Jung and his Mystics

In the end it all comes to nothing

John P. Dourley

ROUTLEDGE

JUNG AND HIS MYSTICS

Jung's psychology describes the origin of the Gods and their religions in terms of the impact of archetypal powers on consciousness. For Jung this impact is the basis of the numinous, the experience of the divine in nature and in human nature. His psychology, while possessed of a certain claim to science, is based on depths of subjective experience which transcends psychology and science as ordinarily understood. *Jung and his Mystics: In the end it all comes to nothing* examines the mythic nature of Jung's psychology and thought, and demonstrates the influence of mysticism and certain religious thinkers in formulating his own work.

John P. Dourley explores the influence of Mechthild of Magdeburg and fellow mystics/Beguines, and traces the mystic impulse and its expression through Meister Eckhart and Jacob Boehme to Hegel in the nineteenth century. All of these mystics were of the apophatic school and understood the culmination of their experience to lie in an identity with divinity in a nothingness beyond all form, formal expression or immediate activity. Dourley shows how this is still of relevance in our lives today. The book concludes that Jung's understanding of mysticism could greatly alleviate the conflict between faiths, religious or political, by drawing attention to their common origin in the depths of the human.

Jung and his Mystics: In the end it all comes to nothing is aimed at scholars and senior research students in Jungian studies, including religionists, theologians and philosophers of religion, especially those with an interest in mysticism. It will also be essential reading for those interested in the connection between religious and psychological experience.

John P. Dourley is Professor Emeritus, Department of Religion, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada (1970–2001). He is a practising Jungian analyst, a graduate of the Zurich programme, 1980. He has written widely on Jung and religion. His previous works include *Paul Tillich*, *Carl Jung and the Recovery of Religion* (Routledge, 2008) and *On Behalf of the Mystical Fool*: *Jung on the Religious Situation* (Routledge, 2010). He is also a Catholic priest and a member of the religious order the Oblates of Mary Immaculate.

This page intentionally left bank

JUNG AND HIS MYSTICS

In the end it all comes to nothing

John P. Dourley

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2014
by Routledge
27 Church Road, Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Dourley, John P.
Jung and his mystics : in the end it all comes to nothing / John P. Dourley.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Jung, C. G. (Carl Gustav), 1875-1961. 2. Mysticism. 3. Psychoanalysis and religion. I. Title.
BF173.J85D68 2014
150.19'54–dc23
2013039825

ISBN: 978-0-415-70388-8 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-415-70389-5 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-79627-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Cenveo Publisher Services

To Sandy whose help with this work at a difficult time
remains deeply appreciated

This page intentionally left bank

CONTENTS

This page intentionally left bank

PREFACE

Jung understood mysticism to be based on the unmediated experience of archetypal energy usually expressed in gripping imagery. Yet a closer look at the mystics he cited most often in his work reveals that their mystical journey ended in an experience of a nothingness beyond imagery. In short his favoured mystics were of the apophatic tradition. Their journey culminated in the fecundity of the nothing in what they took to be a moment of identity with God beyond all distinction between creature and source. Yet this was a creative nothing from which all distinction and discourser proceeded.

There is more to these mystics than their sharing a common experience of dissolution in the nothing. Viewed in historical sequence they can be seen as developing their experience toward a divine/human reciprocity in which both participants redeem each other as the base meaning of individual and collective life and history.

The sequence starts with Jung's reference to the thirteenth-century Beguines, women mystics whose imagery depicts a torrid sexual love with the figure of Christ ending in an identity of lovers beyond difference. These women mystics influenced Meister Eckhart in the following century. Eckhart is the mystic Jung uses to elaborate his understanding of the "relativity of God". By it Jung means that God creates human consciousness to become self-conscious in it through the return of consciousness to its source in a never-ending cycle. Next to Eckhart Jacob Boehme is the most frequently cited mystic in Jung's *Collected Works*. Living in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century he may have read Eckhart through John Tauler, one of Eckhart's disciples. In dramatic visions Boehme also returned to the source of consciousness but found it conflicted in itself. He came then to understand that this conflict in the life of the divine could not be resolved in the eternal unity of opposites implied in the imagery of Trinity but was to be resolved in human consciousness and history. Hegel, in the nineteenth century, understood Boehme as the initiator of Teutonic philosophy, though Boehme's symbol-laden writings needed the rational refinement Hegel would give to them. In this light Hegel's philosophy is in large part an effort to complete Boehme by giving to his symbolism the intelligibility it needed.

As a significant contributor to the modern culmination of this line of the development of religious consciousness, Jung in his *Answer to Job* completes Hegel's philosophy as Hegel had completed Boehme's symbolic discourse by raising both to the psychological level. Jung's final assertion identifies the relation of consciousness to the unconscious as wholly containing that of the human to the divine. From this perspective the deepest impulse of personal and collective historical consciousness seeks the union of consciousness and the unconscious, the human and the divine, in their mutual redemption in the human. Without giving the future a too limiting and so self-defeating definition, it is obvious that Jung's late psychology calls for a supersession of the consciousness informing Western religion, especially that of the monotheisms, toward a spirituality as wide in its embrace as is the unconscious itself as the "eternal Ground of all empirical being" (Jung 1970: 534). What follows fills in the foregoing.

1

THE MYSTICS AND PSYCHIC SELF-CONTAINMENT

Jung's myth as the Mother myth

Jung's psychology serves as an excellent resource for the interpretation of myth. It is so because myth, in whatever form, ranging from cosmogonic or theogonic statements on how the Gods and the universe were created to the interactions between specific deities and humanity, is an expression of archetypal energies. As such all myths invite their readers to experience in one's psyche the energies they depict and personify as beyond the psyche. The introjection of the myth moves the individual to become a full participant in the drama it depicts by experiencing its truth in oneself.

Usually overlooked even by Jungians is the fact that Jungian psychology is itself a myth expressive of the foundational movements of the psyche and its extension to the world, humanity and divinity "beyond" the psyche. The dynamic of Jung's myth describes the birth and fall of consciousness, and its return through death to its womb as a prelude to rebirth, now cast as the co-redemption of both Goddess and her child, the ego, in a cycle without end. This cycle is the primordial pulse of individual life and of the life of humanity itself. Effectively psychic life in Jung's myth become the reenactment of the Mother myth. The defining moments in this great round lie in the emergence of consciousness from the maternal pleroma, its reimmersion through the baptism of egoic dissolution into her fontal plenitude and a resurrection toward her ongoing incarnation in a consciousness now more unified in itself and moved to embrace the totality whose eternal matrix and ground the Great Mother is. In the process the Goddess and her progeny, consciousness, engage in an all encompassing dialectic wholly contained within the total psyche neither needful nor tolerant of the influence of any agency from without. In fact within Jung's myth it is not possible to talk of anything existing as knowable "outside the psyche". The phrase lacks intelligibility in a Jungian context since the psyche wholly encompasses what is and what can be know.

The cycle's first moment is the universal original sin. It is the sin of becoming conscious. It is a sin both rewarding and yet painfully paid for. It casts the newborn ego in its infantile and developing self-affirmation into a state of unconsciousness unaware of its connection to its own origin and so unaware of its

connection through that origin to all that is both within and beyond itself. Though a sin, it is a needed sin, a happy fall. To be conscious and alienated from origin and surrounding is better than being wholly unborn. In its earlier condition consciousness fresh from its origin in the land of the Gods and Goddesses took them in literal projection as dwelling on mountaintops and eventually heaven. As the millennia flowed on the ego's proclamation of independence inevitably took on a pathological hubris in the pride of its limited power and constricted but real freedom unaware of the "supremacy of the self" in all matters maturational (Jung 1969b: 259–260).

Closer to our situation in the history of consciousness, the dialectic between ego and the unconscious, at once developmental and pathogenic, took the form of the release of reason from its captivity to religion and religious institutions in the wake of the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. As necessary and, indeed, cherished as these developments were the progressive removal of consciousness, personal and collective, from its own depths deeply informs and sickens contemporary Western culture. Such diminished relation to depth is the pathological hallmark of patriarchy in either gender. The mind is torn from its ground and left to suffer isolation from the other and nature, as well as the conflict between differently archetypally bonded communities now in the form of secular faiths funded by the same possessive powers as previously empowered religious faiths and their carnage. This is not to deny that secular faith and religious faith cannot align their powers in an even deeper collective unconsciousness, as is evident in the conflicted Middle East and along the eastern shore of the Adriatic (Dourley: 2003).

This current moment of universal existential alienation is described in many terms beyond its religious designation as original sin. The current term of choice derives from Weber's conception of disenchantment. Disenchantment in Jung's myth describes a debilitating remove from the Goddess as source and sustenance of conscious life, and so a remove from one's personal depth, from each other and from nature itself as grounded in her power. Jung was keenly aware of the profound disenchantment of his culture infecting himself as early as *The Red Book*. Early in this work he describes the creative tension in his own life as that between the spirit of the times and the spirit of the depths and so of the soul. In terms redolent of society's current malaise he describes his possession by the spirit of the times as one of loss of soul. "I still labored misguidedly under the spirit of this time and thought differently about the human soul. I thought and spoke much of the soul. I knew many learned words for her. I had judged her and turned her into a scientific object" (Jung 2009: 232). In doing so Jung frankly confesses he was immersed in a darkness and alienated from the life of his soul about whom he had lectured scientifically and written so grandly (Jung 2009: 233, fn. 52).

Jung's response to this cultural and personal malaise describes the second movement in his myth. His psychology itself takes on mythic proportion as seeking a redemptive but hard won freedom from the spirit of his time and the recovery of his soul in a soulless society. The recovery of soul was far more than

individual. The recovery of his soul entailed the recovery of the soul of his culture and civilization. In the relation of the personal to the cultural Jung's problem and its resolution became his analysis of the problem of his time and the strategy for its resolution. As Erikson would argue that Luther's problem and its resolution was the problem and resolution of the anguish of his time so also was the resolution of Jung's suffering and its alleviation the answer to his (Erikson 1958). The personal imagery of *The Red Book* emerging from his own unconscious became the mythic basis of his psychological elaboration of the powers they symbolized. For both Jung and Luther the power of the divine was engaged in their suffering toward the higher consciousness such suffering was to engender. For Luther the answer came through a revelation from beyond. Jung came to understand revelation as the compensation the unconscious offers to individual and society as the source of both becomes more real in each. This would make of Jung's myth a revelation without making him a messiah. His personal revelation implied a relation to the divine common to all and the figures in it ones that peopled the universal psyche from which they came into his conscious life in a form appropriate to the historical situation of that life. Under his suffering of the spirit of the time Jung's revelation came entirely from the depth of his own being. It had no origin beyond the psyche itself. In this he was among the first to realize clearly that the Gods speak entirely from within as they spoke to him in the experience that took the shape of the figures in *The Red Book,* later developed in a more discursive manner in his *Collected Works*.

From early on Jung's psychology as myth was thus dedicated to the reconnection of the mind with its ground in the deeper psyche. The recovery of the ground of consciousness in the depths of one's own psyche is not without suffering. The images surrounding the process are of death and dismemberment to convey the pain of a descent working a loss of mind in the interests of a wider and deeper consciousness upon return from the depth. Jung draws on a number of traditions and resources to describe the return to the inner origin in compelling variants. The return is a crucifixion and burial between archetypally based opposites as a prelude to a resurrected consciousness (Jung 1969b: 225). It is imaged in flaying as a body moves to new life (ibid.: 228). It can be a sacred dismemberment and self-eating to be endlessly reenacted (ibid.: 227). It is visioned as a "baptism" into the abyss of the Goddess, a total immersion, even to the point of ego annihilation, in her creative nothingness (Jung 1969e: 425). And these are but a few of the images describing the horrors of the descent into the world beyond ego as the precedent to its renewal.

Return from this immersion in the depth becomes in Jung's myth the third and resolving moment. It is the substance of incarnation and redemption. The psychic hallmarks that characterize it most adequately are an enhanced personal integration of the energies that create the individual coupled with an extended universal compassion. The cycle of birth from, return to, and fuller conscious expression of the origin is the basis of the mother myth and the mother myth is the myth informing Jung's psychology. In effect processes of what Jung calls "individuation" are

the reenactment in individual life of this myth of birth, death and rebirth. The mother myth thus described may indeed be the primal cosmogonic and theogonic myth. By making the myth the basis of the individual's true reality, Jung's psychology works to reconnect the individual with the origin of the universe as the ground of one's personal being from which the Gods and Goddesses arise as needed to consciousness in person and history. The universal dialectic between consciousness and its origin seeking consciousness in it engages every individual and, through the individual, the species. From participation in this commerce there is no place to hide. The dialectic commences with the original sin of consciousness and will continue as long as the origin of consciousness seeks ever-greater self-consciousness in it in a cycle without end.

To the extent that this dialectic becomes conscious in historical humanity, the sense of the Goddess and her sympathies becomes increasingly real in existential consciousness. Such consciousness bears an intensified compassion for all that lies within and beyond the individual born anew from the Great Mother as the creative nothingness from which the individual and the all proceed. In the above treatment the moments of the myth were distinguished and dealt with as scenes in a play. This presentation may be overly intellectual in dissecting the myth. The myth itself and its moments are susceptible of great variation but on closer inspection appear in the significant myths both extant and practiced or now living only in memory.

Nor can the great moments in the myth be reduced to once-and-for-all historical events though they may be so depicted, in particular by communities who live under their spell and in various ways depend on their literal and historical interpretation for communal coherency, assurance and even survival. There was no historical Garden of Eden nor fall therefrom. There was no universal redemption of humanity in an individual's return from death in a unique historical event. Nor will there be a final gathering of the saved within history in a New spotless Jerusalem. Nor can these events be confined to any historical autobiography though their depictions in collective religious imagery, and especially in a literal and rational age, may force them to be so. Jesus' return to mother earth in death and resurrection from her are but one instance of taking a myth personally, literally and historically. Death and resurrection undergone by an historical individual is in this instance a striking variation on a much told tale, still in possession of large swaths of the collective imagination reducing it to historical biography and so missing its myth and transformative power. In the Jungian myth these religious depictions of birth, death and rebirth are not of past events. They owe their origin to passionate energies operative in the creations of the mythic whose intent is to lead those they touch into the same intensities from which they came. The object of symbolic story and its ritual enactment is to lead the individual into living contact with inner powers they depict. One whose experience has yet to include that of personal death and resurrection would be incapable of understanding its biblical meaning.

These archetypally based energies are the real authors of and actors in the stories of heroic enactment in days of yore and the guarantors of the indelible imprint

they have left on the present. Their referent is not to history and its religious luminaries and communities but to the deeper movements of the psyche itself working now, always, everywhere, and in everyone. By elevating it to a psychic reality Jung gives a universal meaning to the Vincentian Canon. It now reads that religious humanity in the very diversity of its communities lives under the suasion of that which is believed "always, everywhere and by everyone." In this sense Jung can proclaim the universal truth of the Christian myth and liturgy and be entirely free from the slightest taint of Christian religious imperialism. When he writes, "That is to say that what happens in the life of Christ happens always and everywhere" (Jung 1969c: 89) he is not writing as an aggressive Christian apologist on behalf of the supremacy of institutional Christianity, he is writing that the archetypal power of the image is one of the self from which it derives its lasting import and universal meaning as one among many expressions of the self. Jung could have said the same thing about the lives of Abraham, Moses or Mohammed.

And yet to admit that both the origin and referent of the great religions, and their "revealed" accounts of deities, in their dealing with humanity express specific variants of the foundational movements of the universal human psyche remains regrettably beyond the epistemic and faith boundaries of many. The popular religious imagination would dismiss such suggestion with the accusation that such a position is reductionism in the form of psychologism. It would become the basis of the vapid accusation that Jung "psychologizes" religion. Such a position reduces an objective revelation by an objective God to the status of a symbol whose origin is wholly internal to the human and serves to track the movements of the major energies of the psyche. In contrast for Jung only the symbolic as expressive of its living archetypal base enables revelation to endure. Taken literally such symbolism is rightfully dismissed as magic and infantile. Thus Jung found himself strangely forced to defend himself from charges of reductionism by pointing out to religious critics that his archetypal theory points to the foundational power and perdurability of their faith located in the archetypes themselves. As such his psychology hardly corrodes faith by revealing its profoundly human origin or, more precisely, it origin in the profundity of the human (Jung 1967a: 49, 50; Dourley 1994: 20, 21). Yet sophisticated intellectual and theological reflection on the origin and substance of the diverse religions continues into the present to evidence a hankering, however disguised, for the supernatural status and so objectivity of one's preferred divinity and its engagement with humanity. A psychological analysis of another religion is quite acceptable as long as it does not touch one's own. Jung's response to such religious protectionism was simply, "Yet, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander" (Jung 1969d: 109).

As a cosmogony Jung's myth links the individual to the universe and as a theogony accounts for the origin of the divinities in the impact of the archetypal and its numinosity on consciousness. He could hardly be more explicit on this point than in his reference to "my demonstration of the psychic origin of religious phenomena" (Jung 1968c: 9). In the context of his wider work he is here affirming that the archetypal psyche creates the experience which creates the Gods as well

as personal and communal faith in them. This experience of the divinities and their interaction with the human are the substance of all religious conviction, scriptures, dogma and ritual reenactment, the most dramatic "empirical" expression of the archetypal foundation of human consciousness. Sketched in its broadest sense Jung's cosmogony and theogony coalesce in affirming that the Goddess creates consciousness in order to become conscious in her child. She births the various religions to provide a diversity of access to herself. The stories of their Gods, the substance of their beliefs and their ritual initiations and constant reenactment serve primarily and forcefully to identify and access her deeper movements in the human psyche. She is the presiding divinity, the one true Goddess and source of all the others. Only in human consciousness can her lesser and defined offspring, human and divine, work toward an ever demanded yet ever evasive conscious fullness adequate to her and to her at once unbounded but conflicted potential to be united and realized in consciousness. A later chapter will fully address Jung's late work, *Answer to Job*, in which he makes clear that the relation of the ego to God is its relation to the archetypal unconscious, that the ego had to emerge from its source at the insistence of the self as the only locus in which the polarities inherent in the source could be perceived and resolved, and that such resolution is the meaning of individual life and the life of the species. Jung's myth thus stated has many implications in many fields.

The implication for cultural diagnosis and healing

Severance of the mind from its generative roots is more than simply a widespread wallowing in a passive social malaise of superficiality and meaninglessness. Such severance is the precondition of collective possession. It is dangerous and currently threatens the species. For the emergence of a rational milieu has by no means disabled the archetypal energies that create the Gods and their communities. On the contrary, the mind stripped of conscious interaction with the powers that create the Gods and equivalents in other forms of faith is peculiarly susceptible to being possessed by the very powers whose existence reason denies, diminishes or forgets. Individually those possessed not only of but also by faith are most visible in all form of fanaticism whose only distinction lies in the underlying archetype. More lethal than individual fanaticisms is their collective equivalent, the transformation of religious faith into political faith and the loss of life such transformation works so widely today. Political faith is the insidious concretion of the same archetypal power that formerly created religious faiths and the enmity and bloodshed that so marked their history. Such religiously inspired mayhem became a major impetus in the emergence of the Enlightenment. If religion and its wars in the wake of the Reformation could not keep the peace then reason might. And to some extent it did. The Enlightenment, especially in its Kantian and Humean streams, demonstrated the weakness if not total inefficacy of traditional arguments for the existence of God and reduced metaphysical speculation about the nature of the divine to a skeleton creed evocative of a universal rational assent

that God existed, rewarded good and punished evil. It separated church and state. Explicit theocracy is no longer an option in the societies living in the legacy of the Enlightenment. Enlightened reason's critique of institutional religion and its theological support did contribute to a more responsible religious sense if such a sense was to be maintained at all beyond an affirmation of faith both beyond reason and divested of experience.

Yet this critique, invaluable though it was and remains, left a void, an emptiness of soul still draining the spiritual blood of Western culture. While Enlightened reason's contributions to humanity cannot be denied, Jung was aware early on that these gains were not without their own cost and consequent social and personal pathology. Ironically the Enlightenment's removal of the collective mind from its depths in the name of reason became the occasion for reason's unwitting possession by faiths even more lethal than their religious precedents. These newer faiths were the political faiths that Jung termed the "isms" (Dourley 2003: 143–144; Jung 1969a: 175). The level of archetypally based hatred between religious tribes and between their internal factions may have been constant throughout history but when religious faith became political faith the danger posed to humanity doubled with the twice bonded. Along with the deepening of collective unconsciousness the body count soared in direct proportion to the increase in effective weaponry and modes of inflicting death. One side of Jung's appropriation of Lévy-Bruhl's understanding of "participation mystique" would reduce such communities, whether religious, political, national or combinations of all three, to the level of unconscious competing tribes even when such tribalism attained international currency in our times. The power of the bonding archetype limits or forbids personal distancing from absorption in tribal Gods and their universal goals. "Mass intoxication" became the basis of religious and political community (Jung 1968a: 126). The political sciences still remain largely immune to the suggestion that the variety of significant political persuasions rests on collective unconsciousness of the archetypal power at the base of such communal commitment. It too remains an insult to remind Christian traditions, and by extension others, that their ecclesiology is a religious variant of humanity's instinct to herd and so retains the residual basis of collective "psychic epidemics" (ibid.: 127).

In this regard Jung must be credited with identifying the continuity between collective religious faith and current political faith. Even in the period since his departure, Jung's warning of the lethal quality attaching to such collective unconsciousness, particularly when religious and collective faith coalesce in paroxysms of destruction, cannot be denied. Indeed, they are presently recognized in the work of such modern geo-politicians as S. P. Huntington (Huntington 1993, 1996; Dourley 2010b). What Huntington lacks is Jung's psychological analysis of the psychic process of the creation of the Gods whose communities demonize individuals and other differently possessed communities. On a more positive note Huntington also lacks Jung's sense that the common origin of religious and political faith also pushes to a religious consciousness beyond extant forms of religious and political life. These divinely based communities reveal their political

and religious idolatry in their universal and exclusive claim to ultimate truth and in the loss of life whenever their devotees share neighbouring or the same geography. The body count at the hands of these powerful psychic coalitions continues at this writing. In the end Jung's response to the unconscious hostility of the religiously and politically possessed is the autonomy and freedom of living out of the personal truth of the self even if it be a moral imperative few can attain. For Jung such autonomy was, nevertheless, the ultimate bastion against infection by religious or political psychic epidemics. "*Resistance to the organized mass can be effected only by the man who is as well organized in his individuality as the mass itself* " (Jung 1964a: 278; author's italics). And yet it would seem to be through the few still capable of leading the symbolic life as a direct expression of their soul that the wider empathies of the Goddess will enter a society in the relief of the enmity between lesser Gods and their unconscious constituencies.

The implication for the secular

Jung's analysis of the transformation of religious into political and societal faith describing a continuity of archetypally based suasion as collective possession raises the question of the possibility of a secular society. Jung's social psychology would seem to join Tillich's theology in denying the possibility of atheism to the individual and secularity to society. For Tillich humanity's native and universal sense of the unconditioned means that "secular society is essentially as impossible as atheism" (Tillich 1964: 27). Jung makes the same kind of statement. Individual and society cannot be free of the impress of the self seeking fuller concretion in the support and potential possession of individual and society. Jung's sociology names the archetypes that inform and bond modern forms of communal political faith such as the collective utopianism of communism (Jung 1964d: 537), the "benign" father of fascism (Jung 1964c: 190, 191) and the power of individual reason and interest unbridled in a democracy leading to state totalitarianism (Jung 1976f: 574). The strong suggestion in his theory of society is that its members become fully aware of the archetypal power at the heart of their communal cohesion as the sole protection against losing their identity and freedom to it. A society based on this kind of consciousness or self-consciousness has yet to exist and may be itself a utopian goal but its approximation is the only protection against the tyranny of whatever the bonding archetype offers. It is both humorous and tragic to see religious bodies bonded by the self in religious form make a distinction between the religious and the secular. The implication is that religious forces are not equally archetypally bonded by whatever form of faith unites them. As this is realized the ability of a specifically religious body to uphold religion in the face of a secularity allegedly divested of religious commitment is a vapid claim. Rather the split between religion and the secular from a Jungian perspective is a split between competing faiths, values, and their communities. Neither has the right to call the other irreligious from a position wholly free from the unconsciousness endemic to collective and personal faiths. Indeed in such matters as human rights

in the various forms such rights now assume it would appear that secular faith has a greater sensitivity than religious faith. No reservation about gays, women in leadership roles, the peace movement, or issues of social justice such as equal pay for equal work are evident in secular faith which is not always the case with its religious variant.

In his extended analysis of secularity Charles Taylor identifies a societal malaise described as a widespread "mind-centred disenchantment", a term initially coined by Weber in the nineteenth century (C. Taylor 2007: 35, 156). Taylor frames his discussion in terms of the question "Why was it virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western society, while in 2000 many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable?" (ibid.: 25, 539). The question leads him to distinguish a shift from a medieval "porous" consciousness to today's "buffered" mind (ibid.: 35–39, 143). The porous mind was open to the beyond, the transcendent, the supernatural, God and the spirits. The buffered mind is the mind closed to these realities. It is based on a wholly "immanent" understanding of reality, concerned only with an impersonal order supporting wholly human goals in a constrained consciousness cut off from the festive and the enchantment that a world of supernatural entities apparently supported. Here it should be noted that Taylor's understanding of "immanent" extends only to an immanent order in nature compatible with the Thomistic/Aristotelian conception of a natural order. Such immanence refers to that which is beyond the mind rather than within the psyche as the basis of enchantment or re-enchantment in a Jungian sense. In the end the buffered mind in relation to an inner worldly immanence moves toward an "exclusive humanism" and even "atheistic humanism" simply incapable of imagining the reality of the entities which can pervade the porous mind (ibid.: 19–21; 130–136; 569). In terms of a simpler theological discourse Taylor is arguing that the process of secularization has moved from the conviction of the reality of a supernatural transcendent realm to a realm of pure immanence reduced to reason related to a natural order and in the service of the "flourishing" of humanity (ibid.: 18). With such a truncated understanding of immanence he can then bemoan "the malaise of immanence" and mean by it the "utter flatness, emptiness of the ordinary" (ibid.: 309). Jung would identify the same cultural malaise but diagnose it not as a constricting immanence but as the removal of consciousness from a deeper immanence, the immanence of the spirit of the depths which he contrasts with the spirit of the times.

For Taylor such flatness is not incompatible with various forms of "interiority". His conception of interiorization does extend beyond the more superficial levels of mind to deeper dimension of the inner depths of human experience. Here Freud is referenced (ibid.: 540). But these depths do not engage the possibility of the numinous as that power that gives to conscious life its meaning, vitality and whatever enchantment it might experience. Rather Taylor also confines interiority to what he terms the "buffered" personality. Such individuality builds on a personal discipline apparently unrelated to or buffered from wider external worlds, human and natural and, of course, from a cosmos where divinity might dwell (ibid.: 539,

540). An enhanced relation to this transcendent God would apparently heal the malaise of immanence though much of the modern thrust has been to see such a relation as the basis of human alienation from its own immanent truth and dignity. In this context Taylor understands the modern's search for "wholeness" to be "utopian" (ibid.: 616, 617). Wholeness as something that can be fully attained Jung would also see as utopian; as the underlying drive of human history he would see it as inescapable. Immanence for Taylor is not, as with Jung, the source of the sense of the sacred and of the Gods who embody it in projection. Rather it is simply ruled out as shorn of the spiritual. The consequence is to set up a questionable dichotomy between a therapeutic consciousness deemed endemically divested of spiritual value as well as being utopian and the now needed recovery of a relation to a transcendent God as the sole source of the authentically spiritual (ibid.: 731). Taylor would confirm Jung's complaint that grace must be imported from beyond: "Grace comes from elsewhere; at all accounts from outside" (Jung 1939: 482). In his discussion of the relation of the therapeutic to the spiritual Taylor will cite Freud but never Jung. One is left to wonder who or what is the object of his attack on "wholeness" as a utopian characteristic of a therapeutic consciousness divested of a true spirituality. Such wholeness is hardly a major characteristic of a Freudian conception of maturity and yet is foundational to Jung's. This paradox in evident in Jung's wonderment why religiously inclined people were interested in Freud's "psychology without the psyche" and not in his psychology, where "a spiritual standpoint" is foundational to both theory and therapy (Jung 1969i: 333).

Taylor fingers the usual suspects involved in the making of modern secularity. The Protestant Reformation elevated to a more all encompassing Reform began the erosion of the porous with its insistence on the purity of every Christian and so the rejection of the festive, the celebration of the Feast of Fools, celibacy as an option and all that would be open to the enchantment of this other world and its occasionally iconoclastic upheaval of this world's now constricting but puritanically perfect social order (C. Taylor 2007: 118–125). The Enlightenment with its valuation of autonomous reason and conception of a providential Deism served in a spirit of human self-interest of a spiritless order further intensified the buffering of the mind (ibid.: 221–225). Science as it moved, in effect, to scientism further enhanced the idea of a wholly immanent order open to rational discovery and closed to the supernatural and its many enticements. "Scientific reason was at once an engine and beneficiary of disenchantment, and its progress led people to brand all sorts of traditional beliefs and practices as superstition" (ibid.: 271).

In the end contemporary Puritanism with its "rage for order" allegedly underlies the now apparent link between the Western religious traditions, the monotheisms, and violence. To violate the sacred order each possesses and is possessed by is not simply to err but to be a heretic, and so evil. The extirpation of such evil then justifies the collective, now in the form of nation states or groups of them, to exorcise the evil of the other. The violence of the exorcists is worked by those with different versions of the same compulsive need for a preferred order, a sacred

order to be imposed on reality by the buffered mind (ibid.: 653, 688, 692). Taylor's elaboration of violence will associate religious and secular violence, as does Jung, but is largely divested of Jung's analysis of collective violence perpetrated by the archetypally possessed on the differently possessed whether by religious or secular ideologies.

Nevertheless Taylor is to be commended in facing the ever growing sensitivity to the connection between religion and violence (ibid.: 684–689). He will even suggest that only the end of religion will end its violence (ibid.: 708). But in a position shared by Jung, but on an entirely different basis, he affirms that religion is an "inescapable" force in the human condition and both secularists and believers are afflicted with the virus (ibid.: 708, 709). In this matter his argument would be fortified if he could locate the origin of religion in the human archetypal psyche rather than in the hoped for return of agencies transcendent to it. He could then argue that the creation of the Gods and their communities entails in itself the creation of counter communities as evil. This realization would enable him to collaborate with Jung in deepening the fearful paradox that religion is inescapable because of its basis in the psyche and inevitably violent when its object, the divine, is located beyond the psyche in a variety of transcendent Gods whose communities are then destined to violence or enmity as imbedded in their interface. Responsibility would then shift to the individual and community to recall their God to the origin of all Gods in the psyche as the basis of a greater acceptance and even mutual appreciation between them. Because of his shallow sense of immanence Taylor does not go there. Indeed his confidence in the saving transcendence of God appears so sure that he can summarily dismiss the threat of the "clash of civilizations" as a real threat to humanity universally. Huntington's thesis that present and future wars are and will be fought between religion-based civilizations to the peril of all is summarily dismissed in favour of the return of the truly transcendent still held in cultures other than the West (ibid.: 770). Thus the wasteland of the present will open onto a return of the transcendent from beyond. For Jung the wasteland drives to the recovery of the within.

In effect Taylor's analysis of contemporary secularism is thus a lament for the passing of Christendom in which the porous mind flourished. As a lament for the past it hints at the future and the possibility of the restoration of the supernatural in some kind of theonomous harmony with the wider society. This hope is reminiscent of Paul Tillich's appreciation of the high Middle Ages when belief, politics and culture shared a common world view. In it morality, religion and culture drew much closer together as distinct aspects of the religious spirit. But to make Tillich's view work all dimensions of the significantly human, especially religion and culture, must share a common ontological ground, a ground that Taylor places in the sky. Despite his familiarity with Hegel and German idealism Taylor does not appeal to an agency capable of unifying religious and human aspirations native to the shallow immanence he so deplores. That such a unified cultural situation can be restored currently is questionable. Taylor points to certain individuals who might promise it such as Bede Griffiths, Vaclav Havel (ibid.: 728), Chesterton,

Belloc, Dawson, Eliot, Maritain (ibid.: 733) and Peguy (ibid.: 745–751), to name some of the more outstanding. Few of these names are honored even in Catholic cultural, theological or philosophical circles today. Taylor also points to a kind of hankering for the good evident in the reforms John XXIII initiated in Vatican II and by the impressive religious persona of John Paul II (ibid.: 521, 727). He fails to mention that the reforms of John XXIII and Vatican II were largely undermined by John Paul II and his successor, Joseph Ratzinger, soon after their initial proclamation in the documents of Vatican II. Today the Roman Catholic world is immersed in a split between the right and progressives in a profoundly disenchanted milieu. The prospect of a return to a modified Christendom, in a kind of second but chastened naivete, appears itself to be naïve and especially so when sponsored by institutional forces.

And yet Jung would agree with Taylor that we live in a world of disenchantment and for many of the same reasons. Jung firmly believed that the modern mind had been severed from its roots by the Enlightenment and by the current reduction of the validity of the mind to science and a debilitating scientism. There would be no dispute about a disenchanted society and about many of its contributing factors. Indeed Jung felt that the West began to lose its soul when the enchantment of alchemy yielded to chemistry and the modern scientific approach. Between Jung and Taylor the major differences are thus the nature and causes of the disenchantment and not its reality. But the differences are significant. Taylor locates the malaise in the loss of the supernatural. Jung, in his critique of religion, implies that the supernatural is created by the projection of archetypal forces beyond the psyche. As such these projection must be withdrawn and, if not, the whole world of supernatural entities would contribute to a disenchanted world by locating the source of the world's enchantment beyond the world and not in the psyche within the world (Jung 1969c: 85). The ultimate difference between Taylor and Jung lies in where the "supernatural" is located. For Taylor it is in distant heavens capable of intersecting with humanity in a porous mindset. For Jung the supernatural, if the term is to be used at all, is located in the depths of nature. From these depths emerge the sense of divinity, the Gods themselves, the stories of their interaction with the human, as well as the ritualizing and dogmatizing of these divine adventures with the created order. The process of re-enchantment from this perspective is not to reconnect with a transcendent supernatural world beyond the human in a restored neo-Christendom, however chastened, but to reconnect with a transcendent world within the human in the inexhaustible and life-giving energies of the unconscious.

Implications for the relation of transcendence to immanence

The counter position to Taylor's is best understood in a more precise and controlled expansion of what Jung and Tillich mean when they use the term "ground", since their usage is unfamiliar to most contemporary understanding of participation and causality. In Jung's perspective the ground of all empirical reality lies

within the psyche and the ego in resonance with it is in touch with the "One World" from which consciousness and nature emerge as the basis of the harmony that could exist between them (Jung 1970: 534). In comparison Taylor's sense of and attack on immanence is truncated. It goes no deeper than reason in relation to an assumed order. It misses entirely the possibility of reason's reconnection with that which transcends it not beyond but within humanity. Jung's position, in contrast to Taylor's, is a position of radical immanence. In it God is understood as the experience of the ground of the individual, relating the individual in touch with the ground to all that is as an expressions of this same ground (Dourley 2011: 514–531). Taylor's problem is that his attack on immanence is an attack on the very superficial sense of immanence reduced to reason that Jung also deplores. But Jung can go to a deeper immanence, to that of the archetypal unconscious as the source of religious, political and all enchantment as the key to any significant societal re-enchantment. Such re-enchantment is currently not likely to be worked through confessional religion but rather through forces on their periphery. These forces would be the modern equivalents of the mystics, the gnostics, adherents of the grail and alchemists. All these traditions share the sense that mind is natively imbued with the latent awareness of its universal connectedness. The development of this awareness intensifies the sense of the divine. This reconnection of the mind with its divine ground happens pre-eminently through the work of the dream and its symbols, expressing the energy of the divine. Such reconnection is the substance of analysis. Thus Jung's radical immanence works to a deeper immanence whose absence is indeed a significant factor in the disenchantment of a society severed from its natural roots in the divine and eternal. Jung's psychology came into existence to address this uprootedness in individual and society.

In this context post-modernity has brought the autonomous mind of the Enlightenment to its knees with the realization that the severance of the autonomous mind from its unconscious roots culminates now in an egoic grandiosity divested of meaningful relationship whose spiritual expression is individual and cultural alienation, depression and aggression. Rather than parry such pathology with an unearthed, floating rationalism or the renewal of a religious or political faith, both now seen as the cause rather than the relief of such illness, critics like Jung seize the collective moment of widespread despair of meaning as the occasion of a new and more embracing myth which would ground a personal and social ethic on fidelity to the truth of the self as the ultimate resource in resisting all forms of superficial rationalism on one hand and collective forms of faith possession on the other. As this myth turned to the recovery of the interior life its participants would become increasingly imbued with the experience that "God's actions springs from one's inner being" (Jung 1971a: 243) and that this immediate sense of the ultimate now worked toward the recovery of the sacredness of nature, of the body, of the feminine and even of the demonic. The innate divinity of all these powers blatant in creation is jointly stripped by the presiding variants of Western monotheism. Nor are these values simply contingently proposed, the product of wishful thinking or gratuitous fantasy. Rather Jung would contend that

they are the products of an emerging conviction that humanity's sense of the sacred derives from the universal source of consciousness and nature and sponsors a resacralization of all reality as universal as itself as the origin of what is and of the mind that knows it.

The emerging sense of the mind's native inherence in the sacred in the wake of a now debilitating Enlightenment rationalism, once so necessary as a moment in the development of the Western mind, coupled with the subsequent effective reduction of the mind to the scientific and technological, has forced contemporary thinkers and religionists to a much welcomed appreciation of the immanental in the search for a life giving meaning that reason and science, of themselves, could not provide. For framing much of his address to secularity around the issue of the relation of the immanent to the transcendent Taylor is to be thanked but hardly followed (C. Taylor 2007: 15, 16). Others take a different tack in revisioning the relation of the immanental to the transcendent. Thinkers such as Jung, Teilhard de Chardin and certain currents of process philosophy and theology see in the corrosion of the classical sense of divine transcendence the opportunity of revisioning the divine/human relation in a dialectic between transcendence and immanence in which the interplay would be maintained but in the context of an enhanced appreciation of divinity as immanent to or a power inherent in the human condition. In effect the transcendent would come to be seen as a function of an immanental point of departure, and, with Jung, would have as its referent the infinity of creative power within the psyche seeking conscious expression in human consciousness.

As will be seen this revisioning has political correlates. The demand for a transcendent referent wholly other than the human belongs to the right in matters theological and political. The left of the theological and political spectrum would understand transcendence as a function of immanence. Immanence thus understood would contain a realm that probably transcends the possibility of exhaustive human realization and so urges an ongoing growth of human consciousness destined to break through whatever form it currently gives to a creativity destined to surpass it. Such a realm would constitute a potential infinity whose nature, nevertheless, is to seek its realization in human consciousness with which it exists and existed in an organic continuity first as the power of evolution which created consciousness and then as the power seeking ever greater expression in human consciousness as its sole voice.

Mark C. Taylor in a book aptly entitled *After God*, winner of an American Academy of Religion award for excellence, works toward an understanding of religion and even of apophatic mysticism in some discernible affinity with the dynamic of the psyche as Jung describes it (M. C. Taylor 2007). First Taylor makes the point that recent critical commentary has avoided, indeed shunned, the foundational question of what religion is (ibid.: xv, 4). The scholarly dissection of the trees has missed the religious forest in ever more constrictive micro-analyses. Taylor's call for a return to asking the question of what religion is implies that the study of religion without an interest in its nature and origin remains academic in the worst of senses and can easily devolve into forms of unconscious devotion to

the scholar's fascination with this or that religious phenomenon. These blinkers fail to realize the universality of religion and, closer to home, the interpenetration of the religious and the secular. Religious Studies departments then become an elaborate Friday, Saturday or Sunday school and degenerate into little more than variegated theology faculties reduced to the study of the so called world religions and their intricate subdivisions. With no foundational notion of religion itself scholarly studies of religion easily fall into a positivism limited to descriptions and elaborations of the content of the various religions. Such an approach is divested of a sense of a variety in unity and so of similarities in variation between religions and their beliefs and practices. More importantly this approach is unable to show in what direction the forces involved in the creation of religion are moving at any given time in the context of the culture and history of any specific religion and the society it informs. The unspoken assumption is that the religions currently concretized in history are here to stay and their disparate content taken collectively constitutes the substance of religion itself. Such an approach might miss, for instance, the similarities between the Aztec offering of human hearts to the Gods in order to further the advance of the universe through better alignment with the divinity and similar themes in the Catholic Mass.

Against this trend of accurate but meaningless facticity Paul Tillich in his early career could author a book entitled *What Is Religion?* (Tillich 1969). In it Tillich describes religion as the human experience of and relation to the unconditioned manifest most obviously in identifiable religion but also in culture. Mark Taylor closely associates his own position with Tillich's in working toward a systematic understanding of religion and culture based on the presence of divinity as the ground of both (M. C. Taylor 2007: 35, 36). And Jung, based on his extension of empiricism to include the more significant expressions of the unconscious, identified an "authentic religious function" in the dynamic interplay of conscious and unconscious forces influential in the unfolding of individual lives and of wider realms of the cultural and political life of the species itself (Jung 1969c: 6). Mark Taylor, Tillich and Jung become collaborators in describing religion as native to human life and, no doubt, expressed in the confessional or institutional religions but manifest also in culture and politics not usually described as primarily religious.

Mark Taylor's description of religion is refreshing in its explicit and prolonged addressing the question of the relation of divine immanence to transcendence, a question long silenced with the studied abandonment of the search for the nature of religion itself (M. C. Taylor 2007: 36, 37). Mark Taylor's recovery of the nature of religion makes of religion a stabilizing and destabilizing power in personal and cultural life. He works to the position that religion cannot be understood as either wholly transcendent or immanent in favour of an "immanent transcendence" uniting these opposites in a dialectic interplay native to religion itself (ibid.: 41, 127). A sense of immanence works as a stabilizing force by providing the sacred ground of personal and collective existence. In its extremes on the further left immanence thus understood can devolve into an immoderate monism and so, for Mark Taylor, the negation of the distinction between the sacred and profane (ibid.: 297, 346).

But precisely in its immanent base religion rests on infinite possibility and so also always transcends its current concretions as the sacred basis of a society. In this sense the immanent itself carries a certain iconoclastic transcendence in relation to the status quo. From the side of the right immanental infinity as the basis of a sense of transcendence can degenerate into the dualism of an objectified personal transcendent God as the source of the chosen religiously and politically. Such dualistic transcendence is for Mark Taylor an extremist distortion of religious thought and provides the basis for right wing religious fundamentalism (ibid.: 297). For Charles Taylor religious transcendence thus understood is the sole desideratum. Mark Taylor insists that both sides of the tension, the immanental as stabilizing and iconoclastic, have to be honored in a complete understanding of what religion is and how it functions in the making and unmaking of its expressions, especially socially.

In his further delineation of the priority of the immanental Mark Taylor again turns to an understanding of the ground of religion to be found in Tillich and his mystical and philosophical ancestors in the German tradition. He contends that the residual ambivalence of religion rests on the reality of religion ultimately expressing a groundless ground, an abyss, an originary nothingness (ibid.: 116–121, 126, 182, 347). This power works an immanent sense of the sacred in social organization and in individuals even as it remains ever unsatisfied with its specific concretions. Its lack of satisfaction in its observable expression becomes the basis of a restlessness inspired by the drive of the infinitely creative ground to incarnate in but ever beyond its current formalities. The very sense of the sacred remains the destabilizing force in any and all of its expressions. Like Tillich and Jung, Mark Taylor here describes religion as made up of sacramental and iconoclastic urgencies ever in tension. Such tension is also vividly operative in Jung's vision of the archetypal unconscious ever seeking greater historical incarnation in individual and collectivity progressively enriched by such expression and the more universal compassion it carries with it. But again with Jung the archetypal potential always transcends its incarnation forbidding any of them the claim to an unqualified and exhaustive ultimacy, a claim which the monotheistic religious imagination and faith is forced to make by its very nature.

Such persistent extension of conscious embrace at the insistence of the unconscious grounds Jung's understanding of the teleology of the psyche and bears distinct affinity with Mark Taylor's conception of relationality and emergence. The abyss as the originary source of the religious impulse is the source of all and so of consciousness. As such it is the ultimate human resource for relationality since it is the source of all individuality which continues its inhesion in the abyss. The emergence of the sense of relationality derivative from the deepening realization of the sole and common origin of all particularity becomes then the meaning of creativity. That is creative which sponsors the sense of the universal connectedness of the individual with the totality as an ongoing emergence from the "groundless ground" of all.

This religious paradigm has profound psychological consequences. Creativity thus understood is also the immediate source of life for individual and society. Its

negation is death. Effectively Mark Taylor is here arguing that the sense of emergence from a common origin as the basis of a cultural movement toward universal relatedness functions as a salvific and humanizing power in his paradigm. The denial of such a universal source in clinging to absolutes lodged ultimately in a wholly transcendent God severs life from its source and is fatal individually and collectively and especially politically (ibid.: 354). On the basis of this distinction Mark Taylor can portray the religious right as bearers of death in their idolatrous clinging to wholly transcendent religious and ethical absolutes and the religious left as imbued by the ground of humanity with a commendable relativity and an ability to live if not thrive on the religious doubt such relativity entails (ibid.: 358). Creative advance lies therefore with the left.

The titles of the last two chapters of his book refer to a religion without God and an ethics without absolutes. Here again Mark Taylor approaches Jung in the latter's position that a living organism, individual or societal, will "perish" when removed from the sustenance that a depth connectedness with the ground of the psyche can alone provide (Jung 1968b: 180). With Mark Taylor Jung also appreciates the doubt that attaches to the relativity of specific religious positions and traditions when all are viewed as emergent from a common source and urged always to move beyond themselves by this source. In his dialogue with Victor White Jung praised "doubt and insecurity" as characteristic of an authentic religious life (Jung 1954a: 171). Tillich with his understanding of the ambiguity embedded in the life of faith as the experience of the essential within the existential would make doubt nothing less than a condition of a living faith, one that could only be conquered by an unambiguous possession of the essential which cannot happen in existence (Tillich 1957a: 16–22).

Mark Taylor's understanding of emergence, relationality and creativity enable him to appreciate the somewhat chaotic atmosphere of post-modernism not as something to be feared as do the religious absolutists clinging to their deadly certitudes but as a possibly significant instance of the destabilizing nature of religion out of which a more adequate stability might well emerge. Jung also envisions the present situation as one in which traditional forms of religious imagination and commitment are being undone by the corrosive side of the unconscious. His dialogues with Martin Buber and Victor White clearly demonstrate the incompatibility of his understanding of the religious psyche with both Jewish and Christian/Aristotelian monotheism (Dourley 2010c, 2010d). Since the psyche never rests with what has become conscious, Jung envisions the transcendence of the monotheisms themselves as a religiosity like that of Mark Taylor's in which centres of consciousness, individual and cultural, come increasingly to understand themselves as emergent from a common origin as the basis of their unity and relationality across their historical differentiations. With this sense the false fragmentation between individuals and individual cultures cedes to a mutual appreciation promising mutual supersession of their current consciousness in a mutual embrace beyond difference.

What is of significance in both Mark Taylor and Jung is that a newly emerging religious consciousness rests on a greatly enhanced appreciation of the

immanental in matters religious, that is, in the experiential appropriation of a sense of the divine working even in the dissolution of religious structures toward structures of greater encompassment and inclusion. Both locate the impulse toward this extension in the groundless ground in which every existent participates. This relation of the immanental to the transcendent is caught in Jung's description of even the enlightened individual's relation to "the One who dwells within him, whose form has no knowable boundaries, who encompasses him on all sides, fathomless as the abysms of the earth and vast as the sky" (Jung 1969e: 470). In this profound text it should be noted that this sense of the divine moves from the within, the immanental, to a sense of the all encompassing transcendent. Without the within the divine without remains ambivalent. It takes on the features of a meaningless abstraction, a divinity whose completion does not entail the earth and the human and who remains beyond natural human experience. This external divinity is a heteronomous divinity. It can only act as a repressive and authoritarian imposition on the human and so the extreme form of an alienation between the divine and a humanity unconscious of the inner origin of all the Gods none of whom are wholly other or wholly foreign to the humanity from whose depths they are born.

Another contemporary author of substance also appreciative of the current urgency toward the recovery of the immanental is Richard Tarnas (1993). He has written a compelling and competent history of the West with a noticeable bias toward the intimacy between the human and the absolute enlivening Platonic and especially neo-Platonic subjectivity. In the light of modern instability in the wake of the discrediting of scientific and religious objectivity he is appreciative of the "turn inward" (Tarnas 1993: 384, 387). The most significant moment in this turn may well have been in Kant's reflection on the conditions of mind operative in the structure of knowing itself. Tarnas relates this inwardness to traditions as old as the Renaissance and as recent as nineteenth-century German idealism and romanticism. He is explicit in drawing parallels between Hegel's understanding of an originary power completing itself in the contradictions of history and Jung's understanding of the archetypal basis of the psyche becoming conscious of itself as the underlying meaning and direction of history and the ultimate strategy against disenchantment (ibid.: 430–433). He repeats and appreciates Jung's emphasis that the psyche can deal only with itself and not with the world of scientific "objectivity", even though such "objectivity" is itself questioned in post-modernity. But in his final analysis of post-modernity Tarnas pays high tribute to Jung and later developments of Jungian thought in the elaboration of the human power of imagination which reaches to the archetypal and conveys to consciousness the power of the numinous in possibly unlimited variation (ibid.: 405). Thus understood this deepened appreciation of imagination points to a significant power prior to consciousness providing it with an "underlying formal coherence and universality" (ibid.: 405–406). Again this position goes to an underlying originary source of an emergent numinosity creative of significant human expression in cultures now recognized as housed

in the depths of the psyche and heralding a new religious sense based on its reception in consciousness.

Perhaps Tarnas' greatest contribution to understanding the total Jung lies in the seemingly obscure but ultimate question for psychology, religion and philosophy. This is the question of the subject/object split – the split between knower and known and the defeat of the dualism maintained by the way the split is widely understood in Western consciousness since Descartes. Tarnas is of the more credible opinion that Jung understood the consequences of defeating this split more accurately than Freud. Jung was steeped in Kant from an early age. He was less bound by continental scientism and, ultimately, the experience that informs his psychology is much more profound than Freud's. Tarnas points out that in his middle period Jung was himself caught up in the dualism between psyche and what was beyond psyche. But as he moved into his mature thought, especially on synchronicity, Jung healed the subject/object split by understanding the universal archetypal world as the basis of the psyche itself and so as the ultimate origin and determinant of all human experience. Jung's reflection on synchronicity as a power underlying both psyche and matter defeated the cultural conviction that there was a split between a knowing consciousness and the object of its knowledge, a split on which the alleged "objectivity" of science rested. Both knower and known participated in this universal substrate generative of both and now seeking ever greater entrance into a consciousness informed by an extended relationality moving to being all inclusive (ibid.: 423–424).

In this ongoing maturation religious consciousness would continue to be of crucial importance to humanity even as institutional religion faded. In this Tarnas joins Jung but not Taylor in the recognition of the "privatization" of religion as a commendable note of post-modernity. This kind of analysis and tribute to Jungian insight would surpass the frequent usage of the term "post-Jungian" toward the elaboration of what Jungian psychology contributes to post-modernism and its potentially liberating potential through the very chaos of its deconstructive powers. For instance the monotheisms themselves endorse a subject/object relationship to a divine object. The corrosion of such a dichotomy would corrode the religious credibility of the monotheisms themselves. But the key to this shift in consciousness lies in the ability of the mind to recover its connection with the unitary world in the relief of archetypally based communities now hostile to each other. Tarnas is accurate in describing the movement and passion of Western thought in these terms. "*For the deepest passion of the Western mind has been to reunite with the ground of its own being*" (ibid.: 443). He describes such a consciousness as a "mature *participation mystique*", that is a community of communions in which the communion of the different enhances rather than maims the consciousness of those making it up. Jung understood Tarnas' reunion of the mind with its ground as the ego's reconnection with *unus mundus* which Jung took to be "the eternal Ground of all empirical being" at the basis of the psyche seeking to become more conscious in an ego related through it to the totality and what lies beyond ego (Jung 1970: 534).

Implications for the evolution of religious consciousness and its philosophical import

Jung's contribution to the emergence of a myth superseding its monotheistic precedents is consistent with his succinct but incisive understanding of the evolution of religious consciousness at least in the West. To put it as briefly as he does, the many Gods became one, the one God became man and every man became God or at least was challenged to do so by the developmental demands native to the human psyche itself (Jung 1969c: 84; 1976a: 733–735). Orthodox Christology would confine the unity of divine and human natures to an individual instance. Jung makes it a natural maturational property and so a foundational and necessary aspiration of "the common man" (Jung 1969c: 84). He adds immediately that the movement to the unity of the divine and the human in every individual is no doubt fraught with the possibility of dangerous inflation endemic to the incarnation or penetration of the self in consciousness but one which modernity is called upon consciously to address (Jung 1969c: 84; 1976a: 734). In thus recounting the evolution of historical consciousness to its present state and challenge Jung is explicitly extending to every individual the maturational challenge to bring about the unity of two natures, divine and human, native to everyone in the relation of consciousness to the unconscious. Thus the Christological councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451) no longer would point to a past unique figure possessed of a divine and human nature unified in the person thus graced. Rather the *homoousia* or uniting of the two natures becomes the inescapable challenge to each individual to bring about and allow the unity of the divine and the human in each life under the power of the Self as uniting spirit. Jung doubts if the church can ever accept the naturalism and universality of this process since she has made of the separation of the divine and the human an essential dogma. Writes Jung, "it would be considered blasphemy or madness to stress Christ's dogmatic humanity to such a degree that man could identify himself with Christ and his homoousia" (Jung 1969c: 61). Yet it is precisely on such blasphemy and madness that Jung's understanding of individuation rests. The heresy of individuation, thus framed, consists of the experience of the developing unity of the divinity and consciousness in every life. However the official Church can never admit that "nature unites what she herself has divided" (ibid.). And so it can neither endorse the full experience of individuation nor the philosophical and theological implications the experience carries with it, at least not in a Jungian context.

Humanity's discovery of its intimate relation with divinity is recent and ongoing. Jung writes, "It was only quite late that we realized (or rather, are beginning to realize) that God is Reality itself and therefore – last but not least – man. This realization is a millennial process" (Jung 1969e: 402). At the heart of this religious realization is Jung's conviction that the reality and experience of the divine is, at least initially, entirely internal to the psyche. "What one could almost call a systematic blindness is simply the effect of the prejudice that God is outside man" (Jung 1969c: 58). But this blindness is at the heart of orthodox monotheistic

belief. Such belief denies or, worse, historically persecutes individuals and traditions proclaiming the mystical experience of "the essential identity of God and man" (ibid.).

These radical aspects of Jung's thought on religion entail a revolutionary shift in the understanding of religious consciousness and its fostering or deepening. In matters religious Jung's myth would relocate consciousness in a monistic world alive with a pantheistic heartbeat (Dourley 2011: 517–518). The monism at the heart of Jung's understanding of the psyche is a differentiated monism. It would encompass the unconscious in dialectic interplay with consciousness in which alone the former can become self-conscious. This process includes the total development of historical human consciousness and is wholly intrapsychic between the formalities of consciousness and the unconscious. Jung's naturalism here implies that the unconscious is the sole source of the knowable and that the ego is the sole theatre in which its origin can know itself. The archetypal psyche, thus understood as the source of religious experience and so the religions, needs no divinity transcendent to itself in the dynamic of humanity's "authentic religious function" (Jung 1969a: 6).

The monistic embrace is alive with a throbbing pantheism because the sense of the divine is generated by its unconscious base in the inescapable experience of the numinous which Jung implies touches, to some degree, every life. In its most intense form such numinosity generates a sense of the sacredness not only of individual places, persons and events but also of all of nature and simply of what is. For instance in the experience of the *unus mundus* the ground of the totality would manifest through the totality of the empirical or visible world because the mind undergoing such experience then resonates with the one ground of individual and nature. A sense of the individual's continuity with the totality is inescapable.

The pantheism and monism invigorating Jung's myth deserve a brief elaboration. The term "pantheism" in a Jungian context does not refer to a simplistic version of an unqualified identity of everything natural with the divine. In this matter one should understand Spinoza as identifying the divine with that "substance" pervading all of nature as a power informing but greater than any and all natural entities. A Jungian meaning would be closer to what more recent theologians have more timidly termed "panentheism" (Tillich 1963: 421). The term evolved in the face of various religious and theological urgencies for a more intimate and experiential understanding of the divine presence in the human. Yet it defers to orthodox fears of a more robust pantheism based on an intimacy of the divine to the human that would be natural, universal and beyond institutional manipulation and necessary mediation. Panentheism would affirm that all inheres in the divine, which remains always more than the totality of its expressions much as the "inexhaustibility" of archetypal power always transcends its manifestation in consciousness and beyond. Indeed it is the experience of archetypal impact that creates religious communities whose existence is justified only to the extent that they continue to mediate the experience which created them. Once the experience is lost they cease to function. In this sense the archetypal unconscious would

sponsor a certain panentheistic sensibility in that it is a native resource and experience addressing consciousness itself but always outstripping its conscious incarnation in individual and species. In this the psyche is both sacramental as the residual basis of the sense of the sacred and iconoclastic in denying to any archetypal expression the status of a finality exhaustive of the creativity of the archetype. However, in as much as Jung would affirm with Tillich that there is a point of coincidence of consciousness with the divine his psychology is supportive of a more robust understanding of the natural presence of the divine to the human more forcefully expressed by the term "pantheism" understood as above. This intimacy will be elaborated at length in the following treatment of the mystics.

Jung further exposes the monistic nature of the psyche when he equates the ground of all with the ground of the psyche and relates this ground to synchronicity and the mandala. "If mandala symbolism is the psychological equivalent of the *unus mundus*, then synchronicity is its para-psychological equivalent" (Jung 1970: 464). The agency active in the reality of synchronicity then is understood as a living universal substrate able to manipulate nature without violating it because it is native to nature but in ways that introduce transformative meaning into the lives of individuals through the seemingly chance events this agency orchestrates. The "intent" of the agency operative in the synchronistic event is the overall intention of the self toward the ego, namely, the continued and intensified reconnection of the individual with the ground of the individual's being. Without the native presence of this agency the synchronistic event would be analogous to the demeaning interference of a foreign God in the miraculous ordering of nature from beyond nature on behalf of chosen individuals. Though providential interference comes to mind when reading Jung on synchronicity, his theory neither presupposes nor needs a controlling divinity beyond the psyche able to interfere with it from without.

The same monism and pantheism are evident in the symbol of the mandala when God is understood as a sphere whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere (Jung 1970: 47). The citation is unequivocal in placing the divine as the centre in each individual. In his late writings Jung will identify individuation as "*life in God*" and equate such life with the meaning of the mandala (Jung 1976a: 719). The monism of these aspects of his psychology reveals a naturalism containing the totality of the relation of the human to the divine within the psyche. He is obviously arguing that the unbounded energy of the unconscious transcends not only the ego, which never identifies with the centre and so is always transcended by the periphery. Such energy also transcends the sum total of its concretions in natural and human history. Yet such energies have their origin within the psyche, which nothing transcends. Put simply consciousness and the powers transcending consciousness are the dialectical poles contained in one all-containing life process, that of the psyche. Within this dialectic the unconscious transcends consciousness infinitely but within the containment of the total psyche, which tolerates no invasion from forces beyond it. This position brings to a close all religious and theological speculation based on the dualism of the natural world over against a supernatural world even potentially discontinuous from it and not

dependent on it for its own fulfillment. The curtain comes down on all remnants of a supernatural medieval religious imagination in current civilizations still imprisoned by it in both believers and deniers. The argument between theism and atheism are both based on the misconception of the existence or non-existence of a transcendent God. The real argument is whether or not humanity is vest with a sense of true ultimacy, a sense of the absolute or unconditioned however described. To argue that it is not is a difficult argument to make.

In the interest of recovering a social and individual spiritual vitality Jung deplores the ecclesially induced death of a pantheistic sensitivity. In its place orthodoxy installs a wholly other transcendent divinity beyond immediate human experience and necessary manifestation in nature. He effectively accuses Christianity of sponsoring a dualism between the body and soul, matter and spirit, and ultimately the human and divine, a dualism a living pantheism would heal by reunifying these opposites and the "dissociation" such severance causes in the Christian spiritual mindset (Jung 1970: 540).

> And although it was also said of God that the world is his physical manifestation, this pantheistic view was rejected by the Church for "God is Spirit" and the very reverse of matter… Despite all assurances to the contrary Christ is not a unifying factor but a dividing "sword" which sunders the spiritual man from the physical
>
> (ibid.: 541)

Jung could hardly be more explicit on the disastrous psychic consequences of the loss of a pantheistic sense in Christianity and by implication in its monotheistic variants.

In his overall analysis Jung understands alchemy to compensate this dissociation embedded in the Christian mind. Yet his position here is subtle. He contends that the alchemists deeply felt the distress of living the split between body and spirit but also were unwilling or unable to respond to it by denying the validity of their Christianity. In the end he absolves them of heresy and seems to leave them in the uneasy position of being unable to further tolerate the Christian dissociation between spirit and body even as they remained faithful to the Christianity at its root (ibid.: 540–541). Jung addresses this question again when he contends that the first moment in alchemical transformation, the *union mentalis*, freed the soul from the body and brought the soul to the "window into eternity" (Jung 1970: 471, 535). For Jung the initial dissociation of the soul from the body is preliminary. In this he implies that the Christian would only too gladly step through the window and so be lost to the world in an imbalanced spirituality which serves only "to cripple life" (ibid.: 472). And so Jung shut the window into eternity at least as a permanent healthy state reflective of spiritual maturity. Reimmersion of the separated soul in an earthly body, now revisioned as the *caelum* (heaven), was where the *corpus glorificatum* (the glorified body) was to be realized culminating in a theophany, however transient, described in the consciousness of the *unus mundus*,

the one world (ibid.: 487, 524, 535). Perhaps Jung's claim that the alchemists were not conscious heretics is tenable. That heaven and the resurrected body are to be achieved psychologically and so spiritually in this world certainly is, as is the attendant implication that divinity is enhanced in its own self-consciousness as the process completes itself in the human.

Jung would understand creation and its movement to human self-consciousness as the theatre of God's self-objectification (Jung 1969e: 401, 402; Dourley 1999, 54–58). On this point Tarnas rightly associates Jung's philosophy and psychology of history with Hegel's (Tarnas 1993: 385). Divinity's self-objectification in nature and human nature would mean that both are latently divine. To be unaware of this natural latency as the basis of the unity of divine and human in the human describes what Hegel terms "unhappy consciousness" (Hegel 1967: 251–267). This issue will be addressed more fully in the chapter on Hegel. Here it suffices to say that effectively the phrase describes a conception of divinity which assumes a wholly transcendent God whose very distance and discontinuity with the human serves as the basis of human diminishment if not depression. Jung joins Hegel in negating this dualism in the affirmation that religious consciousness moves to the assertion that what is is both natural and divine. Christianity reserves the defeat of divine/human dualism to the unique status of the Christ figure and to its culmination in a post-temporal kingdom. Jung claims that the contemporary development of religious consciousness has come to realize what has been the case from eternity, namely, "the human nature of God and the divine nature of man" (Jung 1969e: 402).

