barcelona Football Club, would be other opportunities for his legacy formation.[25] And these are only some of the many projects all over the world on his drawing board (and computer screens), for which see the constantly updated Foster & Partners website.

According to statements from Fosters and the words of Foster himself, there is reason to believe that his own preference in terms of legacy would be the establishment of a new ecological architecture. All of his buildings, from those with the highest profile to the most mundane, have, for some time past, claimed impressive green credentials. Notable in this regard is the GLA building in London (Schroeder 2014), which has featured in the Eurostar Paris-London timetable as '*un symbole d'ecologie*'. However, in 2005 City Hall was said to be overrunning its energy consumption targets by 50 per cent. This prompted the local MP Simon Hughes to say: 'Icon buildings must set the example and not promise one thing and deliver another' (*BD* 29 July 2005, front page). Nevertheless, ecological innovation remains a top priority for Foster. His Hearst Tower in New York, for example, has won prestigious green building awards. Through his completed buildings and those in progress, Foster has clearly achieved global reach. This extends to aspiring globalizing cities, for example, to Astana, capital of Kazakhstan. Celebrating the opening of the Peace Pyramid in 2006, the design magazine *Blueprint* explicitly announced that it was a 'monument to the global reach of Norman Foster' (October 2006).

Rem Koolhaas (Home Office Rotterdam)

Rem Koolhaas (b. 1944, Holland) was a journalist long before he became an architect and reputedly funded his architecture training by writing film scripts (Lootsma 1999). He first hit the architectural headlines in 1978 not with a building but with a remarkable book, *Delirious New York* (Koolhaas 1994). He established the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) in 1975 in London, and in the late 1990s founded a think tank AMO (Architectural Media Office) devoted to the 'virtual domain', with a client list that has included Volkswagen, IKEA, Prada, Condé-Nast, Harvard University, and the EU. All Koolhaas projects are said to have inputs from OMA and AMO (Patteeuw 2003).

A professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Design since 1995, he has led the Harvard Project on the City, among whose publications are *S,M,L,XL* in 1995 ('a novel about architecture,' according to Koolhaas), and in 2000 *Great Leap Forward* and *A Guide to Shopping*, the fruits of research projects with colleagues and students focused on five Chinese cities and Lagos. He won the Pritzker Prize in 2000 on the basis of these projects and with an impressive but perhaps not quite starchitect list of iconic buildings to his name, including the Kunsthal exhibition halls in Rotterdam (1992); the masterplan for the Euralille transport interchange in France (1994); and the Bordeaux House (a film about this, *Koolhaas HouseLife,* was made in 1998). However, since his Pritzker Prize, high-profile projects have streamed into OMA offices in Europe, the United States, and Asia. Notable examples are the Campus Center for Miese's Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago (2003); the Dutch Embassy in Berlin (2003); Seattle Public Library (2004); Casa de Musica in Porto (2004); Los Angeles County Museum of Art (2006); and the CCTV building in Beijing. Another film, *Rem Koolhaas: A Kind of Architect*, was released in Germany in 2008. Hundreds of stories about him and his buildings have appeared in quality newspapers all over the world. As his fame began to spread, he appeared in *Time* magazine's top 100 most influential people in the world in 2008, and in the same year he was invited to join a European 'group of the wise' to help 'design' the future EU. He was also invited to curate the 2014 Venice Architecture Biennale, probably the most prestigious architectural event in the cultural calendar. A tweeting session organized by the architecture magazine *Domus* reported in January 2013 (@DomusWeb), 'Koolhaas wants this Biennale . . . to use historical research to explore how Modernity and globalization has, since 1914, formed the architecture we practice today. The Biennale will focus on the erasure of national architectural identities and the formation, over the last 200 years, of a global architecture which produces, in Koolhaas' words, "the same stuff, with the same materials, in the same styles. How did this happen?" [and somewhat paradoxically] ... Koolhaas will not just curate, but also coordinate the "collective effort of all national pavilions".' The apparent contradictions in the written and spoken pronouncements of Koolhaas seem to attract admiration and scorn in roughly equal amounts. However, his ambiguity on the question of national architectures is shared by many architects.

Koolhaas and his work are widely referred to as iconic. Among many examples we can cite 'OMA's Plans for "Iconic" Qatar National Library' (*ArchDaily* 30 November 2012), 'Rem Koolhaas—an architect known both for his iconic structures as well as his success with the Seattle Public Library—has been hand-picked for the important design, soon to be, according to the QNL website, "one of the most ... iconic landmarks" [in Qatar and the region]' and Paul Goldberger in his blog 'Burning Koolhaas Down' in *The New Yorker* (posted 10 February 2009) refers to Koolhaas's 'iconic headquarters building [CCTV in Beijing].... Long before it was finished, the building became an icon—in many ways, ***the*** icon—of the Beijing skyline.'[26]

Koolhaas/OMA has exhibited widely in Europe, the United States, and Asia. In 2006, MoMA mounted an exhibition devoted to the CCTV building in Beijing. Most Koolhaas events are deeply immersed in consumerism and are genuine examples of self-conscious brand-stretching. In an article in *Wired* magazine, for which Koolhaas is a consultant, Wolf (2000) reports that during a lecture in Berkeley, California, Koolhaas showed a slide with the symbols for the yen, the euro, and the dollar and declared: 'During some recent work at OMA ... we noticed that the signs of the world's major currencies, put together, spell ¥€$. We are working inside this global ¥€$' (figure 4.8).[27]

This ¥€$ is a deliberate reference to capitalist consumerism at once apparently both cynical and celebratory. Its first major expression was the cornucopia of an exhibition in Berlin and Rotterdam accompanied by a lavishly illustrated glossy 554-page book in magazine form (or vice versa) entitled *Content* (Koolhaas and McGetrick 2004). The first pages of *Content* consist of advertisements from Prada, Gucci, the Dutch government,

Figure 4.8. ¥€$ sign on MayBank in KLIA.

Nigeria Tourism; with Boffi and VW on the back cover. While global in scope, it is largely an account of Koolhaas's triumphal move east, his major project at this time being CCTV in Beijing, dubbed by him: 'an instant icon that proclaims a new phase in Chinese confidence' (2004: 489). *Content* is a bewildering mixture of architectural projects, social and political analysis, cultural cliché, and self-promotion embedded in the ¥€$ worldview. This was exemplified by Koolhaas's brilliant proposal when invited by the EU to rethink design for the European Community: turn the flag into a multi-coloured barcode.[28] This became the logo of the 2006 Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, but has rarely been used since then, for obvious reasons. Koolhaas's work for Prada, in their Epicenter designer stores in New York and Los Angeles (2001–2004), further reinforced the significance of shopping and capitalist consumerism for him, as did the launch in Seoul at the end of April 2009 of his Prada Transformer to show-case a series of cross-cultural exhibitions, film screenings, and live events over five months. And, in another realm, koolhand [*sic*] typeface created by Chris Papasadero is said to take its form from the architectural works of

Koolhaas. While the letters in koolhand are not really designed for legibility, Papasadero envisions them for 'textural treatments' [*sic*].[29]

Since the publication of *Delirious New York* in 1978, Koolhaas has been a force for innovative thinking about the form of the city among architects and urbanists. In the new millennium his idea of the generic city, a sprawling metropolis of tall towers around an airport run by the equivalent of what sounds very much like the TCC, and serviced by a workforce of migrant labour, appears to be happening before our eyes in locations around the world, particularly in the Arabian Gulf. Globalizing cities look to many people, of whom one of the most influential is certainly Koolhaas, to provide blueprints for their future. He has had ample opportunity to test out his theories. In 2009 the OMA website featured 46 masterplan projects, and by 2014 this had become 60, for whole cities and city districts all over the world. 'Koolhaas told to build big and iconic to put White City [an area in West London in need of regeneration] on the map' (*BD* 10 June 2005). In the United States, local investors in his Museum Plaza development scheme in Louisville, Kentucky, were said to be looking for a Bilbao effect. An architect who is hired to build big and iconic, and who is considered to be capable of producing a Bilbao effect, is certainly culturally significant. In his address at Koolhaas's Pritzker Prize ceremony, the eminent architecture critic Paul Goldberger said: 'There is Rem Koolhaas the architect, there is Rem Koolhaas the writer, there is Rem Koolhaas the urban theoretician, and there is Rem Koolhaas the figure to whom younger architects are drawn as moths to a flame.' This appears to me to be a fair assessment: Koolhaas the architect (aesthetic significance) is only one out of four claims to distinction. There is probably as much discussion in the literature about his place in the *zeitgeist* as about his aesthetics (but see Patteeuw 2003: 89–151).[30] His cultural significance, as I have argued, is very much expressed in the idea that architecture should always engage with consumerism as exemplified in the generic city and the belief that this is not entirely a bad thing. This position clearly challenges progressive architectural aesthetics, in particular, leftist critiques of capitalist-consumerist domination of urban design. It is possible that the legacy of Koolhaas will turn out to be as much bound up with his analysis of urban life as with his architectural aesthetic. CCTV, his most important project to date, is already a feature on the Beijing skyline and tourist itinerary (figure 4.9). This is despite the ongoing critique of it, and other foreign architect-designed icons, from cultural elites in China (Zhu 2009; Ren 2011).

Figure 4.9. CCTV model on display in Beijing. (© Julie Bauer)

In 2012, CCTV was chosen by the readers of *ArchDaily* as their Building of the Year and CTBUH crowned it Best Tall Building Worldwide due to its 'unusual take on skyscraper typology'. *ArchDaily* (9 November 2013) reported his acceptance speech of this award, entitled 'A New Typology for the Skyscraper,' as follows:

> When I published my last book, *Content*, in 2003, one chapter was called 'Kill the Skyscraper'. Basically it was an expression of disappointment at the way the skyscraper typology was used and applied. I didn't think there was a lot of creative life left in skyscrapers. Therefore, I tried to launch a campaign against the skyscraper in its more uninspired form. The fact that I am standing on this stage now, in this position, meant that my declaration of war went completely unnoted, and that my campaign was completely unsuccessful [Koolhaas joked, concluding] Being here, it is quite moving—to be part of a community that is trying to make skyscrapers more interesting. I am deeply grateful, and thank all my partners.

He was as good as his word, for in 2013 he completed his Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and labelled it an anti-icon icon (figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10. Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

The global significance of the CCTV building and the influence of the institution it houses are, together, formidable. The legacy of Koolhaas may well rest with CCTV and with the new urban forms he creates in the Gulf and elsewhere. And let us not forget his cameo on *The Simpsons*. Such is the global reach of this extraordinary starchitect.[31]

Zaha Hadid (Home Office London)

Zaha Hadid (b. 1950, Iran) died unexpectedly in March 2016 on a business trip. Obituaries in media all over the world attest to her fame and talent. She first sprang to celebrity status not with a building but with the drawing of a building that was never built. In 1983, she won a high-profile international competition for a sports club on the Peak at the top of Hong Kong Island, one of the most iconic locations in Asia. This made her name among architects and cultural elites around the world. The importance of architectural drawing for the cognoscenti can hardly be exaggerated: 'desk drawer architecture . . . is often artistically and historically as important as what has been built . . . architectural drawings can often express more than finished buildings' (Lampugnani 1982: 6). Not surprisingly, there is a lucrative market in architectural drawings. In lean times, Rem Koolhaas supported his family by selling his drawings. Twenty years later, in 2004, Hadid won the Pritzker Prize, which, she claimed, allowed her to shed her reputation as a 'paper architect' (interview in the *Financial Times* magazine, 27 August 2005). Alone among the four starchitects, she began her career in the office of one of the others, Rem Koolhaas, and struggled to establish herself when she left. Her early career was strewn with prestigious victories in competitions for projects that never got built, notably the Peak Club (see Rattenbury 2002: 70–1), Cardiff Bay Opera House, and for the Architecture Association in London (Moore 2012: 237ff.). Her first major large completed public building, the Rosenthal Art Center in Cincinnati (2003), opened the floodgates and since then she enjoyed considerable success with major commissions and the publicity that accompanies them. According to a profile in the magazine of the *Royal Academy*, she herself attributed this to the Bilbao effect: 'People have become used to it [media coverage of new architecture] largely thanks to the Guggenheim Bilbao, which convinced local politicians worldwide to become more ambitious about building iconic architecture' (quoted in Greenberg 2005: 91). Several of her smaller-scale projects were also very well received, notably the Bergisel Ski Jump, Innsbruck (2002), which featured prominently in her Pritzker Prize ceremony coverage and the Vitra Fire Station, for which she acknowledged Rolf Fehlbaum, chairman of Vitra Design and Pritzker juror. By 2016 she was in the happy position of combining major prizes and lucrative commissions; for example, she won the RIBA Stirling Prize two years running with the MAXXI Museum in Rome in 2010 (figure 4.11) and the Evelyn Grace Academy in London in 2011. However, there are always dissenters. For example, a letter to the editor of *BD* complains about an enthusiastic piece on Hadid: 'When are you going to learn that commissioning a Zaha Hadid building . . . always produces the same tale of a rising budget for an overambitious, "iconic" structure?' (12 September 2008). Some of her buildings, for example, the Riverside transport museum in Glasgow, have been subjected to fierce social criticism, and there were over 200 responses, many vitriolic, to a generally positive review of her work in *The Guardian* online in September 2013.[32]

Figure 4.11. Zaha Hadid's Maxxi Museum in Rome (David Nissan).

She has, of course, been widely exhibited, notably with a multi-media 30-year retrospective in the Guggenheim New York in 2006, an accolade accorded to few living artists, let alone architects. This was followed by a major show in the Design Museum in London (she subsequently acquired the building for her practice). She has been dubbed, accurately: 'the world's most famous woman architect' (*Royal Academy Magazine*, Summer 2007). Other high-profile exhibitions have been held at MoMA San Francisco, the Museum of Applied Arts in Vienna, and in Rome and Tokyo. A Hadid retrospective opened at the State Hermitage Museum in St Petersburg in 2015. In 2004, a 52-minute film profile, *A Day with Zaha Hadid,* was made in New York (the first of several).

Hadid's qualities extend beyond mere architecture, as attested by her 'Lessons in Leadership' contribution to *Newsweek* (20 October 2008). Other marks of her status as an influential woman include the *Forbes* 'World's Most Powerful Women' list. This undoubtedly attracted opportunities for commercial brand-stretching in which she enthusiastically participated. She joined other celebrities in launching new ranges of perfume and shoes in

2007, and her high-profile exhibition at the Design Museum in London prominently featured her paintings and furniture, as well as her stunning Swarm Chandelier, composed of 16,000 black crystals. Her shoe designs, in partnership with the up-market Brazilian company Melissa, appeal, it is said, especially to 'eco-chic fashionistas'. She has also turned her talents to the Z.CAR, a hydrogen-powered three-wheeler. However, her most passionate embrace of consumerism was the Zaha Hadid Chanel Mobile Art Pavilion, which appeared in Manhattan's Central Park in October 2008, during its world tour (subsequently curtailed due to the global economic crisis). Despite the fact that the *New York Times* called it an 'instrument of psychological healing for the weary' this will have done her reputation little harm among the fashionistas. Hadid, like all the starchitects, appeared willing and able to design many things to stretch her brand. In October 2011, Zaha Hadid Architects launched iPhone and iPad apps, eventually with interactive guides to the main buildings of the firm, clear indicators of expansion in the consumerist marketplace.

The cultural significance of Hadid revolves around the fact that she was not only the most important woman architect ever but a significant presence in the world of cultural business, celebrated most notably when she won Veuve Clicquot's 2013 Businesswoman of the Year Award. This had both upsides and downsides in the mass media. For example, it was noted that she had become embroiled in a human rights row in 2007 over her Cultural Centre in Baku (Azerbaijan) in memory of the recently deceased President Aliyev, a former KGB chief. While the three male starchitects have all been criticized on ethical grounds (Foster for his work in the former USSR and China, Koolhaas for his CCTV building in Beijing, and Gehry for his carceral architecture in Los Angeles), the criticism of Hadid as a woman architect seems to have a slightly keener edge.[33] Nevertheless, her status as starchitect is beginning to bear comparison with Gehry and the Bilbao effect. In the opinion of the architecture critic Rowan Moore: 'If you want a building that symbolises a global event, and is a landmark for decades afterwards, Zaha is now of a small number who can do that' (quoted in *BD* 11 July 2008; see also Moore 2012: ch. 6). Moore's comments could serve as at least a partial definition of the starchitect.

Much of her early work was conceptual, exemplified by her Peak Club competition entry. This unbuilt design was, according to the professional assessment of the Pritzker Prize jury, 'as original to architecture as the twelve-tone scale once was to music . . . [and] quickly proved a foundational thesis for architecture, an unexpected precedent for shifting Modernism's paradigm from simplicity to complexity'.[34] Allowing for a measure of hyperbole at all prize ceremonies, this is high praise and establishes her aesthetic significance. While speculative, it is not wildly risky to predict that part of the lasting legacy of Hadid will be her Aquatics Centre, its wave-shaped roof almost immediately dubbed 'iconic' (figure 4.12).

Just in time for the start of the 2012 Olympics, she was ennobled, becoming Lady Zaha Hadid. *Glamour* magazine proclaimed her as their Woman of the Year 2012. This popular source of fashion, beauty, and sexual gossip predictably labelled her the Lady Gaga of Architecture, as well as acknowledging her first-class professional credentials. Other large projects, if they survive the global economic downturn, are also likely to contribute to her legacy formation, notably her design for the largest residential development ever in Singapore, valued at one billion dollars plus; and the Gulf, where 'Dubai is the latest part of the globe to fall under Zaha Hadid's spell after the architect won a competition to design three iconic towers in the city' (*BD* 9 June 2006). A more personal but no less important contribution to the formation of her legacy among architects is her Maggie's Cancer Care Centre of 2006 in Scotland.[35] This, incidentally, was her first realized commission in the United Kingdom. Buildings by Hadid now span the globe, from Vilnius to Baku, from Singapore to Beijing, from London to Rome to Glasgow to Vienna, from New York to Minneapolis. Like all starchitects, she was increasingly being sought out where urban growth coalitions in



Figure 4.12. Aquatics Centre London. (© ZHA)

globalizing cities or globalizing national elites want architecture that will put them on the global map, raise their cultural profile, attract tourists, and put people in the mood to spend. It remains to be seen whether her firm ZHA will continue to thrive without her.

There is natural resistance to seeing great artists as businesspeople, let alone members of something as formidable as the TCC. Nevertheless, as the evidence suggests, these four starchitects actively engaged not simply in the creative work of architecture but also in the business of architecture and, through their active engagement with the culture-ideology of consumerism, in the Icon Project. To a greater or lesser extent all great artists do this, and it is not my place to judge them for it. My purpose here is to try to explain how unique iconic architecture works for the TCC and global capitalism, and how these starchitects can be considered part of the corporate fraction of the TCC in architecture and urban design. Without them and the larger group of signature architects and the much larger group of big firms producing hundreds of typical iconic buildings all over the world, the Icon Project as I have conceptualized it would not be possible. The FLW and Corb industries show how the great iconic architects of the recent past are also mobilized for the Icon Project today. However, the social production of iconic architecture also needs the skills and resources of the political, professional, and consumerist fractions of the TCC to create the requisite connections with consuming publics distributed in a great variety of cultures globally. It is to these people and their institutions that we now turn.

5
The Politics of Iconic Architecture

The political fraction of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) in architecture and urban design is made up of national, international, and transnational politicians and officials at all levels of administrative power and responsibility. They operate in communities, cities, states, and international and global institutions. They make decisions on what gets built where, how changes to the built environment are regulated, and on issues of urban preservation. The TCC facilitates the production of iconic architecture in the same way and for the same purposes as it does all cultural icons, by incorporating creative artists to construct meanings and aesthetics that effectively represent its power in order to maximize profits for the capitalist class. In his very widely reviewed book on megaprojects and risk, Bent Flyvbjerg (2003: 16) states, 'Cost underestimation and overrun cannot be explained by error and seem to be best explained by strategic misrepresentation, namely lying, with a view to getting projects started.' It seems to me sensible to bear this apparently extreme statement in mind when thinking about the relations between politicians and professionals in this field.

The political fraction of the TCC in architecture divides into two overlapping groups and two sets of institutions. First, there are globalizing state officials and politicians and their nominees in public agencies who promote, award, permit, or refuse contracts for important national or subnational (usually urban) projects. Governments and local authorities organize competitions, sometimes inviting entries from domestic or foreign architects. The selection of iconic foreign architects for prestigious national and urban projects has become a feature of the era of capitalist globalization. The second group comprises inter-state and transnational officials and politicians who are influential for architectural projects promoted as sites or buildings with global significance.

Others confer a sort of transnational political iconicity on existing buildings and places, notably through the World Heritage Site system of UNESCO (Edensor 1998: 184–7).[1] The work of private transnational non-governmental organizations is also important. For example, the title and mission statement of the World Monuments Fund, 'Saving the world's architectural masterpieces and important cultural heritage sites from damage and destruction', have a deliberately official ring. Its partners include several transnational corporations (American Express, Google, Tiffany, and Kroll), and its listing of endangered monuments is clearly an attempt to establish or confirm iconicity. In 2011 it announced an Endangered Monuments Watch campaign comprising 67 threatened cultural-heritage sites worldwide.[2] Construction, destruction, or demolition of buildings and spaces considered iconic by any community is perennially controversial. In his powerful book *Destruction of Memory*, the British journalist Robert Bevan (2006) documents how, during times of war, the targeting of iconic buildings is a key weapon against the memory and identity of the enemy. The Belgrade-born architect Srdjan Jovanovic Weiss (2000/2001) explains the NATO bombing of Belgrade in similar terms (see also Young 1993 on Holocaust memorialization and Huyssen 2003 on the architectural politics of memory).

In most countries, prominent architects are recruited by politicians and bureaucrats onto official bodies that decide and help implement planning policies for the built environment. Notable examples include Lord (Richard) Rogers, once dubbed the 'planning czar of London', those designing state-sponsored buildings in the postcolonial world, the architects (in more than one sense) of the *grands projets* in Paris, and megaprojects in China. Such individuals and their agencies form the core of the political fraction of the TCC in architecture and urban design. Sensitive projects in or near the most important cities are most likely to achieve iconicity, and elites in many cities have set out deliberately to establish or enhance their credentials through promotion of iconic architecture, notably Barcelona (McNeill 1999; Marshall 2004), Bilbao (del Cerro 2006; Plaza 2006), Glasgow (Gomez 1998), and Los Angeles (Koenig 2000; Ouroussoff 2001). In China: 'Cities are competing against each other for icons and are using international architects to drum up that "something different". In Chongqing [not yet considered a global city] . . . city authorities are racing to create the necessary public buildings. Rather in the manner of a shopping spree, they say they want 10 and have decided half should go to foreign architects' (*BD* 7 November 2003).[3]

Many of the buildings intended by urban boosters to be global icons that will put their city 'on the map' start off with high-profile competitions, sometimes open only to a restricted group of already famous architects who are invited to submit entries and sometimes paid to do so. As well as being regularly reported in specialist publications, the most important competitions attract attention worldwide in the mass media. In 2013, the Spanish architect Angel Borrego Cubero made *The Competition*, the first real-time documentary on the topic. The film showed how Jean Nouvel, Frank Gehry, Dominique Perrault (the eventual winner), Zaha Hadid, and Norman Foster competed for the commission to design a new National Museum of Art of Andorra in 2008. Larson (1994) makes the provocative argument that competitions rest on a bourgeois ideology of art, blurring the line between art and commerce in the sense that the structure and discourse of competitions create a situation such that what matters most is not getting the building built, but leveraging as much publicity from the competition as possible.[4]

Several competitions have attained legendary status in the profession, notably the rebuilding of the Ground Zero site in New York post-9/11. A formidable literature on the politics of Ground Zero is emerging.[5] The saga has spawned many TV documentaries and at least one novel, *The Submission* (Waldman 2012), in which a Muslim-American architect wins the Ground Zero memorial competition with predictable consequences. The competitions for the Sydney Opera House and Pudong in Shanghai in the 1980s were also controversial, as were the Chicago Tribune Building in 1922, the League of Nations in 1927–8, and the UN headquarters in New York. Le Corbusier was thwarted in the latter two.[6] Where competition juries for public or national buildings have foreign members, this is often interpreted as a globalizing tendency among state bureaucrats and politicians. For example, William Holford (one of three foreign jurors for the Brasilia competition in 1956) is credited with having had the imagination and independence to pick the rather schematic design by Lúcio Costa (actually born in France). Competitions for projects marketed as sites with genuinely globalizing significance are of particular interest. As researchers such as Broudehoux (2010), Frank and Steets (2010), and Horne (2011) demonstrate, major sporting and cultural events (e.g., the new stadia associated with the Olympics and football World Cups) attract architects and cities seeking to enhance their iconicity like bees to a honey pot, as do repositories of world heritage like the Cairo Museum of Antiquities, the Library in Alexandria, and the Acropolis Museum in Athens, all served by many consumerist websites—by which I mean, if it is not already obvious, when you log on you are usually swamped by adverts for hotels, tours, restaurants, shopping, and other attractions in the locality.

It has long been recognized by scholars and interested publics alike that architecture has been used to express and reinforce the power of the strong over the weak, as I argued in the first chapter with reference to the work of Bentmann and Müller on hegemonic architecture. Up until the middle of the 20th century, such ideas were discussed largely in terms of the ways in which monumentality in architecture was employed by religious or political authorities.[7] One of the most influential histories of architecture in the 20th century declares: 'Throughout history, monumental architecture has been employed to embody the values of dominant ideologies and groups, and as an instrument of state propaganda' (Curtis 1996: 351). In the chapter of which this is the opening sentence, Curtis shows that while most accounts of the architectures of Nazi Germany, Communist Russia, and Fascist Italy portray them as chauvinist, debased, and worthless,[8] there were exceptions. Terragni's Casa del Fascio in Como (1936) is the only fascist building that has the seal of approval in the modernist canon (Curtis 1996: 362–9). It is the only one represented in the collection of icons of 20th-century architecture edited by Thiel-Siling (2005: 62–3) and is favourably mentioned in most critical histories (e.g., Moore 2012: 199).[9]

Sigfried Giedion had argued in 1944 that monumentality needed to be recovered from its totalitarian distortions and re-created in an emotionally literate and democratic form. Reprinted in a special issue of the *Harvard Architecture Review* (Giedion 1984), this article stimulated a lively debate. Curtis also contributed to the special issue and, significantly, chose to illustrate his argument with reference to Louis Kahn's celebrated National Assembly Building in Dacca (1962–75), which he dubbed in his textbook the crowning achievement of this phase of democratic monumental architecture (1996: ch. 28). Curtis concludes: 'Monumentality is a quality in architecture which does not necessarily have to do with size, but with intensity of expression' (1996: 514). All this, of course, involves complex historical processes. Lawrence Vale (2008: 334) puts this very well:

> At what point, one may ask, did the pyramid become an Egyptian form? At first those sentinels at Giza must have seemed far more alien intrusions than anything Louis Kahn has conjured for Bangladesh. Yet today they remain the unchallenged architectural symbols of Egypt. And, like the Pyramids of Egypt

> or the Eiffel Tower, the Citadel of Assembly [in Dacca] may someday be seen as being quintessentially of its country as well.[10]

The relations between monumentality and iconicity have certainly changed since the middle of the 20th century. At the very least, members of the TCC appear to prefer their iconicity in tall buildings (King 2004) as well as in various sculptural forms—the prime examples being the Sydney Opera House and Guggenheim Bilbao.

In his comparison of the architectures of Barcelona from the 1888 Universal Exhibition to the 1992 Olympics, Andrew Smith argues that while the former was mainly about Catalan nationalism the latter was much more about Barcelona as a global city. He makes explicit the connection between monumentality and iconicity as follows: 'the contemporary obsession with iconic buildings can be interpreted as the latest attempt by cities to use monumentality as a way of affirming and displaying capital status . . . [today] tourism objectives are often the prime justification for these new monumental strategies' (2007: 82). While Smith makes the perfectly valid point that contemporary icons operate as symbols of communication, he fails, in my view, to see that it is not only in terms of form that monuments of the pre-global era differ from architectural icons of the global era, but crucially in terms of those who drive their production and representation. Intrinsic to these projects is the attempt to create new identities, particularly that of the global consumer.

Architectural Iconicity and Identities

Political elites have frequently employed architectural icons to influence the formation, expression, and marketing of city and national identities (Davis and Libertun 2011). This is clearly the case for the most spectacular remains of classical antiquity (notably the Acropolis and Parthenon in Athens, the pyramids and the Sphinx of Egypt, and what survives in Rome) and other civilizations (popular examples are the Taj Mahal, Machu Pichu, gothic cathedrals, and Borobudur). More recently, the Statue of Liberty, as famously portrayed at the end of the film *Planet of the Apes,* speaks of another sort of doomed classical civilization. In each case political and religious elites have attempted to make their special places iconic, sometimes in ways that strikingly resemble what happens in our own times. It is unlikely that global icons expressing global identities spring up spontaneously. This is usefully conceptualized in terms of the creation and manipulation of collective memory. An architect-professional put it like this: 'All the buildings demolished in Las Vegas, and Venice (California) were failed icons in their time' [CA4]. Local, city, national, and in some cases transnational identities are created through the dissemination of images, a process vastly accelerated in the era of capitalist globalization as quantitative increases in visibility through electronic media of communication have resulted in qualitative changes in global and transnational imaginaries, collective memories made somehow more real in architectural and other forms. Architectural icons can be mobilized in the deliberate creation of new identities as well as in attempts to represent old and often contested identities.[11]

Prior to the era of capitalist globalization (which I date from the 1960s and the advent of the electronic revolution) political and religious authorities, often working together though sometimes bitterly opposed, were the key drivers of collective memory, the key formulators of the urban imaginary. Both national political authorities and urban elites used urban images for these purposes. Wayne Attoe (1981) offers some valuable clues for understanding this phenomenon, arguing that skylines work as cultural indexes and collective symbols and can be transformed into icon-like objects. He gives as a historical exemplar New Jerusalem with its domes and glittering spires, skylines represented in paintings, on postcards, and in corporate logos, advertisements, and civic emblems. Another ideal skyline presents Oxford as the city of dreaming spires, but it is purified by getting rid of the smoking chimneys of the real industrial Oxford, distilled into the icon of dreaming spires alone. Skylines become transportable on postcards, merchandise, and electronic images, and so become iconic. Newspaper columns use skyline icons as emblems, whether showing the generic big city skyline as does the *Auckland Sunday News* (Attoe's local paper), or a specific one, the most ubiquitous example being the Manhattan 'Sky Line' as famously introduced in Lewis Mumford's *New Yorker* column in the 1930s (Wojtowicz 1998:101ff.).

The gradual transformation from state- or religion-driven to corporate-driven iconic skylines began in the 19th century, pre-dating what I have been identifying as the era of capitalist globalization by a few decades in the major cities of the capitalist world, notably in the United States (Willis 1995). However, from the 1960s onwards, when the electronic revolution began to transform the capitalist mode of production, distribution, and exchange, corporate interests gradually displaced religious and state interests in the sphere of iconic architecture for place-marketing of cities (as well as place-marketing of countries) in the scramble to ascend various global city hierarchies (Derudder et al. 2012). To this might be added the place-marketing of global corporations themselves with the employment of famous architects to build iconic headquarters and research labs, dubbed 'Industrial Versailles' by *Fortune* magazine in 1951 (Knowles and Leslie 2001). Reinhold Martin (2003) usefully locates this in the wider context of the military-industrial complex in the United States. Corporate elites controlling globalizing cities need the support of globalizing politicians, and officials, the political fraction of the TCC.[12] It is remarkable how quickly what might be termed aspirant icons of recent origin have been incorporated into promotional images of skylines alongside much older, well-established city icons. In London, the Millennium Wheel (London Eye), Fosters Gherkin, and Piano's Shard now regularly stand beside St Paul's Cathedral, the Palace of Westminster with Big Ben, and Tower Bridge in advertisements and promotional materials. The London 2012 Olympics added several more aspirant icons, and the judgement that commerce rather than civitas 'is now the inspiration drawn from the Los Angeles skyline' (Attoe 1981: 35) is increasingly accurate for skylines all over the world today. Maria Kaika (2010) provides an exemplary case study on the role of globalizing politicians and the local authority in paving the way for mostly corporate and consumerist iconic architecture in the City of London. Figure 5.1

Figure 5.1. Skyline icons for MBA marketing.

elegantly illustrates how old and new unique icons can be commercially mobilized, in this case advertising elite multi-campus MBAs and the cities in which they are taught (London, Hong Kong, and New York) at Hong Kong airport in 2014.

The iconic city skyline has a double function. First, it serves to forge a sense of urban identity and pride, often irrespective of the merits or the popularity of the individual buildings that make it up, for those who want to identify with the city. And second, it serves as a marker, negative or positive, of the city for outsiders. Architects are not unaware of this. 'After sunset, [Arup's] Canton Tower appears as a luminous icon on Guangzhou's skyline. . . . The positive feedback about the tower has been magnificent . . . and got us exposure outside the field of architecture and construction [coverage in the international press, TV, and the *MegaStructures* series]' (Schittich and Brensing 2013: 94). Iconic skylines, thus, help both to identify and to identify with specific cities.

Different class, gender, ethnic, and other groups in cities may view skylines and their elements differently or fail to see them at all. This is vividly illustrated by one professor who had worked in New Orleans and observed that the Pontalba Apartment Building of the 1840s was iconic for the white middle class, whereas for working-class blacks the local icon would be the Municipal Auditorium. For the white working class the International Longshoreman Hall was the local icon—a legacy of Jim Crow segregation [NY11]. Another expression of this, from an urban scholar, was that the iconic is the vernacular for people's everyday lives [NY7]. Visual narratives of east European migrants in London which display a counter-discourse to the global London flaunted in corporate-official promotions make the same point (Datta 2012). Car drivers, those who use public transport, cyclists, the disabled, pedestrians, those who clean and maintain iconic buildings, may also see their cities differently from those who have highly paid jobs in them or who regulate them or simply make profits from them.

There are many examples of how those in control of the state have explicitly used iconic buildings, often in tandem with the capital cities in which they are located, to symbolize national identities that they are attempting to create (Vale 2008). In his study of the return of the capital of reunified Germany to Berlin, Michael Wise (1998) argues that capitals everywhere embody national identity and historical consciousness, citing the Mall in Washington, DC, the Kremlin in Moscow, and the Forbidden City in Beijing. A much-researched case is the Eiffel Tower, the ultimate urban icon roundly disliked when it was first constructed (recall that Guy de Maupassant dined there every day in order not to have to look at this hideous structure). Now its seminal role in identity formation for Paris and France is universally acknowledged. Fierro argues, 'No city in the world has been deployed as a symbol of national identity to the same degree as Paris' (2003: 10) and no representation of Paris is complete without the Eiffel Tower. Figure 5.2 is just one of countless illustrations of the role that the Eiffel Tower plays in creating and marketing city and national identities—in this case on the city map distributed by the chic department store Galeries

Figure 5.2. Tourist map for Paris.

Lafayette. This rings true for many other major cities and their icons all round the world today.

The complexity of this issue is illustrated by the curious case of Luis Barragán's up-market El Pedregal housing development in Mexico City. Commonly seen as a major revision of the International Style and as an icon of Mexican cultural identity, the real estate images used to market El Pedregal showed a drawing very much like Frank Lloyd Wright's Fallingwater! (Eggener 1999b; Perez-Mendez 2009). The elitist Barragán did not share the populist-leftist Juan O'Gorman's social agenda. O'Gorman, who had also been influenced by Wright, argued prophetically in an article in 1953: 'This architecture that is called Modern . . . is the denial of what is Mexican, and its domineering characteristic lies in its imitative condition of what is foreign. . . . It is only possible to understand this architecture as a reflection of the interests of a National Class for whom the industrialization of Mexico means the alliance with the International Capitalistic Class' (quoted in Eggener 1999a: 256, n. 55).[13] In the global era, states increasingly collude with corporate interests, often to the financial advantage of the political fraction of the TCC.[14] The process of incorporating agents of the state into the Icon Project often takes place with the conscious participation of the architect. A good example of this was the patriotic (some might say jingoistic) strategy adopted by Daniel Libeskind in his struggle to win the World Trade Center replacement competition at Ground Zero, which he lost to SOM. Libeskind's idea to build a Freedom Tower 1,776 feet high—referencing the date of the signing of the US Declaration of Independence—was seen by some as crass. The whole project was, predictably, embroiled in symbolic, aesthetic, political, and commercial conflicts (Sudjic 2005: ch. 13; Charney 2014; Sagalyn, forthcoming).

