LIBERATING HISTORIES

CLAIRE NORTON and MARK DONNELLY

ROUTLEDGE

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Liberating Histories makes an original, scholarly contribution to contemporary debates surrounding the cultural and political relevance of historical practices. Arguing against the idea that specifically historical readings of the past are necessary or are compelled by the force of past events themselves, this book instead focuses on other forms of past-talk and how they function in politically empowering ways against social injustices.

Challenging the authority and constraints of academic history over the past, this book explores various forms of past-talk, including art, films, activism, memory, nostalgia and archives. Across seven clear chapters, Claire Norton and Mark Donnelly show how activists and campaigners have used forms of past-talk to unsettle 'common sense' thinking about political and social problems, how journalists, artists, curators, filmmakers and performers have referenced the past in their practices of advocacy, and how grassroots archivists help to circulate materials that challenge the power of authorised institutional archives to determine what gets to count as a demonstrable feature of the past and whose voices are part of the 'historical record'.

Written in a lucid, accessible manner, and combining insightful critical analysis and philosophical argument with clear consideration of how different forms of past-talk influence the narration of pasts in a variety of socio-political contexts, *Liberating Histories* is essential reading for students and scholars with an interest in historiography and the ethical and political dimensions of the historical discipline.

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A book for Kerry, Jeff, Jude and Holly – with love x

With love to Katherine and Isobel from your Dad

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INTRODUCTION

Beyond discipline

Liberating Histories began as an attempt to explore how historical practices could assist contemporary efforts to confront social and political problems. As such we thought of our project as being broadly aligned with the recent 'ethical turn' in history theory.[1] This development has seen a shift of focus away from well-rehearsed debates about how meanings and narratives are constructed linguistically and about the status of the discipline's truth-claims. In their place has come thinking about how historians – as producers of a certain type of institutionally accredited knowledge – necessarily acquire and exercise their ethico-political responsibilities as intellectual workers in the present. In contrast to what we see as the dominant collective attitude of academic historians, which views the production of a certain type of knowledge about the past as the discipline's primary existential justification, we regard history theory's ethical turn as opening more promising routes for exploring history's relations with the many different ways of conceiving and communicating about the past. For us it represents a serious attempt to engage with the often problematic ways that people experience or consume various mediated versions of "pastness" in the present; and it is a reminder that the ways in which historians "do history" have ideological and political consequences, which too often go unrecognised. Because of our shared ideological outlook, we had long been sympathetic to Hayden White's argument in 'The Burden of History' that historians should seek to direct their work on the past so that it became 'a way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the solution of problems peculiar to our own time'.[2] Therefore, one of our original aims in this book was to identify some practical ways in which historians could help to bring about what White called 'an ethically responsible transition from present to future'.[3] As in our previous work, we intended to stretch the definitions of "history" and "historians" as far as possible.[4] By including a wide array of past-directed practices, practitioners, representational forms, temporalities and imaginaries within what for us constituted the "historical",

our aim was to demonstrate a commitment to principles of openness and inclusivity within this discursive space, and thus signal our rejection of all attempts to establish a hierarchy that positioned professional histories above other representations of the past or appropriations of it for instrumental purposes.[5] But this book has not turned out to be the one that we initially conceived. The reason for this can be explained simply. The more we looked for examples of how historians – operating *as* historians, invoking specifically *historical* readings of the past – have been able to perform the kind of politically constructive roles that White had encouraged them to do, the more convinced we became that academic histories (those produced by professional or institutionally accredited historians) are largely disconnected from discussions of "what is to be done" in response to contemporary social, political and ethical challenges.

It does not necessarily follow from this that we think historians should simply attend to their professional duties and cultivate their scholarly reputations. On the contrary, we recognise that there are circumstances in which academic historians can and do occasionally act as publicly engaged intellectuals, sometimes in pursuit of what we would recognise as campaigns for social justice or other types of progressive causes. Unlike those who believe that historical work on the past should be "uncontaminated" by present-day concerns or political commitment, we are encouraged by the rare examples that we can find of the historian-activist. Moreover, we are convinced about the value of historians critiquing their own models of truth and knowledge, recognising the often damaging political effects of these models, and clearing space in which other forms of past-talk can operate in politically constructive ways – beyond academic history's controlling disciplinary gaze. For any historians who *are* intent on using their practices as a way of intervening in current political debates, Chantal Mouffe provides a useful model for thinking about how this might be effective. She argues that because any given social configuration lacks a final ground and is 'never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity that is exterior to the practices that brought it into being', it is always susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices that attempt to 'disarticulate it in an effort to install another form of hegemony'.[6] In theory, academic history could function as one of these politically charged counter-practices, because there is nothing inherent in any articulatory practice that determines how it might be used politically. However, in researching this book we have come to the view that academic history's potential to be used as a form for disturbing existing political arrangements does not appear particularly strong. History's capacity to be mobilised as a rhetorical resource to help campaigns for socio-political justice, countering oppressive claims to knowledge, expanding the scope of personal and social autonomy, and achieving individual or group dignity is realised only rarely. Look at a representative sample of the kind of texts that professional historians commonly write. Very few historians see their academic work as something that could or should be directed towards the service of explicitly articulated political projects. Professional history's adherence to long-dominant epistemologies, methodologies and representational forms mean that a collective resolve to preserve its institutional

credibility as a discipline normally takes precedence over whatever radical political ambitions its practitioners might have as individual citizens. Any oppositional energies that academic history has are all too 'easily incorporated into a disciplined, polite and non-contrarian discourse'.[7] This is why we believe that "every-day" or "vernacular" or other-disciplinary appropriations of the past are more likely to be mobilised effectively as tactical resources to assist the kind of political activism that we support: after all, 'the present day is rarely *damaged* by mainstream academic historians'.[8]

Before we discuss our political preference for the kind of past-talk that is produced outside academic history's normative discursive boundaries, we should first explain a little more about how and why we criticise some of what occurs inside them. Although it is fairly common for historians to critique their disciplinary practices in relation to specific historiographical controversies or disputes over methodology, it is very rare for them to criticise their own discursive protocols in general ideological terms. Indeed, in the current academic climate, historians are more likely to rally to defend the general value of their discipline from political campaigns against the humanities, which regard subjects like history as expendable curriculum luxuries. We should make it clear at this point that our critique of academic history is not overly concerned with the discipline's relevance or otherwise to the modern "knowledge economy", or with what measurable "impact" historical research might make in terms of the criteria set out by higher education management. Instead, our position is grounded on what has become an unfashionable preference for the post-foundational, postmodern, or anti-representationalist critiques of the discipline that generated such controversies in the 1990s.

There was always an asymmetrical character to history's internal arguments about the status of the knowledge that the discipline claimed to produce. A few writers took seriously the discursive turn's wider undermining of epistemic certainties across all fields of knowledge production and sought to use it as a set of tools for critiquing the genre of academic history. But ranged against them was pretty much the whole of the resources of the professional history-making machine. Not surprisingly, therefore, the arguments appear to have been settled for now in favour of orthodox understandings of historical representation and realist models of "truth". As such, we know that our position on meta-history issues is out of sync with the majority view of our profession, which regards epistemological scepticism towards academic history as redundant and even irrational: Felipe Fernàndez-Armesto probably expressed the prevailing view when he dismissed such scepticism for having turned out to be a 'paper tiger'.[9] Despite the best efforts of writers such as Hayden White, Elizabeth Ermarth, Sande Cohen, Keith Jenkins, Alun Munslow, Martin Davies, Kalle Pihlainen and others, the intellectual climate in which we currently work assumes that academic history's research and writing procedures are capable of producing factually accurate (and thus "reliable") accounts of past events. As the editor of a collection of essays about the state of the discipline wrote fairly recently: 'By and large, practicing historians have rejected the nihilistic tendencies of postmodernism in favor of a commonsensical approach to their craft . . . they do

not lose sleep over epistemological matters'.[10] Problematising how history works as a discourse is something that now happens only on the far edges of the profession. We regret historians' collective indifference or hostility towards theoretical reflection because "business as usual" approaches to history reinforce the illusory idea that there is one proper way of attending to the past, and this illusion is too often used to justify actions that damage people and groups around the world. This is why we argue against all-too-familiar assumptions about how specifically historical readings of the past are *necessary*, somehow compelled by the force of past events in themselves, and more "correct" in terms of their form (narrative representation) and method (archive-based research) than other readings or tellings of the same. We can always choose to read and narrate the past historically. But equally we should recognise that many other ways of engaging with and appropriating what has gone before are always available to us. In making such choices, we should not mistake the force of habitual ideas about historians' collective authority over the past for strong arguments about the discipline's ability to produce a superior form of knowledge of "how things were". Martin McQuillan was right when he wrote that: 'We continue to live in the unchallenged culture of the historian'.[11] But any attempt to explain this elevated cultural status by using epistemological claims would (in our view) be untenable. Indeed, one of our principal arguments in this book is the importance of taking a position *against* the belief that history offers a privileged descriptive or explanatory perspective on the past. We reject any claim that gives historians priority as observing subjects of the past. In making this point, we want to avoid caricaturing all (or even most) historians as being straightforward positivists. Historians today rarely (if ever) claim to have produced a singularly truthful account of any past event or process of change across time. Historians commonly accept that their texts are linguistically and culturally mediated representations of the before-now rather than mimetic reproductions of the real as it once was. We concede that many historians see themselves as producers of a certain kind of discourse about the past, and one that is less than ideal. But as a *collective* (expressing views that can be seen, for example, in the language of professional history associations, or in the ways that history curricula are organised and taught in universities, or in the ways that historians critique texts of many kinds), it seems clear to us that historians regard their practices as being epistemologically superior to *all* other forms of past-talk. They act *as if* their practices give them some kind of partial or constrained access to a past reality. They talk *as if* the "rigour" of their research and writing methods operate as checks on the degree to which subjective, ideological influences necessarily intrude into their work. They talk *as if* the "historical perspective" was a form of supra-perspective, one that transcended all specificities of ideological preference and political value: in effect, not really a perspective at all. History as a professional practice assumes that it knows what truth is and how to find it. Commonplace complaints that history is being abused, manipulated or distorted for dubious political reasons imply that there must be a properly historical account available (conceived not so much as a single account, but as the combined authority of a

set of scholarly histories) that can serve as a benchmark against which the charge of transgression can be measured. As White observes, historians tend to regard the past as *only* historical and will therefore measure any other way of constituting a past against what they see as the "pure past" of this history.[12] Confident (still) that their discipline protocols can best be trusted to establish the "facts of the matter" in relation to the past, historians see themselves as guardians of what Martin Davies describes as a 'social practice that not only organizes the world in the shape of past events, but imposes its practice as the sole, exclusive way of organizing it'.[13]

We see this collective sense of superiority as a habit of mind that historians should abandon if they want their discipline to contribute meaningfully to broader social conversations about what to do in the world. In particular, if historians wish to contribute to political and social projects that challenge dominant interests and prevailing orthodoxies, we believe that they will need to commit to critiquing their own institutionalised disciplinary habits and to reconfiguring their collective self-identity. The problem with academic history, as we see it, is that it is (still) characterised by intellectual caution, cultural conservatism, political quietude and practitioners' fear that they might be criticised for partisanship in their work. Howard Zinn recalled how his proposal for the American Historical Association to take a collective stance against the Vietnam War in 1969 shocked his contemporaries.[14] More recently, Caroline Elkins was criticised by colleagues who judged that her history of the last years of British rule in Kenya lacked appropriate scholarly "detachment" – Elkins subsequently provided expert testimony that helped Kenyan survivors of torture make a legal claim against the British government. From her critics' perspective, the fact that the Kenyan Human Rights Commission regarded Elkins's historical work as helpful simply reinforced their belief that her scholarship infringed on history's long-established disciplinary code of fair-minded, even-handedness. Notwithstanding the profession's various moves to make itself more inclusive, open and culturally tolerant – for example, by diversifying university history departments' gender and ethnic profiles, incorporating social and cultural histories within curricula and research agendas, embracing trans-disciplinarity, and so on – history remains committed to codes of source evaluation, epistemic realism and notions of "truth at the end of enquiry" that were formed in the prevailing intellectual paradigms of the nineteenth century. Thus the American Historical Association continues to refer to the need for its practitioners to 'honor the historical record', to show a 'readiness to follow sound method and analysis wherever they may lead', and to demonstrate how historians are able to link 'evidence with arguments to build fair-minded, nuanced and responsible interpretations of the past'.[15] Historians might interject at this point that criticising the conservatism of their practices is self-refuting: they could say that it is precisely because of their commitment to scholarly integrity and common-sense notions of historical truth that audiences beyond the profession have trusted historians' work over such a long time-span. But even if we accept that there are good reasons for the profession to cultivate, maintain and preserve certain forms of trustworthiness with its audiences,

the *consequences* of how it does so can be both culturally alienating and politically damaging. This is the point that historians rarely acknowledge as being a serious issue, much less one that they are willing to concede.

Historians are collectively reluctant to acknowledge that their ideological power to regulate what counts as legitimate talk about the past might have social or political consequences, some of which could be harmful to already marginalised and disempowered groups. They rarely, if ever, discuss in their texts how their 'practices of knowledge may intersect with and serve purposes other than that of comprehending a field of enquiry'.[16] They prefer instead to regard the regulatory function of their work as being technically oriented and ideologically neutral; as being a kind of epistemologically sensible and morally responsible knowledge audit: more like a referee overseeing agreed-upon rules among players than a coercive operation that favours some interests at the expense of others. But even if historians practice their discipline in good faith as purportedly neutral observers of the past, that does not free them from responsibility for recognising that 'the effect of a single practice is not reducible to the goal of the actors engaging in the practice'.[17] The procedural norms that have to be observed so that inventions such as propositions, narratives, interpretative readings, textual forms and material artefacts can be regarded as historical are always tangled up in networks of other political and social practices and relations of power. And yet discussions of history's epistemic status often undervalue what is politically at stake in the debate.[18] This neglect of politics we argue needs to be corrected, not least because as Todd May recognised many years ago, the political effects of any attempt to regard a form of knowledge as a neutral substance can be 'all the more telling because of the mantle of political impartiality in which it cloaks itself'.[19] History-as-discourse claims for itself the right to be the benchmark against which other forms of knowledge about the past are tested, but this "right" rests on fragile grounds. History is not a discursive instrument that explains how the past has caused the present, and the idea that it constitutes a collective enquiry into the actuality of what happened in the past raises significant (and now well-traversed) problems about epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, narrative constructivism and the status of the archive. Of course, historians invoke empirical procedures for making statements about the past that cohere with surviving traces of information, traces which the profession chooses to regard as specifically "historical evidence". And we recognise that these empirical *procedures* are often vital, particularly in circumstances in which matters of human rights violations, criminal conduct, justice, restitution and so forth are involved. But there is no reason why we should believe that (we) historians are more adept at practicing these empirical procedures than, say, journalists, lawyers, screenwriters, historical novelists, social activists or academics in other disciplines. While history often succeeds in subjecting the past to its controlling disciplinary gaze, this simply confirms its elevated institutional status as a certain kind of articulatory practice. Moreover, this status means that it has the discursive power to contribute to marking out the boundaries of "legitimate knowledge" that are required for temporarily fixing hegemonic social formations.

In taking this position, we do not seek to deny or downplay the discipline's current public reputation. We are well aware that history as a discourse produced by accredited historians (the "historical past") enjoys considerable intellectual authority; in effect, professional historians hold something akin to licensing rights for producing "reliable" knowledge claims about the past and for evaluating everybody else's ways of dealing with that past. In the UK for example, where we work, this epistemological authority is at once reliant upon and productive of the weight of tradition that is expressed within the discipline's three main long-standing collective organisational bodies: The Royal Historical Society, which began its work in 1868; the Historical Association (1906); and the Institute of Historical Research (1921). History, as these institutional lineages exemplify, has a long disciplinary pedigree that is certain to be invoked against criticisms of its practices and foundational assumptions. We also recognise that engaging with the past is a major source of public interest and pleasure across different societies today. Mostly this involves people consuming the past in one or more of its popular, mass-media, pseudo-experiential and *visual* forms, and sometimes academic historians are able to cross over into this popular sphere of past-talk as presenters, expert contributors and advisors. But we will argue here that history has acquired this authority and public endorsement precisely because as a discourse it relies on maintaining a distance from contemporary "issues for living". It is marginal at best to contemporary conversations about issues such as people's collective rights and responsibilities, standards of governance and democracy, climate change, human exploitation and suffering, the use of power to inflict humiliation on others, and other similar concerns *in the terms in which they make an ethical demand on us now*. But in stating this point, we also need to be clear that we are *not* making a wider claim about the irrelevance of all the phenomena, events, processes, experiences and actions that are taken to constitute the past for campaigns in favour of justice, solidarity and more equitable divisions of resources. On the contrary, we will discuss numerous examples of how traces from the past – ideas, texts, vocabularies, signs, aesthetic figurings, representational forms, rhetorical tools, objects, discursive materials of many kinds – have been appropriated to produce constructive (from our standpoint) social and political effects. The point about such appropriations, however, is that they invariably occur outside the boundaries of institutionally accredited 'historying';[20] they belong to the realm of what Hayden White refers to as the 'practical past'.[21]

Hayden White's critique of the 'historical past' suggests that it does not matter much if historians appoint themselves as overseers of knowledge production about this past, because according to this view what professional historians do rarely concerns anyone outside of small, scholarly peer groups. More important than the versions of the past produced by historians, according to White, is the 'practical past': the past that is constituted by practices, discursive forms and representational models beyond the borders of academic history's professional codes; a past that often does resonate in the social conversation and that can be used as a store of tactical resources for one's conduct in the world.[22] White draws attention to the ways in which non-academics and specialists in other disciplines utilise the past as a

'"space of experience" that can be drawn upon as a basis for all kinds of judgments and decisions in daily life'.[23] The most significant of these are the Kantian "practical" (or ethical) decisions: what should we do? This conceptualisation of the past as a space of experience that we can use in our ethical deliberations – one that White takes from Reinhart Koselleck – is important for our project.[24] We will argue in this book that where appropriations or invocations of the past *have* contributed to projects of social and political change – in favour of justice, dignity, fairer distribution of resources and so on – they have usually done so with little or no recourse to the historical past. We will show that activists and campaigners of many different types have used forms of vernacular past-talk to unsettle those temporary fixings of "common sense" that limit thinking about current political and social problems. We will show how journalists, artists, curators, filmmakers and performers have been adept at referencing the past in their practices of advocacy, harnessing it to projects that openly articulate political and ideological positions. We will show how grassroots archivists help to circulate materials and ideas that challenge the power of authorised institutional archives to determine what gets to count as a demonstrable feature of the past, and to decide *de facto* whose voices are included in, and excluded from, the "historical record". We will show how various forms of memory work constitute counter-practices against orthodox, state-approved narratives that purport to explain present conditions in terms of their relationship to a posited past. And we will argue that only the most inclusive, accessible and democratic practices for producing past-talk can overcome the political and semantic problems of representationalism. Why do we believe that ways of constituting pastness outside of the boundaries of academic history possess a political agency that orthodox historical practices are rarely able to demonstrate? The most important reason is because they are not inhibited by a long-held commitment to disciplinary codes of impartiality, fair-mindedness and political restraint that are central to academic history's collective self-identity. Forms of past-talk beyond academic history are free to be openly positioned and politically committed. They can be used for short-term instrumental purposes, such as a rhetorical intervention in a given political dispute or problem. Equally, they can contribute to longer-term struggles for political position, such as those that involve undermining long-established cultural or political narratives which are damaging to particular group interests or claims for ontological recognition. In making this point we do realise that every academic history is (and must always be) positioned. But our argument is that professionally authorised histories are constructed on the illusion that their ideological positioning is somehow determined by the contents of their primary archival data; that the evidence itself "shows" that a certain judgment about some aspect of the past arises out of a reading of that data. By maintaining what some of them, anyway, recognise is an epistemic illusion – 'they know, but still. . . '[25] – historians falsely imply that the meaning of a given past situation inheres in its own "factuality", rather than being a matter of the historian's own interpretative preferences that are brought in from the outside when they inscribe that past situation within their professional discourse. In fact, maintaining the illusion is a professional necessity because history's epistemic

codes demand that its practitioners should not be seen to be speaking through openly acknowledged political positions. In contrast, other forms of past-talk are free from these restrictions. This is why we will argue that they are more compatible with the demands of political and social advocacy.

There are other advantages as well. Many forms and sites of past-talk – including films, songs, slogans, performance art, wall art, journalism, blogs, wikis, heritage sites, museums, anniversary dates, memory places of all kinds – are familiar parts of people's everyday consumption of media and other signs, as well as their experiences of social interaction. To the extent that people periodically summon and connect with a sense of pastness in the present – for ideological reasons as well as for pleasure – they do so overwhelmingly within public spaces (physical and imagined) and via popular media. Activist organisers can mobilise hundreds of thousands of people to occupy public spaces on symbolically important anniversaries. A piece of wall art referencing the past can function as an identity marker for marginalised communities, particularly in occupied or post-conflict spaces, providing people with a sense of solidarity and collective political potential. Memory sites can work as venues that evoke feelings of communal loss, guilt, pride or other types of identification in ways that spur the creation of new political subjectivities; equally, they might prompt collective reflection about political futures that were promised but that never arrived. The situation is different for scholarly works of history, which primarily function to feed the machine of academic-institutional history. As David Harlan recognised, of all the available forms for summoning a sense of times past, academic history is 'neither the most interesting nor the most important'. Even history graduates, he argued, are unlikely to read historical monographs and journal articles once they finish their studies. Instead, they will feed their interest in the past with other forms of popular representation, thereby illustrating 'the nature of the historical imagination in a media-saturated culture that, mercury-like, has been spilled into drops that cannot be gathered'.[26] Allowing for occasional exceptions where academic histories reach out beyond the academy to find a larger audience – usually, it should be said, by sticking to one of a few tried and trusted, market-friendly subjects like monarchy and military – professional history is a largely sealed-off discourse.

This is not simply to make a routine observation about how popular forms of past-talk are more accessible and palatable than academic histories. Rather, our argument follows the logic of Foucault's analytics of power, which proceeds from the axiom that the sources and effects of power are heterogeneous and multiple. As he stated: 'Power is widely dispersed through society, it is exercised in multiple and localized relationships, it is a matter of "ceaseless struggles and confrontations". . . . Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere'.[27] If, as we believe, Foucault's diagnosis of how power is 'employed and exercised through a net-like organization'[28] is convincing, it follows that the forms of past-talk that are best equipped for the task of resisting the negative effects of this (always dispersed) power are ones that are *similarly* multiple, heterogeneous, un-disciplined, non-institutional and widely networked. As May observed: 'it is *because* what is resisted comes in the form of networks that resistance must do so

too'.[29] Viewed from the opposite end of the problem, we believe that any attempt to challenge oppressive power using a discourse that is itself rigidly orthodox and committed to producing closures of meaning risks being self-negating:

> if power creates its own resistance, then the liberation from specific forms of power must take account of the kind of resistance that is being engaged in, on pain of repeating that which one is trying to escape.[30]

Thus, in our view, if past-talk is at all capable of functioning within projects of social resistance, then localised, vernacular and popular appropriations of the past really have the best prospects of countering the oppressive exercise of power *where it happens*, in its (always) specific, localised situations and its vernacular rhetorical forms.

Having said this, we recognise that Foucault never saw power exclusively as an oppressive force to be resisted. He stressed that it could also have creative consequences, producing forms of invention and adaptation in response to its effects. Power, for example, provokes people to experiment socially, personally and politically so that they can define their own subject positions rather than have these imposed on them from outside. It spurs people to find ways to widen the scope of personal and social freedom and dignity within given circumstances that are not of their choosing. Power can persuade those who are oppressed to invent new discursive practices and vocabularies, or perhaps to revive older ones that have been forgotten or suppressed, so that they can use these as tools for their struggles. Deleuze and Guattari built on Foucault's insights into this dynamic of power in its relation to the political imagination, emphasising the importance of experimentation and innovation in thought, pointing up the value of finding 'your own places, territorialities, deterritorializations, regime, lines of flight'.[31] Again, we will argue that if the past as a space of experience has anything to contribute to innovation, experimentation or 'lines of flight' in political thinking, this is far more likely to come from outside academic-institutional history than from within. Notwithstanding fairly recent disciplinary developments like new social history, new cultural history and new political history, academic historians are risk averse when it comes to matters of epistemology and representation. 'Experimental', 'alternative' and 'disobedient' academic histories have been (for us) welcome additions to the genre of history writing in the last twenty years or so, but these novel forms for narrating or otherwise representing the past only look innovative to the extent that they depart from the highly conservative genre practices that constitute mainstream academic history.[32] For genuinely bold and politically imaginative uses of the past – the kind that might define new political communities, or stake out new subject positions – we aim to show that the work of creators such as filmmakers, graphic novelists, artists, curators and activists offers much greater promise.

We will also argue that only forms of past-talk beyond history's disciplinary borders are capable of overcoming the semantic and political problems of representation. As Pihlainen has noted, an important legacy of the cultural-political radicalisms of 1968 has been the principle of avoiding the worst effects of

representationalism – that is, assuming the right to speak on other people's behalf and seeking to act as a proxy for their political interests.[33] Professional history does not recognise the problematics of representation – how could it, when to do so would leave most historians with nothing to say? We historians simply assume for ourselves the right to speak on behalf of anyone for whom a trace can be found in one or another recognised archival form. But the simple fact that such representational practices are habitual does not effectively address the problem that Deleuze identified as 'the indignity of speaking for others'.[34] Nor is the problem avoided when professional historians decide to write about dispossessed or subaltern groups, seeking to give voice to those who are otherwise voiceless in histories. However well-intentioned such attempts might be, and regardless of the integrity with which these "histories from below" are written, when historians claim the right to speak on behalf of absent others, it raises particularly troubling issues because their discourse is so wedded to epistemic certainty and interpretative authority. If – as is obviously the case – history *is* its representational forms (which it can hardly abandon), then the discipline could at least shed its certaintist assumptions. Moreover, academic history claims for itself the right to represent the whole of the human past, yet the profession carrying out this work consists of people drawn from a narrow social base, and accredited historians only ever constitute a tiny fraction of the wider societies in which they research and write. In effect, professional historians operate as a vanguard who take on the role of representing everybody else's past to them: the restrictive procedures that regulate entrance to this vanguard also ensure that the profession largely reproduces itself in its own image. Moreover, historians work within an institutional culture that pursues its own political interests – through funding, availability of resources, career promotion, controlling criteria for assessing academic work and so on – which means that their representations of the past (again, however well-intentioned) are at some level expressive of those interests. Therefore, we think that the best prospects for connecting past-talk to progressive or emancipatory political projects are to be found in its vernacular and heterogeneous forms. Writing academic histories *about* an ever-widening range of people and groups has little impact on subjects' claims to political justice. Instead, we need to recognise the potentially liberating effects of the ways that people summon the past for their own purposes, and to evaluate how they do so *in terms of political consequences* and not in relation to the norms of institutional historiography.

Organisation of the book

The first chapter of this book, developing Davies's argument that the 'historian-function' provides states with a narrative power that affirms and justifies the inevitable telos of the status quo, focuses on history as a coercive tool of dominant socio-economic interests that is always bound up with relations of power and social practices.[35] It analyses the use of past-talk as vehicles for imperial and nationalist rhetorics and the performance of ontologies in the main institutional instruments of historicisation: the archive, archaeological site, museum and school. It argues that

historical accounts, far from achieving hegemonic status because of their purported mimetic resemblance to the past, generate cultural authority from the political, ideological and aesthetic values that they embody.

Chapter 2 argues in favour of challenging academic history's authority over the past. As Hayden White has long argued, there is nothing inherent within the past that determines that the correct (or best) way to comprehend it is in the form of a history. We believe that by now historians should be able to recognise that the epistemological underpinnings of their practices are illusory, and that if they are to continue to produce representations of the past, then they should at least do so from a position of epistemic modesty. More importantly, we argue here that other discursive ways of appropriating and representing the past are more likely to be mobilised effectively as tactical resources to produce the kind of political effects that we seek to encourage. Our position is that plural democratic values are best served by inventing and proliferating different semantic forms of past-talk and not by subordinating them to academic history on flawed epistemological grounds. As a way of illustrating how other forms of past-talk have embraced their potential for unsettling "common sense" assumptions about our current social formations, we discuss the art and activist collective REPOhistory, post-museum practices such as Fred Wilson's 'Mining the Museum' project and the District Six museum in Cape Town, and the "activist" films of Michael Winterbottom and his collaborators.

Chapter 3 is about the politics of making histories. To the extent that historians sometimes aim to utilise the past as a potential site of political intervention in the contemporary public sphere, this tends to be an implied rather than a directly articulated feature of their work. Most historians are reluctant to position their academic work directly in the service of named political projects in the present, although their authority over the past pulls them into the spaces of cultural politics. Using the examples of debates about slavery reparations in France and the USA, as well as Australia's "history wars", we will argue that concepts such as disinterested historical scholarship and respecting the historical record are inescapably political because they are implicated in attempts to mark the boundaries of what is taken to be legitimate speech about the past. The chapter also discusses historians who *have* been willing to support named ideological causes in their work. Researchers such as Ilan Pappé and Nur Masalha openly align themselves with Palestinian political claims. Howard Zinn's scholar-activism was important in the formation of the REPOhistory collective and was used as a discursive resource by some in the Occupy Wall Street movement. Paul Mason, meanwhile, used the genre of history writing to suggest that workers who are currently denied solidarity and security are capable of creating better social and economic lives through collective action – but without prescribing what forms such action should take, and without underestimating the strength of the forces that are routinely summoned by authorities to enforce the status quo. In these ways, some historians at least have sought to follow Hayden White and Jacques Derrida in producing histories that are oriented towards the openings of a (better) future to come.

Chapter 4 then discusses various ways in which political campaigners and activists have sought to use the past as a store of resources for counter-hegemonic purposes. This discussion is situated within the theoretical frames provided by Laclau and Mouffe's reworking of the concept of hegemony, and by Walter Benjamin's idea of "awakening" – in which moments in the past can be seen as belonging to a given situation in the present, and in which the present can be transformed politically by making those aspects of the past that belong to it "live" in the now. Whether for the purposes of securing retroactive justice or placing a contemporary political struggle within a genealogy of analogous precedents, activists commonly invoke the past for constructive effect. The examples discussed in this chapter include Hungarian opposition to communist rule in the 1980s, the global protest movements of 2010–12, the activists who briefly established the Runnymede eco-village in 2012–15 (referencing both rights established by the Magna Carta in 1215 and cultural memories of the Diggers of 1649), and Kenyans who brought a legal claim against the British government in 2009 after being abused by the British colonial authorities in the 1950s.

Chapter 5, through an analysis of Lebanese, Iranian and Palestinian posters commemorating martyrdom, considers explicitly political uses of past-talk to imagine identities, persuade and proclaim, demarcate space, resist, recruit, coerce and empower in the context of contested spaces. Martyrdom posters function as symbolic sites of struggle in which the dead are used to shape a temporal-ethical space as a means of renegotiating the present.[36] We explore how and why such posters project 'a portable image' of a desired world, and the role they have in current political strategies and future imaginations.[37] As such, the posters are read as the articulations of diverse political communities to dominate not only politico-cultural environments but also the field of discursivity.

Chapter 6 explores how artists utilise forms of past-talk to engage in practical, ethical discussions, effect socio-political change and disrupt the status quo. We look at the work of Emily Jacir, Hadjithomas and Joreige, Walid Ra'ad, Paul Antick and Goshga Macuga among others with a view to how periods of conflict are narrated in their work. We are particularly interested in the manner in which they address the many ways in which histories are intricately bound up with relations of power, ontologies and processes of legitimisation, how memory is performed and "historical" authority and authenticity is created, their use of the counter/actual and the impossibility of representation. Focusing on how the heterotemporality of their work critiques the dominance of the singular, linear and progressive notion of historical time allows us to draw some connections with various human rights activists and communities around the world who similarly challenge the hegemony of the 'irreversible past' as a politically instrumental means of keeping in the present the consequences of past injustice.[38]

Following Mouffe, Chapter 7 argues that archives do not necessarily have to function as a 'system of discursive production' in which hegemonic power is produced and articulated.[39] Instead, it considers examples of how activists in various

situations have reconceptualised and constructed grassroots archives that function as sites of counter-hegemonic practices. We explore the potential for activist archives to offer inspiration to those involved with present-day struggles through the construction of a genealogy of protest, but also to witness and document state violence and to contest socio-cultural erasure. The second half of the chapter focuses on the archival impulse among artists and how they have utilised archival sources as a means of engaging in debates about identity, regional politics, possible futures, the politics of collective memory, forgetting, memorialisation and the possibilities of representation.

Definitions

In this book we distinguish between *institutionalised histories* and *vernacular histories*. Here the distinction is located in the particular discourse within which the narrative is produced and consumed. Machan, in a context of medieval manuscript textualities, argues that manuscripts were produced and consumed within two different textual discourses, each embodying various expectations concerning literary style, authorship and textual fixity. Texts composed in Latin were situated within a discourse of *authoritas* (authority) that embodied tradition, power (authority) and stability. This imbued the texts with prestige but also a concomitant expectation of fixity and truthfulness. In contrast, texts written in the vernacular in a more fluid discourse did not possess the same expectations of permanence, fixity and authority.[40] We feel this distinction might usefully be extended to the varieties of past-focused representations that we discuss in this book. History produced directly or indirectly through the instruments of the state – academic history, history in school curricula, archives, museums, heritage institutions; history supported by government or institutional grants, the media, or research institutes – can usefully be referred to as produced within a discourse of *authoritas*. Such *institutionalised history* (or professional history as we sometimes term it) is imbued with an authority, legitimacy and fixity. It is assumed to have been inscribed in accordance with particular genre rules. It has the power to create meanings, to constitute knowledge, to reify pasts and presents. Through its reception as knowledge it constructs the real and projects it as true. It is fixed and stable. Despite the occasional cursory nod to polyvocality, underlying such institutional histories is the notion that there exists a singular, true account of the past, an account that corresponds (to some degree) to what really happened and that the only way to contribute to the production of such an account is by closely adhering to the genre rules of historical interpretation, analysis and writing.

In contrast, we use the terms *vernacular histories* and past-talk to describe past-focused representations and acts of reference that are produced and consumed within a more fluid discourse, one that is beyond *authoritas*. Such texts (conceived in the broadest terms) are not bound by the same genre rules, but equally they are not accorded the same social status – they are often perceived as opinion, not knowledge; as subjective not objective; as story not history.

Our use of the term *institutionalised history* in this book, however, should not be taken to imply any kind of hierarchical status: institutional or professional history is no closer to the actuality of what happened, nor is it less political. Its perspective just happens to accord more closely with the normative view of society, which has the consequence of eliding a perception of bias. The epistemological and aleathic status of "texts" produced within these two discourses differ not in comparison to a foundational reality but in the social expectations and uses of the two discourses. Both are equally contingent and positioned, but *institutionalised history* is accorded a greater socio-cultural value perhaps as a consequence of the useful role it has played and continues to play in supporting, articulating and legitimising nation-states, their institutions and elites. Professional history is a more "fixed" discourse, in that it adheres to genre conventions – contingent, socially agreed-upon conventions – that permit less fluidity in the use and interpretation of sources, the form of the narrative and the perceived function or use of the text. The social status and authority bestowed on institutional or professional histories is located not in the methodology as a process that guarantees the truth of the narrative, but in these rules or protocols as a means of producing stable texts that are organised and focused in such a way that they can be easily utilised by the dominant interests, which then in turn support their production and dissemination.

Notes

1 Recent examples from key meta-history journals illustrate the point: *History and Theory* published an issue on "Historians and Ethics" in 2004; *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* produced themed issues on "Politics and History" in 2009 and "Historical Justice" in 2014. Also, the International Network for Theory of History's second conference, in Ouro Preto, Brazil in August 2016, was on "The Practical Past: on the advantages and disadvantages of history for life".
2 Hayden White, "The Burden of History," in White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 41.
3 Ibid., 49.
4 To clarify our own position, and to anticipate a line of professional self-defence that is often used by historians against the type of arguments we intend to run in this book – a defence which maintains that only "proper" historians have a warrant to comment on academic historical practices – we continue to be employed as university historians, and have written books and articles that are classified as conventionally historical, as well as works that are described as historiography or history theory.
5 Mark Donnelly and Claire Norton, *Doing History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).
6 Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically* (London: Verso, 2013), 2.
7 Kalle Pihlainen, "Historians and 'the current situation'," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 20/2 (2016): 151.
8 Keith Jenkins, "Sande Cohen: On the Verge of Newness," in Jenkins, *At the Limits of History: Essays on Theory and Practice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 275. Emphasis in original.
9 Felipe Fernàndez-Armesto, "Epilogue: What Is History *Now*," in *What Is History Now?*, ed. David Cannadine (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 155.
10 Donald A. Yerxa, ed. *Recent Themes in Historical Thinking: Historians in Conversation* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 3.
11 Martin McQuillan, "Paul de Man and Art History," in *Reading Rancière*, ed. Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp (London: Continuum, 2011), 174.

12 Hayden White, "The Practical Past," in White, *The Practical Past* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014), 18–19.
13 Martin L. Davies, *Historics: Why History Dominates Contemporary Society* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 3, emphasis in original.
14 Howard Zinn with David Barsamian, *Original Zinn: Conversations on History and Politics* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), 71.
15 American Historical Association, "Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct," updated January 2011, accessed 7/12/15, www.historians.org/jobs-and-professional-development/statements-and-standards-of-the-profession/statement-on-standards-of-professional-conduct#Profession.
16 Todd May, *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 89.
17 Ibid., 89.
18 Kalle Pihlainen, "The End of Oppositional History," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 15/4 (2011): 469, 480, 481. Indeed, arguing that history should be, and can be, politically neutral is as disingenuous as insisting that medicine and health is not a political issue. For the debate surrounding the *Lancet*'s coverage of the 2014 Gaza conflict, see "Lancet medical journal under attack for 'extremist hate propaganda' over its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," accessed 28/4/15, www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/major-medical-journal-lancet-under-attack-for-extremist-hate-propaganda-over-its-coverage-of-the-israelipalestinian-conflict-10199892.html.
19 May, *Poststructuralist Anarchism,* 92.
20 We take the term *historying* from Alun Munslow. See, for example, Munslow, *A History of History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 6, passim.
21 White, "Practical Past," 3–24.
22 Ibid., 3–24.
23 Ibid., 15.
24 Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 21.
25 Wendy Brown, *Politics Out of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4.
26 David Harlan, "Ken Burns and the Coming Crisis of Academic History," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 7/2 (2003): 184 and 187.
27 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), 92.
28 Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in *Power/Knowledge,* trans. and ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), 98.
29 May, *Poststructuralist Anarchism,* 52.
30 Ibid., 73.
31 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* trans. Brian Massumi (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 161.
32 See, for example the kinds of texts included in Alun Munslow and Robert Rosenstone, eds., *Experiments in Rethinking History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004); also in Keith Jenkins and Alun Munslow, eds. *The Nature of History Reader* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 115–239.
33 Kalle Pihlainen, "The End of Oppositional History," 470.
34 See "Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation Between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze," in *Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews,* trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 209.
35 Martin L. Davies, *Imprisoned By History: Aspects of a Historicized Life* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), xi and Martin L. Davies, *How History Works. The Reconstitution of a Human Science* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), passim.
36 The phrase "symbolic sites of struggle" is used by Zeina Maasri, *Off the Wall: Political Posters of the Lebanese Civil War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 16 and passim.

37 For the notion of a poster as a 'portable image' see Susan Sontag, "Posters: Advertisement, Art, Political Artefact, Commodity," in *The Art of revolution: 96 Posters from Cuba 1959–1970,* ed. Donald Stermer (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), last accessed 24/3/17, www.scribd.com/document/157634653/Posters-Susan-Sontag.

38 Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts discuss and develop Vladimir Jankélévitch's use of 'irreversible' and 'irrevocable' pasts in Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts, "Haunting Pasts: time and historicity as constructed by the Argentine *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* and radical Flemish nationalists," *Social History* 34/4 (2009).

39 Anthony Downey, "Contingency, Dissonance and Performativity, Critical Archives and Knowledge Production in Contemporary Art," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East,* ed. Anthony Downey, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 40.

40 Tim William Machan, "Editing, Orality, and Late Middle English Texts," in *Vox Intexta: Orality and Textuality in the Middle Ages,* ed. Alger N. Doane and Carol Braun Pasternack (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 229–45.

1

IMPRISONED BY HISTORY

The archaeology of hegemony

History as a coercive tool of dominant socio-economic interests

Megill presents history 'as a model of honesty and intelligence in the investigation of the human world'. He continues that 'historians are better placed to be epistemologically responsible' than other scholars and social scientists who 'deal with the pressing concerns of the moment' and that if we can't expect epistemological responsibility from historians then how can we expect it from 'politicians, intelligence agencies, journalists, business persons, therapists, clergy, lawyers, judges, and all the rest'.[1] The idea that the work of historians is socially edifying; that it provides a model for all other disciplines, for institutions and professionals; that it is epistemologically responsible in a manner that transcends that of other disciplines and institutional practices is not just simply problematic, it is a lie. Academic history, indeed all academic practice, is inherently politicised, and depends for its legitimisation on a 'micro-political ethology' that is a manifestation of the prevailing political and economic forces: '[h]istorical comprehension remains authoritative: it is endorsed by dominant power formations – state, economy, society, church, culture, [and] national heritage'.[2] While historians might argue that their work is an ideologically neutral, morally responsible knowledge audit, what counts as history is always bound up with relations of power and social practices. As Foucault noted,

> discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them.[3]

However, history is a discursive representation of "reality" that has extraordinary social authority. The 'historian-function' provides states with a narrative power that

legitimises and justifies: to the extent that 'historical comprehension' accounts for how things have got to be the way they are, it is in essence socially and politically conservative, an affirmation of the status quo as the inevitable telos, it 'operates as an all-purpose instrument of social management affirming dominant political, economic, and cultural interests'.[4] That the history-function as exemplified by academic historians is intimately connected to political and cultural authorities is exemplified by the website *History and Policy*.[5] Here historians keen to augment the "impact" of their work sign up as a 'self-appointed, reserve civil service' and offer a historical analysis of contemporary socio-political problems based on their knowledge of *the past*.[6] *History and Policy* contends that it is providing a platform for policy makers, journalists and historians to contact and learn from each other. But history does not 'teach us about how we got to where we are and how we might move forward', nor does it contribute to improving 'the quality of debate on contemporary issues and policy formation'; it instead validates and authorises these debates and policies through its contextualisation and truth function.[7] Academic history has long been practiced *as if* its value and authority reside in its ability to produce truth, where truth is understood as a correspondence of sorts to a noumenal reality. But pretending that history occupies an epistemologically foundational position is an illusion that needs to be abandoned. History is a discourse whose sources of cultural power are ultimately social and institutional.[8]

But this relationship between history and hegemonic institutions is mutually beneficial as exemplified by the state's production, collation and archiving of documents which, through the epistemological role they play in constructing history as an authorised discourse, create a vicious circle of hegemonic legitimisation. It can also be identified in the colonial historico-archaeological disinterring, measuring, photographing, analysing and display of ancient sites which always, implicitly or explicitly, construct a hierarchical relationship of dominance through the juxtaposition of the splendour of the monument and the poverty of a sometimes specified, but often unspecified other.[9] The coevality of the nineteenth-century institutionalisation of archaeology through the establishment of archaeological departments, surveys and directorates of museums and historical monuments in the occupied lands of colonial powers, with the establishment of a "modern" system of education for the colonial natives, provides a clue to the close relationship between museumification, education and the use of institutionalised past-talk (history and archaeology) in the service of the empire and also the nation-state. History, archaeology, and museum and heritage sites are all examples of 'political inheriting' – the display, legitimisation and articulation of hegemonic interests.[10] The main institutional instruments of historicisation developed into their modern forms concomitant with the new imperialism of the nineteenth century and the shift towards the nation-state as a means of delineating geo-political space. The archive, museum, school, archaeological site and memorial facilitated an imagination of identity, a rhetorics of legitimisation and a bureaucratisation of control.

The archive and the process of archivisation is fundamental in the discursive production and dissemination of knowledge. What is archived becomes fact – the archive is the ultimate foundation in appeals to truth and underlies history's

claims to plausibility. What is not archived is erased or side-lined to the realm of myth, memory and opinion. But the archive, while it can be 'a beautiful thing, [is] never a neutral one'.[11] Rather than a simple repository of facts, archives are closely enmeshed with bureaucracies of power and the state, as Derrida observed: '[t]here is no political power without control of the archives'.[12] And thus 'nothing enters the archive that is not in some sense destined to be there from the moment of its inception': the archive makes possible the constitution or discovery of facts as facts.[13] As such the collation, preservation, structuring and cataloguing of materials in the archive belies an always implicit, and sometimes explicit, violence.[14] As such, despite a veneer of openness, archival space is stringently controlled and policed. At one extreme is the destruction of government, military or administrative material that would usually be destined for a state archive, but which is deemed too politically sensitive or damaging even for disclosure after a thirty- or fifty-year embargo period. For example, orders were given to burn paperwork documenting the abuses inherent in British imperial practices, the torture and murder of colonial subjects in Kenya and other outposts of empire.[15] Alternatively, documents might be kept in undisclosed archives, files can be kept indefinitely sealed, misplaced, or improperly stored.[16] Thus, although campaigners have asked the UK Information Rights Tribunal to compel the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to release the full text (rather than the heavily redacted version) of a Foreign and Commonwealth Office document dating from 1977 detailing a conversation between FCO officials and Ian Henderson, the chief of police in Bahrain, the tribunal in 2015 agreed with the UK government that the release of the unredacted document would prejudice Britain's current defence interests in the region and thus confirmed its exemption from the thirty-year rule for the release of government papers.[17] Likewise, politically sensitive records in the South African National Archive, including some required by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and ones that related to the apartheid-era security establishment were liable to be improperly stored, and Jonker has described how an investigation into the failure of a Dutch peace-keeping force to prevent the massacre at Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995 was also hindered by shortcomings in official records management, particularly the incompleteness of Royal Army records.[18] In a similar manner, Ghosh explains how staff in Indian archives were particularly resistant to her research into personal and sexual relations between British men and local women in India during British colonial rule and tried to control and mediate her work in the archives.[19] On occasion, in order to forestall any potential criticism and to provide a veneer of transparency and access, archives can be opened to specifically sanctioned representatives of the state. Thus, although state-appointed historians were given access to archives in order to inform a parliamentary commission of inquiry set up in 2000 to investigate Belgium's responsibility in the murder in 1961 of the Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba, in the years since the closure of the commission, no one else has been given such privileged access, meaning that the findings of the experts can neither be confirmed nor denied.[20]

Archaeology: digging up the future

While some might argue that the origins of archaeology can be traced back to early modern antiquarians' descriptions of material monuments, before the nineteenth century the interest in antiquities was largely ad hoc and did not resemble the institutionalised discipline archaeology is today.[21] The collection of ancient artefacts shifted in the nineteenth century from demonstrating the learning and taste of an individual to proclaiming the achievements of a people and a state. Archaeology as a scientific endeavour and academic subject arose as part of the process of nineteenth-century colonialism and nation-building. Anderson argued that the grammar of colonial power was articulated most clearly through the census, map and museum; and embedded within these institutions of power was an archaeological past. Moreover, the development of archaeology as a discipline was closely intertwined with military technological advances in the early twentieth century, particularly in the fields of remote sensing, archaeological imaging and aerial photography. Not only was the practice of modern military reconnaissance situated originally in the desire of photographers and archaeologists to view ancient sites from the air, but subsequent archives of military photographs have been instrumental in the work of archaeologists and in the 'manufacture of narratives, myths and national terminology' so fundamental to the imagination of national identities.[22]

Archaeology is thus unavoidably political and has always had a close association with the infrastructure of the state, perhaps because large archaeological digs generally require considerable financial support or perhaps because of its visibility: not only can artefacts be displayed in national museums, but archaeological sites can easily be transformed into sites where nationality or empire are ceremonially performed, sites which can be marked on maps or reproduced as iconic images, sites that embody the social memory of the nation.[23] Kohl distinguishes between national and nationalistic archaeology, where the former term refers to archaeology undertaken in a nation-state context and the latter refers to the policies adopted by the state which use archaeological data specifically for the purposes of nation-building and the imagination of a national identity.[24] While archaeologists in the service of a state have at times manipulated, or in extreme cases forged, archaeological remains to legitimise claims to political control over a particular territory, the absence of such explicit manipulation does not mean that archaeology is depoliticised and offers an unproblematic scientific presentation of the facts.[25] Although the use of archaeology in well-established nations can appear to be non-politicised, neutral and objective, this is not the case. Rather, the fact that the practices and genre norms of archaeology embody and articulate a nation-state dominated discourse have become normalised or internalised to such a degree that they create an objectivity effect.

Nationalism is understood here, not in an essentialist or primordialist sense; the nation is not a natural entity. Instead, the nation is understood as a socially constructed or imagined geo-political organisation that is constantly performed and

reinvented.[26] To assume that a national identity is co-extensive with a distinct ethnic or racial identity and that this ethno-national identity is enduring and can exist continuously and unbroken over millennia is at best disingenuous and naïve, and at worst legitimises oppressive practices. Key constituents of a community's *national identity* include the imagination of a distinct or unique culture in which a shared religion, language, culture or narrated past play a fundamental role, as well as a narrative of autochthonous development. The interpretative versatility of archaeology means it was, and is, very well suited for validating and disseminating myths of ethno-genesis – it was therefore not only instrumental in legitimising the existence of nations, but also in constituting them. Moreover, the lack of precision dating in the early decades of the profession permitted a scientific veneer to be given to myths of origin: one could not establish exactly how old an artefact was, only that it was old. The material remains that archaeology produces therefore provide a means by which myths of origin and claims to longevity can be conceptualised as factual knowledge – it creates a continuity between ancient cultures and contemporary ethno-cultural groups; it unites a land and a people. As Silberman argued,

> all archaeological stories . . . can be read as narratives of the inevitability of certain lands to be conquered and the right of certain people to rule. . . . Archaeological remains, when preserved and presented to the public, are almost always monuments either to generalized notions of progress or of *someone's* inalienable historical and political rights.[27]

The development of Mesopotamian archaeology was integral to the colonialist enterprise, specifically the rhetorical legitimisation of colonialism as part of a broader "civilising mission".[28] Within the western Eurocentric and imperialistic meta-narrative of civilisational progress, Mesopotamia is conceptualised as not only 'the place of world culture's first infantile steps: first writing, laws, architecture', but also the root of western culture. Following the French invasion of Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century saw western imperial powers competing with each other to uphold their national honour and demonstrate their civilised status through the exhumation, preservation and deciphering of various ancient Mesopotamian stone inscriptions and artefacts. These looted ancient architectural works of art, displayed as symbols of 'imperialistic advancement and national prestige', were transformed into French or British imperial and national symbols and placed in newly formed national museums, or erected in public spaces, where they were incorporated into performances of nation and empire in which the west was imagined as the natural civilisational heir of ancient southwest Asian cultures.[29] The explanatory narratives, maps and labels that narrated these archaeological and architectural remains made no reference to the current local inhabitants – modern Iraqis, Egyptians, Palestinians or Iranians – as heirs of the Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian cradle of civilisation. Instead, by virtue of an interpretative deftness, the modern west was, and is, figured as the teleological end point of a single evolutionary process of human civilisational development.[30]

In a similar manner, archaeology in Palestine has been closely associated with the intertwined projects of western imperialism, settler-colonial expansion and nation-state legitimisation.[31] The first archaeological explorations of Palestine, undertaken by the key European imperial powers, should be seen as part of a wider imperial western penetration of the area, with scholars (including historians and archaeologists) acting 'as agents of direct political influence' of the western imperial powers in the Ottoman Empire.[32] The first European archaeological surveys in Palestine concentrated on what has become known as biblical archaeology; that is, the sites chosen for excavation and the interpretative framework for analysis were dominated by a concern to research events from the Bible, and thus Palestine became a significant site of cultural origins in the story of European-Christian civilisation.[33] Archaeological surveys constructed knowledge that was useful not only for stories of origin and domination but also for more practical military and economic purposes. Indeed, the borders of Palestine that would be finalised in future colonial mandate discussions were in many ways constructed by the activities of these European archaeologists and cartographers, and were a combination of their beliefs as to the extent of biblical Palestine combined with more practical considerations concerning geographical terrain.[34] However, the colonising rhetoric employed by the British in occupying Palestine was a variation on the standard "civilising mission" narrative. The primary aim was not the necessity of educating the "primitive" natives, but was the need to protect a space that had 'since prehistoric times' been critical 'in the development of civilization', and guarantee it be open to all religions and 'not dominated by any single race or creed'.[35] As such, British colonial archaeology in Palestine generally marginalised the indigenous population. British accounts of Palestinian life in British Mandate Palestine adopted colonialist narratives of governance and legitimacy that conflated modernity and development with a right to live on the land. By narrating Palestinians as backward, unproductive and incapable of effectively working the land, the implication was that they did not deserve to live there, and their removal in favour of the more modern Zionist colonial-settlers favoured by British imperialism was thus legitimised.[36] Moreover, the assumption of the British colonial administration was that the indigenous population of the area were not sufficiently educated to excavate, preserve or interpret such an important heritage. Instead, the world-making aspect of archaeology was employed by Zionist settler-colonialists who through the excavation of sites of ancient Jewish presence, visualised the land visible as inherently Jewish.

Just as archaeology has functioned as a key imperial and national discipline in colonial and nation-state imaginations of self and other around the world, it became a central scientific discipline, and played a critical role, in the development and enactment of the Israeli state's 'colonial-national historical imagination and in the substantiation of its territorial claims' largely because Israeli colonial settlement and the legitimising national narrative was, and is, articulated as a narrative of redemption in which a people finally return to their original land.[37] Archaeology has been a dominant knowledge-making practice in Israel not only constituting, and authorising, itself as a discipline, but transforming ideology into incontrovertible

facts through which 'historical-national claims, territorial transformations, heritage objects and historicities "happen"'.[38] By providing a foundational myth of origin, it has legitimised both the Israeli nation-state and the territories occupied and colonised by Israeli settlers and the military in the post-1967 period. It has also, as we will discuss later, played a role in erasing a non-Jewish Palestinian presence from Israel-Palestine.

Israeli archaeology has almost exclusively worked within a nationalist framework in that the epistemology underlying the discipline assumes that the archaeological record will contain remnants of nations and ethnic groups that can be clearly identified.[39] In many ways archaeology has produced the state of Israel (and increasingly the occupied West Bank) as *the* Jewish national home through its identification and creation of an ancient Israelite/Jewish nation that forms the foundation for an uninterrupted occupancy of the land and thus made it visible as an intrinsically Jewish space.[40] In this manner, the activities of the settler-colonialists, the displacement of the majority of the indigenous population, and the appropriation of occupied territory were legitimised through the narrative of redemption, a returning home. Zionist archaeology had a distinct 'presentist vision', arguing for a 'unitary, continuous and contiguous' Hebrew past and present. Some, such as Benvensti, went so far as to deny the notion of antiquity, and thus challenged the idea of temporal distance, collapsing the past and the present; 'for the people of Israel in the Land of Israel there are no antiquities, everything is alive'.[41] For these adherents of the *yedi'at ha-aretz* [knowledge of the country] national-cultural movement, the past was an irrevocable past, one that endured into the present and was fundamental in building the Hebrew nation anew. The rhetorics of Israeli state legitimisation are articulated to a large extent through a historicisation of religious discourse and a concomitant metanarrative of redemption and return. The claim to historical rights to the land are based on biblical narratives of a Hebrew Israelite presence dating back to more than 2000 years. The determination of 'Jewish or Israelite ruins' and artefacts were seen as a 'physical confirmation of the modern Jewish right to the land', and the excavation of Galilean Jewish cities as well as ancient synagogues was 'fundamental to this cartography of continuity'.[42]

And key to this claim was the production and interpretation of archaeological artefacts that affirmed the status of narratives outlined in religious texts – primarily the Bible – as reliable, true knowledge: archaeology thus played a significant role in the establishment of biblical narratives as incontrovertible fact. The landscape, the land itself, was seen as a font of authentic and objective historical knowledge. If properly interpreted, it was argued, the material objects found would confirm the accuracy of biblical tales. As archaeological excavations delineated the movements of the biblical Israelites, Canaanites and Philistines, these communities, who had previously only inhabited religious narratives, were historicised, reified in a contemporary landscape, and made visible.[43] But it was the biblical texts that provided the framework within which archaeological analysis took place. And as Abu El-Haj demonstrates, this archaeological knowledge, rather than corroborate the biblical stories, was itself given shape and meaning by these same stories. The interpretation

of identified remains relied on information drawn from biblical texts, which were in turn validated by the presence of material archaeological remains, creating a circular process of epistemological reinforcement. Zionist archaeologists presumed the existence of ancient Israelite settlements in the Galilee (and biblical Palestine) on their basis of reading the Bible as a historical document. Moreover, in Israeli archaeological practice, archaeological periods have been designated with ethnic, rather than the more usual labels: thus the Canaanite period I-III and the Israelite Period I and II instead of the Bronze Age I-III and the Iron Age I-II. This use of ethnic names presupposes the existence of distinct archaeological cultures and entities that can clearly be demarcated as 'remnants of identifiable nations and ethnic groups'. This ethno-historical periodisation becomes part of the academic framework within which archaeological remains are identified and classified.[44] This presumption of Israelite settlements enabled the identification of particular pottery shards as 'Israelite pottery' and in turn was then taken to provide empirically factual evidence that verified the Bible's textual accounts. For example, in the early twentieth century when Albright was excavating Tell el-Ful, he found ceramic material finds from the Iron I period that he classified as "Israelite" on the basis that they appeared to indicate a material-cultural break and thus had to represent a new culture in early Iron Age Palestine, which could only be Israelite: a conclusion that presented itself as reasonable primarily because of the fundamental role that biblical texts, and their narrative of a Israelite invasion, played in the establishment of an interpretative framework for archaeological finds in Palestine.[45] The application or invocation of the term *Israelite* to a chronological period, types of pottery and architecture essentially 'performs nationality in the very ontology of material-cultural things'; it enacts and reifies the nation.[46] The interpretation of pottery remains formed a significant part of archaeologists' identification of an ethnically distinct Israelite culture, but biblical narratives provided the interpretative framework for identifying these as critical breaks in the material-cultural record that might signify conquest, rather than ruptures that might simply signify internal changes. The texts provided the interpretative structure within which the archaeological remains could be constituted as empirical facts.[47]

Archaeological evidence is not found; it is made. When archaeologists excavate an area of land, they carve particular types of objects out of the ground, they make particular kinds of remains visible, and only those remains recognised as significant are recorded and subsequently interpreted.[48] Discovered artefacts have a particular epistemological resonance. In Israel, as elsewhere, specific kinds of sites and material remains were recognised as important, and they were excavated, preserved and interpreted. As with the archaeological establishment of Israelite settlements and the confirmation of the narrative of the displacement of the Canaanites discussed earlier, the archaeological construction of Jerusalem has been focused on the production of empirical evidence that will validate or authenticate biblical events.[49] The Israeli excavation and display of archaeological architecture and remains in Jerusalem has privileged those eras which can be interpreted as evidence of Jerusalem as a Jewish city and which therefore project a vision of a coherent, enduring

Jewish nation.[50] Although some of the excavations recorded and catalogued material remains that could have been used to ask more social-historical questions regarding the practices of everyday life in Iron Age Jerusalem, Israeli archaeology particularly in occupied East Jerusalem, has tended to focus exclusively on the settlement and fortification of the area by the Israelites, their subsequent wars with the Babylonians in the Iron Age, and the Roman destruction of the splendours of Herodian Jerusalem in 70 C.E.[51] This has been done to confirm the biblical narrative, demonstrate not only the originary status, but also the civilisational achievements of the Israelite culture, and to articulate a narrative of national ascendance, cohesion and subsequent demise.

In particular, the architectural remains of public works or aristocratic homes, such as the Herodian Mansion and the Burnt House, attest not only to the civilisational splendour of the Israelites, but through the narratives of their construction and destruction, they articulate a national-historical tale, and stand as 'the cultural heritage of a returning modern nation'.[52] Their depiction of 'eras of national ascendance and moments of national demise' testify to the establishment of a splendid Hebrew city and culture, which was destroyed by the Romans and the Hebrews forced into a long exile, before finally returning to their homeland.[53] Moreover, emphasis placed by Israeli guides in the various archaeological museums on the foundational status of the Hebrew city as original and built on bedrock, in contrast to the later accretions of Byzantine, Arab or Islamic buildings, combined with the archaeological (re)construction of the old Jewish Quarter of Ottoman Jerusalem has worked to present the city as an 'old-new (Jewish) place and the symbolic center of the unified capital of the Israeli state'.[54]

This enthusiasm to reveal the 'strata in which Jewish (colonial) national imagination is rooted' has at times perhaps inadvertently erased evidence of the other peoples and cultures who have lived in Jerusalem and Palestine/Israel: something that is exemplified by the use of bulldozers to remove the more 'recent remains' in some Israeli archaeological practice.[55] The strata of pre-eminent interest to Israeli archaeologists is that from the Iron Age to the early Roman period, so material remains from later periods and particularly from the Islamic period are often seen as of little or no significance. Of course, Israel isn't the only country where bulldozers and archaeologists find themselves working almost simultaneously. In a different context, the downtown area of post-war Beirut was largely bulldozed to the ground in preparation for reconstruction. Although some archaeological teams worked on the site for limited periods most of the area was simply bulldozed, with archaeologists following the bulldozers trying to salvage whatever they could, thereby destroying any opportunity for detailed archaeological research.[56] Naccache criticises the missed opportunity for undertaking a proper archaeological study of the site in Beirut largely because he believes it could have helped to write a consensual national Lebanese history – one that did not simply project back modern confessional differences onto ancient Phoenician and Arab communities.

Concomitant with the archaeological making of modern Israel has been a transformative cartographical project of renaming that through the creation of a spatial

history 'symbolizes the imperial project of permanent possession through dispossession'.[57] In the context of Israel the renaming of natural and socio-cultural geographical features such as mountains, streams, valleys, villages, shrines and wells with Hebrew names by the Governmental Names Committee [*Va'adat ha-Shemot ha-Memshaltit*] remade the land, erasing reminders of an indigenous Arab past.[58] The renaming was conceptualised as a cleansing 'of foreign names' and a return to the old, *original* names.[59] These new Hebrew 'names *belonged* to the land itself' and because they were biblical names they were the 'original names' in a way that the 'foreign sounds' of the Arabic names of the indigenous population were not.[60] The desire to replace the old Arabic names with Hebrew names was such that when there were no longer sufficient Biblical or Hebrew names available 'to fill a modern map', the committee translated Arabic names into Hebrew or gave Hebrew forms to existing Arabic names.[61]

However, '[t]he archaeology of power – to name, classify and domesticate – doubles as the means to obliterate, silence and negate other histories and ways of dwelling in the same space'.[62] What happens when the 'historic and built environment', the history taught in schools, the events that are commemorated, exclude, silence or marginalise citizens? What kind of national identity is fostered through exclusion? Historicisation as a form of cultural production is a fundamental component of the performance of social visibility. But equally the 'co-determinative of the visible' is the invisible – that which is erased.[63] What, one might ask, is the 'co-determinative of the visible' in the context of Israeli archaeology? If history is being amplified for the sake of dominant political or national interests, is it also being withheld from others? Co-extensive with archaeological efforts to narrate and thus constitute a continuity between ancient Hebrew populations and the modern Israeli state in Israel/Palestine has been an attempted erasure of any significant, enduring Palestinian presence, including 'not just the elimination of populations, but the confiscation or destruction of the material basis of their historical culture', the destruction of villages, the renaming of shrines and geographical places, looting of libraries, archives and photographic evidence of the culture.[64] The Palestinian past has been systematically destroyed through a strategic re-historicisation.

Education and indoctrination

Davies argues that history isn't simply susceptible to being employed by nefarious colonial or nationalist agendas. He contends that it is always and only an 'indispensible information-management technology' whose production makes universities, as well as heritage institutions, the ideal, compliant instruments of socially dominant interests, governmental and cultural policies, colonialism, nationalism and today's neo-liberal ideology.[65] The academic function, says Davies, 'sponsored as it is by the state, blocks any knowledge that "won't reproduce the prevailing order" or won't affirm received values'.[66] In one sense this instrumental use of history is to be expected. As Keith Jenkins has argued, it would be perverse for government agencies to allocate such sizeable funds to history teaching in schools and (at least

until recently in the UK) universities, and to support historical research and heritage activities, unless they believed that in doing so they were helping to reproduce forms of social cohesion and acquiescence in current political arrangements.[67] History as taught in schools

> must serve to inculcate in the student a strong sense of responsibility for the future. It must foster a belief in the importance of social activism. Our goal is not to create historians but mold citizens who will, one day, themselves make and shape history.[68]

Because history is the technological 'management system of the historicised world . . . a technology of technologies'; because it 'reinforces its comprehensive control of the social imagination through its efficacy'; and because it is a pre-eminent, authoritative social-cognitive practice, it is the ideal vehicle for the dissemination and mobilisation of hegemonic 'image realities' of dominant social groups under the guise of objective, neutral, impartial knowledge – the facts of the matter.[69] More specifically, as textbooks are designed to present 'an authoritative pedagogic version of an area of knowledge', and history textbooks are, moreover, the quintessential manifestation of the cultural productions of a 'complex network of relations of "authority"', they are the ideal means to act as "memory agents" and disseminate the narratives and symbols that work to constitute and construct a 'standpoint of what is common to the community' – the nation's collective memory.[70] They may 'pretend to teach neutral, legitimate knowledge, [but] they are often used as ideological tools to promote a certain belief system and legitimize an established political and social order', they 'contribute to social relations of power and domination': in other words, the selection and organisation of knowledge in school textbooks around the world is an ideological process that aims to provide a 'usable past'.[71]

Textbooks and curricula have been an integral part of Palestinian colonisation from the British colonial mandate period until present-day Israeli settler-colonialism. The British approach to non-Jewish Palestinian education in Mandate Palestine was that of reinforcing traditional norms and values; education was not seen as a means for social and political change. In particular, the colonial powers were mindful to ensure that the Palestinian population were "immunised" against nationalist feelings that might threaten British colonial rule. To this end the teaching of contemporary history was excluded from the official curricula.[72] This colonial model of education – that is, a model with the intention of delegitimising both Arab and Palestinian nationalism – was continued after the establishment of Israel with regard to the education of the remnants of the Palestininan population who were still living in the newly established state of Israel.[73] The education of Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel was, and still is, segregated, and while the curricula share some goals, they are not parallel, particularly with regard to the teaching of history.[74]

In the early decades of the Israeli state, the curriculum in Palestinian schools in Israel placed a noticeable emphasis on Arab-Jewish co-existence, something that

contrasted with the curriculum of Jewish schools, which focused on promoting a Zionist-Jewish national consciousness and stressing the achievements of Jews in establishing the culture of humankind.[75] The curriculum goals in the Palestinian schools left no real space for any form of Palestinian nationalism, and the emphasis was instead on the efforts of all nations as responsible for the culture of humankind.[76] After 1970 the curricula goals of school history were modified and did allow for the fostering of a sense of identification with a broadly conceived Arab nation and culture, but one which was decidedly not Palestinian.[77] Indeed, Abu-Sa'ad argues that the Palestinian school curriculum in Israel 'is designed to "de-educate", or dispossess, indigenous Palestinian pupils of the knowledge of their own people and history . . . and suppresses any aspects that challenge or contradict the Zionist narrative and mission'.[78] As such it intersects with the official Israeli argument that there was and is no such thing as a Palestinian nation or people, so they have no right to land or a nation-state; Palestinians are simply Arabs and thus should be happy living in other Arab nations.[79]

Similarly, following the 1967 war and the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), who were responsible for the education of displaced Palestinian children in refugee camps, had to come to an agreement with Israel in order to continue teaching Palestinian children in the Occupied Territories. This "accommodation" consisted in the censorship of textbooks used in all UNRWA schools to exclude any hostile reference to Israel; the excision of all references to Palestinian national history and identity as well as references to Palestine as a geographical entity; the removal of the words Palestine, liberation or *fida'yi*; and the replacement of Arabic place names on maps with their Hebrew equivalent.[80] Moreover, according to a UN report, 'any teacher trying to . . . create nationalistic sentiments among the students is most likely doomed for transfer, dismissal or other punitive measures including arrest, detention or fine'.[81]

Podeh acknowledges that Israeli textbooks were once 'replete with bias, prejudice, errors, misrepresentations and even deliberate omissions' and that Palestinians were portrayed in negative stereotypical ways. However, his analysis ultimately tells a story of Israeli textbooks that embodies the typical meta-narrative of progression in that he argues that since the end of the 1990s, there has been a radical change in the new "third generation" of history textbooks, and the "new narrative" in many, if not all of them, presents 'a balanced picture of the Arab-Israeli conflict' and 'attest[s] to a more confident society willing to confront its past, with all its flaws'.[82] This view is challenged by Nurit Peled-Elhanan, who illustrates how the Israeli state continues to use textbooks to create a 'usable past' that justifies Zionist ideology and de-legitimises Palestinian claims.[83] Rather than reading post-1984 textbooks as "more balanced" in their eschewal of crude stereotypes and their rejection of the obvious manipulation of the past found in earlier books, Peled-Elhanen argues that these post-1984 textbooks continue to intersect with, and reproduce, the hegemonic Israeli-Zionist meta-narrative that presents the Palestinians as a problem in the wider context of Israel's need for land and security. Palestinians are almost always

depicted in such textbooks by 'racist icons or demeaning classificatory images' as 'terrorists, refugees or primitive farmers'; none of the Israeli textbooks studied by Peled-Elhanen 'contain photographs of Palestinian human beings'.[84] Indeed, even in contemporary academic writing about Israeli textbooks, Palestinians are still referred to as the 'Arab *problem*'. Podeh, for example, argues that the Israeli 'education system's failure to address the Arab *problem* stemmed from two factors'.[85] The first factor, Podeh argues, arose from the fact that 'the Arabs had not been given a place in the newly created collective memory of the Jewish (Israeli) nation' and was the 'challenge of coalescing a collective memory for a nation composed of numerous immigrant groups, each with its own background and history', which 'was difficult enough without complicating matters further by inserting the Israeli Arabs'.[86] Podeh's identification of the factors contributing to the 'Arab *problem*' in effect ignores the ideological role that textbooks play in promoting a certain belief system and legitimising an established political and social order that he so carefully outlined at the beginning of his article; they instead provide an *apologia* of sorts.

Peled-Elhanen argues that a fundamental function of Israeli school books has been to connect Jewish Israeli students to their "origins" in Israel. Just as both the public and academic strands of Israeli archaeology discussed previously seek to present Israeli Jews as the direct descendants of the biblical Hebrews, 'home-coming indigenes' who are a manifestation of a direct continuation of the biblical kingdom of Judea, so too do Israeli textbooks.[87] A practice that is reinforced cartographically through practices of renaming and a concomitant obliteration of evidence of Palestinian existence through 'geographic or toponomyc silences'.[88] For example, cartographical representations of Israel in school books depict the illegal settler colonies as visually the same as Israeli cities such as Tel Aviv; Palestinian place names are erased or Hebraised; and the occupied West Bank is presented as part of Israel, but renamed with the biblical toponyms, Judea and Samaria.[89] In such a manner the occupation and confiscation of lands is legitimised as redemption and imbued with a sacred validity.[90] Such a renaming reinforces the religio-political narrative of origin that much Israeli archaeology articulates and that provides a key foundation to the legitimising rhetoric of the Israeli state.

Israeli textbooks are not alone in their conceptualisation of ancient peoples as providing a direct link to, and thus geo-political legitimisation of, current communities. As a result of the interim accords that created the Palestinian Authority in 1994, Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza were granted the power to write their own textbooks and curricula. Groiss provides examples from a number of Palestinian textbooks that position the 'Canaanite Arabs' as the direct ancestors or "forefathers" of the Palestinians – 'the first ones who settled in Palestine' – who remained 'in spite of the successive invasion waves that descended upon their country' and who built a great civilisation.[91] Moreover, criticisms concerning the presence of negative stereotypes, prejudice and misrepresentation in the narration of the past can also be levelled at Palestinian textbooks.[92] As Groiss notes, on occasion the maps in some Palestinian textbooks omit the term *Israel*, and sometimes textbooks describe places that are holy to both Jews and Muslims by the name used

in Islamic tradition, for example, references to the Mosque of Abraham, rather than the Cave of the Patriarchs as it is known in Jewish tradition.[93] Negative depictions are obviously deplorable and not conducive to the peaceable co-existence of Israelis and Palestinians. However, in the context of the dramatic asymmetry of power in virtually all aspects of the lives of Palestinians, who live in exile in refugee camps or under the violent and oppressive Israeli occupation or blockade, it is worth asking how Palestinians could actually go about re-inhabiting the nominally de-colonised field of education while still stateless and living within the colonial 'architecture of occupation'? how could they avoid performing the 'colonial present'? how realistic would it be to change the 'existing attitude featured in the books' to the 'active peace-orientated curriculum' Groiss desires, and what would this consist of? Is it even possible for Palestinians to articulate their right to return to the homes that they were ethnically cleansed from in a way that is not interpreted by Israeli audiences as a 'message of a delayed war for the liquidation of the State of Israel'?[94]

The collusion between the education system and the state in silencing politically problematic counter-hegemonic narratives occurs in all political systems to varying degrees. We have discussed in another publication how the Teddy Katz case demonstrates how academia, media and the state's educational and judicial institutions all provide a 'professional and scholarly scaffold' for hegemonic narrations of the past.[95] That such collusion is to a degree pervasive in all societies is evident in the last-minute cancellation by the University of Southampton of a conference on *International Law and the State of Israel* that was initially approved by the university in 2014 and scheduled to be held 17–19 April 2015. After significant political pressure from government ministers, Conservative members of parliament and pro-Israel lobby groups for it to be cancelled or for more pro-Israel speakers to be included, the university decided to cancel it, ostensibly on health and safety grounds.[96] Many academics criticised the university's decision, arguing that it was an attack on free speech and that the university had capitulated to political pressure.[97] The decision to cancel was upheld by the High Court in a judgement issued on 8 April 2015 refusing permission to bring a judicial review of the decision at the request of the conference organisers. Far from providing a neutral and unpartisan space for the pursuit of objective knowledge, universities are intricately entwined in the socio-political power-knowledge nexus.

Public space and cultural remembrance: museums, murals, mausoleums

The role of museums in modern states is complex. Modern heritage institutions are polyvalent hybrids: they embed a multiplicity of narratives that interweave past-focused narratives with presentist ideologies. Through their institutionalisation of a particular form of past-talk, museums function as official repositories of so-called national values; articulate collective memory; incite national pride; inculcate particular values through education; constitute identities; historicise reality; institutionalise the past; explain, justify and administer; and through their demonstration

of the 'latest thing' as the 'same old thing' they legitimise the status quo, create, reflect, disseminate and mobilise support for dominant socio-political narratives and anaesthetise any 'last pang of intellectual and ethical consciousness' – they do our thinking for us.[98]

Modernist-era museums were designed as sites of entertainment and instruction: spaces in which works of high culture were treated as instruments of social management for rapidly expanding populations in the industrial era.[99] They were places in which visitors were exposed to hierarchies of cultural values, told about the gains of technological progress and shown how colonialism brought the "wonders of the world" home to European peoples, and offered civilisation to non-Europeans. By providing contextual settings in which works of culture could be refashioned, museums were able to render these works suitable for use within governmental programmes that aimed to reshape 'general norms of social behaviour'.[100] By so doing they aimed to produce the kind of civilised and knowledgeable citizens that modern states and modern capital increasingly required. In particular, the proliferation of museums commemorating conflict and veterans in the twenty-first century responds to and articulates current nationalist projects, which also 'act as marketing devices for inciting nationalist pride, as legitimizing loci for political mobilization, and as spaces for spiritual nourishment and renewal'.[101] That history-focused behaviour is still exploited as an ideological or socio-political tool is reflected in the comments of Tessa Jowell that '[t]he historic environment and wider heritage contributes to a wide range of Government ambitions to cut crime, promote inclusion, improve educational achievement'.[102] Moreover, by encouraging 'people [to] better understand and engage with their history', she contends that heritage helps 'slay that poverty of aspiration which holds so many people back from fulfilling their potential' – access to our history through heritage institutions such as museums can not only 'reconcile public attitudes to the economic injustices that prevail' but it can also, apparently, 'remedy socio-economic discrimination'.[103]

But, contrary to Jowell's cheerfully optimistic faith in the capacity of heritage institutions to remedy economic inequalities engendered by the neo-liberal capitalist economic system, as Davies cogently argues, the museum is instead a fundamental part of such a system; it is a powerful socio-economic agent encouraging and supplying our 'unquenchable, nostalgic desire' and 'fostering the ludic activity, the "creativity" essential to the latest imperatives of the mercurial, postmodern economy'. In a historicised society we are coerced into valuing heritage because it can then be aligned with economic value.[104] Moreover, museums offer the perfect platform for *history-wash*, the sponsorship of archaeo-historical exhibitions that extol the unique culture, history and geography of particular communities by corporations who are engaged in the financial and material exploitation of that very same environment. For years, large multi-national corporations have utilised arts sponsorship as a means of mitigating the socio-political impact of their harmful social, economic and environmental activities; they have sought social licence, acceptability and approval through a practice of *art-wash*.[105] But large corporations also sponsor exhibitions in prestigious national heritage institutions that are more

obviously concerned with the past. British Petroleum (BP), which has a crude oil refinery in Kwinana, Western Australia, and also operates numerous off-shore, deep-water oil rigs and was responsible for the largest oil spill in U.S. waters, supported the *Indigenous Australia: enduring civilisation* and the *Sunken Cities: Egypt's lost worlds* exhibitions at the British Museum.[106] The topics chosen for sponsorship are unlikely to be coincidental, but are instead aimed at mitigating any negative public reaction to the company's environmental damage and procuring social licence.