In fact it is the universalism endemic to the pantheistic impulse that forbids the regression of the central maturational process Jung calls "individuation" to gross individualism. This is so because in the process of individuation the individual approaches to the point of a transient identity with a centre in the personal psyche which coincides with the centre of the universe, that is, with what is experienced as God (Jung 1969b: 292). The compassion emergent from such coincidence of personal and universal centres would stretch toward the being of all that is or could be as an expression of that same ground at the heart of each life. It is this conscious inherence in the source of the totality which breeds a sense of a relatedness hostile to any form of residual solipsism or narcissism. Individualism and individuation are thus incompatible and beyond confusion. The former isolates. The latter relates to what is and can be since the source of the totality is operative in its formation.

The tragedy of the reigning monotheisms lies in their location of the source of the empirical totality and the mind perceiving it beyond the totality in transcendent entities whose relation to reality beyond them is contingent to the point of being arbitrary. The history of such discontinuous transcendence is the history of the alienation of the human from the divine and of the communities founded on such variants of monotheistic transcendence from each other. Though such projections were a necessity in one stage of the development of religious consciousness the recall of the Gods to their psychic origins and the conscious relation to such origins is now a condition of survival for humanity. The consequence of

alienation and aggression is no different when monotheism moves into the so called secular realm and effectively deifies one political, ethnic or cultural constellation over against the rest. Effectively this means that enormous swathes of humanity including its monotheistic communities have come to the point where the many Gods have indeed become one with the connotation of the divine distillate then being the one and only God. But they have yet to move into Jung's next stage where the one God became human and revealed to humanity that it was naturally divine. Needless to say, the completion of the evolution of the religious mind in the emergence of the sense that divinity inheres in humanity and that humanity is to make this inherence conscious is rejected by orthodox variants of the monotheisms as corrosive of their foundational claims. And in this they are right. Consequently the consciousness that the three one and onlies are three variants of the same myth now clamoring for its supersession in whatever of many contemporary forms this might take remains forbidden. The unfortunate outcome is that the one and only Gods exist as separate transcendent entities and as each others' archetypal shadows in heaven and on earth.

The mature Jung was of the opinion that such a psychic situation could not guarantee the future of the species and so urged that the monotheistic level of religious consciousness transcend itself toward a myth of greater inclusion. He put this challenge most explicitly toward the end of his life when he expressed the fear that collective failure to die a symbolic death in the birth of a more encompassing myth expressive of the movements and current thrust of archetypal energies would be the prelude to an eventual "universal genocide" (Jung 1976a: 735). To this point genocide has not been universal but with the improvements in weaponry and the prevalence of powerful communities unconscious of the source of their disparate but archetypally based possession, universal genocide remains an ever increasing threat at this moment in humanity's history. The end of history would thus take on the status of a final act of faith.

The implications for a unified mind

The emergence of the myth Jung brought to completion in his mature work as the theoretical and operational basis of his psychology is sophisticated to a degree that makes it difficult to pigeonhole in any extant discipline and the consciousness that attaches thereto. To address the copious perspective that attaches to his total myth perhaps a series of questions evokes the difficulties, on the one hand, of limiting this perspective to over definition and, on the other, failing to nuance the affinity his thought might legitimately have with a variety of defined perspectives. Let us begin to ask.

Is Jungian psychology a science?

The opening pages of *The Red Book* speak of Jung caught between "the spirit of this time" and "the spirit of the depths" (Jung 2009: 229). His internment in the

spirit of the time forced the confession, "I had to become aware that I had lost my soul." No small part of the loss was his scholarly efforts to objectify the soul and in so doing remove himself from it (ibid.: 232, 278). Though it was not the only factor in the creation of a soulless society of soulless people, Jung depicts science as one of the more toxic contributors to both. He describes science as a "prison master who binds the soul and imprisons it in a lightless cell" (ibid.: 238). It is a deadly "magic" which has lamed Western consciousness with its poison and cut off the capacity of belief" (ibid.: 279). This indictment refers in context to deeper understanding of belief as experience arising unmediated from the soul itself. The ancient conception of the Logos as the mind's participation in the divine had ceded in modernity to the poison of the mind severed from its native connection with the divine in its reduction to reason in interplay with the senses and a pathologizing and now missionary enlightenment spreading its "paralysis" (ibid.: 280, 282–283). Jung puts the spiritual poverty and eviscerating loss of depth rather succinctly when he writes, "words are all we have" (ibid.: 279).

The vapid scholarship accompanying the severance of science from the soul comes under equal fire. To recover his soul Jung had to "hang up exact science and put away the scholar's gown" for a more thorough engagement with the inner life itself and all its variable passions (Jung 2009: 233, fn. 55). His most extended imagery of the scholar depicts a man in a castle surrounded by a swamp addicted to his books, hardly able to concentrate on Jung's presence and needs, and living with his effectively imprisoned daughter, anima, as the only survival of his departed wife and a relation to the feminine. The soulless character of scholarship could hardly be more vividly portrayed. Nor could Jung's summation of so much of such scholarship be easily surpassed. "Go to the meetings of scholars and you will see them, these lamentable old men with their great merits and their starved souls famished for recognition and their thirst which can never be slaked" (ibid.: 264).

What then are we to make of this aggressive attitude toward science and scholarship? In a most general response these remarks have to be taken in the context of a criticism of a science that had removed human consciousness from its own native depths with disastrous consequences. In the same general sense the foregoing critique makes it very clear that Jung's response to a soulless society came out of his own soul with the consequence that Jungian psychology is built on Jung's efforts to recover his personal soul as the prerequisite of enabling a wider recovery on a societal plane. More, the specific energies depicted in his psychology were initially identified and engaged in his own conversation with these powers, described in *The Red Book.* Does this mean, then, that one must bow to Jung's personal experience in reading his work or engaging in a Jungian analysis? No it does not. And it does not because the powers that Jung discovered emanating from his own soul abide in variation in everyone's. To miss this point would be to say that one must be a Danish prince to understand Hamlet or a Scottish noble to understand Macbeth. Hamlet and Macbeth are immortal because they live in our souls as archetypal energies, as do the archetypes Jung was to bring to consciousness as the energies on which his psychology rests.

Thus when Jung writes in 1957, now at the beginning of *The Red Book*, that his later work was a "scientific elaboration" of the experiences related in *The Red Book*, he hardly means an elaboration that would meet the demands of an exact science based on a mathematical, measured, statistical data base or foundation whose experiments could be repeated as the basis of predictability (ibid.). It is equally improbable that Jung's "scientific elaboration" would become a sustained recurrence of the very pathology that elicited his psychology in the first place. If anything his "science" would describe the direct dialogue of the ego with the divine in the deeper subjectivity of the individual. No doubt his association experiment could be called a scientific proof of the autonomy of the complexes and so of the unconscious but as he moves on could his resting of all mythical and religious imagery on the archetypal unconscious as preserved in written form as religious revelation and in the form of individual experience and expression such as dreams be also called "scientific"? When Jung affirms so strongly that his psychology rests on "extreme subjectivity" can such extremity be boxed and packaged for either scientific or religious delivery (Jung 1970: 540)? And can his move to the conception of synchronicity and the assumption of a universal ontological "substrate" able to influence the individual in correlation with nature in the interests of the recovery of the individual's deeper life meaning be described as scientific even if Pauli, a Nobel prize-winning physicist, was a major contributor to the final sketch of the process in the *Collected Works*? (Jung 1971b: 51)? Can matters of such an "extreme subjectivity" beyond the realm of the ego and addressing the ego from an infinitely transcendent position within the psyche be either denied to Jung or truly termed "scientific"?

And yet Jung did claim the status of "science" for his psychology. A significant element in answering the question "why?" lies in the need Jung would have in introducing so unusual a theory as that of the archetypal unconscious to appease the still strong scientism of his day and ours. Anything in the field of psychology not a science or scientific would hardly get a hearing. But even in his self-description as a scientist Jung adds strange qualifiers which might well disqualify his claim to science as the noun is used today. Whenever the question of a romantic element in his psychology as science is raised he concedes that his psychology rests on experience and in so doing bows to a romantic element even as he insists in the same context that the experiential dimension of his psychology does not undermine its scientific and rational grounds (Jung 1976b: 775). The problematic claim to science arises when a "science" tries to synthesize such personal and subjective experiences of the psyche such as dreams, hallucinations, and other forms of radical interiority with the "objectivity" most sciences claim to attain. How many sciences today would include such subjectivity as a valid basis for claims to be scientific or based on legitimate empirical data?

The problem would resolve itself if Jung were to be more consistently insistent on the status of his psychology as empirical and himself as an empiricist (Jung 1969c: 5). It could be argued that the problem would remain since, at least in the popular mind, the empirical is understood to rest on the yield of the senses,

directly or enhanced. But Jung refused to reduce the validly knowable to the yield of the senses. True, the dictionary extends the meaning of "empirical" beyond the reduction of knowledge to sensation. Funk and Wagnall and Webster both provide understandings of the "empirical" as that which is known by direct experience or observation. Archetypal expression, especially in dreams and kindred manifestation, is certainly known directly. Once known it can become the object of observation and the basis of a legitimate correlation between collective expression in any age and the experience of the individual now living who, for instance, might glimpse Mithraic imagery in a personal experience (Jung 1966a: 101). If the empirical can be thus extended to encompass such experience Jung is certainly an empiricist and his psychology would have a legitimate claim to an empirical basis on which its scientific character rested. But again how many sciences would consider such "extreme subjectivity" to be empirical? For Jung the manifestations of such subjectivity in whatever guise were the "method of proof" he put forth for his psychology (Jung 1968n: 48–50).

Rather than quibble over the legitimacy of Jungian psychology as a science it would be better to describe it as a discipline that would unite a more inclusive understanding of the empirical with the rigors of science in such a way as to engage a more total humanity in the doing of science. Teilhard de Chardin, for instance, was a recognized evolutionary scientist and a member of the French academy and yet he himself could discern in his work the blend of the scientific, the philosophical, the mystical and the poetic (Dourley 2012). These dimensions enriched rather than diminished his status as a scientist by giving them a deeper anchor in the totally human. In a similar vein Paul Tillich understood the experience of revelation itself to involve the experience of reason with its own depths in a state of consciousness he termed "theonomous". Jung too raises the possibility of a consciousness engaged in the doing of science capable of uniting the power of scientific reason with the subjective experience of the depths of the human in a synthesis affirming the truth and relative autonomy of both (Dourley 2008: 190–191). This unified approach would demand that the doing of Jungian science would demand an unmediated experience of the unconscious if it was to be valid as science. The question could then be asked, "Do those who consider Jungian psychology to be a science ground their science on such experience, and if not are they then empiricists in the sense Jung claimed, that is, able to deal with the total human cognitive capacity which would have to include the unconscious?" Reversing this thrust we might well ask whether science detached from the unconscious is truly a science since it reduces knowledge to the interplay of the mind with the senses and their yield as measurable.

Is Jungian psychology a religion?

That Jung was convinced he had discovered the origin of religion in the psyche can hardly be gainsaid. Again, it would be difficult for him to be more explicit: "It is a telling fact that two theological reviewers of my book *Psychology and*

Religion – one of them Catholic, the other Protestant – assiduously overlooked my demonstration of the psychic origin of religious phenomena" (Jung 1968c: 9). The text can only mean what its says. Jung thought he had demonstrated that the origin of religion lies in the psyche. However, the demonstrations of religion's psychic origin hardly reduces Jungian psychology to one religion among many. In his early work Jung would contend that in the face of rationalism and science the symbolic sense had been lost to his culture even or especially within confessional religion. The "spokesmen of religion have failed to deliver an apologetic suited to the spirit of the age" (Jung 1966a: 227). Jung goes on to urge that the question of why religious or symbolic statement, that is, religion itself, arises in the first place replaces futile religious appeals to faith which no one can manufacture at will. Jung, as his work continued, did develop such an apology but it turned out to be an apology for religion itself. This apology would be abusively exploited if it were confined to an apology for any particular religion. Rather it points to universal agencies, the archetypes, manifesting in the various religions as their generative source. The basis of religion in the psyche can be reduced to no single such manifestation. Rather their common sources endorse them all as relative expressions of the psyche. Currently this power at the basis of the evolution of religion universally urges a more encompassing sense of the Spirit than any extant religion, at least in the West, can proffer.

This said there remains a sense in which Jungian psychology could function as a religion beyond any form of confessionalism. The Western religious scene is currently embroiled in a schism crossing confessional boundaries. The broader schism is between fundamentalism and a more moderate expression of traditional confessions within each tradition. Fundamentalism is growing as the core component of orthodox confessional communities. While fundamentalist numbers swell in churches, synagogues and mosques, the overall numbers diminish as those of liberal and humanistic bent flee the takeover. This state of affairs has few attractive options. The situation too often presents the authentically religiously minded with the choice between an increasingly regressive ecclesial body and nothing. It is in addressing this false cleavage that Jungian psychology can play a role which could be understood as "religious" if the latter term is taken to refer to the connection of consciousness with the vitalities of the archetypal life of the unconscious. Initially Jung saw this as a societal need in the face of the failure of the religious community around him to establish such a living connection. But for Jung religion as a societal need never excluded the individual. On the contrary the religious need was profoundly individual and nowhere more so than in Jung himself as evidenced in *The Red Book* and his later writings on religion. His psychology originated in the depths of his personal experience. The religious impulse is in itself an effort to undergo and experience personally the powers that lie within. The swing to the right is therefore an effort to avoid the depths out of which Jungian psychology lives and religion originates. An ironic note here is the fact that the religious traditions were founded by the unconscious to lead their members into the energies that created the communities themselves as expressed

in founding stories, their reenactment and attendant moralities. Religious communities now cut off from their founding agency, the unconscious, prevent rather than serve access to their origin. They are dysfunctional and becoming increasingly more so as they seek in fundamentalist mentalities protection from the immediate experience of the divine which functional communities should mediate not flee as the reason for their being. The turn to a direct experience of such vitalities lies behind the current birth of so many forms of "spirituality" as a religion without a religion. Jungian psychology could be understood as such since, especially through a sustained conversation with the dream, it works a connection with the divine as personal revelation which institutional religion can no longer convey.

The collective situation thus understood surfaces again the notion of the self-containment of the psyche and the implication that the relation to the divine is the relation of consciousness to its unconscious matrix in an ongoing reciprocity of mutual dialogue. But there is an element in Jungian psychology which might well challenge such a conception of the organic unity of the divine and human based on their interactive dialectic within the total psyche. It is Jung's understanding of the psychoid. An early reference to the notion appears in a footnote at the end of a work, originally written in 1919, whose conclusion is that the spirits and spirit world are "externalizations" of psychic processes (Jung 1919: 318). This is Jung's usual position. In a footnote written nineteen years later Jung confesses, "To put it bluntly I doubt whether an exclusively psychological approach can do justice to the phenomena in question. Not only the findings of parapsychology, but my own theoretical reflections… have led me to certain postulates which touch on the realm of nuclear physics and the conception of the space-time continuum. This opens up the whole question of the transpsychic reality immediately underlying the psyche" (ibid.: 318, fn 15).

This "transpsychic reality" somehow distinguishable from the psyche refers to the psychoid. As Jung deals with it in greater detail the psychoid takes on many faces and connotations. The central and possibly unifying characteristic of the psychoid is that it is the "irrepresentable and unconscious essence of the archetype". Its second feature is its embodiedness. As such the psychoid archetype possesses parapsychological traits and is involved in synchronistic events implying it is beyond space and time and universal in its extension as a substrate underlying the psyche and its expressions though it remains in itself irrepresentable and so unknowable except in its manifestations and operations (Jung 1958a: 450; 1971b: 436). It is on the basis of its being irrepresentable in itself that Jung draws the ambiguous and awkward though repeated distinction between the psyche and the psychoid. The psyche is apparently knowable and somehow susceptible to the will in ways the psychoid is not. In precise contradistinction to psychic manifestation in consciousness, the psychoid remains beyond representation and so unknowable in itself. Jung seems to be arguing that regardless of the degree to which the archetypal as psychic becomes conscious in history or the individual its essential core, the psychoid, remains beyond representation in itself. Any representation

would be through archetypal images and so fall short of the essence or core of the archetype, the psychoid.

In reflecting on this elusive concept and its distinction from the psyche Jung will insist he only uses the term as an adjective. It is not a "psychic quality". Nor is it a form of nineteenth-century vitalism and so again must be distinguished from "specifically psychic processes" (Jung 1954b: 177, 178). As such it inheres in the human where the psyche touches matter and so it is a bodily factor. As such Jung can draw a comparison between the psychoid and the life of the instinct in that the psychoid lives at a depth that is not immediately perceptible or controllable. This is to say that while it is organically based it cannot be reduced to an organic reality nor to a biologically based instinct (ibid.: 184). More, the psychoid moves beyond the psyche toward the instinctual realm just as it surpasses the instincts in moving in the opposite direction toward the spirit. Thus the psychoid would seem to "transcend" the psyche toward the instinctual and toward the spiritual though Jung confesses little is known about either (ibid.: 183). But in these crucial passages Jung grounds the distinction between psyche and psychoid on the contention that the psyche can be bought under the control of the will, presumably as unconscious energies are surfaced in consciousness, whereas the psychoid cannot. "What I would call the psyche proper extends to all function which can be brought under the influence of the will" (ibid.: 183). Other of his formulations would greatly extend this position as when he refers to the inexhaustibility of the archetypal unconscious and the failure of any of its expression to fully exhaust the potential that lies behind them. Such overflowing abundance of expression can hardly be wholly brought under the will.

Going beyond these descriptive and limiting categories Jung can speak of the psychoid in a language that could be related to the religious sphere and to a God referent. He relates the psychoid to the *unus mundus*, the unitary world and ground of what is and to which both his psychology and modern physics move independently but in "analogous" manners (Jung 1969a: 233–234). In describing the relation of his psychology to physics as "analogous" Jung denies that the yield of modern physics can be unequivocally identified with the yield of his psychology. Elsewhere Jung relates the *unus mundus* to the mandala and synchronicity as pointing to the originary source of what is. "If mandala symbolism is the psychological equivalent of the *unus mundus*, then synchronicity is its para-psychological equivalent" (Jung 1970: 464). Apparently the psychoid is somehow related to the realization of the height of alchemical maturation, the *unus mundus* to the synchronistic event, and to the mandala whose centre Jung understands to symbolize the divine as the centre of every existent including the human.

This side of his reflection on the psychoid leads Jung into the use of the term "transcendent". Because the nature of the archetype and its psychoid essence cannot be made exhaustively conscious it is termed "transcendent". The question remains to what? One answer is that God communicates through the soul, here equated with the unconscious or, "through its transcendental 'psychoid' basis." This basis is also the medium of "grace" (Jung 1976a: 705). To block off the

unconscious thus understood is to turn from God and the world of grace. In his work on conscience the psychoid is again related to the essence of the archetype and as such possesses "a transcendence" giving to it the numinous power of the "voice of God" (Jung 1958a: 453). Though irrepresentable the psychoid as related to conscience and to the voice of God would hardly be inexpressible. Again Jung refers to the psychoid as related to "the essentially transcendental nature of the archetype as an 'arranger' of psychic forms inside and outside of the psyche" (Jung 1951a: 22). The psychoid as "arranger" might well be irrepresentable in itself but the consequences it works in synchronistic events are dramatic and transformative and so blatantly capable of being represented. While Jung will maintain that the psychoid does not exercise any direct effect on psyche or the external world it would seem to come close to doing so as the "arranger" of the synchronistic happening. Again in language pointing to a God concept Jung describes the psychoid essence as approximating "oneness" and "immutability" (Jung 1956a: 318). Moreover, the psychoid core of the archetype is probably an inherited a priori (Jung 1958b: 451). This would hardly mean archetypal images are inherited, but their base in the psychoid apparently is.

Reviewing these foundational but somewhat scattered elements in Jung's thought on the psychoid the question can be asked: "Do they speak of a supernatural God beyond the psyche at least as imagined in the monotheistic tradition?" It is obvious that Jung was wrestling with what he was trying to express in the term "psychoid". Why the reality he seeks to depict through it could not be simply integrated with the widely extended psyche he arrives at in his later conceptions of a psyche of infinite creativity seeking expression in humanity remains unclear. He himself in writing on synchronicity refers to Occam's razor, which forbids the multiplication of needless categories. Were he to include the psychoid in the psyche itself it would be advantageous to his psychological theory. He would still have a convincing picture of divinity as the power of the archetypal unconscious seeking ever greater conscious realization and the resolution of its opposites in consciousness as the basic meaning of history. This power native to nature would be able to correlate the individual with other individuals and with nature in chance but profoundly transformative events in a manner reminiscent of providential intervention but without the dualism between God and nature this religious idea demands.

In the context of the organic consistency of his psychology the basis to understand the psychoid as pointing to a divinity sharing the self-sufficient and supernatural autonomy of a monotheistic God appears slim. Or else Jung's use of the term points to a relapse into a supernatural discontinuity between the divine and the human psychoid and psyche, which the vast burden of his psychology corrodes. In distinguishing the psychoid from the psychic Jung seems to author a distinction without a difference, probably to express the deepening and extension of the unconscious of his later work especially in conjunction with Pauli. He could have simply argued that the unconscious as the ground of consciousness will always transcend it as the archetypal seeks ever greater historical ingression in it.

The integration of the psyche and psychoid would thus both simplify and expand his conception of the psyche and the role of divinity within his amplification of the immensity of the psyche taken in its totality.

In the wake of the foregoing the consciousness characteristic of a Jungian perspective is too rich to easily categorize and may be unique in contemporary cultural thought. It can claim to be a science but only if the profoundly subjective be accepted as its empirical base. It could be understood as a religion but only in the sense that it has uncovered the roots of religion in the psyche and so the source of all the religions and so offer religious respite to the spiritually disenchanted. It could be called a form of theology but only in the sense that such a theology would presuppose an experiential rapport with the psychic source of all religion. All symbols, sacraments, ritual activity and morality would then become expressions of the archetypal. Theology would then be a sympathetic examination of these realities as expressions of the unconscious intended to lead the practitioner into the energies they express. It could be called a philosophy because it reflects on the nature of being and how being and meaning are known. It does this through an epistemology locating the origin of consciousness in the unconscious and locating meaning in the communication between them. Though this communication is initially in the form of symbolic discourse, the symbols themselves point to the source of what is grounding the individual's psyche and grounding whatever is natural in the surrounding. The epistemology would relate closely to an ontology which would understand the nature of being to be realized to a greater or lesser extent to the degree reason was in active touch with its depth. In this Jung's ontology is close to James in the latter's understanding of the "more" entering consciousness through the subliminal door of the unconscious in the interests of rebirth (James 1958: 194–195; 386). Jung's epistemology and ontology depart from any form of static being and from knowledge understood to be confined to the mind in its correlation with the sensate world. They are compelling pieces of a dynamic type of process philosophy built on the energetic and always shifting reciprocity between ego and unconscious. While, then, Jung's psychology makes substantial contributions to science, to psychology, to the philosophy of religion and so to religious studies and theology, it cannot be reduced to any of them. Rather it moves to a unitary mind in which all would be synthesized but none preside.

The implication for the study of mystical experience

The wealth and extension of a Jungian perspective may contribute most significantly to a reviviscence of a living and sustaining religious consciousness in a society currently living at a soul destroying and depressive level of superficiality. This shallowness extends to the failure of institutional religion currently to provide its constituents with a significant spiritual meaning. At the time of the second Vatican Council (1963–1965) a frequently made remark was that the Council, unlike its predecessors, did not face a burning issue in the Church such as the

nature of Christ, the Trinity or the Church itself. The crisis that provoked the council was that the Church was irrelevant to the society in which it lived and was increasingly becoming more so. Some of the theologians who were prominent in creating the documents of the Council were cognizant of the peripheral cultural status of the Roman Church even before the Council. One of these, Karl Rahner, the famous Innsbruck theologian, was keenly aware that a theology unable to convey an experiential impact was a dead theology. This awareness lay behind his famous statement, "the devout Christian of the future will either be a 'mystic', one who has 'experienced' something, or he will cease to be anything at all" (Rahner 1971: 15; 1982: 22).

When Rahner's understanding of the statement is unpacked in his own terms it bears considerable affinities with Jung. One commentator urges that Rahner's theological anthropology functions as "a mystical depth psychology" (Egan 1980: 146). And Rahner does explicitly acknowledge a legitimate role for psychology in the understanding of mystical experience. He would seem to suggest that psychology not theology should be the determinant of whether or not mystical experience is a constituent element in a full human maturation (Rahner 1982: 77; McGinn 1995: 286, 287). Rahner is not quite wholly able to match Jung's naturalism which would relate mystical experience directly and simply to the experience of the archetypes and in so doing make of Jung a mystic. "Mystics are people who have a particularly vivid experience of the processes of the collective unconscious. Mystical experience is experience of archetypes" (Jung 1976b: 98, 99). Rahner's Catholicism binds him to a supernatural/natural dualism but in a more muted and qualified sense. He works with a concept of the "supernatural existential" which means that God, undemanded, has elevated humanity to move toward the divine reality. In effect the conception approaches the position that the natural is really supernatural in its depths and especially in the primordial depths of the individual who thus becomes constitutionally capable of mystical experience through the experience of these depths. For Rahner this experience has been sadly lacking in the extrinicism of a theology resting on a wholly intellectual appropriation of the history of the creeds and dogma complied by Heinrich Denzinger (Denzinger: 1964a). Consequently the experiential basis of faith and grace had been lost and theology reduced to a vapid intellectualism much like that of Jung's ministerial father and uncle and cousins who knew their theology and dogma well but lacked the experience behind these formulations and so, quite literally, did not know what they were talking about (Egan 1980: 156; Jung 1965: 73, 74).

In the context of the primordially supernatural grounding of the consciousness of everyone made explicit in Christian faith and grace Rahner concludes that every Christian is a mystic. The only difference between life in the Christian Spirit as the basis of Christian mysticism and those distinguished as Christian mystics is a degree not of total difference but of intensity. In the delineation of the intensity of an experience universal to the Christian but outstanding in the classic mystics Rahner feels that psychology has a significant role to play, one that cannot be exercised by the theologian as such. He can thus contend that those distinguished

for their mysticism in some outstanding way are gifted by their nature to undergo these experiences and that the psychological and parapsychological nature of these experiences should be examined from the perspective of the accounts of the "empirical mystic" and the "experimental psychologist" (Rahner 1982: 73, 74). Like Jung, Rahner turns to the primary importance of the individual whose unmediated and frequently solitary experience of the divine would become the basis of the future Church as a community of mystics who stand over the same abyss as does the mystic who enters more deeply into it (Rahner 1982: 22). Not everyone can write like Shakespeare but everyone can write and everyone can understand what Shakespeare has written.

The universality of the "supernatural existential", like the reality of the collective unconscious, has great ecumenical import. Rahner distinguishes between religious and natural mysticism. The former refers to Christian and non-Christian but religious mysticism; the latter to a natural mysticism. For Rahner all are valid forms of mysticism and as such would point to a common underlying experience (Egan 1980: 253–254). Again in words reminiscent of Jung, the common element of even a "secular mysticism" is a "return to oneself" (Egan 1980: 152). Though it is undeniable that Rahner's understanding of mysticism describes an experience that originates in human interiority he shows a Christian reflex rejection to its description as a form of pantheism based on his Christian conviction that God has raised humanity's cognitive drive to a supernatural level and so beyond the naturalism that pantheism implies. Jung is far less fearful of pantheism, nor taken by any concern to retain the supernatural however natural it might be framed. Yet like Rahner he attributes much of the pallid character of the Christian spirituality of his day to its loss of the pantheistic sense already evident in the days of the alchemists (Jung 1970: 541). Rahner is aware of the same problem and works toward the same kind of revitalization of the experiential as its cure.

With his categories Rahner can argue that every Christian is at least potentially a mystic to the extent he or she responds to the Spirit rising from within and at the same time affirm that extraordinary mystical experience witnessed, for example, with the Rhine mystics or in the early Carmelite tradition are not an essential part or requirement of the Christian life. However, Rahner remains happily ambiguous on the issue when he submits the phenomena of mysticism to psychological evaluation. In this context he professes himself open to the possibility that if psychology could demonstrate that mystical experience, even if pre-reflective, was a constituent element in human maturation it would obviously have to be equally necessary in terms of Christian maturation (Rahner 1982: 77). Otherwise the conclusion would loom that Christian maturation would fall short of a wholly human maturation to which mysticism would be an essential contributing factor if not its capstone.

In the context of what follows in this work, the comment has been made of Rahner's theology in general that it is peculiarly dependent on, and perhaps even a continuation of, the German mystical tradition. This critical commentary names, among others, Eckhart and his disciple, Tauler, and refers to Rahner's use of the

religious and theological terminology of the German tradition from the twelfth to the fifteenth century in his own theology. This response to Rahner ends with a plea for more research on Rahner's dependence on his German mystical forbears (Baker 1980: 165).

It is interesting to note that this tradition is to some large extent the tradition to which Jung turns in elaborating some of the more profound dimensions of his own psychology and so of the psyche. If Jung identifies mysticism as the experience of the archetypes, which he definitely did, then accusations of his psychology bearing a certain mystical sense are not wholly unfounded. He was himself to wearily bemoan the fact that when his psychology linked the psyche to divinity he was accused of a reductive "psychologism" or a "morbid 'mysticism'" (Jung 1939: 482). Many of his detractors dismissed his psychology as being just that, a form of mysticism. A more positive critique of Jung as a mystic is Aniela Jaffé's. She acknowledges that Jung's psychology paints a picture of humanity in its essence as "*homo mysticus*" and refers to Jung's "mystical experiences" (Jaffé 1989: 23, 25). She concludes by repeating Jung's traditional distinction between the experience of archetypal images and a transcendent realm beyond them which nevertheless influences humanity (Jaffé 1989: 27). However, the following examination of his treatment of those mystics to whom he was drawn would indicate that those who reject Jung's psychology as a form of mysticism or diminish the role of mystical experience in his thought have a tenuous grasp of the total Jung and of the radical implications to be drawn for the contemporary world of religion, politics and social organization from his understanding of mysticism as native to the psyche.

For it is in his treatment of the mystics that he reveals most deeply his understanding of religion and its inescapable impact on individual and society. Jung's myth taxes humanity with the birth into consciousness of the archetypal powers of the Great Mother. A moment of dissolution in her would make the birth less painful and serve to guarantee the survival of the child and the species.

2

THE UNSPEAKABLE ECSTASY

Mechthild and other divine mistresses

The Beguines

The origin of the Beguine movement, including the origin of its name, are not historically certain. It is known that the movement began in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries in what today would be Belgium and soon moved into modern day Holland, Germany along the Rhine, and later, in a more allegedly heretical variation, into France and Italy (McGinn 1998: 32–41, 158–159, 174–175; McDonnell 1954: 59–80, 96–100). Today it might well be classified as a rapidly growing movement of "lay" women who chose neither to marry nor to enter a more traditional and canonically or ecclesially approved convent or monastery. There were a number of variations of Beguine life. They ranged from living in the family household, to the better known forms of communal life in Beguinages, to the life of the individual wanderer like Marguerite Porete, to be treated later at greater length (McGinn 1998: 32, 244). The movement is most associated with the establishment of communities of women seeking a self-sufficient life of holiness bound by celibate living and by less formal and potentially temporal commitment, dedicated to good works usually related to the sick and poor. Unlike, for example, the Benedictines, they usually conformed to no "rule" deriving from a saintly founder. Rather they sought their place in that experimental and newly evolving space between a simple lay person's life and the religious life of those living in permanently vowed communities under a canonically approved rule with formal ecclesial support and protection both by Rome and the local episcopacy.

Consequently, they never received the unqualified approbation of the Church as did the regular orders of men and women living in monasteries, convents and other forms of ecclesially legitimized community (Hollywood: 2004; Babinsky: 1993). Because the movement never received sustained, unqualified legitimation from the papacy or hierarchy and because it was then a radically new form of religious life, the history of the Beguines was turbulent. By and large the canonical church was never unambiguously supportive though at times it granted the movement a qualified appreciation and protection, an appreciation shared by other prominent religious personalities of the period (McDonnell 1954: 508; Lerner 1972: 171). The Beguines were susceptible to association with the

movement of the free spirit now seen as hardly a dogmatic and homogeneous heretical movement currently admitted to defy too confining a definition (Lerner 1972: 8, 228–243). Nevertheless the association of the Beguines with heretical positions, however questionable, was injurious to them (ibid.: 8).

From its amorphous origins in the twelfth century it grew rapidly in the thirteenth. Its growth itself prompted suspicion. Decrees were issued restraining them in Magdeburg, where Mechthild herself was located, in 1261 (ibid.: 1954: 508). In 1312 the ecumenical council of Vienne under Clement V attacked the Beguines in the "Clementine decrees". The first decree called for the dissolution of the Beguines unless they accepted an ecclesially approved rule and forbade them theological speculation especially around the Trinity and the essence of God (ibid.: 524). This wording appears harsh and absolute but then was qualified by a reference receptive to Beguine life when in accord with the canonical Church. The council also condemned eight propositions attributed to the Beguines and Beghards (Denzinger 1964b: 282). Most of these propositions were exaggerated descriptions of a spirituality which would endow its holders with the perfection of heaven on earth, deny the need for penance and good works, freely grant to the body its needs including its sexual needs, and provide freedom from all forms of external ecclesial authority. The ambiguous status of the Beguines continued on after the Council of Vienne. Some efforts at reconciliation with orthodox ecclesial authorities were moderately successful in fourteenth-century Belgium, France and the Netherlands (McDonnell 1954: 539–556) only to be met with an ongoing opposition and increasing suspicion of heresy later in the century (ibid.: 557–574). In the face of this continued opposition over its lifetime, the movement went into decline, lost its specifically religious character and was reduced to the level of the poor house by the late fifteenth century (McDonnell 1954: 573, 574).

From this brief historical account focus shifts to the major motifs in Beguine imagery and to their psychological meaning. The Beguines developed a spirituality and probably circulated texts focused on "the mystical marriage" or "bride mysticism". These texts had some affinity with the then declining tradition of the minne singers and their devotion to courtly love (Tobin 1995: 55, 89). In some of these texts, and especially Mechthild's and Hadewijch's, there are frank depictions of sexual intercourse between Christ and the author culminating in a union of identity beyond difference. Of Mechthild it is said, "hunger for God is not simply sexual, though one might call it 'spiritually sexual'… though she renounces sex physically enacted she does not renounce sexuality" (Tobin 1995: 89). This comment resonates with the Jungian idea of the union of opposites, in this case working the union of the sexual and spiritual in a unified consciousness culminating, as we shall see, in an identity between lovers beyond all differentiation. The relationship to the divine becomes an erotic relationship and spirituality and sexuality embrace in it.

Mechthild and her work

It was to a prominent member of this tradition, Mechthild of Magdeburg, that Jung turned as to one among a number of mystics whose experience both illuminated

and was illuminated by aspects of his own psychology. Frank Tobin has compiled the history of the recovery of her single extant work, *The Flowing Light of the Godhead*, in 1861 in the Benedictine library in Einsiedeln as well as a history of the critical response – Catholic, Reformed, and literary – to her single work. The question his work asks is: "Who was Mechthild and how are we to understand her book?" (Tobin 1995: 137). Her most likely dates were ca 1207–1282 (Tobin 1995: 1–3; McGinn: 1998: 222–223). The text itself allows a partial reconstruction of her life. One opinion holds that her work is substantially a "reflective autobiography" (Tobin 1995: 89). Others have flatly denied the verifiability of any historical facticity in her work and see it wholly as a literary construct (Tobin 1995: 127–133). If the text is granted any historicity it is not characterized by the facticity and completeness of a contemporary biography. Even taken as a literary work with profound psychological insight the work does refer to historical events in Mechthild's life. From her references to courtly life and thorough knowledge of the courtly love traditions she was likely born into some personal acquaintance with the court though she was not of the aristocracy. Tobin suggests a "courtly upbringing" (Tobin 1995: 1). At the age of 12 she experienced her first being "greeted so overpoweringly by the Holy Spirit" (Mechthild 1953: 94). In 1230 she left home to join the Beguines in Magdeburg (Tobin 1995: 2; Mechthild 1953: 95). With the encouragement of her confessor, likely Heinrich von Halle, and acting directly at the command of God, she began to write her religious experience (Mechthild 1953: 98). Her writings were to take on the form of the seven books of her work compiled over a period extending from 1250 to her death in 1282. She wrote in the vernacular in medieval Low German. The original manuscript is unfortunately lost and apparently cannot be recovered by translating back to an original from which currently available translations derive. She would not have had the formal education that a member of an established convent would have had. By her own account she did not know Latin (Tobin 1995: 71, 79; Mechthild 1953: 52).

A version of her single manuscript in the form of middle High German was discovered in the Einsiedeln library in 1861 by Karl Greith, later the bishop of the nearby diocese of St. Gall (Tobin 1995: 21). Though there are other manuscripts the work seems to have had little or no widespread currency between its composition, concluded in the late thirteenth century, and its recovery in 1861. The translation with which Jung worked and which he cited in his own work is by Lucy Menzies, a translation Tobin describes as transmitting "the essential Mechthild" in a manner "free and poetic" though lacking in scholarly rigour (Tobin 1995: 15, 64). Using this translation in this work is appropriate because poetic expression is better able to express archetypal power and nuance than more wooden and inflexible scholarly versions. Indeed, some critics, such as J. Ancelet Hustache, W. Kimbres, and U. Muller, have pointed to the work as bearing psychological import relating to the dialogue between the archetypal unconscious and consciousness (Tobin 1995: 42–43, 64, 89). Jung was not the first to point out the psychological import of Mechthild's work but his conceptions of the animus and of the symbol

of Trinity and its expansion into a quaternitarian vision provide a perspective on her work which is peculiarly Jungian.

Tobin refers, with the insight of the historian, to Mechthild's awareness of charges of questionable orthodoxy and to her response to them. Within the work and probably during her time as a Beguine she fully acknowledges the criticism of her orthodoxy. Some would consign her book to the flames: others she calls Pharisees and blind (Mechthild 1953: 58–60, 199). These may well have been clerical and theological critics challenging the orthodoxy of her experience. As most mystics who deny an absolute severance between the divine and the human she may have been suspected of pantheism, and to some extent lived in fear of the Inquisition (Tobin 1995: 23, 73, 83, 87). A. Hass and K. Ruh refer to her understanding of "identity" with the divine, an identity possibly extending to a fusion of essences (Tobin 1995: 68, 74). As we shall see, the basis for these perceptions does indeed lie in certain of her formulations and would be heretical to the ears of institutional orthodoxy then and now. Identity thus understood could imply that such experience was a natural moment which completed and humanized divinity as it divinized the human and so continued processes of Incarnation. The perception of some critics of a pantheistic element enlivening her thought would have considerable affinity with Jung's indictment of Christianity's currently vapid spirituality through the loss of such human/divine natural intimacy whose vitalities provoke pantheistic sentiment (Jung 1970: 541).

After living for 40 years as a Beguine in Magdeburg and possibly rising to a position of authority at one point, Mechthild, now in later age and with impaired sight, entered the Cistercian convent at Helfta in 1270 where she completed the seventh and last section of her work (Tobin 1995: 3). In it she addresses some of the specific difficulties her earlier formulations caused, especially around the natural divinity of humanity. At Helfta she would be entering the life of the convent endorsed by the Church and into a community possessed of a higher formal religious education. For here she was in the company of Gertrud von Helfta and Mechthild von Hacekborn, each of whom was to author significant spiritual works in Latin perhaps influenced by and influencing their new community member (Tobin 1955: 2, 3). Her later writings lack some of the fire of her earlier work in its fusion of eroticism and religious experience. She confesses that Christ was present to her as a companion in her childhood, and a lover in her youth but now, in the debility and resignation of age, she relates to him as a "housewife" (Mechthild 1953: 212). The spouse with whom she earlier made love was now the God who would welcome her in her death.

The mystical marriage

Jung identifies certain foundational themes in Mechthild's writing as illustrative of the deeper movements of the psyche. The first and most prominent of these is the fusion of sexual and religious experience. Jung's own appreciation of the mutual impregnation of the sexual and religious is evident in his response to the

reduction of sexuality to biology. He possibly had Freud in mind when he wrote: "Any such conception overlooks the spiritual and 'mystical' implications of the sexual instinct" (Jung 1968d: 226). One of Jung's earliest dreams was that of an underground enthroned phallus (Jung 1965: 11, 12). The dream may have served as a portent of his future prophetic role with regard to the need to reconnect consciousness with the unconscious and with the power of the sexual in a world uprooted from connection to the earth. The dream could refer to Jung's vocation to work a reconnection between mind and eros, physical and psychological. Jung will also observe that earlier alchemy was an effort on the part of believing Christians to overcome their dissociation of body and spirit to recover a wholeness not to be found in Christianity's exclusion of the bodily from the sphere of the holy (Jung 1970: 540, 541). In her own religious experience expressed in powerful sexual imagery Mechthild preceded Jung in urging a more robust and inclusive spirituality expressed in frank sexual imagery offensive to orthodoxy then and now.

Jung refused to reduce libido to sexuality. Rather he argues that there is a sea of libido in the psyche which can take on many forms. All such forms are powerfully libidinal expressions of the Great Mother as source of the archetypal. This extended sense of libido could then well be expressed in imagery uniting the sexual and spiritual. Jung describes Mechthild's experience as one of unabashed "Christ eroticism" (Jung 1971a: 232). A teenage Christ depicted as her physical lover is the sole power who can satisfy her libidinal drive, one which obviously synthesizes the sexual and spiritual. This eroticism of the soul is for Mechthild as powerful and animalistic as "the roar of a hungry lion" (Jung 1966a: 94, 95). Such libido drives her to a prayer with obvious sexual innuendo. Jung cites Mechthild, "Ah Lord, love me greatly, love me often and long!" (Jung 1966a: 90). She continues that the more she is loved the purer she is. The sustained sexual intensity is in itself a cleansing purity. It is equally important that the divine response is all too eager to accommodate her prayer in meeting its own need. In this dialectic the need of divinity for completion in the human is heard as early as the thirteenth century.

Her candid sexuality was an embarrassment in medieval times and remains such in ours. The translation of her work from low German into Latin in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century toned down her explicit sexuality (Tobin 1995: 41). Even the Menzies translation did. In a passage from the second book, part four, of *The Flowing Light of the Godhead*, McGinn translates, "No matter how high he dwells above me, his Godhead shall never be so distant that I cannot entwine my limbs with him and so I shall never cool off" (McGinn 1998: 235, 236). The Menzies translation reads:

> And his Godhead is never so unattainable to me
> That I am not ceaselessly aware of Him
> In all my being!
> Thus my love of Him can never cool.
>
> (Mechthild 1953: 48)

Menzies makes no reference to the entwining of limbs and so waffles on what precisely needs cooling.

The power of Mechthild's sexual imagery has even greater theological and psychological implications. It strongly suggests that the divine and human lovers share a common nature and that the height of the erotic is in the experience of this eternally shared nature beyond any difference between its joint possessors. Such intimacy further sounds the note of the necessity of the creation of nature and of humanity as the locus in which divinity and humanity complete each other in a moment depicted as sexual ecstasy absorbing the lovers beyond their difference. Mechthild's imagery of divine/human intercourse would lend credence and extension to Jung's understanding of the animus as the woman's inner masculinity and sustaining support. The relation to the animus experienced by Mechthild is to a psychic power divine, human, male and sexual. The animus would then be the source of both an abiding joy and a sustaining confidence, as well as a profound suffering in its absence.

Such experience would make of Mechthild a prophet. Her prophetic criticism of the institutional church later in her work would appear, then, as a consequence of a woman enjoying intercourse with an inner divine male figure whose reflection in institutional form was distorted, even imperceptible. The experience would breed a sense of the self as the basis of both a greatly deepened sensitivity and a courage at once more empathic and sensitive to her surroundings. These same qualities of soul would ground a critique of an institution when it served to impede the processes of divinization she had undergone and imaged as intercourse with a divine lover, processes whose effective transmission are paradoxically the sole reason for the existence of the institution itself. In the light of the power of her experience the institution's inability to proffer a spirituality as intense as sexual ecstasy and its transformative memory would expose a less than fully functional spirituality, one that many women (and men) no longer access institutionally.

In an age which generally suppressed the role of women as teachers and spiritual directors, Mechthild's basing of her authority not only on her confessor but directly on God raises her to the level of an evangelist and her works to the level of a gospel (McGinn 1998: 223, 224). In a Jungian context the experience of the power of the archetypal is the basis of both collective and personal revelation. One's dream book becomes one's bible. To look on her work as a gospel would only be to confirm its archetypal origin. Such religious experience would describe a woman speaking out of her animus rooted in the power of the self. In short, from the perspectives of both Jung and Mechthild the roles of mystic and prophet are united in such experience. The solitary mystical experience of an insuperable intimacy with the divine is not solipsistic. Rather such experience is the basis of the courage to speak the truth as a prophet to one's own times and community. In accord with this spirit many today compose their own bible in the form of their dream book and come then to speak to others and institutions out of the power of their personal revelation. The self-empowering power of the inner diving may yet prove to be the major resource in the transformation of society beyond the individual.

The tryst

These themes are evident in Mechthild's prolonged description of a tryst with a youthful Christ in an early passage in *The Flowing Light of the Godhead* (Mechthild 1953: 20–25). The tryst is cast in the idiom of courtly love. The dialogue begins between Mechthild's soul with God and the Holy Spirit. In a peculiar passage the Holy Spirit informs her that if she is to find her way she is to give up a variety of virtues and vices. To be laid by the wayside are the need for remorse and penance as well as love of the world, the fight against demonic temptation and even the "annihilation of self-will" as an obstacle to true love (Mechthild 1953: 20). This theme is repeated in variation by other Beguine mystics. They hardly endorse a life without virtue but their experience convinces them that there is much more. It would seem to imply that conscious, intellectual or willful virtuous effort can never attain on its own what is given in the moment of sexual ecstasy with the divine lover. It is comparable to the fairy tale theme of the effort of the hero or heroine to perform a task or series of tasks ending in exhaustion and failure only to have a power other than the ego perform the required impossible task on behalf of the tale's protagonist. The personal effort is never effective but has apparently to be made as the necessary prelude to a more compendious power completing the necessary task effectively as an act of freely given grace. Such grace in a Jungian universe would be provided by energies resident in the psyche itself. In Mechthild's case such energy would be hers from the animus acting in the power of the self as the basis of her divine support and ecstasy. In the end the ego must cede to the self or at least enter a coalition with it in the completion of the *opus* as the work of a lifetime never to be finished but never to be abandoned. Mechthild's ambiguous relation to the virtuous life will reappear as her tale of courtly love unfolds.

It is then as if the narrative of the tryst assumes for a moment the perspective of the animus as Christ, the suppliant lover. The youthful Christ hears her voice apparently for the first time and confesses that long has he wooed her in non-reciprocated love. But now he will go to meet her in response to the awakening of her "intimate rapture". In the dialectic of the ego–animus relation, the animus and by extension the unconscious itself is always eager to address and inform the conscious realm, where alone it attains its own realization, but cannot do so, at least creatively, unless consciousness grants it entrance. The divine lover never ceases to knock, but the object of his love must open the door. And precisely at this point the senses enter the scene. Initially they are enthralled at the prospect of the imminent rapture. They are the agents that encourage the soul to clothe itself in virtues to meet her lover. She gladly does so and enters the woods themselves filled with virtues to meet her loved one who reciprocates in kind and sends her messengers in the form of many virtues to match her own. This topos apparently respects the tradition of courtly love whose culmination is preceded by a liturgy of exchange between lovers prior to love's consummation.

Finally the lover appears and proposes a dance. Again the dialectic of the dance reveals much of the reciprocity involved in the relation of ego and animus. The

soul cannot dance unless her partner lead her to and through an initial "fruition" to a state beyond all human sense where she will circle around her lover eternally. It should be noted that the soul's inability to dance turns into her imperative that her lover lead her in the dance. Her partner is only too willing to obey and in so doing surrenders to Mechthild. In this inner commerce her submission is the price of her control.

> The dance of praise is well done.
> Now shalt thou have the will
> Of the Virgin's Son.

The male as envoy of the self in the end submits to her and in virtue of her submission her will prevails but now in the power of her divinity. And so it is an intricate reciprocity. At the end of the dance the power of the divine male submits to the soul when the soul submits to him. There could hardly be a more adequate depiction of the commerce between consciousness and its submission to the powers of the unconscious who then come into its service. Mechthild's animus, divine and sexual, now is at her call and promises to cool her love by a brook at midday. The idiom of cooling has been referred to above.

At this point the senses rebel when Mechthild dismisses them as incapable of following her into love's fulfillment. Rather they try to impede the soul's leaving them by offering her a series of virtues ranging from Mary Magdalene's tears to Mary's maternal care for the Christ child. It is interesting to note that the senses twice provide or try to provide Mechthild with virtues to aid in her relation to her lover. First they offer the clothing of virtues as she sets out to meet him. Now they offer a variety of virtues Mechthild judges as "childish joy" as actual obstacles to the consummation of her love not as the mother of God but as bride and lover. The reader can only reflect that the virtuous life, though not rejected in itself, neither leads to nor can satisfy her spiritual/sexual hunger. Only full intercourse with her lover will. A virtuous life, commendable as it is, is not the goal of the spiritual life. The role of the senses depicted here lend a certain credibility to Jung's rejection of the epistemic principle that grounds Aristotelian philosophy and theology, "*Nihil est in intellectu, quod non antea fuerit in sensu in sensu*." Nothing is in the intellect unless first in the senses (Jung 1939: 492; 1969g: 559). Jung evaluated such a principle as dominating Western culture and as the source of a pathological Western extraversion removing its victims from their inner life. The truncating pathological fixation on the sensible stood always in need of compensation from the Eastern sense of connectedness with the archetypal and so with the universal roots of the mind (Jung 1939: 478–480). However, Jung did not think such a reconnection with an interior universal divine power could be imported from a different culture. Rather he thought it must be cultivated out of the West's own neglected or suppressed spiritual resource, not the least of which would be the religious experience of the Beguines.

In leaving behind the senses as she moves to a final identity with her lover Mechthild bows to the demands of an experience of the archetypal which the

world of senses may be able to depict and so express once experienced but can neither create nor force out of their own very limited cognitive resources. As Mechthild bids them adieu the senses draw back in fear from the intensity of the experience she is about to willingly undergo so far beyond the sensate world, "Who may abide it, even one hour?" Mechthild's poetry in answer to the senses loses none of its power to the theological implications and impact it carries. In effect she claims that her nature is divine and the fulfillment of her humanity is in the full recovery and enjoyment of her native divinity.

> This has God given to all creatures
> To foster and seek their own nature,
> How then can I withstand mine?
>
> (ibid.: 24)

Her question to the senses' objection that she leave them for her lover and the fulfillment of her fate leads to her affirmation, "I must go to God." But though this God is beyond the senses this God is not beyond Mechthild's nature and her eternal nature. For this God is:

> My Father through nature,
> My Brother through humanity,
> My Bridegroom through love,
> His am I forever.
>
> (ibid.)

Her affirmation of her natural divinity follows her claim that in her native divinity she is as much in her natural element as is a fish in water, a bird in the air, or gold in the refiner's fire.

The poetry reveals the essentialism, the pantheism and the monism residual in her recorded experience. In this passage she boldly proclaims that her nature and that of humanity itself is divine and is to be fulfilled in the intensity of a moment of identity with the divine best imaged through the passion of sexual intercourse. Such affirmation would ground a pantheism that would recognize all of nature and human nature as participating in the divine in a monistic universe wholly made up of its originary power – nature, human nature and the commerce between it and its origin. This said Mechthild nevertheless issues orders to the senses to stand by – she will need them again on her return to deal with the snares of the world – and sallies forth to her tryst with her divine lover in the Godhead where nothing can come between the divine and the soul since the two are by nature one.

There is some evidence in this imagery that Mechthild's experience would take place in something of a trance state if one looks at the cognitive inventory with which medievals worked. In her rejection of virtuous effort so endeared to the senses Mechthild is denying that her experience is one that intellect or will could induce. Her experience is not mindful fantasy though it may be one of imagination

when imagination is conceived as the power that brokers the connection of the world of consciousness with the archetypal unconscious. Moreover her experience is in no way indebted to the senses. By default one must conclude that it occurs in a realm unattainable by mind or will and beyond the sensation. How this state is described remains a question but it would be one in which none of the above cognitive agencies are active though all these powers could contribute to the helpful elaboration of the experience once had much as active imagination might reactivate a dream in the interests of intensifying its meaning. As we shall see the same state is described in variation by other mystics.

In the culminating moments of the rendezvous her lover demands that she must let go of "self", in the context something much akin to the ego and the ego's facilities of knowing and willing and sensation. What is left from such stripping is her divine nature or essence. Thus stripped her divine lover speaks to her in her nakedness, "Thou art by nature already mine" (ibid.: 25). Thus divested what remains in eternity for Mechthild is her experience of her unqualified natural divinity.

> Only that of which thou are sensible by nature
> shalt thou wish to be sensible in Eternity.
>
> (ibid.)

Mechthild is now a "naked soul" engaged in a "two-fold intercourse" which "can never die" (ibid.). The final identity is a compelling description of sexual union as an image of blessed sateity.

> Now comes a blessed stillness
> Welcome to both. He gives Himself to her
> And she to Him,
> What now shall befall her the soul knows:
> Therefore am I comforted.
>
> (ibid.)

Though marriage implies such intimacy what really drives Mechthild's narrative is the more discrete act of lovemaking in contrast to the less explosive life commitment of marriage. At least this is the thrust of the earlier sections of her work prior to her late description of herself as a "housewife" of the Godhead, written in her own seniority (ibid.: 212). In this her account of herself as a bride and lover of a youthful Christ may well point to the brevity and intensity of the mystical moments at their height in her middle years. Such moments though they might appear to be brief in their intensity and limited to the early and middle years of life, yet when experienced, cry out for their re-experience in a fulfillment that can only be ephemeral but never abandoned and always sought again. A contemporary of Mechthild, Hadewijch, speaks constantly of the impact of a love once experienced and now lost but still cherished in its indelible memory. McGinn refers to

this dynamic as *epektasis* where moments of breakthrough into intimacy if not dissolution into the divine are experienced as non-residual but profoundly transformative and never to be forgotten moments of pain and pleasure (McGinn 1998: 38, 157, 220, 265). Mechthild refers to both the passing nature of her immersion in the divine and its lasting impression when she closes her account of her tryst with Jesus with the remark,

> Where two lovers come secretly together
> They must often part, without parting.
>
> (ibid.: 25)

Neither can ever forget what has happened between them and the moment, now gone, of a once upon a time identity without difference remains in memory forever.

At a level deeper than the sequence leading to love satiated and left lies the intimation that even in the love there is intense pain and a certain fulfillment in love's absence itself. Certain of Mechthild's formulations on this side of her experience have tones of sado-masochism. Love as an archetypal force and queen speaks of the pain she inflicts on Mechthild's soul, blows which effect love's subjugation through the wounds inflicted (ibid.: 8).

> Thy wounds have made us one,
> My cunning blows me thine.

Following the reciprocity these lines describe in the very suffering love inflicts Mechthild gains command of love. Apparently forbidden Mass and the Eucharist, God comforts with a presence that cannot be broken (ibid.: 73).

> For we two are fused in one,
> Poured into one mold
> Thus unwearied are we forever.

But immediately after these words of assurance that their mutual fusion is eternal God speaks of the pain in the relationship (ibid.).

> For training costs noble maidens dear,
> They must conquer themselves in all their sufferings,
> And quite often tremble before their disciplinarian.

Fusion with divinity through an ongoing suffering at divinity's hands followed by a distancing are not incompatible in the logic of *epektasis*. This is so because however deeply the soul penetrates the divine it can go further and however deeply the divine penetrates the soul it seeks ever greater ingression. The dance between ego and its depths can never exhaust either.

In this connection McGinn is of the opinion that the theme of sinking into a state of extreme yet "welcome" forsakenness or estrangement is one of the major themes in Mechthild's writing (McGinn 1998: 240–242). This sinking is vividly described at the end of a passage in which she describes the suffering of the Bride of Christ (Mechthild 1953: 108).

> In pride I so easily lost thee –
> But now the more deeply I sink,
> The more sweetly I drink
> Of Thee!

In this and similar passages there could well be the implication of a certain consolation even in the depths through but beyond depression. Jung points out in reference to Eckhart that in "mystic regression" the ego moves to an identity with the unconscious in which it can no longer be distinguished from its origin and in this state he locates a psychic identity with divinity (Jung 1971a: 255). Mechthild's expressions and Jung's understanding of the extremities of regression point to the possibility that even in the depths of depression divinity is operative or, indeed, that the experience of divinity in this modality approaches depression itself. A further consequence of this implication would be that of a bipolar dynamic in the life of the apophatic mystic in which a plunge into the depths of depression alternates with ascension to the highest heights of divinity and, more, that such opposites are never severed so that there remains an incipient joy in depression and a latent depression in joy. The continuity of this dimension of psycho/mystical experience with the *Story of O* has not gone unnoticed in certain commentaries.

A Jungian instance and Mechthild

Jung gives a dramatic account of a marriage between the figure of Christ and a woman in a tale cited by Epiphanius in a collection, the *Panarium*, Epiphanius authored against heresy. In the account Christ accompanies a woman named Mary to a mountain and proceeds to produce a woman from his side with whom he has sexual intercourse. The Christ figure then proclaims that this should be done, "that we may have life" (Jung 1968e: 202–206). Mary's reaction was to fall to the ground in something of a faint. The Christ figure goes on to imply that those who do not understand the mystery of the intercourse they have witnessed are of little faith (John 3: 12). The faith they lack is the understanding of such events as symbolic and psychological. What they have witnessed as descriptions of the interplay between the ego, the anima and the self acted out in a personal event by the Christ figure remains wholly foreign to them. In Jung's interpretation the figure of Christ is first and foremost a self figure but as he continues more is involved in this story. Jung argues the account depicts Christ not only as a self figure but as androgynous. As androgynous the story would implicate both genders. The woman he creates from his side makes of him a second Adam and reveals his

femininity. From this perspective Christ's intercourse with the woman would describe a male's intercourse with the anima from which the unconscious God is born into, in this case male, consciousness.

From the viewpoint of Mary, the female observer, the incident would compensate an overly masculine Christ figure by pointing to his feminine power and his intimacy with her as grounding her in an earthiness not associated with a too spiritual Christ too often depicted as incapable of any intercourse, physical or spiritual. Not only does Jung here relate the story to the femininity of Christ but also Christ's relation to the maternal involved in such intercourse. In some medieval iconography Christ was depicted with breasts. Here the underlying thrust of the symbol is that through the male's intercourse with the inner feminine the unconscious – God – is born into the male's consciousness. The male gives birth to a divine androgynous consciousness through the relation to the natural inner feminine. The male maternity thus understood gives birth to greater realized consciousness in both the human and the divine. In a certain parallel fashion the woman's relation to the feminine side of the male Christ also fosters the birth into consciousness of the unconscious as Father. Addressing Mechthild's experience Jung writes, "Mechthild's vision is a continuation of the sacred myth: the daughter–bride has become a mother and bears the Father in the shape of the Son" (Jung 1968e: 206). To simplify the above, the woman's intercourse with Christ as animus brings about the birth of God in her consciousness as Father. Effectively she gives birth to her Father as the presiding power in her consciousness.

Whether in male or female the birth of God as Christ or Father would implicate the power of the Trinity itself. Jung's interpretation would give new life, extension and depth to the traditional Christian doctrine of the indwelling of the Trinity in the soul. The divine power, the divine form and the unity of the power and form become the prevailing energy of consciousness whose current becomes the flow of unconscious life birthed into conscious human vitality (Jung 1968e: 205–206).

Mechthild later in her writing confirms this interpretation that as bride of Christ she also mothers Christ and the Father in a Spirit-filled mind. Mechthild could say of herself what she attributes to Mary as mother of God.

> Then the Father chose me as bride that He might have something to love, because his noble bride, the soul, was dead [in Adam's fall]. Then the Son chose me as mother and the Holy Spirit received me as friend. Then was I alone the bride of the Holy Trinity.
>
> (Mechthild 1953: 13)

The maternal nature of the mystic birthing God into consciousness is, as Jung here notes, more developed in Meister Eckhart and later mystics (Jung 1968e: 206). But, for Jung, this development marks a millennial change in how the divine/human relationship is imagined. God is no longer understood as a creative power beyond the soul but as a power addressing consciousness from within the soul: "the procreative power no longer proceeds from God, rather is God born from the

soul" (ibid.). In his final remarks Jung refers to the "incestuous" nature of spiritual renewal (Jung 1968e: 206, 207). The process of intercourse with the animus, a divine/human figure in Mechthild's imagery, gives birth to the power of God in consciousness. It can rightly be described as "incestuous" because it is entirely acted out within the psyche. For Jung, then, Mechthild was among the pioneers in a Christian Western environment to make this kind of interiority conscious and to identify the divine/human relationship as one wholly contained within the ego's commerce with the deeper movements of the psyche.

But Mechthild was also a pioneer in surfacing other implications and consequences of her inner love affair. For in her intercourse with Christ and through Christ with the Trinity she implies that divinity needs the human theatre where alone it becomes self-conscious. In another graphic flight of archetypally laced imagination Mechthild recreates the situation within the Trinity prior to its decision to create (Mechthild 1953: 75). She describes the Trinity as "enclosed" in a joyous unity "struck asunder" by the Holy Spirit's challenge to give up its "unfruitful" solitude and to create the angelic and human orders. For the Spirit the joy of the Trinity would be solipsistic, confining if not shared. The Father's response, looking somewhat ahead, is to confess that even if the fall of the angels had not occurred "man had to be created." The Son concurs in the plan of creating the human on his "Pattern". Then the Father completes the agreement to become fruitful in creation through the reciprocity of divine love and human love. In obvious reference to Mechthild he exclaims, "I will make Myself a Bride who shall greet Me with her mouth and wound Me with her glance. Then first will love begin" (ibid.). The Father is hardly disinterested in creation and what He might gain therefrom. Between himself and Mechthild love will first begin. One wonders about the quality of love within Trinitarian life prior to creation on the way to Eckhart's effective denial that there was none. One wonders more about the idea of the creation of the human as a necessity and as completing a need in the Father and Trinity as well as in the human. One wonders also about the human, now an essential element wrapped up in the total process of the divine unfolding beyond itself. In fact Mechthild is here depicting the Trinity's "decision" to create as necessary to it for the completion of itself. Her poetry anticipates the final sentence in Hegel's *Phenomenology* and its description of a divinity which did not create and engage in history as "lifeless, solitary and alone" (Hegel 1967: 808). More in Mechthild's scenario divinity would appear to be vulnerable to the human response which, if negative, could return the three members of the Trinity to the isolation of solely intra-Trinitarian life and so to a diminished love. On the other hand, humanity would meet its deepest need in allowing the divine demand to be loved to inform its consciousness in a love which would complete the human and the divine in the same organically unified cosmological dynamic. This dialectic is at the heart of Mechthild's famous lines, "God has enough of all good things save of intercourse with the soul; of that He can never have enough" (Mechthild 1953: 105). God can never have enough of such intercourse because only in it does God become more fully self-conscious and only in it does the soul

cooperate in the redemption of the divine which can take place only in itself. Neither can the infinity of creativity in God and the unconscious have enough intercourse with humanity, the site of its manifestation and realization. In this Mechthild anticipates Jung in his late *Answer to Job*. Here Jung makes explicit the necessity of creation and the dialectic of the mutual redemption of the divine and human in the human.