Brazil is considered by many to be the paradigm case of the attempt to nationalize modernist architecture in the Third World. While in Turkey and Indonesia there were also strong early modernist forays influenced by notable foreign architects, only in Brazil was a whole new national capital city built under the influence of CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne)—founded in 1928 by the historian Sigfried Giedion with prominent architects, notably Le Corbusier and Josep Lluís Sert. Its aim was to propagate modernist principles in architecture and urban design (it dissolved in 1959). It is often claimed that Brasilia best exemplified the costs and benefits of CIAM's urbanistic aims (Mumford 2000). The story of Brasilia revolves around President Kubitschek, who provided the political will, the eminent Brazilian architects Lúcio Costa (who created the masterplan), and the communist Oscar Niemeyer (who designed most of the iconic buildings). Le Corbusier and the Soviet Constructivists provided the inspiration, though scholars such as Zilah Quezado Deckker(2001) and Jorge Nudelman (2013) argue that the influence of Corbusier in Brazil is often exaggerated. Kubitschek promoted Brasilia, located deep in the interior of this vast country, as a motor of regional economic development and a hub of a new communications revolution for national integration. The architects saw it as a material embodiment of the blueprint for the socialist utopia to which early modernism aspired. In the middle of the 20th century, Brasilia's planners were already calling it 'the capital of the twenty-first century' (Holston 1989: 85; Fraser 2000: ch. 3; Vale 2008: ch. 4). While the intentions of these parties were not always realized, to many people Brasilia was an iconic city with many iconic buildings (figure 5.3).[15]

The architectural context in which all this was taking place was a vibrant modernist movement that began in the 1940s, taking the so-called Brazilian Style to international prominence with a wildly successful exhibition 'Brazil Built' at MoMA in 1943. Quezado Deckker (2001) in her history of the movement shows that the Brazilian Style had as much political as aesthetic

Figure 5.3. Congress building, Brasilia.

significance, being seen by some in Brazil as a symbol of American imperialism, but by others as Brazil's true path to modernization and development. Holston expresses this in the following terms: 'an architectural sign [the appearance of a building, for example] may remain constant while its denoted meanings shift dramatically with changes in use, context, and intention' (1989: 97), anticipating Jencks's discussion of the iconic building as enigmatic signifier. The main lessons of this case are that the end results of such a project (and probably even single buildings) are highly unpredictable over time with respect to aesthetics, symbolism, politics, use, and reception. However, it should be noted that Niemeyer (1907–2012) earned a global reputation with his magnificent architectural achievements, shared a Pritzker Prize, and was a member of the team that designed the UN building in New York. He became one of the few architects from the Third World to build an important building in the First World, the Communist Party headquarters in Paris. In 2000 it was rented by Prada to show its fashion collection.

The construction of the Petronas Twin Towers (PTT) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia—a self-styled moderate Islamic state—is another good, if convoluted, example of how issues of identity are typically worked through by political elites under conditions of capitalist globalization. PTT's architect Cesar Pelli was born in Argentina in 1926 and moved to the United States in the 1950s. Pelli had attracted international attention with his skyscrapers at the World Financial Center in New York (1981) and in Canary Wharf in London (1986), so it was no great surprise when he won the international competition for PTT in 1991. The project, the centre-piece of President Mahathir's *Wawasan* (Vision) 2020, consisted of two 88-storey towers over 450 metres high with a sky bridge between the 41st and 42nd floors. PTT was owned and largely tenanted by the consortium led by Petronas (the state petroleum company) as part of the Kuala Lumpur City Center plan. The architect reported, 'It was never specified that the towers should become the tallest buildings in the world, just that they be beautiful' (Pelli et al. 1997: 66), though the fact that Petronas Towers would be the tallest building in the world (for a short time at least) was certainly appealing to the Malaysian client.[16] Pelli tells us that the contract was won not only because the 'proposal met the desire for a uniquely Malaysian design' but because meeting this desire also solved a problem in skyscraper design. 'Linking the Petronas Towers to Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia required rethinking the character of the traditional skyscraper to unburden it of American or

European connotations . . . [the] shape of the towers has its origin in Islamic tradition, in which geometric patterns assume greater symbolic importance than in Western culture' (1997: 68). Where does this 'uniquely Malaysian design' come from? According to Pelli, at one level it comes from the Islamic geometry of the floor plan, but at another, deeper, level it comes from the break with modernist tradition embodied in the symmetrical arrangement of the towers and what this means for the space between them. 'Through Frank Lloyd Wright, many architects have been influenced by Lao Tzu's teaching that the reality of a hollow object is in the void and not the walls that define it. . . . This quality of the building is not derived from Malaysian tradition. But because it appears for the first time in Kuala Lumpur, it will be forever identified with its place' (1997: 70). Just as the Eiffel Tower became synonymous with Paris, though its structure and form were not 'French' in origin (Wells 2010: 128–30), and the Opera House whose structure and form were not 'Australian' in origin became synonymous with Sydney, PTT will become synonymous with Kuala Lumpur. This is clearly a rationale that is open to many types and layers of interpretation. Suffice it to say that at one level and for some politicians, professionals, and ideologues, it painlessly reconciles local and global sensibilities in a conciliatory consumerist direction. The ground floor of PTT has become one of the most iconic shopping malls in Asia and, as Pelli predicted, the Petronas Towers complex has become a first-class marketing symbol for Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia as a whole, despite its purported 'break with modernism'. As in so many globalizing cities, T-shirt–wearing tourists and locals are walking adverts for old and new urban icons (see figure 5.4).[17] A professional in a starchitect firm expressed a version of the unique/typical icon distinction as follows: 'Once you get it on the skyline, it will start to appear on the T-shirts. So, distinguish good (useful, functional) icons and bad (repetitive) icons' [HL4].

The Istanbul Modern museum, for which the local firm Tabanlioglu turned an abandoned warehouse into an impressive multi-purpose cultural space, makes another kind of statement. The website explains, 'Minimum interference has been the architectural approach; the warehouse maintained its structural essence, simplicity is preferred to put the emphasis on the exhibited artwork to stand out.'[18] While there are no Guggenheim sculptural intentions for this typical local icon, it is a striking building in its context, an ironic decorated shed (figure 5.5). The social and political compromise with consumerism is made clear in the layout of the building: 'Educational ateliers, meeting rooms, museum shop, and a restaurant decorated with

Figure 5.4. Kuala Lumpur icons T-shirt.

modernized Ottoman motifs are integrated at the first floor. The basement floor is designed for temporary exhibitions, library, photography exhibition, press zone, theatre and offices.' 'Istanbul Modern' and 'modernized Ottoman motifs' are constructed as contributions to nation-building in Turkey.

PTT and Istanbul Modern are illustrations of the argument that there is a deliberate urban spatial strategy, anchored by iconic architecture, happening all over the world. In the late 1990s, 13 of the 30 largest architect-developer firms working in Asia were based in the United States, Australia, or the United Kingdom (Marshall 2003: 2). All large projects, both successful copies and unique icons, will have partners on the ground, not just

Figure 5.5. Ironic modernist decorated shed: Istanbul Modern by Tabanlioglu. (© Nérostrateur, Wiki)

architects but engineers, real estate agents, bankers, lawyers, the tourist industry, and other support staff. Out of these relationships new local affiliates of the TCC will emerge as part of transnational urban growth coalitions where the political climate is supportive. In the era of capitalist globalization it generally is, through the joint efforts of corporate elites and globalizing politicians and officials. Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) provides a potent example (Bunnell 2004b). MSC (which recruited Bill Gates to its International Advisory Panel) links the Petronas Twin Towers in Kuala Lumpur (once the tallest building in the world) with the new towns of Cyberjaya, promoted as the world's first fully smart city, and the icon-expectant Putrajaya, the first multimedia paperless seat of government (Nicoletti 2009). These are connected via a high-speed rail link to Kuala Lumpur International Airport, the biggest airport in the region. Marc Boey (2002) usefully describes this as a carefully articulated hybrid landscape connecting global city architecture with nationalist tradition and culture, complete with strategic placement of new mosques.

While MSC has stalled somewhat in recent years, the rhetoric and some typically iconic architecture remain. Nevertheless, frequently hidden from the tourist gaze, the iconic buildings of the MSC obscure the lives and living conditions of the poor in Kuala Lumpur (Bunnell 2004a, b). Abidin Kusno (2000) forcefully makes the same point for Jakarta and, indeed, this appears to be true for many globalizing cities, and not just those in the Third World. Such transnational social spaces imposed from above intensify the class polarization crisis. On the surface, this appears to turn the earlier critique of capitalism as private affluence and public squalor if not on its head, on its side. Neoliberal consumerism fortified by platitudes like 'the rising tide lifts all boats' promises the fruits of capitalist globalization to all. Transnational social spaces from above create apparent public affluence through iconic architecture. This is achieved through an appropriation of modernist iconicity with regionalist characteristics which prevailing capitalist-inspired modes of representation translate into a language that sits comfortably in the Icon Project (see Dovey 1999 on 'enclaves'). Some transnational social spaces and local icons can also be created more democratically from below. Kevin Gotham (2005) provides an interesting case study of tourism in New Orleans from this perspective. Statue Square in Hong Kong and similar places elsewhere, where expatriate domestic and other workers congregate, may also be analyzed in these terms, more or less consumerist.

Politics and the Architecture of Transnational Social Spaces

The role of iconic architecture in the strategies of globalizing cities highlights the importance of transnational social spaces for the political fraction of the TCC. The distinction between public and private space provides a starting-point. This much-used distinction is not as clear-cut as it sounds, because much public space has been effectively privatized and some private space has been made public (Kayden 2000; Minton 2009). The fact that a space is legally private or public does not necessarily mean that it is effectively private or public. For example, the London Bridge City riverside walk is legally private, as is announced by a relatively small notice attached by the developers, morelondon, to the river wall alongside the public right of way (figure 5.6).

This space was mobilized for further commercial development to take advantage of the Olympics and celebrations of the Queen's Jubilee. It is legally private but nominally public, and few skateboarders, roller-bladers,

Figure 5.6. Private/public space in London.

and cyclists seem aware or take any notice of the restrictions. However, embedded as it is within a consumerist waterfront development, the rules are there for a purpose. In 2014, the UK parliament (Tory-Liberal coalition) passed a set of laws granting sweeping new powers to police and private security firms to restrict access to what is generally considered public space. Josie Appleton (2014) argues: 'These controls are exerted by a fusion of public and private interests, with state authorities and business interests (who are increasingly the legal owners of what we think of as public space) forming seamless collaborations to restrict what they see as unseemly or "messy" activities.' Prime among these collaborations are private security guards issuing fines, business associations pressuring for restrictions, and police issuing trespass orders on private property without owners' consent. For Appleton this represents a new alliance of business and state against civil society (what I would term the local arm of the TCC). Social life itself is messy, she argues—skateboarders, protesters, buskers, leafleteers, children playing games—that is, any activity that is not shopping or getting from A to B.[19] Not all those involved in control measures are members of the local political fraction of the TCC, but many can be considered as acting for it. Appleton points to similar legislation in Australia and the United States (see Beckett and Herbert 2009) and, of course, there are many other countries where such controls are the norm. Many scoffed at the dire predictions of those like Sorkin (1992) and Gottdiener (1997), who argued that public space in the United States was being compromised through the commercial principles and regulatory norms of the theme park, but evidence is accumulating that this is becoming a global phenomenon.

The narrative in many globalizing cities is the attempt to recover from deindustrialization and urban blight by creating viable transnational social spaces, often anchored by iconic architecture. The paradigm case is Barcelona, where the Urban Regeneration plan of the 1980s and the opportunity of the 1992 Olympics stimulated substantial waterfront redevelopment and the construction of iconic buildings all over the city (McNeill 1999; Marshall 2004). A culture industry around the works of the most celebrated local architect, Antoni Gaudi, provided a link to an extraordinary past and the tourists flocked in. The 150th anniversary of Gaudi's birth in 2002 kept up the momentum. Iconic foreign architects contributed to reinforce Barcelona's reputation as one of the great architectural destinations. In 1999 RIBA awarded its Gold Medal to Barcelona (the first time to a city) in recognition of the political, architectural, and commercial coalition that made this happen. Richard Meier, whose Museum of Contemporary Art near La Rambla was slotted into his schedule as he was building the Getty Center in Los Angeles, joined Herzog & de Meuron, Hadid, and Foster in the Barcelona project. The other side of the boosterist discourse is revealed in a documentary film on the effects of mass tourism in Barcelona (https://www.youtube.com/user/byebyebarcelona). Ricky Burdett (2000) argues that a similar coalition in Salerno, a small city south of Naples, followed the same strategy and recruited leading lights from the Barcelona planning team to provide a 'Programmatic Document' to reinvent the city. A Ferry Terminal by Hadid (Burdett calls this 'iconic'), an urban park by Sejima and Nishizawa, and a scheme by Chipperfield for the regeneration of the historic centre among many other projects have transformed Salerno from an industrial backwater into a city of culture and tourism. As in Barcelona, a coalition that included a charismatic mayor, pragmatic architects, and commercial interests used iconic architecture to boost the city—'a significant indicator of the success of the operation is that property values in the city center have increased sevenfold' (2000: 100; see also Lees et al. 2016: ch.5). Iconic architecture and real estate are umbilically linked in Salerno, Barcelona, and other globalizing cities around the world.

In Glasgow, the regeneration of the city was directly connected with the buildings of a native son, Charles Rennie Mackintosh, and a new culture industry was built around him. Glasgow was proclaimed European City of Culture in 1990 and won the prestigious British City of Architecture and Design designation in 1999. Crawford (1996: 342) explains how between 1980 and 1995 'control of Mackintosh's reputation has passed out of the hands of the enthusiasts and into those of advertising agencies, journalists, giftware manufacturers, and tour operators'.[20] As Maria Gomez (1998) points out in her comparison of Glasgow and Bilbao, one of the models for Bilbao's regeneration was Glasgow's discourse of boosterism with its business and university-led redevelopment. Bilbao's special feature, of course, was Gehry's Guggenheim franchise museum, an iconic building that is said to be responsible for turning Bilbao into one of the leading weekend tourist destinations in Europe, added to which are the airport and bridge by Calatrava, the metro system designed by Foster, and a transport interchange by Stirling and Wilford. In his analysis of what he has dubbed 'McGuggenisation', Donald McNeill (2000, and 2009: ch. 4) shows how iconic architecture played a fundamental role in the relations between the Basque political elite and the commercial interests of the Guggenheim Foundation. Its director, Thomas Krens, the 'professional seducer', persuaded the Basque authorities to pay in excess of $100 million for use of the brand name. This was a central element in what del Cerro (2006) characterizes as 'Basque pathways to globalization'. Despite the hype, the jury is still out on the cost-benefits of Guggenheim Bilbao. As Patricia Morgado (2008) shows in her research on starchitecture in South America, icons do not always succeed, even if they are by Gehry. Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that enough members of the TCC believe that some version of the 'Bilbao effect' is worth investing in. Gehry's Biodiversity Museum in Panama City has been explicitly marketed with a comparison to Guggenheim Bilbao and the new museum has attracted much more media attention than if it had been designed by a less celebrated architect, thereby boosting the image of Panama. In a remarkable table Maria Gravari-Barbas (2015: 153–5) shows that of 12 Guggenheim-related 'Bilbao effect' museum projects since 1991 only two were actually built (in Bilbao and Abu Dhabi, both by Gehry), one more abandoned (Hadid in Vilnius) and another (Helsinki) won by the Paris-based firm Moreau Kusunoki—there were 1,715 applicants for the job—but it is by no means certain to be built (Iloniemi 2015). Projects in Vienna, New York, Venice, Las Vegas, Rio, Taichung, Guadalajara, and Singapore were either abandoned or short-lived.

Three main audiences are targeted by those who own and control such globalizing cities. First, these spaces and buildings seek to attract the national and international tourist trade, an important component of which is business-tourism (trade shows, conferences, sports events, etc.); second, the local urban middle class, whose numbers have increased rapidly over the last few decades in most cities; third, the better-off members of the local working class who are encouraged to participate by looking at and experiencing occasional outings in their new gleaming city centres, public buildings, and suburban shopping malls promoted as sources of civic and national pride even in the poorest countries. In a wide-ranging study of consumerism and analysis of the iconic architecture of some of the new shopping malls in Cairo, the Egyptian sociologist Mona Abaza (2006) provides ample evidence of this phenomenon. The wealthy Sawiris family—major mall developers, owners of the Orascom transnational corporation, and local members of the TCC—exemplifies the triumph of the new class of tycoons in Egypt. The research of the architect academic Gehan Selim (2013) complements the work of Abaza with a focus on those displaced by gentrifying urban development in Cairo.

Not all transnational social spaces have been created anew in the era of capitalist globalization. Indeed, one of the most prominent types of transnational social space is the rebranding of ancient monuments as prime tourist and consumerist sites (Vale 1999). Tourism at ancient monuments has existed for centuries, boosted by the invention of photography in the 1830s and accelerated spectacularly by the growth of the Internet. The Taj Mahal is a paradigm case. As Pratapaditya Pal (1989: 194) argues, 'the best-known symbol of Indian civilization is essentially a creation of Western enthusiasm,' though its contemporary significance for internal tourism in India is evident. This and the consumerist significance of the Taj as well as the prime importance of commission in the local tourist economy are brought out by Tim Edensor, who shows that tourist paths around the Taj (like most other similar sites) focus on 'realizing anticipated consumption . . . the next stop is invariably a craft emporium' (1998: 109). It comes as little surprise to learn that the Indian Department of Tourism called in the US National Parks Service for help with its development plans for the site in the 1990s. Architectural icons all over the world are a regular feature of tourist marketing.

The importance of transnational social spaces is evident everywhere, as large and small cities and even villages strive to replicate the Bilbao effect or a less expensive local substitute. Such endeavours produce losers as well as winners, not least in the sense that capitalist globalization intensifies class, social, cultural, and residential polarization. Most transnational social spaces are tools in the repertoire of those who own and control globalizing cities.[21] In the present era this has been taken to a new level, commonly known as urban megaprojects.

Iconic Architecture in Urban Megaprojects

Iconic architecture is not only compatible with but a necessary component of urban megaprojects (UMPs) in the era of capitalist globalization.[22] An excellent example is the ongoing story of the West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD). In 2002 a competition to design a new cultural megaproject in Hong Kong was won by a consortium comprising Fosters, the Bartlett School of Planning of University College London (UCL), and Nonometric Design & Planning Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government encouraged the participation of Sun Hung Kai, the largest developer in the Special Administrative Region of which Hong Kong is part, who sponsored the winning team. Despite this high-level support, the planning process for WKCD dragged on throughout the decade, though by 2014 it appeared to be back on track. WKCD has been promoted as a $40 billion project that will transform a relatively underdeveloped part of Kowloon into what is routinely referred to as an icon for culture and leisure, with several museums and theatres, concert venues, outdoor water park, design school, residential and office buildings, shopping malls, and other retail opportunities. Never one to pass up an opportunity for hyperbole, Rem Koolhaas (at the time developing a new plan) speculated: 'WKCD is a project of such scale and ambition that it could define the nature of the public realm in the 21st century.'[23] Fortunately, we have an insider account of how the first stage of planning took shape.

Matthew Carmona, Professor of Planning and Urban Design at UCL, was part of the original consortium team, and his 'Practice Note' identifies the cultural stakeholders and representatives of the public realm whose interests were prioritized in the competition process. While public piazzas and green spaces were to be delivered by the private sector, reverting to public ownership after 30 years, they were to be 'intensively programmed', meaning that they all had to be seen to be 'working for their living'. As in the rest of China and in most of the rest of the world, this meant that they had to attract customers for the benefit of the private retail market and profits for the real estate market. Carmona expresses this clearly in the context of how the design programme evolved: 'To win the competition required: a single strong iconic architectural image—the first priority . . . a functional urban design solution—a distant second . . . commercial elements (and therefore deliverability) were downplayed' (Carmona 2006: 120). During this period, aesthetic concerns preoccupied the architects, whereas not appearing to be too profit-driven was the developer's primary concern. However, priorities changed following the competition win, and the challenge became: 'to deliver a commercial viable development . . . to maintain the architectural vision (as much as possible) . . . to deliver a successful urban design solution—including a viable, vital, functional and livable public realm . . . The change was driven by the developers' (2006:120). Significantly, the challenge of commercial viability was considered entirely compatible with delivering high-quality design outcomes.[24] Thus, there was no conflict between the strong iconic architectural image necessary to win the competition and the corporate-consumerist interests driving the megaproject.

The Foster masterplan was abandoned in 2012 after many delays and false starts. In late 2012 two 'big announcements' were made.[25] First, the WKCD authority chose local architects Bing Thom and Ronald Lu over Fosters to design the Xiqu Center, the 'gateway of access' and 'the district's first landmark building'. Second, the short list of the six architects competing to design the M+ Museum for Visual Culture was announced. Herzog & de Meuron with TFP Farrells and Arup were the eventual winners, but the fact that the short list included Sejima, Piano, Ban, Snøhetta, and Ito (all signature architects) confirms that the clients were looking for an iconic building. Both Xiqu and M+ were intended 'to transform Hong Kong's West Kowloon Cultural District into a world-class destination for arts and culture . . . an ambitious project, the scale of the museum building alone, at around 62,000 square metres, will be on par with the Museum of Modern Art in New York'. Despite its ongoing difficulties it seems to me that the case of WKCD is strong evidence for the argument that iconic architecture has become not only compatible with but a necessary component of UMPs in the era of capitalist globalization (see figure 2.1).[26]

While definitions of UMPs differ between researchers, Fernando Diaz and Susan Fainstein (2008) are surely correct to highlight waterfront redevelopment, recovery of old manufacturing and warehouse zones, construction of new transport infrastructure, and renovation of historic city districts, usually to stimulate consumer demand. While their case studies are restricted to Europe and North America, there is evidence that the phenomenon is becoming truly global. An emerging urbanity as a result of increasing numbers of large urban projects designed by Western architects in the Asia Pacific Rim 'leads inevitably to a collection of architectural projects that are remarkably the same in cities such as Tokyo, Shanghai, Singapore and Jakarta' (Marshall 2003: 2).[27] Transformations in cities all over the world force those concerned with urban design to create new vocabularies to describe and analyze what is going on. New concepts flood the marketplace of ideas (world city, global city, 100-mile city, megacity, postmetropolis, exopolis, edge city, simcity, fractal city, post-Fordist industrial metropolis), all jostling for prominence.[28] Marshall's Asian case studies all shared the following features: perceptions of global competition, striving for competitive advantages for host cities, a new kind of space occupancy, targeting global elites, differences in scale and articulation to surrounding environments, and attempts to secure celebrity status through marketing images (all elements of the Icon Project). Richard Marshall argues that these processes, while varying in fine detail from city to city, result in a rather narrow definition of urban life and culture, promoting a rather restricted consumerist urban vision, which has become the dominant global urban vision. Urban growth coalitions in globalizing cities of whatever size increasingly look to iconic architecture as key components in UMPs to secure higher ranking in the global hierarchy of cities. 'Like corporations without logos, cities without icons are not in the market' (Dovey 1999: 159).

Even in Sydney, home of one of the world's greatest global icons, some feel the urge go further:

> Four of architecture's finest have been shortlisted to design what Australian businessman James Packer hopes to be the most iconic building in Sydney since the Opera House. . . . 'Sydney deserves one of the world's best hotels and with these amazing architects I'm confident we will see the most iconic building constructed here since the Opera House,' Packer told *The Daily Telegraph*. 'I want this hotel resort to be instantly recognizable around the world and feature on postcards and memorabilia promoting Sydney. That's how you attract international tourists, create jobs and put Sydney on the map.' Packer has

> asked each practice to design a dramatic masterpiece that will rise up to 235 meters, making it one of Sydney's tallest. In addition, the resort must feature at least 350 rooms, including 70 luxurious suites on the upper levels of the 65-story building, along with 100 private luxury apartments, two fine dining restaurants, luxury retail, spa and beauty facilities, an executive lounge and multiple levels of VIP gaming. (*ArchDaily* 18 February 2013)

As the business narrative of competitive capitalist neoliberalism dictates, nothing and no one can afford to stand still. All globalizing cities always need UMPs and more iconic buildings.[29]

While they are by no means equivalent, the phenomenon of UMPs can rarely be entirely separated from the rise of skyscrapers. King (2004) frames the issue in terms of the transformation of the skyscraper from an American icon of corporate power to a signifier of modernity all over the world (see also Abalas and Herreros 2003). Cities, particularly in Asia, compete openly to build the world's tallest building. Images of soaring towers on the skylines of aspiring global cities join shopping malls, sports stadia, museums, transportation hubs, and culture complexes as the sine qua non for global city status on the world stage. In many cases the immensity of new skyscrapers vying for the accolade of the tallest building in the world makes them UMPs in their own right, bearing in mind that they often bring with them contiguous retail and infrastructural complexes, necessary to service the anticipated residential, business, and tourist traffic that is intrinsic to their economic and political rationale.

By 2014, 8 of the 10 tallest buildings in the world were in Asia, the exceptions being One World Trade Center at Ground Zero and the Willis (formerly Sears) Tower in Chicago, both designed by SOM (table 5.1). There were three Moscow skyscrapers in the top 100 (numbers 37, 47, and 78), and the Shard was the tallest building in the rest of Europe (number 71). All were buildings to a greater or lesser extent devoted to consumerism: hotels, corporate headquarters, and sites of leisure and entertainment.[30] Even the Clock Tower in Mecca has a 20-storey shopping mall. Most of these tall towers exemplify the mixed-use form that best suits the economics of megastructures in the era of capitalist globalization.

In the first decade of the new millennium, there were two clear leaders in the race for the top ranking in the UMP competition, the Persian Gulf and China. In their essay 'Dreams So Big Only the Sea Can Hold Them', Mark Jackson and Veronica Dora (2009) relate the stories of the Palm Jumeirah complex in Dubai (their title is from its promotional video), Palm Jebel Ali,

Table 5.1. Ten tallest completed buildings in the world (2014/15)

Rank	Building (Floors)	Architect	Height (m)	Built
1	Burj Khalifa Dubai (163)	SOM	828	2010
2	Shanghai Tower (128)	Gensler	632	2014
3	Abraj Al-Bait Clock Tower Mecca (120)	Dar Al-Handasah	601	2012
4	One World Trade Center New York (104)	SOM	541	2013
5	Taipei 101 (101)	C.Y. Lee	509	2004
6	Shanghai World Financial Center (101)	KPF	492	2008
7	International Commerce Centre Hong Kong (118)	KPF	484	2010
8	Petronas Towers 1 and 2 Kuala Lumpur (88)[a]	Cesar Pelli	452	1998
9	Zifeng Tower Nanjing (89)	SOM	450	2010
10	Willis [Sears] Tower Chicago (108)	SOM	442	1973

[a] Often counted as two buildings.

Source: Adapted from Wikipedia lists for 2014/15.

and Palm Deira. By 2008 it was claimed that more than half of the $14 billion development of 300 private islands known as 'The World' had been sold to transnational buyers.[31] Deconstructing the key terms used to market these projects, notably 'The World' and 'dream', Jackson and Dora comment: 'ostensible superlatives brand Dubai's efforts towards global iconicity' (2009: 2087), Many contributions to this literature demonstrate the important role of new iconic buildings and also the continuing importance of traditional icons, notably the protection of views of the minarets of the Grand Mosque. For example, in the Abu Dhabi Urban Structure Framework Plan, financial functions were concentrated in the Central Business District and government offices in the Capital District, 'where the use of iconic and branded architecture is explicitly mentioned in order to express local capital city status' (Ponzini and Nastasi 2011: 52). The developer Aldar Properties is a typical corporate-state development vehicle and its Saadiyat Island of Happiness project 'includes the creation of a Cultural District as an icon in the international scene. . . . From the beginning, the creation of a collection of iconic buildings in a short period of time has been the driving idea' (2011: 58). Foreign architects involved have included Koolhaas, Gehry, Nouvel, Hadid, SOM, I. M. Pei, and Shiguru Ban, all Pritzker prizewinners.

In nearby Doha, the sea has become 'commodity space' for the global real estate market, notably in Pearl-Qatar (an artificial hyper-consumerist island complex) on land reclaimed from the Gulf, an Arab Riviera. 'In the urban dynamics of contemporary capitalism, for Doha to become a global city it must reinvent and rediscover itself, but in this round through real estate and spectacular iconic projects' (Adham 2008: 252).

While most contemporary research on Arab urbanity has focused on the Gulf, there is also an expanding literature on what Yasser Elsheshtawy and his colleagues (2011) call the 'Evolving Arab City' outside the Gulf.[32] Reflecting on geographies of inequality and urban disparities in Amman, Rami Daher tells us: 'During a visit to Rabbat [in 2009], the author was astonished by the similarities in terms of investors, developers and even the rhetoric and discourse around development between neoliberal investors in Beirut, Amman and elsewhere in Mashreq and those in Rabbat. This global city is definitely circulating not only surplus capital from oil, but also images and models of neoliberal development' (2013: 100), including 'prioritization of iconic buildings' (108).

A similar story emerges from two prestige projects in Morocco (Tanger-Med and Casa-Marina), where Valyans Consulting—a Casablanca-based firm created by the financial services conglomerates Ernst & Young and Andersen—developed the 'brand' with an international expert group independent of the Moroccan authorities. The researchers quote an executive: 'To gain media-space for large projects internationally, planners attempt to bring in famous foreign architect-planners' (Barthel and Planel 2010: 183). This gradual privatization of city planning in Morocco tends to squeeze out any remaining democratic controls, an apparently universal consequence of UMPs anchored by iconic architecture. Analyzing what they see as a 'Glimpse of Dubai in Khartoum and Nouakchott', Armelle Choplin and Alice Franck (2010: 74) argue that the new architectural styles evoke Arab influences, noting that project names often have Arabic signifiers. The end result is an ideal and simplistic picture of these 'iconically pharaonic projects'. In a particularly interesting study of al-Saha Village in Beirut, Mona Khechen shows how this revenue-generating restaurant-hotel, owned by the controversial al-Mabarrat charities of one of Lebanon's leading Muslim Shiite clerics, has become an exercise in hyper-reality. The restaurant-hotel embraces 'market aesthetics and image-making strategies, and packages itself for visual consumption' in Beirut and also in new restaurants in Sudan and

Qatar (Khechen 2007: 19). All this research lends credence to what Elsheshtawy (2013: ch. 9) has labelled 'Dubaization'—raising questions as to what extent this obscures the 'reality' of Dubai or anywhere else.

Artificial islands (as in 'The World') are special cases of UMPs (and often Dubaization), and there are plans to build various types of islands, for example off the coasts of Korea, The Netherlands, Spain, Pakistan, Slovenia, Singapore, Venezuela, and Russia (Federation Island in the Black Sea off Sochi, site of the 2014 Winter Olympics). There is also a substantial literature on the saga of Tokyo Bay. Lin (2010) locates the ongoing Tokyo Bay story within the context of the metabolist movement in Japan, seeing it as part of the visionary, often utopian, movements of the 1960s in which architects and futurists all over the world imagined sites of future human habitation in the sea and up in the sky, features of some contemporary megastructures. In Singapore a design competition was set up with the parameters of Explore (lifestyle options), Exchange (business opportunities), and Entertain (culture and fun). Safdie and Arup won the competition and created a SkyPark (horizontal skyscraper) sitting on top of the three 55-storey towers of the Marina Bay Sands Hotel (figure 5.7). It is certainly spectacular and heavily marketed as iconic. SkyPark is the world's longest (340 metres) habitable cantilever observation deck. Celebrating Arup's contribution, a glossy engineering magazine tells us that Marina Bay Sands integrated resort is set to become 'an icon for Singapore' (Schittich and Brensing 2013: 107; see also Yap 2013).

For China, discussed in greater detail later, let it suffice at this point to cite the words of Xie Xiaoying, a Chinese landscape architect: 'It is a good time to be a designer in China. Unlike America there are no rules in China. We can do what we want. We can do good design' (quoted in Marshall 2003: 85, and probably still true). The cases of the Gulf and China appear on the surface at least to suggest that most contemporary UMPs are driven by the state and in one sense they are. I have argued that until the advent of capitalist globalization (roughly dating from the electronic revolution of the 1960s) the drivers of iconic architecture tended to be religious and/or state institutions, while in the era of capitalist globalization the drivers tend to be members of the TCC. Gavin Shatkin (2008) provides ample evidence from all over South-East Asia that large private developers are implementing urban development plans with government assistance and that urban planning is increasingly being privatized. This results in what he terms 'bypass-implant urbanism', based on regressive state subsidies for profit-driven private-sector development, abandonment of public purpose

Figure 5.7. Marina Bay Sands Singapore. (© Timothy Hursley/Arup)

by planning agencies, and idealization of the private sector by international organizations. Shatkin argues convincingly that this is not simply a case of straightforward Americanization. Asian cities tend to be bigger than North American or European cities (UMPs have been designed for up to a million people in Thailand and Indonesia, for example); not all are strictly oriented to automobile use; and many are scattered rather than the edge cities outside traditional downtowns of the West. In his penetrating case study of Metro Manila, Shatkin identifies four types of actors involved in UMPs: local and national governments, formally involved but tending increasingly to leave urban development to the private sector; private developers, often ethnic Chinese linked into global networks of overseas Chinese and international finance; a consumer class of the winners of capitalist globalization whose spending power is incentivizing urban development; and foreign planners and architects who provide models of urbanism. Of this last group, Shatkin argues: 'their impact is less to "Westernize" urban form than it is to commodify the urban experience . . . "bypassing" the congested arteries of the "public city" and "implanting" new spaces for capital accumulation that are designed for consumerism and export-oriented production' (2008: 38).[33] Shatkin's table 1 on major real estate developments in Metro Manila shows that global architects and architect-developers, including HOK, SOM, and other foreign firms are heavily involved. As will be recalled from chapter 3, such firms view iconicity as extremely important. Thus, what drives UMPs is not so much Americanization or indigenization or even hybridization, but anything that looks profitable. In the absence of a public vision for Metro Manila, the large developers provide their own visions for urban development privileging iconic buildings and supporting infrastructure. Governments in apparently permanent fiscal crisis have little option but to be part of this totalizing consumerist urban vision. Shatkin argues that while these processes are most pronounced in Manila, they are also emerging all over the region, a judgement strongly supported by the research of Marshall (2003), amongst others. Although he does not use the terms, what Shatkin describes for Metro Manila sounds very much like the Icon Project that globalizing urban growth coalitions are engaged in creating all over the world via the TCC with the sometimes enthusiastic and sometimes placid collaboration of political elites. I have already provided evidence for significant TCC input in the consumerist urbanization of Arab cities and in parts of Asia. But how can places where the state appears to be in control be reconciled with this thesis? The cases of Paris, the first genuinely globalizing UMP in my terms, and China, the latest and biggest, can be fruitfully analyzed in these terms.

Paris: The Ongoing Saga of the *Grands Projets*

The 1996 English edition of 'Guide to the Architecture', an official publication of EPAD (Etablissement Public pour l'Aménagement de la Région de La Défense), introduces the *grand projects* of Paris in the following words:

> In 1958 the French government decided to launch the largest urban planning project that the second half of the 20th century would see. . . . A business- and industry-oriented public agency, EPAD was invested with the task of developing town planning, setting up infrastructures and marketing available land space. . . . From the very first skyscraper—the Nobel Tower, which has since been rebaptized the Roussel-Hoechst building—to the new headquarters of one of Europe's leading banks, the Société Générale, architects from the world over have succeeded in adapting their art to the needs and expectations of both enterprises and residents. (Demeyer 1996: 3)[34]

In October 2012 the Guggenheim museum in New York hosted a symposium on 'The Grands Travaux: Its Legacies and Lessons. Are There Lessons Here for the World Trade Center Design?' testifying to its continuing significance.[35] The *grands projets* are often referred to as *grands travaux* (great works) in French publications, and include other less well-known buildings (Jahn 1991). Davide Ponzini and Michele Nastasi (2011: 73) identify 'the Grands Travaux engine' in the controversy over the siting of Institut du Monde Arabe (see also Collard 2008).

La Défense (the name originally referred to a statue erected in 1883 to commemorate the siege of Paris in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1) was the westernmost point of the great axis of the capital that took the eye from the Louvre Palace via the Place de la Concorde and the Arc de Triomphe along the Champs Élysée. As Vale points out 'Paris's "royal axis" now conjoins high culture and high capitalism' (2008: 21). In a 1930s competition to develop the area, Le Corbusier proposed lines of skyscrapers on each side of a pedestrian boulevard, a vision that partially inspired what was eventually built. By the 1990s, La Défense comprised 160 hectares, encompassing business and residential districts catering to the needs of around 40,000 families, as well as 140,000 employees working in 1,600 enterprises (including 14 of France's 20 biggest companies and 15 of the world's biggest 50 at that time). The potential for domestic and international tourism was built into the plan, with 2,600 new hotel rooms, a major transport hub, and 26,000 underground parking spaces to accommodate around one million visitors per year. Also promised were parks and museums and a multitude of consumption opportunities, including a plan to build the largest shopping mall in Europe.