The state also uses its financial power to purchase social-capital through the sponsorship of forms of past-talk in narratives of persuasion in the public space. Through the dissemination of images and text in public spaces and heritage institutions, Iran employs a sophisticated integration of eschatological and sacred referentiality together with references to key moments from revolutionary past events to maintain the state's revolutionary Islamic ideology. While the Iranian revolution in 1979 started off as a 'pluralistically-orientated revolution' consisting of 'nationalist, communist and religious-Islamic groups', very quickly the latter employed a series of media strategies that combined commemoration of revolutionary martyrs, key events from Shi'ite history, and revolutionary and liberationalist narratives to effectively re-define the revolution as 'a decidedly "Islamic" revolution'.[107] Aware that '[h]e who controls images controls thought, belief, and ideology', after the revolution Iran turned itself into a 'museum of furious art', with the state sponsoring a phenomenal production of revolutionary and propagandistic images in the public space in the form of posters, films, stamps, murals, textbooks, paintings and graffiti.[108] These were instrumental in consolidating remembrance of the revolution as exclusively 'religious-Islamic' – a process that was reinforced by the long and bloody eight-year war that followed Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 – and were employed to remind Iranians of their duty to support the revolutionary ideology; to contribute to the imagination of the new Islamic republic; to mobilise support for the war with Iraq; and to ensure social conformity and political obedience.[109] While Chapter 5 in the present volume discusses the counter-hegemonic socio-political role that Iranian images of martyrdom have played, it is pertinent here to discuss the Iranian state's use of the memorialisation of martyrdom, visually in the urban public space, and in heritage institutions, as a means of not only disseminating a particular revolutionary ideology and politics, but also as a means of effecting social compliance.[110] Revolutions are not simply political or military conflicts; they are also struggles over memory. With the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, there was a need to create 'a counter-historical narrative that was ideally structured to fit the new teleology of the revolution'.[111] However, it is important not to interpret the significance and role that martyrdom plays in Iran as either evidence of a pre-modern (or primitive) attitude of the Iranian state or of an Islamic commitment to jihad and martyrdom. In contrast, Talebi argues that it is entirely

> in tune with the totalizing nature of the Enlightenment [that] in constructing the state and governing the nation, the ideologs of the Islamic Republic

> incorporate myth, deity and stories of origins to formulate their own regimes of truth, power and knowledge.[112]

The past in various forms is a key feature of Iranian state narratives of persuasion. While the commemoration of martyrs of the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war is a ubiquitous feature of various heritage sites and urban visual narratives, such events, as well as contemporary politics, are interpreted through a Shi'ite soteriological framework of salvation and the mourning rituals of *Ashura* that commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein.[113] In particular, they provide a context for modern Iranian understandings of martyrdom and underpin the way in which cultural institutions such as the Central Martyrs' Museum and the Behesht-i Zahra cemetery in Tehran provide a stage for communal acts of remembrance and mourning that ultimately work to constitute a civic body.[114] The Central Martyrs' Museum, originally begun in 1980 to commemorate the martyrs of the revolution, has been expanded twice and now commemorates both those who died fighting for the revolution and the martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war.[115] This memorial-museum functions as a sacred space, a *lieu de mémoire*, and a public archive. Through various installation techniques and visual motifs it embodies a ritual or therapeutic zone that thereby facilitates the remembrance of trauma and death.[116] It works as a means of articulating and enforcing national cohesion, thereby generating a shared sense of mission, encouraging political mobilisation and effecting compliance at a time when the direct memory of both conflicts passes into cultural memory.[117] The museum, both through its contextualisation of the narratives of the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war within dominant religious and nationalist discourses, including a framework of Shi'ite martyrology, and through its conscious employment of culturally resonant metaphors for, and symbols of, Karbala, utilises the symbolic power of religio-national martyrdom to legitimise both events as the struggle of activists and heroes standing firm against injustice and adversity, and therefore works to promulgate and inculcate Iranian state ideology.[118] Although, through the commemoration of martyrs in the museum from among Iran's non-Muslim minorities, an attempt is made to universalise martyrdom or to construe it as a national sacrifice, such minority narratives are absorbed into the hegemonic Shi'ite commemorative and mourning discourse in a sanitised, "politically correct" and homogenising manner: no real attempt is made to give voice to alternative ethno-cultural expression.[119]

Tehran's Behesht-i Zahra cemetery is also a significant social-political space 'for the routinization of state ideology' and the articulation and enforcement of state power.[120] Ayatollah Khomeini gave his first speech on his return to Iran from exile at the cemetery alongside the graves of martyrs of the Shah's regime. Here billboards depicting the dead bodies of martyrs, the faces of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei and images of flowers and birds symbolising the martyrs from the Iran-Iraq war, many of whom are buried there, contextualise the cemetery and construct a potential reading that martyrdom is not just, at times, a necessity, but is a virtue to be pursued in itself. The state's construction of martyrdom is inclusive; it is for everyone. This is achieved through a number of ways, most commonly through the

presentation of martyrs as ordinary Iranians who sacrificed their lives for their faith and nation. Their graves at Behesht-i Zahra and the exhibits in the Central Martyrs' Museum include, in addition to images of Imam Hussein and quotations about the virtue of martyrdom, photographs of the martyrs in their everyday life before martyrdom, personal objects and artefacts such as education certificates, glasses, prayer beads, watches, clothes and for the child martyrs, toys, ribbons and school bags. Mirrors are also employed in both places to directly include the visitor in the martyrology narrative: as the visitor looks at the grave of the martyr, their own image is reflected back to them, effecting a form of 'total social control'.[121]

As with the Martyrs' Museum, the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini, by virtue of its architectural tectonics and its role in promulgating Shi'ite practices of mourning and pilgrimage, is both a religious edifice, a Shi'ite shrine and a civic monument or state symbol that articulates the 'propagandistic agenda of the republic': it functions as a sign of both religious and national identity.[122] The tomb, with its golden dome and minarets resembles the Shi'ite shrine of Imam Hussein at Karbala, but also that of Fatima al-Ma'suma in Qom, thereby intertextually referencing both Imam Hussein's martyrdom and the origins of the 1979 Iranian revolution in the Qom *madrasa* uprisings.[123] But its accessible location, vast, open, hypostyle hall, informal atmosphere, and functional, but not elaborate, building materials and decoration mark it as 'a public space belonging to the Iranian people'.[124] And yet, Khomeini's tomb is not simply a place of religious pilgrimage nor an articulation of national ideology. As with the Martyrs' Museum and Behesht-i Zahra cemetery, it demonstrates 'venerative consumption': they are all spaces where the 'profane realm of cultural and historical tourism gets an encrustation of religious praxis', a consumerist ethos pervades the site, and alongside the graves of martyrs and religious iconography are retail outlets selling martyr memorabilia and fast food.[125]

State-sponsored art in Iran functions as a 'mechanism of productive power' where the 'order of signs and practices . . . images and epistemologies – drawn from a historically situated cultural field . . . come to be taken for granted as the natural and received shape of the world'.[126] The large-scale murals of martyrs on the sides of multi-story buildings sponsored by various organs of the state and para-statal political organisations such as the Martyrs' Foundation that colonise busy or politically resonant public spaces in Tehran work to ensure a visual monopoly over not only what politics are presented in the public space of Tehran, but also how they are represented.[127] Yet it is important to remember that there is no single coherent message to, or interpretation of, the images: they are the product of different time periods and are on occasion replaced or repainted.[128] That said, the murals usually consist of a realistic portrait of the martyr; symbols such as a red rose or tulip, dove or butterfly symbolising the martyr's soul and green lush countryside and a blue sky representing paradise; icons of Hussein's martyrdom at Karbala such as water, a white horse or the dome or minaret of Iman Hussein's mosque at Karbala; images of Ayatolloh Khomeini or his successor as Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei; a brief biography of the martyr (usually just name and place of death) and quotations from the Qur'an, Khomeini or the words of the martyr,

which frame the interpretation of the mural.[129] There are martyrdom murals featuring ordinary (sometimes anonymous) Iranians as well as prominent social figures killed in, or as a result of, the Iran-Iraq war, as well as martyrs from an earlier age such as Sheikh Fazollah Nuri who, as a result of his opposition to the constitutional movement, was hung in 1909. These murals do not simply commemorate events or heroes of the past, but through their projection of historical events into the present, they use the past as the foundation of present identity.[130]

The inclusion of the image of Ayatollah Khomeini in many of the murals, juxtaposed with symbols recalling the martyrdom of Hussein and images of martyrs from the revolutionary struggle and the Iran-Iraq war, conflates the finite and political with the sacred and the infinite. It not only links the past to the present, but it also 'presents contemporary events as normative for the future'.[131] By positioning Khomeini within a discourse of martyrdom and in proximity to Hussein it sacralises him, legitimises his status as the highest political and military authority in Iran and infuses the regime with 'total social authority'.[132] In so doing it also enables the transmission of Khomeini's politico-spiritual authority and holiness to his successor Ayatollah Khamenei.[133] An example is the mural on a building on one of the busiest squares in Tehran, the Square of the Revolution. In the middle of the mural against a backdrop of other soldiers is a young soldier who wears a red ribbon signalling his readiness to die as a martyr. On the right and behind the young man is Khomeini, stretching out his arm in a gesture of blessing. To the left is Khamenei, who, reading the mural from right to left, appears to be not only the recipient of Khomeini's blessing but the future of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[134] Above all three images is the slogan 'educating the God-seeking youth means mobilization for the final battle of the Imam [Hussein]'.[135] The juxtaposition of the image of the martyr with symbols of Karbala and Hussein and the image of Khomeini encourages an interpretation that the martyrs sacrificed their lives for the nation *and* god, and as such the murals 'aim to create an aura of legitimacy for revolutionary politics and for self-defense as much as for martyrdom and sacrifice in the name of the faith'.[136]

The imagined ethnogenesis of the Islamic Republic of Iran is firmly situated in the defence of the nation against not only its neighbour Iraq, but also neo-imperial western political, economic and military interference.[137] The murals' effective interweaving of narratives of victimisation and sacrifice work as metaphors for resistance and self-defiance against an outside enemy and are a key feature of the Iranian state's ideology. The continuous commemoration of the war and the revolution in Iran work to inculcate a religio-national identity, a shared sense of solidarity, obligation and political mobilisation predicated on the imagination of Iran as a victim of foreign interference and aggression. As such, some of the murals specifically foreground American military oppression, for example that on the flyover on Karim Khan Zand Avenue, which depicts an America flag whose stripes morph into falling bombs.[138]

In the last ten years there has been a shift in the commemoration of martyrs in the public realm: the state has begun to inter martyrs among the living, in public space, specifically on university campuses.[139] The highly visual presence of martyrs, who were once referred to by Ayatollah Khomeini as his 'light of the eyes', permits

their use as 'the eye of power' to oversee and ensure compliance.[140] Billboards warn passers-by to '[w]atch your behaviour' as '[m]artyrs are witnesses of our acts'. Martyrs therefore act not simply to encourage and mobilise support for the Islamic Republic, but they also articulate and police the boundaries of acceptable social and political behaviour, and thus extend the domain of state surveillance.[141] A mural depicting martyrs of the Moral Police watches over a Tehran street, encouraging an internalised self-disciplining even when actual officers of the morality police are not in evidence.[142] However, the passage of time and changing conditions in Iran and the population's increasing indifference towards martyrs has meant that the ubiquitous presence of the image of the martyr in the public realm is no longer as effective in promulgating the state's legitimacy, a consequence that has led the state 'to force the martyrs on the living, no longer just discursively but in their corporeality' as well.[143] In 2006, in the face of opposition to 'the instrumental utilization of war martyrs', the state buried the recently recovered remains of unknown martyrs from the Iran-Iraq war in the grounds of Sanati Sharif University.[144] The Iranian commemoration of martyrdom in murals and heritage institutions could therefore be read as a means of promoting the 'consumption of traumatic memory', an 'exercise in fear-mongering', which 'through the muffled yet infectious tactics of trauma and fear' seeks to silence public calls for socio-political change in Iran.[145]

As a result of being forms of textual production firmly situated in the present, the historical disciplines of history and archaeology serve as vehicles for nationalist discourse, they reflect and project the interests of the nation-state and perform nation-state ontologies. Far from achieving hegemonic status because of their purported mimetic resemblance to the past, historical accounts generate cultural authority from the political, ideological and aesthetic values that they embody. Thus, '[h]istory operates ideologically . . . [i]t offers a sedative, anaesthetizing people to social injustices, accustoming them to them as historical facts, lulling them into a sense of their natural inevitability', but what about theoretically self-reflexive, counter-histories?[146] What about past-talk that offers an "oppositional critique" of traditional ways of writing history; narratives that don't reinforce the status quo, but consciously challenge it; stories that work to critique, undermine and replace oppressive institutions and practices? What about the histories of the marginalised, emancipatory pedagogies, stories of liberation, revolutionary past-talk? What about the work of artists, resistance archivists and activists engaging in past-talk to witness, critique and debate conflict, human rights abuses and injustice? In the following chapters we explore alternative forms of past-talk, accounts of the before-now that are produced and circulate outside of hegemonic institutions and discursive regimes of power, and we ask whether these narratives liberate history.

Notes

1 A. Megill, *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error. A Contemporary Guide to Practice,* with contributions from S. Shepard and P. Honenberger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 215 and 209 quoted in Martin L. Davies, "Disobedience Reconsidered: History, Theory, and the Morality of Scholarship," *Rethinking History* 17/2 (2013): 204.
2 Davies, "Disobedience," 207.

3 Michel Foucault, "History of Systems of Thought," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977* (Pantheon Books, 1980), 200.
4 Martin L. Davies, *Imprisoned by History: Aspects of a Historicized Life* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), xi. For the phrases 'historian-function' see Davies, op. cit. xi and also Martin L. Davies, *How History Works. The Reconstitution of a Human Science* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); *passim*, for a definition see Davies, *How History Works,* 162; and for 'historical comprehension' see Davies, "Disobedience," 192.
5 Accessed 14/11/17, www.historyandpolicy.org/
6 Davies, *How History Works*, 11.
7 Chris Bowlby, BBC Radio 4 Current Affairs, and then Frank Field MP accessed 14/3/16, www.historyandpolicy.org/about-us/what-we-do.
8 Martin L. Davies, *Historics: Why History Dominates Contemporary Society* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Davies, *Imprisoned by History*; Keith Jenkins, *At the Limits of History: Essays in History and Practice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). While Davies might argue that there is something particular about the historical perspective that engenders its socio-political appropriation by hegemonic powers, we would argue that it is perhaps the institutionalised nature of history produced within and disseminated by the educational, broadcasting and heritage organisations of the state that means it can so readily be employed by dominant interests. We also acknowledge that the state itself does not represent a singular, identifiable entity or collection of interests and that it can be more profitably seen as a site of contestation among various influential, authoritative and powerful groups.
9 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 179, 181 discusses this in a colonial context. For example, in the case of the Dutch East Indies, colonial 'history focused-behaviour' [Davies, *How History Works,* passim and 163] undertaken by imperial information-management technicians conceptualised the builders of the monuments as being of a different 'race' to the colonised 'natives', thus providing a suitable narrative in support of imperial claims to be providing 'civilisation' rather than occupation and exploitation. Such political museumification was in turn continued in the nationalist imaginings of the post-independence states established with the retreat of imperial power. For the idea of historians as information-management technicians, see Davies, *Historics*, 152 and passim.
10 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 178.
11 Guy Mannes-Abbot, "This Is Tomorrow. On Emily Jacir's Art of Assembling Radically Generative Archives," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 109.
12 Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), 4, n.1. Derrida continues that '[e]ffective democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the participation in and the access to the archive, its constitution, and its interpretation'.
13 Sven Spieker, *The Big Archive: Art from Bureaucracy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 174.
14 For example, the confiscation of non-Jewish Palestinian cultural resources such as books, photographs and artefacts (and entire villages), during Israeli military invasions and occupations, including the library of Dr. Tawfiq Canaan in 1948, the Palestine Archaeology Museum and library in Jerusalem in 1967, the library of the Palestine Research Centre in Beirut in 1982, and that of the Orient House in East Jerusalem in 2001, Albert Glock, "Archaeology as Cultural Survival: The Future of the Palestinian Past," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23/2 (1994): 71 and Nur Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating the Subaltern, Reclaiming Memory* (London: Zed Books, 2012), 145–7.
15 For information on the destruction of colonial-era official UK documents, see Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), x; David Anderson, "Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and the Discovery of Kenya's 'Migrated Archive'," *History Workshop Journal* 80/1 (2015); The Guardian, "Britain Destroyed

Records of Colonial Crimes," (April 18, 2012). Last accessed 19/10/17, www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/18/britain-destroyed-records-colonial-crimes?newsfeed=true

16 For example, the documents from thirty-six former British colonies that escaped destruction and were kept hidden at a secret Foreign and Commonwealth Office archive at Hanslope Park – see The Guardian, "Sins of Colonialists Lay Concealed for Decades in Secret Archive," (April 18, 2012). Last accessed 19/10/17, www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/18/sins-colonialists-concealed-secret-archive and Chapter 4 for more on Hanslope Park.

17 The document details a conversation between British FCO officials and Ian Henderson, a British military officer who was in charge of the police force in Bahrain for thirty years and is thought to be highly critical of the Khalifa ruling family, https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2015/05/17/judge-orders-further-partial-release-of-henderson-files/; Jamie Merrill, "Government Refuses to Release Details of Relationship with Authoritarian Bahrain," *The Independent* (March 10, 2015). Last accessed 19/10/17, www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/government-refuses-to-release-details-of-relationship-with-authoritarian-bahrain-10099197.html; and Jamie Merrill, "Campaigners Lose Battle to Release Cable Detailing Historic UK Relations with Bahrain," *The Independent* (May 16, 2015). Last accessed 19/10/17, www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/campaigners-lose-battle-to-release-cable-detailing-historic-uk-relations-with-bahrain-10255642.html?origin=internalSearch; see also https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2015/03/09/public-hearing-notice-court-to-look-into-fco-secret-document-on-bahrain-tomorrow/, last accessed October 19, 2017.

18 Verne Harris, "Archives, Politics and Justice" in *Political Pressure and the Archival Record*, ed. Margaret Procter, Michael Cook and Caroline Williams (Chicago: The Society of American Archivists, 2005), 179–81; Agnes E. M. Jonker, "Srebrenica: A Balkan Tragedy and the Making of a Dutch Affair," in Procter, Cook and Williams, op. cit.

19 Durba Ghosh, "National Narratives and the Politics of Miscegenation," in *Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History*, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 28–30. Archive Stories includes a number of articles that address the power of the archive and the role that archive staff play as gatekeepers.

20 Berber Bevernage, "History by Parliamentary Vote: Science, Ethics and Politics in the Lumumba Commission," *History Compass* 9/4 (2011): 308.

21 Margarita Díaz-Andreu and Timothy Champion, "Nationalism and archaeology in Europe: an Introduction," in *Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe*, ed. Díaz-Andreu and Champion (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015, first published by UCL Press in 1996), 15; Philip L. Kohl, "Nationalism and Archaeology: On the Construction of Nations and the reconstructions of the Remote Past," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 27 (1998): 227.

22 Sarah H. Parcak, Satellite Remote Sensing for Archaeology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 13–14, discusses the beginnings of aerial archaeology by Lieutenant P.H. Sharpe, who took photographs of Stonehenge in 1906 from a balloon after he had been blown off course during an army exercise. Later during World War I, pilots flying over archaeological and historical sites in the Middle East often took photographs with their personal cameras. Their superiors subsequently realised the military advantage that such images could provide. For examples of the use of military archives and images by archaeologists, see the articles in Birger Stichelbaut, Jean Bourgeois, Nicholaus Saunders, Piet Chienlens (eds), *Images of Conflict: Military Aerial Photography and Archaeology* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009). Quote from Rona Sela, "Rethinking National Archives in Colonial Countries and ones of Conflict: the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Israel's National Photography Archives as a Case Study," in *Dissonant Archives*, ed. Anthony Downey, 79.

23 Kohl, "Nationalism and Archaeology," passim. As Díaz-Andreu and Champion, "Nationalism and archaeology," 10, have argued, nationalism is 'deeply embedded in the very concept of archaeology, in its institutionalization and development'.

24 Kohl, "Nationalism and Archaeology," 226. Such processes do not only occur during times of nation creation; they can also occur as states expand and when they interact with other states.
25 This is something recognised by post-processual archaeology, which acknowledges the fact that archaeology is always undertaken in a socio-political context by individuals who reflect and reproduce their perspectives, interests, preferred interpretative frameworks and experiences.
26 Umit Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) offers a useful summary of the main approaches to nationalism.
27 Neil Asher Silberman, "Promised Lands and Chosen Peoples: the politics and poetics of archaeological narrative," in *Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice of Archaeology*, ed. Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 256 and 258.
28 Zainab Bahrani, "Conjuring Mesopotamia: Imaginative Geography and a World Past," in *Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East*, ed. Lynn Meskell, Ann M. Roth and Neil Silberman (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998).
29 Bahrani, "Conjuring Mesopotamia," 165; Kohl, "Nationalism and Archaeology," 227. Quote from Neil Asher Silberman "Whose Game Is It Anyway? The Political and Social Transformations of American Biblical Archaeology," in *Archaeology Under Fire*, ed. Meskell, Roth and Silberman, 179.
30 Bahrani, "Conjuring Mesopotamia," 165. Bahrani, op. cit. notes that in contrast to this practice, when discussing ancient western cultures, the names of modern nation-states are used.
31 The term *Palestine* is used to refer to the former region of the Ottoman Empire named as such, an area which was largely conterminous with British colonial Mandate Palestine up to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, after which we use the term *Israel* to refer to the territory delineated by the 1949 Armistice Agreements (acknowledging that this includes territory designated by the 1947 UN Resolution 181 to be part of an Arab Palestinian state and occupied by Israel during the 1948 war) and the term *Palestine* and/or *the Occupied Territories* for the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including the areas often described as the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. When referring to territory in both Israel and Palestine, we use the term *Palestine-Israel* or *Israel-Palestine*. For the period pre-1948 we use the term *Palestinian* to refer to the indigenous population of the Ottoman province, and British Mandate Palestine, regardless of their religion. For the period after the 1948 establishment of the state of Israel, the term *Palestinian* is used to apply to Christian and Muslim Palestinian Arabs who either live in the occupied territories or who live as refugees or in exile as a result of ethnic cleansing operations carried out against them in 1948 and in subsequent Israeli military operations. Following Nadia Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), we use the term *Israeli* to refer to Jewish citizens of the state of Israel because Israel consciously fashions itself as a Jewish state. Following Tamir Sorek, *Palestinian Commemoration in Israel: Calendars, Monuments and Martyrs* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), we refer to non-Jewish citizens of Israel as Palestinian citizens of Israel. For the argument that Israel's policy towards Palestine and Palestinians is an example of ethnocratic settler colonialism, see Elia Zureik, *Israel's Colonial Project in Palestine: Brutal Pursuit* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2012); Oren Yiftachel "Democracy or Ethnocracy? Territory and Settler Politics in Israel/Palestine," *Middle East Report*, 207 (1998): 8–13; Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); and as André Elias Mazawi "'Which Palestine Should We Teach?' Signatures, Palimpsests, and Struggles over School Textbooks," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 30 (2011): 171, succinctly argues '[b]etween 1993 and 2001, despite signing interim accords on self-governance with the PLO, Israel's colonisation doubled in intensity. By 2010,

colonisation reached overwhelming proportions in the West Bank (including in East Jerusalem), witnessing the effects of the building of a "wall of separation" on Palestinian lands, declared illegal by the International Court of Justice. The State of Israel also imposes its differential law systems – military versus civilian – on Palestinians and Israeli settlers, respectively'.

32 Silberman, "Whose Game Is It Anyway?," 179. Glock, "Archaeology as Cultural Survival," 71.

33 The word *bible* comes from the Greek word *biblia*, which means books. The Bible is a collection of sacred Jewish and Christian texts or books that were largely written in Hebrew originally and have been increasingly regarded as a single entity. The first five books of the Old Testament are known in Hebrew as the Torah, Nur Masalha, *The Bible and Zionism: Invented Traditions, Archaeology and Post-Colonialism in Israel-Palestine* (London: Zed Books, 2007), 1, n.1.

34 Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground*, 29. What later became British Mandate Palestine was in earlier centuries split among three different Ottoman administrative areas.

35 Ibid., 45 quoting the Anglo-American Committee, *Report of the Anglo American Committee of Inquiry on Jewish Problems in Palestine and Europe* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1946), 38.

36 Rochelle Davies, *Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 109. This discourse was continued in Israeli, Zionist narratives that situated a Zionist right to the land in terms of the increased productivity and modernity that Jewish settlers brought to the land.

37 Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground*, 2. Abu El-Haj argues for the contemporaneous projects of settlement and nation building on a single colonial terrain in the case of the Israeli state. A situation in which the colony and metropole were coterminous and to which Jewish settlers rapidly laid national claim, 5. Notwithstanding the heuristic usefulness of the classifications or story patterns outlined in Bruce Trigger's seminal article "Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist," *Man* 19 (1984), the case of archaeology in Israel demonstrates that there will always be instances that complicate any classificatory system. In the case of Israeli archaeology, aspects of colonial, nationalistic and imperial discourses can be identified in that many of the indigenous inhabitants (specifically non-Jewish Palestinians) of the country are denigrated; the narrative is concerned with establishing a clear link between Jewish citizens of Israel and ancient Hebrew cultures; and archaeological practice is often intimately connected with settler-colonial expansionist intentions.

38 Abu El-Haj, Facts on the Ground, 6 citing Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19.

39 Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground*, 3.

40 Ibid., 10, 16 and 18. Of course the state of Israel has also been produced as a nation-state geo-political entity through the proclamation of the State of Israel by the Jewish People's Council on 14 May 1948, and its recognition as a state by other nations and the United Nations. The point we are making here is that archaeology produces the state as a specifically Jewish national home, and in doing so it not only conceptually imagines a Jewish nation, but it also embodies this land as rightfully belonging to such a Jewish nation by virtue of their connection to, and continuity with, an Israelite or Jewish nation that dwelt on the territory thousands of years ago.

41 Ibid., 57–8 citing Shmue'l Yeivin, Ha-Kinus ha-Rishon le-Yedi'at ha-Aretz [The first Yedi'at ha-Aretz conference] (Jerusalem: ha-Hevrah ha-'Ivrit le-Haqirat Eretz Yisrael ve-'Atiqoteha, 1967), 53 for the quote by Benvensti. See Bevernage and Aerts' discussion of Vladimir Jankélévitch's use of 'irreversible' and 'irrevocable' pasts in Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts, "Haunting Pasts: Time and Historicity as Constructed by the Argentine Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Radical Flemish Nationalists," *Social History* 34/4 (2009); and Berber Bevernage, *History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice*

(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 4–6. For a more detailed discussion of the use of heterotemporalities in critiquing rather than legitimising (neo)colonialism, see Chapter 6.

42 Neil Asher Silberman, *Between Past and Present: Archaeology, Ideology and Nationalism in the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), 9; Abu El-Haj, op. cit. 55 and 79.

43 Ibid., 15.

44 Ibid., 107.

45 Ibid., 11, and 104–5, quotation at 104.

46 Ibid., 119.

47 Ibid., see chapter 5, especially 122–3.

48 Ibid., 13.

49 Israeli archaeologists sought to determine the topographical layout, settlement patterns, and the construction of architectural structures primarily of the Temple Mount area in East Jerusalem in the Herodian period guided by what they already knew from textual and literary sources. The reciprocal epistemological dynamism between archaeological digs and textual sources as noted earlier is problematic and circular: the textual sources provided the framework for interpreting the archaeological finds (they provided in essence a map of where to excavate and named the structures that were found), which then in turn validated the textual sources, Abu El-Haj, op. cit. 133, 135–6.

50 Ibid., 160.

51 Ibid., 139–42. Israeli excavations undertaken in East Jerusalem focused on remains from, what is known in Israeli archaeological discourse as, the First and Second (Temple) periods, time periods more commonly referred to in archaeological praxis of the eastern Levant as the Iron Age and the Persian, Hellenistic and early-Roman periods:

> [t]hese periods are understood to mark the birth of Jerusalem as the ancient Jewish capital, from the time of the initial Israelite conquest and settlement to the culmination of the First Temple period in the establishment of the United Monarchy under Davidic and Solomonic control, through the Babylonian exile, Jewish return, and ending with the destruction of the Second Temple by the Roman army in the year 70 C.E.
>
> Ibid., 132

52 Ibid., 206.

53 Ibid., 206–7 and 142. However, as Abu El-Haj argues, the material remains of both structures can be just as easily situated into a narrative of the Roman destruction of Jerusalem, or one centred on sectarian or class conflict within Jewish society – there is textual evidence to support both hypotheses. The material evidence cannot accurately determine the date of the destruction of the buildings: both stories are thus 'underdetermined by the data', and the narrative preferred arises from the interpretative framework within which the evidence is analysed, 145.

54 Ibid., 167 and 219.

55 Ibid., 148–9. '[R]ecent remains' are anything from early-Islamic to Ottoman times and constitute about 1300 years of the city's history. Not only have smaller artefacts been discarded or destroyed by the archaeological process, but on occasion Arab Muslim buildings have also been destroyed, for example the Afdail and Buraq mosques, and the Fakhriyah hospice and mosque, op. cit. 153–4. See also op. cit. 157 for the problems that a lack of records concerning the stratigraphy and loci of those Islamic remains that have been unearthed and preserved produce. Without such information, such objects are in effect unusable in archaeological inquiry and thus are silenced.

56 Albert Farid Henry Naccache, "Beirut's Memorycide: Hear No Evil, See No Evil," in *Archaeology Under Fire*, ed. Meskell, Roth and Silberman.

57 Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History* (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1989) xxiv, cited in Abu El-Haj, op. cit. 35.

58 Abu El-Haj, op. cit. 91–8. The committee included key members of the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society, who would become leading figures in the first generation of Israeli archaeologists.

59 Ibid., 35.
60 Ibid., 85 and 91–3. The two quotes are from a Review of the Governmental Names Committee, [Sqira Shel Va'adat ha-Shemot ha-Memshaltit], (Israel State Archive, 1952), 1 and 2 cited in Abu El-Haj, op. cit. 92–3.
61 Ibid., 94.
62 Lynn Meskell, "Archaeology Matters," in *Archaeology Under Fire*, ed. Meskell, Roth and Silberman, 5.
63 Slavko Splichal, "Manufacturing the (in)visible: Power to Communicate, Power to Silence," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 3/2 (2006): 110 cited in Mazawi "Which Palestine," 171.
64 Davies, *How History Works*, 63. For the confiscation of Palestinian cultural resources. see n.14 above. Forests were often planted over the ethnically cleansed and bulldozed remains of Palestinian villages. For example, the Palestinian village of Biriya was completely destroyed and is now covered by the Israeli Biriya National Forest. Rather ironically, a section of it has been named after Coretta Scott King, the wife of civil rights leader Martin Luther King. Similarly, the village of Saffuriya destroyed by Israeli forces is now the site of an archaeological park showcasing the ancient Roman and Jewish town of Tzippori and a forest commemorating Guatemalan independence (15/9/1821). The Martyrs Forest, commemorating the 6 million European Jews murdered in the Holocaust, is planted around the Palestinian villages of Suba and Bayt Mahsir, which were largely destroyed and replaced with Israeli towns; see Davies, *Palestinian Village Histories*, 2. See also Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (London: One World, 2006), 227–34 for the examples of the Forest of Birya and the Ramat Menashe Park, both of which cover the destroyed ruins of a number of Palestinian villages.
65 Davies, *Imprisoned by History*, 57 and 61; Davies, *Historics*, 133.
66 Martin L. Davies, "Institutionalized Nihilism: An Outline of the Academic Function," *Rethinking History* 12/4 (2008): 464–5 quoting G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, *Mille plateaux. Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980), 456.
67 Keith Jenkins, *Rethinking History*, 3rd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 25.
68 Mihail Ziv, *Teaching History in School: Methods and Trends* (Tel Aviv: 1956 in Hebrew), 1–7, and 13–14 cited in Elie Podeh, "History and Memory in the Israeli Education System: The Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in History textbooks (1948–2000)," *History and Memory* 12/1 (2000): 70–1. As Podeh notes, Ziv was head of the department for high school education in the Israeli Ministry of Education during the 1950s and the author of several history textbooks.
69 Davies, *How History Works*, 40; André Elias Mazawi, "Which Palestine," 170, quoting K.A. Crawford and S.J. Foster, *War, Nation, Memory: International Perspectives on World War II in school History Textbooks* (Charlotte, NC: Information Age, 2007), 7.
70 Mazawi, "Which Palestine," 170–1 quoting Chris Stray, "Paradigms Regained: Towards a Historical Sociology of the Textbook," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 26/1 (1994): 2 and Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics* (London: Continuum, 2004), 13.
71 Podeh, "History and Memory," 66 paraphrasing Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian Smith (eds.), *The Politics of the Textbook* (London: 1991), 10. Podeh, op. cit. 68 argues that this is particularly the case with regard to history textbooks; N. Fairclough, Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 9 cited in Nurit Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Propaganda in Education* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 45. See also D.R. Olson, "On the Language and Authority of Textbooks," in *Language, Authority and Criticism: reading on the School Textbooks*, ed. S. de Castell (London: Falmer Press 1989); T. van Leeuwen, "The Schoolbook as a Multimodal Text," *International Schulbuch Forschung* 14/1 (1992); A. Luke, Literacy, *Textbooks and Ideology* (London: Falmer Press, 1988). For the term *usable past*, see J. V. Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 45 cited in Peled-Elhanan, op. cit. 12.

72 Majid Al-Haj, *Education, Empowerment, and Control: The Case of the Arabs in Israel* (New York: SUNY, 1995), 47–8 citing Ylana Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 93 and Abd al-Latif Tibawi, *Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine: A Study of Three Decades of British Administration* (London: Luzac and Company Ltd., 1956), 196. In contrast, the Mandate government recognised the autonomy of Jewish schools in the same period, and also provided a block grant to them. One of the reasons for this different approach, according to Al-Haj, op. cit. 53, was the commitment of the British Mandate to the Zionist movement and its support of the establishment of a Jewish National Home.

73 Over 700,000 Palestinians, approximately about 90 percent of the indigenous non-Jewish population of the territory occupied by Israeli forces in 1948–9, were forcibly driven from their homes in a wave of organised ethnic cleansing that included widespread violence and atrocities. These refugees, together with later victims of Israeli ethnic cleansing, policies of transfer, forced removal and land expropriation, have been prevented from returning home, see Pappé, *Ethnic Cleansing*; Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba; Nur Masalha, A Land Without People* (London: Faber and Faber, 1997); Walid Khalidi (ed.) *All that Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israeli in 1948* (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006); Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) – while Morris acknowledges the ethnic cleansing of 1848, he justifies it as having been necessary for the establishment of a Jewish state, see Ilan Pappé, "The Vicissitudes of the 1948 Historiography of Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 39/1 (2009): 12. The few Palestinians who remained within the state of Israel, about 25 percent of whom are still classed as "present absentees" and prevented from returning to their lands and homes which were confiscated by the Israeli state, face systemic discrimination, see Sorek, *Palestinian Commemoration*, 4, citing Ali Haider, Yaser Awad and Manar Mahmoud, *The Equality Index of Jewish and Arab Citizens in Israel* (2009) (Jerusalem: Sikkuy, 2010) and As'ad Ghanem and Nadim N. Rouhana, "Citizenship and the parliamentary Policies of Minorities in Ethnic States: The Palestinian Citizens of Israel," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 7/4 (2001); Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba*, 231–2. Our position on Palestine/Israel centres on the necessity of guaranteeing the human rights and safety of all Israelis and Palestinians, adherence to UN resolutions, the end of occupation, a fair division of resources and the right to return home for all refugees who were forced to leave during the Nakba and subsequent periods of ethnic cleansing.

74 Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba*, 233.

75 Al-Haj, *Education*, 128–9, and 145. See also Podeh, "History and Memory," 74 and Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba*, 235, 240.

76 Al-Haj, *Education*, 129. Moreover, Arab school spent 20 percent of the time allotted to history studying Jewish history, whereas Jewish schools only spent 2 percent studying Arab history, Ibid., 130.

77 Ibid., 144.

78 Isma'el Abu-Sa'ad, "Present-Absentees: The Arab School Curriculum in Israel as a Tool for De-educating Indigenous Palestinians," *Holy Land Studies: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 7/1 (2008): 17.

79 The aims behind the teaching of the Arab-Israeli conflict is also very different in Israeli Jewish and Arab schools. In the former it is designed to foster the students' understanding of the 'just struggle of the Jewish people for national renewal at home', whereas for Palestinian Arab students it is meant to strengthen their understanding of both Arab and Jewish national movements and the factors behind them: again a generic Arab identity is substituted for a Palestinian one, see Naif Farah, "Teaching of History: Curriculum and Textbooks," in *Education for the Arab Minority in Israel; Issues, Problems and Demands*, ed. Muhammad Habib-Allah and Attallah Kupty (Haifa: Al-Karmah, 1991, in Arabic), 111 quoted in Al-Haj, op. cit. 146–7.

80 Khalili, *Heroes*, 71. In response, teachers in UNRWA schools in Lebanon went on strike and this, together with the threat of a general strike by all teachers in the Palestinian

diaspora, led to a review of affected textbooks by a UN commission, ibid., 71–2. Mazawi, "Which Palestine," 172, citing Moughrabi, "The Politics of Palestinian Textbooks," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31/1 (2001): 5–19.

81 United Nations, *Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Living Conditions of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories* (New York: United Nations, 1985), 37–8 cited in Mazawi, "Which Palestine," 172.

82 Podeh, "History and Memory," 91 and 85. Indeed, Podeh subtitles his periodisation of Israeli textbook production as 'The early phase: "childhood" (1948–1967)', 'The middle phase: "adolescence" (1967–1984/5)', 'The transformative period: "adulthood" (1984-present)', thereby utilising a meta-narrative of linear progression and development.

83 Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine*.

84 Ibid., 49 and 65.

85 Podeh, "History and Memory," 74, emphasis is ours.

86 Ibid., 74–5. He identifies the second factor as being a result of the Israeli response to 'menacing military and political events' that 'produced a siege mentality' and widespread fear that the next war would result in the destruction of the State of Israel.

87 Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine*, 2, 9.

88 Ibid., 120.

89 Ibid., ch. 1 and 119–25. It should be noted that many Israeli politicians also regularly refer to the occupied West Bank in English-language interviews as Judea and Samaria; the Israeli state uses the name "Judea and Samaria Area" to describe an administrative region under the governance of Israel Forces Central Command in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. On naming practices and "occupation speak" see Akiva Eldar, "Learning the Language of Occupation," Al-Monitor. Israel Pulse, June 8, 2017, last accessed 24/10/17, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/isarel-palestinians-west-bank-judea-and-samaria-security.html

90 Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine*, 32.

91 Arnon Groiss, "De-legitimization of Israel in Palestinian Authority schoolbooks," *Israel Affairs* 18/3 (2012): 455–84, 460 citing National Education, Grade 2, Part 1 (2001), 4, Reading and Texts, Grade 9, Part 2 (2004), 34–5.

92 Groiss, "De-legitimization," 455–84. Groiss, op. cit. 457 in sharp contrast to the research of Peled-Elhanan, argues that

> [o]f the 465 Israeli schoolbooks examined during the research project . . . no trace of an explicit or implicit call for violence against Palestinians or other Arab/Muslim nations/groups was found; nor were there any expressions that could be interpreted as contributing to the creation of a mental infrastructure necessary for the development of bellicose inclinations. . . . By contrast Arab and Iranian schoolbooks (with the notable exception of the Tunisian books), did contain crude anti-Jewish expressions and open incitement to fighting against the Jews, and – in some cases – even annihilating them.

Although later he qualifies this and notes that 'the bulk of the Palestinian curriculum, which includes some 230 books issued by the PA Ministry of Education between the years 200 and 2006, has been found to be devoid of open anti-Jewish incitement', op. cit. 458.

93 Ibid., 461.

94 Weizman, Hollow Land, 6; D. Gregory, *The Colonial Present* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Groiss, "De-legitimization," 477 and 476. Both Groiss and Podeh see Palestinian textbooks as a significant obstacle to peace. Podeh, "History and Memory," 92 argues that Palestinian textbooks are currently in the same position that Israeli textbooks were fifty years ago. He concludes his article with a comment on the role that prejudiced textbooks play in the escalation and continuation of conflict and a warning that the prospects of a 'genuine and lasting Israeli-Palestinian conciliation may lie far off in the future' if there is no corresponding change in Palestinian textbooks as there has been in Israeli ones.

95 Ilan Pappé, "Historical Truth, Modern Historiography and Ethical Obligations: The Challenge of the Tantura Case," in *The Israel/Palestine Question: A Reader*, ed. Pappé (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), provides the most comprehensive discussion of the case, see also Pappé, *Out of the Frame: the Struggle for Academic Freedom in Israel* (London: Pluto Press, 2010). Quote from Pappé "Vicissitudes," 7–8. We discuss the case in Claire Norton and Mark Donnelly, "Thinking the Past Politically: Palestine Power and Pedagogy," *Rethinking History* 20/2 (2016).

96 Conservative MPs Eric Pickles, who was the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government at the time, and Caroline Noakes, as well as the Jewish Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation UK, all condemned the conference. Pickles described it as 'a one-sided diatribe', Matthew Reisz, "Southampton Cancels Controversial Israel conference" *Times Higher Education* (April 2, 2015), www.timeshighereducation.com/news/southampton-cancels-controversial-israel-conference/2019499.article accessed 24/11/16; see also "University event Questioning Israel's Right to exist is cancelled," *The Guardian* (March 31, 2015), www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/31/southampton-university-cancels-event-questioning-israel-existence accessed 24/11/16; a public statement by the university on their website, www.southampton.ac.uk/israelpalestinelaw/index.page accessed 24/11/16; and Asa Winstanley, "UK High Court Backs Shutdown of Israel Conference" *The Electronic Intifada* (April 14, 20015), https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/asa-winstanley/uk-high-court-backs-shutdown-israel-conference accessed 24/11/16; and Naomi Firsht, "Southampton University Confirms it is Considering Cancelling Anti-Israel Conference," *The Jewish Chronicle* (March 31, 2015) www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/133033/southampton-university-confirms-it-considering-cancelling-anti-israel-conference accessed 24/11/16. The organisers argued that academics representing a variety of political perspectives were invited, but some chose not to accept the invitation.

97 http://freespeechsouthampton.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/a-selection-of-lettersto-university-of.html#more accessed 24/11/16.

98 Davies, Historics, 4 and 9. Davies, Imprisoned by History, 24 notes that the relatively recent emphasis of museums on their role not simply as 'repositories of exhibits' but as places that encourage people to think differently and 'to generate new things based on the creativity of the past' means that in our historicised world 'the same old thing sustains the latest new thing', and museums and galleries have effectively historicised themselves. The idea that museums are just another coercive public agency that 'does our thinking for us' is from Davies, Imprisoned by History, 27 quoting Immanuel Kant, "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung" in *Werkausgabe*, ed. W. Weischedel (Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp taschenbuch wissenschaft, 1977) vol. XI, 53.

99 Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995), 6.

100 Ibid.

101 Christine Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum in Tehran: Visualizing Memory in Post-Revolutionary Iran," *Visual Anthropology* 25/1–2 (2012): 69.

102 Tessa Jowell, *Better Places to Live. Government, Identity and the Value of the Historic and Built Environment* (London: DCMS, 2005), 23–4 cited in Davies, *Imprisoned by History*, 26.

103 Ibid.

104 Martin L. Davies, *Imprisoned by History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 20–7, quotations at 24 and 23.

105 Mel Evans, *Artwash: Big Oil and the Arts* (London: Pluto Press, 2015).

106 www.britishmuseum.org/whats_on/exhibitions/sunken_cities.aspx http://www.britishmuseum.org/whats_on/exhibitions/indigenous_australia/about.aspx accessed 2/11/17. The oil spill occurred when a blowout caused a massive explosion on the *Deepwater Horizon* rig that BP leased and operated.

107 Ulrich Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way to Paradise: Shiite Mural art in the Urban Context," *Ethnologia Europaea* 33/2 (2003): 88.

108 Roxanne Varzi, *Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution Iran* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 64. For the phrase '[t]he Museum of Furious Art' see Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran* (London: Booth-Clibborn Editions, 2000), 10 and also for an extensive range of examples.
109 Varzi, *Warring Souls*, 4.
110 In the current terminology of the Islamic Republic of Iran the term *martyr* denotes someone 'whose violent death is linked to the service of ideals propagated by the Islamic Republic of Iran' or who has given their 'life to defend the country and, by extension the country's ideological and political system' including victims of assassinations and state executions, see Ulrich Marzolph, "The Martyr's Fading Body: Propaganda vs. Beautification in the Tehran Cityscape," in *Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East*, ed. Christine Gruber and S. Haugbolle (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 169 and 164.
111 Haggai Ram, "Multiple Iconographies: Political Posters in the Iranian Revolution," in *Picturing Iran: Art, Society and Revolution*, ed. Shiva Balaghi and Lynn Gumpert (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 98.
112 Shahla Talebi, "From the Light of the Eyes to the Eyes of the Power: State and Dissident Martyrs in Post-Revolutionary Iran," *Visual Anthropology* 25/1–2 (2012): 139–40.
113 Ashura commemorates the day on which Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet, was martyred (along with his family) at the battle of Karbala on the 10th of Muharrem 61 AH (680 C.E.) by the army of the Caliph Yazid. The schism in the Islamic community between Sunni and Shi'ite originated in a dispute over who was to succeed the Prophet Muhammad as leader of the Muslim community. The Shi'ite community believed the only legitimate successor was a descendent of the Prophet himself, and thus it had to be Ali, the Prophet's cousin and only surviving male relative. However, the two caliphs (Abu Bakr and Omar) who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad were elected by a decision of elders of the Muslim community. The two subsequent caliphs, Osman and Ali, were assassinated, and Ali's son, Hasan Ibn Ali, abdicated after a few months, permitting Muawiya to become the first Umayyad caliph. After the death of Muawiya the question of legitimate succession arose again, with Muawiya's son Yazid claiming the caliphate while the Shi'ite party argued that it should be Hussein, the son of Ali and the Prophet Muhammad's daughter, Fatima. Hussein refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid, and as he and his family travelled to Al-Kufah they were intercepted by the numerically superior forces of Yazid and brutally murdered. Ashura thus constitutes a pivotal, defining moment for Shi'ite Muslims and is the most important Shi'ite religious holiday celebrated both privately by individuals and in dramatic public mourning rituals, processions and re-enactments. These public rites of remembrance are intended to demonstrate solidarity with Hussein and also to mark the dichotomy between worldly injustice and corruption, and God's justice. Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way," 91–2 provides a useful summary of events and the significance of Hussein's martyrdom to Shi'ite communities.
114 Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum," 68
115 Ibid., 70.
116 Ibid., 83.
117 Ibid., 70. Gruber addresses the potentially different motivations and responses of visitors to the museum on p. 89.
118 Lina Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East: The Role of the Visual in Political Struggle* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 87. See also Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum."
119 Gruber, op. cit. 85. See Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way," 96 for a discussion of a martyrs' mural depicting Iranian non-Muslims.
120 Khatib, *Image Politics*, 86.
121 Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum," 75–6 and 87. Something similar occurs in Kazem Chalipa's painting of an archetypal Shi'ite martyr on horseback, *Everyday is Ashura*,

where the face of the hero is left blank, allowing for it to be metaphorically configured by the believer who wishes to imagine themselves in that role, see Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution 89, fig. 5.2. While the intention of Chalipa may well have been to leave Hussein's face veiled or blank, there is also a tradition of veiling the faces of Shi'ite imams and the Prophet and the holy family to protect the viewer from their holy effulgence. For example, Qasim Ali, Imam Muhammad al-Baqir teaching in Medina, (1525), a copy of which can be found online https://ismailignosis.com/2016/07/09/the-aga-khans-direct-descent-from-prophet-muhammad-historical-proof/ accessed 22/11/17; and also a miniature painting of Imam Mehdi from the *Falname* (Iran, 1570s) Istanbul: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, H1702.

122 Kishwar Rizvi, "Religious Icon and National Symbol: the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran," *Muqarnas,* 20 (2003): 209–10.

123 Ibid., 214.

124 Ibid., 217.

125 Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum," 91 quoting David Chidester and Edward Linenthal, "Introduction" in *American Sacred Space*, ed. Chidester and Linenthal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 4; and Rizvi, op. cit. 214.

126 Khatib, Image Politics, 81, the second quote is originally from Jean Comoroff and John Comoroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 23.

127 Most murals are funded by the Martyrs' Foundation, which was established to not only provide care for martyrs and their families as well as the injured, but also to keep their memory alive, see Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way," 90 and Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum," 71–2.

128 Marzolph, "The Martyr's Fading Body," 173.

129 Marzolph, "The Martyr's Fading Body," passim and Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way," 89 for examples of quotations.

130 Marzolph, "The Martyr's Fading Body," 172.

131 Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way," 92.

132 Khatib, *Image Politics*, 84, citing Stuart Hall, "Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance," in *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism*, ed. UNESCO (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), 331.

133 Khatib, *Image Politics*, 82.

134 See Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way," 95–6 for a description of the mural. That the mural would be read right to left is highly likely, in that Persian texts are read right to left and the slogan centred above the images would encourage this reading. Moreover, the mural is on a wall whose left-side is lower than the right, therefore visually drawing the eye to the left.

135 Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way," 96.

136 Ibid., 97.

137 This fight against western neo-imperialist interference, regional American hegemony and the support for liberation movements manifests itself in Iranian support for the Palestinians as well as Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Asad regime in Syria, and the Shi'ite opposition in Bahrain. In particular, a number of murals include images of the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem, which is often used as a symbol for Palestinian liberation, as well as Palestinian martyrs, Marzolph, "The Martyr's Fading Body," 175–6.

138 Marzolph, "The Martyr's Fading Body," 167. Marzolph, op. cit. 173 also mentions Iraj Eskandari's anti-American mural placed on a wall adjacent to the Felastin Square. See also Chelowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 36–7, fig. 2.4, and 119–21, figs. 7.22–24, for other examples of large-scale anti-American murals and graffiti. A key site for such murals in Tehran are the walls surrounding the former American embassy.

139 Talebi, "From the Light of the Eyes." As Talebi makes clear, traditionally in Iran the cemeteries have been located just outside villages and towns. Although occasionally villages developed around local shrines where holy men were buried, the general practice has been to ensure that the dead are not buried in close proximity to the living.

The exception here is the burial of dissidents, who are usually executed or murdered by the state or para-military groups. Although many are buried in marginalised areas of cemeteries, some of the murdered were dumped outside the homes of their relatives, who were forced to bury them in their yards.

140 Ibid., 138. The very cartography of Tehran is a map of the dead, with many of the streets and squares having been renamed after martyrs of the revolution and Iran-Iraq war.

141 Ibid., 135–6.

142 Image of the mural can be found in ibid., 135, fig. 7.

143 Ibid., 138.

144 Ibid., 121.

145 Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum," 91.

146 Davies, *Imprisoned by History*, 30.

2

CHALLENGING HISTORICAL AUTHORITY

Public art, (post)museums and activist film

On epistemological modesty

Academic history's dominant methodologies and representational strategies carry the traces of foundational models of knowledge, ones that purport to be able to show the "true state of things" separate from the classificatory, interpretative and narrative frameworks that are available for producing descriptions in any given semantic system. Yet there is nothing inherent within the past that determines that the correct (or necessarily the best) way to comprehend it is in the form of a history. Historical objects do not constitute themselves; they are produced by acts of enunciation within the discursive regime or "language game" that we call history.[1] This language game may well be rational, rigorous, respectful of procedural norms for using certain types of evidence and subject to peer appraisal, but ultimately adherence to these professional codes does little more than ensure the continuation of a tautology: historians remain the best people for producing the discourse that we call history. The idea that the discourse itself might be problematic at the ontological level is simply not admitted. Because the illusion of the givenness of the historical past is so powerfully familiar, it is easy to forget that making a choice to read the past historically is in fact a choice at all.[2] There are always many other ways in which the traces of the past can be the source of acts of enunciation and representation in the present; we can always use other forms of past-talk for whatever projects we have chosen to undertake. Unless one believes that the past always already contains the shape of the historical within it – unless one thinks that occurrences in the past originally played out in innately "historical" form, prior to the discursive operations which are used to inscribe those occurrences within the disciplinary codes of history – there are no strong epistemic reasons for thinking that history is any more capable than other discursive vehicles for finding out and representing "how things were". This was why Hayden White advised historians to let go of the mistaken

assumption that their accounts corresponded 'to some pre-existent body of "raw facts"'.[3] The "facts" were not a given in the historical record itself, he argued, but were constructed by the questions that the historian asked of their empirical data, and by the problem that was implied by the choice of metaphor that the historian used to order their account.[4] White's theory of narrative constructivism implied that historiography was (and always had been) a poetic mode of composition, which meant that there could be no singularly definitive or "true" account of any past event in textual form; instead, there were as many possible (and equally plausible) narrative versions of an event as there were culturally available plot structures and/or interpretative communities for endowing stories with meanings.

Narrative constructivism implies that the discourse – or the set of textual, reading, interpretative, methodological and representational practices – that we call history has never been able to deliver epistemologically privileged descriptive or explanatory perspectives on the past. But far from embracing epistemological modesty in their work, historians commonly act *as if* their practices give them some kind of partial or constrained access to a metaphysical "historical" past. They act *as if* their versions of the past, while conceding they are not singularly correct, are 'more true' than those of non-historians. They act *as if* they are collectively responsible for policing all other forms of past-talk against their own "pure" standard of the historical past. Such claims to authority over the past are only coherent for those who believe that foundationalism and metaphysics are unproblematic. History might (still) function as a hegemonic discourse, but it is a mistake to attribute its social power to epistemic considerations rather than cultural-political ones.[5] Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth explained this well when she described a shift from the Modern Condition (the term she used to characterise certain Euro-Atlantic cultures for six centuries from the Quattrocentro onwards) to the Discursive Condition (characterised by the systemic and relational understandings of knowledge that were developed across various intellectual fields in the twentieth century).[6] In the latter, no signifying practices or codes can claim epistemic authority outside of the discursive system in which they are situated. There is 'no Original discourse, no privileged position from which to judge'; equally there is 'no Elsewhere, no site of meaning and value' that transcends discursive regimes and practices.[7] Instead, there are semantic systems (including history) that operate, like all languages, according to rules that refer to nothing outside of these systems' own conventions, and there are acts of enunciation. As Ermarth put it:

> Begin with this hypothesis: that *enunciation*, as a formality of the Discursive Condition, is the same kind of event in every system, regardless of its materials; that enunciation is simply *practice understood as a semiological event*, in other words, an event intelligible within a single or a finite set of discursive regimens.[8]

This way of understanding enunciation is incompatible with historians' claims about the superior epistemic value of their discipline in relation to other forms

of past-talk. It means that the past (or "before now") can only be understood as a dimension of present enunciation, not something that is extra-discursive and 'back there'.[9] It means that historians' acts of enunciation should only be valued against localised, discipline-specific criteria rather than universal or transcendent ones.

One of the consequences of the post-linguistic-turn critique of orthodox history was that it encouraged some historians to be more adventurous in their choices of subject matter, representational practices and willingness to experiment with narrative form. In many respects this was a welcome challenge to the disciplinary norms and authority of institutional academic history. However, as Kalle Pihlainen has pointed out, "alternative" histories were soon incorporated into the mainstream of academic practice; "experimental" forms of historying might have claimed a non- or counter-hegemonic status, but in most cases they were "oppositional" only in representational rather than political terms. Despite their "disobedient" credentials, experimental histories reinforced the discipline's tendency to leave the social status quo undisturbed, because what they sought to do was to interest audiences beyond the small circle of academic specialists, not challenge prevailing political arrangements. As Pihlainen concluded:

> [H]istory and historians have allowed us to become complacent concerning injustices and have dulled our (ethico-political) senses with entertaining stories. Stories that keep us – those of us who are privileged enough to enjoy spending time with stories – preoccupied and content. To remedy this, we should be wary of reading narrative constructivism or any other theory of opposition in terms of system(acity), of turning it into a methodology. We need, rather, to embrace insecurity regarding what history can be.[10]

What Pihlainen advocated was a rethinking of historical praxis in ways that could be aligned with current political campaigns against injustices and forms of oppression. Because of the history profession's self-talk about scholarly "detachment" and "sovereignty" of the archival sources, any such call to politicise historical practices is typically resisted as an infringement of academic integrity – as an "abuse of history".[11] But history writing is already – and always has been – politicised. For a host of cultural and material reasons, current social formations bestow semantic and epistemological authority on certain types of (orthodox) historical praxis. Historians – whether we like it or not – occupy positions of moral and political responsibility because of ingrained public assumptions about history writing's fidelity to the past. As Sande Cohen has argued, historians not only provide the data that give particular social formations retroactive justification (for example, by anchoring them to perceived traditions or inter-generational shared identification with certain events), but they are also able to underscore future-oriented appeals by collectives of varying type through their power to exclude contending claims to the future by designating them as (supposedly) historically invalid. Indeed, as Cohen explains, what is most troubling about the smoothness of the conventional historical text is that it gives the 'illusion of noncontestable knowledge' to narratives that function

to serve those interests which make a political claim on what is yet to come.[12] To historicise, he argues, is as much a tactic designed to service making a future as it is about recuperating the past:

> When the norm of historiography shows images and roles that gate-keep the future, or increasingly do so, sorting and ranking claimants in the here and now not as to how they descended from the past, but as what they deserve as a future, then historiography as such can be said to have been pulled into cultural politics.[13]

Cohen and others are troubled by the politico-cultural function of historians' work because they believe that such work is normally aligned (even if only tacitly) with dominant economic and political interests.[14] It does not have to be so. In theory, academic history could function as a counter-hegemonic practice, challenging sedimented and socially damaging iterations of common sense, but there are few good reasons to think that this might happen. Historians' lingering attachments to objectivist and positivist ideals, their commitment to the materiality (or what Wendy Brown calls the 'brute facticity')[15] of the historical past, makes them unlikely advocates of present-day political causes in their professional work. The contrast with producers of other forms of past-talk, for whom "taking a stand" is not regarded as an "abuse" of their discourse, is clear. But while history's commitment to what its practitioners regard (problematically) as "neutrality" or "impartiality" might be a matter of some regret, what needs to be actively resisted is the way that historians seek to police and control all forms of representations of the past. Mistaking the particular protocols of their own semantic system for universal (or common denominator) ones, historians assume to speak with the authority of 'The Expertise That Silences'.[16] History's adherence to long-dominant epistemologies, methodologies and representational forms mean that a collective resolve to preserve its institutional credibility as a discipline normally takes precedence over whatever radical political ambitions its practitioners might have as individual citizens. History's capacity to be mobilised as a rhetorical ally for present-day (and specifically named) campaigns for socio-political justice is therefore realised only rarely (but not, we acknowledge, never). Admitting "presentism" into academic historical work usually remains a step too far for the profession as a whole. As a result, any oppositional energies that academic history has are all too 'easily incorporated into a disciplined, polite and non-contrarian discourse'.[17] More significant still, a discourse that is so enmeshed in social privilege, institutional authority and exclusionary practices, and that claims the authority to represent the past "properly" to everybody else, seems to be at odds with the kind of non-authoritarian, non-hierarchical, non-representationalist, decentralised, participative political projects that are at the forefront of attempts to minimise oppression and injustices now.

An additional problem is that historical discourse is a method for representing absent others, and in the case of contemporary history for representing others to themselves. In carrying out its representational functions, history as a discipline

presupposes epistemic certainty and confidence in its authority to make explanatory evaluations of those it describes. Armed with this confidence, professional historians rarely, if ever, recognise problematics of representation: instead they assume for themselves the right to speak on behalf of anyone for whom a trace can be found in one or other recognised archival form.[18] This may be understandable in practical terms, because how else would historians write? But it ignores a political consideration: avoiding the wider problems of representationalist practices has been a key concern among left radicals since the upheavals of 1968. As Deleuze recalled, Foucault taught him 'something absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others'.[19] Similarly – and drawing on her participatory research with new social movement activists in Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia and Argentina – Sara Motta discusses the importance of a 'commitment to a politics of knowledge that begins from the ground up and builds from the realities of popular politics in community struggles, movement organizing, and everyday life'.[20] Without such a pluralising and inventive politics of knowledge, she argued, oppressed communities and movements would continue to be '"spoken over" by discourses that misname and misrepresent their struggles'.[21] May elaborated the point in more general terms, explaining that representationalism was socially damaging in two main ways:

> First, the power to represent people to themselves is oppressive in itself: practices of telling people who they are and what they want erect a barrier between them and who (or what) they can create themselves to be. . . . Second, representing people to themselves helps to reinforce other oppressive social relationships.[22]

For these reasons, even well-intentioned attempts to represent victims of oppression to themselves are potentially problematic as they infringe on people's freedom for self-(re)description.[23] As a point of political principle, it is important that people are given discursive space and freedom to work the materials of the past on their own terms, incorporating them into their own subjectivities and political projects, free from any requirement to respect academic history's methodologies and with no expectation that they will be held accountable to history's discipline-specific codes. This is not an argument in favour of "anything goes" when it comes to invoking the past. Disavowing the context-transcendent truth claims of orthodox history's epistemology does not lead to "nihilism", because there are other grounds on which people can be asked to justify how they deal with the past. Crucially, these include the power to challenge people about the political justification for choosing to use particular forms of past-talk and about the possible consequences of doing so.

Another problem with history's discursive authority is that it can be used to reify and harden subject positions which, for the purposes of creating a democratic ethos, are better understood as contingent and ungrounded. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe showed that by denying that the social was determined by objective (historical) processes, one could discredit assumptions that any subject

position (or social actor) was ontologically privileged in society. If there were no ontological foundations for the social, there could be no grounds on which a singularly privileged subject position within it could be established. Rather, it was better to think of the social as the site of multiple social identities with no necessary structure or organising logic governing the relations between them.[24] So, for example, whereas Marx's philosophy of history had stated that fundamental social change was caused by class-based antagonisms (positing a progressive simplification of the social structure under capitalism, until the final antagonism in history was played out between the bourgeoisie and a vast proletarian mass),[25] Laclau and Mouffe maintained that modern social formations were constituted by multiple social antagonisms. Class struggle for them was not an objective entity in the world (produced by the immanent features of capitalism itself), but rather a particular way among many of conceptualising the construction of social identities. By the same reasoning, classical notions of "emancipation", which had been part of the political imaginary for centuries, were also artefacts of foundational models of thought that were best left behind. Using the procedures of deconstruction, Laclau sought to show that emancipation was a logical impossibility and an idea that was compromised by its old associations with closure and the thought that a radical refoundation could become the source of a social that would fully realise itself.[26] His main purpose in doing so was not to advocate a straightforward abandonment of classical ideas of emancipation, but rather to explore how a critical dissection of the term could provide an opening towards the creation of new liberating discourses.[27] These liberating discourses – products of linguistic invention rather than "revealed" by historical analysis – could never achieve a "once and for all" emancipation of oppressed people and groups, only a contingent and temporarily stabilised set of social arrangements. As Laclau stated:

> We can certainly free some social possibilities but only at the price of repressing others. The relationship between power and freedom is one of permanent renegotiations and displacement of their mutual frontiers, while the two terms of the equation always remain. Even the most democratic of societies will be the expression of power relations, not of a total or gradual elimination of power.[28]

Laclau's thought here resembles Foucault's analytics of power, which proceeds from the axiom that the sources and effects of power are heterogeneous and multiple. Foucault argued that: 'Power is widely dispersed through society, it is exercised in multiple and localised relationships, it is a matter of "ceaseless struggles and confrontations". . . . Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere'.[29] Because power is 'employed and exercised through a net-like organization',[30] one can argue that the forms of past-talk that are best equipped for the task of resisting the negative effects of this (always dispersed) power are ones that are *similarly* multiple, heterogeneous, un-disciplined, non-institutional and widely networked: they might be taken as constituting a

'biodiversity of resistance'.[31] Or as Koch wrote in relation to what he called an 'ethics of resistance':

> Resistance is formulated against a background of plurality. It is plurality that cultural and political institutions oppose as they promote one form of subjectivity over another. This is precisely why post-structuralism can support liberation movements even though a specific definition of power remains elusive. The struggle for liberation has the character of political resistance to a process of semantic and metaphorical reductionism that serves the interests of control and manipulation.[32]

This is why we believe that other discursive ways of appropriating and representing the past are more likely to be mobilised effectively as tactical resources to produce the kind of political effects that we seek to encourage. Following Laclau and Mouffe's argument that politics *is* finally a matter of articulation, we think that plural democratic values are best served by inventing and proliferating different semantic forms of past-talk and not by dismissing or subordinating them to academic history on flawed epistemological grounds. As Mouffe explained, creating a democratic ethos necessitates 'the mobilization of passions and sentiments, the multiplication of practices, institutions and language games that provide the conditions of possibility for democratic subjects and democratic forms of willing'.[33] The artists, (post)museum curators and filmmakers that we discuss in the following sections have shown how forms of past-talk can contribute to the creation of the democratic ethos that Mouffe envisages. Experimenting with form, materials and representational tactics, and openly advocating ideological positions in what they produce, such work can be understood as an attempt to "repossess" the past from academic history's controlling disciplinary authority.

Repossessing the past: public art and (post)museums

In her critique of Habermas's theorisation of the bourgeois public sphere, Nancy Fraser drew attention to the importance of what she called 'subaltern counterpublics', which were 'parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs'.[34] Instead of conceptualising the public sphere as a singularity, Fraser wrote about multiple and differentially empowered publics that were engaged in forms of discursive contestation, and also in acts of withdrawal that allowed subordinated groups to reflect and deliberate on where they thought their identities and interests currently stood.[35] Something of the idea of 'parallel discursive arenas' can be seen in the work of the art-activist collective REPOhistory, which sought between 1989 and 2000 to disrupt the symbolic patterning of New York's official and homogenised public memory culture by making visible ("repossessing") overlooked and repressed episodes from the city's past. In effect, they were challenging some of the various ways in which history's

dominance of past-talk within the public sphere was constituted by exclusions of subjects on grounds of gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status. The group – whose fluctuating membership comprised artists, academics, performers, teachers and media activists – first met in May 1989 to discuss Greg Sholette's proposal that artists should 'retrieve and relocate absent historical narratives' through the production of 'counter-monuments, actions and events'.[36] REPOhistory fused politically engaged art practices with Walter Benjamin's belief in the redemptive potential of dialectical encounters between past and present. The result was a series of installation projects that mixed visual art, urban activism, social history and radical pedagogy.[37] The first of their urban installations was the Lower Manhattan Sign Project (1992–3), a set of thirty-nine silk-screened metal signs which members of the collective attached to street lampposts in Downtown Manhattan as markers of the area's various forgotten or erased pasts. Each sign was researched and designed around a feature of the city's multi-ethnic and working-class life, carrying an image on one side and an explanatory text on the reverse. The signs were also numbered and plotted on ten thousand freely available (and freely distributed) maps so that the whole set could be experienced as a coherent walking tour as well as being encountered separately and randomly by people walking the streets. REPOhistory's strategy was to confront a large and diverse audience with images and texts that connected the past with instances of contemporary injustice and oppression. Sign 33, for example, linked the site of Manhattan's first Alms House with the contemporary crisis of homelessness by memorialising the life of June, a homeless New Yorker who died in February 1992. Sign 36 marked the United States' first all-women's strike in Lower Manhattan, while simultaneously drawing attention to the textile industry's contemporary use of non-unionised labour both overseas and in the U.S.[38] Sign 18 meanwhile showed the location of an old colonial slave market on Wall Street dating from the 1740s, a site whose invisibility from public recognition contrasted with the official bronze plaque that marked the spot where stock traders had first met in 1792. REPOhistory lacked the resources to conduct a survey into how audiences reacted to their signs, but in their intention to provoke viewers into making multiple and critical readings of their content, the street signs were at least an attempt to constitute a discursive space, which in Sholette's description

> presented urban passersby with a different representation of history as well as an alternative, non-commercial notion of how the public sphere might function and how people might relate to the city other than as consumers.[39]

REPOhistory's next major project, 'Queer Spaces' (1994), marked significant sites of New York's gay and lesbian communities with nine pink triangles (timed to coincide with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Stonewall Uprising). They followed this with a sign installation in Atlanta, Georgia titled 'Entering Buttermilk Bottom' (1995), which commemorated how an African American community in the city had been displaced in the name of "urban renewal". Measured against the

group's stated ambition of using the past to "disturb the present", however, REPOhistory's most successful (counter)production was probably 'Civil Disturbances: Battles for Justice in New York City' (1998–9), a joint venture with the non-profit law office New York Lawyers for the Public Interest.[40] The project's aim was to install twenty street signs that drew attention to precedents established by public interest law at a time when public law services were under attack from budget cuts and other political pressures. Among the legal cases that 'Civil Disturbances' commemorated were a lawsuit that established the rights of homeless families to decent emergency shelter, one that established public access rights to the Empire State Building for people with disabilities, a major class action against the city authorities for mal-administration of child welfare services, a case against the New York Police Department and Family Court for failing to protect women from their violent husbands, and the successful use of the courts by activists in Chinatown to resist further 'gentrification' of their neighbourhood.[41] But whereas REPOhistory had previously been able to obtain temporary permits to install their signs, Mayor Giuliani's administration only reluctantly gave permission for 'Civil Disturbances' to go ahead when threatened by legal action, which cited artists' rights of free speech under the U.S. constitution's First Amendment. In this way, REPOhistory became actively involved in the very battle against the corporate-friendly homogenisation of public space and de-politicisation of public art that it had long sought to highlight. And notwithstanding the fact that permits had been secured for 'Civil Disturbances', various landlords and business were sufficiently disturbed by the project's politics to censor it by repeatedly removing some of the signs from public view.[42]

By inserting the non-subjects of historical representation into the open spaces of New York's public sphere, REPOhistory were echoing ideas that were already being discussed inside certain heritage and memory institutions. As we discussed in the previous chapter, critics have characterised museums as coercive public agencies that are integral to the reproduction of culturally dominant and politically hegemonic narratives about the past. This criticism is often warranted, but we should qualify it by recognising that museum practices were caught up in the discursive turn of the 1960s and 1970s onwards, with some curators and museum professionals eventually recognising that they had an ethical responsibility to probe the relations between their own professional and institutional authority on the one hand and wider issues of power, cultural identity and representation on the other. By the 1970s and 1980s, it was no longer tenable to argue that the "white cube" of a gallery was a neutral representational space.[43] As Rosalyn Deutsche explained, public space in all its forms was the space in which the meaning and unity of the social was negotiated: 'What is recognised in public space is the legitimacy of debate about what is legitimate'.[44] Thus a cultural climate developed in which some within the museum community began to read the social meanings of their own institutions' status as historical artefacts, and in which museum practices came to be regarded as a legitimate exhibition subject. As Lisa Corrin observed when writing about U.S. museum culture in the early 1990s, 'with much breast beating, the American museum has lately performed a public purge of its past, owning up to the social

inequities it reinforced through its un-self-critical practices'.[45] Jennifer Barrett has described how a shift that occurred in museum cultures globally towards the end of the twentieth century has made at least some museums more accessible and democratic spaces, and (potentially at least) sites that can facilitate social critique, public debate and political contestation – the contrast with orthodox institutional history's defence of its own practices is striking. The "new museology" that developed in the wake of criticisms about institutional elitism and cultural appropriation distinguished itself by its commitment to engage seriously with issues concerning cultural diversity, accessibility and dialogue with groups beyond institutional walls. So different were the organisations that resulted from this ideological shift in the 1990s that Eilean Hooper-Greenhill referred to them as 'post-museums'. One of their distinguishing characteristics was that they endeavoured to become less like spectator sites for the display of "dead objects" and more like cultural centres in which discussion and a broader range of knowledge-making activities among diverse publics were encouraged. In a similar vein, James Clifford has described how contemporary museums can operate as 'contact zones' in which different audiences, voices and perspectives can encounter each other, and both help to produce and experience the museum's events and exhibitions.[46] Corinne Kratz and Ivan Karp prefer to use the term *museum frictions*, which for them signals how these institutional sites generate and host complex social processes and transformations that ramify far outside formal museum settings.[47] By reforming their practices and performative functions, museums lend weight to Mouffe's argument that 'we should discard the essentialist idea that some institutions are by essence destined to fulfil one immutable function'.[48] Mouffe rejected the idea that museums were always and necessarily partners of dominant socio-economic power, and therefore regarded calls by opponents of hegemonic power to 'desert' them in favour of working outside the institutional field as mistaken.

> To believe that existing institutions cannot become the terrain of contestation is to ignore the tensions that always exist within a given configuration of forces and the possibility of acting in a way that subverts their form of articulation.
>
> In the case of museums, my view is that, far from being condemned to play the role of conservative institutions dedicated to the maintenance and reproduction of the existing hegemony, museums and art institutions can contribute to subverting the ideological framework of consumer society. Indeed, they could be transformed into agonistic public spaces where this hegemony is openly contested.[49]

The District Six Museum in South Africa is a strong example of the kind of agonistic public space that Mouffe envisages. The museum was caught up in the post-apartheid South African state's desire to manage past-present relations as part of its wider strategy for adjusting to political transformation. Seeking to avoid conflict between formerly dominant and oppressed groups under the apartheid

system, the new government hoped that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1996–2003) would produce a discursive, performative break with the past.[50] As a supplement to its strategy for "drawing a line" under the crimes of the past by publicly acknowledging them, the African National Congress (ANC) government called on memory institutions and media to replace displays of racist stereotypes with alternative imagery that could be taken to signify a common national heritage, which in turn was intended to serve as a political ground for the realisation of a more racially and culturally inclusive society. In pursuit of this agenda, substantial sums were invested in new national "flagship" museums that presented officially sanctioned and teleological accounts of the country's past: these accounts were usually divided into three acts; a narrative of oppression and resistance, followed by what was shown to be the inevitable downfall of a morally indefensible apartheid regime, and finally resolution with the emergence of a new multi-cultural "rainbow" nation. The main new institutions that disseminated the state's approved emancipatory reading of the past included the Nelson Mandela National Museum in Mthatha, Qunu, and Mvezo; the Robben Island Museum in Cape Town; and Freedom Park in Pretoria. As part of a wider programme of political-cultural heritage work, there were also notable improvements made by local authorities to museums such as the Kwa Muhle branch of the Durban Local History Museum and MuseuMAfricA in Johannesburg.[51]

In contrast to these state-funded cultural heritage institutions, Cape Town's District Six Museum began as a grassroots initiative in 1994. More importantly, its self-identity was closely connected to the way in which it had developed out of a campaign of political contestation. The museum was a legacy of the work of the 'Hands Off District Six' committee, which was organised by activists in the Woodstock, Walmer Estate and Salt River areas during the last years of apartheid-era "reform" to protest against regime initiatives to transform District Six (so-named as the sixth municipal district of Cape Town) into a predominantly white and middle-class area.[52] Before the 1960s, District Six had hosted one of South Africa's most racially diverse populations, most of whom lived on modest or low incomes from low-grade jobs in Cape Town's city centre. Because the Cape Town City Council had neglected its responsibilities towards District Six for so long, the area gained a deserved reputation for housing shortages, poor municipal services and slum landlordism. Together with the enabling provisions of the 1950 Group Areas Act, District Six's reputation as a "slum of slums" was used as the pretext for the Nationalist Party Government's decision in February 1966 to declare it an area for white settlement and "urban renewal".[53] (Each anniversary of this decision to declare the area as a White Group Area is marked by a commemorative procession.) The District's official total of 35,000 residents – the real total was higher, not least because it was home to thousands of unregistered, illegal tenants – were given one year's notice to prepare for their forced removal and relocation to the city's barren periphery known as the Cape Flats.[54] In a series of evictions throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, between 55,000 and 60,000 residents were uprooted as part of a scheme to develop District Six as a residential area for middle-income whites.

The oil company British Petroleum (BP) had bought land there and employed a firm of urban planning consultants to draw up proposals for a major development programme. Despite the failure of protesters to prevent evictions, numerous opposition groups – including various religious denominations, the National Council for Women, the Civil Rights League, the Institute of Race Relations, schools and sports organisations – mobilised to obstruct the second phase of the development. Public campaigns were used to exert moral pressure on other potential sources of commercial and private investment in District Six in an effort to stop the area from being "bleached" or "whitewashed" with an influx of new residents; two notable successes came when the oil corporations Shell and Total dropped their plans to develop properties in the spaces left behind after demolition teams had bulldozed the old houses and properties.