The question of orthodoxy

The themes of the divine necessity of creation and the mutual completion of the human and the divine are unquestionably present in Mechthild's work. They foreshadow the philosophical development through Eckhart into Boehme and Hegel and so into their more notable descendants like Marx and twentieth-century forms of process philosophy. They also foreshadow the psychological development through Jung into the realization of divinity in individual and collectivity as the meaning of history now rarely expressed in religions or theological terms. It may take the eyes and distance of later historians looking back at Mechthild to sense these movements in her work. Of even greater import and questionable orthodoxy then and now among her innovations is the strong suggestion that humanity and divinity share the same nature and that the deepest interest of both and of history is to be realized in the birthing of such consciousness in time. When she refers to God as "My Father through nature, My Brother through humanity, My Bridegroom through love" there is no reason to take her at less than face value (ibid.: 24). Effectively she is claiming that her experiential inherence in the flow of Trinitarian life is the natural culmination of her spiritual quest. What was always naturally latent becomes now immediately experienced. More, as she follows her lover into the place of their tryst, the Godhead, she realizes her soul is "fashioned in the very nature of God" (ibid). The lines imply that her native inherence in the Trinitarian dynamic would extend this dynamic to all human nature and to nature itself as Jacob Boehme was to intuit. Earlier Roman and Reformed Christian interpreters of Mechthild did indeed see these passages as bearing both a pantheistic and a certain theosophical import (Tobin 1995: 23, 31, 73).

Nor did such heterodoxy escape her contemporaries. As noted Mechthild reveals that unnamed opponents to the book thought it should be burnt. The reference could be to the Inquisition at whose hands Marguerite Porete, a Beguine to be discussed later, was burned in 1310. Again commentators point to the fear of the Inquisition which haunted especially women mystics (Tobin 1995: 73, 74). Mechthild's response makes of her work a revelation and herself a late evangelist. God has assured her that the work is ultimately his and she is effectively the instrument through which he writes. This is not to deny her gratitude to Heinrich von Halle who edited the first six books of her work. But in the end, asserts Mechthild, the work rests on the authority of God. Psychologically this confidence in the face of criticism is further witness that Mechthild's intercourse with a divine/human animus grounds her consciousness in the self so that she can write

with a confidence based on her experience of a residual underlying identity with God as the basis of her nature and truth.

There is a passage in her work where, for whatever reason, she was unable to attend Mass, which may have been a disciplinary measure since discipline is mentioned in the passage (Mechthild 1953: 72). Whether in relation to this deprivation or not, in another passage again in the absence of physical attendance at Mass she imagines herself attending a High Mass celebrated by St. Peter, St. John the Evangelist, and an unidentified "youth", possibly a figure of Christ. Later in the passage she attends a Low Mass celebrated by John the Baptist and receives communion from him in the form of the Lamb itself who then suckled on her heart (ibid.: 32–35). The passage makes at least two points. There may have been times in her life when she was not allowed to attend Mass and the Office. But in these times the spiritual/psychological reality of the Mass took place in her psyche or soul. In this Mechthild bears out Jung's take on the Mass that it is a ritual based on the death of the ego into the self and of the self into the ego. As such its truth is wholly internal and they truly go to Mass in which this internal process is operative (Jung 1969b: 263–265). Such seems to have been the case when Mechthild could not attend in person. A section in a later passage illustrates how segments of her contemporaries well represented in modernity could not understand the spiritual or symbolic import of her understanding of the Mass or, indeed, of her wider writing. One such witless legalistic critique is that St. John the Baptist could not say Mass or give her communion because he was not a priest. Her point, succinctly put, was that this Pharisee was wholly insensitive to spiritual discourse (Mechthild 1953: 199).

This kind of critique betrays the superficiality of the literal minded, an opaqueness sometimes fortified by humanity's "invincible dread of becoming more conscious of itself" (Jung 1969b: 263). But apparently a much more substantial criticism of the earlier portion of her writing was gaining such currency that Mechthild felt called upon to refute it explicitly (Mechthild 1953: 199). Here she admits to the need for the "supernatural", but, in this context, the supernatural can as easily be read as the need for experiential appropriation of divine truth then expressed in spiritual or symbolic discourse. Such an understanding of the supernatural would refer far less to a relationship to a discontinuous divine realm as to the immediate experience of such a realm as native to the deeper strata of human life. A closely related accusation apparently charged that she had effectively denied the difference between the realms of nature and grace and seemed to be saying that humanity was naturally divine and less in need of grace than in recovering or entering more deeply into a divinity natural to it. She could hardly deny writing that "God is my father by nature" (Mechthild 1953: 194). This would seem to deny the need for grace as an addition or supplement to what is human. She concedes that her opponents are right but she contends that she too is right. She does not simply capitulate to their accusation and, in its face, deny the latent divinity of human nature. She affirms rather that God has "so enfolded the soul in Himself and so poured his own nature into it" that he is "more than a Father"

(ibid.: 195). In some sense God transcends the soul but remains naturally conjoined to the soul as "enfolded" in it. She goes on to agree that the Trinity existed in itself prior to creation and that all creation was contained in it before creation proceeded from it. The very fact she had to address this issue shows that some contemporaries thought she somewhat blurred the distinction between an eternal self-sufficient Trinity and a Trinity related to creation once it rather arbitrarily happened. Her position here is with some difficulty reconciled with her description of a self-enclosed Trinity as "fruitless" and needing to kiss Mechthild for its own fullness of life. One can only say that she writes as much as a poet as a theologian. Even in her late clarification ambiguity remains. But there is no ambiguity in the innovative passion of her early passages where the natural and developing intimacy of the divine and human can hardly be sundered through the more formal theological dichotomies of nature/grace, natural/supernatural and divine/human. In these passages she is naturally as close to God as is the ego to the experience of the archetypally powered numinous within the all encompassing psyche Jung extends to include the universe.

Her mystical intimacy with, if not dissolution in, the divine informed a mysticism that was also prophetic. This unites the role of prophet with the role of mystic and defeats the false dichotomy that would see the mystics as indifferent to the prophet's social concerns. The depths of her experience were the basis not only of her residual experience of the presence of God but also of her outspoken opposition to the distortion or corruption of this presence wherever she saw it. She saw it clearly in the contemporary Church. She places bishops in the "forecourt of hell" (ibid.: 87). She accuses "false priests" of following the wisdom of the senses (ibid.: 100). In her most detailed diatribe against the clergy she attacks the "fallen crown of the priesthood" subject as it is to "evil desires", loss of love, purity and humility, fired by greed, and waging war "upon God and upon His chosen friends" (ibid.: 188). She has God addressing the Pope in these terms: "If anyone is ignorant of the way to Hell, let him look at the depraved priesthood… hastening without let to the nether regions." (ibid.: 189). These remarks bear an eerie relevance to the spiritual state of the contemporary situation in segments of the Roman clergy. Such passages cannot disguise Mechthild's vitriol. Yet even in them she seems to anticipate a youthful movement which will counter the wolfish depredation of the clerical caste of "wolves and murderers" (ibid.: 188–189).

As a Beguine Mechthild would not have enjoyed the protection of the Church and its secular arm afforded to women in convents stamped with ecclesial approval. Referring to the similarity between orthodox and heretical mysticism of the time Robert Lerner writes, "Even if, as is likely, they [heretics] were far more radical than Mechthild, the similarity of many of their tenets with positions she took in her *Flowing Light* suggests that heretical and orthodox mystics were close relatives" (Lerner 1972: 19). In the face of these dangers Mechthild had the power to stand alone and speak her truth because it was a personal revelation whose rootedness in her psyche Jung drew to the attention of the modern world. Indeed his wider psychology strongly suggests that if one cannot write one's own scripture directly out

of the unconscious, preferably through the dream, then one will be subject to others' revelation whose relation to one's unique person, spirituality and myth may remain ambiguous. If one cannot discover one's personal revelation one is likely to fall prey to someone else's. This remains the case even when one's personal revelation is as one critic describes Mechthild's: "erotically daring… but also blasphemy and theologically questionable" (Tobin 1995: 74).

And yet there is an ebb and flow to her radical nature. The most striking formulations in Mechthild's work relate to the earlier section of her writing and of her life. From about 1270 to her death Mechthild entered the Cistercian monastery at Helfta. Age brought a certain moderation combined with a heightened critique of the contemporary spiritual environment to her later writing. In these surroundings Mechthild completed the seventh and final chapter of her work. Aging and partially blind she had God sum up the path of her life and spirit, "Thy childhood was a companion of My Holy Spirit; thy youth was a bride of my humanity, in thine old age thou are a humble housewife of My Godhead" (Mechthild 1953: 212). Though the relationship varies from companion to lover to spouse with the stages in her life, God is always there for her. Jung uses the image of the *opus*, the work, to describe the individuation process as a lifelong, never-ending project. The task of ushering the divine consort into consciousness to whatever degree fulfilled remains unfulfilled in its inexhaustible fecundity and takes on different modalities in the journey of consciousness through time. At whatever age its suasion can neither be denied nor wholly satisfied.

Jung's appropriation of Mechthild's imagery is meaningful for women's spirituality today. In an age when women were without authority in official ecclesial society she based her authority and that of her writing on a personal, unmediated and unique relation with God. She was the bearer of a personal revelation with social implications. Contemporary women in many societies and in many ways continue to be disenfranchised. Their reclaiming their dignity, power and authority could well take on the form it took in Mechthild's life and in Jung's appreciation of her. The ultimate power for change derives from the inner resources of those who would bring it about as a precondition to the impact they have on society. In Mechthild such power resided in her immediately experienced relation to God. With Jung such power lay in his understanding of the ego's support from the animus as the legate mediating the power of the self. In the broader Jungian context the expression and acting out of this immediate relation to God under whatever name derives its imperative and the power to fulfill that imperative from God, again under whatever name. Mechthild's experience of the self would by no means curtail political extension and activity. Rather such experience would become the healthy impetus of political commentary and activity, an impetus which the relatively scanty energies of the ego could never match in depth or power.

Jung was among the first to identify and critique the patriarchal and paternal as major blights of our time (Jung 1969e: 399, 465). For him it described a consciousness in either gender severed from its depths. The recovery of those depths is the first step in the defeat of the patriarchal denial of those depths themselves.

Jung appreciated Mechthild because she lived out of those depths as the source of prophetic witness against societal and religious pathologies in her culture. The contemporary woman could well do the same especially when Jung identifies the relation of the ego to Christ functioning as a woman's animus as her lived relation to the most supportive and creative psychological energy endemic to the feminine psyche. As a Christian Mechthild rested her power on her marriage to Christ as engendering the birth of the self in her consciousness. The religious nomenclature can be dropped and its psychological truth remains. The power of the supportive animus and the divinity of the self remain constants in humanity. Standing alone is not solipsism. Individuation can for a period entail a solitude but only in the interests of a building energy never without social import.

Frank Tobin in his near exhaustive review of the academic response to Mechthild presents his review as seeking to find out who Mechthild was, who she thought she was and what kind of book she authored (Tobin 1995: ix). Tobin is keenly aware that mysticism is based on personal experience intersecting with the moment of the historical tradition in which the mystic stands (Tobin 1995: ix, x). In the end he concludes that the greatest contribution to the academic study of Mechthild will come from an historically grounded feminist perspective. "Indeed, if one might be allowed a prediction, one might venture to say that mature feminist analyses, coupled with broader exploration of historical context, show the most promise" (Tobin 1995: 138). However, the underlying argument of this work is that it was not only to Mechthild's vital interior life that Jung was drawn but also to her experience of a fusion of her being with the being of divinity in a moment of nothingness beyond difference. This is the apophatic experience. Mechthild presents this moment as one of sated sexual love: "a blessed stillness welcome to both. He gives himself to her and she to Him" (Mechthild 1953: 25). One might doubt that this image conveys a total loss of mutual identity in an oblivion beyond both lovers. Two of Mechthild's fellow Beguines and contemporaries not mentioned in Jung's work leave little doubt that this stillness entails a moment of mutual self loss in a fusion beyond differentiation. A Jungian methodology depends on the variants of archetypal expression to gain a fuller understanding of the archetypal energies they express. Amplifying Mechthild through two contemporary Beguines employs such a methodology.

Hadewijch of Antwerp

Hadewijch of Antwerp's dates as well as the details of her life remain obscure. Scholarly opinion places Hadewijch in the first half of the thirteenth century. Her familiarity with the French poetry of courtly love and the centrality of *minne* in her work suggest someone with a higher degree of education. Her literary corpus is made up of four components: poetry in couplets and stanzas, letters written to a Beguine likely under her charge with whom she was deeply concerned, and, of special interest to Jungians, some 14 visions filled with archetypal religious imagery (McGinn 1998: 200; Hart 1980: 2–5). Little more is known of her life.

She dates her sixth vision to her nineteenth year (Hadewijch 1980: 278). In her eleventh letter she writes that her passionate love of God beyond the power of her humanity to sustain without divine assistance began at age ten (ibid.: 69). There is further evidence that she joined a Beguinage and may have risen to a position of authority in it. In this role difficulties may have arisen within the community leading to her exile from it for a life of wandering (McGinn 1998: 200; Hart 1980: 4, 5). Speculation that she died awaiting execution for heresy is largely dismissed on the grounds there is no historical evidence for any ecclesial process taken against her (Hart 1980: 22). No biography, if ever written, has survived. Her work was not widely known or distributed in her time though it apparently influenced John Ruusbroec later in the fourteenth century (McGinn 1998: 200). Her literary corpus was recovered for modernity in the Royal Library of Brussels only in 1838 (Hart 1980: 1). Nevertheless a life now sparse in historical detail served as one of the most dramatic expressions of bridal and apophatic mysticism the medieval period had ever seen.

In her seventh vision she makes it dramatically clear that unity with a mature Christ figure leads to a state of unqualified identity beyond all form of individuality. So powerful was the experience it removed her from conscious life for some time. Throughout her work, the moment of identity is the culmination of her spiritual life and consequent removal from it is the source of her immense suffering of so great a loss. Before addressing the defining seventh vision in more textual detail a look at foundational themes in her work demonstrate her affinity in variations distinctly her own with Mechthild in her own century and with Marguerite Porete in the next. A related and leading theme is the experience of a residual though fluctuating identity with God in the power of *minne*, a love that permeates individual and creation. This universal power becomes a residing presence in the mind of its possessor torn between the ecstasy of identity and the agony of its loss. The initiatory unqualified identity with her divine lover cedes to a prolonged sense of his absence, abandonment, and even of the lover's deliberate cruelty to her (Hadewijch 1980: 48). The dialectic of the experience of an identity with a divinity now gone and longed for is at the heart of her own form of *epektasis*. Referring to the cruelty of a love wantonly withdrawn she exclaims, "that suffering has become sweet to me for the sake of his love. But he has been more cruel to me than any devil ever was" (ibid.: 48). Such sweet suffering surpasses all reason and engages the irrational in startling forms of affective outburst ranging from semi-masochistic appreciation of suffering undergone as described above to states of "unfaith" or apparent indifference to the relationship in a passive exhaustion induced by the volatility of the relationship itself. But in the absence of love in this "unfaith" is the sole state in which love cannot flee (Hadewijch 1980: 301). Like Mechthild, Hadewijch speaks of the paradox that in the devastation of love's absence love is most present. Indeed one commentator raises the possibility of a "more or less perverse propensity for pain" (Mommaers 1980: xxi). Such suspicions might well be raised in her reference to the "repeated blows" she suffers for love "under the lash", even though "all her [love's] blows are good" and

"the deeper wounded, the easier cured" (ibid.: 160, 173, 205). What counters the masochistic tone of these typical expressions is the intensity of the enjoyment or "fruition" of her moment of total fusion with her beloved. The expressions of prolonged pain in its aftermath point only to the ephemeral fulfillment of total self loss in the divine abyss. Without moments of insuperable joy the subsequent suffering is unintelligible though joyous in the memory of what has transpired. A more moderate impulse in her writings cautions that Hadewijch's moments of dissolution in the source of the all must return to the aftermath of suffering its loss in the mundane concerns of everyday life. No doubt this is true but immersion in the mundane is for her forever qualified by the suffering induced by the residue of identity lost (Mommaers 1980: xxi–xxiii).

The tension, if not torture, between a moment of identity and its loss are nowhere more evident than in the opening words of the seventh vision: "My heart and my veins and all my limbs trembled and quivered with eager desire… such madness and fear beset my mind… so that dying I must go mad, and going mad I must die" (ibid.: 280). Such self-confessed proximity to madness was closely tied to her understanding of fruition. Fruition, in this context, is almost a technical, or, at least, a precise term. It refers in mystical language to the enjoyment and sense of completion lovers confer on each other. At times Hadewijch describes fruition as attained in her intimacy with the figure of Christ (ibid.: 278, 279). In other imagery such fruition culminates beyond the Christ relation in an identity with a power figured as "the Countenance" and an even deeper power described as the "abyss", the source of all and, though divine, native to all, into which she enters and with which she is identified (ibid.: 279, 342). In her poetry she describes the intimacy of identity in stirring lines:

> And that kiss will be with one single mouth,
> And that fathoming will be of one single abyss,
> And with a single gaze will be the vision of all
> That is, and was, and shall be.
>
> (ibid.: 342)

Eckhart will write that God and the individual see each other out of the same eye. Hadewijch's version is that they kiss with the same lips. Marguerite and Jung will refer to the link between being nothing and being all. Hadewijch's version is that identity with the divine leads to identity with or the vision of the all because in that situation she fully identifies with the divine as the source of all.

It can be manipulative and confining of pristine experience to impose on it too rational a theological overlay. Nevertheless, in these not uncommon passages Hadewijch describes an immersion in a living agency preceding all form or definition and from which all form proceeds. The depth of this ingression takes her beyond the power of reason or intellect to realms inaccessible to both. In striking this theme Hadewijch launches a critique of the power of reason greatly intensified in Marguerite. In her ninth vision "Queen Reason" comes to her clad in a

dress of one thousand eyes and accompanied by three maidens. It turns out that the dress belongs to Hadewijch and the maidens are her own virtues. When she acknowledges reason and the virtues that are hers she seems then to dismiss both for love. "Then reason became subject to me, and I left her" (ibid.: 286). Just as Mechthild leaves the senses yet will need them on her return, so also does Hadewijch leave reason and the virtues and enter naked into the depths at once hers and divinity's. The vision is hardly an attack on reason but a strong statement that her journey inward outstrips the power of reason which could be an obstacle as long as she remains in its dictatorial and confining service.

The point is made again in the eighth vision. A psychopomp or mercurial figure whom she terms "the champion" can take her through four levels of movement into God but cannot take her up to the fifth because he "had too little love with affection and followed the strict counsel of the intellect" (ibid.: 284). Only the fire of love the champion lacked could lead him to this final unity. Though Augustine was one of her favourite saints even he lacked the fruition of the abyss, that immersion in God which was the basis of her freedom and suffering (ibid.: 290, 291). Hadewijch's experience here is no doubt medieval but carries significant import for the modern especially in healing of the blight of contemporary patriarchal consciousness. When the total cognitive capacity of the human is reduced to the intellect and to certain of its functions such as science and technology, the resultant truncation of the more total human uproots the mind from its own depths and so from the quality and sensitivity of spirit characteristic of Hadewijch's mystical consciousness itself. The depths of human experience are closed over. Jung's entire psychology and certainly its more senior statements are a sustained effort to reconnect the contemporary mind with the source of its own being and the life from which the idolatry of intellect and reason has severed it. Jung was able to identify and oppose the patriarchal by name before it was identified as a leading form of current social pathology. Rewriting the mystical journey in psychological terms is an attack on the patriarchal reduction of humanity to mind and intellect. In so doing liberating mystical experience from confessional containment and locating it in depths common to all of humanity might yet prove to be among Jung's greater contributions to his age in its move beyond patriarchal pathology.

For Hadewijch can well be read from a Jungian perspective as using sexual imagery to describe a relation with the figure of Christ which takes her beyond Christ into an identity with the Father and/or the Godhead which precedes him. This procession beyond form of any kind to the source of all form would best be described psychologically as immersion in the Mother. The transition to the Father is evidence of the perhaps needed patriarchal stage now seeking its own supersession at the insistence of the religious instinct itself. This process for Jung takes on the force of intercourse between egoic reason and its own sacred depths which reason as such cannot intellectually or volitionally manipulate nor force to consciousness. In a religious idiom Hadewijch is explicit that through her affair with Christ she is taken into the Trinity itself, but more into an identity with the origin of the Trinity in the Father or Godhead however described (ibid.: 84). Nothing

could be more simple than the statement, "In this state one is the Father" (ibid.: 118). Though led to this state through the imagery of bodily intimacy with an adult Christ figure her identity with the Father would take her beyond consciousness even as expressed eternally in the Logos as the second and so conscious moment in the life of the Trinity. The Godhead or Father would then be that dimension of psyche which precedes even the archetypal as the originary power of all imagery, form and word. It is with this dimension of psyche beyond all imagery and form that the human mind remains continuous in existence even as it seeks a return to this imageless source of all imagery. As we have seen Mechthild uses the term "flowing" to describe her inherence in the flow of Trinitarian life. Hadewijch also uses the term but in a strange manner. She understands the experience of entry into the Trinity through Christ and into the Father or Godhead beyond Christ as being immersed in the flow of the Trinity itself and so being flowed through. The idea is that she enters into the rhythm of Trinitarian life itself which flows through her and she through it. The key text describing her experience reads, "so as to have been flowed through by the whole Godhead, and to have become totally one, flowing back through the Godhead itself" (ibid.: 303). When this flow becomes the basic pulse of life, such identity with the divine can hardly be surpassed. Psychologically it would describe the flow of a numinous libido through a consciousness caught up in it, a type of vital transparency to the movement of the formless through the mind and form and back to the formless in a never ending cycle. If *minne* is akin to *esse* the love thus described would be as permanent and dynamic as one's existence.

It is from this most remote dimension of psyche and divinity that Hadewijch hears the voice of the abyss which precedes expression and gives to the latter whatever power it has: "and there spoke to me a Voice of loud thunder with a noise like stormdrifts, which would silence everything so that it alone could be heard" (ibid.: 305). The voice seems to come from a power beyond her identity with the "Countenance" with whom she is in this scenario identical. The nothingness of the abyss can therefore speak. Its speech is overwhelming and yet in some sense remains the sound of silence. The power which precedes the archetypal can speak through the archetypal and nowhere more intensely than in the form of the archetypal dream or vision. But all such "speech" is from the unspoken which gives rise to it.

And yet the nothingness of this abyss in which she is content to dwell permanently were it possible is at the same time fulfilling yet stark, beyond opposites and divested of ordinary emotive affect (ibid.: 205). This is the state most closely related to "unfaith". In its emptiness love is trapped. "But the noise of the highest unfaith is the most delightful voice of Love; in this she [love] can no longer keep herself at a distance and depart" (ibid.: 301). Such divestiture is the most enduring form of love because it cannot be lost. It would seem to lie beyond the vagaries and rigors of a love which could wax and wane. The state of identity with the lover is marked by an indifference to the ebb and flow of a preliminary and differentiated relation. In this love beyond love, love never departs. Such paradoxical sentiment may recur in Eckhart and in the condemned proposition that the soul

lives beyond concern for reward or punishment, heaven or hell, when it lives in love at this depth (McGinn 1981: 78). As with Mechthild and again, as we shall see, with Marguerite Porete, so with Hadewijch such a state lies beyond the senses, intellect/reason and, in one telling passage, beyond the need for a life of active virtue. It describes a state of identity with a dimension of divinity that rests in itself and in so doing needs no active expression. Writes Hadewijch:

> Fail not with regard to a multitude of things.
> But perform no particular work.
>
> (ibid.: 82)

This position is not an attack on virtue. It is a statement that rest in the abyss is not a consequence or an effect of virtue as its cause. In Mechthild's moment of consummation she strips herself of her virtues and enters into the presence of her lover naked. In Hadewijch's imagery she enters the city of God accompanied by the demands of virtue and the fruition of God anticipating her being swallowed in the divine abyss. The scene unfolds as follows: "So in the company she came into the city led between Fruition of Love and Command of the Virtues; Command accompanied her there, but Fruition met her there" (ibid.: 296). Again the point is that the demands of the virtuous life drop away as Hadewijch enters into dissolution in the divine in a completion beyond their ability to bring about as more than a required prelude to such culmination. In the end, like Mechthild, she enters naked into the depths of the divine. The ego can strive mightily within its capacity but the self and its revelation, especially in the power of the dream, come as grace from a power beyond egoic manipulation or attainment.

In this experience Hadewijch anticipates Eckhart in his understanding of the passivity attaching to the Godhead and to immersion of the human in it. This moment is without intellectual or volitional impulse and is divested of love understood as an emotional reward especially if gained in repayment for virtuous activity. Indeed its stringency can be compared to a season in hell. Only those who have experienced this moment can understand:

> Why it is truly appropriate
> That hell should be the highest name of love.
>
> (ibid.: 357)

And yet this love, hellish though it be, once experienced brings only anguish in its absence. This is the suffering side of *minne*. It is obviously an experience so intense that it is at once spiritually ineradicable and fleeting. It cannot be possessed and must be surrendered to the demands of a return to worldly concerns now haunted and sustained by its memory.

Hadewijch's passions in her experience of divine intimacy are the stuff that her poetry and visions are made of. Yet it would falsify the substance of her writing to assume that poetic and visionary modes of expression are divested of mystical and

philosophical innovation and substance. Her understanding of *minne* implies a truly universal presence of divine love pervading all that is within and beyond the mind in a kind of mystical cosmic pantheism (McGinn 1998: 202). Such a sense of a natural divine universalism is not foreign to mystical experience itself but takes on a specific modality in Hadewijch's experience. She is innovative in that her experience points to the pre-existence of the soul in eternity. It engages what McGinn describes as a form of Christian Platonic exemplarism in which the individual participates naturally and experientially within time in one's divinely grounded exemplar in eternity (ibid.: 211–222). In this Hadewijch anticipates such Platonic modern theologians as Paul Tillich who would locate the essence of the individual existent in the primordial expression of all things in the Logos and so understand religion itself to be based on the recovery of this essential truth as the meaning of personal and collective existence (Dourley 2008: 25–37). Tillich will even depict moments of such recovery as those of the essential self shining through the distortions of existential life (Tillich 1963: 235). In this Platonic context, spiritual and psychological maturity come into coincidence. The telos of both is then to recover as a finite human in time, space and history one's native, eternal and essential truth as the ultimate meaning of one's life and contribution to history's advancement. Such a perspective unites naturally the divine and the human, eternity and time, and urges their conscious unity as the substance of the spiritual development of the individual in existence.

Hadewijch brings out the natural movement of the individual to the recovery of one's personal eternal truth in time in the fourth of her visions dealing with two kingdoms. The first kingdom is effectively the kingdom of her ideal self as it exists in identity with the being and power of Christ before whom the cosmos stood still and simply said, "Amen" (Hadewijch 1980: 274). The unity of the person with their divine exemplar engages the totality of what is because the exemplar rests in the source not only of the individual but of the cosmos itself. Hadewijch then plays off the ideal self against the existential self living in participation with its ideal and moving toward its ever greater realization throughout her earthly spiritual life which will end, paradoxically, in living a darkness beyond the need for her divine lover (ibid.: 275). What Hadewijch's experience cast in the idiom of two kingdoms culminates in the passing moment or moments when her ideal and real or earthly lives unite without difference and provide a memory of this union past or lost as the basis of her ongoing longing and anguish.

These themes are not unlike the exemplar causality evident in Jung's understanding of archetypal influence on consciousness, especially that of the self. Jung too will refer to the self as possessed of "an 'incorruptible' or 'eternal' character on account of its being pre-existent to consciousness" (Jung 1969b: 265). In a similar passage he will refer to the self as pre-existent to birth, "The self as such is timeless and existed before any birth" (Jung 1966b: 184). In this sense the pre-existent self sponsors an "apocatastasis" or gathering together of the total psyche throughout the psyche's movement through time. Effectively this movement to completion is Jung's psychological replay or appropriation of the pre-existence of the individual

which the Christian Platonic tradition lodges in the Logos as the expression and primordial definition of the preceding immensity of divine creativity, that of the Father in Christian parlance, and of the Mother in Jung's. As suggested such pre-existence is the "essential self" Tillich understands to engage existential consciousness participating in it, but alienated from it and driven by the alienation itself to its recovery as the work of a lifetime. Jung refers to this same power, citing Simon Magus, as "an incorruptible essence potentially present in every human being" and, with Simon, equates it with the "divine *pneuma*" with which the individual is potentially identical but which at the same time precedes the individual and to whose fuller appropriation the individual tends in existential life (Jung 1969b: 236, 237). The union of the finite individual with the pre-existing and eternal self becomes, then, "the transformation of the vital spirit in man into the Divine. The natural being becomes the divine *pneuma*" (ibid.: 237). The realization of the self in consciousness, individuation, is thus a process of divinization.

Jung concedes that human experience of divinity and immortality defy purely intellectual affirmation or denial but as an "*experience of feeling*" defies denial. The feeling of the self's pre-existence attaches, in Jung's experience, to the symbols of the self as they appear spontaneously and bring with them "the timelessness of the unconscious which expresses itself in a feeling of eternity or immortality" (Jung 1966b: 312, 313). He repeats, "the experience of the self is nearly always connected with the feeling of timelessness, 'eternity' or immortality" (Jung 1976a: 694). Jung further affirms that the experience of totality the self thus engenders reaches the height of its expression in the *unio mystica*, an experience common to Western mystics and Eastern religious experience (Jung 1966b: 314). No doubt such experience of the unity of time and eternity, of the human and the divine, is part of the unforgettable attractiveness of such experience which, with Mechthild and Hadewijch, then turns to a sense of profound loss in its absence and yearning for its recurrence. But for a moment they experienced an identity with the abyss, the ground and the nothing whose intensity transformed their lives even in its consequent absence. Their Christian description of the experience correlates well with the above mentioned aspects of Jung's description of the heightened experience of the self though the psychological description frees the event from its Christian variant and opens it up to a natural and universal experience in whatever variant, religious or non religious, it might take. As such it transcends confessional confines and becomes accessible to human nature itself.

Hadewijch's description of her immersion in the divine to the point of identity is unsurpassed in the seventh of her visions. She describes her state of mind entering the vision as one "of madness and fear" that she and her lover would fail to satisfy each other so that, "dying I must go mad, and going mad I must die" (Hadewijch 1980: 280). Her psychological turbulence extended to the body, even to her "limbs" and "veins". Only those, she claims, who have experienced such love could understand her suffering. She offers her lover her perfection and demands of him entrance into his Godhead so that she would "be God with God" (ibid.: 280).

There follows then the vision. An eagle comes from the altar and commands her to prepare herself for "oneness". The eagle may be the bird of the fourth gospel but in this interchange is also a psychopomp, a mercurial power connecting her with the source of the oneness and it with her. And as is always the case in the interplay between ego and self the former must bow to the initiative and incessant urgency of the latter, "*the experience of the self is always a defeat for the ego*" (Jung 1970: 546). In his understanding of the self's priority in relation to the ego Jung provides Christianity with the psychological basis for its doctrine of grace in all its forms and to all forms of religion giving a priority to a transcendent divinity in its commerce with humanity. No doubt the ego must respond to the address but a power greater than the ego initiates the address and through the ego's cooperation brings the ongoing address to whatever degree of realization it attains. Hadewijch acknowledges this commerce when she confesses that the attainment of such unity was beyond her power. In response the eagle turns to the source of the oneness and asks it to make Hadewijch one with it before turning to Hadewijch and assuring her of the coming of the much longed for unity.

But the unity is worked through interesting forms of divine shape-shifting. First the figure of Christ appears as a three year old and offers to Hadewijch his body and blood in sacramental form. Little is said about this initial appearance. Could it imply that in terms of what was to follow, such ritualistic, sacramental intercourse with divinity is preliminary and somewhat infantile? For immediately the infant figure returns as a strikingly attractive mature man of the age when "he gave us his body for the first time." More, he returns "as humbly as anyone who wholly belongs to another" (Hadewijch 1980: 281). Again he gives Hadewijch himself in the "outward" sacramental form of bread and wine. But at this point the sacramental moves from an external rite to something much more engaging. "After that he came himself to me, took me entirely in his arms and pressed me to him: and all my members felt his in full felicity, in accordance with the desire of my heart and my humanity" (ibid.: 281). But this intimacy was then to cede to an even greater one. Hadewijch could not hold the distance that separates lovers at the height of their union. The othering was lost both externally and internally. In Hadewijch's words, "I saw him completely come to nought and so fade and all at once dissolve that I could no longer recognize or perceive him outside me, and I could no longer distinguish him within me" (ibid.: 281). There then follows a line that so succinctly captures the core and essence of the apophatic experience: "Then it was as if we were one without difference." She goes on to describe this moment as a "passing away of the one in the other", a state in which "nothing remained to me of myself." And yet she remarks that the nothingness itself showed much to her, probably referring not so much to objective knowledge but to the distillate the experience left in her self-awareness upon return to the more mundane world (ibid.: 281, 282). These concluding remarks would indicate that she may have been in this state she calls an "hour" or "hours" for a discrete period of time but that upon her return from these occasions she carried their spiritual and psychological residue back into her daily life and much more everyday consciousness.

The psycho/spiritual implication once again is starkly evident. The penetration of that which precedes symbol and image is the culmination of human maturation wholly beyond consciousness and beyond even the unconscious as generator of symbolic imagery and rational word.

Hadewijch, like Mechthild, claims also to be both bride and mother of God in her moving through sexual intercourse with a male divinity to a further state of unqualified identity with a divine power beyond all differences. A divine voice proclaims to her, "Behold, Bride and Mother, you like no other have been able to live me as God and Man!" (ibid.: 288). Psychologically what lies behind this tribute? Again it is clear that Hadewijch is the bride of God because she is the lover of the unmistakably male Christ. In this her experience is but a greatly clarifying variant of Mechthild's. But why then mother? Here the radical side of her experience surfaces psychologically and theologically. She is worthy of the title of mother of God because her experience of the divine abyss brings God to birth in her humanity and in her consciousness. Hence she can speak of "an Infant being born in the souls who love in secret, the souls hidden from their own eyes in the abyss of which I speak" (ibid.: 289). Here even as they are lost in the abyss the reality of God is born in them and by extension brought to consciousness in those who return from these depths. Though she does not draw out the conclusion as her visionary successors do, she does imply that in her role of mother of God she completes God by bringing God to a fuller consciousness in her humanity and that God rejoices in her doing so. As we shall see this insight grows clearer as the mystical impulse moves through Eckhart and into Jacob Boehme and Hegel.

And yet such precious experience and the suffering sensitivities it engenders seems always to activate the opposition of those who oppose such immediately available and universal depth in the name of a more ordered superficiality. Hadewijch describes these forces as "aliens". She intimates that they may have been the more pious but shallow members of the Christian community. She writes of the resistance to those who undergo her experiences, "For Godly men doubt them, their neighbors wonder, and a few hate them" (ibid.: 283). She identifies them as "cruel", as driving "noble souls" from their goal (ibid.: 139, 159, 186, 195). "Alien rustics" will never experience the unity of the all with the all (ibid.: 175). Wherever found and whoever they were, the "aliens" would share this in common: the depth of her experience remained alien to them and by extension threatening. In effect she is attacking the impenetrable insensitivity, human and religious, characteristic of her society and ours, where her experience is discounted in a collectivity living away from or severed from its anchoring in these depths. These would be the people living in "the Spirit of the times" severed from the "Spirit of the depths" whose reconnection Jung so dearly sought in himself and his society (Jung 2009: 229). Unlike Mechthild, Hadewijch does not criticize the church directly, though she puts on her list of the perfect a Beguine executed by Robert Le Bougre, the inquisitor in northern France and Flanders from 1235 to 1245 (McGinn 1998: 221). To place a heretic in her list of the perfect would be a

daring thing to do in her situation though apparently it elicited no official approbation beyond the difficulties she may have endured personally in her community.

Marguerite Porete

Unfortunately Marguerite Porete enjoyed no such outcome. The third Beguine herald of the nothing was executed in Paris on June 1, 1310, after her trial for heresy. An impressive history led up to her execution. Her birthplace remains unknown but was certainly in the region of northern France and possibly Hainault.

Her single work, *The Mirror of Simple Souls,* was condemned some time between 1296 and 1306 and burned in her presence at Valenciennes by the Bishop of Cambrai, Guy II (Lerner 1972: 71–78; McGinn 1998: 244–245). She was also warned not to disseminate her ideas or book under pain of being handed over to the secular arm, which would mean death for heresy. Between 1306 and 1308 she was again brought before the Bishop of Cambrai, now Philip of Marigny, because she had sent her book to Bishop John of Chalons-sur-Marne and to other Beguines and Beghards (Lerner 1972: 71). Her judges remanded her to the Dominican Inquisitor of Paris, William (Humbert of Paris) with whom Eckhart was to reside after her execution during his second teaching term at Paris, 1311–1312. William was engaged in the case of the Templars and their condemnation and so Marguerite languished in prison for some time (Babinsky 1993: 21). During this period and throughout her trial Marguerite refused to cooperate with the trial, to appear at its sessions, or to take the vow required of her to participate. In fact she said nothing in the interests of her defence (Lerner 1972: 71; Babinsky 1993: 21). Perhaps her silence was indeed due to a willful resistance as her judges took it. More likely it was due to her awareness that she was speaking to a wall of Hadewijch's "aliens" whose religious obtuseness was beyond penetration by her experience.

At one point Marguerite submitted her book to three theologians of whom two are unknown. All three refused to condemn the work. The third reader, Godfrey of Fontaine, was a well-known doctor of scholastic philosophy and theology at the University of Paris whose works endure to this day (Lerner 1972: 72; Babinsky 1993: 22, 23). His opinion was that the work was not heretical but so stringent in its demands that it lay beyond the spiritual capacities of most and could serve to undermine what was spiritually more realistically attainable. Nevertheless he conceded that the book describes what is "alone divine practice" (Porete 1993: 221, 222).

In 1310, in the face of her silent resistance, William extracted a list of 15 articles from her work and submitted them to 21 theologians at the University of Paris (Babinsky 1993: 23). On April 11 they unanimously decreed that the articles were heretical. On May 9 they noted her refusal to respond to the Inquisitor or to take the vow the Inquisition demanded and her continued pursuance of her book after such pursuit was earlier forbidden at Cambrai. On these grounds they declared her a lapsed heretic. As such she was handed over to the Provost of Paris, sentenced on May 31 and executed on June 1 (Babinsky 1993: 23, 24; Lerner 1972; 71, 72). The circumstances of her trial were complicated by the contemporary

politics of King Philip the Fair and his persecution of the Templars. What his motives were is hard to determine. As a defender of the faith in France he might sincerely have believed in the extirpation of heresy and taken certain of Marguerite's critical remarks about authority to have been directed at his rule (Lerner 1972: 77; Babinsky 1993: 19, 20; McGinn 1998: 246). The king may also have had an eye on Templar wealth. As well, he might have wanted effectively to unite royal and religious power in France in himself and so usurp papal power to the crown under the guise of attacking heresy, while bowing to Rome in doing so. Yet another cloud hangs over the whole proceeding. Philip may have entered into a "political deal" with those opposed to the Beguines, especially the new mendicant orders, to have her executed as the price of their allegiance to his pretensions of uniting the French crown and Church under his power (Babinsky 1993: 24). "Marguerite was put to death because she was a symbol of a threat, real or perceived, to the established order intimately connected with the strengthening of royal power" (Babinsky 1993: 25). The strength of the self affirmed even by an individual can be politically coercive to the existing order, an order the self sees through and beyond. Though her book was burnt with her that fateful day in June 1310, it survived throughout the following centuries and epochs though not identified with Marguerite as its author. The reconnection was made in 1946 by Romana Guarnieri, who was working with Latin texts in the Vatican library (McGinn 1998: 436; Lerner 1972: 73). Ironically a text viewed as a legitimate expression of mystical spirituality for six centuries in the end reclaimed its heretical authorship. The friction between the institutional church and mystical experience ended Marguerite's life in tragedy in 1310 but last to this day (McGinn 1988: 244, 245).

In the context of this work what is important is the psychology of Marguerite's experience and its relation to Jung's understanding of the psyche. Marguerite's work rests on a developmental process culminating in the "annihilated soul". In this state of annihilation she proclaims that only as nothing does she become the all. "Now this Soul has fallen from love into nothingness, and without such nothingness she cannot be All" (Porete 1993: 129, 193). It is surprising then to read an almost identical sentiment in Jung referenced to Faust, Part 2, Act 1 and proposed as the basis of an authentic modern consciousness and spirituality. In context Jung is making the point that the truly modern is a solitary figure who cannot go home again to a collective unconsciousness akin to the tribal *participation mystique* in which most of humanity still lives. Jung is probably referring to Western religious traditions whose efficacy is now lost and beyond retrieval as conveyors of spiritual life to their devotees. Jung then presents his view of an authentic, if not solely authentic, contemporary spirituality. "Indeed, he is completely modern only when he has come to the very edge of the world, leaving behind him all that has been discarded and outgrown, and acknowledging that he stands before the Nothing out of which the All may grow" (Jung 1964b: 75). There simply is no going home for contemporary spirituality. Those who do not know their spiritual history as the precedent to escaping it are for Jung "uprooted wraiths, bloodsucking ghosts"

who demean the solitary standing alone before the Nothing as did Socrates and Jesus (ibid.: 76). The use of the preposition "before" implies a power outside the psyche as if consciousness perceived the nothing as other and wholly beyond the psyche. But for Jung the nothingness is not beyond but is the depth of the psyche itself.

A second point of Marguerite's relevance to Jung is the now emerging realization that she had an influence on Eckhart who very likely knew her work and who in turn Jung uses in one of his more compelling descriptions of the process of individuation which itself implicates a moment of the ego's dissolution in and so identity with the divine as the origin of the all (Lichtmann 1994: 65–86). To deal with these points pertinent to the discussion it is necessary to follow Marguerite in her path to the Nothing.

In a sense this is not difficult to do since she clearly identifies seven steps in her journey to nothingness (Porete 1993: 189–194). The first four are rather traditional. The transition from the fourth to the fifth and sixth crosses the boundary to a total dissolution of her ego and its faculties in an abyss where differences between herself and the divine are simply dissolved. The first stage describes the death of sin and a life lived in accord with the commandments. The second moves on to the observance of the evangelical counsels beyond the commandments. This stage works the death of nature. Marguerite will refer to those who fail to move beyond these levels of virtue as "lost" because they remain wholly unaware of a deeper ingression into the divine life beyond their meager activity however impressive it might appear (ibid.: 130). For Marguerite they are "one-eyed", of greatly restricted vision (Porete 1993: 132). Though widely respected as spiritual "kings" they are mere "servants" in bondage to their virtues and virtuous activity. Another related category of truncated development are the "sad" because they suspect that there is more to the spiritual life than the acquisition of virtue and virtuous activity. The "lost" have no inkling as do the "sad" that there is more from which they are currently removed. One of the constituencies for which the book was written might well be the sad now taught that there is so much more from whose remove they suffer their current sterility. Kant was not the first to realize fully the disconnect between virtue attained and happiness experienced. With Marguerite virtue was not its own reward. The reward was well beyond a pay-off for virtuous living. Psychologically the correlation of traditional understandings of virtue with psychological depression is becoming more manifest especially in religious communities dedicated to a "one-eyed" perfection. Marguerite's experience could lessen the connection between perfection in virtue and depression.

The third stage is complex. It entails a presumably preliminary enthusiasm for the doing of good works, an enthusiasm destined to undergo a death in the interest of a total loss of personal will to a consequent alignment or identity with a deeper divine will. The third stage works a death even of the spirit, that is, of the will to do works in favour of submission to a yet higher and single will now wholly possessing the individual. In the fourth stage the stripping of the third leads the soul

to relinquish virtuous activity and external obedience in favour of the delights of meditation and contemplation. At this stage the loss of concern for virtue comes to be equated with the loss of something cumbersome. The soul moves to becoming an unencumbered soul, that is, unencumbered by the willfulness of the virtuous life. But even such sweetness is deceptive because it too can intoxicate and so annul the sense that there is something more. Liberation from leading a willful virtuous life is analogous to Jung's description of the relation of the ego to self. The ego must invest heavily in cultivating the relationship but in the end its virtuous effort goes beyond egoic willfulness as the transformative power of the self works the abiding transformation.

The fifth stage is the real turning point. In it the soul moves into what Marguerite terms "fine love". In her use the phrase takes on a very sophisticated meaning religiously and psychologically. For it refers to the "love" proper to the annihilated soul. The annihilated soul is the soul that has been dissolved in the nothingness of the divine abyss so that it has freely been divested of its will in its identity with the divine will. Effectively the distinction between divine and human will is aborted. In this nothingness Marguerite is the all because this nothingness is the abyss from which the all derives and she is no longer distanced from it. Anticipating Eckhart she can describe this state as "where she was before she was" (ibid.: 218). In this sentiment she is continuous with Hadewijch and precedes Eckhart in her recovery of a state of identity with God preceding her distancing from God into creation. Her experience here implicates the foundational dialectic of the relation of the immanent to the transcendent and the emotional fallout to her experience of it. As Nothing she describes her relation to the divine as to "Farnearness" (ibid.: 135). In this creative nomenclature Marguerite expresses the very modern theological conviction found in nineteenth-century romantic philosophy and theology that the immanence of the divine within the individual is the basis of the individual's sense of divinity as transcendent. Marguerite is among the first to realize in the abyss of her nothingness that she is identical with the God who transcends her infinitely. Jung himself writes such a conviction into his own understanding of the psyche. "That is to say, even the enlightened person remains what he is, and is never more than his own limited ego before the One who dwells within him, whose form has no knowable boundaries, who encompasses him on all sides, fathomless as the abysms of the earth and vast as the sky." (Jung 1969e: 470). The operative phrase in this passage is "before the One who dwells within". Should the vital connection from the ego to the One within be severed or maimed, the beyond and nature could no longer be perceived a manifestation of the divine externally with which consciousness was continuous. Humanity's religious sense would die externally as the possibility of its unity with the totality died internally. Here Jung joins Marguerite's presentiment of modernity in his locating the immanent, the within, as the source of the sense of the transcendent, the beyond. Not only does Marguerite go within but she seems to rest in the nothingness that is the all in a state divorced of will, and later, for Eckhart, of mind and even being. Again the implication is that she moves into a dimension of the psyche which

precedes the urgencies of the archetypal realization in consciousness and in so doing humanizes and relativizes their historical manifestation as variations on a depth common to humanity itself.

For it turns out that Farnearness is also the Trinity and the spouse of her youth (ibid.: 193). Where Mechthild might engage in sexual ecstasy with a youthful Jesus as a prelude to entering the flow of Trinitarian life, Marguerite would seem to move in this fifth state directly into the furthest reach of the divine beyond all willfulness in either party since there neither is distinguishable from the other. The sixth stage simply intensifies this intimacy now expressed through imagery of divine vision. God sees himself through Marguerite (ibid.: 193). The movement from the fifth to the sixth stage is comparable to Jung's understanding of the alchemical movement from the "*caelum*", the heaven on earth of a unified body, soul and spirit, to the "*unus* mundus" in which the consciousness of the individual perceives all reality as divine from the mind's fleeting but unqualified resonance with the divine in its depths (Jung 1970: 487–544). The final stage, the seventh, is the consciousness that pertains to the glory of heaven attained. It is not accessible to the living but it should be noted that the seventh stage does approximate the reality of a post-temporal consciousness of God. For Marguerite the sixth stage is "a showing of the seventh stage in the sixth". The seventh stage is actually "the being of the sixth" (Porete 1993: 138). Again her inference and Jung's is that psychological experience in the body in time and place is continuous with the fullness of unity with the origin of consciousness eternally.

The theme that God's own self-knowledge occurs through the human, latent in this fourteenth-century mystic, only becomes stronger in Jacob Boehme in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, culminating in the Hegel/Marx dialectic in the nineteenth. In the twentieth century God's coming to know himself through historical humanity becomes the foundational theme in Jung's late work on Job. Marguerite's identity with the divine results in a transparency that is total to the point of her being wholly encapsulated in divinity's vision of itself. And yet she will speak of moments of even greater though short-lived impact:

> There [fifth stage] nothing is lacking to her, and so she is often carried up to the sixth but this is of little duration. For it is an aperture, like a spark, which quickly closes, in which one cannot long remain; nor would that soul ever have authority who knew how to speak of this.
>
> (ibid.: 135)

This passage is strong evidence that the height of the mystical experience is intense but transient. Though short-lived its experience leaves all else vapid. Little more can be said of the experience itself for its description would no doubt disrupt the moment and banish the experience. Indeed Marguerite had to go to great lengths to justify her writing her book on her experience for the writing was itself a willful and mindful departure from the experience and so in effect its denial (ibid.: 194, 195). Yet, at the same time, such experience is incompatible with a

wholly inactive passivity. Her writing of the book, and especially its promotion even after it had been condemned, were sustained even to the point of bringing on her death.

Marguerite's experience illuminates what has been in historical variation described as "original sin", "alienation", "estrangement", "malaise" and currently, in the footsteps of Weber, "disenchantment". Marguerite's and Eckhart's understanding of this reality is radical. The root of all of the above negativities is non-identity with the divine. Only a recovered identity with the divine defeats such personal and societal negativity. For Marguerite, and others, the exercise of the will itself becomes the occasion of the departure from divine identity and so of alienation from God to be overcome in a restored identity with God beyond all willfulness, even virtuous willfulness. As all vestige of will is foregone primordial identity with the divine is restored in the annihilated soul.

Once attained, though ephemeral in its discrete moments of intensity, this identity apparently becomes residual. The term favoured by Marguerite and the author of the similar Sister Catherine tract is "established" (ibid.: 90). The usage of the term suggests that this state once experienced cannot be wholly lost. Can a profound experience of the self ever be wholly lost to those who have undergone it? Or does it become a residual memory permanently grounded in the transformation of the psyche. Established in this state its happy inhabitant is "unencumbered" or totally free of the need, desire or urgency to do, will or think anything. It is this freedom that orthodoxy challenges because it liberates from concern with attaining heaven or hell, reward or punishment, pleasing or displeasing God, using the sacraments or not using them, praying or not praying. Such consciousness does not necessarily deny the value of pious practice. Indeed it presupposes it even as it is abandoned as necessity in the further reaches of spiritual maturity. What is denied is a compulsive necessity in the life of the spirit and its refusal to bow to a superficial but potentially commanding reason. It submits all practice to the sole criterion, "Does it or does it not foster identity with the divine?"

The experience of such freedom is at the heart of the ongoing battle between the figures of Love and of Reason running throughout Marguerite's work. Repeatedly Marguerite calls for freedom from or the transcendence of reason and eventually comes to rejoice in her liberating triumph over it. Examined more closely the figure of Reason is the power behind the leading of the virtuous life then cast as bondage to reason. Lost souls become fixated in such activity and so deny to themselves further spiritual development. Sad souls know there is more but not what the more is and so also remain painfully truncated in their compulsive virtuous activity (Porete 1993: 142–145). Once free from reason and its link to compulsive virtuous activity any and all activity would flow naturally from the soul's inherence in the nothing and its participation in the all. The reversal of the order from the domination of the soul by the virtues to their status as servant of the soul lies behind Marguerite's ambiguous statement her inquisitors used as the basis of charges of libertinism or antinomianism (Lerner 1972: 76). The statement occurs in her description of the annihilated soul's detachment from virtuous activity,

which it can take or leave. The passage ends with the offending statement that the annihilated soul "gives to Nature all that is necessary, without remorse of conscience." This passage is followed by the remark that such a soul is so well ordered that its "Nature demands nothing that is prohibited" (ibid.: 87). In this context nature given its full due refers to one living out of an identity with the divine from which no non-virtuous activity would be able to flow. Rather than granting a license to the licentious the meaning of the phrase would paraphrase Augustine's, "Love and do what you will."

Naturally Godfrey's question of Marguerite's spiritual elitism and the possibility of attaining and holding such spiritual heights is pertinent to the discussion of the freedom such a state carries with it. For Marguerite's experience would free her not only from the burdens of virtue and reason but also from the external dictates of the Church. This freedom is evident in Marguerite's distinction between the Little and the Great Church (ibid.: 101, 122, 129, 142). She equates the Little Church with the canonical, orthodox, and institutional church and the Great Church with those who live in some residual identity with God. The terms hardly refer to the numbers and sociology of the members of each church. Yet there may be some resonance in Marguerites distinction between the churches in our day in the emergence of an increasing number of people who claim to be spiritual but not religious. Is this distinction a contemporary replay of Marguerite's distinction between the churches, great and little, and is it as heretical to the canonical church now as it was in her day? For the implication is hard to avoid that members of the Great Church are free of the Little Church whose sole legitimate function would be the support of the members of the Great Church in their "fine" or refined love derivative of their inhesion in the divine nothing. Freedom from the virtuous life, the life of reason and a life wholly submissive to the orthodox or canonical become three faces of the freedom worked by dissolution in the divine depths. In the Great Church Marguerite envisions a church made up of mystics or possessors of gnostic sensibilities. She might well anticipate Rahner's vision of a church made up of mystics, though of less intensive experience than hers. This would make her the harbinger of a quite modern and vital ecclesiology which would understand the official church to support the individual in his or her dialogue with the unconscious and its numinosity as a direct dialogue with divinity. Such dialogue working through the individual could move both religious and secular collectivities toward a transformation amounting to a supersession of their current self-understanding. This possibility would rest on Jung's conviction that the unconscious creates all religions, their revelation, sacraments and teaching to lead their constituents into the same depths from which their religious communities and commitments have been born. In this sense the institution would serve the individual in the realization that its meaning and existence and that of the individual derive from the same collectively shared human profundity. Jung intimates that this profundity now urges a more widespread and deeper conscious reconnection with itself in the interests of a more universal compassion than ecclesial tribalism can currently proffer.

The consciousness at which Marguerite arrives is no doubt morally demanding. Yet, in whatever variation and degree it is hardly beyond what the religions call "grace" and Jung the ego's penetration by the "self" (Jung 1976a: 734, 736). Marguerite will affirm that such a state is entered only through the vigors of spiritual effort but once entered is recognized as a given no conscious vigor can earn. Jung too will depict the self as requiring the cooperation of the ego but in the end surpassing what lies within the ego's power to accomplish. Nowhere is this truer than in the integration of the deeper conflicts within the human personality. Writes Jung on the power of the self, "For this reason *the experience of the self is always a defeat for the ego.* The extraordinary difficulty in this experience is that the self can be distinguished only conceptually from what has been referred to as 'God' but not practically" (Jung: 1970: 546). It would then appear well within the capacities of the self to lead the ego to a state in which intellect and will were wholly set aside and with them all archetypal urgency in a state then framed as identity with God shorn of the need for any immediate activity. In the passage cited above on behalf of the precedence of the self in its relation to the ego, Jung concludes, "the mystical experiences of the saints are no different from other effects of the unconscious" (ibid.). Would this truth not apply to the radical psychic experience the Beguine's framed as identity with God?

Only Mechthild appears in the pages of the *Collected Works*. Jung's treatment of her experience here amplified through Hadewijch and Marguerite reveals significant aspects of the psychological dynamics at work in all three. The most important question raised is on the nature of the relation of human to divine nature or of humanity to divinity. This formulation puts the question in substantialist categories as if humanity and divinity were subsistent entities unrelated to each other by nature. This imagination is not held by these three mystics. Rather each in their own way strongly suggests that the two natures are latently one from the outset and when looked as developmentally the movement of the human spirit is to a full recovery of their point of coincidence then made residual. Mechthild speaks of God as her father by nature and of Christ as her brother by humanity. When she was challenged theologically on these points she refused wholly to disavow them. Hadewijch's lover leads her to the conviction that she existed in him eternally and through him intersected with the universe in her return to the source of the totality. In introducing the sense of their pre-existence in God both Hadewijch and Marguerite affirm that this pre-existence is residual in their existence and its presence there is the basis of their drive back to its recovery through images of sexual intercourse with a Christ figure toward total immersion in a dimension of divinity and psyche preceding all imagery. From a psychological view the drive to return to where they were before they were is a libidinal energy seeking the source of all libido. Such categories derive from conceptions of energy and not of substance or fixed natures which cannot adequately convey their meaning nor the experience from which they arise. In other words tracking the pattern of the libidinal dynamic of these three mystics opens a window onto the energies of individuation itself now perceived as a pattern of return of consciousness to its

origin in the interests of its renewal through its immersion in the source of all energy. It has to be conceded that few live out this libidinal pattern as did these exceptional women. But it also has to be affirmed that what they lived out to the fullest is the pattern of libido involved in the process of individuation and so in the life of the psyche itself.

A constant refrain in Jungian theory and practice is that the realization of the self can only be approximated and never fulfilled in individual or, by extension, in species. And so a Jungian analysis would approach these experiences with the humble caution that the process of individuation can never be exhausted and so terminated. The impression could be that these women have achieved something like this. This impression is negated by their description of the shortness of the experience, their hope in its recurrence and their agony in its absence. They obviously understand their experience to extend throughout a lifetime. Rather than a prolonged rest in a bliss beyond turmoil they provide a harrowing description of a relation with God or the unconscious that informs in varying degrees the process of individuation each human life undergoes consciously or unconsciously.

The imagery of nakedness in the works of Mechthild and Marguerite talk of a divestiture of virtues of reason and even of the senses as they move into identity with their origin. The next mystic to whom Jung devoted considerable attention took this divestiture to a higher level of religious clarity. Meister Eckhart was stripped not only of the accretions of virtue but of intellect, will and, in the end, his being in his breaking through to the place where he too was before he was.

3

I PRAY TO GOD TO RID ME OF GOD

Jung, Eckhart and the nothing

Eckhart's biography and work is continuous with his Beguine predecessors even as he presents the contours of their movement into the nothing more dramatically and, if anything, more precisely. Unlike the lives of his women predecessors, events in his life culminating in his heresy trial can be dated though he says little if anything autobiographically of what must have been the experience that lies behind his gripping formulations of divestiture to the point of identity with the Godhead. Next to Jacob Boehme he is the most cited mystic in Jung's work. Jung uses him at some length to illustrate his understanding of the "relativity of God" and through it of the deeper implications of the process of individuation. Because of his importance in Jung's corpus, this chapter will deal first with a treatment of Eckhart's life. It will then present a brief and systematic summary of his theology and conclude with Jung's elevation of Eckhart's religious and theological discourse to the level of the psyche and its foundational dynamics.

Eckhart's life

Eckhart was born around 1260 probably at Tambach near Gotha in Thuringia in contemporary central Germany to a family of "lower aristocracy" (McGinn 2001: 2). Prior to 1277 he joined the Dominican Order probably in nearby Erfurt. He was a Dominican student in arts at Paris in or before 1277 (Tobin 1986: 4). Some of his early studies were also at the Dominican house of studies in Cologne possibly under Albert the Great who died in 1280 (McGinn 2001: 2, 3; Tobin 1986: 5). Albert was a major influence on Thomas Aquinas and was familiar with alchemy.

He then disappears until 1293–1294 when he is lecturing on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* at the University of Paris as a requirement toward the degree of Magister, then the equivalent of a doctorate (McGinn 2001: 2, 3; Tobin 1986: 5, 6). The following year he returned to Germany to become prior or head of the house at Erfurt where he had entered on his joining the Dominicans. At this time he also became the Vicar provincial of Thuringia. In this capacity he would have to travel widely to houses throughout the province and foster the spiritual life of

the many houses under his care. As we shall see a notable characteristic of his career is the breadth of Eckhart's capacities. Not only was he among the most outstanding thinkers of his time, he also held high ranking administrative positions at various periods in his life.

In 1302 he completed his degree at Paris with the highest degree of Magister then attached to his name as Meister Eckhart. In this same year, 1302–1303, he held the Dominican professorship at Paris and it is from these years that some of his Latin works derive (McGinn 2001: 4, 5: Tobin 1986: 6). Here it should be mentioned that there is something of a division in Eckhart's extant works between two very distinct kinds of writings. On the one hand as an academic and a skilled scholastic he could and did write well in Latin in the technical manner of scholasticism. Some sermons given in Paris are also composed in Latin. But his German sermons are of another genre and tend to convey the more radical import of his thought free from the constraints of scholasticism and formal Latin. Central themes in his German sermons such as the breakthrough to an identity with the Godhead and the divine as the ground of the soul contribute immensely to the unique quality of his mind and teaching but are peripheral to his Latin work, though the argument can be made that both are necessary for an integral understanding of Eckhart (Tobin 1986: 22). Eckhart himself may not have seen them as complimentary rather than in any tension (ibid.). Nevertheless it was mainly the impact, due in large part to the unfamiliarity of expression in the German sermons, which, at least initially, brought attention to questions of his orthodoxy. The discussion continues whether there is a real disparity between the substance of his work as a scholastic and the content of his later preaching. Some hold there is no such discontinuity and that what he preached is consistent with his more formally theological Latin work so that both contribute to the total Eckhart. This was the attitude taken by the Inquisition. Yet it is hard to deny that his German sermons have a power of expression and of phraseology which his Latin works lack even if he intended the sermons to convey the substance of his scholastic work. The homiletic format allowed him to make points candidly and dramatically that may be consistent with his scholastic writings but have a much more pallid expression there if, indeed, they are there at all (Tobin 1986: 22). In fact there is room for suspicion that those most interested in showing the compatibility of his more restrained Latin works and his German sermons are somewhat embarrassed by the radical nature of the latter where a robust pantheism grounds other positions which can with difficulty be accommodated by orthodoxy. The same point could be made by the suggestion that Eckhart would never have had to face the Inquisition on the basis of his Latin works alone, even though extractions from them constitute the condemned proposition in the bull of condemnation. In the final analysis it remains difficult to deny that it was the public preaching of his ideas and of the experience behind them which set him on the road to his trial in Avignon and the condemnation that awaited him there.

His first teaching period at Paris was for just a year. The German Dominicans split their administration into a north and south province and Eckhart became the

first head or provincial of the northern province. It was a tribute to his administrative capacity that he was later offered the same post in the southern province but in 1311 he was reassigned for a second teaching term to the University of Paris. It also stands as a tribute to his vitality that during this time of heavy administrative burden he continued to write some of his more substantial Latin and German works and to preach (Tobin 1986: 6, 7; McGinn 2001: 5–9).