While La Défense as a whole encompasses hundreds of separate buildings (one of several mini-Manhattans around the world), the Grande Arche at its focal point was clearly intended to be iconic from the beginning. After several attempts to find a suitable design were thwarted by political interference President Mitterand determined to bring the process to a successful conclusion as part of his legacy. In 1982 he instructed EPAD to set up an international competition, which attracted over 400 entries. It was won to general surprise by Johan-Otto von Spreckelsen, the little, known director of an architecture school in Copenhagen, an architect with no famous buildings, indeed few buildings at all, to his name. In the words of EPAD this building 'was meant to be a new landmark . . . on a par with the Louvre and the Arc de Triomphe', both global icons (figure 5.8). Spreckelsen, whose

Figure 5.8. Grande Arche (Paris).

special interests were said to be the study of mosques and other monumental architecture, introduced his project proposal as follows: 'the Grande Arche is an open cube [with sides of 100 metres], a window on the world, like a fleeting musical pause before the future' (in Demeyer 1996: 15). He died during construction and the project was completed by Paul Andreu. The building, constantly in need of repairs, is now one of the most visited tourist attractions outside central Paris.

There are seven major projects associated with the presidency of Mitterand and his successors: La Défense; Musée d'Orsay, originally a railway station converted by the Italian architect Gae Aulenti into one of the most popular and beautiful museums in Paris; the pyramids at the Louvre (Pei);[36] Institut du Monde Arabe (Nouvel); the new Bibliotèque Nationale (Perrault); Opera Bastille (Ott); and the vast leisure complex Parc de la Villette, most famous architecturally for its red follies designed by the Swiss-American deconstructivist architect-academic Bernard Tschumi—controversial to the extent that these red unadorned structures appear not entirely to enhance the visitor experience, despite their contribution to architectural theory (Rattenbury 2002: 74–5; Crysler 2012: ch. 1).[37] The Pompidou Centre (Rogers & Piano, 1977) pre-dates Mitterand's presidency (Silver 1994; Fierro 2003: ch. 2). All of these have become major attractions and all can claim a measure of global iconicity. As François Chaslin (1985: 12) sagely observes: 'Architecture is the most curious symptom of the monarchic character of our democracy' (my translation). True, not only for France. These projects led to the very public charge that the president was gripped by a 'Mitterramses' obsession. The state archive-based research of Sue Collard (2008) skilfully reveals the internal politics of the *grands travaux*.

All four fractions of the TCC (corporate, political, professional, and consumerist) were active in the development of La Défense. While EPAD was created by the state, it is commonly described in official literature as a public corporation with a commercial and industrial character. The aggrandizement of the French state, the legacy of Mitterand, and the interests of capitalist globalization were generally presented as entirely compatible. After an unsuccessful first two decades, when not a single right to build was sold to the private sector, La Défense was relaunched to make it more business- and consumer-friendly. This resulted in a new generation of high-tech buildings, and the massive Quatre Temps shopping mall. The iconic Grande Arche opened with great public fanfare during the G7 Heads of State summit on 14 July 1989, the bicentennial of the French Revolution. This event gave La Défense global media coverage, drawing hundreds of thousands of tourists.[38] In July 1990 an even greater extravaganza orchestrated by Jean-Michel Jarre was played out on the great axis from the Arc de Triomphe to the Grande Arche before an estimated crowd of two million people. It was in this period that many state enterprises in France were privatized and major transnational corporations, both domestic and foreign, began to buy in to La Défense, illustrating the commonality of interests between those who own and control the major corporations and their local affiliates (corporate fraction), globalizing politicians and officials (political fraction), globalizing professionals, and consumerist elites. French members of all four fractions tend to have been classmates at the elite (A+) *Grandes écoles*.

While there has been some criticism of the conception of the *grands projets* as well as of individual buildings (Trilling 1983; Chaslin 1985; Fierro 2003), in general they have received a positive response from the globalizing elements in the architecture-developer profession in France and abroad.

More important, from the perspective of the TCC, they have been popular with consuming publics, domestic and foreign tourists. The new museums have attracted large numbers of visitors and the pyramids at the Louvre have helped to give that venerable old institution a new lease of life, with new franchise museums in Lens and Abu Dhabi (Vivant 2011).[39]

Consumerism, therefore, can be seen as an important element in the story of the *grands projets* in Paris. While Annette Fierro argues that the overall strategy was to site the projects within development zones and thereby to upgrade working-class districts, Elsa Vivant (2009) shows that this policy is only fully realized in the Paris Rive Gauche zone, anchored by the new National Library. This certainly set out to be an iconic building, though it is, as yet, not much loved.[40] Despite differences in scale, the pyramids at the Louvre, Opéra Bastille, and Institut du Monde Arabe are all buildings with impressive, quasi-monumental welcoming glass frontages. These indicate 'Mitterand's ambition to gather crowds (particularly of well-heeled tourists) at key points in the city' in contrast to the 19th-century UMPs of Haussmann whose dominant goals were movement of troops and dispersal of the masses (Fierro 2003: 25). Analyzing the contribution of the Irish-British glass engineers Rice Francis Ritchie (RFR) in terms that ring true for many iconic buildings in UMPs around the world today, Fierro argues: 'As a patented system, RFR's structural glazing becomes a commodity available for purchase and installation in any type of space. It was immediately appropriated by developer culture as a means of endowing commercial space with a fashionable technological flourish' (2003: 217). If the iconic pyramids[41] become the French version of the iconic boutique as the Louvre itself is transformed into a quasi-corporatist consumerist space, is there any limit to what the TCC can achieve by creative manipulation of iconic architecture in UMPs anywhere on the planet? In 2013 the Danish architect Bjarke Ingels (of BIG) won the international invited competition for the design of another megaproject (Europa City) between Charles de Gaulle Airport and central Paris, intended to attract more investment, tourists, and consumers into the northern reaches of the city (completion around 2020). And in 2015 the Tour Triangle designed by Herzog & de Meuron was approved by Paris city council. At 180 metres, this glass pyramid of hotel and office space (sweetened with the addition of child care and cultural facilities) will be the tallest building in Paris since the Tour Montparnasse (210 metres) in 1973. Perhaps the era of *grands projets* in France is not quite over.[42]

China: The Biggest Urban Megaproject in Human History

> Since the 1980s, China has built more skyscrapers; more office buildings; more shopping malls and hotels; more housing estates and gated communities; more highways, bridges, subways, and tunnels; more public parks, playgrounds, squares, and plazas; more golf courses and resorts and theme parks than any other nation on earth—indeed, than probably all other nations combined. (Campanella 2008: 14)[43]

With these words, Thomas Campanella indicates how elites in globalizing cities in China (notably Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, with Tianjin, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and many others in hot pursuit) have been vigorously pursuing UMP strategies since the 1980s. This is one consequence of open-door and market socialism policies introduced in 1979 in Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and then gradually throughout the rest of the country. When the first skyscraper in Shenzhen (the International Foreign Trade Centre) opened in 1985, it was the tallest building in China. The IFTC was modelled on Gordon Wu's Hopewell Centre in Hong Kong and became a 'building type rapidly replicated throughout China' (Campanella 2008: 36), a classic typical icon. It was from Shenzhen—Carolyn Cartier (2002) calls it 'Deng's city'—that the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping issued his historic free-market manifesto in January 1992.

The Princeton-educated Wu was precisely the type of entrepreneur and visionary that the globalizing politicians and officials of the Special Economic Zone and their province and state-level allies were seeking, and he did not disappoint. Campanella vividly describes how the Canton (Guangzhou)-Shenzhen Expressway, built by Wu's company and said to have been inspired by the New Jersey turnpike, began to transform the Pearl River Delta into a global economic hub. This was not the traditional BosWash corridor metropolis but a new type of digitally enhanced development and a step in the direction of the ultimate UMP.[44] Thus Shenzhen, an obscure border crossing on the Kowloon to Canton railway line where the staff still used the abacus when I first passed through in 1975, had by the 21st century become a familiar story in the pages of architecture and urban design magazines, with a new city centre designed by SOM (Cartier 2002) and a new Stock Exchange designed by Koolhaas. Over 300 slum villages now pack the land behind Shennan Grand Boulevard, where many of the iconic buildings of the city (including the new Stock Exchange) are located. These settlements are home to millions of people, the half of the city population who live in 10 per cent of the urban space, an alternative model for China's hyperurbanization.[45]

Digital technology has facilitated an unprecedented transformation of cities as well as architectural labour in China. The number of architects in China in the late 1990s was 10 per cent of the number in the United States but, according to one estimate, the Chinese designed five times the volume of projects (in millions of square metres) while earning one-tenth of the design fee per job. In Shenzhen, extraordinary records were set—five architects working for one night with two computers designing a 300-unit single-family housing development, one architect working for seven days producing a 30-storey concrete residential high rise. In 2014 one source reported that Chinese architects (1 per cent of the world's total) designed 33 per cent of the world's buildings (with a pavilion at the Venice Biennale to prove it).[46] An architect working in Shenzhen suggested: 'Iconic in southern China has come to mean something special. Being first was an original business model, but after the tenth mall, you need something extra. Iconic is now coming to mean something wacky' [CH2]. Most of these high rises are off the shelf with distinctive hats or facade variations, based on 'architectural recipes' often lifted from foreign publications or competition entries (Chung et al. 2001: 158–61), the more successful of which achieve the status of typical local icons. The system is highly dependent on foreign architectural firms working with local design institutes as joint venture partners. A 'New Urbanism' Chinese-American architect, who worked with a large Shenzhen-based firm, explained, 'It is now just a brand name for marketing housing developments in China, the firm is not really interested in the humanistic philosophy but simply in its iconic value as a marketing device for the new rich in China' [CA18].

Where Shenzhen led, Shanghai and Beijing followed, but not at the same pace and not in the same way. Tingwei Zhang (2002) shows that though the importance of the private sector varied significantly in these three city regions, all engaged in substantial megaproject construction. The distinction between private and state is not as clear-cut as it is in the West. Actually, the distinction has become less meaningful due to the onslaught of hypocritical neo-liberal ideology in the West, notably in public-private partnership building projects. I call them hypocritical because the roll-back of the state often means in practice the taxes paid by ordinary workers are siphoned off to subsidize the very rich and the corporations they own and control, with the connivance of globalizing politicians and officials, professionals, and a largely compliant media. What we would usually identify as the corporate interest prevails. In Shanghai, the private sector is certainly more developed than in Beijing, but less than in Shenzhen. The government of Jiang Zemin (former party boss in Shanghai) authorized substantial UMP construction for the development of a major business district in Pudong (Shanghai) in the 1990s. Pudong was divided into four zones: free trade, finance, export-processing, and high-tech firms. In a pioneering study of UMPs in the Pacific Rim, Kris Olds (2001) compared the cases of Shanghai and Vancouver, focusing on the roles of ethnic Chinese property developers and elite non-Chinese design professionals. He explained why a major infrastructure scheme was seen to be necessary to turn Shanghai into a global city and how the Paris-Region Institute for Management and Urban Planning (IAURIF) worked with local authorities in Shanghai from the mid-1980s to bring the project to a successful conclusion. IAURIF was, like EPAD (also involved in the planning process for Pudong), a public–private institution in which members of the four fractions of the TCC could work amicably and profitably together. The Mitterand role was taken in Shanghai by the Mayor, Zhu Rongji (subsequently Chinese Premier), who visited La Défense in 1991 and was duly impressed. It is no coincidence that this occurred shortly after Shanghai had been granted preferential foreign direct investment status by the central government. Olds identifies the main players in the Shanghai UMP as property investors and design professionals (local and foreign), local officials, and state enterprises, the typical globalizing urban growth coalition. International planning consultancy services and the international competition for the design of the new Shanghai were organized by IAURIF. Several globally iconic architects were attracted to the project, including Rogers and Foster, Piano, Ito, Nouvel, and Perrault. The models and graphics they produced were widely used to promote the image of a new global Shanghai, spectacularly complementing its image as the 'Paris of the Orient' in the 1930s. By the year 2000, there were 4,000 new buildings over 24 floors high in the city, with 1,700 more under construction or planned. Despite the scale and ambition of the new Shanghai, Marshall's overall impression of the flagship financial district is negative: '[The] result is unfortunately a collection of high-rise towers and an amorphous open space lacking any capacity to support urban culture. Further, this is exacerbated by the fact that to access the Central Park (and this was a shock for the author) one has to pay!' (2003: 99). While the sentiment is admirable, it misses the point that such projects are all about the creation of consumerist space and paying publics.[47] The most influential consultant brought in by Mayor Zhu was Joseph Belmont, a key figure in EPAD and the *grands projets* in Paris, and his penchant for iconic architects was eagerly taken up by officials in Shanghai.

Amongst the multitude of nondescript skyscrapers (typical icons for some) a few buildings stand out and have achieved a measure of iconicity and global media exposure. The Pearl of the Orient TV tower (1994), dramatically overlooking the Bund on the opposite side of the Huangpu River, was dubbed the Eiffel Tower of Shanghai. The first skyscraper in Pudong to be built by an American firm, SOM's Jin Mao tower (completed in 1999), is a global icon. In what might be termed 'Chinese postmodernist' design, this quasi-gothic tall tower with pagoda overtones, has proved popular with some but not all locals. The Shanghai World Finance Tower (the bottle opener) designed by KPF, like Jin Mao tower, was the world's tallest building for a while. All of these have been eclipsed, in size at least, by Gensler's Shanghai Tower (figure 5.9).

Lujiazui Central Finance District has also attracted media and research attention. The international competition for the District, despite invited

Figure 5.9. Tallest Shanghai icons: Pearl TV Tower on the left, Jin Mao Tower, World Finance Tower, Shanghai Tower on the right. (© Gensler)

entries from Rogers, Fuksas, Ito, and Perrault, was won by the Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Research Institute of Tongji University, though it is widely acknowledged that some elements from other entries appear in the final plan (Olds 2001). This is not uncommon in architectural competitions (e.g., Ground Zero in New York). It was largely modelled on La Défense in Paris, a new central business district for Shanghai to rival the central business districts of other major globalizing cities. The new Shanghai is a spectacular sight. Campanella (2008: 57) waxes lyrical: 'Entering the lobby of the ... [Shanghai Urban Planning Exposition Center], a visitor is greeted by a monumental gilded sculpture of the city's iconic buildings, a kind of architectural gilded calf that slowly rotates on a pedestal, flooded worshipfully with lights'.[48] On the next floor an immense model of the city's buildings in miniature brings to mind what Gulliver might have felt on first sight of Lilliput (figure 5.10).

Not all of the new Shanghai is made up of towering skyscrapers. Xintiandi (New Heaven and Earth) shopping district was opened in 2001, replicating the low-rise Shanghai of the early 20th century with enough

Figure 5.10. Shanghai Urban Exhibition Hall. (© Ek Arkaraprasertkul)

gentrified Chinese relics to please the tourists and trendy venues to please the local new rich (and vice versa). Indeed, much of the architecture of the old colonial concession districts, especially around the Bund, has also been regenerated and gentrified. Xintiandi-style districts are now reproduced all over China, creating a new form of consumerism-inspired typical iconicity (Iovine 2006; Campanella 2008: ch. 9; Wang and Lau 2009; Ren 2011: ch. 4).[49] There seems no end to the UMP wave, both high-rise and low-rise, in Shanghai. Around the city the fantastic 'One City Nine Towns' project promises a more deliberate Western, syncretic consumerist collection of urban designs, evolving before our eyes. To provide appropriate accommodation for half a million local newly prosperous members of the middle class, expatriate professionals, corporate executives, and entrepreneurs, the Urban Planning Institute in Shanghai began to create a series of satellite communities in the 1990s: 'each inspired by a country that played a pivotal role in the colonial and commercial history of the city . . . China is slowly coming to terms with its colonial past and has been inviting foreign investment back into Shanghai. Now, a scheme is underway to mark the impact of colonialism, not in the city centre but out in the suburbs'.[50] This vast project encompasses a Spanish town modelled on Barcelona; a British Thames Town (complete with Tudor cottages, a castle and a maze, shops selling English Premier League football souvenirs, various fast food outlets, and restaurants targeting the wedding trade); a German town designed by Albert Speer Jr.; a Scandinavian town; and sundry others. This is capitalist-consumerism with a vengeance. Comparing it with the haphazard high-rise anomic development in Shanghai, some scholars take a relatively benign view of the project (Lu and Li 2008; Bracken 2009).

Zhang (2002) identifies a 'socialist pro-growth coalition' to explain the success of Pudong, and it is without doubt the case that the party bosses and other officials who ran the city made the final decisions on what got built where and when. Nevertheless, as the research of Olds, Campanella, Ren, and others demonstrates, this was a coalition that included members of the four fractions of the TCC, whose dominant ideology was more consumerist than populist or any other vestige of Maoist democratic centralism. While infrastructure projects and the construction of high-rises gave a great temporary boost to local employment (as well as large numbers of migrants from the countryside) and to the local steel industry, the greatest costs were borne by displaced locals. It is estimated that around 100,000 people lost their homes, having no community power base to protect their interests.

The issue of displacement will be taken up in chapter 7, but suffice it to say here that this was a price that those who enjoy the new iconic architecture in China mostly did not have to pay. In Chinese, as in many other globalizing cities around the world, transformation is made possible by displacing and making invisible inconvenient local populations.[51]

Beijing entered the race for a leading position in the hierarchy of global cities a little later than Shanghai. After the disappointment of losing out to Sydney in 2000, Beijing's successful campaign to stage the 2008 Olympics seized the spirit of the globalizing UMPs with great zeal. Marshall (2003: ch. 7) reports that the first phase, a Science and Technology Park in northwestern Beijing, was opened in 1988. By the new millennium, over one thousand foreign investment joint ventures with generous preferential incentives had been established, valued at over $3 billion. The New West Zone development competition in 1999 attracted entries from China, the United Kingdom, and the United States and was won by Urban Planning and Design Institute of Tsinghua University in Beijing. The chief designer had been much influenced by what he had seen on a tour of California and planned to create a Silicon Valley in Beijing. This was only one of Beijing's three UMPs, and the other two, the new central business district and the new Olympic Center, were more successful in the 'attempt to reposition the city as a node in the global sphere' (2003: 109).

In the 1990s Beijing was an immense 24-hour-a-day building site. 'In the name of progress and modernization, acres of working-class neighbourhoods were levelled, making way for skyscrapers, luxury hotels, and motorways . . . a response to rising pressures for the city to bolster its reputation in order to sell itself on the world market and attract global attention and international capital' (Broudehoux 2004: 2). It is widely accepted that for the Chinese leadership in the post-Mao era the focus was on the nation rather than the workers, chauvinistic ethnicity replacing class in the official rhetoric. In Beijing this meant creating a new Chinese modernity in which the romanticized Old Peking was rapidly being transformed into a series of commercial opportunities (Ren 2010: ch. 3). Anne-Marie Broudehoux presents three case studies on the exploitation of cultural heritage for the selling of place, commodification and aestheticization to serve business, shopping, and leisure functions, and spectacular transformation of the city into a series of performance spaces for international media events (2004: 20). While the case she chooses for selling the past and the commodification of history (the old Summer Palace) is not a UMP,[52] the other two are. For the commodification and aestheticization of places to serve business, shopping, and leisure functions the clearest example is Wangfujing. Near the new central business district, the project began with the redevelopment of the Old Sun Dong An market. This was transformed in the early 1990s into a globalized commercial centre by a 50/50 joint venture of the Beijing-based state-owned Dong An group and Sun Hung Kai Properties of Hong Kong, with unprecedented financial and import incentives borrowing from the models that had worked so well for Shanghai. While the new market reproduced global shopping mall design on the inside, it reproduced vernacular architectural features on the outside, providing the tourists and the locals with two gazes. But this was a relatively modest start compared to its neighbour, the $2 billion Oriental Plaza, financed by a consortium of Hong Kong developers, the largest civil property development in Asia of the 1990s. Famously, the local branch of McDonald's (the biggest in the world when it opened in 1992) was forced to relocate to make way for Oriental Plaza. The main investor was the Hong Kong–based tycoon Li Ka-shing, for which expression of confidence in China's opening up to the world of capitalist globalization he was rewarded in 1996 with a seat on the Preparatory Committee managing the transition from British to Chinese sovereignty in Hong Kong.[53]

Unsurprisingly, not everyone in Beijing welcomed these changes. Campanella (2008: ch. 5) writes compellingly of the dreaded Chinese character *chai* (signifying the impending demolition of people's homes or small places of business) on countless buildings that have displaced hundreds of thousands of people, enriching some corrupt developers and officials in the process of modernizing the city. The mostly symbolic resistance of the displaced has been well represented in a flourishing of the arts around Beijing (also in Shanghai). Broudehoux comments: 'For those who had fought the construction of Oriental Plaza until the bitter end, the monumental building would remain a symbol of China's new subjugation at the hands of world imperialists . . . as wealthy outsiders increasingly dictated the way their cities are transformed' (2004: 123). It is, however, important to add that many of those who have benefited from the malling of Wangfujing, the mega-wealthy and the merely new rich, are locals, many are ethnic Chinese, and some are leading members of the TCC, like Li Ka-shing. Broudehoux correctly predicted the enormous impact that the decision to award the 2008 Olympics to Beijing would have. The Chinese government immediately responded to the International Olympic Committee with a $22 billion five-year plan to turn Beijing into a global city. The elaborate preparations for the 11th Asian Games in Beijing in 1990 and the symbolic and cosmetic makeover of Tiananmen Square in 1999 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC had both been accompanied with substantial demolition in anticipation of what was needed for the Olympics to be the success as a global spectacle that the Chinese leadership and commercial interests craved. The 2008 Olympics was to bring unprecedented waves of building, restoration, destruction, and relocation to the city (Broudehoux 2004: ch. 5; Zhu Jianfei 2009: ch. 8).[54]

The consensus is that after the failed Olympic 2000 bid, 'Beijing subsequently rebranded itself as an international metropolis with avant-garde architectural icons symbolizing contemporary China's arrival on to the world stage' (Liauw 2009: 215). This involved 22 new stadia plus 15 renovated facilities, two new ring roads, 142 miles of new infrastructure, 8 new subway lines, 252 new star-rated hotels, 40 km of cleaned rivers, one million new trees, 83 km of greenbelt, and an artificial mountain and lake. The Olympic Park is three times as big as Central Park in New York, and Beijing's new North-South Central Axis linking Olympic Park and Tiananmen Square was designed by Albert Speer Jr, giving the son the opportunity to bring about a monumental project that his father never had.

Beijing's new central business district echoes the verticality of Hong Kong and Pudong and, as the state owned much more of the housing in the capital than was the case in Shanghai, old districts were more easily swept away to make room for the gentrified new, creating a post-1998 real estate boom. This forced an estimated 1.5 million residents to relocate to suburban satellite new towns. Migrant worker districts were demolished and their residents, some of many years standing, simply sent back home (Campanella 2008; Broudehoux 2010). Amid this massive demolition and reconstruction two buildings stand out, achieving rapid iconicity, their images disseminated all over the world, both designed by foreign architects. The first, Herzog & de Meuron's Olympic Stadium (dubbed the Bird's Nest) reached a global audience of billions during the spectacular opening and closing ceremonies. Touted by the architects a little immodestly but not entirely unrealistically as the Eiffel Tower of Beijing, this confirms Laurence Liauw's view that 'architecture has become part of city branding machine through mediated imagery' (2009: 218). Of the second, the Central China TV building (CCTV) by OMA/Koolhaas, Campanella (2008: 136) wrote, 'If any of Beijing's new signature buildings has potential to become a city icon, this is it.' Both, unsurprisingly, feature prominently in contemporary scholarly and commercial literature on the city and on postcard sets of the 'New Beijing'. Thus, two global architectural icons, both by foreign architects, both identified with the spectacular success of the 2008 Olympics in the new globalizing Beijing, are competing to become the 'Eiffel Tower' of Beijing.

Campanella (2008: ch. 9) highlights the importance of theme parks and the landscapes of consumption for the study of UMPs in China. I discussed Window of the World in Shenzhen in chapter 2 as an exemplar of the social construction of consumerist iconic architecture. To this we might add The World theme park in Beijing and made famous in China as the setting for the popular Chinese film *The World*; a ski resort in Beijing and many heritage theme parks (Splendid China, Folk Culture Villages, etc.). The South China Mall was the biggest in the world in its time, and all over the country new historic districts rose from massive building projects. Perhaps the strangest was in Dalian, a city of over three million people in Northeast China—a huge Bavarian castle constructed in line with the principles of feng shui![55]

Amid the clamour against architectural copying in China (the 'knock-off' culture) there are a few dissenting voices. One of these is *ArchDaily*'s Vanessa Quirk (2013):

> When we see another Eiffel Tower, idyllic English village, or, most recently, a Zaha Hadid shopping mall, copied in China, our first reaction is to scoff . . . we fail to recognize the fascinating complexity that lies behind China's built experimentation with Western ideals; and, what's more, we fail to look in the mirror at ourselves, and trouble our own unquestioned values and supposed superiority.

Quirk expands forcefully on this point, concluding that digital technology is transforming the practice of architecture in the direction of 'the Chinese adaptation of architecture' all over the world, and that Western architects and critics should take it more seriously and learn from it.[56]The law on architectural copyright is complex and varies between jurisdictions. For those who think Quirk goes too far, consider the marketing campaign launched by the *Architects' Journal* under the slogan: 'Get access to over 2,100 exemplar projects in the AJ Buildings Library . . . a practical resource that can help you solve problems in your day-to-day work, inspire your design process and help you target new opportunities' (by e-mail, 14 July 2015). Although they do not use the terminology, these are valuable commentaries on what I conceptualize as typical iconicity. By problematizing the line between copy and original, Quirk raises uncomfortable issues about artistic originality and, I would add, for the contentious concept of authenticity in architecture and art in general (see Rajagopalan 2012).

Having established connections between the corporate and political fractions of the TCC in the social production of iconic architecture (unique and typical) in globalizing cities, the next chapter focuses on the professional fraction of the TCC.

6

Architects as Professionals and Ideologues

The globalizing professionals and technical personnel that make up the professional fraction of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) in architecture are a very mixed group, ranging from those who work with (or for) those who own and control the major architectural firms to those engaged in facilitating construction (Kennedy 2005; Ren 2011), the education of architects, designers in general, professional architectural entrepreneurs, historians, and critics. In chapter 2 the role of architects and their firms in the social production of iconicity was discussed (summarized in table 2.2). In this respect the professional fraction and the corporate fraction of the TCC clearly overlap. However, there are many other professionals in and around architecture and urban design whose relationship to the professional fraction of the TCC is more problematic, and they are the prime focus of this chapter.

Of all the four fractions of the TCC, the professional fraction is the one in which we find most opposition to the globalizing agenda of contemporary capitalism and, in some cases, outright condemnation of consumerism and its effects on architecture and the city. There are frequent debates between globalizing professionals who enthusiastically support and practice the agenda of capitalist globalization and others who pursue their own, sometimes alternative agendas. These include engineers and consultants working with inexpensive and sustainable local materials and building methods, and teachers, historians, and critics who give them theoretical and practical support. There is no shortage of critical commentary on capitalism and consumer society from those on the politically progressive wings of contemporary developments in architecture and urban design, more or less leftist scholars.[1] Proponents of Critical Regionalism in its several incarnations (Frampton

1985; Canizaro 2007; Lefaivre and Tzonis 2012) and those under the umbrella of vernacular architecture (Harris and Berke 1997) also provide some insights about what alternative globalizations in architecture and urban design could look like. Even some notable architects, considered members of the cultural establishment, have expressed radical ideas when in reflective mood (e.g., Rogers 1991). The debate around the politics of modernism in the first half of the 20th century (Rowe 1972; Wilson et al. 1986) stretches all the way from modernism as incipient socialism (Mumford 2000), through modernism as capitalist tool (Riseboro 1983) and even closet Fascism (Taylor and van der Will 1990; Rosenfeld 1997). Controversy around modernism has abated somewhat and the main focus of criticism now revolves around architecture and consumer society, if not capitalism per se (Jameson 1991: ch. 5; Adam 2013).

The long tradition of architecture without architects (Rudofsky 1996) connects with more recent vernacular theories and practices in ways that challenge the pretensions of those promoting starchitecture and celebrity as it applies to architecture and urban design.[2] The prime role of the professional fraction of the TCC here is to reconceptualize the idea of space in such a way that the more abstract, aesthetic, and sociological approaches to this slippery concept can be brought into line with the basic requirement that the TCC sets for contemporary iconic architecture. Whatever else iconic buildings do, they must provide an appropriate level of profit and consumerist space.

Focus on the professional fraction of the TCC in architecture reminds us, in this era of the starchitect, that architecture is never the work of a sole artist but is always a collaborative venture between teams of designers (even when one iconic architect is named for the building), engineers, project managers who can have creative input, and a host of other professionals. For example, the list of those who worked on the CCTV project in Beijing reads like a never-ending film credit (Ren 2011: table A.4). Most attention in the trade press has been paid to the obviously pivotal positions of the architect-developer and connected real estate firms in the industry and the architect-engineer. The most successful engineering firm for the production of iconic architecture in the last five decades has been Arup (as noted in previous chapters).

The real estate industry has been globalizing rapidly (Haila 1997; Lizieri 2009), as have the leading professional organizations of real estate and building managers (IFMA, BOMA) and their equivalents around other building boom sites. A key event providing opportunities to monitor the relationships between architecture firms and private and public developers is the annual property fair in Cannes of Marché International des Professionels de l'Immobiliers (MIPIM), regularly written up in the March/April issues of real estate, construction, and architecture magazines all over the world. Rowan Moore (2016: 297ff.) coined the term 'Mipimism' to chronicle its baleful effects on the cities of the world. MIPIM celebrated its 25th anniversary in style in Cannes in March 2014 with 20,000 individual participants, including 3,000 CEOs and chairs, 460 journalists, 4,300 investors, and exhibiting companies from 80 countries.[3] Scholarly research in this area generally shows the trend to increasing globalization and overlapping functions of architecture and real estate firms (Haila 1997; Kooijman 2000; Ren 2011: ch. 3). MIPIM represents one of the best opportunities for members of all four fractions of the TCC in architecture and city planning to network, do deals, and enjoy themselves (McNeill 2009: 55–7).

Another excellent example of the global connectedness of the architecture industry is the World Architecture Festival (WAF) and its World Building of the Year Awards. At the first festival, in 2008, international juries (chaired by Norman Foster) short-listed buildings in 17 categories, a total of 722 entries from 63 countries. All the 224 short-listed projects were presented by their architects (suggesting that commercial as well as aesthetic criteria applied). Between 2008 and 2014, more than 8,000 architects from 65 countries turned up for WAF and prizewinners ranged from small local practices to starchitects. Zaha Hadid and Miralles & Tagliabue (architects of the Scottish Parliament) are listed among recent award winners. For the 2016 Festival in Berlin, 343 projects were short-listed. Most interesting in the present context is that WAF is organized by EMAP, a media group that also organizes the World Retail Congress and the Cannes Lions International Advertising Festival, as well as publishing various journals, including the *Architectural Review* and the *Architects' Journal*. WAF, with its extensive prize structure, illustrates very clearly the incorporation of architects, both as professionals and as ideologues into the system of capitalist globalization.[4]

The professional fraction of the TCC in architecture also contains what can be called ideological entrepreneurs, critics of various types who operate more or less seamlessly in the popular, scholarly, and business spheres.[5] Commentators and critics who have few or even no buildings to their names are very numerous. They have the luxury of writing radical (left or right) critiques of architectural practice in general and specific buildings in particular, while joining in the celebrity starchitecture system and taking full advantage of market opportunities. The role model for this genre of ideological entrepreneurship was Philip Johnson (1906–2005), an architect with some plausibly iconic buildings to his name. Johnson was largely responsible as a curator for the sponsorship by MoMA of the International Style exhibition in New York in the 1930s (Hitchcock and Johnson 1995) and later worked with Mies van der Rohe on the iconic Seagram Building and as a prizewinning designer in his own right with the AT&T building (both in Manhattan). He was also a competition juror promoting postmodernism and latterly as a proponent of deconstructivism (Schulze 1994). Up to his death in 2005 his influence on architecture and the commerce of style (or should that be the style of commerce) seemed undiminished, meriting a double-page spread in a *Vanity Fair* feature on 'the rediscovery of modernism' (Tyrnauer 2004). While few could match Johnson's versatility, Charles Jencks is in some senses a worthy successor. A landscape architect and influential critic and historian of a multitude of architectural trends, he is, by his own revelations, possibly the best-connected person in global architecture in our time (Jencks 2005). Discussing the importance of English critics for ambitious American architects, the architect Denise Scott Brown comments wryly: 'It was certainly necessary to invent Charles Jencks' (Scott Brown 2009: 99).[6]

Architectural entrepreneurs are also engaged in helping the public and other professionals tell the difference between iconic architecture and more mundane products. These efforts come in many forms, but two stand out as especially important. First, many cities have public outreach programmes to reinforce the worth of architectural icons and to draw attention to the canon. For example, the National Building Museum in Washington, DC, marketed its summer 2013 programme as 'Popular Lecture Series Explores Iconic Styles'. The two lectures, titled 'Miesian' (20 July) and 'Expressionism' (27 July) were designed as a refresher course for all interested parties.[7] Second, there are regular occasions when open warfare breaks out between factions of the architectural community and their respective supporters in and around architecture, often relating to new developments or the rehabilitation, vandalization, or demolition of existing icons. The aborted renovation of the American Folk Art Museum, its subsequent sale to its neighbour MoMA, and then MoMA's decision to demolish the building illustrates this very well, with issues of corporate insensitivity at the centre of the argument (Dimendberg 2014).[8] When Zaha Hadid won the competition to rebuild the National Stadium for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, the Japanese Pritzker prizewinner Fumihiko Maki organized a campaign to oppose the winning design on the grounds that it was too big and out-of-place and—looking like a spaceship—was not a fitting contribution in terms of Japanese culture. Careful not to personalize, Maki's critique appears to be more anti-corporate than aesthetic. In 2015 the government scrapped the project on grounds of cost. In London, Oliver Wainwright (2012) narrates the controversy over a new skyscraper by Rafael Viñoly. Having upset UNESCO and been called 'brutally dominant' by English Heritage, the building markets itself with the slogan 'Big thinkers need big floors'. Wainwright comments, 'The building flares outwards so that its biggest floors can be sited at the priciest upper levels: a monument to the logic of the office rental market and the peculiar whims of the City planning authority.' The building provides a three-level skygarden, free to the public. This is compared favourably to the £25 entry fee to the viewing gallery of the nearby Shard (also controversial). Apparently the free skygarden (it is not much of a garden) silenced the doubts of the planning authority but not a large number of critics. These examples, from New York, Tokyo, and London, are just three among very many cases of professional controversies in architecture with a hint of anti-corporate, anti-capitalist critique. When we recall that some of the greatest icons of architecture (the Eiffel Tower, the Sydney Opera House, and the Scottish Parliament among others) were subject to similar levels of criticism and insult while they were being built, we should not rule out the possibility that any socially produced icon (unique or typical) might become much-admired one day. However, we can conclude that most similar cases tend to be resolved in the interests of corporate consumerism.

The Criticality Debate

While architectural entrepreneurs rarely confront the issues of architecture and capitalist globalization directly, an ideological struggle between left and right, anti-capitalist and pro-capitalist, has been taking place if not at the centre at least in the suburbs of architectural debate, with a surprising twist on the periphery. The criticality debate was provoked by the increasing tendency of architects, especially architects designing iconic buildings, appearing to be too close to their commercial clients at the expense of architectural integrity. It is sometimes difficult to disentangle the criticality debate, in which some leftist critics berate what we might label capitalist architecture (e.g., in Vidler 2008; Hatherley 2010) from controversies swirling around postmodernism (Ghirardo 1996; Larson 1993). Prominent in these debates is the work of Fredric Jameson, notably his deconstructive but also in some ways celebratory discussion of Portman's Westin Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles (Jameson 1991; see also Arkaraprasertkul 2009b). In 2002, Michael Speaks, then director of Graduate Studies at the prestigious Southern California Institute of Architecture, published an article that focused minds. The gist of the argument was that all over the world architects were becoming more and more networked, just like global corporations and that this, not self-indulgent criticality, was the way forward. Koolhaas and AMO/OMA, by offering clients like Prada, Condé Nast, and Harvard University, 'cultural intelligence with a decided point of view', led the way (Speaks 2002: 73). This conception of architectural practice was summed up by the head of the Design Research Laboratory at the AA in London as follows: 'questions concerning design product and process can only be addressed within an academic framework that understands architecture as a research based business rather than a medium of artistic expression' (quoted in Speaks 2002: 73). Adding a little frisson to this narrative is the information that in mounting the full-frontal assault on criticality as a necessary resistance to corporate architecture, Speaks is rejecting the vision of his former teacher Fredric Jameson. While none of my interviewees mentioned criticality as such, many were openly critical about iconic architecture. For example: 'Architecture is about resisting, it insists on saying what it has to say. Many buildings arrive with a flood of publicity, and we have to ride out the flood. . . . Some institutions seem to need an event or to create an event, outside of what is intrinsically valuable in their buildings' [CA13], while others sounded a more cynical note: 'The task of architects is to convert ourselves from outsiders to insiders' [CA9].