Oppositional groups had further ambitions beyond getting in the way of government efforts to socially re-engineer District Six. They also saw how two important and interlinked purposes could be served by the creation of a site of collective memory that recorded residents' experiences of the removal scheme. Gathering testimonies and materials from those who were forcibly evicted, the District Six Museum's first major exhibition in 1994 – called 'Streets: Retracing District Six' – constituted a form of witnessing of the materiality, social life and culture that had all been destroyed as an outcome of a political decision to "renew" an urban space. Alongside the donated photos, objects and memorabilia that had survived the bulldozers, exhibition curators laid out a large painted map of the area that almost covered the building's floor. Original street signs, recovered from the leader of the demolition team who had held onto them, were hung high in the gallery above the map as a tangible reminder of an urban geography that had been obliterated. Visitors were encouraged to annotate the map by marking in the locations of now-erased shops, houses and streets that they could recall, and by leaving comments and messages; the map is now used as a pedagogical tool, with visitor groups standing on it as they learn about the area before it was cleared. The layering up of visual sources, documentation and recovered artefacts in the exhibition constituted, as Ciraj Rassool stated, an 'archaeology of memory';[55] it stood as a collective expression by and on behalf of a community whose physical networks had once been destroyed, but who showed how their sense of group identity could be re-activated given the right setting. It was striking that in contrast to the "connoisseurial silence" conventionally found in museums, 'Streets: Retracing District Six' was an exhibition that provoked interaction, conversation, argument and debate – about the past, but also about the future. In particular, as the museum explained in its own words, it 'created the space for ordinary people to intervene in the bigger politics of urban renewal and to express their views about the future of the city'.[56]

This capacity to connect the past with political openings in the future was the second important feature of the museum's purpose. From the outset the museum was careful not to position itself as a site that represented District Six as the heartland of a dispossessed "coloured" community (in the terminology of the apartheid regime). Instead, it deliberately presented itself as an inclusive space, one that

problematised essentialist assumptions about categories of ethnicity, class, religion, gender and political belief. In Crain Soudien's words, the museum's distinctiveness 'lay in its ability to take difference and to sublimate it within a community identity'.[57] By collecting and producing materials about the area's past that emphasised how identities were necessarily contingent, relational and malleable, it aimed to contribute in the longer term to the creation of a more inclusive Cape Town in the present. Looking beyond its immediate locale, the District Six museum has used narratives about forced removals in its collections as models for discussion of contemporary human rights issues in its educational work with students: it makes connections between what occurred in Cape Town with population expulsions in Palestine, Darfur, Zimbabwe and Iraq, and with current manifestations of xenophobia, slavery and child trafficking.[58] In a more immediately practical way, the museum also provided key resources for activists who aimed to facilitate the pursuit of restitution claims by people who had suffered forced removal, utilising the provisions of South Africa's 1994 Land Restitution Act. Its pivotal role here became apparent in 1997 when the museum was used as the venue for a special session of the Land Claims Court, at which it was confirmed that former landowners or tenants who had been removed from their homes would be entitled to make individual restitution claims for land or monetary compensation. The museum's collections, particularly the large annotated street map, became important here as tools that could be used to support and verify claimants' rights to restitution. This explains why Anwah Nagia regarded the museum as a site of conscience, one in which educational programmes and exhibitions were directly connected to the practical politics of land restitution, resettlement and development. Nagia was one of the founders of the District Six Museum and an ex-resident of the area; he was also Chairperson of the Trust that was set up in 1997 to encourage and coordinate claims for restitution by former residents. Interviewed in 1999, he described the importance of the museum's dual role both as a place of memory and a site of political agency:

> Now much of the history of South Africa was written by whites, by liberals. Perhaps this was also a fault of ours and we can't just blame our engagement in the struggle for not writing our own history. I think an attempt is made now for the first time, in a very quiet and sober environment. In the Museum, black South Africans, victims of forced removal, can articulate how they felt for the first time, without the cloud of the apartheid hegemony and the apartheid thinkers, authors and writers. There is no excuse, actually, for us to write our own history now. We can interpret it for ourselves, we can write with feeling. Some of us are still survivors. [We should write it] while we can. So the Museum is so necessary and so important an organization that even if the community chose not to have it, they almost don't have a choice because of what we have done in the work of the museum.[59]

In retrospect, the fact that the District Six Museum was not adopted by the state as one of its new, national flagship museums (despite the museum's arguments that

it should be) worked to its advantage because it was left with greater autonomy to pursue its political ambitions. By remaining at a distance from the state, relying mainly on other sources of income to fund its work, the museum was able to depart from the agenda laid out in national heritage policies and to follow instead its own priorities of facilitating land restitution claims and raising popular consciousness about the effects of forced removals of residents from Cape Town and elsewhere. It also devoted much of its energy to securing the status of District Six as a national heritage site. Its success in maintaining its own identity made the District Six Museum an exemplar for the other community museums across South Africa that emerged in its trail. Central to this was the institution's self-critical approach to its work, activities and relationships with the people whose lives (and familial predecessors' lives) it represented in its spaces and collections. Peggy Delport, who was a curator and Trustee, explained how the museum used its exhibition *Digging Deeper* (2000) as an opportunity to re-examine its collections, processes and intentions. *Digging Deeper*'s guiding concept was that the museum's role as an interpretative space was determined by the interactions between its visitors – their arguments and interjections, memories and questions – and not by the decisions of curators, artists and historians:

> The content of the Museum is located not in what is seen but in what happens within the space. Once the Museum stops being a live, generative space and becomes an object, to be consumed, merely looked at and left behind untouched, its function as a living space will end. Its visual form would have turned against itself, and become unproductive and closed. Therein lies the risk in imaging and in aesthetic form. It must above all stir the viewer into engagement, and if its visual surface begins to be over-represented as a non-productive icon then that appearance must be shifted and subverted in order to create a fresh interface.[60]

The extent to which the museum has been able to maintain its curatorial autonomy and capacity for self-reinvention in the face of the homogenising forces exerted by fund-raising pressures, the growing reach and authority of international museum consultants, and the effects of collaborating with the higher education sector remains to be seen.[61]

In a similar vein, Fred Wilson's 'Mining the Museum' installation, which was housed at the Maryland Historical Society's (MHS) exhibition space in Baltimore in 1992–1993, exemplified better than most the potential for museums to adopt self-reflexive practices as a way of interrogating (if not necessarily "purging") their pasts. Wilson, a New York–based artist of African American and Caribbean descent, had already built a reputation for exploring the prejudices and value systems inherent in the dominant protocols of mainstream museum installation in earlier projects.[62] In Maryland, working for the first time with materials from a museum collection rather than creating his own, he designed a politically provocative installation that challenged the museum's habitual ordering of some cultures

over others. In particular, he made it impossible for visitors to ignore the racialised politics of representation that had operated for more than a century within an institution that claimed to exercise objective, rational authority over the past. Wilson used his time as artist-in-residence to search through the MHS collection and archives and consult with museum staff, finding materials through which he could convey the exclusion of African Americans and Native Americans from typical MHS representations of Maryland's past. He juxtaposed slave- and segregation-era ephemera (such as shackles, whipping post, Ku Klux Klan hood) with the type of genteel artefacts (nineteenth-century silver teapot, walnut and rosewood armchairs) that were conventionally displayed from the MHS collection, prompting visitors to recognise how a slave economy had enabled a luxury economy, and how high culture and the fine arts intersected with the operation of violence and power.[63] He arranged objects in ways that accentuated blind spots and absences in the MHS collection: for example, out of a set of six pedestals, three white ones were topped by marble busts of Henry Clay, Napoleon Bonaparte and Andrew Jackson (all of these had been collected by MHS); the other three black pedestals had nothing on them, except for brass nameplates for Benjamin Banneker, Frederick Douglass and Harriet Tubman.[64] Wilson's curatorial choices skillfully forced visitors to read objects against the grain. By shining a spotlight on one part of a painted canvas that was otherwise dimly lit, he directed spectators' gazes towards a female, black slave child who was positioned at the edge of a portrait of a wealthy, eighteenth-century Maryland family. Other paintings were obscured by use of a semi-transparent overlay that had windows cut out of it, so that the only clearly visible figures were otherwise incidental representations of African American slaves.[65] Wilson's 'Mining the Museum' suggested that while museums were no doubt complicit in reproducing dominant ideologies, they also had the potential to function as effective spaces for 'imaginative, contemplative and critical experiences'.[66] As Corrin argued:

> Wilson's exhibit represented a departure from the 'museumism' genre. For it is one thing to talk about race and museums in an alternative space or a hip commercial gallery, but it is quite another to address it in an established museum by using its own collection and its own history.[67]

Certainly Wilson intended his work to counter a hegemonic reading of Maryland's past – he likes to describe museums as 'safe places for unsafe ideas'.[68] When he was invited by a peripatetic Baltimore museum called The Contemporary to develop a site-specific work of art at one of the city's main museums, Wilson chose the MHS because of its record on the politics of historical representation of race. He wanted to base himself in an institution whose galleries said 'basically nothing about black people in a city that was majority African American', and yet which was regarded as a site of historical authority.[69] Aware of the need to update its practices and connect with a local audience that could not recognise itself in the museum, the MHS allowed Wilson autonomy over its collections and the design of his installation. Rather than work with established MHS staff, it allowed him to

collaborate with volunteer experts in fields including African American local and state history; rather than produce the usual explanatory guides to the installation in advance (which had didactic effect), Wilson let it run for several weeks before asking room guards, museum volunteers, the receptionist and gift shop manager to compile a list of visitors' most frequently asked questions – answers to these questions were reproduced on a simple photocopied handout, which was then supplied to visitors as a guide to the installation.[70] This was one of the means by which Wilson consciously avoided appropriating the "voice of the expert" in his presentation. Another was the positioning at the entrance to the exhibition of a golden globe emblazoned with the word *truth*, surrounded by empty mounts that 'signaled that neither the museum nor the artist had a monopoly on truth, that the apparatus of display was as much under scrutiny as the objects presented, and that any version of the truth would be necessarily incomplete'.[71]

Fred Wilson's strategy of using museum practices to interrogate the cultural functions of the museum itself has been replicated elsewhere, such as in a recent exhibition at London's Victoria and Albert (V&A) museum. Since it opened in the 1850s, the V&A has fused the activities of design, manufacturing and the appropriating logics of British imperialism, concerning itself almost exclusively with objects of elite production and commodification. Its politics of knowledge usually acquiesce in the reproduction of a common sense that suits the interests of wealthy art collectors and the various corporate sponsors that support the museum's ideals of connoisseurship and aesthetic excellence. As the custodian of a public space that contributes to tourism, heritage work and education, the V&A typically functions as an affirming and "obedient" institution. However, in 2014 the V&A's *Disobedient Objects* exhibition sought to turn part of the museum into a different kind of public space.[72] In the words of its principal curators, Catherine Flood and Gavin Grindon, *Disobedient Objects* was a project 'both within and against' the museum.[73] The free-to-enter exhibition showed how political and social justice activists often use low-tech, improvised and subversive design ideas as instruments of struggle against dominant power. In contrast to the elitist aesthetics displayed throughout the rest of the museum, *Disobedient Objects* featured makeshift tear-gas masks, dollar bills defaced with slogans about hyper-inequality, textiles that bore witness to political murder, lock-on arm tubes used by protesters to make human blockades, and other examples of material culture's role in the production of counterpower. According to the curators, the objects that they selected for display were "disobedient" in the sense that their original use constituted a micro-politics of everyday acts in relation to social change – acts that often predated the formation of a recognisably 'activist' subjectivity by the users.[74] The sparse design aesthetics of the exhibition space amplified its representational politics, with the use of aluminium poles to support chipboard display mounts recalling the low-cost functionalism of an Occupy camp.

In an attempt to democratise the curatorial process and to practice their political values in the ways that they worked, the curators consulted widely and ran workshops before selecting which objects to include as representations. They ensured that social movement activists who lent them objects could make their own

statements in the exhibition about the artefacts they had donated (these statements were displayed on yellow labels to keep them distinct from the rather more muted grey labels that were used for the curators' comments). They provided spaces for certain social movement cultures and groups whose objects were not represented in the exhibition to display some of their campaign materials, in forms such as leaflets and flyers. Bringing the material cultures of oppositional movements within a state-supported institution such as the V&A risked silencing them politically, transforming them into a form of cultural capital to be appropriated and acquired. In their defence, Flood and Grindon were well aware of arguments about capital's ability to reclaim dissidence for itself, usually by commodifying dissent into "edgy" cultural products – indeed, examples of these were available in the form of Disobedient Objects exhibition-related merchandising. Also, they acknowledged that the politics of the everyday acts of resistance displayed in the exhibition were generally directed towards the goals of leftist social movements from the late 1970s onwards: countering climate change, resisting colonialism, extending gender rights, opposing the damaging ways in which global capitalism has reshaped people's relations to work, leisure, technology and culture. This agenda arguably suited the liberal preferences of the V&A's core metropolitan and cosmopolitan audiences, avoiding more potentially troubling subjects such as far-right political cultures and the politics of Palestine-Israel.[75] In addition, there was no way of closing off the possibility that liberally inclined spectators who visited Disobedient Objects might use the exhibition as a safe way of performing their anti-capitalism for them. But on the other hand, on the day after Hong Kong police tear-gassed demonstrators in September 2014, there was a spike in the number of downloads from the exhibition's website featuring instructions on how to make a gas mask out of a plastic bottle, dust mask and elastic bands. And when the Public and Commercial Services Union used the exhibition as a space to put public pressure on the V&A to pay employees a living wage, the museum's management did at least agree to attend pay talks with the trade union. So perhaps in small but worthwhile ways the exhibition supported Mouffe's contention that even the most prestigious national museums can play host to spaces that enable various forms of hegemony to be contested.

Activist film: pasts on screen

The figure of the activist filmmaker is a relatively familiar one now, from well-known names such as Michael Moore, Oliver Stone, Ken Loach and Adam Curtis, through organisations such as Films for Action, The Video Activism Network and Witness, to the work of important but less high-profile filmmakers such as Francine Cavanaugh, Paul Antick, Adams Wood, Jenni Olson, Nettie Wild, Andrew Choi, Kwun-Wai Chow and Ka-Leung Ng. Unlike academic historians, filmmakers are not expected to adhere to norms of ideological restraint, moderation and disavowal of political allegiances within their professional practices. Moreover, filmmakers are not subject to protocols to avoid dealing with the very recent past, to wait until an event has been safely "pastified" before narrating it from an appropriately "historical"

perspective: Bennett calls this waiting period the 'comfortably disempowering historical distance or delay'.[76] Also, whereas almost all historians ignore White's advice that the goal of historical representation should be to 'create perplexity in the face of the real', filmmakers commonly challenge and disrupt the conventional strategies of their own mode of representation in order to achieve political or ideological effect.[77] To take perhaps the best-known example, much of Jean-Luc Godard's work constitutes a form of militant counter-cinema, using Brechtian techniques of distanciation and estrangement to disrupt film's production of reality effects. Godard frequently refuses to allow audiences the comfort of immersion in a smoothly narrativised world on screen and the convenience of encountering ideas that have been packaged for pedagogic consumption. The resulting abstractions and complexities of Godard's films create an opening in which some viewers at least might recognise that interpreting a film (as with all texts) is an act of personal ethico-political responsibility: a reading that is undertaken in conditions of undecidability, a matter of choice and affiliation rather than a process of identifying meanings as if they inhered within the film text. Within the tradition of European art cinema, filmmakers such as Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Pier Paulo Pasolini, Mathieu Kassovitz, Xavier Koller and Michael Winterbottom have all shared Godard's concern with the politics of representation. As such, they exemplify Ermarth's point about the role of artists in what she calls '*naming the discourse*' (original emphasis). By this, she means that artists 'skillfully re-deploy their available discursive capacities in ways that open an interval between what the discursive system conventionally does and what it is capable of and could do'.[78] Social renewal, she argues, depends on the creation of such defamiliarising gaps in the use of discourse.

Beyond Europe – and in some respects in opposition to Eurocentric ideas about an avant-garde film canon – an even more militant aesthetic politics was developed under the heading of Third Cinema from the late 1960s onwards. Two polemical essays, both published in 1969, explained what was at stake for this militant, anti-imperialist cinema that came out of Latin America, Africa and Asia. In 'For an Imperfect Cinema', the Cuban film director and writer Julio García Espinosa argued that 'technically and artistically masterful' cinema was always 'reactionary'. Rejecting the representational conventions of both commercial and 'narcissistic' (European/elite/art) cinema, Espinosa called for Latin American filmmakers to ask themselves one question: 'What are you doing in order to overcome the barrier of the "cultured" elite audience which up to now has conditioned the form of your work?'[79] Although filmmaking was one of the most elitist and expensive cultural practices, Espinosa looked forward to a period when technological advances, increased leisure time, the growth of television and widening access to higher education in Cuba would take film production out of the control of the privileged few: what he hoped for was a '"partisan" and "committed" poetics for the cinema, one that contributed to a revolutionary "folk art"'.[80] The other manifesto of militant activist film in 1969, 'Towards a Third Cinema' by Fernando Solanos and Octavio Getino, took a similar position. The authors called for students, workers and political activists to embrace cinema as an ideological tool, making films that could be

screened as a stimulus to political discussion in a context of mounting political oppression and violence in Latin America. Exemplars of this approach were films that deal with the recent past like *La Hora de los Hornos* [*The Hour of the Furnaces*] (1968), which Solanos and Getino made in conjunction with *Grupo Cine Liberación* as an analysis of Argentina's political situation before and after the installation of a military regime in 1966, *La Batalla de Chile* [*The Battle of Chile*] (1975, 1976, 1979), Patricio Guzmán's three-part documentary about the military coup against Salvador Allende's government in 1973, and documentaries by the Cuban filmmaker Santiago Alvarez.[81] The goal of such 'guerilla cinema', wrote Solanos and Getino, was to intervene in a given political situation, not simply to illustrate, document or passively establish it: after one screening of their agit-prop film *La Hora de los Hornos*, the authors noted, students raised barricades in Montevideo.[82]

The revolutionary rhetoric of Third Cinema – imagining the "new man" and the "liberated personality" that would emerge in the struggle against the enemy – came to define the possibilities of activist film in the 1970s, but it did not exhaust them. Alvaro Bizzarri's film *Il Treno del Sud* (1970) exemplifies how film could be used in support of more limited and specific political causes. Bizzarri was an Italian who had emigrated to Switzerland in 1955, and who began to make amateur films in 1968; he went on to make a dozen films after returning home to Tuscany in 1970. *Il Treno del Sud* narrates the story of Paolo il Rosso, an amateur photographer and alter ego of Bizzarri, who moved to Switzerland to find work in a factory – as many thousands of Italians did in the 1960s and 1970s. The film traces how overlapping social and internal pressures prevented Paolo from settling in his adopted country. We see how he became active in the Italian labour and anti–Vietnam War movements – the character's activism paralleled Bizzarri's involvement in an organisation that fought for the rights of Italian migrant workers. In Switzerland, Paolo witnessed the injustices that Italian migrant workers faced. He saw how his compatriots routinely took the lowest paid and most dangerous jobs, and then suffered the double indignity of becoming the rhetorical target of a newly formed, Swiss anti-immigrant political party. To compound matters, migrant workers in Switzerland had no political or voting rights themselves and were prohibited from engaging in other forms of political activism: the film shows how Italian communist activists were expelled by the Swiss. Missing his wife and family, suffering from illness, haunted by memories of the past that could provoke anxiety or a longing for home, Paolo decided to leave a place in which he felt powerless to act and to return to his native Italy. Clearly, the protagonist's choice at the end of the story mirrored Bizzarri's decision to make a film that would provoke discussion about the problems of Italian migrant workers. And as Morena La Barba explains, in *Lo stagionale*, the second film in which Bizzarri dealt with the same subject matter, the main character and his comrades are shown demonstrating for their rights in Switzerland and protesting against their status as seasonal workers. She concludes:

> In 1970, outside the Italian embassy and the Swiss federal parliament building, the fiction of film meets the reality of the documentary, political actors

> reach film actors, and political imagination adjoins artistic creativity for a better imagined future in Switzerland.[83]

More recently – and in ways that have engaged far larger audiences – Michael Winterbottom's films have dealt with some of the same issues explored in Alvaro Bizzarri's work. Winterbottom has become a leading practitioner of "activist cinema" in the last two decades, showing, as Bruce Bennett argues, 'the critical potential of cinema to make visible the ideological formation of the present'.[84] Although his work is often discussed in relation to European auteurs such as Rossellini, Bergman, Godard, Bertolucci, Wenders and Fassbinder, as well as Iranian "masters" like Abbas Kiarostami, Winterbottom has consistently argued that filmmaking is an industrial and collaborative process rather than a vehicle for expressing a single artistic vision.[85] His preference for making low- to medium-budget films via the company that he set up with Andrew Eaton (Revolution Films) has given Winterbottom and his creative partners greater autonomy to choose "non-commercial", politically controversial projects. As Catherine Portuges argued, he 'may well be one of the few commercial directors working in English to be primarily concerned with the ethics of a moral cinema'.[86] Beginning with *Welcome to Sarajevo* (1997), which was set during the siege of the Bosnian capital in the 1990s, Winterbottom has gone on to make several more films that explored contemporary historico-political issues. His films consistently return to themes around war, migration, border crossing and the power of media organisations to shape the contours of public discourse about these subjects. Winterbottom's thematic preoccupations are present in various ways in three films that deal with the consequences of the U.S.-led coalition attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 onwards: *In This World* (2002), *The Road to Guantánamo* (2006) and *A Mighty Heart* (2007). None of these films narrate the high politics, military strategy or grand ideological rhetoric that constituted what came to be called the "war on terror". Instead, they work more like contemporary micro histories, detailing the 'banal, crushing experience' of living in what Agamben calls a 'state of exception', where laws are suspended under the guise of security measures to combat global terrorism.[87] Making film representations about refugee experiences, border security and the ordeals of victims of kidnap and torture always entails the risk of turning these subjects into sources of spectator pleasure and easy moral identification for western audiences. But such films can also be justified in terms of their potential to intervene in public political discourse. Bennett argues that Winterbottom's films disrupt dominant ways of naming and narrating what global media organisations refer to as the "war on terror":

> Viewed as a trilogy, the films offer different ways of seeing the War on Terror from many of the contemporary films that reproduce the perspectives, ideological frames and experiences of US and European soldiers and their families, contractors and politicians. . . . In their orientation around marginal figures, Winterbottom's films recognise the impossibility of producing a comprehensive, fully coherent account of the war – especially in the face of

> the overwhelming volume of images and narratives – and instead they make visible bodies and audible voices that have been absent from, obliterated by, or indeed terrorised and abjected by, dominant accounts of the war.[88]

Winterbottom's status as a film director with an international profile meant that he could utilise the same global news and entertainment media that circulated the kind of tropes about the rationale, conduct and consequences of wars on people living in Pakistan and Afghanistan that he sought to disrupt. As he explained in one of the many interviews he has given to journalists, *In This World* was his attempt to tell a story about the experiences of refugees fleeing to western Europe in a way that might counter 'anti-immigrant scaremongering in right-wing British tabloids'.[89] Winterbottom explained how he saw the film's political effects:

> We were lucky with *In This World* – in Britain it got a lot of press coverage and sparked discussion about immigration, and maybe someone who saw the film would spend an hour thinking about what it's like to be a refugee.[90]

The film is a docudrama that follows two young Afghan migrants as they attempt to travel illegally from Peshawar in Pakistan through Iran, Turkey, Italy, France and finally to Britain. The youngest character, Jamal, is from the Shamshatoo refugee camp, where some of his fellow Afghan refugees had lived since the Soviets invaded their country in 1979; the most recent arrivals in the camp had fled the U.S. bombing raids that began on Afghanistan in 2001. As preparation for the film, Winterbottom and screenwriter Tony Grisoni journeyed to Pakistan on tourist visas and then travelled the people-smuggling route back as far as Istanbul, researching the terrain that would feature in the production, scouting for locations and deciding what kinds of scenes would provide the film's narrative content. Casting director Wendy Brazington also travelled to Pakistan to find non-professional actors to play the roles of the film's principal characters – the two refugees who are called Jamal and Enayatullah on the screen. Winterbottom's shoestring crew shot some 200 hours of digital video footage on small hand-held cameras, usually featuring staged and improvised scenes rather than scripted scenarios as such, which was then edited down to a film of less than 90 minutes.[91] Because of the difficulties they encountered getting official permission to shoot the film, some of these improvised scenes were shot without permits, using hidden radio microphones in the actors' clothes.[92] This use of subterfuge – the kind of "guerilla filmmaking" that recalled *Hour of the Furnaces* – extended to the film's working title; it was called *The Silk Road* during production so that officials in various countries would think that the film was about a safely "historical" subject, not one that dealt with the recent past's reverberations in the present.[93]

In keeping with its theme of border crossings, the film continually announces its uncertain textual status as it elides the formal boundaries of "fact-fiction" and "drama-documentary". The film's two principal actors, Jamal Udin Torabi and Enayatullah, play characters who have the same names as their own. Viewers watch

them travelling thousands of miles in pick-ups, lorries, buses, ferries, trains and on foot, evading border checkpoints by various ploys that include Jamal clinging to the underside of a heavy goods lorry. However, *In This World* is not a straightforward document of their journey, but a film that instigates and then continually inserts itself into that journey. Without the filmmakers prompting them to travel from Pakistan to western Europe, Jamal's and Enayatullah's journey would not have taken place: the journey is the film, and the film is the journey.[94] Furthermore, as Winterbottom explained, the logistical challenge of getting the two migrants to the UK implicated the filmmakers themselves in the use of 'forged documents, smuggling and bribery'.[95] Scenes are staged, including the film's most affecting moment when all but two of the people concealed in a lorry's container die by suffocation before they reach their destination in Trieste. But the final moments are not staged, as we are told how Jamal decided to use his acting fee from the film to travel to Britain for a second time in order to claim asylum status. His claim was refused by the Home Office, but he was granted "exceptional leave" to remain in the UK until just before his eighteenth birthday. Winterbottom subsequently stated that he liked the confusion that the film created between Jamal the character and Jamal the person, noting how Jamal on his return to London (after his asylum claim was rejected) watched Winterbottom editing footage of the original journey that he had made from Pakistan to the UK.[96]

Whereas the subjects of *In This World* travel from Pakistan to Britain, *The Road to Guantánamo* tells the story of the "Tipton Three" – Asif Iqbal, Ruhel Ahmed and Shafiq Rasul – who travelled in the reverse direction.[97] The three crossed the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan, where they were arrested by the Northern Alliance as suspected Taliban fighters; they then passed into U.S. (and British secret service) hands and were tortured and held without charge at Camp X-ray and then Camp Delta in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Once again Winterbottom, together with Andrew Eaton (producer) and Mat Whitecross (co-director), refused to be constrained by the genre protocols of documentary film. *The Road to Guantánamo* is a complex textual assemblage of archival footage, dramatised sequences, voice-over and interviews with the three protagonists.[98] Jonathan Raban, reviewing the film, referred to its 'deliberately confusing medley of fact . . . and fictional devices'.[99] Winterbottom was open about the political intentions behind making the film: to remind people that Camp Delta existed, to show the system that created and maintained this extra-legal prison, and to persuade the public that it should be closed.[100] The priority, therefore, was to make a film that was as polemical and persuasive as possible. As Allison argued: 'This is not an investigative documentary, but a campaign for political change that uses agitprop techniques to influence opinion'.[101] (In any case, one wonders what an "even-handed" or "fair and balanced" account of Guantánamo Bay – a site that Amnesty International called 'the gulag of our times' in 2005[102] – would look like.) The film's distribution strategy was designed to heighten its political effect: festival screenings were used to generate media interest, and then the film was released simultaneously in theatres, on DVD, on broadcast television and over the internet for streaming and downloading.[103] The UK television

premiere in March 2006 (watched by 1.6 million viewers) was followed by a debate on the issues raised, while in the week following the film's release, Winterbottom, Whitecross and some of the crew toured cinemas where they held post-screening discussions.[104] *The Road to Guantánamo*'s U.S. distributor, Roadside Attractions, set up a website to accompany the film that included a 'Get Active' page, which had links to human rights organisations and an advice guide for anyone who wanted to protest about the existence of a U.S. extrajudicial secret torture site – what one of the lawyers of the Bush administration called 'the legal equivalent of outer space'.[105] Ironically, perhaps, it was the U.S. Department of Defense who best indicated the film's success in challenging authority when they issued a news release in July 2007 that described the Tipton Three's participation in making *The Road to Guantánamo* as an example of 'anti-coalition militant activities'.[106]

For some critics, Winterbottom's position on the politics of war in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the borderlands between the two was complicated by his decision to accept the U.S. corporation Paramount's invitation to make *A Mighty Heart*. The film starred Angelina Jolie in the role of Mariane Pearl, a journalist whose husband (U.S. *Wall Street Journal* writer Daniel Pearl) was kidnapped and murdered in Pakistan in 2002; a videotape depicting his beheading was released to journalists a few days afterwards. Jolie's star status, her compelling performance and the ways in which we as spectators are cued to identify with her character's situation make the film's representational politics far more sympathetic to U.S. claims about what was at stake in the "war on terror" than either *In This World* or *The Road to Guantánamo*. It is this apparent softening of his critique that led Loshitzky, for example, to refer to Winterbottom's '"capitulation" to American capitalist modes of production and representation' in making *A Mighty Heart*.[107] But in a subsequent film, *The Shock Doctrine* (2009), a text that provides a retrospective critical frame that helps us to understand the political significance of the earlier trilogy, Winterbottom reaffirms his critical stance against U.S. neo-liberal interventionism. Adapted from Naomi Klein's book of the same name, *The Shock Doctrine* translated parts of Klein's thesis about the rise of "disaster capitalism" into a conventional documentary format: it argues that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq should be understood as part of a longer-term neo-liberal strategy of disaster capitalism rather than as purely military responses to terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. in September 2001.[108] Klein describes part of the thesis herself in the film, where she is shown delivering fragments of lectures which explain how the shock effects of military coups, war, terrorist attacks, natural disasters and global banking failures have been exploited since the 1970s as preludes to the introduction of radical free-market economic policies. Using a combination of extracts from previous documentaries, archival film, news footage, photographs and stills of documents, the film shows how a powerfully hegemonic narrative was constructed that positioned minimally regulated market capitalism as the natural or only rational response to natural or willed catastrophes – witness how the film shows the expulsion of people from their coastal homes to make way for luxury hotel building following the Sri Lankan tsunami in 2004. Winterbottom and co-director Mat Whitecross use the film to circulate and reinforce Klein's argument that by tracing a genealogy of the

grand narrative of "capitalist realism" (the idea that there is no imaginable alternative to capitalism as currently construed), we create discursive space in which a demystifying alternative narrative to it might take hold and generate political counter-responses.[109]

Conclusion

Michael Winterbottom's films about the effects of the recent U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq are not "historical" as such. Although *The Shock Doctrine* can be read as a counter-genealogy of modern capitalism into which the other films fit, none of *In This World*, *The Road to Guantánamo* or *A Mighty Heart* complies with the generic conventions of what Munslow calls the-past-as-history.[110] The artists and post-museum curators discussed in this chapter are similarly disrespectful of orthodox history's claims to epistemic authority over all matters relating to the past. In part, this is simply a matter of recognising that history's epistemic authority has no foundations beyond the social power of the institutions in which it is produced. But contravening its representational codes is also a way of signalling that academic history (still) embodies essentialist values that contemporary projects for radical democracy seek to reject and resist.[111] As writers like Todd May, Saul Newman, Andrew Koch and Mark Bevir have argued, post-structuralist theories of knowledge have proven to be the ones that are most compatible with the radically democratic and anti-authoritarian political projects that characterise the most vital left activism today. The newest social movements and political collectives that have formed after the protests against the World Trade Organisation at Seattle in 1999 have been organised along decentralised, horizontal and networked lines. The same is true of the new wave of social movements in Latin America.[112] If any of these groups should choose to invoke the past for whatever reason, it follows that the epistemological practices they use to do so should be commensurate with their political ones.[113] This means that there should be a discursive prefiguration of the political values they seek to realise in the methods and forms that they use to invoke the past. Or to put it another way, it would be inconsistent (even self-refuting) for anyone engaged in non-hierarchical and anti-representationalist political projects to insist that one semantic system was *the* correct discourse for invoking the past, particularly academic history, which habitually seeks to produce the kind of interpretative closures that emancipatory political work aims to disturb and disrupt. Activists of many types have found inventive ways to use the past in the present in support of specific causes. To complain that this is an "abuse" of history is to fail to recognise that epistemological disciplining is also a form of social disciplining.

Notes

1 Jean-François Lyotard uses the concept of genre to make a similar point. As Todd May explained: 'Language, for Lyotard, is a set of practices, irreducible in genre to one another, that intersect not only with one another but with other, nonlinguistic practices to create still other practices, both linguistic and nonlinguistic. . . . Lyotard's "genre" corresponds, in the terms we have been using to "linguistic practice". A genre is a practice of language

that makes sense only within the context of that genre'. Todd May, *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 108–9. Michel Foucault put it a different way still:

> What, in short, we wish to do is to dispense with 'things'. To 'depresentify' them . . . To substitute for the enigmatic treasure of 'things' anterior to discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse. To define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance.
>
> I would like to show that 'discourses', in the form in which they can be heard or read, are not, as one might expect, a mere intersection of things and words. . . . I would like to show that discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language. . . . I would like to show with precise examples that in analysing discourses themselves, one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice. These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects. [Discourses are] practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.

See Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. Alan Mark Sheridan Smith (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989), 52–4.

2 This is why Keith Jenkins, for example, often uses the term "before now" in place of "the past", because the latter term has become so imbued through usage with notions of the historical. Ermarth puts the problem in these terms: 'History's values, purpose and entire definition is methodological. History is a method for producing neutrality . . . and that commitment of historical writing has nothing to do with content. Its inscription of neutrality is methodological. The "how" of history is what history is "about"'. But, she continues, 'we have naturalised historical conventions to the point that the term "history" indicates nothing less than "objective reality": the sum-total of has-happeneds that are somehow "out there" and "in" a time that is not only neutral but is an artefact of historical conventions in the first place. "History" has been speaking for 200 years and so effectively that "history" can even seem synonymous with "time"' (original emphasis). Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, *History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering the Tools of Thought* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 96.

3 Hayden White, "The Burden of History," in White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 47.

4 Ibid., 47.

5 Foucault is probably the most widely cited thinker in discussions of the relations between power and the status of knowledge claims. On his reading, knowledge production is enmeshed in processes of struggle and domination. As he said in an interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino in 1976:

> Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth – that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. . . .
>
> There is a battle 'for truth', or at least, 'around truth' – it being understood that once again that by truth I mean not 'the ensemble of truths to be discovered and accepted' but, rather, 'the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true', it being understood also that it's not a matter of a battle 'on behalf' of the truth but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays. . . . The problem is not changing people's consciousness – or what's in their heads – but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth. It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already

> power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.

See "Truth and Power," in *Michel Foucault: Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley and others (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 131–3.

6 Ermarth, *Discursive Condition*, xi–xvi.
7 Ibid., 74, 87.
8 Ibid., 114.
9 Keith Jenkins, *Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 56, 60.
10 Kalle Pihlainen, "The End of Oppositional History," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 15/4 (2011): 483.
11 Variants of such self-descriptions can be found in most orthodox accounts of history's discursive codes. We restrict ourselves here to two recent and widely circulated examples. See Margaret Macmillan, *Dangerous Games: the Uses and Abuses of History* (New York: Modern Library, 2009); Christopher Kissane, 'Historical Myopia is to blame for the attacks on Mary Beard', *The Guardian*, August 11, 2017, accessed 17/8/17, www.theguardian.com/books/2017/aug/11/reformation-2017-christopher-kissane-history.
12 Sande Cohen, "Figuring Forth the Historian Today," in Cohen, *History Out of Joint: Essays on the Use and Abuse of History* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 118.
13 Cohen, "Figuring Forth," 105.
14 See, for example, various works by Martin Davies and Keith Jenkins.
15 Wendy Brown, *Politics Out Of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 140.
16 The phrase is from Ermarth, *Discursive Condition*, 106.
17 Kalle Pihlainen, "Historians and 'the current situation'," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 20/2 (2016): 151.
18 We recognise that we do so ourselves, and indeed we do so throughout this book, including in this chapter.
19 May, *Poststructuralist Anarchism*, 97.
20 Sara C. Motta, "Reinventing Revolutions, an 'Other' Politics in Practice and Theory,"' in *Rethinking Latin American Social Movements: Radical Action from Below*, eds. Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry Vanden and Marc Becker. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 25.
21 Motta, "Reinventing Revolutions," 25.
22 May, *Poststructuralist Anarchism*, 131.
23 We are aware that problems associated with representationalism apply more generally to academic disciplines beyond history. To use an example that is separate from (but related to) historiography, Sharon Rosenberg has written about the implications of incorporating trauma studies into the modern university, with its normative procedures of scholarly enquiry and public pedagogy. She argued that there was a tension, even contradiction, between the performative expectations of academic work – detachment, control, certainty, knowledge as progress – and her own experience of researching trauma (in the fields of social theory and cultural studies). Rosenberg's experiences were that writing about trauma confronted us with what we cannot bear to know and the vulnerabilities of encountering ignorances. She explained that this was not an attempt to justify academic self-introspection:

> Rather, I am arguing that the study of trauma and memory call for encounters with ignorance(s) as a condition of possibility for 'how we might be' in relation . . . to 'what lives on' after violent death and destruction, 'what is conjured from it, how past generations and events occupy the force fields of the present, how they claim us, and how they haunt, plague and inspirit our imaginations and visions for the future.'

See Sharon Rosenberg, "Facing Losses/Losing Guarantees: A Meditation on Openings to Traumatic Ignorance as a Constitutive Demand," in *The Future of Memory*, eds. Richard Crownshaw, Jane Kilby and Antony Rowland (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 260.

24 Society, they argued, should not be conceptualised as the aggregate of its multiple elements combining to produce a completed whole, but neither should it be understood as an enclosed space in which these elements remain dispersed and separated from each other. The reason for this is that either conceptualisation would be an essentialism: the former because it assigned a full, positive identity to the totality of the social as a "society", the latter by giving a fixed and literal identity to the separate elements themselves within the social. See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001), 82–3.
25 Ernesto Laclau, "Why Constructing a 'People' is the Main Task of Radical Politics," in Laclau, *The Rhetorical Foundations of Society* (London: Verso, 2014), 156–7.
26 Ernesto Laclau, "Beyond Emancipation," and "Power and Representation," in Laclau, *Emancipation(s)* (London: Verso, 2007), 2 and 101.
27 In 'Beyond Emancipation', Laclau problematised various dimensions around which emancipation as a term was organised. For a real emancipation to take place, he argued, there has to be a radical discontinuity – or chasm – between the emancipatory moment and the social order that had preceded it. But on his reading the logics of emancipation offered two problematic possibilities. On one hand, in order to assert that a post-emancipation social order was rational and permanent, one would have to accept that there was a "deeper ground" that rationally connected the pre-emancipatory order, the emancipated one, and the transition between the two. But as a consequence, emancipation could not be held to constitute a truly radical break, only an internal differentiation within the same (oppressing) system. On the other hand, for emancipation to be truly radical there would have to be no common ground between the old order, the new and the emancipatory act. But if this were so, the emancipated social order would have to be its own ground, thereby confining what it excludes to a radical otherness constituted by evil or irrationality. Therefore, the emancipatory act and the resulting social order could not be regarded as rational; they would be purely contingent and could not be held to have effected the liberation of any true human essence. Laclau went on to argue that two incompatible lines of thought had been connected to constitute the discourses of emancipation. One of these presupposed that an emancipated social order would be fully transparent to itself, forming a self-contained totality that unified its various partial processes, antagonisms and dichotomies. The other presupposed that the limits of this totality could only be established by differentiating it from what lay outside its borders – which was an irrational and formless exterior. In simple terms, limits are required to mark out the new totality, but these limits also mark an act of radical exclusion that contradict the idea that the totality could be fully transparent to itself. See Laclau, "Beyond Emancipation," 2–6.
28 Ernesto Laclau, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony," in *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (Abingdon: Routledge, 1996), 52.
29 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), 92.
30 Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in *Power/Knowledge*, trans. and ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), 98.
31 Richard J.F. Day, "Hegemony, Affinity and the Newest Social Movements: At the End of the 00s," in *Post-Anarchism: A Reader*, ed. Duane Rousselle and Süreyyya Evren (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 113.
32 Andrew Koch, "Post-structuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism," in *Post-Anarchism: A Reader*, ed. Duane Rousselle and Süreyyya Evren (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 39.
33 Chantal Mouffe, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of Democracy," in *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (Abingdon: Routledge, 1996), 5.
34 Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 123. For a complementary discussion see Chantal Mouffe, "For an agonistic public sphere," in *Radical Democracy: Politics Between Abundance*

and Lack, ed. Lars Tonder and Lasse Thomassen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 123–32.

35 Luke Good, *Jürgen Habermas: Democracy and the Public Sphere* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 46.

36 Gregory Sholette, "Authenticity Squared. REPOhistory CIRCULATION: Anatomy of an Activist, Urban Art Project," *New Art Examiner*, December 1999, 20–3 and 71–2. The online version cited here is available at www.gregorysholette.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/12_authenticity1.pdf, accessed 21/7/17.

37 For an account of REPOhistory's membership, methods and productions, see Dipti Desai, "History that Disturbs the Present: An interview about REPOhistory with Greg Sholette," April 26, 2007, available at www.gregorysholette.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/History-that-disturbs-the-Present1.pdf, accessed 21/7/17. See also Philip Glahn, "Public Art: Avant-Garde Practice and the Possibilities of Critical Articluation," *Afterimage: The Journal of Media Arts and Cultural Criticism* 28/3 (2000): 10–12.

38 Details of the project, including images of the signs and a map showing their locations, can be found in REPOhistory, The Lower Manhattan Sign Project, New York: REPOhistory, 1993. See also Lucy Lippard's introductory essay "Anti-Amnesia," 4–7.

39 Desai, "History that Disturbs."

40 See the special edition of *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 26/5 (1999).

41 Matthew Diller, "Introduction: Civil Disturbances – Battles for Justice in New York City," *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 26/5 (1999): 1317–23. See also Gregory Sholette, Dark Matter: Art and Politics in the Age of Enterprise Culture (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 75–8.

42 Sholette, *Dark Matter*, 76, 78.

43 Lisa G. Corrin, "Mining the Museum: Artists Look at Museums, Museums Look at Themselves," in *Fred Wilson: A Critical Reader*, ed. Doro Globus (London: Ridinghouse, 2011), 48–9.

44 Cited in Jennifer Barrett, *Museums and the Public Sphere* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 94.

45 Corrin, "Artists Look at Museums," 46.

46 See Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, *Museums and the Interpretation of Visual Culture* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000), and James Clifford, "Museums as Contact Zones," in *Representing the Nation: A Reader. Histories, Heritage and Museums*, ed. David Boswell and Jessica Evans (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999), 435–57.

47 Corinne A. Kratz and Ivan Karp, "Introduction" in *Museum Frictions: Public Cultures/Global Transformations*, ed. Ivan Karp, Corinne A. Kratz, Lynn Szwaja and Tomás Ybarra-Frausto (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 2.

48 Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically* (London: Verso, 2013), 101.

49 Mouffe, Agonistics, 100.

50 Berber Bevernage, *History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 46–65. As he discusses in detail, the Commission's attempts to "pastify" the crimes of apartheid were contested by activists such as the Khulumani Support Group, who stated: 'It is not perpetrators who should be announcing that it is time to move on from the horrors of a past that continues to live in the present. It is victims who should announce that time', Bevernage, *History, Memory*, 64.

51 Bevernage, *History, Memory*, 108.

52 Ciraj Rassool, "Community Museums, Memory Politics, and Social Transformation in South Africa: Histories, Possibilities and Limits," in *Museum Frictions: Public Cultures/Global Transformations*, ed. Ivan Karp, Corinne A. Kratz, Lynn Szwaja and Tomás Ybarra-Frausto (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 286. For a detailed overview of the various phases of protest in District Six, see Crain Soudien, "District Six: From Protest to Protest," in *The Struggle for District Six: Past and Present: A Project of the Hands Off District Six Committee*, ed. Shamil Jeppie and Crain Soudien (Cape Town: Buchu Books, 1990), 143–81.

53 The phrase "slum of slums" was used by Louis Fouché, the Director General for Community Development in Cape Town, looking back on the removal and redevelopment scheme in 1982, see Deborah M. Hart, "Political Manipulation of Urban Space: The Razing of District Six, Cape Town," in *The Struggle for District Six: Past and Present: a*

Project of the Hands Off District Six Committee, ed. Shamil Jeppie and Crain Soudien (Cape Town: Buchu Books, 1990), 127.

54 Hart, "Political Manipulation," 124.

55 Rassool, "Community Museums," 291.

56 Ibid., 292.

57 Crain Soudien, "Memory and Critical Education: Approaches in the District Six Museum," in *City, Site, Museum. Reviewing memory practices at the District Six Museum*, ed. Bonita Bennett, Chrischené Julius and Crain Soudien (Cape Town: District Six Museum, 2008), 114.

58 Mandy Sanger, "Education Work in the District Six Museum: Layering in New Voices and Interpretations," in *City, Site, Museum. Reviewing Memory Practices at the District Six Museum*, ed. Bonita Bennett, Chrischené. Julius and Crain Soudien (Cape Town: District Six Museum, 2008), 108.

59 Anwah Nagia interviewed by Colin Miller, "Land Restitution in District Six: Settling a Traumatic Landscape," in *Recalling Community in Cape Town: Creating and Curating the District Six Museum*, ed. Ciraj Rassool and Sandra Prosalnedis (Cape Town, District Six Museum Foundation, 2001), 168.

60 Peggy Delport, "Digging Deeper in District Six: Features and Interfaces in a Curatorial Landscape," in *Recalling Community in Cape Town: Creating and Curating the District Six Museum*, ed. Ciraj Rassool and Sandra Prosalnedis (Cape Town, District Six Museum Foundation, 2001), 159.

61 See Rassool, "Community Museums," 286–321.

62 Wilson made his name with an installation for the Bronx Council on the Arts at the Longwood Gallery, Bronx, New York in 1987–8, called "Rooms With a View: The Struggle Between Culture, Content, and the Context of Art."

63 Fred Wilson, Paula Marincola and Marjorie Schwarzer, "Mining the Museum Revisited: A Coversation," in *Letting Go? Sharing Historical Authority in a User-Generated World*, ed. Bill Adair, Benjamin Filene, and Laura Koloski (Philadelphia: The Pew Centre for Arts and Heritage, 2011), 230; Corrin, "Artists Look at Museums," 64; Jennifer A. González, "Fred Wilson: Material Museology,"' in *Fred Wilson: A Critical Reader*, ed. Doro Globus (London: Ridinghouse, 2011), 347.

64 Simon Dumenco, "Lost and Found: Artist Fred Wilson Pulls Apart Maryland's Hidden History," in *Fred Wilson: A Critical Reader*, ed. Doro Globus (London: Ridinghouse, 2011), 34.

65 Dumenco, "Lost and Found," 35–6.

66 Lynne Cook and Mark Francis, *Carnegie International 1991*, vol. 1 (1991), cited in Corrin, "Artists Look at Museums," 50.

67 Corrin, "Artists Look at Museums," 55.

68 Rachel Kent, "Subtle and Subversive: Fred Wilson's Museum Interventions," in *Fred Wilson: A Critical Reader*, ed. Doro Globus (London: Ridinghouse, 2011), 106.

69 Conversation with Fred Wilson, Paula Marincola, and Marjorie Schwarzer, 232.

70 Corrin, "Artists Look at Museums," 60.

71 González, "Fred Wilson: Material Museology," 343. Recent studies have described Wilson's Maryland exhibition as 'a touchstone for how artists can challenge curatorial and institutional authority' and 'an exemplar of epistemic and aesthetic disobedience'. See Conversation with Fred Wilson, Paula Marincola, and Marjorie Schwarzer, 238, and Walter Mignolo, "Museums in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity: Fred Wilson's Mining the Museum," in *Fred Wilson: A Critical Reader*, ed. Doro Globus (London: Ridinghouse, 2011), 375.

72 The exhibition was open from 26 July 2014 to 1 February 2015.

73 Catherine Flood and Gavin Grindon, 'Introduction' in *Disobedient Objects* (London: V&A Publishing, 2011), 19. BBC Radio 4's 'Front Row' on 21 July 2014 featured Gavin Grindon taking journalist Samira Ahmed on a tour of the exhibition. Catherine Flood's various blogs about the exhibition are available online: www.vam.ac.uk/blog/author/catherine-flood, accessed 4/1/17.

74 Flood and Grindon, 'Introduction', 11. The authors also explained here that the term 'disobedient objects' was used as an 'evocative proposition or an invitation rather than a typology or closed concept'.

75 The material cultures of far-right and neo-conservative protest groups were not featured in the exhibition, ostensibly on the grounds that their campaigns tend to target minorities rather than authorities. So, for example, there was no reference to Greece's Golden Dawn, Germany's Pegida movement or the English Defence League. However, other objects related to protests against occupying powers and oppressive authorities that reflected views that might not have sat so comfortably with a western, liberal audience were marginalised or neglected. There was a very small screen showing a video of a young boy throwing a stone against heavily armed Israeli forces, but where were the iconic posters protesting the massacres of Palestinian refugees, the occupation of their lands, the mass incarcerations and the killing of Palestinian children? Where were examples of Palestinian graffiti? Similarly, objects representing the Arab Spring uprisings and Syrian protests safely restricted themselves to stencils of non-violent activists tortured or killed by the authorities. Other voices, such as those of the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, were missing. Posting portraits of martyrs (often derived from the photos used on their ID cards) has a long tradition in the Arab and Iranian worlds, but would images of martyred Lebanese members of the various military factions during the Civil War have been too disturbing? Where was the Iranian chador or hijab – an iconic object used by women in protesting against the western-supported corrupt and violent regime of the Shah before and during the 1979 revolution? In a virtual "roundtable" discussion between Grindon and several fellow academics in Autumn 2013, before the exhibition opened, Jack Halberstam asked, 'what objects are missing from this show because they are not obviously and assertively "political"? What about dildos, drag queen costumes, burned bras, punk safety pins, 'zines, smashed guitars and torn T-shirts? What are the lost objects of this exhibition? What is not here because something else is?' See 'Roundtable' in Flood and Grindon Disobedient Objects, 133. These exclusions can be fairly criticised, but in our view they were not necessarily fatal to the realisation of the exhibition's broader cultural-political ambitions.

76 Bruce Bennett, *The Cinema of Michael Winterbottom: Borders, Intimacy, Terror* (New York: Wallflower Press, 2014), 197. He goes on to quote Michael Warner:

> A public can only act in the temporality of the circulation that gives it existence. The more punctual and abbreviated the circulation, and the more discourse indexes the punctuality of its own circulation, the closer a public stands to its politics. At longer rhythms or more continuous flows, action becomes harder to imagine. That is the fate of academic publics, a fact very little understood when academics claim by intention or proclamation to be doing politics. In modernity, politics takes much of its character from the temporality of the headline, not the archive.

See Michael Warner, *Publics and Counter-Publics* (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 96–7.

77 Erlend Rogne, "The Aim of Interpretation is to Create Perplexity in the Face of the Real: Hayden White in Conversation with Erlend Rogne," *History and Theory* 48/1 (2009): 63–75.

78 Ermarth, *Discursive Condition*, 122.

79 Julio García Espinosa, "For an Imperfect Cinema," trans. Julianne Burton, *Jump Cut: A Review of Contemporary Cinema* 20/May (1979): 24–6.

80 Espinosa, 'For an Imperfect Cinema'.

81 See Michael Myerson, ed., *Memories of Underdevelopment: The Revolutionary Films of Cuba* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973).

82 Fernando Solanos and Octvaio Getino, 'Towards a Third Cinema', available online, http://documentaryisneverneutral.com/words/camasgun.html, accessed 29/12/16. For a detailed overview of Third Cinema – or what they call 'Third Worldist Film' – see Ella Shohat / Robert Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 248–91.

83 Morena La Barba, "Creative Nostalgia for an Imagined Better Future: Il Treno del Sud by the Migrant Filmmaker Alvaro Bizzarri," in *Media and Nostalgia: Yearning for Past, Present and Future*, ed. Katharina Niemeyer (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 187–8.
84 Bennett, *Cinema of Michael Winterbottom*, 153.
85 See, for example, Ryan Gilbey, "Open Mike – British Directors' Special," *Sight and Sound* October (2004): 31–2; Yosefa Loshitzky, *Screening Strangers: Migration and Dispora in Contemporary European Cinema* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 121–2; Brian McFarlane and Deane Williams, *Michael Winterbottom* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 12–22, 79; Damon Smith, ed., *Michael Winterbottom Interviews* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010) xvi.
86 Catherine Portuges, "Film Reviews," *The American Historical Review* 104/2 (1999): 695.
87 Bennett, *Cinema of Michael Winterbottom*, 169–70; Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 3–4.
88 Bennett, *Cinema of Michael Winterbottom*, 153. Bennett acknowledged that the term "War on Terror" was 'problematic both in framing counter-terrorist or imperialist violence as morally righteous bi-lateral "warfare", and also in its associations with US foreign policy'. He explained that he used the term to describe a 'particular, historically local framing of political violence' rather than as an 'accurate description of events' 198, n. 1. He went on to interpret Winterbottom's "War on Terror" trilogy as 'engaged with the political project of recounting alternative histories that counteract the dominant construction and interpretation of recent history', 169.
89 Jessica Winter, "World in Motion," in The Village Voice, 23 September 2003, in *Michael Winterbottom Interviews*, ed. Damon Smith, 62. Winterbottom has said that the idea for the film came in the wake of the use of anti-refugee and anti-immigrant rhetoric by mainstream political parties during the 2001 UK general election. See McFarlane and Williams, *Michael Winterbottom*, 32.
90 Winter, "World in Motion," 62–3.
91 Winterbottom explained that in place of a scripted narrative, the film was organised around questions such as: 'where do you go from, and to, how do you get there, which borders do you have to cross, and how do you cross over those borders'? Structuring the film around scenarios that answer these questions involves the use of a 'plan-of-action script' rather than the more conventional 'programme script' in which the narrative is carefully organised in advance. See McFarlane and Williams, *Michael Winterbottom*, 32–3.
92 Bennett, *Cinema of Michael Winterbottom*, 172.
93 Loshitzky, *Screening Strangers*, 122.
94 David Farrier, "The Journey is the Film is the Journey: Michael Winterbottom's In This World," *Research in Drama Education* 13/2 (2008): 224.
95 See extra feature, "Behind the Scenes with Michael Winterbottom and Tony Grisoni," In *This World, Optimum DVD*, 2003. See also "Little Boy Lost," *The Guardian*, February 28, 2003. This article was originally attributed to Michael Winterbottom, but it was in fact based on an interview that Winterbottom gave to a journalist. The Guardian apologised for their error on March 5, 2003. www.theguardian.com/culture/2003/feb/28/artsfeatures.immigration, accessed 21/12/16.
96 Bennett, Cinema of Michael Winterbottom, 174; and "Little Boy Lost," *The Guardian*.
97 Monir Ali was a fourth member of the group, but he became separated from the others in Kunduz in Afghanistan during heavy bombing and was never seen again.
98 The film's account of what happened in Camp X-ray and Camp Delta was based on extensive research. Mat Whitecross spent about a month interviewing the three detainees, and the filmmakers also used a deposition that the three did with their lawyer, Gareth Pierce.
99 Jonathan Raban, "The Prisoners Speak," *The New York Review of Books* 53/15 (2006): 25. See also Chris Durham, "The Road to Guantánamo (Michael Winterbottom/Mat Whitecross, 2006): A Commentary," *Communication, Culture & Critique* 1 (2008): 222–6.

100 David Darcy, "Michael Winterbottom's Road Movie," GreenCine, July 2006, in *Michael Winterbottom Interviews*, ed. Damon Smith, 115. Deborah Allison, *The Cinema of Michael Winterbottom* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013), 158.
101 Allison, *Cinema of Michael Winterbottom*, 155.
102 Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Guantánamo is Gulag of Our Time, Says Amnesty', *The Guardian*, 26 May 2005, accessed 22/12/16 www.theguardian.com/world/2005/may/26/usa.Guantánamo.
103 Bennett argues that this distribution strategy was designed to assist the 'project of generating an active/activist audience', see Bruce Bennett, "Cinematic Perspectives on the 'War on Terror': The Road to Guantánamo (2006) an activist cinema," *New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film* 6/2 (2008): 112.
104 Allison, *Cinema of Michael Winterbottom*, 159.
105 Bennett, "Cinematic perspectives," 122–3; Loshitzky, *Screening Strangers*, 138.
106 Cited in Allison, *Cinema of Michael Winterbottom*, 160.
107 Loshitzky, *Screening Strangers*, 189, n. 5.
108 Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (London: Penguin 2007).
109 Bennett, *Cinema of Michael Winterbottom*, 163–4.
110 Alun Munslow, *A History of History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 7, passim.
111 For discussion of how poststructuralist theories of knowledge are most compatible with radical politics today, see, for example: Todd May, *Poststructuralist Anarchism*; Saul Newman, *Unstable Universalities: Poststructuralism and Radical Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 166–202; Mark Bevir, "Post-Foundationalism and Social Democracy," in *Rewriting Democracy: Cultural Politics in Postmodernity*, ed. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 48–63.
112 See, for example, the many case studies discussed in Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry Vanden and Marc Becker (eds.), *Rethinking Latin American Social Movements: Radical Action from Below* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).
113 A decentralised, polyvocal, inclusive engagement with plural pasts is present in the Resistance! exhibitions and the activist-archives on which they are based. The exhibitions encourage participants to record their own oral histories and to scan and archive documents they have collected so the archive and exhibition will grow and develop. Workshops organised as part of the exhibition and social media tool kits available on associated website encourage greater participative involvement of everyone in narrating their pasts. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the *Resistance!* exhibitions and the vernacular archives that support it.

3

THE POLITICS OF MAKING HISTORIES

In *History Out of Joint*, Sande Cohen questioned what we should make of the image and roles of historians in contemporary life. Are Jules Michelet's classical nominations of the roles of the historian – 'judge, prosecutor and defender, connoisseur, lover of the past' – credible in our current globalised, neo-liberal conjuncture, where societies (and thus the audiences for histories) are ever more shattered by divisions of labour and wealth, and where the synthetic histories that we are told we require can perhaps offer us nothing more than sanitised versions of the past?[1] What are we to make of the fact that while academic centres compete for sizeable funding and recognition as agenda-setters in historical research, professional historiography is largely irrelevant to the everyday social acts of making identifications and judgments with the past?[2] For critics like Cohen, historiography is one of the numerous failed discursive projects of modernity: outdated at best and politically irresponsible at worst, irredeemably compromised by its associations with nationalist, racist and imperialist ideologies in its formative years. In Keith Jenkins's view, history lacks any potential utility as a theoretical and/or practical base for emancipatory political projects because it is incompatible with the post-foundational premises of contemporary intellectual life in general. Histories, he argues, are played-out discursive forms that long ago squandered their chances to carry radical political hopes. Attempting to revitalize or reconceptualize conventional forms of historical representation so that they can be used in emancipatory political projects, he argues, is probably futile: we should simply accept that they are flawed beyond repair and dispense with them in a contemporary culture 'that is so radically posthistorical in its postmodernity'.[3] Jenkins concludes that egalitarian political projects can find all the intellectual support that they require from post-foundational theorists, without the need for a backwards, contextualising glance of a type that would be commonly regarded as a "history".[4]

Not surprisingly, professional historians have tended to draw different conclusions when they reflected on historiography's relations to the present. At a conference in Amsterdam in 1997 on 'Social Values and the Responsibilities of the Historian', various leading scholars – including Anne Rigney, Carlo Ginzburg, Peter Gay, Wolfgang Mommsen, Jörn Rüsen, François Bédarida, Geoff Eley, Michelle Perot and Lucette Valensi – discussed historians' 'partiality' and also their social identities as 'responsible individuals in a particular polity'.[5] Some of these thinkers concluded that historians should largely continue with business as usual. Peter Gay, for one, argued that historians should 'Tell the Truth', summoning Rankean realism as a defence against what he saw as the threats posed by postmodern relativism;[6] Wolfgang Mommsen cited Max Weber's 'scholarly ascetism' as an exemplary approach, arguing that because of historians' authority and responsibilities within the public sphere, they 'should not allow themselves to become partisans in the cause of a particular political or ideological ideal';[7] Jörn Rüsen, meanwhile, maintained that intersubjectivity could provide a common ground for reconciling values and the ideal of objectivity.[8] From a different perspective, Michael Adas made a case for historians choosing to engage as activists in controversies over public discourse: for example, by challenging morally illegitimate use of military power.[9] Michelle Perrot ran a similar set of arguments in favour of politically engaged scholarship, using histories of women as a paradigm case.[10] Twenty years on, there are various others who share Adas's and Perrot's views that historical discourse *can* contribute to present-day campaigns for human rights, justice and dignity; or who believe that historians can help to mediate between conflicting nationalist readings of traumatic pasts; or who believe that all producers of past knowledge are obliged to recognize and act on the responsibilities that come with the social authority that is conferred on historicising practices; or who believe that a conception of history as the course of past events is the very arena in which public life is played out – and hence inescapably a matter of ethics and existential reflection. These lines of thought – by no means the only ways of articulating claims to history's present-day political relevance – have been filled out in special themed issues of *Rethinking History* on 'Politics and History' (2009), 'Historical Justice' (2014) and History in the World (2016); meanwhile, Paul Mason, Nur Masalha, Berber Bevernage, Ilan Pappé, Josh MacPhee, Jen Hoyer, Nicholas Lampert, Melissa Morrone, Catherine Flood, Gavin Grindon, Jo Guldi, David Armitage and the international History From Below network are a very few of the writers, archivists and curators who have recently sought to show that historical practices can be aligned with ethico-political concerns. These writers maintain that there is a space at least in the borderlands of historical discourse for the production of explicitly politicised, ethically oriented and in some cases 'oppositional' histories that can contribute to projects of radical democracy.

Viewing the issue from a different perspective, Antoon de Baets has described how historians working under authoritarian regimes have at times been harassed, censored and dismissed from their posts for refusing to accept a quasi-official interpretative position on past events.[11] In such cases, historians' commitment to

maintain communally agreed methodological norms and to uphold their personal scholarly integrity can be seen as courageous political acts. Stalin purged more than 100 historians between 1928 and 1933. Mussolini intervened to curb the careers of a small number of academic historians and to imprison Antonio Gramsci (though in the latter case not primarily because of his historical work).[12] Similarly, de Baets points to isolated cases in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and in China under Mao Zedong when prominent historians were persecuted.[13] However, while these are serious and regrettable demonstrations of political authority, we need to recognise that historians only rarely risk being in a position where they might be directly subject to state disciplinary power. As de Baets himself notes, during the mid-twentieth-century period of dictatorships, semi-dictatorships and one-party rule, 'many historians toed the official propagandistic line of the day, while those who actively resisted it were always in a minority'.[14] More significant (in our view) are the ways in which resistance to attempts to politicise the practices of history writing *in opposition to dominant political authority* has usually come not from political authority itself but from inside communities of professional historians. And where such resistance to practices of scholar-activism has eventually given way to acceptance and incorporation by institutionalised history, what initially seemed to be a "victory" for disruptive and destabilising discursive forces has soon come to look more like a process by which these forces have been co-opted and stripped of their radical edge. Looking back at how feminist history has been absorbed into universities since the publication of Banner and Hartman's *Clio's Consciousness Raised* in 1974, Joan Scott identified this very problem, referring to how the achievement of 'legitimacy, for those who began as revolutionaries, is always an ambiguous accomplishment'.[15] Scott rightly acknowledged that the last several decades have seen women's stories and experiences written into history and women historians admitted in sizeable numbers to the profession (albeit not as fully equal participants in the discipline).[16] But she also recognised that victory could be read simultaneously as a form of "sellout":[17]

> The institutionalization of women's history implies its end as a campaign. Our research and professional activities seem to have lost their purposive political edge and their sense of dedication to building something larger than an individual career. . . . No longer insurgents, we have become disciplinarians, and I suspect that inevitably there's something of a letdown in this change of identity. It is one thing to criticize disciplinary power from the outside, another to be inside, committed to the teaching of established bodies of scholarship. . . . As academic feminism has gained institutional credibility, it also has seemed to lose its close connection to the political movement that inspired it.[18]

For those who want to believe that history writing can and should be used as a spur (or perhaps a supplement) to emancipatory political practice, Hayden White's body of work provides theoretical encouragement. As readers of *Metahistory* (1973)

know, White found some of his ideal of types of political-moral visionaries among the great names of nineteenth-century historiography and philosophers of history: writers such as Marx, Nietzsche, Michelet and de Tocqueville. He was also inspired in important ways by Sartre's and Camus's existentialism, by Benedetto Croce's humanist historicism and by Lucien Goldmann's humanist readings of Marx's thought.[19] But in all his writings about what Herman Paul has termed 'liberation historiography',[20] White wrote nothing substantial about his contemporaries in the postwar U.S. university system who *did* connect scholarly historical work with political activism (the kind of work that he might be expected to endorse) and whose academic careers suffered as a result. Howard Zinn, for example, was dismissed from his post as Chair of the History Department at Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1963 after Spelman's President, Albert Manley, held him responsible for organising student protests against the College administration.[21] Fellow historian Staughton Lynd followed Zinn out of Spelman, resigning in support of a colleague who had hired him two years earlier. Lynd took up an offer instead to join Yale University. However, Yale alumni, administrators and academics – including, as Howard Zinn later noted, 'the important people in the History Department' –[22]disapproved of Lynd's anti–Vietnam War activism, particularly when he went on an unauthorised peace visit to Hanoi with Tom Hayden (organizer of Students for a Democratic Society) and Herbert Aptheker (Communist Party member and blacklisted historian).[23] To compound what some saw as the problem of his partisanship, Lynd was also criticised by fellow historians for pursuing an "ahistorical" approach in his book *Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism* (1969), as it sought to connect past events with contemporary late-1960s radicalism. Indeed, Lynd openly acknowledged his presentist intentions in the book, explaining in the preface that he preferred to be 'provocative about a matter of importance' rather than use his scholarship as a means to conclusively demonstrate 'something trivial'.[24] By this he meant that tracing the lineage of eighteenth-century radical ideas (which he does nonetheless in some detail) was for him secondary to the ahistorical task of thinking about the implication of these ideas for mid-twentieth-century radicalism. He stated: 'The characteristic concepts of the existential radicalism of today have a long and honourable history. Acquaintance with that history may help in sharpening intellectual tools for the work of tomorrow'.[25] Hostile reviews of *Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism* were cited as a factor against Lynd when he was told that he would not be awarded tenure at Yale in 1968. Although the university cited budget constraints as the reason for not retaining him, Lynd believed that the real explanation was politically motivated opposition from the "big three" historians at Yale: C. Vann Woodward, Edmund Morgan and John Morton Blum. Yale was not the only place where Lynd was unwanted. He was also denied posts at five Illinois colleges in 1967–8, and between three and five colleges in Indiana in 1970.[26] Lynd was effectively blacklisted from academic posts because of his refusal to separate his political activism from his historical scholarship. Consequently, he retrained as a lawyer specialising in labour and trade union rights, representing steelworkers in Youngstown, Ohio, and then after the steel mills closed in 1980 representing

prisoners' rights in Ohio's "supermaximum" security prison. All the while, Lynd continued to research and write activist-oriented histories outside of the university system.[27] Lynd regarded what he called 'guerilla history' as analogous to liberation theology's principles of 'accompaniment' and 'the preferential option for the poor': as he later explained, 'a genuine radical, a revolutionary, must indeed swim in the sea of the people'.[28] Making a virtue out of necessity, Lynd embraced his status as a scholarly outsider and explained how he was inspired by the precedent of British Marxist historian E.P. Thompson, who only ever briefly held a regular academic position, and who wrote *The Making of the English Working Class* while he was employed as an adjunct lecturer for a workers' education programme.[29] Indeed, as his biographer explained, Lynd believed that the careerist demands of professional university life – but not scholarly work as such – were antithetical to activist commitment. In words that echo Joan Scott's thoughts on feminist history's absorption into the academy:

> Lynd was arguing that the scholarly enterprise was advanced and enhanced by activism. . . . Should radicals flock to the university, its socialization process would more and more remove them from activism, while their growing absorption into the social world of faculty smokers, faculty dinners, and the reward of tenure was likely to produce increasingly trivial scholarship. A milieu of hierarchical promotions, competition for grants, and self-absorbed titles (from 'full professor' to 'distinguished professor' to 'endowed chair') was the kind of environment that seduced radicals. Research under these conditions would build a bourgeois culture rather than a Left culture. To minimize this tendency, Lynd insisted, one should alternate between the university and the movement, or abandon the campus altogether.[30]

Despite – or rather, because – he was ostracised from the university system, Lynd became the figurehead of an attempt by the Radical Historians' Caucus to challenge and reconfigure the elitist old boys' network of the American Historical Association (AHA) in December 1969. The group (unsuccessfully) proposed a new, more socially inclusive constitution for the AHA, demanded that the organisation accept a resolution against the Vietnam War and nominated Lynd as their candidate for the AHA Presidency.[31] Also at this meeting, Jesse Lemisch pointed out the hypocrisy at work when historians were criticised for allowing present-day political concerns to affect their writing and teaching. Lemisch had just been dismissed from the University of Chicago on the grounds that his political views allegedly interfered with his scholarship. Here he presented an essay that pointed out in detail how historians' political views were regarded as professionally problematic only when they came from a New Left or radical perspective. But when historians produced work that supported U.S. government Cold War policies against communism, or that defended governing Executive authority, or that deified U.S. business pioneers, it did not invoke similar charges of 'present-mindedness'.[32]

The same radical climate of the 1960s and 1970s that produced scholar-activists like Zinn, Lynd and Lemisch in the U.S. also opened up a space in which British historians were able to politicize their practices. Before this period, of course, the British Marxist historians of the 1950s – including the Historians' Group of the British Communist Party – had worked within the contours of a guiding ideology that set them apart from the orthodox empiricism of their professional peers. But the History Workshop movement from 1967 onwards really sought to use historical research as a form of oppositional political practice. From its organisational roots in adult and trade-union education to its alignment with the New Left's cultural eclecticism, History Workshop existed to democratise (and thus politicise) historical practices. As Raphael Samuel, one of the movement's founders, explained, it was contiguous with the 1960s cultural revolts that seemed to carry all before them at that time. Politically, it coincided with radicalisms of varying forms: the rise in worker militancy across Britain and Europe in the late 1960s, the student uprisings of 1968, and the emerging feminist movement.[33] The workshops were inspired by (and crossed over with) the Marxist-inflected historiography of journals like *Past and Present* and the "history from below" being pioneered by E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, George Rudé and others. But by the time that *History Workshop Journal* began publishing in 1976, some of the movement's early ambitions to write labour history as a corrective to the traditionally elitist research interests of British historians were being left behind by two related developments: the rise of identity politics and the growing intellectual influence of post-structuralism.

Caroline Elkins's *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (2005) can be used as a more recent example of how historians continue to disapprove of the presentist orientation of scholar-activism. Together with David Anderson's *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire*, Elkins's book provided detailed accounts of crimes committed by Britain's colonial regime during its final years of rule in Kenya. After the two books were published in 2005, it was harder for apologists to downplay violent excesses by the British and their accomplices in the colony as being exceptional cases. Anderson's book made extensive use of trial transcripts and other documentation from over 800 prosecutions of Kenyan nationalist rebels, all of whom faced charges that carried the death penalty under emergency regulations (some were hung for taking part in oathing ceremonies), mainly related to cases that took place in 1953 and 1954. Elkins focused on the wider systematic detention of the colony's Kikuyu population between 1954 and 1960.[34] She too read archival sources – Elkins has pointed out that a large majority of her footnotes refer to written primary sources – and supplemented this with oral testimonies from more than 300 ex-detainees and villagers from the Emergency period that she interviewed on research trips to Kenya.[35] She also interviewed some Kenyans who were loyal to the British, former colonial officials, missionaries and European settlers. It is worth remembering at this point that Kenyan veterans recently succeeded in taking personal injuries claims to the UK High Court. In June 2013, William Hague, then UK Foreign Secretary, announced

that the government would not contest the complainants' legal action. After fifty years of denying its crimes, the government confirmed that it would settle and pay compensation to more than 5000 Kenyans, who it now recognised were survivors of serious mistreatment. They *had* been tortured. And yet when *Britain's Gulag* was originally published a few years before the case, far from applauding Elkins for writing a history that might be invoked by those seeking to achieve restorative justice for victims of colonial violence, many of her fellow historians took her to task (in part) for taking sides. She was accused of making speculative and exaggerated claims about the numbers of Kenyans who died as a result of British detention.[36] It was also said that Elkins had betrayed the historical profession's commitment to scholarly "detachment": the complaint was that she had written from the stance of an activist, and that because she had been a partisan advocate of reparations for former detainees, she had not been sufficiently critical or sceptical in her use of detainees' oral testimonies.[37]

Emancipating histories

Unlike Howard Zinn and Staughton Lynd, the History Workshop movement in Britain, or the early generations of feminist historians who helped to shape a new disciplinary field, all of whom were clear about the political agendas that motivated their work, Hayden White stopped short of articulating a political position as such in his polemical and provocative writings about history. White's was more akin to a supra-political position: he called for historical thought to recover its 'moral imagination' without suggesting what kind of content might fill the results of such thought.[38] He argued that historians should recognize and *act* upon their present-day ethico-political obligations in these terms: 'The contemporary historian has to establish the value of the study of the past, not as an end in itself, but as a way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the solution of problems peculiar to our own time'.[39] White always understood that there were no epistemological foundations for using the past in such a way. On the contrary, how anyone conceived of their relationship to pasts and futures could only be a matter of their individual choice and therefore responsibility. Influenced by the kind of existentialist philosophy that he found in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, White emphasised that freedom entailed the autonomy of choice.[40] As he explained towards the end of *Metahistory*, people had to be regarded as free to conceive of the past as they wished, and to tell whatever *kinds* of stories they wanted to about it in whatever ways they believed were most compatible with their 'moral and aesthetic aspirations'.[41] What mattered in the end, argued White, was people's animating moral or social vision of the past, not adherence to the academic disciplinary protocols that regulated what counted as a "historical" version of it:

> What is at issue here are not methodological questions or linguistic strategies, but pre-methodological and pre-disciplinary concerns: the moral significance of a man's [sic] perspective on the past, the implications for his present that

> this perspective has, the cultural worth of any merely academic interest in materials properly entertainable as constituting the ways we create a future world.[42]

Making such a choice about how to define oneself in relation to the past was part of people's wider freedom to 'to accept full responsibility for the meaning of their lives and the moral values they want to promote'.[43] If historians were to contribute to intellectual cultures that were attuned to the needs of the present (if history was to be studied *at all* for anything other than personal edification or displays of erudition and connoisseurship), White advised them to use their discursive competence and imaginations as a means to inspire new visions for living, and to emphasize that human choices rather than impersonal historical processes determined social and political relations – albeit, of course, choices made within a given set of material and hegemonic conjunctures within space and time. Only by doing so, argued White, could humans free themselves from the 'burden of history', and instead use the study of the past as a means to help them accomplish 'an ethically responsible transition from present to future'.[44] In these terms, any attempt to argue for a singular reading of the past – or indeed for a singular discursive *method* to read it – would be regarded as authoritarian and anti-democratic. It would seek to deny on ostensibly epistemological grounds people's freedom to relate to the past in their own ways, or what White called their freedom to choose a past in the same way that they choose a present.[45] Ideally, historians should help people to realize their ability to reject those community traditions which they regard as personally or socially damaging; they should pull apart hegemonic stories that narrate the present in terms of historical cause-and-effect; they should draw attention to past futures that were never realised – and inspire people to see that forms of living that are presently dismissed as "utopian" and "impossible" almost took hold in the past. *This* would be the kind of history that would produce what Wendy Brown referred to as: 'this other way of conceiving the familiar, this radical displacement of the lay of the land through which we think and perceive ourselves, our problems, our imperatives'.[46] The past in these terms should be conceived as a store of alternatives that could be explored to help us imagine different ways of being, not as a singular platform that determined the shape of the present. Life, concluded White, 'will be lived all the better if it has no single meaning but many different ones'.[47]

Historians were just about willing to tolerate those features of White's thought that they could strip out, dilute and re-present as entailing little more than a plea for interpretative pluralism. But the profession largely drew a line at what he said about presentism and restoring the role of the moral imagination in ways of constituting the past. After all, using the imagination to produce the kinds of "socially innovative vision" that White wished to encourage had to involve a space for categories such as desire, unreason, excess, fantasy, myth, the sublime – the excluded others of academic history's self-image as a rational, empirical project. As White knew, empirical historians sought always to desublimate the past, to figure history as a comprehensible process whose various features were 'transparent to a consciousness

endowed with the means to make sense of it in one way or another'.[48] This was why he urged historians to embrace formal experimentation, because he saw it as a way of breaking free from the constraints of a realist poetics 'which limits historical thinking to "the kinds of events that lend themselves to the understanding of whatever passes for educated common sense"'.[49] David Harlan noted with regret that 'nothing remotely like' White's call to redefine historical studies happened: indeed, in the forty years since 'The Burden of History' was published in 1966, the dominant professional protocols of 'western' historical practice have gone on to achieve worldwide hegemony.[50] However, perhaps the authority of these protocols should be seen as dominant rather than fully suffocating. Historians have occasionally sought to use their practices to produce just those kinds of ideological affects that White wanted to see. If, as Karyn Ball summarises, 'White's hope for historiography hinges on the non-teleological promise of aesthetic reflection as an analog for an open future', then certain activist historians – sometimes working within the mainstream of university history's infrastructure, but just as likely working outside of it – have attempted to make good on this hope.[51] Academic historians can *choose* to incorporate White's meta-historical vision within their mainstream practices. The problem is that they hardly ever do. But the promise that historical practices could be made commensurate with Laclau and Mouffe's assertion that no discursive instruments should be ruled out *per se* from struggles for social transformation and justice remains a source of inspiration for some. What was needed was a new conceptualisation of history that avoided the kind of foundational epistemology that Derrida problematised as the metaphysics of presence.