In what would then be considered a rare honor Eckhart taught a second time at Paris from the autumn of 1311 to the summer of 1313. It may have been during this period or shortly after that he worked on his Opus Tripartitum which was to be his master work, his Summa. Either it was never completed or is not extant beyond the Prologue and a few fragments. Consequently, though we have occasional pieces of highly technical theological work from Eckhart, we do not have an encompassing piece of systematic work which would give an organic view of his total mind. One might well wonder if the Master himself could bring the experience which lay behind the more radical aspects of his theology into systematic order. This leaves the Eckhart scholar with Eckhart's Latin works and sermons and with his German sermons and tractates but without a synthetic overview by Eckhart. Without the benefit of a systematic synthesis it remains true to say that the vital and characteristic themes of his thought may be gleaned in their more powerful expressions from his German work. In this the Inquisition is once more helpful by identifying the heretical contents of his provocative sermons in his scholastic work (Tobin 1986: 20–23). In doing so they make the theology of the sermons normative in understanding Eckhart's spirit.

His second teaching term at Paris may have been influential in other ways. For during it he lived with William of Paris or William Humbert, an English Dominican who presided at the trial and execution of Marguerite Porete. It is possible Eckhart may have read a preserved copy of her work and may also have been familiar with Mechthild's work (McGinn 2001: 9). Whether or not Eckhart's actual textual familiarity with either Beguine can be proven, it is beyond denial that a number of Eckhart's thematic and even literal formulations resonate with both. And yet as it turned out Eckhart's efforts to synthesize the mystical moment of identity with the divine with the rigidity of orthodoxy were doomed to failure (McGinn 2001: 10).

In 1314 he left Paris for Strasbourg where again he held an administrative post but more importantly entered into an environment alive with a spiritual ferment following the condemnations of the "Free Spirit Movement" by the Council of Vienne in 1311. Strasbourg was a Beguine centre and alive with debate following the Council. Eckhart continued preaching and it would appear to be in this period and the immediately following period in Cologne that his German sermons drew widespread attention and eventually led to his trial for heresy (Tobin 1986: 8). At some time probably around 1323 he moved up the Rhine to the Dominican house of studies at Cologne and continued his teaching and preaching. It was here that his orthodoxy was first questioned. The difficulties seem to have been local in origin. It is true that the General Chapter of Dominicans meeting in Venice in

1325 refers to German Dominicans whose preaching was leading their hearers astray. But commentators are unsure if this referred to political preaching bearing on the then emerging tension between the papacy of John XXII and Louis of Bavaria or to matters of mystical and theological speculation considered inappropriate for the simple faithful. It is of interest to note that in McGinn's opinion the warnings from the Dominican meeting in 1325 may have indeed been aimed at Eckhart. A number of his more mature and powerful German sermons date from this period of 1324–1327 (McGinn 2001: 14). It appears that the Dominicans themselves tried to offset growing suspicion of Eckhart's orthodoxy by conducting a preliminary hearing presided over by two of Eckhart's fellow Dominicans in 1325–1326. Eckhart's response was judged to be orthodox (McGinn 2011: 15; Tobin 1986: 9). More recent scholarship tends to attribute the genesis of the trial to widespread fear of heresy in the then current religious culture. Though still clouded the issues provoking the trial would seem to centre on the theological implications of Eckhart's mind rather than political strife between pope and emperor or religious strife between the newly founded mendicants, the Dominicans and Franciscans.

However, Henry of Virneburg, the Archbishop of Cologne, a Franciscan and noted heresy hunter, refused to let the matter drop. On September 26, 1326, Eckhart made his first statement of defense refuting 49 articles extracted from his Latin and German works (McGinn 2001: 15, 16). In this first and spirited response, among other issues he questions the ecclesial or canonical legality of the Archbishop's proceedings because as a Dominican he would be exempt from trial by a local authority (McGinn: 2001: 16). He also protested here and throughout the entire proceedings that, though he might be guilty of error, he was not guilty of heresy which was an act not of judgment but of will. He did not will to teach anything other than what the Church taught and so could not be a heretic (McGinn 2001: 15). Therefore he was beyond heresy and would be willing to refute anything erroneous or contrary to sound doctrine. As events proceeded, Eckhart, after responding to the first set of articles, was then faced with 59 more extracted from his sermons and a number of other lists were to follow (Tobin 1986: 10). It is obvious that in late 1326 and early 1327 pressure was building against Eckhart and his orthodoxy.

On January 24, 1327, Eckhart appealed to the pope to have his case shifted to a papal jurisdiction, then located in Avignon (Tobin 1986: 10, 11). On February 13, 1327, Eckhart defended himself with a sermon in the Dominican church in Cologne (McGinn, 2001; Tobin 1986: 130, 131). Sometime after that he set out for Avignon accompanied by supportive members of his own order to take his case to the Papacy (Tobin 1986: 11). The burden of the consequent trial and his defense in Cologne must have taken its toll on him. In a letter of April 30, 1328, written by John XXII to Archbishop Henry in Cologne, the Pope assures the Archbishop that the proceedings involving Eckhart continue though Eckhart is dead (Tobin 1986: 12). His memory was honored in German convents on January 28 and he probably died that day in 1328 (McGinn 2001: 18).

Bull of condemnation

On March 27, 1329, the bull of condemnation, "*In agro dominico*", listed 28 propositions (McGinn 1981: 77–81). They constitute a distillate of earlier lists of contested statements but are taken from all modalities of his work ranging from formal Latin treatises to sermons in German to indicate all his work was the object of condemnation (Tobin 1986: 11). Of the 28 articles the first 15 and the last two are condemned as heretical. The last two had been rejected by Eckhart as not his own, which is strange since they did appear in his writing. It should be pointed out that Eckhart admitted that the first 15 heretical propositions were his own. Eleven more, also admitted as his own, are listed as suspect though capable of an orthodox meaning with sufficient explanation. The bull concludes that Eckhart had "revoked and deplored" all 26 articles prior to his death (McGinn 1981: 81). Some see the phrase qualifying his revocation, "insofar as they could generate in the minds of the faithful a heretical opinion, or one erroneous and hostile to the true faith" (ibid.), to be a mitigation of the harshness of the condemnation freeing Eckhart from a personal admission of preaching heresy. His retraction would only refer to his teaching, which could generate a sense of heresy while denying that in themselves the articles were in fact heretical (McGinn 2001: 19; Tobin 1986: 14). Such sophistry did little to alleviate the taint of heresy that hung over his thought in consequent history. Thus a man who believed himself to be an obedient son of the Church and had served it well as theologian, preacher and administrator died during an investigation into his orthodoxy leaving the work of a lifetime and his reputation under a cloud of suspicion.

The content of the condemnation

The articles condemned almost open out onto a systematic presentation of Eckhart's theology and its indebtedness to a vigorous and profound neo-Platonic spirit. The first three articles deal with problems of creation. In a Christian Platonic perspective all that is and can be finds its primordial and continued truth in the Father's expression in the Logos. The logic then continues that when the Logos goes out from its trinitarian matrix in creation every creature retains the truth of its primordial being in the Logos which inheres in the creature and urges the creature toward a greater appropriation of the creature's eternal truth experienced in time as its and the only ultimate reality. The first article of condemnation has Eckhart replying to the question of why God did not create the world earlier, implying an infantile imagination of a situation in which God existed and the world did not. Eckhart's heretical response was to affirm that "as soon as God existed he created the world" (McGinn 1981: 78). In effect the procession of the Son of God from the Father and the world from both were two aspects of the same dynamic moment. This is an heretical position explicitly condemned in the third article. His position here coincides with Jung's that humanity becomes aware of divinity as it becomes aware of itself and that this awareness is the basis of its

belief in the reality of God. There is no moment or situation in which the unconscious existed as fulfilled in itself beyond its need to become conscious in human consciousness potentially or actually. More, in this response, Eckhart is affirming that divine need or compulsion to create, a point he makes more precisely in his treatment of a Trinity whose inner dynamic could not withstand its need to express itself beyond itself. Again the affinities with Jung's position that the archetypal world has to create consciousness as the only locus in which it can become conscious are obvious.

The condemnation then switches to Eckhart's apparent tolerance of evil, even blaspheming God, as contributing to "God's glory" (McGinn 1981: 78). What Eckhart seemed to be after in the three articles addressed to this side of his thought is again the ultimacy of God as the ground of created being. The individual thus grounded in God affirms God even in what appears to be sin. There is no human action which can subvert the participation of the individual in the divine as the ground of humanity. The sinner should not will that he has not sinned since sin serves or can serve the divine purpose. In the later fourteenth article of condemnation God is depicted as having willed Eckhart to sin (McGinn 1981: 79). Here Eckhart may be touching on the central point of his thought that the original sin is becoming conscious intensified by the use of mind and will to further the individual from the originary identity with God. Eckhart's heresy here could also relate to Jung's position that evil and good are both in the Father and externalized in the dark and light sons of God, Satan and Christ, destined to unite in a more inclusive unity of opposites. Eckhart's position could derive from the sense of a conscious identity with God which could not be obliterated through sin. Sin's defeat through one's consequent confident inherence in God freed the individual from having to deny sin especially in one's past. In Jung's life his affairs with Sabina Spielrein and Toni Wolff may have been behind his frequent remarks about the need to suffer the conflict between the demands of duty as collective morality and the demands of life and its further living. Out of the bearing of this conflict and its possible alleviation in personal infidelities a more mature individual may evolve. Eckhart's and Jung's positions here also would undermine a commercial attitude in the relation to the divine. Good works could not be traded for divine favour as a total submission to bourgeois moral collectivism might suggest.

There follow then three articles which again make most sense when read against the dissolution of the difference between divine and human subjects at the height of Eckhart's religious and theological experience. Prayers of petition are ruled out on the grounds that they confirm rather than remove the difference between creator and creature, a difference Eckhart's experience negates. Nor should one look to God for reward or honor since this reduces the relationship to that of master to slave and again is based on otherness and self-interest (McGinn 1981: 78).

In all of these condemned positions Eckhart's principle of a prior identity of divinity and humanity is operative and rejected. These articles make clear that for Eckhart, the pristine identity of humanity and divinity is never lost and the Christian life works to its full recovery. As it is recovered the recovery moves the

individual to a state of identity, "not just similar" with both Christ and one's groundedness in the Father. Rather than the conferral of grace or anything external to the human, the human recovers what he or she eternally is and was in a restored identity with the divine understood as the natural fulfillment of human nature. These positions are condemned in the tenth and eleventh articles on participation in God and Christ. Both articles would have Eckhart arguing that in the process of the Christian life the Christian identifies with God and with Christ receiving personally all that the Father gives to Christ. "By the living God there is not distinction here" (McGinn 1981: 78). Is there any difference here in what Eckhart was condemned for and Jung's statement about inherence in Christ, "you totally become his nature, deny his being apart from you, should be he himself not *Christians* but *Christ* otherwise you would be no use to the coming God" (Jung 2009: 234)? To become Christ not Christians, a citation from *The Red Book* and so early Jung, would seem to be but a modern restatement of the tenth and eleventh articles of condemnation against Eckhart's urging to become Christ and God in identity intolerant of total separation.

After the affirmation of this unqualified identity there follows a condemned proposition, number 13, stating that those who have recovered their identity with the divine create heaven and earth with the divine and serve as the locus where divinity is born into the human so "that God would not know how to do anything without such a man" (McGinn 1981: 79). This condemned theme in Eckhart is itself substantially identical with the position Jung adopts in his *Answer to Job*. Here he makes it clear that the relation of the ego to the unconscious totally contains the relation of the individual to God and that the vocation of humanity in this cosmology is to render God increasingly conscious in humanity in an ongoing process that Jung calls variably "incarnation" or "penetration" (Jung 1976a: 734). Jung could hardly be clearer or in greater resonance with Eckhart on God's becoming conscious in humanity than when he writes, "the immediate cause of the Incarnation lies in Job's elevation and its purpose is the differentiation of Yaweh's consciousness" (Jung 1969e: 406).

Toward the end the condemnation addresses the issue of the unity of God which in the modern formulation of Paul Tillich points to a God beyond the God of theism or at least beyond popular conceptions of God the creator (McGinn 1981: 79). The inquisitors are here attacking Eckhart's thought that the Godhead precedes and gives rise to the Trinity and the Trinity as differentiated cannot enter the Godhead where all differentiation is overcome. There is a sense in which this position points to one side of Jung's thinking on individuation and indeed may extend it. For Jung the emergence of ego from the unconscious would be the basis of the ego as other than its origin, as other than God. Jung would also understand that the ego must reenter its origin imaged as death in alchemy as a precondition to its subsequent return to an enhanced consciousness on earth. Eckhart's condemnation in these articles implies his experience of immersion in the Godhead was beyond all distinction and so would point to a level of the psyche beyond even the archetypal which works the creation of consciousness as the locus of its manifestation.

In commonly accepted archetypal theory the archetypal unconscious is the creator of consciousness but reference to a God beyond God, or Godhead beyond Trinity, would point to a dimension of God and the psyche deeper than the creator God and the archetypal. It is to this furthest remove from consciousness that Eckhart would seem to go and in which he would rest as a precedent to a very active return to engagement with the worldly other. The imagery implies a fourth in God and a dimension beyond the archetypal in the psyche.

A final heresy of interest to the Jungian mind is the statement that there is in the soul something uncreated which Eckhart locates in the intellect understood in his peculiar sense as humanity's point of residual identity with the divine. This is one of the two heretical statements attached to the end of the bull of condemnation (McGinn 1981: 80). The experience of this identity would be powerfully numinous even though it derives from a dimension of God and the psyche beyond all differentiation between ego and non-ego. It is little wonder then that Jung was drawn to Eckhart even if the mystic's experience traces to a psychic depth Jung never clearly charted, the nothing beyond the archetypal and its compulsive drive to differentiation in consciousness.

The aftermath

The history of how Eckhart's works and thought fared down to the editions on which Jung drew are of some interest (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 139–178). In the period immediately after his death two of his disciples sought to keep the substance of his thought alive though in a more acceptable formulation given the prohibition to defend or disseminate his thought in the bull itself (McGinn 1981: 80). They were Johann Tauler (1300–1361) and Heinrich Suso (1296–1366). They are described as Eckhart's "pupils and disciples" (Colledge 1981: 15). Tauler was himself a Dominican and may have been Eckhart's pupil at Strasbourg in 1314. If he did not sit in his classroom he certainly knew the master's spirit well (Clark: 1949: 36). He was himself a powerful preacher and collections of his sermons continued to circulate in Europe long after his death. Luther read a collection of Tauler sermons that included some by Eckhart in the critical years of 1515–1518 (McGinn 2001: 183, fn. 3; Clark 1949: 48, 49; Ozment 1978: 260). Ozment states that Luther may have read Eckhart unwittingly in a collection of Tauler's sermons in which some of Eckhart's sermons were contained. Ozment points out, however, that Luther and Lutheran theology tend to draw back from the full implication of Eckhart's radical doctrine of letting go which came itself to be seen as a form of interior work and so hostile to the Reform's founding insight of justification by faith alone. Perhaps at a deeper level the Lutheran spirit became wary of the intimate ontological connectedness which Eckhart's mystical experience implies between the human and divine, an intimacy sin could not obliterate. In the final analysis it takes two to enter a covenant and Eckhart went well beyond the subject/object split between the divine and human that conventional covenantal imagination and experience imply and demand.

Though a mystical element is not lacking with Tauler, even if relatively subdued in the wake of Eckhart's condemnation, it is more openly apparent in Heinrich Suso. Much more personal in his writing style and revealing more of his own experience, he wrote such works as the *Little Book of Truth* in defense of the legitimacy of Eckhart's thought. The sixth chapter of this book is written in the form of a dialogue with the "Wild One", who would seem to be a Beghard or a representative, individual or collective, of a false appropriation of Eckhart's mysticism (Clark 1949: 61, 62). Suso's defense of Eckhart shows that he not only knew Eckhart's thought but could reproduce Eckhart's own responses to charges against it (Colledge 1981: 17). His acquaintance with Eckhart may well have been personal since we are told that Eckhart helped him overcome difficulties of conscience consequent upon his being admitted to the Dominican order at a premature age aided by a substantial gift from wealthy parents (Clark 1949: 56; Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 156). Yet he himself came to be suspect by orthodoxy and had to face an inquiry at the Dominican General Chapter in the Netherlands in 1330 (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 157). Besides Tauler and Suso there is some evidence that the Dominicans continued to copy and to read Eckhart's works possibly justified by the casuistry that the works were forbidden by the decree only to the "simple faithful" (Colledge 1981: 19, 20). While there can be no doubt that Eckhart's thought continued in some form of transmission after the condemnation of 1329, the question remains whether the moving power of Eckhart's experience is truly conveyed when modified for orthodox ears and sensitivities even by disciples loyal to his thrust.

In the next century Nicholas of Cues (1401–1464), a cardinal active at the councils of Basle and Florence, preserved some of Eckhart's works and was thoroughly familiar with the condemnation and Eckhart's defense at Avignon (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 169–170; Colledge 1981: 20). He himself wrote on such topics as the coincidence of opposites, derived from Eckhart and dear to Jung's psychology. Indeed it is currently alleged that Jung took the phrase from Nicholas rather than the alchemical tradition. Nicholas related closely the coincidence of opposites to his doctrine of learned ignorance as that state beyond the opposites in which their opposition is resolved in the further reaches of divine unity. He too used imagery consistent with Eckhart's in his references to the nothing, the desert and silence. His appreciation of and closeness to Eckhart may be seen in the reaction of John Wenck, rector of Heidelberg University, who accused Nicholas of taking up positions which were condemned in Eckhart, suggesting that Eckhart identified creature and creator. Nicholas openly defended Eckhart before Wenck and was convinced that Eckhart had been misunderstood (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 170).

Though one can argue that Eckhart's influence may have worked through the Netherlands, then a possession of Spain, and into Carmelite mysticism, there is little hard evidence to date that such prominent later mystics as John of the Cross or Teresa of Avila in the sixteenth century had a textual acquaintance with Eckhart in spite of the then close cultural ties between the Netherlands and Spain

(ibid.: 171). Suspicion of the earlier mystics continued throughout this period of the Reformation. In 1576 the General of the Jesuits forbade the reading of Mechthild, Tauler, Suso and other mystics. The list did not include Eckhart who may have faded from memory or, quite another reason, did not even have to be mentioned (ibid.).

The German nineteenth century

In fact Eckhart's writings seem to have had little explicit attention from the fifteenth century until the period of the German romantic-idealist revival in the early nineteenth century. Franz Baader (1765–1841), a Catholic professor at the University of Munich, familiar with Jacob Boehme's thought, by his own account introduced Eckhart to the master of German idealism, George Hegel. Hegel, claimed Baader, saw in Eckhart's understanding of the relation of the absolute to the human a position which anticipated historically his own and was fully compatible with what he sought to articulate (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 172–173; Clark 1949: 27). In his initial enthusiasm he is said to have lectured Baader on his appreciation of Eckhart at some length the day following Baader's presentation. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* Hegel refers to Eckhart's famous dictum that God and the human see each other out of the same eye. He relates this experience to the substance of a living cult, that is, a living liturgical practice in modern language, and contrasts it to the more superficial rationalism and historicism prevailing in then contemporary Protestant thought (Hegel 1824: 347, 348, 445). Based on these expressions of appreciation it is difficult to deny an underlying morphological affinity and spiritual sympathy between Eckhart and Hegel. For both the ontological intimacy of the divine and the human was to come into progressive realization in individual and historical humanity. Nor is it possible to deny a continuity of the affinity of Eckhart and Hegel with Jung's understanding of the basic movement of the psyche. His late *Answer to Job* insinuates that the sole locus of the resolution of the divine self-contradiction is in the consciousness of humanity created for this purpose. The Hegelian implication is blatant and will be addressed in Chapter 5.

A landmark in Eckhart scholarship and a substantial contribution to its modern phase was Franz Pfeiffer's publication in 1857 of major portions of Eckhart's German work (Pfeiffer 1857). This edition was translated into two volumes by Miss C. de B. Evans in 1924 and it is from this translation that Jung draws many of his citations from Eckhart (Eckhart: 1924a). The history of Pfeiffer's work and the energies it released is almost a study in itself. Scholars have currently come to realize that much of the material is not authentic in the sense that it cannot be said to have been authored by Eckhart and yet is to be greatly valued as an authentic expression of his spirit. One form of misguided endorsement came from Thomists eager to show the continuity and compatibility between Aquinas and Eckhart. None of these positions have stood the test of further scholarship in time. But for a time after the discovery of its spurious material, Pfeiffer's work tended to be

discredited. The question of authenticity still clouds Eckhart scholarship and the number of certainly authentic works, especially among the German sermons and tractates, has been greatly reduced by modern scholarship. However, Joseph Quint, one of the main editors of the German works, has restored considerable credibility to Pfeiffer's nineteenth-century collection. Quint reasons that while much of the material may not be of Eckhart's hand or mouth it is almost entirely Eckhartian in spirit. He writes:

> Although the authenticity of individual pieces in the Pfeiffer edition, particularly in the case of the majority of the tractates, is very questionable, I have not hesitated to cite parallel passages from such pieces. Even granted that the majority of the German tractates edited by Pfeiffer do not in their present form emanate from Eckhart, there can scarcely be any serious doubt that their content is essentially Eckhartian, as indeed is shown by the fact that many passages from the sermons have been identified as component parts of individual tractates. Yet even if pieces in question can be shown in the last analysis to be spurious, the parallels drawn from them will serve to some extent to lift the Eckhart passage under discussion out of its isolation, and so by means of contemporary statements emanating from the intellectual environment to which Eckhart belonged, illuminate it from the most diverse sides.
>
> (Quint 1936: xiii; Clark and Skinner 1983: 24)

Thus Jung, in citing from Evans' translation of Pfeiffer, cites many passages which are universally accepted as authentic; but he also cites others that obviously belong to legends and stories included in the Eckhart material published by Pfeiffer. Using Quint's principle of interpretation one can say that though these materials are not written or taught or preached by Eckhart they do capture his spirit as it impacted on his culture, evoking a widespread cultural response. It is also fair to say that whoever included the so called spurious material in the material which Pfeiffer collected was probably correct in assuming that it was Eckhartian in spirit even if not derived directly from his mouth, pen or pulpit. In fact some pieces of the certainly spurious material such as the Sister Catherine material, the story of Eckhart's daughter, and his meeting with the little boy, may be invaluable in pointing to what was truly operative in Eckhart's spirit, justifying their rightful inclusion in Pfeiffer's collection. The fact that many of the sermons that Jung cites are currently understood as authentic somewhat undermines the suggestion that his 1921 work on Eckhart was a "travesty" because of its exclusive reliance on Eckhart's German sermons (Clark and Skinner: 1983: 17). In fact it was reliance on these sermons as cited in the bull of condemnation and admitted by Eckhart to be his that was used initially to establish a core of authentic Eckhart German material and the Inquisition made it clear that his sermons and his more scholastic Latin works were consistent with each other in their content and heresy (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 50; Clark and Skinner 1983: 22).

With Pfeiffer's publication of Eckhart's material nineteenth-century interest in Eckhart became widespread. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) in his major work, *The World as Will and Representation*, relates Eckhart's thought to his own admiration of states of nirvana, absolute nothing and the "denial of the will to live" (Schopenhauer 1966a: 381, 387; 1966b: 612, 614, 633). The will to cease willing is the path to the primordial nothingness as the source of the all. Schopenhauer's Eckhart captures much of the latter's truth. However, whatever truth there is to this interpretation of Eckhart's identity with the Godhead, it should not exclude the intensity of his active life as an academic, administrator and later defender of his own position in court proceedings. If anything such identity magnified rather than reduced his will to live. Wilhelm Preger's *History of German Mysticism* (1873–1893) gave a prominent place to Eckhart. But as Eckhart interest increased so did sharply different interpretations about his basic truth emerge. The main point of dispute then as now centres on the question of Eckhart's pantheism, or, at the very least, a radical experience of the mutual inhesion and co-dependence of human and divine energies. Christian and scholastic, read Thomistic, orthodoxy either muted such elements or dismissed Eckhart because of them. In 1839 a great scholar in his own right Carl Schmidt understandably depicted Eckhart as a pantheist and his views found a certain acceptance in both Roman and Reformed ranks (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 174). H. L. Martensen, the Danish scholar with a background in Hegel, continued the same line of thought. Eckhart was a pantheist and Martensen argued that this is nothing to be ashamed of since pantheism is the basis of both mysticism and theological speculation (Clark 1949: 29). Jung might add that it is the basis of religious experience itself and, as seen, deplores its rejection by the Church (Jung 1970: 541). Others writing in the same period closely related Eckhart to Plotinus and affirmed his discontinuity with traditional scholasticism and the Church, a disconnect reaffirmed into our times (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 175, 176).

Soon the counter position was to emerge. H. S. Denifle, a Dominican and orthodox Thomist, led the attack on Schmidt and Preger. On the basis of his discovery of Eckhart's Latin and scholastic work Denifle sought to show that Eckhart's thought was much closer to the Aquinas imposed on the Church as its official theologian by Leo XIII in 1879. In fact Denifle came close to imposing a Thomistic hermeneutic on Eckhart. This hermeneutic would have limited Eckhart's truth to those scant areas of his experience and theology where he can be shown to be compatible with Aquinas (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 174). For Denifle all incompatibility with Aquinas was due to Eckhart's difficulties with conceptual clarity, if not downright muddle-headedness (McGinn 2001: 20). Denifle proceeded to attack Preger on the latter's ignorance of scholasticism and so misinterpretation of the meaning of Eckhart, which is only truly revealed when read in the context of his continuity with his alleged Thomistic ancestry. Undoubtedly the Latin works do show Eckhart as a scholastic working with a scholastic methodology especially when compared with his German work, including the sermons. Denifle did Preger some damage during their lifetimes but current scholarship, especially outside of

Catholic circles, seems much more open to the likelihood that Eckhart's experience was close to a Platonic or Plotinian pantheism which he sincerely tried to reconcile with his Christianity with ambiguous success, especially in the eyes of the Inquisitors he faced at Avignon (Clark 1949: 33). Denifle's efforts to reduce Eckhart to a Thomist are currently thoroughly discredited.

Nevertheless the tension between readings of Eckhart as a more or less Thomistic scholastic with a peculiar taste for paradox offensive to usual Thomistic clarity and relative superficiality and those who saw in him a robust Plotinian or Platonic pantheist continued. Thus Henri Delacroix in his *Essai sur le pantheisme populaire au XIV siecle* (1899) agreed with Schmidt (Clark 1949: 28). H. Buttner (1903), in a preface to his translation of Eckhart, related Eckhart to the monism of Avicenna, the emmanationism of Plotinus, and to gnosticism (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 175, 176). He understood the religiosity of these traditions to be in tension with the religiosity of institutional Christianity and understood Eckhart to endorse a religious experience based on unity with humanity's universally present ground. Henri Lichtenberger seems to have sought a middle ground in his lectures at the Sorbonne in 1909. He worked to soften too absolute a distinction between mysticism and scholasticism by showing the latter, even in Aquinas, to be informed by a profound religious sensitivity (ibid.: 175). Later in the century certain differences became apparent even in Catholic commentators. Otto Karrer, a Catholic theologian, writing in 1926, sought, in continuity with Denifle, to demonstrate Eckhart's orthodoxy, both Christian and scholastic, by extending the parameters of orthodoxy beyond what was acceptable to Denifle (ibid.: 176, 177). On the other hand, G. Thery, a Dominican, who did valuable editorial work on Eckhart's trial, felt that his radical dialectic did not respect the needs of human psychology or spirituality (ibid.: 176, 177). But Aloys Dempf, the Catholic philosopher writing in 1934, saw in the very rigor of his dialectic Eckhart's strength and specific contribution (ibid.: 177).

Thus did the battle rage on. It is obvious that the distinguishing mark in these interpretations is the interpreters' sensitivity or lack thereof to the radical nature of Eckhart's experience of an immanence that ultimately denies a difference between creature and creator by attaining their common origin in the nothingness that subsumes all distinction. It is now becoming obvious that this experience remains beyond the imaginative capacity of the Aristotelian mind and so cannot be reduced to or understood by a Thomistic perspective because of the organic, natural and experiential continuity it establishes between divinity on the one hand and the source of created reality and the human on the other. Thus the ontological and epistemic intimacy, extending to the point of identity between the divine and the human and now widely acknowledged as foundational to Eckhart's experience, is the core issue in the dispute. The major division lay between those who defined orthodoxy in Aristotelian terms or in terms of Reformed Christianity ever suspicious of pantheism, and those who saw a healthy but questionably orthodox pantheism and monism at the heart of Eckhart's experience to be respected, even cherished, whether compatible with Christian orthodoxy or not. In the end it

comes down to what appears to be a religious sensitivity. Eckhart's and Jung's are based on immediate experience. Such experience seems beyond the capacity of a mind needing an objectively transcendent God revealing itself from beyond humanity with an objectivity and clarity the experience of the human depths cannot afford. This sensitivity, or lack thereof, may well be informed by a residual fear of those very depths.

A strange interlude in Eckhart's legacy was the attempted expropriation of his work by National Socialism in Germany. The Nazis blocked a critical edition of his work based in Rome and undertook their own. Eckhart was to be the representative of a truly German religiosity. The only lasting result of this unlikely gambit has been a delay in the production of a complete critical edition of Eckhart's total work (Ancelet-Hustache 1957: 177, 178; Clark 1949: 34, 35). Jung dismissed the movement and its attempted appropriation of Eckhart with characteristic disdain in his essay on Germany as collectively possessed by the spirit of Wotan originally written in 1936 (Jung 1964c: 190, fn 16). Given the profoundly iconoclastic and individual nature of Eckhart's thought he would be a poor candidate to provide a theological foundation for National Socialism or an associated distinctively German but potentially universal religious imperialistic revival when the Christian institution of his time felt such depth and breadth was intolerable to its own claims.

The recent situation

Contemporary work is marked by a mood more willing to take Eckhart's specific and radical contributions seriously. Thus John D. Caputo points to such central themes in Eckhart as his distinction between Godhead and Trinity, the implications of his doctrine of the birth of the Word in the soul, its difference from and relation to what Eckhart called "breakthrough", and his radical understanding of letting go into the nothingness of identity with the divine. Caputo's work brings a philosophical precision to the elaboration of these foundational themes in Eckhart, even as he relates these themes to the master themes in Heidegger's philosophy. Caputo by and large views Eckhart as orthodox in his thought in spite of his condemnation. This reading leads Caputo into a questionable tension between Eckhart as Christian and as a neo-Platonist (Caputo 1984: 106). Jung might resolve this issue by agreeing with Nietzsche that Christianity is Platonism for the masses but in a far more positive sense than Nietzche's equation of Platonism with Christian flight from the body and world (Livingston 1988: 400). Caputo concludes that, in spite of the great differences between a secular and religious modality and tone, Heidegger's thought is indeed structurally analogous to Eckhart's whose work is thus of value in accessing Heidegger's (Caputo 1984: 239).

Rheiner Schurmann also brings out the radical themes distinctive to Eckhart's perspective by drawing out the philosophical implications of Eckhart's sermons. Schurmann understands Eckhart as certainly non-Thomistic, anti-scholastic and in some respects somewhat beyond even the neo-Platonists (Schurmann: 1978: 65, 66, 82, 139, 179, 190, 209). Schurmann also is open to the discussion initiated

by Suzuki of affinities between Eckhart and Zen (Schurmann 1978: 221–226; Suzuki 2002: 1–30). Finally Mathew Fox, O.P. centres on Eckhart's panentheism as a powerful resource in the revitalization of modern Catholic theology, spirituality and ecology (Fox 1980). Fox ran into the same problems with the Roman Inquisition in the twentieth century that Eckhart himself had faced in the fourteenth. He was finally forced to leave the Dominican order and his Catholic priesthood in his sustained but failed efforts to reintroduce Eckhart's insights into contemporary Christian and Catholic culture. Nothing changed institutionally between Eckhart's condemnation in 1327 and Fox's in the late twentieth century, a period of over six hundred years.

Given the history of Eckhart scholarship, Jung's engagement with his thought is fresh and synthetic. It brings together psychological, theological and philosophical insight into Eckhart's thought in the kind of consciousness and argumentation that is peculiar to Jung and to Jungian psychology. Jung brings these diverse perspectives into a cohesive unitary mind in his time as did Eckhart and most inheritors of Plato did in theirs. In his lengthiest treatment of Eckhart, Jung works to identify the psychodynamics involved in Eckhart's experience and to relate them to the key moments in the individuation process itself. Because of the intimacy Jung establishes between psychic and religious experience his analysis of the Eckhart's apophasis includes the moment of the identity of the centre of consciousness with its source in a state beyond their differentiation. Philosophically such a psychological and religious experience would be the culmination of the philosophical quest for the state of identity of the mind with its ground in a moment, perhaps repeated, which would alter the subsequent consciousness of those who undergo it. To further explore these points a somewhat ordered presentation of Eckhart's theology is helpful before it is related to the psychological power Jung saw in it.

Theological summation

It may be impossible to reduce Eckhart's experience to a tightly systematic formally theological exposition since he failed to do so himself. His own summa or systematic presentation, the *Opus Tripartitum*, yielded only the Prologue and scattered fragments following it. However, one can expose his thought on the relation of the divine to the human in an intelligible sequence as a needed preliminary to Jung's elevation of his work to the psychological level in the service of a more compelling contemporary spirituality. Such an exposition would centre around the following seven pillars in Eckhart's work drawn from the same translation Jung used in his appropriation of Eckhart's experience.

1. A distinctively two-dimensional divinity

Eckhart draws a strict distinction between the Godhead (*Gottheit*) and God (*Gottes*). The latter he equates with the Trinity as intensively active and compulsively

creative. To the former, the Godhead, he attributes a total stillness or rest divested of any urge to act or express itself beyond itself. The Godhead remains "idle" throughout the divine/human drama. "In this unity God is idle. The Godhead effects neither this nor that: it is God who effects all things" (Eckhart 1924b: 270). The distinction could hardly be more precisely made: "God and Godhead are as different as active and inactive" (Eckhart 1924c: 143). This is not to deny some kind of implied emanation of the Trinity from the Godhead. But the Godhead is of the essence of divinity from which the Trinity proceeds to its manifestation in creation. Modern commentary agrees on the fact that Eckhart deals with a two-dimensional divinity, the Godhead and the Trinity as God and creator (Caputo 1984: 106).

Eckhart will enforce this distinction by commenting on the strange reversal of gender roles this distinction implies. The Godhead, a feminine noun in German, gives birth to nothing. "It begets not" (Eckhart 1924d: 388). The Trinity, a masculine noun in German, is the source of all creation. "The work of the Persons consists in the genesis and output of things" (Eckhart 1924e: 398). Eckhart faces the problem explicitly in confessing that the Godhead, in some sense the source of all that divinity can express, remains expressionless and that the creative expression of creating creatures beyond divinity derives from the Father and trinity. In his experience of the Godhead Eckhart makes a point familiar to the gnostics and implicit in Jung's treatment of the Trinity. The Father in as much as he is the more immediate source of what exists beyond the divine is really a "mother" expressing in creation through the Trinity the potential, resident but unexpressed, in the unmoving and formless Godhead. Of the "father" he writes, "But also he plays a mother's part, the unity [the Godhead] providing him with all that he brings forth. In this bringing forth he is functioning as a mother" (Eckhart 1924f: 471; McGinn 2001: 84, 85). This clear distinction between a non-creative Godhead and the creative Trinity as the source of creation first raises the psychological question as to what possibly might be the experiential basis which drove Eckhart to this distinction? For in it lies the possibility of a maternal depth of the psyche which is beyond the drive of the archetypal unconscious to create consciousness and express itself in it.

The mystery deepens as Eckhart elaborates the difference between Godhead and Trinity. Though it is somehow the potential for all form and definition, nevertheless, the Godhead remains formless and the formed cannot penetrate it. The Trinity itself, because of its propensity to form expressed in the *Logos*, cannot enter this dimension of divinity. "Nay even God himself is forbidden there so far as he is subject to condition. God cannot enter there in any guise" (Eckhart 1924h: 202). Neither can the human soul unless divested of all imagery and so as naked as Mechthild's in her final identity with her lover (Eckhart 1924g: 295). Accessing the Godhead implies the death of God. In it God "passes away", gives up the ghost. And yet the Godhead is the source of the Father from which the Trinity and the soul emanate even though the soul must go beyond Trinity and image in its return to the Godhead. In one passage Eckhart attributes to the Trinity the status of a universal "archetype" in its role of mediating the preceding Godhead to the world (Eckhart 1924g: 394). In these passages it becomes obvious that Eckhart is

proposing a divine quaternity in the form of a divine domain which precedes the Trinity, from which the Trinity as creator derives and from which the Trinity receives the potential whose expression beyond the Trinity becomes "creation". In this sense Eckhart's Godhead becomes a fourth in a quaternity. It is a dimension of the divine life itself beyond Trinitarian activity from which the Trinity derives in an outward emanation whose reversal leads the soul beyond Trinity into identity with the Godhead whose psychological implications remain a fascinating challenge to further Jungian delineation to follow at chapter's end.

Eckhart's own delineation rests on his sense of radical immanence and interiority inserting the human in both the flow of Trinitarian activity out of God into creation and in the return to the dark stillness of the Godhead beyond the Trinity. The "innermost heart of the Godhead" is in the human from creation (Eckhart 1924i: 436). The foundational dynamic of the spiritual and psychological life is then the individual's recovery of identity with the Godhead naturally present from the outset through reimmersion in its reality. This recovery Eckhart describes as a death into a primal darkness in which the Godhead and creature attain mutual completion in the nothingness of identity (Eckhart 1924b: 274–279; 1924d: 384–385; 1924j: 224). This return will be addressed in greater detail but here it can be said for the first time that it culminates in a divestiture restoring the individual to a primordial identity with the Godhead. Eckhart, like Marguerite, regains that situation "when he was not." Once recovered his "eternal nature" is where he "has always been, am now, and shall eternally remain" (Eckhart 1924k: 220). In this total dissolution in the Godhead the soul recovers her nature in her "native land", the land of her native divinity (Eckhart 1924l: 355).

2. God as Trinity and creation/fall

The question then arises how the soul was exiled from its native land and what are the conditions of its return. On these points Eckhart is again complex. One side of his thought will clearly contend that the energies of the Trinity cannot be contained within it and so flow over into the creative act out of what can only be called a compulsive necessity. Supporting this side of his mind is a very modern theme that the individual in freely stepping out of the original identity with the divine establishes an otherness to the divine. This otherness then becomes the basis of an alienation between the creature and the divine in the shattering of their pristine identity. The original identity is negated in the creature's willing its autonomy and this negation, the otherness of God and creature, must be itself negated in the soul's natural movement back to its primal identity with the divine. As Paul Tillich worked these themes in the twentieth century he effectively argued Eckhart's point that creation and fall are simply two sides of humanity's existential remove from its essential nature, for Tillich, in the Trinity's expression in the Logos (Tillich 1957b: 29–43). With Eckhart Tillich would also argue that the very alienation entailed in such a remove provided the energy of the soul's drive to recover its lost identity with its origin. Eckhart, Tillich and Jung, as manifest in his treatment of Eckhart, were

keenly aware that the soul could never divest itself of a sense of its primordial divinity and eternity as the basis of its current search for their greater recovery.

To return to the Trinity as creator, Eckhart describes the vitalities of the life of the Trinity as a certain "boiling" or *bullitio*, a "boiling" the Trinity could not stop from "boiling over" in an *ebullitio* into creation. The imagery describes a compulsive necessity in the divine creative libido which was beyond resistance and resulted in creation and the universal situation of alienation. Every creature proclaimed God but none was happy or blessed (Eckhart 1924k: 221). Effectively their proclaiming God was a statement of their alienation from their source. And this alienation as negation had to itself be negated in the soul's return to its native identity with God as the basis of an identity with the all.

In his understanding of the necessity of creation Eckhart also becomes a significant precursor of a theme that grew stronger in later centuries, namely that of a mutual completion of the divine and the human in their eternal and inescapable reciprocity. "God can no more do without us than we can do without him" (Eckhart 1924m: 44). In context the statement is one that demands of the listener a loving response to the divine "necessity" of creation. As the theme of mutual fulfillment develops through Boehme and into Hegel and Jung it increasingly takes on the implication that divinity must create in order to resolve its own polar tensions in human consciousness as the basis of life universal.

What then are we left with in Eckhart's two-dimensional divinity and what would it mean in terms of Jung's attraction to Eckhart? From a Jungian perspective the archetypal dimension of the psyche directed by the self is compulsively creative in two senses. First it is driven to create the ego. Second, it is driven to become itself conscious in the creation of the ego through a process of an ongoing reimmersion of the ego in its maternal origin, itself redeemed in the return of the ego from its origin. The ego in moving beyond its unconscious origin is both created and fallen and so is driven to recover its origin and in doing so make the origin more conscious in the ego on its return from its depths. So it is not difficult to correlate Eckhart's thought on creation and fall with Jung's understanding of the creative unconscious giving birth to the ego and recalling the ego to itself as the pattern of individuation. It is more difficult to see in Jung's model of the psyche where the ego attains an identity with a dimension of the psyche which would precede the archetypal and provide a moment of passivity to moderate the passion of the archetypal seeking incarnation in the collective or personal mind in ways that might overwhelm society or individual to the detriment of both. In effect Eckhart's identification of a dimension of psyche that precedes creative compulsion could enhance by its restraint the more aggressive incarnations of archetypal energies in negative forms of collective or personal faith in forms of epidemic madness. The peace such a pre-archetypal rest in an origin beyond compulsion affords would carry with it a more universal compassion because it would proceed from the deepest source of human creativity and affirmation and so carry a compassion as universal and as pacific as its origin. The same origin as that of the all.

3. Christ as Word and the birth of God in the soul

Eckhart's position that "as soon as God existed he created the world" was the first of the heretical propositions at his trial (McGinn 1981: 78). It would mean that the created world is co-eternal with the Trinity. When this position is coupled with his assertion that, when God spoke his Word, Eckhart heard two things, this quaint phrase would mean that as the Word proceeded from God within the life of the Trinity it concurrently proceeded beyond the Trinity into the creation of the world. God speaking the Word to himself is God speaking the Word beyond himself (Eckhart 1924n: 164). In this perspective there is no gross imagination that would imagine a divinity contemplating whether or not to create the world or an ontological situation when God was and the world was not. Rather God speaking the Word within his life is God speaking his Word in creating. The Word is thus natural to the structure of the world and mind and humanity is thus naturally gifted to experience its presence and to move back through the Word to identity with the Godhead which precedes it. The experience of the birth of God in the soul is the experience of an emerging identity with Christ begotten in the soul as a natural extension of its procession from the Father in eternity (Eckhart 1924o: 163). Latently and universally each individual is of the same nature as Christ. When and as the individual becomes self-conscious of this latency God as Christ is born in the soul (Eckhart 1924p: 48). As this process goes on and to the extent it goes on the individual is not like Christ but is Christ. The identity Eckhart affirms between Christ and the individual in whom Christ is born is also condemned in the eleventh and twelfth heretical statements. Such identity with Christ is at the basis of Eckhart's repeated statement that the birth of God in Mary means little or nothing unless it be repeated in him (Eckhart 1924j: 216). Eckhart here anticipates Jung's position that the imitation of Christ is not in a literal reprisal or appropriation of a past historical figure but in the lived experience of Christ now synonymous with the experience of the self whether in a specifically religious tradition or not. As such Eckhart and Jung's appropriation of Eckhart go beyond specific confessional religions to affirm that fidelity to the self is common to all in the symbolic and religious variants describing the assimilation of the self in consciousness. Though accurately reflective of Eckhart, Jung's admonition to become Christs not Christians goes beyond Christianity to the activity of the self in whatever religious or non-religious mode it might operate. Eckhart will thus summarize Christ's "supernatural" teaching as simply abandoning the senses and the faculties in a self knowledge more valued than knowledge of all things gained through the interplay of sensation and intellect and, moreover a knowledge natural to human profundity (Eckhart 1931a: 160, 161). What Eckhart is here proposing is the conscious recovery of an ever working latency, that of the second power of the Trinity, naturally present to and seeking to become conscious in every human. Described in Christian terms the process can hardly be confined thereto. And yet, for Eckhart and for Jung as his admirer, this experience remains preliminary to an even greater identity with the divine.

4. The breakthrough to the Godhead

The furthest identity is with the Godhead. Changing images but with the same idea Eckhart will vision the soul as not only the mother of Christ but as the bride of Christ whom Christ then leads into the depths of the Godhead. "[A]ccompanied by his bride", he can "show her the hidden mystery of his secret Godhead" (Eckhart 1924ee: 224). On the spiritual drive back to identity with the ultimate origin Eckhart writes, "The essence of the Godhead sucks the spirit out of itself into itself, making it as itself, so that there seems now but one essence" (Eckhart 1924/1927g: 392). Recent scholarship confirms that though they be continuous the experience of the birth of God in the soul and the experience of the breakthrough are distinct though related. It is as if the birth of the Son in the soul demands of its very dynamic the deeper ingression into the preceding Godhead as the culmination of the soul's spiritual life. John Caputo recognizes the birth and the breakthrough to be distinct and reconciled with some difficulty. The birth of God in the soul he sees as personal and Christian. The breakthrough he identifies as Eckhart's neo-Platonism, questionably compatible with Christian orthodoxy. In the end he feels there may be a certain complementarity between these distinguishable movements of soul but is fully aware of the difficulty the breakthrough poses to Christian orthodoxy (Caputo 1984: 127–134). As noted above a Jungian perspective might well see neo-Platonism and Christianity as two variants of the same archetypal movement. Reiner Schurmann agrees that Eckhart's understanding of the return to the unity of the Godhead is "Neoplatonic" and inspired by Proclus but stands in some tension with the Platonic tradition since it describes a new way of being in the world through resonance with the ground of being (Schurmann 1978: 46, 47). But of greater importance Schurmann contends that the birth of the Son of God can be distinguished from, precedes and leads organically to immersion in the Godhead as toward its completion (Schurmann 1978: 163, 164). McGinn also concurs that the breakthrough is to a dimension of the divine "deeper even than the birth of the Son in the soul" (McGinn 2001: 141–146).

The breakthrough into the Godhead, described in religious language by Eckhart, is of immense psychological import since it also describes the deepest ingression of consciousness into the unconscious and so into the psychology of the descent into nothingness. For it is at this point that Eckhart and other mystics of the apophatic introduce their crucial understanding of the nothing or nothingness. In Eckhart's discourse the dynamic of the breakthrough is at least paradoxical if not self-contradictory. For it implies an identity with a wholly passive nothingness divested of activity and any urgency thereto. Yet this total passivity is at the same time the source of the Trinity and through the Trinity of creation and the created mind. Itself divested of activity the nothingness is the source of all that flows from it within and beyond divinity. In its recovered identity with the Godhead the soul is drowned, dissolved in a darkness, an abyss without bottom referred to as hell by Eckhart and "deeper than hell" by Jung (Eckhart 1924q: 373, 374; Jung 1968f: 135). In effect the nothing, the void, the abyss and in one formulation "spiritual

dementia" are synonyms capturing diverse aspects of the nothing defiant of tighter definition (Eckhart 1924r: 370, 371). Though it is in some sense the source of opposites it is beyond all opposites in an all consuming darkness resistant to even divine light and every formality or modality of Trinity (Eckhart 1924s: 377). It is at this point where divine and human coincide beyond all differentiation, that they see each other with the same eye. "The eye wherein I see God is the same eye wherein God sees me: my eye and God's eye are one eye, one vision one knowing one love" (Eckhart 1924t: 240). The dissolution of the mind beyond all differentiation is the basis of the deepest freedom and the root of a restorative resignation. It enables the question, "Why ask why?" (Schurmann 1978: 112, 113). The cessation of questioning is a consequence of Eckhart's understanding of resignation and of self-acceptance as a residual component in the consciousness consequent to the moment of dissolution. No doubt such ego-loss is radical. Eckhart does point out that the total loss of distinction between divinity and humanity is an experience which can happen "only now and then", yet obviously one that remains unforgettable in its aftermath (Eckhart 1924u: 148). Like Marguerite before him the experience takes Eckhart to a place where he was before he was (Eckhart 1924v: 288, 289; 1924w: 348). He is referring to the soul's primordial identity with the Godhead "prior" to creation to be regained beyond creation but within life and from which the soul cannot be separated throughout.

Has Eckhart in his immersion in the Godhead returned to an even deeper experience of the Great Mother or Goddess than the burden of Jung's psychology deals with though it be an experience Jung obviously appreciated? After his break with Freud, especially in what is today Volume 5 of the *Collected Works*, Jung returned to a stratum of the psyche he knew was beyond Freud's psychic boundaries. He came to understand this stratum to be that of the maternal matrix of the archetypal, herself the formless mother of all form. In this early work this power divides into the dual mother and Jung describes her propensity to sustain or to devour consciousness in telling terms. Eckhart would seem to have penetrated even beyond the duality Jung identifies in the matrix of consciousness to a maternal nothingness paradoxically beyond all distinction and yet the remotest source of the multiple and the ultimate resource for its unification when recovered. Eckhart describes the maternal nothingness as mother even of the Trinity and so of all intellectual delineation. In this Eckhart goes to a layer of the ground of what is, of which Jung was appreciatively aware but to which he addressed only occasional sustained focus mainly in his work on Eckhart himself.

5. The Ground

For Jung was aware of the ground of which Eckhart speaks (Dourley 2011: 519–520). In the culmination of the alchemical transformation he describes a consciousness at "one with the eternal Ground of all empirical being" (Jung 1970: 534). In German the term "*grunt*", "ground", is used in a religious/poetic/mystical sense as a synonym for God. In Eckhart it refers to the place where divinity as the

source of the totality and humanity naturally coincide in sharing mutual being. Eckhart is explicit on the mutual inherence of the human and the divine in the ground. "Here God's ground is my ground and my ground is God's ground" (Eckhart 1924x: 49). And elsewhere in an admittedly apocalyptic writing, "for the ground of God and the ground of the soul are one nature" (Eckhart 1924y: 327). This ground is fully alive with a trinitarian vibration but is also continuous with the preceding and more primordial Godhead. Out of the dynamic of this ground proceed the birth of the soul and of God in the soul, but this birth itself draws the soul back beyond her faculties into identity with the Godhead as the origin of Trinity. In this nothingness the soul is at one with the source of the all and in a sense rests in this nothingness. Yet at the same time this nothingness is a stillness which gives new and permanent life and joy. It is the operative force of all valid virtuous work the individual may perform. In effect it supplants the individual's agency in virtuous activity and so undermines anything of the frantic in the doing of the good (Eckhart 1924z: 101).

Here again is a paradox in Eckhart. In this stillness the soul and the Godhead remain beyond the need to act and yet it is from such radical immanence that any valid work proceeds. Marguerite describes those who attain a perfect virtuous life through intense activity but are still profoundly lacking and many are aware of the sterility of such virtue gained. Eckhart deplores virtuous activity when it proceeds from any motivation other than simply the expression of the individual's identity with the Godhead (Eckhart 1924aa: 175). Whatever activity might follow the attainment of the nothing beyond the Trinity is wholly enabled by the attainment itself. Such radical interiority and its relation to activity lies at the basis of Eckhart's remark, "When a man goes outside himself to fetch God he is wrong" (Eckhart 1924o: 163). Jung was to repeat these sentiments when he discusses the prevailing Western poverty of soul stripped of a religious sensitivity. Such religious impoverishment would place "'all God outside'" (Jung 1968c: 9, 10). He immediately remarks, "(A little more Meister Eckhart would be a very good thing sometimes!) (ibid.). He goes on to twice describe the soul as imbued with a native consciousness of God and then spells out his rejection of a God like Barth's wholly other divinity. "It is therefore quite unthinkable for God to be simply the 'wholly other', for a 'wholly other' could never be one of the soul's deepest and closest intimacies – which is precisely what God is" (ibid., fn 6). The continuity of thought and spirit between Jung and Eckhart could hardly be made more explicit.

6. Further consequences for the virtuous life

The identity of the divine and the human in the Godhead make them peers of each other (Eckhart 1924o: 163). Since they are peers prayers of petition lose all sense and value. The one who prays does not pray to a divine entity other than oneself to intervene on one's behalf from a position transcendent to the petitioner. Rather the identity of the divine and the human who lives out of this identity is itself an

ongoing prayer based on the very being of the human thus graced. The idea of doing the good for a divine reward is reduced to the level of the pusillanimous, to that of a merchant striking a deal with God. Such people Eckhart terms, depending on the translation, "fools" or "asses" (Eckhart 1924k: 218; Eckhart 1978: 215). Even the sacraments when divorced from the soul's inherence in the Godhead are obstacles to this deeper identity (Eckhart 1924bb: 193). As such there is no asceticism in the normal sense of sustained virtuous restraint in Eckhart. The needs of life such as eating and drinking are to be fully and normally met in one whose God works in the depths (Eckhart 1924y: 332). Yet Eckhart will affirm that, "The swiftest steed to bear you to your goal is suffering" (Eckhart 1924cc: 347). Here he may mean the acceptance of the suffering of everyday life but he may also be referring to a much deeper suffering involved in the divestiture of mind, will and being toward the ultimate dissolution into "sameness" with divinity. "Identity means *same*" (Eckhart 1931b: 103). This suffering is a suffering of divestiture of the senses, the intellect, the will and ultimately of one's personal being as other than or not God. There could hardly be a more demanding stripping of obstacles as the precedent to the living out of the nothing as the source of the all. And though it is demanding, Eckhart's description of the process ultimately asks if it is one natural to the soul and if so what role does "grace" understood as supernatural and so not native to the soul have to play in it.

7. Nature or grace?

The experience out of which Eckhart's theology grows undermines a dualistic division of two realms of reality, the natural and supernatural, nature and grace, because of his insistence on the reality of that point in the human where natural and supernatural coincide. The reality of grace cannot be understood as the conferral or infusion of something foreign to human nature from an agency wholly beyond it. Rather grace for Eckhart, as it is for Jung, is the recovery of that which was there from the outset and which urges an ever greater entrance into consciousness through the reimmersion of consciousness in it. For both Jung and Eckhart the recovery of one's preconscious and so eternal truth in time fully describes the dynamics of the interplay between grace and nature. Citing an unidentified saint with approval Eckhart proposes a natural understanding of grace. "What the soul cannot conceive by nature can never be hers by grace." The statement follows the conviction that the soul rests in the "perennial" or eternal now and owes its heritage to its inherence in the Word before its advent into time, that is, both eternally and now (Eckhart 1924e: 398). The movement of the soul to its spiritual maturity is the recovery of its origin in the creative nothingness of the Godhead. Grace is the return to or recovery of one's native identity with the divine and this for Eckhart is the natural movement of the soul.

Where Eckhart does introduce a distinction between a supernatural grace enabling human activity, grace acts as the power stripping the soul of its faculties. But grace divests the soul of its powers so that the soul may come into the nothingness of the

Godhead where all distinctions between itself and the divine, grace and nature, cease entirely. In this identity the soul is not a recipient of grace from beyond itself but by grace it becomes itself. "The supreme function of grace is to reduce the soul to what it is itself" (Eckhart 1924dd: 409). Grace does not build on nature as a super-addition. Grace ceases to be accidental to human nature. Rather grace is human nature fully recovered in its identity with God. And this culminating state of identity with the divine may be the secret behind Porete's and Jung's fascinating statement, "Unless I can be the nothing I cannot be the all." For Eckhart affirms that the individual has within the power of identity with all particulars when that individual identifies with their ultimate source in the Godhead beyond the Trinity. In this context grace is the full recovery of nature.

A short summa: The sermon on poverty

Eckhart's sermon on the biblical citation "Blessed are the Poor" (Matt 5: 3) is a dramatic summation of his entire theology of the soul's movement to identity with the divine beyond the subject/object split. Early in the sermon Eckhart distinguishes between "external" and "internal" poverty (Eckhart 1978: 214). The former he initially endorses if it is willingly undertaken in imitatio of the circumstances of Christ's life. However, when it is done willfully for a reward either in the eyes of admiring but spiritually impoverished others or by the divine itself, Eckhart derides the practice as selfish, in psychological parlance as an act of pure ego (Eckhart 1978: 215).

True internal poverty is practiced by those who will nothing, know nothing and have nothing (Eckhart 1978: 214). He then proceeds to deal with each of these forms of poverty under the rubric that all three forms of poverty negate the difference between the divine and the human. In the return to the Godhead the individual must recover an identity shared with God "as when he was when he was not yet", a phrase twice repeated in the sermon (Eckhart 1978: 215, 218). He amplifies this primordial identity as a state of identity of will with the Godhead when he was what God willed and so willing himself was the will of God (Eckhart 1978: 216). He then addresses the dialectic of creation and fall as two aspects of the same spiritual movement. For when Eckhart "went out" from this eternal identity with the divine he then acquired a God and creatures as other than himself (ibid.). Put succinctly creation and alienation coincide as removal of the existent from its eternal essence in the Godhead. In so emanating from God all creatures affirmed God's existence but none were happy because the God they affirmed was other than themselves and their distance from divinity was the substance of their alienation (Eckhart 1978: 219). For this reason the return to the Godhead in the breakthrough is "nobler" than the emanation from God because in it the individual's eternal essence from which there is no complete severance in time or in eternity is fully regained (ibid.).

The defeat of creation as alienation in the recovery of one's essence lies at the heart of Eckhart's strange prayer twice repeated in this sermon, "This is why

I pray to God to rid me of God" (Eckhart 1978: 216, 219). The God that must be got rid of or gone beyond is the creating Trinity. The God prayed to is the Godhead as the locus of one's abiding eternal truth and essential reality. Here Eckhart makes his famous statement that if a fly possessed reason God as other than the fly could not satisfy the fly's spiritual aspirations. Only that identity beyond distinction where angel, fly, mind and God are "equal" fully satisfies because all distinction between them is overcome in that state (Eckhart 1978: 216).

Thus the poor man is divested of a will other than that of identity with the divine will and divested of knowledge of God understood as an entity other than oneself. Rather than join in the contemporary debate on the relative value of knowing or willing in relation to God, Eckhart transcends a faculty theology and psychology and points to a "oneness in the mind", that point of natural identity of creature and divinity from which knowing and willing flow and which must be recovered beyond the exercise of both faculties, intellect and will, in the soul's return to its initial and infrangible identity in the divine (Eckhart 1978: 217).

When Eckhart addresses the poor man as having nothing he is again explicit. The poor man must be so divested of any sense of self that God works whatever is worked in a life thus shorn of ego activity. In this context Eckhart is again clear that in this state the individual recovers what can never be lost, "the eternal being that he was, now is, and will eternally remain" (Eckhart 1978: 218). In this context he makes one of the more dramatic remarks in his work. For, using St. Paul as his example, he states that the role of grace moves the individual from the "accidental" into one's "essential being." The meaning is that grace makes actual a residual potential, namely one's natural divinity as lodged in the Godhead and incapable of loss or severance (ibid.). In the breakthrough, "I and God are one." Eckhart in identity with the Godhead becomes pure act, "an immovable cause that moves all things" (Eckhart 1978: 219). And so the cycle of maturation is complete in his return to identity with the divine in allowing a purely natural process to take place. His identity with "pure act", a scholastic term for God, could hardly go unnoticed or accepted by his inquisitors.

Jung on Eckhart

The foregoing is a brief portrayal of the foundational points of Eckhart's elaboration of his experience enhanced by some of his more telling expressions of that experience. Jung deeply appreciated Eckhart. He cites his work 38 times from 21 widely varying loci in the early twentieth-century translations on which he widely relied. Jung confesses that he turned to Eckhart's thought on letting go "as a key which opens the door to the way" (Jung 1967a: 16). More he attributes to Eckhart a profound anticipatory experience of what came to be called the "unconscious", fully formulated and appreciated as such only six centuries later (Jung 1968e: 194). Jung's most protracted treatment of Eckhart appears under the rubric of "*The relativity of the God-concept in Meister Eckhart*" (Jung 1971a: 241–258). When fully elaborated as it appears throughout his work Jung's understanding of

the relativity of God does not address, at least in the first instance, the idea of the plurality of divinities supportive of a certain religious pluralism making each contending divinity relative to the others. Rather the full burden of Jung's thought on the relativity of God would contend that divinity and humanity are mutually engaged in processes of reciprocal redemption. In this process divinity creates human consciousness to become conscious in it and redeem humanity as a dimension of its own redemption in humanity. Humanity when consciously bearing the suffering of the divine ingression in the historical resolution of the divine self-contradiction participates in the redemption of God in the human (Dourley 2010e: 46–68). Though the phrase is not used in Jung's *Answer to Job*, the reciprocal redemption of humanity and divinity is the substance of the work.

In his lengthiest treatment of Eckhart, *The Relativity of the God-concept in Meister Eckhart,* Jung begins by associating the birth of medieval German mysticism to early Gnosticism based on the primacy given to "individual revelation", i.e. immediate experience (Jung 1971a: 242). Within this framework Jung takes Eckhart's work as Eckhart's personal revelation. Jung moves quickly to describe what he calls "the relativity of God" in Eckhart's experience and as it would work in his own understanding of the psyche (ibid.: 242). His elaboration of the relativity of God becomes a description of the divine/human relation as the relation of transcendence to immanence effectively destroying orthodox belief in transcendence as pointing to the beyond in favour of a radical understanding of immanence as the within. Eckhart's God for Jung's is not "absolute" or "wholly cut off" from humanity. God as relative is not a transcendent absolute over against the human. Rather God is "dependent" on the human. In fact this mutual dependence makes of God and the human "functions" of each other in a "reciprocal and essential relation" (ibid.: 243). The human becomes a function of God as the immanental source of the ego. But God is "a psychological function" of consciousness in that humanity is constitutionally and psychologically aware of the concentrated libido which births images of the divine in the ego from the depths of the psyche. This presence would generate the universal sense, *the consensus gentium*, that God exists resting as it does on the potentially universal numinous presence of the archetype of the divine to human consciousness. In these passages such impact is related to the "God image", and so to humanity as the image of God effected by the experience of the self. Such experience exercises an ascendancy over consciousness and the will enabling, on occasion, an individual performance beyond the boundaries of "conscious effort" (ibid.). Effectively the God image and the activity of the self here constitute a more than adequate description of the power of grace and its capacity to enable and transform the ego but as a wholly intra-psychic energy. God, as a function of the unconscious, is, from the viewpoint of Jung's psychological "science", the archetypally based energy operative in the human experience of divinity. And here Jung attempts to distinguish his psychology from the "metaphysical" world by conceding that the metaphysical God, at least of the monotheistic traditions, "is, of course, absolute, existing in himself." But then he remarks that God thus understood by either metaphysician, psychologist or

theologian betrays "a complete unawareness of the fact that God's action springs from one's own inner being" (ibid.). The conclusion, with a bow to traditional conceptions of divine transcendence, is that those who remain unaware of the subjective origins of the sense of God remain unaware of what religion is within themselves and wherever it occurs beyond.