The origin of the criticality debate is usually located in an argument put forward in Montreal in 1994 by Koolhaas that architecture cannot be critical. O.W. Fischer (2012: 36) asks, sensibly, critical of what exactly? The ensuing debate focused on long-standing questions of the autonomy of architecture and architects themselves, specifically autonomy from market forces (the Icon Project in my terms). However, as Fischer points out, Tafuri (1976) had argued for a 'critique of production' rather than the search for autonomy of architecture per se, a fruitless search that has become what we could call a red herring in the dispute over criticality (see also Baird 2004). A clue to what mainstream architects (in the United States at least) want to hear might come from a report, under the title 'Conscious Capitalism and the Future of Business' from the American Institute of Architects 2013 National Convention. This is highlighted by the speech of Blake Mycoskie, the founder of TOMS (a philanthropic shoe company). His message to the thousands of assembled architects was that giving not only makes you feel good, it makes good business sense, turning customers into marketers—an interesting message for architects and their clients (*ArchDaily* 20 June 2013). The professional fraction of the TCC in architecture covers a wide spectrum with business-oriented professionals at one end, who are challenged from within the profession by those critical of capitalist globalization at the other end.[9] It is easy to assume that these debates rage only in the prosperous West, and in order to dispel this notion let us turn to architects in the Third World.

Third World Modernism and Postcolonialisms

Many, perhaps most, contemporary architectural icons in the Third World have been designed by architects from the First World, some of whom are in great demand to build spectacular buildings to put some city on the map. Few architects with Third World origins have built iconic projects in the First World, though there are some whose work is universally admired. These include Luis Barragán (Mexico), Nina Bo Bardi, Oscar Niemeyer and Paolo Mendes da Rocha (Brazil), and Baghdad-born Zaha Hadid (a rather special case)—all winners of the Pritzker Prize—and others, notably Carlos Villanueva (Venezuela), Charles Correa (India), Geoffrey Bawa (Sri Lanka), Hassan Fathy (Egypt), and Ken Yeang (Malaysia).[10] While all of these could be considered cosmopolitan in outlook, their work is generally considered more local (regional) than global (modernist), to which contentious distinction I return. They all, however, inhabit the new forms of cosmopolitanism engendered by iconic architecture, a notable example of which was the relationship between the Egyptian vernacular architect Hassan Fathy and the visionary Greek architect Constantinos Doxiadis in a project to create mass housing in Iraq and Pakistan. While unsuccessful in practical terms, it brought the thinking of these two apparently disparate architects together and encouraged broader visions of the vernacular (Pyla 2007).[11]

One criterion of generic globalization is postcolonialisms. In contrast to 'post-colonial' (hyphenated to indicate formal political independence of the former colonies), 'postcolonialisms' refers to theories and practices developed to explain the structures and dynamics of former colonies after independence (Desai and Nair 2005). In order to understand the emergence of an important part of what I am conceptualizing as the contemporary political fraction of the TCC in architecture, it is necessary to clarify the difference that the events leading up to and following the post-colonial watersheds made to architecture. Here I acknowledge the insight of an urbanist: 'Probably all countries have their national icons. A good way to examine the history of colonialism is to see how these icons stick' [NY12]. I suggest that two main forms of postcolonialisms developed from the middle of the 20th century to the present: first, *critical postcolonialism*, largely the creation of an expatriate intelligentsia working from universities in the West, challenged old elites and the emerging TCC all over the Third World; and second, *capitalist-consumerist postcolonialism* emerged in and around architecture and urban design in response to the opportunities created by this new class. These labels are derived from my own interpretation of the sources.[12]

In the pre-global era, capitalist hegemony legitimated itself on claims to cultural superiority by colonialists and imperialists, producing a form of racist Orientalism. For architecture, this was expressed in many ways, for example, in the idea of tropical vernacular, meaning poorly or quaintly designed buildings for unhealthy climates, as expressed in the miasmic theory of tropical diseases (King 2004: 49ff.; Chang, in Lu 2011: ch. 9). While these assumptions survive, ideological hegemony in the present era of capitalist globalization is based largely on claims to cultural superiority of a TCC, producing capitalist-consumerist postcolonialism. This tends to be expressed through hybridity as a marketing tool in architecture and urban design (and in most other cultural spheres). As we shall see, this hybridity favours particular materials and design forms and almost always privileges consumerist spaces. Capitalist globalization does indeed produce homogenizing effects with sometimes disastrous local consequences, but it also produces hybridity and variety.[13] The key to understanding this issue is not simply respect or disrespect for local cultures but profitability, in architecture as well as consumer goods. As Vale (2008: 57) observes, 'in an age of increased electronic communication and rapid dissemination of glossy periodicals, an architect designing a large public building in a developing country can scarcely avoid being aware of Western trends and preferences'.

The literature on colonialism and architecture over the last century can be seen as an important branch of one of the most fundamental debates in the recent history of architecture, namely the battle between what we can call international modernism (IM) and architectural regionalism (AR), though these are not the only terms in which it is portrayed. These labels amalgamate the more commonly used terms of International Style and (the almost 57 varieties of) modernism; and a similarly large variety of regionalisms. Briefly put, IM refers to buildings characterized by thin or curtain walls as opposed to massive load-bearing walls, regularity as opposed to symmetry, new materials (glass, steel, reinforced concrete) as opposed to wood, stone, and earth. Despite the original radical even socialist intentions of many of its founders, IM resulted in monotonous tower blocks and glass and steel skyscrapers that dominate the skylines of most globalizing cities today, the typical iconic architecture of capitalist globalization. AR, on the other hand, is based on the idea that the vernacular, namely buildings using local methods and materials for small-scale site-specific projects, should be the guiding principle for architecture. The history and theory of postcolonialist understandings of architecture, before and after the end of formal colonial rule, revolve around these idealized tropes of IM and AR, the dominant narrative being the imposition of First World versions of IM on Third World communities whose needs would be better served by versions of AR. The reality is, unsurprisingly, somewhat different.[14]

As I have argued, certain types of architecture can be hegemonic in a class sense. Like other art forms, buildings and spaces can serve specific class interests alongside their recognized aesthetic qualities, as Bentmann and Müller (1992) argued for the Palladian villas in the 16th century. The construction of Hilton hotels outside Europe and North America after 1945 provides a more recent example of a parallel project for our time, indeed a forerunner of the Icon Project. As Conrad Hilton himself said, his hotels were literally 'a little America' for upper-middle-class travellers, a 'space of modern luxury and technological desire . . . [signifying the] new and powerful presence of the United States' or more accurately its dominant class, in the post-war world (Wharton 2001: 2). Between 1949 and 1966, Hilton hotels were built in San Juan, Istanbul, Mexico City, Havana, Port of Spain, Tehran, Hong Kong, Athens, Tunis, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Bridgetown (Barbados). The

Istanbul Hilton, a typical example and a typical local icon, was built in the International Style (notably transparent glass revealing a mini-mall in the spacious atrium) on one of the city's best sites. Illustrating a classic postcolonialist theme, it was claimed that in fitting out the hotel, ancient Turkish tile-making was reinvented. Annabel Wharton comments: 'Whether these tiles were modified or reinvented, they were deployed as a sign of the Other within a dominant aesthetic of American Modernity' (2001: 26).[15] The cultural theorist Ackbar Abbas explores how colonialism and cosmopolitanism are expressed in the urban cultures of Shanghai and Hong Kong. Historically, each city developed a form of 'cosmopolitanism under colonialism' (Abbas 2000: 773). In architecture, this resulted in the first half of the 20th century in Shanghai's Tudor villas, Spanish townhouses, Russian churches, German mansions, and, of course, the still-iconic Bund. Bringing the story of Shanghai up-to-date, Abbas uses the example of the new Shanghai Museum (opened 1996) to illustrate the combination of traditional Chinese motifs in design (shaped like an antique Chinese bronze vessel) and display ('ostentatiously clean' cosmopolitanism), but still surrounded by dirty streets: 'And suddenly you realize that the museum does not think of itself as being part of a local space at all, but as a part of a virtual global cultural network' excluding the subaltern inferior local Other (2000: 782).[16] This is not uncommon, as Edensor (1998: ch. 5) shows for the Taj Mahal, and Wharton (2001: ch. 4) for the 'forceful Modernity' of the Hilton hotel in Tel Aviv, its prime site looking out to the west and the sea, diverting attention from the Arab slums to the east.

Such architectural developments were to be found all over what we used to call the First World (roughly North America, Western Europe, Japan, and the white Commonwealth), in what we used to call the Second (Communist) World, and the Third World. These labels have fallen by the wayside and have been replaced by a plethora of others, all similarly problematic. However, they continue to be useful and are still widely employed to discuss what has come to be known as Third World Modernism (TWM)—how modernism was transferred and translated from the First to the Third World. The iconization of some classical colonial architecture adds an extra and often contentious ingredient to what is already a heady mix. TWM almost always raises questions of identity for Third World architects but rarely for Western architects building in the Third World. By implication, this appears to have created an environment in which the products of IM and the classical colonial styles were much more likely to be characterized as iconic (in my use of the term) than products of AR, which were more likely to be identified as anti-iconic architecture. However, these vernacular architectural sites become iconic as the foreign and domestic tourist industries promote them through the culture-ideology of consumerism along with newer, often modernist icons. Whether an iconic building is interpreted as international modernist with regional vernacular characteristics or as regional vernacular with international modernist characteristics, under the conditions of capitalist globalization the consumerist spaces created by local and foreign architects are essential ingredients in these histories.

We are fortunate that a substantial body of research by scholars from the Third World is beginning to emerge on these issues. Many of these scholars have received their higher education and some have found university posts in Europe, Australia, and North America. For example, in 2011 Duanfang Lu, an architectural theorist and historian from China teaching at the University of Sydney, edited a book with the title *Third World Modernism*, and in 2013 Patricio del Real and Helen Gyger, both PhDs in Architecture History and Theory from Columbia University in New York, edited a book with the title *Latin American Modern Architectures*—the authors in both books were mainly from Latin America, Asia, and Africa.[17]

Lu's book focuses directly on the ways in which various forms of modernism impacted on architecture and design in the Third World between 1945 and the late 1970s (the period when the first shoots of capitalist globalization were appearing). In her introductory chapter Lu rejects the hegemonic assumption that the West provides yardsticks for all aesthetic and technical issues, mapping multiple patterns of interlocking between Western and non-Western architectures, as well as those within non-Western architectures. This is not simply posing the question of the histories of different modernities but, more fundamentally, questioning the legitimacies of different knowledges, for which she offers the provocative example of a 1964 review of contemporary Western architecture in a major Chinese journal. This describes as 'chaotic, ugly, and sick' works of Le Corbusier, Eero Saarinen, and Louis Kahn that are usually considered uniquely iconic in the Western architectural canon. Of equal significance is the fact that at this period Chinese architects were also expressing appreciation of non-Western modernist architecture from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East (Lu 2011: 23).[18] Contrary to the orthodoxies of much recent architectural history, there was a good deal going on outside what was called universal modernism in the post-colonial world. However, it is important to remember that modernism entered a world already framed by colonialist rulers and institutions—as Gwendolyn Wright (1991), for example, demonstrated in her research on French colonial architecture in Morocco, Indochina, and Madagascar.

Three case studies in Lu (2011) directly address the question of how modernist architects joined with political elites in post-colonial societies for the often contentious purpose of nation-building, identity formation, and the creation of capitalist consumer societies. Inbal Gitler (2011) explains how the Bauhaus-trained Israeli architect Arieh Sharon was recruited to design the Obafemi Awolowo University campus in Ile-Ife, Nigeria (1962–76). The university celebrated its golden jubilee in 2012. 'OAU has been acclaimed the most beautiful university campus in Africa and fifth best place of real estate in the world. It hosts the only museum of Natural History in West Africa which edifice sits like a colossus on the scenic terrain of our university campus.'[19] Bauhaus architecture has also been significant in the creation of capitalist consumerism in Israel.[20] Anoma Pieris (2011) shows how the architecture of Ceylon's 20th Century Exhibitions was used to promote different messages of national identity. The vernacular style was first mobilized for tourism-led development and then for elite housing, expensive resorts, craft museums, and village replicas (all now familiar components of tourist resorts all over the world). Ceylon's exhibitions: 'were neither orientalist nor were they sentimental in their eclectic and untroubled appropriation from both the East and the West' (2011: 161).[21] Ela Kaçel (2011) examines the popularizing of the idea and design of the 'American house' and its impact on what she terms 'Good Sense Modernism' in 1950s Turkey. A study of how neocolonial architecture was reframed across the US-Mexico border from the del Real and Geiger collection provides an instructive counterpart to Kaçel's analysis. Cristina López Uribe argues that two different architectures competed in Mexico in the 1930s, elitist-academic-nationalist-modernist versus popular Californiano, and the real threat to modernist aesthetics was the mass appeal of the neocolonial, as evidenced in Mexican residential architecture: 'here the influences were different, primarily mass-media images, created not in Mexico, but the United States' (López Uribe 2013: 216).

Between 1959 and 1961 an exhibition on 'Design Today in Europe and America' organized by MoMA (New York) travelled around India. The background to the exhibition in India was a previous MoMA exhibition in New York on 'Textile and Ornamental Arts of India'. This had focused on the 'imaginary bazaar' model of India (typical of Orientalism) full of lovely and very marketable saris exemplifying Indian exoticism in the 'concrete jungle' of Manhattan. It was a great success, attracting over 300,000 visitors, extended by five months to cope with demand. It was framed by a 'rhetoric of *Indianness*, the semantic construction of a free India within a free market of consumer goods' (Karim 2011: 194).[22]

The Epilogue to the *Third World Modernism* book is a socio-philosophical reflection directed towards a 'cosmopolitan reading of modernism' by Vikramādity Prakāsh (born in Chandigarh, subsequently a Professor at Washington University in the United States). Despite the idea that there are many different modernisms he settles for only one, 'just modernism'. The key to this unorthodox argument is: 'seeing all modernisms as already local . . . [pointing towards] cosmopolitan modernism' (2011: 266), not with closure on the question of TWM but with plurality, heterogeneity, and difference. The significance of all these studies for the Icon Project is that most postcolonial architects, often in collaboration with globalizing politicians,[23] have successfully mediated between the vernacular (often in regionalist terms) and the modern. This works, as long as there is no serious challenge to the hegemony of consumerism and the smooth working of corporate-political and professional architect alliances.

The collections of Lu (2011) and del Real and Gyger (2013) have two pragmatic but significant features in common. Seven of the eleven contributors in the first book are women, seven out of sixteen in the second, an unprecedented representation in edited books on architecture, with the exception of books specifically on the role of women in architecture. As usual the question is not why there are so many women in these collections but why there are so few in other collections.[24] The second feature, not so exceptional, is that most of the contributors were born in the old Third World and took their postgraduate education and/or currently teach in the First World. I return to this fact in my discussion of the variants of postcolonialist understandings of architecture in the next section.

All of the contributions to these two collections raise issues about the relations between architects and political elites underlying the variations of architecture in the Third World. The single common demoninator is the tendency to mobilize architecture and urban design to create 'modern' consumer societies, usually but not exclusively within a capitalist mode of production. There is also an interesting contrast to be made between the city planning strategies enacted by First World powers in their colonies and the potential but largely unrealized influence of communist (Second World) powers on the emerging Third World. The story of Sotsgorod, the socialist city of early Soviet architecture which might have had an influence on Third World urbanization is told in Miliutin (1974). As it was, some influence can be seen in Brasilia, and Dodoma in Tanzania (Siebolds and Steinberg 1981; see also Scarpaci 2000). Lu (2011: *passim*) provides examples of how the Cold War impinged on architecture, as do the studies by d'Auria on Superbloques in Caracas, Talesnik on the UNCTAD III Building in Chile, and Alonso and Sagredo on the introduction of a Soviet building system in Chile during the Allende period (all in del Real and Gyger 2013). The story of TWM and local, national, and regionalist responses to it is a complex and convoluted one, and recent research has gone some way to deconstruct some old orthodoxies and definitively consign others to the dustbin of history, though, as usual, old habits of thought die hard, especially in the field of cultural stereotyping. The careers of those who were to become the leading agents of the professional fraction of the TCC in architecture and urban design in the old Third World provide a basis for understanding how consumerism in these countries developed. Many of these architects played some part in promoting what I conceptualize as the Icon Project in architecture and cities in their own countries of birth.

Postcolonialist Understandings of Architecture

Debates around criticality, TWMs, and postcolonialisms in recent decades have highlighted divisions between the professional fraction of the TCC in architecture and more radical elements within the profession, locally and globally. This is the case as much in the former colonial countries as in the former colonies. The age of direct formal imperialism and colonialism is all but gone, but a culture-ideology of Orientalism is an important feature of capitalist globalization. Its effects are felt in architecture and cities all over the world. In his seminal book *Orientalism*, Edward Said defined the term as 'a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles' (1985: 2). Orientalism works through Western scholars, theorists, and administrators appropriating the right to represent not only how the Occident (the West) sees the Orient (the East) but how the Orient sees itself.[25] The term 'postcolonialisms' refers to conceptions of the colonized (the Other) and the colonizers, in the sense that designating some people as Other has important consequences for the self whether done subjectively as an individual or collectively as a member of a dominant group or institution seeking to establish 'the facts'. Where there were large expatriate communities from Western imperialist powers creating colonial structures (notably in the Indian subcontinent, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, treaty ports in China, and the Caribbean), the architectural impact tended to be greater than in those places where imperial military forces exerted control without large settler communities.[26]

Of course, architecture of many kinds existed long before capitalism and colonialism (see Ching et al. 2007). As Dora Crouch and June Johnson (2001: 3) argue, 'the old Euro-American lens for architectural history, with its emphasis on form and content, is inadequate to the study of traditional architecture of the rest of the world'. Drawing widely from both the vernacular and the monumental, with particular reference to Japanese, Indian, Chinese, Nepalese, Peruvian, and Mesoamerican traditional architecture, they provide a timely reminder of the limitations of Orientalism (though they do not employ the term theoretically). They also give many interesting examples of the ways in which traditional architecture was used to express relations of power. Some of these structures are familiar, having been iconized and turned into tourist sites in the global era (e.g., Great Zimbabwe in East Africa, the Great Wall of China, the Inka/Spanish encounter at Cuzco, the Red Forts at Agra and Delhi) and some less familiar (Saqsaywaman Fortress in Peru, and the stone architecture in the Caroline Islands). Under the influence of various types of postcolonialisms the system of iconic architecture driven by the TCC has increasingly facilitated the spread of transnational consumerist social spaces in the Third World. As Vale argues in his study of power and identity embedded in the design of parliament buildings in the Third World in the second half of the 20th century: 'Grand symbolic state buildings need to be understood in terms of the political and cultural contexts that helped to bring them into being' (1992: 3). He goes on to demonstrate that despite the stated aim of post-colonial state architecture to create national identity what really happens is the reinforcement of existing hierarchies. These existing hierarchies led by (in my terms) emerging fractions of the TCC at various levels become increasingly connected with the multifarious world of capitalist globalization, and old and new iconic architecture tends to become more consumerist.

Where to start in this minefield of theory, practice, convoluted histories, and personal sensibilities? One albeit tricky place from which to launch ourselves is the advice of Hart Davalos quoted in chapter 1: 'To confuse art and politics is a political mistake. To separate art and politics is another mistake.' It is no coincidence that this quasi-dialectical proposition is deemed significant for a study of the golden age of the poster in Cuba (1959–1979), its success due to the fact that it 'embraced a remarkable range of global visual languages' (Craven 1992: 80), notably pop art. The new generation of poster makers (1979–89) was rather more surrealist and irreverent in its attempts to create a distinctively Latin American non-Western art, and this opened it up to charges from abroad of being apolitical.[27] As I have argued, most interesting original works of architecture are enigmatic signifiers, meaning many things to different people and sometimes different things to the same people. But, Craven argues, Cuban poster artists were not so much trying to find an identity as trying to construct one. This is one way and I think the correct way to approach the central issues in post-colonial struggles and encounters with Western art and architecture. My own view is that 'national art styles' like 'national styles in architecture' are mostly convenient myths that can profitably sit alongside 'global' arts or 'world music' as another lucrative market within consumerism. This is not to deny that some geo-aesthetic environments (sea, forest, mountain, desert, etc.) do predispose to some artistic choices, but that is a different question. Arata Isozaki (2006) argues that architecture in Japan moves in 25- to 30-year cycles and that regular rebuilding of iconic sites like the Ise Shrine and Katsura Villa makes for a distinctive Japanese architecture. A Japanese-American architect explained: 'This reflects how the Japanese view their culture, not the building but the process of building' [CA8]. So, the aim of this section will be to understand the varying attempts of embryonic professional fractions of the TCC to validate a link between art (specifically iconic architecture and urban design) and politics (specifically the political economy of capitalist globalization and its attendant nation-state container) without confusing or separating them.

We can date the beginnings of postcolonialisms in theory and practice to the time when, from among the masses of colonized peoples of the Third World, men and women began to engage in anti-colonialist struggles. These brave people created movements that resulted in formal emancipation from colonial or imperial rule in the 19th century in Latin America and in the 20th century in Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia. Postcolonial studies as a scholarly field is of more recent origin. This is best understood as a 'belated project' in the sense that Said and those inspired by his work conceptualized it, expressing ideas that had been milling around for centuries (Desai and Nair 2005: 2 and *passim*). The two basic assumptions that I make here are that it makes sense to talk about postcolonialisms before the formal end of colonies and that it also makes sense to see influences travelling in several directions. A splendid example of this is the story of how the *banggolo*, a peasant dwelling that appears to have originated in Bengal, was adapted, became a symbol of imperial power as the bungalow, and evolved in many other guises all over the world (King 1995a). In what follows, I contrast a critical postcolonialism that seeks to highlight the continuing centrality of Orientalism and exploitation and disrespect of the Other (all surviving in various guises in the era of capitalist globalization), on the one hand, with capitalist-consumerist postcolonialism that seeks to marginalize such critiques in the interests of the TCC and the culture-ideology of consumerism, on the other. Underpinning this argument is the conviction that socialist ideals of modernism became subverted when applied in the Third World just as they had been in the First World. Here we find the roots of critical postcolonialism.

The Pakistani-born artist and culture critic Rasheed Araeen argues that artists in the post-colonial world have had to struggle against Western cultural domination: 'This domination does not necessarily manifest in suppressing other cultures, or artistic forms of other cultures, but denying other cultures, or peoples from other cultures, their subject positions in modernism' (2003: 4). Despite the ambiguity of the subject/object relation in the English language, it is clear that Araeen uses 'subject' in its positive empowering sense here, not in the sense of being subject to a master. While acknowledging their achievements, Araeen is a harsh critic of the heroic figures of critical postcolonialist theory (notably Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak). He labels them postcolonialist celebrities, producing hybrid cultural products.[28] Hybridity, he concludes, is simply the dressing up and carrying of cultural identity cards without upsetting the establishment. Araeen's critique is mainly directed at art and performance events, but it can be replicated in the struggles over postcolonialist architecture and architects.

It is difficult to decide whether anyone with Third World origins could entirely escape Araeen's strictures. For example, would the architectural historian Prakāsh be regarded as an elitist critic of critical postcolonialism or as a subtle exponent of it? Prākash speaks of 'a genuinely postcolonial act, if being postcolonial is described as the work of inverting and reinscribing colonial ideologies in the service of the postcolonies rather than the metropolitan centres' (2011: 255). The phrase 'in the service of the postcolonies' should find no place in a critical postcolonialist theory of anything, since it makes invisible class, ethnic, gender, and other issues, thus facilitating capitalist-consumerist ideology and so-called nation-building, sometimes in the guise of revolution. However, in another context, Prakāsh argues:

> When one talks of an Indian architect, or of an architect from the 'non-Western' world, it seems necessary to deal with the question of identity. While discussing Western architects one can get away with dealing with supposedly universal architectural issues like aesthetics and technology, but it seems necessary that in discussing the work of an architect from India the issue of identity be specifically raised in addition to, or in dialogue with, issues more directly aesthetic or architectural. Architects of the West do not specifically make Western buildings. Architects of the non-West are expected to [make non-Western buildings].[29] Even architects of the West working in the non-West in one way or another find themselves obliged to deal with the issue of non-Western identity. (Prakāsh 1997: 39)

This statement sounds like a clarion call for precisely the sort of Third World subjectivity that Araeen (correctly in my view) places at the centre of critical postcolonialist theory. Developing this line of thought, I would argue that the dilemma is best addressed in terms of the opposition between the market interests of the TCC and the practical as well as the symbolic/aesthetic interests of progressive architects and popular classes. By this I mean that the two opposing types of postcolonialist theory (capitalist-consumerist versus critical) can best be analyzed as a site of struggle over power and meaning as expressed in control over iconicity. The next section takes some familiar case studies of the relations of architecture and power in the Third World and reinterprets them in terms of how the professional fraction of the TCC, as always aided and abetted by the other three fractions (corporate, political, and consumerist), works through these issues.

Disney, China, and India

Disneyland, one of the most successfully typical iconic transnational social spaces of the global age (with the public and urban boosters if not with architects) has some surprising post-colonial connections. Liliana Feierstein (2008) begins the story with the Peronist building projects in Argentina of 1945 to 1955. Evita Peron's unique contribution was *República de los Ninõs*, a model city near Buenos Aires scaled to the height of 10-year-olds, with copies of the British Houses of Parliament, gothic Palace of Justice, Venetian Ducal Palace–style bank, Palace of Culture modelled on the exterior of the Taj Mahal and the interior of the Alhambra, and more. Legend tells that this inspired Walt Disney when he visited the site in 1950—the first Disneyland opened in California in 1955.[30] In 1966, a military coup brought General Suharto to power in Indonesia, proclaiming a New Order. Its most famous architectural expression became the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park (Mini), which opened outside Jakarta in 1980 (Kusno 2000: 74–9). Apparently, Mrs Suharto had been inspired by a visit to Disneyland and took it upon herself to create this more complete and more perfect version of it in Indonesia. The centrepiece of Mini was a large lake with islands to represent the whole country, surrounded by replicas of ancient monuments and religious buildings, a 1,000-room hotel, and shopping malls. Each of Indonesia's 26 provinces was represented by displays of 'genuine customary architectural styles'. For example, Borobudur, the most famous ancient monument in Indonesia, is, according to the locals, best seen at Mini rather than at the actual confusing and inconvenient ruins (Pemberton 1994: ch. 4). The eminent analyst of nationalism Benedict Anderson provided a history of the roots of 'political museumizing' (close to iconizing in my terms) of Borobudur during the colonial period. The census, the map, and the museum profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion: 'postcards and schoolroom textbooks follow the same logic. From there it is only a step into the market: Hotel Pagan, Borobudur Fried Chicken, and so on. . . . an infinite series of identical Borobudurs' (Anderson 1991: 182ff. and ch. 4 *passim*)—the commodification of architecture meets the architecture of commodification! Abidin Kusno (2000: 79) comments, 'What has been crucial in this process are the replica of tradition and not the tradition itself', and this is true everywhere. In the era of capitalist globalization the TCC appropriates existing iconic monuments or builds new ones in the interests of consumerism. Critical postcolonialist understandings of iconic architecture help to explain why encounters between modernism and indigenous cultures are almost always resolved in the interests of capitalist consumerism, in architecture as in other spheres, with both typical and unique iconicity.

One of the most high, profile and certainly extremely complex cases of colonial encounters between Western architecture and the non-Western world is the experience of China. Jianfei Zhu (2009) explains how Western learning was introduced during the Ming Dynasty at the end of the 15th century by the Jesuit Matteo Ricci. This was followed by a visual breakthrough after 1700, when ideas of perspective and quasi-Baroque Western–style pavilions by the Italian painter Giuseppe Castiglione (known as Lang Shining) caught the eye of the Emperor. Despite some opposition, many Chinese artists and builders were eager to adopt these new ideas (2009: ch. 2). Nevertheless, there were relatively few Western buildings in China before the Opium War in 1840, but with the spread of Western imperialism and colonialism, the collapse of feudalism, and the development of capitalism, Western architecture made rapid inroads, particularly in treaty ports with foreign concessions. Where there were several concessionary powers (Shanghai, Tianjin, Hankou), there were mixes of styles imported from Europe and America. Where a single imperialist power dominated (Qingdao, Dalian, and Harbin) there was 'a more harmonious integration of architectural styles' (Cai 2011: 153). It was in Shanghai that the greatest impact of Western architectural styles, as well as modernism, was felt (Wasserstrom 2008). By the 1930s Shanghai had a 'large number of buildings that were artistically brilliant and functionally effective, and also represented a complete departure from the traditional Chinese architectural system and its concept of architectural space. . . . Shanghai could be described as a vivid historical account of the architectural styles of the world' (Cai 2011: 153–4; see also Abbas 2000). Cai's short introduction to Chinese architecture cites the Western-style 'Street of the Banks' in Tianjin; the German-influenced zonal city with garden-style residences, Bavarian and Renaissance-style buildings (many still standing) in Qingdao; and Harbin (often referred to in guide books as the art deco Moscow of the East) with its grand St Sophia Cathedral restored in Harbin Architecture Square 'still the visual highlight for visitors to Harbin today' (Cai 2011: 163). A revealing study of architects as 'cultural heroes' in Republican China analyzes the ways in which myths were generated and still prevail about the introduction of modernism to China by foreign-trained (notably in the University of Pennsylvania) Chinese architects, making invisible the uniqueness of local architectural histories, both locally and globally (Rujivacharakul 2007).

The victory of the Communist Party in the civil war (1937–49), the proclamation of the People's Republic of China by Mao in Tiananmen Square in 1949, and the Soviet critique of bourgeois modernist cosmopolitanism in the following decade once again turned Chinese architecture inwards in theory. But in practice the Ten Grand Buildings in Beijing (1959)—socialist realism with national forms—combined European, Soviet, Western, and Chinese elements through use of colour, decorative motifs, big roofs, and horizontality. Zhu (2009: ch. 4) argues that this was at the expense of the autonomy of the architect. The death of Mao in 1976 and the opening up to the world market signalled by the introduction of Special Economic Zones in 1979 ushered in another period of relative liberalization in architecture and culture in general, only temporarily interrupted by the democracy movement and the killings that crushed it in 1989, adding a brutal new global negative element to the iconicity of Tiananmen Square (Wu 2005). The promotion of a National Style in the 20th century with various neo-traditional elements and the localization of modernism in China are still controversial (Rowe and Kuan 2002; Zhu 2009). We have already seen (in the previous chapter) how the biggest building boom in history has once again transformed architecture in China, serving a huge domestic market obsessed with speed and quantity. A new registration system has allowed free rein for market-oriented architects working with and without foreigners, producing a remarkable variety of buildings in a variety of styles.

Zhu (2009: ch. 10) offers a complex historical landscape of architecture in China with five design bands (Beaux Arts–based Chinese neo-classicism, expressive regionalism, socialist collectivist modernism, hypermodernism of the state, and market-based and experimental modernism) and 20 plateaux over six periods between 1910 and 2010.[31] For Yanxin Cai (2011: 171, 173), the recent period of pluralism in Chinese architecture has the following styles: archaism, synonymous with neo-traditionalism, 'a modernist expression of traditional forms' and neoclassicism, neo-regionalism, native pluralist modernism, neo-environmentalism, and 'new global architectural styles', in short, most available styles. A unique feature of Zhu's research is his analysis of the criticality debate and its significance for China. I suggested earlier that in the West the criticality debate revolved around one fundamental question, namely, the autonomy of the architect under pressure from strong states and increasingly globalizing capitalism. An article by Zhu in the prestigious *Journal of Architecture* in 2005 elicited responses from major Western protagonists as well as Chinese critics.[32]

Discussing projects of several prominent Chinese architects, including Ai Weiwei, Cui Kai, and the 2012 Pritzker prizewinner Wang Shu, Zhu argues that they have gained varying degrees of relative autonomy from the state. Some Chinese architects are now supported by the market, through developments like the California-style modernist houses that make up the Commune by the Great Wall estate. This and other projects in Beijing are financed by the prestigious Chinese architect-developer firm SOHO. It is significant that the *Phaidon Atlas* (PACWA) has separate entries for each of the 12 Asian architects featured in the project. SOHO achieved great success at the Venice Biennale in 2002, where the developer Zhang Xin was awarded a special prize 'as a patron of architectural works' (*Phaidon* 2005: 49–53). As Ren (2011: ch. 3) documents, SOHO has gone from strength to strength (figure 6.1).[33]

Zhu concludes that the agonizing of Western theorists over criticality, post-criticality, and autonomy is futile and that Chinese architects have worked out a series of reasonable compromises based on relative autonomy and a measure of creative independence permitted by market forces.[34] It is difficult to decide if this is a genuine case of architects in China forging for themselves a measure of modernist subjectivity (in one of its many incarnations) as a form of critical postcolonialism. Can this really be seen

Figure 6.1. Commune by the Great Wall celebrated at the Venice Biennale. (© SOHO)

as the Others creating their own symbolic and aesthetic criteria as Chinese architects, or is it one more example of the self-delusions of the postcolonial Other? Zhu points out that the debate in the West appears confused, concluding rather speculatively that Western and Chinese criticality might be gradually merging in a new hybrid criticality. He cites the controversial CCTV building in Beijing by Rem Koolhaas as evidence, though he appears to underestimate the strength of the opposition from architects and publics in China to this and many other 'foreign' designs (Campanella 2008: 139ff.; Ren 2011: xi–xii and ch. 5)—which is itself a different form of criticality. It is notable that there is very little discussion of Marxism in Zhou's account of criticality. One of his Chinese commentators, the architect Yung Ho Chang, reports on his period of study and practice in the United States: 'To be critical is, for the American intelligentsia, to establish one's social-political agenda. In other words, criticality carries on the Marxist legacy: it is a critique of capitalism' (in Zhu 2009: 149). Chang, head of Architecture and Planning at MIT for five years, has his own firm in Beijing. He is a well-travelled and well-respected member of the new generation of Chinese architects (Sudjic 2005: ch. 5).

The criticality debate in general is often characterized as a debate about theory rather than practice, so it is fortunate that we also have a rare study of its practical effects (Feng 2010).[35] China Architecture Design and Research Group (CAG) was founded in 1949 and built many officially designated 'great buildings' during the Mao period. It had also built for the Chinese state in the Third World. Cui Kai, chief architect at CAG (one of the Commune by the Great Wall architects), characterized the reform of architecture in China as: 'maintaining the big and releasing the small' (q. in Feng 2010: 19). As with most spheres of Chinese economic life, differences between state and private are often difficult to grasp, and the history of CAG provides support for the concept of in-between space (between the state and the market). Significant changes had occurred in the early 1990s with the introduction of an incentive system to reward individual architects and studios for the actual work they did. Perhaps even more significant from the perspective of iconic architecture was the decision in 2003 to name five studios after their principal architects, breaking up the collectivist tradition of the firm and encouraging a further move to the market (2010: section 3.3). A Chinese-American architect recalled working in Beijing with a state firm in 1996, 'only one person, the chief architect, had a car, a Honda. Now [2004] they all have their own private cars, five or six of them have Mercedeses [CA18]. By 2010, CAG had 15 subsidiaries and over 4,000 employees. It had been working with foreign firms (notably Arup, and Herzog & de Meuron on the Olympic Stadium in Beijing) since 2000. The administrative changes intensified the contradictions between state socialist and competitive market forces expressed in the emergence of a spectrum ranging from the pragmatic (market driven) to the critical (individual creativity) for design decisions. A Chinese architect–urban planner told me in 2002: 'There has been a long discussion on whether Haikou [Hainan Island] needs luxury buildings. The market will decide. . . . There is a plan for areas for the very rich, which was impossible in the past when the state fixed the price of land' [CH1]. Feng concludes that while there is evidence of 'intentionality' in the practice of architects at CAG, pragmatic socialist modernism prevailed, but not in the biggest, most high-profile projects. She highlights the failure of CAG to win the competition for the National Theatre,[36] followed by other failures (e.g., the CCTV competition), and sees these as signalling the decline of functionalist Socialist Modernist design in contrast with the rise of foreign iconic [not *sic*] design. Commenting on the Digital Centre building in Beijing, she shrewdly observes: 'No matter how much "discontent" the architect had expressed on the facades, the core idea of the building was still put in to a regular linear functional space' and could thus be considered pragmatic (2010: 61). In architecture, as in other aspects of culture, it is clearly easier to challenge the mainstream with a rich private client behind you, though in general the lower cost of pragmatic functional modernist buildings is the usual default criterion for Chinese architects (modernism with Chinese characteristics). Although Feng is less inclined than Zhu to consider criticality as having swept the board in Chinese architecture, both agree that most projects are market-driven though there are in China different markets existing side by side. In my terms, the upshot of the criticality debate in China and the research on CAG is that consumerist postcolonialism is the prevailing orthodoxy, and the social production of typical iconic buildings the norm. Whether Chinese architects have created their own subjectivity in modernism or not is debatable. The Pritzker Prize awarded to Wang Shu in 2012 could be used to argue that they have taken the opportunity to do both, and when architects do this consumerism and the Icon Project usually prevail.