As Derrida told an interviewer in 1971, the conventional assumption that histories referred to a presence that was anterior to the semantic contexts in which they were enunciated implied a metaphysical concept of history. And what one should be wary of, he said, was a metaphysical understanding that posited the idea of history as the history of meaning developing, producing and fulfilling itself across time.[52] It was not a concept of history as such that was problematic, Derrida argued, explicitly refuting those who associated him with a 'rejection of history'.[53] Instead, he advocated a conceptualisation of history (both as a practice and mode of temporal understanding) that escaped the linear consecution of presence, one that was more akin to Sollers's idea (following Nietzsche) of "monumental" history. The assumption that history referred to an extra-discursive outside may have become sedimented, argued Derrida, but it was not necessarily immutable:

> I have never believed that there were *metaphysical* concepts *in and of themselves*. No concept is by itself, and consequently in and of itself, metaphysical, outside all the textual work in which it is inscribed. This explains why, although I have formulated many reservations about the 'metaphysical' concept of history, I very *often* use the word 'history' in order to reinscribe its force and in order to produce another concept or conceptual chain of 'history': in effect a 'monumental, stratified, contradictory' history.[54]

Derrida's work challenges some academic historians' core assumptions about verities such as temporality, textual interpretation and signification, but one does not have to search too hard in his writings to see that he is far from the straightforward anti-historicist that some of his critics want him to be. Part of his intellectual project was to open up the gaps in which a new understanding of history could be invented and take hold by critiquing the metaphysical associations of the term's conventional usage. The challenge, as he recognised, was to produce a new conceptualisation of history without reintroducing the essentialist concepts that he wished to criticize in the first place – in other words, to avoid replacing one ontology of history with an alternative ontology that reinscribed various associations with ideas of thing, reality, presence, content, reference, and so on. So why did he insist on the need to position a concept of history within a new signifying chain, despite the attendant risks of reintroducing what he calls 'logocentric values' in a new conceptualisation? Why not decide that history as a concept has become toxic with "certaintist" assumptions and let it go? The answer is that for Derrida, having a concept of historicity that was not another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence was indispensable to political projects of justice and emancipation. His clearest articulation of this view is found in *Specters of Marx*: *The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International* (1994), where he explained how from the outset in his project of deconstruction he had sought to make possible a concept of historicity that opened up access to an 'affirmative thinking of the messianic and emancipatory promise as promise'.[55] By putting into question the kind of ontological and teleological conceptions of history found in Hegel, Marx and Heidegger, he sought to move away from a historicity that was premised on notions of programme and design, away from one that posited a logic of historical events via the construction of retrospective teleologies. Instead, in Derrida's thought the emancipatory desire, or the promise of a justice to come, could only be realised in conditions of undecidability, where the certainty of a final ground for a decision would never be available.

In contrast to those who assume that Derrida's thought leads to hapless relativism or nihilism, Mark Mason rightly elaborates the affirmative forces in what he calls Derrida's 'messianic historical theory'.[56] Derrida had no desire to provide a positive description of what history could or should become, but by emphasising what history was not and never could be, he opened the promise of another form of history, another way of thinking with time, another conceptualisation of past-present-future relations. He suggested to historians a strategy of negation that they could choose to adopt in their work by delineating those habitual features of historical work that postfoundationalist historians should avoid, resist and counter in their practices: totalising knowledge claims, attempts to identify originary meanings, interpretative closures, empiricism as an epistemology, realist representational forms and the like. The reason for negating these was to keep open the promise of what Mason calls a 'non-historical historicity as "future to come"',[57] which in turn would open the way towards visions of new possible futures that are wholly

other and undetermined by historians' conventional master concepts (periodisation, continuities, causation, origins, development, linear temporalities, and so on). By continually reaffirming the conditions of history's impossibility – namely, that histories can never (re)present a past actuality in which the past provides a foundation for its own knowability –we make space for different concepts of history, ones that accept that the historical past is not a given but a product of fictive construction. And if we dispense with the idea of the historical past as a given, then we are free to work the materials and genre possibilities of history unencumbered by notions of correspondence between event and narration, and we are free to follow Derrida in experimenting with a historical consciousness in which the past "haunts" and acts in the force fields of the present, but not in ways that are mappable and reducible to instantiations of presence. Wendy Brown explains what is at stake:

> In Derrida's reformulation, history emerges as that which shadows and constrains, incites or thwarts, rather than that which moves, directs, or unfolds. History as a ghostly phenomenon does not march forward – it doesn't even march. Rather, it comes and goes, appears and recedes, materializes and evaporates, makes and gives up its claims. And it changes shape: that is, the same event or formation does not haunt in the same way across time and space. The notion of progress as the unfolding of the future is also undone by Derrida's image of political life as a stage on which spectres of past and future appear unbidden and at other times are expressly conjured by those vying for particular futures vis-à-vis particular interpretations of the past or particular claims of homage to the past.[58]

Derrida's terminology of spectres that haunt that present and his concept of the 'messianic without a messianism' has obvious affinities with Walter Benjamin's image of an 'angel of history'.[59] Derrida was careful to elaborate where the two concepts diverged.[60] Nonetheless, both point towards the idea of a political consciousness in the present that resists an understanding of history as a progressive, autonomous force in its own right. Rejecting models of historical thought that position the past as an inferior antecedent of the present, Derrida and Benjamin suggest forms of political activity and thought that mobilise traces and spectres of the past while still denying that there is a historical past with its own shape and trajectory.[61] The past becomes a store of ideas and ideals, traumas and oppressions, experiences and visions that we can choose to recognise and incorporate into our present political projects. It has no determining force, but we might 'awaken' to it both as a form of cognition and as a motive for political praxis.[62] In Benjamin's terms, each present offers an opportunity for people to recognise a past that 'belongs' to them, not in terms of a simple identification that would leave the past undisturbed, but in ways that have the potential to simultaneously transform the present and redeem the injustices of the past.[63]

Historians, however, are reluctant to position their work in primarily presentist terms, usually stopping short of justifying their scholarly projects predominantly for

what they might bring to named political or ideological causes. To the extent that historians sometimes share an ambition to shape resistance in the present and utilise the past as a potential site of opposition, this tends to be an implied rather than a directly articulated feature of their work: manifesting itself as a generalised sense that discussing previous instances of social or political change (in conventional narrative forms) might function to encourage faith in the possibility of analogous changes in the future. Beyond the restraints of institutionally authorised history, however, one can find more directly politicised uses of the historical past – something perhaps closer to the 'messianic' history that Benjamin and Derrida wrote about. In *Live Working or Die Fighting: How the Working Class Went Global* (2007), Paul Mason juxtaposes reportage of his meetings with various members of the twenty-first-century global, working-class "precariat" with historical accounts of European labour organisation and working-class militancy from the 1800s to the 1940s.[64] As he explained, his aim was not to draw parallels as such between past and present workers' conditions and ways of life, nor did he mean to invoke precedent as a way of predicting what might happen to the contemporary global labour movement. Rather, he believed that the anti-globalisation activists who protested at Seattle (1999), Genoa (2001) and elsewhere should know something about previous revolts and worker solidarity. Moreover, he wanted to make today's worst-paid, most-exhausted and least-protected workers aware that their counterparts a hundred or more years earlier had fought against (sometimes successfully) comparable levels of exploitation and alienation. It was necessary to bring stories of older working struggles to the attention of a new working class, he believed, because this class was being formed in a culture in which organic or traditional memories of the past had been broken. Globalised, neo-liberal economic and trading policies, he argued, had ripped apart within twenty years forms of working-class culture that had taken two hundred years to build.[65] And when those cultures disappeared, they took with them a collective memory of successful worker resistance, self-education and activist struggles for wider social freedom. Using an example from the UK's capital city, Mason explained why recovering such shared memory was important:

> Right now in London there are Somali, Kurdish and Brazilian migrant cleaners trying to form unions inside the headquarters of investment banks, but they are still having trouble with the city's geography, let alone its history. They have no idea that Irish and Jewish migrants who lived in the same streets 100 years ago had to fight the same kind of battle, or how they won. And why should they? Amid relentless change we can no longer rely on word of mouth, family, tradition and community to keep working class history alive.[66]

The book is organised around a series of present-and-past studies of workers' experiences, each of which is meant to suggest that workers are capable of creating better social and economic lives through collective action – but without prescribing what forms such action should take, and without under-estimating the strength of

the forces that are routinely summoned by authorities to enforce the status quo. Mason draws on a long tradition of labour and worker struggles. In one chapter, the challenges faced by millions of Chinese workers in the industrial suburb of Shenzhen in 2003 are paired with an account of how Manchester factory workers in 1819 organised trade unions and strikes. In another, Indian silk weavers struggling against World Trade Organisation global competition rules in 2005 are juxtaposed with Lyon silk weavers who took part in violent uprisings in the 1830s. Multiple workplace occupations in Argentina in 2001 are discussed alongside earlier car factory seizures in Turin, Paris and Michigan in the 1920s and 1930s. By emphasising workers' self-education and cultural self-actualisation, Mason echoes how Jacques Rancière's *The Nights of Labour* portrayed the becoming subjectivities of proletarian intellectuals and worker poets in mid-nineteenth-century Paris.[67] By pairing contemporary worker struggles with those of previous times, he articulates in more accessible and concrete terms the position that Derrida elaborated in *Specters*: we are not yet finished with socialist ideas, despite the temporary dominance of an ideology that claims that there "is no alternative" to neo-liberal, transnational capitalism. And by rejecting a determinist model of history – Mason argues that new workers' organisations in the global south may well develop much more rapidly than happened in Europe and North America in previous centuries, but equally he recognises that they might fail – he writes in the spirit of Benjamin's *Theses*.

Mason developed his thinking about how to understand the crises of contemporary capitalism and how to respond to it in two further books that form a kind of trilogy with *Live Working Or Die Fighting*.[68] *Meltdown: The End of the Age of Greed* (2009) covered the financial collapse that began in 2008, from the fall of Lehman Brothers bank to the beginnings of the Eurozone crisis. *Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions* (2012) dealt principally with the Arab Spring and Occupy movements, both of which can be understood in part as after-shocks of the global economic crisis, but which Mason also describes in relation to the European revolutionary uprisings of 1848 and the student protest movements of the 1960s. By showing how a globalised economy has produced a globalised labour movement – albeit one that is more stratified and individualistic than its pre–World War I forerunner – Mason shares some common ground with Hardt and Negri's theory in *Empire* (2000) that the coming agents of rebellion will be members of a diverse and transnational 'multitude'. Hardt and Negri's use of the figure of the 'multitude' to denote the emergence of a collective political (revolutionary) subjectivity has been controversial. But leaving this controversy to one side, their conceptualisation of history does at least bear traces of the shape of thought implied by Derrida's "messianic promise" or White's "liberation historiography". Towards the beginning of *Empire*, Hardt and Negri explained how they wished to emphasise both the power of the multitude to 'make history' and the political potential of a praxis that was grounded in social hope.[69] To achieve these ambitions, they employed a methodology that had two main elements. The first element was critical and deconstructive, aimed at subverting hegemonic languages and normative social structures. Hardt and Negri summarised this as a process of deconstructing

the *historia rerum gestarum* of the 'reign of global capitalism', in ways that would subvert the idea that its development was a historical necessity, and which would point towards the possibility of alternative social organisations. The second element was constructive and ethico-political, working to create subjectivities that opened towards social and political alternatives. Here the focus was on *res gestae*, the subjective forces acting in historical contexts that produced not a 'new rationality' but a 'new scenario of different rational acts – a horizon of activities, resistances, wills, and desires that refuse the hegemonic order . . . and forge alternative constitutive itineraries'.[70]

Contesting histories

Recent debates about slavery reparations exemplify why any discourse that claims final cultural authority over the past needs to be challenged. The debates at issue here are not arguments about the historical past – what previously happened and how historians should interpret past events. In fact, they aren't really arguments about the past at all. They are instead a conflict about *historical presents*: an argument about political authority, the distribution of resources, inequality and the 'distribution of the sensible'.[71] As such they provide a useful illustration of how past-talk that reinforces dominant power relations is often categorised as history and described as 'universal, inclusive and rational'. In contrast, that which seeks the recognition of past brutality or injustice by the state, challenges the hegemonic imagination of national identity, seeks a platform for marginalised or dissenting voices and sometimes calls for a different (more equal) distribution of resources is characterised as memory and is seen as epistemologically inferior, as 'divisive, identity obsessed and irrational' or the 'manipulation of the past for political ends'.[72] Van De Mieroop provides a detailed analysis of the slavery reparation debates in France and the USA, but of particular interest here is his discussion of the naming of the historical present by those opposing reparations in the two countries as the 'age of commemoration' and the 'post-racial era', respectively.

The 'age of commemoration', a phrase first used by Pierre Nora to describe our current epoch, is a time in which memory culture, in a response to particular historical conditions (including the ever-increasing speeding of change and the traumas of the twentieth century), has begun to dominate society to such an extent that it is displacing the continued existence of history as an authoritative discipline or genre.[73] In the case of France, accusations of the abuse of memory, or the rise of the tyranny of memory, began to become more widespread in the first decade of the twenty-first century, possibly as a response to commemorations surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of the Algerian War of Independence, calls for reparations for French slavery in their colonies and the perceived concomitant 'culture of repentance' that was spreading in society.[74] François Hartog argues that this rise of memory in the 'age of commemoration' and its attendant challenge to 'history's hegemony in the space of retrospection' constitutes a new regime of historicity, that of 'presentism', a regime in which history is under threat and is no longer

the dominant and authoritative past-focused discourse.[75] The past-talk of those arguing for the persistence of racism and the lingering effects of colonial brutality and injustice in contemporary France has often been historicised as an instance of this memory boom; they are accused of using the past in the service of present interests and employing a divisive form of identity politics in their anachronistic attempts to cling on to the past.[76] Nora, for example, describes memory as 'always a phenomenon of the present . . . a phenomenon of emotion and magic [which] accommodates only those facts that suit it'. In contrast, he describes how 'history is a representation of the past . . . [it is] an intellectual, nonreligious activity [that] calls for analysis and critical discourse'.[77] We would argue that both history and memory are phenomena of the present; both are rhetorical and persuasive; both 'well up from' and 'weld' groups together; and neither 'belongs to everyone' nor 'has a universal vocation'.[78] This use of interpretative naming – labelling the discourse of both French and American advocates for reparations as partisan memory politics, not history, despite their extensive, coherent use of historical scholarship by professional historians – functions as an effective means of marginalising and discrediting their arguments.

The conception of the 'post-racial era' as a historical present in the U.S. functions in a similar manner to silence the voices of those calling for reparations or drawing attention to continuing racial inequality and injustice. The post-racial claim is essentially a 'performative declaration that although racism exists, its time has passed'; racist acts might still happen, but racism is no longer a significant problem.[79] Crucially, therefore, there is no need for an ongoing critique of racism; the fight for equality is over. Moreover, the argument continues that those who persist in fighting against racism are themselves perpetuating the antiquated frame of race as a form of identity politics often in order to exploit white guilt and extract undeserved and unfair advantages for black Americans.[80] There is no real disagreement between those arguing for or against reparations over the fact that slavery was a horrific crime, but the debate concerns the boundary between past and present; whether the injustices of slavery still have repercussions today or whether they remain securely in the past. For reparationists the injustices of slavery in the form of structures of control and domination as well as the distribution of resources and equal opportunities are still with us today; for them slavery is an irrevocable past, one that endures into the present.[81] However, by historicising the present as a 'post-racial era', anti-reparationists present the arguments for reparations as anachronistic; reparations advocates are criticised for living in the past, for engaging in retrospective politics, for having a 'pathological nostalgia for suffering'.[82] In the post-racial era it is not appropriate to talk about slavery as if its legacy endures into the present; slavery belongs safely in the past.

However, as Van De Mieroop argues, neither the 'age of commemoration' nor the 'post-racial era' are epochs of time which can be identified through the correct description and interpretation of evidence. Time does not naturally divide into epochs. Periodisation is a process of interpretation, not description – a way of ascribing meaning through narrativisation. The 'post-racial era' has been produced

by a particular emplotment of events; it is the culmination in a redemptive narrative of progress in which the U.S. overcomes the horror of slavery, Jim Crow legislation and rampant racism and advances into a post-racial epoch. 'The pastness of slavery . . . is not simply a matter of the number of years gone by, its pastness is also the result of an active historicization. . . . It has been necessary to construct a story of the overcoming and surpassing of slavery' and historians have made a significant contribution to this.[83] The historical presents articulated by the 'age of commemoration' and 'post-racial era' narrative constructs are presents that serve particular socio-political and ideological functions and are supported, defended and legitimised by academic historians.[84]

When historical presents are presented as impartial, descriptive, historical or scientific measurements, they become a powerful rhetorical weapon that can close down other potential meanings, and they silence other voices and interpretations.[85] The post-racial era functions as what Rancière calls the 'distribution of the sensible' in that it defines 'a set of relations between the perceptible, the thinkable, and the doable'.[86] The 'post-racial era' and 'the age of commemoration' both work to silence, or make invisible, the possibility of racism. As such they work to install a hegemonic interpretation that temporarily terminates debate or actions to promote greater equality.

In similar ways, Australia's "history wars" demonstrate the fact that stories about the past are always produced and read in relation to political authority in the present. The principal issues at stake in Australia were not historiographical or epistemic as such: the disputes were not primarily about academic historians arguing over methodology or what facts they could substantiate in their footnotes. Instead, the history wars are best understood as a contest over values: whose interests were historians and the cultural circuits of historical knowledge supposed to serve? In straightforward terms, the controversy can be described as choice between two ideological positions. The first of these held that publicly funded historical activities had a responsibility to produce the kind of affirmative histories that could underscore popular sentiments of national pride. The second maintained that such activities should be free to function as a collective dissenting conscience, giving a voice to those who were excluded from dominant ways of articulating an imagined national community. The views of advocates for either position were rehearsed across Australia's media and political spheres, giving them a public profile that purely academic debates rarely warranted. In the 1980s conservative politicians and commentators accused academic historians of denouncing the national past by giving undue prominence to claims about the levels of violence inflicted on indigenous peoples during and after the years of colonial settlement. Because of planned commemorations to mark the Bicentennial of British settlement in Australia in 1988, there was no easy way to avoid the issue of how Australians should interpret their country's record as a modern nation-state at this time. When deliberating which perspective the commemorations should adopt towards the past, some voices sought to stress what they saw as the country's positive record of achievements and the role of some of its most celebrated "heroic" individuals (invariably white males).

Others wanted to ensure that public markings of the bicentenary adequately recognised colonial settlement's devastating effects on indigenous peoples, both in the immediate and longer terms. Conservative historian Geoffrey Blainey contemptuously labelled this latter critical stance towards the past as 'black armband' history. Political leader John Howard subsequently amplified the epithet into a slogan which was used to characterize the mainstream of Australia's historical profession as elitist, politically correct, disaffected, guilt-ridden and disloyal to popular conceptions of national identity.[87] Howard later maintained that he wanted Australians to be 'comfortable and relaxed' about their collective pasts – perhaps to help them cope with the unsettling economic reforms that he was about to introduce in the present – [88]and he was scathing about those who, in his view, wanted to 'rewrite Australian history in the service of a partisan political cause'.[89]

The antagonisms that battles over Australia's past could generate tended to surface during times when public attention was focused on questions relating to past injustices, suffering and crimes – such as Paul Keating's 1992 acknowledgement of settler maltreatment and crimes against Aboriginals, the Stolen Generations report of 1997 (which estimated that from 1910 to 1970, between one in ten and one in three Aboriginal children were forcibly separated from their families) and then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's 2008 apology to the Stolen Generations.[90] Keith Windschuttle helped to sustain the controversy when he published the first two of a series of planned books on what he provocatively called *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History* (2002 and 2009): the first volume attempted to discredit claims about the scale of settler violence towards Aboriginals in the Tasmanian frontier, and the second dismissed what it regarded as the myth of the Stolen Generations.[91] Although Windschuttle's texts drew overwhelmingly negative reviews from indigenous spokespeople and specialist historians, the response among conservative commentators in the mainstream media was much more favourable, including two supportive editorials in *The Australian* newspaper.[92] Around the same time, John Howard's re-elected government commissioned Film Australia to make a major ten-part documentary series on the nation's history, the results of which were screened by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) in 2007–9.[93] To no one's surprise, the series exemplified the kind of sentimentalised nationalist reading of the past that Howard had been advocating ever since he complained about 'black armband' history. The documentaries were an attempt to re-instate a dominant narrative about past national "heroes" using mainstream visual media:

> The *Making History* films were concerned with nation, with leadership and with achievements: they were also overwhelmingly concerned with white men. Even ABC commissioning editor Stuart Menzies agreed that the films could be characterized as 'dead white males'. Indigenous people form a backdrop to the action . . . but are absent elsewhere. Women were allotted similarly narrow roles.[94]

As Michelle Arrow argued, the ways in which the producers of *Making History* chose to confirm the social and political status quo throughout the film series was

typical of ABC documentaries in the early 2000s.[95] But rather than criticise the films (or ABC's commissioning of documentaries more generally) for the kinds of political effects that they might produce, historians often invoked disciplinary codes against them instead. Ann McGrath, for example, complained that *Making History*'s producers failed to consult with expert historians sufficiently during the production process, preferring to use professional historians primarily as talking heads on screen. Inga Clendinnen, meanwhile, criticised the films' use of dramatised scenes. In her view, while such scenes might succeed in provoking audience empathy, they were problematic on the grounds that they were not amenable to empirical testing.[96] In regretting the fact that a television documentary series failed to respect academic history's claims to authority over the past, McGrath and Clendinnen were expressing views that are common within the history profession. Similar invocations of history's assumed scholarly integrity had been made some years before during the controversy about Keith Windschuttle's books on "fabricated" Aboriginal history. Although this controversy was often heated, it is striking to note how often the issues at stake were pulled back towards questions about scholarly codes. Rounding off a major collection of essays that rebutted Windschuttle's historical account, Dirk Moses argued that Windschuttle had 'rejected any methodological sophistication he may once have embraced'; he complained that Windschuttle had made up his mind about Aboriginal death tolls on mainland Australia during the colonial period 'before visiting the archives'; and he concluded that '[h]istorical scholarship and Aboriginal history are too valuable to be reduced to the culture wars that he and his ilk want to wage'.[97]

Conclusion

The irony of Australia's culture wars was that each side accused the other of taking a partisan position on the past which involved (in their terms) falsifying the actuality of what had happened. At the same time as accusing their opponents of fighting a culture war, meanwhile, each side maintained that their particular version of the past was grounded on responsible archival scholarship. But as we have already argued, claiming that one's practices of knowledge production are non-ideological is perhaps the most powerfully ideological move of all. Concepts such as disinterested historical scholarship and respecting the historical record are inescapably political because they are implicated in attempts to mark the boundaries of what is taken to be legitimate speech about the past. Macintyre and Clark concluded that 'Australians deserve more from their history than the History Wars'.[98] But they also recognised that Australian historians had long used their work as vehicles for advocating ideas such as 'colonial progress, imperial duty, radical nationalism and other causes'.[99]Some historians have been willing to embrace their potential to support named ideological causes in their work, sometimes to good effect. Howard Zinn's scholar-activism, for example, was important in the formation of the REPOhistory collective and was used as a discursive resource by some in the Occupy Wall Street movement. Caroline Elkins helped to persuade Kenyan victims of British colonial brutality that they could claim compensation in court. Historians such as Ilan

Pappé and Nur Masalah openly align themselves with Palestinian political claims. But instances such as these are rare. Few historians position their academic work in the service of named political projects, despite (presumably) appreciating that their authority over the past pulls them into the spaces of cultural politics. History's collective resolve to preserve its institutional credibility as a discipline tends to override the expressly articulated political affiliations of its practitioners. Artists, however, do not operate under the same kind of general injunction to produce "fair-minded" and "responsible" interpretations of the past.[100] As we will see in the following chapters, forms of past-talk outside of academic history have greater potential to destabilise our contemporary "distribution of the sensible".

Notes

1 Sande Cohen, "Figuring Forth the Historian Today," in *Cohen, History Out of Joint: Essays on the Use and Abuse of History* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 103, 124. For a recent example of what such synthetic, sanitized history might look like, see David Cannadine, *The Undivided Past: History Beyond Our Differences* (London: Allen Lane, 2013).
2 Cohen, "Figuring Forth," 109.
3 Keith Jenkins, *At The Limits of History: Essays on Theory and Practice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 15–16, 107, passim.
4 This having been said, Jenkins is only too aware that collective historical imaginaries continue to exert a hold in contemporary cultures and that the infrastructures of academic history remain apparently secured. For as long as these contingencies are reproduced, he concedes that the least-bad option is to support the production and reading of histories of a postmodern kind (theoretically and methodologically reflexive, paratactical and non-linear, endlessly open, overtly positioned on the left).
5 Ann Rigney, "Introduction: Values, Responsibilities, History," in *Historians and Social Values*, eds. Joep Leerssen and Ann Rigney (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), 7–8.
6 Peter Gay, "Do Your Thing," in *Historians and Social Values*, eds. Leersen and Rigney, 33.
7 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Moral Commitment and Scholarly Detachment: The Social Function of the Historian," in *Historians and Social Values*, eds. Leersen and Rigney, 54.
8 Jörn Rüsen, "Historical Objectivity as a Matter of Social Values," in *Historians and Social Values*, eds. Leersen and Rigney, 57–66.
9 Michael Adas, "In Defense of Engagement: The Social Uses of History in a Time of Intellectual Abdication," in *Historians and Social Values*, eds. Leersen and Rigney, 141–56.
10 Michelle Perot, "Women and the Silences of History," in *Historians and Social Values*, eds. Leersen and Rigney, 157–68.
11 Antoon de Baets, *Censorship of Historical Thought: A World Guide, 1945–2000* (London: Greenwood Press, 2002); *Responsible History* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2009); "Censorship and History, 1941–5: Historiography in the Service of Dictatorships," in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 4: 1800–1945*, eds. Stuart Macintyre, *Juan Maiguashca and Attila. Pók* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 133–158; "Censorship and History Since 1945," in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 5: Historical Writing Since 1945*, eds. Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 52–73. De Baets also coordinates the Network of Concerned Historians.
12 Baets, de. "Censorship and History, 1941–45," 137, 138.
13 Ibid., 53–4.
14 Ibid., 137.
15 Joan Wallach Scott, "Feminism's History," in Scott, *The Fantasy of Feminist History* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), 25.

16 Julie Des Jardins noted some of the national variations in the reception of women's history in a recent survey of the field. U.S. historians of women have largely been accepted and granted autonomy. Their counterparts in countries such as Canada, Spain, Austria and Sweden have often worked closely with women's studies programmes to combat sexist practices in the university as well as society more generally. In Greece, by contrast, universities have 'remained hostile to feminist-minded projects'. In England, she notes, feminist history largely developed out of polytechnics (now new universities) rather than the 'major universities'. Julie Des Jardins, "Women's and Gender History," in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 5: Historical Writing Since 1945*, eds. Schneider and Woolf, 141.
17 Scott, "Feminism's History," 25.
18 Ibid." 26–7.
19 Herman Paul, *Hayden White: The Historical Imagination* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011) 28–56 passim.
20 Ibid., 35–56.
21 See Howard Zinn, "Foreword," in Carl Mirra, *The Admirable Radical: Staughton Lynd and Cold War Dissent, 1945–1970* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press), xi–xvi.
22 Zinn "Foreword," xiv.
23 Mirra, Admirable Radical, 98–116. See also Herbert Aptheker, *Mission to Hanoi* (New York: International Publishers, 1966). Aptheker was blacklisted from employment in the U.S. academic history profession because of his political views. Despite publishing major scholarly works such as *American Negro Slave Revolts* (1943) and the multi-volume *A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States* (the first of which was published in 1951), Aptheker's membership in the Communist Party meant that he was denied a secure university teaching position throughout the 1950s and 1960s. As late as 1975–6, Yale University's history department – following the lead of C. Vann Woodward – blocked Apteheker's temporary appointment in one of the university's other academic departments. See Eric Foner and Manning Marable, eds., *Herbert Aptheker on Race and Democracy: A Reader* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press 2006), 248–9. Aptheker's works on African American history were well-known within particular political communities in the U.S. during the period when he was blacklisted, but it was not until the 1980s that Aptheker's importance began to be recognised and discussed within mainstream U.S. academic and intellectual culture. When Eric Foner reviewed the third volume of Aptheker's *The Selected Correspondence of W.E.B. Du Bois* for the *New York Times Book Review* in the early 1980s, Aptheker told him that this was the first time that any of his publications had been reviewed in the *Times*. See Foner and Marable, Herbert Aptheker, 253.
24 Staughton Lynd, *Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism* (London: Faber & Faber, 1969), v.
25 Lynd, *Intellectual Origins*, vii.
26 Mirra, *Admirable Radical*, 121, 139.
27 Lynd's early academic work was cited as the main example of a "presentist" approach to historical research in a strongly critical article by Aileen S. Kraditor, "American Radical Historians on their Heritage," *Past and Present*, 56/August (1972): 136–53. Kraditor argued that historians should be concerned with the 'pastness of the past', not the relevance of the past in the present – which she saw as a wrong-headed approach favoured by Old and New Left historians in the U.S.
28 Staughton Lynd and Andrej Grubaric, *Wobblies and Zapatistas: Conversations on Anarchism, Marxism and Radical History* (Oakland, CA: PM Press), 23.
29 Ibid., 119–20, 122.
30 Mirra, *Admirable Radical*, 154. Lynd explained his thoughts about the political benefits of working as a 'guerilla historian' outside the university system in one of a series of conversations with Andrej Grubaric. See Lynd and Grubaric, *Wobblies and Zapatistas*, 57–67, 119–54.
31 Mirra, *Admirable Radical*, 151. For the most detailed account of this incident, see Ayesha Shariff, "A Bee in Clio's Bonnett: The Radical Caucus of the Historians at the 1969

American Historical Association Convention" (MA diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1990). See also Jesse Lemisch, *On Active Service in War and Peace: Politics and Ideology in the American Historical Profession* (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1975). This includes an extended version of the Jesse Lemisch's essay, 'Present-Mindednness Revisited: Anti-Radicalism as a Goal of American Historical Writing since World War II' that he read at the December 1969 meeting of the American Historical Association.

32 Lemisch, *Active Service*, passim. Perhaps not surprisingly, Lemisch's essay was rejected for publication by the American Historical Review and Journal of American History. It was eventually published in 1975 by an independent, Canadian 'left' publisher.

33 Raphael Samuel, *History Workshop Journal: A Collectanea 1967–1991* (Oxford: History Workshop 25, no. 1, 1991).

34 In addition to the suspected Mau Mau that were held in the various camps, Elkins explained that some 1.5 million Kenyans were detained in about 800 enclosed villages. These were 'surrounded by spiked trenches, barbed wire, and watchtowers, and were heavily patrolled by armed guards. They were detention camps in all but name'. See Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag: the Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), xii.

35 Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, xii.

36 Elkins maintains that the official figure of eleven thousand Mau Mau killed is 'implausible'. Using a combination of witness testimony and the colonial government's censuses of 1948 and 1962, she suggests that the number of Kenyan detainees who died as a result of their treatment by the British could exceed one hundred thousand: see Britain's Gulag 366, and n. 26, 429. David Elstein sought to defend Britain's colonial administration against Elkins' charge that they caused so many deaths. In letters to the *London Review of Books* on 2 June and 21 July 2005, Elstein referred to 'glaring errors' in *Britain's Gulag* and said that in relation to claims about the numbers who died as a result of British policies, 'we cannot conclude that such mass murder happened'.

37 For critical reviews of *Britain's Gulag* see, for example, Pascal James Imperato, "Differing Perspectives on Mau Mau," *African Studies Review* 48/3 (2005): 147–54; Susan Carruthers, "Being Beastly to Mau Mau," *Twentieth Century British History* 16/4 (2005): 489–96; Joanna Lewis, "Nasty, Brutish, and in Shorts? British Colonial Rule, Violence, and the Historians of Mau Mau," *The Round Table* 96/389 (2007): 201–3; Bethwell A. Ogot, "Britain's Gulag," *Journal of African History* 46/3 (2005): 493–505; Philip Murphy, "Book Review of History of the Hanged and Britain's Gulag," *History* 91/303 (2006): 427–8. There is a critical note on *Britain's Gulag* in Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), n.111, 192. See also David Elstein's letters to *The New York Review of Books*, 23 June 2005 and *London Review of Books*, 2 June and 21 July 2005. Finally, we note that John Parker and Richard Rathbone, *African History: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), cite Anderson's book but not Elkins' in their bibliography.

38 Herman Paul, "Hayden White and the Crisis of Historicism," in *Re-Figuring Hayden White*, eds. Frank Ankersmit, Ewa Domanska and Hans Kellner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 56. In some of his earlier writings (published between 1966 and 1973), Hayden White used insights from literary theory and philosophy to argue the case that historical discourse could be usefully oriented towards present-day political (or ethical) concerns. This is the period in White's career that spans 'The Burden of History' and *Metahistory*, and before he began to harden his division between conceptions of the 'practical' and 'historical' pasts. White's work is much discussed in scholarly circles at least, and conducting critical work on his texts is almost a sub-discipline in its own right. We make no attempt here to provide an innovative reading of White, nor do we intend to elaborate at length on his thinking as a philosopher of history. Instead, we limit ourselves to a brief discussion of those parts of White's work that help us to clarify our position on what we think historians can bring to current-day political work. In those of his earlier writings that interest us here, White sought to extend Nietzsche's thoughts about how history should be used to serve life in the present by urging historians to abandon their

scientific pretensions and to embrace the obviously poetic and visionary qualities of their discourse. White's understanding of historical practices rejected the antiquarianism of those who would study the past "for its own sake" in favour of approaches that sought to utilize the discipline's potential as an imaginative and moral resource.

39 Hayden White, "The Burden of History," in White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 41.
40 Robert Doran, "Choosing the Past: Hayden White and the Philosophy of History," in *Philosophy of History After Hayden White*, ed. Robert Doran (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 9–10.
41 Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 434.
42 Hayden White, "The Politics of Contemporary Philosophy of History," in *The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, Literature and Theory, 1957–2007*, ed. Robert Doran (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), 150.
43 Paul, "Hayden White and the Crisis of Historicism," 65.
44 White, "Burden," 49.
45 Hayden White, "What Is a Historical System?," in *The Fiction of Narrative*, ed. Doran, 135.
46 Wendy Brown, *Politics Out of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 96.
47 White, "Burden," 50. For a thoughtful critique of White's thinking that avoids offering an outright rejection of his theoretical and formalist insights, and which cautions against applying a binary logic of utopianism/anti-utopianism to reading White, see Dirk Moses, "Hayden White, Traumatic Nationalism, and the Public Role of History," *History and Theory* 44/3 (2005): 311–32.
48 Hayden White, "The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and De-Sublimation," in White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 73.
49 White, Content of the Form, cited in Karyn Ball "Hayden White's Hope, or the Politics of Pre-Figuration," in *Philosophy of History After Hayden White*, ed. Doran, 101. Zoltán Boldizsár Simon rejects White's idea that professional history lost touch with the non-academic world because it failed to keep pace with modern literary and artistic representational forms; instead, he argues that the problem with historical writing was that it lost touch with a concept of history as the course of events – what he calls a substantive or quasi-substantive philosophy of history. See Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, "We are History: the Outlines of a Quasi-Substantive Philosophy of History," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 20/2 (2016): 259–79.
50 David Harlan, "'The Burden of History' Forty Years Later," in Re-*Figuring Hayden White*, eds. Ankersmit, Domanska and Kellner, 177.
51 Ball, "Hayden White's Hope," 106.
52 Jacques Derrida, "Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta," in *Derrida, Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (London: Continuum, 2002), 49–50.
53 See Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 93.
54 Derrida, "Positions," 50.
55 Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 94.
56 Mark Mason, *Derrida, the Return of Religion in Cultural Criticism and Messianic Historical Theory: Impossible Histories* (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming).
57 Mason, *Derrida, the Return of Religion*.
58 Wendy Brown, "Futures – Specters and Angels: Benjamin and Derrida," in *Brown, Politics Out of History*, 151–2.
59 See Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations: Walter Benjamin*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zorn, (London: Pimlico, 1999), 245–55. Thesis 9 refers to the 'angel of history' with its face turned towards the past.
60 Derrida explained that whereas Benjamin's messianism was associated with Jewish traditions, his own concept of the messianic was a quasi-transcendental structure, not bound up with any particular moment of history or culture – and not describable as a power as

such. This was why, said Derrida, he spoke precisely of a 'messianicity without messianism' (original emphasis). See Jacques Derrida, "Marx and Sons," in *Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx: Jacques Derrida, Terry Eagleton, Frederic Jameson, Antonio Negri et al.*, ed. Michael Sprinkler (London: Verso, 2008), 250. For a lucid comparative discussion of Derrida's and Benjamin's thought, see Brown, "Futures – Specters and Angels."

61 Brown, "Futures – Specters and Angels," 172–3.

62 Uwe Steiner, *Walter Benjamin: An Introduction to His Work and Thought*, trans. Michael Winkler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 149. See also Eli Friedlander, *Walter Benjamin: A Philosophical Portrait* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

63 Friedlander, *Walter Benjamin: A Philosophical Portrait*, 166–7.

64 Paul Mason, *Live Working or Die Fighting: How the Working Class Went Global* (London: Random House, 2007). Mason is not a professional historian. He has been a university music lecturer, musical director, financial journalist, reporter and Economics Editor on BBC and ITN news programmes. He is currently (2017) a freelance journalist, novelist and film-maker as well as a left political activist.

65 Mason, *Live Working or Die Fighting*, xi.

66 Ibid., xii–xiii.

67 Jacques Rancière, *The Nights of Labor: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth-Century France*, trans. John Drury (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).

68 We are grateful to Dave Evans for allowing us to read his unpublished (at the time of writing) paper on Paul Mason's work.

69 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 46.

70 Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 48.

71 The term *historical presents* is from Kenan Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents: a study of the debates around reparations for slavery in the United States and France, the post racial era and the age of commemoration" (PhD diss., University of Ghent, 2015), who takes it from Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) who uses it to describe self-historicisation; the means by which one emplots oneself (or something) into a story of historical development thereby establishing its significance – what Van De Mieroop calls auto-periodisation, "Historical Presents," 183. The phrase 'distribution of the sensible' is from Jacques Rancière, "In What Time Do We Live?," *Política Común* 4 (2013) [Available http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/pc/12322227.0004.001?view=text;rgn=main. Last accessed 31/1/17], in which he describes it as

> a set of relations between the perceptible, the thinkable, and the doable that defines a common world, defining thereby the way in which, and the extent to which, this or that class of human beings takes part in that common world.

It can also be found in Jacques Rancière, *Politics of Aesthetics*, trans., Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2004), 12–13 cited in Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents," 249–50. Van De Mieroop notes that 'reparations' mean very different things to different people. In broad terms he argues that '[t]he debate about reparations for slavery . . . concerns the question of repairing the system, the manifold injustices that it produced, and its continuing effects', "Historical Presents" 2, see 15–21 for a longer definition.

72 Kenan Van De Mieroop, "The "age of commemoration" as a narrative substance: a critique of the discourse on the contemporary crisis of memory in France," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 20/2 (2016): 172–91, 174.

73 The phrase the 'age of commemoration' is originally from Pierre Nora ed. Lieux de Mémoire vols 1–3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1984–87). The 'post-racial era'

74 Van De Mieroop, "The 'age of commemoration'," 182; for the "tyranny of repentance" see Pascal Brouckner, *La Tyrannie de la pénitence: Essai sur le masochisme occidental*

(Paris: Grasset, 2006) cited in Van De Mieroop, "The 'age of commemoration'," 183; for Nicolas Sarkozy's condemnation of the culture of repentance and the shame it brings to France see Tel Quel: Sarkozy : « Je Déteste La Repentance »." L'Humanité www.humanite.fr/node/371023 accessed 31/1/17; also cited in Van De Mieroop, "The 'age of commemoration'," 183.

75 Paul Ricoeur, *Memory History Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 351; for the age of commemoration see Pierre Nora; for regimes of historicity and the notion of presentism see François Hartog Regimes of Historicity. See also Kenan Van De Mieroop, "The "age of commemoration" as a narrative substance: a critique of the discourse on the contemporary crisis of memory in France," Rethinking History for an in-depth discussion of this subject.

76 Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents," 277–8.

77 Pierre Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in *Realms of Memory – Volume 1: Conflicts and Divisions*, ed. Pierre Nora, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1–20, 3.

78 Extracts taken from Nora "General introduction," 3.

79 Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents," 239. A racist act is not racist, it is post-racist; that is, it is a set-back, the act of an individual and not a symptom of a wider societal attitude. The 'post-racial era' is often considered to have been augured in by Barack Obama's successful U.S. presidential campaign in 2008, see Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents," 219–30.

80 Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents," 222–6.

81 See Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts' discussion of Vladimir Jankélévitch's use of 'irreversible' and 'irrevocable' pasts in Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts, "Haunting Pasts: time and historicity as constructed by the Argentine Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Radical Flemish Nationalists," *Social History* 34/4 (2009): 391–408; and Berber Bevernage, *History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 4–6.

82 Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents," 256–7.

83 Ibid., 281. James W Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 157, 168–9 for a discussion as to how American school history textbooks generally gloss over not only the horrors of slavery but also its ongoing repercussions and instead work to situate it within a broader, more positive narrative of American progress.

84 Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents," 232–42.

85 Ibid., 248.

86 Rancière, "In What Time Do We Live?" http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/pc/12322227.0004.001?view=text;rgn=main accessed 31/1/17

87 Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, *The History Wars* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 14–15, 128–32, 137–9.

88 Michelle Arrow, "The Making History Initiative and Australian Popular History," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 15/2 (2011): 158.

89 Macintyre and Clark, *The History Wars*, 1, 136. See also Robert Manne, ed., *Whitewash: On Keith Windschuttle's Fabrication of Aboriginal History* (Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2003), 3–5.

90 Macintyre and Clark, *The History Wars*, 125–6, 153–9; Martin Crotty and David Andrew Roberts, eds., *Turning Points in Australian History* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2009), 3; Anton Froeyman, "The Ideal of Objectivity and the Public Role of the Historian: Some Lessons from the Historikerstreit and the History Wars," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 20/2 (2016): 224.

91 Keith Windschuttle, *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, Volume One, Van Diemen's Land 1803–1847* (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2002), and *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, Volume Three, The Stolen Generations 1881–2008* (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2009). Windschuttle's arguments and use of evidence in volume one were refuted by various scholars in Manne, *Whitewash*.

92 Ann Curthoys and John Docker, *Is History Fiction?* (Sydney: New South Wales Press, 2010), 230–1; Manne, *Whitewash*, 10–11.
93 Arrow, "Making History," passim.
94 Arrow, "Making History," 163.
95 Out of thirty-four documentaries commissioned by the ABC between 2006 and 2009, eleven were biographies of male subjects, eleven were about the world wars, and only two featured female subjects, Arrow, "Making History," 161.
96 Arrow, "Making History," 154–5.
97 Dirk Moses, "Revisionism and Denial," in Whitewash, ed. *Robert Manne*, 362, 363, 364.
98 Macintyre and Clark, *The History Wars*, 222.
99 Ibid., 217–8.
100 The phrases are taken from the American Historical Association, "Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct," updated January 2011, accessed 7/12/15. www.historians.org/jobs-and-professional-development/statements-and-standards-of-the-profession/statement-on-standards-of-professional-conduct#Profession.

4

USING THE PAST IN THE PRESENT

Nostalgia, memory and activism

The politics of nostalgia

One might easily read the intense phase of commemorative observance, cultural heritage mobilisation and institutionalised memory work that developed towards the end of the twentieth century as being politically retrogressive, confirmation of a collective resignation towards the global dominance of neo-liberal capitalist values; a sign that the only imagined alternatives to a reified present in which Hegel's historical time has stopped – "there is no alternative" – are the ones offered by memory and nostalgia. On the political left, radical democracy and the impulse towards nostalgia are usually regarded as antithetical.[1] Although they each posit a modern conception of irreversible and unrepeatable time, they necessarily invoke a different temporal direction. Political terminology commonly ascribes to the left the youthful and forward-looking values of being "progressive" and "modernising"; radical projects are associated with promises of "renewal" and "rupture", and in their most utopian forms with the "new man", "new civilisation" or "new democracy" that could emerge. Marx's essay on the 'Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' helped to establish the orthodox idea among the left that the past was an obstacle that had to be overcome:

> The social revolution of the nineteenth century can only create its poetry from the future, not from the past. It cannot begin its own work until it has sloughed off all its superstitious regard for the past. Earlier revolutions have needed world-historical reminiscences to deaden their awareness of their own content. In order to arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead.[2]

Nostalgia, on the other hand, is commonly taken to be the opposite of a 'poetry from the future'. Left radicals tend to regard it as backward looking and reactionary,

something that signals a failure to adapt to modernity, a psychological state that should be scorned as the kind of defeatist yearning for better yesterdays that one is most likely to hear in 'old people's talk'.[3] The counter-orthodox suggestion that nostalgia might be a source of radical critical potential has rarely found a receptive hearing among the left.[4] But as Alastair Bonnett argues, it is too easy to dismiss nostalgia as necessarily a symptom of critical immaturity or political acquiescence in present arrangements. His central thesis is that concealed or repressed within the modern and ostensibly anti-nostalgic left is a strong sense of loss – the very longing for, and attachment to (usually recent), pasts that they criticise in their political opponents.[5] Walter Benjamin had first used the concept of 'left-wing melancholy' in the early 1930s to criticise those for whom memories of old (lost) causes were more powerful sources of attachment than the prospect of working for present political change.[6] Bonnett's model of left nostalgia is different from the one that Benjamin named; he does not admonish those on the left who find sources of political subjectivity in the past, but instead explores the apparent paradox that 'nostalgia is integral to radicalism; yet, radicalism has been offered as a narrative of anti-nostalgia'.[7] By reading various case studies of radical left activity, Bonnett aims to show how traces of the 'awkward presence of nostalgia' could be found among even the most committed 'partisans of forgetting', detailing how radicals have demonstrated (implicit and overt) longings for a past that has passed.[8] To take one example, although Guy Debord and the Situationist International were outwardly contemptuous of nostalgia, Bonnett argues that we can discern within their project two forms of it. One is 'rootless nostalgia' – defined as a commitment to an authentic political subjectivity, based on rejecting the alienating effects of the capitalist, commodified spectacle in all its forms, regardless of any specific identification with a time or place (a kind of militant, bohemian nihilism). The other is 'rooted nostalgia', which developed from the Situationists' collective memory of an old Paris before it was transformed by technocratic urban planners between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s. As Debord wrote in one of his later works: 'Whoever sees the banks of the Seine sees our grief: nothing is found there now save the bustling columns of an anthill of motorised slaves'.[9]

The claim that contemporary culture was dominated by the "nostalgia mode" was an important element of Frederic Jameson's argument that postmodern society 'has become incapable of dealing with time and history'.[10] In his view, contemporary society (Jameson's quote was written in the 1980s) existed in a 'perpetual present' and state of permanent change, one where the destruction of traditions led to 'historical amnesia'.[11] But far from creating optimal conditions for social and cultural innovation – because in theory an amnesiac society should place no limitations on grounds of precedent on what forms of social organisation could be imagined as being feasible – Jameson lamented that in a world 'where everything now submits to the perpetual change of fashion and media image . . . nothing can change any longer'.[12] Absolute change equalled stasis, he argued, because in such circumstances radical change could only be conceived as putting an end to change itself. Despite being the site of rapid changes in tastes and technologies, postmodern

society at a general level was utterly homogenous and standardised, he argued, because these changes always operated within the social field but without any transformative effect on the field itself.

All of this mattered for Jameson because he understood postmodernism to be the social and cultural correlate of a new economic order – the multinational corporate capitalism that developed after 1945 (otherwise known as post-Fordism). The waning of historicity that he regretted was for him integral to the new consumer economy's requirement for constantly manufacturing and marketing new patterns of desire – and hence generating new flexible modes of production that better suited the interests of capital. As contemporary society lost 'its capacity to retain its own past', culture became constituted by pastiche and the 'nostalgia mode'. As a consequence, whereas an older modernism – populated by forms and artists such as Abstract Expressionism, T.S. Eliot, Le Corbusier, Stravinsky, Joyce, Mann and so on – had deserved to be called 'negative, contestatory, subversive, oppositional', Jameson did not see that postmodern culture carried any such critical potential.[13] On his reading, the irony of the new culture was that it was incapable of generating anything genuinely new that might function as a representation of current experience – rather, 'all that is left is to imitate dead styles, to speak through the masks and with the voices of the styles in the imaginary museum'.[14] Postmodern nostalgia on his account was marked by an affinity for these old (un)dead styles: his favoured examples were half-forgotten film genres and narrative modes which could be revived for aesthetic reasons while separated from any comprehension of historical time as such.[15] The cultural omnipresence of these types of simulacra fed a heightened sense of living in a world where the possibilities of diachronic thinking had collapsed into a time of constant "now". In such conditions it was ever more difficult to imagine coherent alternatives to prevailing modes of social organisation – characterised by Mark Fisher as *capitalist realism* (his preferred term for postmodernism). In one of many passages where he cited the influence of Jameson's thinking, Fisher wrote that capitalism now 'seamlessly occupies the horizon of the thinkable'.[16] But whereas Fisher argued that the development of a left alternative must avoid the 'endless rehearsal of historical debates', Jameson had called for 'the renewal of historical analysis itself' alongside a diagnosis of the 'political and ideological functionality' of postmodernism.[17] Similarly, Negt and Kluge regarded collective memory of past political struggles, resistance and organisation as a precondition for the practice of counter-hegemonic politics. In their view, 'the assault of the present on the rest of time' was one of the major problems to be overcome in the modern public sphere because 'the tendency towards historical impoverishment' eroded the horizon of experience, stripping the past of its critical potential for use in the present.[18] Understood in these terms, counter-hegemonic political work included the task of contesting dominant ways of managing and understanding temporality within the spheres of public life – including the state's repertoire of ceremonial display – as well as arguing for a preferred narration of a given past. As we will show here, political campaigners and activists commonly seek to use the past for just such counter-hegemonic purposes. Whether for the purposes of

securing retroactive justice, or placing a contemporary political struggle within a genealogy of analogous precedents, activists have often chosen to invoke the past as a store of resources for constructive effect.

Counter-hegemony

In order to understand how types of past-talk can be used as discursive forms for 'taking a stand',[19] or for recognising and acting on one's social responsibilities, it is helpful to turn to Laclau and Mouffe's theorisation of hegemony. Their various writings on hegemony provide a conceptual framework in which post-metaphysical politics and post-metaphysical models of knowledge can be seen to be fully commensurate with one another. Laclau and Mouffe define hegemony, which is central to their understanding of the political, as 'the process by which a particularity assumes the representation of a universality that is essentially incommensurable with it'.[20] They use the concept – appropriated and refashioned in the main from Antonio Gramsci, supplemented by insights from poststructuralist and Lacanian vocabularies – as a cornerstone of their project to replace foundationalist explanations of social organisation with the idea that discursive or rhetorical tropes provide society's non-foundational grounds.[21] This project necessitated a reversal of the priorities usually assigned to the categories of the social and the political. Rather than view the political as being derived from a given form of social organisation, as a kind of sector within the social, they argued for a position of the 'ontological centrality of the political',[22] in which the political was understood as the moment of the institution of the social. Their aim here was to elucidate the 'eminently political character of any social identity'.[23] For Laclau and Mouffe, *society* was a term that expressed an impossibility: the achievement of a completed object with a fully positive identity – a sutured totality that stood as an immutable essence behind the various observable forms of social life (society as a 'founding totality'). Society as a completed totality could never be achieved, they argued, because of the anti-essentialist premise that the constitution of any identity as difference must involve the exclusion of that which denied it. In their favored Lacanian terms, any subject formation always stood in relation to an antagonistic outside that internally split and decentred it – it always carried a trace of what was repressed in its moment of becoming, a trace of what it was not.[24] (Or if one prefers Judith Butler's use of Derrida to theorise the same, no given 'content' of identity can claim the status of the ontological because any subject formation is necessarily unfinished, always having to repeat and reinstall itself in time, again and again.)[25] The important point is that in contrast to the essentialism that was associated with the idea of "society" as a singularity, the social was conceived as an infinitude or open space in which identities were articulated and social meanings were generated (and sometimes stabilised) but could never be finally fixed. Laclau and Mouffe understood the social to be a contingent, open and never-to-be-completed effect of linguistic and extralinguistic articulatory practices, marked by the infinite play of differences. As they stated: 'The social *is* articulation insofar as society is impossible'.[26] But as Laclau also explained

in 'The Impossibility of Society', some form of partial and temporary fixing of differences was necessary for there to be a meaningful notion of the social at all:

> [The social] is also the attempt to limit that play, to domesticate infinitude, to embrace it within the finitude of an order. But this order – or structure – no longer takes the forms of an underlying essence of the social; rather, it is an attempt – by definition unstable and precarious – to act over that 'social', to *hegemonise it*. . . . The social only exists as the vain attempt to institute that impossible object: society.[27]

The operation to temporarily fix the play of differences was the work of politics. In these terms, politics was not an activity that sought to reconcile social structures with some transcendent notion of an essential commonality or final consensus. Instead, politics, when viewed through a hegemonic framework, was the process by which diverse articulatory practices brought about the incomplete and selective structuring of the social field around certain nodal points – the latter defined as privileged signifiers that temporarily fixed the meaning of a signifying chain. This structuring involved creating a discursive relation between elements in the social field (which in turn modified the identity of those elements). The discursive fixations that resulted were necessarily incomplete; because of the relational character of every identity, because of the ambiguous character of the signifier, and because 'every nodal point is constituted with an intertextuality that overflows it'.[28] This meant that there could be no final point at which society arrived at itself and eliminated the need for politics. There would always be some element(s) within the social field that escaped or resisted hegemonic signification, and which would eventually mobilise articulatory practices to create a new discursive stabilisation (in which their own subjectivities would be modified). Thus for Laclau and Mouffe, the political refers to a dimension of antagonism which they saw as being irreducible in human relations and which was constitutive of the social. By giving the political primacy over the social, they were of course disavowing orthodox Marxist social theory in which the mode of production was held to determine the totality of social formations, including their ideological and political superstructure. In place of Althusser's thesis that social structures were determined in the last instance by the economy, they offered a theory of indeterminacy in which the social was formed on the basis of decisions taken on the terrain of structural undecidability. In Laclau's terms: 'Undecidability and decision are the names of that ineradicable and constitutive tension which makes possible a *political* society'.[29] This was not to posit a return to a simple voluntarist notion of the subject. The force of social structures at any given time were acknowledged as providing the contours within which decisions were taken and by whom – without determining the *contents* of any decision. But these structures were to be understood as the effect of previous hegemonic operations, not as natural or self-constituting phenomena. In other words, although there were grounds on which various social agents took political decisions, these grounds could not be final or transcendentally determined. The

eschatological dimension of Marxist thought, which held that historical necessity would deliver a revolution in which antagonisms were resolved and power was eliminated from a new social space, was for them illusory. Their alternative project of a radical and plural democratic politics assumed a struggle that was characterised by endless multiple contestations, carried out from different and necessarily fluid subject positions that were connected to each other by links of equivalence, and in which everything was to play for but nothing was guaranteed.

Laclau and Mouffe argued that a hegemonic struggle to defend, challenge or establish a new structuring of the social was in effect a contest to occupy the "empty" position of the universal. Hegemony results when 'a *particular* social force assumes the representation of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it'.[30] Or as Laclau went on to explain in more detail, politics 'is possible because the constitutive impossibility of society can only represent itself through the production of empty signifiers'.[31] The place of an "empty signifier" here operates in a similar way to Derrida's notion of the messianic as a future to come.[32] Because the community can never achieve the promise of the absent fullness that always eludes it – a finally reconciled and harmonious society in which there was consensus without exclusion – the social remained a site in which groups 'compete between themselves to temporarily give to their particularisms a function of universal representation'.[33] A group that succeeds in (always only) temporarily filling out an empty signifier gives a meaning to terms such as "people", "nation", "order", "justice", "revolution", "the free world" and so on that transcends particularity and stands for (or rather produces) a community's symbolic unity. Empty signifiers therefore function as nodal points to fix the meaning of signifying chains, while their empty character points in the direction of their universal signification.[34] What they make possible is an imaginary closure of the social space around this temporary filling out – neatly summarised by Laclau as a never-ending and never totally convincing impersonation of the universal by the particular.[35]

When a hegemonic filling of an empty signifier was successfully maintained for a sufficiently long period, the effect was to erase the traces of the original hegemonic operation. In such circumstances a contingent social structuring could be regarded as "natural", "common sense" and simply the "reality" of how things were. Laclau called this masking of contingency 'sedimentation'. One of the tasks of a project of 'radical plural democracy' was to 'reactivate' the hegemonic operations that produced given social structurings; this was possible because hegemony was a situation of antagonism in which the contours and frontiers of that antagonism were unstable.[36] Demonstrating how the social was constituted on contingent, non-foundational grounds involved efforts to reactivate the other possibilities or choices that were discarded at the moment of any hegemonic (partial) closure, thereby highlighting how current arrangements could easily have been otherwise. This idea of reactivation as a process that disturbs the seemingly natural configuration of present arrangements recalls Walter Benjamin's concept of 'awakening'. Benjamin stressed the importance of recognising how moments in the past can be seen as belonging to a given situation in the present, and also of *acting* in a way

that politically transformed that present by making those aspects of the past that belonged to it live in the now. Steiner explains how in Benjamin's writing: 'The dialectical structure of awakening becomes the model both for historical cognition and for political praxis. As dream images do not become fixed before awakening, so it is only from the present that the past can become known'.[37] When Benjamin wrote that the past is alive in the present, we can read him as saying that each present has the potential for a unique experience with the past. By articulating a model in which historians have a dialectical encounter with those parts of the past that they recognise as speaking to their present – and in which every "now" is a potential turning point in relation to whichever past it chooses to recognise as its own – Benjamin broke with the German historicism school of thinkers such as Ranke, Treitschke and Meinecke.[38] By effecting this break he also signalled his rejection of the 'self-acting' ideology of 'progressive historiography', including those eschatological models which insisted that a fully emancipated subject was waiting to emerge out of a historical process.[39] In our post-Marxist age, we might contrast Benjamin's ideas with Hardt and Negri's predictions about the emergence of the 'multitude' as a revolutionary subject, and also with Badiou's fetishised notion of the militant who might inherit an opportunity to a make a "truth".[40]

Consistently in his writings, Benjamin critiqued philosophies of history that fused together temporal continuity, historical causality and the ideology of progress.[41] He stated that: 'History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by presence of the now . . . blasted out of the continuum of history'.[42] Benjamin's political philosophy required him to reject the idea of 'empty time' that was disconnected from the '"time of the now" which is shot through with chips of Messianic time'.[43] Presented in this way, the kind of political action that is called for (according to Benjamin's political orientation) in any given present has the potential not only to transform current political arrangements but also to redeem the injustices of the past by insisting that those injustices do not belong to an absent past: they are part of the now in which political futures are contested. Chronological time tells us that the past has passed, but experiential time operates differently; experiential time makes it possible to reject dualistic claims that phenomena are either now and present or past and absent.

Activists and the past

In communist Hungary, old symbols and dates that were lodged in the public memory as expressions of national sovereignty were periodically reactivated in the present as sources of friction between János Kádár's government (in office from November 1956) and opposition groups of various types (nationalist, reform communist and anti-communist). Two past events in particular tended to be invoked as signifiers of Hungarian ambitions for national independence and internal political reform. The first of these was the 1848 Revolution, the time when Hungary had fought for independence from the Austrian Habsburg Empire. Opposition groups in Hungary adopted the tactic of staging street demonstrations on 15 March, which

was the symbolic date of the 1848 uprising, in a bid to mobilise Hungarian popular nationalism as a force against what they saw as a modern form of imperial dominance by the Soviet Union. According to István Rév:

> After World War II, March 15 became the day the authorities feared most: the day when the defeated revolutionaries of 1956 wanted to start the uprising all over again, the day every year when the democratic opposition, together with university students, took to the streets to demonstrate against censorship and the Soviet military presence, and for freedom of thought and the liberation of the country.[44]

In 1988 the roundness of that year's anniversary commemorations of 1848 helped the opposition to persuade an estimated ten thousand demonstrators to take to the streets for a march to the statue of revolutionary poet Sándor Petőfi: hero of 1848 and author of the poem *Nemzeti dal* ('National Song'), which he had read out on the steps of the National Museum at the beginning of the revolution. Energised by the levels of popular support that were evident that day in 1988, and encouraged by the crowd's enthusiastic support for calls for free elections and a new constitution, two significant political organisations were set up in the wake of the 15 March demonstration. The so-called Network of Free Initiatives was established to link together various opposition groups in Hungary, and the Association of Young Democrats (Fidesz) was set up as a campaigning political group – which was immediately declared to be illegal and subject to an official press boycott.[45] Both groups went on to be influential in the revolution of 1989 that removed the communist regime from power.

The other symbolic historical reference point for the political opposition was the 1956 uprising that had briefly promised to transform Hungary. Articulated most succinctly by the 'sixteen points' formulated by Hungarian university students, demonstrators in 1956 called for the reinstallation of Imre Nagy as prime minister of a new administration (Nagy had been forced out of office as prime minister and expelled from the communist party in 1955 for supporting reform), the evacuation of all Soviet troops from Hungary, the reinstatement of free elections, freedom of the press, free speech, the right to strike and fundamental economic reorganisation – some of these goals were to remain relevant in Hungary more than thirty years later.[46] These democratic aspirations were blocked by the use of Soviet military force, after which János Kádár's government set about restoring communist rule and dismantling the opposition's capacity to organise further uprisings. Leading figures in the failed Hungarian revolution such as Nagy, József Szilágyi, Pál Maléter and Miklós Grimes were tried and convicted of treason and sentenced to death. Over three hundred people who were suspected or accused of revolutionary activity were tried in special military or later "People's Courts" and executed, thousands were imprisoned, and thousands more fled Hungary as refugees.[47] Not surprisingly, Kádár's government responded to one of the most serious challenges within the Soviet sphere during the early decades of the Cold War by attempting to embed their own favoured, hegemonic interpretation of the 1956 events within the public memory culture. Across Hungary's public spaces – and consequently, it

seems, in many citizens' private views – 1956 was narrated and remembered as a criminal attempt at counter-revolution.[48] Memorials were erected across Budapest to honour those who had not joined in the revolt, and a monument was installed outside communist party headquarters to remember those who had been killed in the course of (as the official terminology described it) defending the communist state. School and university textbooks explained the events of autumn 1956 as a 'counter-revolutionary riot', one that was apparently pushed by 'extreme right-wing parties' against the will of the Hungarian people who, it was maintained, were outraged by the protesters' actions. And on national holidays, guards were stationed on monuments or sites associated with either the 1848 or 1956 revolutions, including the cemetery where it was known that Nagy and his co-defendants were buried.[49] The state's efforts to forcibly prevent public discussion or remembrance of 1956 – for example, school teachers who were suspected of departing from the official narrative about the protests being a form of counter-revolution could find themselves investigated by the police – resulted in the development of a 'pact of silence', or what Rév called 'complicit nontalk', in Hungary about the uprising.[50] This pact held throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s; when in return for relative economic prosperity under Kádár, people largely agreed not to question the official narrative that the party had saved the country from counter-revolution in 1956. But the pact was broken in the final months of communist rule in Eastern Europe, when in the more open conditions inspired by Gorbachev's *Glasnost*, and under pressure from a democratic opposition who wanted to revive questions about Nagy and 1956 in the public domain, reform elements within the Hungarian communist party established a sub-committee to investigate the historical interpretation of 1956.[51] In January 1989, this subcommittee stated that 1956 should be understood as a popular uprising rather than a right-wing counter-revolution; a month later Imre Pozsgay, who was a leading reformer within the communist government, publicly repeated and endorsed the sub-committee's interpretation of 1956.[52]

The effect of this public *volte-face* was to make questions about the fate of those who had been executed for their roles in the uprising all the more pressing. Most prominent among these was Nagy, who was convicted on charges of high treason and executed on 16 June 1958 at the central prison in Budapest (at the behest of Hungarian communist supporters of the Soviets). Nagy was buried without any identification in the prison courtyard; his coffin was later disinterred on 24 February 1961 and moved to the nearby public cemetery of Rákoskeresztúr, where he was buried somewhere in plot 301 under a false name in the official documentation. But as Rév pointed out, the regime's practice of burying its enemies in unmarked graves carried significant risks. To the extent that death marked the end not just of a physical self but as a social self as well, a proper burial in a marked grave gave a person 'social integrity as a dead member of the society of the living'.[53] Placing someone in an unmarked grave was in effect to leave them unburied:

> For the relatives, the families of the victims, the unknown burial was not a real funeral. So long as the executed could not rest peacefully, as proper dead persons, the living were under the obligation not to rest either. In spite – and

> exactly because of – the horror of the execution, the deceased was not truly dead until the corpse had its final burial.[54]

Not only for relatives, but for survivors of the post-1956 purges and the democratic opposition as a whole, Nagy's illegal execution and then burial without the dignity of a proper gravestone or nameplate were acts that underscored the brutal character of the regime that had governed in Hungary since 1948. In contrast to an official policy of remaining largely silent about Nagy's trial, execution and burial, the opposition sought to spur public memory of these events as a way of exerting critical pressure on the regime. In the 1970s, former colleagues (released from prison) and families began to demand a dignified burial for Nagy, Szilágyi and Maléter.[55] From the beginning of the 1980s, they marked anniversaries of their executions by placing flowers in the cemetery plot where it was believed that the bodies had been placed. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Nagy's execution in 1983, the Hungarian samizdat publication *Beszélo* produced a special edition about his trial and called for all those political prisoners who were executed for their role in 1956 to be given a proper burial. Then in 1986 the opposition organised a conference to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the uprising, a gathering that gave different generations and holders of political positions within the opposition a chance to exchange ideas. Two years later, a group of former political prisoners used the anniversary of Nagy's trial as an opportune moment to set up a Committee for Historical Justice, which demanded both the rehabilitation of the official reputations of those who were executed, and their internment in a suitably respectful site. On 16 June 1988, the thirtieth anniversary of Nagy's execution, the opposition dedicated a grave to him in Père Lachaise in Paris, which had been given to them by Jacques Chirac, who was then mayor of the city; simultaneous to this in Budapest, at the site of the Eternal Sacred Flame, which honoured the executed prime minister of the 1848 revolution, Nagy's name was chanted on the streets at a major demonstration before the police forcibly broke it up.[56] Within months (and with the elderly Kádár now forced out of office), the Hungarian government conceded to popular pressure and agreed that Nagy and others who were executed could be reinterred; shortly afterwards the Supreme Court cancelled the guilty verdicts on Nagy and his co-defendants from 1958. On 16 June 1989, after weeks of searching by officials for the grave's location, Nagy's remains were exhumed and reburied during a ceremony at the same public cemetery where his coffin had been placed in 1961. On the same day, a crowd of some 200,000 paid their respects to Nagy and other victims of Soviet retribution for their roles in 1956 at Heroes' Square in Budapest. Nagy's ceremonial reburial on the thirty-first anniversary of his execution was used by Fidesz and veterans of the 1956 uprising as a public stage on which to imagine a Hungarian state without communism: represented most clearly by the display of Hungarian flags with their communist symbols cut out from the centre at the ceremony.[57] The names of 277 victims of post-revolutionary trials were read to the crowds. Given that there was no singular day in Hungary that marked the end of Soviet-backed communist rule, 16 June 1989 was perhaps the closest equivalent to a moment that

marked a point of national political transition. In Rainer's words, the day became 'a historical and psychological turning point in the process, usually described as a system change, of democratic transformation in Hungary'; this was a transition that saw the self-dissolution of the Hungarian communist party in October 1989 and the final withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country in June 1991.[58]

Kicking off everywhere: 2010–12

More recent examples of political activists 'past-presencing' symbolically important reference points from collective memory occurred in the transnational protests of 2010–12.[59] Activists and campaigners have long quoted from their predecessors' use of imagery and iconography. Websites such as Radicalgraphics.org, Protestgraphics.org, Anotherposterforpeace.org and Riniart.org, for example, house hundreds of old political graphics and posters that are free for any activist groups to adapt and use.[60] The global revolts of 2010 and afterwards demonstrate further how, in the right circumstances, performative and symbolic citations of the past could be productively employed as tactical and moral resources for political resistance.[61] A recent study of the political aesthetics of these protests highlighted how demonstrators in one location often copied gestures, symbols, tropes and slogans from each other; these symbols and slogans sometimes referenced earlier activist campaigns as a way of positioning current protest within a discursive-political genealogy. As Werbner, Webb and Spellman-Poots describe,

> In being imaginative and creative, protesters everywhere drew upon locally shared aesthetic traditions, vernacular popular media, and visual, material and artistic histories, narratives and myths. They wove these intertextually into their protests, reiterating, inverting, reproducing and parodying past national events, performance traditions and filmic or theatrical histories, to convey a contemporary message.[62]

In India's "August Spring" of 2011, for example, images of M.K. Gandhi and revolutionary martyrs from the fight for national independence were widely used and circulated by protesters seeking to equate the moral authority of their own anti-corruption struggle with the public memory of anti-colonialism decades earlier. The most direct assertion of the continuity between the earlier and later campaigns was the self-description of the 2011–12 protests by activists as 'India's Second Freedom Movement'. To underscore the lineage of the contemporary struggle, when activist and social reformer Anna Hazare began a hunger strike in 2011 to pressurise the government into accepting anti-corruption legislation, he did so on a public stage under a large photo of Gandhi, earning him the soubriquet of the 'second Gandhi' or 'come-again Gandhi'.[63] Perhaps more effective than this as a means of equating old anti-colonial and new anti-corruption political campaigns in India was the mobilisation of cinema's popular appeal. On the day when Hazare's campaign pressurised the Indian Parliament into considering the practicalities of

establishing a people's ombudsman, he was flanked by two important personalities from the film industry. One was Rajkumar Hirani, a director whose feature film *Lage Raho Muna Bhai* (2006) had reimagined Gandhi for contemporary times, making him the chimeric moral adviser of a Mumbai small-time gangster – which went some way to preparing the ground for Hazare's appropriation of Gandhi's moral authority. The second was actor Aamir Khan, who in the 2006 film *Rang de Basanti* had played the role of Bhagat Singh, a revolutionary Marxist who was executed alongside independence fighters by the British on 23 March 1931 (commemorated as *shahid diwas* – martyr's day).[64] The integration of filmic references into the anti-corruption campaign exemplified how popular culture, historical citation, and nationalist and religious iconography could be folded into the repertoire of activists who were engaged in struggles.[65] Crucially, the historical citation invoked in *Rang de Basanti*'s narrative of radicalised youth and martyrdom seems to have been instrumental in mobilising middle-class support for the anti-corruption campaign in Delhi and other northern cities. When Martin Webb visited a 'Drive Against Bribe' camp in Delhi in 2006, the student volunteers he met constantly referred to the film, and some of them had seen it several times.[66]

Hazare's campaign to institute a parliamentary ombudsman (*Lokpal*) who would hold members of parliament to account and provide a channel for investigating complaints against them was part of a long struggle against corruption in India. Since independence in 1947 there had been repeated public concerns about corruption, attested by the fact that there had been eight attempts to introduce a *Lokpal* bill since the 1960s, none of which had passed both houses.[67] Just as Hazare had done with his appropriation of Gandhi's image, earlier iterations of this struggle had cited references from the Indian political archive as a tactic to acquire moral legitimacy by association and thus to increase levels of popular support. At one such protest in 2007 in Delhi, for example, activists from the Gandhian Satyagraha Brigade (GSB) met each Sunday to stage a public fast against political corruption outside the gates of the Gandhi memorial garden at Raj Ghat – the site at which Gandhi had been cremated after his assassination in 1948. Moreover, the GSB were part of a genealogy of activist organisations that stretched back to the Servants of the People Society (founded in 1921), and more recently *Lok Sevak Sangh* (LSS), which was set up as an NGO by imprisoned activists at the time of Indira Gandhi's emergency regime in the mid-1970s. By the time of the 2007 protest, LSS was led by Shambhu Dutt, an octogenarian veteran of the Quit India movement who had marched with M.K. Gandhi, been imprisoned by the colonial British and then detained again during the 1975–77 emergency period. As Webb pointed out, Shambhu Dutt's role in connecting the contemporary *Lokpal* protests with two significant moments in India's national memory – the original anti-colonial movement and the struggle against what was seen as Indira Gandhi's illegitimate rule in the 1970s – underscored their democratic credentials.[68]

Similarly, protests in Wisconsin in 2011 in support of the living wage and in defence of trade union rights directly referenced the past as one way of challenging new orthodoxies about what was possible in an era of "capitalist realism", an

orthodoxy that was articulated starkly in State Governor Scott Walker's budget plan of February 2011. In opposition to Walker's proposals to cut billions from budgets for public services, education and health care for low-income families, and to signal their alarm at plans to cancel collective bargaining rights for most public sector workers, protesters invoked traditions of free speech in the public space and pointed out that Wisconsin state had a progressive political past.[69] "Fighting Bob" La Follette Sr, who was Wisconsin's Governor in 1901–1906, supported women's suffrage, racial equality, corporate regulation and labour unions, was revived as a politically progressive icon, symbolised by use of the 'What Would Bob Do?' slogan on protesters' placards. Protesters who built a tent city in Wisconsin as a focal point for their campaign named it 'Walkerville' in memory of the so-called Hoovervilles of the Depression era. And old songs that formed part of the region's folk memory, such as 'Wisconsin Fight Song' and 'The Beer Barrel Polka', were re-fitted with contemporary political lyrics by grassroots activist groups like The Raging Grannies, whose background was in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

In Britain, activists who set up the Runnymede eco-village in a piece of disused woodland between Staines and Windsor invoked the past for political purposes at around the same time as the protesters in India and Wisconsin discussed earlier. The eco-village was established in 2012 by a group of "land-activists" who wanted to reconnect to the land and live more or less independently of mainstream, consumer culture. Taking inspiration from the seventeenth-century Protestant radical Gerald Winstanley, who aimed to reform the social order and create egalitarian, agrarian, rural communities, they walked down the River Thames from Syon Lane and settled in an area of disused woodland which was part of the abandoned ex-Brunel University Runnymede Campus. Winstanley and his Diggers established two very short-lived settlements on common land in Surrey in 1649–50, where they built houses and attempted to cultivate the land before being driven off. The Diggers have since been seen as inspirational precursors of a variety of community-anarchist, squatting, anti-capitalist, communalist groups such as the San Francisco Diggers.[70] The land-activists of the Runnymede eco-village have also consciously situated their work in the historical context of the Diggers through their writings, activities and self-description as Diggers2012.[71] They argue that just like the 1649 Diggers, they hope 'to spark a land reform revolution and return to people their right to live freely on the land, to grow their own food and to build their own home'.[72] In May 2012 they issued the *Declaration from the Dispossessed* indirectly referencing the seventeenth-century Digger pamphlet, *A Declaration from the Poor Oppressed People of England*, arguing that everyone should have the right to dwell on and cultivate disused land. They also intended to show how people could live free from debt and without destroying the planet.[73] The banner of their old website includes a line from Rosselson's song, "World Turned Upside Down", and includes a list of resources: including information on the history of land rights, land enclosures, the clearances and the commons, as well as many quotes from Winstanley.[74]

In 2015 when their community was under threat of destruction, they contextualised their legal fight to retain their eco-village with reference not only to

its location at Runnymede, but also the rights outlined in the Magna Carta and *The Charter of the Forest, 1225*.[75] On the blog and activist website Phoenix Rising, numerous entries intertextually reference the Magna Carta and situate the struggle of the eco-village as part of an ongoing struggle by the people of England and Britain for 'democracy, land rights and other rights relating to Magna Carta', a connection facilitated by the timing of the court proceedings to evict the eco-village and the 800th anniversary of the signing of the Magna Carta.[76] Using the *Charter of the Forest*, they argued that they had the right to live on the land under English common law because the charter grants people the right of access to (unmanaged) woodland. Links to a scan of the *Charter of the Forest* held in the National Archives are also included on the community's website.[77] The eco-village enlisted the support of a number of academic historians, scholars and constitutional experts in their campaign. Guy Standing, professor in Development Studies at SOAS and the author of *The Precariat Charter*, spoke at the eco-village Festival for Democracy, while Justin Champion supported the eco-village by giving a talk on the radical history of Egham and the Diggers at a 'Land and Freedom Gathering'.[78]

Just as they were facing eviction, the eco-village celebrated their third anniversary with a Festival for Democracy – Land, Freedom & Community (12–15 June 2015) organised in conjunction with Occupy Democracy and The New Putney Debates, which was described as an alternative celebration of the Magna Carta's 800th anniversary intended to 'celebrate the right to freedom at the "birthplace of modern democracy"'.[79] The festival was part celebration of the community, but it was also intended to explore 'how citizens can write their own Magna Carta (or constitution) that is fit for the 21st century' and offered workshops on charters through the ages, including the Charter of the Forest.[80]

Anthony Barnett, founder of Charter 88 and Open Democracy, spoke at the Festival and outlined the relevance of what he calls 'the Magna Carta process' and the Charter of the Forest for issues today.[81] In this talk and elsewhere, he criticises how both the state and historians have sought to present the Magna Carta as a single event and to determine its "correct" interpretation. He is critical of an approach to the history of the Magna Carta that focuses on getting the facts straight (determining exactly where it was signed) rather than exploring what it can *mean* to people now. He is particularly scathing of Melvyn Bragg's four-part BBC Radio 4 series on the Magna Carta, which he says was

> so low key that it asphyxiated the possibility that listeners might see in Magna Carta a symbol of the need to challenge despotism, an inspiration to fight for liberty, an example to codify our rights, an assertion that all must have access to justice (when legal aid is being shredded), or a foundational document for a shared claim to the commons.[82]

People's historian Peter Linebaugh, author of *The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberty and Commons for All*, has similarly argued against viewing the document as a trace of the past to be firmly placed in its context and interpreted correctly by historians.