As Jung continues he forces a reconsideration of charges that he uses the term "primitive" in a primarily derogative manner. For he understands in these passages the primitive, the medieval mystic and the more self-conscious power of Eastern religiosity, to have regressed to that point of primordial interiority connecting individual and community with the totality (ibid.: 244). Such radical regression is the operative dynamic in *participation mystique*, in the experience of the *unus mundus* as the ground of all empirical being, and in the cherished unity of individual with the "All-oneness" as the source of what is (ibid.: 255). The projections which this wholly subjective experience generates become then the objective Gods over against the individuals and communities through which they are created (ibid.: 244). In passing Jung notes that such highly valuable regression is to "Mother Earth" and so once more in this context restores the primacy of the maternal in processes of psychological and religious regression as the first moment in renewal and maturation. Though the earth may be muddy and "impure" it supports a life that a sterile "purity" cannot. Here Jung cites Eckhart to the effect that God winks at sins especially in those destined for great things such as the apostles (ibid.: 244, 245).

Though cast in psychological terms there then follows one of the most devastating attacks on idolatry conceivable. For Jung argues that, when the libido carrying the power of the self is projected beyond the psyche, it creates the Gods and anything else, personal or natural, which fascinates its captive devotees with the allure of the divine. Not only does this process create the Gods but also divine mediators. By extension they would include shamans who impart *tondi* or mana, Popes who impart infallible truths, Gods awarding discrete divine land grants or "Holy Lands", inspired and inerrant bibles and sacred personalities and holy groves and ghettoes. Worship of all or any in the foregoing list and beyond is a form of psychic idolatry that destroys the soul by giving to an other what belongs to her and so alienating her from her own dignity as the mediator of the divine to consciousness. The first most difficult task in religious maturation is the recovery and repossession of the energies that create the Gods and any object of worship as energies residual to the soul and psyche. In the recovery of these God-creating energies they become objectively residual in the individual who does so and there become the basis of his or her inner comfort, support and ethical response in all situations. Recovered from the possession induced by the projection of divinity beyond herself, the soul is then freed to be fully at home in the world wherever she is and in whatever circumstance. On this Jung cites Eckhart, "For a man of right feeling has God with him" (ibid.: 246). Again citing Eckhart Jung contends that God thus internalized is not fetched from without (ibid.: 245). In Jung's terms such an individual is "not forever needing and hoping to get from the object what he lacks in himself" (ibid.: 246).

It should be noted that in this citation the object is the divine understood as wholly other than the human psyche. Against this view and inspired by Eckhart Jung writes in obvious agreement with the latter, "for Eckhart, God is a psychological or, to be more accurate, a *psychodynamic state*" (ibid.: 246).

Jung then embarks on a reading of Eckhart's understanding of the soul and her bliss or happiness in relation to God. In this Jung confers on Eckhart's formulation a modern psychological clarity which at the same time respects the word and spirit of the Meister. The operative passage Jung takes from Eckhart is one in which Eckhart writes that when the soul is in God she is not happy but when God is in the soul she is happy (ibid.: 246). The obvious but not explicit presupposition behind Jung's interpretation of this passage is that God is the power of the unconscious and the soul the mediator of its symbols to consciousness. In this function the soul is two-faced. She is both "a receiver and transmitter" (ibid.: 251). In this paradigm the soul is denied a subsistent, substantial nature, understood for better or worse as an enduring and more or less stable entity. Jung thus denies the objectivity of the soul as understood in some traditions to be infused at conception and remaining a constant objective substance or form throughout life. Rather Jung understands the soul as a living "relation to the unconscious" on the one hand; but on the other she is "a personification of unconscious contents" as they are mediated to consciousness through her (ibid.: 247). These "contents" would be the symbols which the soul, transparent to her depths, retrieves from the unconscious on their way to consciousness. Symbols of unconscious origin then become the reality of the soul on what can only be a passing and ever shifting basis. Not only the state but the substance of one's soul are the symbols she conveys to consciousness at any given time in an individual's life. The substance of the soul becomes the symbols she mediates as the individual's personal revelation and immediate access to God. If one is working through dreams their symbols are the soul and its current state, lending credence to occasional references in secondary Jungian literature to processes of psychic "soul making". These passages in Jung would justify the term. It should also be understood that these symbols could just as well be destructive to consciousness depending on how the ego responds to them. Efforts to resist the symbolic especially in a consciousness not attuned to the interior life and caught in the web of projected divinity can lead to the destruction of such truncated consciousness and become a source of suffering without relief or redemption. An example would be Jung's father who could only relate to the symbols and the dogma they engender but not to the experience they initially carried. Victims of such exteriority lose their souls in their relation to a God beyond the psyche.

On a more positive note, when the energy-bearing symbols of the unconscious flow through the soul they carry with them a "vitality", an experience of "life at its most intense", and "a oneness of being". The soul mediating such divine energy to consciousness lies behind Jung's remark, "God and the soul are essentially the same when regarded as personifications of an unconscious content" (ibid.: 248). Life simply flows. This is the state of Eastern *ananda,* of bliss in which the ego bows to the determining power of the unconscious and more specifically to the

fuller ingression of the self into conscious life (ibid.: 249). However, the recovery or internalization of the projection of the divine beyond the soul is not without its own peculiar distress and danger. Jung goes on to frame such recovery as no doubt difficult in itself but still a preliminary dynamic to the whole process he seeks to describe, relying again on Eckhart's medieval experience. For the recovery of projected divinity leads to a second movement of the soul which constitutes an even greater threat to psychic life than its submission to a divinity beyond itself.

This is the risk attached to the moment when the soul is in God and loses its bliss if it remains there. It is an elaboration of Eckhart's statement that the soul is not happy in God. For Jung suggests that in its role of mediator to consciousness of the depths of the divine in the unconscious the soul must enter those depths and risk being "overwhelmed by the divine *dynamis*" (ibid.: 251). It would appear that the soul must enter these depths and risk being lost in them, in Jung's terms "by no means a happy state" (ibid.). It involves a descent into what Jung calls the *deus absconditus*, the turbulent and potentially consuming side of the unconscious. At this point Jung uses foundational passages of Eckhart's experience to elucidate the "rhythm" of the soul into and out of the divine abyss. He cites the passage in which Eckhart so clearly distinguishes between Godhead and God. In his primordial identity with the Godhead Eckhart was not separated from God and so had no God. Jung identifies this as the original state of non-differentiation between ego and unconscious. But when Eckhart stepped out of the Godhead he was then other than God and so had a God other than and outside himself. For Jung this stepping out describes the emergence of the ego from the unconscious and the alienation from its origin implied in its removal therefrom. It is a "separation of ego as subject from God (= dynamis) as object" (ibid.: 255). For Eckhart God's ongoing birth in the soul, depicted in terms of the birth of Christ in the soul, becomes the soul's mediation of the unconscious to consciousness. But such mediation does not complete the dynamic involved. The birth of God in the soul is, for Jung and Eckhart, the initial step leading to a recovered identity of soul and Godhead beyond the alienating negation of this identity worked in creation understood as the separation of the ego from the originary unconscious. For Jung psychologically the birth of God in the soul precedes the soul's movement back to its primordial identity with the Godhead, that is, the ego is temporarily abolished in the unconscious in identity with it or God. Jung reads Eckhart's breakthrough to identity with the Godhead to describe a state when ego and unconscious are again indistinguishable. "God disappears as an object and dwindles into a subject no longer distinguishable from the ego" (ibid.). This formulation gives too much to the ego in terms of what Jung is trying to say. It would be more to the point if it read that the ego could not be distinguished from the unconscious, that is, God. But Jung does remove all doubt in his description of the consequence of this regression as part of the total cycle of renewal. "As a result of this retrograde process the original state of identity with God is re-established and new potential is produced" (ibid.). One must assume that Jung knew the full import of what he was writing when he used the noun "identity".

Nevertheless, it is crucial that the cyclical or rhythmic nature of the process be clear. Jung is arguing with Eckhart that the emergence of the ego from the unconscious is the substance of all mythic variants of creation and fall. The myth describes a universal condition that had to be overcome. Creation's initial proclamation of God is one of universal alienation. The defeat of this alienation is the recovery of the identity with God from which the ego has departed in entering the conscious world. The negation of God as other means the recovery of an original identity with God, for Eckhart in the Godhead, for Jung in the unconscious with the understanding that Eckhart's religious terminology and Jung's psychological terminology have the same referent. If this process congeals in any of its moments the consequence is pathological. The worship of divinity in the form of God or creature beyond the soul removes the soul through projection from the source of divine energy in the deeper psyche. Such idolatry would more likely lead to depression or despair. The more intense the faith in such a foreign God the greater the removal of its victims from the source of life often in the service of a divine imposition on humanity of a God foreign to it. However, the moment of recovered identity with divinity in the power of the life of the unconscious is one which would destroy the soul if it were to fall permanently into the hands of the living God or unconscious and lose permanently its relation to the conscious world. Hence the return from the womb of the all to a renewed consciousness is a necessary defeat of the psychosis of being trapped there. But the cycle must go on as the basic dynamic of religious and psychological maturation even though this dynamic rarely finds expression in such explicit language as Eckhart's formulation of his radical experience. Jung implies all this when he writes of this cycle, "It may well be a question of vital rhythm, of fluctuation of vital forces, which as a rule go on unconsciously" (ibid.: 253). For the majority they no doubt do but when Jung brings such rhythm to conscious psychological analysis the majority are the beneficiaries because what he and Eckhart describe are universal movements of the most profound life of the human soul. Though few undergo them so dramatically all are enhanced through their depiction of what is present and moving in all.

In his work on the gnostics Jung again closely associates the experience of the gnostics, the *atman/purusha* of the East and Eckhart with the "God without consciousness" (Jung 1968e: 192). But in these passage Jung specifically relates the "blessed non-existent God" of the Basilidians to the dialectic between self and ego. On the one hand the non-existence of God becomes the self as an *a priori* structure of a life to be lived just as this structure can only emerge into consciousness through the ego's dialogue with the self. The unknowing or unconscious God becomes the ultimate latency urging the individual's movement to a consciousness unified in itself and with the totality (ibid.: 190). This primal *a priori* power is of interest in a discussion of Eckhart because Jung here amplifies Eckhart with the gnostic imagery of an unconscious God divested of all definition in itself but the source of all derivative consciousness and definition. In this source there is no distinction, no othering and so unconsciousness. But again it is this non-existent

Godhead, the source of all that comes to exist including the Trinity, to which the ego regresses and in which it is dissolved in the experience of gnostic and Eckhart alike. In a paradox worthy of the Meister himself Jung writes, "As the Godhead is essentially unconscious, so is the man who lives in God" (ibid.: 193). The mystery of the unconscious God or Godhead is intensified because loss of ego as other than God bears with it the power of the numinous even though such experience be stripped of all content. Loss in the unconscious God, stark though it be, is of ultimate religious importance because "it identifies the Deity with the numinosity of the unconscious" (ibid.: 194). Symbols which address consciousness with images of wholeness or opposites reconciled emerge from this formless depth. For Jung such symbols express "the universal 'Ground', the Deity itself." This Ground then becomes the originary basis of all religions (ibid.: 195). Though Jung will deny to these formulations the status of metaphysics in the interests of scientific responsibility they do carry metaphysical import. Divinity and humanity share a point of coincidence of being in Jung's vastly expanded conception of the psyche. The coincidence remains when the birth of the ego sunders it apart but the underlying dialectic in the process is that once separated both divinity and humanity redeem each other as this point of original identity becomes conscious in human history in individual and collective.

In a brief treatment of Zen Jung relates Eckhart's experience to satori in the context of the poverty of Western spirituality devoid of such experience except in certain mystics. Only they can approach a Zen experience and go to the "non-ego-like self" in release from the "I-ness of consciousness" (Jung 1969g: 543, 545). On behalf of the mystical supersession of ego Jung relates Zen to Eckhart's "breakthrough" to identity with God as pure act citing again his sermon on poverty (ibid.: 543). He goes on to endorse such experience as badly needed in the West and to contend that spiritualities such as the Ignatian exercises and collective Christian consciousness remain fixed on imagery whose referent is to a God beyond the human. In response to such efforts Jung is explicit. "The characteristically Eckhartian assertion that 'God is nothingness' may well be incompatible in principle with the contemplation of the Passion, with faith and collective expectations" (ibid.: 548). These are daunting words since they do describe the present status of Western Christian religiosity in its sustained relation to a God other or wholly other than the human. Others have noted the similarity between themes in Eckhart and Zen and would agree to some large degree with Jung's comparisons (Schurmann 1978: 221–226). But in the end Schurmann fears even the most sensitive and scholarly comparison of Eckhart and Zen risks a certain reductionism in introducing a psychological analysis into the comparison (ibid.: 226). Schurmann does not define what he means by psychology. It remains an open question whether such fears would persevere in the face of a Jungian analysis. Jung's understanding of psyche would never be without an innate religious dimension that implicates ontology or the nature of being, based as it is upon the psyche's universal generation of the religious experience. More, in deepening this insight through an analysis of the apophatic experience, Jung would argue

that the ego must go beyond itself into an identity with its origin which would then inform its consciousness with an innately religious perception of what is and so engage the realm of formal epistemology. Like Zen in the end the mountain would still be a mountain but perceived quite differently than before the experience.

Contemporary scholarship on both Eckhart and Jung shows some awareness of the importance of both Eckhart's mysticism and Jung's appropriation of it for the revitalization of contemporary spirituality. Don Cupitt, a leading Cambridge theologian interested in the recovery of a mystical religious sense as a major contribution to religion's recovery in a post-modernist age, presents a most insightful analysis of Eckhart's mysticism (Cupitt 1998: 95–104). Cupitt also sees that the mystics are ecclesially subversive in their denial of the objectivity of God as an entity other than human whose saving graces are mediated by the church. This perspective would undermine the claim by the Church and all ecclesial or political bodies that they are the possessors and medium of an absolute truth, religious or secular (ibid.: 120, 121). In a Jungian context such claims could still be legitimately based on a capacity to mediate to consciousness the unconscious as the ultimate source of all salvation-bearing societies, religious or social. This would involve the relativity of all such claims. However, given the unconsciousness so manifest in the literalism and legalism which continues to bond redemptive communities such an outcome is highly unlikely to become widespread in the foreseeable future. For Eckhart, Jung and Cupitt confessional religiosity remains the basis of a dualism between the divine and the human, the natural and supernatural, which cannot be defeated in this world or in the next where the difference between the divine and creature is maintained in such images, for instance, as the "beatific vision" (ibid.: 54, 56). The mystics defeat such dualism in both worlds, the here and the hereafter, by insisting on their experienced identity with the divine in the here and now. In affirming such identity Eckhart is brought to the fore. Cupitt describes his experience of reimmersion in the Godhead acutely and accurately as a "double meltdown" (ibid.: 118–122). The meltdown obliterates the distinction between the divine and human in the all encompassing nothing of identity and with it comes an astonishing happiness in the present (ibid.: 121). Because the mystic realizes that he or she is undermining the credibility of the church as the possessor of a supernatural truth based on an eternal dualism between the divine and the human they must defend their writing with "a plausible deniability" which the mystic can bring to his or her defence should inquisitorial powers come calling (ibid.: 120). As seen the credible deniability was to no avail with Marguerite at the stake nor Eckhart at his trial.

Along similar lines Lionel Corbett has raised the question of whether for Jungian psychology an objective God exists beyond the psyche and concludes that Jungian psychology defers taking a position on this issue. However, he does illuminate what is at stake in the question. Either the psyche itself creates the Gods as a projection of its native energies, a perspective Corbett attributes to "the mystical traditions of all the world religions", or the psyche transmits the experience of a God who remains beyond it even in the transmission (Corbett 1996:

7–10). If the first option were adopted the psyche would be the creator of the sense of divinity and so the divinities. If the second option were adopted the psyche would be the medium through which a wholly transcendent God impacted consciousness. The second option would prompt the question of why God would create the unconscious as his vehicle of expression? Why not speak directly to the human? In his later alchemical work and work on Job Jung moves further away from the idea of the psyche as the mediator of a wholly transcendent divinity. Rather in continuity with the insights of Eckhart, Jung makes it increasingly clear that divinity creates humanity as the soul source of its own self-consciousness in a process entirely and exhaustively understood as the archetypal unconscious becoming progressively conscious in the human. In terms then of the options Corbett presents the later Jung would move to the first, that the allegedly wholly other God is the God who appears from the depths of the unconscious and not from foreign heavens. Much closer to Jung Corbett agrees that apophatic theology relativizes all absolute claims in its understanding of a fruitful nothingness beyond exhaustion in any or all of its expressions. Claims of an exhaustive revelation are, as suggested above, idolatrous (ibid.: 224). Corbett is also acute in seeing in the Godhead, as Eckhart would understand it, that which is analogous to the psychoid, that dimension of the psyche unknowable in itself and prior to all differentiation yet also the source of all conscious differentiation (ibid.: 113). This power, unknowable in itself, expresses itself in potentially infinite ways or at least in as many ways as there are individuals capable of its unmediated reception, i.e. everyone. In terms of honoring divinity as manifest in one's personal and unique life Corbett issues the challenge that one must forego the comfort of "classical theism" (ibid.: 39). The dualism inherent in all forms of theism and in all forms of the schizoid distinction of natural from supernatural worlds is hostile to the organic relation of the human to the divine within the greatly extended psyche of Jungian psychology. Corbett is again correct in affirming that such ontological intimacy of the divine and the human is more compatible with Eastern forms of thought as Jung himself was to claim (ibid.: 39, 42, 45). In the West, "Grace comes from elsewhere; at all events from outside" (Jung 1969f: 482). Against the background of these remarks Corbett's insight is all the more stinging when he remarks that many analysts cling to conceptions of monotheistic dualism reflective of their Judaeo-Christian roots perhaps unconscious of their bias or more likely their failure to understand and integrate more deeply the religious implications of Jung's understanding of the religious function of the psyche (Corbett 1996: 42).

Out of the precedence Jung's psychology gives to the interior life Corbett appreciates mystical experience as among the more powerful forms of such inwardness as he amplifies the psychological implications of Jung's appropriation of Eckhart. He too cites Eckhart's injunction to let go of all knowing and willing which would objectify the divine and human over against each other and to move to the experience, with its affinity to Advaita Vedanta, that "I and God are actually one" (ibid.: 31). He points to Eckhart's Christology based on the reality that "Christ came to remind us of our divinity" (ibid.: 109). He relates Eckhart's statements to the effect

that "I am the cause that God is God" to the differentiation of the ego from the unconscious (ibid.: 159, 160). He interprets Eckhart's appreciation of suffering as the occasion when suffering itself presents the opportunity for the self and the numinous to erupt into consciousness and address the suffering triggering the experience. Few commentators have yet to so thoroughly address the religious implications of Jung's understanding of mystical dialectical identity with the divine and especially the formulations given to such identity by Eckhart (ibid.).

The experience of the point of identity between the divine and the human drew Jung to Eckhart. It lies at the basis of Eckhart's statement that the return to divinity is nobler than the flowing out. In Eckhart's experience the moment of identity is the highest moment and the culmination of the soul's journey back to God. A glance at Eckhart's biography would discount any suggestion that his return to identity with the divine impaired his return to mundane activity. If anything Eckhart's identity with the divinity gave him the energy driving a life of consistent action and achievement. Yet the most cited mystic in Jung's work, Jacob Boehme, also went to the one, the point of identity, only to find that the return revealed a self-contradictory divinity whose polarities could only be resolved in a humanity created for that purpose. To Boehme and his emphasis on the return we now turn.

4

JUNG ON BOEHME

The co-redemption of the divine and human

Jacob Boehme shares a primacy of place with Eckhart in Jung's treatment of specific Western mystics. Even more than with Eckhart foundational elements in Boehme's mystical experience clearly anticipate essential elements in Jung's psychology. Such resonance does not mean that Jung simply copied dominant themes of Boehme's experience into his depiction of the psyche's deeper movements. Jung's psychology is not a pastiche made up of various sympathetic historical sources cobbled together into a psychology. Rather Jung saw in Boehme's narrative experiences dramatically similar to those of the contemporary psyche which he witnessed in his patients' material. In fact one of Jung's most expansive treatments of Boehme is an amplification of the artwork of one of his clients.

Boehme shared certain experiences with Eckhart. But the affective tonality and overall directionality of his experience is significantly different. Whereas the movement of Eckhart's experience is inward and culminates in the calm frugality of the desert in the nothingness of the Godhead, Boehme's language and imagery is charged with an emotional volatility and intensity verging on the unintelligible (Dourley 2010f: 223–226). Indeed Boehme does follow Eckhart inward to the experience of what Boehme calls the *ungrund,* analogous to Eckhart's Godhead. Yet he differs significantly from Eckhart in the emphasis he places on the return from the One or nothing and the consequences the return has for the divine and human as they both emanate from a common maternal origin.

Put summarily as a stance to be further delineated, Boehme's experience is that the conflict within the divine has not been resolved eternally either in a Godhead beyond the Trinity or in self-contained Trinitarian life itself but must be resolved in human historical consciousness created for that purpose. Whereas Eckhart identifies a fourth in the Godhead beyond the creating Trinity, Boehme completes the picture, identifying humanity as the fourth in which divinity completes itself in history. When their experience is combined it constitutes a double quaternity, a plunge into the depths of divinity, a fourth beyond the trinity, consummated in a humanity itself completing the divine in the unfolding of history. Eckhart's Godhead is the fourth beyond the Trinity in divinity. Boehme's humanity is the fourth beyond the Trinity in finite existence. In terms of Jungian psychology Boehme's experience is that of the redemption of the divine in the human framed

as the unconscious progressively emerging into consciousness as the underlying meaning and telos of history itself (Dourley 2004: 60–71). This perspective would add a powerful religious, psychological and historical note to current theories of emergence.

The question then arises of how best to present Boehme in himself and Jung's appropriation of Boehme. The core affinity rests in their joint understanding of human subjectivity, the psyche, as the sole historical theatre of the mutual redemption of the divine in the human and of the human in the divine. Such internal resolution serves, then, as the basis of external resolution in the fields of archetypal conflict, especially religious and political. The approach taken here will present a brief outline of Boehme's biography and historical surroundings, helpful because the experiences that ground his mysticism are datable and, from a psychological perspective, probably in some continuity. Boehme's inaugural experience is probably experientially continuous with Boehme's consequent personal and visionary life. Though Boehme's writing defies a too formal systematization there are certain themes that predominate and are present on a more or less consistent basis. Drawing them out without turning them into a wooden philosophy risking the loss of their power supports the correlation Jung himself made between foundational themes in Boehme's mysticism and the structure and dynamic of psychic maturation. The identification of affinities between Jung's observation of the maturing psyche and Boehme's religious experience could serve to bring new life to contemporary religious self-understanding and experience and a much deeper sense of all that is at stake in the broader implications of Jung's understanding of the psyche, religion and history, individual and collective.

Biographical background

Jacob Boehme was born the fourth of five children in Old Seidenberg near Gorlitz in Lusatia on April 24, 1575. His parents were land-owners and farmers with a certain prominence in the community (Weeks 1991: 35, 36; Stoudt 1957: 43, 44). There had been a history of religious concern and conviction in the family. Boehme's grandfather and father were distinguished members of the church and had also served as magistrates. Early in life Boehme began an apprenticeship as a shoemaker and moved to nearby Gorlitz around 1592 (Weeks 1991: 42). In 1599 he was made a citizen of Gorlitz, acquired a cobbler shop and practice and married his wife, Catharina, with whom he had four sons between 1600 and 1611 (ibid.: 42, 43; Stoudt 1957: 48, 49).

Boehme was born into a place and time rife with religious and political strife. It was the century of the Reformation and tensions between the various Christian factions and their political support swirled about Silesia and Lusatia. Historically the area had been disturbed in the previous century by the reverberations of the condemnation and execution of John Huss. In his century Boehme would be caught up in specifically religious disputes within the factions of the Reformation and between the Reformation and the counter-Reformation. Within the former

community he would be exposed to tensions between religious enthusiasm (Anabaptists), a more or less established Lutheranism, and an emerging Calvinism (Weeks 1991: 14–31). Though he lived in the calm of an historical respite following the early wars of the Reformation, a calm characterized by a certain pluralism and tolerance among the various religious factions, nevertheless it was an environment marked by the tensions destined to break out in the Thirty Years religious wars which decimated Germany (1618–1648). Added to this turbulence was the ever present possibility of invasion by Islamic forces from the south-east.

Religious currents not specifically Christian were also at work in Boehme's surroundings and person. His own works show considerable knowledge of alchemy. Paracelsus was an influence in his society and in the course of his life Boehme became acquainted with the kabbala. There is some evidence of it even in his first work, later called the *Aurora* (Stoudt 1957: 88, 89 fns. 16, 17). More, Boehme lived in the period when Renaissance Neoplatonism was a new force prominent in such representatives as Pico Della Mirandola (Weeks 1991: 204–205). Giordano Bruno was executed in 1600, the year of Boehme's inaugural vision. Bruno, among others, had been intrigued by the implications of a radically immanent divinity and its relation to science and nature, and in a synthetic unitary mind bringing together these disparate perspectives (ibid.: 49). Thus both the conflictual institutional and political faces of religion as well as the immediate experiential basis of religion in the individual facing these external conflicts were much to the fore in Boehme's early environment and in his mind. At a more individual level he struggled throughout his life with the tensions between the elaboration of his illuminations, their extra-Christian elaborations and his residual Christian belief and piety.

The illuminations

Boehme, like Jung, seems to have been possessed with a profound religious sensitivity from his younger years. Abraham von Frackenberg, Boehme's anecdotal biographer and friend, refers to an early illumination following a personal moral crisis when Boehme was an apprentice prior to 1599 (ibid.: 40, 41). Boehme would have been in his mid-twenties. The impact apparently lasted some seven days. It may have been induced by Boehme's personal piety and sense of probity and by the religious disturbances caused by the political/theological disputes of his time, disputes that apparently then evoked a residual sadness in him.

His melancholy extended to a sense of the strangeness of nature which he felt to be hostile to his then presiding spirituality. Out of this crucible came the major inaugural illumination of 1600 (ibid.: 61, 125). Boehme describes it as lasting a quarter of an hour. He refers to it in a letter and in his first work, the *Morgenrothe im Aufgang*, *Rising Dawn*, commonly called the *Aurora* (ibid.: 1, 2, fn. 1). This immense work was never fully finished and was published only in 1612, 12 years after the illumination that informs it, no doubt reinforced by further illumination in 1610 and continued in 1619. The initial event is also mentioned by his biographer

and friend von Franckenberg. A glance into a pewter or tin vessel reflecting sunlight occasioned Boehme's entering the "secret heart of nature, into a concealed divine world" (ibid.: 1; Stoudt 1957: 49, 50). From the vision he walked outside the city and could see in his verdant surrounding the living presence of divinity, somehow in its trinitarian form, in all he surveyed. The experience dissolved the alienation between himself and the divine and himself and nature in favour of a lifelong conviction of their underlying identity as the basis of their intimate complicity in the knowing of each other.

His later visions and writings were but expansive elaborations and refinements in continuity with the initial vision. The lasting impact of the experience has provoked one commentator to ask, "How was it possible that the entire expanding and evolving agglomeration of his thought could continue to appear to him as the elaboration of one brief moment of integral insight?" (Weeks 1991: 51). The answer might well be given in archetypal theory. The numinous power of the archetype can demand a lifetime of assimilation, especially at a moment when the archetypal world is fostering a consciousness that contests or even supersedes the presiding myth or collective consciousness. If St. Paul's experience of the power of the archetypal self on the road to Damascus so completely transformed his world and became the basis of a lifetime of elaboration, why would not a similar experience transform Boehme's and of its own dynamic reinforce its elaboration in subsequent variant recurrences? Each illumination became the protagonist of a newly evolving consciousness continuous with the inaugural event, deepening a consciousness which would eventually transform the cultures into which it was born. The intensity of the religious and political conflict soon to bring on the desolation of the Thirty Years War could well elicit from the unconscious a vision of divinity as the universal ground of mind, nature and of religious experience itself. The revelation of an underlying and universal divine presence would greatly offset the lethal tensions between its partial manifestation taken as absolute and exhaustive by religion and religious/political sectarianism then and now. Efforts of historians to see in Boehme's experience no more than a personal and reasonable construct in the face of a conflict which was about to decimate much of Europe in the Thirty Years War miss the contribution his archetypal experience made to a line of historical development that would, in Jungian terms, increasingly frame specific revelations as variants of their universal and common origin in the ground of the psyche itself. It is therefore not surprising that Boehme's first illumination was followed by other datable experiences, in 1610 (ibid.: 61) and again in 1619 (Stoudt 1957: 101, 102; Walsh 1983: 10, 11). One has the impression that though there were particularly intense experiences in these later years they were not unrelated to the initiatory event of 1600.

Possibly the title of Boehme's first publication in 1612 relates to the alchemical work, the *Aurora Consurgens*, also known to Jung and falsely attributed to Thomas Aquinas. Jung himself wonders if Boehme was familiar with the work at least by name but hard evidence is lacking (Jung 1968c: 396; Weeks 1991: 29). The historical consequences of the circulation of this first work are worthy of

note. In 1606, Martin Moller, the pastor of Gorlitz, died. After his death the new pastor was Gregor Richter. Moller had been favourable to Boehme's experience and spirituality and, indeed, may have been an early inspiration to Boehme (Stoudt 1957: 51, 52). In the spirit of Boehme, Moller was of a more mystical bent, hostile to the lifelessness of Protestant intellectualism and scholasticism (Erb 1978: 5, 6). Richter, himself of humble origin, but more a guardian of strict orthodoxy, of traditional learning and of clerical structure, was to prove much less sympathetic (Weeks 1991: 94). Richter read Boehme's *Aurora* and was enraged by it. His enmity for Boehme was to last until their deaths in 1624 (ibid.: 28, 209–212). In 1613, he took measures that resulted in Boehme being brought before the magistrates of Gorlitz, being forbidden to write again and having his first book confiscated (Erb 1978: 6; Stoudt 1957: 72–76).

Boehme dutifully observed the ban on writing until 1620. At this time, possibly driven by the power of a further illumination in 1619, Boehme began to write again. During his seven-year sabbatical of silence since his first book in 1612, Boehme had had contact with individuals familiar with Paracelsus, alchemy and the kabbala (Erb 1978: 4, 5). For this reason certain commentators describe this period as the alchemical period or middle period (Stoudt 1957: 119, 147). It begins with the *Three Principles of Divine Being* and continues with a number of major works written in 1620 and 1621. Though one cannot draw lines too closely in such matters, a third period of his writings could be called the writings of his maturity. Stoudt, for instance, is of the opinion that beginning with parts of the work entitled the *Signature of All Things*, and including such works as *The Way To Christ* and the *Mysterium Magnum*, Boehme returns to a position that is more orthodox and Christian though even these later works were not entirely free of alchemical influence and wording (ibid.: 147). Nor were they free of vast opposition among the clergy and especially Richter.

In an interesting aside directed to this issue Jung notes that up to the time of Boehme there had been a tendency for the anthropos image in its alchemical variant to absorb the Christ figure. The symbol of the anthropos is one that conveys the sense of the individual's unique truth as a participant in the human totality. For Jung this would imply that the anthropos imagery of the true individual was not dependent on its Christian variant but rather preceded Christianity as the wider archetypal base of which the image of Christ as anthropos would be one expression. "The alchemical Anthropos showed itself to be independent of any dogma" (Jung 1970: 349). From this perspective the symbol of anthropos is a more universal power than its concretion in the Christ figure. Then Jung remarks that from the time of Boehme in the seventeenth century this process was reversed and alchemy was used to amplify and enrich the Christ figure. Such enrichment could move to synthesis of alchemy with a livelier and more immediate experience of the Christ as an image of the anthropos (ibid.: 349, 350, fn. 350). Jung has considerable scholarly support for his insight in this matter. After 1622 Boehme does turn away from alchemy and to a concern more specifically Christian reflected in the publication of a series of essays in the *The Way to Christ*, published on New Year's day,

1624 (Erb 1978: 7). Yet even here his orthodoxy is extended. In this work he implies that the relation of the originary nothing to the something suggests the necessity of creation. His understanding of the mysterious figure of Sophia in relation to the Trinity implies a quaternity, a point not missed by Richter. He also restates that evil manifest in creation is an expression of its divine source, the fire of God's wrath in conflict with light, both within and beyond that source.

During the period of authorship following 1620 Boehme was secretly distributing his works in manuscript form to those interested in them and receiving many discussants in his home. Thus he was building up something of a reputation in certain circles which remained, if not hidden, at least unknown to and unexamined by ecclesial and orthodox authorities. When his *The Way to Christ*, published by associates and not by Boehme on New Year's Day, 1624, fell into the hands of Gregory Richter it again offended the latter's sense of orthodoxy and renewed his enmity toward Boehme. Richter published a series of pamphlets dating from March 5, 1624, accusing Boehme of error, and among other things suggesting, with some insight, that Boehme taught a quaternity instead of a Trinity (Stoudt 1957: 177–184; Weeks 1991: 211, 212). Once more he initiated action that led to Boehme's second appearance before the Council of Gorlitz with what could be taken as the very serious charge of heresy. After some debate and division in the council it refused to charge him with heresy and he was temporarily exiled from the town. The decree reads that he is "enjoined to seek fortune elsewhere" (Stoudt 1957: 178). Cooler heads were to prevail in the Council and the exiled Boehme was sought out and returned to Gorlitz with honor restored a few days later. The council accepted his pledge to live a quiet and peaceful life in Gorlitz after only a few days absence (Stoudt 1957: 179–184).

This time of difficulty happened to coincide with an invitation to travel to Dresden to expose his religious position to the court of the Elector of Saxony, Johan Georg. He accepted the invitation in May 1624. Although well received in the Dresden court, he never met the elector and the conversations he had with highly placed court officials remain ambiguous in import and outcome (Weeks 1991: 213–216). His hope that the court and the Elector might favour what he was then describing as a "new reformation" was never realized (ibid.: 210). More, in his absence in Dresden the mobs of ecclesial orthodoxy urged on by Richter threatened to attack his home and his wife in Gorlitz (ibid.: 217; Stoudt 1957: 186, 187). The threat to the security of faith-based certitude, especially in the name of the freedom of individual experience, seems always to demand a high price, one that Jung also was to pay in his feeling of isolation from his culture and colleagues in proposing a psychology that grew out of his own experience. Upon his return to Gorlitz in July Boehme fell ill in August and died there in the presence of his family after receiving the sacrament of the supper on November 17, 1624. His last words were a triumphant, "Now I am traveling thence into paradise" (ibid.: 218).

Boehme scholarship can emphasize the specificities of his life story, his reliance on his self-acquired knowledge of the Christian and other religious and philosophical traditions and his fateful immersion in the conflicted religious and

cultural circumstances of his day. But the emphasis on historical detail in the interests of scholarly responsibility universally concedes that the experience which structures his work derives from his illuminations and the perspective that the illuminations gave him in his perception of human and non-human nature. This is not to deny Boehme's self-acquired erudition. It is to deny that he could have responded to his times or assimilated the many traditions evident in his work without his intense and personal experience reflected in the traditions he brings to bear in its elucidation.

In fact the volatility of his writing style bears out his opinion that the religiosity to which he had been exposed prior to his illuminations was rendered pallid by them. Here Boehme, like Eckhart, whose work he may have known indirectly through his reading of Tauler, one of Eckhart's students and a mystic himself (Stoudt 1957: 80, fn. 5), is moving toward modern consciousness in so much as he raises the question and strongly suggests that spirituality and psychology coincide in the ground of human interiority. He is also aware that the coincidence of the spiritual and the psychological experience has a profound implication for the manner in which divine transcendence is related to immanence. The experience of the movements of divine life at the base of one's humanity would point to the conclusion that the experience of God within life is the only enlivening basis for the experience of God as beyond life if within and beyond are capable of real distinction in Boehme's experience. Thus critical commentary on Boehme is also aware of the pantheistic implications of his experience and the challenge of his life long concern to express his experiences in ways that did not mute their immediacy and yet would also guarantee a transcendent element acceptable to biblically based orthodoxy. He is very modern in solving this problem by showing humanity's sense of transcendence to be a function of the experience of the God within as the basis of nature and human nature while affirming that this presence expresses a power greater than the totality of its manifestations in visible creation. And yet the profound sense of a divine immanence was the distinguishing basis of the solution he had to offer to the religious conflict in which he lived and which was shortly to decimate Europe.

Archetypal conflicts still rage today and their relief through an awareness of the common ground of all parties possessed by archetypal influence, that is, by faith, religious or political, may be as distant now as it was in Boehme's time. The recovery of this common ground would remain as equally effective in our time as it might have been in Boehme's. And yet, as in Boehme's time, the spirit of ecclesial orthodoxy seems instinctively to sense the perceived danger of too great an affirmation of the intimacy between the divine and the human let alone their coinherence seeking greater awareness as the deeper meaning of history. The need to disrupt religious harmony with a vigorously maintained schizoid split between the natural and supernatural remains a basic necessity for those in exclusive possession of the final invasion of the human by the non-human. The link between the final revelation and the final solution still remains obscure to the archetypally possessed.

Foundational themes

Hegel was to call Boehme the originator of a distinctly German philosophy but at the same time described his writing as "barbaric" and so in need of Hegel's rational clarification to save its valued meaning (Hegel 1990: 119, 120). Hegel was correct. Boehme's "barbaric" prose with its seemingly unrestrained symbolic outpouring is truly defiant of systematic or what Hegel terms "consistent presentation" (ibid.: 121). Even Boehme's own late effort to do so in his *Clavis* as the key to his previous work hardly meets the criterion of strict discursive reasoning. What follows is an effort to present basal themes as they appear and recur in what might be called the unfolding of the divine/human drama in Boehme's religious experience and its development throughout his life.

The ungrund, the matrix and the nothing

Like Eckhart Boehme had experienced the reality and power of the ground. In his unschooled manner he termed it the "*ungrund*", probably a derivative of the "*urgrund*" or primordial ground. The term and its parallels describe the most remote dimension of divine life, that from which all else derives. In his usage the term is effectively interchangeable with the "One", the matrix and the nothing. It resonates with Marguerite's experience that the nothing is the all in this One. He shares with Eckhart the experience that the "*ungrund*" is itself divested of content. It is wholly unconscious (Stoudt 1957: 115, 116, 198–203). It is wholly indeterminate and somehow precedes the will to action that is nevertheless ever latent in it. In this respect, like Eckhart's Godhead, the *ungrund* precedes Trinitarian distinction and so cannot be equated with the Father as the first principle of Trinitarian life. This precedent power is "the cause and ground of the eternal Trinity" (Boehme 1911: 2; Stoudt 1957: 216; Weeks 1991: 149). Religiously this power precedes the Trinity; psychologically it precedes the archetypal.

Yet even in their like description of this most remote domain of divine life Boehme's experience begins to depart from Eckhart's. Eckhart tends to leave the reader with the culminating moment of identity with a Godhead divested of all form and activity though he clearly affirms that this identity, once undergone, never leaves him in his existential life. In contrast with Eckhart, Boehme vests the nothing with a certain indeterminate but powerful will which is the basis of its need for expression in order to know itself in its expression. On this point Boehme makes explicit what Eckhart leaves undefined, namely, that the *ungrund* precedes the Trinity and gives birth to the Trinity as both as its primordial expression and the basis of the expression of the *ungrund's* potential beyond divine life in creation. Otherwise there would be nothing other than the nothing in which all is latent but unspoken, undefined, and so unreal. "If there were not such a desiring perceptibility, and outgoing operation of the Trinity in the Eternal Unity, the Unity were but an eternal stillness, a Nothing;… likewise there would be nothing in this world… there could be no world at all" (Boehme 1911: 4). Religiously the *ungrund* had to

express itself beyond itself both in the Trinity and in creation; psychologically what precedes the archetypal comes to know itself only in the archetype as the basis of archetypal expression in human consciousness. Here, like Eckhart, Boehme describes a God immovable in itself, yet moving to a God who must create to know itself. And so the ground proceeds from the *ungrund* as the Trinity. The trinitarian opposites are the primal emanation from the preceding matrix, the nothing in which the all is latent. The Trinity as first emanation then becomes the basis of the emanation of the created world from it. This primordial nothingness then is effectively the maternal source of what is alive both within and beyond God. For Boehme and Jung it is the living truth of the Great Mother and the preceding basis of the *Mysterium Magnum*, understood as the experienced power of the Trinity as the living substrate of all creation and its opposites including good and evil (ibid.: 10, 50; Stoudt 1957: 244, 245; Weeks 1991: 101, 104). Boehme's inaugural vision was that of the inherence of the mind and of nature in the energies of the Trinity and, beyond the Trinity, in the maternal nothingness of the *ungrund* from which Trinity, humanity and nature proceed (Stoudt 1957: 259; Weeks 1991: 70).

The Trinity

The dialectic of Trinitarian life for Boehme is a dialectic in which every existent participates. In effect the traditional distinction between an intra-Trinitarian and an extra-Trinitarian procession within and beyond divine life is negated. Human consciousness and nature itself are stamped or signed with the dynamic of a trinitarian pulse beating within God and beyond God in the human. There is only one pulse and it is intense. Its first power is described as a dark fire and given a male valence effectively identified with an unrelated self-affirmation (Stoudt 1957: 224–229). This power is the Father in a tamer orthodox imagery. In Boehme's symbolism it can closely relate to the reality of hell into which the devil and lost souls descended in their effort to affirm themselves directly out of their divine origin unrelated to the light and warmth of a more benign disclosure in the second trinitarian principle (Boehme 1911: 47, 48; 1958: 25–29, 32). Either principle without the other presents as truncated an image of God as would the absence of the light of the ego or darkness of the unconscious distort the total psyche. This first energy, the dark fire of the Father's willfulness, would be Jung's Satan, the *deus absconditus*, the God of creative chaos, familiar to and feared by Luther and alchemist alike (Jung 1969d: 175).

The second power is identified with a kindly revealing light whom the darkness cannot grasp or, more precisely, extinguish. Between the two even in their unity there is a certain enmity, a kind of inpenetrability of the darkness by the light which has to be broken toward a certain reciprocity and interpenetration. This conflict and its resolution is to the fore in Jung's appropriation of Boehme because it describes the dynamic of the relation of the ego to the unconscious. In Boehme's primal reciprocity the light breaks into the darkness of the first principle, which cannot quench it (Boehme 1911: 10). In more traditional imagery this light would

be Christ as the Logos or expression of the Father's unbounded creativity united to its expression by and in the Spirit. But with Boehme the figure of light is vested with a compensatory androgynous character. Though obviously a Christ figure it functions as a bride of the soul, now the recipient of the kiss of Christ, and the way to a deeper ingression into the fullness of Trinitarian life. The imagery implies that this androgynous figure leads the soul into the depths of the divine and into the union of its opposites, fire and light. In this context Boehme tends to closely relate Sophia with an androgynous Christ figure whose function is to lead the soul to Christ and, as his bride, into a deeper ingression into the Trinitarian coincidence of the foundational opposites, fire and light (Boehme 1909: 230; 1978: 154).

Boehme's experience of Sophia and his description of her as somehow of less stature than the trinitarian powers but closely associated with them as almost their bond and operative in their specific activity must likely remain ambiguous. Her proximity to divinity in Boehme's mythology may well have been the basis of Richter's accusation that Boehme's experience of divinity is that of a quaternity. The basis for this accusation would lie in both the suggestion of a fourth preceding and causing the Trinity, the *ungrund* (Stoudt 1957: 207), and in the person of Sophia herself (Walsh 1983: 75). The accusation may thus have some justification though it remains very difficult to be too precise on the function and status of the all encompassing power of Sophia in Boehme's symbology. In certain formulations she could be closely related to the light and loving side of the Christ figure. She is referred to as "consubstantial with the Trinity", associated with the function of each person yet not distinct in her own right (Stoudt 1957: 216). She also is closely related to the Holy Spirit as the energy informing the outgoing divine manifestation in creation (ibid.: 215, 216). In Jungian parlance she would relate to the feminine side of the figure of Christ, a side excluded by orthodoxy, which split the feminine from the divine in the person of Mary. Despite this ambiguity her presence in Boehme's vision pays tribute to the depth into which he penetrated the life of God and the unconscious. Not only did he recognize the maternal quality of the divine ground as the creative nothing and so source of all but also identified the power of a feminine wisdom figure both within the divine and in the process of the emanation of creation from the divine. Effectively he experienced what Jung calls the *anima mundi*, or soul of the world, that is the feminine power which runs through all that is.

Boehme's depiction of Trinitarian life as a unity of opposites seeking their resolution in eternal interplay is susceptible of an orthodox reading. However, Boehme breaks definitively with traditional Trinitarian theology in its affirmation that the opposites are brought together in the Trinity in eternity as the precondition and source of their union in human life. Neither Boehme nor Jung can support this position. For both the conflict in divine life is not resolved in eternity but in time as the meaning of each life and of history itself. This means that individual and collective human consciousness is the sole locus in which divinity can perceive its opposites as the precondition to their resolution. Thus a compulsively self-manifesting God becomes self-conscious in a humanity aware of the divine opposites

and tasked with their resolution in time. Boehme like Jung would identify the dynamics of this process as a return to the originary power of what is as the necessary prelude to the resolution of the divine opposites in the now of lowly existence.

All of this wealth of imagery was latent in Boehme's inaugural vision in 1600, later deepened and extended in 1610 and 1619 (Walsh 1983; 118, fn. 2). Boehme refers to this vision as a discrete event in time at a moment in his life in 1600. He talks of a *blitz or "flash"* of insight generating a *blick*, a "glance", suggesting an insight or intuition of permanently transformative power (ibid.: 50). Stoudt puts it well when he states that the *blick* for Boehme was God's self-knowledge through the human and the human's knowledge of God and of God's trinitarian presence in all of nature (Stoudt 1957: 259). Boehme closely relates the impact of his insight to a crack, as in the splitting of a rock, and will relate the experience of the crack to Christ, as light, breaking the rock of the Father's hardness and in so doing releasing life from death in the confinement of the first principle or Father (Boehme 1909: 426). As we shall see this imagery is analogous to the imagery of one of Jung's clients who drew it in the form of lightning splitting a rock and so opening her to the energies of the unconscious in an initial fragmenting of her resistance. In Boehme's case this instant revealed to him that the trinity sought the unity of its opposites in him as the basis of the deepest spiritual challenge in his life, namely the resolution of the unresolved conflict in trinitarian life, which could only take place in his own. As an immediate participant in trinitarian life its conflicts were his and to be resolved in his life and by extension in the life of humanity. But the vitality of trinitarian life was not confined to human nature. Rather it flowed through nature itself and so the continuity of the human with the trinity extended to the continuity of both with surrounding nature, now to be endorsed as a manifestation of God and accepted in its dark and bright sides as such.

The initial and consequent revelations would mean that human interiority would be the place where the fire and light of God, Father and Son would unite. This union Boehme images as a *temperatur*, and a tincture, a kind of tempering of the human spirit through its participation in the unifying of divine opposites much as a blade would be tempered in fire (Boehme 1911: 47; Walsh 1983: 88, 89). Metallurgy thus became the basis of a number of significant images for the union of divine opposites of a dark fire and a benign light moving to coincidence in divine and human life.

Creation

A number of features of Boehme's thought on creation and its emanation from ground and Trinity are radical and with great difficulty made compatible with theistic orthodoxy. The created proceeds from its maternal ground or root and all that is remains naturally rooted in the being of its source in nature and consciously so in human nature. Traditional doctrinal formulation would describe a creator God who created "*ex nihilo sui et subjecti",* from nothing of himself or of a subject. That God does not create from any subject denies the possibility of an eternal matter used by

the creator in creation much as an eternal creator would use eternally available mud to build a castle, or in this case, the world and its inhabitants. But the first denial that God does not create from himself is a statement that there is nothing of God natively, naturally and ontologically present in what God authors as creator. Boehme's vision denies this proposition. God as trinitarian is in the being of the created and of the human mind. In fact divinity in its trinitarian modality of opposites in conflict is a potential experience native to the human mind because the mind and nature natively inhere in the movement of trinitarian life and in the maternal nothing that precedes Trinity. The experience of Trinity is thus natural to the mind as it moves into the recovery of its rootedness in the Trinity and the preceding mother of the Trinity.

Boehme's initial illumination is really a revelation of the native inherence of mind and nature in the Trinity as the locus in which the Trinity seeks the relief of its eternal self-contradiction. This aspect of his vision is a thoroughgoing form of Trinitarian pantheism. Such intimacy prompts the comment that Boehme is dealing with a universal and potentially experiential "consubstantiality" or trinitarian ubiquity. Such a universal intimation of a felt trinitarian vitality native to the mind rests on the experience of the mutual interpenetration of divinity with human life and nature (Weeks 1991: 46, 47; Walsh 1983: 13, 21, 64). The presence of the eternal in time, the infinite in the finite and the dynamics of the life to the Trinity as the underlying life of all that is serves then as the basis of a universal sacramentalism which would sustain sacramental and ritual practice in every particular tradition and in personal life. This is a valuable insight. It would imply that sacramental and ritual activity when performed in discontinuity from the sense of a universal sacramentalism would be an act of magic coercive of the divine through the performance of a religious drama commanding a divine response or favour in discontinuity from a universal divine presence and ontological reality. Only Boehme's universal pantheism validates a non-pathological sacramental practice specific to one or other institutional variant because it grounds all of them in the vitality of the divine in the depth of mind and nature themselves. The sacramental would thus be seen as an expression of such pantheism and serve to intensify such pantheistic sensitivity in participants in sacramental ritual. The absence of such vitality in the sacramental life of so many traditions is at the root of their emptiness, their formality and their lack of impact on those who participate in their reduction to rote. Boehme's vision and Jung's appropriation of it would contribute greatly to the alleviation of this religious blight in contemporary spirituality.

Boehme's second major departure from orthodoxy in matters of creation is the necessity he attaches to creation as redeeming divine and human life in one organic movement (Walsh 1983: 90). The moving out of the maternal nothing already moves to manifestation within divine life and beyond it. Creation becomes inevitable, unstoppable, expressive of the divine will, first manifested in the dark fire of the Father. Here Boehme picks up the theme already present in Eckhart's experience of a boiling Trinity boiling over in the necessary act of creation. Boehme adds to this theme. Boehme's divinity had to create to know itself in creation through human consciousness as the only agency whose self-consciousness serves

the fuller self-consciousness of divinity (Weeks 1991: 79, 149). The intimate ontological mutuality of this dialectic intimacy is well stated as "a self-contemplating God known by a God-contemplating self" (Stoudt 1957: 303). Only through human consciousness does divine consciousness know itself and become fully aware of its own creative latencies. The same could be said for the relation of the unconscious to the ego as the latter's creator whose nature is known only as manifest in the consciousness of the creature.

At this point Boehme engages the theme that also lies at the heart of Jung's discussion with representatives of monotheistic orthodoxy. For, though he waffled on the issue, in the end Boehme has to admit that evil is latent in the Trinity, indeed, is Trinity's initial moment within itself, that its expression in creation is an expression of a divine potential and that humanity is the locus where evil and good must unite, imaged as the union of the dark fire with the divine light. In these profound themes Boehme would anticipate Jung and Jung's identification of Satan and Christ as two sons or manifestation of a common origin or Father destined to embrace as one of history's major challenges (Jung 1969d: 175).

The meaning of history

Thus for Boehme history becomes the theatre for the ongoing mutual completion and redemption of divinity and humanity as two sides of the same process. His vision is world redeeming and not escaping (Stoudt 1957: 232, 300–302). The movement of the divine commerce with the world is toward divinity's self-realization in creation. This movement would reverse a classical Platonism but not that of a neo-Platonism, especially as developed by the Renaissance Platonists. Rather than the mind moving toward a culmination in distant divine ideas, the flow is reversed but the dialectic retained as the power of the divine seeks incarnation in historical consciousness where alone it can resolve its conflictual energy and complete its own life. Hierarchies based on degrees of elevation toward a trans-temporal climax are abolished. In their place is the vocation of the individual to work toward the coincidence of divine opposites in one's personal life in accord with the foundational telos of history itself and as the greatest gift one can give to the wider collective and its historical development (Walsh 1983: 56, 57). In a very real sense humanity becomes a needed partner of divinity in the resolution of the divine self contradiction and so works in time a coincidence of opposites, especially that of good and evil, defiant of resolution within the flow of Trinitarian life divorced from the creature if Boehme's categories would allow for such a situation.

Philosophical, theological and psychological/ spiritual consequences

It is obvious that Boehme's vision is incompatible with Aristotle and Aristotelian theology. Both are forms of intellectualism divested of the immediate experience of divine life in all that is, the sense at the heart of Boehme's experience (Weeks

1991: 62, 63). This experience rests on the priority of the will, a will that seeks a total divine disclosure and so realization in creation and in the human mind. This will as it takes trinitarian vitality in the soul of the individual gives a priority not only to divine but to trinitarian immanence. Transcendence would become a function or consequence of this residual and so profoundly immanental experience. The soul becomes the subject of the experience of the urgency of the Trinity to become one in it. Aristotle's and Aquinas' imprisonment in the sensorium as that on which the intellect depends would make any sympathy with Boehme's deeper vitality impossible because it is self-removed from the inner profundity from which Boehme's experience emerges. An equal barrier to the experience of the immanental is the logic of the principle of contradiction which would place an absolute barrier between the divine and the human, oblivious to their participation in each other. Boehme's experience engages a logic resting on the experience of a point of identity common to both divine and human captured in Hegel's logic of a unity of identity and non-identity. Western monotheism is strong on the non-identity of the divine and the human. This emphasis has lost the point of identity and with it has impaired humanity's natural religious sense. The divine remains alien to the human and so becomes the deepest form of alienation. The theology of total transcendence becomes a blue print for depression in its removal of the human from the energies of the divine in its depth. Over against such transcendental distancing, for Boehme the mind is in a paradoxical unity with the Trinity but, in the role usually attributed to the Spirit, tasked with the drawing together of the divine opposites at the insistence of the divine itself. In this sense humanity itself becomes a fourth, as the ongoing subject of the resolution of the eternal Trinitarian conflict. In this conflict humanity dwells in both time and eternity as the finite site of the resolution of divinity's eternal struggle for integration.

Much in the manner of Jung's Christology, Boehme would understand the historical Christ to have activated the inner Christ as a residual human potential (Weeks 1991: 36, 150). "The Christ of history reawakens and rekindles the soul's innermost ground" (Stoudt 1957: 275). Adherence to the historical Christ gives a specific form to the native presence of this power in humanity without denying the truth of its universal presence in other forms and religions. The specifically Christian church is made up of members in whom the universal Christic potency is actual but the more extensive church would include all those in whom this power is active under different names and religious auspices. This distinction is operative in the ecclesiology of Paul Tillich where essential humanity is believed fully realized in the Christ figure but processes of essentialization are much broader than the institutional Christian church (Dourley 1995: 442, 443). In making much the same point Boehme is more radical and incisive. The church body divested of the immediate experience of God and Christ native to the soul he characterizes as "the Temple made of stone", the empty vestiges of "the Temple of God in Christ" (Boehme 1909: 452).

Taken out of its collective and put into its individual implication Boehme's Christology coincides with Jung's confession that he is not a Christian but a Christ,

as seen above a point condemned as heresy in Eckhart's indictment. At the collective level Jung's Christology rests on the priority of the internalization and universality of the reality of Christ as one instance of the manifestation of the self among other religious variants of the self and the cultures built upon them. With Boehme the historical Christ derives its efficacy from its ability to awaken the sense of the natural presence of the Trinity in all that is. Within a specifically Christian context the individual through the historical Christ enters more fully into the flow and unification of Trinitarian vitality natural to humanity. However, from this perspective the true church becomes a much wider community than the visible Christian church or any religious body. The true church becomes the community of those who participate in the natural power of the Trinity and in a more universal Christianity, whatever the manner in which they are initiated into the life of these natural energies (Stoudt 1957: 285, 293). The historical Christ triggers the immanent Christ and is functionally subordinate to its activation. In this spirit Boehme can extend such participation in the spiritual and psychological power of the figure of Christ to the greater philosophers, to "wise heathens" to "Jews, Turks and heathens" and to the native residents of the Americas just being discovered at this time (Weeks 1991: 26, 50, 133, 203). With this growing sense of universalism the "stone church", symbolic of the institution, is increasingly transcended by the immediate experience of a universal Christ and God. "Christendom extends beyond Christianity and includes all those who seek the truth" (ibid.: 133). From this abiding universal spirit Boehme feared the narrower perspective of conflicting theologies and their endemic tendency to violence in Boehme's time and ours. Boehme's most acerbic remarks are reserved for sectarian theologians whose debates he so clearly saw as divisive and ultimately as contributors to war. When it did come the Thirty Years War was to that date the most devastating Europe had seen.

Before leaving these more extended implications of Boehme's thought, what might be called his basic spirituality is worth addressing. In his religious experience the originating nothing moved to its manifestation and attainment of its own self-consciousness in human self-consciousness. But the human remained conscious of its origin in the nothing and was aware that it had distanced itself from it and in so doing had undergone the universal alienation of what moderns call existential life and its disenchantment. Adam had fallen asleep and awakened outside of paradise separated from Eve, from his primal androgyny and from God (Boehme 1909: 244–246). In Boehme's logic the fall as the mind's distancing itself from its origin was necessary if the origin was to become conscious in the fallen mind. In this dialectic the mind yearned for the recovery of its origin and reimmersion in the nothing. Dialectically the nothing demanded the I to know itself but the I also was constantly to be reborn in the return to the nothing as its ultimate healing resource (Boehme 1911: v). This state of return describes a psychological "calm nothingness" of a "clear divinity" and constitutes the "cure of nothingness", that is, nothingness as curative (Weeks 1991: 193). This cyclical pattern of the ego's propulsion from the unconscious and re-emergence in it becomes the psychic basis of both individuation and baptism in Jung's later work.

The movement in and of itself partakes of the holy. With these parallels between Jung and Boehme on the foundational movements of the spiritual life or life of the spirit it is not surprising then that critics have seen affinities between Boehme and later psychoanalysis. Boehme's dark and light worlds as sides of divinity in conflict and union have been related to Freud's ego and id and to the wider theme of the light of consciousness emerging from the darkness of the preconscious depths, anticipating the basic dynamic in psychoanalysis itself (Weeks 1991: 179, 181, fn. 12, 211, fn. 1). Boehme's complex understanding of the heavenly and brutish sides of sexuality and reproduction is likened to Jung's understanding of the *Mysterium Coniunctionis* as the union and synthesis of heaven and earth (ibid.: 117). Further commentary on Boehme relates him both to Jung's appreciation of theosophic imagery and to Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionary thought in which a religious power, a universal Christ, is the energy empowering evolution itself. This movement would culminate in a point in which the unifying power of the divine would complete itself in drawing historical consciousness to it as living cells would complete an organic brain (Walsh: 1983: 36, 37). Teilhard describes this energy as working the unification of the many sides of the individual with the unification of the individual with the totality. Such are the realities of purity, as personal integrity and charity as universal compassion in an evolutionary perspective (Teilhard 1968: 108, 109). The energy Teilhard describes would appear to function as does the energy of the self uniting the complexes of the individual and the integrating individual with the totality (Dourley 2012). More research needs to be done on the similarity of these forces described by Jung and Teilhard. They could be two ways of describing the same energy. In any event Jung's appropriation of Boehme lends considerable validation to Boehme's mystical experience as anticipating the discovery of the unconscious even as it adds a considerable depth to Jung's understanding of the religious dimension of the psyche.

Jung on Boehme

One of Jung's more radical statements about the divine/human relationship gives human consciousness a certain superiority to its divine origin. He does this in reference to a dream in which he appears with his father. In the dream Jung refused to follow his father's subservient example by bowing to the floor before the figure of Uriah. Had he done so in the dream he would thereby join Uriah and his father in the betrayal of his autonomous consciousness to a transcendent God represented in Uriah's life by the divinely appointed King David who had him murdered to gain his wife. Jung writes, "The dream discloses a thought and a premonition that have long been present in humanity: the idea of the creature that surpasses its creator by a small but decisive factor" (Jung 1965: 220). In context Jung was probably referring to Job's consciousness surpassing Yaweh's in their famous biblical encounter. However, what Jung writes here of Job would actually be even truer of Boehme. For Boehme was eventually forced to the conclusion that human consciousness surpassed that of its origin because its origin was

compelled to create it to become self-conscious in it. Jung develops this foundational theme of Boehme in his understanding of the "relativity of God", namely that the unconscious seeks to become progressively conscious in human historical consciousness in the joint completion of history, God and humanity (Dourley 2010e). This became the core theme in Jung's own *Answer to Job* in resonance with both Boehme and Boehme's more measured mediator to modernity, Hegel.

Prior to the late work on Job, Jung was already appreciative of Boehme and of his inaugural and continued mystical experiences. Jung correlated his interest in Boehme with the appearance of imagery in the dreams and art of one of his patients, imagery in discernible continuity with the mystic's experience. The moment of Boehme's intuition as the sun struck his pewter cup has been likened to a lightning flash and a shriek or crack. In this moment Boehme saw the sweet light of God bursting open the impenetrable divine, fiery, darkness and wrath. The penetration itself promotes the union of the darkness and the light. Jung relates Boehme's inaugural experience to that of Nicholas of Flue (1417–1487) who also experienced the unqualifiedly wrathful side of the divine (Jung 1968g: 9–12). For Jung this experience is that of the *deus absconditus*, the terrifying side of God, real but a heresy to the Christian picture of a one-sidedly benign God. In Jung's estimate had Nicholas proclaimed the dark side of God it could have cost him his life as a heretic were he not able to modify and humanize the image with the help of the dogma of the Trinity still operative and credible to him and to his society (ibid.: 11). By Boehme's time the experience of the wrath fire as native to the divine could not rely on similar dogmatic support and so he was left to wrestle with it throughout his life and consequent writings. As will be seen Jung felt that Boehme never did successfully bring about the integration of the dark and light side of divinity within a Christian context. More, Jung openly doubted whether the union of divine opposites can be brought about in a myth that denies the dark or evil side of God.

Jung's most prolonged interpretation of Boehme comes in his amplification of a series of paintings by a 55-year-old client with whom he began work in 1928. She had a lively mind and an academic background. She had only recently begun painting landscapes of her native Denmark prior to her arrival in Zurich (Jung 1968h: 290). Although her later paintings show considerable artistic skill, Jung saw her initial lack of a developed talent for art as a fortunate occasion for the unconscious to enter her painting all the more easily precisely because of its lack of sophistication (ibid.: 292, 293). In the initial painting, the day prior to her first analytic session, she depicts herself as standing among rocks, some roughly circular, some as sharp as pyramids. The lower part of her body seems to be imprisoned or stuck in the rocks as she gazes out to a seascape reminiscent of her native Denmark (ibid.: Picture 1). In a related fantasy she saw Jung as a sorcerer and called out for help (ibid.: 291–292). Jung implies that this first painting shows she is caught in the hard grip of the unconscious and suffers from a consciousness gifted in itself but not in a viable, flowing and so liberating commerce with the profundities of the psyche (ibid.: 301).