Unlike the multiplicity of forces acting on architecture in China in the 19th and 20th centuries, in India there were two dominant forces at work in this period, namely the British empire and Le Corbusier. New Delhi, designed by the British architects Edward Lutyens and Herbert Baker, was a monumental creation focused on the Viceroy's House—begun in 1911, it took 20 years to build. The architecture was largely classical British and Palladian, but it incorporated some traditional Indian elements, for example, the ubiquitous stupa (Buddhist funerary mound) and even a new version of the Roman Doric Order (christened the Delhi Order) as well as gardens combining Eastern and Western elements.[37] Then, in the 1950s, Le Corbusier was invited to build Chandigarh, a project that has had a profound influence on architecture in India and elsewhere. Generally praised by the Western architectural establishment, some prominent Indian architects were more critical. Charles Correa lambasted its brise-soleils, which he considered much inferior to indigenous verandahs. Balkrishna Doshi, Corbusier's associate on the project, is quoted as follows:

> The people involved were over-awed by the fact that he [Corbusier] was a genius and also a foreigner and therefore thought that nothing could go wrong; they were hesitant to discuss functional issues with him. He didn't ask, they didn't question, so the blame lies with both. Indians are generally too subservient to foreigners ... [but, as Nehru, with whom Corbusier appears to have forged a warm relationship, said] 'It doesn't really matter whether you like Chandigarh or whether you don't like it. The fact of the matter is simply this: it had changed your lives'. (Weber 2008: 652–3)

Contrast this with a commentary by an unnamed official from the government Centre for Cultural Resources and Training:

> whenever architecture is thought of in conjunction with India, images of the Taj Mahal, Fatehpur Sikri and South Indian temples are conjured up in our minds ... [in] 1950 [Le Corbusier] created Chandigarh, one of his most ambitious projects. This had a tremendous impact on the mind of Indian architects. ... Overwhelmed, they found this expression of modern architecture quite acceptable. ... [but] There is the growing realization among architects that just to build visually beautiful buildings will be useless unless it is backed by infrastructure of services, such as water supply, electrical supply and communication system of rapid mass transit, etc.[38]

And V. S. Naipaul (Nobel Laureate for literature) comments:

> Le Corbusier's unrendered concrete towers, after 27 years of Punjab sun and monsoon and sub-Himalayan winter, looked stained and diseased, and showed now as quite plain structures, with an applied flashiness: megalomaniac architecture: people reduced to units, individuality reserved only to the architect, imposing his ideas of colour in an inflated Miroesque mural on one building

> . . . India had encouraged yet another outsider to build a monument to himself. . . . The people of Chandigarh, following a more natural Indian inclination, promenaded in the afternoons on the lakeside, far from the dreadful public buildings. The city over which people squabbled was without a centre and a heart. (Naipaul 1998: 426–7)[39]

So it is clear that the legacy of Le Corbusier, or indeed any Western architect, is as problematic in India as it is in Brazil and elsewhere. Tombesi et al. (2003) argued that architecture in India was split into two groups at the end of the 20th century. The first group consisted of those associated with elite avant-garde architecture schools and a 'significant ideological commitment to the formal and theoretical autonomy of Indian architecture from the globalising forces of the present world market of architectural forms and services, and from its colonial and modernist pasts' (2003: 84). The second group consisted of certified and uncertified practitioners with a commercial market focus based on architectural data-processing skills (especially CAD packages) who worked with a relatively closed network of clients, caste groups, non-resident Indians and local builders. In a richly illustrated study of the emergence of 'supermodern global aesthetics' in Mumbai, Manish Chalana (2010) seems to suggest that this trend to CAD has intensified and that the local working class is not benefiting from the resulting urban regeneration. The design magazine *Wallpaper* devoted its June 2011 issue to 'Reborn in India. Come alive with the most eye-popping, synapse-snapping, pulse-pushing place on the planet' showcasing 'the hottest Indian architects'.

A particularly egregious example of this process, an extreme case of transnational capitalist-consumerist postcolonialism, was exposed by the *Guardian* newspaper in 2014. It concerned the activities of the CDC (formerly Commonwealth Development Corporation), charged with distributing the aid budget of the British government. CDC was shown to have invested over £150 million in 44 property and construction companies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, about half of them engaged in hotels, shopping centres, gated communities, and luxury property. The journalist Claire Provost (2014) details some of these schemes. In El Salvador, 10 gated communities were criticized by local campaigners for putting pressure on water resources and privatizing scarce green space. In Kenya, \$25m was invested in Garden City, a megaproject in Nairobi comprising hundreds of upmarket flats, a business hotel, and what will be east Africa's largest shopping centre. In India, one CDC-supported developer boasts of 'South Asia's first truly international luxury apartment project [home to a] Forbes billionaire, prominent entrepreneurs, CEOs, directors and chairmen'. CDC has also invested in luxury housing and shopping centres across sub-Saharan Africa, including the huge Jabi Lake mall in Abuja, Nigeria, which aims to 'meet the desires of sophisticated Nigerians wanting a compelling retail experience with leisure facilities and high-quality brands'. Critics in the United Kingdom and Nigeria are justified in asking about the needs of the rest of the Nigerian people. No architects are identified.[40]

It is, therefore, not surprising that within the professions of architecture and urban design militant expressions of the ideology of capitalist-consumerist postcolonialism are usually muted, often through devices such as local cultural references in the design and decoration of unique and typical iconic buildings. Those involved with the types of projects described above claim that they provide jobs and better lives to the citizens of the countries which receive the aid and enhance their built environment (Vorng 2011). Such rationales conceal the class polarization and ecological crises that beset cities and countries all over the world, especially in the Third World. However, it would be unfair to single out architects and city planners, as they are no more implicated in the ideology of limitless growth as most other professionals, and less than some. The next section explores how those in and around architecture cope with such 'social questions'.

Sustainability, Human Rights, and the Architect's Place in Society

There are at least two further issues that are of increasing importance for members of the professional fraction of the TCC in First and Third World architecture. The first is the role of architects in debates over sustainable architecture (Bolchover and Solomon 2009). This is of particular relevance for large iconic buildings and projects in globalizing cities.[41] What I have analysed elsewhere as 'the corporate capture of sustainable development' (Sklair 2001: ch. 7) appears also to be happening in the architecture industry, with some of the most corporate firms (notably Gensler and Fosters) claiming green leadership. The problem in architecture as in all other industries is that reductions in carbon emissions per unit of production tend to be self-defeating if the result is expanded consumption overall. There is evidence to suggest that the commercial message about sustainable green, eco-friendly production is penetrating architecture and the high-end building trades as much as other industries, particularly in terms of the economic advantages of reducing energy costs. A telling indicator of this is the increasing importance of sustainability and energy efficiency certification and the prizes that go with it. Sustainability is a large and competitive market.

The brand leader is Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), a 'voluntary, consensus-based, market-driven program that provides third-party verification of green buildings [grown from] a simple idea, to a several-hundred-billion-dollar industry'.[42] LEED is an offshoot of the US Green Business Council (USGBC), which was founded in 1993. LEED certification assesses, at a price, best practices for energy saving, water efficiency, CO_2 emissions reduction, better indoor quality, and the proper management of natural resources in buildings and environmental systems. Recognizing the enormity of the sustainability challenge, USGBC asserts: 'Thanks to the LEED green building rating system, sustainability is now a foremost consideration in construction projects around the world. Green building has developed into a full-scale global movement that is transforming lives and communities.' As of February 2014, there were more than 20,000 LEED-certified commercial projects worldwide, representing 2.9 billion square feet, and another 37,000 commercial projects in the pipeline. In addition, more than 50,000 projects have been certified under LEED for Homes, and 130 certified LEED for Neighborhood Development projects. The parent organization USGBC employs 95,000 professionals who have taken the LEED Accredited Professional exam and about the same number of LEED Green Associates. There are LEED projects in all 50 US states and in 147 countries and territories worldwide. Its global reach is organized by the LEED International Roundtable in association with over 100 green building councils and the World Green Building Council 'in a truly global mission'. USGBC has around 13,000 member organizations representing 13 million employees, including *Fortune* 500 companies, architecture firms, contractors and builders, product manufacturers, non-profit organizations, and government institutions. In 2000 the Kandalama Hotel in Sri Lanka became the first LEED-certified hotel and the first LEED international project. Since then, the industry has experienced a 'Green Building Explosion'. USGBC was financed in its early days by government grants, but as is usually the case in the United States, this only intensified its free, market business orientation. Certification is expensive, and its commercial reach is wide.[43] Over 100,000 Practice flash cards for those taking LEED tests ($24.95) had sold through Green Building Education Services by 2014.

LEED's main rival is the UK-based Building Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) and its international arm, BREGlobal. The Building Research Establishment (originally Board) was established in 1921 as a civil service agency and was privatized in 1997. It is now a charitable organization earning its keep through research, consultancy, and testing for the building industry. BREEAM markets itself as the sustainable building certification scheme that is the most widely used throughout the world, with over 250,000 buildings certified in more than 50 countries since its inception in 1990. It also promotes Passivhaus, a building methodology pioneered in Germany that has achieved impressive levels of energy reduction and has its own raft of annual awards. The BREEAM website presents an interesting mix of business values and independence from commercial interests. While the organization has close ties with state-sponsored Building Councils in Europe, giving it a claim to independence from commercial interests, BRE pushes the business case for green building to the front of its offer, highlighting research showing that BREEAM certification generally increases the value of property. Searching for 'LEED versus BREEAM' reveals a lively Internet debate comparing their merits and drawbacks (the former more responsive to conditions in the United States, the latter for the United Kingdom and Europe). Some firms have developed their own green tools. For example, Arup's SPeAR, aims at carbon, neutral projects (Schittich and Brensing 2013: 63). The Hadid-Arup Aquatics Centre for the London Olympics was certified as Excellent by BREEAM.

As well as green architecture (in its many guises) as a category within the general prize culture of contemporary architecture, there are many dedicated awards for sustainable architecture sponsored by certification companies, architectural associations, building trades bodies, and other organizations. These include the Global Award for Sustainable Architecture, funded by the GDF-Suez Foundation (the largest independent utility group in the world) under the patronage of UNESCO. Increasingly, annual lists of top architecture firms take account of green credentials in ranking business performance. For example, the US-based *Architecture Magazine* now ranks firms in its top 100 list on profitability, sustainability, and design quality. The Danish firm BIG, led by the charismatic Bjarke

Ingels has developed the idea of hedonistic sustainability, making green architecture fun. Notable examples of the work of this firm is the power station in the middle of Copenhagen that not only reduces emissions but also blows huge smoke rings, and a ski slope built on top of a waste processing plant. In 2015 BIG won the contract for 2 World Trade Center, a new home for 21st Century Fox and News Corporation, controversially replacing the firm of Norman Foster.[44]

Lest I be thought irredeemably cynical, let me explain that I am not against green architecture or sustainability, far from it. There is no doubt that many architects and urbanists create a great deal of valuable sustainable architecture and city design all over the world. My point is that most of these efforts are ultimately framed within commercially viable free-market constraints. LEED, BREEAM, and many other green initiatives, while reducing the environmental impact per unit, actually encourage unsustainable architecture and urban design as a whole. A few LEED Platinum or BREEAM air-conditioned skyscrapers or shopping malls may be of benefit to a city, but when cities are full of them, as has been the trend for some time, the system becomes unsustainable, as theorized in the Jevons paradox (Owen 2010)—still controversial, but its effects seem clear in this case. Competition to LEED in the United States has come from a non-profit organization, Green Globes, which promises a simpler and less expensive process of certification. However, the fact that it appears to be a creature of the plastics, chemical, and timber industries has raised concerns about its operation. I cannot resist quoting again the statement by an environmental executive in the 1990s: 'If we made a lot of money destroying this planet, we sure can make money cleaning it up' (in Sklair 2001: 253 n. 33).

Also creating controversy for the professional fraction of the TCC in architecture are questions of human rights.[45] These focus on building for oppressive regimes and the conditions of labour in urban megaprojects, especially in the Gulf. Few prominent architects have spoken out on these issues, though Gehry, Foster, Hadid, and Koolhaas have all been challenged to do so. Fosters has built in Kazakhstan for what is widely considered a repressive regime. In 2009 Foster, Hadid, and Nouvel were all accused by Human Rights Watch (following up on a previous exposé in 2006) of ignoring abuses of labour at the luxury Saadiyat Island development in Abu Dhabi for which they were designing a National Museum, Louvre, and Performing Arts Centre, respectively. The most considered opinion on these ethical questions has come from Frank Gehry in *Foreign Policy* in 2013. Here Gehry confesses:

> I was a bit reluctant to get engaged in the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi. It's so far away and the cultural issues seemed so different. . . . We hired a human rights lawyer from Human Rights Watch when we started on the Abu Dhabi project. Both we and our client were interested in making sure the project was in the clear. There was a time when they were being beat up on for the conditions of temporary workers. And they did something about it: They built relatively comfortable camps. These issues are important to me when I take a project. If we're hired to do a project in China, we'll make it the best. (quoted in Pauker 2013)

Moved by the fact that Hillary Clinton had name-checked him in an important speech, Gehry shares his views on democracy. 'Democracy, obviously, is something we don't want to give up, but it does create chaos. It means the guy next door can do what he wants, and it creates a collision of thinking. In cities, that means people build whatever they want. I think the best thing is to have a benevolent dictator—who has taste!' (Pauker 2013). The issue of labour rights in the Gulf has not gone away; indeed it has intensified. Despite a promised report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, and pressure on the Louvre, British Museum, and New York University—all involved in Saadiyat Island projects—abuses and campaigns against them continue (see also McNeill 2009: ch. 7; Harris 2013).[46] The misery of labour on Happiness Island continues, as do denials.[47] While rarely posed in these terms, many of these ethical issues involve some form of postcolonialist ideology and the architects, developers, and local authorities more often than not end up promoting the consumerist interests of the TCC rather than the welfare of the workers. The fact that most readers will find this unsurprising tells us something about the Icon Project and, I would argue, the role of iconic architecture and urban design in promoting consumerism, the topic of the next chapter.

7

Architecture and the Culture-Ideology of Consumerism

This chapter sets out to explore the theoretical and substantive connections between iconicity and consumerism in the field of contemporary architecture and urban design.[1] The culture-ideology of consumerism refers to a set of beliefs and values, integral to the system of global capitalism, intended to make people believe that human worth is best created and happiness best achieved in terms of consumption and possessions.[2] Although she uses different terms, Juliet Schor (1993) expresses very well the view of consumerism on which my argument rests. While I share her emphasis on producerism, I would explain it as a direct consequence of how the major transnational corporations operate. My argument in what follows assumes that capitalist globalization and consumerism are unsustainable in the long run, due to the crises of class polarization and ecological stress they engender (Sklair 2002: 48–57).

Not all culture is ideological, even in capitalist societies. Consumerism in the capitalist global system can only be fully understood as culture-ideology, where cultural practices (embedded in socio-economic institutions) reinforce the ideology of capitalist consumerism and the ideology (embedded in commonsense beliefs) reinforces the cultural practices. The brand-stretching campaign of the locally iconic Boston Public Library in 2004 (figure 7.1) embellished by the slogan 'Books Are Just the Beginning' is a telling example of the links between architecture and consumerism in practice. Libraries are not exempt.[3] This is a first indication of how the Icon Project in architecture operates at the local level.



Figure 7.1. 'Books Are Just the Beginning': brand-stretching at the Boston Public Library.

Consumerist Space in the City of Capitalist Globalization

More or less all space is potentially consumerist space, but there is certainly a continuum from maximally consumerist space, in which users are provided with many opportunities to spend money and few opportunities not to (e.g., shopping malls) to minimally consumerist space, in which there are very few if any opportunities to spend money (e.g., cemeteries; the families have already spent the money and for others this may only be a matter of time). While John Hannigan's idea of 'fantasy city' (1998) may be something of an exaggeration, there is no doubt that his triad of shopertainment, eatertainment, and edutainment, plus the architainment of Luis Fernandez-Galiano (2000), are key components of the mix intended to turn places that were once centres of productive labour and of carbon-neutral leisure into sites devoted to consumerism. Iconic architecture, through the Icon Project, plays a central role in promoting consumerism in the interests of the transnational capitalist class (TCC). Such connections are already common in popular culture, fashion, sport, and so on (Sklair and Struna 2013), but there is relatively little systematic research on the links between iconic architecture and capitalist consumerism.[4]

As I argued in chapter 5, the process begins with transnational social spaces, the globally branded shopping malls, theme parks, waterfront developments, and transportation centres that could be almost anywhere in the world. What makes them transnational is that they are designed to represent one or more of various global architectural styles, recognized through the mass media as much as through direct experience by quite different communities of people from a multitude of class, geographical, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds. Where they are successful, transnational social spaces provide visual references that mark out specific sites of belonging identified with each of these communities without offending the sensibilities of members of other communities. This is the sphere in which iconic architecture and the culture-ideology of consumerism relate most directly, insofar as consumerism provides the defining set of practices and beliefs—the delights of shopping (or, more subtly, retail opportunities)—that aspire to transcend the very real differences that exist between classes, geographical, ethnic, and cultural communities, at 'home' and 'abroad'. The social production of both unique and typical iconic architecture is integral to this process through which the Icon Project operates.

Research carried out in 1995 showed that for the first time entertainment industries had overtaken aerospace in the provision of jobs in California (reported in Hannigan 1998: 2). This finding, generalized to service industries outstripping manufacturing industries, can be replicated in globalizing cities around the world. The connection between consumerism and iconic architecture at the urban level is an important part of this story. This raises again the contentious distinction between public and private space and, more pointedly, the very survival of genuine public space in our cities (Sorkin 1992, Herzog 2006). The crux of the matter, in the context of consumerism, is that while logically it would appear that consumerist spaces need to be public to facilitate spending, sociologically it is clear that much consumerist space operates as space restricted to those with the means to buy what is on sale and excluding those without. A Disney plan to reconfigure Seattle in the 1980s was resisted because it may have resulted in admission charges to enter the city centre (Hannigan 1998: ch. 7). 'Main Street Disneyland is the best designed public space and most popular street in Southern California, but you have to pay $48 to get to it' [CA10].[5] In his influential argument on 'Fortress L.A.' Mike Davis expounds a radical history of the struggle over public space, showing that the traditional complaints by local liberal intellectuals about 'anti-pedestrian bias . . . fascist obliteration of street frontage' miss the 'explicit repressive intention, which has its roots in Los Angeles's ancient history of class and race warfare . . . the fortress effect emerges not as an inadvertent failure of design, but as a deliberate socio-spatial strategy' (Davis 1992: 229). This is evident all the way from people-unfriendly benches and megastructures to the works of Frank Gehry, Disney's 'imagineer' of urban boosterism. The logical conclusion to this process is the 'panopticon mall . . . [surrounded by] belligerent lawns . . . creating the carceral city' (1992: ch. 4). This theme echoes in Melbourne: 'As the corporate towers have replaced our public symbols on the skyline, so the meaning and the life have been drained from public space. The degradation of public space encourages its replacement by pseudopublic space (public access but private control) as part of a slow expropriation of the city' (Dovey 1992: 187). The dilemma for urban growth coalitions in globalizing cities is to reconcile the need to attract maximum numbers of shoppers while excluding 'undesirables'. In many cities the appeal of the mall is the promise of some protection from urban crime and real or imagined harassment from the poor and undesirable. This can be built into the design of buildings: one example among many it is difficult to enter the exclusive Daslu department store in São Paulo on foot, because the obvious entrances are through the parking garages, where the cost of valet parking is about one-third of the weekly minimum wage, or the helipad on the roof. São Paulo, one of the 'poorest' cities in the world, is said to have the highest proportion of private helicopter ownership per capita of any major city. Restrictions can also be designed into the spaces between buildings—for example, not providing comfortable seating in order to discourage vagrants from lingering. Nevertheless, whatever the contradictions, whatever the restrictions, there is no doubt that cities all over the world are becoming more consumerist.

The clear trend to increasing commercialization of transportation hubs (especially airports, railways, and subways), museums, art galleries, indeed cultural centres of all types, schools and universities, even some places of worship, not to mention the more obvious examples of the massive rise in the numbers and scope of shopping malls, theme parks, and entertainment spaces, suggests that a major spatial effect of capitalist globalization is to squeeze out non-consumerist space and replace it with consumerist space anywhere that people are likely to gather or pass through.[6] In his cornucopia of a book *The Vatican to Vegas* Norman Klein (2004) conceptualizes this as scripted space to explain illusions in architecture from the 16th century to the birth of the cinema, amusement parks, and globalizing consumerist cities. He expounds on this in a series of brilliant if eccentric analyses of walk-through or click-through environments such as malls, churches, casinos, theme parks, and computer games.[7] His exposition of architainment in Las Vegas is particularly instructive. Tri-M Inc, the initial developer for the New York/New York attraction, was sued in 1996 by the developer of another New York–themed design. 'A judge had to decide who indeed owned the false memory of New York as a condensed city' (2004: 346). In the words of one insider: 'That's the way Vegas has to work. It plays on instant recognizability. A lot of people haven't been to New York, but almost everyone knows its iconic image. It is more important that New York looks like the familiar map of the city than the city itself' (quoted in Klein 2004: 347). Previously, the art critic Dave Hickey had argued that the real fakery of Las Vegas is preferable to the fake reality of Santa Fe—the former characterized by the iconography of desire, the latter by the iconography of taste (Hickey 1998: 12–13). In terms of capitalist consumerism it rarely matters whether the architecture is real or fake: what matters is: does it help or hinder the buying experience? Central to the Icon Project in architecture and urban design is the constant striving to enhance the culture-ideology of consumerism and to eliminate anything that might impede or blemish it. Contemporary transnational scripted spaces can be seen as instruments of class control wielded by the TCC in globalizing cities all over the world. The arts entrepreneur Evi Sari, for example, identified nine 'New City Icons' for 2004. Most were designed by architects with global reputations, all major urban presences, and all to a greater or lesser extent fitting my description of consumerist spaces. The unveiling of major works of architecture in these globalizing cities generated enormous publicity. Aside from the socio-economic impact of such high-profile buildings on the cities themselves, iconic architecture puts these cities on the fast track to join the ranks of well, recognized global city brands such as New York, Tokyo, and London (Sari 2004: 23).[8]

The evidence that those active in urban growth coalitions in globalizing cities believe that unique and typical iconic architecture could work for them is compelling. In Melbourne: 'A cluster of new civic icons are built or proposed; all marked by a dynamic aesthetic signifying the state slogan "on the move". . . The Manhattan skyline, Westminster, the Eiffel Tower and the Sydney Opera House set the standards of urban iconography' (Dovey 1999: 158–9).[9] In Buenos Aires: 'Transnational corporate elites, international financiers, tourists, and the global "jet-set" (*los elegantes*) create the demand for advanced infrastructure [meaning iconic architecture]' (Keeling 1996: 205). David Keeling provides a timely reminder that the relationship between architecture and consumerism produces losers as well as winners. The upper middle class and the elite occupy Barrio Norte and the northern suburbs, where bankers are linked to global financial centres, industrialists to foreign franchises and distributorships, and agriculturalists to export markets. In the rest of the city, the 'people' carve out a precarious living; many fear globalization and the destruction of what makes Buenos Aires (and Argentina) special and different, though this has often been a Europeanized (and now globalizing) version of local identity.

Capitalist globalization and consumerism have transformed and expanded the meaning of tourism in their own image. Tourism is no longer simply a term to describe people on holiday. Theorizing from his empirical research on the Gold Coast, near Brisbane in Australia, the urban sociologist Patrick Mullins (1991) developed the concept of tourism urbanization (cities and towns built solely for tourist consumption). This is now a global phenomenon. The significance of the tourist industry and tourism urbanization for the transformation of globalizing cities all over the world has attracted a great deal of research (see, e.g., Judd and Feinstein 1999; Lasansky and McClaren 2004; Urry and Larsen 2012).[10] Tourism now refers to the provision of spending opportunities for people travelling for a variety of purposes, nicely encapsulated in the acronym MICE (meetings, incentives, conferences/conventions, and exhibitions/events). Whatever the reason for travel there are always more ways of inciting people to spend, and an important part of the process involves seductive images of the iconic architecture (both typical and unique) on offer, as a glance at trade publications (e.g., *micenet ASIA*)[11] readily illustrates. The most spectacular architectural results of the efforts of globalizing urban growth coalitions have occurred in Asia. Marshall explains, in terms that MICE industry executives would immediately recognize: 'these [global urban] projects provide two very important global advantages to their host locations . . . a particular type of urban environment where the work of globalization gets done and . . . a specific kind of global image that can be marketed in the global market place' (2003: 4; see also Teo 2003; Knox 2011). Although Marshall does not use the term, this is the Icon Project in action.

Millennial developments in Singapore and Beijing are just two among many examples. In Singapore plans to rebuild the downtown began in the 1980s, including iconic projects by foreign architects along with government aspirations to turn Singapore into a global city for the arts (Chang 2000; Marshall 2003: ch. 9). In 2006 an ambitious scheme was announced to build a new bridge, whose double-helix steel structure design would be a 'world first' as part of a $300m Urban Redevelopment Authority scheme for the Marina Bay area. This provides a walking route linking the iconic Esplanade cultural complex with a proposed tourist resort and a Singapore Flyer Ferris wheel, copying the success of the Millennium Wheel in London. Justifying the cost of the project, the National Development Minister told Parliament that many cities are now 'building new attractions and actively marketing themselves. . . . No idea is too far-fetched or too bold' (*Business Times* [Singapore], 7 March 2006). Visa, an Esplanade corporate partner, leveraged the popular image of the building as a durian (local fruit) in an advertising campaign, illustrating once again the commercial value of iconic architecture (figure 7.2).

The introduction of Business Improvement Districts in the 1990s in Beijing is described as follows:

> the provision of modern infrastructure, high quality shopping facilities, and the creation of up-to-date business environments . . . generally devised by downtown business owners with the support of municipal authorities . . . organized around a set of functions oriented to business people, commercial tenants, and foreign tourists . . . these simulated downtowns rely on a spectacular imagery designed to connote sumptuousness and luxury . . . [demonstrating] the direct influence of world capitalism and global consumerism. (Broudehoux 2004: 94–5)

What Broudehoux calls the malling of Wangfujing—the 'Fifth Avenue of Beijing' and once home to the world's largest McDonald's outlet—followed rapidly. A new central business district policy permitted the displacement of McDonald's (to a nearby site) by the massive Oriental Plaza scheme and many other new projects, mostly joint ventures between Hong Kong and Beijing developers with the active participation of the government at city and national level. 'The goal was to turn Wangfujing into an elaborate and highly efficient machine devoted to a single activity: consumption'

Figure 7.2. Visa in Singapore: leveraging consumerist space from the Durian.

(2004: 108). Referring to another massive mall in the area, Broudehoux (2004: 113) observes: 'While Sun Dong An's interior design conforms to the sleek signature style of international shopping malls, the exterior architecture of the building is a superficial attempt to integrate the building into the local urban landscape by cloaking it under a familiar guise', complete with a replica Old Beijing Street, and pagoda-style roofing. This is an interesting comment on both capitalist postcolonialist design and typical iconicity.

All four fractions of the TCC use iconic architecture as a tool of urban intervention, often in the context of rehabilitation of depressed areas, the demands of consumerism and commercial profits unsurprisingly at the top of developer agendas. Gospodini's argument (2002) that in the era of globalization, the relationship between urban economy and urban design seems to be reversed is entirely corroborated. While for centuries the quality of the urban environment has been explained as an outcome of the economic growth of cities, nowadays the quality of urban space has become a prerequisite for the economic development of cities: iconic architecture and consumerist urban design have an enhanced new role in economic development. The next question is, how is this transmitted to the general public?

Architecture, Consumerism, and the Media

Turning architecture from an obscure esoteric cultural phenomenon into good news stories is one important strand in the Icon Project. The consumerist fraction of the TCC in architecture is especially active in ensuring that the mass media promote architecture in ways that consumers will find appealing. Although it is an extreme case, Jencks (2005: 65–99) uses the drama of Ground Zero to illustrate how this process works for print media and TV, and architecture has always had a well-regarded presence in film. The single most famous film about an architect is probably the 1949 Hollywood version of Ayn Rand's novel *The Fountainhead* with a star-studded cast. Gary Cooper played its architect hero Howard Roark, an iconoclastic outsider (literally, as he blew up his own compromised building). Roark was widely believed to have been modelled on Frank Lloyd Wright.[12] Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* (1982) is a common reference for discussions of futuristic urban dystopias (Covert 1993; Fontin 2011). *Blade Runner* was shot in the Bradbury building in Los Angeles, a restored local icon. Of particular interest to film and architecture enthusiasts is the strange case of Gotham City. In the original comic book version of 1940, a young architect called Cyrus Pinkney created a gothic fantasy, subsequently redesigned in modernist tropes by Lex Luther, morphing into the contemporary corporate skyline of *Dark Knight* (Holland 2008). Woody Allen's *Manhattan* and the *Men in Black* series both featured Frank Lloyd Wright's Guggenheim in New York, which has also appeared on magazine covers, cartoons, and comic books. The Manhattan skyline, as James Sanders (2001) exhaustively documents, dominated the urban presence in the movies throughout the 20th century (think *King Kong* and Woody Allen), though the skylines of other cities, not all in the United States, are now becoming more familiar through films, TV, and the Internet. Peter Krieger, discussing the impact of modernist architecture from the United States on post-war Germany, argues that 'the modern illuminated skyline of the Metropolis seems like a logical continuation of gothic feelings watching the moonlighted mountains . . . [and] explains the contradictions between the iconic power of dense skyscraper accumulation in New York and the continuing German myth of the isolated tower' (1999: 3–4). The reference, of course, is to Fritz Lang's silent classic *Metropolis* of 1927, set in a city of the future based on Lang's first sight of Manhattan (Rattenbury 2002: 84–5). The film shows a rigidly class-stratified society, and connections between this vision of the city and its masses and what was to transpire in Germany a few years later are obvious. All this is vividly illustrated in the spectacular display of the continuing influence of the film in the Sony Museum of Film and TV, itself located in the highly consumerist glass atrium of Sony Plaza in the heart of Berlin.

The Depression of the 1930s set a trend in Hollywood for escapist architectural environments within which the stars performed. Now American dream buildings not only play all round the world but are being built all round the world (Lamster 2000). 'At their most basic level, architecture and cinema have natural inbuilt affinities. Plan, construction; script, production' (Grigor 1993: xxviii).[13] According to Covert (1993), by 1990 there were around 1,000 films on architectural subjects and 400+ production companies making them, though few architecture films get broadcast in the mass media. Charlotte Neilson makes the argument that according to Hollywood, psychopaths prefer modernist design (Neilson 2012).

The use of iconic buildings in films and television is there for all to see, but representatives of the architecture industry regularly complain that architecture, unlike other serious cultural forms (notably painting, music, literature), is virtually ignored by mainstream media. In the United Kingdom, most of the few architecture programmes that get airtime appear on the minority TV channels BBC2, BBC4, and the hybrid public service commercial Channel 4. For example, in the 1980s, BBC2 ran a three-part series narrated by the critic Robert Hughes on Gaudi, Albert Speer, and Mies van der Rohe. Hughes is best known for his BBC TV series and book *Shock of the New*, influential in introducing audiences all over the world to modernist art and architecture (Hughes 1991). Building restoration and design have become common themes on TV in many countries. Such programmes, especially so-called 'makeover' shows, invite people to have their homes restored and/or redesigned, presumably for free. They are very popular and have also raised the profile of design, if not architecture for the general public. It is a staple of such programmes that the focus on design is framed by commercial interests, notably enhanced resale values.

The Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) created a 'Building of the Year' award in 1988, taken up by Channel 4 in 2000. The Stirling Prize, the most important award in British architecture, is named for the architect James Stirling, who died in 1992 (he won the Pritzker Prize in 1981). It has been awarded annually since 1996 by RIBA. The presentation ceremony was televised by Channel 4 from 2000 until 2011, hosted on several occasions by Kevin McCloud, the presenter of the popular *Grand Designs* TV show. Other local celebrities of various types have also been involved. Tony

Blair was invited to present the 1999 prize, and although he had to pull out at the last moment he sent an enthusiastic video message. Some credited this for neutralizing the traditionalist architectural propaganda of Prince Charles and his associates and establishing contemporary iconic architecture as an integral part of Cool Britannia.[14]

The 1999 Stirling Prize was won by Future Systems with Arup for the NatWest Media Centre at Lords cricket ground in London. In the words of a brochure promoting the event, this building 'has become an instant icon. . . . [and is] an extraordinary iconic structure' (Channel 4/RIBA 2000: 3). Between 1998 and 2011, the Stirling winners were mostly iconic architects with global reputations. The winner in 2012 was the firm Stanton Williams for the Sainsbury Laboratory in Cambridge (beating two Koolhaas projects, one by Chipperfield, and the Olympic Stadium by Populous); in 2013 Witherford Watson Mann won for the restoration of Astley Castle, Nuneaton. In 2014 Haworth Tomkins won for their new Everyman Theatre in Liverpool, beating Hadid's Aquatics Centre and Piano's Shard. The architect's website refers to the 'iconic institution' that the new theatre has replaced, and the new version of the 'iconic red' Everyman sign. It appears to have become an instant local icon, unusually combining typical and unique features.[15] In 2015 the prize went to the London firm AHMM, for an elegant if unspectacular redesign of a large comprehensive school complex. These results were interpreted by some as a setback for large-scale iconic architecture, and it remains to be seen if they set a trend. The prize is now sponsored by Almacantar, a property investment and development company, described on the RIBA website as: 'specialising in large-scale, complex investments in Central London, with the potential to create long-term value through development, repositioning or active asset management'. The 2016 shortlist contained only one globally iconic firm—Herzog & de Meuron. The winner was the Newport Street Gallery (housing Damien Hirst's art collection) in London by Caruso St John, a respected small firm with offices in London and Zurich. In a poll which attracted 36,000 votes conducted by the BBC, first place went to a modernist house in the countryside. The eventual winner came last in the poll.

A documentary series with RIBA on five leading British global architects (Richard Rogers, Norman Foster, Nicholas Grimshaw, Michael Hopkins, and Terry Farrell) was screened on BBC2 in February 2014. This was entitled *The Brits Who Built the Modern World* and presented an entertaining if largely uncritical account of the work of the famous five. By accident or design, in the same month BBC4 screened a two-part series by the maverick critic Jonathan Meades (2014), a provocative celebration of Brutalism.

In the United States, the Museum of Television and Radio in Los Angeles (designed by Richard Meier) turns up dozens of TV shows on and around architecture. These include a two-part series on Frank Lloyd Wright in the 1980s (A&E channel) and the 1986 Mobil-sponsored eight-part series *Pride of Place* presented by Robert Stern (PBS). Some TV imports were also shown, for example, from Germany (on Mies van der Rohe) and an outstanding co-production from SDR in Germany and Channel 4 in the United Kingdom, 'Beyond Utopia, Changing Attitudes in American Architecture' (1984), on the postmodernist turn. And, of course, in the aftermath of 9/11, skyscrapers and the egos of architects have come under a great deal of media scrutiny. PBS regularly screens programmes of architectural interest, including an architecture series in 2013 with the snappy title *Cool Spaces*, covering spectacular new projects by Gehry and Libeskind, as well as a major new series: *The Top Ten Buildings That Have Changed America*, the most recent of which was Gehry's Disney Concert Hall (2003). The visibility of architecture seems to be moderately high on TV in Europe and North America, with a balance between the consumerist, the celebratory, and the didactic. The Internet and its attendant social media have, of course, transformed coverage of and access to architecture, as they have everything else, and web access to TV programming has no doubt increased outreach.[16] The web-based *ArchDaily* acts as a global daily digest of architecture-related stories from around the world, often with video inserts, images, and details of new projects, all available for the effort of a few clicks. Media exposure is making architecture part of the general culture and part of the culture-ideology of consumerism, while at the same time occasionally providing critiques of capitalist globalization.