Instead, he argues, it should be used to inspire and guide future action; a future based on mutuality and cooperation:

> [W]e're not interested so much in bringing back a charter in an archival work. We're interested in bringing back a spirit and a practice [that] concerns not only defenses against tyranny, but . . . concerns powers of subsistence. . . . It was fundamental to the abolitionist struggle against the fugitive slave law. It was fundamental to the civil rights struggle. And now we must bring it back because, unfortunately, all its major provisions are being trampled upon by beasts, high and low.[83]

On the 800th anniversary of the signing of the Magna Carta, he gave a series of interviews and talks in which he discussed human rights abuses arising from the incarceration of people without trial in the American military prison facility in Guantánamo as being against the rights provided by the Magna Carta and Charter of the Forest.[84] He argued that the document can be seen as a foundation of our liberties in ongoing struggles for democracy, campaigns against the death penalty and in eradicating slavery.[85] Linebaugh and four others also sent a message 'to the Runnymede Commoners Under the Ankerwyke Yew' on 15 June 2015, in which they read extracts from the Magna Carta, the Charter of the Forest and the work of Frederick Douglas, noting the relevance of these works for the Black Lives Matter movement and the ongoing debates for reparations for slavery, exploited labour and the forced removal of indigenous native Americans from their lands.[86]

Retroactive justice

Walter Benjamin insisted that the injustices of the past were part of the now in which political futures are contested. Perhaps this is one reason why Britain's political, judicial and memory cultures have generally been reluctant to confront the country's past colonial practices, whether for purposes of atonement, securing justice for victims or seeking to "draw a line" under its imperial record. But an exception to this occurred in the early twenty-first century when pressure from victims, activists and lawyers forced the UK government to admit liability for violations committed in one of its former east African colonies. In 2003, recognising that the time had come to deal with past injustices, the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC) formally took up the case of Kenyan veterans who had been violently abused when British security forces suppressed colonial rebellion in their country in the 1950s.[87] Britain committed some of its worst atrocities as a colonial power during the "Emergency" period in Kenya (October 1952–January 1960). Its judicial system executed more Africans than the French did during their war in Algeria in roughly the same period. As well as the 1090 Kenyans who were hanged by order of the courts, prisoners in British custody were regularly beaten to death or near death by their guards. Thousands of ethnic Kikuyu, Embu and Meru who were suspected of being a danger to Britain's settler population in Kenya were raped,

tortured, starved, brutalised and murdered. Some were burned alive. The scale of these crimes and the perpetrators' sense of impunity were enabled by Britain's implementation of a network of some 100 detention camps, known as the 'pipeline', in which tens of thousands Kenyans were interned (conservative calculations suggest 70,000 were incarcerated, the highest put the figure at around 150,000). The pipeline which these Kenyans passed through was designed to "screen" out anyone who was suspected of swearing one or more of a graded sequence of loyalty oaths to Mau Mau, a guerilla insurgent force which had formed in the late 1940s to fight European occupation of their land.[88] As part of the British security administration's Operation Anvil in 1954, approximately 17,000 Mau Mau suspects were detained without trial: the aim was to force them to confess their oath, renounce it and then "re-educate" them to accept the colonial situation before they were released from the camps. Depending on the level of threat that they were deemed to represent to the British – and how cooperative they were under interrogation – detainees were held in one of six types of camps: holding camps, work camps, special detention camps, exile camps, chiefs' camps, and women and juvenile camps.[89] This carceral system operated until the British colonial administration was forced to abandon it following a political and public outcry about the deaths of eleven prisoners, together with the serious wounding of sixty others, at Hola Camp in March 1959. But by the time the pipeline was dismantled, its main aim of breaking the Mau Mau insurgency had been realised in any case. David Anderson estimated that by the end of the Emergency period in 1960 more than 20,000 Mau Mau had been killed (compared with 2000 African civilians who were killed by Mau Mau, about 200 police and army casualties, and 32 deaths among the white settler population).[90]

Veterans' associations in Kenya had been discussing the possibility of bringing legal action against the British government for what had occurred in the camps since the 1990s.[91] Supported by KHRC, a test case featuring five claimants who were abused in the pipeline camps was finally brought by legal firm Leigh Day in 2009 – the five initial claimants were Ndiki Mutua, Paulo Nzili, Wambugu Wa Nyingi, Jane Muthoni Mara and Susan Ngondi. It was the first claim for restorative justice in relation to past imperial wrongs ever made in a British court.[92] Three historians – David Anderson, Huw Bennett and Caroline Elkins – gave evidence as expert witnesses for Leigh Day. Anderson and Elkins also had a role in making the legal action possible, because both published books in 2005 that helped to convince KHRC and the Mau Mau War Veterans Association that they could make a plausible case in court.[93] These books were not the first to provide details about British atrocities in Kenya as such – information about beatings and killings in the "dirty war" against Mau Mau had been in the public domain since the 1950s[94] – but they were the first to show how this violence functioned as part of a systematic and officially sanctioned policy of repression. Before Elkins' and Anderson's books were available there was a dominant – but not completely unchallenged – narrative in Britain which maintained that its forces had fought a largely civilised war in Kenya in the face of extreme provocation by peculiarly barbaric fighters. Scholarly

accounts of Britain's post-1945 withdrawal from empire frequently implied that the suppression of the Mau Mau was a contest between equal forces, or they glossed over the violence of what occurred.[95] Sustaining the authority of these dominant and self-serving historical versions of the past was assisted by a "cleansing" of the archives. Before they quit Kenya in 1963, British officials destroyed and removed vast quantities of documents relating to the network of detention camps in which tens of thousands of Kikuyu had been held and abused.[96] This effort to conceal documents that contained evidence of colonial crimes in Kenya became a crucial issue in the High Court claim. Indeed, the case turned against the British government in April 2011 after it was forced to admit that about 1500 files relating to the insurgency had been hidden from public view for almost fifty years.

Although a large quantity of official documents relating to Britain's war against Mau Mau had been released in the normal way to archives in London and Nairobi, it was long known that British officials had stripped the archival record of as much potentially damaging material as they could before they quit the colony.[97] The filtering operation was carried out in accordance with Colonial Office advice issued in May 1961, which told administrators what types of documents should be destroyed by fire or dumped in the ocean and which ones should be "migrated" back to the UK and kept away from public scrutiny.[98] According to legal convention, documents about colonial administration should have been passed to the new Kenyan state after independence; UNESCO classified removal of such documents by a colonial power as an act of theft. Kenyan governments asked Britain in 1967, 1971, 1974 and 1981 to account for what had happened to the crates of documents that it suspected were flown out of Nairobi in the last moments of colonial rule in 1963. In 1981 senior archivists from Kenya's National Archive travelled to London to meet Foreign and Commonwealth Office staff and to visit what was then called the Public Record Office (now The National Archives). On this occasion – as on all previous approaches – British diplomats and archivists gave misleading answers to the Kenyan delegation and deflected all attempts to locate and reclaim missing records, including documents that corroborated claims about Britain's colonial abuses. All the time that they denied withholding evidence about their actions as a colonial power in Kenya, the migrated files from Nairobi were in fact locked in a facility in Hayes until 1994, after which they were transferred to a high-security archive in Hanslope Park in Buckinghamshire. Here, documents relating to Kenya and another thirty-six former British colonies were shelved alongside files from the state intelligence agencies MI5 and MI6: so secret was this depository that within the framework of UK law the migrated Kenyan archives 'simply did not officially exist'.[99] After denying for so long that embarrassing and incriminating documents about colonial practices had been made to disappear from the public records, a government minister finally conceded on 5 April 2011 (the day before court hearings were to begin) that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 'irregularly held' thousands of documents relating to former colonies.[100] It was a key admission by the government – followed within days by a newspaper interview about the documents with then Foreign Secretary, William Hague – that showed

how managing archival records had been used as a means to control what could be claimed about the violent exercise of power under British colonial occupation.[101]

Although the previously hidden files were released only slowly to the claimants' lawyers, they were crucial to the eventual success of the case against the UK government.[102] In one of the three witness statements that she submitted to the High Court, Elkins emphasised how important it was that the newly available documentation 'supports the extensive oral evidence from multiple sources that I collected over the ten years of my research'.[103] Mr. Justice McCombe's 'Approved Judgment' in the High Court in October 2012 – which concluded that a fair trial of the claimants' case could be heard – repeatedly referred to their significance.[104] Faced with the evidence contained in Hanslope Park, the government eventually stopped contesting the case and agreed to pay compensation to Kenyans who could prove they were mistreated by the colonial forces. In a statement to parliament in June 2013, Foreign Secretary Hague announced:

> The British Government recognises that Kenyans were subject to torture and other forms of ill treatment at the hands of the colonial administration. The British government sincerely regrets that these abuses took place, and that they marred Kenya's progress towards independence.[105]

Viewed from one perspective, the disclosure of the Hanslope Park archive might be claimed as a vindication of sorts for empirical history and its belief that with time and diligent effort the truth of the past will become known via its surviving traces. After all, without the material from the Hanslope archive, the prosecution team would have been unable to corroborate claims that the British were responsible – either directly or indirectly – for beating and torturing their clients. David Anderson was probably right to argue that the 'quest for documentary evidence has proved to be the most critical aspect of the case', even if it sounds rather immodest coming from an expert witness whose testimony was important in forcing the British government to release all papers relevant to the Kenyan Emergency.[106] While none of them has claimed the status of 'activist scholar', there is no denying the importance of the testimony given by the three historians to the case, nor the role of Anderson's and Elkins's books in persuading the KHRC to mount a legal challenge to the UK government – indeed, Justice McCombe's judgment expressed the view that the effect of the books in changing the 'academic understanding of the period' was 'the principal trigger for the initiation of the claims'.[107] Elkins, Anderson and Bennett can be seen as rare but welcome examples of historians who used their knowledge to take a stand for a cause beyond scholarship.

However, lest historians want to cite this legal case as a reason why it is important to believe in the straightforward 'facticity' of the historical past – as a platform that allows us to judge people's actions – we should point to some difficulties with any such interpretation. For about fifty years, Britain's academic history infrastructure was largely complicit with the state's denial of its crimes in Kenya. Texts that were taken be "true" and "authoritative" histories of empire repeatedly downplayed or

ignored abuses committed by British forces and their accomplices. Their approach here cannot be excused simply on the grounds that evidence of crimes was concealed from them. According to Anderson, British historians knew at least as early as the 1990s that there were significant gaps in the archives about the counter-insurgency period. Also, it was well known that the British – as with other colonial powers – routinely destroyed records when they withdrew from a territory. But none of this prevented historians from writing about Britain's apparently "orderly" withdrawal from empire using archival traces that they knew had been filtered of the most incriminating material. When Elkins challenged the dominant narrative about Britain's last years in Kenya, the reception from her academic colleagues was far from uniformly supportive.[108] And even after the High Court case, there were historians who continued to excuse or mitigate the conduct of Britain's colonial forces against the nationalists. For these reasons, it is difficult to see the Mau Mau case as a clear vindication of empirical history's procedures and practices.

Establishing justice in this case was not primarily about the victims' rights to have their historical narrative recognised – even though the British government's concession and the revelations about Hanslope Park will no doubt have implications for future historiography. More important than historiographical interpretations were the ways in which the Kenyan Human Rights Commission, the Mau Mau War Veterans Association, the individual claimants and their legal representatives combined to secure legal and political recognition that crimes had been committed against them and many others. Initially, more than 5000 Kenyans were granted compensation totalling some £20 million; in May 2016 a further 40,000 announced that they would also seek compensation.[109] To the extent that the Hanslope Park documents were important in the case, we should remember that pressure from the Leigh Day legal team forced their disclosure. Moreover, in the High Court judgement that established the credibility of the claimants' case, it was made clear that in any subsequent trial,

> the court would have to conduct its own analysis of the documents to at least the same, and possibly even to a greater extent, than the historians have done in some areas of factual dispute. . . . [T]he role of historical scholars is different from that of a trial court.[110]

Conclusion

Arguing that there is a connection between post-positivist epistemologies and the political economy of "capitalist realism" is an important feature of the left defence of orthodox historical practices. This defence insists that historical analysis is indispensable to establishing *with certainty* that any given group "really" has been exploited, oppressed, dispossessed, displaced or mistreated in some other way that warrants recognition and redress. In these terms, claims to social justice rely on the prior establishment of historical claims to identity, legitimacy, presence or ontology. Seen against this background, critics complain that the effect of post-structuralist or

post-discursive epistemologies are problematic or even "nihilistic". They seemingly deprive wronged groups of the bedrock of historical "truth" and "facticity" on which their claims for redress depend. By rooting disempowered and disadvantaged groups in a historical past, the argument runs, so their claims to present-day justice are strengthened: hence the production of histories of subaltern, marginalised and victim groups, which seek to lend the force of time to claims for justice in the now. Such arguments are no doubt made in good faith, but they also raise serious problems. Most obviously, history as a mode of knowledge is incapable of providing a neutral or agreed-upon platform for justice because its method will always be ideologically weighted in favour of those political interests that possess and control archives: what gets to be preserved, what is made accessible, who gets access and how the idea of the archive itself is defined. So, rather than offer to equip disadvantaged groups with a history – or even to help them produce histories of their own – the more ethically defensible position is one which recognises that no one should *need* a history as a support for their political claims or appeals for justice. In the cases of Ndiki Mutua, Paulo Nzili, Wambugu Wa Nyingi, Jane Muthoni Mara and Susan Ngondi discussed earlier, what they needed were competent lawyers and the support of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission. Historians helped to persuade the court that violations of the type being claimed had been common in Kenya at the time. But as the High Court judgment made clear in October 2012, the legal profession's protocols for reading the documented evidence would have decided the facts of the case if a full trial had been necessary.

In more general terms, the cultural habit whereby claims for justice now are routinely scrutinised in relation to the historical past (the past of the historians) should be acknowledged as one that disadvantages too many people in the world, notably those in post-colonial territories where authorised history was part of the ideological framework of colonisation and oppression that caused so many injustices in the first place. Of course, people and groups freely *choose* to invoke the past for strategic political or other reasons. In cases where they do so, we should disregard any hierarchy of value that assigns subordinate status to forms of past-talk that are not recognised as histories. Instead, we should affirm how memories and loyalties towards the past have been effectively invoked in many different forms for deployment in political struggles. If such invocations could be described as expressions of nostalgia, the nostalgia in question would best be characterised not as a state of being (how a person felt) or a feature of contemporary cultural conditions, but as an activity that sought to 'transform the past' by acts of imagination, in ways that opened up possibilities for inventing different futures.[111]

Notes

1 The "left" is an imprecise term, but we have in mind the kind of usage that Tony Judt employed when he wrote:

> To be on the Left in France is before all else to share a style of discourse, a way of talking about politics, present and past. . . . It is the French Revolution which supplies

the form for much of this discourse, both in the vocabulary itself, but also in the resonances produced by that vocabulary in popular memory.

See Tony Judt, *Marxism and the French Left: Studies in Labour and Politics in France, 1830–1981* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3.

2 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *The Portable Karl Marx*, ed. and trans. Eugene Kamenka, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), 290.

3 Alastair Bonnett, *Left in the Past: Radicalism and the Politics of Nostalgia* (London: Continuum, 2010), 3.

4 Note, for example, how the UK Independence Party (UKIP) was attacked from the left for running a populist campaign around the intertwined themes of nationalism, anti-immigration and a narrowly conceived version of cultural heritage in the 2015 UK general election.

5 Bonnett, Left in the Past, 3. Svetlana Boym's distinction between 'restorative nostalgia' (which could be seen in political terms as a reactionary attempt to imaginatively reconstruct a lost home) and 'reflective nostalgia' (which was ironic, progressive and inclusive) is useful in this context. See Boym, (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

6 Benjamin wrote in a 1931 review essay:

> What then does the 'spiritual elite' discover as it begins to take stock of its feelings? Those feelings themselves? They have long since been remaindered. What is left is the empty spaces where, in dusty heart-shaped velvet trays, the feelings – nature and love, enthusiasm and humanity – once rested. Now the hollow forms are absent-mindedly caressed. A know-all irony thinks it has much more in these supposed stereotypes than in the things themselves, it makes a great display of its poverty and turns the yawning emptiness into a celebration. For this is what is new about this objectivity – it takes as much pride in the traces of former spiritual goods as the bourgeois does in his material goods. . . . In short, this left-wing radicalism is precisely the attitude to which there is no longer in general any corresponding political action. . . . For from the beginning all it has in mind is to enjoy itself in a negativistic quiet.

Walter Benjamin, "Left-Wing Melancholy; On Erich Kästner's New Book of Poems," trans. Ben Brewster, *Screen* 15/2 (1974): 29–30. See also Wendy Brown, "Resisting Left Melancholy," *boundary 2* 26/3 (1999): 19–27. As an interesting parallel, Eli Friedlander discusses how Benjamin elsewhere suggests that historicism's relation to the past is a form of enshrinement of it, and therefore historians' empathetic approach to the past is a manifestation of melancholy. The melancholic regards the past as dead and enshrined, drained of life and eternally secure like a set of relics to be conserved, incapable of emanating any meaning or significance. Historicism freezes the historical object, and it therefore denies the possibility that there is life in the historical object itself. See Eli Friedlander, *Walter Benjamin: A Philosophical Portrait* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2012), 163–4.

7 Bonnett, *Left in the Past*, 7.

8 Ibid., 1.

9 Ibid., 149.

10 Frederic Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," in Jameson, *The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983–1998* (London: Verso, 1998), 10.

11 Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," 20.

12 Frederic Jameson, "The Antinomies of Postmodernity," in Jameson, *The Cultural Turn*, 59.

13 Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," 20.

14 Ibid. 7.

15 Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (New York: Duke University Press, 1992), 19–21, 287.

16 Mark Fisher, *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* (Ropley: Zero Books, 2009), 8.

17 Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 401.

18 Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere*, with a foreword by Miriam Hansen, trans. Peter Labanyi, Jamie Owen Daniel and Assenka Oksiloff (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xxxv and 276.
19 Kalle Pihlainen, "Historians and 'the current situation'," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 20/2 (2016): 144.
20 Ernesto Laclau, *The Rhetorical Foundations of Society* (London: Verso, 2014), 190–1.
21 See, for example, Ibid.
22 Ibid., 8.
23 Ernesto Laclau, "Letter to Aletta," in Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London: Verso, 1990), 160.
24 Ernesto Laclau, "New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time," in Laclau, *New Reflections*, 30–1.
25 Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau, "The Uses of Equality," in *Laclau: A Critical Reader*, eds. Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 336.
26 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001), 100.
27 Ernesto Laclau, "The Impossibility of Society," in Laclau, *New Reflections*, 91–2.
28 Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, 99–100.
29 Ernesto Laclau, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony," in *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (Abingdon: Routledge, 1996), 59.
30 Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, x.
31 Ernesto Laclau, "Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?" in Laclau, *Emancipation(s)* (London: Verso, 2007), 44.
32 Mark Devenney, "Ethics and Politics in Discourse Theory," in *Laclau: A Critical Reader*, eds. Critchley and Marchart, 125.
33 Ernesto Laclau, "Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity," in Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, 35.
34 Ernesto Laclau, "Glimpsing the Future," in *Laclau: A Critical Reader*, eds. Critchley and Marchart, 322.
35 Laclau, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony," 59.
36 In rhetorical terms, Laclau described how operations of sedimentation and reactivation involved:

> the movement from metonymy to metaphor, from contingent articulation to essential belonging. The name – of a social movement, of an ideology, of a political institution – is always the metaphorical crystallization of contents whose analogical links result from concealing the contingent contiguity of their metonymical origins. Conversely, the dissolution of a hegemonic formation involves the reactivation of that contingency: the return from a 'sublime' metaphoric fixation to a humble metonymic association.
>
> Laclau, Rhetorical Foundations, 63

37 Uwe Steiner, *Walter Benjamin: An Introduction to his Work and Thought*, trans. Michael Winkler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 149. See also Friedlander, *Walter Benjamin*, 157. Benjamin explained:

> The Copernican revolution in historical perception is as follows. Formerly it was thought that a fixed point had been found in 'what has been', and one saw the present engaged in tentatively concentrating the forces of knowledge on this ground. Now this relation is to be overturned, and what has been is to become the dialectical reversal – the flash of awakened consciousness. Politics attains primacy over history. The facts become something that just now first happened to us; to establish them is the affair of memory. Indeed awakening is the great exemplar of memory.
>
> Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project, ed. Rolf Tiedemann*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 388–9.

38 Historicism should be understood here as a practice that attempts to relate phenomena to the specific contextual particularities of their time. Benjamin argued that in seeking continuity between historical contexts, historicism denied the revolutionary potential of the present. It sanctified the actual present order as the rational outcome of history, making those who have ruled into those who have been vindicated. As Friedlander wrote about the assumed 'neutrality' that governed ideas about the practice of historicism: 'Whoever benefits from such passive or neutral relation to the past is always those who rule in the present'. See Friedlander, *Walter Benjamin*, 158–9.

39 See Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations: Walter Benjamin*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), 245–55. In Theses 5–7, Benjamin radically questions the concept of historicism. Theses 8–11 bring about the break with the traditional concept of progress. For further discussion of Benjamin's critique of progressivism and historicism, see Stéphane Mosès, *The Angel of History: Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem*, trans. Barbara Harshav, (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2009), 66–7.

40 Hardt and Negri write that:

> The biopolitical production of the multitude . . . tends to mobilise what it shares in common and what it produces in common against the imperial power of global capital. In time, developing its productive figure based on the common, the multitude can move through the Empire and come out the other side, to express itself autonomously and rule itself.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (London: Penguin, 2004), 101. For Badiou's notion of the militant who might have the chance to hold true to an event (and everything that the given event implies) that constitutes a break with the past, see Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001), and *The Rebirth of History*, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2012).

41 Foucault was the most influential thinker who took up Benjamin's legacy, emphasising the importance of ruptures and discontinuities in history and working Nietzsche's ideas about what Foucault sometimes calls 'effective history'. Foucault argued that:

> history serves to show how that-which-is has not always been; i.e., that the things which seem most evident to us are always formed in the confluence of encounters and chances, during the course of a precarious and fragile history. What reason perceives as its necessity, or rather, what different forms of rationality offer as their necessary being, can perfectly well be shown to have a history; and the network of contingencies from which it emerges can be traced. Which is not to say, however, that these forms of rationality were irrational. It means that they reside on a base of human practice and human history; and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made.

See Foucault, "Critical Theory/Intellectual History," in *Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), 37.

42 Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 252–3. As a way of illustrating what Benjamin was saying, consider the reply that Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos gave when he was asked what the Zapatistas wanted: 'To open a crack in history'. See Alex Khasnabish, *Zapatistas: Rebellion from the Grassroots to the Global* (London: Zed Books, 2010), 199.

43 Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', Appendix A, 255.

44 István Rév, *Retroactive Justice: Prehistory of Post-Communism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 23–4.

45 Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 141–2.

46 Karl P. Benziger, *Imre Nagy, Martyr of the Nation: Contested History, Legitimacy, and Popular Memory in Hungary* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), 48–9.
47 Benziger, *Imre Nagy*, 82–3.
48 For a discussion of how the 1956 event was reported by communist regimes beyond Hungary, see János M. Rainer and Katalin Somlai, eds., *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Soviet Bloc Countries: Reactions and Repercussions* (Budapest: The Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security, 2007).
49 Benziger, *Imre Nagy*, 84–9.
50 Rév, *Retroactive Justice*, 33.
51 Benziger, *Imre Nagy*, 104.
52 To reinforce the points being made using a related example, in Prague on 21 August 1988 activists in the 'Czech Children' movement, students and thousands more citizens marked the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion that had crushed the Prague Spring in 1968. Although Charter 77 signatories had often used the anniversary as a symbolically resonant moment to call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, the gathering in Václav Square was the first time in twenty years that a public gesture of national solidarity had been seen on such a scale. By the time that the crowd had walked to the Old Town Square, where people shouted slogans and sung the Czechoslovak anthem, an estimated ten thousand had taken to the streets, and some fifteen hundred had signed a petition that called for free elections, respect for human rights and the departure of Soviet troops. Moreover, two main organisers of the demonstration – Tomá Dvorák and Hana Marvanová – persuaded people that they should continue to meet each month to discuss ideas and provide a visible opposition to communist rule. Major public gatherings took place in Václav Square on 28 October 1988 (marking the seventieth anniversary of democratic Czechoslovakia's independence) and again on 21 August 1989. The anniversary of Jan Palach's self-immolation in Prague in January 1969 was also commemorated with a week-long series of demonstrations, some of which turned confrontational when police decided to arrest opposition leaders and beat up activists. See Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution*, 238–41.
53 Rév, *Retroactive Justice*, 34.
54 Ibid., 33.
55 Benziger, *Imre Nagy*, 102.
56 Ibid., 189–90.
57 Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution*, 210–11. For further discussion of reburial as a political act – albeit reburials performed by right-wing Flemish nationalists – see Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts, "Haunting Pasts: Time and Historicity as Constructed by the Argentine Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Radical Flemish Nationalists," *Social History* 34/4 (2009): 391–408.
58 Rainer, *Imre Nagy*, 192; Dan Stone, *Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 222. For a detailed discussion of Nagy's place within Hungarian memory politics, see Benziger, Imre Nagy, ch. 7. Stone also discusses how Hungary's memory politics continue to be contested into the twenty-first century. On the left some still use the language of anti-fascism, recalling the arrival of the Soviets in wartime as a liberation from the suffering imposed by fascism. Alternatively, right-wing populist and radical-right groups have sought to appropriate 1956 as the forerunner of their preferred vision of post-communist, authoritarian, nationalistic – and openly antisemitic – politics. See Stone, Goodbye to All That?, 277–9.
59 The phrase 'past-presencing' is taken from Sharon Macdonald, *Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 12–13, passim.
60 Josh MacPhee and Favianna Rodriguez, eds., *Reproduce Y Rebélate / Reproduce and Revolt* (Brooklyn: Soft Skull Press, 2008), 16. Riniart.org archives the work of Rini Templeton, an artist and activist who spent 25 years organising around Chicano and Indigenous rights, against U.S. imperialism and in solidarity with Mexican and Central American social movements. Templeton would travel to sites of protest and produce graphics that could quickly be distributed on flyers, posters, newsletters and pamphlets.

61 See Pnina Werbner, Martin Webb and Kathryn Spellman-Poots, eds., *The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest: The Arab Spring and Beyond* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 1–27. This is not to argue that the historical perspective should be seen as having special authority, explanatory insight or affective potential generally. On the contrary, there are any number of cases where the habit of making contemporary events intelligible by positioning them against a putative historical context stops us from appreciating their specificity and novelty – they come to be seen, in Martin Davies's words, as simply the latest iteration of the 'same old thing'. Hamid Dabashi, for example, explains how global media organisations in 2011 habitually invited Middle East specialists to provide 'historical background by area experts', the effect of which was to assimilate understandings of the protests back into the familiar realm of the already known, tying the various revolts to 'unending historical antecedents'. Commentators and analysts interpreting the revolts consistently drew on long-trusted paradigms of colonialism and postcolonialism, invoking a repertoire of terms ('Islam and the West', 'the West versus the Rest') that manufactured the Arab world as 'constitutionally backward, congenitally vile, violent and incompetent'. Academic and journalistic discourses about the Arab Spring, including ones that were ostensibly sympathetic to revolutionary forces, all too easily fell into a trap of reproducing Eurocentric and Orientalist cliches about 'Arab exceptionalism' and 'Arab awakening'.

The challenge therefore, according to Dabashi, is to discard these old paradigms and to read the uprisings in 'the language that they exude and not in the vocabularies we have inherited'. Thinking and writing about the Arab Spring, he argues, has to express itself in a 'new language of revolt', one that constitutes a new regime of knowledge, assuming forms that are worthy of the occupiers of Tahrir and other squares. What is significant here is the way that he explains the uprisings of 2011 in terms of Arab people's retrieval of 'cosmopolitan worldliness', a quality that he maintains was 'always already there' but which had been suppressed by the related forces of domestic tyranny and globalised imperialism. Dabashi had worked out his concept of cosmopolitan worldliness across a series of studies, using it as an alternative to colonially informed conceptions of a world habitually identified as the Arab and Muslim World, the Orient, or the Middle East and North Africa. In his reading, the revolts of 2011 constituted a retrieval of organic cosmopolitan cultures that had been formed as a result of specific historical (and imperial) experiences: from the Abbasids in the eighth century to the Ottomans through into the nineteenth century. As he explained: 'By cosmopolitan worldliness, then, I mean the actual worldly experiences that have historically existed but that have been overridden and camouflaged by the heavy ideological autonormativity of "the West"'. See Hamid Dabashi, *The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism* (London: Zed Books, 2012), 9–11, 15, 29, 63, 75, 78–9, 114–6.

62 Werbner, Webb and Spellman-Poots, *Political Aesthetics*, 16.

63 Christopher Pinney, "Gandhi, Camera, Action! India's 'August Spring'," in *Political Aesthetics*, eds. Werbner, Webb and Spellman-Poots, 177–192. Images of Gandhi were also visible in Tahrir Square and other protest sites in 2011.

64 Pinney, "Gandhi, Camera, Action!," 184–5, and Martin Webb, "Short Circuits: The Aesthetics of Protest, Media and Martyrdom in Indian Anti-corruption Activism," in *Political Aesthetics*, eds. Werbner, Webb and Spellman-Poots, 215.

65 Webb, "Short Circuits," 205.

66 Ibid., 205.

67 Ibid., 199.

68 Ibid., 201–2.

69 Christine Garlough, "Vernacular Culture and Grassroots Activism: Non-Violent Protest and Progressive Ethos at the 2011 Wisconsin Labour Rallies," in *Political Aesthetics*, eds. Werbner, Webb and Spellman-Poots, 264. In 1911 Wisconsin had been the first U.S. state to pass workers' compensation protection; in 1932 it enacted measures for unemployment compensation.

70 https://artforsocialchangetoolkit.wordpress.com/history/san-francisco-diggers/ accessed 21/11/16.

71 https://diggers2012.wordpress.com/about/ accessed 21/11/16.
72 www.runnymede.community/ accessed 29/2/16.
73 www.runnymede.community/ and https://diggers2012.wordpress.com/about/ and www.diggers.org/diggers-ENGLISH-1649/Declaration_from_the_poor_oppressed.pdf accessed 29/2/16. The Diggers2012 also have a facebook page www.facebook.com/diggers2012
74 https://diggers2012.wordpress.com/ accessed 21/11/16; www.runnymede.community/three-points/ accessed 21/11/16; see https://diggers2012.wordpress.com/links/ accessed 21/11/16 for a link to www.thelandmagazine.org.uk/articles/short-history-enclosure-britain accessed 21/11/16
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78 www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/guy-standing/let-there-be-runnymede-left accessed 21/11/16; https://wwolfing.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/land-freedom-gathering-at-runnymede-london/ accessed 21/11/16; WWOOF UK News 238 (spring 2013): 10–11 www.wwoof.org.uk/sites/wwoof.org.uk/files/WWOOF_newsletter_238.pdf accessed 21/11/16.
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81 www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6twrDNomG4 accessed 21/11/16.
82 www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/anthony-barnett/from-king-john-to-baron-bragg-celebrating-magna-carta accessed 21/11/16. See here for link to Radio Series. www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04y6wdt/episodes/guide accessed 21/11/16.
83 Peter Linebaugh, *The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberty and Commons for All* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); www.democracynow.org/2015/6/15/from_the_vault_peoples_historian_on accessed 21/11/16.
84 Linebaugh also discusses how provisions outlined in the Magna Carta are violated in Guantánamo Bay in an interview he gives to Amy Goodman in 2005 for Democracy Now! For an interview with Linebaugh, see www.democracynow.org/2016/4/29/historian_peter_linebaugh_on_the_incomplete, accessed 21/11/16.
85 www.democracynow.org/2015/6/15/what_do_800_year_old_magna accessed 21/11/16 and www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/video-magna-carta
86 The others were Michaela Brennan, Anthony Morgan, D'Real Graham and Donald Roberts. Video was posted on Phoenix Rising: Journal of Uprising and Evolutionary Action, June 17, 2015 http://phoenixrainbow23.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/a-juneteenth-message-from-american.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+blogspot/ZDStg+%28Phoenix+Rising%29 accessed 21/11/16; and on Peter Linebaugh and Anthony Barnett, "Magna Carta 800th anniversary: three contrasting videos," Open Democracy June 19, 2015. www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/video-magna-carta accessed 21/11/16.
87 The long delay in achieving justice in this case reflected the fact that after Kenyan independence it had suited both Britain and the new Kenyan government to put behind them what had been done in the war for liberation. In Kenya, public commemoration of the nationalist war was minimal. The Kenyan government's preference for forgetting the Mau Mau revolt was signalled by its banning of all organisations that were linked to Mau Mau until 2002. President Daniel arap Moi's regime even threatened Caroline Elkins in a bid to obstruct the research she was doing for her book on the last years of colonial rule in Kenya: *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005). See Witness Statement of Caroline Macy Elkins, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Ndiku Mutua and 4 others and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1 April 2011, para. 14.
88 Greet Kershaw, *Mau Mau from Below* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), 219–27.
89 Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, passim.
90 David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 2005), 4; Bernard Porter, "How Did They Get Away with It?," *London Review of Books* 27/5 (2005): 3–6.
91 David Anderson, "Mau Mau in the High Court and the 'Lost' British Empire Archives: Colonial Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle?," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39/5 (2011): n. 3, 714.
92 Caroline Elkins, "Alchemy of Evidence: Mau Mau, the British Empire, and the High Court of Justice," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39/5 (2011): 732.
93 Elkins "Alchemy of Evidence," 733.
94 In addition to allegations made in parliament by Labour opposition MPs, newspapers such as *The Observer* and the left-wing weekly *Tribune* publicised British crimes in Kenya. Also, occasional freedom fighter memoirs were published shortly after the insurgency. See for example: Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, *"Mau Mau" Detainee: The Account by a Kenyan African of his Experiences in Detention Camps, 1953–1960* (London; Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1963); Karari Njama and Donald Barnett, *Mau Mau from Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt* (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1966); Waruhiu Itote, *Mau Mau in Action* (Nairobi: Transafrica, 1979).

95 Suppressing Mau Mau is covered only briefly in texts by John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988); David George Boyce – who described Britain's handling of the uprising as 'firm and at times severe' – *Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775–1997* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 207; Nicholas White, *Decolonisation: The British Experience Since 1945* (Harlow: Longman, 1999); Frank Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind* (London: Frank Cass, 2002); Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Martin Lynn, ed. *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and Ronald Hyam – who details what he sees as peculiarly abhorrent Mau Mau oathing ceremonies, but says only briefly and in the passive mode that '[b]eatings and forced labour took place in detention camps', *Britain's Declining Empire: the Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 189–90, 192. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, eds., *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2015) barely discusses Kenya or Mau Mau.

Jeremy Black, in *Contesting History: Narratives of Public History* (London: Bloomsbury 2014), writes in relation to British counter-insurgencies in Kenya (and Malaya): 'In each case, the nature of counter-insurrectionary warfare was condemned without due regard to the more general character of such conflict in the period' (135). Moreover, he continues, and referring directly to *Britain's Gulag* 'there was a widespread failure to devote sufficient attention to the deadly violence used by the rebels, violence that was generally directed against other members of the colonial population' (136). Black also claims that in resisting and then overcoming the Mau Mau uprising, 'the British benefited from a wide-ranging social reform policy, including land reform' (136). This, he says, proved significant 'as an aspect of winning hearts and minds' (136). Later in the book, Black complains that 'Kenyan history is presented without an attempt to explain why colonial rule in a country divided by tribalism also brought advantages that led some to co-operate' (193–4).

96 Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, x.

97 For the importance of the destroyed and missing documents, see Witness Statement of Caroline Macy Elkins, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Ndiku Mutua and 4 Others and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 February 2011, paras. 144–8.

98 David Anderson, "Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and the Discovery of Kenya's 'Migrated Archive'," *History Workshop Journal* 80/1 (2015): 147.

99 Ibid., 155.

100 Ibid., 151.

101 Contingency played a crucial role in the Foreign Secretary's sudden commitment to "transparency" in 2011, when he promised to make the migrated records in Hanslope publically available. The existence of these records had been concealed for almost fifty years, and without a coincidence of fortunate circumstances (or unfortunate from the FCO's point of view), they could easily have remained so. Anderson explained that from at least the late 1990s, all Kenya's historians who wrote about Mau Mau knew that the British had destroyed some key documents and retained others. Historians knew that there were major gaps in the colonial records in London and Nairobi, and in the documents that they were able to read they found a note written on a British file in 1967 that confirmed how the departing colonial administration had brought papers back with them to London from Kenya. But the location of the missing files was unknown. By chance, Anderson was tipped off in 2003 by author Colin Murray that there were vast deposits of colonial records at Hanslope Park. Murray happened to be co-writing a book about Lesoto with a former colonial official whose contacts in the FCO had led him to the closed archive. Still, when Leigh Day's lawyers requested in October 2006 that all withheld documents relating to the suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion should be made available to them, government solicitors responded that all such papers had already been released to the National Archives. This (false) assurance

that there were no hidden files was repeated on many subsequent occasions, both in response to Leigh Day and historians making enquiries under Freedom of Information legislation. See Huw Bennett, "Soldiers in the Court Room: The British Army's Part in the Kenya Emergency under the Legal Spotlight," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39/5 (2011): 717–30.

102 Between February and March 2011, before Lord Guildford made a statement in the House of Lords acknowledging the missing files' existence, Anderson and a team of graduate historians examined the newly 'found' files for the prosecution. See Anderson, "Mau Mau in the High Court," 709.

103 Witness Statement of Caroline Macy Elkins, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Ndiku Mutua and 4 Others and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1 April 2011, para. 23. See also her later Witness Statement, 25 May 2012, passim.

104 The Honourable Mr. Justice McCombe, 'Approved Judgment', Mutua and four others and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, 5 October 2012, paras. 48, 50–2, 55, 86, 95, 115. The Approved Judgment excluded Susan Ngondi's claim from the case, see paras. 161–2.

105 William Hague, Statement to Parliament on settlement of Mau Mau claims, June 6, 2013, www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims accessed 16/5/16.

106 Anderson, "Mau Mau in the High Court," 706.

107 Mr. Justice McCombe, "Approved Judgment," para. 117.

108 See this book, Chapter 3.

109 See "Mau Mau torture victims to receive compensation – Hague," *BBC News*, June 6, 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22790037 accessed 24/1/17; and "Mau Mau Lawsuit due to Begin at High Court," *The Guardian*, 22 May 2016, www.theguardian.com/law/2016/may/22/mau-mau-kenya-compensation-lawsuit-high-court, accessed 24/1/17.

110 Mr. Justice McCombe, 'Approved Judgment', paras. 51 and 56.

111 Katharina Niemeyer 'Introduction', in *Media and Nostalgia: Yearning for Past, Present and Future*, ed. Katharina Niemeyer (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 10 and 18.

5

WEAPONS OF WAR

The power of the poster

Posters as weapons and symbolic sites of struggle[1]

The autonomy and coherence of the imagined self, whether it be of an individual or a community, is strengthened through negation. Agonistic "others" perpetuate the identity of those who locate them as oppositional, and this coalescing against outsiders is an effective way of establishing unity among communities of otherwise disparate people.[2] Encounters with an oppositional "other" and representations or memories of such conflict thus have an ontological role; they help construct, shape and perpetuate self-other definitions, and they create space within which communities are imagined.[3] The role of past-talk in various forms as a means of creating and contesting group and state imaginaries is magnified and intensified in situations of physical, ontological or existential conflict. In addition to the ontological function inherent in historicisations of conflict, the socio-political commemoration of massacres, wars and the deaths of martyrs in various forms are often employed to encourage resistance, protest and participation in political or military action. Such historicisations utilise the dead as a renegotiation of the present: through such past-talk a temporal-ethical space is constructed within which a present and a future can be imagined or shaped. Often in the space that emerges from conflict, 'art talks back to power, subverts its authority and proposes alternative, oppositional ways of thinking and behaviour . . . art engages in the construction of new symbols, counter myths, and ultimately, new meanings'.[4]

The act of remembering is increasingly taking a visual form.[5] Images as a form of past-talk (particularly those outside traditional media) contribute to the "visual construction of the social field"; they influence socio-political discourses, perform identities, stand as witness, demarcate territories, set agendas, reflect and constitute collective beliefs, mobilise, (dis)empower, (de)legitimise and are part of the complex entanglement of the knowledge-power nexus.[6] The visual depiction of conflict is too vast and complex a subject to be dealt with in a single chapter, and is also

beyond the focus of this book.[7] Here we explore the articulation of past-focused narratives in posters and wall murals, the multiple roles such images play in mobilising public support for, or opposition to, acts of violence, as well as constructing collective identities that coalesce around an opposition to a defined "other". It is not our intention in this chapter to use posters to 'flesh out . . . different kinds of history' of various conflicts.[8] Instead, we want to explore how and why they engage with and visualise the past as part of current political strategies and future imaginations: posters as 'a portable image' of a desired world.[9] We read posters as evidence of the diverse political, religious and ideological discourses employed by different groups involved in particular conflicts as 'symbolic sites of struggle over meaning and political discourse'.[10]

Posters can be used as "political advertising" by the powerful; they work to control the symbolic world, to reinforce and replicate the conditions under which they maintain hegemony. Yet images can also be employed by the disenfranchised as 'tactical attempts to disrupt, however momentarily, the (un/conscious, ideological, hegemonic) *strategies* of those in power': they can function as 'an empowering agent, enabling citizens to perform a meta-narrative of political agency'; they can provide a voice, a means of resistance; they can function as political weapons.[11] All political posters, however, intend 'to seduce, to exhort, to sell, to educate, to convince, to appeal';[12] they all demonstrate 'the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist'.[13] As such we argue that the distinction between propagandistic or activist posters simply reflect the ideological viewpoint of the viewer rather than reflecting any difference in aesthetics, function, intention, content or form.[14]

Particularly in the case of revolution or multi-party conflicts, but also to an extent in instances of colonial occupation, power is not simply the preserve of "the state" and embedded in dominant discourses. Maasri argues that in the context of the Lebanese civil war – and we believe this extends to the other situations we discuss – political posters 'reveal the political factions' continual attempts to dominate the field of discursivity and construct a "regime of truth", as part of their hegemonic struggle to win the consent of their own communities and maintain dominance'; they are 'symbolic sites of hegemonic struggle'.[15] Rather than speak of hegemony as a single dominant discourse that is countered by oppositional discourses, Maasri argues that in the Lebanese civil war there was a multiplicity of hegemonic formations which were each attempting to articulate and therefore constitute their own regimes of truth. She employs the notion of hegemony as outlined by Laclau and Mouffe, whereby 'there can be a variety of hegemonic nodal points' or 'hegemonic articulations' that are operating within a specific socio-political space – political posters are therefore 'inscribed in the hegemonic articulations of political communities'.[16]

We have chosen to look at a selection of political posters from the Lebanese civil war, Iranian revolutionary movements, and organisations calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state free from Israeli occupation to illustrate how the marking of a particular temporal moment can be interwoven into larger narratives which

consciously work to shape future realities; to encourage resistance and solidarity; to imagine alternative collective and individual identities; and to recruit political and military support and participation.[17] Posters and murals in Iran, Lebanon, Palestinian refugee camps and the Occupied Territories have shaped not only the urban environment but also discursive, politico-religious and cultural environments. Just as acts of violence and military engagement seek to exert dominance over physical geo-political territory, posters play a role in the symbolic appropriation of space in an ongoing battle of persuasion and the articulation of identities and legitimisation. They function as agitational images, reflecting a 'delirium of violence and identity' occasioned by revolution, civil war and resistance to colonial oppression and occupation.[18]

In periods of conflict when social media and forms of mass communication have shut down, posters provide a cheap and effective way of disseminating information. Although they often have a 'fleeting life span', they have a 'propensity to be remembered and preserved'.[19] Posters also provide a means of demarcating territory, claiming a space and place. In Bosnia there were poster wars in which hostile ideological groups tore down the posters of their rivals and tried to dominate the best locations with their own posters and message.[20] Similarly, posters produced by the various factions involved in the Lebanese civil war delineated the zones of Beirut under their control, while graffiti and posters in Palestine counter the Israeli state's categorisation of Palestinians as moveable, as not belonging in their homeland, as not having a place of their own. They therefore act as a form of territorialisation; they function as polysemic affirmations of community; they debate tradition, envision competing futures, record historical events and inscribe memory.[21] The rather 'fugitive nature' of posters, just like that of graffiti and stencils, allows them to act as 'an intervention in a relationship of power' and encroach on hegemonic public spaces.[22] In places of extreme censorship, they provide the means for people to speak and be heard; they circumvent the denial of voice. For example, graffiti, even if it is only visible for a few hours before being removed, provides a form of expression that documents and intervenes in relations of domination.[23] Posters, in situations of conflict, can therefore also be an act of defiance, resistance and civil disobedience. Inscribing graffiti or putting up posters can be a 'performative element in a rite of passage into the resistance', as well as a means of defiantly reacting to extensive surveillance.[24] In an extreme example, posters were put up in the infamous Sniper Alley in Sarajevo during the conflict despite the fact that those posting them would be in the sights of the besieging gunmen.[25] The presence of posters and graffiti can further mobilise other people in an area to undertake similar risky actions, to "write on the walls".[26]

The symbolic power of the martyr

The martyr and the notion of blood sacrifice is an established icon in the political, military and national lexicography of not only transnational liberationist, anti-colonial and revolutionary discourses, but also the national rhetoric of more

established European and American nations. Although the act of martyrdom can slip between being read as 'a heroic act of resistance' for the nation and a more consecrated sacrifice, ultimately, in the majority of politico-military contexts it is the fight to 'liberate national territory' or to 'guarantee the life of the nation' and not entry to paradise that is predominant.[27] As Anderson notes, 'exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars, and holocausts' are part of the nation's biography when 'remembered/forgotten as "our own"'.[28]

The tradition of the poster commemorating political martyrs is long: the left-wing journalist and 'murdered hero of the French Revolution', Jean-Paul Marat was commemorated in a number of engravings that circulated throughout France after his execution in 1793, reinforcing his reputation as a martyr and inventing him as a secular saint. Similarly, posters were published commemorating Irish Fenians seeking independence from colonial British rule who were prosecuted and executed by the British state, for example, the Manchester Martyrs, Allen, Larkin and O'Brien.[29] Indeed, the Manchester Martyrs are still remembered today on a number of wall murals in Northern Ireland painted in the context of the conflict between Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries and the British state. Such murals focus on the campaign to bring the remains of the martyrs back to "Irish soil" and are designed to historicise the late twentieth-century conflict as simply the latest incarnation of Irish resistance against British colonial oppression.[30]

However, within the predominantly Euro-American-dominated discourse of terror, the term *martyr* is generally conflated with suicide-bomber and marked as Islamic. Yet, as Bharucha cogently argues, 'the relationship between suicide-bombing and religion is at best tenuous, if non-existent'.[31] The leading instigator of 75 of the 188 global suicide bombings and attacks that happened between 1980 and 2011 was the Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, whose members, although from Hindu families, were themselves 'adamantly opposed to religion'.[32] Instead, what virtually all suicide-terrorist or insurgent campaigns have in common is not only 'a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel liberal democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland', but they also occur in a context of a military asymmetry between the protagonists and their adversaries manifested not only in superior weaponry but also a greater capacity to control civilian populations in occupied territory on the part of their opponents.[33] This is not to say that religion is not employed by such groups as part of their recruitment strategy, simply that religion is not a primary motivating factor or explanation for such actions. For example, although in a Palestinian context, martyrdom has, in recent years, gradually become more consecrated and, framed within a more religious discourse, it is still fundamentally seen as a heroic act of anti-colonial, anti-occupation resistance; that is, as a means of facilitating the independence of the Palestinian nation and not as a means of gaining access to paradise.[34]

Similarly, interpretations of suicide attacks as evidence of a 'necropolitics' or a sacrificial 'culture of death' emanating from an unreformed, totalitarian Islam are not only banal, reductive assertions, but their emphasis on the concept of sacrifice frames suicide attacks, according to Asad, with a significance that is in fact derived

from a Christian and post-Christian, not Islamic, tradition.[35] In contrast, acts of martyrdom narrated within a "liberationalist" or nationalist framework, including many of those discussed as follows, are instead frequently conceptualised as 'life-generating moment[s] of agency'; as 'guarantee[ing] the life of the nation'; as evidence of the dead being 'fully alive'.[36] And as Sana Yusif Muhaydli, a member of the secular Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, asserted in her videoed testimonial made just before her suicide attack against occupying Israeli forces in Lebanon, 'I am not dead, but alive among you. Sing, dance, realise my dreams. Don't cry; don't be sad for me, but exult and laugh for a world in which there are heroes'.[37] Martyrdom provides an opportunity for rebirth or renewal, a chance for the nation and the people to be free:

> [s]elf-sacrifice, within the context of revolutionary action, is an expression of the very highest understanding of life, and of the struggle to make life worth of a human being. The love of life for a person becomes a love for the life of his people's masses and his rejection that their life persists in being full of continuous misery, suffering and hardship.[38]

The recollection of martyrdom in times and places of intense conflict conceals and dissimulates death as an all-too-frequent part of reality: it functions as a form of collective self-defence against daily devastation and suffering by assimilating death 'to eternity and the infinite'.[39] But while the martyrdom poster can function as an obituary occupying 'the place deserted by the person who has died', the commemorative aspect of it is not limited to a means of coping with the devastating loss of life conflict engenders.[40] The image of a martyr on a poster or mural functions as 'image munitions' in the symbolic conflict, which often accompanies a more violent military interaction.[41] It can be an assertion of politico-military hegemony – an articulation of agency, a means of self-representation in a heroic rather than passive frame; it articulates and promulgates sectarian, national identities; resists hegemonic representation; disseminates political ideologies; and encourages self-surveillance and conformity.[42]

Iranian revolutionary movements

As argued in Chapter 1, the mourning rituals of *Ashura* and the Shi'ite soteriological concept of salvation have provided a framework for the consolidation of hegemonic discourses, identities and dominant socio-political institutions, but they have also provided a vocabulary for the expression or articulation of dissent or protest among Shi'ite communities.[43] *Ashura* and the martyrdom of Hussein is interpreted by many Shi'ites as a symbol of passionate and heroic struggle against injustice and tyranny, as well as resistance against oppression. Disenfranchised, marginalised and oppressed Shi'ite communities have therefore used the processions that are often part of the mourning traditions of *Ashura* as a means for articulating dissent. For example, they provided the catalyst for revolutionary movements throughout the

nineteenth century in Iran, protests against the Saudi government in 1979, uprisings in Bahrain in the 1990s, clashes during the Lebanese wars including those against the Israeli occupation, demonstrations in Palestine against Israeli occupation and anti-Shah rebellions in pre-revolutionary Iran.[44]

In the years leading up to the Iranian revolution in 1979, political imagery played a huge role in contesting the violence, oppression and propaganda of the ruling Pahlavi regime by subverting the ideas and images of the Shah's authority. In doing so it articulated a new collective ideology that offered a redefinition of socio-political values. In this primarily 'pictorial revolution' posters, graffiti, murals, banners, songs and slogans were key to the dissemination of a vision that challenged the authority of the state and imagined political liberation and national emancipation free from the influence of western colonial powers.[45] While the revolutionary iconography combined the sacred and the profane, the national and international, the modern and traditional, the past and the present, the 'relentless resuscitation of the shared sacred history', specifically the martyrdom of Imam Hussein and his extended family by the forces of the Umayyad caliph Yazid I at Karbala in 680 C.E. (61 A.H.), was fundamental to the delegitimisation and undermining of the political status quo.[46] The politicisation and mobilisation of this historical event, together with the acts of remembrance and mourning associated with the martyrdom of Hussein, was used by Ayatollah Khomeini to inspire and mobilise support for the revolution.[47]

The Iranian revolutionary aesthetic was, however, similar to revolutionary culture and anti-imperialist, national liberation rhetoric around the world; it was multifarious, complex and intertextual – combining an international, revolutionary, modernist graphic, anti-colonial imagery, socialist realism, and Soviet iconography with the symbolism of Shi'ism and the Shi'ite struggle against oppression as manifested in the *Ashura* narrative.[48] For example, a revolutionary poster from 1979 commemorating the role of Zeinab (daughter of Imam Ali and sister of Imam Hussein) in post-Karbala events has, in a modernist aesthetic, depicted her in white silhouette, arm raised, fist clenched, smashing the crown of Yazid, while contained within her silhouette is a crowd of women, wearing the chador with fists raised and the slogan, *Zeinab, oh spokesperson of Ali*.[49] This slogan refers to Zeinab's assumption of the leadership of the captive women and children of Hussein's extended family, and by default therefore, also of the nascent Shi'ite community, until the fourth Imam Zayn al-Abidin recovered from the illness that had prevented him from fighting during the battle of Karbala. While held prisoner by Yazid, Zeinab defiantly spoke out against his tyranny, thus maintaining the message of Hussein to fight against against oppression. The women of Iran are therefore urged to be as steadfast as Zeinab, to actively oppose and speak out against tyranny and thus smash the crown of the Pahlavi Shah, who is by implication the Yazid of the age.[50]

Although Khomeini and other critics of the Iranian state had, since 1963, articulated their struggle against the Shah's regime as a parallel of the Karbala narrative, it was only in the last few months leading up to the 1979 revolution and the departure of the Shah that Iranians were encouraged to emulate Imam Hussein

not only in his steadfast opposition against tyranny but also in their willingness to martyr themselves on the streets of Iranian cities during anti-regime demonstrations.[51] A poster from the period leading up to the revolution, *Ashura: Victory of Blood over the Sword* (1978), reflects such sacrifice, comprising a series of bleeding, disembodied hands, some clenched in defiant fists, some with a single finger pointing upwards indicating the oneness of god, and some making the sign for victory. The blood from the severed hands has run down and in turn cut through the sword below: reflecting the Shi'ite belief that the sacrifice of the martyr will ultimately lead to triumph against oppressive injustice and evil even in death.[52] Indeed, protesters in the vanguard of the 1978 *Ashura* demonstrations wore symbolic burial shrouds to indicate their readiness for martyrdom at the hands of the bayonets and bullets of the Shah's forces: their traditional re-enaction of the *Ashura* events at Karbala united with a revolutionary agency collapsed past, present and eschatological time as encapsulated by the slogan employed frequently by Ayatollah Khomeini: *every day is Ashura, every land is Karbala*.[53]

The commemoration of revolutionary martyrs features prominently in the posters produced during the revolution. Such an invocation of martyrdom, sanctified within a specifically Shi'ite framework, serves two fundamental functions: providing a means by which the bereaved can cope with their loss, and mobilising support; the martyr achieves a mystical or spiritual union with god.[54] The martyrdom of the demonstrators on 15 *Khordad* (5 June 1963) at the hands of the Shah's forces reoccurs in revolutionary posters. One poster, commissioned by the Islamic Republican Party of the city of Marshad in 1979, features the date written in blood by the hand of a dying martyr that we see sliding down the page.[55] The bloody hand is perhaps the most iconographic and resonant symbol of Shi'ism, representing in the five digits the Shi'ite holy pantheon of Muhammad, Ali, Fatima, Hasan and Hussein, whereas the blood recalls both the martyrdom of Hussein and Abbas Ibn Ali, who remained steadfast against tyranny.[56] Participants in *Ashura* processions frequently hold up their bloody hands in solidarity with the sacrifice of Hussein and to mark the dichotomy between worldly corruption and God's justice. Similarly, demonstrators during the revolution often held aloft their bloodied hands, testifying to the 'revolutionary spirit driven by the Karbala paradigm' and bearing witness to the violence and oppression of the Shah.[57] By recalling this slaughter, revolutionary groups situate themselves not simply within a religious narrative of martyrdom, but they also narrate the revolution as the teleological culmination of earlier revolutionary activities by Iranians, as the end of an inevitable and unfolding process.

More contemporary instances of martyrdom were also commemorated in revolutionary posters. One of the earliest posters to be produced during the revolution commemorated The Black Friday Massacre when on 8 September 1978, following the declaration of martial law, the Iranian military opened fire on protesters in Zhaleh Square, Tehran and about eighty were killed. This massacre has been interpreted as a point of no return for the revolution, radicalising and uniting the protest movements in a shared opposition to the Shah and his willingness to kill unarmed civilians. Such an interpretation was undoubtedly assisted through the

dissemination of posters, the most iconic of which was published in *Aban* 57 (October 1978) and is a vertical series of eight bodies wrapped in white shrouds in the centre of which is a red rifle and the words 'Black Friday' in English and Persian.[58] Another poster published by the Iranian Student's Association of the United States and Canada has the English caption in the top left 'The Shah and his U.S. trained and equipped army gear up for further massacres' and in the bottom right-hand corner 'Shah's "Black Friday" Massacre, Tehran Sept. 8, 1978' over an image of the Shah standing on the bodies of the dead civilians overseeing soldiers who, complete with gas masks, are pointing their machine guns directly at the viewer.[59] Both posters directly responded to, and challenged, the propaganda of the Shah, who through the wide public dissemination of posters of himself, the Crown Prince and Empress Farah attempted to convey the message that for as long as he watched over Iran it would prosper and be safe.[60] A third poster, *Black Friday Massacre*, consists of a map of Zhaleh Square overlaid with red splotches marking the locations where demonstrators were killed. It also includes a bilingual Persian and English text, which employs the rhetoric of martyrdom to exalt the dead, who are described as 'eternal living souls', as victims of the Black Friday Massacre, witnesses to the cruelty of the 'Great Satan (America)' and pioneers of the 'Islamic Justice State'.[61]

Khomeini's remapping of sacred memory and the concomitant contraction of space and time brought about by the transposition of past narratives onto current events and vice versa is also evident in Iranian state visual propaganda with regard to 'The Imposed War' brought about by Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980.[62] The state's rhetorical propaganda cast the conflict as an example of 'a consecrated, cosmic battle between good and evil' with Iraq as the demonic other, the embodiment of worldly evil, and Saddam Hussein as the reincarnation of Yazid.[63] In this epic conflict the Iranian people became the heroic, martyred supporters of Imam Hussein in a new confrontation against oppression and injustice. In thousands of posters, wall murals, billboards and graffiti all across Iran, a variety of collective, performative and pictorial acts of remembrance commemorating sacred history were used to re-awaken a specifically embodied Shi'ite militant memory with the aim of generating a self-sacrificial consciousness. The use of such imagery went beyond securing domestic support for the long-lasting and traumatic conflict, comforting the bereaved and re-affirming a revolutionary identity; it aimed at convincing Iranians that the very existence of their nation, faith, identity and Imam Hussein's steadfast opposition to injustice was dependent on their readiness for martyrdom. The iconography of the visual (and textual) war propaganda positioned the conflict within the Shi'ite framework of salvation, promoting self-sacrificial acts and instructing Iranians to live every day as if it were *Ashura*; that is, to be ready to achieve spiritual salvation through martyrdom. The power inherent in this particularly Shi'ite historicisation of events – their shared 'realm of memory', the means by which signs were transformed into a visualised reality through their tacit cultural knowledge – contributed to Iran's eventual victory and helped assuage the physical and emotional horror and trauma that the Iranian population suffered.[64] This collapse of the present and eschatological time is evident in the poster by Habub

Sadeqi, *The Martyr* (1981), where a blindfolded soldier, bayonetted to death by an Iraqi, is thrust from this finite world to the next, where Imam Hussein and a row of nameless martyrs wait to welcome him to paradise.[65] Kazim Chalipa's *Certitude of Belief* [*Yaqin*] (c. 1981) similarly collapses time. It depicts an Iranian mother holding the body of a martyr while above and behind her are not only rows of headless martyrs ascending to paradise but also the prince of martyrs, Imam Hussein sitting on his white horse. The lower half of the woman's body resembles the symbol of Shi'ite martyrdom (and Iranian national identity), a blood red tulip, and to the left are tulip-wombs endlessly incubating sons who we see on the right have grown up and are marching to war and martyrdom. The image is framed with Qur'anic quotes urging the viewer to 'fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you' (2:190) and 'to him who fighteth in the cause of Allah whether he is slain or gets victory soon shall we give him a reward of great [value]' (4:74).[66]

As outlined in Chapter 1, although in the years since the revolution the Iranian state has attempted, and to some extent succeeded, in exerting a monopoly over the visual representation of politics in the public sphere, oppositional voices are in evidence in art, political protests and the internet.[67] Specifically, artists and protestors have subverted the iconography and symbols employed by the state, particularly the dominant image of the martyr, and used them to challenge state hegemony. For example, Homayoun Askari Sirizi's *Photo Exhibition of a Preconceived War* – a title that plays on the official Iranian name for the Iran-Iraq war, *The Imposed War* – subverts the use of mirrors at martyrs' graves at the Behesht-i Zahra cemetery to suggest that rather than voluntarily seeking martyrdom, people are instead led to their deaths by the state.[68] Similarly, Mahmoud Bakhshi-Moakhar in *Martyrs' Kaleidoscope* covered the unmarked graves of people who were tortured to death by the Iranian state with the Iranian flag, photographed them and then digitally altered the images to resemble the fractured images of kaleidoscopes that feature images of Shi'ite holy places.[69] As a response to the killing of protestors demonstrating against fraud in the 2009 Iranian presidential election by security forces, Bakhshi-Moakhar, in his work *Tulips Rise from the Blood of the Nation's Youth* (2009), subverts not only the Iranian revolutionary and national symbol of the tulip but also the political dogma surrounding the cult of martyrology associated with it.[70] The installation consists of a darkened room where the walls are covered with funeral black cloth and in the middle there are neon lights in the stylised form of tulips.[71] These tulips take the form of the emblem of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a stylised calligraphic inscription of the word Allah in the form of four crescents and a sword that is found in the centre of the Iranian flag. The tulip, in Persian mythology, is said to grow wherever the blood of a martyr is shed, and it is a powerful symbol signifying the sacrifice of the martyr in the Iranian state's narratives of persuasion. Likewise, the title of the exhibit refers to a famous patriotic song that eulogises the sacrifice of the martyr. Bakhshi-Moakhar's work directly engages with the iconographic exploitation of the martyr by the Iranian state; it acts as a counter-point to the ubiquitous presence of posters, murals, billboards, road names, public art and heritage institutions that embody the glorification of the martyr as a form of state propaganda; it is an

"anti-monument" that works to de-mythologise the rhetoric of the regime and in so doing draws attention to the many opponents killed anonymously by the state both on the streets and in prison.[72] As such, it is an example of how the new generation of protest in twenty-first-century Iran has successfully appropriated the iconography and interpretative frameworks of state-sponsored martyrology.

The anti-government, pro-democracy Iranian Green Movement has, among other rhetorical vocabularies, utilised Shi'ite symbolism and the commemoration of martyrs for political purposes. The Green Movement originated in the 2009 Iranian election in which the incumbent President Ahmadinejad was challenged by Mir Houssein Mousavi (and Mehdi Karroubi). It was the first time since the 1979 revolution that counter-hegemonic voices had been heard and seen on such a large scale in Iran. The re-election of Ahmadinejad was perceived by many as a result of electoral fraud and resulted in widespread demonstrations during which many people were killed by state security forces. Among those killed were Sohrab Aarabi, who disappeared during a demonstration on 15 June 2009. His family were told more than a month later that he had died as a result of a gunshot wound to the heart. Neda Agha-Soltan was also martyred in June: a bystander to events rather than a participant in a demonstration, she was shot on the street on 20 June 2009. Very quickly their images and those of later martyrs became not only iconic symbols of the movement and the call for democracy, but also motivated ongoing support for the continuing protests.[73] The images of those killed by the security forces were prominent on digital and physical flyers and posters calling for days of action and/or mass demonstrations, both during the 2009–10 demonstrations and those in 2011.[74] For example, many posters advertising and commemorating the Green Movement protest organised for 16 *Azar* 1388 (7 December 2009) prominently featured images of Neda and Sohrab and other martyrs of the protests.[75] The 16th of *Azar* was traditionally celebrated in the commemorative calendar of the post-revolutionary Iranian state as University Student Day and commemorated the killing by the Shah's security forces in 1953 of three students who were protesting against the Shah at the University of Tehran. By organising anti-government protests on this date and using images of young martyrs killed during the 2009 protests, the Green Movement effectively co-opted the revolutionary potential of the earlier pre-revolution, anti-Shah demonstrations and moreover, conflated Ahmadinejad's undemocratic regime with that of the Shah.[76] Not only do some of the posters include photographs of martyrs killed on the street or in prison during the 2009 demonstrations, but in their captions they specifically urge their fellow citizens to follow the lead of the martyrs who have died: one poster includes images of twenty-four martyrs and says '16th Azar – Continue the way of the martyr – Green Movement'; another with sixteen photographs says '16 guides for the sake of 16 Azar'. This positioning of the martyr as a guide or leader also recalls Ayatollah Khomeini's description of the child martyr Muhammad Hussein Fahmideh as 'our leader', literally 'way-guide'.[77] The Green Movement therefore appropriated the rhetorical message of the regime that figured the martyr as an example to be emulated in defending both faith and nation.

The co-option of the vocabulary of the state by the Green Movement subverts the rhetoric of the regime and creates a complex intertextuality. For example, just as traditional *Ashura* processions were co-opted by anti-Shah demonstrators in street protests leading up to the 1979 revolution, a large demonstration was organised by the Green Movement a few weeks after the 16 *Azar* protests to coincide with *Ashura* that year. The posters for this event feature references to the Shi'ite holy pantheon of Muhammad, Ali, Fatima, Hussein and Hasan, including the symbol of a raised hand palm outwards. In many of these posters two fingers of the hand are painted green, the colour not only of Islam but also of the Green Movement. There are also direct references to the battle of Karbala, through the presence of white horses, images of the shrines and mosques of Imam Hussein and Abbas in Karbala, and raised spears.[78] Many of the posters combine traditional Shi'ite symbols such as the raised palm and/or the innovation *ya Hussein* with images of those killed in earlier demonstrations in 2009. A series of posters promoting or commemorating the *Ashura* demonstration in 2009 also played on the fact that presidential candidate and leader of the Green Movement Mir Hussein Mousavi shares a name with Imam Hussein, captioning their images with the phrase "*ya Hussein, Mir Hussein*" further conflating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein and his fight against oppression with the activities of the Green Movement.[79] In 2011, when there was a renewed series of protests by the Green Movement, again iconic revolutionary dates were chosen for demonstrations. The 22nd of *Bahman* was the day the Shah fled Iran in 1979, and it is traditionally a day on which supporters of the Islamic Republic demonstrate their support for the regime. In 2011 the Green Movement organised counter pro-democracy protests. Again, some of the posters featured images of the martyred Neda.[80]

Martyrdom and massacre in Lebanon

Martyrdom, and particularly the visual depiction of martyrs for various socio-political purposes, is not something specific to Shi'ite communities or to those who explicitly interweave their politico-military ideologies with the vocabulary of religion. Martyr posters proliferated among all factions (religious and secular) during the Lebanese civil war, and they served a variety of socio-political functions: identity creation, the demarcation of spatialities, recruitment, political promotion and commemoration.[81] As with the Iranian posters and murals, the aesthetic of posters varied: those produced by left-wing factions employed the symbols of popular resistance and revolutionary armed struggle seen in political posters employed in other anti-imperialist movements in Latin America and Africa, including the preponderance of the heroic guerrilla armed with an AK-47, the clenched fist and pop-art graphics.[82] This diffusion of iconography was facilitated by transnational networks of political alliance among revolutionary, anti-colonial, and liberationist movements.[83] More specifically, the presence of Palestinian refugees and the PLO in Lebanon, together with the Israeli occupation of the south of the country, led to a more pronounced anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist sentiment among many

of the left-wing and Arab-nationalist factions, which explains the close similarity and shared iconography between some Lebanese posters and posters produced in support of Palestinian liberation, nationalism and self-determination.[84] Similar connections between Hizbullah and Iran, including a visit of Iranian artists to Lebanon to provide workshops in poster design, further facilitated an exchange of aesthetic and motifs.[85]

Lebanese martyr posters originated in the practice of posting obituaries in public spaces to inform local residents of the death and funeral arrangements of people who had died.[86] The various political and military factions involved in the conflict continued and developed this practice, covering walls with posters that commemorated their deceased soldiers. Although the visual rhetoric of the posters varied between the factions and over time, they all shared a similar typology: a photo of the deceased (often their ID card photo), their name, a short combatant biography, including party affiliation, the battles in which they fought and/or died and the date of death.[87] To this extent and purpose, content-wise, the posters resemble the large Iranian wall murals commemorating martyrs discussed in Chapter 1, except of course in Lebanon there were multiple parties involved in the fighting and therefore the inclusion of a clear means of communicating party affiliation was critical; each faction utilised a specific template that worked to create a visual identity that contributed to an imagination of belonging and a sense of unity among affiliates of the party. So, for example, the National Liberal Party placed a photograph of the deceased within a stylised cedar tree surrounded by a circle reminiscent of their logo; the Lebanese National Resistance Front edged their posters in red and included their logo, which was a calligraphic cedar tree in red and black; Hizbullah included photographs in a circle superimposed above their flag, which included a graphic of their name with the *alef* (letter a in Arabic) outstretched and holding a gun symbolising armed resistance; and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party's (SSNP) obituary posters were framed in black with their symbol, a red cyclone in a white circle.[88]

The political context during the Lebanese civil war was complicated; party allegiances and alliances shifted regularly, and there was considerable intervention by foreign states, including Syrian military and political intervention, Iranian support, Israeli occupation and the presence of pro-Palestinian factions.[89] Because of the often very different but sometimes overlapping ideologies and goals of the various factions in terms of confessional and nationalist goals, political orientation and their allegiances to foreign states or peoples, posters often imagined complex, interconnected identities beyond that of party allegiance. A poster commemorating the martyrs of the Lebanese Communist Party between March 1975 and March 1976 clearly demarcates its political position with the caption 'martyrs in the battle against the fascist isolationist plan in defence of Lebanon, its unity, Arab identity and in defence of the Palestinian resistance'. The poster consists of a map of Lebanon covered in red stars marking the place of martyrdom of the party's soldiers, thus visibly demonstrating the party's commitment to defend the unity of Lebanon – their soldiers were active and died on a variety of battlefronts. The

sheer number of martyrs also demonstrates the commitment of the party to the Lebanese National Movement coalition.[90] Similarly, a poster by the Organisation of Communist Action in Lebanon includes an image of guns sticking out of the earth like graves, with the photos of six martyrs above and the slogan '[t]he martyrs of defiance to occupation in defence of the nation's land' conveys the political commitment of the party to the unity of Lebanon and a determination to defend the land and nation against external forces.[91] That a hand is grasping one of the guns protruding from the earth conveys the message, found in many commemorations of martyrdom, that self-sacrifice and death will lead to a new beginning or life for the people and the country.

Martyrdom posters produced by Islamic Resistance/Hizbullah tended to be inscribed within both an anti-imperialist, pro-Palestinian revolutionary framework and a Shi'ite iconographic imaginary; therefore, their military actions are principally narrated as a defensive jihad against Israeli oppression and occupation.[92] Their martyrdom posters include verses from the Qur'an, which are often interpreted as supportive of martyrdom, references to Imam Hussein, and images of the Dome of the Rock mosque.[93] Other parties also employed religious iconography in the wars; for example, a poster commemorating the Lebanese Forces' defence of the predominantly Christian village of Zahleh in the Bekaa Valley depicts an image of the ghostly Virgin Mary above the hills of the Bekaa Valley cradling a machine gun out of which flowers are blooming, suggesting perhaps that divine intervention saved the village.[94]

The act of commemorating someone in a martyr poster primarily marks them as a hero, and as such these posters serve not only a commemorative and ontological function, but also one of mobilisation and recruitment: the martyr is an exemplar to others. By glorifying and idolising the deceased, they encourage others to follow the example of their friend, neighbour or relative: they provide a role model for active participation in the conflict.[95] They can also induce feelings of guilt that one is not doing enough to support the cause and thus shame individuals into making a greater contribution.[96] Martyr posters (either of individuals or groups) also had a politico-spatial function; they effectively demarcated physical spaces of belonging by clearly identifying the areas over which different factions had military control, or by laying claim to contested spaces.[97] This was particularly the case in western Beirut where in disputed areas the fight for symbolic hegemony accompanied the military skirmishes, car bombings and other violence. For example, in eastern Beirut the dominance of the Lebanese Forces under Bashir Gemayel in this area went largely unchallenged so there was less of a need for such forms of communication.[98]

In situations of socio-political or military conflict, the persistence of the dead through specific forms of commemoration challenge dominant temporalities and collapse linear (historical) time. From the Argentinian *Madres de Plaza de Mayo* asserting that 'death does not exist' and demanding the 'living (re)appearance' of their disappeared children, to the claim of Sana Yusif Muhaydli [Sana'a Mehaidli] in her videoed testimony made hours before her martyrdom operation, 'I am not dead, but alive among you', and the banners of the Gezi Park protesters in

Turkey asserting that the young men killed by the police during the protests were 'ölümsüz' – literally without death, immortal – the murdered child and sacrificial martyr, to the extent that they continue to live as "public figures", can constitute a particularly powerful political tool.[99] Sana Yusif Muhaydli was 17 years old when on 9 April 1985 she crashed a car full of explosives into an Israeli military convoy in Jezzin, Lebanon, killing two Israeli soldiers.[100] Although, as Straub notes, her declaration that she is not dead can be read as an intertextual link to the Qur'anic *sura* 3:169: 'And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah "dead". Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not', in her videoed testimony she avoids all mention of god and paradise, situating her actions in the context of the liberation of her oppressed and occupied homeland. Moreover, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the undertaking and political use of martyrdom operations are not in any way intrinsically linked to any religion, including Islam.[101] During the Lebanese civil war, combatants undertook what they termed "martyrdom missions" from across the political and religious spectrum in the name of liberation, the homeland, nationalism and other ideologies. Moreover, Muhaydli was affiliated with the Syrian Social National Party, who were a secular, multi-sectarian party resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Muhaydhli begins her performative video testimony shown on Lebanese state television the evening of the day of her martrydom with the present-tense declaration "I am the comrade martyr Sana Yusif Muhaydli" and thus raises a fundamental paradox of the living describing themselves as dead. The fact that audiences knew that Muhaydli was dead as they watched her say these words compounds the paradox: Muhaydli's declaration is a re-animation, a haunting.[102]

The broadcast of the video of Muhaydli, filmed before her suicide mission when she is very much alive, declaring herself to be a martyr and therefore dead, because it is broadcast after her death, creates a temporal and ontological tautology where the past, present and future, death and life, blur together. This destabilisation of time and the distinction between being alive and a live performance as testament is examined in Mroue and Khoury's performance *Three Posters* discussed as follows. The video of the future martyrs declaring their death functions as a commitment to the act, 'a fatal record', a political declaration, self-affirmation, autobiography and a contract of intent.[103] Such video-taped testimonies by future martyrs were sent to the state-owned Télé-Liban and were aired during the evening news broadcast. As such they reached a wide audience and formed a unique part of the Lebanese experience and collective memory of this time: Mroue comments that living in Lebanon at the time he would suddenly see 'a poster of a friend . . . or a photograph or video on the TV announcing his or her death'.[104] In their performance the martyrs historicise both themselves and their actions; they explain the reasons behind their decision and outline the meaning their martyrdom should carry in the broader military-political context; and they situate their action in a context of other military and martyrdom missions.[105]

A video of someone declaring themselves a martyr, Toufic argues, is the declaration of someone who wishes to extend their life into death. The power of the dead to speak is significant. Khoury and Mroue, in their performance piece on Jamal

al-Sati, a member of the secular Lebanese Communist Party who blew himself up in a martyrdom mission against the Israeli army occupying South Lebanon in 1985, call into question whether the martyrdom mission, the death of the enemy, or the video left behind and seen by audiences across Lebanon is more important.[106] Straub similarly argues that the image of the suicide bomber disseminated after the attack can be more powerful than the direct military consequences of a successful suicide mission.[107] Even after their deaths, the dead continue to function as weapons in a broader war of representation and ideological persuasion. This power was recognised by the organisations to whom the martyrs were affiliated, and those who died as a result of martyrdom missions in the Lebanese wars were commemorated not only in such broadcasts and videos but also on posters.[108] Stills and emotive quotes from the videos were frequently used to create posters. In one SSNP poster, a future martyr is standing in front of posters of previous SSNP martyrs, presumably with the knowledge that this image of them will in turn become a poster that will form the backdrop to a future martyrdom testimony, creating the impression of an *ad infinitum* stream of those willing to die for the cause, past, present and future.[109]

What was the driving force behind the production and dissemination of these martyrdom mission posters? Who were they aimed at persuading? As with the production of posters commemorating the dead discussed earlier, one of the main audiences were other militant factions in the conflict. The posters became a symbolic battleground, where the number of combatants willing to undertake martyrdom missions became a demonstration of the level of support for a particular organisation and their commitment to the cause.[110] Posters commemorating martyrdom operations also have an operational role, particularly in recruitment; they are intended to inspire others to commit to the cause. Jamal al-Sati in his video expresses his honour at being able to participate in such a mission that will bring freedom and dignity closer. He also specifically positions his actions as following in the example of earlier heroic martyrs. If there is honour in making such a sacrifice, then conversely there is shame for those left behind. The minimalist inclusion of biographical data and the use of everyday photos of the martyr can amplify this process of self-identification. Martyrdom posters were also, at times, used to target specific audiences: a poster commemorating the martyrdom of Sana Muhaydli, for example, was captioned 'the week of resistant women' and is a call for women to be active in the Lebanese conflict.[111]

The death of party leaders is also commemorated and framed within a broader discourse of martyrdom that conceptualises it as a life-giving act of sacrifice. Following his assassination on 16 March 1977, Kemal Jumblatt, founder and leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, head of the left-wing coalition, the Lebanese National Movement, and the icon and hope for a democratic and secular Arab Lebanon, was commemorated on numerous posters as a martyr for socialism. Many of the posters include extracts from speeches he had made that reference the contribution that sacrifice makes to the struggle for liberation and socialism. On one poster an image of him walking into the unknown is accompanied by an extract from a speech he made before his death: 'is there anything more noble than crossing

over the bridge of death into the life that revives others and genuinely supports their cause and that strengthens the model of resistance and sacrifice in the souls of activists?' And on another, his image, and the number sixteen, referencing the date of his assassination, are accompanied with the words 'offering life gave a new understanding to the liberation struggle'.[112]

The imagery surrounding party leaders in the Lebanese context resembles, to a degree, the depiction and use of Khomeini in Iranian posters and murals. In Lebanon the *za'im* or leader figure is mythologised and is depicted as possessing heroic qualities; they are brave, will resist oppression and are willing to sacrifice themselves to defend their sectarian community and its interests.[113] Images of deceased leaders often float above depictions of conflict, where they act as the spiritual guardians of the combatants, very similar to the way in which images of Ayatollah Khomeini were carried into battle by Iranian soldiers as talismans. The image of a martyred leader is also used to ensure continuity during periods of political transition. For example, one poster depicts Kemal Jumblatt's son, Walid Jumblatt, who succeeded him as leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and Lebanese National Movement, but behind him is a larger image of his father with the caption 'a pledge is a pledge'.[114] This is reminiscent of the use of images of the deceased Ayatollah Khomeini alongside the image of his political successor, Ayatollah Khamenei on murals commemorating individual martyrs on Tehran murals: the portrait of the former leader endorses not only the ideological and military fight but also his successor.[115]

During the Lebanese civil war, horrific massacres of Palestinians were undertaken by the Lebanese Forces (a right-wing, Lebanese nationalist, Christian coalition which included the Kataeb Party) and associated right-wing, Christian militias. The first of these was the murder of thirty-three Palestinian civilians on 13 April 1975 by the Lebanese Kataeb party in the suburbs of Beirut (Ain al-Rummaneh), an event which was retrospectively taken to mark the beginning of the civil war. April 13 1975 is understandably a contested date in the context of narratives of the civil war, and it was interpreted and remembered in very different ways by the various factions. A year later in 1976, the Lebanese Forces chose the 13th of April as the date to commemorate their foundation in recognition that this was the moment at which their "national salvation" was awakened. The date of the massacre thus has an ontological function – more specifically, it also served a cohesive purpose, binding together the various factions and parties that comprised the Lebanese Forces. It reminds audiences that despite their differences they were united in a common cause: a sovereign Lebanon, free from external influence.