The second painting is crucial and the basis of Jung's introducing his extensive reading of Jacob Boehme to its interpretation. Picture 2 depicts a lightning strike hitting the rock and freeing from the pile a circular stone with a red interior. Citing Boehme's *Aurora*, Jung relates the dynamic of this picture to Boehme's experience of the "Fire-flash" of his initial illumination (ibid.: 295). Here the flash in the picture becomes closely associated with Boehme's experience of the breaking asunder of the intransigence of the first power in God, releasing both the liberty and the light of a conscious relationship to the darker unconscious in the development of the self (ibid.: 296, 301, 312–313). Jung would join Boehme in attributing the flash to the divine itself, that is, the self working toward the unity of its opposites, darkness and light, in a consciousness enlivened and deepened by their union. For both Jung and Boehme the flash was a moment of "sudden rapture and illumination" (Jung 1967b: 317). He notes in his patient's response to the painting that the liberating power is no longer himself appearing as wizard but now a transpersonal force, that of lightning bearing a divine impact (Jung 1968h: 301, 302). Citing Boehme, the lightning is a power that is momentary in human experience – where it works "the birth of the innermost soul" – but ever present in God (ibid.: 296). In these remarks Jung's understanding of the relation of the immanental to the transcendental is again in evidence. The lightning that bursts open the intransigent wrath of God is a power present in the psyche itself. The decisive and transformative moment of the revelation of dark and light in their conscious unification is never more than transient at least in their inaugural appearance. But they represent powers of the psyche that are opposites and clamor for their synthesis. The most encompassing of these conflictual powers is the light of the ego and the darkness of the psychic depth.

It is worthy of note here that his patient's experience is not the only instance in Jung's corpus in which the unconscious dramatically makes its reality and power felt as an initiation into a fruitful continued exchange between a centre of consciousness and its unconscious origin. In his work on synchronicity he relates an incident in which a figure in a dream, a scarab, appeared during a session with the dreamer consequent to its appearance in the dream. The startlingly meaningful coincidence worked an inaugural connection of a rational mind with the unconscious which became the basis of a fluid ongoing dialogue (Jung 1971b: 438, 525–526). The implication in this event and in Jung's appropriation of Boehme that divinity and humanity are mutually caught up in a single process of reciprocal redemption in a mutually maturational interchange is difficult to avoid. Equally difficult to deny is the point that the immanental and transcendental, the finite and infinite, the eternal and temporal share a point of common being and so cannot be any longer conceived as wholly separable from a human viewpoint.

What follows in the patient's painting is an impressive visualization in art of the maturational process as one uniting archetypal opposites. Amplifying the painting of the flash Jung introduces Boehme's famous mandala depicting the movement of divine life in its interplay with creation (Jung 1968h: 296). What dramatically characterizes the mandala and seems to remove it from the mandala's usual function as

a symbol of integration is the failure of the opposites of Father and Holy Ghost to meet. As semi circles facing in different directions there is no completed ring or circle. The divided semi-circles touch only back to back at a single point. Except for this point they remain in opposition. Yet through the point where they touch, depicted as a heart, runs the power of the Son extending to heaven above and through earth to hell below. One is left with the impression that the heart at the point of connection does not seem to unite the powers of Father and Holy Ghost, turned from each other except for this slender, tenuous point of contact. And yet the Son would run through this point of contact and in so doing unite the opposites of heaven and hell. Later in Jung's treatment of the paintings the failure of opposites to unite becomes specifically an explicit Christian problem but in the early phase of this discussion Jung signals already that tracking the thrust of the client's paintings reveals that in the natural processes of individuation the opposites do indeed unite toward a unity more encompassing than the Christian perspective can effect. Jung cites Boehme where the latter describes his illuminations as uniting eternity and time, Divine love and anger, Heaven and Hell and most generally the above and the below in a natural intimacy and inclusiveness surpassing the unresolved splits of these opposites more characteristic of the Christian view (ibid.: 298). In these unities Boehme would thus surpass Christian orthodoxy. The remaining pictures document its progress in various forms of unification but especially in the unity of the above and the below.

Initially the ongoing paintings, all mandalas, describe the early stages of the painter's process through the imagery of the fecundation of the psyche by a mercurial serpent. The imagery is obviously sexual, indicative of the acceptance of sexual reality yet in a mode, Jung argues, not wholly reducible to physical, literal sexuality. Later paintings moved to the unification of the spiritual and the sexual in the form of birds coming to earth, a theme Jung relates to Boehme's "Love-desire" (ibid.: 334) and to the idea of a double quaternity in the form of the differentiation and unification of both spiritual and deeper, earthier powers (ibid.: 335). Fecundation by the mercurial serpent also demanded the temporary submission of the ego to the autonomous power of the greater unconscious (ibid.: 313–329). The serpent was to return in the later art but as a symbol of the dark background of the unconscious itself moving toward fuller conscious acceptance and integration. Jung relates the black background of the unconscious in certain of his patient's mandalas to Boehme's conception of the maternal or matrix as the source from which all differentiation proceeds toward grounding in the real (ibid.: 334). The artist was thus painting toward the unity of the maternal origin with the paternal conscious power, of depth with a far too spiritual consciousness. The tension of opposites took its toll on the artist (ibid.). Jung might also have added that Boehme's matrix is also the basis of his experience of the numinous *magia* in the form of the common origin of every existent evident in the individual's growing sense of the maternal ground that runs beneath and can connect the individual to all that is as transparent to its sacred base. But the attainment of the conscious light capable of such unitary vision and its ultimate sense of a connectedness to

the whole is only through the acceptance of the preceding and remaining darkness of the unconscious. Here Jung joins Boehme in the latter's understanding of the light shining into the darkness which the darkness could not grasp or extinguish. Only the assimilation of the shadow as potential enables the recovery of the light in a consciousness uniting light and dark (ibid.: 337). Jung notes in passing that the assimilation of the shadow remains an ongoing ethical challenge to those who attempt it.

The problem of the shadow intensifies as the paintings continue. The ninth depicts the opposites in images of a Trinity of winged creatures on top and a goat at the bottom of the mandala. The spiritual Trinity and the goat, often an image of a very earthy Dionysus, must be brought together. For Jung this is a Christian problem, the problem of absolute good, a spiritual Trinity, in conflict with what then becomes an absolute evil in the baser proclivities of the goat. The painting in question inserts material from the I Ching and Jung comments that the unity of these opposites works in the East more easily than in the Christian West. The mandala in the ninth picture suggests "no white without black, no holiness without the devil" (ibid.: 339). Then Jung addresses Boehme explicitly in terms of his famous mandala in which the opposites in God are not reconciled. In the mandala itself the role of the Son as heavenly and earthly may suggest a certain reconciliation, at least of these opposites. But Jung takes the position that the reconciliation of divinely based opposites of good and evil is not possible in a Christian universe. For Jung Boehme's attempt to bring them together in his famous mandala simply documents the Christian "failure" to unite opposites which remain "irreconcilable" within its world view (ibid.: 340, 341). On this point Jung is explicit. He writes of Boehme's mandala, "This drawing is most unusual, but aptly expresses the insoluble moral conflict underlying the Christian view of the world" (Jung 1968i: 381).

Jung's solution to the Christian problem was to place the opposites of good and evil in the power that gives rise both to consciousness and to the opposites that consciousness perceives and in whom they are to be united. For Boehme as for Jung this preceding power from which all form derives is the "mother". She is the ultimate source of good and evil in all things and in their origin (Jung 1968h: 329, 330, fn. 119). In terms of the affinity between Boehme and Jung the mother thus understood is the ultimate source of all that can be differentiated and so of divinely based good and evil. But more the mother or matrix is also the place in existential life where the spiritual and bodily unite and the spirit becomes real in its incarnation in matter transfused by its maternal, chthonic depths (ibid.: 333–334, 335, fn. 137). Jung's interpretation of Boehme's mandala is the basis of his attraction to and agreement with Boehme that absolute good and evil are to be found in the originary power of consciousness, the Great Mother, and so in divinity itself. Jung will refer to Boehme's maternal darkness as the mother of life and the first principle of the Trinity. Her psychic precedence makes of her the "creator" and source of all emanation. The conscious realization of the full inventory of her maternity provides the ultimate urgency behind the now emerging myth of greater inclusion to which Jung's myth sought to contribute.

In occasional references to Boehme Jung does point to the resolution of the problem Boehme could sketch but not solve in his mandala. He refers to the contradictory God image Job faced and the possible influence on Boehme through the kabbala and alchemy of this God of contradictions in whom love and Lucifer burn forever (Jung 1968j: 61). Here Jung anticipates his own resolution of the problem made explicit in his *Answer to Job.* Good and evil are present in the divine as two of the most powerful archetypal opposites humanity is tasked by God to resolve in history. In this respect good and evil both have substance grounded in the archetypal or divine and as the basis of their fraternity allowing both to bear the name Lucifer (Jung 1959a: 389). In a shot at White's Thomistic theology Jung notes that the power of Boehme's depiction of evil as divinely based leaves the sophistry of the doctrine of evil as a privation of good "pale by comparison" (Jung 1951b: 313). If the opposites of good and evil are to unite in history their union could only be worked through an archetypal energy equal or greater in power than both operating through human historical consciousness. In effect it would be the power of the self creating a supplanting myth in which these opposites would embrace. Indeed, Jung thought the Joannine apocalypse anticipates Eckhart and Boehme in pointing to the opposites in God and the challenge of their union in historical consciousness through the forthcoming birth of an image of God which would embrace both and enable both to embrace. On this point the birth of an image of the ultimate embracing and uniting of good and evil remains the primary challenge of the day if competing lesser Gods, wholly good and pure and possessed of an exhaustive truth, are not to destroy their constituencies in open combat and imperil the species itself.

Such an embracing consciousness would require a radical alteration of current more constricted forms of religious perception. In key passages Jung depicts the Christ figure as descending from heaven to earth and so as a predominantly spiritual symbol. The needed compensation would take the form of an ascending figure, indeed, a figure ascending from the earth to heaven as in Boehme's vision of a unity of opposites. Jung frames this compensation as the union of Christ with Mercurius as the bearer of the earth and its deeper, volatile and less controllable but vivifying powers. Whether Christ and Mercurius could ever embrace in such a mutually completing marriage remains to be seen. Without such embrace the figure of Christ will remain pallid and that of Mercurius rejected by a spirituality faithful to the lifelessness of his absence.

In this context Jung reads Boehme in terms of the too glib but not wholly false axiom about the mystical cycle, "Journey inwards; journey outwards". The saying implies that mystical inversion is never without external consequence and insight. For Jung Boehme's turning or being turned inward took him to the dark mother and to her priority in the psyche. Effectively she either precedes the Father or is equated with the first principle of the Trinity, who is the ultimate origin of all that follows, namely, the other functions of the Trinitarian life and creation itself. She is also the source of revelation though the primary revelation is that all that proceeds from her manifests the opposites latent but undifferentiated in her (Jung

1968c: 165). She can be equated with the dark fire of the Father but has an added status that would give her a precedence to the fiery darkness and to the light it grasps not as first among her emanations but as their source. As such she would be the matrix or creator of all the opposites including the Trinitarian powers flowing from her into creation. She would also be the ultimate source of the divine mandate that these opposites attain a unity in human life and consciousness beyond them in the divine.

In further delineating the theme of the universality of the psychic energies informing Boehme's experience, Jung amplifies a second mandala of Boehme's to draw out the cosmic implications of his Christology (Jung 1967c: 356). Just as the symbol of Christ works to unite opposites in the divine as the centre and the only place where they touch so does this power unite opposites throughout the cosmos in all that is. Among the opposites united in Boehme's image of Christ are those of male and female. This union is at the basis of Boehme's understanding of the androgynous Christ and the relation of the androgynous Christ to Sophia (Jung 1970: 373, 404–405). Christ's femininity as the universal Sophia would constitute a powerful symbol of the unification of all created opposites, especially of male/female, and heaven/earth in the power of Christ, or psychologically in the power of the self. Christ's androgyny would thus serve as a powerful image in the restoration of the divinity of the feminine and the assertion that neither gender can be whole without the assimilation of the other.

This imagery has personal and collective import. Personally Jung takes it to mean that the true relation to Christ is one of identity and especially identity in the passion of Christ. In *The Red Book* this point is presaged in Jung's endorsement of being Christ as distinguished from being a Christian. The passion of the individual identified with Christ then becomes the passion of the individual suffering the unity of divinely grounded opposites in person in the processes of natural maturation. Such suffering is the substance of the lifetime opus as reflected in Boehme's first work, the *Aurora* (Jung 1970: 349). In this suffering, much in the spirit of Eckhart, the sufferer is understood not as imitating Christ but as being Christ. Such individual suffering is not solipsistic. Such suffering is the energy informing an emerging myth now assimilating the underlying divinity of all that is often beyond the limited province of the sacred collectively and institutionally understood. Boehme's ability to see the signature of the Trinity in all of nature no doubt follows from the suffering of the integration of the Trinity in himself as the basis of his integration with nature. The suffering of the opposites in human consciousness is for Jung the meaning of incarnation extending to nature. Thus understood incarnation is the telos of history itself. "The real history of the world seems to be the progressive incarnation of the deity" (Jung 1958c: 436). Jung pays high tribute to Boehme as one of the initiators of this consciousness. In Jung's estimate he was one of the pioneers in the neo-Platonic recovery of a lost paganism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In effect what Jung is describing here is the historical reversal of the Platonic thrust of the mind from its embodiment to absolutes beyond the embodied mind to a counter thrust in which the absolute would

find its realization in the embodied mind. Such realization for Boehme and Jung would take the form of the ongoing penetration of archetypal/divine energies in the movement of history. Such a view of the emergence of consciousness in history would be compatible with the modern development of evolutionary thought, process philosophy and theology, and self psychology, indeed, wherever it was understood that maturation, individual and collective, drives to the actualization of archetypal energies, however named, in the individual and through the individual in society.

In all of this what Jung says of the demise of alchemy and the resultant split between the worlds of science and of religion and spirituality is pertinent. He deplores the fact that late alchemy gave up the emphasis on immediate experience and devolved into an irresponsible Hermetic philosophy, a "nebulous mysticism" (Jung 1968k: 227–228). Alchemy on the other hand devolved into the objectivity of scientific chemistry. What had been together in the *laboratorium* split into an *oratorium* removed from its experiential basis and a scientific laboratory rightfully working within the boundaries and with the promise of the scientific mind increasingly divorced from its own depths. Jung describes the modern mind looking back on the split, "We feel sorry for the former (discredited alchemists) and admire the latter (science triumphant) but no one asks about the fate of the psyche, which thereafter vanished from sight for several hundred years" (Jung 1967b: 349). Jung does not take up the question of who tried to recover psyche after science moved the modern mind from it in the very legitimate and inevitable exercise of the human powers on which science rests, but one suspects strongly that he is referring largely to himself. However, between Boehme and Jung stands another towering figure who looked back to Boehme and forward to the future of humanity in the interests of grounding religion within humanity and its historical unfolding. In his maturity Jung was to acknowledge his affinity with him. The man was Georg W. Hegel.

5

HEGEL AND JUNG

A requiem for a lonely God

In the concluding paragraph of *The Phenomenology of Mind* Hegel presents an all encompassing picture of reality in which divinity becomes self-conscious in humanity and its history as humanity becomes historically conscious of its divinity. Only the living intensity of its shared being with humanity saves divinity from the fate of being "lifeless, solitary and alone" (Hegel 1967: 808). Hegel goes on to describe the culmination of human history in the full consciousness of the mutual dependence and fulfillment of the divine and the human as the "Golgotha of Absolute Spirit" (ibid.). In this crucifixion God or Absolute Spirit as wholly transcendent to or wholly external to the human dies. What rises from such death is the sense of the reciprocal completion of divinity and humanity as the foundational meaning and movement of human history itself. As will be argued in the next chapter, Jung's late work on Job resounds with these same motifs. Central to this work is the portrayal of a conflicted God driven to create consciousness as the sole agency capable of perceiving and resolving the divine self-contradiction at the insistence and with the help of divinity.

Textual Jung on Hegel

The affinities between the Hegel of the *Phenomenology of Mind* and the Jung of *Answer to Job* go back to one of their more significant and common intellectual ancestors, Jacob Boehme. Hegel's indebtedness to Boehme as well as his effort to supersede and so philosophically complete the undisciplined volatility of Boehme's discourse are well known and will be documented. Hegel's relation to Boehme is of import in fully delineating Jung's own, largely unconscious, kinship with Hegel, which he admitted only later in life. For as seen in the preceding chapter, Jung, too, was profoundly attracted to Boehme. He was also responsive to Hegel in a variety of ways prior to his recognition of their compatibility. Thus Jung's relation to Hegel taken from Jung's published work is complex. It ranges from a reserved appreciation to a vitriolic rejection and ends with the confession of far reaching sympathy between them.

As a credible historian of Western and nineteenth-century philosophy Jung early on presents Hegel as a modern defender of the ontological argument as a

statement of the mind's natural awareness of the divine. Further Jung appreciates Hegel as someone whose thought would be helpful in resolving the medieval and ongoing clash between a realism upholding the reality of the universals, and a nominalism exclusively fascinated by the yield of the senses and the particular on which the yield rests. Jung's answer to this problem was his understanding of *esse in anima*, being in the soul. In Jung's solution the truth of the universal or archetypal would be mediated through the soul but in relation to sensate reality beyond the soul, possibly acting to trigger the archetype. The interplay between archetype and the sensate running through the soul is the basis of the profound sacramental sense that runs through Jung's understanding of the psyche. Such interplay between the soul, the external world and a deeper human interiority would throw considerable light on how natural realities in the sensate world could activate archetypal imagery and its ritual enactment whose referent is well beyond the world of sensation. In Jung's understanding of the *esse in anima* consciousness would be brought into touch with the archetypal, the power of the universals, but freed from a wooden slavery to them through its relation to the ever shifting world of sensation beyond the soul (Jung 1971c: 40–42; 45–46).

Jung also expresses occasional appreciation of Hegel's power of intuition. For Jung it structured his whole system though in the end was subordinate to his intellectualism (Jung 1971d: 320, 321). In discussing the definition of idea Jung's philosophical capacities are again in evidence when he understands Hegel to have hypostatized the idea as that which is alone real. Consequently Hegel's philosophy concludes that the idea of God and the reality of God are united to each other in human consciousness. This is but a variant of the ontological argument here cast in terms of the "idea" as resting on the archetype and repeating in conscious variation "from time immemorial" (Jung 1971e: 438, 439). For Hegel, as we will see, the argument derives its sustaining power from the demonstration of the mind's natural and experiential inhesion in the divine. It is no wonder, then, that Jung can include Hegel among those thinkers who anticipated the "collective psyche". In this context Jung relates Hegel to Schelling's conception of the "eternally unconscious" as "the absolute ground of consciousness" (Jung: 1976d: 515).

In a number of passages focused on the nineteenth century Jung, again with considerable insight, relates Hegel to the Romantic reaction to Kant's reduction of religion to a rational moralism divested of a deeper religious substance and sensitivity. As a Romantic searching for such depth Hegel is already anticipating psychology and on its brink. However, Jung qualifies and distances himself from this appreciation of Romanticism, if such it be, when he limits his own Romantic inclination to his student days and elsewhere confesses in half denial that he did not know his psychology could be termed "romantic". When described by a writer as a "romantic" in a 1935 work on Fichte, Jung does not absolutely deny the affinity but qualifies it again with his more modern "empiricism", which was unavailable to the Romantic age (1976e: 770–772). When the basis of this empiricism is further exposed it turns out to be an appreciation of "sheer experience" or a radical subjectivity which would be the sole basis of attributing a legitimate romanticism

to Jung's own style of thought (Jung 1976b: 773–775). In these passages Jung cannot deny a certain romantic hue to his thought though he is keen to qualify such admitted romanticism with the empirical and scientific elements that this romanticism informs even if such empiricism is grounded ultimately in the subjective and experiential. In terms of his interface with Hegel on the issue of romanticism one might ask if a philosophical idealist is a thinking romantic and a romantic a more emotive idealist. It would appear that the two perspectives unite in Jung's psychology in such a way that it cannot be reduced to a science nor dismissed as without evidentiary, empirical support in its claim to be "scientific". In reference to the more profound aspects of his psychology as it would engages alchemy, mysticism and religion, for instance, he freely admits, "On this level of knowledge, psychology has to abdicate as a science, though only on this very high level" (ibid.: 774).

In the context of the modern and contemporary merging of philosophy and psychology, nowhere more evident than in Jung's psychology, Jung more than once charges that Hegel is really "that great psychologist in philosopher's garb" (Jung 1976e: 772). This charge has to be understood in terms of Jung's openness to the interpenetration of disciplinary perspectives. He will concede that just as Hegel may be something of a disguised or marred psychologist so might he himself be a flawed philosopher. "It was always my view that Hegel was a psychologist '*manque*' in much the same way that I am a philosopher '*manque*'" (Jung 1935: 194). The truth of the matter lies in the fact that neither Hegel nor Jung could sever the psychological from the philosophical or theological so organically do these dimensions of their thought connect. To violate the integration of the many disciplinarian perspectives united in their overriding perspective by splitting them into autonomous and unrelated sub-units of mind effectively truncates their vision and loses sight of their vision of a mind unified, not fragmented, by its distinct abilities. This organic connectedness of a number of disciplinary perspectives is probably true in most configurations of mind and spirit informed by a lively Platonic sensibility. For those who would draw too tight a distinction between their philosophical, theological and psychological perspectives Hegelian philosophy and Jungian psychology remain beyond their epistemic capacities. They would be well advised to limit their inquiry to the narrower and artificial confines of one or other of the then fragmented approaches of mind to reality unified by Hegel and Jung.

In contrast with such hints of appreciation and accommodation with Hegel, Jung could also be nothing short of vitriolic in his judgment of Hegel's philosophy and its psychological coloring. Again showing a commendable understanding of the politics of nineteenth-century German philosophy Jung identifies Hegel's prominence in the attack on Kant's "critical thinking" and indeed lays at Hegel's feet the idealist/romantic victory over Kant. But in these passages he understands such victory as "the gravest blow" to the subsequent development of the German and European mind running through Schelling, Schopenhauer and Carus to the excesses of Nietzsche and to the current "catastrophe that bears the

name of Germany" (Jung: 1969a: 169, 170). Hegel did all of this "as a psychologist in disguise" but as a somewhat demented one. When on the attack Jung views Hegel's philosophy as a purely personal projection into a "cosmos that he alone had created" (ibid.: 169). Jung reads Hegel deeply and accurately when he characterizes his philosophy as culminating in the "equation of philosophical reason with Spirit", that is with God. Such equation Jung attributes to Hegel's inflation in the form of an "invasion of the unconscious." Hegel's language is "reminiscent of the megalomanic language of schizophrenics" (ibid.: 170). He concludes by relating Heidegger to Hegel in dismissing both: "But that does not prevent the latest German philosophy from using the same crackpot power words and pretending that it is not unintentional psychology" (ibid.: 170–171). Heidegger is not named here but is described as Hegel's "blood brother" in a late letter (Jung 1957: 501).

Obviously Hegel and Heidegger had constellated considerable negativity in Jung himself blatantly evident in this highly complexed outburst. One must wonder if specific events in Jung's life had led him to link Hegel and Heidegger and charge both with inflated language revelatory only of the pathology induced by the invasive powers of their unconscious. But Jung himself was alert to the dangers of possessive inflation as residual danger in the deeper commerce with the unconscious. We have seen his equation of the radical regression of Eckhart's mystical experience as tantamount to identity with the divine (Jung 1971d: 255). In his alchemical work he gives to the alchemist the power to induce the birth of the divine in consciousness as the very son or daughter of the alchemist (Jung 1969b: 263). In his understanding of the *unus mundus* Jung effectively equates the ego's relation to its ground with the relation to the divine as the ground of all that is and can be (Jung 1970: 534; Dourley 2011). In his reflections on the mandala he will identify the centre of the mandala with the centre of the individual and of the universe in the service of uniting the individual more intimately with the totality (Jung 1969b: 288, 292). He will describe the process of individuation as itself a religious process. "*Individuation is the life in God*, as mandala psychology clearly shows" (Jung 1976a: 719). In his discussion of the ontological argument and more widely throughout his work he grounds humanity's universal experience of divinity, the *consensus gentium*, in the archetypal strata of the unconscious and its impress on consciousness (Jung 1971c: 41, 42). When these foundational features of his own psychology are brought to the fore Jung is in a dubious position when he criticizes or dismisses Hegel's philosophy as describing an exaggerated proximity opening onto an identity of the divine with the human spirit and mind. The most distinctive features of his own psychology as it matured do so with a certain sustained insistence.

In a final brief text in a more considered moment Jung lays aside this hostility and grants that between his psychology and Hegel's philosophy there may exist an affinity he had not acknowledged. Six years before his death Jung wrote to a correspondent that though he had never studied primary Hegel he must now admit correspondences with his own psychology. The passage is worth citing:

> There is no possibility of inferring a direct dependence but, as I said above, Hegel confesses the main trends of the unconscious and can be called a 'un psychologue rate.' There is of course a remarkable coincidence between tenets of Hegelian philosophy and my findings concerning the collective unconscious.
>
> (Jung 1959b: 502)

Jung does not elaborate on the content of the "remarkable coincidence". Giving this coincidence content in Hegelian terms would greatly enhance the understanding of Jungian psychology because Hegel makes precise what remains less so in Jung, namely, that the movement of the mind is to its identity with its origin, an origin itself ever active in the movement toward its full expression in conscious humanity. While Jung usually hesitates to be as explicit as Hegel on this point Hegel's philosophical clarity and acuity would make the conclusion that history is the story of the co-redemption of the human and divine inescapable as it indeed it did become in Jung's senior and fuller understanding of the psyche.

What follows, then, is first the elucidation of the undeniable influence of Boehme on Hegel, to be followed by the affinity and difference of Jung's late work with Hegel's philosophy. This connection turns naturally to the elaboration of the Hegelian dynamic in Jung's own psychology as it moved to maturation. Such enquiry opens to the possibility that Hegel is Jung's philosopher and Jung Hegel's psychologist. The question is more than academic. A foundational theme in both is that the origin of consciousness seeks its completion in consciousness itself. Hegel tended more to identify this completion in history and the history of religion acting out before him though he is by no means closed to the inner bases of history as personal epiphany. Jung moves more to the internal impress of the ground of consciousness on consciousness with a priority given to the individual, but he is keenly aware of how such impact is a powerful determinant of history for better or for worse. The line of connectedness between Boehme, Hegel and Jung serves to illuminate the importance of Jungian psychology as a human resource to recover the depths of humanity glossed over in more superficial approaches to the psyche and society. The connection of these three thinkers clarifies the personal and social implications of the emergence of the self and of the more inclusive mythic consciousness the self currently sponsors. The continuity of these three contributors to Western culture contributes significantly to the ongoing search for the ultimate power that emerges in the making of history. Jung's psychological continuity with Hegel's philosophy would better equip humanity to mould the energies that have given birth to consciousness into the configuration of the more universal sympathy these energies demand in the surpassing of their current limited concretions. Jung's psychology in its extension of Hegel's philosophy would thus parry the threat that the diverse communal, and especially religious/political, incarnations of these energies would destroy the consciousness created by them in a joint refusal to grow beyond them.

Hegel on Boehme

Hegelian scholarship could hardly be unaware of the substantial connection between Hegel and Boehme. Hegel was given a gift of Boehme's work in 1809 (Stoudt 1957: 24, fn. 5; Darby 1982: 122) and devotes a significant treatment to Boehme's visionary work in his *History of Philosophy* (Hegel: 1990: 117–131; 1995: 188–219). While Boehme's influence on Hegel is beyond denial, its importance is subject to varied assessment. One line of Hegelian scholarship would so highly weigh the influence as to argue that Hegel's entire philosophical effort was to give coherent and responsible formulation to Boehme's intense, undisciplined, deeply subjective, and, at times, near unintelligible symbolic discourse. Major contributors to this viewpoint such as Alexandre Korye and Alexandre Kojeve understand Boehme's effort to unite eternity and time, the infinite and finite, in effect, the divine and human, as at the "core of Hegel's philosophy" (Darby 1982: 123). Hegel's dialectic between the I (Ich) of human consciousness and the creative nothing (Nicht) from which it proceeds and to which it remains related even in its otherness describes the foundational dynamic in his understanding of the divine/human relation (ibid.: 124). The delineation and defeat of the sense of the absolute otherness of the divine, so much to the fore in orthodox imagery, is the basis of the deep affinity Hegel shares with Boehme in affirming and recovering the point of identity between the human mind and the unfolding of the Trinity in history. Indeed, in this matter Hegel will identify the point of departure of Boehme's philosophical experience as that of "the pantheism of the Trinity" (Hegel 1995: 170).

Given their compatibility on the point of the participation of the human in divinity's expression in history the question immediately follows: does the dialectical interpenetration of the opposites within divinity and its natural extension to human consciousness necessarily implicate a pantheism in both Boehme and Hegel of dubious compatibility with any form of traditional theism (Darby 1982: 124, fn. 10, 75, fn. 54)? In so much as the originary nothingness participates in all that proceeds from it including the human mind the relationship between origin and expression in Hegel can be safely described in Hegelian scholarship by the more conciliatory and relatively timid term, "panentheism" (Hodgson 1985: 16, 17). The term can be used to imply that the divine and the human participate naturally in each other in a manner at once defeating both absolute otherness and an unqualified identity divested of any real difference between them. It refutes a more simplistic understanding of pantheism as a simple identity of divinity and the other than divine. It should be noted than no serious pantheist, least of all Spinoza, has ever held such an indiscriminate identity beyond the misperceptions of defensive orthodoxies intent on destroying the intimacy of the divine and human in the interests of one or other of their wholly other Gods. Yet in the ongoing theological politics between the affirmation of the deeper identity of the divine and the human, grounding a radical sense of immanence, and the opposing more traditional affirmation of their absolute difference, it must be granted that Hegel's

thought favours the immanental. His genius and the novelty of his contribution to Western thought lie in his argument on behalf of the native and experiential participation of the temporal in the eternal, of the created in the divine, and of the movement of history as naturally engaging and completing both as it moves to their underlying identity. The fact that he was forced to mount a strenuous defence against his position being either a form of pantheism or a "philosophy of identity" demonstrates that he could be perceived as holding these positions by those who saw them as threatening their preferred and traditional sense of a wholly transcendent God (Hegel 1827a: 374–375). The suspicion was not wholly baseless and a more gracious Hegel could have admitted as much (Lauer 1982: 244–282).

In the face of accusations of pantheism and his rejection of the charge, Hegel's thought nonetheless ends the traditional idea of God as wholly transcendent. With Hegel the ontological and epistemic intimacy connecting the divine and the human forecloses all imagination of a wholly other or supernatural God invading the human from beyond the human. Rather, like Boehme, the discovery of the divine would be in the instant that its presence becomes dramatically apparent to the mind as the basis of both mind and nature. The recognition need not and usually would not be as dramatic as it was in the life of Boehme. With Hegel this instant would occur after a lengthy philosophical tracing of the mind back to its origins. It occurred in Hegel in this manner and his hope was that it would occur in those who could follow his path to the absolute within as the basis of its perception beyond. It was probably around issues such as these that he wrote in a letter to Schelling that traditional theologians espousing a literal transcendence should be driven out of all places of hiding and the poverty of their thought be exposed to the light of day (Darby 1982: 130). Many of Jung's mature positions would have the same effect on theologies of the supernatural and bear the same imperative of flushing out the juvenile conception of transcendence attached to them.

The affinity of Hegel's developed philosophical positions with Boehme is blatantly evident in Hegel's treatment of Boehme in his *History of Philosophy*. Throughout this work and particularly in his treatment of Boehme Hegel opposes all forms of literalism, externalism and historicism. Against these inadequate forms of religious thought Hegel proposes the "Protestant principle", the essence of Protestantism, which identifies the origin of valid religious experience wholly with the experience of the Spirit in human interiority (Hegel 1995: 191; 1990: 99, 102). Hegel will trace the origin of this principle to the Reformation and Luther's translation of the bible into the vernacular. The Protestant principle reappears in Paul Tillich in the twentieth century. Here the principle combines a powerful sacramentalism with a corresponding iconoclasm. Effectively Tillich argues that the ground of all reality is divine and so all that is can mediate the divine including religious and political systems but with the proviso that whatever reality mediates the divine it can never be identified with the divine. The iconoclastic side of this sacramentalism forbids the equation of the divine with that through which it appears. A prime example would be the Catholic Thomistic doctrine of transubstantiation where bread and wine become substantially divine (Dourley 2008:

13–17, 54, 166). In Tillich's own mind the iconoclastic dimension of his understanding of the Protestant principle enables him to distance himself from Hegel or at least from Hegel's implication that his elevation of Christianity to the philosophical level completes philosophy, the history of religion, and Christianity. In this distancing from Hegel, highly nuanced though it be, Tillich joins Jung in leveling the charge of hubris at Hegel and the alleged or implicit identity of his philosophy with the standpoint of the divine (Dourley 2008: 64; Jung 1969a: 169, 170: Yerkes 1983: 256, 257, fn. 138; Tillich 1967: 115–118).

In spite of the suspicion of hubris, the culminating referent of inner experience became with Hegel, as it does for Jung, the process of the mind's or the ego's journey from and to its origin in the making of personal and collective history. Hegel's philosophy thus has a certain precedent in Augustine's *Confessions*. In this work Augustine ultimately locates the presence of God as within him when all identification was retracted from both external and preliminary internal reality. Bonaventure does much the same thing in his tracing of the mind's journey to God, a journey completed beyond the crucifixion of the *Logos* in an immersion with the divine "darkness" beyond all form (Bonaventure 1953: 43–45). For Jung this immersion would be the ego's dissolution in its maternal source in a moment of a transformative identity. For Hegel biblical symbolism had the same referent and described the same process but in a preliminary and pre-philosophical sense. Out of this perspective Hegel could appreciate Boehme's work as presenting a powerful alternative to the externalism and literalism of traditional theology because it rested on the aforesaid "pantheism of the Trinity" rising from the depths of the immediate experience of trinitarian energies in human and extra-human nature (Hegel 1995: 170, 196). Hegel contrasts the power of such experience with the sense-bound philosophy of Roger Bacon (ibid.: 188). He does not hesitate to call Boehme's enthusiastic thought and expression "barbarian", "barbarous" and incomprehensible (ibid.: 189, 192, 210). Indeed, for Hegel (and many others) his writing was so obtuse as to make it "impossible… to read Boehme continuously" (ibid.: 193). His corpus simply defied all efforts at a systematic presentation (ibid.: 195–196). And yet for all these many well founded criticisms Boehme remained for Hegel typically German in that he dealt with "what is most inward" (Hegel 1990: 121). In his inwardness Boehme stood for Hegel as the originator of the spirit of a truly German philosophy. "He became known as the *philosophicus teutonicus*, and in fact it is through him that philosophy of a distinctive character first emerged in Germany" (Hegel 1995: 119, 120). And in this appreciation Hegel preemptively critiques the degeneration of philosophy from the depth of his own nineteenth-century contribution to its current status of a sterile and defensive logic or, worse, grammar severed from the mind's rootedness in its life-giving origin, the reconnection with which should be philosophy's current ultimate concern as it was Jung's. Hegel worked to a culmination of the philosophical project in which the maturation of divine and human self-consciousness were two sides of a single process. In spite of all the accusations of hubris brought against him it remains true that his vision contributed greatly to a philosophically responsible synthesis of the divine and human completing each

other in individual and collective historical life, a truth to which Boehme could not give rationally intelligible expression.

Hegel's understanding of the origin of religion in human interiority stands in substantial accord with what Jung meant by leading the symbolic life, that is, a life devoted to discourse with the symbolic world as it appears for the individual most immediately in the personal dream as proceeding from the same origin as the collective revelations of formal religion. But this affinity is not without its serious differences. Though they might share similar views of the origin of symbol, Hegel would depart from Jung's willingness to remain at the symbolic level and allow the dream to be its own interpretation especially as dreams appear sequentially in an ongoing analysis (Jung 1969c: 26). For Hegel Boehme's expression remained too much attached to sense-based images, often biblical, and so too closely related to unexamined or pre-critical popular faith. "Faith possesses the truth but unconsciously" (Hegel 1995: 194). Jung would agree that popular faith remained unconscious of its experiential origin in the psyche and so ignorant of its true referent, namely, the deeper movements of the archetypal unconscious. Thus for both Hegel and Jung, but for different reasons, religious symbols were not to be taken literally as pointing to the world of the senses and moments in history either in the present or the distant past. Rather symbols had as their referent the more profound movements of the Spirit for Hegel and of the psyche for Jung. With Hegel the symbolic completed itself in its elevation to reason; with Jung the symbols completed themselves through other symbols and risked losing their power if rationalized. With Boehme and Jung symbolic access to the depths of the human gave rise to the sense of the opposites in internal conflict and to their drive to attain expression and ultimate coincidence in human consciousness. In this matter Jung reflects both Boehme and to some extent Hegel in his insistence that good and evil, for example, exist in the origin of consciousness, are perceived as opposites by consciousness and drive to their mutual embrace and so joint integration in historical consciousness (Hegel 1995: 194, 195; Jung 1969d: 174–176). But, where Boehme and Jung would see this process manifest in and urged by the symbols themselves and so more psychologically, Hegel was driven to move beyond the symbol and to uncover by purely rational processes the movement of mind to identity with divinity conveyed at a preliminary, that is sensuous or imaginal, level by the symbols. Yet even in his rational proclivity and need to move from image to Notion or Idea, Hegel arrives at that point of the coincidence of the human and divine within as working toward their union in the movement of history without in however ambiguous a manner. In this matter Hegel gives to the deeper working of reason what Jung would give to psyche as the ground of the symbolic seeking through the symbols to bring the unconscious increasingly into the conscious life of individual and community and in so doing foster the union of its opposites within them.

For Hegel, Boehme's master image is that of the coincidence of opposites in the symbol of the Trinity but as Hegel continues his treatment of Boehme it becomes clearer that Boehme's master image pervades Hegel's own mature philosophy. For in treating of Boehme Hegel will understand the unity worked in the Trinity

as a primordial coincidence of opposites by no means contained in a wholly self-sufficient and transcendent God imagined as somehow "prior" to creation. Rather this primordial unity of opposites extends to humanity and nature in a sense so real that they are intrinsic to the flow of even primordial trinitarian life as its natural and necessary expression. For Hegel all of this is latent in Boehme's experience and expression with the following single major reservation: "only he cannot express it in the form of thought" (Hegel 1995: 197). It is thus Boehme's experience that Hegel brings to a height of rational clarity in his later work. The intimacy and continuity he establishes between the Trinity in itself and in its expression beyond itself effectively undermines the orthodox distinction between the Trinity as eternally self-sufficient and the Trinity as creator. This point will be given further elaboration. Suffice it to say for now that Hegel's effort to bring Boehme's volatile experience to responsible philosophical formulation becomes the basis of Hegel's panlogism and implies that the second moment in the Trinity is to find its necessary expression in historical human consciousness itself. The base meaning of history then becomes the mind's return in individual and collectivity to a conscious appropriation of its initial point of coincidence with the divine and to bring this consciousness into historical reality. Jung understands this process as the ego's ongoing initial emergence from and return to the Goddess as the maternal unconscious and womb of mind as preludes to her greater incarnation in historical consciousness in the never ending cycle described above.

In his treatment of Boehme Hegel goes on to relate the meaning of the Trinity to the need for the other or the othering so that any centre of consciousness might know itself. This need for othering applies to God and God's self-knowledge. Again Hegel seems to understand this differentiation in Boehme, and in his own maturity, to be both within the Trinity in the emanation of the Logos from the Father but also in the emanation of human consciousness from both. Here again the question arises as to whether the Logos might not be the history of human consciousness as the vehicle in which God as the origin of that consciousness become itself self-conscious. This process is the substance of what has been referred to as Hegel's panlogism. The idea echoes Eckhart's statement that in the one word God speaks Eckhart hears two things, that is, the emanation of the Logos from its origin within God and beyond God in human consciousness itself. Put succinctly no absolute distinction exists between the eternal differentiation of the Logos from its origin in the Father and the emergence of the created mind from both in time. Hegel makes the point that in this dialectical process Logos, as the principle of differentiation between itself and its origin, must recover its origin that it may know the origin and the origin know itself in the Logos thus repossessed of its origin. Put simply, human historical consciousness becomes the fourth in which the Trinity gains ever fuller knowledge of itself in and through human self-consciousness.

For Hegel, the process Boehme describes moves easily and naturally into the psychological language of the ego (Ich) and the nothing (Nicht). The former, the ego, proceeds from the latter. The nothing here functions in close proximity to the role of the unconscious as the source of the ego and so of all consciousness. The Logos as

the power of consciousness differentiates from the nothing within God and in created consciousness beyond God in an all encompassing movement that embraces divine and human life in one organic dynamic. The implication is that God only knows God in the otherness of human consciousness and human consciousness knows God in the healing return to the creative nothingness from which all consciousness proceeds (Hegel 1995: 205–206). All that is manifests God and God knows himself in the manifestation. The flow of trinitarian life thus described has profound affinity with Jung's paradigm of the movement of the ego from the creative nothing of the unconscious as the initial moment of the process in which the ego's knowledge of the unconscious is the only knowledge the unconscious has of itself. This knowledge is intensified as the ego returns constantly to its source in the interest of their mutual realization in consciousness. Jung would describe this nothingness as the inexhaustible fecundity of the Great Mother. In a similar vein Hegel, in his mature work, refers to that from which the ego emerges as the "absolute womb" or "infinite fountainhead" out of which all emerges, to which all returns and by which all is "eternally maintained" (Hegel 1827a: 374). With both thinkers existential consciousness is related to its origin by its nature and is the sole theatre in which that origin becomes self-conscious.

This position connects closely to the problem of evil as Hegel, Boehme, and Jung understood it. As Hegel reads Boehme the source of the manifest "is the origin of evil in God and out of God" (Hegel 1995: 206). What is this evil? From Boehme, through Hegel to Jung, evil is variously cast as grossly exaggerated and so pathological self-affirmation. The I then exists in a state of willful isolation in both divine and human life. With Hegel reading Boehme such isolation is the ego's refusal of relatedness through its severance from the light of *Logos* as the light of consciousness and so of relationality (ibid.: 206–208). This is the logic behind Boehme's equation of the first moment of the Trinity's isolating self-affirmation with the hell to which the angels receded. It would be the dark but powerful side of God affirmed without the consort of light and by extension the light of Sophia. This is then the darkness the light must pierce in both the human and the divine. With Hegel such evil would reside in a divinity incapable of expressing itself to or beyond itself. In human consciousness it would describe a mind distanced from its point of identity with its origin. Such debilitating insensitivity to the importunity of its origin to become conscious in it can lead to its being overwhelmed by the unconscious as an agency foreign to it. In either scenario such a mind would live in an unrelated isolation.

For Jung this would describe the ego as unrelated to the unconscious, its origin as the origin of all, and so severed from a sense of continuity with all that it perceives in the world beyond itself as proceeding from that same origin. Jung is reaching to express such isolation within the prison of an unrelated consciousness in his statement to the effect that the worst if not only sin is the sin of unconsciousness. Such sin would be found in living away from the unconscious or being possessed by it (Jung 1968l: 253). In this passage Jung suggests that many contemporary leaders, "teachers and examples" are thus possessed by their faiths.

From Hegel's take on Boehme, the relation between the I and the nothing is such that if the I, once differentiated from the nothing, does not return to it, the I remains ignorant of or alienated from it and so "knows nothing of its original state" (Hegel 1995: 203). The poverty of this isolation and truncation is the substance of evil in both the divine and human.

In Hegel's reading of Boehme then the expression of the creative nothingness in the primordial definition of the Logos within the Trinity is inseparable from its continuity with the Logos as the essential structure of finite mind and reality in the world. Hegel cites Boehme precisely to this effect though he could say it equally well of his own thought. "The world is none other than the essence of God made creaturely" (Hegel 1995: 211). And again, "the abyss of nature and creation is God himself" (Hegel 1995: 212). Hegel himself uses the image of the abyss and with the same meaning in his mature work (Hegel 1827b: 288). In thus fusing the divine with the human and the natural in the sacred centre of the individual entity Boehme negates the distinction between time and eternity and insinuates strongly that humanity is at least latently aware of their underlying unity. "In this *centrum* man has both lives in himself, he belongs to time and eternity" (Hegel 1995: 215). Attributed here to Boehme this position is foundational in Hegel's own more measured philosophy and to Jung's understanding of the nature of the psyche.

In spite of Boehme's failure to bring philosophical precision to his work it is difficult to deny that Boehme and Hegel, in his effort to raise Boehme's experience to a metaphysical level, share a major point in common with Jung and his psychology. The point is this: the divine as the source of consciousness is compelled to create consciousness to become fully conscious in it. Humanity's most effective participation in this universal process lies in the cultivation of a living interiority in which the power of the divine is immediately experienced in a manner susceptible to philosophical analysis with Hegel, and to psychological, empirical observation with Jung. The true history of humanity is the history of its commerce with this experience. The coincidence of opposites moves necessarily and teleologically to increasing consciousness of the identity of the divine and the human in personal and collective history. Wherever such coincidence is more closely approximated, the divine and the human are mutual benefactors. Where such coincidence is denied or feeble both are diminished. Hegel justifies Boehme's experience even in Boehme's failure to express it in a tighter reason. In this respect Boehme's failure became Hegel's opportunity to which Jung provides a more compelling psychological support. Such support is more persuasive because it is based on the more immediate experience of the energies involved, an experience that Hegel's philosophy presupposes but also hides behind his rational façade and its efforts to make Boehme more intelligible.

Hegel and Jung: A wider resonance

The foregoing presents Hegel's documented appreciation of Boehme and touches briefly on a few substantial areas of Boehme's influence on Hegel's philosophy.

Nevertheless there remain more extensive areas of latent affinity between Boehme, Hegel and Jung. Making them explicit contributes to the understanding of the continuity between the three and to the resources they proffer to the revitalizing of the contemporary cultural spirit.

Hegel attempted the gargantuan task of bringing the Western philosophical and theological traditions to the completion of their task in his own work. This effort is evident throughout his major works and is explicit as the central concern of his work on the history of philosophy and on the philosophy of religion. His philosophy culminates in the description of a consciousness restored to and aware of its native inhesion in the divine in a state he terms "philosophy" and even "science". In reality the consciousness he seeks to describe is one in which the distinction between the height of philosophical and theological reasoning and religious and mystical experience falls away. The description of Hegel as "a Christian mystic, seeking adequate speculative expression" applies most immediately to the early Hegel but also to traits that remained residual and foundational to his mind throughout his life (Kroner 1970: 9). This is not to make of Hegel a mystic who underwent the intensity of immersion in the reality of the divine described in earlier chapters. It does make of Hegel a philosopher who brought this experience of the "abyss" as the first moment of Trinity to the highest degree of intelligibility in his description of the *unio mystica* as an "inner cultus", that is, as an identity with the divine as a needed prelude to the experience of the divine beyond the individual (Hegel 1827b: 180; 444–445). More, in continuity with the apophatic mystics previously examined Hegel writes of this mystical union at its culmination, "This experience of nothingness can be a bare condition or single experience, or it can be thoroughly elaborated [in one's life]" (ibid.: 446). In this Hegel embraces a universal teleology of the movement of mind and history to the recovery of its ground found also in Jung's description of the mind at one with its ground and so capable of a residual awareness of the depth dimension of its surroundings (ibid.: 444, fn. 176; Jung 1970: 534). With both the implication is that the movement of history supports the deepening and extending sense of the coincidence of the individual with humanity in its totality as expressive of its divine ground. The actualization of such breadth and depth then constitutes the redemption of God and the human in one organic process.

Hegel's own philosophy is thus a philosophy of history driven universally and so with an endemic necessity by the process of God becoming self conscious in and through human consciousness which itself becomes increasingly conscious if not ultimately identified with God in and through the same process. Divinity becoming increasingly conscious through humanity and humanity becoming increasingly conscious of its own divinity are simply two dimensions of this same all encompassing dynamic. Yet in his documentation of this universal process Hegel demands an intellectual rigor which would undermine too easily claims to the experience of God in the form of irresponsible affirmations of immediacy, that is, an immediate experience of the divine needing no further evidence than itself. One of his main targets here was his contemporary and colleague in Berlin,

Friedrich Schleiermacher. Hegel rejected Schleiermacher's effort to base the reality of God on the feeling of absolute dependence (Schleiermacher 1963: 17). Hegel responds that feeling is a power humanity shares with the animal world and so is ill equipped to ground the Christian or any religion (Hegel 1824: 273; Livingston 1988: 117). Elsewhere in writing on Schleiermacher he refers to "dumb feeling" (Hegel 1995: 509). Hegel also dismissed Kant's argument for the reality of the divine based on the moral sense of the ought that "resounds unabatedly in our souls" (Kant 1934: 40). Though the moral sense remained of uppermost importance to Hegel the reduction of religion to morality fell short of the objective knowledge of God based on the mind's recovery and identity with its divine origin. For Jung also morality derives from the ingression of the self into consciousness but such ingression greatly expands the moral imperative toward the demand of personal integration and universal relatedness. Individual integration and universal relatedness as the two prominent virtues in the morality of the self do not exclude traditional morality but greatly expand the moral sense toward a universal compassion based on the universal sentiment of the self even as it speaks to the individual.

What then was the substance, the content, of the mind's recovery of its identity with the divine beyond the immediacy of religious affect or moral compulsion? For Hegel such substance lay largely in the defeat of the alienation that pervaded religious consciousness, then and now, the common religious and theological understanding of God as other. In philosophical discourse bordering on the psychological Hegel describes the consciousness of God as other as "an unhappy consciousness" based on the misperception that the individual in existence is wholly removed from the essential and absolute, that is, from God (Hegel 1967: 251–267; 752–753). This sense of the otherness of God becomes then the truth of the universality of the story of original sin. The story in all its contingency grounds a sense of alienation from a wholly transcendent origin as universal as human consciousness itself (Hegel 1827b: 300–304). In scriptural and dogmatic formulation this universal alienation falls under Hegel's classification of representational or symbolic expression. For Hegel representational expression in the form of dramatic stories involving the divine and human were necessary, even appreciated, as preliminary pictures of the divine/human relation but for the immature mind. Their truth needed to be elevated or sublated to the level of philosophy where their truly universal and necessary nature was revealed beyond the arbitrary contingencies of divine activity and equally arbitrary human response. A compelling example of this process lies in the story of the fall of Adam. Sublated the story becomes the substance of the universal truth of humanity's experienced separation in existence from its origin. Such a moment is universal and necessary and describes the egression of consciousness from its matrix as the precondition of its return thereto in the completion of both. The symbolic, sensuous, representational had to cede to the post-symbolic truth the symbols conveyed. As this hermeneutic proceeds, the universal alienation expressed in the story of the fall is defeated by the death of Christ now framed as the death of God as other to the presence of God as the basis of human consciousness now driving to a more universal realization under the

impetus of Spirit. Within the understandable limits of Hegel's Christian commitment this Spirit would be the Spirit of Christianity.

In Jung's view, more inclusive than the Christian, the Spirit would be the power of the self bringing into historical synthesis not only God and humanity but a much fuller manifestation of the total divine reality in continuity with Boehme's understanding of a God whose nature it is to fully manifest the totality of the divine potential in existence. Jung would be reluctant to depart from the symbolic expression toward an Hegelian philosophical extraction of the symbols' meaning in the interest of completing the symbol but he joins Hegel in his refusal to take symbolic discourse as literal, historical and referring to reality external to the psyche. Jung, like Hegel, is steadfast in his conviction that the referent of symbolic discourse, and especially of the dream as revelatory, is to the movements of the psyche itself and not to divinities beyond the psyche. In Hegel's parlance biblical events understood to be of past history and distant geographical location are of religious insignificance. He drives home this point when he observes that the Crusaders in recovering the Holy Land discovered not the grave of Christ but the grave of Christianity as a past event, one not spiritually reenacted and so moribund in the present, "the Christians (crusaders) found only their loss, their grave in this present" (Hegel 1995: 104). If they were to rise from the grave of their historical literalism, argues Hegel, they would have to find what they sought in Jerusalem "in themselves" (ibid.). Jung writes in much the same spirit when he argues that the true Christians are those who suffer the meaning of the Christian symbols as "inner events" in the passion of their individual lives and not in some literal imitation of a distant historical figure in a far off land (Jung 1969b: 273). In this Jung is also contending that the truth of death and resurrection describe two of the essential moments of the psychic truth of individuation couched in the less than universal imagery of Christianity (ibid.: 262–263).

Hegel, Jung and the Trinity

The arcane symbol of the Trinity was of great importance to Hegel and Jung. In the context of Hegel's overriding understanding of the history of human consciousness as a departure from and recovery of its origin within history itself the usually remote imagery of the Trinity takes on great illuminative value. For Jung, likewise, the symbol plays a key role in one of the distinguishing features of the radical newness of his psychology, namely, the move from a trinitarian to a quaternitarian paradigm. Throughout Hegel's philosophy the image of the trinity is the dominant structuring dynamism. The basic triad is that of the source of consciousness undergoing a diremption or split both in and beyond its own life. Out of the inner dynamic of Trinitarian life as a life of opposites creation necessarily proceeds. We have seen this point anticipated in Eckhart and Boehme. For Hegel the most serious consequence of this split is the false consciousness that the finite and infinite, the divine and the human, stand as opposites in relation to each other. Their point of primal coincidence remains obscured or ignored in the usual patterns of mundane

consciousness. With Eckhart also the departure of mind from its point of identity with the divine is a fair though less philosophically precise description of creation and fall as two side of the same event. Thus Eckhart, Hegel and Tillich in the twentieth century contend that the creation of discriminating consciousness and the fall coincide (Hegel 1827b: 300, fn. 138; Tillich 1957b: 44).

From its first instance discriminating consciousness once born is keenly aware of its estrangement from its origin and essential truth and so from human and prehuman nature. With Eckhart, Hegel and Jung the sense of otherness from its origin is then the basis of universal alienation. In some quarters contemporary parlance would describe this removal of the mind from its ground as "disenchantment" and so imply the need for re-enchantment. Whatever word is chosen to describe the situation of removal from one's essential truth lodged in the origin of consciousness the basic meaning remains this: to be other is to be alien. To be wholly other is to be wholly alien. Perceived as wholly other, God is wholly alien to humanity and the source of its "unhappy consciousness". The core of Hegel's philosophy is to overcome this alienation and so to reconcile the split between the divine and the human through the philosophical recovery of their point of identity now made real in finite consciousness. As the split is resolved the two become one in the Spirit now understood to work this reconciliation in an historical subjectivity both divine and human exclusive of agencies transcendent to such subjectivity.

In Jungian categories the split between one's essential truth and actual consciousness occurs when the ego is born from the unconscious and becomes aware in this development of its estrangement from the truth of the self within and from reality without. The suffering of this universal alienation is further deepened as consciousness becomes aware of the universal conflict of opposites grounded in the same divine origin as the ego. Jung's psychology hinges on the reconciliation of the ego with its origin and the resolution in consciousness of divinely based opposites under the urgency of the self which becomes increasingly incarnate in consciousness as it works the resolution. This perspective in its foundational morphology approaches identity with Hegel's understanding of history participating in the conscious recovering of the identity of the human and divine. For Hegel when the dynamics of this unity are raised from religious to philosophical experience this elevation becomes a rationally rigorous description of the *unio mystica*, personal and collective. Such mystical union is the goal of history and brings religion to its consummation in the philosophical certitude of the mind's native identity with the divine. If not yet totally actualized at least the teleology of the movement of mind and history are laid bare as a movement toward the responsible conscious recovery of that point of identity between the divine and the human, present from the outset to be fully recovered in the end and always active as the depth dimension of the present.

The immanent and economic Trinity in Hegel and Jung

To more fully grasp the implications of Hegel's position on humanity's participation in Trinitarian life, the intricacies of Trinitarian theology have to be addressed.

Traditional Christian theology would usually distinguish what it termed the "immanent Trinity" from the "economic Trinity". The immanent Trinity referred to the life of the Trinity in itself. The imagination attached to the phrase implied the total self-sufficiency of the Trinity existing in a state somehow "prior" to creation. Trinitarian self-sufficiency meant that there was no necessary connection between the Trinity and creation. The Trinity was in a position to do quite well in and by itself. More, once creation escaped its Trinitarian origin there was no necessary conscious connection between human consciousness and the divine. Further the Trinity gained nothing from the failure or success of its creation. In the divine/human economy everything was contingent including creation, the fall and redemption in the wake of the fall. God was a self-thinking thought complete in itself. It remains difficult to see in this imagination of the divine why creation would take place and in what sense creation would be truly meaningful to so self-sufficient a divinity with nothing at stake in the creative process and its historical unfolding. Not only creation but also the fall would be equally contingent events. One can only marvel at the divine bad luck in creating a couple who arbitrarily turned from the divine and the joys of paradise in which, like children, they lacked nothing but the power of the conscious discrimination of opposites. In the aftermath of a totally contingent creation and fall the divine then embarks equally contingently on the redemption of the fallen world ultimately through the second power of the Trinity becoming human. Here again the Trinity did not have to launch a second outgoing to a fallen humanity after the first creation failed so miserably. Jung in the wake of Hegel demolishes this theological scenario in his own version of the motive for the incarnation. "To sum up: the immediate cause of the Incarnation lies in Job's elevation, and its purpose is the differentiation of Yaweh's consciousness" (Jung 1969e: 406).

In distinction from the immanent and wholly self-sufficient Trinity, the interplay of Trinity with humanity in creation and fall but especially in redemption is then distinguished as the economic Trinity imagined as the Trinity in relation to what lies beyond its internal. The activity of the economic Trinity would likewise be imagined as devoid of necessity and so as arbitrary as the initial creation and fall. The truly crucial point in Hegel's philosophy is whether he does and can distinguish between the immanent and economic Trinity. In other words Hegel, again in affinity with Eckhart, can be read to conflate the immanent and economic Trinity and so to affirm that God as self-thinking thought can only think itself through human consciousness. In this scenario humanity itself becomes the collective second person in the Trinity and only through it does the first power in the Trinity (God the Father in traditional religious discourse) become conscious. It cannot be denied that passages in Hegel appear to sustain the traditional distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity. But taken in its totality his work strongly suggests that divinity necessarily creates to become conscious in its creature making human consciousness and history itself the second moment in the Trinity and so extending, as does Jung, the incarnation to everyone, at least as the deepest human potential seeking realization in every individual and culture. Thus

understood humanity's deepest potential equates with processes of divinity becoming progressively conscious in human history.

P. C. Hodgson treats this issue well. He endorses Hegel's own consistent denial that his thought was a form of pantheism and so an affirmation of the real distinction between the Trinity in itself (immanent) and the Trinity engaged in the world (economic). Hodgson would seem to settle for a form of trinitarian panentheism in which the difference between the Trinity and created consciousness is affirmed but, paradoxically, this difference can, and perhaps must, accommodate a latent identity between the divine and a humanity becoming conscious of this identity in the completion of both in history. In this union of identity and difference Hodgson bows to Hegel's dependence on German mysticism and neo-Platonism (Hodgson 1985: 16, 17, 87, fn. 79). One is moved to conclude that Hegel draws near to the denial of a real distinction between a preceding and self sufficient Trinity and a consequent creation as its necessary second though finite and so passing moment on its way to the realization of the ever present latent identity with God. Hodgson concedes such a conclusion is "*implicit* only". Yet in so arguing Hegel elevates the myth of creation and fall to reason and shows its universal and necessary truth. The divine and human are co-dependents in their mutual becoming fully conscious in human consciousness. Again, so arguing Hegel also establishes an intimacy between the Trinity in itself and its expression in creation that tortures orthodoxy and explains its hostility to mystics like Eckhart and Boehme who have experienced and proclaimed such intimacy to the point of an underlying identity between the divine and the human. Though he did not include him in his *History of Philosophy* Hegel had been introduced to Eckhart through F. X. von Baader sometime in 1823–1824 and, as mentioned, may have known him as early as 1794 (Hodgson 1984: 347, 348, fns. 166, 167). Obviously Hegel had appreciated Eckhart. On the question of the mutuality of shared being and knowing between the divine and human, Hegel cites with approval Eckhart's famous passage in which the latter affirms that God and humanity see each other out of the same eye (Hegel 1824: 347–348). In this passage Hegel warns theologians that if they cannot grasp such thought, probably because of their orthodox obtuseness and rational superficiality, they "should leave them alone" (ibid.: 347).

For in the context of his total work Hegel does so closely relate the immanent and economic Trinity that to clearly distinguish their reality is difficult if not impossible. Thus he will distinguish a first moment of God as universal, a self-thinking thought othering and reuniting with itself within itself. This is obvious homage to the traditional imagination of an immanent Trinity sufficient in itself as a precedent to reality beyond itself. The second moment is God as determinate. Within the Trinity this is the Logos. Beyond the Trinity this is effectively human consciousness aware of God as other, the basis of Hegel's sense of the pervasive sense of bad infinity, one that does not experientially penetrate finite consciousness and results in an unhappy consciousness. As such this second moment in the divine life is called particular or determinate and refers to particular instances of finite, created consciousness imbued with a profound sense of removal from the

divine and with a corresponding anguish for reunion. Hegel is here laying out the basis for the situation to be described later in the twentieth century as existential estrangement. With Tillich this becomes the suffering of a mind removed from its source whose very removal grounds the possibility of its disintegration and the basis of its drive to recover its source and integration therein. The third moment in the process of trinitarian life is that of trinity as consummate. This moment describes the reality of the spirit understood as the recovery on the part of finite consciousness or subjectivity of its native inherence in infinite subjectivity. Though it is difficult to delineate more precisely it would describe a state in which finite subjectivity realized fully its participation in the flow of divine life as both an expression of divinity beyond divinity coterminous with the full human recovery of union with its source in divinity. This state of consciousness would seem then to encompass the movement of the mind from its origin and its restoration with its origin and to identify this process as discernible moments in the common life of the Trinity and human consciousness. As such this thinking remains somewhat eschatological. But the dynamics of the consummate moment or consummate religion would move in the present toward an interpenetration of trinitarian and human subjectivity ultimately with no residue and beyond separation. The moments of divine life would thoroughly pervade humanity and humanity would manifest an unqualified transparency to its inhesion in the flow of trinitarian life moving from an infinite origin, its expression in the finite mind and the union of both in Spirit (ibid.: 305–310). To orthodox depictions of such a moment of mutual identity and fulfillment as religiously or theologically "presumptuous" Hegel simply responds, "What a bogey!" (ibid.: 310).