Iconic Architecture and Shopping

In the early 1990s, shopping became the second most important leisure time activity in the United States after TV, which also promotes shopping, directly through advertising and indirectly through product placement. When Jon Goss (1993: 18) proclaimed: 'shopping has become the dominant mode of contemporary public life', many were sceptical. In the first decades of the new millennium, the sceptics have become a declining minority. The spread of shopping malls has spawned a huge volume of research, invoking findings from the consciousness industry (Ewen 1976), environmental design, Madison Avenue (Goss 1993; Schor 1993: ch. 5), and 'theme park America' (Sorkin 1992) to explain and evaluate the enormous impact of shopping on American and now global society. The implications of this retail (and entertainment) revolution for architecture and urban design have been drawn out in a variety of publications—all the way from *Learning from Las Vegas*, both literally and in terms of the influential treatise of Venturi et al. (1977), to the changing cultures of cities (e.g., Zukin 1995 and 2015; Knox 2011).[17]

The shopping mall is the quintessential contemporary example of what can be called consumerist/oppressive scripted space. Goss (1993) not only demonstrates how the 'magic of the mall' works but also makes a powerful plea for shopping malls to be transformed into a third type of public space (the other two being home and work/school), showing how the consciousness industry and environmental design practice are intimately connected. Mall design (not surprisingly) is 'overdetermined by the goals of retail profit' (1993: 22), with escalators, maximum walking distances to spending points, entrances, temperature, lighting, music, mirrors, cleanliness, all subordinated to the profit imperative. Floorplan is critical: 'a too direct and obvious route between the entrance and exits must be avoided. . . . the goal is to trap the consumer in the world of consumption' (1993: 32). By the early 1990s brand-stretching was being created as food outlets and leisure points multiplied in malls, and it was already evident that cultural products in various forms were being brought into the mall and in the process commodified to the extent that more and more they became creatures of the body corporate. Goss notes that the first National Endowment for the Arts grants to private corporations in the United States funded art projects in malls. TV, and now the marketing screen, is everywhere, selling everything. In many cities, in modes of transportation, in iconic and ordinary buildings, this mode of display broadcasts the Icon Project night and day for all to see.

There are, of course, some commercial constraints on mall architects and developers, notably the imperative of maximizing revenues for every available unit of retail space, but apart from this there are plenty of opportunities for ingenious designers to build various forms of iconicity into malls from the local to the global scale. While the locations are local, the phenomenon is transnational, connecting the built environment to capitalist consumerism.

Almost every city in the world, however nominally poor, now has its malls. Africa presents special problems in this context.[18] The editors of a collection on global cities comment, 'It appears as if an entire continent has been sidestepped by contemporary forms of globalization' (Brenner and Keil 2006: 189). However, despite its position at the bottom of most global socio-economic hierarchies, similar globalizing trends through the creation of consumerist space can be observed in the major cities of Africa. South Africa has many malls, some of them of 'world class standard' (in mall-speak). The Mlimani City mall in Dar es Salam in Tanzania, the Lagos Palms mall in Nigeria, and the Accra mall in Ghana were all marketed as the first world-class malls in their respective countries. One of the numerous shopping mall websites concludes: 'As western consumerism continues to spread its money making tentacles into the far corners of the globe countries that not long ago didn't even have grocery stores are now building shopping facilities so big that they can't even find enough vendors to fill them. In fact, you'll find that most of the shopping centers on this list are located in Asia and its surrounding regions. It's a classic case of the student surpassing the master.'[19] Malls do not build themselves. The consumerist fraction of the TCC in architecture and urban design overlaps with ideological entrepreneurs, whose task it is to promote the culture-ideology of consumerism all over the world. A special issue of the magazine *Architectural Design* in 2004 celebrated the news that property developers are starting seriously to recognize the added value that an architect can bring to commercial projects, in the United States and abroad (see Sokol 2004).

Many if not most malls achieve a measure of typical local iconicity just by being malls. They are known to all the locals (thus famous), they have specific aesthetic qualities via superficial modernism and/or postmodernism, often with variations on vernacular themes. And they have the symbolic quality of showing off the good life through gleaming and welcoming buildings. The most iconic malls in the world tend to be admired for their scale and monumentality and for what they represent (usually the regeneration of a neighbourhood or a whole city) as much as for their architectural qualities. Consideration of the geographical distribution of shopping malls demonstrates that what was not so long ago a largely Western phenomenon is now, in terms of size if not turnover, a predominantly Asian phenomenon. Of the ten biggest shopping centres by rentable floor area in 2014, the top two were in China, and the rest were in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Iran, Malaysia again, Turkey, Dubai, and Canada (the West Edmonton Mall). The largest buildings by total area are more evenly spread, with all of the top five in the United States and Europe, the largest being the Boeing plant, followed by the Target Warehouse both in the United States, and the Airbus factory in Toulouse. However, the most spectacular new building is probably in China:

> Measuring at 500 meters long, 400 meters wide and 100 meters high, the newly constructed Century Global Center in Chengdu is reportedly capable of housing 20 Sydney Opera Houses in its 1.7 million square metre interior. Perhaps the center's most unique of attractions—aside from an abundance of high-end shopping outlets, cinemas, office space, conference centers, two five star hotels, a university complex and a replica Mediterranean village—is a massive artificial beach that is illuminated by a giant screen which mimics the horizon and offers sunrises, sunsets and nautical breezes. Though the nearest *real* beach is 1000km away, visitors are accommodated with an ocean-front paradise that can provide them with literally anything their heart desires. (*ArchDaily* 7 July 2013)[20]

Despite the ever-increasing gigantism of buildings worldwide, in recent years the connections between shopping, consumerism, and iconic architecture have been driven as much by boutiques as by malls, and by boutiques in malls. This is best illustrated by the relationship between Prada and its architects of choice, Rem Koolhaas, Herzog & de Meuron, and Kazua Sejima, all of whom have designed explicitly iconic boutique stores for Prada in globalizing cities.[21] According to the CEO of Prada: 'Architecture is the same as advertising for communicating the brand' (*Guardian*, G2, 30 June 2003). Caroline Lamy (2015: 207ff.) documents commercial centres designed by Piano in Paris, Nouvel in Eurolille, and Libeskind in Berne, among others. In England, the London department store Selfridges commissioned a new building in Birmingham by architects Future Systems. This was instantly dubbed 'A New Icon for UK's Second Largest City: The "Sexy" Silver Building' (Sari 2004: 68–81). The iconic image of the building was used on the store credit card. The architect asserted: 'More people will pass through here than Tate Modern. This building questions the nature of a public building' (quoted in Jencks 2005: 15–16). The process is taken to its logical conclusion in the book blurb by the principal of Kl!ngmann [*sic*] Architects and Brand Consultants: 'In the twenty-first century, we must learn to look at cities not as skylines but as brandscapes, and at buildings not as objects but as advertisements and destinations. In the experience economy, experience itself has become the product: we're no longer consuming objects but sensations, even lifestyles. In the new environment of brandscapes, buildings are not about where we work and live but who we imagine ourselves to be' (Klingmann 2007). Hyperbole aside, stuff is still being consumed.

Commissions from the luxury goods chain LVMH for the trendy French architect Christian de Portzamparc, Prada by Koolhaas, the Royalton and Paramount hotels by the even trendier Philippe Starck, Renzo Piano, and Toyo Ito for Hermès, Peter Marino for Vuitton and Dior, and Fuksas for Armani, are but the most sparkling pinnacles of this global consumerist iceberg (Lamy 2015: 199–220). While luxury boutique hotels have attracted most attention in the glossy design magazines, other luxury hotel developments (most of which have their own malls) have also caught the eye as much for their monumental scale as for their architectural quality. An outstanding example is the Burj Al Arab Hotel in Dubai, also labelled iconic by Sari (2004). This hotel complex, with its distinctive Arab dhow shape, is one of several self-proclaimed architectural icons that have turned Dubai and other Arabian Gulf destinations into new wonders of the consumerist world.[22] Major architect-developers of the global age, John Portman (discussed in chapter 3) and John Jerde, famous for his Bellagio in Las Vegas, Mall of America in Minneapolis, and waterside projects in Fukuoka (Jerde 1999; Klein 2004) have made the spectacular atrium integral to the Icon Project (on the atrium in new public libraries see Mattern 2006: esp. ch. 4). The recent recovery of the reputation of Morris Lapidus, architect of the Eden Roc and Fontainebleau hotels in Miami and many more, is of interest here. His pre-postmodernist combination of elements of modernism (from Le Corbusier, Niemeyer, and Erich Mendelsohn) and local touches, is credited by Alice Friedman (2000) with the creation of a new building type, the American resort hotel with spectacular atrium, now of course globalized.

A feature of consumerist architecture, particularly in shopping malls, that is often ignored in critical discussions and textbooks, is interior design. This is at least partly because the retail sector is not valued very highly by architects.[23] However, in sociological terms it is highly significant. A good example of how interior architecture has come into its own in the era of capitalist globalization is the experience of the UK-based firm Benoy, particularly in Hong Kong and China. Benoy markets itself as the creator of 'destinations', recognizing earlier than most that in China, in the words of a local architect, 'there are fewer and fewer places for people to meet and congregate, especially after 1989, so malls serve as community spaces' [HK3].

Here, as elsewhere, the key term is 'mixed-use development', shopertainment plus office towers plus hotels. The story of Hysan Place in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, illustrates this in both architectural and sociological terms. Hysan Place was a project of Kohn Pedersen Fox (KPF), one of the largest architect firms in New York and active all over the world. KPF worked with a local architect-engineer and Benoy as interior architect for the creation of spectacular interior spaces. In a crowded urban site, it is essential that potential customers (primarily the young) looking in from the street are drawn into the mall by the view of the atrium. Hysan Place was intended to be an icon for young shoppers in Hong Kong. The aesthetic works, in the language of interior architecture and retail science, by irrigating the arterial flow, the circulation of shoppers, all round the 17 floors of shops. This requires good signage, but needs to be sufficiently interesting to be fun, thus the idea of 'labyrinthine retail'. An important aspect of the design is the recognition that young shoppers are intelligent and welcome a challenge, rejecting the stereotype of shopping as mindless activity. In Hysan Place this is achieved by local video graphics around and inside the lifts. All this helps to blend the street and the mall together. Benoy inserted a spectacular skylight to the design, creating a 'sense of awe'. As a company born in the United Kingdom and working all over the world, Benoy is a good example of the trend noted earlier always to look for local historical, geographical, and cultural influences to enhance the experience of those who use buildings.

This is, of course, only one model of retail interior architecture. Another is also to be found in Hong Kong, which still has the reputation of a prime place to shop on the global tourist trail. The redevelopment of Victoria Peak around the Tram and the Tower is certainly less subtle than the Benoy approach, but appears to be equally effective. The Peak Tram opened in 1888 and was the first funicular railway in Asia. An enterprising Scotsman, Alexander Findlay Smith, saw it as the way to open up new residential districts, a cool 550 metres above sea level. These districts were reserved for expatriates and their servants, a restriction lifted in 1947. The commercial development of the Peak began in the 1970s when the original Peak Tower was built: 'a futuristic display of architecture' (according to the informative tourist guide), redesigned in 1993 by the British architect Terry Farrell. The old sailing junk logo used to promote Hong Kong was looking increasingly out of date and local media were calling for a replacement. Further revitalized in 2006, the Peak Tower is now marketed as the 'most iconic landmark in Hong Kong,' its distinctive gondola logo widely disseminated (figure 7.3).

As I noted at the beginning of this book, the Peak experience is a seamless web of traditional Hong Kong and the Hong Kong of contemporary consumerist capitalist globalization (and consumerist post-colonialism fuelled in part by streams of tourists from the rest of China, including my two acquaintances from Guangzhou). The experience begins in the Peak Tram Historical lobby and processes through a cornucopia of spending opportunities. The Peak Tower is an expertly orchestrated example of scripted spaces working for the culture-ideology of consumerism. Whatever one's view of capitalist globalization, the atrium in Hysan Place, the Peak Tower, and indeed Hong Kong by night are all breathtaking experiences (figure 7.4). Small as it is, Hong Kong often gives the impression of one large spectacle, a prime site for the Icon Project to cast its magic consumerist spells.

Figure 7.3. Peak Experience by day.

Figure 7.4. Iconic Hong Kong: the skyline at night. (© Michele Nastasi)

Performance Spaces

For shopping malls, boutiques, tourist attractions, and resort hotels, the immediate connection between iconic architecture and consumerism is quite obvious. However, it is not so obvious with respect to other types of architectural icons especially in the field of culture (performance spaces, sports stadia, museums). The Sydney Opera House is a paradigm case of how a performance space commissioned by public bodies and designed to be a national architectural icon (Messent 1997: chs. 3–5; Murray 2003) is transformed under the conditions of capitalist globalization into a unique global icon. From its roots as a city icon for Sydney and as a national icon for Australia, to eventual canonization as a UNESCO World Heritage listed building (another indicator of global iconicity), the Sydney Opera House has become one of the best-known buildings in the world. It is arguably the gold standard against which the social production of iconic architecture in the global arena is measured. The clients of the Guggenheim Bilbao are widely reported to have cited it in these terms, and this is confirmed by Gehry himself in print (in Jencks 2005: 12) and on screen (Pollock 2006).

In her discussion of the project to build a new National Theatre in Beijing, Broudehoux (2004: 227) asserts, 'The theatre was to become an emblem of late 20th century modernity and a deserving symbol of China which could attract worldwide recognition and compete as a visual icon with structures such as the Sydney Opera House or the Grande Arche in Paris.' Similarly, the Burj al Arab in Dubai and many other contemporary iconic buildings justify their existence in terms of the Sydney Opera House. A spokesperson for the Australian arts minister commented on the ongoing process to upgrade the Opera House: 'The Federal Government acknowledges the icon status of the Sydney Opera House, not just as a building in the hearts of all Australians but as a world-recognised symbol of Australia' (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 19–20 May 2007, 29).[24] This followed the headline image position of the Opera House in the multimillion-dollar 'Where the bloody hell are you?' international advertising campaign launched in 2006 for the Australian tourist industry (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 25–6 June 2006). As everyone realized, the Opera House was seen as a bonus for the national airline (Qantas), flying tourists from all over the world in and out. Already boosted by exposure during the Sydney Olympics, the innovative research of Cristina Garduño Freeman (2016) provides definitive evidence of the global dissemination of images of the icon through reproduction on more and more memorabilia. All this was accompanied by ever-increasing commercialization of the building itself over the last few decades, and enlargement of retail opportunities in and around the Circular Quay site.

The Olympics and the World Cup in particular, and sporting venues in general, provide many good examples of the links between iconic architecture and consumerism in the sporting realm. Jules Boycoff (2014) acutely labels this 'celebration capitalism'. The London 2012 Olympic Games transformed a desolate post-industrial site in east London which now houses Westfield Stratford City, one of the largest shopping malls in Europe. Fulfilling the same function as the ubiquitous shops at entrances and exits of major museums and stadia, visitors have to pass through this enormous consumerist space to arrive and leave the Olympic site. The pre-eminent sports architect Rob Sheard of HOK explained that after the success of his firm's Stadium Australia for the Sydney Olympics he decided to focus exclusively on sports and leisure architecture because this is the building type that most touches hearts and minds: stadia as 'symbols of a region or a nation, as icons of popular culture' (Sheard 2001: xiv). Often labelled 'Cathedrals of Sport,' many new stadia are multi-experience venues, complete with spectacular digital visual and sound technology. Rod Sheard goes on to philosophize about sports architecture, a philosophy grounded with a large dose of commercialism, arguing that city centre stadia generate revenue for surrounding businesses and services. What is known as the secondary spend from these venues can be considerable. Added to this is the new consumerist phenomenon of 'stadium tourism'. In Munich the Olympic Stadium is one of the most popular tourist attractions in the city, while in Barcelona more tourists visit Nou Camp (the home of Barcelona football club) than the Picasso museum. Old Trafford (the home of Manchester United) is commonly referred to as the 'Theatre of Dreams'—all highly commercialized. As gate receipts for sports events decline relative to TV income, merchandising becomes more important than rents, as in airports all round the world, and this is reflected in the layout of both types of architecture. For stadia and airports, 'spending time' is literally two to four hours. In the high-profile Wembley Stadium project (HOK Sports with Fosters) the original twin towers known to football fans all over the world have been replaced by an instantly globally recognizable iconic arch, images of which adorn a myriad of publicity materials, directional signs on the approaches to the stadium, and the cover of the semi-official publication *Wembley Stadium: National Icon* (Barclay and Powell 2007).

This two-way process whereby deliberately typical iconic architecture and enhanced consumerism of sports stadia feed into one another is also evident in the case of museums. Andy Warhol is reputed to have said (if he did it was a remarkable prediction): 'All department stores will become museums, and all museums will become department stores'—without a source I can find, but widely quoted, for example, in Jencks (2005: 44ff.; see also Carbonell 2004). Frank Lloyd Wright appears to have had the same thought. In a letter about the new director of the Guggenheim (dated 10 April 1954) to Harry Guggenheim (nephew of Solomon, the original benefactor, who died in 1949), Wright observed, 'Sweeney wants to run a museum-business' (Pfeiffer 1986: 201; Levine 1996: 340ff.).[25] Like department stores and shopping malls, all major new museums around the world have been proclaimed architectural icons by their patrons, sometimes by their architects, if not always by the critics or the public. Their images and logos have been mobilized in the service of consumerism, providing more evidence for the social production of architectural icons and starchitects.

The role of new museums for urban growth coalitions in globalizing cities can hardly be overstated. Vittorio Lampugnani and Angeli Sachs

(1999) show that architecturally distinguished museums designed by world-famous architects are to be found not only in the obviously global cities but in many other secondary cities, for example, in Nimes (Fosters), Graz (Cook and Fournier), Hamburg (Ungers), Karlsruhe (Koolhaas), Monterrey (Legorreta), Milwaukee (Calatrava), Cincinnati (Hadid), all aspiring globalizing cities in my terms. The first iconic museum of the global era was Frank Lloyd Wright's Guggenheim in New York, opened in 1959 a few months after the death of the architect, and 40 years later Frank Gehry's Guggenheim Bilbao became even more iconic on the global stage. Of the reasons commonly given to explain why some museums become iconic for the public, most of them connect directly with consumerism. By this I mean that they promote the idea of museums as consumerist spaces and that part of the aesthetic experience of visiting museums involves buying stuff. The two Guggenheims and many other successful museums have unusual sculptural qualities: people visit them to see the museums themselves, as much as and sometimes rather more than the art inside. Again, Frank Lloyd Wright proved prescient when he rebutted complaints from 21 'avant-garde artists' that their paintings could not be hung properly on the spiralling walls. Wright retorted that people would come to see his building rather than their art (Twombly 1979: 352). Museums like all cultural institutions have become much more commercialized in the global era. Most new museums today have larger shops and a greater variety of art and architecture-related merchandise, and spaces for refreshment than previously (Zukin 1995). 'Fifty years ago no museum was considered to be a business in the commercial sense, and the notion that museum directors and curators should possess management skills would have been considered absurd' (Hudson 2004: 86). Nowadays, a ubiquitous feature of the remodelling of old and the building of new museums is the addition of substantial areas of consumerist space, leading one researcher to observe: 'Remarkably, the key performance indicator of retail sales per square foot is higher in MoMA's museum stores than in Walmart' (Evans 2003: 431; see also Duncan and Wallach 1978). The Louvre was given a new lease of life with one of the most successful of the *grands projets* in Paris, the almost immediately iconic pyramids of I. M. Pei (figure 7.5), highly consumerist spaces which stimulated a bout of Louvre franchising at home (Lens) and abroad (Dubai).

Similarly, consumerist refurbishment of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London led to the jibe (or maybe it was an advertising slogan): 'a great café with a museum attached' and this sentiment has been repeated, notably

Figure 7.5. Inside the Louvre Pyramid, smile and shop with Mona Lisa.

for the remodelled MoMA in New York (Evans 2003: 434). Museums often become endowed with iconicity when they can be seen to regenerate run-down areas; crudely this means that they seek to upgrade real estate, shopping, and entertainment potential.[26] In his full-frontal attack on iconic architecture, Miles Glendinning (2010) identifies what he calls the 'Evil Empire' of modernist architecture (ironically branded McMoMo™) closely associated with the building of cultural complexes for city-boosterism, for which he blames public institutions rather than capitalism. However, it is the alliance between the two under the aegis of the TCC that better explains the Guggenheim in Bilbao, and new museums in many other cities. These include Amsterdam's Museumplein and Berlin's Museuminsel (van Aalst and Boogarts 2002), and Museum Miles and their equivalents in New York, Vienna, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Frankfurt, and all over Asia where the building of private museums is booming, especially in China, where over 3,500 have been built since 1978.[27] In London, the so-called Tate Modern effect helps to explain how the conversion of a disused power station has transformed a grimy area south of the Thames. By connecting the Tate Modern via the new Millennium Bridge with St Paul's Cathedral on the north side of the river a new urban pole of attraction was created. One of my most vivid architectural memories is of the public opening of the Tate Modern in London in 2000, joining the crowds crossing the new bridge from St Paul's, bumping into friends, and watching the mass of excited visitors flooding into the vast Turbine Hall to be greeted by Louise Bourgeois spider sculptures—truly iconic moments in truly iconic spaces—but for a more critical analysis, see Davidts (2007).[28]

In all of these cases the iconic museum is intended to stand not in isolation but as part of an urban renewal plan. For example, the Beijing-based and internationally renowned firm MAD Architects (winners of the National Museum of China Competition) boldly proclaimed in their project proposal that design was intended to produce 'a city-sized museum where the public space is the greatest good. . . . something iconic on an unrealistic and inhuman city scale ' (reported in *ArchDaily* 4 October 2012).[29]

A cautionary tale is that of the Barnes Collection. In the 1920s, Dr Albert Barnes, who had made his fortune in pharmaceuticals and had astutely been buying contemporary European art for some years, engaged a local architect to design a home for himself and his unique private art collection in a Philadelphia suburb. The collection contained 181 Renoirs, 69 Cézannes, and 59 Matisses, along with works by Manet, Degas, Seurat, Titian, and Picasso together with an eclectic mix of African sculpture, Pennsylvania Dutch folk art, and antique Chinese paintings. Barnes stipulated that after his death no changes were to be permitted to the collection, its content, or location. His intentions were clearly pedagogical, with limited but free public access and special encouragement for students. Each weekday, the workers in his factory were given two hours of instruction in art appreciation and great books. The philosopher John Dewey was the first director of the Foundation. Barnes died in 1951, leaving oversight of his Foundation to Lincoln College, the oldest African-American university in the United States. To cut a long and highly controversial story short, ambiguities in the Foundation's charter and in Lincoln's legal position, combined with increasing need for further funding to maintain the collection, and local unrest over public access, led to a campaign for relocation of the collection to a new building in the Museum District of Philadelphia. After a bitter battle involving local, national, and international art communities the campaign achieved a successful court ruling in 2004. The new building was designed by Williams & Tsien, marketed as a 'gallery in a garden, a garden in a gallery' (referencing the original location), and opened in 2012. The $150 million campaign to move the collection was financed by an urban growth coalition comprising globalizing organs of local and state governments and major charitable foundations with substantial corporate input. A highly critical and revealing documentary film on the Barnes was released in 2009 under the unambiguous title *The Art of the Steal*.[30]

The marketing of the new Barnes Collection is typical of consumerist cultural institutions, if somewhat more cynical than usual. The website sums it up: 'The scheme is the physical manifestation of the teachings of the man who collected the works, Albert C. Barnes. Complete your visit to The Barnes Foundation with a stay in one of Philadelphia's incredible hotels. . . . The Barnes Foundation Hotel Package includes untimed tickets to The Barnes Foundation, audio guides, discounts and more. To discover participating hotels, additional offers and book your stay, click here.'[31] That the new Barnes Foundation had global ambitions for their project is clear from the fact that a team from Philadelphia met with tour operators and the international media in Paris and London to promote the collection. The team included the CEO of Philadelphia Convention & Visitors Bureau, the PR executive of the Barnes Foundation, and the communications director of Philadelphia Museum of Art, which, naturally, had a synergetic interest in the success of the Barnes. While all of these members of the urban growth coalition claim that the change of location and philosophy of the collection adheres to the pedagogical spirit of Barnes himself, there is room for doubt (Hudson 2011). Where there is no doubt is that the new Barnes is a highly consumerist space, entirely against the spirit of the original.

Another case of the attempt to leverage iconic architecture in an inappropriate setting is recounted in a penetrating case study of post-Katrina New Orleans. 'In its attempt to transform, post hurricane, itself into "Hollywood South", the city turned to a "starchitect" [recent Pritzker prizewinner Thom Mayne of Morphosis] to fashion an architectural icon of international calibre [a Jazz Center], completely divorced from the context and history of the city's urban landscape' [i.e., creole urbanism] (Holliday 2009: 280). The idea of the Jazz Center originated with John Portman and the CEO of Strategic Hotels, at that time the owner of the local Hyatt and the Super Dome, who funded the masterplan.

As discussed in chapter 1, Bentmann and Müller (1992) argued that the rise of the Palladian villa as a building type in 16th-century Venice can best be analyzed as a form of hegemonic architecture, that is, architecture that serves class interests. In this chapter, I have tried to show that most iconic architecture of the global era is also best analyzed as a form of hegemonic architecture, serving the interests of the TCC through the creation of highly consumerist space. Just as one can appreciate the aesthetic qualities of the best Palladian villas while deploring the socio-economic system that nurtured them and that they promoted ideologically, one can also appreciate the Sydney Opera House or the Guggenheims in New York and Bilbao as splendid works of architecture while questioning the consumerist and corporate interests they serve and the motives of those who own and control them. The icon-bedecked message on an advertising hoarding in Shanghai Pudong airport, 'save money have fun' illustrates the democratic rhetoric so vital for the success of consumerism and the Icon Project (figure 7.6).

Perhaps cut-price mass tourism is too obvious a target to engage the critique of iconic architecture in the service of capitalist consumerism. The challenging idea of Goss that malls should become a third public space, after home and work/school, seems more apt. Malls could become places

Figure 7.6. Mobilising iconic architecture; 'Save money have fun'.

not only to buy and sell but places with other functions, for example, providing for the educational, cultural, health, and child care needs of the community. Some malls do offer some of these facilities in relatively safe environments, but most are understandably reluctant to provide anything for non-shoppers and other types of deviants. Lynn Staeheli and Don Mitchell (2006) have revisited these issues in terms of the useful distinction between community and public. In their study of the Carousel Center Mall and plans for its enormous Disneyesque Destiny USA complex in Syracuse, New York,[32] they remind us that malls, in North America at least, have been sites of struggle over free speech, public access, and social services for decades. However, malls generally cater for specific communities, principally of consumers, and their design and regulations are often biased in terms of class, age, ethnicity, and politics. Parallel to the argument that a major spatial effect of capitalist globalization is to squeeze out non-consumerist space and replace it with consumerist space, radical critics of malls argue that they squeeze out publics, replacing them with consumers. The hegemonic effect of the architectures of malls, which frequently become endowed with local iconicity, is to create a disposition to see these buildings as integral to the pleasures of consumption. They are usually characterized by glass and shiny metal to encourage happy and colourful thoughts of transparency, openness, and light. This point is not exclusive to privately developed malls but is also forcibly made in a study of state-inspired buildings, or rather buildings inspired by an unlikely recruit to the political fraction of the TCC. In her study of the *grands projets* of President Mitterand, Fierro (2003: xii) observes, 'For Mitterand, primary elemental forms lined in refined details of glass and steel symbolized the most grandiose aspects of the French leftist [and, I would add, not exclusively leftist] state' (see also Barnstone 2005). In this process, the costs of the Icon Project, in terms of stress, ecological damage, debt, substance abuse, and class polarization, are conveniently hidden. The next section attempts to analyze some of these costs.

Displacement

There is an explicit connection between the idea of capitalism as creative destruction and the architectural consequences of consumerism. 'Dams, roads, ports, urban developments, pipelines and petrochemical plants, mines and vast industrial plantations both reflect and instantiate the larger social projects of colonialism, development, and globalization. . . . Mega-projects are spatially situated and inherently displacing' (Gellert and Lynch 2003: 15; see also Lees et al. 2016). Displacing both nature and people, consumerist urban design in general and urban megaprojects in particular succeed to the extent that they can turn the displacement they produce into an externality, a cost that has to be borne by the public purse, mostly paid for by the workers, for an often specious wider public good.[33] Paul Gellert and Barbara Lynch argue that we should be asking how displacement is produced and who produces it before we tackle the question of how to reduce its ill effects. They conclude that mega-projects tend to be 'creative' for the rich who control states and communities. Those outside the biogeophysical landscape of displacement tend to win, while those inside tend to lose,[34] though new economic spaces and opportunities are also created. The rich can be very innovative in creating enclaves that shield them and their families from the worst effects of UMPs and in propagating consumerism on which new forms of global urbanity rest. Unique icons, most of which seem to win over the hearts and minds of initially sceptical publics, are powerful tools in transmitting the consumerist values and practices that sustain capitalist globalization and the Icon Project. Resistance to these values is often aimed directly at the icons, a point made forcibly by the Chinese sculptor Zhang Huan which shows a donkey (symbolising the proletariat) penetrating the Jin Mao tower (figure 7.7).[35]

Olympic Games and World Cups, world fairs, and large-scale exhibitions raise special issues of displacement, particularly with regard to infrastructure and transportation. For example, new highways and public transportation systems, upgrading of electronic communications, and improved signage in English make non-anglophone cities more international-tourist-friendly, loading expenses onto hosts. There is ongoing controversy over the use to which actual buildings and spaces (especially sports facilities) are put after the event. Olympic legacies are mixed, with general agreement that sites in Barcelona and Sydney were successfully integrated into urban regeneration, but the outcomes in Montreal and Athens, for example, were generally deemed to be failures. The maintenance costs of the Olympic Stadium in Beijing have been estimated at around $15 million a year, but so far it seems unlikely that it will ever earn that much. This issue has been passionately debated over World Cups in South Africa in 2010 and Brazil in 2014, and the London Olympics in 2012, with mixed results. Urban growth

Figure 7.7. Zhang Huan 'Donkey', Mixed Media. (© Zhang Huan, 2005. Image courtesy of the Saatchi Gallery, London)

coalitions always highlight the positives, for example, substantial job creation, improvements to local infrastructure and services, and some genuine green building and development policy.[36]

Iconic buildings are an important part of the legacy of mega-events. In Beijing, Olympic Green (where the Bird's Nest and Water Cube are located) is being turned into a commercial and cultural zone, with underground shopping malls. A property developer linked to local government is leading the exploitation of this site, hoping to attract more business to the under-used Olympic stadium, another indication of capitalist-consumerist globalization, as if another was needed in this city. From further afield, the New York Regional Plan Association argued that the Atlantic Yards project was ideal for mixed-use redevelopment of an old railway site. Through its 'Manhattanization' effect 'it can and should be a process that successfully integrates large iconic buildings with their surroundings and provides benefits that compensate for the increased congestion, noise and visual impacts that accompany these projects' (quoted in Fainstein 2008: 773–4). Fainstein's conclusion is that to succeed such projects need vast public subsidies for infrastructure. Moreover, luxury homes and hotels, big office towers, and shopping malls are likely to displace affordable housing not only in the United States but also in Europe and China. Atlantic Yards (rebranded as Pacific Park) is well on the way to gentrifying a community, bringing upmarket consumerism across the water from Manhattan, with predictable results for the poor. However, Miles (2005) argues that architectural icons worked well for the NewcastleGateshead project in the north of England. This level of democratic optimism is unusual. More common are dystopian conclusions (e.g., Merrifield 2000; Hatherley 2010).

All over the world, the four fractions of the TCC in various combinations are turning cities into landscapes of consumerism adorned with iconic buildings at various scales and little thought of the consequences for those displaced. Nevertheless, some of these buildings are remarkable architectural icons and many could be mobilized to serve other, nobler, and more genuinely pleasurable ends than they do at present. For this to be possible we would need to move beyond capitalist globalization and release what may be termed the emancipatory potential of generic globalization (Sklair 2009a). My final chapter argues that some green shoots of transformation suggest that a non-capitalist future may be a realistic and sustainable long-term goal as capitalist globalization lurches from one crisis to the next. The Icon Project in architecture and urban design (and in other spheres) is powerful, but not all-powerful.

8

Architecture, Cities, and Alternative Globalizations

> 'It is easier to imagine the end of the world, than to imagine the end of capitalism.'[1]

Most architects and urban designers would work as creatively to provide a built environment fit for an alternative globalization as they currently do for the system of capitalist globalization. But questions about the role that architecture might play in creating alternative non-capitalist and non-consumerist forms of human settlements are of limited use without a larger vision of what alternatives are possible. If these large transformations are not possible within the framework of capitalist globalization, as I believe, then a new political project for change is necessary. While it is absurd to expect architects and urbanists to design their (and our) way out of capitalism and its many dysfunctions and contradictions, the emancipatory potential of successful, radical, non-capitalist examples should never be underestimated. I mean non-capitalist rather than post-capitalist, which implies that elements of capitalism linger on and, in my view, inevitably subvert progressive changes. This is obviously a very long-term project. In itself, this is not exclusively an architectural or design issue, but it does have architectural and design implications. As Oscar Niemeyer said in 1980: 'I see now that a social architecture without a socialist base leads to nothing—that you can't create a class-free oasis in a capitalist society, and that to try ends up being, as Engels said, a paternalistic pose that pretends to be revolutionary' (quoted in Holston 1989: 93).

There are many imaginative schemes to pedestrianize cities, to discourage the use of private cars, to deal with the lack of affordable decent housing in rich as well as poor countries. However, as long as the transnational capitalist class provides the framework for these initiatives they will always remain marginal. While acknowledging the power of the 'just city' literature (notably, Fainstein 2010; Harvey 2012; Sandercock 1997), I argue that challenging capitalism on its own ground is futile and that a radical disengagement with capitalist globalization offers the best prospect of escaping from the destructive consequences of class polarization and ecological unsustainability. Replacing the culture-ideology of consumerism that condemns us to fatalism with a culture-ideology of human rights that inspires optimism is an essential first step, and this entails a radical change in mentalities globally.

Some architects and urban designers are already asking questions about the roles they might play in creating alternative non-capitalist and non-consumerist forms of globalization. The problem is that in most cases those who own and control villages, towns, and cities and the major institutions smile, nod their heads, and generally succeed in undermining the progressive ideals of the creative artists they employ. Those who pay for unique iconic buildings are always looking for something different to enhance the consumerist space and display of power they crave, and this certainly provides plenty of opportunities for aesthetic and structural experimentation. Nevertheless, the bottom line is largely dictated by commercial interests. In a world dominated by capitalist globalization and framed by consumerism, the architect either plays this game or has to be content to work on the fringes (which some, even Pritzker Prize winners, happily do). When the transition from a capitalist society begins in earnest, there will be architects and urban designers ready and willing to take up the challenges of building for communities in ways that address class polarization and ecological unsustainability.

In the recently not quite so fanciful event that voters start to reject capitalist globalization, speculating about non-capitalist society presents daunting challenges. In order to open up a discussion of these issues, I propose a framework that sets up two models of city life, conceptualized as the consumerist/oppressive city of global capitalism and its non-capitalist antithesis, the functional/emancipatory city.[2] The consumerist/oppressive city combines the idea of consumerism with the vision of the city that offers unlimited opportunities. However, for most people the city quickly becomes a series of more or less oppressive spaces, threatening everyone some of the time. Whereas capitalist globalization produces consumerist/oppressive cities where formal and informal controls split those who have too much from those who have just about enough and those who have too little, progressive architecture and planning in a non-capitalist future would produce functional/emancipatory cities combining efficiency with structures for encouraging the full flowering of human potential and provision for all to have enough, sustainably.