Although the coalition of factions that made up the Lebanese Forces produced relatively few posters during the conflict, some were produced in the power vacuum that followed the assassination of the Lebanese Forces' leader Bashir Gemayel in 1982.[116] A number of these posters specifically reference the date 13 April, and as such they attempt to mitigate potential disruption to an existing ontological narrative occasioned by the death of Gemayel by reminding all the factions of the coalition of their purpose and founding mission – the freedom of Lebanon. One

poster includes an outline of two soldiers and the slogan '13 April. The Dawn of Freedom', suggesting that freedom for Lebanon will only be found through military action.[117] What this freedom entails is implied by another poster that has a map of Lebanon entirely composed of numerous small symbols of the Lebanese Forces together with the date 13th April: freedom for the Lebanese Forces meant a Lebanon free from 'foreign' elements such as the PLO, and Iranian and Syrian influences, but ironically not Israeli occupation.[118] Another poster depicts Bashir Gemayel handing on his weapon to a soldier and bears the caption 'continuing the journey' and the date 13 April 1983 – an attempt not only to reassure coalition partners that although Gemayel is dead, the fight continues, but also to remind them of the founding event of the conflict and thus why they are fighting.[119]

While the Lebanese Forces commemorate 13th April as an awakening to national salvation, the same point in time and the same event is appropriated and employed in very different explanatory narratives. The Arab Liberation Front, a faction of the PLO, created an explicit link between the massacres of the thirty-three Palestinians on the outskirts of Beirut in 1975 by the Kataeb and the massacre by the nascent Israeli forces at Deir Yassin in 1948 – an event that is seen by Palestinians as marking the beginning of the *Nakba*. By claiming that '[T]his is what the Zionists have done in Deir Yassin in 1948 . . . and this is what the Kataeb gangs have done in Ain el-Rummaneh in 1975', a continuous, ongoing narrative of Palestinian persecution, displacement and suffering is created.[120] Similarly, the anniversary of the 1975 massacre and the assassination of Gemayel are commemorated in another poster published by the friends of Habib Shartuni, who was behind the bomb that killed Gemayel. The poster includes an image of Shartuni and the caption, '[o]n the 9th commemoration of one of their most atrocious massacres; we salute you who executed the people's judgment over the butcher, 13 April 1984'.[121] Here the emplotment of the massacre is within a broader narrative of active retaliation and resistance rather than passive victimisation.

Khalili, in her discussion of Palestinian heroes and martyrs, argues that their commemoration can similarly be framed in distinct ways: as heroic, tragic or as an example of *sumud* (steadfastness).[122] The heroic frame interprets events teleologically as part of a larger progression that will inevitably lead to victory in terms of liberation or the establishment of a nation.[123] For example, the poster captioned *Steadfastness and Victory – Al Karameh* references the Battle of Karameh in 1968 between the Israeli Defence Forces, the PLO and the Jordanian Armed Forces in the Jordanian town of Karameh, which was the site of a PLO camp.[124] After a day of fighting, the Israelis withdrew. Although it was claimed as a victory by both sides, it did help establish the PLO as an authentic, revolutionary movement fighting for national liberation rather than simply a collection of disenfranchised 'Arab' refugees, thereby bolstering Palestinian claims to statehood.[125] Such posters are designed to mobilise military and ideological support, but they also fulfil an important ontological function in the imagination of a nation, which is particularly crucial in the context of the fragmented, occupied and displaced Palestinian nation; they effect a degree of solidarity. The primary audience of such posters are

Palestinians and those supporting their struggle. A poster commemorating the Tel al-Zaatar massacre entitled *The Embrace of Heroism and Martyrdom* depicts a Palestinian woman and man dynamically taking up arms in defence of their community against the assault by Phalangist and Lebanese Front forces.[126] Within the heroic narrative massacres, refugees and the refugee camps are transformed from potential symbols of failure, impotence and weakness into empowered and 'potent nationalist symbols'; the refugee, armed and militant, becomes the archetypal icon of Palestinian nationalism; martyrs are not passive victims, but they have dynamic agency as part of the resistance – their actions and sacrifice will ultimately facilitate the final victory and liberation. In this manner, commemoration 'becomes a performance of self-assertion'; defeats are read as temporary, but not ultimately causing deviation from the process towards inevitable victory.[127]

Moreover, by situating more recent massacres within a chronologically broader narrative of the slaughter of Palestinians, such commemorations can also in effect legitimise the nationalist or liberationalist claims of the various political parties. A number of posters situate the massacres of Tel al-Zaatar and/or Sabra and Shatila with earlier massacres of Palestinians by Israeli forces.[128] Others list the massacres that have occurred in Palestinian refugee camps primarily in Jordon and Lebanon, emphasising that having already been displaced from their homes by policies of ethnic cleansing and intimidation by Israeli forces in 1948, Palestinians have not been assimilated into neighbouring Arab countries as Israel claimed, but instead they lead a precarious life in squalid refugee camps where they are subject to widespread violence, intimidation and slaughter. *We Will Not Forget* includes the text 'September 1970 Jordan – September 1982 Sabra and Shatila. We will not forget' in Arabic, English and Russian, thereby asking the reader to make a connection between the killing of Palestinians by the Jordanian army in 1970, that led to the expulsion of the PLO, and the massacre at Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon.[129] Marc Rudin, in another poster that conflates the killing of Palestinians as refugees in Lebanon and Jordon, uses the reference to mobilise Palestinians and give support to the *intifada*, asserting that only active resistance will break 'the cycle of massacres'.[130] Some posters also situate the massacres of Palestinians within a wider, global context of colonial or fascist violence. For example, one poster captioned with the phrase 'we denounce this outrage with weapons and resistance' makes reference to the Fakhani, Tel al-Zaatar, Deir Yassin, Guernica and My Lai massacres.[131]

While Palestinian martyrs are documented and represented in a variety of media, since the second intifada there has been a proliferation of martyr posters covering the walls of public spaces in the Occupied Territories and refugee camps: posters bearing witness to the deaths of civilians, children, protesters and those assassinated by the Israeli security apparatus, as well as those engaged in suicide military operations.[132] These posters are layered onto public walls, a palimpsest creating both a permanence and ephemerality, symbolising the fleeting nature of life and the steadfast nature of Palestinian resistance to colonial occupation: they 'turn city walls and building surfaces into pictured metaphors for resistance, as well as dramatic icons of collective self-defense in the face of devastation'.[133] Photographs of the martyr

are 'stripped of their actual life context' and superimposed in front of nationalist images of the Dome of the Rock or al-Aqsa mosques, both of which symbolise an independent Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital. The martyrs are therefore reimagined not simply as tragic victims but as embodying steadfast resistance to the colonial occupation of their country.[134] Such narratives of *sumud* or steadfastness reflect the resilience of Palestinian refugees in the face of political and existential annihilation; they are the 'infra-politics of the powerless'; they offer 'a strategy of struggle when all other avenues are closed', a refusal to give up or acquiesce.[135] See also the poster by Abd Almouty Abozaid, which includes the Arabic caption 'an inclination to steadfastness is stronger than massacres'.[136]

Perhaps one of the most significant shifts in the narrative emplotment of the Palestinian martyr has been the adoption of the tragic frame within which the suffering of the refugees is the main focus. Such a framework, to a large extent, arises from, and is reinforced by, transnational discourses on human rights, development and humanitarianism, all of which are common to aid agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Such a narrative emplotment emphasises a depoliticised passivity, victimisation and powerlessness. Suffering is foregrounded in order to secure 'sympathy, attention and money' from governments, donors and transnational publics, but also to legitimise the claims of a stateless and powerless people to nationhood.[137] These tragic narratives of the Palestinian people are aimed at international audiences whose material and political support is explicitly sought.[138] Within this 'politics of pity' the focus is on the innocent, non-threatening victims of conflict: a martyred child, grieving mother or the elderly. See, for example, the two posters *Stop Killing Our Children*, in the first of which a man carries the body of a child and in the second a woman cries out in grief.[139] Similarly, Hafez Omar's *They will not depart*, designed to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacre, depicts an old man holding identity photos of his family who were killed in the massacre.[140] This contrasts with posters produced in the first couple of years after the massacre, which frame the slaughter in a more heroic or steadfast frame. For example, *Their Blood is a Renewal of the Pledge of Ultimate Victory* and *We Will Never Retreat*, which features the bodies of people massacred piled up in front of a roughly made, bullet-pocked house, out of which a fist emerges clenching a gun against a background of the map of Palestine in red. The caption reads 'Martyrs of Sabra and Shatila (hear this) We Will Never Forget. We Will Never Forgive. We Will Never Retreat'.[141]

Following Said's call in the *Journal of Palestinian Studies* to Palestinians to extend their struggle into the realm of representation following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a number of seminal histories of the *Nakba* and of the Israeli occupation of Palestine have been written.[142] In addition to challenging the hegemony of the Israeli discourse on post-1948 events through the production of alternative narratives, such examples of Palestinian *liberation historiography* serve an ontological or identitary function, reinforcing the idea of the de-territorialised Palestinian nation in the face of fragmentation and oppression.[143] However, such an ontological function is equally served by the diverse 'stories of peoplehood', performances of

Palestinianess, 'social invocations of past events, persons, places and symbols', and the mnemonic practices embodied in vernacular representations of the past such as Palestinian martyr posters.[144] By inscribing a remembrance of massacres, military operations and war crimes in posters, not only is a history of the ethnic cleansing, dislocation and occupation produced that counters the general indifference of the global media in much of the northern world, but an active Palestinian agency is also reclaimed, and in so doing the passivity implicit in death and defeat is re-inscribed as active struggle, steadfast resistance and martyrdom.

The examples discussed here demonstrate what a 'compelling mobilisational resource' the past can be.[145] The colonised suffer not only from dispossession, dislocation and oppression but also, as Memmi and Fanon have argued, their past is distorted, disfigured or destroyed.[146] Many of the examples of Palestinian, vernacular past-talk discussed here aim to resist such attempts at erasure and 'bring into existence the history of the nation – the history of decolonisation'.[147] Some of the posters described in this chapter have situated instances of martyrdom within a heroic framework, not only to mobilise support and generate a collective identity, but also to 'reclaim history'; to marshal the resources of the past as a response to 'global arrangements of power' in order to narrate an alternative present.[148]

Many would argue that these posters offer an account of the past that is politicised and perspectival and that they therefore cannot be seen as the epistemological equivalent of academic, institutionalised 'history'. But as Jenkins and others have demonstrated, history as an academic genre of writing is itself an "epistemic failure".[149] Despite society bestowing upon it a degree of authority, it does not occupy a privileged epistemological position. It too is politicised and perspectival, something that is particularly evident in histories of contested spaces and events. It is clear that narratives about past events, particularly massacres, assassinations and martyrdom, have not only a socio-political importance but also a pragmatic utility. They are used to raise awareness, to imagine identities, to recruit men and women, to demarcate space and time, to persuade and proclaim, to resist and coerce. While one may not agree with the messages of all the posters, the pasts imagined and the uses to which they were put, they are examples of people using past-talk to change the present and imagine a different future. They are examples of vernacular, often counter-hegemonic, histories which demonstrate that history (broadly conceived) may well have a value, not in its ability to ascertain epistemological truth, but in its creative, artistic, rhetorical and political capacity for affecting change.

Notes

1 The phrase "symbolic sites of struggle" is used by Zeina Maasri, *Off the Wall: Political Posters of the Lebanese Civil War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 16 and passim. See also title of the foreword by Fawwaz Traboulsi, "Posters as Weapons" in *Maasri*, op. cit.

2 Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 44.

3 Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies*, 42. See also B. Taithe, and T. Thornton "Identifying War: Conflict and Self-Definition in Western Europe" in *War: Identities in Conflict 1300–2000*, ed. B. Taithe and T. Thornton (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), 1 and 9.

4 Haggai Ram, "Multiple Iconographies: political posters in the Iranian revolution," in *Picturing Iran: Art, Society and Revolution*, ed. Shiva Balaghi and Lynn Gumpert (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 90.
5 Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (London: Penguin, 2003), 19 argues that the single image is the basic unit of the memory freeze-frame; a photograph provides 'a quick way of apprehending something and a compact form for memorizing it'.
6 W.J.T. Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 345 cited in Jens Eder and Charlotte Klonk, eds., *Image Operations: Visual media and Political Conflict* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 13.
7 Eder and Klong, eds., *Image Operations Provides a Comprehensive and Up-to-Date Bibliography of Relevant Sources*.
8 Quote is from Catherine Flood, *British Posters: Advertising, Art and Activism* (London: V&A Publishing, 2012), 9 and reflects the general academic view of posters, that they can either fill in the gaps or provide some interesting "colour" to histories of social movements.
9 For the notion of a poster as a 'portable image', see Susan Sontag, "Posters: Advertisement, Art, Political Artefact, Commodity," in *The Art of Revolution: 96 Posters from Cuba 1959–1970*, ed. Donald Stermer (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), last accessed 24/3/17, www.scribd.com/document/157634653/Posters-Susan-Sontag
10 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, 7.
11 Matt Soar, "26 Ways of Thinking About a Graphic Advocacy Poster," under the entry "Tactics vs Strategies," http://mattsoar.com/26ways/Soar_26Ways.pdf last accessed 24/3/17. Soar employs Michel de Certeau's distinction between the strategies of the powerful and the tactics of the relatively powerless. Lina Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East: the Role of the Visual in Political Struggle* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 9, referencing the work of Günter Schweiger and Gertraud Schrettenecker Werbung (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1995).
12 Sontag "Posters." Julie Peteet "The Writing on the Walls: The Graffiti of the Intifada," *Cultural Anthropology* 11/2 (1996): 146–7 makes a similar point in the context of Palestinian graffiti.
13 Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1999) 6, cited in Maasri, Off the Wall, 7–8.
14 David Crowley, "The Propaganda Poster," in *The Power of the Poster*, ed. Margaret Timmers (London: V&A Publications, 1998), 100–1 makes the distinction between political posters that are celebratory and are produced by professionals, usually for the state, and those that are agitational and are produced by activists. While Liz McQuiston, *Graphic Agitation: Social and Political Graphics Since the Sixties* (London: Phaidon, 2004) does consider both posters produced by "the establishment" and those by the unofficial voice of dissent to utilise propaganda techniques in her discussion of U.S. posters, when discussing those produced outside the U.S., she has a tendency to associate the term *propaganda* with the dominant institutionalised powers; she does not use it to describe the posters produced by activists agitating against war or for democracy, liberation or social change. Both are discussed in Maasri, *Off the Wall*, 4–5.
15 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, 15.
16 Ibid., 16–17, citing Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2001), 139–43.
17 The series of conflicts in Lebanon between 1975–1990 are often named as the Lebanese Civil War. In contrast Walid Ra'ad has described the various conflicts as the Lebanese wars because they were not experienced by the Lebanese people as a single event, but rather as a 'discontinuous series of intermittent and ongoing conflicts of varying intensities, enacted by multiple actors in different regions, involving distinct groups and interests'. Chad Elias, "Stage and Screen," in *In Focus: On Three Posters 2004 by Rabih Mroué*, ed. Chad Elias (Tate Research Publication, 2015), last accessed 08/11/17, www.tate.org.

uk/research/publications/in-focus/on-three-posters-rabih-mroue/stage-and-screen. We acknowledge that the term "civil war" facilitates an interpretation of the conflicts as internal to the country and thus elides the involvement of external actors and forces. We also believe that Ra'ad's naming practice reflects the multiplicity and complex nature of the conflicts. However, on this occasion we have decided to employ the more commonly used term for the conflicts.

18 Traboulsi, "Posters as Weapons," xviii.

19 Flood, *British Posters*, 8.

20 Daoud Sarhandi, "Introduction," in *Evil Doesn't Live Here: Posters from the Bosnian War*, ed. Daoud Sarhandi and Alina Boboc (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001), 12.

21 Peteet, "The Writing on the Walls," 148, 140–1.

22 The phrase 'fugitive nature' is from Flood, British Posters, 9; for the quote and discussion of Palestinian graffiti in Israel and the Occupied Territories, see Peteet "The Writing on the Walls," 140.

23 See, for example, the graffiti of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, and Egyptians during the Arab Spring, Peteet, "The Writing on the Walls," 142 and 146 and Rana Jarbou, "The Seeds of a Graffiti Revolution" in *Walls of Freedom: Street Art of the Egyptian Revolution*, ed. Basma Hamdy and Don Karl aka Stone (Berlin: From Here to Fame Publishing, 2014), 10.

24 Peteet, "The Writing on the Walls," 143 and 147–8.

25 Sarhandi, "Introduction," 12.

26 Peteet, "The Writing on the Walls," 149. Graffiti can, however, also be a means of politicising private space and mobilising individuals. The presence of illegal graffiti and posters on the walls of private properties in occupied Palestine implicates their owners and perhaps unwillingly draws them into the resistance, see Mahmoud Abu Hashhash, "On the Visual Representation of Martyrdom in Palestine," *Third Text* 20/3–4 (2006): 399. Peteet, op. cit. 143 notes that one graffiti 'don't paint over graffiti voluntarily, First Warning!' commands residents to stop policing themselves on behalf of the occupying military, who not only force the owners of private property to clean up any graffiti but also fine them.

27 Abu Hashhash, "On the Visual Representation," 392. The last two quotations refer to Hizbullah and the Islamist ideologue of the Iranian revolution, Shari'ati's understanding of the value of martyrdom, respectively, see Laleh Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31–2 quoting Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbu'llah: Politics, Religion* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 83 and Ali Shari'ati, *Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness*, trans. Ali Asghar Ghassemy, (Tehran: The Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1981) 74. Khalili, op. cit. 19–20 also cites a number of examples from the Americas and Africa that illustrate the point that although nationalist discourses of martyrdom often co-opt or borrow a vocabulary of religious cosmology, the underlying reason behind such acts of self-sacrifice is generally the nation.

28 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 206.

29 See, for example, the hand-coloured etching Anonymous, "Marat. L'Ami du Peuple," France (c.1793) in the V&A collection E.657–1993 included in Crowley, "The Propaganda Poster," 102–3 and 107. A number of posters and memorial cards were produced commemorating the public execution on 23 November 1867 of the "Manchester Martyrs," the Fenians Allen, Larkin and O'Brien, including for example, The Fenian martyrs of Ireland. Executed at Manchester England, 23 November, 1867. Their last words were 'God save Ireland' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchester_Martyrs#/media/File:Manchester_Martyrs_02.jpg last accessed 5/4/17. Ceremonies commemorating their martyrdom on the Sunday nearest the 23rd of November became a significant commemorative ritual in Irish nationalism for many years, see Mervyn Busteed, "The Manchester martyrs: a Victorian melodrama," *History Ireland* 16/6 (2008), last accessed

05/04/17 www.historyireland.com/18th-19th-century-history/the-manchester-martyrs-a-victorian-melodrama/ Engels, in a letter to Marx on 24 November 1867, a day after the execution of the "Manchester Martyrs", concisely articulated the political power of the martyr: 'yesterday morning the Tories, . . . accomplished the final act of separation between England and Ireland. The only thing that the Fenians still lacked were martyrs', Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Ireland and the Irish Question* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971) also online, last accessed 5/4/17, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867/letters/67_11_24.htm.

30 Stuart Borthwick, *The Writing on the Wall* (Liverpool, Bluecoat Press, 2015), 35, fig. 28; and another mural that can be found online https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchester_Martyrs#/media/File:Manchester_Martyrs_Mural.jpg accessed 5/4/17.

31 Rustom Bharucha, *Terror and Performance* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 162.

32 Robert A. Pape, "Dying to Kill Us," *New York Times*, September 22, 2003; see also Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), quoted in Talal Asad, *On Suicide Bombing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 54.

33 Ibid., 54–5.

34 Abu Hashhash, "On the Visual Representation," 392.

35 Bharucha, *Terror and Performance*, 163 and Asad, *On Suicide Bombing*, 50–1. Through an analysis of various theorists' discussions [Roxanne Euben, "Killing (for) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action," *Political Theory* 30/1 (2002); Ivan Strenski, "Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of Muslim Human Bombers," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15/3 (2003); May Jayyusi, "Subjectivity and Public Witness: An Analysis of Islamic Militance in Palestine," unpublished paper for the SSRC Beirut Conference on the Public Sphere in the Middle East, October 2004; and Bruno Étienne, Les combattants suicidaires (Paris:Éditions de l'aube, 2005)] of the inherent evil of suicide attacks, Asad op. cit. 45 argues that such explanations, formed within the broader discourse of the war on terror, in fact work to demarcate particular forms of violence, in particular those wielded by the Euro-American liberal democracies, as legitimate, civilised, 'disciplined, reasonable, and just', in contrast to the premodern, morally underdeveloped, unreformed, barbaric religious terrorism of the violence of the uncivilised. He also astutely notes that implicit to these arguments and indeed to the hierarchical global order is the idea that 'human life has [a] differential exchange value in the marketplace of death when it comes to "civilised" and "uncivilised" peoples', Asad, op. cit. 94. This subject is discussed in more depth in a forthcoming article by Claire Norton, "Narrative Terrorists: Writing the Right Kind of Islam."

36 Khalili, Heroes, 20; Shari'ati, Martrydom, 74, quoted in Khalili, op. cit. 32; Khalili, op. cit. 31 quotes Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu'llah, as stating that Hizbullah celebrate the Islamic Resistance martyrs as dying in order to 'liberate national territory', emphasis added by Khalili; and Ruhallah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), 216 describes the protesters killed by the forces of the Shah as 'fully alive' see Khalili, *Heroes*, 32.

37 Sana Yusif Muhaydli, "Last will and Testament," quoted in Khalili, *Heroes*, 14.

38 Anni Kanafani, *Ghassan Kanafani* (Beirut: Near East Ecumenical Bureau for Information and Interpretation, 1973), 30 writing about her husband, the Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani. It is also worth bearing in mind the point that Mark Harrison, "An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism," *World Economics* 7/4 (2006): 3 makes that some groups may engage in "terrorist" attacks because such conflict not only 'promotes factional power in the community' but, quoting David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 320, 1998), it may also provide the means 'to engage in abuse or crimes that bring immediate rewards'.

39 Hashhash, "On the Visual Representation," 400.

40 Hans Belting, "Image, Medium, Body: A New Approach to Iconology," *Critical Inquiry* 31/2 (2005): 307 cited in Chad Elias, 'Martyrdom and Mediation', in Chad Elias, 'Martyrdom and Mediation', in *In Focus: On Three Posters 2004 by Rabih Mroué*, ed. Chad

Elias (Tate Research Publication, 2015), last accessed 8/11/17 www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/in-focus/on-three-posters-rabih-mroue/martyrdom-and-mediation

41 The phrase 'image munitions' is from Nathan Roger, *Image Warfare in the War on Terror* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) no page number given, cited in Verena Straub, "The Making and Gendering of a Martyr: Image of Female Suicide Bombers in the Middle East," in *Image Operations: Visual Media and Political Conflict*, ed. Jens Eder and Charlotte Klong (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 139.

42 Hashhash, "On the Visual Representation," quote at 391, the martyr as hero at 393. This conflation of the martyr as hero is reinforced by the use of the epithet hero-martyr in statements made by Lebanese factions to describe the actions of those who undertook martyrdom missions. See the statement given by the National Lebanese Resistance Party to the Beirut daily newspaper al-Nahar (7/8/1985) 6, the day after Jamal al-Sati's martyrdom mission where he is described as "the hero-martyr Jamal al-Sati", cited in Elias, "Stage and Screen." Palestinian posters challenge the representation by much of the Israeli media of Palestinians as terrorists by presenting them as heroes. Those commemorated as martyrs vary, but can include non-combatants and innocent bystanders, those engaged in protest, those participating in armed conflict and those who undertake suicide-attacks. Peteet, "The Writing on the Wall," 158, n. 28 notes that in a Palestinian context the term *martyr* is given to anyone who dies in the course of resisting Israeli occupation or in exile. In an Iranian context the term *martyr* is used to describe those who were killed by the Shah's forces during the 1979 revolution and those who died in the course of the Iran-Iraq war. In the context of the Iranian Green Movement anyone killed by the security forces of the Iranian state during a protest, as an innocent bystander, or while in custody is described as a martyr. With regard to Lebanon, our discussion focuses on combatants who died during conflict and those who undertook "martyrdom missions".

43 *Ashura* commemorates the day on which Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad, was martyred along with his family at the battle of Karbala on the 10th of Muharrem 61 A.H. (680 C.E.) by the army of the Caliph Yazid. See Chapter 1 in the present volume, n. 106 for more about the event.

44 See the collection of articles in Juan Ricardo Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). For references to nineteenth-century revolutions, see Iran Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 22 citing Abbas Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844–1850* (Ithaca, NY, 1989); for Saudi Shi'i demonstrations in 1979 during *Ashura*, see R.K. Ramazani, "Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf," in *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, ed. Juan Ricardo Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 46; there are numerous news sites that have provided coverage of anti-government protests in Bahrain during *Ashura* processions in recent years, Ramazani, "Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf," 51 notes that while in Bahrain in November 1980 during *Ashura* the Shi'ite mourners carried images of the mutilated body of a Bahraini Shi'ite leader Jamil 'Ali [al-Thaur] who had died in police custody with the slogan "martyred by the Pharaonic Regime"; for resistance to Israeli occupation of Lebanon, see Maasri, Off the Wall; for Palestine see Khalili Heroes, and Abu Hashhash, "On the visual representation"; for the protests and movements that led to the Iranian Revolution, see Chelkowski and Dabashi, op. cit.

45 Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 9. Images played a vital role not only in the struggle against the Shah but also in the struggle for ascendency between the different forces of the revolution.

46 Ram, "Multiple Iconographies," 91; quote from Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 6.

47 Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 22.

48 Some posters conveyed a direct socialist or Marxist message of an empowered worker in the style of socialist realism that was given additional depth with Islamic iconography or a verse from the Qur'an. Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 98, fig. 6.2; 101,

fig. 6.5; 152 fig. 9.17; 9; 89, fig. 5.3; 255 fig. 15.7. Other posters reflect a more global, anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, liberation iconography, ibid., 133–4 and 166–8, figs. 64, 9.41, 9.43 and 9.45, respectively.

49 Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 103, fig. 6.8; see also Ram, "Multiple Iconographies," 63, fig. 27.

50 Ram, "Multiple Iconographies," 94. More traditional aesthetic forms were also employed to narrate the revolution. Hasan Isma'ilzadeh, *The Shah's Exile and Khomeini's Return* (1979) depicts the revolution using the *pardeh* (coffee-house) genre of paintings used by story-tellers to illustrate their narrations of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. In his 1979 painting, Imam Hussein and Yazid, replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shah, are overlaid on a map of Iran, which features a series of protests, demonstrations, fighting and executions that constituted the revolution. Khomeini is shown victoriously returning from exile in Iraq and France (represented by the Najaf Shrine and the Eiffel Tower respectively) entering Iran holding aloft a copy of the Qur'an while the Shah slopes off in disgrace with bags spilling money, having just evaded the hangman's noose, accompanied by a black dog and the devil. For the image see the website The Graphics of Revolution and War: Iranian Poster Arts www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/webexhibits/iranianposters/revolution.html accessed 17/3/17. And also Peter Chelkowski, "The Art of Revolution and War: the role of the graphic arts in Iran," in *Picturing Iran: Art, Society and Revolution*, ed. Shiva Balaghi and Lynn Gumpert (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 126–41, 129–31 see fig. 60; and Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 148–9, fig. 9.10; the University of Chicago also has a copy, which can be found in the Middle Eastern Posters Collection Box 1, Poster 11, Special Collections Research Centre, the University of Chicago Library. Another example of a *pardeh* painting can be found in Chelkowski and Dabashi, op. cit. 90, fig. 5.4 where Khomeini is accompanied by two ideologues of the revolution, Shari'ati and Taleqani, while the Shah, complete with a cracked crown, seeks sanctuary in America.

51 Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 82.

52 *Ashura: Victory of Blood Over the Sword* (1978), Iranian Poster Arts www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/webexhibits/iranianposters/revolution.html accessed 17/3/17. See also Middle Eastern Posters Collection Box 2, Poster 54, Special Collections Research Centre, the University of Chicago Library. *Muharram: Victory of Blood Over the Sword* (c. 1970–1980s), Iranian Poster Arts www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/webexhibits/iranianposters/revolution.html last accessed 17/3/17, see also Middle Eastern Posters Collection Box 3, Poster 56, Special Collections Research Centre, the University of Chicago Library, conveys a similar message. See also Chelkowski and Dabashi, op. cit. 146–7, figs 9.8 and 9.9.

53 Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 83 and 71. See also op. cit. 144, fig. 9.5 for Habib Sadeqi's poster *Ashura*, which depicts a traditional Muharrem cloth complete with invocations to Imam Hussein and Fatima. The cloth, however, is frayed and dripping blood. Attached to the cloth is a proclamation of Khomeini issued from France in which he called for the true followers of Hussein to sacrifice their blood and in doing so bury the satanic regime of the Shah. Written in white in the blood is the slogan "Every day is Ashura and the whole earth is Karbala". See also Kazem Chalipa's painting *Every Day is Ashura and Every Soil is Karbala* (c. 1981) in op. cit. 89, fig. 5.2 and also Iranian Poster Arts www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/webexhibits/iranianposters/revolution.html accessed 17/3/17, Middle Eastern Posters Collection Box 3, Poster 96, Special Collections Research Centre, the University of Chicago Library. For the transformation of the Karbala paradigm from an originary, foundational myth of Shi'ism to a 'mobilizing narrative of political struggle and self-sacrifice' in a modern nation-state context, see one of the key ideologues of the Iranian revolution, Shari'ati, Martyrdom, 'In the permanent battle of history – everywhere and every place, all fields are Karbala, all months are moharram, all days are Ashura' cited in Khalili, *Heroes*, 26 and 28–9.

54 Ram, "Multiple Iconographies," 96. Ram notes, citing J.M. Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 76, that such 'spiritualist representations of martyrdom' and death are

similar to those that can be seen during World War I in Europe in response to the mass carnage.

55 Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 110, for the poster see 111, fig 7.6. For other 15 Khordad posters, see Chelkowski and Dabashi, op. cit. 146 and 258. Both posters feature the guns and bayonets used to kill the protesters and on the barrel of these weapons is written USA, indicating the military and political support the Shah received from the U.S. and other western states.

56 Abbas Ibn Ali was the half-brother of Hussein. During the siege of Karbala, he went to the river Euphrates to fetch water for the children in the party. Returning from the river he was attacked by Yazid's men, who amputated both of his arms, yet despite this he still held the water bag in his mouth and tried to get back to the camp. A variety of posters, stamps and other media featuring the bloodied hand can be found in Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, see in particular 170, fig. 9.47; 72–3, fig. 4.4; and 110, fig. 7.5. See also Chelkowski and Dabashi, op. cit. 109, fig. 7.3; here a bloody hand mark features in a poster that the Revolutionary Guards ostensibly made from a photograph of a graffited street sign. Following the Black Friday massacre someone had obliterated the old name of Zhaleh Square with a bloody hand-print and writing in blood had renamed it 'The Square of the Martyrs'. Below the sign was taped a photograph of Khomeini.

57 Ibid., 110. They also left bloody palm prints on walls, op. cit. 108.

58 The designer of the poster also added their name despite the fact that the outcome of the revolution could not have been predicated at that time: Ismael Shishakeran. See Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 140, fig. 9.2.

59 Ibid., 142, fig. 9.3.

60 Ibid., 142–3, for an example of such images, see op. cit. 141, fig. 9.1.

61 *Black Friday Massacre*, ca. 1980 Middle Eastern Posters Collection Box 1, Poster 8, Special Collections Research Centre, the University of Chicago Library, see also Iranian Poster Arts www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/webexhibits/iranianposters/revolution.html accessed 17/3/17.

62 The Imposed War is the Iranian name for the war with Iraq, which is generally known in the west as the Iran-Iraq war.

63 Christine J. Gruber "Media/ting Conflict: Iranian Posters of the Iran-Iraq War," in *Crossing Cultures: Conflict, Migration, Con-Vergence, Proceedings of the 32nd Congress of the international Committee of the History of Art*, ed. Jaynie Anderson (Melbourne: Melbourne University, 2009), 684. Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 164. In a number of posters, Saddam Hussein is also depicted as a puppet of the U.S., Israel and other western powers, Chelkowski and Dabashi, op. cit. 164, figs 9.37, 9.38 and 9.40. In one poster, Majid Qaderi, *War Criminals,* in Chelkowski and Dabashi, op. cit. 164, fig. 9.39 Saddam Hussein is depicted morphing into another historical person – Hitler. This is also mentioned by Gruber, op. cit. 689, n. 12. In the Bosnian war the warlord Radovan Karadžić was compared to Hitler on the cover of *DANI* magazine (Sarajevo: February 1993); for image see Sarhandi and Boboc, Evil Doesn't Live Here, 44, and also 42. A number of other posters produced during the Bosnian conflict use symbols commonly associated with the Nazis in conjunction with Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [the latter consists of the former republics of Serbia and Montenegro]; see another cover of *DANI* magazine (Sarajevo: January 1994) that employs the swastika superimposed over the flag of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in ibid., 132–3. Another cover contrasts images of concentration camps, one from World War II and the other in Bosnia during the 1990s war, ibid., 86–7. Equally, the ultranationalist Croatian party HSP (Croatian Party of Right) used a World War II Ustaša slogan 'Ready to Defend the Homeland' in some of its posters, thus recalling the efforts of the fascist-allied Croatian state during the war to create a racially pure state through pogroms, murder and internment in concentration camps of Serbs, Jews, Roma and dissidents, see ibid., 108–9.

64 Gruber, "Media/ting Conflict," 685. Gruber employs Pierre Nora's phrase "lieux de mémoire" or 'realm of memory' in this context.

65 Ibid., 684–5; see also Middle Eastern Posters Collection Box 4, Poster 197, Special Collections Research Centre, the University of Chicago Library, see Iranian Poster Arts www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/webexhibits/iranianposters/index.html last accessed 14/2/17.
66 Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 162, fig. 9.32. See also Middle Eastern Posters Collection Box 3, Poster 67, Special Collections Research Centre, the University of Chicago Library, see Iranian Poster Arts www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/webexhibits/iranianposters/newkarbala.html last accessed 14/3/17.
67 In particular, the rhetorical iconography of the revolutionary posters discussed previously was continued by the state after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a means of imagining a homogenising religio-national identity, and silencing dissent, see Kishwar Rizvi, "Religious Icon and National Symbol: the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran," *Muqarnas* 20 (2003) for a discussion of Republic-era billboards and posters.
68 Homayoun Askari Sirizi, *Photo Exhibition of a Preconceived War* (Tehran, 2006) – the installation consists of a number of photographs, but also a dark-room in which the viewer looks into a series of chemical baths in which photographs are in various stages of development. The last bath, entitled "Unknown Martyr" in Persian and English, simply includes a mirror. See https://vimeo.com/199917002 last accessed 07/11/17. The mirrors at the Behesht-i Zahra cemetery encourage people to 'wish for the "gift" of martyrdom' in that they see their own image reflected over the martyr's grave; see Khatib, *Image Politics*, 102–3. For a discussion of the Behesht-i Zahra cemetery, see Chapter 1 in this volume.
69 Khatib, *Image Politics*, 101.
70 Mahmoud Bakhshi-Moakhar, *Tulips Rise from the Blood of the Nation's Youth* (Industrial Revolution series), eight sculptures in neon, tinplate, wood, plastic, electric motor (2009).
71 Carola Hoffmeister, "Provocation with the Cult of Martyrdom: An Interview with Mahmoud Bakhshi-Moakhar," trans. Michael Lawton, Qantara (14/10/2009), https://en.qantara.de/node/1878 accessed 08/11/17.
72 Irène Burkel, "Mahmoud Bakhshi. Tulips Rise from the Blood of the Nation's Youth," *Nadour*, trans. Theodora Taylor, http://nadour.org/collection/Tulips-Rise-from-the-Blood-of-the-Nations-Youth/ last accessed 08/11/17.
73 www.irangreenposters.org/vsgallery/5/ last accessed 20/3/17 for examples of posters. The website is not always available. Posters can also be found on www.facebook.com/IranGreenPosters/?ref=nf
74 With the increased prevalence of smartphones that allow easy access to social media and the internet, the poster became a digital means for disseminating information and protest in the cyber-cityscape. It also facilitated the shared use of key symbols and images of the protest movement, and through forwarding, re-posting and tagging engaged with potentially a wider audience. See Flood, *British Posters*, Chapter 3, "Into a Digital Age", for a discussion of the digitisation of posters in a British context. While most of Flood's chapter deals with posters in a commercial context, the last section looks at the intersection of digital and paper posters in the context of protests against the Iraq war (2003) and the 2010 British general election, 115–21.
75 See at https://.droi.wordpress.com/16-azar/ and www.irangreenposters.org/vsgallery/5/ last accessed 20/3/17 for examples of posters featuring Neda Agha-Soltan and Sohrab Aarabi as well as other martyrs. See www.enduringamerica.com/home/2011/2/12/iran-love-protest-and-sacrifice-7-special-posters-for-25-bah.html last accessed 10/3/17 for posters promoting and commemorating the demonstration planned for 25 Bahman (February 14 2011), and their use of images of the 2009–10 martyrs. Although the Iranian state stopped Neda's funeral from becoming a rallying point for anti-government protests, the Shi'ite mourning cycle provided an opportunity for mass participation in mourning on the streets. On 31 July, forty days after her death, thousands of Iranians mourned her and others killed during the protests on the streets of Tehran and other Iranian towns.

76 That some Iranians directly made a connection between the 1979 Revolution against the Shah and the 2009 protests can be seen in the poster *Put Down Your Guns and Join Us 1979–2009* on https://droi.wordpress.com/22-bahman-info-protest-routes-posters-and-videos/ last accessed 10/3/17.

77 Both of these posters alongside many others related to the 16 *Azar* demonstration can be found at www.irangreenposters.org/chgallery/1/4 and https://droi.wordpress.com/16-azar/ last accessed 10/3/17. Quotes from Khomeini can be found in Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 132. In another speech by Khomeini, where he is referring to the young *basijis* [volunteer, para-military forces] who were going to the frontline where many would die as martyrs, and which is often included as graffiti in the background of posters, he says 'it is better if you call me servant rather than leader' – see, for example, Muhammad Taraqijah, *Boy Going to War with Crying Girl*, (1980) Iranian Poster Arts www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/webexhibits/iranianposters/revolution.html last accessed 17/3/17 Middle Eastern Posters Collection Box 4, Poster 209, Special Collections Research Centre, the University of Chicago Library; and Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 163. These posters were often released to commemorate Student Day, which adds another level of intertextuality. Perhaps the most famous *basiji* was twelve- or thirteen-year-old Muhammad Hussein Fahmideh, who having lied about his age joined a para-military force. When faced with the approach of Iraqi tanks on the battlefield, he threw himself under a tank and exploded his grenades. See Gruber, "Mediating Conflict," 685 and Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 137 n. 9 for a discussion of his age; Ulrich Marzolph, "The Martyr's Fading Body: Propaganda vs. Beautification in the Tehran Cityscape," in *Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East*, ed. Christine Gruber and S. Haugbolle (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 180 for a discussion of various versions of a mural in Tehran depicting Fahmide; and Christine Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum in Tehran: Visualizing Memory in Post-Revolutionary Iran," *Visual Anthropology* 25/1–2 (2012): 76 for a discussion of the exhibit dedicated to him in the Tehran Martyrs' Museum.

78 For posters see https://droi.wordpress.com/moharram-info-posters-and-videos/ last accessed 20/3/17. See also www.irangreenposters.org/vsgallery/6/ last accessed 20/3/17.

79 www.irangreenposters.org/vsgallery/6/ last accessed 20/3/17.

80 https://droi.wordpress.com/22-bahman-info-protest-routes-posters-and-videos/ last accessed 20/3/17.

81 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, notes that there were more than twenty ideologically distinct Lebanese political factions. She provides an introduction to the 'warring fronts and political parties' and main coalitions or alliances on op. cit. 25–9 as well as a chronology of key events, op. cit. 3–33. It is worth noting that this practice of publically commemorating martyrs was also employed during the later 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, when romanticised images of Hizbullah soldiers killed while fighting Israeli troops were displayed along the roadside in southern suburbs of Beirut; see the photograph by Houssam Mcheimech in Chad Elias, "Postscript: The Digital Afterlife in Mroué's Artistic Works," in *In Focus: On Three Posters 2004 by Rabih Mroué*, ed. Chad Elias (Tate Research Publication, 2015), www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/in-focus/on-three-posters-rabih-mroue/postscript-the-digital-afterlife-in-mroues-artistic-works accessed 3/4/2017.

82 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, 45 and see figs 1.2, 1.21, 2.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17–9, 3.23, 5.8–10, 5.19 for examples.

83 Delegates from various revolutionary movements attended congresses and conventions in various Latin American and African countries, and posters were often produced by particular groups in support of the revolutionary aims of another and sent as displays of solidarity.

84 Maasri, *Off the Wall,* figs. 3.25–6.

85 Ibid., 50, compare the posters in fig. 1.30 Abdulfazl Ali untitled (Islamic Republic of Iran, early 1980s) and fig. 1.31 anonymous, *A constellation/squadron of martyrs of the Islamic Resistance*, in the western Bekaa (Islamic Resistance/Hizbullah, c.1985). A number of

the posters include quotations by, or images of, Khomeini, fig. 3.27 anonymous, *Muslim Woman's Day* (Hizbullah/Islamic Women Committee, 1984) and fig. 3.28 anonymous, *Jerusalem . . . here we come. Every Muslim has to prepare himself to confront Israel . . . and Jerusalem will ultimately return to Muslims – Khomeini*, (Hizbullah, c. 1984). Two posters, fig. 1.5 Omran Kaysi, *The assault on Saida is an assault on the national resistance* (1985) and fig. 1.6 Rafic Charaf, *Be Prepared for Them with all your Force* (mid-1980s), feature a red horse recalling the stead of Imam Hussein.

86 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, 88.

87 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, includes images of a large selection of obituary posters, see figs. 4.1–4.41.

88 The National Liberal Party was a predominantly Christian, right-wing Lebanese nationalist party that formed part of the Lebanese Forces coalition and was supported by Israel. The Lebanese National Resistance Front was formed after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and consisted of the Lebanese Communist Party, the Organisation of Communist Action, the Social Nationalist Party and other members of the Front of Patriotic and National Parties. Hizbullah and its military wing Islamic Resistance were formed as the result of a split from the Amal movement (Lebanese Resistance Detachments) by Shi'ite clerics influenced and guided by Ayatollah Khomeini. They were supported by Iran and resisted the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. The main political and military aim of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party was to revive Greater Syria as a national geo-political entity rather than simply a province of the Ottoman Empire. It was multi-sectarian, opposed the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and was a participant in the National Resistance Front coalition, ibid., 25–9.

89 The situation in Lebanon was, and is, complex. Part of the conflict pivoted around confessional differences between the various Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon. Part, however, was focused on nationalist concerns and the extent to which Lebanon should be influenced by Syria or the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Maasri, ibid. 25–33 offers a useful overview of the various military coalitions, political parties and a chronology of events.

90 Ibid., 90, see fig. 4.22 for the poster anonymous, *Martyrs of the Lebanese Communist Party, March 1975 – March 1976* . . . (Lebanese Communist Party, 1976). See also figs 4.18–4.21 for examples of posters published by other factions that commemorate large numbers of martyrs.

91 Ibid., 91 see fig. 4.24 for the poster, anonymous, *The Land is Ours. The Martyrs of Defiance to Occupation in Defence of the Nation's Land* (Organisation of Communist Action in Lebanon, c. 1980–1). The Organisation of Communist Action was a multi-confessional independent Marxist-Leninist organisation. Its military forces joined in operations with Palestinian forces in the south against Israeli occupation, and it was part of the Lebanese National Resistance Front coalition, ibid., 28.

92 The political, military and economic support they received from Iran also facilitated the diffusion of iconography and aesthetical form from Iranian martyr posters from the revolution and war with Iraq. This cultural diffusion was a multi-way process, as Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, 115 have argued that Iranian revolutionary artists were probably originally influenced by an exhibition of Palestinian political art that came to Tehran in 1979.

93 For example, the poster in Maasri, *Off the Wall*, fig. 4.37, anonymous, *The Blood of Martyrs is the Most Honest Expression of Blood Vanquishing the Sword* (Islamic resistance/Hizbullah, mid-1980s), and fig. 4.38, Merhi Merhi, *The Islamic Resistance. Our glory . . . Our Pride and the Price of Martyrs . . . the guide to our path* (Islamic resistance/Hizbullah, c. 1986). The first poster reiterates the idea that sacrifice (blood) will ultimately triumph over injustice (the sword) outlined in an Iranian context above n. 56.

94 Ibid., fig. 3.21.

95 It should not be forgotten though that this commemoration also indexes the power that the faction wields in deciding who is commemorated as a martyr.

96 Peteet, "Writing on the Wall", 153 discusses the reactions of some Palestinians to graffiti commemorating martyrs and their feelings of guilt. The poster by Pierre Sadek, *Our Lebanon Needs YOU* (1983) produced after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Forces, references Alfred Leete's recruitment poster *BRITONS [Lord Kitchener] Wants YOU* (UK, 1914) featuring Lord Kitchener, and in a similar fashion has Gemayel facing the viewer with his finger pointing at them. It thus seeks to mobilise the guilt felt by those as yet not actively involved in the conflict. For the poster, see Maasri, Off the Wall, fig. 2.15.

97 Ibid., 51–2. Something similar happens with regard to Palestinian graffiti, which bears witness to the competition between political and military factions and demarcates territory. Peteet, "The Writing on the Wall," 152.

98 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, 52. The Lebanese Forces was a military coalition of predominantly right-wing, Lebanese nationalist, Christian-dominated parties including the Lebanese Kataeb Party, the National Liberal Party, the Guardians of the Cedars and Tanzim. It was affiliated with the Lebanese Front, collaborated with Israel against the presence of Palestinian organisations in Lebanon, was sceptical of Arab nationalism and opposed left-wing reforms, op. cit. 25–6.

99 For the Argentinian Madres de Plaza de Mayo's claim that 'death does not exist' and their slogan demanding the 'Aparición con vida' [living (re)appearance] of their disappeared children, see Bevernage and Aerts' discussion of Vladimir Jankélévitch's use of 'irreversible' and 'irrevocable' pasts in Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts, "Haunting Pasts: time and historicity as constructed by the Argentine Madres de Plaza de Mayo and radical Flemish nationalists," *Social History* 34/4 (2009): 391 and 397 and Berber Bevernage, *History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 4–6. The first phrase was said by the president of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo quoting Eduardo Galeano. Sana Yusif Muhaydli, 'Last will and Testament' quoted in Khalili, *Heroes*, 14, see n. 43 above. Christiane Gruber, "The Gezi Martyrs and Visual resistance in Turkey," *Mizan* (2017): 3, last accessed 5/10/17, www.mizanproject.org/the-gezi-martyrs-and-visual-resistance-in-turkey-part-1/ includes some photographs of banners declaring 'Abdullah Cömert ölümsüzdür hesabı sorulacak' [Abdullah Cömert is immortal, the account will be inquired about] and "'then Sarısülük ölümsüzdür' [Ethen Sarısülük is immortal]. Other banners declared that the martyrs of the protest (a protest that was largely concerned with preserving in Turkey 'a secular representative democracy in the face of increasing authoritarianism displayed by the ruling Sunni-Islamist AKP' op. cit. 2 were 'aramızda' [among us]. *Pace* Gruber, we are not sure to what extent the symbolic lexicon of the Gezi protestors in remembering the murdered demonstrators is necessarily "reiterative of religious praxis", op. cit. 12. Recalling them as martyrs – *şehitler* in Turkish – is not necessarily an example of religious rhetoric or vocabulary. It is common in Turkey for those who are killed to be remembered as *şehitler*. Moreover, we interpret the use of the term *ölümsüz* to be an example of the politically instrumental use of the irrevocable past, a past that persists into the present, in an attempt to get justice or hold authorities to account, rather than a reference to religious immortality. Bevernage and Aerts, op. cit. 394 note that '[t]he irreversible and the irrevocable experience of time share a recognition of the inalterability of the past, but in contrast to the former, the latter rejects the notion of a temporal "distance" separating past and present'.

100 Jalal Toufic, "I am the Martyr Sanâ' Yusif Muhaydlî," last accessed 31/3/17 www.slashseconds.org/issues/002/001/articles/03_jtoufic2/index.php.

101 Straub, "The Making and Gendering of a Martyr," 140. Most Palestinian martyr posters contain this *sura*; see Abu Hashhash, "On the Visual Representation," *Third Text* 20/3–4 (2006): 402.

102 Straub, "The Making and Gendering of a Martyr," 140. According to Toufic, "I am the Martyr," Muhaydlî is thought to have been the first suicide bomber to use this locution and thus it might be, ironically, one of the major inventions of the Lebanese war.

103 Straub, "The Making and Gendering of a Martyr," 140 uses the phrase 'a fatal record', Harrison, "An Economist," 1 discusses suicide missions in the context of them being a contract of exchange.
104 Elias Khoury and Rabih Mroue, "Three Posters: Reflections on a Video/performance," *The Drama Review* 50/3 (2006): 184.
105 See for example the three takes of Jamal al-Sati's testimony transcribed in Khoury and Mroue "Three Posters," 188–9.
106 Khoury and Mroue, "Three Posters," 183. The performance/video work *Three Posters*, as conceptualised and performed by Elias Khoury and Rabih Mroue, was first staged at the Ayloul Festival, Beirut in September 2000. *On Three Posters* originated from that performance and was made as a video in 2004 by Rabih Mroue; it is a seventeen-minute, single-channel colour video with sound, see Chad, "Stage and Screen." In this article, Mroue reflects on the work. The text from the performance, including uncut rushes of three video takes of Jamal al-Sati's testament, is included. Jamal al-Sati's last video can be seen on YouTube www.youtube.com/watch?v=mlsynVNS1uk last accessed 31/3/17, as can that of Wafa Nur ad-Din www.youtube.com/watch?v=-zarM1kW28s last accessed 31/3/17. In a Lebanese context it is the playback of this performance that in a way authenticates the martyrs and their operation. The practice of making videos to be shown after the operation does not occur in all military contexts where suicide bombing have been used; for example, it is not part of the context of suicide bombings in Sri Lanka, see Bharucha, Terror and Performance, 163.
107 Straub, "The Making and Gendering of a Martyr," 139–40.
108 These videos became a standard part of martyrdom missions, many of them beginning with the same formula used by Muhaydli. Toufic, "I am the Martyr," provides a list of martyrs who used this formula in attacks against the occupying Israeli army and the South Lebanon Army. He also gives the date, time and nature of their suicide attack.
109 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, figs 4.31–4.34.
110 Something similar occurred in Palestine as well, where posters became a battleground on which the PFLP, DFLP and Fatah proclaimed their hegemony – see Straub, "The Making and Gendering of a Martyr," 139 and Hashhash, "On the Visual Representation," 397–8 for a discussion of martyr posters published by Hamas and Fatah. A poster commissioned by Hamas commemorating the deaths of two Palestinian children shot dead in their house by the Israeli Defence Force uses a photo of the girl in black hijab to conform to the depiction of martyrs on Hamas posters. The dominant colours of the poster are those of Hamas, red and green, and although there is a small image of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, this is quite insignificant when compared to the Hamas logo, their green flag, and an image of the Qur'an. In contrast, posters by Fatah commemorating the martyrdom mission of Wafa Idriss demonstrate her political affiliation through the use of the iconography of Fatah: she wears a black-and-white chequered shirt and headband resembling the keffiyeh scarf, symbol of both Palestinian nationalism and Fatah.
111 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, fig 4.30. M. Haydar, *In the First Annual Commemoration of Sana' Mehaidli. 9 May 1986. The Week of Resistant Women* (Lebanese National Resistance Front/Syrian Social Nationalist Party, 1986).
112 Maasri, *Off the Wall*, figs 2.1 anonymous, *Is There Anything More Noble . . .?* (Lebanese National Movement, 1978) and 2.4 Hassib al-Jassem, *Offering Life . . .* (Lebanese National Movement, 1979), respectively.
113 Interestingly, the various communist organisations active during the war did not produce posters representing their leadership, perhaps in part because ideologically they were critical of the traditional idea of Lebanese *zu'ama* (leadership) that is predicated on the client-patron relationship. Maasri, Off the Wall, 58.
114 For the poster, see Maasri, *Off the Wall*, fig. 2.13 and pp. 60–01.
115 Ulrich Marzolph, "The Martyr's Way to Paradise: Shiite Mural Art in the Urban Context," *Ethnologia Europaea* 33/2 (2003) and Marzolph, "The Martyr's Fading Body

provide a number of examples of such murals in Tehran; see also Chapter 1 in the present volume.

116 The production of posters was less common among the coalition of the Lebanese Forces firstly because posters were a political tool embedded in a politically left-wing, anti-imperialist tradition. Secondly, as noted earlier, while West Beirut was a space contested by multiple factions, east Beirut was more securely under the control of the Lebanese Forces, who were more or less unified in their support for the leader of the LF Bashir Gemayel. Lastly, the Lebanese Forces tended to use television channels and periodical publications to articulate their politico-military contestations rather than posters; Maasri, *Off the Wall*, 51–2.

117 For the poster, see Maasri, *Off the Wall*, fig. 3.12, Raidy, *13 April. The Dawn of Freedom* (Lebanese Forces, c. 1983).

118 For the poster, ibid., fig. 3.13, anonymous, *13 April* (Lebanese Forces, c.1983).

119 For the poster, ibid., fig. 3.14, *Pierre Sadek, . . . Continuing the Journey* (Lebanese Forces, 1983).

120 For the poster, see ibid., fig. 3.15 anonymous, *This is what the Zionists have done* . . . (Arab Liberation Front, c. 1975–6).

121 For the poster, ibid., fig. 3.16 anonymous, *On the 9th Commemoration* . . . (Friends of Habib Shartuni, 1984).

122 Khalili, *Heroes*, see particularly Chapter 5. While these different interpretative frames are not necessarily restricted to a particular period, there is a tendency for posters and other commemorative narratives produced during the period of mobilisation or *thawra* [revolution], 1969–1982, to be depicted heroically; a more tragic emplotment has prevailed since the 1980s, but particularly since the Oslo Accords (1993), whereas a narrative centred on steadfastness tends to occur during liminal times or periods of extreme crisis, such as was the case in Lebanon after the invasion of Israel in 1982 and the evacuation of the PLO fighters, see Khalili, *Heroes*, 92–3, 103, 99.

123 Khalili, *Heroes*, 21 argues that the 'heroic liberationalist discourse metamorphoses into the heroic narrative of nationhood' in which the nation-state as embodied by the statesman and institutions of nationhood becomes preeminent and the heroic fighters and revolutionary discourse are domesticated and contained in monuments, museums and street names – see also op. cit. 24.

124 *Steadfastness and Victory – Al Karameh* (PLO Unified Information, c. 1968), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 13/11/17 www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/steadfastness-and-victory-al-karameh; see also Natheer Nabah, *Al Karameh – The Symbol* (FATAH, c. 1968), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, https://palestineposterproject.org/poster/al-karameh-the-symbol which includes the caption 'Al-Karameh is a symbol of defiance and steadfastness'.

125 See Donald Neff, "Battle of Karameh establishes Claim of Palestinian Statehood," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (March 1998): 87–8 available online www.washingtonreport.me/1998-march/middle-east-history-it-happened-in-march.html last accessed 7/4/17.

126 Muaid Al Rawi, *The Embrace of Heroism and Martyrdom* (Lebanon: FATAH and PLO Unified Information, 1976), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, https://palestineposterproject.org/poster/the-embrace-of-heroism-and-martyrdom last accessed 7/4/17. See also a poster by the Socialist Arab Union, *The Maslakh has Fallen Yet the Will to Resist did not and will not Fall. 2nd commemoration* (1978) image in Maasri, Off the Wall, fig. 3.19 anonymous, *The Maslakh* . . . (Socialist Arab Union, 1978), which includes scenes of the massacre in the bottom half of the poster, but defiant armed Palestinians in the top half with a clenched fist superimposed over both halves punching up through the images of the massacre.

127 Khalili, *Heroes*, 93–5 quotations from 94 and 93, respectively.

128 For example, Jamal Al Afghani, *Israeli Massacres Against Palestinians* (PLO Unified Information, 1983), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17 https://palestineposterproject.org/poster/israeli-massacres-against-palestinians lists Deir Yassin (1948), Tabariya (1955), Kafr Qassim (1956), the Gaza Strip and Sinai (1956) and Sabra and Shattilla (1982).

129 Marc Rudin, *We Will Not Forget* (Lebanon: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, c. 1992), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17 https://palestineposterproject.org/poster/we-will-not-forget; see also *Self-Policing* (Lebanese National Movement, c. 1982), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, https://palestineposterproject.org/poster/self-policing which lists the six massacres of Palestinians that happened in Lebanon.

130 Marc Rudin, *The Uprising* (Lebanon: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 1989) The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, https://palestineposterproject.org/poster/the-uprising. The poster depicts a hand holding a stone rising out of a puddle of blood with the text in Arabic and English 'Black September-Jordan, Sabra-Shatila. The Uprising Breaks the Cycle of Massacres'.

131 *Fakhani – Tal Al Zaatar – Deir Yassin – Guernica – My Lai* (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 1981) The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, https://palestineposterproject.org/poster/fakhani-tal-al-zaatar-deir-yassin-guernica-my-lai. There are also numerous Palestinian posters that express solidarity with, or appropriate the political and ideological capital of, various anti-colonial and liberationalist movements and revolutionaries; see for example *A Pledge for Continuous Struggle against Imperialism and World Zionism* (PLO Unified Information, 1974),) The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/a-pledge-for-continuous-struggle; *Wherever Death May Surprise Us* (General Union of Palestinian Students, 1970) The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposter project.org/poster/wherever-death-may-surprise-us ; Ismail Shammout, designed a number of posters expressing the similarity between the situation of the Vietnamese and the Palestinians: *Vittoria* (Italy: General Union of Palestinian Students, c. 1972), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17 www.pal estineposterproject.org/poster/vittoria and *Victory. Vietnam-Palestine* (PLO, c. 1972), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www. palestineposterproject.org/poster/vietnam-palestine. Similarly, other anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and liberationalist movements also produced posters that expressed solidarity with the Palestinians and vice versa. Rafael Enriquez, *Sabra y Chatila* (Cuba: Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, 1983), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, https:// palestineposterproject.org/poster/sabra-y-chatila. For other posters produced by OSPAAL in support of Palestinian solidarity, see The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, https://palestineposterproject.org/special-collec tion/ospaaal-palestine-solidarity. Murals in support of Palestinians were also painted by Republicans in Northern Ireland, see Borthwick, *The Writing on the Wall*, 229–31, figs. 193, 194 and 195. For a number of posters produced by Iran in support of Palestine, see The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, https://palestineposterproject.org/search/site/Iran. For support by Palestinian organisations for other revolutionary movements, see Yusuf Al Nassar, *The Revolutionaries of Palestine Salute the Revolutionaries of Iran* (Lebanon: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 1979), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, https://palestineposterproject.org/poster/the-revolutionaries-of-palestine-salute-the-revolutionaries-of-iran; and also Shammout, op. cit.

132 A memorial exhibition *100 Shaheeds, 100 Lives*, held at the UNESCO Palace in Beirut, displayed artefacts belonging to, and photographs of, the first 100 martyrs of the second

or al-Aqsa intifada who were killed by Israeli gunfire during protests, as participants or bystanders; Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs*, 113.

133 Christine J. Gruber, "The message is on the Wall: Mural Arts in Post-Revolutionary Iran," *Persica* 22 (2008): 36.

134 Abu Hashhash, "On the Visual Representation," 391 and 398.

135 Khalili, *Heroes*, 217 and 99.

136 Abd Almouty, *Abozaid, Resolute Steadfastness* (General Union of Palestinian Women, 1983), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/resolute-steadfastness. Some of the posters combine the idea of steadfast endurance with Shi'ite imagery. The poster by Mustafa Al Hallaj, *Never* (FATAH, 1985), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/never depicts a graphic of a horse leaping over the bodies of the massacred reminiscent of the Shi'ite motif of the Imam Hussein's horse, and the caption 'Never to be restrained by massacres'.

137 Khalili, *Heroes*, 38.

138 Ibid., 103.

139 *Stop Killing Our Children* (Tunisia: League of Arab States, c.1988), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/our-children-1 and *Stop Killing Our Children* (Tunisia: League of Arab States, c.1988), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/our-children-2; see also a poster by Jesus Barraza, *Children in Gaza* (USA: Dignidad Rebelde, 2008), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17 www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/children-in-gaza which depicts children behind barbed wire and the caption, 'End the killing of children in Gaza. Over 380 women and children have died since Israel began its attack. End the Israeli occupation now!' Another poster published in 1978 by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), *Children are Still Being Born as Palestine Refugees* (UNRWA, 1978), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/children-are-still-being-born-as-palestine-refugees depicts a woman holding a young baby at the head of a line of children cutting through a refugee camp. The caption says 'After thirty years . . . children are still being born as Palestinian refugees. And UNRWA is still serving them'. Similarly, *Palestinian Women are the Symbol* (Tunisia: General Union of Tunisian Workers, 2014), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/palestinian-women-are-the-symbol depicts a mother facing an Israeli soldier pointing a gun with two children behind her, one of which she is holding by the hand.

140 Hafez Omar, *They Will Not Depart* (Palestine, 2012), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/they-wont-depart.

141 *Their Blood is a Renewal of the Pledge of Ultimate Victory* (Lebanon: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command, 1982), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/their-blood-is-a-renewal-of-the-pledge-of-ultimate-victory; *We Will Never Retreat* (Lebanon, Palestinian Liberation Front, 1982), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/we-will-never-retreat; see also *Cajal, Solidarity with the PLO* (PLO – Department of Information and Culture, 1982), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/solidarity-with-the-plo; *Khair Allah Sheik Saleem, Defiant Even Unto Death* (PLO, 1982), The Palestine Poster Project Archives, available online, last accessed 7/4/17, www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/defiant-even-unto-death depicts a young murdered woman surrounded by blood, whose severed hand makes the V for victor sign.

142 Edward Said, "Permission to Narrate," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13/3 (1984).

143 The phrase 'liberation historiography' is from Herman Paul, *Hayden White: The Historical Imagination* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
144 Phrase is from Roger Smith, *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) cited in Khalili, *Heroes*, 3
145 Khalili, *Heroes*, 13.
146 Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1965), 91 and Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 169, cited in Khalili, *Heroes*, 16–7.
147 Fanon, The Wretched, 51, cited in Khalili, *Heroes*, 17.
148 Khalili, *Heroes*, 33.
149 Keith Jenkins, *Rethinking History*, 3rd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), especially chapter 1.

6

ART AND THE POWER TO DISRUPT

Heterotemporality, the impossibility of representation, and disenssus

The space, politics and epistemologies of representation are far from transparent or equitable. Those located in the geo-political and hegemonic centre generally control the power of representation, while those displaced to the margins face cultural, political and ontological erasure. Freedom of movement and freedom of representation are thus often concomitant – themes that Emily Jacir explores in work that frequently deals with the repercussions of the ethnic cleansing of more than 700,000 Palestinians from their homeland in 1948, and the subsequent Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. While Jacir can't provide the freedom to return home to the displaced and occupied Palestinians, she can subvert the imperialist gaze that controls and describes them. She can draw attention to a war of representation that is attempting to erase the Palestinian people from public consciousness. To do this she 'pulls hegemonic narratives apart and reconstitutes them as an intervention' and thus interrupts the imperialist narrative that seeks to imagine itself through a denial of the other.[1] Jacir's work often focuses on the narration of collective histories; it merges the biographical and the political, as well as dissolving 'the boundary between the present and the historical'.[2]

Jacir's *Memorial to 418 Palestinian Villages which were Destroyed, Depopulated and Occupied by Israel in 1948* (2001), created against the horrific events of the second intifada, is a refugee tent into which the artist, helped by friends and strangers who heard of her project, stitched the names of the Palestinian villages which were ethnically cleansed, occupied or destroyed by the Israelis in 1948. The tent was exhibited in 2001, unfinished, along with a roster of the sewing participants and texts written by them about their experience of making the work in the main space of P.S.1 Clocktower Gallery (New York, USA). The work took as its resource the

edited volume by Walid Khalidi, *All That Remains: the Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, and many of the participants, themselves from diverse backgrounds, read through sections of the book as they stitched, which in turn gave rise to the sharing of memories, exchange of stories and conversations about the expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland.[3] Read and discussed in this way, the book, through Jacir's tent, 'became not a record of a dead history, but a living thesis'.[4] Jacir is not the only artist to use academic sources recording the Israeli destruction of Palestinian villages, farmland and homes as the basis for a work challenging the hegemonic Zionist narrative that denies and erases memory of the forced removal of Palestinians from their homes. Fazal Sheikh's *Memory Traces* is a haunting montage of photographs of destroyed Palestinian villages and portraits of Palestinians forced from their homes interwoven with the oral testimony of those who were ethnically cleansed and information on the occupation and subsequent renaming or destruction of their villages by Israel.[5] Sheikh primarily collaborated with human rights activist, researcher and tour guide Noga Kadman to compile the site references and details of the occupation and expulsion of each Palestinian village, but he also used information from Khalidi, Morris, Pappé and Abu-Sitta.[6] *Memory Traces* is 'an attempt to recognize and respect the history of that period, and to acknowledge the traumatic effects of its legacy'.[7]

By giving the work the title *Memorial to 418 Palestinian Villages which were Destroyed, Depopulated and Occupied by Israel in 1948*, Jacir ensures the subversion of the title into a political statement witnessing the occupation and erasure of Palestinians and their land; an unequivocal statement that would necessarily have to be included in any review of an exhibition featuring the work. One of the most controversial locations for Jacir's tent was at an installation she designed for the *Queens International*, an exhibition featuring artists living in the New York borough of Queens and held at Queens Museum in Flushing Meadows–Corona Park. The museum, during the 1940s, had been the temporary home of the United Nations, and it was at that location on 29 November 1947 that under General Assembly Resolution 181 the decision to partition Palestine was made.[8] Jacir's installation for the exhibit was in three parts: her refugee tent was installed in the middle of one of the museum's galleries; to one side three vitrines displayed photographs taken during the partition meeting of the UN; and on a nearby wall Jacir displayed reproductions of a pamphlet that had originally included copies of the mural and poem eulogising the 1948 Palestinian refugees that were displayed in the Jordanian pavilion from the 1964–65 World's Fair held in Queens, New York and which were given out to visitors. The pamphlet caused an outcry from the American-Israeli pavilion at the time of the World's Fair and from some Jewish groups. Many years later, a similar response met Jacir's attempts to give out reproductions of the pamphlet, with some condemning it as anti-Israeli propaganda. The museum's director finally decided that while the pamphlet could stay on view as part of Jacir's exhibit, it could not be given out to visitors. Jacir's installation at Queens Museum thus not only draws attention to the illegal expulsion and ethnic cleansing of 700,000 Palestinians from their homes and the complicity in this act of the world powers

at the time, but also to the ongoing disregard of many powerful nations to this injustice and the plight of the refugees many decades later. The ensuing controversy and hostility surrounding Jacir's reproduction of a historical document that displays sympathies for the exiled Palestinians is further evidence of a desire among many to neatly consign the expulsion of the Palestinians and the occupation of Palestine to the past and move on into a different future, one in which past injustices do not keep resurfacing, and the dispossession and continuing oppression of a people is erased and forgotten. The comment of one visitor to Queens Museum that '[it] is not the museum's business to help this Palestinian further her cause' might make one ask what indeed is the business of museums, art galleries and histories if not to challenge injustice and facilitate a Rancièrian dissensus, a 'creation of a fissure in the order of the sensible' in which hegemonic and counter-hegemonic narratives can be discussed, challenged and unpacked?[9]

Jacir's preoccupation with erasure, forgotten histories, unrealised possible futures and appropriation is manifested at multiple levels in the short, animated audio-visual poem *Lydda Airport* (2009), which is created from archival photographs of Lydda Airport in the 1930s. The work is based on a story Salim Tamari told Jacir about how his father, who was a transport company employee, waited one day with a bouquet of flowers to welcome Amelia Earhart to Lydda Airport, but Earhart never arrived.[10] In the film Jacir waits with a bouquet in front of the British Imperial Airways long-distance aircraft *Hannibal* – an aeroplane that, just like Earhart, subsequently disappeared *en route* without a trace. The disappearance of *Hannibal* and Earhart parallel the "disappearance" of British imperial rule in Palestine and with it any possibility of an independent Palestinian state. The work is a reflection on unrealised futures and lost moments of possibility. The disappearance of these dreams is symbolised by the erasure of Lydda Airport itself, appropriated and renamed first Lod Airport and then Ben Gurion Airport following the Israeli capture and occupation of Lydda.[11] Just as Jacir waits for Earhart, so too do the Palestinians wait to return. The hopeless irony of someone waiting in anticipation for another's arrival unaware that they are in fact dead could analogously also apply to Palestinian hopes for the peace process.

The insertion of Jacir into the Earhart narrative problematises the temporal distance inherent in the modern regime of historicity as exemplified in historical discourse – that of the irreversible past, a past that is gone, that is separate and distinct from the present. For Palestinians waiting not only for the hoped-for, and UN-declared, inalienable right of return, but especially for those Palestinians waiting stateless in refugee camps, those who are waiting for a travel permit or visa besieged under occupation in Gaza or the West Bank, those waiting for the bombing to stop, or for their house to be demolished, their past is not an irreversible past, it is an irrevocable past, an animated past that endures and persists in the present.[12] The Palestinian refusal to give up on the hope of the right of return is a refusal to close off events and assign the ethnic cleansing of 1948 to the past and accept a new geo-political reality.[13] It is a politically instrumental means of keeping in the present the consequences of the injustice of mass expulsion and occupation, and to

stop it from being consigned to the past and thus perceived as fixed and immutable. It assumes the juridical notion of reversible time in which the crime is 'still wholly present and able to be reversed, annulled, or compensated'.[14]

The irrevocable nature of the *Nakba* for Palestinians may also explain both a reluctance to commemorate it and the specific form that the few commemorations of it actually take. Until 1983 there was no monumental representation of the thousands of Palestinians who were killed in 1948 and, furthermore, it was only in 1998, on the fiftieth anniversary of the *Nakba*, that the first attempts to create a monument that embedded the victims of the 1948 war in a Palestinian national narrative were undertaken.[15] The absence of any public commemoration is not the result of collective amnesia. Memories of the *Nakba* were produced in the private realm, stories were told, visits made to destroyed villages, individuals and groups also put together memorial or *village books*, but there was no 'spatial political commemoration in the public sphere'.[16] While it is necessarily a complex issue, a large part of the reason for the absence of public monuments commemorating the *Nakba* is the complexity of commemorating a tragedy when one still hopes that the tragedy is simply a 'reparable distortion of history' and that the consequences of it will be ultimately reversed and justice will be restored.[17] Palestinian poet Hana Abu Hana described the Palestinians as 'a people in a corridor' stuck in a transition period of 'permanent liminality' that never ends.[18] A memorial would be a concrete, physical acknowledgement of the loss of Palestine.[19]

The idea of time as unproblematically linear with the past behind us and the future in front is complicated further by Toufic's notion of 'the withdrawal of tradition past a surpassing disaster': a situation in which past artistic and social traditions, films, buildings, photographs, and literature have been immaterially withdrawn from use by photographers, artists and musicians among others. While the object may still materially exist, it has been immaterially withdrawn and although it can ostensibly be perceived, it is unconsciously unavailable as a referent and thus quasi-forgotten.[20] Toufic discusses the immaterial withdrawal of many of the buildings and ruins in Beirut after the fifteen-year civil war and the inability of the people of Lebanon to perceive or record the destroyed buildings. This is not a result of habituation to destruction and war, but rather a consequence of a rupture in a historical narrative – 'the buildings belong to a history whose thread has been broken' – and the impossibility of producing images that avoid 'cut-and-dried definitions', a 'simplifying, often "orientalist" vision' or one that could be 'made use of, or taken over by, propaganda'.[21] A photograph of a withdrawn building will result in the withdrawal of the photograph until the work of resurrection has countered the effects of the withdrawal.[22] Photographs from the period of withdrawal of tradition past a surpassing disaster are often blurred, haphazardly framed or refuse a classical composition, not as a formal strategy, but reflecting the fact that 'something in the referent cannot be localized exactly'.[23] An effect of the withdrawal of tradition is therefore a form of forgetfulness, '[m]emory of what has thus been withdrawn is a betrayal of it, a false memory'.[24]

The process of a withdrawal of tradition (and the possibility of an eventual resurrection of that tradition) is evident in Hadjithomas and Joreige's multi-part installation *Wonder Beirut* (1997–2006). The first and second parts of the project, *The Story of a Pyromaniac Photographer* and *Postcards of War*, are based on a collection of photographs by a fictional Lebanese photographer Abdallah Farah.[25] Farah was commissioned in 1968–9 by the Lebanese state to take photographs of the luxury hotels along the Lebanese Riviera that would be made into postcards promoting an idealised image of Beirut and Lebanon. With the outbreak of the Lebanese wars and the destruction of his studio, Farah, realising these postcards no longer referred to anything, began, in 1975, to burn his salvaged negatives to match the damage done to the hotels by the shelling and bombing, thus making them conform to his reality. As each building was shelled, he burnt the negatives to match the destruction, and after each burn he photographed the new image and noted the date of the shell impacts and their origin in a book. In this manner, by reproducing the destruction to the buildings as it happened, he documented the phase of the conflict known as the "Battle of the Hotels" and produced what the artists Hadjithomas and Joreige term the *historical process*, a chronicle of phases of the civil war.[26] The second part of Farah's collection consists of negatives that he damaged accidentally or deliberately, but not in accordance with the destruction he witnessed around him – the *plastic process* – these were displayed by the artists in a work *Postcards of War*. In displaying Farah's photographs, the artists wish to not only 'publicize his work but also to counter the trend in Lebanon of idealizing the past and projecting a future fantasy by bracketing off the civil war and including it only marginally in our contemporary history'.[27]

The third and last part of the project displays rolls of film taken by Farah but never developed. During the war Farah was short of materials and stopped developing his photographs, meticulously describing the image instead in a small notebook. He continued this practice after the war, documenting all the rolls of film that he did not develop. He calls this part of his collection *the invisible image* or *the image in the text*. The artists prefer to call it *Latent Images*.[28] Descriptions of the images inform us that they record the minutiae of a lived environment: film roll no. PE 136 GPH 160 includes photographs of raindrops on the window pane, water seeping under the windows, spots of humidity on the wall.[29] Toufic argues that the fact that Farah exhibited photographs of his burnt postcards from the early years of the war suggests that the war was not, at that stage, a surpassing disaster, but rather a localisable catastrophe.[30] But the undeveloped rolls of film are, in contrast, 'a symptom of the withdrawal past the surpassing disaster that Beirut must have become'.[31] Between the withdrawal and resurrection of a referent, its withdrawal, the nothing, must first be made visible – the display of the unprocessed film rolls makes visible this absence or latency. If these photos are developed one day, Toufic argues that this will signal the resurrection of tradition.