Jung comes very close to these positions in his own treatment of the symbol of the Trinity. In fact his understanding of the unconscious seeking ever greater emergence in the conscious life of humanity can identify more precisely from a purely psychological perspective how the power of the so called "economic" Trinity is in fact now operative in the world. The first phase of Jung's treatment of the Trinity is based on the traditional imagination of the economic Trinity in traditional theological imagination. Behind his treatment of this symbol lies his consistent hermeneutic that religious symbols refer to the more profound movements of the psyche. To this rule the immanent Trinity is no exception. The Trinity depicts the relation of the unconscious as Father, to its expression in the Son or human consciousness and to their reconciliation in and through the Spirit. These lines of Jung could have been written by Hegel: "The point is that the unfolding of the One reaches its climax in the Holy Ghost after polarizing itself as Father and Son" (Jung 1969d: 135). Jung's opening section of his treatment of the Trinity thus describes the triadic flow between the unconscious as generative of the ego as other and the consequent economy between them moving to their unity worked by the self or Spirit (ibid.: 148–163). He even correlates the psychological aspects of the ages of Father, Son and Spirit with each of the three persons somewhat in the footsteps of Joachim di Fiore with whom he closely associates his thought and even person in one of his letters to Victor White (Jung 1953: 138). To this point

Jung's psychology approximates foundational elements in Hegel's thought. His psychology depicts the Father as the wholly undifferentiated source of creation in a psychological age prior to a sense of individuality. The Son represents the evolution of consciousness to the sense of individuality critical of the world and its origin and in conflict with the Father. The conflict is then resolved through the mediation of the Spirit/self as the synthesis of the unconscious and consciousness. In the age of the Spirit the ego could indeed say that I and the Father are one as long as there difference stood. Were the ego to say "I am the father", the situation would be one of total possession by the unconscious, a pathological identification of the ego with the self. But in his description of the psychology of the birth of consciousness from its origin and its return thereto under the aegis of the Spirit Jung joins Hegel in the affirmation that the full cycle of trinitarian life reveals to man "the secret of his divinity" (Jung 1969d: 135).

At this point Jung's trinitarian thought steps beyond Hegel in his move to a quaternitarian paradigm. Jung's argument forcing this move is simply that so much of what exists in reality is not reflected in the imagery of its creator as its alleged origin, especially the reality of evil, though he could add the feminine and the bodily with equal justification. Prior to the discussion of what is absent in the Trinity and present in creation is Jung's presupposition that what is in creation including human consciousness itself is an expression of the unconscious and of an unconscious that drives to express its total reality in consciousness. The strong implication is that what is is not created by a God beyond the psyche but is an expression of the creative psyche itself. From this perspective creator and creature are wholly and mutually self-contained in a psyche currently in the process of creating a myth that would sacralize all that proceeds and can proceed from the matrix of observable creation. Thus the first moment in the quaternity, the age of the Father, becomes the creative but wholly unconscious ground of all that is and that can and must become conscious. The second moment, the age of the Son, is the emergence of ego consciousness from its origin in the unconscious. The third moment is the splitting or conscious distinction not only of the ego from the unconscious but of opposites undifferentiated in the unconscious but blatantly real as opposites to the world of consciousness. Since Jung is here dealing primarily with the absence of evil in the Trinity, the opposites made conscious he focuses on becoming the light (Christ) and dark (demonic) sons of the same God (Jung 1969d: 175).

Here is Boehme again and his acknowledgement of the root of evil in God and the need of God to become aware of his full nature in human consciousness. In Jung's movement from a trinitarian to a quaternitarian paradigm the fourth moment becomes the now emerging unity of the opposites worked by the self in the wake of the ego's perception of them as opposites. Thus the integration sought and demanded by the nature of the psyche is the reunification of the ego with the unconscious extending by the same dynamic to the unity of archetypally based opposites in the created world. In this treatment of Christ and Satan the opposites become the divine and demonic dimensions of humanity united by the Spirit or self. Jung's Spirit is thus richer, more compelling and more inclusive than Hegel's

which does not envision the embrace of Christ and Satan. The Spirit in Jung's paradigm unites good and evil, body and spirit, male and female in a much more specific and currently topical way than can Hegel who does not stoop to deal with such specifics. The latter's explicit dismissal of divinity as a quaternity lies in the limitations of the nineteenth-century Christian mind which could still conceive of the Kingdom of God, no doubt, being worked in history, but without the integral components of the demonic, the body and the feminine as essential to the fullness of the Spirit (Hegel 1967: 772). In this respect Jung's significant but largely unconscious affinity with Hegel surpasses his predecessor in the vision of an age of the Spirit much wealthier and wider in its embrace and promise than even Hegel's sparse but rationally compelling depiction of the finite mind resonating with the trinitarian life and pulse of its origin as a universally emerging sensitivity.

The role of religious representation in Hegel and Jung

At this point Hegel's and Jung's understanding of the symbolic needs elaboration. In Hegel's terminology "representational", "sensible" and symbolic writing and discourse are effectively synonymous. Hegel appreciated and, as a Christian, had to endorse this level of consciousness in its biblical and dogmatic form (Hegel 1824: 333–334; 1827b: 273–274, fn. 67). In this sense he would happily concede that religious symbolism did convey religious truth but in a preliminary almost juvenile form. Thus he will bow to the need for religious symbols and to the scriptural revelations which bear them, and so to the immense meaning of the historical event of Christ and the Christian symbols informing the authority of doctrine and Christian education (ibid.: 334–336). Nevertheless such expression remained for him premature and demeaned the mind developmentally frozen in it. In its literal and historical form symbolic consciousness blocked its holder from the full understanding and impact of the symbol through forbidding its deeper appropriation and internalization by reason wherein its true power, necessity and universality lay. In this context he understood his philosophy to complete religious symbolic expression by raising or sublating such expression to a rational philosophical level in which the energies of its content would be preserved, indeed intensified, even as the symbolic form was surpassed by its rational integration. Christian maturity weaned on the representational would thus find its completion in the experience of the recovered identity of finite spirit with absolute Spirit.

As an important example of this process, he argues that the truth of Christ as that of humanity at one with a God, a process immanent in the evolution of historical religious consciousness itself, had to occur initially in a symbolic depiction of an historical individual. Such mythic presentation then served as a prelude and prompt to the truth of its universal and necessary meaning, namely, that the substance of history was its movement to a recovered identity with the divine (ibid.: 336–339). When this same position is applied to ritual activity Hegel will even appreciate the ritual of the Catholic Mass as an enactment of the truth of Christ even as he rejects the Catholic sense of the externality of what is being celebrated

in favour of the celebration leading individual and community into the internal and so wholly spiritual experience of Christ and God (Hegel 1827a: 152; 1827b: 337–339). In effect Jung brought this perception of the Mass into psychological universality in his work on the Mass. Here the reality of the ritual is grounded in the double dialectic between the sacrifice of the ego to the self and of the self to the ego as a compelling description of the interplay of ego with self in the latter's drive to fuller conscious incarnation. In Jung's view the second dialectical movement of this process describes the birth of divinity in the mind of the practitioner. Jung borrows the alchemical term "*filius philosophorum*", "the son of the philosopher", to describe that conscious state in which divinity has entered the consciousness of the alchemist consequent to the sacrificial dissolution of the alchemist's ego in the unconscious. The dialectic revolves around the power of the self, there from eternity, demanding the sacrifice of the ego so that it may dwell more fully in the ego in reciprocal fulfillment of the divine and human (Jung 1969b: 263–265).

In their emphasis on the role of the symbolic culminating in an inner transformation free of a perverse literalism, historicism and externalism, Jung and Hegel share a substantive common ground. In a letter addressing White's claim that the then newly proclaimed dogma of the Assumption had a literal and historical as well as a symbolic meaning Jung terms a literal assumption of a physical body into heaven a "parapsychological stunt" (Jung 1950: 567). As he continues in this letter he describes miracles as "the attempt to prove the existence of the spirit to a coarse and primitive mind unable to grasp the psychic reality of an idea, a mind needing miracles as evidence of a spiritual presence" (ibid.). This religious sensitivity would identify Jung with Hegel in questioning the spiritual worth of historical miracles (Hegel 1821: 146–149). The latter does not begrudge the happy but few recipients of the healing miracles worked by Christ but simply points out that "millions" of the currently afflicted remain unhealed (Hegel 1827a: 339). Hegel could well have written these lines of Jung's, "The spirit and meaning of Christ are present and perceptible to us even without the aid of miracles. Miracles appeal only to the understanding of those who cannot perceive the meaning. They are mere substitutes for the not understood reality of the spirit" (Jung 1969e: 360).

Jung and Hegel on the figure of Christ

Jung and Hegel would also share some common ground on their understanding of the reality of Christ. Hegel's insistence on an element of necessity and universality in matters religious and philosophical led him to the position that the truth of the Christ event must first appear in mythic or representational guise as an historical depiction of a human in unqualified unity with God. The particularity of the myth would be the basis of and cede to its universal meaning. Only an initial telling of the history of the Christ as an individual in symbolic form could serve to unveil its universal truth, the death of the false, guilt ridden consciousness of relating to a supernatural divinity wholly other than the human and so to the death of such a God. Hegel would appear convinced that the conception of God as transcendentally

other, from whose heaven the Christ figure descended, informed much of the biblical, theological and representational account of the "historical Christ" as it continues to do in much of the Christian community today. Hegel was little interested in what today would be termed the "historical Christ". For him the Christ event was an historical necessity whose truth in representational form was the point of identity of the divine and human in a single person and by extension in everyone. This truth would become more evident and widespread as history proceeded. Raised to the level of universality the death of Christ becomes the death of a relation to a supernatural God accompanied by the realization that the Holy Spirit as a continuation of the reality of Christ now elevated history as such to the status of the second moment in trinitarian life moving toward the culmination of an historical consciousness aware of its identity with God as its end and origin (Hegel 1921: 122–130).

Thus while the imagery and imagination of the historical Christ was a divine and human spiritual necessity the meaning of the symbol is not historical in that its prime referent is not to a distant past. Rather the symbol induces in the present the sense of the mind's inherence in the flow of divine life at any given moment in history. In this position Hegel affirms the need of both the Christ event and its biblical depiction but insists both must be raised or sublated to their universal meaning as describing an ever present divine impulse in humanity supporting a heightened consciousness of their underlying identity. On a similar note Hegel would appreciate the necessity of creedal and doctrinal statements not as intended preservatives of the experience their formulation was meant to continue but too often killed through the necrosis of literalism and a shallow rationalism. Jung described the reduction of symbol and ritual to such superficial literalism as "sacrosanct unintelligibility" and "preposterous nonsense" (Jung 1969d: 109, 110). For both men symbolic discourse points beyond itself – for Hegel to a universal truth beyond the specifics of the mythical; for Jung to the deeper and universal movements of the psyche itself.

In this respect Jung's psychology has profound affinity with Hegel's Christology and goes well beyond it in certain areas of contemporary interest. As with Hegel so for Jung the "still living myth" of Christ provided the "culture hero" for contemporary Western society (Jung 1968j: 36). Whether this remains true today can be questioned but that much of the West retains a Christian or, at least, monotheistic conception of divinity, whether accepted or rejected, cannot. For Jung the symbol of Christ depicted the unity of consciousness with the unconscious as the basis of a certain collective cohesion as do all images of culture heroes whose divinity in religious or secular form becomes the basis of the religious grounding of culture and too often of the "clash of civilizations" (Dourley 2010b: 135–142). In the instance of the symbol of Christ, always to be taken as one among many symbols of the self, Jung gives psychological validation to the biblical statement, "I and the father are one." Christ becomes an image of consciousness wholly at one with its source in marked affinity with the culmination of conscious development in Hegelian philosophy. However, Jung's appreciation of the symbol has

always to be countered by his withering critique of its now pathogenic one-sidedness and the need for its compensation in a mythical consciousness of greatly extended inclusion (Jung 1968j: 39–45).

Such supersession of the symbol of Christ as either personal or cultural hero is currently necessary because for Jung the image of Christ as an image of the self is maimed. It excludes the shadow, Satan as Christ's dark brother of the same father (ibid.: 42). Jung could also add here that the Christ image is divested of a relation to the feminine and is ambivalent on the value of the body and especially of the sexual. In fact Jung effectively appeals, like Hegel, to the element of necessity in the movement of history to alter this situation. With Jung this necessity is based on the unfolding of the laws of psyche rather than reason as the most significant determinants in the evolution of historical and religious consciousness. Jung's argument in this matter rests on the psychic law of compensation as it works on the evolution of consciousness and, particularly, religious consciousness. In terms of the law of compensation Christianity, along with Mithraism, its sister religion, would owe their origin to the power of the psyche compensating the barbarism of the epoch into which they were born (Jung 1966a: 65–71). Such collective inhumanity and contempt for life itself drew Christianity from the unconscious. Christianity, as creative compensation to its surroundings, produced a profoundly spiritual religion to offset the then societal contempt for spiritual as well as physical and sexual life. However, as the laws of the psyche determining history worked themselves out in the wake of Christianity, its once needed emphasis on the precedence of spirit offsetting dehumanizing forms of libidinal excess became itself one-sided and so pathologizing in much of its current concretion which does not include and too often excludes the validity of physical and sexuality reality from the wholly human. In fact Jung will contend that Christianity's initial one-sidedness contained within it from the outset the necessity of its own transcendence in terms of the now needed extension of the sacred to what is real but not sacred in the Christian world view. Writes Jung on Christianity's need for compensation of the image of Christ, "It [the figure of Christ] is, in fact so one-sidedly perfect that it demands a psychic complement to restore the balance" (Jung 1968j: 42). The balance would appear in the form of the anti-Christ, again not by some kind of historical contingency but by the working of "inexorable psychological law" in history depicted in the Joannine anti-Christ (ibid.: 43). Within modernity this compensation is evident sexually in the work of Freud, materially in the work of Marx, and intellectually in the Reformation and the consequent Enlightenment in its freeing the mind from religious heteronomy and the transcendent tyranny of wholly other Gods stripped of evil.

The implications of Jung's view of Christianity's one-sidedness demanding its own supersession in history and currently are radical. It would mean that the religions are products of the unconscious responding to the collective pathology in the society that elicits them from the agency of the self and that this process is a continuing one. In effect each society gets the God or Gods it deserves. Divinely based moral repression in the monotheisms counters the depth of the societal depravation

it compensates. Emergence from a sense of supernaturally imposed moral restriction is emergence from an imposed divine morality which Hegel, citing Voltaire, relates to divine toilet training (Hegel 1824: 339). In a similar sardonic vein Hegel relates such biblical and theological literalism to Moliere's portrayal of the individual who was surprised to learn from his tutor that he had been speaking in prose all this time (Hegel: 1827b: 261, fn. 39). Such minds are immune to the poetry of the spirit in the text to which they are exposed. Jung would supplant such spiritual obtuseness with a morality based on adherence to the truth of the self contributing to the consciousness of God in each individual life in the manner unique to that life. Through such consciousness raising in individuals religion itself would become a matter of response to the needs of human wholeness and totality in the contingency of the ongoing historical situation. Religious evolution driven by the psychic laws of compensation would then become a continuing process. Such an understanding of the unconscious acting through the self in the promotion of consciousness by becoming more fully conscious in the human would deny to any religion, itself produced by the unconscious, claim to an exhaustive ultimacy and so undermine the monotheisms, each of which makes this claim. Such a denial of ultimacy would also apply to non-monotheistic religions who may not make a claim to terminal ultimacy so blatantly but imply it in their lived reality through their holy texts, rituals and community life. Thus archetypally based compensation accounts fully for the appearance of all the divinities, and their texts, rituals and devotional communities, as it accounts for the evolution of religious consciousness currently moving beyond an unqualified adherence to any. At a level deeper than the resacralization of those created realities not sacralized in the Christian myth, Jung identifies the substance of the evolution of religious consciousness currently emerging in human consciousness as the widespread realization that all that is, and especially the human, is, in its depths, divine.

Jung and Hegel on consummate and relative religion

We have seen that Hegel understands the first or universal moment in the unfolding of the Trinity as a self-contained activity, a self thinking thought giving itself adequate and ultimate expression. The second moment, the determinate, is manifest in the history of religion and especially in those religions which understand their Gods to be wholly other than their finite adherents. This situation is seen to prevail in the Greek, Roman and Judaic religions (Hegel 1827b: 267, 268). Finally, the consummate religion, the religion of singularity, is Christianity and it is so blessed because of its trinitarian consciousness, understood as the culmination in historical consciousness of the mind's ever latent identity with the flow of triadic life. This means that for Hegel Christianity is the culmination of religious historical development because it alone carries the realization that the finite is an expression of the divine in which the divine offers itself in humanity to become self-conscious in its otherness in the restoration of the original identity of the divine and human (ibid.: 271–274).

The difficulties with Hegel's vision emerge both within the world of Christian orthodoxy and beyond it in contemporaneity. The ontological intimacy if not identity it establishes between trinitarian life and human historical life is abrasive to vast segments of Christianity's own orthodox self-understanding. Copleston, the renowned Catholic historian, is forced to conclude that Hegelianism is a form of esoteric Christianity and Christianity a form of exoteric Hegelianism. His point is that Christianity could not accept what Hegel had to offer. Yet he grants to Hegel a sincerity of intent, graciously conceding that Hegel as a self proclaimed champion of Christianity was not writing "with his tongue in his cheek" (Copleston 1994: 241). The response Hegel elicited in his own time split into right and left. The right were impressed that he did give a place and appreciation to specifically Christian symbolism though deemed as preliminary to spiritual truth. The left were more sensitive to the implication that divinity realized itself in human history and that collective humanity was itself divine or destined to become aware that it was (Livingston 1988: 127, 214–236). Feuerbach reversed Hegel and saw divinity simply as humanity's projection of its own collective resources in the creations of God. Feuerbach was on the way to Marx's conclusion that the only significant dialectic in history was its march to universal justice to culminate in the universal identity of the individual with the species. The late Schelling after Hegel's death was to attack his philosophy as devoid of positive or existential content. Kierkegaard proposed a leap of faith to Christ to evade Hegel's integration of humanity and its history with the unfolding of the divine. Schopenhauer described a will to cease willing in the face of the frustration inherent in humanity's native drive to the infinite and the realization that only finite surcease was attainable. Finally Nietzsche attacked bourgeois Christianity in its totality (Tillich 1967: 132–207). Hegel's more immediate impact thus remains rich but ambiguous. As a Christian apologetic it failed. Its more lasting influence took on forms hostile to Christianity but still extant in contemporary culture.

To today's broader secular perspective Hegel's philosophy appears fatally tainted with Christian triumphalism. When a specific religion is presented as the culmination of the development of religion universally, including but surpassing what has come before, modern sensitivity is immediately and rightly suspicious. This suspicion is not wantonly corrosive. Rather it is a tribute to a deepening extension of a growing religious sensitivity and relativity in various cultural forms and occasionally within the religions themselves manifest, for instance, in interfaith dialogue. This contemporary sensibility also owes a great debt to a fuller realization of what disasters have been wreaked on modernity by claims by any religion or functional equivalent to have completed civilization's evolution in itself. However, it can be convincingly argued that Hegel's philosophy could be freed from the confines of its Christian bias and still be helpful currently. For the dynamics and structure of his philosophy could serve as a cogent description of a universal religious process operative beyond the confines of confessional Christianity. This universal process freed of Christian constraint would be lodged in humanity itself as it recovers a conscious connectedness with its own common

depths as the collective source of all the divinities and their disparate communities. The various religions then would be seen as diverse expressions and experiences of this common creative core leading their devotees through their very diversity to a generative unity underlying them all seeking an historical unity currently beyond them all. The controlling image would be of a source expressing its creativity in a diversity of particularities each of which furthered access to the human core these diverse expression afforded. Needless to say in this paradigm none of the expressions of a common source could be understood to exhaust the potential of its origin. Rather the process would point to an endless but always partial revelatory sequence as the source of all revelation sought ever fuller expression in its child, historical consciousness.

Such a philosophy would well describe the process of human maturation which Jung calls individuation. Individually individuation, the self becoming conscious in humanity, is never without wider effect. Though individuation is in some sense primarily individual it is never without collective import. The connecting thread of direction in this process can only be toward a more universal sensitivity present in an ever more extensive cultural compassion increasingly transparent to the full potential of the power that creates all cultures and so always open to the surpassing of the present archetypal concretions. This thinking in both Jung and Hegel brings up the question of the "hidden hand in history". Jung will refer to the reversal of "the fatality inherent in the Christian disposition itself" through the very laws of the psyche that work in history and in so doing create its cultures and its epochs (Jung 1968j: 43). He will waffle on identifying the movements and times that began to compensate the Christian perspective, ranging from early gnosticism to the Renaissance, through to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, but the common thread in these remarks is that the psyche corrects not only personal imbalances but also historical imbalances and addresses the latter through new revelations and cultures (Jung 1968j: 43–44; 1968m: 94). Jung might even identify this hidden hand as now operative in a societal turn to a deeper interiority and from such interiority to a heightened appreciation of the feminine, the bodily and currently antagonistic cultural, political and religious powers whose antagonism the new mythic sense might transform into mutual appreciation of archetypal expression other than one's own.

Indeed some hints of a Jungian relativism are present even in Hegel. In his treatment of trinity, for instance, he does point to its precedents in other religions such as the Hindu, the Pythagorean, the Platonic and neo-Platonic, the Philo and the gnostic "heretics" (Hegel: 1821: 80, 81). Had Hegel been capable of a Jungian perspective he could have seen the above mentioned variants of trinitarian expression and experience as expected variations of a common archetypal dynamic describing the triadic interplay of the unconscious, consciousness and their union in spirit. Rather than seeing these other traditions as somehow surpassed by the Christian variant, Hegel might have embraced them as contributing to a fuller expression of an archetypal truth of which the Christian trinity would be a valued instance enhanced by its pre-Christian and extra-Christian concretions. Taken

together the meaning of each variant contributes to the meaning of the whole since archetypal wealth drives to express itself to a multiplicity of expression whose abundance defies exhaustion to any of them.

The mutual appreciation of the ontological argument

Hegel's analysis of the mind's movement to a conscious recovery of its immersion in the flow of trinitarian life presupposes a universal sense of God, even if it be of alienation, as the point of departure for his trinitarian thought. As Hegel unpacks humanity's sensitivity to the divine he exposes a universal sense of estrangement or guilt seeking its resolution in a return to and identity with its origin. Hegel equates humanity's natural sense of the divine thus understood as the truth of the ontological argument. The argument itself derives from Anselm in the twelfth century and put succinctly contends that the idea of God is innate to the human and supposes the existence of God as experienced. Otherwise the idea of the perfect would not be perfect unless its referent existed. As moderns both Hegel and Jung effectively argue that the weight of the argument is not to prove the existence and identity of an entity, God, beyond the human but to identify the immediate sense of God in the human (Hegel 1831: 351–358; Jung 1971c: 39–43). Tillich puts this same point well in his position that the ontological argument proves nothing, attempts to prove nothing, but simply documents the immediate experience of the divine by the human universally in the many forms it can take (Tillich 1951: 204–208). With Anselm and Descartes the ontological argument was intellectual; with Kant it was moral; with the legal mind it lies in the sense of absolute justice, with the aesthetic in the sense of beauty, and with others wherever the sense of the unconditional is experientially present or implied (ibid.: 79–80, 205). In these positions Tillich's indebtedness to Hegel is obvious.

In Hegel's view the ontological argument is the "only genuine one", even though it frequently appears tacked onto variants of the cosmological or teleological arguments that argue a posteriori from the finite to the infinite (Hegel 1831: 352). The ontological argument is a priori and departs from the point that precedes the split into subject/object, God/creation, supernatural/natural, divine/human. It starts from the point Hegel describes as "the unity of subject and object" (Hegel 1831: 354, 356). In this context the reference is to the point where human subjectivity and the objectively divine coincide in being. Hegel attributes as does Jung the origin of this position to Plato (Hegel 1831: 356; Jung 1971c: 39–40). The attainment of this consciousness would describe the culmination of the coincidence of opposites, divine and human, in a life lived out of its inherence in the flow of divine life as its creative origin, throughout its temporal history and back to a conscious inhesion in its origin as the foundational and ever cyclical movement of the human spirit caught up in it. This philosophical vision lies behind Hegel's simple but profound assertion that religion is God's "self-consciousness" (Hegel 1821: 62; 1827b: 249–250, fn. 3). The ontological argument is humanity's immediate intimation that this is what religion is and so the argument is in itself

religious or rests on the premise of the religious experience of knowing God through God's knowledge of the person known. "Finite consciousness knows God only to the extent that God knows himself in it" (ibid.: 250, fn. 3). In this sense the ground of the finite mind is by its nature a divine "soil", but a living soil, out of which divinity is born into consciousness, and humanity's ultimate humility is in the attainment and acknowledgement of its natural divinity intimated in the experiential substance of the ontological argument (Hegel 1821: 62).

Jung, like Hegel and Tillich, is explicit that the ontological argument is neither argument nor conclusion but simply points to a sense of God held by those who refuse to reduce cognition to sensation and its derivatives (Jung 1971c: 40). His most extensive treatment of the argument is in the context of the medieval dispute between the realists, defenders of the reality of the universals, and the "sensualist", here taken to mean those who would reduce the knowable to the interplay of mind with the sensibly perceptible (ibid.). For this mindset the universals were words or sounds. For Jung, Anselm and the realists were "a class of men", among whom he surely included himself, who were convinced of the power of the universals whose "efficacy" was hardly diminished by their "invisibility" to the "world of perception" (ibid.: 39, 41). In this context Jung is obviously implying that the power of the universals rests on the archetypal as the source of the numinous. To his credit in these passages Jung refers both to the vulnerability of the argument but also to its strange staying power into the nineteenth century with Hegel and Fichte (ibid.: 40, 41). In the end he almost mimics Tillich and to some extent Hegel in affirming that "the ontological argument is neither argument nor proof" but a "psychological demonstration" of the psychology of those whose minds are more impressed by the power of the invisible than the yield of the senses (ibid.: 41).

Jung thus pays an initial tribute to both sides of this argument, realist and sensualist, before taking his own stance and grounding the prevailing truth of the ontological argument on a "*psychological fact*" as the basis of its longevity (ibid.: 42). And what is the substance of the psychological fact? Jung argues that it is the "*consensus gentium*". And what is this universal consensus of the peoples? It is the fact that humanity is vested with a natural sense of the divine however understood or experienced. At this point Jung shows his own considerable philosophical acumen again in line with modern commentators who endorse the argument as a psychological fact but deny that it points to an entity or thing (res), namely, God beyond the psyche (ibid.: 42, 43). Jung's argument here is sophisticated and has significant consequences. It would mean as Hegel had argued that God is not an entity over against humanity and related to humanity and the psyche from without as would be an object of the senses. Rather the reality of God is elevated from the substantive to the experiential level and in the elevation is universalized. In concrete terms this would mean that humanity is universally vested with a sense of the divine which does not have as its referent an existent invisible object. When the ontological argument is taken to point to a divine object it oversteps its legitimate boundaries. Imaging God as an object or entity over against human subjectivity

itself reduced to an object by this very imaging violates the human mind and engages humanity in an unworthy and spiritually debilitating conception of God as other. In Hegel's imagery such a God is "bad infinity" and imbues humanity with a false consciousness and the inevitable guilt that accompanies such estranged otherness (Hegel 1967: 251–267). But can humanity live with the conclusions Jung's psychology forces, that is, live with a sense of God which has no object yet takes on as many forms as there are Gods and individuals attached to them and is, at the same time, the inescapable product of the psyche itself? In terms of Western religiosity few but the mystics seem up to the challenge. The existence of the one and only Gods in the form of three transcendent entities spawns diverse orthodoxies whose existence continues to refute such saving relativism.

Elaboration of the foregoing

Hegel and Jung on the birth of consciousness as creation and fall

In the spirit of Boehme but with greater philosophical acumen, Hegel understands nature and human nature to be the result of the divine split between God and what is, at least initially, perceived to be other than God. The split was a necessary split if God was to become self-conscious and yet it was equally tragic. The necessity gave birth to human consciousness. The tragedy lay in the removal of consciousness from an unqualified but unreal and premature unity of divinity and humanity, the consciousness Genesis describes in pre-fallen paradise prior to discrimination, the state an Hegelian perspective describes as "dreaming innocence" prior to the birth of consciousness. Hegel rejects literalism in all its forms and in this instance he rejects Genesis if taken literally to mean that somehow all are condemned in the fall of an original couple, two unfortunate individuals in relation to their unfortunate God, rejected in spite of giving them everything except the power of differentiation. Rather Hegel would have it that original sin is universal not as the result of the parentage of a fallen original couple but as a result of each individual's becoming conscious as an individual and finite human being in apparent discontinuity from all else and from a common origin (Hegel 1821: 101–108). The will to know, to be like God, both brings about the distancing from God but is also the necessary precondition to the drive to a recovered identity. "Knowledge heals the wound that it itself is" (ibid.: 106).

In this paradigm creation and fall are but two sides of a single event, the willful emergence of human consciousness. Original sin is relocated in the universal event of the individual becoming self-conscious. When the individual becomes self-conscious the individual is created and in this creation the individual becomes aware of one's essential truth from which it is distanced in creation yet to whose recovery it is driven. Thus creation and fall are universal in so much as they describe the ambivalence of the individual's being self-conscious in the world. The moment of self-consciousness is the moment of creation and in it the individual is initially and deeply aware of a profound estrangement from the depths of

one's being, from others and from a common source of both self and other. Such a situation is a gift and a burden. It means that the individual is, but is in a state of what Hegel terms the anguish of separation from one's origin and deepest truth. To be conscious is thus to be fallen and in a state calling for redemption as the recovery of one's origin and so essential being. This epistemology and ontology easily translate to psychology. The ego as born from the unconscious becomes self-conscious. Creation happens. Yet the ego thus born knows something is seriously wrong. It is alienated from its origin. It must return to its source and yet never wholly forego its created reality as ego. As seen Hegel's solution lies in the recovery by the individual of the point of its identity with the divine and so with the all. This consciousness comes then to inform both personal consciousness and the collective cultus as the basis of the sense of the sacred and of a particular sacramentalism, the Christian, continuous with the sacramentalism of what is when perceived as grounded in the divine.

The dialectic endemic to Jung's psychology also identifies the moment of the birth of consciousness with the moment of creation and fall. The ego in proceeding from the unconscious, the mother, into existence beyond her is, for the first time, faced with the terrors of both life and death beyond the mother understood as the undifferentiated and seductive plenitude and protection of the unconscious (Jung 1966a: 307, 312). The birth of the ego can be likened to a dissociation from its source comparable to Hegel's conception of a universal estrangement of consciousness from its origin. Jung uses language similar to Hegel's to describe the birth of consciousness from the mother. "The moment of the rise of consciousness of the separation of subject and object is indeed a birth" (ibid.: 326). This initial freedom of the ego, the conscious subject, from the mother, as unconscious source, becomes a life and death struggle, "for the relation to the mother must cease, *must die*, and this is almost the same as dying oneself" (ibid.: 312). What must die is the ego's imprisonment in the maternal unconscious. Jung' response to this situation is also analogous to Hegel's. The alienation of the ego from its source can only be defeated by its recovery of its source through its return to the universal womb, for Jung orchestrated by the self in never ending cyclical patterns. Through the repeated baptism of the ego into its origins worked by the self, the self becomes more conscious in individual and history. The essential movement here, as it is with Hegel, is that of the conscious recovery of one's origin in the completion of both the originating power and its child, consciousness, as the underlying dynamic of personal and collective history.

Christ as the unity of opposites: The death of God and sublation

At this point some attention should be redirected to the image of Christ in Hegel and Jung. Hegel argues consistently that the father, or first principle in the divine human drama, others itself in the second principle, the Logos, and in so doing creates divine and human consciousness. But what distinguishes Hegel's perspective is that even in othering itself in the creation of finite consciousness the divine

source of consciousness remains the ground or depth of finite consciousness. Thus humanity from the outset is implicitly but unconsciously divine and driven by its very alienation from its divinity to become more intensely aware of it. Processes of redemption are therefore processes in which the implicit becomes explicit, in which humanity recovers fully the consciousness of what it is, namely, divine and imbedded in the flow of divine life.

The recovery of the unity of divinity and humanity depicted in the myth of Christ returns to themes first developed in a more religious and less philosophical idiom with Eckhart. The idea is that the emergence of finite consciousness from its creative precedent is a negation of the identity of the infinite and finite in that preceding state beyond differentiation. The very consciousness of the finite individual negates the individual's identity with the God imagined as preceding creation. Hegel and Tillich call this identity of creator and creature prior to creation a state of "dreaming innocence" universally broken in the individual's option to become conscious (Hegel 1827b: 298–299; Tillich 1957b: 33–36). In effect this state coincides with Jung's description of the unconscious prior to the emergence of the discriminating ego from it. Once emergent, the ego is imbued with a sense of distance from its origin within and faces the apparently absolute opposition of archetypally based opposites without. If this identity of divine and human from which consciousness has departed is to be restored then finite consciousness must be negated. This is what is meant by the phrase "the negation of the negation" (Hegel 1827a: 426, 427).

The total negation of self-consciousness as that of an individual other than God is one way of understanding the symbol of crucifixion. In it God as other to humanity dies toward an emerging total identification with humanity and humanity is divested of its false consciousness of God as wholly other than itself. Out of this negation comes an affirmation. God as the ultimate reality of humanity affirms humanity from humanity's own profound intersection with the divine, now not in a heaven beyond this world but in the world and its history. Thus resurrection and ascension are aspects of the divine affirmation of humanity which occurs when humanity has died to its sense of God as other and is affirmed in its unity with the divine beyond the split in the present moment (Hegel 1967: 764–785). Hegel, no doubt, assumes that this can happen in individual lives and in humanity collectively. As such it remains both a present and an eschatological reality realized in Christ consciousness as the end toward which history moves but also to be worked out in history subsequent to the event. When Jung gives his own answer to Job he also invokes the image of crucifixion between opposites leading to a consciousness in which the divine self-contradiction is resolved in humanity as the basic meaning of its history. He describes the image of Christ between thieves "as divine as it is human, as 'eschatological' as it is 'psychological'" (Jung 1969e: 408). Indeed, suffering the form that the divine contradiction takes in each individual life works toward a more integrated consciousness of the divine in the human and is the substance of the psychological dynamic Jung calls the "transcendent function". Imaged as crucifixion, the transcendent function is the full

acceptance and living out of the uniqueness of one's fate as redemptive of oneself and of whatever divinely based archetypal opposites are at play in the suffering.

In this matter Hegel and Jung share a like conviction that the meaning of the Christ event does not lie in a past historical event. It lies rather in the spiritual and psychological reenacting of the event in individual and community. For Jung the Christian of whatever religion is the individual who experiences personally the major moments in the life of Christ. Birth, death and resurrection as the substance of the Christian mystery become recurrent moments in the cyclical life of the psyche itself and in its maturation. Those who really attend Mass are not bystanders but those who experience the ongoing sacrifice of ego to self and self to ego in the privacy of their psychic life, which the Mass expresses and can induce in those who participate in its psychology. This hermeneutic enables Jung to apply the Vincentian Canon to the Mass and state that what happens in the life of Christ happens always and everywhere to everyone as one among many descriptions of the major moments of human maturation. When Jung writes, "what happens in the life of Christ happens always and everywhere" (Jung 1969c: 89), he is not writing as a Christian imperialist. He is arguing that the imagery and ritual of any and every specific tradition describes the major movements of the archetypal psyche to maturation universally through the imagery and ritual specific to the tradition they inform. In this hermeneutic it would be equally appropriate to say that what happens in the life of Abraham, Mohammed, Ramah Krishna and the Buddha happens always and everywhere and in everyone.

Sublation and freedom

The negation of the transcendent God, God as wholly other, symbolized in the death of Christ, means that divinity and humanity are mutually engaged in a recovery of an original identity beyond difference. This negation of difference toward an emerging identity is what Hegel understands by sublation. While this position may appear somewhat theoretical it has profound consequences for the understanding of human freedom philosophically and psychologically.

For the experience of one's identity with divinity is the most profound basis of human freedom. In the sublation the individual realizes one's essential truth, one might say one's essential self, as it is grounded in the energy of the divine. The experience of this groundedness is the ultimate basis of self-realization and brings with it that quality of security which can only rest, to whatever degree realized, on the experience of one's identity with the essential self. In Hegel's paradigm such identity is the culmination of his philosophy and of philosophy itself but is itself a profoundly religious experience. Self-realization, freedom and security, as well as living beyond the guilt of estrangement from one's truth, are thus with Hegel merely different sides of the one process of sublation, the movement of the mind from symbolic expression to identity with what the symbols express. The freedom described here is not a freedom of indetermination, arbitrariness or of any kind of licentiousness. Rather it is a freedom of being determined by one's deepest truth.

Adherence to one's essential truth and living out of the confidence and courage such freedom inspires becomes the basis of a freedom and affirmation which cannot be negated. It is the kind of freedom that enabled Socrates, Christ and Joan of Arc to choose death rather than betray their essential self.

Sublation in its Hegelian sense as grounding freedom and courageous affirmation is in some direct continuity with the mystical experience of moving into and out of the nothingness of God as Godhead with Eckhart and as *ungrund* with Boehme. With Eckhart such unity enables him to affirm that he has recovered his eternal truth, one from which he is not and cannot be wholly separated in time (Eckhart 1978: 219). Boehme also appreciates the curative and empowering force of a return to nothingness (Stoudt 1957: 198). However, Eckhart and especially Boehme understand these necessarily periodic or intermittent episodes of identity with God to culminate in a return to a fuller humanity more actively engaged in its finite circumstances. Hegel gives to this process a philosophical precision through his understanding of the negation of God as other. The Christ event once realized and mythologized as the basis of a concrete life now becomes a universal reality in the movement of the energies of the Spirit to their fullness in history as it moves to its completion in whatever form it does so. Thus Hegel brings to completion in philosophical form centuries of a growing mystical intuition that the meaning of human life, collectively and individually, is the redemption of God in time. What Hegel does for the mystical tradition as a philosopher, Jung does as a psychologist. He too is explicit in locating the meaning of life and history in the human suffering of the many-sided divine self-contradiction through to its ultimate resolution as history completes itself in a divine–human synthesis. In Jung and Hegel the reversal of the original Christian vision of divine transcendence in a wholly other God relating to the human in a contingent arbitrariness is recognized as dehumanizing and superseded with the conscious statement that divinity is driven to create in order to complete itself in humanity. The substance of Hegel's philosophy can be found in Jung's reflection on the evolution of human consciousness and religion: "Consequently, man's achievement of consciousness appears as the result of prefigurative archetypal processes or – to put it metaphysically – as part of the divine life process. In other words, God becomes manifest in the human act of reflection" (Jung 1969d: 161).

Hegel on philosophy and religion: The psychological implications

Hegel's thought culminates in the mind's subjective and unqualified inherence in a divine subjectivity. Such absolute inter-subjectivity is the basis of a truly objective experience of the divine. In this perspective the philosophical, the theological, the psychological and the mystical unite as three aspects of the same experience. The truth of the ontological argument resting on the point of the identity of the mind with a divine subjectivity in its depths is the ultimate form of mystical experience. For Hegel the ontological argument becomes a responsible philosophical statement of the ultimate *unio mystica*, "mystical union" (Hegel

1827a: 445, 446). Though Hegel could give the moment little content, perhaps because in the best of apophatic traditions it has none, nevertheless, he can and does philosophically describe its dynamics and necessity as the culmination of the human ingression into God in the service of God's redemption in history.

Jung's psychology is hardly shallower than Hegel's philosophy. It too was to find the basis of the objective absolute in the ground of human subjectivity. In his formulations of the unconscious Jung would relate such subjectivity to the "objective psyche" (Jung 1969e: 456, fn. 2). The difficulty in Jung's use of this language lay in the fact that the objective unconscious is the archetypal unconscious and therefore very much alive and so imbued with its own subjectivity. Paradoxically this objectivity is a living subjectivity vested with the greatest subjective impact on consciousness, that of the numinous. As fully alive the objective unconscious effectively coincided with the universally possessed and possessing archetypal ground of the psyche. Though its expressions would vary from individual to individual and from culture to culture in possible infinite variation the ground of such expression was objectively universal. The basic teleology in Jung's psychology is the redemptive movement of this archetypal ground into full human consciousness. Because of the infinite creative fecundity of this ground its exhaustive synthesis with consciousness can never be attained nor abandoned in history. It cannot be attained because its fecundity will also outstrip its actualization in human consciousness. Nor can it be abandoned since the deepest movement of the psyche and meaning in life is that of the unbounded unconscious becoming conscious. The movement involved in this co-redemption is that of the reimmersion of consciousness into the source of the totality in the depths of the psyche and the return to a fuller consciousness from such immersion. Thus the pattern of the redemption of the divine in Hegel and Jung retains a basic morphological identity. The redemption of the divine can only occur through a moment of identity with it as the precedent to its fuller incarnation, in Jung's sense, in human consciousness.

Further remarks on historicism and literalism

Hegel's consistent attack on literalism and externalism is dramatically vigorous in his rejection of the Catholic understanding of transubstantiation. Its literalism and externality identifies the divine with food to be ingested. The literalism offends the sacred quality of sacramentalism by making the Mass like a county fair in which grace is bought and sold much like market produce in a festive surrounding (Hegel 1821: 155, fn. 241; 1824: 236). Here Hegel is arguing that a sacramentalism that remains unaware of its continuity with the sacramental reality of all that is or fails to repeat the experienced reality of the divine in the participant in the sacrament reduces the sacraments to an unbecoming magical mechanism unrelated to the natural presence of the divine in nature and human nature. In his remarks on the Catholic Mass and the doctrine of transubstantiation he contends that the true meaning of transubstantiation is to be found in the apotheosis of all that is as it becomes transparent to and pervaded by its living divine ground.

Needless to say Hegel's attack on literalism extends to miracles. For Hegel the true miracle is in the mind's recovery of its native inhesion in the divine and its celebration in the cultus or Christian ritual (Hegel 1821: 146–148).

Jung too felt that historicism and literal biblicism were anti-religious. In their effort to substantiate the mythical they discredited it and with it religion itself. In this sense his whole psychology is an effort to provide an apology not for any specific religion but for religious experience itself carried initially by symbolic discourse and enactment. In this his psychology would provide to his times an effective apologetic current that "spokesmen of religion" could not (Jung 1966a: 227). Jung sought throughout his life to restore the experience the symbolic carries as the basis of the sense of the religious in humanity universally. This deeper restoration had to reestablish the credulity of religion before any particular religion could again become meaningful. In this sense his apology on behalf of religion itself is far more extensive than Hegel's apology constricted as it is to the Christian myth. In this sense Jung would take up and extend Hegel's attack on religious literalism informing a gross and often fundamentalist biblicism in his contention that the unconscious creates all bibles and their discourse in order to enable the reader to enter the depths from which the various bibles themselves emerge across institutional lines. Of course for Jung the process would begin with the individual's writing their own biblical revelation composed in large part by their dream texts.

The historical/political implications

In spite of the profound affinity between them there is a foundational difference between Jung and Hegel which cannot be overcome though it hardly negates their spiritual kinship. Just as Hegel's philosophy brought Christianity to full self-consciousness by showing to it the universal meaning of its myth, the universal underlying identity of the divine and human, so does Jung's psychology complete Hegel by extending it beyond Christianity and any particular revelation. Both Hegel and Jung would share a foundational agreement on the reality of a power which precedes and gives rise to human consciousness and seeks its realization in humanity from its ever present basis in the consciousness it creates. Discrete religions can then be universally acknowledged and appreciated as instances of this function. The claim by any source to have brought the process to completion is today seen as a murderous idolatry.

This is a crucial shared position but from it the two thinkers begin to deviate. Hegel's understanding of the necessary manifestation of the ground is in fact less inclusive and more simplistic than Jung's. However, Jung would include more in the Spirit's becoming conscious of itself in history and so Jung's Spirit is of wider embrace and more inclusive than Hegel's. With Jung the ground contains and must express in creation more highly defined opposites than Hegel takes seriously. Thus with Jung the task of consciousness is first to clearly perceive the opposites latent in the ground of consciousness and then through the suffering of

their conflict to unite them in itself. The major opposites with which Jung works are those of spirit/matter, male/female, and good/evil, the latter personified in the Christ/Satan split. The unity of these opposites would demand a synthesis that supersedes Christianity and which Christianity can hardly endorse or attain in its current form. With Hegel the Spirit works exclusively or solely to the unity of divine and human subjectivity beyond the split of creation/fall and subject/object. With Jung the Spirit works the unity of spirit with matter and so gives some credence to the eternity of the bodily symbolized in Boehme's subtle body but not seriously worked in Hegel where matter is essentially absorbed in spirit though necessary in the creation of the human as embodied spirit. For Jung the spirit of the self further works an androgyny in present and eschatological humanity, again a theme present in Boehme and effectively absent in Hegel. Finally the spirit would work a resolution between good and evil or Christ and Satan. Boehme gave symbolic formulation to this unity of opposites in the manner in which he understood the light and dark sides of God to unite in the fire/light or fire/love of God within the human. The most Hegel can say about this union is his location of evil, in some considerable continuity with Boehme, in the affirmation of the ego unrelated to its own depths in divinity and so to the other than itself in its environment. Such affirmation though taken to a philosophical level is not far removed from Boehme's insight that the implacable pathological and unrelated ego-affirmation of nature and human nature is grounded in the dark side of divinity and as such is the reality of evil. But Hegel is less able to affirm even in mystery how evil and good are to unite in the final synthesis of Spirit. The closest he would come would be the identification of evil with the insensitivity, religious and otherwise, of living away from or in contradiction to humanity's natural inherence in the full flow of divine life. This life is always a synthetic union of the Father power with the benign light of the Logos concurrently in the divine and human. Evil becomes a misperception of the mind's latent identity with the divine and this misperception and fascination with the less than ultimate must fall away. This defeat of alienation in all its forms is impressive and profoundly meaningful but lacks the impact of the needed embrace of Christ and Satan as the ultimate symbol of the unity of good and evil within the psyche and beyond the psyche especially between archetypally bonded communities.

No doubt Jung is also ambivalent on this most difficult dimension of the unity of opposites. But at least his psychology does entertain the notion of absolute evil as the projection on the other enabled and fostered by one's own claim to exhaustive and exclusive possession of and by the absolute good (Dourley 2003; 2010a). Today conflicting societal absolutes, religious and secular, bond a variety of communities in conflict on the world stage. The possibility of demonizing the other in the name of one's own truth is both raised and undermined in Jung's thought on the conflict of good and evil and in the Spirit which would unite them in a richer and more pacific humanity. Hegel was aware that divinity's drive to become conscious in humanity lay behind the differentiation and bonding of national and ethnic/religious communities. There were qualifiers in that each cultural concretion

expressed the Absolute Spirit in itself even as such expression sought its own supersession in so doing. Yet within the context of the state as the expression of Spirit Hegel felt that war was not only tolerable but necessary in the progressive unfolding of history (Copleston 1994: 216–218). In this he anticipates Huntington's perception that current wars between ethnic blocs are religious wars because the power of the absolute, in religious, ethnic or political forms, in the collective foundational faith of the cultures in conflict makes war possible if not necessary (Huntington 1993, 1996; Dourley 2010b: 153–171). Even though he suffered personally from the invasion Hegel could peer out of his quarters in Jena and proclaim that in the French Republican army he could see the hand of God in history. No doubt one could agree with his analysis at that time. The army stood for democracy and the modern origin of the values currently funding human rights. Today the march of history through military conflict is no longer tolerable. The motivation for war still lives in archetypal collective possession as the ultimate basis of one's national or political faith but the weaponry is too advanced. Such competing cultural faiths now threaten the survival of the species unless they can move through themselves to a position beyond themselves.

The Jungian alternative to archetypal conflict settled by war in the external forum shifts the battlefield to the internal forum. The opposites are to be faced in the war within the individual psyche. This relocation of the legitimate locus of war demands a maturity that may currently be beyond the reach of the human. For it would mean that one's deepest commitments would have to respect and eventually come even to admire the bonding faith of those differently committed. From this ideal and hopefully emerging perspective action in the interest of the imposition of one's own religious or political faith commitments on others especially by force would be deemed coercive and dehumanizing, and rejected as a legitimate choice. The crusades in the name of any God, religious or political, would be over as blocs of believers examined their convictions in the light of the truth of the counter convicted with a light beyond the demonization of the infidel. Such inclusiveness has not yet worked in the religious field of ecumenical endeavour among those of the same faith and has had little more success at the level of broader interfaith dialogue. Nor do political factions within countries and conflict between countries appear to be diminishing so strong is the faith that binds the factions. The internalization of conflict and its inner resolution does offer humanity a valuable resource in avoiding the universal genocide Jung feared and warned of at the end of his life (Jung 1976a: 735). To what extent such internalization will prove possible and effective remains to be seen.

Thus, in the end, Hegel remains very much a trinitarian thinker unable specifically to sacralize the body, the feminine and the demonic in his version of the age of the Spirit. Jung does this by expanding his cosmology to a quaternity. This implies that as reason moves out of its ground, that is, as the second principle moves out of the first, reason itself perceives the opposites in its ground. Thus the one becomes two, but the second principle really gives birth to the suffering consciousness of the opposites, that is, to the second and third which demand the

fourth, the Spirit, as their resolution and so completion of their origin, the One. This is the burden of Jung's frequent citation of the alchemist Maria Prophetissa (Jung 1968c: 160). This cosmology simply includes more than a trinitarian universe can because it takes seriously the opposites which it perceives in reality and knows to be grounded in reality's source. Thus the quaternitarian synthesis demands that the completion of the divine Spirit in the human spirit include the earth, the feminine and the demonic without which the age of the Spirit remains pallid, a ghostly product of reason alone. Jung's concept of spirit can meet this demand. Hegel's does not.

And so Jung's psychology envisions a completion of divinity and humanity that Hegel cannot. Jung does this with his understanding that divinity creates human consciousness as the sole locus of its own redemption which is to include and embrace all that is potential but unrealized or as yet unconscious in the primordial Pleroma. More, Jung provides his culture not only with this newer cosmology but also with the possibility of its access through contact with the unconscious as the source of history. This access is most effective through one of current culture's most neglected resource, namely through the personal dream now functioning as the individual's personal revelation. As the sense that one is in immediate contact with one's greatest truth through this neglected venue of the dream, a sense of individual autonomy inevitably follows almost as a vaccination against the appeal of collectivist voices to an unconscious mob. Jung's psychology, then, completes the recall of the Gods from their towering transcendence to their identification as the compelling inner urgencies which seek consciousness in each life and can destroy or enhance life to the extent that consciousness can enter or fail to enter a yet newer testament with them. Jung's sense of a needy divinity driven to become conscious in its creature was dawning on Western consciousness as early as Mechthild's poetry describing a bored trinity compelled to create her in order to make love with her. The insight gained full philosophical expression in Hegel and expanded further in Jung's psychology. As stated at the opening of this chapter, Hegel, Jung and the mystics who contributed to such consciousness and to the hope and wealth it proffers the contemporary spiritual situation would give common assent to the closing lines of Hegel's *Phenomenology* that without history in which it becomes real divinity would remain "lifeless, solitary and alone" (Hegel 1967: 808).

6

THE ANSWER TO JOB

The humanity of the divine as the divinity of the human

The Psyche and containment

The "remarkable coincidence" between Jungs own understanding of the psyche and the "tenets of Hegelian philosophy" are nowhere more obvious than in his late commentary on the biblical Job (Jung 1952: 357–470). If it had not become increasingly obvious in his earlier work, it becomes crystal clear in this one that the relationship between the divine and the human is the relationship between the archetypal unconscious and the ego as the seat of human consciousness. In this work Jung unequivocally equates the relationship between God and humanity with the relationship between the unconscious and consciousness. This containment means that the dialectic between the ego and the unconscious is one between the ego as centre of consciousness and the power that creates this centre within the psyche. It means that consciousness from its beginning has been and is in a reciprocal dynamic with its origin and its origin with it. Within this reciprocity the unconscious is forced to create consciousness to become conscious in it just as the ego must repeatedly return to its origin as a prelude to making its origin conscious in the human ego. This dialectic and its cyclical dynamic give whatever meaning and vitality is given to individual and collective human consciousness, a vitality which derives from the developing self-consciousness of the divine in individual and history. The dialectic between the ego and the archetypal toward their resolution in consciousness describes the teleology of history, personal and species-wide, as one in which the unconscious and consciousness are driven toward an ever greater integration, a mutual synthesis, culminating in what the religious imagination might describe as God all in all. Jung describes the suffering attendant on the union of divinely based opposites in consciousness as itself the answer to Job. This answer is at once both "psychological" and "eschatological" (ibid.: 408). It is both because the union of divinity and humanity, of the unconscious with consciousness, moves humanity toward a total conscious integration of its origin at the insistence of the origin and out of the need of the origin itself to become conscious in humanity. This process is the reality of individuation itself, a reality Jung describes as psychological and "metaphysical" meaning "religious" in this context (ibid.). But it is also "eschatological" in so much as it describes the

teleological impulse of the psyche in the movement of individual and species toward a consciousness wholly transparent to the creative plenitude of their common matrix. Beyond its psychological, eschatological and metaphysical substance Jung could well extend his vision here to a consistent philosophy of history whose teleology and meaning derive from the origin of consciousness becoming self conscious in its creature (ibid.: 467). Such a perspective is consistent with the theological meaning of "Kairos", the awaited time when the origin of history will appear within it. Jung's vision would perceive individual and collective maturation as in itself a religious reality working itself out in history as the basis of the meaning of history even though such an understanding of religion would surpass most religions' current self-understanding. This is not to deny that they have been among the most significant contributors to the process in the past. They have after all expressed in consciousness the power of the archetypal and in expressing it led their members into its conscious experience even as they remain unconscious of what it is they do and have done in their history and currently.

Currently the development of human maturation, history, and the movement of the religious instinct itself transcend all extant religions in their current self-understanding toward a still inchoate religious consciousness as a more encompassing, inclusive and so truly consummate religion. The foregoing statements express Jung's mature understanding of the divine/human relationship. All bear affinities with the tenets of Hegel's philosophy even as they surpass them in breadth of inclusion. If Hegel thought of himself as completing Christianity, Jung could present himself as completing Hegel by elevating the latter's thought on religion and its historical realization to the level of the engagement of archetypal powers with human historical consciousness universally. This engagement is the substance of Jung's psychology. The mutual maturation of the divine and the human is never pain free. The suffering involved in uniting the many sides of the divine self-contradiction in consciousness is well brought out in Jung's statement, "The whole world is God's suffering, and every individual man who wants to get anywhere near his own wholeness knows that this is the way of the cross" (Jung 1969d: 179).

The unfolding drama

From Yaweh's viewpoint

Jung's *Answer to Job* is an extended and complex metaphor. The work rests on the literary conceit that the relation of Yaweh to Job is that of the divine to the human and of the unconscious to the ego where alone the unconscious becomes self-conscious. This ploy enables Jung to separate the autonomous but inseparable unconscious and ego from each other and then view their interaction as divine and human agencies. In the earlier part of the work Yaweh is the God in question, though as the work goes on the terms "Yaweh" and "God" tend to be used interchangeably (Jung 1952: 369). Their convertibility within the controlling metaphor

of the work lies in the fact that the work corrodes all forms of orthodox monotheism in a variety of ways. It assumes that the monotheistic God is really the polarized power of the unconscious driven by inner necessity to create consciousness as the sole locus of its own unification. The divine necessity to create establishes a relationship of mutual dependence or need between the divine and what might be called created consciousness. It assumes that the divinity is itself a conflicted life force whose antinomies can only be recognized and resolved in conscious humanity. Humanity's vocation is then to assist its creator in the resolution of its divine bi-polar dysfunction. It also assumes that if creation is an expression of its underlying source then all that is expressed including evil must exist in that source. None of the extant monotheisms – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – can confess to these features as descriptive of their specific one and only Gods. Job's realization of the defective nature of the God he faced in Yaweh constitutes, then, the beginning of the end of the monotheistic epoch in the development of religious consciousness. Jung clearly locates the origin of the one and only wholly other Gods in the depths of human interiority from which they originally emerged in the projections which jointly create them and the faith of their communities (ibid.: 385). Yet in their passing Jung and the modern can bow to the profound and accurate description of the dynamics of the deeper psyche they did provide in projection even as the conscious individual now turns from their transcendent remove to face their unquestionable force within the confines of the personal psyche.

In the opening interface between Job and Yaweh, the latter is portrayed unkindly as a personification of an unconscious state wholly divested of a discriminating consciousness. He is immoral, too unconscious to be moral, and, despite his omniscience and omnipotence, unconscious that even a God should be bound by the ethic he propounds and the commandments he reveals for others (ibid.: 372, 376). He is unduly suspicious of his people, disturbed by a doubt in their fidelity, a doubt personified and intensified by Satan from whom he has little distance (ibid.: 375, 378). He is so barbaric that Jung can write that the depiction of the creator as "a conscious being" is "a naïve assumption" and a "disastrous prejudice" (ibid.: 383, fn. 13). To the contrary Yaweh is possessed of an "animal nature", reminiscent of Teilhard de Chardin's observation of the cruel loss of life in evolution's experimental movement toward the human brain and self-consciousness (ibid.). In these passages Jung is attacking Victor White's position that evil be understood as a *privatio boni*, a privation or absence of the good, giving considerable credibility to the conjecture that Jung's *Answer to Job* serves also as an answer to Victor White's Thomistic philosophy and theology with its schizoid separation of a naturally good God from a humanity solely responsible for evil (Stein 2007; Dourley 2010d: 95–134). Rather than a conscious and perfect being Yaweh is a divine narcissist fed by the unending praise of others and susceptible to rage and withdrawal when such praise is withdrawn (Jung 1952: 372–373). Claims to omnipotence and omniscience are sadly undermined in Yaweh's regret about his creatures' turning against him. Could he not have foreseen it in his omniscience and countered it in his omnipotence (ibid.: 370)? Further, were his

omnipotence and justice not undermined in his inability to honor the covenant between himself and his people, exiled to Babylon in spite of his power (ibid.).

Yet in the face of so compelling an indictment there are some redeeming features. One such feature is Yaweh's need for humanity and its power of conscious discrimination so obviously lacking in himself. His very railing against Job is an inadvertent confession of his need for Job and of Job's superior consciousness and morality (ibid.: 370, 373, 405). At the same time Yaweh's necessity to relate to the human where alone he can become self-conscious is steeped in ambiguity. Yaweh needs to become conscious in the human and yet fears doing so. Put succinctly, Jung writes, "That is to say, God wants to become man but not quite" (ibid.: 456). Becoming fully human would confine Yaweh to human finitude there stripped of divine prerogatives and arbitrariness. But the divine reluctance to become human also impairs or delays but could never destroy humanity's emerging sense of its native divinity (ibid.: 373). This divine reluctance to forego divine transcendent emotional irresponsibility in the name of unrestricted freedom is again evident in Jung's remarks on Yaweh's "fear of becoming conscious and the relativization which this entails" (ibid.: 381). Jung's understanding of the "relativity of God" is a radical side of Jung's thought still in need of more detailed exposure. As previously seen Jung uses the term in the title of his work on Eckhart to move to the idea that regression to identity with the divine potential in the unconscious serves as a prelude to the renewal of life and so the increasing consciousness of humanity on its return from such identity (Jung 1971a: 255). The relativity of God in a Jungian context refers to the psychic reality that God can become conscious only in humanity's recovery of its own native divinity in a wholly internal dialectic. As such it serves as a synonym for Jung's extended understanding of "incarnation" and his later use of the term "penetration" to get at the same urgency of the archetypal to become conscious in humanity (Jung 1976d: 734; Dourley 2010e: 46–68). Once again the meaning of history takes on a religious import in its core.

From Job's viewpoint

The necessity of the creation of ego-consciousness in the redemption of divinity switches focus to Job's role and, by extension, humanity's, in the divine/human dialogue. From the outset of their conversation Job is in the much weaker position before the might of Yaweh but his very vulnerability is the basis of a higher consciousness honed by an instinct to survive in the face of the might of the unconscious. Thus the initial equation is that of a brute power, Yaweh, as vastly superior in sheer overwhelming strength as he is inferior in consciousness, over against a much weaker power, ego-consciousness itself, as superior in discernment as it is weak in power. In short, Job is more conscious than his creator and the creator more powerful than Job (Jung 1952: 375–377). Job's conscious perception of Yaweh's polarized tendencies to swing between the affirmation and denial of moral and ethical positions gives him a "numinous" knowledge beyond that of Yaweh's as the basis of an emerging new revelation. Job's experience of Yaweh

provides him not only with a higher knowledge but also with a superior moral sensitivity which over time forces the powerful Yaweh into the recognition that Job's discriminating morality has defeated and shamed him. As such Yaweh's defeat at the hands of Job becomes a powerful drive to his own humanization, that is, incarnation in consciousness (ibid.: 405, 406). Given the state of the collective religious imagination then and now Job could only propitiate, even perhaps humor, Yaweh along (ibid.: 574). But his confrontation with Yaweh puts him in a superior position. As a result of his dialogue with Yaweh Job becomes a "judge over God himself" (ibid.: 385).

The emerging reciprocity between the divine and the human in a pattern of mutual redemption becomes the opening act in the emergence of a new myth ending the reign of the religious monotheisms and by extension all monotheisms including the political, which is now more threatening to humanity than the more easily identifiable religious versions. Writes Jung, "An unusual scandal was blowing up in the realm of metaphysics, with supposedly devastating consequences, and nobody was ready with a saving formula which would rescue the monotheistic conception of God from disaster" (ibid.: 385). Strong words these! But what "monotheistic conception of God" began to move beyond salvation with the Yaweh/Job confrontation? The first conception would be that of a God who was wholly other than the human whether perfect as the *Summum Bonum*, the greatest good, or the wholly self-sufficient, the *Actus Purus*, the "pure act" of Thomistic fame. The idea of God as an entity complete in itself and eternally independent of the human and not naturally sharing a point of identity with the human as the basis of humanity's universal sense of the divine is corroded in principle. With such transcendent aloofness goes the notion that the reality and well-being of God is wholly independent of the outcome of historical processes which complete divinity and humanity through their natural and eternal ontological reality and the dynamic of their reciprocity. Another conception of monotheism dissolved by the emerging new myth would be that of a conflicted and emotionally disturbed God such as Yaweh whose power is surpassed only by their unconscious irresponsibility and arbitrariness in their relation to the human. Whether emotionally unstable or secure in the perfection of their immutability, the joint monotheistic claim to a transcendent God even potentially independent of humanity in the orders of being or knowing and mutual completion is ruled out. Henceforth the being of the one and only Gods is enhanced or diminished to the degree of their becoming real in human consciousness in the interest of their own responsible self-consciousness. In this paradigm the knowledge that the allegedly transcendent Gods have of themselves is directly related to the knowledge that humanity has of the Gods. Neither surpasses the other. In religious language this means that Job's conscious superiority to Yaweh initiates the divine movement to become conscious and so incarnate in humanity. In psychological language it means that what is depicted in the relation of Yaweh to Job is the origin and intensification of the urgency of the unconscious to become conscious in the human. Both statements, religious and psychological, point to the same dynamic process, "the potential starts flowing

from the unconscious towards consciousness and the unconscious breaks through in the form of dreams, visions and revelations" (ibid.: 420).

In Jung's view the motive of the incarnation undergoes radical revision. Aquinas took it to be the counter to original sin. The Franciscans understood the motive to be the provision of a certain capstone of creation. Jung's understanding of the motive reads as follows: "To sum up the immediate cause of the Incarnation lies in Job's elevation, and its purpose is the differentiation of Yaweh's consciousness" (ibid.: 406). In this perspective Incarnation is freed from its Christian confinement and describes a universal process of the unconscious becoming conscious in whatever mode it takes, ranging from the individual dream as a personal revelation to the great revelations underlying the world's religions and political communities.