The first step in this transformation is to deny the hegemonic coupling of consumerism and emancipation on which the attraction of contemporary urban life rests. Urbanists, novelists, dramatists, artists, and romantics in great numbers have long bemoaned the dark side of urban life. Despite stereotypes of dangerous, wrecked inner-cities and the numbing little boxes of the suburbs, ordinary people in ever-increasing numbers nevertheless flocked from surrounding areas and distant places to the cities in a veritable torrent of urbanization that shows no signs of abating in the 21st century.[3] The orthodox narrative of why this is so is inextricably bound up with the supposed lack of opportunities for constructing the good life in the countryside and the supposed plethora of opportunities for constructing a good or at least a better life in the city. It is fruitful to locate this within the framework of consumerism that began to emerge after the industrial revolution in the West and all over the world in the second half of the 20th century, the start of the era of capitalist globalization. We must not confuse oppressive consumerism with the noble aspiration that societies should strive collectively to ensure a decent level of consumption of goods and services for all. Consumerism, an addiction to more and more possessions and to constantly new experiences, becomes oppressive as it inevitably exacerbates class polarization and ecological unsustainability. Markers of urban class polarization are widening gaps in residential, educational, and occupational segregation between the richest and the poorest, with groups in the middle experiencing ever-higher levels of economic and spatial insecurity. Markers of the drift to ecological unsustainability in the city are inexorable rises in carbon emissions from large stocks of energy-inefficient housing, factories, public buildings, infrastructure, shops, leisure facilities, vehicles, and air travel. Where technological advances reduce unit emissions, the total quantity of emissions tends to increase.[4] All of these markers are implicated with consumerism, cultural processes created, manipulated, and reinforced by the ideology of never-endingly expanding capitalist globalization. Even in times like these (post-2008), when capitalism itself is in crisis again, the solutions on offer are to borrow more, spend more, consume more, and no serious alternative to a political economy based on unlimited growth is contemplated in the official discourse or the mass media. The big, expanding city is the ideal place for such a system to take hold, the ideal setting for the TCC to promote consumerism and the Icon Project. Architecture and urban design provide the scripted spaces within which this happens. Under capitalism, whether those who run the city use the formal regulation of the planning regime or the informal control of scripted spaces or both, the end point is the same: making the city safe and profitable for capitalist globalization, turning the city into a network of consumerist/oppressive spaces. The Icon Project puts the architectural gloss on the consumerist/oppressive city.

What, then, of the functional/emancipatory city? By functional I mean (admittedly a little idiosyncratically) the opposite of consumerist in the sense that the functional city is one that brings communities together in an efficient manner rather than splits them apart as consumerism does. In the four key areas of shopping, transportation, housing, and food the reality in cities all over the world ranges from consumerist to ultra-consumerist. At the extreme, shops are everywhere, open all the time, inciting people to spend at every turn for the alleged convenience of all (except for those who have to work in, service, or live beside the shops); private cars monopolize space, causing traffic congestion and pollution almost everywhere and squeezing the life out of public transport in most cities. Housing is allocated according to market forces, with scant regard for need or for the social good; and most food and drink is processed and transported over long distances (food miles) rather than locally sourced where possible. In the functional city, certainly in any transitional period from the present of capitalist globalization to a non-capitalist future, democratically elected and accountable representatives will be focused on providing an efficient environment within which all citizens can live comfortably, safely, and with dignity. People will shop less because the satisfaction of their basic needs will be easier for them to organize as consumerism and addiction to constant novelty wither; public transport will be free and ubiquitous, most private transport will be seen as pointless; decent housing will be available for those who need it; and the assumption will be that food is local first, brought in where necessary. All this, of course, sounds hopelessly utopian and would have dramatic consequences for those whose precarious livelihoods depend on transnational trade and the privatization of everything. Third World producers mortgaged to supplying a few basic commodities to First World markets, with most of the profits siphoned out of their communities, would suffer. But if, as I believe, the present system of capitalist globalization is unsustainable economically, politically, and ecologically in the long run, these difficulties should not stop us from thinking about the non-capitalist future and mitigating their ill-effects. When everyone starts to understand that 'standard of living' is not the same as 'quality of life', then resources will be freed up to enhance the life chances of poorer people. This implies a radical challenge to the dogma of growth, exemplified in the new idea of convivial degrowth (D'Alisa et al. 2014). The environmental encyclical issued by Pope Francis in 2015 echoes many of these arguments about the destructive effects of consumerism and 'the market' but is silent about capitalism per se.[5]

The prospects that such a functional city, organized for efficiency and social need and not largely to satisfy the demands of the so-called free market, locally and globally, would actually be less oppressive than the consumerist city cannot be taken for granted. In an instructive critical review, Anthony Alofsin (1989) compares two competing early-20th-century visions: Frank Lloyd Wright's Broadacre City and Le Corbusier's Radiant City, both providing some clues as to the challenges of what I mean by the functional/emancipatory city. They differ, however, in their conceptions of the ideal urban plan. Wright envisaged a highly decentralized pattern of settlement, while Le Corbusier envisaged a highly centralized city. Broadacre City was a four-square-mile settlement for 1,400 families. Its main elements were farms correlated with systems of production and sale, non-polluting factories, decentralized schools, monorails, controlled traffic systems, warehouses built into highway structures, and cost-saving prefabricated houses. The prevailing ethic was small is good, and the organizing principles were that each person was entitled to one acre for productive use, and each adult at least one car, based on the traditional system of American land division of about 2.2 families per acre. Le Corbusier's plan was very different in some senses but not so different in others. The Radiant City would be centralized; its core unit would be skyscrapers, very big for commercial life and not so big for residential use. However, like Wright, Le Corbusier saw the need for green space in the city, and planners inspired by his vision sought to create towers in the park, without much success. And, again like Wright, he uncritically accepted that the 20th century would be a century of the private automobile, and tried to design the urban fabric around this unchallenged destructive assumption.

In the context of the functional/emancipatory city there are three main lessons to be learned. First, cities where easy access to good, affordable housing, greenery, and safe open space are allocated by the market are doomed to failure for all but the lucky few in most countries. Second, the tyranny of the private car must be challenged. In the functional/emancipatory city private car use will gradually decline as the public good achieves clear priority over individual convenience, both redefined to address the dysfunctions of class polarization and ecological unsustainability. And third, centralization and decentralization, high rise, medium rise, low rise will all have a place in better cities of the future, but only where energy-efficient housing and public buildings are properly integrated with workplace, education, nutrition, health, and other vital services, and allocated not by the market but by democratic decision-making made practical in popular control of city life.[6] We need to wake up to the possibility that this is not possible under the conditions of capitalist globalization. We also need to wake up to the fact that whatever they might say in public, the leading agents in the TCC are unlikely to abolish their own system and its privileges. If something as obvious as curbs on bonuses for bankers and others in the corporate world can be successfully resisted, despite revelations of their incompetence and/or malpractices, they are not going to concede to more fundamental demands. As I have argued, the system of capitalist globalization in its various forms (ranging from North Atlantic capitalisms, through Russian and Chinese state capitalisms, to postcolonialist capitalisms, and so on) has become too powerful and systems of democracy too weak to effect major change through the ballot box in the immediate future. Violent resistance is a dangerous fantasy that only breeds more violence. However, consumerism depends on consumers and we cannot be forced to drink fizzy drinks, eat junk food, or shop till we drop. Everyone has the capacity to disengage from the system, and many of us do to some extent. The literature on urban planning is useful as much for what it tells us about what to avoid as for what it suggests could work in the circumstances of the 21st century, but this should not exclude utopian thinking, as John Friedmann (2011: ch. 8) so eloquently argues.

The functional/emancipatory city implies profound change at the economic, political, and culture-ideology levels. Carolyn Steel (2009) provides an instructive example in her book *Hungry City*. While her argument is not explicitly anti-capitalist, its implications leave little room for doubt that what it leads to would require a different socio-economic system out of which different types of cities and other forms of human settlement would emerge. These would be more like functional/emancipatory cities than the consumerist/oppressive cities of our world today. Her case study of how the population of Cuba coped with the sudden absence of most of its food supply when the Soviet Union collapsed demonstrates two truths. First, change on such a scale is not easy, and second, change may be possible if it comes from a willing and determined population. Barring catastrophe, it is unlikely that the contemporary system of industrial food production and processing, shown by many experts as ecologically and nutritionally unsustainable in the long run, will suddenly collapse. A system that creates both malnutrition on a huge scale and a crisis of obesity cannot be considered efficient or humane. However, if present small trends to avoid junk food were to spread to consumer boycotts of unhealthy processed food and drink (especially for children) and accelerate, and if some toxic companies collapsed, two consequences would surely follow. First, more people would start to realize that they could take some measure of what they eat and drink into their own hands, and they might begin to believe that a new world is possible. Second, the market would respond as it already has to the demand for organic food, reduced sugar, salt, and transfat in processing and so on from those who can afford to pay a premium to eat more healthily. Movements like Via Campesina and Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) show that while many progressive schemes more or less reproduce capitalist social relations on a small scale, some do not. The idea of producer-consumer cooperatives appears to have taken some root in CSA projects around the world, and if it can work successfully for something as basic as food, surely it can work more broadly over social life.[7] Within the confines of capitalist globalization such initiatives are bound to be marginal, but this is where the power of the successful alternative begins to create conditions for real change over time, what Chomsky (1985) calls the 'threat of a good example', Sandercock (1997) 'a thousand tiny empowerments', and Harvey (2000) 'spaces of hope'. One outcome may be a new society of democratic socialist globalization. As far as I can see, the principle of producer-consumer cooperatives (PCCs) appears to be the best option, the only genuine alternative to capitalist globalization and the intensification of its crises of class polarization and ecological unsustainability (Sklair 2009a). Consumer cooperatives are fine, but it is only through producer cooperatives, particularly in terms of communities taking responsibility to produce their own food, that humanity will be able to reconnect with nature in a sustainable fashion, turning the Anthropocene era from a death sentence into a life-enhancing opportunity.

It is important to locate the sources of change in this direction in our present reality as well as in some utopian future. Our present reality is capitalist globalization and, as will be recalled from the argument at the beginning of this book, we can usefully distinguish generic, capitalist, and alternative forms of globalization, though most writers on the topic see only the capitalist form. The concept of generic globalization focuses on the emancipatory potential of the electronic revolution, postcolonialisms, the creation of transnational social spaces, and new forms of cosmopolitanism. Capitalist globalization undermines the emancipatory potential of each of these in the interests of the TCC and the system of capitalist globalization. How, then, could PCCs be organized to release the emancipatory potential of generic globalization in a non-capitalist world? The simple and encouraging answer is that they would work, in the early stages of transformation at least, much as millions of small-scale cooperative groups work at present in enclaves all over the world. Rob Harrison (2013) brings together many useful contributions to the debate around the prospects for co-operatives in a capitalist society, but despite many interesting practical ideas, only one contributor, Chris Tomlinson (ch. 14 on 'The False Alternative of Co-operative Choice under Capitalism'), gets to grips with the issue of disengagement from the capitalist system. While not explicitly anti-capitalist, the global transition movement for a zero-carbon future (see http://www.transition.freepress.org) is another indication of what needs to be done. The viability of such projects rests on many untested assumptions. The first assumption is that those who at present do the essential day-to-day work that sustains our civilization would continue to do their jobs in a PCC in preference to capitalist businesses or public sector institutions run like capitalist businesses, big and small. A simple example might be the Internet in a non-capitalist world. This would involve a multitude of like-minded people in PCCs communicating across the globe with each other for the common good. What would they eat? How would they learn? What would they do for healthcare? Who would provide the power to run the computers? How would they be safe? Again, this would depend on a multitude of people who now work in the private/public sectors, directly or indirectly, establishing producer-consumer cooperatives in their local communities, producing food, organizing transport, setting up schools and colleges, providing healthcare, running power systems, and so on. The Internet already makes it possible to communicate fairly easily with anyone, anywhere, who is connected. PCCs already do this all over the world on a small scale, but such initiatives struggle within capitalist markets. Neoliberal ideologues argue that there is no alternative to capitalist globalization. If we refuse to believe them and start creating alternatives and these alternatives prove to be successful in their own terms, then the logic of the market can be refuted, undermined, or simply ignored. It is less easy to work out how to escape from the hierarchic state, but eventually that may be necessary too.[8]

As I write this, I can see the smiles of those who would like to believe it but find it unbelievable. One hundred years ago suggestions that human organs could be successfully transplanted, that we would be able to witness events unfolding live in any part of the world, that we could walk on the moon, that intercontinental travel could be achieved within hours and visual communication almost instantaneously, would also have been dismissed as unbelievable. As the rallying call of the World Social Forum has it: 'Another world is possible' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Social_Forum).

There are several large issues raised if the capitalist corporation is to be replaced by anything like networks of PCCs. First is the perennial problem of so-called 'human nature'. This, like so many other class-driven human inventions, is deeply ideological. Acquisitive-competitive theories of human nature are as simplistic as the view that babies are born *tabula rasa*, blank sheets to be imprinted with received human values and behaviours. Babies are obviously born with a wide range of potentialities and people act on a variety of motivations and incentives. Early parenting plays a vital role in shaping these potentialities. In her book *The Selfish Society*, Sue Gerhardt analyzes the impact of early parenting on brain development itself. Secure early attachments provide effective protection against stress and ensure that children develop balanced stress response, a capacity for resilience. Responsive parenting also activates and strengthens neural pathways in those 'social' parts of the brain which play an important part in emotional self-control and empathy for others. 'The social brain—a brain that develops, through the right kind of care in infancy, the social and emotional skills that make a person sensitive to others—is not just the responsibility of individual parents, however. Whole cultures, as well as families, can assist or undermine the development of a more empathic social brain' (Gerhardt 2010: 116). So large numbers of people will need to want to change and be prepared to change their parenting practices to embed transformations in whole communities and cultures.

As the structures on which capitalism rests shrink, notably our current system of money and all the financial institutions associated with it, older systems of exchange such as barter could be reborn and creatively reconfigured, as is already happening with local currencies. Of course, it is difficult to see how such transformations could work beyond the level of a small community, but let us not forget that we live in a digital world where many things that seemed impossible a few years ago are commonplace today. If we can control our domestic appliances remotely, and programme driverless vehicles, then surely the expertise that goes into such consumerist innovations can be redirected towards the solution of technical problems for the new society. What could architects and those who design our cities and communities contribute to such a society? The electronic revolution provides simultaneously the most powerful tools of capitalist exploitation and the means of changing the system. Architects and urbanists with computers already have the capacity to create sustainable, affordable, and decent dwellings and public service buildings for all, even now to 'print' them via 3-D printers. It is the capitalist market, not lack of design talent, that prevents them from being readily available and affordable for all.[9] It is likely that there are many in and around architecture who would welcome the opportunities that radical change would provide.[10]

The electronic revolution would also facilitate a more egalitarian form of critical postcolonialism in the long march to eradicate racism, Orientalism, sexism, and related forms of prejudice and discrimination. Again, this is a project of many generations, a project that begins with damaged parents and communities acquiring the insights and incentives to nurture children through new forms of upbringing and schooling. New generations will be less damaged, these children in their turn nurturing their own children to be a little less damaged, and on and on. The design of communities all the way from small settlements to large cities could play an important part in this process. Transformations in housing, transport, nutrition, health, and other necessities of a decent life would free up space for everything that the capitalist market squeezes out or whose pleasures it compromises. The culture-ideology of consumerism and the Icon Project have socialized populations all over the world to crave certain built environments, unique and typical iconic buildings that focus on consumerism. Better, more love-based parenting could help people to strive for other life goals and places to achieve them.

The last two characteristics of generic globalization, as I conceive it, are the creation of transnational social spaces and new forms of cosmopolitanism. The most recognizable transnational social spaces of capitalist globalization, documented in the previous chapters, are the shopping malls, mixed use developments, museums, performance spaces, and celebrity infrastructure that have sprung up in and around cities all over the world. The challenge for architects and urban designers in the new society will be to create spaces that will meet the needs of all the communities in the new society. New forms of cosmopolitanism will be required to connect the cultural specificities of different groups of people with the vision of a common humanity. Architecture, like all other art forms, already tries to do this through unique architectural icons. Most are big and spectacular, a few are not, and the new society would ideally have room for both. The difference would be that decisions about what to build and where would not be the sole preserve of big government or big corporations or the very rich, as at present. Architects working in their own PCC would be able to express their talents in new ways that reflect the aspirations of the communities in which they, their families, and those they choose to work with live.

All this, admittedly, must sound like pure fantasy to those presently struggling for existence or enjoying themselves in the cities of today. My purpose is to encourage those who believe that all is not well with the life of capitalist globalization, that the long and arduous journey from what I have called the consumerist/oppressive city to the functional/emancipatory city and other forms of human settlement is, at least, worth thinking about and embarking upon. Even the longest journey starts with a few short steps. The point is to keep going forward. Architects and urban designers will surely work to enhance our built environment on the way. All types of architecture, including reimagined iconic buildings, would find a place in the new global society.

Appendix

Interview Codes

In order to protect anonymity I code the interviewees by location and by role: CA [California, 20 interviews], NY [New York, 22], MA [Massachusetts, 15], US [other United States, 4], UK [4], CH [China, 3], HK [Hong Kong, 3], HL [Holland, 4], 75 interviews in total. A small number of interviews took place before and after 2004, as indicated. Architect indicates full-time architect; Professor indicates full-time teacher/researcher in architecture or related university department (mostly Urbanists); Architect, Professor (of Architecture unless otherwise denoted) and vice versa indicates principal activity; signature indicates appearance in table 2.4; professional indicates non-design role, and gatekeeper indicates leading position on a journal or a body that promotes architecture.

CALIFORNIA

[CA1] Architect, Professor, [CA2] Architect, [CA3] Architect, Professor, [CA4] Architect, Professional, [CA5] Professor, [CA6] Engineer, Signature, [CA7] Professional, iconic building, [CA8] Architect, [CA9] Professor, Gatekeeper, [CA10] Professor, Urbanist, [CA11] Professor, [CA12] Signature Architect, Professor, [CA13] Signature Architect, Professor, [CA14] Professor, [CA15] Professor, Architect, [CA16] Architectural photographer, [CA17] Owners of iconic house, [CA18] Architect, Professor, [CA19] Curator of Architecture, [CA20] Professional.

MASSACHUSETTS

[MA1] Architect, Professor, [MA2] Architect, Professor, [MA3] Professor, Urbanist, [MA4] Professor, Urbanist, [MA5] Architect, Professor, [MA6] Professor, historian, [MA7] Professor, Architect, Gatekeeper, [MA8] Professor, Gatekeeper, [MA9] Professor, Gatekeeper, [MA10] PhD candidate, History, [MA11] M.Arch candidate, [MA12] Architect, Professor, [MA13] PhD candidate, Architect, [MA14] Architect, Professor, [MA15] Professor, Urbanist.

NEW YORK

[NY1] Professor, Gatekeeper, [NY2] Professor, Urbanist, [NY3] Architect, [NY4] Professor, Urbanist, [NY5] Professor, Urbanist, [NY6] Professor, Urbanist, [NY7] Professor, Urbanist, [NY8] Professor, Urbanist, [NY9] Professor, Urbanist, [NY10] Professor, [NY11] Professor, Urbanist, [NY12] Professor, Urbanist, [NY13] Professor, Gatekeeper, [NY14] Professor, [NY15] Professor, Urbanist, [NY16] Architect, Professor, [NY17] Professor, Urbanist, [NY18] Professor, [NY19] Professor, Urbanist, [NY20] Professor, Urbanist, [NY21] Professor, Urbanist, [NY22] Professional.

OTHER UNITED STATES

[US1] Professional, [US2] Professional, [US3] Professional, [US4] Professional.

UNITED KINGDOM

[UK1] Architect, [UK2] Architect, Urbanist, [UK3] Former architect, [UK4] Retired architect (2014).

HONG KONG

[HK1] Architect (2002), [HK2] Professor, Architect (2002), [HK3] Architect (2014).

CHINA

[CH1] Architect, Urbanist (2002), [CH2] Architect (2014), [CH3] Architect, Professor (2014).

HOLLAND

[HL1] Professional, Gatekeeper, [HL2] Professional, Curator, [HL3] Professional, Curator, [HL4] Professional, Writer.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. For more on the Peak experience and Hong Kong, see ch. 7 and fig. 7.3.
2. I use the term 'globalizing cities' in the expansive sense suggested by two edited collections, Marcuse and Kempen (2000) and Derudder et al. (2012). See also Twombly (1995).
3. This idea of the hegemony imposed by the TCC is derived from Gramsci; see Sklair (2001: 23–9).
4. I am indebted to the pioneering research of Kester Rattenbury (2002: ch. 11), which suggested that media searches in this area could yield useful results.
5. My main focus is not on individual architectural practices (in both senses of the term)—on which there is already a good literature—but on the role of the largest and/or most famous firms in the industry as a whole.

CHAPTER 1

1. The role of non-architectural iconicity is discussed in Sklair and Struna (2013).
2. See also the collection of case studies edited by Deamer (2014) exploring the architecture-capitalism relationship between 1845 and the present. The collection edited by Leach (1997) provides an introduction to the main architectural theorists of the 20th century.
3. 'I remember driving to Chicago with my mother to interview for college and the sight of Lake Shore Drive from the south, awe-inspiring, the way it comes out of nowhere, out of the Midwest, breathtaking'[MA4].
4. It is rarely cited, and I can only explain this in terms of its ideological message.
5. Dreams of the countryside or the seaside are, in my view, an inevitable consequence of urbanization. See also in this context Manfredo Tafuri (1976), who surprisingly fails to mention B&M. I would be happy to be corrected on this.
6. For insightful reflections on variations of this idea, where embassies and museums have to defend both ideas and territory, see Wainwright (2016) and Gintoff (2016).
7. It could be argued that architectural style is the key link between iconicity and consumerism, given that histories of architecture tend to focus on the procession of styles, usually national, as in *Encyclopedia Britannica* (anon. 1988) and

most textbooks. My contention is that iconic architecture is less a style per se, more a composite social, economic, and ideological construct.

8. 'Taste classifies and it classifies the classifier' (Bourdieu 1984: 6). This redefinition of aesthetics is probably the most quoted phrase in the sociology of culture. For a thorough study of the architectural profession inspired by Bourdieu, see Stevens (1998).
9. Benjamin's essay (1969), first published in 1944, was one of the inspirations for this book and my attempt to explain what might be termed 'iconic architecture in the age of electronic reproduction and dissemination'. Benjamin's discussion of 'aura' led me to the distinction between unique icons and successful typical icons. I acknowledge that it could lead others in different directions (see Elliott 2011).
10. 'In architecture it is easy to find what you don't like but difficult to find what you do like' [UK3].
11. For instructive attempts to connect the capitalist machine aesthetic and modernist architecture, see Wilson et al. (1986), Martin (2003), Guillen (2008), and Gartman (2009).
12. The rest of this chapter borrows from Sklair (2006) courtesy of Taylor & Francis.
13. Despite this, the *Handbook* is a generally excellent contribution to many of the debates covered here.
14. As usual there are exceptions. One of Andy Warhol's images of Campbell's soup cans is much more valuable in the art market than one of the cans in the soup market.
15. It is ironic that it took the surrealist René Magritte to simplify this issue with his much-reproduced and copied painting of a pipe, 'The Treachery of Images' (1929). The text reads: 'Ceci n'est pas une pipe.'
16. One urbanist said: 'Architecture is a global subculture where everyone knows the same buildings, but often they have just seen the pictures' [MA3]. See also Russell (1998: 44), who argues that 'certain kinds of architecture more readily lift off the page'.
17. Dovey (1999: 198 n. 3) argues that the meaning of iconic in architecture has shifted from mimetic (copy) to synecdoche (part for whole). This may be true to some extent, but my analysis takes a different direction.
18. See Bonta (1979) and Dodds (2005) on the history and meanings of the Barcelona Pavilion. While diverging theoretically, both books provide valuable information on its iconization. See also Jones (2011: 27–33).
19. I am grateful to Davide Ponzini and Michele Nastasi for explaining in detail during a walk along the canal how the 'Palladian-type villa' (typical icon) in fig. 1.1 differs from its uniquely iconic original.
20. I generally follow Jencks's suggestion (2007) that we call the Norman Foster brand 'Fosters'.
21. For a penetrating history of the idea of 'type' in architecture, see Vidler (1998). While he does not connect this with iconic architecture per se, he argues that

the type 'has provided a ready basis for the generation of an entirely new species of building demanded so insistently by the rising consumption and production society' (437); see also Vidler (2008).

22. When the Gherkin won the Stirling Prize in 2004, a female member of the team suggested that the top of the building actually symbolizes the nurturing breast.
23. See also http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/jul/07/beyonce-towers-body-building- melbourne.
24. 'Venturi's buildings were iconic for some students. They flashed across the sky' [NY16]. The contribution of Denise Scott Brown to the work of VSB is often ignored.
25. Some of my respondents spoke of negative or inauthentic icons, which may overlap with my more recent category of typical icons, perhaps unsuccessful typical icons. For example: 'I find buildings like the Trump Tower repulsive. These are negative icons, they reflect social imbalance' [NY15, interviewed in 2004]. With Trump as president the iconicity of Trump Tower may change.
26. See http://www.e-architect.co.uk/birmingham/birmingham_new_street_station.htm. After 2009 the firm split into FMA and AZPA.
27. DOCOMOMO is an organization devoted to the protection of modernist architecture. Its website, http://www.docomomo.com, links to all the conferences.
28. For views of those living in Frank Lloyd Wright houses, see Reisley (2001).
29. Very few women find a place in the higher reaches of architecture. Denise Scott Brown (2009: 79–89 and *passim*) has fought long and hard to improve the situation, with some success. See also Berkeley and McQuaid (1989); Fowler and Wilson (2004).
30. Kellner (2012) presents an interesting analysis of the critique by Ernst Bloch of the Frankfurt School culture industries thesis. He shows how Bloch found emancipatory utopian dimensions even in ideological products. I share this critique—there is much to admire in bourgeois culture, not least in wonderful (albeit alienating and consumerist) iconic architecture.
31. For an early brief exposition of the importance of the digital revolution for architecture by a pioneer in the field, see Mitchell (1999). See also McNeill (2009: 51–55) and Hight (2012).
32. Originating in the United Kingdom through the Ministry of Defence, the ISO 9000 series was the first truly global quality-management system based on third-party certification. It was introduced in 1987 and is continuously evolving.
33. The painting 'The Professor's Dream' of 1848 is one of many selections of iconic buildings through the ages. It comprises 100 buildings from the Middle East, classical Athens and Rome, and the rest of Europe, many of which would be considered iconic today (Cockerell 2005,< http://www.vam.ac.uk/users/node/3898>).
34. On the persistence of icons of the classical world, see the interesting study of the Vancouver Public Library as an 'ersatz Colosseum' (Lees 2001).

35. Dixon (2004: 57) says: 'The Pantheon was one of the best preserved and arguably the most visited and commented upon architectural works in the city [Rome] in the mid–eighteenth century, as it is today.' Her short section on 'The misprision' (74) evokes shades of the typical icon. See also Benson (2004) on Rome and the origin of souvenirs—embryonic consumerism.
36. See Prideaux (2005) and http://www.trrworld.org/article303-2.pdf.
37. Architecture theme parks and other iconic ventures are discussed at the end of my next chapter.
38. Sold, rebranded, and revitalized as the O2 Entertainment Centre, it advertised itself with a 'Climb an icon' campaign in 2013.
39. Architects themselves sometimes wield a modicum of political power—see Lane (1986) on Ernst May, and Hall (1996: ch. 3 and *passim*) on the leftist Architect's Department of the London County Council. See also Violeau (2007) on fraught encounters between radical leftist students and architects in France around May 1968.
40. I am grateful to the late Julius Shulman for a critical discussion of this and related issues in February 2004 [CA16]. At his suggestion Carlota and Buck Stahl, who were living in the house at the time, invited me in 'to see for myself' [CA17].
41. For example: 'Iconic suggests a superficial visual image, like the flash of a slide in an architecture class. In Los Angeles there are dozens, maybe a hundred canonic or iconic buildings' [CA11].
42. The Stirling Prize awarded by RIBA is considered the most important prize in British architecture.
43. My research demonstrates that claiming iconicity for buildings in advance of their completion is common (see next chapter). Another example from my interviews: 'Ito's Sendai MediaTech in Japan was famous for five years before it got built and attracted mixed reactions when it opened' [MA12].
44. He is often criticized in Spain for his extravagant architecture; one website is labelled 'Calatravatelaclava' (Calatrava bleeds you dry). Another example of site iconicity: 'The Freedom Tower at the World Trade Center is an explicit attempt to make an icon, but it won't work because it is too big and looks like a speculative office building for New York' [MA9].
45. CABE was merged into the Design Council in 2011. For the theoretical expansion of this issue into the debate around criticality, see ch. 6 in this volume.
46. An urbanist observed that 'icons are not the essence of the place, but they are recognizable symbols of it, of Paris, London, Bilbao etc.' [NY5].
47. Another put it like this: 'If the New York Times correspondent chose to live in Buenos Aires for two months then his neighbourhood would become iconic' [MA13]. Wirth-Nesher (1996) provides an interesting discussion on urban icons (not *sic*) as landmarks in the modern novel.
48. For those who consider IKEA simply as a furniture store, I recommend Collins (2011), a serious piece of journalism despite its flippant style.

49. The inspiration for this line of argument is Logan and Molotch (1987), especially Molotch's original essay on the city as a growth machine (ch. 3 in the book). See also Jonas and Wilson (1999).
50. For 'Downtown Inc.' in the United States, see Frieden and Sagalyn (1991). Zukin (1995), Hannigan (1998), Knox (2011), and many others explore how consumerism takes over cities.
51. While the original websites are long gone, these places and others like them still market themselves as iconic.
52. At http://www.architectural-review.com/buildings/skylines-opinions-on-renzo-pianos-shard-london/8633386.article#. Many of these pundits also feature in the mass media.
53. Iconic replacement also happens at the global level, for example, 'in the short space of a couple of months [in 1997] Gehry's chaotic Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao hit Meier's Getty like a billiard ball, displacing the Getty as the progressive symbol of its time' (Giovanni 1998: 81).
54. See also Lamy (2015: 210–13). Selfridges was designed by Future Systems (Jan Kaplický and Amanda Levete), who had won the Stirling Prize for Lord's Media Centre in 1999. Kaplický died in 2009 and the firm was wound up. Levete now heads her own firm.
55. See, for example, 'From Eyesore to Icon: Rebirth of the Council Tower Blocks: Architects' Makeover Sends High Rise Flats "Not Fit for Human Beings" up the Property Market Ladder' (*The Guardian*, 30 June 2003).
56. http://www.thecube.co.uk/about.
57. See the literature on the entrepreneurial city, notably Harvey (1989a), the case study of Manchester by Quilley (2000), Knox (2011), and the 'Bilbao Effect'.
58. The Falkirk Wheel, a tourist attraction recalling the engineering prowess of the Scots, was anointed by Lord Dalkieth as 'a wonderful new icon for Scotland' in 2002 (RMJM 2004). It has become a major tourist attraction (http://www.thefalkirkwheel.co.uk/).
59. The architect was Charles Holden and the building was used by the British Ministry of Information (i.e., propaganda) in the Second World War. It was the model for the Ministry of Truth in Orwell's *1984*.

CHAPTER 2

1. At https://www.google.co.uk/#q=ten+most+iconic+buildings&start=90 and http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=1250339&page=3, respectively.
2. This section is based on an article written and researched jointly with Dr Laura Gherardi (Sklair and Gherardi 2012), courtesy of Taylor and Francis.
3. All websites cited in this section were accessed between 1 February 2009 and 30 September 2009. Regular checks of corporate websites subsequently showed similar patterns.
4. For an account of this project by one of the design partners, explicitly confirming the importance of iconicity, see Carmona (2006), discussed in ch. 5 in this volume.

5. See fig. 3.1 and http://www.hok.com/about/news/2012/09/26/hoks-barry-hughes-explains-the-design-inspiration-for-the-baku-flame-towers-on-cnns-great-buildings-series/.
6. For a lively account of the ongoing competition surrounding the 'Tallest Building in the World', see King (2004: ch. 1) and various dedicated tall buildings websites.
7. See fig. 4.2. Levine (1996: 217) labels Fallingwater 'iconic'. For a tour of 'concrete monstrosities', see Meades at http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/feb/13/jonathan-meades-brutalism-a-z.
8. As in: 'The icon enriches buildings around it, for example the New York Sports Club' [NY2]. I would say the same for Wright's Guggenheim museum.
9. At http://www.rmjm.com/news/rising-from-controversy-architectural-icons-that-faced-scrutiny-yet-persevered/.
10. Iconeye created 'The Icon Design Trail' for the annual London Design Festival that began in 2004 and has become a staple of the London design scene (http://www.iconeye.com/).
11. Koolhaas turned this from theory into practice in his Stock Exchange building in Shenzhen (see fig. 4.10). Koolhaas as starchitect is discussed in ch. 4.
12. While I have sympathy with News Junkie on this issue, I hope this book will encourage her and others to reconsider the significance of iconicity in architecture.
13. In the complete transcript of my 75 interviews, Wright received 111 separate mentions, Gehry 73, Le Corbusier 69, Mies 49, Koolhaas 46, Foster 32, and Hadid 15. No other architect received more than 20. The most mentioned buildings were Guggenheim Bilbao with 80, World Trade Center with 44, and Sydney Opera House with 29. A reminder: most of the interviews took place in 2004, in the United States.
14. Online searches were carried out for every newspaper website in the sample. The option chosen was articles/full text/all categories and the search terms were: 'name of the firm' + 'architecture'.
15. Winners of the Pritzker Prize (the most prestigious in architecture) are not included in table 2.4 (they are listed in table 4.3). Most of them and their famous buildings are assumed to have acquired some iconicity in the profession if not always with the public by virtue of winning the prize. All four starchitects have won the prize. See also the list of 50 boutique architects compiled by Ren (2011: table A.3), based on a more limited measure of specialist media exposure and including living Pritzker prizewinners.
16. Renard-Delautre's research is an excellent example of the iconization process at the national level, and more research along these lines would be welcome.
17. One of my respondents commented: 'It has strong iconicity as a building but not as a filled space' [NY8].
18. In professional rhetoric, however, the architect is frequently said to serve the common good and is therefore socially committed (see, e.g., Saint 1983; McNeill 2009: ch. 7; Crysler 2012: *passim*).

19. For a selection from Baudrillard's unrelentingly negative travel log of American architecture and cities—covering New York, Santa Barbara, the Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, Salt Lake City, Disneyland, and Las Vegas, see Leach (1997: 208-13).
20. All text in quotations is from the website http://www.chinaoct.com/category.aspx?NodeID=80 (English version). I have taken the liberty of minor editing.
21. This was the destination of a ferry that sank in April 2014 with tragic consequences.
22. 'Just as the Sphinx and the pyramid of Giza have not lost their iconic status, the Luxor never will either' [US4]. See also Betsky (1997: 230-43) and Cass (2004) for 'Egypt on Steroids'.
23. See Hell and Steinmetz (2014), and on Las Vegas in South Africa, Fu and Murray (2014).
24. I was refused permission to reproduce some images, for example, *Financial Times* cityscapes (scanned from an unsolicited subscription flyer): 'We are happy to note your interest in FT's cityscape advertisement; however, this is not something we allow to use or reproduce in any way. This is only used for FT's marketing activities' (e-mail from FT Syndication, 4 June 2014). A search for 'Financial Times cityscape' or this link will bring you the forbidden images: https://www.google.co.uk/?gws_rd=ssl#q=financial+times+city scapes.

CHAPTER 3

1. This chapter borrows from Sklair (2005) courtesy of Blackwell, my first attempt to apply the four fractions model of the TCC to architecture.
2. For the pre-history of the sociology of architecture, see Gutman (1972) and King (1980), substantially updated in Jones (2016).
3. Meier won the Pritzker Prize in 1984; Gehry and Venturi won after Gutman's book was published. The first item retrieved in the NEXIS search on 'iconic architect' was a *New York Times* celebrity profile of Michael Graves in 1996.
4. For an interesting analysis of the reception of Tom Wolfe's *From Bauhaus to Our House*, first published in 1981, see Hines (1987).
5. The film *John Portman: A Life of Building* was shown on PBS and BBC4 in 2013. The quotation is from http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01rd35v.
6. This term also cropped up in a discussion of another spectacular atrium, Hysan Place in Hong Kong [HK3].
7. Levine (1996: 334) draws an enigmatic comparison between Wright's Guggenheim and Portman's hotels.
8. 'A friend at CEU is writing a thesis on Parises of the East' [MA10].
9. Barthes (1993) explored this idea in his essay on the Eiffel Tower, as did Betsky (1997: 12–51) in his book on icons, and the phrase 'enigmatic signifier' is used in psychoanalytic and cultural theory. Jencks (2005) was the first to apply it systematically to the study of architectural iconicity in general.