The heterotemporality inherent in *Wonder Beirut* and *Lydda Airport*, together with a problematising of the contemporaneity of the historical present, offers a significant critical and emancipatory potential absent from what Chakrabarty calls the

singular and secular (and one might add, linear, universal and progressive) notion of historical time that envelops and dominates other kinds of time. It also provides a means of critiquing the relationship between history and (neo)colonialism or imperialism.[32] Accepting non-coevalness in itself, as Bevernage argues, does not infer or lead to allochronistic abuse, it is only with the positing of a referential coevalness, the idea of the historical present as a natural given and not a hegemonic fictional construction, that communities can be judged as backward, anachronistic, out of touch with reality, or living in denial – as is the case with Palestinian demands for the right of return, the Argentinian *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*'s insistence on the living (re)appearance of the *desaparecidos* [the disappeared], calls for reparations for black slavery, and the complaints of victims and survivors of state violence such as the Khulumani Support Group.[33] The construction of a hegemonic referential contemporaneity by historians is used ideologically by dominant interests to create a rupture between a past and a present that effectively undermines communities' experiences of an irrevocable, haunting past, a past that remains in the present along with its concomitant injustices and inequalities.[34]

Wonder Beirut addresses not only the difficulties of reducing a diachronic process to a synchronic instant, but also the complexity of the relationship between text and image, the impossibility of representation, the over-production and distrust of images, and the difficulties inherent in writing histories. When faced with atrocities, cycles of extreme violence and the destruction of hope for a better future, what can we write, what stories can we recount, what images can we show? How can art, cinema, literature or history comprehend and react to such catastrophe and loss?[35] This foregrounding of the failure of representation is evident in the work of other artists and photographers working in Lebanon. Yacoub and Lasserre's photos of Beirut in 1988 were taken alongside a photo-journalist working for Gamma Agency during surveillance operations and fighting. Unlike the journalist's photos, theirs were shot without any particular aim, and like Farah's undeveloped film, they depict 'the non-events of places and things on the peripheries of the war-zone'.[36] They were not meant to tell a story or reproduce the real, and as such suggest not only a withdrawal of tradition, but also the failure of an image to represent the complexity and nuances of reality. How do you make sense of such a situation? How do you embody the plurality of perspectives and voices in a civil war? How can you trust an image to adequately represent all of this?

The failure of narration, the impossibility of accessing a complete narrative and the inevitability of gaps in memory and history is addressed in Lamia Joreige's *Objects of War* (1999–2006) and *Here and Perhaps Elsewhere* (2003). The former is a video installation of a series of testimonials of the Lebanese wars in which the speaker chooses an object as a means of telling their story.[37] While acknowledging that the stories recounted here are held as truth by those narrating them, Joriege points out that these stories simultaneously and perhaps illogically contribute to the creation of a collective memory while also demonstrating the impossibility of telling a single history of the war. A similar point is made by Souheil Bachar, a Lebanese man who was kidnapped in Beirut and held hostage for ten years, at

times with some American captives.[38] In his video testimony, *Hostage: the Bachar Tapes* (2000), that forms part of Walid Ra'ad's *Atlas Group Archive*, Ra'ad produces a 'performative documentary fiction' in which Bachar notes that five books were published by the five Americans held for twenty-seven weeks with him in the same small room.[39] He asks why five books were published of the same event, and answers that it is because each man experiences things differently and will therefore tell a different story.[40]

Joreige's *Here and Perhaps Elsewhere* is a documentary-style video in which she walks along the former Green Line that divided Beirut, tries to locate the position of the various checkpoints from archival newspaper photographs and asks residents if they knew anyone who was kidnapped or killed by militias during the war.[41] Her questions are met with distrust, refusal and deflection. They are answered with stories 'visceral and vague, on and off the point. They slip between fact and fiction, between what seems to be a straightforward recollection of past events and what is clearly an interpretation of memories performed in the present'.[42] Finally, one couple tells her the story of her own uncle's disappearance, but in its brevity we wonder whether their story is true, or are they simply telling her what she wants to hear? As such this work acknowledges that not only is the collation of all testimonies and documents relating to a particular event an impossibility, but 'some facts, dramas, and experiences will never reach us and will remain unspoken, buried [we can only] presume that they are there, yet missing'.[43] To respond to these gaps, Joreige assembles and interweaves documentary practices – archival footage and eyewitness testimony – with fictional narratives and more artistic styles in her work in order to 'restore an essential speech . . . [t]o make visible and audible speech that has been willingly or unwillingly concealed or simply ignored'.[44]

This recalls Hadjithomas and Joreige's, as well as Jacir's, use of the anecdotal and the counter/actual.[45] Here the anecdotal is not metaphoric; it is instead symptomatic. The symptomatic cannot and should not be reduced to a symbol or allegory; it is not a micro-history trying to reflect a larger history. It is a way of appropriating history, producing a counter-narrative to dominant forms of representation, a way of narrating a subversive, unofficial history; a history that is not totalising or universal, that does not seek to consign the past to the past, nor establish a singular, collective memory; a history that does not endeavour to establish fixed or transhistorical identities; a history that 'perforates [the] official frame' and affirms a presence, a complex, contested, ever-changing, plural presence; a history that 'produces meaning in the present'.[46]

The anecdotal, the secret and the forgotten combines with archival material and art in Hadjithomas and Joreige's *The Lebanese Rocket Society – A Tribute to Dreamers* (2011–2013), a project that includes a documentary film entitled *Lebanese Rocket Society: the Strange Tale of the Lebanese Space Race* (2012), as well as a series of installations including performance, a reproduction of the *Cedar IV* rocket, photography, textiles and archiving practices that emerged from their research into the long-forgotten Lebanese involvement with the space race and rocket research in the early 1960s. Under the leadership of Prof. Manoug Manougian, a group of students built

and launched more than ten rockets designed for space study and exploration until their project was terminated, an event concomitant with the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967.[47] Although these launches made the front pages of Lebanese newspapers and the *Ceder IV* rocket was chosen as the image for a postage stamp celebrating the twenty-first anniversary of Lebanese independence in 1964, the story of Manougian and the Lebanese Rocket Society is largely absent from history and collective memory – it is nothing more than an anecdote. While the Lebanese wars destroyed many material archives, was the loss of this episode from memory an instance of withdrawal? A response to the loss of a sense of possibility? Hadjithomas and Joreige's interest in this long-lost project does not take the form of nostalgia for a past golden age, but instead explores the significance of its absence from memory today. They are concerned with how past narratives structure and constrain our imaginaries, how they affect our imagination of the future, how they reinforce mythologies and meta-narratives, but also how they could be used to liberate people from overwhelming mythologies. In a time when the term *rocket* has become a synonym for missile, and the idea of Lebanese scientists working on space research seems inconceivable, they wanted to capture a moment in which a different future was possible, a moment full of hope, a moment before the defeat of 1967 transformed the Arab world and overwhelmed the possibilities of past futures. Joreige comments that '[s]uch a space adventure seems nearly inconceivable today, impossible even to imagine', but it is this 'impossible representation' of the counter/actual that interests both of them. They want to deconstruct 'the mythologies of the 1960s by questioning our memory of this time period, our representations of it and of ourselves' and use the past to create a space in which a future of possibilities and dreams becomes available. As Hadjithomas argues, '[c]inema and art can be a place of resistance, enlarge territories, they can open roads even symbolically for a very short time'.[48]

The invention of tradition: the invention of the nation

A national art gallery together with a national museum has been for some time an intrinsic part of the nation-state heritage package.[49] While some historians acknowledge the contingent, always-performed nature of national identity and the role that museums, archaeology and histories play in this imagination, artists often offer a more self-reflexive analysis that problematises the role of the narrator while also foregrounding the subjectivity and fluidity of our narrations of the world both past and present. Yto Barrada's film *Faux depart (False Start)* questions the veracity of artefacts in the context of modern museology and asks whether authenticity is really necessary for the production of identities.[50] By exploring palaeontology in Morocco, she asks not only how a history might be fabricated, but also how archaeology, the act of digging, reveals the construction and artifice of national heritage and thus foregrounds 'the notion of history as a constructed sphere, constantly in flux, simultaneously being buried and excavated'.[51] Similarly, in her *Dinosaur Road* series, Barrada raises questions about both authenticity and the invention of traditions, particularly those surrounding the geo-political construct of the nation-state,

and explores the role that national museums and palaeontology have played in the articulation of nationalist identities.[52]

The power of a fictitious past to supplant present memories of another past; the ability of the unreal to supercede, erase or replace the real; the idea 'that myth and fiction have a constitutive effect on history and political reality' is also explored by Larissa Sansour in her new work, the last in her trilogy of science-fiction short films, *In the Future, They Ate from the Finest Porcelain*.[53] The film is a montage of archival photographs, live action and computer-generated imagery. Using the genre of science fiction, Sansour explores the close relationship between archaeology, history, museology and state-making; she problematises the arbitrary notion of a fact-fiction dichotomy; and provides an insightful commentary on Middle Eastern politics. The film begins with the leader of a 'narrative resistance' group and self-styled 'narrative terrorist' talking to a psychiatrist about the group's undertaking to bury deposits of porcelain in the ground for future archaeologists to find. The aim of the resistance group is to influence history, to create a new reality and support future claims by their postulated descendants to their currently occupied and vanishing lands. The porcelain fragments are thus future archaeological remains, a means of 'establishing facts in the ground, [and] de facto creating a nation'.[54] Just like Jorge Luis Borges' 'benevolent secret society' of encyclopaedists, the narrative resistance recognise 'the indisputable advantages of a fictitious past' and seek to create an imagined world, a new reality by way of the unreal, making use of Tlönian objects in the form of porcelain fragments.[55] Moreover, the use of porcelain fragments by Sansour recalls the significance that pottery had for Zionist archaeologists, for many of whom it functioned as an emblem of continuity and a signifier of the lasting presence of Jewish communities in Palestine; '[p]ottery is not pottery, it *is* Eretz Yisrael'.[56] As discussed in Chapter 1, it was with Albright's identification of pottery shards as specifically "Israelite pottery" that 'a body of evidence in which the ancient – *the historical* – nation would henceforth inhere' was generated.[57]

Sansour's work is a critique not only of the role that archaeology and history play in state-making as epistemologies that shape and legitimise national identities, but also their roles as tools of warfare and occupation. In the film the idea of archaeology as a tool of occupation and colonisation is reified through the weaponisation of historical artefacts and archaeological evidence: airplanes dropping bombs that open and scatter pottery over the landscape. The weaponisation of archaeological evidence is not simply an artistic conceit; the discipline of archaeology (and history) has been on the frontline in conflict over land for more than a hundred and fifty years. Colonisation and military occupations are often accompanied by legitimising narratives that through the "evidence" of archaeology either imagine a new settler population as the direct descendants of communities who inhabited the land many centuries before or establish that ancient monuments were not built by the ancestors of the colonised native population, thereby demonstrating their inferiority and the necessity of colonial intervention.[58]

While the dystopian landscape that Sansour depicts in this film could be anywhere, certain elements secure it firmly in the context of the Israeli occupation and

colonisation of Palestine. The porcelain that is buried is decorated with the pattern of the Palestinian *keffiyeh*, a symbol of Palestinian nationalism; the two girls and older women who appear in the film wear traditional nineteenth-century Palestinian dress; and the montage of armed forces we see towards the end are Ottoman, British and Israeli soldiers – pointing to the ongoing occupation of the region of Palestine.[59] An intertwining of archaeology, history and religious scripture has played a significant role in legitimising the twentieth-century Israeli colonisation of Palestine and in delegitimising Palestinian claims to the land. Just as with *Tlön*, Israeli archaeology and history in conjunction with the physical destruction of Palestinian remains – villages, archives, photographs, people – erases and replaces Palestinian stories so that in the future they will have become completely unreal and fictional.

In the Future, They Ate from the Finest Porcelain undermines the idea that history and archaeology establish neutral facts, arguing instead that a fact is a malleable notion and that the occupation of territory, the establishment of a nation-state and the rejection of the claims of others to contested lands requires the imposition of fictions, not the establishment of fact. The power to control the narrative, rather than any claim to truth, ensures historical legitimacy. This power means that '[w]hat starts out as farfetched poetry soon enough presents itself as fact'. While the resistance leader 'used to see archive and documentary as shortcuts to a truth-based counter-measure to the versions of history written by [her] rulers', now she doesn't – 'truth is beside the point'. Her project is 'not about getting history right, but about making it useful'. Archival resources – historical and archaeological *evidence* – don't tell you what happened, they 'don't depict history, history is the story we tell about these photos and this story was never immune to fiction, religion, folklore or myths'; telling this story *is* a 'narrative intervention'.[60] But the privileged institutional position of archaeology (and one could argue history too), its control over, and designation as, a hegemonic discourse confirms the 'myths of the past and defends them against scrutiny'.[61] Repetition, particularly repetition in discourses legitimised by the epistemologies of those in power, provides the best camouflage for myth. When these epistemologies are conflated with religious persuasion, the result is even more compelling. The film, through its intertextual references to the Turin Shroud and the Last Supper, foregrounds the way in which in the context of Israeli colonialism, religious narratives are used to determine the physical geo-political boundaries of a modern nation-state. To what extent then is the co-option of the *fiction* of burying porcelain as a means of claiming future entitlement or ownership of land different from the *fiction* of using archaeology to reify and legitimise myths and religious stories to create the *fiction* of a continuity and ontological bond between people living thousands of years ago and people today?

Whereas Sansour's work foregrounds the fiction in the facts, Walid Ra'ad's work in *The Atlas Group Archive* illustrates the 'facts in fiction', the creation of the real through the unreal.[62] *The Atlas Group Archive* is a collection by Walid Ra'ad that documents the Lebanese civil war in images, text, video and other documents organised into an archive and accompanied by various installations, publications

of visual and literary essays, and lectures/performances.[63] The stated aim of the archive is to 'locate, preserve, study, and produce audio, visual, literary and other artifacts that shed light on the contemporary history of Lebanon. In this endeavor, we produced and found several documents'.[64] The various notebooks, photographs, and videos presented in the archive problematise our unquestioning reliance on form when judging which texts can be used to ascertain the *truth*. They at once look like archival materials but simultaneously do not. "Already Been in a Lake of Fire", one of the notebooks from the Fakhouri File recording cars used in car bombings, and "Let's Be Honest the Weather Helped", a notebook from the Raad File documenting bullets and shrapnel found, suggest that the documentary facts we get from historical evidence and the sources themselves really tell us nothing; our contextualisation, interpretation and use of this information creates a story.[65]

The photograph is often thought to be a historical form of evidence par excellence, but with Ra'ad's photographs of the 1982 Israeli invasion, the issue is not whether they are fictional – whether the explosions, planes and soldiers depicted were *real* – it is instead that photographs, despite our tendency to interpret them as having mimetic properties, are still interpretations, viewpoints that require interpretation. The series of photographs in the archive *Secrets in the Open Sea*, for example, reverses our notion of the photograph as an index and marker of reality. The file consists of six large photographic prints that were ostensibly found under rubble during the 1992 demolition of the war-ravaged commercial districts of Beirut. The Lebanese government ostensibly donated the prints to the Atlas Group for preservation and analysis. While the prints were undergoing analysis in France and the U.S., the laboratories found hidden in the prints small group portraits of men and women who, it turns out, were all individuals who had been found dead in the Mediterranean between 1975 and 1990.[66] Through this series of photographs, Ra'ad problematises the notion of an easily readable image: photographs do not reveal reality; they do not provide evidence of what really happened and, perhaps more importantly, what is not photographed, catalogued or narrated does not therefore, not exist. The 'blurred, never-on-time, always-to-the-side images' that Ra'ad produced as part of *The Atlas Group Archive* not only problematise the possibility of representation and the difficulties inherent in using a synchronic image to narrate the diachronic, but they are also indicative of Toufic's withdrawal of tradition, or as Ra'ad says, they 'may have been due to the withdrawal of reality itself'.[67]

The choice to present his work in a factual or documentary format foregrounds the slippage between the historical and fictional. Ra'ad places invented memories in his archive to challenge and elide the opposition between the two seemingly different narrative structures and genres – history and literature. By urging people to treat the archive's documents as 'hysterical documents', in that they are not based on any one person's memories, testimony or notebooks, but are instead 'fantasies erected from the material of collective memories', he problematises the reductive binaries of fact and fiction, true and false, real and imaginary.[68] While he is concerned with facts, he does not view them as 'self-evident objects that are already present in the world'.[69] He continues that while his documents may ultimately

be imaginary, many of the elements on which they are based originate from 'the historical world'. His choice of representational structure therefore highlights the way memory is performed and history is forged.[70] His work examines the forms in which certain discourses, spaces and modes of address convey an authority and sense of authenticity that works to create an unquestioning sense of legitimacy among audiences. Despite repeatedly emphasising in different times and places that the documents in the archive were produced by himself and attributed to various imaginary individuals, there is a reluctance or inability among audiences to internalise the fictitious nature of the work.[71] This perhaps explains the ease with which the sometimes counter-intuitive 'fictions' of religion, archaeology and history are perceived as incontrovertible fact by people when framed in an authorising, academic or institutional discourse.

The Atlas Group Archive also foregrounds the ways in which such genres in turn lend veracity to, or construct events as *historical* events. Historians' accounts of the Lebanese civil war seek to make sense of events, if only within a political and military framework; they impose an explanatory coherence that for those involved is often absent. Unlike academic histories, which have a tendency to tie up loose ends, to elide or smooth over ruptures, to create the impression of continuity through homogenous narrative, the works by Ra'ad embrace the discontinuity and absence that violent irruptions engender. Historians and histories seek the impossible: to make sense of wars, to determine the truth, to present them as an inevitability given preceding events despite the inevitable falsifications and irreconcilable differences in perspective. Ra'ad's work reminds us that the search for truth in the aftermath of conflict is impossible. The role of art is not to establish the truth, nor to simply demonstrate the perspectivality of narrative, but it is to extend a critical suspicion towards reality itself.

Paul Antick's work resonates with that of *The Atlas Group Archives*; he too situates the facts in fiction, and by employing a documentary style he problematises not only issues surrounding the representation of suffering and poverty, but also the voyeuristic consumption of such pain and inequality in the capitalist economic system. Many of his works describe recovered, partial extracts documenting the relationship between two "research tourists", a photographer named Smith and an anthropologist named Willing.[72] Smith is drawn to photograph places of what might be termed "dark tourism", including Auschwitz-Birkenau, Bhopal, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and Palestine. Willing's interest is in how Smith 'behaves in challenging environments and difficult situations'.[73] In a more recent work, "Three Places I Never Went to When I was Alive", Antick utilises the trope of a damaged, degraded recording, rescued from slightly murky circumstances.[74] Antick is sent video footage, photographs and an audio file by a journalist who received it from a colleague who was, in turn, given it by a "people trafficker" he met on the popular holiday island of Kos while researching a story on the refugee crisis. Having restored and edited the material, Antick has screened the 'quasi-documentary film' that narrates the people trafficker's search through Hungary and Greece for a refugee named Raqqa Ali in a number of situations.[75] While the tenuous nature of

the provenance of the video might encourage audiences to ask questions about its veracity, as with the *Atlas Group Archives* discussed earlier, this does not necessarily happen, demonstrating again that documents framed in already authorised ways (and ostensibly narrated by an eyewitness, an 'actual people trafficker') are automatically accorded a particular status and deemed to provide proof or testimony of an event.[76] Moreover, by "fictionalising" what is already a constructed trope, that of the entrepreneurial people-smuggler, Antick draws attention to the already given and "natural" meta- or explanatory narratives we use to narrate and "make sense" of events.[77] Again, the contrast here is with historians who far from problematising the interpretative frameworks they employ often assume instead that they are universal givens.

Antick also explicitly addresses history as a capitalist commodity, the complex (inter)dependency of the writer/narrator as university employee/lecturer and their role in both the internal university marketplace and the broader neo-liberal knowledge economy, particularly their engagement in promotional exercises that involve the production and transfer of 'knowledge . . . for dissemination beyond the university'.[78] As Davies notes, history, as a technocratic system of knowledge production, 'is meant to demonstrate its effectivity in terms of demonstrable results: as in terms of students' academic success, or of external cash investments in its research projects, or of its public recognition outside the academic institution'.[79] It is history as an 'indispensable information-management technology' that makes universities (and heritage institutions) compliant instruments of socially dominant interests and neo-liberal capitalist ideology, something that historians studiously refuse to interrogate, preferring instead to conceptualise the relationship in a rather benign manner as helping history students acquire useful transferable skills for future employment.[80]

Art as protest – Picasso's *Guernica*

Picasso painted *Guernica* as a commission for the Spanish republican government to be displayed in the Spanish pavilion at the Paris International Exposition in 1937. The works in the Spanish Pavillion, including films by Luis Buñuel and Picasso's *Guernica*, were designed to promote the agricultural, educational and social programmes of the Republic; draw international attention to the horrific civil war unfolding in Spain; and encourage support for the republican fight against Franco's fascist, nationalist forces. *Guernica*, depicting the anguished suffering of the people and animals of Gernika, was a ferocious response to the indiscriminate aerial bombardment of the Basque town of Gernika on 26 April 1937 and the mass killing of civilians by German and Italian warplanes in support of Franco's nationalist forces.[81] Following the Paris Exposition, the painting toured Scandinavia, the U.S. and the UK to generate awareness of the conflict and to raise money for Spanish republican forces as part of the fundraising initiative of the Spanish Relief Campaign. In 1939 the painting came to the Whitechapel Gallery in London, where the suggested price of admission was a small financial donation or a pair of boots. Over 15,000 people visited in the first week.[82] *Guernica* has since become an iconic symbol of

the atrocities of war and the suffering of civilians, and it has been reinvented in a variety of different contexts.[83]

In 1970 the Art Workers' Coalition (AWC) used *Guernica*, which was at that time on display at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) New York, as a backdrop to protest the American invasion of Vietnam and their culpability for the My Lai massacre by unfurling the anti-Vietnam war protest poster *Q. And babies?* in front of it.[84] The AWC had initially reached an agreement with MoMA promising to fund and distribute the poster. However, when MoMA's board of trustees, including Nelson Rockefeller, saw the proofs, the Museum, in a decision similar to that of the Queens Museum discussed earlier, withdrew their support, arguing that the poster was outside the "function" of the museum. Such a decision of course leads one to wonder why Picasso's *Guernica*, which depicts the slaughter of civilians by German and Italian military forces, is within the function of the museum, whereas the slaughter of innocent civilians by the U.S. military is outside of that same function. As a consequence of this decision, the AWC chose to unfurl the poster in front of Picasso's *Guernica*, creating a resonance between the two events. A few years later in 1974, Tony Shafrazi, who was a member of the AWC, spray-painted *Guernica* with the words KILL LIES ALL ostensibly as a protest against the release on bail of U.S. Lieutenant William Calley, who had been convicted for his role in the My Lai massacre.[85] The painting has also been used on a poster by Jasminko Arnautović *9 May – Victory Over Fascism Day?* Here Arnautović juxtaposes the date, the European Union flag and an extract from *Guernica* to draw attention to the resurgence of fascism that occurred as part of the conflicts in the various republics of the former Yugoslavia, in particular Bosnia.[86] As a testament to the painting's value as an icon of peace and to the progress of the peace process between republicans and loyalists in Northern Ireland, a re-creation of the painting was undertaken as a mural on the Falls Road, West Belfast by Mark Ervine in conjunction with republicans and a loyalist.[87]

In 2008–9 Goshka Macuga, an artist known for her art of dis/assembly and her sculptural installations utilising historic objects and documents, was invited by the Bloomberg Commission to create a site-specific artwork or installation for the re-opening of the Whitechapel Gallery inspired by the history of the former library.[88] She produced *The Nature of the Beast* which, in a similar manner to that of Jacir in her installation of *Memorial to 418 Palestinian Villages which were Destroyed, Depopulated and Occupied by Israel in 1948* (2001) at the Queens Museum discussed previously, pieced together a number of seemingly disparate objects to reference and recontextualise a network of past events and key moments in the history of a building and neighbourhood.[89] The specific moment that Macuga decided to elaborate on was the display of Picasso's *Guernica* at the Whitechapel Gallery in 1939. The original painting is too fragile to move, so Macuga took advantage of renovations happening at the United Nations headquarters to request the loan of a tapestry version of *Guernica*, which usually hangs outside the UN Security Council meeting room.[90] Using the tapestry as both a backdrop and a focal point, Macuga hung it in front of a large blue curtain at one end of the former reading room of

the old library. In front of the tapestry she installed a slightly smaller replica of the UN Security Council's circular table. Contained within the table, in eight separate sections was an archive of documents relating to Picasso's *Guernica*. These included information about its display at the Whitechapel Gallery in 1939, attempts by the gallery to borrow the painting in subsequent decades, archival images of anti-fascist demonstrations held in the vicinity of the gallery in the 1930s, and a promotional leaflet from the Watney Street Propaganda Art course from 1938 promising to help you '[i]mprove your propaganda and hasten the progress of the whole Left Movement' as well as other pamphlets advertising courses on poster design, banner-making and typography written by Norman King, a local Communist Party activist and unionist.[91]

But Macuga's installation addresses issues and asks questions that extend beyond the local. The blue curtain hung behind the tapestry evokes and comments on the press conference given by Colin Powell in his role as U.S. Secretary of State in front of the Security Council room after his speech at the UN on 5 February 2003, during which he presented "evidence" of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. During this press conference, the tapestry was covered by a blue curtain, ostensibly at the request of the camera team, but it is hard not to interpret this veiling as an instance of kairological time, as a foretelling and response to the future horrific bombing and slaughter of Iraqi civilians in a conflict that retells, and is diachronically connected to, the aerial bombing not only in Gernika, but to the first use of the mass aerial bombing of civilians: the British aerial bombing of Iraqi and Kurdish villages in British-occupied Mesopotamia in the early 1920s, which was designed to instil terror, impose colonial rule and quell the revolt against British occupation.[92] The connections in Macuga's installation continue with the placement to one side of the tapestry of a bronze Cubist-style bust of Colin Powell holding a vial of anthrax, referencing the speech he made at the UN during which he displayed such a vial in a rhetorical demonstration of just how little anthrax was needed to create widespread death and injury as part of his argument that Saddam Hussein possessed unaccounted-for chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.[93] Again the connection can be made with earlier, colonial attitudes towards chemical weapons, specifically Churchill's comment: 'I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. . . . I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes'.[94] Placed opposite the bust of Powell and in front of an Afghan war rug depicting a map of Iraq, various militarised vehicles and the English-language slogan 'Welcome United States in Iraq' was the projection of a selection of films highlighting the repetitive patterns of war, thus reinforcing the connections between civilian deaths in Spain, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine.[95] In bringing the *Guernica* tapestry to Whitechapel and inserting it into already existing narratives of anti-fascist activism and the 2003 attack on Iraq, Macuga encourages connections to be made between the global 2003 anti-war protests against American and allied aggression and earlier protest movements.[96] However, the work also reminds us how easy it is for an intersection of hegemonic interests, the media and institutional histories to not only silence the voices of ordinary people suffering under

occupation and bombardment, but also to erase memories of collective anti-war action.

Maybe *The Nature of the Beast* also rescues a tapestry that in many ways originated in the belly of capitalism and commodification, commissioned as it was by Nelson Rockefeller so that he could continue to enjoy his Picassos while they were on loan to various museums, and which has, in the intervening years, been consigned to hang outside of the UN Security Council room as 'mere décor for the various forces of reaction'?[97] As a response to the often incestuous relationship between the art world, political power and economic wealth, Macuga produced her own tapestry as a museological critique: *On the Nature of the Beast* (2009). The tapestry was a response to an event celebrating the opening of an expansion to the Whitechapel Gallery at which Prince William spoke to a group of wealthy donors, including some who had made their fortune in the arms trade.[98] This tapestry depicts Prince William giving his speech in front of the Guernica tapestry watched by numerous dignitaries, donors, politicians, key figures from the art world and Macuga herself. While all look towards Prince William on the podium, only Macuga has turned away – a critique by the artist on her own work and how easy it is for political meaning and dissent to be circumvented or neutralised by hegemonic interests.[99] She acknowledges the inexorable complicity of the artist in mitigating the critical potential of their work through their engagement with the structures and institutions of patronage and dissemination. This tapestry of a tapestry of a painting provides another layer of commentary on the complicated reticulation of power relations and the intersection of capitalism, elites, politics and art.[100]

The Nature of the Beast is situated firmly in archival research. Macuga collates, interprets and displays information about past events, but her work is far from that of institutional histories. Rather than present a linear, totalising narrative that offers an explanation of events, she juxtaposes an often surprising dynamic aggregate of 'elements in a discursive and archaeologically creative practice' from which a 'historical meaning might emerge [but] not as a set of 'true' facts but rather as forms of intensity and agency through story-telling and palimpsest'.[101] In telling a story – not a history – Macuga foregrounds the interpretative role of the author-creator-artist. By including the fictional in the factual (for example, the tapestry hangs outside the UN Security Council room, not inside it as might be suggested by her installation), she acknowledges the possibilities of other interpretations.[102] She does not simply seek to tell a history about *Guernica*, or the invasion of Iraq, nor does she just create parallels between two instances of mass civilian slaughter, although both conflicts have proven to be extraordinarily complex – conflicts in which alliances between factions were fluid and unexpected, where events were unpredictable and there was no easy resolution. Instead, her interconnected, layered stories seek to reflect on how historical perspectives and truth criteria for judging discourse change over time, and how explications of events are never fixed and immutable. While historians have a tendency to simplify the multiple meanings that make an event or action intelligible in a single, explanatory narrative, artists have a greater freedom to complicate, multiply and intertwine possible explanations. Macuga's *The Nature of the*

Beast offers a narrative of war and propaganda, misinformation and manipulation; it questions our representations of war, the links between art and socio-political struggle, and the commodification and appropriation of art by reactionary forces while still holding out a hope that art offers a possibility and space for collective activism and political action – a hope reified in the open invitation to groups to hold meetings around the circular table in front of the tapestry during the period of the installation.[103] As such, the work 'functions as a platform for negotiating democracy on several levels': from the provision of a space for community groups to hold meetings, to its foregrounding of the complicity of museums and galleries in art-washing neo-liberal, totalitarian democracy-capitalism and perpetuating the fiction of neo-liberal consensus politics.[104]

The possibility of art providing a space for collective organisation and protest is also manifested in *Remaking Picasso's Guernica*, a communal project by activists and artists who remade Picasso's *Guernica* as a sewn and stitched banner.[105] As with Jacir's refugee tent, the project brought together hundreds of people who, as they cut and sewed, discussed politics and violence, new types of fascism, apartheid policies and the indiscriminate use of aerial bombardment against civilians. As with Picasso's *Guernica*, it is both a work of art and a tool of protest and has been used in numerous protests against war and racism, including a march against the English Defence League (EDL), a protest against a weapons component factory, and four protests against the aerial bombardment of civilians in Gaza.[106] Just as with the original painting, it has also been used as a gathering point for donations, in this instance to help refugees living in camps in Calais and Dunkirk.

As a consequence of making the Guernica banner, some of those involved got to hear of the work of a Norwegian textile artist, Lise Bjorne Linnert, who has initiated an international art project *Desconocida Unkown Ukjent*, which uses art installations to protest against the murder of women in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico – a town in the killing fields of the U.S.–Mexico borderlands.[107] The project organises workshops around the globe where participants sew two nametapes, one with the name of a murdered young girl or woman and one with the word *unknown* embroidered in their own language to remember victims of similar crimes around the world. Like *Remaking Picasso's Guernica*, this project too is democratic; it involves taking the time to stitch and remember, and it provides a space for people to talk and protest. The project will continue for as long as women are murdered in this region and nothing is done about it.

The deaths of these women are unlikely to ever be included in an institutional history. Despite the protestations that institutionalised history is no longer solely focused on the activities of elites, and that "history from below" concerns itself with the subaltern, histories still rarely actually focus on the lives of the marginalised. Historians are not interested in the aftermath of violence and catastrophe; they extrapolate from and imagine the conditions that led to the event, the detailed political and military decisions that were part of it. History *has* to make sense of events to provide existential reassurance that 'there is a meaning, direction and purpose in human action', but what sense can be made out of such slaughter that

would be meaningful for anyone who has experienced it?[108] Histories provide statistics of those killed, displaced or wounded, but they rarely consider what happened to those affected, or the meaning this had for them. And as it is historical scholarship that defines and projects what is worthy of public recognition, the lives and deaths of these people are 'too anecdotal for their imprint to appear in the archives of history'; they do 'not have enough weight to become "news"', much like the undocumented accidental deaths of people killed by stray [distracted] bullets in Lebanon every year as a result of guns fired in celebration that Hadjithomas and Joreige explore in *Distracted Bullets, Symptomatic Video Number 1*.[109] Moreover, what use in the present are histories of the working classes of late-nineteenth-century London? What use are explanations for the oppression and abuses of colonialism? What use is it to put the untimely deaths of the working poor in mines in context, when such practices are still perpetuated today and the poor continue to suffer and die? Many artists use invocations of the historical to explore or unpack particular socio-cultural stories. They interact with, narrate and explore past events as a means of challenging perceptions and reflecting on habits of thinking that have sedimented and naturalised. They work with the past to the extent that it can 'allow [us] to live well in the present'.[110] The art installations discussed in this chapter offer a way of looking *otherwise* at hegemonic practices and provide new articulations to challenge or question them.

Institutional history constructs itself as a discourse that embodies a disinterested universalism that enables it to provide an overview of reality, and in doing so it makes claims to an ultimately unobtainable epistemological privilege predicated on its ability to represent. It ignores the cacophony of contesting and conflicted voices in favour of a simplified, totalising narrative that necessarily excludes and closes down the imagination of alternative possible futures. In contrast to history's almost pathological refusal to engage in critical reflection, the art practices, installations, photographs and films discussed here have speculated on the failure of representation and challenged the claims to truth and the representational totality that is inherent in the institutional discourse of history. The artists have highlighted and critiqued the "irreversible past" as the dominant chronosophy of historicity; deconstructed the way in which histories are intricately bound up with relations of power, ontologies and processes of legitimisation; and consciously explored and interrogated the mechanisms behind the imagination and performance of identities. They have utilised archival sources as a means of engaging in debates about identity, regional politics, possible futures, the politics of collective memory, forgetting, memorialisation and the possibilities of representation. They have emphasised the heuristic benefit of plurality, contestation and intervention and worked to produce a critical art practice as a means of engaging with, or changing, 'the contents of public discourse and the contours of public space'.[111] It might well be that institutionalised history as a discourse currently conceptualised and practiced lacks the flexibility to reinvent itself. Perhaps, paraphrasing Walid Sadek, if we are to engage in serious debates, we need 'different strategies for [the] dissemination' of politically useful past-talk.[112]

Notes

1 Omar Kholeif, "Europa: Performance, Narration and Reconstitution," in *Emily Jacir. Europa*, ed. Emily Jacir and Omar Kholeif (London: Prestel, 2013), 16.
2 Ibid., 16 and 18.
3 Walid Khalidi, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006).
4 John Menick, "Undiminished Returns: the Work of Emily Jacir 1998–2002," in *Emily Jacir. Belongings: Arbeiten/Works 1998–2003*, ed. Emily Jacir, Stella Rollig and Genoveva Rückert (Vienna: Folio Verlag, 2004), 25, last accessed 28/11/17 http://johnmenick.com/writing/emily-jacir.html.
5 Fazal Sheikh, *Memory Trace* (Göttingen: Steidl, 2015).
6 Noga Kadman, *Erased from Space and Consciousness: Israel and the Depopulated Palestinian Villages of 1948* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015). Khalidi, op. cit.; Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: One World, 2006); Salman Abu-Sitta, *The Palestinian Nakba 1948: The Register of Depopulated Localities in Palestine* (London: Palestinian Return Centre, 2000).
7 Sheikh, *Memory*, 5. Sheikh's work *Independence/Nakba* (Göttingen: Steidl, 2015) acknowledges the complexity of narrating an event which for one community is commemorated as independence and the other as a catastrophe or *Nakba*. In 2013, sixty-five years after the war, he took a portrait of a Palestinian and an Israeli born in each year going back to 1948, placing them side-by-side.
8 Menick, "Undiminshed Returns," 33.
9 The comment was apparently made by Nicole Levine and is quoted in an article by Jewish Press staff writer Tzivia Emmer "Propaganda Or Art?" *Miftah* (September 16, 2002), last accessed 28/11/17, www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=1006&CategoryId=5. We have not been able to find a copy of the article on the Jewish Press website. For a reference to the comment, see also Media Farzin, "Emily Jacir: Dispatch," Bidoun "Bazaar. Of Boom and Bust" 20 (Spring 2010), last accessed 27/10/16 http://bidoun.org/articles/emily-jacir and Menick, "Undiminshed Returns." See also Howard Halle, "The Hugo Boss Prize 2008: Emily Jacir," *Time Out New York* 701 (March 5–11, 2009) commenting on Jacir being given the Guggenheim award: '[t]hat such a crude, self-indulgent exercise has been given one of contemporary art's most prestigious awards is unfortunate, though not, sadly, entirely unexpected' and that by Ken Johnson, "Material for a Palestinian's Life and Death," *New York Times* (February 13, 2009) 'if the ultimate point is to arouse humane concern for Palestinians in general, Ms. Jacir's work falls short' both cited in Adila Laïdi-Hanieh, "Destination: Jerusalem Servees – Interview with Emily Jacir," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 40 (2009): 60. For the quote by Rancièrie, see Laïdi-Hanieh, op. cit. 63 citing Rancièrie, *The Politics of Aesthetics* (New York: Continuum, 2004), 62–3.
10 Laïdi-Hanieh, "Destination," 66. Earhart was an aviation pioneer and was the first woman to fly solo across the Atlantic Ocean. She disappeared over the Pacific Ocean in 1937 during an attempt to circumnavigate the globe and was presumed dead.
11 The town of Lydda and surrounding land were designated in the 1947 UN partition plan to be part of the proposed Palestinian state, but in the 1948 war it was captured and occupied by Israeli forces; the surviving population were expelled and denied a right of return, and the land was incorporated into the nascent state of Israel. See Jean Fisher, "Emily Jacir: Visual Poems and Silent Songs," in *Emily Jacir. Europa*, ed. Emily Jacir and Omar Kholeif (London: Prestel, 2013), 29.
12 See Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts' discussion of Vladimir Jankélévitch's use of 'irreversible' and 'irrevocable' pasts in Berber Bevernage and Koen Aerts, "Haunting Pasts: time and historicity as constructed by the Argentine Madres de Plaza de Mayo and radical Flemish nationalists," *Social History* 34/4 (2009); and Berber Bevernage, *History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011) 4–6; see also Chapter 5 in this volume, n. 103 for a discussion of irreversible and irrevocable time.

The UN has passed a number of resolutions recognising the Palestinian right of return; UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (11/12/48) and Resolution 3236 (22/11/74). On waiting see Edward Said, "Emily Jacir," *Grand Street* 72 (2003): 106; this article is also included in *Emily Jacir: Belongings: Arbeiten/Works 1998–2003*, ed. Emily Jacir, Stella Rollig and Genoveva Rückert (Vienna: Folio Verlag, 2004), 48. The difficulties Palestinians in the occupied territories face in moving about their daily business and the endless waiting and abuse that they have to endure at Israeli checkpoints is addressed by Jacir in *Crossing Surda (a record of going to and from work)* (2002). The lack of any freedom of movement for the majority of Palestinians is also explored in *Where We Come From* (2001–03). Here Jacir asks various Palestinians what she can do for them in Palestine, a place that she can travel to but they can't. For example, she goes to Gaza to eat *sayadiyeh* as the person making the request is an Israeli citizen and so can't travel to Gaza; she walks in Nazareth because the person asking has a West Bank I.D. and isn't permitted to travel there; and she visits the families of Palestinians separated between the West Bank and Gaza who are not allowed to travel, Jacir, *Belongings*, 50–9.

13 The injustice and absurdities inherent in Israel's refusal to accept the Palestinian right of return is directly addressed by Jacir, *Sexy Semite* (2000–2002). In this work she places a number of personal ads in the *Village Voice* ostensibly from a Palestinian woman seeking a Jewish man with whom she can move to Israel – the irony being that only by marrying a Jewish man of any nationality can this Palestinian woman return home. This injustice, the ethnocratic nature of Israel and the second-degree status of Palestinian citizens of Israel are further illustrated in the context of 'The Law of Citizenship and Entrance into Israel 2003/544', which decrees that spouses of Palestinian citizens of Israel, if they are from the West Bank or Gaza, are ineligible to become Israeli citizens or to have residency in Israel despite their marriage to a "citizen". Thus, if a Palestinian citizen of Israel marries a Palestinian from territory in effect occupied by Israel, they are not allowed to live together in Israel, Eyal Weizmann, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2012), 155 and n. 52.

14 Bevernage, *History*, 2.

15 Tamir Sorek, "Cautious Commemoration: Localism, Communalism, and Nationalism in Palestinian Memorial Monuments in Israel," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50/2 (2008): 342. In 1983 a monument to commemorate some of the victims of the 1948 *Nakba* was unveiled in 'Ailabun. However, the monument did not use the term *Nakba* nor did it contextualise the event as part of Palestinian history; it in effect denationalised and de-Palestinianised the event and commemoration of it, op. cit. 348. In the years leading up to the fiftieth anniversary of the *Nakba*, and despite the encouragement and organisation of a *Nakba* and Steadfastness committee by the political leadership of Palestinian citizens of Israel, the majority of local Palestinian municipalities in Israel did not build a monument. Of the three which did, only one gained any public recognition as a commemorative site, the monument at Kafr Kana, op. cit. 356–7; another built at 'Ailabun was destroyed by local residents, and one built in Shefa'amr became neglected, op. cit. 350–6. The events of the 2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada, and particularly the killing of twelve Palestinian citizens of Israel by Israeli police, radically affected the attitude of Palestinian citizens of Israel towards commemoration, and the memorial monument was gradually added to the cultural "tool kit" of political protest after this time, 360.

16 Sorek, "Cautious Commemoration," 342–3. On memorial and village books, see Rochelle A. Davies, *Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Disposed* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Susan Slymovics, *The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).

17 Sorek, "Cautious Commemoration," 344. Other factors inhibiting the establishment of memorials remembering the *Nakba* in Israel centre on the fact that Palestinians who are citizens of Israel are a colonised native minority living in an ethnocratic nation-state, which engenders a tension between Palestinian intellectual elites who wish to tie such remembrance to a national consciousness and a larger circle of the Palestinian public who prefer to keep their memories private and not attract negative consequences on

themselves, op. cit. 338–9. Sorek notes examples of Israeli hostility to *Nakba* commemoration and the use of implicit and explicit threats and intimidation from the Israeli state to discourage it: the Israeli Minister of the Interior Eli Yishai threatened to cut off government funding of any local authorities that financed a *Nakba* commemoration, op. cit. 337–8; and in 2001 the Minister of National Infrastructure, Avigdor Liberman, told ministry employees to avoid contact with any public figures who participated in *Nakba* commemorations, op. cit. 363. In addition, a lack of Palestinian public or common space in Israel, the fact that Palestinian society is made up of different religious and ethnic groups, and the association of martyrological monuments with the expression of Israeli identity all work to militate against public commemoration of the *Nakba*, op. cit. 340, 341–2, 364.

18 Sorek, "Cautious Commemoration," 344 quoting Huneida Ghanem's interpretation of Hana Abu Hana's comment, "The Role and Status of Palestinian Intellectuals in Israel," PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2004, in Hebrew, no page numbers given for the two quotes.

19 Sorek, "Cautious Commemoration," 344.

20 Toufic, *Withdrawal*, 60–1. Toufic argues,

> [i]n the case of surpassing disasters, the material loss of many of the treasures of tradition not only through destruction but also through theft to the victor's museums is exacerbated by immaterial withdrawal. Basing themselves on what has been resurrected, some of those who belong to the community of the surpassing disaster can contest the version of history edited by the victors, who, not being part of the community of the surpassing disaster, have the advantage that the works and documents are available to them without having to resurrect them.

See also Toufic's example of the American architect Lebbeus Woods, who noticed the ruins in Sarajevo after the war and suggested in a book that they be integrated into future reconstructions of the city. In contrast, those from the community that experienced the surpassing disaster are likely to be oblivious to the book and his recommendations, 61.

21 Chad Elias, "The Museum Past the Surpassing Disaster. Walid Raad's Projective Futures," in *Dissonant Archives. Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 218. See also Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige, "Wonder Beirut," in *Out of Beirut*, ed. Suzanne Cotter (Oxford: Modern Art Oxford, 2006), 77.

22 Toufic, *Withdrawal*, 58.

23 Ibid., 65–6.

24 Ibid., 62.

25 See http://cdn.hadjithomasjoreige.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/WB-story.pdf and http://cdn.hadjithomasjoreige.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/WB-cartes.pdf and also http://hadjithomasjoreige.com/the-novel-of-a-pyromaniac-photographer/ last accessed 18/10/16.

26 http://hadjithomasjoreige.com/historical-process/ last accessed 18/10/16.

27 Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige, "The Story of a Pyromanic Photographer," *Cabinet* 16 (2004/05): 37.

28 Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige, Part 3: latent Images http://hadjithomasjoreige.com/latent-images/ last accessed 2/1/16.

29 Toufic, *Withdrawal*, 74.

30 Ibid., 72.

31 Ibid., 74.

32 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provicializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). For a wider discussion of this topic, see Berber Bevernage, "Tales of Pastness and Contemporaneity: On the Politics of Time in History and Anthropology," *Rethinking History* 20/3 (2016).

33 Bevernage, "Tales of Pastness," especially 355, 371–2; Bevernage and Aerts, "Haunting Pasts,"; Kenan Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents: A Study of the Debates Around Reparations

for Slavery in the United States and France, the Post-Racial Era and the Age of Commemoration," (PhD diss., University of Ghent, 2015); Berber Bevernage, "Writing the Past Out of the Present: History and the Politics of Time in Transitional Justice," *History Workshop Journal* 69 (2010): especially 126. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo are a group of women who have organised a movement fighting for justice in the name of their children who were among the 30,000 *desaparecidos* who disappeared during the brutal military dictatorship in Argentina 1976–1983. The Khulumani Support Group is an organisation of more than 100,000 victims and survivors of human-rights abuses in apartheid-era South Africa. They work to spearhead 'healing and memory, the struggle for reparations, and active citizenship in countries transitioning out of conflict' www.khulumani.net/khulumani/about-us.html last accessed 7/11/16. In a South African context, they challenge the official claim that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 1990s adequately addressed and compensated for the injustices of the apartheid era and fight for more inclusive change and a more just society. See Chapter 3 in the present volume for a more detailed discussion of historical presents and the slavery reparations movements in the United States and France.

34 As noted in Chapter 1 in the context of Zionist archaeology, the notion of the irrevocable past and concepts of time that challenge linear, secular time can be just as easily employed to support narratives of settler-colonial expansion and land appropriation with the concomitant disenfranchisement and dislocation of an indigenous population, as they can be used to challenge hegemonic interests.

35 Hadjithomas and Joreige's response to these questions is their film, *Je Veux Voir [I Want to See]* (2008) http://hadjithomasjoreige.com/i-want-to-see/ last accessed 18/10/16.

36 Paola Yacoub and Michel Lasserre, "A Brief Journey Towards Scepticism," in *Out of Beirut*, ed. Suzanne Cotter (Oxford: Modern Art Oxford, 2006), 9–10. See also the essay by Cotter, "Beirut Unbound" op. cit. 28.

37 www.lamiajoreige.com/installations/installations_objects.php last accessed 3/11/16.

38 Files Type A: Bachar www.theatlasgroup.org/data/TypeA.html last accessed 3/11/16. For a more detailed discussion of the *Atlas Group Archives* see following paragraphs.

39 Quote is from Simon Harvey, "Smuggling Practices into the Image of Beirut," in *Out of Beirut*, ed. Suzanne Cotter (Oxford: Modern Art Oxford, 2006), 39.

40 Bachar's testimony also raises interesting questions about the privileging of narratives and viewpoints. While the five Americans published their stories for the world to read, Bachar's narrative is limited to his home video.

41 Lamia Joreige, "Here and Perhaps Elsewhere," in *Out of Beirut*, ed. Suzanne Cotter (Oxford: Modern Art Oxford, 2006), 18–22, 18. www.lamiajoreige.com/films/films_houna.php last accessed 3/11/16.

42 Kaelen Wilson-Goldie, "Contemporary Art Practices in Post-war Lebanon: An Introduction," in *Out of Beirut*, ed. Suzanne Cotter (Oxford: Modern Art Oxford, 2006), 82–3.

43 Joreige, "Here and Perhaps Elsewhere," 18.

44 Ibid.

45 The phrase was used in discussions at the Counter[f]actual Strategies in History Writing, Literature, and Arts workshop at Jagiellonian University, Poland 16–17 November 2017. We use the term to describe not that which is fictional, but that which speaks otherwise to a particular society's hegemonic or widely accepted narratives. We understand narrating otherwise to be a practice similar to Simon's 'remembering otherwise', Roger I. Simon, *A Touch of the Past: Remembrance, Learning, and Ethics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) passim. We are grateful to all those involved with the workshops for contributing to our understanding of the possible uses and meanings of the counterfactual and the counter/actual in a variety of genres and contexts.

46 Hadjithomas and Joreige, "Wonder Beirut," 77 and extract from an e-mail by Tony Chakar, quoted in Stephen Wright, "Territories of Difference: excerpts from an e-mail exchange between Tony Chakar, Bilal Khbeiz and Walid Sadek," in *Out of Beirut*, ed. Suzanne Cotter (Oxford: Modern Art Oxford, 2006), 64.

47 http://hadjithomasjoreige.com/the-lebanese-rocket-society/ last accessed 3/11/16. In his curriculum vitae, Prof. Manougian notes that between 1960 and 1966 he ran a

student program at Haigazian College, Beirut called Haigazian College Rocket Society, http://math.usf.edu/faculty/data/manougian_cv.pdf last accessed 28/11/17. In an interview with Mehr Nadeem for *The Politic* he talks more about the society, last accessed 28/11/17, http://thepolitic.org/an-interview-with-dr-manoug-manougian-former-leader-of-the-lebanese-rocket-society/; see also an interview with Rashed Aqrabawi, "Lebanon's Forgotte Space Race: In 1961, Manoug Manougian Aimed the Middle East at the Stars," *Motherboard* 17 July 2013, last accessed 28/11/17 https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/pggn4y/lebanons-forgotten-space-race-in-1961-manoug-manougian-aimed-the-middle-east-at-the-stars

48 A conversation with Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige, in *Summer, Autumn, Winter . . . and Spring. Conversations with Artists from the Arab World*, ed. Sam Bardaouil and Till Fellrath (Milan: Skira, 2014), 70–1.

49 They are of course also a manifestation or symbol of neo-liberal "corporate globalization" and are aimed as much at an international tourist market as their own citizens. See Elias, "The Museum," 215 discussing in particular Abu Dhabi's massive investment in its cultural district on Saadiyat Island.

50 See Omar Kholeif, "Before History," in *Before History: The Abraaj Group Art Prize 2015*, vol.1 (Dubai: Sternberg Press and The Abraaj Group, 2015).

51 Omar Kholeif, "Faux Depart (False Start)," in *Before History: The Abraaj Group Art Prize 2015*, ed. Yto Barrada, vol.2 (Dubai: Sternberg Press and The Abraaj Group, 2015), 7.

52 For more on this series, see Nicole Maturo, "Along the Dinosaur Road: A conversation with Yto Barrada," *Aperture* (March 29, 2016), last accessed 3/11/16, http://aperture.org/blog/along-dinosaur-road-conversation-yto-barrada/.

53 Larissa Sansour and Soren Lind, *In the Future, They Ate from the Finest Porcelain* (2015); see also Sansour and Lind, "In the Future, They Ate from the Finest Porcelain (extended consultation)," *Ibraaz* (May 6, 2016), last accessed 7/11/16, www.ibraaz.org/projects/130#.

54 www.ibraaz.org/projects/130# last accessed 7/11/16

55 Jorge Luis Borges in the postscript of his short story "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius", describes a 'benevolent secret society' of encyclopedists who work to create an imagined world, a new reality named Tlön by way of the unreal – a comprehensive, but fictional encyclopedia. With the publication of this encyclopedia, the language, culture and history of Tlön becomes increasingly influential and gradually begins to supersede the existing languages, culture and history of Earth. Jorge Luis Borges, "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" in idem., *Fictions* (London: Penguin, 1998), 20–5. Quote is from W.G. Sebald, *The Rings of Saturn* (London: Vintage Books, 2002), 71.

56 Shmue'l Yeivin, *Ha-Kinus ha-Rishon le-Yedi'at ha-Aretz* [The first Yedi'at ha-Aretz conference] (Jerusalem: ha-Hevrah ha-'Ivrit le-Haqirat Eretz Yisrael ve-'Atiqoteha, 1967), 60–1 quoted in Nadia Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-fashioning in Israeli Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 59, emphasis is ours, see also Abu El-Haj, op. cit. 74.

57 Abu El-Haj, ibid. 105 and 111, n. 11.

58 For an example of the first case, see the discussion in Chapter 1 on the Israeli use of archaeology and for the second case, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 181 where he gives the example of the Dutch East Indies and Burma.

59 The same porcelain also features at the end of Sansour, *Nation Estate* (2012).

60 Sansour and Lind, "In the Future."

61 Ibid.

62 Phrase used by Ra'ad to describe the documents contained in *The Atlas Group Archive* "In Conversation: Walid Raad with Seth Cameron," *The Brooklyn Rail*, 9/12/2015, last accessed, 28/11/17 www.brooklynrail.org/2015/12/art/walid-raad-with-seth-cameron. Ra'ad always makes clear that the Atlas Group is an imaginary foundation and that he has produced the documents and attributed them to imaginary individuals. However, the institutional authority of the lecture or gallery space work to produce an "authenticity

effect" of sorts to the extent that audiences often react to the *Atlas Group Archive* as comprising found, "non-fictional" or "factual" documents. "Walid Ra'ad by Alan Gilbert," *Bomb Magazine* 81 (October 1, 2001), last accessed 28/11/17, https://bombmagazine.org/articles/walid-raad/ also available as "Walid Raad. Interview with Alan Gilbert," in *Documentary*, ed. Jullian Stallabrass (Whitechapel: documents of contemporary art, 2013).

63 Ra'ad has argued that '[i]t is difficult for us to speak of the Lebanese Civil War, and we prefer to speak of the wars in Lebanon'. In an interview with Alan Gilbert in 2002, he qualified this to say that he now prefers to refer to 'the history of Lebanon of the past fifty years with particular emphasis on the history of Lebanon since 1975' in Julian Stallabrass, *Documentary* (London: Whitechapel Gallery and the MIT Press, 2013), 194–97, 195–6.

64 www.theatlasgroup.org/index.html

65 Files Type A: Fakhouri: "Already Been in a Lake of Fire_Notebook Volume 38" is a notebook by Fakhouri in which he includes cut-out photographs of 145 cars which correspond to the exact make, model and colour of each car used as a car bomb between 1975 and 1991. Next to the cut-outs are the details of the place, time and date of the explosion, the number of casualties, type of explosives used and exploded car's engine and axle numbers. Files Type A: Raad: "Let's be Honest the Weather Helped" is a notebook in which Ra'ad kept notes on every bullet he found, including a photograph of its location and a record of the hues on the bullet tips. www.theatlasgroup.org/data/TypeA.html last accessed 12/10/16.

66 Files Type FD: The Secrets File: "Secrets in the Open Sea," last accessed 28/11/17, www.theatlasgroup.org/data/TypeFD.html; see also Griffith, "Walid Raad and Andrea Geer."

67 See discussion of Hadjithomas and Joreige on pages xx–xx; "Walid Raad. Interview with Alan Gilbert," 197.

68 Ibid., 195.

69 Ibid., 194.

70 Sarah Rogers, "Forging History, Performing Memory: Walid Ra'ad's the Atlas Project", *Parachute: Contemporary Art Magazine*, 1/10/2002.

71 "Walid Raad. Interview with Alan Gilbert," 194.

72 Paul Antick, "Smith in Palestine (to be read aloud, in its entirety)," *Journal of Visual Communication* 9/3 (2012) is based on what remains of a short film shot by Willing that was almost completely destroyed by Smith when they returned from Palestine. Antick, "Bhopal to Bridgehampton: Schema for a Disaster Tourism Event," *Journal of Visual Culture* 12/1 (2013) is based on a short story written by Willing in 2010 including photographs by Smith. Again this story was almost destroyed by Smith during a violent confrontation with Willing. Paul Antick, "Smith's Tour Favela," in *Transcultural Montage*, ed. Christian Suhr and Rane Willerslev (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013) is based on selected extracts from a notebook by Smith and some of his photographs put together by an unknown person who accompanied Smith on eight tours of Rocinha in 2008 and stole Smith's notebook when he found him face-down in a Rio side street, 106, n. 1. The quote is from Kennedy Saldanha and Lisa Klopfer, "On Seeing Monkeys, Cows, and Beggars: Between Ethnography and Tourism," *Cultural Studies – Critical Methodologies* 14/4 (2014): 324–32, 324 cited in Paul Antick "Smith at Auschwitz. Research Product #5," Photographies 63. This work is based on Willing's '"analysis" of Research Product #4 (RP4), a public art project by Smith that makes explicit reference to Holocaust tourism in Poland' Antick, op. cit. 63.

73 Antick, "Smith in Palestine," 3. See also Antick, "Smith at Auschwitz."

74 Paul Antick, "Three Places I Never Went to When I was Alive," *Liminalities* 12/5 (2016), last accessed 14/12/16, http://liminalities.net/12-5/3places.html

75 The film was shown in June 2016 at the University of Roehampton, see Antick "Three Places"; and also at Pasts without History: politics and the practical past, a two-day symposium organised by the authors at St Mary's University, 21–22 June 2016. For

the phrase 'quasi-documentary film', see Andrew Wilford, Jonathan Skinner and Paul Antick, "Terror and the Tour: Introduction," *Liminalities* 12/5 (2016): 1–9, 7.

76 Antick, "Three Places."

77 See the comment by one of Antick's (perhaps equally "fictional"?) students who notes that

> [c]onversations . . . often endeavour to attribute the cause of the crisis to the people traffickers' entrepreneurial daring, as opposed to, for example, the ongoing civil war in Syria; the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the USA, Great Britain (and significant others); and the invasion of Libya in 2012, to name but a few of the events that have apparently caused millions of people across several continents to recently flee their homes in abject desperation.
>
> Antick, "Three Places"

78 Specifically, Antick, "Smith at Auschwitz," but also Antick, "Bhopal to Bridgehampton."

79 Martin Davies, *How History Works. The Reconstitution of a Human Science* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 53.

80 Martin Davies, *Imprisoned by History: Aspects of a Historicized Life* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 57 and 61; Martin Davies, *Historics: why History Dominates Contemporary Society* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 133. For more on the way in which history degree curricula in UK universities are increasingly organised around a dominant managerialist discourse of skills, personal development and learning outcomes, see Mark Donnelly and Claire Norton, "In the Service of Technocratic Managerialism? History in UK Universities," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 49/6 (2017).

81 Gernika is the Basque spelling of Guernica.

82 Cynthia Bronson Altman, "Picasso's Guernica, and the Tapestry it Inspired," in *Goshka Macuga: The Nature of the Beast*, ed. Kirsty Ogg (London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2010), 25–9, 25; Gils van Hensbergen, *Guernica: The Biography of a Twentieth-Century Icon* (London: Bloomsbury, 2005), 95; Manny Thain, "Art and Propaganda. Goshka Macuga: The Bloomberg Commission," *Socialism Today* 129 (2009) www.socialismtoday.org/129/guernica.html last accessed 9/11/16.

83 The latest of which is a cartoon by Martin Rowson on Aleppo in which a blood-splattered *Guernica* hangs in a gallery awash with blood while Trump and Putin sit beneath it with a child Bashar al-Assad tethered on a long leash and a Saudi Arabian man leaves to the right, last accessed 15/12/16, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/picture/2016/dec/14/martin-rowson-on-aleppo-cartoon. See also the cartoon by Vasco Gargalo in Aleppo(nica), which turns the painting into a commentary on the mass slaughter of Syrian civilians by transforming the lightbearer of the original into Bashar al-Assad holding a missile above the Syrian flag and transposing the face of Putin onto the bull. It also comments on the complicity or impotency of the U.S. and the UN in the ongoing situation through the incorporation of their flags into the body of the tortured horse and a briefcase held by the person in the bottom right of the image. The broken sword has been replaced by a gun, and on the far right a suicide bomber blows themselves up above a spilt barrel of oil, encouraging connections to be made with the Iraq conflict and the mass suicide bombings this engendered. http://ilustragargalo.blogspot.co.uk/2016/05/alepponica-guerra-civil-na-siria.html see also www.cartoonmovement.com/cartoon/29802 last accessed 10/11/16.

84 Ron L. Haeberle (photographer) and the Art Workers' Coalition, *Q. And Babies? A. And babies* (USA, 1970). A copy of the poster and details can be found in the V&A museum, London http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/O75611/q-and-babies-a-and-poster-haeberle-ron/ last accessed 9/11/16, see also www.famouspictures.org/and-babies/ last accessed 9/11/16.

85 Pablo Lafuente, "A Picture that Moves: Goshka Macuga's Guernica," in *Goshka Macuga: The Nature of the Beast*, ed. Kirsty Ogg (London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2010), 32. See also Wikipedia "And babies", last accessed 5/4/17, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/And_babies

86 Jasminko Arnautović, 9 May – Victory Over Fascism Day? (Tuzla: 1992), see Daoud Sarhandi and Alina Boboc, *Evil Doesn't Live Here: Posters From the Bosnian War* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001), 94–5.

87 Stuart Borthwick, *The Writing on the Wall* (Liverpool: Bluecoat Press, 2015), 214, fig. 178. The resonance that the painting has with civilian deaths has been used to comment on more recent events; on the right-hand side of the mural on the Falls Road a bomb with a swastika on it and Guernica '37 has been placed above a similar bomb with the star of David and Gaza 2009 on it.

88 The term 'art of dis/assembly' comes from Dieter Roelstraete, "Unmaking Worlds: Goshka Macuga and the Art of Dis/Assembly," in *Goshka Macuga: The Nature of the Beast*, ed. Kirsty Ogg (London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2010), 12–17.

89 www.whitechapelgallery.org/exhibitions/the-bloomberg-commission-goshka-macuga/ last accessed 20/10/16

90 The tapestry was commissioned in 1955 by Nelson Rockefeller to be made by René and Jacqueline de la Baume Dürrbach in consultation with Picasso. In 1985 it was lent to the United Nations, where it was hung outside the Security Council Chamber. See Bronson Altman, "Picasso's Guernica," 25.

91 Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, "On Macuga and The Nature of the Beast," in *Goshka Macuga: The Nature of the Beast*, ed. Kirsty Ogg (London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2010), 18.

92 There was also discussion in the British Cabinet in 1920 concerning the use of chemical weapons in the form of gas to overpower resistance to British colonial occupation during the Iraqi Revolt; see R. M. Douglas, "Did Britain Use Chemical Weapons in Mandatory Iraq?" *The Journal of Modern History* 81/4 (2009): 859.

93 See www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa for Colin Powell's speech and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Powell-anthrax-vial.jpg for an image of him holding the vial. Both the U.S. and Britain were aware of Iraqi manufacture and use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and continued to supply materials and equipment that were used in the process. www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/06/uk.iraq; www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/04/history-lesson-when-the-united-states-looked-the-other-way-on-chemical-weapons/?utm_term=.1f9e2820f728; and www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0908-08.htm all last accessed 27/1/17.

94 Quote can be found in a minute located in Chartwell Papers 16/16A, fol. 196; the original is at the National Archives, WO 32/5184. Quoted by Douglas, "Did Britain Use Chemical Weapons?" 861 citing Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 1874–1965, vol. 4 companion documents, "January 1917 – June 1919" (London, 1977), pt. 1: 649. Gilbert cited the document as "Churchill Papers 16/16." See Douglas op. cit. for a discussion of the sources concerning the British use of poison gas (chemical weapons) in Iraq in the early twentieth century. He also addresses the questions of whether official sanction was given to the use of chemical weapons in Iraq, if such weapons were available and if they were actually used. He answers in the affirmative to the first and second questions, but concludes that the weapons were not in fact ever used.

95 Janet Marstine, *Critical Practice: Artists, Museums, Ethics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 128–9. On Afghan war rugs, see Stephanie Strasnick, "From Combat to Carpet – The Strange Story of Afghan War Rugs," *Art News* 29/04/14, last accessed 02/11/17, www.artnews.com/2014/04/29/afgan-war-rugs-at-boca-museum-of-art/; and Mimi Kirk, "Rug-of-War," Smithsonian.com, 4 February 2008, last accessed 02/11/17, www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/rug-of-war-19377583/

96 *Winter Soldier* (Winterfilm Collective, 1972); *Guernica* (Antony Penrose, 1984); and *Fallujah: The Real Story* (Ali Fadhil, 2005), *Welcome to Hebron* (Terje Carlsson, 2007), *Sir! No Sir!* (David Zeiger, 2005); *The Spanish Civil War* (Green Umbrella Media, 1994); *Baghdad Stories* (Julia Guest, 2003); *Caught in the Crossfire* (Mark Manning, Rana Al Aiouby, Natalie Kalustian, 2005); *Occupation: Dreamland* (Garrett Scott and Ian Olds, 2005), see "Film Programme," in *Goshka Macuga: The Nature of the Beast*, ed. Kirsty Ogg (London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2010), 64–5.

97 Quote from Dieter Roelstraete, "On the Nature of *The Nature of the Beast*," in *Goshka Macuga: The Nature of the Beast*, ed. Kirsty Ogg (London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2010), 67.
98 Marstine, *Critical Practice*, 144.
99 For this tapestry, see Ogg, *Goshka Macuga*, 68–9.
100 It also references the centuries-long tradition of royal appearances being recorded and disseminated through the medium of tapestry.
101 Christov-Bakargiev, "On Macuga," 19 and 18.
102 The composite nature of the image is another example of Macuga situating the fictional in the factual.
103 The only condition for groups to use the installation space for their meeting was that they 'send photographs, recordings or minutes of [the] meeting' to the gallery 'for inclusion in the gallery's growing archive', quotations from a letter included as part of the installation *The Nature of the Beast* cited in Ogg, *Goshka Macuga*, 40. Ogg, op. cit. 41–63 also contains the "Meetings' Archive" a summary of the various meetings held during the installation. The groups that met at the Whitechapel included teachers, various professional associations, universities, art groups and activists. Macuga notes that the gallery turned down requests for meetings by a few groups who proposed pro-war agendas, cited in Marstine, *Critical Practice*, 137.
104 Marstine, *Critical Practice*, 126. On art-wash see Mel Evans, *Artwash: Big Oil and the Arts* (London: Pluto Press, 2015) and Chapter 1 of the present volume. For the phrase 'totalitarian capitalism', see Davies, *Imprisoned by History*, passim; for the idea of neoliberal 'democracy-capitalism' being the most advanced form of social oppression ever invented, see Davies' citation, op. cit. 16 of P. Allott, *The Health of Nations. Society and Law beyond the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 140.
105 Groups involved include Amnesty International, Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Brighton Anti-Fascists, Migrant English Project, Gatwick Detainee Visitors Group and University of Brighton and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom https://remakingpicassosguernica.wordpress.com/ last accessed 20/10/16.
106 https://remakingpicassosguernica.wordpress.com/ last accessed 20/10/16.
107 www.lisebjorne.com/art_projects/desconocida-unknown-ukjent/ last accessed 20/10/16.
108 Davies, *How History Works*, 68.
109 Davies, *How History Works*, 63; Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige, "Distracted Bullets, Symptomatic Video Number 1," in *Out of Beirut*, ed. Suzanne Cotter (Oxford: Modern Art Oxford, 2006), 24
110 Paraphrase of a quote from Khalil Joreige in an interview in Sam Bardaouil and Till Fellrath, eds., *Summer, Autumn, Winter . . . and Spring*," 71.
111 Wilson-Goldie, "Contemporary," 84.
112 Extract from an e-mail by Walid Sadek, quoted in Wright, "Territories of Difference," 58.

7

ARCHIVES OF RESISTANCE

As outlined in Chapter 1, archives function as a 'system of discursive production', a space, as Derrida noted, in which hegemonic power is both articulated and produced.[1] Through the collection, arrangement and interpretation of materials, institutional archives provide an epistemologically secure authority for the state and other hegemonic interests. The information that archives organise is integrated into, and provides the foundation for, dominant discursive narratives that are rarely questioned or interrogated. However, although it is usually true that 'the structural pull in all recordmaking is towards the replication of existing relations of power, with the attendant exclusions, "privilegings" and marginalisations', following Mouffe there is no reason why archives cannot function as sites of counter-hegemonic practices as there is nothing inherent in any articulatory practice that determines how it might be used politically.[2] For Harris, therefore, archivists have a moral responsibility to counter attempts by political elites to use archives as instruments of power.[3] He argues that they should be accountable first of all to principles of justice, rather than to oft-cited values of truth, memory or accountability.[4] Of course in practice, the archives that are most likely to achieve this are probably going to be those outside of the direct control and funding of dominant interests and organisations. It may be that in this context non-institutional 'cultural and artistic practices' will again 'play a decisive role' in transforming and diffusing "common sense".[5]

Grassroots archives or "archives from below" are responses to the attempted monopolisation of public memory and concomitant mnemonic power by dominant groups in society.[6] Such counter-collections consist of the personal and institutional, the digital and the fictional and include cultural ephemera, state documentation, photographs, books, films and tweets. They are critical spaces in which historical practices are employed to support and sustain various forms of social movement activism, freed from the guise of political neutrality that professional archives are so often obliged to maintain by their academic, business or state

sponsors.[7] By preserving and making accessible the cultural memory of projects aimed at social transformation, grassroots archives work to keep in circulation ideas, narratives, organisational tactics and communication strategies that would otherwise be silenced, marginalised or lost within mainstream historical cultures. The simple presence of organisations such as the Freedom Archive (San Francisco), Radical Archives of Philadelphia, the Lesbian Herstory Archives (Brooklyn) and Interference Archive (Brooklyn) challenges the power and authority of professional archives to define what counts as legitimate research materials in any given field of enquiry, and thereby counters the manner in which such authorising practices restrict the productions of histories to those that largely reinforce normative interpretations of society.

Opened to the public in December 2011 with an exhibition exploring punk and feminist subcultures, Interference Archive was conceived as a place to explore, preserve and make accessible the self-documentation and material production of social movement cultures. It originated from the personal collection of posters, flyers, photographs, banners, badges and other ephemera amassed by Josh MacPhee and Dara Greenwald, both of whom were engaged in art, social justice movements, as well as punk and DIY culture.[8] Greenwald and MacPhee, together with their fellow co-organisers, saw the building of a grassroots archive as an analogue to their existing politically directed work, not simply as an exercise in preserving materials but as a means of creating a social space in which people could learn about activist campaigns in the past and apply this to their thinking about present-day struggles.

> We felt that it was important to preserve culture we were actively producing, and that an archive would be a way to have agency to tell our own stories from a radical perspective. . . . From the beginning, we wanted to build a public space that would do more than serve as a repository to hold the collection – we saw great possibility for cultivating a social center bustling with activities like workshops, talks, move screenings, and media production, all happening in conjunction with our archival work.[9]

As a way of negating some of the frustrations they had experienced when researching social movement culture in traditional institutions – where access was commonly restricted to researchers with academic credentials, professional authority was taken for granted, and in which only token attempts had been made to document and describe the work of social justice activists – Interference Archive was founded on more democratic, inclusive and politically committed principles. In place of top-down organisational and knowledge management structures, Interference Archive sought to draw on the collective historical knowledge of its neighbouring communities from the outset, developing itself as a sustainable and co-operative project. The histories that the archive enabled by gathering materials in an accessible location were the histories of the local communities who generated and donated those materials in the first place. Local people helped to build, organise and staff the space as volunteers; social movement activists explained the political

significance of the personal collections of materials that they donated to the archive; and there was fully open public access to the deposited materials, with no items withheld on grounds that they were too fragile or valuable for public use.[10] In short, Interference Archive regarded itself as a communal custodian and not the owner of the histories that its collections represented.[11] Currently open on four days a week, it functions as an important (information) commons in a culture where access to spaces of knowledge production is increasingly enclosed.

In addition to its other functions, Interference Archive also provides an important space for cultural production and political communication, sometimes using aesthetic influences from previous activist campaigns as citations that connect past and present social movements in a genealogy of protest. In 2012, for example, it worked with a group called Occuprint (one of several creative co-operatives that came together during the Occupy Wall Street protests in Zuccotti Park) to critique and develop image and messaging resources for social movements; the resulting graphic materials were printed and distributed out of the Brooklyn archive as part of the wider Occupy movement's campaigns. The archive's collections were similarly consulted and utilised by design students involved in the six-month strike against tuition fees in Quebec. And alongside Todos Somos Japon, a group of anti-nuclear activists formed in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima plant catastrophe, the archive created an exhibition of international protest culture since the 1970s, as well as a map of nuclear sites in North America that could be used as an informational tool for activists.[12]

Some archives are smaller and more personal, but through digital media, activist networks and interactive exhibitions, such collections of protest ephemera (including leaflets, fliers, songs, photographs and film) document and narrate pasts often missing from mainstream narratives. In addition, they offer a focus for engagement with social issues, encourage involvement in protest and social change movements and provide the opportunity for the exchange of knowledge and experiences. One such example includes the print and photographic archives of Pete Phoenix and Adrian Arbib, as well as the film archives of Undercurrents News Network, Vision-Ontv and Climate Camp TV.[13] These archives formed the basis, together with contributions from other protest groups and individuals, of a number of *Resistance!* exhibitions at various venues in London and elsewhere in 2016 and 2017.[14] The exhibitions brought together a wide range of printed and video material, photographs, artworks and artefacts representing a variety of UK-based movements for social and environmental change dating from the 1990s onwards, including environmental protests against GMO crops, road building, fracking, fossil fuels and climate change; movements for social change fighting for LGBTQI, disability, travellers, refugee and ethnic minority rights, as well the Occupy movement, and anti-capitalist, anti-racism and anti-war protests.

A key motivation linking the different archives behind the exhibition is to provide a space for alternative and radical voices, to disrupt and challenge hegemonic conceptions of how the world is, and to inspire others to take action.[15] As such they constitute counter-hegemonic interventions, the diffusion of alternative

articulations of "common sense", a notion encapsulated by VisionOntv's tagline – 'make your own news and get it seen'.[16] VisionOntv, an offshoot project of Undercurrents News Network, an organisation set up in 1993 by two television producers and a group of activists, collates and archives 'the best social change video from around the world'.[17] It provides a digital platform for the widest possible distribution, and by making the videos easy to embed in other websites it encourages the development of a non-institutional, undisciplined, open media network in which it is simply one of many nodes. Through the creation of such a network owned by nobody, but open to 'the participation of a very wide range of content providers', an open network in which the nodes or hubs are mutually and aggregately interlinked, the dominance of corporate media and their articulation of "common sense" can be challenged by a 'biodiversity of resistance'.[18] They don't only offer unrestricted access to their archive footage though; through the creation of social media toolkits, they work to encourage their users to create and collate their own videos – to *be* the media – and thereby build communities of action: it is a user-generated archive which encourages and facilitates citizen reporters in making and distributing news.[19] As such it provides 'an alternative distribution [of] views and perspectives rarely heard or seen on mainstream television' with the intention of bringing about social and environmental change and giving a voice to local communities.[20] Undercurrents has produced documentaries on globalisation and the media, mental health, International Women's Day, terminal illness, police brutality, eco-villages, and threats to press freedom, as well as organising video activist training projects and festivals, to encourage more people to use digital media to create social change and to build the future they want to see. In a similar manner the *Resistance!* exhibitions also sought to democratise the process of archival collection and the stories that could therefore be told by encouraging visitors to record their own stories as podcasts and to scan and upload their own documents to the archive, thus creating an evolving, mobile, community counter-archive.