(Re)-enter Sophia

As the unconscious moves to consciousness, Yaweh to incarnation, he is blessed with a recovered memory, that of Sophia the co-eternal feminine with whom he cavorted in his original creation (ibid.: 386, 391, 395). Sophia is effectively the divine equivalent and consort of the male Logos. The Logos is the first emanation from the Father within trinitarian life and beyond into creation (Jung 1952: 388). Though both Logos and Sophia should have been included as a primordial couple, male and female moving out of a prior divine matrix, Sophia soon disappeared after her brief but powerful role as co-creator. Her fading into the background had left both the Father and his primal expression in the Logos impoverished by the sterility of life without the feminine both within and beyond God. We have seen Mechthild's response to a barren and bored Trinity in its option to create her as its much needed lover. Yaweh's jealous and patriarchal concern with Israel, his second wife, following his separation from Sophia, turned the relationship into one of a perfectionist husband relating to a love that could only betray his unreal demands and provoke his murderous rage (ibid.: 395). But at this contentious point in the drama Yaweh's recall, the "anamnesis of Sophia", greatly lessened his perfectionist designs for Israel and hastened his impulse to query himself on the way to becoming fully human, compassionate and morally responsible. "Self-reflection becomes an imperative necessity and for this Wisdom [Sophia] is needed" (Jung 1952: 391, 396). Yaweh's recall of his feminine wisdom shows his amiable side, amicable to humanity. In one sense Sophia is the personification of humanity's advocate against the meaner side of God on behalf of a gentler, kinder divinity (ibid.: 396). In herself she is a complex unity of feminine opposites. She integrates in a single figure the truth of Eve's docility and Lilith's darker ebullience (ibid.: 397). Yaweh's renewed intercourse with her in eternity is the holy wedding from which his incarnation in the flesh is ultimately born (ibid.). Again going to the foundational structure of the work, Yaweh's recovery of Sophia describes Yaweh as a male whose recovery of his anima alters his relation to the world. Where a suspicious moralist and perfectionist ruled consciousness now a

more universal embrace extends to all from a propensity of the unconscious deeper than moralism and legality.

But, sad to say, her presence was a fleeting one. Though she appears as a co-creator and inspiration at the original creation and as giving birth to Yaweh's aspirations to become fully human she has once more faded as an effective power from both Jewish and Christian communities. Despite the move from the Old to the New Testament, the "glorification of the feminine principle never prevailed against the patriarchal supremacy" (ibid.: 399). Writing in the middle of the twentieth century Jung is prescient in remarking that we have not heard the last of feminine concern over the patriarchal nature of the monotheisms (ibid.: 399). And what is this patriarchal nature? No doubt it is anchored in male gendered and single Gods but their patriarchal bent is most forcefully evidenced in a transcendence that removes them from an innate connectedness with the embodied in a self-sufficiency wholly independent of the outcome of the divine/human relation in history. Looking at the Catholic doctrine of the Assumption Jung effectively argues that in the doctrine Sophia may have herself become incarnate in an appearance as the mother of God assumed into heaven with body and matter as the completion of an all male trinity (ibid.: 458). Far more significantly Sophia may reappear in the apocalyptic image of the sun woman and her child whose persona is the reality of nature itself and so of its full acceptance and incarnation in the human (ibid.). But this is jumping too quickly to the end of the story.

Creation and baptism into the flow of trinitarian life incarnate

In the context of the dialogue between Job and Yaweh it is obvious that incarnation means the process of the unconscious becoming progressively conscious in human history. Further, in his work on Job Jung delineates the dynamics of progressive historical incarnation equating the process with individuation. The more detailed elucidation of the further reaches of individuation takes on the form of both the divine and the human transforming through their interaction in an all encompassing process of mutual maturation. God becoming increasingly conscious in the human demands that the human be ever "baptized" into the "pleroma". The pleroma or fullness here refers to God or the unconscious as the source of all consciousness and all that can become conscious. "This can only be taken as meaning that in the same measure as God sets out to become man, man is immersed in the pleromatic process" (ibid.: 425). The pleromatic process is the ongoing cyclical re-immersion of the ego in its return to its source as that source becomes itself more conscious in the ego's return to a consciousness more attuned to its source and so to all that is as an expression of that source. The personal suffering toward the embrace of the totality Jung here equates with crucifixion into the wider embrace of the quaternity, that is, the all. We have heard Marguerite Porete's proclaim, "Unless I can be the nothing I cannot be the all." Jung's conception of the ego's return to the unconscious as the pleromatic source of the all is

very close in substance and spirit to Marguerite's return to the nothing as the basis of an enhanced relation to the totality. Jung's psychology renders this radical spiritual experience intelligible and available to the contemporary though few may plumb its depths to the extent depicted in these passages. More, such a conception of human maturation could be a great resource in the humanizing of competing divine and human claims to absolute truth through an intensified experience of the sole source of the sense of the absolute and so of divergent faiths therein.

The co-redemption of the divine and human in the ongoing individuation process within history also illuminates what is meant by the term "creation". It would cease to have the implication of a more or less arbitrary act performed or not performed at the will of the creator. In this perspective creation takes on a certain necessity in so much as the creator needed to create in order to express his potential beyond himself and in the expression to know it. Regarding the creator, "all possibilities are contained in him, and there are in consequence no other possibilities than those which express him" (ibid.: 401). Given the fecundity of the creating God one would hesitate to argue that all possibilities of consciousness, especially religious and political, have been expressed to date in humanity. In fact one would assume that the divine impulse to create would want ever to surpass the possibilities that are at any given moment extant in the process of divinity becoming increasingly conscious in expressing its possibilities in human consciousness.

There is yet more in Jung's understanding of creation revealed in Yaweh's interchange with Job. Jung contends that Yaweh created the world from himself and that he is in the world he created as the basis of its mystery and charm. The traditional Christian formulation of creation reads that divinity created "*ex nihilo sui et subjecti*". It translates that God created from nothing, that is, not from himself (i.e. divinity is not present in creation as a natural extension of the divine) nor from a subject (i.e. from a preexisting subject or matter). This latter position denies the eternity of matter. In Jung's perspective both sides of this dogma are denied. Yaweh created from his *prima materia*, the "Void" (ibid.: 401). In this he does create from himself. This "void" or prime matter is an eternal aspect of himself and as such is divine. Jung's position here is a thinly disguised affirmation of the eternity of matter. It is the basis of nothing less than an ontological pantheism and monism affirming that divinity is naturally present to all natural reality and, further, that processes of maturation make this presence increasingly conscious. Yaweh "could not help breathing his own mystery into the Creation which is himself in every part, as every reasonable theology has long been convinced" (ibid.: 401). Significantly Jung does not document these "reasonable" theologies nor their historical lineage. The suspicion is that they may be rarer and more peripheral to orthodoxy than Jung claims. However, the obvious pantheism in his position here does ground the basis of a universal sense of God's presence pervading nature and the mind, a presence intensified in direct proportion to the mind's awareness of itself and nature as expressions of a commonly shared ground and psychic depth.

Jung wonders then why there had to be a "second entrance", a particular incarnation of God in one historical person? His answer to his own question hinges on

a matter of degree. God was always incarnate in nature and now wants to become incarnate in human consciousness. "At the time of the Creation he revealed himself in Nature; now he wants to be more specific and become man " (ibid.: 401). But creation both of nature and of human nature from the outset was alive with the interpenetration of the divine and the human as the driving font of the urge of both agencies to become aware of their underlying intimacy if not identity: "there had existed from all eternity a knowledge of the human nature of God or of the divine nature of man" (ibid.: 402). In one of the most optimistic lines in his work Jung claims that the continuing incarnation of the divine in the human as the foundational impulse of the evolution of religious consciousness is beginning to peak in our time. "It was only quite late that we realized (or rather, are beginning to realize) that God is Reality itself and therefore – last but not least – man. This realization is a millennial process" (ibid.: 402). Consequently what became "specific" in the specifically Christian revelation Jung elevates (Hegel would say sublates) to the level of a universal realization of the divinity of nature and human nature as manifestations of God in whom God is to be experientially realized. This extension of the meaning of incarnation transcends Christianity's limitation of this reality to a single historical instance, valuable though such a singular event may have been as a prelude to its being perceived as a universal religious and psychological truth and imperative.

The process of the mutual redemption of the divine and the human involves the suffering of both. Divinity must enter humanity to see through human eyes its own nature and the full range of its conflicted potential. Humanity must suffer toward the unification of a bi-polar deity as its task in history. Yaweh's "inner instability" becomes the ultimate "cause" not only of the "creation of the world" but also of the "pleromatic drama" in which humanity is engaged (ibid.: 428). The creature must not only dialogue with but also re-enter the world of the creator in the process of changing both itself and the divine by resolving the split nature of Yaweh in human history, ultimately at the insistence of the suffering creator himself "for, just as man must suffer from God, so God must suffer from man, otherwise there can be no reconciliation between the two" (ibid.: 414).

Finally, the answer to Job

Jung's replay of the discussion between Yaweh and Job as one between the unconscious and consciousness culminates in a very explicit answer to Job, one not given in the original story. Its substance is that divinity and humanity jointly bear the suffering of divinity becoming self-conscious in the human. Jung starts the key passage with the acerbic remark, perhaps purposely provocative, that the biblical figure of Jesus betrays both a certain "irascibility" and "a manifest lack of self-reflection" (ibid.: 408). Jung may be deliberately sardonic in these remarks but he could attribute these traits of the Son to the Father whose initial lack of self-reflections reduces him to the barbaric. For Jung the one notable exception to the Christ figure's residual unconsciousness (and implied puerility) becomes in fact

the definitive answer to Job. It is the cry of despair of Jesus dying between the opposites of the yes and no of those crucified on each side of him, "'My God, my God why have you forsaken me?'" (ibid.: 408). Though not explicitly introduced in this passage Jung was fascinated by the image of Christ dying between a criminal who affirmed him and one who denied him. Symbolically it pointed to the universal human vocation to suffer the divine or archetypal opposites through death to a resurrected consciousness in which the opposites grounded in the divine moved through the shared suffering of God and the human toward their integration in the human (ibid.: 455; 1969b: 225; 1968j: 44). In this moment humanity attains divinity and divinity humanity. Jung's commentary on this moment is profoundly significant. He adds, "Here is given the answer to Job, and clearly, this supreme moment is as divine as it is human, as 'eschatological' as it is 'psychological'" (Jung 1952: 408). A simpler explicitly psychological restatement meaning the same thing would be that the direction and meaning of history lies in the ongoing emergence of the unconscious into human consciousness. One statement of this eschatology is religious. The second is psychological. Yet they have the same content and refer to the same process. Both refer to the foundational movement in individual and history as the unconscious becoming conscious in the human. In the specific perspective Jung brings to bear in this work the religious, the eschatological and the psychological coincide. In this coincidence Jung's psychology is as thoroughgoing a philosophy of history as Hegel's – but with two telling differences. Jung freed Hegel from his Christian constraint and Jung enables the individual's direct contact with the unconscious, especially through the dream or other forms of compensatory revelation, to become a conscious, active player in the making of history through the making of the self conscious in history.

Jung gets at the coincidence of the religious, the eschatological and the psychological in various ways. He will write that the biblical accounts of Christ's biography are obviously mythical: "Christ's biography and psychology cannot be separated from eschatology" (ibid.: 407). In amplifying this position Jung argues that the man behind the myth may have been one of those individuals in whom the archetypal acted out in a personal life "down to the final detail" (ibid.: 409). But when Jung amplifies such a life wholly possessed by an archetypal power he adds the note of the eschatological and implies that the archetypal movements in the life of Christ are the archetypal movements in the unconscious becoming conscious universally. Again such an extension of the symbol of Christ frees it from Christianity. These universal manifestations of the unconscious in possibly unlimited variations are movements of life, death and resurrection and describe the suffering and reward of the ongoing renewal of life in the process called individuation. Otherwise Jung's statement, "what happens in Christ happens always and everywhere", would express the mind of a fanatic Christian apologist (Jung 1969c: 89).

When further pressed to give some delineation to the movement in history of this emerging eschatology Jung shows both a radical and an ambivalent side. He is radical in his affirmation that this eschatology as inspired by the self or Holy

Spirit may be in the present an appreciative undermining of Christianity toward a religious consciousness in which the Holier Spirit takes to itself more of the real as a sacred manifestation of a more total divine creativity. In these more radical moments he relates his own psychology to the perspective of Joachim di Fiore (c. 1135–1202) who saw, toward the end of the twelfth century, the coming of the age of the Spirit. Jung identifies himself and the epoch he lived in as similar to Joachim's and the passing of the Christian era. "Thus I am approaching the end of the Christian aeon and I am to take up Gioacchino's anticipation and Christ's prediction of the coming of the Paraclete. This archetypal drama is at the same time exquisitely psychological and historical. We are living in the time of the splitting of the world and the invalidation of Christ" (Jung 1953: 136). The Christian dispensation now demands its own supersession by the same Spirit that created it. "Christ is still the valid symbol. Only God himself can 'invalidate' him through the Paraclete" (ibid.: 138). Jung is here consistent in affirming with Joachim that the Christian epoch in its current form is ceding to a surpassing myth at the hands of the same agency that created the period now in transition. But this is not the whole story.

To put forward the ambivalence in Jung's position it must be stated that the presiding symbol of the self, Christ, is being invalidated by the self in the interests of a more extensive and inclusive symbol of the self. Yet in the very process of its invalidation the symbol must be clung to as a certain anchor while its decomposition completes itself in a symbol more inclusive and so transcendent to the accepted symbol of Christ. Jung's ambivalence here is complex. In defending his publication of his work on Job to Fr. Victor White he argues that he felt compelled to publish it to parry the threat of conflicting political faiths whose communities were, by implication, as unconscious and so as lethal as preceding communities of religious faith. Were he not to raise his voice he would be responsible for what he perceived as the then "drift towards the impending world catastrophe" (Jung 1955: 239). In offsetting the threat to the species Jung saw his work on Job as a call to personal psychic responsibility and so disengagement from the collective faith of conflicting political communities whose unconsciousness could move to a greater intensity when reinforced by an explicitly religious faith. The obvious implication is that the process of becoming conscious at the individual level has an immediate political effect in undermining the mass-mindedness of conflicted communities threatening human survival. Thus understood individuation in and of itself has an immediate political impact. Individuation would move to address whatever forms of collective unconsciousness the individual might be in from the wisdom of the self applied to the specifics of the time. Card carrying membership in a believing political community would cede to a society in which the self manifested collectively through those in resonance with it in their personal lives.

At the same time the paradoxical invalidation and remaining validity of the Christ symbol engages Jung's thought on the one-sidedness of the incarnation symbolized in the Christ event. In the incarnation of Christ the split between the opposites of good and evil in God become mythically and historically manifest in

the opposition of the dark and light Sons of a common Father (Jung 1969d: 174–175). The very split between the all good Son and the demonic brother currently awaits the integration of the rejected latter. Jung feared the darkness externally in the clash of political faiths but he also feared it in some deeper sense in the form of a stifling conservatism clinging to traditional one-sided Christian values as the light and dark sons entered into a cautious but inevitable mutual embrace. Thus the first incarnation was that of the good side of God as the foundation for the current movement to the completing incarnation of the darker side (Jung 1952: 456). Traditional values and the "Christian virtues" will be needed for the assimilation of "the dark God who also wants to become man" (ibid.: 457; 1953: 136). The ambiguity of meeting the divine demand to usher the dark side of God into consciousness is made evident in a letter to White addressing this problem explicitly. The presupposition is that a new myth is in the making which would unite the divine opposites in consciousness but the question is that of a symbol that would enable the union. The symbol Jung chooses is the crucified Christ. It depicts the suffering involved in reuniting a mind severed from nature through a pathological spirituality with the very nature such spirituality excludes. The symbol reconciles not good and evil but "man with his vegetative (= unconscious) life" (Jung 1954a: 167). Christianity depicts this union in the after life if anywhere. For Jung this is not good enough. The union of consciousness with the totality of the unconscious expressed in it must take place in historical processes. He sees such processes astrologically illuminated in the passage from the age of Pisces and conflict into the age of Aquarius and the oneness of consciousness with the fullness of the unconscious and in the union the emergence of a more complete sense of God. Of the movement of history to this point Jung writes, "This is a formidable secret and difficult to understand, because it means that man will be essentially God and God man" (ibid.). This passage is fraught with the danger of inflation. Collectively such inflation is witnessed in the identification of archetypally grounded political, religious or cultural form with the divine. This identification becomes the equivalent of an idolatrous kingdom of God in the present. At the personal level such inflation is most dramatically evident in the identity of the ego with an archetypal force, the removal of freedom in psychosis from a mind thus possessed. Writing in confidence to White Jung affirms both the fact that the Christian myth is being transcended by the powers that created it while affirming that its values will be needed in the process of its very supersession. Those like himself and White must cling to their vision of a more inclusive integration of divinely based opposites in an emerging human consciousness but in some sense stay behind such an inclusive vision to enable its more gracious realization in the future (Jung 1953: 136).

The second incarnation

In a general manner, Jung does sketch what this future will look like in biblical and symbolic terms. The first incarnation of a sinless son through an immaculate virgin birth involved characters who were not fully human but actually divine. Of

the figures of Mary and Jesus he writes, "she will not conceive her child in sin, like all other mothers, and therefore he also will never be a human being but a god." Consequently, "the Incarnation was only partially consummated" (Jung 1952: 399). Its full consummation is wrought by a different mother and a different son. This is the sun woman and her son depicted in the book of Revelation (12: 1). She is at one with the powers of nature, clad in the sun, the moon under her feet and the stars in her crown (ibid.: 438). Her immersion in nature so powerfully presented in symbolic language makes her and her son more real for Jung. "Note the simple statement 'a woman' – an ordinary woman, not a goddess and not an eternal virgin immaculately conceived" (ibid.: 439). One might wonder how a woman so at one with the cosmic forces of nature could be called "ordinary". But Jung's point is to present this woman and her son as the completion or consummation of Mary the sinless virgin and her divine and spotless son. Not only does she unite nature with spirit, she symbolizes the masculine in the child to whom she gives birth rising out of the depths of her darker nature, hinting at the union of Jesus and Mercurius. "She adds the dark to the light, symbolizes the hierogamy of opposites, and reconciles nature with spirit" (ibid.: 439). For Jung she heralds the reconciliation and union of these opposites as the lodestone of an emerging myth and spirituality.

Jung's understanding of the psychogenesis of such symbolism is important to his understanding of the role of his psychology in the contemporary social and religious scene. Effectively the sun woman and her child begin the compensation of an overly spiritualized Christianity from resources within the canon of Christianity itself. The condemnation of the many churches in the book of Revelation is, in Jung's estimate, a residue of an aggressive Christian virtue, a virtue effectively beyond realization. The sudden appearance of the sun woman compensates the unnatural first incarnation and the demanding spirituality accompanying it (ibid.: 438). Thus the imagery of the sun woman and her child is not a reprise of the incarnation of Christ but a revelation in its own right forced by a failed attempt to live out the impossible demand of perfection and universal love through conscious effort in the original Christian mandate. Jung's thesis is that the earlier writings of John and its demands of unqualified love grounded in a spotless divinity produced an entantiodromia, one extreme producing its opposite, that turned love into destructive vengeance and hatred (ibid.: 438). Biblical scholarship today would unanimously deny the same authorship to John's gospel, epistles and the book of Revelation. Jung's hypothesis would, no doubt, be strengthened if all three had a single authorship describing the devolution of a sincere individual who tried to live up to the impossible demands of a moral perfection beyond the possible. Jung seems to favour this unlikely position (ibid.: 444, 449, 453). But his hypothesis would still stand in pointing to a collective Christian consciousness labouring under the demand of a belief in God as unqualifiedly good and in his son as without sin to be emulated by every member of the community. Collective repression in the effort to imitate such impossible ideals could turn to hatred of communities that fell noticeably short of the ideal. Such negativity could

then provoke the personal revelation of hatred and destruction present in the Apocalypse (ibid.: 450). The Christ of the apocalypse in condemning five out of seven churches would then resemble "the 'shadow' of a love-preaching bishop" and the sacrificial lamb could return as "an irascible ram whose rage can at last be vented" (ibid.: 436–438). Jung confesses he had not seen the collision of unresolved opposites, predominantly those of good and evil, present in the Book of Revelation except in the case of "severe psychosis and criminal insanity" (ibid.: 450, 457). What Jung is dissecting here is the transformation of religious ideals, and not necessarily only Christian ones, into their opposites, with consequences of envisioned mass destruction of the evil. Examining our current situation globally the truth of "the clash of civilizations" is all too obvious. The religious, ethnic and political bases for the "clash of civilizations" continue to heighten the body count in communities bonded in unconscious faith, religious, political or religious/political, by archetypal forces of which they remain unaware. The consequence is that twentieth-century genocide and mass loss of life move into the twenty first (Dourley: 2003, 2010a, 2010b). As Jung puts it, the "universal religious nightmare" can no longer be addressed only by theologians but has become the concern of everyone (Jung 1952: 453). The daily papers report the areas in which the religious nightmare and accompanying loss of life are most dramatically evident. If Jung's psychology is not persuasive in its analysis of the phenomenon of the cleansing of the differently bonded and so morally questionable, familiarity with the media should be in their too frequent reports of the accuracy of his analysis.

Jung goes on to extend the savagery of the unconscious of those committed to virtuous perfection from the hatred of the imperfect to the maiming or killing of the erotic. He discusses the pathological side of the pursuit of perfection evident in male virgins whose removal from the sexual has removed them from the fullness of life and from the continuation of the species (ibid.: 445). Jung relates such virginity to a twisted devotion to the Great Mother in the form of Cybele and to her priests, the Galli, who in religious ecstasy would castrate themselves to consolidate their commitment to her. The archetype remains alive in contemporary Roman Catholicism where celibacy is demanded of all priests in the service of the Holy Mother, the Church. For Jung the shadow side of celibacy is to transform women into threats to male spirituality, effectively into whores, and to transform all sexuality into fornication. The apocalyptic description of the destruction of Babylon destroys such whoredom and with it works the "eradication of all life's joys and pleasures" (ibid.: 446). As it climaxes the Book of Revelation splits eternally those saved into "the bright pneumatic side of God" from the rest. Jung sees this as a final and eternalized failure to unite opposites in both God and humanity. As such it is "a denial of propagation and of sexual life altogether" (ibid.: 448). In the next world the virgins may follow the lamb wherever he goes. In this world he goes nowhere.

Without a sexual dimension, physically and psychologically/spiritual, life for Jung becomes a joyless venture. His critique of Catholicism's suspicion of the

sexual is hardly groundless when he writes, "The arch-sin the Catholic Church is ever after is sexuality and the ideal *par excellence*, virginity, which puts a definite stop to life" (Jung 1976d: 742). It also puts women in the shadow and supports the misogyny so obvious throughout not only Christianity but the monotheisms in their mainstream affirmations. In a late and caustic evaluation of his long time conversant, Fr. Victor White, a Dominican priest, Jung writes, "What Victor White writes about the assimilation of the shadow is not to be taken seriously. Being a Catholic priest he is bound hand and foot to the doctrine of his Church and has to defend every syllogism" (ibid.: 710). Here Jung's critique is not only of the authoritarianism of dogma as it constrained the mind of an individual victim. His critique extends to the casting into the shadow of the feminine and its repression in those whose virginity is dedicated to the preservation and promulgation of dogma. In this whole discussion of the patriarchal suspicion of sexuality Jung raises the question of the possibility of individuation without a sexual component, either physically or in the spirituality of a relationship to the anima in a male or animus in a woman, that would be as intense, as permanent and as all engaging as a physical sexual relationship to an individual. Jung would seem to say no and that a life deprived of the sexual, literally or spiritually, is a failed life.

The new morality

The sun woman and child symbolize the union of consciousness with the unconscious in the full expression of the latter's vitalities, light and dark, male and female, spirit and body, nature and mind. The imagery would suggest that the mind severed from its depths is to recover its depths through a suffering entrance into them in the interests of an increased ability to embrace the divine in all that is out of an unmediated experience of the mind's connection with the universe. Doing so places an immense but inescapable moral burden on humanity, that of becoming more fully conscious of the unconscious, or in religious language of cooperating in a fuller incarnation of God in humanity. Jung puts this succinctly when he writes, "Everything now depends on man" (Jung 1952: 459). However, this stark statement needs modification or amplification in terms of Jung's own psychology. Early on in *Answer to Job* Jung identifies Yaweh as "an *antinomy* – a totality of inner opposites" (ibid.: 369). Job recognized the antinomy in Yaweh, indeed was graced and cursed by this realization, but could not reverse its presupposition, namely, that the antinomy was between God as good and the human as evil. Jung's psychology relocates the antinomy from one between God and the human into the dynamic of the divine life itself. This antinomy is in God and God demands its resolution in the human. More specifically it currently calls on humanity to cooperate in the incarnation of the dark side of God or the side of God that the unalloyed misconception of his unqualified goodness has turned dark. The completion of God in the human is also the healing of the "fragmentary man" labouring under the burden of his unworthiness before an all good God. Beyond such fragmentation the mature man now is enjoined to bow to the "instinct",

divine in origin, which drives him to accept everything which seeks entrance into a fuller life. Because God wants to become fully human his full divinity must be consciously incarnate in the human. This means "the union of his antinomy must take place in man" (ibid.: 461). This uniting is the basis of a "new responsibility" made all the more acute in humanity's now possessing the weaponry to end itself. If it is to avoid this fate it must move more deeply into itself and the dark side of its nature lest it lose itself in trying to destroy an enemy that should be its completion. At this point the new morality endemic to the psyche becoming increasingly conscious of itself unites the psychological and political in disarming the thrust to kill in the other what is different than oneself. The psychic and moral movement to this level is "everything that depends on man", that is, on humanity's ability to cooperate in the full redemption of God through making conscious and embracing the dark side of the divine and so the totality of human nature.

Can the new morality take hold?

If the uniting of the divine opposites in humanity is to ground the new moral imperative then individuals in increasing numbers will have to become more sensitive to the immediate experience of God urging such union. Toward the end of his work on Job Jung contends that only that God exists and is operative who is experienced by the individual as acting on the individual. At this level God and the experience of the archetypal unconscious are indistinguishable from the human perspective, the only one we really have. Where there is no confusion is in the precedence or predominance of an archetype moving to human wholeness. This would be the archetypal self. The conclusion can only be that the experience of the self as it generates the experience of wholeness is coincident with the human experience of God and with humanity as the image of God. Humanity would image God when and to the extent it experiences its wholeness as the truth of God (ibid.: 469). Jung is not often so explicit on the empirical and experiential identity of the impact of the self as whole-making with the impact of the divine. Whether humanity at the individual or collective level can cultivate so sophisticated a relation to its own depths remains problematic.

The depth of the problem and the hope for its solution are to be found in the last line of the work on Job:

> That is to say, even the enlightened person remains what he is, and is never more that his own limited ego before the One who dwells within, whose form has no knowable boundaries, who encompasses him on all sides, fathomless as the abysms of the earth and vast as the sky.
>
> (ibid.: 470)

The key to understanding this all encompassing vision is in the reference to the "One who dwells within". If this connection with the within is lively then this within can be perceived without in all that is from the depths of the earth to the

height of the skies. If the connection is broken or maimed then the One dies within and the perception of the One dies without. In a Western culture where three one and only wholly transcendent Gods dwell beyond the individual and each claims a universal validity, the One within as the source of all three disappears or is significantly diminished. Where science and technology, valuable and inevitable though they be, reduce the knowable to the yield of the senses in relation to nature as something to be measured and manipulated, the within, though not directly discounted, suffers the fate of the irrelevant. With few exceptions contemporary philosophy has come to content itself with matters of logic and grammar. Efforts by the arts, literatures and some social sciences to recover the within are more directly concerned with the issue but have relatively little influence in a society where universities cut first fine arts and cognate disciplines in times of financial stringency. Jung's psychology was a sustained and prolonged effort to enable individual and society to reconnect with the One within. The success of Jung's efforts can be deeply questioned even in the face of the apparent current growth and attractiveness of his psychology. The barren world of its alternative already sickens many though the illness may be short-lived if the greatly extended compassion of his myth fails in the face of the seemingly impenetrable unconsciousness of an exclusively conscious approach to the symptoms of the widespread disconnection of the mind from the One who dwells within. Collective unconsciousness stands ever as a present threat to the continuation of consciousness itself and most decisively in its religious and political concretions.

Should all religious focus continue to be on the God who dwells without, the empirical identity of the experience of the self and of God is maimed or broken. Such severance "only helps us to separate man from God, and prevents God from becoming man" (ibid.: 469). Traditional understandings of transcendence then stand in the way of an authentic experience of the divine. Jung fully acknowledges that faith teaches both the transcendence and the immanence of God, the divine distance and nearness. Like Marguerite Porete and the mystics he admired Jung opts for the nearness. He writes of the current need to recover the sense of the proximity and accessibility of the divine in a faith that "teaches his [God's] nearness, his immediate presence, and it is just this nearness which has to be empirically real if its not to lose all significance" (ibid.). Jung very much appreciated the mystics who had immersed themselves in the One who dwells within and so to the all beyond. In his seniority his psychology pointed to such immersion if the sense of God was to be maintained as the basis of a truly universal compassion now sorely needed if the species is to survive.

7

CONCLUSION

So what?

Reviewing the bidding

Jung describes mystical experience as unmediated experience of the archetypes (Jung 1976c: 98, 99). In the same passages he singles out certain mystical experience whose imagery suggests a "certain heretical or pagan element" because they express the voice of nature, from which Christian orthodoxy is removed. However, the mystics he singles out for more prolonged psychological examination are mystics who not only express most vivid images, but whose experience engages an immersion in a primordial nothingness beyond imagery and from which all imagery derives. In varying degrees of intensity all have experience of a dimension of the psyche which is beyond differentiation and any subject/object distinction between the divine and the human. This psychic situation they take to be a moment of identity with God.

Tracing Jung's appropriation of his preferred mystics reveals a certain historical continuity from Mechthild of Magdeburg in the thirteenth century, to Eckhart in the fourteenth and on to Jacob Boehme in the sixteenth and seventeenth. Hegel gave a philosophical credibility to Boehme's experience and Jung, especially in his *Answer to Job*, completed Hegel psychologically as Hegel completed Boehme philosophically. Jung did this by raising Hegel's philosophy and philosophy in general to the psychological level. In this process the meaning of historical and personal consciousness became the assisting of the origin of consciousness to fuller consciousness in time, space and history. The process entailed the return of consciousness to and from its ground in the psyche in the mutual redemption of the ground of consciousness and consciousness itself in a wholly intrapsychic dialectic. The same dialectic describes the totality of humanity's relation to divinity in the present and as it unfolds into the future.

Historically the process begins with the Beguines and their imagery of a sexual consummation with a youthful Christ figure leading to a total self-loss in a dimension of psyche beyond any distinction between the divine and the human. Hadewijch, in sympathy with Mechthild, makes this explicit in her description of unqualified fusion between herself and her divine lover in which all external and internal otherness is defeated. Marguerite Porete sought the annihilation of her

soul or personal identity in a dissolution into the nothing enabling her unity with the all. Jung cites this experience as the most promising basis for a modern spirituality which cannot regress to commerce with one or other of the wholly transcendent and traditional Gods. There is no going home.

In the next century Eckhart, familiar with the writing of the Beguines, described the same experience in what he termed "the breakthrough". The breakthrough depicts a total self-divestiture of the mind, the will and even personal being in a process of moving to an identity with the Godhead beyond the Trinity. Only so radical an ingression into the divine could overcome the alienation of a creation framed as a compulsive act on the part of the Trinity, othering the consciousness from its source. In the Godhead Eckhart fully recovers his native divinity from which he can never be wholly severed and which he carries back to his consequent life in the world. The assurance of his native divinity becomes the basis of his doctrine of resignation, of why ask why? It is also the support that carried him through his heresy trials in Cologne and Avignon, where he died.

Jacob Boehme may have known Eckhart through Eckhart's disciple, John Tauler. But Boehme's movement to the "*ungrund*" or "One" took on a different aspect when Boehme realized that the divine opposites, the members of the Trinity, had not worked their unity in eternity but had created humanity as the possessor of the only consciousness in which such unity could be worked. Here are the seeds that lead to Hegel and to Jung's psychological completion of Hegel. For Boehme is the first to realize, even if in a tortured mode of symbolic expression, that divinity creates to know itself in the creature as both become conscious as two aspects of the same dynamic. Hegel gave to Boehme the tribute of being the Father of Teutonic philosophy and the contention has been made that Hegel's philosophical effort was to translate Boehme's symbolism into more rational form. In the end Hegel's proposition is that philosophy culminates in humanity's knowledge of God, which is at the same time God's knowledge of himself. In justifying this thesis by showing its profound psychic meaning, the meaning of the psyche itself, Jung vests humanity with a new morality, that of assisting divinity in becoming self-conscious in humanity through humanity's cooperation with the emergence of its archetypal ground in conscious variation but universally.

The implication for the contemporary evolution of the religious instinct

Sustained examination of Jung's thought on religion, religious experience and its prototype in mysticism reveals that it rests on three major propositions. Religion is ineradicable. Religion kills. Religion could greatly enhance life. It would do so in its contribution to a consciousness supportive of human survival and well-being based on an ever extending compassion for all humanity and all manifestation of the depths of its spirit. Each of these propositions needs elaboration.

Religion is ineradicable in human consciousness because it is grounded in the human psyche and so in human nature. This truth is the basis of Jung's frequent

reference to humanity's collective consensus, the *consensus gentium*, that God exists because the experience of God is native to humanity. In fact, Jung understands such experience to be the basis of Anselm's proof of God's existence. In so doing he raises the argument to the psychological level as a reflection on the origin of religious experience itself. Anselm, Tillich and Jung point to the immediate experience the mind has of the absolute truth and power on which it rests. With Anselm this is an intellectual experience but Jung expands it beyond the merely intellectual in his understanding of the numinous nature of the experience to encompass the totality of human cognition including the emotive and pre-rational. In Jung's appropriation of the mystics this more inclusive experience is to the fore. However, in the apophatic tradition the experience goes beyond the subject/object split. It leaves the religionist with the challenge of an experience which is without an object and to which the definite or indefinite article cannot be applied. Such an experience of the objectless is well beyond the epistemic capacity of those who can only conceive of entities, the visible and the quantifiable, and for whom the mind is a passive recipient, a *tabula rasa*, an empty blackboard to be written on by sensate evidence. If these characteristics describe the practice of science then Jung's thought on religious experience is beyond science, cannot be reduced thereto, and would defeat all efforts to reduce the experience at the heart of religion and of Jungian psychology to the sciences. This is not to deny that the mystical experience of God as a legitimate experience that cannot be reduced to the experience of "a" or "the" object is easily intellectually assimilated. The difficulty grows all the greater in that religious imagery in most orthodoxies reduces God to personal categories imbued with extraordinary powers. Such imaginal idolatry cannot conceive of an experience which has no object and that this is the deepest experience of the reality of God.

The objectification of God in powerful archetypal imagery leads to the collective possession Jung attacks as the "isms". This is the reason religion kills. To date Jung's contention that the religions derive from and lead their devotees into a creative nothingness as the furthest reach of the psyche does not divest religion of its lethal potential. The archetypal powers seek their realization in human consciousness and religious imagery is among, if not the most, powerful expression of these powers at the personal and collective levels. As such they easily become the basis of collective unconsciousness. In so doing they reduce communities to tribes engaged in tribal warfare. Jung was frequently to observe that the only evil is unconsciousness. And yet religion in identifiable guise has reduced entire communities to unconscious aggression against the other. The question grows increasingly compelling, "In the face of the violence of their history can the traditional religions be seen as beyond evil as the unconsciousness which glues religious communities together?" Currently more and more seek salvation from religions rather than through them. The problem grows all the more intense in the light of Jung's contention that modern political communities are funded by the same archetypal powers that funded religion prior to the Enlightenment and so reduce their members to the same unconsciousness now through political rather than

identifiably religious faith. In today's world political tribalism takes as many lives as religious tribalism and when the two forms of tribalism combine the body count soars even higher. And so the question is forced. Does Jung's understanding of the psyche have anything to offer to allay the violence, the loss of life, and the danger to the survival of the species associated with religion?

Jung does have much to offer but one must wonder if his specific perspective and the moral demands it makes are powerful enough to turn the tide. A consideration of Jung's thought on monism and pantheism serve as an entrance into this problem and into the foundations of his creative response to it. In his analysis of James, Jung understands the latter to associate monism with intellectualism and pluralism with sensation. In these terms Jung will criticize monism as one-sided, less capable of dealing with the "facts" sensation yields, and of questionable developmental value (Jung 1971d: 318). Yet in another context, and one closer to his own sensitivities, he will describe the Eastern referent of monism to be "the monistic origin of all life" (Jung 1939: 498). In this discussion he relates this origin to his own conception of the unconscious as the "Universal Mind" or "matrix mind", the source of both consciousness and the archetypal powers seeking entrance into it (ibid.: 476, 490). The experience of such ingression he identifies with the experience of grace rightfully enabling its recipient to say "I am God", a statement native to Eastern consciousness and still heresy in the West (ibid.: 480, 499). Out of this background he excoriates Western theology as insisting that "grace" comes from "elsewhere". Such debilitating externalism eviscerates the dignity and value of the human soul and interiority. It leads to the tiresome but repeated accusation of psychologism and of a mysticism used against his psychology and the reconnection it makes between the experience of divinity and the psyche itself (ibid.: 482). The effect, enforced by the development of modern philosophy, has been to sever the mind from its participation in the universal mind. The result is the atomic ego floating beyond any connectedness with its surroundings or other egos because of its uprootedness from the common ground of both. And so the critique of reductionism and mysticism leveled at Jung's psychology circles back to a critique of Jung's diagnosis of his culture as removed from the spirit of the depths in favour of the meaningless spirit of the times and so to his effort to reconnect the mind with its own depths.

To continue this thread of reflection, Jung's appreciation of Eastern spirituality did not lead him to think it could be imported into the West. Rather he urged the West to recover the spiritual traditions that had sponsored a comparable radical interiority and whose rejection or suppression as heresy accounted for the accumulated religious decrepitude of contemporary Western civilization. The missing spiritual elements in the West would be those of the gnostics, their connectors with modernity, the alchemists, and the mystics, dealt with in this work and beyond its parameters. The contemporary challenge then becomes this: can Western institutional religions, especially monotheistic orthodoxies, recover their spiritual vitality unless they appropriate the traditions they have expelled in the creation of their now sterile yet still mutually aggressive traditions? It would

appear that their leaders cannot because as leaders they are intellectually imprisoned by the doctrine their leadership must proclaim. If these sources of new life are to break through into a widespread consciousness their emergence would have to be through individuals in increasing numbers. And Jung has stated explicitly that the removal of the conditions of repression of a gnostic spirituality, for example, would allow the growth of a gnostic sympathy. A gnostic sensitivity in the reading of symbols specific to any tradition would deepen rather than weaken the power of the symbols as expressions of the archetypal unconscious and the transformation such symbols seek to work in the individual exposed to them (Jung 1969c: 97; 1968j: 70).

Jung's mourning of the passing of a pantheistic spirit in Christianity is also pertinent to this discussion. For Jung its death in Christianity splits the spiritual from the physical, nowhere more evident than in the figure of Christ. Such a religious consciousness cannot embrace the divinity of both the spiritual and the material and so foster their union (Jung 1970: 541). It leaves a schizoid split in the consciousness of the devotee, a residual discomfort that infected and drove the believing alchemists to seek the union of these opposites. Modern theological efforts to reunite the bodily and spiritual by showing both to be faces of each other in the evolutionary process have been condemned in the last century. Teilhard de Chardin, a distinguished scientist of evolution and Jesuit, described the evolutionary process as one whose energy united matter in ever greater patterns of complexity eventually making possible self-reflection through the complexity of the human brain. As evolution now moves through the human lever the same energy moves to a future complexity and organic life form made up of humanity and of the divine energy that now completes itself in a total human communion. In this view matter provide the multiplicity which constitutes higher organic union in a spirit that both completes matter and is its product. Teilhard's view of energy is one of union toward higher consciousness. So is Jung's. With both the union is that of spirit and matter. Teilhard could feel the pantheistic energy of evolution running through matter and identify it as divine. Jung too relates the unifying power of the self and the union it works to the divine. In so doing both divinize what the monotheistic spiritualities cannot – matter, the embodied without which the divine cannot complete itself in corporeal humanity. The manner in which both so intimately related spirit and body in the co-redemption of the divine and the human raises the question of the possible identity of the energy driving evolution and the energy of the psyche (Dourley: 2012).

Beyond the profound empathy between their understanding of the nature of the most elemental energy at work in reality, both thinkers move toward what might be called a new perspective which engages many disciplines and sides of the mind without being reducible to any and without violating the nature of each in its relation to the other. Such an understanding of an emerging consciousness points to a disciplinary approach that is radically new in transcending previous and now questionable divisions of the mind in favour of a synthesis of the mind's capacities in its engagement with the real. For instance, Teilhard will write a number of

extended essays divided into sections that tradition would separate in the name of diverse disciplinary approaches. A typical but far from sole example is his late *Comment je vois,* which is divided into three parts: a phenomenological/physical section, a metaphysical section and a mystical section (Teilhard de Chardin, 1948: 181–220). In this integrated approach no severing wall exists between the worlds of physical science, philosophy and mystical/poetic expression. Jung too would claim his psychology was scientific, empirical and phenomenological and yet he could turn his attention to the psychological importance of mystical experience and describe in near poetical language the relation of consciousness to its origin within the confines of a vastly extended psyche using the paradigm of the mystic as his vehicle.

The line of the development of consciousness and religious consciousness to which Jungian psychology contributes seems to be supported by an emerging conspiracy of immanence. His psychology argues that the same process which created consciousness now wants to become fully conscious in it and that this is, in the first instance, a wholly immanental event. To date the most substantial contributions to this process have been the creation of the Gods, their religions and the societies founded upon them. As the process becomes secular the same dynamic goes on, with the same urgency and with the same possibility that humanity will destroy itself in its role of ushering the divine into consciousness. At this point Jung's implication that there is a dimension of the psyche beyond or deeper than the archetypal is of immense importance for survival. It would free those who, like the mystics who have attained it or can appreciate it, from possession by divinely based partialities through an appreciation of the collective source of archetypal power, of its need to become conscious and of the dangers involved in its so doing. A moment's identity with the one God who is the source of all Gods, namely the Goddess, provides the possibility of appreciating the variety of current and historical archetypal expression without being consumed by them. Though few have enjoyed this moment to the same degree as have the mystics exposed in this work, the simple knowledge that such a dimension of the human psyche exists makes humanity's role in birthing the divine in history safer and lighter. More, it strengthens Jung's conviction that religious consciousness in its current personal and collective concretions seeks its own supersession toward a state in which "man will be essentially God and God man" (Jung 1954a: 167). The mystics discussed above have already been there and not been overcome with the inflation Jung mentions as a danger endemic to this experience. Theirs was an unqualified yet momentary and so anticipatory experience. It was their way. And for Jung it remains the way of the psyche itself in its foundational impulse toward a consciousness at one with its source ever more fully expressed in it should humanity not destroy itself in its vocation to surface such depths without addiction to any of its more forceful concretions.

REFERENCES

Ancelet-Hustache, J. (1957) *Master Eckhart and the Rhineland Mystics* (H. Graef, trans.). New York: Harper.

Babinsky, E. (1993) "Introduction". In *Marguerite Porete, The Mirror of Simple Souls*. New York: Paulist (pp. 6–20).

Baker, K. (1980) "A Response to Father Egan". In W. Kelly (ed.), *Theology and Discovery*: *Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner*, *S. J.* Milwaukee: Marquette University Press (pp.159–165).

Boehme, J. (1909) *The Three Principles of the Divine Essence*. Chicago: Yogi Publication Society.

___(1911) *The Clavis*. In *The Forty Questions of the Soul and The Clavis* (J. Sparrow, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.

___(1958) *Six Theosophic Points* (J. R. Earle, trans.). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

___(1978) *The Way to Christ* (P. Erb, trans.). New York: Paulist.

Bonaventure (1953) *The Mind's Road to God* (G. Boas, trans.). Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Caputo, J. (1984) *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Copleston, F. (1994) *A History of Philosophy, Volume III, Modern Philosophy*. New York: Doubleday.

Clark, J. (1949) *The Great German Mystics*: *Tauler and Suso*. New York: Russell & Russell.

Clark, J. and Skinner, J. (1983) "Introduction". In *Treatises and Sermons of Meister Eckhart*. New York: Octagon Books.

Colledge, E. (1981) "Historical Data". In *Meister Eckhart* (E. Colledge, B. McGinn, trans.). New York: Paulist.

Copleston, F. (1994) *A History of Philosophy, Volume III, Modern Philosophy*. New York: Doubleday.

Corbett, L. (1996) *The Religious Function of the Psyche*. London & New York: Routledge.

Cupitt, D. (1998) *Mysticism after Modernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Darby, T. (1982) *The Feast*: *Meditations on Politics and Time*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Denzinger, H. (1964a) *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 33rd edition. Herder: Rome.

___(1964b) Constitutio "Ad nostrum qui", *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (33rd edition). Herder: Rome.

Dourley, J. (1994) *"Jung and Metaphysics: a Dubious Distinction"*. Pastoral Sciences, St. Paul University, Ottawa, vol. 12, 1993, 15–24.
___(1995) "Jacob Boehme and Paul Tillich on Trinity and God: Similarities and Differences". *Religious Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4, December, 429–445.
___(1999) "Bringing Up Father: C.G. Jung on History as the Education of God". *The European Legacy*, vol. 4, no. 2, 54–68.
___(2003) "Archetypal Hatred as Social Bond: Strategies for its Dissolution." In J. Beebe (ed.), *Terror, Violence and the Impulse to Destroy: Perspectives from Analytical Psychology*. Papers from the 2002 North American Conference of Jungian Analysts. Einsiedeln: Daimon Verlag (pp. 135–160).
___(2004) "Jung, Mysticism and the Double Quaternity: Jung and the Psychic Origin of Religious and Mystical Experience". *Harvest*, vol. 50, no. 1, 60–64, 47–74.
___(2008) *Paul Tillich*, *Carl Jung and the Recovery of Religion*. Hove: Routledge.
___(2010a) "The mystical fool and why the killing must go on". In *On Behalf of the Mystical Fool*: *Jung on the Religious Situation.* Hove: Routledge.
___(2010b) "C. G. Jung, S. P. Huntington and the search for civilization". In *On Behalf of the Mystical Fool*: *Jung on the Religious Situation.* Hove: Routledge.
___(2010c) "Martin Buber and the lunatic asylum". In *On Behalf of the Mystical Fool*: *Jung on the Religious Situation.* Hove: Routledge.
___(2010d) "Jung, White and the end of the pilgrimage. In *On behalf of the Mystical Fool*: *Jung on the Religious Situation.* Hove: Routledge.
___(2010e) "Taking back divinity: Jung on the Relativity of God". In *On Behalf of the Mystical Fool*: *Jung on the Religious Situation.* Hove: Routledge.
___(2010f) "Jung, Some Mystics and the Void: Personal and Political Implications". In *On Behalf of the Mystical Fool*, *Jung on the Religious Situation.* Hove: Routledge.
___(2011) "Jung's equation of the ground of being with the ground of psyche". *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 56, no. 4, September, 514–531.
___(2012) Paper delivered at 2nd European Conference on Analytical Psychology, 30 August–2 September, 2012, St. Petersburg, Russia.
Eckhart, Meister (1924a) *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, 2 Volumes (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924b) "The Kingdom of God". In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924c) "Sermon LVI, The Emanation and Return". In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924d) "The Three Creations". In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924e) "Commentary on the Gospel of St. John". In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924f) "Liber Positionum". In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924g) "The Twofold Way". In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924h) "Sermon LXXX, There Is One Power in the Soul". In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924i) "Sayings". In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.

___(1924j) “Sermon LXXXV, A New Commandment I Give Unto You”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924k) “Sermon LXXXVII, The Poor in Spirit”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924l) “Tractate XI”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924m) “Sermon XI. The Hour Cometh and Now Is”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924n) “Sermon LXVI, Publish the Word”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924o) “Sermon LXV, The Just Live For Ever”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924p) “Sermon XIII, In This Was Manifested the Love of God”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924q) “The Flow Into the Father”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924r) “This is the Gloss on the Drowning”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924s) “Saint John Says, ‘I Saw the Word in God’”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924t) “Sermon XCVI, Riddance”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924u) “Sermon LVIII, Divine Understanding”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924v) “The Rank and Nature of the Soul”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924w) “Spiritual Poverty”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924x) “Sermon XIII, In This Was Manifested the Love of God”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924y) “Sister Kateri”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924z) “Sermon XXXVII, Young Man, Arise”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924aa) “Sermon LXXI, Boethius Says: He Who Wants to See True”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924bb) “Ascension Day Sermons, 4, Hindrances”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924cc) “Detachment”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924dd) “The Beatific Vision”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1924ee) “The Virgin Birth”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 1 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.
___(1931a) “Sermon XXX”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 2 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.

___(1931b) “Innocents’ Day”. In *Meister Eckhart*, Franz Pfeiffer, 1857, Volume 2 (C. de B. Evans, trans.). London: John M. Watkins.

___(1978) “Sermon, Blessed Are the Poor”. In *Meister Eckhart*: *Mystic and Philosopher* (R. Schurmann, trans.). Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press (pp. 214–220).

Egan, H. (1980) “‘The Devout Christian of the Future Will… be a ‘Mystic’. Mysticism and Karl Rahner’s Theology”. In W. Kelly (ed.), *Theology and Discovery*: *Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner*, *S. J*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press (pp. 139–158).

Erb, P. (1978) “Introduction”. In *The Way to Christ* (P. Erb, trans.) New York: Paulist.

Erikson, E. (1958) *Young Man Luther*, *A Study in Psychoanalysis and History.* New York: W.W. Norton.

Fox, M. (1980) *Breakthrough: Meister Eckhart’s Creation Spirituality in New Translation*. New York: Image.

Hadewijch (1980) *Hadewijch*, *The Complete Works* (Mother Columbus Hart, O.S.B., trans.). New York: Paulist Press.

Hart, C., O.S.B. (1980) “Introduction”. In *Hadewijch*, *The Complete Works*. New York: Paulist Press (pp. 1–42).

Hegel, G. W. F. (1821/1985) “The Consummate Religion, Hegel’s Lecture Manuscript”. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Volume III*, *The Consummate Religion* (P. C. Hodgson, ed.; R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, J. M. Stewart, trans.) Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

___(1824/1984) “The Concept of Religion, the Lectures of 1824”. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume I*, *Introduction and the Concept of Religion* (P. C. Hodgson, ed.; R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, J. M. Stewart, trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

___(1827a/1984) “The Concept of Religion, The Lectures of 1827”. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume I*, *Introduction and the Concept of Religion* (P. C. Hodgson, ed.; R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, J. M. Stewart, trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

___(1827b/1985) “The Consummate Religion, The Lectures of 1827”. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume III*, *The Consummate Religion* (P. C. Hodgson, ed.; R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, J. M. Stewart, trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

___(1831/1985) “The Ontological Proof According to the Lectures of 1831”. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume III*, *The Consummate Religion* (P. C. Hodgson, ed.; R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, J. M. Stewart, trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

___(1967) *The Phenomenology of Mind* (J. B. Baillie, trans.; G. Lichtheim, intro.). New York & Evanston: Harper and Row.

___(1990) *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, *The Lectures of 1825–1826*, *Volume Three*, *Medieval and Modern Philosophy* (R. F. Brown, ed.; R. F. Brown, J. M. Stewart, H. S. Harris, trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

___(1995) *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, *Medieval and Modern Philosophy*, *Volume* 3 (E. S. Haldane & F. H. Simson, trans.). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska.

Hodgson P. (1984) “Footnotes”. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume I*, *Introduction and the Concept of Religion* (P. C. Hodgson, ed.; R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, J. M. Stewart, trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

___(1985) “Editorial Introduction”. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, *Volume III*, *The Consummate Religion* (P. Hodgson, ed.; R. Brown, P. Hodgson, J. Stewart, trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hollywood, A. (2004) "Begin the Beguines: A Review of Walter Simons' 'Cities of Ladies: Beguine Communities in the Medieval Low Countries'". *Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring, 91–97.

Huntington, S. (1993) *The Clash of Civilizations*? *Foreign Affairs*, Summer, 1993, 23–49.

___(1996) *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Jaffé, A. (1989) "Was C. G. Jung a Mystic?". In *Was C. G. Jung a Mystic? and Other Essays*. Einsiedeln: Daimon Verlag (pp. 1–27).

James, W. (1958) *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: Mentor Books.

Jung, C. G. (1919) "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits". In *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 8.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

___(1935) Letter to Friedrich Seifert, 31 July, 1935, In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume I*, 1906–1951. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1939) "Psychological Commentary on 'The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation'". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

___(1950) Letter to Father Victor White, 25 November, 1950. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume I, 1906–1950*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.

___(1951a) Letter to Dr. H., August 30, 1951. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume II*, 1951–1961. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1951b) "Foreword to Werblowsky's 'Lucifer and Prometheus'". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

___(1952) "Answer to Job". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works, Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

___(1953) Letter to Father Victor White, 24 November, 1953. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume II*, 1951–1961. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1954a) Letter to Father Victor White, 10 April, 1954. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume II*, 1951–1961. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1954b) "On the Nature of the Psyche". In *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 8.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

___(1955) Letter to Father Victor White, 2 April, 1955. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume II*, 1951–1961. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1956a) Letter to Enrique Butelman, July, 1956. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume II*, 1951–1961. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1957) Letter to Father Victor White, 25 November, 1950. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C .G. Jung Letters*, *Volume I*, 1906–1951. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1958a) "A Psychological View of Conscience". In *Civilization in Transition*, *Collected Works, Volume 10.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

___(1958b) Letter to Michael Fordham, June 14, 1958. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume II*, *1951–1961*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1958c) Letter to Rev. Morton T. Kelsey, 2 May, 1958. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume II*, *1951–1961*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

___(1959a) “Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies”. In *Civilization in Transition*, *Volume 10*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1959b) Letter to Joseph F. Rychlak, 27 April, 1959. In G. Adler and A. Jaffé (eds.) *C. G. Jung Letters*, *Volume II*, *1951–1961*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
___(1964a) “The Undiscovered Self”. In *Civilization in Transition*, *Collected Works, Volume 10.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1964b) “The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man”. In *Civilization in Transition*, *Collected Works, Volume 10.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1964c) “Wotan”. In *Civilization in Transition*, *Collected Works, Volume 10*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1964d) “A Rejoinder to Dr. Bally”. In *Civilization in Transition*, *Collected Works, Volume 10*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1965) *Memories, Dreams*, *Reflections.* New York: Vintage.
___(1966a) *Symbols of Transformation*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 5*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1966b) “The Psychology of the Transference”. In *The Practice of Psychotherapy*, *Collected Works, Volume 16*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1967a) “Commentary on ‘The Secret of the Golden Flower’”. In *Alchemical Studies*, *Collected Works, Volume 13*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1967b) “The Philosophical Tree”. In *Alchemical Studies*, *Collected Works, Volume 13*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1967c) “The Lapis-Christ Parallel”. In *Alchemical Studies*, *Collected Works, Volume 13*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968a) “Concerning Rebirth”. In *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *Collected Works, Volume 9i*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968b) “Background to the Psychology of Christian Alchemical Symbolism”. In *Aion*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 9ii*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968c) “Introduction to the Religious and Psychological Problems of Alchemy”. In *Psychology and Alchemy*, *Collected Works, Volume 12*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968d) “The Structure and Dynamics of the Self”. In *Aion*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 9ii*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968e) “Gnostic Symbols of the Self”. In *Aion*, *Collected Works, Volume 9ii*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968f) “The Fish in Alchemy”. In *Aion*, *Collected Works, Volume 9ii.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968g) “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious”. In *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *Collected Works, Volume 9i*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968h) “A Study in the Process of Individuation”. In *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *Collected Works, Volume 9i*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968i) “Concerning Mandala Symbolism”. In *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *Collected Works, Volume 9i*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968j) “Christ a Symbol of the Self”. In *Aion*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 9ii*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968k) “Religious Ideas in Alchemy”. In *Psychology and Alchemy*, *Collected Works, Volume 12*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

___(1968l) "The Phenomenology of Spirit in Fairy Tales". In *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *Collected Works, Volume 9i*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968m) "The Sign of the Fishes". In *Aion*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 9ii*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1968n) "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious". In *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, *Collected Works, Volume 9i*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969a) "The Structure of the Psyche". In *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 8.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969b) "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969c) "Psychology and Religion". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969d) "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969e) "Answer to Job". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969f) "Psychological Commentary on 'the Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation'". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969g) "The Psychology of Eastern Meditation". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969h) "Foreword to Suzuki's 'Introduction to Zen Buddhism'". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1969i) "Psychotherapists or the Clergy". In *Psychology and Religion*: *West and East*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 11*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1970) *Mysterium Coniuntionis*, *Collected Works*, *Volume 14*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1971a) "The Relativity of the God-Concept in Meister Eckhart". In *Psychological Types*, *Collected Works, Volume 6.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1971b) "Synchronicity: an Acausal Connecting Principle", *Collected Works*, *Volume 8*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1971c) "The Problem of Types in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought". In *Psychological Types*, *Collected Works, Volume 6.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1971d) "The Type Problem in Modern Philosophy". In *Psychological Types*, *Collected Works, Volume 6.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1971e) "Definitions". In *Psychological Types*, *Collected Works, Volume 6.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1976a) "Jung and Religious Belief". In *The Symbolic Life*: *Miscellaneous Writings*, *Volume 18*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1976b) "Foreword to von Koenig-Fachsenfeld: 'Wandlungen des Traumsproblems von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart'". In *The Symbolic Life*: *Miscellaneous Writings*, *Volume 18*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

___(1976c) “The Tavistock Lectures, Lecture III, (Discussion)”. In *The Symbolic Life*: *Miscellaneous Writings*, *Volume 18*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1976d) “The Hypothesis of the Collective Unconscious”. In *The Symbolic Life*: *Miscellaneous Writings*, *Volume 18*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1976e) “Foreword to Mehlich: ‘J. H. Fichtes Seelenlehre Und Ihre Beziehung Zur Gegenwart’”. In *The Symbolic Life*: *Miscellaneous Writings*, *Volume 18*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(1976f) “Psychology and National Problems”. In *The Symbolic Life*: *Miscellaneous Writings*, *Volume 18*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
___(2009) *The Red Book* (S. Shamdasani , ed.; M. Kyburz & J. Peck, trans.) New York & London: W.W. Norton & Co.
Kant, I. (1934) *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (T. M. Greene & H. H. Hudson, trans.). New York: Harper.
Kroner, R. (1970) “Introduction: Hegel’s Philosophical Development”. In *On Christianity, Early Theological Writings* (T. M. Knox & R. Kroner, trans.). Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.
Lauer, Q. (1982) “Chapter Six, The Question of Pantheism”. In *Hegel’s Concept of God*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Lerner, R. E. (1972) *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Late Middle Ages*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Lichtmann, M. (1994) “Marguerite Porete and Meister Eckhart”. In *Meister Eckhart and the Beguine Mystics* (B. McGinn, ed.). New York: Continuum.
Livingston, J. (1988) *Modern Christian Thought*, *Volume I*, *The Enlightenment and the Nineteenth Century*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
McDonnell, E. (1954) *The Beguines and Begards in Medieval Culture*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
McGinn, B. (1981) “In agro dominico”, March 27, 1329. In *Meister Eckhart* (E. Colledge & B. McGinn, trans.). New York: Paulist Press (pp. 77–81).
___(1995) *The Foundations of Mysticism*, *Origins to the Fifth Century.* New York: Crossroads.
___(1998) *The Flowering of Mysticism*: *Men and Women in the New Mysticism 1200–1350.* New York: Crossroads.
___(2001) *The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart*. New York: Crossroad.
Mechthild of Magdeburg (1953) *The Revelations of Mechthild of Magdeburg (1210–1297)* or *The Flowing Light of the Godhead* (L. Menzies, trans.). London: Longmans, Green & Co.
Mommaers, P. (1980) “Preface”. In *Hadewijch*, *The Complete Works* (Mother Columbus Hart, O.S.B., trans.). New York: Paulist Press.
Ozment, S. (1978) “Eckhart and Luther: German Mysticism and Protestantism”. *The Thomist*, vol. 42, 248–272.
Pfeiffer, F. (1857) *Deutsche Mystiker des XIV Jarhunderts*, *II*, *Meister Eckhart.* Leipzig: C. G. Roder.
Porete, M. (1993) *The Mirror of Simple Souls* (E. L. Babinsky, trans.). New York: Paulist Press.
Quint, J. (1936) “Introduction”. In *Die Deutschen und lateinischen Werke*, *Herausgeben in Aufrage der Deutschen Forshungsgemeinschaft*. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer.
Rahner, K. (1971) *Theological Investigations*, *Volume VII* (D. Bourke, trans.). New York: Herder and Herder.

___(1982) *The Practice of Faith*. New York: Crossroad.
Schleiermacher, F. (1963) *The Christian Faith*, *Volume I* (H. R. Mackintosh & J. S. Stewart, eds.). New York: Harper.
Schopenhauer, A. (1818/1966a) *The World as Will and Representation*, *Volume I*. New York: Dover.
___(1818/1966b) *The World as Will and Representation*, *Volume II*. New York: Dover.
Schurmann, R. (1978) *Meister Eckhart*: *Mystic and Philosopher*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Stein, M. (2007) "Foreword". In *The Jung–White Letters* (A. Lammers & A. Cunningham, eds.). London: Routledge.
Stoudt, J. (1957) *Sunrise to Eternity*: *A Study in Jacob Boehme's Life and Thought*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Suzuki, D. (2002) "Meister Eckhart and Buddhism". In in *Mysticism*: *Christian and Buddhist*. London: Routledge.
Tarnas, R. (1993) *The Passion of the Western Mind*. New York & Toronto: Random House.
Taylor, C. (2007) *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, M. C. (2007) *After God*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Teilhard de Chardin, P. (1948) "Comment je vois". In *Les Directions de l'Avenir*, 1973. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Tillich, P. (1951) *Systematic Theology*, *Volume II*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
___(1957a) *Dynamics of Faith*. New York: Harper and Row.
___(1957b) *Systematic Theology, Volume II*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
___(1963) *Systematic Theology, Volume III*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
___(1964) "Two Types of Philosophy of Religion". In *Theology of Culture* (R. C. Kimball, ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
___(1967) *Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology* (C. Braaten, ed. & intro.). New York: Harper.
___(1969) *What Is Religion?* (J. L. Adams, ed.). New York: Harper and Row.
Tobin, F. (1986) *Meister Eckhart: Thought and Language*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
___(1995) *Mechthild von Magdeburg*, *a Medieval Mystic in Modern Eyes*. Columbia, SC: Camden House.
Walsh, D. (1983) *The Mysticism of Innerworldly Fulfillment*. Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida.
Weeks, A. (1991) *Boehme*, *An Intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-Century Philosopher and Mystic*. Albany, NY: State University of New York.
Yerkes, J. (1983) *The Christology of Hegel*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

INDEX