10. Venturi (1977: 25) quotes Louis Kahn's 'enigmatic remark: "architecture must have bad spaces as well as good spaces". . . . The decisions for such valid compromises are one of the chief tasks of the architect'. Perhaps we should see the shops in great buildings in this light.
11. For an interesting review of the reception of the building (and the new US Embassy in London), which connects these with the Brexit vote in the UK in 2016 and 'Fortress Urbanism', see Gintoff (2016).
12. It should be noted that rankings always refer to data from the end of the previous year. I am grateful to Lisa Hendriks for information on the rather convoluted history of these lists.
13. Quoted in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayan_Tower.
14. Ivar Tengbom, who died in 1968, was a celebrated Swedish architect noted for his neoclassical buildings in Stockholm.
15. http://yourarchitectureisbad.wordpress.com/tag/stauch-vorster-architects/. This seems a harsh judgement, but the sentiment expressed is not uncommon.
16. Kwinter (2010) takes this to interesting extremes in an extended conceptualization of infrastructure.
17. Derudder et al. (2012, especially section IIA) provides useful surveys and critiques of the general literature on all of these. See also, on infrastructure as 'design politics', Tonkiss (2014: ch. 6).
18. Jones (2006) is an engaging biography of Ove Arup. Pearman (1992) provides an early analysis of the globalizing of the firm, and Schittich and Brensing (2013) bring this up to date. The literature already cited on the Sydney Opera House contains further information on Arup the man and the firm (especially Messent 1997).
19. Calatrava also built the Athens Olympic sports complex and several transportation hubs, notably at Ground Zero in New York, all widely iconized. On his career, and specifically his place in the debate around iconic architecture, compare Jencks (2005: 137–43) and Sudjic (2005: 297–9).
20. Ownership of the bridge over time is not entirely clear. I am grateful to Joseph Wykes for this information.
21. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expo_%2798#After.
22. Proposals to build 236 new towers in London, 113 already in the pipeline, were announced in early 2014 (NLA 2014). New London Architecture is an explicitly boosterist, icon-friendly, urban growth coalition.
23. For a debate on architecture for the London Olympics, see http://www.bdonline.co.uk/comment/should-london%E2%80%99s-olympic-stadium-be-an-iconic-design?/3100251.article. Herzog & de Meuron's Olympic stadium in Beijing (the Bird's Nest) was readily accorded iconic status (Hubbert 2010).
24. Noobanjong (2009) provides a most interesting study of the new Bangkok International Airport.
25. This event and rumours around it are reminiscent of the publicity that surrounded the survival of Frank Lloyd Wright's Imperial Hotel in the Tokyo earthquake of 1923 (Gill 1987: 257–64). It was not an earthquake that demolished

the hotel in 1968 but commercial imperatives, despite campaigns to save it. Some parts of the hotel were, however, installed in a museum in Japan.

26. http://www.fosterandpartners.com/projects/chek-lap-kok-airport/. See Solomon (2012) on the Airport Core Program in Hong Kong.
27. Kurokawa also designed the iconic Capsule Tower in Tokyo and Pacific Tower at La Defense in Paris. Certainly an eminent signature architect, he died in 1997.

CHAPTER 4

1. For more recent surveys of fame and architecture, see Chance and Schmiedeknecht (2002) and Jencks (2005).
2. Among the dozens of general biographies of Wright, I have found those of Secrest (1998) and Gill (1987) most useful. There are also many full-length architectural biographies, notably Twombly (1979) and Levine (1996). Storrer (2006) is the definitive guide to the architectural works, along with his regularly updated website, http://www.franklloydwrightinfo.com/. For the long-drawn-out story of the Guggenheim museum based on the letters of the main participants, see Pfeiffer (1986).
3. The Frank Lloyd Wright Home and Studio in Oak Park outside Chicago has also been a thriving consumerist tourist destination for some time, as indeed is the whole of Oak Park, a celebration of Wright and Ernest Hemingway (Wilcoxon 1991).
4. There is already a shelf of reference books detailing archival sources for research on Wright. By the 1980s, Meehan (1983) was listing nine collections, not including Taliesen. For my own sociological research on Wright, most useful have been the library at the Getty in Los Angeles, which has a formidable collection of letters, the Oak Park public library, and the Avery Collection at Columbia University.
5. Noting that around 400 monographs had been published on Corb's architecture but very little on the man himself, in his biography Weber (2008) uses a large archive of personal letters to devastating effect on Corb's conduct during the Second World War and his personal life.
6. There is a growing critical literature on the impact of Le Corbusier in Latin America and India, a topic that is revisited in ch. 6.
7. There are many opportunities for budding architects and the rest of us to build models of our own and/or favourite buildings; see, for example, http://www.tsshure.com/ArchiQuest-master-builder-wooden-blocks/.
8. Their iconic buildings have been represented and commodified also in hair braids and, even according to *Metropolis Magazine*, as 'Iconic Museums, Rendered in Gingerbread' (*ArchDaily* 9 December 2013).
9. A first draft of the rest of this chapter was written in 2009 and eventually published in Gravari-Barbas and Renard-Delautre (2015). As far as I am aware, this was the first research-based collection on the topic.

10. For a debate stimulated by Peggy Deamer, see http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/opinion/the-starchitect-image.html.
11. See http://www.architectural-review.com/archive/profiles-and-interviews/flexibility-versus-ownership-the-two-sides-of-boris-bernaskoni/10002664.fullarticle.
12. A research unit at MIT provides a study of starchitects using different but complementary methodologies. Although there is no comparable list available from this project, it appears to match roughly with my own findings (see http://senseable.mit.edu/myarchitect/index.php).
13. For a witty guide, see Finch (2002).
14. For a comprehensive list, including 25 major international and regional prizes plus national and other prizes, many attached to events, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_architecture_prizes.
15. For another conception of fame in architecture, see the Bourdieu-inspired study by Stevens (1998), which focuses on models of architectural education and their consequences. This can be usefully compared with Williamson (1991), who focuses more on apprenticeship and timing.
16. See Morrison (2004), Glendinning (2010), Moore (2016).
17. On the significance of the Vitra campus, see Ponzini and Nastasi (2013: 113–23).
18. The aspirant starchitect Bjarke Ingels (of BIG) designed a well-received pavilion in 2016.
19. According to one of my respondents [HL2], the mayor of a small city in Holland contacted Gehry, asking for a Frank Gehry building. Sadly, the budget on offer was too small. See also Jencks (2005: 171–82).
20. This is despite the premature judgement of Jencks (1995), quoted earlier in this chapter.
21. The most discussed buildings of all top four starchitects are often not those other architects and critics consider their greatest architectural achievements.
22. At http://www.woodsbagot.com/en/Documents/Public3/pdf. A spokesperson for Swiss Re reflected: 'We're the developer and tenant of an iconic building. . . . If we charged as much admission as Disney World, we could probably pay off the cost of this building in a year' (*Sunday Times*, 25 April 2004). It has always been in financial difficulties.
23. In April 2014, I was sent an unsolicited e-mail inviting me to join 'the ultra exclusive Searcys Club/The Gherkin . . . located in one of the most striking buildings in the world, an iconic image of modern London . . . your ideal location for all of your business and social meetings': the Gherkin as up-market consumerist space.
24. Fosters' curved staircase in the redesigned library at the London School of Economics certainly adds drama to the space.
25. The global economic crisis that began in 2008 has meant the freezing of many such projects around the world. With architecture and construction being

heavily impacted, decade Top Ten firms, signature architects, and starchitects had to lay off staff. The Brexit vote in 2016 adds to these uncertainties.

26. The title of the blog refers to the widely reported fire that partially destroyed a building in the CCTV complex in 2009.
27. I am grateful to Joan Ockman for this reference (see also Ockman 2002). An image dated 1999 labelled 'regime of the ¥€$' appears in Patteeuw (2003: 22–3). My inquiries at May Bank yielded no results.
28. Stuart Ewen (in Betsky 1997: 79) had made a similar suggestion in his redesign of the American flag, going further in renaming the country UMA (United Markets of America). See also Koolhaas and McGetrick (2004: 376–89) and Jencks (2005: 101–3).
29. At http://www.designboom.com/design/koolhand-typeface-inspired-by-rem-koolhaas/.
30. One website frames this issue as follows: 'Has Koolhaas ignored the needs and aesthetics of the people who will occupy his buildings? Or is he using technology to show us better ways to live?' http://architecture.about.com/od/ideasapproaches/a/koolhaas.htm.
31. Ockman writes: 'Both fascinated and repelled by the world of commerce, he bestrides the globe in his brown Prada coat like a post-modern Howard Roark' (2002: 78).
32. See http://www.theguardian.com/.../zaha-hadid-dont-make-nice-little-buildings.
33. In 2014, Hadid sued the *New York Review of Books* over what she claimed was a defamatory comment about her alleged uncaring attitude to workers on building sites in the Gulf. The case was dropped. See (http://www.archdaily.com/?p=542852).
34. Compare this with the opinion of an architect professor, no doubt shared by many of Hadid's critics: 'Globalization and the media have squeezed complexity out of architecture in favour of the quick thrill' [MA5].
35. On Maggie's Centres (the first was in 1996): 'Rem Koolhaas joins an all-star cast of Frank Gehry, Zaha Hadid, Richard Rogers and Richard MacCormac. . . . Every architect is given the same brief . . . yet each reinvents it in their own inimitable style [Charles Jencks, who helped his late wife Maggie Keswick set up the Centres, says] "They are all mini icons".' (*BD* 5 October 2011).

CHAPTER 5

1. Few post-18th-century works of architecture are listed by UNESCO (in New York, for example, only the Statue of Liberty). For a thorough case study of the listing of the Sydney Opera House as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, see Garduño Freeman (2016). See also Hernandez (2008). D'Eramo (2014) introduces the challenging idea of 'Unescocide'.

2. At http://www.wmf.org/our-projects/project-map?tid_3=33. Paul Hirst commented, 'Now, of course, the heritage industry is so omnivorous it will restore *anything*' (2005: 246 n. 1).
3. Campanella (2008: 195) reports that Chongqing city limits enclose more than 30,000 square miles, making it the largest city in the world by area, so plenty of room for building.
4. See also Haan and Haagsma (1988), Lipstadt (1989), and Collyer (2004).
5. See, e.g., Goldberger (2004), Greenspan (2013), Sagalyn (forthcoming).
6. As documented in the chapters by Frampton and Sharp in Haan and Haagsma (1988).
7. See Lasswell and Fox (1979), Holston (1989), Scott (1998: ch. 4), Wharton (2001), and Vale (2008).
8. Ockman (1998) is a powerful critique of attempts to rehabilitate the architecture of the Nazi period (see also Rosenfeld 1997), while Cooke (1997) is an equally powerful attempt to defend the architectural profession in the Soviet Union under Stalin.
9. Sudjic (2005: ch. 4) also suggests that some of the architecture in Italy of the Fascist period (notably Mussolini's EUR project for the aborted Rome Exhibition of 1942) may have lost its toxic connotations.
10. In this study of parliamentary buildings in capital cities all over the world throughout the 20th century, Vale (2008) provides many excellent examples of the changing nature of such architecture.
11. Suggested in Riegl's distinction between 'age-value' and 'newness-value' (1998) in his discussion of what he called in 1928 the 'modern cult of monuments'. See also Sudjic (2005), who calls this the edifice complex, and the analysis of 'mediated monuments' in Vale (1999).
12. A study of two museum expansion projects in Toronto highlights the role of the local client, in these cases public institutions, in the production of iconic architecture (Patterson 2012). In my view, this analysis would have been enhanced by conceptualizing these clients as the political fraction of the TCC, which explains more clearly their rather limited autonomy with respect to corporate interests. Patterson's figure 2, distinguishing between 'public' and 'commercial', confuses the issue.
13. On Pedregal and subsequent developments, see Herzog (2015: 134ff.). Notable recent studies of the uses of architecture and urban design in the creation or invention of national identities include those on Turkey (Bozdogan 2001), Indonesia (Kusno 2000; Cowherd 2002), Malaysia (Marshall 2003: ch. 10; Bunnell 2004b), and the more general surveys of Vale (2008) and King (2004).
14. Anderson (1991: ch. 6) provides a classic analysis. Nowadays, this is often expressed in the idea of UK plc, USA Inc, Russia Inc, and so on.
15. As Quezado Deckker (2001: ch. 12) demonstrates, Brasilia was not universally praised. For a critique of Brasilia and other 'High-Modernist' cities, see Scott (1998: ch. 4).

16. King (2004) discusses the 'tallest building' obsession, with a picture of PTT on the cover of the paperback edition of his book. See also Bunnell (1999).
17. For the story of how the urban experience of Kuala Lumpur was transported to Hyderabad, see Bunnell and Das (2010).
18. At http://www.tabanlioglu.com/MODERN.html.
19. The Manifesto Club, for whom Appleton writes, has created a Google map bannedinlondon.co.uk showing the extent of no-leafleting, no-drinking, no-dogs, no-protest zones in London. See also Minton (2009) and Boycoff (2014) on the politics of space at the London and other Olympics.
20. Laurier (1993) dubs this 'Tackintosh'. See also Crawford (2002: ch. 7). The fire that partially destroyed Mackintosh's Glasgow School of Art in May 2014 appears to have increased its global iconicity.
21. See Short and Kim (1999) and Brenner and Keil (2006); and on Amsterdam (Trip 2007), Kuala Lumpur (Bunnell 2004b), Melbourne (Dovey 1992, 1999: ch. 11), Toronto (Gad and Holdsworth 1987), and Vienna (Grubbauer 2014).
22. The following sections borrow from Sklair (2013), courtesy of Emerald.
23. At http://www.oma.eu/index.php?option=com_projects&view=portal&id=1187&Itemid=10.
24. Carmona provides a useful table on other UMPs, including Baltimore Inner Harbour, Oslo city centre, Sydney Darling Harbour, Paris Parc de la Villette, Copenhagen Tivoli, London Southbank, Barcelona Olympic Village, and Bilbao waterfront. He identifies many iconic buildings in these projects.
25. All the material in quotation marks in this paragraph is from the official website, accessed in 2014 but no longer available. For updates see <legco wkcd>.
26. M+ is scheduled to open in 2019, but already it is running intern programmes and other cultural events (see http://www.westkowloon.hk/en/home).
27. The evidence from tables 3.5a-b suggests that while the geographical spread of firms may have widened, Marshall's conclusion still appears to be accurate.
28. For a list of 100 such concepts and a penetrating critique of paradigm shifts in urban studies, see Taylor and Lang (2004). Neil Brenner (2014) and his colleagues make a powerful case for the concept and practice of planetary urbanization to replace the 'methodological cityism' that dominates urban studies.
29. On UMPs at various scales in globalizing cities in eastern Europe, see Crowley (2003) on Warsaw, Golz (2006) on Moscow, Moravanszky (2001) and Bodnar and Veres (2013) on Budapest, Ladd (2000) and Molnar (2013: ch. 5) on Berlin, and Hoffman and Musil (1999) on Prague.
30. Since 1969 the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat (CTBUH) has set the standards in this field, though the concept of 'tallest' is controversial, http://skyscrapercenter.com/buildings.
31. 'The World' was temporarily halted around 2008 but appears to have resumed. Richard Branson reportedly purchased the island of Great Britain (http://www.privateislandsonline.com/islands/the-world-islands-dubai).

32. This edited collection has chapters on Amman, Beirut, Rabat, Riyadh, Kuwait, Manama, Doha, and Abu Dhabi—all highly relevant to the issues raised in this chapter.
33. See also Garrido (2013) on intra-city differences. The case studies in Lees et al. (2016) on planetary gentrification provide many examples of these processes.
34. Surprisingly, there appears to be no comprehensive book on the *grands projets* as a whole in French or in English. The following account is based on information collected during site visits, EPAD guides, and sources cited in the text.
35. See http://www.architect.org/gt/gt.html.
36. In the 1970s Pei submitted a design for the Grand Arche, which fell victim to political intrigue.
37. Perhaps with Tschumi in mind, one of my respondents remarked on the (usually) friendly rivalry between New York and California architects: 'On the east coast the questions are more interesting but they don't build much, here on the west coast they build' [CA14]. The follies would certainly look good in California.
38. For a multi-layered interpretation of this 'spectacle', see Bonnemaison (2004).
39. See also Fagnoni (2015) on the new Pompidou in Metz and the Louvre in Lens. The largest museum franchise is, of course, the Guggenheim.
40. See Ponzini and Nastasi (2011: 73–5). W. G. Sebald, in his remarkable novel *Austerlitz* (an intense commentary on the powers of architecture, among other things) is scathing about the building.
41. While most architectural attention has focused on the Pyramid over the main entrance, sociologically its relation to the smaller pyramids surrounding it is also interesting in terms of flows of spending customers (see figure 7.5).
42. In 2008 President Sarkozy established 10 groups of experts for urban transformation in Paris, each led by a prominent architect, the so-called 'Grand Paris' (Greater Paris) project (Ponzini and Nastasi 2011: 78–82). It has not proved popular.
43. The post-Mao reformist leadership is often described as technocratic (many trained in engineering), and this may help to explain these huge government investments in infrastructure.
44. Chung et al. (2001); and Zhu (2009), Ren (2010), Bracken (2012).
45. See Du Juan (2010), a necessary corrective to the boosterist literature.
46. At http://theconditionofchinesearchitecture.com.
47. On the evolution of the new Shanghai, see Arkaraprasertkul (2009a: esp. ch. 3).
48. For a satirical account of the 'Shanghai Global City' experience, see Krupar (2002). On a visit to the museum in February 2016, the sculpture was still there—spectacular but no longer rotating.
49. For an interesting variation on the Xintiandi model, see Yu Hai (2015) on Tianzifang, another gentrified Shanghai district, also featured in guide books.

50. From the website of Gregotti Associati, who won the contract to design Pujiang modelled on a classical Italian town plan. See http://www.archello.com/en/project/new-city-pujiang#.
51. Which is what will happen if the High Speed Rail 2 project goes ahead and destroys communities along the route, one among many examples.
52. When Armand Hammer visited China in 1984 he presented Deng with a painting, 'Memories of My Hometown,' by a Chinese-American art student. This fishing village (Suzhou) attracted huge interest in China, turned the place into a tourist site, and started a movement to preserve vernacular architecture (Wang 1992). On preservation in Chinese cities, see Tung (2001: *passim*), Ren (2011: ch. 4).
53. Li Ka-shing was also a major investor in Pudong and in Vancouver (Olds 2001).
54. For an interesting analysis of Cape Town's failed Olympics bid in the context of UMPs, see Hiller (2000). The award of World Cup 2010 to South Africa did result in some locally iconic stadia.
55. With the 2015 slump in the Chinese economy, the future of many megaprojects is uncertain.
56. An example of which is the remarkable list of 100 foreign architect firms from 27 countries chosen by Herzog & de Meuron to work on the Ordos (Inner Mongolia) project (Ren 2011: table A.5 and 58–9).

CHAPTER 6

1. For example, Tafuri (1976), Risebero (1983), Foster (1985), Harvey (1989a, b), Jameson (1991), Dutton and Mann (1996), Leach (1997), Hays (1998a, b), Vidler (2008), and Hatherley (2010). Most of these are best described as Marx-inspired (my own position) rather than Marxist—apologies to those unfairly included or excluded from my list, especially those in the edited collections.
2. *ArchDaily* and most architecture magazines regularly feature vernacular designs presented as simple, sustainable, often inexpensive, and aesthetically pleasing.
3. MIPIM Asia first met in July 1997 in Singapore (full-page advert, *World Architecture* 52: Dec.1996-Jan.1997). MIPIM UK met for the first time in London in 2016. A feature of architecture-related trade shows, indeed all industries, is the large numbers of prizes on offer, a part of the social production of iconicity at all levels (see English 2008).
4. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Architecture_Festival where corporate sponsors are also listed.
5. The level of architectural criticism in the quality press is generally very high, and many of these critics are cited in my bibliography. The professionals discussed here write mainly for consumerist lifestyle print and digital media, and treat architecture as if it were furniture, fashionable clothing, or gourmet cooking, as Gutman (1988: 59) had observed.

6. For a caustic critique of Johnson, Jencks, Robert Stern, and celebrity architecture in general, see Filler (1989), the critic in the Zaha Hadid lawsuit in 2014 (see ch. 4).
7. At http://www.nbm.org/about-us/press-room/media-advisory/architecture-101-2013.html.
8. Jacobson (2011) sees the Folk Art Museum story as a cautionary tale for all architects. For the equally vitriolic controversy around Foster's New York Public Library renovation scheme, see Rosenfield (2013).
9. See also articles in Hays (1998b) from the publication *Oppositions* and Crysler (2003) on the role of journals as paradigm and ideological gatekeepers. The debate now seems to be in the phase of post-criticality, or even exhaustion. My book could be seen as an attempt to re-energize the debate in a different direction.
10. On the vexed question of First World promotion of Third World architects, see Hernandez (2008) on Latin America, and J.-H. Chang (2010) on Tay Kheng Soon.
11. González Pendá (2013) discusses Félix Candela's 'geopolitical imaginary', another form of cosmopolitanism. Her call for more research on the politics of expatriate architects is timely.
12. Moore (2005) argues convincingly for postcolonialist research on the former Soviet empire. In architecture and urban design such work is already underway on eastern Europe (e.g., Molnar [2013] has an extensive multi-lingual bibliography). See also the provocative analysis of the American influence on British architecture in terms of hybridisation and post-colonial theory in Fraser and Kerr (2007).
13. On foreign-indigenous hybrid architecture, see Cowherd (2002: chs. 3 and 4) on Indonesia and Metcalf (2002) on India.
14. On IM, see Jencks (1985), Hitchcock and Johnson ([1932] 1995), Frampton (2007); on AR, see Frampton again (1985) and Lefaivre and Tsonis (2012: esp. ch. 9); and three wide-ranging collections, Nalbantoğlu and Wong (1997), Herrie and Wegerhoff (2008), and Canizaro (2007). For textbook overviews of both IM and AR, see Curtis (1996). Eggener (2007) explicitly compares critical regionalism and postcolonialism.
15. While he does not engage with postcolonialism in his history of exporting the 'steel-framed skeletons of American modernity', Cody (2003) provides a valuable guide to their materiality and political economy all over the world. Gillem (2007) supplements this in a history of US military bases abroad (over 750 sites for 600,000 personnel), Loeffler (1998) provides a history of the architecture of American embassies, and Robin (1992) a study of American 'imperial architecture'.
16. Non Arkaraprasertkul informs me that by 2010 parts of the surrounding area had been gentrified, reflecting the growth of the new rich in Shanghai. See

also Bunnell (2004a) on the contrived images of the Petronas Towers in the Hollywood movie *Entrapment*, obscuring the slums of Kuala Lumpur.

17. Space considerations preclude me from discussing all the contributions to these two excellent books, ranging from the effects of the Cold War on architecture and urbanism to the influence of CIAM—my selection focuses on those with the most direct bearing on the origins of the Icon Project in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
18. Lu (2007) examines the effects of the design of People's Communes on Chinese conceptions of modernism.
19. See http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/11/oau-celebrates-golden-jubilee-in-grand-style/. See also Yacobi (2015), Efrat (2015).
20. Sharon (1976) provides a Zionist perspective on modernist architecture in Palestine/Israel, while Hatherley (2008) deconstructs the myths of Tel Aviv Bauhaus. See also Weizman (2007) on architects in Palestine/Israel.
21. This case study is expanded in Pieris (2012).
22. The famous kitchen debate between Khrushchev and Nixon in 1959 provides an interesting coda to these exhibitions. The Soviet state news agency commented at the time: 'There is no more truth in showing this [a modernist house from the USA reconstructed in Moscow] as a typical home of the American worker than, say, in showing the Taj Mahal as the typical home of a Bombay textile worker' (quoted in Davidson 2011). See also Haddow (1997).
23. On architects as politicians in Latin America, see also the study of Belaunde in Peru and Pedro Ramirez Vazquez in Mexico by Castañeda (2013: ch. 4).
24. For a nuanced analysis of the more general issue of women in architecture, see Fowler and Wilson (2004). Ethnicity is also an issue. There are very few black architects with global public profiles. One exception is London-based David Adjaye, born in Tanzania to Ghanaian parents. His reputation has been enhanced by his splendid Smithsonian Museum of African American History and Culture, opened by President Obama in September 2016. Two of his houses were featured in PACWA (Phaidon 2005). Adjaye Associates were named Architects of the Year by Iconic World (*sic*) in 2016, and their luxury shopping centre in Beirut will open in 2017 (www.adjaye.com/).
25. For quite different approaches, compare Crinson (1996) and Cody (2003). Crinson's sympathetic critique of the application of Orientalism to architecture is of particular interest.
26. See, e.g., King (1995b, 2004) in general; Çelik (2008) on Ottoman-French encounters; Crinson (1996, 2003) on British rule in the Middle East; Metcalf (2002) and Kalia (2006) on India; Kusno (2000) on Dutch rule in Indonesia; and Wright (1991) on the French and their colonial architecture.
27. See also, on the efforts of the planners to rescue Old Havana for socialism, Lasansky (2004).

28. An example of the complexities of this argument is the furious debate that arose around the architecture (by Jean Nouvel), meaning, and content of the Musée Branly in Paris (Price 2007; White 2012).
29. I am grateful to Prof. Prakāsh for clarifying this point by e-mail. Similar debates are current in the fields of postcolonial literature and probably all the arts.
30. After the Peronist period *República de los Ninõs* gradually decayed. In 2002 (the 50th anniversary of the death of Evita) renovations began to rebrand it as a tourist attraction. An alternative narrative tells that it was a visit to the Tivoli Gardens in Copenhagen in 1951 that inspired Disney. Both versions are possible.
31. It is interesting to compare this with Jencks's evolutionary tree of the six main movements in 20th-century architecture (1985: 28ff. and 392 n. 1), revised in Jencks (2001) and Banister Fletcher's much earlier 'Tree of Architecture' (https://archive.org/stream/historyofarchite00fletuoft#page/n5/mode/2up).
32. See Zhu (2009: ch. 6), where some of the responses are reprinted. While Zhu mentions colonialism in his book, he does not discuss postcolonialisms at all, which I find surprising as there are many echoes of it in the debate. Ren (2011: 159–66) critiques Zhu's concept of criticality.
33. Commune has expanded to 40 villas, offering corporate events, weddings, private dinners, and life-style promotions (see the 2011 edition of PACWA). SOHO's property portfolio is expanding rapidly in China with Bund SOHO, a new iconic mixed-use spectacular addition to the Bund in Shanghai. Perhaps this references 'New York by Gehry'?
34. Followers of Ai Weiwei might be surprised by this. For a thought-provoking analysis, see Tang (2015: 212–13 and ch. 6 *passim*).
35. This was an MA thesis from the University of Melbourne, under the supervision of Professor Zhu. While the version cited is unpolished, it is nevertheless a valuable contribution to the literature. Ding (2016), obviously relevant, reached me too late to be considered here.
36. Paul Andreu's blobby design was dubbed locally 'the French Opera House'. For the opposition to this and other 'foreign' projects in China, see Broudeheux (2004: ch. 6) and Fan (2009).
37. For an interpretation of the history of colonial architecture in India and the creation of the Indo-Saracenic style before New Delhi, see Metcalf (2002). For the modern period, see Lang et al. (1997), especially on the issue of architectural Indian-ness.
38. Excerpted from (http://discuss.forumias.com/uploads/FileUpload/61/288b619bc1d83c6e9f157378a45d43.pdf).
39. Similar criticisms have been made of Brasilia (Holston 1989); see also Scott (1998: ch. 4). Ksiazek (1993) discusses Louis Kahn's National Assembly in Dhaka (often compared to Chandigarh).
40. For an informative upbeat collection of essays on African Modernism, see Herz (2015).

41. The idea of the ecoskyscraper was first introduced by Ken Yeang, an architect from Singapore working in London in the 1990s (Yeang and Powell 2007). See also Kusno (2000: 197–205).
42. At http://www.usgbc.org/?CategoryID=19.
43. The pricing system is complex. One website estimates '2 percent for construction costs and $150,000 in soft costs for Certified through Gold level certification on most projects.' http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/smart-takes/leed-certification-what-it-costs/.
44. See http://www.ted.com/talks/bjarke_ingels_hedonistic_sustainability.html. See also Fowler (2014).
45. One of my respondents, not in the United States, suggested that 'we need an architectural Peace Corps' [HK2].
46. The Iraqi-born artist Doris Bittar has been collating artwork on migrant workers in the Gulf for some time (see https://www.academia.edu/25934347/Cultural_Settlements_Gulf_Labor_and_Global_Solidarity).
47. For example, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/tdic-refutes-new-claims-over-saadiyat-island-worker-abuses-581 727.html.

CHAPTER 7

1. This chapter borrows from Sklair (2010), courtesy of SAGE Publications.
2. My interest in consumerism was first stimulated by the path-breaking books of Stuart Ewen (1976 and 1988). Although focused mainly on the United States and not explicitly global, these books are still essential reading for understanding how capitalist globalization works.
3. Mattern (2007) writes persuasively on new libraries as cultural icons; see also Fuentenebro (2015).
4. In his book (and exhibition) on icons as magnets of meaning Betsky (1997) and his colleagues certainly show the connections between iconicity and consumerism. See also Chase (1991) and Adam (2013: 144ff.).
5. That was in 2004; by 2016 adult tickets to Disneyland CA were over $100 per day, with children paying a little less.
6. For a particularly egregious example, see Choi (2012) on Hong Kong Disneyland. Disney has specialized in turning consumers into walking adverts for corporate products.
7. See also Lasansky and McLaren (2004), a collection bursting to the seams with touristic scripted spaces.
8. A rapidly expanding literature challenges the focus of Sassen (2001) and others on the three main 'global cities' (New York, London, Tokyo) and calls for more attention to be paid to the hundreds of cities aspiring or not to global status (Robinson 2002; Brenner and Kiel 2006; Derudder et al. 2012). See also Tonkiss (2014).
9. Dovey (1999: ch. 11) is very instructive, particularly for the Leunig anti-icon cartoon on p. 169.

10. The architectural aspect is thoroughly explored in Ockman and Frausto (2005), where the original concept of architourism is utilized to give agency to tourists in iconic sites around the world.
11. I picked up a copy at the Hong Kong Institute of Architects in January 2014. For the globalizing of MICE, see http://www.worldluxurytourism.com/mice/mice-trends-and-its-immediate-future.html.
12. Both Rand and Wright were vague on the question (Secrest 1998: 494–8). No doubt the film attracted some into the profession. For a scathing analysis of the baleful influence of *The Fountainhead* on architecture, expanded into a diatribe against starchitects like Koolhaas and Hadid, see Hosey (2013), who labels them F*heads.
13. Two architects interviewed in Los Angeles also compared making films and making buildings [CA3, CA12].
14. Rattenbury (2002: ch. 11) dates the coming of age of architecture in the British media to 30 May 1984, when Prince Charles gave a speech to RIBA ridiculing modernist architecture. Thirty years later, China's premier spoke out against 'weird architecture' (http://www.dezeen.com/2014/10/20/no-more-weird-architecture-in-china-says-chinese-president/). Neither intervention seems to have had much effect.
15. See http://www.haworthtompkins.com/built/proj44/index.html.
16. There are several good websites that list architecture in the movies, TV, and the Internet, for example, http://architizer.com/blog/architecture-movies-netflix/, http://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/01/12/spc-ones-to-watch-architecture-a.cnn/video/playlists/intl-ones-to-watch/, and for 50 architecture documentaries, http://www.archdaily.com/784786/watch-over-50-architecture-documentaries-via-this-youtube-channel.
17. On the architecture of American chain restaurants, see Langdon (1986). I take it as a confirmation of my central thesis about the globalizing of typical iconic architecture that so many phenomena that began in the USA are now spreading around the world as capitalism itself globalizes (Sklair 2002: especially ch. 7).
18. For a valuable set of essays on attempts to resist and transform the colonial legacy (and, to some extent, capitalist consumerism) in African cities, see Demissie (2007).
19. At http://list25.com/25-largest-shopping-malls-in-the-world/. This list (2013) ranked the Morocco Mall in Casablanca as the 22nd largest in the world.
20. Chengdu city, globalizing rapidly, now markets itself on the Internet and adverts in major airports (e.g., in Hong Kong in 2014) as home to 50 *Fortune Global 500* corporations.
21. For Prada's global reach, see http://www.prada.com/en/store-locator.
22. As well as a prime site for the exploitation of migrant labour, as discussed in ch. 6.

23. However, many celebrated architects have done interiors, for example, Zaha Hadid designed the Mind Zone for the Millennium Dome in London, and Norman Foster redesigned the First Class cabin for Cathay Pacific.
24. This repeats almost word for word the citation when Utzon belatedly won the Prizker Prize in 2003.
25. See also McBride (2006) on the relaunch of MoMA in New York and iconic museums in general and Shiner (2007).
26. The connections between cities, culture, consumerism, and regeneration are often implicit in the booming field of gentrification research (Lees et al. 2016). See also Zukin et al. (2015) on the contrast between gentrification of shopping streets by the ABCs (art galleries, boutiques, and cafés) and the development of more complex ethnic and racial identities. Slater (2006) offers a critical perspective on the eviction of the working class from gentrification research.
27. For a critique, spectacularly illustrated, see http://www.dezeen.com/2015/12/11/new-chinese-museums-construction-boom-opening-money-cant-buy-culture-china/.
28. In summer 2016 a new 10-storey extension to Tate Modern (Switch House) was opened with great fanfare—more shopping, exhibition, networking, restaurant, and educational space (see ch. 3).
29. On the topic of exhibitions, particularly the role of Ralph Appelbaum Associates, designer of the US Holocaust Museum and many others, see McKee (2002). I have been unable to trace the original of McKee's piece, quoted at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ralph_Appelbaum_Associates.
30. Stuth (2010) focuses on design issues but also provides details on the film, a book on the topic, and more. A spirited official Barnes Foundation riposte can be found at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Response-from-the-Barnes-Foundation/20072.
31. http://www.visitphilly.com/museums-attractions/philadelphia/the-barnes-foundation/.
32. Rebranded 'Destiny USA' in 2012, this mall like many others has had a chequered history.
33. For the most influential statement of modernity's impact on the city, see Berman (1988), notably his analysis of the Cross-Bronx expressway (291–6).
34. In her ethnographic study of resistance to displacement in Shanghai, Qin Shao (2013) introduces the powerful concept of 'domicide' to characterize this process. See also, for studies of displacement in Cairo, Selim (2013) and, in Delhi, Ghertner (2015).
35. The exhibition website text reads: 'farm animal humping the famous Jin Mao tower . . . Zhang's icon of modernisation gets a literal . . . shafting from the beast of burden "proletariat".' http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/artpages/zhang_huan_donkey_5.htm.

36. For an interesting contrast of sociological and econometric approaches, compare Horne (2011) with Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2010).

CHAPTER 8

1. Jameson reports that someone once said this; http://newleftreview.org/II/21/fredric-jameson-future-city. Whoever said it, it is a profound truth: it should be engraved on all documents about climate change, inequality, and poverty.
2. The argument of this section borrows from Sklair (2009b) courtesy of Sage, my commentary on a collection of papers on regulating urban design and the problems and prospects of change (Imrie and Street 2009).
3. See Brenner (2014) on planetary urbanization. Herzog (2015) explores the baleful social and environmental consequences, and ongoing attempts to combat them, of the 'globalization of urban sprawl'. On the bigger picture of the survival of planet earth in the fossil-fuelled Anthropocene epoch, see Angus (2016).
4. This is the unresolved Jevons paradox (Owen 2010), pointed out in my discussion of the green building industry. Rowan Moore (2016: ch. 15) develops the idea of embodied energy in his scintillating analysis of the need to turn London into a 'slow burn city'.
5. See https://www.google.co.uk/?gws_rd=ssl#q=pope+environmental+encyclical. Ignatow et al. (2014) fairly criticize my version of global system theory for ignoring the role of 'market friendly religion' in sustaining capitalist globalization. The Pope also ignores this issue.
6. Technical solutions already exist; see, for example, http://www.bioregional.com/bedzed/, but the socio-political issues also need to be addressed. See also *Archdaily* (24 September 2014), where the pioneering efforts of Alejandro Aravena to promote open-source architecture in the provision of housing are highlighted.
7. See and compare http://www.newfarm.org/features/0204/csa2/part2.shtml and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community-supported_agriculture#Ideology.
8. There are obviously elements from the non-violent anarchist tradition in these proposals, and I join with those who see the importance of detoxifying and rethinking anarchist and socialist theory and practice and learning the lessons of crimes committed in their names (Goodway 2006). My next project grapples with these issues; see http://www.lse.ac.uk/sociology/whoswho/academic/sklair.aspx and click on Half-Baked.
9. Using 3-D printer technology, the Chinese company WinSun Decoration Design Engineering built 10 small houses in 2015, and the world's

first partly 3-D printed large building was announced in July 2015—a 2,000-square-foot Museum of the Future in Dubai (http://www.museumofthefuture.ae/).

10. See the Critiques series of the Architectural Humanities Research Association—e.g., the volume edited by Morrow and Abdelmonem (2013)

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