Archiving the revolution

The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) archives developed simultaneously with the occupation of Zuccotti Park in September 2011, with the main impetus coming from a discussion between OWS participants Jeremy Bold and Amy Roberts after a general assembly meeting in the park. The Archives Working Group that they decided to establish soon expanded into a major collective of professional and student archivists, as well as others who believed that traces of the various OWS activities should be preserved and made accessible. According to the working group's own definition of the archive's scope and aims:

> Our mission is to collect ephemera, signs, posters, audiovisual materials, digital files, photographs, oral histories, and artifacts that were created and distributed in and around Liberty Plaza and at actions that Occupy Wall Street participates in. It stands as evidence of how participatory democracy can

> work, how culture and politics connect, and how the 99% can come together to generate social and economic change. Its mission is to keep OWS historically self-conscious and guarantee that our history will be accessible to the public.[21]

However, while defining the archive's aims was fairly straightforward, it was much harder to reach a consensus – whether at the working group's weekly meetings or during wider consultation with OWS activists – about how and where access to the archive should be realised. Inevitably, these discussions became entangled with issues of social power, institutional authority and political subjectivities. Some activists expressed concerns about whether embodying the archive in spatial and institutional form, with attendant considerations about "intellectual control" and the materiality of the objects collected, necessarily contradicted Occupy's self-defining principles of horizontalism and anti-materialism. Others sought reassurance that information preserved in the archives would not be used by law enforcement agencies against OWS activists. Aside from this specific question of making potentially incriminating material publicly available, there were also more general issues of privacy to take into account. As Rodney Carter had previously pointed out: 'it is essential that archivists not undermine the rights of groups to remain silent'.[22] For some socially marginalised groups, choosing not to be archived could be seen as a political tactic – hence it was crucial for OWS archivists to include a diverse range of community members in decisions about planning and administering their planned archive. Another issue that soon became clear was the objection of some activists to housing the OWS collections in buildings provided by New York University (NYU) or any of its affiliates – on the grounds that NYU represented the kind of corporate target that OWS protestors had in their sights.[23]

Just as with OWS, activism and archiving co-existed in Tahrir Square from the beginning of the Egyptian revolution in 2011. The 2011 revolution was one of the most digitally documented events to date. Social media, Facebook, Twitter, the internet and digital photography played a crucial role not only in documenting events but also in communicating with Egyptian protesters and the rest of the world. Countless websites and blogs were established to host, document and disseminate information about the revolution. Despite graffiti stating 'the revolution will not be tweeted', that is exactly what happened.[24] The revolution was twitterised, just like it had been to a lesser degree in Tunisia a few weeks earlier. Moreover, Twitter played a key role in organising logistics for demonstrations, getting news out about events, announcing initiatives, as well as reporting on events.[25] But despite the ubiquity of social media, archiving and accessing such an ephemeral format has proved more difficult, although an edited selection of tweets from the revolution have been archived and narrativised in hard copy *Tweets from Tahrir*. In contrast, Baladi's *Vox Populi: archiving a revolution in the digital age* is an interactive, immersive web-based installation that constitutes an index of online archives of social media, videos, photos, graffiti and digital data of the revolution. *Vox Populi* provides an architectural frame which is an attempt to create an index of online

archives of social media and internet-related data concerning the 2011 revolution.[26] Developing out of the *Vox Populi* archive project, *Tahrir Cinema* was a project that started during the 2011 summer occupation of Tahrir Square and which was designed to provide a forum for the screening and dissemination of archival footage, video clips, testimonies, etc., of the revolution.[27] Similar archiving endeavours were started by the American University in Cairo, Mosireen and others. Perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of the revolution to archive was the graffiti and street art arising from the revolution. This was, in a large part, due to the efforts of the army and police in painting over any political graffiti, prompting the proliferation of the slogan 'erase and I will draw again'.[28] Creating, collating and collecting images and video of the revolution was not simply a response to an archival impulse. It was instead a means of witnessing the abuses of the regime and then using this footage not only to counter state propaganda but also as a weapon to unite Egyptians and inform the world, as exemplified by Keizer's graffiti of a man filming with the slogan 'we are watching you back'.[29]

Archiving existence

While the archive can obscure and elide, it can also be a weapon or tool in the fight to stop cultural, ontological and socio-political erasure. As outlined in Chapter 1, Israel has made significant attempts to erase the existence of Palestinians from a range of discursive arenas, in the media, textbooks, cartography, the landscape, histories and archives. In order for Palestinians to be able to narrate accounts of their own individual and collective experiences on their own terms, they need access to their own archival materials. But because of conditions of former colonisation and current occupation, there is no Palestinian national archive. Most of the materials that would normally be used to construct histories from Palestinian perspectives were destroyed or are held in archives in Turkey, the UK or Israel.[30] For Palestinians exiled in 1948, those living under Israeli occupation or as Arab citizens in an ethnocratic Israel, the creation of counter-archives of cultural knowledge is a bastion against cultural oblivion. The comprehensive and detailed work *All That Remains: the Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, based on extensive fieldwork and oral interviews and utilising a wide range of Ottoman and British maps, data, official documents, statistics and photographs, functions as an archival testament to the 481 Palestinian villages within Israel's pre-1967 borders that were ethnically cleansed of their inhabitants as part of the expulsion of Palestinians during the *Nakba*.[31] Each village entry includes the site coordinates, statistics on the pre-1948 population, number of houses, land-holdings and usage, photographs and sections of narrative based on Arab, Palestinian, western European and Israeli sources that provide summaries of the village history before 1948 and accounts of the military operations that led to the conquest of the village. There are also descriptions of the current status of the village, including information of post-1948 Israeli settlements and installations established on confiscated village lands. Where the villages have been completely destroyed by the Israelis and plowed into

the ground, the researchers used more immutable landmarks such as caves, springs and rock formations as well as map coordinates to identify the site.[32] This is not the first attempt that has been made by Palestinian historians, geographers, architects and researchers to archive the destruction and erasure of Palestinian life, but it is the most authoritative one to date.[33] It is also an elegant and comprehensive attempt to counter ontological erasure, '[i]t is an attempt to breathe life into a name, to give body to a statistic, to render to these vanished villages a sense of their distinctiveness. It is, in sum, meant to be a kind of "in memoriam".'[34]

All that Remains has inspired a number of other similar archival projects, including the phone app *I-Nakba: the Invisible Land* created by Israeli NGO Zochrot, which provides an interactive map of all Palestinian localities that were destroyed and/or depopulated during, or as a result of, the *Nakba*. The app provides GPS coordinates and historical information and functions as a community archive as it allows users to upload photographs, video, updates and comments on the various sites.[35] Zochrot also hosts tours to the sites of destroyed Palestinian villages, to both educate a new generation of Palestinians and Israelis and to commemorate and keep alive the memory of the ethnic cleansing. They have created an online video archive of many of these tours.[36] The website *Palestine Remembered* also has a project *Tracing all that Remains Since Nakba*, which archives videos that document destroyed or depopulated Palestinian localities.[37] It collects and collates oral histories of the *Nakba*, creating an online video archive of oral testimony from survivors.[38]

In a somewhat different way, Sheikh's *Desert Bloom* is a haunting photographic archive of the Israeli state's manipulation of the environment to displace and force out the Palestinian Bedouins from their home in the Negev.[39] The state's approval of the Prawer Plan threatens to relocate between 30,000–70,000 of the Negev Bedouins from their Israeli-defined "unrecognised" villages and agricultural land to government "recognised" areas. Their homes have been bulldozed, and where they stood a Jewish National Fund (JNF) Ambassador forest has been planted: afforestation as a tool of settler-colonialism and a means of erasing a Palestinian past has a long history in Israel.[40] The aerial images included in Sheikh's *Desert Bloom*, however, provide a record of how Israeli militarisation, mining, industrialisation, afforestation and settlement have over time displaced the Bedouin and erased their traditional way of life.[41] Its comprehensive study and annotation of the intersection of climate change, political conflict and colonisation has resulted in its submission as evidence for the "Truth Commission on the Events of 1948–1960 in the Negev", a Zochrot initiative.[42]

Palestinian *Village Books* – local, vernacular histories produced by Palestinians about the villages they were expelled from in 1948 – similarly act as informal, counter-hegemonic micro-archives. A hundred and twenty-two different village or memorial books have been produced since the 1980s. Some of these have been produced under the auspices of Birzeit's University Centre for Research and Documentation of Palestinian Society (CRDPS) in their series *The Destroyed Palestinian Villages* and were intended as ethnographic portraits of Palestinian villages in the 1940s just before their destruction. Although the first series of these books was

written by a team of researchers who transcribed and collated oral interviews with people expelled from the villages, the majority of village books, including those produced subsequently by the CRDPS, are authored by former villagers. In the context of the ethnic cleansing and dislocation of Palestinians in 1948 and subsequently, these works function as "dossiers of evidence" or archives of the villagers' relationship with the land. They act as a testament to the fact that the villages and the villagers did exist, that there was an extensive and developed Palestinian society and culture which was translocated and fragmented by their forced expulsion by Israeli forces.[43] This function is aided by the inclusion of land registration records, deeds, official documents from the British Mandate period, genealogies, photographs, copies of drivers' licences, passports, identity cards, tax receipts, birth and marriage certificates, and newspaper cuttings as well as oral testimony from villagers. These books also function as repositories of valuable socio-cultural and genealogical information, including family trees, folk songs, wedding traditions, harvest practices and children's games. Such evidence contests the erasure of a Palestinian presence – of a Palestinian civil and political society – by the Israeli destruction of buildings, the renaming of geographical places and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. These books do not simply record Palestinian legal ownership of the land, land from which they were forcibly expelled in 1948, but they also describe a vibrant, established, sophisticated society that challenges the official Zionist narrative of a barren land barely populated with Arabs who had no or few ties to it. The inclusion of advertisements for bus, book distribution and furniture companies, Palestinian shops offering 'modern artistic photographic techniques' and 'outstanding' doctors in the village books from the first half of the twentieth century, together with descriptions of a huge variety of economic ventures, and sport and political clubs, challenge the Zionist argument that it was they who brought modernity to a backward, underdeveloped, primitive land.[44]

For occupied peoples under military oppression the lines between archiving, witnessing and recording attacks and confrontations by the police, army or security guards can blur. Digital media and the internet have provided a variety of alternative means of archiving and narrating histories. Campaign groups such as B'Tselem – the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories – through its textual and photographic documentation of human rights abuses in the Occupied Territories, creates a virtual archive. The testimonials of Palestinians who describe life under military occupation, who were injured in Israeli attacks, who describe the killing and imprisonment of loved ones and the destruction of their houses, tents, fields, livestock and orchards form a valuable archive of oral testimony.[45] B'Tselem also have an extensive video archive documenting the violence and hardship of life under occupation.[46] B'Tselem's Camera Project is primarily designed to empower Palestinians living under occupation, to bring the reality of their lives to a wider Israeli and international audience, to provide a protective presence, deter violence and provide accountability of those who commit human rights abuses. Footage taken by civilian volunteers has been used to both effect the release of Palestinians who have been wrongfully arrested and to

make complaints to the Israeli security forces and police about human rights abuses. It also constitutes an invaluable video archive. New digital technologies in the form of cheap camera phones and video cameras, plus the widespread accessibility of YouTube and other social media, mean that it is easier to distribute such recordings. Similarly, B'Tselem's multi-media interactive map is a cartographic archive of expulsion, physical abuse by colonial settlers and the Israeli security forces, killings and house demolition, as well as an archive of resistance, documenting the demonstrations that have taken place and the often excessive force used against peaceful demonstrators.[47]

Emad Burnat in *Five Broken Cameras* got his first camera to record family events, but instead he ended up documenting the appropriation of village land and the ever-increasing encroachment of the apartheid wall in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. He started filming demonstrations, and his footage has been used as evidence in court. Despite the ongoing destruction of his cameras by the Israeli military police, his record still remains and, in collaboration with Guy Davidi, it was made into a film.[48] In a similar manner, the footage taken by Zuheir from CCTV cameras that he set up to document clashes between settlers, residents and Israeli security forces constitutes an important archive of life under Israeli occupation and the expansion of illegal settlements. Zuheir's cameras recorded the killing of a local Silwan resident, Samir Sirhan, by an Israeli colonial settler guard and offered a counter-narrative that challenged the official Israeli explanation for events. Although this evidence hasn't led to any repercussions for the murder of Sirhan, it was picked up by news outlets and forms part of a video archive on life in occupied East Jerusalem on *The Guardian* website.[49] As with Burnat, Zuheir's cameras and computers are frequently broken or confiscated by Israeli security forces and the police who understand the power inherent in the documentation of such events.

The exhibitions and projects undertaken by the new Palestinian Museum also attest to the importance of archiving as a means of forestalling erasure. While the Palestine museum project was initially conceived as a commemoration of the *Nakba*, it evolved into a more dynamic space that would use a celebration of Palestinian culture as a means of looking forward to a better future. When the museum building was inaugurated in the summer of 2016, some elements of the Israeli media mocked the opening, making the tendentious claim that the absence of exhibits in the museum stood as a synecdoche for the lack of any distinct Palestinian history or culture.[50] However, in many ways simply the physical existence of such a museum is a testament to the fortitude and tenacious collective spirit of Palestinians living in the diaspora, under occupation, or in Israel, to hold onto their culture and refuse to disappear despite more than sixty years of Israeli attacks on their cultural life and institutions. While the museum staff collect physical collections for the museum, the project has, over the past few years, started to establish virtual collections and online archives. The interactive *The Family Archive: Your Pictures, Your Memory, Our History* project started off inviting people to give the museum old family photographs that were then scanned and catalogued.[51] The project has since developed into an interactive, audio-visual digital archive that allows people to upload photographs,

film and video. The preservation and archiving of photographs, particularly of pre-1948 Palestinian life, is important in contesting the erasure of Palestinians as a distinct ethno-cultural community.[52] The museum also plans to make much of the UNRWA archive accessible through its digital platforms.[53]

The archival impulse

In recent years artists have turned to the archive as a source of inspiration, not only interacting with, critiquing, allegorising and utilising archives, but also producing them – the artist-as-archivist seeking 'to make historical information, often lost or displaced, physically present'.[54] Uriel Orlow in researching and creating his work *2292 Days* constructs an archive of materials related to the entrapment of fourteen ships for eight years (from 1967–1975) in the Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, an event that does not seem to be mentioned in any history.[55] He recorded testimony from some of the sailors, collected photographs and film material. Although Orlow felt that it was important to tell the story of the trapped sailors, he didn't want to simply 're-insert it into history' as a single, linear narrative. Instead, he wanted to maintain an evocative indeterminacy, so he incorporated his archival material into a montage combined with material he filmed or constructed.[56] In creating a level of opacity, viewers had to collaborate in the work and construct their own meanings. In this manner, he subverts the tendency of historical narratives to be definitive and authoritative and, unlike most historians, foregrounds not only 'the nature of all archival materials as found yet constructed, factual yet fictive, public yet private', but also the need for all archives to be interpreted.[57]

In contrast, Jafri's *Independence Day 1936–1967* (2009–ongoing) works, wherever possible, with documents reproduced from state archives to create a 'second order archive – an archive of archives' through her collection and assemblage of photographs of post-colonial nations celebrating their first independence days.[58] In doing so she explores how the archival process of collating documents is intimately connected with the articulation of a nation's identity and its history. Through her collation of these images it becomes obvious how similar the various ceremonies and parades are between the new nations, and the degree to which they have adopted not only the same political aesthetics but also the same political systems as their colonisers.[59] The inevitability of their adoption of the nation-state, as a means to organise the newly independent geo-political space, almost as a teleological necessity, is highlighted – as is of course the power of the colonial powers to control the parameters of what political entities can even be imagined.[60]

In the twenty-eight posters that constitute the *Siege of Khartoum, 1884* (2006), Jafri juxtaposes iconic images from the Iraqi war or the War on Terror with archival news articles detailing earlier colonial military interventions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia that resonate with the image. In doing so she comments not just about the new imperialism of the West, but also about the way in which material collected in archives can lend itself to reiteration, the production of new historical knowledge which is interpreted as another instantiation of 'the same old

thing'.[61] In her 2012 project *Getty vs. Ghana, Corbis vs. Mozambique and Getty vs. Kenya vs. Corbis*, she explores the relationships between commercial photographic and national archives, including questions concerning the increasing capitalist appropriation and foreign ownership of national heritage. She discovered that the commercial archives of Getty and Corbis claimed copyright on a number of foundational images relating to the history of various post-colonial nations, although the originals of the image were located in the national archives of the relevant states. This led to the situation in 2007 on the fiftieth anniversary of Ghanaian independence of some blogs and online newspapers linking to images of Ghanaian independence via the Getty archive and not the Ghanaian state archive.[62] The ability of a western capitalist corporation to represent and financially profit from the commemoration of an iconic moment, and to enforce copyright through their army of lawyers thus highlights the ongoing legacy of the economic inequalities underpinning colonialism.

In her work *Material for a Film* (2004–ongoing), Emily Jacir has created an archive of the life and death of the Palestinian intellectual, writer, translator and PLO representative in Italy, Wael Zuaiter. *Material for a Film* is a large-scale immersive installation including archival material, sound, video, personal correspondence and photos that document the life and assassination of Zuaiter, who was murdered by Israeli Mossad agents in Rome on 16 October 1972, ostensibly in revenge for the murder of eleven Israeli athletes in the Munich attack of 1972.[63] However, there is absolutely no evidence that Zuaiter was involved in the attack, and according to the many testimonies of those who knew him, he deplored violence.[64] His death marks the first of Israel's extrajudicial killings of prominent Palestinian intellectuals living in Europe.[65]

Jacir's work takes its title from an elegiac essay by Elio Petri and Ugo Pirro, interweaving extracts of oral interviews with people who were part of Zuaiter's life in Rome.[66] Petri and Pirro, together with Janet Venn-Brown, Zuaiter's partner, intended to use this material to make a film of Zuaiter's life, but as Petri died shortly after the interviews, the film was never made. In 2004 Jacir took on the project and, collaborating closely with Venn-Brown, who already had her own personal archive of material from Zuaiter's life and extensive notes on his assassination, they spent a number of years meticulously collecting and collating information on his life, using extracts from his personal papers, talking to his friends and family and going through his effects. The result is a "film", a multi-media installation that contexualises Zuaiter amongst the intellectuals, writers, artists and filmmakers he had connections to, thus constructing a counter-narrative to the unsubstantiated narrative of the Israeli state that he was a terrorist. In this work, the personal story of Zuaiter becomes, in some way, a synecdoche of the story of all Palestinians: their dislocation and marginalisation; their depiction as the aggressor rather than victim. Combining extracts of music, personal correspondence, interviews with friends and family, photographs and Zuaiter's writings, with information from police phone-taps, photographs of his death and the scene of his murder, and Venn-Brown's handwritten list of the Mossad agents suspected of killing Zuaiter, *Material for a Film* is not only a

personal archive of a Palestinian intellectual and writer, but also an archive of deletion, documenting the erasure of not only an individual, but a people.

The installation foregrounds the complex relationship between military and political power, the production of truth and cultural identity: the ease with which power constructs and disseminates the true, as well as the threat that the articulation and assertion of a Palestinian culture poses for the Israeli state and the violent ends that they will go to erase it. Jacir 'observes, selects, compares, interprets'; she produces artefacts, displays evidence, constructs a narrative. But to view Jacir's work as a history is to institutionalise it, to negate its distanciation, to limit, contain and discipline its potential to challenge ideological and institutional structures. Kholeif describes it as a 'recuperative reconstitution' of Zuaiter's life, but it is one with Jacir firmly embedded in it. This is not exposition or mimesis, it is 'inventing through finding'. It does not disingenuously pretend to be a neutral recording of events; it is not a history. It is instead an intervention, a self-conscious realignment of, and challenge to, the politics of representation, in that Jacir recognises that 'every image of the past that is not recognised by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably'.[67]

Contesting erasure

Jacir's *Tel al-Zaatar Project*, in contrast with *Material for a Film*, is a work of archival restoration. While working in Rome on *Material for a Film*, Jacir was told of a collection of documentary footage kept at the Audiovisual Archive of Workers' and Democratic Movements in Rome. Among the footage were the outtake rushes from a documentary film *Tel al-Zaatar* (1977), which was made as a collaboration between Palestine and Italy and shot by the Palestinian Film Institution – the only film that traces the aftermath of the 1976 massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese in the UN-administered refugee camp in Tel al-Zaatar, Lebanon – as well as other footage taken by the PLO's film unit of daily life in the refugee camps. Jacir, working with her colleague Maurer and some young Gazan artists and filmmakers, began restoring the film footage – careful not to discard even fragments which were very damaged, reinforcing the importance that every scrap of archival documentation has for a people facing cultural erasure.[68] These rushes and outtakes are valuable because they constitute hundreds of hours of interviews with survivors of the massacre and Palestinian Resistance fighters. Moreover, the significance is all the more important because through its depictions of the PLO infrastructure in the camps, the hospitals, schools, training centres etc., it functions as audiovisual testimony of a society – "the embryo of a future state" – the history (but not the personal memory) of which has been largely erased.[69] The entire PLO Film Unit Archive which was housed in the Palestine Research Centre, Beirut was looted during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, leaving very little extant film footage of Palestinian life and resistance in exile in Lebanon.[70]

Unarchiving or re-archiving as a form of erasure is, in a different context, examined in Jacir's work *ex libris* (2010–2012).[71] In this work Jacir not only revisits the

ways in which Palestinian culture and thus presence has been systematically erased by the Israelis throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, but she articulates the way in which museumification – the means by which objects are removed and archived, subjected to the historicising gaze – transforms, confines and fixes the object, closing down alternative interpretations. She surreptitiously photographed with her mobile phone the incipits of Arabic-language books looted from Palestinian homes, schools and libraries during the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in West Jerusalem by Israeli forces and now contained in the Jewish National and University Library.[72] Her unofficial photographs of them constitute an alternative archive, an archive extracted from between the substrates and layers of archival strata; an archive that resists and challenges hegemonic institutions and narratives of occupation; an archive that bears witness to the existence of a people who once lived in this land before they were ethnically cleansed from it.

However, in the silences and aporia of hegemonic archives, as well as in the structures of their classificatory systems, it is often possible to locate, in dissonance, the subaltern or the erased. In preserving the looted Palestinian books and then in classifying those in Arabic separately and not integrating them into the Jewish National and University Library's other collections, these looted books essentially constitute a record of Palestinian cultural and intellectual life before their expulsion in 1948.[73] The topics of the books, various dedications, inscriptions, names of owners, and stamps of Palestinian libraries, printing presses and institutions provide evidence of the interconnected and vibrant Palestinian economic, educational and cultural society that existed before the *Nakba*.[74] Such evidence complicates and challenges official Israeli attempts at memoricide and the historical de-Palestinianisation of Palestine through an erasure of the material evidence of Palestinian institutions, socio-political and cultural networks, and villages.[75]

The treatment of these looted Palestinian books by the Israeli state differs considerably from the post–World War II response to books and property looted by the Nazis. The Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Division was established with the aim of repatriating cultural works after the war. Looted books were stored at the Offenbach Archival Depot while efforts were made to repatriate them to the libraries and individuals from whom they had been looted. For example, the Library Rosenthaliana was successfully returned to the Netherlands.[76] In contrast, although the looted Palestinian books were initially catalogued according to a sequential number and an abbreviation of their Palestinian owners' names, by the 1960s they were re-catalogued and simply given the generic notation A.P. standing for Abandoned Property.[77] This change in the system of classification marks an important shift that is mirrored in other actions taken by the Israeli state at this time designed to not only forestall any possibility of Palestinian return but to also contribute to the erasure of Palestinian culture.[78] Up until their reclassification there was always a chance that the owners of the books could be traced and the books ultimately repatriated. Indeed, a National Library report dated 1949 provides a list of sixty Palestinians whose books had been "collected". Many of these were widely known members of the Palestinian cultural elite who continued to occupy positions of

prominence in exile following their expulsion and to whom the books could have easily been returned.[79] Jamal Zahalka, a member of the Israeli Knesset, requested that the books in the National Library that originally belonged to Khalil Sakakini be transferred to a cultural centre named after him in Ramallah. Zahalka received a response stating that a transfer could not be even discussed until he could provide a complete list of all Sakakini's books in the library's possession, an answer that effectively stalled any possibility of transfer and exemplifies Israeli tactics to frustrate attempts to maintain Palestinian culture and society.[80]

Rona Sela reads Israeli state photography archives in a similar manner. By stripping the 'imposed Zionist national context' from the photographs, she 'deciphers' and 'liberates' 'additional contextual layers – often contrary to the nature of the archive'. She contests the power of these archives, disrupts their power to construct epistemologies and structures of meaning that reinforce the naturalness of the Zionist ideology and worldview, and makes visible the violence implicit in their construction.[81] Sela looks at photographs in the Government Press Office National Photo Collection and the Photography Archive of the National Jewish Fund, which documented new Jewish settlements in ethnically cleansed Palestinian villages and farm land as part of Zionist propaganda, which sought to document the re-population of the land by Jewish families, to present the land as Israeli and Jewish and *not* Palestinian. Demonstrating Jewish possession of the land was a means to counter the UN resolution ruling that the Palestinian refugees should be allowed to return to their homes, but what these photos indirectly also show is a Palestinian absence. This absence, the displacement of one group of people by another, is foregrounded by the juxtaposition of the distinctive Palestinian landscape and architecture with the new immigrants, many of whom were still dressed in clothes from their country of origin; 'the Zionist photographs become the mouthpiece of the Palestinian catastrophe'.[82] In another example, Sela focuses on the archives that record the beginning of Jewish military photography in Palestine. Photography was a significant part of Zionist intelligence gathering on Palestinian villages and settlements that started from the 1920s, but it become institutionalised and more organised in the 1940s. Although these photographs were taken for military operational purposes, they provide possibly the last comprehensive documentation of the geographical distribution of Palestinians in Palestine before their expulsion: the photographs therefore stand as a testimony to the destruction of the Palestinians as a geo-political and cultural entity.[83]

Craze undertakes a similar process in his grammar of redaction *How to do Things Without Words* where he argues that the redacted sections [the visible invisibles] in a CIA report of the torture of Abu Zubaydah offer a certain, strange type of visibility. In this work he considers the logic of the state's textual archive of torture and detention as a whole.[84] His redacted grammar does not seek to unveil the redaction, but instead interrogates the logic of the veiling itself, including its contribution to the construction of public secrets, things we know about, but know we shouldn't know *too much* about.[85] Similarly, Algün Ringborn's *Library of Unborrowed Books* (2012) focuses not on the borrowed and read books in public libraries, but on the

books that have never been borrowed, the disregarded or unconsumed knowledge, what the archive or library doesn't tell us.[86] She is interested in what falls through the gaps in systems of archiving, what gets lost. The unborrowed books are 'representative of the gaps and cracks of history . . . the cataloguing of the world and the ambivalent relationship between absence and presence'.[87]

Geyer's video *Insistence* (2013) narrates a different instance of archival absence or '*in*operation'.[88] The film narrates the lives of three women who were instrumental in the creation of The Museum of Modern Art, New York (MoMA), while a disembodied hand places down a series of postcards of images of the women, their lovers and artworks. Although the postcards could be archival documents, they are not; they are instead commercial reproductions. In the narration Geyer mentions how she was unable to find any correspondence between the three women, but this is not to say that there was not any. As an archivist tells her, this absence is not the result of non-existence but a consequence of women's correspondence being seen as unremarkable, 'trifling', not of historical importance. The trivial and incidental is not archived; it is destroyed or unarchived.[89]

Archival absence

There is an absence in the Algerian archives. It isn't simply a consequence of the French removal of the archives to France at the end of a vicious attempt to put down the Algerian fight for independence against their colonial oppressors. There is an absence of photographs, an absence of representation, an absence of histories of a post-independent Algeria, an absence that might be explicated in terms of a 'withdrawal of tradition'.[90] There is no official archive of photography and very few photographs of the War of Independence (1954–62) or the subsequent civil war (1991–2002) taken by Algerians. Into such an absence Zineb Sedira's work *Guardiennes d'images* [Image Keepers] (2010) presents the personal photographic archive of Algerian photographer Mohammad Kouaci.[91] Kouaci was a photographer for *El Moudjahid*, the official newspaper of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) during the War of Independence and later, after independence, he worked for the Ministry of Information. The boxes of his photographs, which have survived under the guardianship of his widow, represent one of the few photographic collections that embody the gaze of the "insider" rather than the coloniser during the war.[92] His archive includes images of key people during the war, refugees fleeing, the exilic theatre and cultural scene in Tunisia, and everyday life for FLN fighters and refugees in the *maquis* – safe places in the mountains. In post-independence Algeria he captured images of famous revolutionaries, leaders and thinkers who came to Algeria, such as Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Patrice Lumumba and the Black Panthers.[93]

Yet the primary focus of Sedira's video installation is not Kouaci or his photographs; it is instead his widow Safiye Kouaci, who herself embodies a 'living archive' both in her role as interpreter of the photographs but also in terms of her own recollections of life in exile in Tunisia and the role that the arts, culture

and sport played in the FLN resistance to French colonial occupation.[94] Sedira has foregrounded similar living archives in her art before. For example, her 2003 work *Mother, Father, and I*, in which she filmed her parents talking about their life in Algeria during the war before they emigrated to France. While both works are intensely personal in their focus on the life and memories of an individual, they are also political. A point clearly illustrated by the attempt of officials in Vallauris to close down *Mother, Father, and I*, which was showing as part of the Musée National Picasso's *La Guerre et la Paix* because her mother talks about the rapes and torture committed by French soldiers and *harki* (Algerian collaborators with the French).[95]

Guardiennes d'images foregrounds the fragility of such personal archives – the photographs are not only collected, uncatalogued in boxes subject to environmental stresses and degradation, but as time passes, situating the photographs in wider social and political context becomes more problematic as Safiye ages: as time erodes the materiality of the photographs themselves, so too it erodes her memories.[96] In choosing to make a film of Safiye and her husband's photographic archive, Sedira wanted to intervene in the inevitable erasure of this collection. Her work, in effect, constitutes the collection of Kouaci's photographs as an archive. Yet, despite the publicity her work has produced for the photographs and an increased interest in scholars wanting to work with the photos, they have still not found a permanent home.[97] Safiye believes that most Algerians are not interested in the archive and 'disregard it because they do not understand the need to preserve such historical images'.[98] Yet, is the reluctance of Algerian authorities, individuals or institutions to provide a home for Kouaci's archive more a result of a 'withdrawal of tradition'? Despite the physical availability of material remains that survived both the war of independence and the civil war, as well as the theft by the retreating colonial power, has there been an immaterial withdrawal of these photographs arising from the 'surpassing disaster' of the wars?[99] It is interesting that Kouac's archive has been incorporated into an art-work by Sedira who, while closely connected to Algeria, is part of the Algerian diaspora as she was born and brought up in France by Algerian parents who emigrated there in the early 1960s. Does her distance from the community of the surpassing disaster enable her to 'perceive, read or listen, and generally use pre-surpassing-disaster art, literature, music and thought without having to resurrect them'?[100]

The distance provided by exile might also explain why Bruno Boudjelal, a photographer who consciously challenges the perception of documentary photography as objective, is responsible for one of the most affective photographic collections of the Algerian civil war. Boudjelal's father was an Algerian who emigrated to France at the outbreak of the War of Independence, but Boudjelal only learnt of this in the early 1990s, after which he made frequent journeys to Algeria to reunite with a family he had previously known nothing about.[101] The photographs he took and which constitute *Jours Intranquilles* [*Disquiet Days*] (2001) comprise family snapshots, landscapes, images of places marked by violence, scenes from windows and moving cars, and self-portraits.[102] The Algerian civil war was largely undocumented by photojournalists and the media. In the five years between 1993 and

1997, fifty-eight reporters were murdered, and photography was treated with great suspicion; as Boudjelal notes, 'I've never been faced with such violence. . . . As for continuing to take pictures, I don't even dare get my camera out'.[103]

During the civil war, in addition to the thousands who were killed, at least seven thousand Algerians disappeared, a silence that has, post-conflict, become institutionalised in law through the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.[104] Families of the disappeared would have photographs of their loved ones re-printed as posters with other missing people as part obituary, part expression of grief and part request for information.[105] Such posters function as a transitory, fleeting archive of the disappeared. While an archive seeks clear representation, in Boudjelal's photograph of a poster of missing people, he has deliberately blurred the faces and rendered the details indecipherable. His photographs do not focus clearly on the instant of suffering in a conventional photojournalistic manner. His blurred photographs of the disappeared and his photographs of Bentalha five years after the massacre depict instead a space and instance of past violence, but a violence that continues to haunt the present.[106] The distance engendered by such an approach counters the immediate and emotive scenes of suffering we see daily in the media with a more affective encounter that requires the viewer to inhabit the space and personally engage with the trauma and its long-term consequences while also signalling the impossibility of a photograph's ability to fully represent or contain suffering. Boudjelal's technique works to consciously challenge the perception of documentary photography as providing an objective, transparent representation of the real. The framing of his images by windows or doors reminds us that a photograph is always taken from a particular perspective, while the blurred images suggest photographs taken in motion, drawing our attention to the presence of the photographer. Instead of directing our gaze to that which is represented, they instead ask us to consider the relationship between the photographer and their surroundings. Boudjelal is not an external witness to events; he is immersed in them.[107] Moreover, the blurred images remind us that Algeria (as everywhere) is a space and a people in flux – a place of becoming – there is not a single way to describe, narrate or explain. *Disquiet Days* provides a photographic archive of the civil war, but one which challenges the idea of fixed, objective, neutral representation, foregrounds the subjectivity of the photographer and the role of the audience in creating meaning, and acknowledges the impossibility of providing a fixed representation.

The 'withdrawal of tradition' and archival absence is also addressed in Katia Kameli's film, *The Algerian Novel (Chapter One)* (2016).[108] The film focuses on a father and son who run a street stall in Algiers selling postcards, coins, images of traditional Algerian costumes and reproductions of archival photographs to Algerians.[109] The images begin at the start of the French colonial occupation in the early nineteenth century and depict an Algiers almost untouched by colonial architecture. There are also photographs of key politicians from the first decade or so of Algerian independence, but tellingly there are no images from the period of the

civil war. There are very few foreign tourists in Algeria, and no outlets sell typical touristy postcards. So who buys these photographs and why?

With the removal of much Algerian archival material to France by the French colonial power and given the contested and problematic nature of much of the recent Algerian past, the stall acts as an informal, community archive, providing a space for 'people's personal search for materials to make sense of their country's past, future and their own national identity'.[110] It meets a perceived need for past-talk in a society in which, because of ongoing tensions, there is an absence of historical narration beyond the middle of the twentieth century in state institutions and school history.[111] The images do not come captioned or framed in an already existing narrative; instead, the Algerians who frequent the stall interpret the images in contexts that are relevant to them; for example, they point out streets where family members lived and identify and discuss independence-era politicians.

The film is framed with two musical performances in the street: at the beginning a group in Maghrebi dress playing traditional Algerian music and at the end a colonial-style marching band in uniform. This duality of cultural heritage is reflected in the bilingual street signs and shop names and the architectural styles that we see throughout the film, as well as the language spoken by the Algerians who were interviewed about the stall. Some of those interviewed are critical of the fascination that these archival images hold for their fellow Algerians. They argue that in using such images to build an identity, Algerians are either appropriating a colonial city or are hearkening back to an earlier pre-colonial era, neither of which exist any longer nor reflect what Algeria is today. They simply provide a dream of Algeria from before, a chimera of smiley men glossing over periods of trauma – a suggestion that Algerians are not at ease with their pasts and as a response are merely living by proxy through a substitute and dream-like history. This notion of a society that is unable to move forward and taking refuge in the past through a love of nostalgia 'to escape a bitter present and avoid projection into the future' can also be seen in the work of Algerian artist Amina Menia, *The Golden Age* (2011–ongoing) and her series of ironic, orientalist paintings on tile.[112]

The works discussed here reveal and problematise the mechanisms by which archives discursively produce knowledge. One of the advantages of such artistic engagement with, and critique of, the institutional, authoritative and authorised archive is the uncertainty it encourages concerning the production of definitive, verifiable knowledge. The vernacular archives created by artists and activists offer instead more 'tentative forms of suppositional knowledge' that in turn make available alternative epistemologies and radical, future possibilities.[113] Artists and activists not only resist the hegemonic power articulated through the narratives engendered by institutionalised archives, but they simultaneously work to produce and disseminate their own archives of resistance encouraging a multiplicity of heterogeneous, co-existing, often conflicting counter-voices that work to challenge the dominance of particular epistemological assumptions, and in so doing articulate new solutions for social and political injustice.

Notes

1 Anthony Downey, "Contingency, Dissonance and Performativity, Critical Archives and Knowledge Production in Contemporary Art," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 40. Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 4, n.1.

2 Verne Harris, "Archives, Politics and Justice" in *Political Pressure and the Archival Record*, ed. Margaret Procter, Michael Cook and Caroline Williams (Chicago: The Society of American Archivists, 2005), 178.

3 Randall C. Jimerson, "Archives for All: Professional Responsibility and Social Justice," *The American Archivist* 70/2 (2007): 281.

4 For a detailed discussion see Verne Harris, *Archives and Justice: A South African Perspective* (Chicago: The Society of American Archivists, 2007).

5 Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically* (London: Verso, 2013), 89–90. The archives discussed in this chapter are conceptualised in the widest sense.

6 Pad.ma, "10 Theses on the Archive," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 353.

7 Although as Vani Natarajan points out, the American Library Association list of the core values of librarianship (2004) does not include a reference to 'neutrality', although it does list 'social responsibility', see Vani Natarajan and Hannah Mermelstein, "Knowledge, Access and Resistance: A Conversation on Librarians and Archivists to Palestine," in *Informed Agitation: Library and Information Skills in Social Justice Movements and Beyond*, ed. Melissa Morrone (Sacramento, CA: Library Juice Press, 2014), 251.

8 Molly Fair, "Building an Archive from Below: Reflections from Interference Archive," in *Informed Agitation: Library and Information Skills in Social Justice Movements and Beyond*, ed. Melissa Morrone (Sacramento, CA: Library Juice Press, 2014), 186.

9 Ibid., 186–7.

10 In this regard their attitude towards archiving is the antithesis of the dominant philosophy of archiving and has more in common with Henri Langlois, who argued that 'the best way to preserve film is to project it', Langlois cited by Richard Roud and François Truffaut, *A Passion for Films: Henri Langlois and the Cinematheque Francaise* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) in Pad.ma, "10 Theses on the Archive," 354.

11 Fair, "Building an Archive from Below," 185–9.

12 Ibid., 189.

13 See www.undercurrents.org/; http://visionon.tv/; www.solsburyhill.org.uk/ last accessed 25/1/17.

14 The first two exhibitions were held 7–14 June and 12–21 December 2016 at the Hive, Dalston, https://hivedalston.wordpress.com/resistance-25-years-of-protest-and-social-movements/ and see https://hivedalston.wordpress.com/resistance-exhibition-2/ and http://historyofresistance.org/ last accessed 25/1/17. The Hive is an independent social space that has been facilitated by a not-for-profit company ReSpace Projects, which specialises in enabling the temporary use of empty buildings for social good – see https://hivedalston.wordpress.com/ last accessed 25/1/17. In 2017 there were exhibitions at the Lush Summit, Tobacco Docks, London 8–9 February, last accessed 30/11/17, https://uk.lush.com/article/what-expect-lush-summit-2017 ; 3 Carnaby Street 19–22 October, and Makerversity's Tools for Change at Somerset House, London, 18–23 November 2017, see www.facebook.com/historyofresistance/ last accessed 30/11/17. An article on Pete Pheonix can be found in the Guardian www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/23/pete-phoenix-direct-action-protester-activism-exhibition. The exhibition was also taken to a number of festivals in the summer of 2017, such as the Boomtown Fair www.youtube.com/watch?v=qE3up0DN3O4&t=30s last accessed 30/11/17.

15 The *Resistance!* exhibition has featured in two events designed to encourage making and doing. See the involvement with the Lush Summit and Makerversity's Tools for Change

exhibition at Somerset House n.14 above, http://makerversity.org/london and www.facebook.com/makerversity/ last accessed 30/11/17.

16 Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically* (London: Verso, 2013), 89–90; http://visionon.tv/home last accessed 25/1/17.

17 http://visionon.tv/en/mission last accessed 26/1/17. See http://visionon.tv/en/home and www.undercurrents.org/ last accessed 26/1/17. In the 1990s their news videos were released on VHS tape, receiving the first of many international awards, and in 1996 they set up the UK's first grassroots protest video archive, in which more than a thousand hours of footage taken by video activists are stored. By the end of the millennium, they had started to stream video through their website.

18 Richard J.F. Day, "Hegemony, Affinity and the Newest Social Movements: At the End of the 00s," in *Post-Anarchism: A Reader*, ed. D. Rouselle and S. Evren (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 113.

19 http://visionon.tv/mission and http://visionon.tv/how-to see also their sister site http://streetreporter.org/tools last accessed 25/1/17.

20 www.undercurrents.org/about.html last accessed 25/1/17.

21 Siân Evans, Anna Perricci and Amy Roberts, "'Why Archive?' and Other Important Questions Asked by Occupiers," in *Informed Agitation: Library and Information Skills in Social Justice Movements and Beyond*, ed. Melissa Morrone (Sacramento, CA: Library Juice Press, 2014), 291.

22 Rodney G.S. Carter, "Of Things Said and Unsaid: Power, Archival Silences, and Power in Silence," *Archivaria* 61 (2006) cited in Evans, et al., "Why Archive?," 303.

23 Ibid., 300–2. Among the specific criticisms of NYU were its expansion into Greenwich Village and its refusal to recognise the NYU graduate students' union. Despite these objections, materials from the OWS archives are currently held at the Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labour Archives at NYU.

24 Image of the Twitter logo in a red circle bifurcated by a red line with the phrase in English 'the revolution will not be tweeted', Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt, June 2011, photo by Lara Baladi reproduced in Lara Baladi, "Archiving a Revolution in the Digital Age, Archiving as an Act of Resistance," *Ibraaz* (July 28, 2016), last accessed 16/10/16, www.ibraaz.org/essays/163.

25 Gsquare86 Gigi Ibrahim – The Tunisian revolution is being twitterized . . . history is being written by the people! #sidibouzid #Tunisia 17:28:11 Jan 14. Reproduced in Nadia Idle and Alex Nunns, eds., *Tweets from Tahrir: Egypt's Revolution as It Unfolded, in the Words of the People Who Made It* (New York: OR Books, 2011), 27.

26 The entire Twitter archive is digitally archived at the Library of Congress, see "All your Twitter belongs to the Library of Congress," *The Guardian* (April 14, 2010), last accessed, 17/10/16, www.theguardian.com/world/richard-adams-blog/2010/apr/14/twitter-library-of-congress. Baladi's Vox Populi can be accessed here http://tahrirarchives.com/ last accessed 17/10/16.

27 Baladi co-founded Cinema Tahrir in collaboration with Mosireen, an Egyptian non-profit media collective. See Baladi, "Archiving a Revolution."

28 Baladi, "Archiving a Revolution." Rana Jarbou "The Seeds of a Graffiti Revolution" in *Walls of Freedom: Street Art of the Egyptian Revolution*, ed. Basma Hamdy and Don Karl aka Stone (Berlin: From Here to Fame Publishing, 2014), 10. Basma Hamdy and Don Karl aka Stone, eds., *Walls of Freedom and also Mia Gröndhal, Revolution Graffiti: Street Art of the New Egypt* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2013) provide an introduction to some of the iconic images and key artists. There was a hierarchy of exclusion with regard to graffiti – politics were to be whitewashed immediately, whereas profanities, it seems, could be ignored.

29 Baladi, "Archiving a Revolution."

30 Nur Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating the Subaltern, Reclaiming Memory* (London: Zed Books, 2012), especially ch. 4.

31 Walid Khalidi, ed., *All that Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israeli in 1948* (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006). The work is the culmination of nearly six years' work by more than thirty participants.

32 Khalidi, *All that Remains*, information taken from the inside of the front jacket, no page number.
33 In the preface to Khalidi, *All that Remains*, a number of earlier works and lists are described.
34 Khalidi, *All that Remains*, xvii.
35 http://zochrot.org/en/keyword/45323 last accessed 17/10/16. See also Noga Kadman, *Erased from Space and Consciousness: Israel and the Depopulated Palestinian Villages of 1948* (Indiana University Press, 2015), which includes appendices providing maps and lists of the depopulated Palestinian villages as well as the new names given to them by the Israeli Government Names Committee.
36 http://zochrot.org/en/tour/all last accessed 17/10/16.
37 www.palestineremembered.com/Articles/General/Story2041.html last accessed 17/10/16.
38 www.palestineremembered.com/OralHistory/Interviews-Listing/Story1151.html last accessed 17/10/16. See also Fazal Sheikh, *Memory Trace volume 1 of The Erasure Trilogy* (Göttingen: Steidl, 2015) discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 and based on the work of Kadman, *Erased from Space*. It offers a poetic photographic and textual archive of the villages destroyed and Palestinians displaced in the 1948 *Nakba*.
39 Fazal Sheikh, *Desert Bloom* (Göttingen: Steidl, 2015). It is volume 3 of *The Erasure Trilogy*. It is ironically named after Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion's invocation to 'make the desert bloom'. See also Fazal Sheikh and Eyal Weizman, *The Conflict Shoreline* (Göttingen: Steidl, 2015), which provides a narrative essay in response to *Desert Bloom*, including historical aerial photographs and travellers' accounts, court testimonies, state plans and contemporary remote-sensing data that trace the settler-colonial origins of Zionist practices that use climatic conditions as a means to displace Bedouin tribes from the Negev.
40 Rochelle A. Davies, *Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Disposed* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 2 mentions a number of Palestinian villages whose Palestinian inhabitants were ethnically cleansed by Israel before the villages were completely destroyed and forests planted to cover any remaining ruins. See Chapter 1 of the present volume, n. 64 for examples.
41 Fazal Sheikh, "Introduction," in *Desert Bloom* (Notes), (Göttingen: Steidl, 2015), 5.
42 www.fazalsheikh.org/projects/the_conflict_shoreline/description.php last accessed 18/10/16.
43 Davies, *Palestinian Village Histories*, 38.
44 Ibid., 39–41. Such economic ventures include trucking, water storage and distribution, dairies, leather workshops, dyeing, grain mills, knitting and textile companies.
45 www.btselem.org/testimonies and www.btselem.org/video last accessed 29/2/16.
46 www.btselem.org/video/about-btselem-video last accessed 29/2/16.
47 www.btselem.org/map last accessed 17/10/16. The B'Tselem website also houses a cartographical archive of maps illustrating various illegal land appropriations by the Israeli State, www.btselem.org/maps last accessed 17/10/16. The websites of many activist and campaigning groups also function as archives. For example, the Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign documents the use of Elbit drones in attacking Palestinians, as well as global protests against the company and instances of divestment around the world, www.stopthewall.org/divest-elbit last accessed 17/10/16.
48 http://5brokencamerasthemovie.com/ last accessed 17/10/16.
49 www.theguardian.com/world/video/2011/jun/08/east-jerusalem-israel-palestine-cctv-english last accessed 29/2/16.
50 "The Irony! Palestinian Museum Opens with no Exhibits," *Israel Today* (May 22, 2016), last accessed 18/10/16, www.israeltoday.co.il/NewsItem/tabid/178/nid/29240/Default.aspx. Not all newspaper reports were so hostile; see for example an article by Shany Littman, "Even Empty, the New Palestinian Museum is Making History," *Haaretz* (May 26, 2016), last accessed 18/10/16, www.haaretz.com/israel-news/culture/.premium-1.721510, which also noted that the Jewish Museum in Berlin similarly opened the building to the public before it had any exhibitions.

51 www.palmuseum.org/projects/the-family-album#ad-image-thumb-1651 last accessed 18/10/16.
52 The power of archival photographs and film has been recognised by the Israeli state. After occupying and looting the Palestine Research Centre in Beirut during their invasion of Lebanon in 1982, they returned many of the cultural artefacts taken, but not the film collection, Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba*, 144.
53 www.palmuseum.org/projects/the-palestinian-audio-visual-archive#ad-image-thumb-1651 last accessed 18/10/16.
54 Hal Foster, "An Archival Impulse," *October* 110 (2004), 4–5. Héla Ammar, for example, uses archival material in her art work, often combining embroidery with archival photographs. See Wafa Gabsi, "The Woven Archive: Héla Ammar in conversation with Wafa Gabsi," *Ibraaz* (March 31, 2014), last accessed 30/11/17, www.ibraaz.org/interviews/119/ and Héla Ammar, "The Woven Archive," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).
55 This work remixes two of his earlier works, *The Bitterlake Chronicles* and *Anatopism*, both of which formed part of the work cycle *The Short and Long of It* (2010–2012). See Omar Kholeif, "Memory Montage: Uriel Orlow in conversation with Omar Kholeif," *Ibraaz* (January 22, 2015), last accessed 16/10/16, www.ibraaz.org/interviews/152.
56 Ibid.
57 Foster, "An Archival Impulse," 5.
58 Maryam Jafri, *Independence Day 1936–1967* (2009–ongoing) is an installation of more than sixty archival photos of the first independence day of various Afro-Asian and Middle Eastern nations after the end of colonial occupation. The photos are primarily sourced from public archives in the countries themselves. See www.maryamjafri.net/indepDay.htm last accessed 07/11/17.
59 Stephanie Bailey, "Archives on Archives: Maryam Jafri in conversation with Stephanie Bailey," *Ibraaz* (November 6, 2013), last accessed 17/10/16, www.ibraaz.org/interviews/101.
60 Ibid.
61 Davies, *Historics*, passim.
62 Bailey, "Archives on Archives." For an example adapted from Jafri's photo series, *Getty vs. Ghana* (2012) see www.ibraaz.org/platforms/6/responses/155/ last accessed 17/10/16.
63 See Emily Jacir and Omar Kholeif, eds., *Emily Jacir. Europa* (London: Prestel, 2013), 116–41 for images from the installation and accompanying performance from 2006. We saw a version of the installation in her survey exhibition at the Whitechapel Gallery, Europa 2015 see www.whitechapelgallery.org/exhibitions/emily-jacir-europa/ last accessed 26/09/16.
64 On July 21 1973, Israeli hitmen also shot dead an innocent Moroccan waiter Ahmed Bouchikhi in Lillehammer, Norway, mistaking him for Hassan Salameh, the PLO intelligence chief suspected of being behind the killing of the Israeli athletes in 1972 – see www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/02/israel last accessed 26/1/17.
65 The political cartoonist Naji al-Ali was also murdered in London in 1987; see Jean Fisher, "Emily Jacir: Visual Poems and Silent Songs," in *Emily Jacir. Europa*, ed. Emily Jacir and Omar Kholeif (London: Prestel, 2013), 32. See also Lorenzo Fusi, "No More Enemies, No More Frontiers: The Borders are Red Flags," in *Jacir and Kholeif*, op. cit. 55–6. Ghassan Kanafani, a Palestinian novelist, was killed by a Mossad car bomb in Beirut in 1972; see Laleh Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 133.
66 Elio Petri and Ugo Pirro, "Materiale per un film," in *Per un palestinese. Dediche a piú voci a Wael Zuaiter*, ed. Janet Venn-Brown (Torino, 1979).
67 Quotations from Omar Kholeif, "Europa: Performance, Narration and Reconstitution," in *Emily Jacir. Europa*, ed. Emily Jacir and Omar Kholeif (London: Prestel, 2013), 17. Walter Benjamin, *Theses on the Philosophy of History*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: 1969) xvii, quoted in Fisher, "Emily Jacir," 23.

68 Fisher, "Emily Jacir," 33 and Graziella Parati, "An Art for New Italians: Emily Jacir's Installations in Milan and Venice," in *Emily Jacir. Europa*, ed. Emily Jacir and Omar Kholeif (London: Prestel, 2013), 70. As a source the footage provides invaluable documentation of women's participation in the armed resistance: not simply depicting women as passive vessels of suffering, but showing women wearing uniforms and carrying weapons. For more on the project and outtake rushes from the 1977 documentary, see Maureen Claire Murphey, "1970s Film of Palestinian Struggle in Lebanon Restored," *The Electronic Intifada* (November 17, 2013), last accessed 30/11/17, https://electronicintifada.net/content/1970s-film-palestinian-struggle-lebanon-restored/12914.

69 Quote from Monica Maurer in Murphey, "1970s Film of Palestinian Struggle."

70 Murphey, "1970s Film of Palestinian Struggle." For more on the importance of the research centre and Israeli attempts to destroy it and assassinate its personnel, see Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba*, 140–5. Although much of the material from the research centre was eventually returned by Israel as part of a prisoner exchange the film collection was not returned at that time, and its location is now unknown, Masalha, op. cit. 144–5.

71 Emily Jacir, *ex libris*, Installation and public project (2010–2012). We saw a version of the installation in her survey at the Whitechapel Gallery, *Europa* 2015; see www.whitechapelgallery.org/exhibitions/emily-jacir-europa/ last accessed 26/09/16. A book has been published as part of the project, Emily Jacir, *EX LIBRIS* (Köln: Verlag der Buchlandlung Walther König, 2012). Extracts are also included in Emily Jacir and Omar Kholeif, eds., *Emily Jacir. Europa* (Munich: Prestel Verlag and Whitechapel Gallery, 2015). The term "unarchived" is from Gyanendra Pandey, ed., *Unarchived Histories: the "mad" and the "trifling" in the Colonial and Postcolonial World* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).

72 It is estimated that approximately 30,000 books were "collected" from Palestinian private homes and public institutions such as libraries, schools and colleges in West Jerusalem after their owners were forced to flee and subsequently incorporated into the library collection. Gish Amit "Salvage or Plunder? Israel's "Collection" of Private Palestinian Libraries in West Jerusalem," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 40/4 (2011) and Gish Amit "Ownerless Objects? The Story of the Books Palestinians Left Behind in 1948," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 33 (2008) notes that possibly more were collected from West Jerusalem and that many tens of thousands of books were taken or destroyed from other parts of the country during the conflict. Nearly 30,000 books were sold as paper waste. Jacir notes her debt to Amit, "Ownerless Objects?" and that it provided the inspiration for *ex libris*.

73 Looted books that were not in Arabic were absorbed into the library's main collection, see Amit, "Salvage," 14. Amit notes that these Palestinian books are also kept on their own section of shelves in the library store; with the exception of manuscripts and rare books, this is the only collection to be treated like this.

74 The exchange of books among Palestinians of different religious backgrounds attests to the multi-faith nature of pre-*Nakba* Palestine.

75 Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba*. This memoricide and process of de-Palestinisation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 of this book. A corollary of this practice of de-Palestinisation is the Israeli argument that before the establishment of Israel the land was underdeveloped, backward and inhabited only by Arab peasant farmers who had no sense of a Palestinian identity and no particular ties to Palestine. See, for example, the statements by Israeli prime minister Golda Meir in the *Sunday Times* (15 June 1969) and *Washington Post* (16 June 1969) that '[t]here was no such thing as a Palestinian people', quoted in Masalha, op. cit. 4–5.

76 Melanie J. Meyers and David P. Rosenberg, "Mapping the Offenberg Archival Depot: a Visual Representation of Looted Libraries from WWII," *Archival Outlook* (January–February 2014): 4–5 and 27. See also www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online-exhibitions/special-focus/offenbach-archival-depot/restitution-efforts last accessed 17/10/16.

77 Amit, "Salvage," 14.

78 Ibid., 14 notes that in 1965 the Israel Land Administration completely demolished over 100 deserted Arab Palestinian villages to prevent their inhabitants, who had been forced into exile in 1948, from ever returning. The Israeli NGO Zochrot, which was established to raise awareness of the *Nakba*, has provided a detailed list of JNF-KKL forests that have been planted on the ruins of demolished Palestinian villages; forty-six out of sixty-eight of their forests and sites conceal the ruins of Palestinian villages destroyed by Israel. www.zochrot.org/en/article/55963 last accessed 17/10/16.
79 Amit, "Salvage," 14–5.
80 Ibid., 15.
81 Rona Sela, "Rethinking National Archives in Colonial Countries and Zones of Conflict: the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Israel's National Photography Archives as a Case Study," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 80 and 85.
82 Ibid., 87.
83 Ibid., 88.
84 The archive of memos, reports, e-mails and inquiries solely related to the detention and torture of "enemy combatants" between 2001–08 is more than a million pages; see Joshua Craze, "Excerpts from a Grammar of Redaction," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 387. See also www.joshuacraze.com/exhibitions. Last accessed 30/11/17.
85 Craze, "Excerpts," 389 referring to Michael Taussig, *Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 50–1 for the idea of public secrets.
86 This work has been realised using the unborrowed books from a variety of different libraries, including the Stockholm Public Library, The Centre for Fiction, and Sydney Mechanics' School of Arts Library. See Meriç Algün Ringborn, "The Library of Unborrowed Books," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 324–9.
87 Meriç Algün Ringborn, "Excerpt From a Dialogue with the Artist," in www.artingeneral.org/exhibitions/538 last accessed 12/10/16.
88 Phillip Griffith, "Walid Raad and Andrea Geyer," *The Brooklyn Rail* (December 9, 2015), last accessed 30/11/17, www.brooklynrail.org/2015/12/artseen/walid-raad-and-andrea-geyer
89 Pandey (ed.), Unarchived Histories.
90 Jalal Toufic, *The Withdrawal of Tradition Past a Surpassing Disaster* (2009), 12, last accessed 28/11/17, www.jalaltoufic.com/downloads/Jalal_Toufic,_The_Withdrawal_of_Tradition_Past_a_Surpassing_Disaster.pdf employs the notion of a withdrawal of tradition past a surpassing disaster in the context of the civil war in Lebanon, the Palestinian *Nakba*, and the devastation in Iraq among other places. It might also be a heuristically useful notion in the context of Algeria. See Chapter 6 in the present volume for a more detailed discussion of this idea.
91 www.zinebsedira.com/?q=video/gardiennes-dimages-image-keepers-2010 last accessed 16/10/16. Many of Sedira's other works also use archives, including *Lighthouse in the Sea of Time* (2011) and *Transmettre en abyme* (2012).
92 Most of the photographs of the conflict were taken by the French military and colonial forces or photographers who were encouraged by the French. They, therefore, narrate the conflict from a particular perspective.
93 Zineb Sedira in conversation in "Zineb Sedira," in *Summer, Autumn Winter . . . and Spring: Conversations with Artists from the Arab World*, ed. Sam Bardaouil and Till Fellrath (Milan: Skira Editore, 2014), 89.
94 Phrase is from Horacio N. Roque Ramírez, "A Living Archive of Desire: Teresita La Capesina and the Embodiement of Queer Latino Community History," in *Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions and the Writing of History*, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), passim.
95 "Sedira" in *Summer*, ed. Bardaouil and Fellrath, 90.

96 Safiye notes that when her husband's studio was cleared out after his death, many of his photographs were accidentally thrown away; Anthony Downey, "Contingency, dissonance and Performativity. Critical Archives and Knowledge Production in Contemporary Art," in *Dissonant Archives: Contemporary Visual Culture and Contested Narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 16.
97 "Sedira" in *Summer*, ed. Bardaouil and Fellrath, 88; Downey, "Contingency, 41, n. 6; and the artist in a talk given at The Mosaic Rooms, London, 29/09/16.
98 "Sedira" in *Summer*, ed. Bardaouil and Fellrath, 88.
99 Of course other factors may have played a part in the absence of photographic archives in Algeria: scarce resources may have been directed to more pressing social projects, for example. Sedira suggests that there may be a reluctance of some groups such as the Arab Image Foundation to provide a home for the collection because Kouaci worked for the Ministry of Information after independence and thus 'he is seen as not "objective", therefore not of interest' "Sedira" in *Summer*, ed. Bardaouil and Fellrath, 89.
100 Toufic, *The Withdrawal of Tradition*, 13.
101 Katarzyna Falecka, "In and Out of Algeria: Bruno Boudjelal's Documentary of Affect," *Ibraaz* (January 29, 2016), last accessed 30/11/17, www.ibraaz.org/essays/137#_ftn32.
102 Ibid. Bruno Boudjelal, *Disquiet Days* (London: Autograph ABP, 2009).
103 Boudjelal, Disquiet Days, diary entry from 4 May 1993, cited in Falecka, "In and Out of Algeria," no page number given.
104 The charter provides an amnesty for most of the perpetrators of violence during the civil war, but crucially also stipulates penalties for those who accuse others who have received amnesty of crimes. As a consequence, it is virtually impossible for the families of those who were "disappeared" by the security services to find out any information about their loved ones, nor to pursue justice on their behalf. The charter has been criticised by many for promoting amnesia and ignoring the suffering of the victims. The charter gained 97 percent support in the 2005 referendum and was implemented as law in 2006. See www.hrw.org/news/2005/08/19/algeria-charter-peace-and-national-reconciliation last accessed 14/8/17; Valerie Arnould "Amnesty Peace and Reconciliation in Algeria," *Conflict, Security and Development* 7/2 (2007); L. Kennedy and C. Patrick, eds., *The Violence of the Image: Photograph and International Conflict* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 86, cited by Falecka, "In and Out of Algeria."
105 Compare to the publication of obituary posters in Lebanon during the civil war discussed in Chapter 5.
106 The village of Bentalha was the site of a massacre on 23 September 1997, which left 400 people dead. The iconic representation of the event is a photograph by Hocine Zaourar called *The Madonna of Bentalha*, which shows a woman comforting another grieving woman.
107 Falecka, "In and Out of Algeria."
108 The film was shown as part of her 2016 exhibition, *What Language do you Speak Stranger?* at The Mosaic Rooms, London (16/09/16–3/12/16), and accompanied by three lightboxes showing details of the various postcards and reproductions on sale. *The Algerian Novel* (Chapter One), video HD, 16 minutes (2016), http://mosaicrooms.org/event/katia-kameli/ last accessed 30/11/17.
109 Incidentally, Zineb Sedira, during a discussion on her film *Image Keepers at the Mosaic Rooms* (29/09/16), noted that some of the reproductions on sale were photographs originally by Mohammad Kouaci.
110 Quotation from the film.
111 One woman notes that she has heard the names of various politicians, but does not know their faces; others say that it is interesting to find photographs of characters who are excluded from the history books.
112 See Amina Menia, "The Golden Age," www.kamellazaarfoundation.org/initiatives/4/17 last accessed 4/4/18; and Amina Menia, "The Golden Age," in *Dissonant Archives: contemporary visual culture and contested narratives in the Middle East*, ed. Anthony Downey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), quotation on 331.
113 See Downey, "Contingency," 15.

CONCLUSION

Liberating from . . .

Throughout this book we have worked through some of the various effects of meaning produced by the phrase "liberating histories". One strand of our project was to use it as a heading for evaluating the potential consequences of freeing historical practices from their own disciplinary constraints, questioning whether the production of "disobedient" or "experimental" histories might inspire academic historians to adopt more innovative practices, and thereby "save" the discourse from what David Harlan called a 'pyramid of irrelevance'.[1] Starting off from a different inflection, we used the phrase as a label to signal our preference for forms of vernacular past-talk that were not only different from orthodox history but that were resistant to history's controlling disciplinary gaze. In a different sense still, we invoked "liberating histories" as a sign for discussing some of the many ways in which past-talk has been used by artists, activists and social movement groups in campaigns for socio-political justice, and as a means of contesting what are taken to be the 'distribution of the sensible', the ideological underpinnings of our contemporary social formations.[2]

More important than any of these ways of assigning meaning to the title of this book, however, is the idea of being free *from* history. We have argued that campaigns against injustice in the world can always be fought without referring to anything that might be recognised as a history or to something that might be conceptualised as a "historical past". Responding to Said's call to 'furnish the world with some narrative evidence' of the ethnic cleansing and massacres of Palestinians as well as the brutality of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, many scholarly histories and historical analyses have been produced that respond to *all* the available evidence. These have effectively challenged both the hegemonic Israeli narrative of the 1948 'voluntary flight of the Palestinians from much of Palestine' and the argument that the 'politics of separation/partition' and the 'unilaterally imposed

domination, oppression and fragmentation of the Palestinian people and their land' that this entails, is in reality a defensive measure and 'a formula for a peaceful settlement', rather than a means of extending Israeli sovereignty further into occupied lands.[3] And yet, such narratives maintain their hegemony despite the inconsistencies between them and the available sources. The injustice and violence continues.[4] Thus, although it is the view of historians, and that articulated by the MacBride Commission, that 'the facts speak for themselves', it is obvious that this is not at all the case.[5] 'The facts' serve dominant socio-political and economic interests and, as Sansour says, '[t]ruth is beside the point. Legitimacy is not a rational concept, it's emotional, psychological'.[6] Although the MacBride Commission found Israel 'guilty of acts of aggression contrary to international law' both in its use of 'forbidden weapons and methods' and the fact it 'indiscriminately and recklessly bombed civilian targets [and] deported, dispersed and ill-treated civilian populations' during its 1982 invasion of Lebanon, such practices continue today. Historians have "furnished the world with evidence", but the world (which in this case really means America) has not taken notice. It is, however, quite possible to address the widespread injustices and violence in Israel/Palestine without recourse to history. The argument over Palestine does not, as Howard Halle states, revolve around 'the question of just *who* is indigenous: the Jews who conquered the place three millennia ago, or the Arabs who did so 2,000 years later'.[7] Rather, the conflict centres on *historical* presents; it is an argument about political authority, the provision of justice, human rights and an equitable division of resources for everyone who lives in Israel/Palestine and the occupied territories as well as those who have been forced from their homes and live in exile or in refugee camps.[8] The 'facts on the ground' *now* – the mistreatment, exclusion and oppression of people *now* – are what are important and not the interpretation of old fragments of pottery, archaeological ruins or ancient texts. For example, Birzeit University Institute of Law employs a framework derived from international law to challenge the occupation, ethnic cleansing, settler colonialism and apartheid practices inflicted on Palestinians and Palestine rather than a historical analysis of events. Access to basic human rights should not rest on the ability of individuals of communities to narrate an acceptable account of the before-now.

Similarly, the Kenyans who instigated a recent legal test-case against the British government – on the grounds that they had been tortured and abused during the British counter-insurgency in their country in the 1950s – were not seeking primarily to have their historical narrative recognised. Instead, the Kenyan Human Rights Commission, the Mau Mau War Veterans Association, the individual claimants and their legal representatives were working to secure legal and political recognition that crimes had been committed against them and many others in Kenya during the "Emergency" period. In our view, rather than offer to provide oppressed or disadvantaged groups with a sympathetic historical account of their situation – or even to support them in producing such histories of their own – a more morally defensible position is to counter the assumption that anyone *needs* to invoke history as part of their appeal for justice, dignity or access to vital

resources. The cultural habit whereby claims for justice now are scrutinised in relation to assumptions about the historical past (the past of the historians) should be recognised as disadvantaging too many people, particularly in post-colonial territories where authorised history was long part of the ideological framework of colonisation and oppression that caused so many injustices in the first place. Although we accept that the archives that make possible the construction of historical knowledge do not straightforwardly reflect material and political interests, we remain convinced that epistemological and political asymmetries are regularly constitutive of one another.

For this reason, we reject any general assertion that egalitarian and democratic political projects *need* to be supported by historical accounts of how injustices in the present came to be. Even radical, openly partisan or disobedient histories are at best optional resources that can be utilised within campaigns for justice. An 'attitude of radical and critical disobedience' towards how things are now is more likely to serve the needs of the present than are (disobedient) histories about how things once were.[9] Historians might like to think that by discussing previous instances of social or political change they are encouraging belief in the possibility of analogous changes now and in the future, but there is no strong evidence that the production of histories, or indeed the more recent growth of heritage practices, has done anything to prevent or even impede the worst kinds of excesses in the world: mass killings, violence against adversaries, people trafficking and slavery, extraordinary inequalities in access to safe housing, healthcare, food and water supplies, and so on. On the contrary, we find more persuasive the argument that history's role in "explaining" the present through its construction of retrospective teleologies risks creating 'the illusion that the world's wrongness makes sense'.[10]

Liberating by . . .

In cases where appropriations or invocations of the past *have* contributed to projects of social and political change, they have usually done so with little or no recourse to the *historical* past. We have sought to show that various forms of past-talk are functioning as alternative discursive spaces in which historians' collective disciplinary power is being contested and in which politically empowering counter-discourses are being invented. In effect, forms of past-talk have been *liberated by* resisting history's claims to authority over the past. As a result, the most imaginative and politically engaged uses of the past are to be found outside of the boundaries of orthodox history. Activists and campaigners have used various forms of vernacular past-talk to unsettle the temporary fixings of "common sense" that limit thinking about current political and social problems. In their innovative uses of past-talk they have speculated on the failure of representation and challenged the claims to truth and representational totality that are inherent in the institutional discourse of history. They have deconstructed the way in which histories are intricately bound up with relations of power, ontologies and processes of legitimisation. They have emphasised the heuristic benefit of plurality, contestation and intervention and worked to

produce practices that change 'the contents of public discourse and the contours of public space'.[11]

As Mouffe explained, creating a democratic ethos necessitates 'the mobilization of passions and sentiments, the multiplication of practices, institutions and language games that provide the conditions of possibility for democratic subjects and democratic forms of willing'.[12] The artists, (post)museum curators, radical archivists and filmmakers that we have discussed have shown how forms of past-talk can contribute to the creation of the kind of democratic ethos that Mouffe envisages. Experimenting with form, materials and representational tactics, and openly advocating ideological positions in what they produce, such work can be understood as an attempt to "repossess" the past from academic history's controlling disciplinary authority. Instead of perceiving this challenge to their authority over the past as a threat, we would like to see historians abandon their habit of subjecting all forms of past-talk to their own communally agreed-upon criteria for making truth claims. Productive resistance to history's hegemonic functions has to come from *within* its own institutional practices as well as from outside. This does not simply mean reviewing methodological protocols, allowing new types of source material into what is taken to constitute the historical archive, or resolving to be more adventurous in choices of representational forms (though we do, nevertheless, support each of these). It means historians working to challenge our own collective identity as experts who act as if we have been accorded final rights to adjudicate questions of meaning, value and truth in relation to the past. It means historians becoming truly self-critical, rather than critical of everything *except* the epistemological assumptions that underpin academic historical practices. As Davies put it:

> If universities were really places for critical intellectual reflection (and did not manage the training facility franchise for the so-called "knowledge-based economy"), there might be, here or there, "Departments of Historics", not Departments of History. Since, just as economics appraises commercial trends, politics the tendencies of governments, and literary criticism the output of creative writers, historics would, indispensably, unmask the affirmative forces of historical knowledge in its many public guises.[13]

Liberating of . . .

If the past is to be invoked at all as a dimension of contemporary "politics talk", then it is best conceived as a store of alternatives that could be explored to help us imagine different ways of being, not as a platform that determined the shape of the present. Past-talk's social functions should be evaluated in relation to the type of "liberating" effects they produce for groups and individuals. Past-talk can be used to pull apart hegemonic stories that narrate the present in terms of historical cause-and-effect, and which therefore naturalise current arrangements as the always-already determined outcome of "historical" processes; it can draw attention to past futures that were never realised; and inspire people to see that forms of living

that are presently dismissed as "utopian" and "impossible" almost took hold in the past. Conceived in these terms, the most useful forms of past-talk function along the lines of Derrida's idea of a non-historical historicity as 'future to come', which in turn opens the way towards visions of new possible futures that are wholly other and undetermined by historians' conventional ordering concepts.[14] Of course, this kind of counter/actual approach to the past is contrary to the dominant epistemological codes of the history profession, for whom establishing "the facts of the matter" in relation to the past remains a guiding ambition.[15] But in post-foundational thought, no signifying practices or codes can claim epistemic authority outside of the discursive system in which they operate. There is 'no Elsewhere, no site of meaning and value' that transcends discursive regimes and practices.[16] Instead, there are semantic systems (including history) that operate, like all languages, according to rules that refer to nothing outside of these systems' own conventions, and there are acts of enunciation. As a result, historians' claims about the superior epistemic value of their discipline relative to other forms of past-talk are groundless.

To say that a fact can only be established as a fact by an act of enunciation within a semantic system, and never in a way that transcends the specificities of discursive regimes, is not to dismiss the constitution of facts as unimportant. It is simply to say that we do not believe that historians are more adept at establishing facts about the past than others who play different types of language games – such as lawyers, artists, filmmakers, journalists, political activists, novelists and the like. Leaving aside problems about how archives are constituted and endowed with epistemic authority, we see no reason to believe that history as a discipline possesses reading practices for dealing with archival material that ensure more "true", "rigorous" or "correct" outcomes of these readings than other practitioners' ways of working with the same primary texts. Establishing facts that matter can only be done relative to a project in which those facts are generated and then positioned. In any case, even if it was possible to identify important facts in ways that transcended the specific discursive context in which such facts were constituted, deciding what those facts meant or how they should be used could only ever be an act of interpretation, and as Stanley Fish argued, interpretation is always an act of (community-constrained) construction, not retrieval.[17]

Therefore, when it comes to evaluating particular accounts or invocations of the past, we advocate the use of consequentialist rather than (flawed) epistemic criteria. Iterations of past-talk can be judged in relation to the kinds of effects that they produce or are likely to produce. They can be assessed in terms of whose interests they are likely to serve and how. As part of any such evaluation, producers of past-talk will need to be able to justify what they have said about the past to different audiences. So instead of asking whether an account of the past is "true", we should think about its reception among a range of interpretative communities – not just on epistemic grounds, but on ideological and aesthetic grounds as well. Following Rorty, rather than expect histories or other forms of past-talk to elucidate truths out there that we have not yet discovered, we should use it instead to ask: 'are there ways of talking and acting that we have not yet explored?'[18] It seems to us that

institutionalised or academic history is not the best way of answering or addressing this question. Instead, the engagements of artists, activists and creators of vernacular histories with the past seem to be more vibrant and promising.

On our reading of the situation, either the past is largely irrelevant to contemporary political questions, in which case the ways that historians provide intellectual spectacle by performing their scholarship and erudition do not matter much beyond the academic infrastructures in which they are situated. Or alternatively, the past is regarded as a dimension of our politics-talk now, in which case the task of deciding how the past should be figured into deliberations about possible futures is too important to be entrusted to any single discursive practice such as academic history. Past-talk in its many and varied forms is more likely to produce the kind of conversations about "democracies to come" that we believe are needed in the world.

Notes

1 David Harlan, "Ken Burns and the Coming Crisis of Academic History," *Rethinking History* 7/2 (2003): 184.
2 Jacques Rancière, "In What Time Do We Live?," *Política Común* 4 (2013), last accessed, 31/1/17, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/pc/12322227.0004.001?view=text;rgn=main.
3 Edward Said, "Permission to Narrate," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13/3 (1984): 38; Ilan Pappé, "The Vicissitudes of the 1948 Historiography of Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 39/1 (2009): 6; Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2012), 10–11. For examples of such scholarly analyses, see the various works listed throughout this book and the numerous works by Noam Chomsky, Norman Finkelstein, Walid Khalidi, Nur Masalha, Ilan Pappé, Michael Prior, Eyal Weizman, Elia Zureik.
4 In fact, as Pappé 'Vicissitudes', 9–10 argues, Israeli neo-Zionist historians in terms of agreement on the 'facts' accept the arguments of the New Historians that there were in fact widespread massive and intentional expulsions of Palestinians, massacres and other war crimes during the 1948 conflict. But rather than see this as evidence of 'human and civil rights abuses or even atrocities and war crimes', they are treated in this new historical research as 'normal and sometimes even commendable behavior by the Israeli military'. They accept the facts established by the New Historians, but reject the moral implications of these findings, and furthermore they criticise the New Historians for undermining the legitimacy of the nation.
5 Cited in Said, "Permission', 29. The MacBride Commission was an international commission of five lawyers and a university professor chaired by Sean MacBride set up to investigate reported violations of international law by Israel during their 1982 invasion of Lebanon. A report of their findings was published, Sean MacBride et al., *Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the International Commission* (London: Ithaca Press, 1983).
6 Larissa Sansour and Soren Lind, "In the Future, They Ate from the Finest Porcelain (extended consultation)," *Ibraaz* (May 6, 2016), last accessed 7/11/16, www.ibraaz.org/projects/130#
7 Howard Halle, "The Hugo Boss Prize 2008: Emily Jacir," *Time Out New York* 701 (March 5, 2009), last accessed 30/11/17, www.timeout.com/newyork/art/the-hugo-boss-prize-2008-emily-jacir
8 Kenan Van De Mieroop, "Historical Presents: A Study of the Debates Around Reparations for Slavery in the United States and France, the Post Racial Era and the Age of Commemoration" (PhD diss., University of Ghent, 2015).
9 Keith Jenkins, *Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 6; also cited in Martin L. Davies, "Disobedience Reconsidered: History, Theory, and the Morality of Scholarship," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 17/2 (2013): 206.

10 Davies, "Disobedience," 195.
11 Kaelen Wilson-Goldie, "Contemporary Art Practices in Post-war Lebanon: An Introduction," in *Out of Beirut*, ed. Suzanne Cotter, (Oxford: Modern Art Oxford, 2006), 84.
12 Chantal Mouffe, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of Democracy," in *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (Abingdon: Routledge, 1996), 5.
13 Martin L. Davies, *Historics: Why History Dominates Contemporary Society* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 18.
14 Mark Mason, *Derrida, the Return of Religion in Cultural Criticism and Messianic Historical Theory: Impossible Histories* (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming).
15 See Chapter 6, n. 46 on our use of the term *counter/actual*.
16 Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, *History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering the Tools of Thought* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 74, 87.
17 See, for example, the various essays in Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
18 Richard Rorty, "Introduction," in *Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1–15, 6.

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